WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
28 February 2019  
(19-1134) Page: 1/94 
  Original: English  
 
  
CHINA – DOMESTIC SUP PORT FOR AGRICULTURAL  PRODUCERS  
REPORT OF THE PANEL  
Addendum  
This addendum  contains Annexes A to D to the Report of the Panel to be found in document  
WT/DS511/R . 
 
 
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  LIST OF ANNEXES  
ANNEX  A 
WORKING PROCEDURES O F THE PANEL  
Contents  Page  
Annex  A Working Procedures of the Panel  4 
ANNEX B  
ARGUMENTS OF THE PAR TIES 
Contents  Page  
Annex  B-1 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of the United States  10 
Annex  B-2 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of China  35 
ANNEX  C 
ARGUMENTS OF THE THI RD PARTIES  
Contents  Page  
Annex  C-1 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Australia  62 
Annex  C-2 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Brazil  65 
Annex  C-3 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Canada  67 
Annex C -4 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Colombia  71 
Annex C -5 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Ecuador  72 
Annex C -6 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of the European Union  74 
Annex C -7 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of India 76 
Annex C -8 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Indonesia  78 
Annex C -9 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Japan  80 
Annex C -10 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Kazakhstan  83 
Annex C -11 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of the Russian Federation  86 
ANNEX D  
RAW DATA  
Contents  Page  
Annex D  Raw Data as presented by the p arties  90 
 
 
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  ANNEX  A 
WORKING PROCEDURES O F THE PANEL  
Contents  Page  
Annex  A Working Procedures of the Panel  4 
 
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  ANNEX  A 
WORKING PROCEDURES O F THE PANEL  
ADOPTED ON 11 AUGUST 2017 
1. In its proceedings, the Panel shall follow the relevant provisions of the Understanding on Rules 
and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU). In addition, the following Working 
Procedures shall apply.  
General  
 
2. The deliberations of the Panel and the documents submitted to it shall be k ept confidential. 
Nothing in the DSU or in these Working Procedures shall preclude a party to the dispute (hereafter 
"party") from disclosing statements of its own positions to the public. Members shall treat as 
confidential information submitted to the Pa nel by another Member which the submitting Member 
has designated as confidential. Where a party submits a confidential version of its written 
submissions to the Panel, it shall also,  upon request of a Member, provide a non -confidential 
summary of the information contained in its submissions that could be disclosed to the public.  
3. The Panel shall meet in closed session. The parties, and Members having notified their interest 
in the dis pute to the Dispute Settlement Body in accordance with Article 10 of the DSU  (hereafter 
"third parties"), shall be present at the meetings only when invited by the Panel to appear before it.  
4. Each party and third party has  the right to determine the composition of its own delegation  
when meeting with the Panel. Each party and third party shall have the responsibility for all members 
of its own delegation and shall ensure that each member of such delegation acts in accordanc e with 
the DSU and these Working Procedures, particularly with regard to the confidentiality of the 
proceedings.  
Submissions  
 
5. Before the first substantive meeting of the Panel with the parties, each party shall submit a 
written submission in which its pre sents the facts of the case and its arguments, in accordance with 
the timetable adopted by the Panel. Each party shall also submit to the Panel, prior to the second 
substantive meeting of the Panel, a written rebuttal, in accordance with the timetable adop ted by 
the Panel.  
6. A party shall submit any request for a preliminary ruling at the earliest possible opportunity 
and in any event no later than in its first written submission to the Panel. If the United States 
requests such a ruling, China shall submit i ts response to the request in its first written submission. 
If China requests such a ruling, the United States shall submit its response to the request prior to 
the first substantive meeting of the Panel, at a time to be determined by the Panel in light of  the 
request. Exceptions to this procedure shall be granted upon a showing of good cause.  
7. Each party shall submit all factual evidence to the Panel no later than during the first 
substantive meeting, except with respect to evidence necessary for purposes o f rebuttal, answers 
to questions or comments on answers provided by the other party. Exceptions to this procedure 
shall be granted upon a showing of good cause. Where such exception has been granted, the Panel 
shall accord the other party a period of time for comment, as appropriate, on any new factual 
evidence submitted after the first substantive meeting.   
8. Where the  original language of exhibits is not a WTO working language, the submitting party 
or third party shall submit a translation into the WTO work ing language of the submission  at the 
same time. The Panel may grant reasonable extensions of time for the translation of such exhibits 
upon a showing of good cause. Any objection as to the accuracy of a translation should be raised 
promptly  in writing, no  later than the next filing or meeting (whichever occurs earlier) following the 
submission which contains the translation in question. T he Panel may grant an extension to this 
deadline. Any objection shall be accompanied by a detailed explanation of the gr ounds of objection 
and an alternative translation.  WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
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  9. In order to facilitate the work of the Panel, each party and third party  is invited to make its 
subm issions in accordance with the WTO Editorial G uide for Panel Submissions attached as Annex  1, 
to the extent that it is practical to do so .  
10. To facilitate the maintenance of the record of the dispute and maximize the clarity of 
submissions, each party and third party shall sequentially number its exhibits throughout the course 
of the dispute. For exa mple, exhibits submitted by the United States could be numbered USA -1, 
USA-2, etc. If the last exhibit in connection with the first submission was numbered USA -5, the first 
exhibit of the next submission thus would be numbered USA -6. 
Questions  
 
11. The Panel m ay at any time pose questions to the parties and third parties, orally or in writing, 
including prior to each substantive meeting.   
Substantive meetings  
 
12. Each party shall provide to the Panel the list of members of its delegation in advance of each 
meeti ng with the Panel and no later than 5.00  p.m. the previous working day.  
13. The first substantive meeting of the Panel with the parties shall be conducted as follows:  
a. The Panel shall invite the United States to make an opening statement to present its case 
first. Subsequently, the Panel shall invite China to present its point of view. Before each 
party takes the floor, it shall provide the Panel and other participants at the meeting with 
a provisional written version of its statement. In the event that interpr etation is needed, 
each party shall provide additional copies for the interpreters, through the Panel Secretary. 
Each party shall make available to the Panel and the other party the final version of its 
opening statement as well a s its closing statement, i f any, preferably at the end of the 
meeting, and in any event no later than 5.00  p.m. on the first working day following the 
meeting.  
b. After the conclusion of the statements, the Panel shall give each party the opportunity to 
ask each other questions or mak e comments, through the Panel. Each party shall then  
have an opportunity to answer these questions orally. Each party shall send in writing, 
within a timeframe to be determined by the Panel, any questions to the other party to 
which it wishes to receive a  response in writing. Each party shall be invited to respond in 
writing to the other party's written questions within a deadline to be determined by the 
Panel.  
c. The Panel may subsequently pose questions to the parties. Each party shall then have an 
opportun ity to answer these questions orally. The Panel shall send in writing, within a 
timeframe to be determined by it, any questions to the parties to which it wishes to receive 
a response in writing. Each party shall be invited to respond in writing to such qu estions 
within a deadline to be determined by the Panel.  
d. Once the questioning has concluded, the Panel shall afford each party an opportunity to 
present a brief closing statement, with the United States  presenting its statement first.  
14. The second substanti ve meeting of the Panel with the parties shall be conducted as follows:  
a. The Panel shall ask China if it wishes to avail itself of the right to present its case first. If 
so, the Panel shall invite China to present its opening statement, followed by the United 
States. If China chooses not to avail itself of that right, the Pane l shall invite the United 
States to present its opening statement first. Before each party takes the floor, it shall 
provide the Panel and other participants at the meeting with a provisional written version 
of its statement. In the event that interpretati on is needed, each party shall provide 
additional copies for the interpreters, through the Panel Secretary. Each party shall make 
available to the Panel and the other party the final version of its opening statement as well 
as its closing statement, if any, preferably at the end of the meeting, and in any event no 
later than 5.00  p.m. of the first working day following the meeting.  ..... WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
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  b. After the conclusion of the statements, the Panel shall give each party the opportunity to 
ask each other questions or make comments, through the Panel. Each party shall then 
have an opportunity to answer these questions orally. Each party shall send in writing, 
within a timeframe to be determined by the Panel, any questions to the other party to 
which it wishes to receive a re sponse in writing. Each party shall be invited to respond in 
writing to the other party's written questions within a deadline to be determined by the 
Panel.  
c. The Panel may subsequently pose questions to the parties. Each party shall then have an 
opportunity  to answer these questions orally. The Panel shall send in writing, within a 
timeframe to be determined by it, any questions to the parties to which it wishes to receive 
a response in writing. Each party shall be invited to respond in writing to such quest ions 
within a deadline to be determined by the Panel.  
d. Once the questioning has concluded, the Panel shall afford each party an opportunity to 
present a brief closing statement, with the party that presented its opening statement 
first, presenting its closi ng statement first.  
Third parties  
 
15. The Panel shall invite each third party to transmit to the Panel a written submission prior to 
the first substantive meeting  of the Panel with the parties, in accordance with the timetable adopted 
by the Panel.  
16. Each thi rd party shall also be invited to present its views orally during a session of this first 
substantive meeting, set aside for that purpose. Each third party shall provide to the Panel the list 
of members of its delegation in advance of this session and no l ater than 5.00  p.m. the previous 
working day.  
17. The third -party session shall be conducted as follows:  
a. All third parties may be present during the entirety of this session.  
b. The Panel shall first hear the arguments of the third parties in alphabetical order . Third 
parties present at the third -party session and intending to present their views orally at 
that session, shall provide the Panel, the parties and other third -parties with provisional 
written versions of their statements before they take the floor. T hird parties shall make 
available to the Panel, the parties and other third parties the final versions of their 
statements, preferably at the end of the session, and in any event no later than 5.00  p.m. 
of the first working day following the session.  
c. After the third parties have made their statements, the parties may be given the 
opportunity, through the Panel, to ask the third parties questions for clarification on any 
matter raised in the third parties' submissions or statements. Each party shall send in  
writing, within a timeframe to be determined by the Panel, any questions to a third party 
to which it wishes to receive a response in writing.  
d. The Panel may subsequently pose questions to the third parties. Each third party shall 
then have an opportunity  to answer these questions orally. The Panel shall send in writing, 
within a timeframe to be determined by it, any questions to the third parties to which it 
wishes to receive a response in writing. Each third party shall be invited to respond in 
writing t o such questions within a deadline to be determined by the Panel.  
Descriptive part  
 
18. The description of the arguments of the parties and third parties in the descriptive part of the 
Panel report shall consist  of executive summaries provided by the parties a nd third parties, which 
shall be annexed  as addenda to the report. These executive summaries shall not in any way serve 
as a substitute for the submissions of the parties and third parties in the Panel's examination of the 
case.  WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
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  19. Each party shall submit  an integrated executive summar y of the facts and arguments as 
presented to the Pa nel in its written submissions and oral statements, in accordance with the 
timetable adopted by the Panel . This summary  may also include a summary of responses to 
questions . Each party's integrated executive summary shall not exceed 30 pages. The Panel will not 
summarize in the descriptive part of its report, or annex to its report, the parties' responses to 
questions.  
20. Each third party shall submit an integrated executive summary  of its arguments as presented 
in its written submission and statement in accordance with the timetable adopted by the Panel. This 
summary may also include a summary of responses to questions, where relevant. The executive 
summary to be provided by each th ird party shall not exceed 6  pages.  
Interim review  
 
21. Following issuance of the interim report, each party may submit a written request to review 
precise aspects of the interim report and request a further meeting with the Panel, in accordance 
with the time table adopted by the Panel. The right to request such a meeting shall be exercised no 
later than at the time the written request for review is submitted.  
22. In the event that no further meeting with the Panel is requested, each party may submit 
written comments on the other party's written request for review, in accordance with the timetable 
adopted by the Panel. Such comments shall be limited to commenting on  the other party's written 
request for review.  
23. The interim report, as well as the final report prior to its official circulation, shall be kept 
strictly confidential and shall not be disclosed.  
Service of documents  
 
24. The following procedures regarding serv ice of documents shall apply:  
a. Each party and third party  shall submit all documents to the Panel by filing them with the 
DS Registry (office No. 2047) .  
b. Each party and third party shall file 2 paper copies of all documents it submits to the Panel. 
Exhibits  may be filed in 4 copies on CD -ROM or DVD and 2 paper copies. The DS  Registrar 
shall stamp the documents with the date and time of the filing. The paper version shall 
constitute the official version for the purposes of the  record of the dispute.  
c. Each part y and third party shall also provide an electronic copy of all documents it submits 
to the Panel at the same time as the paper versions, preferably in Microsoft Word format, 
either on a CD -ROM, a DVD or as an e -mail attachment. If the electronic copy is pr ovided 
by e -mail, it should be addressed to DSRegistry@wto.org, with a copy to 
****.**** @wto.org , ****.**** @wto.org  and ****.**** @wto.org . If a CD -ROM or DVD 
is provided, it shall be filed with the DS Registry.  
d. Each party shall serve any document submitted to the Panel directly on the other party. 
Each party shall, in addition, serve on all third parties its written submissions in advance 
of the first substantive meeting with the Panel. Each third party shall serve any document 
submitted to the Pan el directly on the parties and all other third parties. Each party and 
third party shall confirm, in writing, that copies have been served as required at the time 
it provides each document to the Panel.  
e. Each party and third party  shall file its documents w ith the DS Registry and serve  copies 
on the other party (and third parties where appropriate) by 5.00  p.m. (Geneva time) on 
the due dates established by the Panel.  A party or third party may submit  its documents 
to another party or third party in electroni c format only,  subject to the recipient party or 
third party's prior written approval and provided that the Panel Secretary  is notified . 
f. The Panel shall provide the parties with an electronic version of the descriptive part, the 
interim report and the fina l report, as well as of other documents as appropriate. When WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
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  the Panel transmits to the parties or third parties both paper and electronic versions of a 
document, the paper version shall constitute the official version for the purposes of the 
record of the  dispute.  
25. The Panel reserves the right to modify these procedures as necessary, after consultation with 
the parties.  
 
 
 
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 ANNEX  B 
ARGUMENTS OF THE PAR TIES 
Contents  Page  
Annex  B-1 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of the United States  10 
Annex  B-2 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of China  35 
 
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 ANNEX  B-1 
INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE  SUMMARY OF THE ARGU MENTS OF THE UNITED STATES  
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE U.S.  FIRST WRITTEN SUBMISSION  
 
1. Each year, the People 's Republic of China ( "China ") provides a significant level of domestic 
support to its agricultural producers through a variety of subsidy programs and other measures.  This 
dispute addresses a single means of agricultural support, "market price support " ("MPS"), which  
China utilizes to support farmer incomes and increase production for basic agricultural products, 
including wheat, Indica rice, Japonica rice, and corn.  Through this form of support alone, China has 
provided support far in excess of its WTO commitments.  The level of domestic support China 
provided to its agricultural producers in 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015 exceeded the level set out in 
Section I of Part IV of China 's Schedule of Concessions on Goods ( "CLII"). China 's level of domestic 
support in favor of agricultural producers has therefore breached Articles 3.2 and 6.3 of the 
Agreement on Agriculture  ("Agriculture Agreement ") for the ye ars 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015.  
2. China 's MPS programs announce on an annual basis an applied administered price that will 
be available to farmers either immediately upon initiation of each year 's program, as for corn, or 
when market prices drop below the applied administered price, as for wheat, Indica rice, and 
Japonica rice.  This appl ied administered price is provided or furnished to farmers in the major 
producing provinces during the period immediately following harvest.  By guaranteeing farmers an 
established price for their commodities, China 's MPS programs for wheat, Indica rice, Ja ponica rice, 
and corn ensure that commodity prices in the relevant provinces are maintained at the Chinese 
government 's chosen support level.   
I. CHINA'S IMPLEMENTATION OF MARKET PRICE SUPPORT PROGRAMS  
 
3. Per the annual policy direction in the Document Number 1  and regulatory framework 
provided by the 2004 Grain Distribution Regulation , China issued annual announcements of 
minimum prices for wheat, Indica rice (early season and mid -to-late season), and Japonica rice, and 
implementation plans for purchasing those  grains harvested in 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015 at the 
established prices.  Together these instruments form the wheat, Indica rice, and Japonica rice MPS 
Programs.  China has also maintained similar MPS Programs  for corn announced through an annual 
notice in  the years 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015.   
A.  China's Wheat Market Price Support Program  
 
4. Wheat is China 's second most prevalent crop, after rice, and China is one of the world 's top 
wheat producers.  Between 2005 and 2015, wheat production in China increased by  25 percent, with 
production in 2015 reaching 130.19 million metric tons ( "MT") annually.   
5. China issues two documents each harvest year to implement the MPS Program for wheat.  
First, prior to the planting of winter wheat, China announces the annual "minimu m purchase price " 
in a Notice on Raising the Wheat Minimum Purchase Price or Notice on Announcing the Wheat 
Minimum Purchase Price  ("Wheat MPS Notices "). This is China 's applied administered price for wheat.  
China 's National Development and Reform Commissi on ("NDRC "), Ministry of Finance ( "MoF"), 
Ministry of Agriculture ( "MoA"), State Administration of Grain, and the Agricultural Development 
Bank of China jointly issue the annual Wheat MPS Notice s.  
6. The Wheat MPS Notices  are directed to China 's "development  and reform commissions, price 
bureaus, finance departments (bureaus), agricultural departments (bureaus, commissions, offices), 
grain bureaus, and Agricultural Development Bank of China branches in all provinces, autonomous 
regions, and municipalities dir ectly under the central government. " The Wheat MPS Notices  state 
that "each locality is  required to earnestly and properly carry out dissemination work for the grain 
minimum purchase price policy. " The 2015 Wheat MPS Notice  states that "[i]n order to protect the 
interests of farmers and prevent 'low grain prices hurting farmers, '" the Notice  is provided to "guide 
farmers to plant rationally, and promote the stable development of grain production. "  
7. Second, the NDRC, MoF, MoA, State Administ ration of Grain, Agricultural Development Bank, 
and China Grain Reserves Corporation ( "Sinograin ") publish a Notice on Issuing the Wheat and Rice WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
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 Minimum Purchase Price Implementation Plan,  "in order to implement and fulfill the spirit of the 
[2015 Documen t Number 1 ]." Attached to the notice is a detailed Wheat  and Rice  Minimum Purchase 
Price Implementation Plan  (the "Wheat MPS Implementation Plans ") that is issued "in accordance 
with the relevant provisions in the [ 2004 Grain Distribution Regulation ]."  
 
8.  The annual Wheat MPS Implementation Plans  reaffirm the applied administered price 
initially announced in the Wheat MPS Notices , noting that this is "the at -depot price of direct 
purchases [of wheat] from farmers by the purchasing and storage depots respons ible for making 
purchases at the minimum purchase price. " The Wheat MPS Implementation Plans  subsequently set 
forth the parameters of that season 's MPS Program for wheat including: (1) the geographic scope, 
(2) characteristics of qualifying wheat, (3) rele vant timeframe, (4) the roles and responsibilities of 
the numerous Chinese government entities involved in implementing, and financing the MPS 
Program.  
9. Each year to implement the Wheat MPS Program, local offices of Sinograin and the 
Agricultural Developme nt Bank of China must identify and authorize "entrusted purchasing and 
storage depots " in each affected province.  These depots or warehouses must satisfy a number of 
specific criteria to be eligible to participate in the program.  Further, "the total depot storage capacity 
volume of the entrusted purchasing and storage depots within each county shall be linked to the 
forecast volume of grain purchases at minimum purchase prices in that locality. " 
10. Under the Wheat MPS Program, "entrusted purchasing and storage  depots . . . are required 
to announce, on a board in a prominent location at the purchasing site, policy information relating 
to the implementation of the minimum purchase price for each grain variety,  . . . including the 
purchase price, quality standards , deduction methods for weight increase of moisture and impurities, 
the purchase settlement method, and the implementation period, so that farmers can transact in 
'grain with peace of mind. '"  
11. The Wheat MPS Implementations Plans  clarify that entrusted purc hasing and storage depots  
"must not " "refuse grain sold by farmers that meets the standard; " "will promptly settle the grain 
sales price with the farmer, and must not issue IOUs to the farmers. " Further, entities charged with 
making purchases "shall active ly enter the market to purchase new grain. "  
12. Purchase and administration costs under the MPS Program for wheat are financed through 
loans "secured by a directly affiliated enterprise of [Sinograin], [in the form of] a loan uniformly 
from the Agricultural D evelopment Bank of China, at the locality [of the depots]. " Further, ownership 
"rights belong to the State Council, and the grain must not be put to use nor mortgaged without 
approval by the state. " The wheat held by the entrusted purchasing and storage de pots will 
eventually be sold "according to the principle of selling at profitable prices, rationally formulate base 
sales prices, and auction [the grain] at public auctions on grain wholesale markets or online. "  
13. The Chinese instruments setting out the MPS  Programs for wheat instruct central and 
provincial government officials to initiate a program of wheat purchases on an annual basis.  The 
MPS Programs ensure that farmers in the six major wheat producing provinces are able to make 
sales of qualifying wheat  at the announced applied administered price, if the prevailing domestic 
market price falls below the applied administered price.  As described below, the MPS Programs for 
Indica rice and Japonica rice operate in a similar manner.  
B. China's Indica Rice and J aponica Rice Market Price Support Programs  
 
14. China is the world 's largest rice market, accounting for nearly a third of global production 
and consumption.  Between 2005 and 2015, total rice production in China increased by 15 percent, 
with production in 2015  reaching 208.23 million MT annually.  
15. China issues two documents each harvest year to implement the MPS Programs for Indica 
rice and Japonica rice.  China first issues an annual Notice on Raising the Rice Minimum Purchase 
Price or Notice on Announcing the R ice Minimum Purchase Price  ("Rice MPS Notices ") each year, 
which defines the "minimum purchase price " or applied administered price for three products: early -
season Indica rice, mid -to-late season Indica rice, and Japonica rice.  NDRC, MoF, MoA , State 
Administration of Grain, and the Agricultural Development Bank jointly issue the annual Rice MPS 
Notices.  WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
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 16. The Rice MPS Notices  are directed to China 's "development and reform commissions, price 
bureaus, finance departments (bureaus), agriculture de partments (bureaus, commissions, and 
offices), grain bureaus, and Agricultural Development Bank of China branches of all provinces, 
autonomous regions, and municipalities directly under the central government. " The Rice MPS 
Notices  are issued in January or  February, which is well in advance of planting.  The Rice MPS Notices  
state that "[a]s it is currently the middle of the preparatory spring plowing period, all localities are 
required to earnestly and properly carry out dissemination work for the grain min imum purchase 
price policy. " The Rice MPS Notices  continue that the announced price is to "guide farmers to plant 
rationally, and promote the stable development of grain production. " 
17. Second, the NDRC, in conjunction with the MoF, MoA, State Administration of Grain, 
Agricultural Development Bank of China, and Sinograin, publish an annual Notice on Issuing the 
Wheat and Rice Minimum Purchase Price Implementation Plan, "in order to implement and fulfill the 
spirit of the [2015 Document Number 1]. " Attached to the notice is a detailed Wheat  and Rice  
Minimum Purchase Price Implementation Plan  (the "Indica Rice and Japonica  Rice MPS 
Implementation Plans ") that is issued "in accordance with the relevant provisions in the [ 2004 Grain 
Distribution Regulation ]. 
 
18. Typically, the early Indica rice Implementation Plan is released first, and a joint mid -to-late 
Indica rice and Japonica rice plan follows during the later planting season.  In other instances, the 
Indica Rice and Japonica Rice MPS Implementation Plans  are annou nced in the same document as 
the Wheat MPS Implementation Plan,  as was the case for 2015.  
19. The annual Indica Rice and Japonica Rice MPS Implementation Plans reaffirm the applied 
administered price initially announced in the Rice MPS Notices , noting that thi s is "the at -depot price 
of direct purchases [of rice] from farmers by the purchasing and storage depots responsible for 
making purchases at the minimum purchase price. " The Indica Rice and Japonica Rice MPS 
Implementation Plans  subsequently set forth the parameters of that season 's MPS Program for wheat 
including: (1) the geographic scope, (2) characteristics of qualifying Indica rice or Japonica rice, (3) 
relevant timeframe, and (4) the roles and responsibilities of the numerous Chinese government 
entitie s involved in implementing, and financing the MPS Program.  
20. Each year to implement the Indica Rice and Japonica Rice MPS Programs, local offices of 
Sinograin and the Agricultural Development Bank of China must identify and authorize "entrusted 
purchasing and storage depots. " These depots or warehouses must satisfy a number of specific 
criteria to be eligible to participate in the program.  Further, "the total depot storage capacity volume 
of the entrusted purchasing and storage depots within each county shall be linked to the forecast 
volume of grain purchases at minimum purchase prices in that locality. " 
21. When the Indica Rice and Japonica Rice MPS Programs are activated, "entrusted purchasing 
and storage depots . . . are required to announce, on a board i n a prominent location at the 
purchasing site, policy information relating to the implementation of the minimum purchase price 
for each grain variety, [this information] will include the purchase price, quality standards, deduction 
methods for weight incre ase of moisture and impurities, the purchase settlement method, and the 
implementation period, so that farmers can transact in 'grain with peace of mind. '"  
22. The Indica Rice and Japonica Rice MPS Implementation Plans  clarify that entrusted 
purchasing and st orage depots  "must not " "refuse grain sold by farmers that meets the standard, " 
"will promptly settle the grain sales price with the farmer, and must not issue IOUs to the farmers. " 
Further, entities charged with making purchases "shall actively enter the market to purchase new 
grain. "  
23. Purchase and administration costs under the MPS Program for rice are financed through 
loans "secured by a directly affiliated enterprise of [Sinograin], [in the form of] a loan uniformly 
from the Agricultural Development Ban k of China, at the locality [of the depots]. " Ownership "rights 
belong to the State Council, and the grain must not be put to use nor mortgaged without approval 
by the state. " The Indica rice and Japonica rice held by the entrusted purchasing and storage d epots, 
will eventually be sold "according to the principle of selling at profitable prices, rationally formulate 
base sales prices, and auction [the grain] at public auctions on grain wholesale markets or online. "  WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
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 24. The Chinese instruments setting out the M PS Programs for Indica rice and Japonica rice 
instruct central and provincial government officials to initiate a program of Indica rice or Japonica 
rice purchases on an annual basis.  The MPS Programs ensure that farmers in the identified major 
rice produci ng provinces are able to make sales of qualifying rice at the announced applied 
administered price, if the prevailing domestic market price falls below the applied administered price.  
The MPS Program for corn operates in a similar manner.  
C. China's Corn Mark et Price Support Program  
 
25. China is the world 's second largest producer of corn.  Since 2005, China 's corn production 
has increased 38 percent.  Corn is primarily grown in northern and northeastern China.   
26. As described in China 's Document Number 1 , the measur es related to corn procurement are 
part of a "temporary " program to procure and store corn.  To implement market price support for 
corn, China issues a single document titled the Notice on Issues Relating to National Temporary 
Reserve Purchases of Corn in the Northeast Region  (the "Notice on Purchases of Corn "). The Notices 
on Purchases of Corn  are issued jointly by NDRC, the State Administration of Grain, MoF, and 
Agricultural Development Bank of China, and provide details on the available applied administ ered 
price, geographic scope, timing, and requirements of the Corn MPS Program.  
27. The Corn MPS Programs provide that the applied administered price is to be available in 
three Northeast provinces – Liaoning, Jilin, and Heilongjiang – and the Inner Mongolia Autonomous 
Region.  The Notices on Purchases of Corn  for 2012 through 2015 provide the applied administered 
prices in the referenced provinces and autonomous region.  This price is "the at -depot purchase price 
of direct purchases from farmers by the purchasi ng and storage depots. " 
28. The Corn MPS Program operates from when the Notice on Purchases of Corn  is issued 
typically in late November or early December until April 30 of the following calendar year.  This is the 
period immediately following the corn harvest in northeastern China.  
29. The Corn MPS Program provides that the applied administered price is for "domestically 
produced corn produced in 2015, meeting the quality standards for national at -grade product, " or 
"Grade 3 " corn. The applied administered price is  "the at -depot purchase price of direct purchases 
from farmers by the purchasing and storage depots. " Corn that meets a lower or higher grade may 
also be purchased and "[p]rice differences between adjacent grades will be controlled at 0.02 yuan 
per jin [half kilogram]. "  
30. Sinograin is "entrusted by the state to act as the primary policy implementation entity, " and 
in particular "will make open purchases of farmers ' surplus grain and prevent the occurrence of 
farmers ' 'difficulty selling grain. '" Aspects of the work are also delegated to the provincial 
governments who may issue their own implementing measures.  
31. The Notices on Purchases of Corn  further provide that "COFCO , Chinatex, and [ Aviation 
Industry Corporation of  China ( "AVIC")], as the suppl emental forces for [Sinograin], are entrusted 
by [Sinograin] to undertake purchasing and storage tasks, and will independently take on loans from 
the Agricultural Development Bank of China. " Other warehouses and granaries may be designated 
as "purchasing a nd warehouse sites " by joint decision of local subsidiaries of Sinograin, and the 
Agricultural Development Bank of China, as well as local grain administration authorities.  Further, 
permanent and temporary storage facilities may be built by Sinograin and p rovincial officials where 
there is determined to be a need for additional storage.  
32. Each identified "purchasing and warehouse site " throughout the Northeast region is "required 
to openly post and purchase in accordance with stipulated prices. " Further, the y must "ensur[e] that 
grain standards and quality and price policies are posted and standard sample products are 
displayed. " While assuring that these requirements are followed, the sites will also "make open 
purchases of farmers ' surplus grain and will pr event the occurrence of 'difficulty selling grain ' among 
farmers. " 
33. The Chinese instruments setting out the MPS Programs for corn instruct central and 
provincial government officials to initiate a program of corn purchases on an annual basis.  The MPS WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
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 Progra ms ensure that farmers in the northeast provinces are able to make sales of qualifying rice at 
the announced applied administered price, once notice of the program has been issued.   
II. CHINA MUST MAINTAIN DOMESTIC SUPPORT EXP RESSED AS CURRENT TO TAL AMS 
AT LEVELS BELOW CHIN A'S FINAL BOUND COMM ITMENT LEVEL WHEN CA LCULATED 
IN ACCORDANCE WITH T HE AGRICULTURE AGREE MENT  
 
34. China may, like other Members of the WTO, maintain domestic support prog rams, including 
market price support programs, as long as the domestic support provided under those programs 
does not exceed the Member 's fixed commitment levels.  The basic obligations in the Agriculture 
Agreement regarding domestic support are set forth a s follows: (1) Article 3.2 states that:  "[s]ubject 
to the provisions of Article  6, a Member shall not provide support in favour of domestic producers in 
excess of the commitment levels specified in Section  I of Part  IV of its Schedule; " (2) Article 6.3 
states that:  "[a] Member shall be considered to be in compliance with its domestic support reduction 
commitments in any year in which its domestic support in favour of agricultural producers expressed 
in terms of Current Total AMS does not exceed the correspo nding annual or final bound commitment 
level specified in Part IV of the Member 's Schedule "; and (3) finally, Article 7.2(b) states that: 
"[w]here no Total AMS commitment exists in Part IV of a Member 's Schedule, the Member shall not 
provide support to agr icultural producers in excess of the relevant de minimis  level set out in 
paragraph 4 of Article 6 ."  
35. The Agriculture Agreement thus frames a WTO Member 's obligation to limit domestic 
support:  first, the Member 's individual commitment recorded in Section I  of Part IV of the Member 's 
Schedule, and second, the de minimis  level of support that may be provided by a Member to its 
producers of basic agricultural products, without including the value of that product -specific AMS in 
the calculation of Current Total  AMS.  
36. China scheduled a "Final Bound Commitment Level " of "nil" in Section I of Part IV of its 
Schedule of Concessions on Goods ( "China 's Schedule CLII "). China 's consistency with this 
commitment is measured in terms of its Current Total Aggregate Measurement of Support (Current 
Total AMS), which is the sum of the Aggregate Measurement of Support (AMS) provided to each 
basic agricultural product.   
37. Pursuant to Article  1(a) of the Agriculture Agreement, the AMS for each basic agricultural 
product must  be "calculated in accordance with the provisions of Annex 3 of this Agreement and 
taking into account the constituent data and methodology used in the tables of support material 
incorporated by reference in Part IV of the Member 's Schedule. " Article 1(h),  in turn, provides that 
a Member 's "Total AMS " for a given year refers to "the sum of all domestic support provided in favour 
of agricultural producers, calculated as the sum of all aggregate measurements of support for basic 
agricultural products, all non -product -specific agreement measurements of support and equivalent 
measurements of support for agricultural products. " Pursuant to Article 6.4 of the Agriculture 
Agreement, a Member 's Current Total AMS does not include product -specific AMS values that are 
less than or equal to the relevant de minimis  level of support.  For China, the de minimis  level of 
support equals 8.5 percent of the total value of production of a basic agricultural product during the 
relevant year.  
38. Therefore, to determine China 's Current  Total AMS for each year, the Panel first must 
calculate the product -specific AMS for each basic agricultural commodity, and compare that value to 
the total value of production for that agricultural product.  To the extent that the product -specific 
AMS for a particular basic agricultural product exceeds China 's de minimis  level of 8.5 percent, the 
full value of the product -specific AMS would be included in China 's Current Total AMS.  Because China 
has committed to a level of domestic support of "nil" or zero,  in the event the product -specific AMS 
for any basic agricultural product exceeds the de minimis  level of 8.5 percent, China will have 
breached Articles 3.2 and 6.2 of the Agriculture Agreement.  
Market Price Support  
39. Annex 3 of the Agriculture Agreement identifies support that "shall" be included in a 
Member 's AMS calculation.  It states that "an Aggregate Measurement of Support (AMS) shall be 
calculated on a product -specific basis for each basic agricultural product receiving market price 
support , non -exempt direct payments, or any other subsidy not exempted from the reduction WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
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 commitment ( "other n on-exempt policies ")." Thus, the Agriculture Agreement states that "market 
price support " in favor of basic agricultural products is a form of non -exempt domestic support and 
must be included in a Member 's AMS calculation.  
 
40. The Agriculture Agreement does n ot expressly define the term "market price support; " it is 
useful to consider the ordinary meaning of the constituent terms of "market price support " to 
understand the scope of domestic support programs contemplated by this term.  A "market " is the 
physical  or geographic place where commercial transactions take place, or the business of buying 
and selling, including the rate of purchase or sale, of a particular good or commodity.  "Price" is 
defined as "a sum in money or goods for which a thing is or may be b ought or sold. " "Support " is 
defined as "the action of holding up, keeping from falling, or bearing the weight of something " or 
"the action of contributing to the success of or maintaining the value of something. "  
41. Relevant to the consideration of the term "market price support, " the dictionary also supplies 
a number of definitions of compound terms.  The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary , defines "market 
price" as "the current price which a commodity or service fetch es in the market. " Further, it defines 
"price support " as "assistance in maintaining the levels of prices regardless of supply and demand. "  
42. Thus, the ordinary meaning of the constituent terms, as well as the compound phrases 
indicates that "market price s upport " is the provision of assistance in holding up or maintaining the 
price for a product in the market, regardless of supply and demand.  In the context of Annex 3, 
paragraph 1, an AMS for "each basic agricultural product " includes the provision of assis tance in 
holding up or maintaining a market price for that agricultural product.   
43. Paragraph 8 of Annex 3 provides the methodology for calculating the specific type of support 
at issue in this dispute – market price support.  Paragraph 8 states that "market price support shall 
be calculated using the gap between a fixed external reference price  and the applied administered 
price multiplied by the quantity of production eligible  to receive the applied administered price. " The 
paragraph goes on to provide that "[b]udgetary payments made to maintain this gap, such as 
buying -in or storage costs, shall not be included in the AMS. " 
44. Thus, the calculation of market price support is based on the price gap between the "applied 
administered price " identified in the domes tic support measure and the "fixed external reference 
price, " multiplied by the quantity of eligible production.   
Applied Administered Price  
45. The Agriculture Agreement does not define the term "applied administered price ". It is 
therefore necessary to evalu ate the ordinary meaning of the constituent terms of "applied 
administered price. " Specifically, "applied " is defined as to "put to practical use; having or concerned 
with practical application. " This definition suggests an actual or real life action.  With respect to 
"administered, " "administer " is defined as to "carry on or execute (as office, affairs, etc.), " to 
"execute or dispense, " or to "furnish, supply, give (orig. something beneficial to). " Finally, as 
described above, "price" is defined as "a sum in money or goods for which a thing is or may be 
bought or sold " or its "value or worth. " 
46. Considering these definitions, the "applied administered price " is the price a Member 
dispenses or furnishes to support a particular basic agricultural product.  Parag raph 8 also refers to 
"the" applied administered price, suggesting that this price is known and discernable.  The applied 
administered price is thus price set or established by the government and is, as such, distinguishable 
from a prevailing domestic marke t price.  The "applied administered price " is the price the Chinese 
government provides  for each of the basic agricultural products and is identified  for each product 
and each year in the Chinese legal instruments implementing the program (Relevant data ava ilable 
at U.S. First Written Submission, Table 6; Exhibits US -20 – US-23, US -39 – US-42, US -52 – US-55).  
Fixed External Reference Price  
47. The "fixed external reference price " is a static reference value  defined by the Agriculture 
Agreement in Annex 3, paragraph 9.  This states that the price "shall be based on the years 1986 to 
1988" and "may be adjusted for quality differences as necessary. " These fixed external reference WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
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 prices can be determined using o fficial Chinese customs data from these years (Relevant data 
available at U.S. First Written Submission, Table 7; Exhibit US -65).  
Eligible Production  
48. The third element of the market price support calculation methodology contained in Annex 
3, paragraph 8, of the Agriculture Agreement directs that the established price gap be multiplied "by 
the quantity of production eligible to receive the applied administered price. " The ordinary meaning 
of the terms indicates that "eligible production " is all of the produ ction entitled or permitted to 
receive the administered price.  Specifically, the ordinary meaning of "eligible " is "[f]it or entitled to 
be chosen for a position, award, etc. " Thus, the "quantity of production eligible " is a portion or 
amount of the commodity produced that is entitled to receive the applied administered price.  It is 
the amount of agricultural production that has the rightful claim to receive the applied administered 
price, whether or not that amount of p roduction actually received the specified applied administered 
price.  
49. The Appellate Body in Korea – Beef considered the meaning of the phrase "quantity of 
production eligible to receive the applied administered price " and reached a similar understanding.  
The Appellate Body stated that "production eligible to receive the applied administered price " has "a 
different meaning in ordinary usage from 'production actually purchased. '" The Appellate Body 
further defined "eligible " as that which is "fit or entitled to be chosen. " It noted that "a government 
is able to define and limit 'eligible ' production, " and that "[p]roduction actually purchased may often 
be less than eligible production. " Thus, "eligible production " within the meaning of Annex 3, 
paragraph 8 of the Agriculture Agreement is production, which is fit or entitled to receive the 
administered price, whether or not the production was actually purchased.  
50. Because under China 's programs all production in identified provinces is fit or entitled to 
receive the applied administered price, the "quantity of production eligible " is drawn from 
China 's National Bureau of Statistic and Ministry of Agriculture official wheat, rice, and c orn 
production volumes (Relevant data available at U.S. First Writte n Submission, Table 8; Exhibits  US-
18, US -73 – US-75). 
III. CHINA'S MPS PROGRAMS  FOR WHEAT, INDICA R ICE, JAPONICA RICE, AND CORN 
PROVIDE GREATER THAN  DE MINIMIS LEVELS O F DOMESTIC SUPPORT A ND T HUS 
RESULT IN CHINA EXCE EDING ITS DOMESTIC S UPPORT COMMITMENT FO R 2012, 
2013, 2014, AND 2015   
51. China 's MPS Programs for wheat, Indica rice, Japonica rice, and corn are "market price 
support " measures as contemplated by Annex 3 of the Agriculture Agreement.  As a preliminary 
matter, China has notified its Wheat and Rice MPS Programs on the "Product Specific Aggregate 
Measure of Support:  Market Price Support " supporting table "DS:5" of its annual notification.  These 
programs are notified as "product -specific. " Therefore, China itself has stated that the MPS Programs 
for wheat, Indica rice, and Japonica rice operate as product -specific "market price support " and has 
characterized these programs as such to WTO Members.  
52. Further, China 's MPS Programs for wheat, Indi ca rice, Japonica rice, and corn constitute 
"market price support " within the meaning of Annex 3, because each Program exhibits an "applied 
administered price " and "quantity of production eligible. " Specifically, China announces for each MPS 
Program the "minimum procurement price " at which designated state -owned enterprises will 
purchase wheat, Indica rice, Japonica rice, and corn.  This annually announced "minimum 
procurement price " constitutes an "applied administered price, " because it is the known or 
discernable price China dispenses or furnishes for each basic agricultural product, regardless of the 
price that would be otherwise determined by the market.  This offers price support to Chinese farmers 
in the designated regions.   
53. China 's MPS Programs also each establish a "quantity of eligible production. " The MPS 
Programs specify that production in designated provinces is eligible for support, and in those 
provinces the state -owned enterprises will purchase all proffered product.  Theref ore, the portion or 
amount of the commodity produced that is entitled to receive the  administered price is identified in 
the MPS Programs as all production produced in the identified provinces.  WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
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 54. For these reasons, China 's MPS Programs for wheat, Indica rice , Japonica rice and corn are 
"market price support " programs for the purposes of the Agriculture Agreement and must be 
evaluated per the methodology set forth in Annex 3.   
55. As described above, Annex 3, paragraph 8, of the Agriculture Agreement provides the 
calculation methodology for market price support as:  
(Applied Administered Price – Fixed External Reference Price) * Quantity of Production Eligible = AMS  
56. Based on the val ues for each element of the "market price support " calculation, as well as 
the "total value of production " data, China has provided support in excess of its de minimis  level for 
each of wheat, Indica rice, Japonica rice, and corn solely through its market price support programs 
for the years 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015.  Accordingly, China has acted inconsistently with its 
obligations pursuant to Articles 3.2 and 6.3 of the Agriculture Agreement on the basis of the level of 
domestic support provided through C hina's market price support measures in favor of wheat, Indica 
rice, Japonica rice, and corn, viewed separately or collectively.  Therefore, the United States requests 
that the panel issue the mandatory recommendation for China to bring its measures into co nformity 
with the Agriculture Agreement.  
EXECUTIVE SUMMARIES OF THE U.S.  COMMENTS ON CHINA'S CHALLENGE TO THE PANEL'S TERMS OF 
REFERENCE , U.S.  ORAL STATEMENTS AT THE FIRST SUBSTANTIVE MEETING OF THE PANEL, AND THE U.S.  
RESPONSES TO THE PANEL'S FIRST SET OF QUESTIONS  
57. [Summaries of the U.S. comments on China 's challenge to the Panel 's terms of reference, 
the U.S. oral statements at the first substantive meeting, and the U.S. Responses to the Panel 's First 
Set of Questions are reflected in the Executive Summ ary of the U.S. First and Second Written 
Submissions.]   
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE U.S.  SECOND WRITTEN SUBMISSION  
I. DOMESTIC SUPPORT PROVIDED BY CHINA TO ITS CORN PRODUCERS IN 2012  THROUGH 2015  IS 
PROPERLY WITHIN THE PANEL'S TERMS OF REFERENCE  
58. During this panel proceeding, China has not denied that it provided domestic support to corn 
producers from 2012 through 2015 in excess of its Final Bound Commitment Level.  Instead, China 
erroneously argues that the Panel is precluded from examining and making findings and 
recommendations on China 's provision of domestic support to its corn producers from 2012 through 
2015.  China argues that the annual legal instruments through which China provided domestic 
support to its corn producers in 2015 have "expired," and on that basis the provision of domestic 
support provided to Chinese corn producers from 2012 through 2015 is outside the Panel 's terms of 
reference.   
59. China 's arguments misunderstand "the matter " at issue in this dispute, and the nature of 
domestic support challenges generally, which necessarily relate to past action by a responding 
Member.  As explained below, the United States properly identified the matter at issue in its panel 
request – the onl y matter as of the date of panel establishment that would permit an examination, 
and a finding of WTO -inconsistency.  The DSU thus requires the Panel to examine and make findings 
and a recommendation regarding China 's provision of domestic support during th e relevant years.  
The expiration of annually -issued legal instruments through which China provided such support in 
the relevant years does not alter the Panel 's terms of reference.  Moreover, China 's non -transparency 
prevents it from demonstrating that Chin a ceased to provide domestic support to its corn producers 
in excess of its commitment level prior to the establishment of the Panel.  
60. The "matter " to be resolved is that described in Article 7.1 of the DSU.  This provision states 
that a panel 's terms of ref erence are "[t]o examine, in the light of the relevant provisions in (name 
of the covered agreement(s) cited by the parties to the dispute), the matter referred to the DSB  by 
the [United States] in [its panel request] …, and to make such findings as will a ssist the DSB in 
making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in that/those agreements ". With 
respect to Article 7.1 of the DSU, the Appellate Body has stated:  "[a] panel 's terms of reference are 
governed by the request for the establis hment of a panel.  In other words, the panel request identifies 
the measures and the claims that a panel will have the authority to examine and on which it will WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
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 have the authority to make findings. " Accordingly, the matter that the DSB places within a panel 's 
terms of reference for its examination is defined by the complaining Member 's panel request.   
61. Thus, as set out in the U.S. panel request and explained in prior submissions, the United 
States has challenged China 's provision of domestic support to its ag ricultural producers during the 
years 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015 as inconsistent with China 's Final Bound Commitment Level of 
"nil" and in breach of Articles 3.2 and 6.3 of the Agriculture Agreement.  The panel request describes 
four measures at issue:  the "domestic support provided by China " (or "China 's domestic support in 
favor of agricultural producers ") in each of the years 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015.  It also describes 
eight affirmative claims, i.e., the United States challenges that the levels of domestic support 
provided for each of the four years exceeds China 's final bound commitment level in breach of Article 
3.2 and of Article 6.3 of the Agriculture Agreement.  These four measures and eight claims constitute 
the "matter " that the DSB has charge d the Panel with examining through its terms of reference.  
62. In addition to identifying the "matter, " the U.S. panel request also includes additional 
information that previews the main arguments the United States will advance in its First Written 
Submission to demonstrate its claims.  Prior panels and the Appellate Body have explained that there 
is a significant difference between the claims identified in a panel request, which establish the panel 's 
terms of reference under Article 7 of the DSU, and the argume nts supporting those claims, which 
are set out and clarified progressively in the written and oral submissions.  The United States has 
identified both in its panel request.   
63. The U.S. panel request is best understood by parsing the constituent parts of the t hree 
sentences in the U.S. panel request.  The italicized language identifies the measures, the bolded 
language identifies the claims, and the underlined language previews the arguments put forward by 
the United States.  
The United States considers that China has acted inconsistently with its 
obligations pursuant to Articles 3.2 and 6.3 of the Agriculture Agreement  
because the level of  domestic support provided by China exceeds China 's 
commitment level of "nil" specified in Section I of Part IV of China 's 
Schedule CLII . In particular, China 's domestic support in favor of agricultural 
producers , expressed in terms of its current Total Aggregate Measurement of 
Support ( "Total AMS "), exceeds China's final bound commitment level in 2012, 
2013, 2014, and 2015  on the basis of domestic support provided to producers of, 
inter alia , wheat, Indica rice, Japonica rice, and corn.  The United States further 
considers that,  to the extent applicable, these measures  are inconsistent with 
China's obligation under Article 7.2(b) of the Agriculture Agreement 
because, in 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015,  China provides domestic support  for 
wheat, Indica rice, Japonica rice, and corn in excess of its product -specific de minimis  
level of 8.5 percent for each product . 
64. The first sentence includes the measures and claims.  The second sentence previews that the 
claims will be demonstrated on the basis of a specific argument.  The third sentence includes an 
alternative claim and argumen t. As the Appellate Body recognized in EC – Selected Customs , 
"nothing in Article  6.2 prevents a complainant from making statements in the panel request that 
foreshadow its arguments in substantiating the claim.  If the complainant chooses to do so, these 
arguments should not be interpreted to narrow the scope of the measures or the claims. " 
Accordingly, the U.S. panel request includes both the matter referred to the DSB under Article 7 of 
the DSU, and a preview of the arguments supporting those claims that the United States advanced 
progressively in its written and oral submissions.  
65. Therefore, contrary to China 's claims that the Panel is precluded from examining China 's 
provision of domestic support to its corn producers in 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015, the Pa nel's 
function pursuant to Article 11 of the DSU is to make an objective assessment of "the matter " before 
it – the same "matter " that the DSB has put within the Panel 's terms of reference.  In this dispute, 
in light of the U.S. panel request and Article 7.1 of the DSU, the Panel must make an objective 
assessment as to whether China 's provision of domestic support to Chinese agricultural producers 
in each of the relevant years exceeded China 's commitment level and thereby breached its 
commitments under the Agriculture Agreement.   WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
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 A. China's Rebuttal Arguments Do Not Establish that the Measures and 
Claims  Identified in the U.S. Panel Request Fall Outside the Panel's Terms of 
Reference  
66. In China 's Response to the Panel 's Questions, China makes a number of false statements 
and advances arguments unsupported by the DSU and the Agriculture Agreement.  First, China 
argues that "domestic support " and the "level of domestic support " are not measures but a "legal 
concept, " and therefore are insufficient to present the problem clearly under Article 6.2 of the DSU.  
In supporting its argument, China tries to draw a parallel between "domestic support " covered by 
the Agriculture Agreement and "subsidies " discipline d under the SCM Agreement.  Further, it argues 
that the "level of domestic support " is not a measure, but an unspecified reference to a numerical 
value that fails to "identify the specific measures that are alleged to have contributed to the level of 
domest ic support. " China 's arguments are in error and must fail principally because the United States 
properly identified the measure at issue in its panel request.  
67. The United States has not identified the measure in its panel request as simply the "level of 
domestic support " or "domestic support. " China has failed to provide the complete and accurate 
identification of the measure included in the U.S. panel request.  As stated repeatedly, the measure 
at issue is "China 's domestic support in favor of agricultura l producers " (also expressed as the 
"domestic support provided by China "), and the panel request then lists legal instruments through 
which that support is provided.  The measure is therefore neither a numerical value, nor a legal 
concept but action  by China.  As China itself noted in its answer, the measure at issue in a dispute 
may be any act or omission attributable to the responding Member.  The United States, indeed, 
identified the measure as "China 's domestic support in favor of agricultural prod ucers " and "domestic 
support provided by China. " Thus, the United States identified a specific measure at issue – an act 
attributable to China – in its panel request.  
68. Moreover, contrary to China 's argument, a comparison between domestic support under the 
Agriculture Agreement and a subsidy under the SCM Agreement does not support China 's position 
that the provision of domestic support by China is insufficient to identify the specific measure at 
issue.  Unlike the Agriculture Agreement, the SCM Agreement proh ibits Members from providing 
certain types of subsidies, known as prohibited subsidies, and seeks to neutralize adverse trade 
effects on the interests of another Member, through serious prejudice actions and authorizing the 
use of countervailing measures.  Conversely, the Agriculture Agreement neither prohibits any specific 
form of domestic support, nor seeks to counter any negative effects of the provision of support.  The 
Agriculture Agreement simply seeks to limit the amount of domestic support provided by  a Member 
and requires that the Member calculate and notify the amount of support given in accordance with 
certain methodologies.   
69. In addition, China seems to conflate  terms of reference issues with issues to be resolved on 
the merits.  The question of whet her the measures identified in the panel request can breach an 
obligation under a covered agreement is a substantive issue to be addressed and resolved on the 
merits.  China 's argument that "domestic support " and "level of domestic support " are legal concep ts 
not only misstates the U.S. identification of the measure, but asserts that these "concepts " cannot  
breach the Agriculture Agreement themselves.  The Panel should examine whether the measure 
identified by the United States (the provision of domestic supp ort by China) breaches the Agriculture 
Agreement as part of its review of the merits.  
70. In a final attempt to persuade the Panel, China baselessly argues that the right to challenge 
"domestic support " or the "level of domestic support " would deprive the respondent of its due 
process rights to know the case it must answer, result in uncertainty about the steps it must take 
to bring its measure into conformity, and permit a complaining Member to inappropriately broaden 
the scope of any co mpliance proceeding.  China 's concerns are unfounded.  First, as explained above, 
the United States did in fact identify the specific measure at issue.  Second, the concern China 
advances is not present in this dispute.  The U.S. panel request, in addition to identifying "China 's 
domestic support in favor of agricultural producers, " also sets out the instruments through which 
the support is provided (and the United States has not sought to rely on any other instruments).  It 
further listed the agricultural produ cts through which China 's breach would be demonstrated (and 
the United States has not sought to prove its case on the basis of other products).  Thus, China 's 
concern may apply to another dispute and another panel request, but the circumstances China 
concer ns itself with are not present here.  Typically, original panels do not dictate to respondents 
how to bring their measures into conformity; rather, a panel 's recommendation is simply to bring WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
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 measures into conformity with the covered agreement.  Respondents have the flexibility to choose 
how to comply with a panel 's recommendation.  Therefore, despite China 's arguments, the U.S. 
identification of "China 's domestic support in favor of agricultural producers, " including domestic 
support to China 's corn producers , is not contrary to the DSU and would not permit challenges to 
unidentified measures.   
71. Second, China mischaracterizes the nature of a domestic support challenge.  To overcome 
an objection that its terms of reference argument renders domestic support unchal lengeable, China 
goes so far as to argue that a complaining Member could bring an AMS claim before  the necessary 
data is available to prove a breach.  China 's statement reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of 
WTO AMS commitments and would, indeed, render  such commitments beyond challenge.  A 
Member 's domestic support commitments, in terms of their Final Bound Commitment Level, apply 
with respect to domestic support provided over a full calendar, marketing, or financial year.  
Therefore, the question of whet her a WTO Member is in breach of its domestic support commitments 
necessarily involves a retrospective examination of the level of domestic support, calculated as 
Current Total AMS provided over a period of time.  Where a challenge involves market price sup port 
programs, the complaining party must produce, among other things, data related to a country 's total 
annual production volume and average farm -gate prices for the full years at issue in order to 
establish the level of domestic support provided and then  compare that support to a Member 's AMS 
commitments.  
72. With respect to the market price support at issue in this dispute, data for both annual 
production and prices for each product were necessary for the United States to examine whether 
China had exceeded i ts Final Bound Commitment Level.  And, importantly, the United States and 
other WTO Members do not have access to the necessary data until China itself  releases it to the 
public.  The complete data required for the United States to analyze China 's compliance  with WTO 
rules for the year 2015 were not publicly available until November 2016  – nearly a year after the 
end of the relevant time period.  Therefore, the United States filed its request for establishment of a 
panel as soon as was feasible, on December 5,  2016, less than a month after the complete data 
became available.  
73. Under these circumstances, China 's argument that the United States is precluded from 
challenging China 's provision of domestic support to its corn producers for 2012 -2015 would, indeed, 
frustrate the ability of the United States or any other WTO Member to challenge China 's provision of 
domestic support in excess of its WTO commitments.  If the Panel were precluded from examining 
past provisions of domestic support simply because a program has  allegedly changed, given the 
retrospective nature of domestic support obligations, simple changes to a legal instrument would 
preclude challenges to a Member 's domestic support without the Member having achieved conformity 
of its support with its WTO obligations.  The Panel should not endorse a legally erroneous approach 
that would also open such a loophole in WTO rules.  Instead, consistent with the DSU and the 
Agriculture Agreement, the Panel should consider China 's domestic support provided through an nual 
legal instruments during the years at issue, as set out in the U.S. panel request and therefore within 
the Panel 's terms of reference.  
74. Such an analysis is exactly what the panel and Appellate Body did in Korea – Beef. 
Specifically, in Korea – Beef, the United States and Australia requested the DSB to establish a panel 
on April 15, 1999 and July 12, 1999, respectively, and the panel was established on May 26, 1999.  
The panel and Appellate Body issued findings concerning domestic support provided in 1997  and 
1998 – that is, the two years prior to  the complaining parties ' requests for panel establishment.  
Moreover, in examining whether Korea 's provision of domestic support in 1997 and 1998 exceeded 
its domestic support commitments, the panel reviewed annua l legal instruments that were no longer 
in effect at the time the DSB established the panel to examine the matter raised in the requests for 
panel establishment.  
75. The U.S. approach in this dispute is the same as that taken in Korea – Beef, the only prior 
WTO dispute addressing market price support programs.  In both, a complaining party seeks to 
demonstrate a Member 's breach of its domestic support commitments through the domestic support 
provided through the legal instruments capable of examination.  Accordin gly, the Panel should 
approach the domestic support China confers, and the time -bound legal instruments it employs, no 
differently than did the panel and Appellate Body in Korea – Beef. Failing to do so would ignore the 
fact that Current Total AMS is deter mined annually, as well as ignore the annual nature of market 
price support programs in China.  WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
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 B. China's Rebuttal Arguments Do Not Establish that the Panel Is Precluded From 
Making Findings and Recommendations On the Measures Identified in the U.S. 
Panel Req uest 
76. The United States has explained that it is not challenging a measure that had expired prior 
to panel establishment, but rather is challenging the domestic support provided by China.  China has 
not alleged or demonstrated that the legal instruments thro ugh which it provided domestic support 
in 2016 had removed any WTO -inconsistency as of the date of panel establishment.  Therefore, the 
replacement of the annual 2015 corn legal instrument with another instrument for 2016 is not 
relevant.  To the extent the 2015 corn support legal instrument is considered to have "expired, " it 
would be appropriate for the Panel to make findings and recommendations in light of the Panel 's 
terms of reference and the DSU provision (Article 19.1) requiring a recommendation for an y measure 
within the panel 's terms of reference found to be WTO -inconsistent.  
77. The Appellate Body reports in China – Raw Materials  demonstrate that expiry of an annual 
legal instrument should not deprive the complaining party of a finding and recommendation  on a 
WTO-inconsistent measure within a panel 's terms of reference.  The situation in this dispute is similar 
to that in China – Raw Materials , which also dealt with a series of annual Chinese measures.  The 
Appellate Body held that with respect to annual in struments that implement a measure (in that 
dispute, export duties or quotas), a panel should make findings on a recurring measure, as evidenced 
by annual legal instruments that may have been superseded in the course of the dispute.  In so 
doing, both the p anel and Appellate Body examined the measure as it existed at the time of panel 
establishment . The Appellate Body noted that if complainants were precluded from challenging 
measures of an annual nature that may have expired during the course of the panel p roceedings, it 
would create a loophole in the system.  Complainants could find themselves 'taking aim ' at 'appearing 
and disappearing targets, ' and responding parties could evade a panel's scrutiny by removing 
measures during the panel proceedings and reins tating them in the future without any 
consequences.  
78. In the present dispute, China argues that Raw Materials  is not applicable because the annual 
legal instruments that implement the provision of domestic support for corn in 2015 allegedly expired 
before panel establishment. However, as explained above, China is incorrect that the expiration of 
an annual legal i nstrument for a particular year prevents a panel from making findings on the 
domestic support provided through that instrument in the relevant year – the U.S. panel request 
sets out the only "matter" that existed and demonstrated China's WTO -inconsistent s upport as of 
that date. Moreover, in the context of domestic support, China's argument creates the very loophole 
the panel and Appellate Body in Raw Materials  sought to avoid.  
79. Most of the instruments identified in the U.S. panel request are annual in nature – both for 
corn and for wheat and rice. China has indicated that it does not argue that the market price support 
programs for wheat or rice have expired. As China explained at the first panel meeting and in its 
answers to the Panel's questions, the rice and wheat programs essentially operate in the same way 
the export duties and quotas in Raw Materials  operated – i.e., they consist of an ongoing legislative 
framework and a series of annual measures that identify the specific applied administered pric e and 
implementation plans for each year in which the MPS program operates. However, China has not 
explained why the Panel should view the instruments for corn any differently, or why the differences 
between the annual legal instruments for corn in 2015 an d 2016 mean that the expiration of the 
2015 legal instruments extinguishes the Panel's authority with respect to the provision of support 
during 2012 -2015.  
80. Specifically, China does not dispute that all of the annual legal instruments for rice and whea t 
issued in 2012 through 2015 in fact expired prior to the establishment of the panel. Therefore, China 
appears to suggest that the continued existence of the ongoing legal framework measures, including 
the 2004 Grain Distribution Regulation, preserves the  Panel's authority to make findings regarding 
the provision of domestic support for rice and wheat in the relevant years. But China's argument 
does not support finding that corn domestic support has "expired", for two reasons.  
81. First, the 2004 Grain Di stribution Regulation  provides authority for China to implement market 
price support for corn, as well as for wheat and rice. The annual legal instruments for each product 
covers one year (and therefore could be argued to "expire" with that year). There is  no logical basis 
to distinguish rice and wheat from corn, then, and to think that the authorizing framework that 
applies to the three products provides a basis for the Panel's terms of reference for rice and wheat, WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
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 but not for corn. China's approach would  lead to the very "disappearing target" dilemma the panel 
and Appellate Body in Raw Materials  warned against.  
82. Second, China's argument apparently relies on the absence of a regulatory framework 
pursuant to which the corn instruments were enacted. But,  if the mere absence of an ongoing legal 
framework meant that the expiration of annual instruments precluded a panel from making findings, 
this again would allow the same "disappearing target" danger – a constantly moving target that 
required a complainant  to continually update its analysis in hopes of keeping up with the changing 
measures. Moreover, such a finding would encourage Members to reduce the level of transparency 
in their systems and instead rely on annual, and even ad hoc , legal instruments alon e – a 
development that would only add to a complainant's difficulty in bringing a successful challenge.  
83. As the United States has explained previously (and again in the next section of this 
submission), the fact is we do not know – and the Panel therefo re cannot properly evaluate – the 
factual and legal situation in China in 2016. Under such circumstances, and given the nature of 
challenges to a Member's AMS, to avoid prejudicing U.S. rights to meaningful findings and 
recommendations with respect to the provision of domestic support in 2012 -2015, including through 
support for corn, the Panel must make findings on the matter as articulated in the U.S. panel request. 
That the specific legal instruments upon which those findings would be based may have expir ed does 
not alter the matter at issue or exclude the relevant measures from the Panel's terms of reference.  
84.  In addition to being required to examine the "matter" before it, if the Panel finds China's 
provision of domestic support to be inconsistent wi th China's obligations, it must, pursuant to Article 
19.1 of the DSU, recommend that China bring its measure(s) into conformity with the Agriculture 
Agreement. Pursuant to Article 11, therefore, the Panel must make an objective assessment as to 
whether Chi na's provision of domestic support to Chinese agricultural producers in each of the 
relevant years is in excess of its commitment level and thereby breaches China's commitments under 
the Agriculture Agreement. If the Panel finds China's provision of domest ic support to be inconsistent 
with China's obligations, it must, pursuant to Article 19.1 of the DSU, recommend that China bring 
its measure(s) into conformity with the Agriculture Agreement.  
85.  Thus, a panel is required to make a recommendation on any measure that it finds to be 
inconsistent with China's WTO obligations; and such a recommendation is the right of a complainant 
under the DSU. Therefore, if this Panel finds that China has provided domestic support in excess of 
its AMS commitments for any o f the relevant years, the Panel must recommend that China bring the 
measure(s) into compliance with its obligations.  
C. China Has Not Demonstrated That Its Market Price Support Program for Corn 
"Expired," or That It Ceased to Provide Domestic Support for Corn in Excess of 
Its Commitment Level in 2016  
86. As explained in the preceding section, the matter at issue before the Panel is whether China's 
provision of domestic support to its agricultural producers from 2012 through 2015 is inconsistent 
with its do mestic support commitments. Based on the U.S. panel request and the nature of AMS 
disputes, the expiration of specific legal instruments through which the United States has 
demonstrated that China has breached its Final Bound Commitment Level does not prec lude the 
Panel from making findings on this matter. For completeness, however, the United States also 
explains in this section why China also has failed to show that its market price support program for 
corn had "expired" by the time of the Panel's establi shment, or that it ceased to provide domestic 
support for corn in excess of its commitment level in 2016.  
87. First, China asserts at some length that after the "expiry" of the 2015 corn market price 
support instrument, it moved to a system of "market -oriented purchase" by "market players," where 
all types of entities may decide to make purchases "on their own initiative." According to China, the 
2016 corn purchasing instruments are " seeking  to achieve a market -based price discovery." China 
supports this assertion with the text of the 2016 corn purchasing instruments. However, the market -
based aspirations espoused in the 2016 Northeast Region Corn Purchase are simply not sufficient to 
demonstrate that China no longer provides domestic support for  corn in excess of its commitments. 
The United States notes that seeking  market -based price discovery is not the same as eliminating  
price support policies for corn, and "reform" of the price support program is not the same as WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
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 termination. On its face, the n, the instrument China identifies does not support its assertion that 
market -price support had "expired" or been withdrawn.  
88. The aspirations and policy "reform" reflected in the 2016 Northeast Region Corn Purchase 
Notice and other 2016 policy statement s are in fact similar to those identified in the 2004 Grain 
Opinion and 2004 Grain Distribution Regulation , pursuant to which China's market price support for 
wheat and rice are implemented. For instance, the 2004 Grain Distribution Regulation  states that 
the "state encourages market entities of various forms of ownership to engage in grain business 
operations, so as to promote fair competition" and that the "grain price is formed principally by 
market supply and demand." But the 2004 Grain Distribution Reg ulation  also provides that, "to 
protect the interests of grain farmers, the State Council may decide, when necessary, to implement 
minimum purchase prices in the main grain -producing regions." In this manner, though China's 2016 
Northeast Region Corn Purch ase Notice calls for "advancing corn purchasing and storage system 
reform," this reform is similar to the "marketization reform in grain purchasing and sales" pursued 
in 2004.  
89. This dichotomy between encouraging "market -oriented purchases" and maintain ing 
government control also is apparent on the face of the 2016 corn purchasing instruments and 
reflected in China's responses to the Panel's Questions. The 2016 Northeast Region Corn Purchase 
Notice cites as its goal facilitating a situation where farmers  "sell corn according to the fluctuating 
market price," and that "market entities of all types [are] independently entering the market to 
make purchases." However, China's 2016 Northeast Region Corn Purchase Notice simultaneously 
provides that relevant reg ions must "comprehensively organize the branches of central government -
owned enterprises under jurisdiction and local backbone grain enterprises to lead the way in entering 
the market for purchasing." The 2016 instrument further states that "[r]elevant cen tral government -
owned enterprises such as COFCO and AVIC must fully utilize their own channels and advantages to 
launch marketized purchasing, striving not to go lower than the policy -based purchasing amount of 
the previous year, and properly bring into pl ay their guiding and driving role." All of this is to "prevent 
the occurrence of farmers having "difficulties in selling grain.'" Therefore, while the 2016 measure 
does encourage "all types" of entities to enter the market, it also recognizes and provides for the 
continuing role of state -owned enterprises tasked with ensuring the market operates properly to 
compensate farmers and avoid difficulty selling corn by purchasing substantial volumes of newly 
harvested corn. Thus, direction towards increased "marke tization" does not, and has not in the past, 
meant that the Chinese government cannot continue to engage in the provision of domestic support 
through government purchasing, including at support prices.  
90. The provincial implementation measure from Heilong jiang, the 2016 Notice on Proper Handling 
of Corn in Heilongjiang , similarly recognizes the separate roles of private actors beginning to 
"marketize" the corn market, and state -owned enterprises tasked with driving the market by making 
purchases at levels similar to prior years. For instance, the regional implementing instrument states 
that "all types of entities can enter the market to purchase the corn as they wish." To that end, the 
provincial government is both "encouraging multiple market players to ac tively purchase and sell 
corn in the market," and "mak[ing] overall plans on coordinating the branches of central enterprises 
and major local grain enterprises in the administrative regions to take the lead to purchase corn in 
the market." Specifically, th e instrument provides that "[a]ssociated branches of central enterprises, 
such as COFCO, Chinatex Corporation, Aviation Industry Corporation of China, etc. shall make full 
use of their own advantages and channels to carry out the market -oriented purchase, work harder 
to ensure the purchase volume [is] no less than that of the policy -based purchase last year, and 
play a leading role in stabilizing the market and guiding the expectations." Thus, while the instrument 
released at the provincial level by Heilong jiang suggests a desire for private enterprises to enter the 
market and purchase corn, it also recognize the need for state -owned enterprises to guide the 
market through continuing purchasing activities and ensuring that farmers are able to sell their corn .  
91. Second, China argues in its responses to Panel Question 2(b) that prices for corn are now 
determined by the market and "reflect[] the market forces of supply and demand." To support this 
assertion, China cites to an NDRC press release reporting that  "[c]orn prices are based on the 
market," and reflect "reasonable price differences resulting from regional differences and corn quality 
differences." The United States notes that the press release was published on June 23, 2017, seven 
months  after the U.S . panel request. The NDRC press release contains no citations or data, and 
therefore consists of a series of unsubstantiated assertions. This new exhibit provides no information 
that is pertinent to the Panel's assessment of "the matter" as of the date of panel establishment.  WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
- 24 - 
 
 92. Moreover, that China permitted prices for corn to decline from artificially high levels does not 
demonstrate that China has instituted a "market -based price discovery mechanism," or that Chinese 
corn prices have "linked up with th e international market." To the contrary, Chinese corn prices have 
remained above international prices for corn throughout 2016 and 2017 as illustrated by Exhibit US -
94. Further, the GAIN Reports cited by China further illustrate the continuing differentia l between 
Chinese domestic prices for corn and international prices. According to the GAIN Reports, the "spot 
market" for corn in early December 2016 provided a price of 1,681 RMB or $244 per ton. The Report 
compares these Chinese port prices to the U.S. c orn import price in December 2016 which "landed 
at Chinese ports is about 1,500 RMB per ton ($218)," and other competing grain imports such as 
U.S. sorghum, which costs 1,690 RMB or $205. Thus, the lack of an applied administered price 
communicated to priv ate market actors and farmers does not mean that the domestic price is 
market -based, or that the purchases made by state -owned enterprises were not done at support 
prices.  
93. Third, China makes a number of other erroneous assertions regarding its 2016 co rn purchasing 
instruments and activities. In particular, China states that that the 2016 instruments "are not 
designating enterprises to purchase corn."  As the United States described in its response to Panel 
Question 2(a) -(c), the central and provincial l evel instruments implemented in 2016 mirrored prior 
corn market price support instruments in all relevant policy and logistical elements – including the 
designation of state -owned enterprises, such as Sinograin, COFCO, and AVIC, to purchase corn. Like 
in prior years, private entities may also purchase corn, but designated state -owned enterprises have 
a "guiding and driving role." These state -owned enterprises "must fully utilize their own channels 
and advantages to launch marketized purchasing, striving not  to go lower than the policy -based 
purchasing amount of the previous year." Further, both the 2015 and 2016 corn purchasing 
instruments also provide for financing through the Agricultural Development Bank of China, and 
making available storage for purchase d grain.  
94. Next, China erroneously asserts that "there is no purchase of corn by government entities 
after 30 April 2016," and that "the Chinese government does not have statistics" regarding purchases 
after the expiry of the TRPR. However, as described  in the response of the United States to Panel 
Question 2(a) -(c), Sinograin, a state -owned enterprise also charged with making purchases between 
2012 and 2015, reported that it purchased 21.41 million metric tons of corn during the 2016/17 
harvest through 743 Sinograin depots in the northeast region. According to Sinograin, this was 21 
percent of the production in northeast China and 70 percent of the volume procured by state -owned 
enterprises. Describing its activities, Sinograin further reported that "[i] n circumstances where 
purchasing entities have decreased, the strength of the market is insufficient, and there is downward 
pressure on prices, [Sinograin headquarters] does not push prices even lower ; it actively enters the 
market to expand the number of depots and accelerate the rate of purchasing to send a strong signal 
to stabilize and guide market expectations." Moreover, in addition to the statistics kept by state -
owned enterprises, such as Sinograin, the 2016 corn purchasing instruments direct certai n 
recordkeeping and reporting activities. The 2016 Northeast Region Corn Purchase Notice, states that 
"[a]ll relevant regions must . . . strengthen situation analysis and evaluation, closely track market 
changes, regularly announce information such as grai n purchasing progress and market price 
trends." Thus, it appears that records regarding purchasing and pricing activity are held by the 
Chinese government through its provinces and state -owned enterprises.  
95. Finally, the United States notes that it is Ch ina that argues that its market price support for 
corn "expired" in 2016, and therefore it is for China to demonstrate that this claim is supported by 
the record facts. To make this argument China must demonstrate that as of the date of panel request 
it had ceased to provide support for corn in excess of its commitments. China has made this 
assertion, but as described above and in the U.S. response to the Panel's Question 2, it was not 
clear at the time of panel request and it is not clear now that China ha s ceased to provide support 
prices to Chinese corn farmers, or that it no longer provides support in excess of its commitment 
levels.  
II. CHINA HAS FAILED TO REBUT THE UNITED STATES ' CLAIM THAT CHINA BREACHED ITS DOMESTIC 
SUPPORT COMMITMENTS  
 
96. China attempts to rebut the U.S. showing that China has exceeded its permitted levels of 
domestic support by arguing that it is permitted to use an alternative approach to the computation 
of the product -specific AMS. Specifically, China argues that the methodolo gy contained in Annex 3 
of the Agriculture Agreement is only a "fallback" option, and that the Supporting Tables attached to WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
- 25 - 
 
 Part IV of its Schedule of Concessions contain agreed China -specific methodologies that supplant 
the methodology required by the Ag riculture Agreement. However, China's position is unsupported 
by the text and structure of the relevant covered agreements, including China's Protocol of 
Accession.  
97. China, like all WTO Members, committed to abide by the rules outlined in the Agricultu re 
Agreement, as well as maintain a level of domestic support at or below its Final Bound Commitment 
Level of "nil." Paragraph 1.3 of China's Protocol of Accession specifically states: " [e]xcept as 
otherwise provided for in this Protocol , those obligations  in the Multilateral Trade Agreements 
annexed to the WTO  Agreement that are to be implemented over a period of time starting with entry 
into force of that Agreement shall be implemented by China as if it had accepted that Agreement on 
the date of its entry  into force." The Agriculture Agreement is one of the listed Multilateral Trade 
Agreements annexed to the WTO Agreement, and with which China has agreed to comply.  
98. Consistent with Paragraph 1.3 Members also agreed in China's Accession Protocol to cert ain 
modifications of the calculation methodology for Current Total AMS. Specifically, pursuant to 
paragraph 235 of China's Working Party Report, incorporated by reference into China's Protocol of 
Accession, China agreed that, for purposes of Article 6.4, i t would maintain product -specific domestic 
support at or below a de minimis  level of 8.5 percent of the total value of production for each basic 
agricultural product and that China would not have recourse to Article 6.2.  
99. In contrast to Paragraph 235, P aragraph 238 of the Working Party Report records that 
Members did not agree with all elements of the methodology and policy classifications used in China's 
Supporting Tables. Specifically, Members asked China to clarify methodological issues contained in 
its Supporting Tables, and, China agreed to clarify the methodological issue in the context of its 
notification obligations under the Agriculture Agreement. This demonstrates that WTO Members did 
not view China's Supporting Tables as reflecting new rights o r obligations of China to which they 
were "agreeing."  
100. Therefore, for China, as for other Members, Paragraph 8 of Annex 3 of the Agriculture 
Agreement mandates the methodology for calculating the value of the type of domestic support at 
issue in this d ispute – market price support. Paragraph 8 states that "market price support shall be 
calculated using the gap between a fixed external reference price  and the applied administered price  
multiplied by the quantity of production eligible to receive  the appl ied administered price."  
101. China has argued that the Panel can look to information contained in its Supporting Tables to 
identify China -specific methodologies for identification of the fixed external reference price and the 
quantity of eligible producti on, and that these methodologies supplant the "fallback" obligations 
contained in Annex 3 of the Agriculture Agreement. Specifically, China argues that "Articles 1(a)(ii) 
and 1(h)(ii) of the Agreement on Agriculture  … specifically designate the 'constituen t data and 
methodology' as the elements from the supporting tables that give rise to domestic -support -related 
rights and obligations in the calculation of Current (Total) AMS." China relies on the Appellate Body 
report in Korea – Beef to argue that there i s no hierarchy between the relevant provisions of Annex 
3 and a Member's constituent data and methodology. China's arguments misunderstand the 
relationship between the Agriculture Agreement and a Member's Schedule of Concessions and 
Supporting Tables, as w ell as the role and status of information contained in Supporting Tables under 
the Agriculture Agreement.  
102. The Agriculture Agreement provides the ways in which the information contained in a 
Member's Supporting Tables may be used in the calculation of a Member's Current Total AMS, but it 
does not give rise to domestic -support related rights and obligations in the calculation of Current 
Total AMS. The Agriculture Agreement directs the reliance of a Member's Supporting Table to provide 
Member -specific fac tual information used to understand a Member's agricultural sector. Specifically, 
Article 1(b) states that "basic agricultural product" "is defined as the product as close as practicable 
to the point of first sale as specified in a Member's Schedule and in  the related supporting material." 
Similarly, the definition of "year" provided by the Agriculture Agreement in Article 1(i) "refers to the 
calendar, financial or marketing year specified in the Schedule relating to that Member." Thus, the 
Agriculture Agre ement directs the use of a Member's Supporting Table to glean Member -specific 
factual information for purposes of identifying the basic agricultural products in the Member's 
territory and definition of year for a particular program; it does not create inde pendent rights and 
obligations.  WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
- 26 - 
 
 103. Where the Agriculture Agreement does not expressly direct recourse to information contained 
in the Supporting Tables, the information may be used only as provided in Articles 1(a) and 1(h). 
Specifically, Article  1(a)(ii ) of the Agriculture Agreement states that the product -specific AMS must 
be "calculated in accordance with  the provisions of Annex 3 of this Agreement and taking into account  
the constituent data and methodology used in the tables of support material incor porated by 
reference in Part IV of the Member's Schedule." Article 1(h), in turn, provides that a Member's "Total 
AMS" refers to "the sum of all domestic support provided in favour of agricultural producers, 
calculated as the sum of all aggregate measureme nts of support for basic agricultural products, all 
non-product -specific aggregate measurements of support and equivalent measurements of support 
for agricultural products." For a given year, the "Current Total AMS" must be calculated in accordance 
with the provisions of this Agreement, including Article 6, and with  the constituent data and 
methodology used in the supporting material."  
104. The inclusion of the phrase "in accordance with" in Article 1( a)(ii) indicates that a 
product -specific AMS calculation  must be conducted "consistent with" the methodology provided in 
Annex 3. Conversely, the use of the phrase "taking into account" in reference to constituent data 
and methodology requires a panel to "take into consideration, [or] notice" that information. This 
indicates that the Panel must consider any relevant constituent data and methodology, but may not 
accord a higher degree of consideration to that information than it does the methodology in Annex  3.  
105. Contrary to China's argument, the Appellate Bo dy report in Korea – Beef supports this 
understanding. In that dispute, the Appellate Body noted the distinction reflected in the text of 
Article 1(a)(ii) between the phrases "in accordance with" and "taking into account," and found that 
the ordinary meani ng of the phrases suggests a hierarchy attributing a "more rigorous standard" to 
Annex 3, than to constituent data and methodology. The Appellate Body did not limit this statement 
regarding the supremacy of Annex 3 to those circumstances in which no consti tuent data and 
methodology were provided by a Member; nor would the text of the Agriculture Agreement have 
supported such a view. Rather, the text of the Agriculture Agreement suggests that, when 
performing the calculation of AMS for a particular product p ursuant to Annex 3, the data and 
methodology contained in the supporting material may provide additional information relevant to 
the calculation of support for the specific product at issue , but it does not permit Members to use 
alternative methodologies i n its Supporting Table . 
106. When discussing how a panel should treat a conflict between Annex 3 and a Member's 
constituent data and methodology, China states that "the Appellate Body in Korea – Beef did not 
resolve the question of any hierarchy between th e relevant provisions of Annex 3 and a Member's 
constituent data and methodology . . . the Appellate Body therefore explicitly left open the question 
of a hierarchy, and even entertained the possibility that the hierarchy could be in favor of the 
constitue nt data and methodology." Contrary to China's argument, the Appellate Body in Korea – 
Beef did address the apparent hierarchy between Annex 3 and a Member's constituent data and 
methodology, and did not find that Article 1(a)(ii) permitted a panel to favor  a Member's constituent 
data and methodology.  
A. The Legal Status of a Member's Supporting Table Is the Same regardless of 
When the Member Joined the WTO  
107. China also argues that the constituent data included in a Member's Supporting Tables has a 
different legal status depending on whether the Member is an original Member or a recently acceding 
Member. Specifically, China argues that, "for each original Member of the WTO,  . . . based on the 
incorporation by reference of a Member's supporting tables into  that Member's Schedule of 
Concessions, the supporting tables constitute an integral part of the GATT 1994." However, in 
contrast to original WTO Members, China argues that for "later -acceded Members . . . the supporting 
tables are an integral part of the terms of that Member's accession to the WTO, under Article XII:1 
of the Marrakesh Agreement." This is false, and China's argument must fail for two reasons.  
108. First, China's Schedule of Concessions, including Part IV, does not form part of China's 
Accession Protocol. Rather, as stated in Part II, paragraph 1 of China's Protocol of Accession: " [t]he 
Schedules annexed to this Protocol shall become the Schedule of Concessions and Commitments 
annexed to the GATT 1994." This is consistent with the treatm ent of other WTO Members' Schedules 
of Concessions, which also form part of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994  ("GATT 
1994"). Thus, it is clear that China's Schedule of Concessions is not part of the Accession Protocol, 
but the GATT 1994.  WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
- 27 - 
 
 109.  Second, Article 21, paragraph 1 of the Agriculture Agreement clarifies the relationship 
between the Agriculture Agreement and the GATT 1994. It states t hat the "provisions of the 
GATT  1994 and of other Multilateral Trade Agreements in Annex 1A to the WT O Agreement shall 
apply subject to the other provisions of this Agreement ." In other words, where there is a conflict 
between the provisions of the Agriculture Agreement and the GATT 1994, the Agriculture Agreement 
would prevail.  
110. In the EC – Export S ubsidies on Sugar  dispute, the panel and the Appellate Body agreed that 
"WTO Members may use entries in their Schedules of Concession to clarify and qualify the 
'concession' they individually agree to assume," but they may not "reduce or conflict with obli gations 
they have assumed under the GATT or WTO Agreement, including the Agreement on Agriculture." 
This echoed prior statements by a GATT 1947 panel in US – Sugar  suggesting that a "Schedule[] of 
Concessions" is for Members to "incorporate . . . acts yiel ding rights under the General Agreement 
but not acts diminishing obligations under that Agreement." Therefore, where, as here, a Member's 
Schedule conflicts with the obligations of the Agriculture Agreement, the provisions of that Schedule 
must fail, and t he Panel must apply the applicable provisions of the Agriculture Agreement  instead.  
111. We note that the European Union relies on EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar  to suggest that a 
Member may deviate from agreements found in the covered agreement in its Sch edule where the 
deviation "does not 'reduce' per se  the commitments of the newly acceded Members under the 
Agriculture Agreement." That is, the European Union suggests that a panel must evaluate the 
apparent change to the Member's commitment to determine w hether it in fact "reduces" the 
commitment, or only alters it. However, the European Union fails to provide the legal basis for such 
a position, much less explain how or why in practice such a rule could operate. Similar to China's 
arguments, the European Union's argument would mean that every WTO Member could in theory be 
bound by as -of-yet unknown commitments, different from those reflected in the texts of the covered 
agreements as agreed by WTO Members, and different from the commitments of every other W TO 
Member.  
112. The only vehicle through which China could accede to a commitment not consistent with the 
obligations of the Agriculture Agreement was its Accession Protocol, including any paragraphs of the 
Working Party Report incorporated by reference i nto that Protocol. Absent such a commitment, China 
must comply with the obligations of the Agriculture Agreement like any other WTO Member must, 
including the methodological obligations contained in Annex 3 with respect to the calculation of 
market price s upport.  For these reasons, the Supporting Tables thus do not, and could not, 
themselves set out any legally permissible deviation from the Agriculture Agreement.  
113. Even aside from the fact that China may not alter an Agriculture Agreement commitment 
through its Schedule or Supporting Table,  we note that China 's Supporting Tables contain no 
reference to an article in the Agriculture Agreement, nor any express language  indicating that the 
Membership agreed to alter a commitment specifically for China.  Compare the language included in 
China's Supporting Table to the language used in China's Working Party to deviate from the de 
minimis  amount outlined in Article 6.4 of the Agriculture Agreement.  
114. When WTO Members agreed to provide China with an obligation different from the Agriculture 
Agreement, they clearly referenced the legal obligation to be modified by name. The Working Party 
Report thus clearly evinces that WTO Members agreed  to provide Chin a with a different de minimis  
than that provided for in the Agriculture Agreement, and agreed  that China would not have recourse 
to Article 6.2 of the Agriculture Agreement. In contrast, China's Supporting Table contains no similar 
reference. On the face o f the Supporting Table, there is no indication that the WTO Members agreed 
to modify any legal obligation (because there was no agreement), and there is no reference to Annex 
3 or any other provision in the Agriculture Agreement. Accepting China's argument  would create a 
situation where, again, Members would not know what other Members' obligations are, because 
numerous implicit methodologies could be drawn from the data and descriptions provided in a 
Member's Supporting Tables. Such an interpretation lacks  any legal basis and would lead to absurd 
and unworkable results.  
115. This dilemma becomes apparent when looking more closely at China's arguments regarding 
the quantity of eligible production. China argues that the Panel should use the procurement amoun ts 
for purposes of calculating MPS for the programs at issue here, because it used procurement for the 
programs in existence when it calculated its base AMS. However, the description provided in the 
Supporting Table does not make clear how the China's mark et price support programs operated, WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
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 including whether the programs limited purchases to a specific amount. Were the latter to be true, 
total production would not have been the appropriate value to use for eligible production.  
116. China argues that any di fferences between the programs does not matter, because constituent 
data and methodology apply to products, and not measures. However, China fails to explain how 
this view supports its arguments. With respect to eligible production, for example, China argu es that 
the Panel must calculate market price support based on the calculation of the market price support 
program (measure) in its Supporting Tables. China therefore appears to suggest that while the 
methodology in the Supporting Tables relates to a parti cular program, the methodology now must 
necessarily be used with respect to all market price support measures for the same product 
regardless of the differences between the market price support programs at issue. However, if 
constituent data and methodolog y apply to products and not measures, then the more logical 
consequence of this view would be that China's use of an alternative methodology with respect to 
the calculation of a particular program simply does not reflect the type of constituent data and 
methodology the Panel must take into account in determining China's current product -specific AMS 
for the relevant products. Regardless, as the United States has explained, China may not rely on 
constituent data and methodology where the methodology is incons istent with the requirements of 
the Agriculture Agreement.  
117. Moreover, not knowing how a program described in China's Supporting Tables works, it is 
unclear on what basis the Panel would be able to determine that the values used in that calculation 
reflect the intention by the Members to alter the market price support methodology for purposes of 
calculating China's product -specific and Current Total AMS. That is, the Panel cannot determine 
based on the record before it whether the calculation provided in  the Supporting Table is consistent 
with Annex 3 or not. Therefore, based on the vague factual descriptions provided in the Supporting 
Table alone, China asks the Panel to assume an intention on the part of the WTO Membership to 
amend an obligation under t he Agriculture Agreement as it applied to China only.  
118. The situation regarding the fixed external reference price is no different. China used a value 
in its Supporting Tables for purposes of calculating Base Total AMS and now asks the Panel to derive 
from that usage an intention by the Members to alter the terms of China's accession. Not only would 
such an exercise be inconsistent with the terms of China's Accession Protocol, it would create 
significant uncertainty with respect to Members' obligations,  not only under the Agriculture 
Agreement, but under the General Agreement on Trade in Services  ("GATS") and any number of 
other Agreements.  
119. The second concern raised by China's argument is the disparity it would create between 
original and acceding M embers to the WTO. Without a clear indication in the legal texts, a Member 
like China acceding to the WTO six years after the conclusion of the Uruguay round would have been 
able to do so on terms significantly more production - and trade -distorting than or iginal Members. 
That is, were China able to use a quantity of eligible production limited only to the quantity actually 
procured, China's freedom to distort would be compounded, as the effect of such support might be 
provided to total production, but the c alculation would only need to reflect a small portion of that 
support. China thus could have an identical program to another Member like India, but, 
unconstrained by the same obligations as those other Members, be able to provide significantly more 
support  to its producers, increasing consequent production and trade effects. China has provided no 
argumentation that would allow such an interpretation in the absence of the clear, and legally 
confirmed intention of WTO Members, and the Panel should reject Chin a's arguments accordingly.  
120. Accordingly, the Panel should reject China's interpretations of the relevant Agreements, 
because they lack any legal basis and would give rise to serious concerns regarding the status and 
content of the WTO commitments of a ll Members.  
B. China Has Not Demonstrated the Existence of a Subsequent Practice or 
Subsequent Agreement Regarding the Use of an Alternative Fixed External 
Reference Price For Newly Acceding WTO Members  
121. In addition to its argument that both its quanti ty of eligible production and its fixed external 
reference price were modified by virtue of information contained in its Supporting Table, China has 
now argued in its responses to questions that the "practice of Members to use, for later -acceded 
Members, a  different base period, including for the fixed external reference price, constitutes a WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
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 subsequent practice in the application of the treaty, within the meaning of Article 31 of the Vienna 
Convention."  
122. The use of post -1986-1988 fixed external referen ce prices by recently acceding Members does 
not fit within the definition of subsequent practice or subsequent agreement per Article 31(3) of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties  ("VCLT"). Article 31(3) of the VCLT provides, in relevant 
part, that with respect to the general rule of interpretation "[t]here shall be taken into account, 
together with the context: (a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the 
interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions; (b) any su bsequent practice in the 
application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation."  
123. That is, Article 31(3) directs that a panel shall take into account that subsequent practice 
"which establishes the agreem ent of the parties  regarding [the] interpretation " of the treaty. 
Therefore, for the practice of WTO Members to be relevant to the Panel's interpretive exercise, the 
practice must relate to the interpretation of a relevant provision o f the Agriculture Agre ement. In  this 
dispute, the Panel is charged with interpreting and applying China's obligations under Article 3.2 and 
6.3 of the Agriculture Agreement regarding Current Total AMS. The Agriculture Agreement provides 
instructions for the calculation of each of Chi na's product -specific AMSs, and  then its Current Total 
AMS, in Articles 1(a)(ii) and 1(h)(ii), and by extension in Annex 3 and Article 6.  
124. The heart of the interpretative concern is Annex 3, paragraph 9 of the Agriculture Agreement, 
which states  the "fixed external reference price shall be based on the years 1986 to 1988."  The text 
of Annex 3 is clear in requiring Members to calculate market price support for purposes of product -
specific AMS using a fixed external reference price of 1986 -1988. Cu stomary rules of interpretation 
do not permit an interpreter to use context, or a subsequent practice or agreement, to reach an 
interpretation inconsistent with the ordinary meaning of the terms of the provision in question, such 
that they create a derogat ion or exception from the provisions of the treaty. Rather, these sources 
of interpretation must be used to determine the particular meaning of the terms as used in the 
relevant provision.  
125. The Appellate Body in EC – Bananas (Article 21.5)  made a simi lar finding with respect to 
subsequent agreements. It noted that Article 31(3)(a) relates to the situation where an agreement 
specifies how existing rules or obligations in force are to be "applied;" the term does not connote 
the creation of new or the ext ension of existing obligations. Therefore, a subsequent practice, like a 
subsequent agreement, cannot have the legal effect of changing the obligation set out in a covered 
agreement.  
126. China has shown no subsequent agreement regarding the interpretatio n of Annex 3, paragraph 
9, because it has pointed to no text in any supporting table that even refers to that provision and it 
has pointed to no "agreement" that speaks to an "interpretation" of that provision. Moreover, a panel 
cannot refer to subsequent practice in order to develop an interpretation of a legal provision that 
applies to some Members only, and not to other Members. China appears to suggest that the alleged 
subsequent practice would support different meanings  of the text of the Agriculture A greement for 
different Members. But while a legal provision may be susceptible to multiple interpretations, the 
interpretative exercise cannot change depending on the Member in question. This would lead to an 
illogical result, whereby each Member may be su bject to potentially very different obligations.  
127. Therefore, the Panel should reject China's argument that the use of an alternative fixed 
external reference price for newly acceding WTO member amounts to a subsequent practice or 
subsequent agreement under the VCLT.  
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF U.S.  ORAL STATEMENTS AT  
THE SECOND SUBSTANTIVE MEETING WITH THE PANEL 
I. CHINA ERRS IN CLAIMING THAT THE PANEL MUST CALCULATE CHINA'S CURRENT AMS  CONSISTENT 
WITH CHINA'S BASE AMS   
128. Throughout this dispute, China has argued that China's "Current Total AMS" for subsequent 
years must be calculated consistently with the calculation of its "Base Total AMS," as set out in its 
Supporting Tables. China asserts that "the same  constituent data  and methodology, including the 
same  fixed external reference prices and the same methodology for determining eligible production, WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
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 must be used to calculate both Base (Total) AMS and Current  (Total) AMS." While China insists that 
the Agriculture Agreement and its Supporting Tables can be interpreted harmoniously, it is clear that 
China is suggesting that a Member's Supporting Table can supplant the calculation requirements 
provided in the Agriculture Agreement for calculation of AMS and Current Total AMS wi th country -
specific methodologies. This would both contradict the Agriculture Agreement and significantly 
expand China's ability to provide d omestic support while other WTO  Members are subject to different 
rules. The text of the WTO Agreements simply does not support this understanding.  
129. The Agriculture Agreement defines the terms "AMS," "Base Total AMS," and "Current Total 
AMS," and sets out specific instructions and methodologies for the calculation of "AMS" and "Current 
Total AMS." The Agriculture Ag reement does not impose specific requirements on the calculation of 
AMS during a base period or Base Total AMS. Indeed, Base Total AMS is not relevant as an obligation 
of a Member; rather, that calculation provided a basis for the Annual and Final Bound Co mmitment 
Levels that are the subject of a Member's commitments under Article 3.2 and 6.3. Naturally, then, 
the Agriculture Agreement nowhere requires "consistency" between the calculation of Current Total 
AMS and the calculation of Base Total AMS.  
130. First, turning to AMS, it is described in Article 1(a). AMS is the annual level of non -exempt 
domestic support, expressed in monetary terms, provided to the producers of the basic agricultural 
product or non -product -specific support provided in favor of the agricultural producers generally. 
Romanette (i) of Article 1(a) states that AMS " with respect to support provided during the base 
period " is "specified in the relevant tables of supporting material incorporated by reference in Part  IV 
of a Member's Schedul e." From the plain text, it is clear that Article 1(a)(i) does not set out or 
mandate any calculation for AMS during the base period, but rather identifies where the value of 
such support is recorded for the base period. Romanette (ii) addresses AMS " with respect to support 
provided during any year of the implementation period and thereafter." As we described earlier, 
Article 1(a)(ii) does require a calculation. Each product -specific AMS in a subsequent year will be 
"calculated in accordance with the provis ions of Annex 3 of this Agreement and taking into account 
the constituent data and methodology used in the tables of supporting material incorporated by 
reference in Part IV of the Member's Schedule."  
131. Thus, Article 1(a)(ii) provides a calculation requ irement for AMS in the subsequent years, 
while Article 1(a)(i) provides no such requirement for AMS provided during the base period. Nothing 
in the Agreement suggests that the method a Member used to calculate AMS in the base period 
would have the effect o f nullifying the obligation to calculate AMS in the subsequent years "in 
accordance with" Annex 3, and "taking into account" constituent data and methodology. As 
previously explained, "taking into account" does not require calculation consistent with or in  
conformity with information contained in the Supporting Tables. Rather, it requires a Panel to give 
consideration to country -specific "constituent data and methodology" – including the types of basic 
agricultural products grown in that Member's territory,  the "year" relevant for domestic support, or 
whether supported products have unique attributes that affect the calculation of support such as 
multiple growing seasons, processing practices or requirements, or issues of quality – when 
calculating AMS.  
132. The AMS or AMSs described in Article 1(a) are discrete component parts of a Member's Total 
AMS. Specifically, if individual AMSs exceed the de minimis  level when calculated in accordance with 
Article 6 of the Agriculture Agreement, each such product -specific AMS (and if applicable a non -
product specific AMS) must be included in the "Total AMS." Total AMS refers to a different stage in 
the computation of domestic support – namely, the summing of component parts. Article 1(h) 
defines Total AMS as the "sum o f all domestic support provided in favour of agricultural producers, 
calculated as the sum of all aggregate measurements of support for basic agricultural products, all 
non-product -specific aggregate measurements of support and all equivalent measurements of 
support for agricultural products."  
133. The definition of Total AMS informs the definition of both "Base Total AMS" and "Current Total 
AMS."  Specifically, Article 1(h)(i) states that Base Total AMS, all domestic support provided in favor 
of agricultur al producers in the "base period," is "as specified in Part IV of a Member's Schedule."  
134. Critically, again, Article 1(h) does not provide a calculation methodology for determining the 
value of Base Total AMS; it indicates where the value of such suppo rt can be found. As the Appellate 
Body observed in Korea – Beef, "Base Total AMS, and the commitment levels resulting or derived WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
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 therefrom, are not themselves formulae to be worked out, but simply absolute figures set out in the 
Schedule of the Member conc erned."  
135. Separately, in romanette (ii), Article 1(h) provides the definition and calculation directions for 
"Current Total AMS." Current Total AMS is "the sum of all domestic support provided in favour of 
agricultural producers . . . actually provided  during any year of the implementation period and 
thereafter." The Current Total AMS is "calculated in accordance with the provisions of this 
Agreement, including Article  6, and with the constituent data and methodology used in the tables of 
supporting mat erial incorporated by reference in Part IV of the Member's Schedule." Thus, Article 
1(h)(ii) provides both a definition of Current Total AMS and instructions for the calculation of Current 
Total AMS.  
136. Nothing in the text of the Agriculture Agreement p rovides, as suggested by China, that Base 
Total AMS calculations that may (or may not) be contained in a Member's Supporting Tables can 
supplant the rules in Article 1(h) to calculate "Current Total AMS." Because no particular calculation 
or rules for such  a calculation is required to establish Base Total AMS, naturally, the Agreement 
nowhere suggests that consistency is required between the calculations. Rather, constituent data 
and methodology reflected in these documents may provide country -specific data  and methodologies 
to inform, but not alter, the calculation requirements set out in Article 1(h).  
137. China's proposed methodology is not consistent with the calculations contained in its 
supporting tables. Not only do China's arguments regarding "consi stency" between the calculations 
of Base Total AMS and Current Total AMS fail because they are legally unfounded, but China's 
proposed market price support calculations are not in fact "consistent" with the calculations actually 
utilized in its Supporting Tables. This is a critical point, and fatal to China's case. Recall that China 
has been asserting that its Current Total AMS must be calculated using the same  methodology as in 
its Schedule. But, on closer inspection, China did not in fact use  a "fixed ext ernal reference price" 
based on the years 1996 to 1998 for wheat, Indica rice, Japonica rice, and corn in its original Base 
Total AMS. To recall, China asserts that the " fixed external reference price  for wheat is 1698.1 Yuan 
per ton , as set out in Appendi x DS 5 -3 to Rev.3." Similarly, citing an appendix to DS -5 of its 
Supporting Tables, China provides a "fixed external reference price of 2343.0 yuan per ton  for Indica 
rice and a fixed external reference price of 3290.6 yuan per ton  for Japonica rice. China  broadly 
notes "China's FERP for corn may be found in Rev.3." China further clarifies in its second written 
submission that "Rev.3 . . . includes FERPs for China that apply to certain products," and that 
"[t]hese FERPS are (i) based on a three -year base period of 1996-1998; (ii) based on China's status, 
during that period,  as a net exporter or net importer of the product at issue; and, (iii) fixed." 
138. However, China's calculation of its Base Total AMS was not  based on a "fixed external 
reference price" or the values drawn from Appendix DS 5 -3 or Appendix DS 5 -4 of its Supporting 
Tables. Instead, China's market price support calculations for wheat, Indica rice, Japonica rice, and 
corn in its DS 5 Supporting Table used three different, annual "exter nal reference price[s]" 
corresponding to each year of the base period. The fifth column in China's Support Table is labeled 
"external reference price" – not "fixed" external reference price; and the values contained in that 
column reflect three different p rices, one for each year. According to footnotes 17 and 18 to the 
Supporting Table, these "external references prices" were calculated based on CIF prices for wheat, 
and on FOB prices for Indica rice, Japonica rice, and corn. Rather than use a fixed extern al reference 
price covering 1996 -1998, as China has asserted to the Panel, China's market price support 
calculations thus compared a 1996 applied administered price to a 1996 external reference price, a 
1997 applied administered price to a 1997 external re ference price, and a 1998 applied administered 
price to a 1998 external reference price. The values of market price support calculated in these 
tables were included in China's DS 4 Table calculating its Base Total AMS. To illustrate, in the row 
covering wh eat, for each year from 1996 -1998, there is a separate price. So, it is not the same 
average price that would reflect a fixed external reference price.  
139. Thus, Table DS 5, which contain the actual calculations of market price support for wheat, 
Indica rice, Japonica rice, and corn, reveals that the calculation of market price support during the 
base period did not utilize a "fixed" external reference price at all. Rather, the calculation appears 
to reflect an evaluation of market price support using the  price gap between an applied administered 
price and the average FOB or CIF unit value for the basic agricultural product in the specific year  in 
question .  WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
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 140. Were this methodology applied to the calculation of market price support in this dispute, 
China's support would be determined based on the gap between the applied administered price for 
wheat in 2015, for example, and the average CIF prices for Chinese wheat imports in 2015 , and 
similar external reference prices would be needed for each year from 2 012 to 2014. China does not 
argue that a Panel may calculate market price support in this way, and Annex 3, which requires the 
use of a "fixed external reference price . . . based on the years 1986 to 1988," does not permit such 
a calculation methodology.  
141. China draws its proposed "fixed external reference price" for each product, not from the 
Supporting Tables that informed its market price support (DS 5) and Base Total AMS (DS 4) 
calculations, but from a separate appendices included in its Rev. 3 cont aining values that appear not 
to have been used in the original calculation process. These appendices provide the underlying 
calculation for China's year -by-year external reference price calculation, including the import/export 
volumes, import/export value s, CIF/FOB prices, and calculated CIF/FOB unit prices. The charts also 
contain an average of these values, but this is not utilized elsewhere in the document, and in 
particular to calculate the AMS for each product for each year.  
142. For this reason, Chi na's demand for consistency between the Base Total AMS and Current 
Total AMS seems misplaced. First, nothing in the text of the Agriculture Agreement provides, as 
suggested by China, that Base Total AMS calculations contained in a Member's Supporting Table s 
can replace the binding commitments in the Agreement to calculate "Current Total AMS" in 
accordance with Annex 3. Second, in any event, China's own Supporting Tables did not use the data 
or methodology suggested by China in its actual calculation of mark et price support and Base Total 
AMS. Rather, the Agriculture Agreement sets forth the requirements for calculating Current Total 
AMS in subsequent years and this includes recourse to country -specific data and methodology 
reflected in a Member's Supporting Tables to the extent that it informs, but does not alter, the 
calculation requirements.  
II. CHINA HAS NOT ESTABLISHED THAT THE PANEL IS PRECLUDED FROM ISSUING FINDINGS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING CHINA'S PROVISION OF DOMESTIC SUPPORT TO CORN PRODUCERS I N 
2012  THROUGH 2015   
 
143. China has not demonstrated that its Corn MPS Program had "expired" prior to the Panel's 
establishment; nor has China shown that it ceased to purchase corn at administratively determined 
prices during the 2016/17 harvest. First, t he introduction of a direct payment program for corn 
producers does not demonstrate that China no longer purchases corn at an administratively 
determined price. Second, while China asserts that its 2016 Northeast Region Corn Purchasing Notice  
provides for "market -oriented" purchases by "market players," where all types of entities may decide 
to make purchases on their own initiative, the 2016 Notice  directs the same state -owned enterprises 
who were engaged in corn purchases in prior years to "striv[e] not t o go lower than the policy -based 
purchasing amount of the previous year."  
144. Although not required in order to satisfy the obligations of Article 6.2 of the DSU, the United 
States has continued to seek additional information and instruments related to C hina's 2016 -17 corn 
purchase programs for the Panel's reference. The additional information found suggests that China 
had not ceased to provide market price support in 2016. First, despite China's statements regarding 
the transition to the use of a "market  price" for government purchases of corn in 2016, the United 
States has identified a notice of administered prices issued by Sinograin to certain purchasing 
locations in Inner Mongolia on October 16, 2016. Entitled, Notice on Activating 2016 Autumn Grains 
Corn Purchase Work  (Exhibit US -101), this document – released one month after the "reformed" 
purchasing instruments – announces the prices at which government purchases will be made, and 
directs local grain depots to display or post the available prices fo r new, standard grain corn in that 
area. This announcement read together with the 2016 Northeast Region Corn Purchase Notice 
(Exhibit US -87) are very similar in form and content to the 2012 – 2015 Corn MPS Programs.  
145. Second, Exhibit US -102, entitled Jilin Notice on Further Proper Handling of Corn Purchases 
and Sales Work issued by the Jilin Province Grain Bureau, a provincial branch of the State 
Administration of Grain, directs Sinograin and other state -owned enterprises to enter the corn et 
and make c orn purchases, in order to counteract negative market trends, including falling corn 
prices.  WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
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 146. Third, Exhibit US -103, a May 2017 transcript of a live broadcast interview of the Jilin Province 
Grain Bureau Vice Director confirms that Sinograin's Jilin p rovince subsidiary has given full play to 
its role of macro -control and as a 'stabilizing instrument' and 'ballast.'" Taken together, these 
documents suggest that China has not "ceased" government purchases of corn at pre -set prices.  
U.S.  RESPONSES TO THE  PANEL'S SECOND SET OF QUESTIONS  
Summary of U.S. Response to Panel Question 74  
147. Generally, other Member's Supporting Tables may be considered "context" in instances where 
they assist in the interpretation as directed by Article 31 of the VCLT.  
148. We also note that while other Members' Schedules may be looked to as context, they are only 
one source of context. Typically, interpreters look first to the "immediate context" of a term or 
provision, including for instance the rest of the particular provisi on at issue, the other provisions of 
the relevant WTO Agreement, other similar provisions in other Agreements, and the overall structure 
of the Agreement, which may be considered along with the Agreement's object and purpose.  
149. Contrary to China's argu ments, customary rules of interpretation do not permit an interpreter 
to use context to reach an interpretation inconsistent with the ordinary meaning of the terms of the 
provision in question, such that they create a derogation or exception from the provi sions of the 
agreement. Importantly, when China points to certain other Members' Supporting Tables as context, 
it does not and cannot assert that those Supporting Tables provide context for the calculation of 
current AMS and Current Total AMS. Rather, it c an only point to certain other Members' use of a 
different time period for purposes of calculating base AMS . Thus, to the extent these Supporting 
Table provide context, they do not provide relevant context – that is, context for the understanding 
of the pa rticular calculation as described in the provision of the Agreement on Agriculture in question.  
150. More relevant context is provided by China's Accession Protocol and Working Party Report. 
The clear intention to alter the calculation methodology for Chi na for future years, including a China -
specific de minimis support level, was recorded in paragraph 235 of the Working Party Report and 
incorporated into China's Accession Protocol. This demonstrates how WTO Members altered a WTO 
obligation when they intended  to alter that obligation. Paragraph 235 does not contain any alteration 
to the Article 1(a)(ii) or Annex 3 current AMS obligations. China's Supporting Table is not the 
appropriate vehicle to alter a WTO obligation and contains no text suggesting a n intention to alter 
an obligation.  
Summary of U.S. Response to Panel Question 75  
151. China has no reduction commitments and has an ongoing Final Bound Commitment Level of 
"nil." China is obligated to maintain Current Total AMS, when calc ulated in accord ance with Annex  3 
and Article 6 of the Agriculture Agreement, at a zero level.  
U.S.  COMMENTS ON CHINA'S RESPONSE TO THE PANEL'S SECOND SET OF QUESTIONS  
Summary of U.S. Comments on China's Response to Panel Question 52  
152. China erroneously argues that Sin ograin acted as a market player and subsequently "adjusted 
its prices" to reflect market prices reflected in Exhibits CHN -111-B – CHN-127-B. However, Sinograin 
is a state -owned enterprise directed by the State Council to actively enter the corn market and make 
purchases at amounts not lower than the prior year. Moreover, nothing in the documents presented 
by China indicates that Exhibit US -101 did not implement mandatory purchases at pre -set prices, or 
that this announcement was "replaced" with subsequent n otices. Rather, the documents placed on 
the record by China appear to be internal price monitoring documents devoid of any indication of its 
authenticity and status, rather than directions to purchase at a particular price as provided for in 
Exhibit US -101.  
Summary of U.S. Comments on China's Response to Panel Question 83  
153. China asserts that constituent data and methodology "must be used consistently, where 
pertinent, for the calculation of that Member's Base (Total) AMS and Current (Total) AMS."  WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
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 154. China misstates the requirements of Articles 1(a) and 1(h) of the Agriculture Agreement. 
Articles 1(a) and 1(h) prioritize consideration and use, not of what data and methodology were used 
to evaluate different programs at the time of accession, but rathe r the calculation requirements 
provided by the text of the Agriculture Agreement. This is made explicit by the hierarchy provided 
in Article 1(a)(ii). Article 1(a)(ii) does not use the same language or instruction to describe both 
elements of calculation, as suggested by China. Rather, it specifies Members are to calculate the 
value of AMS "in accordance with the provisions of Annex 3 of this Agreement," and that Members 
are to calculate AMS "taking into account the consistent data and methodology used in t he tables of 
supporting material." Article 1(h)(ii) governing the calculation of Current Total AMS in subsequent 
years presents a similar hierarchy.  
155. Articles 1(a)(ii) and 1(h)(ii) do not limit the application of constituent data "to the same 
measures that already existed during the base year." Instead, the text limits the application by first 
plainly stating that the calculation in subsequent years must be consistent with the text of the 
Agriculture Agreement. The subsequently used data and methodology  may not be not inconsistent 
with the requirements of the Agriculture Agreement. The reference to constituent data and 
methodology does not, as suggested by China, permit the use of a methodology that was accurate 
for a program in the base period (such as the using a pre -set maximum procurement volume as the 
quantity of eligible production) to calculate the value of support provided through a different program 
that requires a different evaluation pursuant to the requirements of Annex 3.  
156. In support of the application of "methodology" used to evaluate different  domestic support 
measures that operated under different  legal requirements and parameters, China again falls back 
on its demand for "consistency." China suggests that a calculation not based on th is historic 
methodology used to evaluate a different program would "involve substantial distortions," and 
"would become a meaningless apples -to-oranges comparison." China's argument is again withou t 
merit.  
157. Consistency from year -to-year and, crucially,  amongst Members is provided by observing the 
requirements of the Agriculture Agreement, including Annex 3 and Article 6, regardless of the 
domestic support program, agricultural product, or Member at issue. Consistency with the 
requirements of the Agricul ture Agreement with regard to quantity of production eligible to receive 
the applied administered price and with regard to the fixed external reference price is what ensures 
a meaningful evaluation, and is the basis for evaluating the value of domestic sup port provided in 
any year after accession.  
158. Finally, with regard to the statements of the panel and the Appellate Body in Korea – Beef, 
China suggests that the Appellate Body "shared the panel's understanding of . . . the need for 
consistency with Bas e AMS." The United States does not share China's reading the Appellate Body's 
statements. Specifically, the Appellate Body's footnote citing to the panel report in Korea – Beef 
appears to indicate that while the panel and Appellate Body both agreed they di d not need to reach 
the issue of how to address constituent data and methodology, the Appellate Body disagreed  with 
the panel's broad statements regarding consistency between the calculation of Base Total AMS and 
Current Total AMS. Specifically, the Appell ate Body asserted that a hierarchy exists between the text 
of the Agreement and a Member's constituent data and methodology, and this would appear to 
directly refute China's proposed blanket requirement for "consistency."  
 WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
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 ANNEX B -2 
INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE  SUMMARY OF THE ARGU MENTS OF CHINA  
I. INTRODUCTION  
This dispute arises against the background of the complexity and special characteristics of 
the agricultural sector of the People 's Republic of China ( "China "). It concerns the nature and scope 
of China 's right to provide domestic support for its wheat, rice and corn farmers.  It also raises 
important systemic issues regarding the interpretation and application of the methodology for the 
calculation of aggregate meas urement of support ( "AMS"), under the terms of both (i) Annex 3 of 
the Agreement on Agriculture and (ii) a Member 's negotiated and agreed "constituent data and 
methodology ", as found in the Member -specific Supporting Tables incorporated by reference in Par t 
IV of each Member 's Schedule.  For Members that have acceded to the World Trade Organization 
("WTO") subsequent to the Uruguay Round, such as China, these "constituent data and 
methodology " are of particular relevance because they are also part of those M embers ' terms of 
accession, and a basis upon which China and other later -acceded Members have undertaken their 
domestic support reduction commitments.  
In its submissions to the Panel, China has rebutted U.S. claims, under Articles 3.2, 6.3 and 
7.2(b) of  the Agreement on Agriculture , that China 's AMS from market price support for wheat, 
indica rice and japonica rice exceeds China 's domestic support reduction commitments.  China has 
also demonstrated that alleged market price support for corn, under China 's Temporary Purchase 
and Reserve Policy ( "TPRP"), expired prior to panel establishment, and is thus outside the Panel 's 
terms of reference.  Accordingly, the Panel is precluded from making any findings or 
recommendations with respect to the TPRP for corn.  
II. RELEVANT BACKGROUND  
China 's past and present domestic support policies for its agricultural sector, and the 
direction in which they are evolving, can be understood only against the background of the particular 
challenges facing China.  First and foremost amongst t hose is the unique challenge of  ensuring a 
sufficient, stable, reliable and affordable supply of food for China 's population of 1.38  billion people, 
the largest in the world.  In meeting the challenge of ensuring food security, consistent with its WTO 
obligations, China employs a variety of agricultural policy measures, including public stockholding.  
While China imports large volumes of grains – in 2016, 167 million tons – the bulk of China 's 
food requirements is supplied by China 's dome stic agricultural sector.  That sector is dominated by 
small -scale family farms, relying predominantly on family labor, and other smallholder farms.  
Indeed, for a large part of China 's population, these small -scale household farms constitute the main 
source  of both income and other means to support their livelihood, including through the 
consumption of agricultural commodities grown on their family farms.  To appreciate the importance 
of China 's agricultural policies, China notes that, in 2016, its rural popu lation accounted for 590 
million people.  Of that rural population, many are involved in the production of wheat, rice and corn, 
the agricultural products at issue in this dispute.  Thus, China 's agricultural policies necessarily affect 
the well -being of a s ignificant proportion of its population, and accordingly have an important impact 
on the stability and the sustainable development of China 's society and economy.   
These complex and important policy considerations are enshrined in China 's regulation of 
the marketing and distribution of basic agricultural products, including for wheat, rice and corn.  At 
the same time, China 's agricultural policies for wheat, rice and corn are moving towards a 
comprehensive opening of those grain markets.   
China 's uniqu e agricultural challenges stand in sharp contrast to the situation in the United 
States and other large agricultural commodity -exporting countries, where agricultural production is 
dominated by very large and highly mechanized farm operations.  Indeed, the average size of a U.S. 
farm is several hundred times larger than the average size of a farm in China.  The advantage of 
large-sized U.S. farms is further enhanced by the United States ' USD 19.1 billion AMS entitlement.  WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
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 Together, scale and substantial amount s of domestic support have enabled U.S. farmers to produce 
large volumes of agricultural products, and to sell them cheaply.  As a result, the United States is a 
net exporter of agricultural products, including for corn and wheat.  By contrast, China is a ne t 
importer  of grains.   
China and the WTO Membership negotiated and agreed China 's domestic -support -related 
commitments under the Agreement on Agriculture against this background.  China 's objective in 
those negotiations was to ensure it retained the flexibility to provide domestic support for food 
security purposes, and to encourage Chinese farmers to remain on their farms to grow the staple 
crops, including wheat, rice and corn, necessary to feed China 's large population.  
Like most developing cou ntries, China was not in the position to declare a Base Total AMS 
for its 1996 -1998 base period.  Accordingly, China accepted a domestic support reduction 
commitment of "nil", limiting domestic support to levels below its de minimis threshold.  China was 
further required to accept a de minimis threshold of 8.5% of the value of production of each basic 
agricultural product, instead of the 10% level for developing countries, provided for under Articl e 6.4 
of the Agreement on Agriculture . In exchange, China secu red agreement to use "the amount 
purchased " as the measure of "eligible production " in the context of market price support measures.  
In addition, China uses fixed external reference prices from its 1996 -1998 base period.  These agreed 
commitments, which are  included in China 's "constituent data and methodology " in its Supporting 
Tables in WT/ACC/CHN/38/Rev.3, or "Rev.3 ", are incorporated in China 's Accession Protocol.   
Since its accession to the WTO in 2001, China has relied on, inter alia , the negotiated  and 
agreed constituent data and methodology in Rev.3 to devise its agricultural policies consistent with 
its domestic support reduction commitments.  Specifically, in 2004, China implemented reform of its 
agricultural policies, adopting a market -oriented g rain policy, with direct government intervention 
into the market authorized only in exceptional circumstances to protect farmers from the effects of 
significant fluctuations in supply and demand.  For example, under the minimum procurement price 
("MPP") pro grams for wheat, indica rice and japonica rice, which apply in certain provinces, 
purchases occur only when market prices fall below the established MPP level.  The MPP program is 
not available when prices are above that level.  Moreover, prior to 2016, Chin a implemented the 
TPRP for corn in four northeast provinces/regions, designed to meet food security purposes.  In 2016, 
China reformed the TPRP and enacted market -based reforms.  China 's new corn measures involve 
the use of direct payments to farmers growing  corn, with the amount of payments determined by 
historic benchmarks.  The measures further seek to limit the production of corn.   
III. THE MEASURES AT ISSUE  UNDER THE PANEL'S TERMS OF REFERENCE  
The United States ' panel request defines the Panel 's terms  of reference.  It identifies as the 
specific measures at issue, pursuant to Article 6.2 of the DSU, the MPP programs for wheat, indica 
rice and japonica rice, and the (albeit expired) TPRP for corn.  Consistent with its identification of the 
measures at iss ue, the United States presented arguments and evidence in its First Written 
Submission.   
However, upon China 's showing, in its own First Written Submission, that the TPRP for corn 
had expired prior to panel establishment, and was, thus outside the Pane l's terms of reference, the 
United States attempted to re -define the "measures at issue " in this dispute as the "levels of 
domestic support ", or "domestic support " in each of the years 2012 -2015.   
The Panel must make its own objective assessment of its  terms of reference, and of the 
measures at issue.  In so doing, the Panel must reject the United States ' attempt to unilaterally re -
define, following establishment of the Panel and its terms of reference, the "measures at issue " in 
these proceedings.  As ex plained in the next section, the Panel must also find that the expired TPRP 
for corn is outside its terms of reference.   WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
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 A. The United States ' challenge in this dispute is limited to alleged market 
price support under the MPP for wheat, indica rice and jap onica rice, and 
the (albeit expired) 2012 -2015 TPRP for corn  
The starting point of any WTO dispute is the identification of an act or omission by a Member 
as a specific "measure at issue ", within the meaning of Article 6.2 of the DSU.  It is that measu re 
which is the object of claims of inconsistency with one or more of the provisions of the covered 
agreements.  And it is that measure that may, if found to be inconsistent, become subject to 
recommendations, under Article 19.1 of the DSU.  
Accordingly,  the core requirements that any panel request must fulfill, consistent with Article 
6.2, are the identification of the specific "measures at issue " and the claims raised.  These 
requirements "serve the due process objective of notifying the parties and third parties of the nature 
of a complainant 's case ".1  
China has established that, properly construed, the U.S. panel request identifies the legal 
basis of the complaint , i.e., the claims at issue as follows:  "[t]he level of domestic support  China 
provides is in excess of its commitment level of 'nil'", resulting in an alleged inconsistency with 
Articles 3.2, 6.3 and 7.2(b) of the Agreement on Agriculture .2  
The U.S. panel request then proceeds to identify the specific measures  at issue.  It explains 
that "[t]he legal instruments  through which China provides domestic support in favor of agricultural 
producers, including support in favor of producers of wheat, indica rice, japonica rice, and corn, 
operating collectively or separately, includ e, but are not limited to "3 a list of individually specified 
legal instruments.  These legal instruments permit the identification of the following specific 
measures at issue:  the MPP programs for wheat, indica rice and japonica rice and the (albeit expired ) 
TPRP for corn.   
Thus, the U.S. panel request identifies as the measures at issue the MPP programs for wheat, 
indica rice and japonica rice, and the (albeit expired) 2012 -2015 TPRP for corn.  Contrary to the U.S. 
assertion, the MPP and TPRP  measures id entified do not constitute mere "additional information ", 
"argument " or "evidence " to provide a preview of  the U.S. case – they comprise and delimit the 
specific "measures at issue ". 
Indeed, while the United States erroneously parses out the text of the U.S. panel request 
into alleged "measures ", "claims " and "arguments ", the United States is forced to accept that its 
panel request  
sets out the instruments through which the support is  provided (and 
the United States has not sought to rely on any other instruments).  
It[s panel request] further listed the agricultural products through 
which China 's breach would be demonstrated (and the United States 
has not sought to prove its case on th e basis of other products).4  
Thus, the United States accepts that its case is limited to alleged market price support provided by 
the MPP programs for wheat and rice and the (albeit expired) TPRP for corn, as the specific measures 
under its panel request.  Not surprisingly, these are also the sole measures for which the U.S. 
submissions assert, based on argument and evidence, alleged inconsistencies with the covered 
agreements.  
The United States further attempts to support its erroneous argument that it s panel request 
covers "domestic support ", by arguing that that it "does not seek a finding that any particular legal 
instrument … is in breach of China 's commitments … because the existence or maintenance of a 
market price support program or any other leg al instrument would not itself necessarily lead to the 
breach of a domestic support commitment ".5 Yet, the U.S. argument does not support its position.  
                                                
1 Appellate Body Report, US – Carbon Steel , para. 126.  
2 United States, first written submission, para. 15, citing WT/DS511/8, p. 1 (second substantive 
paragraph) (underlining added).  
3 WT/DS511/8, p. 1 (second substantive paragraph) (emphasis added).  
4 United States, second written submission, para. 27.  
5 United States, response to Panel Question 5, para. 32.  WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
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 Instead, the U.S. argument is a mere reflection of the fact that the U.S. claims are of an "as applied " 
nature, rather than "as such ". As the Appellate Body explained in  US – Continued Zeroing , "the 
distinction between 'as such ' and 'as applied ' claims does not govern the definition of a measure for 
purposes of WTO dispute settlement ".6 Thus, the U.S. clarif ication that it is challenging certain 
measures "as applied ", as opposed to "as such ", has no bearing on the identification of the measures 
at issue, and certainly does not establish that the measure at issue must be "domestic support ".  
B. Identification of "domestic support " as the specific measure at issue would 
fail to meet the "specificity requirements " of Article 6.2 of the DSU  
In any event, the U.S. identification of "domestic support " as the measure at issue would 
fail to meet the  specificity requirements under the DSU.  As the Appellate Body explained in US – 
Continued Zeroing , "the specificity requirement means that the measures at issue must be identified 
with sufficient precision so that what is referred to adjudication by a pan el may be discerned from 
the panel request ".7  
China has explained that the reference to the legal concept of "domestic support " cannot be 
used to identify a specific measure.  Instead, it characterizes  an otherwise specifically identified 
measure under  WTO law.  This is consistent with the fact that the legal concept of "domestic support " 
itself covers many different forms of domestic support, including:  different forms of "amber box ", 
"blue box ", and "green box " domestic support measures.  The United Sta tes is forced to recognize 
that domestic support does not specifically identify any particular measure at issue.  It explains that 
"the Agriculture Agreement gives WTO Members the flexibility to provide domestic support in various 
forms ".8 In these circumstances, a mere reference to "domestic support " is insufficient to meet the 
specificity requirements under Article 6.2 of the DSU.  
While the Appellate Body has accepted that "there may be circumstances in which a party 
describes a measur e in a more generic way ", the Appellate Body nonetheless required that such 
generic characterization "allow[] the measure to be discerned ".9 Indeed, the inability of the legal 
concept "domestic support " under the Agreement on Agriculture  to allow the measu re at issue to be 
discerned is similar to that of the legal concept of a "subsidy ", under the  SCM Agreement  – both of 
which are used to characterize a specific measure under the substantive provisions at issue, but are 
insufficient to identify a specific m easure under Article 6.2.  
Finally, in re -defining "domestic support " as the "measure at issue ", the United States 
reduces the specifically identified and enumerated legal instruments in its panel request to mere 
"evidence ". As mere evidence of an alleg ed breach (and not identifications of the measures at issue), 
the Panel would be precluded to rely on that evidence to inform the meaning and scope of the U.S. 
reference to "domestic support " as the alleged measure at issue.  That is, the Panel cannot rely on 
that evidence to inform its understanding of the meaning and scope of the term "domestic support " 
in a manner that permits that term to meet the specificity requirements under Article 6.2.  In those 
circumstances, The Panel would have to find that the U. S. panel request, in its entirety, fails to meet 
the specificity requirements.  
The United States does not address any of China 's arguments set out above.  Instead, it 
simply asserts that "domestic support " can be a measure at issue because it fulfills o ne relevant 
requirement – namely that it constitutes action  by China.  Yet, to constitute a "measure at issue ", 
any challenged "act or omission " by a Member must, additionally, be  identified in a panel request 
with the required level of specificity.  
In short, if the Panel were to find that the U.S. panel request identified "domestic support " 
as the "measure at issue ", that request would fail to meet the specif icity requirement under 
Article  6.2, and the Panel would have to deny the U.S. claims in this  dispute.  By contrast, the Panel 
would be able to consider the particular measures and claims that an objective assessment of the 
U.S. panel request reveals, as set out above.  This is a further reason on which the Panel should 
reject the United States ' post-hoc rationalization of its panel request, which the United States only 
adopted following China 's demonstration that the U.S. panel request inappropriately challenges the 
                                                
6 Appellate Body Report, US – Continued Zeroing , para. 179.  
7 Appellate Body Report, US – Continued Zeroing , para. 168.  
8 United States, second written submission, para. 28 (emphasis added).  
9 Appellate Bo dy Report, US – Zeroing (Japan) (Article 21.5 – Japan) , para. 116.  WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
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 expired TPRP for corn.   
C. Permitting claims against a measure identified as "domest ic support " raises 
serious systemic concerns  
Moreover, accepting "domestic support " as the "measure at issue " raises due process 
concerns.  Under Article 19.1 DSU, a panel may make recommendation only with respect to 
"measures at issue ", and it is with  respect to those measures that an implementing Member is 
required to achieve compliance.  Thus, the scope of any recommendation is constrained by the 
specific measures identified in a panel request.   
In these proceedings, the United States appears to s eek a recommendation that China bring 
its "domestic support " into conformity, without limiting that recommendation to those market -price-
support -related measures that have been the sole focus of the United States ' case before the Panel.  
Specifically, the U nited States argues that the recommendation should cover "domestic support ", 
and that "[t]he Panel need not include a further characterization of the measures in its 
recommendation ".10  
The United States errs.  Under Article 3.7 of the DSU , WTO dispute settlement must 
contribute to a "positive solution to the dispute ". This objective requires a panel to inform a 
respondent, through specific findings, of the particular measures that have resulted in particular 
WTO inconsistencies.  Pursuant t o a recommendation under Article 19.1 of the DSU, a respondent is 
then under an obligation to remedy the WTO inconsistencies identified, by bringing the measures 
found to have resulted in the WTO inconsistencies into conformity with its WTO obligations.  The 
particular findings of WTO inconsistencies that form the basis for a recommendation are framed with 
reference to the specific arguments and evidence provided by the parties, and cannot relate to 
specific measures or claims not covered by the parties ' arguments and evidence.  Otherwise, 
recommendations could cover specific measures that may potentially fall under the umbrella of 
"domestic support ", but for which the respondent has not had a chance to defend itself.  This would 
violate the respondent 's due pr ocess rights.  
Accordingly, a panel 's recommendation must identify, and must be limited to, the particular 
measures (amongst those properly before a panel) that the panel has found to have resulted in 
particular WTO inconsistencies, based on the parties ' arguments and evidence.  
D. Conclusion  
The U.S. panel request reflects a deliberate choice to challenge the MPP programs for wheat, 
indica rice and japonica rice, and the (albeit expired) 2012 -2015 TPRP for corn.  That choice has 
consequences – China 's due process rights and the jurisdiction of the Panel mean that the United 
States cannot, belatedly, broaden the scope of the measures at issue.  
IV. THE TPRP  FOR CORN EXPIRED PR IOR TO PANEL ESTABLI SHMENT AND IS THEREF ORE OUTSIDE THE 
PANEL'S TERMS OF REFERENCE  
China has further established that its TPRP for corn expired prior to panel establishment, 
and is therefore outside the Panel 's terms of reference.  Yet, the United States asserts, erroneously, 
that the expiry of the TPRP  for corn prior to panel establishment did not affect the Panel 's terms of 
reference, and that, in any event, the TPRP continues to exist.  
A. Factual background  
From 2012 to 2015, China 's Central Government provided for a TPRP for corn in Liaoning, 
Jilin, and Heilongjiang Provinces and in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region.  The TPRP for corn 
was established through annual TPRP Notices issued by several national -level government 
authorities.  These TPRP Notices set out the geographic and temporal scope  of the TPRP, and 
determined the TPRP price at which designated entities offered to purchase corn during a defined 
period of time . For example, the 2015 TPRP Notice set a TPRP purchase price of RMB 1 yuan per jin 
for "grade 3 " corn offered for purchase at certain purchasing and storage depots in the Jilin, Liaoning, 
                                                
10 United States, response to Panel Question 59, para. 39.  WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
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 Heilongjiang Provinces and the Inner Mongolia Region . This price was available for a purchasing 
period that lasted from 1 November 2015 to 30 April 2016.  
In announcing the discontinuation of  the TPRP for corn, on 28 March 2016, the deputy 
director of the National Development and Reform Commission of the People 's Republic of China  
("NDRC ") explained that the TPRP for corn had encountered "prominent problems ", including a 
"heavy financial burden ".11 Similarly, a Ministry of Finance ( "MOF") Opinion  explained that "the corn 
temporary purchase and reserve system does not fit into the current situation ".12 Starting with the 
2016 harvest, China "has made the reform of the [TPRP], pursuant to the  principle of 'Price formed 
by market and decoupling of price and subsidy '", involving the expiry of the TPRP and the 
introduction of "'market -oriented purchase ' plus ' direct subsidies '".13 Such direct payments are 
available to producers of corn in the fo ur provinces/region, subject to certain requirements to limit 
production.  
B. Under Article 6.2 of the DSU, measures that have expired prior to panel 
establishment generally fall outside a panel 's terms of reference  
Under Article 6.2 of the DSU, the g eneral rule is that a measure that no longer exists at the 
time of panel establishment is outside a panel 's terms of reference.  For example, in EC – Chicken 
Cuts, the Appellate Body noted that a measure at issue must be "in existence at the time of the 
establishment of the panel ".14 Likewise, in China – Raw Materials , the panel noted that "the date of 
a panel 's establishment is critical in deciding which measures may be included in a panel 's terms of 
reference ".15 And in EC – Biotech , the panel held that "the question [that this panel] is mandated to 
answer is whether on the date of its establishment, … the European Communities applied  a general 
de facto  moratorium on approvals ".16  
China explained that, for expired measures, there is one notable except ion to the general 
rule that a measure at issue, under Article 6.2, must exist at the time of panel establishment.  
Specifically, a measure that has expired prior to panel establishment may be properly before a panel 
where it is demonstrated that it continu es to affect the operation of a covered agreement.  The 
burden of prove to establish that the expired measure continues to affect the operation of a covered 
agreement falls on the complaining Member.  Here, the United States has not even attempted to 
meet th at burden.   
Instead, the United States simply ignores the well -established case law in favor of asserting 
that failure to make a recommendation on the matter that the DSB referred to the Panel would 
deprive the United States of its rights under the DSU . In particular, the United States argues that 
"[t]he alleged expiry of a legal instrument does not change the matter the DSB put within the Panel 's 
terms of reference, nor does it make another matter susceptible to examination by the Panel ".17 In 
short, t he United States argues that, since the "matter " referred to this Panel includes the expired 
TPRP measure, the Panel must review that measure.  Yet, while the United States may have intended  
to place an expired measure before the Panel, its expiry before pa nel establishment means that that 
measure was never properly part of the matter referred to the Panel by the DSB.  The case law is 
clear – a measure that has expired at the time of panel establishment is not properly before a panel.  
In its Second Writte n Submission, the United States appears to have recognized the 
existence of the general rule, when referring to situations where an expired measure has been 
replaced by a new measure that is of the "same essence ". The United States argues that "a panel 
should make findings on a recurring  measure ".18 Indeed, consistent with the case law on expired 
measures, a "recurring " measure could be properly before a panel in a situation where a specifically 
listed measure has expired prior to panel establishment, but where that measure has been replaced 
                                                
11 The State Council, News Report "Corn Temporary Purchase and Reserve System will be Shifted to a 
'Market -oriented Purchase ' and 'Direct Subsidies '", available at: http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2016 -
03/28/content_5059171.htm (last viewed 26 October 2017) (English translation), (Exhibit CHN -74-B).  
12 MOF Opinion, May 2016, (Exhibit CHN -73-B), Section I.   
13 Notice on Proper Handling of C orn Purchase Work in Northeast China This Year  (2016)  (Guo Liang 
Tiao [2016] No. 210 ), 19 September 2016  (English translation) , (Exhibit CHN -80-B), p. 1.   
14 Appellate Body Report, EC – Chicken Cuts , para. 156.    
15 Panel Report, China – Raw Materials , para. 7.19.  
16 Panel Report, EC – Biotech , para. 7.1301 (underlining added).  
17 United States, response to Panel Question 11, para. 56.  
18 United States, second written submission, para. 39 (emphasis added).  WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
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 by is a new measure that is of the "same essence " as the expired measure.  In fac t, in those 
circumstances, the measure at issue has not truly expired.  Yet, on the facts of this case, the United 
States has not, and cannot, demonstrate that the TPRP for corn has been replaced by a measure 
that is of "the same essence ". China turns to th ese factual issues in the next section.  
The United States also argues that domestic support cases are somehow unique, allegedly 
because "a dispute challenging the conformity of a Member 's domestic support with its domestic 
support commitments necessari ly involves a retrospective analysis ".19 In making this argument, the 
United States confuses the distinction between the existence of a measure, and the existence of 
evidence necessary to show a WTO inconsistency.   
With respect to the existence of a measure , there is nothing inherently different about claims 
involving domestic support measures compared to claims involving other measures.  That is, nothing 
warrants a carve -out from the case law on expired measures.  In particular, domestic support 
measures  do not necessarily involve annual measures that would always have expired, as the United 
States initially argued.  In fact, domestic support measures often involve long -standing programs 
supporting agriculture through payments or other support.  Annual meas ures may also form part of 
an ongoing program.  This was precisely the situation in US – Upland Cotton where the United States 
provided annual marketing loan payments pursuant to a multi -year marketing loan program.   
Moreover, with respect to the eviden ce, China explained that domestic support measures 
are not the only type of measure for which an assessment of their WTO consistency may involve 
consideration of historic evidence.  Indeed, while a domestic support measure  must exist at the time 
of panel es tablishment, its WTO consistency may be assessed in light of (i) evidence predating panel 
establishment, (ii) evidence contemporaneous with panel establishment, or (iii) the most recent 
evidence, depending on their availability.  These considerations apply across many types of measures 
and disputes.  Yet, the need for evidence that may predate panel establishment, to enable assessing 
the WTO consistency of a measure, does not remove the requirement for the measures to exist at 
the time of panel establishment.  
Finally, systemic concerns arise were the Panel to accept the U.S. argument that panels are 
required to make findings and recommendations on expired measures.  Accepting the U.S. argument 
would result in purely declaratory judgments.  Yet, WTO dispute s ettlement is not designed to deliver 
declaratory judgments.20 Rather, it is designed to secure a positive solution to the dispute.  The Panel 
must, thus, avoid a declaratory judgment.   
Contrary to the U.S. assertions, this would not prejudice the United  States.  This is because 
the United States has no right to purely declaratory judgment.  To recall, in US – Certain EC Products , 
the Appellate Body held that panels may not make recommendations with respect to expired 
measures.  It explained that this rule exists because t here is an "obvious inconsistency " between, on 
the one hand, a finding that a measure has expired, and, on the other hand, a panel 's 
recommendation that such expired measure be brought into conformity with the applicable WTO 
obligations, in cluding through its withdrawal.21 
The United States ' reliance on the panel report in EC – Biotech  and the Appellate Body report 
in China – Raw Materials  does not change that finding.  Indeed, the United States mischaracterizes 
EC – Biotech  as standing f or the proposition that panels may make recommendations on expired 
measures.  In fact, the opposite is true.  The panel in EC – Biotech  made recommendations with 
respect to an unwritten general de facto  moratorium on the approval of biotech products – which it 
found existed at the time of panel establishment . In the face of uncertainty whether the measure 
continued to exist, or had subsequently ceased to exist during the panel proceedings, as the 
European Communities asserted, the panel  made a recommendation "to the extent that[] that 
measure ha[d] not already ceased to exist ".22 This is evidently different from the situation here, 
where the evidence demonstrates that the TPRP for corn has expired  prior to panel establishment . 
With respect to China – Raw M aterials , the United States fails to appreciate that the concern 
to which it referred, involving an "endlessly moving target " loophole, is resolved through the case 
                                                
19 United States, response to Panel Question 4, para. 21.   
20 Appellate Body Report, US – Wool Shirts and Blouses , p. 19.  
21 Appellate Body Report, US – Certain EC Products , para. 81.   
22 Panel Report, EC – Biotech , para. 8.16.   WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
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 law, including China – Raw Materials  itself.  That case law permits challenges of, and event ually 
recommendations on, measures (including programs and "series of measures ") that continue to exist 
at the time of panel establishment or measures that have "replaced " them, where they are of the 
"same essence ". However, contrary to the U.S. assertions, neither the case law in general, nor China 
– Raw Materials  in particular, stand for the proposition that a panel must, or even may, make 
recommendations with respect to measures (i) that did not exist at the time o f panel establishment 
or (ii) that expired during panel proceedings, in situations where those measures have not been 
"replaced " by new measures that are of the "same essence ". In other words, China – Raw Materials  
does not permit, let alone require, panel s to make recommendations with respect to expired 
measures.  
In these circumstances, the Panel should conclude that the TPRP for corn, which expired 
prior to panel establishment, is outside the Panel 's terms of reference.  
C. The evidence demonstrates th at the TPRP for corn has expired  
As noted above, the TPRP for corn expired prior to panel establishment.  China has 
established that, in its place, and starting with the 2016 harvest, China began providing direct 
payments to producers of corn in the fo ur provinces/region, subject to certain requirements to limit 
production, and established a market -based price discovery mechanism, with prices reflecting the 
supply -demand relationship.  
Initially, the United States asserted that the 2012 -2015 TPRP for  corn continues to exist 
because China allegedly had merely "reformed " its corn policy.  The United States errs.  In China, a 
policy "reform " generally refers to a fundamental change in that policy, resulting in the 
discontinuation of the previously existing  policy.  Indeed, the MOF Opinion that announced the new 
corn measures described these measures as a "reform of market economy system, emphasizing the 
decisive role of the market in the allocation of grain resources and better performing the role of 
governm ent".23 Indeed, the fundamental "reform " that occurred in China 's domestic support for its 
corn producers was to abolish the previous fixed TPRP prices and introduce a new direct payment 
program for producers of corn.  As the NDRC official announcing the re form explained, it would result 
in a "price formed by the market and decoupling of price and subsidy "24 – i.e., the absence of an 
applied administered price, under "the principle of 'Price formed by market and decoupling of price 
and subsidy '".25  
Outside this litigation, the United States fully agrees.  Indeed, since early 2016, the United 
States Department of Agriculture ( "USDA ") has consistently explained, in report after report, that 
China abandoned the TPRP.  Even in this litigation, the United S tates admits that purchases under 
the TPRP ended on 30 April 2016.26 
Nonetheless, the United States makes vague allegations about the existence of an applied 
administered price for corn during 2016 and beyond.  Confusing the question before the Panel fu rther, 
the United States also asserts that it is China 's burden to "demonstrate that it had withdrawn or 
modified its support so as to come within its domestic support commitments for corn by the time of 
panel establishment ".27 That U.S. assertion reflects  a misunderstanding of the general principle on 
the burden of proof.  Since the United States, and not China, asserts that there continues to exist an 
applied administered price in the new corn measures, the United States carries the burden to provide 
evide nce to substantiate this assertion.  Absent such evidence, there is no legal basis for the United 
States to claim that the Panel must make findings and recommendations regarding the TPRP.  
In fact, evidence from before panel establishment demonstrates that the key elements of 
the reform consisted of three major new components:  (i) the establishment and operation of a direct 
                                                
23 MOF Opinion, May 2016, (Exhibit CHN -73-B), Section I.   
24 The State Council, News Report "Corn Temporary Purchase and Reserve System will be Shifted to a 
'Market -oriented Purchase ' and 'Direct Subsidies '", available at: http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2016 -
03/28/content_5059171.htm (la st viewed 26 October 2017) (English translation), (Exhibit CHN -74-B); MOF 
Opinions, May 2016, (Exhibit CHN -73-B), Section I.  
25 Notice on Proper Handling of Corn Purchase Work in Northeast China This Year  (2016)  (Guo Liang 
Tiao [2016] No. 210 ), 19 Septembe r 2016  (English translation) , (Exhibit CHN -80-B), p. 1.   
26 United States, 12 December 2017 comments, para. 35.  
27 United States, responses to Panel Questions 4 and 9, paras. 25, 48 -49. WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
- 43 - 
 
 payment program for eligible Northeast corn producers based on historic areas planted to corn, and 
not connected to the price for c orn; (ii) the establishment and implementation of a series of 
measures designed to limit production of corn in the provinces/region adopting the new corn 
measures; and, (iii) the implementation of policies seeking to achieve a market -based price 
discovery mechanism for corn, resulting from a market with diversified purchasers and sellers, and 
multi-channel distribution, of corn.   
The USDA recognized the production -limiting effects of the new corn direct payment 
program, as implemented in China 's Northea st region, noting a drop in corn harvested area and 
expectations of further decline.  Similarly, price developments in China 's corn market since the 2016 
introduction of the production -limiting direct payment program are consistent with a market -based 
price discovery mechanism and the absence of market price support.   
The United States also argued that the TPRP for corn continued to exist based on allegedly 
significant similarities  between the 2015 TPRP Notice  and a 2016 Northeast Region Corn Purchase 
Notice. Issued following the expiry of the TPRP for corn, the 2016 Notice requires provincial/regional 
governments to encourage  market participants to purchase corn and to collaborate in the orderly 
purchasing, financing, storage, and warehousing of corn in the Northeast region.  That is, the 2016 
Notice sets out government tasks to support the new market -based price discovery mechanisms.   
Crucially, while mischaracterizing the alleged policy objective of the 2016 Notice as involving 
purchase work similar to that under the TPRP price,  the United States ignores entirely the absence 
of any applied administered price from the 2016 Notice . Instead, the United States asserts irrelevant 
similarities.  Yet, there are fundamental differences between the 2015 TPRP  Notice  and the 2016 
Notice  that reflect the core of the fundamental reform in China 's TPRP for corn, which resulted in the 
absence of a Government -determined TPRP price at which designated entities purchase corn.  For 
example, while the United States highl ights that, under the 2015 TPRP Notice , China Grain Reserves 
Corporation  ("SinoGrain ") was "entrusted by the State "28 to perform purchases at the TPRP price, it 
remains silent regarding the absence of any such entrustment under the 2016 Notice . Indeed,  the 
new corn measures established a market -based price discovery mechanism , and the 2016 Notice  
repeatedly references criteria and elements to be adopted to create and sustain that mechanism.  
These references are found throughout the 2016 Notice , but are enti rely absent from the 2015 TPRP 
Notice . In these circumstances, the 2016 Notice contradicts the U.S. assertion of a continued 
existence of the TPRP for corn.  
Late in the proceedings, the United States then purported to have found evidence of China 's 
alleged continued application of an applied administered price for corn.  As support, the United States 
produced a notice by SinoGrain 's Inner Mongolia Branch to its depots in Inner Mongolia, 
communicating prices at which to purchase corn.   
The United Stat es errs in asserting that it has identified an applied administered price for 
corn. In fact, the document identified by the United States consists of a set of different, market -
based purchase prices  at which SinoGrain 's Inner Mongolia Branch offered, on 14  October 2016, to 
purchase corn at various of its depots in the Inner Mongolia Region.  That is, rather than constituting 
evidence of an applied administered price, the document identified by the United States involved an 
offer, at a particular point in tim e, to purchase corn at varying market -based prices  in different 
locations in the Inner Mongolia Region.   
Moreover, China has established that this offer  by one of many purchasers of corn in China 
(SinoGrain) was superseded by later market -based offers from the same entity to purchase corn at 
different market -based prices.  Specifically, the evidence demonstrates that SinoGrain 's market -
based price offers change from time to time, and reflect changing market prices in line with market 
developments . Indeed , after 30 April 2016, SinoGrain had no mandate from the Chinese Government 
to purchase corn at an applied administered price.  Thus, and contrary to the U.S. assertion, the 
SinoGrain branch notice identified by the United States is not based on any authori ty or legal basis 
flowing from the 2016 Notice .  
By way of background, the evidence demonstrates that SinoGrain headquarters issues, from 
time to time, notices with guidance prices for corn purchases to its provincial/region branches.  Those 
guidance pr ices take into account market price information observed, collected and published by 
                                                
28 United States, response to Panel Question 55, para. 23.  WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
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 China 's State Administration of Grain, similarly to the manner in which U.S. corn traders take into 
account information on corn prices continuously published by the USDA.  Moreover, these guidance 
prices are not determinative of prices offered by each SinoGrain depot.  Instead, each of the four 
SinoGrain 's branches in China 's Northeast region enjoys discretion to set, through consecutive 
branch notices, the prices at which it s local depots offer, from time to time, to purchase corn, based 
on local market conditions.  Each SinoGrain depot in these four provinces/region then offers to 
purchase corn at the market -based price set for it in the most recent branch notice.  That is, 
depending on evolving market conditions, one set of prices offers will be superseded by a later set 
of prices offers, adjusted either upwards or downwards, reflecting market developments.  In short, 
China has established that SinoGrain 's purchase price offers  are consistent with local market prices .  
While SinoGrain has, at present, no mandate from the Chinese Government to purchase 
corn at an applied administered price , purchasing corn remains one of its core business activities.  
Consistent with the fact that, after 30 April 2016 and under the new corn measures, the Chinese 
corn market is characterized by a market -based price discovery mechanism, SinoGrain follows a 
market -based process to purchase corn at market prices.  Indeed, the evidence demonstrates t hat, 
in making fluctuating price offers, SinoGrain follows a common and well -established practice that is 
consistent with that adopted by large commodity traders worldwide.  Like SinoGrain, those traders 
inform potential sellers of corn of the price at whic h they would, from time to time, purchase corn . 
Specifically, China demonstrated that other major purchasers of corn in China similarly publish price 
offers to purchase corn, and that those price offers fluctuate based on market developments.  China 
further  established that it is a common practice in the United States for small and large purchasers 
of corn to publish announced prices at which they will purchase corn.   
Thus, China demonstrated that the announcement of offered purchase prices by SinoGrain 
and other corn purchasers in China is a completely normal , expected , and necessary element of a 
functioning price -discovery mechanism.  That announcement does not establish the existence of an 
applied administered price, as the United States argues.  With SinoGrain 's prices indistinguishable 
from market prices, the United States cannot show the existence of an applied administered price.  
Accordingly, it cannot show that the TPRP for corn continues to exist.  
D. Conclusion  
In sum, the Panel should conclud e that the 2012 -2015 TPRP for corn, which expired prior to 
panel establishment, is outside the Panel 's terms of reference.  
V. THE UNITED STATES FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT CHINA'S DOMESTIC SUPPORT F OR WHEAT AND 
RICE VIOLATES ARTICLES 3.2,  6.3,  AND 7.2 OF TH E AGREEMENT ON AGRICULTURE  
A. Factual background on China 's MPP for wheat and rice  
Pursuant to China 's 2004 Grain Opinion  and 2004 Grain Distribution Regulation , China 
implemented market price support in the form of minimum procurement price ( "MPP") programs for 
wheat, indica rice and japonica rice for each of the years 2012 -2016.  These programs are established 
through annual MPP Notices that are adopted jointly by a number of different entities, including the 
NDRC, MOF, Ministry of Agriculture ( "MOA"), and State Administration of Grain ( "SAG"). The annual 
MPP Notices set the annual level of the MPP for wheat, indica rice and japonica rice of particular 
quality grades, with MPP prices defined for a standard Grade 3 and adjusted for Grades 1 -2 and 4 -
5.  
The same entities that adopt the MPP Notice also introduce annual MPP Implementation 
Plans.  These Implementation Plans inform implementing authorities29 of, inter alia , the geographic 
scope, relevant timeframe, rules on the activation and deactivation of the MPP programs, and the 
characteristics of qualifying wheat and rice.   
With respect to the geographic scope of the MPP programs in 2012 -2016, the MPP program 
for wheat covered six wheat -producing provinces (Hebei, Jiangsu, Anhui, Shandong, Henan and 
Hubei); the MPP programs for indica rice and japonica rice covered (i) five early -season indica rice 
                                                
29 These in clude the provincial Development and Reform Commissions, Price Bureaus, Departments 
(Bureaus) of Finance, Agriculture Departments (Bureaus, Commissions, Offices), Administrations of Grain, and 
autonomous regions and municipalities.  WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
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 producing provinces (Anhui, Jiangxi, Hubei, Hunan and Guangxi); and , (ii) eleven mid -to-late season 
indica and japonica rice producing provinces (Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Jiangsu, Anhui, Jiangxi, 
Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangxi and Sichuan).  
Under the MPP Implementation Plans, the time period during which the MPP p rograms may 
be implemented during the applicable year is limited.  For example, purchases of wheat under the 
MPP program may take place between May 21 to September 30 of each applicable year; MPP 
purchases of early -season indica rice may take place between 16 July and September 30 of each 
applicable year; and for purchases of mid -to-late season indica rice and japonica rice, the timeframes 
differ depending on the province.  For Jiangsu, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangxi, and 
Sichuan Provinces , the MPP program is implemented between mid -September and 31 January, and 
for Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang Provinces, it is implemented between October/November and 
February/March.  
Moreover, purchases under the MPP programs are not activated during the ent irety of the 
implementation period.  The MPP Implementation Plans provide that purchases at the MPP are 
activated only "when the grain market price drops to the minimum procurement price stipulated by 
the government ".30 Purchases are deactivated when the ma rket price rises again above the MPP.  
It follows that the MPP programs retain, as the guiding principle, market -based price discovery and 
purchases by market actors, and intervene only where market prices drop below the MPP.  Thus,  and 
consistent with the 2004 Grain Opinion  and 2004 Regulation on Grain Distribution , the grain price is 
formed principally by supply and demand, except when a "material change occurs in the relationship 
between supply and demand of grain ".31 Thus, the actual application of the  MPP program is further 
limited to (i) the timeframe  during which pri ces are found to fall below the  MPP; and (ii) areas  within 
its geographic scope where prices were found to have fallen below  the MPP price.   
As noted above, the MPP applies to wheat, ind ica rice and japonica rice of particular qualities.  
Specifically, only purchases of in -grade grains may occur – i.e., wheat or rice that is of Grades 1 to 
5 of China 's National Grain Standard.  Out-of-grade grains – i.e., wheat and rice that is of a quality  
lower than Grade 5 – may not be purchased under the MPP programs.  
Despite the existence of the MPP programs, the vast majority of wheat and rice is sold on 
the market.  Indeed, purchases under the wheat MPP program did not exceed 25% of total producti on 
in the covered provinces (or 22% of total production in China), and purchases under the rice MPP 
programs did not exceed 20% of total rice production in the covered provinces (or 16% of total 
production in China).  
As an important background fact, China further notes that, similarly to the situation in many 
other developing countries, small -scale farms in China typically consume a significant portion of the 
staple foods that they produce, including wheat and rice.  It follows that the total amount of  wheat 
and rice available to be sold by farmers on the market or under the MPP programs is smaller than 
the total amount of wheat and rice actually produced.  Based on data from China 's Rural Statistical 
Yearbook , between 9 -18% of total wheat production in China in 2012 -2015, and between 17 -22% 
of total rice production was consumed or retained by Chinese farmers, and not available for purchase 
in the marketplace.  
B. Legal argument  
Contrary to the U.S. claims, China 's market price support, under its MPP programs for wheat, 
indica rice and japonica rice, is consistent with its domestic support commitments under Articles 3.2, 
6.3 and 7.2(b) of the Agreement on Agriculture .  
Under Articles 3.2 and 6.3, Members shall not provide overall annual domestic support for 
their agricultural producers, calculated as Current Total AMS, in excess of their Member -specific 
domestic support reduction commitments, as set out in Part IV of their Schedules.  Those domestic 
support  reduction commitments, in turn, result from a Member -specific calculation of Base Total 
AMS – i.e., Total AMS during each Member 's base period.  Article 7.2(b) further clarifies that, where 
                                                
30 See, e.g., 2015 Wheat  & Rice Implementation Plan, (Exhibit CHN -28-B), Article 6; 2016 Wheat & Rice 
Implementation Plan, (Exhibit CHN -32-B), Article 8. 
31 Regulation on the Administration of Grain Distribution , 2004 (English translation), (Exhibit CHN -9-
B), Article 27.  WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
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 a Member 's domestic support reduction commitment is "nil", as in t he case of China, that Member 
shall not provide domestic support in excess of its de minimis level.  For China, paragraph 235 of its 
Working Party Report, as incorporated into China 's Accession Protocol, sets that de minimis level at 
8.5% of the total value  of production of each basic agricultural product.   
As summarized below, the United States has failed to establish that China 's Current AMS, 
calculated for each of its market price support measures for wheat, indica rice and japonica rice, 
exceeds Chin a's de minimis support level of 8.5% of the total value of production of each of these 
products.  Accordingly, the United States has failed to establish that China 's Current Total AMS 
exceeds China 's "nil" domestic support reduction commitment.  Below, China  first summarizes its 
arguments regarding general concepts for the calculation of AMS, in particular the role of a Member 's 
constituent data and methodology, before turning to the AMS calculation for market price support 
at issue here, and any applicable c onflict rules.  China then provides the resulting AMS calculations.  
1. The role of a Member 's constituent data and methodology in the 
calculation of Current AMS  
China has established that, in calculating Current AMS and Current Total AMS under Articles 
1(a)(ii) and 1(h)(ii) of the Agreement on Agriculture , the United States errs by relying solely  on the 
provisions of Annex 3.  Pursuant to Articles 1(a)(ii) and 1(h) (ii), that calculation must consider both 
(i) the framework for the calculation of AMS set out in Annex 3 of the Agreement on Agriculture , and 
(ii) China 's constituent data and methodology, included in its Supporting Tables in Rev.3.  
Consideration of, addi tionally, China 's constituent data and methodology has important 
consequences for two key variables in the calculation of Current AMS from China 's market price 
support for wheat and rice.  As discussed in more detail below, these variables are (i) China 's fixed 
external reference prices for these products, taken from China 's Member -specific 1996 -1998 base 
period, and (ii) China 's methodology for the determination of the amount of "eligible production " as 
"amount purchased ", both as detailed in China 's Suppor ting Tables in Rev.3.  
Under customary rules of treaty interpretation, it is well -established that "a treaty should be 
interpreted as a whole ",32 and that a treaty interpreter must not read out entire aspects of a treaty.  
Moreover, "a treaty interpreter  must read all applicable provisions of a treaty in a way that gives 
meaning to all of them, harmoniously ".33 Application of the Vienna Convention rules on treaty 
interpretation also requires a treaty interpreter to avoid, where possible, reading two provi sions of 
the same treaty as conflicting.  As set out below, a holistic and harmonious reading of Annex 3 and 
China 's constituent data and methodology is possible.  Nonetheless, below, China also addresses the 
applicable conflict rule.  
a. Articles 1(h)(ii) and 1(a)(ii) of the Agreement on Agriculture require 
a holistic and harmonious interpretation  
The requirement to interpret a treaty holistically and harmoniously, and not to read out 
entire aspects of that treaty, applies with even gr eater force where, as here, the treaty requires that 
two provisions be considered together.  As noted, the starting point of the interpretive exercise 
determining the applicable calculation rules for Current AMS and  Current Total AMS are 
Articles  1(a)(ii) a nd 1(h)(ii) of the Agreement on Agriculture , which define Current AMS and Current 
Total AMS.  For purposes of their calculation, Articles 1(a)(ii) and 1(h)(ii) direct a treaty interpreter 
to consider and give meaning to two sources of treaty text : (i) Annex  3; and, (ii) a Member 's 
"constituent data and methodology used in the tables of supporting material incorporated by 
reference in Part IV of the Member 's Schedule ". Thus, the Panel must attempt to adopt a holistic 
and harmonious interpretation that gives m eaning to both.  
b. The meaning of "constituent data and methodology " in Articles 
1(a)(ii) and 1(h)(ii)  
China considers it useful to begin by exploring the meaning of the phrase "constituent data 
and methodology ". That phrase covers those data and metho dologies in a Member 's Supporting 
Tables that are characteristic , formative , essential , and integral  for the calculation of both Base and 
                                                
32 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Dairy , para. 81.  
33 Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Footwear (EC) , para. 81 and footnote 72 thereto (emphasis in 
original).  WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
- 47 - 
 
 Current  AMS and Base Total AMS and Current  Total AMS.  Under Articles 1(a)(i) and 1(h)(i) both 
"constituent data " and "constituent methodology ", applied together with other elements of the 
Supporting Tables, gave rise to a Member 's Base AMS and Base Total AMS (collectively referred to 
as "Base (Total) AMS "), and, thus, that Member 's domestic support reduction commitments.  Under 
Articles 1(a)(ii) and 1(h)(ii), both remain relevant for, and must be applied in, the calculation of a 
Member 's Current AMS and Current Total AMS (collectively referred to as "Current (Total) AMS "). 
That is, Base (Total) AMS and Current  (Total) AMS a re calculated by reference to the same  Member -
specific constituent data and methodology in a Member 's Supporting Tables.  
In this respect, China explained that "constituent data and methodology " must be able to 
constitute an unchanging element  (either a  data point or a methodology) that carries over from the 
calculation of Base (Total) AMS to the calculation of Current  (Total) AMS.  As detailed below, for 
China 's market price support for wheat and rice, the term (i) "constituent data " applies to:  (a) the 
numerical value of the fixed external reference prices based on data from the 1996 -1998 base 
period, and (b) the conversion rate of 70% for paddy -rice-based data into milled -rice-based data.  
In turn, (ii) "constituent methodology " applies to:  (a) the metho dology for the determination of 
eligible production as "amount purchased ", and (b) the methodology for converting paddy -rice-
based data into milled -rice-based data.   
Although, the Parties provided similar definitions of "data", "methodology " and "constituent ", 
and agreed that "constituent " qualifies "data" and "methodology ", the U.S. interpretation of 
"constituent data and methodology " effectively fails to give any meaning to the phrase.  
Fundamentally, the United States takes the flawed view that "constituent data and methodology " 
are only of historical, and/or factual interest, and not relevant for the calculation of Current (Total) 
AMS. While the United States provides a few examples of what it considers to be constituent data 
and methodology, the se examples are largely covered under other provisions.  For example, the 
United States refers to the definition of the "basic agricultural product " and the "year" for which AMS 
is to be calculated.  Yet, both are covered separately by Articles 1(b) and 1(i)  of the Agreement on 
Agriculture .  
If the role of constituent data and methodology were, as the United States argues, either 
non-existent or extremely limited, there would have been no need for Articles 1(a)(ii) and 1(h)(ii) 
to refer to them as one of two elements necessary for, and relevant to, the calculation of Current 
(Total) AMS from present domestic support.  Accordingly, the U.S. position effectively reduces the 
references to "constituent data and methodology " to nullity, contrary to the customary  rules of treaty 
interpretation, and Article 3.2 of the DSU.   
c. The ordinary meaning of "in accordance with " and "taking into 
account " in Articles 1(h)(ii) and 1(a)(ii)  
Articles 1(a)(ii) and 1(h)(ii) also speak to the relationship between the framewor k for the 
AMS calculation in Annex 3 and a Member 's constituent data and methodology.  That relationship 
must be determined based on the ordinary meaning of the terms "in accordance with " and "taking 
into account " in Articles 1(a)(ii) and 1(h)(ii), in their  context, and in light of the object and purpose 
of the Agreement on Agriculture . In addition, there is limited guidance from the findings of the panel 
and the Appellate Body in Korea – Beef – although on the facts of that dispute, Korea had no relevant 
constituent data and methodology for beef.  
Article 1(a)(ii) provides that Current AMS is "calculated in accordance with  the provisions of 
Annex 3 …, and taking into account  the constituent  data and methodology ". Article 1(h)(ii) uses only 
the phrase "in accordance with ", providing that Current Total AMS shall be "calculated in accordance 
with the provisions of this Agreement, including Article 6 [which includes Annex 3], and with  the 
consti tuent data and methodology ". China has established that, contrary to the U.S. view, the term 
"in accordance with " applies to both sources of treaty text referenced.  The dictionary meaning of "in 
accordance with " is "in agreement or harmony with, in conform ity to, according to ".34 That is, under 
Article 1(h)(ii), Current Total AMS must be calculated "in agreement or harmony with " both (i) the 
framework of Annex 3 and (ii) "the constituent data and methodology ". The same requirement flows 
from Article 1(a)(ii ), which also uses the phrase "in accordance with " when referring to Annex 3.  
Indeed, in Korea – Beef, the Appellate Body confirmed the meaning of the term "in accordance with ", 
                                                
34 Oxford English Dictionary, OED Online, "in accordance with, n. ", pp. 2 -3, available at: 
http:/ /www.oed.com/view/Entry/1170? (last viewed 26 October 2017), (Exhibit CHN -53).  WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
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 and also recognized that Article 1(h)(ii) attributes equal importance to both sources of treaty text.35  
Article 1(a)(ii) uses the phrase "taking into account " when referring to "the constituent data 
and methodology ". The meaning of "to take into account " is "to include something in an account or 
reckoning ".36 Thus, similarly to Article 1(h)(ii), Article 1(a)(ii) also emphasizes the role of "the 
constituent data and methodology " in calculating AMS.   
In short, Articles 1(a)(ii) and 1(h)(ii) require the Panel to give meaning to both Annex 3 and 
the constituent  data and methodology, in a holistic and harmonious manner.  Contrary to the U.S. 
arguments, they are not conflict rules that give, in all circumstances, precedence to Annex 3 over a 
Member 's constituent data and methodology.  In any event, questions of hier archy become relevant 
only where a conflict existed between Annex 3 and a Member 's constituent data and methodology, 
which does not arise on the facts of this dispute.  
d. Current AMS and Current Total AMS are part of the same overall 
calculation  
The relationship between Annex 3 and a Member 's constituent data and methodology is also 
defined by the fact that Articles 1(a)(ii) and 1(h)(ii) are part of the same overall calculation.  They 
do not involve different assessments, as the United States argues in  an attempt ultimately to remove 
China 's constituent data and methodology from the calculation of Current AMS.  Instead, Annex 3 
and a Member 's constituent data and methodology must each be given the same meaning and the 
same weight in the calculation of bo th AMS and Total AMS.  
As China has explained, the notion of AMS, which expresses domestic support in monetary 
terms, is built into each of the concepts of AMS, Total AMS, Current Total AMS and Base Total AMS.  
As the panel in Korea – Beef held, "all these concepts, e.g. domestic support, AMS, Current Total 
AMS, and total domestic support and the provisions of Articles 1(a), 1(h), 3.2, 6.4, and 7.2 are 
organically and inextricably linked ".37 It follows that AMS must be calculated in the same manner 
for purposes of both AMS and Total AMS.  This requirement flows also from the fact that Total AMS 
is defined, in Article 1(h),  as the sum of the AMS calculations for each basic agricultural product 
(along with non -product -specific AMS), subject only to de minimi s exclusion rules under Article 6.4.  
In the summing -up that results in Total AMS, each AMS component remains unaltered, however, 
and is not re-calculated, demonstrating that calculating both AMS and Total AMS is part of the same 
overall calculation.   
Indeed, both AMS and Total AMS, whether calculated for the base period or for current 
domestic support, are elements of the same overall calculation of a level of domestic support.  In the 
case of Base AMS and Base Total AMS, the AMS components are part of the calculation that yielded 
a Member 's Base Total AMS and the resulting annual and final bound commitment levels, including 
where the reduction commitment is "nil". And, in the case of Current AMS and Current Total AMS, 
they are part of the calculation th at assesses whether a Member 's domestic support in any year after 
the base period has exceeded that Member 's domestic support reduction commitments, in violation 
of Articles 3.2 and 6.3.  
Thus, contrary to the U.S. assertions that both are separate exer cises, there is no basis to 
require one set of calculations for Current  AMS, under Article 1(a)(ii), and another set of calculations 
for the same Current  AMS that is summed up into Current Total AMS, under Article  1(h)(ii) (subject 
only to de minimis exclusions).   
e. The relevant context, and object and purpose of the Agreement, 
reflecting the requirement for consistency in the calculation of Base 
(Total) AMS and Current (Total) AMS  
Further illuminating the role of a Member 's constituent data and method ology in the 
calculation of Current AMS and Current Total AMS is the need for consistency in the calculation of 
(i) Base (Total) AMS and (ii) Current (Total) AMS.  That need for consistency flows from relevant 
                                                
35 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Beef, footnote 111.  
36 Oxford English Dictionary, OED Online, "to take account of, n. ", pp. 21 -22, available at: 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry /1194? (last viewed 26 October 2017), (Exhibit CHN -54). 
37 Panel Report, Korea – Beef, para. 813.  WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
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 context and the object and purpose of the Agree ment on Agriculture . The need for consistency is an 
important element in the Panel 's consideration of the role, in calculating Current AMS from China 's 
market price support for wheat and rice, of China 's constituent data and methodology in Rev.3.  
Specifica lly, it is relevant for the identification of the appropriate fixed external reference prices 
sources from data reflecting the China 's 1996 -1998 base period; the methodology for the 
determination of eligible production as "amount purchased "; and, the metho dology for converting 
paddy -rice-based data into milled -rice-based data, reflecting a conversion rate of 70%.   
Beginning with context , Articles 1(a)(i) and 1(h)(i)  refer to AMS and Total AMS during the 
base period "as specified in the relevant tables of supporting material incorporated by reference in 
Part IV of a Member 's Schedule " and "as specified in Part IV of a Member 's Schedule ", respectively.  
Thus, they refer to the same  Member -specific Supporting Tables that, pursuant to Articles 1(a)(ii) 
and 1 (h)(ii) include constituent data and methodology as elements of the calculation of Base AMS 
and Base Total AMS.   
The calculations of Base (Total) AMS in those Supporting Tables reflect the framework in 
Annex 3 and Member -specific constituent data and m ethodologies.  Indeed, paragraph 5 of Annex 3  
explains that Annex 3 also served as a framework for the calculation of the Base (Total) AMS, as 
recorded in a Member 's Supporting Tables.  Paragraph 5 stipulates that "[t]he AMS calculated as 
outlined below [ i.e., in paragraphs 6 -13 of Annex 3] for the base period shall constitute the base 
level for the implementation of the reduction commitment on domestic support ". As a result, a 
Member 's Base (Total) AMS will generally reflect the framework set out in Annex 3.  Accordingly, the 
United States errs in arguing that Base AMS calculations occurred in a legal vacuum, allegedly 
because "the Agreement does not provide a specific calculation methodology ".38 Instead, Base  AMS 
calculations were guided by the framework in A nnex 3 (as set out in paragraph 5 thereof) 
and included Member -specific constituent data and methodology (as  noted in Articles  1(a)(ii) 
and 1(h)(ii)).   
China also rebutted the related, and equally erroneous, U.S. argument that there is no 
requirement f or consistency in the calculation of Base (Total) AMS and Current (Total) AMS because 
the former is of historical interest only.  As set out above, the U.S. position is contradicted by the 
Agreement on Agriculture . Articles 1(a)(ii) and 1(h)(ii) signify tha t the choices Members made in the 
calculation of Base (Total) AMS have consequences in the calculation of Current (Total) AMS.  
Specifically, while Base AMS and Current AMS differ with respect to the time period for which they 
are calculated, they are calculated using the same  calculation framework under Annex 3 and the 
same  constituent data and methodology.  Thus, contrary to the U.S. assertion, they are "inextricably 
linked",39 and the constituent data and methodology from the calculation of Base (Total) AMS remain 
relevant for the calculation of Current (Total) AMS.   
Further relevant context  is provided by the domestic support provisions in the Agreement 
on Agricultu re – i.e., Articles 6.1, 6.3, 7.1, 20, title of Annex 2, paragraph 1 of Annex 3.  They each 
refer to domestic support reduction  commitments.  Similarly, recital 3 of the Agreement 's preamble  
provides that the object and purpose of the Agreement , with regard to domestic support, is to 
achieve "progressive reductions in agricultural support ".  
Consistency with the objective to reduce domestic support requires that compliance with a 
Member 's domestic support reduction commitments is assessed in a meaningful manner – i.e., in a 
manner that permits drawing conclusions about a Members ' reduction  of its domestic support.  This 
requires consistency in the calculation of Base (Total) AMS (which reflects domestic support during 
the base period and served as the basis  for a Member 's domestic support reduction commitments) 
and Current  (Total) AMS (which reflects current domestic support).  A lack of consistency in the 
calculation of both would undermine the usefulness of the Current (Total) AMS calculation as a proxy 
for the level of current domestic support, relative to a Member 's domestic support reduction 
commitments, which flow from Base (Total) AMS.  Indeed, the panel in Korea – Beef explicitly 
recognized this need for consistency.40 The Appellate Body found no error in the panel 's findings.41 
As China has shown, failure to use, where pertinent, consistently the same constituent data 
                                                
38 United States, response to Panel Questions 62, para. 46.  
39 Panel Report, Korea – Beef, para. 813.  
40 Panel Report, Korea – Beef, para. 811.  
41 Appellate B ody Report, Korea – Beef, paras. 113 -114 ( footnote 49), and 118.  WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
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 and methodology together with the framework of Annex 3 leads to substantial distortions in the 
calculation of Current  (Total) AMS, re lative to Base (Total) AMS.  Specifically, if constituent data and 
methodology used for the calculation of Current (Total) AMS differed  from those used for the 
calculation of Base (Total) AMS, AMS calculations would become meaningless apples -to-oranges  
comp arisons that reveal nothing about actual reductions in domestic support.  Variations in the 
constituent data and methodology mean that one cannot know whether, for example, a Member 's 
compliance with its reduction commitments results from (i) actual reducti ons in its domestic support, 
or (ii) simply from the use of different constituent data and methodology.   
Importantly, where different  constituent data and methodology are used, a reduction in AMS 
may be found, and may mask actual levels of domestic sup port that either remain unchanged or 
have even increased.  These distortions are illustrated by the exaggerating effect on China 's Current  
AMS of the United States ' application of (i) entirely new fixed external reference prices for wheat 
and rice, based on  1986-1988 (rather than 1996 -1998) data; and, (ii) a different methodology for 
the determination of "eligible production ".  
While the United States, at times, recognized these distortions, and argued that constituent 
data and methodology may be used wh ere a Member continues to apply the same program , there 
is no basis for that narrow reading of the consistency requirement.  In any event, the United States 
appears to have abandoned that argument.  
In short, the requirement for consistency in the calcu lation of Base (Total) AMS and Current 
(Total) AMS that flows from the text and context in Articles 1(a) and 1(h), the context of paragraph 
5 of Annex 3, and the design and architecture of the Agreement on Agriculture . It follows that the 
framework in Anne x 3 and a Member 's constituent data and methodology must be used consistently 
in the same manner when a Member continues more broadly to use certain forms of domestic 
support for a basic agricultural product for which its Supporting Tables include relevant  constituent 
data and methodology.  The United States ' negation of the need for such consistency is without a 
basis in the Agreement on Agriculture .  
Finally, and contrary to the U.S. assertion, China has established that the need for 
consistency applie s irrespective of whether a Member has a "positive " or a "nil" domestic support 
reduction commitment.  Under the terms of the Agreement on Agriculture , and contrary to the U.S. 
assertions, both constitute reduction commitments.  Thus, China 's commitment level of "nil" is an 
ongoing domestic support "reduction " commitment.  Indeed, absent a reduction commitment, the 
domestic support disciplines of Articles 3.2 and 6.3 of the Agreement on Agriculture would not apply 
to China.   
f. Constituent dat a and methodology are an important basis for a 
Member 's domestic support reduction commitments  
The considerations above highlight that a Member 's domestic support reduction 
commitments arise, in important part, from its Member -specific constituent dat a and methodology.  
Ignoring those constituent data and methodology in assessing compliance with individually 
negotiated and Member -specific domestic support reduction commitments, as the United States 
does, would be tantamount to re -writing that Member 's commitments.  Moreover, using different 
constituent data and methodology would undermine the utility of Current AMS calculations as a 
means to assess compliance with Member -specific domestic support reduction commitments.  
i. For later -acceded Members their c onstituent data and 
methodology are also part of their Accession Protocols  
The implications of the United States ' attempt at reading out a Member 's constituent data 
and methodology are aggravated for later -acceded Members, such as China.  For those Mem bers, 
their constituent data and methodology are not only part and parcel of their domestic support 
reduction commitments, but also of their "terms of accession ", under Article XII:1 of the Marrakesh 
Agreement.  Contrary to the U.S. assertions, China 's Supp orting Tables in Rev.3, which include its 
constituent data and methodology, are part of  China 's Accession Protocol.  Specifically, Annex 8 
thereto includes China 's Schedule of Concessions and Commitments on Goods ( "Schedule "), which 
incorporates Rev.3.  Indeed, China 's Schedule notes that it "result[ed] from the negotiations between 
the People 's Republic of China and WTO Members [ and that it ] is annexed to the Protocol of Accession WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
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 of China ".42 As part of  China 's Accession Protocol, Rev.3 enjoys the same legal status as the 
Accession Protocol.   
The United States further errs in arguing that China 's Schedule, including Rev.3, lost its 
status as part of China 's Accession Protocol because it became annexed to the GATT 1994.  The legal 
status of Rev.3 as p art of China 's Accession Protocol is not affected by its integration into the GATT 
1994.  As noted, Schedules of Concessions in an accession protocol form part of the "terms of 
accession ", under Article XII:1 of the Marrakesh Agreement.  They are an integral  part of the package 
of rights and obligations under which that Member acceded to the WTO, and can never lose their 
status as "terms of accession ". 
ii. The constituent data and methodology give rise to China 's 
domestic support commitments  
China 's constituent data and methodology gave rise to binding commitments, as part of 
China 's domestic support reduction commitments.  Contrary to the U.S. assertions, they do not 
"alter" or "supplant " those commitments.  Instead, they are themselves China 's negotiated and 
agreed "terms of accession ". China has explained that the U.S. position rests on an erroneous 
understanding of the relationship between an Accession Protocol and the Agreement on Agriculture.  
When a new Member accedes to the WTO under Article XII:1 of the Marrakesh Agreement, it does 
not agree to undertake pre -existing commitments in the Agreement on Agriculture , as those 
commitments stood prior to its accession.  Instead, it accedes to the Agreement on Agriculture  
subject to individually negotiated and agreed commitments that are set out in the "terms of 
accession " under the Accession Protocol.  
For China, this is confirmed by paragraphs 1.2 and 12.1 of China 's Accession Protocol.  
Paragraph 1.2 confirms that the Accession Protocol, including the domestic -support -related 
commitments, "shall be an integral part of the WTO  Agreement ". Paragraph 12.1 then stipulates 
that "China shall implement the provisions contained in China 's Schedul e of Concessions and 
Commitments on Goods and, as specifically provided in this Protocol, those of the Agreement on 
Agriculture ". Thus, China is required to implement the provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture 
subject to the terms of its Accession Prot ocol. That is, China 's Accession Protocol does not "alter" 
domestic support reduction commitments; it gives rise to those commitments.   
Moreover, China has rebutted the U.S. arguments that aim to invalidate the binding nature 
of China 's constituent da ta and methodology.  First, China has demonstrated that paragraph 1.3 of 
China 's Accession Protocol does not speak to the question of substantive commitments China 
allegedly undertook as those commitments stood prior to its accession.  Instead, it relates to  potential 
transition periods, and explains that, unless specifically stated, China is not entitled to them.  Second, 
China explained that paragraph 238 of China 's Working Party Report does not reflect a disagreement 
between China and its negotiating partne rs as to China 's constituent data and methodology that 
would invalidate them.  Rather, paragraph 238 records concerns regarding certain policy 
classification of certain "green box " support unrelated to China 's domestic support reduction 
commitments.  Finally , China has explained that the case law from EC – Sugar  regarding the role of 
schedules in undertaking commitments is inapposite.  This is because Rev.3 is part of China 's 
Accession Protocol, and because, in any event, the scheduling rules for export subsidy and domestic 
support commitments are very different in light of the Member -specific nature of domestic support 
reduction commitments, including the ability to use Member -specific constituent data and 
methodology that give rise to these commitments.  
2. The appropriate methodology to calculate Current (Total) AMS  for 
China 's market price support measures for wheat and rice  
Having set out the general interpretative framework, and the need for consistency in the 
calculation of Base (Total) AMS and Current (Total) AMS, China turns to demonstrating the 
importance of using its own constituent data and methodology, where relevant.  Specifically, China 
now turns to the AMS calculations required for market price support pursuant to paragraph 8 of 
Annex 3, and identifies on the basis of a holistic and harmonious interpretation the data and 
                                                
42 WT/ACC/CHN/49/Add.1 (emphasis added).  WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
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 methodologies to be used in those calculations.   
To begin, AMS from market price support is to be calculated on the basis of the difference 
between the fixed external  reference price ( "FERP") for the product at issue and its applied 
administered price ( "AAP"), multiplied by the quantity of eligible production.  Most of these input 
factors have been the subject of intense debate.  
a. The appropriate fixed external refere nce prices based on data from 
1996-1998 
China has demonstrated that its FERPs must be sourced from its 1996 -1998 base period.  
This result flows from a holistic and harmonious interpretation, consistent with the customary rules 
of treaty interpretation , of all relevant provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture , in light of relevant 
context and the object and purpose of the treaty.  
By contrast, the United States takes the view that China 's FERPs must be identified reflecting 
a 1986 -1988 base period . For the United States, this flows from the alleged clarity and plain meaning 
of a few words in paragraph 9 of Annex 3, ignoring the rest of the Agreement on Agriculture  and 
China 's constituent data and methodology in Rev.3.  The United States errs, and ba ses its 
interpretation on only a subset of relevant materials.  China established that the case law provides 
numerous examples where consideration of all relevant text, context and the objective and purpose 
of the treat result in interpretations of a provis ion, or select words in a provision, that go beyond 
the alleged clarity of those words.   
Thus, in approaching the interpretative task of identifying the relevant base period for 
Chinas ' FERPs, the Panel 's first task is to identify what it is being cal led upon to interpret.  Only then 
is it meaningful to discuss how that interpretative exercise must proceed.  Contrary to the U.S. 
assertion, the Panel is not called upon to interpret a few words in paragraph 9 of Annex 3 in clinical 
isolation from all the o ther provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture .  
Instead, the Panel is required to interpret, holistically and harmoniously, all provisions of the 
Agreement that deal with the determination of the base period for the FERPs, in the light of relevant 
context and the object and purpose of the Agreement . This involves consideration of Articles 1(a) 
and 1(h), as well as paragraphs 5 and 9 of Annex 3, and additionally China 's constituent data and 
methodology in Rev.3, along with the context from other Members ' Supporting Tables, as included 
in those Members ' Schedules, and the need to ensure consistency in the calculation of Base (Total) 
AMS and Current (Total) AMS, which flows from the design and architecture of the Agreement on 
Agriculture . 
Following the correct interpretative approach, China has established that the proper, holistic 
and harmonious interpretation of these provisions establishes a single rule regarding the 
identification of the applicable base period for Members ' domestic support c ommitments, including 
for their FERPs.  That single rule requires each Member to use a three -year base period for 
establishing its domestic support reduction commitments, including for the identification of the 
applicable FERPs to be used in the calculation  of Base (Total) AMS and Current (Total) AMS.  Under 
that single rule, the three -year base period must be sufficiently proximate to the time of the 
Member 's accession .  WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
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Consistent with the context provided by Members ' Supporting Tables, this single rul e is 
implemented through different modalities.  For original Members, the base period proximate to the 
time of the creation of the WTO is generally 1986 -1988, as memor ialized in paragraph 9 of Annex  3 
and in those Members ' Supporting Tables.  For each of the  36 later -acceded Members, there are 
Member -specific three -year base periods that are each proximate to the time of accession of the 
later-acceded Member concerned, as agreed in the relevant accession protocol between that Member 
and the WTO, and as memori alized in each of those later -acceded Members ' Supporting Tables.  
Specifically, o f the 36 Members that acceded to the WTO after the conclusion of the Uruguay round, 
all43 used a three -year base period for the calculation of Base (Total) AMS that was proxim ate to 
their accession, and later than 1986 -1988.  And all 10 later -acceded Members that maintained 
market price support measures during their Member -specific base periods drew their FERPs from the 
same base period used to calculate Base (Total) AMS.  For Ch ina specifically, that base period is 
1996-1998, as indicated in its Supporting Tables, which are also part of its Accession Protocol.  
Indeed, each of the draft Schedules China prepared during the five -year negotiating period from 
1997 to 2001 consistently  used the most recent three -year time period, and none used 1986 -1988.  
No Member objected to this approach.  
Thus, the context provided by other Members ' Supporting Tables reinforces the 
interpretation of the relevant treaty provisions that China has advanced in these proceedings, 
whereby (i) original Members were generally required to use a 1986 -1988 base period, including for 
their fixed external referen ce prices, while (ii) later -acceded Members were required to use a later 
base period, including for their fixed external reference prices, that was proximate to the time of 
their accession.  That is, for Members that acceded after the Uruguay Round, includi ng China, this 
context supports the conclusion that they are not required to calculate their FERPs on the basis of a 
1986-1988 base period; instead, they must use the base period in their respective Schedules – i.e., 
for China, 1996 -1998, as set out in Rev .3. China considers that the Panel should give significant 
weight to this context.44  
Moreover, the object and purpose of the Agreement on Agriculture demonstrates the error 
in the United States ' treatment of the 1996 -1998 base period, resulting from the above interpretative 
exercise, as relevant only for the calculation of Base (Total) AMS, but not Current  (Total) AMS.  This 
U.S. argument ignores the role and purpose of FERPs and the requirement for consistency in the 
Agreement . To recall , a FERP acts as a benchmark to permit an assessment of a Member 's Current 
AMS from market price support relative to its Base AMS from market price support, in line with that 
Member 's domestic support reduction commitments.  A WTO Member must calculate its Current 
(Total ) AMS consistently by using the same constituent data and methodology it used to calculate 
its Base (Total) AMS, including the same FERPs.  Otherwise, it would be subjected to AMS 
commitments it did not und ertake, in violation of Article  3.2 of the DSU.   
The existence of the single rule that the three -year base period, including for the FERPs, 
must be sufficiently proximate to the time of the Member 's accession is consistent with a 2010 
Technical Note by the WTO Secretariat, which explains that, "[w]h ereas a fixed period (1986 -1988) 
was established for commitments on domestic support and export subsidies undertaken in the 
Uruguay Round, the base periods for Members acceding under Article XII of the WTO Agreement 
have been determined on an individual ba sis".45 Indeed, for later -acceding Members, a 1996 
Technical Note from the WTO Secretariat on the accession process emphasizes that acceding 
governments should calculate an "external reference price " from data "normally for each of the last 
three years ".46 
China further notes that forcing each of the 36 later -acceded Members, including China, to 
calculate, going forward, Current AMS using different FERPs has important systemic consequences.  
During none of the accession negotiations did the United State s, or any other Member, suggest that 
                                                
43 There is one exception, Bulgaria, which arose from the particular factual situation regarding its 
accession.  
44 China also notes that, alternative ly, the Panel could perhaps view the Schedules of later -acceded 
Members as evidence of a common, concordant and consistent "subsequent practice " relating to the 
interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture.  The Panel 's conclusi ons under both 
approaches would remain unchanged.  Indeed, resort to subsequent practice merely confirms, and does not in 
any way modify, the meaning that results from a holistic and harmonious interpretation employing other tools 
of treaty interpretation.  
45 WT/ACC/10/Rev.4, p. 25.  
46 WT/ACC/4, pp. 3 -4 (emphasis added).  WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
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 a 1986 -1988 base period had to be used, including for the FERPs.  Doing so now forces later -acceded 
Members to comply with commitments not undertaken, in violation of not only Article 3.2 of the 
DSU, but also each of the ir respective accession protocols.  Moreover, for several of these Members, 
there may be no 1986 -1988 data from which to draw FERPs, given that several countries at issue 
did not even exist in 1986 -1988.  Rather than using proxy data, as the United States su ggests, under 
the proper interpretation, those Members should simply use their own FERPs in their Supporting 
Tables.   
Finally, the United States errs in arguing that China 's three -year average FERPs were not 
"used" in its Supporting Tables, and must t herefore be ignored when calculating Current AMS.  
China 's FERPs appear in Rev.3 as the three -year average of external references prices during China 's 
1996-1998 base period.  Moreover, in calculating Base AMS, China used the data for the external 
reference prices for each of the three years of its 1996 -1998 base period.  Specifically, for each year 
of the 1996 -1998 base period, China used the external reference price from the year at issue.  Thus, 
the U.S. allegation that "China did not 'use' these data points  (or methodologies) in the calculation 
of its market price support "47 is unavailing.  
Indeed, China 's approach is consistent with the need to use constituent data and 
methodology for the calculation of both Base (Total) AMS and Current (Total) AMS.  China calculated 
Base AMS using annual 1996 -1998 external reference prices.  It continues to calculate Current  AMS 
using FERPs that reflect the average of those same external reference prices.  This ensures 
consistency as China 's FERPs are fixed and serve as  external reference prices situated in the 1996 -
1998 base period.   
b. The appropriate applied administered prices  
The dictionary meaning of an "administered price " refers to a price "determined not by 
market forces but by administrative action ".48 The dictionary meaning of "applied " includes "brought 
to bear, made effective, acting at a point or place ".49 Thus, the AAP refers to the price, as set or 
established by a government, at which a Member effectively provides market price support for the 
produce rs of a basic agricultural product.  Similarly, the United States observed that an AAP must be 
"known and discernible ", and that it is a "price set or established by a government and …, as such, 
distinguishable from a prevailing market price ".50 
The re quirement for a comparison between the AAP and the FERP means that "both the FERP 
and the AAP must be calculated at an equivalent stage of processing or converted accordingly ".51 As 
paragraphs 8 and 9 of Annex 3 require the FERP to be fixed – limiting perm issible adjustment to 
those for quality differences – any adjustment to make the required price/product comparison must 
be made to the AAP.  Thus, the United States errs in adjusting the FERP.  Instead, as China has 
demonstrated that relevant adjustments mus t be made to the AAP and the amount of eligible 
production.  China addresses the Parties ' debate regarding the appropriate conversion factor in the 
context of identifying the basic agricultural product, below.  
c. The appropriate methodology for determining eligible production  
Under paragraph 8 of Annex 3, calculating AMS from market price support requires that the 
difference between the FERP and the AAP be multiplied by the quantity of eligible production.  In the 
case of China 's market price support for wheat and rice, the methodology to determine that amount 
is included as a constituent methodology in its Supporting Tables.  Specifically, in calculating Base 
AMS for wheat and rice, China determined "eligible production " as the "amount purchased ".  
                                                
47 See United States, response to Panel Question 79, para. 136.  
48 Oxford English Dictionary, OED Online, "administered, adj. ", available at: 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/2532? (last viewed  26 October 2017), (Exhibit CHN -60). 
49 Oxford English Dictionary, OED Online, "applied, adj. ", available at: 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/9713? (last viewed 26 October 2017), (Exhibit CHN -61). 
50 United States, first written submission, para. 97 (emphasis added).  
51 Panel Report, Korea – Beef, para. 828.  WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
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By way of background, Rev.3 records the "amount purchased " methodology as having been 
used for both market price support measures that China maintained during the base period for wheat 
and rice.  Specifically, it explains that "eligible production for Sta te Procurement Price " refers to "the 
amount purchased  by state -owned enterprises from farmers at state procurement price for the food 
security purpose ", and that "eligible production for Protective Price " refers to "the amount purchased  
by state -owned ente rprises from farmers at protective price in order to protect farmer 's income ".52 
Indeed, each of the draft Schedules China prepared during the five -year negotiating period from 
1997 to 2001 consistently used this methodology for the determination of the am ount of eligible 
production.  Throughout the 14 working party meetings and numerous informal consultations, there 
is no record of any WTO Member disputing this methodology.  Instead, the use of purchased amounts 
to determine eligible production is part of th e custom -made package that China and all Members 
agreed to as part of China 's "terms of accession ".  
Contrary to the erroneous U.S. argument, China 's methodology for the determination of 
"eligible production " is not only of historical interest since i t was applied to the measures that existed 
during the 1996 -1998 base period.  Instead, it remains relevant as a constituent methodology under 
Articles 1(a)(ii) and 1(h)(ii) of the Agreement on Agriculture  for the calculation of China 's Current 
AMS and Current Total AMS from market price support for wheat and rice.  Moreover, and contrary 
to the U.S. assertions, it is a constituent methodology because it sets out a method for the 
determination of eligible production that applies consistently across the tw o different market price 
support measures that China maintained at the time for wheat and rice.  Thus, and contrary to the 
U.S. assertions, it was not tied to, and applicable for, only those specific measures.  
The U.S. error in concluding that China 's constituent methodology in Rev.3 may be ignored 
results in the U.S. reliance on solely the dictionary definition of the term "eligible ". For that, the 
United States points to the findings of Appellate Body in Korea – Beef, arguing on that basis that 
"eligible" refers to the total amount of production in the geographic area where a market price 
support measure operates.   
The United States errs.  Exclusive reliance on an undefined term in Annex 3 could only be 
warranted in situations in which there is no  relevant constituent data and methodology for the 
product at issue.  That was precisely the situation in Korea – Beef, where Korea 's Schedule did not 
contain relevant constituent data and methodology for beef . By contrast, market price support for 
wheat an d rice was included in China 's calculation of its Base Total AMS, and there are relevant 
constituent data and methodology.  Indeed, unlike the situation in Korea – Beef, the constituent data 
and methodology incorporated in China 's Supporting Tables contains  a specific methodology for the 
determination of the amount of eligible production for the products at issue.   
In these circumstances, the Panel must consider the text in paragraph 8 and China 's 
constituent methodology, relevant context and the object  and purpose of the treaty.  Adopting this 
approach, WTO panels and the Appellate Body consistently look beyond  a few words considered in 
isolation in one provision, and consider relevant context and the object and purpose of the treaty to 
arrive at a meani ng that may qualify or depart from the literal meaning of those few words used, 
when considered alone.   
Indeed, unlike the United States ' interpretative approach (which is based solely on the text 
of paragraph 8 and ignores all other elements of the i nterpretative exercise), China 's interpretation 
is arrived at by appropriately considering, in a holistic and harmonious manner, all elements of the 
interpretive exercise under Article 31 of the Vienna Convention – i.e., all applicable text, the context 
and the object and purpose of the Agreement on Agriculture .  
To begin, paragraph 8 refers to "the quantity of production eligible to receive the applied 
administered price ". As the Appellate Body held in Korea – Beef, the dictionary meaning of "eligible " 
is "fit or entitled to be chosen ".53 To recall, i n that dispute, the Appellate Body focused its 
interpretation on the dictionary meaning of the term "eligible ", because Korea had no constituent 
data and methodology f or beef.  Thus, where there is no further relevant text or context – and in 
particular in the absence of relevant constituent data and methodology – "eligible " production may 
be determined based on production that is "fit or entitled to be chosen ". It is ag ainst that legal 
                                                
52 WT/ACC/CHN/38/Rev.3, note 19.  
53 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Beef, para. 122.   WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
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 standard then that the specific facts surrounding the measure at issue must be assessed.   
Thus, the United States misunderstands the Appellate Body in Korea – Beef. Contrary to the 
U.S. assertions, the Appellate Body did not find that , where a Member 's market price support 
measures do not declare any quantity of production as "eligible " to receive the applied administered 
price, the default "interpretation " requires use of "total production " as "eligible production ", when 
calculating market price support under paragraph 8 of Annex 3.  Instead, the legal standard in the 
absence of any relevant constituent data and methodology continues to be production that is "fit or 
entitled to be chosen ".  
 In the circumstances of this dispute, t he Panel must also take into account China 's 
constituent methodology in Rev.3, determining the amount of "eligible production " as "the amount 
purchased ". China has established that, contrary to the U.S. position, a holistic and harmonious 
interpretation of  (i) paragraph 8 of Annex 3 and (ii) the constituent data and methodology in Rev.3 
is possible.  Indeed , paragraph 8 does not prescribe in detail how "eligible production " must be 
identified, and does not specify a singular methodology for doing so.  
China's interpretation that eligible production for its market price support for wheat and rice 
must be determined based on "the amount purchased " flows, in particular, from the context and 
object and purpose of the Agreement on Agriculture , which require co nsistency in the calculation of 
Base (Total) AMS and Current (Total) AMS – i.e., a proper apples -to-apples comparison in assessing 
compliance with China 's domestic support reduction commitments.  Indeed, and contrary to the U.S. 
assertion, China 's interpret ation of "eligible production " ensures that China is held to the domestic 
support reduction commitments that it agreed with the Membership, and recorded in its Accession 
Protocol.  
In short, and as China has explained in detail, considering all the ele ments of the 
interpretative exercise – i.e., the texts and context of Articles 1(a) and 1(h), as well as paragraphs 
5 and 8 of Annex 3, and, China 's constituent methodology in Rev.3, and in light of their context and 
the object and purpose of the Agreement  on Agriculture  – the proper interpretation of the 
methodology for the determination of the amount of "eligible production " for China 's market price 
support for wheat and rice is "amount purchased ". Thus, when calculating AMS from China 's market 
price supp ort for wheat and rice, it is necessary to apply a methodology for determining eligible 
production based on the "amount purchased ".  
The United States also sought to support its arguments for a methodology to determine 
"eligible production " as "total production " based on alleged market effects of market price support 
measures.  Yet, the United States finally recognized that the Agreement on Agriculture  does not 
"seek[] to counter any negative effects of the provision of support ".54 This confirms China 's position 
that the calculation of AMS from market price support is not linked to, and does not measure, the 
"effects " of such measures.  Indeed, reading an "effects " test into the rules on the calculation of a 
Member 's AMS would be inconsistent with the Agreement 's definition of AMS as a measure of a 
Member 's "annual level of support, expressed in monetary terms " under Article 1(a).   
d. The relevant basic agricultural products  
For each calculation of Current AMS, it is necessary to identify the relevant  basic agricultural 
product, for which that calculation must be undertaken.  The United States argues that, pursuant to 
paragraph 7 of Annex 3, AMS must be calculated at the "point of first sale " of an agricultural 
commodity  – i.e., for the product that lea ves the farm.   
Yet, as China has explained, Article 1(b) and paragraph 7 of Annex 3 require AMS to be 
calculated for "the product  as close as practicable  to the point of first sale as specified in a Member 's 
Schedule and in the related supporting mate rial".55 Thus, as the United States accepts elsewhere, 
Article 1(b) of the Agreement on Agriculture  defines the basic agricultural product, for which AMS is 
to be calculated, by reference to a Member 's Supporting Tables, as included in its Schedule.  There 
is no requirement that the "basic agricultural product " "specified " in a Member 's Supporting Tables 
is the product at the beginning of the processing chain, as sold at the point of first sale.  Rather, that 
product is simply as specified in a Member 's Suppo rting Tables, and may be processed.  It is that 
                                                
54 United States, second written submission, para. 25.  
55 Emphasis added.  WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
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 product, for which data need to be sourced as close as practicable to the point of its first sale.   
In these proceedings, issues regarding the identification of the relevant basic agricultural 
product hav e arisen principally in the context of rice.  The United States erroneously calculated 
Current AMS for each of paddy  indica rice and paddy  japonica rice.  By contrast, China 's Supporting 
Tables in Rev.3 identify the basic agricultural rice products as milled  indica rice and milled  japonica 
rice. Specifically, for both types of rice, China 's FERPs in Rev.3 are expressed in terms of 
HS10063000 – i.e., "semi-milled or wholly milled rice, whether or not polished or glazed ". Similarly, 
China 's Base AMS in Supporti ng Table DS:5 was calculated  for milled indica rice and milled japonica 
rice. Pursuant to Articles 1(b) and paragraph 7 of Annex 3, China 's Current AMS must, therefore, 
similarly be calculated on the basis of milled  indica rice and milled japonica rice.  
As noted, where certain variables for the calculation of AMS from market price support are 
reported for a form of processing other than that of the basic agricultural product, these variables 
need to be converted to represent the basic agricultural prod uct. Relevant conversion rates may be 
included in a Member 's constituent data and methodology in their Supporting Tables.   
As relevant to these proceedings, China 's AAPs and amounts of eligible production are 
reported in terms of paddy rice. To conver t these price and volume data into milled rice equivalents, 
China 's Supporting Tables in Rev.3 used a single 70% conversion rate, which is derived from volume -
based data.  As constituent data, the Panel should apply this same conversion rate.  This conversio n 
rate is, moreover, reasonable, appropriate, and consistent with an objective assessment of the facts.  
It reflects a milling rate applicable between paddy rice and milled rice and is acknowledged and 
accepted, including by the OECD and the USDA.  Use of a volume -based conversion rate is self -
evidently reasonable and appropriate for a volume -based conversion, such as for the amount of 
eligible production.  Use of that same conversion rate is also reasonable and appropriate for the 
price-based conversion for t he AAP, where precise data is unavailable, as the United States accepts.  
Indeed, the volume/quantity effect of further processing rice is the predominant factor affecting the 
price of rice at different levels of processing.   
By contrast, the United St ates uses a 60% price conversion rate for its conversion of FERPs 
into paddy  rice data.  It derived this conversion rate from a ratio between (i) the retail price for paddy  
rice and (ii) the price of polished  rice in the Chinese retail market.  Using polishe d rice, the United 
States selected the most processed product, with the highest price, among the varieties of rice falling 
under HS10063000, thereby distorting the applicable conversion rate.  The U.S. proposed conversion 
rate is further inappropriate, beca use it adjusts not only the level of processing, but also the level 
of trade of the data concerned.   
In sum, the Panel should use the 70% conversion rate included in China 's constituent data 
and methodology to convert data on the AAP and the eligible production, and to ensure that both 
data are expressed at the equivalent level of processing as the rice FERPs in Rev.3.   
e. China's de minimis level  
Under paragraph 235 of China 's Working Party Report, which is incorporated in China 's 
Accession Protocol, China is entitled to a de minimis level of 8.5% of the total value of production 
for each basic agricultural product, instead of the 10% that apply for other developing M embers 
under Article 6.4 of the Agreement on Agriculture . Thus, as long as China 's product -specific domestic 
support for a basic agricultural product is equivalent to, or less than, 8.5% of the total value of 
production of that product, China is not requir ed to include such support in its Current Total AMS 
under Articles 3.2 and 6.3 of the Agreement , and complies with its domestic support reduction 
commitments, including under Article 7.2(b).  
f. Total value of production of a basic agricultural product  
China 's de minimis assessment requires calculating AMS as a percentage of the total value 
of production for the basis agricultural product at issue.  As noted above, pursuant to Article 1(b), 
the relevant basic agricultural product is identified in a Memb er's Supporting Tables.  Paragraph 7 of 
Annex 3 further provides that "AMS shall be calculated as close as practicable to the point of first 
sale of the basic agricultural product concerned ". Similarly, the total value of production of the basic 
agricultura l product must be calculated "as close as practicable to the point of first sale " of the WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
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 product concerned.  Thus, the total value of production for wheat and rice should be calculated by 
multiplying the total amount of wheat, milled indica rice and milled japonica rice produced in China 
with the producer price for these products, determined as the weighted average of market prices 
and government administered prices.  This approach is consistent with the manner in which total 
value of production is determined  in Rev.3.   
3. In case the Panel finds a conflict, the Accession Protocol, including 
Rev.3, prevails over the Agreement on Agriculture   
If the Panel were to disagree that a harmonious interpretation of Annex 3 and China 's 
constituent data and methodology in Rev.3 is possible, and were to find a conflict for any of the data 
or methodologies to be used, China has explained that its constituent data and methodology in Rev.3 
prevail to the extent of that conflict.  To recall, China 's constituent dat a and methodology in Rev.3 
are part of its Accession Protocol and, thus, the Marrakesh Agreement.  Accordingly, when resolving 
a conflict between China 's constituent data and methodology in Rev.3 and the provisions of the 
Agreement on Agriculture , the appli cable conflict rule is that in Article XVI:3 of the Marrakesh 
Agreement.  Article XVI:3 provides as follows:  "In the event of a conflict between a provision of this 
Agreement [ i.e., the Marrakesh Agreement] and a provision of any of the Multilateral Trade 
Agreements, the provision of this Agreement shall prevail to the extent of the conflict ". Accordingly, 
in the event of a conflict, Rev.3 would prevail over the Agreement on Agriculture , to the extent of 
that conflict.  
The United States recognizes that  application of this conflict rule means that precedence 
must be given to the Accession Protocol.  Indeed, it properly relies on the same mechanism to support 
its argument that the applicable de minimis  support level for the calculation of China 's Current T otal 
AMS is 8.5%, rather than the 10% otherwise applicable under Article 6.4(b) of the Agreement on 
Agriculture . According to the United States, this result flows from paragraph 235 of China 's Working 
Party Report, as included in China 's Accession Protocol , which prevails to the extent of its conflict 
with Article 6.4(b).  
China further rebutted all three alleged conflict rules that the United States considers apply 
so as to displace China 's constituent data and methodology in Rev.3.  First, China explai ned that the 
alleged hierarchy in Article 1(a)(ii) of the Agreement on Agriculture  does not exist, and that, in any 
event, Article 1(a)(ii) does not constitute a conflict rule.  Secon d, China explained that Article  21.1 
of the Agreement on Agriculture is applicable only to conflicts between the GATT 1994 and the 
Agreement on Agriculture . It does not apply in case of conflict between a "term of accession " and 
the provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture . For later-acceded Members, Article  XVI:3 of the 
Marra kesh Agreement, as a higher level conflict rule, takes priority over any other conflict rule in 
the covered agreements.  Indeed, to the extent that a conflict rule in a Multilateral Trade Agreement, 
such as Article 21.1, were to suggest a different conflict  resolution from that dictated by Article 
XVI:3, that rule would itself be in conflict with Article XVI:3, which would prevail.  Third and finally, 
China explained that, likewise, the case law from EC – Sugar  regarding conflicts between a Schedule 
and a cov ered agreement does not apply in case of a conflict between a "term of accession " and the 
provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture . 
4. Conclusion  
In sum, either through a holistic and harmonious interpretation, or on the basis of the 
applicable conflict rule, the Panel must recognize the role of China 's constituent data and 
methodology, and use them, as identified above, in the calculation of China 's Current (Total) AMS 
for wheat and rice.   
C. China 's AMS calculation for market price support for wheat and rice  
1. China 's domestic support for wheat for 2012 -2016 is within its 8.5 
percent de minimis  commitment level  
Having identified the legal errors in the U.S. approach to calculating AMS from market price 
support for wheat, provided under t he MPP for wheat, China then set out the accurate calculations.  
Specifically, in its AMS calculations, China used the appropriate 1996-1998 FERP for wheat, as 
included in Rev.3, rather than the flawed FERP used by the United States, based on 1986 -1988 data . WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
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 Moreover, like the United States, China sourced the AAP for wheat from the annual wheat MPP 
measures for each of the years 2012 -2016.  Finally, and again consistent with Rev.3, China used as 
the amount of eligible production the amount of wheat that was a ctually purchased under the MPP 
program in each of years 2012 -2016, instead of the, legally incorrect, total amount of wheat 
production in the MPP provinces, as used by the United States.   
China demonstrated that its AMS from market price support for wheat in each of these years 
was less than 8.5% of the total value of wheat production in China.  Specifically, China 's product -
specific AMS from market price support for wheat, as a percentage of the total value of production 
in 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, and  2016, is 3.02%, 1.54%, 5.51%, 4.54%, and 6.56, respectively.56 
Each of these values is below the de minimis  level of 8.5% of the total value of China 's wheat 
production.  Thus, China 's market price support for wheat is consistent with its domestic support 
reduction commitments under the Agreement on Agriculture . 
2. China 's domestic support for indica rice and japonica rice for 2012 -
2016 is within its 8.5 percent de minimis  commitment level  
As explained above, the United States advanced an incorrect in terpretative approach to the 
identification of many of the relevant elements of the calculation of AMS from market price support 
for indica rice and japonica rice.  Accordingly, the United States ' AMS calculations are seriously 
flawed, reflecting the flawed  legal bases on which they are built.  
To begin, the United States calculated AMS for the wrong basic agricultural rice product – 
i.e., for paddy indica rice and paddy japonica rice.  Yet, a proper interpretation of Articles 1(b) and 
paragraph 7 of Annex 3, along with Rev.3, compels the conclusion that, for China, AMS for rice must 
be calculated for each of milled  indica rice and milled  japonica rice.  Accordingly, the Panel should 
rely on China 's AMS calculations for these products.  
Correcting for further U.S. errors, China calculated AMS using the appropriate 1996-1998 
FERPs for milled indica rice and milled japonica rice, as included in Rev.3.  These FERPs replace the 
flawed FERPs used by the United States, which are, erroneously, converted into paddy  indica rice 
and paddy  japonica rice, and based on 1986-1988 data, rather than data from China 's 1996 -1998 
base period.  Like the United States, China sourced the AAP for paddy indica ri ce and paddy japonica 
rice from the annual MPP indica rice and japonica rice measures for each of the years 2012 -2016.  
However, China converted these values into milled indica rice and milled japonica rice values, using 
the appropriate 70% conversion rate.  Finally, and consistent with Rev.3, China used as the amount 
of eligible production the amount of indica rice and japonica rice that was actually purchased under 
the MPP programs in each of years 2012 -2016, instead of the total amount of indica rice and j aponica 
rice production in the MPP provinces, as used by the United States.  Again, China converted the 
amount of paddy indica rice and paddy  japonica rice purchased into milled  indica rice and japonica 
rice equivalents, using the appropriate 70% conversion  rate.  
On the basis of the appropriate calculations, China 's product -specific AMS from market price 
support for milled indica rice , as a percentage of the total value of production in 2012, 2013, 2014, 
2015, and 2016, was 0.02%, 5.52%, 4.08%, 3.91%, and 3.00%, respectively.57 Moreover, China 's 
product -specific AMS from market price support for milled japonica rice , as a percentage of the total 
value of production in 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, and 2016, was 0.99%, 4.74%, 6.95%, 7.84% and 
8.26, respectivel y.58  Each of these values is below the de minimis  level of 8.5% of the total value 
of China 's milled indica rice and milled japonica rice production.  Thus, China 's market price support 
for indica rice and japonica rice is consistent with its domestic supp ort reduction commitments under 
the Agreement on Agriculture . 
In the alternative, China also calculated AMS from market price support for indica rice and 
japonica rice combined.  China 's product -specific AMS from market price support for rice, as a 
percentage of the total value of rice production in 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, and 2016 is 0.36%, 
4.87%, 4.82%, 5.00%, and 4.55%, respectively.59 Each of these values is below the de minimis  
level of 8.5% of the total value of China 's rice production.  Again, China 's market price support for 
                                                
56 China, first written submission, para. 273 (Table 22) and Exhibit CHN -88 (Table 22).  
57 China, first written submission, para. 261 (Table 17) and Exhibit CHN -88 (Table 17).  
58 China, first written submission, para. 261 (Table 18) and Exhib it CHN -88 (Table 18).  
59 China, first written submission, para. 264 (Table 19) and Exhibit CHN -88 (Table 19).  WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
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 rice is consistent with its domestic support reduction commitments under the Agreement on 
Agriculture . 
VI. CONCLUSION AND REQUES T FOR RELIEF  
For the summarized above, and set out in detail in its submissions, China requests the Panel 
to find as follows:  
• For wheat, indica rice and japonica rice, China requests the Panel to find that the United 
States has failed to establish that China provided domestic support in excess of its de 
minimis  commitment level of 8.5% of the value of production, and therefore has failed 
to establish that China acted inconsistently with Articles 3.2, 6.3, and 7.2(b) of the 
Agreement on Agriculture .  
• For corn, since the TPRP expired in 2016, and thus before panel establishment, China 
reque sts that the Panel find that this measure falls outside the Panel 's terms of 
reference.  WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
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 ANNEX  C 
ARGUMENTS OF THE THIRD PARTIES  
Contents  Page  
Annex  C-1 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Australia  62 
Annex  C-2 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Brazil  65 
Annex  C-3 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Canada  67 
Annex C -4 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Colombia  71 
Annex C -5 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Ecuador  72 
Annex C -6 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of the European Union  74 
Annex C -7 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of India 76 
Annex C -8 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Indonesia  78 
Annex C -9 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Japan  80 
Annex C -10 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Kazakhstan  83 
Annex C -11 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of the Russian Federation  86 
 
 WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
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 ANNEX C -1 
INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE  SUMMARY OF THE ARGUM ENTS OF AUSTRALIA  
I. INTRODUCTION  
1. Australia 's submissions in this dispute have focused on the relationship between a Member 's 
Schedule and obligations in WTO Agreements; as well as the legal interpretation of key provisions 
in the Agreement on Agriculture, including the methodology used to calculate market price support, 
the meaning of "production eligible" in Annex 3, and the reference period for the "fixed external 
reference price".  
2. In Australia 's view, the Agreement on Agricul ture provides clear and precise direction for 
calculating market price support, including the reference period to be used for a fixed external 
reference price.  In Korea – Beef,1 the WTO Appellate Body has also provided clear and unambiguous 
guidance on wha t is meant by the term "p roduction eligible" in Annex 3.  
3. As relevant context for interpreting the provisions at issue, it is important to recall that the  
Agreement on Agriculture provides "a framework for the long -term reform of agricultural trade and 
domestic policies, with the aim of leading to fairer competition and a less distorted sector" .2 The 
Agreement not only places rules and limitations  on domestic agricultural support by Members, it also 
aspires to reduce  domestic support. The Agreement on Agr iculture recognises Members ' long term 
objective of "provid[ing] for substantive progressive reductions  in agricultural support"3 and contains 
commitments by Members to continue reforms to reduce  support.4 
4. Accordingly, Australia is of the view that any outcome in this dispute that would effectively 
allow Members, including China, to increase  levels of domestic support would be in direct conflict 
with the object and purpose of the Agreement on Agriculture.  
II. Relationship between a Member 's Schedule and obligations in WTO Agreements  
5. Much of China 's legal argument in this dispute centres on the status of WT/ACC/CHN/38/Rev.3 
(hereafter referred to as 'Rev. 3 ') a document included as a reference under the heading "Relevant 
Supporting Tables and document" in Part IV of China 's Schedule.  China argues that the document 
should be c onsidered treaty level text.  
6. In Australia 's view, Rev. 3 is not in itself a Schedule, it is merely a reference in a Schedule 
which provides an illustration of domestic support in  China  at the time of its accession.  
7. Even if the Panel were to take a different view on the status of Rev.3, Australia observes that 
Members cannot use Schedules to unilaterally modify their obligations under the WTO  Agreements.5 
In particular, informat ion in a document referenced in one Member 's Schedule cannot be used to 
override legal obligations in the Agreement on Agriculture.  
III. Calculating market price support  
8. In Australia 's view, the Agreement on Agriculture provides clear and unequivocal gu idance for 
calculating market price support. It provides that AMS should be "calculated in accordance with  the 
provisions of Annex 3" and " taking into account  the constituent data and methodology used in the 
tables of supporting material incorporated by re ference in Pa rt IV of a Member's Schedule".  
9. In this dispute, the US has put forward its estimations of China 's market price support using 
the provisions of Annex 3, whereas China argues that the "constituent data and methodology" in 
Rev. 3 is the more relevant authority.  While both of these sources are valid for calculating market 
                                                
1 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef . 
2 WTO, "Agriculture gateway" available online at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/agric_e.htm , accessed on 19 January 2018.  
3 Preamble, Agreement on Agriculture.   
4 Article 20, Agreement on Agriculture.  
5 Appellate Body Report, EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar,  paras. 212 -213 and 220.  WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
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 price support, the Agreement on  Agriculture makes clear that their status under the WTO Agreement 
is not equal . 
10. The phrase "in accordance with" indicates that the calculation of domestic support must 
comply with  the provisions of Annex 3.  By contrast, the phrase "taking into accoun t" requires that 
consideration be given  to a Member 's Schedule, without specifying the weight such consideration 
should be accorded. This interpretation has been affirmed by the Appellate Body in Korea – Various 
Measures on Beef .6 
11. In Australia 's view, two points are therefore clear: (i) reference to Annex 3 is mandatory; and 
(ii) the relevance of a Member 's Schedule is of a lesser nature and, at the very least, subsidiary to 
Annex 3. As such, there is no direct obligation on the Panel to accept  or apply  the constituent data 
and methodology in China 's Schedule.  The Panel is only required to " consider " it.  However, in any 
event, the requirements of Annex 3 override any methodology contained in a Member 's Schedule 
(or contained in a reference within a Member 's Schedule).  
IV. The meaning of "production eligible"  
12. In Australia 's view, the Appellate Body 's findings in Korea – Beef make clear that, absent 
exceptional circumstances, "production eligible" is all production "fit or entitled"  to be purchased  and 
will generally equate to total production.7 
13. Accordingly, in applying the text of the WTO Agreement to the facts in this dispute, Australia 
considers that the relevant values to be used for "eligible production" in the calculation for market 
price support should be the value of total production of each given commodity in the identified 
provinces.  
14. China submits that this definition of "production eligible" does not apply and  the Panel should 
instead rely on the definition of "eligible production"  in Rev. 3.8 The Rev. 3 definition limits eligible 
production to "the amount purchased  by state -owned enterprises from farmers".  
15. China 's alternative definition of "eligible production" – which seeks to limit eligible production 
to the amount actually p urchased – cannot be accepted for three reaso ns. 
16. First, the definition does not reflect the economic impact of market price support programs, 
which provides producers with the "assurance that their products can be marketed at least at the 
support price ".9 Given this assurance, the price distorting effect of market price support takes place 
the moment a product is eligible  to be purchased by the government.  
17. Second, the definition is contrary to the terms of Annex 3 of the Agreement on Agriculture, as 
interpreted and applied by the Appellate Body in Korea –Beef.10  Since a Member cannot use its 
Schedule to reduce or modify commitments under WTO Agreements, China 's proposed alternative 
definition i s not legally valid – even if Rev. 3 had the status of a Schedule.  
18. Third, limiting eligible production to the actual amount purchased would permit Members to 
underreport the level of domestic support they provide and, as a consequence, effectively allo w 
Members to increase such support. Any outcome that would lead to increased levels of domestic 
support would undermine the object and purpose of the Agreement on Agriculture to not only limit 
domestic support but also to reduce it. 
V. The reference period  for the "fixed external reference price"  
                                                
6 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef , para. 111.  
7 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef , para. 120.  The Panel in Korea – Various 
Measures on Beef  had earlier specified that the actual amount purchased by a government is not relevant, nor 
are the government outlays involved: Panel Report Korea – Various Measures on Beef , para. 827.  
8 China's first written submission, paras. 196 -203. 
9 Panel Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef , para.  827. 
10 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef , para. 120.  The Panel in Korea – Various 
Measures on Beef  had earlier specified that the actual amount purchased by a government is not relevant, nor 
are the government outlays involved: Pan el Report Korea – Various Measures on Beef , para. 827.  WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
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 19. The methodology for calculating market price support is set out in paragraph 8 of Annex 3 of 
the Agreement on Agriculture. One of the figures to be inserted into the formula is the "fi xed external 
reference pri ce". 
20. Paragraph 9 of Annex 3 specifies that "the fixed external reference price shall be based on the 
years 1986 to 1988". The text in the Agreement on Agriculture  is mandatory and unambiguous.  
21. In this dispute, China asserts that an alternative refe rence period – namely, the years 1996 -
1998 – applies in calculating China 's market price support. China argues this on the basis that: this 
is the period used in Rev. 3 (the supporting material referenced in China 's Schedule); WTO Members 
accepted this per iod as one of the terms of China 's accession to the WTO; this approach would be 
in accordance with a technical note by the WTO Secretariat for acceding Members11; and all 
accessions since the establishment of the WTO in 1995 have used base periods other th an 1986 -88. 
22. In Australia 's view, the text of the Agreement is clear. The Agreement on Agriculture specifies 
that the fixed external reference price shall be based on the years 1986 to 1988; and neither China 's 
Accession Protocol nor its Working Party Report specifies that an alternative reference period to 
1986-88 must be used. While the documents and practice put forward by China in support of an 
alternative reference period highlight key policy  consideration s, they do not constitute a legal basis 
on which to apply a later reference period.  
23. In Australia 's view, if WTO Members determine that a new reference period should apply for 
acceding Members this should be provided for explicitly – either through amen dment of the 
Agreement on Agriculture or express provision in  relevant Accession Protocols.  
                                                
11 (WT/ACC/4, pp3 -4) which provides that "in order to calculate a product -specific AMS for these 
products, relevant tables from Supporting Tables DS:5 and DS:7 should be used" and that an "external 
reference price" is to be calculated from data "normally for each of the last three years"  WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
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 ANNEX C -2 
INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE  SUMMARY OF THE ARGU MENTS OF BRAZIL  
I. CHINA 'S CLAIM REGARDING TH E TPRP CORN MEASURE (ARTICLES 6.2 AND 7. 1 OF 
THE D SU) 
1. China argues that the Temporary Purchase and Reserve Policy ( "TPRP") for corn, which was 
applied between 2012 and 2015, does not constitute a "measure at issue " under Article 6.2 of the 
DSU because the TPRP had been terminated by the time the United  States requested the 
establishment of the Panel, and would thus fall outside the Panel 's terms of reference under 
Article  7.1 of the DSU1.  
2. Brazil understands, however, that if a measure no longer in effect is still relevant to the 
dispute, the Panel should exercise caution before deciding to exclude it from its terms of reference. 
An excessively restrictive interpretation of the measures cons idered to be within the terms of 
reference could undermine the ability of the dispute settlement system to bring about a positive 
solution to the dispute, in conformity with Article 3.7 of the DSU.  Brazil notes that, in the present 
case, the parties do no t seem to dispute that the TPRP was in force between 2012 and 2015 and 
that such market price support subsidy was used to calculate China 's Current Total AMS for those 
years. Thus, Brazil understands that the TPRP should be considered by the Panel for a pr oper 
assessment of this case.  
II. CALCULATION METHODOL OGY ON CHINA 'S DOMESTIC PRICE SUP PORT MEASURES 
FOR WHEAT, CORN AND RICE  
3. In Brazil 's view, the Panel in the present dispute is challenged to set a proper balance 
regarding the relation between Annex 3  and a Member 's "data and methodology ", on the basis of 
Article 1(a)(ii) of the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA). Brazil considers that the analysis by the Panel 
concerning the calculation of China 's market price support should focus separately on the concep ts 
of FERP and eligible production.  
4. With regard to the FERP, Brazil recalls China 's argument about the principle set out in WTO 
Document WT/ACC/4 (a WTO Secretariat note providing guidance for acceding Members), which 
provides that "[i]n order to calcul ate a product -specific AMS, an 'external reference price ' is to be 
calculated from data 'normally for each of the last three years '"2. As China accession to the WTO 
occurred in 2001, the base period of 1996 -1998 instead of 1986 -1988, as disposed in paragra ph 9 
of Annex 3 of the AoA, could be considered acceptable.  Besides, utilizing the most recent data 
available for the calculation of the FERP consists of a common practice among Members that have 
joined the WTO after 1995.  
5. About the calculation of eligi ble production, China claims its constituent data and methodology 
set out in its schedule should be "taken into account ". In accordance with that document, China 's 
eligible production for wheat and rice should be "the amount purchased " by state owned enter prises. 
This proposed methodology, however, conflicts with the established definition of "eligible 
production ", which comprises the whole set of production that could potentially be purchased by the 
government as defined by the Member 's municipal rules. In that sense, the Appellate Body found in 
Korea – Beef that "production eligible to receive the applied administered price " in paragraph 8 of 
Annex 3 has a different meaning in ordinary usage than "production actually purchased"3. 
6. Brazil notes that any disposition on a Member 's data and methodology regarding eligible 
production cannot modify its obligations under the AoA, in line with the findings by the Appellate 
                                                
1 China's First Written Submission, para. 323.  
2 China 's First Written Submission, para. 48.  
3 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef , para. 120.  WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
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 Body in EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar : "we find no provision under the  AoA that authorizes 
Members to depart, in their Schedules, from their obligations under that Agreement "4. 
7. In conclusion, Brazil views that, in order to maintain a harmonious interpretation of the 
covered agreements, the concept of "eligible production"  cannot have different meanings depending 
on the Members ' Schedules. A Member could, however, insert elements of clarification in its data 
and methodology regarding its understanding of "eligible production " only to the extent it is 
commensurate with the e stablished definition of said term.  
                                                
4 Appellate Body Report, EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar , para. 220. WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
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 ANNEX C -3 
INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE  SUMMARY OF THE ARGU MENTS OF CANADA  
I. INTRODUCTION  
1. Canada presents its views on three issues in this case.  First, it is an accepted custom that 
acceding Members use m ore recent reference years than 1986 to 1988. Second, for the definition 
of eligible production, the text of the Agreement on Agriculture must take priority over the supporting 
tables where there is any contradiction. Third, the proper methodology for dete rmining eligible 
production for market price support is to use the amount "fit or entitled" to be purchased, which can 
be the total production of the product if no limitations are imposed.  
II. ACCEDING MEMBERS MAY  USE A MORE RECENT R EFERENCE PERIOD FOR THE 
FIXED EXTERNAL REFER ENCE PRICE  
2. While paragraph 9 of Annex 3 of the Agreement on Agriculture refers to the years 1986 to 
1988 for the reference period, this does not prevent Members acceding to the WTO under Article XII 
of the Marrakesh Agreement from u sing a more recent base period. It is fair and reasonable to use 
more recent and up -to-date information for acceding countries, as data going back to 1986 may not 
be available, and acceding countries may not have been formally independent or even existed a t 
that time. Members have consistently and uniformly applied the practice of Article XII acceding 
Members using the three most recent years in reporting the fixed external reference price. As such, 
this constitutes an international custom in the context of  Paragraph 9 of Annex 3.  
3. Article 3.2 of the DSU requires the DSB to resolve disputes in accordance with the customary 
rules of interpretation of public international law. The Appellate Body has on numerous occasions 
recognized the relevance and applicat ion of customary international law in WTO dispute settlement1. 
4. In this instance, the WTO Membership has applied a consistent practice over the course of 
thirty -six post -Uruguay Round accessions. Every acceding Member that reported data in its 
constituen t data and methodology used a more recent base period with respect to Supporting Table 
DS:5.  In all of the supporting tables of all acceding Members, the only acceding Member that ever 
used a 1986 to 1988 base period in its supporting tables was Bulgaria,  which is explained by the 
fact that it acceded so soon after entry into force of the WTO Agreement as the second newly 
acceding Member.  However, even Bulgaria provided data up to 1990 where it was available for one 
table. The first acceding Member, Ecuad or, did not report any support programs and therefore had 
no data in supporting tables.  
5. Thus, in every instance of accession following the conclusion of the Uruguay Round over more 
than 20 years, there has been a consistent and uniform practice among Me mbers. All Members were 
aware of this practice and consented to it, or at the very least acquiesced to this practice. During 
the thirty -six accession processes, no Member has objected to the use of the three most recent 
reference years.  
6. Moreover, the re cognition by the Membership that this practice was required under the 
Agreement on Agriculture is demonstrated by Members ' consistent use of the Technical Note by the 
Secretariat on Information to be Provided on Domestic Support and Export Subsidies in Agriculture  
in accessions2. Members have consistently referred to this document during accession processes and 
the requirement to use the three most recent years of available data and concluded thirty -six 
accessions with no stated objection to the use of t hose reference years. The uniform, consistent use 
of the three most recent years for the relevant reference period following the conclusion of the 
                                                
1 See e.g. Appellate Body reports, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China) , paras. 301 -
316; EC – Hormones , paras. 120 -125; US – Line Pipe , para. 259.  
2 Information to be provided on Domestic Support and Export Subsidies in Agriculture – Technical Note 
by the Secretariat, WT/ACC/4.  WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
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 Uruguay Round shows that Members considered this practice to be consistent with the Agreement 
on Agriculture.  
7. During the Uruguay Round itself, the years 1986 to 1988 were chosen as three recent 
representative years in order for the fixed external reference price to reflect the actual extent of 
support provided as accurately as possible3. The continued use of t he three most recent years by 
acceding Members represents the application of that same principle.  
8. This consistent and uniform practice of every WTO Member in every accession process, 
accompanied with the opinio juris  of Members that this practice was co nsistent with the Agreement 
on Agriculture, shows that Members have adopted a customary rule of using the three most recent 
years for the reference period for acceding Members. This custom applies only with respect to 
Members acceding under Article XII of the Marrakesh Agreement.  Paragraph 9 of Annex 3 remains 
applicable to original Members under Article XI of the Marrakesh Agreement.  
III. THE TEXT OF THE AGRE EMENT ON ELIGIBLE PR ODUCTION TAKES PRIOR ITY OVER 
CHINA 'S SUPPORTING TABLES  
9. There is an apparent  contradiction between the supporting tables and the text of Annex 3 in 
respect of China 's use of production actually purchased in China 's supporting tables rather than the 
quantity of production eligible to receive the applied administered price as requir ed under paragraph 
8 of Annex 3.  However, in this case there is no consistent, uniform practice that implies that all 
WTO Members intended to allow for China to employ a methodology for calculating eligible 
production in a manner different from Annex 3 an d different from  the requirements for other 
WTO Member s. As such, there is no customary norm with respect to eligible production that could 
modify the obligation under the Agreement on Agriculture.  
10. The text of Article 1(a) of the Agreement on Agricultu re sets out the meaning of Aggregate 
Measurement of Support or AMS. Article 1(a)(ii) specifies that support shall be calculated in 
accordance with Annex 3, which is an integral part of the Agreement. It also provides that the 
constituent data and methodolo gy incorporated by reference into the Member 's schedule must be 
taken into account when calculating AMS. In defining Total AMS, Article 1(h)(ii) also makes reference 
to the constituent data and methodology, stating that Total AMS shall be calculated "in ac cordance 
with" the Agreement on Agriculture and the constituent data and methodology.  
11. The Appellate Body in Korea – Various Measures on Beef  examined these provisions and found 
that the relationship between Annex 3 and the constituent data and methodol ogy was one of an 
"apparent hierarchy"4. It found that the provisions of Annex 3 take priority over the constituent data 
and methodology used in a Member 's supporting tables5. 
12. In Canada 's view, this approach is reasonable. Annex 3 of the Agreement on A griculture 
provides an explicit requirement for how market price support is to be calculated.  As per Article  21.2, 
Annex 3 is an integral part of the Agreement on Agriculture. The supporting material incorporated 
by reference in Part IV of a Member 's Sched ule, however, is not an integral part of the Agreement.  
13. A Member cannot use its Schedule to reduce its commitments nor to depart from its obligations 
under the Agreement6. Logically, this principle also applies to supporting tables incorporated by 
reference into a Member 's Schedule. China, like all other WTO members, must abide by the terms 
of the treaty, including paragraph 8 of Annex 3. Upon its accession to the WTO, China agreed to 
comply with the entire WTO Agreement, including the Agreement on Agriculture.  China cannot 
reduce it s obligations or commitments under the Agreement on Agriculture or any other agreement 
through the supporting tables incorporated by reference into its Schedule.  As the Appellate Body 
found in EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar , "we find no provision under th e Agreement on Agriculture 
that authorizes Members to depart, in their Schedules, from their obligations under that 
Agreement."7 Thus, China cannot justify departing from its obligations under Annex 3 of the 
                                                
3 See e.g. GATT documents MTN.GNG/NG5/TG/W/12, para. 11 (Exhibit CAN -1); 
MTN.GNG/NG5/TG/W/15, para. 11 (Exhibit CAN -2); and M TN.GNG/NG5/TG/W/16, para. 4 (Exhibit CAN -3). 
4 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef , paras. 112 -113. 
5 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef , para. 114.  
6 Appellate Body Report, EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar , paras. 217-220. 
7 Appellate Body Report, EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar , para. 220.  WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
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 Agreement on Agriculture on the basis of an endn ote to a supporting table incorporated by reference 
into its Schedule.  
14. China 's commitment in paragraph 238 of the Working Party Report to provide "further 
methodological clarification" to its supporting tables ("Rev.3") supports these tables must be of  a 
lower precedence than Annex 3 of the Agreement on Agriculture. A document that is expressly 
acknowledged as containing methodological issues that require further clarification cannot have the 
same status as binding treaty text.  Paragraph 238 of the Wor king Party Report notes China 's 
commitment that the issues requiring methodological clarification "would be addressed in the context 
of China 's notification obligations under the Agreement on Agriculture". However, any subsequent 
unilateral notification ma de by China on applicable methodology cannot have the power to modify 
China 's treaty obligations.  Therefore, contrary to China 's argument that Rev.3 must be considered 
as having equal value to the treaty text8, the reference to Rev.3 in paragraph 238 of t he Working 
Party Report clearly supports Canada 's argument that this should not be the case.  
15. Of course, Members are required to take the supporting tables into account, as required by 
Article 1(a)(ii). However, in the event of a contradiction between t he Agreement and the supporting 
material incorporated by reference in a Member 's Schedule, the text of the Agreement must take 
priority.  
IV. ELIGIBLE PRODUCTION MEANS PRODUCTION "FI T OR ENTITLED" TO RE CEIVE THE 
APPLIED ADMINISTERED  PRICE  
16. The definition  of eligible production must be the same for all Members. The provisions of the 
covered agreements must be interpreted in a coherent and consistent manner, giving meaning to 
all applicable provisions harmoniously9. Having an interpretation that would allow  for a different 
definition of eligible production for China alone would be inconsistent with this principle.  Moreover, 
it would result in an inconsistent application of market price support disciplines.  
17. In examining the meaning of eligible production , the Appellate Body in Korea – Various 
Measures on Beef  found the following: under paragraph 8 of Annex 3, "production eligible to receive 
the applied administered price" means "production that is 'fit or entitled ' to be purchased rather than 
production t hat was actually purchased"10. "Production actually purchased may often be less than 
eligible production"11. 
18. While in Korea – Various Measures on Beef , the measure in question applied to a fixed, 
announced quantity of production that was eligible for p urchase, the findings and principles from 
that case remain applicable in the present dispute. The object and purpose of the Agreement on 
Agriculture includes the objective of providing for "substantial progressive reductions in agricultural 
support and pro tection sustained over an agreed period of time resulting in correcting and preventing 
restrictions and distortions in world agricultural markets"12. The panel in Korea – Various Measures 
on Beef noted specifically that the purpose of disciplining the prov ision of market price support 
related to "the effect of a government policy measure on agricultural producers of a basic product 
rather than the budgetary cost of that measure borne by government"13. 
19. This is because the distortive effect produced by a market price support measure occurs when 
the applied administered price is announced. The existence of a minimum support price provides 
economic guarantees to producers, which affects the market. The effect continues to exist as long 
as producers of the pr oduct benefit from the assurance of the minimum support price. As a result, 
the quantity of production actually purchased may have no relevance to these distortive effects.  
20. This is why the reasoning in Korea – Various Measures on Beef  is applicable to the present 
dispute. If, as in the facts of Korea – Various Measures on Beef , a government limits the quantity of 
production eligible for purchase at the applied administered price to a fixed quantity, then the 
distortion of the market for that product wil l be limited in scope to that quantity.  As the Appellate 
                                                
8 China's first written submission, paras. 104 -158. 
9 Appellate Body Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China) , para. 570.  
10 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef , para. 120.  
11 Ibid. 
12 Agreement on Agriculture, Preambular para. 3.  
13 Panel Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef , para. 827.  WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
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 Body found, "in establishing its program for future market price support, a government is able to 
define and limit 'eligible ' production"14.  However, if the government does not set any limitations, 
then the signal to the market is that all production is "fit or entitled" to receive the applied 
administered price. Thus it is reasonable and appropriate in this situation that all production should 
be reported as eligible production.  
21. The Appellate Body 's interpretation of eligible production, meaning production "fit or entitled" 
to be purchased, allows for a logical and harmonious application to different factual circumstances 
of any given market price support program. The facts related to the particular measure establish 
how eligible production is determined. For example, if there is an announcement that the 
administered price will be applied only to a given quantity, then that defines the production eligible 
to receive that price for th e purposes of paragraph 8 of Annex 3.  As another example, if the measure 
operates only in certain regions, then the quantity of eligible production may be limited to production 
in those regions.  
22. However, the amount of grain used by farmers for their o wn consumption is irrelevant to the 
quantity of production eligible to receive the applied administered price. Farmers consuming their 
own products are not isolated from the market or from the market price support program. If there 
are no limitations on th e amount of production eligible to receive the applied administered price, 
then the government has distorted the market in a way that affects all production. If the applied 
administered price is high enough, a farm household could sell part or all of their  production and 
then buy cheaper alternative foodstuffs. The fact that some production might not have been sold or 
that some farmers might consume some of their own production is irrelevant to the distortions 
caused by the market price support program, whi ch is what the Membership negotiated these 
provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture to discipline.  
23. The quantity of production consumed by farmers is thus not independent of the price policy.  
The quantity of eligible production is about production . There are no exceptions in the Agreement 
on Agriculture for production that is not sold, because all of the production can potentially  be sold. 
The text of the Agreement is clear: all production eligible to receive the applied administered price 
shall be in cluded in the calculation for market price support. All production eligible to receive the 
applied administered price is covered by the market price support program regardless of how or 
whether it is sold, and therefore it must be considered in calculating  the product -specific AMS.  
24. The disciplines in the Agreement on Agriculture seek to reduce and prevent restrictions and 
distortions in agricultural markets. The legal test is not whether an individual farmer would 
personally benefit from a market price support program  by selling at a higher price. The question is 
whether the production is affected by the market distortions caused by the market price support 
program. The Agreement on Agriculture requires that all eligible production be considered in the 
calculation because the price distortions affect the entire market if no limit is imposed on the amount 
of production that is eligible to receive the applied administered price.  
25. The question in each case is how to determine "the quantity of production e ligible to receive 
the applied administered price". To ensure a harmonious interpretation of the covered agreements 
vis-à-vis each WTO Member, the core elements of eligible production need to be respected when it 
is being applied to particular measures, in  accordance with the principles elaborated upon in Korea  – 
Various Measures on Beef . Namely, the quantity of production must be considered "fit or entitled" 
to receive the applied administered price.  
26. The reasoning and findings in Korea – Various Measur es on Beef  are consistent with the text 
of the Agreement on Agriculture and its object and purpose. Therefore, the Panel must examine how 
China has defined and limited eligible production in its market price support measures. If there are 
no limitations on  purchases of a particular product, then the total quantity of production must be 
considered "fit or entitled" to receive the applied administered price, regardless of the actual 
purchases made by the government.  
                                                
14 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef , para. 120.  WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
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 ANNEX C -4 
INTEGRATED EXE CUTIVE SUMMARY OF TH E ARGUMENTS OF COLOM BIA 
1. The government of Colombia intervened in this case given its systemic interest in the 
application of several provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture. Therefore, Colombia provided its 
views on some of the le gal claims discussed before the Panel.  
2. While not taking a final position on the specific merits of this case, Colombia acknowledged 
the importance of the issues discussed for the clarification of the obligations under the Agreement 
on Agriculture presen ted by the Parties to the dispute. In particular, with respect to the issue of the 
methodology for calculating the amount of "market price support ", Colombia encourage this Panel 
to carefully review the scope and clarify two important concepts: (i) the "fixed external reference 
price"; and, (ii) "eligible production ", with respect to Paragraphs 9 and 8 of Annex 3 of the 
aforementioned Agreement.  
3. With respect to  the former, Colombia submitted  that the "fixed external reference price " for 
China should be based  on its Accession Protocol documented in the Working Party on the Accession 
of China, Document WT/ACC/CHN/38/Rev.3. of 19 July 2001.  The average contained therein reflects 
the prices of 1996 -98. Although this reference period may deviate from that spe cified in Paragraph 
9 of Annex 3, reliance thereon appears relevant  in the case at hand.  
4. The principle of lex specialis  prescribes that the law governing a specific subject matter takes 
precedence over a more general provision. Here, the conflict betwee n China 's Accession Protocol, 
constituting an integral part of its WTO obligations, and Paragraph 9 of Annex 3 may be resolved  by 
reference to this principle. It appears that China 's obligations concerning  the establishment of a 
"fixed external reference price" would, thus, be governed by the more specific rule, its Accession 
Protocol. Furthermore, from a practical perspective, it is not feasible to necessarily rely on the period 
specified in Paragraph 9 concerning  acceding members as opposed to original W TO members. Data 
for the period of 1986 -88 may be may be incomplete or inaccessible for national authorities.  
Therefore, in the case of China, the reference period should be that of 1996-98. 
5. Furthermore, Colombia submitted that the appropriate "fixed ex ternal reference price " should 
be adjusted taking into account the prices of goods at the same level of trade. Under Paragraph 9, 
this is contained  within the wider formulation that "[t]he fixed external reference price may be 
adjusted  for quality differen ces as necessary. " In the case of rice, if the "applied administered price " 
was provided for unmilled rice by China, then the "fixed external reference price " should be adjusted 
to "unmilled rice ", even though the accession document (Rev 3) does not reflec t this difference.  
6. Lastly, with respect the concept of "eligible production ", Colombia submitted that, in the 
absence of a pre -announced limit on the quantity to be bought, all production is eligible to receive 
the applied administered price. In the cas e of China "eligible production ", thus, includes all selected 
provinces where the measures of support are available.  
7. The Panel 's findings in Korea -Various Measures on Beef  paragraph 827 support this approach. 
In that case it was stated that "eligible pr oduction (…) should comprise the total marketable 
production of all producers which is eligible to benefit from the market price support, even though 
the proportion of production that is actually purchased by a governmental agency may be relatively 
small o r even nil ". The Appellate Body confirmed this approach in Paragraph 120 of its Report. Hence, 
eligible production in the case at hand includes all the production fit to receive the support, whether 
actually bought or not, wh ether consumed on -farm or not.  
 
 WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
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 ANNEX C -5 
INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE  SUMMARY OF THE ARGU MENTS OF ECUADOR  
1  GENERAL ISSUES  
Ecuador considers that the specific calculations for certain products should be applicable to all 
equally, for example in the case of products that are not included in the Part IV of a Member 's 
Schedule. The Appellate Body or the Panel reports which have been prepared after analysis and 
investigation, provide recommendations that should be taken into account as a kind of opinio juris 
and in turn be a guide on similar cases, therefore the panel in the case Korea - Beef has already 
ruled that the calculation method of Annex 3 should be applied only in cases where the product is 
not in Part IV of the Members ' agenda.  
2  QUANTITY OF ELIGIBLE  PRODUCTION (QE P) 
Ecuador considers that if a requirement was imposed on China to accede to the WTO and it was 
complied with, it is perfectly valid and applicable. The requirement imposed on China is what 
determines if it 's eligible production on the basis of the quantit y of production compared with a 
market price support measure, which is detailed in document WT / ACC / CHN / 38 / Rev.3, issued 
in September 2001. If China had the faculty to establish these measurement parameters, they 
should be taken into account at the time of calculations and not those parameters which are 
applicable to other countries. China must follow its obligations adopted as agreed while it was 
negotiating it 's accession.  
The issue that a certain amount of grain production is for it 's own consump tion is relevant since 
taking into account the size and the population of China it can be interpreted that the levels of 
measurement of their total production will be on a larger scale at the moment of making the 
calculation. However, by stating that a per centage does not go to the market, the situation may 
change because the calculations are not directly proportional when talking about the total production 
of grains versus grains destined for trade and for the market.  
3  FIXED EXTERNAL REFER ENCE PRICE (FER P) 
In the document of Accession of China to the WTO WT / ACC / CHN  / 38 / Rev.3 it is observed that 
the calculations are made in -the period 1996 -1998, the accession document was approved, besides 
being used for references in other cases, so it is tacitly understood that the period that is used in 
the cases of China is th e one mentioned above. It must be considered as well that no other Member 
and also Ecuador has expressed opposition to the period of time for reference, especially for those 
members who acceded to the WTO after 1995.  
 
4  CALCULATIONS AND MET HODOLOGY  
The l egal status of the document WT/ACC/CHIN/38/rev.3, when incorporated in the original list 
submitted by China as a list of concessions acquires the same legal status  as the lists annexed to 
the its Accession Protocol.  
Regarding the tables presented, Ecuador  considers that they are not incompatible with the 
regulations, statements and of the Agreement on Agriculture. Therefore, the tables presented cannot 
modify the commitments made, nor can they be used as lists to modify agreements.  
The Agreement of Agricul ture on its Annex 3 determines that the market price support should 
be: 
- Market price support: market price support shall be calculated using the gap between a fixed 
external reference price and the applied administered price multiplied by the quantity of 
production eligible to receive the applied administered price. Budgetary payments made to 
maintain this gap, such as buying -in or storage costs, shall not be included in the AMS  WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
- 73 - 
 
  
- The fixed external reference price shall be based on the years 1986 to 1988 and shall 
generally be the average f.o.b. unit value for the basic agri cultural product concerned in a 
net exporting country and the average c.i.f. unit value for the basic agricultural product 
concerned in a net importing country in the base period. The fixed reference price may be 
adjusted for quality differences as necessa ry. 
 
Therefore, any methodology and trade measure under the Agreement of Agriculture should be based 
on Annex 3 definitions and calculations.  
 
 WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
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 ANNEX C -6 
INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE  SUMMARY OF THE ARGU MENTS OF THE EUROPEA N UNION  
I. THE RELATION SHIP BETWEEN THE MEMBERS ' SCHEDULES AND THE AOA 
1. The commitments limiting subsidization undertaken by Members pursuant to the AoA are 
included in Part IV of each Member 's Schedule and are an integral part of the GATT 1994. The 
Appellate Body addressed co mprehensively the issue of the relationship between the commitments 
on subsidization included in a Member 's Schedule and the provisions of the AoA in EC – Export 
Subsidies on Sugar . There, the Appellate Body confirmed that, just like under the GATT 1994, t here 
is "no provision under the Agreement on Agriculture that authorizes Members to depart in their 
Schedules from their obligations under that Agreement"1. 
2. Therefoire, the domestic support commitments specified in the Schedules (including the 
supportin g documents incorporated by reference in the Schedules, such as WT/AC/CHN/38/Rev. 3) 
must be in conformity with the provisions of the AoA and do not allow Members to depart from the 
obligations imposed by those provisions.  
II. WHAT IS THE RELEVANT PERIOD F OR CALCULATING THE F IXED EXTERNAL REFERE NCE PRICE ? 
3. The reference in paragraph 9 of Annex 3 to the years 1986 -1988 does not prevent those 
Members acceding to the WTO after its establishment from specifying in their Schedules a more 
recent base period, ag reed by all Members as part of the accession process. The calculation of the 
current AMS must "take into account"/be "in accordance with" such more recent base period, as 
required by Article 1(a)(ii) and Article 1(h)(ii) of the AoA. The reference in paragr aph 9 of Annex 3 
to the years 1986 -1988 reflects the fact that this was the period which had been used by the 
participants in the Uruguay Round negotiations for the purposes of quantifying their base AMS in 
accordance with the Modalities Paper. For that re ason, the requirement to use that period is 
addressed primarily to t he original Members of the WTO.  
4. In the EU 's view, it would be unreasonable to require that the accession terms of new Members 
continue to be negotiated on the basis of data which, by no w, are more than 30 years old. Moreover, 
the use of more recent data does not "reduce" per se  the commitments of the newly acceded 
Members under the AoA, unlike in EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar . As observed by the Appellate 
Body in Korea – Beef, there is no reason why the FERP for a more recent period should be necessarily 
higher than the FERP for the years 1986 -1989. Moreover, in the case of China, the same period has 
been used consistently for calculating both the applied administered price and the FERP for the base 
AMS and the  FERP used in the current AMS.  
5. For those reasons, the reference to the years 1986 -1989 in paragraph 9 of Annex 3 must be 
understood dynamically. In other words, where a newly acceded Member has used a more recent 
period for calcu lating the base AMS in its Schedule, as agreed during the accession process, the 
current AMS must be based on that period, provided that such period has the same basic 
characteristics, in respect of that Member, as the years 1986 -1988, in respect of the or iginal 
Members. In particular, that period should pre -date as closely as possible to the date of accession 
and be sufficiently representative. This interpretation of paragraph 9 of Annex 3 of the AoA is 
comforted by well -established WTO practice. As pointe d out by China, the Schedules of each and 
every one of the thirty -six Members that have acceded to the WTO since the establishment of the 
WTO specify base periods other than 1986 -88 for the pur poses of Supporting Table DS:5.  
III. WHAT IS THE RELEVANT "ELIG IBLE PRODUCTION "?  
6. For the reasons explained by the United States and not contested by China, the ordinary 
meaning of 'eligible production ' is all of the production entitled or permitted to receive the 
administrative price, regardless of the quantity actually purchased by the Government. That reading 
                                                
1 Appellate Body Report, EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar , para. 220  WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
- 75 - 
 
 is confirmed by the fact that the words "production eligible" are followed in paragraph 8 by the words 
"to receive … " and not by other terms that would point to the quantities actually purchased, such 
as "that received …" or "actually receiving …". That reading, moreover, reflects the rationale  or 
purpose of market price support policies (or of t he various arrangements that governments may put 
in place to provide market price support to producers of basic agricultural products), which is to 
maintain the price of the whole production of a certain product at a desired level . 
7. The Appellate Body ex plicitly confirmed these findings of the Panel by stating that:  
We share the Panel 's view that the words "production eligible to 
receive the applied administered price" in paragraph 8 of Annex 3 
have a different meaning in ordinary usage from "production actually 
purchased ". The ordinary meaning of "eligible" is "fit or entitled to 
be chosen". Thus, "production eligible" refers to production that is 
"fit or entitled" to be purchased rather than production that was 
actually purchased. In establishing its p rogram for future market 
price support, a government is able to define and to limit "eligible" 
production. Production actually purchased may often be less than 
eligible production.2 
8. In essence, since the notion of 'market price support ' seeks to gauge t he effects of a 
government policy measure on agricultural producers of a basic product and, as a matter of fact, 
these effects depend on the production that may be purchased at the administered price (and not 
solely or necessarily on the quantity actually purchased), it follows that the notion of 'eligible 
production ' must refer to production that is "fit or entitled" to be purchased, rather than production 
that was actually purchased , 
9. As regards China 's argument that it is entitled to calculate market price support by using 
actual purchases, because it used actual purchases in its calculations in the tables of supporting 
material in its Schedule, the European Union would note, first of all, that the meaning of footnote 
19 to Rev. 3 is by no means unequi vocal. More importantly, as indicated in paragraphs 237 and 238 
of the Working Party Report on the Accession of China some Members raised concerns with regards 
to the Supporting Tables in Rev.3. Furthermore, if a Member were authorised to calculate market 
price support basing itself merely on the actual production purchased by the Government, it would 
almost systematically underestimate its AMS. Indeed, it is only where the quantity actually 
purchased tallies with the eligible production that that Member wo uld not underestimate its AMS, 
whereas in all other frequent situations China 's approach would allow a Member to underestimate 
its AMS, even though the support it provides benefits the marketable production as a whole . 
10. It follows that China 's line of d efence would allow a Member not simply to clarify and qualify 
the commitments that it has undertaken at the moment of accession but rather "to reduce or conflict" 
with the obligations already imposed on it by the provisions of the AoA, and notably by parag raph 8 
of Annex 3, as they result from their ordinary meaning, rationale and previous case law.  
  
                                                
2 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Beef, para. 120.  WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
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 ANNEX C -7 
INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE  SUMMARY OF THE ARGU MENTS OF INDIA  
1. India welcomes the opportunity to present its views to the Panel on certain systemic issue s 
arising for interpretation under the Agreement on Agriculture ( "AoA"). India 's views in this 
submission are limited to the issue of assessment of "production eligible to receive the applied 
administrative price ", for the purposes of calculation of Aggreg ate Measurement of Support 
("AMS") in the AoA.  
2. India notes that the First Written Submission of the United States as well as the T hird Party 
Written Submissions by Australia, Brazil, Canada and EU have relied on Korea -Beef to state that 
"production eligible to receive the applied administered price " has a different meaning in ordinary 
usage from "production actually purchased "1 and that "eligible production " within the meaning of 
Annex 3, Paragraph 8 of the AoA is production which is fit or entitled to receive the administered 
price, whether or not the production was actually purchased.2 Australia has further stated that 
'production eligible ' is all production 'fit or entitled ' to be purchased and will generally equate to 
total production ."3 
3. In Ind ia's view, these submissions, while relying on the findings of Korea -Beef, have not 
considered the facts and circumstances of that dispute, which provide context and rationale for 
the findings. The findings of the panel and the Appellate Body in Korea -Beef were specific to a 
circumstance when there was a declaration by Korea of an eligible quantity for purchase at the 
support price, which was held to be the "eligible production ". The panel and the Appellate Body 
considered this declared quantity to constitu te "eligible production ", which was different from 
what Korea eventually procured under the facts of that dispute. In its reasoning, the Appellate 
Body relied on the ordinary meaning of "eligible" and explained that this referred to what is "fit 
or entitled to be chosen", and further that "production eligible" refers to production that is "fit or 
entitled" to be purchased rather than production that was actually purchased. This was in the 
context of the announcement made by Korea in the facts of that  dispute, to purchase a specified 
quantity of cattle for the 1997 calendar year.4  
4. In India 's third -party submission, India has explained that there would be situations 
wherein there is no specification of any quantity; but a mere listing of crops that a government 
may or may not procure. Not all countries, for instance, pre -determine the quantity of production 
that may be procured, since this will be based on the needs and resources available, which may 
vary across time and geographical areas. The quant ity eligible for procurement is therefore 
determined only at the time when such procurement is required and made.  
5. Being a complex and sensitive issue, the manner in which to administer domestic support 
for agriculture is not always determined at the fed eral level in all countries, but often at the 
regional/ sub -federal levels, leading to wide variations in procurement models. Sometimes 
Members simply list crops/products, and not the quantities that would be procured, thereby 
leaving determination of quan tity eligible for procurement to the time of such procurement, which 
may be done at the sub -federal level. There are also instances when numerous products are listed 
in a Member 's listing of price support, but these may not be procured at all. In such situ ations, it 
is simply illogical to state that all quantities of the specific product that is produced, will be eligible 
for procurement. Such a proposition is absurd and unrealistic, since it may be virtually impossible 
to extend the price su pport to the en tire production.  
6. Australia argues that "the price distorting effect of a product takes place the moment it is 
eligible to be purchased"  which is why "any consideration of the product distorting effect of market 
                                                
1 Para 103, First Written Submissions by the United States, referring to  Korea – Beef (AB), para. 120.  
2 Para 103, First Written Submissions by the United States, referring to  Korea – Beef (Panel), para. 827 
(noting that "eligible production for the purposes of calculating the market price support component of current 
support should comprise the total marketable production of all producers which is eligible to benef it from the 
market price support, even though the proportion of production which is actually purchased by a governmental 
agency may be relatively small or even nil "). 
3 Para 22, Third Party Submission of Australia  
4 Korea -Beef (AB), para. 121  WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
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 support must be taken at that point."5 Clearly, in situations where the total production is never 
procured, and there is no expectation even among producers that the total production will ever 
be procured, there is no question of any price distorting effect arising from the market support 
till the  time that procurement actually takes place. It would be highly incongruous to suggest, 
then, that the mere listing of crops would cause a price -distorting effect equivalent to the 
procurement of the entire quantity produced!  
7. In India 's view, it is cruc ial to recognise the multiplicity of political and economic realities 
underlying agricultural policies of various countries, especially developing countries, instead of 
assuming that there is one immutable "economic reality " that should inform all asessmen ts of 
domestic support requirements.  
8. The interpretation of "eligible production " in Korea -Beef cannot therefore be extended to 
be applied in the abstract in cases when there is no declaration of quantity of production to be 
procured. Such a reasoning is  not only devoid of any basis in actual procurement practices of 
countries but could lead to an anomalous result of considering all production of a particular 
product in a Member 's territory as "eligible production "- a proposition that can only be consider ed 
as fanciful for most Members.  
9. India reiterates that the term "eligible production " necessitates the specification of a 
quantity  that is eligible. The absence of any specification of a quantity for procurement cannot 
mean that the entire production of  the listed crop would constitute 'eligible production '. Rather, 
the reality of the situation would be that what is eligible for procurement is determined only at 
the time that a procurement needs to be made . 
10.  In addition, it is significant to undersco re that the term used in the AOA is 'production  
eligible to receive the applied administered price ' and not 'crops/ products  eligible to receive 
the applied administered price '. A mere listing of crops, which, if considered as eligible for 
procurement, would receive the applied administered price, cannot be interpreted to mean that 
all production  of such crops wou ld be eligible for procurement.  
11. In conclusion, India would lik e to state that the reasoning in Korea -Beef should be viewed 
in light of the very specific context in which it arose – one where there is a difference between 
the Korean Government 's declaration of an "intent " and its actual procurement of beef. The 
identi fication of such "intent " in other cases may require application of a more context -specific 
methodology where there is no declaration of intent by specifying eligibility in quantitative terms. 
It is important to take into consideration context -specific evi dence such as the actual procurement 
practices of Members, and their notifications under Article 18 of the AoA. It follows that if  there 
is no conflict between any declared quantity and actual  procurement, and the price support is in 
effect available only for the quantities procured, then it follows that only what is actually procured 
is entitled to the price support.  
12. India requests the panel to carefully scrutinize and consider the interpretive issues under the 
AoA which would benefit from further clar ification in  light of the present dispute.  
 
 
  
                                                
5 Para 28, Th ird Party Submission of Australia  WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
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ANNEX C -8 
INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE  SUMMARY OF THE ARGU MENTS OF INDONESIA  
I. INTRODUCTION  
1. Indonesia exercises its rights to participate as a third party in this case due to its systemic 
concern on the interpretation and application of the provisions of the covered agreement at issue in 
this dispute, in particular Paragraph 9 Annex 3 and Paragraph 8 Annex 3 of the Agreement on 
Agriculture ( "AoA"). 
II. INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF "FIXED EXTERNAL REF ERENCE PRICE " 
2. As indicated in Indonesia 's third party statement, Indonesia highlights the interpretive issue 
of the terms which will clarify the obligation of WTO Member according to the AoA. In this case, 
Indonesia pays attention to the terms of: (1) "Fixed External Reference Price " as set out in the 
Paragraph 9 Annex 3; and (2) "Eligible Production " as indicated through Paragraph 8 of Annex 3 of 
the AoA.  
3. In order to calculate the market price support provided by particular Member, the Annex 3 
Paragr aph 8 of the AoA provides that "market price support shall be calculated using the gap between 
a fixed external reference price  and the applied administered price multiplied by the quantity 
of production eligible  to receive the applied administered price.. ..". 
4. Consequently, the reference to the fixed external reference price provided under the 
Paragraph 9 of Annex 3 states that "the fixed external reference price shall be based on the years 
1986 to 1988 and shall generally be the average f.o.b. unit valu e for the basic agricultural product 
concerned in a net exporting country and the average c.i.f. unit value for the basic agricultural 
product concerned in a net importing country in the base period. The fixed external reference 
price may be adjusted for q uality differences as necessary ." 
5. In their written submission, China has argued that the United States has erroneously referred 
to the fixed external reference price based on the prices of 1986 -1988. Indonesia took note that 
China has relied on its Part  IV of China 's Schedule 's notification (Rev.3) that the reference shall be 
the 1996 -98 average of FOB and CIF prices given as export and import unit values.1 
6. Indonesia is on the view that it is necessary for the Panel to analyze and pay to attention the 
methodology to execute the adjustability nature of the fixed external reference price as set out under 
the last sentence of Paragraph 9 of Annex 3. Consequently , Panel should also determine the 
conditions in order to deem the adjustment as "necessary " for the reference of Fixed External 
Reference Price. The interpretation itself will be the key element to examine the arguments provided 
by the Parties in this case . 
III. INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF "ELIGIBLE PRODUCTION " 
7. In the calculation of Market Price Support, the term of "production eligible to receive the 
applied administered price " has also been the key component. Meanwhile, the AoA itself does not 
provide any particular definition to constitute the term. As the result of the uncertainty, the 
interpretation of the term has been varied among Members according to their own policies.  
8. Indonesia highlighted the arguments of the United States derived from  the Korea -Beef case 
on the methodology to interpret "eligible production ". In the Appellate Body report, it is stated that 
the "quantity of production eligible to receive the applied administered price " was different from the 
"production actually purchase d". In this regard, Indonesia requested for the Panel to put caution on 
applying the jurisprudence on this present case.  
9. Indonesia would like to draw the attention on the nature of rulings made by the Appellate  Body 
during the Beef case. In the case, th e Korean government has declared specific quantities of the 
                                                
1 Communication from China. Working Party on the Accession of China, WT/ACC/CHN/38/Rev.3.  
19 July 2001.  WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
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 products to be purchased. Meanwhile, this may not be the case for all WTO  Members. There are 
some conditions in which the government cannot make the declaration of quantity to be purchased  
at ear lier stage due to certain reasons. On the other hand, WTO  Members, especially those with 
large production and geographical coverage, may face a circumstance where the amount of 
production eligible for purchase in an administered price does not cover the to tal production of the 
product.  
10. In this regard, Indonesia supported the argument in Paragraph 8 of India 's Third Party 
Submission that "the interpretation of 'eligible production ' in Korea -Beef cannot therefore be applied 
as a 'one size fits all ' approa ch even in cases there is no declaration of quantity of production to be 
procured. " 
11. Accordingly, Indonesia requested the Panel to examine the interpretation of the aforesaid 
term, in order to clarify the WTO Members ' obligation under the Paragraph 8 of Annex 3 of the AoA.  
 
 
 
 
 
  WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
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 ANNEX C -9 
INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE  SUMMARY OF THE ARGU MENTS OF JAPAN  
I. ORAL STATEMENT  
A. The Status of S upport Tables Referenced in China 's Schedules  
1. In this dispute, the United States and China appear to have a difference in opinion regarding 
the methodology for calculating  China 's aggregate measurement of support (or "AMS"), based on 
their different views on the relationship between the text of the Agreement on Agriculture  and the 
document referenced to as "Relevant Support Tables " in China 's Schedules. This difference in views 
raises the issue of the proper status of this document as "the constituent data and methodology " 
referenced to in China 's Schedule .1 
2. As a general matter, it is Japan 's view that a Member 's Accession Protocol, including the 
Working Party Report and Schedules, is "an integral part of the WTO Agreement "2 and as such their 
meaning must be discerned and ascertained in accordance with "customary rules of interpretation  
of public international law ."3 
3.   The Appellate Body in EU – Computer Equipment  recognized that the underlying principle 
that accords this status to these Member 's Schedules is that, "while each Schedule represents  the 
tariff commitments made by one Member, they represent a common agreement among all 
Members. "4  Thus the terms contained in "the constituent data and methodology " incorporated in a 
Member 's Schedule may be viewed as representing the agreement of all Members.  
4. In the present case, however, there may not have been an agreement among all Members 
regarding the supporting tables that formed the basis of the commitments contained in China 's 
Schedules. Specifically, a s the EU pointed out in its third part y submission, the Working Party R eport 
on the Accession of China recognized that "the document still contained issues which required further 
methodological clarification  relating to policy classification, " and that China would address this 
clarification in  the context of its notification obligations under the Agreement on Agriculture .5 It is 
not clear whether such clarification was made, or if it was, whether all Members concerned have  
agreed  on the clarification offered by China . 
B. Whether the Temporary P urchase and reserve Policy for Corn Forms Part of  
the Specific Measure at Issue that Falls Within the Terms of Reference  
5. China contends that the TPRP  for corn for the period 2012 to 2015 was terminated and 
replaced with another measure as of 2016, and therefore, is not a "measure at issue " under 
Article  6.2 of the DSU.6 Accordingly, it is China 's view that the measure falls outside of the Panel 's 
terms  of reference.  The United States, on the other hand, argues that the TPRP is not itself a specific 
measure at issue, but rather, a series of legal instruments issued annually through which China 
provides domestic support to corn producers.7 Moreover, acco rding to the United States, the 
retrospective nature of agricultural domestic support commitments necessitates an examination of 
the level of domestic support provided over a period of time.8 Thus, the Parties appear to disagree 
on whether the TPRP is itse lf a "measure " that was not in existence at the time of panel 
establishment, or part of a series of legal instruments that form the basis for the measure at issue . 
                                                
1 China 's First Written Submission, para. 90 (referencing U.S. First Written Submission, para. 90).  
2 Accession of the  People 's Republic of China, WT/L/432, p. 2.  
3 DSU Article 3.2  
4 Appellate Body Report, EC – Computer Equipment , para. 109 (emphasis in original) ; see also  China 's 
First Written Submission, para. 155.  
5 EU Third Party Written Submission, para.  37 and footnote 23.  
6 China 's First Written Submission, paras. 286 -289 and 325 -342. 
7 Comments of the United States on China 's Challenge to the Panel 's Terms of Reference, para. 15.  
8 Comments of the United States on China 's Challenge to the Panel 's Terms of Refe rence, paras. 8 -10 
and 17.  WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
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 6. As noted by China, as a general rule, "the measures included in a panel 's term of referen ce 
must be measures that are in existence at the time of the establishment of the panel. "9 
7. However, Japan agrees with the United States that the specific nature of the obligations in 
question may affect the way  that a measure 's consistency with those ob ligations  is analyzed . For 
example, in India – Agricultural Products , the Appellate Body observed that "the obligation in Article 
6.1 [of the SPS Agreement] does not apply only at one specific point in time … but is, instead, an 
ongoing one ." Given this ongoing nature of the obligation, the Appellate Body continued, SPS 
measures are required to "be adjusted over time so as to establish and maintain their continued 
suitability in respect of the relevant SPS characteristics of the relevant areas ."10  Thus, when the 
obligation  is one of an  ongoing nature , an analysis of a measure 's consistency with the obligations 
would necessarily require  a dynamic – rather than a  static – inquiry as to whether the measure has 
been "adjusted  over time " to ensure the measure 's "continued suitability ." 
8.  Even where a legal instrument  ceases to exist, an examination of the legal instrument  may 
still be relevant to the resolution of the matter  in issue in the dispute.11 For example, the United 
States notes that "[t]he nature of domestic support commitments, including the need for data on 
the amount and value of production for purposes of calculating market -price support and the 
applicable de minimis  exemption, necessitates a backward -looking analysis of data covering a 
previous time period. "12 
9. Thus, it is appropriate to examine the substance of the TPRP to the extent that the operation 
of the TPRP affects measures at issue which  were identified in the United States ' panel request.  
II. RESPONSE TO PANEL QU ESTIONS  
10. First, as regards Annex 3  of the Agreement on Agriculture , Japan considers that "constituent 
data and methodology " is important in clarifying the methodology used to calculate product -specific 
AMS. However, as articulated in Article 21 of the Agreement on  Agriculture, "the provisions of GATT 
1994 and of other Multilateral Trade Ag reements in Annex 1A to the WTO  Agreement shall apply 
subject to the provisions of [the Agreement on Agriculture]. " Therefore, Japan considers that the 
methodology set out in Anne x 3 should not be regarded as only a fall back option.  
11. Second, as regards the methodology for determining eligible production, paragraph 238 of the 
Working Party report on the Accession of China recognized that "the document still contained issues 
which required further methodological clarification relating to the policy classification. "  Therefore, 
all WTO Members did not agree with all elements of the methodology and policy classifications.  As 
eligible production is not explicitly excluded from this category, Japan considers it proper to include 
eligible production as part of the methodology and policy classification that required further 
clarification.  
12. Third, Annex 3 of the Agreement on Agriculture provides a single definition of "eligible 
produc tion" as "production eligible to receive the applied administered price. " Moreover, the 
methodology for calculating market price support set out in paragraph 8 of Annex 3 does not differ 
for each country.  Therefore, Japan does not believe that the definiti on of "eligible production " differs 
by country.  
13. However, whether production consumed on the farm should be included in the calculation of 
the quantity of eligible production may differ based on the circumstances of each country, because 
the manner in w hich the numerical value of market price support is captured may be different for 
each country, given the differences in product characteristics, circumstances surrounding production 
and distribution, and the policy design of market price support in each c ountry.  
14. Fourth, when it comes to China 's Schedule of Concessions, i.e. the legal instrument "Schedule 
CLII – People 's Republic of China ", "an agreed terms of China 's accession to the WTO " is what is 
                                                
9 China 's First Written Submission, para. 327 and footnote 340 (referencing Appellate Body Report, 
EC-Chicken Cuts , para.  156). 
10 Appellate Body Report , India – Agricultural Products , para.5.132.  
11 See China 's First Written Submission  para. 330 and footnote 343  (referencing Panel Report, 
Argentina  – Textiles and Apparel , para. 6.13 and Appellate Body Report, US – Wool Shirts and Blouses , p. 19).  
12 Comments of the United States on China 's Challenge to the Panel 's Terms of Reference, para. 2.  WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
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 stated in Part II, paragraph 1, of China 's Accession Protocol, which reads "[t]he Schedules annexed 
to this Protocol shall become the Schedule of Concessions and Commitments annexed to the GATT 
1994". In other words, by having been annexed to China 's Accession Protocol, China 's Schedule was 
made "an integral part of " the GATT 1994.  Assuming that the supporting table referenced in Section 
I of Part IV of China 's Schedule which contains the use of the 1996 – 1998 period is a part of China 's 
Schedule, then, the question is whether the terms of the GA TT 1994 can prevail over, or modify, the 
terms o f the Agreement on Agriculture.  
15. The relationship between the Agreement on Agriculture and other multilateral trade 
agreements including the GATT 1994 is expressly regulated by Article 21 of the Agreement on 
Agriculture, which provides "[t]he provisions of GATT 1994 and of other Multilater al Trade 
Agreements in Annex A to the WTO Agreement shall apply subject to the provisions of this 
Agreement ". As the Appellate Body explained,  
Members explicitly recognized that there may be conflicts between the 
Agreement on Agriculture and the GATT 1994,  and explicitly provided, 
through Article 21, that the Agreement on Agriculture would prevail to the 
extent of such conflicts.13   
16. Thus, contrary to what China appears to posit, the supporting table referenced in China 's 
Schedule cannot change, modify or replace the terms actually used in the relevant provisions of the 
Agreement on Agriculture, including the terms used in paragraph 9 of Annex 3.  
17. This does not mean that the supporting tables referenced in a Member 's Schedule have no 
interpretive value in ascertaining the meaning of provisions in the Agreement on Agriculture. Indeed, 
Article 1(a) (ii) of the Agreement of Agriculture expressly provides the AM S "during any year of the 
implementation period or thereafter " is "calculated in accordance with the provisions of Annex 3 of 
this Agreement and taking into account the constituent data and methodology used in the tables ".  
18. Japan further recalls that, in Chile – Price Band System , the Appellate Body stated that "[t]he 
Schedule of one Member, and even the scheduling practice of a number of Members,  is not relevant 
in interpreting the meaning of a treaty provision, unless that practice amounts to 'subsequent 
practice in the application of the treaty ' within the mea ning of Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna 
Convention. "14 Thus according to the Appellate Body, the scheduling activity or practice which 
"amounts to 'subsequent practice '" shall be taken into account, together with the context, in 
interpreting relevant  provi sions of covered agreements,  including paragraph 9 of Annex 3. Japan 
notes, in this respect, that more than 30 accession Members have already used a base period other 
than 1986 -1988, and it might be difficult for some new accession Members to obtain data from 
1986-1988. Indeed, some countries were not in existence at that time.    
19. Therefore, to the extent  the use of a period other than 1986 -1988 in the scheduling activity 
of newly acceding Members ' Accession Protocols  amounts to "subsequent practice " in the application 
of [Annex 3, paragraph 9, of the Agreement on Agriculture]  which shows the common  understanding 
of WTO Members , such practice is certainly relevant to the interpretation of that particular 
provision.15 
 
  
                                                
13 Appellate Body Report,  EC-Export Subsidies on Sugar , para. 221.  
14 Appellate Body Report, Chile-Price Band System , para.272  
15 Paragraph 9 of Annex 3 provides "The fixed external reference price shall be based on  the years 1986 
to 1988 …". (emphasis added)  Japan notes that, in interpreting Article 3 of the SPS Agreement, the Appellate 
Body observed "[a] thing is commonly said to be  'based on ' another thing when the former  'stand ' or is 
'founded ' or 'built' upon or  'is supported by ' the latter " and "[a] measure … based on the same standard might 
not conform to that standard, as where only some, not all, of the elements of the standard are incorporated 
into the measure. " Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones , para.163.  WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
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 ANNEX C -10 
INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE  SUMMARY OF THE ARGUM ENTS OF KAZAKHSTAN* 
Distinguished Chairman, Members of the Panel,  
Kazakhstan appreciates the opportunity to express its view on certain aspect of systemic importance 
for Kazakhstan. In particular, we would like to present our view with respect to interpretation of 
accession terms of Members acceded to the WTO under Article XII of Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization (hereinafter - Marrakesh Agreement) as applied to 
determination of base period for the purposes of  calculation of market price support ((hereinafter - 
MPP), and specifically fixed external reference prices.  
Article 3.2 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) prescribes that the "covered 
agreements ", i.e. WTO Agreements, should be clarified in acc ordance with the customary rules of 
interpretation of public international law. As we know, the customary rules of interpretation of public 
international law are codified in the relevant provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties1 (hereinaf ter – "Vienna  Convention "). We would like to turn the attention of the Panel to 
Article 30 of the Vienna Convention. Paragraph 2 of the Article stipulates that when a treaty specifies 
that it is subject to, or that it is not to be considered as incompatibl e with, an earlier or later treaty, 
the provisions of that other treaty prevail.  Article 30 sets out to resolve conflicts arising from 
successive treaties, i.e., an earlier and a later treaty both of which are in force . No distinction is 
made as to the typ es of treaties. Article 30 extends in its scope beyond the notion of conflicts and 
incompatibility by addressing more generally the rights and obligations of States parties to 
successive treaties relating to the same subject -matter and in particular the pr iority among them2. 
Kazakhstan considers that in the context of the obligations and commitments of China acceded under 
Article XII Marrakesh Agreement, the Accession Protocol encompassing inter alia Schedules of Tariff 
Concessions (hereinafter – Schedule) and Report of the Working Party on Accession of China to the 
WTO must be regarded as a later treaty  while the Marrakesh Agreement itself with its Annexes, 
including Agreement on Agriculture, must be treated as an earlier treaty  within the meaning o f 
Article 30 Vienna Convention.  
If the Panel agrees with this approach, two questions inevitably arise:  
- What are the provisions of the two treaties, which could be found incompatible?  
- Whether they are incompatible?  
 
Kazakhstan further proposes its analysis in the context of determination of the base period for the 
purposes of calculation of MPP, including fixed external reference prices.  
What are the provisions of the two treaties, which could be found incompatible?  
Paragraph 9 Annex 3 of the Agreement on Agriculture prescribes that fixed external reference price 
shall be calculated based on the years of 1986 to 1988. Whereas in Part IV of China 's Schedule, the 
fixed external reference price in calculation of MPP is ba sed on the years of 1996 to 1998.  
It is clear that there are two approaches contained in the documents pertaining to the same subject 
matter, i.e. China 's agricultural domestic support commitments which could be found incompatible.  
Whether they are incompatible?  
After finding the two provisions, the most important question is whether they are incompatible? To 
answer this question we would like to turn the attention of the Panel to the ordinary meaning of the 
                                                
* Kazakhstan req uested that its oral statement be treated as its executive summary.  
1 Done at Vienna, 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331;  8 International Legal Materials 679.  
2 Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Mark E. Villiger, Brill Online 
Books and Journals, http://booksandjournals.brillonline.com/content/books/b9789004180796_036 , page 402  
 WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
- 84 - 
 
 word "incompatible ". From the definitions suggested by online dictionaries3 it can be drawn that the 
word "incompatible " implies that two or more things cannot coexist, i.e. cannot exist together or at 
the same time.  
In the context of the present example, the question is whether the requirement to  use fixed external 
prices based on 1986 -1988, as required by Annex 3 of the Agreement on Agriculture, or those based 
on the years of 1996 to 1998, as applied in Part IV of China 's Schedule. In order to be incompatible 
or to be incapable of coexisting, onl y one of these two parameters would be valid because of 
competing nature of their application.  
Annex 3 explicitly points to the years of 1986 to 1988. This is straightforward. The question now is 
whether the WTO commitments of China stipulate that fixed ex ternal reference prices of 1996 -1998 
are equally valid to render period of 1986 to 1988 "incompatible ". 
With respect to this issue we would like to refer to the relevant case law developed by the WTO 
jurisprudence, in particular to the finding of the Panel  in its Report "China — Measures Related to 
the Exportation of Various Raw Materials "4 (hereinafter – "China - Raw Materials ") and  to the Report 
of the Appellate Body "China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten, and 
Molybdenum " (hereinafter – "China - Rare Earth Metals ")5. 
In "China — Raw Materials ", in a finding not appealed by any party to the dispute, the Panel explained 
that the terms of accession protocols are integral parts of the WTO Agreement6: 
"Accession to the WTO is achieved through negotiation with other WTO Members. 
Pursuant to  Article XII of the Marrakesh Agreement, accessions take place 'on terms to 
be agreed ' between the acceding Member and the WTO membership. Most accession 
processes take  several years to complete and lead to detailed negotiated provisions. The 
terms of each WTO Member 's accession are set out in its Accession Protocol and 
accompanying Working Party Report. The negotiated agreement between the WTO 
membership and the accedin g Member results in a delicate balance of rights and 
obligations, which are reflected in the specific wording of each commitment set out in 
these documents….  
WTO Members ' accession protocols are considered to form integral parts of the WTO 
Agreement "7. 
The Appellate Body in "China - Rare Earth Metals " reaffirms the findings of the Panel:  
"In sum, Article XII:1 of the Marrakesh Agreement provides the general rule for 
acceding to the WTO. Its first sentence stipulates that accession is to be accomplished 
on "terms" to be agreed between the acceding Member and the WTO, and its second 
sentence makes clear that such accession applies to the entire package of WTO rights 
and obligations, consisting of the Marrakesh  Agreement and the Multilateral Trade 
Agreements an nexed thereto... "8. 
 
In both cases the adjudicators confirm that the accession package, i.e. Accession Protocol together 
with its Annexes shall be applied in its entirety forming integral parts of the WTO Agreement . 
Likewise, we assert that it cannot be tr ue that one part of the accession terms applies and another 
part is not valid. In the context of this dispute, Part IV of China 's Schedule indicates the level of its 
commitment with respect to Total Aggregate Measurement of Support (AMS). Part IV of China 's 
Schedule refers to the document WT/ACC/CHN/38/Rev.3 (hereinafter – Rev.3). In this case, it is 
evident that the two base periods in Annex 3 of the Agreement on Agriculture and Part IV of China 's 
Schedule are incompatible.  
                                                
3 Online Oxford Dictionary: https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/incompatible , Merriam -Webster 
Dictionary: https://www.merriam -webster.com/dictionary/incompatible  
4 Document WT/DS394/R, WT/DS395/R, WT/DS398/R of 5 July 2011.  
5 WT/DS431/AB/R, WT/DS432/AB/R, WT/DS433/AB/R of 7 August 2014.  
6 The explanation is drawn from the WTO Analytical Index — Guide to WTO Law and Practice:  
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_ e/analytic_index_e/wto_agree_03_e.htm#articleXIIB1f  
7 Ibid para. 7.112  
8 Ibid para. 5.34  WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
- 85 - 
 
 In the light of Article 30 of Vi enna Convention and the logi c of the WTO jurisprudence, WTO  Members 
should find the base period for calculation of fixed external reference price of China in the same 
document, i.e. in Table DS:5 "Product -Specific Aggregate Measurement of Support:  Market Price 
Support " of Rev. 3. Therefore, fixed external reference prices of China should be based on the years 
of 1996 to 1998.  
In conclusion, Kazakhstan would like to call the attention of the Panel that the outcome of this 
dispute is of systemic importance a nd would affect the membership terms of more than 30 Members 
acceded under Article XII of Marrakesh Agreement since all these Members follow the same practice 
as China applies in its domestic support calculations, including Kazakhstan.  
This concludes our s tatement.  
Thank you!  
 
 
 
 
  WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
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ANNEX C -11 
INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE  SUMMARY OF THE ARGU MENTS OF THE RUSSIAN  FEDERATION  
1. The Russian Federation would like to present, as a third party in this  dispute,  the summary of 
its arguments that mostly relate to the issues concerning  the determination of representative period 
used to calculate the fixed external reference price (FERP).  
2. The Russian Federation would like to highlight the systemic nature of the issues raised in this 
dispute and their importance for those Mem bers that acceded after the Uruguay Round with an AMS 
reduction commitment in their Schedules.  
3. According to Article XII of the WTO Agreement "any State […] may accede to this Agreement, 
on terms to be agreed between it and the WTO ". The terms of accessi on, contained in the Protocol 
of Accession, the Report of the Working Party, and the Schedules of commitments, including the 
Base Total AMS, constitute an integral part of the WTO Agreement.  
4. During the accession process the same representative period is  used to calculate the fixed 
external reference price, the level of market price support, product -specific AMS and the Base Total 
AMS. Such representative period, according to the WTO Secretariat1, normally comprises the last 
three representative years. We  would like to draw the attention of the Panel that the amount of the 
Base Total AMS depends on the level of market price support calculated during the accession process, 
and consequently on the fixed external reference price. It would be illogical and inc oherent to first 
calculate the Base Total AMS using the last three representative years, and then, upon the accession 
and thereafter, to calculate Current Total AMS and market price support using another reference 
period. In such circumstances the amount o f Current Total AMS cannot be compared with the amount 
of the Base Total AMS due to the fact that they were calculated on different terms and different 
basis. The situation of using different representative period to calculate the fixed external reference 
price, and as the result – Base Total AMS and Current Total AMS, could lead to the impairment of 
the right of a Member that acceded to the WTO after the Uruguay Round to provide the level of 
support within the agreed limits and based upon the terms it has agreed.  
5. In its First Written Submission the United States claims that the fixed external reference price 
shall be based on the years 1986 to 1988 as it is set out in paragraph 9 of Annex 3 of the Agreement 
on Agriculture.2  
6. In view of the Russian Fed eration the period of 1986 – 1988 referred to in paragraph 9 of 
Annex 3 of the Agreement on Agriculture was the basis for calculating fixed external reference price 
for the founding WTO Members due to the fact that this period was chosen during the Uruguay  
Round as the most recent representative period. For all Members (except one) that acceded to the 
WTO after 1995 the most recent representative period was the period other than 1986 – 1988 (for 
instance, for the Russian Federation this period was from 2006  to 2008, for China – from 1996 to 
1998).   
7. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention requires that the interpretation of a treaty shall take into 
account "any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement 
of the parties  regarding its interpretation ". From the perspective of the Russian Federation, 
subsequent practice of calculating fixed external reference price demonstrates that all WTO Members 
during the accession processes agreed that for acceding Members the FERP cou ld be based on the 
years other than 1986 to 1988. This is demonstrated by the supporting materials incorporated by 
reference in Part IV of Members ' Schedules and, thereby, reflecting all WTO  Members ' agreement 
on all aspects of acceding Member 's rights and  obligations. Such subsequent practice is also reflected 
                                                
1 Technical Note of the WTO Secretariat, Procedures for Negotiations under Article XII, Information to be 
Provided on Domestic Support and Export Subsidies in Agricult ure, WT/ACC/22/Add.1, 1 August 2014.  
2 The United States ' First Written Submission, paras. 98, 113.  WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
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 in the Technical Note of the WTO Secretariat on Procedures for Negotiations under Article XII3, which 
says that the info rmation on product -specific AMS  measures, including the information on market 
price support, is normally used for each of the last three years . This document, as it was pointed 
out by the Secretariat, took into account the evolution of accession practices.4 Notifications of the 
acceded WTO Members, including China, and review process  within the work of the Committee on 
Agriculture on examination of those notifications also support this understanding.  
8. Turning to practice, there were Members of the Working Party on the accession of the Russian 
Federation to the WTO (which consisted o f 65 Members) that stated that the more recent reference 
period should be used to calculate the domestic support level as it is more adequate and statistically 
relevant. This common understanding was reflected throughout our accession process, inter alia , in 
some of the statements of the Working Party 's Members. One Member of the Working Party 
expressed its view that "the base period used to establish commitments will need to be based on a 
recent three year period which reflects current agricultural support  programs ".5 Moreover, other 
Member of the Working Party on the accession of the Russian Federation to the WTO said that "there 
is a general understanding that the Russian accession should be based on the methodology included 
in the WT/ACC/4 WTO document "6 and that "it is intended that new Members initiate negotiations 
departing, at least, from figures based on volume and budgetary outlays related to the base period 
mentioned in the WT/ACC/4 WTO document "7. It should also be noted that in the document 
WT/AC C/4 the structure of methodology to calculate domestic support measure that affects the 
producer price implies that the fixed external reference price shall be provided for each of the last 
three years  
9. The definition of Aggregate Measurement of Support set out in Article 1(a)(ii) of the 
Agreement on Agriculture clearly demonstrates that Annex 3  is not the only source for 
AMS calculation – "constituent data and methodology used in the tables of supporting material 
incorporated by reference in Part IV of t he Member 's Schedule " shall also be taken into account.  
10. In the view of the Russian Federation, the logic used by the panel and the Appellate Body in 
Korea – Various Measures on Beef  shows that if agricultural products were included in corresponding 
supporting materials incorporated in Member 's Schedule, calculation of AMS shall be based not only 
on Annex 3 but also shall take into account "constituent data and methodology ".8 Since wheat and 
rice were included in China 's supporting materials, the "consti tuent data and methodology " shall be 
considered in this dispute.  
11. From the perspective of the Russian Federation, "constituent data and methodology " in this 
context refers to the period for calculation of the fixed external reference price. The Appellate Body 
in Korea – Various Measures on Beef  examined the issue of determination of basic period for 
calculation of market price support for beef. Accord ing to the Appellate Body, since beef was not 
included in Korea 's supporting materials, then the reference period for it shall be 1986 – 1988, and 
not 1989 – 1991 as for those agricultural products which were included in Korea 's corresponding 
tables.9 In a similar vein, since wheat and rice were included in China 's supporting materials, the 
period of 1996 – 1998 shall be used to calculate the fixed external reference price for these 
products.10 
12. Therefore, the Russian Federation believes that for Members  acceded to the WTO after the 
Uruguay Round the basic period for fixed external reference price calculation should be the period 
                                                
3 Technical Note of the WTO Secretariat, Procedures for Negotiations under  Article XII, Information to 
be Provided on Domestic Support and Export Subsidies in Agriculture, WT/ACC /22/Add.1, 1 August 2014, 
para. 15. 
4 Technical Note of the WTO Secretariat, Information to be Provided on Domestic Support and Export 
Subsidies in Agriculture, WT/ACC/4/Rev.1, 1 August 2014.  
5 WT/ACC/RUS/23/Add.1, p. 1.  
6 WT/ACC/RUS/ 17/Add.1, p. 13.  
7 WT/ACC/RUS/17/Add.1, p. 14.  
8 Panel Report,  Korea - Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef , paras. 811 -812, 
830.  Appellate Body Report, Korea - Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef , paras. 113 -
114, 117 -118. 
9 Appellate Body Report, Korea - Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef , paras. 
113-114, 117 -118. 
10 WT/ACC/CHN/38/Rev.3.  WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
- 88 - 
 
 used in the tables of supporting materials incorporated by reference in Part IV of the Member 's 
Schedule, rather than the perio d used in paragraph 9 of Annex 3 of the Agreement on Agriculture.  
 
 
  WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
- 89 - 
 
  
 
ANNEX D  
RAW DATA   
Contents  Page  
Annex D  Raw Data  as presented by the p arties  90 WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
- 90 - 
 
 ANNEX D  
RAW DATA  
1.1.  The following tables contain data for the products forming part of the United States' complaint, 
i.e. wheat, Indica rice, Japonica rice and corn, as presented by the parties1, and revised in some 
cases by the Panel , where necessary.2 This information is presented without prejudice to the Panel's 
findings in sections 7 and 8 of the Panel Report or of the calculati ons performed in tables 10 -16 of 
the Panel Report.  
1.1  Wheat  
  Source  Units  2012  2013  2014  2015  20163 
Total national 
production  China  million 
tons 121.023  121.926  126.208  130.185  128.845  
US million 
tons 121.024  121.926  126.208  130.185  - 
Producer price  US/China  ¥/ton  2,166.20  2,356.20  2,411.80  2,328.60  2,232.60  
Production by 
province    
  
Hebei  US million 
tons      13.377        13.872       14.299       14.350       14.333  
Jiangsu  US million 
tons      10.488        11.013       11.604       11.740       11.196  
Anhui  US million 
tons      12.940        13.320       13.936       14.110       13.859  
Shandong  US million 
tons      21.795        22.188       22.638       23.466       23.446  
Henan  US million 
tons      31.774        32.264       33.290       35.010       34.660  
Hubei  US million 
tons       3.708        4.168        4.216        4.209        4.282  
Total  US million 
tons 94.082  96.825  99.983  102.885  101.776  
Out-of-grade 
percentage   
Hebei  China  percentage  0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Jiangsu  China  percentage  2.0 1.0 0.3 1.0 0.0 
Anhui  China  percentage  1.0 0.0 0.0 1.7 0.0 
Shandong  China  percentage  0.0 1.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 
Henan  China  percentage  1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Hubei  China  percentage  8.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
AAP US/China  ¥/ton  2,040.00  2,240.00  2,360.00  2,360.00  2,360.00  
1996-1998 FERP 
(c.i.f. price)  China  ¥/ton  1996 -1998  Average 1996 -1998  
1,885.00  1,629.60  1,579.80  1,698.13  
1986-1988 FERP  
(c.i.f. price)  US ¥/ton  431.114 
Quantity procured 
under  measures   
Hebei  China  million 
tons 0.774  0 0 0.591  3.1765  
Jiangsu  China  million 
tons 5.319  3.61 6.708  5.474  4.0765  
Anhui  China  million 
tons 4.126  2.9315  6.648  3.97 5.515  
                                                
1 See United States' response to Panel question No. 96, (Exhibit USA -106); China's res ponse to Panel 
question No. 96, (Exhibit CHN -146).  
2 These revisions involved adjusting certain of the original figures presented by the parties to express 
them in a common unit (renminbi/ton and million tons), and to present quantities using the same numb er of 
decimal places (where  useful).  
3 All 2016 data was provided by China.  
4 Only one value was provided by the United States. See United States' first written submission, Table 
7: Fixed External Reference Price.  WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
- 91 - 
 
   Source  Units  2012  2013  2014  2015  20163 
Shandong  China  million 
tons 1.769  0 0.032  1.242  3.109  
Henan  China  million 
tons 9.815  0.698  10.423  8.948  12.1415  
Hubei  China  million 
tons 1.369  0.939  1.534  0.559  0.492  
Total amount 
procured  China  million 
tons 23.172  8.182  25.345  20.784  28.5105  
1.2  Rice 
 Source  Units  2012  2013  2014  2015  2016  
Total national rice 
production  US/China  million 
tons 204.236  203.612  206.507  208.225  207.075  
Total rice 
production in 
covered provinces  US/China  million 
tons 159.34  160.09  162.06  164.14  162.73  
 
1.2.1   Japonica rice  
  Source  Units  2012  2013  2014  2015  2016  
Total national 
production  China  million tons  68.011  67.803  68.767  69.339  68.956  
US million tons  64.539  64.341  65.256  65.760  - 
Producer price  US/China  ¥/ton  2,919.60  2,936.60  3,035.20  2,951.20  2,935.40  
FERP (f.o.b. prices - 
milled)  China  ¥/ton  1996 -1998  Average 1996 -1998  
3,682.90  2,862.10  3,326.90   3,290.63  
1986-1988 FERP 
(f.o.b.  price)  (unmilled 
equivalent)  US ¥/ton  546.625 
Production by province   
Liaoning  US million tons  5.078  5.069  4.515  4.677  - 
Jilin US million tons  5.320  5.633  5.876  6.301  - 
Heilongjiang  US million tons  21.712  22.206  22.510  21.997  - 
Jiangsu  US million tons  16.360  16.551  16.461  16.811  - 
Anhui  US million tons  2.422  2.364  2.431  2.592  - 
Total  US million tons  50.892  51.823  51.793  52.378  - 
Out-of-grade 
percentage   
Liaoning  China  percentage  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 - 
Jilin China  percentage  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 - 
Heilongjiang  China  percentage  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 - 
Jiangsu  China  percentage  0.0 0.0 0.0 1.5 - 
Anhui  China  percentage  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 - 
AAP (unmilled)  US/China  ¥/ton  2,800.00  3,000.00  3,100.00  3,100.00  3,100.00  
Quantity of paddy rice 
purchased under the 
measures   
Liaoning  China  million tons  0 0.351  0.175  0 0 
Jilin China  million tons  0.057  0.713  0.58 1.1675  0.133  
Heilongjiang  China  million tons  3.842  10.625  15.025  16.897  17.7745  
                                                
5 Only one  average value was provided by the United States. See United States' first written submission, 
Table 7: Fixed External Reference Price.  WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
- 92 - 
 
   Source  Units  2012  2013  2014  2015  2016  
Jiangsu  China  million tons  0 1.352  1.796  1.089  1.5765  
Anhui  China  million tons  0.063  0.481  0.615  0.965  1.478  
Hubei  China  million tons  0 0.019  0.02 0.018  0.0265  
Total China  million tons  3.962  13.541  18.211  20.137  20.989  
 
1.2.2   Indica rice  
1.2.2.1   Early -season  
 Data 
provided 
by Units  2012  2013  2014  2015  2016  
Total national 
production  US million tons  33.291  34.145  34.012  33.687  -  
Producer price 
(early -season)  US/China  ¥/ton  2,622.00  2,603.20  2,681.60  2,687.40  2,602.60  
1996-1998 FERP 
(f.o.b. prices - 
milled)  China  ¥/ton  1996 -1998  Average 1996 -1998  
 3,082.10   2,033.00   1,913.90   2,343.00  
1986-1988 FERP 
(f.o.b.  price)  
(unmilled equivalent)  US ¥/ton  470.836 
Production by 
province   
Anhui  US million tons  1.320  1.308  1.283  1.092  - 
Jiangxi  US million tons  8.002  8.280  8.201  8.119  - 
Hubei  US million tons  2.089  2.228  2.387  2.523  - 
Hunan  US million tons  8.187  8.605  8.548  8.589  - 
Guangxi Zhuang 
Autonomous Region  US million tons  5.449  5.552  5.433  5.288  - 
Total  million tons  25.047  25.973  25.852  25.611  - 
Out-of-grade 
percentage   
Anhui  China  percentage  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 - 
Jiangxi  China  percentage  1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 - 
Hubei  China  percentage  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 - 
Hunan  China  percentage  1.0 0.0 3.0 1.0 - 
Guangxi Zhuang 
Autonomous Region  China  percentage  1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 - 
AAP (unmilled)  US/China  ¥/ton  2,400.00  2,640.00  2,700.00  2,700.00  - 
Quantity of paddy 
rice purchased under 
the measures   
Anhui  China  million tons  0.0000  0.0665  0.0870  0.0400  0.0215  
Jiangxi  China  million tons  0.0000  3.3340  2.1450  1.4500  1.3065  
Hubei  China  million tons  0.0000  0.0985  0.0600  0.0960  0.0485  
Hunan  China  million tons  0.0000  2.2000  1.9420  1.4300  1.1890  
Guangxi Zhuang 
Autonomous Region  China  million tons  0.0000  0.0360  0.0110  0.0000  0.0000  
Total China  million tons  0.0000  5.7350  4.2450  3.0160  2.5655  
 
  
                                                
6 Only one  average value was provided by the United States. See United States' first written submission, 
Table 7: Fixed External Reference Price.  WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
- 93 - 
 
 1.2.2.2   Mid-late-season  
  Data 
provided 
by  Units  2012  2013  2014  2015  2016  
Total national 
production  US million 
tons 106.406  105.136  107.239  108.739  - 
Producer price (m id-
season Indica)  US/China  ¥/ton  2,697.40  2,627.20  2,658.00  2,601.60  2,603.40  
Producer price (late-
season Indica)  US/China  ¥/ton  2,769.40  2,713.40  2,838.20  2,787.00  2,768.40  
1996-1998 FERP 
(f.o.b. prices - 
milled)  China  ¥/ton  1996 -1998  Average 1996 -1998  
  
3,082.1
0    2,033.00    1,913.90   2,343.00  
1986-1988 FERP 
(f.o.b.  price)  
(unmilled  equivalent)  US ¥/ton  470.837 
Production by 
province              
  
Jiangsu  US million 
tons 2.641  2.672  2.658  2.714  - 
Anhui  US million 
tons 10.193  9.951  10.232  10.910  - 
Jiangxi  US million 
tons 11.758  11.760  12.051  12.153  - 
Henan  US million 
tons 4.926  4.858  5.286  5.315  - 
Hubei  US million 
tons 14.425  14.539  14.908  15.584  - 
Hunan  US million 
tons 18.130  17.011  17.792  17.859  - 
Guangxi Zhuang 
Autonomous Region  US million 
tons 5.971  6.010  6.228  6.090  - 
Sichuan  US million 
tons 15.354  15.490  15.261  15.526  - 
Total   million 
tons 83.398  82.291  84.416  86.151  - 
Out-of-grade 
percentage              
Jiangsu  China  percentage  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 - 
Anhui  China  percentage  1.0 1.0 0.8 0.0 - 
Jiangxi  China  percentage  1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 - 
Henan  China  percentage  0.0 3.0 2.2 1.1 - 
Hubei  China  percentage  0.0 4.0 0.7 0.0 - 
Hunan  China  percentage  0.0 1.0 0.0 1.7 - 
Guangxi Zhuang 
Autonomous Region  China  percentage  1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 - 
Sichuan  China  percentage  0.0 0.0 1.3 1.0 - 
AAP (unmilled)  US/China  ¥/ton  2,500.00  2,700.00  2,760.00  2,760.00  - 
Quantity of paddy 
rice purchased under 
the measures                
Jiangsu  China  million 
tons 0.0000  0.1565  0.1310  0.0985  0.0050  
Anhui  China  million 
tons 0.0000  3.9235  2.8050  3.1585  1.9705  
Jiangxi  China  million 
tons 0.0790  2.1660  1.3700  0.9480  0.6000  
Henan  China  million 
tons 0.0000  1.8160  1.2480  1.4550  1.5695  
Hubei  China  million 
tons 0.0000  2.5780  1.7800  2.9635  2.0895  
                                                
7 Only one  average value was provided by the United States. See United States' first written submission, 
Table 7: Fixed External Reference Price.  WT/DS511/R/Add.1  
 
- 94 - 
 
   Data 
provided 
by  Units  2012  2013  2014  2015  2016  
Hunan  China  million 
tons 0.0000  1.3820  1.2630  0.9105  0.7965  
Sichuan  China  million 
tons 0.0000  1.2970  1.0810  0.6540  0.4645  
Total China  million 
tons 0.079  13.319  9.678  10.188  7.4955  
1.3  Corn  
  Data 
provided 
by  Units  2012  2013  2014  2015  
Total national 
production  US million 
tons 205.614  218.489  215.646  224.632  
Producer price  US/China  ¥/ton  2,222.60  2,176.20  2,237.00  1,884.60  
1996-1998 FERP 
(f.o.b. price)  China  ¥/ton  1996 -1998  Average 1996 -1998  
1581.4 0 1075.8 0 939.2 0 1,198.80  
1986-1988 FERP 
(f.o.b.  price)  US ¥/ton  366.078 
Production by 
province   
Heilongjiang  US million 
tons          28.879           32.164           
33.434           
35.441  
Jilin US million 
tons          25.788           27.757           
27.335           
28.057  
Liaoning  US million 
tons          14.235           15.632           
11.705           
14.035  
Inner Mongolia  US million 
tons          17.844           20.697           
21.861           
22.508  
Total  US million 
tons 86.746  96.250  94.335  100.041  
Out-of-grade 
percentage   
Heilongjiang  US/China  percentage  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Jilin US/China  percentage  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Liaoning  US/China  percentage  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Inner Mongolia  US/China  percentage  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
AAP Heilongjiang  US ¥/ton  2,100.00  2,220.00  2,220.00  2,000.00  
AAP Jilin  US ¥/ton  2,120.00  2,240.00  2,240.00  2,000.00  
AAP Liaoning  US ¥/ton  2,140.00  2,260.00  2,260.00  2,000.00  
AAP Inner Mongolia  US ¥/ton  2,140.00  2,260.00  2,260.00  2,000.00  
Quantity of corn 
purchased under the 
measures   
Heilongjiang  China  million 
tons 0.326  6.205  8.369  21.897  
Jilin China  million 
tons 0.130  4.777  7.874  11.780  
Liaoning  China  million 
tons 0.030  15.903  25.402  34.530  
Inner Mongolia  China  million 
tons 2.334  16.353  23.047  57.149  
Total China  million 
tons 2.820  43.236  64.690  125.356  
 
 
 
__________  
 
 
                                                
8 Only one average value was provided by the United States. See United States' first written submission, 
Table 7: Fixed External Reference Price.