JOB/GC/148  
JOB/CTG/10  
 
30 October 2017  
(17-5893) Page: 1/7 
General Council  
Council for Trade in Goods  Original: English  
 
PROCEDURES TO ENHANC E TRANSPARENCY AND S TRENGTHEN NOTIFICATI ON 
REQUIREMENTS UNDER W TO AGREEMENTS  
COMMUNICATION FROM T HE UNITED STATES  
The following communication, dated 30 October  2017, is being circulated at the request of the 
Delegation of the United States.  
 
_______________  
 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
1. The upcoming 11th Ministerial Conference provides an opportunity to consider and evaluate 
institutional issues relating to the effectiveness and operation of the WTO.  
 
2. Transparency, particularly the fulfilment  of WTO  Agreement notification requirements, is a 
critical cross -cutting issue where progress could be made in improving the institutional 
effectiveness of the WTO in the short time remaining until MC11.  
 
3. Notification requirements constitute fundamental  elements of many WTO  Agreements, 
including the:  
 
Agreement on Agriculture  
Agreement on Implementation of Article  VI of the GATT  1994 (Anti -Dumping)  
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures  
Agreement on Safeguards  
Understanding on the Interpretat ion of Article  XVII of the GATT  1994 (State Trading)  
Agreement on Implementation of Article  VII of the GATT  1994 (Customs Valuation)  
Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures  
Agreement on Rules of Origin  
Agreement on Preshipment Inspection  
Decision on Notif ication Procedures for Quantitative Restrictions (G/L/59/Rev.1)  
Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures  
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures  
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade  
 
4. It is broadly recognized that compliance with the notification requirements of the various 
WTO Agreements is inadequate. For example, the most recent report by the WTO  Secretariat for 
the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures indicates that less than half of the 
WTO Member s have provided their 2015  subsidy notification. The most recent report by the 
WTO Secretariat for the Committee on Agriculture from June  2017 shows that at least one  third of 
the regular notifications are outstanding for the period 1995 -2015. Those WTO  Members listed in 
the report who had still not notified their domestic support for the year  2013 accounted for 
approximately 30% of the total value of agricultural production by WTO  Members based on Food 
and Agriculture Organization statistics. Notifications concerning the Agreement on Import Licensing 
Procedures saw just 23% compliance in 2016, while the compliance rate regarding state-trading 
enterprises was only slightly better compliance at 26% in 2016. Fewer than 8% of Members 
submitted notifications for the Decision on Notification Procedures for Quantitative Restrictions for 
the 2014 -2016 period, in line with the requirements  of the Decision on Notification Procedures for JOB/GC/148 • JOB/CTG/10  
 
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  Quantitative Restrictions (QR  Decision – G/L/59/Rev.1). Regarding Safeguards, just 34% of 
Members complied with their notification requirements as of 2016.  
 
5. The notification requirements under the various agreements are intended to provide basic 
factual information regarding each Member 's implementation of the relevant agreement. The 
chronic low -level of Members ' compliance with existing transparency obligations undermines the 
proper functioning and operati on of these agreements. The absence of this information also makes 
it difficult to develop, evaluate, and assess negotiating proposals to improve operation of the 
agreements. In addition, the lack of compliance with these obligations undermines confidence in 
the system – if Members can 't comply with the most basic obligations, what certainty can there be  
that they are complying with the more substantive ones.  
 
DEFICIENCIES IN EXISTING NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS  
 
6. As briefly described below, notification re quireme nts and procedures for many 
WTO agreements are not working as intended, and consideration needs to be given to ways to 
improve compliance with the requirements. In this regard, consideration should be given to 
tangible benefits for compliance and ne gative consequences for non -compliance. Compared to 
non-compliance with substantive obligations, the effects of which can be more easily quantified, 
transparency obligations are often perceived as not having a quantifiable, negative consequence 
and therefo re to be less important than core trade disciplines. That is simply incorrect. Clearly, for 
example, un -notified subsidy programs can distort trade and can have a devastating impact on a 
Member 's industry. Lack of transparency with respect to subsidy progr ams leaves the affected 
Member without the necessary information to understand and address the real cause of the injury 
to its industry. Therefore, we believe consideration needs to be given to enhancing the 
effectiveness of the transparency requirements, with the goal of strengthening notification 
obligations under the agreements, with a focus on a few discreet areas where compliance is most  
lacking or new disciplines are being contemplated. Employing administrative measures already 
implemented by other pa rts of the WTO, and promoting the use of counter notifications of 
Member 's policies that should have been notified, as provided for in the Agreement on Agriculture, 
are some mechanisms that could enhance the effectiveness of WTO  transparency requirements.  
 
Fisheries Subsidies  
 
7. The world 's fisheries resources are rapidly being depleted. The Food and Agriculture 
Organization estimates that approximately 90% of global fisheries are overfished or fully fished. 
The global fishing fleet is estimated to be 250%  larger than what is needed to fish at sustainable 
levels.  
 
8. Harmful fisheries subsidies, particularly those that contribute to overfishing, overcapacity, 
and illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, have been estimated at approximately 
$20 billion annually. These harmful fisheries subsidies are considered to be a major contributing 
factor in the unsustainable depletion of fisheries resources. However, notified fisheries programs 
appear to account for only a small portion of the $20  billion in e stimated subsidies. As noted 
above, the Secretariat found that less than half of all WTO Members provided notifications under 
the SCM  Agreement for the January to June  2016 reporting period. With respect to fisheries 
subsidies, that proportion is likely to  be substantially less. As an example, the United States 
recently counter -notified over 40  fisheries support measures that a major fishing Member had 
failed to notify.  
 
9. WTO Members currently are negotiating potential new disciplines aimed at prohibiting  the 
most harmful forms of fisheries subsidies. However, without a solid foundation of information 
regarding the scope, nature, and extent of existing fisheries subsidies, it has been and will 
continue to be difficult to craft appropriate and effective sub sidy disciplines.  
 
10. As an interim step, the United States proposes that Ministers take a decision at MC11 to 
re-commit to complying with their existing notification obligations under the Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, and agree on a dditional new categories of information to 
be reported. With a more comprehensive picture of existing programs and their trade and 
conservation impacts, Members will be better positioned to develop fisheries subsidies obligations 
that would be effective in  achieving the objectives of addressing the worst forms of subsidies, 
including those that contribute to overfishing, overcapacity, and IUU  fishing.  JOB/GC/148 • JOB/CTG/10  
 
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Agriculture  
 
11. Compared to 1995, more countries with a broader array of characteristics, including 
devel opment status, account for a larger share of and play a more important role in agricultural 
production, subsidization, and trade. This means understanding distortions in agricultural trade 
today requires detailed information on agricultural policies from a  wide variety of countries.  
 
12. As noted above, the Secretariat found that one  third of all WTO  Members have outstanding 
notifications under the Agreement on Agriculture between 1995 and 2014. Domestic support and 
export subsidy notifications account for 70% of outstanding notifications. According to the 
Secretariat 's report, 31  Members have not submitted any notifications on their domestic support 
measures, and 26  Members have not submitted any notifications on their export subsidies. Some 
countries that have substantial agricultural production, as well as significant agricultural policies, 
are more than five  years behind in submitting their notifications. Further, discussions in the 
Committee on Agriculture have shown that notifications that have been woe fully inadequate in 
explaining how policies are implemented and their effect on global markets.  
 
13. WTO Members remain interested in continuing to negotiate agricultural trade liberalizing 
reforms. However, it has been and will remain difficult to engage in a successful negotiation on 
agriculture that meets the trade liberalizing objectives of the WTO when we lack basic data to give 
us a clear understanding of today 's global agricultural trade landscape.  
 
14. As an interim step, the United States proposes that Ministers take a decision at MC11 to 
re-commit to complying with their existing notification obligations under the Agreement on 
Agriculture and to commit to further strengthening the Committee on Agriculture as a forum for 
Members to discuss Members ' implementation of agricultural policies. With a deeper understanding 
of the facts and problems we are all facing today, Members will be better positioned to strengthen 
agricultural disciplines in the context of today 's landscape.  
 
Technical Barriers to Tra de 
 
15. The WTO  Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade has four  main notifications 
requirements. Members inform the Committee of measures in existence or taken to ensure the 
implementation and administration of the agreement, under Article  15.2. 
Member  15.2 notifications include laws governing the transparent development of regulation and 
laws governing standardization, conformity assessment and metrology. Members also notify 
central government standardization bodies ' acceptance and adherence to the Stand ards Code of 
Good Practice to the ISO/IEC  Centre, according to Article  4.1. Members ' bilateral and regional 
agreements are notified to the TBT  Committee under Article  10.7. Last, Members notify proposed 
technical regulations and conformity assessment proce dures, under Articles  2.9.2, 3.2 and 5.6.2 to 
the TBT  Committee for WTO  Member comment.  
 
16. With regard to regular notifications of new laws implementing the TBT  Agreement, 
acceptance of the Code of Good Practice, and notification of Agreements between Me mbers, 
activity could be improved. While the total number of annual notifications of proposed technical 
regulations and conformity assessment procedures has gradually increased to over 
2000 notifications and that trend is encouraging, there is still room f or improvement given the 
disparity between those Members notifying and those that do not, with 83  Members  not notifying 
any proposals in 2016.  
 
Other Agreements  
 
17. As noted above, compliance with regards to state -trading enterprise notifications was only 
26% in 2016. This is a growing problem, as the notification compliance rate has been steadily 
decreasing compared to past years and the problem is starting to become  systemically 
entrenched. According to the latest data circulated by the Secretariat, fifty -four Members have not 
made a notification under Article  XVII:4 of GATT  1994 and paragraph  1 of the Understanding on 
the Interpretation of Article  XVII of the GATT  1994 in the last ten  years. Given the increasing role 
and impact that state -trading enterprises are having on trade, as well as ongoing privatization 
efforts taking place with many Members ' enterprises, transparency is all the more important. 
In 2015, the S ecretariat conducted a notification workshop for Members, providing information on JOB/GC/148 • JOB/CTG/10  
 
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  the notification requirements and what information has been typically provided by Members in 
their respective notifications. The Secretariat and some Members (including the United States) also 
offered to discuss bilaterally particular notification challeng es on a case -by-case basis.  
 
18. As of November  2016, the Secretariat reported that 96  Members have notified the 
Committee on Customs Valuation on customs valuation legislat ion. However, only 65  Members 
have notified on the check list of issues required under the Agreement on Implementation of 
Article  VII of the GATT  1994. And 35  Members have not made either of these two  notifications. 
The high number of outstanding notificat ions concerning customs valuation brings into question 
Members ' commitment to an organization based in the rule of law.  
 
19. Further examples of the low level of Member compliance with notification requirements are 
outlined in document  G/L/223/Rev.24, "Updating of the Listing of Notification Obligations and the 
Compliance therewith as set out in Annex  III of the Report of the Working Group on Notification 
Obligations and Procedures ". 
 
DRAFT MINISTERIAL DECISION  
 
20. The Annex includes a draft Ministerial De cision that sets out proposed actions intended to 
improve compliance with, and the quality and effectiveness of, notification requirements in 
general, as well as under specific agreements. The United States proposes that Members consider 
adopting this deci sion at MC11 as an important contribution to improving the functioning of the 
WTO. If timing does not permit agreement to be reached for MC11, the United States proposes 
that Members consider continuing work on this proposal as a part of broader i nstitutio nal reform 
post-MC11.  
 
  JOB/GC/148 • JOB/CTG/10  
 
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  Annex  
Draft Ministerial Decision  
 
Procedures to Enhance Transparency and Strengthen Notification Requirements  
Under WTO  Agreements  
 
Ministerial Decision of XX  December  2017  
 
The Ministerial Conference,  
 
 Recognizing  that transparency and notification requirements constitute fundamental 
elements of many WTO  agreements and a properly functioning WTO  system, and thus of Members ' 
obligations;  
 
Acknowledging  the chronic low level of compliance with existing notification r equirements 
under WTO  agreements; and  
 
 Desiring  to strengthen and enhance transparency and improve the operation and 
effectiveness of notification requirements;  
 
 Decides:  
 
General  
 
1. To reaffirm existing notification obligations and recommit to providing complete and timely 
notifications under the WTO  Agreements within the remit of the Council on Trade in Goods, for 
which there is regular annual reporting provided by the Secretariat (G/L/223/Rev.24 and its 
revisions), including the:  
 
(a) Agreemen t on Agriculture  
 
(b) Agreement on Implementation of Article  VI of the GATT  1994 (Anti -Dumping)  
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures  
Agreement on Safeguards  
Understanding on the Interpretation of Article  XVII of the GATT  1994 (State Trading)  
Agreement on Implementation of Article  VII of the GATT  1994 (Customs Valuation)  
Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures  
Agreement on Rules of Origin  
Agreement on Preshipment Inspection  
Decision on Notification Procedures for Quantitative Restrictions (G/L /59/Rev.1)  
Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures  
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures  
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade.  
 
2. To instruct appropriate committees, working groups or other bodies, such as the Work ing 
Group on Notification Obligations and Procedures, to assess and report annually to their 
designated supervisory bodies on Members ' compliance with notification obligations under the 
agreements listed in paragraph  1, take appropriate steps to reinforce compliance with the 
notification requirements under such agreements (for example, by carrying out notification 
workshops), and to make recommendations, as appropriate, on means by which greater 
compliance ca n be encouraged and achieved.  
 
3. To instruct the  Trade Policy Review Body to ensure that beginning in 2018 all trade policy 
reviews include a specific, standardized focus on the Member 's compliance with its notification 
obligations under the agreements listed in paragraph  1. 
 
4. At any time, Members are  encouraged to provide a counter notification on behalf of the 
delinquent Member concerning notification obligations under the agreements listed in paragraph  1. 
 
5. That beginning in 2018, a Member that fails to provide a required notification under an 
agreement listed in paragraph  1(b) by the relevant deadline or has failed to provide any prior 
required notification shall submit to the relevant committee by 1 November  2018 and by JOB/GC/148 • JOB/CTG/10  
 
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  1 November of each subsequent year an explanation for the delay, the anticipa ted time -frame for  
its notification, and any elements of a partial notification that a Member can produce to limit any 
delay in transparency. If a Member fails to provide the complete notification within one  year of the 
deadline, the Secretariat shall research the matter and, in consultation with the relevant 
delinquent Member, provid e a notification on its behalf.  
 
6. For an agreement listed in paragraph  1(b), if a Member fails to provide the complete 
notification within one  year of the deadline and th e delinquent Member fails to cooperate with the 
Secretariat so that the Secretariat is unable to obtain enough information to provide a notification, 
the following administrative measures shall apply to the delinquent Member:1 
 
(a) After one but less than two full years from a notification deadline, the following 
measures shall be applied to the delinquent Member  at the beginning of the 
second  year:  
 
(i) representatives of the delinquent Member cannot be nominated to preside over 
WTO bodies;  
 
(ii) documentation will not be provided to delinquent Member delegations in Geneva 
nor to the Member 's capital;  
 
(iii) the delinquent Member 's access to the WTO  Members ' web site will be 
discontinued;  
 
(iv) the Director -General will contact annually the Ministe r of the delinquent Member 
responsible for the WTO, or any other official at the appropriate level 
emphasizing  the question of notifications;  
 
(v) the Secretariat will report annually to the Council on Trade in Goods on the 
status of the delinquent Member 's notifications; and  
 
(vi) the delinquent Member will be subject to specific reporting at the General 
Council meetings.  
 
(b) After two but less than three  full years following a notification deadline, the following 
measures shall be applied to the Member a t the beginning of the third  year, in 
addition to the measures in paragraph  6(a): 
 
(i) the Member will be designated as an Inactive Member;  
 
(ii) the Inactive Member will be denied access to training or technical assistance 
other than that necessary to meet their WTO  Article  XIV:2 obligations; and  
 
(iii) when the Inactive Member takes the floor in the General Council  it will be 
identified as such.  
 
7. At the beginning of each year when measures will be applied, the Director -General will notify 
the Minist ers of the Members responsible for the WTO of the administrative measures being 
applied with respect to the delinquent Member. Once the Member comes into compliance with its 
notification requirements, th e measures will cease to apply.  
 
Improvements to Spec ific Notification Requirements  
 
Agriculture  
 
8. That in order to strengthen and enhance the effectiveness of the review process of the 
implementation of commitments in the Agreement on Agriculture, the Committee on Agriculture is 
requested to regularly review and update its Notification Requirements and  Formats (G/AG/2), 
                                                
1 The proposed administrative measures are derived from WT/BFA/W/410, concerning administrative 
measures for Members in arrears.  JOB/GC/148 • JOB/CTG/10  
 
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  taking into account recommendations made by the committees and other bodies described in 
paragraph  2 and consistent with paragraph  9. 
 
9. Taking note of the discussions by Members in the Committee on Agriculture, it is recognized 
that th e compilation of the required information and data with regards to the agricultural 
notifications may not be available within the time -frame [currently set forth] [established for 
submitting notifications] in G/AG/2. Therefore, Members [are encouraged to][ shall] submit their 
notifications within the timeframes noted in G/AG/2 whenever possible, but shall submit them, no 
later than [720  days] [2  years] following the year in question.  
 
10. That beginning in 2018, a Member that has not provided the required no tification under the 
Agreement on Agriculture shall be required to submit to the Com mittee on Agriculture within 
60 days of the notification deadline as noted in paragraph  9 an explanation for the delay, the 
anticipated time -frame for its notification, and  any elements of a partial notification that a Member 
can produce to limi t any delay in transparency.  
 
11. If a notification is not filed by the delinquent Member for the Agreement on Agriculture in 
accordance with paragraph  9, the administrative measures identified in sub -paragraphs  6(a) and 
(b) shall apply to the Member.  
 
Fisheries Subsidies  
 
12. That in order to strengthen and enhance the effectiveness of notifications of fisheries 
subsidies, each Member shall notify as part of its regular notifications under Article  25.3 of the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures the following info rmation to the extent 
possible:  
 
(a) program name;  
 
(b) legal authority for the program;  
 
(c) name of recipient;  
 
(d) vessel name and identification number;  
 
(e) catch data by species in the fishery for which the subsidy is provided;  
 
(f) status of the fish stocks in the fishery for which the subsidy is provided (overfished, 
fully fished, or underfished);  
 
(g) fleet capacity in the fishery for which the subsidy is  provided;  
 
(h) conservation and management measures in place for the relevant fish stock; and  
 
(i) total imports and exports per species.  
 
13. That each Member shall also provide, to the extent possible, information in relation to other 
subsidies that the  Member grants or maintains to persons engaged in fishing or fishing related 
activities that are not covered by paragraph  12, in particular aquaculture and fuel subsidies.  
 
Technical Barriers to Trade  
 
14. In order to strengthen the notification of propose d technical regulations and conformity 
assessment procedures, Members are strongly encouraged to use the WTO  TBT Committee 's 
recommendation on Coherent Use of Notification Formats.2 
 
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2 G/TBT/35 .