RESTRICTED  
  
TN/C/M/37  
 
5 October 2015  
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Trade Negotiations Committee 
31 July 2015    
 
 MINUTES OF MEETING 
HELD IN THE CENTRE WILLIAM RAPPARD ON 31 JULY 2015 
Chairman: Mr. Roberto Azevêdo (Director-General) 
Contents 
 
1   STATEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN .................................................................................. 1  
2   REPORTS BY THE CHAIRP ERSONS OF THE BODIES ES TABLISHED BY THE TNC ........... 4  
3   STATEMENTS BY  PARTICIP ANTS ............................................................................... 13  
ANNEX - STATEMENT BY MALAYSIA ON  BEHALF OF THE ASSOCIATION OF 
SOUTHEAST ASIAN NA TIONS (ASE AN) .......................................................................... 51  
 
1  STATEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN 
1.1.  The Chairman said that Members had been working to fulfil a mandate that had been 
originally given to them in Bali in December 2013. The key line of the Bali Ministerial Declaration 
read: "we instruct the Trade Negotiations Comm ittee to prepare within the next 12 months a 
clearly defined work program on the remaining Doha Development Agenda (DDA) issues". In that context, the Declaration had also been clear that Members should build on the decisions taken in Bali, particularly on agriculture, development and least-developed countries (LDCs) issues, as well 
as all other issues under the Doha mandate that were central to concluding the Round. In doing 
so, Members had to prioritize issues in the Bali  package where legally binding outcomes had not 
been achieved. This had been followed by the General Council Decision of November 2014, which 
had moved the deadline for agreeing the work pr ogram to July 2015. That deadline expired on 
31 July 2015. 
1.2.  The Chairman recalled that Members' work to deliver on this mandate had begun in 2014, 
but had gained renewed momentum in January 2015. Since then work had taken place in an 
intensive manner on three main tracks: in the negotiating groups, where the seeds of the work program would have to be sown; meetings conven ed by Members themselves; and the Chairman's 
own consultations with different configurations of the membership, including meetings of the full 
membership. This formal TNC meeting was the eleventh meeting of all Members this year, 
counting meetings in the General Council, TNC or in Room W, where the work program had been at the top of the agenda.  
1.3.  The task had been to prepare a "clearly  defined" work program that Members had hoped 
would be detailed, precise, modalities-like and as specific as possible – covering all areas of the 
negotiations. The aim was for Members to be in a position to finalise negotiations in a more 
expedited way and to set the scene for the Tenth Ministerial Conference (MC10) in Nairobi. Some 
essential elements had emerged which had info rmed Members' approach. These had included: 
urgency, doability, creativity, resisting the te mptation to sequence work, and the primacy of 
development issues.  
1.4.  Members had also recognised the importance of placing special focus on the three core areas 
of agriculture, non-agricultural market access (NAMA) and services. From the Chairman's TN/C/M/37 
 
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  discussions with Members, it had been clear that the level of ambition in these three core areas 
would be linked, but that agriculture would be important in driving the process and in setting 
benchmarks. Discussions on these issues had continued with a very high level of engagement, but there had been few signs of convergence. This had proved to be the most significant obstacle to 
delivering on the mandate. It had had negative knock-on effects on progress in other areas. 
In light of this situation, he had asked the ne gotiating group Chairs to keep testing areas of 
convergence, and exploring views on possible ways forward.  
1.5.  He said that he could see some areas where outcomes seemed possible. In his view, there 
had been clear consensus on the need to deliver for LDCs. However, he had not yet seen this kind of potential in most elements of the core areas.  While there had been excellent engagement in the 
consultations, Members needed a higher level of attention at the political level if they were to 
move towards convergence.  
1.6.  He had provided Members with regular, detailed reports on progress, so he would not recap 
the work thus far in detail. Instead, he reported  on the discussions over the previous few weeks. 
He said that consultations had continued until the last minute. A number of negotiating groups had 
met over the previous few days, including agriculture, NAMA, services, Rules and the TRIPS Council Special Session. He had also continued his consultations with the intention of taking 
up some of the key issues in a horizontal manner.  In each case, he had invited the General Council 
Chairman, the Chairs of the relevant negotiating bodies, group coordinators and delegations with 
key interests in the issues at hand.  
1.7.  On 24 July, he had held a session on market access issues, covering the three areas of 
agriculture, NAMA and services. The meeting had ta ken place after the relevant negotiating groups 
had held their informal open-ended sessions. He had been informed that substantive positions had not evolved during those meetings and that, in some cases, there had been a hardening of 
positions. In his consultations, most delegations had shared the assessment that it would not be 
possible to agree to a work program by the end of July, and that the focus in September should be 
to strive to achieve a meaningful outcome for Nairobi.  
1.8.  He reported that some delegations had said that an understanding was needed on the level 
of ambition. Some participants had indicated aver aging approaches as a promising concept for the 
work going forward, especially in the context of  a lower ambition. Others had called for balance 
and symmetry between the different areas of market access, as well as with other pillars in the 
negotiations, especially domestic support in agriculture. Some calls had been made for the major 
players to take the lead and remain committed in looking for convergence. The Chairman had sensed a serious willingness to engage in the next phase. However, he had pointed out that in 
order to translate these good intentions into concrete outcomes, more proposals and ideas from 
Members were needed.  
1.9.  He had held another meeting on 29 July. The focus had been on the pillars of domestic 
support and export competition in agriculture. Th e meeting had confirmed that Members' positions 
remained wide apart. In the discussion, it was pointed out that, besides the poor chances of outcomes in market access, no outcome would be possible in the area of domestic support without 
a contribution by at least all major players. For others, this logic was not acceptable for a number 
of reasons, including that the support provided by countries with different levels of development 
was not directly comparable. Besides, many delegations had stressed the importance of an outcome in all three pillars. More than that, so me had added that the domestic support pillar 
would set the level of ambition in the other areas. The two non-papers – one by Australia and 
Canada, and another by Norway – had been welcomed  as useful contributions. It had been pointed 
out that the paper by Australia and Canada indica ted that there was enough policy space to find a 
solution should there be a political will to do so . The Norwegian paper had been seen by many as a 
useful basis that could be built on.  
1.10.  On export competition, the participants had confirmed that this pillar remained essential as 
part of a wider package and could be considered to be more mature than the two other pillars. 
Several participants had noted that an outcome under the export competition pillar should 
incorporate all its components, specifically export finance, agricultural exporting state trading enterprises (STEs) and international food aid. It had been noted that adjustments to the Revised 
Draft Modalities for Agriculture contained in document TN/AG/W/4/Rev.4 (Rev.4) would be 
required nonetheless. Some Members had reaffirmed the importance of appropriate flexibilities for TN/C/M/37 
 
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  LDCs and net food-importing developing countries  (NFIDCs), as well as for small and vulnerable 
economies (SVEs), including in particular Cuba. The Chair of the Agriculture Committee in Special Session had invited those delegations who had concerns, but who had not presented any written contributions, to elaborate on the scope and nature of the issues at hand. 
1.11.  On 29 July, he had held a meeting focussing  on development, LDC issues and Rules. On LDC 
issues, while Members had been able to make some progress on the implementation of the LDC Bali decisions, more was needed. The main challenge was how, and to what extent, the Bali 
decisions could be built upon. His consultations had indicated a genuine willingness on the part of 
Members to work on a package for LDCs at MC10. He would continue to attach priority to LDC 
issues in the process leading up to MC10, so  that Members could deliver a substantive and 
meaningful package for LDCs at Nairobi. He also welcomed the fact that the Cotton-4 (C-4) were 
working on a communication on cotton for September.  He said that the good will discernible for 
LDC issues had to be converted into specific outcomes. 
1.12.  With regard to special and differential tr eatment (S&D), he had been informed that the 
proponents were in the final stages of their work to table a consolidated G-90 submission. This had 
now been received. He said that this was a big step forward in this work and could be a major 
contribution to an outcome in Nairobi. He had asked delegations to return from the summer break 
with clear instructions from capitals so that they could hit the ground running in September.  
1.13.  On Rules, it had been positive to see a number of papers from various delegations on anti-
dumping, fisheries subsidies and on possible outcom es on transparency in all four Rules pillars. 
However, despite the engagement, it was clear that Rules issues were complex and that Members' 
interests often diverged widely. It also appeared  that delegations sometimes had different views 
on whether some proposals lowered or actually ra ised the level of ambition. Furthermore, some 
delegations had been reluctant to engage on possible outcomes until there was greater clarity in 
other areas, such as agriculture and NAMA. On the other hand, some delegations considered that 
an outcome in Rules would be an important elem ent of the overall outcome of the negotiations. 
For them, this was a core area. On the basis of his consultations, at this stage, he said that the 
Rules issues did not seem to have reached a level of maturity which would allow for the 
identification of what was doable or not.  
1.14.  The Chairman reported that on 21 July, he had participated in a meeting convened by 
Australia, where Brazil, China, the European Unio n, India, Japan and the United States had also 
been present. The Chairs of the negotiating gr oups of agriculture and NAMA, and the General 
Council Chair, had also participated. The meetin g had been dedicated to agricultural market 
access.  
1.15.  The initial focus was on three basic elemen ts: whether to have a minimum cut; preferences 
for an average cut, or a cut in the average; and the order of magnitude of the cuts in question. 
He reported that before engaging in that discussion, a concern had been expressed about the 
benchmarks to be used in defining the targets for agricultural and non-agricultural market access 
cuts in any averaging approach. The concern expr essed by some had been that since agriculture 
and NAMA tariffs were quite different, adopting the benchmarks provided by the Fourth Revision of 
Draft Modalities for Non-Agricultural Market Access contained in document TN/MA/W/103/Rev.3 
(Rev.3) and Rev.4, for example, would not properly  address existing imbalances in market access 
conditions for agriculture and non-agriculture products.  
1.16.  On the minimum cut, he said that he had not seen any of the participants pushing for this 
concept in either agriculture or NAMA. Despite this, some differences still remained as some 
Members had expressed interest in minimum cuts in one of the areas only – in NAMA – while 
others considered that this would be unbalanced and unacceptable. He had pointed out that some 
others outside this group had expressed views fa vouring minimum cuts and he had stressed the 
need to engage further with those delegations.  
1.17.  On the discussion regarding which averaging approach to follow – a cut in the average or an 
average cut – some participants had expressed inte rest in having an average cut for agriculture 
and a cut in the average for NAMA. At the same ti me, others had argued that the same approach 
had to apply to both areas. Therefore, there had been no agreement on this issue.  TN/C/M/37 
 
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  1.18.  On how to define the magnitude of the cuts, different possibilities had been raised, 
including: basing targets on Rev3/Rev 4 outcomes; applying a reduction factor to the Rev.3/Rev.4 outcomes; or using any other reference deemed appropriate, such as Uruguay Round average cuts. Sharp divergence had emerged regarding the desirable level of ambition and concerns had 
been raised that extremely low target tariff cuts would be worse than having no cuts at all. 
Another difficult discussion concerning the value of cuts in applied tariffs versus the value of cuts in bound tariffs had also followed. Arguments related to the importance of less-than-full 
reciprocity (LTFR) had been part of this debate. At the same time, other participants had stressed 
that higher tariffs should be cut more. 
1.19.  In light of this complex discussion, it was clear that there had been no common ground 
among the participants on market access as a whole. Recognizing this, participants had not found 
it useful to pursue the other elements of the ag riculture market access architecture that had been 
on the agenda for the meeting.  
1.20.  Regarding another meeting in the same configuration convened by Australia, participants 
had discussed how to resume work in September, looking towards Nairobi. In light of the 
conflicting positions, while most participants had ca lled for results in the three agriculture pillars, 
it had still not been clear what the outcomes in domestic support and in market access could be. 
Some participants had stressed that no issue should be taken off the negotiating table at this 
p o i n t .  I t  h a d  a l s o  b e e n  s a i d  t h a t  t h e  status quo  was preferable than an outcome of minimal 
results, or outcomes in one pillar only.  
1.21.  Some participants had said that Members should try to identify ideas that improved 
disciplines vis-à-vis the status quo , while avoiding Members' redlines. He had encouraged 
participants to think about the main conceptual differences that had been impeding a solution in each of the three agriculture pillars and in NA MA. The idea, which had been floated previously, 
about Members contributing in the areas where they could, had been raised again. It had been 
argued that while this could facilitate things, it could also make it more difficult to measure and compare different Members' contributions. It had also been pointed out that this concept could 
bring more flexibility and help the internal selling of the results. It was recalled, for example, that 
cross-sectoral trade-offs had been present in the Uruguay Round negotiations.  
1.22.  There had been convergence on the import ance of having more clarity on the possible 
outcomes by mid-September in order to prepare the ground for concrete results in MC10. Some 
had argued that if no convergence was found by then it would be extremely difficult to reach 
concrete results by Nairobi. 
2  REPORTS BY THE CHAIRPERSONS OF THE BODIES ESTABLISHED BY THE TNC 
2.1.  The Chairman noted that written reports had been circulated in the following official 
documents: 
 Special Session of the Committee on Agriculture: TN/AG/30 
 Negotiating Group on Market Access: TN/MA/27 
 Special Session of the Council for Trade in Services: TN/S/39 
 Negotiating Group on Rules: TN/RL/26 
 Special Session of the Committee on Trade and Development: TN/CTD/30 
2.2.  Ambassador John Adank (New Zealand), Chai rman of the Special Session of the Committee 
on Agriculture, said that a full report on his consultations and the wider work within the Special 
Session of the Committee on Agriculture (CoA SS) had been circulated on 30 July in document 
TN/AG/30. Since January, there had been an extensive range of open-ended and smaller group 
consultations aimed at providing greater clarity on what Members might be able to agree under the agriculture component of the Doha mandate and paragraph 1.11 of the Bali Declaration.  TN/C/M/37 
 
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  2.3.  While these consultations had, in some ca ses, led to a better understanding of positions, 
overall there was little substantive progress to report. The consequence was that he was not in a position to advise the TNC at this meeting of any agreement among Members on a clearly defined 
post-Bali work program for agriculture. 
2.4.  However, he could give an indication on where discussions on the substantive issues had 
been going, as this would be the basis from which discussions would need to build after the 
summer break. Accordingly, his report was aimed at providing both a reality check as well as a 
wake-up call about the significant ground that would need to be covered before Nairobi. 
The summer break should be a time for deep reflection in capitals on how these issues could be further progressed when delegations return ed to Geneva after the August recess. 
2.5.  In domestic support, discussions had continued to focus on different elements of the pillar 
and how they might combine to further limit the use of trade-distorting support. In his written 
report, he had noted the potential convergence around reforms in the area of Blue Box support, which was currently not subject to any limitations. A number of Members had, however, 
underlined that they would only see this as viable in the context of broader domestic support 
outcomes.  
2.6.  Beyond this, it was fair to say there were no signs of any breakthrough in the area of 
domestic support. The issue of Overall Trade Distor ting Support (OTDS) had proven to be one of 
the most contentious issues, owing to exemptio ns provided for some Members in the draft 
modalities that were disputed by some other Members, who argued in favour of comparable disciplines for all large subsidisers. This, in turn, had made it difficult to get some Members to 
engage on other elements such as Aggregate Measurement of Support (AMS) and de minimis  
reductions and product-specific limits.  
2.7.  More specifically, in relation to proposed reductions in de minimis  and AMS support, some 
Members with AMS suggested it was difficult to take  on additional disciplines here if some other 
Members without AMS took on no further disciplines. Those other Members without access to AMS commitments pointed out that as de minimis  was the only basis on which they could provide 
trade-distorting support they were more legally co nstrained, particularly with respect to product-
specific support which remained capped at de minimis  levels.  
2.8.  Discussions had identified that at a practical level it was possible for Members to undertake 
further disciplines, given that – subject to a coup le of exceptions – the existing WTO commitments 
of Members allowed for support well in excess of  current applied settings. Some Members had 
noted that additional disciplines were not only bo th possible but also highly desirable in order to 
ensure that WTO disciplines better reflected current settings rather than those in place one or two 
decades earlier. At the same time, the political doability of further disciplines in this area remained 
challenging given the different views among Members, particularly among the largest Members, on the respective contributions each should make to the deal overall. The wider membership had 
continued to highlight to him that progressing these discussions to the point where Members could 
see the outline of a credible domestic support deal remained fundamental to unlocking wider progress. 
2.9.  In market access, he said that looking at the bright side, there had been some progress, at 
least in Members' reacquainting themselves with the practical issues that would need to be 
resolved if Members were to find any agreemen t. Members had demonstrated a willingness to 
explore alternative tariff reduction approaches on  a without-prejudice basis, including averaging 
approaches. There had been useful contributions from the Secretariat and a technical workshop 
that delegations had found helpful.  
2.10.  While Members had engaged constructively in these discussions, they had also expressed a 
range of concerns with respect to how other aspects of the market access pillar would relate to 
particular tariff reduction approaches, and also about the relationship between approaches in 
agriculture and those in NAMA. The fact remained that until delegations could see the shape of any 
new alternative more clearly and had a stronger sense from key participants that such an 
alternative could be viable for all of them, it wo uld be difficult for them to make the necessary 
evaluations that would move discussions forward. Accordingly, discussions needed to move from 
the general to the more specific. Members would need to decide whether alternative approaches TN/C/M/37 
 
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  should be based on a cut to the average or an  average cut, and what would be the target 
reduction that would apply to Members in different categories or situations for each approach. In short, what was the level of ambition that Members were seeking for tariff reductions? These issues had been under discussion in smaller group processes, but it was fair to say that Members 
were still a long way from having clear answers. Once again, this related to the differences of 
views among key participants on their respective contributions to any outcome and what they stood to get in return.  
2.11.  Deeper discussions were needed on the range of specific issues relevant to the impact and 
value of any alternative formula, which he had listed in his report. The point had also been registered strongly from a range of Members that while they might accept that the level of ambition achievable in current circumstances mi ght be less than that envisaged in the 2008 draft 
modalities, in order for a deal to be politically viable, it had to be of substantive value when 
compared to the status quo  arising from the Uruguay Round. Finding this optimal level and being 
able to present it in a balanced way that respected the interests of all Members, therefore, 
remained the key challenge if Members were to reach closure. 
2.12.  With regard to export competition, he said that it had become something of a ritual to note 
that this pillar could be considered to be more mature than the two others. But it was still far from 
clear that delegations were talking about the same things in this area. Everyone seemed to agree 
about the importance of eliminating export subsidies. After all, it had been over a decade since Ministers had first expressed their determination in this regard. But some specific issues had been raised in the broader export competition pillar, part icularly in respect of the areas of export credits 
and in the field of international food aid, in particular the question of in-kind food aid monetization. 
Delegations that had expressed concerns under th is pillar but had not yet provided any clear 
indication of the scope and nature of the issues at stake needed to do so in order that Members 
could engage in a more focused discussion on this pillar in a way that highlighted exactly what all 
Members might be prepared to commit to. 
2.13.  Beyond the three pillars, some Members had renewed their call to strengthen disciplines in 
the area of agricultural export prohibitions and restrictions.  
2.14.  With regard to cotton, he said that there co uld be no doubt that it would need to be part of 
any outcome coming out of MC10 in Nairobi, and there had been some positive signs of 
developments, at least in the market access area. In the past, it had been repeatedly 
acknowledged that outcomes on cotton would need to await outcomes in the broader agriculture 
negotiations so that Members had a base to determine how much more "specifically, ambitiously and expeditiously" cotton could be addressed. But he  said that it was no longer viable to await 
wider developments here. Members needed to en gage without delay on what could constitute 
possible outcomes on cotton in relation to export competition, market access and domestic support. The C-4 would be putting forward a submission in September.  
2.15.  Finally, he said that, while recognising that the issue of Public Stockholding for Food 
Security Purposes was on a separate track, it was also clear that it was likely to be linked to Doha issues. In recent consultations, there had been no evidence of substantive progress between the 
key proponents and others on the nature of a perm anent solution to this issue. Nevertheless, he 
had detected a greater willingness among participants to recognise the need to try and build up a 
further consensus here, including by focussing on elements of the Bali Decision that might usefully inform any potential permanent solution. These consultations would need to be continued and 
deepened in preparation for a further dedicated session.  
2.16.  He said that the task ahead remained to search for agreement on substantive results in all 
the pillars of agriculture by Nairobi. He had noted that in this context, Members were looking to 
the larger participants to provide some indication of what collectively the climate would bear for all 
of them as without this Members were unlikely to be able to evolve further consensus. He was aware that this was a difficult and sensitive process.  It required, at the most basic level, a belief 
that an outcome that represented a su bstantive step forward on the current status quo  of Uruguay 
Round rules was worth fighting for, and a commitment to achieve that. It required both advocacy 
as well as forbearance. It required subtlety and an appreciation on all sides that asking what one knew to be impossible from the opposite number was unlikely to lead to success. For this reason, 
he had noted that there remained an urgent need for delegations to consider not simply what they TN/C/M/37 
 
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  wanted, but how the interests of other players, whose consent would be required for any deal, 
might be accommodated so that Members would be able to declare a collective victory. 
2.17.  Ambassador Remigi Winzap (Switzerland), Chairman of the Negotiating Group on Market 
Access, said that since the last formal TNC of 24 April, he had continued with bilateral 
consultations and had had two open-ended meetin gs of the negotiating group on 1 June and 
23 July 2015. The objective of the more recent meet ing had been to take stock of the situation in 
NAMA. He had provided his assessment at the begi nning of the meeting and had asked delegations 
whether they shared this assessment and what it would mean for work until the end of July and 
beyond the summer break. His impression had been  that his assessment had been largely shared 
by delegations and that there was, on the positive  side, engagement and, on the negative side, a 
lack of concrete proposals for Members to work with. Several Members had reiterated their call for 
a proponent-driven process, which had not yet materialized. 
2.18.  On 30 July, Members had received a written report on NAMA (TN/MA/27) with three 
headings: 1. What happened in NAMA since January 2015?; 2. Personal assessment by the Chair; 
and 3. The Way Ahead.  
2.19.  Comparing the current situation with some of the difficulties he had identified on NAMA at 
the end of 2014, reflected in document JOB/MA/114, he observed the following. First, discussions 
had taken place less in silos since the beginning of the year. In his view, a more horizontal 
discussion, at least on NAMA and agriculture, existed. Second, many Members – for different 
reasons – used to see the application of a Swiss Formula as a potential handicap to a successful NAMA outcome, but had hesitated to enter into a discussion on alternatives until the end of 2014. 
Now, Members seemed rather open to envisage alternative approaches to the Swiss Formula, and 
in particular different variations of averaging. Third, divergent views persisted on the significance of market access negotiations in the context of a development Round, on the level of contributions 
expected from trading partners, on the value of the reduction of water and of new tariff bindings. 
Considering particularly this third point, he concluded that since the beginning of 2015, Members had only made very limited progress on NAMA. As Chair, he could not identify much convergence 
to date. 
2.20.  Looking ahead, he saw the following challenges that needed to be addressed by Members. 
First, in the search for outcomes, the question of the level of ambition seemed to be at the core. 
In his view, Members should further engage in a more numbers-based discussion on a non-
prejudicial basis. It was hard to define ambition in abstract terms, and difficult to make an honest 
assessment of what one could do when one did no t know what one could get. Possibly the best 
way forward was to work backwards from acce ptable results. Second, without negotiating 
mandates allowing for convergence, it seemed di fficult to move ahead. At this juncture, some 
Members were not in a position to work on the basis of Rev.3 while others did not have a mandate to move away from Rev.3. Third, Members should be encouraged, and not deterred, to bring 
forward proposals. Fourth, to handle the substance of the DDA, all issues, including in NAMA, 
might need to be divided into smaller bits, which could be discussed in a focused way without losing sight of the broader picture of the DDA. No final solution could be found in the absence of an overall balanced outcome of the DDA. He had suggested, in his written submission circulated on 
30 July, a non-exhaustive list of such pieces whic h could be discussed in the NAMA context, and he 
hoped that Members would dig into this substance between now and September. Time was extremely short and Members needed to move quickly in all areas of negotiation, NAMA included, 
immediately after the summer break.  
2.21.  As he had received a strong call at the last open-ended meeting for a dedicated session on 
non-tariff barriers (NTBs) soon after the summer-break, he would invite NAMA technical experts to 
such a meeting on Monday, 21 September at 10 am. He said that it would help the process if 
Members interested in progress on NTBs submitted their ideas and new or updated proposals for discussion at that meeting in a timely manner. 
2.22.  In respect of further discussions on tariffs, he would consult with the Chairman and his 
fellow Chairs. He intended to fix a date for a m eeting to take place soon after the summer break.  
2.23.  Ambassador Gabriel Duque (Colombia), Chairm an of the Special Session of the Council for 
Trade in Services, said that since the beginning of the year, the Special Session had focused on TN/C/M/37 
 
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  developing the services elements of the "clearly defined work program" required in paragraph 1.11 
of the Bali Ministerial Declaration. During this period, a lot of effort had been made to reach a common view on the substantive and procedural elements that could be included in it.  
2.24.  In pursuing this objective, he had conducted numerous meetings and consultations aimed at 
achieving convergence on the service elements of the work program. In the course of this work, 
delegations had benefited from two separate briefings from the Secretariat, providing valuable background information on the services negotiations in general, on 10 March, and on the 
negotiations on domestic regulation, on 1 June. Additionally, he had circulated an informal 
Chair Note on 18 February updating Members on his consultations and indicating possible ways forward, and an informal Chair Summary of a dedi cated session held on 20 April on the services 
elements of the work program.  
2.25.  It was with considerable disappointment, therefore, that he had to report that despite 
Members' best efforts, it had not proved possible to agree on a work program in services. Although various interesting ideas had been put forward by Members in the course of the discussions, 
ultimately there had been no convergence towards any text containing a clearly defined work 
program in services. In his written report (TN/S/39), he provided a detailed account of his consultations. 
2.26.  There was a need to reflect on what needed to be done in services after returning from the 
summer break in September. Even without an agreed  work program, he believed that delegations 
would still be committed to the substance of the DDA negotiations, and wished to continue to advance towards a significant result by the Nairobi Ministerial in December. Given the nature of 
the services negotiations in market access, with request/offer as the principal negotiating method, 
early consultations and preparation, including in capitals, of revised offers would appear necessary. It would also seem vital to start work as early as possible after the summer break so 
that services did not hold up agreement in Nairobi on an overall package. 
2.27.  Ambassador Wayne McCook (Jamaica), Chairm an of the Negotiating Group on Rules, said 
that since this was the last TNC before the summer break, he wished to review what had been 
done in the first semester of 2015 and where Members were in the work on Rules.  
2.28.  A key challenge for the Group had been how to situate its work in the broader context of the 
DDA. Some delegations had deemed it premature to engage on possible outcomes in Rules until there was greater clarity in other areas, such as agriculture and NAMA. Other delegations had 
been concerned that if Members did not engage, they would run out of time later. While this 
tension had not disappeared, the Negotiating Group had managed to develop a working method that had accommodated all delegations' concerns and that had allowed it to advance its work in 
the semester. 
2.29.  Following several open-ended meetings and a Secretariat information session in the spring, 
the Negotiating Group had had a number of pape rs from delegations seeking to identify 
recalibrated contributions from Rules to the work program. Among these papers had been three 
submissions from a group of delegations on anti-dumping, a submission from a group of delegations on fisheries subsidies, and a submissi on identifying possible outcomes on transparency 
in all four Rules pillars. The Negotiating Group had discussed all of these papers, including earlier 
in the week. Sponsors had presented their prop osals and delegations had provided reactions. 
He appreciated that without prejudice to Members' views about the role of Rules in the broader context of the DDA, all delegations had participated constructively within the limits implied by their 
overall positions. 
2.30.  Overall, while the possible contribution of Ru les to an outcome in Nairobi was far from clear, 
some delegations clearly considered that some outcome on Rules was indispensable to a balanced 
overall result. Others remained of the view that whether, and to what extent, there would be Rules 
outcomes in Nairobi depended upon developments outside Rules. 
2.31.  He had no magic formula for how to proceed with work in the Fall in a way that allowed 
Members to be ready for MC10 without prejudicing the position of any delegation. In his view, 
however, given the importance of Rules to some Members, inactivity was not an option. He would 
be consulting with the Chairman and fellow Ch airs, and listening to Members' views and ideas TN/C/M/37 
 
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  about how to advance work in the autumn. In the meantime, he encouraged those Members who 
had advanced ideas to reflect on and respond to the reactions of delegations, for example through technical papers. He also encouraged all Members to think creatively about what doable Rules outcomes might be pursued for Nairobi.  
2.32.  Ambassador Tan Yee Woan (Singapore), Chairperson of the Special Session of the 
Committee on Trade and Development, recalled that in February the proponents had tabled two 
lists of S&D provisions which they wished to pursue in the Special Session. The African Group and 
the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Group jointly had tabled a list of 14 S&D provisions whilst 
the LDC Group had tabled a list of 25 S&D prov isions. The proponents had indicated that they 
would soon table detailed textual proposals on these provisions so that work in the Special Session could begin. She had since been in contact with the proponents to discuss the status of their work 
on the proposals.  
2.33.  She did not wish to repeat in her oral statement the details contained in her written report 
as contained in TN/CTD/30. Instead, she wished to bring to Members' attention that the Special 
Session had received the detailed proposals of th e 25 S&D proposals jointly tabled by the G-90. 
This was contained in the dual symbol document JOB/DEV/29 and JOB/TNC/51, dated 30 July 2015.  
2.34.  She thanked the proponents for tabling the detailed proposals, and for the significant work 
which had gone into putting them together. It was her intention to reconvene the meeting of the Special Session soon after the summer break. She hoped that Members would have received clear instruction from capitals by then, so that the substantive consideration of these proposals could 
start immediately when Members returned from the summer break. Members would need to work 
at a fast pace in order to ensure progress for the Nairobi Ministerial Conference.  
2.35.  Ambassador Wiboonlasana Ruamraksa (Thailand), Chairperson of the Special Session of the 
Committee on Trade and Environment, said that since the last formal TNC meeting, she had held a 
series of bilateral consultations reaching out to all delegations and she was pleased to report that 
many delegations had responded positively to her call. The intention had been to follow-up on the 
informal Informative Session held in March and to hear delegations' views on what contribution the 
Negotiating Group could make to MC10.  
2.36.  As on previous occasions, delegation s had expressed their continued support to the 
environment chapter of the Doha negotiations. De legations had also generally reiterated their 
willingness to contribute constructively to the negotiations once there was a better understanding 
of the way forward on other areas of the DDA. It ha d also been made clear to her that delegations' 
attention was on the core issues of the DDA negotiations. Her understanding was that such 
sequencing between the work on core issues and the work of the Special Session of the Committee 
on Trade and Environment (CTE SS) seemed to be an essential element for some delegations before they could be ready to engage in any additional step in the CTE SS. 
2.37.  She made a few points regarding the specific parts of the mandate of the Special Session. 
First, on paragraph 31(iii) of the DDA, it was clear that the liberalization efforts on environmental 
goods pursued by a subset of WTO Members had im pacted the level of priority that delegations 
currently gave to the topic in the CTE SS. At this stage, she did not see this situation changing in 
the coming months unless delegations started to come up with concrete proposals on specific work 
to be undertaken under paragraph 31(iii). 
2.38.   Concerning the mandate on the rela tionship between Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements (MEAs) and the WTO under Paragraphs 31(i) and (ii) of the DDA mandate, she sensed 
that the Informative Session had been particular ly useful to delegations and had helped them 
refresh their memory on this part of the mandate. She reported that at the Informative Session, 
as well as during her bilateral consultations, some delegations had expressed an interest in 
reengaging in the work related to the mandate on MEAs, as a lot of good work had already taken place. After the summer break, she intended to explore with delegations what could be done to advance work on this part of the mandate with a view to contributing to MC10. 
2.39.  She said that over the years, WTO Members had put a lot of work into trying to move the 
trade and environment mandate forward. While she understood that Members were still reflecting TN/C/M/37 
 
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  on the contribution that could be made for MC10, she had also not heard in her consultations any 
delegations disagreeing with the importance of moving forward on environment. 2015 was a significant year for the environment and the world's attention would also be on what the WTO could do. When Members returned in September, th ey needed to build on the goodwill expressed 
and work seriously and constructively towards MC 10. Therefore, she urged participants to the 
environment negotiations to intensify their refl ections and to come back after the summer break 
with concrete proposals for an outcome.
1 
2.40.  Ambassador Ronald Saborío Soto, Chairman of the Special Session of the Dispute 
Settlement Body, said that as regularly reported, the Special Session had had constructive 
discussions based on Members' conceptual and textual proposals. As he would outline in a more 
detailed report to be issued the following week, 2 Members had explored an extensive universe of 
issues that could lead to a package of results.  Recently, Members had had discussions on all of 
these issues across the board at a conceptual level,  building on previous work on specific draft 
legal text in all areas. This had led to useful indications emerging on the possible contours of a 
successful outcome. The time had come to reap the benefits of this work and fulfil the mandate by 
concluding this negotiation. 
2.41.  He said that the dispute settlement pr ocedures embodied in the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding (DSU) concerned all Members. With almost 500 disputes initiated over the past two 
decades, involving more than two thirds of th e membership, these procedures had proven their 
systemic value. Experience had shown where the DSU could be improved. Members should improve their dispute settlement rules, wherever possible, by finding permanent solutions that 
benefitted all Members, including those that had not been frequent users to date. 
2.42.  The level of dispute settlement activity and increasing complexity of cases had also revealed 
the need to enhance the efficiency of these procedures. The urgency of this task had recently been 
stressed by the Director-General and acknow ledged by Members. Any improvements and 
clarifications to the dispute settlement procedures would make a valuable systemic contribution to 
the multilateral trading system as a whole. They would enhance effectiveness and predictability in 
the settlement of WTO disputes, and thus contri bute to the security and functioning of the 
multilateral trading system.  
2.43.  It was therefore the common interest of all Members to find a balanced outcome and 
conclude these negotiations expeditiously. In this, Members should be driven by a genuine 
ambition to address current challenges, build upon  existing practices where agreeable, and find 
practical solutions to underlying concerns expressed by all participants. For this, Members needed to engage – in Geneva and back in capitals. 
2.44.  Members had the opportunity to seize the benefits of years of negotiations on issues that 
would only continue to increase in importance. They also had the collective responsibility to do so – to the entire Membership and to the multilateral  trading system. He intended for work during the 
second half of the year to be guided by thes e considerations, counting on the commitment of all 
Members. It was his intention to circulate a detailed report in the following days. 
2.45.  In the absence of Ambassador Dacio Castillo (Honduras), Chairman of the Special Session of 
the Council for TRIPS, the Chairman read out his report as follows: 
"When I last reported in person to the TNC meeting in April 2015, I shared my 
assessment that – although the TRIPS Special Session negotiations remained substantively important to a number of Members – delegations from all sides 
remained hesitant to engage in the TRIPS Special Session for lack of clarity on the 
overall negotiations picture after Bali. 
Since then, I have held informal consultations with the most active Members of each 
of the two groupings – the Joint Proposal  Group and the supporters of TN/C/W/52 – 
on 11 June 2015. In those consultations I urged Members to share any thoughts and ideas on how to move forward and to also prepare themselves for possible scenarios in light of the approaching July deadline and the Nairobi Ministerial.  
                                               
1 The Chair's report was later circulated in document TN/TE/22. 
2 The Chair's report was later ci rculated in document TN/DS/27. TN/C/M/37 
 
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  I also held an open-ended meeting of the TRIPS Special Session yesterday (on 
30 July) to provide transparency and to report on my consultations, as well as to provide an opportunity for Members to share any views ahead of today's TNC 
meeting.  
Judging from the feedback from these meetings  there is no indication of a substantive 
shift of Members' traditional positions. The delegations supporting document TN/C/W/52 reiterated the importance they attach to their proposal that the three 
TRIPS issues (Geographical Indication (GI) register, GI extension and TRIPS/ 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)) being reflected together in any work programme as well as in any meaningful Doha outcome, and argued that parallel progress in all three areas was key to advancing the work.  
While they conceded that the post-Bali context might require some recalibration, any 
such adjustment should – in their view – not affect the linkages and parallelism proposed in W/52. After a sustained period of hesitation to engage, waiting for 
progress in the core Doha issues, the W/52 group has now signalled willingness to 
engage in constructive discussions on how to move forward at an appropriate time after the summer break.  
The delegations supporting the Joint Proposal  reiterated their longstanding position 
that no engagement was possible in the absence of a clear commitment from the W/52 group to respect the mandate of the TRIPS Special Session for a GI Register limited to wine and spirit GIs.  
Some argued further that, in light of the Director-General's urging to apply the 
principles of doability and realism, delegations' efforts should be focused on areas where consensus could be achieved – and argu ed that the TRIPS area did not fall into 
that category of issues.  
In light of the above, it is my assessment at this stage that the TRIPS Special Session 
remains some way away from substantive reengagement. While I am heartened by 
recent indications on the part of some to enter into constructive discussions on the 
way forward after the summer break, it seems also clear to me that rigorous efforts on the part of all members will be requir ed to address the different views regarding 
the scope and application of the negotiating mandate, as well as regarding the 
substance of the register.  
I stand ready to foster such efforts and to further work with delegation towards 
substantive reengagement in the TRIPS Special Session after the summer break." 
2.46.  The Chairman said that Members were also aware that there were certain issues that he had 
been charged to carry forward as Director-General. He wished to assure Members that at the 
appropriate time he stood ready to convene meetings on these issues when all Members felt that it 
would be fruitful. Some, including himself, believ ed that this should be done once Members had 
established some momentum in the core areas of the negotiations. 
2.47.  The Trade Negotiations Committee took note of the reports by the Chairpersons of the 
bodies established by it. 
2.1  Overall assessment by the Chairman 
2.48.  The Chairman said that in his report to the General Council on Tuesday he had given his 
view that delivering a work program by the estab lished deadline had been highly unlikely given the 
gaps which still needed to be bridged. He had called on Members to keep working to see what 
could be achieved. They had done that. They had worked hard since then, as since January. He had met with a large number of Members to discuss a range of issues. The Chairs had 
continued meeting and Members had continued consulting among themselves. However, despite 
all this activity, he had not seen the progress need ed to deliver a work program, as mandated, by 
the July deadline.  TN/C/M/37 
 
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  2.49.  He said that this conclusion should not have come as a surprise. Since the beginning of the 
previous month, he had cautioned that if the tough political calls were not made, Members' efforts would not be successful. These political calls had not been made and there had not been sufficient flexibility in Members' positions. This work had to be Member-driven. The negotiating groups had 
to be the engine room of this process. That was where the work program should have emerged – 
not from the Chairs or from him.  
2.50.  Members had heard the reports of the Chairs. There was no proposed work program on the 
table. He said that unless a veritable miracle happened in the following hours, this would remain 
the case. 
2.51.  Members needed to face the reality of the situation. They would not be able to deliver on 
the instructions by Ministers to deliver a "clearly defined" work program on the remaining DDA 
issues by July 2015. Therefore, the question that had to be faced was what would be next and how 
Members would move forward.  
2.52.  He said that at midnight the mandate to deliver the work program would lapse. He had been 
clear in his view, which he believed was widely shared, that while this was a very disappointing 
result, it should not become an obstacle to achieving outcomes in Nairobi in December. This missed deadline did not represent a barrier to delivering in Nairobi – but should be a wake-up call 
about Members' prospects for success. In recent months, Members had had excellent engagement 
on the DDA issues – engagement at a level that had not been seen for many years. Yet, they had still not made sufficient progress to deliver a work program. Substantive progress towards convergence had remained very limited. There were still huge differences in expectations. 
The redlines did not overlap. 
2.53.  There would need to be a step-change in Members' flexibility and political engagement if 
Members were to make progress. When they returned in September, Members would have 
approximately two and a half months before the Ministerial Conference. They would need to move 
on from questions of process and put an intense, relentless focus on substance. He said that he 
could see potential outcomes in a number of areas, particularly on the LDC issues, but it would 
depend on how fast Members moved in the second half of the year.  
2.54.  He believed that the most important thing at this meeting was to send a united message 
that Members were all committed to delivering real outcomes in Nairobi and that this was their number one priority. From his consultations and from everything he had heard from Members, 
he believed there was unanimity on this point. He  had been heartened to hear that Members were 
ready to reflect during the summer break and to return in September more committed to focus on the substantive issues. As they had done in the lead-up to Bali, Members would have to roll up 
their sleeves and be ready to work intensely. Wh ile they were not where they had wanted to be, 
they had laid solid foundations for future work.  
2.55.  It was clear from his consultations and from the Chairs' reports that Members were 
committed. Serious efforts had been made to try to move things forward. There had been more 
willingness to explore different approaches and to consider proposals or ideas. He had been pleased to see a number of papers put forward in  recent days, including from the ACP Group and 
the G-90. He had been particularly pleased to s ee the G-90's submission providing detailed textual 
suggestions on S&D. This was invaluable. It gave Members a basis for further discussions and 
could be a major contribution to the outcomes in Nairobi. He said that more such initiatives would be needed after the summer. Putting clear proposals on the table would be essential in spurring 
meaningful discussions on substance, narrowing down the gaps and starting to shape the outline 
of the final outcomes.  
2.56.  As Members looked to the task ahead, he thought they should be confident. Members knew 
that they could deliver. They had done it in Bali and had shown it again in the past few days. 
They had concluded two decades of negotiations on Monday when Members approved the accession of Kazakhstan. The previous week, wi th the breakthrough on the expansion of the 
Information Technology Agreement (ITA), they had set the stage for the WTO's first tariff-cutting 
agreement in 18 years. It had shown that they we re negotiating and that Members were prepared 
to use innovative approaches to achieve results. He urged Members to take inspiration from this. As he had said at the General Council, it had not been easily achieved. Only a few weeks earlier, TN/C/M/37 
 
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  it had looked impossible. The breakthrough had re quired political will and compromise. These were 
the ingredients which had to be brought to other areas of the WTO work – both from the participants in the ITA and others.  
2.57.  While Members had missed a deadline, this was not the end of the discussions on what they 
could achieve in Nairobi or on the DDA issues mo re broadly. Rather, this was where the really 
tough work started. He urged Members once again to come back in September with ideas on substance. If they came back with the same positions, there would be no further progress. 
He encouraged them to take the time to talk to their capitals, test their redlines, reflect on the 
redlines of others, and come back with a broader sense of what might be doable from their perspective. He urged them to come back with proposals. 
2.58.  In addition, Members had to be prepared to  tackle all of the issues on the table. There 
would not be time to sequence work. Members would need to engage on all fronts immediately, 
particularly the LDCs issues. Members still had a real chance of delivering meaningful outcomes in Nairobi. He therefore urged them to do everything they could to be ready to seize that opportunity 
in September.  
2.59.  The Trade Negotiations Committee took note of the Chairman's statement. 
3  STATEMENTS BY PARTICIPANTS 
3.1.  The representative of Barbados, on behalf of the ACP Group, said the Group had taken 
careful note of the assessments provided by the Chairman at the present meeting and during the 
Room W meeting of 8 July. The Group wished to re-affirm that all existing mandates, including the 2001 Doha Ministerial Declaration, the July 2004 Framework, the 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial 
Declaration and the 2013 Bali Ministerial Declaration remained valid and applicable to the DDA 
negotiations and had to be the basis upon which negotiations would continue, with or without a work program.  
3.2.  The Group and many other developing countries remained keen to actualise the development 
dimension of the Round, which was now in its second decade of discussions. It was in this constructive spirit that the Group had recently submitted its contribution (JOB/TNC/50) on 
"Proposals for Bridging Gaps on the Remaining Doha Development Agenda (DDA) Issues and 
Development Outcomes for the WTO Tenth Minister ial Conference". Given the shortness of time, 
members of the Group had been unable to engage in as full a consultative process as they would have liked. Therefore, they had not titled their presentation "A Work Program for completing the 
DDA issues". However, the Group believed that  their paper put forward a number of possible 
elements which could lead Members in that direction. In addition, the G-90 had recently submitted its request regarding the S&D proposals. This document (JOB/TNC/51 – JOB/DEV/29) contained 
the G-90's detailed textual proposals on the 25 S&D proposals that had been submitted in the 
CTD SS in February.  
3.3.  The Group also wished to draw attention to the importance of cotton. She said Members 
should work towards obtaining concrete and balanced results by Nairobi in the three pillars of the 
negotiations to meet the July 2004 Framework Agreement and the 2005 Hong Kong mandate on 
this vital issue.  
3.4.  She introduced the ACP Group submission . After examining the submissions and ideas put 
forward by other Members this year on agriculture,  NAMA, and services, as well as in other areas, 
the Group had conducted its own simulations and ha d examined the options offered by the Chairs 
of the agriculture and NAMA negotiating groups. Th is had allowed the Group to come to a position 
from where it was able to make some recommend ations. In agriculture, for example, the ideas 
were related in particular to the tariff cut formulas in both agriculture and NAMA and the other pillars in agriculture, especially in domestic support.  
3.5.  Domestic support had repeatedly been recogn ised as a significant pillar in the agriculture 
negotiations for all developing countries, including LDCs and SVEs. Essentially, therefore, it was no surprise that, looking at agriculture, the Grou p strived again to preserve the interests and 
flexibilities not only of ACP countries, but also of SVEs, NFIDCs and LDCs. In terms of bridging 
ideas, on the OTDS, the Group had looked at the current disposition and had made some TN/C/M/37 
 
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  suggestions on a possible way forward. To bridge those positions, the text proposed consideration 
of a financial limit but suggested the provision of  c o m p e n s a t i o n  i n  t h e  f o r m  o f  a n  a d d i t i o n a l  
entitlement, possibly an AMS entitlement. Some  of the ACP members would also require the 
recognition of necessary S&D treatment in relation to OTDS as well. In parallel, a proposal for 
consideration was also made on de minimis , in the context of possible changes in the level of 
ambition.  
3.6.  The proposal in agricultural market access suggested an alternative to the tiered formula. 
However, the Group recognized that this was not a closed issue and that there were many other 
proposals on the table to be considered. However, the Group attempted to address the concerns of certain Members but also other countries with high tariffs. The proposal also attempted to simplify the negotiations suggesting that exceptions might need to be reviewed depending on the level of 
ambition, but that simplicity could not be the only goal and a substantive result should emerge, 
while trying to simplify. A formula to give countries enough flexibilities to accommodate their sensitivities had been deemed essential and concerns relating to protection for special products 
(SPs) had been given consideration. The Group had also suggested that further elements on tariff 
escalation, tropical products and similar flexibilities might need to be considered and evaluated, given any resulting level of ambition. 
3.7.  In NAMA, while ensuring that flexibilities were not undermined, the proposal for an 
alternative formula aimed to address the concerns  of those who had said that they could not 
accept a Swiss formula, which included some AC P members and other Members, both developing 
and developed. It also contained elements to ensure that ACP countries, SVEs and others would 
not end up undertaking disproportionate commitments if formula-applying countries moved away 
from the Swiss formula. The Group had also incl uded the need to find a solution for those 
Members that were part of customs unions with LDCs.  
3.8.  On NTBs, the proposal aimed to reconcile the views of those who wanted an outcome on 
NTBs and those who were sceptical about existing proposals on the table, including some ACP members and certain developed Members, for exam ple on the horizontal mechanism. The Group 
proposed that Ministers in Nairobi establish a Working Group, similar to the existing Working 
Group on Trade, Debt and Finance and the Working Group on Trade and Transfer of Technology, to 
examine the NTBs impacting developing countries' and LDCs' exports into other markets. This did 
not mean that Members should not try to make as much progress as possible on NTBs in Geneva 
before Nairobi, but it meant that it could be an exercise that would continue after Nairobi as well. 
3.9.  For services, a lot of material was on the table in the form of over 60 offers having been 
submitted and other signals that Members had engaged in since the Hong Kong Ministerial 
Conference. Also on the table were the principles found in Annex C of the Hong Kong Declaration, 
which still served as a guide for Members. In a ddition, the ACP Group had signalled the fact that 
notwithstanding market access responses to developing countries and LDCs, it was imperative that 
developed Members, in particular, reduced or eliminated the paralysing impact of qualification 
requirements and procedures on the ACP supply of  services into their markets under mode 4. 
In services, while many developed Members spoke of their existing openness and bindings, it was in mode 4 where most developed Members had not made commitments that facilitated trade from 
developing and LDC services suppliers. The bridging element found in the ACP's submission was to 
recognize the fact that individual Members were responsible for their offers. Therefore, the request-offer modality allowed individual Members to revise their offers, at any time, either up or 
down, to take into account the change in ambition in other areas in the DDA. It was up to 
individual Members to decide if new elements were introduced from other Members that would encourage new offers.  
3.10.  On development outcomes for Nairobi, the ACP Group was convinced that MC10 – as it was 
taking place in Africa – had to have development outcomes for developing countries, and for Africa in particular. Therefore, after nearly two decades,  the WTO had to be clear and precise on specific 
decisions in favour of developing countries, LDCs and SVEs. The ACP Group had a particular 
interest in ensuring that there was an outcome on cotton. The Group was also aware that the 
Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) proposals had been placed before WTO Members and wished to ensure a positive outcome here as well.  
3.11.  This list of development elements that the Group would like to see executed in Nairobi was 
not exhaustive. Addressing the problems of members of customs unions, which had been missing TN/C/M/37 
 
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  in earlier texts, was going to be imperative for many African Members. The decision should also 
include the principle that if any agreement emer ged on agriculture and NAMA that resulted in 
lower ambition, then the flexibilities should be adjusted accordingly to avoid undermining those flexibilities. Affirmation of the development flex ibilities in services and in other areas where 
ambition had been changed was also important.  
3.12.  The Group believed that these could be good bases to begin work early in September. After 
the summer break, there would be effectively less than 14 working weeks until Nairobi. A lot 
remained outstanding if Members were to ensure that Nairobi was the success they desired and 
had been striving for. Members needed to re-double their efforts, ensure that the necessary political will was there and begin serious negotiations on a balanced outcome. It would be important to set timelines for the completion of various stages of the negotiations. This was going 
to be essential if Members were to have a meaningful outcome in Nairobi. Members would only 
achieve an outcome for Nairobi if there was something for all Members. This was something that needed to be considered in all Members' deliberations. 
3.13.  The representative of Bangladesh, on beha lf of the LDC Group, thanked the Chairman for 
his assessment of the state of play and commended him and the Chairs of negotiating groups for 
their tireless efforts to have a post-Bali work prog ram by the agreed deadline. Coming up with an 
outcome that would be satisfactory to all was in  the hands of the WTO membership as a whole. 
It was not supposed to be an easy task given the atmospherics. Members had had similar experiences in the past, but their efforts had ne ver stopped and eventually they had succeeded. 
The Bali outcome had been a testimony to that. 
3.14.  He said Members were at a critical juncture. They could neither agree on a clearly defined 
work program within the deadline, nor could they  make substantial progress in implementing the 
Bali decisions. There would be only about three months before MC10, after the summer break. 
Clearly, time was very short and Members needed to come up with an outcome at Nairobi under 
the able leadership of the MC10 Chair. Members co uld not fail and, therefore, needed to redouble 
their efforts to reach consensus on a package with development as the centrepiece. The LDC 
Group was sure that Members could deliver if they kept the global perspective in mind. The work 
jointly done by the ACP, African and LDC groups in the G-90's S&D proposals and the ACP Group's 
Bridging Proposals were ex amples of such efforts. 
3.15.  From the discussions over the previous week s, it was clear to the LDCs that Members could 
not shift the focus from the implementation of the Ba li decisions. They also needed to touch on all 
areas of the DDA, with substantial and meaningful movement in core elements, focusing on development. LDCs were looking forward to constructively engaging in this process. 
3.16.  From the LDCs' perspective, implementation of the Bali decisions on LDC issues prior to 
MC10, in letter and spirit, was of utmost priority, so that delegations could report to Ministers that meaningful progress had been made since Bali. To  that end there had recently been dedicated 
sessions on rules of origin and cotton, where the WTO membership had got a clear idea about 
LDCs' need in these areas. The LDC Group intended to make a formal submission on the needs of LDCs in the specific elements of rules of origin  soon after the summer break, so that preference-
giving countries could improve and streamline their rules of origin applicable to LDCs. The LDC 
Group hoped that the dedicated session on duty-f ree quota-free (DFQF) market access for LDCs, 
which the CTD Chair was planning after the summer break, would help find a way forward for the implementation of the Ministerial decisions in this regard. The Group proposed to hold a similar 
dedicated session on the operationalization of th e Services Waiver. This would give Members the 
opportunity to assess the progress to date – which was the deadline for submission of notifications for preferential treatment in trade in services fo r LDCs – and identify further steps. He thanked 
those countries who had taken positive steps in implementing the Bali decisions on DFQF market 
access, rules of origin, operationalization of the LDCs service waiver and cotton. 
3.17.  As Members moved towards Nairobi, they needed to address key issues with a development 
focus. First, on the long-standing S&D treatment provisions in the existing WTO Agreements, the 
LDC Group, together with the African and ACP groups, had submitted the proposals on 25 S&D 
provisions (JOB/TNC/51). The Group expected th at Members would commence discussion on these 
proposals with a view to having a fruitful outcome, in line with the Doha mandate, to be delivered 
at MC10. TN/C/M/37 
 
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  3.18.  Second, in the areas of agriculture, the LDCs wished to see commitments on substantial 
reduction in OTDS and elimination of all sorts of export subsidies, including in cotton; developing disciplines to restrict shifting from the Amber to the Green Box; continuation of flexibility not to undertake any reduction commitment by LDCs in any pillars of agriculture, including in the de 
minimis  threshold; bringing public stockholding by LDC for food security purposes in the 
development box; addressing sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures with a view to reducing trade costs; and binding DFQF market access for LDCs through scheduling. 
3.19.  Third, in NAMA, the LDC Group said Members would need to address preference erosion, 
including the disproportionately affected countries (DAC) issue, maintaining commitment to exempt LDCs from undertaking tariff cuts, addre ssing the concern of LDCs in customs unions, 
NTBs hindering exports of LDCs, and binding DFQF market access through scheduling. 
3.20.  Fourth, any outcome in the services pillar of the DDA should respect Article IV.3 of the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS); the negotiating guidelines and procedures; the LDC Modalities for the Special Treatment for Least-Developed Country Members in the 
Negotiations on Trade in Services, particularly paragraphs 3, 4, and 5 concerning expectations 
from LDCs in the negotiations and paragraph 12 on the provision of technical assistance; 
paragraph 26 of the Hong Kong Declaration statin g that LDCs were not expected to undertake new 
services commitments; and LDC provisions in Annex C. 
3.21.  Fifth, any outcome in the Rules negotiations had to address the concern of LDCs through 
appropriate S&D provisions including adoption of simplified procedures for taking anti-dumping action for use of LDCs and increase of the thresh old from 3% to 7% for volume of imports referred 
to in Article 5.8 of the Agreement in the case of  LDCs, without any provision for cumulation, which 
has been outstanding since Doha. 
3.22.  LDCs also wished to see a positive outcom e on their request for extension of the transition 
period for pharmaceutical products, including exemption from obligations under paragraphs 70.8 
and 70.9 of the TRIPS Agreement, for as long as the Member was an LDC. 
3.23.  In conclusion, he said that the LDC Group was available to effectively and constructively 
engage in upcoming discussions with a view to  ensuring an outcome at Nairobi. The Group 
intended to submit specific proposals on core i ssues of their concern, including possible elements 
for an LDC package, as soon as possible. The Chairman had said that Members had to make political calls. The LDC Group believed that it was the major players who would be required to start 
the process, showing constructive leadership. 
3.24.  The representative of Lesotho, on behalf of the African Group, said the Group had taken 
note of the Chairman's and the negotiating grou p Chairs' reports on the post-Bali work program 
negotiations. These reports were consistent with the assessment made in numerous consultations, 
including at the informal Heads of Delegation  (HoDs) meetings. There was clearly not much 
progress to date. However, at this point in time, Members had to avoid creating or being caught in 
any level of uncertainty on the way forward.  
3.25.  He said that a few things had to be made clear to move the negotiation process forward in a 
balanced and fair manner. First, this was neither the first time that Members had missed a deadline to construct a work program, nor was it the first time that Members were presented with 
circumstances that demanded a deeper search for a credible outcome. Failure to construct a work 
program did not mean that there was no mandate for negotiations. The pre-eminence of the DDA mandate guiding the negotiations continued to subsist and had been a faithful conscience guiding 
the principles of negotiations. He said there was no other basis for the post-summer-break 
negotiations save for the DDA mandate. It was on the basis of this mandate that every innovative idea had to conform to the standards set out by this mandate. The post-summer-break 
negotiations, therefore, could not be an exceptio n to this rule. Second, Nairobi presented the WTO 
with an opportunity to leave a lasting legacy in a continent that was most marginalised in global trade by delivering development outcomes. The va lue of such outcomes would be measured by 
their commercial, economic and social meaningfulness.  
3.26.  On the substantive areas of negotiations, work should continue on the three core areas of 
agriculture, NAMA and services. It would take progress in the agriculture negotiations for TN/C/M/37 
 
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  breakthroughs in other areas. For the African Group, the agriculture reform agenda remained the 
cornerstone of the Group's motivations to remain engaged in the DDA negotiations, particularly because this was where the most important development gains with a human face would accrue. In this regard, Members should aim for a mean ingful outcome across the three pillars of 
agriculture, domestic support, market access and export competition. A credible outcome in the 
agriculture negotiations would be one that addressed the plight of millions of poverty-stricken people across the face of the African continent and elsewhere in the world. The reality was that 
OTDS undermined Africa's economic development and growth potential. To this end, there had to 
be a result on domestic support, first and foremost to reduce the distortions that created disincentives for investments in Africa's agricultural sector and that led to the loss of livelihood and to food insecurity. Second, it had to address the asymmetries codified in the Agreement on 
Agriculture. It was on that note that the draft mo dalities contained in Rev.4 remained a good basis 
for further negotiations on agriculture.  
3.27.  The flexibilities for developing countries and LDCs contained in Rev.4, including flexible 
treatment of SPs and the Special Safeguard Mechan ism (SSM), should be maintained and be part 
of the post-summer-break consultations. In this regard, the African Group supported the submissions made by the G-33 on SPs and the SSM. In addition, Members had to aim for a 
solution for cotton, in accordance with the July 2004 Framework and the Hong Kong mandate. The 
African Group called upon prioritizing the issues of NFIDCs in the negotiations and highlighted the 
paramount importance of the flexibilities envisage d for NFIDCs in Rev.4 for their food security.  
3.28.  Under NAMA, the Group was of the view that  the modalities and flexibilities contained in the 
2008 Rev.3 draft modalities for LDCs, developing countries, SVEs and RAMs had to be maintained. 
For Africa, outcomes in this area should not undermine or impede achieving the objective of promoting the industrialization and structural transformation of African economies. Members would 
also need to address the anomalies that arose from applying different tariff reductions for 
Members of custom unions composed of developing countries, LDCs and SVEs. 
3.29.  In services, flexibilities for developing co untries and LDCs provided for in GATS had to be 
preserved. The Group reiterated its view that the progress and the level of ambition in the 
negotiation of services and other areas would depe nd on the progress and level of ambition in 
agriculture and NAMA.  
3.30.  The African Group attached utmost importan ce to the principles of S&D treatment and LTFR 
and it was of the view that these principles sh ould be meaningfully applied in any negotiated 
outcome. The Group, together with the ACP an d LDC groups, had submitted a package composed 
of 25 S&D proposals contained in document JOB/TNC/51. The Group looked forward to 
constructive engagement by Members after the summer break.  
3.31.  The Group aligned itself with the statemen ts by Barbados on behalf of the ACP Group and 
Bangladesh on behalf of the LDC Group. In conclusion, the Group reiterated the vital importance of 
ensuring continued transparency and inclusiveness in the negotiation process for an equitable, 
balanced and legitimate outcome. 
3.32.  The representative of Switzerland, on behalf of Albania, Australia, Benin, Botswana, Brunei 
Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El 
Salvador, Fiji, Guatemala, Hong Kong China, Iceland, Israel, Kenya, Korea, Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic, Liechtenstein, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, Montenegro, Morocco, Myanmar, New 
Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Samoa, 
Singapore, Solomon Islands, Switzerland, Chinese Taipei, Thailand, Togo, Tonga, Turkey, Uganda, 
Uruguay, Vanuatu, and Vietnam, read a statement on behalf of a group of 50 Members,3 which 
represented a wide range of interest groups and sensitivities. The group included LDCs, SVEs, 
other developing countries and developed countries. The statement did not necessarily reflect 
national positions in all of its wording. It did, however, convey strong, shared concerns about the 
current state of the DDA negotiations, the need for full engagement by all Members and, in particular the majors after the summer break, and the importance of delivering concrete results at 
MC10 in Nairobi in the interest of a credible, inclusive and well-functioning multilateral trading 
system. 
                                               
3 The statement was later circulated in document TN/C/15. TN/C/M/37 
 
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  3.33.  He read out the joint statement as follows:  
"We, a group of 50 developing and developed Members strongly supportive of the 
multilateral trading system, are deeply concerned at the state of discussions on the outstanding Doha Development Agenda issues. 
We are disappointed that Members were unable to reach agreement on a work 
programme by the end of July. Nevertheless we are determined to continue intensive efforts, based on the work done over recent months, to develop a comprehensive 
package of credible outcomes for the forthcoming WTO Ministerial Conference in 
Nairobi which will allow us to conclude the DDA. 
Achieving concrete outcomes on outstanding DDA issues would ensure a successful 
Conference in Nairobi – the first WTO Minist erial Conference to be held in Africa. 
It would highlight the unique capacity of th e WTO to deliver meaningful improvements 
in global trade rules and would bring development benefits that cannot be matched through trade negotiations conducted outside the WTO. 
We understand that all Members are subject to political constraints and recognize that 
we must focus our efforts on outcomes that are realistic in the current environment. We acknowledge that doing so requires all of us to revisit the ambitions we might 
have held at earlier stages in the negotiations, while upholding a necessary level of 
credibility.  
We believe this imposes a responsibility on all Members to engage effectively towards 
a meaningful and balanced agreement in Nairobi. We are committed to working 
towards that goal but we also call on all of the largest of the WTO's Members to work 
together and show the leadership necessary to make MC10 a success. 
In Nairobi, we have a historic opportunity to inject new life into the WTO and confirm 
its crucial role for development and the global economy. We should not miss that 
chance." 
3.34.  Speaking on behalf of the G-10, he said that the G-10 shared the Chairman's concerns 
about the state of play of the negotiations. As others, the Group would have hoped to be close to 
adopting a detailed work program which would have set Members on the path towards a conclusion of the Doha Round in Nairobi. In this challenging situation, all Members needed to redouble their efforts, focus on substantial issues and enter into real negotiations on a meaningful 
outcome of the DDA. For the G-10, this would impl y concessions in the very sensitive sector of 
agriculture. As in the past, the G-10 remained ready to make contributions in this area, provided that a balance was achieved with its interests in other areas. In this context, and as the Group had 
stated before, for the G-10, tariff capping in agriculture could not be accepted as part of a 
balanced outcome. G-10 Members attached the hi ghest importance to the multilateral trading 
system and remained fully committed to making MC10 a success. 
3.35.  Speaking on behalf of Switzerland, he a nnounced that Switzerland's notification of its LDC 
Services Waiver had been submitted on 30 July. He  also informed delegations that Switzerland's 
ratification procedure for the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) was about to be completed and 
the notification would be conveyed by early September. 
3.36.  On the DDA negotiations and further to the joint statement by 50 Members, Switzerland 
appreciated the efforts made by the ACP Group to  present the "Proposals for Bridging Gaps on 
Remaining DDA Issues and Development Outcomes for MC10". At first glance, this was a very 
helpful paper which it would examine very carefully with its capital. His delegation also appreciated 
the submission received from the G-90 containing S&D proposals which addressed a key area of the negotiations.  
3.37.  Switzerland believed that the WTO was at a crossroads. The question Members were facing 
was whether they still had a sufficiently strong interest in concluding the DDA. If the answer was yes, he asked whether Members would be able to muster the political capital required to do so, or TN/C/M/37 
 
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  alternatively whether they were entering a pote ntially extended period during which the Doha 
agenda might still be around, but rather in the form of a zombie.  
3.38.  Convinced of the unique role and importance of the multilateral trading system, Switzerland 
hoped that Members collectively would not miss the historic opportunity that Nairobi offered to 
deliver on the DDA and to open up new horizons for the WTO. For many Members, an ambitious 
wide ranging package to conclude the DDA would still be desirable. However, the reality was that in today's world, this was no longer more than wishful thinking. At the same time, a minimal 
package which did not deliver a meaningful outc ome for all Members and would not conclude the 
DDA could not be an option either. The only viable path ahead, therefore, was to strive for a comprehensive Nairobi package with lowered ambiti on across the board, while still taking steps 
forward – even small ones – towards a more open, more predictable and more resilient 
multilateral trading system.  
3.39.  For Switzerland, such a package meant realistically achievable, balanced outcomes in all 
three pillars of agriculture, market access and other aspects of non-agricultural products, services, 
development issues, Rules and environment, as well  as in TRIPS, where the three issues proposed 
by the W/52 coalition remained on the table. 
3.40.  Switzerland was of the view that the ambition level had to be tackled with priority. Members 
should enter into concrete discussions on key issues on a non-prejudicial basis, for it was hard to 
define ambition in abstract and it was difficult to make an honest assessment of what one could do when it was not known what one could expect to get. Possibly the best way would be to work backwards and fill the defined level of ambition wi th substance, with the flexibility required to 
respect truly Members' redlines.  
3.41.  Switzerland was deeply concerned that it had not yet been possible to effectively enter into 
negotiations on the substance of the DDA in the process to establish a work program mandated for 
the end of July. Under these circumstances, however,  it did not believe that more work should be 
invested in such a work program. What was need ed was to focus all energy on a turnaround in 
time for success at MC10. Political calls and creati vity were urgently needed to set Members on a 
positive track right after the summer break in September to deliver in a comprehensive way on the 
substance of the DDA in Nairobi. Such a turnaround would not be possible without more engagement and more willingness to compromise by all and primarily by the majors. Switzerland, therefore, called on all Members, but in particular the largest ones, to fully assume their 
responsibility and leadership, at this crucial point in time, commensurate with their respective 
weight and capabilities, in the interest of a successful MC10 and the multilateral trading system, which remained alive and relevant to the world, also in the future. 
3.42.  The representative of Indonesia, on behalf of the G-33, expressed disappointment that 
some Members continued to be reluctant to take the 2008 draft agriculture modalities as the basis 
to move the negotiations forward. These draft moda lities did not get the appropriate attention they 
deserved, although the G-33 had heard from othe r groups and individual Members that they 
wished to take Rev.4 as the basis. Valuable time had been occupied by discussions on some 
alternatives that sought to depart from Rev.4, which might water down further the already limited 
and constrained flexibilities for developing countries under the said modalities.  
3.43.  The G-33 recalled that throughout the negotiations on the post-Bali work program, it had 
demonstrated its constructive engagement, not only by actively initiating and participating in various discussions and consultations, but also by putting forward concrete proposals on SPs and 
the SSM. The Group regretted that other Members had not demonstrated meaningful engagement 
by responding to those proposals with written feedback for the specific issues proposed.  
3.44.  As announced at the General Council meeting, the G-33 together with SVEs, the ACP Group 
and the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu had circulated a joint 
submission on Renewing Development throug h the SP and SSM, contained in document 
TN/AG/GEN/36. The joint submission from divers e groups and individual developing Members 
abundantly demonstrated that SPs and the SSM cont inued to enjoy a critical mass of support and 
legitimacy; hence, these required more concrete action and immediate positive resolution. This 
joint submission sought to strongly renew the long-standing calls of developing Members for global trade reforms that addressed inequities and imbalances in the Uruguay Round through S&D TN/C/M/37 
 
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  treatment. The submission emphasized that mean ingful SP and an accessible and effective SSM 
were parts of the balancing and S&D treatment instruments, as endorsed unequivocally by 
Members through the July 2004 Framework and the Hong Kong Declaration in 2005. In this submission, the co-sponsors had also underlined that SP and SSM should be stand-alone elements 
of the market access pillar and they should be linked neither to any tariff reduction formula nor the 
level of ambition. The co-sponsors also undersco red that SP and SSM were "must haves" for a 
successful outcome in MC10.  
3.45.  The G-33 reminded Members that while work would continue, Members could not ignore the 
Bali ministerial mandate to find a permanent solution to the Group's proposal on public stockholding for food security purposes. Discussions in the dedicated sessions of the CoA SS had to continue if Members were to arrive at the permanent solution by December 2015. 
3.46.  In conclusion, the G-33 highlighted that SP and SSM, as well as a permanent solution to the 
proposal on public stockholding for food security  purposes, were critical to enable developing 
Members to effectively take into account thei r development needs including food security, 
livelihood security and rural development. These issues, together with other development issues, 
were essential ingredients for a successful MC10 in Nairobi. To that end, the G-33 was prepared to 
continue and deepen its engagement with other Members who wished to ensure that MC10 
resulted in a strong, credible outcome from the development perspective. 
3.47.  Speaking on behalf of Indonesia, he said that his delegation aligned itself with the 
statement delivered by Malaysia on behalf of AS EAN. His delegation thanked the Chairs of the 
negotiating groups and the Chairman for the tireless efforts and passion shown in trying to bridge 
the gaps among Members in an effort to define a post-Bali work program. His delegation also 
wished to convey its appreciation to the ACP Group for tabling the paper on how Members might bridge the gaps on remaining DDA issues to deliv er development outcomes at MC10. This proposal 
exemplified how Members should continue to engage constructively in rising to the challenge of 
building consensus. While welcoming this initiative, and due to the extensive and comprehensive nature of the proposal, his delegation would need time to consult with its capital before offering 
any comment. As such, Indonesia wished to reserve the right to comment on this proposal at a 
later stage. 
3.48.  It was Indonesia's view that, at this point, Members should not waste time mourning the 
inability to once again fulfil the mandate of defini ng a post-Bali work program. Rather, they should 
set the next course of direction to ensure that after the summer break all Members were on the 
same boat, on the same planet, to accelerate  work towards a successful MC10 in Nairobi. 
3.49.  It was his delegation's views that, firs t, Members needed to strengthen trust among 
themselves through enhanced inclusivity and transparency. Bearing in mind that this was a 
Member-driven organization, the responsibility and the burden to move the work forward, had to 
be borne by all Members. This could be done on ly on the basis of inclusivity and transparency. 
Second, while there were gateway issues which n eeded to be resolved in an expeditious way, 
Members should be forward-looking and prepare for an eventual, speedy movement as Nairobi drew closer. Members should be open minded, do their homework without delay, test new possibilities even on a without-prejudice basis, and hopefully come up with better positions to 
contribute positively, rather than waiting for a doomsday scenario to happen. Third, recalibrating 
the ambition should not be defined as a permit to  cherry pick on the issues to be negotiated. 
Doability and practicability should not sacrifice the mandate of the DDA, which should focus on the 
development interests of developing countries. Last ly, his delegation reminded Members that their 
credibility and the credibility of the WTO and the multilateral trading system were once again being tested. It was Members' shared obligation and responsibility to prove to the world that they could 
deliver. 
3.50.  The representative of Brazil, on behalf of the G-20, reiterated the Group's commitment to 
advance the agriculture negotiations with a view to achieving a meaningful outcome at the Nairobi 
Ministerial Conference, in accordance with the Doha  and all subsequent mandates, taking into full 
account S&D treatment and LTFR for developing countries. In this regard, results in all three pillars 
of agriculture were essential to deliver on the development dimension of the Doha Round. TN/C/M/37 
 
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  3.51.  For the G-20, it was long overdue that Members begin to correct the imbalances inherited 
from the Uruguay Round and to promote substantial reforms in agriculture, without taking backward steps from current commitments. The implementation of the draft modalities for agriculture contained in Rev.4 would be a step in the direction of achieving this long-awaited 
reform. The 2008 modalities should remain the basis for the discussions. The G-20 reaffirmed once 
again the need to address cotton with the ambition, specificity and sense of urgency expected by Ministers.  
3.52.  In the broader context of the Doha, Hong Kong and Bali mandates, agriculture remained the 
area that would determine the level of ambition of all the other elements of the negotiations. 
The G-20 stood firm in its view that any perceived need to recalibrate and achieve feasible outcomes in the current negotiations could not, by any means, compromise necessary gains in all 
three pillars of agriculture and lead to imbalances to the detriment of agriculture, but rather serve 
the goal of allowing substantive progress to correct  the long standing imbalances that were at the 
heart of the mission of the G-20. The G-20 woul d support an outcome for the Doha Round that 
contributed to the reform process, and by no means would it allow the repetition of the unbalanced 
outcomes that had occurred in the past. On this basis, the G-20 was open to exploring options that were consistent with the ministerial mandates and would continue to engage constructively in the 
intense negotiations that would be required after the summer break to deliver a substantive 
outcome in Nairobi. 
3.53.  Speaking on behalf of Brazil, he said it was always going to be difficult and it would have 
been naïve to expect otherwise, as it was naïve to consider that there could be a minimalist or a 
neo-pointillist way out of this. He said that pointillism involved depicting reality by adding up 
thousands of painted dots on a canvas and not by selecting only a handful which ultimately would have no perceivable correspondence to the real world. That would be minimalist abstraction. 
It could fetch millions of dollars in art galleries, but had no market here. 
3.54.  Given that since Bali there had been much talk about realism and doability, he proposed 
that after the summer break, Members return to Geneva with a revised understanding of both 
those concepts. Realism had been presented by some  as simply meaning recognising the reality of 
what could not be done. He argued that prior to th at, it also meant recognizing the reality of what 
Members had to do – what would have to be included in the outcome Members were working for. Members should not call realism what ultimately amounted to asking that others passively accept 
what those realists wanted to do and that they agreed to give up everything those same realists 
did not wish to go ahead with. 
3.55.  This also applied to the determination of doability. It was not only a question of establishing 
what, at this point in time, some Members believed they might or might not be able to do – 
dropping all the rest and going once more for a mini-package. Nairobi could not be about mini-packages. Members had to begin by determining what  would have to be part of the outcome, what 
could not be left out without compromising the entire exercise, and then agreeing on the way to 
make that possible. The focus of doability had to be not on what Members could do but on how they could do what they ultimately had to do. Re luctant, though somewhat well-meaning, partners 
had to face reality and recognize, for example, that Members would have to make progress vis-a-
vis the status quo  in the three pillars of agriculture and also have meaningful results on the 
development front. They would have to recognize that any viable outcome required movement in domestic support as a necessary condition. All Members knew that this was one big issue that 
could not be dealt with elsewhere. He had seen no reference to disciplines in domestic agriculture 
subsidies in the context of mega-laterals or plurilaterals, even despite the immense distortions that such subsidies caused to global trade in a way that was especially damaging to developing 
countries.  
3.56.  He said that the holiday should also serve to put an end to the illusion entertained by some 
Members that agriculture could once again be left behind, with close to zero progress. While on other fronts – including NAMA, services and Rules – there could be broader movement even if 
related only to policy space. That was not going to happen. Brazil for one – and it was not alone – 
would not be part of any attempt to build consen sus upon any kind of unbalanced outcome. On the 
contrary, it would continue to be engaged in discussions with a strong and permanent focus on 
balance, symmetry and fairness, working with the 2008 modalities as reference, particularly for 
any adjustment of ambition, and taking up more recent discussions. Brazil would reject upfront 
any formula approach, benchmark, schedule, modality or proposal the result of which could TN/C/M/37 
 
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  amount to maintaining or worsening the disadv antaged position of agriculture within the 
multilateral trade regime. He also said that th e notion that some Members needed a meaningful 
result in the WTO more than others should be dispelled. Such a misperception, that he had occasionally sensed, could lead to serious miscalculations. The only premise for a successful 
negotiation was that, despite naturally different perspectives, all Members collectively needed this.  
3.57.  Brazil had been playing a constructive role in this process – constructive in what his 
delegation said, even when it might sound less su ave than most well-known Brazilian music, but 
also in what it frequently avoided saying. His delegation would continue to be engaged in that 
same manner. He urged Members to return in September with the necessary determination to 
engage and collectively work towards a meaningful result at the Ministerial Conference. He urged them to contain the little sceptic devils inside each Member and surprise the broad scepticism out 
there. He encouraged Members not to assume that  the possibility of failure was already priced-in 
to current expectations. Instead, they should try to give markets and pundits a positive jolt. It was a matter of political will. If there was no such will, it would not happen. If, on the contrary, all 
Members decided to do it, then it would be done  and Members would be able to comfortably look 
back and smile at this moment of frustration.  
3.58.  He also recalled the idea of legacy – the legacy of Members' individual and collective 
contributions, the legacy of the governments and leaders to the coming generations. Members 
could not afford to throw into the dustbin of i rrelevance one of the most important collective 
accomplishments in the history of international relations. They had to honour the extraordinary efforts of those who had preceded them and live up to their responsibility towards each of their 
countries as well as to the entire global community, present and future.  
3.59.  The representative of Australia, on behalf of the Cairns Group, said the Group had long 
sought an ambitious outcome to the agriculture negotiations. Cairns Group members were 
concerned that, despite increased engagement in the first half of the year, little progress had been 
made in any of the three agriculture pillars.  
3.60.  Discussions in recent months had demonstrated that agriculture remained at the centre of 
the Doha negotiations and that it influenced all areas of these negotiations. The discussions had 
confirmed the need for meaningful outcomes in all three pillars of the agriculture negotiations. Cairns Group members found it difficult to believe that any Member – even one which had supported lowering ambition – could sell domestically a conclusion to the Doha negotiations devoid 
of meaningful results. Discussions had also reve aled that the positions of the major players 
remained very far apart on fundamental issues. Nevertheless, the Cairns Group strongly believed that an outcome that met the needs of all Members was possible. To move the negotiations 
forward towards meaningful outcomes, what was needed was political commitment and leadership. 
The Cairns Group called on all Members to work constructively and pragmatically towards resolving the differences in all three pillars of agriculture wi th a view to achieving an outcome that advanced 
the reform process and removed the barriers and imbalances inherited from the Uruguay Round. 
3.61.  On domestic support, it was clear that there was scope for major subsidisers to make 
significant reductions to their entitlements while retaining the policy space they needed. The Group recognised the political sensitivities attached to this pillar of the negotiations, but called on 
Members involved to redouble their efforts to develop solutions. The Cairns Group believed finding 
a solution in this pillar of agriculture could free up obstacles across the negotiating agenda. On market access, the outcome would only be acceptable if it supported progress in the reform 
process. On export competition, it was critical that  Members expended the political will to fulfil the 
Doha mandate as well as the commitments made in Hong Kong and reaffirmed by Ministers in Bali.  
3.62.  Despite the difficulties Members were facing, the Cairns Group remained optimistic that 
Members could in the lead-up to Nairobi develop meaningful outcomes in all three pillars of the 
agriculture negotiations and pave the way for the successful fulfilment of the DDA. 
3.63.  Speaking on behalf of Australia, he agre ed with the Chairman on the task ahead and the 
way that Members needed to focus their work. MC10 provided a crucial opportunity for the WTO to 
deliver meaningful results on the DDA and Memb ers needed to make the most of it. Members 
would need to be prepared to come back in September ready to discuss specific elements of the package in concrete detail. Australia would be ready for that discussion and it would focus on TN/C/M/37 
 
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  substance and possible outcomes. The ACP Group ha d usefully reminded Members that their task 
was to bridge the gaps between their dreams and what was doable by MC10. 
3.64.  The representative of Chinese Taipei, on behalf of the Group of Recently Acceded Members 
(RAMs), said that the Group appreciated the Ch airman's and the negotiating groups Chairs' 
endeavours in conducting the consultations. It  was also grateful to those Members that had 
contributed to the process since the beginning of the year with substantive proposals or ideas, including the latest ones submitted by the ACP Group and the G-90. The RAMs were aware of the 
huge efforts made by all in trying to deliver the post-Bali work program by the deadline. The RAMs 
were disappointed, like others, that Members could not reach the convergence to fulfil the mandate in time. However, while they recognized that the work program was a vital part of the 
process towards concluding the DDA, it was not in itself the final destination. The absence of a 
work program should not thwart Members' efforts at achieving a successful MC10 in Nairobi in 
December. 
3.65.  It was evident that there were only a few months left and he urged Members to make good 
use of the summer break by working together with capitals, and returning to the negotiating table 
with solid, practical solutions in September. In particular, the RAMs looked forward to the major 
Members becoming fully engaged and showing more leadership and responsibility to make MC10 a 
success. 
3.66.  The RAMs Group urged all Members to make commitments in this Round to a level at least 
equivalent to that already made by their group. No matter what the level of ambition would be, the gap in the commitment levels between the RAMs  and the original WTO Members needed to be 
significantly narrowed. It was only through this kind of collective contribution by all Members that 
the DDA would be successfully concluded. The RAMs Group reaffirmed its commitment to the multilateral trading system and stood ready to work with the Chairman and other Members 
constructively to make MC10 – the first Ministerial Conference in 20 years to be held in Africa – 
both deliverable and a great success. 
3.67.  The representative of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, on behalf of the Arab Group, said that 
there had been active engagement in the previo us weeks between Members in discussing the way 
forward, with some new ideas and proposals submitted by certain Members, which presented alternative approaches in dealing with the market access pillar in both agriculture and NAMA. Despite these developments and the renewed phase of engagement, no concrete progress had 
been yielded and the contours of the post-Bali work program remained unclear. 
3.68.  Members were at a critical juncture. They  w e r e  m i s s i n g  t h e  J u l y  d e a d l i n e  t o  d e v e l o p  a  
substantive work program to complete the Doha Round. This would put the credibility of the WTO 
at stake. The failure to finalize the work program cast serious doubts on the WTO's ability to wrap 
up negotiations on the DDA. He said that Members should avoid future failures in order to keep the 
Doha Round negotiations on track. There was an urgent need for all Members to engage 
constructively and work in a solution-finding mode in order to achieve a balanced and meaningful 
outcome by MC10. Members should not miss this o pportunity – the world would not wait for long. 
Success in Nairobi was critical to pave the way for the conclusion of the Doha Round and also for the future of the multilateral trading system. 
3.69.  The Arab Group confirmed that, whatever the result would be in terms of the approach that 
Members adopted and applied, it should not in any way affect the flexibilities and the S&D treatment accorded to developing countries and LD Cs, as enshrined in the DDA mandate. The Arab 
Group reiterated its commitment to the multilateral trading system and remained ready to engage 
constructively in the work ahead. 
3.70.  The representative of Mali, on behalf of the Cotton Four (C-4), associated herself with 
statements by Lesotho on behalf of the African Gr oup, Bangladesh on behalf of the LDC Group and 
Barbados on behalf of the ACP Group. The C-4 thanked and congratulated the Kenyan Authorities 
for their commitment to make MC10 a success and for the tireless efforts they had been deploying.  
3.71.  She said that it had already been more than twelve years since an urgent and vital issue 
had been put on the WTO negotiating agenda in order to find an equally urgent and appropriate 
solution that, as decided, would be addressed in an ambitious, expeditious and specific manner. TN/C/M/37 
 
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  However, to date, Members had not yet responded to this call and to the cry of cotton-producing 
communities and LDCs, where cotton represented more than 8 to 12% of GDP, 40% of total 
export earnings, 70% of agricultural revenues and employed 80% of the working population in the 
production, transmission and marketing chain. It was also important to recall that there were 
36 African countries that produced cotton and several other developing and least-developed 
countries in Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean.  
3.72.  For this reason, the C-4 wished to make another call to WTO Members to provide an 
appropriate follow-up to the mandate given in July 2004 and in Hong Kong in 2005 on cotton 
under the three negotiating pillars – market acce ss, domestic support and export competition – 
while giving the development dimension the appropriate attention. Thus, by MC10, at the latest, Members would be able to provide solutions and responses to the cotton issue that would allow 
cotton producers and exporters in developing count ries and, especially LDCs, to make trade a 
significant lever for sustainable development and the fight against poverty. The C-4 believed that Members could work towards this goal with stronger political will and engagement.  
3.73.  The representative of Guatemala, on be half of Small and Vulnerable Economies (SVEs), 
shared the Chairman's evaluation of the situ ation and expressed concern about the lack of 
progress in the negotiations, which had prevented Members from having a modalities-like work 
program by 31 July, as mandated by Ministers. The SVEs had been committed to the formulation 
of the work program and, in this spirit, had ci rculated the document JOB/TNC/49 entitled: "Small, 
Vulnerable Economies (SVEs) Contribution for the Post Bali Work Program". In the current context and within the preparation of a successful MC10, to which they were committed, they expected 
that the SVEs' positions in the different areas included in this document be taken into account in 
any outcome under the DDA. 
3.74.  As a Group, the SVEs believed that wo rk from September onwards should focus on 
delivering credible outcomes with development at its core, and on the basis of the mandates and 
compromises that had been reached to date. Within  this context and on the basis of the special 
circumstances faced by the members of the group, SVEs flexibilities should be preserved in all 
areas of the negotiations including agriculture, NAMA , services and fisheries subsidies. He said that 
SVEs' contributions should be adjusted downwards, should there be a lowering in the level of ambition.  
3.75.  The SVEs remained committed to the strengthening of the multilateral trading system, a 
successful MC10 and the realization of the development gains for SVEs on the basis of the DDA. 
3.76.  The representative of Turkey associated hi s delegation with the statement by Indonesia on 
behalf of the G-33. He expressed his frustration with regard to the current state of play where 
Members had missed yet another deadline. Nevertheless, in the light of the last-minute 
breakthroughs that had been witnessed in the past, he still hoped that a credible outcome in Nairobi could be achieved. However, to do that, all Members had to be ready to work hard and 
with goodwill after the summer break. In this context, Members should stop negotiating over 
entrenched positions and leave, to the extent possible, their comfort zones.  
3.77.  He believed that the most important factor that would help him convince his stakeholders 
would be the fairness of an outcome. Such an ou tcome was possible. Members should try to look 
at the issues from this perspective and ask themselves how they could achieve an outcome that 
was fair for all. He recalled that all Members aimed to create more jobs and better living conditions for their own people through trade and development. This meant that all of them should gain from 
an outcome. During the negotiations, concentrating on what Members benefitted overall, instead 
of focusing on what they would lose, was a crucial point which would lead Members to success. The multilateral trading system was the best way to reach such a common good. Therefore, all 
Members had a stake in advancing the negotiations in this forum. If they failed to deliver here, the 
alternatives were likely to create unbalanced outcomes for many.  
3.78.  He underlined that development was a theme that would remain significant and recurrent in 
the negotiations and discussions in the WTO and in other fora, in the coming years and decades. 
However, inability to deliver a meaningful result in a Round that contained the word development 
in its title would be very unfortunate and would cause many to lose their faith in this forum and its intentions. TN/C/M/37 
 
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  3.79.  His delegation's preference would be an am bitious outcome that addressed all issues in the 
DDA, but given that the stakes were high in terms of the credibility of the multilateral trading system and its Members, Members should have an outcome, even a modest but fair one, and set 
the goal for post-Nairobi to continue on the remaining DDA issues, for achieving an ambitious 
outcome at the end of the Round. As for the fu ture of the WTO, everyone agreed on the 
importance of the role that the WTO played. However, no outcome in Nairobi and declaring this Round dead – or accept it de facto  – might mean a diminished role. He hoped this scenario would 
not come true. All Members had a common responsibility and should make a common endeavour 
to avoid such an eventuality. He reassured the membership of Turkey's strong support to the 
multilateral trading system and that Turkey, Presiden t in office of the G20, would continue to work 
constructively in all fora to achieve a meaningful outcome in Nairobi.  
3.80.  Finally, he informed the membership that Ankara had confirmed Turkey's acceptance of the 
ITA Expansion Declaration and the Chair's Product Li st as circulated on 18 July 2015. Turkey was 
also close to finalizing its notification under the Services Waiver for the LDCs.  
3.81.  The representative of Chile said that the Chairman's and the negotiating group Chairs' 
reports gave Members an overview of the reas ons as to why Members did not have a work 
program and left little hope of having a robust package for Nairobi, unless something changed. 
The lack of a work program put into question once again Members' political will to take a 
qualitative leap forward, after 20 years, towards trade liberalization at the multilateral level – 
because ultimately, this was what it was all about, beyond numbers, formulas and vested interests. 
3.82.  Without a common, systemic, strategic pers pective for the future, conflicts of interests 
would always lead to paralysis. The times that the international community had been able to advance in creating a better world, it had done so by looking at the whole and focussing on the 
long term, guided by the collective belief that the common good was the way forward. This 
required leadership, genuine solidarity and generosity on the part of all. All Members had a responsibility. However, amongst them, there were  some Members that had sufficient clout to be 
able to generate, for the common good, the conditions that would allow Members to have a 
Conference in Nairobi with substantive results.  
3.83.  From what had emerged in the many fo rmal and informal meetings, conversations and 
analysis with different groups, it was not impossible to agree to a robust package that would allow 
Members to conclude Doha and move into a new era post-Nairobi. Chile was ready to explore any 
option that would allow Members to make substantive progress. This had to be the focus in the coming months. However, in order to do this, Members could not continue to negotiate from 
entrenched and static positions, or advance demand s that would be objectively impossible to fulfil. 
Those who appeared to be the main obstacles for arriving at a good deal could turn out to be the driving force of a new era in multilateral trade. Ho lding a Ministerial Conference that was devoid of 
content and – even worse – that would be beyond any forward looking vision would only delay 
further the conclusion of the Doha Round, leaving it in a state of permanent drowsiness. Due to the systemic value of the WTO and the magnitude of the political and economic capital invested in these negotiations, giving in to drowsiness was not an option.  
3.84.  He said that the challenge was clear. Members had to build a package imbued with the 
principles of relevance, realism, recalibration and doability. They also had to add another principle: 
solidarity. He believed that, although this latter principle seemed far from the business logic and 
closer to other areas of multilateral cooperation, its introduction in this process was necessary as 
an ethical basis for the negotiations.  
3.85.  The global reality was a world of gaping inequalities that only balanced and fair 
development could rectify. The difference in income between the rich and the poor continued to 
expand rapidly. In 2014, the wealth of the 80 ri chest people had equalled the total wealth of the 
bottom 50% of humanity. If this trend continue d, in the short term, the richest 1% of the 
population would have more than the rest of the wo rld. This was not sustainable. As highlighted in 
recent documents issued by the WTO and the Worl d Bank, international trade could be one of the 
main sources of growth and development to combat  poverty, inequality and build a better world.  TN/C/M/37 
 
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  3.86.  Therefore, Members' responsibility was ca pital. Members had to conclude the Doha Round, 
even with the adjustments required by the present re ality, by taking a real step forward to ensure 
that the WTO contributed to global development. If not, he could not see how multilateralism in 
trade could contribute to achieving the 2030 SD Gs that the international community was set to 
agree upon in the following weeks. Without the WT O's contribution, these objectives would not be 
achievable. 
3.87.  He mentioned another factor that should give Members a sense of urgency, especially in 
consideration of the fact that the last multilateral negotiation had been concluded 20 years earlier, 
in a world that was very different. From Nairobi, Members had to enter a new era of negotiations to address the new reality facing international trade. Chemistry, biology and computational physics were changing the nature and the speed of scienti fic knowledge and its technological application to 
the production of goods and services. Future sy nergies between synthetic biology, 3D and 4D 
printing, artificial intelligence, robotics, atomically precise manufacturing and other forms of nanotechnology, augmented reality and systems of collective intelligence meant that the past 
20 year would appear to be extremely sluggish in  comparison to the changes that would occur in 
the next 15 years. In addition, given that the world population was expected to grow by 1 billion in 
only 12 year and by 2.3 billion in 35 years, and given that by 2050 most of the world population 
would be living in cities and would belong to th e middle class, the demand of goods and services 
would be enormous and only an open, non-distortive multilateral trading system would be able to meet that demand. It was enough to say that to keep balancing the relation between population growth and economic growth, food production would need to increase by 70%. These 
circumstances should be kept into account when Members took decisions, beyond immediate, 
short term calculations. 
3.88.  Chile wished to see a successful conclusion  of this Round. The multilateral trading system 
continued to be at the top of Chile's priorities. His country wished to contribute, in line with its size 
and capacity, focussing on the present, but with a strategic perspective that would allow the WTO 
to respond to present and future challenges. Ch ile hoped that in September, Members would be 
able to redouble their efforts and see a change to the sluggishness. 
3.89.  The representative of the Bolivarian Repub lic of Venezuela associated his delegation with 
the statements by Indonesia on behalf of the G-33 and Brazil on behalf of the G-20. His delegation 
regretted that despite all efforts, Members had not achieved a work program focused on 
development. He said that it was important to recall the validity of the Doha Ministerial 
Declaration, as well as the Hong Kong and Bali Ministerial Declarations, which together with the July 2004 Framework, were the foundations to advance the negotiations. They contained the 
agreed basis that would enable Members to successfully complete the work under the negotiations. 
Venezuela said it was not constructive, at this stage, to question the clear mandates enshrined in the DDA.  
3.90.  His delegation considered that agriculture had to lead the process towards Nairobi. 
Negotiations in the three pillars of agriculture had to continue to be the engine of this Round. The DDA could not be reduced to a mere market access exercise, limiting its outcome to a simple tariff reduction formula. 
3.91.  Venezuela hoped that these negotiations woul d not follow the prevailing trend that had been 
favouring developed countries to the detriment of developing countries. Members should not allow imbalances between countries to grow bigger. The negotiations towards Nairobi had to help 
generate results that aimed at reducing the existing gaps between developing and developed 
countries. Balance and fairness in the multilateral trading system had to be the motto of the negotiations. It was important for the process to be driven by all Members and for any proposal to 
be discussed in the formal fora in a transparent and inclusive manner.  
3.92.  Venezuela considered that it was not po ssible to conclude the DDA at any cost, without 
complying with the development mandate, withou t overcoming the system's deepest imbalances, 
and to the detriment of developing countries. Ther e was no mandate by the Ministerial Conference 
or the General Council to conclude the Round in Nairobi. Without concrete answers to the 
legitimate concerns related to development, whic h was an integral part of the Doha Round, it 
would be difficult to think of inclusive and shared results in Nairobi. If Members wanted a 
successful result in Nairobi – one that addressed the legitimate concerns of the poorest countries, 
especially in Africa, where the next Ministerial Conference would be held – they had to concentrate TN/C/M/37 
 
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  their efforts on development issues, such as S&D treatment, implementation, food security, cotton 
and LDC issues.  
3.93.  He said that the latest proposals in agriculture domestic support did not give the necessary 
confidence to embark upon meaningful discussions in market access, both in agriculture and in 
NAMA. Venezuela, as a member of the G-33, reiterated that SPs, public stockholding for food 
security purposes and the SSM were fundamental tools for food security and rural development. 
These were fundamental in ensuring that the fl exibilities contained in Rev.4 be maintained. 
Venezuela fully supported the document circulat ed by the G-33, the SVEs, the ACP Group and 
Chinese Taipei on SPs and the SSM (TN/AG/GEN/36). This document contained the legitimate concerns of an important number of developing and least-developed Members, which had to be 
taken into account and not despised.  
3.94.  In NAMA, since the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference, Venezuela had expressed concern 
with regard to the Swiss formula for tariff reduction and its negative effects on Venezuela's industrialization efforts.  
3.95.  The representative of Qatar, on behalf of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Member 
States, supported the statement delivered by Saudi Arabia on behalf of the Arab Group. He said 
the Chairman's report confirmed that Members were missing the deadline for the adoption of the 
post-Bali work program, despite their intense and active engagement. However, as the Chairman 
had said earlier in the week, Members would have the opportunity to achieve substantive outcome in Nairobi that would allow them to conclude the Doha Round. The DDA was at its core a development agenda. Development considerations, therefore, had to be at the heart of any 
outcome. In this regard the GCC Member States remained open to consider any development-
focused proposal. They also remained fully committed to achieving and concluding the DDA and were ready to re-engage constructively after th e summer break in order to achieve a successful 
outcome at MC10. 
3.96.  The representative of Fiji, on behalf of the six members of the Pacific Islands WTO Group, 
said that the Group supported the statements of Barbados on behalf of the ACP Group, Guatemala 
on behalf of the SVEs, Bangladesh on behalf of  the LDC Group and Switzerland on behalf of the 
group of 50 Members. The Pacific Group expressed its disappointment at the lack of progress in 
the first semester of the year in identifying pote ntial elements for the post-Bali work program and, 
in particular, in failing to deliver the work program by the agreed deadline. The Chairman's report 
to the General Council earlier in the week and the negotiating group Chairs' reports painted a 
sombre picture of the current status of discussions on the gateway issues, as well as other DDA mandates. Failing to meet the deadline did not mean that Members should stop negotiating. 
Rather, they needed to collectively redouble their efforts towards finding solutions on the difficult 
issues in the second semester. 
3.97.  The Group recognised that both developed and developing countries could still secure 
common understanding on the difficulties that were blocking convergence in the three gateway 
issues, in particular in agriculture, and move to resolving these to enable progress in other areas. It was clear that the smaller Members did not have the answers to offer in bridging the gaps on these gateway issues. The Pacific Group, theref ore, urged the larger WTO Members to engage 
constructively to help find creative solutions on those issues and to engage constructively to find 
solutions to issues that were of core importance to some Members, including those belonging to the Group. 
3.98.  The Pacific Group stood ready to engage with Members after the summer break to ensure 
success at MC10. As they prepared for Nairobi in  the second semester, the Pacific Group stressed 
that development remained the core pillar in the Round. The development dimension should be 
embedded across all the negotiating areas. The Paci fic Group also took note of the recalibration 
mode of the current negotiations, but wished to underline that this lowering of ambition should not be at the expense of achieving credible meanin gful and development-centred outcomes at MC10, 
particularly on agriculture, development, LDC issues and fishery subsidies, which was an important 
area to the Group. 
3.99.  The Pacific Group continued to stress the im portance of multilateral rules to SVEs and LDCs 
in providing predictability, certainty and transparency to trade, in ensuring that they had an equal TN/C/M/37 
 
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  voice and in addressing the trade challenges, including trade capacity, of smaller Members. In this 
connection, the Pacific Group placed on record its appreciation to the Director-General, the WTO Secretariat and WTO Members for highlighting the unique trade challenges of the Pacific Island Member countries in the recent successful Fift h Global Review on Aid for Trade. The Group 
underscored the critical role that Aid for Trade played as a development tool and in helping it 
address these challenges.  
3.100.  The Pacific Group supported the proposal of the ACP Group on bridging the gap on the 
Doha development issues for the Post-Bali work program and looked forward to responses to the 
proposal. 
3.101.  The representative of Colombia associated his delegation to the statements by Switzerland 
on behalf of a group of 50 Members and Australia for the Cairns Group. Colombia joined others in 
regretting not having been able to conclude the work to define a detailed, modalities-like work 
program, as Members had hoped for, by July. However, this did not mean that Members had lost their time. This work had been useful in defining a route and providing momentum. It allowed 
Members to familiarize themselves once again with the issues and the trajectory of the 
negotiations. Members had also exchanged ideas and alternatives.  
3.102.  It was important that as Members returned in September, they built on this work, if they 
wanted to achieve meaningful results in Nairobi. It  was time to assess appropriately, with capitals, 
the importance of achieving results at MC10 and to think carefully about the systemic implications of having – or not – an agreement.  
3.103.  It was Colombia's view that the priority, when Members returned in the autumn, was to 
define a whole gamut of areas of convergence th at would allow them to achieve a comprehensive 
package on the DDA remaining issues, as agreed in Bali. This package had to bring about meaningful results in all areas, which meant that there were elements that had to necessarily be 
part of the package. In particular, there had to be deliverables in the three pillars of agriculture 
and in development, where Colombia expected substantive results on issues of interest to the LDCs. However, beyond the priorities that each Member could identify, the package had to contain 
elements that all Members would be able to sell in their respective countries. Hence, the 
importance not only of what Members would be able to obtain, but also what they would be able to 
contribute. 
3.104.  It was clear that Members were far from completing the task at hand. If they wished to 
make the best use of the little time remaining, it  would be essential that the largest WTO Members 
showed leadership. He urged them to do so.  
3.105.  The representative of Malaysia, on behalf of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), said that in the interest of time, the Group would submit its full statement to the 
Secretariat for the record.4 The Group would, however, like to stress that a successful MC10 was 
imperative and ASEAN would play its part, together with other Members to contribute towards its 
success. ASEAN was of the view that all Members had the responsibility to redouble their efforts to 
forge a credible Doha outcome and a successful MC10. ASEAN hoped that in September Members would be fully ready to engage and deli ver a concrete outcome for Nairobi.  
3.106.  The representative of Nigeria acknowledged the extensive consultations, which the 
Chairman had continued to hold with Member s, world leaders and various groupings. His 
delegation was, however, disappointed that Members had failed to prepare a clearly defined, detailed and precise work program by 31 July 2015 – which was the second missed timeline after 
Bali. 
3.107.  As had been reported by the Chairman, Members had had unprecedented intensive and 
active engagement, with new ideas, proposals and approaches. However, in spite of these efforts, 
significant differences remained across many areas, especially on the core areas of agriculture, 
NAMA and services. It was Nigeria's expectation that this meeting would lay the foundation for work upon resumption in September, especially  in building on the areas where convergence had 
emerged.  
                                               
4 The statement is reproduced in the Annex.  TN/C/M/37 
 
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  3.108.  On agriculture, Nigeria agreed with the Chairman's assessment that with only few months 
left before the Nairobi Ministerial, Members needed to engage in a more focused negotiation on what could constitute a possible outcome on co tton across the three pillars of agriculture. 
His delegation also underscored the need to address cotton with the ambition, specificity and 
sense of urgency expected by Ministers. In this regard, Nigeria looked forward to the proposal by 
the C-4 to facilitate discussions after the summer break. Nigeria also agreed with the Chairman 
that the main task remained the search for an agreement on substantive results in all the three 
pillars. Furthermore, it reiterated that SPs and SSM were stand-alone development instruments 
that should not be linked to the market access ambition. Nigeria also expected a permanent solution on public stockholding for food security purposes as part of the Nairobi outcomes.  
3.109.  Nigeria shared the view that negotiations in  respect of NAMA should fully take into account 
the principles of proportionality and LTFR. There sh ould also be clear and specific S&D provisions 
and flexibilities for developing countries. As one of the Paragraph 8 countries, it wished to re-emphasise its position on the need to ensure that their specific circumstances were taken into 
consideration, particularly, as the Common External Tariff (CET) that had come into force in 
January was being implemented by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
members, which comprised mostly LDCs who were not required to undertake any commitments in 
these negotiations. Nigeria took note of the NAMA  Chair's personal assessment that agriculture, 
NAMA and services were not symme trical and, as such, symmetrical solutions in the different 
negotiating pillars might not work. This was largely because the aims and ambitions of Members were not the same. Nigeria also agreed that similar to all the other negotiating processes, the 
NAMA negotiations should be a proponent-led process. 
3.110.  While hoping that negotiations in both agriculture and NAMA would be advanced, there 
was no doubt that the services negotiations had it s dynamics. Therefore, his delegation wished to 
reiterate its concerns about the lack of progress in the services negotiations, given the crucial 
importance of services to Nigeria's economy.  He also observed that there was no common 
understanding on how services could be recalibrated in relation to agriculture and NAMA. It was 
generally agreed that the request-offer negotiations should remain the main method of 
negotiations, with a view to securing substantial commitments. Nigeria, like others, wanted an outcome in both market access and domestic regu lation and recognized the need for work to 
resume in September in the Working Party on Domestic Regulation (WPDR) in order to identify 
areas of possible elements, including compromises required to close the existing gaps.  
3.111.  Although Members had missed the deadline for the preparation of a well-defined post-Bali 
work program for the remaining DDA issues as ma ndated by Ministers at the Ninth Ministerial 
Conference (MC9), it was encouraging that Member s had signalled very clearly their determination 
to forge ahead with the remaining issues in the DDA negotiations and its conclusion as quickly as possible. In this regard, Nigeria welcomed and full y endorsed the proposal by the ACP on bridging 
the gaps on the remaining DDA issues and development outcomes for Nairobi. It believed that the 
ACP's contributions would facilitate Members' renewed engagement immediately after the summer break.  
3.112.  Nigeria called on Members to redouble effo rts and avoid any distraction that would deviate 
from the goal of achieving a meaningful development outcome at the Nairobi Ministerial, including 
the successful conclusion of the Doha Round. Accordingly, the preparation of a credible and meaningful outcome at MC10 had to ensure that : (i) development remained central and should 
permeate all areas of the negotiations; (ii) agricu lture remained at the centre of the negotiations; 
(iii) recalibration of expectations for MC10 in Nairobi, Kenya, should not in any way lower the level of ambition of the Doha Round negotiations; (iv) there was a balanced, fair and meaningful 
outcome; (v) there were flexibilities and open-m indedness to overcome entrenched and static 
positions; and (vi) there was transparency, inclusiveness and full participation by all Members.  
3.113.  Nigeria once again called for full engage ment by all Members, particularly the major 
players, after the summer break to enable Members deliver tangible results at MC10 and, thereby, 
safeguard the credibility and integrity of the multilateral trading system. Before Members 
proceeded on to the summer break, they had to be gin the process of laying a solid foundation for 
their work. They needed to focus their priority on the challenges ahead and not worry about the 
missed opportunity. The challenges might be daunting but they were not insurmountable given 
Members' collective determination for success. TN/C/M/37 
 
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  3.114.  Nigeria was committed to advancing work in all areas, particularly, on development and 
other core issues. In this regard, it was open to exploring options that would enable Members to overcome the hurdle, so long as such options were consistent with the Ministerial mandates. Nigeria supported the joint statement by Switzerl and on behalf of a group of 50 Members, the 
statements by Lesotho on behalf of the African Gr oup, Mali on behalf of the C-4, Barbados on 
behalf of the ACP Group, Indonesia on behalf of  the G-33, and Brazil on behalf of the G-20. 
3.115.  The representative of the European Union said Members were faced with a challenging 
situation, the significance of which did not seem to be fully shared by all. Despite the positive spirit 
that had filled the WTO after MC9 and in particular after the resolution of the previous year's stalemate on the TFA, Members had not been able to advance on the DDA. In the past few days, not only had Members been unable to advance, but the discussions held in the negotiating groups 
had shown that in certain cases Members had mo ved backwards. While Members had been slowly, 
for several months, moving away from old ideas that had not worked in the past and had started to consider promising ideas on a without-prejudice basis, the most recent debate in the 
negotiating groups had shown that some Members had hardened their views. Members would need 
to find the right ways to recover quickly, after the summer break, the progress that they had achieved and move forward. 
3.116.  For the past few months, the EU had consistently engaged other WTO Members in a 
process of exploring possible ideas and options th at would allow Members to bridge the gaps and 
advance on the DDA. The numerous discussions they had had showed that a change of approach 
was needed if Members were to reach an acceptab le compromise. Although this might be difficult 
for some to hear, and even more difficult to accept, the lessons from this exercise had been clear: 
if any deal was to be reached, the ambition had to be lower than in 2008 and this adjustment needed to take place across all negotiating areas. The discussions on domestic support and market 
access had shown what was and was not possible. He said that those who shut their eyes to this 
reality and demanded high levels of ambition on the one hand, coupled with flexibility regarding their concessions on the other hand, were pushing the WTO towards another failure. 
3.117.  While the situation was very difficult, the recipe to advance was clear. What was needed 
was: to target a different level of ambition than  in 2008; to accept that no Member would give 
concessions requiring major reforms of its trade and agricultural policies; and to ensure proportionate contributions within and across all ar eas by all key WTO Members, in line with their 
roles in international trade, while bearing in mind the development orientation of this Round. This 
recipe was the best hope to advance. Unfortunately, it had not yet been sufficiently accepted by all. 
3.118.  He was deeply worried that aside from the differences on the individual areas of 
negotiations and on how to proceed, there were al so more fundamental differences with regard to 
the interpretation of the significance of MC10. Fo r some, including the EU, the upcoming Ministerial 
Conference in Nairobi was the last stop to have a meaningful and full DDA outcome. At the same 
time, some other Members seemed to consider that a partial outcome could be pursued in Nairobi and that the DDA process could then continue levitating unharmed for many more years. While some mini-deliverables mi ght have contributed to maintaining a certain momentum in the past, 
this was no longer a valid option at this juncture. The negotiating function of the Organisation was 
not delivering on the issues and at the pace expe cted by world's traders. MC9 had provided the 
WTO with some breathing space. But, if Members did not use this chance to advance on the DDA, 
the attention would move entirely elsewhere. 
3.119.  The EU therefore hoped that the upcoming summer break would be used as a period of 
deep reflection which would allow Members to co me back in September with the openness that 
was needed in order to advance. He provided a few elements that in his view could usefully form 
part of this reflection and which might help co ncentrate efforts when Members reconvened. First, 
while it was undisputable that agriculture was the central element of the Round and would need to 
be resolved in order to get any feasible deal, all issues needed to advance in parallel. Otherwise, 
all of the individual issues would remain blocked, as they were all interlinked. Second, domestic 
support was the ambition setter of what could be achieved in the DDA. Discussions had proven that the only realistic way forward was to focus on an outcome which respected Members' current 
policies, but also restrained trade-distorting support by introducing constraints and eliminating 
l o o p h o l e s ,  s o  a s  t o  e n c o u r a g e  f u r t h e r  r e f o r m .  F o c u s i n g  o n  O T D S  m i g h t  b e  t h e  o n l y  w a y  t o  advance. TN/C/M/37 
 
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  3.120.  Third, market access needed to be adjusted to today’s reality and needed to be considered 
horizontally, in the sense that similar recalibration had to occur both in agriculture market access and NAMA. The basic elements of a market access outcome were already in place. They involved 
recalibration by a certain factor, simplification, and flexibility for all Members in implementation – 
an 'average tariff cut' approach. In this approach, there was no room for unrealistic expectations, 
such as on tariff rate quotas (TRQs). Fourth, there was a willingness to advance towards a good 
outcome on export competition, but this could only  take place as part of a broader DDA package. 
Export competition had to be part of any DDA deal; but, it could not be the only element of an 
outcome. Finally, on services, the focus would have to be on market access and an element of domestic regulation. Members would have to be in a position to proceed with an exchange of offers 
before the Nairobi Ministerial Conference, if they were to have any chance of success. 
3.121.  There was very limited time left to sa lvage the situation, prepare a successful MC10 and 
reach agreement on the DDA. The EU would actively support the Chairman in his efforts to guide Members to a compromise. It was clear that the responsibility for success or failure squarely lied 
with the Members and that this was a unique chance that could not come back or be repeated and 
thus should not be missed. 
3.122.  The representative of the Plurinational Stat e of Bolivia associated his delegation with the 
statements by Brazil on behalf of the G-20, In donesia on behalf of the G-33 and Guatemala on 
behalf of the SVEs. His delegation reminded Members of the reasons behind the adoption of the Doha Work Programme in 2001 and why it had been called the Development Round. The main reasons had been the need to rectify the imbalances left by the Uruguay Round and to place 
development at the centre of the Organization. The main component of these negotiations had 
been to continue the reform in agriculture, which had already been mandated in Article 20 of the Agreement on Agriculture. This had been one of th e most important, if not the main, elements for 
launching a new negotiating round. 
3.123.  After about 14 years of negotiations under the Doha Round, some Members seemed to 
neglect these facts. During those 14 years, developed countries, in different ministerial 
declarations, including in Doha and Hong Kong, had made a series of compromises to put an end 
to the distortions in agriculture trade, beginning with inter alia  the elimination of export subsidies, 
domestic support, market access distortions and Green Box disciplines. Many of these elements 
had been enshrined in a fairly balanced way in Rev.4, which had been the result of a collective 
effort. However, once again, in light of the present scenario, it seemed that the reform in 
agriculture was being postponed. On the other hand, in NAMA, some Members were still expecting ambitious commitments. There could not be parallelism between NAMA and agriculture. The same 
went for services, where Members were being pressured into liberalizing new sectors, when what 
was needed was to permanently exclude basic serv ices, such as health, water, education, etc., 
from the scope of the GATS. 
3.124.  As other Members had recalled, in the lead-up to MC9 and in Bali itself, Bolivia, together 
with other Members, had warned that once develo ped countries obtained the TFA, they would lose 
any appetite to continue the reform process in agriculture. It appeared that they had been right. Bolivia observed that for developed countries, the WTO seemed to have lost relevance because 
they had realized that developing countries, by fo llowing the rules of the game, could benefit from 
the multilateral trading system. Therefore, they were now trying to change those rules or were looking for other fora to impose their agenda, where they would find less resistance. 
3.125.  At the Bali Ministerial Conference, Bolivia had said that the result of that Conference had 
been imbalanced in favour of developed countries, as one developed country had received the best S&D treatment of the Round – this country would be able to apply an agreement for six years and 
then withdraw if it considered it convenient. This had been accepted for the health of the 
Organization. Members were now talking about recalibration, simplification and doability. This could not mean once again offering S&D treatment to those developed countries that had benefitted the most from the multilateral trading syst em over the past 20 years. This would be an 
unfair scenario for the rest of the membership. Therefore, Bolivia urged the countries that had 
benefitted the most from the system to fulfil their commitment to the Organization. 
3.126.  In concluding, Bolivia put forward three id eas. First, the WTO had to develop fairer and 
more balanced rules that took into consideration the interests and concerns of all of its Members, 
especially developing countries and the poorest amongst them. An organization that failed to look TN/C/M/37 
 
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  after the interests and needs of its smaller and most vulnerable Members run the risk of losing its 
credibility. Second, for a successful Ministerial Conference in Nairobi, Members had to start by bringing about results in the area of developmen t, particularly in those areas that had been 
promised to the LDCs and for which a solution rema ined outstanding. Finally, for Bolivia, the WTO 
should not be a forum in which developing countries were pressured into liberalizing at any cost, 
as President Evo Morales had said in a letter addressed to WTO Members in 2008. Rather, the WTO should be a forum that combined the development efforts of all Members. The objective 
should be to achieve a multilateral trading system for the benefit of all and not just a few.  
3.127.  The representative of Norway said his de legation subscribed to the Chairman's assessment 
of the situation. Members should not underestimate the gravity of the situation they were in. What 
was important was that they remained committed until the end of this process and finalised the 
DDA with a credible result, which inter alia  delivered on the development component.  
3.128.  Although there had not been sufficient progress on substance, Members had had more 
engagement on substance, recently. It was a positive sign that Members had come forward with 
new written proposals in the previous few weeks. Members needed more of this. Norway urged 
Members to be constructive and work to develop reasonable and realistic papers that could lead to consensus on substance.  
3.129.  If MC10 was going to be a success, there was only one thing to do: commit to working 
hard to achieve the necessary convergence on subs tance and, not least, inject political impetus 
into the process. The major players had a special responsibility, as had been underlined by many 
other delegations. The real negotiations had to star t taking place. To prepare for the final stretch, 
Members had to engage across all areas in order to pave the way for the final compromises, as the 
Chairman himself had stressed. If not, they risked  failure. In addition, all Members had to adjust 
their expectations. Finally, the systemic importance of Members' efforts could not be 
underestimated. Members needed to preserve the negotiating arm of the WTO. 
3.130.  The representative of Hong Kong, China said it was regrettable that Members had missed 
the deadline for preparing the post-Bali work prog ram, but all was not lost. Although the work 
program could have been a useful interim step, far more important was the ultimate goal, which 
was the successful conclusion of the DDA negotiations. In the final months preceding MC10, Members could still redouble their efforts to develop a comprehensive package of credible outcomes. Previous ministerial decisions and the many informative and negotiating sessions that 
had been held should have given Members sufficient guidance to proceed. However, Members had 
to be judicious in investing their time. That meant getting ready for intensive negotiation on matters of substance. It was time for earnest exchange. It was important for Members to be frank 
with each other, and remain fully committed. 
3.131.  Hong Kong China aimed for a successful MC10 and wished to see the negotiations 
conducted in an effective manner. In its view, this would entail the following elements. First, 
keeping all key elements on the table. Elements  like Rules went beyond the three pillars of 
agriculture, NAMA and services, but were not peri pheral and, on a balanced agenda, they should 
have a place. Second, allowing all areas to move in tandem. There was no need to pursue one area at the expense of others. There was no ti me for sequencing. Without doing the necessary 
ground work in advance, even the most promising proposals would not be ready for the political 
call when the time came. It would be frustrating enough if, in the end, some of them would have 
to be curtailed or abandoned only because of the lack of time. More importantly, some elements, 
like services, were indispensable if Members wanted to conclude the Round. Artificially stifling their 
progress was counter-productive and could backfire. 
3.132.  Third, having everyone on the same pa ge. Not everyone participated in small group 
discussions, but everyone needed to be informed  and engaged in order to join the consensus. 
Therefore, timely communications and transparency  were essential. Fourth, promptly capturing 
any progress made and not allowing discussion to dr ift. Hong Kong China appreciated that this was 
what the Chairman and the Chairs of the various negotiating groups had been trying to do. Some 
Members had also helpfully submitted proposals. If progress had been slow, at least, in the 
process, Members knew what was doable or not doable and why. In her view, the many hours 
spent in meeting rooms had not been wasted. However, time would be wasted if Members were 
not prepared to listen to each other and refused to engage. TN/C/M/37 
 
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  3.133.  The political reality was that all Members needed a saleable deal to take home. 
She appealed to Members that, in weighing the costs and benefits, they looked beyond the immediate calculations and to the broader pictur e. They were Members of the WTO because they 
all believed in trade liberalisation. They believed that tariff reduction and removal of protectionist 
measures benefitted not only their trading partners  but also their own economies. She hoped this 
conviction was duly reflected in the negotiations. 
3.134.  At the same time, it had to be understood that a failure to deliver the DDA did not mean 
status quo . It was worse than that. It meant losing a precious opportunity to seriously address 
development issues in multilateral negotiations. It also meant allowing trade distortions to perpetuate and subsidies to grow, making it even more difficult for the disadvantaged economies to gain access to a level-playing field. On top of this, it would be a severe blow to the multilateral 
trading system once the WTO's negotiating engine grinded to a halt. These were costs that few 
Members could bear. However, there was still a chance to avoid all this, but only if Members, especially the major players, could be less entrench ed in their positions. If they were willing to 
take a more liberal view, they might see greater merit in getting a deal done, even if that meant 
making greater efforts to compromise. Hong Ko ng China remained fully committed to the DDA. 
Her delegation had an open mind and was ready to engage constructively in the intensive 
negotiations ahead. 
3.135.  The representative of the United States said that the reports of the Chairman and the 
negotiating group Chairs were quite sobering, but Members needed to hear the unvarnished reality 
of the situation they were in. After seven months  of extensive engagement and sometimes intense 
debate, each Member's position was well-known and needed not be repeated.  
3.136.  Like others, the United States was disappointed at the collective failure to produce a post-
Bali work program by the deadline, which was in itself an extension of the original deadline of 
December 2014. The original deadline had been set after the success at Bali in December 2013, 
when there had been some hope that Members mi ght return to the core Doha agenda and make 
progress. Prior to that, at the Eighth Ministeria l Conference (MC8) in December 2011, Ministers 
had temporarily set aside a core agenda after declaring that the DDA was "at an impasse". Before 
that, Members had had the deadlock of Geneva in 2008 and the deadlock of Cancun in 2003. 
3.137.  Much had changed since Doha had been launched in 2001. What had not changed, 
unfortunately, was WTO Members' inability to find consensus on the agenda laid out in Doha. 
There had been many mandates over the years, but none of them had led to agreement. In an 
institution based on consensus, Members disagree d fundamentally on how to move forward. All 
Members were grappling with the questions of what would happen in the Fall. All remained 
stubbornly hopeful that the first ministerial conference hosted in sub-Saharan Africa could be a 
success. Certainly, one area in which Members had to succeed was in finding meaningful outcomes for the LDCs. However, all Members had to know that the certain path to failure was to continue in 
September with the dialogue that had characterised the previous seven months. 
3.138.  As many delegations noted, failure in Nairobi would have inevitable consequences both for 
the Doha Round and for the institution of the WTO. If Members wanted to succeed in Nairobi and have success in the Doha Round, Fall would need to be a season not for debating but for deciding. 
The basic contours of doable outcomes were quite clear and had been for months. Likewise, 
Members had a clear sense of what was not doable, even if it was hard to admit. Each Member of the WTO would make its own decision about whether or not the outcomes were sufficiently 
meaningful to accept a deal, but the moment for making that decision could no longer be avoided.  
3.139.  All Members claimed to value the WTO as an institution. If they did, they would make the 
hard decisions necessary to prevent the institution from sleepwalking into the second half of a 
second decade of deadlock. Members could do bette r than that. This institution could do better 
than that. The United States would continue to play its traditional leadership role in this institution. It stood by its clear track record, including at Bali, in November 2014 and recently in pushing the ITA deal across the finish line. However, for th e United States, leadership did not mean the 
repetition of reassuring but hollow platitudes. His delegation was ready and urged others to be 
ready to make tough decisions and to deal directly with the consequences. TN/C/M/37 
 
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  3.140.  The representative of Uganda associated hi s delegation with the statements by Bangladesh 
on behalf of the LDC Group, Barbados on behalf of  the ACP Group, Lesotho on behalf of the African 
Group, Mali on behalf of the C-4, and Indonesi a on behalf of the G-33; and supported the ACP 
proposal in JOB/TNC/50 on issues and development outcomes for MC10.  
3.141.  He agreed with the Chairman that Members had failed in meeting the mandate in 
paragraph 1.11 of the Bali Ministerial Conference on preparing a clearly defined work program. The suggested approach, which had been a distraction, had cheated Members of the opportunity to 
engage in substantive negotiations. The lesson learnt was that there was no magic in trying to 
reinvent the wheel. Members had to reaffirm all the mandates. The Doha Work Programme should guide the negotiations towards the conclusion of the Round. Going forward, Uganda did not expect 
a framework, or a decision, or a Chairman’s statement in December. Members had to aim for a 
development package of concrete and legally-binding deliverables in Nairobi. LDC specific issues 
should form part of the package in line with paragraph 1.11. Anything short of that might not be acceptably palatable. 
3.142.  He said that 80% of Uganda's population heavily depended on agriculture for subsistence 
and livelihood purposes. The responsibility rested  with Members to improve food security through 
increased agricultural productivity, production an d export. It was important to increase export 
earnings, but also protect producers in case of price decline. Ugandan farmers continued to face 
the unmitigated flood of highly subsidised imports that for several decades had had a negative impact on their production.  
3.143.  According to the joint publication by the WTO and the World Bank Group entitled "The Role 
of Trade in Ending Poverty", it was estimated that a 1% rise in agricultural GDP would result in a 
6% increase in income growth for the poorest 10% of the population. Without the fundamental 
reform which had been promised in paragraph 13 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration, poorer 
countries would continue to have difficulties in accessing the export markets which were protected 
by these subsidies. For instance, studies had shown that cotton farmers from LDCs would have benefitted more from higher and stable prices if subsidies had been non-existent. Trade-distorting 
subsidies cost farmers about USD 400 million in lost revenue annually. Strangely, there were 
Members who were looking to access these markets to flood them with subsidised imports. The resultant effect was that farmers would not even be competitive in their own domestic markets. 
This was unacceptable. Members had to find solutions that substantively disciplined domestic 
support, because this was the key to effective market access. 
3.144.  He thanked all those delegations that had submitted proposals on domestic support. 
Uganda's preliminary view was that all those proposals fell far below the instructions in 
paragraph 13 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration. It was against this background that agriculture 
would determine the level of ambition. It still remained the main gateway issue in these negotiations. The draft modalities text in Rev.4 sh ould be the basis for discussions, with the LDCs 
flexibilities embedded therein. Members had to establish an SSM for developing countries to deal 
with import surges. All forms of export subsidies and disciplines on all export measures with equivalent effect should be eliminated.  
3.145.  On NAMA, the negotiations should be prem ised on the Doha Ministerial Declaration and the 
principles enshrined therein, such as LTFR. The mandate in paragraph 16 of the Doha Ministerial 
Declaration had to be dealt with in all its composite elements. They had to be captured in the ideas that were floating around. The policy space necessary for the growth of Uganda's infant industries 
and for building up over time their competitive edge had to be preserved. There had to be the 
preservation of LDCs' specific flexibilities as enshrined in Rev.3 – namely, LDCs should not undertake reduction commitments.  
3.146.  Any outcome in NAMA had to have a result on NTBs and related initiatives, particularly 
rules of origin. It had to go beyond mere standards. This would be vital in ensuring that market access accorded to LDCs was truly meaningful. Studies had shown that trade restrictions imposed by rich countries cost developing countries over USD 100 billion annually – more than twice the 
development aid they received each year. As a region, sub-Saharan Africa, home to most LDCs, 
lost USD 2 billion per year. To this end theref ore, a development outcome had to include an 
outcome that sought to eliminate NTBs on products originating from LDCs and stop the emergence 
of new ones. As long as Members continued to maintain prohibitive and creative NTBs, LDCs would 
not be able to access those export markets of interest to them. Members needed to address the TN/C/M/37 
 
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  peculiar concerns of those LDCs that would be forced to undertake cuts by virtue of being part of 
customs unions with non-LDC Members.  
3.147.  On the services waiver, Uganda apprec iated all those delegations that had submitted 
notifications to date, as highlighted by the LDC Coordinator, and especially those that had 
specifically notified preferential treatment for LD Cs pursuant to the LDC Services Waiver. Uganda, 
however, was concerned about notification of preferences ridden with conditions and restrictions, or notification of information about the openness of existing regimes without any preferential 
treatment. It recalled that preferential treatment was defined, at a minimum, as the removal of 
restrictions and/or the provision of special access or procedures in favour of LDC suppliers over non-LDC suppliers. It therefore followed that, wher e restrictions had been carried over from GATS 
schedules, the preference had to include the removal of those restrictions on LDC service suppliers 
and clarify how such preferences would work. Uganda was concerned that in the dying hours of 31 
July, only a handful of Members had submitted their notifications. For the credibility of this institution's commitment to LDCs and any positive direction for Nairobi, it was imperative that 
notifications were submitted.  
3.148.  He said that Bali was still fresh in Memb ers' minds. Many commentators had argued that 
the adoption of the TFA had spelt doom for the successful conclusion of the DDA. Many developed 
countries argued to the contrary. Nairobi offered all Members the chance to save face. There was 
no hiding behind the curtain of doability and recali bration. Major players had to take their rightful 
seat of responsibility and deliver development outcomes that would translate into tangible benefits for the 400 million people who lived on less than one dollar a day. 
3.149.  The representative of China associated his delegation with the statements made by 
Indonesia on behalf of G-33, Brazil on behalf of  G-20 and Chinese Taipei on behalf of the RAMs. 
China also endorsed, as one of the sponsors, the joint submission by the G-33, the SVEs, the ACP 
Group and Chinese Taipei on SPs and the SSM. It also took note of the new submissions by the 
ACP Group and the G-90 and would carefully review these papers.  
3.150.  China shared the Chairman's assessment and appreciated the efforts that he and the 
Chairs of negotiating bodies had made in the first semester. Members had to face up to the 
disappointing reality that they had been unable to  deliver a substantive and clearly defined work 
program by the deadline. This was a clear reflec tion of a deep discrepancy among Members and a 
mounting challenge they collectively faced in the negotiations. The mandates to advance the DDA, 
such as the Doha Declaration, the July 2004 Framework and the Hong Kong Declaration, would 
remain in place and the 2008 draft modalities, reflecting those mandates, were still on the table. As a rules-based organization, discussions should continue on the basis of these mandates. 
3.151.  The first seven months of the year had shown that the efforts made had not been wasted. 
Members had engaged in intensive discussions at various levels and configurations, with all possible alternatives explored and tested. It was commendable to see that there had emerged a 
positive momentum that had not been seen for many years. It was true that missing this deadline 
was neither the end of the day nor the destination of the journey. Members had to move on to Nairobi straight away. However, in order to successfully arrive in Nairobi, the first thing to do was to seriously draw some lessons from this experien ce and refrain from making the same mistakes in 
the second semester. These lessons were not cheap.  
3.152.  China's position on the remaining DDA issu es was as follows. It was true that export 
competition was an important, consistent part of Rev.4. However, China did not think that this was 
the only deliverable in the agriculture pillar. Domestic support was the landmark issue in 
agriculture for the development dimension. It was hard to imagine any DDA outcome without 
resolving domestic support. China was open to exploring alternative options to collectively 
lowering the level of ambition, but, in no case, should some Members be required to do more than 
what was in Rev.4. China hoped that the narrative that all the so-called major players should make contributions in this regard was not against this principle. Meanwhile, China would not agree to Blue Box caps only as the harvest in the domestic support pillar. 
3.153.  On agriculture and non-agriculture market  access, China was open to explore the other 
alternative approaches, such as a cut to the aver age or average cuts, on the basis of Rev.4 and 
Rev.3. However, the level of ambition could not go as low as almost nothing. TN/C/M/37 
 
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  3.154.  On services, Members needed to simultaneously advance discussions on market access 
and domestic regulation and make collective decisions on the timeline for the submission of revised offers or final offers as soon as possible. More attention needed to be paid to sectors and modes of specific interests of developing Members.  
3.155.  On development and LDC issues, priority shou ld be given to the issues of interest to LDCs. 
Members should lock in the progress already achi eved and work hard to expand consensus as 
much as possible. However, resolution of LDC is sues was not the whole picture of development. 
The DDA had been designed to address the over all rules and the development deficits in the 
multilateral trading system.  
3.156.  On Rules, it was difficult to imagine any negotiated outcome without Rules elements. 
At the same time, Members needed to keep all pilla rs of Rules – such as fishery subsidies, trade 
remedies and RTAs – on the same track with a comparable level of ambition. There should be no 
fast-track for any of those. 
3.157.  In order to better map out the way forward to Nairobi in the second half of the year, China 
wished to share some of its ideas. First, Memb ers needed to enter into comprehensive discussions 
across the board on the basis of Rev.4 and Rev.3. No issue should be left behind and unturned. 
Members should refrain from making prejudgements at the outset or hastily starting the selective 
approach; although, at a certain point in time, they had to decide how big a package could be 
sufficient and acceptable to all. Second, the final outcome should be both doable, meaningful and should take care of each other's legitimate concerns. The principles of S&D treatment and LTFR should be fully preserved and for all Members. Th ird, the level of ambition of the final outcome 
should be as close as possible to that of Rev.4 and Rev.3. Members should pay more attention to 
the political redlines of other Members. Any attempt at challenging those redlines would lead nowhere. Any attempt at capping or reducing the de minimis  levels of developing Members would 
fail, especially when export subsidies and the more trade-distorting AMS of developed Members 
had not yet been cleared from this system. Four th, Members should listen to the voices and 
concerns of the developing Members, including developing RAMs. Their efforts and engagement 
should be encouraged instead of being ignored. Fifth, Members should allow the Chairman and the 
Chairs of negotiating bodies to play their du e role in bridging the gaps between Members. 
Meanwhile, Members should engage capitals as fully as possible to help them make last-minute political calls. 
3.158.  The representative of Argentina associated his delegation to the statements by Brazil on 
behalf of the G-20 and Australia on behalf of the Cairns Group. Argentina also welcomed the 
submissions by the ACP Group and the G-90, which would play an important role in future work. 
As it had become clear over the past few days, Members had reached the 31 July deadline without 
a post-Bali work program, despite the enormous e fforts carried out. As many had said, the work 
program was not an end in itself, but it would have allowed Members to better develop their work 
in the second semester. The lack of a work prog ram did not mean that, as of September, Members 
could not discuss or negotiate a package for Nairobi. 
3.159.  As Minister Amina Mohamed had said at the General Council, Nairobi had to be a success, 
it had to build on Bali and go beyond Bali. Members could not afford to let the first WTO Ministerial 
Conference held in Africa go to waste. In this context, it was important to agree to a substantive 
package with development at the centre. To do this, Members had to start with agriculture, which was the main economic sector of the majority of  developing countries, especially the poorest. 
He believed that all Members agreed that agricult ure was the pillar that would determine the level 
of ambition of any result achieved in Nairobi – not NAMA, nor services. Throughout the first semester of the year, Argentina had been concerned that for some Members, while the level of 
ambition in agriculture was being lowered, the level of ambition in the other two key areas and in 
other marginal issues, such as anti-dumping, was being increased. The proposals submitted by these delegations did not equate to the possible re sults that those same delegations had indicated 
for the agriculture negotiations. It was therefore contradictory that, as this was a development 
Round and the next Ministerial Conference would be held in Africa, some wished to give more 
impetus to broader opening in the industrial and se rvice sectors, rather than in the agricultural 
sector. Tariff and non-tariff barriers, without mentioning subsidies, would continue to be 
maintained at the same level as before the start of these negotiations. TN/C/M/37 
 
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  3.160.  Whilst in NAMA many continued to insist on the Swiss formula or similar formulas, in 
agriculture Members had been discussing an average cut without addressing tariff peaks, tariff escalation, tariff simplification, the safeguard of Article 5, nor tariff quotas. For this reason, in order to respect the balance in the market access negotiations and give certainty of what Members 
would be giving and receiving, Argentina had proposed a request-and-offer approach, which was 
currently the only formal submission in NAMA.  
3.161.  In agriculture, there were other two pillars that complemented the market access pillar. 
In this regard, Argentina had recently heard that several developed Members were ready to 
proceed to the elimination of export subsidies, but were imposing a lot of conditions for doing so. The same went for domestic support, where Argentina welcomed Norway's proposal, but considered it to be far from its aspirations, as  already mentioned at the latest COA SS meeting. 
3.162.  Despite this situation, Argentina belie ved that if the willingness to strengthen the 
multilateral trading system prevailed, Members coul d come up with a package for Nairobi. The first 
semester had served to deepen Members' understanding of each other's positions. In the second 
part of the year, starting in September, Members had to start negotiating with an open mind. 
If recalibration was necessary, then Members wo uld recalibrate. However, this reduction of 
ambition had to be done in a manner that ensu red concrete outcomes in the three pillars of 
agriculture and that would correct the imbalances in the rules governing international trade. 
3.163.  The representative of Japan announced that his country had submitted in the morning to 
the Secretariat its notification regarding the LDC Service Waiver.  3.164.  He said that Japan agreed with the assessment by the Chairman and the Chairs of the 
negotiating groups. The focus of Members' discussion after the summer recess should be to 
explore possible Nairobi outcomes, building on the emerging new ideas and submissions, as well 
as the discussions held in the previous months and in line with the MC8 political guidance to fully 
explore different negotiating approaches. Members n eeded not only political will, but at this stage 
of the negotiations, they also had to face the time and physical constraints ahead. Japan would spare no efforts for the success of MC10 with a sense of urgency and spirit of pragmatism. Japan 
joined others in believing that Members should try again in September.  
3.165.  It welcomed the ACP Group submission an d said that it would seriously look into it, 
especially with regard to some of the new interesting ideas suggested. It also supported the statements by Switzerland on behalf of the G-10 and on behalf of the group of 50 Members. He 
concluded by citing the songs by the music band, The Monkees. He said that Members should not 
be allowed to be Daydream Believers  as the upcoming Fall was the only remaining chance to catch 
the Last Train to Clarksville  – bringing an end to the DDA negotiations. 
3.166.  The representative of Uruguay associated his delegation with the statements by Australia 
on behalf of the Cairns Group, Brazil on behalf of the G-20 and Switzerland on behalf of the group 
of 50 Members. Missing the deadline to complete a work program required even greater 
commitment to redouble efforts in the few months left before the Nairobi Ministerial Conference.  
3.167.  Uruguay reiterated its commitment to the Doha Round and reasserted its conviction that 
agriculture was the key element of the trade negotiat ions and it would set the level of ambition in 
the other areas of the Round. Agriculture had to remain central to the negotiations and results in 
this area had to be meaningful and ambitious. Uruguay continued to rely on the multilateral 
trading system to increase and improve market acce ss opportunities for its agricultural exports. In 
this regard, amongst other components, Members had to insist on the importance of creating and 
expanding tariff rate quotas (TRQs) to achieve this  objective. The latest developments in this area 
with regard to the tariff reduction formula would only work with an appropriate combination of elements that would ensure new market access opportunities, for example through TRQs. Uruguay 
also considered that in the other two pillars, Me mbers had to aim at achieving ambitious results, 
as addressing them had an impact on world trade in agricultural products and had the potential of 
neutralizing the benefits obtained in market access. It was important to underline that the commitment to eliminate export subsidies could be an immediate outcome in Nairobi, thus 
bringing agriculture closer to the general disciplines, in line with the mandate in Article 20 of the 
Agreement on Agriculture resulting from the Uruguay Round. He said that reforms in the three TN/C/M/37 
 
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  pillars of agriculture were crucial to meet the Doha mandate and continue advancing the reform of 
international agriculture trade.  
3.168.  As this was his last TNC meeting as Permanent Representative of Uruguay, he provided his 
personal reflections. He said that the multilateral trading system needed to be reformed in order to 
broaden its scope and have a positive impact on the lives of every citizen of the world and of 
future generations. In his view, it was clear that the multilateral trading system needed the constructive participation and the political commitment of all its Members. He said that 
multilateralism, and the multilateral trading system in particular, was facing great challenges. 
However, Members had to work towards finding possible and realistic solutions that would allow all Members to remain under the umbrella of this great and imperfect Organization. Quoting Henry Ford, he said that "coming together is a beginning ; keeping together is progress; working together 
is success." For this reason and as someone who believed in the benefits that could accrue from a 
transparent, balanced, inclusive and supportive multilateral trading system, he encouraged 
Members to work with commitment and look at all options, in a way that would allow them to 
reach an acceptable agreement at the Nairobi Ministerial Conference that would deliver results for 
the benefit of all Members and, especially in those areas that had been postponed for many years. 
3.169.  The representative of Korea associated his delegation with the statements by Switzerland 
on behalf of the G-10 and on behalf of the gr oup of 50 Members, and the statement by Indonesia 
on behalf of the G-33. Korea appreciated the Chairman's and the negotiating group Chairs' 
sobering assessment of the situation and expressed its disappointment that Members could not agree on the work program by the agreed deadline.  
3.170.  In the first semester of the year, Members had engaged in the discussions in various 
configurations and levels to explore alternative approaches on a without-prejudice basis. Members 
had a clearer understanding of the nature and magnitude of the existing gaps. In his view, such 
understanding could serve as a basis for further discussions in the second semester. What really 
mattered was to deliver a meaningful outcome in Nairobi. He agreed with the Chairman that Members should focus on substance in the second semester. 
3.171.  First, Members had to identify the level of the shared ambition to be delivered in Nairobi 
bearing in mind the doability and credibility of the outcome. Second, they had to start intensified discussions on a horizontal basis. Third, they shou ld be fully prepared to immediately start down-
to-earth discussions on substance after the summer  break. In this regard, he expected Members 
with proposals to present their ideas in writing so as to allow the start of text-based negotiations. 
Korea welcomed the specific proposals submitted by the ACP Group and the G-90, which his delegation would carefully study.  
3.172.  Fourth, Members needed to mobilize thei r political capital for the advancement of the 
negotiations. In particular, major players had to show genuine leadership to unblock the structural impasse surrounding the gateway issues. Korea believed in leadership and the ability to 
demonstrate flexibility in good faith and to bear responsibility for the sake of the system. Looking 
back at the ITA expansion negotiations, one month earlier there had been no positive prospect of 
cutting a deal. However, participants had managed to agree on the product list at the end. In his view, the leadership of the United States, China and the European Union, with political 
engagement at the highest level, had been instrumental not only in pushing the negotiations 
forward but also in bridging the last remaining ga ps. He hoped that the same spirit and leadership 
could be replicated in the DDA negotiations in the run-up to the Nairobi Ministerial Conference. 
3.173.  In closing, he announced that Korea had submitted in the morning the instrument of 
acceptance of the TFA, as it had antici pated at last General Council meeting.  
3.174.  The representative of India associated her delegation with the statements by Indonesia on 
behalf of the G-33 and Brazil on behalf of the G-20 . She said the first semester had been a critical 
and active phase in the negotiations, owing to sincere efforts to keep a sustained dialogue among Members in different formats. Several new ideas and alternative approaches had been floated in a bid to find landing zones, although not with th e precision required for serious discussion, nor 
always in the form of concrete, self-contained proposals from Members. As such, the discussions 
had been largely conceptual and on a without-prejudice basis. There was no common understanding yet on what recalibration, simplification or lowering of ambition meant in practical TN/C/M/37 
 
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  terms or on the alternative approaches. Despite intensive engagement, the reality was that 
Members did not have a clearly defined post-Bali work program as mandated, which was disappointing. The consequence was that they neither had a narrowed-down list of issues central to the conclusion of the Doha Round, nor a direction for further negotiations. 
3.175.  Going forward, India endorsed the view th at there was no option but to redouble efforts 
when work resumed in September and focus on substance so that the outcome was not lop-sided, especially from the perspective of developing  countries and LDCs for whom the development 
dimension of this Round was not merely a matter of scoring debating points at the WTO.  
3.176.  India had received the submission from the ACP Group and the detailed textual submission 
from the G-90. It would review these along with  any other submissions that Members might make 
in due course.  
3.177.  She reiterated certain important parameters that India believed should continue to form 
the bedrock of Members' work. First, Members sh ould not lose sight of the centrality of the 
development dimension as enshrined in all the Ministerial decisions starting with the Doha 
Ministerial Declaration. Second, LTFR and S&D within and across all negotiating areas were non-
negotiable. Third, Members needed to respect all Ministerial mandates and Decisions relating to the DDA, and not ignore the work done by Member s at various stages since the launch of the 
Round. Relying on mandates when convenient, and disregarding them when not, was not 
acceptable. 
3.178.  Fourth, agriculture remained central to any outcome in the Round. It would be the 
bellwether in calibrating the level of ambition across all negotiating areas. Frontloading of 
discussion on all its three pillars with equal priority was therefore necessary to move forward and 
ensure balanced outcomes in all other areas of ne gotiations. Fifth, India believed that Rev.3 and 
Rev.4 provided a good basis for further work in NAMA and agriculture. Her delegation had been 
open to looking at new ideas and alternative approaches but did not see the possibility of a 
breakthrough unless there were clear and actionable proposals. 
3.179.  Sixth, recalibration with a lowering of ambi tion could not happen if it led to dilution of the 
development quotient and was not symmetrical across all areas of the negotiations. Retention of 
ambition or even raising it in some areas while lowering it in others would not be helpful. Seventh, doability and realism could not imply the dropping of issues and elements. All issues had to remain on the table. Cherry-picking of issues had to be avoided. Eighth, Members should avoid bringing in 
issues that might be divisive and counter-productive in Members' search for credible outcomes. 
Here, she referred to suggestions made by some Members that questioned the existing WTO legal framework of treating developing countries as a homogenous category. 
3.180.   Ninth, it was important to maintain tr ansparency and inclusiveness, and a Member-driven 
and bottom-up approach in the run-up to the Mi nisterial Conference. It should be Members' 
collective endeavour to complete work on the Nairobi outcomes in Geneva itself. Lastly, India did 
not subscribe to a Nairobi make-it-or-break-it narrative or conclusion of the Round at any cost or 
in any manner whatsoever. India believed that  the Round could not be completed without a 
credible outcome on the development dimension.  
3.181.  She pointed out specific concerns with the report of the CoA SS Chair. In respect of 
domestic support, her delegation wished to emphasize that the availability of policy space could 
not be a metric for undertaking commitments which,  as had been the practice in the WTO, were 
based on bound levels. Moreover, it was anomal ous to equate the policy space of developing 
countries – the need for which was recognized by the relevant S&D provisions of WTO law – and 
that of developed countries. The Chair's report also appeared to equate the elements of market access, such as tariff peaks, tariff escalation etc., with S&D treatment. India stressed that S&D 
treatment was an abiding principle that informed all elements and pillars of the negotiations and 
was not to be treated as just another element.  
3.182.  Another concern was with the linkage that was sought to be established between 
approaches to tariff reduction and the SSM. As her delegation had repeatedly pointed out, with the 
support of several developing countries, the inclus ion of the SSM was a given that flowed from the 
mandate. Only its design was the subject matter of further work and negotiations. In other words, TN/C/M/37 
 
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  the inclusion of the SSM in the final package was not contingent upon the type of tariff reduction 
modalities to be adopted and was a stand-alone issue.  
3.183.  Her delegation disagreed with the Chair's assessment of potential solutions to the issue of 
public stockholding for food security in as much as there was no convergence on devising a 
permanent solution on the basis of the elements of the Bali decision. The only proposal on the 
table was that submitted by the G-33. India was deeply concerned that Members were not engaging meaningfully on that proposal and were instead asking for alternatives to be explored. As 
India had repeatedly pointed out, a permanent solution to this problem was an essential 
deliverable at Nairobi.  
3.184.  On the NAMA Chair's report, her delegation  did not share the perception that the division 
of substance into smaller bits would facilitate progress, as the NAMA elements enumerated by him 
were closely interlinked. In Indi a's view, it was only on the basis of wholesome proposals covering 
all elements that meaningful discussions were possible. 
3.185.  India was ready to engage in the negotiations, in whatever format the Chairman deemed 
appropriate, in a constructive and creative manner,  to achieve a credible and balanced outcome at 
Nairobi. Such an outcome should level the playing field for developing countries, address existing inequities in the system, and advance the trade an d development goals of the entire membership.  
3.186.  The representative of Canada said his delegation was deeply concerned about the state of 
play. Members had missed the 31 July deadline for the work program and, more importantly, key 
players and others remained very far apart on key threshold issues, such as how to strengthen disciplines on trade-distorting domestic support and on approaches to tariff reductions – whether 
in agriculture or NAMA. The vast majority of Members had chosen to restate their motivations for 
their current positions and very few had chosen to offer creative ideas as a means out of a genuine impasse. Members were not on track to deliver meaningful outcomes at MC10.  
3.187.  In his view, it was worth recalling some basic principles that Members should be able to 
agree on. First, Members needed to put aside wh at was becoming a stale debate about mandates. 
Since the launch of the Doha Round in 2001, ther e had been innumerable ministerial declarations, 
decisions, framework agreements, that had assigned various priorities at various times and had 
instructed Members to advance in negotiations in different ways. However, above all else, what Ministers had consistently said was to find ways to overcome differences in order to deliver meaningful results. This spirit had been clearly reflected in the MC8 ministerial guidance, where 
Members had been specifically directed towards looking at new ways of doing things. 
In September, Members needed to focus on results with renewed intensity.  
3.188.  Second, there was no doubt that all Members agreed, as they had from the outset, that 
this was a Development Round. Members universally accepted and respected the principles of S&D 
treatment. They were all committed to delivering development-oriented outcomes in Nairobi, including and not limited to a credible package for the LDCs. The focus on development, as a 
common thread, needed to pervade each aspect of the negotiations, as well as the implementation 
of the Bali decisions. Therefore, it was a give n that development would continue to animate the 
discussions going forward. Canada welcomed the ACP paper, which contained some very interesting ideas that merited reflection in the course of August. 
3.189.  Third, at this meeting, it had been reiterated that Members should collectively 
acknowledge that Nairobi was not a deadline, like so many of the past deadlines. In his view, it was far more important and it was not self-imposed. If Members could not deliver credible 
results, they would face a collective credibility problem and this could not be papered over with 
grand statements or with an intention to renew efforts to continue working. It would be the outside world and the stakeholders that would take  away the WTO's credibility. Looking back, it 
had been the success at Bali that had renewed Members' credibility with stakeholders – a 
credibility that Members were in danger of losing at this point. Members had also earned renewed credibility with their political leaders and this had given them this window of opportunity to deliver 
a bigger result. However, barring a major breakthrough, that window was going to close in 
Nairobi. This was not a Canadian threat or a negotiating position; it was Canada's observation 
about the outside reality. The reality was that when one was in a results-driven business and did not deliver results, eventually people stopped taking one seriously.  TN/C/M/37 
 
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  3.190.  Fourth, Members had to recognise that a year and a half after Bali, Members were still 
closer to the starting line than the finish line. This would require each Member to move away from long-standing opening positions. To this end, he  supported the Chairman's encouragement to use 
the summer break and, where necessary, seek political guidance to advance discussions and 
engage in negotiations in the Fall. The real ques tion each delegation had to face with its own 
governments and business community was whether any Member would be better off with no result in Nairobi – which was the scenario that seemed to  be shaping up – rather than an imperfect or 
modest or incremental progress to preserve the international trading system and its future. There 
would be unfinished business. In Canada's view, as reflected in the paper on domestic support that his delegation had tabled jointly with Australia, if Members could not produce immediate gains – in terms of tighter disciplines or bigger market access  – then it was worth trying to develop the right 
framework that could be used when political circumstances were better. He pointed out that in the 
Uruguay Round, tariffication did nothing but give Members a framework that quantified a number of restrictions setting the basis for moving forward in the future. Therefore, frameworks on 
domestic support and formulas for tariff reductions might provide for such a result. Each Member 
had to assess the relative pain not only for the short term, but also relative to what kind of world they wished traders to operate in one, three or five years' time. He asked whether Members would 
want to have the current rules with nothing added – this would happen if they did not succeed in 
Nairobi – or a framework that would allow Members to continue building on the 50/60 years since the GATT and the onset of the WTO. 
3.191.  He encouraged Members to aim for outcomes that were realistic in the current 
environment and that provided the foundation for future progress, even if it required moderating 
respective ambitions and expectations. In partic ular, Canada agreed and endorsed Switzerland's 
statement on behalf of a group of 50 Members that  there was a special burden on the largest WTO 
Members to work together and show the leader ship necessary to make MC10 a success. Canada 
was committed to developing as comprehensive a pa ckage of credible outcomes as possible. It had 
demonstrated, with some of its non-papers, papers and factual presentations on different 
approaches to tariff reduction showing that outcom es were possible on even difficult issues, that 
his delegation was open to new ideas and new approaches to strengthening existing commitments and discipline. It recognised that no deal was going to be perfect and that reaching consensus always required making some sacrifices. His delegation had signalled where it knew it had to make 
some sacrifices and hoped others would do the same.  
3.192.  Canada believed the ACP Group's paper was a good signal and hoped that it was a sign of 
things to come. He said that for the sake of the future of the negotiating function of the WTO, 
Members could not afford anything but this kind of spirit when they resumed in September. 
3.193.  The representative of Costa Rica aligned his delegation with the statements by Australia on 
behalf of the Cairns Group and Switzerland on be half of a group of 50 delegations. Costa Rica 
shared the disappointment that others had expres sed at the lack of an agreement on a work 
program as mandated by Mini sters in Bali. Although Members had missed this valuable 
opportunity, Costa Rica believed that if Members redoubled their efforts and showed openness and creativity, they would be able to garner greater courage and obtain a successful result in Nairobi. 
All Members shared the responsibility to achieve a significant and credible result at the next 
Ministerial Conference. Costa Rica stood ready to make every effort to achieve this objective. 
It hoped that all other Members would do the same and that in particular the main trading 
partners would be able to identify common interests in key areas. Costa Rica expected to see 
constructive engagement and innovative leadership from them.  
3.194.  Costa Rica would assess the Nairobi outcome on the basis of its coherence with the 
fundamental principles of the WTO, geared at maki ng progress in market opening, reducing trade 
barriers, strengthening legal certainty and contributing to creating more and better trade. Only in this way would Members be able to recover the credibility of the WTO as a forum for negotiations and a tool for development, of which Costa Rica was a clear example. To get there, Members had 
to learn how to find mutually beneficial solutions, leaving aside any approach that would lead to a 
zero-sum game.  
3.195.  Costa Rica had always supported ambitious results in all areas of the Doha Round, in 
particular in the three pillars of agriculture, NAMA and services. The insistence on sequencing 
approaches had prevented Members from making progress. Costa Rica believed that it was important to tackle the negotiations with pragmatism and political will.  TN/C/M/37 
 
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  3.196.  As stated, Members were aware of each ot her's position. However, this was not sufficient 
to succeed in the negotiations. They needed to st ep aside from reiterating positions and enter into 
real negotiations. In order to do this, they had to identify the interests that underpinned these positions. Continuing to negotiate on the basis of entrenched positions would only lead to a vicious 
circle, which had prevented Members from concluding the Doha Round. Costa Rica hoped that the 
summer break would allow Members to reflect on their positions and identify their real interests in order to overcome this vicious circle and move towards the solutions that would ensure that 
Nairobi would be the success that Members had worked so hard to achieve.  
3.197.  The representative of Zimbabwe associated his delegation with the statements by Lesotho 
on behalf of the Africa Group, Barbados on behalf  of the ACP Group, Indonesia on behalf of the G-
3 3 ,  B r a z i l  o n  b e h a l f  o f  t h e  G - 2 0  a n d  M a l i  o n  b e h a l f  o f  t h e  C - 4 .  Z i m b a b w e  a g r e e d  w i t h  t h e  
Chairman that the failure to deliver a work program should not constitute a barrier to delivering at 
MC10. His delegation wished to underscore a few points with regard to the negotiations towards Nairobi. Development should remain central in the DDA negotiations – this had been a fairly 
common thread. The challenge was how to deliver on this.  
3.198.  Agriculture was a very import ant pillar of the negotiations and work in this pillar should be 
about addressing the current imbalances in the Ag reement on Agriculture. Most of the developing 
countries' economies relied on agriculture for liveli hoods, food security an d rural development, and 
a positive outcome in the agriculture negotiations  would achieve development goals and create the 
balance that was needed. Agriculture should theref ore set the level of ambition in all the other 
pillars of the negotiations and flexibilities in the Rev.4 modalities should be preserved. The 
domestic support pillar was the gateway to addressing the imbalances in the agriculture pillar. 
Therefore, substantial reduction of domestic subsidies had to be kept on the WTO agenda. Zimbabwe hoped that the summer break would revita lise Members' work towards convergence. All 
the three pillars in agriculture needed to be addressed. An effective SSM and SP were needed. 
Members also needed to work towards a permanent solution to the challenges regarding the public 
stockholding for food security purposes issue. A ddressing the cotton issues remained a matter of 
priority. 
3.199.  Regarding negotiations on NAMA, developing countries needed policy space to 
industrialise, thus whatever approach Members ad opted should be based on the principle of LTFR 
and, at the same time, improve the flexibilities for developing countries, SVEs, LDCs and the group 
of countries with low binding coverage identified in Rev.3.  
3.200.  As Members continued to work on the three core pillars of agriculture, NAMA and services, 
this work should continue to be based on the DDA mandate and other Ministerial mandates, such 
as the Hong Kong and Bali Declarations, as well as the July 2004 Framework. A successful 
outcome of the negotiations would be when Members delivered on the development mandate. Accordingly, the DDA negotiations should continue beyond Nairobi in the event that Members 
failed to deliver on the DDA mandate at the upcoming MC10. Members should not take on new 
issues until the DDA was concluded with a meaningful development outcome. 
3.201.  Regarding issues of process, he highlighted that all work should be Member-driven, 
inclusive and transparent. To this end, propos als should originate from and be sponsored by 
Members. He noted that increasingly more proposals were coming to the table. In this regard, 
Zimbabwe welcomed the ACP Group's and G-90's proposals. His delegation hoped that in this labyrinth of proposals lay the solution. Overall, Zimbabwe remained positive that a substantive 
and meaningful outcome could be delivered in Nairobi but this needed real commitment from all 
Members, especially the major players. 
3.202.  The representative of Peru said the 31 July marked the deadline for delivering a post-Bali 
work program, and despite all efforts, Members had not been able to agree to such a work 
program. Despite the pessimism expressed by some delegations, for Peru, this did not mean that there was uncertainty with regard to what Members had to do in preparation for MC10 in December. The exercise of reflection and the exchange of proposals carried out since the 
beginning of the year had allowed Members to identify the outstanding issues that needed to be 
discussed and define their contours, so as to advance the negotiations on the remaining DDA issues. In view of the lack of a formal work program, document JOB/TNC/48 and the recent 
reports provided by the negotiating group Chairs summarized in a detailed manner the situation. TN/C/M/37 
 
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  3.203.  He said that Members had to continue build ing on the basis of what they had done to date. 
For Peru, this meant that identifying points of co nvergence and divergence had to be the starting 
point to launch the discussions on the fundamen tal issues in September – when Members would 
need to start negotiations on the substance.  
3.204.  The process had to develop on the basis of the principle of the Single Undertaking and 
should not be limited to the three areas of agricu lture, NAMA and services. Peru would not support 
another early harvest or any other agreement that did not include substantive results for the 
interest of all Members, in all the outstanding issues of the Doha Round. If Members wanted to 
have success in Nairobi, they had to learn from their own mistakes. They had to start negotiating all issues in their own right to be able to identify results that would allow them to strike a balance. If Members waited until there was clarity in the agriculture negotiations before starting to engage 
in other areas, it would be difficult to achieve successful results in Nairobi. Members had to start 
building, step by step, their path towards Nairobi without restrictions. As the Chairman had said, the negotiations had to be simultaneous.  
3.205.  Finally, if, despite all efforts, Members did not reach any substantive result for Nairobi, 
Peru did not agree that this would be the end of the Doha Round, given that the outstanding issues of the DDA would not disappear if they were  not solved in Nairobi. These would continue to 
be the starting point of any other negotiating round.  
3.206.  The representative of Nepal associated his delegation with the statement made by 
Bangladesh on behalf of the LDC Group. While appreciating the Chairman for his leadership in 
advancing the DDA negotiations, Nepal expressed co ncern at the lack of progress in substantive 
matters that would lead Members towards a successful Nairobi Ministerial. In the previous period, 
engagement and discussions in different configurations had taken place, but Members had been unable to produce a clearly defined work program, as mandated by Ministers, to meaningfully 
conclude the remaining DDA issues. In the absence of such a work program, there was uncertainty 
in terms of fulfilling the Doha mandate. In this se nse, it seemed that Members were still standing 
at the crossroads. Nepal believed that moving ahead from this point needed a higher degree of 
political will, commitment and determination, as well as the necessary flexibility among key 
players. 
3.207.  LDCs were the most vulnerable group in th e WTO, with a paltry share of 1.23% in global 
trade. No significant stride had been made to date towards materializing the goal of doubling LDCs' 
export trade by 2020, as envisaged by the Istanb ul Programme of Action. In September, the post-
2015 development agenda and the SDGs would be launched with a view to propelling sustainable and inclusive growth globally and leaving nobody  behind. Trade was one of the most important 
instruments for the SDGs to achieve the cherished goal of an inclusive global society, free from 
marginalization, poverty and hunger. He said that unless and until bolstered by strong market access facilities and enhanced technical and financial support for LDCs, all these goals and targets, 
might remain rhetoric. Therefore, the integration of  LDCs into the multilateral trading system with 
a visible boost to their exports was mandatory in achieving the SDGs. Members needed to be serious, flexible and sympatheti c towards the LDC trade agenda. 
3.208.  Even in the absence of a post-Bali work pr ogram, Nepal considered that negotiations could 
be advanced based on earlier mandates, particularly the 2001 Doha Work Programme, the 
July 2004 Framework, and the Hong Kong and Bali Ministerial decisions. For Nepal, Members could advance the negotiations and reach an agreement based on the foundation and understanding 
made earlier. With respect to the LDC agenda, Nepal believed that there should be no doubt or 
debate about advancing the negotiations. LDCs were engaged in finalizing their priority agenda in 
the run-up to MC10. In this regard, Nepal was pleased to note that the LDC Group, in close 
collaboration with the G-90, had been able to subm it their combined proposal on S&D. Converting 
LDC specific Bali decisions into legally binding provisions that could deliver all intended results on the ground, and strengthening some two dozen S&D treatment provisions, among others, were 
Nepal's priority at this juncture. 
3.209.  It thanked all Members for supporting the LDCs in conducting the dedicated session on 
preferential rules of origin and hoped that af ter the summer break Members would streamline the 
LDC DFQF issue through another dedicated session.  In this context, Nepal thanked those Members 
who had submitted their notifications on services waiver, and urged the remaining Members to 
submit their notifications at the earliest possible date. Finally, it called upon Members to make TN/C/M/37 
 
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  Nairobi successful in ensuring meaningful deliverables for all and in particular for the poorest. In 
order to stop further marginalization of the LDCs, Nairobi had to deliver substantive outcomes. 
3.210.  The representative of Ecuador quoted th e Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO that 
recognized that "there is need for positive effo rts designed to ensure that developing countries, 
and especially the least developed among them, secu re a share in the growth in international trade 
commensurate with the needs of their economic development." In his view, this meant that the WTO was not only related to trade liberalization, but that it also had as its primary objective the 
use of international trade as a tool for economic development. For this reason, the lack of results 
in the negotiations of a post-Bali work program not only put into question the viability of the Organization as a forum for negotiation and regulati on of global trade, but what was more serious, 
it marginalized the WTO with regard to the impo rtant agreements that were being negotiated in 
the area of development. This year the WTO coul d not afford to do nothing in the face of the 
expectations of millions of poor people in the world, whose living conditions could significantly improve if Members started to think more about their needs. Unfortunately, this was a moral duty 
that Members were not necessarily complying with.  
3.211.  The Doha Round had been launched with the objective of generating trade reform 
processes that would allow developing countries to benefit from increased opportunities and the 
wellbeing generated by the multilateral trading system. However, Members had reached a new 
missed deadline. For 14 years, countries, such as Ecuador, had been waiting for more balanced and fairer international trade rules that would allow developing countries to maintain the necessary conditions to advance their industrial policies and, therefore, increase their participation in 
international markets, especially in agriculture, where developing countries held a large part of 
their production and potentials. Over many years, Ecuador had been waiting for those commitments to be met, participating actively in the various stages of the negotiations.  
3.212.  Ecuador regretted that yet another deadlin e remained unmet. However, it was still hopeful 
because it needed the commitments made in 2001 to  bear their fruits. His delegation would spare 
no effort to ensure that this happened. For this  reason, Ecuador did not agree that Members could 
close the current Round without having complied wi th the commitments undertaken. This would be 
a hard blow to the credibility of the Organization.  
3.213.  Ecuador hoped that the Nairobi Ministerial Co nference would be substantive. To this end, it 
was necessary that, as of September, Members changed pace and sped up the rhythm of the 
negotiations. His delegation was ready to collaborate in this effort but without losing sight of the 
reason for which this Round had been launched – to develop trade capacity so as to spur economic development, which was the tool to reach the ultimate objective of enhancing people's wellbeing. 
3.214.  The representative of Pakistan said that the vehicle for bridging the gaps on some of the 
thorny issues had been provided through ample oppo rtunities for consultations. In his view, lack of 
convergence did not indicate aversion to free trad e, in fact the number of bilateral, regional and 
plurilateral agreements was on the rise and Members wanted to choose from a large set of menu. 
However, liberalization through a multilateral organization reduced the adjustment costs and created value for everyone by enlarging the size of  the pie. Pakistan agreed with the Chairman's 
assessment that conceptual clarity was not there on some of the key areas and proposed to use 
the summer break as an introspection break and make it an endeavour for meeting of minds.  
3.215.  The importance of this issue was most ev ident in agriculture, where domestic support and 
export competition could only be addressed meaningfully in a multilateral setting. The food 
security of millions of farmers was linked with the substantial reduction in trade distorting 
subsidies, including AMS which had no product caps, and all forms of export subsidies. Substantial reduction in domestic support and removal of export subsidies could be a triple win as it would 
ensure sustainability. A move towards domestic reforms that addressed trade distortions and 
investment in sustainable production was the most advisable way forward for food security and fair agriculture trade. Pakistan was open to discuss new approaches that recognized S&D treatment and allowed for flexibilities to NFIDCs. On the issu e of public stockholding, flexibilities had been 
extended twice and it was now up to Members to use that tool. Any further flexibility would alter 
the balance between rights and obligations. TN/C/M/37 
 
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  3.216.  Discussions on market access approaches in agriculture and NAMA had generated 
engagement and Members needed to build on th is. Pakistan acknowledged the hard work of 
Ambassador Winzap and appreciated his tireless efforts in encouraging Members to achieve convergence. Yet owing to individual sensitivities, Members had had difficulties in find a landing 
zone for consensus on tariff cutting modalities that were doable, realistic and catered for Members' 
sensitivities. On the need to address NTBs, Pakistan recognized their importance for developing countries and underscored the need to begin tech nical work after the summer break. Some well-
known proposals were on the table. These were mature enough and remained central to 
negotiations in NAMA for meaningful market access. 
3.217.  On services, his delegation shared the views of Ambassador Duque that despite good work 
on market access and domestic regulation, Members could not agree to a post-Bali work program. 
Achieving a desirable level of ambition in agricu lture and NAMA had posed daunting challenges for 
Members to proceed in this area as well. 
3.218.  He suggested that Chairs be requested to identify two or three issues that were likely to 
achieve consensus and the rest of the edifice co uld be developed along those consensus areas by 
utilizing the positive momentum generated by the engagement amongst Members. 
3.219.  Ratification of the TFA would enable countries to improve their competitiveness and 
increase income generation, create employment  and use trade as a vehicle for development. 
3.220.  He said Members had missed a deadline, but this did not have to be an obstacle to future 
work. Members would have to redouble their efforts to achieve credible outcomes for MC10. In this connection, serious engagement and political will by  all Members, especially the key players, would 
be critically important. His delegation assured the Chairman of its full support for the work up until 
the Ministerial. The guiding principle should be no backtracking from the existing disciplines. 
3.221.  The representative of Cambodia associated his delegation with the statements by 
Bangladesh on behalf of the LDCs and Malaysia on behalf of ASEAN. He said that although 
Members could not reach agreement on the work program, Cambodia had noted that substantive progress had been made. His delegation believed that under the Chairman's leadership and with 
Members' efforts, the work program would be do ne before MC10 and the DDA would be concluded 
in a meaningful manner.  
3.222.  His delegation appreciated the Chairman's strong commitment and determination to have 
a meaningful outcome especially for the LDCs in  Nairobi. Cambodia was happy to see Members' 
engagement and ambition to move LDC issues forward. Their ambition was very important. It 
would not only give the poorest countries the opportunity to reap the benefits from the conclusion of the DDA, but would also ensure public trust an d confidence in the multilateral trading system. 
Towards this ambition, Cambodia encouraged Memb ers to re-double their efforts to bridge the 
gaps in the remaining issues. Members should not link their differences on other issues to hinder the implementation of LDC priority areas. Camb odia, therefore, called on those Members who had 
not implemented the LDC package adopted in MC9 to speed up implementation in the following 
months to enable Members to report about progress in these areas to Ministers at MC10. His delegation thanked those who had improved their DFQF schemes and notified the operationalisation of the services waiver for LDCs . The effective implementation of LDC priority 
areas would act as a catalyst for LDCs to increase revenues, achieve employment creation and 
poverty reduction.  
3.223.  The representative of Tanzania associated her delegation with the statements made by 
Bangladesh on behalf of the LDC Group, Lesotho on behalf of the African Group, Barbados on 
behalf of the ACP Group, Indonesia on behalf of the G-33, Brazil on behalf of the G-20, and Mali on 
behalf of the C-4. As the Chairman had reported, there was still a lot of work to do in closing 
existing gaps. Her delegation believed that, wi th more efforts and commitments, Members could 
do a commendable job, mostly towards preparing for Nairobi. The missed deadline to submit the post-Bali work program should not stop Members' efforts in preparing positive results for MC10. Although there had been no meaningful progress, due to lack of engagement by Members resulting 
from wider divergences in positions, Members should move forward in a more constructive, 
transparent and inclusive way to deliver at this important Ministerial.  TN/C/M/37 
 
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  3.224.  If MC10 had to deliver a meaningful outcome in Nairobi, text-based negotiations would 
have to begin immediately after the summer break. Developing and least-developed countries had been constructive by tabling their proposals in va rious configurations, such as the ACP Group, the 
G-33 and the LDC Group. Those proposals should se rve as a basis of negotiations for work to 
progress towards Nairobi. 
3.225.  LDCs held high expectations for MC10 in Nairobi. She called upon Members to engage in 
constructive negotiations aiming at ensuring a successful MC10 with practical and meaningful 
outcomes on issues of interest to LDCs. Members had constantly reiterated that they had no 
problem with LDC issues. Therefore, LDCs expect ed them to walk the talk on issues to be 
harvested in Nairobi, including, among others, legally-binding preferential rules of origin for LDCs. Her delegation had no doubt that preference-granting Members were in a position to understand 
the concerns of the LDCs on rules of origin, as  put forward by the LDCs during the dedicated 
session of the Committee on Rules of Origin (CRO) held on 23-24 July 2015.  
3.226.  Tanzania urged Members not to take the Ministerial Decisions lightly. Members should stick 
to them as instructions from Ministers and as re ference for further work in this Organization.  
3.227.  The representative of Antigua and Barbuda, on behalf of the WTO Members of the 
Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), thanked the Chairman and the negotiating 
group Chairs for their reports on the state of affairs in the DDA negotiations and for their efforts 
towards finding convergence, providing transparen cy and ensuring a measure of inclusiveness in 
the smaller limited consultations undertaken towards this goal. Not having participated in these meetings, these efforts were very important to the OECS Member States.  
3.228.  The Chairman's and the negotiating group Chairs' reports painted a dim picture of the DDA 
negotiations and the prospect for its successful completion in the near future. The OECS WTO Members had hoped that the success in Bali surrounding the conclusion of the TFA and the other 
elements of the Bali package would have pr ovided the added momentum and catalyst to 
demonstrate that WTO Members could find convergence, build consensus and clear a path towards concluding the DDA in short order. This ha d been the promise and expectation of Bali. 
Unfortunately, to date this had not been realized.  
3.229.  While the OECS Members felt and shared some sense of disappointment at not having met 
the deadline for the work program, they were more concerned that sufficient progress had not been made on bridging the gaps on the substantiv e issues in the negotiations. The work program, 
after all, as the Chairman had said, was not meant to be an end in itself. In this regard, the OECS 
WTO Members associated themselves with the atte mpt of the ACP Group to put forward ideas and 
proposals that could help build convergence. The OE CS had previously articulated its priorities for 
the DDA negotiations. Many of these were reflected in the ACP Group's earlier Elements Paper and 
its more recent submission, the SVEs' contribution to the work program and the G-33 positions on SPs and SSM.  
3.230.  The OECS Members looked forward to and called for continued and meaningful 
engagement after the summer break, when Members' attention would necessarily need to turn to MC10 in Nairobi and the need to ensure that Me mbers had a successful outcome and one that was 
development-centred. The six Member States of the OECS Economic Union were committed to a 
successful DDA and stood prepared to embrace i nnovative approaches to achieve a successful 
outcome. The Group associated itself with the s t a t e m e n t s  b y  J a m a i c a  o n  b e h a l f  o f  C A R I C O M ,  
Barbados on behalf of the ACP Group, Guatemala on  behalf of the SVEs and Indonesia on behalf of 
the G-33.  
3.231.  The representative of the Russian Federa tion supported the position expressed by the 
Chairman and other delegations that irrespective of the failures in finalising the post-Bali work 
program, it was a must for Members to deliver tangible results in Nairobi. For that purpose, his 
delegation called on all Members to do their utmo st in order to prepare and agree on a meaningful 
package at MC10. This package should include issu es related to the successful conclusion of the 
Doha Round.  
3.232.  The Russian Federation had taken note of some Members' calls for recalibration and setting 
the level of ambitions and was open to consider such efforts in the second semester, as it seemed TN/C/M/37 
 
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  to be one of the practical ways to achieve the common goal of delivering substantive results by 
December. However, echoing Chinese Taipei's statement for the RAMs, the Russian Federation reiterated that, as a very recently acceded Member, it had obvious limitations for this recalibration. 
In its view, this should not lead to a situation where the Doha Round consolidated the existing 
imbalances between the newly acceded Members and the Members that had joined the 
Organization in 1995 and earlier. Particularly important for the Russian Federation was to overcome the differences in agricultural obligations. Thus, his delegation continued to believe that 
issues of critical importance, such as export subsidies and domestic support, should be properly 
addressed in the Doha outcomes. 
3.233.  The representative of Sierra Leone fully en dorsed the statements delivered by Barbados on 
behalf of the ACP, Lesotho on behalf of the Af rican Group and Bangladesh on behalf of the LDC 
Group, including the proposals submitted by these groups. She said that all these groups had been 
working assiduously to clearly map out the doable actions that were expected to address the provisions of the Doha Round and that were bein g presented to the various negotiating bodies and 
to the TNC. Sierra Leone regretted the limited progress in drawing up the work program. It had 
been clear from the interventions at this meeting, that there had been a need for Members to show understanding and goodwill if the noble go als of the DDA were to be realised. For this, 
political will was essential. 
3.234.  Sierra Leone wished to address, in particular, issues pertaining to the LDCs – the weakest 
link in the chain of the multilateral trading system. This did not imply that the other development issues were not important, as LDCs expected to graduate from their LDC status, but for now, their 
utmost priority was getting the required boost to enable them do so. 
3.235.  As indicated by the LDC Coordinator, Sierra  Leone considered the operationalization of the 
LDC Bali Package as an absolute priority to be accomplished before MC10, so that concrete results 
could be reported in Nairobi. To this end, with respect to the implementation of preferential rules 
of origin for LDCs, her delegation urged concerne d Members to give life to the streamlining and 
transparency envisaged in the Decision adopted at Bali. For LDCs, preferential rules of origin could 
have a real and catalytic impact on the ability of LDCs to benefit from market access opportunities.  
3.236.  With regard to the Services Waiver, he r delegation was gratified by the announcements 
made by Members at the High Level meeting in Fe bruary and by the notifications that had been 
made to date and looked forward to the expediti ous operationalization of the waiver that would 
enhance real market access in sectors of export inte rest to LDC services suppliers. In addition, her 
delegation wished to encourage those Members that had announced their intentions to grant the waiver to submit their notifications as soon as possible and to urge other Members to give positive 
consideration to this request. 
3.237.  On trade facilitation, Sierra Leone looked forward to the scaling up of technical assistance, 
including the commissioning of the Trade Facilitation Trust Fund. A step forward in the area of 
technical assistance would not only support implementation, it would send a strong signal to 
developing countries that all Members were honouring the commitments made during the negotiation of the TFA. This was the time for the WTO to make good on the commitments made to developing countries and LDCs in this regard. 
3.238.  The statement of the LDC Group had also iden tified key issues to be addressed in the post-
Bali Doha work program. These included actions on S&D treatment, agriculture – whose importance had been stressed by various delegati ons – NAMA, services and Rules that had been 
spelt out in the statement of the LDC Coordinato r. Sierra Leone urged Members not to leave the 
negotiations on the LDC package to the tail end, as had been the case for MC9. 
3.239.  Trade was a key pillar of the development st rategy of LDCs and a major driver of economic 
growth and poverty reduction. In 2001, a commitment had been made in the Brussels Programme 
of Action (BPOA) to enhance the role of trade in development. The Doha Round negotiations had been launched only six months after the adoption of the BPOA, when Trade Ministers had committed themselves to "addressing the marginalization of Least-Developed Countries in 
international trade and to improving their effective participation in the multilateral trading 
system". Since 2001, a number of commendable actions had been taken, which had seen an increase of the LDCs' contribution to world trade from 0.4% in 1998 to 1% in 2009, while LDCs TN/C/M/37 
 
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  were home to 18% of the world population. These did not go far enough. This was why LDCs were 
looking forward to more transparent and meaningful concessions and appropriate levels of Aid for Trade, including through the Enhanced Integrated  Framework (EIF), that would enable them to 
address their development challenges. 
3.240.  The year 2015 was a key year for development. The draft Outcome Document of the post-
2015 Development Agenda had set out ambitious goals that should be achieved by all countries by 
2030. No one was to be left behind. LDCs were at the bottom end of the ladder, while some 
countries were already at the top. There was a need for a substantial pull to get LDCs to catch up 
or at least narrow the gap and the DDA provided th e elements for action on trade. LDCs counted 
on the understanding of WTO Members to make good on the Doha promises. MC10 would be a moment of truth for the almost one billion people living in LDCs.  
3.241.  The representative of Jamaica, on behalf of the Member States of the Caribbean 
Community (CARICOM), said that like many other delegations, CARICOM was disappointed that 
Members had not been able to find convergence around a work program by the 31 July deadline. 
As Members broke for the summer and looked ahead to Nairobi and to re-engagement in the 
second semester, the Caribbean Community wished to express its continued commitment to constructively participate in the effort to achieve meaningful outcomes for MC10 in line with the 
mandates entrusted to Members. CARICOM aligned itself with the statements by Barbados on 
behalf of the ACP and Guatemala on behalf of the SVEs. 
3.242.  Speaking on behalf of Jamaica, he said that his delegation also supported the statement by 
Indonesia on behalf of the G-33. On the question  of how Members should proceed in September, 
Jamaica said that Members had to recall that the mandates for the DDA had all been agreed by 
Ministers by consensus. Therefore, it had to be assumed that nothing on the table had been 
inherently unacceptable to any Member at some point in time. The central issue remained what 
areas among those original goals could ultimately be accommodated in a Nairobi outcome in a 
situation where ambition was drastically changed. He recalled that Ministers in Bali had instructed Members to conclude the whole DDA and some had said that they would not foresee and perhaps 
could not accept a repeat of Bali or a mini-package approach. This would need to be tested early 
on in the post-September discussions. 
3.243.  Members had also to assume that recalibration had to take place on the basis of something 
that existed. Therefore, rather than resuming a sterile discussion of Rev.3 and Rev.4, he urged 
Members to redouble efforts to seek to determine, pillar by pillar, subject by subject, what inputs – 
new or old – could help them find convergence. In this regard, the paper by the ACP Group, while presented without prejudice to Members' final nego tiating position, should provide valuable inputs 
for resuming the conversation in September. 
3.244.  Attempts to simply take things off the table a priori  had not worked. Therefore, Members 
should better seek to see what was acceptable and possible in all areas and let that be the process 
that would lead to the adjustment, retention, or removal of components from the mandated 
negotiating agenda, including what elements were to  be placed in a post-Nairobi built-in agenda, if 
that was the path Members chose to take. In this exercise, a burden was placed on proponents to advance realistic proposals. Of equal importance, a burden was placed on delegations with 
concerns about the effects of those proposals to engage the proponents in focused negotiations on 
how to further recalibrate their proposals to make them acceptable. Given the context in which Members were working, creativity and collaborat ive efforts were necessary. September could not 
be about general reactions and pronouncements, it had to be about proposals, counterproposals 
and real negotiations – sequenced or not. In this  regard, the appeal to the majors issued by a 
group of delegations led by Switzerland was most timely.  
3.245.  The representative of Côte d'Ivoire took note of the absence of a work program to date. 
In light of this situation, his delegation welcomed the ACP Group's initiative and thanked Barbados, 
as Group Coordinator, for presenting a proposal that resembled a work program. Côte d'Ivoire 
considered that this proposal covered almost all remaining areas of the DDA. Given the constraints 
in terms of time for the development of a work program by MC10 and in order to have some 
substance to think about as of September, it was highly recommended that the ACP Group proposal was retained as a basis for work and that Members be encouraged to contribute to its 
improvement. Nature abhorred a vacuum and, in this case, the ACP Group seemed willing to fill 
that void. At this stage, this proposal was a step  forward, because, as the saying went, a bird in TN/C/M/37 
 
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  the hand was worth two in the bush. The delegation of Côte d'Ivoire urged all Members to make 
multilateral efforts and to be ready to pull their energies together for a post-Bali work program based on the ACP proposal, which was viable and took into account most of the concerns and interests expressed by the majority of Members.  
3.246.  Therefore, it would be desirable that this  proposal was not disregarded immediately. It was 
an issue of profitability in terms of time-saving, in light of the challenges and the stakes for Nairobi. Therefore, it was worth trying, especially as the proposal set the contours of what could 
be a work program – namely, a work program did no t have to find solutions to problems, but set 
objectives to identify possible approaches and options that would bring about those solutions.  
3.247.  For Côte d'Ivoire, the multilateral negotiations framework represented the best option for 
introducing trade disciplines that would allow ea ch and every Member to take advantage of the 
opportunities brought about by this framework. The ACP proposal, which was part of this dynamic, 
aimed at achieving greater development. 
3.248.  The representative of Singapore expressed her delegation's disappointment that despite all 
efforts, Members had not been able to agree on a post-Bali work program. Singapore agreed that 
the lack of a post-Bali work program should not be  an obstacle to constructive engagement after 
the summer. There had been some useful discussions in the past few months. Some Members had 
come forward with possible alternative approaches. Singapore thanked them as well as the 
ACP Group and the G-90 for their recently tabled proposal for bridging gaps and for the S&D proposal, respectively. This momentum n eeded to be sustained and intensified. 
3.249.  All Members had a duty to bring the DDA to a meaningful conclusion. In particular, the 
major Members bore a special and heavier responsibility to shape the contours of an acceptable 
DDA outcome and chart the way forward towards Nairobi. Recent experience had shown that meaningful outcomes were possible and differences  could be bridged when major players had the 
political will and a shared interest in forging a mutually beneficial outcome. She was referring to 
the ITA expansion negotiations, where the major pl ayers, with the skilful intervention of the 
Director-General, had risen to the occasion and he lped to clinch the deal. Singapore hoped that 
this would inspire similar leadership from the majo rs for the implementation of the Bali decisions, 
the completion of the DDA  and a successful MC10. 
3.250.  Continuing to negotiate on the basis of redlines would not lead anywhere meaningful. 
This was evident from Members' inability to find convergence on a work program even though they 
had been discussing its possible contours for the past seven months. Therefore, Singapore 
strongly urged Members to do some serious introspection over the summer. Her delegation suggested three questions to reflect on: (1) What kind of pains were Members willing to bear, in 
return for what kind of gains to conclude the DDA?; (2) What would a no-deal scenario on the DDA 
mean for the multilateral trading system and for each Member?; (3) What was each Member's definition of a successful Nairobi Ministerial Conference? 
3.251.  The representative of Mexico agreed with the Chairman's assessment of the state of play. 
As other delegations, Mexico regretted that despite Members' high level of engagement in the past 
months, they had not been able to have full mo dalities in agriculture and NAMA, a date for the 
submission of offers in services and specific texts in Rules and the other DDA issues. 
From Mexico's perspective, this would have been the work program that Ministers had mandated. 
However, what prevailed were statements on what was not acceptable. Few Members indicated 
what concessions they would be ready to make. As the Chairman had said, some Members had 
even hardened their positions. However, Mexico noted that a significant number of Members had 
shown openness to new ideas and alternative approaches.  
3.252.  As of September, Members would have only two months to change attitude and achieve 
the objective of reaching concrete results for Nairobi. For this, Members would need to redouble 
their efforts. It was time to move to real negotiat ions. In this context, Mexico agreed that after the 
summer break, Members would have to address al l issues simultaneously. There was no longer 
room for sequencing. For Nairobi, it was necessary to find a solution to every issue under the Doha 
Round. For Mexico, agreeing only to a partial package would be unacceptable. This would only 
prolong the agony. At the same time, Members had to be aware of the need to treat issues in a realistic manner in view of the new scenario Members were faced with. MC10 should go down in TN/C/M/37 
 
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  history as the Conference in which Members achieved the conclusion of the Doha Round with a 
comprehensive package. Mexico thanked the AC P Group for the elements contained in their 
proposal. Her delegation believed it would be useful to Members' deliberations towards building a solution for Nairobi.  
3.253.  The representative of Tajikistan, as a recently acceded Member, associated his delegation 
to the statement by Chinese Taipei on behalf of  the RAMs and welcomed the ACP proposal subject 
to further analysis. As a WTO Member for the past two years, Tajikistan was witnessing the 
complexities in negotiations in some tracks and believed that the outcomes were only possible 
where the major players were fully engaged. By recognising the major recent breakthroughs – including the Bali decisions, overcoming the ba rriers in agreeing on the TFA protocol, the ITA 
Expansion and accepting Kazakhstan as a new Member, the most complex case of accession – 
it could be said with confidence that the WTO as an institution played a significant role in 
advancing the multilateral trading system as a whole. 
3.254.  Members were at the historic moment when the time had come for making concrete 
decisions to move forward the DDA negotiations based on realism, doability and respecting each 
other's redlines. While the present disappointment could be minor, the disappointment for future 
generations could be major. Tajikistan was still pragmatic and looked forward to more flexibility by 
Members particularly in narrowing the gaps in commitments between the RAMs and original WTO 
Members, granting S&D treatment to develo ping countries and LDCs and focussing on 
development rather than protectionism.  
3.255.  Tajikistan remained committed to the multilateral trading system and had been 
undertaking economic reforms at the speed of light, both at the time of its accession and in the 
post-accession period. By enjoying the benefits of membership, Tajikistan was one of the first 
countries to ratify the TFA, which served as a signal to other countries in the region to do so, and 
had hosted the Third China Round Table on accessio ns on 2 June 2015. Finally, Tajikistan hoped 
that after the summer break, Members would come back with reasonable proposals for an inclusive work program for better outcomes at Nairobi. 
3.256.  The Chairman said he had been hoping to hear, first of all, an expression of 
disappointment from all Members, which he had heard from every single delegation. He had also 
hoped that he would not hear any delegation saying anything that resembled or gave the 
impression that they were giving up – and he had not heard that. On the contrary, he had heard 
words of commitment, words of encouragement an d promises that Members would be back in 
September fully committed to finalise their efforts in Nairobi and to make the Ministerial Conference a success. So, this was the goal and this was exactly the kind of message Members 
had to give to the outside world.  
3.257.  The Chairman urged Members to use the summer to think about the challenges that they 
were all facing at this point in time. He also urged them to get their teams involved and tell them 
that they would have to come up with constructive ideas. If Members cared for this Organization, 
coming back in September with no ideas was not an option.  
3.258.  Members should not spend the summer hoping that something would happen or that 
somebody else would change their mind. Each Member had to be part of the solution, no matter 
how big. He had heard a lot of delegations urging the major players to do something. This was 
about everybody. The major players had a role and they knew it. They had a big burden on their 
shoulders, but so did everybody else. Each Member was part of this as much as anybody else. In 
the second semester, all Members would have to be ready for engagement. Therefore, he thanked 
all delegations for the messages that they had gi ven at this meeting. It had been useful for 
delegations to listen to each other, to hear each other and to promise each other that they were 
going to come back with redoubled engagement.  
3.259.  The Trade Negotiations Committee took note of the statements.  
 
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  ANNEX 
STATEMENT BY MALAYSIA ON BELHALF OF THE ASSOCIATION  
OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN) 
ASEAN has always been a strong supporter of the multilateral trading system. A rules-based, 
stable and predictable international trading system is of vital interest to us. We want the WTO to 
continue to play its important role in upholding the multilateral trading system.   
It is in this context that we express our grave conc ern over the current state of play in this house, 
especially the inability of its membership to re ach agreement on a post-Bali work programme on 
DDA remaining issues. The deep divergences amongst members are eroding the effectiveness of the WTO. The WTO must keep moving forward. The lack of a clearly defined work programme, 
therefore, must not be an obstacle towards a successful MC10 in Nairobi. In Bali, we had shown 
the world that the WTO could deliver. We must do so again in Nairobi.   
ASEAN wants to see a successful Nairobi Ministerial Conference and will play our part together with 
other members in contributing towards its success. We are of the view that all Members have the responsibility to redouble efforts to forge a cred ible DDA outcome and a successful MC10. We hope 
that all members will come back in September fully ready to engage and to deliver concrete 
outcomes for Nairobi.  
__________