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Committee on Trade and Development  
Fifty-Second Special Session    
 
 NOTE ON THE MEETING OF 19 JULY 2017 ,  
RECONVENED ON 14 AND  21 SEPTEMBER 2017  
Chairperson:  Ambassador Tan Yee Woan (Singapore)  
 
A. ADOPTION OF THE AGEN DA ................................ ................................ ....................  1 
B. SUBMISSION BY GUYANA  ON BEHALF OF THE ACP  GROUP, THE AFRICAN 
GROUP AND THE LDC GR OUP (JOB/DEV/48 – JOB/TNC/60)  ................................ ...........  1 
C. OTHER BUSINESS  ................................ ................................ ................................ .. 10 
RECONVENED SESSION ( 14 SEPTEMBER 2017)  ................................ ..............................  10 
RECONVENED SESSION ( 21 SEPTEMBER 2017)  ................................ ..............................  24 
 
A. ADOPTION OF THE AGEN DA 
1. The agenda as contain ed in Airgram WTO/AIR/TN/CTD/4 of 5 July 2017 was adopted . 
B. SUBMISSION BY GUYANA  ON BEHALF OF THE ACP GROUP , THE AFRICAN GROUP 
AND THE LDC GROUP (J OB/DEV/48 – JOB/TNC/60)  
2. At the outset , the Chairperson  stated that the  objective of the meeting was to provide  an 
opportunity to the proponent s to introduce  special and differential treatment ( S&D) proposals  
contained in JOB/DEV/48 - JOB/TNC/60 that the G90 had tabled  on 10 July 2017 at the Special 
Session of the Committee on Trade and Development ( Special Session ). After the formal 
introduction of the proposals, she would offer the floor to Members for their  general statements 
and comments. She hoped that Members would engage in a substantive discussion on the 
proposals . With a view to facilitate a frank discourse , she proposed that discussions should take 
place in an informal mode.  Accordingly, after the introduction of the proposals , she said that she 
would switch the meeting to informal mode. After concluding this work, however,  she intend ed to 
reconvene in form al mode so as to share her thoughts on how she intended  to proceed with the 
post-summer work in the Special Session  in preparation for  the 11th WTO Ministerial Conference 
(MC11 ). 
3. The representative  of Rwanda , speaking on behalf of the G90, said that the re vised 
proposals were the fruit of a lot of hard work . In undertaking a review of the WTO's S&D regime 
and introspection , theG90 members had drawn up the proposals based on a realistic assessment 
of past discussions, including  the Nairobi process . The low a mbition in the revised proposals , 
coupled with the fact that the number of proposals had also been substantially reduced , reflected 
the pragmatic and result -oriented approach followed by the proponents in the review process.  He 
hoped that Members would mov e beyond the rhetoric and positively engage so as to address the 
fundamental constraints and structural challenges that confronted the economies of developing 
countries and LDCs in fully integrating into the multilateral trading system  (MTS) . These 
economi es were faced with a myriad of challenges including, among others, high levels of 
unemployment, low household incomes, poverty, disease and migration , etc. Efforts to find 
solutions to these chronic issues had failed because of the inability to address the  root causes that 
led to these problems. While  noting that 65% of all uncultivated land was in Africa, he stated that 
the question for WTO Members was to see how WTO rules and the trade policy instruments could TN/CTD/M/52  
 
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  be effectively  used to provide enhanced emplo yment opportunities, increase incomes, promote 
forward and backward linkages between agriculture, services and manufacturing – all of which 
could contribute to sustainable economic growth and help achiev e development aspirations. A 
pro-development MTS which is sensitive to the chronic challenges faced by the proponents ' 
economies  would help address  if not all , then, at least most of these problems and pave the way 
for development in these economies.  
4. He said that part of the solution was to look  at S&D provisions in the WTO Agreements.  
There were 148 S&D provisions contained in the WTO Agreements which had been classified into 
six categories: provisions aimed at i ncreasing trade opportunities for  developing countries ; 
provisions under which WTO Members shoul d safeguard the interests of developing country 
Members ; flexibility of commitments, of action and use of policy instruments ; transitional time 
periods ; technical assistance ; and provisions related to LDC Members. The challenge was that 
most of these provi sions were couched in hortatory and best endeavour language. Complex 
procedural hurdles were built into some of them, which had the effect of diluting and negating the 
intended flexibilities.  These  were of a non-binding nature and often lacked clarity, whi ch rendered 
them difficult to operationalize , as the y contained onerous conditionalities . As a result it was 
difficult for developing countries to use them effectively.  
5. He went on to state  that the main objective of S&D was to assist poor countries and pro vide 
policy space for integration into the MTS. In 2001 , WTO Members had acknowledged the problems 
with S&D proposals and had resolved to address the challenges in line with paragraph 44 of the 
Doha Ministerial Declaration and paragraph 12 of the Decision on Implementation -related Issues 
and Concerns. He noted  that with the exception of five LDC -specific S&D provisions adopted in the 
Hong Kong Ministerial Conference in 2005, no other substantive decisions had been made in this 
negotiating area, despite repe ated efforts on the part of the proponents to revise their proposals. 
On top of that , the decisions taken on the five LDC-specific proposals  in Hong Kong had not been 
effectively implemented or were not implementable. He added that the G90 had lowered its 
ambition from the original 88 proposals tabled in 2002 to only ten. However this did not preclude 
in any way a Member or a group of embers of the G90 from making submissions on the remaining 
S&D proposals in the Special Session . The ten proposals contained  in JOB/DEV/48 - JOB/TNC/60  
were structured around three themes  - structural transformation, industrialization and 
diversification . 
6. He added that the G90 had carefully looked at the issues and in tabling the revised 
proposals had suggested win -win solution s for all  as these would  facilitate structural 
transformation, diversification and promote industrialization in their economies.  The G 90 hoped 
that after the summer break Members would engage in a deta iled and substantive consideration  of 
each of these pro posals with an open mind with a view to agreeing on proposed solutions in the 
proposals in line with the mandate in paragraph 44 of th e Doha Ministerial Declaration before or by 
the Buenos Aires  Ministerial.  
7. Subsequently, t he representative of Cameroon  introduced proposals 1 to 5. In explaining the 
rational of Proposal 1 relating to  the Agreement on Trade -Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) , 
he stated that the Agreement provided flexibilities for develop ing countries to introduce TRIMS  
inconsistent measure s on a temporary basis  inasmuch as the GATT and Balance -of-Payments 
(BOPs) provisions allowed . Also, the TRIMS Agr eement enabled  the Council for Trade in Goods to 
extend the transition period for the elimination of TRIMs notified by a develo ping country Member 
or LDC that  demonstrated particular difficulties in implementing the provisions of the Agreement.  
However, the flexibilities were limited by the onerous requirements in the GATT and BOP 
provisions.  Several developing cou ntries, in particular LDCs, fac ed difficulties in implementing the 
TRIMS Agreement and needed flexibility to use measures including local content requirements . 
Thus, developing countries, in  particular the LDCs and low -income developing countries, should be 
allowed to introduce TRIMS in consistent measures wit hout being constrained by GATT 
Article XVIII. They should also be given a six-month period to notify new TRIMs , and the measures 
should be of a sufficient duration of up to 15 years. LDCs should be exempted from TRIMS 
obligations  until they  have graduated from LDC status.  
8. In introducing proposals 2 and 3 pertaining  to GATT Article XVIII which deal s with infant 
industries and balance of payments, the representative stated that  the Preamble of Article XVIII  
stipulated that developing co untries enjoy additional concessions so as  to enable them to maintain 
sufficient flexibility in their tariff structure to be able to grant tariff protection required for infant TN/CTD/M/52  
 
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  industries and apply quantitative restrictions for BOP purposes. However, proce dural requirements 
under Article XVIII , replicated to a large extent  as well  in GATT  Articles  XII and XXVIII , 
constrained the intended concessions to  developing countries vis-à-vis what was otherwise 
available to all WTO Members. Talking about Proposal 2  on infant industry protection  that dealt 
with sections A and C of Article XVIII was intended to allow developing countries and LDCs to 
modify or withdraw concessions or provide governmental assistance in order to protect those 
industries. The current condit ions and procedures for invocation of these concessions  were too 
strict.  Section A had never been utilized since the inception of the WTO. Section C had even more 
onerous conditions , and as such , it had not been operational. In order to address these chall enges,  
he stated that  the G90 had proposed a simple process for temporary modification or deviation 
from WTO commitments for developing countries and LDC, using a broader definiti on of infant 
industries. Procedural clarity  and definite duration would provi de much needed certainty for 
investments and long -term industrialization in the proponents ' economies . 
9. Continuing with his explanation of proposal 3 that dealt with GATT Article XVIII section B on  
BOPs, the representative stated that the current provisions  allowed Members to impose import 
restrictions in certain BOP situations . The need for BOP measures remained pertinent due to 
instabilitie s in the global monetary system. However,  here again , due to onerous procedural 
requirements, developing countries, small and vulnerable economies ( SVEs) and LDCs had not 
been able to fully ut ilize these provisions. The G90, in their proposal , had suggested better 
guidelines for determining the adequacy of Members'  monetary  reserves and the suspension of 
right to retaliat e against developing country Members  that faced BOP challenges and resorted to 
the provisions in A rticle XVIII Sections A and B . 
10. On proposal 4 that related to  Article s 9.2 and 10 of the Agreement on Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures ( SPS), he stated that  developing  countries and LDCs were regularly 
confronted with changing regulations  and stringent SPS measures. The proposal  by the G90 
sought to clarify the concept of reasonable time-frame for making comments , which should be at 
least 180 days for the LDC s and developing country Members facing capacity constraints before 
the adoption of the measure . The challenge was that the special needs of de veloping countries and 
LDCs were not normally taken fully into account when  the developed countries prepared and 
applied  SPS measures. The current time -frame of s ix months for compliance was  also insufficient. 
The G90 had proposed that a compliance  period of no less than 12 months  be allowed to 
developing country Members facing capacity constraints  in case of such SP S Measures . The G90 
had also proposed that importing developed countries should not ban importation of products from 
developing countries and LDCs based on the rejection of shipments from one or a limited number 
of suppliers.  
11. The representative  went on to introduce proposal 5 concerning A rticle 12.3 of the 
Agreement  on Technical Barriers to Trade ( TBT), which required Members to take account of the 
special development, financial and trade needs of developing countries in the preparation and 
application of t echnical regulations, standards and conformity assessment procedures and ensure 
that these TBT measures did not create obstacles to exports from developing cou ntries. The G90 
proposal sought almost similar concessions with respect to technical regulations,  standards and 
conformity assessment procedures  as had been requested in the case of the proposal on SPS.  
12. Proposal 6 pertaining to the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures  (SCM ) 
was introduced by Cambodia . The representative of Cambodia explained that the G90 proposal  
sought to seek the right to introduce subsidies to achieve legitimate development goals such as 
regional growth, technology research and development funding, production diversification and 
development and implementation of envir onmentally sound methods of production. This, in effect, 
meant to reintroduce non -actionable subsidies  that had expired in 1999. The proposal also referred 
to Article 3.1 of the Agreement on SCM, which prohibited subsidies contingent upon the use of 
domest ic over imported goods . Article 27.3 had provided for a five -year transitional period for 
developing countries and an eight -year period for LDCs. However, developing countries and LDCs 
were constrained by the TRIMS Agreement, which prohibited the use of lo cal content 
requirements.  Also, the periods provided for under A rticle 27.3 had already expired , and the 
Hong Kong Ministerial Decision  on this issue  only provided flexibility to LDCs on TRIMs until 2020, 
which could also be constrained by A rticle 3.1(b) o f the A greement on SCM. In order to solve these 
challenges, the G90 pr oposed that developing country Members in Annex 7  be exempted from the 
obligation in A rticle 3.1 (b) of the A greement on SCM to allow them to implement subsidies 
contingent on the use of  domestic over imported content.  TN/CTD/M/52  
 
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  13. Regarding proposal 7 on the Agreement on Customs Valuation  (CV), she stated that the 
proposal was  LDC-specific  in highlighting the challenges that these Members faced in implementing 
the provisions of the Agreement on Artic le VII of the GATT  1994 (Customs Valuation Agreement ). 
Article 20 .3 of the CV  Agreement  required developed country Members to furnish, on mutually 
agreed terms, technical assistan ce to developing countries. She stated that  under -invoicing was an 
issue that  plagued these economies of these countries. It deprived governments of money fo r 
development expenditures. The G90 proposal was about  allowing LDCs  to use minimum or 
reference values for up to 10% of their tariff lines in cases where they had difficulties  in utilizing 
the rest of the valuation techniques while addressing under -invoicing.  It also sought exemption for 
LDCs in implement ing certain provisions of the Agreement until implementation capacity ha d been 
acquired . Finally, the G90  proposed the conclu sion of Customs Mutual Assistance Agreements, or 
customs cooperation agreements.  
14. The representative  further  introduced proposal 8, which address ed the Enabling Clause. She 
stated  while formulating non -reciprocal preference schemes , the developed country Members 
hardly consulted  the beneficiary developing partners which often resulted in no or less than 
meaningful market access for products of beneficiary's export interest. Therefore, the G90  had 
proposed that developed partners  should c onsult with developin g partners  and the LDCs  at the 
formulation stage to e nsure that the beneficiaries obtained meaningful market access.  
15. On proposal 9, the representative  stated that the G90 proposal  sought to operati onalize 
various technology transfer -related provision s in the WTO Agreements, especially A rticle 66.2 of 
the Agreement on Trade -Related Aspects of Intellectual Property ( TRIPs) to ensure an effective 
transfer of technology  to those who needed it most . It also called for targeted technical assistance 
to support LDC s in their domestic efforts to enhance their technological base with a view to moving 
up the technology ladder. The proposal would also require developed country Members  to take into 
account the objectives and principles of the TRIP s Agreement as contained  in Articles 7 and 8 
respectively , as well as the objective of sustainable development contained in the Preamble of the 
Marrakesh Agreement . 
16. The representative  went on to introd uce proposal 10, which related to LDC A ccession. The 
proposal sought to ensure that the special treatment in terms of LDC accession was guaranteed 
through decisions adopted under the Special Session. The limited human, institutional, financial 
and administrative capacity of LDCs made LDCs accession more challenging. Therefore, in ord er to 
facilitate a speedy and smooth integration of LDCs into the MTS with a view to e nsuring that no  
one is left  behind,  the proposal sought  to operationalize the 2002 LDC Accession Guidelines and to 
discipline the "fast -track" accession  procedure recentl y practiced for  LDC's accessions.  
17. The representative of the United States  stated  that the Special Session  had a  long and 
disappointing history  - one that was  driven by the efforts of a few Members and some 
non-governmental organization ( NGO) advisor s to im pose a discouraging view of development, 
including on those Members in need  of sustainable development. Tho se few Members were 
regrettably wedded to failed ideologies. They seemed unwilling to adjust to the opportunities 
around them, and profoundly unhappy  that others who faced similar challenges might want to 
make different choices. They had bought into a mind -set that the path to sustainable development 
laid not in their full integration into the trading system, but in their de -integration . His delegation  
could not help reflecting on what could have been accomplished if tho se Members had taken the 
past two decades to implement WTO commitments, and to integrate into today ’s global supply 
chains. Unfortunately, tho se Members viewed  with suspicion the commitm ents that other Member s 
had made in acceding to the WTO. They were dismissive of the accession process and seemed 
uncomfortable with the results, which consis tently showed that Article XII Members had 
outperformed the rest of the M embership in trade growth , even when China was excluded. His 
delegation  was not surprised by the proposals but  was nonetheless disappointed. For some time, 
his delegation had asked tho se few Members to make a good -faith attempt to be constructive by 
considering a new approach. It was clear that that  invitation had  not been accepted . Most of the  
G90 proposals had been tabled in very similar forms in 2015, and they never came close to 
achieving consensus. The few elements that had been added reinforc ed, rather than addressed, 
the US'  concerns.  
18. Regarding the new proposals, his delegation  viewed  that proposal 9 on Transfer o f 
Technology was a non -starter.  He added that his delegation  would not discuss narrowing the 
mandate of the Working Group on Trade and Transfer of Technology  (WGTTT) . Similarly, p roposal TN/CTD/M/52  
 
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  10 on Accession  of LDCs had the clear intent of  turning the WTO accession  process into a political 
one. The long -term impact of that  would be that acceding LDCs would be denied the opportunity to 
use the accession process to reform th eir trade regimes and to make commitments that a ttracted 
investment and trade. That would hinder, not help,  sustainable development  in LDCs . The proposal 
also implied that the 2012 LDC Accessi on Guidelines were not working , which his delegation  flatly 
disagreed  with. In the five years since the guidelines were agreed by consensus, five LDCs had 
joined the WTO, compared to just four in the ten years prior to 2012. Currently, another three 
LDCs were enthusiastically engaged and making progress  on the accessio n front , and several more 
were showing strong interest.  
19. The representative stated that if accepted, the  ten proposals would initiate an immediate 
race to the bottom.  If a subset of Members was right to have a perm anent carve -out from 
previously agreed rule s, every other Member woul d demand to receive the same. That would fuel 
more demands for carve -outs, and the cycle would repeat itself. Production might temporarily 
increase, but only until the inevitable backlash, marked by an avalanche of subsidies, loca l content 
rules, and other regressive measures . This would be followed by effo rts to shut off market access. 
It was hard to see how the proponents themselves could expect that the proposals would achieve 
consensus. His delegation regretted to say that the goal appeared to be to pressure the 
Chairperson  and Members into a process that would provide a platform to press the view that the 
WTO was anti -development and ineffective and to advance an image of dysfunction and failure . His 
delegation  did not share th is goal, and would not participa te in an effort to achieve it. His 
delegation  would not engage on the tabled  proposals, be yond what it had stated at the current 
meeting . They were not a basis for work, and the United States could not conceive of any proces s 
that would allow for a productive discussion of these proposals.  
20. The representative of Canada  stated  that Canada had undertaken a preliminary review  of 
the G90 proposals  and was struck by the similarity of these proposals to those tabled in 2015, all 
of which had failed to achieve consensus after extensive discussions  and hard work both in the run 
up to and at Nairobi. At that time , Canada had outlined a number of concerns with the proposals 
which included, among others, the  lack of differentiation betwee n developing countries, the 
inclusion of obligatory technical assistance, broad carve -outs from core WTO obligations  and 
limitations on Members’ rights to regulate in the public interest . Canada  had sought explanations 
from the proponents on  the specific p roblems the individual proposals were meant to address and 
how policies that would remove certainty and predictability for investors, traders, and consumers 
would contribute positively to sustainable economic growth and the further integration of 
developin g and LDCs into the MTS. Canada had engaged constructively and in good faith in 
numerous informal meetings in the lead -up to and during the Nairobi Ministerial Conference in an 
attempt to secure an outcome on S &D for the 10th WTO Ministerial Conference ( MC10). Though 
those conversations were difficult,  yet some progress towards narrowing  large gaps between 
positions  on some proposals had been made. That  progress, though incremental, did not seem to 
have been reflected in the recent submission  by G90  in the Special Session . Canada had not been 
approached by the proponents to talk about the substance of the proposals on the table. 
Therefore, to the extent that the proposals had not changed and explanations had not been 
provided, her delegation's position remai ned unchanged. Canada  could not accept the proposals. 
Past experience had shown that the type of approach taken had failed to deliver results. Canada 
was increasingly concerned about again launching an exercise whose outcome could weaken the 
rules-based MTS. Canada, together with other Members, had committed to upho lding this system  
in the face of a backlash against globalization. Her delegation  had committed to keeping markets 
open and f ighting protectionism. Canada also  acknowledged that the gains of trad e had not been 
shared widely enough and that governments could and should do more to ensure that trade policy 
was more inclusive, both at home and abroad. Canada was not alone in developing progressive 
approaches to trade policy. The Special Session  should  be examining proposals that helped to 
better integrate, rather than alienate, developing and LDCs into the MTS. Her delegation  
encouraged the propone nts and all developing country Members  to reassess how this negotiating 
body could contribute to a chieving  meaningful outcomes on  S&D. This was a conversation that 
Canada was prepared to engage in. Finally, regarding the Chair person 's suggestion of how to 
proceed and switch to informal mode, Canada indicated preference to continuing the discussions  in 
a formal  mode , so there would be a record of the stat ements, discussions  and comments made.  
21. The representative of Japan  stated  that his delegation share d the concern  expressed by the 
US and Canada  on the proposal s tabled by the G90 . For Japan, the t rade and develo pment issues 
were important, which was  why Japan was  actively engaging in the related discussion s in all WTO TN/CTD/M/52  
 
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  bodies, especially in the context of  the Committee on Trade and Development  (CTD)  as well as the 
Special Session . They strongly believe d that trade  played  a key role in the sustainable 
development of developing countries  and LDCs. In order for a developing country to reap the 
benefits of trade, it was essential to attract investments and to be integrated into the global or 
regional value chain s. For that goal, it was indispensable to create a predictable, transparent and 
stable busine ss environment. The rule s-based MTS gave Members  a solid platform for such 
business environment, which  was so essential for development. The WTO disciplines were its 
anchor. However  the new proposals tabled before the Special Session  today were totally 
incompatible with this approach. The proposals did not reflect the debate that had been held in the 
process towards MC10.  Almost all the proposals aim ed to largely deviate  from the WTO disciplines, 
which would  eventually decrease  transparency and predictability – cornerstones of the MTS 
envisaged under the WTO - and thus injure a country’s business environment. Of course, there 
would be some cases where deviation was  necessar y, but this should  be considered as an 
exception and not a norm , and should be administered only for those countries that really need ed 
it and only to the extent that was really necessary. It was a remedy that should be used with due 
caution and prudence. Japan's  position on these issues remained  the same as  it had been two 
years ago. Japan  was ready to engage in a discussion that focused  on identifying the real problems 
and exploring remedies that genuinely help ed countries in real need, in particular the LDCs. Japan  
could not , however,  agree on giving a blank check for deviation s without limit ing to those who 
really needed them , otherwise  it would endanger the rule of law under the WTO and ultimately 
damage the whole system. It appeared to be that Members were on the same trajectory as two 
years ago, where failure was guaranteed. They should not repeat the same error. J apan hoped 
that the proponents would review their approach so that meaningful outcomes for MC11 in this 
important area of development could be explored.  
22. The representative of India stated  that his delegation believed that the MTS was in the best 
interest of developing countries, especially the poorest and most marginalized among them. The 
S&D provisions, which were an integral part of the MTS, were mean t to enable developing country 
and LDC Members  to meaningfully integrate into the MTS so as to derive maximum economic 
benefits. Given the concerns expressed by some Members regarding the effectiveness and 
operation of S&D provisions, Ministers a t Doha gave a mandate as contained in paragraph 44 of 
the Doha Declaration to review all S&D provisions with a view to strengthening them and making 
them more precise, effective and operational. Although Members had been discussing these i ssues 
since 2002,  unfortunately  not much progress had been secured with regard to this mandate. In 
the run up to Nairobi, Members had held intensive negotiations on  the 25 Agreement -specific 
proposals  (ASPs)  and India had  participated cons tructively in those discussions , but no positive 
outcome on S&D at MC10  could be achieved . 
23. In this context, his delegation believed  that the textual proposals introduced by the G90 
provide d a useful input and basis to advance work in this very important area for developing 
countries, inclu ding the LDCs.  His delegation  understood  that the ten ASPs would  enable 
developing countries and LDCs to promote  much needed industrialization, structural 
transformation and diversification of their economies for raising the standard of living of their 
population s and facilitate their integration into the MTS. India recognized  and underst ood the 
reasoning behind the G 90 proposals. For his delegation, substantial progress and outcome on 
"development aspects " of the Doha Work Programme was essential. India wa s ready to participate 
constructively in the Special Session  discussions  on the tabled proposals.   
24. The representative of the European Union  stated that his  delegation had on many occasions 
expressed its readiness to engage constructively on development iss ues, in particular those 
concerning LDCs, on the basis of an analysis that clearly explai ned where specific problems and 
challenges justified specific courses of action.  In this respect, the EU had encouraged Members to 
work on realistic proposals , taking into account the views and concerns expressed with regard to 
previous S &D proposals, like the ones discu ssed before N airobi. Despite those calls, his  delegation 
observed , with much disappointment , that the current proposals did not deviate in their essence  
from those of 2015. This was unfortunate and his delegation was  curious to hear why the 
proponents had not taken into account the multiple comments made during the 2015 process,  and 
why had they not decided to come up with new approaches . Instead they had  come out with 
recycled proposals  that were even more unrealistic, ambitious and seemed to widen the gaps in 
positions. They continued to sense an underlying perception, which in their view was incorrect, 
that whatever was binding  in the WTO rules  was, som ehow,  not good for development . India had 
just noted that these proposals were good for  integration  of the proponents in the MTS. H e TN/CTD/M/52  
 
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  wondered how suspending A rticles III and XI for 15 years could help in this direction.  As was the 
case before Nairobi, the EU was still strivin g to see the value -added in the G90 proposals  which , in 
his delegation's  view,  would only result in weakening the WTO rules. To the extent that the 
concerns expressed  on similar proposals  in the past were not taken on board and that the  
proposals had become even more unrealistic, the EU delegation was not optimistic in  achieving a 
consensus  on the revised G90 proposals . He wished to reiterate the EU's position, as explained on 
several occasions in the past. When the EU referred to realis tic proposals, it meant proposals 
which were c oherent with the  well-established  fundamental  principles underlying the WTO 
Agreements. Proposals that would  aim to  suspend provisions on the basis of vague criteria for 15 
to 30 years with automatic renewable clauses were not what t he EU  considered realistic proposals.  
What the EU meant was that the proposals should target  specific obstacles whose removal would 
benefit developing countries, and notably the least developed among WTO Members. He added 
that the EU  remained committed to making Buenos Aires a success. However, his delegation  
feared that the proposals that had been put forward would not help achieve this objective. His  
delegation was , as always , ready to engage constructively on realistic ideas. A con siderable 
amount of work and, most importantly, a substantial reality -check on the proponents' side would 
be necessary to justify such engagement.  
25. The representative of Singapore  said that  in her delegation 's view , the G90 had made 
serious efforts and intr ospection in  reflect ing on its priorities and in  narrow ing down its proposals 
to those that its Members felt would address their key economic concerns, namely structural 
transformation, industriali zation and diversification. She also not ed that there were some new 
proposals in the G90 submission , for example on technology transfer and LDC accessions. 
Singapore hoped that as the Special Session delved into deeper discussions on these proposals, 
members of the G90 would share specific examples and case studie s that highlighted the 
difficulties and challenges faced by them in implementing or benefitting from the existing  relevant 
S&D provisions in  the WTO Agreements  and how these provisions were inadequate. This would 
enable Members to better understand the bac kground to these proposals, and collect ively find 
ways to address the  challenges in a manner which would not undermine the rules -based MTS. The 
representative said that active engagement by  all Members was needed in order to forge an 
outcome at MC11  in the  little time Members had on their side . Noting that the p ast discussions in  
the Special Session on the ASPs had been difficult, her delegation called on Members to keep an 
open mind and work creatively to find solutions that would be amenable to all . Singa pore stood  
ready  to engage constructively in this process.  
26. The representative of Switzerland  stated that  her delegation  attached  great importance to  
development issues in the WTO, including the work on S&D. For Switzerland , finding ways to 
further enhanc e developing countries' integration in the MTS and to increase trading opportunities 
for developing Members remained  a key objective. T he experience over the past 16 years in the 
Special Session  had shown that the  work on the A SP proposals wa s a challenging one. With 
respect to the latest set of proposals, she doubt ed that  they would  bring Members  any closer to 
common ground or even agreement . Her delegation's impression was  that these  proposals did  not 
seek to build on the substantive discussions from two ye ars ago in the lead up to Nairobi. Nor did 
they appear to be effectively addressing the issue of differentiation within the large and very 
diverse group of developing countries.  There was an assumption, to which Switzerland disagreed, 
that the existing ru les of the WTO tend ed to prevent developing countries from experiencing 
economic development and from adequately participating in global trade.  The proposals  sought 
flexibilities that would potentially erect new barriers to trade that could  be invoked unil aterally  by 
a large majority of WTO Members, thereby undermining openness and predictability in t he MTS. 
That was a perspective and an objective Switzerland did not share. Her delegation  believe d that 
WTO rules play ed an important role in creating  stabilit y and predictability, that they support ed 
good governance and in general enhance d trade and economic opportunities. As evidenced by the 
World Trade Statistical Review 2016, growing domestic markets in many developing countries 
provide d for new trad e opport unities for Members  which were less advanced in their economic 
development.  South -South t rade had  shown stronger growth than North -South trade. In 
Switzerland's  view, new flexibilities for existing agreements should , therefore , avoid undermining 
these posi tive trends and remain limited to clear cases of need, principally  for LDCs. T he Trade  
Facilitation Agreement  (TFA)  provided  a valuable example of how S&D could  be approached in an 
effective way. She said that her delegation  remain ed ready to explore targe ted solutions that  
addressed challenges faced by  proponents ' economies , where possible.  TN/CTD/M/52  
 
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  27. The representative of Norway  said that while considering the revised  proposals, Members  
needed to keep in mind past  discussions in the Special Session  in order to be as  efficient as 
possible. In  recall ing the discussions  on proposals relating to TRIMS, Safeguards, Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures and Customs Valuation , to name a few, in the run -up to MC10  Members 
did not see eye -to-eye and , ultimately , the fundament al differences marred any chances of 
outcome at Nairobi.  In the run -up to Nairobi, Norw ay had worked very closely  with other Members 
in the Special Session  in trying to identify areas of convergence on the then 25 ASPs. However, 
during the process , it soon  became clear that Members had fundamentally different views on these 
proposals and were not necessarily convinced that derogations from existing WTO Agreements, or 
the creation of new decisions relating to those proposals was the best way forward. These 
differences from two years ago were not likely to have changed. Some of the statements made 
today had confirmed this perception . In o rder to be efficient and result -oriented, she suggested 
that Members quickly identify the areas in which conve rgence was mos t likely , and focus on tho se 
areas  in the next meetings. In analysing the revised  G90 proposals, Norway continued to have a 
particular focus on the LDCs and the challenges they faced.  
28. The representative of Chinese Taipei  stated  that since receiv ing the ten ASPs from the G90, 
her delegation  had started a process of intense discussions on all these important issues for 
developing country Members and the LDCs. One thing that Chinese Taipei  had immediately  
recognized was that the  proposals covered a very wide r ange of different issues and that  the 
proposals were somehow not substantively different from the ones Members had discussed in 
2015. As a preliminary comment, Chinese Taipei  saw some positive element s in the  proposals, 
such as those on LDC Accession. Her delegation  looked forward to participating in the negotiations  
on the revised proposals  and very much hoped that these proposals would  constitute part of the 
development package  in MC11 . 
29. The representative of Pakistan  stated  that the development dimension was essential for an 
inclusive , rules-based MTS. The ultimate goals of trade policy and trade rules were poverty 
reduction, growth, welfare and development that work ed for all Members of the global economy.  
Therefore , a key message Pakistan  wanted from MC1 1 was that development was there  to stay. It 
was important that the MTS must deliver , particularly for the poorest and most  marginalized. 
Paragraph  44 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration  mandated the strengthening of S &D prov isions in 
the WTO Agreements in  making them more precise, effective and operational. Pakistan  believe d 
that S&D issues together with implementation issues were key to the development component of 
the Doha Development Agenda ( DDA) and were rightfully given priority status in the Doha 
Ministerial Declaration.  Unfortunately, despite intense hard work over the past 16 years, the 
negotiations so far had not led to outcomes that complied with the clear mandate of paragraph 44. 
The representative said that his  capital was still analysing the pr oposals , but his delegation  could 
see that there were many important elements in the ten proposals and looked forward to 
constructively engaging  in future discussions.  
30. The representative of Korea  stated  that S&D was  an important element of the WTO 
instrume nts which could provide  flexibilities needed by developing Members, especially LDCs, to 
integrate into the MTS. S&D was an exception to WTO disciplines which could be applicable only 
under well -defined conditions. Therefore, if any proposal could be detrim ental to the rules -based 
MTS, it would not be possible for Korea  to consider the necessary exceptions. Korea  already had 
reiterated this principle in  the discussions leading up to MC10. T he revised G90 proposal s did not 
fully reflect  this fundamental princ iple or those  discussions . This situation would still make efforts 
difficult , as Members  could expect to face the same fault line s due to  fundamental differences in 
S&D approach es. In order for the Special Session  to proceed with discussions on S&D, the re vised 
proposal s should be built  on the core principle that S&D  should be provided  only to the most 
needed Members, under well-defined conditions. The representative  urged the G90 members to 
have a relook at their proposals in light of the concerns expresse d by Members  during the MC10 
negotiations and again voiced today.  
31. The representative of Hong Kong, China  express ed her delegation's  appreciation for the 
proponents' hard work in putting together the revised proposals. She stated that d evelopment was 
at the heart of WTO rules issues – a view that all Members share d. Hong Kong,  China  was a 
staunch supporter of a rules -based  MTS. Her delegation  took note that S&D provisions were an 
integral part of WTO Agreements, and had no doubt that making these provisions  effective and 
operational was crucial in enabling least developed and developing Members to better integrate 
into the MTS. She hoped all Members could remain open -minded and flexible, and contribute to an TN/CTD/M/52  
 
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  intensive, innovative and constructive discussion  on the tabled proposals  with a view to achieving 
concrete and meaningful progress at MC11.  
32. The representative of Bangladesh  said that he would like to confirm that all the G90 
members , including the ACP Group, the LDC Group and the African Group had all be en actively 
involved in the drafting  process of the proposals  and that is why it had taken so long to finally 
make a submission in the Special Session . The process had started in October  2016 and they had 
only been able to submit the proposals in July  2017. The perception held by some delegations that  
the proposals were only being pushed  by a small group  of developing countries  was incorrect. In 
the proposals tabled by the G90,  the proponents  had tried to capture the work and the discussions 
that had taken place on some of these proposals before and during Nairobi. The G90  understood 
the concerns  and had tried to address them, but it could be the way they had addressed them that 
did not refle ct the way other Members thought these should have been capture d. The problem 
might be in  different way s of thinking betwe en proponents and other Members. However, 
discussions in the Special Session could always help in finding common ground. Referring to the 
comments made by some Members that by seeking flexibilities in the tabled proposals the G90 did 
not want to integrate into the MTS , the representative asked for an explanation as to why they had 
that perception.  
33. The representative of Thailand  stated that now that the Special Session had a submission 
from the proponent s, it was important that all Members considered them with an open mind.  
34. The representative of China  said that her delegation firmly believed that the developm ent 
dimension was the key dimension  of DDA negotiations, and improving S&D provisions was one of 
the most important issues in that context. China welcomed the joint effort  made by the 
proponents to put forward the proposal with ten priority areas related to S&D. While China  was still 
conducting consultations back in the capital, it was willing to work together with the proponents  
and other Members on the basis of those  proposal s, with a  view to achieving positive outcome at 
MC11. Her delegation  expect ed that the Members would  engage in constructive discussions to 
address the issues and conce rns specifie d by the proponents,  on the basis of paragraph 44 of the 
Doha Ministerial Declaration, so as to  make  S&D provisions more precise, effective and 
operational . This could go a long way in enhancing  the inclusiveness and mitigating  the 
development deficit  in the MTS . 
35. The representative of Uganda  said that the G90 members were  willing and r eady to engage 
with all Members . The reason why the submission of the proposals had taken so long , was because 
the G 90 was a large diverse group and the internal coordination and consultative process to get 
everyone on board  was a challenging task . The suggestion that  it had been just a small group  of 
Members wh ich was interested in dragging along this process was not accurate. The G90  had gone 
through an intensive process at a ll levels in their own groupings.  What the G90  needed to justify 
were the proposals they had put on the table, not how they had arrived at them. The suggestion 
that NGOs or think -tanks were be hind these proposals  was unfair and very biased. Recalling the 
past discussions on the cluster on industrialization , he stated that it had the least engagement. 
There had not been sufficient discussion on many of the proposals that the G90  had brought back  
in the recent submission . After having heard today different pe rceptions on how the developing 
countries and the LDCs could better integrate in the MTS, the proponents were at a loss. It 
seem ed that there were  entirely different perspective s about what  integration  into the MTS meant. 
Members were well aware of the G90 's contribution  to world trade and the challenges it faced . 
There was nothing  new in tho se proposals that had  not been built upon the historical context of 
the existing WTO Agreements.  In those Agreements , there were instances of carve -outs and 
transition  periods. Members needed to think as to what was the objective and  purpose of those 
instruments , were the flexibilities provided to the weaker Members sufficient  as well as  to what 
extent they  had been  used and had been beneficial ? He went on to add  that th e point about 
differentiation  was well understood by the proponents , but he was not convinced that such a 
systemic issue should be dealt with within t he Special Session . This issue should involve everyone, 
horizontally within the WTO, so the G90 did not in tend to resolve it here. What t he G90  had tried 
to do was to narrow down the scope of application.  
36. The representative of Indonesia  stated  that her country believed in the importance of S&D 
especially for developing countries and LDCs and found that some el ements in the proposals would 
contribute positively to helping the proponents in achieving their development aspirations.  TN/CTD/M/52  
 
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  37. The representative of Cambodia  said that her delegation took note of the comments made, 
and expected to have a detailed and substantiv e reading of each proposal. Her delegation  would 
consult and reach out to other Members in different configurations to bilaterally and plurilaterally 
discuss the proposals.  
38. The representative of the United States  seconded Canada's proposal that the discuss ions be 
held in a formal mode where Members could have a record of the views  expressed . 
39. The Chairperson  stated that  Members  broadly  welcomed and supported further discussions 
in the Special Session based on the G90 proposals.  She noted that there were new proposals in 
the areas of transfer of technology and LDC accession.  Some Members felt that the proposals were 
on the same trajectory as was in the lead up to Nairobi and that, as such , the discussions were 
doomed to fail. Yet some others favoured a new app roach. She viewed that there should be at 
least one detailed reading of the proposals. The first reading should be completed no later than 
mid-October . Thereafter,  Members would be able to collectively assess the situation and decide on 
how to proceed. She  encouraged Members to consult among themselves and try to find common 
ground on the way forward. Members must be willing to talk and listen to each other. Flexibility, 
accommodation and political will would be key successful outcome in this area for  MC11.  She also 
noted that one Member had proposed that the discussions on the proposals be held in a formal 
setting. She stated that she was ready to work in any manner the Membership was comfortable 
with. 
40. The Special Session took note  of the statements made.  
41. Before suspending the meeting, t he Chairperson  announced that the next meeting would be 
held on 14 September  2017 at which  the Special Session would begin a proposal -by-proposal 
reading. The meeting would be held in formal mode.  
C. OTHER BUSINESS  
42. No issues ha d been brought under Other Business.  
43. The meeting was suspended.  
RECONVENED SESSION ( 14 SEPTEMBER 2017 ) 
44. The 52nd Special Session of the Committee on Trade and Development was  reconvened on 
14 September 2017 . 
45. The Chairperson  stated that that at the meeting o n 19 July 2017, the proponents had 
introduced their revised S&D proposals contained in document JOB/TNC/60 – JOB/DEV/48 and had 
provided a brief rationale on eac h one of them. At that meeting , Members had offered preliminary 
views and general comments on t he proposals. The meeting was suspended with the 
understanding to reconvene on 14 September to start a first substantive reading of each proposal 
in a formal se tting. She had also hoped that Members would constructively engage in the 
discussion on the prop osals with a view to finalizing concrete S&D deliverables by MC11. Members 
had a lot of work ahead of them and the time was not on their side. With only ten weeks up to the 
end of November to identify deliverables for the Ministerial in Buenos Aires, the S pecial Session 
would need to work hard with one single objective of making concrete progress , so as to be able to 
deliver a positive outcome at MC11. Therefore, she urged Members to be succinct and 
task-oriented in their interventions. Thereafter, the Chai rperson  proceeded to discuss the 
proposals sequentially in the order of the numbering of the proposals tabled by the proponents. 
She also stated that her aim was to complete the first reading of all proposals by the middle of 
October 2017.  
46. The representati ve or Rwanda  made a general introduction of the proposals. He recalled that 
the G90 was composed of the African Group, the LDC and the ACP Group. The  three Groups  had 
an elaborate internal consulting process in agreeing to common positions and in arriving at 
decisions. Th e G90's  objective in drafting the proposals contained in document 
JOB/DEV/48  - JOB/TNC/60 was to agree trade policy instruments that promoted structural 
transformation, diversification and industrialization in the proponents' economies. In the TN/CTD/M/52  
 
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  G90's submission, th e G90  had suggested an approach that would serve the needs of its people in 
terms of addressing challenges as a result of high levels of de -industrialization, poverty, low 
income and unemployment , particularly among the youth in thei r constituencies. In Africa, 54% of 
the population in 46 countr ies was still living in poverty,  one third of young people were 
unemployed, another third were vulnerably employed , and only one of every six was in wage 
employment. While 10 to 12 million of t he young entered the work force each year, only 
3.1 million jobs were created. However, UNECA had suggested that by transforming Africa's 
mineral export volume by just 5% before export, it could increase 5  million jobs per year. This was 
where S&D came int o play.  
47. Recalling the Ministerial mandate on S&D in paragraph 44 of the Doha Ministerial 
Declaration , he stated that the Ministers had agreed to review all S&D provisions with a view to 
strengthening them and making them more precise, ef fective and operati onal. While Members 
agreed on the importance and need for development in developing and LDCs ' economies, they 
seemed to have different perspectives on what exactly the concept of development meant and how 
it coul d be achieved. He invited each Member to ask  itself the following questions in considering 
the tabled pro posals.  How does its intervention address the priority challenges hindering 
developing countries, in particular LDCs and low -income country Members from participating in the 
MTS effectively? Does  it have economic value in terms of promoting trade and development 
interests of LDCs and vulnerable economies? How does the intervention aim at increasing trade 
opportunities of developing countries, LDCs and low -income country Members? How does it 
contri bute towards improving the effective delivery of technical and financial assistance or Aid for 
Trade? Does it provide development policy flexibility of action and use of policy instruments such 
as infant industry protection and industrialization? He went o n to state that in fulfilling the 
mandate of paragraph 44, proposals must be drafted in legally binding language and not in best 
endeavour language, and must contribute towards addr essing the specific challenges Members 
faced. They must be precise, accurat e and specific, effective and operational. The Special Session 
should avoid sliding back into the rhetoric and circuitous discussions of 2015 and strive to find 
common solutions that would ensure the credibility of this organization in the eyes of those wh o 
felt that they had been losers.  
48. Introducing the G90 proposal on GATT Article s XVIII A and C , the representative of 
Bangladesh  stated that Article XVIII was the only Article in GATT which allowed certain developing 
countries, more specifically, the countr ies referred to in paragraph 4(a) , to introduce traditional 
trade policy measures for economic development. During the Tokyo Round Contracting Parties to 
the GATT agreed to introduce some procedural changes in order for allo wing paragraph 4(a) 
developing Members to introduce these measures soon after the notification without going through 
stringent procedures. The current proposal on Article s XVIII A and C intended to bring clarity in 
the process after introduction of the measures. This proposal was put for ward by the G90 in 
December  2015 after extensive consultations on the initial proposal on the same Article in 
July 2015. However, Members  did not have enough time to discuss that proposal in the run up to 
and during Nairobi. He went on to state that in lin e with the 1979 Deci sion paragraph 4(a) , 
developing Members could notify and introduce the measures under Article s XVIII A and C in order 
to attain certain development objectives. It was the proponents' understanding that introduction of 
such measures for a product, which was included in t he schedule of the introducing Members 
might affect the interests of Member s having a substantial interest or principle supplying interest 
in that product. Therefore, the revised proposal suggested that the Member introduc ing the 
measure would, upon request, immediately ent er into consultations with the Members having 
substantial interest or principle supplying interest in the product concerned. Suc h consultation 
would allow the Members concerned to reach an agreement and i f such agreement required 
rebalancing  the schedule, the introducing Member would be allowed to make necessary 
modification in the schedule, which would come into effect five years after the introduction of the 
measures. In case, after consultations, no agr eement was possible, the proposal envisaged the 
possibility of retaliation but only after five years of the introduction of such measures. The 
five-year period had been proposed in light of the consideration that measures were taken to 
achieve certain deve lopment objectives. He also referred to the Agreement on Safeguard Measures 
that contained similar provision for retaliation after three years. In further explaining the rationale 
of the G90 proposal, he said that due to low level of development and lack o f adequate hum an and 
financial resources , the Members referred to paragraph 4(a) were not in a position to resort to any 
other provisions in the WTO Agreements such as safeguard measures or any other contingency 
measures in order to ensure development of c ertain industries. For these countries , Article XVIII 
Sections A and B are the only options to ensure development of particular industries. However, TN/CTD/M/52  
 
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  since 1995 , effort s to invoke these provis ions by any developing country Member could not yield a 
positive outcome due to procedural requirement. The proponents hoped that bringing minor 
changes in the procedures , as suggested in the revised proposal , could make the provision 
effective, operational and provide legal basis for developing countries to accord much  needed 
protection to their industries. In this li ght, the proponents hoped that Members would 
constructively discuss the revised proposal tabled in JOB/DEV/48 – JOB/TNC/60. The proponents 
would be happy to respond to any questions from the floor.  
49. In expre ssing their readiness to engage constructively on development issues, in particular 
those concerning the LDCs, the representative of the European Union  stated that any discussion on 
the proposals should be on the basis of an analysis that clearly explained  where specific problems 
lay and justified specific courses of action. In that respect , the EU delegation ha d encouraged 
Members to work on realistic proposals , taking into account the views and concerns expressed with 
regard to previous S&D proposals. As such, his delegation would like to avoid repeating the hollow 
and frustrating debate that led Members to an unsatisfactory outcome on this topic at the 
Ministerial Conference in Nairobi. The EU's reaction to the proposals on the table remained that of 
disappointment. The first meeting in July had revealed clea r differences of views between Members 
as to how to deal with S&D. More specifically, the revised proposals did not improve enough on the 
sweeping, one -size-fits-all carve -outs that the Special Session  had discussed in the past. The EU 
held a firm view that the proposal did not serve a real developmental objective . Members needed 
to have a deeper and more fundamental conversation about how trade could be an engine to 
generate development. He went on to state that since the last meeting of the Special Session  in 
July 2017, the EU had met with the proponents and had some constructive conversations , at which 
both sides had the opportunity to listen to each other's views and concerns. On the EU's part, he 
explained why it felt that, with the best of intentions, this negotiating process had little chance of 
succeeding on the track that it had been put on with these proposals. By saying so, he said that 
the EU did not intend to trivialize the development challe nges that some developing countries and 
especially the LDCs faced in being competitive and in their efforts to integrate into the global 
trade. The EU firmly believed that the WTO rules and the MTS were the best insurance to achieve 
a level -playing field. Having said that, his delegation  remained open to discussing diffic ulties and 
challenges that any Member might experience in applying WTO rules or the exis ting S&D. In such 
cases, those Members facing those challenges should bring forth concrete case studi es and 
examples that highlight specific challenges, constraints and needs. He wen t to make three key 
points: (i)  that deviating from existing commitments and rules, should be the exception – not the 
rule; (ii)  fundamental principles of the WTO such as MFN and national treatment must be 
preserved; and (iii) the different level of industrial, trade and developmental situ ations of WTO 
Members would need to be reflected in any proposal. In assuring that the EU would continue to 
engage on the important issues fl agged in the proposals, the representative of the EU hoped to 
have a rational conversation based on facts and concrete examples of the challenges that the 
proponents faced and aimed to resolve through these proposals. He indicated that his delegation 
would  be seeking clarification and posing questions to better understand the rationale behind the 
proposals and also provide food for thought to the proponents when considering next steps. He 
said that his delegation would also like to suggest that the proponen ts seriously reflect on 
alternative and realistic measures that might be needed to pursue their developmental aspirations 
and the reason  why they had the perception that the WTO rules barred this path?  
50. In concluding his statement, the representative of the EU asked the proponents to explain as 
to what was meant by the term "developing countries facing capacity constraints" which seemed to 
be relatively broad and open concept that could , in theory , be all encompassing.  
51. The representative of Canada  stated th at her delegation was sceptical of restarting a process 
that was similar both in substance and approach to that of the previous years - one which had 
failed to deliver results, despite constructive efforts from all sides. Her delegation agre ed with the 
delegations of Rwanda and the EU that Members had different perspectives of what was n eeded. 
She strongly encouraged Members, in particular the proponents, to consider alternative 
approaches in the work of the Special Session  and to examine what meaningful co ntributions this 
negotiating body could make towards the integration of developing and LDC Members into the 
MTS. Having said that, she expressed her delegation's willingness to engage in an honest and 
fact-based review of the proposals. She went on to make  a few general remarks and questions 
applicable to all the proposals. The overarching concerns that Canada outlined in 2015 on most of 
the proposals continued to be valid in the case of the revised proposals tabled now by the G90. 
These included, among oth ers, a lack of meaningful differentiat ion between developing country TN/CTD/M/52  
 
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  Members, obligatory technical assistance, broad carve -outs from the core WTO o bligations, and 
limitations on Members'  rights to regulate in the public interest. Her delegation sought answ ers to 
the following questions, applicable to al l proposals:  (i) w hat were the specific development 
challenges being confro nted by the proponents that the proposals meant to address?  (ii) h ow 
would the proposed policies contribute to sustainable and inclus ive economic growth?  (iii) h ow did 
the proposa ls intend to further integrate m embers into the MTS? 
52. She recalled her delegation' s statement made at the suspended July meeting of the 
Special  Session , wherein her delegation had stated that it was not in a pos ition to accept the 
proposals. To the extent Canada's fundamental concerns were not addressed and satisfactory 
responses to the questions posed were not provided, Canada' s position would remain unchanged.  
53. The representative of Japan  stated that it was enco uraging to hear that the G90 wished to 
further integrate into the MTS rather than to deviate from it, though his delegation still had doubts 
whether such intention was duly reflected in the revised proposals. The basic position of Japan on 
the new G90 prop osal remained the same as that was stated in the meeting on 19 July 2017. 
Japan could not, and would never, agree to a blank cheque to limitless deviations f rom the existing 
WTO rules. S pecial and differential treatment  should be considered, to the extent necessary, in 
exceptional case s for those developing country Members which really needed it. He also 
emphasized that the Special Session must first undertake a faithful and honest discussion on the 
specific needs and then find pragmatic solutions that best  served those needs. Japan was ready to 
sincerely engage in discussions to seek possible solutions or remedies once the challenges f aced 
by developing country Members were discussed. But for such  constructive debate to start, 
Members needed to see real, fa ct-based cases of the challenges that the proponents faced. 
Without them , it would be really difficult for Japan to engage in substantial and meaningful 
discussions, as only such a process could facilitate in -depth analysis of the proposal and help to 
identify the need to further operationalize the existing provisions and procedures, or the possibility 
of any other solutions, such as a better and more efficient use of waivers. On the contrary, if the 
proponents aimed to continue negotiations taking a concep tual app roach without a factual basis, 
Members would inevitably witness a repeat of circuitous debate which was a recipe for failure as 
was experienced two years ago. Elements such as permanent and unlimited carve -outs from the 
obligations in the existing WTO rules, and obligatory financial and technical assistance, were 
extremely difficult to entertain. In addition, the question of rea l needs and how Members should 
tackle them still needed to be addressed. Regarding proposal 2 , despite the explanation prov ided 
by the proponents Japan held the view that there was a significant difference between the 
procedures in the decision of 28  November  1979 (L/4897) and what was tabled in the revised 
proposal. Although the referred document provided certain flexibility in the application of GATT 
Articles XVIII A and C ,.the process was supposed to start with the notification , not the introduction 
of the measures. In the proposal, the process was intended to start with the introduction of the 
measure. He also said that the  text of proposal 2 suggested that the retaliation measures were 
prohibited for the first three years. The proposal seemed to aim to provide for a blank  cheque for 
developing country Members to deviate from  the obligations under GATT. Furthermore, the 
sequence in paragraph d was not clear. Japan had difficulty in understanding the intent of 
paragraph 2.2 because it only seemed to repeat what was provided for in Sections A and C of 
Article XVIII of GATT. He also requested that proponents clarif y the meaning of the expression 
"facing constraints", and the difference between "substantial interest" and "principal supplying 
interest" . 
54. The representative of Switzerland  stated that her delegation had a long tradition of 
supporting the int egration of developing coun try Members, and in particular the LDCs, into the 
MTS. Together with the Membership, Switzerland  had consistently been seeking ways to increase 
trade opport unities for developing country Members and the LDCs. With regard to discussion on 
S&D in the Special  Session, Switzerland had remained open for dialogue over the 16 year -long 
process. At the same time, it had repeatedly underlined the importance of the WTO as a  rules-
based and rules -setting O rganization for global trade upholding predictability, certaint y and 
stability - principles, which had proven to play a key role in enhancing trade and development 
opportunities. Past discussions had shown that any broad -based and extensive derogations from 
existing WTO Agreements and commitments would go against thos e principles and would not have 
the potentia l of gathering consensus among Members. She said that h er delegation would like to 
reiterate its concern that the latest proposals did not build on the substantial discussions Members 
had in 2015, nor did they ad dress the challenge of differentiation. In underlining the importance of 
integrating LDCs and developing coun try Members into global trade , she stated that this objective TN/CTD/M/52  
 
- 14 - 
 
  could be achieved by following an approach that was in conformity with the principles  of the WTO. 
Having said that , the delegation of Switzerland was ready to go through and comment on the 
individual proposals. Turning to proposal 2, she said that discussions prior to MC10 had showed 
little progress and no convergence had been  found on thi s issue. The text proposed elements that 
would undermine predictability and it would also affect South -South trade. For her delegation , 
there was little room for agreement on the proposal.  
55. The representative of Nigeria  said that proposals should be discus sed on the basis of their 
merits. Members should avoid airing reactions or making interventions that could derail the 
effective consideration of the proposals. He added that he could not imagine how MC11 could be 
deemed successful without a result in the a rea of development.  
56. The representative of Cameroon  sought clarification from the representatives of the EU and 
Canada on what they had meant by asking for concrete development problems the G90 members 
faced. Citing the example of Japanese companies buildin g primary schools and providing technical 
assistance in this regard in Cameroon, he said that it was a sufficiently illustrative example of a 
concrete problem that Cameroon or other countries faced in the field of providing basic education.  
57. The representat ive of the United States  said that his delegation  stood by the comments it 
had made at the 19 July 2017 Special Session  meeting and asked for the full inclusion in the 
formal records of the meeting. In that meeting, he stated that the Special Session had a long and 
disappointing history  - one that was driven by the efforts of a few Members and some non-
governmental organization ( NGO) advisors to impose a discouraging view of development, 
including on those Members in need of sustainable development. Those f ew Members were 
regrettably wedded to failed ideologies. They seemed unwilling to adjust to the opportunities 
around them, and profoundly unhappy that others who faced similar challenges might want to 
make different choices. They had bought into a mind -set that the path to sustainable development 
laid not in their full integration into the trading system, but in their de -integration. His delegation 
could not help reflecting on what could have been accomplished if those Members had taken the 
past two decades  to implement WTO commitments, and to integrate into today’s global supply 
chains. Unfortunately, those Members viewed, with suspicion, the commitments that other 
Member s had made in acceding to the WTO. They were dismissive of the accession process and 
seemed uncomfortable with the results, which consistently showed that Article XII Members ha d 
outperformed the rest of the M embership in trade growth, even when China was excluded. His 
delegation was not surprised by the proposals but was nonetheless disappo inted. For some time, 
his delegation had asked those few Members to make a good -faith attempt to be constructive by 
considering a new approach. It was clear that that invitation had not been accepted. Most of the 
G90 proposals had been tabled in very simil ar forms in 2015, and they never came close to 
achieving consensus. The few elements that had been added reinforced, rather than addressed, 
the US' concerns.  
58. Regarding the new proposals, his delegation  viewed that proposal 9 on Transfer of 
Technology was a  non-starter. He added that his delegation  would not discuss narrowing the 
mandate of the Working Group on Trade and Transfer of Technology  (WGTTT) . Similarly, proposal 
10 on Accession of LDCs had the clear intent of turning the WTO accession process into a political 
one. The long -term impact of that would be that acceding LDCs would be denied the opportunity to 
use the accession process to reform their trade regimes and to make commitments that attracted 
investment and trade. That would hinder, not help, s ustainable development in LDCs. The proposal 
also implied that the 2012 LDC Accession Guidelines were not working , which his delegation  flatly 
disagreed  with. In the five years since the guidelines were agreed by consensus, five LDCs had 
joined the WTO, co mpared to just four in the ten years prior to 2012. Currently, another three 
LDCs were enthusiastically engaged and making progress on the accession front, and several more 
were showing strong interest.  
59. The representative stated that if accepted, the ten p roposals would initiate an immediate 
race to the bottom. If a subset of Members was right to have a permanent carve -out from 
previously agreed rules, every other M ember would demand to receive the same. That would fuel 
more demands for carve -outs, and the cycle would repeat itself. Production might temporarily 
increase, but only until the inevitable backlash, marked by an avalanche of subsidies, local content 
rules, and other regressive measures would hit global economy. This would be followed by efforts 
to shut off market access. It was hard to see how the proponents themselves could expect that the 
proposals would achieve consensus. His delegation regretted to say that the goal appeared to be TN/CTD/M/52  
 
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  to pressure the Chair person  and Members into a process that woul d provide a platform to press 
the view that the WTO was anti -development and ineffective and to advance an image of 
dysfunction and failure. His delegation  did not share this goal, and would not participate in an 
effort to achieve it. His delegation  would not engage on the tabled proposals, beyond what it had 
stated at the current meeting . They were not a basis for work, and the United States could not 
conceive of any process that would allow for a productive discussion of these proposals.  
60. He added that the United  States  would not engage further on the tabled proposals since in 
his delegation's  view they did not form a sound basis for work, and no amount of tinkering would 
help to get a result.   
61. The representative of Norway  took the floor to state that his delegation was pleased to note 
that G90 has narrowed down the number of proposals to 10 in their new submission. It had 
become clear during the negotiations lead ing up to MC10 in Nairobi that Members had 
fundamentally different views on the best approaches  for the integration of developing Members, 
in particular the LDCs into the MTS and whether there was a need to derogate from existing WTO 
Agreements or create new decisions to achieve that goal. The views from two years ago did not 
seem to have changed. I n that context, he noted that several of the current proposals were not 
materially  different from those on which Members spent enormous time in 2015. As such there 
was little possibility that the revised proposals could gain consensus. Norway had been and would 
remain focused on discussing and exploring solutions faced by the LDCs. In N orway's view , 
Members should quickly identify areas in which convergence was more likely to achieve and focus 
their work on them. Commenting on Proposal 2, the representative  of Norway said that although 
the proponents had explained that their intention was to seek clarity on the procedures in the 
Decision of 28 November 1979 (L/4897), yet the proposal seemed to considerably expand the 
scope of Article XVIII and the decision r eferred to above.   
62. The representative of the European Union,  in response to the intervention from the 
delegation of Cameroon, clarified that in his earlier intervention he had sought clarity from the 
proponents on the specific development measures that th ey wished to pursue , but were barred to 
do so by a particular provision in the WTO Agreements , and how those measures would promote 
development in that particular country and other developing countries. For example, he would like 
to know how suspending TRI MS obligations or allowing a BOP measure for five years would help a 
country in addressing specific challenges.  
63. The representative of Australia  said that his delegation very much supported discussion on 
trade and development . Assisting developing country Members, in particular the LDCs, in their 
efforts to better integrate into the MTS was a priority for his delegation. Flagging his delegation's  
concern with the revised proposals, he stated that some of the proposals submitted by the G90 
sought exemptions f rom fundamental WTO rules , which in Australia' s view was not in line with 
how, it thought,  these Members could better integrate into the MTS. The current set of proposals 
was almost identical to the proposals that were comprehensively discussed ahead of MC 10. He 
believed that revisiting those discussions would not be useful. For a ny discussion to be productive , 
Members would need to better  understand developing country Member s' concerns and challenges 
that they confronted with existing obligations in the WT O Agreements. In particular, his delegation 
wanted to understand  how those agreements impacted Members'  ability to implement measures 
necessary for development. On proposal 2, he sought to have greater clarity on the phrase 
"Members facing constraints".  
64. The representative of Rwanda  thanked Members for their active engagement and request ed 
that the questions asked by Members should be made available, through the Secretariat, in written 
form so that the G90 could carefully reflect on them and come back with responses and 
clarifications at the next meeting of the Special Session .  
65. The Secretariat took note  of the request.  
66. The representative of Uganda  introduced proposal 1 relating to the Agreement on Trade 
Related Investment Measures (TRIMS Agreement) , He stated that trade-related investment 
measures (TRIMS) when used in conjunction with other measures, such as local 
content/performance requirements and technology transfer requirements played a vital role in the 
industrialization process . Indeed a number of dev eloped Members had used them on their path to TN/CTD/M/52  
 
- 16 - 
 
  industrial growth and development. He stated that Article 4 of the TRIMS Agreem ent allowed 
developing country Members to "deviate temporarily" from the provisions of Article 2 to the extent 
and in such a manner  as the BOP -related provisions in Article XVIII pe rmitted the Member to 
deviate from the provisions of Articles III and XI of GATT 1994. Article 5.3 of TRIMS Agreement 
gave the Council for Trade in Goods (CTG) the authority to extend the transition period for 
elimination of TRIMS that were notified by dev eloping country Members including the LDCs that 
demonstrated particular difficulties in implementing the provisions of the TRIMS Agreement. The 
CTG was required to take into account the individual developme nt, financial and trade needs of the 
Member in question. He explained that the challenge with the current provisions was that the 
flexibility provided in Ar ticle 4 for developing country Members to deviate from Article 2 was 
limited to exceptions allowed u nder GATT Article XVIII and the related provisions therein on BOP s. 
The procedures and requirements for invoking infant industry measures and taking BOP measures 
were very stringent. This basically meant that the flexibility provided in Article 4 of the TR IMS 
Agreement was limited by stringent requirements under Article XVIII. In addition, the current 
provision did not clearly define the term "free to deviate temporarily".  A number of developing 
county Members , including members of the G90 , had been questio ned, either in the Committee on 
TRIMS or under the dispute settlement understanding (DSU)  when they took TRIMS that were 
intended to promote their industries and determined that those measures were necessary to 
accelerate industrialization.  
67. He went on to e xplain that these issues were also covered under "Outstanding 
Implementation Issues (JOB(02)/152/Rev.1). Tiret 39 of this document noted that "Developing 
countries shall be exempt from the disciplines on the application of domestic content requirement 
by providing for an enabling provision on Articles 2 and 4 to this effect". Although the Hong Kong 
Decision in 2005 did allow some flexibility to LDCs in the case of TRIMS, the LDCs could not notify 
the TRIMS inconsistent measures pursuant to the Hong Kong Dec ision, and might face similar 
challenges as they adopt mea sures to accelerate industrializ ation. According to the United Nations 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2012), the most common issue of non -compliance 
with a WTO obligation raised by respo ndents was related to notifications. Some LDCs 
acknowledged that the non -notification of TRIMS measures was due to a lack of familiarity with, or 
understanding of the TRIMS Agreement. Most LDCs surveyed, indicated that they had not 
eliminated any measure t hat was inconsistent with the TRIMS Agreement during the transition 
period. The other challenge was that the Hong Kong Decision would expire in 2020 and the 
situation of LDCs would not have changed much.  
68. He said that in order to address these challenges, d eveloping countries, in particular LDCs, 
and low -income countries, should be allowed to introduce TRIMS inconsistent measures as 
provided for in Article 4 of the TRIMS Agreement but without being constrained by GATT 
Article  XVIII. This would enable G90 mem bers to, among other things, promote domestic 
manufacturing capabilities, stimulate transfer of technology, promote domestic competition and 
correct restrictive business practices, among other things. They should be given a six-month 
period to notify new T RIMS. The measures would be for an initial period of 15 years in order to 
ensure that there was adequ ate time to promote industrializ ation and economic transf ormation in 
developing country Members and LDCs. Given that LDCs spend a lot of time and resources  
negotiating extensions, there was a need to exempt LDCs from TRIMs until they graduated from 
LDCs status. This would create investor certainty.  
69. It ought to be recalled that TRIMS were used by a number of countries to industrialize and 
support their domest ic industries. Today however, there were many WTO cases and discussions in 
the Committee on TRIMS involving local content requirements and which showed the cha llenge 
that developing country members had with the prohibition on local content requirements. During 
the period from 1995 to 2015, of the 29 items considered by the Committee on TRIMS, 20 items  
related to measures of developing country Members, and the overwhelming majority (28/29) of 
these measures include d issues relating to local content . Although  in some cases , they also 
included other aspects. By 2015, 41 dispute settlement proceedings had been initiated, which 
included a claim under the TRIMS Agreement. Of these 41 proceedings, 27 involved a developing 
country Member as a respondent, and 25 out of 27 - about 93% - and included an allegation 
relating to local content. This showed that a number of developing countries still required flexibility 
to use local content requirements to promote upstream and downstream linkages with the local 
economy and achieve industrialization and economic transformation. Since a number of LDCs were 
beginning to put in place or were reviewing their industrialization policies, their interests needed to TN/CTD/M/52  
 
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  be taken more fully into account th an those of developing country Members in terms of using 
TRIMS to achieve their industrialization objectives.  
70. History had shown that  most developed country Members, while in the early stages of their 
industrial development, employed protective industrial, trade and technological measures including 
local content. Local content could assist the development of weak local industries, facilitate 
technology transfers and thereby close the huge technology gap between many of these countries 
and the more developed ones. This could potentially incr ease domestic production and job 
creation. Local content requirements could help to protect infant industries and curb the market 
power of multinational companies and direct it towards developing linkages for the range of 
supplies sourced locally and local  value addition. For example, promotion of linkages was very 
important in the mining sector where in a number of African countries, the mineral value chain was 
characterized by weak linkages and mines largely relied on imports, while local businesses were 
not supported in entering the supply chain. The agro -processing sector was another area where 
the G90 members wanted the flexibility to use local content requirements to promote agro -food 
processing. Linkages in this area within the local economy could hav e a positive impact especially 
on women who were mainly involved in agriculture.  
71. The representative of India said that the proposal in paragraph 1.1 provide s developing 
countries necessary flexibilities for implementing development policies intended to pr omote their 
industries. Developing countries and LDCs should be allowed to introduce new TRIMs such as local 
content development policies, in order to promote domestic manufacturing capabilities, stimulate 
the transfer of technology, promote domestic compe tition and correct restrictive business 
practices, among other things. The developing countries shall be allowed to deviate temporarily 
from the provisions of Article 2 of TRIMS and introduce new investment measures related to trade 
in goods and be given a  six-month  period to notify new TRIMS. He said that t he proposal seeks an 
initial period that does not extend beyond 15 years in order to ensure that there is adequate time 
to promote industrialisation and economic transformation in developing countries. He said that 
India fully support ed paragraph 1.1 of the proposal.  
72. He went on to support paragraph 1.2 of the proposal and stated that it was specific to LDCs . 
He said that the proposal  envisaged that the LDCs would not be obliged to implement, apply or 
enforce provisions of the TRIMS Agreement until they ceased to be a n LDC. He also stated that the 
when the Hong Kong Decision would expire in 2020 , the situation of LDCs would not have changed 
much. Therefore, there was need to exempt LDCs from TRIMs until the y graduated from LDC 
status.  
73. The representative of the European Union  requested the proponents to explain the economic 
rationale for allowing all  developing country Members, regardless of size, to introduce 
TRIMS -inconsistent measures for a potentially ind efinite duration. He also wondered whether this 
was not equal to allowing for a permanent waiver from the TRIMS Agreement if the requests to 
renew temporary modifications were automatically granted.  
74. The representative of Nigeria  took the floor to state tha t repeated questi ons had been asked 
as to which Members were facing difficulties or had challenges that could necessitate the 
proposals. He said that these difficulties and challenges were not theoretical or abstract as these 
issues had been raised repeate dly in the TRIMS Committee, in the CTD and in Trade Policy 
Reviews. It was a fact that developing country Members, regardless of their size, were facing 
challenges. It was not hard to find instances where it was legitimate to say that the WTO 
Agreements co nstrained development policy in terms of domestic economic environments. The 
challenge was to see how those Members could get relief on the basis of these flexibilities.  
75. The representative of Japan  said that his delegation had serious concerns on this prop osal 
since it sought to allow a wi de range of developing country Members to apply inconsistent 
measures without any practical review mechanism. In the process of review of extensions of these 
measures, the CTG was only expected to accord the extensions. He  also said that the objectives 
mentioned in subparagraph 1.1(a) were too broad and difficult to verify.  
76. Recalling their statement made at the 19 July 2017 meeting of the Special Session , the 
representative of Korea  said that his delegation  was of the opini on that the S&D discussions should 
contribute towards the int egration of developing country Members and especially LDCs into the TN/CTD/M/52  
 
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  MTS. However, any deviation from multilateral trading rules should be strictly limited. With regard 
to the proposal on TRIMS Ag reement, the delegation of Korea was afraid that it seemed to g ive 
developing country Members a broad discretion to deviate from the basic principles of rules -based 
trading system. The objectives of the sought deviations were neither sufficiently defined i n the 
proposals nor there were any suggestions for appropriate review mechanism for such measures. 
He also sought clarification on what exactly was meant by the term "developing countries facing 
constraints".  
77. The representative of Australia  said that his d elegation would like to know how the 
proponents would deal with the issue of differentiation, particularly how this proposal  would  apply 
to larger economies.  
78. The representative of Switzerland  said that in the run up to Nairobi , Members had had 
extensive di scussions on the issues in paragraphs 1.1 and 1.3 of the proposal and they had shown 
no progress. The tabled proposal contained no changes from the text of 2015 and, therefore, her 
delegation saw very slim chance of success. In her delegation's  view, such measures would 
discourage foreign investors. On the issue referred to in paragraph 1.2, Switzerland had, 
previously demonstrated willingness to address certain aspects and still remained so.  
79. The representative of Norway  stated that the proposal extended fa r beyond what was on the 
table in the last round of negotiations. It appeared very unlikely that it could be accepted.  
80. The representative of Egypt  introduced proposal 3 o f GATT Article XVIII B . He stated that 
many developing country Members and LDCs had de monstrated declines in manufacturing and 
insufficient or a lack of growth that had devastated the potential for sustained industrialization, 
structural transformation of their economies and diversification. The end of commodity price cycle  
had negatively i mpacted the current accounts and financial markets, which might have a deep 
impact on future competiveness enhancing investments. Since the decline in commodity prices in 
2014, revenues had not managed to keep up with expenditures and it had not been easy for 
adjust ment to a diminishing inflow of capital. For example , over the past two years, the aggregate 
macroeconomic environment of Africa had worsened due to higher debt, higher public deficit and 
lower savings.  
81. The BOP issues that reside at the crux of d evelopment - illustrated the intersection of trade 
and finance and revealed the relationship of a given economy to the international marketplace. 
The reasons  for the BOP  crises among developing countries stemmed from the basic obstacles that 
they faced in trying to become industrialized. A traditional cause of BOB crises was a sudden and 
severe increase in a country's trade deficit. Such an increase might occur, for example, if bad 
weather  drastically reduced production of key export crops and export earnin gs. Another classic 
case was one in which a steep rise in oil prices dramatically increased a country's import bill. In 
recent years, the capital account side had become an increasingly frequent source of BOP 
difficulties for developing countries including  LDCs. A sudden and sharp reduction of foreign 
investment, typically short -term portfolio investment, in domestic assets could also produce a 
sharp drop in demand for domestic currency relative to foreign currency, creating the same effect 
as a rapid rise in the trade deficit.  
82. Article XVIII:B of the GATT 1994 established rules allowing WTO Members to impose 
restrictive import measures specifically in order to address BOP concerns. In recent times , the 
international economic order has gained considerable aut hority and coherence, in the context of a 
country applying quantitative restrictions, and through the close coordination between the WTO 
and the I nternational Monetary Fund (IMF) . The need was that the WTO rules should not pursue 
an unduly narrow understan ding of the goals of the international economic order in the application 
of provisions of Article XVIII.B On BOP s, the main objective of the G90  proposal was to simplify 
the procedures for invoking BOP measures. The G90 had, among others, proposed to : (i) devise 
better guidelines under Article XVIII Section B to determine the adequacy of countries' reserves 
within the context of their economic development programmes, (ii) to suspend the right to 
retaliate against developing countries and LDCs when they took BOP measures under this Article;  
and (iii) that short -term financial flows should also be excluded while determining the reserves of a 
country , as they did not give an accurate picture of a country’s BOP positio n. In conclusion , he 
hoped that Members woul d engage constructively in making the relevant provisions in 
Article  XVIII.B precise, effective and operational.  TN/CTD/M/52  
 
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  83. The representative of the European Union  asked whether the proponents thought that 
adding further discretion to the assessment of adequacy woul d not further complicate the 
achievement of consensus even for the application of existing provisions.  
84. The representative of Japan  stated that the substance of the proposal was contained in 
paragraph 3.2. He wondered why the proponents had included paragra ph 3.1. He also asked for 
clarification regarding the technical differences between the current proposal and the different 
versions of it that had been discussed in 2015.  
85. While introducing proposals 4 and 5 on the SPS and TBT Agreements, the representative  of 
South Africa  said that the number of SPS measures, technical regulations and standards 
introduced by developed country Members were increasing significantl y. For many developing 
country Members including LDCs , those measures, in most cases , acted as ba rriers to trade, that 
had the potential of impeding their export trade and their integration into the world trading 
system. A study by UNCTAD showed that developing countries encountered significant additional 
costs while adapting their production processe s to comply with foreign regulatory measures and 
standards and that could lead to de facto  discrimination against exports of those countries that 
faced difficulties to comply with the regulations in export markets. The incorporation of S&D 
provisions inclu ding on technical assistance in the SPS Agreement and the TBT Agreement was an 
acknowledgement that there were challeng es faced by developing country Members in complying 
with SPS and TBT measures. Those provisions were mean t to assist developing country Members 
in implementing those stringent requirements. On the contrary they had proved to be difficult to 
utilize. The S&D provisions in those Agreements lacked clarity and often involved complex 
procedural hurdles. All this had made it di fficult for develop ing country Members to operationalize 
them effectively.  
86. The G90 proposal on SPS and TBT aimed to provide clarity and suggested timelines with 
regards to the following areas of the SPS and TBT Agreement; reasonable time for making 
comments; consultations; a nd procedures to be follow ed by developing or LDC Member facing 
capacity constraints, that was or would be adversely affected by a proposed or final measure. She 
went on to explain the rationale of G90 proposals in these areas. The G90 had proposed that th e 
reasonable time for making comments on any SPS measure or TBT measure notified by the 
developed country Members sh ould be understood to mean at least 180 days for least developed 
country  Members and developing country Members facing capacity constraints,  before the adoption 
of the measure, which sh ould commence with the circulation of the notification  by the WTO 
Secretariat. Upon request, a longer period of time sh ould be granted for least developed country  
Members.  
87. On the issue of consultations , the prop osal was that a developed c ountry Member proposing 
an SPS measure, a technical regulation or standard "shall consult directly", at an early stage, with 
any LDC Member or developing country Member  facing capacity constraints, exporting a product 
that would be covered by the proposed measure in order to take into account the special needs of 
those countries. Article 10.1  of the SPS Agreement required Members to take account of the 
special needs of developing country Member s and in particular of the LDC Member s. Similarly , 
Article 12 of the TBT Agreement provided for S&D of developing country Members.  
88. On the procedures that shoul d apply for developing country Members or LDC Members 
facing capacity constraints or that would be adversely affected by a proposed or  final measur e 
taken by a developed country Member, it had been proposed by the G90 that where the 
appropriate level of SPS protection or technical regulation or standard allowed scope for the 
phased introduction of measures , the phrase longer time -frame f or compliance referred to in 
Article 10.2 of the Agreement on SPS Measures and also in paragraph 12 of Article 2 of the 
Agreement on TBT, "shall be understood to mean a period of not less than 12 months and 
18 months respe ctively". This would allow LDC Members and developing Members facing capacity 
constraints to maintain opportunities for their exports. Where investments were required in order 
for an exporting LDC Member or a developing country Member facing capacity constraints to fulfil 
the SPS measures or technical regulation or standard proposed or applied by a developed country 
Member, the developed country Member "shall, provide financial and technical assistance required 
for compliance with the SPS measure or technical regulation or standard in order  to enable them 
to maintain and expand its market access opportunities for the product involved as envisaged in 
Article 9.2". Similarly , in situations where the SPS or TBT measure were adopted in urgent 
circumstances, a developed country Member "shall prov ide a developing or least developed TN/CTD/M/52  
 
- 20 - 
 
  country Member that is or will be adversely affected by the proposed or final measure 
compensatory adjustment such as to ensure maintaining the market share of the developing or 
least developed country Members in their e xport markets and supporting the technological and 
infrastructural capabilities of the concerned developing or least developed country Member". For 
SPS measures  - importing developed country Members "shall not ban the importation and 
marketing" of products  originating from a least developed country Member and developing country 
Member facing capacity constraints based on the rejection of shipments from one or a limited  
number of suppliers from that Member.  
89. She expressed hoped that m embers would engage cons tructively on the proposals with a 
view to making these provision precise, effective and operational.  
90. The representative of Nigeria  stated that "capacity constraints" did not need a definition, 
because it was obvious, not only in terms of notification chal lenges but also on implementation of 
the SPS Agreement.  
91. The representative of India said that even though the SPS and TBT Agreement fully 
acknowledged the particular difficulties and challenges that developing country and the LDC 
Members might face in the  implementation of such technical agreements, t he special needs of 
developing Members and LDCs had not been fully taken into account when preparing and applying 
SPS and TBT measures. Even in instances where the appropriate level of SPS and TBT protection 
allowed scope for the phased introduction of new SPS and TBT measures, developing  and LDC 
Members ha d not been accorded longer time -frames for compliance as there was no clarity on the 
concept of longer time -frame. With the decline in tariffs, there had bee n a proliferation of non -
tariff measures and non -tariff barriers . Products fr om developing country and LDC Members had 
increasingly been subjected to SPS and TBT measures which had effectively prevented them from 
entering developed markets. Against  this ba ckdrop, India had found that the G90 proposals 4 and 
5 were an important contribution towards reinforcing the development dimension of the 
Agreement, and making these provisions more precise, effective and operational.  
92. Commenting more superficially  the SP S proposal, the representative of India continued to 
state that the proposal on SPS sought to enhance the comment period to 180 days for LDCs and 
developing country Members facing capacity cons traints. The developed country Members, upon 
request, were to c onsult the developing partners at an early stage, prior to the adoption of the 
measure. Developing and LDC Members would be accorded longer a time-frame of at least 
12 months for compliance with the measures. He said that his delegation  supported the propo sed 
obligatio n on the part of the developed Members to provide financial and technical assistance so as 
to enable an advers ely affected developing or LDC Member to maintain  and expand its market 
opportunities. India also supported the proposal in paragraph  4.4, which stated th at importing 
developed country Members would not ban the importation and marketing of products originating 
from a developing and LDC Member based on the shipments from one or a limited  number of 
suppliers from that Member.  
93. On the TBT p roposal , he stated that the first paragraph of the TBT proposal sought to 
enhance the transparency provisions of the TBT Agreement for the benefit of the developing 
country and LDC Members. It included the provisions relating to notifying a TBT measure and  
providing a comment period. The proposed requirement of notifying all  TBT measures by the 
developed Members would assist the exporters of the developing country and LDC Members in 
becoming aware of the contemplated measures on goods of their export intere st, so that they 
could appropriately adapt to the new requirements well in time. The other proposal in the 
paragraph for an enhanced comment period of 180 days would also be of great value for the 
developing Members. Such Members, due to their capacity con straints, faced tremendous 
difficulties in preparing comments within the existing period of 60 days.  
94. The second parag raph sought to ask a developed Member, proposing a TBT measure, to 
consu lt a developing country or LDC Member directly on request. This pr oposed element was well 
aligned with existing principles w hich called upon the developed Members to safeguard the 
interests  of developing country and LDC Members when adopting trade measures. The third 
paragraph was a special provision for th ose developing  country and LDC Members wh ich would be 
adversely affected by a TBT measure. It  also called developed country Members to provide 
financial and technical assistance so as to enable an advers ely affected developing or LDC Member TN/CTD/M/52  
 
- 21 - 
 
  to maintain and expand its ma rket opportunities. India supported all elements of the proposals 4 
and 5.  
95.  The representative of the European Union  said that similar proposals, perhaps less 
ambitious, on SPS and TBT Agreements had been discussed in the past. Her delegation had 
concerns  and questions on the proposals discussed in 2015.  She asked if there was a definition of 
the term "capacity constraints" used in the proposals and also wondered as to what was the 
rationale behind proposing 180 -day period and why was the 60 -day period in sufficient. She also 
asked whether there were instances in which extensions in the period for comments had been 
requested but not granted. Her delegation wanted to know why the proposal wa s limited to 
developed country Members , only given that developing c ountry Members also adopted SPS and 
TBT measures. She also had questions about the thresholds for the obligation and whether the 
amount of exports was somehow defined. She asked for clarification of the terms "adversely 
affected", "compensatory adjustment" , and on the obligation to provide mandatory financial and 
technical assistance.  
96. The representative of Australia  stated that his delegation's questions referred to both SPS 
and TBT. He asked for clarification on the phrase "Members facing constraints" and the rationale 
for suggesting the 180 -day period.  
97. The representative of Switzerland  said that in 2015 extensive discussions had taken place on 
both of the proposals. Fun damental understanding between Members had not changed and neither 
had Switzerland's pos ition. She said that the intention of the SPS Agreement was to allow 
Members to introduce measures to protect human, animal and plant health and life and that 
economic considerations entered only insofar as these measures had to be the least trade 
restrict ive. The introduction of economic compensations in the proposal on SPS went against the 
protective spirit of the Agreement. She added that due to parliamentary processes and restraints , 
her delegation was not in a position to enter into across the board an d long -term commitments on 
technical assistance in an international agreement. About the 180 -day period, her delegation was 
surprised to see that the proposal went beyond what had been on the table in 2015.  
98. The representative of Norway  said that his delega tion had noticed that in both proposals the 
comment period ha d been proposed to be double from what was proposed in the proposal 
discussed in the run -up to Nairobi. This was an example of how proposals had been reformulated 
in a way that widened the gaps i n Members' positions instead of narrowing them.  
99. The representative of New Zealand  said that her delegation supported the integration of 
developing countries into the MTS, but for New Zealand it was extremely important to ensure that 
the proposals this Comm ittee considered were consistent with this goal. In terms of proposals 4 
and 5 , she said that her delegation had expressed its concerns in 2015 . New Zealand agreed with 
Switzerland that the overriding objective of the SPS Agreement was protecting health.  
100.  The representative of Japan  said that the proposals were more ambitious than the ones that 
had been discussed ahead of MC10. He noted that apart from the comments other Members had 
made about the doubling of the comment period, in paragraphs 4.2 and 5.2 of the proposals on 
SPS and TBT , respectively, the phrase "upon request" that had appeared in the 2015 proposals 
had been removed. This meant that in th e new version developed Members would be e xpected to 
approach developing Members even in the absence of an expression of interest. He wanted to hear 
the rationale for removing the phrase "upon request" from the revised proposals. His delegation 
also had strong reservations about any proposal that would seek to make technical assistance 
compulsory.  
101.  The represent ative of Nigeria  made reference to a study by the Secretariat evaluating 
questionnaires regarding challenges in the implementation of the SPS Agreement. He also made 
reference to Articles 9 and 10 of the SPS Agreement which addressed technical ass istance a nd 
S&D for developing Members , respectively. These provisions were insufficient and inadequate for 
developing country Members and did not help its proper implementation. Furt hermore , the 
developing country Member lacked the capacity to examine all the noti fications received.  
102.  The representative of Cameroon  took the floor and proceeded to introduce proposal 6. He 
recalled that the Secretariat had identified and listed 148 S&D provisions contained in the WTO TN/CTD/M/52  
 
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  Agreements in documents WT/COMTD/W/196 of 14 June 20 13 and WT/COMTD/W/219 of 
22 September  2016. Part VIII , Article 27 of the Agreement on SCM was dedicated to deve loping 
country Members. According to the listing given in the above referred documents, the A greement 
on SCM contained 16 S&D provisions fall ing into three categories: (a) t wo provisions under which 
WTO Members must safeguard the i nterests of developing country Members (p aragraphs 27.1 and 
27.15) ; (b) ten provisions establishing flexibility of commitments, measures, and the u se of means 
of action; and (c) s even provisions relating to transitional periods. This showed that the 
Agreement on SCM did provide S&D and the negotiators of the Tokyo R ound had foreseen what 
level of flexibility was needed on this  issue in favour of developing Members. Article  3.1 of the 
Agreement on SCM stated that subsidies contingent upon the use of domestic over imported 
products alone or among other cond itions were prohibited. Article  27.3 of the Agreement provided 
a transition period of fiv e years for developing country Members and eight years for LDCs in the 
context of this pro hibition. The discussion among Members that took place in 1999 for extension in 
the transition period did not result in a consensus. Therefore, Article 8 had fallen into disuse.  
103.  At the Doha Minister ial Conference , the Ministers took a decision on the use of 
non-actionable subsidies and directed the Committee on S ubsidies and Countervailing Measures  to 
extend the transition period for certain developing countries and urged Members to exercise 
restrain t and not to challenge the measures set out in Article 8.2 of the A greement on SCM 
pending negotiations on this issue. The measures envisaged in Article 8.2 were precisely the 
meas ures implemented by developing Members to achieve legitimate development obj ectives, 
such as regional growth, financing of technological research and development, diversification of 
production, and the development and application of environmentally sound production methods. 
The basic problem with the issue of subsidies was that de spite clear direction by the Mi nisters , the 
developing country Members needed to have an authorization f rom the Membership to use 
subsidies in the absence of which there was al ways a danger of legal action. The Committee could 
not achieve consensus on this  issue. As of today , the relevant provision st ands expired. The G90 
proposal aimed to give a second life to non -actionable subsidies and to ensure that Article 27.1 of 
the Agreement became meaningful and played an important role in the industrialization an d 
economic development pr ogrammes of developing country Members. He added that Article 27.1 
recognized that subsidies "may" play an important role in the economic development program mes 
of developing countries. However, the challenge was that the use of th e word "may" in Article 27.1 
did not fully recognize the role played by subsidies in industrialization and economic development. 
Nor was it clea r whether the subsidies imp lemented by developing country Members, be it LDCs, 
low-income countries or SVEs, in order to achieve legitimate development objectives, such as 
regional growth, financing of technological research and development, diversification of production 
and the development and implementation of environmentally sound production methods, would be 
considered as non -actionable subsidies. The G90 had proposed that subsidies provided by 
developing country Members to achieve these legitimate development objectives, such as regional 
growth, financing of technological research and development, diversificatio n of production and the 
development and implementation of environmentally sound production methods, be considered as 
non-actionable subsidies. This flexibility for the weaker WTO Members to use these specific 
subsidies was important to get o ut of the situa tion that these Members were experiencing today. 
The focus of G90 proposal was to seek export -oriented flexibility rather than an import -oriented 
one. The proposal introduced a reference to Annex VII of the A greement on SCM. In doing so, the 
G90 had the su bsidies related to exports in section 3.1.a in mind. The proposal established a link 
between subsidies and the development of manufacturing capacity for exports. In other words, the 
capacity being sought was not for the local market, instead it was geared towards the 
development of production capacity of goods for export. N or was it the intention to have the 
flexibility to use these subsidies from the perspective of local content. This wou ld give G90 
members the opportunity to develop their means of product ion as well as to integrate into 
international trade and participate at least in regional value chains if global value chains were 
further away. The G90 would assure Members that the intention behind the proposal was not to 
disintegrate from internation al trade. On the contrary, G90 m embers remain fully committed to 
achieve deeper integration with building much needed production capacity for goods destined for 
the international market, while improving their economic structures. The ultimate goal was to 
break the structures of poverty, provide jobs and create opportunities for their people.  
104.  He invited Members' attention to the fact that the proposal did not intend to restrict imports 
to increase local production against imports. Most recent figures showed tha t the trade deficit in 
G90 economies had steadily increased. According to WTO statistics, from 2010 to 2016, the share 
of LDCs decreased from 1.1% of world trade to 0.9%. In the same period, the imports went from TN/CTD/M/52  
 
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  1.1% to 1.4% using the same s cale. Other de veloping country Members, without industrial 
capacity , were experiencing similar situations. According to the WTO Press Release 768 of 
7 April 2017, world trade was increasing in volume and had declined in value as a result of 
fluctuating exchange rates an d declining commodity prices. According to studies by the 
International Chamber of Commerce, G90 exports increased in volume and not in value because of 
the low rate of transformation of its products  which suffered structurally from the problem of 
producti on surpluses. A lso, the added value remained very low. In the case of Cameroon, 
according to data from World Development Indicators, since the end of the 1960s, the share of 
industrial production in Cameroon's GDP had increased slightly from 20% in 1967 to  28% in 2015, 
while the level of contribution of manufacturing production to GDP ha d remained almost 
unchanged, around 10% of GDP. This situation had persisted for the last 50 years. In a 
comparable country like Zimbabwe, for example, the share of the manu facturing sector declined 
from around 17% to 12%. As an indication of the level of industrial ization, in developing country 
Members, barely 30% of agricultural production was industrialized, w hereas in high -income 
country Members , this figure r ose to 98%. Also, industrialization had a multiplier effect on 
employment, with the creation of 2.2 jobs in other sectors, each time a job was created in the 
manufacturing sector . 
105.  In addition, the G90 did not seek a blank cheque for use of non -actionable subsidies. Th e 
proposal needed to be read and considered with an  open mind. Developing country Members that 
were not in need would not ask for the flexibility.  Only those developing country Members facing 
difficulties would utilize the flexibility. This exactly was the  meaning of paragraph 6.2 in the 
proposal. Members needed to note  that the candidate developing Members for the use of flexibility 
would need to demonstrate : that they had failed to develop or diversify their existing industrial 
capacity in a more open glo bal economy and had experienced stagnation or decline in the share of 
manufacturing in their gross domestic product; that they were still vulnerable to external trade 
and financial shocks; that they had suffered from the steady decline in commodity prices;  that the 
share of the manufacturing sector in their GDP had decreased while that of services had not 
increased significantly; that they had failed to bridge the digital divide with other economies ; and 
that nationa l industries were struggling to keep pace  with key technological breakthroughs. The 
proposal aime d to enable developing country Members fulfilling the above conditions to use 
subsidies contingent on the use of domestic goods on imported products, in order to add value to 
their natural resources a nd to diversify their production and exports. Flexibility to link export 
subsidies to capacity development was crucial for developing country Members and especially for 
the weakest. Industrialization and the addition of value were the basis of the drive fo r negotiations 
among , for example, African country Members that wanted to create a continental free trade zone. 
The G90 proposal was not even open -ended. The flexibility being sought was limited in time - eight 
for developing country Members and ten years for LDCs. This would allow G90 members to correct 
a structural anomaly that had handicapped their economies.  
106.  The representative of India took the floor to state that India fully supported the G90 
proposal as subsidies played an important role in industrial ization and economic development 
programmes of developing country Members and the LDCs. The proposal in paragraph 6.1 sought 
to provide clarity on the use of subsidies imp lemented by developing country Members facing 
certain constraints described in paragr aph 6.2. The objective was to achieve legitimate 
development goals, such as regional growth, technology, research and development funding, 
production diversification and development and implementation of environmentally sound methods 
of production. There w as proviso  that such subsidies must fall under Article 8 of the Agreement. 
These subsidies would be considered as non -actionable subsidies for a period of eight years for 
developing country Members facing capacity co nstraints and ten years for LDC Members.  The 
proposal in paragraph 6.4 create d space for developing country Members listed in the Annex 7 of 
the A greement on SCM to employ subsides based on local content with a view to adding value to 
their natural resources and diversifying their production or export base.  
107.  The representative of the European Union  said that subsidies were now at the heart  of many 
difficult issues that Members were discussing in other fora. It would be very important to be clear 
about the measures that could result from the G90 pr oposal as the consequence of such a 
proposal would be a significant exemption f or LDCs and developing country Members from the core 
subsidy disciplines with conditions that could be met quite easily. She asked as to why the 
proposal was conditioned on Arti cle 8, which had expired. Members needed to reflect carefully on 
the legal implications of including references to the requirements of an expired provision. She also 
asked how proponents had reconcile d the open list of development goals in the proposal wit h the TN/CTD/M/52  
 
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  closed list of Article 8, if the latter would be applicable, and how they s aw the rest of the 
requirements of Article 8 applying. She further enquired as to what the reasoning was behind the 
criteria listed in paragraph 6.2 which define d developing c ountries as "facing certain constraints", 
and what was its relevance in defining "developing countries facing capacity constraints" found in 
other proposals.  
108.  The representative of Switzerland  stated that in her delegation's view gran ting a major part 
of th e WTO M embership de facto  unlimited flexibilities regarding subsidies would be 
counter -intuitive. For example , the sco pe of the proposal in terms of Members' eligibility was too 
broad. She echoed the questions raised by the EU regarding Article 8 on action able subsidies not 
existing anymore.  
109.  The representative of Japan  echoed the concerns raised by the EU and Switzerland. He 
asked for cla rification as to whether eligible Members would have to demonstrate that they had 
fulfilled the conditions listed in the  proposal at the time of notification. He recalled the Hong  Kong 
Ministerial Decision in 2005 on TRIMs, where no notification was made by LDCs on any TRIMs 
within the notification period due to the lack of capacity. He thought that when discussing  
notifica tions in this context , Members should pay attention to the capacity or lack  thereof of 
developing country Members.  
110.  The representative of Venezuela  said that his delegation considered that all the proposals in 
the document presented by the G90 represented a  good contribution to the discussions on S&D. 
He wished to intervene especially to support G90 on proposal 6.  
111.  The representative of Cameroon  said that as the delegat ion of Japan had p ointed out, 
developing country Members had capacity problems, including in terms of notifications. The 
proposal took into account the provisions of both the TRIMS Agreement and the Agreement  on 
SCM. The intention was that no provision should impede the activation of Article 8 that the G9 0 
had requested, and that only Members t hat needed the flexibility would use it. They wanted to be 
able to export products that they did not yet export. Their exports depended on a few tariff lines 
and wanted to diversify their exports.  
112.  The representative of China  requested that the written ques tions that had been posed during 
the discussion at the current meeting be made available to all Members.  
113.  The Chairperson  asked Members to send written questions that they had posed on the 
proposal to the Secretariat so that these could be circulated to Mem bers. This would facil itate 
meaningful discussion by Members in future meetings , in particular, it  would help proponents to 
prepa re responses to the questions.  
114.  The meeting was suspended . 
RECONVENED SESSION ( 21 SEPTEMBER 2017)  
115.  The 52nd Special Session of t he Committee on Trade and Development was reconvened on 
21 September 2017.  
116.  At the outset, the Chairperson  recalled that at the previous meeting of the Specia l Session 
on 14  September 2017 , Members had begun a first substantive reading of the proposal in ha nd. 
Members had had fruitful exchange of views on the first six proposals. The discussions had allowed 
the Special Session to have a better understanding of the underlying issues behind each propo sal 
and the concerns that some Members had. She hoped that t he remaining proposals would also 
elicit positive and constructive engagement.  
117.  While introducing proposal 7 on Agreement on Customs Valuation (CV), the representative 
of Senegal  said that despite efforts made over many years to modernize and strengthen th eir 
customs administration, and the te chnical assistance provided by Members of the WTO and the 
World Customs Organization, LDCs had continued to experience significant difficulties in 
implementing certain provisions of the Agreement on CV. The implementat ion of the Agreement on 
CV required, in addition to transpositions in national or communitarian positive law, pre - and 
post-clearance procedures, efficient information systems, databases in particular on values, TN/CTD/M/52  
 
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  institutional reforms, efficient customs adm inistrations and strengthening of technical and human 
capacities. In addition, the S&D provided to developing country Members in the form of a 
transitional period for implementation, technical assistance, and reservations did not fully address 
the specific  needs of LDCs and their low level of development. LDCs were increasingly in need of 
foreign investments, especially internal investments to finance their development with a view to 
better integrate in international trade and global value chains. In this r egard, domestic resource 
mobilization and the fight against illicit capital flows were a priority. The long -standing concerns of 
developing country Members and LDCs about significant loss of customs revenue due to under -
valuation of imported goods remained  current. Beyond the negative impact on public revenue and 
the ability of LDCs to finance their development, under -valuation also distorted the conditions of 
competition in local markets. Moreover, the application of alternative customs valuation methods 
in a strict order was burdensome, expensive and time -consuming for LDCs. It needed up -to-date 
information on the values of identical and like products, as well as information that was not readily 
available or required complicated calculations. Applying the computed value also required 
investigations in exporting countries as well as procedures that LDCs found difficult to implement 
due to financial and human resource constraints. In addition, strict enforcement of these rules led 
to delays in customs clearan ce and assessment, particularly in cases where post -clearance audits 
were not yet in place or were impossible to conduct. As a r esult, many developing country 
Members used the method of last resort for a substantial part of their imports. The main 
constrai nts in that regard were the lack of data on values and the unreliability of the information 
and declaration verification tools, as well as the inadequacy of the risk management systems. In 
addition, there were administrative and technical constraints and i nsufficient internal controls and 
external audits. The proposal on Agreement on CV aimed to enable LDCs to use minimum or 
reference values on certain tariff lines when faced with constraints to implement the Agreement on 
CV. The proposal was in line with t he S&D provided in paragraph 2 of Annex III of the Agreement 
on CV, which was invoked and implem ented by 38 developing country Members and LDCs until 
2007. The proposal on the table aimed at enabl ing LDC to use minimum values in case of doubt as 
to the ver acity of declared values and in case of difficulties in using alternative methods of 
valuation.  LDCs remained open to discussions and work on the scope of eligible products as well as 
implementation modalities for the proposal that took into account their needs and constraints in 
this area. Article 12 of the TFA set the terms and requirements for customs cooperation and 
exchange of information to ensure proper coordination of controls, while respecting the 
confidentiality of information. Though constituting  an important step in strengthening customs 
cooperation among WTO Members, the procedures, limitatio ns and discretion left to the Member to 
whom the request was addressed, could nonetheless prove to be restrictive or unproductive for 
LDCs. In addition, Art icle 12 of the TFA did not provide specific provisions for LDCs. In that regard, 
LDCs had asked that, upon request, mutual assistance or customs cooperation agreements could 
be signed with developed country Members to enable them to access price data and t o make a 
reliable determination of the veracity or accuracy of the declared values. The proponents invited 
Members to a constructive discussion with a view to finding a solution that took into account the 
legitimate interests of LDCs and  the concerns of ot her Members.  
118.  The representative of the European Union  stated that the proposal in paragraph 7.1 seemed 
to follow from paragra ph 7.2, and suggested that the " non-implementation of the transaction 
value  for customs valuation purposes"  and the consequent reli ance on the remaining secondary 
methods of customs valuation be replaced in part by the use of minimum or reference values. She 
sought clarification from the proponents as to whether her understanding was correct.  With 
respect to paragraph 7.2 , she asked why there was now an assumption that LDCs did not have the 
capacity to implement the Agreement on CV. With respect to the new content and language from a 
previous version of the proposal, she wondered whether the focus was being placed on the ability 
of an  LDC Member to carry out checks and customs controls with respect to imports. In her 
delegation's view, the choice of terms and phrases including " lack the necessary capacity to 
establish the truth  or accuracy of declared values"  seemed to indicate a belie f that a customs office 
must "establish …t he accuracy of a declared value" . This was not a normal function of a customs 
office. She asked whether some LDC Members had practical problems that were separate from the 
actual content including methods, means, p rocesses and procedures, rights and obligations set out 
in the Agreement on CV. Regarding paragraph 7.3, she asked if the only choices available to some 
LDCs and developin g country Members were to have "price data"  or to have bilateral agreements 
with " provisions and mechanisms to exchange info rmation about values" . Finally, she asked how 
the proponents had examined the possibilities and opportunities offered by the TFA. TN/CTD/M/52  
 
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  119.  The representative of Japan  opined that his delegation understood the motive of the 
proposal and appreciated the flexibilities demonstrated by the proponents, including the notion of 
10% of the tariff lines. Nevertheless, Japan still had concerns about the introduction of minimum 
values from a systemic point of view. His delegation was mindf ul of the risk of abuse of minimum 
values by the importing customs authorities such as in the form of tremendously high customs 
duties, even within the range of 10% of total tariff lines.  
120.  The representative of Switzerland  said that her delegation was of th e opinion that the global 
use of minimum values was not necessarily the best way to address the problem off 
under -invoicing. Switzerland  was also reluctant to allow the use of minimum values as these were 
explicitly prohibited by the Agreement on CV. Her d elegation  would rather suggest having a 
targeted risk assessment. Switzerland was also not in a position to commit to the general provision 
of technical and financial assistance. She asked proponents to elaborate as to whether the 
technical assista nce that  had been provided by the WTO in this field over the past 20 years had 
concretely failed to meet its objectives.  
121.  The representative of Bangladesh  introduced proposal 8 on the Enabling Clause. After 
reading the proposal, he sa id that the developing country Members needed support from the 
developed country Members in their efforts to industrialize. He adde d that many developing 
country Members had supply -side constraints and were struggling with development of their 
industries with their limited resources. In  order to effectively integrate those Members into the 
international trade , it was essential to consider their supply -side constraints in designing the 
Generalized System of Preferences ( GSP) schemes offered by the developed Members. Developing 
Members wit h limited resources could not fully utilize the benefits offered by the GSP schemes 
because of non -coverage of products which they were capable of producing. The proponents 
understood that GSP was an autonomous scheme targeted towards enhancing exports of 
developing country partners with limited resources. Therefore, the G90 proposal envisaged that 
while designing the GSP schemes, developed country Members consult with the beneficiary 
countries in order to take into consideration the export needs of the dev eloping partners including 
the LDCs. This would make the GSP effective and conducive to industrialization and economic 
growth of developing countries having limited resources.  
122.  The representative of the European Union  asked if the phrase "shall take into ac count the 
needs of developing an d least-developed  country M embers by consulting with them, with a view to 
ensuring that their products of export interest are accorded meaningful market access" constituted 
an obli gation of result for developed Members. From  a legal standpoint, the EU considered that it 
would be best not to include an obligation of result. Regarding the proposal to annually review the 
progress made, she asked what exactly should the review focus on, given that the Secretariat had 
already issu ed a report on the duty-free and quota -free ( DFQF ) market access for LDCs, on the 
basis of the Hong Kong Decision, as revised after Bali. For example, was it correct to understand 
that the proposal aimed at enlarging the scope of the existing report that t he Secretariat prepared 
for LDCs , thus to cover also DFQF market  access for developing country Members?  
123.  The representative of Japan  asked if the use of the term "consulting" in the proposa l meant 
that developed country Members formulating their GSP schemes  were expected or obliged to 
approach affected developing an d LDC Members proactively. Such a mechanism, he said, would 
not be feasible in terms of practical application.  
124.  The representative of Switzerland  said that her country put emphasis on measures to 
enhance South -South trade as in Switzerland's  view that was an important source of growth. In 
principle , she saw value -added in taking into acco unt developing country and LDC Members' views 
while formulating schemes under the Enabling Clause, and holding co nsultations on a strictly 
voluntary basis. In her delegation 's view there was merit in what the proposal suggested but 
making it obligatory was difficult.  
125.  The representative of the Solomon Islands  said that the countries in the Pacific Region had 
the high est trade costs that related to the smallness of the countries, their isolation and the 
fragmentation of the islands. Added to that was the cost of rebuilding their economies after natural 
disasters that recently had become regular and more destructive. Th e high trade costs made the 
region less competitive and unattractive to investments. Prompted by the need to provide jobs for 
the rapidly rising unemployment, his country was considering several strategies on putting the 
country on the path to industrializ ation. Solomon Islands was an LDC that was likely to graduate in TN/CTD/M/52  
 
- 27 - 
 
  2023, but it would need policy space that the proposals on the table had envisaged even after 
graduation. Therefore, the Solomon Islands  fully supported the G90 proposals.  
126.  The representative of India stated that the proposal sought to enhance the predictability and 
reliability of the GSP schemes provided by developed countries. It also sought to provide 
meaningful market access to products of export interest to developing countries.  
127.  The repres entative of Norway  said that the proposal seemed to imply that developed 
Members would be under an obligation to p roactively approach developing Members and LDCs for 
consultations while formulating or amending their GSP schemes. Such an obligation would no t be 
in line with the very nature of those schemes.  
128.  The representative of Egypt  introduced proposal 9 on transfer of technology. He said that 
technological progress was a key factor in economic development, and  that decreasing the 
technology gap be tween de veloped and developing Members would have a positive impact on the 
international trade. M any developing country  Members had demonstrated declines in 
manufacturing and faced insufficient or a lack of growth that had devastated potential for 
sustained indust rialization, and structural transformation of their economies. As developing and 
LDC Members continued to struggle with industrialization because many were still technologically 
far behind, specific measures needed to be taken in the WTO to encourage incre ased flows of 
technology to those economies. He added that a number of provisions in the WTO Agreements 
mentioned the need for effective transfer of technology between de veloped and developing 
country Members. However, it was not clear how such a transfer took place in practice. Major 
aspects of the technology and knowledge deficits in ma ny developing country Members were easily 
spotted by observing such indicators as the share of GDP devoted to scientific and technological 
research or the low share of manu facturing and technology products in exports. However, a more 
comprehensive perspective could be gained by making further assessments on the functioning of 
national innovation systems. For this, technology and knowledge stocks and flows, as well as the 
supporting institutional and policy frameworks, had to be brought into the picture.  
129.  The G90 proposal on transfer of technology contained seven  main points which could be 
summarized in three  groups. The first group included paragraphs 9.1 and 9.7. Paragraph 9 .1 
stressed the importance of transfer of technology not only within the WTO but also did so in 
relation to SDG  17.6-8 which encouraged international cooperation on access to technology and 
innovation, including the promotion, development, transfer, dissem ination and diffusion of 
technologies to developing countries. Paragraph 9.7 called upon dev eloped country Members to 
take into account the objectives and principles contained in Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS 
Agreement. The second group covered paragraphs 9.3, 9.5 and 9.6. These referred to the need to 
encourage transfer of technology in various modes t o developing p artners. The proposal aimed at 
establishing a publicly owned technology inventory, which would make available information 
concerning technologi es patented or funded for at least 50 %, either directly or indirectly, by the 
government or any public  body within developed country Members. The proposal sought to 
enhance the work of the Working Group on Trade and Transfer of Technology (WGTTT) by 
mandat ing it to examine the following: restrictive practices adopted by multinational enterprises in 
the area of transfer of technology and how to prevent such practices; diff iculties of developing 
country Members and LDCs in meeting relevant WTO standards; all the WTO Agreements to 
identify the constraints that certain provisions could be creating against transfer of te chnology to 
developing country Members; t he implementation by developed Members of all WTO provisions 
related to transfer of technology to develo ping countries; and the design of instruments  and 
incentives that developed Members could grant to enterprises and institutions in order to help 
disseminate and transfer technology. The third group of the proposal contained two LDC -specific 
provisions. Wit h regards to Article 66.2 of the TRIPS Agreement, the proposal aimed to allow 
effective access on fair, reasonable, and non -discriminatory terms to technologies owned or 
controlled by enterprises and institutions in the te rritories of developed country Members, in a 
manner that enabled LDCs to absorb, adapt and improve on the received technologies. It also 
requested targeted technical assistance to be provided to support LDCs ' domestic efforts to 
enhance their technological base and improve their innovation  capacities.  
130.  The representative of Brazil  said that his delegation attached great importance to the 
principle of S&D for b oth developing country and LDC Members of the Organization. Special and 
differential treatment provisions were important tools to  level the playing field among Members. 
Specifically , on technology transfer, Brazil saw merit in revitalizing the WGTTT.  TN/CTD/M/52  
 
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  131.  The representative of Canada  said that her delegation was surprised to see this proposal. In 
seeking clarification on paragraph 9.2, she s aid that the second sentence suggested an 
interpretation of how developed Member s must meet the obligations under Article 66.2 of the 
TRIPS Agreement. This interpreta tion had not been agreed among Members, nor had it been 
discussed in the context of the TR IPS Council. It had also not been raised in the context of the 
annual workshops under Article 66.2. She said that any discussion regarding the interpretation of 
TRIPS should take place in the TRIPS Council, with relevant experts. Her delegation would also like 
to ask the proponents to clarify the relationship between paragraph 9.2 and paragraph 9.6. With 
respect to paragraph 9.3, Canada sought further clarification of the intent of the proposal. Canada 
noted that TRIPS Article 6 6.2 required developed countr y Members to provide incentives to 
enterprises and institutions in their own territories, while paragraph 9.3 implied a requirement for 
enterprises and inst itutions in developing country Members and LDCs to have access to that 
technology. The representativ e of Canada asked if that was the intent and whether this paragraph 
intended to build upon the TRIPS Article 66.2 obligation. She also asked f or clarification on the 
phrase " under the contr ol of developed country Members" , asking if this meant technologies  
owned by a government. Canada noted that a government might have control of a given 
technology insofar as it had a license to use or exploit that technology, without necessarily owning 
it. The representativ e also asked what was meant by " technologie s deve loped with public funding" . 
With respect to paragraph 9.4, she said that request for binding technical assistance was a 
non-starter for Canada. On paragraph 9.5, her delegation would apprecia te clarification on the 
phrase " technologies patented or funded f or at least 50 percent, either directly or indirectly, by the 
government or any pub lic body within their territory" . Was  the "50 per cent"  intended to refer to 
funding, e.g. financed by the government and a private entity, or patenting, e.g. patented by th e 
government and a private entity, or both? Finally, with respect to paragraph 9.6, she said that the 
language of this paragraph presupposed the proposed examination of the WTO Agreements. For 
example, it drew the conclusion that there were "constraints " against transfer of technology in the 
WTO Agreements. WTO Members had not reached this conclusion, which would only be possible in 
the event of an examination or review of WTO Agreements. Canada would also appreciate 
clarification as to why the proponents h ad put forward this proposal in the Special Session, rather 
than directly to the WGTTT.  
132.  The representative of Hong Kong, China  said that her delegation  supported the idea that the 
WGTTT could play a more substantive role in examinations regarding technolog y transfer. She 
asked for clarification on the publicly -owned technology inventory and how it would contribute to 
the transfer  of technology to developing Members and LDCs.  
133.  The representative of the European Union  said that the EU was the biggest provider in 
technology transfer in the world under Article 66.2 of the TRIPS Agreement. Her delegation 
thought that Article 66.2 worked well in its current form. Technology transfer referred to the ways 
in which companies, individuals and organizations acquired tec hnology from third parties. It also 
took place via training and education which was as important as transfer via buying or licensing 
intellectual property  rights.  The acquisition by LDCs of a sound and viable technological base did 
not depend solely on the  provision of physical objects or equipment but also on their absorption 
capacity which required a certain degree of know -how, management and production skills, access 
to knowledge sources and adaptation of new technologies to local conditions. Technology transfer 
was often one component of a more complex project, rather than a stand -alone activity. Most 
projects that dealt with sectors such as energy, water, agriculture, governance and infrastructure 
resulted in transfer of know -how and technology. She add ed that in its efforts to encourage and 
promote technology transfer, the EU was limited by two factors: first, the vast majority of such 
technologies were owned by the private sector – which was nowadays the main source of 
technologies ; second, the EU coul d not force the private sector to transfer its technologies. While 
the EU was willing to promote consensual technology transfer as much as possible, it was not 
supportive of a number of mechanisms put in place by certain third countries so as to impose 
technology transfer, especially on foreign companies. Consequently, it could not support the 
proposal because it went beyond Article 66.2 of the TRIPS Agreement. The EU was not in a 
position to support any of these ideas in the proposal, even if they only tar geted LDCs. 
Nevertheless, the representative  asked for clarification if there were concerns on the ongoing 
technology transfer projects the EU a nd other developed country Members provided to LDCs under 
Article 66.2 of the TRIPS Agreement. She also asked wh ether the LDCs would agree that 
technology transfer from emerging economies to LDCs would also be useful to reflect better the 
economic power and the growing responsibility of emerging economies towards LDCs. Finally, she TN/CTD/M/52  
 
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  asked if there were initiatives wi thin LDCs that strengthened their absorption capacity with the 
intention to attract more inward investments to their economies.  
134.  The representative of India said that his delegation believed that transfer of technology was 
essential for improving productivi ty, promoting export growth and attaining the  developing 
aspirations of all Members, especia lly for the developing country Members and LDCs. Transfer of 
technology should be seen as an important tool to narrow the technological gap between 
developing and d eveloped Members, to integrate developing Members into the MTS and to enable 
them to meet their international obligations.  
135.  The representative of Japan  said that, in line with the comments by the delegate of the EU, 
Japan was also making many efforts in th e area of technical transfer, through channels such as 
official development assistance ( ODA) and public investment for the purposes of increasing 
productive capacity of deve loping country Members including LDCs. He added that while his 
delegation understoo d the background of the proposal, it reiterated its basic views that the 
proposal was extremely difficult to consider.  
136.  The representative of the United States  said that the proposed commitments on 
paragraphs  9.2 to 9.7 were unacceptable to her delegation, as was narrowing the mandate of the 
WGTTT . She said that some of the reasons for this were that the US could not support any call for 
technology transfer that was not voluntary and on mutually agreed terms by both parties. The 
language on the proposal seem ed to suggest that governments could and should have effective 
control over the commercial decisions of non -government entities with respect to the use of their 
intellectual property rights. Her delegation did not accept that premise and did not support ca lls for 
technology transfer that would undermine intellectual property rights. Also, paragraph 9.3 seemed 
to be an attempt to force right holders to involuntarily transfer their technology if it was developed 
using public funds. For the reasons stated abov e, the U S could not accept the proposal. Regarding 
paragraph 9.5 , her delegation did not understand the merit of an intellectual property inventory of 
information concerning technologies and would not consider steps toward it. Finally, on the 
WGTTT, her de legation was of the view that the Special Session was not a proper forum to debate 
or attempt to negotiate the mandate of a separate WTO body.  
137.  The representative of Switzerland  said that it was her understanding that paragraph 66.2 of 
the TRIPS Agreement r equired incentives be provided for the purpose of promoting and 
encouraging technology transfer to enable LDCs to create a sound and viable technological base. 
Switzerland was not in a position to urge enterprises or institutions to transfer their technolo gy if 
they did not want to do so. Paragraph 9.3 of the proposal could be read as a requirement for 
mandatory measures to enable access to technologies, which in her view were not desirable and 
not possible due to the private character of intellectual prope rty and other rights involved. She 
added that regarding the efforts to enable access to technology in paragraph 9.4, such technical 
assistance was already being provided through several means. Her delegation did not see the need 
for any new mechanisms. She  asked for clarification regarding the proposal in paragraph 9.5 to 
make information available concerning technologies patented or funded for at least 50%.  
138.  The representative of Bangladesh  said that he understood that technology was owned by the 
private s ector, but governments could take measures to encourage transfer of technology to 
developing countries. He said that Article 66.2 was the only mandatory provision in the whole WTO 
Agreements on S&D. It said that "Developed country Members shall provide inc entives to 
enterprises and institutions in their territories for the purpose of promoting and encouraging 
technology transfer to least-developed  country Members in order to enable them to create a sound 
and viable technological base" . That was the obl igation that developed country Members had taken 
in 1995. In 22 years of WTO existence , the G90  had not seen such policy measures from the side 
of the developed countries that incentivize d firms to transfer technology to developing partners. 
Technology transfer  was very important for the industrialization and economic growth of the 
proponents.  
139.  The representative of Benin  presented proposal 10 on LDC accession. He said that despite 
the 2002 Guidelines on LDC Accessions and the 2012 General Council Decision revisi ng these 
Guidelines, challenges remained regarding the levels of commitments that each of the countries in 
this category should make, and the exorbitant leve l of obligations that some WTO Members were 
seeking to impose on them. He mentioned two factors exp laining the lack of effectiveness of the 
Guidelines on the Accessions of the LDCs. First, the average duration of the LDC accession TN/CTD/M/52  
 
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  process, which was 12 years and 6 months, well above the overall average. Moreover, after the 
first two accessions, namely t hose of Nepal and Cambodia in 2004, two years after the adoption of 
these Guidelines, it took another eight years, in 2012, for the next two accessions of LDCs, Samoa 
and Vanuatu. Other LDCs had been waiting since October 1994. The representative explained  that 
the other factor for the lack of effectiveness of the Guidelines on LDC Accessions was the almost 
exces sive demands of some developed Members which  had substantial interests in negotiations. 
He wondered what should  be the price to pay for accession ? He also asked if acceding countries 
should be required to have lower levels of tariffs than the ceilings agreed in previous negotiations, 
including those in the Uruguay Round. In this regard, the Guidelines mentioned reasonable 
concessions, which was where  vagueness had often led to abuse. He said that the S&D proposal 
for the LDC accessions was being tabled in order to correct this non -effectiveness of the 
Guidelines, and to help remove the enormous and multiple constraints on the acceding countries 
that b elonged to the lowest category of Members of the WTO. Therefore, the G90 requested that 
WTO Members refrain from demanding concessions and commitments that went beyond the level 
of development and regulatory capacity of developing countries in general and LDCs in particular, 
by fully implementing the benchmarks set, with a view to an average tariff binding on goods and 
improved market access for services, as set out in the 2012 General Council Decision.   
140.  The representative of Canada  said that her delegation  was supportive of universal 
membership at the WTO and had participated in each and every accession process, including 
through bilateral negotiations with acceding governments. With respect to the accessions of LDCs, 
Canada had always adopted a pragmatic a nd flexible approach to market access for goods and 
services. The G90 proposal came as a surprise to Canada, as issues with the Guidelines had never 
been raised in recent years. Canada noted that accession to the WTO was fundamentally a process 
of domestic  reform. Ultimately, the ability to expedite the process rested with the acceding 
government. The representative asked whether the proponents were seeking to renegotiate the 
LDC Accession Guidelines and what specific problems had been encountered to prompt  this 
proposal. She also requested f urther elaboration of the term "full restraint"  in paragraph 10.2. 
Finally, she a sked as to how proponents define d "fast-track"  accession procedure and what 
practical steps they saw Members taking that would l ead to the implementation of a "disciplined"  
fast-track procedure.  
141.  The representative of Australia  said that his delegation also supported universal membership 
in this Organization. He viewed accession as a process of comprehensive overhaul of domestic 
trade reforms.  Like Canada, Australia also sought clarification on the term "full restraint" and on 
disciplining "fast -tracking"  accession procedure.  
142.  The representative of Nepal  stated that S&D provisions were an integral part of the WTO 
Agreements and were designed to create a level playing field and provide policy  space for the less 
privileged Members , including LDCs , to facilitate their integration into the MTS. In line with 
paragraph 44 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration and respecting paragraph 32 of the Nairobi 
Ministerial Declaration, the LDC Group, together with the ACP and African Group s, had examined 
and prioritized ten S&D proposals with the aim of supporting industrialization, structural 
transformation and diversif ication in the less privileged Member countri es. Several developing 
country Members and all LDCs had experienced a premature decline in their share of 
manufacturing in their GDP . There was also a renewed interest in industrialization as clearly 
mentioned in SDG -9. She added that industrialization had  a positive multiplier effect on inclusive 
and sustainable development and was the principal driver of employment creation, export 
promotion and overall economic development. Her delegation req uested developed Members to 
show more flexibility, open -mindedn ess and be supportive of the S&D proposals in hand as these 
would not only help them in overcoming marginal ization of the most vulnerable Members , but also 
would support them in meeting their commitments.  
143.  The representative of Switzerland  said that her de legation was also supportive of a 
comprehensive WTO Membership and would continue supporting LDC accession. Since the 
founding of the WTO, nine countries had acceded as LDCs, while the total accessions in that period 
were 36, which meant that a quarter of the accessions were LDCs. More than half of these LDC 
accessions had been completed in the last five years, since 2012, the year of the General Council 
Decision regarding LDC Accessions. She asked the proponents to elaborate how the current 
proposal would add value to what Members already had in Guidelines on LDC Accession and which 
aspects they specifically expected to further improve as a result of the proposal.  TN/CTD/M/52  
 
- 31 - 
 
  144.  The representative of the European Union  said that her delegation was always supportive of 
LDC accessions to the WTO. She added that she was puzzled by the proposal since it was her 
understanding that the guidelines were working well as shown by the accessions of Afghanistan 
and Liberia and other accession processes appeared to be progressing smoot hly. She asked  for 
clarification of the meaning of "fast -track" accession procedure, and what would be the 
proponents' suggestions to "discipline" it.  
145.  The representative of the United States  said that her delegation would not consider changes 
to the LDC A ccession Guidelines of 2012, nor would it support creation of any other authority 
related to the WTO accession process. In her delegation's  view, the intent of the proposal was to 
turn the accession process into a political one. The impact of this would be  that acceding LDCs 
would be denied the opportunity to use the accession process to reform their trade regimes and to 
make commitments that attracted investment and trade. She added that the proposal also implied 
that the 2012 LDC Accession Guidelines were  not working. Her delegation did not agree with this 
perception. In the five years , since the guidelines were agreed by consensus, five LDCs had joined 
the WTO, compared to just four in the ten years prior to 2012. Currently, another three LDCs were 
enthus iastically engaged and making progress and several more were showing strong interest.  
146.  The representative of Japan  said that his delegation strongly supported the universalization 
of WTO Membership. Japan also considered the accession process to be a useful  incentive for 
acceding LDCs to proceed to domestic reform processes. Any attempt to depart from the objective 
of that process would be very difficult for his delegation to consider. He asked what improvements 
could be achieved in the existing guidelines a s a result of the proposal on the table.  He also sought 
clarification as to whether the proposal was about the guidelines themselves or about lack of 
implementation of those guidelines. Finally, he  asked for further elaboration of the meaning and 
implicati ons of the term "fast-track" . 
147.  The representative of Venezuela  said that his delegation supported all necessary measures 
to facilitate LDC accession to the WTO.  
148.  The representative of Norway  said that the principles found in the 2002 LDCs Accession 
Guideline s and the General Council Decision of 2012 sought to address the special situation of 
LDCs. He asked proponents to explain in more detail why they did not regard the mentioned 
flexibilities as sufficient to accommodate the needs of LDCs in the accession pr ocess.  
149.  The representative of China  said that her delegation had been supportive of LDC accession 
to the WTO and always actively followed the 2002 Guidelines and the 2012 Decision during 
accession negotiations with them. China spent 15 years in its acceding  negotiations and there 
were difficult times in the process. Considering the constraints faced by LDCs, China was in favour 
of further clarifying the efforts Members could make to facilitate LDC accessions.  
150.  With no further interest among Members to take th e floor, the Chairperson  said that the 
Special Session had now concluded a first reading of all the ten ASPs. She recalled that at the 
14 September 2017 meeting it had been agreed that questions posed on the proposal  be conveyed 
in writing to all Members t hrough the Secretariat. As of this date, the Secretariat had received 
questions submitted in writing by Japan, Switzerland and the EU. She urged other delegations that 
wished to do so to send their questions to the Secretariat as soon as possible. She aske d 
proponents whether they were ready to answer any of the questions.  
151.  The representative of Rwanda  said that the G90 would consider the questions and come 
back with comprehensive responses at the next meeting.  
152.  The representative of the European Union  asked for the presentations by the proponents to 
be circulated as well.  
153.  The representative of Rwanda  said that the proponents would compile their presentations for 
circulation to all Members.  
154.  The Chairperson  asked Members if they had any views on next steps in t he Special Session 's 
work in the run -up to Buenos Aires. She informed Members that conference and interpretation 
services for 29 September, 12 October, 19 October, 9 November, 16 November and 23 November TN/CTD/M/52  
 
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  had been reserved. She asked whether the Special Ses sion should meet again the following week 
on 29 September and if so, what should be discussed. She said that Members had heard each 
other, and were aware that the differences on the ten ASPs were deep and wide, across the full 
spectrum of issues. She added  that time was short and the resources of delegations, especially the 
smaller ones, were stretched across competing and increasing demands as MC11 drew nearer.  
155.  The representative of Canada  asked whether there would be anything to discuss the 
following wee k and whether the proponents would be ready with answers by then. If that was the 
case, Canada would be ready to participate. She suggested the Chair person  could also conduct 
informal consultat ions with proponents and other Members.  
156.  The representative of Japan said that if the proponents were ready to respond, his 
delegation would be available at any time. Regarding further steps, he did not have a clear idea, 
but agreed with Canada's proposal for informal consultations.  
157.  The representative of Switzerland  said that her delegation was ready and available for 
further discussions as soon as answers to the questions were provided by the proponents.  
158.  The representative of Rwanda  said that the G90 attached great importance to S&D. The G90 
had presented a very short list of proposals which intended to respond to two imperatives: reduce 
the number of issues to be negotiated and align with their national and regional objectives, notably 
industrialization, diversification and structural transformation. He said that trade  rules and trade 
policies impacted on development and industrialization as demonstrated throughout the history of 
economic development. The  G90 was only asking for what the develop ed country Members had 
used in their development proce ss. The  Group  was asking developed Members "not to kick the 
ladder" f rom underneath  the less developed and weaker Members of the O rganization. The G90 
was determined to pursue these discussions regardless of the current lack of engagement by 
partners. The G90  proposed to contin ue in this format along the schedule suggested by the 
Chairperson , but to be better prepared, the suggestion was that the next meeting be held on 12 
October 2017. The  G90 would continue to reach out to Members to further understand their 
concerns and clari fy the proponents' objectives to facilitate convergence with a view to delivering 
an outcome in Buenos Aires.  
159.  The Chairperson  said that she shared the view for her to engage in i nformal consultations 
with key Members and also appreciate d that Members would  actively pursue consultations on 
these important yet difficult issues among themselves. She noted the request from the delegation 
of Rwanda to continue discussions in the current format. She strongly believed that the Special 
Session should work towards h aving some deliverables for MC11. This would entail some laborious 
work in the weeks to come. She announced that the next meeting of the Special Session would be 
held on 12  October  2017, when she would report on her informal consultation s that she would ho ld 
with key Members in the mean time. She also hoped that the proponents would res pond to the 
questions posed by Members.  
160.  The meeting was suspended . 
 
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