TN/RL/W/258  
 
19 June 2015  
(15-3201)  Page: 1/4  
Negotiating Group on Rules  Original: English  
 
 ELEMENTS FOR EFFECTIVE DISCIPLINES ON FISHERIES SUBSIDIES 
IN THE POST-BALI WORK PROGRAMME 
COMMUNICATION FROM ARGENTINA; ICELAND; NEW ZEALAND;  
NORWAY; PERU; AND URUGUAY 
The following communication, dated 19 June 2015, is being circulated at the request of the 
Delegations of Argentina; Iceland; New Zealand; Norway; Peru; and Uruguay. 
 
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1  INTRODUCTION 
1.1.  Given the compelling case for fisheries su bsidies reform, we remain committed to securing 
substantive and effective disciplines on fisheries subsidies. We recognise that the current post Bali 
discussions on recalibration are focused on finding newer, alternative paths towards convergence 
amongst the membership and in that regard at what is achievable. In that regard, we would also recall that the Chair of the Trade Negotiations Co mmittee has been clear that the work programme 
must be "substantive and meaningful".
1 
1.2.  It is within this context that we make this  contribution on elements for inclusion in the post-
Bali work programme (PBWP). In doing so, we are guided by our Ministerial mandates, in 
particular the agreement in Hong Kong to prohibit certain forms of fisheries subsidies that 
contribute to overcapacity and overfishing, with  appropriate and effective special and differential 
treatment, and the recognition at MC8 about th e need to explore how to overcome the most 
critical and fundamental stalemates. 
1.3.  This communication is without prejudice to  the individual positions of Members that they 
have previously taken in the negotiations or may take in the context of the PBWP. It represents an effort to identify elements that attract broad convergence amongst Members for inclusion in the 
PBWP and adoption at MC10. 
2  CONTEXT 2.1.  We remain deeply concerned at the state of the world's fisheries resources given the critical 
importance of the fisheries sector to poverty reduction, livelihood and food security concerns 
particularly in developing countries. The desire and need to negotiate new effective disciplines on 
fisheries subsidies is demonstrated by the support for such disciplines coming from all four corners 
of the globe and spanning LDCs, developing and industrialised Members. In fact almost 60% of the 
WTO's membership has called for disciplines on fisheries subsidies (which includes well over two-
thirds of developing country Members). 
2.2.  Subsidies to the fishing sector distort the trade, economics and politics of fishing. Subsidies 
distort trade by creating conditions of unfair competition. Subsidies which underwrite the costs of 
harvesting or the costs of production contribute to overcapacity in global fleets and global overfishing, by encouraging fishing when it may otherwise not be profitable. Fisheries are a key resource for many Members, and subsidies can undermine the sustainable use of their stocks. 
                                               
1 JOB/TNC/47 (27 April 2015), para 2.19. TN/RL/W/258 
 
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  Subsidies can also affect political decision making over management of the resource, as well as 
creating uneven competition between fishing nations which harvest and trade fish. 
2.3.  The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), in its 2014 report on the State 
of World Fisheries and Aquaculture (SOFIA), reported that fish now accounts for almost 17% of the 
global population's intake of protein - in some coastal and island countries it can top 70%. Fish 
provided nearly 3 billion people with almost 20% of their intake of animal protein, and 4.3 billion with about 15% of such protein. The FAO estima tes that fisheries and aquaculture support the 
livelihoods of 10–12% of the world's population. Since 1990 employment in the sector has grown 
at a faster rate than the world's population an d in 2012 provided jobs for some 60 million people 
engaged in capture fisheries and aquaculture.  
2.4.  While fish remains among the most traded  food commodities worldwide, the state of the 
world's fisheries have deteriorated since the launch of the Doha Round, with almost 29% of global 
stocks reported as overfished by the FAO in 2014.  There is also diminish ing room for growth in 
catches through increased fishing effort, with over 60% of stocks reported as fully exploited. This 
is in the context of harmful fisheries subsidies having increased over the same period to an 
estimated US$20 billion and continuing to be a major contributing factor.
2  
2.5.  The call for action in the WTO on fisherie s subsidies will be centre stage this year. World 
leaders reaffirmed in 2012, at the UN Conference on Sustainable Development, their commitment 
to eliminate subsidies that contribute to illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing and overcapacity, and their continued commitment to concluding multilateral disciplines on fisheries subsidies that will give effect to the WTO Doha Development Agenda and the Hong Kong 
Ministerial Declaration. In September 2015, world leaders will adopt the new Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs). Prohibiting certain forms of fisheries subsidies
3 and the conclusion of 
new effective WTO disciplines will be the focus of  one of the targets under an SDG on conserving 
and sustainably using the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development. 
2.6.  The PBWP provides the opportunity to lay the foundation for an outcome with effective new 
disciplines on fisheries subsidies that are win-win-win for trade, for development, and for the 
environment. 
3  ELEMENTS 3.1.  We consider that any outcome on fisheries subsidies, that provides effective and meaningful 
disciplines, should contain the following elements: 
a. Prohibitions focusing on some of the most obvious subsidies around which all Members 
should be able to agree to; 
b. Appropriate and effective special and differential treatment; 
c. Transitional arrangements; 
d. Standstill provision; 
e. Transparency, monitoring and review provisions; and 
f. Continuation of the fisheries subsidies reform process. 
                                               
2 U Sumaila RU, Lam VWY, Le Manach F, Swartz W and Pauly D (2013) Global fisheries subsidies. 
Directorate General for Internal Polici es, Policy Department B:  Structural and Cohesion Policies, Fisheries, 
European Parliament, IP/B/PECH/IC/2013-146, Brussels. 44 p. 
3 Under the proposed SDG 14 (conserve and sustainabl y use the oceans, seas an d marine resources for 
sustainable development), the sixth target focuses on th e prohibition of certain fo rms of fisheries subsidies 
which contribute to overcapacity and overfishing, and eliminate subsidies that contribute to IUU fishing. TN/RL/W/258 
 
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  3.1  Prohibitions 
3.2.  Prohibitions are necessary to deliver on the Hong Kong mandate to 'strengthen disciplines on 
subsidies in the fisheries sector, including through the prohibition of certain forms of fisheries subsidies that contribute to overcapacity and over -fishing'. We consider that we should focus on 
the most obvious and simple prohibitions around which all Members should be able to agree. This 
is based in part on the chair's 2011 assessment of where there was most convergence, where there is the most compelling case for a prohibition, and where legal drafting should be most 
simple. 
3.3.  Taking into account other contributions on elements
4, we propose that there should be 
prohibitions on: 
i. subsidies on activities affecting overfished stocks; and 
ii. subsidies provided to any vessel engaged in IUU fishing  
3.4.  Under these prohibitions Members would not be able to introduce any new subsidies in these 
areas or maintain existing subsidies beyond a limited transitional period. 
3.5.  All other specific fisheries subsidies would remain actionable under the SCM Agreement. In 
the absence of comprehensive prohibitions, an additional discipline would be necessary to guard against circumvention. This would clarify that the new disciplines are attributable to the Member 
conferring them, regardless of recipient nationality, vessel flag, or the rule of origin. 
3.2  Special and differential treatment  3.6.  Special and differential treatment (S&DT) needs to be proportional to, and appropriate for, 
the obligations that are envisaged. The prohibition on subsidies on activities affecting overfished 
stocks, and the prohibition on subsidies provided to any vessel engaged in IUU fishing should 
apply to all subsidies from all Members. It would not be appropriate to accord S&DT on these prohibitions. S&DT may however be appropriate in the context of the transparency provisions or 
the transitional arrangements. 
3.3  Transitional arrangements 3.7.  We are mindful that some Members may have existing subsidy programmes that will not be 
in conformity with the prohibition on subsidies on activities affecting overfished stocks. To that 
end, similar to the approach taken under Article 28 of the SCM Agreement, we would be open to limited transitional arrangements whereby Members would have a limited period to bring their programmes into conformity with the new disciplines. 
3.8.  In the case of prohibited subsidies provided to any vessel engaged in IUU fishing, it would 
seem inappropriate to provide a transitional period. 
3.4  Standstill 
3.9.  Given we are only proposing a limited list of prohibited subsidies, this leaves a range of 
subsidies that are recognised as being harmful such as vessel construction and fuel subsidies. It would therefore seem prudent to introduce a standstill commitment using language similar to that 
adopted at Rio+20 (to refrain from introducing new subsidies that contribute to overcapacity and 
overfishing or from extending or enhancing existi ng ones) until more complete disciplines can be 
established. This standstill would apply to subsidie s that contribute to overcapacity and overfishing 
not covered by the prohibitions. 
3.10.  We envisage recommitting to what is essentially agreed language. We consider that such a 
standstill could be monitored through the WTO. 
                                               
4 The ACP in its paper JOB/TNC/46 called for the prohibition of certain fisheries subsidies that contribute 
to overcapacity and over-fishing as an integr al part of the post-Bali work programme.   TN/RL/W/258 
 
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  3.5  Transparency, monitoring and review 
3.11.  New disciplines will necessarily require new and tailored reporting requirements to enable 
effective monitoring, together with effective meas ures for surveillance and enforcement. The types 
of subsidies for which Members provide information should also include fuel subsidies where these 
may have an impact on fisheries even when such subsidies may be non-specific. While already the 
case, the SCM Agreement could be amended to make clear that Members are required to notify any specific subsidy that they grant or maintain to persons or enterprises engaged in fishing or 
fishing related activities.  
3.12.  The SCM Committee should hold a de dicated annual review of progress in the 
implementation of the new disciplines, the natu re and extent of Members' subsidy programmes, 
and the related fish stock status, production and trade. This would be supported by a Secretariat 
summary based on Members' notifications complemented by relevant information provided by 
Members to the WTO Secretariat and information from other international organisations. 
3.6  Continuation of the fisheries subsidies reform process 
3.13.  Given the limited disciplines envisaged under the PBWP, we Members should also establish a 
built-in-agenda to continue the fisheries subsidies ongoing reform process. 
4  CONCLUSION 
4.1.  We are ready to engage constructively in discussions with other interested Members whether 
that be bilaterally, in small group discussions or through the Rules Negotiating Group on how the proposed elements feature in the PBWP for adoption at MC10. 
 
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