RESTRICTED  
  
TN/AG/37/Rev.1  
 
4 December 2017  
(17-6652) Page: 1/18 
Committee on Agriculture  
Special Session    
 
 
COMMITTEE ON AGRICUL TURE IN SPECIAL SESS ION 
REPORT BY THE CHAIRM AN, H.E. MR STEPHEN NDŨN'GŨ KARA U, 
TO THE TRADE NEGOTIA TIONS COMMITTEE  
28 Nove mber 2017  
Revision  
Contents  
1   EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  ................................ ................................ ................................ . 3 
2   STATE OF PLAY  ................................ ................................ ................................ ............  3 
2.1   PUBLIC STOCKOLDING FOR FOOD SECURITY PURPOSES  ................................ ..................  3 
General  ................................ ................................ ................................ .....................  3 
Core Provision ................................ ................................ ................................ ............  4 
Country and Programme Coverage  ................................ ................................ ...............  4 
Product Coverage  ................................ ................................ ................................ ....... 5 
Safeguards and Anti -Circumvention Provisions  ................................ ...............................  5 
Transparency Provisions  ................................ ................................ ..............................  5 
2.2   DOMESTIC SUPPORT  ................................ ................................ ................................ .... 6 
General  ................................ ................................ ................................ .....................  6 
Overall Limit on Trade -Distorting Domestic Support  ................................ ........................  6 
Aggregate Measurement of Support  ................................ ................................ ..............  7 
De minimis  ................................ ................................ ................................ ................  7 
Blue Box  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...................  7 
Product -Specific Disciplines  ................................ ................................ .........................  7 
Article 6.2  ................................ ................................ ................................ .................  8 
Green Box  ................................ ................................ ................................ .................  8 
Transparency Provisions  ................................ ................................ ..............................  8 
Special and Differential Treatment  ................................ ................................ ................  8 
2.3   COTTON  ................................ ................................ ................................ .....................  9 
General  ................................ ................................ ................................ .....................  9 
Domestic Support  ................................ ................................ ................................ ....... 9 
Other elements  ................................ ................................ ................................ ......... 10 TN/AG/37/Rev.1  
 
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  2.4   MARKET ACCESS  ................................ ................................ ................................ ........ 10 
General  ................................ ................................ ................................ .................... 10 
Work Programme  ................................ ................................ ................................ ......11 
Special Agricultural Safeguard  ................................ ................................ .................... 12 
2.5   SPECIAL SAFEGUARD ME CHANISM  ................................ ................................ ............... 12 
General  ................................ ................................ ................................ .................... 12 
Outstanding Issues  ................................ ................................ ................................ ....12 
Recent Discussions  ................................ ................................ ................................ ....13 
2.6   EXPORT PROHIBITIONS AND RESTRICTIONS  ................................ ................................ .13 
General  ................................ ................................ ................................ .................... 13 
Advance Notification  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..13 
Content of notification, consultation, reporting and monitoring  ................................ ........ 14 
Exemptions for Foodstuffs Purchased for Non -Commercial Humanitarian Purposes  ............ 14 
Special and Differential Treatment  ................................ ................................ ............... 14 
Other issues  ................................ ................................ ................................ ............. 14 
Post-MC11 work programme  ................................ ................................ ....................... 15 
2.7   EXPORT COMPETITION  ................................ ................................ ................................ 15 
2.8   SANITARY AND PHYTOSA NITARY MEASURES  ................................ ................................ .15 
3   RECOMMENDATIONS  ................................ ................................ ................................ . 15 
3.1   PUBLIC STOCKHOLDING FOR FOOD SECURITY PURPOSES  ................................ ............... 15 
3.2   DOMESTIC SUPPORT  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...16 
3.3   COTTON  ................................ ................................ ................................ .................... 16 
3.4   MARKET ACCESS  ................................ ................................ ................................ ........ 16 
3.5   SPECIAL SAFEGUARD ME CHANISM  ................................ ................................ ............... 17 
3.6   EXPORT PROHIBITIONS AND RESTRICTIONS  ................................ ................................ .17 
3.7   EXPORT COMPETITION  ................................ ................................ ................................ 17 
3.8   SANITARY AND PHYTOSA NITARY MEASURES  ................................ ................................ .17 
4   CONCLUSION ................................ ................................ ................................ .............  17 
 
  TN/AG/37/Rev.1  
 
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  1  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
1.1.  This document updates my report to the Trade Negotiations Committee circulated on 
27 November 2017. It has been produced under my own responsibility. It does not purpo rt to be a 
consensus document or exhaustively reflect the positions advocated by Members on the various 
issues under negotiation. It is intended, from my perspective as Chair, to inform the Membership 
of where we are  in the A griculture negotiation s, so as to enable Ministers to make the necessary 
decisions and provide the necessary guidance at the Eleventh Session of the Ministerial Conference  
(MC11) , which is scheduled to take place in Buenos Aires, Argentina on 10 -13 December 2017.  
1.2.  In preparing this revised report, I took into account the written submissions and oral 
interventions made by Members at formal and informal meetings of the Special Session of the 
Committee on Agriculture (CoA -SS) and the Dedicated Sessions of the CoA -SS on Public 
Stockholdi ng for Food Security Purposes  (PSH)  and the Special Safeguard Mechanism for 
Developing Countries (SSM) as well as in bilateral/plurilateral meetings with different Members in 
various configurations , including at the meetings that took place after the circu lation of my initial 
report . To ensure transparency, I also periodically convened open -ended meetings of the entire 
Membership to report on my consultations. In that regard, since my appointment as Chair of the 
CoA-SS on 26  April 2017, I have held more tha n 100  meetings . I wish to underscore  that I 
observed  the principles of transparency, inclusiveness, balance and objectivity  in the consultation 
process .   
1.3.  This report builds on the state of play document (JOB/AG/109) whic h was circulated to 
Members on 5  September 2017. It covers the eight topics being negotiated by Members , namely 
(i) PSH; (ii) Domestic Support; (iii) Cotton; (iv) Market Access, including the Special Agricultural 
Safeguard  (SSG) ; (v) S SM; (vi) Export Prohibitions or Restrictions; (vii) Expo rt Competition , and 
(viii) Sanitary and Phytosanitary Mea sures  (SPS) . This report only summariz es the salient 
elements or ideas expressed by Members on the various negotiating issues and does not purport 
to be a substitute for the written submissions or oral interventions of Members. Nevertheless, it is 
my considered view that it gives an accurate p icture of the current status of the negotiations in the 
various areas.  
1.4.   This revised  report contains my final recommendations for the consideration of M embers . 
These recommendations are without prejudice to the positions of Members on the negotiating 
issues.   
2  STATE OF PLAY  
2.1  PUBLIC STOCKOLDING FOR FOOD SECURITY PURPOSES  
General  
2.1.  Public Stockholding for Food Security Purposes remains a priority issue for MC11. All 
Members recognize that unlike other issues, there are clear Ministerial mandates, both from Bali 
and Nairobi  Ministerial Conferences , and a firm deadline  for a permanent solution to be found by 
the end of the year. Currently, there are four proposals on the table: one by Brazil, the 
European  Union (E U), Colombia, Peru and Uruguay in JOB/AG/99 (17 July  2017), a second one by 
the G33 in JOB/AG/105 (19 July 2017) , a third one by Russia n Federation  and Paraguay in 
JOB/AG/118 ( 30 October  2017)  and a fourth one by Norway and Singapore in JOB/AG/125 
(20 November 2017) .   
2.2.  This section summarizes the ideas espoused in the four most recent proposals, as well as 
other ideas put forward during different meetings and consultations  I convened in my capacity as 
Chairman  of the A griculture negotiation s. Whereas the first two propos als suggest exempting the 
support provided under public stockholding programmes from the Aggregate Measurement of 
Support (AMS) calculation  with differing conditions that have to be fulfilled by developing  country  
Members, the other two proposal s build on the Bali Ministerial Decision (BMD)1, which seeks to 
                                                
1 Public Stockholding for Food Security Purposes, Ministerial Decision of  7 December 2013 
(WT/MIN(13)/38 –WT/L/913).  TN/AG/37/Rev.1  
 
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  provid e a legal shield against challenges  under the Agreement on Agriculture  (AoA). Of the two 
approaches, the Bali approach has gain ed broad support  among the Membership , owing to the 
opposition of many Members to the idea of an unlimited exemption  of market price support from 
AMS calculation and the fact that Members are familiar with  it having adopted the BMD in 
December 2013 .  
2.3.  In general, apart from the core provision, there i s convergence of views on some key 
elements to be included in the permanent solution such as safeguards and transparency 
requirements. However, Members ' views on the scope and content of these elements continue to 
differ. Different views have also been exp ressed on other issues such as country coverage, 
programme coverage and product coverage.  The issue of linkage between PSH and Domestic 
Support has also been discussed extensively in meetings of the CoA -SS and also in my 
consultations. The view of most dev eloping Members is that PSH is on a separate track and there 
is a specific Ministerial mandate for a permanent solution to be found by December 2017. As such, 
there is no basis for a linkage to be made between PSH and the negotiations  on Domestic Support . 
The opposing view is that there is a strong link between PSH and Domestic Support and that 
considering them together , or at least in parallel , would actually facilitate a permanent solution to 
the PSH issue.  
Core Provision  
2.4.  As mentioned above,  two approaches have been under consideration . Under the first 
approach, one proposal suggests the exemption of support provided under PSH programmes for 
food security purposes from AMS calculation , while another also advocates the same treatment in 
additio n to the exemption from a proposed new overall li mit to t rade-distorting Domestic Support . 
By contrast, t he second approach advocates that the permanent solution should be built on the 
Bali interim solution, which provides that Members shall not challenge through the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Mechanism compliance of PSH programmes  with the obligations under Articles 6.3 and 
7.2(b) of the AoA when they satisfy a number of conditions and the developing country Member 
fulfils  the terms of the Decision. Proponents believe that it would be easier to build convergence 
around the Bali approach given the familiarity of Members with it having adopted the BMD in 
December 2013 and the fact that  it does not require an amendment to the A oA, to which many 
Members are strongly opposed . This approach has been gaining support  among Members in light 
of the current state of negotiations in other areas.  In my consultations, s ome Members highlighted 
the need for legal certainty of the permanent solution. In response, other  Members  stated 
unequivocally that they regarded a Ministerial Decision as legally binding .  
Country and Programme Coverage  
2.5.  Regarding the country coverage, there are divergences in the proposals on the table. Three  
of the proposals suggest that apart from programmes of developing countries existing as of the 
date of the Bali Ministerial Declaration, the Decision should be extend ed to cover:  (i) programmes 
of least developed countries (LDCs); and ( ii) small programmes of any developing country Mem ber 
in the sense of them not exceeding a certain percentage of the VoP or total quantity of a product 
produced by a developing country Member . The other proposal advocates a wider coverage that 
would include all programmes of developing Members and LDCs. It has also been  suggest ed to 
limit the coverage to net importers of relevant products with a volume of production that does not 
exceed a certain level or that significant exporters should be excluded. The view has also been 
proffered  that the eligibility o f a Member should be forfeited should exports from stocks take place.  
Additionally, some Members have suggested that the permanent solution should apply only to non -
commercial activities, including ensuring that stocks are constituted for a bona fide food assistance 
programme only; or only to support rural development and for the benefit of resource poor 
farmers.  
2.6.  In my consultations, broad support was expressed for the extension of the Decision to 
programmes  of LDCs and small programmes of developing countries. However, some Members 
indicated that they could support the extension of the Decision to LDCs and other developing 
countries only when the transpar ency and safeguard provisions a re enhanced.    TN/AG/37/Rev.1  
 
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  Product Coverage  
2.7.  Regarding product coverage,  two contrasting views have been expressed by Members. On 
the one hand, several Members have argued for maintaining the current phrase "traditional staple 
food crops " as used in the BMD . They noted that this issue was the subject of intens ive 
consultations among Members before the Bali Ministerial Conference and as such there was no 
basis for re -visiting the agreed language. On the other hand, the G33 believes that there is a need 
for consistency in the terms used in the Decision and the A oA. They noted that the term used in 
footnotes 5 and 5&6  of Annex 2 and Article 12 of the AoA was "foodstuffs ", and as such the same 
term should be used in the Decision.  
2.8.  In my consultations, there was broad support for maintaining the agreed language in the  
BMD.    
Safeguards and Anti -Circumvention Provisions  
2.9.  Many Members are of the view that safeguards are needed to ensure that the procured 
stocks do not distort trade or adversely affect the food security of other Members. However, views 
differ on how these safeguards should be formulated. On the one hand, s ome Members see the 
safeguards in the BMD as a necessary minimum , with others expressing the view that they should 
be strengthened through, inter alia , having an explicit prohibition of direct and indirect  exports  in 
the text.  On the other hand, some Members have requested "more functional" safeguards than 
those contained in the BMD , while others believe that the current language in the BMD is adequate 
and should not be changed.  
2.10.   It was also suggested that should a developing Member have a share in global exports 
above a certain percentage (for example 5%) for the stocked product or should exports of the 
product increase by a  certain percentage [X]%, the product should no longer benefit from the 
permanent solution. Inclusion of a provision not allowing the applied tariffs for the products 
procured to exceed [X]% of the average applied tariffs in the period of 2013 -2017 has also been 
suggested.  
2.11.   In my consultations, there was broad support for the view that the current language should 
be supplemented with language prohibiting direct and indirect exports from procured stocks.   
Transparency Provisions  
2.12.   There are two opposing views on this issue. On the one hand, some Members, including 
those belonging to the G33 are of the view that the ex-ante conditions, such as those requiring a 
developing Member to be up -to-date with its Domestic Support notifications and to notify in 
advance a breach or a potential breach , are too onerous and difficult for a developing Memb er to 
comply with. As such, they have demanded that the transparency provisions in the BMD  be made 
more pra cticable . It was pointed out that most Members – developed and developing – were 
several years behind with their D omestic Support notifications and t hat it was unrealistic for 
developing countries to be up -to-date with their notifications for five years immediately preceding 
their recourse to the BMD. On the other hand, some Members are of the view that the 
transparency provisions in the BMD are a necessary minimum  and should be complemented . They 
disagree with the view that the ex-ante transparency requirements in the BMD are excessive. The 
point has also been made that there should be proportionality between the transparency 
requirements and the s ize of the PSH programme. The bigger the programme the more onerous 
the transparency provisions should be.  
2.13.   Some Members have also suggested including a mandatory notification of the targets, and 
data demonstrating that PSH programmes are not distorting tra de or commercial markets. Two 
proposals, for example, advocate for additional data requirements such as notification of the VoP 
and the value of acquired stock prior to the implementation of the PSH programme as well as on 
an annual basis. Another proposal  suggests a narrower set of transparency requirements that TN/AG/37/Rev.1  
 
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  include information on the programme and description of its functioning and statistical information 
on domestic activities2, and on exports and imports.3 
2.14.   In addition, it has also been suggested to hold annual dedicated discussions based on 
available data and with the assistance of the Secretariat; to examine the programmes in the 
dedicated discussions on an annual basis; and to review or assess the situation by the Committee 
on Agriculture (CoA).  
2.15.   In recent discussions, however, some Members have indicated their willingness to re -visit 
the requirements if developing Members could identify  which particular conditions they consider ed 
problematic . It was suggested, for example, that developing Members should be granted a grace 
period of not more than two years to submit their notifications and that the DS1 template and its 
supporting tables should be used to notify a breach or potential breach. One  proposal built on this 
idea and suggested that notifications should be made not later than 18  months from the end of the 
reporting period.  
2.2  DOMESTIC SUPPORT  
General  
2.16.   Many Members have consistently indicated that they would like to see an outcome on 
Domestic  Support at MC11. A number of submissions have been tabled since last year.4  
Overall Limit on Trade -Distorting Domestic Support  
2.17.   An overall limit on trade -distorting Domestic Support has been suggested in several 
submissions and has been a focus of our dis cussions for a while. While there is broad support for 
the introduction of such a limit, some Members have expressed their opposition to such a limit. A 
key question among those supporting the introduction of an overall limit is whether such a limit 
should  be fixed or floating.  
2.18.   In the proposal JOB/AG/99, proponents put forward the idea of a floating limit, expressed as 
a percentage of the VoP. However, several Members expressed a strong preference for a fixed 
limit.5 More recently , the idea of  a hybrid lim it has been advanced; it combin es elements of both 
fixed and floating limits. It has been suggested that an overall limit should be based on existing 
entitlements ( i.e. AMS and de minimis ) – an idea that was picked up in one of the recent 
proposals, or that the current de minimis  limit could be used as an overall limit (thereby 
constraining  also Blue Box spending).  
2.19.   The other issue which has been discussed is what type of support such a limit should apply 
to. It is suggested in several proposals that it should apply to the sum of AMS and de minimis  
                                                
2 This includes, for example, annual purchases, annual releases, administered prices, released prices, 
total production, eligible population benefiting from the release of this crop, estimated quantities released to 
the beneficiaries.  
3 This refers,  inter alia, to total imports (quantity and value) and total exports (quantity and value).  
4 Submission by Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay in JOB/AG/72/Add.1  
(11 November 2016 ); Submission by Rwanda on behalf of the ACP Group in JOB/AG/87  (15 November 2016 ); 
Communication by Benin on behalf of the LDC Group in JOB/AG /90 (13 January 2017); Proposal by Brazil, the 
EU, Colombia, Peru and Uruguay in JOB/AG/99  (17 July 2017 ); Submission by New Zealand, Australia, Canada 
and Paraguay in JOB/AG/100  (17 July 2017 ); Submission by China and India in JOB/AG/102 (18 July 2017 ); 
Communication by Switzerland on behalf of the G10 in JOB/AG/103  (18 July 2017 ); Communication by Japan 
in JOB/AG/104  (19 July 2017 ); Submission by Guyana on Behalf of the ACP Group  in JOB/AG/112 
(6 October  2017);  Proposal by New Zealand, Australia, Canada, Chile and Paraguay in JOB/AG/114 
(17 October 2017) ; Proposal by Argentina in JOB/AG/1 20 (2 No vember 2017); P roposal by Mexico in 
JOB/AG/124 (17  November 2017) ; Proposal by the Philippines in JOB/AG/127 (27 November 2017); Proposal 
by Russia in JOB/AG/129 ( 29 November 2017); and Proposal by Rwanda on Behalf of the African Group in 
JOB/GC/165 -JOB/TNC/67 -JOB/AG/132  (1 December 2017) . However, s tatistical  papers are not covered as they 
were submitted primarily in support of views  and ideas put forward elsewhere . 
5 Relevant proposals include a Submission  by New Zealand, Australia, Canada and Paraguay in 
JOB/AG/100 (17 July 2017); Communication by Switzerland on behalf of the G10 in JOB/AG/103  
(18 July 2017) and C ommunication by Japan in JOB/AG/104  (19 July 2017 ); Proposal by Argentina in 
JOB/AG/1 20 (2 No vember 2017); and P roposal by Mexico in JOB/AG/124 (17 November 2017).  TN/AG/37/Rev.1  
 
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  support, at least initially. Many Members, however, prefer a wider coverage that would also include 
the Blue Box and/or Article 6.2 support. Some Members have expressed strong reservations 
against the potential inclusion of Blue Box, de minimis  and/or Article 6.2  support . Special 
treatment in the form of a longer implementation p eriod has also be en suggested for Members 
with trade -distorting Domestic Support above a certain level.  
Aggregate Measurement of Support  (AMS)  
2.20.   A number of Members are of the view that priority should be given to further reducing AMS 
entitlements.6 Some even go further by c alling for the complete elimination of AMS for all Members 
or limited only to developed Members. T aking into account the Doha mandate, some of t hese 
Members have reviewed  their position by demanding  that a first step towards the elimination of 
AMS could be taken at MC11. One proposal builds on this idea and suggests that a cut could be 
taken at MC11. For many Members, however, the elimination of current AMS entitlements is 
unrealistic  and that there is a need for proportionality in the commitments t o be assumed by 
Members . 
De minimis  
2.21.   Some Members have argued that in view of the increasing VoP of several developing 
countries, particularly the large r ones, any reform to level the playing field should include de 
minimis  support . However, many Members, p articularly developing country Members have 
indicated that de minimis is a very sensitive issue for them  and could not accept any proposals 
calling for their current level to be reduced. Members seeking  reduction in trade -distorting 
Domestic Support have b een considering the idea of an overall limit that would further discipline 
the use of trade -distorting Domestic Support in general, rather than seeking a reduction in de 
minimis  entitlement per se . The views and ideas put forward  in the course of the year  also 
include d exclusion of de minimis  entitlement from any additional limitation; exclusion of LDCs, Net 
Food Importing Developing Countries (NFIDCs), and developing country Members in general from 
any additional commitment; and curtailing the de minimis  entitlement notably for the world's 
largest producers and exporters.  
Blue Box  
2.22.   A number of Members have expressed the view that disciplines governing the Blue Box 
should be re -evaluated considering its potential to distort trade. Among the disciplines sugge sted 
are a fixed overall limit; product -specific limits; and its inclusion in an overall trade-distorting 
Domestic Support coverage – immediately or at a later stage.  
2.23.   However, a number of Members consider the Blue box as a sensitive issue for them. They 
argue that the Blue Box is less trade distorting than the Amber Box  and facilitates reforms which 
would level the playing field and introduce more competition in the agricultural sector.  
Product -Specific Disciplines  
2.24.   Many Members consider product -specific l imits or disciplines as a necessary element to limit 
trade -distorting Domestic Support. However, doubts have been cast by several Members about the 
feasibility of an outcome at MC11. The views and ideas put forward since a year include product -
specific num erical limits; limits expressed as a percentage of the overall trade -distorting Domestic 
Support, as a percentage of the VoP of the products in question, or in per capita terms. Others 
have suggested product -specific AMS limits; overall limit on product -specific AMS, particularly for 
products of interest to the LDCs; product -specific Blue Box limits; product -specific limits to trade -
distorting D omestic Support; and linking trade -distorting support and exports .  
2.25.   There is also a suggestion to focus on those p roducts which benefit most from Article 6 o f 
the AoA  and which are of specific interest to developing country Members, including LDCs, NFIDCs 
                                                
6 See, for example, the Submission by China and India in JOB/AG/102 (18 July 2017) and the Proposal 
by Rwanda on Behalf of the African Group in  JOB/GC/165 -JOB/TNC/67 -JOB/AG/132  (1 December 2017).  TN/AG/37/Rev.1  
 
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  and Small and Vulnerable Economies (SVEs). However, many Members have expressed their 
opposition to product -specif ic disciplines, whether in general or for developing country Members.  
2.26.   One recent proposal suggests putting the product -specific disciplines in the work 
programme, given the very divergent views of the Members on this issue.   
Article 6.2  
2.27.   Some Members are o f the view that the disciplines governing Article 6.2 should be re -visited 
considering the vast sums of money being spent by some developing Members. They argue that at 
least certain types of support under Article 6.2 (such as input subsidies) need to be d isciplined 
and/or its use be constrained by an overall limit to trade -distorting Domestic Support. One 
proposal advocates the establishment of a work program me to explore additional reductions and 
discipline s for all elements of Article 6, including Article 6.2 . However, a lmost all developing 
country Members consider support under Article 6.2 as a sensitive issue; several of them have 
indicated that they do not have flexibility to accommodate the demands of other Members.   
Green Box  
2.28.   While there is th e recognition that Green Box support is non - or minimally trade distorting, 
several Members would like it to be disciplined at some point owing to its increasing size and 
doubts about whether certain programmes meet the prescribed criteria.7 In addition, m any 
developing country Members have expressed the view that Green Box disciplines should be better 
adapted to their needs. However, many Members remain opposed to any change in the current 
disciplines.  
Transparency Provisions  
2.29.   The importance of transparency  in the WTO is widely acknowledged by Members. Many 
Members would like to see an enhancement of the relevant disciplines and/or stricter enforcement. 
One recent proposal suggests exploring ways to enhance the effectiveness of existing notifications 
requirements in document G/AG/2, as well as of their implementation, and to review and update 
these requirements as necessary. Other ideas to e nhance the transparency include additional data 
to be provided annually based on a questionnaire; annual dedicated discu ssions in the CoA; and 
punitive penalties for Members not fulfilling their transparency obligations, particularly large 
producers or large exporters of particular products.  
2.30.   Many developing country Members have, however, cautioned against onerous requirements, 
especially considering the difficulties that have been encountered by some of them in fulfilling the 
current requirements.  
Special and Differential Treatment  
2.31.   The import ance of special and differential treatment (SDT) for developing country Members 
is recognised by all Members. There appears to be a general understanding that no further 
commitment would be required from LDCs. However, while there is a recognition that SDT  should 
be provided to all developing country Members, there are divergences as to the nature of 
flexibilities to be granted. The views and ideas put forward include higher overall limit (expressed 
as higher percentage or higher numerical limit) for develo ping country Members and longer 
implementation periods or same limit as developed Members but longer implementation period for 
them; exemption of developing country Members or SVEs and NFIDCs from binding reduction 
commitments; and technical assistance and  capacity building to help the implementation of 
disciplines.  
  
                                                
7 See, for example, the communication by Benin on behalf of the LDC Group in JOB/AG/90  
(13 January  2017). See further Proposal by Rwanda on Behalf of the African Group in JOB/GC/165 - 
JOB/TNC/67 -JOB/AG/13 2 (1 December 2017).  
 TN/AG/37/Rev.1  
 
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  2.3  COTTON  
General  
2.32.   All Members recognize the mandate , agreed  more than 13 years ago , that Cotton  be 
addressed "ambitiously, expeditiously and specifically within the agriculture negotiations " and most 
Members have continued during all my consultations to express their support to a meaningful and 
specific outcome on Cotton.  
2.33.   This being said, a couple of delegations have consistently cast doubts about the possibility 
of achieving a  substantive outcome at MC11, taking into account the overall negotiating 
environment.  
Domestic Support  
2.34.   Cotton Domestic Support remains the central and most controversial issue in the 
negotiations on Cotton  and the views remain far apart on what could constitute a poss ible outcome 
in this area.  
2.35.   As indicated in the Compilation Document JOB/AG/128, in addition to the C4 proposal 
contained in document TN/AG/GEN/46, several other submissions on Domestic Support also 
include specific suggestions on Cotton Domestic Support.  
2.36.   More generally, several Members continue to highlight the existence of a de facto  link 
between the overall negotiation on Domestic Support and the negotiation on Cotton Domestic 
Support.  The C4 considered that this link is contrary to the spirit of the agr eed mandate to address 
cotton " ambitiously, expeditiously and specifically " and reaffirmed the need for a substantial 
outcome on cotton Domestic Support at MC11.  
 Trade -Distorting Support  
2.37.   The positions remain divided between three main possible general appr oaches on how to 
address Cotton trade-distorting support:  
a)   The C4 proposal suggests a combination of disciplines addressing trade -distorting support 
(AMS, Blue Box and de minimis ) including differentiated level of reductions for developed 
Members with fin al Bound Total AMS Commitments and reduction in AMS support for 
developing country Members with final Bound Total AMS Commitments based on the level of 
support notified during a reference period. The C4 proposal also includes a cap for all Members 
applicab le on AMS and Blue Box  support  based on Members de minimis  entitlements.  
The C4 proposal generated  various questions from Members, as well as some specific concerns 
related to the idea of a differentiation between developing country Members on the basis of 
whether or not they have AMS commitments. Several Members considered that the C4 
proposal was too ambitious in the current overall negotiation context.  
b)   Several Members favour a limit o n Cotton trade-distorting support  expressed as a 
percentag e of Cotton VoP as detailed , for example , in the proposals JOB/AG/99 and 
JOB/AG /120. In these proposals, trade-distorting support would be composed initially of de 
minimis  and AMS only. By contrast, t he C4 considered that a floating limit would not be 
sufficiently constraining.  
c)   Another group of Members insist on the need to first address the AMS granted to Cotton  
beyond the de minimis  level and oppose any new disciplines on de minimis  for developing 
country Members without an AMS commitment.  
2.38.   It seems generally ac cepted from the proposals and the discussions that LDCs should be 
exempted from any new commitments . TN/AG/37/Rev.1  
 
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  2.39.   The C4  also called for a figures -based negotiation in order to compare the various levels of 
support and cuts in Cotton  subsidies in the different boxes that would result from the different 
proposals currently on the table.  
2.40.   Recalling  its strong scepticism about any possible substantive outcome on Cotton Domestic 
Support in the current  negotiating environment, one delegatio n invited participants to turn their 
attention to a possible post -MC11 work programme in which Cotton  could be included.  
2.41.   Several Members have expressed the view that the negotiations should ultimately a im at 
eliminating all types of D omestic Support that h ave distorting effects on the Cotton  market, while 
others have suggested a review clause following a certain period of time after MC11 with a view to 
agreeing on the next steps to be taken in phasing out trade -distorting Domestic Support provided 
for Cotto n.  
 Green Box  
2.42.   While all Members recognize the Ministerial mandate to treat Cotton  ambitiously, 
expeditiously and specifically, many Members considered that further disciplines on Green Box 
direct payments granted to Cotton  producers as suggested by the C4 in its proposal could not be 
achieved at MC11. Some Members are of the view that it is not a realistic option for the time 
being , while some others have opposed t he proposal on more fundamental grounds . 
Other elements  
2.43.   As regards the other components of Cotton  – Market Access, Export Competition, 
implementation and follow up as well as development assistance  – Members  have reaffirmed the 
continued relevance of the Nairobi Decision.  
2.44.   Most delegations agreed that this fact coul d be recognized in a Cotton  outcome at MC11 as 
suggested by the C4 in paragraphs 10 to 13 of TN/AG/GEN/46, subject to possible minor edits 
aimed at updating references to various timelines contained in the Nairobi Decision.  
2.45.   It also appears to me, following  the 8th Dedicated Discussion of the relevant trade -related 
developments for Cotton  held on 17  November 2017 that the upcoming launch of a joint WTO/ITC  
Cotton Portal could be recognized in a Ministerial text on Cotton.  
2.4  MARKET ACCESS  
General  
2.46.   The discussions on Market Access have benefitted from technical work done by Members on 
topics such as tropical products, tariff overhang, tariff peaks, tariff escalation and the S SG. The 
need for enhanced transparency and updated Market Access information has been highlighted by 
some Members in order to make progress in the Market Access negotiations.  
2.47.   In May 2017, Paraguay and Peru in their submission8, sought to pursue agricultural  Market 
Access negotiations in an incremental manner.9 The two Members also proposed to focus, as a first 
step, on the following specific issues so as to arrive at sp ecific outcomes on them by the T welfth 
Session of the Ministerial Conference (MC12): tariff simplification, tariff peaks, tariff escalation and 
bound in -quota tariffs. The proponents sought Members' engagement in Market Access 
negotiations post -MC11 towards establishing parameters for meaningful Market Access through 
tariff reduction and the revision of tariff rate quotas.  
2.48.   Specifically on the theme o f tariff simplification, one more submission10 was presented by 
Tunisia to Members. A few Members support ed tariff simplification as a potential outcome at MC11. 
                                                
8 Submission by  Paraguay and Peru in JOB/AG/93 ( 29 May 2017 ). 
9 A similar idea of pursuing market access reforms in an incremental manner was also contained in the 
submission from the Cai rns Group in document JOB/AG/91 ( 19 May 2017 ). 
10 JOB/AG/119  (30 October 2017 ). TN/AG/37/Rev.1  
 
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  Some of these Members , however, suggested focussing only on highly complex forms of tariffs, 
rather than seeking an outright conversion of all non -ad valorem  tariffs into ad valorem  
equivalents.  
2.49.   Generally, Members  have not engaged in detailed technic al discussions on the specific 
Market Access elements included in the various proposals. It became clear subsequently that with 
the limited time available before  MC11, it would not be possible to address complex and technical 
issues such as tariff simplification , and achieve appropriate outcomes. The proponents have since 
redirected their nego tiating efforts towards achieving an agreement on a detaile d post -MC11 work 
programme for M arket Access negotiations.   
2.50.   Some other Members have also  supported the idea of negotiations on a post -MC11 work 
programme to guide the M arket Access negotiations. H owever , a number of Members have 
cautioned against a selective picking and choosing among the various Market Access issues in any 
work programme that may be agreed.  
2.51.   A number of developing country Members (including LDCs and SVEs) have underlined the 
impor tance of incorporating SDT in any negotiating framework that is agreed in the area of Market 
Access. Some developing country Members have expressed the view that a lower priority should 
be accorded to Market Access negotiations considering their defensive concerns about preference 
erosion. The point about para llel progress in non -agricultural  Market Access and services Market 
Access negotiations has also come  up in the discussions.  
2.52.   Article XII Members have underscored the need for their special situation to be taken into 
account in the negotiations in view of the extensive Market Access commitments assumed by them 
at the time of accession.  
Work Programme  
2.53.   Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Thailand and Uruguay have recently presented a 
submission11 containing a work pro gramme for the continuation of M arket Access reform in 
agriculture. The proposed work programme has been discussed both in open -ended CoA -SS 
meeting s and in a limited group format  and generally received broad support .  
2.54.   Several develop ing Members have echoed their concerns on the lack of SDT in the proposed 
text. A specific request has also been made by a group of developing country Members to suitably 
acknowledge the issue of preference erosion. Some importing Members have expressed concerns 
about a few aspects of the proposed work programme , including on paragraph 2 , which  they 
consider prejudge the outcome  of the negotiations . The proposal to conduct negotiations in 
dedicated sessions and have yearly transparency and monitoring exerci ses on Market Access has 
also been questioned by some Members.  
2.55.   The proponents have since circulated a revised submission12 taking into account some of the 
comments Members made on the original submission.  
2.56.   In the most recent discussions, some Members reitera ted their view that the revised 
proposal  still include d elements that might potentially prejudge an outcome  and as such could not 
be the basis for future work . Furthermore, some Memb ers stressed that without parallel progress 
in the market access negotiations in non -agricultural market access and trade in services, they 
could not envisage negotiations in agricultur al market access. The need to have a simply -worded 
work programme modelled on the basis of Paragraph 31 of the Nairobi Declaration w as 
emphasi sed by some Members.  
  
                                                
11 JOB/AG/122 and Corr.1  (9 November 2017 ). 
12 JOB/AG/122/Rev.1  (20 November 2017 ). TN/AG/37/Rev.1  
 
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  Spec ial Agricultural Safeguard (SSG)  
2.57.   Several Members have proposed a decision at MC11 on the elimination of SSG rights 
(Article  5 of the AoA) of WTO Members.13 This position has been endorsed by some other 
Members.  
2.58.   Simultaneous ly, some other Members have expressed their opposition to the elimination of  
the SSG. Some of them consider the SSG as forming part of the delicate balance that was reached 
during the Uruguay Round . A number of Members also doubt that SSG elimination would  be 
feasible in isolation of broader Market Access reforms.  
2.59.   Some of these proposals14 have also included a possibility for Members to negotiate access 
to or an improve ment of  the SSG until its elimination b y all.  A few Members have expressed 
support for such a negotiating window; simultaneously a number of other Members have 
expressed opposition to any idea of extension of the SSG to Members which are not currently 
eligible , or a relaxation of the existing SSG con ditions in Article 5 of the A oA. One proponent has 
identified SSG "improvement " to be a possible approach to address its concerns related to price 
volatility and market distortions and has considered a successful outcome addressing these 
concerns to be ind ispensable for the success of  MC11.  
2.5  SPECIAL SAFEGUARD MEC HANISM  (SSM)  
General  
2.60.   The discussions on SSM continue to reveal the contrasting readings of the negotiating 
mandate among Members . Relying on various mandates, including the Nairobi Ministerial 
Declar ation, the G33, supported by some other developing country Members, have sought an 
outcome on SSM at MC11 without accepting any linkage with other negotiating issues . However, 
several Members are strongly opposed to an outcome on SSM in isolation and, especially, in the 
absence of a Market Access outcome.  
2.61.   The G33 contends that an SSM for developing country Members is needed to enable them to 
effectively address the negative impacts of international price volatility on  resource -poor small -
scale farmers.15 Other developing country Members have also supported an agreement on SSM to 
also counter price volatility and remedy the existing distortions in international agricultural trade.  
2.62.   A number of other Members do not consid er the SSM to be the appropriate remedy to 
address price volatility. One Member also stressed that Members that  were not responsible for 
causing distortions in international trade should be exempted from the application of the SSM. 
2.63.   A number of developing c ountry Members with SSG rights also support an outcome on SSM, 
as they consider the existing SSG provisions to be complex and not attuned to addressing the 
needs of developing country Members facing import surges and/or price depressions . 
Outstanding Issues  
2.64.   The G33 has elaborated on the following outstanding issues in connection with the SSM with 
a view to reaching agreement on the technical aspects and leaving the bigger political decisions to 
be made later by Ministers: product coverage, capping of r emedies , and treatment of trade under 
                                                
13 Submission by Paraguay, Argentina, Australia, Chile, Colombia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Peru, Uruguay 
and Viet Nam in JOB/AG/85, C orr.1, Corr. 2 (15 November 2016 ); Submission s by the Russian Federation in 
JOB/AG/95 (29 May 2017 ), and JOB/AG/116  (19 October 2017 ) and Submission from the Philippines in 
JOB/AG/121 (8 November 2017) . 
14 JOB/AG/116 (19 October 2017 ), JOB/AG/121 (8 November 2017 ), and JOB/AG/123 
(10 November  2017). 
15 Submission by the G33 in TN/AG/GEN/45  (29 May 2017 ). TN/AG/37/Rev.1  
 
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  Free Trade Agreements (FTA).16 To facilitate those technical discussions, the G33 submitted a set 
of specific questions on certain outstanding issues.17 
2.65.   The level of engagement on these issues has been limited . Some Memb ers did emphasize a 
few aspects related to these issues, especially concerning the capping of remedies and treatment 
of FTA trade. These were, however, a re -statement of their well -known positions. Some Members 
have indicated their willingness to discuss t echnical aspects related to product coverage.  
Recent Discussions  
2.66.   The G33 has suggested focussing on a partial concrete outcome on SSM at MC11 in the 
form of either a volume -based or a price -based SSM.18 Not all G33 Members have expressed their 
support for this proposal. Some stated that they were in the process of examining the proposal 
and reserved their right to present their views later. The incremental approach included in the 
proposal has not led to any discernible change in the negotiating position of  other Members. The 
recent discussions have rather remained one -sided with only the proponents participating in the 
discussions.   
2.67.   A few Members believe that the only feasible outcome on SSM at MC11 would be a decision 
on the continuation of the SSM negoti ations post -MC11. One Member has underlined the 
difficulties it would have in accepting an outcome at MC11 in the form of a continuing work 
programme on SSM. It would rather prefer a concrete outcome, albeit , a partial one on SSM at 
MC11 , and suggested an outline19 of such a partial outcome based on the price -based SSM. 
However, the submission by that Member , being made at a late stage in the Geneva preparatory 
process for MC11 , generated only preliminary discussions and feedback  from Members . 
2.6  EXPORT PROHIBI TIONS AND  RESTRICTIONS  
General  
2.68.   The discussions on this  subjec t have been facilitated by a proposal  from Singapore  in 
JOB/AG/101  (17 July 2017 ) and its revised version circulated as JOB/AG/101/Rev.1 on 
9 November  2017 as well as a submission  from Israel, Japan, Korea, Switzerland  and 
Chinese  Taipei circulated as JOB/AG/115 on 18 October  2017. Following discussions on 
Singapore' s proposal, it circulated a second revised proposal , JOB/AG/101/Rev.2,  on 
1 December  2017. This revised proposal  could not  be discussed by the Membership before the 
issuance of my revised report.    
2.69.   My consultations have confirmed that many Members consider that there could be an 
outcome in t he area of Export Prohibitions and  Restrictions at MC11 , and th at Singapore' s proposal  
could be a basis for a decision by Ministers at MC11.  
2.70.   However, some Members still have concerns  about some elements in the proposal . One 
Member in particular has stated its opposition to an outcome at MC 11, as it believes  it is the first 
step to limit the  policy space available to developing countries to make use of this important policy 
tool to further their economic development.  Some  Members  have expressed the view that an 
outcome could not be envisaged in the absence of a broader agricultural package .  
Advanc e Notification  
2.71.   The revised proposal JOB/AG/101/Rev.1 by Singapore suggests that the advance notice for 
an export prohibition or re striction , to be made in accordance with subparagraph 1(b) of Article 12 
of the AoA, should be submitted at least 30 days prior to the coming into force of the measure . 
However, this time frame may be dispensed with when there is a  critical shortage of foodstuffs 
caused by an event constituting force majeure . 
                                                
16 Submission by the G33 in JOB/AG/96 ( 29 May 2017 ). 
17 Submission by the G33 in JOB/AG/106  (19 July 2017 ). 
18 JOB/AG/11 1 and Corr.1, 2  and 3 (15 September 2017 ). 
19 Submission by the Philippines in JOB/AG/130 (29 November 2017).  TN/AG/37/Rev.1  
 
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  2.72.   Many Members expressed their support for the language proposed  by Singapore . However, 
some Members , particularly net -food importing developing countries , favoured an advance notice 
period longer than 30 days, so as to enable them to make alternative arrangements.  It was noted 
that the term "force majeure " was an ambi valent term and that it should be avoided in the text . 
The issue of shipments " en route " was also raised.  
2.73.   Some Members cautioned , however , against the risk of making the notification requirements 
too burdensome for developing country Members. The view was expressed that the proposed time 
frame of 30 days would limit the policy space of developing countries. It was also noted that it was 
not always possible to anticipate sudden demand/supply mismatches and that advance notification 
might lead to market m anipulation . 
2.74.   In this context, t he possibility of not making the time limit mandatory was discussed  and 
drafting suggestions to reflect this option were made . While expressing a preference for the 
language proposed by Singapore in its proposal JOB/AG/101/Rev.1 , some Members  indicated that 
they might consider such an approach, if this c ould help bridge the gaps in Members ' positions on 
this issue. Building upon my consulta tions on this issue, the latest  proposal by Singapore , 
JOB/AG/101/Rev.2 , now includes such an option as a possible alternative to its initial proposal.   
Content of notification, consultation , reporting and monitoring  
2.75.   The revised proposal JOB/AG/101/Rev.1 by Singapore also includes  provisions related to the 
content of notice as well as on consultation, reporting, and monitoring  in paragraphs 3 to 7.  
2.76.   These provisions did not generate lengthy debates amongst the Membership . However, it 
was noted  that the suggested provisions might be too onerous , including the one requiring that 
reasons be provided for the instituti on of restrictive measures. It was also noted that the proposed 
text was redundant considering the existing language in the A oA. In its latest proposal , 
JOB/AG/101/Rev.2, Singapore has taken on bo ard the concerns expressed and has deleted these 
paragraphs .  
Exemptions for Foodstuffs Purchased for Non -Commercial Humanitarian Purposes  
2.77.   Singapore's  proposal s specif y that foodstuffs purchased for non -commercial humanitarian 
purposes by the World Food Programme shall be exempted from the application of Export 
Prohibitions and  Restrictions.  
2.78.   While many Members supported this proposal, the view  was expressed that this provision 
would limit  Members' flexibility in applying such measures and that WFP purchase s were made on 
commercial terms.  One Member  suggested discussing after MC11 how the WTO could assist the 
WFP humanitarian efforts, but in a context de -linked from the proposal on transparency o f export 
restrictions.  
Special and Differential Treatment  
2.79.   The SDT provisions contained in Singapore's revised proposal  JOB/AG/101/Rev.1  replicate 
the S DT provisions contained in p aragraph 2 of Article 12 of the AoA and also exempt  LDCs.  
2.80.   In my consultations, there was broad support for Singapore' s approach , but a few  Members 
questioned the relation ship between the proposed language and the text of Article 12.2 of the AoA. 
The need to  permit NFIDCs  to benefit  from these SDT provisions  was also mentioned , as reflected 
in the proposal JOB/AG/101/Rev.2 .  
Other issues  
2.81.   Israel, Japan, Korea, Swi tzerland and Chinese Taipei  suggested addressing complementary 
elements in relation to Export Prohibitions and Restrictions in their submission JOB/AG/115 , 
namely: Duration of measures, status of net -food importers , and clarificati on of foodstuffs.  TN/AG/37/Rev.1  
 
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  2.82.   While s ome Members  expressed an  interest in these issues, there was broad agreement that 
an outcome on these issues cannot be envisaged at MC11 and that they should be addressed post-
MC11 . 
Post-MC11 work programme  
2.83.   Several Members welcomed the inclusion of a reference to the  continuation of the work on 
Export Prohibitions and Restrictions after MC11  in paragraph 10 of Singapore's revised propo sal, 
as they thought further discussions on the topic were warranted. This view was opposed  by some 
Members , who said there  was no basis for continuing discussions on this topic post -MC11.  It was 
noted that th is issue could only be discussed as part of the overall agricultural negotiations and not 
in isolation.  
2.7  EXPORT COMPETITION  
2.84.   Canada, Chile and Switzerland  circulated on 10 November  2017 a proposal containing 
possible language on a post -MC11 work programme on Export Competition in document 
RD/AG/61 . I detected broad support for this proposal.  
2.85.   A couple of concerns were expressed, including on how the proposal relate d to the review 
process foreseen to be undertaken by the Co A in the December 2015 Ministerial Decision . Some 
Members indicated that they were still assessing the proposal by Canada, Chile an d Switzerland . 
2.8  SANITARY AND PHYTOSA NITARY M EASURES  
2.86.   Following the  submission of a discussion paper  by Brazil and Argentina on 30 May 2017  in 
RD/AG/57 , Brazil  circulated on 10 November  2017 a proposal containing possible language on a 
post-MC11 work programme on SPS in document RD/AG/62.  
2.87.   Several Members , while acknowledging the ir interest in the SPS proposal,  considered that 
these issues could be addressed by the SPS Committee , which already had a mandate and did not 
need a Ministerial Decision to continue its work.  Some Members indicated that the y were still 
assessing the proposal by Brazil.  
3  RECOMMENDATIONS  
3.1  PUBLIC STOCK HOLDING FOR FOOD SECURITY PURPOSES  
3.1.  Taking into account the proposals on the table and what I have heard in different meetings 
and the strong opposition by many Members to the unlimi ted exemption of market price support 
provided under the public stockholding programmes, my assessment is that in the absence of 
parallel progress on Domestic S upport, a Permanent Solution  based on the Bali Decision  is most 
likely to attract convergence among the Membership .  
3.2.  With respect to transparency, m any Members feel that the provisions in the BMD should be 
made more operable , otherwise it would be difficult for developing countries to make use of the 
Decision.  Some Members disagreed with this view and said that the transparency provisions in the 
BMD should be maintained at the minimum and preferably strengthened. In their view, this was 
necessary to ensure that public stockholding programmes were not causing tr ade distortions or 
undermining the food security of other Members. In recent discussions and following the tabling of 
the Norway/Singapore proposal, some Members have indicated the ir willingness to re-examine the 
transparency requirements considered too onerous  by developing Members .  
3.3.  In that regard, some Members welcomed the transparency provisions in the 
Norway/Singapore proposal, which envisages , inter alia , developing Members being given not later 
than 18 months to submit their domestic support notifica tions after the end of reporting period. 
Regarding safeguards, it is the view of some Members that the provisions in the BMD should be 
maintained a nd that it was unnecessary to add any new provisions to clarify the existing agreed 
language in the Decision.  Many Members disagree with this view and several of them have argued , 
inter alia , for an explicit provision prohibiting direct or indirect exports from procured stocks . The TN/AG/37/Rev.1  
 
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  point has also been made that the safeguard provisions s hould be strengthened if a  decision was 
taken to extend the country and programme coverage in the BMD.    
3.4.  I believe that substantive progress has been made in the PSH negotiations and that a 
decision is within reach if all Members engage constructively and move away from their entre nched 
positions , particularly  on the key negotiating issues of transparency and safeguards. I am of the 
considered view that the Norway/Singapore proposal provides Members with a good platform  to 
address the outstanding issues and reach an agreement in fulfilment of the Ministerial mandate to 
find a solution by the end of this year.   
3.2  DOMESTIC SUPPORT  
3.5.  There have been many submissions and proposals on Domestic Support. However, Members' 
negotiating positions on the key issues still remain far apart despite the attempts by several 
Members to bridge the gaps through recent proposals. While several Members are in favour of a 
commitment t o set an overall limit on trade -distorting Domestic Support, others disagree  that such 
a limit is needed. They rather argue that it would be important to address AMS limits, particularly 
product specific AMS entitlements whic h are mostly responsible for distortions in trade. Among the 
proponents of an overall limit, there is disagreement as to the coverage : AMS and de minimis  
support; AMS, de minimis  and Blue Box s upport; and all Article 6 support, including Article 6.2.  
Unles s there is a significant change in Members ' positions on the key negotiating issues and a 
recalibration of the level of ambition in the next few days, I would recommend that M embers work 
towards a limited outcome in the form of a decision on some core prin ciples  that would also 
include  a work programme to guide the negotiations post -MC11 .  
3.3  COTTON  
3.6.  Based on my consultations, I believe that the Nairobi Decision pertaining to Cotton  in the 
areas of Market Access, Export Competition, Implementation and Development assistance can be 
reaffirmed and the work undertaken since then acknowledged. It is my considered view that an 
agreement could potentially be reached on textual elements bas ed on the C4 proposal in this 
regard.  
3.7.  More specifically, it could be envisaged to use the Market Access text suggested by the C4 in 
paragraph 10 of its proposal  in TN/AG/GEN/46 , complemented by  an explicit renewal of the 
biannual review of the list of prod ucts annexed to the Nairobi  Ministerial Decision on Cotton and  an 
acknowledgment of the launch of the Cotton Portal . On Export Competition, Development and 
Implementation and follow up , the text suggested by the C4 in paragraphs 11, 12 and 13 of its 
propos al could be used, wi th updates as appropriate, regarding the D irector General 's regular 
reports to the Ministerial Conferences.    
3.8.  As regards Cotton Domestic Support, the divergences remain too wide for me to make a 
recommendation on the way forward. Conseq uently, I would suggest  merely juxtapos ing for 
reference the different options suggested in the cotton -specific proposals circulated by Members, 
including the C4.  I invite Members to reflect on what can be envisaged in this area at MC11.  
3.4  MARKET ACCESS  
3.9.  Based on my consultations thus far, it appears to me that the joint revised submission from 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Thailand and Uruguay in JOB/AG/122/Rev.1, which incorporates 
some of the comments received following the initial proposal , could  form a basis of a possible work 
programme to guide negotiations on this issue post -MC11.  I therefore invite Members to work 
together and make all efforts to achieve convergence based on this proposal, taking into account 
the specific concerns and issues r aised by Members . 
3.10.   Notwithstanding the repeated calls for the elimination of SSG by the proponents at MC11 , 
the positions of Members have not evolved. A large group of Members with SSG rights has stated 
clearly that the elimination of SSG might be contempla ted only within the framework of the market 
access reform process.  There is also not a common view among the proponents on the sort of 
improvements that could be made to the SSG and what could be achiev ed at MC11. I will therefore TN/AG/37/Rev.1  
 
- 17 - 
 
  invite Members to reflect  on what could possibly be achieved at MC11 and the issues that could be 
addressed post-MC11.  
3.5  SPECIAL SAFEGUARD ME CHANISM (SSM)  
3.11.   I would encourage Members to reflect on the collective mandate that the Ministers gave us 
at Nairobi to negotiate an SSM for dev eloping country Members in dedicated sessions of the 
CoA-SS. Despite a number of submissions from the G33 on this topic, the positions of Members 
remain far apart and recent discussions have not manage d to bridge the gaps in negotiating 
positions.  
3.12.   I am aware of the efforts being made by one Member, among the proponents, to make 
progress on this issue, including through the consideration of a partial outcome initially targeting 
the price -based mechanism only. However, the progress made thus far in thos e discussions has 
not been sufficient to provide me with a basis to make specific recommendations for a way forward 
at MC11 . 
3.6  EXPORT PROHIBITIONS AND RESTRICTIONS  
3.13.   There is an acknowledgement among most Members that an outcome on Export Prohibitions 
and Rest rictions is possible at MC 11. One Member  has stated that it cannot envisage an outcome, 
as it would erode its policy space to use this policy instrument for its economic development. Some 
Members have also indicated that they cannot envisage a stand -alone  outcome on export 
prohibitions and restrictions and that it needed to be part of a bro ader A griculture package. 
Notwithstanding these concerns, it is my considered view that Singapore' s latest proposal  offers 
Members a platform to further engage with a view to reaching an agreement on this issue at 
MC11. I suggest that Members continue exploring language which could accommodate the 
remaining concerns.    
3.7  EXPORT COMPETITION  
3.14.   There was broad support for the proposal by Canada, Chile and Switzerland in docume nt 
RD/AG/61, which contains elements that could be included in a work programme post -MC11  and I 
consider this proposal constitutes a potential basis for a post -MC11 work programme in this area.  
3.8  SANITARY AND PHYTOSA NITARY MEASURES  (SPS)  
3.15.   In this area, severa l Members doubted whether an outcome on SPS was relevant  in the 
context of the Agriculture negotiations  but the text suggested by Brazil in document RD/AG/62 
nevertheless remains on the table . 
4  CONCLUSION  
4.1.  This report is an honest effort on my part to accura tely ca pture the state of play of the 
Agriculture negotiation at this point in time.  
4.2.  My responsibility as Chair also requires me to clearly identify at this stage  what I see as 
potential deliver ables at MC11 based on the proposals as well as the meetings,  consultations and 
informal contacts I have had thus far with Members. By doing so, I hope I can effectively help the 
Membership to prioriti ze and focus on issues in respect of which outcomes are within reach and 
provide the necessary directions to guide n egotiations in respect of issues where significant 
outcomes could not be achieved at MC11.  
4.3.  As you will have seen from my recommendations, I consider that there is basis for 
agreements to be reached at MC11 on PSH and Export Prohibitions and Restrictions. A Decision 
could also be envisage d on Cotton at MC11. Regarding D omestic Support, I have recommended 
that unless there is a significant shift in Members ' positions  in the next few days , they should  
pursue a limite d outcome in the form of a decision on some core principles that would also include  
a work programme to guide the negotiations post -MC11  owing to persistent differences in the ir 
negotiating positions . With regard to SSM , I am not in a position to propose a ny specific 
recommendations for a way forward considering the wide divergence s in Members' positions . TN/AG/37/Rev.1  
 
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  Regarding other negotiating issues, my assessment is that the best possible outcome will be a 
post-MC11 work programme. I suggest considering the work pro gramme for all these outstanding 
negotiating issues together in order to ensure consistency and coherence  in approach . 
4.4.  While I had initially envisaged circulating draft texts , where appropriate , in these 
recommendations for Members ' consideration, I decided not to do so as Members had indicated to 
me that they would like to further engage on the negotiating issues both in Geneva and Buenos 
Aires. Consequently, I therefore decided to limit the scope of this document to the current sta tus 
of the negotiations in the various areas and also provide my final recommendations to Members on 
how they could usefully approach the outstanding issues . It is my expectation that th ey will 
stimulate further discussions among Members paving the way for  agreements to be reached by 
Ministers on some of the negotiating issues and decisions reached on work programmes for the 
remaining issues contributing to a successful Ministerial outcome on Agriculture at MC11.  
4.5.  Last but not least, Members have undertaken significant work in the negotiations through the 
attendance of numerous meetings and the submission of proposals  including in the very last days , 
which are reflected in the Compilation Document JOB/AG/128. It is my sincere hope this important 
body of work will not be lost and will constitute a solid basis for Members ' work post -MC11.  
4.6.  Let me conclude by confirming that I remain fully committed to facilitating co nvergence in 
every way possible in the remaining days before MC11  and at the Ministerial Conference itself .  
 
__________