RESTRICTED  
  
G/AG/W/106  
 
11 February 2013  
(13-0710)  Page: 1/40  
Committee on Agriculture   
 
 RESPONSES TO POINTS RAISED BY MEMBERS UNDER THE REVIEW PROCESS 
COMPILATION OF RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS RAISED DURING THE COMMITTEE 
ON AGRICULTURE MEETING ON 14 NOVEMBER 20121 
 The present document compiles the responses received in writing by the Secretariat to the 
questions raised in document G/AG/W/104 as well as follow-up comments made during the Review Process. 
 
 Outstanding responses will be circulated in addenda to this document as soon as they are provided by Members. A comprehensive version of the present compilation will be issued thereafter. 
                                               
1 This document has been prepared under the Secret ariat's own responsibility and is without prejudice 
to the positions of Members or to their rights or obligations under the WTO. G/AG/W/106 
 
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1   MATTERS RELEVANT TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF COMMITMENTS: 
ARTICLE 18.6 .................................................................................................................. . 4 
1.1   Brazil's domestic support programmes .......................................................................... 4  
1.2   Brazil's trade an d industry policy ................................................................................. 4  
1.3   Canada's Ice Cream Promotion Init iative ....................................................................... 5  
1.4   Costa Rica's Complian ce with AMS Co mmitments ........................................................... 6  
1.5   The European Union's ex port subsidies on sugar ............................................................ 7  
1.6   Indonesia's quantitative and other import restrictions on certain food products ................... 9  
1.7   The Republic of Korea's autonomous tariff rate quota for pork ......................................... 11 
1.8   Norway's changes to border pr otection ........................................................................ 12 
1.9   Thailand's Paddy  Pledging Scheme .............................................................................. 13 
1.10   Ukraine's Expo rt Ban on  Wheat ................................................................................. 18 
1.11   Ukraine – Tariff-related Issues .................................................................................. 19 
1.12   European Union's Recourse to GATT Article XXVIII procedures on poultry products ........... 19 
2   POINTS RAISED IN CONNECTION WITH INDIVIDUAL NOTIFICATIONS .................... 21  
2.1   Special Agricultural Safe guards (Tables MA :3 to MA:5) .................................................. 21 
2.1.1   Chinese Taipei (G/AG/N/TPKM/ 97, G/AG/N/TPKM/98 an d G/AG/N/TPKM/99) .................. 21 
2.2   Domestic Support Co mmitments (Tab le DS:1) .............................................................. 22 
2.2.1   Armenia (G/AG/N/AR M/20) ..................................................................................... 22 
2.2.2   Brazil (G /AG/N/BRA/27) ......................................................................................... 23 
2.2.3   Canada (G/AG/N/CAN/ 90 and G/AG/N/CAN /90/Corr.1) ............................................... 23 
2.2.4   Indonesia (G/AG/N/ID N/30) .................................................................................... 23 
2.2.5   Moldova (G/AG/N/MOL/4) ....................................................................................... 24 
2.2.6   Nepal (G/AG/N/NP L/2 and G/AG /N/NPL/4) ................................................................ 24 
2.2.7   Norway (G/AG/N/NO R/64) ...................................................................................... 24 
2.2.8   Oman (G /AG/N/OM N/11) ........................................................................................ 24 
2.2.9   Panama (G/AG/N/PA N/26) ...................................................................................... 24 
2.2.10   Ukraine (G/AG/N/UK R/9 and G/AG/N /UKR/13) ......................................................... 25 
2.2.11   United States (G/AG/N/USA/89) ............................................................................. 29 
2.3   New or Modified Domestic Support Measures (Table DS:2) ............................................. 31 
2.3.1   Armenia (G/AG/N/AR M/22) ..................................................................................... 31 
2.3.2   New Zealan d (G/AG/N/ NZL/76) ............................................................................... 32 
2.3.3   United Stat es (G/AG/N/ USA/86) .............................................................................. 32 
2.3.4   United Stat es (G/AG/N/ USA/91) .............................................................................. 33 
2.4   Export Subsidy Notifica tions (Tables ES :1 to ES:3) ........................................................ 34 
2.4.1   Australia (G/AG/N/AU S/87) ..................................................................................... 34 
2.4.2   Brazil (G /AG/N/BRA/28) ......................................................................................... 34 
2.4.3   India (G /AG/N/IN D/9) ............................................................................................ 35 
2.4.4   United Stat es (G/AG/N/ USA/88) .............................................................................. 36 G/AG/W/106 
 
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  2.5   Notifications in the Context of th e Follow-Up to the Decision on Measures 
Concerning the Possible Negati ve Effects of the Reform Programme on Least-Developed 
and Net-Food Importing Developi ng Countries (T able NF:1) ................................................... 36 
2.5.1   United Stat es (G/AG/N/ USA/90) .............................................................................. 36 
3   OVERDUE NO TIFICATIONS ........................................................................................ 37  
3.1.1   India – Domestic  support notifications ...................................................................... 37 
ANNEX 1 ....................................................................................................................... . 38 
ANNEX 2 ....................................................................................................................... . 39 
ANNEX 3 ....................................................................................................................... . 40 
 G/AG/W/106 
 
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  1  MATTERS RELEVANT TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF COMMITMENTS: ARTICLE 18.6 
1.1  Brazil's domestic support programmes 1.  Questions by the United States: 
a. In response to the United States' question
2 in June 2012 regarding official data 
on the percentage of "Prêmio para Escoamento do Produto (PEP)" rice and 
wheat transactions that were auctioned for the domestic market for 2005 through 2011, Brazil stated such figure s were not available at the time. Can 
Brazil provide the data requested at this time? 
CONAB informed that its control mechanism does not presently include information 
about the final destination of transactions (d omestic or external market), but only about 
the Brazilian States of origin and destination of the auction. CONAB indicated that it is 
currently reviewing its control mechanism in order to include the final destination. 
b. The United States remains concerned about the accuracy of data on PEP and 
the other price equalization programmes, because of the long time lag Brazil 
identified in "Companhia Nacional de  Abastecimento" (CONAB) recording and 
documenting auction/destination data. A ccording to the CONAB website, data 
on the auctions by state are available. In addition, the aggregate data for total 
government expenditures often va ry considerably from Brazil's 
WTO notifications and the CONAB data ar e significantly revised over time. The 
United States understands that revi sions of government data are not 
uncommon but these revisions are significan t. For example, the data in Annex 1 
for corn and cotton are taken from Braz il's last notification for 2008/09, and 
from the CONAB website at two different periods. Some of the changes in the 
reported data are striking. Please advi se on the accuracy of the CONAB data 
and provide information relative to whic h data may be considered stable and 
which data may undergo further updates. 
The data notified by Brazil refer to crop ye ars, whereas the data published in the CONAB 
website are based on calendar years. Moreover, the figures published on the CONAB 
website are the quantity and the value av ailable for each programme and commodity 
concerned. As the subsidies are given through auctions according to pre-established conditions, the figures for the quantity and the value actually granted are usually far 
below those previously announced. 
1.2  Brazil's trade and industry policy 2.  Questions by Canada: Canada notes th at in August 2011, Brazil launched its trade 
and industry policy for 2011-2014, called the Pl ano Brasil Maior ("Greater Brazil Plan"). 
Canada notes that a second round of measures was announced in April 2012 and the number of beneficiary sectors was increase d in September 2012. Canada understands 
that the plan covers investment and innovati on, foreign trade, aid to Brazil's domestic 
industry, and includes measures such as payroll tax exemptions and reductions on 
energy tariffs. The legislative basis for the pa yroll tax exemption is found in the Greater 
Brazil Plan Act of 14 December 2011 (Lei No. 12.546) and the Greater Brazil Plan 
Amendment Act of 17 September 2012 (Lei No . 12.715). According to the Amendment 
Act of 17 September 2012, this measure exempts employers from a 20% payroll contribution to social security if 50% or more of their gross income is derived from 
exports. The Amendment Act also extended this  payroll tax exemption to the poultry and 
swine sectors. 
a. Could Brazil confirm if any other agri culture sector benefits from this 
exemption? 
                                               
2 Paragraph 11 of G/AG/W/96 refers. G/AG/W/106 
 
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  b. Could Brazil provide the estimated value of  this benefit for Brazilian poultry and 
swine exporters and the number of enti ties that would benefit from this 
measure? 
c. Could Brazil elaborate on what basis it is providing what appears to be an 
export subsidy to its agriculture sector? 
Neither Law No. 12.546 nor Law No. 12.715 has established any tax exemption or any other 
measure which could be interpreted as an ex port subsidy. The measure referred to by 
Canada is a temporary modification to the calculation methodology of the contribution to 
social security, in force until 31 December 2014. 
1.3  Canada's Ice Cream Promotion Initiative 3.  Questions by New Zealand: New Zeal and has sought further information about 
Canada's Ice Cream Promot ion Initiative at the 57
th, 60th, 62nd, 63rd, 64th, 65th and 
67th Committee on Agriculture meetings. New Zealand is concerned that the responses 
provided have not addressed the specific conc erns raised and therefore asks Canada to 
please expand upon its earlier responses. 
4.  In previous responses Canada has said th e Ice Cream Promotion Initiative is a purely 
commercial arrangement between Dairy Farmer s of Canada and ice cream producers. 
However, Canada has also acknowledged that  the Canadian Dairy Commission (CDC), a 
Crown Corporation, calculates the poolin g returns and sharing of promotion costs 
related to the programme. Furthermore, the CDC's latest Annual Report 2010-2011 
(page 9) states: "through its many roles and central facilitating function in the dairy 
industry, the CDC ensures Canadian dairy fa rmers receive sufficient revenues from the 
marketplace to achieve decent living standa rds and invest in their businesses […] it 
supports the dairy industry in the development and implementation of major 
programmes. On the industry's behalf, the CD C administers the Special Milk Class Permit 
Program, the Domestic Dairy Product Innova tion Program, the Dairy Marketing Program 
as well as the pooling systems […] the CDC chairs the Canadian Milk Supply 
Management Committee and in this capacity  apprises the committee on matters of 
interest or concern that require resolut ion and, when necessary, proposes various 
solutions, alternatives or recommendations to enhance orderly and efficient marketing 
with an eye to avoiding deficit or surplus milk production. "Given the important roles 
played both a Crown Corporation and provinci al marketing boards that are governed by 
federal and provincial legislation, New Ze aland considers it important for greater 
transparency to be provided on what is ef fectively an import replacement programme." 
5.  Specific questions are: 
a. Given the CDC is a Crown Corporation, wh y does Canada allow the CDC to play a 
key role in administrating a scheme wh ich is effectively aimed at displacing 
imports occurring in accordance with Canada's WTO commitments? 
b. What steps has Canada taken to ensu re that the actions of the CDC are 
consistent with Canada's international obligations? 
As already noted in Canada’s response to the questions posed by New Zealand at the 57th, 
60th, 62nd, 63rd, 64th, 65th, and 66th Committee on Agriculture meetings, the Ice Cream 
Promotion Initiative is a private contractual agreement between the Dairy Farmers of Canada, a non-governmental organization, and individual ice cream processors. The CDC 
has no part in determining the terms and conditions of the Ice Cream Promotion Initiative. 
Canada considers that such a purely private initiative is not inconsistent with its WTO obligations. 
c. What is the function of the Milk Pooling Agreement Supervisory bodies in 
relation to the Ice Cream Promotion Initiative? G/AG/W/106 
 
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  d. What is the function of the provincial marketing boards in relation to the Ice 
Cream Promotion Initiative? 
Canada answered similar questions on the function of the Milk Pooling Agreement 
Supervisory bodies, and the provincial market ing boards in relation to the Ice Cream 
Promotion Initiative at the 66th Committee on Agriculture meeting on 20 September 2012, 
and at the 64th Committee on Agriculture meeting on 21 March 2012.3 
Follow-up: New Zealand noted that Canada's response did not address the questions it had raised 
and that Canada provided no further information other than what had been supplied at the 
previous seven Committee meetings. The CDC is a Crown Corporation and while Canada said it did not determine the terms and conditions for the Ice Cream Promotion Initiative New Zealand believed that it did have a role. In New Zealand’s view the Ice cream Promotion Initiative was an 
import replacement scheme and as such transpar ency around the role Government agencies 
involved was important and was of interest to this Committee. 
1.4  Costa Rica's Compliance with AMS Commitments 
6.  Questions by: 
a. Canada: Canada appreciates the updates that Costa Rica has provided to this 
Committee with regard to its domestic process for bringing its Current Total 
AMS into line with its domestic support  commitment. Costa Rica indicated in 
September that it was constrained by a judicial ruling and was reviewing the 
implications of a domestic judicial ruling with regards to support to rice producers. Canada asks Costa Rica to prov ide an update and to indicate when it 
can bring its domestic support levels into compliance with its international 
obligations. 
b. The United States: The United States a ppreciated Costa Rica's updated status, 
particularly regarding recent judicial outcomes, at the September 2012 
Committee meeting and would like to follow-up with additional questions. Please explain what steps the Governme nt of Costa Rica has undertaken to 
reduce its trade-distorting domestic su pport to levels within its commitments 
since the July 2012 court ruling. 
As indicated at the 67
th meeting of the Committee, the Costa Rican Government is 
conducting a legal analysis of the ruling (No. 137-2012-VI of the Administrative Court, 
issued at 3.25 pm on 6 July 2012) before determining how to proceed with respect to 
setting rice prices. The ruling ordered that the price established as a precautionary measure be maintained at C23,131.72 per 73.6 kg bag of  dry and clean rice in the husk (roughly 
equivalent to US$626/MT at the current exchange  rate), until the State of Costa Rica, acting 
through the Ministry of the Economy, Industry and Trade (MEIC), lays down the new regulations to govern the marketing of rice at the domestic level, which will be covered by 
Law No. 7472 (Law on the Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Protection). 
Article 5 of Law No. 7472 empowers the MEIC to regulate prices by executive decree, on an 
exceptional and provisional basis, should market conditions not allow for competition. The MEIC is conducting the relevant studies under this regulatory framework to lay the 
appropriate foundations for the measure to be adopted. 
As a result, Costa Rica is not in a position to specify the date on which it will comply in terms 
of the applied level of support. 
7.  Questions by the United States: The Unit ed States appreciated Costa Rica's updated 
status, particularly regarding recent ju dicial outcomes, at  the September 2012 
Committee meeting and would like to follow-up with additional questions. Please 
explain the objectives of the Government of Costa Rica's current rice policies (including 
mandated changes per the judicial outcome). 
                                               
3 Paragraph 11(a) of G/AG/W/103 and paragraphs 9(a) and 9(b) of G/AG/W/94 refer. G/AG/W/106 
 
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  a. Please provide the intended goals the current policies strive to obtain, for 
example, is there a policy design to impr ove income for rice growers; if so, does 
the policy design target certain segments  of Costa Rica's rice producers more 
than other segments? 
b. Given the Government of Costa Rica's elev ated rice prices have been in effect 
for several years, what evidence does th e Government of Costa Rica's have as 
to whether the policy goals have been met? If the goals have not been met, 
what specific goals remain to be accomplished? 
c. Noting the specific policy goals outlined in the Government of Costa Rica's early 
2011 proposed alternative rice policy, how do the results currently being realized via the guaranteed, elevated ri ce prices compare with expectations 
under the alternative proposed policy? 
As reported to this Committee at its 61
st meeting4, the Government of Costa Rica 
acknowledges that the key to the well-being of Costa Rican rice producers is increased 
productivity, and not price setting, which not only puts up the price to consumers but 
provides "relief" that is artificial and affects the search for and implementation of productivity improvements. As also stated at  that meeting, the major producers already 
have high productivity and enjoy high incomes, but there is a layer of vulnerable small 
and medium producers whose productivity is lo w and who need public support in order to 
improve their level of competitiveness. The Go vernment of Costa Rica has therefore framed 
a new National Rice Policy, aimed at improv ing the competitiveness of small and medium 
rice producers with a production area of less than 50 hectares. 
Three of the four components of the new policy are being implemented: the business 
management training component; the agreemen t for the transfer of public storage and 
drying infrastructure to producer organizations; and the credit component through the 
development banking programme. The new policy also envisages the elimination of the price 
support mechanism for rice, the objective being to remedy the country's non-compliance in 
terms of the levels of AMS applied. For the above-mentioned reasons, however, it has not 
yet been possible to implement this component. 
Follow-up: Australia, Canada, Pakistan and the United States appreciated Costa Rica's efforts in 
transparency. The United States further asked when the consideration on the judicial decision and 
future actions would be finalized. Costa Rica indicated that it was not yet in a position to provide a 
date. Australia expressed interest in continuing the dialogue with the hope to see Costa Rica taking the necessary steps to abide by its WTO obligations. Canada wondered when the fourth element of 
the National Rice Policy would be implemented. Pa kistan registered its concern as a rice exporter 
and requested Costa Rica to reconsider its approach. In Pakistan's view, offering double the international price to any farmer irrespective of his/her status did not lead to competitiveness. 
1.5  The European Union's export subsidies on sugar 
8.  Questions by: 
a. Australia: Australia has strong concerns that the European Union has exceeded 
its WTO commitment levels for sugar ex ports with export subsidies in the 
2011/2012 marketing year.  
Australia recalls that over the past year Australia has raised this concern in 
both the Committee on Agriculture and the Dispute Settlement Body. Australia 
further recalls that Brazil, Thailand  and Australia have taken successful 
WTO action against the European Union for its level of subsidized sugar exports in the European Communities – Export Subsidies on Sugar Dispute. This dispute 
determined that all European Union out-of-quota sugar exports were in receipt 
of export subsidies. It also determined  that the European Union had exceeded 
its WTO export subsidy quantity commitm ent levels for a number of years.  
                                               
4 Paragraph 9 of docume nt G/AG/W/83 refers. G/AG/W/106 
 
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  At the Committee on Agriculture meeting in June 2012 the European Union 
confirmed the quantities of sugar notified to this Committee as subsidised exports were on the basis of licences i ssued and not actual exports. Members’ 
export subsidy commitments limiting subsid ization relate to actual exports. The 
practice of notifying on basis of licen ces issued is a matter of longstanding 
concern to Australia given that it make s it difficult to determine whether a 
Member is meeting their commitments.  
The European Union’s own forecast for its actual exports in the 2011/2012 
marketing year is over 2 million tonnes of out-of-quota sugar. This is more than 
50% above the European Union’s export subsidy commitment level, and therefore appears to be in breach. 
Australia requests the European Union ex peditiously advise their actual export 
quantity of out-of-quota sugar for 2011/2012 marketing year. 
Australia further requests that the EU address this apparent breach to ensure 
compliance with their export subsidy commitments.  
b. Brazil: In the General Council of 30 November 2011, Brazil expressed the 
concern that the European Union issued export licences for out-of-quota sugar 
that would allow exports of the product in marketing year 2011/2012 in excess 
of the European Union’s WTO schedule commitments.  
Brazil notes with regret that Brazil's concern came true as the licences issued 
materialized in exports in excess of the European Union’s WTO commitments. 
According to Eurostat statistics, from October 2011 to July 2012 the European 
Union’s exports of out-of-quota sugar reached 1,881 million tonnes, considerably above the European Union’s WTO export subsidy annual 
commitment of 1,273 million tonnes, and also largely above the European 
Union’s unilaterally determined subs idy limit of 1,374 million tonnes.  
As Brazil mentioned in the General Council in November 2011, it is noteworthy 
that in the last three crop years, the European Union breached its WTO export 
subsidies’ reduction commitments on sugar at least in two of them. These actions by the European Union are particul arly troubling in light of the findings 
by the panel and the Appellate Body in the EC-Sugar dispute. Brazil urges the 
European Union to rectify the situatio n. The Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) 
rulings and recommendations cannot be di sregarded every time that subsidized 
sugar production overshoots the re levant regulatory targets.  
Brazil would also like to highlight that European Union’s WTO export subsidy 
commitments are not fulfilled by simp ly guaranteeing that the number of 
export licences issued with reference to a particular year is not above the 
European Union’s scheduled commitments . Brazil considers that the actual 
exports of a Member in any given year  should not be in excess of its WTO 
schedule commitments. Members should no t lose sight that it is the actual 
subsidized exports that affect the international market and not the licences 
issued. In a year like marketing year 2011/2012, in which the European 
Union’s subsidized exports of out-of-quota sugar was far above its WTO obligations, Brazilian and world sugar pr oducers were disproportionately and 
unfairly affected by the European Union’s sugar subsidies. Finally, Brazil would 
also like to have greater clarity from the European Union that why Eurostat 
statistics for sugar exports differ from th e data used by the European Union to 
prepare its WTO notifications. 
The European Union abides by its WTO commitments on export subsidies for sugar, in 
particular concerning the quantitative limit for out-of-quota sugar exports. As explained before, the European Union has always monito red its export subsidy commitments on the 
basis of licences issued, and not on the basis of physical exports. This concerns not only 
sugar but also other agricultural products an d the European Union is convinced that its G/AG/W/106 
 
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  approach is in full compliance with the WTO rules. In that context, the European Union 
stands ready, for the sake of transparency, to provide all interested parties with the data on physical exports of sugar for the 2011/201 2 marketing year once the data becomes 
available from Eurostat, irrespective of the fact that the timing of the actual physical sugar 
exports cannot affect the European Union's compliance with its export subsidy commitments 
on the aforesaid basis of licences issued. 
Follow-up: Argentina, China, Colombia and Thailand registered concern on this issue. Supported by 
China, Argentina further stated that export subsidization in 2013 continued to be a matter of 
relevance. 
1.6  Indonesia's quantitative and other impo rt restrictions on certain food products 
9.  Questions by New Zealand: New Zealand thanks Indonesia for the response to its 
questions on Regulation 60/2012 Ministry of  Trade and 60/2012 Ministry of Agriculture 
in Committee on Agriculture dated 20 September 2012. New Zealand notes that the objective of the Regulations is to ensure ho rticulture products entering Indonesia meet 
food safety requirements. New Zealand l ooks forward to Indonesia notifying this 
Regulation to the WTO SPS Committee. New Zealand has some outstanding concerns about Regulations 60/2012 Trade and 60/2012 Agriculture and would appreciate 
further clarification from Indonesia on the following questions: 
a. Why does Regulation 60/2012 (3/2012) Agriculture maintain reference to 
imports being determined dependent on domestic supply and demand (removed from Regula tion 60/2012 Trade)? 
Regulation 60/2012 of the Ministry of Agri culture has been notified to the WTO SPS 
Committee (G/SPS/N/IDN/55 dated 23 October 2012). As with Regulation 60/2012 of the Ministry of Trade, Indonesia has notified the said regulation to the Import Licensing 
Committee but is still under domestic consultation process to notify the said regulation 
to the SPS Committee.  
The objective of the regulation seeks to st rike a balance between the fulfillment of 
domestic consumption and the achievement of  livelihood security by smallholder/poor 
farmers. Therefore, the regulation shall take into consideration, among others, the domestic production and the domestic consumption of similar products. Such reference does not in any way impose prohibition of the importation of the product being 
regulated. 
b. How will the new Regulation meet Indo nesia's WTO commitments, specifically 
the commitment not to "maintain, resort to, or revert to any measures […] 
including quantitative import restrictions " as provided for by Article 4.2 of the 
WTO Agriculture Agreement and Article XI of the GATT of 1994? 
Ministry of Agriculture Regulation No.60/2012 is to ensure that horticulture products 
entering Indonesia shall meet food safety requirements to warrant maximum consumer 
protection. Further, under Article 1 of th e Import Licensing Procedures Agreement, 
Members are allowed to have administrative procedures to regulate the importation of goods into the customs territory of the importing Member.  
In relation to this, Indonesia wishes to reaffirm that the said regulations seek to regulate 
administrative procedures and are in conformity with Indonesia’s WTO commitments. Such applications of import licensing procedures are intended to ensure, through 
administrative means, that maximum consumer  protection and food safety requirements 
are put into place. In relation to that, Regu lation 60/2012 of the Ministry of Trade sets 
forth that the import approval is issued after the Import Recommendation of 
Horticultural Products (RIPH) from the Ministry of Agriculture, in line with the objective 
of ensuring food safety requirements.  
c. Would Indonesia explain how the import licensing regime is "transparent and 
open to all who can meet the lega l requirement", when New Zealand's G/AG/W/106 
 
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  interpretation of these regulations su ggests a pivotal aspect of "the legal 
requirement" is to first obtain a "R ecommendation to Import Horticulture 
Products" (RIPH)? New Zealand's under standing of 60/2012 Ministry of 
Agriculture suggests that the grant of an RIPH is not automatic, is premised on 
the discretion of the Minister of Agri culture, who may consider criteria not 
"relevant to the principl es of the GATT of 1994". 
d. Could Indonesia please explain why, an d how, import licensing measures are 
being implemented to address SPS issues? 
The procedure for obtaining such an import licence is in fact transparent and open, as set 
forth in the regulation. There are no additional licences, permits or certificates other than stipulated in the regulation. Furthermore, the issuance of RIPH takes into consideration food 
safety, plant protection for pests or diseases, as well as import risk analysis for horticulture 
products that are being imported for the first time to the customs territory of Indonesia, w h i c h  a r e  i n  a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  t h e  W T O  p r o v i s i o n s  a s  p r o v i d e d  b y  A r t i c l e  X X ( b )  o f  t h e  
GATT 1994 on measures necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health. 
10.  Questions by New Zealand: New Zealan d would also like to ask Indonesia about the 
Food Law 2012: 
a. What is the objective of the Food Law 2012? 
The overall objective of the 2012 Food Law is to ensure food security in a comprehensive 
manner, both at a national/country level as well as for individuals, reflected by the adequate availability of food, whether in  quantity or quality, food safety and 
accessibility.  
b. How will the Food Law meet Indonesia' s WTO commitments, specifically the 
commitment not to "maintain, resort to, or revert to any measures […] 
including quantitative import restrictions " as provided for by Article 4.2 of the 
WTO Agriculture Agreement and Article XI of the GATT of 1994? 
Indonesia is committed to meet its WTO commitment, taking into account the livelihood 
security of millions of poor farmers in  Indonesia and food security objectives.  
c. Has Indonesia considered how the Food Law 2012 will impact on the import of 
food products into Indonesia? If so, wh at impact does Indonesia envisage that 
there might be as a result of Food Law 2012? 
The 2012 Food Law is still in the process of fi nalization. Indonesia will inform the content 
of the proposed law at a later stage after its publication. Indonesia will notify the implementing regulations to the relevant WTO committee.  
11.  Questions by the United States: Th e United States appreciates Indonesia's 
responses to questions submitted for th e September 2012 Committee on Agriculture 
meeting and has some follow-up questions: 
a. Regarding Indonesia's response in paragraph 18(b)(ii) in G/AG/W/103, how 
does restricting trading rights by re ducing the number of importers prevent 
monopolistic practices? Wouldn't limitin g the number of importers, in fact, 
decrease the number of pote ntial distributors of a product in the Indonesian 
market? Does Indonesia restrict retailers from purchasing 
domestically-produced fresh and processed horticultural products directly from 
producers or factories? 
b. Regarding Indonesia's response to in paragraph 18(b)(iv) in G/AG/W/103, 
how has the regulation been reformulated  to give equal treatment to domestic 
and imported products? Does the Government of Indonesia intend to change 
the regulations to allow any distributor, including retailers, to import products? 
Additionally, although the Ministry of Trade (MOT) eliminated references to G/AG/W/106 
 
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  quantitative import restrictions in Articles 2 and 4 of the MOT Regulation 
30/2012 (now MOT Regulation 60), quantitative restrictions remain in Article 7 ((a) through (e)) of Ministry of Agricu lture (MOA) Regulation 60 (previously 
Regulation 3). When does Indonesia plan to remove the quantitative 
restrictions from the MOA Regulation 60? 
Indonesia would like to clarify that The Minister of Trade Regulation does not intend to 
reduce trading rights. Rather it seeks to diffe rentiate the classifications into importers, 
distributors and retailers to stimulate business and entrepreneurial activities. 
c. The United States is concerned that the Government of Indonesia has been 
limiting the amount of livestock import s through a quota system for years, 
despite the fact that Indonesia's WTO commitments do not allow for quotas of 
livestock products. In the June and September 2012 Committee meetings, the 
Government of Indonesia stated that it would review Decree of the Minister of 
Agriculture No. 50/2011, No. 51/2011, and No. 52/2011 (paragraph 16(b)(v) 
in G/AG/W/103 refers). When will the Go vernment of Indonesia complete that 
review, and what changes are being consid ered to bring it into compliance with 
WTO obligations?  
The regulation in question, i.e., Decree of  the Minister of Agriculture No. 50/2011, 
No. 51/2011, and No. 52/2011 on livestock products is still in the process of review. Indonesia will continue to follow the progre ss of the review and inform the WTO in due 
time.  
d. The United States notes that since the September 2012 Committee meeting, 
Indonesia has replaced MOA Regulation  3 and MOT Regulation 30 with MOA 
Regulation 60 and MOT Regulation 60, but did not offer explanations to 
importers or trading partners unt il October 10 and 15, well after the 
September 28 implementation date. This caused even more confusion and lost 
trade. The revised version of the MOA Regulation still contains quantitative 
restrictions and both revised regulati ons contain various trade restrictive 
measures that appear incompatible wi th Indonesia's WTO obligations. How and 
when does Indonesia plan to bring the measures in line with its WTO obligations? 
Indonesia wishes to inform that it has provided a time extension for the attainment of 
RIPH until 28 November 2011 in regard with  the implementation of Regulation 60/2012 
of the Ministry of Trade and Regulation 60/2012 of the Ministry of Ag riculture. Both the 
Ministry of Trade and Ministry of Agriculture have held transparent and detailed 
socialization on RIPH and there were no objections made by stakeholders/importers. 
Follow-up: Canada, the European Union, New Zealand, Thailand and the United States flagged 
concern on Indonesia's import licensing regime and the Philippines registered its interest in the 
topic. Claiming that Indonesia granted only a small number of import permits compared to the high volume of imports requested for onions, New Zealand stated that Indonesia had maintained quantitative restrictions and sought explanations on the compatibility of the restrictions with 
Indonesia's WTO obligations. New Zealand was further concerned with the introduction of 
non-WTO-mandated import quotas. New Zealand's exports had been severely affected since their introduction. Thailand and the United States urged Indonesia to bring import restrictive measures 
into compliance with its WTO commitments. The European Union expressed dissatisfaction with 
Indonesia's late notifications to the WTO on impo rtant changes to import regulations. Echoed by 
the United States, the European Union encouraged Indonesia to keep its trading partners informed 
of the changes to import regulati ons. The Republic of Korea reported about its current discussions 
with Indonesia on the relevant custom clearance procedures and hoped that the discussions would be conducted in a prompt and productive manner. 
1.7  The Republic of Korea's autonomous tariff rate quota for pork 
12.  Question by Canada: Cana da understands that the Republic of Korea has created an 
autonomous TRQ for pork which has been a llocated to importer associations by the G/AG/W/106 
 
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  Republic of Korea's Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and Fishery. Canada 
understands that since July 2012 none of the quota volumes have been utilized. Could 
the Republic of Korea elaborate as to th e reasons why the quota volumes were not 
utilized? In addition, does the Republic of Korea anticipate establishing autonomous 
TRQs for pork in the future? If so, what is the mechanism whereby this information is 
provided to importers or other interested parties? 
According to the results of the Uruguay Round, the Republic of Korea had administered the 
TRQ for pork until the end of June 1997. On 1 July 1997, the Republic of Korea abolished the 
TRQ for pork and completely opened its pork market. This was notified to the WTO through 
G/AG/N/KOR/11. As such, the Republic of Korea does not maintain any form of TRQs for pork in the context of its Uruguay Round commitments. 
Canada mentioned that the Republic of Korea created an “autonomous TRQ”, which, as the 
Republic of Korea understands, indicates the system where tariffs are reduced for certain products in limited quantities and for limited periods of time. The TRQ is aimed at facilitating 
imports of the products concerned in response to temporary domestic supply shortages. It is 
administered in accordance with the Republic of Korea’s Customs Law and is carried out in a non-discriminatory manner. The tariff for pork was temporarily reduced to help increase 
imports, thereby alleviating domestic supply shortages caused mainly by the outbreak of the 
foot-and-mouth disease in the Republic of Korea in 2011. 
1.8  Norway's changes to border protection 13.  Questions by Australia: Australia understa nds that Norway's Ministry of Agriculture 
and Food has announced changes to Norway's bo rder protection for selected agricultural 
products. This has been framed as increa sed border protection being essential to 
Norwegian food production. Australia requests  further clarification from Norway on the 
background to this change, in particular its rationale for increasing trade protection. Can 
Norway please advise the ad valorem equivalent  rate of protection of  the specific duties 
it currently applies to these selected agricu ltural products? Will Norway apply its new ad 
valorem tariffs at the maximum bound rate? 
Norway can confirm that the Government has proposed tariff changes for six tariff lines at 
eight digit level, changing these from specific tariffs to the maximum bound ad valorem duty from 1 January 2013. Changes are fully in line with Norway's WTO commitments. 
In Norway’s bound tariff schedules, a large numbe r of tariff lines – including the six tariff 
lines in question – are expressed with mixed du ties. This implies that the tariff lines have 
bound specific and ad valorem duties, and the schedules specify that the one to be used is 
“whichever is highest”. In practice, Norway ha s chosen not to apply a mixed duty on a per 
shipment basis, but rather to apply one of the two duties for one calendar year at a time. For the six tariff lines in question, a specific duty has been applied since the beginning of the 
implementation of the Uruguay Round, as this has been considered to provide an 
appropriate level of protection for these key sectors of Norwegian agriculture. 
With a gradual increase of prices and costs, the latter having increased twice as much as 
producer prices since 1995, the Norwegian Govern ment considers that the specific tariffs are 
no longer at a sufficient level to sustain Norwegian agricultural production in these sectors 
that are considered essential in safeguarding non-trade concerns. This is the background for the changes. 
At the same time, Norway has been mindful of not reversing existing trade flows. A growing 
trade in beef fillets from developing countries under ordinary GSP conditions will be allowed to reach approximately double the current level before being subjected to tariff changes, 
due to the establishment of a new GSP quot a. For cheese, a large number of specialty 
cheeses that provide a supplement to domestical ly produced cheese will be subject to no 
change whatsoever. The changes are thus not meant to stop current trade, but to ward 
against an erosion of Norwegian tariff protection to a level that is not compatible with 
maintaining a viable agriculture in Norway. G/AG/W/106 
 
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  As regards ad valorem equivalents, Norway has provided Australia (and also the Secretariat) 
with a list ( Annex 2 refers ) of the relevant AVEs from the submissions made under the 
Doha Development Agenda (DDA) negotiations. As there is no commonly agreed methodology outside the DDA for calculating AVEs, as far as Norway is aware, Norway is not 
in a position to provide AVEs with more up-to-date price information.  
Norway has appreciated the opportunity to already meet with Australia bilaterally, where 
Norway and Australia went further into detail on the background and the Government's 
policy considerations. Norway will continue to demonstrate a commitment to transparency 
as regards its trade policy in line with Norway's obligations in the WTO.  
14.  Question by the European Union: Norway has dual tariff bindings for many products 
(i.e. a bound rate that is the higher of the specific duty and the ad valorem rate). Cheese 
is one of the product categories for which No rway uses such dual bindings. At present, 
Norway applies specific tariffs for cheese at the bound level expressed in "NOK/kg" 
(between 24.68 and 28.24 NOK/kg depending on the type of cheese). However, the 
Norwegian Government has suggested switchin g the tariffs for certain types of hard 
cheese (as well as for "beef steaks and f illets" and "carcasses and half-carcasses of 
lamb") to ad valorem tariffs by 1 January 2 013. Such a move implie s an increase in the 
actual tariff protection of the affected vari eties of cheese (the applied tariff will be at 
the bound ad valorem level of 277%). Tr ade statistics from  Statistics Norway
5 indicate 
that Norway has been a net exporter of ha rd cheese at least since 2001 (the year when 
the present Norwegian tariff nomenclature  for hard cheese was introduced). In 2011 
Norway exported 12,645 tonnes of hard ch eese and imported 2,337 tonnes. Considering 
that Norway is a substantial net exporter of  hard cheese, could No rway please explain 
the reasons behind the proposal for this increa se of tariff protection for hard cheese? 
The present tariff structure with specific duties for import of cheese to Norway has existed 
since 1995. The European Union has been gran ted duty free tariff quotas for import of 
cheese to Norway. These tariff quotas have been increased twice, first in 2003 and again 
from this year. The tariff quotas now cover 7,200 tonnes of a total import of 9,000 tonnes 
from the European Union in 2011. 
Including outward processing, the (total) volume of imports of cheese to Norway is 
10,900 tonnes, whereas the volume of export is, as mentioned by the European Union, 
slightly higher. The main export product is Jarlsberg, 10,900 tonnes in 2011. In addition, 
Jarlsberg is produced based on licensing in Ireland and in the United States. 
The value of the present specific import duty  for cheese is considerably reduced since 1995, 
due to inflation. The result is that the sum of import price and specific duty presently is at 
the same level as the domestic Norwegian cheese price. To compensate for increased costs in dairy production in the years to come, it is necessary to have the possibility to increase 
cheese prices domestically. The changes in two tariff lines for hard and semi hard cheese will 
not affect existing trade with the European Union, due to the duty free quota of 7,200 tonnes. 
Follow-up: Australia informed the Committee of its bilateral discussions with Norway and 
expressed doubts on Norway's' approach as rega rds (1) the compliance of Norway's changes to 
the tariffs, in particular the operation of th e GSP system under those changes; (2) whether 
reducing market price support and increasing tariff s at the same time provided a degree of support 
to production. Argentina also registered concern with Norway's measures. 
1.9  Thailand's Paddy Pledging Scheme 15.  Question by Canada: Canada has been  closely monitoring Thailand's dramatic 
increase in government rice purchases under  the "Paddy Pledging Scheme". Thailand's 
last domestic support notification (G/A G/N/THA/72) occurred in October 2010, 
covering the period up until 2007. In light of  these recent developments, Canada urges 
Thailand to provide more recent domestic support notifications. 
                                               
5 See http://www.ssb.no/  G/AG/W/106 
 
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  Thailand is gathering information from all relevant agencies. Notification to the WTO will be 
made at the soonest opportunity. 
16.  Questions by the United States: Inte rested Members are inviting Thailand to 
participate in an informal plurilateral session in advance of the 14 November 
2012 formal Committee meeting to discuss rece nt developments in its domestic rice 
policies. Since Thailand's policy returned in  October 2011 to a paddy pledging scheme 
and set intervention prices well above mark et prices (by some estimates as much as 
40% higher), Thailand's budgetary outlays for the rice support appear to have increased 
significantly. Given Thailand's traditiona l role as a major rice exporter, these 
developments have raised serious concer ns among Members, including the United 
States. These concerns are further underscored by the intense debate regarding the 
paddy pledging programme in Thailand's medi a. Thailand's last notification to the WTO 
Committee on Agriculture for domestic suppo rt was marketing year 2007. Moreover, it 
appears that the Thai Board of Trade has di scontinued publishing daily data related to 
the pledging scheme, encumbering transparen cy. Previously, the daily data provided a 
transparent mechanism for following deve lopments in the Thai rice market. 
a. When does Thailand expect to provid e updated Table DS:1 and Table DS:2 
notifications to the WTO that include in formation regarding the paddy pledging 
scheme? 
Thailand is gathering information from all relevant agencies. Notification to the WTO will 
be made at the soonest opportunity. 
b. Will the Thai Board of Trade renew publishing daily data? 
The Thai Board of Trade informed that it has never published daily information on rice 
pledging scheme. Official information on the rice pledging scheme could be found on the 
website of the Department of Inte rnal Trade, Ministry of Commerce 6 
17.  The United States notes that the Thai  Commerce Minister was recently quoted as 
saying Thailand had no intention of  dumping rice in the world market.7 Nevertheless, the 
United States remains concerned that with go vernment procurement of rice at rates as 
much as 40% above world market prices it will be difficult for the Government of 
Thailand to export any procured rice without incurring a loss. 
a. What steps is the Government of Thailand taking to ensure rice procured by the 
government under the programme is not being sold for export at prices below 
acquisition cost? 
The Government takes into account market conditions in releasing rice from the 
government stock to prevent undesirable impacts on domestic and world markets. When 
bidding rice from the government stock, if the offered price is far below the market price, the government retains the right to refuse the offered price. 
Since the implementation of the rice pledging  scheme, Thai rice prices, both domestic 
and export prices, have continuously increase d. Currently, the export price of Thai rice 
varies between US$540 and US$560 per tonne, which is higher than the price of Vietnamese and Indian rice (around US$100 per tonne). When compared to the US 
prices, the price of Thai rice is increased to a comparable level. In this regard, Thailand 
considers that other rice exporting countries also benefit from an upward trend of Thai rice prices. 
b. Please provide a detailed explanation of  the process and cite any relevant 
legislation/regulations by which the Go vernment of Thailand sells stocks 
                                               
6 See http://www.dit.go.th . 
7 See http://www.nationmultimedia.com/business/US-fear-over-Thai-rice-dumping-is-groundless-
30192701.html . G/AG/W/106 
 
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  procured under the paddy pledging sche me, including any specific information 
on stocks sold for export. 
The Government is obliged to follow the strategic framework in releasing rice from the 
government stock with a view to stabilize the domestic price through the following 
channels: 
 Sales via Government to Government (G to G); 
 Sales in the futures commodity market operated by the AFET; 
 Sales to domestic sellers for export and/or domestic sales; 
 Sales to domestic and international organizations/agencies for public interest; 
 Donation to countries experiencing disaster to promote international relationship. 
c. How much rice procured under the current scheme has been sold from 
government stocks to date? 
d. Are these government stocks be ing sold to private companies? 
 Sales via Government to Government (G to G) 
Sales via Government to Government require the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 
or the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) prior to arranging the sales contract with importing countries. Currently the government has MOUs/MOAs with countries like 
Indonesia, the Phillipines and Bangladesh and is arranging the MOU with Cote d'lvore. The 
MOUs/MOAs are generally effective for 3 to 5 years. The total amount of rice under all the MOUs/MOAs is 8 million tonnes, in which sales contracts have been made for 7.328 million tonnes. 
Detailed information on G to G transactions is confidential due to the political sensitivity 
(implication on importing country’s price and the issue of food security) in importing countries. 
 Sales to domestic sellers 
As of September 2012, the government has released 324,508.29 tonnes of rice to 
domestic sellers. 
 Sales to governmental agencies 
As of September 2012, the government has released 829,960 tonnes of rice to 
governmental agencies, i.e. the Public Ware house Organization, the Agriculture Market 
Organization, the Department of Corrections and the Department of Juvenile Observation 
and Protection. 
e. What, if any stipulations exist regarding how the rice must be disposed of – 
that is, for domestic use or export only? 
Rice from the government stock could be used for both export and domestic sales. 
f. Has the Government of Thailand exported  any rice directly? If yes, how much 
has been exported to which destinations and at what price? 
Rice from the government stock could be exported by the government (through the 
Public Warehouse Organization) and privat e sellers designated by the government. 
However, as earlier mentioned, detailed information on Government to Government 
transactions is confidential. G/AG/W/106 
 
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  18.  In the same media article, as mentio ned above, the Thai Commerce Minister also 
noted that Thailand wants to push up rice prices to boost farmers' incomes.8 The United 
States acknowledges Members' sovereign right to set their own domestic policy 
objectives as long as all relevant inte rnational commitments and obligations are 
maintained. 
a. Please elaborate on the objectives of  income-enhancing programmes for rice 
and what criteria the Government of Tha iland uses to ensure those objectives 
are being met. 
Policy objectives:  To raise farmers' income and living standard; 
 To strengthen, stabilize and foster domestic economy by increasing domestic 
consumption; 
 To stabilize the domestic price by better management of rice supply; 
 To increase the domestic price in a holistic approach. 
The increase of paddy rice prices, since th e implementation of rice pledging scheme, 
implies that as a result of the implementation  of the rice pledging scheme, even farmers 
who are not participating in the scheme benefit from increasing prices. 
b. What, if any, eligibility requirements exis t in order for agricultural producers to 
participate in the rice scheme (e.g., mu st farmers register to participate)? 
Criteria for farmer’s participation in rice pledging scheme: 
 Farmers have to register themselves with the Department of Agriculture 
Extension. The Department of Agriculture Extension will then issue the certificate 
to registered rice farmers; 
 Rice to be pledged under the scheme mu st be grown and owned by farmers who 
have the rice farmer certificate during the pledging period; 
 Farmers must be the client of Bank of Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives; 
 Farmers must present themselves on-site while pledging their rice; 
 Farmers could only pledge their rice within the province of residence or tambon 
in other provinces adjacent to their areas. 
c. How are rice intervention prices dete rmined (e.g., on what basis are these 
formulated)? 
Pledging scheme prices are determined by taking into account costs of production and 
appropriate profits reflecting farmers' living costs. 
19.  The United States understands that und er the scheme, the Government of Thailand 
purchases rice from farmers, the farmers deli ver rice to millers, and the millers deliver 
rice to government warehouses. 
a. Are farmers paid directly by Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives 
(BAAC)? 
                                               
8 See http://www.nationmultimedia.com/business/US-fear-over-Thai-rice-dumping-is-groundless-
30192701.html  G/AG/W/106 
 
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  The Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Coop eratives will transfer money to farmers' 
accounts after receiving rice pledging warrant from the farmers. The rice pledging warrant is a document issued by the Public Warehouse Organization, upon the delivery of paddy by farmers. These two agencies are designated government bodies in operating 
the rice pledging scheme. 
b. What price does the miller receive? 
Millers receive: 
 A milling services fee of B 500 per tonne; 
 The transportation cost from mills to the government warehouses; 
 The costs of sacks. 
However, the government does not make actual payment to millers. The government 
makes payment to millers in form of rice and by–products from milling. 
20.  The United States understands that  the preferred type of rice consumed 
domestically in Thailand is a high quality, low yield variety. Has the rice scheme had any 
effect on the planting of higher yielding va rieties or on Thai rice production overall 
(e.g., total production levels , number of crops annually)? 
The rice cultivated area on average has been stable (around 60 million rai). During 2009-
2011, the cultivated area varied around 57-64 million rai, while the harvested area was 
generally lower (approximately around 54-59 million rai) which depends on the condition. 
21.  Current estimates put government ri ce stocks at 14-15 million metric tonnes: 
a. How much rice does Thailand curre ntly have in government stocks? 
b. How much of the rice in government stocks was procured under the current 
scheme? 
Information on rice in government stock is confidential due to the sensitivity of its impact on 
domestic price. 
c. Does the Government of Thailand track the destinations of all stock sales? 
The government does not track the destination of all stock sales. 
22.  The United States' understanding is that the Thai government finances rice 
purchases by obtaining liquidity from BAAC and other specialized financial institutions. 
The government then uses the sales of procur ed rice to repay the loans. Please confirm 
or correct this United States' understanding regarding the Thai government's financial 
arrangements under the rice programme. 
The United States' understanding is correct. 
23.  The United States understands that som e operational costs for the paddy pledging 
scheme (e.g., milling fee, rent) are sometim es reimbursed from the fiscal budget. 
a. What costs are included in the "o perational cost" of the programme? 
The operational cost includes expenditure fo r the Public Warehouse Organization and the 
Agriculture Market Organization in running the rice pledging scheme, the storage cost 
and the transportation cost. 
 G/AG/W/106 
 
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  b. Does the government track these disaggregated costs? 
The government keeps track of these costs. 
c. Are these costs similar to what Thailand has previously notified to the WTO for 
the old paddy pledging scheme? 
Yes, they are similar. 
d. Does the "operational cost" include any losses sustained due to the selling of 
rice at a price below the purchase price? 
The operational cost does not include the difference between released prices and the 
pledging price. 
e. How would the cost of selling below the acquisition cost be accounted for, both 
in terms of domestic budge t and WTO notifications? 
Losses incurred from selling below the pledging  price will be reflected by the payment 
reimbursed to the BAAC from the government budget, which will also be included in the 
notification to the WTO. 
Follow-up: Canada, the European Union and the United States thanked Thailand for participating in 
the plurilateral meeting on the day before the Committee meeting and looked forward to receiving 
Thailand's responses and future notifications on this issue. The Philippine s also informed Members 
of the bilateral meeting that took place in Bangkok and indicated its willingness to continue 
pursuing this matter bilaterally. China and Pakistan shared similar concerns. 
1.10  Ukraine's Export Ban on Wheat 24.  Questions by: 
a. Australia: Australia plans to make a statement and ask questions about 
Ukraine's reported wheat export ban to be applied from 15 November 2012. Australia notes media reports of the incr ease in the international wheat price 
as a result of the announcement, and seeks further information on the level of 
wheat stocks in Ukraine. Further, Austra lia seeks confirmation that Ukraine has 
met their commitments contained in Article 12 of the WTO Agreement on 
Agriculture. 
b. The European Union: The European Union notes that on 24 October the Minister 
of Agrarian Policy and Food of Ukraine confirmed that a ban on wheat exports 
would be imposed as from 15 November. 
 Would Ukraine provide explanations of the reasons behind introducing this 
measure? 
 How is this measure compliant with Article XI GATT of 1994? 
 The European Union recalls Ukraine's obligations under Article 12 of the 
Agreement on Agriculture, whereby th e export prohibition or restriction 
shall be notified to the Committee as  far in advance as practicable. 
c. Japan: There have been media reports that the Government of Ukraine will 
introduce an export ban on wheat beginning on 15 November 2012. Japan would appreciate if Ukraine clarifie s the information and share with the 
Committee the latest situation concerning supply and demand on wheat and 
any policy measures, including its complia nce with the notification requirement 
in accordance with Article 12 of  the Agreement on Agriculture. G/AG/W/106 
 
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  This item has been included upon the reques t of several Members based on interpretations 
of some media reports. Given the fact that the Government of Ukraine has not imposed a ban on wheat exports, Ukraine does not see an y reasonable grounds to discuss this issue.  
Follow-up: Australia confirmed that many delegations worked on the basis of media reporting in 
the absence of further communications within the Committee. Given the outlook of likely increased 
grain prices, Australia shared the concern with other Members, particularly net food importing countries, of the impact of export restrictions on international trade flows and commodity price 
volatility. Members' obligations under Article 12 of the Agreement on Agriculture were recalled in 
this regard. Australia requested an update on: (1 ) wheat production, stock plans and likely exports 
over the next 12 months; (2) the current policy on export restrictions and agricultural products that are in particular in relation to wheat; (3) the application of any limits on the volume of 
agricultural products exported this year. The European Union, Japan and the United States 
associated themselves with the questions and th e comments made by Australia. Japan considered 
the exchange of views on Article 12 at the informal meeting as a good way to enhance 
transparency. The United States praised Ukraine's efforts of notifying five versions of Table ER:1 
between October 2010 and June 2011, stating that transparency was a fundamental need in this 
Committee. As a significant net-importer of wheat, Korea echoed previous interventions. 
1.11  Ukraine – Tariff-related Issues 
25.  Question by the United States: The United  States continues to have strong concerns 
about the systematic and market access imp lication of Ukraine's proposed action on 
Article XXVIII of GATT 1994, and asks it to with draw the action as there continues to be 
little transparency surrounding what Ukraine intends to do in terms of modifying its 
tariff rates. In addition to the Article XXVI II action, recent reports about legislative 
efforts in Ukraine to raise its applied tari ff rates bound levels received even more 
concerns. The latter appears to affect agricu ltural goods in a number of chapters. In 
totality, this is a complete change of ag riculture tariff policy in key commodities and 
goods areas. The United States waits for th e detailed information from Ukraine on its 
new tariff increases. 
Ukraine had a possibility to discuss this issue and its position was clear. Ukraine believes 
that it has the right as a Member to use legal provisions such as Article XXVIII of GATT 1994 and does not see any problem if Ukraine implem ents such action because Ukraine's trade in 
the world is significantly low. With regard to Ukraine's recent legislation changes, Ukraine 
will be ready to submit an explanation if it receives some specific questions from the United States. 
Follow-up: Australia shared similar concerns with the United States. 
1.12  European Union's Recourse to GATT Ar ticle XXVIII procedures on poultry products 
26.  Statement by China: At the last regu lar Committee meeting on 20 September, China 
raised the concern on the European Union's renegotiation of its tariff commitments with 
respect to relevant tariff lines of poultry products. Both in the document G/AG/W/100 
and in China's statement, China requested th e European Union to recognize China as a 
party with substantial interest and entering  into consultations with China as soon as 
possible. In that meeting, China also raised  the questions seeking the European Union's 
classifications and explanations to China's questions and concerns. And insofar China is 
still waiting for the European Union to prov ide formal responses in writing to those 
questions. 
27.   Since the last Committee meeting, Chin a has bilaterally continued its efforts and 
expressed its concerns on several occasions with the European Union without achieving 
satisfactory outcome. Yesterday China and the European Union had another bilateral 
meeting in Geneva. China's representati ves from China Chamber of Commerce for 
Imports/Exports of Foodstuffs, Native Pr oduce and Animal By-Products (CFNA) and 
major poultry industry representatives, enterprises and exporters have vigorously 
expressed their grave concern over the European Union's upcoming new tariff quota 
regime on poultry products and the immine nt devastating implication upon China's 
poultry industries. G/AG/W/106 
 
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  28.   It is a fact that, for the past thr ee years, China's export of certain poultry 
products to the European Union market has continuously increased and China is the biggest supplier of certain poultry products in  that market and the current market share 
of those products are more than 50%. Unfo rtunately, under the European Union's new 
TRQ regime, 96% will be country specific qu ota allocated for only two Members and the 
rest of the Members including China will have  to share the very limited remaining 4% 
global quota. On top of that, the tariff rates out of the tariff rate quota will be much 
higher – double of the in-quota rate, which will substantially stop all the trade and the 
imports of poultry from China. As such, such  a new system will lead to serious damage 
to the poultry industry in China and the poultry enterprises' over 360 million euro of the investment will be wasted, more than 50,000  of workers will be unemployed, and one 
million poultry farmers across the country will lose their source of income. This is a 
serious issue that not only concerns the surviv al of tens of thousands of China's poultry 
workers and farmers, but also the bilateral trade relationship between China and the 
European Union.  
29.  This is why China has to raise the issue again at this Committee. This also 
demonstrates the urgency and the importance of this issue, as well as China's firm 
determination to get this i ssue resolved expeditiously. 
30.   As a Member of WTO and strong su pporter of the multilateral trading system, 
China believes that this is not just an issu e relating to economic interests or market 
share, but rather a systemic concern about the renegotiation of one Member's tariff 
commitments with implication to all Members. 
31.   As one delegation pointed out at anot her meeting concerning the renegotiation of 
concessions one month ago, tariff binding is one of the fundamental principles of WTO 
which preserves the value of market access and reciprocal balance negotiated among 
Members and guarantees the security and predictability of the multilateral trading 
system. The European Union's modification of concessions by changing its tariff into TRQ 
itself is clearly not in line with the prin ciple of trade liberalization under the WTO. 
Particularly, Article 4.2 of the Agreement on  Agriculture stipulates that Members shall 
not maintain, resort to, or revert to any measures of the kind which have been required to be converted into ordinary customs duti es, and Article 11 and Article 13 of the GATT 
calls for elimination of quantitative restrictio ns and non-discriminatory administration of 
TRQs. Hence, China reiterates its position and urges the European Union to recognize 
China as a party with substantial interest an d to address China's serious concerns in an 
appropriate manner consistent with the WTO ru les, in order to avoid creating obstacles 
to the normal trade flow and impair Ch ina's legitimate right and interests. 
The European Union takes note of China's intervention. This issue has already been raised 
by China in the Committee on Agriculture as well as bilaterally and the European Union has 
provided ample and clear responses to the Chinese Authorities. 
The European Union notified its intention to modify the concessions on certain poultry 
products on 16 June 2009 through the communication G/SECRET/32 which contained 
statistics of imports of the products involved for the period 2006, 2007, and 2008. Further 
to this communication, the European Union receiv ed claims of interest from trade partners 
having substantial or principal supplying interest in accordance with the procedures for the 
negotiations under Article XXVIII, in particular paragraph 4 which provides that "claims of 
interest should be made within ninety days following the circulation of the import statistics". The European Union did not receive any claim of interest from the People's Republic of China 
at that time.  
The statistics contained in communication G/SECRET/32 have been defined in accordance 
with paragraph 4 of the procedures for the negotiations under Article XXVIII which provides that "the notification or request should be accompanied by statistics of imports of the 
products involved, by country of origin, for the last three years for which statistics are 
available". In this case, the "last three years" preceding the notification dated 16 June 2009 are 2006, 2007 and 2008. The argument develo ped by China in its intervention at the 
September 2012 meeting of the Committee a ccording to which the "2006-2008 period does 
not constitute the representative three-year period" is therefore in contradiction with the G/AG/W/106 
 
- 21 - 
 
  procedures for the negotiations under Article XXVIII. The statistics of the period 2009-2011 
-posterior to the notification- cannot be taken into consideration. Using a different period for China would not only be in breach of Article XXVIII but would also result in a discriminatory 
treatment vis-à-vis the other WTO Members. 
Follow-up: China drew Members' attention to it s previously submitted document G/AG/W/100 as 
well as its prior statement. Argentina reiterated th at it shared China's concern from both a trade 
and a systematic point of view and highlighted the importance of the issue raised by China. 
2  POINTS RAISED IN CONNECTION  WITH INDIVIDUAL NOTIFICATIONS 
2.1  Special Agricultural Safeguards (Tables MA:3 to MA:5) 2.1.1  Chinese Taipei (G/AG/N/TPKM/97, G/AG/N/TPKM/98 and G/AG/N/TPKM/99) 2.1.1.1  Transparency issues 
32.  Questions by: 
a. Canada: In G/AG/N/TPKM/97, Canada no tes that the volume of imports in 
2010 for those tariff lines classified under  Livestock Offal and identified in the 
notification is a fraction of the volume  of imports in the previous two years. 
Could Chinese Taipei please clarify the reasons for this anomaly? 
b. The European Union: According to the Table MA:3 notification 
(G/AG/N/TPKM/97), Chinese Taipei applies the volume-based SSG for 
livestock offal between 28 August an d 31 December 2012. The statistics 
provided by Chinese Taipei to calculate the trigger level indicates that imports 
decreased in the three years reference pe riod. Notably, imports as percentage 
of consumption have decreased sharply. According to the information given in 
the notification, imports as percentage of consumption decreased from 17% in 
2009 to less than 1% in 2010. Could Ch inese Taipei please explain why under 
these circumstances it is necessary to apply the SSG? 
Even before receiving Members’ questions, the delegation of Chinese Taipei found out that a 
clerical error had been made in the figure quoted for the volume of livestock offal imports in 
2010. A full internal investigation and correction process is currently underway. A 
corrigendum to the notification and any remedy measures as necessary will be issued once the administrative procedure is completed. Please be assured that Chinese Taipei's primary aim is to ensure and protect the rights and interests of every livestock offal importer at all 
times. 
33.  Question by the European Union: Plea se provide details of how the SSG is made 
operational and applied to the individual tariff lines within the aggregates of tariff lines 
used in Chinese Taipei notifications? 
Because the line-by-line statistics for the domestic consumption of liquid milk, as well as for 
chicken wings and legs are not available, Chinese Taipei grouped the relevant tariff lines 
together in order to calculate the trigger level for the SSG. Since all these tariff lines have 
an SSG mark in Chinese Taipei's schedule, th e use of an aggregated trigger volume is 
consistent with the Agreement on Agricult ure and with Chinese Taipei's accession 
commitment. 
2.1.1.2  Trigger calculations 
34.  Question by the European Union: Coul d Chinese Taipei expl ain the rationale for 
calculating the trigger level based on aggregat ed tariff lines and not per individual tariff 
line? 
Because the line-by-line statistics for the domestic consumption of liquid milk, as well as for 
chicken wings and legs are not available, Chinese Taipei grouped the relevant tariff lines G/AG/W/106 
 
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  together in order to calculate the trigger level for the SSG. Since all these tariff lines have 
an SSG mark in Chinese Taipei's schedule, th e use of an aggregated trigger volume is 
consistent with the Agreement on Agricult ure and with Chinese Taipei's accession 
commitment. 
2.2  Domestic Support Commitments (Table DS:1) 
2.2.1  Armenia (G/AG/N/ARM/20) 2.2.1.1  Transparency issues (including Table DS:2) 
35.  Questions by the European Union: In Armenia's notification, there is information 
about Green Box domestic support for vari ous programmes (such as a programme for 
counteracting avian influenza) carri ed out with support from various 
foreign/international donors (the World Bank, the International Fund for Agricultural 
Development, the Japanese Government , the Kingdom of Denmark and OPEC). 
a. Do the monetary values presented in Supporting Table DS:1 include 
foreign/international support or do they only reflect the amount of cofinancing 
by the Armenian government? 
b. If foreign/international support is included in the values presented, could 
Armenia please specify which proportion s of the various support measures are 
financed by the Armenian government? 
The names of the measures under the Green Box domestic support are provided as they 
appear in the State Budget of Armenia. The monetary values of the measures specified reflect only the amount of co-financing by th e Government of Armenia, wherever the names 
of measures mention "co-financing". Conversely, the monetary values reflect only the 
amount of donor support implemented throug h the State Budget, wherever the names do 
not mention "co-financing". Annex 3  summarizes the measures in question and the 
proportion of financing from Government and donors in the monetary values. 
2.2.1.2  Current Total AMS (Amber Box) – Non-product-specific AMS 36.  Questions by the European Union: In 2008 and 2009 Armenia notified non-product-
specific Amber Box support in the form of "state support to agricultural land users" (a 
per hectare payment for land parcels of a si ze up to seven hectares). In 2010 and 2011 
no such support is notified. Could Armenia pl ease confirm that Amber Box support in the 
form of "state support to agricultural la nd users" has been terminated after 2009? 
The state support to agricultural land users (per hectare payments) has been terminated 
after 2009. 
2.2.1.3  Classification of measures 
37.  Armenia notified a measure described as  "supplying farmers with livestock on the 
condition of postponed payments, in the framework of the Cattle Husbandry Development Programme" as non-product-sp ecific AMS in 2008–2010. In 2011 Armenia 
notified a measure described as "state su pport to agricultural land users in the 
framework of grain crops production, seed breeding, and seed production development 
programmes" as non-product specific AMS. Could Armenia please explain the reasoning 
why these measures are classified as non-product-specific? 
The measure of "supplying farmers with livestock on the condition of postponed payments" 
carried out in 2008-2010 addressed the cattle husbandry development as a broad objective and did not involve production of any specific cattle husbandry product. 
Similarly, the measure of "supporting agricult ural land users" carried out in 2011 addressed 
the grain crops production, seed breeding, an d seed production development as a broad 
objective and did not involve production of any specific grain crop product. G/AG/W/106 
 
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  2.2.2  Brazil (G/AG/N/BRA/27) 
2.2.2.1  Current Total AMS (Amber Box) – Market price support 38.  Question by the United States: The Un ited States appreciates Brazil's previous 
answer on how it notifies support under the Empréstimo do Governo Federal (EGF) 
programme. The United States notes that prior to 2004/2005, Brazil notified support 
under the EGF as product-specific support. Since then, Brazil has notified the EGF as 
non-product specific support. Please describe  the reasons for the change. For example, 
was there a policy change that prompted the change in the notification? 
Until the 2003/2004 notification, product-specif ic market and production credit subsidies 
were determined for products for which a minimum (or administrative) price was established, although budget provisions applicable to this kind of credit have never been 
designed that way. Nonetheless, Brazil decided to treat them as product-specific subsidies 
based on the understanding that farmers might have felt induced to produce such goods. From 2004/2005 crop-year onward, Brazil has been notifying all its production and 
marketing credit as non-product-specific do mestic support. Price support mechanisms are 
increasingly losing importance in Brazil, and traditional minimum support prices have been 
replaced by more market-oriented mechanisms. 
2.2.3  Canada (G/AG/N/CAN/90 and G/AG/N/CAN/90/Corr.1) 
2.2.3.1  Current Total AMS (Amber Box) – Scheduled commitment level 39.  Question by the United States: The Unit ed States appreciates Canada's responses to 
its questions in paragraphs 25(b) and 23(c) in G/AG/W/103. The United States seeks to 
better understand how Members with large non-federal expenditures on domestic 
support coordinate between provincial/state /territorial governments and the federal 
government to ensure compliance with WT O commitments. What steps does Canada 
have in place to ensure it can remain with in its annual total AMS commitment level if it 
appears a provincial/territorial or federal government non-exempt direct programme is 
likely to result in Canada exceeding the commitment level? 
Federal/Provincial/Territorial (FPT) Ministers work closely together in the formulation of 
agricultural policy and programmes. There is  an over-arching FPT Framework Agreement 
(i.e. Growing Forward which is to be succeeded  by Growing Forward 2), in which Ministers 
have agreed, amongst other policy issues, that  programmes be consistent with Canada’s 
international trade obligations (e.g. Canada’s WTO commitment level on domestic support). 
Canada has designed many of its programmes to meet the Green Box criteria. Furthermore, the budgetary caps on provincial programme s and the data sharing arrangement in the 
Framework Agreement enables federal officials to  closely forecast and monitor expenditures 
to ensure that they are within Canada’s WTO commitment level.  
2.2.4  Indonesia (G/AG/N/IDN/30) 
2.2.4.1  Article 6.2 – Input subsidies generally  available to low-income or resource-poor 
producers 
40.  Question by Canada: In the 20 J une 2012 Committee meeting, Canada asked 
Indonesia questions regarding significant increases in Article 6.2 (Development 
Programmes) support (from Rp2.2 thousand billion in 2002 to Rp19 thousand billion in 
2008). Canada asked Indonesia to indicate if  this type of support is expected to 
increase, and Indonesia opted to provide a re sponse at a later date (paragraph 84 of 
G/AG/W/96 refers). Could Indonesia please pr ovide an update as to whether this type 
of support has continued to increase since 2008 and if it is projecte d to increase further 
in the future? 
Indonesia wishes to inform that this type of support, which is in the form of input subsidies 
generally available to low-income or resource-poor producers, has gradually decreased since 2008. In 2009, the value of this type of support amounts to Rp18.3 thousand billion in 2009, G/AG/W/106 
 
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  down from Rp19 thousand billion in 2008. It has further decreased to Rp16.3 thousand 
b i l l i o n  i n  2 0 1 1 .  A t  p r e s e n t ,  I n d o n e s i a  p r o j e c t s  t h a t  t h i s  t y p e  o f  s u p p o r t  w i l l  c o n t i n u e  t o  decrease in the future. 
2.2.5  Moldova (G/AG/N/MOL/4) 
Moldova undertook to provide a response at a later stage. 
2.2.6  Nepal (G/AG/N/NPL/2 and G/AG/N/NPL/4) 
Nepal undertook to provide a response at a later stage. 
2.2.7  Norway (G/AG/N/NOR/64) 
2.2.7.1  Current Total AMS (Amber Box) – Other product-specific AMS/EMS 41.  Question by the European Union: From Norway's answers to questions raised by the 
European Union during the 66
th meeting of the Committee on Agriculture in June 2012, 
the European Union understands that Norway  has applied price su pport (internal price 
rebates) for beef in processed agricultur al products for several years prior to 
1 July 2009, but that it was not notified sepa rately as Norway claimed that the support 
was part of the price difference between th e administered target price and the world 
market reference price. During the 67th meeting of the Committee on Agriculture in 
September 2012, Norway confirmed that pric e support (internal price rebates) was 
applied to potatoes and poultry as well before the domestic support regimes for those 
products underwent reform in 2002 and 2007 re spectively. This price support was not 
notified separately either, as the support was part of the price difference between the 
administered target price and the world market  reference price. At present, is there any 
other product (besides beef, potatoes and poultry) for which Norway applies price 
support of this kind? 
The scheme allows for equal competition as regards input raw material costs for Norwegian 
producers and EU producers, for processed agricultural products subject to reciprocal free 
trade under Protocol 3 to the EEA agreement between Norway, Iceland and the European Union. Other products subject to price compensation payments are dairy products, pork and 
lamb meat. 
2.2.8  Oman (G/AG/N/OMN/11) 2.2.8.1  Transparency issues (including Table DS:2) 
Oman undertook to provide a response at a later stage. 
2.2.9  Panama (G/AG/N/PAN/26) 
2.2.9.1  Transparency issues (including Table DS:2) 42.  Questions by Canada: Canada notes th at Panama has in Supporting Table DS:1 
identified the relevant paragraphs of Anne x 2 under which support is claimed. Canada 
appreciates this contribution to facilitating the review of its notification. 
a. Could Panama provide Table DS:2 noti fications for the newly introduced 
"National emergency plan"?   
Panama will circulate a Table DS:2 notification soon.  
b. Further, could Panama plea se explain how this measur e meets the criteria of 
paragraph 8, Annex 2 of the Agreement on  Agriculture, e.g. that the payments 
cover losses greater than 30%? G/AG/W/106 
 
- 25 - 
 
  This measure was taken after declaring a national emergency plan, which was decided in 
2010 by Cabinet Decree because of the floods that took place on 7-8 December 2010. This measure came into force in December of the same year benefitted mainly rice 
producers. Panama estimated that 36% of the total areas of rice were affected by this 
natural disaster. 
2.2.9.2  Classification of measures 43.  Question by Japan: Could Panama kindly explain why it has changed the 
classification of "irrigation programmes" on Supporting Table DS:1 from "Infrastructural 
services" into "Marketing and promotion services"? 
The change in the classification of the measure was taken into account in 
G/AG/W/PAN/26/Rev.1. The correction to the notification was circulated on 
11 January 2013. 
2.2.10  Ukraine (G/AG/N/UKR/9 and G/AG/N/UKR/13) 2.2.10.1  Transparency issues (including Table DS:2) 
44.  Question by the European Union: The overall value of production has increased 
substantially (by 25%) between 2009 and 2010 according to the Table DS:1 notifications G/AG/N/UKR/13 and G/AG/N/UKR/9 . An increase in value of production 
is also noted for almost all products in Supporting Table DS:4, and in particular for 
milk (60%), sugar beet (59%), honey (34% ), wool (23%), grapes (23%), fruit and 
berries (19%), and poultry (14%). Would Ukra ine please elaborate on this significant 
annual increase of the overall agricultural va lue of production, as well as the increases 
for specific products? 
The increase of the value of agricultural pr oduction in 2010, compared with the previous 
year, was due to the growth of the volume of  production in tonnes and the growth of the 
actual prices of agricultural products in 2010.  For example, sugar beet production grew to 
3.7 million tonnes (136.6%). 
2.2.10.2  Annex 2 (Green Box) 
2.2.10.2.1  General services: research 
45.  Question by the European Union: The no tification shows some noticeable changes in 
separate Green Box measures spending compared to the previous Table DS:1 notification covering 2009 (G/AG/N/UKR/9 re fers): Could Ukraine elaborate on the 
decrease in spending on "General resear ch and development and product specific 
research programmes" (from Hrv 441 million to Hrv 139 million)? 
Ukraine undertook to provide a response at a later stage. 
2.2.10.2.2  General services: inspection services 
46.  Questions by: 
a.  Canada: Canada notes that in 2010 (G/AG/N/UKR/13 refers) that Ukraine 
provided Hrv 1,202.6 million under "Gener al inspection and specific product 
inspection services for purposes of  health care, safety, grading or 
standardization", which is a signific ant increase from 2009 (G/AG/N/UKR/9 
refers) when Ukraine noti fied Hrv 11.7 million in support for this general 
service. Could Ukraine please explain this  significant increase in expenditures 
over this one year period? 
b. The European Union: The notification  shows some noticeable changes in 
separate Green Box measures spending compared to the previous Table DS:1 
notification covering 2009 (G/AG/N/UKR/9 refers): Could Ukraine elaborate on G/AG/W/106 
 
- 26 - 
 
  the substantial increase in spending on General inspection and specific product 
inspection services for purposes of  health care, safety, grading of 
standardization (from Hrv 12 million to Hrv 1,203 million)? 
c. Japan: Could Ukraine kindly explain wh y "General inspection and specific 
product inspection services for purpose s of health care, safety, grading or 
standardization" on Supporting Table DS:1 increased so much from the previous year?  
Ukraine undertook to provide a response at a later stage. 
2.2.10.2.3  Public stockholding  for food security purposes  
47.  Question by the European Union: The no tification shows some noticeable changes in 
separate Green Box measures spending compared to the previous Table DS:1 
notification covering 2009 (G/AG/N/UKR/9 re fers): Could Ukraine elaborate on the 
increase in spending on public stockholdi ng (from Hrv 109 million to Hrv 199 million)? 
Increases in the state reserves for ensuring food security from Hrv 109 million to Hrv 199 
million, are caused primarily by an increase in volume of storage facilities and the actual 
costs incurred for storage due to a storage price increase per tonne. There was also an increase in the cost of stocking of varietal and hybrid seeds. 
2.2.10.2.4  Direct payments: paymen ts under environmental programmes 
48.  Question by the European Union: The no tification shows some noticeable changes in 
separate Green Box measures spending compared to the previous Table DS:1 
notification covering 2009 (G/AG/N/UKR/9 re fers): Could Ukraine elaborate on the 
increase in spending on environmen tal programmes (from Hrv 16 million to 
Hrv 175 million)? 
Increased spending on programmes to protect the environment were in connection with the 
increased costs, including the costs of enforcement activities related to: 
 Protection from the harmful effects of floods villages and agricultural lands; 
 Creation of protective forest plan tations and forest shelter belts; 
 Protect and defend the use of forests. 
Note that in 2009 planned spending on these measures was not fully used. 
2.2.10.3  Current Total AMS (Amber Box) 2.2.10.3.1  Market price support 
49.  Questions by  
a. Canada: Regarding the calculation of ma rket price support for sugar produced 
from sugar beets in Supporting Table DS:5, Canada understands from 
WT/ACC/SPEC/UKR/1/Rev.12 that Ukraine' s fixed external reference price for 
2004–2006 is Hrv 1,747.33 per tonne. Given that paragraph 8, Annex 3 of the Agreement on Agriculture requires the ex ternal reference price to be fixed, 
Ukraine's indexing of the reference pr ice in Supporting Table DS:5 does not 
seem to follow the rules of the Agreement. Canada raised a similar question, as did Japan, during the June 2011 meet ing of the Committee (paragraphs 38 and 
39 in G/AG/W/86 refer) and notes that Uk raine's response cited Article 18.4 as 
providing accommodation for its methodol ogy. Canada observes that Ukraine 
has again indexed the reference price for sugar produced from sugar beets. Canada notes the appropriate methodolog y for calculating ma rket price support 
is described in paragraph 8, Annex 3 of the Agreement on Agriculture after G/AG/W/106 
 
- 27 - 
 
  which due consideration may be considered  as described in Article 18.4. Could 
Ukraine please indicate when it will pr ovide revised notifications which would 
include the accurate fixed external re ference price of Hrv 1,747.33 per tonne 
for sugar produced from sugar beets?  
b. The European Union: In G/AG/N/UKR/ 13, Ukraine calculates market price 
support for sugar in Supporting Table DS:5. According to paragraph 8 of Annex 3, the parameters needed for this calculation are: (i) an internal applied 
administered price; (ii) a fixed external  reference price; and (iii) a volume of 
production eligible to receive the admi nistered price. The external reference 
price for Ukraine is based on the average of 2004-2006 and it is fixed in its accession documents at Hrv 1,747. per to nne. According to the notification for 
2009 (G/AG/N/UKR/9 refers) the external reference price was Hrv 2,798.1 per 
tonne, and in the current notification for 2010 it is Hrv 3,052.8 per tonne. 
 What justifies the change in the Uk rainian external reference price for 
sugar? 
 Please explain the composition of the consumer price index used in the 
calculations. 
 Please provide an official website where the Ukrainian consumer prices 
index can be consulted. 
c. Norway: Ukraine refers in column 9 of its Supporting Table DS:5 to the fixed 
external reference price of Hrv 1,747.3 per tonne for "sugar produced from 
sugar beets". However, in column 5 of the same Supporting Table, the external 
reference price used in the calculation of  the actual market price support is set 
at Hrv 3,052.8 per tonne. According to the fo otnote to column 5, this is due to 
the fact that the "Consumer Price Index for 2007-2010 is taken into account at 
calculation". Norway notes that the Market Price Support calculation appears to result in a Current Total AMS higher than Ukraine's Total AMS Commitment if 
based on the unadjusted fixed external reference price. Could Ukraine please 
explain which provision or provisions of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture 
would allow or enable such an adjustment to the fixed external reference price?  
In document WT/ACC/SPEC/UKR/1/Rev.12, the external reference price for sugar was 
recorded in dollars (column 5 of Supporting Table DS: 5). This methodology is explained by 
the fact that the external reference price of sugar in 2004-2006 was based on national 
customs statistics on exports and not on the export price of sugar produced in Ukraine, 
because sugar was imported by Ukraine. 
According to the document WT/ACC/SPEC/UKR/1/Rev.12, in 2004-2006 the average fixed 
external reference price of sugar was US $340 per tonne, which was the value of import of 
one tonne of white sugar to Ukraine (based on the export value of one tonne of white sugar 
according to the White Sugar Contract N°5, fob, European ports, London Daily Price for 
refined sugar (LIFFE)) including the cost of freight (US $25) to the port of Ukraine. For the 
calculation of Current Total AMS, the fixed reference price of sugar was converted into 
Ukrainian Hryvnia using the average exchange rate in the period of 2004-2006. 
During this period, the average official exchange rate was Hrv 5.13 per U.S. dollar. 
However, in 2009 (the first year Ukraine submi tted its domestic support notification to the 
WTO), the national currency devaluated against the U.S. dollar and the exchange rate 
dropped to Hrv 7.8 for one U.S. dollar, the depreciation rate of which was 1.5 times. In 
addition, after the base period, high inflation was observed in Ukraine. The Consumer Price Index was 116.6% in 2007, 122.3% in 2008, 112.3% in 2009, and 109.1% in 2010. Considering the above circumstances, Ukraine has corrected the constant adjustments to 
the fixed external reference price of sugar (US$ 340 exchange rate x 5.13 = US$ 1,747.3) 
for the amount of inflation using the Consumer Price Index in each year after the base period. Ukraine intends to keep a constant method of calculation in each of its notification on 
domestic support. G/AG/W/106 
 
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  The application of the external reference price in local currency (Hrv 1,747.3 per tonne) 
without adjustment for inflation would be incorrect and would not reflect the actual level of product support, because the administrative sugar price (applied administered price) increases annually due to an excessive inflation and a corresponding increase of the cost of 
inputs for sugar production. 
Such adjustments of external reference price to inflation, allow Ukraine, where there is 
excessive inflation, to commit to its obligations as to the level of AMS, as described in 
paragraph 4 of Article 18 of the Agreement on Agriculture. 
Information about the Consumer Price Index is co ntained on the official website of the State 
Statistics Service of Ukraine.
9 
50.  Question by the European Union: The G/AG/N/UKR/13 notification shows a large 
increase in Current Total AMS compared to the previous Table DS:1 notification, from 
37% to 72% of the Bound Total AMS commitmen t. It seems to be primarily related to 
the significant increase in the market price support for sugar. Coul d Ukraine explain the 
policy reasons for this increase? Could Ukra ine also provide a comment on developments 
of support to sugar produced  from sugar beets after 2010? 
Ukraine undertook to provide a response at a later stage. 
2.2.10.4  Current Total AMS (Amber Box) 
2.2.10.4.1  Other prod uct-specific AMS/EMS 
51.  Question by Canada: Canada notes that product-specific support provided to Hops 
under a measure which provides "compens ation of costs of production" in 2009 
amounted to 119% of that product's value of production and in 2010 support amounted 
to 95% of value of production. Could Ukraine provide more information on this measure, 
e.g. how are payments per hectare determined ? What is the payment rate per hectare? 
What are the eligible costs? Is there a limit  on the amount of payment to a producer? 
Ukraine undertook to provide a response at a later stage. 
52.  Question by the European Union: Coul d Ukraine provide more detailed information 
on subsidies for producing grape products  included in Supporting Table DS:6 in 
G/AG/N/UKR/13? 
Ukraine undertook to provide a response at a later stage. 
2.2.10.4.2  Non-product-specific AMS 
53.  Questions by Canada: In Supporting Ta ble DS:9, by far the largest non-product 
specific AMS expenditure in 2010 is for "T otal support of producers by introducing 
special value-added tax regimes" at Hrv 7,099.3 million out of a total NPS amount of 
Hrv 8,229.5 million. In 2009, Ukraine notified Hrv 2,824.7 million for the programme 
"Accumulation of VAT for purchasing of in puts for agricultural production". Could 
Ukraine please confirm if these are the same measure or two different measures? If 
they are indeed the same measure, please indicate what amendments were made that 
would account for the substantial increase? Wh at are the eligibility criteria and how is 
this support calculated? 
Ukraine undertook to provide a response at a later stage. 
54.  Question by Canada: In Supporting Table DS:9, Ukraine provided "Partial 
reimbursement of price of agricultural ma chinery and equipment" in the amount of 
Hrv 2.6 million in 2009, however, in 2010 th e programme was changed to "Partial 
reimbursement of price of domestically prod uced agricultural machinery and equipment" 
                                               
9 http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua  (Statistic information/Prices/Consumer price indices in 1992 – 2011). G/AG/W/106 
 
- 29 - 
 
  and Hrv 30 million in support was provided. Co uld Ukraine elaborate on the rationale for 
limiting the reimbursement to "domesticall y produced agricultural machinery and 
equipment"?  
Ukraine undertook to provide a response at a later stage. 
55.  Question by the European Union: Could Ukraine provide details on what the 
"financial support to individual farmers" noti fied in Supporting Table DS:9 constitutes of 
in G/AG/N/UKR/13? 
Ukraine undertook to provide a response at a later stage. 
56.  Question by the European Union: Coul d Ukraine provide more information on the 
measure of "partial reimbursement of pric e of domestically produced agricultural 
machinery and equipment" notified in Su pporting Table DS:9 in G/AG/N/UKR/13? 
Ukraine undertook to provide a response at a later stage. 
Follow-up: Supported by Canada, the European Union and Norway, Australia pointed out that 
Ukraine may incorrectly interpret the definition of excessive rates in Article 18.4 of the Agreement 
on Agriculture. Ukraine was requested to provide its AMS data calculated without indexing the 
external reference price to the Consumer Price Index. Japan recalled the question it posed to Ukraine last year on a similar issue and drew all Members' attention to market price calculation.  
2.2.11  United States (G/AG/N/USA/89) 
2.2.11.1  Annex 2 (Green Box) 2.2.11.1.1  General services 57.  Questions by Australia: Australia notes that there has been increased expenditure 
under the "Rural Energy for America Program" . In this context, Australia returns to a 
question that it has previously asked about this programme. Can the United States explain how this programme complies with th e general prohibition on direct payments 
to producers for programmes notified under  Annex 2 as General Services? Australia 
notes that paragraph 2(g) of Annex 2 explicit ly excludes subsidized provision of on-farm 
facilities and paragraph 5 extends dire ct payments to "payments in kind". 
The Rural Energy for America Program provides grants and loan guarantees to both farm 
and non-farm rural businesses. Specific data on  what share of grants and loan guarantees 
were awarded to farmers and ranchers are not available. The United States notes that the 
programme has been changed in legislation over  time, and in light of those changes, the 
United States is reviewing how to notify this programme.  
58.  Question by Australia: Can the United St ates advise how it calculates the value of 
outlays on "State Programmes for Agriculture" ? Australia notes that the outlay on these 
programmes does not seem to change. 
The United States has continued to report on state programmes based on the last available 
data, which are from 2006. The U.S. Department  of Agriculture has been working with the 
U.S. Bureau of Census to gather updated st ate government expenditure data. The United 
States believes it is close to being able to provide updated data. 
2.2.11.1.2  Direct payments: payments  for relief from natural disasters 
59.  Question by Canada: Would the United St ates indicate the length of the reference 
period that was used in determining the 50% loss for the individual farm under the 
Non-insured Crop Disaster Assistance Progra m? Were losses in comparison to a 10-year 
average? Or a 5-year average? G/AG/W/106 
 
- 30 - 
 
  The approved yield is an average of a produc er's actual production history (APH) for a 
minimum of four to a maximum of 10 crop ye ars, depending on the crop and producer 
history.  
2.2.11.2  Current Total AMS (Amber Bo x) – Other product-specific AMS/EMS 
60.  Question by Canada: The United States re ports support to the livestock sector on an 
aggregate basis (not by cattle, hogs, sheep, poultry, other livestock). Does the United 
States have data for the various livestock programmes reported in Supporting Table 
DS:6 on a disaggregated basis? If not, would the United States consider pro-rating data 
so that an estimated level of support for the individual commodities would be reflected? 
The United States does not have disaggregated data by animal species for the programmes 
reported on this basis. The agency responsible for disbursing the funds does not obtain and 
record such data. The programmes reported this way are disaster relief programmes that 
reflect expenditures across disparate farming areas that may not reflect regular species distributions, thus the United States has no ba sis on which to make an  estimate. The United 
States believes the best method is to report the data on an aggregate basis.  
2.2.11.3  Classifica tion of measures 
61.  Questions by Australia: Australia seeks to  return to the issue on "Risk Management 
Agency" notified under "General Services". Au stralia appreciates that it was discussed in 
detail at the time of the United States ' previous notification. In particular: 
a. Can the United States provide any further advice to explain th e rationale for its 
notification of funding provided by the Risk Management Agency in support of 
the administration and provision of crop insurance? 
b. Can the United States explain why these payments are not a cross subsidy on 
crop insurance otherwise notified as an Amber Box measure? 
The United States would appreciate further clarification about what Australia means by 
"cross subsidy". The United States notes again that the U.S. crop insurance programme is a unique programme in that crop insurance policies are delivered by private companies, rather 
than by a government entity. Similar to how th e United States notifies budgetary outlays for 
other government agencies that deliver services to agricultural producers, the United States 
has notified the budgetary outlays associated with the delivery of crop insurance policies as exempt general services. Premium rates are set by the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation. 
Companies must use these rates in selling crop insurance policies and are prohibited from 
providing subsidies to producers through actions like rebating. The Risk Management Agency (RMA) of the U.S. Department of Agriculture pays a portion of administrative and operating 
expenses and underwriting gains to crop insurance companies. These payments benefit the 
company, but they do not go to producers.  
62.  Question by Canada: As of 2008 the "Rur al Energy for American Program" is being 
notified as Green Box under General Servic es. The United States indicates that it 
provides "direct loans, loan guarantees and grants to farmers, ranchers and small rural 
business to purchase renewable energy systems and make energy efficiency improvements". The previous programme (i.e., Renewable Energy Program) was 
notified as an environmental programme un der paragraph 12. Would the United States 
explain the reason for the change in classi fication; indicate under which sub-paragraph 
of General Services it is being notified; and explain how it meets the criteria, particularly 
those in the chapeau that payments do not involve direct payments to producers or 
processors? 
The Rural Energy for America Program provides grants and loan guarantees to both farm 
and non-farm rural businesses. Specific data on  what share of grants and loan guarantees 
were awarded to farmers and ranchers are not available. The United States notes that the 
programme has been changed in legislation over  time, and in light of those changes, the 
United States is reviewing how to notify this programme.  G/AG/W/106 
 
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  63.  Question by Canada: Credit progra mmes are usually considered as Amber Box 
support unless provided by developing countri es under Article 6.2. Under "Farm Credit 
Programs", in the category of "Structural adjustment through investment aids", the 
United States notifies support to producer s that cannot obtain credit elsewhere as a 
"structural disadvantage" and thus exem pt from reduction commitments under 
paragraph 11. Would the United  States explain how this is  a "structural disadvantage" 
and why such support should be exempt  from the United States' reduction 
commitments? 
Paragraph 11 of Annex 2 does not specifically disqualify provision of credit as a structural 
adjustment investment aid. A share of farm credit loans and loan guarantees are targeted to socially disadvantaged farmers and ranchers, which includes women and minority groups 
who often have difficulty obtaining credit because of their minority status. Another share is 
reserved for beginning farmers, who also may have difficulty obtaining credit because of 
their inexperience. Other borrowers must show their inability to obtain credit through 
regular channels to be eligible for these programmes. Provision of loans and loan guarantees 
makes it possible for those facing social disadvantages to achieve farm ownership and viable operations.  
64.  Question by the European Union: The insurance premium subsidies to producers are 
notified in Supporting Table DS:9 of the noti fication. Would the United States consider 
that there could be a risk of double counting of some of this spending in the underwriting gains/losses entr y under "General Services"? 
The United States carefully considered the possibility of double-counting support under the 
crop insurance programme when it modified its notification method. Outlays under the different elements of the crop insurance programme are accounted for separately and are 
easily identifiable and distinct.  
65.  Question by the European Union: Underw riting gains to insurers of US$ 2.44 million 
are notified under "General Services". Ho w will the United States treat underwriting 
losses in the notification? 
The United States has always reported negative support as zero. 
Follow-up: Pakistan shared Canada's concern as expressed in question 63.  and requested more 
details. 
2.3  New or Modified Domestic Support Measures (Table DS:2) 
2.3.1  Armenia (G/AG/N/ARM/22) 2.3.1.1  Annex 2 (Green Box) –General services 
66.  Question by Canada: The "Wheat and Barley Seed Farming Development 
Programme" is described as providing the enti ties involved in seed farming with high 
quality imported seeds. Canada notes that  Armenia has reported this measure as a 
"General Services" under Annex 2. Could Armenia please elaborate as to how the 
provision of seed (a product) meets th e criteria of a "General Services"?  
The expenditures under the programme are in co nnection to research activities relating to 
wheat and barley to provide benefits to seed farming and seed production development. The 
government participation in the broad resear ch process was limited to providing product 
inputs to the process – seeds. In particular, research work was carried out towards adapting imported varieties of high reproduction and resistant seeds of wheat and barley to the 
Armenian climate. Taking into account these circumstances, the measure has been classified 
under paragraph 2 (subsection (a), research) of Annex 2 of the Agreement on Agriculture. G/AG/W/106 
 
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  2.3.2  New Zealand (G/AG/N/NZL/76) 
2.3.2.1  Annex 2 (Green Box) – General services: pest and disease control 67.  Question by Canada: New Zealand stated in the cover page of its revised domestic 
support notification (G/AG/N/NZL/75/Rev.1 refers) that "Border Biosecurity Risk 
Management ($NZ 80.7 million)" and "Dom estic Biosecurity Risk Management 
($NZ 58.9 million)" were dele ted due to double-counting. Could New Zealand explain 
where these measures were double-counted in the original 
notification (G/AG/N/NZL/75 refers)? 
As per New Zealand’s response to Japan in the 67
th Regular Session of the WTO Committee 
on Agriculture, the "Border biosecurity risk management" and 'Domestic biosecurity risk management' headings and figures were deleted as they were a sub-total covering the 
following two listed items under each heading.  
The "Border biosecurity risk management" of $NZ80.7 million was a total of the "Border 
biosecurity systems development and mainte nance" ($NZ15.7 million) and the "Border 
biosecurity monitoring and clearance" ($NZ65 million). Similarly, the "Domestic biosecurity 
risk management" deleted in the amended notifi cation was a total of "Biosecurity Incursion 
Response and Long Term Pest Management" ($NZ15 million) and "Domestic biosecurity 
surveillance" ($NZ43.9 million). 
2.3.2.2  Annex 2 (Green Box) –Direct pa yments: payments for relief from natural 
disasters 
68.  Question by Canada: New Zealand also prov ided a response to Canada's question at 
the 67
th Committee on Agriculture meeting, that $NZ 17.4 million was paid to 
compensate growers for losses of their ki wifruit crops and those payments were 
consistent with Annex 2 paragraph 8. Could New Zealand indicate where such payments 
have been notified? Would New Zealand also submit a new Table DS:2 to justify those 
payments meet Annex 2 paragraph 8 (a)-(e ), particularly meeting the loss-trigger 
reference stipulated in paragraph 8(a)? 
All expenditure on the programme was notified in the Table DS:1 notification for the year 
ending June 2011 (G/AG/N/NZL/75/Rev.1 refers). While expenditure under the programme could have been classified under existing biosecurity programmes, in the interest of transparency and best practices, New Zealand provided a separate Table DS:2 notification 
for this expenditure. New Zealand encourages other Members to consider, in the interest of 
greater transparency, providing Table DS:2 notifications for specific biosecurity responses where there is significant expenditure.  
As noted already, all parts of the expenditure is consistent with Annex 2 including 
paragraph 2 and paragraph 8 (a)-(e). New Zealand is reviewing the notification to see if additional clarity would be provided through submitting a revised notification.  
2.3.3  United States (G/AG/N/USA/86) 
2.3.3.1  Transparency issues (including Table DS:2) 69.  Question by the European Union: Could the United States explain more in detail the 
rules of the Standard Reinsurance Agreement on the basis of which it is decided which 
part of the underwriting gains/losses goes to the State and which part goes to the 
insurers? 
The Standard Reinsurance Agreement (SRA) and the Livestock Price Reinsurance 
Agreement (LPRA) are cooperative financial assistance agreements between the Federal 
Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC) and an insurance company. FCIC is a government 
corporation within USDA authorized to carry out programmes of the Federal Crop Insurance 
A c t .  T h e  R i s k  M a n a g e m e n t  A g e n c y  a c t s  o n  b e h a l f  o f  F C I C  t o  a d m i n i s t e r  a l l  f e d e r a l  c r o p  
insurance programmes.  G/AG/W/106 
 
- 33 - 
 
  The SRA and LPRA establish the terms under wh ich FCIC provides reinsurance and subsidies 
on eligible crop insurance contracts sold by the insurance company. By regulation, an insurance company must be in good financial standing and in compliance with the state laws where domiciled and writing business prior to being considered for an SRA or LPRA. 
In general, the companies and the FCIC nego tiate an agreement under which companies are 
allowed to place policies in separate funds that offer varying degrees of retention and exposure. The degree of risk sharing between  the companies and the FCIC has changed 
significantly over the years. The SRA has b een re-negotiated six times since this basic 
risk-sharing feature was put in place in 1992.  
The actual SRA and supporting documents are le ngthy and complex. The current SRA can be 
found at: http://www.rma.usda.gov/pubs/ra/. 
2.3.4  United States (G/AG/N/USA/91) 
2.3.4.1  Annex 2 (Green Box) – Direct payments: Payments under environmental 
programmes 
70.  Questions by Australia: With regards to "Voluntary Public Access and Habitat 
Incentive Program (VPA-HIP)": 
a. Are all the specific conditions, on wh ich payment is dependent, related to 
environmental or conservation objectives ? How does providing public access to 
wild-life dependent recreation, such as hunting and fishing, further environmental or conservation objectives? 
Programme guidelines recommend applicants consult state wildlife action plans in 
planning their programmes. The wildlife action  plans identify a variety of actions aimed 
at preventing wildlife from declining to the point of becoming endangered. Integration of 
conservation activities with wildlife dependent recreation may allow for land 
management that balances game species population growth and fosters a higher quality 
of habitat conditions. 
b. Can the United States provide further information on the amount of grant 
funding that will be provided to individu al land owners, and how it will ensure 
that payments are limited to the extra costs or loss of income involved in 
complying with the government programm e, consistent with Annex 2 of the 
Agreement on Agriculture, paragraph 12? 
Grants are to state and tribal governments to operate programmes that encourage 
public access to privately held lands for wildlife dependent recreation. Benefits to individual land owners may be in the form of rental payments for public access to wildlife 
dependent recreation on privately owned land and for technical assistance in 
implementing habitat development and conser vation measures. Specific participation 
criteria and benefit levels will be determined by the state and tribal governments 
operating funded programmes.  
71.  Questions by Australia: Regarding "Con servation Loan Program", the criteria for 
determining which farmer gets access to the credit and for what project seem somewhat open-ended. What arrangements are in place to ensure that direct loans and loan 
guarantees are provided only for genuine environmental and conservation measures? 
And how will the United States ensure that pa yments (interest rate subsidy) are limited 
to the extra costs or loss of income invo lved in complying with the government 
programme, consistent with Annex 2 of th e Agreement on Agriculture, paragraph 12? 
Conservation Loan funds can only be used to implement conservation practices approved by 
the Natural Resources Conservation Service (N RCS). These loans are guaranteed loans, and 
thus payments to producers from the programme will only be the interest subsidy inherent 
in the loan, which will be much less than the costs of the practices for which the loans are made.  G/AG/W/106 
 
- 34 - 
 
  72.  Question by Japan: Could the United  States kindly explain which measure in 
G/AG/N/USA/89 corresponds to "Voluntar y Public Access and Habitat Incentive 
Program (VPA-HIP)"? "Wildlife Habitat Incent ives Program" which has a name similar 
to VPA-HIP, seems to have existed since 2010. 
The United States did not make any payments under the Voluntary Public Access and 
Habitat Incentive Program (VPA-HIP) in 2010. The first payments were made in 2011 and will be reported accordingly. The Wildlife Habitat Incentive Program is a different programme. 
2.4  Export Subsidy Notifications (Tables ES:1 to ES:3) 
2.4.1  Australia (G/AG/N/AUS/87) 2.4.1.1  Circumvention of commitm ents – International food aid 
73.  Comments by the European Union: Aust ralia explains that it has not provided 
physical food aid, and therefore entries for Table ES:3 for 2009, 2010 and 2011 are zero. 
However, international organisations like World Food Programme (WFP) express the 
amounts of distributed food aid in physic al equivalent also when the donor country 
provided food aid in the form of cash cont ributions. For the sake of transparency, it 
could be useful if also Members who donate ca sh based food assistance only could notify 
their total volume of food aid, in physical equivalent. 
Australia welcomes the question and shares commitments with other food assistance donors 
in implementing the Marrakech Ministerial decision. Australia takes this opportunity to reiterate that it provided no export subsidy for products for which it has export subsidy commitments. Australia also reiterated that sinc e 2005 it has had a policy of untied food aid 
and has provided no in-kind donations. In a ccordance with the G/AG/2, food aid donors 
should notify the total volume of food aid provid ed during the reporting period in the form of 
Table ES:3, unless otherwise notified in column 5 of Table ES:1. However, for the purposes 
of ES:3, the list of products or groups of pr oducts shown under (iii) on page 24 of G/AG/2 
should be used. Australia understands that this type of notifications is only relevant when a Member provides in-kind food aid for which it is claiming that there is no export subsidies or 
food aid is provided in fully grant, terms as stated in G/AG/N/AUS/75 in page 2 and also 
stated in paragraph 5 of G/AG/N/AUS/87. Full details of the equivalent amounts of the food 
aid in aggregate terms are notified in Australia's NF:1 notification. 
2.4.2  Brazil (G/AG/N/BRA/28) 
2.4.2.1  Circumvention of commitm ents – International food aid 
74.  Question by the European Union: Why do es Brazil notify food aid for products which 
are subject to export subsidy reduction co mmitments, like suga r for example, under 
Table ES:3 while according to the notificati on requirements these products shall be 
notified under Table ES:1? 
In fact, Table ES:3 should be used only for products not based on annual commitments on 
export subsidies. 
2.4.2.2  Circumvention of commitmen ts – Quantity of total exports 
75.  Question by the European Union: Could Brazil explain the reasons behind the 
dramatic drop in exports of undenat ured ethyl alcohol from 2008 to 2010 
(2008: 4,054,588 tonnes; 2009: 2, 646,444 tonnes; 2010: 207 tonnes)? 
From 2008 to 2010 the Brazilian production of un denatured ethyl alcohol grew at a slower 
rate than its domestic consumption. Accordingl y, the quantity of that product available for 
exportation has been reduced. G/AG/W/106 
 
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  2.4.3  India (G/AG/N/IND/9) 
2.4.3.1  Export subsidies subject to reduct ion commitments (Article 9.1) – Special and 
differential treatment (Article 9.4) 
76.  Question by Canada:  
a. In relation to India's reply to Austra lia at the September 2012 Meeting of the 
Committee on Agriculture (paragraph 64(d) in G/AG/W/103 refers): India at the time indicated that as the export sa le(s) had not yet been completed it was 
not in a position to provide details as to the support provided for the export of 
wheat. Presumably, some of these export  contracts have now been realized, 
therefore could India provide informatio n on the support for wheat exports? 
The export of wheat from government stocks is being done through a competitive tender 
process. The export prices quoted under the tender bids range from US $297 to US $314 
per tonne while the procurement price was US $234 per tonne at an exchange rate of 
55 Rupees per dollar.  
b. In relation to India's reply to Australia and the European Union at the 
September 2012 Meeting of the Committee on Agriculture (paragraphs 64(a) 
and 65(a) in G/AG/W/103 refer) that the Agreement on Agriculture be read in conjunction with paragraph 164 of the Re vised Draft Modalities for Agriculture: 
Canada notes that WT/MIN(05)/DEC ("Ho ng Kong Ministerial Declaration") and 
TN/AG/W/Rev.4 (Revised Draft Modalitie s for Agriculture) reflect a process 
and dynamic that is distinct from the implementation of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture. Canada's ob servation is that documents associated 
with the Committee on Agriculture in Sp ecial Session are "conditional in the 
deepest sense" as noted in the preamb le to the Revised Draft Modalities for 
Agriculture. Could India share its view on what basis it is able to provide export 
subsidies under the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture? 
c. In relation to India's reply to the European Union at the 
September 2012 Meeting of the Committee on  Agriculture (paragraph 65(b) in 
G/AG/W/103 refers): Could India elabor ate on its response that it has 
reserved the right to use export subsidies under Article 9.1(d) and (e) in Part 
IV, Section II of its WTO schedule? 
For the reasons explained in India's responses to Australia and the European Union at the 
September 2012 meeting of the Committee on Agriculture,
10 India has reserved the right to 
use export subsidies under the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture. The Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration makes it clear that developing countries would continue to be exempt 
from reduction commitments on export subsidies listed in subparagraphs (d) and (e) of 
paragraph 1 of Article 9 of the Agreement on  Agriculture. Therefore, Members which are 
benefiting from S&D treatment during the implementation period would continue to benefit from such provisions till a new agreement is in place. In the spirit of the on-going reform 
process under Article 20 of the Agreement on Agriculture, while developed Members 
continue to provide export subsidies, developing countries should not be deprived of S&D treatment during the interim period. 
Follow-up: Echoed by the European Union, the Unit ed States pointed out that the reference to the 
Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration should only be based on the completion of the DDA negotiations 
and the implementation of the relevant agreement. 
                                               
10 Paragraph 64 (a) and 65 (a) in G/AG/W/103 refer 
 G/AG/W/106 
 
- 36 - 
 
  2.4.4  United States (G/AG/N/USA/88) 
2.4.4.1  Export subsidies subject to reductio n commitments (Article 9.1) – Transparency 
issues 
77.  Question by Australia: Australia would a ppreciate the United States' elaboration on 
its domestic policy regarding its existing ex port subsidies. In particular, Australia 
requests advice on what plan, if any, the Un ited States has to eliminate export subsidies 
by 2013, consistent with the 2005 WTO Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration. 
At the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference, the United States and other WTO Members agreed 
to eliminate export subsidies by 2013 in the context of a Doha Development Agenda (DDA) 
single undertaking and based on the uniform elimination of export subsidies by all Members. Pursuant to the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration, eliminating export subsidies will be 
achieved in a progressive and parallel manner, to be specified in the modalities, so that a 
substantial part is realized by the end of the first half of the implementation period. As such, the actual date for the elimination of all forms of export subsidies, together with the agreed 
progressivity and parallelism, can only be confirmed upon the completion of the modalities.  
In the absence of a DDA agreement subject to  Member implementation, the United States 
maintains that all preliminary, provisional, and prospective DDA agreements that were 
founded on the premise of a successfully conclu ded DDA single undertaking should be held 
in abeyance pending such a DDA conclusion. However, all Members party to the agreement 
in Hong Kong to eliminate export subsidies by 2013 should be working towards that goal in good faith. To that end, while Members worked to conclude the DDA, the United States 
proactively reduced usage of the Dairy Export Incentive Program (DEIP), and, as is evident 
in the United States' latest Table ES:1 and ES:2 notification, G/AG/N/USA/88 dated 27 September 2012, the United States did not provide any export subsidies in its most 
recent reporting period. The United States fully intends to honour its commitment taken in 
Hong Kong related to export subsidies.  
2.4.4.2  Circumvention of commitm ents – International food aid 
78.  Question by the European Union: Why is the Table ES:3 notification missing? Does it 
mean that the United States did not grant fo od aid for products without export subsidy 
commitments in 2010?  
The United States notified its volume of food aid for 2010 in Table ES:1. According to 
G/AG/2, the WTO notification requirements and formats document, a notification in the form 
of Table ES:3 showing the total volume of food aid should be provided unless this 
information is provided in Table ES:1.  
2.5  Notifications in the Context of the Follow-Up to the Decision on Measures 
Concerning the Possible Negative Effects of  the Reform Programme on Least-Developed 
and Net-Food Importing Developing Countries (Table NF:1) 
2.5.1  United States (G/AG/N/USA/90) 
2.5.1.1  Quantity and concessionality of food aid 79.  Questions by the European Union: The United States notifies that 2,435,640 tonnes 
of food aid was provided to Least-Deve loped and Net Food-importing Developing 
Countries during 1 October 2009 to 30 Sept ember 2010. 156,770 tonnes were provided 
through the Food for Progress Programme and 97,020 tonnes were provided through the Food for Education Programme. Food aid under  those programmes was provided in fully 
grant form. Additionally, 2,181,850 tonnes of f ood aid was provided through either Title 
I or Title II of the Food for Peace Act (P.L. 480). Food assistance under Title II of the 
Food for Peace Act is according to the no tification provided in fully grant form. 
a. Could the United States please provide information about the volume of food 
aid provided through Title I of the Food for Peace Act? G/AG/W/106 
 
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  The United States did not provide any food aid through the concessional financing 
mechanism of Title I of the Food for Peace Act. The United States used some funding from Title I to cover the costs of donating  14,300 tonnes of food to Burundi and the 
Central African Republic through the Food for Progress programme. The donation was 
reported within the food aid provided by Food for Progress. 
b. Could the Unites States please provid e information about which concessional 
terms apply to food aid provided through Title I of the Food for Peace Act? 
The concessional financing mechanism of Title I of the Food for Peace Act has not been 
used since 2006. The last agreement in 2006 included a repayment term of 30 years and a one % interest rate.  
3  OVERDUE NOTIFICATIONS 
3.1.1  India – Domestic support notifications 
80.  Question by Canada: At the 20 Sept ember 2012 meeting of the Committee, India 
indicated that it was in the process of collecting data for its outstanding annual 
domestic support notifications. Could India provide an update as when it expects to 
submit its annual domestic support notifica tions for the years 2004-2005 through to 
2010-2011? 
India would like to assure Canada and the Committee that the process of compiling data for 
India's domestic support notifications from  2004-2005 onwards is underway and India is 
working towards submitting them at the earliest. G/AG/W/106 
 
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  ANNEX 1 
QUESTION BY THE UNITED STATES  (PARAGRAPH B 1.1  1.  B)) 
Comparison of data from Br azil's notification and data from CONAB website for 2008/09 
Item PEP 
 
$US million  PROP 
 
$US million  PEPRO 
 
$US million  
Corn    
 Notification 21 110 3 
 CONAB 13/07/20111 176 0 52 
 CONAB 12/08/20121 176 40 52 
Cotton    
 Notification 0 0 0 
 CONAB 13/07/20111 0 0 301 
 CONAB 12/08/20121 105 0 301 
 
Source: http://www.conab.gov.br/conteudos.php?a=538&t=2&Pagina_objcmsconteudos=1#A_objcmsconteudos 
                                               
1 Data reported on the CONAB websit e on this date, converted from real s to US dollars using an average 
exchange rate for 2008 and 2009. G/AG/W/106 
 
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  ANNEX 2 
RESPONSES BY NORWAY (PARAGRAPH 13.  ) 
List of relevant AVEs from the su bmissions under the DDA negotiations  
  AVE (%) 
Cheese:    
04.06.909 Other 101.01 
Beef:   
02.01.300 Boneless 344.80 
02.02.300 Boneless, frozen 344.80 
Sheep/lamb:   
02.04.100 Carcasses and half carcasses of lamb, fresh or chilled 114.90 
02.04.300 Carcasses and half carcasses of lamb, frozen 175.68 
 G/AG/W/106 
 
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  ANNEX 3 
RESPONSES BY ARMENIA (PARAGRAPH 35.  ) 
Proportion of financing from  Government and donors in the monetary values of 
Armenia's Green Box measures: 
Name of measure Government 
financing 
(%) Donor 
financing 
(%) 
2008-2009   
1 Co-financing of a programme for rural enterprises and small-scale 
commercial agriculture development carried out with World Bank 
support 100 0 
2 Measures to maintain and improve ameliorative conditions of soil (in 
the framework of the Food Production Increase Program carried out with Japanese Go vernment support) 0 100 
2008-2010   
3 Co-financing of a programme for counteracting avian influenza carried 
out with World Bank support 100 0 
4 Co-financing of a Japanese grant programme for counteracting avian 
influenza carried out with World Bank support 100 0 
2008-2011   
5 Co-financing of the Marketing O pportunities for Farmers programme 
carried out with International Fund for Agricultural Development 
support 100 0 
2009-2010   
6 Marketing Opportunities for Farmers programme carried out with OPEC 
support 0 100 
2010-2011   
7 Marketing Opportunities for Farm ers programme carried out with 
Kingdom of Denmark support 0 100 
 
 
__________