RESTRICTED  
  
G/AG/W/121  
14 March 2014  
(14-1592)  Page: 1/2  
Committee on Agriculture  Original: English  
 
  UNITED STATES' EXPERIENCES WITH DOMESTIC FOOD SECURITY 
COMMUNICATION FROM THE UNITED STATES 
1.1.  In response to the WTO Secretariat questionnair e on food security issued in early 2013, the 
United States noted that its domestic food secu rity policy is limited to domestic food aid 
programmes involving the direct transfer of benefi ts. U.S. food security policies focus on food 
insecurity caused by poverty rather than insuffic ient food supplies because the openness of the 
U.S. market and strong domestic production mean there is sufficient food available for those who 
have the means to pay. The United States has fo und it ineffective to operate in-kind and food 
stock holding schemes to address food security obje ctives due to excessive costs, limited efficacy 
in targeting needy populations, and creation of market distortions. 
Domestic Definition of Food Security 
1.2.  For U.S. policy purposes, food security means acce ss by all people at all times to enough food 
for an active, healthy lifestyle. Food security thus  covers the accessibility of food, availability of 
food, and nutrition. In 2012, approximately 15% of U.S. households were food insecure at some 
point. A majority of food insecure households participate in one or more nutrition programmes, which reduce the likelihood of food insecurity by approximately one-third.
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Historical Experiences 
Food Security 1.3.  The United States primarily addresses food security through nutritional assistance 
programmes, which involve the direct transfer of benefits ( i.e., food and instruments for use in the 
purchasing of food) to eligible participants. Controlling budgetary costs of nutrition programmes 
has been a long standing priority in the United St ates and, as a result, policy has been focused on 
the most cost-effective means of increasing access to food for the poor. The United States has 
found that direct transfers are significantly more cost effective than market manipulation to control 
consumer prices, both in terms of budgetary and administrative costs. Further, by providing participants with the choice to purchase the food products they desire, the U.S. nutrition 
programmes are more likely to result in food co nsumption tailored to address the nutritional 
requirements of each participant. 
1.4.  The largest U.S. nutrition programme is the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program 
(SNAP), which provides electronic debit cards to low-income households for the purchase of nearly 
any food item, domestic or imported. Several sm aller, more targeted programmes operate in a 
similar manner. 
1.5.  In addition, the United States operates the Child Nutrition Programs, including the School 
Lunch Program, which primarily provide funding to certain entities, e.g., schools, for the purchase 
of food through commercial channels. Small quantities of surplus food that arise from price support and surplus removal programmes may al so be distributed through these programmes. 
Another nutrition programme, the Commodity Assistance Program (CAP), directly supplements the 
diets of low-income individuals with nutritious foods that are typically lacking in the participants' diets. These foods are directly acquired and distributed by USDA through competitive bids. 
                                               
1 USDA ERS food security study. G/AG/W/121 
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  Income Support 
1.6.  Producer income support is sometimes cited as a means to increase food security due to the 
overlap in the population who are both agricultur al producers and low-income. The United States 
has addressed these two issues separately, through farm programmes to provide a producer 
safety net and through nutrition programmes to help low-income individuals. These approaches 
allow for better targeting and greater efficiency in meeting the specific objectives. Some Members have conflated both domestic food aid policy and producer income support policies into a "single" 
food security policy, such as a market price support policy that uses accumulated stocks for 
distribution to identified food insecure populations. Although the United States has not had any experience in the conflation of food aid policy with producer income support policy, the United States does have significant experience with income support policies for producers. 
1.7.  The primary objective of U.S. agricultural policies has always been to raise and stabilize 
producer income while minimizing the cost to the government. Today, this is largely accomplished through payments directly to farmers, but this was not always the case. For a significant part of 
the last century, market price supports, stockholding, and supply management were used with the 
objective of increasing producer income through market manipulation. 
1.8.  Although, the United States repeatedly had di fficulty achieving the stated objective of 
increasing producer income, it was not until after a series of policy failures that started in 1974 
and continued through much of the following decade that difficult political decisions were made to reform an agricultural policy that was ineffe ctive, costly, and difficult to administer. 
1.9.  In 1974, grain and oilseed prices spiked at record levels due to a variety of factors, including 
rapid increases in global demand and production shortfalls. In line with policy adjustments in 
previous decades, the United States continued its effort to control prices, producer income and stock levels by altering course from production-limiting programmes (to limit stocks and keep 
prices high) to production-incentivizing programmes (to free producers to take advantage of the 
high prices accompanying increased demand). With in a few years, production again significantly 
surpassed demand (both domestically and internationally), which resulted in the US Government 
again accumulating large stocks. To deal with the increased stocks, the farmer-owned reserve 
(i.e., stocks) programme was established in 1978, which paid farmers to hold grain in excess of levels generally needed by commercial customers. 
1.10.  By 1986 the United States again held record public stocks (e.g., 62% of all wheat produced 
in the United States, 54% of all grain sorghum, and 33% of all corn). Recognizing that the 
standard tools of agricultural policy over the previous 30 plus years had been insufficient to deal with agricultural market volatility, the United States started a transition to more market-orientated 
policies in the 1985 Food Security Act and moved the government away from significant stocks 
management. 
1.11.  The 1985 Food Security Act lowered price support and other policy parameters to reduce 
stock acquisition. It introduced the predecessor to the marketing loan programme (first for cotton 
and rice, then in later farm bills for feed grains, wheat, and other crops), which greatly reduced the incentive to forfeit commodities to government stocks. 
1.12.  The 1996 Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act eliminated price supports and 
supply management and established direct payments based on historical production and the 
flexibility for producers to plant with market conditions in mind rather than government mandates and incentives. These reforms were designed to provide income support to farmers as they 
adjusted to responding to market signals rather than to government programmes. They were also 
designed to provide more predictable payment levels  even when prices fell. Further, when prices 
did decline and payments increased, the production- and trade-distorting effects were far less than 
previous price supports and supply management policies. The programmes of the 1996 Act are the 
predecessors to today's U.S. income support and risk management programmes. 
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