WT/AB/24  
 
3 July 2015  
(15-3440)  Page: 1/153  
   
 
  
 
 
  
 
   
 
  
 
  
 
   
 
APPELLATE BODY 
  
ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2014 
 
 
  
 
JULY 2015 WT/AB/24 
 
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The Appellate Body welcomes  comments and inquiries  
regarding this Annual Report at the  
following address: 
 
Appellate Body Secretariat 
World Trade Organization 
rue de Lausanne 154 
1211 Geneva, Switzerland 
e-mail: appellatebody.registry@wto.org 
<https://www.wto.org/english/tratop _e/dispu_e/appella te_body_e.htm > WT/AB/24 
 
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  CONTENTS 
FOREWORD ...................................................................................................................... . 6 
1 INTRODUC TION ............................................................................................................. 7 
2 COMPOSITION OF TH E APPELLATE BODY ....................................................................... 9 
Table 1: Composition of th e Appellate Bo dy in 2014 ..................................................... 11  
3 APPEALS ..................................................................................................................... . 11 
Table 2: Panel reports appealed in  2014 ..................................................................... 12  
Chart 1: Total number of  appeals 199 5–2014 .............................................................. 13  
4 APPELLATE BODY  REPORTS ......................................................................................... 13  
Table 3: Appellate Body repo rts circulated  in 2014  ....................................................... 13  
Table 4: WTO Agreements addressed in Appellate Body reports circulated in 2014 ............ 14  
Chart 2: WTO agreements addressed in appeals 1996–2014 .......................................... 15  
4.1 Appellate Body Reports, European Communities – Measures Prohibiting the Importation 
and Marketing of Seal Products , WT/DS400/AB/R and WT/DS401/AB/R ............................. 15  
4.1.1 Annex 1.1 to the TBT Agreement ....................................................................... 16  
4.1.2 Articles I:1 and III:4 of the GATT 1994 ............................................................... 18  
4.1.3 Article XX of the GATT 1994 .............................................................................. 20  
4.2 Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Measures on 
Certain Products from China , WT/DS449/AB/R ............................................................. 29  
4.2.1 Article 6.2 of the DSU ...................................................................................... 29  
4.2.2 Article X:2 of the GATT 1994 ............................................................................ 31  
4.2.3 Article 11 of the DSU ....................................................................................... 33  
4.2.4 Completion of the analysis ................................................................................ 33  
4.3 Appellate Body Reports, China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths, 
Tungsten, and Molybdenum , WT/DS431/AB/R; WT/DS432/AB/R; and WT/DS433/AB/R ....... 36  
4.3.1 Availability of Article XX of the GATT 1994 – Systemic relationship between 
China's Accession Protocol and the Marrakesh Agreement together with its Annexes ......... 37  
4.3.2 Article XX(g) of  the GATT 1994 ......................................................................... 41  
4.3.3 The United States' appeal of the panel' s decision to reject certain evidence ............. 45  
4.4 Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervailing Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled 
Carbon Steel Flat Products from India , WT/DS436/ AB/R................................................ 46  
4.4.1 Public body .................................................................................................... 47  
4.4.2 Financial contribution ....................................................................................... 49  
4.4.3 Benefit – "as such" clai ms ................................................................................ 50  
4.4.4 Benefit – "as applied" claims ............................................................................. 54  
4.4.5 Specificity ...................................................................................................... 57  
4.4.6 Article 12.7 of the SCM Agreement .................................................................... 58  
4.4.7 New subsidy allegations in administrative reviews ................................................ 59  
4.4.8 Cross-cu mulation ............................................................................................ 60  
4.5 Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products 
from China , WT/DS437/AB/R ..................................................................................... 61  WT/AB/24 
 
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  4.5.1 The panel's term s of refe rence .......................................................................... 63  
4.5.2 Articles 14(d) and 1.1(b) of  the SCM Agreement – Benefit .................................... 64  
4.5.3 Article 2.1 of the SCM Agreement – Specificity .................................................... 69  
4.5.4 Article 12.7 of the SCM Ag reement – Facts available ............................................ 73  
5 PARTICIPANTS AND THIRD PA RTICIPANTS IN APPEALS ............................................. 75  
Table 5: Participants and third participants in appeals for which an Appellate Body 
report was circulat ed in 2014 .................................................................................... 76  
Chart 3: WTO Member participation in appeals 1996–2014 ............................................ 77  
6 WORKING PROCEDURES FO R APPELLATE REVIEW ....................................................... 78  
6.1 Procedural issues aris ing in appeal s in 2014 ................................................................... 78  
6.2 Procedural issues arising from appeals ........................................................................... 78  
6.2.1 Open oral  hearing ........................................................................................... 78  
6.2.2 Allocation of appeal numbers ............................................................................ 78  
6.2.3 Challenge to No tice of Appeal ........................................................................... 79  
6.2.4 Consolidation of a ppellate proceedings ............................................................... 79  
6.2.5 Extension of time to file submissions .................................................................. 79  
6.2.6 Amendments to the offi cial Working Schedule ..................................................... 80  
6.2.7 Timeliness and adequa cy of notifi cations ............................................................ 81  
6.2.8 Unsolicited amicus curiae  briefs ......................................................................... 81  
6.2.9 Extension of time period for circulation of reports ................................................ 81  
6.2.10 Request for se parate reports ........................................................................... 82  
7 ARBITRATIONS UNDER ARTICL E 21.3(C) OF THE DSU ................................................. 82  
8 WTO TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE  AND TRAINING  PLAN ................................................... 82  
9 OTHER ACTI VITIES  ...................................................................................................... 82  
9.1 Briefings, conferences, moot court competitions .............................................................. 82  
9.2 WTO internship  programme ......................................................................................... 82  
9.3 The WTO Digital Disput e Settlement Re gistry ................................................................. 83  
Annex 1 The Workload of the Appellate Body .................................................................. 84 
Annex 2 Director-General's Speech to the DSB  ............................................................... 86 
Annex 3 Members of the Appellate Bo dy 2014 – Biographic al notes .................................... 92 
Annex 4 Welcome of a new A ppellate Body Member ......................................................... 96 
Annex 5 Former Appellate Body Members and Chai rpersons .............................................. 98 
Annex 6 Appeals fi led: 1995 –2014 ............................................................................... 100 
Annex 7 Percentage of panel reports appealed by year of adoption: 1995–2014 .................. 101 
Annex 8 WTO agreements adddressed in Appellate Body reports circulated through 2014 ..... 102 
Annex 9 Participants and third part icipants in appe als: 199 5–2014 ................................... 103 
Annex 10 Appellate Body Secretariat participation in the WTO Technical Assistance and 
Training Pl an in 2014 ..................................................................................... 131 
Annex 11 Appellate Body Secretariat participation in briefings, conferences, and moot 
court competitions in 2014 .............................................................................. 132 
Annex 12 WTO dispute settlement reports and arbitration aw ards: 1995–2014 ..................... 133 WT/AB/24 
 
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  WTO ABBREVIATIONS USED IN  THIS ANNUAL REPORT 
Abbreviation Description 
ATC Agreement on Textiles and Clothing 
Anti-Dumping Agreement Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994  
CAFC United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
China's Accession Protocol Protocol on the Accession of the People's Republic of China to the 
WTO 
CVD countervailing duty 
DSB Dispute Settlement Body  
DSU Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement 
of Disputes 
GATS General Agreement on Trade in Services  
GATT 1994 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 
GOC Government of China 
GOI Government of India 
NMDC National Mineral Development Corporation 
NME non-market economy 
OCTG Oil Country Tubular Goods 
Rules of Conduct Rules of Conduct for th e Understanding on Rules and Procedures 
Governing the Settlement of Disputes, adopted by the DSB on 3 December 1996, WT/DSB/RC/1 
SCM Agreement Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
SDF Steel Development Fund 
SOEs state-owned enterprises 
SPS Agreement Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures 
TBT Agreement Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade  
TRIMs Agreement Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures  
TRIPS Agreement Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights  
USDOC United States Department of Commerce 
USITC United States International Trade Commission 
Working Procedures Working Procedures for Appellate Review, WT/AB/WP/6, 
16 August 2010 
WTO World Trade Organization 
WTO Agreement Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization 
 
 WT/AB/24 
 
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  FOREWORD 
In January 2014, the Appellate Body welcomed a new cycle in the Mayan Calendar, fully aware of 
the challenges ahead. David Unterhalter completed his second term in December 2013, and the Appellate Body was left to function with only six Members for most of 2014. It was not until 
September that the Appellate Body reverted to normality with the appointment of Mr Shree Baboo 
Chekitan Servansing. Shree has already made his presence felt in the Appellate Body, and his skills and knowledge continue to make our institution stronger and wiser. 
By the end of 2014, the Dispute Settlement Bo dy had received nearly 500 requests for 
consultations. In its first 16 years, the DSB has handled disputes spanning over US$1 trillion in 
trade flows. Two thirds of WTO Members have participated in dispute settlement in one way or another. These numbers are quite telling. Despite the attention given to emerging regional trade 
initiatives, our dispute settlement system remains to be the preferred and perhaps the only forum 
where international trade disputes are adjudicated effectively and efficiently. 
2014 saw the highest number of total active disputes at the panel and appeal stages. Thirteen 
panel reports were appealed in 2014, and the Appellate Body issued eight reports concerning five 
matters in: EC – Seal Products ; US – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Measures (China) ;  
China – Rare Earths ; US – Carbon Steel  (India) ; and US – Countervailing Measures (China) . 
A ninth Appellate Body report, in Argentina – Import Measures , was circulated in January 2015. 
The robust level of appeal activity in 2014 confirms the conclusions reached in the Appellate 
Body's 2013 Workload Paper (see Annex 1 to th e Annual Report for 2013). As indicated in the 
2013 Workload Paper, appeals have increased not only in rate, but also in complexity, to what was 
witnessed in the first decade of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. Disputes now commonly 
involve multiple parties advancing a variety of claims, increased third-party participation, and greater procedural complexity. Looking at it from a broader context, 2014 has been a "trend-
setting year" in terms of complexity of appeal s and the number of panel reports appealed. On 
average, 68% of circulated panel reports are appealed. In 2014, that figure rose to 87%. 
Be that as it may, 2014 is just the tip of the iceberg. As the 2013 Workload Paper projected, 
the upward trend of dispute settlement activity will  continue for the next several years. On top of 
the current heavy workload, we anticipate appeals in the aircraft and tobacco cases, which are on the horizon. 
All these facts have increased the burden that is  placed on the dispute settlement system, and on 
the Appellate Body in particular, to produce high-quality reports. This significant strain on the 
system and its limited resources require effectiv e and innovative solutions. The Appellate Body, 
together with the WTO Administration, continue to address budgetary and human resource issues 
to meet the challenges posed by the current workload. Nonetheless, there are structural aspects to 
these concerns that only the WTO Membership can address. 
We interpret the upsurge in the use of dispute settl ement, and in appeals specifically, as a sign of 
confidence by the WTO Membership in the disput e settlement system. We thus consider it our 
mission to continue delivering high-quality Appellate Body reports swiftly, regardless of the number and complexity of appeals filed. 
For the past 20 years, the Appellate Body has se rved as a model for treaty interpretation and 
adjudication. Regardless of one's agreement with our findings, it is uncontested that we adjudicate 
disputes on their merits and in a methodical  manner. The WTO dispute settlement system is 
among the most active, complex, efficient, an d sophisticated international dispute settlement 
systems. The quality of our reports is our trademark, and it is non-negotiable. We stand ready 
with the WTO Membership and the WTO Administration to address coming challenges and make the system work better than ever. 
Ricardo Ramírez-Hernández 
Chair, Appellate Body 
 WT/AB/24 
 
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  WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 
APPELLATE BODY 
ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2014 
1  INTRODUCTION 
This Annual Report summarizes the activities of the Appellate Body and its Secretariat for the 
year 2014. 
Dispute settlement in the World Trade Organization (WTO) is regulated by the 
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU), which is 
contained in Annex 2 of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement). Article 3.2 of the DSU states the overarching purposes of the dispute settlement system as such: "The dispute settlemen t system of the WTO is a central element in 
providing security and predictability to the mult ilateral trading system." Further, Article 3.2 
provides that the dispute settlement system "ser ves to preserve the rights and obligations of 
Members under the covered agreements, and to clarif y the existing provisions of those agreements 
in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law." The dispute 
settlement system is administered by the Disput e Settlement Body (DSB), which is composed of 
all WTO Members. 
A WTO Member may have recourse to the rules and procedures established in the DSU if it 
"considers that any benefits accruing to it directly or indirectly under the covered agreements are being impaired by measures taken by another Member".
1 The DSU procedures apply to disputes 
arising under any of the covered agreements listed in Appendix 1 to the DSU, which include the 
WTO Agreement and all the multilateral agreements  annexed to it relating to trade in goods2, 
trade in services3, and the protection of intellectual property rights4, as well as the DSU itself. 
Pursuant to Article 1.2 of the DSU, the special or additional rules and procedures listed in 
Appendix 2 of the DSU prevail over those cont ained in the DSU to the extent that there 
is an inconsistency. The application of the DSU to disputes under the plurilateral trade agreements annexed to the WTO Agreement
5 is subject to the adoption of a decision by the parties to each 
of these agreements setting out the terms for its application to the individual agreement.6 
Proceedings under the DSU take place in stages. In the first stage, Members are required to hold 
consultations with a view to reaching a mutually agreed solution to the matter in dispute.7 If these 
consultations fail to produce a mutually agreed solution, the dispute may advance to the 
adjudicative stage in which the complaining Member requests the DSB to establish a panel to 
examine the matter.8 Panelists are chosen by agreement of  the parties, based on nominations 
proposed by the Secretariat.9 However, if the parties cannot agree, either party may request the 
WTO Director-General to determine the composition of the panel.10 Panels shall be composed of 
well-qualified governmental and/or non-governmental individuals with expertise in international trade law or policy.
11 In discharging its adjudicative function, a panel is required to "make an 
objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the 
case and the applicability of and conformity with  the relevant covered agreements, and make such 
other findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings 
                                               
1 Article 3.3 of the DSU. 
2 Annex 1A to the WTO Agreement . 
3 Annex 1B to the WTO Agreement . 
4 Annex 1C to the WTO Agreement. 
5 Annex 4 to the WTO Agreement. 
6 Appendix 1 to the DSU. 
7 Article 4 of the DSU. 
8 Article 6 of the DSU. 
9 Article 8.6 of the DSU. 
10 Article 8.7 of the DSU. 
11 Article 8.1 of the DSU. WT/AB/24 
 
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  provided for in the covered agreements."12 The panel process includes written submissions by the 
main parties and also by third parties that have no tified their interest in the dispute to the DSB. 
Panels usually hold two meetings with the parties, one of which also includes a session with third parties. Panels set out their factual and legal findings in an interim report that is subject to 
comments by the parties. The final report is first issued to the parties, and is subsequently 
circulated to all WTO Members in the three o fficial languages of the WTO (English, French, 
and Spanish), at which time it is also posted on the WTO website. 
Article 17 of the DSU establishes a standing Appellate Body. The Appellate Body is composed 
of seven Members who are each appointed to a four -year term, with a possibility to be reappointed 
once. The expiration dates of terms are staggered in order to ensure that not all Members begin and complete their terms at the same time. Me mbers of the Appellate Body must be persons 
of recognized authority, with demonstrated expertise in law, international trade, and the subject 
matter of the covered agreements generally. They  shall be unaffiliated with any government. 
Moreover, the Appellate Body membership shall be  broadly representative of the membership of 
the WTO. Appellate Body Members elect a Chairp erson to serve a one-year term, which can be 
extended for an additional one-year period. The Chairperson is responsible for the overall direction of Appellate Body business. Each appeal is heard by a Division of three Appellate Body Members. 
The process for the selection of Divisions is de signed to ensure randomness, unpredictability, 
and opportunity for all Members to serve, regardless of their national origin. To ensure consistency and coherence in decision-making, Divisions exch ange views with the other four Members of the 
Appellate Body before finalizing Appellate Body reports. The Appellate Body receives legal 
and administrative support from its Secretariat. The conduct of Members of the Appellate Body and 
its staff is regulated by the Rules of Conduct for the Understanding on Rules and Procedures 
Governing the Settlement of Disputes
13 (Rules of Conduct). These Rules emphasize that 
Appellate Body Members shall be independent, impart ial, and avoid any direct or indirect conflict 
of interest.14  
Any party to a dispute, other than WTO Members that were third parties at the panel stage, 
may appeal a panel report to the Appellate Body. These third parties may however participate 
and make written and oral submissions in the appellate proceedings. The appeal is limited to issues of law covered in the panel report and legal interpretations developed by the panel. Appellate proceedings are conducted in accordance with the procedures established in the DSU 
and the Working Procedures for Appellate Review
15 (Working Procedures), drawn up by the 
Appellate Body in consultation with the Chai rperson of the DSB and the Director-General 
of the WTO, and communicated to WTO Members.  Proceedings involve the filing of written 
submissions by the participants and third participants, as well as an oral hearing. The 
Appellate Body report is to be circulated within 90 days of the date when the appeal was initiated, 
and is posted on the WTO website immediately upon circulation to Members. In its report, 
the Appellate Body may uphold, modify, or reverse the legal findings and conclusions of a panel.  
Panel and Appellate Body reports must be adop ted by WTO Members acting collectively through 
the DSB. Under the reverse consensus rule, a report is adopted by the DSB unless all WTO Members present at the meeting formally object to its adoption.
16 Upon adoption, 
Appellate Body reports and panel reports (as modified by the Appellate Body) become binding 
upon the parties. 
Following the adoption by the DSB of a panel or Appellate Body report that includes a finding 
of inconsistency of a measure of the responding Member with its WTO obligations, Article 21.3 
of the DSU provides that the responding Member should, in principle, comply immediately. However, where immediate compliance is "impracticable", the responding Member shall have 
                                               
12 Article 11 of the DSU. 
13 The Rules of Conduct, as adopted by the DSB on 3 December 1996 (WT/DSB/RC/1), are directly 
incorporated into the Working Procedures for Appe llate Review (WT/AB/WP/6), as Annex II thereto. 
(See WT/DSB/RC/2, WT/AB/WP/W/2) 
14 Former Appellate Body Members, Secretariat staff and interns are also subject to Post Employment 
Guidelines, which facilitate compliance with relevant  obligations of conduct following a term of service 
(WT/AB/22). The communication from the Appellate Body regarding post-employment guidelines is attached as Annex 1 to this Annual Report.  
15 Working Procedures for Appellate Review, WT/AB/WP/6, 16 August 2010. 
16 Articles 16.4 and 17.14 of the DSU. WT/AB/24 
 
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  a "reasonable period of time" to implement the DSB's recommendations and rulings. 
The "reasonable period of time" may be determ ined by the DSB, by agreement between the 
parties, or through binding arbitration pursuant to Article 21.3(c) of the DSU. In such arbitration, 
a guideline for the arbitrator is that the reasonable period of time to implement panel or Appellate 
Body recommendations should not exceed 15 months  from the date of adoption of the panel or 
Appellate Body report. However, that time may be shorter or longer, depending upon the particular circumstances. Arbitrators have indicated that the reasonable period of time shall be the 
shortest time possible in the implementing Member 's legal system. To date, arbitrations pursuant 
to Article 21.3(c) of the DSU have been conducte d by current or former Appellate Body Members 
acting in an individual capacity. 
Where the parties disagree "as to the existenc e or consistency with a covered agreement 
of measures taken to comply", the matter may be  referred to the original panel in compliance 
proceedings under Article 21.5 of the DSU. In these Article 21.5 compliance proceedings, a panel report is issued and may be appealed to the A ppellate Body. Upon their adoption by the DSB, 
panel and Appellate Body reports in Article 21.5 compliance proceedings become binding on 
the parties. 
If the responding Member does not bring its WTO-inconsistent measure into compliance with its 
obligations under the covered agreements within the reasonable period of time, the complaining 
Member may request negotiations with the responding Member with a view to finding mutually acceptable compensation as a temporary and voluntary alternative to full compliance. Compensation is subject to acceptance by the complaining Member, and must be consistent with 
the WTO agreements. If no satisfactory compensa tion is agreed upon, the complaining Member 
may request authorization from the DSB, pursua nt to Article 22 of the DSU, to suspend the 
application of concessions or other obligations under the WTO agreements to the responding 
Member. The level of the suspension of concessi ons or other obligations authorized by the DSB 
shall be equivalent to the level of the nullification or impairment resulting from non-compliance with the DSB recommendations and rulings. The responding Member may request arbitration 
under Article 22.6 of the DSU if it objects to the le vel of suspension proposed or considers that the 
principles and procedures concerning the sector or covered agreement to which the suspension may apply have not been followed. In principle, the suspension of concessions or other obligations must relate to the same trade sector or agreement as the measure found to be inconsistent. 
However, if this is impracticable or ineffective for the complaining Member, and if circumstances 
are serious, the complaining Member may seek authorization to suspend concessions with respect to other sectors or agreements. The arbitration under Article 22.6 shall be carried out by the 
original panel, if its members are available. Compensation and the suspension of concessions 
or other obligations are temporary measures; neither is to be preferred to full implementation of 
a recommendation to bring a measure into conformity with the covered agreements.
17  
A party to a dispute may request good offices, conciliation, or mediation as alternative methods of 
dispute resolution at any stage of dispute settlement proceedings.18 In addition, under Article 25 
of the DSU, WTO Members may have recourse to arbitration as an alternative to the regular procedures set out in the DSU.
19 Recourse to arbitration, including the procedures to be followed in 
such arbitration proceedings, is subject to mutual agreement of the parties.20 
2  COMPOSITION OF THE APPELLATE BODY The Appellate Body is a standing body composed  of seven Members, each appointed by the DSB 
for a term of four years with the possibility of being reappointed once for another four-year term.  
The second term of office of Mr David Unterhal ter expired on 17 December 2013. In order to fill 
the vacancy arising from the expiration of Mr Unterhalter's term, the DSB, at its meeting on 
                                               
17 Article 22.1 of the DSU. 
18 Article 5 of the DSU. 
19 There has been only one recourse to Article 25 of the DSU and it was not in lieu of panel or 
Appellate Body proceedings. Rather, the purpose of that  arbitration was to set an amount of compensation 
pending full compliance by the responding Member. (See Award of the Arbitrators, US – Section 110(5) 
Copyright Act (Article 25) ) 
20 Articles 21 and 22 of the DSU apply mutatis mutandis  to decisions by arbitrators. WT/AB/24 
 
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  24 May 2013, launched a selection process for the appointment of a new Appellate Body 
Member.21 Based on the procedures set forth in document WT/DSB/1, the DSB established 
a Selection Committee consisting of the Director-General and the 2013 Chairpersons of the General Council, Goods Council, Services Council, TRIPS Council, and the DSB.
22 
Four candidates were nominated by four WTO Me mbers, namely, Australia, Cameroon, Egypt, and 
Kenya. These four candidates were interviewed by the Selection Committee on 21 October 2013. At the DSB meeting held on 22 October, Member s wishing to express their views on any of 
the candidates were invited to meet with the Selection Committee. As previously agreed, 
the Selection Committee was to make its recommendation to the DSB no later than 7 November 2013, in order to enable the DSB to  consider the recommendation at its regularly 
scheduled meeting on 25 November 2013.
23 However, on 14 November 2013, the Chair of the DSB 
informed Members that, due to the intensive consultation process in preparation for the 
9th Ministerial Conference in Bali in December 2013, the Selection Committee had not been able to complete its deliberations on a recommendation regarding a new Member of the Appellate Body. 
The Selection Committee proposed to resume its deliberations in 2014 with a view to making its 
recommendation as soon as practicable. 
At its meeting on 23 May 2014, the DSB decided to launch a new selection process for the 
appointment of an Appellate Body Member.
24 The DSB also decided that the candidates nominated 
for the 2013 process would remain under consideration and that it would not be necessary for Members to re-nominate them. Based on the procedures set forth in document WT/DSB/1, the DSB established a Selection Committee consisting of the Director-General and the 2014 
Chairpersons of the General Council, Goods Council, Services Council, TRIPS Council, and the 
DSB.
25 The 2014 Selection Committee considered seven candidates nominated by seven WTO 
Members, namely, Cameroon, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, Uganda, and Zimbabwe.26 
These seven candidates were interview by the Selection Committee on 22 and 23 July 2014. 
Members wishing to express their views on any of the candidates were invited to meet with the 
Selection Committee or send written comments to the DSB Chair. 
At its meeting on 26 September 2014, on the basi s of the Selection Committee's recommendation 
and following consultations with WTO Members, the DSB appointed Mr Shree Baboo Chekitan Servansing as a member of the Appellate Body for a four-year term starting on 1 October 2014.
27 
The new member of the Appellate Body was sw orn in at a ceremony on 20 October 2014.28 
The composition of the Appellate Body in 2014 and the respective terms of office of its Members 
are set out in Table 1. Before Mr Servansing's  appointment the Appellate Body was composed 
of only six members between 12 December 2013 and 30 September 2014. 
                                               
21 WT/DSB/60. 
22 WT/DSB/M/332. 
23 WT/DSB/338. 
24 WT/DSB/63. 
25 WT/DSB/M/343. 
26 The candidates from Cameroon and Egypt, nominated in 2013, remained under consideration in the 
2014 process. 
27 WT/DSB/M/350. 
28 The Director-General Azevêdo, and the then Chair of the Appellate Body, Mr Ricardo Ramírez-
Hernández, welcomed Mr Servansing at the DSB meeting held on 20 October 2014. Their remarks are attached as Annex 4 to this Annual Report. WT/AB/24 
 
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  Table 1: Composition of the Appellate Body in 2014 
Name Nationality Term(s) of office 
Ujal Singh Bhatia India 2011–2015 
Seung Wha Chang Korea 2012–2016 
Thomas R. Graham United States 2011–2015 
Ricardo Ramírez-Hernández Mexico 2009–2013 
2013–2017 
Shree Baboo Chekitan Servansing Mauritius 2014-2018 
Peter Van den Bossche Belgium 2009–2013 
2013–2017 
Yuejiao Zhang China 2008–2012 
2012–2016 
 Pursuant to Rule 5.1 of the Working Procedures , the Members of the Appellate Body re-elected 
Mr Ricardo Ramírez-Hernández to serve a second te rm as Chairperson of the Appellate Body from 
1 January to 31 December 2014.
29 In December 2014, Mr Peter Van den Bossche was elected to 
serve as Chairperson as of 1 January 2015 until 31 December 2015. 
Biographical information about the Members of the Appellate Body is provided in Annex 3. A list of 
former Appellate Body Members and Chairpersons is provided in Annex 5. 
The Appellate Body receives legal and administrative support from the Appellate Body Secretariat, 
in accordance with Article 17.7 of the DSU. As at 31 December 2014, the Secretariat comprised a 
Director, fourteen lawyers, one administrative a ssistant, and three support staff. Werner Zdouc 
has been Director of the Appellate Body Secretariat since 2006. 
3  APPEALS 
Pursuant to Rule 20(1) of the Working Procedures and Article 16(4) of the DSU, an appeal is 
commenced by a party to the dispute giving written notice to the DSB and filing a Notice of Appeal 
with the Appellate Body Secretariat. Rule 23(1) of the Working Procedures allows a party to the 
dispute other than the initial appellant to join the appeal, or appeal on the basis of other alleged errors, by filing a Notice of Other Appeal within 5 days of the filing of the Notice of Appeal. 
Thirteen panel reports concerning seven matters were appealed in 2014. One dispute related to 
compliance proceedings, while all remaining disputes related to original proceedings. "Other 
appeals" were filed pursuant to Rule 23(1) of th e Working Procedures in nine out of the thirteen 
disputes. Table 2 sets out further information regarding appeals filed in 2014. 
                                               
29 WT/DSB/62. WT/AB/24 
 
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  Table 2: Panel reports appealed in 2014 
Panel report appealed Date of appeal Appellant a Document 
symbol Other 
appellant b Document 
symbol 
European Communities — 
Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products* 24 January 
2014 Canada  WT/DS400/8 European 
Union WT/DS400/9 
European Communities — 
Measures Prohibiting the 
Importation and Marketing 
of Seal Products* 24 January 
2014 Norway WT/DS401/9 European 
Union WT/DS401/10 
United States — 
Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Products from China 8 April 2014 China WT/DS449/6 United 
States WT/DS449/7 
China — Measures Related 
to the Exportation of Rare 
Earths, Tungsten and 
Molybdenum* 8 April 2014 United 
States WT/DS/431/9 China WT/DS/431/10 
China — Measures Related 
to the Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten and Molybdenum* 25 April 2014 China WT/DS/432/9 - - 
China — Measures Related 
to the Exportation of Rare 
Earths, Tungsten and 
Molybdenum* 25 April 2014 China WT/DS/433/9 - - 
United States — 
Countervailing Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled 
Carbon Steel Flat Products 
from India 8 August 2014 India WT/DS436/6  United 
States WT/DS436/7 
United States — 
Countervailing Duty 
Measures on Certain 
Products from China 22 August 2014 China WT/DS437/7 United 
States WT/DS437/8 
Argentina — Measures 
Affecting the Importation of Goods* 26 September 
2014 Argentina WT/DS438/15 European 
Union WT/DS438/16 
Argentina — Measures 
Affecting the Importation 
of Goods* 26 September 
2014 Argentina WT/DS444/14 - - 
Argentina — Measures 
Affecting the Importation of Goods* 26 September 
2014 Argentina WT/DS445/14 Japan WT/DS445/15 
United States – Certain 
Country of Origin Labelling 
(COOL) Requirements: 
Recourse to Article 21.5 of 
the DSU by Canada 28 November 
2014 United 
States WT/DS384/29 Canada WT/DS384/30 
United States – Certain 
Country of Origin Labelling 
(COOL) Requirements: 
Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Mexico 28 November 
2014 United 
States WT/DS386/28 - - 
a Pursuant to Rule 20(1) of the Working Procedures . 
b Pursuant to Rule 23(1) of the Working Procedures . 
* Appellate Body reports concerning disputes with the same title were circulated as a single document. 
 WT/AB/24 
 
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  Information on the number of appeals filed each year since 1995 is provided in Annex 6. Chart 1 
shows the number of appeals filed each year between 1995 and 2014. 
Chart 1: Total number of appeals 1995–2014 
 
 
 The overall average of panel reports that have  been appealed from 1995 to 2014 is 68%. 
A breakdown of the percentage of panel reports appealed each year is provided in Annex 7. 
4  APPELLATE BODY REPORTS 
Eight Appellate Body reports concerning five matters were circulated in 2014, the details of which 
are summarized in Table 3. As of the end of 2014, the Appellate Body has circulated a total of 
127 reports. 
Table 3: Appellate Body reports circulated in 2014 
Case Document symbol Date circulated Date adopted  
by the DSB 
European Communities — 
Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of 
Seal Products * WT/DS400/AB/R  22 May 2014 18 June 2014 
European Communities — 
Measures Prohibiting the 
Importation and Marketing of 
Seal Products * WT/DS401/AB/R 22 May 2014 18 June 2014 
United States — Countervailing 
and Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Products from China WT/DS449/AB/R 7 July 2014 22 July 2014 
China — Measures  Related to 
the Exportation of Rare Earths, 
Tungsten and Molybdenum * WT/DS431/AB/R 7 August 2014 29 August 2014 
China — Measures  Related to 
the Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten and Molybdenum * WT/DS432/AB/R 7 August 2014 29 August 2014 WT/AB/24 
 
- 14 - 
 
  Case Document symbol Date circulated Date adopted  
by the DSB 
China — Measures  Related to 
the Exportation of Rare Earths, 
Tungsten and Molybdenum * WT/DS433/AB/R 7 August 2014 29 August 2014 
United States — Countervailing 
Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Flat Products from India WT/DS436/AB/R 8 December 2014 19 December 2014 
United States — Countervailing 
Duty Measures on Certain 
Products from China WT/DS437/AB/R 18 December 2014 16 January 2015 
* Appellate Body reports concerning disputes with the same title were circulated as a single document.  
 
 
The following table shows which WTO agreements were addressed in the Appellate Body reports circulated in 2014. 
Table 4: WTO Agreements addressed in A ppellate Body reports circulated in 2014 
Case Document symbol WTO agreements addressed 
European Communities — 
Measures Prohibiting the 
Importation and Marketing of 
Seal Products * WT/DS400/AB/R GATT 1994 
TBT Agreement 
European Communities — 
Measures Prohibiting the 
Importation and Marketing of 
Seal Products * WT/DS401/AB/R GATT 1994 
TBT Agreement 
United States — Countervailing 
and Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Products from China WT/DS449/AB/R GATT 1994 
SCM Agreement 
DSU 
China — Measures Related to the 
Exportation of Rare Earths, 
Tungsten and Molybdenum * WT/DS431/AB/R GATT 1994 
China's Accession Protocol 
WTO Agreement 
DSU 
China — Measures Related to the 
Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten and Molybdenum * WT/DS432/AB/R GATT 1994 
China's Accession Protocol 
WTO Agreement 
DSU 
China — Measures Related to the 
Exportation of Rare Earths, 
Tungsten and Molybdenum * WT/DS433/AB/R GATT 1994 
China's Accession Protocol 
WTO Agreement 
DSU 
United States — Countervailing 
Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled 
Carbon Steel Flat Products from 
India WT/DS436/AB/R GATT 1994 
SCM Agreement 
WTO Agreement 
DSU 
United States — Countervailing 
Duty Measures on Certain 
Products from China WT/DS437/AB/R SCM Agreement 
DSU 
* Appellate Body reports concerning disputes with the same title were circulated as a single document.  WT/AB/24 
 
- 15 - 
 
  Chart 2 below shows the number of times specific WTO agreements have been addressed in the 
127 Appellate Body reports circulated from 1996 through 2014. 
Chart 2: WTO agreements addressed in appeals 1996–2014 
 
 
 Annex 8 contains a breakdown by year of the frequency with which the specific WTO agreements 
have been addressed in appeals from 1996 through 2014. 
The findings and conclusions contained in the Appellate Body reports circulated in 2014 are 
summarized below. 
4.1  Appellate Body Reports, European Communities – Measures Prohibiting the 
Importation and Market ing of Seal Products , WT/DS400/AB/R and WT/DS401/AB/R
 
These disputes arose from challenges by Canada and Norway (complainants) to certain measures 
enacted by the European Union affecting the import ation and placing on the EU market of products 
derived from seals. Specifically, the complainants challenged EU Regulation (EC) No. 1007/2009 
on trade in seal products (Basic Regulation) and Commission Regulation (EU) No. 737/2010 laying down detailed rules for the implemen tation of Regulation (EC) No. 1007/2009 
(Implementing Regulation). Together, these measures prohibit the importation and placing on the 
market of seal products other than seal produc ts derived from hunts conducted by Inuit or other 
indigenous communities (IC exception), conducted for marine resource management purposes (MRM exception), or seal products imported for the personal use of travellers 
(Travellers exception). The panel and the Appellate Body referred to these measures collectively 
as the "EU Seal Regime". 
Before the panel, Canada and Norway claimed that the EU Seal Regime is inconsistent with 
Articles I:1, III:4 and XI:1 of the GATT 1994, and Articles 2.2, 5.1. 2, and 5.2.1 of the 
TBT Agreement. In addition, Canada also claimed that the EU Seal Regime is inconsistent with Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement, and Norway claime d that the regime at issue is inconsistent with 
Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture. 
The panel found that the EU Seal Regime is a "technical regulation" within the meaning of 
Annex 1.1 to the TBT Agreement. The panel also fo und that the EU Seal Regime has a detrimental 
impact on the competitive opportunities of Canadian imported seal products compared to like 
products from Greenland and certain EU member States. The panel concluded that the 
IC exception and the MRM exception under the EU Seal Regime are inconsistent with Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement because the detrimental impa ct caused by these exceptions does not stem 
exclusively from legitimate regu latory distinctions and consequently the exceptions accord 
imported seal products treatment less favourable than that accorded to like domestic and other foreign seal products. The panel further found that  the EU Seal Regime is not inconsistent with 
Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement, because it fulf ils the objective of addressing EU public moral WT/AB/24 
 
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  concerns on seal welfare to a certain extent, and no alternative measure had been demonstrated 
to make an equivalent or greater contribution to the fulfilment of the objective as the EU Seal Regime. The panel also determined that the EU Seal Regime is inconsistent with Article 5.1.2 of the TBT Agreement because th e conformity assessment procedures under the 
EU Seal Regime were incapable of enabling trade in qualifying products to take place as from 
the date of entry into force of the EU Seal Regi me. The panel, however, rejected the claims under 
Article 5.2.1 of the TBT Agreement. 
Regarding the remaining claims, the panel found that (i) IC exception under the EU Seal Regime 
is inconsistent with Article I:1 of the GA TT 1994 because an advantage granted by the 
European Union to seal products originating in Greenland is not accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like products origin ating in Canada and Norway; and (ii) the MRM 
exception under the EU Seal Regime is inconsistent with Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 because it 
accords imported seal products treatment less favourable than that accorded to like domestic seal products. The panel, however, rejected the claims under Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994, 
and Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agricultur e. In addition, the panel found that (i) the 
IC exception and the MRM exception under the EU Seal Regime are not justified under Article XX(a) of the GATT 1994 because they fail to meet the requirements under the chapeau; 
and (ii) the IC exception and the MRM exception under the EU Seal Regime are not justified under 
Article XX(b) of the GATT 1994 because the European Union has failed to make a prima facie  case 
for its claim. 
On appeal, Canada challenged the panel's intermediate finding under Article 2.1 of the 
TBT Agreement that the distinction between commerc ial and IC hunts is justifiable. Canada also 
claimed that the panel acted inconsistently with Article 11 of the DSU by failing to make an objective assessment of the facts in the context of its findings under Article 2.1 of 
the TBT Agreement. In addition, Canada and Norway appealed the panel's findings that 
(i) the EU Seal Regime is not inconsistent with Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement, and (ii) the EU Seal Regime is provisionally justified under Article XX(a) of the GATT 1994 and the 
panel's reasoning with respect to the chapeau of Article XX. Canada and Norway also alleged that 
the panel acted inconsistently with Article 11 of the DSU in relation to its findings under Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement. Finally, Canada alleged that  the panel acted inconsistently with Article 11 
of the DSU in making certain factual findings in relation to its finding under Article XX(a) of the 
GATT 1994. 
In its other appeal, the European Union challenged the panel's finding that the EU Seal Regime is a 
technical regulation within the meaning of Anne x 1.1 to the TBT Agreement. The European Union 
also appealed the panel's interpretation of Articles I:1 and III:4 of the GATT 1994, as well as 
the panel's conclusion under Article I:1. 
4.1.1  Annex 1.1 to the TBT Agreement 
In its cross-appeal, the European Union challenged the panel's finding that the EU Seal Regime 
lays down product characteristics, including the applicable administrative provisions, and requested the Appellate Body to reverse the pa nel's conclusion that the EU Seal Regime is a 
technical regulation within the meanin g of Annex 1.1 to the TBT Agreement. 
The Appellate Body explained that, since Annex 1.1 describes a technical regulation by reference 
to a "document" and makes clear that it is "compliance" with the content of the document laying down product characteristics or their related proc esses and production methods (PPMs) that must 
be found to be "mandatory", the scope of Annex 1.1 is limited to those documents that establish 
or prescribe something and thus have a certain normative content. With respect to the meaning of the term "product characteristics", the Appellate Body recalled its observations in EC – Asbestos  
that the "characteristics" of a product include "objectively definable 'features', 'qualities', 
'attributes', or other 'distinguishing mark' of a product" that might relate, inter alia , to "a product's 
composition, size, shape, colour, texture, hardne ss, tensile strength, flammability, conductivity, 
density, or viscosity". Further, the Appellate Body noted that, in EC – Asbestos , the Appellate Body 
had described these characteristics as "features and qualities intrinsic to the product itself" 
and had added that "product characteristi cs" within the meaning of Annex 1.1 may  also include 
"related 'characteristics'". In addition, the Appella te Body explained that the reference to "or their 
related processes and production methods" in the first sentence of Annex 1.1 indicates that the 
subject matter of a technical regulation may also consist of the laying down of PPMs that are WT/AB/24 
 
- 17 - 
 
  related  to product characteristics. According to the Appellate Body, in order to determine whether 
a measure lays down related PPMs, a panel should examine whether the PPMs prescribed by the measure have a sufficient nexus to the characteristics of a product in order to be considered related to those characteristics. 
Turning to the term "applicable administrative provisions" in the first sentence of Annex 1.1 to the 
TBT Agreement, the Appellate Body noted that this term is linked to the words "product 
characteristics or their related processes and prod uction methods" by the conjunctive "including". 
Recalling the ordinary meaning of the words "provision" and "administrative", the Appellate Body 
noted that the word "applicable" in this context indicates that the relevant "administrative provisions" must "refer" to or be "relevant" to the product characteristics or their related PPMs as 
prescribed in the relevant document. The Appellate Body further explained that the second 
sentence of Annex 1.1 enumerates specific elements that technical regulations "may also include 
or deal exclusively with", namely, "terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or labelling requirements" as they apply to a product, proc ess or production method. The use of the words 
"also include" and "deal exclusively with" at the beginning of the second sentence indicates that 
the second sentence includes elements that are additional to, and may be distinct from, those 
covered by the first sentence of Annex 1.1. 
With regard to the panel's analysis of the EU Seal Regime, the Appellate Body found that the 
panel's conclusion that the measure lays down product characteristics appeared to be based on a single component of the measure, namely the prohibition on seal-containing products. Referring to its report in EC – Asbestos , the Appellate Body explained that the panel should have examined the 
design and operation of the measure while seeking to identify its "integral and essential" aspects 
before reaching a final conclusion as to legal characterization of the measure as a whole. The Appellate Body considered that the panel therefore erred to the extent it reached a final conclusion 
as to the legal character of the measure on the basis of an examination of the aspect of the 
EU Seal Regime that sets out a "prohibition on seal-containing products" taken alone. The Appellate Body further noted that a prohibition of pure seal products also found in the 
EU Seal Regime does not prescribe or impose any "characteristics" on such products 
and considered that the panel should have assessed  the relevance of this aspect of the measure in 
order to determine whether it was an integral and essential aspect of the measure, and, if so, the weight that should be ascribed to it in characterizing the EU Seal Regime as a whole.  
The Appellate Body then turned to examine the EU Seal Regime as it applies to products 
containing seal as an input ("mixed" products). The Appellate Body noted that the prohibition on "mixed" products could be seen as imposing certain objective features or characteristics on all 
products by providing that they may not contain seal. However, this was but one of the 
components of the EU Seal Regime and had to be analysed together with the other components of 
the measure. Referring to its report in EC – Asbestos , the Appellate Body noted that, in that case, 
the measure at issue regulated asbestos-containing products due to the carcinogenicity or toxicity 
of the physical properties of the products at issue , i.e. the fact that those products contained 
asbestos fibres . By contrast, the Appellate Body pointed out that the EU Seal Regime does not 
prohibit seal-containing products merely because they  contain seal as an input ; instead, 
the prohibition is imposed based on criteria relati ng to the identity of the hunter or the type or 
purpose of the hunt from which the product is derived .  
The Appellate Body next addressed the European  Union's argument that the panel erred in 
considering that the word "applicable" pertains to products rather than "product characteristics or 
their related processes and production methods". The Appellate Body explained that the clause 
"including applicable administrative provisions" in Annex 1.1 refers to provisions to be applied by 
virtue of a governmental mandate in relation to either product characteristics or their related 
PPMs. Insofar as the essential and integral aspects of the EU Seal Regime do not set out product characteristics, the Appellate Body found that the relevant administrative provisions cannot be characterized as being applicable to product characteristics. Although the administrative provisions 
under the EU Seal Regime "apply" to products containing seal, this did not, in the Appellate Body's 
view, mean that the measure at issue amounts to a technical regulation for that reason alone, since these administrative provisions only serve to identify the exempted products, and are an 
ancillary aspect of the measure.  
Having reviewed the relevant aspects of the EU Seal Regime, the Appellate Body explained that, 
to the extent that the measure regulates  the placing on the EU market of pure seal products, WT/AB/24 
 
- 18 - 
 
  it does not prescribe or impose any "characteristics" on the products themselves. To the extent the 
measure prohibits the placing on the EU market of  seal-containing products, it could be seen as 
imposing certain "objective features, qualities or characteristics" on all products by providing that they may not contain seal. However, the Appellate Body was not persuaded that this constitutes 
the main feature of the measure at issue. The Ap pellate Body added that the EU Seal Regime's 
prohibition of "mixed" products differs, to a considerable extent, from the prohibitive aspects of the French Decree under EC – Asbestos . The Appellate Body further noted that, when the 
prohibitive aspects of the EU Seal Regime ar e considered together with the IC and MRM 
exceptions, it becomes clear that the EU Seal Regime is not concerned with the banning of the placing of seal products on the EU market as su ch; instead, the measure establishes the conditions 
for placing on the market based on criteria relating  to the identity of the hunter and/or the type or 
purpose of the hunt from which the product is derived. That being the main feature of the 
EU Seal Regime, the Appellate Body did not consider that the measure as a whole lays down product characteristics. For these reasons, the Appe llate Body reversed the panel's findings in that 
respect. Since the panel's conclusion that the EU Seal Regime constitutes a technical regulation 
was based on its intermediate finding that the EU Seal Regime lays down product characteristics, the Appellate Body also reversed the panel's finding that the EU Seal Regime constitutes 
a technical regulation within the meaning of Annex 1.1. 
In the event the Appellate Body were to reverse th e panel's finding that the EU Seal Regime lays 
down "product characteristics" and/or "applicable administrative provisions" within the meaning of Annex 1.1 of the TBT Agreement, Canada and No rway had requested that the Appellate Body 
complete the analysis and find that the EU Seal Regime constitutes a "technical regulation" within 
the meaning of Annex 1.1 to the TBT Agreement. Thus, the Appellate Body turned to Norway's 
and Canada's requests. The Appellate Body noted that in order to complete the analysis it would 
have to determine whether the EU Seal Regime lays down "related processes and production 
methods" and therefore qualifies as a technical regulation even though it does not lay down 
product characteristics. The Appellate Body reca lled that Norway and Canada presented arguments 
on PPMs to the panel in the alternative; however, the panel did not consider it necessary to 
examine whether the EU Seal Regime lays down PPMs since it had already found the EU Seal Regime to lay down product characteristics. The Appellate Body noted that, during the hearing, 
Canada confirmed that it had not argued that the IC and MRM exceptions are "related PPMs", 
and Norway indicated that it did not consider  that the conditions under the exceptions, 
by themselves, constitute "related PPMs". The Ap pellate Body recalled that it had on previous 
occasions refused to complete the analysis in the absence of a full exploration of the issues before 
the panel that could give rise to concerns about due process. Since neither the panel, nor the 
complainants, addressed in detail whether the EU Seal Regime lays down "related process and production methods" within the meaning of Annex 1.1, the Appellate Body considered it 
inappropriate to complete the legal analysis in this respect. 
Having reversed the panel's finding that the EU Seal Regime constitutes a technical regulation, 
and having found that it was unable to complete the legal analysis, the Appellate Body declared moot and of no legal effect the panel's findings under Articles 2.1, 2.2, 5.1.2, and 5.2.1 of the 
TBT Agreement. 
4.1.2  Articles I:1 and III:4 of the GATT 1994 The European Union appealed the panel's interpreta tion of Articles I:1 and III:4 of the GATT 1994, 
claiming that the panel erred in finding that the legal standard of the non-discrimination 
obligations under Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement does not apply equally to claims under Articles I:1 and III:4 of the GATT 1994. The Europe an Union also appealed the panel's conclusion 
under Article I:1 but not under Article III:4. 
The Appellate Body began by making some general observations about the similarities 
and differences between Articles I:1 and III: 4 of the GATT 1994. Firs t, although the MFN 
and national treatment obligations under the GATT 1994 are both fundamental non-discrimination 
obligations under the GATT 1994, their points of comparison for determining whether a measure 
discriminates between like products are not the same. Second, the Appellate Body highlighted the textual differences between the two provisions, noti ng that the national treatment obligation under 
Article III:4 is expressed through a "treatment no less favourable" standard, whereas the legal 
standard under Article I:1 is expressed thro ugh an obligation to extend any "advantage" 
granted by a Member to any product originating in or destined for any other country WT/AB/24 
 
- 19 - 
 
  "immediately and unconditionally" to the "like prod uct" originating in or destined for any other 
Members. Third, notwithstanding the textual differences between the two provisions, each 
provision is concerned with prohibiting discriminatory measures by requiring the equality of competitive opportunities for like products. Agains t this background, the Appellate Body examined, 
separately, the panel's interpretation of Articles I:1 and III:4.  
Turning to address the European Union's appeal as it related to Article I:1 of the GATT 1994, 
the Appellate Body considered that an interpretati on of the proper legal standard under Article I:1 
must take into account the fundamental purpose of Article I:1, namely, to preserve the equality of 
competitive opportunities for like imported products from all Members. The Appellate Body noted that Article I:1 requires that any advantage gran ted by a Member to imported products must be 
made available "unconditionally" to like imported products from any other Members. 
However, insofar as Article I:1 is concerned with protecting expectations of equal competitive 
opportunities for like imported products from all Members, the Appellate Body explained that Article I:1 does not prohibit a Member from attaching any conditions to the grant of an 
"advantage" within the meaning of Article I:1.  Instead, the Appellate Body explained that 
Article I:1 prohibits those conditions that have a detrimental impact on the competitive opportunities for like imported products from any Member. Conversely, the Appellate Body noted 
that Article I:1 permits regulatory distinctions to be drawn between like imported products, 
provided that such distinctions do not result in a detrimental impact on the competitive opportunities for like imported products from any Member. Thus, the Appellate Body rejected the European Union's argument that, for the purposes of establishing an inconsistency with Article I:1, 
it must be demonstrated that the detrimental impact of a measure on competitive opportunities for 
like imported products does not stem exclusively fr om a legitimate regulatory distinction. Instead, 
the Appellate Body considered that where a measure modifies the conditions of competition 
between like imported products to the detriment of the imported products at issue, it is 
inconsistent with Article I:1.  
Turning to address the European Union's appeal of the panel's interpretation of the legal standard 
under Article III:4 of the GATT 1994, the Appellate  Body noted the European Union's argument 
that WTO jurisprudence under Article III:4 establishes that the analysis of whether imported products are accorded treatment less favourable than that accorded to like domestic products, "goes beyond" a consideration of the detrimen tal effect of a measure on the competitive 
opportunities for like imported products. The Appellate Body recalled that, in  
US – Clove Cigarettes , it had clarified that a violation of Article III:4 had not been established in 
Dominican Republic – Import and Sale of Cigarettes , since, in that dispute, the detrimental impact 
on competitive opportunities for like imported products was not attributable to the specific 
measure at issue. Thus, the Appellate Body ha d clarified that the detrimental impact on 
competitive opportunities for like imported products must be attributable to, or have a genuine 
relationship with, the measure at issue. The Appellate Body therefore rejected the 
European Union's argument that its report in Dominican Republic – Import and Sale of Cigarettes  
stands for the proposition that, under Article III:4, a panel must examine whether the detrimental impact that a measure has on competitive opportunities for like imported products stems 
exclusively from a legitimate  regulatory distinction. 
The European Union also relied on the Appellate Body's statement in EC – Asbestos  that 
"a Member may draw distinctions between products which have been found to be 'like', 
without, for this reason alone, according to the gr oup of 'like' imported products 'less favourable 
treatment' than that accorded to the group of ' like' domestic products". In the European Union's 
view, this statement supports its contention that , for the purposes of establishing a violation 
of Article III:4, a finding that a measure has a detrimental impact on competitive opportunities for 
like imported products is not dispositive. 
The Appellate Body considered that th e statement of the Appellate Body in EC – Asbestos , 
on which the European Union relied, merely highlighted that Article III:4 does not require the 
identical treatment of imported and like domestic products, but rather the equality of competitive 
conditions between these like products. In this regard, neither formally identical, nor formally different, treatment of imported and like domest ic products necessarily ensures equality of 
competitive opportunities for imported and domestic like products. However, in the Appellate 
Body's view, regulatory distinctions between impo rted and like domestic products constitute less 
favourable treatment of imported products, under Article III:4, where such distinctions modify the 
conditions of competition in the relevant market to the detriment of like imported products. WT/AB/24 
 
- 20 - 
 
  The European Union further asserted that the pane l's interpretation of the legal standard under 
Article III:4 failed to take account of the gene ral principle, expressed in Article III:1 of the 
GATT 1994, that internal regulations should not be applied "so as to afford protection" to domestic 
production. The Appellate Body considered that  although the general principle expressed in 
Article III:1 informs the rest of Article III, includin g Article III:4, the extent to which this general 
principle informs the other paragraphs of Article III depends on the textual connection between Article III:1 and the other paragraphs of Article III. Noting that Article III:4 does not explicitly 
refer to Article III:1, the Appellate Body considered that Article III:4 is, itself, an expression of the 
principle set forth in Article III:1, such that if there is "less favourable treatment" of the group of "like" imported products, "protection" is afforded to the group of "like" domestic products.  
The European Union also suggested that, since the list of possible legitimate objectives that may 
factor into an analysis under Article 2.1 of th e TBT Agreement is open, a divergent approach to 
de facto  discrimination under the GATT 1994 could lead to a situation where, under Article 2.1, 
a technical regulation that has a detrimental impact on imports would be permitted if such 
detrimental impact stems from a legitimate regulatory distinction, while, under Articles I:1 
and III:4 of the GATT 1994, the same technical regula tion would be prohibited if the objective that 
it pursues does not fall within the closed list of the subparagraphs of Article XX of the GATT 1994. 
In the Appellate Body's view, this argument was predicated on a perceived imbalance between, 
on the one hand, the scope of a Member's right to regulate under Article XX of the GATT 1994, 
and, on the other hand, the scope of that ri ght under Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement. 
The Appellate Body dismissed this argument, noting that under the TBT Agreement, the balance 
between the desire to avoid creating unnecessary obstacles to international trade under the fifth 
recital, and the recognition of Members' right to regulate under the sixth recital, is not, in principle, different from the balance set out in the GATT 1994, where obligations such as 
national treatment in Article III are qualified by the general exceptions provision of Article XX.  
For these reasons, the Appellate Body upheld the panel's finding that the legal standard for the 
non-discrimination obligations under Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement does not apply equally to 
claims under Articles I:1 and III:4 of the GATT 19 94. As a result, the Appellate Body also upheld 
the panel's conclusion that the measure at issue is inconsistent with Article I:1 because it does not "immediately and unconditionally" extend the same market access advantage to Canadian and Norwegian seal products that it accords to seal products originating from Greenland. 
4.1.3  Article XX of the GATT 1994 
The Appellate Body recalled that it had declared m oot and of no legal effect the panel's conclusions 
under Articles 2.1 and 2.2 of the TBT Agreement. However, to the extent that the panel had relied 
on certain of its findings and reasoning in the context of its analysis under the TBT Agreement 
when addressing claims and arguments under Ar ticle XX of the GATT 1994, the Appellate Body 
explained that it would refer to those findings and reasoning in considering the participants' claims 
and arguments on appeal under Article XX. 
4.1.3.1  The Objective of the EU Seal Regime The Appellate Body noted that the panel sought first to identify the "objective" of the 
EU Seal Regime in the context of its analysis und er Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement, and relied on 
that assessment in its analysis under Article XX of the GATT 1994. In the context of Article XX, 
the Appellate Body explained that the panel's char acterization of the objective of the measure has 
implications both in respect of the analysis under subparagraph (a), as well as under the chapeau. 
Accordingly, before addressing the claims on appeal directed at the panel's analysis under 
Article XX, the Appellate Body addressed the pane l's characterization of the objective of the 
EU Seal Regime and the parties' arguments relating thereto. Norway challenged the panel's finding 
that the "sole objective" of the EU Seal Regime is to address EU public moral concerns regarding 
seal welfare. In Norway's view, the panel committed a number of legal and factual errors in reaching the conclusion that the EU Seal Regime does not pursue objectives relating to the protection of IC interests and the promotion of MRM interests. The European Union maintained 
that the panel correctly found that the "principal" or "main" objective of the EU Seal Regime is to 
address public moral concerns with regard to the welfare of seals. WT/AB/24 
 
- 21 - 
 
  The Appellate Body began by noting that, in order to identify a measure's objective, a panel must 
take account of all evidence put before it in this regard, including the texts of statutes, the legislative history, and other evidence rega rding the structure and operation of the measure 
at issue. The Appellate Body also noted that, a pa nel's identification of the objective of a measure 
is a matter of legal characterization subject to appellate review under Article 17.6 of the DSU. 
Contrary to what Norway argued, the Appellate Body considered that the panel did not find that addressing EU public moral concerns regarding seal welfare was the "sole objective" of the EU Seal 
Regime. Instead, while the panel identified the "principal objective" of the EU Seal Regime as 
being "to address public concerns on seal welfare", the panel found that the interests, inter alia , 
of indigenous communities and those for marine management purposes had been "accommodated" in the measure as well. Thus, when the panel stated that the other interests 
must be distinguished from the "main objective" of the measure "as a whole", according to the 
Appellate Body, it was commenting on how the relative significance of the policy interests played out in the measure, suggesting that such other interests were not manifest in the objective of the 
measure in the same manner as concerns regarding seal welfare. Finally, the Appellate Body noted 
that although the panel did not determine the moral content of such other interests, either alone or as part of a single moral standard for seal welfare, the panel also did not accept the 
European Union's contention that the benefits to Inuit communities "outweighed" concerns in 
respect of seal welfare in indigenous community hunts. The Appellate Body also recalled that the panel did not consider that the evidence before it  supported the European Union's position that the 
EU public attributes a higher moral value to the protection of Inuit interests as compared to seal 
welfare. 
For these reasons, the Appellate Body rejected  Norway's claim that the panel erred in its 
characterization of the objective of the EU Seal Regime. Having reviewed the panel's findings 
and the participants' arguments on appeal, the Appellate Body considered that the principal 
objective of the EU Seal Regime is to address EU public moral concerns regarding seal welfare, while accommodating other interests so as to mitigate the impact of the measure on 
those interests. 
4.1.3.2  Article XX(a) of the GATT 1994 Norway submitted that the panel erred by seekin g to justify under Article XX(a) of the GATT 1994 
the EU Seal Regime as a whole, instead of the aspects of the measure – namely, the IC and MRM 
exceptions – giving rise to WTO-inconsistency under Articles I:1 and III:4 of the GATT 1994. 
The Appellate Body noted that the general exceptions  of Article XX apply to "measures" that are to 
be analysed under the subparagraphs and chapeau, and not to any inconsistency with the 
GATT 1994 that might arise from such measures. With respect to the claims under Article I:1 
of the GATT 1994, the Appellate Body considered th at the existence of the permissive component 
in the form of the IC exception alone cannot be considered to confer an advantage to seal products 
of Greenlandic origin, unless it is compared to the treatment of seal products of Canadian 
and Norwegian origin. The Appellate Body thus noted that it is only the combined operation of the permissive aspect of the EU Seal Regime (i.e. the IC exception which grants market access to seal products of Greenlandic origin), together with its prohibitive aspect (i.e. the "ban" which restricts 
market access for Canadian and Norwegian seal products), that leads to a finding of de facto  
discrimination under Article I:1. The Appellate Body noted that, in the present case, the panel's analysis correctly focused on determining whether these WTO-inconsistent aspects of the measure 
are justified under Article XX(a). The Appellate Body  therefore rejected Norway's claim, and found 
that the panel did not err in concluding that the analysis under Article XX(a) of the GATT 1994 should examine both the prohibitive and pe rmissive aspects of the EU Seal Regime. 
Canada maintained that the panel erred in finding that the EU Seal Regime is a measure taken 
"to protect public morals" within the meaning of Article XX(a). Relying on the panel report in  EC – Asbestos , Canada argued that the use of the phrase "to protect" in Article XX(a) requires the 
identification of a risk to public morals against which the EU Seal Regime seeks to protect. 
In Canada's view, the evidence it submitted esta blished that the welfare risks associated with 
commercial seal hunts are "commonplace" in situations that involve the killing of animals, especially in the context of wildlife hunts, regardle ss of whether they take place inside or outside 
the European Union. On this basis, Canada argued that the panel failed to consider whether the 
risks associated with commercial seal hunts "excee ded the accepted level of risk of compromised 
animal welfare". WT/AB/24 
 
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  The Appellate Body noted that the statement of the panel in EC – Asbestos  – that "the notion of 
'protection' … impl[ies] the existence of a health risk" – was made in the context of Article XX(b) which focuses on the protection of "human, animal or plant life or health". Referring to the concepts of "risk" and "protection" embodied in the SPS Agreement, the Appellate Body noted that 
the protection of human, animal, or plant life or health may suggest a particular focus on the 
protection from or against certain dangers or risks. However, the notion of risk in the context of Article XX(b) is difficult to reconcile with the subject-matter of protection under Article XX(a), 
namely, public morals. The Appellate Body explained that while the focus on the dangers or risks 
to human, animal, or plant life or health in the context of Article XX(b) may lend itself to scientific or other methods of inquiry, such risk-assessm ent methods do not appear to be of much 
assistance or relevance in identifying and assessing public morals. The Appellate Body therefore 
did not consider that the term "to protect", when used in relation to "public morals" under 
Article XX(a), required the panel to identify the ex istence of a risk to EU public moral concerns 
regarding seal welfare. For these reasons, the Appellate Body also rejected Canada's argument 
that, for the purposes of an analysis under Article XX(a), a panel is required to determine the 
exact content of the public moral standard at issu e. The Appellate Body noted that Canada did not 
challenge the panel's reliance on statements by the panel in US – Gambling , including that 
"the term 'public morals' denotes 'standards of right and wrong conduct maintained by 
or on behalf of a community or nation'", and that Members should be given some scope to define and apply for themselves the concept of public morals according to their own systems and scales 
of values. The Appellate Body further noted that Canada did not directly challenge the panel's 
finding that public moral concerns exist in relation to seal welfare in the European Union.  
The Appellate Body noted that, by arguing that the European Union must recognize the same level 
of animal welfare risk in seal hunts as it does in its slaughterhouses and terrestrial wildlife hunts, 
Canada appeared to suggest that a responding  Member must regulate similar public moral 
concerns in similar ways for the purposes of satisfying the requirement "to protect" public morals under Article XX(a). The Appellate Body recalled that the panel in US – Gambling  underscored that 
Members have the right to determine the level of protection that they consider appropriate, which 
suggests that Members may set different levels of  protection even when responding to similar 
interests of moral concern. Even if Canada were correct that the European Union has the same moral concerns regarding seal welfare and the welfare of other animals, the Appellate Body did not 
consider that the European Union was required by Article XX(a) to address such public moral 
concerns in the same way. For these reasons, th e Appellate Body found that the panel did not err 
in concluding that the objective of the EU Seal  Regime falls within the scope of Article XX(a). 
Canada and Norway both contended that the panel e rred in concluding that the EU Seal Regime is 
"necessary" to protect public morals and by find ing that the EU Seal Regime made a "material" 
contribution to its objective, since the degree of co ntribution of the EU Seal Regime did not rise to 
the level of being "material". In addition, because the panel's analysis under Article XX(a) relied on 
findings it made in the context of Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement, the Appellate Body also 
considered the arguments made by Canada and Norway in that context to the extent they were relevant to Article XX(a) of the GATT 1994.  
The Appellate Body first noted the panel's reliance on Brazil – Retreaded Tyres  to state that 
"the contribution made by the 'ban' to the identified objective must be shown to be at least material given the extent of its trade-restrictiv eness". In that dispute, the Appellate Body was 
confronted with the particular challenge of assessing the contribution of a measure that formed 
part of a broader policy scheme, and that was not yet having an immediately discernible impact on its objective. Accordingly, the Appellate Body sought in that dispute to determine whether the 
measure was "apt to make a materi al contribution" to its objective. The Appellate Body explained 
that its approach in Brazil – Retreaded Tyres  was tailored to the peculiar features of the measure 
at issue in that case and did not set out a gene rally applicable standard requiring the use of a 
pre-determined threshold of "material" contribution in analysing the necessity of a measure under 
Article XX of the GATT 1994. The Appellate Body cons idered that this was supported by the notion 
of an overall necessity analysis, which involves a holistic process of "weighing and balancing" a series of factors, including the importance of the objective, the contribution of the measure to 
that objective, and the trade-restrictiveness of the measure, following which a comparison with 
less trade restrictive alternatives should in most cases be undertaken. In the Appellate Body's view, whether a measure is "necessary" cannot be determined by the level of contribution alone, 
but will depend on the manner in which the other factors of the necessity analysis, including a 
consideration of potential alternative measures, inform the analysis. For these reasons, the WT/AB/24 
 
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  Appellate Body rejected Canada's and Norway's argument that the panel was required to apply a 
standard of "materiality" as a generally applicab le pre-determined threshold in its contribution 
analysis, and considered that the panel erred to the extent that it relied on such a standard in its analysis. However, because it considered that th e panel went on to examine the contribution of 
both the prohibitive and permissive aspects of th e EU Seal Regime, the Appellate Body proceeded 
to address Canada's and Norway's appeals of the panel's conclusions under Article XX(a) on 
the basis of their contentions that the panel erred in the contribution analysis it conducted in the 
context of Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement to the extent these arguments were relevant to 
the analysis under Article XX(a). 
The Appellate Body then turned to address Canada's  and Norway's claims that the panel failed to 
articulate the "degree" or "extent" of the contribution made by the prohibitive and permissive 
components of the EU Seal Regime. The Appella t e  B o d y  o b s e r v e d  t h a t  t h e  p a n e l  o p t e d  f o r  a  
qualitative analysis that focused mainly on the design and expected operation of the measure, and the panel had only limited information on how certain aspects of the measure would operate in 
practice. Furthermore, the permissive aspects were still in a relatively nascent stage of 
implementation at the time of the proceedings be fore the panel. Moreover, although the parties 
submitted considerable evidence regarding th e EU market, the Appellate Body noted that, 
as acknowledged by the panel, that information was incomplete and subject to a number of 
limitations. The Appellate Body therefore did not consider that the panel's decision to adopt a 
qualitative approach in assessing the contribution of the measure was improper. With respect to the contribution made by the EU Seal Regime to th e first aspect of the objective – i.e. addressing 
public moral concerns relating to the EU public's participation as consumers in the market for 
products derived from inhumanely killed seals – th e complainants argued that, by concluding that 
the ban was "capable of making a contribution", the panel identified a possible, instead of an 
actual, contribution. The Appellate Body noted that, because the panel made clear that it was 
focusing on the design and expected operation of the measure, the panel could be seen as 
projecting what the impact of the prohibitive as pect of the measure would be. In the Appellate 
Body's view, such an approach was similar to the analysis in Brazil – Retreaded Tyres , where the 
panel concluded that the measure at issue was "capable of making a contribution to the objective". With regard to the second aspect of the objective – i.e. addressing public moral concerns relating 
to the number of inhumanely killed seals – the Appellate Body considered that the panel's 
articulation of the degree of contribution was influenced by the limitations in the data about which 
the panel had signalled its prior reservations. With respect to the complainants' contention that the panel failed to identify how the positive and negative contributions of the different elements of 
the measure resulted in a net overall contribution to the identified objective, the Appellate Body 
noted that, although the panel's conclusion that the EU Seal Regime is "capable of making and does make some contribution" does not prov ide much information as to the precise degree 
or extent of the contribution, it was not clear what greater clarity or precision the panel could 
have achieved.  
Next, the Appellate Body addressed the complainants' distinct claims that various aspects of the 
panel's findings with respect to the contribution of the EU Seal Regime to its objective were 
unsubstantiated. The Appellate Body first assessed Canada's and Norway's contention that the 
EU Seal Regime fails to contribute to the object ive in various respects because it leads to worse 
seal welfare outcomes, given: (i) that the EU Seal Regime will have the effect of replacing imports 
from commercial hunts with those from IC and MRM hunts; and (ii) that IC and MRM hunts lead to 
higher rates of inhumanely killed seals as compared to commercial hunts. In the Appellate Body's view, the record before the panel provided the panel with reasonable grounds for not concluding 
that IC and MRM hunts lead to poorer seal welfare outcomes than commercial hunts, or that the 
EU Seal Regime resulted in the replacement of seal product imports from commercial hunts with such products from IC and MRM hunts. Accordingl y, the Appellate Body rejected the claims of 
Canada and Norway as they relate to this aspect of the panel's contribution analysis. 
The Appellate Body then addressed the complainants' claims in respect of the panel's finding that 
the EU Seal Regime contributes to reducing EU and global demand for seal products and the incidence of inhumanely killed seals. The Appellate Body noted that the European Union had 
argued that the ban makes a partial contribution to addressing public concerns regarding seal 
welfare "by reducing global demand for seal products resulting from commercial hunts, with the consequence that less seals are killed in an inhumane way". By focusing on whether the ban 
reduces demand for seal products, the panel appeared to have accepted the proposition that 
reducing such demand would lead to fewer inhumanely killed seals. The Appellate Body did not WT/AB/24 
 
- 24 - 
 
  consider it unreasonable for the panel to have assumed that a decrease in demand, and hence a 
contraction of the seal product market, would have the effect of reducing the number of seals killed, and thus the number of inhumanely killed seals. With regard to the complainants' argument that seal products derived from Greenlandic hunts could fully satisfy EU demand, and that the ban 
could or does lead to an increase in the numbe r of seals killed inhumanely, the Appellate Body 
recalled that this argument rested on a factual premise that was highly contested by the parties, was not uniformly supported by the panel record, and, in any event, the panel did not make 
a finding in this respect. In the light of this uncertainty, the Appellate Body rejected Canada's 
and Norway's claims in this regard. 
The Appellate Body next turned to the remaining questions of whether the panel's finding that the 
EU Seal Regime led to a reduction in demand for seal products was properly substantiated. Canada 
and Norway contended that the evidence relied on by the panel suggesting that the market 
uncertainty created by the EU Seal Regime led to a decline in demand is unavailing because the prohibitive aspect of the EU Seal Regime affect s the supply, not the demand, for seal products. 
The Appellate Body noted that the evidence cited by the panel did not refer to demand per se but 
rather to observations about trade impacts experien ced by the EU seal product market as a whole. 
Such observations, in the Appellate Body's view , were descriptive of a market dynamic that 
necessarily reflects both supply-side and demand-side considerations. The Appellate Body 
therefore considered that the references to market uncertainty and decreases in trade volume and market prices were all elements of a market  dynamic that is at least partly informed by 
demand-side considerations, and that the panel therefore had a reasonable basis to conclude that 
the evidence that it cited provided some su pport for the view that the measure reduced 
EU demand for seal products. In respect of the panel's conclusion that the EU Seal Regime contributes "to a certain extent, to reducing a glob al demand", the Appellate Body considered that 
the panel based its conclusions largely on its conclusions regarding the effect of the 
EU Seal Regime on EU demand. Although it considered that the basis for this finding was somewhat tenuous, the Appellate Body recalled the difficulties faced by the panel in conducting 
any sort of quantitative analysis on the basis of the panel record, which rendered the panel's 
analysis necessarily qualitative in nature. For these reasons, the Appellate Body rejected the claims of Canada and Norway with respect to the panel's assessment of the EU Seal Regime's 
impact on EU and global demand for seal products. 
The Appellate Body next addressed claims by No rway alleging that the panel undervalued two 
additional aspects in assessing the contribution of  the EU Seal Regime. First, Norway argued that 
the panel failed to take full account of the negative contribution made by the implicit exceptions in 
its contribution analysis. The Appellate Body disagr eed with Norway's claim, highlighting that the 
panel explicitly discussed the impact of inward processing on the EU market in the context of its contribution analysis. Norway further argued that the panel wrongly concluded that indigenous 
communities have not been able to benefit from the IC exception, a factor that the panel 
considered to limit the negative impact of the ex ceptions. The Appellate Body considered that the 
panel was not, as Norway suggested, referring excl usively to the difficulties faced by Greenlandic 
Inuit as the basis for its statement, and it therefore rejected Norway's claim. 
The Appellate Body then turned to assess Canada's and Norway's claims relating to the panel's 
finding that the alternative measure was not reason ably available. The Appellate Body noted that 
the alternative measure proposed in these disputes consisted of market access for seal products 
that would be conditioned on compliance with animal welfare standards, and certification 
and labelling requirements. Canada and Norway requested the Appellate Body to reverse the 
panel's finding that the proposed alternative measure is not reasonably available, arguing, 
principally, that the panel failed to assess the alternative measure against the actual contribution 
of the EU Seal Regime, but rather did so against a standard of complete fulfilment of the objective. The Appellate Body took note of the panel's explanation that it was undertaking an analytical exercise in which the contours of the animal welf are standards required as part of the alternative 
measure were not clearly defined. The Appellate Body further noted that, based on the differing 
views on what would constitute adequate welfare standards, and absent a clearly articulated standard from the complainants, the panel examined a range of hypothetical versions of the 
alternative measure spanning a range of different  levels of stringency or leniency. In the 
Appellate Body's view, the fact that the panel entertained, and compared, the possibility of 
stringent versus lenient versions of a certification system, in order to consider how a loosely 
defined alternative measure might contribute to th e identified objective, confirmed that the panel WT/AB/24 
 
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  was undertaking considerable efforts to understand how such variations of the alternative measure 
might operate.  
Canada and Norway further contended that the pane l erred in considering the costs and logistical 
demands on hunters and marketers of seal products if a strict certification scheme were to be 
adopted by the European Union. According to th e complainants, the Appellate Body report in 
Brazil – Retreaded Tyres  stands for the proposition that it is the burdens and costs imposed on the 
responding WTO Member, not on the industry, th at are relevant for a finding on whether the 
alternative measure is reasonably available. Th e Appellate Body explained, however, that its 
observations in Brazil – Retreaded Tyres  did not exclude a priori the po ssibility that an alternative 
measure may be deemed not to be reasonably available due to significant costs or difficulties faced by the affected industry, in particular where such costs or difficulties could affect the ability 
or willingness of the industry to comply with the requirements of that measure. 
Ultimately, having reviewed the panel's reasoning and findings in respect of the alternative 
measure, the Appellate Body did not consider that the panel erred in concluding that the 
alternative measure is not reasonably available. Th e panel considered that even the most stringent 
certification system would be difficult to implement and enforce, and would lead to an increase in the number of inhumanely killed seals. The panel further considered that making the welfare 
standards or the certification and labelling requirements more lenient would make the alternative 
measure more reasonably available but would not meaningfully contribute to addressing EU public moral concerns regarding seal welfare. The Appellate Body therefore understood the panel to have concluded that, irrespective of the level of stringency, a certification system would be beset by 
difficulties in addressing EU public moral concerns regarding seal welfare.  
Finally, the Appellate Body considered two claims  brought respectively by Canada and Norway 
under Article 11 of the DSU relating to the reason able availability of the alternative measure. 
First, the Appellate Body responded to Canada's assertion that the panel had no basis to conclude 
that the alternative measure could result in an increase in the number of seals killed inhumanely. The Appellate Body considered that the panel ha d relied on more information than alleged by 
Canada. The Appellate Body noted that a panel does  not fail to make an objective assessment as 
required under Article 11 of the DSU by failing to cite all of the arguments and evidence supporting a particular proposition, and therefore rejected Canada's claim.  
Second, the Appellate Body addressed Norway's co ntention that the panel acted in violation of 
Article 11 of the DSU by ignoring two further alternative measures it had proposed during the 
course of the panel proceedings. The Appellate Bo dy explained that the first alternative to which 
Norway referred amounted to the removal of the EU Seal Regime. The Appellate Body noted that 
this alternative rested on the factual premise that  it had previously examined and which the panel 
did not find to exist, namely, that the EU Seal Regime could or does lead to worse seal welfare outcomes than those existing prior to the adopti on of the measure. Norway's second alternative 
proposed the removal of three of the restrictiv e conditions of the MRM exception – that is, 
the not-for-profit, non-systematic, and sole purpose conditions – to be replaced by certain animal welfare, certification, and labelling requirements. The Appellate Body noted that Norway's second alternative consisted in part of a set of requirements similar to what the panel actually analysed in 
its Reports, and, therefore, any conclusions the panel reached regarding the likely limitations of 
the certification system it analysed equally applied to a version of that system that would apply only in respect of seal products from MRM hunts.  In sum, the Appellate Body dismissed Norway's 
Article 11 claims as it considered that the addition al alternatives to which Norway referred were in 
fact implicitly addressed by the panel.  
For the above reasons, having rejected the clai ms on appeal by Canada and Norway as they 
related to Article XX(a), the Appellate Body upheld the panel's finding that the EU Seal Regime is 
provisionally deemed necessary within the meanin g of Article XX(a) of the GATT 1994. Since it 
upheld the panel's finding that the EU Seal Regime is provisionally justified under Article XX(a), the Appellate Body was not called upon to addres s the European Union's conditional other appeal 
with respect to Article XX(b). WT/AB/24 
 
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  4.1.3.3  The chapeau of Article XX of the GATT 1994 
While Canada and Norway agreed with the panel's ultimate conclusion that the EU Seal Regime 
does not meet the requirements of the chapeau, th ey took issue with the panel's reasoning, and in 
particular its reliance on findings under Articl e 2.1 of the TBT Agreement, in reaching this 
conclusion. The European Union, in turn, requested the Appellate Body to reverse the panel's 
conclusion under the chapeau with respect to the IC exception, to complete the analysis, and to 
find instead that the IC exception meets the requir ements of Article XX(a), including the chapeau.  
The Appellate Body began its analysis by setting out an interpretation of the chapeau of Article XX 
of the GATT 1994. The Appellate Body noted that the chapeau imposes additional disciplines on measures that have been found to violate an obligation under the GATT 1994, but that have also been found to be provisionally justified under one of the exceptions set forth in the subparagraphs 
of Article XX. The Appellate Body recalled that th e function of the chapeau is to prevent the abuse 
or misuse of a Member's right to invoke thos e exceptions. The Appellate Body noted that the 
examination of whether a measure is applied in a manner that would constitute a means of 
"arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail" 
necessitates an assessment of whether the "conditions" prevailing in the countries between which the measure allegedly discriminates are "the same". The Appellate Body considered that, 
in determining which "conditions" prevailing in different countries are relevant in the context of the 
chapeau, the subparagraphs of Article XX, and in particular the subparagraph under which a measure has been provisionally justified, provide pertinent context. The Appellate Body recalled that the analysis of whether discrimination is arbitrary or unjustifiable within the meaning of the 
chapeau "should focus on the cause of the discrimin ation, or the rationale put forward to explain 
its existence". Drawing on previous jurisprudence, the Appellate Body further noted that a key factor in the assessment of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination is the question of whether the 
discrimination can be reconciled with, or is rationally related to, the policy objective with respect to 
which the measure has been provisionally justified under one of the subparagraphs of Article XX.  
With regard to Canada's and Norway's claims, the Appellate Body recognized that there are 
important parallels between the analyses under Ar ticle 2.1 of the TBT Agreement and the chapeau 
o f  A r t i c l e  X X .  H o w e v e r ,  t h e  A p p e l l a t e  B o d y  a l s o  saw significant differences with respect to the 
applicable legal standard, and the function and scope of these provisions. The Appellate Body therefore found that the panel erred in appl ying the same legal test under the chapeau 
of Article XX of the GATT 1994 as it applied under Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement, instead of 
conducting an independent analysis of the consis tency of the EU Seal Regime with the specific 
terms and requirements of the chapeau. The A ppellate Body therefore reversed the panel's 
findings under the chapeau of Article XX, and consequently found that it did not need to address 
the participants' appeals as far as they related to those findings. 
The Appellate Body then went on to complete the analysis on the basis of factual findings by the 
panel and uncontested facts on the panel record. The Appellate Body recalled that the 
circumstances that bring about the discrimination within the meaning of the chapeau may include, but are not limited to, the circumstances that led to the finding of a violation of a substantive provision of the GATT 1994. The Appellate Body st ated that it would therefore examine whether 
the different regulatory treatment that the EU Seal Regime accords to seal products derived from 
IC hunts as compared to "commercial" hunts constitutes "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination", as well as whether the measure has any discriminatory effects on different indigenous 
communities that would amount to arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination. 
Turning to the question of whether the "conditions" prevailing in Canada and Norway, on the one 
hand, and Greenland, on the other hand, are releva ntly different, the Appellate Body considered 
that the European Union had not shown this to be the case. In particular, the Appellate Body noted 
that the European Union did not appear to contest that "the same animal welfare conditions prevail in all countries where seals are hunted". The Appellate Body also did not understand the European Union to have argued that the differences in the identity of the hunter or in the purpose 
of seal hunts that the panel found to exist between "commercial" and IC hunts would render the 
conditions in Canada and Norway, on the one hand, and Greenland, on the other hand, relevantly different. The Appellate Body therefore proceeded on  the basis that the conditions prevailing in 
these countries are "the same" for the purposes of the chapeau.  WT/AB/24 
 
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  The Appellate Body next turned to Canada's and Norway's claim that the EU Seal Regime results in 
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination because it discriminates on a basis that does not have a "rational relationship" with the objective of the measure or goes against that objective. The Appellate Body recalled that the objective of the EU Seal Regime is to address EU public moral 
concerns regarding seal welfare, and that in pursuit of this objective, the EU Seal Regime bans the 
importation and placing on the market of seal products derived from "commercial" hunts, while it allows the importation of seal products derived from IC hunts that satisfy certain criteria relating 
to the identity of the hunter, the purpose of th e hunt, and the use of by-products from the hunt. 
The Appellate Body noted the European Union's expl anation that it exempts seal products derived 
from hunts conducted by Inuit and other indigenous peoples from the ban on the importation and placing on the market of seal products in order to mitigate the adverse effects on those 
communities resulting from the EU Seal Regime to the extent compatible with the main objective 
of addressing the public moral concerns with rega rd to the welfare of se als. Yet, the Appellate 
Body considered that the European Union had failed to demonstrate how the discrimination 
resulting from the EU Seal Regime can be reconciled with, or is related to, the policy objective of 
addressing EU public moral concerns regarding seal welfare. In this connection, the Appellate Body noted that the European Union had not established why the need to protect the economic and 
social interests of the Inuit and other indigenous peoples necessarily implies that the European 
Union could not do anything further to ensure that the welfare of seals is addressed in the context of IC hunts, given that IC hunts can cause the very pain and suffering for seals that the EU public is concerned about. 
The Appellate Body noted that, while the relationsh ip of the discrimination to the objective of a 
measure is one of the most important factors, it is not the sole factor that is relevant to the assessment of arbitrary or unjustifiable discriminat ion, and there could be additional factors that 
may also be relevant to that overall assessmen t. The Appellate Body therefore proceeded to 
examine whether the specific criteria of the IC exception are designed and applied in a manner that would constitute arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination. 
The Appellate Body identified ambiguities with respect to two of these criteria, namely, 
the requirements that the seal products are derived from "seal hunts which contribute to the subsistence of the community" ("subsistence") and from "seal hunts the products of which are at least partly used, consumed or processed within the communities according to their traditions" 
("partial use"). With respect to the "subsistence" criterion, the Appellate Body recalled the panel's 
finding that the subsistence purpose of IC hunts encompasses a commercial component "to the extent that Inuit or indigenous communities also exchange some by-products of the hunted 
seals for economic gain." With respect to the "parti al use" criterion, the Appellate Body considered 
that the ambiguity in the notion of "partial use" arises when it is applied on an aggregate basis 
together with the ambiguity arising from the subsistence criterion. The Appellate Body was 
concerned that, where conformity with the "partial use" criterion is not assessed with respect to 
individual seals but rather with respect to indi vidual hunters over an extended period of time 
(e.g. through licensing conditions), or with respect to all hunters active in a particular area or even 
all members of an Inuit community, a proportion of seal products that, when considered 
individually, might not conform to the "partial use" criterion (either because the hunter has 
commercialized the entire seal or because the non-commercialized parts of the seal have been disposed of rather than used) could potentially qualify for the IC exception. Given the ambiguities 
that could arise with respect to at least these two elements of the IC exception requirements, 
the Appellate Body considered that the "recognize d bodies" applying these requirements appeared 
to enjoy broad discretion, which could allow for inst ances of abuse of the IC exception, even where 
the recognized body was acting in good faith. The Appellate Body was concerned that, 
depending on how strictly the IC requirements are applied, seal products derived from what should 
in fact be properly characterized as "commercial" hunts could thus enter the EU market under the IC exception in some instances. For the Appellate Body, the European Union had not sufficiently 
explained how such instances could be prevente d in the application of the IC exception. 
The Appellate Body noted that differently from the other exceptions under the EU Seal Regime, the IC exception did not contain any anti-circumvention clause which would allow the denial of 
entry of seal products that, while formally compliant with the exception appear to be outside the 
scope of the exception. 
Finally, the Appellate Body turned to the question  of whether the manner in which the IC exception 
affects Inuit communities in different countries amounts to "arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination". The Appellate Body considered that, to the extent that the IC exception is WT/AB/24 
 
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  designed or applied so as to be de facto  only available to Greenland, the EU Seal Regime would 
treat seal products derived from IC hunts in Greenland and Canada differently and, in this respect, result in arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail. While it was undisputed that the Inuit in Greenland are currently the only beneficiaries of 
the IC exception, the European Union contested that  this outcome can be attributed to the EU Seal 
Regime, which would imply that there is no "genuine relationship" between the current de facto  
exclusivity of the IC exception and the design an d application of the exception, such that this 
outcome would not be "attributable" to the EU Seal Regime. 
The Appellate Body noted that the panel did not poin t to any aspect of the IC exception itself that 
prevents indigenous communities in Canada from taking advantage of it, and that the panel also did not explain how it accounted for the failure of the Canadian authorities to apply for recognized 
body status in reaching its conclusion. The Appellate Body further noted that, according to 
Canada's own explanation, the reason why Inuit communities in Canada did not have an incentive to take advantage of the IC exception was related to the incidental effects of the ban on seal 
products derived from commercial hunts, rather than any aspect of the "text" of the measure, as 
the panel was suggesting.  
The Appellate Body was, however, not persuaded that the European Union had made 
"comparable efforts" to facilitate the access of the Canadian Inuit to the IC exception as it did with 
respect to the Greenlandic Inuit. The Appellate Body observed, for example, that the Danish 
customs authorities processed imports based on certificates by the Greenlandic authorities prior to a Greenlandic entity obtaining recognized body status within the meaning of the Implementing 
Regulation. The Appellate Body acknowledged the Eu ropean Union's argument that it "engaged in 
'multiple efforts' to assist the Inuit in Canada to benefit from the IC exception", but also noted the European Union's recognition that "the relevant Canadian Inuit authorities wrongly interpret the 
EU Seal Regime as requiring the Inuit communities to process their own sealskin products to fall 
under the IC exception". The Appellate Body also observed that the European Union did not appear 
to have pursued cooperative arrangements to facilitate the access of Canadian Inuit to the 
IC exception. The Appellate Body recalled, in this regard, that a measure may result in arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination "when the application of the measure at issue does not allow for any inquiry into the appropriateness of the regulatory program for the conditions prevailing in those exporting countries", adding that setting up a "recognized body" that fulfils all the requirements 
of Article 6 of the Implementing Regulation may entail significant burdens in some instances. 
In sum, the Appellate Body identified several feat ures of the EU Seal Regime that indicated that 
the regime is applied in a manner that consti tutes a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, in particular with respect to 
the IC exception. First, the Appellate Body found  that the European Union had not shown that the 
manner in which the EU Seal Regime treats seal products derived from IC hunts as compared to 
seal products derived from "commercial" hunts can be reconciled with the objective of addressing 
EU public moral concerns regarding seal welfare. Second, the Appellate Body found considerable ambiguity in the "subsistence" and "partial use" crit eria of the IC exception. Given the ambiguity of 
these criteria and the broad discretion that the recognized bodies consequently enjoy in applying 
t h e m ,  t h e  A p p e l l a t e  B o d y  c o n s i d e r e d  t h a t  s e a l  p r o d u c t s  d e r i v e d  f r o m  w h a t  s h o u l d  i n  f a c t  b e  
properly characterized as "commercial" hunts could potentially enter the EU market under the IC exception.  
For these reasons, the Appellate Body found that  the European Union had not demonstrated that 
the EU Seal Regime, in particular with respect to  the IC exception, is designed and applied in a 
manner that meets the requirements of the chapeau of Article XX of the GATT 1994. 
Thus, the Appellate Body found that the European Union had not justified the EU Seal Regime 
under Article XX. WT/AB/24 
 
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  4.2  Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Measures 
on Certain Products from China , WT/DS449/AB/R  
This dispute concerned China's challenge to measures taken by the United States regarding the 
application of countervailing duties to imports from non-market economy (NME) countries, 
and the United States' failure to investigate and avoid double remedies30 in certain countervailing 
and anti-dumping duty investigations. On 13 March 2012, the US Congress enacted Public Law (PL) 112-99, which in Section 1 adds a new paragraph (f) to Section 701 of the 
United States Tariff Act of 1930, expressly providing for the application of countervailing duties to 
NME countries. Section 1 of PL 112-99 further specifies that it applies to all countervailing duty proceedings initiated by the United States authorities on or after 20 November 2006, as well as to all pending court proceedings relating to such countervailing duty proceedings.  
Before the panel, China claimed that: (i) Section 1 of PL 112-99, and the new Section 701(f) of the 
US Tariff Act it establishes, are inconsistent with Articles X:1, X:2, and X:3(b) of the GATT 1994; and (ii) the United States acted inconsistently with Articles 10, 19, and 32 of the SCM Agreement 
by failing to investigate and avoid double remedies in certain investigations and reviews initiated 
between 20 November 2006 and 13 March 2012. 
The panel found that Section 1 of PL 112-99 was not inconsistent with Article X:1, X:2, or X:3(b) 
of the GATT 1994. The panel also found that, in 25 of the 26 sets of proceedings included in 
China's claim, the United States acted inconsistent ly with Article 19.3, and Articles 10 and 32.1 of 
the SCM Agreement because it imposed concurrent ly anti-dumping and countervailing duties on 
the same products, without investigating whether double remedies arose in each case. 
On appeal, China claimed that the panel erred in its interpretation and application of Article X:2 of 
the GATT 1994, insofar as the panel found that PL 112-99 is consistent with Article X:2 because it does not effect an "advance in a rate of duty or other charge on imports under an established  
and uniform practice" or impose "a new or more burdensome requirement, restriction or 
prohibition on imports" within the meaning of that provision. China also claimed that the panel applied an incorrect standard of review and failed to make an objective assessment of the matter 
before it, as required by Article 11 of the DSU, in making factual findings with respect to the rates, 
requirements, or restrictions applicable under US municipal law prior to the enforcement or enactment of Section 1 of PL 112-99.
 In its other appeal, the United States challenged the panel's 
findings that China's claims under Articles 10, 19.3, and 32.1 of the SCM Agreement were within 
the panel's terms of reference. The panel's findin gs under the SCM Agreement were not challenged 
on appeal. 
4.2.1  Article 6.2 of the DSU 
In its other appeal, the United States challenged the panel's finding in its Preliminary Ruling of 
7 May 2013 that the claims listed in Part D of China's panel request were identified consistently with Article 6.2 of the DSU. First, the United States argued that the panel imposed a new 
and incorrect legal standard when the panel determined whether China's panel request permitted 
"sufficiently clear inferences as to the WTO obligations at issue in its Part D". Second, the United States contended that the panel failed to examine China's panel request on its face when the panel treated the findings in US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China) (DS379), 
as referenced in footnote 6 of the panel request,  as an integral part thereof. Third, 
the United States pointed out that the panel's finding that China's panel request was limited to Article 19.3 of the SCM Agreement contradicted China's own indication of its intent to bring claims 
under Article 19 as an "integrated whole". Finally, the United States maintained that the panel 
sought to "cure" China's panel request by allowing China, by its letter dated 25 March 2013, to limit its claims under Part D of its panel request to Articles 10, 19, and 32 of the SCM Agreement, 
despite having earlier identified several other general claims under that Agreement, 
the Anti-Dumping Agreement and the GATT 1994. 
                                               
30 The term "double remedies" refers to the imposition of anti-dumping and a countervailing duties on 
the same product, as well as to "double counting", i.e. circumstances in which the simultaneous application of anti-dumping and countervailing duties on the same impo rted product results, at le ast to some extent, in the 
offsetting of the same  subsidization twice. WT/AB/24 
 
- 30 - 
 
  The Appellate Body examined the text and narr ative of China's panel request, which made a 
general reference to Articles 10, 19, and 32 of the SCM Agreement without specifying the particular paragraphs on which its claims were based. The Appellate Body observed that both Articles 10 and 32 are consequential claims, in that a violation of these provisions depends on 
whether there is a finding of violation of Article 19. While Article 10 contains only one paragraph, 
Article 32.1 appears to be the only paragraph in Article 32 that imposes an obligation on the imposition of countervailing duties. 
As for Article 19 of the SCM Agreement, the Appe llate Body found that neither Article 19.1 nor 
Article 19.2 was relevant to China's complaint. Article 19.1 establishes when a countervailing duty may be imposed, and Article 19.2 grants Members the discretion for such imposition. The Appellate Body noted that this dispute concerned investigations and reviews already initiated 
and countervailing duties already imposed. With respect to Articles 19.3 and 19.4, 
the Appellate Body agreed with the panel that Articles 19.3 and 19.4 are "the potentially relevant obligations", as they impose substantive obligations on the permissible amounts of countervailing 
duties. Since both Article 19.3 and Article 19.4 addre ss the quantitative limits on the imposition of 
countervailing duties, they are "closely related" articles that share an "interlinked nature". However, the Appellate Body underscored that Arti cle 19.3 pertains to the amount of the duty to 
be levied ("in the appropriate amounts"), as well as to the manner in which it is imposed 
("on a non-discriminatory basis"), and Article 19.4 limits the maximum amount of the countervailing duty. Thus, the fact that these obligations under Articles 19.3 and 19.4 may be interlinked does not necessarily, in itself, provide a summary of the legal basis of the complaint 
sufficient to present the problem clearly. 
The Appellate Body then turned to the narrative of  the panel request, and noted that its explicit 
reference to "double remedies" is supplemented by an elaboration of what this concept means 
in the context of the present dispute, i.e. "the do uble remedies that are likely to result when the 
USDOC [United States Department of Commerce] a pplies countervailing duties in conjunction with 
anti-dumping duties determined in accordance wi th the US non-market economy methodology" in 
respect of the investigations or reviews initiated between 20 November 2006 and 13 March 2012. 
According to the Appellate Body, the panel request narrative sufficiently explained that, in these investigations and reviews, the US authorities failed to investigate and avoid double remedies that may have resulted therefrom, thus amounting to an alleged violation of Article 19 of the 
SCM Agreement. The Appellate Body found that th e word "double" gives an indication that the 
problem with "double remedies" is that they result in the levying of countervailing duties exceeding the "appropriate amounts in each case" in the sense of Article 19.3 of the 
SCM Agreement. Therefore, the Appellate Body held that the narrative's reference to "double 
remedies" assisted in presenting the problem clearly by providing a connection between the measure at issue (the failure of the US authorities to investigate and avoid double remedies) and 
the legal claims (Articles 10, 19, and 32 of the SCM Agreement). In this way, the term "double 
remedies" "plainly connects" and assists in clarifying how the measure at issue is inconsistent with the relevant legal provision in Article 19, i.e. Article 19.3. 
The Appellate Body emphasized that, ideally, the panel request in this dispute would have referred 
not only to the specific measure at issue (the failure of the US authorities to investigate and avoid 
double remedies), but also to the specific pr ovision concerned, namely, Article 19.3 of the 
SCM Agreement. However, the Appellate Body cl arified that simply specifying Article 19.3, 
or adopting its exact language, without referring to "double remedies", would not necessarily have 
presented the problem more clearly. The Appellate Body noted that the obligations under Article 19.3 to impose countervailing duties "in the appropriate amounts" 
and "on a non-discriminatory basis" are broader in scope than the specific concept of 
"double remedies". When a Member imposes concurring countervailing and anti-dumping duties on the same imports, strictly speaking, the amount of countervailing duty may still be levied "in the appropriate amounts" or not in excess of the amount of the subsidy found to exist. 
Neither does the concurrent imposition necessarily  mean that the anti-dumping duty exceeds the 
margin of dumping found to exist. The problem arises when, as a result of the parallel imposition of countervailing and anti-dumping duties, the same subsidization is offset twice in calculating the 
amount of subsidy and the dumping margin. Under these circumstances, countervailing duties may 
not be levied "in the appropriate amounts in each case", contrary to Article 19.3. 
Further, the Appellate Body agreed with the pane l that using "sufficiently clear inferences" is 
merely a way of explaining how "the WTO obligations at issue in a panel request, while not WT/AB/24 
 
- 31 - 
 
  explicitly identified by paragraph number, are nonetheless identifiable from the panel request 
considered as a whole." Inferential reasoning may be inevitable in ascertaining compliance with Article 6.2, as in situations where a panel request makes a general reference to a set of measures or WTO provisions containing multiple obligations, and the specific measure and/or legal claim must be 
discerned from the panel request as a whole, including its narrative and any annexes. 
Turning to the panel's reliance on footnote 6 of the panel request, the Appellate Body emphasized 
that footnotes are part of the text of a panel request, and may be relevant to the identification of 
the measure at issue or to the presentation of the legal basis of the complaint. In this dispute, 
however, the Appellate Body disagreed with the manner in which the panel interpreted footnote 6 
as excluding China's claim under Article 19.4. The Appellate Body explained that footnote 6 refers 
to Appendices A and B to the panel request, which list the parallel countervailing duty 
and anti-dumping investigations and reviews initiated between 20 November 2006 
and 13 March 2012. Footnote 6 also states that China excluded from this list of investigations and reviews those that resulted in a negative in jury determination, and those that were already 
the subject of the dispute in US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China)  (DS379).  
According to the Appellate Body, references to these Appendices and to DS379 merely indicate which investigations and reviews were the subjec t of, and which were excluded from, Part D of 
China's panel request. Nevertheless, the Appe llate Body noted that the panel's exclusion 
of Article 19.4 from its terms of reference was not challenged on appeal. 
Finally, the Appellate Body did not agree with the United States that China's abandonment of its 
c l a i m s  u n d e r  P a r t  C ,  a s  w e l l  a s  s o m e  o f  i t s  c l a i m s  u n d e r  P a r t  D ,  o f  t h e  p a n e l  r e q u e s t  " c u r e d "  
its alleged inconsistency with Article 6.2 of the DSU. The Appellate Body stated that even 
assuming that the initial listing of the abandoned claims in China's panel request failed to fulfil the requirements of Article 6.2 of the DSU, this did not affect the analysis of whether the remaining 
claims under Articles 10, 19, and 32 of the SCM Agr eement were identified with sufficient clarity, 
which must be addressed in its own right. The Appe llate Body also did not agree that the mere fact 
that the United States had to prepare for claims that were later on dropped could be considered as 
affecting its due process rights in respect of the remaining claims. 
Based on the analysis of the panel request as a whole, the Appellate Body considered that China's 
panel request, given its references to Articles 10, 19, and 32 of the SCM Agreement, and coupled with the identification of the specific measure at issue and a reference to and explanation of 
"double remedies", provided "a brief summary of the legal basis of the complaint sufficient to 
present the problem clearly". Therefore, the Appellate Body upheld the panel's finding that the claims under Articles 10, 19.3, and 32.1 of the SCM Agreement were within its terms of reference, 
and found that China's panel request was not inconsistent with Article 6.2 of the DSU. 
4.2.2  Article X:2 of the GATT 1994 Article X:2 of the GATT 1994 stipulates that no measure of general application that (i) increases a 
rate of duty or (ii) imposes a new or more burdensome requirement shall be enforced before such 
measure has been officially published.
31 Whether the measure at issue increases the duty or 
imposes a new or more burdensome requirement within the meaning of Article X:2 requires a comparison between the new measure of general application in municipal law and the prior 
published measure that it replaced or modified. T hus Article X:2 requires the identification of a 
"baseline" of comparison in municipal law applicable prior to the new measure, which was the focus of China's appeal. 
On appeal, China challenged the panel's interpretation of Article X:2 of the GATT 1994 in respect 
of the baseline of comparison to determine whether a measure effects an advance in a rate of duty or imposes a new or more burdensome requirement. China also challenged the panel's application 
of its interpretation of Article X:2 to the measure at issue, Section 1 of PL 112-99. In particular, 
China challenged the panel's findings that "China ha[d] not established that Section 1 is a provision 'effecting an advance in a rate of duty or other charge on imports under an established 
                                               
31 The Panel concluded that Article X:2 prohibits an  administrative agency or court not only from 
enforcing a measure prior to its official  publication, but also from enforcing or applying such measure in respect 
of events or circumstances that occurred  before it has been officially published . This finding was not appealed. WT/AB/24 
 
- 32 - 
 
  and uniform practice'" and that "China ha[d] not established that Section 1 is a provision 'imposing 
a new or more burdensome requirement, restriction or prohibition on imports'".  
The Appellate Body reversed the panel's interpretation in respect of the relevant baseline of 
comparison under Article X:2 of the GATT 1994 to determine whether a measure effects an 
advance in a rate of duty or imposes a new or more burdensome requirement. 
First, the Appellate Body considered that the panel erred in finding that the phrase 
"under an established and uniform practice" "serves to define the relevant prior rate … to establish 
whether or not an advance in a rate [of duty ] has been effected", and that the relevant 
comparison contemplated by Article X:2 of the GATT 1994 is "between the new rate effected by the measure at issue and the rate that was previously applicable under an established and uniform practice". The Appellate Body noted that, within th e context of Article X:2, the preposition "under" 
may be interpreted as introducing the manner in which the measure of general application should 
advance the rate of duty or other charge. Definition s of the preposition "under", as "in the form of" 
and "in the guise of", suggest that the phrase " under an established and uniform practice" refers 
to certain characteristics of the application of th e measure, and not to the baseline of comparison. 
Relying on Article 33 of the Vienna Convention, the Appellate Body further considered that the 
definition of the preposition "under" as "in the form of" and "in the guise of" was reconcilable with 
the French and Spanish versions of the provisions which read " en vertu de " and " en virtud del ". 
The context found in Article X:1 of the GATT 1994, which requires that measures be published promptly, further supports the view that the identification of the baseline of comparison under Article X:2 should start with the measure that Article X:1 requires to be published promptly. 
The Appellate Body concluded that the ordinary meaning of the phrase "under an established 
and uniform practice", its position in Article X: 2, its relevant context, and the function that 
Article X:2 performs relating to transparency an d due process, suggest that this phrase refers 
to the measure of general application, rather than serving as the baseline of comparison. 
Second, the Appellate Body considered that the pa nel committed an error in finding that, in order 
to determine whether a measure of general a pplication imposes a new or more burdensome 
requirement or restriction, a comparison should be made with a requirement or restriction 
that results from an interpretation  of a measure adopted and publicly communicated 
by an administering agency . The Appellate Body considered that a textual and contextual analysis 
of Article X:2 of the GATT 1994 does not suggest that the baseline of comparison for the second 
type of measure in this provision, i.e. a measure "imposing a new or more burdensome 
requirement, restriction or prohibition", should be the uniform or established practice of the administering agency. Unlike in the case of measures "effecting an advance in a rate of duty or 
other charge on imports", the reference to "a uniform and established practice" is of no assistance 
because this phrase precedes the reference to measures "imposing a new or more burdensome requirement, restriction or prohibition on imports", and thus it has no connection to it. 
Moreover, the Appellate Body remarked that, like for measures "effecting an advance in a rate of 
duty or other charge on imports", the context of  Article X:1 of the GATT 1994 suggests that the 
starting point of the analysis of municipal law should, normally, be the published measure of general application, rather than an administrative practice. 
Having disagreed with the panel's interpretation of Article X:2 of the GATT 1994 as requiring a 
comparison with the practice of the administrative agency, the Appellate Body found that, to determine whether a measure of general application increases a rate of duty or imposes a new or 
more burdensome requirement, the comp arison should be conducted with the prior published 
measure of general application . In this regard, the Appellate Body clarified that Article X:2 requires 
panels and the Appellate Body to ascertain the meaning of municipal law. The Appellate Body 
recalled its ruling in US – Carbon Steel  that, in ascertaining the meaning of municipal law, a panel 
should undertake a holistic assessment and consider the text of the law on its face and, when this 
is not clear, it could rely on other legal instruments such as evidence of the consistent application of such law, the pronouncements of domestic cour ts on the meaning of such law, the opinions of 
legal experts and the writings of recognized schol ars. The Appellate Body also clarified that an 
examination of whether these elements are legal characterizations depends on the circumstances 
of each case. Although factual aspects may be involved in the individuation of the text
32, 
                                               
32 For example, whether the text is o fficial in more than one language, its date of enactment, publication 
and enforcement, the issuing authority, etc. WT/AB/24 
 
- 33 - 
 
  an assessment of the meaning of a legal text for determining whether it complies with the covered 
agreements is a legal characterization. Similarly, whether or when a domestic court ruling has been rendered, or what a writing by a recognized scholar contains, may involve factual aspects. However, the examination of legal interpretations given by domestic courts or administering 
agencies as to the meaning of municipal law with respect to the challenged measure may be a 
legal characterization. These assessments are subject to the circumstances of each case, including the national legal system in which the municipal law operates. 
In the present case, the Appellate Body considered  that the panel erred in identifying the USDOC's 
practice of applying countervailing duties to imports from China as an NME country between 2006 and 2012 as the relevant baseline of comparison to determine whether Section 1 increased the rate of duty or imposed a new or more burden some requirement. Instead of proceeding from 
the agency practice and then addressing the issu e of whether that practice was lawful or not, 
the panel should have focused on ascertaining the meaning of the prior published measure of general application, that is, Section 701(a) of the US Tariff Act, in order to determine whether 
Section 1 (through the new Section 701(f) of the US Tariff Act) increased duties or imposed new or 
more burdensome requirements as compared to Section 701(a). In ascertaining the meaning of Section 701(a), the panel should have taken into account all other relevant elements besides its 
text, including the practice of the USDOC, as well as the relevant judicial decisions on the meaning 
of Section 701(a), in order to determine the meaning of the US countervailing duty law applicable to NME countries prior to Section 1 of PL 112-99. 
The Appellate Body thus reversed the panel's inte rpretation and application of Article X:2 of the 
GATT 1994 to the measure at issue as well as the panel's final conclusion under Article X:2. 
The Appellate Body also declared moot and of no legal effect the panel's findings that: (i) the USDOC's practice of applying countervailing du ties to China as an NME country between 2006 
and 2012 was "presumptively lawful" under US  law, as the USDOC's interpretation of 
US countervailing duty law governs in the absence of a binding judicial determination indicating otherwise; and (ii) it was potentially relevant to address the issue of whether the USDOC's practice 
prior to enactment of Section 1 of PL 112 99 was lawful under US law, for purposes of an analysis 
under Article X:2. The Appellate Body considered that an unlawful practice by an administering agency, which may be overturned by a domestic court decision, could not create expectation among traders over and above the published measure of general application with which it failed 
to comply. 
4.2.3  Article 11 of the DSU China argued that the panel failed to conduct an objective assessment of the matter as required by 
Article 11 of the DSU in concluding, in paragraphs 7.158-7.186 of the panel report, that the 
USDOC's practice should be regarded as "presumptively lawful" and, thus, requested the Appellate Body to reverse these findings. 
The Appellate Body understood China's claims under Article 11 as being linked to the panel's 
approach in the application  of Article X:2 of the GATT 1994 to the measure at issue. As the 
Appellate Body had reversed the panel's findings regarding its interpretation and application of 
Article X:2, and had declared moot and of no legal effect the panel's findings regarding the 
lawfulness of the USDOC's practice in the context of the analysis under Article X:2, it did not 
consider it necessary to examine further China's claims under Article 11 of the DSU. 
4.2.4  Completion of the analysis 
Having found that the panel erred in its interpretation and application of Article X:2 of the 
GATT 1994, the Appellate Body turned to consider whether it was in a position to complete the 
analysis and to determine whether Section 1 of PL 112-99 effects "an advance in a rate of duty or 
other charge on imports" or imposes "a new or more burdensome requirement [or] restriction" 
within the meaning of Article X:2, as requested by China.  
At the outset of its analysis, the Appellate Body recalled that, in order to make such a 
determination, it is necessary to conduct a comparison with the prior published measure of general 
application that the new measure replaces or modifies. In order to establish the relevant baseline 
of comparison, it is necessary to ascertain the meaning of the relevant municipal law. WT/AB/24 
 
- 34 - 
 
  Accordingly, the Appellate Body ex amined the elements mentioned in US – Carbon Steel  as 
relevant in this dispute in order to conduct the comparison required by Article X:2 between the measure at issue (i.e. Section 1 of PL 112-99) and the US countervailing duty law applicable prior to Section 1. The Appellate Body noted that its examination of these elements was a legal 
characterization issue, as it sought to ascertain the meaning of municipal law for purposes 
determining whether Section 1 of PL 112-99 is consistent with Article X:2 of GATT 1994. However, to the extent that this analysis involved examining factual elements, the Appellate Body 
was mindful that it would need to rely on findings by the panel or undisputed facts on the panel 
record in doing so. 
The Appellate Body noted that the published measure of general application prior to Section 1 
of PL 112-99 was Section 701(a) of the US Tariff Act. The Appellate Body highlighted that its 
examination would seek to determine whether the US countervailing duty law was changed by 
Section 1, as argued by China, and thereby effect ed an "advance" in a rate of duty or imposed a 
"new or more burdensome" requirement within the meaning of Article X:2. The United States in 
turn contended that Section 1 merely clarified or confirmed what was already required under prior 
municipal law. 
The Appellate Body divided its analysis in several parts. First, it examined the text of the measure 
at issue, Section 1 of PL 112 99, as compared to the text of Section 701(a) of the US Tariff Act. 
Next, it assessed other elements of US countervailing duty law that are relevant to the present case, including judicial decisions by US courts an d the practice of the USDOC. Based on a holistic 
examination, the Appellate Body assessed whether it could reach a conclusion on whether 
Section 1 effected an advance in a rate of duty or imposed a new or more burdensome 
requirement or restriction within the meaning of Ar ticle X:2 of the GATT 1994, as compared to the 
US countervailing duty law applicable prior to Section 1. 
After examining the text of both Section 1 of PL  112 99 and Section 701(a) of the US Tariff Act, 
the Appellate Body concluded that the questi on of whether Section 1 created the USDOC's 
authority to apply countervailing duties to NME countries could not be answered by merely 
examining the text of relevant US laws alone. Al though the title and some aspects of the text of 
Section 1 suggest that US countervailing duty law did not previously apply to imports from NME 
countries, the text and scope of Section 701(a) does not explicitly exclude NME countries from the scope of application of US countervailing duty law. Rather, Section 701(a) applies to imports from 
any "country" where the USDOC determines the existence of a countervailable subsidy. 
Consequently, the Appellate Body considered that further examination of other elements related to 
the application of US countervailing duty law beyond the text of Section 1 and the text of 
Section 701(a) was required. 
The Appellate Body turned next to examine a number of other elements of municipal law including 
relevant court rulings and administrative practice, beginning with the decision of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) issued in 1986 in Georgetown Steel . 
The Appellate Body recalled the panel's finding that, in that ruling, "the CAFC upheld USDOC's decision not to apply CVD measures to NME countries". Although both participants accepted that the CAFC's decision in Georgetown Steel  was final, the Appellate Body noted that they held 
divergent views as to the meaning of that decision. On the one hand, China argued that the 
CAFC's decision supports the view that the counter vailing duty law was not applicable to imports 
from NME countries prior to Section 1, and that Section 1 should be read as having changed  that 
legal scenario. On the other hand, the United States argued that the CAFC's decision suggest that 
the US countervailing duty law was already applicable to imports from NME countries if it was possible to identify a countervailable subsidy, and that Section 1 should be read as only having 
clarified  what previously applicable US countervailing duty law already required. 
The Appellate Body noted that the panel did not make any findings addressing these divergent readings, and stated that the panel should have  further analysed the scope and meaning of the 
holding of that CAFC decision. The Appellate Body considered that it was not in a position on 
appeal to draw conclusive guidance from the Georgetown Steel  decision for the purposes of 
determining whether Section 1 changed  or clarified  the pre-existing countervailing duty law 
applicable to NME countries. 
Next, the Appellate Body examined the practice of the USDOC to ascertain whether or not 
US countervailing duty law applicable prior to Section 1 provided authority to the USDOC to WT/AB/24 
 
- 35 - 
 
  impose countervailing duties on imports from NME countries and required such imposition 
whenever a countervailable subsidy could be identified.  
The Appellate Body examined three elements re flecting the USDOC's practice prior to 2006. 
First, the Appellate Body examined the 1984 USDOC's countervailing duty determinations with 
respect to carbon steel wire rod from Poland  and Czechoslovakia, but concluded that these 
negative countervailing duty determinations are not clear regarding the applicability of the US countervailing duty law to imports from NME co untries. Next, the Appellate Body examined the 
1998 countervailing duty regulations published by the USDOC. The participants disagreed on the 
meaning of the following statement by the USDOC found in the regulations: "it is important to note here our practice of not applying the CVD law to [NMEs]. The CAFC upheld this practice in Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States ". The Appellate Body noted that the reference to the 
Georgetown Steel  holding was ultimately not of assistance in ascertaining the USDOC's statutory 
mandate, because, as noted above, the ruling in Georgetown Steel  itself is amenable to different 
readings. Third, the Appellate Body assessed the 2002 USDOC determination in Sulfanilic Acid 
from Hungary . The Appellate Body indicated that the USDOC's determination in Sulfanilic Acid can 
be read to suggest that the countervailing duty law was not applicable to imports from NME countries. However, the Appellate Body also acknow ledged the United States' argument that this 
determination stands for the proposition that the USDOC could not identify a subsidy because 
Hungary was an NME country at the time of the investigation. Due to the lack of analysis by the panel and undisputed facts on record, several aspects of the pre-2006 practice of the USDOC remained unclear, even following the Appellate Body's own analysis of that practice. 
The Appellate Body then turned to examining th e post-2006 practice of the USDOC. While it was 
clear that the USDOC's practice in applying US countervailing duty law changed in 2006, the Appellate Body considered that the USDOC's pr actice over the years did not ultimately permit 
it to ascertain whether or not the US countervailing duty law precluded or required the application 
of countervailing duties to imports from NME countries prior to Section 1. 
Next, the Appellate Body turned to examine a series of pronouncements of US courts regarding 
the application of countervailing duties to imports from China after 2006.  
With respect to the decision in GPX V  rendered by the CAFC in 2011, the Appellate Body observed 
that the panel's analysis with respect to the content  of the GPX V  decision was limited, as it did not 
address in detail the reasoning of the CAFC in reaching its main conclusion. The Appellate Body 
observed that, while the participants agree on the non-finality of this decision, they disagree on 
the relevance of the CAFC's conclusions in GPX V  as to the meaning of Section 701(a). Given its 
non-final status and the lack of findings by the panel on whether a US court could rely on the 
GPX V  decision to establish what the US countervailing duty law was prior to Section 1, the 
Appellate Body consider that this decision was of limited import to determine whether Section 1 changed or clarified US countervailing duty law in respect of imports from NME countries. 
The Appellate Body then examined the CAFC's decision in GPX VI . After remarking the limited 
nature of the panel's findings regarding this decision, and then conducting its own analysis, 
the Appellate Body considered that the GPX VI  decision was of limited import for determining the 
state of the US countervailing duty law prior to the enactment of Section 1, because the main 
feature of the holding in GPX VI  related to Section 2 of PL 112-99. 
In sum, the Appellate Body's examination of the relevant elements of US countervailing duty law 
revealed that the text of the relevant legal instruments, the USDOC's practice and its consistency 
in interpreting and applying US countervailing  d u t y  l a w  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  i m p o r t s  f r o m  N M E  
countries, the relevant judicial pronouncements of US courts, and the opinions of legal experts presented by the participants are amenable to different readings. The Appellate Body emphasized 
that its task had been made difficult because the panel, as a consequence of its erroneous 
interpretation of the relevant baseline of comparison under Article X:2 of the GATT 1994, and its consequential focus on the USDOC's practice after 2006, did not adequately examine all relevant elements of US countervailing duty law that would have been required to arrive at a conclusion on 
the basis of the correct interpretation of Articl e X:2. For these reasons, the Appellate Body was 
unable to complete the analysis. WT/AB/24 
 
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  4.3  Appellate Body Reports, China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths, 
Tungsten, and Molybdenum , WT/DS431/AB/R; WT/DS432/AB/R; and WT/DS433/AB/R  
These disputes concerned challenges brought by the United States (DS431), the European Union 
(DS432), and Japan (DS433) (the complainants) against China's use of export duties and export 
quotas (the measures at issue) on various forms of rare earths, tungsten, and molybdenum. 
The complainants also challenged aspects of China's administration and allocation of its export quotas for rare earths and molybdenum.  
Before the panel, the complainants alleged that: (i) in respect of export duties, the measures 
reflected in several instruments implemented by China are inconsistent with its obligations under Paragraph 11.3 of Part I of China's Accession Protocol; (ii) in respect of export quotas, 
the measures reflected in various instruments implemented by China are inconsistent with 
Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 and Paragraph 1.2 of Part I of China's Accession Protocol which 
incorporates 162 and 165 of China's Accession Workin g Party Report; and (iii) in respect of export 
quota administration and allocation, the measures reflected in several instruments are inconsistent 
with Paragraphs 1.2 and 5.1 of Part I of China's Accession Protocol. For its part, China argued 
that: (i) the general exceptions of Article XX of the GATT 1994 are available to China to defend a potential violation of Paragraph 11.3 of China's Acce ssion Protocol; (ii) the export duties on rare 
earths, tungsten, and molybdenum are justified un der Article XX(b) of the GATT 1994; (iii) the 
2012 export quotas on rare earths, tungsten, and molybdenum are justified under Article XX(g) of the GATT 1994; and (iv) the trading rights commitments in Paragraph 5.1 of China's Accession Protocol and Paragraphs 83 and 84 of China's Accession Working Party Report do not prevent the 
use of prior export performance and minimum registered capital requirements as criteria to 
administer the rare earths and molybdenum export quotas. 
The panel found that, with respect to export duti es: (i) the export duties applied by China are 
inconsistent with Paragraph 11.3 of China's Accession Protocol; and (ii) China may not seek to 
justify the export duties at issue pursuant to Article XX(b) of the GATT 1994, and even assuming 
arguendo  that China could seek such justification, China has not demonstrated that the export 
duties at issue are justified under Article XX(b) or  applied in a manner that satisfies the chapeau of 
Article XX. The panel also found that, with respect to export quotas: (i) the export quotas applied 
by China are inconsistent with Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994, and Paragraphs 162 and 165 of 
China's Accession Working Party Report as incorporated into China's Accession Protocol by virtue 
of Paragraph 1.2 of that Protocol; and (ii) China has not demonstrated that the export quotas at 
issue are justified pursuant to Article XX(g) of the GATT 1994, or that the measures at issue are 
applied in a manner that satisfies the chapeau of Article XX. In addition, with respect to export 
quota administration and allocation, the panel found that: (i) the restrictions on trading rights of 
enterprises applied by China are inconsistent  with Paragraphs 83(a), 83(b), 83(d), 84(a), 
and 84(b) of China's Accession Working Party Re port, and Paragraph 5.1 of China's Accession 
Protocol; (ii) China is entitled to seek to justify the restrictions on the trading rights of enterprises 
at issue pursuant to Article XX(g) of the GATT 1994; and (iii) China has failed to make a prima facie  case that the violations of its trading rights commitments are justified pursuant to 
Article XX(g). Moreover, with respect to DS432, the panel found that the European Union had not 
established that the prior export performance criterion in the 2012 Application Qualifications and 
Application Procedures for Molybdenum Export Quota is inconsistent with the commitment in Paragraph 84(b) of China's Accession Working Party Report. 
On appeal, in DS431 the United States challenged as inconsistent with Articles 11 and 12.4 of the 
DSU the panel's rejection of 10 exhibits. The United States indicated, however, that the Appellate Body would need not reach the issues raised in its appeal in either of two 
scenarios: (i) if China were not to appeal the panel report; or (ii) if the Appellate Body were not to 
modify or reverse the legal findings or conclusions of the panel pursuant to an appeal by China.  
For its part, China challenged in DS432 and DS433, and as other appellant in DS431: (i) the 
panel's conclusion that the legal effect of th e second sentence of Paragraph 1.2 of China's 
Accession Protocol and Article XII:1 of the Marra kesh Agreement is to make China's Accession 
Protocol, in its entirety, an "integral part" of the Marrakesh Agreement, and not that the individual provisions of the Protocol are also integral part s of the Multilateral Trade Agreements annexed to 
the Marrakesh Agreement; and (ii) the panel's finding that China's export quotas for rare earths 
and tungsten send "perverse signals" to the domestic users and, consequently, do not relate to WT/AB/24 
 
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  conservation in the sense of Article XX(g) of the GATT 1994.China further alleged that the panel 
had committed a number of errors under Article 11 of the DSU. 
4.3.1  Availability of Article XX of the GATT 1994 – Systemic relationship between 
China's Accession Protocol and the Marrakesh  Agreement together with its Annexes  
In the prior disputes in China – Raw Materials , the Appellate Body found that Article XX of the 
GATT 1994 is not available to justify a breach  of China's export duty obligations under 
Paragraph 11.3 of its Accession Protocol. In its appeal in China – Rare Earths , China did not ask 
the Appellate Body to reconsider its decision in China – Raw Materials . According to China, 
its appeal was intended to obtain clarification of the systemic relationship between specific provisions in China's Accession Protocol and other WTO agreements, and of the rights of WTO Members to protect and conserve their exhaustible natural resources. 
China appealed the panel's "erroneous assessment of the systemic relationship" between, 
on the one hand, specific provisions in China's Accession Protocol, and, on the other hand, the Marrakesh Agreement and the Multilater al Trade Agreements annexed thereto. 
China contended that the panel erred in its interpretation of Article XII:1 of the 
Marrakesh Agreement
33 and Paragraph 1.2, second sentence, of China's Accession Protocol in 
finding that the legal effect of the second sentence of Paragraph 1.2 is to make China's Accession 
Protocol, in its entirety, an "integral part" of the Marrakesh Agreement, and not that, in addition, 
the individual provisions thereof are also integr al parts of Multilateral Trade Agreements annexed 
to the Marrakesh Agreement. China claimed that the panel should have conducted a "holistic" interpretation of Article XII:1 of the Marr akesh Agreement and the second sentence of 
Paragraph 1.2 of China's Accession Protocol, which would have led it to the conclusion that each 
provision of China's Accession Protocol is an inte gral part of the Marrakesh Agreement or one of 
the Multilateral Trade Agreements to which the provision "intrinsically relates".  
Before addressing the substance of China's appeal , the Appellate Body observed that the scope of 
China's appeal was very narrow. Specifically, the panel findings challenged by China were part of the panel's intermediate findings leading to its conclusion that Article XX of the GATT 1994 is not 
available to China as a defence to justify the ex port duties at issue in these disputes. China's 
appeal did not involve any challenge to the panel's finding that the export duties are inconsistent 
with Paragraph 11.3 of China's Accession Protocol, or  the panel's conclusion that Article XX of the 
GATT 1994 is not available as a defence to justify these export duties. China also did not appeal 
the panel's other intermediate findings leading to the latter conclusion. Moreover, China did not 
appeal the panel's finding, reached on an arguendo  basis, that the export duties at issue are not 
justified by either subparagraph (b) or the chapeau of Article XX of the GATT 1994. 
The Appellate Body further explained that, in addressing China's claim, it would begin with an 
initial assessment of Article XII:1 of the Marr akesh Agreement and the second sentence of 
Paragraph 1.2 of China's Accession Protocol, before proceeding to an integrated assessment of the 
relevant provisions and general architecture of the relevant instruments as they bear on the issues 
raised on appeal. 
4.3.1.1  Article XII:1 of the Marrakesh Agreement China submitted that, by virtue of  Article XII:1 of the Marrakesh Ag reement, specific provisions of 
its Accession Protocol must intrinsically relate  to either the Marrakesh Agreement or one of 
the Multilateral Trade Agreements annexed thereto.  According to China, its position followed from 
the requirement in the second sentence of Articl e XII:1 that "[s]uch accession shall apply to the 
                                               
33 Before the Panel, China drew a distinction between the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization excluding  the Multilateral Trade Agreements annexed to it, on the one hand, and that 
Agreement together  with its annexes, on the other hand. China used "the Marrakesh Agreement" to refer to 
the former, and "the WTO Agreement" to  refer to the latter. On appeal, Chin a drew the same distinction. In its 
findings regarding the availability of Article XX of the GATT 1994 to justify a breach of Paragraph 11.3 of 
China's Accession Protocol, the Panel also used "the  Marrakesh Agreement" to refer to the Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization excluding  its annexes. For purpos es of consistency, the 
Appellate Body, like the Panel, used "the Marrakesh  Agreement" to refer to  the Marrakesh  Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization excluding its annexes. The Appellate Body emphasized that the use 
of such nomenclature was for purposes  of these appeals only, and without pr ejudice to the legal issues raised 
by China on appeal. WT/AB/24 
 
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  [Marrakesh Agreement ] and the Multilateral Trade Agreements annexed thereto", read together 
with the important context provided by Pa ragraph 1.2, second sentence, of China's 
Accession Protocol. In China's view, a proper reading of Article XII:1, second sentence, confirms that China's Accession Protocol serves to specify China's rights and obligations under the 
Marrakesh Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Ag reements annexed thereto. China argued that, 
by rejecting this interpretation of Article XII:1, the panel failed to give effective meaning to this 
key provision governing the WTO accession process by essentially reducing the function of 
Article XII:1 to prescribing that newly acceding Members need to accept the Marrakesh Agreement 
and the Multilateral Trade Agreements annexed thereto as a single undertaking. 
The Appellate Body noted that Article XII: 1 of the Marrakesh Agreement provides the general rule 
for acceding to the WTO. Its first sentence stipulates that accession is to be accomplished through 
"terms" to be agreed between the acceding Member and the WTO, and does not spell out the 
content of, or impose limitations on, such "terms". Moreover, the second sentence of Article XII:1 makes clear that such accession applies to the entirety of the Marrakesh Agreement and the 
Multilateral Trade Agreements annexed thereto, and not just some part thereof. The 
Appellate Body emphasized that the term "[s]uch accession" in the second sentence refers to the legal act  of acceding to the Marrakesh Agreement spec ified in the first sentence. Thus, the second 
sentence does not mean, as China's argument seemed to suggest, that the legal instrument  
embodying the "terms" of accession, or specific pr ovisions thereof, must "apply" to, or somehow 
be directly incorporated into, the Marrakesh Agreement or the Multilateral Trade Agreements. 
The Appellate Body considered that its interpretation of Article XII:1 is confirmed by, 
and complements, Article II:2 of the Marrak esh Agreement. Article II:2 provides that 
"[t]he agreements and associated legal instruments included in Annexes 1, 2 and 3 (hereinafter referred to as 'Multilateral Trade Agreements') are integral parts of this Agreement, 
binding on all Members." The reference to "integral parts" in Article II:2 indicates that the 
Multilateral Trade Agreements annexed to the Marrakesh Agreement are necessary components of a single package of WTO rights and obligations. Article II:2 thus stipulates the requirement for 
existing WTO Members to abide by the obligations under  all of the agreements in this package. 
Article XII:1, which concerns accession, extends the same requirement to acceding Members. 
Therefore, the Appellate Body found that the pane l correctly stated that the second sentence of 
Article XII:1 requires acceding Members not to "pick and choose" among the various agreements, 
and rightly rejected China's arguments concerning the interpretation of Article XII:1. 
The Appellate Body further stated that, beyond the general  rule governing accession set out in its 
two sentences, Article XII:1 itself does not spea k to the question of the specific relationship 
between individual provisions of an accession  protocol and individual provisions of the 
Marrakesh Agreement and the Multilateral Trad e Agreements. In particular, Article XII:1, 
alone, does not create a substantive relationship, "intrinsic" or otherwise, between provisions of 
China's Accession Protocol (such as Paragraph 11. 3) and provisions of the covered agreements 
(such as Article II or XI of the GATT 1994). The Appellate Body therefore turned to examine the 
other provision concerned by China's appeal – i.e. Paragraph 1.2 of China's Accession Protocol – to see whether that provision provides further guidance on this relationship. 
4.3.1.2  Paragraph 1.2 of China's Accession Protocol 
China contended that the panel erred in its interpretation of Paragraph 1.2, second sentence, 
of China's Accession Protocol in finding that the legal effect of this second sentence is to make 
China's Accession Protocol, in its entirety, an "integral part" of the Marrakesh Agreement, 
and not that, in addition, the individual prov isions thereof are also integral parts of 
Multilateral Trade Agreements annexed to the Marrakesh Agreement. In China's view, the panel 
erroneously interpreted the term "the WTO Agreement" as referring to the Marrakesh Agreement 
alone, excluding its annexes. For China, the term "the WTO Agreement" in the second sentence of 
Paragraph 1.2 is properly understood as the Marra kesh Agreement together with the Multilateral 
Trade Agreements annexed thereto. 
The second sentence of Paragraph 1.2 of China's Accession Protocol provides that "[t]his Protocol, 
which shall include the commitments referred to in paragraph 342 of the Working Party Report, shall be an integral part of the WTO Agre ement." The Appellate Body first noted that 
Paragraph 1.2, second sentence, does not, itself, define the term "the WTO Agreement". Turning to 
the immediate context of the term "the WTO Agreement" found in the remaining words of the WT/AB/24 
 
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  same sentence, the Appellate Body found that the term "integral part" is used frequently in the 
covered agreements in order to integrate one or more agreements (or legal instruments) into another agreement. For example, Article II:2 of the Marrakesh Agreement makes the Multilateral 
Trade Agreements "integral parts of" the Marrakesh Agreement.  
Next, the Appellate Body examined the contex t provided by various other provisions of 
China's Accession Protocol. The Appellate Body found that the first sentence of Paragraph 1.2 may properly be understood to cover the possibility  that the Marrakesh Agreement may have been 
rectified, amended, or modified during the period  between 1995 and the date of ratification of the 
accession protocol by the acceding Member. In th e Appellate Body's view, this provision does not 
compel a conclusion, as China argued, that "the WTO Agreement" must be read to include a reference to the Multilateral Trade Agreemen ts. Moreover, the Appellate Body found that 
Paragraphs 1.1 and 1.3 of China's Accession Protocol, as well as the Decision of the Ministerial 
Conference of 10 November 2001 to which China's Acce ssion Protocol is annexed, all indicate that 
the term "the WTO Agreement" refers to the Marrakesh Agreement alone, excluding the 
Multilateral Trade Agreements annexed thereto. The Appellate Body additionally noted that the first 
recital of the preamble of China's Accession Pr otocol identifies the "WTO Agreement" as the 
abbreviation of "the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization".  
However, the Appellate Body found that the defini tion of the "WTO Agreement" contained in the 
preamble of China's Accession Protocol does not necessarily preclude the annexed Multilateral Trade Agreements from also falling within the scope of the term "the WTO Agreement" in some of the instances where this term is used in China's Accession Protocol. In particular, 
the Appellate Body recalled that the term "the WTO Agreement" in Paragraph 5.1 of 
China's Accession Protocol was interpreted by the Appellate Body in China – Publications and 
Audiovisual Products  as referring to "the WTO Agreement  as a whole, including its Annexes". 
In the Appellate Body's view, the fact that the term "the WTO Agreement" in China's Accession 
Protocol may have both narrow and broad connotati ons is consistent with the principle of the 
single undertaking reflected in both Articles  II:2 and XII:1 of the Marrakesh Agreement. 
Pursuant to this principle, the Marrakesh Agreement is the umbrella under which all of the annexed 
Multilateral Trade Agreements are united in a single package of rights and obligations. Thus, whether the term "the WTO Agreement" in the second sentence of Paragraph 1.2 is understood in the broad sense (as the Marrakesh Agreement and the Multilateral Trade 
Agreements), or in the narrow sense (as the Marrake sh Agreement alone), is not dispositive of the 
key legal question raised in China's appeal, that is, the specific relationship between individual provisions of China's Accession Protocol and individual provisions of the Marrakesh Agreement 
and the Multilateral Trade Agreements.  
The Appellate Body found that the operative term of Paragraph 1.2 – i.e. "an integral part", 
together with Article XII:1 of the Marrakesh Agreem ent – serves the function of integrating China's 
Accession Protocol into a single package or WTO rights and obligations, just as Article II:2 of the 
Marrakesh Agreement serves the same function with regard to the Multilateral Trade Agreements. As a result, the Marrakesh Agreement, the Mult ilateral Trade Agreements, and China's Accession 
Protocol form one package of rights and obligations that must be read in conjunction. 
The Appellate Body found, however, that this und erstanding does not dispense with the need to 
analyse, on a case-by-case basis, the specific re lationship between an individual provision in the 
Protocol and an individual provision of the Marr akesh Agreement or one of the Multilateral Trade 
Agreements. 
4.3.1.3  The relationship between China's Accession Protocol, on the one hand, and the 
Marrakesh Agreement and the Multilateral Tr ade Agreements annexed thereto, on the 
other hand 
The Appellate Body found that, as has been establ ished in relevant jurisprudence, the mere fact 
that each of the Multilateral Trade Agreements is an integral part of the Marrakesh Agreement 
by virtue of Article II:2 of the Marrakesh Agreement does not, in and of itself, answer the question 
as to how specific rights and obligations contained in those Multilateral Trade Agreements relate to 
each other. In the Appellate Body's view, like the approach to ascertaining the relationship among 
provisions of the Multilateral Trade Agreements, th e specific relationship between the provisions of 
China's Accession Protocol, on the one hand, an d the provisions of the Marrakesh Agreement 
and the Multilateral Trade Agreements, on the other hand, must also be determined on a 
case-by-case basis through a proper interpretation of all relevant provisions. Neither obligations WT/AB/24 
 
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  nor rights may be automatically transposed from one part of the WTO legal framework into 
another. The Appellate Body considered that such an approach is consistent with the one adopted 
in China – Publications and Audiovisual Products , in which the Appellate Body found that Article XX 
may be directly invoked to justify a breach of Paragraph 5.1 of China's Accession Protocol. 
The Appellate Body's finding was based on a th orough analysis of the text and context of 
Paragraph 5.1, of the circumstances in that dispute, including the specific measure subject to China's commitment under Paragraph 5.1, and of how this commitment related to China's right to 
regulate trade. 
The Appellate Body considered, therefore, that the relevant jurisprudence indicates that the 
questions of whether a particular protocol provision at issue has an objective link to specific obligations under the Marrakesh Agreements and the Multilateral Trade Agreements, 
and of whether the exceptions under those agreements may be invoked to justify a breach of such 
a protocol provision, must be answered through a thorough analysis of the relevant provisions on the basis of the customary rules of treaty interp retation and the circumstances of the dispute. 
The analysis must start with the text of the relevant provision in China's Accession Protocol 
and take into account its context, including that provided by the Protocol itself and the relevant provisions of the Accession Working Party Report, and by the relevant provisions of the 
agreements in the WTO legal framework. The analysis must also take into account the overall 
architecture of the WTO system as a single pa ckage of rights and obligations and any other 
relevant interpretative elements, and must be applied to the circumstances of each dispute, including the measure at issue and the nature of the alleged violation.  
The Appellate Body noted that, under the above ap proach, express textual references, or the lack 
thereof, to a covered agreement (such as the GATT 1994), a provision thereof (such as Article XX of the GATT 1994), or "the WTO Agreement" in general, are not dispositive in and of themselves. 
This was also confirmed by the Appellate Body's analysis in China – Raw Materials . In those 
disputes, the Appellate Body did not limit its analysis to the text of Paragraph 11.3 alone, but additionally relied on the context provid ed by Annex 6 of China's Accession Protocol, 
Article VIII of the GATT 1994, and the relevant st ructure of the Accession Protocol, including the 
specific exceptions to China's obligations to eliminate export duties. On this basis, the Appellate Body concluded in those disputes that a proper interpretation of Paragraph 11.3 of China's Accession Protocol does not make available to China the exceptions under Article XX 
of the GATT 1994. 
The Appellate Body recalled that, according to China's interpretation, Article XII:1 of the 
Marrakesh Agreement and Paragraph 1.2 of China's Accession Protocol, read together, indicate that 
a specific Protocol provision must be treated as integral part of either the Marrakesh Agreement 
or one of the Multilateral Trade Agreements to wh ich the Protocol provision "intrinsically relates". 
The Appellate Body noted that Chin a did not provide a clear definition  of the "intrinsic relationship" 
test that it proposed. In any event, the Appellate  Body considered that its own interpretation of 
Article XII:1 of the Marrakesh Agreement and Paragraph 1.2 of China's Accession Protocol does not support the view that an inquiry into the relationship that an individual provision of China's Accession Protocol has to provisions of the Marrakesh Agreement and the 
Multilateral Trade Agreements must start from the premise that such provision is 
"intrinsically related" to some other provision(s). The Appellate Body reiterated that the specific relationship between an individual provision of China's Accession Protocol and provisions of the 
Marrakesh Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements must be ascertained through a 
thorough analysis of the relevant provisions, on the basis of the customary rules of treaty interpretation and the circumstances of each dispute. 
In conclusion, the Appellate Body declined to accept China's interpretation of Paragraph 1.2 
of China's Accession Protocol and Article XII:1 of the Marrakesh Agreement. The Appellate Body 
found that the panel did not err in concluding that the legal effect of the second sentence of Paragraph 1.2 of China's Accession Protocol and Article XII:1 of the Marrakesh Agreement 
is not that the individual provisions of China's Accession Protocol are integral parts of 
Multilateral Trade Agreements annexed to the Marrakesh Agreement. The Appellate Body recalled that the panel also expressed the view that the term "the WTO Agreement" in Paragraph 1.2 refers 
to the Marrakesh Agreement. Recalling its findin g that whether the term "the WTO Agreement" 
in Paragraph 1.2 is understood in its narrow or broad sense is not dispositive of the issue of the specific relationship between individual provisions of China's Accession Protocol and individual 
provisions of the Marrakesh Agreement and the Mu ltilateral Trade Agreements, the Appellate Body WT/AB/24 
 
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  found it unnecessary to opine on the scope of the term "the WTO Agreement" in 
the second sentence of Paragraph 1.2 of China's Accession Protocol. 
4.3.2  Article XX(g) of the GATT 1994 4.3.2.1  Introduction 
China appealed two sets of intermediate findings in the panel's analysis of whether China's export 
quotas on rare earths, tungsten, and molybdenum are justified pursuant to Article XX(g) of the GATT 1994. First, China contended that the panel erred in its interpretation and application of 
Article XX(g) of the GATT 1994, and acted inconsistently with Article 11 of the DSU, in finding that 
China's export quotas on rare earths and tungsten do not "relate to" conservation within the meaning of Article XX(g). Second, China claimed that the panel erred in its interpretation and application of Article XX(g) of the GATT 1994, and acted inconsistently with Article 11 of the DSU, 
in finding that China's export quotas on rare earths, tungsten, and molybdenum are not "made 
effective in conjunction with" restrictions on domestic production or consumption pursuant to Article XX(g) of the GATT 1994. 
China requested the Appellate Body to reverse th e panel's intermediate findings that China's 
export quotas on rare earths and tungsten do not "relate to" conservation within the meaning of Article XX(g) of the GATT 1994, and that Chin a's export quotas on rare earths, tungsten, 
and molybdenum are not "made effective in conjunction with" domestic restrictions pursuant to 
Article XX(g) of the GATT 1994. Furthermore, to the extent that the panel's errors tainted the panel's conclusions that China's export quotas on rare earths, tungsten, and molybdenum cannot be provisionally justified under Article XX(g) of the GATT 1994, China also requested 
the Appellate Body to reverse these conclusions of the panel. 
China's appeal of the panel's findings under Article XX(g) was limited in scope. With respect to the 
panel's analysis of whether China's export quotas on rare earths and tungsten "relate to" 
conservation, China's appeal was directed at only one aspect of the panel's overall analysis, 
namely, the panel's findings in respect of the "signalling function" of China's export quotas. Furthermore, China's appeal in this regard conc erned only the panel's findings regarding China's 
export quotas on rare earths and tungsten, and did not involve any challenge to the panel's 
findings regarding China's export quota on molybdenum. Similarly, with respect to the panel's analysis of whether China's export quotas were "made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption", China's appeal was also directed at limited 
parts of the panel's overall analysis, namely, the panel's findings in respect of the 
"even-handedness" requirement of Article XX(g). China did not appeal the panel's findings on 
"conservation" or "exhaustible natural resources". Moreover, China did not appeal the panel's 
findings that China's domestic extraction and production caps on rare earths, tungsten, 
and molybdenum did not qualify as "restrictions on  domestic consumption or production" for the 
purposes of Article XX(g) of the GATT 1994. Finally, China did not appeal the panel's findings 
that China had not established that its export quot as on these three groups of products meet the 
requirements of the chapeau of Article XX of the GATT 1994. 
4.3.2.2  China's claim that the panel erred in  its interpretation and application of the 
"relating to" requirement of Article XX(g) of the GATT 1994 
China requested the Appellate Body to reverse the panel's interpretation of the term "relating to" 
in Article XX(g) of the GATT 1994. According to China, the panel erroneously interpreted this term as requiring the panel to examine solely the design and structure of China's export quotas to the 
exclusion of any evidence regarding the effects of those export quotas and other elements of 
China's conservation scheme in the marketplace.  China also requested the Appellate Body to 
reverse the panel's findings that China's export quotas on rare earths and tungsten do not 
"relate to" conservation within the meaning of Articl e XX(g) by virtue of the signals that they send, 
in particular to domestic consumers of these products. In this regard, the panel expressed 
the view that, even if export quotas may reduce  foreign demand for the products in question, 
they are also liable to stimulate domestic consumption by effectively reserving a supply of 
low-price raw materials for use by domestic industries. The panel referred to this potential signal 
to domestic consumers as a "perverse signal". WT/AB/24 
 
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  Regarding China's claim that the panel erred in its interpretation of the term "relating to" in 
Article XX(g) of the GATT 1994, the Appellate Body addressed the two issues that arose from this 
claim: (i) whether the panel made the findings attributed to it by China, i.e. that the assessment of whether a measure "relates to" conservation must be limited to an examination of the design 
and structure of the measure at issue to the excl usion of evidence regarding the effects of those 
export quotas in the marketplace; and (ii) whethe r it was proper for the panel to place analytical 
emphasis on the design and structure of the measure. 
The Appellate Body began by recalling that, for a measure to "relate to" conservation in the sense 
of Article XX(g) of the GATT 1994, there must be  "a close and genuine relationship of ends 
and means" between that measure and the conser vation objective of the Member imposing the 
measure. Hence, a GATT-inconsistent measure that is merely incidentally or inadvertently aimed 
at a conservation objective would not satisfy the "relating to" requirement of Article XX(g). 
Furthermore, the Appellate Body noted that the text  of Article XX(g) does not prescribe a specific 
analytical framework for assessing whether a measure satisfies the component requirements of 
that provision. In past disputes, the Appellate Bo dy has emphasized the importance of scrutinizing 
the design and structure of the challenged meas ure as part of a proper assessment of whether 
that measure satisfies the requirements of Articl e XX(g). Assessing a measure based on its design 
and structure is an objective methodology that al so helps to determine whether or not a measure 
does what it purports to do. This is so because the design and structure of a measure do not vary, and are not contingent on the occurrence of subsequent events. Thus, the Appellate Body considered that, by focusing on the design and structure of the measure, particularly where 
a measure is challenged "as such", a panel or th e Appellate Body has the benefit of an objective 
methodology for assessing whether a measure satisfies the requirements of Article XX(g). At the same time, the analysis of the design and structure of the measure cannot be undertaken in 
isolation from the conditions of the market in which the measure operates. Since the 
characteristics and structure of the market would normally influence a Member's choice and design of a measure, such market features may also shed  light on whether a given measure, in its design 
and structure, satisfies the requirements of Article XX(g). In addition, the Appellate Body 
reiterated its statement in US – Gasoline  that, while there is no requirement to apply an 
"empirical effects" test under Article XX(g), cons ideration of the predictable effects of a measure 
may be relevant for the analysis under Article XX(g). 
Having reviewed the panel's interpretation of the term "relating to" in Article XX(g) of the 
GATT 1994, the Appellate Body found that, contra ry to what China alleged, the panel did not 
consider itself obliged to limit its analysis to an examination of the design and structure of 
the measures at issue. The panel also did not consider itself precluded from examining evidence 
of the effects of China's export quotas as well as of the operation of the other elements of China's 
conservation scheme in the marketplace. Instead, the panel considered that it should "focus" on 
the design and structure of the export quotas in  its assessment of whether those measures relate 
to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources within the meaning of Article XX(g) of the GATT 1994. The Appellate Body found that the panel did not err in doing so. 
Regarding China's claim that the panel erred in its application of the "relating to" requirement of 
Article XX(g) to China's export quotas on rare ea rths and tungsten, the Appellate Body noted that 
China's appeal was limited to the panel's finding that China's export quotas on rare earths and tungsten send a "perverse signal" to domestic consumers to increase consumption. 
These panel findings were made in addressing China's argument that its export quotas on rare 
earths and tungsten relate to conservation because they send a conservation "signal" to foreign consumers. China contended that the export quot as contributed to the effectiveness of China's 
overall conservation policy by "signalling" to foreign users the need to explore other sources 
of supply, including substitutes and recycling. Th e complainants, on their part, argued that, while 
an export quota may send a conservation-related signal to foreign users, by also reducing domestic prices it simultaneously sends signals to  domestic consumers that they should increase 
their consumption of the product concerned. According to the complainants, such 
"perverse signals" contradicted China's claim that its export quotas relate to conservation, particularly given that most rare earths and tungsten produced in China are consumed in China. 
The Appellate Body addressed two sets of issues ra ised by China on appeal. First, China submitted 
that, because of the panel's incorrect interpretation that "subparagraph (g) does not require an evaluation of the actual effects of the conc erned measures", the panel did not move beyond WT/AB/24 
 
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  an examination of the design and structure of Chin a's export quotas by examining whether: (i) the 
theoretical "perverse signals" were present in the marketplace for rare earths and tungsten; and (ii) there was in fact a risk that "perverse signals" sent by export quotas to domestic users might offset the positive effect of conservation signals to foreign users. Second, China contended 
that, even in limiting the analysis to the elemen ts of design and structure of the export quotas, 
the panel erred because: (i) the panel's own factual findings based on the design and structure were sufficient for it to conclude that China's export quotas relate to conservation based on 
the finding that the quotas can send effective conservation signals to foreign users; and (ii) even if 
the panel were right that the general effect of ex port quotas is to send a "perverse signal" to 
domestic users, the panel should have found – purely as a matter of design and structure – that China's regime relates to conservation because the existence of domestic production caps 
mitigates any "perverse signals" sent to domestic consumers by the export quotas. 
The Appellate Body found that the panel did not err in its application of the "relating to" 
requirement in Article XX(g) of the GATT 1994. In  particular, the Appellate Body disagreed with 
China's contention that the panel applied an incorrect legal standard that limited its analysis to an 
examination of the design and structure of China's export quotas only, and that this prevented the 
panel from engaging with evidence of the broa der operation of China's conservation regime. 
The Appellate Body determined that the panel did not err in focusing on the design and structure 
of China's export quotas in its assessment of whether those measures relate to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources within the meanin g of Article XX(g). The Appellate Body also 
determined that the panel did not find that export quotas can send effective conservation signals 
to foreign users. Additionally, the Appellate Body was not persuaded by China's argument that 
the panel should have found – purely as a matter of design and structure – that China's regime relates to conservation because the existence of domestic production caps mitigates any 
"perverse signals" sent to domestic consumers by the export quotas. 
4.3.2.3  China's claim that the panel erred in  its interpretation and application of the 
"made effective in conjunction with" requ irement of Article XX(g) of the GATT 1994 
China requested the Appellate Body to reverse the panel's finding that China's export quotas on 
various forms of rare earths, tungsten, and molybdenum are not "made effective in conjunction with" domestic restrictions. China further requested that, "[t]o the extent the Panel's errors in connection with the analysis of the 'made effective in conjunction with' requirement taint 
the Panel's conclusions … that China's export quotas on rare earths, tungsten, and molybdenum 
cannot be provisionally justified under Article XX( g) of the GATT 1994", the Appellate Body also 
reverse this conclusion. 
China alleged, first, that the panel erred in its interpretation in considering the "even-handedness 
requirement" to be a separate requirement that ha d to be fulfilled in addition to the conditions 
expressly set out in Article XX(g). The Appellate Body stated that it did not see "even-handedness" 
as imposing a separate requirement that must be fulfilled in addition to the condition that 
a measure be "made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption". Instead, for the Appellate Body, the terms of Article XX(g) themselves (in particular, the clause "made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production 
or consumption") reflect the notion of "even-handedness" in the imposition of restrictions. 
The Appellate Body noted several different statemen ts of the panel articulating its understanding 
of the "even-handedness requirement". The Appellate Body found certain of these statements to 
be in keeping with the Appellate Body's interpretation in previous cases. 
However, the Appellate Body also found that certain other statements of the panel raised 
concerns. Accordingly, the Appellate Body found th at the panel erred to the extent that it found 
that "even-handedness" is a separate requirement that must be fulfilled in addition to 
the condition that a measure be "made effective in conjunction with" restrictions on domestic production or consumption. 
Second, China asserted that the panel erred in its interpretation in finding that Article XX(g) 
requires that the burden of conservation-related  measures be evenly distributed, for example 
in the case of export restrictions, between domestic and foreign consumers or producers. The Appellate Body again noted several different statements of the panel articulating 
its understanding of the balance that "even-ha ndedness" requires. The Appellate Body found 
certain of these statements to be in keeping with  the Appellate Body's interpretation in previous 
cases, however, the Appellate Body also found that certain other statements of the panel raised WT/AB/24 
 
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  concerns. Accordingly, the Appellate Body conclude d that the panel erred to the extent that it 
found that the burden of conservation must be evenly distributed, for example, between foreign 
consumers, on the one hand, and domestic producers or consumers, on the other hand. The Appellate Body clarified that Article XX(g) does not require a Member seeking to justify its 
measure to establish that its regulatory regime achieves an even distribution of the burden 
of conservation. At the same time, the Appellate Body observed that it would be difficult to conceive of a measure that would impose a significantly more onerous burden on foreign 
consumers or producers that could still be shown to satisfy all the requirements of Article XX(g). 
In this connection, the Appellate Body emphasized that the clause "made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption" requires that, when GATT-inconsistent measures are in place, effective restrictions must also be imposed on domestic production 
or consumption. The Appellate Body further stated that such restrictions must be "real" rather 
than existing merely "on the books", particularly in circumstances where domestic consumption accounts for a major part of the exhaustible natural resources to be conserved. 
Moreover, such restrictions on domestic production or consumption must reinforce 
and complement the restriction on international trade. 
The Appellate Body further concluded that neither of the two above errors in the panel's analysis 
relating to the second clause of Article XX(g)  tainted the remaining elements of the panel's 
interpretation of the second clause of subpara graph (g), and observed that, in any event, 
China's appeal did not concern those other elements. 
Third, China alleged that the panel erred in its interpretation of Article XX(g) in finding that it must 
limit its analysis under the second clause of Article XX(g) to an examination of the general design 
and structure of China's export quotas, to the excl usion of evidence regarding the effects of these 
quotas in the marketplace. The Appellate Body , based on a review of the panel's analysis, 
observed that the panel had in fact not considered itself precluded from reviewing evidence in 
the context of the analysis under subparagraph (g). Accordingly, the Appellate Body held that the panel did not err in focusing on the design and structure of the measures at issue in its 
analysis under the second clause of subparagraph (g). 
Fourth, China submitted that the panel erred in it s application of Article XX(g) by applying an 
"additional" requirement of "even-handedness" th at required an even distribution of the 
conservation burden imposed by the export quotas on foreign consumers, on the one hand, 
and domestic consumers and producers, on the other hand; and by focusing on the structure 
and design of the export quotas, to the exclusion of evidence of their effects in the marketplace. 
The Appellate Body noted that the panel's applicatio n of Article XX(g) to China's export quotas did 
not contain an inquiry into whether the relative conservation burdens imposed by China on 
domestic and foreign producers or consumers were  evenly distributed and concluded that it was 
therefore consistent with the Appellate Body's in terpretation of the clause "made effective in 
conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption". The Appellate Body recalled 
that Article XX(g) requires an effective restriction on domestic production or consumption that operates together with, and so as to reinforce and complement, the restriction imposed on international trade, but that it does not require an inquiry into whether the relative conservation 
burdens imposed by China on foreign consumers as opposed to domestic producers or consumers 
are evenly distributed between them. 
4.3.2.4  China's claims under Article 11 of the DSU 
China also alleged multiple failures by the panel to comply with its duties under Article 11 
of the DSU. Due to these alleged failures, China requested the Appellate Body to reverse the panel's findings that the rare earth and tungsten export quotas send "perverse signals" 
to domestic consumers and, consequently, do not "relate to" conservation within the meaning 
of Article XX(g) of the GATT 1994. China furthe r requested that the Appellate Body reverse 
the panel's findings that China's export quotas on rare earths, tungsten, and molybdenum are not "made effective in conjunction with" domestic restrictions. 
The Appellate Body observed that, in making its claims under Article 11 of the DSU, China made 
arguments identical or virtually identical to those it made in elaborating several other claims that the panel erred in its application of Article XX(g) of the GATT 1994. The Appellate Body considered 
that the latter set of claims and arguments by China all implicated the panel's assessment of 
the facts and evidence, rather than its characterization of the consistency or inconsistency WT/AB/24 
 
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  of certain facts with the requirements of Article XX(g). Therefore, the Appellate Body addressed all 
of these allegations under Article 11 of the DSU only. 
Regarding the panel's analysis in respect of the "relating to" requirement of Article XX(g), 
China submitted that the panel acted inconsistently with Article 11 of the DSU in two main ways. 
First, China identified a number of panel findings that, according to China, lacked a sufficient 
evidentiary basis, and alleged that the panel failed to "reconcile its findings" with contrary evidence. Second, China argued that the panel's reasoning was "incoherent" insofar as the panel 
considered that the relevant question was whethe r the "perverse signals" sent by China's export 
quotas were offset by restrictions on domestic production, but then declined to examine evidence 
relevant to precisely that issue. The Appellate Body  rejected all of the allegations made by China, 
and found that China had not demonstrated that the panel breached its duty under Article 11 
of the DSU to conduct an objective assessment of the facts. 
With regard to the panel's analysis under the second clause of Article XX(g), China asserted that, 
through its failure to engage properly with eviden ce relating to the operation of China's domestic 
restrictions, its incoherent reasoning, and its use of a "double standard" in applying its 
"even-handedness" test, the panel failed to ma ke an objective assessment of the matter, 
including an objective assessment of the facts, under  Article 11 of the DSU. With respect to one of 
China's claims under Article 11, the Appellate Body found that the claim did not meet the 
requirement of being clearly articulated and substantiated with specific arguments and rejected the claim on that basis. The Appellate Body assessed the substance of the remaining claims 
and, for each of them, found that China had not de monstrated that the panel failed to conduct an 
objective assessment of the facts of the case, or otherwise acted inconsistently with Article 11 
of the DSU.  
4.3.2.5  Conclusion on Article XX(g) of the GATT 1994 
On the basis of the above analysis, and taking account of the unappealed aspects of the panel's 
Article XX(g) analysis, the Appellate Body upheld the panel's conclusion that "China has not demonstrated that the export quotas that China applies to various forms of rare earths, tungsten, 
and molybdenum are justified pursuant to subparagraph (g) of Article XX of the GATT 1994". 
4.3.3  The United States' appe al of the panel's decision to reject certain evidence 
The United States requested the Appellate Body to find that the panel erred in rejecting 
10 panel exhibits submitted by the complainants  at a late stage of the panel proceedings. 
The United States maintained that, in deciding to reject this evidence, the panel erred in reasoning 
that it would not have been consistent with the prompt settlement of disputes to instead allow China more time to respond to the evidence. The United States contended that, in so reasoning, 
the panel erroneously applied Article 3.3 of the DSU, because a limited extension of time would 
not have undermined the value of "prompt settlem ent" in the context of the overall length 
of a panel proceeding. The United States further submitted that, in suggesting that the 
United States should have submitted the evidence earlier, the panel acted inconsistently with 
Article 12.4 of the DSU and failed to provide sufficient time to the United States to prepare its submissions. Finally, the United States contended that the panel also acted inconsistently with Article 11 of the DSU in finding that the evidence could and should have been submitted at an 
earlier date, and in finding that the evidence did not rebut arguments made by China at the 
second meeting of the panel. 
The United States submitted, however, that th e Appellate Body would not need to address its 
appeal if China were not to appeal the panel repo rt or if the Appellate Body were not to modify 
or reverse the panel's intermediate or ultimate findings and conclusions after reviewing an appeal by China. The Appellate Body noted that the firs t of the two conditions on which the appeal was 
premised was met because China filed another appeal in DS431 on 13 April 2014. WT/AB/24 
 
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  With respect to the second condition, the Appe llate Body recalled that it had not reversed 
or modified any of the ultimate findings and conclusions made by the panel. The Appellate Body noted that, in considering the panel's interpretati on of the phrase "made effective in conjunction 
with" in Article XX(g) of the GATT 1994, it had identified certain erroneous statements made 
by the panel. The Appellate Body recalled its finding that, notwithstanding such erroneous 
statements, the panel did not commit reversible legal error in its analysis and findings with respect to the "made effective in conjunction with" requ irement under Article XX(g). Moreover, several 
other elements of the panel's analysis under that provision were in any event not appealed. 
Therefore, the Appellate Body considered that it had not identified any legal findings or conclusions of the panel that needed to  be reversed or modified. 
In these circumstances, the Appellate Body considered that one of the conditions on which the 
United States' appeal was premised was not met. Accordingly, the Appellate Body did not rule on 
the United States' claims that the panel acted in consistently with Articles 11 and 12.4 of the DSU 
in excluding the 10 panel exhibits. 
4.4  Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervailing Measures on Certain 
Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Flat Products from India , WT/DS436/AB/R
 
This dispute concerned India's challenge to the United States' imposition of countervailing 
duties (CVDs) on certain hot-rolled carbon steel flat products from India. The investigation 
at issue was initiated on 12 December 2000 and resulted in a final order on 8 January 2002, which was revised by a number of subsequent determ inations. At issue in this dispute were several 
provisions of US law relating to CVD investigations – as set out in the United States Code 
or the United States Code of Federal Regulations – as well as determinations and orders published 
by the United States Department of Commerce (USDOC) or the United States International Trade Commission (USITC) in the original investigation; administrative reviews in 2002, 2004, 2006, 
2007, and 2008; and sunset reviews in 2007 and 2013. The CVD order at issue in this dispute 
addressed various government programmes consisting of, inter alia , sales of input products, 
licensing schemes for mineral extraction, and financing arrangements. 
Before the panel, India claimed that certain provisions contained in the USC and the CFR 
are "as such" inconsistent with Articles 12.7, 14(d), 15.1-15.5, 19.3 and 19.4 of the SCM Agreement. India also claimed that the United  States' imposition of countervailing duties on 
hot-rolled carbon steel flat products from India was inconsistent with various substantive 
and procedural requirements contained in Articles  1.1(a)(1), 1.1(b), 2.1(a)-(c), 2.4, 11.1-11.2, 
11.9, 12.5, 12.7, 13.1, 14(d), 15.1-15.5, 19.3-19.4, 21.1-21.2, 22.1-22.2 and 22.5 of the SCM Agreement. Finally, India raised consequential claims relating to Articles 10, 19.3, 19.4, 32.1 
and 32.5 of the SCM Agreement, Article VI of the GATT 1994 and Article XVI:4 of the 
WTO Agreement.  
The panel upheld India's "as such" claims, under Articles 15.1-15.5 of the SCM Agreement, 
against the United States' provision governing the cumulation of the effects of subsidized imports 
with the effects of non-subsidized imports in original countervailing investigations. The panel also upheld a number of the procedural and substantive "as applied" claims raised by India under Articles 1.1(a)(1)(iii), 2.1(c), 12.5, 12.7, 14(d), 15.1-15.5, and 22.5 of the SCM Agreement. 
On appeal, India challenged most issues on which the panel did not rule in its favour. 
India appealed the panel's finding upholding the USDOC's determination that the National Mineral Development Corporation (NMDC) is a "public body". India also appealed the panel's findings 
regarding the existence of a financial contribution. India further appealed several of the panel's 
findings and conclusions in respect of India's "as such" and "as applied" claims against the USDOC's benchmarking mechanism for determining benefit. Moreover, India appealed the panel's 
findings in connection with de facto  specificity, USDOC's use of "facts available", the examination 
of new subsidy allegations in administrative reviews, and "cross-cumulation". In respect of each of these issues listed above, India also claimed that  the panel acted inconsistently with its duty to 
make an objective assessment within the meaning of Article 11 of the DSU.  
In its other appeal, the United States requested the Appellate Body to clarify that "an entity that is 
controlled by the government, such that the government may use the entity's resources as its own", is also a public body. In addition, the Un ited States challenged the panel's finding that WT/AB/24 
 
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  Section 1677(7)(G) of the US Statute is inconsistent with Articles 15.1-15.5 of the 
SCM Agreement, and claimed that the panel acted in consistently with Article 11 of the DSU in its 
examination on this matter. 
4.4.1  Public body 
India appealed the panel's findings regarding the USDOC's determination that the NMDC is a public 
body, arguing that the panel erred in its interpretation and application of Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement. For its part, the United States argued that the panel interpreted 
and applied Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement in a manner consistent with the interpretation 
given by the Appellate Body in US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China) , 
but requested, in its other appeal, that the Appellate  Body clarify that "an entity that is controlled 
by the government, such that the government may use the entity's resources as its own", 
is a public body within the meaning of the SCM Ag reement, "irrespective of whether the entity also 
possesses 'governmental authority' or exercises th is authority in the performance of governmental 
functions".
  
Regarding the meaning of the term "public body",  the Appellate Body recalled its finding, in  
US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China) , that a public body is "an entity that 
possesses, exercises or is vested with governmental authority" and that in determining whether an 
entity is a public body, it may be relevant to consider "whether the functions or conduct are of a 
kind that are ordinarily classified as governmental in the legal order of the relevant Member" as well as the classification and functions of entities within WTO Members generally. The Appellate Body further recalled that "just as no two governments are exactly alike, the precise 
contours and characteristics of a public body are bound to differ from entity to entity, State to 
State, and case to case." The Appellate Body noted that there are different ways in which a government could be understood to vest an auth ority with governmental authority and therefore 
different types of evidence may be relevant. Evid ence that "an entity is, in fact, exercising 
governmental functions may serve as evidence that the relevant entity possesses or has been vested with governmental authority." The Appellate  Body added that "evidence that a government 
exercises meaningful control over an entity and its conduct may serve, in certain circumstances, 
as evidence that the relevant entity possesse s governmental authority and exercises such 
authority in the performance of governmental functions."
 An investigating authority must therefore 
"evaluate and give due consideration to all relevant characteristics of the entity and, in reaching its 
ultimate determination as to how that entity should  be characterized, avoid focusing exclusively or 
unduly on any single characteristic without affording due consideration to others that may be relevant". In particular, mere ownership or control over an entity by a government, without more, 
is not sufficient to establish that the entity is a public body. 
Turning to the participants' arguments on appeal, the Appellate Body rejected, as a preliminary 
matter, India's contention that the United States' request for the Appellate Body to clarify the 
meaning of Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreemen t should be dismissed on the basis that the 
United States was not challenging "issues of law covered in the Panel report and legal interpretations developed by the Panel", and that  the principles to be applied in determining 
whether an entity is a public body have been settl ed in the adopted report of the Appellate Body in 
US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China) . The Appellate Body explained that it is 
required, under Article 17.12 of the DSU, to address each of the legal issues raised in the appellate proceedings and that the United States had appealed a "legal interpretation" developed by 
the panel in the sense of Article 17.6 of the DSU.  
Regarding the legal standard to be applied in de termining whether an entity is a public body, 
the Appellate Body rejected India's contention that  in order to be a public body, an entity must 
have the power to regulate, control, or supervis e individuals, or otherwise restrain conduct of 
others. The Appellate Body also rejected the prop osition that an entity must have the power to 
"entrust" or "direct" a private body to carry out functions identified in Article 1.1(a)(1)(i)-(iii) 
in order to be a public body, and clarified that it had not made such a finding to this effect in  
US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China) . The Appellate Body also noted that the 
terminology advocated by the United States – "a public body may also include an entity controlled by the government … such that the government may use the entity's resources as its own" –
 is difficult to reconcile with that used by the Appellate Body in US – Anti-Dumping and 
Countervailing Duties (China) . The Appellate Body recalled that a government's exercise 
of "meaningful control" over an entity and its co nduct, including control such that the government WT/AB/24 
 
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  can use the entity's resources as its own, may certainly be relevant evidence for purposes of 
determining whether a particular entity constitute s a public body. Similarly, government ownership 
of an entity, while not a decisive criterion, may serve, in conjunction with other elements, 
as evidence. 
The Appellate Body recalled that the term "public body" in Article 1.1(a)(1) means "an entity that 
possesses, exercises or is vested with government al authority"; and that the question of whether 
t h e  c o n d u c t  o f  a n  e n t i t y  i s  t h a t  o f  a  p u b l i c  b o d y  m u s t  b e  d e t e r m i n e d  o n  i t s  o w n  m e r i t s ,  
with due regard to the core characteristics and functions of the relevant entity, its relationship with 
the government, and the legal and economic envi ronment prevailing in the relevant country. 
The Appellate Body explained that evidence re garding the scope and content of government 
policies relating to the sector in which the investigated entity operates may inform the question 
of whether the conduct of an entity is that of a public body. The absence of an express statutory 
delegation of governmental authority does not necessarily preclude a determination that a particular entity is a public body. Instead, there are different ways in which a government could be 
understood to vest an entity with "governmenta l authority", and therefore different types of 
evidence may be relevant. In order to characterize a particular entity as a public body, it may be relevant to consider whether its functions or conduct are of a kind that are ordinarily classified as 
governmental in the legal order of the relevant Member, and the classification and functions of 
entities within WTO Members generally. 
Turning to whether the panel erred in its analysis of the USDOC's determination that the NMDC 
is a public body, the Appellate Body found that, in grappling with the case-by-case nature of 
public body determinations, the panel correctly articulated the appropriate standard when 
it observed that "evidence that a government exercises  meaningful control over an entity and its 
conduct  may serve, in certain circumstances, as evidence that the relevant entity possesses 
governmental authority and exercises such authority in the performance of governmental 
functions." However, the Appellate Body found that the panel erred in its substantive interpretation 
of Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement by construing the term "public body" and in its 
understanding of "meaningful control" by a government. The Appellate Body explained that the 
term "public body" in Article 1.1(a)(1) means "an entity that possesses, exercises or is vested with governmental authority". The substantive legal question  to be answered is therefore whether one 
or more of these characteristics exist in a particular case. This substantive standard  should not be 
confused with the evidentiary standard  required to establish that an entity is a public body within 
the meaning of the SCM Agreement. The Appellate Body considered that, while the panel reviewed 
some indicia of control by the Government of India (GOI) (such as shareholding and the GOI's 
involvement in the selection of directors), it di d not address the question of whether there was 
evidence that the NMDC was performing governmental functions on behalf of the GOI. Moreover, the panel failed to evaluate whether the USDOC had properly considered the 
relationship between the NMDC and the GOI within the Indian legal order, or the extent to which 
the GOI in fact "exercised" meaningful contro l over the NMDC as an entity and over its conduct . 
The Appellate Body explained that while the GO I's ownership interest in the NMDC, the GOI's 
power to appoint and nominate directors, and the reference on the NMDC's website indicating that 
the NMDC is under "administrative control" of the GOI, insofar as they were discussed by the 
USDOC in its determinations, were certainly relevant to the question at issue, such evidence of "formal indicia of control" did not, without further evidence and analysis, provide a sufficient basis 
for a finding that the NMDC is a public body. For these reasons, the Appellate Body found that the 
panel erred in its application of Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement in its analysis of the USDOC's determination that the NMDC is a public body, and consequently reversed the panel's 
finding rejecting India's claim. Having done so, the Appellate Body did not consider it necessary to 
rule on India's claims that the panel acted inconsistently with Article 11 of the DSU. 
Turning to the question of whether it could comp lete the legal analysis of whether the USDOC's 
determination that the NMDC is a public body is inconsistent with Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM 
Agreement, the Appellate Body found that the US DOC did not evaluate the relationship between 
the NMDC and the GOI within the Indian legal or der, and the extent to which the GOI in fact 
"exercised" meaningful control over the NMDC and over its conduct  in order to conclude properly 
that the NMDC is a public body. Instead, the USDOC examined evidence more appropriately seen 
as evidence of "formal indicia of control" such as the GOI's ownership interest in the NMDC and the GOI's power to appoint or nominate directors. The Appellate Body recalled that these factors are 
certainly relevant but do not provide a sufficient basi s for a determination that an entity is a public 
body that possesses, exercises, or is vested wi th governmental authority. The Appellate Body WT/AB/24 
 
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  further noted that the USDOC did not refer in its determinations to evidence contained on the 
USDOC's administrative record that was referred to by the United States in the panel proceedings as well as on appeal. The USDOC also did not discuss in its determinations evidence on record regarding the NMDC's status as a Miniratna  or Navratna  company that could ha ve been relevant to 
the question of whether the USDOC's determinations contain a sufficient and adequate evaluation 
of the degree of control exercised by the GOI over the conduct  of the NMDC and the degree of 
autonomy enjoyed by the NMDC. For these reasons,  the Appellate Body concluded that the USDOC 
did not provide a reasoned and adequate explanat ion of the basis for its finding that the NMDC 
is a public body within the meaning of Article 1. 1(a)(1). Thus, the Appellate Body found that the 
USDOC's determination that the NMDC is a public body is inconsistent with Article 1.1(a)(1). 
4.4.2  Financial contribution 
4.4.2.1  Captive mining rights 
India appealed the panel's rejection of India's claim that the USDOC's determination that the GOI's 
provision of goods through the grant of mining rights for iron ore and coal is inconsistent with 
Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii) of the SCM Agreement. Th e participants disputed whether such a grant 
established a "reasonably proximate relationship", as set out by the Appellate Body in  US – Softwood Lumber IV , between the governmental action of providing a good or service, 
and the use or enjoyment of that good or service by  a beneficiary. India argued that the extraction 
process undertaken by Indian steel producer s, due to its complexity and uncertainty, 
was a significant intervening act that undermined any reasonably proximate relationship between the GOI's grant of mining rights and the final goods consisting of extracted iron ore and coal. 
The panel relied on several features of the mining rights in concluding that there is a reasonably 
proximate relationship between the GOI's grant of mining rights and the final goods consisting of extracted iron ore and coal. In particular, the Appellate Body noted the distinction drawn by the 
panel between the mining rights at issue in this case, which involve the right to extract minerals 
from known sites, as opposed to exploration rights, which involve the right to explore or prospect, and, if anything is found, extract it. The Appellate Body further noted that the USDOC's 
determinations concern the grant of mining rights, and not reconnaissance permits or prospecting 
licences, and that the mining rights at issue involved the payment of royalties that were tied to the amount of extracted material. The Appellate Body rejected India's contention that the panel's approach would permit other governmental acts, such as the granting of a business licence, 
to constitute a provision of goods, since, but for the governmental action, the mining company 
would not have been able to access the mineral. Unlike the general governmental acts to which India referred, the Appellate Body considered that  the governmental act of granting these mining 
rights has a reasonably proximate relationship with the output in the sense that it is provided 
expressly to enable the beneficiary to extract for its use or enjoyment what was previously 
a government-controlled mineral, in this case, iron ore or coal. The Appellate Body therefore 
upheld the panel's finding rejecting India's claim that the USDOC's determination that the GOI 
provided goods through the grant of mining rights for iron ore and coal is inconsistent with Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii) of the SCM Agreement. Th e Appellate Body also rejected a claim under 
Article 11 of the DSU relating to the panel's disagreement with India as to the significance 
of certain evidence considered by the panel. 
4.4.2.2  Steel Development Fund (SDF) loans India appealed the panel's rejection of India's claim that the USDOC's determination that the 
Steel Development Fund (SDF) Managing Commi ttee provided direct transfers of funds is 
inconsistent with Article 1.1(a)(1)(i) of the SCM Agreement. India argued that Article 1.1(a)(1)(i) covers only transfers of funds that are "direct", which means that the action and its consequence 
must be immediately linked without involving any intermediary or intervening agency. 
India further contended that a "transfer" of funds within the meaning of Article 1.1(a)(1)(i) refers 
only to situations in which the funds are drawn from government resources or result in a charge on the public account.  
The Appellate Body examined Article 1.1(a)(1)(i), which provides for the existence of a financial 
contribution where "a government practice involves  a direct transfer of funds". The Appellate Body 
stated that the meaning of the term "direct" in  relation to a "transfer of funds" suggests the WT/AB/24 
 
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  immediacy of the conveyance of funds, which in turn points to the existence of a close nexus 
concerning, for instance, the parties to, and/or the actions relating to, the transfer of the funds. At the same time, the Appellate Body observed that any such immediacy is mitigated by the language consisting of a "government practice" that "involves" the direct transfer of funds. For the 
Appellate Body, these latter terms suggest a more a ttenuated role for a govern ment or public body 
for purposes of Article 1.1(a)(1)(i) than what would otherwise have been understood through an examination of the phrase "direct transfer of funds" in isolation. The Appellate Body therefore 
concluded that Article 1.1(a)(1)(i) does not rigidly prescribe the scope of its coverage, but rather 
reflects a balance of different considerations to be taken into account when assessing whether a particular transfer of funds constitutes a financial contribution. 
In the light of these considerations, the Appell ate Body did not consider that the fact that 
a government effects a transfer through an interm ediary necessarily negates a finding of financial 
contribution under Article 1.1(a)(1)(i). Instead, an assessment of the role and involvement of any 
intermediaries in the relationship between the government and the recipient would be important in 
assessing whether a government practice involves a direct transfer of funds. The Appellate Body 
further considered that, if there is a government practice that involves a transfer of financial resources exhibiting sufficient indicia of di rectness, the transfer need not emanate from 
government title or possession over the resources. 
The Appellate Body pointed to the panel's conc lusion that, notwithstanding the role of an 
intermediary administrator, the Joint Plant Committ ee (JPC), in the disbursement and collection of 
funds, the SDF Managing Committee made all decisi ons regarding the issuance of loans, the terms 
on which they were approved, and any waiver conditions. This meant that no major decision 
regarding SDF loans could be made, and no loans could be extended, by the JPC alone. The Appellate Body stated that the panel ther efore had a credible basis to conclude that, 
notwithstanding the JPC's role as an intermediary administrator of the SDF, the role of the 
SDF Managing Committee in making critical decisions regarding the issuance and terms of the SDF loans supports a finding that the actions of the SDF Managing Committee involve a direct transfer 
of funds within the meaning of Article 1.1(a)(1)(i).  The Appellate Body also pointed to the panel's 
view that, regardless of the source of the resource s used to fund the SDF loans, those funds were 
nevertheless held in an account and could only be issued as loans on terms and conditions as decided by the SDF Managing Committee. The Appellate Body therefore upheld the panel's finding 
rejecting India's claim that the USDOC's determination that the SDF Managing Committee provided 
direct transfers of funds is inconsistent wi th Article 1.1(a)(1)(i) of the SCM Agreement. 
4.4.3  Benefit – "as such" claims 
India appealed various of the panel's findings rejecting its claims that Section 351.511(a)(2)(i)-(iv) 
of the US Regulations is "as such" inconsiste nt with Article 14(d) of the SCM Agreement. 
Section 351.511(a)(2)(i)–(iv) sets forth the US benchmarking mechanism for calculating 
the benefit arising from the provision of goods or services by a government. Pursuant to 
Section 351.511(a)(2)(i)-(iii), the United States follows a three-tiered benchmark approach in determining the adequacy of remuneration for the provision of goods or services by the government. Under Tier I, the USDOC uses as a benchmark an "in-country" price, that is, 
a market-determined price resulting from actual transactions in the country in question. 
If the Tier I price is unavailable, the USDOC considers the world market price (Tier II), provided that it is reasonable to conclude that such price would be available to purchasers in the 
country in question. If the Tier II price is also unavailable, the USDOC assesses whether 
the government price is consistent with market principles (Tier III). Pursuant to Section 351.511(a)(2)(iv), when Tier I or Tier II benchmarks are used, the USDOC must ensure 
that these prices reflect the price that a firm ha s actually paid or would pay if it imported the 
product. 
4.4.3.1  Adequacy of remuneration for government-provided goods Before the panel, India argued that the US benchmarking mechanism is inconsistent with 
Article 14(d) of the SCM Agreement because it does  not require an assessment of the adequacy of 
remuneration for government-provided goods from  the perspective of the government provider, 
prior to assessing whether a benefit has been conferred on a recipient. On appeal, India claimed 
that the panel erred in finding that Article 14(d) does not require an assessment from the 
perspective of the government provider prior to  an assessment of benefit. India argued that WT/AB/24 
 
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  the terms "adequacy of remuneration" and "benefit" describe distinct concepts that require 
separate analyses. The Appellate Body considered that the term "unless", as used in Article 14(d), expressly links the concepts of "benefit" an d "remuneration" such that a showing that 
"remuneration" is "less than adequate" is consonant with a finding of "benefit". Thus, 
the Appellate Body considered that separate analyses of "benefit" and "remuneration" are not 
required under Article 14(d). 
The Appellate Body also considered that a proper interpretation of Article 14(d) of the 
SCM Agreement suggests that the assessment of  the adequacy of remuneration must be 
conducted from the perspective of the recipient. Th e title of Article 14 – "Calculation of the Amount 
of a Subsidy in Terms of the Benefit to the Re cipient" – suggests that the adequacy of the 
"remuneration" paid in exchange for goods or services is, under Article 14(d), to be examined from 
the perspective of the recipient, rather than the government provider. In addition, the text of the 
second sentence of Article 14(d) prescribes how the adequacy of remuneration is to be 
determined, namely, in relation to prevailing market conditions in the country of provision. 
Recalling its finding in Canada – Aircraft  that a benefit arises under each of the subparagraphs of 
Article 14 if the recipient has received a "financi al contribution" on terms more favourable than 
those that are available to the recipient in the market, the Appellate Body agreed with the panel 
that "[o]nce it is established that the price paid to the government provider is less than the price 
that would be required by the market", the government price in question is inadequate, 
and a benefit is thereby conferred. For these re asons, the Appellate Body upheld the panel's 
finding rejecting India's claim that the US benchmarking mechanism is inconsistent with 
Article 14(d). The Appellate Body also rejected India's claim under Article 11 of the DSU, as it was 
premised on India's interpretation of Article 14(d), which the panel had correctly rejected. 
4.4.3.2  Selection of benchmarks und er the US benchmarking mechanism 
Before turning to India's remaining claims, the Appellate Body set forth an interpretation of 
Article 14(d) of the SCM Agreement as it relates to  the identification of an appropriate benchmark 
for calculating benefit. The Appellate Body observ ed that the second sentence of Article 14(d) 
prescribes that the adequacy of remuneration for a government-provided good or service "shall be 
determined in relation to prevailing market conditions for the good or service in question in the country of provision or purchase". For the Appellate Body, this means that prevailing market conditions in the country of provision is the standard for assessing the adequacy of remuneration. 
The Appellate Body interpreted the terms "prevailing market conditions" in Article 14(d) of the 
SCM Agreement as describing generally accepted characteristics of an area of economic activity in which the forces of supply and demand interact  to determine market prices. Highlighting the 
market orientation of the inquiry, the Appellate  Body considered that, because the assessment 
m u s t  b e  m a d e  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  prevailing market conditions  in the country of provision , 
any benchmark must consist of market-determined prices for the same or similar goods that relate 
or refer to, or are connected with, the prevailing market conditions for the good in question 
in the country of provision. Proper benchmark pr ices would normally emanate from the market for 
the good in question in the country of provision be cause, to the extent that such in-country prices 
are market determined, they would necessarily ha ve the requisite connection with the prevailing 
market conditions in the country of provision. In the Appellate Body's view, such in-country prices 
could emanate from a variety of potential sources, including private or government-related entities. Investigating authorities bear the responsi bility to conduct the necessary analysis in order 
to determine, on the basis of information su pplied by petitioners and respondents, whether 
proposed benchmark prices are market determined. The Appellate Body highlighted that, in arriving at a proper benchmark, an investigating authority must adequately explain the basis for 
its conclusions in its published report. 
The Appellate Body recognized that some types of  prices may, from an evidentiary standpoint, 
be more easily found to constitute market-determine d prices in the country of provision. This does 
not suggest, however, that there is, in the abstract, a hierarchy between different types of 
in-country prices that can be relied upon in arri ving at a proper benchmark. The Appellate Body 
emphasized that whether a price may be relied upon for benchmarking purposes under Article 14(d) of the SCM Agreement is not a function of its source but, rather, whether it is a 
market-determined price reflective of prevailing market conditions in the country of provision. 
Accordingly, while the prices at which the same or similar goods are sold by private suppliers in the country of provision may serve as a starting point of analysis, this does not mean that, WT/AB/24 
 
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  having found such prices, the analysis must necessarily end there. For example, prices of 
government-related entities other than the entity providing the financial contribution at issue also need to be considered, where present on th e record, to assess whether they are market 
determined and can therefore form part of a proper benchmark. Thus, Article 14(d) establishes no 
legal presumption that in-country prices from any particular source can be discarded in a 
benchmark analysis. Rather, Article 14(d) requires an analysis of the market in the country of 
provision to determine whether particular in-country prices can be relied upon in arriving at a 
proper benchmark. 
4.4.3.3  Government-related prices under the US benchmarking mechanism On appeal, India claimed that the panel found that government prices can be presumptively 
rejected in the determination of a benchmark, and thus erred in its interpretation of Article 14(d) 
of the SCM Agreement. The Appellate Body reca lled that whether a price may be relied on for 
benchmarking purposes is not a function of its source but, rather, whether it is market determined. Private prices and government-related prices can both reflect prevailing market 
conditions in the country of provision. Govern ment-related prices on record other than the 
financial contribution at issue need to be considered in determining a proper benchmark, provided that such prices relate or refer to, or are connected with, the prevailing market conditions 
in the country of provision. A determination of a benefit benchmark cannot, at the outset, 
exclude consideration of any potential in-country prices, including government-related prices other than the financial contribution at issue. The Appellate Body considered that the panel erred in finding that investigating authorities should not be required to treat government prices as being 
representative of "prevailing market conditions ", to the extent that it may suggest that 
Article 14(d) does not require investigating authorities to consider any in-country government-related prices in determining a benchmark for assessing benefit under Article 14(d). 
Turning to the measure at issue, the Appellate Bo dy noted that Tier I of the US benchmarking 
mechanism prescribes that the USDOC will normally measure the adequacy of remuneration by comparing the government price to a "marke t-determined price" that results from 
"actual transactions" in the country in question. Such a price "could include" a price based on 
actual transactions between private parties, actual imports, or, in certain circumstances, actual sales from competitively run government auctions. In the Appellate Body's view, the fact that Tier I prices "could include" an illustrative list of sample transactions suggests that other types of 
transactions, including government-related prices other than government auction prices, may 
constitute a Tier I benchmark. Thus, the Appell ate Body considered that to the extent that 
Section 351.511(a)(2)(i) does not exclude that government-related prices other than the financial 
contribution at issue can be used as Tier I benchmarks, the premise of India's claim that 
government-related prices are necessarily exclud ed as benchmarks under the US benchmarking 
mechanism had not been established. Accordin gly, although the Appellate Body expressed 
concerns about the panel's interpretation of Arti cle 14(d) of the SCM Agreement, it ultimately 
upheld, albeit for different reasons, the panel's finding rejecting India's claim. 
4.4.3.4  World market prices under Tier  II of the US benchmarking mechanism 
On appeal, India took issue with the two panel's findings relating to the use of world market prices 
under Tier II of the US benchmarking mechanism.  The Appellate Body first considered India's 
claim that the panel erred in finding that Articl e 14(d) of the SCM Agreement permits the use of 
out-of-country benchmarks in situations in which the government is not a predominant provider of 
the good in question. The Appellate Body was not persuaded by India's assertion that, in  
US – Softwood Lumber IV and US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China) , 
the Appellate Body had established that the only situation in which out-of-country prices may be 
used to determine a benefit benchmark is where in-country prices are distorted by government 
predominance in the market. While the Appellate Body  has clarified that recourse to out-of-country 
prices is exceptional, the Appellate Body has not, in previous disputes, addressed the issue of whether there are other circumstances in which Article 14(d) permits the use of out-of-country 
prices in determining benchmarks. The Appellate Body considered that the rationale underpinning 
its findings in US – Softwood Lumber IV  is that Article 14(d) does not prohibit the use of 
alternative benchmarks in situations where in-country prices cannot properly be used as a basis 
for determining a benchmark. Thus, the Appellate Body considered that recourse to alternative 
benchmarks is permitted to determine a benchmark where in-country prices are distorted as a result of governmental intervention in the market. There may be other circumstances where an WT/AB/24 
 
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  investigating authority would not be required to use in-country prices to determine a benefit 
benchmark, e.g. where information pertaining to in-country prices cannot be verified so as to determine whether they are market determined. Thus, the Appellate Body considered that the 
panel did not err in finding that Article 14(d) permits the use of out-of-country benchmarks in 
situations other than where the government is a predominant provider of the good in question. 
The Appellate Body then turned to India's appeal concerning the panel's rejection of India's claim 
that the use of "world market prices" as Tier  II benchmarks in Section 351.511(a)(2)(ii) is 
inconsistent "as such" with Article 14(d) of the SCM Agreement because it does not require 
adjustments to reflect prevailing market conditions in the country of provision. The Appellate Body first rejected India's claim under Article 11 of the DSU, stating that it did not consider that a panel 
acts inconsistently with this provision merely because it seeks to determine the meaning of a 
municipal law by reference to the legislative framework within which that municipal law is situated. 
The Appellate Body then stated that it could see nothing on the face of the overarching legislation 
or the implementing regulation to conclude that the USDOC is not mandated to make adjustments 
to Tier II benchmarks where necessary. Thus, upholding the panel's findings, the Appellate Body 
did not consider that the panel erred under Article 14(d) in rejecting India's claim. 
4.4.3.5  India's claims concerning the ma ndatory use of "as delivered" benchmarks 
The Appellate Body then examined India's appeal of  the panel's rejection of India's claim that the 
use of "as delivered" prices, provided for in Section 351.511(a)(2)(iv), is inconsistent with Article 14(d) of the SCM Agreement. The Appellate Body first addressed India's assertion that the 
panel erred in its interpretation of Article 14(d). India submitted that the panel's rejection of its 
claim was partly based on the panel's erroneous statement that government prices are not an 
indicator of prevailing market conditions. The Appe llate Body disagreed with this statement to the 
extent that it may be read as suggesting that Article 14(d) establishes a legal presumption that 
government prices cannot reflect prevailing market conditions in the country of provision, 
but did not consider that it formed the central ba sis upon which the panel rejected India's claim. 
Rather, the panel dismissed India's claim on the basis of its understanding of what India had 
argued, namely, that the mandatory use of "as delivered" benchmarks is inconsistent with 
Article 14(d) because such benchmarks will not relate to prevailing market conditions in the country of provision in cases where the "government price in question" does not include delivery charges. In this regard, the Appellate Body reca lled that the panel considered that the terms 
"prevailing market conditions" and "conditions of sale", in the second sentence of Article 14(d), 
do not relate to the specific contractual terms on which the government provides goods but, rather, "relate to the general conditions of the relevant market, in the context of which market 
operators engage in sales transactions". The Appellate Body observed that India had not 
challenged this finding of the panel on appeal. The Appellate Body further addressed India's claim under Article 11 of the DSU that the panel failed to apply its own interpretation of Article 14(d) 
to its assessment of India's claim. Having found that the question of whether the sale of a good in 
the country of provision generally on an ex works  basis constitutes a "prevailing market condition" 
within the meaning of Article 14(d) was not before  the panel, the Appellate Body rejected India's 
claim in this regard. 
The Appellate Body found it significant that the term "transportation" is explicitly listed among the 
"prevailing market conditions" illustratively identified  in the second sentence of Article 14(d) of the 
SCM Agreement. This confirmed that the costs asso ciated with the transportation of the good in 
question is a factor that must be accounted for in determining the adequacy of remuneration in 
relation to prevailing market conditions in the country of provision. The use of ex works  prices for 
the purpose of a benefit comparison under Article 14(d) would not capture the full cost to the 
recipient of receiving the government-provided go od in question, and would therefore fail to 
assess whether the financial contribution at issue makes the recipient  better off than it would 
otherwise have been absent that contribution. Thus, the Appellate Body did not agree with India's assertion that, had the panel evaluated the question of whether the sale of a good in the market 
generally on an ex works  basis constitutes a "prevailing market condition", this would have 
"materially affected" the panel's decision to reject India's claim. 
The Appellate Body considered that India's concern with Section 351.511(a)(2)(iv) was that, 
in cases where the USDOC uses as a benchmark an actual import price under Tier I of the 
US benchmarking mechanism, or a world market price under Tier II of that mechanism, the assessment of benefit will always reflect a comparison between a government price adjusted WT/AB/24 
 
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  to reflect local delivery charges, and a benchmark price adjusted to reflect international delivery 
charges. Thus, to the Appellate Body, India' s argument suggested that, on its face, the 
US benchmarking mechanism precludes adjustments to Tier I or Tier II benchmarks to reflect anything other than the international cost of delivery of the good in question. The Appellate Body 
noted that, in selecting Tier I prices, the USDOC is required to consider "product similarity; 
quantities sold, imported, or auctioned; and other factors affecting comparability ". Similarly, in 
selecting Tier II prices, the USDOC is required to make "due allowance for factors affecting 
comparability ". According to the Appellate Body, the exte nt to which international delivery charges 
are generally applicable, or "prevailing", in the country of provision is a factor affecting comparability of the financial contribution at issue with a benchmark. Thus, contrary to what India asserted, the Appellate Body did not consider that the US benchmarking mechanism, on its face, 
precludes adjustments to Tier I or Tier II benchmarks to reflect delivery charges that approximate 
the generally applicable delivery charges in the country of provision – e.g. local delivery charges. 
Next, the Appellate Body considered India's claim concerning the panel's rejection of India's 
argument that the use of "as delivered" out-of-country prices as benchmarks nullifies 
the comparative advantage of the country of provision in terms of providing the goods locally. The panel considered that, "[t]o  the extent that  a delivered price benchmark relates 
to the prevailing market conditions in the country of provision, it will reflect any comparative 
advantage that such country might have." The Appellate Body recalled its guidance in  US – Softwood Lumber IV  that, although the countervailing of comparative advantages between 
countries would not be in accordance with the very purpose of levying countervailing duties, 
any comparative advantage would be reflected in the prevailing market conditions in the country 
of provision. Thus, it would be taken into account  in the adjustments made to any method used for 
the determination of the adequacy of remuneration if  it is to relate or refer to, or be connected 
with, prevailing market conditions in the market of provision. The Appellate Body concluded that 
the panel had not erred in its interpretation and application of Article 14(d) of the SCM Agreement 
in rejecting India's claim. Thus, the Appellate Body upheld, albeit for different reasons, the panel's 
finding rejecting India's claim that Section 351.511(a)(2)(iv) is inconsistent "as such" with 
Article 14(d). 
4.4.4  Benefit – "as applied" claims  4.4.4.1  Provision of iron ore by the NMDC 
The Appellate Body considered India's claims concerning the USDOC's determination that the 
NMDC provided iron ore for less than adequate remuneration. The Appellate Body first considered India's claim that the panel acted inconsistently wi th Article 11 of the DSU by making findings on 
the ex post rationales  put forward by the United States to justify the USDOC's failure to consider 
certain domestic pricing information in determining a Tier I benchmark. The Appellate Body considered that the panel's findings were alternative  findings, and that a panel does not act 
inconsistently with its duty under Article 11 merely because it makes alternative  findings that 
might become relevant if the Appellate Body reverses other findings made by that panel. Thus, the Appellate Body rejected India's claim under Article 11 of the DSU, declined to review the panel's alternative findings, and declared these alternative findings moot and of no legal effect.  
The Appellate Body then examined India's claims concerning the USDOC's exclusion of the NMDC's 
export prices from the determination of a Tier II benchmark for assessing whether the NMDC provided iron ore for less than adequate rem uneration. The Appellate Body observed that the 
panel had rejected India's claim on the basis that Article 14(d) of the SCM Agreement does not 
require an investigating authority to rely on a government's domestic prices when determining market benchmarks because a government may set prices on the basis of public policy 
considerations rather than market principles. The Appellate Body considered that the fact that a 
government provider may set its export prices in pursuit of public policy objectives, rather than market-based profit maximization, does not permit a per se  conclusion that Article 14(d) does not 
require the consideration of any export prices  of government providers for the purpose of 
determining an alternative benchmark. As the basis for the panel's rejection of India's claim was in 
error, the Appellate Body reversed the panel's finding rejecting India's claim that the USDOC should have used the NMDC's export prices to determine a Tier II benchmark in the 2006, 2007, 
and 2008 administrative reviews. Upon examining the USDOC's determination, the Appellate Body 
considered that the USDOC did not provide a reas oned and adequate explanation as to why the 
benchmark data that it relied on, namely, world market prices from Australia and Brazil, are more WT/AB/24 
 
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  appropriate than the benchmark data that it had relied upon in previous reviews but subsequently 
excluded, namely, the NMDC's export prices at issue. The Appellate Body completed the legal 
analysis and found that the USDOC's exclusion of these prices is inconsistent with Article 14(d). 
Finally, the Appellate Body considered India's cl aim concerning the USDOC's use of "as delivered" 
prices from Australia and Brazil as benchmarks for assessing whether the NMDC provided iron ore 
for less than adequate remuneration. Turning first to India's claim under Article 14(d) of the SCM Agreement, the Appellate Body considered whether, as India argued, the panel erred in 
finding that the "as delivered" prices from Australia and Brazil – that the USDOC used as 
benchmarks – reflect prevailing market conditions in India. With regard to the "as delivered" Brazilian price, the Appellate Body recalled that the panel considered that, because this price was based on a transaction made by an Indian steel prod ucer established in India, it necessarily relates 
to the prevailing market conditions in India. The Appellate Body saw merit in India's argument that 
an isolated import transaction for a good may not necessarily reflect the prevailing market conditions for that good in the country of provision. In the Appellate Body's view, the fact that an 
importer has paid a price, inclusive of international delivery charges, for a particular good may, 
as an evidentiary matter, provide some indication as to the generally applicable delivery charges for that good in the country of provision. However, the Appellate Body did not consider that it can 
be inferred, without more, that a single, isolated im port transaction for a particular good reflects or 
relates to prevailing market conditions for that good in the country of provision. 
Turning to the "as delivered" prices from Australia and Brazil more generally, the Appellate Body 
recalled that the panel referred to evidence on the record and observed that, in the course of the 
countervailing duty investigation, NMDC officials had explained that the NMDC sets its domestic 
prices in the light of competition from Australia and Brazil, and therefore in the light of how much 
an Indian steel producer would be willing to pay to import iron ore from mines in those countries. 
For the panel, because the "as delivered" prices at issue indicate what an Indian steel producer 
would be "willing to pay" to import iron ore from Australia and Brazil, such prices necessarily relate 
to the prevailing market conditions in India. Th e Appellate Body expressed several concerns with 
the panel's reliance on the statement referred to above as a basis for rejecting India's claims. 
First, the Appellate Body noted that the USDOC's determination did not contain a reference to the statement relied on by the panel, or an explanatio n of how that statement supports the conclusion 
that "as delivered" prices from Australia and Brazil relate to prevailing market conditions in India. 
The Appellate Body thus expressed concern that the panel did not base its assessment of India's 
claims under Article 14(d) on reasoning provided by the USDOC in its written determination. Second, the Appellate Body considered that, although the panel relied on a statement by NMDC 
officials that, in setting the price for iron or e in the domestic market, the "NMDC reviews the 
negotiated international price when determining how much the purchaser would be willing to pay to import", it was not disputed that the reference to the "negotiated international price" 
is not a reference to a price inclusive of international delivery charges, but rather a reference to 
prices in a report which do not reflect the cost of international delivery. Thus, the statement relied on by the panel did not, in the Appellate Body's  view, necessarily permit an inference that the 
NMDC's domestic prices were set based on international prices inclusive of international delivery 
charges. Third, the Appellate Body expressed conc ern that the statement relied on by the panel 
focuses solely on the NMDC. The Appellate Body considered that, without further explanation and substantiation, evidence focusing on one provider of the good in question in the country 
of provision may not be sufficient to establish the prevailing market conditions for that good. 
The Appellate Body therefore reversed the panel's findings rejecting India's claim that the USDOC's use of "as delivered" prices from Australia and Brazil in assessing whether the NMDC 
provided iron ore for less than adequate remuneration is inconsistent with Article 14(d) of the 
SCM Agreement.  
Upon examining the USDOC's determination, the Appellate Body considered that the USDOC had 
not provided a reasoned and adequate explanation for concluding that world market prices from 
Australia and Brazil, adjusted to reflect the cost of international delivery to India, relate to the 
"prevailing market conditions" for iron ore in India. The Appellate Body reiterated that an analysis of prevailing market conditions in the country of provision requires an analysis of the market 
generally in order to draw a conclusion about the conditions prevailing in that market. 
The Appellate Body therefore completed the lega l analysis and found that the USDOC's use of 
"as delivered" prices from Australia and Brazil in assessing whether the NMDC provided iron ore for 
less than adequate remuneration is inconsistent with Article 14(d) of the SCM Agreement. WT/AB/24 
 
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  4.4.4.2  Captive mining rights 
India appealed the panel's rejection of India's claim that the USDOC's use of a methodology to 
construct a government price for iron ore and coal is inconsistent with Articles 1.1(b) and 14(d) of the SCM Agreement. In respect of grants of mining rights for iron ore and coal, the USDOC 
determined benefit by constructing government prices, and then comparing those prices with Tier I 
and Tier II benchmarks. The USDOC constructed the government prices by calculating royalties paid to the GOI for mining rights, and then adding per unit operational mining costs associated 
with the extraction of iron ore and coal. India argues that the panel erred under Article 14(d) by 
endorsing the USDOC's constructed price methodology. India's claim was premised on its view that, because the financial contribution at issue consists only of the GOI's grants of mining rights – i.e. what the GOI actually provided to the recipients, and what the GOI was actually paid for – the 
analysis must necessarily be limited to any benefit arising from the grant of the mining rights, and 
not the final extracted material in the form of iron ore and coal. 
The Appellate Body recalled its conclusion that, in connection with the panel's financial contribution 
analysis in respect of a grant of mining rights, it was proper to consider that the provided good 
consists of the extracted minerals. Accordingly, the Appellate Body considered that it is permissible for an investigating authority in a benefit calculation to construct a price on the basis of any fees 
and royalties paid for the mining rights plus the cost plus profit of the extraction process. 
The Appellate Body noted that this is what the USDOC did when it calculated the royalties for the mining rights and then added operational mining co sts associated with the extraction of the iron 
ore and coal, and that, in this case, India has not challenged the manner in which the USDOC 
actually constructed the government prices for iron ore and coal. The Appellate Body therefore 
concluded that, in the circumstances of this case, the panel did not err in finding that the USDOC did not act inconsistently with Article 14(d) in constructing government prices for iron ore 
and coal. The Appellate Body also rejected India's claim that the panel committed legal error under 
Article 11 of the DSU in refusing to assess India's claim regarding a good faith interpretation of Article 14(d). The Appellate Body considered that India presented arguments relating to a 
distinct legal claim that the United States had breached the international law principle of good faith 
in performing its treaty obligations, and that the panel was therefore warranted in rejecting this claim as not falling within its terms of reference.  The Appellate Body therefore upheld the panel's 
finding rejecting India's claim that the USDOC's construction of government prices for iron ore 
and coal is inconsistent with Articles 1.1(b) and 14(d) of the SCM Agreement. 
4.4.4.3  Steel Development Fund (SDF) loans India appealed the panel's rejection of India's claim that the USDOC's determination that Steel 
Development Fund (SDF) loans confer a benefit is inconsistent with Articles 1.1(b) and 14(b) of 
the SCM Agreement. India argued that, under a proper understanding of the term "comparable 
commercial loan" in Article 14(b), the benchmark to be chosen must have a similar structure as 
the loan under challenge. According to India, because the steel producers that benefit from the 
loans also first contribute the funds to the SDF loan programme, the USDOC was required to use benchmark loans that have a similar entry fee. 
The Appellate Body stated that a proper assessm ent under Article 14(b) examines what the total 
cost of the investigated loan is to the loan recipient, and whether there is a difference between 
that cost and the total cost of a comparable commercial loan. The Appellate Body considered that the distinction the panel drew between costs associated with the interest or repayment terms 
of a loan, and other costs arising from entry or administrative charges, does not seem to reflect 
accurately the cost of the relevant loans from the perspective of the recipient. Moreover, failing to 
take into account a cost that potentially alters a commercial actor's valuation of a loan simply 
because it does not relate to interest or repayment terms appears unduly artificial and contrary to 
the requirements of Article 14(b). The Appellate  Body therefore considered that the panel 
improperly excluded consideration of a borrower's costs in assessing the cost of a loan programme to the recipient for purposes of a benchmark analysis, and that the panel therefore erred in finding 
that Article 14(b) does not require the USDOC to take into account the costs incurred by SDF loan 
recipients in obtaining SDF loans. The Appellate Body therefore reversed the panel's finding rejecting India's claim as it relates to the USDOC's determination that loans provided under the 
SDF conferred a benefit, within the meaning of Ar ticle 1.1(b) and 14(b) of the SCM Agreement.  WT/AB/24 
 
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  The Appellate Body then turned to consider whether it could complete the legal analysis. The 
Appellate Body noted the panel's reliance on a GO I statement that, once collected, the steel levies 
are remitted to the SDF. The Appellate Body noted,  however, that this statement does not provide 
any indication as to the source of the funds,  and therefore did not appear to support the 
conclusion that the steel levies necessarily consist of consumer funds. The panel also did not refer 
to the USDOC's own reasoning as it pertains to the question of whether participating steel companies incur entry costs in the funding and al location of SDF loans and the Appellate Body 
noted conflicting statements in the USDOC's underlying determinations relating to the USDOC's 
selection of a benchmark loan. In the light of disagreement between the parties, and conflicting indications in the USDOC and panel records, rega rding the question of whether, and to what 
extent, entry costs for steel companies affected the terms on which the SDF Managing Committee 
issues SDF loans, the Appellate Body did not consider that it had a basis upon which to complete 
the legal analysis of whether the prime lending rates on which the USDOC relied constitute a "comparable commercial loan" within the meanin g of Article 14(b) of the SCM Agreement.  
4.4.5  Specificity 
India appealed, under Articles 1.2 and 2.1 of the SCM Agreement, aspects of the panel's analysis 
in respect of the USDOC's determination that  the sale of iron ore by the NMDC is de facto  specific 
within the meaning of Article 2.1(c). The factor on which the USDOC based its de facto  specificity 
finding concerns the "use of a subsidy programme by a limited number of certain enterprises", and India presented three challenges to the panel's analysis concerning this factor under Article 2.1(c). First, India submitted that the panel e rred in interpreting this factor because it failed 
to recognize that the "limited number" of users of  the subsidy must form a subset of enterprises 
within a broader group of "certain enterprises". The Appellate Body interpreted the first factor of Article 2.1(c) and concluded that the term "limited number" is meant to convey a finite and limited 
quantity of "certain enterprises". According to the Appellate Body, this suggests that a limited 
quantity of enterprises or industries qualifying as "certain enterprises" must be found to have used 
the subsidy programme, without requiring that the limited quantity represents a subset of some 
larger grouping of "certain enterprises". Such a reading is also compatible with a contextual 
understanding of the term "certain enterprises" an d its relationship to the term "limited number"; 
the latter serves to determine whether the known and particularized enterprises or industries can be quantitatively assessed as limited in number. The Appellate Body therefore upheld the panel's 
finding that there was no obligation on the USDOC to establish that only a "limited number" within 
the set of "certain enterprises" actually used the subsidy programme. 
Second, India argued that the panel erred in find ing that Article 2.1(c) of the SCM Agreement did 
not require an examination of whether the subsidy programme discriminates between 
"certain enterprises" and other, "similarly situated" enterprises. The Appellate Body did not see a textual basis in Article 2.1(c), and specifically in the terms "certain" and "limited number", 
for a requirement to identify whic h enterprises or industries are "similarly situated" prior to then 
having to assess whether only a subset of those "similarly situated" have de facto  access to, 
or are otherwise eligible for, the subsidy. The Appellate Body moreover considered that India had not explained why trade distortions potentially resulting from the selective distribution 
of subsidies would be more likely to result where the set of subsidy recipients constitutes a subset 
of similarly situated enterprises. In addition, that a de facto  analysis of a subsidy granted 
to a single industry would not, in India's view, indicate the existence of specificity is difficult 
to square with the aim of determining whether a subsidy is specific to "certain enterprises". 
The Appellate Body also rejected India's reliance on language from the Appellate Body report in US – Large Civil Aircraft (2
nd complaint) , considering that this analysis was particular to the 
third factor (i.e. the granting of disproportionately  large amounts of subsidy to certain enterprises) 
in Article 2.1(c), which necessarily involves a relational concept not present in the first factor (i.e. the use of a subsidy programme by a limited number of certain enterprises). The Appellate Body therefore upheld the panel's finding rejecting India's argument that specificity must 
be established on the basis of discrimination in favour of "certain enterprises" against a broader 
category of other, similarly situated entities. 
Third, India argued that the panel erred in findin g that the provision of goods by a government can 
be de facto  specific, merely based on the inherent limitations of the goods provided. In India's 
view, the panel's interpretation creates redund ancy in the SCM Agreement by permitting the 
authority to find specificity as a matter of course. The Appellate Body considered that it may be 
the case that, in respect of a provision of goods, there is a greater likelihood of a finding WT/AB/24 
 
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  of specificity in instances where the input good is used by only a circumscribed group of entities 
and/or industries. At the same time, this does not mean that every  provision of goods with 
limitations inherent in the characteristics of the goods will necessarily lead to a finding of specificity. The Appellate Body noted, however, that the analyses under Articles 1.1(a)(1)(iii) 
and 2.1(c) focus on different legal questions, neither of which is itself capable of rendering 
a determination of a specific subsidy. The Appellate Body upheld the panel's finding rejecting India's argument that, if the inherent characterist ics of the subsidized good limit the possible use 
of the subsidy to a certain industry, the subsidy will not be specific unless the subsidy is further 
limited to a subset of this industry. 
4.4.6  Article 12.7 of the SCM Agreement India requested the Appellate Body to reverse the panel's rejection of a number of India claims 
regarding the consistency of Section 1677e(b) of the US Statute and Section 351.308(a)-(c) 
of the US Regulations, "as such" and "as app lied", with Article 12.7 of the SCM Agreement. 
India claimed on appeal that the panel erred in it s interpretation and application of Article 12.7, 
and that the panel failed in its duty under Arti cle 11 of the DSU to make an objective assessment 
of the matter before it, in respect of a number of its claims. 
First, the Appellate Body considered India's cl aim that the panel erred in its interpretation 
of Article 12.7 of the SCM Agreement. India argued  that the panel's statement that investigating 
authorities are not required under Article 12.7 to engage in a comparative evaluation of all available evidence with a view to selecting the best information reflected an incorrect interpretation. Rather, India argued that Article 12.7 includes what it termed an 
"obligation of conduct" to engage in a comparative evaluation of all of the available evidence, 
prior to making a determination on the "facts available". The Appellate Body reaffirmed its finding in Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice  that, pursuant to Article 12.7, an investigating 
authority must use those "facts available" that reasonably replace the information that an 
interested party failed to provide, with a view to arriving at an accurate determination. The Appellate Body found that, under this legal standard, an investigating authority is called upon 
to engage in a process of evaluation of availabl e evidence, the extent and nature of which depends 
on the particular circumstances of a given case. Where there are several "facts available" from which to choose, the Appellate Body considered that it would follow naturally that this process of reasoning and evaluation would involve a degree of comparison. The Appellate Body disagreed 
with India's argument that Article 12.7 necessarily entails a comparative evaluation in all cases, 
since the extent and nature of the evaluation re quired depends on the circumstances of a given 
case, e.g. on whether one or several sets of information are otherwise available to replace the 
missing information. Turning to the specific statement of the panel appealed by India, 
the Appellate Body observed that it is somewhat ambiguous and open to different readings. To the extent it can be read to exclude, in all instances, a comparative evaluation of all available 
evidence from the legal standard for Article 12.7 of the SCM Agreement, the Appellate Body 
modified the panel's finding and found that Article 12.7 requires a process of evaluation of available evidence, the extent and nature of  which depends on the particular circumstances 
of a given case. 
Second, the Appellate Body considered India's claim that the panel failed in its duty under 
Article 11 of the DSU to make an objective assessment of the meaning of Section 1677e(b) of the US Statute and Section 351.308(a)-(c) of the US Re gulations by disregarding material evidence. 
The Appellate Body considered that, where a party seeks to support its argument on the meaning 
and operation of a domestic measure with evidence beyond its text, a panel should undertake a holistic assessment of all relevant elements, st arting with the text of the law and including, 
but not limited to, relevant practices of administering agencies and domestic court rulings. 
While a review of such evidence may ultimately reveal that it is not particularly relevant, that it lacks probative value, or that it is not of a nature or significance to establish a prima facie  
case, the Appellate Body considered that this can only be determined after its probative value has 
been reviewed and assessed. The Appellate Body  noted that India submitted evidence on the 
meaning of the challenged laws in the form  of judicial decisions, the US Statement 
of Administrative Action, and quantitative and qualitative information on their application, 
and that the United States submitted evidence on  their legislative history, as well as evidence 
of examples of their application. Since the pane l's assessment of these US laws did not address 
this evidence, and was limited to reproducing exce rpts of text of the laws together with some 
cursory observations, the Appellate Body found th at the panel failed to comply with its duty WT/AB/24 
 
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  under Article 11 of the DSU. Consequently, the Appellate Body reversed the panel's finding 
that India failed to establish a prima facie  case that Section 1677e(b) of the 
US Statute and Section 351.308(a)-(c) of the US Regulations are inconsistent "as such" with Article 12.7 of the SCM Agreement. 
The Appellate Body then considered whether it could complete the legal analysis. In this regard, 
the Appellate Body recalled that India made two alternative claims of inconsistency, first that the very grant of an authorization in the laws to draw an inference that is adverse to the interests of 
non-cooperating parties is inconsistent with Article 12.7; and second that, although the laws are 
"innocuous" on their face, the evidence beyond their text establishes that they are applied 
mandatorily and are hence inconsistent with Arti cle 12.7 of the SCM Agreement. Turning to the 
first of these claims, the Appellate Body recalled that, under its interpretation of Article 12.7, 
and particularly in the light of the context provided by Articles 12.4 and 12.11 of the 
SCM Agreement and Annex II to the Anti-Dumping Agreement, the permissibility of using an 
inference derived from the procedural circumstances in which information is missing depends on 
whether such use comports with the legal standard  for Article 12.7. The Appellate Body added that 
the use of inferences in order to select adverse facts that punish non-cooperation would lead to an inaccurate determination and thus not accord with  Article 12.7. Turning to the challenged laws, 
the Appellate Body considered that, in the light of their discretionary framing, the use of an 
adverse inference is capable in this case of being limited to those instances where it accords with the legal standard for Article 12.7. The Appellate Body then evaluated India's claim that the laws 
represent a system created to punish non-cooperation by drawing adverse inferences in every case 
of non-cooperation. Contrary to India's claim, the Appellate Body's review of this evidence did not 
establish conclusively that the laws require the USDOC to act inconsistently with of Article 12.7 reflexively in all cases of non-cooperation. T hus, the Appellate Body found that India did not 
establish that Section 1677e(b) of the US Statute and Section 351.308(a)-(c) of the 
US Regulations are "as such" inconsistent with Article 12.7 of the SCM Agreement. 
The Appellate Body then considered India's claims regarding the panel's "as applied" findings 
under Article 12.7 of the SCM Agreement. Beginning with India's appeal that the panel applied an 
"unnecessary burden of proof" regarding India's clai m on the use of a "rule" to select the highest 
non-de minimis  subsidy rates, the Appellate Body observed  that the panel did not appear to have 
analysed and discussed the existence or scope of this  "rule", or whether India sufficiently identified 
the particular instances of its alleged application. The Appellate Body viewed this as problematic, 
since the existence and scope of the "rule", and wh ether it was in fact applied in the instances 
claimed by India, appeared to constitute threshold matters. Notwithstanding those concerns, 
the Appellate Body noted that India's claim on appeal did not call for an assessment of whether 
India discharged its burden of proof, but rather, whether the panel erred in the burden of proof 
that it set. In this regard, the Appellate Body no ted that India brought a claim before the panel in 
relation to a number of instances of application of the measure, and requested it to find that each 
specific application resulted in a breach of Article 12.7. The Appellate Body found that the burden of proof set by the panel, namely, requiring India to explain how each specific application of the 
measure breached the legal standard for Article 12.7, was not in error. Rather, the Appellate Body 
considered that India could not have made a prima facie  case for its specific "as applied" claims 
without demonstrating that each impugned application was inconsistent with Article 12.7. Thus, the Appellate Body upheld the panel's finding that India failed to establish a prima facie  case 
of inconsistency with Article 12.7 of the SCM Agr eement. The Appellate Body also rejected India's 
claim that the panel failed to comply with its duty under Article 11 of the DSU to make an objective assessment of the matter before it in rejecting India's "as applied" claim against the 
2013 sunset review. 
4.4.7  New subsidy allegations in administrative reviews India appealed the panel's finding rejecting India's claims that the examination by the USDOC 
of new subsidy allegations in administrative review s is inconsistent with Articles 11.1, 13.1, 21.1, 
21.2, 22.1, and 22.2 of the SCM Agreement. India argued that the panel erred in interpreting the 
relationship between Articles 11 and 21 of the SCM Agreement by concluding that the 
requirements of Article 11 do not apply to administrative reviews conducted pursuant to Article 21 
of the SCM Agreement. India also alleged that the panel breached its duties under Articles 11 
and 12.7 of the DSU to conduct an objective assess ment of the matter before it and to provide a 
"basic rationale" for its findings. Consequently, India requested the Appellate Body to reverse the 
panel's finding rejecting India's claims under Articles 11.1, 13.1, 22.1, and 22.2 of the WT/AB/24 
 
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  SCM Agreement, and further requested the Appell ate Body to complete the legal analysis in 
respect of these claims. 
India's position on appeal differed somewhat from its position before the panel. Before the panel, 
India contended that Article 21 of the SCM Agreement does not allow an investigating authority to 
examine new subsidy allegations in an administrative review. However, India did not appeal the 
panel's finding that an investigating authority may examine new subsidy allegations in the conduct of an administrative review pursuant to Articl e 21 of the SCM Agreement. India also did not 
challenge the precise considerations that the USDOC took into account in deciding to examine each 
of the new subsidy allegations at issue. Rather, India's position on appeal was that, where any Article 21 review is conducted and involves the examination of new subsidy allegations, 
such examination must comply with the requirements set out in Articles 11, 13, and 22 of the 
SCM Agreement. 
The Appellate Body determined that Articles  21.1 and 21.2 of the SCM Agreement permit 
investigating authorities to examine new subsidy allegations in the conduct of an administrative 
review. Such examination, while subject, mutatis mutandis , to the public notice requirements set 
out in Article 22 of the SCM Agreement, would not be subject to the obligations set out in 
Articles 11 and 13 of the SCM Agreement. The Appellate Body added that Article 21 of the 
SCM Agreement requires an investigating authority to establish that there is a sufficiently close 
nexus between the subsidies that are the subject of  the original investigation and the new subsidy 
allegations that the investigating authority proposes to examine as part of its administrative review. However, India's appeal did not call upon the Appellate Body to determine which of these 
factors were applicable or ought to have been taken into account in this case. The Appellate Body 
therefore upheld the panel's finding rejecting India's claims that the USDOC's examination of new subsidy allegations in administrative reviews is inconsistent with Articles 11.1, 13.1, 21.1, 
and 21.2 of the SCM Agreement, but reversed the panel's finding rejecting India's claims that the 
USDOC's examination of new subsidy allegations in administrative reviews is inconsistent with Articles 22.1 and 22.2 of the SCM Agreement. 
The Appellate Body then assessed whether it was in a position to complete the legal analysis in 
respect of India's claims under Articles 22.1 an d 22.2 of the SCM Agreement. The Appellate Body 
observed that the panel, having determined that Article 22 does not apply to administrative reviews, did not further examine India's claims und er Article 22. Moreover, the Appellate Body did 
not find, on the panel record, sufficient arguments and evidence specific to the eight new subsidy 
allegations to which India's claims related that would have assisted the Appellate Body in addressing this issue. For these reasons, the Appellate Body was unable to complete the legal 
analysis in respect of India's claim under Articles 22.1 and 22.2 of the SCM Agreement. 
The Appellate Body also rejected India's claims th at the panel acted inconsistently with Articles 11 
and 12.7 of the DSU. 
4.4.8  Cross-cumulation 
With regard to Article 15 of the SCM Agreement, th e United States alleged that the panel erred in 
finding that Articles 15.3 and 15.1, 15.2, 15.4, and 15.5 do not authorize investigating authorities to assess cumulatively the effects of imports that are not subject to countervailing duty 
investigations ("non-subsidized imports") with the effects of imports that are subject to such 
investigations ("subsidized imports"). The Appellate Body found that the text of Article 15.3 is clear in stipulating that only subsidized imports may be subject to a cumulative assessment of the 
effects of imports under Article 15.3. Furthermore, the fact that several provisions of Article 15, 
as well as other provisions throughout Part V of  the SCM Agreement refer to "subsidized imports", 
rather than to "imports" in general, suggests that the injury analysis must be limited 
to consideration of "subsidized imports". 
The Appellate Body further considered Article 3. 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement as relevant 
context, noting that it contains a similar requirement concerning injury determinations in anti-dumping investigations. The Appellate Body recalled that with respect to this provision it 
had previously held that investigating authorities must ensure they consider only imports that are 
dumped, and exclude imports that are not dump ed. The Appellate Body held that the same 
rationale applies in the context of Article 15.1 of the SCM Agreement. Accordingly, the 
Appellate Body found that the panel did not err in finding that Articles 15.3 and 15.1, 15.2, 15.4, WT/AB/24 
 
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  and 15.5 do not authorize investigating authorities to assess cumulatively the effects of 
non-subsidized, dumped imports with the effects of subsidized imports. 
In addition, the Appellate Body found no support  in the SCM Agreement for the United States' 
argument that Article 15 of the SCM Agreement mu st allow an investigating authority to take 
account of the effects that all unfairly traded imports (i.e. dumped as well as subsidized imports) 
are having on the domestic industry. Moreover, the Appellate Body found that the panel did not err in rejecting the United States' argument that Article 15.3 is silent on the issue of whether 
cross-cumulation of the effects of dumped and su bsidized imports is permissible. The Appellate 
Body agreed with the panel that Article 15 is no t silent on the question of cross-cumulation 
and concurred with the panel that imports being subject to simultaneous countervailing duty investigations is a necessary pre-condition for a cumulative assessment to be undertaken 
consistently with Article 15.3 of the SCM Agreement. 
The United States further alleged that the panel failed to comply with its obligation under 
Article 11 of the DSU to make an objective assessment of the matter before it, because it failed to 
provide reasoning as to the meaning of the domestic law at issue and in particular why 
Section 1677(7)(G) requires, in certain situations, that the USITC assess cumulatively the effects of subsidized imports with the effects of dump ed, non-subsidized imports. The Appellate Body 
noted the limited nature of the parties' submissions before the panel as to the meaning of 
Section 1677(7)(G) and whether it requires the USITC to assess cumulatively the effects of subsidized imports with the effects of non-subsidized, but dumped imports. Nevertheless, the Appellate Body found that the panel was requ ired to analyse whether and to what extent 
Section 16777(7)(G) requires the USITC to assess cumulatively the effects of subsidized imports 
with the effects of dumped, non-subsidized imports. The Appellate Body found that the panel had failed to articulate clearly the scope of its finding of inconsistency, and thus failed to comply with 
its duty under Article 11 of the DSU to conduct an objective assessment of the matter before it. 
Consequently, the Appellate Body reversed the panel's finding that Section 1677(7)(G) is inconsistent "as such" with Articles 15.3 and 15.1, 15.2, 15.4, and 15.5 of the SCM Agreement.  
Having reversed the panel's finding that Section 1677(7)(G) is inconsistent "as such" with 
Articles 15.3 and 15.1, 15.2, 15.4, and 15.5 of th e SCM Agreement, the Appellate Body, in seeking 
to complete the legal analysis, turned to consider whether Section 1677(7)(G) indeed requires the USITC to cumulate the effects of subsidized imports with the effects of non-subsidized, 
but dumped imports. Section 1677(7)(G) contemplates three scenarios. With regard to two 
scenarios under Section 1677(7)(G)(i and ii), the Appellate Body concluded that it was unclear whether these provisions require such cross-cumulation, namely, where petitions to initiate 
countervailing duty investigations or anti-dumping duty investigations were filed on the same day, 
and where countervailing duty investigations or antidumping duty investigations were initiated by the investigating authority investigation on the same day. However, with regard to the third 
scenario under Section 1677(7) (g)(iii), the Appellate Body found th at it does require the USITC to 
cumulate the effects of subsidized imports with th e effects of non-subsidized, but dumped imports. 
More specifically, Section 1677(7)(g)(iii) requires the investigating authority to cumulatively assess the volume and effect of subject merchandise from all countries with respect to which 
petitions to initiate countervailing duty investigations or anti-dumping duty investigations were 
filed and countervailing duty investigations or antidumping duty investigations were initiated by 
the investigating authority on the same day. Thus, the Appellate Body concluded that 
Section 1677(7)(G)( iii) of the US Statute is inconsistent  "as such" with Ar ticle 15.3 and with 
Articles 15.1, 15.2, 15.4, and 15.5 of the SCM Agreement. 
4.5  Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain 
Products from China , WT/DS437/AB/R
 
This dispute concerned countervailing duties imposed by the United States following 
17 countervailing duty investigations initiated by the US Department of Commerce (USDOC) between 2007 and 2012.
34 
                                               
34 China's request for the establishment of a panel (W T/DS437/2) originally set forth "as applied" claims 
against 22 countervailing duty investigations. However, in its first written submission to the Panel, China stated 
that it did not wish to pursue its claims with respect to five of the 22 investigations listed in its panel request.  WT/AB/24 
 
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  Before the panel, China challenged several aspects of the investigations leading to the imposition 
of these duties, including the United States' appl ication of an alleged "rebuttable presumption" 
to determine whether Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) can be characterized as "public bodies" within the meaning of the SCM Agreement. Specifically, China claimed that: 
(i) the USDOC's findings of financial contribution are inconsistent with Article 1.1(a)(1) of the 
SCM Agreement because the USDOC incorrectly determined, or did not have a sufficient basis to determine, that certain SOEs are "public bodies"; (ii) the USDOC's "rebuttable presumption" is, 
as such, inconsistent with Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement; (iii) the USDOC's initiation of 
four investigations is inconsistent with Articles 11.2 and 11.3 of the SCM Agreement due to insufficient evidence that SOEs constitute "public bodies"; (iv) the USDOC's determinations that a benefit was conferred because SOEs provided inpu ts for less than adequate remuneration were 
inconsistent with Articles 14(d) and 1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement; (v) the USDOC's findings of 
specificity are inconsistent with Articles 2.1 and 2.4 of the SCM Agreement; (vi) the USDOC's 
initiation of investigations is inconsistent with Articles 11.2 and 11.3 of the SCM Agreement due to 
insufficient evidence of specificity; (vii) the USDOC's use of adverse "facts available" 
is inconsistent with Article 12.7 of the SCM Agreement; (viii) the USDOC's findings of regional specificity are inconsistent with Articles 2.2 and 2.4 of the SCM Agreement; (ix) The USDOC's 
initiation of investigations is inconsistent with Articles 11.2 and 11.3 of the SCM Agreement in two 
investigations; (x) the USDOC's determination that export restraints provided a "financial contribution" is inconsistent with  Article 1.1(a) of the SCM Agreement in two 
investigations; and (xi) in each instance where the panel made a finding of inconsistency under 
the SCM Agreement, the United States had also acted inconsistently with Articles 10 and 32.1 
of the SCM Agreement and Article VI:3 of the GATT 1994. 
The panel found that: (i) in 12 countervailing duty investigations, the United States acted 
inconsistently with Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement when the USDOC found that SOEs were 
public bodies; (ii) the USDOC's policy to presum e that a majority government-owned entity is a 
public body is inconsistent "as such" with Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement; (iii) in four 
investigations, China failed to establish that the USDOC acted inconsistently with the 
United States' obligations under Article 11 of the SCM Agreement by initiating the investigations without sufficient evidence of a financial contribution; (iv) in 12 investigations, China failed to establish that the USDOC acted inconsistently with the United States' obligations under 
Articles 14(d) or 1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement by rejecting in-country private prices in China; 
(v) in 12 investigations, the United States acted inconsistently with the last sentence of Article 2.1(c) of the SCM Agreement, but China failed to establish that the USDOC acted 
inconsistently with the United States' obligations under Article 2.1(c) by failing: (a) to apply the 
first of the "other factors" in the provision at issue; (b) to apply a "subsidy program"; or (c) to identify a "granting authority"; (vi) in 14 investigations, China failed to establish that the 
USDOC acted inconsistently with the United States' obligations under Article 11 of the 
SCM Agreement by initiating the investigations without sufficient evidence of specificity; (vii) in 13 investigations, China had not established that the USDOC acted inconsistently with the United States' obligations under Article 12.7 of the SCM Agreement by not relying on facts 
available; (viii) in six investigations, the USDOC acted inconsistently with Article 2.2 of the 
SCM Agreement by failing to establish regional specificity; (ix) in two investigations, the USDOC acted inconsistently with the United States' ob ligations under Article 11.3 of the SCM Agreement 
by initiating investigations in respect of certain export restraints; and (x) consequently, 
the United States acted inconsistently with  Articles 10 and 32.1 of the SCM Agreement. 
On appeal, China challenged the panel's findings that China failed to establish that the USDOC 
acted inconsistently with the United States' obligations under Articles 14(d) and 1.1(b) 
of the SCM Agreement. In particular, China alleged that the panel: (i) erred in its interpretation of Article 14(d) of the SCM Agreement in findin g that China's claims rested on an erroneous 
interpretation of that provision; (ii) acted inconsistently with Article 11 of the DSU in finding 
that China failed to establish the factual premise for its claims in four investigations; 
and (iii) erred in its application of Articles 14(d)  and 1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement in finding that 
China failed to establish that the USDOC's benefit determinations are inconsistent with these 
provisions. With respect to the panel's findings on the USDOC's determinations of de facto  
specificity under Article 2.1(c) of the SCM Agreement in respect of 12 investigations, China maintained that the panel erred in: (i) finding that the USDOC did not act inconsistently with 
the United States' obligations under Article 2.1 of the SCM Agreement by analysing specificity 
exclusively under Article 2.1(c); (ii) rejecting China's claims that the USDOC acted inconsistently with the United States' obligations under Article 2. 1(c) of the SCM Agreement by failing to identify WT/AB/24 
 
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  a "subsidy programme"; and (iii) rejecting China's claims that the USDOC acted inconsistently with 
the United States' obligations under Article 2.1 of the SCM Agreement by failing to identify a granting authority. As regards the panel's findings under Article 12.7 of the SCM agreement on the instances of use of adverse "facts available" by the USDOC, China claimed that the panel 
acted inconsistently with Article 11 of the DSU by  failing to make an objective assessment of the 
matter before it. 
In its other appeal, the United States argued th at the panel erred in finding that China's panel 
request, as it relates to its claims under Article 12.7 of the SCM Agreement, is not inconsistent 
with Article 6.2 of the DSU. 
4.5.1  The panel's terms of reference China's panel request alleged that, with respect to all of the countervailing duty investigations 
identified therein in which the USDOC issued preliminary or final determinations, the United States 
acted inconsistently with "Article 12.7 of the SCM Agreement, because the USDOC resorted to facts available, and used facts available, including so-called 'adverse' facts available, in manners 
that were inconsistent with that provision". China's panel request also stated that it was bringing 
"as applied" claims "in respect of each instance in which the USDOC used facts available, including 'adverse' facts available, to support its findings of financial contribution, specificity, 
and benefit". The United States argued on appeal  that China's panel request failed to provide 
"a brief summary of the legal basis of the complaint sufficient to present the problem clearly", as required under Article 6.2 of the DSU, for failing to "plainly connect" the "facts available" obligation in Article 12.7 of the SCM Agreement to the 22 investigations in the panel request.  
The Appellate Body noted that the two requirements  under Article 6.2 of the DSU to "identify the 
specific measures at issue" and to "provide a brief summary of the legal basis of the complaint sufficient to present the problem clearly" are central to the establishment of a panel's jurisdiction, 
and fulfils a due process objective by putting the re spondent and the third parties on notice of the 
case against them. Article 6.2 requires that the legal basis of the complaint (the claim) be set out in the panel request in a manner that is sufficient to present the problem clearly. A "claim" is an 
allegation that the respondent party has violated, or nullified or impaired the benefits arising from, 
an identified provision of a particular agreement.  While a panel request must set out the claim(s), 
there is no requirement under Article 6.2 that a panel request must provide arguments in support 
thereof. While arguments are put forth to prove a claim, a "brief summary" of the claim aims to 
explain succinctly how or why a measure at issue is considered to be violating a WTO obligation.  
The Appellate Body noted that, under Article 6.2 of the DSU, it is the measures at issue that are to 
be "plainly connected" to the provision at issue, which in this case refers to Article 12.7 of the 
SCM Agreement, and not to the "instances" of  the use of facts available by the USDOC. 
The language of China's panel request was clear that China was challenging all "instances" of the use of facts available by the USDOC. China's panel request also specified that China's claims under 
Article 12.7 concerned those instances in which th e USDOC used facts available "in support of its 
findings of financial contribution, specificity and benefit" in the context of the specific measures at issue. The Appellate Body disagreed with the United States that the inadequacy of the 
identification of instances in China's panel request was evidenced by the inconsistency between 
China's assertions at the initial stages of the dispute (i.e. all instances of the use of facts available 
would be challenged), and the instances identified in the later stages (i.e. "only 48 instances of the use of 'adverse' facts available were being challenged"). The Appellate Body noted that a 
complainant's prerogative to narrow or abandon its claims is different from an assessment of the 
consistency of a panel request with the requirements under Article 6.2, which must be assessed in the light of the language used in the panel request at the time it was filed.  
The Appellate Body also rejected the United States' argument that Article 12.7 contained multiple, 
distinct obligations that made it necessary for China to specify which of the various obligations under Article 12.7 the United States was alleged to have breached. The fact that, under Article 12.7, an investigating authority can resort to facts available in different scenarios 
involving non-cooperation specified in that provision does not mean that Article 12.7 contains 
multiple, distinct obligations. Instead, Article 12.7 imposes the obligation on an investigating authority to use those facts available that reasonably replace the missing information, with a view 
to arriving at an accurate determination.  WT/AB/24 
 
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  China's panel request indicated that China took issue with the "manners" in which the USDOC 
"resorted to facts available, and used facts available, including so-called 'adverse' facts available". For the Appellate Body, this language shows that the challenge concerned the consistency of each 
instance in which the USDOC used facts available with the "manners" in which an investigating 
authority can act inconsistently with Article 12.7. Thus, the "problem", for the purpose of 
Article 6.2, was the "manners" in which the USDOC "resorted to" and "used facts available". The Appellate Body agreed with the panel that pr oviding further details would amount to setting 
out arguments, which do not need to be included in a panel request. For these reasons, 
the Appellate Body upheld the panel's finding that China's panel request was consistent with Article 6.2. 
4.5.2  Articles 14(d) and 1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement – Benefit 
China argued on appeal that the panel erred in finding that China failed to establish that the 
USDOC acted inconsistently with Article 14(d) and Article 1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement by rejecting private prices in China as benchmarks in its benefit analyses. China argued that the legal 
standard for determining what constitutes "government" – in particular, a "public body" – for 
purposes of the financial contribution inquiry under Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii) of the SCM Agreement should also apply when determining what constitutes "government" for purposes of the selection of 
a benefit benchmark under Article 14(d). According to China, the panel erred in its interpretation 
of Article 14(d), and acted inconsistently with Article 11 of the DSU in concluding that China failed to establish that the USDOC treated SOEs as public bodies and as part of the government in the collective sense. Accordingly, China requested the Appellate Body to reverse the panel's ultimate 
finding that China failed to establish that the USDOC acted inconsistently with Article 14(d) 
and Article 1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement in respect of the benefit analysis in four investigations, namely, the Oil Country Tubular Goods (OCTG), Solar Panels, Pressure Pipe, and Line Pipe 
investigations.  
According to the United States, the panel properly concluded that there was nothing in the text of 
Article 14(d) or in WTO jurisprudence requiring the same analysis with respect to the financial 
contribution and benefit elements of a subsidy, as  these are distinct aspects of a countervailing 
duty investigation that play different roles. The United States argued that China's approach would prevent investigating authorities from properly analysing the ways in which a government can interfere in a given marketplace and distort prices, and would result in a benefit calculation that 
would not capture how much better off the recipient is through a financial contribution.  
4.5.2.1  The panel's interpretation of Article 14(d) of the SCM Agreement The Appellate Body agreed with China that there is a single legal standard that defines the term 
"government" under the SCM Agreement. The term  "government" under Article 1.1(a)(1) of the 
SCM Agreement, encompasses both the government in the "narrow sense" and "any public body 
within the territory of a Member". However, the fact that the SCM Agreement establishes a single 
definition does not mean that, under Article 14( d), a proper analysis for selecting a benefit 
benchmark is dependent on an examination of whether any relevant entities in the market fall within the definition of "government", including on the basis of a finding that an SOE is a public body. The existence of a single standard for defining "government" does not answer the 
question of whether the prices of goods provided by private or government-related entities in 
the country of provision are market determined for purposes of selecting a benefit benchmark. 
The Appellate Body recalled that the second senten ce of Article 14(d) prescribes that the adequacy 
of remuneration for government-provided goods or  services "shall be determined in relation 
to prevailing market conditions for the good or service in question in the country of provision or purchase". In US – Carbon Steel (India) , the Appellate Body found that "prevailing market 
conditions" in the context of Article 14(d) "consist of generally accepted characteristics of an area 
of economic activity in which the forces of supply and demand interact to determine market prices". The inquiry under Article 14(d) has a market orientation because it requires that the assessment of the adequacy of remuneration for a government-provided good must be made in 
relation to prevailing market conditions in the country of provision. Thus, any benchmark for 
conducting such an assessment must consist of ma rket-determined prices for the same or similar 
goods that relate or refer to, or are connected with, the prevailing market conditions for the good 
in the country of provision. Proper benchmark prices for purposes of the benefit determination 
would normally emanate from the market for the g oods in the country of provision. To the extent WT/AB/24 
 
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  that such in-country prices are market determined, they would necessarily have the requisite 
connection with the prevailing market conditions in the country of provision that is prescribed by the second sentence of Article 14(d). According to the Appellate Body, such in-country prices could emanate from a variety of sources, includin g private or government-related entities. 
The Appellate Body further noted its finding in US – Carbon Steel (India)  that investigating 
authorities bear the responsibility of conducting the necessary analysis in order to determine whether the proposed benchmark prices are market determined such that they can be used to 
assess whether remuneration is less than adequate. This responsibility encompasses a 
requirement to conduct a sufficiently diligent investigation into, and solicitation of, relevant facts, and to base a determination on positive evidence on the record. The chapeau of Article 14 requires 
investigating authorities to explain adequately, consistent with the guidelines set out in the 
provision, the application of the methodology to calculate the amount of benefit that is conferred 
by a government-provided financial contribution. According to the Appellate Body, what an investigating authority must do in conducting the necessary analysis for the purpose of arriving at 
a proper benefit benchmark will, however, vary depending upon the circumstances of the case, 
the characteristics of the market being examined, and the nature, quantity, and quality of the information supplied by petitioners and respondents,  including such additional information that an 
investigating authority seeks to ensure that it may base its determination on positive evidence on 
the record. In all cases, in arriving at a proper benchmark, an investigating authority must explain the basis for its conclusions in its determinations. 
The Appellate Body noted that, depending on the circumstances, some types of prices may, 
from an evidentiary standpoint, be more easily found to constitute market-determined prices in 
the country of provision. In US – Carbon Steel (India) , the Appellate Body observed that 
"the primary benchmark, and therefore the star ting point of the analysis in determining a 
benchmark for the purposes of Article 14(d)…, is the price at which the same or similar goods are 
sold by private suppliers in arm's length transactions in the country of provision". This is because private prices in the market of provision will generally represent an appropriate measure of 
the "adequacy of remuneration" for the provision of goods. However, there is no hierarchy, in the 
abstract, between in-country prices from different sources that can be relied upon in arriving at a proper benchmark because the issue of whether a price may be relied upon for benefit benchmarking purposes under Article 14(d) is not a function of its source, but whether the price is 
a market-determined price reflective of prevailing market conditions in the country of provision. 
The Appellate Body pointed out that, while in-country private prices may serve as the starting 
point of the analysis under Article 14(d), this does not mean that, having identified such prices, 
the analysis must necessarily end there. Prices of  goods provided by government-related entities, 
other than the entity providing the financial contribution at issue, must also be examined to determine whether they are market determined that can form part of a proper benchmark. 
The reason why the prices of goods provided by government-related entities for which there has 
not been a "public body" determination need to be examined in selecting a benefit benchmark under Article 14(d) is because there is no legal presumption under this provision that in-country prices from any particular source can or should be discarded in a benchmark analysis. Rather, 
Article 14(d) requires an analysis of the market in the country of provision to determine whether 
particular in-country prices can be relied upon in arriving at a proper benchmark. Although prices found to exist in the market for the good in questi on in the country of provision should normally be 
taken into account in identifying a proper benchmark, there may be circumstances in which the 
use of such in-country prices would not be appropriate. In US – Carbon Steel (India) , 
the Appellate Body observed that it would not be a ppropriate to rely on such prices when they are 
not market determined, as "a government, in its role as a provider of a good, may distort 
in-country private prices for that good by setting an artificially low price with which the prices of private providers in the market align". In such circumstances, those prices cannot be said to be 
market determined. The Appellate Body emphasized that the ability of a government provider to 
have such an influence on in-country private prices presupposes that it has sufficient market 
power to do so.  
The Appellate Body noted that, in conducting the necessary analysis to determine whether 
in-country prices are distorted, an investigating authority may be called upon to examine various 
aspects of the relevant market. Although a government's predominant role as a supplier in the market makes it likely that prices will be distorted, the distortion of in-country prices must be 
established on the basis of the particular facts underlying each countervailing duty investigation. WT/AB/24 
 
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  In US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China) , the Appellate Body indicated that an 
investigating authority may reject in-country prices if there is price distortion, and, thus, the analysis is not limited to determining whether the government is a predominant supplier. The Appellate Body cautioned against equating th e concept of government predominance with the 
concept of price distortion, and highlighted th at the link between the two concepts is an 
evidentiary one. Also, in conducting the necessary analysis to determine whether in-country prices are distorted or market determined, an investigating authority may be called upon to examine 
"the structure of the relevant market, including the type of entities operating in that market, 
their respective market share, as well as any entry barriers. It could also require assessing the behaviour of the entities operating in that mark et in order to determine whether the government 
itself, or acting through government-related entities, exerts market power so as to distort 
in-country prices." Such an analysis may lead an investigating authority to conclude that 
in-country prices cannot be relied upon in determining a benchmark for the purposes of Article 14(d), and that an alternative benchm ark should be employed. The Appellate Body, 
however, underscored the importance of making appropriate adjustments to ensure that 
alternative benchmarks reflect prevailing market conditions in the country of provision. 
Thus, while the Appellate Body agreed with China that there is a single definition of the term 
"government" for purposes of the SCM Agreement,  it did not consider that the panel erred by 
rejecting China's claim partly on the basis that "a government can distort prices in other ways than through its role as a provider of the financial contribution." China's argument that there is a single standard for defining the term "government" did not answer the question of whether a proposed 
in-country price is a market-determined price fo r the same or similar goods in the country of 
provision and, thus, whether it may serve as a benchmark for determining benefit. 
Furthermore, while the Appellate Body agreed with China that, in US – Anti-Dumping and 
Countervailing Duties (China) , the focus of the analysis was not on the same interpretative issue 
as raised by China in this dispute, the Appellate Body considered that its report in  US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China)  clarified several issues relevant for 
addressing China's claims in this case. In that dispute, the Appellate Body explained that price 
distortion must be established on a case-by-case basis and that an investigating authority cannot base a finding of price distortion merely on the finding that the government is a predominant supplier, and cannot refuse to consider evidence relating to factors other than market share.  
The Appellate Body considered that the panel correctly relied on the Appellate Body's findings in 
US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China)  in rejecting China's argument that 
"SOE presence in the market could support a dist ortion finding only if the SOEs at issue were 
properly found to be public bodies within the meaning of Article 1.1(a)(1)."  
In the Appellate Body's view, China's argument was premised on the understanding that it is 
sufficient for purposes of establishing a prima facie  case of inconsistency under Article 14(d) with 
respect to each of the USDOC's benefit determinations at issue to show that: (i) the USDOC's price 
distortion findings were predicated on its equation of SOEs with government; and (ii) the USDOC's equation of SOEs with government was not made in accordance with the legal standard articulated in US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China) . The Appellate Body rejected China's 
argument that the decision to have recourse to an alternative benchmark was inconsistent with 
Article 14(d) if it is established that the SOEs were equated with government without meeting the legal standard in US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China) . The Appellate Body stated 
that, instead of hinging on whether a government-owned entity has been properly found to 
constitute a public body, a finding of inconsistency with Article 14(d) in the selection of a benefit benchmark depends on whether or not the investigating authority at issue conducted the 
necessary market analysis to evaluate whether the proposed benchmark prices are market 
determined such that they can be used to asse ss whether the remuneration is less than adequate. 
While the Appellate Body acknowledged that investigating authorities may have to examine the 
structure of the relevant market, including the na ture of the entities operating in that market, 
their respective market shares, and any entry barriers, it nevertheless emphasized that evidence 
relating to government ownership of SOEs and their respective market shares does not in itself provide a sufficient basis for concluding that in-country prices are distorted. Investigating 
authorities may be required to assess "the behaviour of the entities operating in that market in 
order to determine whether the government itself, or acting through government-related entities, exerts market power so as to distort in-country prices". Thus, investigating authorities may be WT/AB/24 
 
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  called upon to examine the conditions of competition in the relevant market in order to assess 
whether the government is influencing the pricing conduct of any government-related or private entities. The Appellate Body recalled that the specific type of analysis that an investigating authority must conduct for the purpose of arriving at a proper benchmark will vary depending 
upon the circumstances of the case, the characte ristics of the market being examined, and the 
nature, quantity, and quality of the informat ion supplied by petitioners and respondents, 
including additional information that an investigating authority may seek in order to base its 
determination on positive evidence on the record. In  all cases, the Appellate Body stressed that, in 
arriving at a proper benchmark, an investigatin g authority must provide a reasoned and adequate 
explanation of the basis for its conclusions in its determination. Once an investigating authority has properly established and explained that in-country  prices are distorted, it is warranted to have 
recourse to an alternative benchmark for the benefit analysis under Article 14(d). 
Thus, while there is a single definition of "g overnment" for purposes of the SCM Agreement, 
it does not follow that, in determining the a ppropriate benefit benchmark under Article 14(d), 
investigating authorities are required to limit their analysis to an examination of the role played in 
the market by government-related entities that ha ve been properly found to be government in the 
narrow sense, or public bodies. Because the issu e of whether a price may be relied upon for 
benchmarking purposes under Article 14(d) is not a function of its source, but whether 
it is a market-determined price reflective of prevailing market conditions in the country 
of provision, the selection of a benchmark for the purposes of Article 14(d) cannot, at the outset, exclude consideration of in-country prices from any particular source, including 
government-related prices other than the financial contribution at issue.  
4.5.2.2  China's claim under Article 11 of the DSU China argued that the panel acted inconsistently with Article 11 of the DSU in finding that China 
failed to establish the "factual premise" of its cl aims, i.e. that the USDOC actually treated SOEs as 
public bodies and thus as part of the government  in the collective sense in the context of the 
benefit analysis in the four countervailing duty investigations. 
The Appellate Body understood China's claim under Ar ticle 11 to be premised on its interpretation 
of Article 14(d) of the SCM Agreement. Having re jected China's arguments concerning the panel's 
findings regarding the legal predicate of China's claim, the Appellate Body saw no need to make additional findings with respect to China's claim regarding the factual predicate of its claims under 
Article 11 of the DSU in order to provide a positive solution to this dispute.  
4.5.2.3  The panel's application of Article 14(d) of the SCM Agreement  
The panel rejected China's argument that "SOE presence in the market could support a distortion 
finding only if the SOEs at issue were properly found to be public bodies within the meaning 
of Article 1.1(a)(1)". China argued that the pa nel erred in its application of Article 14(d) 
of the SCM Agreement to the USDOC's determinatio ns at issue by applying the reasoning in  
US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China)  as regards the USDOC's benefit findings. 
The Appellate Body considered this to be in line with its findings in that case, to the extent that the panel understood these findings as indicating that the selection of a benchmark for the purposes of Article 14(d) cannot, at the outset, exclude consideration of in-country prices from any particular 
source, and that a proper finding that recourse to an alternative benchmark is justified requires an 
investigating authority to carry out the necessary market analysis in order to determine whether the proposed benchmark prices are market determin ed or distorted by government intervention.  
Nonetheless, the Appellate Body did not consider  that the panel properly applied the standard 
required by Article 14(d) of the SCM Agreement to  the challenged determinations. The panel failed 
to conduct a case-by-case analysis of whether the USDOC had properly examined whether the 
relevant in-country prices are market determined or distorted by government intervention in each 
of the investigations at issue. Rather, the panel simply assumed that because the Appellate Body had faced a similar situation in US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China) , China failed 
to establish that the USDOC acted inconsistently with the United States' obligations under 
Article 14(d). In the light of the correct interpreta tion of Article 14(d), the Appellate Body did not 
consider the panel's analysis and reasoning sufficient to conclude that the USDOC properly rejected in-country prices in China as benc hmarks for purposes of the benefit analysis. WT/AB/24 
 
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  The Appellate Body therefore reversed the panel's finding upholding the USDOC's rejection of 
private prices as potential benchmarks in the investigations under challenge on the grounds that such prices were distorted. The Appellate Body also reversed the panel's conclusion that China had not established that the USDOC acted inconsistently with the obligations of the United States 
under Article 14(d) or Article 1.1(b) of the SCM Ag reement by rejecting in-country private prices in 
China as benchmarks for the relevant challenged  investigations. Consequently, as requested by 
China, the Appellate Body reversed the panel's ultimate finding that China failed to establish that 
the USDOC acted inconsistently with the obligations of the United States under Article 14(d) 
or Article 1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement by rejecting in-country prices in China in respect of the OCTG, Solar panels, Pressure Pipe, and Line Pipe countervailing duty investigations. 
4.5.2.4  Completion of the legal analysis 
The Appellate Body examined China's request for it to complete the legal analysis and find that the 
USDOC determinations that SOEs provided inputs  for less than adequate remuneration in four 
investigations were inconsistent "as applied" with Articles 14(d) and 1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement.  
Regarding the legal standard to be applied under Articles 14(d) and 1.1(b), the Appellate Body 
recalled that the chapeau of Article 14 requires investigating authorities to explain adequately, consistent with the guidelines under Article 14, the application of the methodology for calculating 
the amount of benefit conferred by a government-provided financial contribution. In arriving at a 
proper benchmark, an investigating authority must explain the basis for its conclusions in its determination. Further, Article 14(d) of the SCM Agreement "establishes no legal presumption that in-country prices from any particular source can be discarded in a benchmark analysis." Thus, 
prices of government-related entities other than the entity providing the financial contribution at 
issue must also "be examined to assess whether they are market determined and can therefore f o r m  p a r t  o f  a  p r o p e r  b e n c h m a r k . "  T h e  A p p e l l a t e  B o d y  a l s o  r e c a l l e d  t h a t ,  i n  c o n d u c t i n g  t h e  
necessary analysis to determine whether proposed in -country prices can be relied upon in arriving 
at a proper benchmark, an investigating authority may be called upon to examine various aspects of the relevant market and that "what an investigating authority must do in conducting the 
necessary analysis for the purpose of arriving at a proper benchmark will vary depending on, 
inter alia , the circumstances of the case and the char acteristics of the market being examined. 
4.5.2.4.1.1  The OCTG countervailing duty investigation The Appellate Body found that the USDOC did not consider whether the prices of 
Government of China (GOC) owned or controll ed firms as such were market determined. 
The USDOC accepted without any examination that those government-related prices were automatically distorted by governmental intervention. Thus, the Appellate Body found that the 
USDOC's analysis and explanation for rejecting in-country prices in China in its benchmark analysis 
was inconsistent with the United States' obligations under Articles 14(d) and 1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement.  
4.5.2.4.1.2  The Solar Panels countervailing duty investigation 
The Appellate Body observed that the essence of the USDOC's findings was that 37 out of a total 
of 47 producers of polysilicon in China were the entities through which the GOC influenced and distorted the domestic market. While the role  of these 37 producers in the relevant market 
could, in principle, suggest that the presence of these government-related entities could be 
"significant" or "predominant", "an investigating authority cannot, based simply on a finding that the government is the predominant supplier of the relevant goods, refuse to consider evidence 
relating to factors other than government market share." The USDOC neither explained whether 
and how the 37 producers possessed and exerted market power distorting other in-country prices, nor explained whether the prices of the governme nt-related entities were market determined. 
Thus, the Appellate Body found that the USDOC's analysis and explanation for rejecting in-country 
prices in its benchmark analysis in the Solar Panels countervailing duty investigation was inconsistent with the United States' obligations under Articles 14(d) and 1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement. WT/AB/24 
 
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  4.5.2.4.1.3  The Pressure Pipe countervailing duty investigation 
The Appellate Body noted that the USDOC's decision to have recourse to an alternative benchmark 
was based on the market share of government-owned/-controlled firms in domestic production. The USDOC concluded that "prices stemming from private transactions within China cannot give 
rise to a price that is sufficiently free from th e effects of the GOC's actions, and therefore cannot 
be considered to meet the statutory and regulato ry requirement for the use of market-determined 
prices to measure the adequacy of remuneration." However, Article 14(d) of the SCM Agreement 
establishes no legal presumption that in-country prices from any particular source can be 
discarded in a benchmark analysis. Moreover, the USDOC did not explain in its determination whether and how the mentioned market shares held by SOEs actually resulted in the government's possession and exercise of market power such that price distortion occurred in a way that private 
suppliers aligned their prices with those of the government-provided goods. Thus, the Appellate 
Body found that the USDOC's analysis and explanation for rejecting in-country prices in China in its benchmark analysis in the Pressure Pipe countervailing duty investigation was inconsistent with 
the United States' obligations under Articles 14(d) and 1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement.  
4.5.2.4.1.4  The Line Pipe countervailing duty investigation The Appellate Body noted that, through the application of "adverse" facts available, the USDOC 
assumed that government-owned producers manufactured all hot-rolled steel produced in China 
during the period of investigation. The USDOC's distortion finding appeared to have been predicated on its determination that entities "o wned or controlled" by the government can be 
treated as "GOC authorities", and that prices of goods provided by such entities can be discarded 
in a benchmark analysis solely on the basis of government ownership or control. Yet, the relevant 
inquiry for finding a proper benchmark under Article 14(d) of the SCM Agreement is whether or not certain in-country prices are distorted, rather than whether such prices originate from 
a particular source (e.g. government-owned entities). In addition, a finding of government 
ownership and control of certain entities alone cannot serve as the sole basis for establishing price distortion, and government-related prices cannot be discarded in a benchmark analysis without an 
examination of whether or not they are market-d etermined. The Appellate Body thus found that 
the USDOC's analysis and explanation for rejecting "prices stemming from private transactions" in China in its benchmark analysis in this investigation was inconsistent with the United States' obligations under Articles 14(d) and 1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement.  
4.5.3  Article 2.1 of the SC M Agreement – Specificity  
China argued that the panel erred in its interpretation and application of Article 2.1 when it found 
that the USDOC did not act inconsistently with the United States' obligations under Article 2.1 
by analysing specificity exclusively under Article 2.1(c) of the SCM Agreement. China also asserted 
that the panel erred in its interpretation and application of the term "subsidy programme" in Article 2.1(c) by finding that the consistent provision by the SOEs of inputs for less than 
adequate remuneration provided an objective basis for the USDOC to identify sufficiently a subsidy 
programme under Article 2.1(c). Lastly, China argued that the panel erred in its application of Article 2.1 when it found that "the relevant jurisdiction was at the very least implicitly understood to be China" in the challenged investigations, and that China had therefore failed to establish that 
the USDOC acted inconsistently with Article 2.1 by not identifying the relevant granting authority. 
4.5.3.1  The panel's finding that the USDOC di d not act inconsistently with Article 2.1 by 
analysing specificity exclusively under Article 2.1(c) of the SCM Agreement 
China contended that the USDOC's consideration of the "other factors" under Article 2.1(c) 
of the SCM Agreement in the absence of an "appearan ce of non-specificity" was contrary to its first 
sentence, which conditions any examination of such other factors upon an "appearance of 
non-specificity" resulting from the application of subparagraphs (a) and (b) of Article 2.1.  
In the Appellate Body's view, China's appeal raised  the question of whether it may be permissible 
in certain circumstances for an investigating authority to proceed directly to a specificity analysis under Article 2.1(c), or whether an application of the principles in subparagraphs (a) and (b) 
is always required before an analysis can be conducted under subparagraph (c).  WT/AB/24 
 
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  The Appellate Body reviewed the analytical fram ework and structure of the specificity analysis 
under Article 2.1 in the light of relevant Appellate Body jurisprudence. In US – Large Civil Aircraft 
(2nd complaint) , the Appellate Body held that "the structure of Article 2.1 suggests that the 
specificity analysis will ordinarily proceed in a sequential order by which subparagraph (c) is 
examined following an assessment under subparagrap hs (a) and (b)" of whether there are "explicit 
limitations as to which enterprises or industries have access to the subsidy". There is a logical progression in the type of evidence that sh ould be examined under each subparagraph of 
Article 2.1 and the specificity analysis should thus "ordinarily" proceed in a certain sequence. 
However, the Appellate Body did not exclude the possibility that an investigating authority in 
certain circumstances could properly conduct the specificity analysis without examining the subparagraphs of Article 2.1 in a strict sequential order.  
The Appellate Body found that, based on the lang uage of the first sentence of Article 2.1(c), 
the application of the principles in subparagraphs (a) and (b) is necessarily a condition to be met in order to consider "other factors" under subparagraph (c). This is confirmed by the reference to 
an appearance of specificity in Article 2.1, suggesting that examining the factors in 
subparagraph (c) does not presuppose a formal finding or determination under subparagraphs (a) and (b). The word "if" in the first sentence of Article 2.1(c) relates to the phrase "there are 
reasons to believe that the subsidy may in fact be specific", meaning that the analysis under 
Article 2.1(c) may proceed "if" or "where" there are "reasons to believe that the subsidy may in fact be specific." Thus, in certain situations, investigating authorities are not required to examine specificity with respect to the subsidy at issue under all three subparagraphs. Rather, depending 
on the type of evidence present in a given case, an investigating authority may limit its specificity 
analysis to de jure  elements under subparagraphs (a) and (b) or to de facto  elements under 
subparagraph (c). The Appellate Body cautioned, however, against examining specificity on the 
basis of the application of a particular subpara graph of Article 2.1, when the potential for 
application of other subparagraphs is warranted in the light of the nature and content of measures challenged in a particular case. 
The Appellate Body noted that China's interpretati ve position was based on the proposition that 
the first sentence of Article 2.1(c) conditions an examination of de facto  specificity upon 
an "appearance of non-specificity" from the application of subparagraphs (a) and (b). Recalling that "there may be instances in which the evidence under consideration unequivocally indicates 
specificity or non-specificity by reason of law, or by reason of fact, under one of the 
subparagraphs, and that in such circumstances further consideration under the other subparagraphs of Article 2.1 may be unnecessary", the Appellate Body disagreed with China that 
the first sentence of Article 2.1(c) conditions the assessment of de facto  specificity on the basis of 
the factors listed under that subparagraph upon an application of the principles set out in subparagraphs (a) and (b). While there may be circumstances where "unwritten measures" 
providing subsidies may be analysed under the prin ciples set forth in subparagraphs (a) and (b), 
an analysis under these provisions focuses on explicit limitation of access to a subsidy that would ordinarily be found in written instruments. By contrast, a de facto  specificity analysis under 
subparagraph (c) is most pertinent and useful in the context of subsidies in respect of which 
eligibility or access limitations are not explicitly provided for in a law or regulation. 
The Appellate Body recalled that the panel had indi cated that the unwritten nature of the subsidies 
in the underlying investigations had led the USDOC to examine whether those subsidies are 
de facto  specific under Article 2.1(c). The panel had further observed that the USDOC's findings 
were not based on an explicit limitation of access to the subsidy by the granting authority or the legislation pursuant to which the granting authority operates, nor on criteria or conditions that are 
spelled out in a law, regulation, or other official document. Since China had not pointed to any 
evidence that was before the USDOC of the kind that would ordinarily be examined in determining de jure  specificity under subparagraphs (a) and (b), the panel did not err in its assessment of 
China's claim. The Appellate Body therefore upheld the panel's finding that the USDOC did not act 
inconsistently with Article 2.1 by analysing specificity exclusively under Article 2.1(c). 
4.5.3.2  The panel's interpretation and app lication of the term "s ubsidy programme" in 
Article 2.1(c) of the SCM Agreement 
China argued that the panel erred in the interpretation and application of the term 
"subsidy programme" in Article 2.1(c) of the SCM Agreement, contending that any examination of 
the first of the "other factors" under Article 2.1(c) must begin with the identification of the relevant WT/AB/24 
 
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  "subsidy programme" and that the USDOC provided no evidentiary basis for the existence, scope, 
and content of these alleged "programmes".  
The Appellate Body recalled that the starting point of an analysis of specificity is the measure that 
has been determined to constitute a subsidy under Article 1.1 of the SCM Agreement, and that a 
determination that a given measure constitutes a financial contribution therefore informs the scope 
and content of the analysis required to establish  de facto  specificity. The ordinary meaning of the 
word "programme" refers to "a plan or scheme of any intended proceedings (whether in writing or 
not); an outline or abstract of something to be done." Evidence regarding the nature and scope of 
a  s u b s i d y  p r o g r a m m e  m a y  b e  f o u n d  i n  a  w i d e  v a r i e t y  o f  f o r m s ,  s u c h  a s  i n  t h e  f o r m  o f  a  l a w ,  regulation or other official document or act setting out criteria or conditions governing the eligibility for a subsidy. Thus, the existence of a subsidy scheme or plan may also be evidenced by 
a systematic series of actions pursuant to which financial contributions that confer a benefit have 
been provided to certain enterprises. The Appellate Body pointed out that this is so particularly in the context of Article 2.1(c) where the inquiry focuses on whether there are reasons to believe 
that a subsidy is, in fact, specific, even when there is no explicit limitation of access to the subsidy 
set out, for example, in a law, regu lation, or other official document.  
The Appellate Body added that an examination of the existence of a plan or scheme regarding the 
use of the subsidy may also require assessing the operation of such plan or scheme over a period 
of time. Supporting this proposition is the last sentence of Article 2.1(c), which establishes that, "[i]n applying this subparagraph, account shall be taken of … the length of time during which the subsidy programme has been in operation." The mere fact that financial contributions have been 
provided to certain enterprises is not sufficient, however, to demonstrate that these have been 
granted pursuant to a plan or scheme for purposes of Article 2.1(c). To establish that the provision 
of financial contributions emanates from a plan or scheme under Article 2.1(c), an investigating 
authority must have adequate evidence of the existence of a systematic  series of actions pursuant 
to which financial contributions that confer a benefit are provided to certain enterprises. 
The Appellate Body agreed with the panel to the extent it suggested that, in the absence of any 
written instrument or explicit pronouncement, ev idence of a "systematic activity or series of 
activities" may provide a sufficient basis to establish the existence of an unwritten subsidy programme in the context of assessing de facto  specificity under the first factor of Article 2.1(c) 
of the SCM Agreement. The Appellate Body found it troubling, however, that the panel did not 
provide any case-specific discussion or references to the USDOC's determinations of de facto  
specificity at issue prior to reaching its conclusion. The panel had thereby failed to apply Article 2.1(c), as properly interpreted, to the USDOC's determinations at issue. Accordingly, the 
Appellate Body reversed the panel's finding that  China had not established that the USDOC acted 
inconsistently with the United States' obligations under Article 2.1 of the SCM Agreement by failing 
to identify a subsidy programme in each of the specificity determinations at issue. 
Having reversed the panel's finding, the Appellate  Body examined China's request to complete the 
legal analysis in respect of 15 specificity determinations in 12 countervailing duty investigations. The Appellate Body recalled that the panel found that the USDOC had acted inconsistently with Article 2.1(c) of the SCM Agreement by failing to take into account, in each of the determinations 
of de facto specificity challenged by China, "the extent of diversification of the economic activities 
within the jurisdiction of the granting authority" and the "length of time during which the subsidy programme has been in operation". These findings by the panel were not challenged by the 
United States on appeal, and they therefore stand. 
In the light of these findings, and having laid out the legal standard that applies under 
Article 2.1(c) insofar as it relates to the first factor under Article 2.1(c), the Appellate Body saw 
limited value, for purposes of resolving the dispute between the parties, in completing the analysis 
with respect to the issue of whether the USDOC sufficiently identified and substantiated the existence of a "subsidy programme" in each of  the determinations at issue. Moreover, the 
A p p e l l a t e  B o d y  c o n s i d e r e d  t h a t  m u c h  o f  t h e  e v idence regarding the existence of the alleged 
subsidy programmes in this dispute had not been subject to the panel's scrutiny. As noted, 
the panel did not refer to any of the challenged coun tervailing duty determinations on the record in 
reaching its finding that the provision of inputs was "systematic". The Appellate Body also did not 
consider the participants to have addressed sufficiently, in their submissions, the issues of whether 
the USDOC sufficiently identified and substantia ted the existence of a "subsidy programme" in 
each of the determinations at issue. In these circumstances, the Appellate Body decided not to WT/AB/24 
 
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  complete the legal analysis with respect to this particular aspect of China's appeal. 
4.5.3.3  The "jurisdiction of the granti ng authority" under Article 2.1 of the 
SCM Agreement 
China argued that the panel erred in its applicatio n of Article 2.1 of the SCM Agreement to China's 
claim concerning the USDOC's failure to identify a "granting authority" in the specificity 
determinations at issue. China asserted that, without identifying the granting authority (or authorities), it is not possible to identify the jurisdiction (or jurisdictions) within which to 
situate the specificity analysis. China argued that , because the USDOC did not identify the granting 
authority (or authorities), it acted inconsistently with Article 2.1 of the SCM Agreement. 
The Appellate Body noted that the chapeau of Article 2.1 "frames the central inquiry as a 
determination as to whether a subsidy is specific to 'certain enterprises' within the jurisdiction of 
the granting authority". In situations where the granting authority is the central government, the 
scope of the jurisdiction is usually the entire territory of the relevant Member. By contrast, where the granting authority is a regional or local government, the scope of the jurisdiction is usually 
limited to the territory of that regional or local government. Determining whether the jurisdiction 
at issue covers the entire territory of the relevant WTO Member or whether it is limited to a designated geographical region within that territo ry is, therefore, important because, as indicated 
by the panel in EC and certain member States – Large Civil Aircraft , "if the granting authority was 
a regional government, a subsidy available to enterprises throughout the territory over which that regional government had jurisdiction would not be specific." Conversely, if the granting authority was the central government, a subsidy available to the very same enterprises would be specific.  
The Appellate Body observed that an investigating authority's determination under Article 1.1 
as to the existence of a subsidy will inform the assessment of whether it is specific to certain 
enterprises "within the jurisdiction of the granting authority". In determining whether a financial 
contribution exists, investigating authorities must inquire into its nature and determine whether it 
was provided by the "government", by "any pub lic body within the territory of a Member", 
or by a "private body" entrusted or directed by  the government. The Appellate Body considered 
that such assessment will inform the identification  of the "jurisdiction of the granting authority". 
While an analysis of the "jurisdiction of the granting  authority" could start with an identification of 
the granting authority, the Appellate Body did not see why China's suggested order of analysis 
would always be required. Rather, identifying the "jurisdiction of the granting authority" involves a 
holistic analysis of the relevant facts and evidence in each case. As the notion of jurisdiction is 
linked to, and does not exist in isolation from, the granting authority, a proper identification of "the jurisdiction of the granting authority" requires an analysis of the "granting authority" and its 
"jurisdiction" in a conjunctive manner. The Appell ate Body thus refused to read Article 2.1 in a 
manner that focuses on the identity of the granting authority independently from its jurisdiction, stressing that a holistic analysis of the jurisdiction of the granting authority is what provides the 
framework within which specificity is to be analysed. Provided that an investigating authority 
adequately substantiates its finding as to whether the jurisdiction covers the entire territory of the relevant WTO Member or is limited to a designated geographical region within that territory, in conducting this holistic assessment it would normally also identify the granting authority. 
The Appellate Body noted that, in assessing China's "as applied" claims with respect to the 
investigations, the panel found that the relevant jurisdiction was "at the very least implicitly understood to be China in the challenged investigations" without any case-specific discussion 
of the USDOC's determinations or any other evidence on the record, despite the fact that evidence 
had been presented to the panel. Thus, the Appellate Body found that the panel had failed to apply Article 2.1(c), as properly interpreted, to the USDOC's determinations at issue. Accordingly, the 
Appellate Body reversed the panel's finding that  China had not established that the USDOC acted 
inconsistently with the United States' obligations und er Article 2.1 by failing to identify a granting 
authority and ergo the relevant jurisdiction, in each of the specificity determinations at issue.  
Having reversed the panel's finding, the Appellate Body examined whether it was in a position to 
complete the legal analysis in respect of 15 determinations of de facto  specificity in 
12 countervailing duties investigations. The Appellate Body recalled the panel's finding that the USDOC acted inconsistently with the obligations of the United States under Article 2.1(c) by failing WT/AB/24 
 
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  to take into account, in each of the determinations of de facto  specificity challenged by China, 
"the extent of diversification of the economic ac tivities within the jurisdiction of the granting 
authority" and the "length of time during whic h the subsidy programme has been in operation". 
In the light of the panel's findings relating to bo th the USDOC's identification of the jurisdiction 
of the granting authority and the nature and scope of the relevant "subsidy programme", 
and, having laid out the legal standard that applies under Article 2.1(c) insofar as it relates to the first factor under Article 2.1(c), the Appellate Body saw limited value, for purposes of resolving the 
dispute between the parties, in completing the lega l analysis with respect to the issue of whether 
the USDOC sufficiently identified the jurisdiction of the granting authority in each of the determinations. 
4.5.4  Article 12.7 of the SC M Agreement – Facts available 
China appealed the panel's finding that China had not established that the USDOC acted 
inconsistently with Article 12.7 of the SCM Agr eement by not relying on facts on the record. 
China claimed that the panel acted inconsistently with Article 11 of the DSU because it failed to 
examine, with respect to each of the 42 inst ances of the use of adverse "facts available" 
challenged by China, whether there was a reason ed and adequate explanation, discernible from 
the USDOC's published determination, providing the factual basis for the USDOC's conclusion. 
China requested the Appellate Body to reverse the panel's finding under Article 12.7, 
and to complete the legal analysis and find, instead, that the USDOC acted inconsistently with Article 12.7 by not relying on the facts available on  the record in each of the 42 instances of the 
use of adverse "facts available" across the 13 challenged countervailing duty investigations.  
The Appellate Body recalled the panel's interpreta tion of Article 12.7 and the standard of review 
articulated by it, as well as its interpretation of Article 12.7 in Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on 
Rice and US – Carbon Steel (India) . Article 12.7 permits the use of facts on the record solely for 
the purpose of replacing information that may be missing, in order to arrive at an accurate 
subsidization or injury determination. Since there must be a "connection" between the "necessary" information which is missing and the particular facts available on which a determination under 
Article 12.7 is based, an investigating authority, when proceeding under Article 12.7, must use 
those facts available that "reasonably replace" the missing information to arrive at an accurate determination. Moreover, as determinations made under Article 12.7 are to be made on the basis of "the facts available", they cannot be based on non-factual assumptions or speculation. Further, 
in reasoning and evaluating which facts available can reasonably replace the missing information, 
"all substantiated facts on the record must be taken into account" by an investigating authority. 
The Appellate Body explained that, in order to assess reasonable replacements for the missing 
"necessary" information, an investigating authority should engage in a process of reasoning 
and evaluation. Where there are several facts available to an investigating authority that it needs to choose from, the process of reasoning and eval uation would involve a degree of comparison in 
order to arrive at an accurate determination. The evaluation of the facts available that is required, 
and the form it may take, depends on the particular circumstances of a given case, including the nature, quality, and amount of evidence on th e record and the particular determinations to be 
made. Thus, whereas the explanation and analysis provided in a published report must be 
sufficient to allow a panel to assess how and why the facts available employed by the investigating 
authority are reasonable replacements for the miss ing information, the nature and extent of the 
explanation and analysis required will necessarily vary from determination to determination.  
4.5.4.1  The panel's conformity with Articl e 11 of the DSU in assessing China's claims 
under Article 12.7 of the SCM Agreement 
The Appellate Body addressed whether the panel was required to assess whether the USDOC's 
adverse "facts available" determinations were "reasoned and adequate". The Appellate Body 
agreed with China that, in the context of reviewing factual findings made by investigating authorities, a panel is required to examine whether an investigating authority's conclusions are reasoned and adequate. Based on the Appellate Body reports in US – Softwood Lumber VI 
(Article 21.5 – Canada)  and US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS , however, 
the standard of review to be applied by a panel in a case depends, in part, on the particular 
provision of the covered agreement that is at i ssue – Article 12.7 of the SCM Agreement in this 
case – and the specific claim(s) of a complainant. In the present case, in order to comply with 
Article 12.7, the USDOC was required to provide an explanation sufficient to establish that it had WT/AB/24 
 
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  engaged in a process of reasoning and evaluation  of the various facts before it in order to 
determine which of the facts available could reasonably replace the missing "necessary" information. Although China's challenge focused on  whether the USDOC's adverse "facts available" 
determinations were based on the facts on the record, it did not follow that the panel was not 
required to scrutinize the USDOC's analysis and explanation in support of its facts available 
determinations. The Appellate Body recalled the panel's statements that its task in the present case was "to consider whether the USDOC provided sufficient explanation of the challenged 
adverse facts available determinations to assess whether the USDOC based these determinations 
on facts" (emphasis added by the Appellate Body). The Appellate Body thus rejected the United States' argument that the panel was not required to examine whether the USDOC provided a "reasoned and adequate" explanation of its adverse "facts available" determinations in order to 
evaluate China's claims under Article 12.7. 
The Appellate Body noted that Article 11 imposes a general duty on panels to, inter alia , scrutinize 
whether the reasoning of an investigating authority is coherent and internally consistent and carry 
out an in-depth examination of the explanations provided by an investigating authority. 
In the context of Article 12.7, an in-depth examination would entail, inter alia , assessing whether 
an investigating authority's published report provided an explanation that sufficiently disclosed its 
process of reasoning and evaluation such that the panel could assess how the authority chose from 
the facts available those that could reasonably replace the missing information.  
The Appellate Body considered that, with respect to China's first contention that the panel failed to 
examine and address each of the 42 instances challenged by China, instead of examining China's 
arguments and evidence in relation to the 42 instances, the panel limited its analysis to only some 
instances of the use of adverse "facts available" by the USDOC. The panel's approach was directed 
towards ascertaining whether China had successfully established that the USDOC applied the same 
"legal standard" across the 42 challenged instances. However, in the light of the arguments 
and evidence provided by the parties, the Appe llate Body stated that the panel was required 
to scrutinize each instance of the use of adverse "f acts available" challenged by China in order to 
address properly China's "as applied" claims under Article 12.7. 
China's second contention was that, as to the instan ces of the use of adverse "facts available" that 
the panel did discuss, it failed to engage in an in-depth examination, as required under Article 11. Instead, the panel simply accepted the USDOC's references to the term "facts available", 
without inquiring whether the USDOC actually applied the facts available. The Appellate Body 
observed that the panel focused, in large part, on the words employed by the USDOC in its determinations, rather than on whether the USDOC acted inconsistently with Article 12.7. 
Instead of assessing whether the USDOC had "provi ded sufficient explanation of the challenged 
adverse facts available determinations to assess whether the USDOC based these determinations on facts", the panel focused on the language and the formulations used by the USDOC in its 
determinations, without critically examining the USDOC's statements in order to assess whether 
the USDOC had complied with its obligations under Article 12.7. The Appellate Body therefore concluded that instead of conducting its own analysis, the panel simply relied on language in the USDOC's determinations referring to the application of facts available in order to 
reject China's claims.  
Finally, China contended that the panel acted incons istently with Article 11 to the extent that it 
relied on examples of record evid ence supporting the USDOC's determinations at issue provided by 
the USDOC on an ex post basis. The Appellate Bo dy noted that the relevant exhibit provided by 
the United States contained references to facts on the record before the USDOC, as well as excerpts from the USDOC's determinations and memoranda. The Appellate Body did not consider it 
clear whether the panel, if at all, relied on the references to the facts on the record provided by 
the United States, and concluded that the panel's discussion of the United States' exhibit was a further example of the cursory nature of the panel's analysis.  
Therefore, the Appellate Body found that the pane l acted inconsistently with its obligations under 
Article 11 of the DSU in assessing China's claims under Article 12.7 of the SCM Agreement. 
Thus, the Appellate Body reversed the panel's finding that China had not established that the USDOC acted inconsistently with the United States' obligations under Article 12.7 of the 
SCM Agreement by not relying on facts available on the record in the 42 instances challenged 
by China.  WT/AB/24 
 
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  4.5.4.2  Completion of the legal analysis 
Having reversed the panel's findings under Article 12.7, the Appellate Body considered China's 
request to complete the legal analysis and to find, instead, that the USDOC acted inconsistently with Article 12.7 in each of the 42 instances challe nged by China. The Appellate Body had, in some 
disputes, completed the legal analysis with a view to facilitating the prompt and effective 
resolution of the dispute. However, it could only complete the legal analysis if the factual findings of the panel and the undisputed facts on the panel record provide sufficient basis to do so. 
Several factors could prevent the Appellate Body from completing the legal analysis, such as: the 
complexity of the legal issues; the absence of fu ll exploration of the issues before the panel, 
and, consequently, considerations pertaining to the parties' due process rights; the panel's failure to examine a particular claim at all; and where comp letion is not required to resolve the dispute.  
In this case, the Appellate Body noted that, on appeal, China presented an instance-by-instance 
discussion of why the USDOC acted inconsistently with Article 12.7 in each of the 42 instances challenged by it. Before the panel, however, China did not present detailed argumentation with 
respect to each of these instances. Noting that China requested it to complete the legal analysis 
with respect to all of the 42 instances across th e 13 investigations, the Appellate Body recalled 
that the evaluation of the facts available that is re quired on the part of an investigating authority, 
and the form it may take, depends on the particular circumstances of a given case, 
including the nature, quality, and amount of the evidence on the record and the particular determinations to be made. Moreover, the nature an d extent of the explanation that is required on 
the part of an investigating authority necessarily varies from determination to determination. 
The Appellate Body noted that the 42 instances with respect to which China requested it to 
complete the legal analysis included several instances wherein the USDOC relied on adverse "facts available" in support of its public body, benefit, specificity, and export restraints determinations. 
The Appellate Body recalled the panel's findings of inconsistency, not challenged on appeal, with 
respect to the public body, specificity and export restraints determinations by the USDOC. Further, the Appellate Body recalled its finding that the USDOC acted inconsistently with Articles 1.1(b) 
and 14(d) of the SCM Agreement in making its bene fit determinations in the context of the OCTG, 
Line Pipe, Pressure Pipe, and Solar Panels investig ations. Having laid down the legal standard that 
applies under Article 12.7, the Appellate Body saw limited value, for the purposes of resolving the dispute between the parties, in completing the legal analysis with respect to the instances in which 
the USDOC used adverse "facts available" in support of its public body, benefit, specificity, and 
export restraints determinations. The Appellate Bo dy was also of the view that completing the 
legal analysis in the present case would also raise due process concerns.  
For these reasons, the Appellate Body declined to complete the legal analysis with respect to each 
of the 42 instances of the use of adverse "facts available" challenged by China. 
5  PARTICIPANTS AND THIRD PARTICIPANTS IN APPEALS 
Table 5 lists the WTO Members that participated in  appeals for which an Appellate Body report was 
circulated in 2014. It distinguishes between Members that filed a Notice of Appeal pursuant to Rule 20 of the Working Procedures  (appellants) and Members that filed a Notice of Other Appeal 
pursuant to Rule 23(1) (known as the "other appellants"). Rule 23(1) provides that "a party to the 
dispute other than the original appellant may join in that appeal, or appeal on the basis of other 
alleged errors in the issues of law covered in the Panel report and legal interpretations developed by the Panel". Under the Working Procedures, part ies wishing to appeal a panel report pursuant 
to Rule 23(1) are required to file a Notice of O t h e r  A p p e a l  w i t h i n  5  d a y s  o f  t h e  f i l i n g  o f  t h e  
Notice of Appeal. 
Table 5 also identifies those Members that participated in appeals as third participants under 
paragraphs (1), (2), or (4) of Rule 24 of the Working Procedures. Under Rule 24(1), 
a WTO Member that was a third party to the panel proceedings may file a written submission as a third participant within 21 days of the filing of the Notice of Appeal. Pursuant to Rule 24(2), a Member that was a third party to the panel proceedings and that does not file a written 
submission with the Appellate Body may, within 21 days of the filing of the Notice of Appeal, 
notify its intention to appear at the oral hearing and indicate whether it intends to make a statement at the hearing. Rule 24(4) provides that a Member that was a third party to the panel WT/AB/24 
 
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  proceedings and neither files a written submission in accordance with Rule 24(1), nor gives notice 
in accordance with Rule 24(2), may notify its intention to appear at the oral hearing and request to make a statement. 
Table 5: Participants and third participants  in appeals for which an Appellate Body 
report was circulated in 2014 
Case Appellanta Other 
appellantb Appellee(s)c Third participants 
Rule 24(1)  Rule 24(2) Rule 24(4)  
European 
Communities — Measures 
Prohibiting the 
Importation and Marketing of Seal Products  (DS400)  Canada 
Norway European 
Union Canada 
Norway 
European 
Union 
 Iceland 
Japan 
Mexico 
United 
States   Argentina 
China 
Ecuador 
Colombia 
Russia 
European 
Communities — 
Measures 
Prohibiting the 
Importation and 
Marketing of Seal 
Products (DS401) Canada 
Norway European 
Union Canada 
Norway 
European 
Union 
 Iceland 
Japan 
Mexico 
United 
States  Namibia Argentina 
China 
Ecuador 
Colombia 
Russia 
United States — 
Countervailing 
and Anti-dumping 
Measures on 
Certain Products 
from China China United 
States  China 
United 
States  Australia 
European 
Union 
Japan  Canada 
India 
Turkey 
Russia  
Viet Nam   
China — Measures 
Related to the 
Exportation of 
Rare Earths, 
Tungsten and 
Molybdenum 
(DS431)  United 
States China United 
States 
China European 
Union 
Japan 
Argentina 
Australia 
Brazil 
Canada 
Colombia 
Saudi 
Arabia India 
Indonesia 
Korea 
Norway 
Peru  
Russia 
Chinese 
Taipei Oman 
Turkey 
Viet Nam 
China — Measures 
Related to the 
Exportation of 
Rare Earths, 
Tungsten and 
Molybdenum 
(DS432)  China  European 
Union United 
States 
Japan 
Argentina 
Australia 
Brazil 
Canada 
Colombia 
Saudi 
Arabia India 
Indonesia 
Korea 
Norway 
Peru  
Russia 
Chinese 
Taipei Oman 
Turkey 
 Viet Nam WT/AB/24 
 
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  Case Appellanta Other 
appellantb Appellee(s)c Third participants 
Rule 24(1)  Rule 24(2) Rule 24(4)  
China — Measures 
Related to the 
Exportation of 
Rare Earths, 
Tungsten and 
Molybdenum 
(DS433)  China  Japan United 
States 
European 
Union 
Argentina 
Australia 
Brazil 
Canada 
Colombia 
Saudi 
Arabia India 
Indonesia 
Korea 
Norway 
Peru  
Russia 
Chinese 
Taipei  Oman 
Turkey 
Viet Nam  
United States — 
Countervailing 
Measures on 
Certain Hot-Rolled 
Carbon Steel Flat 
Products from 
India (DS436)  India United 
States India 
United 
States Australia 
Canada 
China 
European 
Union  
Saudi 
Arabia  Turkey 
United States — 
Countervailing 
Duty Measures on 
Certain Products 
from China 
(DS437)  China United 
States China 
United 
States Brazil 
Canada 
European 
Union  
Saudi 
Arabia Australia 
India 
Japan 
Korea 
Norway Turkey 
Russia  
Viet Nam 
a Pursuant to Rule 20 of the Working Procedures. 
b Pursuant to Rule 23(1) of the Working Procedures. 
c Pursuant to Rule 22 or 23(3)  of the Working Procedures. 
 
A total of 24 WTO Members appeared at least once as appellant, other appellant, appellee, or third 
participant in appeals for which an Appellate Body report was circulated in 2014. 
Chart 3 shows the ratio of developed country Members to developing country Members in terms of 
appearances made as appellant, other appellant, appellee, and third participant in appeals for 
which an Appellate Body report was circulated from 1996 through 2014. 
Chart 3: WTO Member participation in appeals 1996–2014 
 
 WT/AB/24 
 
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  Annex 9 provides a statistical summary and details on WTO Members' participation as appellant, 
other appellant, appellee, and third participant in appeals for which an Appellate Body report was circulated from 1996 through 2014. 
6  WORKING PROCEDURES FOR APPELLATE REVIEW 
6.1  Procedural issues arising in appeals in 2014 
No amendments were made to the Working Procedures  during 2014. The current version of the 
Working Procedures is contained in document WT/AB/WP/6, which was circulated to WTO Members 
on 16 August 2010. 
The procedural issues that arose in appellate proceedings in 2014 are the following: (i) public 
observation of the oral hearing; (ii) allocation of appeal numbers; (iii) challenge to a notice of appeal; (iv) consolidation of appellate proceedi ngs; (v) extension of time to file submissions; 
(vi) amendments to the official Working Schedule; (vii) timeliness and adequacy of notifications; 
(viii) unsolicited amicus curiae briefs; and (ix) extension of the time period for circulation 
of reports; and (x) request for separate reports These procedural issues are discussed below. 
6.2  Procedural issues arising from appeals 
6.2.1  Open oral hearing In EC – Seal Products , the Appellate Body received a joint communication from Canada 
and Norway requesting that the oral hearing in the appellate proceedings be opened to public 
observation. Both complainants proposed that public observation be permitted via simultaneous closed-circuit television broadcasting with the option for the transmission to be turned off should a third participant wish to keep its oral statemen t confidential. They further requested the adoption 
of additional procedures to ensure the secu rity and orderly conduct of the proceedings. 
The Appellate Body also received a communication from the European Union joining Canada and Norway's request for public observation of the he aring, and indicating that it had no objections 
to the proposed additional security arrangements. 
The Division issued a Procedural Ruling authorizing the request of Canada, Norway, 
and the European Union to open the hearing to  public observation and adopting additional 
procedures for the conduct of the hearing. Pu blic observation of the oral hearing in the 
proceedings took place via simultaneous closed-cir cuit television broadcast to a separate room. 
Transmission was turned off during statements made by those third participants who had indicated their wish to maintain the confidentiality of their statements. 
6.2.2  Allocation of appeal numbers 
The respective appeals of China and the United States in US – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping 
Measures (China)  (DS449) and China – Rare Earths  (DS431) were filed simultaneously. 
In the past, the Appellate Body had attributed appeal numbers sequentially based on the date 
and time of receipt of the Notice of Appeal. Gi ven the unprecedented situation of simultaneous 
filings of appeals, the Chairman of the Appellate  Body invited the parties to these disputes to 
provide their views as to the considerations relevant to the determination of how to allocate appeal 
numbers AB-2014-3 and AB-2014-4 between the two appeals. 
The Appellate Body received comments from Ch ina, the European Union, Japan, and the 
United States. On the same day, the Chairman of the Appellate Body sent a letter to the parties to 
these disputes informing them that, after consider ation of their submissions, the Appellate Body 
determined that the usual manner of assigning such numbers – according to the sequence in which they were appealed – was not available. The Appe llate Body underlined the necessity of assigning 
an appeal number to each appeal before the Appellate Body Members constituting the respective 
divisions could be selected. The Appellate Body re called that Rule 6(2) of the Working Procedures 
calls for the Members constituting a division to be selected taking into account, inter alia , 
"the principles of random selection [and] unpredi ctability". In order to ensure respect for these 
principles in the specific circumstances of a simult aneous filing of two appeals, the Appellate Body 
invited the parties to the disputes to the Appella te Body Secretariat to witness the assignment WT/AB/24 
 
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  of appeal numbers through a random draw. As a result of this draw, the appeal initiated 
by the United States in China – Rare Earths  was assigned appeal number AB-2014-3, 
and the appeal by China in US – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Measures (China)  was assigned 
appeal number AB-2014-4. 
6.2.3  Challenge to Notice of Appeal 
In China – Rare Earths , China requested the Appellate Body to reject the United States' Notice of 
Appeal in DS431 on the grounds that, due to its "c onditional" nature, the Notice of Appeal did not 
constitute a proper Notice of Appeal within the meaning of the Working Procedures.35 
The Chairman of the Appellate Body sent a letter to the participants, and third participants inviting them to provide their comments on China's reques t. After receiving comments from Australia, 
Brazil, Canada, China, the European Union, Japa n, and the United States, the Appellate Body 
Division hearing the appeal in DS431 issued a Procedural Ruling, declining China's request to 
reject the United States' Notice of Appeal due to its "conditional" nature. The Division considered that its jurisdiction to hear the United States' appeal was validly established given that the 
Notice of Appeal conformed to the requirem ents of Rule 20 of the Working Procedures. 
Such jurisdiction was not, in the opinion of the Division, affected by the possibility that it might not need to rule on the issues raised by the United St ates in the event that the scenarios identified in 
its Notice of Appeal were to materialize. 
6.2.4  Consolidation of appellate proceedings In China – Rare Earths , the Division decided, pursuant to Rule 16(1) of the Working Procedures, 
to consolidate the appeals of the panel reports in China – Rare Earths (WT/DS431/R; 
WT/DS432/R; WT/DS433/R). Given this consolidation, and taking account of certain requests 
made by the participants and third participants, the Division found it necessary to make certain 
additional modifications to the Working Schedu les in order to ensure fairness and orderly 
procedure in the conduct of these appeals.
36 More specifically, the Division set a single deadline for 
the third participants' submissions in respect of all these disputes; allowed the United States, the European Union, and Japan to elect to have their su bmissions filed in the capacity of participant in 
their respective disputes also serve as their third participants' submissions in the disputes in which 
they were third participants, without prejudice to their respective rights to file third participants' submissions separate from their appellees' submissions; and decided to hold a single oral hearing for all these appellate proceedings. 
6.2.5  Extension of time to file submissions 
In US – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Measures (China) , the United States requested an 
extension of the deadline for the filing of certain documents pursuant to Rule 16(2) of the 
Working Procedures on account of "exceptional circumstances", particularly: (i) the filing of China's 
Notice of Appeal and appellant's submission 12 days after the circulation of the panel report; 
(ii) the simultaneous filing of the appeals in this dispute and in China – Rare Earths ; and 
(iii) the granting of an extension to China to file its Notice of Other Appeal in China – Rare Earths.  
The Appellate Body Division issued a Procedural Ruling extending the time period for the United States to file its Notice of Other Appeal and other appellant's submission.
37 The Division 
also extended the deadlines for the filing of the appellees' submissions and the third participants' 
submissions. 
In the same appeal, Japan also requested the Appellate Body, pursuant to Rule 16 of the 
Working Procedures, to extend the date for the fili ng of the third participants' submission because 
the original deadline fell within a holiday period in Japan. The Division denied Japan's request on 
                                               
35 The United States indicated in its Notice of Appe als that "[i]f China were not to appeal the Panel 
Report, or if the Appellate Body were not to modify or  reverse the legal findings or conclusions of the Panel 
pursuant to an appeal by China, th en the Appellate Body would not need to reach" the issues raised by the 
United States in its appeal . (Appellate Body Reports, China – Rare Earths , paras. 5.253-5.258, and Annex 4) 
36 The Procedural Ruling was attached as Annex 5 to China Rare – Earths , WT/431AB/R, WT/432/AB/R, 
WT/433/AB/R. 
37 The Procedural Ruling was attached as Annex 3 to United States – Counterv ailing and Anti-Dumping 
Measures (China) , WT/DS449/AB/R. WT/AB/24 
 
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  the ground that the difficulties that Japan could encounter in finalizing its submission during this 
period did not constitute "exceptional circumstances" that would result in "manifest unfairness" within the meaning of Rule 16(2) of the Working Procedures.
38 
In China – Rare Earths , along with its challenge to the Notice of Appeal filed by the United States, 
China also requested the Appellate Body, pursuant to Rule 16(2) of the Working Procedures, 
to extend the time limits for filing relevant do cuments in the event that the Appellate Body were 
not to reject the United States' Notice of A ppeal. After inviting the participants, and third 
participants to provide their comments on China's request, the Division granted China's request for 
an extension of the time period for China to file a Notice of Other Appeal and appellant's 
submission in DS431.39 As a consequence of this decision, and in order to preserve the sequence 
of and periods between the other deadlines pr escribed under the Working Procedures, the 
Appellate Body also modified the dates for the filing of other submissions set out in the 
Working Schedule. 
In the same appellate proceedings, the Appellate Body Division hearing the appeal in DS431 
received a letter from Japan requesting an extension of the deadline for filing the 
third participants' submissions pursuant to Rule 16  of the Working Procedures. The Division sent a 
letter to the participants and the third participants in DS431 stating that it was considering the 
request by Japan and would revert to the ma tter in due course. However, the Division 
subsequently observed in its Procedural Ruling that, having decided to consolidate the appeals in DS431, DS432, and DS433, and to establish a single deadline for the filing of all third participants' submissions in respect of all these appeals, it was not necessary to deal separately 
with Japan's request for an extension of the de adline for the filing of the third participants' 
submissions in DS431.
40 
In US – Carbon Steel (India) , the United States requested the A ppellate Body Division to extend 
the deadline for filing the United States' appellee's submission by seven calendar days due to the 
size and complexity of India's appeal. The Divisi on invited India and the third parties to comment 
in writing on the United States' request. India requested that any extension of the deadline for the 
United States to file its appellee's submission be granted equally to India. The European Union 
requested the Division, if it accepted the United States' request, to consequently extend the deadline for third participants to file their notifications and written submissions. The Division issued a Procedural Ruling to the participants and third parties in respect of the United States' request.
41 
Pursuant to Rule 16 of the Working Procedures, th e Division decided to extend the date for filing 
the appellees' submissions by six calendar days, and the third participants' written submissions and notifications by five calendar days. 
6.2.6  Amendments to the official Working Schedule 
In EC – Seal Products , Canada, Norway, and the European Union requested the Appellate Body to 
postpone the dates for the oral hearing due to logistical difficulties faced by the parties. 
The Division invited the third parties to comment in writing on this request. Japan, Mexico, and the 
United States indicated that they had no objection. The Division issued a Procedural Ruling rescheduling the oral hearing.
42  
In China – Rare Earths , China requested the Appellate Body to extend the time limits, pursuant to 
Rule 16(2) of the Working Procedures, for filing relevant documents in the event that the 
Appellate Body were not to reject the United Stat es' Notice of Appeal. The Division granted China's 
                                               
38 Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Measures (China) , para. 1.15. 
39 The Procedural Ruling was attached as Annex 4 to China Rare – Earths , WT/431AB/R, WT/432/AB/R, 
WT/433/AB/R. 
40 The Procedural Ruling was attached as Annex 5 to China Rare – Earths , WT/431AB/R, WT/432/AB/R, 
WT/433/AB/R. 
41 The Procedural Ruling was attached as Annex 3 to United States – Carbon Steel (India) , 
WT/DS436/AB/R. 
42 The Procedural Ruling was attached as Annex 5 to the Appellate Body Reports in European 
Communities – Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products , WT/DS400/AB/R 
WT/DS401/AB/R. WT/AB/24 
 
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  request.43 As a consequence, and in order to preserve the sequence of and periods between the 
other deadlines prescribed under the Working Procedures, the Appellate Body also modified the dates for the filings of other submissions set out in the Working Schedule. 
6.2.7  Timeliness and adequacy of notifications 
In US – Countervailing Measures (China) , Russia and Viet Nam provided their delegation lists for 
the oral hearing to the Appellate Body Secretariat and the participants and third participants in these appellate proceedings two days before the first day of the oral hearing. Without prejudice to 
rulings the Appellate Body may make in future appeals, the Division hearing the appeal interpreted 
the actions of Russia and Viet Nam as notifications expressing an intention to attend the oral hearing pursuant to Rule 24(4) of the Working Procedures. The Division emphasized that while 
strict compliance with Rule 24(4) of the Working Procedures requires written  notification of such 
intention, it was nevertheless satisfied that, in this case, the lack of strict compliance with 
Rule 24(4) did not raise any due process concerns.
44 
6.2.8  Unsolicited amicus curiae  briefs 
In EC – Seal Products , the Appellate Body received three unsolicited amicus curiae briefs 
from: (i) a group of animal welfare organizations45; (ii) the International Fur Federation; and 
(iii) three individuals. The participants and third participants were given an opportunity to 
express their views on the admissibility and subs tance of these briefs at the oral hearing. 
The Appellate Body Division noted that the third amicus curiae brief was received on the first day 
of the oral hearing. In the light of its late fili ng, and mindful of the requirement to ensure that 
participants and third participants are given an adequate opportunity fully to consider any written 
submission filed with the Appellate Body, the Divisi on deemed this brief inadmissible. The Division 
did not find it necessary to rely on the other two amicus curiae briefs in rendering its decision.46 
6.2.9  Extension of time period for circulation of reports 
The 90-day time period stipulated in Article 17.5 of the DSU for the circulation of reports 
was exceeded in EC – Seal Products , China – Rare Earths , US – Carbon Steel (India) , and  
US – Countervailing Measures (China) . The Appellate Body Report in  
US – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Measures (China)  was circulated within the 90-day 
time period. 
The Appellate Body communicated to the DSB Chair the reasons why it was not possible to 
circulate the Appellate Body report within the 90-day time period in each of the appeals for which 
this time period was not met in 2014.47 These reasons included the postponement 
and rescheduling of the oral hearing; requests for extension of deadlines for filing appellees' 
and third participants' submissions; the volume and complexity of issues raised on appeal; 
the time required for translation; the heavy work load of the Appellate Body; the overlap in the 
composition of the divisions hearing different appeals; the unfilled vacancy on the Appellate Body; and the consolidation of several appellate proceedings. 
                                               
43 The Procedural Ruling was attached as Annex 4 to China Rare – Earths , WT/431AB/R, WT/432/AB/R, 
WT/433/AB/R. 
44 Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Measures (China) , footnote 46 to para. 1.13. 
45 These organizations include Anima, Animal Rights  Action Network, Asociación Nacional para la 
Defensa de los Animales, Bont Voor  Dieren, Compassion in World Farm ing, Djurens Rätt, Eurogroup for 
Animals, Fondation Brigitte Bardot , Fondation Franz Weber, Four Paws, GAIA, Humane Society of the 
United States/Humane Society International, Internationa l Fund for Animal Welfare, Lega Anti Vivisezione, 
Prijatelji živontinja, Respect for Animals, Royal Societ y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, Svoboda 
zvířat, and World Society for th e Protection of Animals. 
46 Appellate Body Report, EC – Seal Products , para. 1.15. 
47 For EC – Seal Products , see WT/DS400/10, WT/DS400/11, WT/DS401/11, WT/DS401/12; for China – 
Rare Earths , see WT/DS431/11, WT/DS431/12,  WT/DS432/10, WT/DS433/10; for US – Carbon Steel (India) , 
see WT/DS436/8; and for US – Countervailing Measures (China) , see WT/DS437/9. WT/AB/24 
 
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  6.2.10  Request for separate reports 
In the appellate proceedings in China – Rare Earths , the European Union requested 
"an Appellate Body Report issued as a single document, with separate pages for the findings and conclusions in each of the three disputes". Japan and the United States submitted a joint letter 
requesting "that the Division issue a separate Appellate Body report for each of the appeals, in the 
form of a single document with separate findings and conclusions bearing the document symbol only relating to that appeal." At the oral hear ing in these appeals, the Division afforded all 
participants and third participants an opportunity to comment on these requests. No comments 
were made, and the Division acceded to these requests. 
7  ARBITRATIONS UNDER ARTICLE 21.3(c) OF THE DSU Individual Appellate Body Members have been  appointed to serve as arbitrators under 
Article 21.3(c) of the DSU to determine the "reaso nable period of time" for the implementation by 
a WTO Member of the recommendations and rulings adopted by the DSB in dispute settlement cases. The DSU does not specify who shall serve as arbitrator. The parties to the arbitration select 
the arbitrator by agreement or, if they cannot agr ee on an arbitrator, the Director-General of the 
WTO appoints the arbitrator. To date, all those who have served as arbitrators pursuant to Article 21.3(c) have been current or former Appellate Body Members. In carrying out arbitrations 
under Article 21.3(c), Appellate Body Members act in an individual capacity. 
No Article 21.3(c) arbitration proceedings were carried out in 2014. 8  WTO TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND TRAINING PLAN Appellate Body Secretariat staff participated in the WTO Biennial Technical Assistance and Training 
Plan 2014–2015
48, particularly in activities relating to training in dispute settlement procedures. 
Annex 10 provides a list of the technical assistance activities carried out by Appellate Body Secretariat staff in 2014 under the WTO Technical Assistance and Training Plan. 
9  OTHER ACTIVITIES 
9.1  Briefings, conferences, moot court competitions Appellate Body Secretariat staff participate in briefings organized for groups visiting the WTO, 
including students. In these briefings, Appellate Bo dy Secretariat staff speak to visitors about the 
WTO dispute settlement system in general, and appellate proceedings in particular. Appellate Body Secretariat staff also participate as judges in moot court competitions. A list of these activities carried out by Appellate Body Secretariat staf f during the course of 2014 can be found in 
Annex 11. 
9.2  WTO internship programme The Appellate Body Secretariat participates in the WTO internship programme, which allows 
post-graduate university students to gain practical experience and a deeper knowledge of the 
global multilateral trading system in general, an d WTO dispute settlement procedures in particular. 
Interns in the Appellate Body Secretariat obtain  first-hand experience of the procedural and 
substantive aspects of WTO dispute settlement and, in particular, appellate proceedings. 
The internship programme is open to nationals of  WTO Members and to nationals of countries and 
customs territories engaged in accession negotiations. An internship is generally for a three-month period. During 2014, the Appellate Body Secretariat welcomed interns from Australia, 
Brazil, Colombia, Georgia, Germany, India, Italy, Romania, the Russian Federation, and 
the United States. A total of 124 post-graduate students, of 51 nationalities, have completed internships with the Appellate Body Secretariat since 1998. Further information about the 
WTO internship programme, including eligibility requirements and application instructions, may be 
obtained online at: <https://erecruitment.wto.org/public/hrd-cl- vac-iew.asp?jobinfo_uid_c=3475&vaclng=en > 
                                               
48 WT/COMTD/W/200. WT/AB/24 
 
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  9.3  The WTO Digital Dispute Settlement Registry 
The WTO Digital Dispute Settlement Registry is being developed as a comprehensive application to 
manage the workflow of the dispute settlement process, as well as to maintain digital information about disputes. This application features: (i) a secure electronic registry for filing and serving 
dispute settlement documents online; (ii) a central electronic storage facility for all dispute 
settlement records; and (iii) a research facility on dispute settlement information and statistics. 
The Digital Registry will provide for the electron ic filing of submissions in disputes, and for 
the creation of an e-docket of all documents su bmitted in a particular case. The system will 
feature: (i) a facility to securely file submissions and other dispute-related documents electronically; (ii) a means of paperless and secure service on other parties of submissions and exhibits; and (iii) a comprehensive calendar of deadlines to assist Members and the Secretariat 
with workflow management. 
As a storage facility, the Digital Registry will provide access to information about WTO disputes, 
in particular, it will serve as an online repository of all panel and Appellate Body records. Over the 
course of 2014, a large amount of dispute-related documents were scanned, catalogued 
and entered into the system. 
As a research facility, the Digital Registry will al low Members and the public to search the digital 
records of publicly available data of past disputes. Users will have access to a broader range of 
information and statistics than in the past. With the extent of the information available, WTO Members and the Secretariat, as well as the in terested public, will be able to generate more 
in-depth and informative statistics on WTO dispute settlement activity. 
The creation of the Digital Registry is a cross-di visional project led by the Legal Affairs Division 
and involving the Appellate Body Secretariat, the Rules Division, and the Information Technology Solutions, Languages, Documentation and Information Management Divisions. Work on this 
project began in 2010. In 2014, work focused on scanning dispute-related documents; developing 
the design, functionality, and security of the new system; and consulting and training delegates of 
WTO Members. The Appellate Body Secretariat partic ipated in the review and cataloguing of data 
to be uploaded into the database. A pilot phase is expected to start in 2015. 
 WT/AB/24 
 
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 ANNEX 1 
In April 2014, the Appellate Body issued a communi cation addressing post-employment guidelines 
for former Appellate Body Members, former Appellat e Body Secretariat staff, and former interns at 
the Appellate Body Secretariat. This communication was communicated to the WTO Membership, 
and is reproduced below. 
  
WT/AB/22 16 April 2014 
POST-EMPLOYMENT GUIDELINES 
_______________ 
COMMUNICATION FROM THE APPELLATE BODY 
The Appellate Body and its Secretariat are bound by various rules of conduct in their work. For 
example, Articles 17.10 and 18.2 of the Understa nding on Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement of Disputes (DSU), together with para graphs II and VII:1 of the Rules of Conduct for 
the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (Rules of 
Conduct) and WTO Staff Regulation 1.7 provide fo r the comprehensive protection of confidential 
information relating to appellate proceedings. In respect of certain obligations of conduct, in 
particular those relating to confidentiality, the Rules of Conduct and WTO Staff Regulations 
expressly provide that such obligations continue ev en after the individual concerned has ceased to 
serve as an Appellate Body Member or as part of the Appellate Body Secretariat.  
In order  to facilitate compliance with relevant obligations and  to set clear expectations for 
individuals involved in WTO dispute settlement following a term of service as an Appellate Body 
Member, or in the Appellate Body Secretariat, the Appellate Body has decided to adopt post-
employment guidelines in respect of former Appellate Body Members, former Appellate Body 
Secretariat staff, and former interns at the Appellate Body Secretariat.  
The guidelines articulate limitations on the abilit y of these individuals to serve as advisers or 
panelists in disputes in which they were involved while serving the Appellate Body, or disputes in 
which the same measures are challenged and the same claims are raised (the same "matter"), as 
well as limitations on the ability of such individual s to attend an oral hearing in an appeal for some 
period following their departure (a so-called "cooling-off" period). Apart from the limitation on advising or serving as a panelist in the same dispute or matter, which is prohibited indefinitely for 
all former Appellate Body Members, former Appellate Body Secretariat staff, and former interns at 
the Appellate Body Secretariat, the limitations are applied for different lengths of time to each of 
these classes of individuals, based on the degree of  their involvement in a given case. In addition, 
the guidelines call upon former Appellate Body Members not to accept any appointment as a 
panelist for a period of two years following their term of office. 
The guidelines seek to safeguard the independence of the Appellate Body and secure its reputation 
by guarding against actual and perceived conflicts of  interests and risks of bias. The guidelines also 
seek to minimize the likelihood that former Appe llate Body Members, Secretariat staff, and interns 
will be placed in circumstances where incentives or pressure could be brought to bear on them to divulge confidential information regarding their work with, or the inner workings of, the Appellate 
Body. At the same time, the guidelines aim to strike a balance between promoting these 
institutional considerations and safeguarding the independence of the Appellate Body, on the one hand, and avoiding undue or unreasonable restrictio ns on the future employment of the individuals 
concerned, on the other hand. 
The Appellate Body requests the cooperation of WTO Members in facilitating compliance with these 
guidelines. WT/AB/24 
 
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  POST-EMPLOYMENT GUIDELINES IN RESPECT OF FORMER APPELLATE BODY MEMBERS,  
FORMER APPELLATE BODY SECRETARIAT STAFF, AND FORMER INTERNS AT  
THE APPELLATE BODY SECRETARIAT 
 
The Appellate Body expects the individuals concer ned to abide by, and requests WTO Members to 
assist in the respect of, the guidelines below. 
1. A former Appellate Body  Member shall not: 
a. be involved as an adviser or panelist in any dispute or matter the same as one that was 
before the Appellate Body during his or her te rm of office as an Appellate Body Member. 
A former Appellate Body Member may, however, accept appointment as an arbitrator in 
an arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU in respect of any dispute;  
b. for a period of three years following the end of  his or her term of office, attend the oral 
hearing in any appeal before the Appellate Body as a member of a delegation of a 
participant or third participant; 
c. for a period of two years following the end of his or her term of office, accept 
appointment as a panelist in any WTO dispute. 
2. A former member of sta ff of the Appellate Body Secretariat shall not: 
a. be involved as an adviser or panelist in any dispute or matter the same as one in which 
he or she had a significant degree of involvement as part of his or her responsibilities at 
the Appellate Body Secretariat;  
b. for a period of one year following the cessation of his or her service, attend the oral 
hearing in any appeal before the Appellate Body as a member of a delegation of a 
participant or third participant. 
3. A former intern in the Appellate  Body Secretariat shall not: 
a. be involved as an adviser or panelist in  any dispute or matter when, during the 
internship period, he or she carried out substantive tasks or attended meetings in connection with an appeal in the same dispute or matter as part of his or her responsibilities at the Appellate Body Secretariat;  
b. for a period of one year following the completion of his or her internship, attend the oral 
hearing in any appeal before the Appellate Body as a member of a delegation of a participant or third participant unless he or she has obtained prior written authorization from the Director of the Appellate Body Secr etariat. Such authorization will be granted 
unless the specific circumstances of the appeal are such that the Director of the 
Appellate Body Secretariat reasonably considers that the former intern's attendance at the oral hearing is likely to give rise to an actual or perceived conflict of interest or risk of bias. 
4. A short-term staff member who was employed by the Appellate Body Secretariat for a total 
period of less than two years shall abide by the guidelines applicable to interns. A short-term staff member who was employed by the Appellate Body Secretariat for a total period of two 
years or more shall abide by the guidelines applicable to Appellate Body Secretariat staff. 
5. For purposes of these guidelines, a "dispute" includes original proceedings, as well as any 
proceedings under Articles 21.3(c), 21.5, 22.6, and 25 of the DSU. 
6. For purposes of these guidelines, a "matter" consists of two elements: a specific legal basis 
of the complaint (claim) and a specific measure at issue. (See Appellate Body Report, 
Guatemala – Anti-Dumping Investigation Regarding Portland Cement from Mexico , para. 72) 
Thus, the same claim brought against the same measure of a Member would constitute the 
same "matter", even if the claim were brought by a WTO Member other than the original 
complaining party. 
_______________ WT/AB/24 
 
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  ANNEX 2 
SPEECH TO THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT BODY ON 26 SEPTEMBER 2014 
BY ROBERT AZEVÊDO, DIRE CTOR-GENERAL OF THE WTO 
I would like to talk to you about the current situation in the DSB: the challenges we face, what we 
are doing to overcome them — and what more we may need to do.  
There is no question that the WTO's dispute se ttlement system has been a success. The numbers 
tell their own story about how valued it has become. In just under 20 years since the system came 
into being, 482 requests for consultation have been received. In 47 years under the GATT, 300 disputes were received. And in 68 years the Internat ional Court of Justice has received 162 cases.  
So we have seen a remarkable level of activity. Looking at the economic importance of the system, 
researchers found that, in the first 16 years of the DSB, we handled disputes covering at least US$1 trillion of trade flows. And members clearly hold the system in high esteem. Two thirds of 
our membership have participated in the system in one way or another.  
It has been suggested that the ever-increasing num ber of RTAs might pose a challenge, but this 
has not proved to be the case. Most dispute settlement mechanisms provided for in RTAs are 
rarely used — indeed, some have never been used at all. Yet one in every five of WTO disputes 
involve parties who are also parties to RTAs. This means that the system is in very high demand. 
In fact, as you are aware, we are experienci ng unprecedented volume of work in dispute 
settlement. And while this is welcome, it does create some very real challenges.  
CURRENT SITUATION  
So let us take a look at the current situation in the DSB. I will not be spending too much time on 
this today as I want to focus more on prescription, rather than diagnosis. The total number of 
active proceedings being serviced by the Legal A ffairs Division, Rules Division, and the Appellate 
Body Secretariat has roughly doubled since 2012. Today there are 19 active panels requiring full-time assistance, 3 ongoing appeals, and 4 panels in composition. Our estimates suggest that this 
is not just a temporary surge and I do not believe that dispute settlement volume will soon 
diminish. In fact, 2014 is moving faster than 2013 in  terms of the number of panels established by 
this time of year.  
As for appeals, you are well aware that the rate of appeal has always been very high — and much 
higher than expected when the negotiators create d a body of 7 part time Members. The average 
rate of appeal is approximately two-thirds. This means we should prepare for around 10-
12 appeals being filed per year during the next 24 months including possible appeals in the 
two complex aircraft cases. If we shut the doors today, panels and the Appellate Body will have 
enough work to keep them and their Secretariat st aff busy for the next 2 years. But of course the 
doors will not be shut — new requests will keep coming in. But it is not just the number of 
disputes and appeals that places demands on the dispute settlement system. Disputes are g e n e r a l l y  m u c h  m o r e  c o m p l e x  n o w  t h a n  t h e y  w e r e  i n  t h e  f i r s t  d e c a d e .  I t  i s  n o w  c o m m o n  f o r  
disputes to involve multiple parties advancing a variety of claims with more voluminous 
submissions, increased third-party participation, more demand for translation, and greater procedural complexity.  WT/AB/24 
 
- 87 - 
 
  I am now going to show a few slides illustrating the upward trend in the complexity of disputes:  
The first graph shows the total number of active disputes per year since the beginning of the 
system in 1995 including all stages of disputes.  
 
The next two graphs show the number of pages of interim review and findings in the panel reports 
per 4-year period from 1995 to 2014.  
 WT/AB/24 
 
- 88 - 
 
  
 
The first includes the two LCA reports.  
The second excludes those two reports as they are outliers in terms of their length. Nevertheless 
you can see that the trend is unchanged. For the most recent 4-year period the average is nearly 200 pages — which is almost four times greater than the first 4-year period, when there was an average of 50 pages.  
The final graph shows the average number of exhibi ts for the first five years of the system at 
about 94 — and for the most recent five years of the system, at just over 300.  
 
As with the upward trend in the number of cases, I do not expect this increased level of complexity 
to change.  WT/AB/24 
 
- 89 - 
 
  We are in a situation where the demand is severely testing our capacity. And there are some clear 
constraints on our ability to extend that capaci ty — such as the budgetary situation and some 
aspects of how the system was designed. For example, we have had some difficulties in retaining staff, which have contributed to some extent to the challenges we are facing. Speaking frankly, 
the private sector, and others, can offer WTO dispute settlement lawyers more stable and lucrative 
long-term working conditions and better career advancement opportunities. That is just reality. We therefore lost a number of trained and experience d lawyers — and their institutional and case law 
memory. Under the present circumstances, we need  senior and experienced lawyers to lead panel 
teams, especially bearing in mind that panellists are part-time. And some of them are not experienced with the system.  
We must also be mindful of the fact that the capa city of the Appellate Body is limited, first and 
foremost by the fact that the DSU stipulates that the Appellate Body shall be composed of 
7 members. The intensity of the work required to  complete an appeal within the 90 day timeframe 
means that it is not possible for an Appellate Body Member to serve on two divisions with identical 
or largely overlapping schedules. The likelihood that appeals will remain too numerous for the 
Appellate Body, composed of 7 members, to handle in parallel is to be continued. Even with 
somewhat staggered appeal filings the Appellate Body cannot hear more than three of the 
nowadays more complex appeals in parallel. Therefore, even if we could service more panels than we currently do, we still have an insurmountable bottleneck at the Appellate Body stage.  
All these factors explain why some Members are ex periencing delays with panels getting up and 
running after composition. It also explains why th e Appellate Body will need more than 90 days to 
complete some appeals over the coming months and why parties may have to wait for an appeal 
slot to become available. I can assure you that we are cognisant of the delays that some of you 
have experienced recently, particularly after panel composition. I understand that this can pose difficulties for you, including financial difficulties. I want to be clear that in working through cases, 
we are proceeding in a strictly chronological order without discrimination or favouritism. There is 
no arbitrary or subjective approach to determining the sequence. 
ADDRESSING THE SITUATION  
So, in very plain terms, that is where we stand today.  
When I started the job this time last year, I found that things were even worse than I had 
expected. It was an emergency situation. 
 WT/AB/24 
 
- 90 - 
 
  
 
Despite the number of disputes rising to its highest in a decade starting in 2012, this slide shows 
that in 2013 the Secretariat did not have enough lawyers who could be assigned in new disputes. 
This is partly because we had lost a number of trained and experienced lawyers in the preceding 
few years. So I took immediate steps to deal with the problems. I reallocated resources so that the 3 dispute settlement divisions could recruit junior lawyers through temporary contracts for 1 to 
2 years, using funds that were available from vacant posts. A total of 17 temporary contracts have 
been awarded in the three divisions since February  2013. Part of this reallocation has addressed 
the need for additional native speakers of Spanish.  
And we have achieved some results through staff mobility. I am envisaging to temporarily assign 
2-3 staff members from non-dispute settlement divisions to pending and upcoming disputes as 
lead lawyers. These staff members had previously worked on disputes, but they are currently in 
different divisions. Of course, there is a very limited number of staff with this experience. The 
same is true for support staff, which require specific expertise more akin to that of registrars, paralegals and professional editors. Therefore mobi lity (in short, moving people from one division 
to another) is not the silver bullet that some may think it is. We need to be prepared to take some 
bigger steps. Simply put, the need for specialised skills means that we will need to hire new staff at both the senior and junior levels.  
Although we have been able to attract qualified people through temporary contracts in the recent 
past, we are unable to retain them without offering more stability and long-term career 
opportunities. And when they leave, the considerable effort and time that we have invested in 
training them is completely lost. So we must find ways to retain the best and the brightest once we have recruited and trained them. Moreover we must bring new people in at the senior level — and this is where the most acute problem is at the moment. The supply is just not there. Let us be 
realistic. Even if we bring in new people at the senior level, it also takes at least a year to 
18 months for them to develop specialized skills and experience necessary to lead a panel or an appeal team. So this is something that we will address. 
I have recently allocated 15 additional posts to the 3 dispute settlement divisions — 6 at the senior 
level and 9 at the junior level. Vacancies for these posts will be announced shortly. In fact, my 
intention is to create overcapacity in the dispute settlement area. Should dispute settlement 
activity wane in a year or two, which is again very unlikely, then we will put these talents to work elsewhere in the Secretariat — and bring them back if the work in dispute settlement so requires.  
Of course hiring staff at present is problematic. Members have put very clear limitations on what I 
can do. And I am not whining. First, there is th e overall cap on the budget. Second, there is the WT/AB/24 
 
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  cap on the proportion of the budget which can be  used for personnel. Of course I must observe 
both of these caps, and therefore my options are limited. I am reallocating resources within the organization. When senior posts are vacated elsewhere in the Secretariat, a significant proportion saved there will be reallocated to disputes.  
Of course this approach will inevitably have so me consequences. It means, for example, that we 
will have to stop doing some things or that we will have to do certain things with less and perhaps 
w e  w i l l  a l s o  h a v e  t o  o u t s o u r c e  e v e n  m o r e  o f  our work, including translation. Clearly there are 
limits to the sustainability of this approach, which Members will want to consider. There are some other steps that we can take to alleviate some of the pressure on the system, in addition to those 
we are taking on staff. To start, we must address the complexity of disputes. There are precedents 
for this. For example:  
Simplifying the descriptive part of a panel report by annexing parties' executive summaries to the 
report. That simplifies things a little. Sometimes setting time limits for oral presentations before 
panels. Seeking ways to streamline selection of panel experts. And, in the Appellate Body, standardizing the content and format of  routine communications and rulings.  
Members could think about taking additional steps in a similar vein in going forward. I am trying to 
ask you to be helpful! Members could also consider some more fundamental steps. And this is for 
you to consider. Some years ago there was a proposal to increase the number of AB Members. 
Under the current situation the 7 member AB can handle around 10-12 appeals at most per year. That is stretching the envelope. And this is with AB Members working almost full-time. This operational cap is thus simply not enough given the level of demand. If, for example, Members 
decided to increase the number of members to 9, the maximum per year could be increased by 
approximately a third. This could potentially address the bottleneck at the AB stage to some degree. But of course this is entirely in your hands. 
CONCLUSION  
We will continue to work hard to address these issues. But, I think that members need to reflect 
on the situation that I have outlined today. I think it is important to consider how the system was designed — and how it has evolved since then. We thought we had built a sailboat — but now we 
have discovered that what we have on our hands is an ocean liner. And of course an ocean liner 
requires more resources, more fuel and a bigger crew. So we will need to consider what resources we are prepared to provide if we want to stay afloat. I am taking concerted action to resolve the challenges before us — but I am working within constraints. No amount of mobility or invention 
will adequately resolve our situation definitely. We  need to confront the situation as we find it 
today — and we need to be honest about what it means if it goes unaddressed.  
The WTO dispute settlement system has served the membership extremely well. It is recognized 
the world over for providing fair, high quality results that respond to both developing and 
developed country members. It is faster than most if not all international adjudicative systems 
operating today, to say nothing of domestic courts  the world over. We need to ensure that this 
remains the case. And for this, I invite you to start thinking seriously about the hard options and decisions we will have to face to fix the system.  
Finally, I would like to take this opportunity to thank staff members for their very hard work in 
assisting panels and the Appellate Body Members. The WTO dispute settlement system would not have achieved its current success without their professionalism and dedication.  WT/AB/24 
 
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ANNEX 3 
MEMBERS OF THE APPELLATE BODY 
(1 JANUARY TO 31 DECEMBER 2014) 
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 
Ujal Singh Bhatia  (India) (2011–2015) 
Ujal Singh Bhatia was born in India on 15 April 1950. He was India's Permanent Representative to 
the WTO from 2004 to 2010 and represented India in a number of dispute settlement  cases. He 
also served as a WTO dispute settlement panelist in 2007–2008. 
Mr Bhatia has also served as Joint Secretary in the Indian Ministry of Commerce, as well as Joint 
Secretary of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, apart from two decades in Orissa State 
in various fields and State-level administrative assignments that involved development 
administration and policy-making. His legal and ad judicatory experience spans three decades, and 
focused on domestic and international legal/jurisprudence issues, negotiations in trade agreements 
and policy issues at the bilateral, regional, and multilateral levels, and the implementation of trade 
and development policies in the agriculture and service industries. 
Mr Bhatia has often lectured on international trade issues  and has published numerous  papers and 
articles on a wide range of trade and economic topics. He holds an MA in Economics from the 
University of Manchester and from Delhi University, as well as a BA (Hons) in Economics, also from 
Delhi University. 
Seung Wha Chang  (Korea) (2012–2016) 
Born in Korea on 1 March 1963, Seung Wha Chang is currently Professor of Law at Seoul National 
University where he teaches International Trade Law and International Arbitration. 
He has served on several WTO dispute settlement panels, including US – FSC , Canada – Aircraft 
Credits and Guarantees , and EC – Trademarks and Geographical Indications . He has also served as 
Chairman or Co-arbitrator of numerous arbitral tribunals dealing with commercial matters. Until he joined the Appellate Body in 2012, he had served  as a Member of the International Court of 
Arbitration. 
Professor Chang began his professional academic car eer at the Seoul National University School of 
Law in 1995. He has taught international trade law and, in particular WTO dispute settlement, at more than ten foreign law schools, including Harvard Law School, Yale Law School, Stanford Law 
School, New York University, Duke Law School, and Georgetown University. In 2007, Harvard Law 
School granted him an endowed visiting professorial  chair title, the Nomura Visiting Professor of 
International Financial Systems. 
In addition, Professor Chang previously served as a Seoul District Court judge, handling many 
cases involving international trade. He also practised as a foreign attorney at a leading law firm in Washington DC, handling international trade matters, including trade remedies and WTO-related 
disputes. 
Professor Chang has published many books and articles in the field of international trade law in 
internationally recognized journals. In addition, he serves as an Editorial or Advisory Board Member of the Journal of International Economic Law  (Oxford University Press) and the Journal of 
International Dispute Settlement  (Oxford University Press). 
Professor Chang holds a Bachelor of Laws degree  (LLB) and a Master of Laws degree (LLM) from 
Seoul National University School of Law; and a Master of Laws degree (LLM) as well as a Doctorate 
in International Trade Law (SJD) from Harvard Law School. WT/AB/24 
 
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  Thomas R. Graham  (United States) (2011–2015) 
Born in the United States on 23 November 1942, Tom Graham is the former head of the 
international trade practice at a large international law firm, and the founder of the international trade practice at another large international law firm. He was one of the first US lawyers to 
represent respondents in trade remedy cases in various countries around the world, and he was 
among the first to bring economists, accountants, and other non-lawyer professionals into the international trade practices of private law firms. Mr Graham also headed his international trade 
practice group's committee on long-term planning and development. 
In private law practice, Mr Graham often collaborated with local counsel and national authorities in 
various countries to develop legal interpretations of laws and regulations consistent with GATT/WTO agreements, and in negotiating the re solution of international trade disputes. 
Mr Graham served as Deputy General Counsel in the Office of the US Trade Representative, where 
he was instrumental in the negotiation of the Tokyo Round Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade and where he represented the US Government in dispute settlement proceedings under the 
GATT. Earlier in his career, Mr Graham served for three years in Geneva as a Legal Officer at the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). 
Mr Graham was the first chairman of the American Society of International Law's Committee on 
International Economic Law, and the chair of the American Bar Association's Subcommittee on 
Exports. He has been a visiting professor at the University of North Carolina Law School and an adjunct professor at the Georgetown University Law Center and the American University Washington College of Law. He has edited books on international trade policy, and international 
trade and environment, and he has written many articles and monographs on international trade 
law and policy as a Guest Scholar at the Brookings Institution, and as a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 
Mr Graham holds a BA in Political Science, with emphasis on International Relations and 
Economics, from Indiana University and a JD from Harvard Law School. 
Ricardo Ramírez-Hernández  (Mexico) (2009–2017) 
Born in Mexico on 17 October 1968, Ricardo Ramírez-Hernández holds the Chair of International 
Trade Law at the Mexican National University (UNAM) in Mexico City. He was Head of the International Trade Practice for Latin America of an international law firm in Mexico City. His practice focused on issues related to NAFTA and trade across Latin America, including international 
trade dispute resolution. 
Prior to practicing with a law firm, Mr Ramírez-Hernández was Deputy General Counsel for Trade 
Negotiations of the Ministry of Economy in Mexico for more than a decade. In this capacity, he 
provided advice on trade and competition policy matters related to 11 free trade agreements 
signed by Mexico, as well as with respect to multilateral agreements, including those related to the WTO, the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), and the Latin American Integration Association 
(ALADI). 
Mr Ramírez-Hernández also represented Mexico in complex international trade litigation and 
investment arbitration proceedings. He acted as lead counsel to the Mexican government in several WTO disputes. He has al so served on NAFTA panels. 
Mr Ramírez-Hernández holds an LLM degree in International Business Law from the American 
University Washington College of Law, and a law degree from the Universidad Autónoma 
Metropolitana. WT/AB/24 
 
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  Shree Baboo Chekitan Servansing  (Mauritius) (2014–2018) 
Born in Mauritius on 22 April 1955, Shree Baboo Chekitan Servansing enjoyed a long and 
distinguished career with the Mauritian civil se rvice. From 2004 to 2012, Mr Servansing was 
Mauritius' Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the United Nations Office and other 
International Organizations in Geneva, including the WTO. During his tenure as Permanent 
Representative, he served on various Committees at the WTO, and chaired the Committees on Trade and Environment, and Trade and Developmen t. He also chaired the Work Programme on 
Small Economies, the dedicated session on Ai d-for-Trade, and the African Group, and was 
coordinator of the African Caribbean Pacific (ACP) Group. 
Mr Servansing previously worked, in various capacities, for the Mauritius Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
in Mauritius, India and Belgium. During his tenure at the Mauritius Embassy in Belgium, he was 
intensively involved in the ACP-EU negotiations leading to the Cotonou Agreement and 
subsequently in the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) negotiations. Mr Servansing also served as the personal representative of the Prime Minister of Mauritius on the Steering Committee 
of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (N EPAD). In this capacity he was engaged in the 
strategic formulation of Africa's flagship development framework. 
Upon retiring from civil service, Mr Servansing served as the head of the ACP-EU Programme on 
Technical Barriers to Trade in Brussels from 2012 to 2014. In this position, he was responsible for 
facilitating the building of capacity among AC P countries in order to enhance their export 
competitiveness, and improve their Quality Infrastructure to comply with technical regulations. 
Mr Servansing's experience in trade policy, trade negotiations, and the multilateral trading system 
spans three decades. He has frequently spoken on international trade issues, and has published 
numerous papers and articles in Mauritian and foreign journals on a variety of trade-related issues. 
Mr Servansing holds an M.A. from the University of Sussex, a Postgraduate Diploma in Foreign 
Affairs and International Trade from Australian Na tional University, and a B.A. (Hons.) from the 
University of Mauritius. 
Peter Van den Bossche  (European Union; Belgium) (2009–2017) 
Born in Belgium on 31 March 1959, Peter Van den Bossche is Professor of International Economic 
Law at Maastricht University, the Netherlands. Van den Bossche is also visiting professor at the College of Europe, Bruges (since 2010); the University of Barcelona (IELPO Programme) (since 2008); the China-EU School of Law, Beijing (since 2008); and the World Trade Institute, Berne 
(MILE Programme) (since 2002). He is member of the Board of Editors of the Journal of 
International Economic Law  and member of the Advisory Board of the  Journal of World Investment 
and Trade and the Revista Latinoamericana de Derecho Comercial International . He is also 
member of the Advisory Board of the WTO Chairs Programme (WCP). 
Mr Van den Bossche holds a Doctorate in Law from the European University Institute in Florence, 
an LLM from the University of Michigan Law School, and a Licence en Droit magna cum laude  from 
the University of Antwerp. From 1990 to 1992, he  served as a référendaire of Advocate General 
W. van Gerven at the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg. From 1997 to 2001, Mr Van den Bossche was Counsellor and subsequently Acting Director of the WTO Appellate Body Secretariat. In 2001, he returned to academia and from 2002 to 2009 frequently acted as a consultant to 
international organisations and developing countries on issues of international economic law. He 
also served on the faculty of the Université libre de Bruxelles (2002–2009); at the Trade Policy 
Training Centre in Africa (trapca), Arusha, Tanzania (2008 and 2013); at the Foreign Trade 
University, Hanoi & Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam (2009 and 2011); at the Universidad San Francisco 
de Quito, Ecuador (2013); and at the Law Scho ol of Koç University, Istanbul, Turkey (2013). 
Mr Van den Bossche has published extensively in the field of international economic law. He is 
author of the book The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization , of which the third edition 
(with Werner Zdouc) was published by Cambridge University Press in 2013. WT/AB/24 
 
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  Yuejiao Zhang  (China) (2008–2016) 
Yuejiao Zhang is Professor of International Economic Law at Tsinghua University and at Shantou 
University in China. She is an arbitrator at the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and at China's International Trade and Economic Arbitration Commission (CIETAC). She served as 
Vice-President of China's International Economic Law Society. She is also a member of the 
Advisory Board of the International Development Law Organization (IDLO). 
Professor Zhang served as a Board Director to the West African Development Bank from 2005 to 
2007. Between 1998 and 2004, she held various senior positions at the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB), including as Assistant General Counsel, Co-Chair of the Appeal Committee, and Director-General. She was the head of the ADB ex perts group on international trade and the ADB 
contact point to the WTO. Prior to this, she held several positions in government and academia in 
China, including as Director-General of Law and Treaties at the Ministry of Foreign Trade and 
Economic Cooperation (1984–1997). She participated in the preparation of China's first joint-venture law, general principles of civil law, contract law, and foreign trade law. From 1987 to 
1996, she was one of China's chief negotiators on intellectual property and was involved in the 
preparation of China's patent law, trademark law, and copyright law. She also served as the chief legal counsel for China's GATT resumption. Between 1982 and 1985, she worked as legal counsel 
at the World Bank. She was a Member of the Gove rning Council of the International Institute for 
the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) from 1987 to 1999 and a Board Member of IDLO from 1988 to 1999. Professor Zhang was a member of the UNIDROIT and UNCITRAL drafting committees concerning several international trade and economic conventions, such as the General 
Principles of Commercial Contract and the International Financial Leasing Convention. 
Professor Zhang has authored several books and articles on international economic law and 
international dispute settlement. She has a BA from China High Education College, a BA from 
Rennes University, France, and an LLM from George town University. Professor Zhang also lectured 
at universities in France and in Hong Kong, Macau of China. 
* * * 
DIRECTOR OF THE APPELLATE BODY SECRETARIAT 
Werner Zdouc 
 Director of the WTO Appellate Body Secretariat since 2006, Werner Zdouc obtained a law degree 
from the University of Graz in Austria. He then went on to earn an LLM from Michigan Law School 
and a Ph.D. from the University of St Gallen in Switzerland. Dr Zdouc joined the WTO Legal Affairs Division in 1995, advised many dispute settlement panels, and conducted technical cooperation 
missions in many developing countries. He became legal counsellor at the Appellate Body 
Secretariat in 2001. He has been a lecturer and Vi siting Professor for international trade law at 
Vienna Economic University, the Universities of  Zurich and Barcelona and the Geneva Graduate 
Institute. From 1987 to 1989, he worked for governmental and non-governmental development 
aid organizations in Austria and Latin America. Dr Zdouc has authored various publications on international economic law and is a member of the Trade Law Committee of the International Law Association. WT/AB/24 
 
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  ANNEX 4 
WELCOME OF A NEW APPELLATE BODY MEMBER  
Remarks of the Director-General Azevêdo to  the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO, 
Geneva, 20 October 2014   
 
Thank you Ambassador de Mateo for that introduction, and for your work both as chair of the Dispute Settlement Body, and also as the chair of the Appellate Body Selection Committee.  
 
I'm pleased to join you in welcoming Mr Shree Baboo Chekitan Servansing, who will shortly be sworn in as the newest Member of the Appellate Body. It is great to see the Appellate Body's membership restored to seven, following the departure of Mr David Unterhalter in December last 
year.  
 And I would like to extend my sincere congratulations to Mr Servansing on his appointment. As 
Ambassador de Mateo has noted, Mr Servansing has vast knowledge and experience of the WTO 
disciplines, trade policy, trade negotiations, and the multilateral trading system itself. His insight and perspective will be extremely valuable as he and his colleagues on the Appellate Body 
continue to assist WTO Members to resolve disputes in the balanced, impartial, and independent 
manner that we have grown to expect from the Appellate Body. I would especially like to thank Mr Servansing for his courage in accepting to join the Appellate Body at a time when the dispute settlement system is facing unprecedented challenges due to its ever-increasing workload.  
 
As I detailed at last month's DSB meeting, the dispute settlement system has undergone a significant evolution since 1995, as a result of Me mbers' growing confidence in the system — and 
their growing use of it. And of course this is very welcome. Recourse to the dispute settlement 
system has ensured adherence to negotiated rules, thereby helping to provide the security and predictability in international trade that is so essential. To date, the dispute settlement system has 
handled disputes covering at least US$1 trillion  of world trade flows. Two-thirds of the WTO 
Membership has participated in the system in one way or another.   And the Appellate Body lies at its heart. Through its prompt settlement of the disputes that have 
come before it, its rigour in reviewing panel decisions, and its clarification of Members' rights and 
obligations under the WTO's covered agreements, the Appellate Body has proven its value beyond any doubt.  
 
However, this success comes with a price. Appellat e Body Members are called upon to do more as 
disputes increase, not just in volume but in complexity as well. Judging from the number of 
ongoing panel proceedings, the workload of the Appellate Body is likely to remain high for the 
foreseeable future. Therefore, this appointment is  very timely. The Appellate Body really can use 
the help!   
The dispute settlement system negotiated in the Uruguay Round was an extraordinary 
achievement. Today, as it approaches the end of its second decade, it should not be taken for granted. To ensure that the system continues to function at optimal levels for the benefit of all 
WTO Members, each of us has a responsibility to contribute to its consolidation and further 
development. We must protect, at all times, th e system's hallmarks of total independence and 
impartiality. Members must use the system wisely, recognising the practical challenges faced by 
the system as a whole — and they must be willing  to work together in addressing them. And we 
must keep equipping the system properly, not only in terms of Appellate Body Members and 
panelists, but also in terms of the secretariat resources that we make available in support.   
In closing, Mr Servansing, I want to congratulate you on your appointment once again — and 
welcome you back to the WTO. The system owes a large measure of its success to your colleagues 
and predecessors — the Appellate Body Members and panellists who have served, and continue to 
serve, the system with dedication , courage, independence, and integrity. I have no doubt that you 
will maintain this tradition.   
We wish you all the best in the weeks and months ahead. Good luck and bon courage! WT/AB/24 
 
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Remarks of the then Chair of the Appellate Body, Mr Ricardo Ramírez Hernández, to the 
Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO, Geneva, 20 October 2014   
 
Estas ocasiones normalmente me generan sentimientos encontrados, pues nos despedimos de uno 
de nuestros colegas y le demos la bienvenida a uno nuevo. Afortunadamente hoy solo tenemos un momento alegre al celebrar el nombramiento del Sr. Servansing  como miembro del Órgano de 
Apelación, puesto que hace ya algunos meses escuchamos el memorable discurso de despedida de 
David.   Permítanme comenzar por felicitar al Comité de Selección por su extraordinario trabajo. Dada la 
cantidad de candidatos altamente cualificados, estoy seguro que su tarea no fue fácil. A todos los 
candidatos y a los gobiernos que los nominaron, les ofrecemos nuestro reconocimiento y apreciación por participar en este proceso.  
 
One of the unique features of the Appellate Body is not only its multicultural but also its multidisciplinary nature. 7 cultures, 7 backgrounds, 7 personalities. The fact that we can look at a 
problem not only from various angles but also through different lenses allows us to resolve 
disputes to the best of our collective abilities. As just highlighted by Ambassador de Mateo and the Director-General, Mr Servansing vast experience on  trade policy and negotiations will certainly add 
a valuable perspective to our deliberations. Today, Mr Servansing's presence makes our institution 
wiser and stronger. I am sure that, like all of us, he will embrace collegiality as one of the 
fundamental pillars of our institution. We look forward to working with you Shree.   
We see with great satisfaction that the Appellate Body workload paper circulated last year, has 
started to pay dividends. We were pleased to he ar the DG's presentation at the September 26th 
DSB meeting and welcome the allocation by the DG of additional human resources to the Appellate 
Body along with the allocation to the divisions servicing panels at a time of strongly increasing 
workload. However, as mentioned in previous messa ges, there are structural problems which need 
to be address by the full Membership. In this respect, we are encouraged to see the growing 
awareness by the Membership of the problems ahea d as reflected in their statements at the last 
DSB meeting. Given the extraordinary challenges the Appellate Body is facing with the growing 
number and complexity of cases, it will be necessary not only to hire the best legal minds to support us, but also to retain their expertise and experience and to reward them for the 
extraordinary demands we place on them.  WT/AB/24 
 
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  ANNEX 5 
I. FORMER APPELLATE BODY MEMBERS 
Name Nationality Term(s) of office 
Said El-Naggar Egypt  1995–2000 * 
Mitsuo Matsushita Japan  1995–2000 * 
Christopher Beeby New Zealand 1995–1999 
1999–2000 
Claus-Dieter Ehlermann Germany 1995–1997 
1997–2001 
Florentino Feliciano Philippines 1995–1997 
1997–2001 
Julio Lacarte-Muró Uruguay 1995–1997 
1997–2001 
James Bacchus United States 1995–1999 
1999–2003 
John Lockhart Australia 2001–2005 
2005–2006 
Yasuhei Taniguchi Japan 2000–2003 
2003–2007 
Merit E. Janow United States 2003–2007 
Arumugamangalam Venkatachalam Ganesan India 2000–2004 
2004–2008 
Georges Michel Abi-Saab Egypt 2000–2004 
2004–2008 
Luiz Olavo Baptista Brazil 2001–2005 
2005–2009 
Giorgio Sacerdoti Italy 2001–2005 
2005–2009 
Jennifer Hillman United States 2007–2011 
Lilia Bautista Philippines 2007–2011 
Shotaro Oshima Japan  2008–2012 ** 
David Unterhalter South Africa 2006-2009 
2009-2013 
 
* Messrs El-Naggar and Matsushita decided not to se ek a second term of o ffice. However, the DSB 
extended their terms until the end of March 2000 in order to allow the Selection Committee and the DSB the time necessary to complete the selection process of replacing the outgoing Appellate Body Members. (See WT/DSB/M70, pp. 32-35) ** Mr Oshima's resignation became effective on 6 April 2012. 
Mr Christopher Beeby passed away on 19 March 2000. 
Mr Said El-Naggar passed away on 11 April 2004. 
Mr John Lockhart passed away on 13 January 2006. WT/AB/24 
 
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  II. FORMER CHAIRPERSONS OF THE APPELLATE BODY 
Name Nationality Term(s) as Chairperson 
Julio Lacarte-Muró Urug uay 7 February 1996 – 
6 February 1997 
7 February 1997 – 
6 February 1998 
Christopher Beeby New Zealand 7 February 1998 – 
6 February 1999 
Said El-Naggar Egypt 7 February 1999 – 
6 February 2000 
Florentino Feliciano Philippines 7 February 2000 – 
6 February 2001 
Claus-Dieter Ehlermann Ge rmany 7 February 2001 – 
10 December 2001 
James Bacchus United States 15 December 2001 – 
14 December 2002 
15 December 2002 – 
10 December 2003 
Georges Abi-Saab Egypt 13 December 2003 – 
12 December 2004 
Yasuhei Taniguchi Japan 17 December 2004 –  
16 December 2005 
Arumugamangalam Venkatachalam Ganesan India 17 December 2005 –  
16 December 2006 
Giorgio Sacerdoti Italy 17 December 2006 –  
16 December 2007 
Luiz Olavo Baptista Br azil 17 December 2007 –  
16 December 2008 
David Unterhalter South Africa 18 December 2008 – 
11 December 2009 
12 December 2009 – 
16 December 2010 
Lilia Bautista Philippines 17 December 2010 –  
14 June 2011 
Jennifer Hillman United States 15 June 2011 –  
10 December 2011 
Yuejiao Zhang China 11 December 2011 –  
31 May 2012 
1 June 2012 –  
31 December 2012 
Ricardo Ramírez Hernández Mexico 1 January 2013 – 
31 December 2013 
1 January 2014 – 
31 December 2014 
 WT/AB/24 
 
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  ANNEX 6 
APPEALS FILED: 1995–2014 
Year Notices of 
Appeal filed Notices of 
Appeals in 
original 
proceedings Notices of 
Appeals in 
Article 21.5 
proceedings 
1995   0 0 0 
1996   4 4 0 
1997   6 a 6 0 
1998   8 8 0 
1999   9 b 9 0 
2000  13 c 11 2 
2001   9 d 5 4 
2002   7 e 6 1 
2003   6 f 5 1 
2004   5 5 0 
2005  10 8 2 
2006   5 3 2 
2007   4 2 2 
2008  13 g 10 3 
2009 3 1 2 
2010 3 3 0 
2011 9 9 0 
2012 5 5 0 
2013 1 1 0 
2014 9 8 1 
Total 129 109 20 
 
a This number includes two Notices of Appeal that were filed at the same time in related matters, 
counted separately: EC – Hormones (Canada)  and EC – Hormones (US).  A single Appellate Body report was 
circulated in relation to those appeals. 
b This number excludes one Notice of Appeal that was withdrawn by the United States, which 
subsequently filed another Notice of Appeal  in relation to the same panel report: US – FSC . 
c This number includes two Notices of Appeal that were filed at the same time in related matters, 
counted separately: US – 1916 Act (EC)  and US – 1916 Act (Japan).  A single Appellate Body report was 
circulated in relation to those appeals. 
d This number excludes one Notice of Appeal that was withdrawn by the United States, which 
subsequently filed another Notice of Appeal  in relation to the same panel report: US – Line Pipe . 
e This number includes one Notice of Appeal that was subsequently withdrawn: India – Autos ; and 
excludes one Notice of Appeal that was withdrawn by  the European Communities, which subsequently filed 
another Notice of Appeal in rela tion to the same panel report: EC – Sardines . 
f This number excludes one Notice of Appeal that was withdrawn by the United States, which 
subsequently filed another Notice of Appeal  in relation to the same panel report: US – Softwood Lumber IV . 
g This number includes two Notices of Appeal that were filed at the same time in related matters, 
counted separately: US – Shrimp (Thailand)  and US – Customs Bond Directive.  A single Appellate Body report 
was circulated in relation to those appeals. WT/AB/24 
 
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  ANNEX 7 
PERCENTAGE OF PANEL REPORTS APPEALED BY YEAR OF ADOPTION: 1995–2014  a 
 All panel reports Panel reports other than  
Article 21.5 reports b Article 21.5 
panel reports 
Year of 
adoption Panel 
reports 
adopted c Panel 
reports 
appealed d Percentage 
appealed e Panel 
reports 
adopted  Panel 
reports 
appealed Percentage 
appealed Panel 
reports 
adopted  Panel 
reports 
appealed Percentage
appealed  
1996 2 2 100% 2 2 100% 0 0 – 
1997 5 5 100% 5 5 100% 0 0 – 
1998 12 9 75% 12 9 75% 0 0 – 
1999 10 7 70% 9 7 78% 1 0 0% 
2000 19 11 58% 15 9 60% 4 2 50% 
2001 17 12 71% 13 9 69% 4 3 75% 
2002 12 6 50% 11 5 45% 1 1 100% 
2003 10 7 70% 8 5 63% 2 2 100% 
2004 8 6 75% 8 6 75% 0 0 – 
2005 20 12 60% 17 11 65% 3 1 33% 
2006 7 6 86% 4 3 75% 3 3 100% 
2007 10 5 50% 6 3 50% 4 2 50% 
2008 11 9 82% 8 6 75% 3 3 100% 
2009 8 6 75% 6 4 67% 2 2 100% 
2010 5 2 40% 5 2 40% 0 0 – 
2011 8 5 63% 8 5 63% 0 0 – 
2012 18 11 61% 18 11 61% 0 0 – 
2013 4 2 50% 4 2 50% 0 0 – 
2014 15 13 87% 13 11 85% 2 2 100% 
Total 201 136 68% 172 115 67% 29 21 72% 
 
a No panel reports were adopted in 1995. 
b Under Article 21.5 of the DSU, a panel may be established to hear a "disagreement as to the existence 
or consistency with a covered agreement of measures taken to comply with the recommendations and rulings" of the DSB upon the adoption of a previous panel or Appellate Body report. 
c The panel reports in EC – Bananas III (Ecuador) , EC – Bananas III (Guatemala and Honduras) ,  
EC – Bananas III (Mexico) , and EC – Bananas III (US)  are counted as a single panel report. The panel reports 
in US – Steel Safeguards , in EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar , and in EC – Chicken Cuts , are also counted as 
single panel reports in each of those disputes.  
d Panel reports are counted as having been appealed  where they are adopted as upheld, modified, or 
reversed by an Appellate Body report. The number of panel reports appealed may differ from the number of 
Appellate Body reports because some Appellate Bo dy reports address more than one panel report. 
e Percentages are rounded to the nearest whole number. 
  
   WT/AB/24  
 
- 102 - ANNEX 8 
WTO AGREEMENTS ADDRESSED IN APPELLATE BODY REPORTS CIRCULATED THROUGH 2014 a 
Year of 
circulation DSU WTO 
Agmt GATT 
1994 Agri- 
culture SPS ATC TBT TRIMs Anti- 
Dumping  Import 
Licensing SCM Safe-
guards GATS TRIPS 
1996 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1997 4 1 5 1 0 2 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 
1998 7 1 4 1 2 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
1999 7 1 6 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 
2000 8 1 7 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 5 2 1 1 
2001 7 1 3 1 0 1 1 0 4 0 1 2 0 0 
2002 8 2 4 3 0 0 1 0 1 0 3 1 1 1 
2003 4 2 3 0 1 0 0 0 4 0 1 1 0 0 
2004 2 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 
2005 9 0 5 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 4 0 1 0 
2006 5 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 2 0 0 0 
2007 5 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 
2008 8 1 9 1 2 0 0 0 3 0 3 0 0 0 
2009 3 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 1 0 
2010 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2011 7 1 6 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 
2012 9 0 7 0 0 0 4 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 
2013 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 
2014 6 4 7 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 
Total 100 15 84 13 7 3 8 2 29 2 33 7 5 3 
a No appeals were filed in 1995. 
 WT/AB/24 
 
- 103 - 
 
  ANNEX 9 
PARTICIPANTS AND THIRD PARTICIPANTS IN APPEALS: 1995–2014 
As of the end of 2014, there were 160 WTO Members, of which 74 have participated in appeals in 
which Appellate Body reports were circulated between 1996 and 2014.1 
The rules pursuant to which Members participate in appeals as appellant, other appellant, 
appellee, and third participant are described in section 5 of this Annual Report.  
I. STATISTICAL SUMMARY 
WTO Member Appellant Other 
appellant Appellee Third 
participant Total 
Antigua & 
Barbuda 0 1 1 0 2  
Argentina 2 3 5 18 28 
Australia 2 2 6 40 50  
Bahrain, 
Kingdom of 0 0 0 1 1 
Barbados 0 0 0 1 1  
Belize 0 0 0 4 4 
Benin 0 0 0 1 1  
Bolivarian 
Republic of 
Venezuela 0 0 1 6 7 
Bolivia, 
Plurinational 
State of 0 0 0 1 1  
Brazil 5 7 12 32 56 
Cameroon 0 0 0 3 3  
Canada 14 9 22 29 74 
Chad 0 0 0 2 2  
Chile 3 0 2 12 17 
China 14 3 9 40 66  
Colombia 0 0 0 20 20 
Costa Rica 1 0 0 3 4  
Côte d'Ivoire 0 0 0 4 4 
Cuba 0 0 0 4 4  
Dominica 0 0 0 4 4 
Dominican 
Republic 1 0 1 4 6  
Ecuador 0 2 2 12 16 
                                               
1 No appeals were filed and no Appe llate Body reports were circulated  in 1995, the year the Appellate 
Body was established. WT/AB/24 
 
- 104 - 
 
  WTO Member Appellant Other 
appellant Appellee Third 
participant Total 
Egypt 0 0 0 2 2  
El Salvador 0 0 0 4 4 
European Union 21 18 44 63 146  
Fiji 0 0 0 1 1 
Ghana 0 0 0 2 2  
Grenada 0 0 0 1 1 
Guatemala 1 1 1 8 11  
Guyana 0 0 0 1 1 
Honduras 0 2 2 3 7  
Hong Kong, 
China 0 0 0 8 8 
Iceland 0 0 0 2 2  
India 7 2 8 41 58 
Indonesia 0 1 1 4 6  
Israel 0 0 0 1 1 
Jamaica 0 0 0 5 5  
Japan 6 5 13 60 84 
Kenya 0 0 0 1 1  
Korea 3 4 6 31 44 
Kuwait, the 
State of 0 0 0 1 1  
Madagascar 0 0 0 1 1 
Malaysia 1 0 1 0 2  
Malawi 0 0 0 1 1 
Mauritius 0 0 0 2 2  
Mexico 5 4 7 35 51 
Namibia 0 0 0 1 1  
New Zealand 0 3 6 13 22 
Nicaragua 0 0 0 4 4  
Nigeria 0 0 0 1 1 
Norway 2 1 3 25 31  
Oman 0 0 0 3 3 
Pakistan 0 0 2 3 5  
Panama 0 0 0 3 3 
Paraguay 0 0 0 5 5  
Peru 0 0 1 7 8 
Philippines 3 0 3 1 7  
Poland 0 0 1 0 1 
Russian 
Federation 0 0 0 7 7  
Senegal 0 0 0 1 1 WT/AB/24 
 
- 105 - 
 
  WTO Member Appellant Other 
appellant Appellee Third 
participant Total 
Saint Lucia 0 0 0 4 4  
Saudi Arabia, 
Kingdom of 0 0 0 11 11 
St Kitts & Nevis 0 0 0 1 1  
St Vincent &  
the Grenadines 0 0 0 3 3 
Suriname 0 0 0 3 3  
Swaziland 0 0 0 1 1 
Switzerland 0 1 1 0 2  
Chinese Taipei 0 0 0 38 38 
Tanzania 0 0 0 1 1  
Thailand 3 2 5 20 30 
Trinidad 
&Tobago  0 0 0 1 1  
Turkey 1 0 0 15 16 
United States 34 24 75 35 168  
Viet Nam 0 0 0 7 7 
Total 129 95 241 733 1198 
 
  
 
  
II. DETAILS BY YEAR OF CIRCULATION 
1996 
Case Appellant Other 
appellant(s) Appellee(s) Third 
participant(s) 
US – Gasoline 
WT/DS2/AB/R  United States - - - Brazil 
Venezuela European 
Communities 
Norway 
Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II 
WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R 
WT/DS11/AB/R Japan United States Canada 
European 
Communities 
Japan 
United States - - - 
 WT/AB/24 
 
- 106 - 
 
  1997 
Case Appellant Other 
appellant(s) Appellee(s) Third 
participant(s) 
US – Underwear 
WT/DS24/AB/R Costa Rica - - - United States India 
Brazil – Desiccated Coconut 
WT/DS22/AB/R  Philippines Brazil Brazil 
Philippines European 
Communities 
United States 
US – Wool Shirts and Blouses  
WT/DS33/AB/R and Corr.1  India - - - United States - - - 
Canada – Periodicals 
WT/DS31/AB/R  Canada United States Canada 
United States - - - 
EC – Bananas III 
WT/DS27/AB/R  European 
Communities Ecuador 
Guatemala 
Honduras 
Mexico 
United States Ecuador 
European 
Communities 
Guatemala 
Honduras 
Mexico 
United States Belize 
Cameroon 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Côte d'Ivoire 
Dominica 
Dominican 
Republic 
Ghana 
Grenada 
Jamaica 
Japan 
Nicaragua 
St Lucia 
St Vincent 
& the 
Grenadines 
Senegal 
Suriname 
Venezuela 
India – Patents (US) 
WT/DS50/AB/R  India - - - United States European 
Communities WT/AB/24 
 
- 107 - 
 
  1998 
Case Appellant Other 
appellant(s) Appellee(s) Third 
participant(s) 
EC – Hormones 
WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R  European 
Communities Canada 
United States Canada 
European 
Communities 
United States Australia 
New Zealand 
Norway 
Argentina – Textiles and Apparel  
WT/DS56/AB/R and Corr.1  Argentina - - - United States European 
Communities 
EC – Computer Equipment 
WT/DS62/AB/R, WT/DS67/AB/R 
WT/DS68/AB/R  European 
Communities - - - United States Japan 
EC – Poultry  
WT/DS69/AB/R  Brazil European 
Communities Brazil 
European 
Communities Thailand 
United States 
US – Shrimp  
WT/DS58/AB/R  United States - - - India 
Malaysia 
Pakistan 
Thailand Australia 
Ecuador 
European 
Communities 
Hong Kong, 
China 
Mexico 
Nigeria 
Australia – Salmon 
WT/DS18/AB/R  Australia Canada Australia 
Canada European 
Communities 
India 
Norway 
United States 
Guatemala – Cement I 
WT/DS60/AB/R  Guatemala - - - Mexico United States 
 WT/AB/24 
 
- 108 - 
 
  1999  
Case Appellant Other 
appellant(s) Appellee(s) Third 
participant(s) 
Korea – Alcoholic Beverages 
WT/DS75/AB/R, WT/DS84/AB/R  Korea - - - European 
Communities 
United States Mexico 
Japan – Agricultural Products II 
WT/DS76/AB/R  Japan United States Japan 
United States Brazil 
European 
Communities 
Brazil – Aircraft 
WT/DS46/AB/R  Brazil Canada Brazil 
Canada European 
Communities 
United States 
Canada – Aircraft 
WT/DS70/AB/R  Canada Brazil Brazil 
Canada European 
Communities 
United States 
India – Quantitative Restrictions  
WT/DS90/AB/R  India - - - United States - - - 
Canada – Dairy  
WT/DS103/AB/R, 
WT/DS113/AB/R and Corr.1  Canada - - - New Zealand 
United States - - - 
Turkey –Textiles 
WT/DS34/AB/R  Turkey - - - India Hong Kong, 
China 
Japan 
Philippines 
Chile – Alcoholic Beverages 
WT/DS87/AB/R, WT/DS110/AB/R  Chile - - - European 
Communities Mexico 
United States 
Argentina – Footwear (EC) 
WT/DS121/AB/R  Argentina European 
Communities Argentina 
European 
Communities Indonesia 
United States 
Korea – Dairy  
WT/DS98/AB/R  Korea European 
Communities Korea 
European 
Communities United States 
 WT/AB/24 
 
- 109 - 
 
  2000  
Case Appellant Other 
appellant(s) Appellee(s) Third 
participant(s) 
US – FSC  
WT/DS108/AB/R  United States European 
Communities European 
Communities 
United States Canada 
Japan 
US – Lead and Bismuth II 
WT/DS138/AB/R  United States - - - European 
Communities Brazil 
Mexico 
Canada – Autos 
WT/DS139/AB/R  Canada European 
Communities 
Japan Canada 
European 
Communities 
Japan Korea 
United States 
Brazil – Aircraft  
(Article 21.5 – Canada) 
WT/DS46/AB/RW  Brazil - - - Canada European 
Communities 
United States 
Canada – Aircraft 
(Article 21.5 – Brazil) 
WT/DS70/AB/RW  Brazil - - - Canada European 
Communities 
United States 
US – 1916 Act 
WT/DS136/AB/R, 
WT/DS162/AB/R  United States European 
Communities 
Japan European 
Communities 
Japan 
United States European 
Communities a 
India 
Japan b 
Mexico 
Canada – Term of Patent 
Protection 
WT/DS170/AB/R  Canada - - - United States - - - 
Korea – Various Measures on 
Beef 
WT/DS161/AB/R, 
WT/DS169/AB/R  Korea - - - Australia 
United States Canada 
New Zealand 
US – Certain EC Products  
WT/DS165/AB/R European 
Communities United States European 
Communities 
United States Dominica 
Ecuador 
India 
Jamaica 
Japan 
St Lucia 
US – Wheat Gluten 
WT/DS166/AB/R  United States European 
Communities European 
Communities 
United States Australia 
Canada 
New Zealand 
a In complaint brought by Japan. 
b In complaint brought by the European Communities. WT/AB/24 
 
- 110 - 
 
  2001 
Case Appellant Other 
appellant(s) Appellee(s) Third 
participant(s) 
EC – Bed Linen 
WT/DS141/AB/R  European 
Communities India European 
Communities 
India Egypt 
Japan 
United States 
EC – Asbestos  
WT/DS135/AB/R  Canada European 
Communities Canada 
European 
Communities Brazil 
United States 
Thailand – H-Beams 
WT/DS122/AB/R  Thailand - - - Poland European 
Communities 
Japan 
United States 
US – Lamb  
WT/DS177/AB/R, 
WT/DS178/AB/R  United States Australia 
New Zealand Australia 
New Zealand 
United States European 
Communities 
US – Hot-Rolled Steel 
WT/DS184/AB/R  United States Japan Japan 
United States Brazil 
Canada 
Chile 
European 
Communities 
Korea 
US – Cotton Yarn 
WT/DS192/AB/R  United States - - - Pakistan European 
Communities 
India 
US – Shrimp 
(Article 21.5 – Malaysia) 
WT/DS58/AB/RW  Malaysia - - - United States Australia 
European 
Communities 
Hong Kong, 
China 
India 
Japan 
Mexico 
Thailand 
Mexico – Corn Syrup 
(Article 21.5 – US) 
WT/DS132/AB/RW  Mexico - - - United States European 
Communities 
Canada – Dairy 
(Article 21.5 – New Zealand 
and US) 
WT/DS103/AB/RW, 
WT/DS113/AB/RW  Canada - - - New Zealand 
United States European 
Communities 
 WT/AB/24 
 
- 111 - 
 
  2002  
Case Appellant Other 
appellant(s) Appellee(s) Third 
participant(s) 
US – Section 211 Appropriations 
Act  
WT/DS176/AB/R  European 
Communities United States European 
Communities 
United States - - - 
US – FSC (Article 21.5 – EC) 
WT/DS108/AB/RW  United States European 
Communities European 
Communities 
United States Australia 
Canada 
India 
Japan 
US – Line Pipe 
WT/DS202/AB/R  United States Korea Korea 
United States Australia 
Canada 
European 
Communities 
Japan 
Mexico 
India – Autos  c 
WT/DS146/AB/R, 
WT/DS175/AB/R India - - - European 
Communities 
United States Korea 
Chile – Price Band System  
WT/DS207/AB/R and Corr.1 Chile - - - Argentina Australia 
Brazil 
Colombia 
Ecuador 
European 
Communities 
Paraguay 
United States 
Venezuela 
EC – Sardines  
WT/DS231/AB/R  European 
Communities - - - Peru Canada 
Chile 
Ecuador 
United States 
Venezuela 
US – Carbon Steel 
WT/DS213/AB/R and Corr.1  United States European 
Communities European 
Communities 
United States Japan 
Norway 
US – Countervailing Measures on 
Certain EC Products 
WT/DS212/AB/R  United States - - - European 
Communities Brazil 
India 
Mexico 
Canada – Dairy 
(Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US II) 
WT/DS103/AB/RW2, 
WT/DS113/AB/RW2  Canada - - - New Zealand 
United States Argentina 
Australia 
European 
Communities 
c India withdrew its appeal the day before the oral hearing was scheduled to proceed. 
 WT/AB/24 
 
- 112 - 
 
 2003 
Case Appellant Other 
appellant(s) Appellee(s) Third 
participant(s) 
US – Offset Act 
(Byrd Amendment ) 
WT/DS217/AB/R, 
WT/DS234/AB/R United States - - - Australia 
Brazil 
Canada 
Chile 
European 
Communities 
India 
Indonesia 
Japan 
Korea 
Mexico 
Thailand Argentina 
Costa Rica 
Hong Kong, 
China 
Israel 
Norway 
EC – Bed Linen 
(Article 21.5 – India ) 
WT/DS141/AB/RW India - - - European 
Communities Japan 
Korea 
United States 
EC – Tube or Pipe Fittings WT/DS219/AB/R Brazil - - - European 
Communities Chile 
Japan 
Mexico 
United States 
US – Steel Safeguards 
WT/DS248/AB/R, 
WT/DS249/AB/R,  
WT/DS251/AB/R, 
WT/DS252/AB/R,  
WT/DS253/AB/R, 
WT/DS254/AB/R,  
WT/DS258/AB/R, 
WT/DS259/AB/R  United States Brazil 
China 
European 
Communities 
Japan 
Korea 
New Zealand 
Norway 
Switzerland Brazil 
China 
European 
Communities 
Japan 
Korea 
New Zealand 
Norway 
Switzerland 
United States Canada 
Cuba 
Mexico 
Chinese Taipei 
Thailand 
Turkey 
Venezuela 
Japan – Apples WT/DS245/AB/R Japan United States Japan 
United States Australia 
Brazil 
European 
Communities 
New Zealand 
Chinese Taipei 
US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel 
Sunset Review 
WT/DS244/AB/R Japan - - - United States Brazil 
Chile 
European 
Communities 
India 
Korea 
Norway 
 WT/AB/24 
 
- 113 - 
 
  2004 
Case Appellant Other 
appellant(s) Appellee(s) Third 
participant(s) 
US – Softwood Lumber IV 
WT/DS257/AB/R  United States Canada Canada 
United States European 
Communities 
India 
Japan 
EC – Tariff Preferences 
WT/DS246/AB/R  European 
Communities - - - India Bolivia 
Brazil 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Cuba 
Ecuador 
El Salvador 
Guatemala 
Honduras 
Mauritius 
Nicaragua 
Pakistan 
Panama 
Paraguay 
Peru 
United States 
Venezuela 
US – Softwood Lumber V 
WT/DS264/AB/R  United States Canada Canada 
United States European 
Communities 
India 
Japan 
Canada – Wheat Exports and 
Grain Imports 
WT/DS276/AB/R  United States Canada Canada 
United States Australia 
China 
European 
Communities 
Mexico 
Chinese Taipei 
US – Oil Country Tubular Goods 
Sunset Reviews 
WT/DS268/AB/R  United States Argentina Argentina 
United States European 
Communities 
Japan 
Korea 
Mexico 
Chinese Taipei 
 WT/AB/24 
 
- 114 - 
 
  2005 
Case Appellant Other 
appellant(s) Appellee(s) Third 
participant(s) 
US – Upland Cotton 
WT/DS267/AB/R  United States Brazil Brazil 
United States Argentina 
Australia 
Benin 
Canada 
Chad 
China 
European 
Communities 
India 
New Zealand 
Pakistan 
Paraguay 
Chinese Taipei 
Venezuela 
US – Gambling 
WT/DS285/AB/R and Corr.1  United States Antigua & 
Barbuda Antigua & 
Barbuda 
United States Canada 
European 
Communities 
Japan 
Mexico 
Chinese Taipei 
EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar 
WT/DS265/AB/R, 
WT/DS266/AB/R, WT/DS283/AB/R  European 
Communities Australia 
Brazil 
Thailand Australia 
Brazil 
European 
Communities 
Thailand 
 Barbados 
Belize 
Canada 
China 
Colombia 
Côte d'Ivoire 
Cuba 
Fiji 
Guyana 
India 
Jamaica 
Kenya 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Mauritius 
New Zealand 
Paraguay 
St Kitts & 
Nevis 
Swaziland 
Tanzania 
Trinidad & 
Tobago 
United States 
 WT/AB/24 
 
- 115 - 
 
  2005 (CONT'D) 
Case Appellant Other 
appellant(s) Appellee(s) Third 
participant(s) 
Dominican Republic – Import and 
Sale of Cigarettes 
WT/DS302/AB/R  Dominican 
Republic Honduras Dominican 
Republic 
Honduras China 
El Salvador 
European 
Communities 
Guatemala 
United States 
US – Countervailing Duty 
Investigation on DRAMS 
WT/DS296/AB/R  United States Korea Korea 
United States China 
European 
Communities 
Japan 
Chinese Taipei 
EC – Chicken Cuts 
WT/DS269/AB/R, 
WT/DS286/AB/R,  and Corr.1  European 
Communities Brazil 
Thailand Brazil 
European 
Communities 
Thailand China 
United States 
Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures 
on Rice 
WT/DS295/AB/R  Mexico - - - United States China 
European 
Communities 
US – Anti-Dumping Measures on 
Oil Country Tubular Goods 
WT/DS282/AB/R  Mexico United States Mexico 
United States Argentina 
Canada 
China 
European 
Communities 
Japan 
Chinese Taipei 
US – Softwood Lumber IV 
(Article 21.5 – Canada) 
WT/DS257/AB/RW  United States Canada Canada 
United States China 
European 
Communities 
 WT/AB/24 
 
- 116 - 
 
  2006 
Case Appellant Other 
appellant(s) Appellee(s) Third 
participant(s) 
US – FSC 
(Article 21.5 – EC II) 
WT/DS108/AB/RW2 United States European 
Communities European 
Communities 
United States Australia 
Brazil 
China 
Mexico ‒ Taxes on Soft Drinks 
WT/DS308/AB/R Mexico - - - United States Canada 
China 
European 
Communities 
Guatemala 
Japan 
US – Softwood Lumber VI 
(Article 21.5 – Canada) 
WT/DS277/AB/RW and Corr.1 Canada - - - United States China 
European 
Communities 
US – Zeroing (EC) 
WT/DS294/AB/R and Corr.1 European 
Communities United States United States 
European 
Communities Argentina 
Brazil 
China 
Hong Kong, 
China 
India 
Japan 
Korea 
Mexico 
Norway 
Chinese Taipei 
US – Softwood Lumber V 
(Article 21.5 – Canada) 
WT/DS264/AB/RW Canada - - - United States China 
European 
Communities 
India 
Japan 
New Zealand 
Thailand 
EC – Selected Customs Matters 
WT/DS315/AB/R United States European 
Communities European 
Communities 
United States Argentina 
Australia 
Brazil 
China 
Hong Kong, 
China 
India 
Japan 
Korea 
Chinese Taipei 
 WT/AB/24 
 
- 117 - 
 
  2007 
Case Appellant Other 
appellant(s) Appellee(s) Third 
participant(s) 
US – Zeroing (Japan) 
WT/DS322/AB/R Japan United States United States 
Japan Argentina 
China 
European 
Communities d 
Hong Kong, 
China 
India 
Korea 
Mexico 
New Zealand 
Norway 
Thailand 
US – Oil Country Tubular Goods 
Sunset Reviews 
(Article 21.5 – Argentina) 
WT/DS268/AB/RW United States Argentina Argentina 
United States China 
European 
Communities 
Japan 
Korea 
Mexico 
Chile – Price Band System 
(Article 21.5 – Argentina)  
WT/DS207/AB/RW  Chile Argentina Argentina 
Chile Australia 
Brazil 
Canada 
China 
Colombia 
European 
Communities 
Peru 
Thailand 
United States 
Japan – DRAMs (Korea) 
WT/DS336/AB/R and Corr.1 Japan Korea Korea 
Japan European 
Communities 
United States 
Brazil – Retreaded Tyres WT/DS332/AB/R European 
Communities - - - Brazil Argentina 
Australia 
China 
Cuba 
Guatemala 
Japan 
Korea 
Mexico 
Paraguay 
Chinese Taipei 
Thailand 
United States 
 d By virtue of the Treaty of Lisbon, as of 1 December 2009, "European Union" replaced and succeeded 
"European Communities". For disputes that began before the entry into force of the Treaty, the WTO dispute 
settlement reports refer to  "European Communities". WT/AB/24 
 
- 118 - 
 
  2008 
Case Appellant Other 
appellant(s) Appellee(s) Third 
participant(s) 
US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) 
WT/DS344/AB/R Mexico - - - United States Chile 
China 
European 
Communities 
Japan  
Thailand 
US – Upland Cotton 
(Article 21.5 – Brazil) 
WT/DS267/AB/RW  United States Brazil Brazil 
United States Argentina 
Australia 
Canada 
Chad 
China 
European 
Communities 
India 
Japan 
New Zealand 
Thailand 
US – Shrimp (Thailand)  
WT/DS343/AB/R  
 Thailand 
 United States 
 United States 
Thailand 
 Brazil 
Chile 
China 
European 
Communities 
India 
Japan 
Korea 
Mexico 
Viet Nam 
US – Customs Bond Directive 
WT/DS345/AB/R  
 India United States United States 
India Brazil 
China 
European 
Communities 
Japan 
Thailand 
 WT/AB/24 
 
- 119 - 
 
  2008 (CONT'D) 
Case Appellant Other 
appellant(s) Appellee(s) Third 
participant(s) 
US – Continued Suspension 
WT/DS320/AB/R 
 European 
Communities 
 United States 
 United States 
European 
Communities 
 Australia 
Brazil 
China 
India 
Mexico 
New Zealand 
Norway 
Chinese Taipei 
Canada – Continued Suspension 
WT/DS321/AB/R 
 
 European 
Communities Canada Canada 
European 
Communities Australia 
Brazil 
China 
India 
Mexico 
New Zealand 
Norway 
Chinese Taipei 
India – Additional Import Duties WT/DS360/AB/R United States India India 
United States Australia 
Chile 
European 
Communities 
Japan 
Viet Nam 
EC – Bananas III 
(Article 21.5 – Ecuador II) 
WT/DS27/AB/RW2/ECU  
and Corr.1 European 
Communities 
 Ecuador 
 
 Ecuador 
European 
Communities 
 Belize 
Brazil 
Cameroon 
Colombia 
Côte d'Ivoire 
Dominica 
Dominican 
Republic 
Ghana 
Jamaica 
Japan 
Nicaragua 
Panama 
St Lucia 
St Vincent & the 
Grenadines 
Suriname 
United States WT/AB/24 
 
- 120 - 
 
  2008 (CONT'D) 
Case Appellant Other 
appellant(s) Appellee(s) Third 
participant(s) 
EC – Bananas III 
(Article 21.5 – US) 
WT/DS27/AB/RW/USA  
and Corr.1 
 European 
Communities - - - United States Belize 
Brazil 
Cameroon 
Colombia 
Côte d'Ivoire 
Dominica 
Dominican 
Republic 
Ecuador 
Jamaica 
Japan 
Mexico 
Nicaragua 
Panama St Lucia 
St Vincent & the 
Grenadines 
Suriname 
China – Auto Parts (EC) 
WT/DS339/AB/R  China - - - European 
Communities 
 Argentina 
Australia 
Brazil 
Japan 
Mexico 
Chinese Taipei 
Thailand 
China – Auto Parts (US) WT/DS340/AB/R  China - - - United States 
 Argentina 
Australia 
Brazil 
Japan 
Mexico 
Chinese Taipei 
Thailand 
China – Auto Parts (Canada) 
WT/DS342/AB/R  China - - - Canada Argentina 
Australia 
Brazil 
Japan 
Mexico 
Chinese Taipei 
Thailand 
 WT/AB/24 
 
- 121 - 
 
  2009 
Case Appellant Other 
appellant(s) Appellee(s) Third 
participant(s) 
US – Continued Zeroing 
WT/DS350/AB/R  European 
Communities United States European 
Communities 
United States Brazil 
China 
Egypt 
India 
Japan 
Korea 
Mexico 
Norway 
Chinese Taipei 
Thailand 
US – Zeroing (EC) 
(Article 21.5 – EC) 
WT/DS294/AB/RW and Corr.1 European 
Communities United States European 
Communities 
United States India 
Japan 
Korea 
Mexico 
Norway 
Chinese Taipei 
Thailand 
US – Zeroing (Japan)  
(Article 21.5 – Japan) 
WT/DS322/AB/RW United States - - - Japan China 
European 
Communities 
Hong Kong, 
China 
Korea 
Mexico 
Norway 
Chinese Taipei 
Thailand 
China – Publications and 
Audiovisual Products 
WT/DS363/AB/R China United States China 
United States Australia 
European 
Communities 
Japan 
Korea 
Chinese Taipei 
 WT/AB/24 
 
- 122 - 
 
  2010 
Case Appellant Other 
appellant(s) Appellee(s) Third 
participant(s) 
Australia – Apples 
WT/DS367/AB/R Australia New Zealand New Zealand 
Australia Chile 
European Union 
Japan 
Pakistan 
Chinese Taipei 
United States 
 
  
2011 
Case Appellant Other 
appellant(s) Appellee(s) Third 
participant(s) 
US – Anti-Dumping and 
Countervailing Duties (China) 
WT/DS379/AB/R China - - -  United States Argentina 
Australia 
Bahrain 
Brazil 
Canada 
European Union 
India 
Japan 
Kuwait 
Mexico 
Norway 
Saudi Arabia 
Chinese Taipei 
Turkey 
EC and certain member States – 
Large Civil Aircraft 
WT/DS316/AB/R European 
Union United States United States 
European 
Union Australia 
Brazil 
Canada 
China 
Japan 
Korea 
Thailand – Cigarettes 
(Philippines) 
WT/DS371/AB/R Thailand - - -  Philippines Australia 
China 
European Union 
India 
Chinese Taipei 
United States 
 WT/AB/24 
 
- 123 - 
 
  2011 (CONT'D)  
Case Appellant Other 
appellant(s) Appellee(s) Third 
participant(s) 
EC – Fasteners (China) 
WT/DS397/AB/R European 
Union China China  
European 
Union Brazil 
Canada 
Chile 
Colombia 
India 
Japan 
Norway 
Chinese Taipei 
Thailand 
Turkey 
United States 
US – Tyres (China) 
WT/DS399/AB/R China - - -  United States European Union 
Japan 
Chinese Taipei 
Turkey 
Viet Nam 
Philippines – Distilled Spirits 
(European Union)  
WT/DS396/AB/R Philippines European 
Union European 
Union 
Philippines 
 Australia 
China 
India 
Mexico 
Chinese Taipei 
Thailand 
Philippines – Distilled Spirits 
(United States)  
WT/DS403/AB/R  Philippines - - - United States Australia 
China 
Colombia 
India 
Mexico 
Chinese Taipei 
Thailand 
 WT/AB/24 
 
- 124 - 
 
  2012 
Case Appellant Other 
appellant(s) Appellee(s) Third 
participant(s) 
China –  Raw Materials 
(United States) 
WT/DS394/AB/R  China United States China 
United States Argentina 
Brazil 
Canada 
Chile 
Colombia 
Ecuador 
India 
Japan 
Korea 
Norway 
Saudi Arabia 
Chinese Taipei 
Turkey 
China – Raw Materials 
(European Union) 
WT/DS395/AB/R China European 
Union China 
European 
Union Argentina 
Brazil 
Canada 
Chile 
Colombia 
Ecuador 
India 
Japan 
Korea 
Norway 
Saudi Arabia 
Chinese Taipei 
Turkey 
China – Raw Materials  
(Mexico) 
WT/DS398/AB/R China Mexico China 
Mexico Argentina 
Brazil 
Canada 
Chile 
Colombia 
Ecuador 
India 
Japan 
Korea 
Norway 
Saudi Arabia 
Chinese Taipei 
Turkey 
 
 WT/AB/24 
 
- 125 - 
 
  2012 (CONT'D) 
Case Appellant Other 
appellant(s) Appellee(s) Third 
participant(s) 
US – Large Civil Aircraft 
(2nd complaint) 
WT/DS353/AB/R European 
Union United States United States 
European 
Union Australia 
Brazil 
Canada 
China 
Japan 
Korea 
US – Clove Cigarettes 
WT/DS406/AB/R United States - - -  Indonesia Brazil 
Colombia 
Dominican 
Republic 
European Union 
Guatemala 
Mexico 
Norway 
Turkey 
US – Tuna II (Mexico) WT/DS381/AB/R United States Mexico Mexico 
United States Argentina  
Australia 
Brazil 
Canada 
China 
Ecuador 
Guatemala 
Japan 
Korea 
New Zealand 
Chinese Taipei 
Thailand 
Turkey 
Venezuela 
US – COOL (Canada) 
WT/DS384/AB/R United States Canada Canada 
United States 
 Argentina  
Australia 
Brazil 
China 
Colombia 
European Union 
Guatemala 
India 
Japan 
Korea 
New Zealand 
Peru 
Chinese Taipei 
 WT/AB/24 
 
- 126 - 
 
  2012 (CONT'D) 
Case Appellant Other 
appellant(s) Appellee(s) Third 
participant(s) 
US – COOL (Mexico) 
WT/DS386/AB/R United States Mexico Mexico 
United States Argentina  
Australia 
Brazil 
China 
Colombia 
European Union 
Guatemala 
India 
Japan 
Korea 
New Zealand 
Peru 
Chinese Taipei 
China – GOES 
WT/DS414/AB/R China - - - United States Argentina  
European Union 
Honduras 
India 
Japan 
Korea 
Saudi Arabia 
Viet Nam 
 WT/AB/24 
 
- 127 - 
 
  2013 
Case Appellant Other 
appellant(s) Appellee(s) Third 
participant(s) 
Canada – Certain Measures 
Affecting the Renewable Energy 
Generation Sector 
WT/DS412/AB/R Canada Japan Japan 
Canada  Australia 
Brazil 
China 
El Salvador 
European Union 
Honduras 
India 
Korea 
Mexico 
Norway 
Saudi Arabia 
Chinese Taipei 
United States 
Canada – Measures Relating to 
the Feed-in Tariff Program 
WT/DS426/AB/R Canada European 
Union European 
Union 
Canada Australia 
Brazil 
China 
El Salvador 
India 
Japan 
Korea 
Mexico 
Norway 
Saudi Arabia 
Chinese Taipei 
Turkey 
United States 
 WT/AB/24 
 
- 128 - 
 
  2014 
Case Appellant Other 
appellant(s) Appellee(s) Third 
participant(s) 
European Communities — 
Measures Prohibiting the 
Importation and Marketing of Seal Products 
WT/DS400/AB/R Canada 
Norway European 
Union Canada 
Norway 
European 
Union  Argentina 
China 
Colombia 
Ecuador 
Iceland 
Japan 
Mexico 
Russia 
United States 
European Communities — 
Measures Prohibiting the 
Importation and Marketing of 
Seal Products  
WT/DS401/AB/R Canada 
Norway European 
Union Canada 
Norway 
European 
Union Argentina 
China 
Colombia 
Ecuador 
Iceland 
Japan 
Mexico 
Namibia 
Russia 
United States 
United States — Countervailing 
and Anti-dumping Measures on 
Certain Products from China 
WT/DS437/AB/R  China United States China 
United States Australia 
Canada 
European Union 
India 
Japan 
Russia 
Turkey 
Viet Nam 
China — Measures Related to 
the Exportation of Rare Earths, 
Tungsten and Molybdenum  
WT/DS431/AB/R  United States China United States 
China Argentina 
Australia 
Brazil 
Canada 
Chinese Taipei 
Colombia 
European Union 
India 
Indonesia 
Korea 
Japan 
Norway 
Oman 
Peru 
Russia 
Saudi Arabia 
Turkey 
Viet Nam 
 WT/AB/24 
 
- 129 - 
 
  2014 (CONT'D) 
Case Appellant Other 
appellant(s) Appellee(s) Third 
participant(s) 
China — Measures Related to the 
Exportation of Rare Earths, 
Tungsten and Molybdenum  
WT/DS432/AB/R  China  European 
Union Argentina 
Australia 
Brazil 
Canada 
Chinese Taipei 
Colombia 
India 
Indonesia 
Japan 
Korea 
Norway 
Oman 
Peru 
Russia 
Saudi Arabia  
Turkey 
United States 
Viet Nam 
China — Measures Related to the 
Exportation of Rare Earths, 
Tungsten and Molybdenum  
WT/DS433/AB/R  China  Japan Argentina 
Australia 
Brazil 
Canada 
Chinese Taipei 
Colombia 
India 
Indonesia 
Korea 
Norway 
Oman 
Peru 
Russia 
United States — Countervailing 
Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Flat Products from India 
WT/DS436/AB/R India United States India  
United States Australia 
Canada 
China 
European Union 
 
Saudi Arabia 
Turkey 
 WT/AB/24 
 
- 130 - 
 
  2014 (CONT'D) 
Case Appellant Other 
appellant(s) Appellee(s) Third 
participant(s) 
United States — Countervailing 
Duty Measures on Certain 
Products from China 
WT/DS449/AB/R and Corr.1 China United States China 
United States Australia 
Brazil 
Canada 
European Union  
India 
Japan 
Korea 
Norway 
Russia 
Saudi Arabia 
Turkey 
Viet Nam 
 
 WT/AB/24 
 
- 131 - 
 
  ANNEX 10 
APPELLATE BODY SECRETARIAT PARTICIPATION IN  
THE WTO TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND TRAINING PLAN IN 2014 
Course / Seminar Location Dates 
Regional Trade Policy Course  
(Basic Principles Module) Bridgetown, Barbados 6-8 May 2014 
Regional Trade Policy Course  
(Dispute Settlement Module) Gaborone, Botswana 9-11 July 2014 
National Seminar on trade 
remedies, services and dispute settlement Cape Town, South Africa 11-15 August 2014 
Regional Trade Policy Course  
(Dispute Settlement Module) Istanbul, Turkey 15-19 September 2014 
National Seminar on technical 
barriers to trade Rio de Janeiro, Braz il 18-19 September 2014 
 
 WT/AB/24 
 
- 132 - 
 
  ANNEX 11 
APPELLATE BODY SECRETARIAT PARTICIP ATION IN BRIEFINGS, CONFERENCES,  
AND MOOT COURT COMPETITIONS IN 2014 
Activity Location Dates 
6th GNLU International Moot 
Court Competition Gujarat, India 8-10 February 2014 
European Law Students' 
Association (ELSA) Moot Court 
Competition Barcelona, Spain 4-10 February 2014 
ELSA Moot Court Competition Kuala Lump ur, Malaysia 28 February-4 March 2014 
ELSA Moot Court Competition Washington, DC, USA 5-8 March 2014 
ELSA Moot Court Competition Warsaw, Poland 26-30 March 2014 
ELSA Moot Court Competition Johannesburg, South Africa 31 March-3 April 2014 
ELSA Moot Court Competition Ge neva, Switzerland 17 May 2014 
Master in International Economic 
Law and Policy (IELPO) Moot 
Court Competition Barcelona, Spain 20 June 2014 
Master of International Law and 
Economics (MILE) Moot Court Berne, Switzerland 23-24 June 2014 
Society of International 
Economic Law (SIEL) Biennial 
Conference Berne, Switzerland 10-12 July 2014 
   
 
 WT/AB/24 
 
- 133 - 
 
  ANNEX 12 
WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT REPORTS AND ARBITRATION AWARDS: 1995–2014 
Short title Full case title and citation 
Argentina – Ceramic Tiles Panel Report, Argentina – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Imports of 
Ceramic Floor Tiles from Italy , WT/DS189/R, adopted 5 November 2001, 
DSR 2001:XII, p. 6241 
Argentina – Footwear (EC) Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Safeguard Measures on Imports of 
Footwear , WT/DS121/AB/R, adopted 12 January 2000, DSR 2000:I, p. 515 
Argentina – Footwear (EC) Panel Report, Argentina – Safeguard Measur es on Imports of Footwear , 
WT/DS121/R, adopted 12 January 2000, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS121/AB/R, DSR 2000:II, p. 575 
Argentina – Hides and Leather Panel Report, Argentina – Measures Affecting th e Export of Bovine Hides and 
Import of Finished Leather , WT/DS155/R and Corr.1, adopted 16 February 
2001, DSR 2001:V, p. 1779 
Argentina – Hides and Leather  
(Article 21.3(c)) Award of the Arbitrator, Argentina – Measures Affect ing the Export of Bovine 
Hides and Import of Finished Leather – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of 
the DSU , WT/DS155/10, 31 August 2001, DSR 2001:XII, p. 6013 
Argentina – Import Measures Appellate Body Reports, Argentina – Measures Affe cting the Importation of 
Goods , WT/DS438/AB/R / WT/DS444/AB/ R / WT/DS445/AB/R, adopted 
26 January 2015 
Argentina – Import Measures Panel Reports, Argentina – Measures Affectin g the Importation of Goods , 
WT/DS438/R / WT/DS444/R / WT/DS445/R / and Add.1, adopted 26 January 2015, as modified (WT/DS438/R) and upheld (WT/DS444/R / WT/DS445/R) by Appellate Body Reports WT/DS438/AB/ R / WT/DS444/AB/R / WT/DS445/AB/R  
Argentina – Poultry 
Anti-Dumping Duties Panel Report, Argentina – Definitive Anti-Dum ping Duties on Poultry from 
Brazil , WT/DS241/R, adopted 19 May 2003, DSR 2003:V, p. 1727 
Argentina – Preserved Peaches Panel Report, Argentina – Definitive Safegu ard Measure on Imports of 
Preserved Peaches , WT/DS238/R, adopted 15 April 2003, DSR 2003:III, 
p. 1037 
Argentina – Textiles and 
Apparel Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Measures Affect ing Imports of Footwear, 
Textiles, Apparel and Other Items , WT/DS56/AB/R and Corr.1, adopted 
22 April 1998, DSR 1998:III, p. 1003 
Argentina – Textiles and 
Apparel Panel Report, Argentina – Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles, 
Apparel and Other Items , WT/DS56/R, adopted 22 April 1998, as modified 
by Appellate Body Report WT/DS56/AB/R, DSR 1998:III, p. 1033 
Australia – Apples Appellate Body Report, Australia – Measures Affecting the Importation of 
Apples from New Zealand , WT/DS367/AB/R, adopted 17 December 2010, 
DSR 2010:V, p. 2175 
Australia – Apples Panel Report, Australia – Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples from 
New Zealand , WT/DS367/R, adopted 17 December 2010, as modified by 
Appellate Body Report WT/DS367/AB/R, DSR 2010:VI, p. 2371 
Australia – Automotive 
Leather II Panel Report, Australia – Subsidies Provided to Producers and Exporters of 
Automotive Leather , WT/DS126/R, adopted 16 June 1999, DSR 1999:III, 
p. 951 
Australia – Automotive 
Leather II  
(Article 21.5 – US) Panel Report, Australia – Subsidies Provided to Producers and Exporters of 
Automotive Leather – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United 
States , WT/DS126/RW and Corr.1, adopted 11 February 2000, 
DSR 2000:III, p. 1189 
Australia – Salmon Appellate Body Report, Australia – Measures Affecting Importation of 
Salmon , WT/DS18/AB/R, adopted 6 November 1998, DSR 1998:VIII, 
p. 3327 
Australia – Salmon Panel Report, Australia – Measures Affect ing Importation of Salmon , 
WT/DS18/R and Corr.1, adopted 6 November 1998, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS18/AB/R, DSR 1998:VIII, p. 3407 WT/AB/24 
 
- 134 - 
 
  Short title Full case title and citation 
Australia – Salmon 
(Article 21.3(c)) Award of the Arbitrator, Australia – Measures Affecting Importation of 
Salmon – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU , WT/DS18/9, 
23 February 1999, DSR 1999:I, p. 267 
Australia – Salmon 
(Article 21.5 – Canada) Panel Report, Australia – Measures  Affecting Importation of Salmon – 
Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Canada , WT/DS18/RW, adopted 
20 March 2000, DSR 2000:IV, p. 2031 
Brazil – Aircraft Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft , 
WT/DS46/AB/R, adopted 20 Augu st 1999, DSR 1999: III, p. 1161 
Brazil – Aircraft Panel Report, Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft , WT/DS46/R, 
adopted 20 August 1999, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS46/AB/R, DSR 1999:III, p. 1221 
Brazil – Aircraft 
(Article 21.5 – Canada) Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft  
– Recourse by Canada to Article 21.5 of the DSU , WT/DS46/AB/RW, adopted 
4 August 2000, DSR 2000:VIII, p. 4067 
Brazil – Aircraft 
(Article 21.5 – Canada) Panel Report, Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft – Recourse by 
Canada to Article 21.5 of the DSU , WT/DS46/RW, adopted 4 August 2000, as 
modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS46/AB/RW, DSR 2000:IX, p. 4093 
Brazil – Aircraft 
(Article 21.5 – Canada II) Panel Report, Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft – Second 
Recourse by Canada to Article 21.5 of the DSU , WT/DS46/RW/2, adopted 
23 August 2001, DSR 2001:X, p. 5481 
Brazil – Aircraft 
(Article 22.6 – Brazil) Decision by the Arbitrators, Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft 
– Recourse to Arbitration by Brazil under Article 22.6 of the DSU and 
Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement , WT/DS46/ARB, 28 August 2000, 
DSR 2002:I, p. 19 
Brazil – Desiccated Coconut Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Measures Affecting Desiccated Coconut , 
WT/DS22/AB/R, adopted 20 March 1997, DSR 1997:I, p. 167 
Brazil – Desiccated Coconut Panel Report, Brazil – Measures Affecting Desiccated Coconut , WT/DS22/R, 
adopted 20 March 1997, upheld by A ppellate Body Report WT/DS22/AB/R, 
DSR 1997:I, p. 189 
Brazil – Retreaded Tyres Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded 
Tyres , WT/DS332/AB/R, adopted 17 December 2007, DSR 2007:IV, p. 1527 
Brazil – Retreaded Tyres Panel Report, Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres , 
WT/DS332/R, adopted 17 December 2007, as modified by Appellate Body 
Report WT/DS332/AB/R, DSR 2007:V, p. 1649 
Brazil – Retreaded Tyres 
(Article 21.3(c)) Award of the Arbitrator, Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded 
Tyres – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU , WT/DS332/16, 
29 August 2008, DSR 2008:XX, p. 8581 
Canada – Aircraft Appellate Body Report, Canada – Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian 
Aircraft , WT/DS70/AB/R, adopted 20 Augu st 1999, DSR 1 999:III, p. 1377 
Canada – Aircraft Panel Report, Canada – Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft , 
WT/DS70/R, adopted 20 August 1999, upheld by Appellate Body Report 
WT/DS70/AB/R, DSR 1999:IV, p. 1443 
Canada – Aircraft 
(Article 21.5 – Brazil) Appellate Body Report, Canada – Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian 
Aircraft – Recourse by Brazil to Article 21.5 of the DSU , WT/DS70/AB/RW, 
adopted 4 August 2000, DSR 2000:IX, p. 4299 
Canada – Aircraft 
(Article 21.5 – Brazil) Panel Report, Canada – Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft  
– Recourse by Brazil to Article 21.5 of the DSU , WT/DS70/RW, adopted 
4 August 2000, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS70/AB/RW, 
DSR 2000:IX, p. 4315 
Canada – Aircraft Credits and 
Guarantees Panel Report, Canada – Export Credits and Loan Guarantees for Regional 
Aircraft , WT/DS222/R and Corr.1, adopte d 19 February 2002, DSR 2002:III, 
p. 849 
Canada – Aircraft Credits and 
Guarantees 
(Article 22.6 – Canada) Decision by the Arbitrator, Canada – Export Credits and Loan Guarantees for 
Regional Aircraft – Recourse to Arbitration by Canada under Article 22.6 of 
the DSU and Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement , WT/DS222/ARB, 
17 February 2003, DSR 2003:III, p. 1187 
Canada – Autos Appellate Body Report, Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive 
Industry , WT/DS139/AB/R, WT/DS142/AB/R, adopted 19 June 2000, 
DSR 2000:VI, p. 2985 WT/AB/24 
 
- 135 - 
 
  Short title Full case title and citation 
Canada – Autos Panel Report, Canada – Certain Measures Affe cting the Automotive Industry , 
WT/DS139/R, WT/DS142/R, adopted 19 June 2000, as modified by Appellate 
Body Report WT/DS139/AB/R, WT/DS142/AB/R, DSR 2000:VII, p. 3043 
Canada – Autos 
(Article 21.3(c)) Award of the Arbitrator, Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive 
Industry – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU , WT/DS139/12, 
WT/DS142/12, 4 October 2000, DSR 2000:X, p. 5079 
Canada – Continued 
Suspension Appellate Body Report, Canada – Continued Suspension of Obligations in the 
EC – Hormones Dispute , WT/DS321/AB/R, adopted 14 November 2008, 
DSR 2008:XIV, p. 5373 
Canada – Continued 
Suspension Panel Report, Canada – Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC – 
Hormones Dispute , WT/DS321/R and Add.1 to Add.7, adopted 14 November 
2008, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS321/AB/R, DSR 2008:XV, p. 5757 
Canada – Dairy Appellate Body Report, Canada – Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk 
and the Exportation of Dairy Products , WT/DS103/AB/R, WT/DS113/AB/R 
and Corr.1, adopted 27 October 1999, DSR 1999:V, p. 2057 
Canada – Dairy Panel Report, Canada – Measures Affecting th e Importation of Milk and the 
Exportation of Dairy Products , WT/DS103/R, WT/DS113/R, adopted 
27 October 1999, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS103/AB/R, WT/DS113/AB/R, DSR 1999:VI, p. 2097 
Canada – Dairy 
(Article 21.5 – New Zealand 
and US) Appellate Body Report, Canada – Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk 
and the Exportation of Dairy Products – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU 
by New Zealand and the United States , WT/DS103/AB/RW, 
WT/DS113/AB/RW, adopted 18 Dece mber 2001, DSR 2001:XIII, p. 6829 
Canada – Dairy 
(Article 21.5 – New Zealand 
and US) Panel Report, Canada – Measures Affecting th e Importation of Milk and the 
Exportation of Dairy Products – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by New 
Zealand and the United States , WT/DS103/RW, WT/DS113/RW, adopted 
18 December 2001, as reversed by Appellate Body Report WT/DS103/AB/RW, WT/DS113/AB /RW, DSR 2001:X III, p. 6865 
Canada – Dairy 
(Article 21.5 – New Zealand 
and US II) Appellate Body Report, Canada – Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk 
and the Exportation of Dairy Products – Second Recourse to Article 21.5 of 
the DSU by New Zealand and the United States , WT/DS103/AB/RW2, 
WT/DS113/AB/RW2, adopted 17 January 2003, DSR 2003:I, p. 213 
Canada – Dairy 
(Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US II) Panel Report, Canada – Measures Affecting th e Importation of Milk and the 
Exportation of Dairy Products – Second  Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU 
by New Zealand and the United States , WT/DS103/RW2, WT/DS113/RW2, 
adopted 17 January 2003, as modified by Appellate Body Report 
WT/DS103/AB/RW2, WT/DS113/AB/RW2, DSR 2003:I, p. 255 
Canada – Patent Term Appellate Body Report, Canada – Term of Patent Protection , 
WT/DS170/AB/R, adopted 12 October 2000, DSR 2000:X, p. 5093 
Canada – Patent Term Panel Report, Canada – Term of Patent Protection , WT/DS170/R, adopted 
12 October 2000, upheld by Appellate Body Report WT/DS170/AB/R, DSR 2000:XI, p. 5121 
Canada – Patent Term 
(Article 21.3(c)) Award of the Arbitrator, Canada – Term of Patent Protection – Arbitration 
under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU , WT/DS170/10, 28 February 2001, 
DSR 2001:V, p. 2031 
Canada – Periodicals Appellate Body Report, Canada – Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals , 
WT/DS31/AB/R, adopted 30 July 1997, DSR 1997:I, p. 449 
Canada – Periodicals Panel Report, Canada – Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals , 
WT/DS31/R and Corr.1, adopted 30 July 1997, as modified by Appellate 
Body Report WT/DS31/AB/R, DSR 1997:I, p. 481 
Canada – Pharmaceutical 
Patents Panel Report, Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products , 
WT/DS114/R, adopted 7 April 2000, DSR 2000:V, p. 2289 
Canada – Pharmaceutical 
Patents  
(Article 21.3(c)) Award of the Arbitrator, Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical 
Products – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU , WT/DS114/13, 
18 August 2000, DSR 2002:I, p. 3 
Canada – Renewable Energy / 
Canada – Feed-in Tariff 
Program  Appellate Body Reports, Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable 
Energy Generation Sector / Canada – Me asures Relating to the Feed-in Tariff 
Program , WT/DS412/AB/R / WT/DS426/AB/R, adopted 24 May 2013 WT/AB/24 
 
- 136 - 
 
  Short title Full case title and citation 
Canada – Renewable Energy / 
Canada – Feed-in Tariff 
Program Panel Reports, Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy 
Generation Sector / Canada – Measures Relating to the Feed-in Tariff Program , 
WT/DS412/R / WT/DS426/R / and Add.1, adopted 24 May 2013, as modified 
by Appellate Body Reports WT/DS412/AB/R / WT/DS426/AB/R  
Canada – Wheat Exports and 
Grain Imports Appellate Body Report, Canada – Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and 
Treatment of Imported Grain , WT/DS276/AB/R, adopted 27 September 
2004, DSR 2004:VI, p. 2739 
Canada – Wheat Exports and 
Grain Imports Panel Report, Canada – Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and 
Treatment of Imported Grain , WT/DS276/R, adopted 27 September 2004, 
upheld by Appellate Body Report WT/DS276/AB/R, DSR 2004:VI, p. 2817 
Chile – Alcoholic Beverages Appellate Body Report, Chile – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages , 
WT/DS87/AB/R, WT/DS110/AB/R, adopted 12 January 2000, DSR 2000:I, p. 281 
Chile – Alcoholic Beverages Panel Report, Chile – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages , WT/DS87/R, 
WT/DS110/R, adopted 12 January 2000, as modified by Appellate Body 
Report WT/DS87/AB/R, WT/DS110/AB/R, DSR 2000:I, p. 303 
Chile – Alcoholic Beverages 
(Article 21.3(c)) Award of the Arbitrator, Chile – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages – Arbitration 
under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU , WT/DS87/15, WT/DS110/14, 23 May 2000, 
DSR 2000:V, p. 2583 
Chile – Price Band System Appellate Body Report, Chile – Price Band System and Safeguard Measures 
Relating to Certain Agricultural Products , WT/DS207/AB/R, adopted 
23 October 2002, DSR 2002: VIII, p. 3045 (Corr.1, DSR 2006:XII, p. 5473) 
Chile – Price Band System Panel Report, Chile – Price Band System and Safeguard Measures Relating to 
Certain Agricultural Products , WT/DS207/R, adopted 23 October 2002, as 
modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS207AB/R, DSR 2002:VIII, p. 3127 
Chile – Price Band System 
(Article 21.3(c)) Award of the Arbitrator, Chile – Price Band System and Safeguard Measures 
Relating to Certain Agricultural Products  – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of 
the DSU , WT/DS207/13, 17 March 2003, DSR 2003:III, p. 1237 
Chile – Price Band System 
(Article 21.5 – Argentina) Appellate Body Report, Chile – Price Band System and Safeguard Measures 
Relating to Certain Agricultural Produc ts – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the 
DSU by Argentina , WT/DS207/AB/RW, adopted 22 May 2007, DSR 2007:II, 
p. 513 
Chile – Price Band System 
(Article 21.5 – Argentina) Panel Report, Chile – Price Band System and Safeguard Measures Relating to 
Certain Agricultural Products – Reco urse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by 
Argentina , WT/DS207/RW and Corr.1, adopted 22 May 2007, upheld by 
Appellate Body Report WT/DS207/AB/RW, DSR 2007:II, p. 613 
China – Auto Parts Appellate Body Reports, China – Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile 
Parts, WT/DS339/AB/R / WT/DS340/AB/R / WT/DS342/AB/R, adopted 
12 January 2009, DSR 2009:I, p. 3 
China – Auto Parts Panel Reports, China – Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile Parts , 
WT/DS339/R / WT/DS340/R / WT/DS342/ R / Add.1 and Add.2, adopted 
12 January 2009, upheld (WT/DS339/R) and as modified (WT/DS340/R / 
WT/DS342/R) by Appellate Body Repo rts WT/DS339/AB/R / WT/DS340/AB/R 
/ WT/DS342/AB/R, DSR 2009:I, p. 119 
China – Autos (US) Panel Report, China – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties 
on Certain Automobiles from the United States , WT/DS440/R and Add.1, 
adopted 18 June 2014 
China – Broiler Products Panel Report, China  Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty Measures on 
Broiler Products from the United States , WT/DS427/R and Add.1, adopted 
25 September 2013 
China – Electronic Payment 
Services Panel Report, China – Certain Measures A ffecting Electronic Payment 
Services , WT/DS413/R and Add.1, adopted 31 August 2012, DSR 2012:X, 
p. 5305 
China – GOES Appellate Body Report, China – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Duties on 
Grain Oriented Flat-Rolled Electrical Steel from the United States , 
WT/DS414/AB/R, adopted 16 November 2012, DSR 2012:XII, p. 6251 
China – GOES Panel Report, China – Countervailing and Anti -Dumping Duties on Grain 
Oriented Flat-Rolled Electrical Steel from the United States , WT/DS414/R 
and Add.1, adopted 16 November 2012, upheld by Appellate Body Report WT/DS414/AB/R, DSR 2012:XII, p. 6369 WT/AB/24 
 
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  Short title Full case title and citation 
China – GOES  
(Article 21.3(c)) Award of the Arbitrator, China – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Duties on 
Grain Oriented Flat-Rolled Electrical Steel from the United States – Arbitration 
under Article 21.3(c) of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing 
the Settlement of Disputes , WT/DS414/12, 3 May 2013 
China – HP-SSST (Japan)/ 
China – HP-SSST (EU) Panel Reports, China – Measures Imposing Anti-Dumping Duties on High-
Performance Stainless Steel Seamless Tubes ("HP-SSST") from Japan / 
China – Measures Imposing Anti-Dum ping Duties on High-Performance 
Stainless Steel Seamle ss Tubes ("HP-SSST") from the European Union , 
WT/DS454/R / WT/DS460/R / and Add.1, circulated to WTO Members 13 February 2015 [adoption/appeal pending] 
China – Intellectual Property 
Rights Panel Report, China – Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of 
Intellectual Property Rights , WT/DS362/R, adopted 20 March 2009, 
DSR 2009:V, p. 2097 
China – Publications and 
Audiovisual Products Appellate Body Report, China –  Measures Affecting Trading Rights and 
Distribution Services for Certain Publ ications and Audiovisual Entertainment 
Products , WT/DS363/AB/R, adopted 19 January 2010, DSR 2010:I, p. 3 
China – Publications and 
Audiovisual Products Panel Report, China –  Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Di stribution 
Services for Certain Publications an d Audiovisual Entertainment Products , 
WT/DS363/R and Corr.1, adopted 19 January 2010, as modified by Appellate 
Body Report WT/DS363/AB/R, DSR 2010:II, p. 261 
China – Rare Earths Appellate Body Reports, China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare 
Earths, Tungsten, and Molybdenum , WT/DS431/AB/R / WT/DS432/AB/R / 
WT/DS433/AB/R, adopted 29 August 2014 
China – Rare Earths Panel Reports, China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths, 
Tungsten, and Molybdenum , WT/DS431/R / WT/DS432/R / WT/DS433/R / and 
Add.1, adopted 29 August 2014, upheld by Appellate Body Reports 
WT/DS431/AB/R / WT/DS432/AB/R / WT/DS433/AB/R 
China – Raw Materials Appellate Body Reports, China – Measures Related to the Exportation of 
Various Raw Materials , WT/DS394/AB/R / WT/DS395/AB/R / 
WT/DS398/AB/R, adopted 22 February 2012, DSR 2012:VII, p. 3295 
China – Raw Materials  Panel Reports, China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw 
Materials , WT/DS394/R / WT/DS395/R / WT/DS398/R / Add.1 and Corr.1, 
adopted 22 February 2012, as modified by Appellate Body Reports 
WT/DS394/AB/R / WT/DS395/AB/R / WT/DS398/AB/R, DSR 2012:VII, 
p. 3501 
China – X-Ray Equipment Panel Report,  China – Definitive Anti-Dumpi ng Duties on X-Ray Security 
Inspection Equipment from the European Union , WT/DS425/R and Add.1, 
adopted 24 April 2013  
Colombia – Ports of Entry Panel Report, Colombia – Indicative Prices and Restrictions on Ports of Entry , 
WT/DS366/R and Corr.1, adopted 20 May 2009, DSR 2009:VI, p. 2535 
Colombia – Ports of Entry 
(Article 21.3(c)) Award of the Arbitrator, Colombia – Indicative Prices and Restrictions on 
Ports of Entry – Arbitration un der Article 21.3(c) of the DSU , WT/DS366/13, 
2 October 2009, DSR 2009:IX, p. 3819 
Dominican Republic – Import 
and Sale of Cigarettes Appellate Body Report, Dominican Republic – Measures Affecting the 
Importation and Internal Sale of Cigarettes , WT/DS302/AB/R, adopted 
19 May 2005, DSR 2005:XV, p. 7367 
Dominican Republic – Import 
and Sale of Cigarettes Panel Report, Dominican Republic – Measures Affecting the Importation and 
Internal Sale of Cigarettes , WT/DS302/R, adopted 19 May 2005, as modified 
by Appellate Body Report WT/DS302/AB/R, DSR 2005:XV, p. 7425 
Dominican Republic – Import 
and Sale of Cigarettes  
(Article 21.3(c)) Report of the Arbitrator, Dominican Republic – Measures Affecting the 
Importation and Internal Sale of Cigarettes  – Arbitration under 
Article 21.3(c) of the DSU , WT/DS302/17, 29 Augu st 2005, DSR 2005:XXIII, 
p. 11665 
Dominican Republic – 
Safeguard Measures Panel Report, Dominican Republic – Safeguard Measures on Imports of 
Polypropylene Bags and Tubular Fabric , WT/DS415/R, WT/DS416/R, 
WT/DS417/R, WT/DS418/R, and Add.1, adopted 22 February 2012, DSR 2012:XIII, p. 6775 
EC – The ACP-EC Partnership 
Agreement Award of the Arbitrator, European Communities – The ACP-EC Partnership 
Agreement – Recourse to Arbitration Pursuant to the Decision of 
14 November 2001 , WT/L/616, 1 August 2005, DSR 2005:XXIII, p. 11669 WT/AB/24 
 
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  Short title Full case title and citation 
EC – The ACP-EC Partnership 
Agreement II Award of the Arbitrator, European Communities – The ACP-EC Partnership 
Agreement – Second Recourse to Arbitration Pursuant to the Decision of 14 November 2001 , WT/L/625, 27 October 2005, DSR 2005:XXIII, p. 11703 
EC – Approval and Marketing of 
Biotech Products Panel Reports, European Communities – Measur es Affecting the Approval 
and Marketing of Biotech Products , WT/DS291/R / WT/DS292/R / 
WT/DS293/R / Add.1 to Add.9 and Corr.1, adopted 21 November 2006, 
DSR 2006:III, p. 847 
EC – Asbestos Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting 
Asbestos and Asbestos -Containing Products , WT/DS135/AB/R, adopted 
5 April 2001, DSR 2001:VII, p. 3243 
EC – Asbestos Panel Report, European Communities – Measur es Affecting Asbestos and 
Asbestos-Containing Products , WT/DS135/R and Add.1, adopted 5 April 
2001, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS135/AB/R, 
DSR 2001:VIII, p. 3305 
EC – Bananas III Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Regime for the 
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas , WT/DS27/AB/R, adopted 
25 September 1997, DSR 1997:II, p. 591 
EC – Bananas III (Ecuador) Panel Report, European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and 
Distribution of Bananas, Complaint by Ecuador , WT/DS27/R/ECU, adopted 
25 September 1997, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS27/AB/R, 
DSR 1997:III, p. 1085 
EC – Bananas III (Guatemala 
and Honduras) Panel Report, European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and 
Distribution of Bananas, Comp laint by Guatemala and Honduras , 
WT/DS27/R/GTM, WT/DS27/R/HND, adopted 25 September 1997, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS27/AB/R, DSR 1997:II, p. 695 
EC – Bananas III (Mexico) Panel Report, European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and 
Distribution of Bananas, Complaint by Mexico , WT/DS27/R/MEX, adopted 
25 September 1997, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS27/AB/R, 
DSR 1997:II, p. 803 
EC – Bananas III (US) Panel Report, European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and 
Distribution of Bananas, Complaint by the United States , WT/DS27/R/USA, 
adopted 25 September 1997, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS27/AB/R, DSR 1997:II, p. 943 
EC – Bananas III 
(Article 21.3(c)) Award of the Arbitrator, European Communities – Regime for the 
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas – Arbitration under 
Article 21.3(c) of the DSU , WT/DS27/15, 7 January 1998, DSR 1998:I, p. 3 
EC – Bananas III 
(Article 21.5 – EC) Panel Report, European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and 
Distribution of Bananas – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the European Communities , WT/DS27/RW/EEC, 12 April 1999, and Corr.1, 
unadopted, DSR 1999:II, p. 783 
EC – Bananas III 
(Article 21.5 – Ecuador) Panel Report, European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and 
Distribution of Bananas – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Ecuador , 
WT/DS27/RW/ECU, adopted 6 May 1999, DSR 1999:II, p. 803 
EC – Bananas III 
(Article 21.5 – Ecuador II)  
/  EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – US) Appellate Body Reports, European Communities – Regime for the 
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas – Second Recourse to 
Article 21.5 of the DSU by Ecuador , WT/DS27/AB/RW2/ECU, adopted 
11 December 2008, and Corr.1 / European Communities – Regime for the 
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas – Recourse to Article 21.5 of 
the DSU by the United States , WT/DS27/AB/RW/USA and Corr.1, adopted 
22 December 2008, DSR 2008:XVIII, p. 7165 
EC – Bananas III 
(Article 21.5 – Ecuador II) Panel Report, European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and 
Distribution of Bananas – Second Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by 
Ecuador , WT/DS27/RW2/ECU, adopted 11 December 2008, as modified by 
Appellate Body Report WT/DS27/ AB/RW2/ECU, DSR 2008:XVIII, p. 7329 
EC – Bananas III 
(Article 21.5 – US) Panel Report, European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and 
Distribution of Bananas – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United 
States , WT/DS27/RW/USA and Corr.1, adopted 22 December 2008, upheld 
by Appellate Body Report WT/DS27/AB/RW/USA, DSR 2008:XIX, p. 7761 
EC – Bananas III (Ecuador) 
(Article 22.6 – EC) Decision by the Arbitrators, European Communitie s – Regime for the 
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas – Recourse to Arbitration by 
the European Communities unde r Article 22.6 of the DSU , 
WT/DS27/ARB/ECU, 24 March 2000, DSR 2000:V, p. 2237 WT/AB/24 
 
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  Short title Full case title and citation 
EC – Bananas III (US) 
(Article 22.6 – EC) Decision by the Arbitrators, European Communitie s – Regime for the 
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas – Recourse to Arbitration by 
the European Communities unde r Article 22.6 of the DSU , WT/DS27/ARB, 
9 April 1999, DSR 1999:II, p. 725 
EC – Bed Linen Appellate Body Report, European Communities – An ti-Dumping Duties on 
Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India , WT/DS141/AB/R, adopted 
12 March 2001, DSR 2001:V, p. 2049 
EC – Bed Linen Panel Report, European Communities – Anti-Dum ping Duties on Imports of 
Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India , WT/DS141/R, adopted 12 March 2001, as 
modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS141/AB/R, DSR 2001:VI, p. 2077 
EC – Bed Linen 
(Article 21.5 – India) Appellate Body Report, European Communities – An ti-Dumping Duties on 
Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India – Recourse to Article 21.5 of 
the DSU  by India , WT/DS141/AB/RW, adopted 24 April 2003, DSR 2003:III, 
p. 965  
EC – Bed Linen 
(Article 21.5 – India) Panel Report, European Communities – Anti-Dum ping Duties on Imports of 
Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU  by 
India, WT/DS141/RW, adopted 24 April 2003, as modified by Appellate Body 
Report WT/DS141/AB/RW, DSR 2003:IV, p. 1269  
EC – Butter Panel Report, European Communities – Measur es Affecting Butter Products , 
WT/DS72/R, 24 November 1999, unadopted 
EC – Chicken Cuts Appellate Body Report, European  Communities – Customs Classification of 
Frozen Boneless Chicken Cuts , WT/DS269/AB/R, WT/DS286/AB/R, adopted 
27 September 2005, and Corr.1, DSR 2005:XIX, p. 9157 
EC – Chicken Cuts (Brazil) Panel Report, European  Communities – Customs Classification of Frozen 
Boneless Chicken Cuts, Complaint by Brazil , WT/DS269/R, adopted 
27 September 2005, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS269/AB/R, 
WT/DS286/AB/R, DSR 2005:XIX, p. 9295 
EC – Chicken Cuts (Thailand) Panel Report, European  Communities – Customs Classification of Frozen 
Boneless Chicken Cuts, Complaint by Thailand , WT/DS286/R, adopted 
27 September 2005, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS269/AB/R, 
WT/DS286/AB/R, DSR 2005:XX, p. 9721 
EC – Chicken Cuts 
(Article 21.3(c)) Award of the Arbitrator, European Communities – Cu stoms Classification of 
Frozen Boneless Chicken Cuts – Arbitr ation under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU , 
WT/DS269/13, WT/DS286/15, 20 February 2006 
EC – Commercial Vessels Panel Report, European Communities – Meas ures Affecting Trade in 
Commercial Vessels , WT/DS301/R, adopted 20 June 2005, DSR 2005:XV, 
p. 7713 
EC – Computer Equipment Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Customs Classification of 
Certain Computer Equipment , WT/DS62/AB/R, WT/DS67/AB/R, 
WT/DS68/AB/R, adopted 22 June 1998, DSR 1998:V, p. 1851 
EC – Computer Equipment Panel Report, European Communities – Custom s Classification of Certain 
Computer Equipment , WT/DS62/R, WT/DS67/R, WT/DS68/R, adopted 
22 June 1998, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS62/AB/R, WT/DS67/AB/R, WT/DS68/AB/R, DSR 1998:V, p. 1891 
EC – Countervailing Measures 
on DRAM Chips Panel Report, European Communities – Counterv ailing Measures on Dynamic 
Random Access Memo ry Chips from Korea , WT/DS299/R, adopted 3 August 
2005, DSR 2005:XVIII, p. 8671 
EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Export Subsidies on Sugar , 
WT/DS265/AB/R, WT/DS266/AB/R, WT/D S283/AB/R, adopted 19 May 2005, 
DSR 2005:XIII, p. 6365 
EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar 
(Australia) Panel Report, European Communities – Expo rt Subsidies on Sugar, 
Complaint by Australia , WT/DS265/R, adopted 19 May 2005, as modified by 
Appellate Body Report WT/DS265/AB /R, WT/DS266/AB/R, WT/DS283/AB/R, 
DSR 2005:XIII, p. 6499 
EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar 
(Brazil) Panel Report, European Communities – Expo rt Subsidies on Sugar, 
Complaint by Brazil , WT/DS266/R, adopted 19 May 2005, as modified by 
Appellate Body Report WT/DS265/AB /R, WT/DS266/AB/R, WT/DS283/AB/R, 
DSR 2005:XIV, p. 6793 WT/AB/24 
 
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  Short title Full case title and citation 
EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar 
(Thailand) Panel Report, European Communities – Expo rt Subsidies on Sugar, 
Complaint by Thailand , WT/DS283/R, adopted 19 May 2005, as modified by 
Appellate Body Report WT/DS265/AB /R, WT/DS266/AB/R, WT/DS283/AB/R, 
DSR 2005:XIV, p. 7071 
EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar  
(Article 21.3(c)) Award of the Arbitrator, European Communities – Ex port Subsidies on Sugar 
– Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU , WT/DS265/33, WT/DS266/33, 
WT/DS283/14, 28 October 2005, DSR 2005:XXIII, p. 11581 
EC – Fasteners (China) Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Definitive Anti-Dumping 
Measures on Certain Iron or  Steel Fasteners from China , WT/DS397/AB/R, 
adopted 28 July 2011, DSR 2 011:VII, p. 3995 
EC – Fasteners (China) Panel Report, European Communities – Definiti ve Anti-Dumping Measures on 
Certain Iron or Stee l Fasteners from China , WT/DS397/R and Corr.1, 
adopted 28 July 2011, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS397/AB/R, DSR 2011:VIII, p. 4289 
EC – Hormones Appellate Body Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products 
(Hormones) , WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, adopted 13 February 1998, 
DSR 1998:I, p. 135 
EC – Hormones (Canada) Panel Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), 
Complaint by Canada , WT/DS48/R/CAN, adopted 13 February 1998, as 
modified by Appellate Body Repo rt WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, 
DSR 1998:II, p. 235 
EC – Hormones (US) Panel Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), 
Complaint by the United States , WT/DS26/R/USA, adopted 13 February 
1998, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS26/AB/R, 
WT/DS48/AB/R, DSR 1998:III, p. 699 
EC – Hormones 
(Article 21.3(c)) Award of the Arbitrator, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products 
(Hormones) – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU , WT/DS26/15, 
WT/DS48/13, 29 May 1998, DSR 1998:V, p. 1833 
EC – Hormones (Canada) 
(Article 22.6 – EC) Decision by the Arbitrators, European Communities – Measures Concerning 
Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) , Original Complaint by Canada – 
Recourse to Arbitration by the Europe an Communities under Article 22.6 of 
the DSU , WT/DS48/ARB, 12 July 1999, DSR 1999:III, p. 1135 
EC – Hormones (US) 
(Article 22.6 – EC) Decision by the Arbitrators, European Communities – Measures Concerning 
Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), Original Complaint by the United States – Recourse to Arbitration by the European Communities under 
Article 22.6 of the DSU , WT/DS26/ARB, 12 July 1999, DSR 1999:III, p. 1105 
EC – IT Products Panel Reports, European Communities and it s member States – Tariff 
Treatment of Certain Information Technology Products , WT/DS375/R / 
WT/DS376/R / WT/DS377/R, adopted 21 September 2010, DSR 2010:III, 
p. 933 
EC – Poultry Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting the 
Importation of Certain Poultry Products , WT/DS69/AB/R, adopted 23 July 
1998, DSR 1998:V, p. 2031 
EC – Poultry Panel Report, European Communities – Measur es Affecting the Importation 
of Certain Poultry Products , WT/DS69/R, adopted 23 July 1998, as modified 
by Appellate Body Report WT/DS69/AB/R, DSR 1998:V, p. 2089 
EC – Salmon (Norway) Panel Report, European Communities – Anti-Dumping Measure on Farmed 
Salmon from Norway , WT/DS337/R, adopted 15 January 2008, and Corr.1, 
DSR 2008:I, p. 3 
EC – Sardines Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Trade Description of 
Sardines , WT/DS231/AB/R, adopted 23 October 2002, DSR 2002:VIII, 
p. 3359 
EC – Sardines Panel Report, European Communities – Trad e Description of Sardines , 
WT/DS231/R and Corr.1, adopted 23 October 2002, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS231/AB/R, DSR 2002:VIII, p. 3451 
EC – Scallops (Canada) Panel Report, European Communities – Trade Description of Scallops  
– Request by Canada , WT/DS7/R, 5 August 1996, unadopted, DSR 1996:I, 
p. 89 
EC – Scallops (Peru and Chile) Panel Report, European Communities – Trade Description of Scallops – 
Requests by Peru  and Chile , WT/DS12/R, WT/DS14/R, 5 August 1996, 
unadopted, DSR 1996:I, p. 93 WT/AB/24 
 
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EC – Seal Products Appellate Body Reports, European Communities – Measures Prohibiting the 
Importation and Marketing of Seal Products , WT/DS400/AB/R / 
WT/DS401/AB/R, adopted 18 June 2014 
EC – Seal Products Panel Reports, European Communities – Measures  Prohibiting the Importation 
and Marketing of Seal Products , WT/DS400/R / WT/DS401/R / and Add.1, 
adopted 18 June 2014, as modified by Appellate Body Reports WT/DS400/AB/R / WT/DS401/AB/R 
EC – Selected Customs Matters Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Selected Customs Matters , 
WT/DS315/AB/R, adopted 11 December 2006, DSR 2006:IX, p. 3791 
EC – Selected Customs Matters Panel Report, European Communities – Selected Customs Matters , 
WT/DS315/R, adopted 11 December 2006, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS315/AB/R, DSR 2006:IX, p. 3915 
EC – Tariff Preferences Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Conditions for the Granting 
of Tariff Preferences to  Developing Countries , WT/DS246/AB/R, adopted 
20 April 2004, DSR 2004:III, p. 925 
EC – Tariff Preferences Panel Report, European Communities – Conditio ns for the Granting of Tariff 
Preferences to Developing Countries , WT/DS246/R, adopted 20 April 2004, 
as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS246/AB/R, DSR 2004:III, 
p. 1009 
EC – Tariff Preferences 
(Article 21.3(c)) Award of the Arbitrator, European Communities – Cond itions for the Granting 
of Tariff Preferences to  Developing Countries  – Arbitration under 
Article 21.3(c) of the DSU , WT/DS246/14, 20 September 2004, 
DSR 2004:IX, p. 4313 
EC – Trademarks and 
Geographical Indications 
(Australia) Panel Report,  European Communities – Prot ection of Trademarks and 
Geographical Indications for Agricultur al Products and Foodstuffs, Complaint 
by Australia , WT/DS290/R, adopted 20 April 2005, DSR 2005:X, p. 4603 
EC – Trademarks and 
Geographical Indications (US) Panel Report,  European Communities – Prot ection of Trademarks and 
Geographical Indications for Agricultur al Products and Foodstuffs, Complaint 
by the United States , WT/DS174/R, adopted 20 April 2005, DSR 2005:VIII, 
p. 3499 
EC – Tube or Pipe Fittings Appellate Body Report, European Communities – An ti-Dumping Duties on 
Malleable Cast Iron Tube or  Pipe Fittings from Brazil , WT/DS219/AB/R, 
adopted 18 August 2003, DSR 2003:VI, p. 2613 
EC – Tube or Pipe Fittings Panel Report, European Communities – Anti-D umping Duties on Malleable 
Cast Iron Tube or Pipe Fittings from Brazil , WT/DS219/R, adopted 18 August 
2003, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS219/AB/R, DSR 2003:VII, 
p. 2701 
EC and certain member States 
– Large Civil Aircraft Appellate Body Report, European Communities and Certain Member States  
– Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft , WT/DS316/AB/R, adopted 
1 June 2011, DSR 2011:I, p. 7 
EC and certain member States 
– Large Civil Aircraft Panel Report, European Communities and Certai n Member States – Measures 
Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft , WT/DS316/R, adopted 1 June 2011, as 
modified by Appellate Body Report, WT/DS316/AB/R, DSR 2011:II, p. 685 
Egypt – Steel Rebar Panel Report, Egypt – Definitive Anti-Dumping  Measures on Steel Rebar from 
Turkey , WT/DS211/R, adopted 1 October 2002, DSR 2002:VII, p. 2667 
EU – Footwear (China) Panel Report, European Union – Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Footwear 
from China , WT/DS405/R, adopted 22 February 2012, DSR 2012:IX, p. 4585 
Guatemala – Cement I Appellate Body Report, Guatemala – Anti-Dumping Investigation Regarding 
Portland Cement from Mexico , WT/DS60/AB/R, adopted 25 November 1998, 
DSR 1998:IX, p. 3767 
Guatemala – Cement I Panel Report, Guatemala – Anti-Dumping Investigation Regarding Portland 
Cement from Mexico , WT/DS60/R, adopted 25 November 1998, as reversed 
by Appellate Body Report WT/DS60/AB/R, DSR 1998:IX, p. 3797 
Guatemala – Cement II Panel Report, Guatemala – Definiti ve Anti-Dumping Measures on Grey 
Portland Cement from Mexico , WT/DS156/R, adopted 17 November 2000, 
DSR 2000:XI, p. 5295 
India – Additional Import 
Duties Appellate Body Report, India – Additional and Extr a-Additional Duties on 
Imports from the United States , WT/DS360/AB/R, adopted 17 November 
2008, DSR 2008:XX, p. 8223 WT/AB/24 
 
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  Short title Full case title and citation 
India – Additional Import 
Duties Panel Report, India – Additional and Extra-Addi tional Duties on Imports from 
the United States , WT/DS360/R, adopted 17 November 2008, as reversed by 
Appellate Body Report WT/DS360/AB/R, DSR 2008:XX, p. 8317 
India – Agricultural Products Panel Report, India – Measures Concerning the Importation of Certain 
Agricultural Products , WT/DS430/R and Add.1, circulated to WTO Members 
14 October 2014 [appealed/adoption pending] 
India – Autos Appellate Body Report, India – Measures Affectin g the Automotive Sector , 
WT/DS146/AB/R, WT/DS175/AB/R, adopted 5 April 2002, DSR 2002:V, 
p. 1821 
India – Autos Panel Report, India – Measures Affecting the Automotive Sector , 
WT/DS146/R, WT/DS175/R and Corr.1, adopted 5 April 2002, DSR 2002:V, 
p. 1827 
India – Patents (EC) Panel Report, India – Patent Protection for Ph armaceutical and Agricultural 
Chemical Products, Complaint by the European Communities and their member States , WT/DS79/R, adopted 22 September 1998, DSR 1998:VI, 
p. 2661 
India – Patents (US) Appellate Body Report, India – Patent Protection  for Pharmaceutical and 
Agricultural Chemical Products , WT/DS50/AB/R, adopted 16 January 1998, 
DSR 1998:I, p. 9 
India – Patents (US) Panel Report, India – Patent Protection for Ph armaceutical and Agricultural 
Chemical Products, Complaint by the United States , WT/DS50/R, adopted 
16 January 1998, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS50/AB/R, DSR 1998:I, p. 41 
India – Quantitative 
Restrictions Appellate Body Report, India – Quantitative Rest rictions on Imports of 
Agricultural, Textile an d Industrial Products , WT/DS90/AB/R, adopted 
22 September 1999, DSR 1999:IV, p. 1763 
India – Quantitative 
Restrictions Panel Report, India – Quantitative Restrictions  on Imports of Agricultural, 
Textile and Industrial Products , WT/DS90/R, adopted 22 September 1999, 
upheld by Appellate Body Report WT/DS90/AB/R, DSR 1999:V, p. 1799 
Indonesia – Autos Panel Report, Indonesia – Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile 
Industry , WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, WT/DS 59/R, WT/DS64/R and Corr.1 and 
Corr.2, adopted 23 July 1998, and Corr.3 and Corr.4, DSR 1998:VI, p. 2201 
Indonesia – Autos 
(Article 21.3(c)) Award of the Arbitrator, Indonesia – Certain Me asures Affecting the 
Automobile Industry – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU , 
WT/DS54/15, WT/DS55/14, WT/DS59/13, WT/DS64/12, 7 December 1998, DSR 1998:IX, p. 4029 
Japan – Agricultural Products II Appellate Body Report, Japan – Measures Affecting Agricultural Products , 
WT/DS76/AB/R, adopted 19 March 1999, DSR 1999:I, p. 277 
Japan – Agricultural Products II Panel Report, Japan – Measures Affecting Agricultural Products , WT/DS76/R, 
adopted 19 March 1999, as modified by Appellate Body Report 
WT/DS76/AB/R, DSR 1999:I, p. 315 
Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II Appellate Body Report, Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages , 
WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R, adopted 1 November 1996, 
DSR 1996:I, p. 97 
Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II Panel Report, Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages , WT/DS8/R, 
WT/DS10/R, WT/DS11/R, adopted 1 November 1996, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS8/AB/ R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R, 
DSR 1996:I, p. 125 
Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II 
(Article 21.3(c)) Award of the Arbitrator, Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages – Arbitration 
under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU , WT/DS8/15, WT/DS10/15, WT/DS11/13, 
14 February 1997, DSR 1997:I, p. 3 
Japan – Apples Appellate Body Report, Japan – Measures Affecting the Importation of 
Apples , WT/DS245/AB/R, adopted 10 December 2003, DSR 2003:IX, 
p. 4391 
Japan – Apples Panel Report, Japan – Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples , 
WT/DS245/R, adopted 10 December 2003, upheld by Appellate Body Report 
WT/DS245/AB/R, DSR 2003:IX, p. 4481  
Japan – Apples 
(Article 21.5 – US) Panel Report, Japan – Measures Affecting th e Importation of Apples  
– Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United States , WT/DS245/RW, 
adopted 20 July 2005, DSR 2005:XVI, p. 7911 WT/AB/24 
 
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  Short title Full case title and citation 
Japan – DRAMs (Korea) Appellate Body Report, Japan – Countervailing Duties on Dynamic Random 
Access Memories from Korea , WT/DS336/AB/R and Corr.1, adopted 
17 December 2007, DSR 2007:VII, p. 2703 
Japan – DRAMs (Korea) Panel Report, Japan – Countervailing Duties on Dynamic Random Access 
Memories from Korea , WT/DS336/R, adopted 17 December 2007, as 
modified by Appellate Body Report WT /DS336/AB/R, DSR 2007:VII, p. 2805 
Japan – DRAMs (Korea) 
(Article 21.3(c)) Award of the Arbitrator, Japan – Countervailing Duties on Dynamic Random 
Access Memories from Korea – Arbitratio n under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU , 
WT/DS336/16, 5 May 2008, DSR 2008:XX, p. 8553 
Japan – Film Panel Report, Japan – Measures Affecting Cons umer Photographic Film and 
Paper , WT/DS44/R, adopted 22 April 1998, DSR 1998:IV, p. 1179 
Japan – Quotas on Laver Panel Report, Japan – Import Quotas on Dr ied Laver and Seasoned Laver , 
WT/DS323/R, 1 February 2006, unadopted 
Korea – Alcoholic Beverages Appellate Body Report, Korea – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages , 
WT/DS75/AB/R, WT/DS84/AB/R, adopted 17 February 1999, DSR 1999:I, 
p. 3 
Korea – Alcoholic Beverages Panel Report, Korea – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages , WT/DS75/R, 
WT/DS84/R, adopted 17 February 1999, as modified by Appellate Body 
Report WT/DS75/AB/R, WT/DS84/AB/R, DSR 1999:I, p. 44 
Korea – Alcoholic Beverages  
(Article 21.3(c)) Award of the Arbitrator, Korea – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages – Arbitration 
under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU , WT/DS75/16, WT/DS84/14, 4 June 1999, 
DSR 1999:II, p. 937 
Korea – Bovine Meat (Canada) Panel Report, Korea – Measures Affecting the Importation of Bovine Meat 
and Meat Products from Canada , WT/DS391/R, 3 July 2012, unadopted 
Korea – Certain Paper Panel Report, Korea – Anti-Dumping Duties on  Imports of Certain Paper from 
Indonesia , WT/DS312/R, adopted 28 November 2005, DSR 2005:XXII, 
p. 10637 
Korea – Certain Paper 
(Article 21.5 – Indonesia) Panel Report, Korea – Anti-Dumping Duties on  Imports of Certain Paper from 
Indonesia – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Indonesia , 
WT/DS312/RW, adopted 22 Octobe r 2007, DSR 2007:V III, p. 3369 
Korea – Commercial Vessels Panel Report, Korea – Measures Affecting Trade in Commercial Vessels , 
WT/DS273/R, adopted 11 April 2005, DSR 2005:VII, p. 2749 
Korea – Dairy Appellate Body Report, Korea – Definitive Safeguar d Measure on Imports of 
Certain Dairy Products , WT/DS98/AB/R, adopted 12 January 2000, 
DSR 2000:I, p. 3 
Korea – Dairy Panel Report, Korea – Definitive Safeguard Me asure on Imports of Certain 
Dairy Products , WT/DS98/R and Corr.1, adopted 12 January 2000, as 
modified by Appellate Body Report  WT/DS98/AB/R, DSR 2000:I, p. 49 
Korea – Procurement Panel Report, Korea – Measures Affectin g Government Procurement , 
WT/DS163/R, adopted 19 June 2000, DSR 2000:VIII, p. 3541 
Korea – Various Measures on 
Beef Appellate Body Report, Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled 
and Frozen Beef , WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/ AB/R, adopted 10 January 
2001, DSR 2001:I, p. 5 
Korea – Various Measures on 
Beef Panel Report, Korea – Measures Affecting Im ports of Fresh, Chilled and 
Frozen Beef , WT/DS161/R, WT/DS169/R, adopted 10 January 2001, as 
modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R, 
DSR 2001:I, p. 59 
Mexico – Anti-Dumping 
Measures on Rice Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Beef 
and Rice, Complaint with Respect to Rice , WT/DS295/AB/R, adopted 
20 December 2005, DSR 2005:XXII, p. 10853 
Mexico – Anti-Dumping 
Measures on Rice Panel Report, Mexico – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Beef and Rice, 
Complaint with Respect to Rice , WT/DS295/R, adopted 20 December 2005, 
as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS295/AB/R, DSR 2005:XXIII, 
p. 11007 
Mexico – Corn Syrup Panel Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Investigation of High Fructose Corn 
Syrup (HFCS) from the United States , WT/DS132/R, adopted 24 February 
2000, and Corr.1, DSR 2000:III, p. 1345 WT/AB/24 
 
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  Short title Full case title and citation 
Mexico – Corn Syrup 
(Article 21.5 – US) Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Investigation of High 
Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) from the United States – Recourse to 
Article 21.5 of the DSU  by the United States , WT/DS132/AB/RW, adopted 
21 November 2001, DSR 2001:XIII, p. 6675 
Mexico – Corn Syrup 
(Article 21.5 – US) Panel Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Investigation of High Fructose Corn 
Syrup (HFCS) from the United States – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU  
by the United States , WT/DS132/RW, adopted 21 November 2001, upheld by 
Appellate Body Report WT/DS132/AB/RW, DSR 2001:XIII, p. 6717 
Mexico – Olive Oil Panel Report, Mexico – Definitive Countervailing Measures on Olive Oil from 
the European Communities , WT/DS341/R, adopted 21 October 2008, 
DSR 2008:IX, p. 3179 
Mexico – Steel Pipes and Tubes Panel Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Duties on Steel Pipes and Tubes from 
Guatemala , WT/DS331/R, adopted 24 July 2007, DSR 2007:IV, p. 1207 
Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Tax Measures on  Soft Drinks and Other 
Beverages , WT/DS308/AB/R, adopted 24 March 2006, DSR 2006:I, p. 3 
Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks Panel Report, Mexico – Tax Measures on Soft  Drinks and Other Beverages , 
WT/DS308/R, adopted 24 March 2006, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS308/AB/R, DSR 2006:I, p. 43 
Mexico – Telecoms Panel Report, Mexico – Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services , 
WT/DS204/R, adopted 1 June 2004, DSR 2004:IV, p. 1537 
Peru – Agricultural Products Panel Report, Peru – Additional Duty on Im ports of Certain Agricultural 
Products , WT/DS457/R and Add.1, circulated to WTO Members 27 November 
2014 [adoption/appeal pending] 
Philippines – Distilled Spirits Appellate Body Reports, Philippines – Taxes on Distilled Spirits , 
WT/DS396/AB/R / WT/DS403/AB/R, adopted 20 January 2012, DSR 
2012:VIII, p. 4163 
Philippines – Distilled Spirits Panel Reports, Philippines – Taxes on Distilled Spirits , WT/DS396/R / 
WT/DS403/R, adopted 20 January 2012, as modified by Appellate Body Reports WT/DS396/AB/R / WT/DS403/AB/R, DSR 2012:VIII, p. 4271 
Thailand – Cigarettes 
(Philippines) Appellate Body Report, Thailand – Customs and Fiscal  Measures on Cigarettes 
from the Philippines , WT/DS371/AB/R, adopted 15 July 2011, DSR 2011:IV, 
p. 2203 
Thailand – Cigarettes 
(Philippines) Panel Report, Thailand – Customs and Fiscal Me asures on Cigarettes from the 
Philippines , WT/DS371/R, adopted 15 July 2011, as modified by Appellate 
Body Report WT/DS371/AB/R, DSR 2011:IV, p. 2299 
Thailand – H-Beams Appellate Body Report, Thailand – Anti-Dumping Duties on Angles, Shapes 
and Sections of Iron or Non-Alloy Steel and H-Beams from Poland , 
WT/DS122/AB/R, adopted 5 April 2001, DSR 2001:VII, p. 2701 
Thailand – H-Beams Panel Report, Thailand – Anti-Dumping Duties on Angles, Shapes and 
Sections of Iron or Non-Alloy Steel and H-Beams from Poland , WT/DS122/R, 
adopted 5 April 2001, as modifi ed by Appellate Body Report 
WT/DS122/AB/R, DSR 2001:VII, p. 2741 
Turkey – Rice Panel Report, Turkey – Measures Affectin g the Importation of Rice , 
WT/DS334/R, adopted 22 October 2007, DSR 2007:VI, p. 2151 
Turkey – Textiles Appellate Body Report, Turkey – Restrictions on  Imports of Textile and 
Clothing Products , WT/DS34/AB/R, adopted 19 November 1999, 
DSR 1999:VI, p. 2345 
Turkey – Textiles Panel Report, Turkey – Restrictions  on Imports of Textile and Clothing 
Products , WT/DS34/R, adopted 19 November 1999, as modified by Appellate 
Body Report WT/DS34/AB/R, DSR 1999:VI, p. 2363 
US – 1916 Act Appellate Body Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 , 
WT/DS136/AB/R, WT/DS162/AB/R, adopted 26 September 2000, 
DSR 2000:X, p. 4793 
US – 1916 Act (EC) Panel Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, Complaint by the 
European Communities , WT/DS136/R and Corr.1, adopted 26 September 
2000, upheld by Appellate Body Report WT/DS136/AB/R, WT/DS162/AB/R, 
DSR 2000:X, p. 4593 WT/AB/24 
 
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  Short title Full case title and citation 
US – 1916 Act (Japan) Panel Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, Complaint by 
Japan , WT/DS162/R and Add.1, adopted 26 September 2000, upheld by 
Appellate Body Report WT/DS136/ AB/R, WT/DS162/AB/R, DSR 2000:X, 
p. 4831 
US – 1916 Act (Article 21.3(c)) Award of the Arbitrator, United States – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916  
– Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU , WT/DS136/11, WT/DS162/14, 
28 February 2001, DSR 2001:V, p. 2017 
US – 1916 Act (EC) 
(Article 22.6 – US) Decision by the Arbitrators, United States – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, 
Original Complaint by the European Co mmunities – Recourse to Arbitration 
by the United States under Article 22.6 of the DSU , WT/DS136/ARB, 
24 February 2004, DSR 2004:IX, p. 4269 
US – Anti-Dumping and 
Countervailing Duties (China) Appellate Body Report, United States – Definitive Anti-Dumping and 
Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China , WT/DS379/AB/R, 
adopted 25 March 2011, DSR 2011:V, p. 2869 
US – Anti-Dumping and 
Countervailing Duties (China) Panel Report, United States – Definitive An ti-Dumping and Countervailing 
Duties on Certain Products from China , WT/DS379/R, adopted 25 March 2011, 
as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS379/AB/R, DSR 2011:VI, 
p. 3143 
US – Anti-Dumping Measures 
on Oil Country Tubular Goods Appellate Body Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil 
Country Tubular Goods (OCTG) from Mexico , WT/DS282/AB/R, adopted 
28 November 2005, DSR 2005:XX, p. 10127 
US – Anti-Dumping Measures 
on Oil Country Tubular Goods Panel Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular 
Goods (OCTG) from Mexico , WT/DS282/R, adopted 28 November 2005, as 
modified by Appellate Body Repo rt WT/DS282/AB/R, DSR 2005:XXI, 
p. 10225 
US – Anti-Dumping Measures 
on PET Bags Panel Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Polyethylene Retail 
Carrier Bags from Thailand , WT/DS383/R, adopted 18 February 2010, 
DSR 2010:IV, p. 1841 
US – Carbon Steel Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervai ling Duties on Certain 
Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Stee l Flat Products from Germany , 
WT/DS213/AB/R and Corr.1, adopted 19 December 2002, DSR 2002:IX, 
p. 3779 
US – Carbon Steel Panel Report, United States – Countervailing Duties on Certain 
Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Stee l Flat Products from Germany , WT/DS213/R 
and Corr.1, adopted 19 December 2002, as modified by Appellate Body 
Report WT/DS213/AB/R, DSR 2002:IX, p. 3833 
US – Carbon Steel (India) 
 Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervai ling Measures on Certain 
Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Flat Products from India , WT/DS436/AB/R, adopted 
19 December 2014 
US – Carbon Steel (India) 
 Panel Report, United States – Countervailing Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled 
Carbon Steel Flat Pr oducts from India , WT/DS436/R and Add.1, adopted 
19 December 2014, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS436/AB/R 
US – Certain EC Products Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Meas ures on Certain Products 
from the European Communities , WT/DS165/AB/R, adopted 10 January 
2001, DSR 2001:I, p. 373 
US – Certain EC Products Panel Report, United States – Import Measures  on Certain Products from the 
European Communities , WT/DS165/R and Add.1, adopted 10 January 2001, 
as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS165/AB/R, DSR 2001:II, p. 413 
US – Clove Cigarettes Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Production 
and Sale of Clove Cigarettes , WT/DS406/AB/R, adopted 24 April 2012, DSR 
2012: XI, p. 5751 
US – Clove Cigarettes Panel Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of 
Clove Cigarettes , WT/DS406/R, adopted 24 April 2012, as modified by 
Appellate Body Report WT/DS406/AB/R, DSR 2012: XI, p. 5865 
US – Continued Suspension Appellate Body Report, United States – Continued Suspension of Obligations 
in the EC – Hormones Dispute , WT/DS320/AB/R, adopted 14 November 
2008, DSR 2008:X, p. 3507 
US – Continued Suspension Panel Report, United States – Continued Suspension of Obligations in the 
EC – Hormones Dispute , WT/DS320/R and Add.1 to Add.7, adopted 
14 November 2008, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS320/AB/R, 
DSR 2008:XI, p. 3891 WT/AB/24 
 
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  Short title Full case title and citation 
US – Continued Zeroing Appellate Body Report, United States – Continued Existence and Application 
of Zeroing Methodology , WT/DS350/AB/R, adopted 19 February 2009, 
DSR 2009:III, p. 1291 
US – Continued Zeroing Panel Report, United States – Continued Existe nce and Application of Zeroing 
Methodology , WT/DS350/R, adopted 19 February 2009, as modified as 
Appellate Body Report WT/D S350/AB/R, DSR 2009:III, p. 1481 
US – COOL Appellate Body Reports, United States – Certain Country of Origin Labelling 
(COOL) Requirements , WT/DS384/AB/R / WT/DS386/AB/R, adopted 23 July 
2012, DSR 2012:V, p. 2449 
US – COOL Panel Reports, United States – Certain Country of Origin Labelling (COOL) 
Requirements , WT/DS384/R / WT/DS386/R, adopted 23 July 2012, as 
modified by Appellate Body Reports WT/DS384/AB/R / WT/DS386/AB/R, 
DSR 2012:VI, p. 2745 
US – COOL 
(Article 21.3(c)) Award of the Arbitrator, United States – Certain Country of Origin Labelling 
(COOL) Requirements  – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU , 
WT/DS384/24, WT/DS386/23, 4 Dece mber 2012, DSR 2012:XIII, p. 7173 
US – COOL 
(Article 21.5 – Canada and 
Mexico)  Panel Reports, United States – Certain Country of Origin Labelling (COOL) 
Requirements – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Canada and Mexico , 
WT/DS384/RW / WT/DS386/RW / and Add.1, circulated to WTO Members 
20 October 2014 [appealed/adoption pending] 
US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel 
Sunset Review Appellate Body Report, United States – Sunset Review of Anti-Dumping 
Duties on Corrosion-Resistant Carb on Steel Flat Products from Japan , 
WT/DS244/AB/R, adopted 9 January 2004, DSR 2004:I, p. 3  
US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel 
Sunset Review Panel Report, United States – Sunset Review of Anti-Dumping Duties on 
Corrosion-Resistant Carbon St eel Flat Products from Japan , WT/DS244/R, 
adopted 9 January 2004, as modified by Appellate Body Report 
WT/DS244/AB/R, DSR 2004:I, p. 85  
US – Cotton Yarn Appellate Body Report, United States – Transition al Safeguard Measure on 
Combed Cotton Yarn from Pakistan , WT/DS192/AB/R, adopted 5 November 
2001, DSR 2001:XII, p. 6027 
US – Cotton Yarn Panel Report, United States – Transitional Safeguard Measure on Combed 
Cotton Yarn from Pakistan , WT/DS192/R, adopted 5 November 2001, as 
modified by Appellate Body Report WT /DS192/AB/R, DSR 2001:XII, p. 6067 
US – Countervailing and 
Anti-Dumping Measures (China) Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping 
Measures on Certain Products from China , WT/DS449/AB/R and Corr.1, 
adopted 22 July 2014 
US – Countervailing and 
Anti-Dumping Measures 
(China) Panel Report, United States – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Measures on 
Certain Products from China , WT/DS449/R and Add.1, adopted 22 July 2014, 
as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS449/AB/R 
US – Countervailing Duty 
Investigation on DRAMS Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervaili ng Duty Investigation on 
Dynamic Random Access Memory Se miconductors (DRAMS) from Korea , 
WT/DS296/AB/R, adopted 20 July 2005, DSR 2005:XVI, p. 8131 
US – Countervailing Duty 
Investigation on DRAMS Panel Report, United States – Countervailing Duty Investigation on Dynamic 
Random Access Memory Semico nductors (DRAMS) from Korea , 
WT/DS296/R, adopted 20 July 2005, as modified by Appellate Body Report 
WT/DS296/AB/R, DSR 2005:XVII, p. 8243 
US – Countervailing Measures 
(China) Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervailing Duty Measures on 
Certain Products from China , WT/DS437/AB/R, adopted 16 January 2015 
US – Countervailing Measures 
(China) Panel Report, United States – Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain 
Products from China , WT/DS437/R and Add.1, adopted 16 January 2015, as 
modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS437/AB/R 
US – Countervailing Measures 
on Certain EC Products Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervailing Measures Concerning 
Certain Products from th e European Communities , WT/DS212/AB/R, adopted 
8 January 2003, DSR 2003:I, p. 5 
US – Countervailing Measures 
on Certain EC Products Panel Report, United States – Countervailing Measures Concerning Certain 
Products from the European Communities , WT/DS212/R, adopted 8 January 
2003, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS212/AB/R, DSR 2003:I, 
p. 73 WT/AB/24 
 
- 147 - 
 
  Short title Full case title and citation 
US – Countervailing Measures 
on Certain EC Products  (Article 21.5 – EC) Panel Report, United States – Countervailing Measures Concerning Certain 
Products from the European Communitie s – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the 
DSU by the European Communities , WT/DS212/RW, adopted 27 September 
2005, DSR 2005:XVIII, p. 8950 
US – Customs Bond Directive Panel Report, United States – Customs Bond Directive for Merchandise 
Subject to Anti-Dumping/Countervailing Duties , WT/DS345/R, adopted 
1 August 2008, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS343/AB/R / 
WT/DS345/AB/R, DSR 2008:VIII, p. 2925 
US – DRAMS Panel Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Duty on Dynamic Random 
Access Memory Semiconductors (DRA MS) of One Megabit or Above from 
Korea , WT/DS99/R, adopted 19 March 1999, DSR 1999:II, p. 521 
US – DRAMS 
(Article 21.5 – Korea) Panel Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Duty on Dynamic Random 
Access Memory Semiconductors (DRA MS) of One Megabit or Above from 
Korea – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Korea , WT/DS99/RW, 
7 November 2000, unadopted 
US – Export Restraints Panel Report, United States – Measures Trea ting Exports Restraints as 
Subsidies , WT/DS194/R and Corr.2, adopted 23 August 2001, DSR 2001:XI, 
p. 5767 
US – FSC Appellate Body Report, United States – Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales 
Corporations" , WT/DS108/AB/R, adopted 20 March 2000, DSR 2000:III, 
p. 1619 
US – FSC Panel Report, United States – Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales 
Corporations" , WT/DS108/R, adopted 20 March 2000, as modified by 
Appellate Body Report WT/DS108/AB/R, DSR 2000:IV, p. 1675 
US – FSC 
(Article 21.5 – EC) Appellate Body Report, United States – Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales 
Corporations" – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the European 
Communities , WT/DS108/AB/RW, adopted 29 January 2002, DSR 2002:I, 
p. 55 
US – FSC 
(Article 21.5 – EC) Panel Report, United States – Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales 
Corporations" – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the European 
Communities , WT/DS108/RW, adopted 29 January 2002, as modified by 
Appellate Body Report WT/DS108/AB/RW, DSR 2002:I, p. 119 
US – FSC 
(Article 21.5 – EC II) Appellate Body Report, United States – Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales 
Corporations" – Second Recourse to Ar ticle 21.5 of the DSU by the European 
Communities , WT/DS108/AB/RW2, adopted 14 March 2006, DSR 2006:XI, 
p. 4721 
US – FSC 
(Article 21.5 – EC II) Panel Report, United States – Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales 
Corporations" – Second Recourse to Ar ticle 21.5 of the DSU by the European 
Communities , WT/DS108/RW2, adopted 14 March 2006, upheld by Appellate 
Body Report WT/DS108/AB/RW2, DSR 2006:XI, p. 4761 
US – FSC 
(Article 22.6 – US) Decision by the Arbitrator, United States – Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales 
Corporations" – Recourse to Arbitr ation by the United States under 
Article 22.6 of the DSU and Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement , 
WT/DS108/ARB, 30 August 2002, DSR 2002:VI, p. 2517 
US – Gambling Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border 
Supply of Gambling and Betting Services , WT/DS285/AB/R, adopted 20 April 
2005, DSR 2005:XII, p. 5663 (Corr.1, DSR 2006:XII, p. 5475) 
US – Gambling Panel Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of 
Gambling and Betting Services , WT/DS285/R, adopted 20 April 2005, as 
modified by Appellate Body Report WT /DS285/AB/R, DSR 2005:XII, p. 5797 
US – Gambling 
(Article 21.3(c)) Award of the Arbitrator, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border 
Supply of Gambling and Betting Services  – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) 
of the DSU , WT/DS285/13, 19 August 2005,  DSR 2005:XXIII, p. 11639 
US – Gambling 
(Article 21.5 – Antigua and 
Barbuda) Panel Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of 
Gambling and Betting Services – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by 
Antigua and Barbuda , WT/DS285/RW, adopted 22 May 2007, DSR 2007:VIII, 
p. 3105 
US – Gambling 
(Article 22.6 – US) Decision by the Arbitrator, United States – Measures Affecting the 
Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services – Recourse to Arbitration by the United States under Article 22.6 of the DSU , 
WT/DS285/ARB, 21 December 2007, DSR 2007:X, p. 4163 WT/AB/24 
 
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  Short title Full case title and citation 
US – Gasoline Appellate Body Report, United States – Standards for Reformulated and 
Conventional Gasoline , WT/DS2/AB/R, adopted 20 May 1996, DSR 1996:I, 
p. 3 
US – Gasoline Panel Report, United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional 
Gasoline , WT/DS2/R, adopted 20 May 1996, as modified by Appellate Body 
Report WT/DS2/AB/R, DSR 1996:I, p. 29 
US – Hot-Rolled Steel Appellate Body Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain 
Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan , WT/DS184/AB/R, adopted 23 August 
2001, DSR 2001:X, p. 4697 
US – Hot-Rolled Steel Panel Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled 
Steel Products from Japan , WT/DS184/R, adopted 23 August 2001 modified 
by Appellate Body Report WT/DS184/AB/R, DSR 2001:X, p. 4769 
US – Hot-Rolled Steel 
(Article 21.3(c)) Award of the Arbitrator, United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain 
Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of 
the DSU , WT/DS184/13, 19 February 2002, DSR 2002:IV, p. 1389 
US – Lamb Appellate Body Report, United States – Safeguard Measures on Imports of 
Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Lamb Me at from New Zealand and Australia , 
WT/DS177/AB/R, WT/DS178/AB/R, adopted 16 May 2001, DSR 2001:IX, p. 4051 
US – Lamb Panel Report, United States – Safeguard Meas ures on Imports of Fresh, 
Chilled or Frozen Lamb Meat from New Zealand and Australia , WT/DS177/R, 
WT/DS178/R, adopted 16 May 2001, as modified by Appellate Body Report 
WT/DS177/AB/R, WT/DS178/AB/R, DSR 2001:IX, p. 4107 
US – Large Civil Aircraft 
(2nd complaint) Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting Trade in Large 
Civil Aircraft (Second Complaint) , WT/DS353/AB/R, adopted 23 March 2012, 
DSR 2012:I, p. 7 
US – Large Civil Aircraft 
(2nd complaint) Panel Report, United States – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft 
(Second Complaint) , WT/DS353/R, adopted 23 March 2012, as modified by 
Appellate Body Report WT/DS353/AB/R, DSR 2012:II, p. 649 
US – Lead and Bismuth II Appellate Body Report, United States – Imposition of Countervailing Duties 
on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom , WT/DS138/AB/R, adopted 7 June 2000, DSR 2000:V, 
p. 2595 
US – Lead and Bismuth II Panel Report, United States – Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain 
Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United 
Kingdom , WT/DS138/R and Corr.2, adopted 7 June 2000, upheld by 
Appellate Body Report WT/DS138/AB/R, DSR 2000:VI, p. 2623 
US – Line Pipe Appellate Body Report, United States – Definitive  Safeguard Measures on 
Imports of Circular Welded Carbon Quality Line Pipe from Korea , 
WT/DS202/AB/R, adopted 8 March 2002, DSR 2002:IV, p. 1403 
US – Line Pipe Panel Report, United States – Definitive Safe guard Measures on Imports of 
Circular Welded Carbon Qu ality Line Pipe from Korea , WT/DS202/R, adopted 
8 March 2002, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS202/AB/, 
DSR 2002:IV, p. 1473 
US – Line Pipe  
(Article 21.3(c)) Report of the Arbitrator, United States – Definitive  Safeguard Measures on 
Imports of Circular Welded Carbon Qual ity Line Pipe from Korea – Arbitration 
under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU , WT/DS202/17, 26 July 2002, DSR 2002:V, 
p. 2061 
US – Offset Act 
(Byrd Amendment) Appellate Body Report, United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy 
Offset Act of 2000 , WT/DS217/AB/R, WT/DS234/AB/R, adopted 27 January 
2003, DSR 2003:I, p. 375 
US – Offset Act 
(Byrd Amendment) Panel Report, United States – Continued Dump ing and Subsidy Offset Act of 
2000, WT/DS217/R, WT/DS234/R, adopted 27 January 2003, as modified by 
Appellate Body Report WT/DS217/ AB/R, WT/DS234/AB/R, DSR 2003:II, 
p. 489 
US – Offset Act 
(Byrd Amendment) 
(Article 21.3(c)) Award of the Arbitrator, United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy 
Offset Act of 2000 – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU , 
WT/DS217/14, WT/DS234/22, 13 June 2003, DSR 2003:III, p. 1163 WT/AB/24 
 
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  Short title Full case title and citation 
US – Offset Act 
(Byrd Amendment) (Brazil) (Article 22.6 – US) Decision by the Arbitrator, United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy 
Offset Act of 2000, Original Complaint by Brazil – Recourse to Arbitration by the United States under Article 22.6 of the DSU , WT/DS217/ARB/BRA, 
31 August 2004, DSR 2004:IX, p. 4341 
US – Offset Act 
(Byrd Amendment) (Canada)  
(Article 22.6 – US) Decision by the Arbitrator, United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy 
Offset Act of 2000, Original Complaint by Canada – Recourse to Arbitration 
by the United States under Article 22.6 of the DSU , WT/DS234/ARB/CAN, 
31 August 2004, DSR 2004:IX, p. 4425 
US – Offset Act 
(Byrd Amendment) (Chile) 
(Article 22.6 – US) Decision by the Arbitrator, United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy 
Offset Act of 2000, Original Complaint by Chile – Recourse to Arbitration by 
the United States under Article 22.6 of the DSU , WT/DS217/ARB/CHL, 
31 August 2004, DSR 2004:IX, p. 4511 
US – Offset Act 
(Byrd Amendment) (EC) 
(Article 22.6 – US) Decision by the Arbitrator, United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy 
Offset Act of 2000, Original Complaint by the European Communities – 
Recourse to Arbitration by the United States under Article 22.6 of the DSU , 
WT/DS217/ARB/EEC, 31 August 2004, DSR 2004:IX, p. 4591 
US – Offset Act 
(Byrd Amendment) (India) (Article 22.6 – US) Decision by the Arbitrator, United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy 
Offset Act of 2000, Original Complaint by India – Recourse to Arbitration by the United States under Article 22.6 of the DSU , WT/DS217/ARB/IND, 
31 August 2004, DSR 2004:X, p. 4691 
US – Offset Act 
(Byrd Amendment) (Japan) 
(Article 22.6 – US) Decision by the Arbitrator, United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy 
Offset Act of 2000, Original Complaint by Japan – Recourse to Arbitration by 
the United States under Article 22.6 of the DSU , WT/DS217/ARB/JPN, 
31 August 2004, DSR 2004:X, p. 4771 
US – Offset Act 
(Byrd Amendment) (Korea) (Article 22.6 – US) Decision by the Arbitrator, United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy 
Offset Act of 2000, Original Complaint by Korea – Recourse to Arbitration by the United States under Article 22.6 of the DSU , WT/DS217/ARB/KOR, 
31 August 2004, DSR 2004:X, p. 4851 
US – Offset Act 
(Byrd Amendment) (Mexico) 
(Article 22.6 – US) Decision by the Arbitrator, United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy 
Offset Act of 2000, Original Complaint by Mexico – Recourse to Arbitration by 
the United States under Article 22.6 of the DSU , WT/DS234/ARB/MEX, 
31 August 2004, DSR 2004:X, p. 4931 
US – Oil Country Tubular 
Goods Sunset Reviews Appellate Body Report, United States – Sunset Reviews of Anti-Dumping 
Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina , WT/DS268/AB/R, 
adopted 17 December 2004, DSR 2004:VII, p. 3257 
US – Oil Country Tubular 
Goods Sunset Reviews Panel Report, United States – Sunset Reviews of Anti-Dumping Measures on 
Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina , WT/DS268/R and Corr.1, adopted 
17 December 2004, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS268/AB/R, 
DSR 2004:VIII, p. 3421 
US – Oil Country Tubular 
Goods Sunset Reviews (Article 21.3(c)) Award of the Arbitrator, United States – Sunset Reviews of Anti-Dumping 
Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU , WT/DS268/12, 7 June 2005, DSR 2005:XXIII, 
p. 11619 
US – Oil Country Tubular 
Goods Sunset Reviews 
(Article 21.5 – Argentina) Appellate Body Report, United States – Sunset Reviews of Anti-Dumping 
Measures on Oil Country Tubular G oods from Argentina – Recourse to 
Article 21.5 of the DSU by Argentina , WT/DS268/AB/RW, adopted 11 May 
2007, DSR 2007:IX, p. 3523 
US – Oil Country Tubular 
Goods Sunset Reviews (Article 21.5 – Argentina) Panel Report, United States – Sunset Reviews of Anti-Dumping Measures on 
Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Argentina , WT/DS268/RW, adopted 11 May 2007, as modified by 
Appellate Body Report WT/DS268/AB/RW, DSR 2007:IX, p. 3609 
US – Orange Juice (Brazil) Panel Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Administrative Reviews and 
Other Measures Related to Imports of Certain Orange Juice from Brazil , 
WT/DS382/R, adopted 17 June 2011, DSR 2011:VII, p. 3753 
US – Poultry (China) Panel Report, United States – Certain Measures  Affecting Imports of Poultry 
from China , WT/DS392/R, adopted 25 October 2010, DSR 2010:V, p. 1909 
US – Section 110(5)  
Copyright Act Panel Report, United States – Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act , 
WT/DS160/R, adopted 27 July  2000, DSR 2000:VIII, p. 3769 
US – Section 110(5)  
Copyright Act  (Article 21.3(c)) Award of the Arbitrator, United States – Section 110(5) of the US Copyright 
Act – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU , WT/DS160/12, 15 January 
2001, DSR 2001:II, p. 657 WT/AB/24 
 
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  Short title Full case title and citation 
US – Section 110(5)  
Copyright Act  
(Article 25) Award of the Arbitrators, United States – Section 110(5) of the US Copyright 
Act – Recourse to Arbitration under Article 25 of the DSU , 
WT/DS160/ARB25/1, 9 November 2001, DSR 2001:II, p. 667 
US – Section 129(c)(1) URAA Panel Report, United States – Section 129(c)(1) of the Uruguay Round 
Agreements Act , WT/DS221/R, adopted 30 August 2002, DSR 2002:VII, 
p. 2581 
US – Section 211 
Appropriations Act Appellate Body Report, United States – Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations 
Act of 1998 , WT/DS176/AB/R, adopted 1 February 2002, DSR 2002:II, 
p. 589 
US – Section 211 
Appropriations Act Panel Report, United States – Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 
1998, WT/DS176/R, adopted 1 February 2002, as modified by Appellate 
Body Report WT/DS176/AB/R, DSR 2002:II, p. 683 
US – Section 301 Trade Act Panel Report, United States – Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974 , 
WT/DS152/R, adopted 27 January 2000, DSR 2000:II, p. 815 
US – Shrimp Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Proh ibition of Certain Shrimp 
and Shrimp Products , WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted 6 November 1998, 
DSR 1998:VII, p. 2755 
US – Shrimp Panel Report, United States – Import Prohib ition of Certain Shrimp and 
Shrimp Products , WT/DS58/R and Corr.1, adopted 6 November 1998, as 
modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS58/AB/R, DSR 1998:VII, p. 2821 
US – Shrimp 
(Article 21.5 – Malaysia) Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Proh ibition of Certain Shrimp 
and Shrimp Products – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia , 
WT/DS58/AB/RW, adopted 21 November 2001, DSR 2001:XIII, p. 6481 
US – Shrimp 
(Article 21.5 – Malaysia) Panel Report, United States – Import Prohib ition of Certain Shrimp and 
Shrimp Products – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia , 
WT/DS58/RW, adopted 21 November 2001, upheld by Appellate Body Report 
WT/DS58/AB/RW, DSR 2001:XIII, p. 6529 
US – Shrimp (Ecuador) Panel Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Measure on Shrimp from 
Ecuador , WT/DS335/R, adopted on 20 February 2007, DSR 2007:II, p. 425 
US – Shrimp (Thailand)  
/ 
US – Customs Bond Directive Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Relating to Shrimp from 
Thailand / United States – Customs Bo nd Directive for Merchandise Subject 
to Anti-Dumping/Countervailing Duties , WT/DS343/AB/R / WT/DS345/AB/R, 
adopted 1 August 2008, DSR 2008:VII,  p. 2385 / DSR 2008:VIII, p. 2773 
US – Shrimp (Thailand) Panel Report, United States – Measures Relating to Shrimp from Thailand , 
WT/DS343/R, adopted 1 August 2008, as modified by Appellate Body Report 
WT/DS343/AB/R / WT/DS345/AB/R, DSR 2008:VII, p. 2539 
US – Shrimp (Viet Nam) Panel Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Shrimp from 
Viet Nam , WT/DS404/R, adopted 2 September 2011, DSR 2011:X, p. 5301 
US – Shrimp II (Viet Nam ) Panel Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Shrimp from 
Viet Nam , WT/DS429/R and Add.1, circulated to WTO Members 17 November 
2014 [appealed/adoption pending] 
US – Shrimp and Sawblades Panel Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Me asures on Certain Shrimp and 
Diamond Sawblades from China , WT/DS422/R and Add.1, adopted 23 July 
2012, DSR 2012:XIII, p. 7109 
US – Softwood Lumber III Panel Report, United States – Preliminary Determinations with Respect to 
Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada , WT/DS236/R, adopted 1 November 
2002, DSR 2002:IX, p. 3597 
US – Softwood Lumber IV Appellate Body Report, United States – Final Countervailing Duty 
Determination with Respect to Ce rtain Softwood Lumber from Canada , 
WT/DS257/AB/R, adopted 17 February 2004, DSR 2004:II, p. 571 
US – Softwood Lumber IV Panel Report, United States – Final Countervailing Duty Determination with 
Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada , WT/DS257/R and Corr.1, 
adopted 17 February 2004, as modified by Appellate Body Report 
WT/DS257/AB/R, DSR 2004:II, p. 641  
US – Softwood Lumber IV 
(Article 21.5 – Canada) Appellate Body Report, United States – Final Countervailing Duty 
Determination with Respect to Cert ain Softwood Lumber from Canada  
– Recourse by Canada to Article 21.5 of the DSU , WT/DS257/AB/RW, 
adopted 20 December 2005, DSR 2005:XXIII, p. 11357 WT/AB/24 
 
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  Short title Full case title and citation 
US – Softwood Lumber IV 
(Article 21.5 – Canada) Panel Report, United States – Final Countervailing Duty Determination with 
Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber fro m Canada – Recourse by Canada to 
Article 21.5 [of the DSU] , WT/DS257/RW, adopted 20 December 2005, 
upheld by Appellate Body Repo rt WT/DS257/AB/R W, DSR 2005:XXIII, 
p. 11401 
US – Softwood Lumber V Appellate Body Report, United States – Final Dumping Determination on 
Softwood Lumber from Canada , WT/DS264/AB/R, adopted 31 August 2004, 
DSR 2004:V, p. 1875 
US – Softwood Lumber V Panel Report, United States – Final Dumping Determination on Softwood 
Lumber from Canada , WT/DS264/R, adopted 31 August 2004, as modified 
by Appellate Body Report WT/DS264/AB/R, DSR 2004:V, p. 1937 
US – Softwood Lumber V  
(Article 21.3(c))  Report of the Arbitrator, United States – Final Dumping Determination on 
Softwood Lumber from Canada – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the 
DSU, WT/DS264/13, 13 December 2004, DSR 2004:X, p. 5011 
US – Softwood Lumber V 
(Article 21.5 – Canada) Appellate Body Report, United States – Final Dumping Determination on 
Softwood Lumber from Canada – Recour se to Article 21.5 of the DSU by 
Canada , WT/DS264/AB/RW, adopted 1 September 2006, DSR 2006:XII, 
p. 5087 
US – Softwood Lumber V 
(Article 21.5 – Canada) Panel Report, United States – Final Dumping Determination on Softwood 
Lumber from Canada – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Canada , 
WT/DS264/RW, adopted 1 September 2006, as reversed by Appellate Body 
Report WT/DS264/AB/RW, DSR 2006:XII, p. 5147 
US – Softwood Lumber VI Panel Report, United States – Investigation of the International Trade 
Commission in Softwood Lumber from Canada , WT/DS277/R, adopted 
26 April 2004, DSR 2004:VI, p. 2485 
US – Softwood Lumber VI 
(Article 21.5 – Canada) Appellate Body Report, United States – Investigation of the International 
Trade Commission in Softwood Lumber from Canada – Recourse to 
Article 21.5 of the DSU by Canada , WT/DS277/AB/RW, adopted 9 May 2006, 
and Corr.1, DSR 2006:XI, p. 4865 
US – Softwood Lumber VI 
(Article 21.5 – Canada) Panel Report, United States – Investigation of the International Trade 
Commission in Softwood Lumber from Ca nada – Recourse to Article 21.5 of 
the DSU by Canada , WT/DS277/RW, adopted 9 May 2006, as modified by 
Appellate Body Report WT/DS277/AB/RW, DSR 2006:XI, p. 4935 
US – Stainless Steel (Korea) Panel Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel 
Plate in Coils and Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip from Korea , WT/DS179/R, 
adopted 1 February 2001, DSR 2001:IV, p. 1295 
US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) Appellate Body Report, United States – Final Anti-Dumping Measures on 
Stainless Stee l from Mexico , WT/DS344/AB/R, adopted 20 May 2008, 
DSR 2008:II, p. 513 
US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) Panel Report, United States – Final Anti-Dum ping Measures on Stainless 
Steel from Mexico , WT/DS344/R, adopted 20 May 2008, as modified by 
Appellate Body Report WT/DS344/AB/R, DSR 2008:II, p. 599 
US – Stainless Steel (Mexico)  
(Article 21.3(c)) Award of the Arbitrator, United States – Final Anti-Dumping Measures on 
Stainless Steel from Mexico – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU , 
WT/DS344/15, 31 October 2008, DSR 2008:XX, p. 8619 
US – Stainless Steel (Mexico)  
(Article 21.5 – Mexico) Panel Report, United States – Final Anti-Dum ping Measures on Stainless 
Steel From Mexico – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Mexico , 
WT/DS344/RW, 6 May 2013, unadopted 
US – Steel Plate Panel Report, United States – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Measures on 
Steel Plate from India , WT/DS206/R and Corr.1, adopted 29 July 2002, 
DSR 2002:VI, p. 2073 
US – Steel Safeguards Appellate Body Report, United States – Definitive  Safeguard Measures on 
Imports of Certain Steel Products , WT/DS248/AB/R, WT/DS249/AB/R, 
WT/DS251/AB/R, WT/DS252/AB/R, WT/DS253/AB/R, WT/DS254/AB/R, 
WT/DS258/AB/R, WT/DS259/AB/R, adopted 10 December 2003, 
DSR 2003:VII, p. 3117  WT/AB/24 
 
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  Short title Full case title and citation 
US – Steel Safeguards Panel Reports, United States – Definitive Safe guard Measures on Imports of 
Certain Steel Products , WT/DS248/R / WT/DS249/R / WT/DS251/R / 
WT/DS252/R / WT/DS253/R / WT/DS254/ R / WT/DS258/R / WT/DS259/R / 
and Corr.1, adopted 10 December 2003, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS248/AB/R, WT/DS249/AB/R, WT/DS251/AB/R, WT/DS252/AB/R, WT/DS253/AB/R, WT/DS254/AB/R, WT/DS258/AB/R, 
WT/DS259/AB/R, DSR 2003:VIII, p. 3273  
US – Textiles Rules of Origin Panel Report, United States – Rules of Origin for Textiles and Apparel 
Products , WT/DS243/R and Corr.1, adopted 23 July 2003, DSR 2003:VI, 
p. 2309 
US – Tuna II (Mexico) Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Concerning the 
Importation, Marketing and Sale  of Tuna and Tuna Products , 
WT/DS381/AB/R, adopted 13 June 2012, DSR 2012:IV, p. 1837 
US – Tuna II (Mexico) Panel Report, United States – Measures Concerning the Importation, 
Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products , WT/DS381/R, adopted 
13 June 2012, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS381/AB/R, DSR 
2012:IV, p. 2013 
US – Tyres (China) Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures A ffecting Imports of Certain 
Passenger Vehicle and Ligh t Truck Tyres from China , WT/DS399/AB/R, 
adopted 5 October 2011, DSR 2011:IX, p. 4811 
US – Tyres (China) Panel Report, United States – Measures Af fecting Imports of Certain 
Passenger Vehicle and Ligh t Truck Tyres from China , WT/DS399/R, adopted 
5 October 2011, upheld by Appellate Body Report WT/DS399/AB/R , DSR 
2011:IX, p. 4945 
US – Underwear Appellate Body Report, United States – Restrictions  on Imports of Cotton and 
Man-made Fibre Underwear , WT/DS24/AB/R, adopted 25 February 1997, 
DSR 1997:I, p. 11 
US – Underwear Panel Report, United States – Restrictions  on Imports of Cotton and 
Man-made Fibre Underwear , WT/DS24/R, adopted 25 February 1997, as 
modified by Appellate Body Report  WT/DS24/AB/R, DSR 1997:I, p. 31 
US – Upland Cotton Appellate Body Report, United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton , 
WT/DS267/AB/R, adopted 21 March 2005, DSR 2005:I, p. 3 
US – Upland Cotton Panel Report, United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton , WT/DS267/R, 
Add.1 to Add.3 and Corr.1, adopted 21 March 2005, as modified by Appellate 
Body Report WT/DS267/AB/R, DSR 2005:II, p. 299 
US – Upland Cotton 
(Article 21.5 – Brazil) Appellate Body Report, United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton – 
Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Brazil , WT/DS267/AB/RW, adopted 
20 June 2008, DSR 2008:III, p. 809 
US – Upland Cotton 
(Article 21.5 – Brazil) Panel Report, United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton – Recourse to 
Article 21.5 of the DSU by Brazil , WT/DS267/RW and Corr.1, adopted 
20 June 2008, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS267/AB/RW, 
DSR 2008:III, p. 997 
US – Upland Cotton 
(Article 22.6 – US I) Decision by the Arbitrator, United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton  
– Recourse to Arbitration by the United  States under Article 22.6 of the DSU 
and Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement , WT/DS267/ARB/1, 31 August 2009, 
DSR 2009:IX, p. 3871 
US – Upland Cotton 
(Article 22.6 – US II) Decision by the Arbitrator, United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton  
– Recourse to Arbitration by the United  States under Article 22.6 of the DSU 
and Article 7.10 of the SCM Agreement , WT/DS267/ARB/2 and Corr.1, 
31 August 2009, DSR 2009:IX, p. 4083 
US – Wheat Gluten Appellate Body Report, United States – Definitive  Safeguard Measures on 
Imports of Wheat Gluten fro m the European Communities , WT/DS166/AB/R, 
adopted 19 January 2001, DSR 2001:II, p. 717 
US – Wheat Gluten Panel Report, United States – Definitive Safe guard Measures on Imports of 
Wheat Gluten from the European Communities , WT/DS166/R, adopted 
19 January 2001, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS166/AB/R, 
DSR 2001:III, p. 779 
US – Wool Shirts and Blouses Appellate Body Report, United States – Measure A ffecting Imports of Woven 
Wool Shirts and Blouses from India , WT/DS33/AB/R, adopted 23 May 1997, 
and Corr.1, DSR 1997:I, p. 323 WT/AB/24 
 
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  Short title Full case title and citation 
US – Wool Shirts and Blouses Panel Report, United States – Measure Affe cting Imports of Woven Wool 
Shirts and Blouses from India , WT/DS33/R, adopted 23 May 1997, upheld by 
Appellate Body Report WT/DS33/AB/R, DSR 1997:I, p. 343 
US – Zeroing (EC) Appellate Body Report, United States – Laws, Regulations and Methodology 
for Calculating Dumping Margins ("Zeroing") , WT/DS294/AB/R, adopted 
9 May 2006, and Corr.1, DSR 2006:II, p. 417 
US – Zeroing (EC) Panel Report, United States – Laws, Regu lations and Methodology for 
Calculating Dumping Margins ("Zeroing") , WT/DS294/R, adopted 9 May 
2006, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS294/AB/R, DSR 2006:II, 
p. 521 
US – Zeroing (EC)  
(Article 21.5 – EC) Appellate Body Report, United States – Laws, Regulations and Methodology 
for Calculating Dumping Margins ("Zeroing") – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the European Communities , WT/DS294/AB/RW and Corr.1, 
adopted 11 June 2009, DSR 2009:VII, p. 2911 
US – Zeroing (EC)  
(Article 21.5 – EC) Panel Report, United States – Laws, Regu lations and Methodology for 
Calculating Dumping Margins ("Zeroing") – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the 
DSU by the European Communities , WT/DS294/RW, adopted 11 June 2009, 
as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS294/AB/RW, DSR 2009:VII, 
p. 3117 
US – Zeroing (Japan) Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Relating to Zeroing and 
Sunset Reviews , WT/DS322/AB/R, adopted 23 January 2007, DSR 2007:I, 
p. 3 
US – Zeroing (Japan) Panel Report, United States – Measures Relating to Zeroing and Sunset 
Reviews , WT/DS322/R, adopted 23 January 2007, as modified by Appellate 
Body Report WT/DS322/AB/R, DSR 2007:I, p. 97 
US – Zeroing (Japan) 
(Article 21.3(c)) Report of the Arbitrator, United States – Measures Relating to Zeroing and 
Sunset Reviews – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU , 
WT/DS322/21, 11 May 2007, DSR 2007:X, p. 4160 
US – Zeroing (Japan) 
(Article 21.5 – Japan) Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Relating to Zeroing and 
Sunset Reviews – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Japan , 
WT/DS322/AB/RW, adopted 31 Augu st 2009, DSR 2009: VIII, p. 3441 
US – Zeroing (Japan) 
(Article 21.5 – Japan) Panel Report, United States – Measures Relating to Zeroing and Sunset 
Reviews – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Japan , WT/DS322/RW, 
adopted 31 August 2009, upheld by Appellate Body Report WT/DS322/AB/RW, DSR 2009:VIII, p. 3553 
US – Zeroing (Korea) Panel Report, United States – Use of Zeroin g in Anti-Dumping Measures 
Involving Products from Korea , WT/DS402/R, adopted 24 February 2011, 
DSR 2011:X, p. 5239 
 
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