WT/L/1023  
17 November  2017 
(17-6279) Page: 1/3 
General Council  
30 November and 1 December 2017  Original:  Spanish  
 
  
CUBA – ARTICLE XV:6 OF THE GENERAL AGREEMENT  
ON TARIFFS AND TRADE 1994  
REPORT BY THE GOVERNMENT OF CUBA UNDER THE  
DECISION OF 12 DECEMBER 2016 (WT/L/1003)  
The following communication, dated 1 7 November  2017, is being circulated at the request of the 
delegation of Cuba.  
 
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1.1.  Pursuant to Article IX:4 of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
the Republic of Cuba hereby submits the first annual report on the waiver extension granted under 
the decision of 1 2 December  2016 (WT/L/1003) . This waiver was granted to Cuba under the 
Decision of 1 4 October  1996 (WT/L/182) in relation to Article XV:6 of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT 1994).  
1.2.  During 2016 and 2017, Cuba continued to be the target of direct attacks by the Government 
of the United States in the context of the infamous and unfair blockade that the latter has imposed 
for more than half a century, in spite of the overwhelming opposi tion by the international 
community in the United Nations (UN)  for more than two  decades.  
1.3.  This policy has tightened in the financial sector over the past few years with the increasing 
harassment and persecution of Cuban financial transactions with third co untries, regardless of 
their relations with Cuba, of the currency used and of the banking regulations in force in the 
countries concerned . This systematically obstructs the normal development of external financial 
flows, causing Cuba severe damage and plac ing it at serious risk . Without any doubt, this 
constitutes an aggression in the area of international monetary and financial relations.  
1.4.  In March  2016, the Government of Barack Obama announced a number of amendments to 
the regulations governing the sanctio ns applied by the United States, including, for the first time 
since the blockade entered into force, permission to  use the dollar in international financial 
transactions . In practice, very few commercial transactions were conducted in dollars in either 
direction, since such operations were still affected by lingering fears on the part of some US-based 
banking institutions as to what it was possible or not possible to do with Cuba and because of 
the million s in fines that had been imposed on third-country banks in the past.  
1.5.  Similarly, under President  Obama the two countries signed a number of memoranda and 
agreements in other areas of the economy, and in 2015 diplo matic relations between the 
two countries  were re -established . 
1.6.  However, in the few months that  the administration of President Donald Trump has been in 
power, there has been a hardening of the rhetoric against Cuba, which has taken on a distinctly 
offensive and interventionist tone.  
1.7.  At the same time, it was announced that Trump's measures would opp ose any international 
initiative that condemned the policy of aggression against Cuba, repealing President Obama's 
directive of 1 4 October  2016 which, although it contained interventionist elements, declared that WT/L/1023  
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  the blockade was "an obsolete burden that w eighs on the people of Cuba" and that it had been  an 
impediment to US interests.  
1.8.  The Torricelli and Helms Burton Act s remain prime examples of the extraterritorial dimension 
of the blockade imposed by the Government of the United States, which has illegall y assumed the 
right to legislate for and on behalf of other countries with regard to their relations with Cuba, even 
to the extent of authorizing itself to judge the behaviour and actions of other States and their 
nationals who are not subject to US jurisd iction.  
1.9.  Not only is t his measure seriously prejudicial to Cuba, but it also adversely affects the 
interests and sovereign rights of third countries , and it is an ongoing source of trade and financial 
conflict, as can be seen from the hefty fines imposed on  foreign banks for their relations with 
Cuba.  
1.10.   The main adverse effects on the National Banking System that remained in 2016 and 2017  
were as follows:  
 disruption of currency exchange operations owing to the impossibility of Cuba using the 
US dollar in its foreign trade , forcing  the country to resort to the double forex 
mechanism (use of currencies other that the US dollar) with the consequent increase in 
financial costs in order to be able to honour the obligations which creditor s require to be 
paid in doll ars; 
 cancellation of any operations linked with Cuban banks as well as the agreements 
concluded;  
 closure of Cuban bank accounts in foreign banks;  
 cancellation by foreign banks of SWIFT Relation ship Management Application  (RMA) 
codes which serve as authoriz ations exchanged between correspondent banks, managing  
which messages can be received and the type of message that can be sent;  
 refusal to allow banks and foreign entities to transfer funds to and from Cuba;  
 refusal by correspondent banks to process, confi rm and/or advise letters of credit from 
Cuban importing companies;  
 rejection  of banking transactions;  
 need to keep minimal balances in Cuban accounts abroad  given the risk of confiscation, 
and retention of Cuban funds in foreign banks.  
1.11.   This policy has led to a substantial increase in financial costs and serious difficulties in 
financing essential imports, principally food, medicines and fuel, and this in turn has had the effect 
of holding social and economic development in check . As a result, the country ha s to make 
enormous  efforts, in particularly difficult circumstances, to integrate into the world trading system.  
1.12.   The Cuban economy ended in 2016 with an estimated decline in gross domestic product 
(GDP) of 0.9 % valued in constant 1997 prices, a complex sit uation due to the impact of  adverse 
factors, both external and internal.  
1.13.   In addition to the blockade measures, Cuba suffered the impact of the global economic and 
financial crisis and the side effects of hurricane Matthew which struck the east of the count ry, 
causing extensive  destruction of housing, educational and health institutions, warehouses, 
industrial facilities and hotels, not to mention the road, electrical, hydraulic and 
telecommunications infrastructure.  
1.14.   On the public finance front, the State bu dget continued to address  the country's social 
economic policy . The budget deficit stood at 6.8 % of nominal GDP, remain ing within the limits 
approved by the Cuban Parliament and in line with the Plan for the Economy.  WT/L/1023  
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  1.15.   During the period, economic measures were taken to promote work in the non -State sphere . 
In particular, non -agricultural or services cooperatives continued to grow as a new form of 
economic management, most of them operating in the areas of trade, catering, transport and 
construction, which a re expected to help raise the quality of services in the country and boost 
economic growth.  
1.16.   In the monetary sphere, work is still under way to improve the instruments for controlling 
currency issues and guaranteeing financial balance in the population sect or, whose participation in 
the economy is predicted to increase in the future . Gradual expansion was maintained in credit 
policy, providing greater access to financing for both natural persons and the various forms of 
non-State management.  
1.17.   The merchandise trade deficit shrank by 4.8 % owing to a 16.4 % decline in total trade, with 
exports decreasing by 30.8 % and imports by 12.2 %. In this area, Cuba faced financial limitations 
owing to the decrease in export revenue as a result of the fall in the price s of its main exports , and 
to the disruptions in its cooperation with other countries and the resulting  decline in its fuel supply 
from abroad.  
1.18.   Nevertheless, the country continued to move ahead in finding solutions to its strategic 
development problems, without af fecting the social programmes designed to raise the standard of 
living of the population.  
1.19.   The most relevant social indicators of the year were:  
 The infant mortality rate was 4.3 per  thousand  live births, the lowest in the country's 
history, which, taken to gether with a life expectancy of 78 years at birth, is an indication 
of the quality of life of the Cuban population.  
 Cuba has one doctor per 125 inhabitants – a figure which is in line with the situation in 
the developed countries – as well as one stomatol ogist per 667 inhabitants.  
 23,971 students graduated from various branches of higher education (medical, 
technical, agricultural, economic and educational sciences, etc.), out of a total of 
274,506 graduates over the last five years.  
 From 2.4 % in 2015, une mployment was down to 2 %, one of the lowest rates in the 
country's history.  
 In 2016, wages continued to be linked to work output in the public sector , and 
administrative limits on wage increases were eliminated, with the result that  average  
monthly wages i ncreased by 7.7 % compared  to the preceding period.  
1.20.   For all of these reasons, Cuba confirms that the particular circumstances which make it 
impossible for it to sign a special exchange agreement with WTO  Members  continue to exist,  and 
that it remains commit ted to complying, where possible, with the principles laid down in the 
General Agreement . The application of the provisions of Article XV:6 of the GATT 1994 would 
involve serious legal and practical difficulties for Cuba.  
1.21.   It must be stressed that the chang es introduced to date have not had any adverse effects 
on other WTO Members, which have not had any need to hold consultations in that connection . 
Cuba has shown that it has complied with its commitment to make use of the waiver without 
affecting the objec tives of the GATT 1994 or harming or impairing the rights of the rest of the 
Membership.  
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