G/AG/W/235  
 
12 May 2023 
(23-3358) Page: 1/358 
Committee on Agriculture  Original: English  
 
RESPONSES TO POINTS RAISED BY MEMBERS UNDER THE REVIEW PROCESS  
COMPILATION OF RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS RAISED DURING THE COMMITTEE  
ON AGRICULTURE MEETINGS IN 2022  
The present document compiles responses received in writing by the Secretariat to the questions 
raised during the four meetings1 of the Committee in 2022 as well as follow -up comments made 
during the Review Process. The questions raised at those meetings are contained respectively 
in G/AG/W/217, G/AG/W/221, G/AG/W/222 and G/AG/W/226.  
Members with outstanding responses to questions raised in 2022 are kindly invited to submit them 
to the Secretariat at the earliest. Members can submit these responses directl y through the AG -IMS 
(Q&A Online Submission (wto.org) ). Should you require login credential to access the Q&A function 
of the AG -IMS, please contact the Secretariat by sending an email  to agcd_mailbox@wto.org . For 
the list of outstanding responses, Members are invited to please consult the Secretariat document 
issued regularly in the G/AG/W/204/ series. The AG -IMS also regularly sends automati c reminder 
emails to Members with outstanding responses.  
 
 
_______________  
 
 
1 The Committee held three regular formal meetings in 202 2 on 15-16 March, 27-28 June,  
14-15 September , and 21 -22 November .  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  TABLE OF CONTENTS  
1   COMPILATION OF RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS RAISED  
DURING THE COMMITTEE  ON AGRICULTURE MEETING ON 15-16 MARCH 2022  .............  18 
1.1   MATTERS RELEVANT TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF COMMITMENTS: ARTICLE 18.6  ............  18 
1.1.1   Angola's import policies  ................................ ................................ ..........................  18 
1.1.1.1    Question by European Union (AG -IMS ID 100058)  ................................ ...................  18 
1.1.2   Argentina's export restric tions on beef  ................................ ................................ ...... 18 
1.1.2.1    Question by European Union (AG -IMS ID 100001)  ................................ ...................  18 
1.1.2.2    Question by Japan (AG -IMS ID 100063)  ................................ ................................ . 19 
1.1.3   Argentina's export restrictions of wheat  ................................ ................................ .... 20 
1.1.3.1    Question by Japan (AG -IMS ID 100062)  ................................ ................................ . 20 
1.1.4   Australia's ethanol tax  ................................ ................................ ............................  21 
1.1.4.1    Question by United States of America (AG -IMS ID 100002)  ................................ ....... 21 
1.1.5   Canada's review of the TRQ system  ................................ ................................ ..........  21 
1.1.5.1    Question by Australia (AG -IMS ID 100 059) ................................ .............................  21 
1.1.5.2    Question by European Union (AG -IMS ID 100039)  ................................ ...................  22 
1.1.5.3    Question by United Kingdom (AG -IMS ID 100065)  ................................ ...................  22 
1.1.6   Canada's compensation to dairy farmers after trade concessions  ................................ .. 22 
1.1.6.1    Question by Europe an Union (AG -IMS ID 100040)  ................................ ...................  22 
1.1.7   Canada's support to Prince Edward Island potato producers  ................................ .........  23 
1.1.7.1    Question by India (AG -IMS ID 100140)  ................................ ................................ .. 23 
1.1.8   Canada's support to the pork industry  ................................ ................................ ....... 24 
1.1.8.1    Question by India (AG -IMS ID 100141)  ................................ ................................ .. 24 
1.1.9   Canada's Herd Management and Drought Assistance progra m ................................ ...... 25 
1.1.9.1    Question by India (AG -IMS ID 100142)  ................................ ................................ .. 25 
1.1.10    Canada's support for the Next Gen Agriculture Mentorship programme  ........................  26 
1.1.10.1    Question by India (AG -IMS ID 100143)  ................................ ................................  26 
1.1.11    Canada's Special Milk  Class Scheme  ................................ ................................ ....... 27 
1.1.11.1    Question by New Zealand (AG -IMS ID 100064)  ................................ .....................  27 
1.1.12    Canada's Dairy Policies  ................................ ................................ .........................  27 
1.1.12.1    Question by New Zealand (AG -IMS ID 100107)  ................................ .....................  27 
1.1.13    China's one -off subsidy to farmers  ................................ ................................ ..........  28 
1.1.13.1    Question by Australia (AG -IMS ID 100136)  ................................ ...........................  28 
1.1.14    Côte d'Ivoire's Tax on imported spirits  ................................ ................................ .... 29 
1.1.14.1    Question by European Union (AG -IMS ID 100139)  ................................ ..................  29 
1.1.15    EU's deforestation and forest degradation strategy  ................................ ....................  30 
1.1.15 .1   Question by Brazil, Paraguay, Argentina (AG -IMS ID 100071)  ................................ .. 30 
1.1.15.2    Question by Indonesia (AG -IMS ID 100103)  ................................ ..........................  34 
1.1.15.3    Question by Thailand (AG -IMS ID 100130)  ................................ ............................  35 
1.1.16    EU's Environmental Policies  ................................ ................................ ...................  37 G/AG/W/235  
 
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  1.1.16.1    Question by India (AG -IMS ID 100041)  ................................ ................................  37 
1.1.16.2    Question by Brazil (AG -IMS ID 100070)  ................................ ................................  37 
1.1.17    EU's Product Environment Footprint (PEF)  ................................ ................................  38 
1.1.17.1    Question by New Zealand (AG -IMS ID 100073)  ................................ .....................  38 
1.1.18    EU's agricultural policies funded by national resources  ................................ ...............  39 
1.1.18.1    Question by Brazil (AG -IMS ID 100072)  ................................ ................................  39 
1.1.19    Guyana's Prohibition of rice exports  ................................ ................................ ........  39 
1.1.19.1    Question by European Union (AG -IMS ID 100110)  ................................ ..................  39 
1.1.20    India's mung beans import restrictions  ................................ ................................ .... 40 
1.1.20.1    Question by Australia (AG -IMS ID 100100)  ................................ ...........................  40 
1.1.20.2    Question by Brazil (AG -IMS ID 100111)  ................................ ................................  40 
1.1.21    India's rice exports  ................................ ................................ ...............................  41 
1.1.21.1    Question by Canada (AG -IMS ID 100086)  ................................ .............................  41 
1.1.22    India's pulses policies  ................................ ................................ ...........................  42 
1.1.22.1    Question by Canada (AG -IMS ID 100087)  ................................ .............................  42 
1.1.22.2    Question by Russian Federation (AG -IMS ID 100135)  ................................ .............  42 
1.1.22.3    Question by United States of America, Canada,  
European Union (AG -IMS ID  100008)  ................................ ................................ .................  43 
1.1.23    India's Dairy Sahakar scheme  ................................ ................................ ................  44 
1.1.23.1    Question by European Union (AG -IMS ID 100112)  ................................ ..................  44 
1.1.24    India's increased budget for subsidy support farmers use of fertiliser  ...........................  44 
1.1.24.1    Question by European Union (AG -IMS ID 100113)  ................................ ..................  44 
1.1.25    India's Export subsidies for skim milk powder  ................................ ...........................  45 
1.1.25.1    Question by European Union (AG -IMS ID 100115)  ................................ ..................  45 
1.1.26    India's Scheme for Remission of Duties and Taxes on Exported Products  ......................  46 
1.1.26.1    Question by United States of America (AG-IMS ID 100003)  ................................ ..... 46 
1.1.27    India- support to sugar and  biofuels  ................................ ................................ ....... 46 
1.1.27.1    Question by United States of America (AG -IMS ID 100009)  ................................ ..... 46 
1.1.28    India's public stockpiling  ................................ ................................ .......................  47 
1.1.28.1    Question by United States of America, Japan, Brazil, Canada, European U nion, 
Uruguay, Australia, Thailand, Paraguay (AG -IMS ID 100006)  ................................ .................  47 
1.1.28.2    Question by United States of America, Japan, Brazil, Canada, Uruguay, Australia, 
Thailand, Paraguay (AG -IMS ID 100005)  ................................ ................................ .............  48 
1.1.29    India's oilseeds policies  ................................ ................................ .........................  48 
1.1.29.1    Question by United States of America, Paraguay (AG -IMS ID 100004)  ......................  48 
1.1.30    India's cotton support  ................................ ................................ ...........................  49 
1.1.30.1    Question by Australia (AG -IMS ID 100085)  ................................ ...........................  49 
1.1.31    Indonesia's palm oil export restrictions  ................................ ................................ .... 50 
1.1.31.1    Question by Japan (AG -IMS ID 100118)  ................................ ...............................  50 
1.1.32    Kazakhstan's quantitative export restrictions on agricultural products  ..........................  50 
1.1.32.1    Question by United States of Am erica (AG -IMS ID 100010)  ................................ ..... 50 G/AG/W/235  
 
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  1.1.33    Malaysia's rice import system  ................................ ................................ ................  51 
1.1.33.1    Question by United States of America (AG -IMS ID 100011)  ................................ ..... 51 
1.1.34    Mongolia's quota regime for importation  ................................ ................................ .. 52 
1.1.34.1    Question by Russian Federatio n (AG -IMS ID 100131)  ................................ .............  52 
1.1.35    Nigeria's import prohibitions on certain agricultural products  ................................ ...... 52 
1.1.35.1    Question by Brazil (AG -IMS ID 100137)  ................................ ................................  52 
1.1.35.2    Question by Brazil (AG -IMS ID 100138)  ................................ ................................  53 
1.1.36    Oman's Vision 202 0 plan  ................................ ................................ .......................  53 
1.1.36.1    Question by United States of America (AG -IMS ID 100013)  ................................ ..... 53 
1.1.37    Philippines' SSG application on instant coffee  ................................ ...........................  54 
1.1.37.1    Question by Indonesia (AG -IMS ID 100120)  ................................ ..........................  54 
1.1.38    Russian Federation's compensation to farmers  ................................ .........................  55 
1.1.38.1    Question by India (AG -IMS ID 100144)  ................................ ................................  55 
1.1.39    Russian Federation's  grain export duties  ................................ ................................ .. 55 
1.1.39.1    Question by India (AG -IMS ID 100122)  ................................ ................................  55 
1.1.40    South Africa's review of tariff structure for poultry meat imports  ................................ . 56 
1.1.40.1    Question by Europea n Union (AG -IMS ID 100124)  ................................ ..................  56 
1.1.41    Türkiye's export restrictions on agricultural products  ................................ .................  56 
1.1.41.1    Question by Japan (AG -IMS ID 100126)  ................................ ...............................  56 
1.1.42    Türkiye's freight support  ................................ ................................ .......................  57 
1.1.42.1    Question by United States of America (AG -IMS ID 100014)  ................................ ..... 57 
1.1.43    UK's forest risk commodities provisions  ................................ ................................ ... 57 
1.1.43.1    Question by Indonesia (AG -IMS ID 100127)  ................................ ..........................  57 
1.1.44    U.S. Market Facilitation Programme (MFP)  ................................ ...............................  58 
1.1.44.1    Question by Australia (AG -IMS ID 100129)  ................................ ...........................  58 
1.1.45    U.S. Partnership to Ease Port Congestion an d Restore Disrupted Shipping Services  
to U.S. Grown Agricultural Commodities  ................................ ................................ ..............  59 
1.1.45.1    Question by Brazil (AG -IMS ID 100132)  ................................ ................................  59 
1.1.46    U.S. USD 800 million subsidies for biofuels from agricultural products  ..........................  59 
1.1.46.1    Question by European Union (AG -IMS ID 100133)  ................................ ..................  59 
1.1.47    U.S. Domestic Support Policies and Notifications  ................................ .......................  60 
1.1.47.1    Question by New Zealand (AG -IMS ID 100134)  ................................ .....................  60 
1.2   POINTS RAISED IN CONNECTION WITH INDIVIDUAL NOTIFICATIONS  ..............................  60 
1.2.1   Administration of tariff and other quota commitments (Table MA:1)  ..............................  60 
1.2.1.1    El Salvador (G/AG/N/SLV/72)  ................................ ................................ ...............  60 
1.2.1.2    European Union (G/AG/N/EU/72)  ................................ ................................ ..........  61 
1.2.2   Imports under tariff and other quota commitments (Table MA:2)  ................................ .. 61 
1.2.2.1    Iceland (G/AG/N/ISL/51, G/AG/N/ISL/52, G/AG/N/ISL/53)  ................................ ....... 61 
1.2.2.2    India (G/AG/N/IND/26)  ................................ ................................ ........................  62 
1.2.2.3    Korea, Republic of (G/AG/N/KOR/85)  ................................ ................................ ..... 62 
1.2.2.4    South Africa (G/AG/N/ZAF/109)  ................................ ................................ ............  63 G/AG/W/235  
 
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  1.2.2.5    South Africa (G/AG/N/ZAF/109, G/AG/N/ZAF/110)  ................................ ...................  64 
1.2.2.6    South Africa (G/AG/N/ZAF/110)  ................................ ................................ ............  65 
1.2.2.7    Switzerland (G/AG/N/CHE/113)  ................................ ................................ .............  66 
1.2.2.8    United Kingdom (G/AG/N/GBR/6/REV.1)  ................................ ................................  67 
1.2.2.9    United Kingdom (G/AG/N/GBR/6 ) ................................ ................................ ..........  70 
1.2.2.10    United Kingdom (G/AG/N/GBR/6, G/AG/N/GBR/6/REV.1)  ................................ ........  71 
1.2.3   Special Safeguards (Tables MA:3 to MA:5)  ................................ ................................  72 
1.2.3.1    Philippines (G/AG/N/PHL/80)  ................................ ................................ ................  72 
1.2.4   Domestic Support commitments (Table DS:1)  ................................ ............................  73 
1.2.4.1    Australia (G/AG/N/AUS/142)  ................................ ................................ ................  73 
1.2.4.2    Canada (G/AG/N/CAN/142)  ................................ ................................ ..................  74 
1.2.4.3    Iceland (G/AG/N/ISL/54)  ................................ ................................ .....................  76 
1.2.4.4    India (G/AG/N/IND/18)  ................................ ................................ ........................  78 
1.2.4.5    India (G/AG/N/IND/25)  ................................ ................................ ........................  79 
1.2.4.6    Indonesia (G/AG/N/IDN/67)  ................................ ................................ .................  80 
1.2.4.7    Indonesia (G/AG/N/IDN/68)  ................................ ................................ .................  81 
1.2.4.8    Israel (G/AG/N/ISR/81)  ................................ ................................ .......................  84 
1.2.4.9    Mexico (G/AG/N/MEX/55)  ................................ ................................ .....................  88 
1.2.4.10    Nigeria (G/AG/N/NGA/19) ................................ ................................ ...................  91 
1.2.4.11    Norway (G/AG/N/NOR/119)  ................................ ................................ ................  91 
1.2.4.12    Oman (G/AG/N/OMN/26)  ................................ ................................ ....................  93 
1.2.4.13    Philippines (G/AG/N/PHL/78)  ................................ ................................ ..............  94 
1.2.4.14    Saudi Arabia, Kingdom of (G/AG/N/SAU/23)  ................................ .........................  94 
1.2.4.15    Switzerland (G/AG/N/CHE/114)  ................................ ................................ ...........  95 
1.2.4.16    Chinese Taipei (G/AG/N/TPKM/206)  ................................ ................................ ..... 95 
1.2.4.17    United Arab Emirates (G/AG/N/ARE/21)  ................................ ...............................  95 
1.2.4.18    United States of America (G/AG/N/USA/135)  ................................ .........................  96 
1.2.4.19    United States of America (G/AG/N/USA/150)  ................................ .........................  96 
1.2.4.20    United States of America (G/AG/N/USA/157)  ................................ .........................  97 
1.2.5   New or modified domestic support measures (Table DS:2)  ................................ .........  102 
1.2.5.1    Australia (G/AG/N/AUS/141)  ................................ ................................ ..............  102 
1.2.5.2    Brazil (G/AG/N/BRA/68)  ................................ ................................ .....................  103 
1.2.5.3    European Union (G/AG/N/EU/71)  ................................ ................................ ........  105 
1.2.5.4    United Kingdom (G/AG/N/GBR/9)  ................................ ................................ ........  105 
1.2.5.5    United States of America (G/AG/N/USA/156)  ................................ ........................  108 
1.2.6   Export Subsidy commitments (Tables ES:1, ES:2 and ES:3)  ................................ ...... 109 
1.2.6.1    Australia (G/AG/N/AUS/137)  ................................ ................................ ..............  109 
1.2.7   Export prohibitions and restrictions (Table ER:1)  ................................ ......................  109 
1.2.7.1    Thailand (G/AG/N/THA/119)  ................................ ................................ ...............  109 
1.2.8   Notifications in the context of the NFIDC Decision (Table NF:1)  ................................ .. 110 G/AG/W/235  
 
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  1.2.8.1    United States of America (G/AG/N/USA/160)  ................................ ........................  110 
1.3   OVERDUE NOTIFICATIONS  ................................ ................................ .......................  111 
1.3.1   Canada  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..............  111 
1.3.2   European Union  ................................ ................................ ................................ ... 111 
1.3.3   Morocco  ................................ ................................ ................................ .............  112 
1.3.4   Türkiye  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..............  112 
1.4   EXPORT COMPETITION  ................................ ................................ ............................  112 
1.4.1   Canada  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..............  112 
1.4.2   China  ................................ ................................ ................................ .................  113 
1.4.3   Egypt  ................................ ................................ ................................ .................  113 
1.4.4   India ................................ ................................ ................................ ..................  113 
2   COMPILATION OF RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS RAISED  
DURING THE COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE MEETING ON 27 -28 JUNE 2022  ...............  115  
2.1   MATTERS RELEVANT TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF COMMITMENTS: ARTICLE 18.6  ..........  115 
2.1.1   Argentina's export restrictions  ................................ ................................ ...............  115 
2.1.1.1    Question by Switzerland (AG -IMS ID 101015)  ................................ .......................  115 
2.1.1.2    Question by United States of America, United Kingd om, Japan (AG -IMS ID  101030)  ... 116 
2.1.2   Canada's review of the TRQ system  ................................ ................................ ........  118 
2.1.2.1    Question by Australia, United Kingdom (AG -IMS ID 101016)  ................................ ... 118 
2.1.3   Canada's Special Milk Class Scheme  ................................ ................................ ....... 118 
2.1.3.1    Question by New Zealand (AG -IMS ID 101013)  ................................ .....................  118 
2.1.4   Canada's dairy policies  ................................ ................................ .........................  118 
2.1.4.1    Question by New Zealand, United Kingdom (AG -IMS ID 101014)  .............................  118 
2.1.5   China's agricultural inputs subsidies  ................................ ................................ ....... 119 
2.1.5.1    Question by Canada (AG -IMS ID 101043)  ................................ .............................  119 
2.1.6   Egypt's import requirement  ................................ ................................ ...................  119 
2.1.6.1    Question by European Union (AG -IMS ID 101003)  ................................ .................  119 
2.1.7   Italy's "local content" requirement  ................................ ................................ ..........  120 
2.1.7.1    Question by Brazil (AG -IMS ID 101017)  ................................ ...............................  120 
2.1.8   EU's deforestation and forest degradation strategy  ................................ ...................  120 
2.1.8.1    Question by Brazil, Paraguay (AG -IMS ID 101033)  ................................ .................  120 
2.1.9   EU's agricultural policies funded by national resources  ................................ ...............  124 
2.1.9.1    Question by Brazil (AG -IMS ID 101031)  ................................ ...............................  124 
2.1.10    India's public stockpiling  ................................ ................................ .....................  124 
2.1.10.1    Question by United States o f America, Japan, Brazil, Canada, European Union,  
Uruguay, Australia, Thailand, Paraguay (AG -IMS ID 101028)  ................................ ...............  124 
2.1.10.2    Questio n by United States of America, Japan, Brazil, Canada, Uruguay,  
Australia, Thailand, Paraguay, European Union (AG -IMS ID 101038)  ................................ ..... 125 
2.1.11    India's oilseeds policies  ................................ ................................ .......................  126 
2.1.11.1    Question by United States of America, Paraguay, Canada,  
European Union (AG -IMS ID 101044)  ................................ ................................ ...............  126 
2.1.12    India's other support for rice  ................................ ................................ ................  127 G/AG/W/235  
 
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  2.1.12.1    Question by United States of America, Australia, Canada, Thailand, Paraguay,  
Japan, Brazil, European Union, Uruguay (AG -IMS ID 101037)  ................................ ..............  127 
2.1.13    India's export restrictions on wheat  ................................ ................................ ...... 128 
2.1.13.1    Question by Australia (AG -IMS ID 101019)  ................................ .........................  128 
2.1.13.2    Question by Switzerland (AG -IMS ID 101057)  ................................ .....................  128 
2.1.13.3    Quest ion by United States of America, Canada, Japan, Brazil, Paraguay,  
European Union, United Kingdom, Ukraine (AG -IMS ID 101032)  ................................ ...........  128 
2.1.14    Indonesia's palm oil export restrictions  ................................ ................................ .. 131 
2.1.14.1    Question by United States of Amer ica, Japan (AG -IMS ID 101058)  .........................  131 
2.1.15    Malaysia's chicken export prohibition  ................................ ................................ .... 131 
2.1.15.1    Question by Switzerland (AG -IMS ID 101059)  ................................ .....................  131 
2.1.15.2    Question by United States of America, Japan (AG -IMS ID 101060)  .........................  132 
2.1.16    Philippines - Sanitary and Phytosanitary Import Clearance (SPSIC) permits  ................  132 
2.1.16.1    Question by United States of America (AG -IMS ID 101061)  ................................ ... 132 
2.1.17   Türkiye's export restrictions on agricultural products  ................................ ...............  133 
2.1.17.1    Question by Switzerland (AG -IMS ID 101063)  ................................ .....................  133 
2.1.17.2    Question by United States of America, Japan,  
United Kingdom (AG -IMS ID 101042)  ................................ ................................ ...............  134 
2.1.18    U.S. crop production support  ................................ ................................ ...............  136 
2.1.18.1    Question by European Union, Paraguay (AG -IMS ID 101004)  ................................ . 136 
2.1.19    U.S. Co nservation Reserve Program  ................................ ................................ ...... 136 
2.1.19.1    Question by Brazil (AG -IMS ID 101035)  ................................ ..............................  136 
2.2   POINTS RAISED IN CONNECTION WITH INDIVIDUAL NOTIFICATIONS  ............................  137 
2.2.1   Administration of tariff and other quota commitments (Table MA:1)  ............................  137 
2.2.1.1    European Union (G/AG/N/EU/72)  ................................ ................................ ........  137 
2.2.2   Imports under tariff and other quota commitments (Table MA:2)  ................................  137 
2.2.2.1    Canada (G/AG/N/CAN/149, G/AG/N/CAN/150)  ................................ ......................  137 
2.2.2.2    China (G/AG/N/CHN/3)  ................................ ................................ ......................  138 
2.2.2.3    El Salvador (G/AG/N/SLV/82)  ................................ ................................ .............  139 
2.2.2.4    European Union (G/AG/N/EU/76)  ................................ ................................ ........  139 
2.2.2.5    Kazakhstan (G/AG/N/KAZ/13)  ................................ ................................ ............  141 
2.2.2.6    Panama (G/AG/N/PAN/60)  ................................ ................................ .................  141 
2.2.2.7    Thailand (G/AG/N/THA/121)  ................................ ................................ ...............  142 
2.2.2.8    United States of America (G/AG/N/USA/162)  ................................ ........................  143 
2.2.3   Domestic Support Commitments (Table DS:1)  ................................ .........................  145 
2.2.3.1    Canada (G/AG/N/CAN/151)  ................................ ................................ ................  145 
2.2.3.2    Côte d'Ivoire (G/AG/N/CIV/34)  ................................ ................................ ...........  146 
2.2.3.3    India (G/AG/N/IND/27)  ................................ ................................ ......................  147 
2.2.3.4    Japan (G/AG/N/JPN/276)  ................................ ................................ ...................  153 
2.2.3.5    Japan (G/AG/N/JPN/277)  ................................ ................................ ...................  153 
2.2.3.6    Mauritius (G/AG/N/MUS/17)  ................................ ................................ ...............  156 G/AG/W/235  
 
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  2.2.3.7    Nigeria (G/AG/N/NGA/19)  ................................ ................................ ..................  157 
2.2.3.8    Nigeria (G/AG/N/NGA/19, G/AG/N/NGA/20, G/AG/N/NGA/21)  ................................ . 157 
2.2.3.9    Panama (G/AG/N/PAN/61)  ................................ ................................ .................  158 
2.2.3.10    Paraguay (G/AG/N/PRY/34)  ................................ ................................ ..............  159 
2.2.3.11    Switzerland (G/AG/N/CHE/114)  ................................ ................................ .........  160 
2.2.3.12    United Kingdom (G/AG/N/GBR/11)  ................................ ................................ .... 160 
2.2.3.13    United States of America (G/AG/N/USA/157)  ................................ .......................  162 
2.2.4   New or modified domestic support measures (Table DS:2)  ................................ .........  163 
2.2.4.1    United Kingdom (G/AG/N/GBR /9) ................................ ................................ ........  163 
2.2.5   Export subsidy commitments (Tables ES:1, ES:2 and ES:3)  ................................ ....... 164 
2.2.5.1    Canada (G/AG/N/CAN/148)  ................................ ................................ ................  164 
2.2.5.2    European Union (G/AG/N/EU/75)  ................................ ................................ ........  165 
2.2.5.3    Japan (G/AG/N/JPN/270, G/AG/N/JPN/271, G/AG/N/JPN/272)  ................................ . 165 
2.2.5.4    United States of America (G/AG/N/USA/161)  ................................ ........................  166 
2.2.6   Export prohibitions and restrictions (Table ER:1)  ................................ ......................  167 
2.2.6.1    European Union (G/AG/N/EU/77)  ................................ ................................ ........  167 
2.3   OVERDUE NOTIFICATIONS  ................................ ................................ .......................  169 
2.3.1   Canada  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..............  169 
2.4   EXPORT COMPETITION  ................................ ................................ ............................  169 
2.4.1   Australia  ................................ ................................ ................................ .............  169 
2.4.2   India ................................ ................................ ................................ ..................  170 
2.4.3   New Zealand  ................................ ................................ ................................ ....... 171 
2.4.4   United Kingdom  ................................ ................................ ................................ ... 171 
3   COMPILATION OF RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS RAISED  
DURING THE COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE MEETING ON 14 -15 SEPTEMBER 2022  .... 173  
3.1   MATTERS RELEVANT TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF COMMITMENTS: ARTICLE  18.6 ..........  173 
3.1.1   Argentina's export restrictions  ................................ ................................ ...............  173 
3.1.1.1    Question by United States of America, United Kingdom, Japan,  
Switzerland (AG -IMS ID 102076)  ................................ ................................ .....................  173 
3.1.2   Canada's Special Milk Class Scheme  ................................ ................................ ....... 175 
3.1.2.1    Question by New Zealand (AG -IMS ID 102073)  ................................ .....................  175 
3.1.3   Canada's Review of the TRQ System  ................................ ................................ ....... 176 
3.1.3.1    Question by United Kingdom (AG -IMS ID 102090)  ................................ .................  176 
3.1.4   Canada – Financial support for wine production  ................................ ........................  176 
3.1.4.1    Question by European Union (AG -IMS ID 102009)  ................................ .................  176 
3.1.5   China's grain reserve  ................................ ................................ ............................  177 
3.1.5.1    Question by Australia (AG -IMS ID 102075)  ................................ ...........................  177 
3.1.6   China's cotton policies  ................................ ................................ ..........................  178 
3.1.6.1    Question by United States of America (AG -IMS ID 102034)  ................................ ..... 178 
3.1.6.2    Question by United States of America (AG -IMS ID 102035)  ................................ ..... 178 
3.1.7   China's cotton  reserves purchasing system  ................................ ..............................  179 G/AG/W/235  
 
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  3.1.7.1    Question by United States of America (AG -IMS ID 102033)  ................................ ..... 179 
3.1.8   China's Blue Box support to cotton  ................................ ................................ .........  180 
3.1.8.1    Question by United States of America (AG -IMS ID 102032)  ................................ ..... 180 
3.1.9   Ecuador's new milk law  ................................ ................................ .........................  181 
3.1.9.1    Question by United States of America (AG -IMS ID 102131)  ................................ ..... 181 
3.1.10    Egypt's Export Prohibitions on Agricultural Products  ................................ ................  181 
3.1.10.1    Question by New Zealand, Paraguay, United Kingdom,  
Australia (AG -IMS ID 102074)  ................................ ................................ .........................  181 
3.1.11    Egypt's import requirement  ................................ ................................ .................  182 
3.1.11.1    Question by European Union (AG -IMS ID 102010)  ................................ ................  182 
3.1.12    Egypt's increase in planted are a ................................ ................................ ...........  183 
3.1.12.1    Question by European Union (AG -IMS ID 102011)  ................................ ................  183 
3.1.13    EU's new CAP  ................................ ................................ ................................ .... 183 
3.1.13 .1   Question by Korea, Republic of (AG -IMS ID 102091)  ................................ ............  183 
3.1.14    India's export restrictions on wheat  ................................ ................................ ...... 183 
3.1.14.1    Question by Australia (AG -IMS ID 102092)  ................................ .........................  183 
3.1.14.2    Question by Paraguay (AG -IMS ID 102078)  ................................ .........................  184 
3.1.14.3    Question by European Union, United States of America, Switzerland,  
United Kingdom (AG -IMS ID 102012)  ................................ ................................ ...............  185 
3.1.14.4    Question by United States of America, Japan, Brazil, Paraguay, United Kingdom, 
Canada, Ukraine, New Zealand, European Union (AG -IMS ID 102021)  ................................ ... 186 
3.1.15    India's public stockpiling  ................................ ................................ .....................  187 
3.1.15.1    Question by Paraguay (AG -IMS ID 102079)  ................................ .........................  187 
3.1.15.2    Question by Paraguay (AG -IMS ID 102081)  ................................ .........................  188 
3.1.15.3    Question by New Zealand (AG -IMS ID 1020 83) ................................ ...................  188 
3.1.15.4    Question by United States of America, Thailand, Japan, Brazil, Australia,  
Paraguay, Canada, European Union, Ukr aine, Uruguay (AG -IMS ID 102019) ...........................  189 
3.1.15.5    Question by United States of America, Thailand, Japan, Brazil, Australia,  
Paraguay, Canada, European Union, Uruguay (AG -IMS ID 102018)  ................................ ....... 190 
3.1.16    India's oilseeds policies  ................................ ................................ .......................  191 
3.1.16.1    Question by Paraguay (AG -IMS ID 102080)  ................................ .........................  191 
3.1.17    India's price support  ................................ ................................ ...........................  191 
3.1.17.1    Question by United States of America, Australia, Paraguay (AG -IMS ID 102017)  ...... 191 
3.1.18    India's other support for rice  ................................ ................................ ................  192 
3.1.18.1    Question by United States of America, Thailand, Japan, Brazil, Australia,  
Paraguay, Canada, European Union, Uruguay (AG -IMS ID 102020)  ................................ ....... 192 
3.1.19    Indian Export Restriction measures on rice  ................................ ............................  192 
3.1.19.1    Question by European Union (AG -IMS ID 102132)  ................................ ................  192 
3.1.20    Japan's stockpiles of skim milk powder  ................................ ................................ .. 193 
3.1.20.1    Question by Australia (AG -IMS ID 102093)  ................................ .........................  193 
3.1.21    Kazakhstan's export quotas on meslin, wheat, and wheat flour  ................................ . 194 
3.1.21.1    Question by United States of America, Switzerland, Japan (AG -IMS ID 102028)  ....... 194 G/AG/W/235  
 
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  3.1.22    Mexico's  Tariff reductions on foodstuffs to improve food security  ...............................  195 
3.1.22.1    Question by New Zealand (AG -IMS ID 102101)  ................................ ...................  195 
3.1.23    Panama's support to rice, milk, and maize  ................................ .............................  195 
3.1.23.1    Question by United States of America (AG -IMS ID 102023)  ................................ ... 195 
3.1.24    Panama's compliance with its domestic support commitments  ................................ .. 196 
3.1.24.1    Question by United States of America, Canada,  
European Union (AG -IMS ID 102022)  ................................ ................................ ...............  196 
3.1.25    Philippines - Sanitary and Phytosanitary Import Clearance (SPSIC) permits  ................  197 
3.1.25.1    Question by United States of America (AG -IMS ID 102036)  ................................ ... 197 
3.1.25.2    Question by United States of America (AG -IMS ID 102037)  ................................ ... 197 
3.1.26    Philippines' import regime for rice  ................................ ................................ .........  198 
3.1.26.1    Question by United States of America (AG -IMS ID 102038)  ................................ ... 198 
3.1.27    Saudi Arabia's tariff increases on agricultural goods  ................................ ................  198 
3.1.27.1    Question by Australia (AG -IMS ID 102109)  ................................ .........................  198 
3.1.28    Chinese Taipei's import tariff on Champagne  ................................ ..........................  199 
3.1.28.1    Question by Australia (AG -IMS ID 102085)  ................................ .........................  199 
3.1.29    Tajikistan's poultry tariffs  ................................ ................................ ....................  199 
3.1.29.1    Question by United States of America (AG -IMS ID 102030)  ................................ ... 199 
3.1.30    Tajikistan's new Tax Code  ................................ ................................ ...................  200 
3.1.30.1    Question by United States of America (AG -IMS ID 102031)  ................................ ... 200 
3.1.31    Türkiye's export restrictions on agricultural products  ................................ ...............  200 
3.1.31.1    Question by  United States of America, Switzerland, Japan,  
United Kingdom (AG -IMS ID 102029)  ................................ ................................ ...............  200 
3.1.32    UK's SSG entitlements  ................................ ................................ ........................  201 
3.1.32.1    Question by India (AG -IMS ID 102095)  ................................ ..............................  201 
3.1.33    UK's Bound Total AMS  ................................ ................................ ........................  202 
3.1.33.1    Question by India (AG -IMS ID 102094)  ................................ ..............................  202 
3.1.34    U.S. funding for environmental action  ................................ ................................ ... 203 
3.1.34.1    Question by New Zealand, Paraguay (AG -IMS ID 102102)  ................................ ..... 203 
3.1.35    United States - Climate Smart Agriculture and Forestry Strategy  ...............................  203 
3.1.35.1    Question by New Zealand, Paraguay (AG -IMS ID 102103)  ................................ ..... 203 
3.1.36    U.S. support to biofuel producers  ................................ ................................ .........  204 
3.1.36.1    Question by India (AG -IMS ID 102096)  ................................ ..............................  204 
3.1.37    U.S. domestic support programmes  ................................ ................................ ...... 205 
3.1.37.1    Question by India (AG -IMS ID 102129)  ................................ ..............................  205 
3.2   POINTS RAISED IN CONNECTION WITH INDIVIDUAL NOTIFICATIONS  ............................  205 
3.2.1   Imports under tariff and other quota commitments (Table MA:2)  ................................  205 
3.2.1.1    Brazil (G/AG/N/BRA/70)  ................................ ................................ .....................  205 
3.2.1.2    Dominican Republic (G/AG/N/DOM/48)  ................................ ................................  206 
3.2.1.3    El Salvador (G/AG/N/SLV/82)  ................................ ................................ .............  206 
3.2.1.4    European Union (G/AG/N/EU/76)  ................................ ................................ ........  207 G/AG/W/235  
 
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  3.2.1.5    India (G/AG/N/IND/28)  ................................ ................................ ......................  207 
3.2.1.6    Japan (G/AG/N/JPN/278)  ................................ ................................ ...................  208 
3.2.1.7    Kazakhstan (G/AG/N/KAZ/13)  ................................ ................................ ............  208 
3.2.1.8    Korea, Republic of (G/AG/N/KOR/89)  ................................ ................................ ... 208 
3.2.1.9    Norway (G/AG/N/NOR/121)  ................................ ................................ ................  209 
3.2.1.10    Panama (G/AG/N/PAN/60)  ................................ ................................ ................  210 
3.2.1.11    Philippines (G/AG/N/PHL/82)  ................................ ................................ ............  211 
3.2.1.12    United Kingdom (G/AG/N/GBR/13)  ................................ ................................ .... 212 
3.2.1.13    United States of America (G/AG/N/USA/162)  ................................ .......................  215 
3.2.2   Special safeguards (Tables MA:3 to MA:5)  ................................ ...............................  216 
3.2.2.1    Philippines (G/AG/N/PHL/53)  ................................ ................................ ..............  216 
3.2.2.2    Philippines (G/AG/N/PHL/81)  ................................ ................................ ..............  216 
3.2.3   Domestic support commitments (Table DS:1)  ................................ ..........................  217 
3.2.3.1    Argentina (G/AG/N/ARG/50, G/AG/N/ARG/51)  ................................ ......................  217 
3.2.3.2    Argentina (G/AG/N/ARG/51)  ................................ ................................ ...............  218 
3.2.3.3    Argentina (G/AG/N/ARG/51, G/AG/N/ARG/49, G/AG/N/ARG/50)  ..............................  219 
3.2.3.4    Bolivia, Plurinational State of (G/AG/N/BO L/30)  ................................ .....................  220 
3.2.3.5    Botswana (G/AG/N/BWA/35)  ................................ ................................ ..............  221 
3.2.3.6    Cuba (G/AG/N/CUB/66)  ................................ ................................ .....................  221 
3.2.3.7    European Union (G/AG/N/EU/79)  ................................ ................................ ........  222 
3.2.3.8    Georgia (G/AG/N/GEO/25)  ................................ ................................ .................  226 
3.2.3.9    Hong Kong, China (G/AG/N/HKG/52)  ................................ ................................ ... 226 
3.2.3.10    India (G/AG/N/IND/27)  ................................ ................................ ....................  227 
3.2.3.11    Japan (G/AG/N/JPN/277)  ................................ ................................ ..................  229 
3.2.3.12    Malaysia (G/AG/N/MYS/53)  ................................ ................................ ...............  230 
3.2.3.13    Philippines (G/AG/N/PHL/85)  ................................ ................................ ............  230 
3.2.3.14    Switzerland (G/AG/N/CHE/114)  ................................ ................................ .........  231 
3.2.3.15    United Kingdom (G/AG/N/GBR/11)  ................................ ................................ .... 232 
3.2.3.16    United States of America (G/AG/N/USA/157)  ................................ .......................  237 
3.2.4   New or modified Do mestic Support Measures (Table DS:2)  ................................ ........  237 
3.2.4.1    Argentina (G/AG/N/ARG/52)  ................................ ................................ ...............  237 
3.2.4.2    Argentina (G/AG/N/ARG/53)  ................................ ................................ ...............  238 
3.2.5   Export prohibitions and restrictions (Table ER:1)  ................................ ......................  239 
3.2.5.1    Kazakhstan (G/AG/N/KAZ/19)  ................................ ................................ ............  239 
3.2.5.2    Malaysia (G/AG/N/MYS/52)  ................................ ................................ ................  239 
3.3   OVERDUE NOTIFICATIONS  ................................ ................................ .......................  240 
3.3.1   Botswana  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...........  240 
3.3.2   Canada  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..............  241 
3.3.3   China  ................................ ................................ ................................ .................  241 
3.3.4   Egypt  ................................ ................................ ................................ .................  241 G/AG/W/235  
 
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  3.3.5   Kazakhstan  ................................ ................................ ................................ .........  242 
3.3.6   Malaysia  ................................ ................................ ................................ .............  242 
3.3.7   Morocco  ................................ ................................ ................................ .............  243 
3.3.8   South Africa  ................................ ................................ ................................ ........  243 
3.4   EXPORT COMPETITION  ................................ ................................ ............................  243 
3.4.1   Australia  ................................ ................................ ................................ .............  243 
3.4.2   Canada  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..............  244 
3.4.3   China  ................................ ................................ ................................ .................  245 
3.4.4   European Union  ................................ ................................ ................................ ... 246 
3.4.5   Ghana  ................................ ................................ ................................ ................  252 
3.4.6   India ................................ ................................ ................................ ..................  253 
3.4.7   Indonesia  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...........  253 
3.4.8   Korea, Republic of  ................................ ................................ ................................  253 
3.4.9   Thailand  ................................ ................................ ................................ .............  254 
3.4.10    Türkiye  ................................ ................................ ................................ .............  254 
4   COMPIL ATION OF RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS RAISED  
DURING THE COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE MEETING ON 21 -22 NOVEMBER 2022  ..... 256  
4.1   MATTERS RELEVA NT TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF COMMITMENTS: ARTICLE 18.6  ..........  256 
4.1.1   Argentina's export restrictions  ................................ ................................ ...............  256 
4.1.1.1    Question by United Kingdom, Switzerland, Japan, New Zealand,  
European Union (AG -IMS ID 103048)  ................................ ................................ ...............  256 
4.2   Argentina's  currency controls and import licensing rules  ................................ ...............  256 
4.2.1   Question by United States of America (AG -IMS ID 103012)  ................................ ........  256 
4.3   Argentina's foreign exchange regime to facilitate soy exports  ................................ ........  257 
4.3.1   Question by European Union (AG -IMS ID 103041)  ................................ ....................  257 
4.3.2   Question by United States of America (AG -IMS ID 103013)  ................................ ........  257 
4.4   Australia, Canada, Europ ean Union, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand,  
United Kingdom, United States – Restrictions on agricultural and agriculture -related services  ... 258 
4.4.1   Question by Russian Federation (AG -IMS ID 103078)  ................................ ................  258 
4.4.2   Question by Russian Federati on (AG -IMS ID 103079)  ................................ ................  259 
4.4.3   Question by Russian Federation (AG -IMS ID 103080)  ................................ ................  259 
4.4.4   Question by Russian Federation (AG -IMS ID 103081)  ................................ ................  260 
4.4.5   Question by Russian Federation (AG -IMS ID 103082)  ................................ ................  261 
4.4.6   Question by Russian Federation (AG -IMS ID 103083)  ................................ ................  261 
4.4.7   Question by Russian Federation (AG -IMS ID 103084)  ................................ ................  262 
4.4.8   Question by Russian Federation  (AG-IMS ID 103085)  ................................ ................  263 
4.5   Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom, United States - 
Import duties in excess of the bound  rates applied on agricultural goods  ................................  266 
4.5.1   Question by Russian Federation (AG -IMS ID 103061)  ................................ ................  266 
4.5.2   Question by Russian Federation (AG -IMS ID 103062)  ................................ ................  266 
4.5.3   Question by Russian Federation (AG -IMS ID 103063)  ................................ ................  267 
4.5.4   Question by Russian Federation (AG -IMS ID 103064)  ................................ ................  267 G/AG/W/235  
 
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  4.5.5   Question by Russian Federation (AG -IMS ID 103065)  ................................ ................  267 
4.6   Canada's Special Milk Class Scheme  ................................ ................................ ..........  273 
4.6.1   Question by New Zealand (AG -IMS ID 103130)  ................................ ........................  273 
4.7   Canada, European Union , Iceland, Norway, New Zealand, Japan – Prohibitions and 
restrictions on agricultural machinery supplies  ................................ ................................ ... 275 
4.7.1   Question by Russian Federation (AG -IMS ID 103070)  ................................ ................  275 
4.7.2   Question by Russian Federation (AG -IMS ID 103069)  ................................ ................  275 
4.7.3   Question by Russian Federation (AG -IMS ID 103071)  ................................ ................  275 
4.7.4   Question by Russian Federation (AG -IMS ID 103074)  ................................ ................  276 
4.7.5   Question by Russian Federation (AG -IMS ID 103073)  ................................ ................  276 
4.7.6   Question by Russian Federation (AG -IMS ID 103072)  ................................ ................  277 
4.8   Canada's review of the TRQ system  ................................ ................................ ...........  280 
4.8.1   Question by United Kingdom (AG -IMS ID 103086)  ................................ ....................  280 
4.9   Canada's compensation for farmers after trade concessions  ................................ ..........  280 
4.9.1   Question by India (AG -IMS ID 103135)  ................................ ................................ ... 280 
4.10   China's grain subsidies  ................................ ................................ ..........................  281 
4.10.1    Question by Australia (AG -IMS ID 103087)  ................................ ............................  281 
4.11   China's recent agricultural policy modifications  ................................ ..........................  282 
4.11.1    Question by Brazil (AG -IMS ID 103004)  ................................ ................................  282 
4.12   China's pork reserve programme  ................................ ................................ .............  283 
4.12.1    Question by United States of America, Canada, Australia (AG -IMS ID 103015)  ............  283 
4.12.2    Question by United States of America, Canada, Australia (AG -IMS ID 103016)  ............  284 
4.12.3    Question by United States of America, Canada, Australia (AG -IMS ID 103017)  ............  284 
4.13   China's swine support  ................................ ................................ ............................  285 
4.13.1    Question by United States of America, Canada, Brazil, Australia (AG -IMS ID 103014)  .. 285 
4.14   China's cotton reserves purchasing system  ................................ ...............................  285 
4.14.1    Question by United States of America (AG -IMS ID 103019)  ................................ ...... 285 
4.14.2    Question by United States of America (AG -IMS ID 103020)  ................................ ...... 286 
4.14.3    Question by United States of America (AG -IMS ID 103021)  ................................ ...... 286 
4.14.4    Question by United States of America (AG -IMS ID 103022)  ................................ ...... 286 
4.15   China's Cotton Policies  ................................ ................................ ...........................  287 
4.15.1    Questio n by United States of America (AG -IMS ID 103018)  ................................ ...... 287 
4.16   China's Export Restrictions on corn starch  ................................ ................................  287 
4.16.1    Question by European Union (AG -IMS ID 103042)  ................................ ..................  287 
4.16.2    Question by United Kingdom, Switzerland, Japan (AG -IMS ID 103051)  ......................  288 
4.17   Ecuador's new milk law  ................................ ................................ ..........................  288 
4.17.1    Question by United States of America, N ew Zealand, Australia,  
European Union (AG -IMS ID 103023)  ................................ ................................ ...............  288 
4.18   Egypt's Export Prohibitions on Agricultural Products  ................................ ...................  289 
4.18.1    Question by Switzerland, United Kingdom (AG -IMS ID 103088)  ................................  289 
4.19   EU's Deforestation And Forest Degradation Strategy  ................................ ..................  289 G/AG/W/235  
 
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  4.19.1    Question by Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay (AG -IMS ID 103006)  ................................ .. 289 
4.20   European Union, Iceland, Norway – Prohibitions on road freight transport  .....................  293 
4.20.1    Question by Russian Federation (AG -IMS ID 103075)  ................................ ..............  293 
4.20.2    Question by Russian Federation (AG -IMS ID 103076)  ................................ ..............  293 
4.20.3    Question by Russian Federation (AG -IMS ID 103077)  ................................ ..............  294 
4.21   European Union, Iceland, Norway – Prohibitions on access to ports  ..............................  297 
4.21.1    Question by Russian Federation, Nicaragua,  
Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of (AG -IMS ID 103066)  ................................ ........................  297 
4.21.2    Question by Russian Federation, Nicaragua,  
Venezuela,  Bolivarian Republic of (AG -IMS ID 103067)  ................................ ........................  298 
4.21.3    Question by Russian Federation, Nicaragua,  
Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic  of (AG -IMS ID 103068)  ................................ ........................  299 
4.22   EU's Temporary Framework for State Aid  ................................ ................................ . 302 
4.22.1    Question by Brazil (AG -IMS ID 103089)  ................................ ................................  302 
4.23   EU's Blue Box programmes  ................................ ................................ ....................  303 
4.23.1    Question by India (AG -IMS ID 103136)  ................................ ................................ . 303 
4.24   France - "European Food and Agricultural Resilience Mission" initiati ve .........................  303 
4.24.1    Question by Brazil, Paraguay (AG -IMS ID 103005)  ................................ ..................  303 
4.25   India's export restrictions on wheat  ................................ ................................ .........  304 
4.25.1    Question by United Kingdom, Switzerland, Ukraine,  
European Union (AG -IMS ID 103060)  ................................ ................................ ...............  304 
4.25.2    Questio n by Australia (AG -IMS ID 103092)  ................................ ............................  305 
4.26   India's dairy subsidies  ................................ ................................ ...........................  305 
4.26.1    Question by Australia (AG -IMS ID 103090)  ................................ ............................  305 
4.27   India's public stockholding  ................................ ................................ .....................  306 
4.27.1    Question by United States of America, Canada, Japan, Thailand, Brazil, Paraguay, 
Uruguay, Australia, New Zealand, European Union (AG -IMS ID 103025)  ................................  306 
4.27.2    Question by United States of America, Canada, Japan, Thailand, Ukraine, Brazil,  
Paraguay, Uruguay, Australia, New Zealand, European Union (AG -IMS ID 103026)  .................  306 
4.28   India's other support for rice  ................................ ................................ ..................  307 
4.28.1    Question by United States of America, Canada, Japan, Thailand, Brazil, Paraguay, 
Uruguay, Australia, New Zealand, European Union (AG -IMS ID 103029)  ................................  307 
4.29   India's food security policies  ................................ ................................ ...................  308 
4.29.1    Question by United States of America, Japan, Paraguay,  
New Zealand (AG -IMS ID 103027)  ................................ ................................ ...................  308 
4.30   India's price support  ................................ ................................ .............................  309 
4.30.1    Question by United States of America, Paraguay, Australia  (AG-IMS ID 103024)  .........  309 
4.31   India's export restriction on sugar  ................................ ................................ ...........  310 
4.31.1    Question by Australia (AG -IMS ID 103091)  ................................ ............................  310 
4.32   India's export restriction measures on rice  ................................ ...............................  310 
4.32.1    Question by United States of America, Canada, Japan, Switzerland,  
United Kingdom, Paraguay, Australia, New Zealand, European Union (AG -IMS ID 103028)  ....... 310 
4.33   Indonesia's stockholding programmes  ................................ ................................ ...... 312 G/AG/W/235  
 
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  4.33.1    Question by Canada (AG -IMS ID 103093)  ................................ ..............................  312 
4.34   Japan's stockpiles of  skim milk powder  ................................ ................................ .... 312 
4.34.1    Question by Australia (AG -IMS ID 103094)  ................................ ............................  312 
4.35   Korea's tariff policies  ................................ ................................ .............................  313 
4.35.1    Question by New Zealand (AG -IMS ID 103124)  ................................ ......................  313 
4.35.2    Question by Australia (AG -IMS ID 103095)  ................................ ............................  314 
4.36   Malaysia's chicken and egg subsidies and export restrictions for chicken  .......................  315 
4.36.1    Question by Australia (AG -IMS ID 103096)  ................................ ............................  315 
4.37   Mexico's ban on exports of  agricultural products  ................................ ........................  315 
4.37.1    Question by European Union (AG -IMS ID 1 03043)  ................................ ..................  315 
4.37.2    Question by Switzerland (AG -IMS ID 103097)  ................................ ........................  316 
4.37.3    Question by United States of America (AG -IMS ID 103030)  ................................ ...... 316 
4.38   Morocco's export restriction of chickpea (Licence exportation pois chiches)  ....................  317 
4.38.1    Question by European Union (AG -IMS ID 103044)  ................................ ..................  317 
4.39   South A frica's poultry TRQ administration  ................................ ................................ . 317 
4.39.1    Question by Uruguay (AG -IMS ID 103045)  ................................ ............................  317 
4.40   Thailand's Paddy Pledging Scheme  ................................ ................................ ..........  318 
4.40.1    Question by India (AG -IMS ID 103137)  ................................ ................................ . 318 
4.41   Türkiye's export restrictions  on agricultural products  ................................ ..................  319 
4.41.1    Question by United Kingdom, Switzerland, Japan, New Zealand,  
European Union (AG -IMS ID 1030 54) ................................ ................................ ...............  319 
4.42   Türkiye's freight support  ................................ ................................ ........................  320 
4.42.1    Question by United States of America, Brazil, Australia (AG -IMS ID 103031)  ..............  320 
4.43   Türkiye's stone fruit support  ................................ ................................ ...................  321 
4.43.1    Question by Australia ( AG-IMS ID 103098)  ................................ ............................  321 
4.44   U.S. Inflation Reduction Act 2022  ................................ ................................ ............  321 
4.44.1    Question by Australia (AG -IMS ID 103100)  ................................ ............................  321 
4.45   United States' soybean programmes  ................................ ................................ ........  322 
4.45.1    Question by China (AG -IMS ID 103046)  ................................ ................................  322 
4.45.2    Question by China (AG -IMS ID 103047)  ................................ ................................  323 
4.46   U.S. funding for environmental action  ................................ ................................ ...... 324 
4.46.1    Question by New Zealand (AG -IMS ID 10 3107)  ................................ ......................  324 
4.47   U.S. expanded insurance coverage for soybean and grain sorghum  ..............................  324 
4.47.1    Question by Brazil (AG -IMS ID 103002)  ................................ ................................  324 
4.48   U.S. corn support  ................................ ................................ ................................ . 325 
4.48.1    Question by China (AG -IMS ID 103049)  ................................ ................................  325 
4.49   U.S. fertilizers  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 325 
4.49.1    Question by European Union (AG -IMS ID 103053)  ................................ ..................  325 
4.50   U.S. biofuel infrastructure grants  ................................ ................................ ............  326 
4.50.1    Question by European Union (AG -IMS ID 103055)  ................................ ..................  326 
4.51   U.S. Urban Agriculture and Innova tive Production  ................................ ......................  326 G/AG/W/235  
 
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  4.51.1    Question by India (AG -IMS ID 103138)  ................................ ................................ . 326 
4.52   U.S. Farm Bill 2023  ................................ ................................ ...............................  327 
4.52.1    Question by India (AG-IMS ID 103139)  ................................ ................................ . 327 
4.53   U.S. American Rescue Plan Act  ................................ ................................ ...............  327 
4.53.1    Question by Australia (AG -IMS ID 103099)  ................................ ............................  327 
5   POINTS RAI SED IN CONNECTION WITH INDIVIDUAL NOTIFICATIONS  ..................  328  
5.1   Imports under tariff and other quota commitments (Table MA:2)  ................................ ... 328 
5.1.1   China (G/AG/N/CHN/57)  ................................ ................................ .......................  328 
5.1.2   Iceland (G/AG/N/ISL/65, G/AG/N/ISL/66)  ................................ ...............................  329 
5.1.3   Iceland (G/AG/N/ISL/66)  ................................ ................................ ......................  329 
5.1.4   Malaysia (G/AG/N/MYS/54)  ................................ ................................ ...................  330 
5.1.5   United States of America (G/AG/N/USA/162)  ................................ ...........................  330 
5.2   Domestic support commitments (Table DS :1) ................................ .............................  331 
5.2.1   Australia (G/AG/N/AUS/129/Rev.1, G/AG/N/AUS/129)  ................................ ..............  331 
5.2.2   Australia (G/AG/N/AUS/142)  ................................ ................................ .................  332 
5.2.3   Canada (G/AG/N/CAN/151)  ................................ ................................ ...................  332 
5.2.4   European Union (G/AG/N/EU/79)  ................................ ................................ ...........  333 
5.2.5   Georgia (G/AG/N/GEO/28)  ................................ ................................ ....................  334 
5.2.6   Georgia (G/AG/N/GEO/28, G/AG/N/GEO/25) ................................ ............................  334 
5.2.7   Japan (G/AG/N/JPN/277)  ................................ ................................ ......................  335 
5.2.8   Malaysia (G/AG/N/MYS/53)  ................................ ................................ ...................  335 
5.2.9   Mexico (G/AG/N/MEX/56)  ................................ ................................ .....................  336 
5.2.10    Mexico (G/AG/N/MEX/56, G/AG/N/MEX/55)  ................................ ...........................  340 
5.2.11    New Zealand (G/AG/N/NZL/132)  ................................ ................................ ..........  340 
5.2.12    Pakistan (G/AG/N/PAK/17/Corr.1, G/AG/N/PAK/18/Corr.1, G/AG/N/PAK/19/Corr.1)  ..... 341 
5.2.13    Paraguay (G/AG/N/PRY/34)  ................................ ................................ .................  341 
5.2.14    Philippines (G/AG/N/PHL/85)  ................................ ................................ ...............  342 
5.2.15    Russian Federation (G/AG/N/RUS/37)  ................................ ................................ ... 342 
5.2.16    United Kingdom (G/AG/N/GBR/11)  ................................ ................................ ....... 343 
5.2.17    United States of America (G/AG/N/USA/157)  ................................ .........................  344 
5.2.18    United States of America (G/AG/N/USA/166)  ................................ .........................  345 
5.3   New or modified domestic support measures (Table DS:2)  ................................ ...........  352 
5.3.1   Brazil (G/AG/N/BRA/68)  ................................ ................................ .......................  352 
5.3.2   United Kingdom (G/AG/N/GBR/14)  ................................ ................................ .........  353 
5.3.3   United Kingdom (G/AG/N/GBR/4)  ................................ ................................ ...........  356 
5.4   Export prohibitions and restrictions (Table ER:1)  ................................ .........................  357 
5.4.1   European Union (G/AG/N/EU/77/Rev.2)  ................................ ................................ .. 357 
5.4.2   Malaysia (G/AG/N/MYS/52/Add.1)  ................................ ................................ ..........  357 
5.5   Notifications in the context of the NFIDC decision (Table NF:1)  ................................ ..... 358 
5.5.1   Japan (G/AG/N/JPN/269)  ................................ ................................ ......................  358 G/AG/W/235  
 
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  6   OVERDUE NOTIFICATIONS  ................................ ................................ ......................  358  
6.1.1   Uruguay  ................................ ................................ ................................ .............  358 
 G/AG/W/235  
 
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  1  COMPILATION OF RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS RAISED DURING THE COMMITTEE ON 
AGRICULTURE MEETING ON 15 -16 MARCH 202 2 
1.1  MATTERS RELEVANT TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF COMMITMENTS: ARTICLE 18.6  
1.1.1   Angola's import policies  
1.1.1.1   Question by European Union (AG -IMS ID 100058 ) 
On 14 January 2019, Angola published Presidential Decree 23/19, i.e., The Regulation of the 
Commercial Chain of Supply of Goods of Basic Basket and Other Priority Goods of National Origin, 
which provides new import rules on 54 products, mainly agricultural goods . This Presidential Decree 
seeks to support domestic production and economic development by restricting importers' access to 
imports, including through an import licensing system that appears to prioritize the use of domestic 
production, similar to an impo rt substitution policy. Given the potential impacts on EU's exports to 
Angola of agricultural products covered by Presidential Decree 23/19, the EU would appreciate if 
Angola could provide clarifications on the following points:  
• Could Angola provide additi onal information on the agricultural products covered by the 
scope of Presidential Decree 23/19, including the specific HS codes for each commodity, as 
well as a list of specific goods produced in the Special Luanda -Bengo Economic Zone that 
are subject to the Decree?  
• Could Angola explain how the restrictions are implemented, and notably if licenses are used 
to manage these restrictions?  
• Could Angola elaborate on the process importers and wholesalers have to follow to be eligible 
for an import licence, inclu ding on the specific steps required?  
• Could Angola provide additional clarifications on the quantitative restrictions laid down by 
Article 11 of the Decree, especially on how the assessment of the existence of internal 
capacity for import substitution is co nducted?  
Angola previously indicated that cancellation of the Decree will depend on the achievement of its 
objectives.  
• Could Angola elaborate on the methodology and process for the assessment of the 
achievement of those objectives?  
Answer by Angola  
Follow -up: Brazil indicated that it had also expressed concerns in previous CoA meetings regarding 
Angola's Presidential Decree establishing quantitative restrictions on imports of agriculture products 
which was seemingly in violation of Article 4 of the AoA amon g other issues as reflected in the EU's 
question. Brazil expressed its eagerness to receive Angola's response.  
1.1.2   Argentina's export restrictions on beef  
1.1.2.1   Question by European Union (AG -IMS ID 100001 ) 
According to information in World Beef report issue no 1454 (7 December 2021) the Argentinian 
government intends to maintain export restrictions for beef during 2022. According to Article 12 of 
the Agreement on Agriculture Members shall give notice in writ ing to CoA on such measures.  
a. Can Argentina explain how the export restrictions for beef will be applied for the different 
beef products and countries as applicable in calendar year 2022?  
b. Does Argentina intend to send ER:1 notification for the 2022 export r estrictions on beef 
export?  
According to the same article measures would also be announced for wheat and maize.  
c. Can Argentina explain the same questions for these measures as well?  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  Answer by Argentina  
By means of Decree No. 911/2021 and Resolution No. 301/ 2021, published in December 2021, new 
guidelines were set for building a public policy for the meat chain for the next few years, with the 
consensus of the producing entities. This was aimed at providing the sector with predictability by 
ensuring productio n, exports and consumption on the basis of technical analyses.  In this framework, 
only certain bovine meat cuts (ribs with or without bone, naval, rose, rib cap, round, shoulder and 
flank) favoured by the Argentine market and mass consumption have been tem porarily reserved for 
export.  Second, in relation to wheat and maize, Resolution No. 276/21 was published in December 
2021 with the aim of making the production chain more predictable and reliable.  It should be noted 
that our country's agricultural exports  have increased significantly, with beef, maize and wheat 
following this trend. In 2020/2021, beef exports increased by 26% over the previous biennium and 
by 227% compared to 2016/2017.Moreover, 2021 was a record year for maize and wheat exports, 
with Arge ntine maize exports reaching a 10 year high and wheat exports at their second highest 
level in the past 10 years.  
1.1.2.2   Question by Japan (AG -IMS ID 100063 ) 
Japan recognizes that Argentina has introduced another export ban and restriction on some parts of 
beef from the 3rd of January 2022, announced in Decr eto 911/2021.  
(https://www.boletinoficial.gob.ar/detalleAviso/primera/255612/20220103 )  
Could Argentina answer the following questions?   
a. Although Japan appre ciates the information provided by Argentina on its domestic 
legislation in its reply to AG -IMS ID  98117  and AG -IMS ID 99096 , Japan regrets that the 
require d notification to the Committee on Agriculture has not been made in accordance 
with Article 12 of the Agreement on Agriculture. We would appreciate if Argentina could 
inform us when the ER notification would be submitted complying with the Article 12 of 
AoA. Japan considers it important that the ER notification shall be submitted "as far in 
advance as practicable", for the predictability and transparency of the measure.  
b. We understand the current measures include export ban on many products while the 
previou s measures were export quotas "equivalent to 50% of the monthly average of the 
total tonnage of meat products exported in the period July December 2020". Could 
Argentina illustrate the details of the current measures imposed from January  2022, as 
well as p rovide the background including domestic supply -demand situation that lead to 
the modification of the measures?  
c. We understand the current measure has been announced to be implemented until 
31st December 2023. Could Argentina explain how the measure meets t he condition of 
Article XI of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) that the measure shall be 
"temporarily applied to prevent or relieve critical shortages"?  
Answer by Argentina  
By means of Decree No. 911/2021 and Resolution No. 301/2021, published  in December 2021, new 
guidelines were set for building a public policy for the meat chain for the next few years, with the 
consensus of the producing entities. This was aimed at providing the sector with predictability by 
ensuring production, exports and consumption on the basis of technical analyses. In this framework, 
only certain bovine meat cuts (ribs with or without bone, naval, rose, rib cap, round, shoulder and 
flank) favoured by the Argentine market and mass consumption have been temporarily reserv ed for 
export.  
Follow -up: Japan enquired about the timing of Argentina's notification on this matter.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  1.1.3   Argentina's export restrictions of wheat  
1.1.3.1   Question by Japan (AG -IMS ID 100062 ) 
a.  
i. Japan recognizes that Argentina introduced export restriction on wheat on the  
17th December  2021.  However, the required notification to the Committee on 
Agriculture has not been made in accordance with Article 12 of the Agreement on 
Agriculture. Could Argentina provide the reason behind and please make the 
notification on this measure in near future.  
ii. Could Argentina explain how it has given due consideration to the effects of the 
measure on importing Members ' food securit y, as required in Article 12 of the 
Agreement on Agriculture.  
b.  
i. According to Bolsa de Comercio de Rosario, BCR, the wheat production in 2021/2022 
will record  the highest amount ever. Could Argentina explain how the measure meets 
the conditions required in A rticle XI of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT): 
namely i) essentiality of the products, ii) criticalness of the shortages, and 
iii) temporality of the measure.  
Answer by Argentina  
Resolution No. 276/21 was published in December 2021 with the ai m of making the production chain 
more predictable and reliable.  It should be noted that investments in technology and good 
agricultural practices, combined with good weather conditions, have resulted in a historic wheat 
harvest in our country. According to  official figures, 22,100,000 tonnes will be produced during the 
2021/2022 season, an increase of 25.6% over the previous year. We have achieved these record 
levels in a sustainable way, by incorporating good agricultural practices, biotechnology and the e ntire 
knowledge -based  economy offered by the biotech and ag tech ecosystem on a large scale.  There is 
no way the measure on wheat could have affected importing Members' food security, as our exports 
have grown tremendously. For this harvest (2021/2022), we  expect 14.5 million tonnes to be 
exported, while 10.74 million tonnes were exported last season and 11.9 million tonnes the season 
before (when the last record was reached).  
Follow -up: The United States called upon all Members to keep their food and agric ulture markets 
open and guard against any unjustified restrictive measures on their exports. The US added that 
predictability in trade was needed on a global scale more than ever as any further increase in food 
price levels and volatility in international markets could threaten food security and nutrition around 
the world, especially among the most vulnerable living in environments of low food security. The US 
said it would review Argentina's response closely and noted that Argentina had experienced increas e 
in exports.  
The United Kingdom highlighted that transparency of export restrictions was important to the 
Committee and for the overall stability and security of global trade in key commodities, the 
importance of which was amplified by the current global  food security issues caused by the war in 
Ukraine. It added that in line with the recent statements by the G -7 agriculture ministers on the 
invasion of Ukraine by armed forces of the Russian Federation, it was calling on all countries to keep 
their food a nd agriculture markets open  and to guard against any unjustified restrictive measures 
on their exports. Any further increase in food price levels and volatility in international markets could 
threaten food security and nutrition at a global scale especially impacting the most vulnera ble and 
food insecure.  
The European Union also expressed interest in the issue in the context of food security challenges 
and recalled the importance of transparency on such measures.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  1.1.4   Australia's ethanol tax  
1.1.4.1   Question by United States of America (AG -IMS ID  100002 ) 
According to the Australian Taxation Office webpage on excise duty rates, domestically produced 
denatured ethanol for use as fuel in an internal com bustion engine is taxed at the rate of 
AUD 0.142  per liter.  
(Source : https://www.ato.gov.au/business/excise -on-fuel-and-petroleum -products/lodging, -
paying -and-rates---excisable -fuel/excise -duty-rates-for-fuel-and-petroleum -products/ ) 
According to the Australian Border Force webpage, the rate charged for imported ite ms under 
subheading 2207.20.10, ethanol for use as fuel in an internal combustion engine, is AUD 0.433  per 
liter.  
(https://www.abf.gov.au/importing -exporting -and-manufacturing/tariff -classification/current -
tariff/schedule -5 and https:// www.abf.gov.au/importing -exporting -and-manufacturing/tariff -
classification/current -tariff/schedule -3/section -iv/chapter -22)  
This appears to subject imported ethanol for use as fuel in a combustion engine to a different 
customs duty rate than the rate applied to domestically produced denatured ethanol for use as fuel 
in an internal combustion engine.  
Please explain why imported ethanol for use as fuel in an internal combustion engine is subject to a 
higher duty rate than domestically produced denatured ethanol for use as fuel in an internal 
combustion engine.   
Answer by Australia  
Australia thanks the U nited States for its question. The information cited from publicly available 
websites ensures we provide as much transparency as possible to Members with r espect to import 
conditions for ethanol for use as a fuel in a combustion engine.  
Ethanol production in Australia is very small, with only three ethanol production facilities in 
operation. Generally, ethanol is made from waste products such as sugar cane,  or the waste from 
starch production and red sorghum.  
Prior to 2015 the Australian Government had been providing grants to ethanol manufacturers and 
importers, to offset the cost of the excise charged. In 2015 this grant scheme was abolished and 
the excis e collected was to raise funds to invest into a sustainable and renewable energy industry. 
A new excise regime was formulated that would provide a path forward for a sustainable domestic 
renewable fuel industry, supporting energy security and the governmen t's environmental objectives. 
The phase -in of the excise also gave Australia 's three small ethanol production facilities in operation 
time to adjust, and encouraged these businesses to be self -supporting.  
Australia thanks the US for bringing this issue to our attention and we will review this excise 
measure.  
Follow -up: The European Union indicated its interest in the question in particular the systemic issue 
raised by the U nited States in it. 
1.1.5   Canada's review of the TRQ system  
1.1.5.1   Question by Australia (AG -IMS ID 100059 ) 
Australia thanks Canada for updating the Membership with its Comprehensive Review of the 
Allocation and Administration of Tariff Rate Quotas for Dairy, Poultry and Egg Products (Phase II). 
Australia notes from its response to previous questions that Canada has paused the review as a 
result of Canada's federal election.   G/AG/W/235  
 
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  a. As it has been almost a year since public consultations have closed and some months since its 
federal election, could Canada please provide a further update to the Membership on when it expects 
to finalise and announce the conclusions of its review?  
Answer by Canada  
Canada appreciates Austr alia's continued interest in the Comprehensive Review of the Allocation and 
Administration of Tariff Rate Quotas (TRQs) for Dairy, Poultry and Egg Products (the Review). All 
feedback received from stakeholders throughout the consultations has been consider ed and will help 
inform decisions on long -term TRQ policies. Canada aims to finalize the Review this year.  
1.1.5.2   Question by European Union (AG -IMS ID 100039 ) 
From January to March 2021, Canada has held consultations about its management of tariff -rate 
quotas. The European Union would like to ask what conclusions were drawn from these consultations, 
whether Canada intends to review its quota management system, and w hat timeline is envisaged.  
Answer by Canada  
Canada appreciates the European Union's continued interest in the Comprehensive Review of the 
Allocation and Administration of Tariff Rate Quotas (TRQs) for Dairy, Poultry and Egg Products (the 
Review). All feedb ack received from stakeholders throughout the consultations has been considered 
and will help inform decisions on long -term TRQ policies. Canada aims to finalize the Review this 
year.  
1.1.5.3   Question by United Kingdom (AG -IMS ID 100065 ) 
The United Kingdom thanks Canada for its response to Ag -IMS questions AG -IMS IDs 99099  and 
99110 . We note that the results of Canada's Comprehensive Review of the Allocation and 
Administration of supply managed TRQs have not yet been announced. Could Canada please provide 
an update as to when these results are expected to be released?  
Answer by Canada  
Canada appreciates the United Kingdom's continued interest in the Comprehensive Review of the 
Allocation and Administration of Tariff Rate Quotas (TRQs) for Dairy, Poultry and Egg Products (the 
Review). All feedback received from stakeholder s throughout the consultations has been considered 
and will help inform decisions on long -term TRQ policies. Canada aims to finalize the Review this 
year.  
Follow -up: New Zealand expressed interest in this question. The United States also noted its interest  
in Canada's Review of its TRQ management.  
1.1.6   Canada's compensation to dairy farmers after trade concessions  
1.1.6.1   Question by European Union (AG -IMS ID 100040 ) 
In August 2019, Canada has announced a Dairy Direct Programme, and later on it published a call 
for applications, covering CAD 937 million, CAD 469 mil lion for the years 2021 -2022 and 
CAD 468 million for 2022 -2023.  The European Union would like to ask about the rate of uptake of 
this programme, and when the programme will be notified in Canada's notifications.  
Answer by Canada  
The Dairy Direct Payment Pr ogram provides CAD 1.75B over four  years to eligible dairy producers 
for the impacts of CETA and CPTPP. Through the Dairy Direct Payment Program, CAD 345 million in 
cash payments was available in 2019 -20, CAD 468 million in 2020 -21, and CAD 469 million is 
currently available for 2021 -2022. The remaining CAD 468 million will be made available 
in 2022-2023.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  Of this amount, the Dairy Direct Payment Program paid out over CAD 338 million the first year of 
the programme (2019 -2020) and over CAD 459 million under the second year of the program me 
(2020 -2021). To date, a total of CAD 433.7 million has been paid out under the third year of the 
programme (2021 -2022). Producers have until 31  March  2022, to apply for the third year of the 
program.  
Follow -up: The European Union noted that they were still awaiting a response from Canada on the 
second part of the question regarding when Canada would notify on the programme.  
1.1.7   Canada's  support to Prince Edward Island potato producers  
1.1.7.1   Question by India (AG -IMS ID 100140 ) 
This question originally formed part of AG -IMS ID 100056 . It has now been resubmitted as a separate 
question.  
As per the news release dated 20 December 2021 ( https://www.canada.ca/en/agriculture -agri-
food/news/2021/12/minister -bibeau -announces -28-million -to-support -prince -edward -island -
potato -producers -impacted -by-trade-disruptions.html ), "Minister Bibeau announces CAD 28 million 
to support Prince Edward Island potato producers impacted by trade disruptions". India requests 
Canada to elaborate on the follow ing: 
a. The nature of the measure and under what provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture 
can it be categorised?  
b. As per Canada, what would amount to trade disruption?  
c. How would the impact of trade disruptions be calculated?  
d. In the news release, it is also m entioned that the support will resume full market access 
for PEI fresh potatoes. How would this support impact the international market of 
potatoes?  
e. When will Canada notify this support to the WTO?  
Answer by Canada  
a. The support provided under this programme  will be classified in accordance with the 
criteria in the Agreement on Agriculture and notified in due course.   
b. Canada draws India 's attention to the  21 November  2021 statement from The Honourable 
Marie -Claude Bibeau on potato wart in Prince Edward Island  regarding the temporary 
suspension of the trade in fresh potatoes from Prince Edward Island to the United 
States.  https://www.canada.ca/en/food -inspection -agency/news/2021/11/statement -by-
the-honourable -marie -claude -bibeau -on-potato -wart-in-prince -edward -island.html   
c. Potatoes are a storable commodity sold 'fresh' throughout the year. To calculate any 
disruptions to the market, at the end of the potato marketing year (August 2021 -July 2022 
for the 2021 crop), the Prince Edward Island Potato Board would review the marketable 
seed and table stock potatoes left in storage, the quantity discarded/lost while in storage 
and the quantity of potatoes diverted to other markets and use this information to quantify 
the trade lost due to export disruptions for PEI potatoes.  
d. The News Release states, "The Government of Canada is taking a T eam Canada approach 
and working collaboratively with the Province of PEI and industry to support potato 
growers and resume full market access for PEI fresh potatoes. ", referring to the full 
complement of Government of Canada response to the trade disruptio n, inclusive of 
ongoing efforts to engage with United States Department of Agriculture for reopening of 
the potato market in the United States.  The funding of up to CAD 28 million will be used 
to support the diversion of surplus potatoes, including help to  redirect surplus potatoes to 
domestic organizations addressing food insecurity and support for the environmentally -G/AG/W/235  
 
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  sound disposal of surplus potatoes.  As the support is directed only to domestic activities, 
there would  be no impact on international market s.  
e. Canada will notify this support in due course.   
1.1.8   Canada's support to the pork industry  
1.1.8.1   Question by India (AG -IMS ID 100141 ) 
This question originally forme d part of AG -IMS ID 100056 . It has now been resubmitted as a separate 
questio n (see G/AG/W/217/Corr.1  -to be issued) . 
As per a news release dated 7 December 2021 ( https://www.canada.ca/en/agriculture -agri-
food/news/2021/12/minister -bibeau -announces -federal -support -to-help-pork-producers -grow-
their-markets -and-protect -against -african -swine -fever.html ), the Minister announced an 
investment of mor e than CAD 4.6 million for three projects to grow the pork industry within Canada 
and in international markets. India requests Canada to elaborate on the following:  
a. the details of the three projects mentioned in the news release for which announcement 
of an investment of more than CAD 4.6 million is made?  
b. The nature of the measure and under what provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture 
can it be categorised?  
c. It is also understood that Canada Pork International will undertake export market 
development init iatives to maintain and improve access to international markets". In this 
regard, Canada is requested to state:   
i. the relevant category of support under the Agreement on Agriculture for this measure?  
ii. Who would be the beneficiaries of this measure?  
Answer by Canada  
a. Through the investment of  CAD 3.2 million Canada Pork International will undertake 
market development activities in international markets such as in -store demonstrations, 
developing marketing resources and tools that provide consumers with information on the 
quality wholesomeness and safety of Canadian pork  Additional information can be viewed 
at: Global Programs – Canada Pork . 
The funding of  CAD 550 K will support  the Canada Pork Council 's activities related to 
national pork marketing and gathering of market intelligence.  These funds support the 
generic development of the pork market in Canada by raising awareness that Canadian 
pork is produced on a foundation of on -farm food safety, responsible animal care and 
mandatory trace ability.  It is also raised without the use of growth hormones (like all pork 
in Canada) and is processed at participating federally approved HACCP plants across 
Canada. Additional information can be viewed here: Domestic Programs – Canada Pork . 
The funding  of CAD 850k will support activities related to Canada 's overall African Swine 
Fever preparedness such as  the development of a national hog on -farm biosecurity audit, 
development of an assembly yard audit, and development of communications products 
targeti ng small -scale hog producers.  These activities contribute to Canada 's overall African 
Swine Fever preparedness. For example, the communications efforts with small -scale 
producers will help ensure small producers have the most relevant information to reduce  
the risks associated with animal disease and on farm biosecurity.  The development of audit 
programs for commercial hog farms and assembly yards will help increase the overall level 
of biosecurity, which is one of the more effective ways to prevent disease  and improve 
animal health.   
b. The support provided under this programme will be classified in accordance with the 
criteria in the Agreement on Agriculture and notified in due course.   G/AG/W/235  
 
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  c.  
i. the relevant category of support under the Agreement on Agriculture for this 
measure?   
The support provided under this programme will be classified in accordance with the 
criteria in the Agreement on Agriculture and notified in due course.   
ii. who would be the beneficiaries of this measure?   
The entire Canadian pork supply chain will benefit from these measures. By 
undertaking activities that differentiate and demonstrate the value of Canadian pork 
supports the sustainability and competitiveness of the sector. Undertaking activities 
that prepare and prevent African Swine Fever, he lps ensure the Canadian pork sector 
remains in business.  
1.1.9   Canada's Herd Management and Drought Assistance program  
1.1.9.1   Question by India (AG -IMS ID 100142 ) 
This qu estion originally formed part of AG -IMS ID 100056 .  
It has now been resubmitted as a separate question.  
As per a news release dated 30 November 2021 ( https://www.canada.ca/en/agriculture -agri-
food/news/2021/11/governments -of-canada -and-manitoba -announce -new-herd-management -
program -under -agrirecovery -framework.html ), the Canada and Manitoba Government had 
announced a Herd Management D rought Assistance programme under the Agri Recovery framework. 
In this regard, Canada is requested to elaborate on the following:  
a. the details of the program?  
b. the implementation period of the program?  
c. Under which category of domestic support would Canada notify this program?  
d. What other programs are covered under the "AgriRecovery framework", notified as 
non‑product specific support in Canada's DS:1 notification and how much is the budgetary 
outlay under each programme in Canada's recent notification ? 
Answer by Canada  
a. The Herd Management Drought Assistance programme under aims to help support 
producers impacted by drought. This programme helps producers offset the cost of 
replacing breeding animals (i.e., breeding females) when culling is above normal  due to 
shortages of feed caused by drought. Animals culled under Herd Management Drought 
Assistance are not eligible for assistance from other drought assistance (i.e., Livestock 
Feed and Transportation Drought Assistance, and Livestock Transportation Dro ught 
Assistance).   
b. The programme covers expenses incurred to replace eligible animals culled from 
16 March  2021 to 15 March 2022. Breeding females culled due to drought can be replaced 
by purchases (eligible period for breeding females purchased from 16 March 2022 to 31 
January 2023) or retaining replacement females from the applicant 's existing herd or flock 
(eligible period for females bred for the first time from 16 March 2022 to 31 January 
2023) ).  
c. The support provided under this programme will be classified in accordance with the 
criteria in the Agreement on Agriculture and notified in due course.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  d. AgriRecovery is not a programme but a framework which forms the basis by which federal -
provincial -territorial governments can work together when natural disasters occur to 
assess impacts and determine whether there is a need for an AgriRecovery initiative.  When 
there is need, an initiative is put in place to provide targeted assistance to help with the 
extraordinary costs of recovery.The expenditures for A griRecovery in Canada 's 2017 
domestic support notification were related to support to assist agricultural producers in 
British Columbia with the extraordinary costs incurred to recover from wildfires, and 
support provided to producers in Quebec to assist p roducers with the extraordinary 
expenses incurred as a result of a number of hail storms which resulted in significant 
damage to farm operations.  
1.1.10   Canada's support for the Next Gen Agriculture Mentorship programme  
1.1.10.1   Question by India (AG -IMS ID 100143 ) 
This question originally formed part of AG -IMS ID 100056 . It has now been resubmitted as a 
separate question (see G/AG/W/217/Corr.1  - to be issued)  
India notes that the Canadian Government announced support for the Next Gen Agriculture 
Mentorship Program. India requests Canada  to elaborate on the following:   
a. The details and description of the program.  
b. Whether it a new or modified version of an existing program?  
c. Which provisions under the AoA does this programme comply with?  
d. When will Canada notify this programme to the WTO?  
Answer by Canada  
a. The Next Gen Agriculture Mentorship Program (Next Gen) is an industry -wide programme 
available for young people in Saskatchewan. The Next Gen program, funded by the 
governments of Canada and Saskatchewan, aims to create a community of graduat es with 
a deeper understanding of agriculture, business, community, leadership and advocacy for 
the industry. Graduates benefit from an immersive, industry -wide mentorship experience 
as part of the program. The programme develops young leaders and prepares  them to 
take on active roles in industry leadership, governance and efforts to build public trust 
through the pairing of each successful applicant with an established member of the 
agriculture industry.   
b. The Next Gen programme is new and is funded jointly by the governments of Canada and 
Saskatchewan under the Canadian Agricultural Partnership (CAP). The programme is 
administered by Canadian Western Agribition.  
The CAP is a five -year (2018 -2023) agreement which provides funding to strategic 
initiatives in the agriculture and agri -food sector.  Part of these initiatives are cost -shared 
by federal, provincial and territorial  (FPT) governments, while some of them are federal 
only initiatives.  
c. The support provided under this programme  will be classified in accordance with the 
criteria in the Agreement on Agriculture.   
d. This programme will be notified in due course.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  1.1.11   Canada's Special Milk Class Scheme  
1.1.11.1   Question by New Zealand (AG -IMS ID 100064 ) 
New Zealand has previously raised questions around Canada's milk classes 7 and 4. In particular 
milk Class 4 continues to have a significant trade impa ct due to the resulting increase in production 
and export of Canadian value -added protein products onto the world market.   
To follow -up from question AG -IMS ID 99098 , New Zealand would welcome further information on 
how the cost of milk production for fat and protein is calculated in the Canadian Dairy Commission 
annual cost of milk production survey, and the why there is a difference to the milk class 4(a) protein 
price paid by processors for product which is then exported onto the global market. How does Canada 
view the linkages, if any, between the implementation of Classes 6 and 7 and now cl ass 4(a) and 
the recent increase in exports of Canadian skim milk powder, skim milk powder blends, and high 
value milk protein products (such as MPC 70, MPC85, MPI, WPC, WPI and casein)?  
Answer by Canada  
As explained in the web link provided in the respons e to AG -IMS 99098, provincial milk marketing 
boards routinely update the price of milk components. This typically happens once a year. Each year, 
a mathematical formula is used to calculate most price updates, which considers inflation and the 
cost of prod ucing milk in Canada.  
With respect to how the cost of milk production is used in the Canadian Dairy Commission 's cost of 
milk production survey, the Canadian Dairy Commission examines a number of variables. The most 
recent cost of production survey publish ed in October 2021, which was based on survey data from 
2020, highlighted cash costs such as purchased feed, land, repairs and maintenance, and hired 
labour as the largest contributors to increased costs.  
With respect to the claim that there is a different  price for milk class 4(a) if it is exported, this is 
inaccurate and simply not true. To be clear, there are no export performance requirements with any 
Canadian milk class. As previously stated in Canada 's response to AG -IMS 96004 , Canadian milk 
class prices are accessible at the following link:  https://agriculture.canada.ca/en/canadas -
agriculture -secto rs/animal -industry/canadian -dairy-information -centre/dairy -statistics -and-
market -information/dairy -processing -sector/canadian -milk-class-prices  
With respect to Canadian exports of dairy products, there are a variety of market conditions at play. 
Ultimately , it is the business decision of a processor or exporter in Canada to either sell dairy 
products on the domestic market, or to export them. It is also the business decision of foreign 
importers to select the products they wish to import.  
Canada would also like to clarify another aspect of this question that is inaccurate. Exports of 
Canadian dairy products have not increased between 2020 and 2021 but have instead decreased.  
According to Statistics Canada, in 2021, Canada 's total exports of dairy products to talled 
approximately CAD  378 million in comparison to approximately CAD  487 million in the year prior. A 
similar trend is seen across multiple dairy products including skim milk powder 
(approximately  39,000 MT in 2020 decreasing to 18,000 MT in 2021), whey  products 
(approximately  73,000  MT decreasing to 65,000 MT), casein and casein products (approximately 
3,500 MT decreasing to 2,800  MT) and products consisting of natural milk constituents, which 
contains milk protein products such as MPC70 (approximately 9,500 MT decreasing to 6,600 MT). 
To put these numbers into context, based on data from Global Trade Tracker, U.S. exports of skim 
milk powder alone totalled approximately 894,000 MT in 2021 (which is an increase of 27% when 
compared to its exports in  2019). 
1.1.12   Canada's Dairy Policies   
1.1.12.1   Question by New Zealand (AG -IMS ID 100107 ) 
New Zealand notes the announcement that the third payment under Canada 's Dairy Direct Payment 
Program (DDPP) is now available to producers . G/AG/W/235  
 
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  https://www.dairyreporter.com/Article/2021/12/23/Third -round -of-compensa tion-available -for-
Canadian -dairy-farmers   
The owner of a farm with 80 dairy cows will be awarded compensation in the form of a direct payment 
of approximately CAD 38,000 each year. Based on their milk quota, dairy farmers will receive 
compensation payment s totalling up to CAD 469 million for this fiscal year, with another 
CAD 468 million will be available in 2022 -2023.  
Canada has committed to provide CAD 1.75 billion to dairy producers for market access concessions 
made under the Canada -European Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) 
and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans -Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). All 
payments are set  to be made by 2023. New Zealand appreciates these will be notified appropriately.  
New Zealand considers the compensation being offered to dairy farmers disproportionate to any 
demonstrated negative impact of preferential trade agreements.  
How does Canad a reconcile the anticipated negative impact of trade agreements with the severe 
underfill of tariff rate quotas on supply managed products currently occurring under the WTO and 
FTA quotas?  
Answer by Canada  
To date, the Government of Canada has launched com pensation programming for dairy, poultry and 
egg producers for the impacts of CETA and CPTPP.  The intent of Canada 's programming is to address 
the domestic impact of Canada 's market access concessions in Canada 's supply -managed sectors, 
ensuring that they remain competitive and resilient in the face of evolving markets.  The 
programming will be administered in a way that is consistent with Canada 's obligations under its 
trade agreements, including at the WTO.  
Follow -up: New Zealand understood that the intent of Canada's programme was to address the 
domestic impact of market access concessions and requested more information and details on such 
impact on Canadian producers.  
The European Union highlighted its interest in the Canadian dairy policy and indic ated that it would 
analyse the response provided by Canada in detail.  
1.1.13   China's one -off subsidy to farmers  
1.1.13.1   Question by Australia (AG -IMS ID 100136 ) 
Australia notes media  in mid -June 2021 reported that China is providing a one -off subsidy to farmers, 
worth 20 billion yuan or USD 3.1 billion, to assist with rising costs of production materials. Australia 
requests China provides the following details in relation to this "one-off subsidy ": 
a. What are the eligibility criteria for this subsidy?  
b. What 'production materials ' is the subsidy seeking to cover rising costs for?  
c. Australia  notes the subsidy is being reported as 'aimed at ensuring farmers' willingness to 
produce grains ', therefore could China please detail which grains (and other agricultural 
products) are eligible for the subsidy?  
d. Will China be notifying this subsidy in its  relevant Domestic Support notification? If so, 
when does China anticipate submitting this notification?  
e. Reporting cites that 'measures will also be taken to better re gulate the agricultural supplies 
market '; could China please provide detail on what measures it may be considering?  
f. Is this subsidy linked to the reported five other types of subsidies (covering the purchase 
of farm machine; agricultural insurance; arable land protection; ploughing; and support G/AG/W/235  
 
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  to corn, soybean and maize production), which are to be provided by the Ministry of 
Finance? Could China please provide details on these other five subsidies, such as what 
the total amounts will be?  
Australia has ask ed this question previously (AG -IMS ID 99100 ) and note China advised at that t ime 
it would reply after it had received the relevant information. Australia would appreciate China 
updating the Membership as to whether this information is now available and if so, providing it in  AG-
IMS. 
Answer by China  
a. What are the eligibility criteria  for this subsidy?  
Subsidies are available to all entities engaged in agricultural production.   
b. What "production materials " is the subsidy seeking to cover rising costs for?  
Production materials include but not limited to seeds, fertilizers, diesel, etc.  
c. Australia notes the subsidy is being reported as 'aimed at ensuring farmers' willingness to 
produce grains ', therefore could China please detail which grains (and other agricultural 
products) are eligible for the subsidy?  
There is no specific restric tions on the kind of grains eligible for the subsidy.   
d. Will China be notifying this subsidy in its relevant Domestic Support notification? If so, 
when does China anticipate submitting this notification?  
China will submit notification in accordance with the  requirements of G/AG/2 and the 
Agreement on Agriculture.   
e. Reporting cites that "measures will also be taken to better regulate the agricultural 
supplies market "; could China please provide detail on what measures it may be 
considering?  
Such measures need to be further confirmed by the competent authorities.   
f. Is this subsidy linked to the reported five other types of subsidies (covering the purchase 
of farm machine; agricultural insurance; arable land protection; ploughing; and support 
to corn , soybean and maize production), which are to be provided by the Ministry of 
Finance? Could China please provide details on these other five subsidies, such as what 
the total amounts will be?  
There 's no link between these subsidies. The amount will be spec ified in future 
notifications.  
1.1.14   Côte d'Ivoire's Tax on imported spirits  
1.1.14.1   Question by European Union (AG -IMS ID 100139 ) 
The EU wants to reiterate its previous q uestion AG -IMS 96046 . 
Côte d'Ivoire appears to apply a tax of 25% only on impo rted spirits, under Article 419(3) of the 
Code général des impôts2. This tax discriminates between imported products and local products.  
How does Côte d'Ivoire explain that this tax does not restrict imports?  
 
2 http://www.dgi.cgici.com/indexs.htm . G/AG/W/235  
 
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  How does it respects the following WTO commitm ents: 
• Article II:1(b) GATT (Schedules of Concessions);  
• Article III:2, first sentence, GATT (National Treatment on Internal Taxation and 
Regulation).  
Answer by Côte d'Ivoire  
1.1.15   EU's deforestation and forest degradation strategy  
1.1.15.1   Question by Brazil, Paraguay, Argentina (AG -IMS ID 100071 ) 
Brazil would like to consult the European Union on its proposed regulation on "deforestation -free 
products " ("Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the making 
available on the Union market as well as export from the Union of certain commodities and products 
associated with deforestation and forest degradation and re pealing Regulation (EU) No 995/2010").   
Brazil understands that such regulation will ban imports into the EU of some agricultural products, 
according to criteria allegedly associated with deforestation and forest degradation.   
It is worth highlighting the background of the proposed regulation:   
In 2019, approximately 34% (20 GtCO2 -eq) of global GHG emissions came from the energy sector, 
24% (14 GtCO2 -eq) from industry, 22% (13 GtCO2 -eq) from agriculture, forestry and other land 
use (AFOLU), 15% (8.7 GtCO2 -eq) from transport and 6% (3.3 GtCO2 -eq) from buildings (IPPC).   
Additionally, in comparison with developing country Members, such as Brazil, the EU in average and 
its largest economies in particular have not only higher %ages of agricultural land as  a %age of land 
area, but also lower %ages of forest area as a %age of land area (World Bank), owing to 
deforestation -led processes of development.   
  
Finally, it has been observed in Europe "(…) an increase in the harvested forest area (4 9%) and an 
increase in biomass loss (6 9%) over Europe for the period of 2016 –2018 relative to 2011 –2015, 
with large losses occurring on the Iberian Peninsula and in the Nordic and Baltic countries. Satellite 
imagery further reveals that the average patch size of harveste d area increased by 3 4% across 
Europe, with potential effects on biodiversity, soil erosion and water regulation " 
(https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586 -020-2438-y). 
In the light of the abo ve, Brazil poses the following questions:  
a. Taking into account the data mentioned above related to agricultural land and forest area, 
could the EU explain the rationale of adopting import bans to curb deforestation and forest 
degradation instead of less tra de-restrictive measures?   
G/AG/W/235  
 
- 31 - 
 
  b. Taking into account the data mentioned above related to the increase in harvested forest 
area in the EU, how does the EU plan to enforce an equivalent ban to domestically -traded 
products?   
c. Could the EU elaborate on how it intends to carry out its border control of imports that will 
be subject to the new legislation? Will the EU require the submission of an application or 
other documentation as a prior condition for importation?   
d. Considering the overarching goals included in  the European Green Deal, why has the EU 
chosen to apply import bans focused on agricultural goods and land use policies (therefore, 
to discriminate against developing countries which rely on the agricultural sector to foster 
its development), vis -à-vis in dustrial goods and the use of "dirty" sources of energy in 
production processes?   
e. How does the EU justify such measures in the light of Article 4 of the AoA?  
Answer by European Union  
Reply to questions A and B  
The main driver of global deforestation and fo rest degradation is the expansion of agricultural land, 
which is linked to the production of commodities we import such as soy, beef, palm oil, wood, cocoa 
and coffee. As a major economy and consumer of these commodities  linked to deforestation and 
forest degradation, the EU is partly responsible  for this problem.  
On 17 November 2021, the European Commission proposed a draft  Regulation to minimis e EU-
driven deforestation and forest degradation , aimed at curbing deforestation and forest 
degradation driven by the expansion of agricultural land used to produce specific commodities, 
namely cattle, cocoa, coffee, palm oil, soya and wood, and some deriv ed products, such as leather, 
chocolate and furniture,  based on a thorough scientific and cost -benefit analysis of their impact on 
deforestation. By promoting the consumption of 'deforestation -free' products and reducing the EU's 
impact on global deforesta tion and forest degradation, the new rules are expected to bring down 
greenhouse gas emissions and biodiversity loss. It is intended to minimis e EU-driven deforestation 
and forest degradation . 
For more details about the proposals, please also see: Proposal for a regulation on deforestation -
free products (europa.eu)  
The proposal is now under discussions  within the European Parliament  and the Council  and 
might be amended before a final adoption . 
The EU would like to flag that there is no import ban in this proposal: it 's a due di ligence system. 
In that respect, we invite Brazil to refer to the impact assessment report accompanying the 
document Proposal for this draft Regulation which considered all the options, and on this basis the 
EU proposal chose the less distorting measure: a  due diligence system with benchmarking system. 
This preferred option ensures that the EU puts in place the less trade distorting regulatory framework 
that is both ambitious and implementable.  
Reply to Question C  
The Regulation sets mandatory due diligence  rules  for operators which place specific commodities 
on the EU market that are associated with deforestation and forest degradation. For a summary of 
the proposal, please see New rules for deforestation -free products (europa.eu)   
Operators will be required to collect the geographic coordinates  of the land where the 
commodities they place on the market were produced. This strict traceability is meant to ensure that 
only defo restation -free products enter the EU market – and that enforcement authorities in Member 
States have the necessary means to control that this is the case.  
A benchmarking system operated by the Commission will identify countries as presenting a low, 
standar d or high risk of producing commodities or products that are not deforestation -free or in G/AG/W/235  
 
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  accordance with the legislation of the producer country. Obligations for operators and authorities 
will vary according to the level of risk of the country or region o f production, with simplified due 
diligence duties for products coming from low -risk and enhanced scrutiny for high -risk areas.  
The legislative proposal refers to customs declarations , as in case of any other product, and a due 
diligence statement. The due  diligence statement is presented by EU operator to confirm that the 
due diligence by the EU operators has been performed, as required.  
Reply to Question D  
The EU proposal on deforestation is part of the global EU Green deal ,3 which contains several 
other initiatives . The July 2021 package4 in support of the EU's climate targets is an integral part 
of our strategy to address climate change. As part of these efforts, the Carbon Border Adjustment 
Mechanism (CBAM)5 is a climate m easure that should prevent the risk of carbon leakage and support 
the EU's increased ambition on climate mitigation, while ensuring WTO compatibility. The CBAM will 
equalise the price of carbon between domestic products and imports and ensure that the EU's  climate 
objectives are not undermined by production relocating to countries with less ambitious policies. The 
CBAM will initially apply to imports of the following goods: cement, iron and steel, aluminium, 
fertilisers, electricity. These sectors have a hi gh risk of carbon leakage and high carbon emissions.  
Reply to Question E  
Article 4.2 of the AoA obliges WTO Members not to maintain, resort to, or revert to any measures 
of the kind which have been required to be converted into ordinary customs duties in t he Uruguay 
Round. Footnote 1 of the AoA lists some examples of such measures but clarifies that they do not 
include measures maintained under balance -of-payments provisions or under other general, 
non-agriculture -specific provisions of GATT 1994 or of the other Multilateral Trade Agreements in 
Annex 1A to the WTO Agreement.  
Article XX of the GATT 1994 is one of the other general, non -agriculture specific provisions of GATT 
1994. Thus, if a measure is justified by Article XX of the GATT 1994, Article 4.2 of the Agreement 
on Agriculture will not apply. This view is in accordance with relevant WTO case law, e.g. the Panel 
Report in Indonesia – Chicken (para. 7.68) as well as supported by the negotiating history of Article 
4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture  
Article XX GATT covers in particular measures concerning the protection of human, animal, plant life 
or health (Article XX(b)), the protection of (living and non -living) exhaustible natural resources 
(Article XX(g)), and public morals (Article XX(a)). The EU 's measures implementing the Green Deal 
and the proposed Regulation on deforestation -free products will strictly comply with the respective 
requirements of these provisions.  
In view of the above, having regard to the explicit recognition by WTO Members of the objective of 
sustainable development in the preamble of the WTO Agreement,  there is no contradiction between 
the objective to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) through the implementation of 
the EU Green Deal and the proposed Regulation o n deforestation -free products on the one hand and 
the spirit of reforming the AoA imbalances, especially in the Agricultural Market Access pillar, on the 
other.  
See also, in that respect, the recent REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND  THE COUNCIL Application of EU health and environmental standards to imported 
agricultural and agri -food products, available at EUR-Lex - 52022DC0226 - EN - EUR-Lex 
(europa.eu) . 
Follow -up: Ecuador indicated their concern regarding access to market considering that the 
regulation impacted products emanating from tropical areas. They noted that the extra territorial 
effects were very specific to forests tha t did not exist in the European Union.  
 
3 European Green Deal (europa.eu) . 
4 EU economy and society to meet climate ambitions (europa.eu) . 
5 Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (europa.eu) . G/AG/W/235  
 
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  Canada highlighted that to make meaningful changes to climate change, the government of Canada 
was defining an innovation as essential to improve agriculture and productivity while at the same 
time reducing agriculture's impacts on the environment. Regulat ions could play an important role in 
achieving a shared outcome such as lower emissions globally. However, actions and regulations that 
were taken to promote increased sustainability in supply chains needed to take into account all 
aspects of sustainabilit y, (social, economic and environment) and not create unnecessary trade 
barriers. Regulations needed to be based on science, be predictable and consider the realities of 
producing, transforming and bringing products to markets to be applicable across all di fferent 
jurisdictions and products. Only then could progress on meeting shared goals be achieved.  
The United States shared the EU's objective of reducing deforestation and forest degradation but 
expressed a number of questions concerning the scope of prop osed legislation which had been 
submitted to the EU's Directorate General for the Environment in February 2022. The US 
underscored the importance of trading partners consultations and continued public participation as 
these policies were developed. They no ted that any proposed legislation would need to take into 
consideration existing policies and programmes to promote reforestation, educate and offer technical 
assistance to growers to sustainably enhance productivity on existing agriculture lands and elimi nate 
the need and incentives for future deforestation.  
Indonesia echoed the concerns of other Members regarding the EU's regulation on deforestation and 
shared the views of Brazil and the co -sponsors particularly in relation to Indonesia's agricultural 
products such as coffee and palm oil. They indicated that the deforestation free products policy was 
a unilateral measure that was likely to be inconsistent with WTO rules, enhance protectionism rather 
than encourage other countries tackle climate change or attain food security. Indonesia requested 
for a holistic clarification on technical aspects such as the calculation methodology, reporting and 
verification. They highlighted that the country had different forest specifications and agricultural 
products' ch aracteristics. The sustainability of production and the livelihoods of smallholder farmers 
varied. Indonesia invited the EU to analyse these issues closely and clarify its position on them and 
invited other Members to oversee this EU policy, especially dev eloping countries and LDCs given the 
impacts of the new measure on them.  
Brazil expressed support to the questions AG -IMS ID 100103 by Indonesia, AG -IMS ID 100130 by 
Thailand and AG -IMS ID 100041 by India. Brazil indicated that it had developed competitiv e, 
sustainable, and efficient tropical agriculture. Brazil added that even in the context triggered by the 
COVID -19 pandemic, its agriculture showed admirable performance and consistent sustainable 
growth notwithstanding relevant international actors had b een erroneously associating the growth 
of Brazilian agriculture with illegitimate practices. These attacks were accompanied by the adoption 
of restrictive measures on international agriculture trade which were targeting imports from Brazil. 
Brazil highligh ted that the number of Members concerned by this showed that it was the reality of 
several other developing countries while noting their awareness about the growing concern of 
consumers and civil society regarding environmental issues, the urgency of clima te action and the 
imperative of achieving the sustainable development goals, especially SDG 2 "Zero Hunger and 
Sustainable Agriculture" and 13 "Action Against Global Climate Change". Brazil emphasized the need 
for more secure and sustainable production sys tems. Brazilian consumers and civil society shared 
the same concerns however, Brazil expressed the view that environmentalist arguments had been 
instrumentalized by protectionist commercialized interests. Some opinion makers and decision 
makers in relevant  markets were unaware of the regulatory and technological advances in Brazilian 
agriculture. Brazil also indicated that there was a reductionist view which tried to restrain sustainable 
development to the environmental aspect and to further restrict these environmental aspects of 
sustainability exclusively to the issue of deforestation. Brazil expressed concerns also regarding 
disproportionate responsibility for high emissions of greenhouse gases attributed by the international 
press and public opinion to a griculture from the World not just from Brazil with a convenient 
omittance of the central role of transport systems, domestic heating and electricity obtained from 
fossil fuels. In many cases, questions about the sustainability of livestock farming for exa mple were 
based on opinion articles or studies carried out in specific regions without accounting for the impact 
of techniques and local ecological context on the sustainability of production. Currently in Europe, 
proposals for mandatory mechanisms on due diligence were on the verge of being adopted and were 
imposing on companies, the burden of proving that their production and supply chains were not 
associated with the risks of deforestation of tropical forests. The intent was to scare away the private 
sector from collaborating with developing countries because of the extra cost they would incur. 
Behind the proposal that was increasing companies' responsibilities for environmental standards of 
their supply chains there was a discriminatory focus which incon sistently redefined what constituted G/AG/W/235  
 
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  sustainability in food production systems. Brazil had long been aware that agriculture was one of 
the sectors that was the most exposed to the impacts of climate change and therefore, the public 
and private sectors in B razil had been developing partnerships towards increasing more sustainable 
practices that were resilient to climate change. Brazilian agriculture production was fully compatible 
with the preservation of the environment and was contributing to the improveme nt of various 
environmental indices and to the rational use of natural resources and based innovation, technology, 
and inclusion policies. Besides, the legitimate concerns about climate change and the projection that 
the world population would reach 9.7 bi llion in 2050 was a scenario of growing demand for food, 
especially grains and proteins which was imposing an additional challenge for the sustainable 
development of food systems to increase production and ensure distribution with the least impact 
on the e nvironment. Brazil therefore had invested in agriculture research and rural extension which 
delivered substantial increases in productivity so that more was produced whilst producing in the 
same area without depleting the soil which Brazil referred to as s ustainable intensification of 
production. Moreover, Brazil was adopting at increasing rate, more sustainable processes including 
crop livestock forest integration, no tiered agriculture, use of planted forests, recovery of degraded 
pastures and treatment o f animal wastes among others.  
Colombia expressed concern about the fact that the deforestation policy showed extraterritorial 
protection for combatting the degradation of primary forest for the production and export of products 
covered by the measure. Col ombia also noted that the measure could be counterproductive and lead 
to discrimination as it focused on foreign products which were not produced in the EU.  
1.1.15.2   Question by Indonesia (AG -IMS ID 100103 ) 
Indonesia and all Members have known and observed carefully the EU Green Deal and all related 
implementing policies especially Forest Policy Deforestation.  
a. Could the EU please explain scientifically the possible neg ative impact of this policy to the 
loss of livelihoods for small farmers in developing countries and LDC's?  
b. It is certain that several agricultural commodities will be impacted in the future such as 
cocoa beans, rubber, coffee and plantation commodities th at Indonesia produces, 
including palm oil. Could the EU please explain the impact of implementing this policy in 
the long term, such as the effect to the market access of agricultural products related to 
Article 4.2 of the AoA?  
Could the EU please explain the contradictions in implementing these policies by achieving the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the spirit of reforming the AoA imbalances, especially 
in the Agricultural Market Access pillar?  
Answer by European Union  
a. The implementation of the Green Deal and all related implementing policies including the 
proposed Regulation on deforestation -free products will take due account of the situation 
of small farmers in developing countries and in LDCs with a view to avoiding  negative 
impacts.  
b. Article 4.2 of the AoA obliges WTO Members not to maintain, resort to, or revert to any 
measures of the kind which have been required to be converted into ordinary customs 
duties in the Uruguay Round. Footnote 1 of the AoA lists some examples  of such measures 
but clarifies that they do not include measures maintained under balance -of-payments 
provisions or under other general, non -agriculture -specific provisions of GATT 1994 or of 
the other Multilateral Trade Agreements in Annex 1A to the WTO Agreement. Article XX of 
the GATT 1994 is one of the other general, non -agriculture specific provisions of GATT 
1994. Thus, if a measure is justified by Article XX of the GATT 1994, Article 4.2 of the 
Agreement on Agriculture will not apply. This view is i n accordance with relevant WTO 
case law, e.g. the Panel Report in Indonesia – Chicken (para. 7.68) as well as supported 
by the negotiating history of Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture. Article XX GATT 
covers in particular measures concerning the protection of human, animal, plant life or 
health (Article XX(b)), the protection of (living and non -living) exhaustible natural 
resources (Article XX(g)), and public morals (Article XX(a)). The EU's measures G/AG/W/235  
 
- 35 - 
 
  implementing the Green Deal and the proposed Re gulation on deforestation -free products 
will strictly comply with the respective requirements of these provisions. In view of the 
above, having regard to the explicit recognition by WTO Members of the objective of 
sustainable development in the preamble of  the WTO Agreement,  there is no contradiction 
between the objective to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) through the 
implementation of the EU Green Deal and the proposed Regulation on deforestation -free 
products on the one hand and the spiri t of reforming the AoA imbalances, especially in the 
Agricultural Market Access pillar, on the other.  
Follow -up: Indonesia expressed the view that the EU's policies on Green Deal and forest degradation 
had to be implemented in a non -discriminatory and equi table manner, especially for developing 
countries and LDCs. The EU represented a market for Indonesia's agricultural products such as 
coffee, palm oil, cacao, tea and wood. Indonesia had monitored this policy closely in order to ensure 
that its market acce ss to the EU would not be affected nor restricted. Indonesia expressed the hope 
that the export competitiveness of its products on the EU market would be preserved and rather 
improved upon. The EU needed to take into account the impact of this policy on th e livelihood of 
smallholder farmers. The country had different forest specifications and different agricultural 
products characteristics meaning that the production sustainability and smallholders' livelihoods 
were different and needed to be given appropri ate considerations.  
1.1.15.3   Question by Thailand (AG -IMS ID 100130 ) 
EU has recently announced the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the making available on the Union market as well as export from the Union of certain 
commodities and products associated with deforestation and forest degradation and repealing 
Regulation (EU) No 995/2010.  
a. Could the EU provide the clear guidance an d requirements for imported products that are 
covered by this proposal?  
b. Could the EU specify the product coverage of this proposal?  
c. Does the EU have plan to expand the list of products in the future?  
Answer by European Union  
On 17 November 2021, the Europe an Commission proposed new rules to curb EU -driven 
deforestation, in its "Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
making available on the Union market as well as export from the Union of certain commodities and 
produc ts associated with deforestation and forest degradation and repealing Regulation (EU) 
No 995/2010".  
As this is only a legislative proposal  for now, the specifics are subject to change. The adoption of a 
Commission proposal is the first stage in the EU legi slative procedure. The Council of the 
European  Union and the European Parliament will now have to agree on and adopt the Regulation. 
If adopted, the Regulation will then come into force without the need for any further implementing 
measures at the member S tate level.  
This initiative is part of the European Green Deal  to "stop deforestation, innovate sustainable waste 
management and make soils healthy for people, nature and climate".  
Just counting from 1990 to 2020 the world has lost 420 million hectares of forest – an area larger 
than the whole of the European Union. The proposed new rules would guarantee that the products 
that EU citizens buy, use and consume on the EU market do not contribute to global deforestation 
and forest degradation. The main driver of these processes is agricultural expansion linked to the 
commodities soy, beef, palm oil, wood, cocoa and coffee, and some of their derived products.  
The draft Regulation sets mandatory due diligence rules  for companies which want to place these 
commodities on the EU market with the aim to ensure that only deforest ation-free and legal products 
(according to the laws of the country of origin) are allowed on the EU market. The Commission will G/AG/W/235  
 
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  use a benchmarking system  to assess countries and their level of risk of deforestation and forest 
degradation driven by the com modities in the scope of the regulation.  
Operators will be required to collect the geographical coordinates  of the land where the commodities 
they place on the market were produced. This strict traceability is meant to ensure that only 
deforestation -free products enter the EU market – and that enforcement authorities in member 
States have the necessary means to control that this is the case.  
A benchmarking system operated by the Commission will identify countries as presenting a low, 
standard or high risk of producing commodities or products that are not deforestation -free or in 
accordance with the legislation of the producer country. Obligations for operators and authorities 
will vary according to the level of risk of the country or region of production, w ith simplified due 
diligence duties for products coming from low -risk and enhanced scrutiny for high -risk areas.  
The EU will also engage in international bilateral and multilateral discussion on policies and actions 
to halt deforestation and forest degrada tion... By promoting the consumption of 'deforestation -free' 
products and reducing the EU's impact on global deforestation and forest degradation, the new rules 
are expected to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and biodiversity loss. Finally, tackling 
defore station and forest degradation will have positive impacts on local communities, including the 
most vulnerable people like indigenous peoples, who rely heavily on forest ecosystems.  
In this context the EU notes that other WTO Members are considering simila r proposal on 
deforestation in their respective parliaments.  
Regarding product coverage , six commodities – beef, wood, palm oil, soya, coffee and cocoa – and 
some of their derived products – for example leather, chocolate or furniture – are currently  included 
in the scope. These have been proposed based on the findings in the Impact Assessment of the 
initiative. This analysis aimed to select, building on scientific data and previous research, the 
commodities through which European production and consumption  has been contributing the most 
to global deforestation and forest degradation. Based on the findings a cost -benefit analysis was 
conducted to further reduce the selection and define where an EU policy intervention could be more 
efficient. This selection w as done objectively, treating equally commodities produced anywhere in 
the world, within or outside Europe.  
Annex I to the Regulation Proposal contains a Combined Nomenclature -based list of products that 
would be covered by the Regulation. The Commission p roposes a progressive scope of the 
commodities to be regulated, reviewing and updating the list regularly, taking into account new 
data. This will allow adapting it to changing deforestation patterns.  
For more information, including details on requirements  for imported products and impact 
assessment:   
Question and Answers on New rules for deforestation -free products  
Factsheet on New rules for deforestation -free products  
Proposal for a new Regulation to curb EU -driven deforestation and forest degradation  
Follow -up: Paraguay noted its interest in the topic and in the previous question raised by Indonesia 
under the same topic. Paraguay highlighted its particul ar interest in the reference to the possible 
expansion of product list in the future.  
Thailand thanked other countries for expressing interest on this issue and Brazil for the presentation 
of data. Thailand specified that their interest in the topic was d ue to their concern that the regulation 
would pose a future trade burden on trading partners, while they recognized that the expansion of 
agricultural land to produce commodities was the driver of deforestation and forest degradation. 
Citing Brazil's state ment and data, Thailand mentioned that the EU had high percentages of 
agricultural land compared to low percentages of forest area on average therefore, Thailand would 
appreciate if in the future, the EU could provide clarifications on the technical detail s and 
requirements that the EU expected from trading partners for full integration into the EU market as 
well as assurance that the draft regulation would be applied domestically and internationally. 
Thailand indicated that it would closely monitor the dev elopment of the EU's draft regulation to 
ensure that the EU respected the appropriate balance between promoting green growth and G/AG/W/235  
 
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  sustainable development while not enforcing additional trade restrictions on trading partners and 
taking into account the commi tment under Article 4 of the AoA.  
1.1.16   EU's Environmental Policies  
1.1.16.1   Question by India (AG -IMS ID 100041 ) 
In response to the question asked in AG -IMS ID 99015 , European Union responded  that the basic 
legal acts in a political agreement on CAP -Reform post 2022 have not yet been adopted. As per a 
news item dated 7 December 2021 on the official website of the EU, it is found that the new CAP 
regulations have entered into force ( https://ec.europa.eu/info/news/new -cap-regulations -enter-
force-2021-dec-07_en ). When would the DS:2 notification in this regard be made?  
India notes that the EU' s latest submitted DS:1 notification is for the marketing year 2018 -19 
(G/AG/N/EU/69 ). By when can the European Union notify the pending notifications?  
Answer by European Union  
The basic legal acts on CAP -Reform post 2022 were adopted by the co -legislators – the Council and  
the European Parliament in December 2021. Currently the EU MS are drafting their Strategic Plans 
which define their choices of policy measures. It is expected that all Strategic Plans will be approved 
during 2022. As soon as all plans have been adopted, t he EU will submit a DS:2 notification with the 
information as required in the AoA.  As concerns marketing year 2019 -2020, the EU is actively 
working on the finalization of  DS:1 notification. The notification will be available by end of April - 
beginning of M ay. For marketing year 2020 -2021, the internal data necessary for the notification 
will be only available by the end of the current year. Therefore, the notification of 2020 -2021 is 
planned for the first quarter of 2023.  
Follow -up: Paraguay stated its inte rest in the question and indicated that the EU had been very 
active in promoting transparency at the WTO while their activism was undermined by the lack of 
their timely notifications particularly on domestic support. It urged the EU to lead by example and 
submit the pending notifications as quickly as possible.  
1.1.16.2   Question by Brazil (AG -IMS ID 100070 ) 
According to publicly available information, "EU countries wil l implement the new CAP with a CAP 
strategic plan at national level. Each plan will combine a wide range of targeted interventions 
addressing the specific needs of that EU country and deliver tangible results in relation to EU -level 
objectives, while contr ibuting to the ambitions of the European Green Deal."  
a. Considering the relationship between the Strategic Plans and the EGD, therefore, with the 
Farm to Fork and biodiversity strategies, what is the criteria for the EU to evaluate the 
Strategic Plans in what they relate to climate and environmental targets/policies in the 
agricultural sector and the Eco -Schemes?  
b. Are the criteria of Annex 2 paragraphs (1) and (12) of any significance in their assessment 
or is the compliance with Eco -Schemes an additional e ligibility requirement for direct 
payments under Annex 2 paragraphs (1) (5) (6)?  
c. Furthermore, if available, could the EU provide information on expected changes - if any 
- on its green box programmes and outlays?  
Answer by European Union  
According to EU le gislation on the matter, all member States eco -schemes need to comply with WTO 
Green Box criteria. EU member States have a choice to design their eco -schemes either as compliant 
with paragraphs (1), and (12) or paragraphs (1) (5) (6) of Annex 2.  
EU member States are currently drafting their CAP Plans. Once all CAP Plans have been adopted we 
will have an indication of outlays under the WTO boxes. The EU will complement its reply to the 
Brazil s question once all necessary information is gathered.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  Follow -up: Paraguay expressed the wish to be included as sponsor to this question. Paraguay 
recalled that its delegation had already conducted consultations in previous meetings with the EU 
on similar matters and the consistency of some of these issues wit h Annex 2.  
1.1.17   EU's Product Environment Footprint (PEF)  
1.1.17.1   Question by New Zealand (AG -IMS ID 100073 ) 
New Zealand understands that the Product Environment Footprint  (PEF) aims to provide a 
comprehensive way of measuring the environmental performance of products among European 
Union (EU) member States and encouraging more sustainable consumption. This includes products 
imported by third countries into the EU.  
Under th e PEF, the proposed PEF Category Rules (PEFCRs) cover a range of products, including a 
number of agricultural products of export interest to New Zealand.   
New Zealand would like to request an update on the PEF process and timelines for PEF method 
implement ation, including for the PEFCRs.   
New Zealand is supportive of efforts to increase sustainable production and consumption and many 
of our exported products have very high sustainability credentials compared to similar products in 
other countries. We theref ore seek to ensure that existing sustainability efforts are appropriately 
recognised, taking into account differences in geography and production systems.   
What steps are the EU taking to engage with trade partners to ensure that PEF does not discriminate 
against its trading partners?  
Answer by European Union  
On 16 December 2021, the Commission adopted a revised recommendation on Product 
Environmental Footprint (PEF) and Organisation Environmental Footprint (OEF) methods. This 
Recommendation aims to foster the generation of information on environmental performance that 
is comparable, reproducible and verifiable. These methods take into account the whole life cycle of 
a product (or, for organisations, its product portfolio), from the extraction of reso urces until the end 
of life of a product (or product portfolio). The application of the methods rely on reliable data – 
specific rules on what type of data to be used when measuring the environmental footprint are 
prescribed by the method.  The green claims  proposal, is expected for July 2022. It will aim to address 
the problem of so -called 'greenwashing ' by companies, by facilitating the choice and confidence of 
consumers in getting reliable information on products or services they buy. It also aims to 
significantly lower the costs of businesses that want to demonstrate their environmental 
performance. It provides that green claims have to be justified by using standard methods. The 
initiative will observe EU commitments under WTO. The Green Claims Initiativ e is developed in close 
coordination with other initiatives, in particular the revision of EU consumer law to empower 
consumers for active participation in the green transition and the Sustainable Product Initiative, 
these two latter to be adopted by end M arch 2022.At the same time, and based on a call for 
expression of interest, there is an ongoing work on the development of Product Environmental 
Category Rules (apparel, marine fish, flowers, flexible packaging and synthetic turf). These category 
rules are  to be finalised by 2023/2024. They are subject to several rounds of public consultation 
where all interested parties can express their views.  
Follow -up: New Zealand indicated their particular interest in the issue as many EU member States 
were more likely  to use voluntary environmental labelling from the PEF methodology. New Zealand 
thanked the EU for providing a timeline for consultations to discuss the development of this 
legislative framework.  
Brazil quoted part of the question asked by New Zealand "  We therefore seek to ensure that existing 
sustainability efforts are appropriately recognised, taking into account differences in geography and 
production systems." and indicated that in its view, the EU's policies did not take this consideration 
into accoun t.  G/AG/W/235  
 
- 39 - 
 
  Paraguay noted its interest on the matter. Paraguay expressed the wish to receive an update on the 
process and learn, as requested by New Zealand, which steps were implemented by the EU to 
cooperate with trading partners and to make sure that the PEF d id not discriminate against imported 
products.  
The United States echoed Brazil and reiterated New Zealand's concerns regarding the recognition of 
existing sustainability efforts. The US looked forward to the EU engaging with partners to ensure 
non-discrim ination.  
1.1.18   EU's agricultural policies funded by national resources  
1.1.18.1   Question by Brazil (AG -IMS ID 100072 ) 
The Italian government, through its Ministro delle Po litiche Agricole Alimentari e Forestali, Stefano 
Patuanelli, has announced a series of additional measures to support its agricultural producers:   
"Se com la PAC l 'Italia ha a disposizione, final al 2027, oltre 50 milliardi di euro, il PNRR 
contempla interventi in ambito agricolo per um ammontare pari a 7,9 miliardi di euro 
(...)".   
"A queste risorse si aggiungone ulterior 2 miliardi di euro messi a disposizione 
dall`ultima Legge di Bilancio".   
(Sources:  https://www.p oliticheagricole.it/flex/cm/pages/ServeBLOB.php/L/IT/IDPagina/17528#:
~:text=%2D%2054%20milioni%20di%20euro%20nel,gli%20agricoltori%20diretti%20under%204
0%3B&text=%2D%20Proroga%20del%20Bonus%20Verde%2C%20per,e%20la%20cura%20del%
20verde ; 
https://m.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=5123724144352946&id=932754746783261 ; 
https://m.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=5007240626001299&id=932754746783261 ).  
Brazil would appreciate if the EU could provide a clarification, in  what regards the information 
contained in its notification, of the relationship between agricultural policies funded by the CAP and 
agricultural policies funded by national resources.   
In that sense, is the domestic support provided through national resou rces, not related to the CAP, 
discernible in the EU 's DS:1 notification (for instance, Brazil notices that some policies are described 
as "national aid" or "national support" type of measures)?  
Answer by European Union  
All EU spending in agriculture whethe r on Union or national level is dutifully notified in the EU yearly 
DS1 notifications. This includes also state aid measures of the kind mentioned by Brazil.  
Follow -up: Paraguay expressed interest in the question and indicated that the CAP was very complex 
and that it would appreciate clarifications on the relationship between CAP financed policies and 
those financed by national resources of the member States and how this could be discerned from 
the EU DS1: notifications. It preferred to receive a wr itten response.  
1.1.19   Guyana's Prohibition of rice exports  
1.1.19.1   Question by European Union (AG -IMS ID 100110 ) 
European importers of paddy rice from Guyana were informed  in mid -November that exports of 
paddy rice from this origin are prohibited by the government, reportedly due to high domestic rice 
prices. This measure was not notified to the CoA as obliged by Article 12 paragraph 1(b) of the 
WTO AoA. 
a. Is Guyana planning to notify this measure a posteriori?  
b. Can Guyana explain the need for this restriction terms of its domestic market? When will 
the restriction be lifted? Does Guyana have any clear policy guidelines in place for possible 
future occurrences of perceived food  shortages?  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  Answer by Guyana  
1.1.20   India's mung beans import restrictions  
1.1.20.1   Question by Australia (AG -IMS ID 100100 ) 
Australia welcomes the Indian Government's annou ncement of 12 February regarding the temporary 
reduction in the effective tariff rate for lentil imports from 11% to zero until 30  September  2022.  
Notwithstanding this, Australia notes the announcement from the Gazette of India on 
11 February  2022, notific ation (S.O. 624 E) that restricts the import of mung beans.  
a. Could India please explain why it is restricting imports of these pulses?  
b. Could India please outline what other less trade -distorting measures could be adopted to 
address the underlying objectives  of India's decision to implement these import 
restrictions on pulses?  
Answer by India  
The objective of this measure is to cater to the food and livelihood security of small and marginal 
farmers. India has been regularly reviewing this measure based on the market situation of pulses. 
Owing to such reviews, these measures have been relaxed from time to time.  
1.1.20.2   Question by Brazil (AG -IMS ID 100111 ) 
Brazil would like to consult India on its decision to restrict the import of moong beans with immediate 
effect as of 11 February, reverting a decision from December 2021 to allow imports under the "free" 
category provided that the bill of lading is issued by 31 M arch 2022 and customs clearance is 
completed by 30 June 2022.  
The decision is negatively affecting contracts between importers and exporters and shipments 
already on their way to India.  
Could India provide an explanation for the trade -restrictive measure a ffecting the imports of moong 
beans, taking into account its obligation not to impose quantitative restrictions on trade?  
Answer by India  
The objective of this measure is to cater to the food and livelihood security of small and marginal 
farmers. India has  been regularly reviewing this measure based on the market situation of pulses. 
Owing to such reviews, these measures have been relaxed from time to time.  
Follow -up: The European Union indicated its interest in this issue as was the case in previous CoA 
meetings. It encouraged India to eliminate the quantitative restriction on the imports of beans and 
pulses.  
Brazil clarified that the reason behind its question was that most of Brazil's production of this product 
was by smallholder farmers, hence the import ance of predictiability and open market for agriculture 
products as a whole and more particularly in this case, given its importance for Brazil's rural 
development.   
Canada indicated its concern regarding India's use of import restrictions on pulses which were 
negatively affecting importers, exporters as well as limiting consumers' access to high quality plant 
proteins. Echoing Brazil, Canada indicated that it was leading to impacts on smallholder farmers in 
other countries as well.  
The US supported the qu estion raised by Australia and Brazil with regards to India's imposition of 
import restrictions on moong beans. The US recalled WTO Members' obligation to not impose 
quantitative restrictions on imports. The continued and repetitive use of quantitative res trictions on 
pulses by India had become a long -standing agenda item of the Committee. The US highlighted that G/AG/W/235  
 
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  this was just the most recent example of numerous trade restrictive and distorting measures 
undertaken by the Indian government in recent years wi th regards to pulses. The US recalled that 
in the CoA, Members had raised policy concerns vis -à-vis pulses, not only with regards to 
quantitative restrictions but also domestic support measures and changes in applied tariffs. India's 
lack of transparency c oncerning its various policies remained apparent, both in terms of its 
notifications and responses in the Committee. The US indicated that it would continue to closely 
monitor the pulses situation in India and could follow -up with further questions.  
1.1.21   India' s rice exports  
1.1.21.1   Question by Canada (AG -IMS ID 100086 ) 
According to a press release from the Ministry of Commerce & Industry from 16 December 2021, 
India's exp orts of Basmati and non -Basmati rice in the 2020 – 2021 period rose by 87% to 
17.72  million tonnes from 9.45 million tonnes in 2019 -2020. India's top five export markets for 
Basmati rice were Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Yemen, United Arab Emirate s accounting for 
64% exports and the top five export markets for non -Basmati rice were Nepal, Benin, Senegal, 
Bangladesh and Togo accounting for 40% of exports.   
Indian rice exporters project that India's rice exports could amount to more than the combined  total 
exports of Thailand, Viet Nam and Pakistan, the three next largest rice exporters.   
a. Could India clarify if any of these rice exports were from public stocks and if so, what 
volumes?  
b. As a significant exporter of rice and to support transparency of in formation on the trade 
of agricultural products when does India plan to provide this Committee with data on its 
rice exports through Table ES:2?  
Answer by India  
India thanks Canada for the question, the response is as under:  
a. No exports from public stocks have been made.  
b. The relevant notification would be submitted in due course.  
Follow -up: Canada noted that it would review India's response on AG -IMS and indicated that given 
that India was a significant exporter of Basmati rice, its agriculture polic ies could have broader 
effects than just on their domestic market.  
Paraguay wished to be included as a sponsor to this question and expressed its particular interest 
in exports from public stocks and possible volumes. Paraguay encouraged India to present its ES:2 
table with data on rice exports as soon as possible and ind icated that they had taken note of India's 
indication that there had been no PSH exports for which it requested to have verifiable information.  
Thailand expressed its interest in this issue. According to a press release from the Ministry of 
Commerce and I ndustry, as cited by Canada, as well as another one on December 10 of the previous 
year, the export quantity of non -Basmati rice increased by more than 235 % between April 2019 and 
January 2020, and April 2020 to January 2021 with highest imports by the Afr ican continent. 
Thailand as the second largest rice exporter, according to a WTO report in February 2022, would 
benefit from India's experience by receiving more comprehensive information and notification on 
how India was implementing the policy tools at h and to promote rice performance, particularly non -
Basmati rice.  
Australia wished to register its support to Canada's question. Australia highlighted that India's 
domestic support for rice and information available on India's domestic support programmes we re 
a concern for many countries as was expressed in the committee and CoASS discussions.  
The EU reminded that it had raised this issue in previous meetings without having received 
substantial answers from India but with a promise from the latter that an ex port subsidy notification G/AG/W/235  
 
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  was forthcoming. The EU requested India to provide the date when the notification would be 
submitted.  
The United States supported the question raised by Canada and noted the significance increase in 
Basmati and non -Basmati rice e xports. The US recalled that since 2009/2010 when India had 
prohibited the export of non -Basmati rice, India's non -Basmati exports had skyrocketed. In 2021, 
non-Basmati rice exports had reached record level of 17.4 million metric tonnes according to offici al 
Indian trade statistics. Indian exports of all rice were 21.4 million metric tonnes. The US requested 
India not only to submit its ES:2 notification but also, in accordance with the Bali Ministerial Decision, 
its export data and echoed EU's concerns ove r India's notifications.  
1.1.22   India's pulses policies  
1.1.22.1   Question by Canada (AG -IMS ID 100087 ) 
The restrictive measures on the import of yellow peas continue throug h an annual import quota of 
150,000 MT, a minimum import price of 200 INR/kg and imports are only allowed through the port 
of Kolkata.  
a. Could India elaborate on its reasons for restricting the import of a high -quality plant 
protein and source of micro -nutrients thereby limiting its availability to Indian consumers?   
Answer by India  
The objective of this measure is to cater to the food and livelihood security of small and marginal 
farmers. India has been regularly reviewing this measure based on the market si tuation of pulses. 
Owing to such reviews, these measures have been relaxed from time to time.  
Follow -up: Canada reminded that these measures were highly distortive to trade of dried peas and 
indicated that it had not received to date, a satisfactory explan ation for the use of such restrictive 
measures for a product that was highly important for Indian diet.  
Australia expressed its support to the question raised by Canada and the previous question AG -IMS 
ID 100008. Australia reiterated its longstanding conc erns on this matter and requested an 
explanation on why these measures continued to be in place.  
1.1.22.2   Question by Russian Federation (AG -IMS ID 100135 ) 
The Russian Federation continues expressing its concerns regarding India's policy with respect to 
import of yellow peas. As for 1 March 2022 the Directorate General of Foreign Trade (DGFT) under 
the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MOCI) of India has not iss ued a notification on the import 
policy on yellow peas for the fiscal year 2021/2022. The delay in publication is almost of one year.  
a. Regarding AG -IMS ID 99101  and AG -IMS ID 98096 , India did not provide answers to the 
questions posed by the Russian Federation. Could India provide answers to those 
questions? For more convenience, the questions were the following (a -c): 
i. i. When is India going to eliminate its q uantitative restriction on pulses? Is India 
planning to make regular use of such measures?  
ii. ii. For 31 August 2021 India has still not announced measures for 2021 -22 with respect 
to import of yellow peas. Does it mean that import of yellow peas in the fisca l year 
2021-22 is de facto prohibited? When is India going to publish an official notification 
on its import regime bearing in mind Article X:1 of the GATT 1994, which states that 
all laws, regulations, judicial decisions and administrative rulings pertain ing to 
restrictions or prohibitions on import shall be published promptly in such a manner as 
to enable governments and traders to become acquainted with them?  
iii. Bearing in mind the fact that in response to AG -IMS ID 98096 India stated that minimal 
import price requirement and port of entry restriction continues to remain applicable 
in the fiscal year 2021 -22 the Russian Federation wonders about the reasons why G/AG/W/235  
 
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  these additional trade -restrictive measures are still in place. When is India going to 
eliminate minimum import price requirement and port of entry restriction?  
b. Please, provide the reasons why the notification about import policy for yellow peas for 
the fiscal year 2021/2022 was not published?  
c. How the absence of such notification complies with Article X:1 of the GATT 1994, which 
states that all laws, regulations and administrativ e rulings pertaining to restrictions or 
prohibitions on import shall be published promptly in such a manner as to enable 
governments and traders to become acquainted with them?  
d. When is India going to publish the notification on import policy for yellow pea s for the 
fiscal year 2022/2023? What will be the allowed volumes, if any?  
e. In January 2020 India introduced a minimum import price requirement on the import of 
pulses. Could India provide a rational reason for the introduction of this measure. What 
are the consequences of introduction of this measure on domestic and international 
market of pulses? Could India please provide the data on domestic market prices on 
pulses in 2020 -2021?  
f. Moreover, the number of ports of entry for the imported yellow peas was l imited to only 
one seaport – Kolkata. We urge India once again to provide a detailed information on the 
reasons for the introduction of this measure. Could India please elaborate how the 
measure complies with the provisions of Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 ? 
g. In its answers to the questions in AG -IMS ID 99101 , India stated that the im port of yellow 
peas (07131010) during 2020 -21 (April – February) was 33,831.58 metric tonne. Bearing 
in mind that the allowed volume for import of yellow peas was zero tonne, could you please 
elaborate how were these 33,831.58 MT of yellow peas imported? F rom which countries 
and under what conditions was this volume of yellow peas imported?   
h. Please, provide answers to the question AG -IMS ID 96056  considering the causal link 
between the protection of public morals, human, plant or animal life or health and import 
restrictions and import prohibition on yellow peas.  
i. We note India's statements that these measures have been applied temporarily since 
2018. When will these temporary measures stop existing?  
Answer by India  
The import policy of yellow peas was notified vide S.O. 1225(E) dated 28.03.2020 and S.O. 1260  (E) 
dated 16.04.2020 by the Ministry o f Industry and Commerce, Government of India. Imports have 
been allowed through Kolkata port for ensuring better monitoring and facility for Phyto -sanitary 
checks. The Wholesale Price Index for pulses for 2020 -21 was 164.7. The quantity of 33,831.58  MT 
of yellow peas during 2020 -21 was imported from Canada. The objective of this measure is to cater 
to the food and livelihood security of small and marginal farmers. India has been regularly reviewing 
this measure based on the market situation of pulses. Owing  to such reviews, these measures have 
been relaxed from time to time.  
1.1.22.3   Question by United States of America, Canada, European Union (AG -IMS 
ID 100008 ) 
Quantit ative restrictions on the importation of various pulses into India have been a longstanding 
agenda item in the Committee on Agriculture (see for example AG-IMS ID 98084 ). The United States 
was pleased to see that most of these restrictions had been lifted as of the last meeting of the 
Committee on Agriculture with the exception of y ellow peas, as noted in response to AG-IMS ID 
99101 . It was reported in the media on 14 Feb ruary 2022 that India would be reinstating restrictions 
on the import of moong beans.  
a. Please confirm the nature and length of the restriction on the import of moong beans.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  b. Please confirm that this will be a temporary measure that will not be extended beyon d the 
date identified in response to part a.  
c. Please identify any other quantitative restrictions on the import of any pulses, including 
yellow peas, moong, tur (pigeon peas), or urad, that are currently in place. Please indicate 
the nature and length of th e restriction on imports for each type of pulse.  
Answer by India  
Currently import of moong and yellow peas is temporarily restricted till further review and Urad and 
Tur is 'Free' till 31.03.2022.  
India has been regularly reviewing this measure based on th e market situation of pulses. Owing to 
such reviews, these measures have been relaxed from time to time.  
Follow -up: Ukraine expressed their interest in the matter and wished to be added as co -sponsor to 
this question.  
Canada noted that they had been raising questions on India's pulse policies to the Committee 
since 2017. In previous meetings India had indicated that it  was a temporary measure, but the 
temporary measure had been extended many times. Canada encouraged India to implement 
measures that would be as least trade -restrictive as possible.  
1.1.23   India's Dairy Sahakar scheme  
1.1.23.1   Question by European Union (AG -IMS ID 100112 ) 
According to Dairy Industry Newsletter on 9 -11-2021, India has made available USD 671 m to dairy 
co-ops.  
India's Cooperation Ministry have launched 'Dairy Sahakar', a Rs 5,000 crore (USD 671 m) scheme 
to provide loans to the dairy sector through the National Cooperative Development 
Corporation  (NCDC).  
a. Who are the beneficiaries?  
b. Could India explain more in detail how this scheme works, eligibi lity criteria for 
beneficiaries and the level of interest rates on the loans granted that the beneficiaries has 
to pay. How is this rate compared to current market rates from bank loans?  
c. What is the redemption period of the loans?  
Answer by India  
Any coope rative society registered under any State/ Multi -State Cooperative Societies Act or any 
FPO/SHG (cooperative), with a suitable provision in its bye -laws to undertake activities related to 
dairy, shall be eligible for financial assistance subject to fulfilm ent of guidelines under the scheme.  
For credit linkage, NCDC circular on the interest rate on loans published from time to time, depending 
on market conditions, shall be applicable.  The period of loan will normally be five to eight years, 
including one to three years of moratorium on repayment of principal, depending on the type of 
project and revenue streams.  
1.1.24   India's increased budget for subsidy support farmers use of fertiliser  
1.1.24.1   Question by European Union (AG -IMS ID 100113 ) 
On 12 October, the Indian Union Cabinet approved an additional subsidy of INR 286 billion (USD 3.8 
billion) for the kharif season (1 October 2021 - 31 March 2022) to assist farmers in the face of rising 
prices of di -ammonium phosphate (DAP) and nitrogen, phosphorus and potassium (NPK) fertilizers.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  a. Can India indicate how much the original budget for fertiliser subsidy, to which this 
additional INR 286 billion is added.  
Answer by India  
We are collecting data and a written answer will be submitted to this question in due course.  
Follow -up: Paraguay expressed its concern on the increasing use of agriculture subsidies by India 
which was the main agriculture subsidiser with some 27 % of its ove rall subsidies being of trade 
distorting kind. India was also a major agricultural exporter and was figuring in the top  10 
agricultural exporters globally with trade of some USD 40 billion worth of goods.  
The US indicated that it had taken note of the 202 1-2022 revised budget which showed that India 
had allocated USD 19 billion to various fertilisers schemes via the Ministry of Chemicals and 
Fertilisers. While the budget for fertilisers subsidies for 2022 -2023 decreased compared with the 
revised budget 202 1-2022, the 2022 -2023 budget was still substantially larger than the initial 
budget for 2021 -2022. The US expressed its concern regarding India's input subsidies policies and 
recalled that input subsidies were among the least effective policies to improve farmers' incomes 
and among the most trade distortive policies. Further, the US noted the negative impacts of these 
policies in terms of incentivizing an overuse of fertilizers and chemicals which negatively impacted 
the environment.  
Switzerland indicated that it was looking forward to consulting India's response on AGIMS. The use 
of nearly USD 4 billion supplemental subsidies for fertilizers provided by India to its agricultural 
producers could distort the production of kharif crops and have unintended con sequences on 
environmental protection.  
1.1.25   India's Export subsidies for skim milk powder  
1.1.25.1   Question by European Union (AG -IMS ID 100115 ) 
In its questions to India AG-IMS IDs 96053  and 98091  the EU did not receive a satisfactory reply to 
the queries. The EU would like to request India to complete its replies with the following information:  
a. Can India confirm that Amul is being paid a subsidy of USD 680 per tonne of SMP that is 
exported?  
b. How wa s the level of subsidy calculated? Which elements or criteria were used?  
According to the press report this export subsidy is granted due to an internal support measure for 
the dairy sector in India. The subsidy would thus not appear to fall within the exceptions for 
developing countries in Article 9:4 of the Agreement on Agriculture. How is this export subsidy 
justified in relation to India's commitments under the Agreement on Agriculture?  
Point 1 of the Nairobi Ministerial decision ( WT/MIN(15)/45, WT/L/980 ) reads: "Members reaff irm 
their commitment, pursuant to the 2013 Bali Ministerial Declaration on Export Competition, to 
exercise utmost restraint with regard to any recourse to all forms of export subsidies and all export 
measures with equivalent effect." How does this export s ubsidy respect this provision?  
c. In its previous reply to questions AG -IMS IDs 96053  and 98091  India stated that the 
measure was introduced in 2020 for a temporary time f rame of six months. Can India 
confirm that the measure is no longer in force?  
d. In addition, the EU notes that the latest export competition notification dates from 2013. 
When will India submit its lacking notifications on export competition?  
Answer by India  
The E uropean Union is kindly requested to refer to India's replies to questions AG -IMS IDs 98091  
and 96053 . G/AG/W/235  
 
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  Follow -up: The U nited States indicated that this was another long -standing agenda item of this 
Committee and that the US had been raising questions and concerns on this matter since the 88th 
meeting of the  CoA. 
1.1.26   India's  Scheme for Remission of Duties and Taxes on Exported Products   
1.1.26.1   Question by United States of America (AG -IMS ID 100003 ) 
In response to AG -IMS ID 97020  and 95033 , India was unable to provide responses at those times.   
The United States now notes that the Government of India in 2021 announced the rates for tax 
refunds under the Scheme for Remission of Duties and Taxes on Exporte d Products (RoDTEP) for 
8,555  products including agricultural and food products, such as chocolates, cotton, rice, rum, sugar, 
wheat, dairy products, etc.  
a. Please provide a description of RoDTEP, a copy of its guidelines, and an update on the 
operational st atus. 
b. Please provide a comprehensive list of agricultural and food products by HS code at the 
national tariff line level eligible under this measure.  
c. Please provide an explanation of this measure, including what specific duties and taxes 
are eligible for r efund for agricultural products, using as examples cotton, rice, and sugar.  
d. Please provide the total level of support, including both quantity and budgetary 
expenditures, for agricultural products covered by RoDTEP.  If unable to provide this 
information, please explain why.  
Answer by India  
a. and b.  The Scheme for Remission of Duties and Taxes on Exported Products (RoDTEP) scheme 
guidelines have been notified vide DGFT Notification No. 19 dated 17.08.21 along with Appendix - 
4R containing 8,55 5 eligible export items and their corresponding rates of remission. The Scheme 
stands implemented and exporters of eligible items under the Scheme are able to generate their e -
scrips.  
c. RoDTEP creates a mechanism for reimbursement of taxes/duties/levies, at the central, state and 
local levels.  
d. The budgeted support for the Scheme is Rs 12,454 Cr for Financial Year 2021 -2022, for the 
8,555  HS lines. There is no sectoral budget and thus budgetary expenditure for agricultural products 
cannot be provided.  
1.1.27   India- support to sugar and  biofuels   
1.1.27.1   Question by United States of America (AG -IMS ID 100009 ) 
In March 2021, the United States in AG-IMS ID 97011  inquired about measures an nounced in 
December 2020 regarding India 's sugar and biofuel policies, to which India responded that the 
details sought were not available at that time. The United States repeats the question below for the 
requested information:   
In December 2020, India's Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs (CCEA) announced that it has 
run a surplus of sugar production for more than a decade and has been providing financial assistance 
to export the surplus stocks. The press release goes on to state that this financial ass istance will be 
discontinued in 2023 and an interest subvention grant of INR 45.7 billion (USD 626 million) was 
approved to help divest excess sugar production for ethanol. It is worth noting that the Indian sugar 
sector benefits from a price support schem e that has incentivized overproduction, and India imposes 
an import tariff on ethanol as high as 150%.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  The United States recognizes the importance of biofuels in addressing climate and environmental 
concerns, but also emphasizes the importance of addressin g these issues in the least -distorting 
manner possible.   
a. Please indicate when the interest subvention grant will be implemented.  
b. Please provide additional details on how the grant will be implemented.  
Answer by India  
The government of India announced the National Bio -fuel Policy in 2018 which included ethanol also.  
In order to expedite the transition to greener fuels as well as to reduce the dependence of India on 
fossil fuels, the Government of India decided to encourage sugar mills, distill eries, entrepreneurs to 
enhance their ethanol production capacities or to set up new distilleries in the country. India has 
targeted 10% ethanol blending by 2022 and 20% ethanol blending by 2025. The Interest subvention 
scheme for this purpose was started in 2018 which will be provided to those projects which satisfy 
the conditions of the scheme and complete the project as per prescribed timelines.  
1.1.28   India's public stockpiling   
1.1.28.1   Question by United States of America, Japan, Brazil, Canada, European Union, 
Urugu ay, Australia, Thailand, Paraguay (AG -IMS ID 100006 ) 
Again in AG -IMS 99005 , which was a follow -up question to AG -IMS 98099 which was asked by a 
number of WTO Members, India stated it would respond "in due course " with the requested 
information regarding state bonuses provided, in addition to the min imum support price provided 
for both wheat and rice.  The information has been requested repeatedly in this Committee.  The 
United States and other Members have provided India with both official state government 
announcements and reports in the media.  Furthe r, India has not explained the reason for the delay 
in providing this information or if this is the relevant support that India has referenced but not 
notified in its recent domestic support notifications as "other support for rice, that is, other than 
public stockholding for food security purposes, will be notified subsequently. " 
a. Is India in a position to provide the requested information in AG -IMS IDs 99005 , 98099 , 
97010 , 97012 , 97060 , 95032 , 93271 , 93251 , 92009 ? 
b. If not, please update this Committee on what issues India is experiencing that has 
prevented it from providing this longstanding requested information in a timely manner.  
Answer by India  
The requested information will be provided in due course . 
Follow -up: The United States indicated that this was not a new question but rather a recurring 
question and requested India to identify factors that were preventing it from providing the 
information.  
New Zealand noted its interest in the question and hi ghlighted the relevance of updated information 
on PSH in the context of the on -going negotiations.  
Paraguay echoed the US and New Zealand and noted that it was a longstanding matter and invited 
India to provide the requested information.  
Thailand support ed the US' request to India to provide the information. Thailand also noted that the 
delay in response without providing any information on challenges encountered to respond could 
impact the discussions on a permanent solution on PSH which India was advoca ting for.  
Canada noted that there was a diverse range of Members who were continuing to express interest 
in India's PSH programmes. Canada also stated its support to the follow -up question of the US to G/AG/W/235  
 
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  India and added that it was interested in better unde rstanding the operation of India's PSH 
programmes including the role of state level measures and how predetermined targets were set.  
1.1.28.2   Question by United States of America, Japan, Brazil, Canada, Uruguay, Australia, 
Thailand, Paraguay (AG -IMS ID 100005 ) 
In response to AG -IMS ID 99103 , itself a follow up to AG -IMS ID 98103 , the United States continues 
to seek clarification from India.   
The United States and other WTO Members had requested India's annual quantitative levels of 
current, historical, and pre -determined levels of wheat and rice stocks since 2010, to which India 
replied that such information was already duly noted in its domestic support notificati ons.  
In that same question, the United States and other WTO Members also inquired if India publishes 
summaries of consultative meetings between the government and the Food Corporation of 
India (FCI), which are held to assess the availability of wheat and rice for procurement at Minimum 
Support Prices (MSP) in order to meet the food security requirements of citizens, to which India 
replied that such information could also be found in its domestic support notifications.   
Please recreate the requested informa tion here as it was not obvious where such information could 
be found in India's domestic support notifications.  
Answer by India  
The required information as per footnote 5 of Annex 2 of the Agreement on Agriculture has been 
duly submitted in India's Domest ic Support notifications to the WTO regularly.  
Follow -up: The United States indicated that they were unable to find the requested information in 
the notification and invited India to indicate where the information was.  
The EU expressed its systemic intere st in this question and indicated that India had a long list of 
questions to which Members had not yet received substantial replies. The EU therefore invited India 
to provide the information and data to allow for constructive discussions.  
1.1.29   India's oilseeds policies  
1.1.29.1   Question by United States of America, Paraguay (AG -IMS ID 100004 ) 
The United States refers to AG -IMS ID 97009 , submitted in March 2021 on India 's oilseed policies, 
to which India responded that the scheme was yet to be implemente d and the details sought were 
"not available at this stage. " The United States understands that the Union Cabinet of India approved 
a new National Mission Edible Oils - Oil Palm on 18  August  2021 with a budget of Rs. 110.4 billion.  
The government 's press re lease ( https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1746942 ) 
states "Due to heavy dependence on imports for edible oils, it is important to make efforts for 
increasi ng domestic production of edible oils… " It is understood that India will provide a price 
assurance to oil palm farmers and will substantially increase the assistance of inputs/interventions.  
a. Please provide additional details with regards to the recently an nounced price assurance 
scheme for oil palm farmers, including how this measure is implemented and eligibility 
requirements for farmers to receive said price assurance, along with any limitations either 
at the farmer, state, or national level.  
b. Please provi de additional details with regards to increases in assistance of 
inputs/interventions for oil palm.  
c. Please provide a link to the operational guidelines and any laws or implementing measures 
for the price assurance scheme, the input/interventions scheme, an d any other measures 
introduced in 2021 or 2022 aimed at the edible oils sector.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  Answer by India  
It is requested to refer to the link given below for the required information about the 
measure:  https://nfsm.gov.in/Guidelines/NMEO -OPGUIEDELINES.pdf . 
1.1.30   India's cotton support   
1.1.30.1   Question by Australia (AG -IMS ID 100085 ) 
Australia notes a 10 November 2021 press release that the Indian Cabinet approved price support 
of INR 17,408.85 crore for the cotton seasons from 2014 -15 to 2020 -21. Australia also notes this 
report states that the Cotton Corporation of India (CCI) has procured around one third of India's 
cotton production for cotton season 2019 -2020 and 2020 -21. 
a. Could India please explain what the factors were for the CCI increasing the ceiling of the 
Minimum Support Price for cotton?  
b. Could India please explain why the approved price support extends back as far as the 
2014-15 season?  
c. Could India please indicate how much the CCI procured for the cotton season 2014/15 , 
2015/16, 2017/18 and 2018/19?  
Answer by India  
India thanks Australia for the question. The response is as under:   
a. Minimum Support Prices (MSPs) are announced by the Government following the 
recommendations of the Commission for Agricultural Costs and Prices (CACP), which takes into 
account various factors including the cost of cultivation/production, changes in input prices, 
input/output price parity, inter -crop price parity, effects on the cost of living, effects on general price 
level, parity between  prices paid and prices received by farmers, etc.  
b. and c. Kindly refer to relevant DS:1 notifications as the support has already been notified.  
Follow -up: Australia indicated that this question and the two previous questions (AG -IMS ID s 100005 
and 100006 ) to which Australian was a co -sponsor, were linked to the unavailability of information 
on India's major domestic support programmes in its notification and therefore these questions 
continued to be raised. Australia invited India to reply to these core q uestions in a clear and factual 
manner.  
The United States expressed interest in India's procurement of cotton under its Minimum Support 
Price programme as approximately 1/3 of the crop had been procured by the government in 
2019/2020 and 2020/2021. The US  recalled that in G/AG/W/188 the US had demonstrated that 
India's support reached as high as 81 % of direct production in the 2010/2011 and 2016/2017 
periods. Since 2016/2017, India's support price for cotton had increased by 47 % through 2021/2022 
which ind icated India's continued upper trend in support of its cotton sector. The US also pointed 
out that India had not provided all requested information in its notifications.  
The EU expressed its support to the question raised to India and indicated that the su pport by India 
had consequences on the cotton sector in other parts of the world, in particular in the C -4 and other 
developing countries and inquired on whether India had assessed the impact of its policy on other 
cotton producing developing countries.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  1.1.31   Indonesia's palm oil export restrictions  
1.1.31.1   Question by Japan (AG -IMS ID 100118 ) 
a.  
i. Palm oil is very important material for Japanese firm activities and consumers , 
therefore Japan concerns about a possible negative impact that Indonesia 's export 
restriction on palm oil would cause.  Due to suspension of scheduled shipping 
permission for Japan in the end of January caused production rescheduling and 
inventory adjustm ent. 
ii. Japan recognizes that Indonesia introduced export restriction on palm oil on 
24 January 2022, but finds that the required notification to the Committee on 
Agriculture has not been made in accordance with Article 12 of the Agreement on 
Agriculture. Cou ld Indonesia provide the reason behind the lack of notification?  Please 
indicate by when this information will be notified.  
iii. Palm oil is one of the major oil used by Japanese food industry, and we have received 
voices of concerns from the industry, some of which have already been affected by the 
delay in shipment due to the measure. According to a media report, 20 % of Domestic 
Market Obligation (DMO) in Indonesia will possibly remain even after the international 
price is stabilized.  Could Indonesia provide further details of the current measure, 
including how it is concretely operated, and when it intends to cease the measure?  
iv. Could Indonesia explain how it has given due consideration to the effects of the 
measure on importing Members ' food security, as requ ired in Article 12 of the 
Agreement on Agriculture.  
b.  
i. Could Indonesia explain how the measure meets the conditions required in Article XI 
of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT): namely i) essentiality of the 
products, ii) criticalness of the sh ortages, and iii) temporality of the measure.  
Answer by Indonesia  
From early on, the agricultural product export policies contained in the Ministry of Trade Regulation 
number 19 in 2021 were never aimed to restrict exports. It was proven that there was no report for 
complaints and obstacles from exporters.  Amendments to the Ministry of Trade Regulation 
number  19 in 2021, as contained in the Ministry of Trade Regulation number 02 in 2022, were also 
never intended to restrict palm oil exports. The changes relate only to export data recording of palm 
oil by private sectors, which are merely administrative issues.  Regarding the existing problems of 
suspension by private sectors, rest assured that this is not a government policy. Our delegation 
would like to h ighlight that this is purely a business procedure adjustment. Considering that these 
regulations were only recently enacted, exporters require some time to adjust. The Indonesian 
government will monitor the implementation of these regulations by the privat e sectors.  
1.1.32   Kazakhstan's quantitative export restrictions on agricultural products  
1.1.32.1   Question by United States of America (AG -IMS ID 100010 ) 
In a press release by Prime Minister's Office ( https://primeminister.kz/en/news/kr -ukimeti -ulttyk -
bankpen -birlesip -inflyaciyany -bakylau -zhonin degi-sharalar -keshenin -azirledi -1804613 ), the 
Republic of Kazakhstan announced in January 2022 ( https://primeminister.kz/en/news/kr -ukimeti -
ulttyk -bankpen -birlesip -inflyaciyany -bakylau -zhonindegi -sharalar -keshenin -azirledi -1804613 ) that 
its Ministry of Agriculture is taking a number of operation and systematic measures, including several 
quantitat ive export restrictions on agricultural products.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  These include:  
• quantitative restrictions on the export of sunflower seeds and sunflower oil for a period up 
to 1 July 2022;  
• a ban on the export of potatoes and carrots for a period of three  months;  
• a ban on  the export of live cattle and small cattle for a period of six months;  
• a ban on the export of grain forage is being introduced.  
a. Noting that Article XI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994 requires 
such export restrictions to be tempor ary in nature, please provide the length of time the 
ban on export of grain forage will be implemented.  
b. Please provide the harmonized tariff codes for all agricultural products subject to the 
announced export prohibitions.  
c. Noting that Kazakhstan has not no tified these export restrictions, when can Members 
expect Kazakhstan to notify these measures to the Committee on Agriculture as required 
by paragraph 1(b) of Article 12 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture?  
Answer by Kazakhstan  
a. Currently, there are no quan titative restrictions (quotas) in the Republic of Kazakhstan on 
the export of grain forage.  At the same time, there was a drought in 2021, which caused 
a shortage of feed for farm animals, which caused the death of livestock.  In order to 
protect the animal  life and health, on the basis of Article XX (b) of GATT 1994, a temporary 
ban was intro on the export of feed for farm animals (hay, silage, seed oats and other, 
seed rye and others).  This ban was introduced by Joint Order of the Ministry of Agriculture 
of the Republic of Kazakhstan No. 240 dated 12 August 2021 and the Ministry of Finance 
of the Republic of Kazakhstan No. 804 dated 12 August 2021 for a period from 24 August 
2021 until 23 February 2022.  Currently, this ban has been lifted.  
b. Potatoes and carr ots: In 2021, a drought led to a decrease in the yield of potatoes and 
carrots in the Republic of Kazakhstan.  Considering that potatoes and carrots are socially 
significant goods for the Republic of Kazakhstan, in order to prevent a critical shortage of 
these goods in the domestic market, on the basis of paragraph 2 (a) of Article XI of the 
GATT 1994, the Ministry of Agriculture introduced a ban on the export of potatoes 
(HS Code 0701) and carrots (HS Code 0706 10 000 1) for a period from 22 January 2022 
until 21 February 2022.  Currently, the ban on the export of potatoes and carrots from the 
Republic of Kazakhstan has been lifted (by Order of the Ministry of Agriculture of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan No. 45 dated 21 February 2022 and the Ministry of Finance of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan No. 180 dated 18 February 2022).  At the same time, in relation to 
potatoes (HS Codes 070190 and 0701 10 000 0) the Ministry of Agriculture temporarily 
introduced export quotas for a period from 22 February 2022 until 1 May 202 2. Live cattle 
and small cattle:  In order to prevent a critical shortage of meat on the domestic market, 
a temporary ban was introduced on the export of live cattle (HS Code 0102) and 
small-horned cattle (HS Code 0104) from the Republic of Kazakhstan for a period from 
22 January 2022 until 21 July 2022.   
c. Currently, Kazakhstan is in the process of finalizing these notifications, and we expect 
these notifications to be available for WTO Members review in the nearest future.  
1.1.33   Malaysia's rice imp ort system  
1.1.33.1   Question by United States of America (AG -IMS ID 100011 ) 
The United States notes that Malaysia recently extended BERNAS 's monopoly on rice imports 
until 2031, despite press reports indicating that it was considering alternative options that would 
enable a more open rice market without compromising the nation 's food security.  BERNAS states 
that its mission is to protect the domestic rice indus try, and it is understood that BERNAS charges 
an estimated 35% mark -up on all imports of rice.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  This limits the ability to import rice into Malaysia and the competitiveness of imported rice.  
a. Please explain what other import systems were considered, and why the government of 
Malaysia ultimately decided to maintain the current import system until 2023.  
Answer by Malaysia  
a. Since 1970 's, Malaysia has experienced several crises, including the Asian financial crisis 
in 1997/1998, the global food price crisis in 200 8, and the most recent COVID -19 
pandemic, which has also affected the whole world.  
b. Food security has become even more critical for the nation as a result of the COVID -19 
pandemic situation. In addition to the availability of food, particularly rice, food s ecurity 
also encompasses stability of rice prices in the domestic market.  
c. Therefore, the sole importer policy remains critical and relevant to Malaysia in ensuring 
the price and supply stability of rice, which is the staple food of the country. Ultimately,  
the import system benefits the people by ensuring the availability of rice at stable prices 
across the country without causing any disruptions to the international markets.  
Follow -up: The European Union mentioned that the last DS1: notification from Malaysia dated back 
to 2012 and encouraged Malaysia to provide its outstanding DS1: notifications as soon as possible.  
1.1.34   Mongolia's quota regime for importation  
1.1.34.1   Question by Russian Federation (AG -IMS ID 100131 ) 
The Russian Federation would like to reiterate its concern about the uncertainty in trade conditions 
with respect to wheat flour and liquid milk. As for 1 March 2022 these products are s till not excluded 
from the list of agricultural products subject to quota regime. We continue referring to the answer 
AG-IMS ID 93072 , where Mongolia stated that import quotas would be applied only before the Law 
on the Enrichment of Food Products comes into force. In context of this, the Russian Federation 
expects to receive the fo llowing information from Mongolia:  
a. Could Mongolia please clarify its quota regime policy for liquid milk and wheat flour for 
2022? We kindly ask to provide references to the particular legislation.  
b. When will Mongolia exclude wheat flour and liquid milk fro m the list of agricultural products 
subject to the annual import restrictions?   
c. When will Mongolia present a confirmation that quota regime for these products will be 
eliminated?  
d. We refer to the question AG -IMS ID 99104  and would like to ask Mongolia the following. 
In the Trade Policy Report in March 2021 Mongolia stated that the is sue of "restrictions on 
wheat flour and liquid milk were included in the guidelines for improving the Mongolian 
legislation until 2024 and shall be amended in accordance with the WTO rules and 
principles by 2021". Could Mongolia please clarify particular a mendments that are planned 
to be developed and implemented? When will these amendments come into force?  
Answer by Mongolia  
1.1.35   Nigeria's import prohibitions on certain agricultural products  
1.1.35.1   Question by Brazil (AG -IMS ID 100137 ) 
Brazil invites Nigeria to provide, in writing, through the AG -IMS system, answers to the questions 
posed by Brazil during the 98th CoA meetings (AG -IMS ID 98129 ): G/AG/W/235  
 
- 53 - 
 
  Nigeria maintains a list of agricultural products whose imports are prohibited. This list can be found 
on the website of the "Federal Ministry of Finance" ("Nigeria Customs Service"), at the following 
address: https://customs.gov.ng/?page_id=3075 . 
Among the products whose import is prohibited are "live or dead birds including frozen poultry; pork; 
beef; birds eggs; refined vegetable oils and fats; cane or beet sugar; coca butter, powder and cakes; 
spaghetti/noodles and fruit juice in retail packs ".  
In the light of the above, could Nigeria explain how the import ban on the products listed above is 
consistent with the obligation taken by Nigeria in Article 4 of the AoA, which prohibits Members to 
maintain or adopt quantitative restrictions on imports?  
Answer by Nigeria  
1.1.35.2   Question by Brazil (AG -IMS ID 100138 ) 
Brazil invites Nigeria to provide, in writing, through the A G-IMS system, answers to the questions 
posed by Brazil during the 99th CoA meeting (AG -IMS ID 99105 ): 
Brazil would like to invite Nigeria to provi de, in writing, through the A G-IMS system, the answer that 
was given during the 98th CoA to question AG -IMS ID 98129 . 
Additionally, Brazil would appreciate it if Nigeria could provide information regarding different 
restrictions that, in Brazil 's view, are tantamount to quantitative prohibitions.  
A decade ago, Brazil was contributing to Nigeria 's food security through exports of rice, which 
increased overall supply and kept prices in check. Since 2014/2015, when Nigeria banned the use 
of foreign exchange to import dozens of agricultural items, including rice, Brazil 's expo rts have 
decreased to the point of no exports of rice being registered since 2018.  
Brazil notes that Nigeria has not answered question AG -IMS ID  98130 , posed by the US, regarding 
the same issue.  
In the light of the above, could Nigeria provide the following information:  
a. Which products are being affected by the foreign exchange restr ictions?  
b. Why is a staple food such as rice being kept under such restrictions?  
c. Is there a timetable for the lifting of such restrictions?  
d. How does such a "de facto" quantitative restriction comply with WTO rules?  
Answer by Nigeria  
1.1.36   Oman's Vision 2020 plan  
1.1.36.1   Question by United States of America (AG -IMS ID 100013 ) 
The United States understands that the Government of Oman, as part of its Oman Vision 2020, aims 
to increase exports of agricultural products and that the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (MoAF) 
formulates policies, sponsors research, and provides technical assistance to farmers.  
a. Please confirm if participants or beneficiaries of any of the agricultur e measures that are 
part of Oman Vision 2020 through MoAF are required to be involved in export activities in 
order to participate or benefit.  
Answer by Oman  
Participants or beneficiaries are not required to be involved in Export activities.   G/AG/W/235  
 
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  1.1.37   Philippines' SSG application on instant coffee  
1.1.37.1   Question by Indonesia (AG -IMS ID 100120 ) 
Indonesia notes that the application of SSG for Indonesia's instant coffee has bee n implemented for 
nearly four years, since 2018 to 2022 and there is no indication to revoke.  
Regarding this,  
a. Could the Philippines please explain the objective of this measure and the urgency behind 
its application that it has been applied continuously in the last four years?  
b. Could Philippines please provide any information and data, including how significant is the 
impact of the change regarding the prices, volumes and economic conditions for instant 
coffee in Philippines for four years so that the SSG instrument continuously been 
applied?  Referring to Article 5.7 of the AoA regarding the aspects of transparency and the 
review of the implementation of the SSG:  
c. Has there been any efforts or policy taken to improve Philippines domesti c economic 
condition of inequality and price competitiveness of these products outside the use of SSG 
instantly?  
d. Please provide the justifications of the extension of the implementation of SSG; also could 
Philippines please inform the policy -making review mechanism in the Philippines that SSG 
has continuously been implemented?  
Answer by Philippines  
a. In accordance with paragraph 1 (b) of Article 5 (Special Safeguard Provisions) of the 
Agreement on Agriculture, SSG may be invoked on an SSG -eligible product if its CIF import 
price falls below the trigger price. The trigger price for instant coffee was among those 
provided in the up -front notification G/AG/N/PHL/27  in 2002, which is the basis of the 
Philippines in the imposition of price -based SSG. The prices of most imports of coffee 
entering the coun try during the period were lower than the trigger price which warranted 
the continued application of the price -based SSG.   
b. The SSG measure is in place due to the following:  
i. Bulk of coffee imports entering the country is still coming in at prices lower than  the 
trigger price.  
ii. Since the SSG imposition, the share of imported brands still dominates the local 
market.   
c. The Philippine government, in partnership with the local coffee sector, is continuously 
providing assistance to local farmers in terms of training  on the latest technologies on 
production, processing and marketing to upscale their skills and improve their livelihood. 
This way, farmers can produce coffee that can compete against cheap imported ones.   
Follow -up: Indonesia noted that the SSG issue had been on -going for nearly four years and had 
impacted its coffee exports due to additional SSG tariffs on it. Indonesia had identified and observed, 
from various sources in the Philippines, that the import value and volume of coffee had decreased 
significan tly since 2019 and although there had been a slight increase in 2020, the import value and 
volume were still far below their respective levels in 2018 before the SSG was implemented. This 
showed that the Philippines had not been efficient in improving its domestic instant coffee price 
competitiveness which had led to the use of SSG as a policy tool. The use of SSG for four years also 
showed that it was not an effective policy tool to change economic inequality and the SSG had rather 
become an import barrier  for trading partners.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  1.1.38   Russian Federation's compensation to farmers  
1.1.38.1   Question by India (AG -IMS ID 100144 ) 
This question originally formed part of AG -IMS ID  100122 . It has now been resubmitted as a 
separate question (see G/AG/W/217/Corr.1 - to be is sued).  
As per a recent announcement by the Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, the Russian 
Government plans to allocate additional funds to compensate farmers for part of the costs of creating 
and modernising agricultural facilities, purchasing fodde r, and implementing the mechanism for 
preferential rural mortgages. India requests the Russian Federation to provide information on the 
following:  
a. When would these funds be allocated?  
b. Under what provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture would these funds be categorised?  
c. What would be the estimated sum allocated for compensation?  
Answer by Russian Federation  
Criteria and time for allocation of support under the new measure have not been set out yet. 
According to the preliminary estimates compensation for a part of the costs for construction and 
modernization of the agricultural facilities as well as for purchasing of fodder would be categorized 
under the Amber Box, while the support for the rural mortgage does not fall under the WTO 
Agreement on Agriculture reduction commitments.  
1.1.39   Russian Federation's  grain export duties  
1.1.39.1   Question by India (AG -IMS ID 100122 ) 
a. India acknowledges Russia's response to question AG -IMS ID 99016 and requests to clarify 
the following in the context of the export duties imposed  on grains:   
i. How does the Russian Federation see the impact of such measures on the food security 
of importing countries?  
ii. In view of the short duration of implementation of these export duties, India would 
like to know if these export duties have stabilised prices for the products in the 
domestic market?  
iii. How does the Russian Federation calculate the impact of these measures on domestic 
prices and international prices?  
Answer by Russian Federation  
The measure under the resolution of the government o f the Russian Federation Nº  2096 as the other 
relevant Russian temporary measures did not result in damage to the global food security and 
significant volatility in world prices. COVID -19 was the main reason that countries faced higher food 
risks caused by  high commodity prices.  
The calculation of the impact of the measures on domestic and international prices is provided on 
the basis of available statistics.  
In April 2021 average producer prices for wheat and corn have decreased by 11.6 % and 3.1 % 
respec tively in comparison to February 2021. Growth of the average consumer prices for wheat flour 
had slowed down from 3.1 % in November 2020 – January 2021 to 1.3 % in February - April 2021, 
as well as over the same period for bread made of wheat flour from 1. 9 % to 1.6 %, and pasta made 
of wheat flour from 2.9 % to 1.6 %.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  1.1.40   South Africa's review of tariff structure for poultry meat imports  
1.1.40.1   Question by European Union (AG -IMS ID 100124 ) 
The European Union would like to support Brazil 's question AG -IMS ID 98137  and ask South Africa 
to provide clarification on its review of tariff stru cture for poultry meat imports. When will it be 
finalised? Is advance information foreseen?  
Answer by South Africa  
As mentioned to the question raised by Brazil at the June 2021 Committee on Agriculture, the 
International Trade Administration Commission of  South Africa (ITAC) is reviewing the tariff 
structure for the importation of poultry meat.   
This review has not yet been concluded.   
Further, as per Regulation 22.3, of ITAC, ITAC will publish the outcome of its investigations on its 
website.   
Follow -up: Brazil noted that it was closely following -up this matter.  
1.1.41   Türkiye's  export restrictions on agricultural products  
1.1.41.1   Question by Japan (AG -IMS ID 100126 ) 
a. 
i. Japan recognizes that  Türkiye  introduced export restriction on agricultural products, 
such as tomato and chicken, published on 27 January 2022 
(https://resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2022/01/20220127 -7.htm ), but finds that the 
required notification to the Committee on Agriculture has not been made in accordance 
with Ar ticle 12 of the Agreement on Agriculture. Could  Türkiye  provide the reason 
behind and please make the notification on this measure in near future.  
ii. Could  Türkiye  explain how it has given due consideration to the effects of the measure 
on importing Members' food security, as required in Article 12 of the Agreement on 
Agriculture.  
b.  
i. Could  Türkiye  explain how the measure meets the conditions required in Article XI of 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT): namely i) essentiality of the products, 
ii) criticalness of the shortages, and iii) temporality of the measure.  
Answer by Türkiye  
Communique No 2022/1 came into force in order for the Ministry of Agricultu re and Forestry to 
monitor agricultural production and demand and to detect threats to food security on time.   
There are currently no restrictions on the trade of products such as tomato and chicken as mentioned 
by Japan.  
Follow -up: The United States share d concerns voiced in the Committee about Members neglecting 
to notify export restrictions in a timely manner or at all. Recalling AG -IMS ID 98140, the US indicated 
that it had enquired about Türkiye 's export restrictions on olive oil to which Türkiye  had answered 
but had not indicated when it would be notifying this measure through ER1 notification. The US 
reiterated its previous question and echoed Japan's question on when Türkiye  intended to notify the 
Committee on its export restrictions.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  1.1.42   Türkiye 's freight support  
1.1.42.1   Question by United States of America (AG -IMS ID 100014 ) 
The United States understands that the Turkish Ministry of Industry and Trade reimbur ses freight 
costs for certain agricultural products exported from  Türkiye  beginning in 2016, as reported by 
various exporter associations and trade consulting firms, such as here: 
(https://igeme.com.tr/ihracat -tasimalarina -navlun -destegi/ ).  
The Turkish Ministry of Industry and Trade's KUSGEM agency describes the purpose of the measure 
is to "increase both the export level of enterprises and the export level to the specifi ed countries by 
support in the freight expenses in the exports…" (translated from: 
https://www.kosgeb.gov.tr/site/tr/ulusaldestekler/destekkate gorileri/13/pazara -giris). 
a. Please provide a copy of or link to the legal measures authorizing these subsidies, 
specifically a 2016 decision entitled "İhraç Taşımalarına Navlun Desteği Sağlanması 
Hakkında Karar"  (Decision on Freight Support for Exports) and  subsequent implementing 
measures.  
b. What products are eligible to receive freight support?  
c. What are the eligible destinations?  
d. How is the freight support determined? How much may an exporter receive per shipment?  
e. Please confirm the years and periods withi n each year that  Türkiye  has authorized such 
freight support since 2016, including for 2022 and beyond, if applicable.  
f. Please provide quantities of goods receiving support by tariff code (at least the 4 -digit 
level) and the total amount of subsidy and amou nt of subsidy per tariff code. In addition, 
please identify the quantities and total amount of subsidy for goods exported to the United 
States, including for dry milled corn products (HS 1104.23).  
g. Noting the apparent contingency on export performance and u nderstanding these 
measures were introduced following the 2015 Nairobi Decision on Export Competition and 
may still be authorized to provide support, please explain how these measures comply 
with Türkiye 's export subsidy scheduled commitments and its commi tments under the 
Nairobi Decision on Export Competition?   
Answer by Türkiye  
We thank the United States  for raising this issue. We take note of it. We will evaluate it.  
1.1.43   UK's forest risk commodities provisions  
1.1.43.1   Question by Indonesia (AG -IMS ID 100127 ) 
Indonesia has known the U nited Kingdom  due diligence on forest risk commodities provisions.  
a. Could the UK please explain scientifically the possible negative impact of this policy to the 
loss of livelihoods for small farmers in developing countries and LDC's?  
b. It is certain that several agricultural commodities will be impacted in the future such as 
cocoa beans , rubber, coffee and plantation commodities that Indonesia produces, 
including palm oil.  
Could the UK please explain the impact of implementing this policy in the long term, such as the 
effect to the market access of agricultural products related to Artic le 4.2 of the AoA?   G/AG/W/235  
 
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  Could the UK please explain the contradictions in implementing these policies by achieving the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the spirit of reforming the AoA imbalances, especially 
in the Agricultural Market Access pillar?  
Answer by United Kingdom  
The United Kingdom thanks the Government of Indonesia for its question on the 'Implementing Due 
Diligence on Forest Risk Commodities Consultation Document ' published in December 2021. The 
consultation period ended on the 11 March 2022 .  
Our consultation sought views on the detail of regulations that will implement the Environment Act 
provisions to tackle illegal deforestation in UK supply chains, to ensure that we design them 
effectively. We will publish a report on the UK government w ebsite here summarising the feedback 
that we have received through consultation within 12 weeks of the closing date.   
The United Kingdom had taken steps to ensure that the Government of Indonesia was aware of the 
consultation, inviting input to inform the development of these measures, as well as offering bilateral 
discussions on this matter.  The UK's aim is to work with other countries, supporting their efforts to 
uphold th eir laws and strengthen environmental protection.   
The United Kingdom is acting in compliance with its international obligations with regard to 
sustainable forestry and we do not see any inconsistencies between our introduction of due diligence 
provisions and our obligations under the UN Sustainable development Goals and the Agreement on 
Agriculture. The United Kingdom welcomes further discussion with the Government of Indonesia and 
other WTO Members on these matters.  
Follow -up: Brazil informed that it had been engaging bilaterally with the United Kingdom including 
by providing written comments to the United Kingdom's legislative process in order to express its 
concerns regarding the restrictive effects of such measures on trade. Brazil indicated that it sha red 
the concerns of the United Kingdom regarding impact of agriculture on the environment but 
highlighted that, imposing restrictions on trade of agricultural products was not the answer as it 
discriminated against one type of activity and product.  
1.1.44   U.S. Ma rket Facilitation Programme (MFP)  
1.1.44.1   Question by Australia (AG -IMS ID 100129 ) 
Australia thanks the US for its previous answer to Australia 's question (AG -IMS ID  99085 ) on the 
Market Facilitation Program (MFP) notified in its DS:1 notifica tion G/AG/N/USA/15 0. In its answer, 
the US said that 'producers received payments based on total acreage of eligible commodities at a 
single, per acre rate '. 
a. Could the US please clarify how it has calculated these payments, including how it has 
derived the single county -level payment rate?  
Answer by United States of America  
The county payment rates were based on historical average area and yields in each county for all 
eligible non -specialty crops. The county payment rate was calculated based on the following steps:  
a. For each eligible crop, multiply the historical average acres (2015 -2018) by the historical 
average yields (2015 -2017) and by the per -unit payment rate that was based on the 
estimated trade damages by crop.  
b. Sum all calculated values from the first step to obta in the total non -specialty crop damage 
estimate for that county.  
c. Divide the value calculated in Step 2 by the total number of historical average acres for 
all eligible non -specialty crops.  County payment rates per acre could be no higher than 
USD 150 per a cre, with a minimum county payment rate of USD 15 per acre.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  Follow -up: Canada noted that payments in 2018 -2019 under the MFP were considerable and just 
over USD 5 billion. Canada underlined its interest in better understanding the functioning of the 
Progra m. 
1.1.45   U.S. Partnership to Ease Port Congestion and Restore Disrupted Shipping Services 
to U.S. Grown Agricultural Commodities  
1.1.45.1   Question by Brazil (AG -IMS ID 100132 ) 
Last January, the USDA released the "Partnership to Ease Port Congestion and Restore Disrupted 
Shipping Services to U.S. Grown Agricultural Commodities ". Among other incentives, it was 
announced that "USDA will also help cover additional movement logistics costs at USD 125 per 
container."  
(Source:  https://www.usda.gov/media/press -releases/2022/01/31/usda -announces -partnership -
ease-port-congestion -and-restore ).  
Could the US provide further information about the payment of USD 125 per container, including 
which party is going to receive such aid?  
Answer by United States of America  
The programme has not yet been implemented and specific elements of the programme are still 
being considered.  No further information is available at this time.   
1.1.46   U.S. USD 800 million subsidies fo r biofuels from agricultural products  
1.1.46.1   Question by European Union (AG -IMS ID 100133 ) 
USDA on 8 December announced that "USDA to Make Up to USD 800 Million Ava ilable to Provide 
Economic Relief to Biofuel Producers and Restore Renewable Fuel Markets Hit by the Pandemic ".  
The announcement includes the following explanation "to increase significantly the sales and use of 
higher blends of bioethanol and biodiesel b y expanding the infrastructure for renewable fuels 
derived from U.S. agricultural products ". This indicates that the programme is established to 
support the agricultural raw material, can the US therefore explain how it intends to notify this 
support in DS:1?  
Answer by United States of America  
These programs will be notified consistent with WTO rules and at the appropriate time.  
Follow -up: China evoked the similar question that it had raised to the United States in the previous 
year. It had not ed that the notification period had been revised by the US since 2017 as a result, 
the first payment for 2018's MFP programme had been reported for the fiscal year 2017/2018. The 
second payment for 2018 and first payment for 2019 of the MFP were reported i n fiscal year 
2018/2019 while the second MFP payment for 2019 and first payment for CFAP 2020 were reported 
in fiscal year 2019/2020. China requested the US to clarify the impact that such changes in 
notification practices on the level of annual support. S econdly, China recalled the US' response to 
China's question during the 99th CoA meeting and requested information on why the payments had 
been divided into two or three stages over more than one year whereas the relevant data was 
already available. China requested the US to provide revised versions of notifications so that 
Members could know the exact level of support in mentioned years.  
Paraguay also expressed interest in the question and enquired, in addition to knowing how it would 
be notified, on the complete list of eligible products for these subsidies.  
New Zealand also expressed interest in the question and indicated looking forward to receiving the 
United States' domestic support notification.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  1.1.47   U.S. Domestic Support Policies and Notifications  
1.1.47.1   Quest ion by New Zealand (AG -IMS ID 100134 ) 
New Zealand notes a report that USDA is making USD 150 million of American Rescue Plan Act 
funding available through the Meat and Poultry Processing Expansion Program  (MPPEP). USDA is 
offering grants of up to USD 25 million each to expand processing capacity through a variety of 
activities, including but not limited to construction, expansion of existing facilities, and acqui sition 
of equipment.  
Grant funds can be used to expand processing capacity by supporting activities such as:  
• Building new – or modernizing or expanding existing – processing facilities;  
• Developing, installing, or modernizing equipment and technology;  
• Ensuring compliance with packaging and labelling requirements;  
• Upholding occupational and other safety requirements;  
• Modifying facilities or equipment to protect food safety;  
• Paying for voluntary grading services on value -added processed produc ts; 
• Offsetting costs associated with becoming an inspected facility;  
• Supporting workforce recruitment, training, and retention.  
New Zealand appreciates that the US will notify in due course any payments made in accordance 
with commitments. How does the US intend to classify these payments?  
Answer by United States of America  
The Meat and Poultry Processing Expansion Program makes grants available to processors rather 
than primary producers.  This programme will be notified consistent with WTO rules and at the  
appropriate time.  
Follow -up: New Zealand stated interest in better understanding the US' support in detail and its 
future trajectory. New Zealand also underlined the USD 18.2 billion of support for 2019 and 2020 in 
the US' notification and encouraged the US not to exceed its WTO entitlement.  
Paraguay recorded their interest in the matter and requested that the US specified how and in which 
category the programme would be notified.  
Brazil specified that although it understood the need for the provision of support against the hardship 
faced by producers since the COVID -19, they expected the support to be targeted, proportionate, 
transparent, and temporary. Brazil stated that the US' domestic support was rather on the rise as 
per its latest DS1: notification.  
Canada indicated that as an exporter of beef and pork, it had an interest in better understanding 
the programme and the ways in which the US was aiming to expand its processing facilities.  
1.2  POINTS RAISED IN CONNECTION WITH INDIVIDUAL NOTIFICAT IONS  
1.2.1   Administration of tariff and other quota commitments  (Table MA:1)  
1.2.1.1   El Salvador (G/AG/N/SLV/72)  
AG-IMS ID 100075: Question by Paraguay - Transparency issues  
El Salvador has consistently notified in its MA:1 notifications (since 1998) only the quota for SLVQ007 
- cheddar cheese. However, section I -B of its schedule of commitments includes other quotas such 
as tariff quotas for poultry and sugar, among others.   
Could El Salvador explain why the other quotas have not been notified in its MA:1?   
In the case of poultry, we note that, in the past, this has even been subject to GATT Article XXVIII 
negotiations to raise bound tariff levels.   G/AG/W/235  
 
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  Answer by El Salvador  
Follow -up: As an export of poultry and sugar, Brazil expressed its interest in the question.  
1.2.1.2   European Union (G/AG/N/EU/72)  
AG-IMS ID 100066: Question by Paraguay - Other administration arrangements  
We thank the European Union (EU) for submitting its MA:1 notification for the fiscal year 2022 and 
calendar year 2022/23. We are pleased to note that, once again, the EU excludes the United Kingdom 
from the erga omnes  quotas in this notification. Does the EU consider an exclusion of the United 
Kingdom from these quotas in its schedule of commitments as an alternative to the submission of 
an annual notifi cation that does not have the same legal effect?  
Answer by European Union  
Following the United Kingdom 's withdrawal from the Union, the European Union notified the WTO 
Membership in its communications G/SECRET/42 and G/SECRET/42/Add.2  of its intention to m odify 
its current concessions by apportioning all tariff -rate quotas as they are reflected in Schedule CLXXV 
of the European Union, while fully taking account of the Guidelines adopted on 10 November 1980 
on Procedures for Renegotiations under GATT Article  XXVIII (BISD 27S/26 -28). Further to these 
notifications, the European Union entered into negotiations and consultations with all the Members 
having rights under GATT Article XXVIII in relation to the modification of concessions with respect 
to the above -mentioned tariff -rate quotas. To date, these negotiations are ongoing. The European 
Union will be in the position to submit for certification a new Schedule of Commitments, which will 
include all the changes following the United Kingdom 's withdrawal from th e Union,  when these 
negotiations have been finalised.  
1.2.2   Imports under tariff and other quota commitments (Table MA:2)  
1.2.2.1   Iceland (G/AG/N/ISL/51 , G/AG/N/ISL/52, G/AG/N/ISL/53 ) 
AG-IMS ID 100053: Question by European Union - Tariff quota fill  
The European Union wo uld like to thank Island for submitting the MA:2 notifications for the 
marketing years 2017/2018, 2018/2019 and 2019/2020 and looks forward to reviewing the MA:2 
notification for the marketing year 2020/2021, as soon as this will be available. The European  Union 
notes the extremely low fill rate for the butter TRQ (ISLQ088) during the last three marketing years.  
a. Could Iceland explain the reasons for the significant under -fill of this quota?  
b. Given that most of Iceland 's WTO tariff rate quotas have not been opened in the last three 
marketing years due to a more favourable applied rate in comparison with the in -quota 
duty rate,  has Iceland considered a reform of its tariff quota system to consolidate the 
number of tariff quotas and simplify its schedule?  
Answer by Iceland  
We thank the EU for their questions.  
a. The Icelandic TRQ in question has been opened in every reporting year, including the 
marketing years referred to in the question by the EU. However, there has been little 
interest in imports as domesti cally produced butter enjoys a strong market position.  
b. The Icelandic tariff quota system reflects Iceland´s obligations under relevant WTO 
Agreements. Icelandic agricultural policies are constantly being review, amended and 
updated as needed. However, refo rming the tariff quota system has not, as of yet, been 
identified as a priority under such review procedures.  Thank you.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  1.2.2.2   India (G/AG/N/IND/26)  
AG-IMS ID 100060: Question by Australia - Tariff quota fill  
In AG -IMS ID 99030  India was requested to provide an explanation of the continually low fill rates 
of two of India 's TRQs (INDQ001,  INDQ002). Australia notes that in G/AG/N/IND/26  the fill rate of 
quotas INDQ001, INDQ002 and INDQ003 were either nil or very close to zero. Australia again kindly 
asks:  
a. Was this the result of market forces, preferential imports or tariff quota administration?  
b. What is India doing to  improve fill rates?  
c. Has India taken any actions that might have discouraged importers from using the TRQs?  
Furthermore, India responded to AG -IMS ID 98034  that the Handbook of Procedures would be 
extended until 30 September 2021.  
d. Australia asks if a new edition of the handbook has been made available or if another 
extension has been granted?  
Answer by India  
India thanks Australia for the question and the response is as under:  Application for import and fill 
rate under TRQ is a dem and-driven outcome and based on the market situation. The fill rates of 
TRQs in any particular year are affected by a variety of factors, including price, exchange rates, 
supply and demand, domestic production, etc.  The policy and process are periodically being reviewed 
for better management of TRQs. Specific efforts have been undertaken to provide an electronic, 
paperless process for TRQ allocation. No actions have been taken that may discourage importers 
from using the TRQs.The DGFT 's Handboo k of Procedures has been further extended till 
31 March  2022.  
1.2.2.3   Korea, Republic of (G/AG/N/KOR/85)  
AG-IMS ID 100067: Question by Paraguay - Tariff quota fill  
a. Could the Republic of Korea explain the reasons for the low use of the following tariff 
quotas:  
i. KORQ 057 sesame seeds: 15%  
ii. KORQ063 oilcake and other solid residues of sesame seeds: 0%.  
b. Is the Republic of Korea considering the possibility of modifying quota administration 
systems to improve use thereof?  
Answer by Korea, Republic of  
a. KOR57 (Sesame oil and it s fractions) TRQ fill rate is 100%. Regarding G/AG/N/KOR/85, 
the Secretariat circulated a revised version(G/AG/N/KOR/85/Corr.1) containing the fill rate 
of 100% of KOR57. In case of KOR63 (cakes and other solid residues of sesame seeds), 
as the price compe titiveness of domestic products is higher, consumption is mostly met 
by domestic production.   
b. KOR63 TRQ is administered based on a first -come, first -served system and the Republic 
of Korea plans to continue the current administration system.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  1.2.2.4   South Africa ( G/AG/N/ZAF/109)  
AG-IMS ID 100069: Question by Paraguay - Tariff quota fill  
a. Could South Africa explain the reasons for the low use of the following tariff quotas:  
i. ZAFQ00 meat of bovine animals: 1.6%;  
ii. ZAFQ025 wheat: 45.5%;  
iii. ZAFQ029 maize: 0%;  
iv. ZAFQ051 other ce reals - 0%. 
b. Is South Africa considering the possibility of modifying quota administration systems to 
improve use thereof?  
c. Could South Africa explain the footnotes to the ZAFQ040 (sugar) quota and provide the 
list of "traditional suppliers"?  
Answer by South Africa  
South Africa thanks Paraguay for its interest in its market access notifications.  
a.  
i. With regard to the quota ZAFQ0001, Meat of Bovine Animals, the bulk of South Africa 's 
meat imports originate in the region and the meat enters the country free of any duty 
under the relevant trade agreement. It should also be noted that beef imports by South 
Africa declined from over 19 ,000 ton nes in 2016 to 2 ,494 ton nes in 2020. Import 
permits for the total quantity available under this TRQ were iss ued to economic 
operators, due to prevailing market conditions, these permits have not been utilized.  
ii. ZAFQ025: The bulk of imports under this TRQ is for wheat (HS 1001). Wheat is subject 
to a tariff formula that changes from time to time. For a large part of 2019, the MFN 
ad valorem equivalent (AVE) import tariff for wheat was only a fraction higher than 
the in -quota tariff rate for wheat. Imports making use of the TRQ took place in the 
latter half of the year when the MFN tariff for wheat was increased. As  you will have 
noted, the fill rate for the wheat TRQ increased to 78% in 2020 as a result of the higher 
MFN import duty.  
iii. ZAFQ029: The MFN tariff for maize was at zero for the years 2019 and 2020. Economic 
operators did therefore not make use of the TRQ pr ovisions.  
iv. ZAFQ051: It is not exactly clear to which TRQ Paraguay is referring to in their question 
a. iv. The code ZAFQ051 refers to oilcake. For oilcake, the MFN applied tariff is equal 
to the in -quota tariff rate and a TRQ was not opened for oilcake (ZAF Q051). Imports 
took place at the MFN level.  
b. At this stage, South Africa is not considering a change to its TRQ administration system 
as the low fill rates cannot be attributed to the administration system.  
c. "Traditional suppliers"  refer to sugar producers and exporters that are members of SADC. 
The Sugar Protocol under the SADC Trade Agreement provides for duty free sugar access.   
AG-IMS ID 100061: Question by Canada - Tariff quota fill  
Canada notes that the fill rates for a number of tariff rate quotas is very low or zero.   G/AG/W/235  
 
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  Could South Africa explain the:  
a. 1.6% and 2.1% fill rates for ZAFQ001 (meat of bovine animals) for 2019 and 2020, 
respectively;  
b. zero fill rates for ZAFQ002 (meat of swine) for 2019 and 2020;  
c. zero fill rate for ZAFQ018 (dried peas) in 2020  following a 66.2% fill rate in 2019.  
Answer by South Africa  
a. With regard to ZAFQ001 Meat of Bovine Animals, the bulk of South Africa 's meat imports 
originate in the region and the meat enters the country free of any duty under the relevant 
trade agreement.  It should also be noted that beef imports by South Africa declined from 
over 19,000 tonnes in 2016 to 2,494 tonnes in 2020 (87% decline). South Africa 's 
un-subsidized prices for beef are substantially lower than prevailing world market prices. 
South Afric a is a net exporter of beef in recent years.  Applications have been received 
from economic operators for the total quantity of 26,254 tonnes and import permits for 
the total quantity have been issued. These allocations have not been utilized due to 
prevail ing market conditions.  
b. For ZAFQ002 (Meat of Swine) for 2019 and 2020, a TRQ in this regard was not opened. 
Over 95% of pork imports enter the country free of duty from all origins.  
c. The ZAFQ018 (dried peas) TRQ is applied across three HS codes, HS 071320, HS 071360 
and HS 071390. The bulk of imports take place under HS 071320, and for this line, the 
MFN tariff is at zero. Importers opt to not make use of the permits that have been issued. 
Some imports do take place for the tariff codes HS 071360 and  HS 071390, however, 
imports originate mainly from the region and enter the country free of any duty under the 
SADC trade agreement.  
1.2.2.5   South Africa (G/AG/N/ZAF/109, G/AG/N/ZAF/110)  
AG-IMS ID 100042: Question by Brazil - Tariff quota fill  
South Africa reports on its latest MA:2 notifications, pertaining to calendar years 2019 and 2020, 
that the fill -rate for tariff -rate quotas ZAFQ001 (Meat of bovine animals); ZAFQ029 (Maize or maize 
equivalent); ZAFQ052 (Tobacco) and ZAFQ053 (Cotton) was 0% or close to  it.  
Firstly, considering that their fill rate has drastically fallen since Calendar Year 2016 (when ZAFQ001, 
ZAFQ029, ZAFQ052 and ZAFQ053 had a fill rate of 63%, 100%, 100% and 92%, respectively), could 
South Africa provide the following information:   
a. Data on market circumstances that would explain the relatively low volume of imports 
under the aforementioned TRQs after 2016;  
b. Updates on policy developments that would explain the relatively low volume of imports 
under the aforementioned TRQs;   
c. volume of im ports taking place outside the TRQ.   
Secondly, Brazil notices that only processors/manufacturers are eligible for licenses under ZAFQ029 
(according to G/AG/N/ZAF/28 ), ZAFQ052 (according to G/AG/N/ZAF/1/Rev.1 ) and ZAFQ053 
(according to G/AG/N/ZAF/35 ).  
d. Could South Africa confirm that importers who are not processors/manufacturers of maize, 
tobacco and cotton are precluded from applying for import under ZAFQ029, ZAFQ052 and 
ZAFQ053?   G/AG/W/235  
 
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  e. Have there been any specific changes in requirements for processors/manufacturers to 
apply to those licenses?   
Thirdly, Brazil observes that for TRQ ZAFQ001 (acco rding to G/AG/N/ZAF/14 ) and for ZAFQ052 
(according to G/AG/N/ZAF/1/Rev.1 ) there is no provision mentioning eligibility criteria for new 
entrants or new importers.   
f. Could South Africa explain if the pro rata allocation based on proven actual imports can 
be waived in the light of recent low fill rate for both TRQs  in order to guarantee that the 
TRQ can be used?  
Answer by South Africa  
a. Beef (ZAFQ001) imports to South Africa declined from over 19,000 tonnes in 2016 to 
2,494  tonnes in 2020, this is a 87% decline. Import permits for the total quantity available 
under this TRQ were issued to economic operators, due to prevailing market conditions, 
these permits have not been utilized.  For beef, it should be noted that the un -subsidized 
South African price is substantially lower than prevailing world market prices.  This also 
explained why South Africa became a net exporter of beef in recent years.   
ZAFQ0129 (Maize): The MFN tariff for maize is at 0% and importers did not make use of 
the TRQ provisions. Some imports did take place at the MFN tariff of 0%.   
ZAFQ052 (T obacco): The  bulk of tobacco imports under the tariff code 2401 originate in 
the region and enter the South African market free of any duty.   
ZAFQ053 (Cotton, HS  5201): Close to 90% of cotton imports into South Africa, are from 
the region and enter the cou ntry duty free.  
b. The TRQ administration for beef, maize, tobacco , and cotton has not been changed for a 
number of years. The low fill rates are a result of prevailing tariffs and market conditions 
as explained above.  
c. For the mentioned products (beef, tobacc o, and cotton) imports are taking place from the 
region under the provisions of the SADC Trade Agreement.  For both tobacco and cotton, 
manufactures and processors are the major importers as these products are not imported 
for direct consumption.  
d. The alloca tion of import permits to manufactures and processors is not a limiting factor 
for the utilisation of the import permits.  
e. The TRQ administration methods for the mentioned products has not changed in recent 
years. There are no specific criteria for new entr ants; however, new entrants are not 
precluded from applying for import permits. 20% of the quota is reserved for new entrants, 
and historical performance is not considered.  
f. A change in the pro -rata allocation based on proven actual imports will not make a 
difference to the TRQ fill rates. The low fill rates are as a result of market conditions and 
not as a result of the quota administration methods.  
1.2.2.6   South Africa (G/AG/N/ZAF/110)  
AG-IMS ID 100076: Question by Paraguay - Tariff quota fill  
a. Could South Africa explain the reasons for the low use of the following tariff quotas:i. 
ZAFQ00 meat of bovine animals: 2.1%ii. ZAFQ029 maize: 0%iii. ZAFQ051 other cereals - 
0%? 
b. Is South Africa considering the possibility of modifying quota administration systems to 
improve use thereof?  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  c. Could South Africa explain the footnotes to the ZAFQ040 (sugar) quota and provide the 
list of "traditional suppliers"?  
d. Could South Africa indicate when the notification MA:2 for 2021 can be expected?  
Answer by South Africa  
a.  
i. With regard to the quota ZAFQ001, Meat of Bovine Animals, the bulk of South Africa 's 
meat imports originate in the region and the meat enters the country free of any duty 
under the relevant trade agreement. It should also be noted that beef imports by South 
Africa dec lines from over 19 ,000 ton nes in 2016 to 2 ,494 ton nes in 2020. The 
un-subsidized price of beef in South Africa is substantially lower than the world market 
price. Beef exports remained stable over this time and South African is a net exporter 
of beef. Impo rt permits for the total quantity available under this TRQ were issued to 
economic operators, due to prevailing market conditions, these permits have not been 
utilized.  
ii. With regard to ZAFQ029: The MFN tariff for maize was at zero for the years 2019 and 
2020. Economic operators did therefore not make use of the TRQ provisions.  
iii. With regard to ZAFQ051: It is not exactly clear to which TRQ Paraguay is referring to 
in their question a.3. The code ZAFQ051 refers to oilcake. For oilcake, the MFN applied 
tariff is equal to the in -quota tariff and a TRQ in this regard was not opened.  
b. At this stage, South Africa is not considering a change to its TRQ administration system 
as the low fill rates cannot be attributed to the administration system.  
c. "Traditional supplier s" refer to sugar producers and exporters that are members of SADC.  
The Sugar Protocol under the SADC Trade Agreement provides for duty free sugar access.  
d. The MA:2 notification for 2021 can be expected towards the end of the year 2022.  
1.2.2.7   Switzerland (G/AG/N/ CHE/113)  
AG-IMS ID 100089: Question by Australia - Tariff quota fill  
Australia welcomes Switzerland notification concerning imports under tariff quotas (Table MA:2) for 
the 2020 calendar year ( G/AG/N/CH E/113 ). In the notifications, Switzerland report underfill for a 
number of items.  
a. Can Switzerland explain the low fill rates for durum wheat (CHEQ026), bread grains 
(CHEQ027) and coarse grains for human consumption (CHEQ028)?  
Answer by Switzerland  
The fill  rates for these tariff quotas can be explained by the market situation, which has led to a lack 
of demand for the products concerned.  Tariff quotas nº  26 and nº  28 are not administered. Imports 
are therefore authorized in unlimited quantities at the tarif f quota rate. Tariff quota  nº 27 is allocated 
according to the order of acceptance of customs declarations.  
AG-IMS ID 100077: Question by Paraguay - Tariff quota fill  
a.  
i. Could Switzerland explain the reasons for the low use of the following tariff quotas:  
• CHEQ026 durum wheat – 56.4%;  
• CHEQ028 coarse grains – 42.2%?  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  ii. Is Switzerland considering the possibility of modifying quota administration systems 
to improve use thereof?  
b. Tariff quota CHEQ005 (bovine meat) is 100% filled but notification G/AG/N/CHE/113  
indicates that imports exceed the quota fill.  
i. Could Switzerland indicate total imports as a %age of the quota, including surplus 
imports benefiting from the in -quota tariff?  
ii. Could Switzerland confirm w hat is the administration method for this quota?  
iii. Given that demand appears to exceed the quota quantity each year, is Switzerland 
considering an increase in quota quantity to provide greater predictability for 
exporters?  
Answer by Switzerland  
a.  
i. The fill rat e for quotas Nos. 26 and 28 can be explained by market factors, most 
notably low demand. The two tariff quotas in question are not administered, i.e. 
imports are authorized in unlimited quantities at the tariff quota rate.  
ii. Switzerland is not, for the momen t, planning to modify the administration method for 
the tariff quotas in question.  
b.  
i. In 2020, Switzerland imported a total of 49,452 tonnes under tariff quota No. 5. This 
corresponds to a total fill rate of 220%.  
ii. Tariff quota No. 5 is administered using a c ombination of two methods – share 
allocation based on a contribution to Swiss production, and share allocation by tender. 
A detailed description of the administration of the tariff quota is provided in notification 
MA:1, the most recent of which dates from  2021 (G/AG/N/CHE/108).  
iii. Switzerland is not, for the moment, planning to increase the quantity of the tariff quota 
in question.  
1.2.2.8   United Kingdom (G/AG/N/GBR/6/REV.1)  
AG-IMS ID 100090: Question by Australia - Tariff quota fill  
Australia welcomes the United Kin gdom 's notification concerning imports under tariff quotas (Table 
MA:2) for the 2021 calendar year ( G/AG/N/GBR/6/Rev.1 ). 
In the notifications, the United Kingdom report nil, or close to nil, fill rates for a number of items.  
Can the United Kingdom provide an explanation as to why these quotas had such low fill rates?  
• Meat of bovine animals ' quotas (GRBQ001, GRBQ002, GRBQ003, GRBQ004, GRBQ005, 
GRBQ006 and GRBQ007)?  
• Meat of sheep or goat 's quota (GBRQ013)?  
• Dairy quotas (GBRQ021 , GBRQ022, GBRQ023, GBRQ024, GBRQ025, GBRQ026)?  
• Fruit and vegetable quotas (GBRQ028, GBRQ029, GBRQ030, GBRQ032, GBRQ034, 
GBRQ035, GBRQ036, GBRQ037, GBRQ038, GBRQ039, GBRQ040, GBRQ041, GBRQ042, 
GBRQ044, GBRQ045 and GBRQ046)?  
• Wheat and barley quotas (GBRQ047 , GBRQ048 and GBRQ049)?  
• Sugar quotas (GBRQ072 and GBRQ073) ? 
• Wine quotas (GBR082, GBRQ084 and GBRQ085) ? G/AG/W/235  
 
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  Answer by United Kingdom  
Firstly, we would like to clarify that this notification mainly covers imports under tariff quotas for the 
calendar year 2021.  This supplements the information we previously notified in August 2021 
covering imports under tariff quotas for the first half of 2021 (1 January – 30 June) marketing year 
(G/AG/N/GBR/6 ).  
As the United Kingdom explained at the last Committee on Agriculture in September, we  assess that 
more than one factor describe lower utilisation of tariff quotas during this period.  Having spoken 
with stakeholders and conducted further data analysis, our assessment is that the low utilisation is 
driven by a decrease in demand during the r eference period, particularly within the hospitality and 
food services sector, which has traditionally been the primary sector using many of these 
quotas.  During the reporting period, the United Kingdom 's economy, like many others, faced 
restrictions on ci tizens to tackle the global Covid -19 pandemic, as well as logistical challenges, 
congestion and delays in moving goods around the world. We believe this is the primary reason for 
the low fill rates, particularly for meat products.  
Our responses to your spe cific questions are as follows:  
Bovine meat (GBRQ001 - GBRQ007):  although utilisation of the beef quotas was low during the 
2021 marketing year period (to 30 June 2021), there is evidence in increased usage so far during 
the current 2021/22 marketing year.  This supports our assessment above that demand is returning 
as COVID -19 restrictions have been gradually eased.  Quota GBRQ007 is administered on a first -
come first -served basis.  Any importer can make use of this quota should they wish to do so and it 
is our assessment that the low utilisation reflects current market demand.  
Sheep/Goat meat (GBRQ013):  this quota is administered on a first -come first -served basis.  Any 
importer can make use of this quota should they wish to do so and it is our assessment that  the low 
utilisation reflects current market demand.  
Dairy quotas (GBRQ021 -GBRQ026):  the majority of these quotas are managed through a licence on 
demand subject to the presentation of an Inward Monitoring Arrangement 1 certificate.  It is our 
assessment th at the low utilisation reflects current market demand.  
Fruit and vegetable quotas (GBRQ028 -GBRQ030, GBRQ032, GBRQ034 -GBRQ042, GBRQ044 -
GBRQ046):  the vast majority of these quotas are administered on a first -come first -served 
basis.  Any importer can make use  of these quotas should they wish to do so and it is our assessment 
that the low utilisation reflects current market demand and/or alternative preferential access to the 
UK market.  The UK applied tariffs for tomatoes (GBRQ029), lemons (GBRQ040) and table g rapes 
(GBRQ041) are the same or lower than the in -quota tariffs.   
Wheat and barley quotas (GBRQ047, GBRQ048 and GBRQ049):  our assessment is that the low 
utilisation reflects a combination of current market demand and alternative preferential access to 
the UK market e.g. through bilateral trade agreements.  
Sugar quotas (GBRQ072 and GBRQ073):  low utilisation of GBRQ072 can be explained by market 
circumstances.  The in -quota tariff rate of GBP 82.01/tonne is not economically viable under current 
market conditions in the United Kingdom.  Additionally , there is alternative preferential access to the 
UK market e.g. through an autonomous tariff quota and bilateral trade agreements.  GBRQ073 is a 
country specific quota and it is our assessment that the low util isation reflects current market 
demand and alternative preferential access to the UK market.  
Wine quotas (GBR082, GBRQ084 and the quota for bran, sharps and other residues 
(GBRQ085):  these quotas are administered on a first -come first -served basis.  Any imp orter can 
make use of these quotas should they wish to do so and it is our assessment that the low utilisation 
reflects current market demand and/or alternative preferential access to the UK market.  For 
vermouth (GBRQ084), the applied UK tariff is lower th an the in -quota tariff rate.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  AG-IMS ID 100043: Question by Brazil - Tariff quota fill  
The United Kingdom's latest MA:2 revised notification, which included information regarding imports 
under tariff quotas during the Calendar Year 2021, demonstrates that the fill rate for TRQs GBRQ034 
- Manioc (cassava), GBRQ035 - Manioc (cassava) other than pellets of flour and meal, and GBRQ050 
– Maize was 0% or close to 0%.  
Could the UK provide the following information:  
a. Data on market circumstances th at would explain the relatively low volume of imports 
under the aforementioned TRQs (in other words, does the answer provided for question 
AG-IMS ID  99052  still apply)?   
b. Are imports taking place outside the TRQ? If so, could the UK provide data on the total 
imports of such products?  
Answer by United Kingdom  
TRQs GBRQ034 and GBRQ035 covering manioc (cassava) are administered on a first -come first -
served basis.  Any importer can make use of these quotas should they wish to do so and it is our 
assessment that the low utilisation reflects a combination of current market demand and alterna tive 
preferential access to the UK market e.g. through bilateral trade agreements.  United Kingdom 
imports of manioc (HS 0714 10) during 2021 were in the region of 4,201,921 kg.  For maize 
(GBRQ050), low utilisation can be expected as the United Kingdom appl ied tariff rate is zero.  Total 
imports of maize in 2021 were in the region of 2,380,018,113 kg.  
AG-IMS ID 100074: Question by Paraguay - Tariff quota fill  
a. Could then United Kingdom explain the reasons for the low use of the following tariff 
quotas:  
• Meat of bovine animals: GBRQ004 - 0%, GBRQ005 - 0%, GBRQ006 - 32.4% 
GBRQ007 - 0.1%;  
• Manioc (cassava): GBRQ034 - 0%; 
• Manioc starch: GBRQ060 and GBRQ061 - 9.5%;  
• Common wheat: GBRQ047 - 41%;  
• Maize: GBRQ050 - 0%; 
• Rice: GBRQ051 - 26.5%, GBRQ052 - 22%, GBRQ053 - 19.8%;  
• Sugar: GBRQ072 - 3.6%;  
• Cane sugar: GBRQ073 - 0%. 
b. Is the United Kingdom considering the possibility of modifying quota administration 
systems to improve use thereof?  
c. Could the United Kingdom explain the footnotes to quotas GBRQ060 and GBRQ061? The 
notification suggests that although two separate quotas are involved, they are considered 
as a single quota instead of the quantities being duplicated.  
Answer by United Kingdom  
Firstly, we would like to clarify that this notification mainly covers imports under tariff quotas for the 
calendar year 2021.  This supplements the information we notified in August 2021 covering imports 
under tariff quotas for the 2021 (1 January – 30 June) marketing year ( G/AG/N/GBR/6 ).  
As the United Kingdom explained at the last Committee on Agricultu re in September, we assess that 
more than one factor describe lower utilisation of tariff quotas during this period.  Having spoken 
with stakeholders and conducted further data analysis, our assessment is that the low utilisation is 
driven by a decrease in demand during the reference period, particularly within the hospitality and 
food services sector, which has traditionally been the primary sector using many of these 
quotas.  During the reporting period, the United Kingdom 's economy, like many others, faced  
restrictions on citizens to tackle the global Covid -19 pandemic, as well as logistical challenges, G/AG/W/235  
 
- 70 - 
 
  congestion and delays in moving goods around the world. We believe this is the primary reason for 
the low fill rates, particularly for meat products.  
Our re sponses to your specific questions are as follows:  
Beef (GBRQ004 - GBRQ007):  Although utilisation of the beef quotas was low during the 2021 
marketing year period (to 30 June 2021), there is evidence in increased usage so far during the 
current 2021/22 mar keting year.  This supports our assessment above that demand is returning as 
COVID -19 restrictions have been gradually eased.  Quota GBRQ007 is administered on a first -come 
first-served basis.  Any importer can make use of this quota should they wish to do so and it is our 
assessment that the low utilisation reflects current market demand.  
 
Cassava (GBRQ034):  This quota is administered on a first -come first -served basis.  Any importer can 
make use of this quota should they wish to do so and it is our assessme nt that the low utilisation 
reflects a combination of current market demand and alternative preferential access to the UK 
market e.g. through bilateral trade agreements.  United Kingdom imports of manioc (HS 0714 10) 
during 2021 were in the region of 4,201, 921kg.  
 
Cassava starch (GBRQ060 and GBRQ061):  These quotas are administered as a single quota volume 
on a first -come first -served basis.  However, low utilisation can be expected as the United Kingdom 
applied tariff rate ( GBP 138/tonne) is lower than the in -quota duty rate of GBP 142.76/tonne.  
 
Common wheat (GBRQ047):  our assessment is that the low utilisation reflects a combination of 
current market demand and alternative preferential access to the UK market e.g. through bilateral 
trade agreements.  GBRQ044 relates to apricots, which is administered on a first -come first -served 
basis.  
 
Maize (GBRQ050):  Low utilisation can be expected as the United Kingdom applied tariff rate is zero. 
Total imports of maize in 2021 were in the region of 2,380,018,113kg.  
 
Rice (GBRQ051 -GBRQ053):  Although utilisation of some rice quotas was low during 2021, there is 
evidence of increased usage so far during the current year.  This supports our assessment above that 
demand is returning as Covid -19 restrictions have been gradually e ased.   
 
Raw cane sugar for refining (GBRQ072):  Low utilisation of this quota can be explained by market 
circumstances.  The in -quota tariff rate of GBP 82.01/tonne is not economically viable under current 
market conditions in the United Kingdom.  Additionall y, there is alternative preferential access to the 
UK market e.g. through an autonomous tariff quota and bilateral trade agreements.  GBRQ073 is a 
country specific quota and it is our assessment that the low utilisation reflects current market 
demand and al ternative preferential access to the UK market.  
 
The UK believes it is important to regularly review TRQ administration methods in light of experience 
gained.  However, it is too early to consider changes given the exceptional circumstances that have 
affect ed trade over the past few years.   
 
With regard to the footnotes to GBRQ060 and GBRQ061, these quotas are administered as a single 
quota volume on a first -come first -served basis.  We will review how we can better reflect this 
situation within the MA:2 temp late for future notifications.  
1.2.2.9   United Kingdom (G/AG/N/GBR/6)  
AG-IMS ID 100091: Question by Canada - Tariff quota fill  
Canada notes that the United Kingdom is implementing its proposed apportioned quota volumes 
which severely underfilled in particular for beef (GBRQ001 to GBRQ007).  
a. Could the United Kingdom provide information as to the reasons for these extraordinarily 
low fill rates?  
b. Could the low fill rates be related to TRQ administration?  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  Answer by United Kingdom  
Firstly, we would like to clarify that this notification mainly covers imports under tariff quotas for the 
calendar year 2021.  This supplements the information we notified in August 2021 covering imports 
under tariff quotas for the 2021 (1 January – 30 June) marketing year (G/AG/N/GBR/6 ).  
As the United Kingdom explained at the last Committee on Agriculture in September, we assess that 
more than one factor describe lower utilisation of tariff quotas during this period.  Having spoken 
with stakeholders and conducted further data analysis, our assessment is that the low utilisation is 
driven by a decrease in demand during the reference period, particularly within the hospitality and 
food services sector, which has traditionally been the primary sector using many of these 
quotas.  During the r eporting period, the United Kingdom 's economy, like many others, faced 
restrictions on citizens to tackle the global COVID -19 pandemic, as well as logistical challenges, 
congestion and delays in moving goods around the world. We believe this is the primary  reason for 
the low fill rates, particularly for meat products.  
Our responses to your specific questions are as follows:  
Beef (GBRQ001 - GBRQ007):  Although utilisation of the beef quotas was low during the first half of 
2021 marketing year period, there is  evidence in increased usage so far during the current 2021/22 
marketing year.  This supports our assessment above that demand is returning as C OVID -19 
restrictions have been gradually eased. Quota GBRQ007 is administered on a first -come first -served 
basis.  Any importer can make use of this quota should they wish to do so and it is our assessment 
that the low utilisation reflects current market demand.   
The UK believes it is important to regularly review TRQ administration methods in light of experience 
gained. However, it is too early to consider changes given the exceptional circumstances that have 
affected trade over the past few years.  
1.2.2.10   United Kingdom (G/AG/N/GBR/6, G/AG/N/GBR/6/REV.1)  
AG-IMS ID 100012: Question by United States of America - Tariff quota f ill 
The United States thanks the United Kingdom for its first notifications of its tariff rate quota fill rates 
in G/AG/N/GBR/6  and G/AG/N/GBR/6/Rev.1 . The United States notes there are a number of product 
commodities with 0% TRQ fill rates including bovine meat (GBRQ001 – GBRQ005) 0%; cheese 
(GBRQ027) 0%; and vermouth (GBRQ084 and GBRQ085) 0%.  
a. Please explain the reason for the low fill r ates for bovine meat, cheese, and vermouth.  
Answer by United Kingdom  
As the United Kingdom explained at the last Committee on Agriculture in September, we assess that 
more than one factor describe lower utilisation of tariff quotas during this period.  Having spoken 
with stakeholders and conducted further data analysis, our assessment is that the low utilisation is 
driven by a decrease in demand during the reference period, particularly within the hospitality and 
food services sector, which has traditionally  been the primary sector using many of these 
quotas.  During the reporting period, the United Kingdom 's economy, like many others, faced 
restrictions on citizens to tackle the global C OVID -19 pandemic, as well as logistical challenges, 
congestion and delays  in moving goods around the world. We believe this is the primary reason for 
the low fill rates, particularly for meat products.  Our responses to your specific questions are as 
follows:   
Bovine meat (GBRQ001 - GBRQ005):  Although utilisation of the beef quo tas was low during the 
2021 marketing year period (to 30 June 2021), there is evidence in increased usage so far during 
the current 2021/22 marketing year.  This supports our assessment above that demand is returning 
as COVID -19 restrictions have been gradu ally eased.   
GBRQ027 (eggs), GBRQ084 (vermouth) and GBRQ085 (bran, sharps and other residues) are 
administered on a first -come first -served basis.  Any importer can make use of these quotas should 
they wish to do so and it is our assessment that the low uti lisation reflects current market demand G/AG/W/235  
 
- 72 - 
 
  and/or alternative preferential access to the UK market.  For vermouth (GBRQ084), the applied UK 
tariff is lower than the in -quota tariff rate.  It is also our assessment that the low utilisation of cheese 
quotas refle cts current market demand.   
The UK believes it is important to regularly review TRQ administration methods in light of experience 
gained.  However, it is too early to consider changes given the exceptional circumstances that have 
affected trade over the pas t few years.  
1.2.3   Special Safeguards  (Tables  MA:3 to MA:5)  
1.2.3.1   Philippines (G/AG/N/PHL/80)  
AG-IMS ID 100044: Question by Brazil - SSG 
a. Could the Philippines clarify if the price -based action has been taken only on 1 January 
2020 or from 1 January 2020 until the end of the year?   
b. If the price -based SSG was continuously in force, could the Philippines clarify if it has 
applied on all imports or on a shipment -by-shipment basis? In other words, does the 
answer to previous questions, such as 60003, still apply?   
c. Does the Philippines have available information on the difference between the c.i.f. import 
price of the shipment and the trigger price (in reference to Article 5.5 of the AoA) for tariff 
item numbers 02071200; 02071410; 02071420; 02071430 and 02071499?   
d. Does t he Philippines have available information on the volume of trade and on the number 
of shipments affected by the additional duties for tariff item numbers 02071200; 
02071410; 02071420; 02071430 and 02071499?   
e. Brazil notices that in G/AG/N/PHL/53 , the Philippines has notified a fill r ate for TRQ 
PHLQ009 (Poultry meat - 0207) of 68.8%. Could the Philippines clarify if the additional 
duties for tariff item numbers 02071200; 02071410; 02071420; 02071430 and 02071499 
were applied against intra -quota trade?  
Answer by Philippines  
a. The price -based SSG on the products indicated in the notification has been imposed since 
August 2018.  
b. The price -based SSG is applied on a shipment -by-shipment basis.  
c. The difference between the respective CIF import prices and the trigger prices in 2020 for 
the concer ned tariff lines ranges as follows:   
AHTN Code  Difference (in PhP)  
0207.12.00B  From 19.41 to 58.91  
0207.14.10B  From 9.62 to 70.87  
0207.14.20B  From 13.86 to 62.72  
0207.14.30B  From 350.96 to 388.29  
0207.14.99B  From 12.30 to 69.84  
d. The volumes affected by the SSG duty in 2020 per tariff line are provided as follows:  
AHTN Code  % Share to total Imports  
0207.12.00B  72.82%  
0207.14.10B  96.78%  
0207.14.20B  96.62%  
0207.14.30B  100.00%  
0207.14.99B  74.73%  
e. The SSG duty applies only to those volumes imported in excess of the tariff quota.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  AG-IMS ID 100088: Question by Indonesia - Transparency issues  
WTO requires that the implementation of Special Safeguard (SSG) should be in line with WTO 
transparency commitment. In this regard, we notice that the notification from the Philippines 
delivered on 1  December  2021 with doc. G/AG/N/PHL/80  for January - December 2020 period, 
subm itted in the 100th CoA meeting in March 2022.  
a. Could Philippines please explain why the March 2022 notification in CoA is only for 
the 2020 period while the application of SSG has already in its 5th year in 2022? Please 
explain whether the notification for submission has been in accordance with the 
transparency commitment in the WTO especially with Article 5. 7 AoA?   
Two months after the first implementation of SSG in 2018, Philippines called off this policy. However, 
the SSG measure has been implemented aga in in 2019. Moreover, has the revocation of the policy 
been transparently notified at the WTO and has the justification been provided for this revocation?  
Answer by Philippines  
The price -based SSG on instant coffee was imposed in August 2018 and its imposi tion continues 
since a majority of imports is still coming in at prices below the trigger price, which was provided in 
the up -front notification G/AG/N/PHL/27  in 2002.  
The Philippines lifted the application of SSG on coffee beans (HS 0901) in 2018, but the SSG for 
instant coffee  (HS 2101) remained as reflected in the MA:5 notifications for 2019 and 2020. The 
Philippines shall submit the MA:5 Annual Summary of SSG Action for 2021 notification in due course.  
Update:  the MA:5 Annual Summary of SSG action for 2021 was already notified in the WTO on 
29 July 2022 with document No. G/AG/N/PHL/81.  
Follow -up: Indonesia referred to article 5.7 of the AoA providing that any Member taking action 
under subparagraph 1.b on price SSG should provide a written notification including relevan t data 
to the Agriculture Committee within 10 days of the implementation of the first action. In this regard, 
Indonesia indicated that it had observed that the Philippines had not yet notified on the 
implementation of the SSG 10 days after it was initially  implemented in 2018. The Philippines also 
had not provided yearly explanation for the extension of the SSG application despite its usage for 
more than four years. Indonesia requested the Philippines to comply with its transparency 
commitment under the WTO  and invited other WTO Members to jointly supervise and review the use 
of several instruments in the AoA which were prone to abuse. Indonesia indicated that it had 
observed that the use of SSG trigger price was prone to misuse as the parameter of its appli cation 
was not as clearly defined as volume based SSG. Indonesia indicated that it will closely monitor the 
use of SSG and requested the Philippines to immediately stop the measure on Indonesia's instant 
coffee.  
1.2.4   Domestic Support commitments (Table DS:1)  
1.2.4.1   Australia (G/AG/N/AUS/142)  
AG-IMS ID 100054: Question by India - Other product -specific AMS/EMS  
a. According to Australia's recent DS:1 notification ( G/AG/N/AUS/142 ) for the FY 2018 -19 
submitted on 2 November 2021, 'dairy' is notified in the Product -Specific Support for Dairy 
Recovery Co ncessional Loans Scheme. Under Supporting table DS:6, footnote (1) claims 
that "this scheme is closed for applications on 31 October 2016". [Refer to Page 11 of 
G/AG/N/AUS/142 ]. Australia has only reported this programme in DS:1 notification for FY 
2018-19. India would like to know:  
i. Why is this programme not notified in the previous year's notifications?  
ii. What does the amount of other non -exempt direct payment of AUD 2.668 million 
signify under the Dairy Recovery Concessional Loan Scheme?   G/AG/W/235  
 
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  iii. As per footnote 7 to the Supporting Table DS:9, the Farm business concessional loans 
scheme comprises three schemes, one of which is the Dairy Recovery Concessional 
Loans Scheme. Why is this scheme notified under ST DS:6 as well as ST DS:9?   
Answer by Australia  
Australia thanks India for its  question with respect to Australia 's DS:1 notification 
(G/AG/N/AUS/142 ) of financial year 2018 -19.  
i. These support measures have been notified in previous years notification, including in 
G/AG/N/AUS/118  of financial year 2016 -17 on page 12 under 'dairy'. Verification has 
revealed that support measures under t his programme should have been notified in 
financial year 2017 -18. Australia will submit a correction to G/AG/N/AUS/129  as soon 
as possible.  
ii. The Dairy Recovery Concessional Loans were used for debt restructuring, new debt for 
operating expenses or productivity enhancement activitie s, or a combination. The 
loans assisted eligible milk suppliers to processors Murray Goulburn, Fonterra and 
National Dairy Products Ltd through the short -term crisis caused by the May 2016 
decision by major milk processors to retrospectively reduce farm -gate milk prices.  
iii. The Dairy Recovery Loan Scheme had been separate to the Farm Business 
Concessional Loans scheme, depending on when the farm business applied for the 
loan. The loans provided were subject to different agreements and funding 
arrangements bet ween the Commonwealth and state/territory jurisdictions, but 
farmers were entitled to apply for a Dairy Recovery Loan in the second programme if 
they missed the cut -off date of the first.  
During  2016-17, farm businesses could apply for concessional loans under the Farm 
Business Concessional Loan scheme. These loans were all ten -year loan products and 
replaced the previous five -year Drought Concessional Loan schemes and ten -year 
Drought/Dairy Reco very loan schemes. As such, they are reported separately.  
1.2.4.2   Canada (G/AG/N/CAN/142)  
AG-IMS ID 100015: Question by United States of America - Market price support: Eligible 
production  
The United States notes that Ontario implemented milk class 6 on 1 April 2016, and class 6 was still 
in effect during January of 2017.   
a. How did Canada account for product sales for further processing under Ontario's class 6 
in calculations of market price support for skim milk powder in Supporting Table DS:5 of 
G/AG/N/CAN/142 , and particularly elig ible production for 2017?   
b. How much skim milk powder was produced in Ontario in January 2017 under class 6 and 
included in the "total production" component of Canada's eligible production calculation 
for skim milk powder market price support in 2017?  
c. Please explain why skim milk powder sold through Ontario class 6 was not excluded from 
eligible production for 2016 and 2017 (January).  
d. Following up on AG -IMS IDs 83079  and 93035 , please provide the regulatory measure 
that specifically excludes butter and skim milk powder sold for further processing and 
exports from eligible production.  
Answer by Canada  
a. Canada applied the methodology in paragraph 8, Annex 3 of the  Agreement on Agriculture 
to calculate market price support for skim milk powder.  Noting that the Canadian Dairy G/AG/W/235  
 
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  Commission ceased to purchase skim milk powder at the applied administered price 
starting in February 2017, the eligible production was the vol ume of skim milk powder for 
the month of January 2017.   
Canada tracks the production of skim milk powder under the special milk classes, whereas 
this is not the case for skim milk power sold through Ontario milk class 6.  Canada included 
for 2016 all produc tion minus the volumes for special milk classes, as noted in Footnote 2 
to Supporting Table DS:5 and in 2017, the volume of skim milk powder production for 
January 2017.   
b. As described in Note 2 of Canada 's Supporting Table DS:5 of G/AG/N/CAN/142 , total 
production data is sourced from Stati stics Canada, specifically table 32 -10-0109-01. This 
same data is also published on table 32 -10-0247-01 and does allow for a breakdown by 
province. However, the data in question, skim milk powder production in Ontario for the 
month of January 2017, is supp ressed to meet the confidentiality requirements of the 
Statistics Act.   
c. Canada applied the methodology in paragraph 8, Annex 3 of the Agreement on Agriculture 
to calculate market price support for skim milk powder.  Noting that the Canadian Dairy 
Commission  ceased to purchase skim milk powder at the applied administered price 
starting in February 2017, the eligible production was for the month of January 2017.   
Canada tracks the production of skim milk powder under the special milk classes, whereas 
this is n ot the case for skim milk power sold through Ontario milk class 6.  Canada included 
for 2016 all production minus the volumes for special milk classes as noted in Footnote 2 
to Supporting Table DS:5 and in 2017, the volume of skim milk powder production for 
January 2017.   
d. As previously stated in Canada 's response to AG -IMS ID  93035 , the Canadian Dairy 
Commission Act (the Act) allows the Canadian Dairy Commission (CDC), among other 
things, to purchase and sell dairy products. Specifically, the Act allows for the CDC to 
purchase any dairy product and sell any dairy product purchased b y it.  
All of Canada 's regulations are publicly available and Canada has compiled all relevant 
acts, regulations, codes and standards related to the dairy sector at the following link:   
https://agriculture.canada.ca/en/canadas -agriculture -sectors/animal -industry/canadian -
dairy-information -centre/acts -regulations -codes -and-standards  
Follow -up: The United States indicated that it was continuing to seek further clarity on how Canada 
determined eligible production volumes and wondered if the 2017 data had been available, would it 
have been counted in eligible production? Regarding Canada's statement t hat it was no longer 
purchasing skim milk power, the US noted that Canada's Dairy Commission was continuing to 
announce support prices for butter and skim milk products.  
The EU expressed its interest in the question and indicated that the definition of eligible production 
was extremely important in the notification of market price support.  
New Zealand expressed its interest in eligible production volumes and in understanding how the 
market price support was provided. New Zealand also expressed their support to India's previous 
question (AG -IMS ID 100056).  
AG-IMS ID 100016: Question by United States of America - Market price support: Eligible 
production  
The Unite d States notes that the Canadian Dairy Commission (CDC) continues to post support prices 
for skim milk powder on its website ( here). 
Please explain why the CDC co ntinue to post prices for skim milk powder purchases if the CDC 
ceased such purchases in February 2017.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  Answer by Canada  
The Canadian Dairy Commission has indicated that it has ceased the purchase of skim milk powder 
in February 2017 and currently has no p lans to do so in the future. The Canadian Dairy Commission 
has decided to maintain the support price as a safety net to address unforeseen future 
circumstances.   
1.2.4.3   Iceland (G/AG/N/ISL/54)  
AG-IMS ID 100068: Question by Paraguay - Other  
In the reference notifi cations Iceland has reported direct payments to sheep farmers every year 
under Annex 2, paragraph 6, in addition to regional assistance for such farmers under paragraph 13 
of that Annex, as follows:  
Support under  
Annex 2  G/AG/N/ISL/54  G/AG/N/ISL/55  G/AG/N/ISL/56  G/AG/N/ISL/57  
Para. 6  ISK 2,531 million  ISK 2,340 million  ISK 2,359 million  ISK 2,405 million  
Para. 13  ISK 280 million  ISK 149 million  ISK 152 million  ISK 154 million  
Total ISK 2,811 million  ISK 2,489 million  ISK 2,511 million  ISK 2,559 million  
Iceland has also reported the following use of AMS levels for this product, with totals as follows:  
"Amber  box" 
support  G/AG/N/ISL/54  G/AG/N/ISL/55  G/AG/N/ISL/56  G/AG/N/ISL/57  
Sheep  ISK 8,608 million 
(25% of VOP)  ISK 8,789 million  
(25% of VOP)  ISK 9,072 million 
(24.9% of VOP)  ISK 9,760 million 
(23% of VOP)  
FBTAMS          
a. Could Iceland explain the reasons for choosing to notify these programmes under the 
"green box", considering that they are linked to a specific product?  
b. How are these programmes consistent with paragraphs 6 and 13 of Annex 2 to the 
Agreement on Agriculture?  
Answer by Iceland  
We thank Paraguay for their question.  The notified decoupled income support for sheep farmers in 
Iceland is decoupled from p roduction and comes in the form of fixed and non -transferable direct 
payments granted to eligible farms. The support is calculated according to sheep production units 
which is a fixed total based on historical quota volumes. The support is not based on pro duction, 
prices or factors of production in any year after the base period. In the present regime, these units 
simply serve as a necessary reference point. Furthermore, participation by a farm in an afforestation, 
soil conservation or environmental program me qualifies the sheep farmer to receive full direct 
payments - irrespective of the number of sheep he may possess. This applies even if the number of 
sheep is zero. Decoupled income support for sheep farmers in Iceland is therefore in conformity with 
paragraphs 6 of Annex 2 to the Agreement on Agriculture.  The notified support under regional 
assistance programmes is targeted at farmers domiciled in remote areas which are 
disproportionately dependent on farming. To be eligible for such support, a farmer mus t be domiciled 
40 km driving distance or farther away from a population centre exceeding 1.000 inhabitants, 75  km 
driving distance or farther away from a population centre exceeding 10.000 inhabitants and 150 km 
driving distance or farther away from the Re ykjavik capital region. In such remote areas of Iceland, 
the only viable agricultural production is that of sheep farming. Therefore, the criteria for receiving 
such support is tailored towards sheep farmers - including the additional requirement of posses sing 
a minimum amount of 300 sheep to be eligible for support. Should that minimum requirement be 
fulfilled, however, the total sum of support payments is fixed and not based on the number of 
livestock units per farmer. Payments under regional support prog rammes to sheep farmers in Iceland 
are therefore in conformity with paragraph 13 of Annex 2 to the Agreement.  Thank you.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  AG-IMS ID 100046: Question by Brazil - Other  
Brazil notices an approximately fourfold increase in Iceland's expenditures under the blue box from 
2013-2016 to 2017 -2020 (Supporting Table DS:3, notifications G/AG/N/ISL/54  through 
G/AG/N/ISL/57 ). 
There has also been an increased number of items/programs notified as Production -Limiting Policies 
during the s ame period.  
a. Could Iceland provide any guidance as regards the changes on political and production 
circumstances that have led to those increased outlays in trade -distorting blue -box 
programs?  
b. Is Iceland considering presenting new DS:2 notifications regardi ng those new 
items/programs included in ST DS:3?  
Answer by Iceland  
We thank Brazil for their question.  A new agreement on agriculture management and production 
between the Government of Iceland and the Icelandic Farmer's Association entered into force on 
1 January 2017. The agreement stipulates new programmes for (1) Family farms and regional 
support and (2) Land cultivation and farmland payments - which have subsequently been notified 
under the blue box. These programs are designed as a way to reduce produ ction related support 
payments in Iceland and to better respond to the actual needs of the Icelandic farming community. 
Headage payments in dairy and cattle farming were also increased at the cost of direct product -
specific AMS payments to dairy farmers.  It is important to keep in mind that these new programmes 
have not resulted in an overall increase in support payments by the Icelandic state to Icelandic 
farmers. The increase in Iceland´s expenditures under the blue box from 2017 -2020 has 
corresponded wit h a comparable decrease in Iceland´s amber box expenditure over the same period.  
A DS:2 notification outlining the new programmes is currently being prepared and will be circulated 
as soon as practicable.  
AG-IMS ID 100045: Question by Brazil - Classificati on of measures  
Brazil notices that Iceland has provided product -specific support (direct payments) for sheep farmers 
that were notified under paragraphs 6 and 13 of Annex 2 (Supporting Table DS:1, notifications 
G/AG/N/ISL/54  through G/AG/N/ISL/57 ). 
However, both paragraphs 6 and 13 determine that the amount of such payments in any given year 
shall not be related to the type of production (including livestock units).   
In the light of the requirement above, could Iceland explain how those direct payments are exempted 
from reduction commitments? Would Ice land consider notifying them as non -exempt payments?  
Answer by Iceland  
We thank Brazil for their question.  The notified decoupled income support for sheep farmers in 
Iceland under paragraph 6 of Annex 2 is decoupled from production. The support comes in th e form 
of fixed and non -transferable direct payments granted to eligible farms. The support is calculated 
according to sheep production units which is a fixed total based on historical quota volumes. 
The support is not based on production, prices or factor s of production in any year after the base 
period. In the present regime, these units simply serve as a necessary reference point. Furthermore, 
participation by a farm in an afforestation, soil conservation or environmental programme qualifies 
the sheep fa rmer to receive full direct payments - irrespective of the number of sheep he may 
possess. This applies even if the number of sheep is zero.  The notified support through regional 
assistance programmes under paragraph 13 of Annex 2 is targeted at farmers do miciled in remote 
areas which are disproportionately dependent on farming. To be eligible for such support, a farmer 
must be domiciled 40 km driving distance or farther away from a population centre exceeding 
1.000  inhabitants, 75 km driving distance or fa rther away from a population centre exceeding 
10.000  inhabitants and 150 km driving distance or farther away from the Reykjavik capital region. 
In such remote areas of Iceland, the only viable agricultural production is that of sheep farming. 
Therefore, th e criteria for receiving such support is tailored towards sheep farmers - including the G/AG/W/235  
 
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  additional requirement of possessing a minimum amount of 300 sheep to be eligible for support. 
Should that minimum requirement be fulfilled, however, the total sum of s upport payments is fixed 
and not based on the number of livestock units per farmer.  In light of the above, Iceland is of the 
view that decoupled income support payments and payments under regional support programmes 
to sheep farmers in Iceland are in confo rmity with paragraphs 6 and 13 of Annex 2 to the Agreement 
and therefore not subject to reduction commitments. Thank  you. 
1.2.4.4   India (G/AG/N/IND/18)  
AG-IMS ID 100007: Question by United States of America, Japan, Brazil, Uruguay, Canada, 
European Union, United K ingdom, Paraguay, Thailand, Australia - Public stockholding for 
food security purposes  
We would like to repeat the request for information in AG -IMS ID 99006 : 
This is a follow -up on AG -IMS ID 98039 , which was submitted by multiple WTO Members.  
In its reply to this question, India has once again stated that it is "in the process of collecting 
information on 'other support' and it will be notified in due course ." Could India please provide an 
update on when this could be expected to be notified?   
We reiterate that this information is necessary to verify whether India has adhered to paragraph 5 
of the Bali Ministerial Decision, which requires that there be no inc rease of Amber Box support for 
programs other than public stockholding. We also reiterate our concern that given the lack of any 
indication of what type of other support may be involved, it is difficult to assess whether India is 
complying with the commitm ents outlined in the Bali Decision on Public Stockholding for Food 
Security.  
Answer by India  
AG-IMS ID 100079: Question by Paraguay - Domestic support  
Follow -up to questions AG -IMS IDs 99006 , 99007  and 99010 : 
 
a. In its an 94swer to question AG -IMS ID 99006 , India once again pointed out that it is in 
the process of collecting the information and that this will be notified in due course. We 
note that Paraguay and other Members have been requesting this information in question 
AG-IMS ID 98039  (June 2021). We note that the information requested refers to what can 
be understood as a timeline  for the information to be received, a matter that is not 
addressed in any of the answers provided by India. Hence the query is repeated and the 
previous question is considered not to have been answered.  
b. We refer to the replies received to que stions 99007  and 99010 requesting specific 
information from India, in follow -up to questions 98072  and 98045 , respectively, on all 
programmes that receive decoupled support and data on expenditure relating to their 
public stockholding programmes for food  security purposes.   
We also note that question 98045 is linked to question 97134 , in turn submitted as 
follow -up to question 95101 , which, moreover, was submitted as follow -up to questions 
93233 and 93236 , and so we consider that these questions take sufficient time on the 
agenda to receive a satisfactory response from India.   
We therefore consider that questions 99007  and 99010 have not been answered and 
reiterate them, and we also request specific indications regarding the paragraphs of India 's 
DS:1 notifications in which the data can be  found, as stated by India in its answer to 
question 99010 . 
Answer by India  
India thanks Paraguay for the question, the response is under : G/AG/W/235  
 
- 79 - 
 
  a. We are in the process of collecting information on "other support" and will notify in due 
course.  
b. Thank you for the follow -up questions. Please see India 's response to questions AG -IMS 
IDs 98072  and 98045 . PM-KISAN as decoupled income support and expenditure on PSH 
have been consistently notified in DS:1 Supporting Table 1 related to Green box.  
Follow-up: Paraguay expressed its disappointment on India's response and encouraged India to 
provide a complete answer to questions raised by other Members.  
Japan also expressed interest in India's reply.  
The U nited States echoed Paraguay regarding India's  unsatisfactory reply to the questions raised 
regarding its domestic support.  
Canada also expressed interest in this matter and in India's reply.  
AG-IMS ID 100094: Question by Japan - Public stockholding for food security purposes  
A considerable number of questions on Public Stockholding were raised at the Committee on 
Agriculture in 2021, however there was hardly any satisfactory response from India.  We strongly 
urge India to provide these requested information, which we believe woul d also be helpful in our 
discussion for a permanent solution to the Bali Decision.  Japan would also like to repeat the question 
AG-IMS ID 98038: What exactly does India count as "other support for rice, that is, other than public 
stockholding for security purposes " (G/AG/N/IND/25 , Supporting Table DS:5, footnote (3))?  
Answer by India  
We thank Japan for the question.  We are in the process of collecting information on "other support" 
and it will be notified in due course.  
Follow -up: The U nited States expressed concerns about indirect e xport of government stocks via 
private traders. The US requested India to provide a source for the data that indicated that 98% of 
the stocks were taken by States rather than private traders.  
Paraguay expressed interest in this question and reply from India.  
1.2.4.5   India (G/AG/N/IND/25)  
AG-IMS ID 100092: Question by Japan - Public stockholding for food security purposes  
Regarding the Public Stockholding, India has noted that "the stocks under the programme are 
acquired and released in order to meet the domestic food security needs of India's poor and 
vulnerable population, and not to impede commercial trade or food security of others. " 
(G/AG/N/IND/25 ) Furthermore, India answered to the questions (AG -IMS IDs  98061  - 98066 ) 
indicating that in MY 2018/19 and MY 2019/20 "around 98% of the stocks released through open -
market sales was taken by the state governments for meeting the requirements under various food 
security and welfare schem es, and hardly 2% was taken up by the private traders.  Hence, the issue 
of private traders turning to export markets to sell their products does not arise. " Japan appreciates 
the information but wonders whether this is merely what happened in these marketi ng years or 
there are clear rules or requirements that the released stocks should not be exported. If the latter 
is the case,  could India explain in detail how these requirements are actually implemented?  
Answer by India  
India thanks Japan for the question . The response is as under:   
 
For sales under Open Market Sales Scheme (Domestic), exports are not allowed. Guidelines for 
empanelment and registration under OMSS (D) stipulate that products under the Scheme will be 
utilized domestically and not exported b y the bidder. These guidelines can be accessed from 
http://fci.gov.in/sales.php?view=224 . G/AG/W/235  
 
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  AG-IMS ID 100093: Question by Russian Federation - Public stockholding for food security 
purposes  
The Russian Federation welcomes the notification on domestic support commitments for the 
marketing year 2019/2020 ( G/AG/N/IND/25 ). The Annex to the notification provides that 
"Government does not undertake export on a commercial basis from public stockholding ". 
 
a. Could India elaborate the legal status of Food Corporation of India and National 
Agricultural Cooperative Federation of India?  
b. Do Food Corporation of India and National Agricultural Cooperative Federation of India 
perform export activities?  
c. Could India provide the vol umes of export of wheat, pulses and rice performed by Food 
Corporation of India and National Agricultural Cooperative Federation of India?  
Answer by India  
India thanks the Russian Federation for the question the information sought is contained in the links  
below.  
 
https://fci.gov.in/  and https://www.nafed -india.com/origin -nafed . 
1.2.4.6   Indonesia (G/AG/N/IDN/67)  
AG-IMS ID 100080: Question by Paraguay  - Article 6.2 (Special and Differential 
Treatment/Development Programmes)  
Art. 6.2   
As reported by Indonesia in its notifications for 2018 and 2019, subsidies granted under Article  6.2 
have been increased, specifically for the provision of seeds and fertilizers, as follows:   
Article 6.2  G/AG/N/IDN/67  G/AG/N/IDN/68  
Input subsidie s – seeds and fertilizers  IDR 37,721,655 million  IDR 39,048,628 million  
Could Indonesia:   
a. explain the reasons for such increases?  
b. Provide a definition of "resource -poor producers" for the purposes of such assistance 
programmes in Indonesia, including rela ted qualification criteria?  
Answer by Indonesia  
• Regarding the increase in input subsidies, it is caused by the high demand on fertilizer for 
various agricultural commodities. Second, the number of small and poor farmers has also 
increased due to the pandem ic. 
• The dependence of small farmers on subsidized fertilizers during the pandemic require the 
government to increase its budget assistance.  
• In relation to the definition of resource -poor producers in relation to fertilizer subsidy 
beneficiaries, it is only given to poor farmers with a maximum of two hectares of land.   
• Accordingly, more stringent criteria have been implemented for granting the assistance 
and monitoring mechanism have been tightened. The basis are as follows:   
a. Confirm ation of the farmer 's identification receiving the fertilizer is carried out every year.  
b. The process of granting the assistance to the small and poor farmers is transparent and 
accountable, verified through a farmer card.  
c. The mechanism for distributing sub sidized fertilizers is in line with the principle of good 
public service.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  d. Control mechanism on subsidized fertilizer has also been tightened.  
Follow -up: The European Union expressed its interest in the question raised by Paraguay.  
The US requested Indonesia to confirm that the definition they had provided applied to all measures 
notified as input subsidies for low -income or resource -poor producers in supp orting table DS:2 and 
not just seeds and fertilizers. Also, the US requested Indonesia to provide a copy or link to the official 
government legislation or other document that defined eligible recipients producer of seeds and 
fertilizers subsidies.  
1.2.4.7   Indonesi a (G/AG/N/IDN/68)  
AG-IMS ID 100081: Question by Paraguay - Domestic support  
As reported by Indonesia in its notifications for 2019 and 2020, subsidies granted for public 
stockholding for food security purposes have been increased (Annex 2, para. 3), as fol lows:   
Public stockholding for food security purposes  G/AG/N/IDN/68  G/AG/N/IDN/69  
Reserve fund for government to purchase foodstuff  
at market prices  IDR 337,495  million  IDR 1,123,777  million  
Reserve stock for emergency  IDR 46,788 million  IDR 118,886 million  
Could Indonesia explain the reasons for these exponential increases that correspond to more 
than 200% and 100% of expenditure, respectively?   
Art. 6.3 - Product -specific support for rice   
According to the information provided by Indonesia in its notifications for 2019 and 2020, subsidies 
granted  as product -specific support for rice have been increased, as follows:   
Art. 6.3  
subsidies for rice  Disbursements  % of VOP  Administered price  Eligible production  
G/AG/N/IDN/68  IDR 4,2478,821  million  1.45%  7,300/kg  671,497  thousand kg  
G/AG/N/IDN/69  IDR 8,142,923 million  2.7%  8,300/kg  1,026,941  thousand  kg 
Could Indonesia please explain:   
a. the basis for calculating eligible production – namely, whether this means total production 
or only actual purchases by the Government? If data other than for total production are 
used as a basis, please provide data.  
b. For Indonesia's total rice production, including value of production for both years.  
c. The increase of more than 50% in eligible production?  
d. The reasons for the inc rease of more than IDR 1,000 per kilo for administered price 
purchases from 2019 to 2020?  
e. The %age and amount corresponding to public stockholding programmes for food security 
purposes financed under this type of subsidy?  
Answer by Indonesia  
• In general, PS H has increased due to the COVID -19 pandemic and the increasing number of 
small, poor farmers. Moreover, food insecurity has also increased due to the scarcity of stock 
and price inflation in Indonesia.   
• Regarding the reserve stock for emergencies, it has increased due to the high use of 
Government Rice Reserve or "Cadangan Beras Pemerintah "-CBP for emergency assistance 
activities related to natural disasters, such as the eruption of Mount Lawu in East Java 
Province.  
• Related to the increase in the Reserve fund for government purchase of foodstuff at market 
prices, this is due to the food price stabilization policies (CSHP) in response to inflation G/AG/W/235  
 
- 82 - 
 
  caused by the pandemic. For example, in 2020 there was the potential of food insecurity for 
rice and stock reserves that were needed to ensure food availability.  
• Furthermore, our delegation would like explain briefly about Eligible Product and related 
information on VOP and administered prices. Bearing in mind that the descrip tion of the 
modalities have not changed, differences are only in nominal amounts.  
• Eligible Production is the Government's Rice Reserve for the Availability of Price Stabilization 
Supply or commonly called CBP -OP. Data is from actual purchases specifically for the 
Government's Rice Reserve for the Availability of Price Stabilization Supply.  
• Total Value of Production/ VoP of Rice in 2019 was Rp. 294.8 trillion and for the year of 2020 
was Rp. 301.5 trillion.   
• Determination for the administered price purchased  from 2019 to 2020 was based on water 
content and quality of the rice, farmers' cost of business, and farmers' cost of transport. 
Decision on the purchased price of rice from farmers was based on market price.  
In addition, Indonesia would like to inform th e Members and the Committee that the PSH programme 
in Indonesia does not affect import on rice. Indonesian market is continuously open for imported 
rice from various country to fulfill our domestic demand.  
AG-IMS ID 100095: Question by Australia - Annex 2 (Green Box)  
Australia thanks Indonesia for submitting its DS:1 notifications for calendar year 2019 
(G/AG/N/IDN/68 ) and calendar year 2020 ( G/AG/N/IDN/69 ). Australia notes Indonesian Green Box 
expenditure on public stockholding for food security purposes – which we understand to be public 
stockholding procure d at market prices – increased by about 223% (from 384,283 million rupiah to 
1,242,663 million rupiah) between 2019 and 2020. Furthermore, domestic food aid increased by 
almost 100% (from 24,330,032 million rupiah to 48,484,826 million rupiah) over the sam e period.  
Can Indonesia please explain the reasons for this significant increase in expenditure on both public 
stockholding for food security and domestic food aid?  
Answer by Indonesia  
• In general, PSH has increased due to the COVID -19 pandemic and the incr easing number of 
poor small farmers, food insecurity, and inflation rate in Indonesia.   
• Regarding the Reserve stock for emergencies, it has increased due to the high utilization of 
Government Rice Reserve or (Cadangan Beras Pemerintah/CBP) for emergency su pport 
related to Disaster Emergency Management and Post -Disaster Food Insecurity.  
• Regarding the increase in the Reserve fund for government to purchase foodstuff at market 
prices, this was used for food price stabilization policies (CSHP) in order to antic ipate a rise 
in the inflation rate caused by the Covid -19 pandemic. In 2020, there was food insecurity 
for rice. Therefore, stock guarantees were needed to ensure food availability for our people.  
• In 2020, the Indonesian government implemented the Domestic Food Aid program, which 
was distributed more widely throughout the provinces in Indonesia as a response to the 
pandemic.  
• The significant increase in Domestic Food Aid was influenced by the increase of the number 
of the beneficiaries (from 15.6 mil lion to 19.4 million) and the increase in the value of the 
Cash-based Food Aid Program for Poor and Low -Income Society (from Rp 110.000 to Rp 
200.000 equal to USD 7.78 to USD 13.67, respectively ). 
Follow -up: Paraguay expressed its interest in this question and in particular in the exponential Green 
Box increases in Indonesia, more specifically linked to the PSH programme.  
AG-IMS ID 100096: Question by Canada - Public stockholding for food security purposes  
Canada notes that the expenditures under th e reserve fund for government to purchase food stuff 
at market prices increased over three -fold from IDR 337,495 million in 2019 and to IDR 1,123,777 
million in 2020.   
 
a. Could Indonesia provide information in the types of foodstuffs that are purchased at 
market prices?  G/AG/W/235  
 
- 83 - 
 
  b. Could Indonesia provide information on the pre -determined targets for the "reserve fund 
for government to purchase food stuff at market prices "and for the "reserve stock for 
emergency" programs?  
Answer by Indonesia  
First, the type of foodstuf f is Rice.  Second, the reserve fund for government to purchase foodstuff 
at market prices was used to offset inflation and take into account stock management to ensure 
food security. Furthermore, the reserve stock for emergencies was used for emergency sup port 
related to Disaster Emergency Management and Post -Disaster Food Insecurity, of which the number 
of target beneficiaries could not be determined beforehand.  
Follow -up: Paraguay expressed its interest in this question and in receiving more information o n the 
programme and its functioning.  
AG-IMS ID 100017: Question by United States of America - Market price support  
The United States thanks Indonesia for bringing its domestic support notifications up to date.  
In its response to AG -IMS ID 93119 , Indonesia cited Minister of Finance Regulation Number 
116/PMK.02/2015 as amended by Minister of Finance Regulation Number 207/PMK.02/2017 as the 
relevant regulation for the applicable dates of the applied administered price.   
For both G/AG/N/IDN/68  and G/AG/N/IDN/69 , covering calendar year 2019 and 2020 respectively, 
please confirm whether these are still the appropriate regulations or if th ey have been updated.  If 
so, please provide a copy or link to the applicable regulation.  
Answer by Indonesia  
Indonesia wishes to thank the United States of America for its inquires on this issue.  Indonesia would 
like to convey the essence of the regulation  for the applicable dates of the applied administered price 
in Indonesia Domestic Support Commitments that has been amended.  
The Minister of Finance Regulation Number 207/PMK.02/2017 amended into Minister of Finance 
Regulation Number 88/PMK.02/2019 applies  for Indonesia 's domestic support notifications in the 
calendar year of 2019 and 2020.  
The regulation covers Procedures for Provision, Disbursement, and Accountability of the 
Government's Rice Reserve Fund, and it is publicly accessible.  
AG-IMS ID 100018: Question by United States of America - Market price support  
In response to AG -IMS ID 93119  Indonesia 's stated, "The determination of procurement target 
quantity is based on the assignment given by the Government, according to APBN/State Budget 
(Calendar Year). " 
Please confirm the numerical target quantities established for calendar year 2019 and 2020 as well 
as provide a copy or link to the applicable APBN/State Budget.   
Answer by Indonesia  
Indonesia wishes to thank the United States of America for asking the question.  Determination for 
the procurement target quantity is based on the State Budget/APBN.  
However, the state budget data consists of the aggregate budget that cannot be broken down in 
detail.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  1.2.4.8   Israel (G/AG/N/ISR/81)  
AG-IMS ID 100020: Question by United States of America - General services: 
infrastructural services  
In Israe l's notification G/AG/N/ISR/81 , in Supp orting Table DS:1, the United States notes a nearly 
400% increase in expenditures for the "Services provided for farmers: Investment in agriculture" 
under General/Infrastructural Services.  
a. Noting Israel has not provided a description of this measure in its  notification, please 
describe the measure "Services provided for farmers: investment in agriculture ", including 
who are the eligible beneficiaries of this measure, and how payments to beneficiaries are 
determined.  
b. Please explain the increase in notified e xpenditures in 2020 and confirm whether this was 
the result of any change or modification in the implementing measure.   
Answer by Israel  
a. Israel notifies "Services provided for farmers: Investment in agriculture " annually. These 
include government service p rogrammes as described in Annex 2, article 2 paragraph g.  
b. The increase in notified expenditures in 2020 is due to special one -time COVID 
investments provided to two types of beneficiaries – a. growers of products other than 
basic food products (such as flo wers, plants and herbs) that were in low demand in 2020 
and therefore needed investment to keep their head above the water; and b. investment 
assistance for self -employed service providers in otherwise cooperative rural populations 
(Kibbutzim and Moshavim) . 
AG-IMS ID 100038: Question by European Union - Current Total AMS (Amber Box)  
Israel - Non-Respect  of AMS limit.  
This is the fourth consecutive year that Israel has not respected its AMS commitment.  
a. Which measures has the Israeli government taken to ensure that it in the future will 
respect its commitment?  
b. Has Israel considered to reform the support for the sectors in question in order to move 
away from Amber Box support towards Green Box Support?  
Answer by Israel  
Measures taken:   
On 5 August 2021, a 4th amendment to the Dairy Sector Planning Law was passed in Israel 's 
parliament, the Knesset, which reduces the target price for raw milk, which, in turn, reduces the 
market price support. We do not have the data for 2021 yet, but we expect partial reduct ion, 
pertaining to the period of implementation of the law. It is also important to stress that raw milk is 
a non -tradable product in Israel, with no effect on global trade and that Israel has introduced an 
increased WTO quota for hard cheeses as part of i ts dairy sector reform.  
On 1st August  2021, a government notice entitled "plan for enhancing competition in agriculture " 
was published with the aim to gradually abolish the planning in the table egg sector. Note that one 
billion table eggs duty free quota will be available to WTO Members in 2022 once Israel finalizes the 
required legal procedure.   
The Reform process:   
Following the reports in previous Committees of Agriculture, Israel had faced some setbacks in 
implementing the reforms in the dairy and table egg sectors. These included the succession of G/AG/W/235  
 
- 85 - 
 
  provisional governments and the COVID -19 outbreak. The aim of both above -mentioned is to 
gradually move from Amber Box support to Green Box support.  
AG-IMS ID 100097: Question by Australia - Scheduled commitment level  
Australia thanks Israel for submitting its DS:1 notification for calendar year 2020 in G/AG/N/ISR/81 . 
Australia note s that Israel has reported domestic support in excess of its annual commitments for 
this calendar year. Australia also notes the trend in Israel's reported domestic support, which has 
been increasing over previous years.   
Could Israel provide an update on the concrete steps it is taking, and the progress made, with 
respect to additional reforms in its dairy and egg sectors so that Israel is in compliance with its WTO 
obligations in the future?   
Does Israel expect to be notifying a further breach for the cal endar year 2021?  
Answer by Israel  
a. Following the reports in previous Committees of Agriculture, Israel had faced some 
setbacks in implementing the reforms in the dairy and table egg sectors. These included 
the succession of provisional governments and the C OVID -19 outbreak.  Dairy sector:  On 
5 August 2021, a 4th amendment to the Milk Sector Planning Law was passed in Israel 's 
parliament, the Knesset, which reduces the target price for raw milk, which, in turn, 
reduces the market price support. We do not have the data for 2021 yet, but we expect 
partial reduction, pertaining to the period of implementation of the law.  It is also important 
to stress that raw milk is a non -tradable product in Israel, with no effect on global trade 
and that Israel has introduced a n increased WTO quota for hard cheeses as part of its 
dairy sector reform.  Table Eggs:  On 1st August 2021, a government notice entitled "plan 
for enhancing competition in agriculture " was published with the aim to gradually abolish 
the planning in the tabl e egg sector.  The timeline for ending the target price system in the 
egg sector is not set yet, but the aim is to make a gradual change over several years.  
Note that one billion table eggs duty free quota will be available to WTO Members in 2022 
once Israe l finalizes the required legal procedure.  
b. Unfortunately, we don 't have the full 2021 data yet.  
AG-IMS ID 100047: Question by Brazil - Scheduled commitment level  
Brazil would like to again express its concern over the continuous notification by Israel of Cu rrent 
Total AMSs in excess of Israel's Total AMS commitment level.  In this sense, Brazil would appreciate 
it if Israel could provide further details on the ongoing negotiations to reform the milk and egg 
sectors support policies.  
Answer by Israel  
Milk sector:   
On 5 August 2021, a 4th amendment to the Dairy Sector Planning Law was passed in Israel 's 
parliament, the Knesset, which reduces the target price for raw milk, which, in turn, reduces the 
market price support. We do not have the data for 2021 yet,  but we expect partial reduction, 
pertaining to the period of implementation of the law.   
It is also important to stress that raw milk is a non -tradable product in Israel, with no effect on 
global trade and that Israel has introduced an increased WTO quota  for hard cheeses as part of its 
dairy sector reform.   
Table Eggs:   
On 1st August  2021, a government notice entitled "plan for enhancing competition in agriculture " 
was published with the aim to gradually abolish the planning in the table egg sector.   G/AG/W/235  
 
- 86 - 
 
  The timeline for ending the target price system in the egg sector is not set yet, but the aim is to 
make a gradual change over several years.   
Note that one billion table eggs duty free quota will be available to WTO Members in 2022 once 
Israel finalizes the r equired legal procedure.  
AG-IMS ID 100098: Question by Canada - Scheduled commitment level  
Canada appreciates Israel's transparency and the explanatory note provided in the notification. 
Canada notes that Israel has exceeded its Total AMS commitment level again in its 2020 notification 
(G/AG/N/ISR/81 ) by USD 93 million.   
Given that Israel spent 113% of its AMS commitment in 2019 and then spent 116% of its AMS 
commitment in 2020, Canada would appreciate an update from Israel on its reforms to reverse this 
trend of exceeding its total AMS commitment level.   
Is Israel expecting to remain within its Total AMS commitment level in 2021 as per its WTO 
obligations?   
Answer by Israel  
a. Following the reports in previous Committees of Agriculture, Israel had faced some 
setbacks in implementing the reforms in the dairy and table egg sectors. These included 
the succession of provisional governments and the COVID -19 outbreak.   
Dairy sector:   
On the 5th August  2021, a 4th amendment to the Milk Sector Planning Law was passed in 
Israel 's parliament, the Knesset, which reduces the target price for raw milk, which, in 
turn, reduces the market price support. We do not have the data for 2021 yet, but  we 
expect partial reduction, pertaining to the period of implementation of the law.   
It is also important to stress that raw milk is a non -tradable product in Israel, with no 
effect on global trade and that Israel has introduced an increased WTO quota for  hard 
cheeses as part of its dairy sector reform.  
Table Eggs:   
On 1st August 2021, a government notice entitled "plan for enhancing competition in 
agriculture " was published with the aim to gradually abolish the planning in the table egg 
sector.   
The timel ine for ending the target price system in the egg sector is not set yet, but the 
aim is to make a gradual change over several years.   
Note that one billion table eggs duty free quota will be available to WTO Members in 2022 
once Israel finalizes the requir ed legal procedure.  
b. Unfortunately, we don 't have the full 2021 data yet.  
AG-IMS ID 100128: Question by Thailand - Scheduled commitment level  
Thailand appreciates the submission on Domestic Support Notification of Calendar Year 2020 by 
Israel. According to the notification, Israel notified the current total AMS at USD 661,951,200, which 
exceeds the level of total AMS commitment level due to the supports on milk and eggs. In this 
regard, what will be the plan for Israel to manage the supports on these product s in order to comply 
with its commitment on the total AMS?   G/AG/W/235  
 
- 87 - 
 
  Answer by Israel  
Dairy sector:   
On 5 August 2021, a 4th amendment to the Milk Sector Planning Law was passed in Israel 's 
parliament, the Knesset, which reduces the target price for raw milk, which, in turn, reduces the 
market price support. We do not have the data for 2021 yet, but we expect partial reduction, 
pertaining to the period of implementation of the law.   
It is also important to stress that raw milk is a non -tradable product in Israe l, with no effect on 
global trade and that Israel has introduced an increased WTO quota for hard cheeses as part of its 
dairy sector reform.  
Table Eggs:   
On 1st August  2021, a government notice entitled "plan for enhancing competition in agriculture " 
was p ublished with the aim to gradually abolish the planning in the table egg sector.   
The timeline for ending the target price system in the egg sector is not set yet, but the aim is to 
make a gradual change over several years.   
Note that one billion table egg s duty free quota will be available to WTO Members in 2022 once 
Israel finalizes the required legal procedure.  
AG-IMS ID 100019: Question by United States of America - Other product -specific 
AMS/EMS  
The United States notes that Israel has once again exceeded its Total AMS commitment level in 2020 
due to support for eggs and milk. While the United States appreciates Israel's transparency on the 
matter through CoA review process responses and various explanatory background notes in its last 
several Tabl e DS:1 notifications, it is important to point out that Israel has now breached its 
commitment in eight out of the last 10 years (2011 -2014, 2017 -2020). Israel has provided support 
in excess of 50% of the value of production for both milk and eggs every si ngle year of the last ten, 
even in the years when it did not breach its Total AMS commitment (2015 and 2016). Members have 
also raised concerns in this Committee with regards to modifications Israel has made to its reporting 
methodology that has resulted i n lower notified support levels. Despite numerous references to 
ongoing attempts at reform and reported increases in efficiency in both sectors, Israel has exceeded 
its limit by 8% in 2017, 11% in 2018, 13% in 2019, and now 16% in 2020. Taking note of thes e 
facts, the United States respectfully, but urgently, requests the following:   
a. An update on the reforms to the Dairy Sector Planning Law that was originally adopted 
in 2011 and re -negotiated with an outline for reform in October 2018 that requires a 
chang e in legislation.   
b. An update in the table eggs sector, where Israel previously stated ( G/AG/N/ISR/66/Corr.1 ) 
structural adjustments for increased efficiency were negotiated, as well as any other 
pending reforms.  
c. A timeframe for when Israel will undertake the necessary reforms, which will result in 
Israel's compliance with its Final Bound Total AMS commitment.  
Answer by Israel  
a. An update on the reforms to the Dairy Sector Planning Law:  On 5  August 2021, a 
4th amendment to the Dairy Sector Planning Law was passed in Israel 's parliament, the 
Knesset, which reduces the target price for raw milk, which, in turn, reduces the market 
price support. We do not have the data for 2021 yet, but we expect partial reduction, 
pertaining to the period of implementation of the law.  G/AG/W/235  
 
- 88 - 
 
  It is a lso important to stress that raw milk is a non -tradable product in Israel, with no 
effect on global trade and that Israel has introduced an increased WTO quota for hard 
cheeses as part of its dairy sector reform.   
b. An update in the table eggs sector  
On 1st August 2021, a government notice entitled "plan for enhancing competition in 
agriculture " was published with the aim to gradually abolish the planning in the table egg 
sector.  
Note that one billion table eggs duty free quota will be available to WTO Member s in 2022 
once Israel finalizes the required legal procedure.  
c. Timeline  
Following the reports in previous Committees of Agriculture, Israel had faced some 
setbacks in implementing the reforms in the dairy and table egg sectors. These included 
the succession  of provisional governments and the CoVID -19 outbreak.  
The timeline for ending the target price system in the egg sector is not set yet, but the 
aim is to make a gradual change over several years. The reduction in the target price for 
raw milk is in effect  since the fourth quarter of 2021.  
Follow -up: Paraguay and Ukraine expressed interest in the questions posed by Members.  
1.2.4.9   Mexico (G/AG/N/MEX/55)  
AG-IMS ID 100099: Question by Canada - Domestic support  
Supporting Table DS:9  
a. Canada notes that Mexico has provided MXN 122.7 million in expenditures related to 
fertilizers.   
Could Mexico elaborate on the criteria for producers to access the program?  
Could Mexico provide information on the number of farms that have benefited from this 
measure?   
Supporting Table DS:1  
b. Canada notes that Mexico's environmental programmes consist of "recovery of soil with 
agrichemical degradation, primarily loss of fertility." Could Mexico provide further details 
on this programme including the activities aimed at soi l remediation and to address loss 
of soil fertility?   
Answer by Mexico  
a. The Federal Expenditure Budget and the 2019 Rules of Operation of the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Rural Development (SADER) provide for the Programme on Fertilizers, 
which is run by SAD ER's Under ‑Secretariat for Agriculture. It should be noted that this 
Programme is still in operation today.   
In 2019, the Programme on Fertilizers granted in ‑kind support consisting of 450 kg of 
fertilizer per hectare, without exceeding a maximum of three hectares per producer. The 
beneficiaries must meet the following requirements:   
i. Beneficiaries must be small ‑scale producers in accordance with the classification 
developed by FAO, specifically those belonging to the E1 and E2 strata established in 
the 2012  Diagnosis of the Rural and Fisheries Sector in Mexico carried out by FAO, 
which are defined as follows:   G/AG/W/235  
 
- 89 - 
 
  Strata E1: Non ‑market family agriculture. The main feature of this type of agriculture 
is that it does not involve revenue from sales or is based solely on sporadic sales of 
unplanned surpluses, as its objective is not to produce goods for the market.   
Strata E2: Family agriculture linked to the market. This type of agriculture is 
family‑based and involves sales of primary goods that do not exceed M XN 55,200.00 
(or USD  2,638) per year. Such households are also engaged in smaller ‑scale 
non‑agricultural undertakings, as well as paid labour services to supplement their 
family income.   
ii. Beneficiaries must be located in areas with a high or very high level  of marginalization. 
Priority is given to the states in the south/south ‑east region; and   
iii. Beneficiaries must be engaged in the production of maize, beans or rice.   
As at 31  December  2019, solely in the state of Guerrero, there were a total of 278,547 
small‑scale producers reported, possessing 473,885 hectares.   
b. In Mexico, 70% of the soil shows some kind of physical, chemical or biological degradation. 
This degradation is threatening our ability to produce food, fodder and fibre, and to retain 
and filter wat er. Moreover, the soil has a high carbon sequestration potential and stores 
twice as much carbon as the atmosphere. SADER has therefore proposed to raise 
awareness of the soil issue in society and in the national policy agenda.   
In 2019, the Agriculture Pr omotion Programme was implemented with the soil and water 
productivity enhancement component, which seeks to contribute to the efficient use, 
conservation and improvement of soil and water resources associated with agriculture, 
through incentives linked to  technology and good agricultural practices.   
This component is targeted at small and medium ‑sized producers engaged in primary 
agricultural activities. It offers incentives of two types, focused on conservation and 
sustainable soil use.   
1. Soil recovery incentive : This incentive seeks to improve soil productivity conditions through 
the use of good agricultural practices.   
Forms of support:   
1. Procurement of agricultural bio ‑inputs ; 
2. Procurement, establishment and incorporation of soil ameliorants an d green manure ; 
3. Levelling of agricultural land ; 
4. Drainage of agricultural land . 
2. Comprehensive soil and water conservation and management projects 
incentive:  Infrastructure for harvesting, managing and storing rainwater; procurement and 
establishment of v egetation as live barriers for retaining soil; construction of terraces, among 
others.   
Form of support:   
1. Comprehensive soil and water conservation and management projects   
For further information: Agreement notifying the Rules of Operation of the Agriculture Promotion 
Programme of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development for the financial year 2019, 
published in the Official Journal (DOF) on 28  February  2019.   
https://dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5551590&fecha=28/02/2019   G/AG/W/235  
 
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  The table below sets out the mitigation targets agreed under the Special Programme on Climate 
Change (PECC) in relation to the reduction of agricultural burning and increa se of soil carbon 
sequestration6: 
SADER 
SECTORAL 
PROGRAMME 
ACTION POINT  PECC ACTION 
POINT  Specific 
measures  Unit of 
measurement  2024 target  
3.18: Promote the 
incorporation and 
use of agricultural 
residue and 
prevent it from 
being burnt  2.7.2.7.1: Reduce 
agricultural burning 
through the 
adoption of 
sustainable 
practices  Hold meetings  Number  38 
  Run 
awareness ‑raising 
campaigns  Number of 
federative entities  32 
  Hold workshops on 
alternatives to the 
use of fire on 
agricultural land  Number of entities  32 
  Report the annual 
area of agricultural 
land on which 
agricultural burning 
has been reduced  Ha 28,000  
3.2.3: Encourage 
sustainable 
production 
practices for the 
sequestration and 
storage of carbon 
in the soil  2.7.2: Promote 
sustainable 
agronomic 
practices focused 
on soil carbon 
sequestration  Technical support 
in agro‑ecological 
and sustainable 
practices  Area subject to 
technical support 
(ha) N/A 
  Implementation of 
conservation 
agriculture 
practices  Area with 
conservation 
agriculture 
practices (ha)  181,521  
  Implementation of 
agro‑forestry 
systems  Area with 
agro‑forestry 
systems (ha)  57,000  
AG-IMS ID 100048: Question by Brazil - Other product -specific AMS/EMS  
Even though Mexico's current Total AMS is within its Total AMS commitment level, Brazil notices that 
there has been a significant increase in the Product -Specific Aggregate Measurements of Support for 
Safflower, Beans, Soya and Wheat, while support for cof fee has remained above 20% of the VoP 
(Supporting Table DS:4, G/AG/N/MEX/55 ). 
Could Mexico provide further information on the policy developments that led to the increased 
product -specific outlays, and comment if Members should expect a similar trend for calendar 
year 2020.  
Answer b y Mexico  
Agricultural public policy developments are based on criteria founded on the equity and distribution 
of resources in the various regions of the country, gender equality, and support for the indigenous 
population and vulnerable groups, with a focus  on small and medium sized producers.  
The support granted to small and medium sized producers through the various programmes is 
subject to limitations based on the applicable Rules of Operation in effect. The current programmes 
of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development may be viewed at:  
https://www.gob.mx/agricultura/acciones ‑y‑programas/programas ‑de‑la‑secretaria ‑de‑agricultura ‑y
‑desarrollo ‑rural‑2022. 
 
 
6 Directorate ‑General for Policy, Prospecting and Climate Change of the Ministry of Agriculture.  G/AG/W/235  
 
- 91 - 
 
  In the case of coffee, its cultivation is an eco nomic and social activity of great importance in highly 
and very highly marginalized regions in the south and south -east of Mexico. In previous years, the 
Coffee Production Promotion Programme was in place, which supported productivity and sanitary 
control  and addressed the decline in producers' income caused by low yields.  
The only programme in place today is the Welfare Programme for Small Coffee Producers, which 
provides income support for 219,657 small  (holdings of up to 5 hectares of rain fed land) and  medium 
scale (holdings from 5 to 20 hectares) producers. 92.5% of all producers supported are small scale 
and the rest are medium scale. 67.2% come from municipalities with an indigenous population and 
41.6% are women.  
As noted by Brazil, the support gran ted by Mexico is within the AMS limits. In the case of the products 
listed, with the exception of 2019, there have been no significant increases in recent years and there 
is not expected to be a trend in this direction.  
The increase in the 2019 figures is because, during that year, extra resources were granted for the 
payment of debts from previous fiscal years under support schemes based on the concepts of target 
income, contract farming and price coverage, which were cancelled from 2020.  
Although it is tr ue that the coffee production incentives exceed the de minimis  level for this product, 
they do fall within Mexico's AMS limit. In addition, over the past five years, the trend in the proportion 
of the value of production has been decreasing by 12% annually  and, in 2020, support for coffee 
was equivalent to 18% of the value of production.  
1.2.4.10   Nigeria (G/AG/N/NGA/19)  
AG-IMS ID 100082: Question by Paraguay - Domestic support  
Follow -up to questions AG -IMS IDs  99011 , 99012  and 99013 :  
In view of the lack of an answer to Paraguay's questions AG -IMS ID 99011 , 99012  and 99013 , 
Paraguay reiterates these questions and looks forward to receiving an answer from Nigeria as soon 
as possible.  
Answer by Nigeria  
1.2.4.11   Norway (G/AG/N/NOR/119)  
AG-IMS ID 100083: Question by Paraguay - Domestic support  
a. Norway reports an increase in its AMS expenditure from NOK 10,837 million in 2019 to 
NOK 11,011 million in 2020. Could Norway:  
i. indicate the rea sons for this increase?  
ii. indicate the actions and measures being implemented or considered by Norway to 
reduce its AMS expenditure levels in view of the fact that it is very close to exceeding 
its authorized levels (NOK 11,449 million)?   
b. Norway reports expenditure of NOK 118.2 million under Annex 2 in paragraph 12 for 
organic production. Could Norway explain why it considers that organic production can be 
subsidized under this paragraph and comply with the requirements of Annex 2, 
paragraph  12? 
c. Norway has reported an increase in expenditure under Annex 2 in paragraph 14, 
specifically for the previously challenged vacation schemes for its farmers, from 
NOK 1,293  million in 2019 to NOK 1,354 million in 2020. Could Norway explain the reasons 
for such  an increase in 2020?  
d. Can Norway explain how "incentive" programmes such as those reported in the "blue box " 
under paragraph (b) regarding meat production are consistent with Article 6.5 of the G/AG/W/235  
 
- 92 - 
 
  Agreement on Agriculture? We also note that these subsidies were increased by over NOK 
10 million in 2020.   
e. Although Norway has reported MPS for wheat and oilseeds in 202 0 beyond their de minimis 
levels, the notification does not indicate the value of production or the %age of production 
value support for any of the products for which it reports support levels above de minimis . 
We urge Norway to provide data for all produc ts and specifically the VOP and %age of 
support for wheat and oilseeds.   
Answer by Norway  
We thank Paraguay for their questions. Our answers are as follows:   
a.  
i. The minor increase in AMS from 2019 to 2020 is a result of adjustments in existing 
support progra ms.  
ii. Norway is constantly monitoring our use of AMS and corresponding commitment level, 
and we make adjustments to our agricultural policies as we deem necessary. In this 
case, it may be noted that as of July 2021, Norway has terminated the target price 
measure for pork.   
b. In order to be eligible to receive support to organic production the farmers are required to 
meet certain criteria with respect to production methods, input use, etc. that are laid down 
in national legislation. The Norwegian legislation wh en it comes to organic products are 
based on the EU legislation. The payments represents compensation for additional costs 
and loss of income due to fulfilling the requirements set out in the national legislation.   
c. The "Vacation and Replacement Scheme" is part of the general welfare system in Norway. 
There are two schemes notified under "social welfare", namely the vacation and 
replacement scheme and the refund for alleviation of financial difficulties due to illness. 
Both schemes are in line with national regulations related to the work environment.   
The main objective of the "Vacation and Replacement Scheme" is to enable farmers to 
hire workers for replacement during vacation and time off, while the objective of the 
second scheme is to alleviate financial difficulties of producers due to illness and 
pregnancy. For both schemes eligible farmers receive payments based on documented 
expenses for hiring replacements during vacation or illness. The programme is notified 
under "other" in accordance with the secon d sentence of Annex  2 to the AoA, 
paragraph  5.  
There are no particular changes in the programme from 2019 to 2020. The small increase 
of 5% from 2019 to 2020 in the vacation programme is within the expected variations of 
the program 's expenditures. As an example, in 2014 the total expenditure of these two 
social welfare programs was 1 ,352 million. The following year, in 2015, they were 1 ,340 
million.   
d. Norway notified a new DS:2 notification for the "quality incentive support programme for 
beef" in 2015 ( G/AG/N/NOR/80 ). The maximum e ligible quantity is calculated on the basis 
of historical production during the three-year period preceding the adoption of this 
program. The programme was adopted by the Parliament in 2013, and accordingly the 
base period includes the years 2010 through 2 012. The historical quantities in these years 
were 58.8 mill kg, 60.4 mill kg and 59.0 mill kg respectively. Hence, the base level of 
production is 59.4 mill kg and the maximum eligible quantity of beef is therefore 
50.49  mill kg according to article 6.5. (ii) in the Agreement on Agriculture.  The objective 
of the programme is to improve the quality of Norwegian beef production. The farmers will 
only receive the payment when the quality requirements are met. In 2020, support for 
47.2 mill kg was granted unde r the programme. Norway therefore fulfills the criterion for 
notifying this programme under the Blue Box.   G/AG/W/235  
 
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  e. We thank Paraguay for raising the question on notification of the value of production. We 
agree with Paraguay that there is an additional information  value in including the VOP for 
all products, and we aim at including this in our notification for 2021.  
Follow -up: Brazil echoed Paraguay and highlighted that organic production was not necessarily 
environmentally sustainable. Also, Brazil indicated that more land was required to produce food 
under organic production. Brazil highlighted the importance of the AoA rules and the incoherence 
in favouring organic vs conventional agriculture which did and would continue to feed the most 
part of the world.  
New Z ealand supported the question.  
AG-IMS ID 100057: Question by European Union - Market price support: Eligible 
production  
a. The European Union notes that in Norway 's DS:1 notification for calendar year 2020 there 
is no separate entry for goat milk in Supporti ng Table DS:4, which has previously been 
the case for calendar years 2005 -2019. Nevertheless, goat milk is mentioned in note 6 to 
Supporting Table DS:5 and in Supporting Table DS:6 (base deficiency payments to goat 
milk) of the notification for 2020. Shoul d this be interpreted as Norway having changed 
its notification practice regarding milk in 2020 as to notifying cow milk and goat milk as 
one single product?  
b. In supporting table DS:5, Norway has included seven notes regarding what constitutes 
the eligible production of each product in the calculations of market price support. There 
have been no similar notes in previous Norwegian DS:1 notifications. According to 
Norway 's answer to Australia 's question AG -IMS ID 86018 , Norway previously did not 
include seed production in its eligible production for wheat, barley and oats. Moreover, 
milk and pork consumed on farms as well as milk processed on farms were not included 
in the eligible production for those products. The basis for this exclusion seems to have 
been that the volumes in question were not eligible to receive the applied administere d 
price. However, according to notes 1 -3 and 6 -7 to Supporting Table DS:5, both seeds of 
wheat, barley and oats, pork consumed on farms and milk consumed or processed on 
farms are included in the eligible production of those products for 2020. Does this ap parent 
change of notification practice of Norway reflect any changes in how Norwegian market 
price support functions? If not, what are the reasons behind the change of practice?  
Answer by Norway  
We thank the European Union for their questions.  
When it comes to the first question, we confirm that we have changed the notification practice 
regarding milk in DS:4. The reason is that the target price for milk is one single measure that applies 
to both cow milk and goat milk.  
When it comes to the second quest ion, we confirm that we have changed notification practice 
regarding eligible production. This change means that we include on -farm consumption and direct 
sales in the number for eligible production, in line with the findings in the panel report WT/DS511/R . 
1.2.4.12   Oman (G/AG/N/OMN/26)  
AG-IMS ID 100021: Question by United States of America - Transparency issues (including 
Table DS:2)  
In WTO notification G/AG/N/OMN/26 covering calendar year 2019, there is no mention of the 
activities of the Oman Food Investment Hold ing Company.   
Through the Trade Policy Review Process, Oman indicated that the mission of the company is to 
invest in food projects, and any activities of the company will be in conformity with Oman's 
obligations on domestic support. One of the WTO obligat ions with respect to domestic support is 
annual notification.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  a. How much did Oman spend on food projects through the Oman Food Investment Holding 
Company in 2019?  
Answer by Oman  
The notification does not include Oman food investment holding because the compa ny does not 
provide any activities under domestic support.  The aim of company is to promote Oman's food 
security through partnerships  with government agencies, private operators and investors.   
1.2.4.13   Philippines (G/AG/N/PHL/78)  
AG-IMS ID 100037: Question by Euro pean Union - Market price support  
In supporting table DS:5 Philippines indicates 444.0 thousand tonnes as eligible production.   
a. Can Philippines please indicate total rice production for the year 2020.   
b. What is the quality criteria for the rice purchased.  
c. Can Philippines indicate whether this quantity had been determined and whether all was 
bought in at the price indicated in supporting table DS:5. Was the quantity fixed in advance 
before the buying began.  
d. How does the Philippines intend to dispose of the pr ocured quantities and is there any 
specific purpose planned?  
Answer by Philippines  
a. The rice (paddy) production in 2020 totaled to 19,294.97 thousand metric tonnes 
('000 MT). 
b. The following are the quality standards in buying clean and dry rice paddy:  
• Moisture content : 14%; 
• Purity : 95%; 
• Discoloration and damaged : 7%. 
c. There is a determined target quantity in the procurement of rice paddy.  
d. The procured quantities serve as buffer stock to be used in government response to 
emergencies, in support to disaste r relief programs, or disposed of as necessary before its 
quality deteriorates and becomes unsafe for human consumption.  
1.2.4.14   Saudi Arabia, Kingdom of (G/AG/N/SAU/23)  
AG-IMS ID 100049: Question by Brazil - Other product -specific AMS/EMS  
Even though the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's Current Total AMS is within its Total AMS commitment 
level, Brazil notices that the Product -Specific AMS for poultry remains above " de minimis " levels for 
the seventh year in a row (Supporting Table DS:4, G/AG/N/SAU/23 ), between 2012 and 2018.   
In light of the abov e, could Saudi Arabia indicate if Members should expect that such a trend of 
product -specific support above " de minimis " for poultry has continued in more recent years (2019, 
2020, 2021)?  
Answer by Saudi Arabia, Kingdom of  
Product -Specific AMS will provided through the notifications for the relevant calendar year mentioned 
above after all data are finalized.  
 
7 Source: Philippine Statistics Authority . G/AG/W/235  
 
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  1.2.4.15   Switzerland (G/AG/N/CHE/114)  
AG-IMS ID 100101: Question by New Zealand - Other product -specific AMS/EMS  
In notification G/AG/N/CHE/114 , Switzerland notified total product specific support for milk and milk 
products of CHF 371.8 million which is in excess of de minimis  levels. We also note that recent 
reporting indicates that around 45% of Swiss milk is processed into cheese with around 40% of this 
cheese being exported to m ore than 70 countries around the world.   
https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/no -holes -in-swiss -cheese -exports -despite -coronavirus/46338236    
Does the product -specific support provided to milk and milk products contribute to the production 
of cheeses that are subsequently exported?  
Answer by Switzerland  
The shares of the contributions that support milk processed into cheese seek to encourage milk 
producers to give added value to milk in the form of cheese. These contributions benefit all the 
cheese produced in Switzerland and are not linked to the condition that the cheese be exported.  
Follow -up: New Zealand highlighted their continu ed concern regarding the use of product -specific 
support as there was a likelihood that these supports would be directly transferable to producers 
and the products benefiting from such support could be exported to the international market.  
Brazil expressed  support to the question by New Zealand and concern on the use of the product 
specific support.  
The E uropean Union also expressed concerns on the use of the product specific support as it 
resembled export subsidy.  
1.2.4.16   Chinese Taipei (G/AG/N/TPKM/206)  
AG-IMS ID 100078: Question by Paraguay - Market price support  
Notifications for 2018 and 2019 reported increases in product -specific support for soybeans by 
comparison with the levels reported in 2017 (80.67%). Could Chinese Taipei explain the reasons for 
these increases?  
Answer by Chinese Taipei  
In our efforts at mitigating the impact of global climate change as well as reduc ing the usage of 
water resources, maintaining the sustainability of the environment, and ensuring food security, TPKM 
is applying policies to rebuild the supply chain of domestic grain crops, with the specific aim of 
improving the quality, safety and diver sification of our domestic coarse -grain production. The 
measures we are taking, aimed at rebuilding our domestic grain -crop industry, play a pivotal role in 
our economic stability. Soybean is one of the main crops covered by these measures. From 2017 
to 2019, the product -specific AMS of soybean steadily decreased. The value of its production was 
declining over the same period as well, resulting in major fluctuations in the ratio of its 
support -to-production value.  In comparison to the considerable size of o ur soybean imports, which 
amounts to some 2,600,000 tonnes per year, our annual domestic yields of between 4,400 to 
4,700  tonnes, which represents a very low level of production. Furthermore, in our experience, 
support for soybean is accompanied by extreme ly low levels of distorting effects on production and 
trade.  
1.2.4.17   United Arab Emirates (G/AG/N/ARE/21)  
AG-IMS ID 100102: Question by Canada - Transparency issues (including Table DS:2)  
Canada notes an United Arab Emirates Ministry of Climate Change & Environmen t (MOCCAE) news 
release from 10 August 2017 highlighting the Ministry 's efforts to support the Year of Giving 
initiative. The release states that the Ministry works with private sector companies to provide farmers 
with agricultural supplies, such as fertil izers, pesticides, seeds, irrigation pipes and soil testing 
equipment for "half their market price. "  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  Could the United Arab Emirates indicate where or how is this domestic support accounted for in its 
notification?  
Answer by United Arab Emirates  
1.2.4.18   United Sta tes of America (G/AG/N/USA/135)  
AG-IMS ID 100104: Question by Canada - Constituent data and methodology (AGST)  
Since G/AG/N/USA/135/Rev.1  released on 8 April 2021, the United States now reports all domestic 
tables on a fiscal year basis (1 October to 30 September) instead of on a marketing year basis 
(1 September to 31 August) as it was done previously. This change in methodology was implem ented 
as total AMS support reported by the United States grew rapidly in recent notifications. 
(USD  3,984.250 in 2017 -2018, USD 13,085.38 in 2018 -2029 and USD 18,247.48 in 2019 -2020)  
  
Could the United States indicate what their total AMS support in 2019 -20 would have been if they 
had not changed their reporting period in 2019 -2020?  
Answer by United States of America  
In light of questions raised by several Members regarding the U.S. domestic support notification in 
recent years, the United States completed a review of its notification practices and is now able to 
provide the extensive amount of information reported in its notifications more accurately and in a 
more timely manner.  Members interested in a comparison of these changes may review 
G/AG/N/USA/135/Rev.1  and G/AG/N/USA/135 . The United  States would encourage all Members, 
including Canada, to review their notification practices to ensure their notifications are provided in 
a timely and accurate manner.  
1.2.4.19   United States of America (G/AG/N/USA/150)  
AG-IMS ID 100114: Question by Canada - Other  product -specific AMS/EMS  
Under G/AG/N/USA/157  and G/AG/N/USA/150  the U.S. classified payments for non -speciality crops 
under the Market Facilitation Program under DS:9 as non -product -specific AMS.   
a. Could the United States clarify why these payments were classified as non -product 
specific?  
b. Did producers have to certify the number of acres of each crop they planted with the USDA 
to get payments?  
c. If a producer planted only a single crop eligible under the program, would payment be 
considered commodity specific?  
Answer by United States of America  
The 2019 MFP for non -specialty crops was paid on a producer 's total acreage of all eligible crops, 
with payments made at a single county -level payment rate per acre based on county -level aggregate 
historical acreage and yields.  Because the payments were on a per-acre, non -product specific basis, 
they were notified as non -product specific.  While a producer 's eligibility for per -acre payments 
required information on total plantings of eligible crops, the mix of crops had no bearing on a 
producer 's payments.  
Follow-up: Canada indicated its continued interest in the difference between document 
G/AG/N/USA/135/REV.1 and the original notification.  
Paraguay, New Zealand, China, and India expressed their interest and support to this question.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  1.2.4.20   United States of America  (G/AG/N/USA/157)  
AG-IMS ID 100108: Question by Brazil - General services: infrastructural services  
The US has notified under Supporting Table DS:1, "Infrastructural services", expenditures that were 
described as:  
"Administrative & operating reimbursements  to insurers - Reimbursements for certain administrative 
and operating expenses of insurance companies delivering Federal crop insurance"; and   
"Underwriting gains to insurers - Underwriting gains provided to insurance companies under the 
Standard Reinsura nce Agreement".  
In a preliminary view, Brazil understands that such expenditures related to insurance and 
reinsurance services do not seem to be directed to the provision or construction of capital works by 
the government, as mandated by paragraph 2(g).  
Even if they were, they seem to operate on the private farm -level and to subsidize operating costs, 
which are specifically excluded from the scope of paragraph 2(g).  
a. Could the US provide further rationale on its decision to classify such expenditures as 
exem pted from the reduction commitments?  
Answer by United States of America  
Outlays under the category "administrative and operating reimbursements to insurers" and 
"underwriting gains to insurers " meet the general criteria of Annex 2, paragraph 1 (support is 
provided through a publicly ‑funded government programme and does not involve transfers from 
consumers, and there is no price support to producers; additionally, there are no trade ‑distorting 
effects or effects on production). In addition, the outlays meet the general criteria in paragraph 2 
(expenditures (or revenue foregone) in relation to programs which provide services or benefits to 
agriculture or the rural community and are not direct payme nts to producers or processors).  
The United States notified these expenditures under paragraph 2(g) as these outlays support the 
institutional infrastructure for delivery of the Federal Crop Insurance Program.  These outlays go to 
private insurers to delive r and service products under the Federal Crop Insurance program.  The U.S. 
crop insurance programme is a unique programme in that its structure combines government 
oversight and administrative control with delivery and servicing of crop insurance products b y private 
companies through a reinsurance agreement.  That agreement specifies the payment of 
administrative and operating costs and the sharing of underwriting risk to support that delivery and 
servicing activity. The United States has notified the budgeta ry outlays associated with delivery of 
crop insurance similarly to the way it notifies budgetary outlays for delivery of services to agricultural 
producers by government agencies.   
Follow -up: India expressed interest in this question.  
AG-IMS ID 100055: Que stion by India - Current Total AMS (Amber Box)  
a. India welcomes the Domestic Support Notification DS:1 by the United States for 
MY2019/20 ( G/AG/N/USA/157 ). It is noted that the current total AMS has increased 
around 40% from USD 13,085.38 million to USD 18,247.48 million. Could the United 
States explain the reason for this increase?   
b. India notes that in the United States' Domestic Support Notification DS:1 for MY2019/20, 
G/AG/N/USA/157 , the product -specific support as a %age of the value of production (VoP) 
of the products: Beef cattle & Calves; Canola; Cherri es; Corn; Cranberries; Dairy; 
Flaxseed; Ginseng; Honey/Apiculture; Legumes; Millet; Mustard; Oats; Papaya; Pears; 
Pea cans; Plums/Prone; Sesame; Sheep & Lambs; Squash; Sunflower; Tobacco; Walnut; 
wheat and Wool has increased significantly in comparison to that provided in DS:1 
notification for MY2018/19 ( G/AG/N/USA/150 ). 
i. the United States may explain the reason for this increase?   G/AG/W/235  
 
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  c. In the United States' DS:1 notification for MY2019 -20, it is noted that in Supporting Table 
DS:9 on Non -Product Specific AMS, the support of USD 1 03.046 million provided for the 
measure  "Irrigation on Bureau of Reclamation Projects in 17 Western States" has been 
notified under Column 3 i.e., Non -product specific budgetary outlays. However, in the 
DS:1 notification for MY 2018/19 ( G/AG/N/USA/150 ), this measure was not ified under 
Column 4, i.e., other non -product specific support (include calculation details)).  What is 
the reason for changing the category of support?   
d. The supplemental nutrition assistance programme of the United States Department of 
Agriculture is a foo d assistance programme that provides low -income households with 
monthly benefits to purchase food. This programme is implemented in Michigan under the 
name "double up food bucks" in many farmers' markets and grocery stores. The 'double 
up food bucks' progr amme is implemented in the following manner at the grocery stores. 
Every dollar a participant spends on fruits and vegetables will be matched dollar to dollar 
with double up food bucks. So, if the participant spends USD 20 from the bridge card, he 
gets USD  20 in free double up food bucks, which can be used to buy any fresh fruits and 
vegetables. In this context, India would like the US to answer the following questions.  
i. Does 'fresh fruits and vegetables' refer to the locally grown produce exclusively or doe s 
it include similar imported products?  
ii. Is the programme notified in the WTO, if not under what provisions of the AoA does 
the United States intend to notify this?   
Answer by United States of America  
a. The primary reason for the increase in the Current Total AMS was the Coronavirus Food 
Assistance Program (CFAP), a temporary programme designed to minimize the negative 
economic impacts of COVID -19 on U.S. agriculture.  Signups for eligible producers under 
the CFAP ended on 12 October 2021.   
b. The temporary CFAP primarily contributed to the increase in notified product -specific 
support for most of the identified commodities.  Supporting Table DS:6 and Supporting 
Table DS:7 include all relevant programmatic outl ays contributing to the product -specific 
level of support.   
c. The United States thanks India for pointing out this change and can confirm this change 
was accidental and will correct this in future notifications.  
d.  
i. The programme cited in India 's question is fu nded through the Gus Schumacher 
Nutrition Incentive Program (GusNIP), which provides funding to conduct and evaluate 
projects that provide incentives to increase the purchase of fruits and vegetables by 
low-income consumers. The programme does not require the purchase of U.S. grown 
produce.  
ii. Yes, GusNIP is notified in Supporting Table DS:1 General Services as part of the total 
notified for National Institute for Food and Agriculture Extension Activities.  
Follow -up: New Zealand expressed its support to this q uestion.  
AG-IMS ID 100084: Question by Paraguay - Current Total AMS (Amber Box)  
a. The United States reports an increase in its AMS expenditure from USD 13,085 million 
in 2018 to USD 18,247 million in 2019. Could the United States:  
i. indicate the reasons for this increase?  
ii. indicate the actions and measures being implemented or considered by the United 
States to reduce its AMS expenditure levels in view of the fact that it is close to 
exceeding its authorized levels (USD 19,103 million)?   G/AG/W/235  
 
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  b. The United States incr eased product -specific support from 2018 to 2019 for the following 
products of interest to Paraguay:  
• Corn: from USD 2,131 million (4.09% of VOP) to USD 4,635 million (9.47%  of VOP) 
• Sesame: from USD 1.110 million (10% of VOP) to USD 2.072 million (16.36%  of VOP) 
• Sugar: from USD 1,530 million (65.6% of VOP) to USD 1,836 million (65.51%  of VOP) 
Could the United States:  
i. explain the reasons for such increases?  
ii. provide information on possible changes or initiatives being implemented or considered 
to red uce support levels for these key export products for developing countries?   
Answer by United States of America  
a. The primary reason for the increase in the Current Total AMS was the Coronavirus Food 
Assistance Program (CFAP), a temporary programme designed t o minimize negative 
economic impacts of COVID -19 on U.S. agriculture.  The final signups for eligible producers 
for CFAP occurred on  12 October  2021 and the programme has been discontinued.   
b. The temporary Coronavirus Food Assistance Program (CFAP) primarily  contributed to the 
increase in notified product -specific support for corn.  The temporary CFAP contributed to 
more than one -half of the increase in notified product -specific support for sesame. 
The remainder of the increase was the result of higher crop in surance premium subsidies, 
resulting from a nearly 50% increase in acres insured.  The increase in notified support for 
sugar is as result of both temporary CFAP payments and payments for sugar beet losses 
under the Wildfire and Hurricane Indemnity Program Plus (WHIP+).  WHIP+ was a 
temporary programme to offset losses from hurricanes, wildfires, and other qualifying 
natural disasters that occurred in 2018 and 2019.  
AG-IMS ID 100109: Question by New Zealand - Constituent data and methodology (AGST)  
According to the United States ' (U.S.) domestic support notification G/AG/N/USA/157 , current total  
aggregate measurement of support ( "CTAMS ") for the 2019/2020 marketing year total 
USD 18.237  billion. This is USD 900 million short of the Final Bound Commitment Level for domestic 
support of USD 19.1 billion.  
 
The U.S. CTAMS is the sum of certain product -specific AMSs in excess of the 5% de minimis level. 
Non-product specific domestic support for the U.S. is notified as below the 5% de minimis level and 
therefore not counted towards the CTAMS.  
 
New Zealand thanks the U.S. for their notification.  What steps does the US take to ensure that 
payments under the programmes below do not include non -exempt product support?  
a. Price Loss Coverage (PLC) and County -level Agricultural Risk Coverage (ARC -CO) 
programs  
b. The Fiscal Year 2019 Market Faci litation Program for non -specialty crops  
c. Payments for administrative and operational expenses and reinsurance services  
d. Payments under the Paycheck Protection Program  
Answer by United States of America  
For further clarification on the U.S. notification of  
1. PLC and ARC -CO, please see the response to AG -IMS ID 100106 ,  
2. the 2019 Market  Facilitation Program for non -specialty crops, please see the response to 
AG-IMS ID 100114 ,  
3. the administrative and operational expenses and reinsurance services of the Risk 
Management Agency, please see the response to AG -IMS ID 100108 , and  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  4. the Paycheck Protection Program, please see the response to AG -IMS ID 98006 . 
AG-IMS ID 100105: Question by Brazil - Other product -specific AMS/EMS  
Brazil notices with concern that the United States Current Total AMS, at USD 18.2 billion, came 
historically close to exceeding the US' FBTAMS of USD 19.1 billion. In the reference year, a total of 
29 agricultural products received product -specific support ab ove "de minimis " levels.  
a. Taking into account the impacts of U.S. agricultural policies in world markets, could the 
US update the Membership on whether the policies that have led to this significant increase 
in outlays are still in place, and if they will b e present on future DS:1 notifications?   
i. If not, could the US indicate which policies have been terminated and whether new 
ones have replaced them?  
Answer by United States of America  
The primary reason for the increase in the Current Total AMS was the Coro navirus Food Assistance 
Program, a temporary programme designed to minimize negative economic impacts of COVID -19 
on U.S. agriculture.  Signups for eligible producers under the Coronavirus Food Assistance Program 
ended on 12  October  2021.  
Follow -up: New Zealand indicated its interest in the question.  
AG-IMS ID 100106: Question by Brazil - Other product -specific AMS/EMS  
In G/AG/N/USA/135/Rev.1 , and in answer to question AG -IMS 98182, the US has explained its 
decision to reclassify expenditures under the Wildfires and Hurricane Indemnity Program (WHIP) as 
non-product -specific AMS, justifying that the programme "does not specify crop -specific payment 
rates".  
 
Brazil is well aware of the several questions answered by the US on the issue and appreciates the 
information previously provided on two important programs on the Farm Bill, the Price Loss coverage 
(PLC) and the County -Level Agricultural Risk Coverag e (ARC -CO).  
 
However, Brazil recalls that both the PLC and the ARC -CO do specify crop -specific price or revenue 
protection, since crop -specific payment rates depend on price or revenues for the crop in a given 
year.  
 
Hence, Brazil would like to consult, in light of its recent revision of notification practices, if the US 
has considered or would consider notifying in G/AG/N/USA/157  both programs as product -specific 
domestic support?  
Answer by United States of America  
Payments under PLC and ARC -CO are made to farms with historical ba se acres of eligible 
historically -produced crops. While payment triggers under the 2018 Farm Act incorporate reference 
prices and revenue guarantees for the historically -produced covered commodities, farm operators 
are not required to produce the historica lly-covered commodity or any other commodity to receive 
ARC-CO or PLC payments. Thus, these payments are not tied to specific commodities and are 
reported as non -product -specific domestic support.  
AG-IMS ID 100036: Question by European Union - Non-product -specific AMS  
Market Facilitation Programme.   
According to the notifications G/AG/N/USA/50  and G/AG/N/USA/56  the following amounts have been 
paid out to farmers:   G/AG/W/235  
 
- 101 - 
 
  MFP  Announced 
amounts  USDA 
authorised 
amounts 
to FAS  2019 DS:1  Billion  
 
2020 DS:1  USD 
 
Total  
  24‑07‑2018 12,0 10,6       
  23-05-2019 16,0 14,5       
    28,0 25,1       
DS:1 notification  PS     8,761  0,641    
 NPS     5,191  8,399    
 Total      13,952  9,040  22,992  
Can the United States explain more in detail about the eligibility criteria for the support notified as 
non-product specific, and why the US has notified this support as non -product specific.   
Does the United States expect any of the remaining amounts (difference between 25.1 and 22.99) 
to be included in later DS:1 notifications?  
Answer by United States of America  
The 2 019 MFP for non -specialty crops was paid on a producer 's total acreage of all eligible crops, 
with payments made at a single county -level payment rate per acre based on county -level aggregate 
historical acreage and yields. Because the payments were on a pe r-acre, non -commodity -specific 
basis, they were notified as non -product specific -support.  It should be noted that programme 
announcements and spending authorizations do not represent actual expenditures.  Some additional 
MFP payments were made during FY 2020/21 and will be appropriately notified in future notifications.  
Follow -up: New Zealand expressed interest in the question and future notification from the US.  
AG-IMS ID 100116: Question by Canada - Domestic food aid  
Under G/AG/N/USA/157  the United States classified the Farmers t o Families Food Box Program as 
green box and under G/AG/N/USA/156  the United States indicates that "Outlays under the 
programme meet th e general criteria of Annex 2, paragraph 1: support is provided through a 
publicly -funded government programme and does not involve transfers from consumers, and there 
is no price support to producers; additionally, there are no trade -distorting effects or  effects on 
production."   
In a recent U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) report , released on 21  September  2021, 
the GAO clearly indicates that one of the goals of the programme was to create alternative outlets 
for food producers after they lost customers and to support producer s. The report also indicates that 
after two rounds of the program, the USDA started to prioritize contractors who could offer the 
lowest price, implying that this wasn't the practice used in the first two rounds. Table 3 in the GAO 
report shows that the me an and median price per box dropped significantly after round 2 when the 
USDA started to prioritize lowest price contractors.   
Furthermore , the report noted that the USDA did not collect the prices received by the producers, 
and did not monitor whether the pandemic reduced demand and sales for the type and quantity of 
products the producers provided for the program.   
It is Canada's understand ing that under the program, the USDA provided funds to contractors, who 
in turn purchased commodities and distributed them. Under question AG -IMS ID 92384 of 93rd COA 
meeting starting on 28  July 2020, Canada already questioned the high price paid for some 
commodities under the programme as reported in the media.   
a. Could the United States clarify how purchases made by private contractors were conducted 
under the prog ram? 
b. If during the first two round of the program, priority was not provided to the lowest bidder, 
what support was provided to producers through this programme by purchasing 
commodity above market price?  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  c. Could the United States clarify how this programme impacted producers as it was an 
objective of the program.  
Answer by United States of America  
As previously explained, including in AG -IMS ID 93284 , contracting for food boxes for the Farmers 
to Families Food Box Program was conducted in accordance with Federal Acquisition Regulation 
(FAR) Part 15. For the first two rounds, technical  evaluation factors were considered in addition to 
price. Proposals submitted outlined technical information such as the distribution plan, capability, 
and past performance, in addition to the proposed price per delivered box. This approach was taken 
to en sure that contractors that were awarded had the capability to package agricultural products 
into boxes and distribute those boxes with minimal handling at the destination as well as with food 
recipients given pandemic safety protocols. Private contractors executed contracts with suppliers for 
the food box components. The United States does not have information on the terms of those 
contracts. A contractor 's bid under the programme was based on pricing that covered the cost of 
the agricultural products, the assembly of boxes, the establishment of distribution networks, and all 
supply -chain activities to distribute the boxes throughout the United States, including rural and 
remote areas.  
 
By the third round, the programme was sufficiently developed so as to re quire uniform requirements 
for food box contents, sizes, and proposed pricing to better compare competing bids, allowing for 
more emphasis on the lowest -cost proposal than was feasible in the previous rounds. There is no 
evidence that commodities purchased  for the food boxes were contracted at prices higher than 
market prices.   
 
The program's design reoriented supply chains such that producers sold product for distribution 
directly to needy households that would otherwise have been sold through channels sup plying 
institutions and other outlets closed due to pandemic restrictions.  
1.2.5   New or modified domestic support measures  (Table DS:2)  
1.2.5.1   Australia (G/AG/N/AUS/141)  
AG-IMS ID 100050: Question by Brazil - Direct payments: payments under environmental 
programmes  
Could Australia provide further explanation on how the expenditures under the "National Landcare 
Program Smart Farms Small Grant" and the "National Landcare Program Smart Farming 
Partnerships" comply with the specific requirements of Annex 2 par agraph 12?  In particular, and 
without prejudice to other information available, could Australia specify if:   
a. the "best practices" and the "new and innovative tools" are "specific conditions under the 
government programme" in the sense of paragraph 12?  
b. The "small grants" are limited to "the extra costs or loss of income involved in complying 
with the government programme"?  
Answer by Australia  
Australia thanks Brazil for its question with respect to Australia 's DS:2 notification 
(G/AG/N/AUS/141) of financial year 2018 -19. The National Landcare Program is the Australian 
Government 's natural resources management program. Funds are provided with the aims of 
protecting, conserving and providing for the productive use of Australia 's water, soil, plants and 
animals and the ecosystem in which they live and interact.  
 
a. The concept of 'best practice ' relates to the adoption of sustainable agriculture and 
comprises the key outcomes of the Smart Farms Small Grants program. The programme 
seeks to deliver more sustainable fishing, aquaculture and forestry industries. Industry 
implementation of best practi ce sustainable agriculture also assists Australia to meet its 
obligations under international treaties including those about climate change, 
desertification, biological diversity and fish stocks.  'Best practice sustainable agriculture ' 
is defined in the pr ogram 's grant guidelines, as in part: an integrated system of plant and G/AG/W/235  
 
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  animal production practices and techniques that have site -specific application that are 
shown by research and experience to produce optimal results compared to other means.  
Projects fu nded under the Smart Farms Small Grants programme must contribute to 
either:  
i. the increased adoption of best practice sustainable agriculture, or  
ii. increase the capacity of land managers to adopt best practice sustainable agriculture.  
Projects under the Smart  Farming Partnerships are to encourage the uptake of these 
innovative best practices, tools and technologies by farmers, fishers, foresters and 
regional communities which creates an on -going legacy for land carers after projects 
have ended. 'Innovative too ls' refers to new methods for doing something that creates 
a benefit when compared with older methods or ideas. It could also involve introducing 
a concept or technique that while not new, was not previously used in the project 's 
subject matter area.  
Projects funded under this programme must contribute to either:  
i. innovation in sustainable resource management practice, or  
ii. innovation in capacity building and promotion of sustainable resource management 
practice.  
b. Payments under these programs are direct payments to producers in compliance with 
Annex 2 paragraph 5 and represent extra costs or loss of income involved in complying 
with the specific conditions of an Australian Government programme under Annex 2 
paragra ph 12. That is, costs relating to the adoption and capacity to implement best 
practice sustainable agriculture and the trial, development and roll -out of innovative tools 
to improve sustainable resource management.  
1.2.5.2   Brazil (G/AG/N/BRA/68)  
AG-IMS ID 100117: Question by Canada - Public stockholding for food security purposes  
Brazil indicates that Programme "Feed Brazil " (Programa Alimenta Brasil) replaces "Program of 
acquisition of agricultural products from family farming" and that it is consistent with the c riteria in 
paragraph 3, Annex 2 of the Agreement on Agriculture.  Could Brazil elaborate on the differences 
between "Feed Brazil " and the previous measure?  
Answer by Brazil  
The relevant difference is the update of the maximum annual payments to eligible sma ll farmers, 
family farmers, and agricultural cooperatives.  
AG-IMS ID 100034: Question by European Union - Public stockholding for food security 
purposes  
The European Union notes that Brazil has introduced a new domestic support measure that is claimed 
to be consistent with the criteria in Paragraph 3 of Annex 2 of the Agreement on Agriculture ( "Feed 
Brazil "). For further clarity, could Brazil please explain whether the agricultural products purchased 
under the programme in question are purchased at market r ates or not?  
Answer by Brazil  
The general rule for purchase is to open a bidding process, to assure public transparency and wide 
participation of interested suppliers, in order to obtain market rate prices.  
In exceptional cases when a bidding process is no t possible, Law Nr 14.284/2021 establishes that 
purchases can only be carried out if prices are compatible with prevailing market prices, at a local 
or regional level.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  AG-IMS ID 100035: Question by European Union - Public stockholding for food security 
purposes  
Brazil does not make any indication for the expected amounts to be spent on this programme, which 
according to the notification is without time limits.  
a. Can Brazil indicate the total amounts allocated to this programme in the year 2022. 
Furthermore , is it possible to give any indications of the level for the next two to five 
years?  
Answer by Brazil  
For this year there is an estimated provision of USD 40 million. It is very difficult to estimate future 
provisions, but they are expected to be between USD 40 million and USD 60 million.   
AG-IMS ID 100119: Question by United Kingdom - Public stockholding for food security 
purposes  
The United Kingdom thanks Brazil for notifying its Programme "Feed Brazil " under G/AG/N/BRA/68 . 
a. The United Kingdom asks Brazil if they can provide the following further information:  
i. The duration of the programme;  
ii. The annual budget of the programme;  
iii. Whether stock purchased may be immediately released, and if so, whether parts of 
the programme come under Paragraph 4 of Annex 2, namely,  domestic food aid.  
b. The United Kingdom also seeks clarification on whether the volume and accumulation of 
food stocks correspond to any predetermined targets, and if so what these targets are and 
how have they been determined?  
Answer by Brazil  
a.  
i. Programme " Feed Brazil" is a structural, long -term policy aimed at facilitating access 
to food for people in situation of food and nutritional insecurity, providing legal basis 
for the government's purchases. Therefore, Law Nr 14,284/ 2021 and Decree Nr 
10,880/ 2021 (the reference domestic legislation indicated in G/AG/N/BRA/68 ) have 
not established a duration for the programme.  
ii. There is no fixed annual budget. The budget may vary according to resource 
availability and actual need. The budget will be defined and published in each year 's 
Public Budget. For this year there is a provision estimate of USD 40 million.   
iii. Immediate release is possible in the case of "Acquisition with Simultaneous Donation ", 
through which the food acquired is directly sent to eligible receiving beneficiaries 
(people in s ituation of food and nutritional insecurity and individuals assisted by 
government social assistance; education and health networks).  Based on available 
information, Brazil will assess the notification of expenditures under any additional 
provisions when t he relevant DS:1 notification is due.  
b. In general, according to article 6 of Decree Nr 10.880/2021, purchases of food must 
reconcile the demand for actions to promote food and nutritional security and food supply 
with the offer of products by the beneficiar y suppliers of the Food Brazil Program.  
Acquisition volumes are defined on a case -by-case basis, according to specific initiatives.   G/AG/W/235  
 
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  Furthermore, Programme "Feed Brazil" has restricted participation in the programme to 
small farmers and family farmers, eit her as individual producers or in agricultural 
cooperatives, all of which are subject to annual monetary limits of acquisition.  
Follow -up: The U nited States expressed interest in the questions raised by Canada, the 
European  Union, and the U nited Kingdom , especially regarding the difference between the previous 
programme and the "Feed Brazil". India also expressed interest in the "Feed Brazil" programme.  
1.2.5.3   European Union (G/AG/N/EU/71)  
AG-IMS ID 100022: Question by United States of America - Annex 2 (Green Box)  
The United States thanks the European Union (EU) for its Table DS:2 submission on the Horizon 
Europe program. In the notification, the EU states projects funded by the programme "are 
transnational and benefit entities (universities, research centres, priva te sector, NGOs, etc.) from 
the EU, associated countries and third countries with the exception of industrialised countries and 
the BRICS. " 
a. Please confirm if this means non -EU entities (other than industrialized countries and 
the BRICS) will be eligible fo r these grants.  
b. Are participants of the program/recipients of the grant, even if non -EU entities, required 
to study agriculture, forestry, and rural areas of the European Union? Or is the study of 
agriculture, forestry, and rural areas outside of the Europ ean Union allowed?   
Answer by European Union  
a. The following non -EU entities are eligible for the grants: countries associated to Horizon 
Europe and low to middle -income countries. The list of concerned countries is available on 
Horizon Europe webpages.  
b. Work done under the grants with non -EU entities as beneficiaries concerns both 
agriculture, forestry and rural areas inside and outside of the EU.  
1.2.5.4   United Kingdom (G/AG/N/GBR/9)  
AG-IMS ID 100121: Question by Australia - Annex 2 (Green Box)  
Australia thanks the United Kingdom for submitting its DS:2 notification dated 1 February 2022 in 
G/AG/N/GBR/9 . Australia notes "The Farming Investment Fund " measure, which has two strands 
that provide grants to farmers, growers, and foresters to invest in technology, equipment and 
infrastructure. The weblink provi ded in the notification indicates the fund could include 'on-farm 
water storage infrastructure, including reservoirs '.  
a. Could the UK please explain in more detail why this support should be categorised as 
Green Box rather than Amber Box support?  
Answer by United Kingdom  
Payments under the Farming Investment Fund (FIF) comply with paragraph 1 and the relevant 
policy -specific criteria of Annex 2 of the Agreement on Agriculture. On -farm water storage 
infrastructure, including reservoirs, would meet the criteria under paragraph 11 as they provide 
structural adjustment assistance through investment aids. The FIF is a direct replacement for, and 
analogous to, the previous EU -funded Countryside Productivity Scheme (part of the 2014 -20 
Common Agricultural Pol icy) which is regarded as having no, or at most minimal trade -distorting 
effects or effects on production.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  AG-IMS ID 100051: Question by Brazil - Annex 2 (Green Box)  
Brazil appreciates the UK's efforts to comply with its transparency obligations. Regarding  the 
Farming Investment Fund:  
a. Could the UK clarify if the grants are one -off, non -refundable payments?   
i. If they are, and in addition to the information already provided by the UK on page 5, 
could the UK provide details on why such payments could be notifie d as general 
services? Is there another sort of support other than the grants included in the 
program?   
b. Since a share of the programs' expenditures can be notified under paragraph 11 of the 
Annex 2, could the UK explain how it applies the concept of "objec tively demonstrated 
structural disadvantage" in the sense of said paragraph to establish the eligibility criteria 
of the program?  
c. Could the UK point to the legislation establishing the environmental or conservation 
programme pursuant to paragraph 12, and i ts specific conditions that apply to the Farming 
Investment Fund?  
d. Could the UK clarify if each grant shall correspond to a specific policy (in the sense of each 
of paragraphs 2 -13 of Annex 2) or if a grant can encompass payments that relate to more 
than on e specific policy (for instance, could the same farmer receive payments under 
paragraphs 11 and 12)?  
e. According to the information provided, an overall goal of the "Farming Equipment and 
Technology Fund" and the "Farming Transformation Fund" is to increase productivity, 
which, in turn, could generate more than minimal trade -distorting effects or effects on 
production. In that sense, has the UK considered notifying such programme as non -
exempt direct payments?  
Answer by United Kingdom  
a. Grant funding provided under the Farming Investment Fund (FIF) are one -off non -
refundable payments per unique project or application. The FIF does not currently provide 
subsidised services to farmers as outlined in paragraph 2, Annex 2 of the Agreement on 
Agriculture. T he FIF represents a rolled over iteration of the predecessor EU funded 
Countryside Productivity Scheme, and as such is notified on the similar basis while the 
policy development of the scheme remains ongoing.  
b. The programme has a clearly defined eligibility  criteria for applicants, deriving from section 
1(2) of the Agriculture Act 2020, which gives the Secretary of State the power to give 
financial assistance for, or in connection with, either or both of the following purposes:  
i. starting, or improving the pro ductivity of, an agricultural, horticultural or forestry 
activity;  
ii. supporting ancillary activities carried on, or to be carried on, by or for a producer.  
The Fund provides financial support to be invested in equipment and technology for 
improved sustainabl e agricultural, horticultural, and forestry productivity. Applications 
are scored based on how they comply with productivity and environmental 
sustainability (including biodiversity), and a third criteria from animal health and 
welfare, water sustainabilit y or innovation. Awarded grants are therefore intended to 
overcome demonstrable structural disadvantages that impact on these areas.  In 
accordance with the framing of the Agriculture Act 2020, only farmers, 
horticulturalists, agro -forestry owners or agricu ltural contractors to the industry who 
work on behalf of producers are eligible to apply for the FIF programme. This eligibility 
meets the criteria outlined under paragraph 11 (a) of Annex 2 "Eligibility for such 
payments shall be determined by reference t o clearly -defined criteria in government G/AG/W/235  
 
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  programmes designed to assist the financial or physical restructuring of a producer 's 
operations in response to objectively demonstrated structural disadvantages. " 
c. Under the section 1(4) within the Agriculture Act 2 020, the framing of any financial 
assistance scheme, the Secretary of State must have regard to the need to encourage the 
production of food by producers in England in an environmentally sustainable way. As 
such, environmental sustainability is given due c onsideration throughout the scheme and 
is a key part of the scoring criteria for all applications.  
d. The scheme remains in its development phase and as such payments will currently only 
correspond to Paragraph 11. As the policy develops there may be instance s where it is 
reported under different policy areas and any future reporting will reflect that. Each grant 
will be reported under one area only.  
e. Payments under the FIF comply with paragraph 1 of Annex 2 of the Agreement on 
Agriculture as well as with the r elevant policy -specific criteria outlined in G/AG/N/GBR/9. 
The FIF is a direct replacement for, and analogous to, the previous EU -funded Countryside 
Productivity Scheme (part of the 2014 -20 Common Agricultural Policy) which is regarded 
as having no, or at most minimal trade -distorting effects or effects on production.  
AG-IMS ID 100052: Question by Brazil - Direct payments: payments under environmental 
programmes  
Brazil notices that the total payments per hectare for each standard of the Sustainable Farming 
Incentive is already defined and publicized. For instance, in what regards "arable and horticultural 
soils standard", "a farmer doing the introductory level would get GBP  22 per hectare; and a farmer 
doing the intermediate level would get a total of GBP  40 per hectare", as per the information 
available on the weblink provided by the UK.   
Considering that the UK has stated on page 6 of the notification that "Support is limited to costs 
incurred and income foregone by landowners delivering the actions of the SFI Pilot", could the UK 
explain how it has established the payment levels, in general, for the farmers complying with the 
standards?  
Answer by United Kingdom  
The GBP 22/ha and GBP 40/ha Brazil refers to are for the Sustainable Farming Incentive (SFI) soils 
standards that will be available nationwide in 2022. This scheme is not yet active and will be notified 
in due course. These standards have been calculated o n the same basis as the SFI Pilot but have 
different requirements, with different cost implications in the standard, and are not part of the SFI 
Pilot notified under G/AG/N/GBR/9 . 
 
The SFI Pilot payment rates have been calculated on an Income Foregone plus Cost b asis, in order 
to compensate farmers for undertaking the actions in the standards.  All data used in the calculations 
has been independently verified to ensure it is representative of the English farming sector.  
 
The payment for each SFI action is based on a net calculation, to compensate a farmer for 
undertaking the SFI action on a hectare of land. It does so by considering the marginal loss of income 
from farming, subtracting costs saved from changes to agricultural operations, and adding any 
additional co sts incurred from delivering the SFI action. These calculations are based on a farm 
which is considered typical of the farming population participating in SFI. These calculations are 
constructed with the support of technical experts in Defra 's Arm 's Length  Bodies (Natural England) 
on how the typical farm is impacted by an SFI action.  
 
The payment for each action is then weighted by the % of land it is required on in the standard, 
repeated for all SFI actions, and aggregated to give a payment for the SFI Pil ot standard as a whole.  
 
The SFI Pilot is intended to test the proposed approach, including participant experience and 
environmental impact. Comprehensive monitoring and evaluation arrangements will ensure that the 
UK will collect evidence and insights to inform and guide the development of SFI over time.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  1.2.5.5   United States of America (G/AG/N/USA/156)  
AG-IMS ID 100032: Question by European Union - Domestic food aid  
During federal years 2020 and 2021 the cost of the Farmers to Families Food Box Program were 
close to USD 6 billion according to the data provided by the United States. The food was contracted 
through a competitive bid process.  
a. Was there a requirement for the food included in the boxes to be of US origin, or could 
imported food also be included?  
b. If imported products were not allowed to be included in the boxes, how could the United 
States ensure that the USD 6 billion programme had no trade -distorting effects?  
Answer by United States of America  
The Farmers to Families Food Box Program (FFFBP) was a  limited -duration programme introduced 
during the COVID -19 pandemic to purchase and distribute U.S. agricultural products to those in 
need.  The FFFBP was administered in accordance with the Federal Acquisition Regulation, which 
includes contracting regulations to ensure fair and reasonable pricing. The food boxes supplied 
through this programme were contracted through a competitive bid process  and pricing incorporated 
delivery costs such as assembly and transportation.  Food boxes were delivered to low -income 
households through established service networks, including food banks, community and faith -based 
organizations, and other non -profits.  The FFFBP ended on 31  May 2021.  
Follow -up: Brazil shared the need for establishing safety nets for vulnerable populations in the 
context of the COVID -19 pandemic. Considering that most of the Green Box Domestic Support 
provided by the US was domestic food aid , Brazil emphasized continued monitoring and guarantee 
that such policies complied with the AoA.  
AG-IMS ID 100033: Question by European Union - Domestic food aid  
The EU appreciates the DS:2 notification. As mentioned in other meetings, when references are 
made to websites, the EU will encourage all Members to indicate the exact link in the 
notification/answer to question etc.  
 
Dairy Donation Programme  
 
According to the notification: " The Dairy Donation Program (DDP) is a voluntary programme 
implemented by t he Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) of the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
(USDA). The programme reimburses eligible dairy organizations to offset a portion of the raw milk 
cost for dairy products donated directly to eligible non -profit organizations fo r distribution to 
individuals in low -income groups ". 
 
a. How is this level of reimbursement fixed? Which criteria are used to fix the level of 
compensation?   
b. Can the United States indicate for the 2021 budget year (that ended on 30/9/2021) what 
was the averag e reimbursement per litre compared to the average overall raw milk price 
paid to the farmers for the dairies participating in the programme?  
Answer by United States of America  
The United States has provided all relevant and required information in its Tabl e DS:2 notification 
regarding its domestic support measures, which notes that the administration and financing of its 
programs are transparent and publicly available.   
 
a. Eligible dairy organizations that incur a qualified expense and have an approved Dairy 
Donation and Distribution Plan can submit a claim to receive reimbursement for donations 
made. The DDP will reimburse for all or part of the following expenses: 1) input  costs 
(fresh fluid milk or bulk dairy commodity product in milk equivalent used in the eligible 
dairy product); 2) manufacturing costs; and 3) transportation costs. Pursuant to the G/AG/W/235  
 
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  statute, the reimbursement rate shall be set at a rate that is within the Class I and Class 
IV Federal Milk Marketing Order (FMMO) prices, is sufficient to avoid food waste, and does 
not interfere with the commercial marketing of milk or dairy products.  
b. The final rule for the programme was only published on 1 September  2021, jus t prior to 
the end of FY 2021.  The data requested for FY 2021 has not yet been finalized and the 
United States can follow up with the requested data at a later date.   
1.2.6   Export Subsidy commitments  (Tables  ES:1, ES:2 and ES:3) 
1.2.6.1   Australia (G/AG/N/AUS/137)  
AG-IMS ID 100123: Question by European Union - Export subsidies subject to reduction 
commitments (Article 9.1)  
The International Freight Assistance Mechanism (IFAM) was established in 2020. It was introduced 
as a temporary measure with ini tial funding of AUD 110 million and  has now received over 
AUD 1 billion.  
This programme therefore provides significant support for Australian exports, and the European 
Union questions the compatibility of a programme of this scale with Australia's export s ubsidy 
commitments.  
Moreover, in its previous answers, Australia underscored the temporary nature of this programme, 
which is supposed to end once the market readjusts. When is the programme expected to end and 
depending on which specific objective criteri a? 
Answer by Australia  
Australia thanks the EU for its question.  IFAM is a temporary and targeted emergency measure 
introduced in response to the sharp decline in airfreight connectivity associated with the COVID -19 
pandemic. IFAM has ensured Australia cou ld continue to access critical imports, including high -value, 
perishable cancer treatments and supplies necessary to manage the pandemic. At the same time, 
IFAM's outbound flights have connected pre -existing markets for high -value perishable Australian 
products to Australian suppliers.  Australia is continually and judiciously monitoring the market for 
airfreight, which is heavily reliant on international passenger flight activity, and has already removed 
or significantly reduced assistance for several route s. Under IFAM, airfreight costs for importers and 
exporters are always more than pre -COVID airfreight rates with Australian businesses required to 
pay the majority of the increased cost of their freight. IFAM assistance will cease when the airfreight 
marke t demonstrates more stabilised connectivity, even if prices remain significantly higher than 
pre-COVID -19 rates.  Affected Australian businesses are either adjusting to the increased costs or 
are re -adjusting their business models and considerations of thei r import -dependent supply chains 
or export capacity.  
Follow -up: The E uropean Union  noted that it was looking forward to the end of the programme as it 
was not fully complying with the AoA.  
Canada inquired about the expected end of the programme as Canada had concerns about its 
compatibility with the Nairobi Ministerial Decision on Expo rt Competition.  
Australia noted that the Programme would be discontinued when freight capacity would be at a 
suitable level.  
1.2.7   Export prohibitions and restrictions  (Table ER:1)  
1.2.7.1   Thailand (G/AG/N/THA/119)  
AG-IMS ID 100125: Question by Japan - Provision of info rmation justifying the measure  
Japan appreciates that Thailand has submitted the required notification to the Committee on 
Agriculture in accordance with Article 12 of the Agreement on Agriculture.  According to 
ER:1 notification, 3 -month export prohibition  of 'live swine ' has been applied.  Could Thailand explain G/AG/W/235  
 
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  in more detail about the "the critical reduction of the live swine production in Thailand " including its 
cause and relevant data?   
Answer by Thailand  
Thailand implemented a 3 -month export prohibitio n on live swine from  6 January to 5 April 2022 as 
a result of the critical reduction of the live swine domestic production. Thai farmers had reduced 
their swine production after facing the COVID -19 pandemic which caused the reduction in demand 
for pork meats. Moreover, a significantly rise on production cost such as the increased prices of 
animal feed also discouraged swine production.  In addition, Thai farmers had also been adapting to 
the new farm management, which concerning animal welfare, in order t o reduce over -crowding and 
prevent any sanitary risks that might occur to their farms. The new farm management needed 
capacity expansion in some areas while they had to maintain the same number of swines in the 
farm. These reduced the supplied of live swin e and resulted insufficient production of live swine 
which significantly affected domestic consumption level of this essential food.  As a result, Thailand 
imposed temporary prohibition on the export of live swine to prevent critical shortage for swine 
products and already notified the Committee on Agriculture to assure transparency.  Thailand 
reaffirms its commitment to comply with Article XI of GATT paragraph 2 a) and Article 12 of the 
Agreement on Agriculture (AoA).  
1.2.8   Notifications in the context of the NFID C Decision  (Table NF:1)  
1.2.8.1   United States of America (G/AG/N/USA/160)  
AG-IMS ID 100030: Question by European Union - Quantity and concessionality of food 
aid 
The European Union notes that under Item 3  e) Value of food assistance used in development 
programs, t he United States explains that some of the commodities donated under Title II, Food for 
Progress and Food for Education food aid programs were monetized in fiscal year 2019/2020. During 
previous years (since 1999/2000) the information in the NF:1 notificat ions suggests that the entire 
amount notified under this item represented commodities that were monetized.  
a. How much of the notified amount of USD 688,614,908 for food assistance used in development 
programs during fiscal year 2019/2020 represent commodi ties that were monetized?   
Have there been any changes introduced to the Title II, Food for Progress and/or Food for Education 
food aid programs that have resulted in a smaller proportion of commodities being monetized or, if 
not, are there any other reaso ns for the change of notification practice?  
Answer by United States of America  
Language in previous notifications that suggested the entire amount notified under item 3(e) Value 
of Food Assistance was monetized was ambiguous and was therefore updated for greater clarity 
beginning in the 2019/2020 Table NF:1 notification.  The 2018 Farm Bill included key technical 
changes to the Food for Peace Act that increased the efficiency and improved the oversight and 
management of food assistance under Tit le II during FY 2019, including the following: "Monetization: 
The elimination of the monetization requirement for USAID's Title II Food for Peace programming 
enables more funding to go toward programs funded under Title II, which allowed USAID to reach 
more beneficiaries with food assistance.  "Of the notified amount for food assistance used in 
development programs during FY 2019/2020, only USD  121.21 million through the Food for Progress 
programme represented commodities that were monetized.  
AG-IMS ID 10003 1: Question by European Union - Other forms of assistance  
The United States informs that WTO developing countries, least -developed countries, and net food -
importing developing countries used U.S. Government officially supported export credit guarantee 
programs for a total value of USD 2,1 billion.  
Can the United States provide information about those programmes as required by the yearly 
questionnaire on export competition? On what terms are they granted? Which agricultural products 
and for which values bene fited from those programmes?  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  Answer by United States of America  
Please see the latest WTO Secretariat 's export competition questionnaire document 
(G/AG/W/125/Rev.15/Add.2 ), beg inning on page 84, for the United States ' response to the section 
on export credits, export credit guarantees or insurance programmes for the export of agricultural 
products.  
1.3  OVERDUE NOTIFICATIONS  
1.3.1   Canada  
AG-IMS ID 100023: Question by United States of Ameri ca - Transparency issues (including 
Table DS:2)  
The United States thanks Canada for its recent submission of its Table DS:1 notification covering 
calendar year 2017, but notes Canada is still several years behind in its notification of its domestic 
support . 
a. What steps is Canada taking to provide its Table DS:1 notifications in a more timely 
manner moving forward?  
Answer by Canada  
Canada thanks the United States for its question.  
Canada is finalizing the data in its 2018 domestic support notification and it will be circulated to 
Members shortly.   
AG-IMS ID 100056: Question by India - Transparency issues (including Table DS:2)  
India notes that Canada's latest submitted DS:1 notification is for the calendar year 2017 
(G/AG/N/CAN/142 ). By when can Canada notify its pending notifications?   
Answer by Canada  
Canada thanks India for its question.  
Canada is finalizing the data in its 2018 domestic support notification and it will be circulated to 
Members shortly.  
1.3.2   European Union  
AG-IMS ID 100145: Question by India  
This question originally formed part of AG -IMS ID  100041 . It has now been resubmitted as a 
separate question.  
India notes that the EU's latest submitted DS:1 notification is for the marketing year 2018 -2019 
(G/AG/N/EU/69 ). By when can the European Union notify the pending notifications?  
Answer by European Union  
As concerns marketing year 2019 -2020, the EU is actively working on the finalization of 
DS:1 notification. The notification will be available by end of April -beginning of May. For marketing 
year 2020 -2021, the internal data necessary for the notification will be only available by the end of  
the current year. Therefore, the notification of 2020 -2021 is planned for the first quarter of 2023.  
Please see also EU reply to question AG -IMS ID 100041 . G/AG/W/235  
 
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  1.3.3   Morocco  
AG-IMS ID 100029: Question by European Union - Transparency issues (including 
Table  DS:2)  
The latest DS:1 notification was submitted in 2012 covering the years 2003 to 2007. When does 
Morocco intend to submit the outstanding notifications?  
Answer by Morocco  
1.3.4   Türkiye  
AG-IMS ID 100024: Question by United States of America - Transparency issues (including 
Table DS:2)  
The United States appreciates the continued efforts by  Türkiye to bring its notifications up to date.  
It is also noted that  Türkiye 's most recent export subsidy notification is for calendar year 2013 and 
was published in 2019, and its most recent domestic support notification is for calendar year 2016.   
Given  Türkiye 's historical notification of support in excess of its domestic support commitments and 
continued apparent use of export subsidies:  
a. please provide an update on  Türkiye 's ongoing efforts to update its notifications.  
Answer by Türkiye  
Türkiye  thanks The United States for its question.  With respect to the domestic support and export 
subsidy notifications:  Türkiye  is in the process finalizing its notifications and expects to upload the 
notifications in due course.  Türkiye  is well aware of its commi tments and doing its utmost to fulfil 
its obligations in order to provide accurate information to WTO Members.  
1.4  EXPORT COMPETITION  
1.4.1   Canada  
AG-IMS ID 100025: Question by United States of America - Export credits, export credit 
guarantees, insurance programmes  
Export Credits  
 
As follow up to AG IMS ID 99034 , the United States notes that Canada did not provide the requested 
breakdown by agricultural product for its export credit programme into the requested product 
categories (i.e., barley, butter, canola, cheese, corn, pulses, soy, skim milk powder, wheat, and 
other milk produc ts). 
 
a. Please provide data by requested product and year from 2015 to 2021.   
b. If Canada is unable to provide this data, please explain why this data cannot be provided.  
Answer by Canada  
Canada appreciates the United States' question regarding our export credit program. However, we 
are unable to provide a product breakdown to the level of detail that is being requested because 
Export Development Canada uses different category groups. We can provide the following table to 
help clarify the nature of t he products that make up each group:   
Export Development Canada Group Category:  Includes products, such as:  
Commodities -Grain, Specialty Crops  Wheat, rice, soybeans, fruits, vegetables  
Processor/Elevator -Grain, Specialty Crops  Edible fats/oils, flour, grain mill products  
Food/Processed Food and Beverages  Butter, skim milk powder, cheese, 
dry/condensed/evaporated products, canned or 
frozen fruits/vegetables  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  1.4.2   China  
AG-IMS ID 100026: Question by United States of America - Export credits, export cre dit 
guarantees, insurance programmes  
The United States thanks China for providing responses to Items 3 and 4 of the export financing 
section of ECQ with regards to SINOSURE 's offering of short term credit insurance for agricultural 
exports in its response to AG -IMS ID 99031 . China response also stated, "The short -term credit 
insurance programme that China provides may cover any products but does not link to any specific 
agricultural products. "  
 
a. Please clarify why China was not able to provide information on "program use by product 
or product group " as required.  
Answer by China  
As requested, China has provided annual coverage and premiums for agricultural products through 
short-term credit insurance for 2019 and 2020. There are no available statistics on usage by product 
or product group.  
1.4.3   Egypt  
AG-IMS ID 1 00027: Question by United States of America - Other measures with 
circumvention potential  
As a follow up to AG -IMS ID s 93042 and 91138 to which no response from Egypt has yet been 
received, the United States has seen press reports that the Government of Egypt settled judicial 
cases for overdue export subsidies administered by the Egyptian Export Development Fund (ESF) to 
promote several economic sectors, incl uding agricultural companies.  According to press reports, we 
understand the government has already disbursed some EGP 31 billion of exporters ' arrears, 
benefiting 3,000 export companies.  
 
a. Please confirm whether any export subsidies arrears with agricultural export companies 
or other agricultural beneficiaries were disbursed.  
b. If so, please confirm the amount of export subsidy arrears that were disbursed and how 
disbursement rates were determined.  
Answer by Egypt  
1.4.4   India  
AG-IMS ID 100028: Question by  United States of America - Transparency issues  
Export Credits   
 
In response to AG -IMS IDs 99042 and 99043  regarding reporting under ECGC 's Credit Risk Insu rance 
cover program, India stated that other Agriculture and allied products "include cashew, coffee, dairy 
and poultry products, spices, tea, etc. " This response was referenced with regards to the request 
made in AG -IMS ID 99043  seeking a breakdown of the total value of USD  4.07 billion by product.  
However, India did not provide the requested information.  The United States therefore repeats the 
request:   
 
Please provide the value covered under the programme for each product identified by India: cotton, 
cashew, coffee, dairy and poultry products, spices, tea, and any other agricultural products covered 
under the program.   G/AG/W/235  
 
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  Answer by India  
We thank the United States for the question. The requested information is as under:  
Product  Value covered under ECGC Credit risk 
insurance (Billion USD)  
Cashew  0.07 
Coffee  0.08 
Dairy and Poultry  0.04 
Spices  0.32 
Tea 0.66 
Others  2.89 
Total  4.07 G/AG/W/235  
 
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  2  COMPILATION OF RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS RAISED DURING THE COMMITTEE ON 
AGRICULTURE MEETING ON 27 -28 JUNE 2022  
2.1  MATTERS RELEVANT TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF COMMITMENTS: ARTICLE 18.6  
2.1.1   Argentina's export restrictions  
2.1.1.1   Question by Switzerland (AG -IMS ID 101015 ) 
Switzerland has noted that Argentina i s restricting exports of beef as well as of wheat. We have also 
noted that certain questions on this matter from the last CoA (ref. AG -IMS ID s 100001 , 100062  and 
100063 ) remain open.  
 
Can Argentina give an update on when it intends to submit the corresponding notifications? 
Moreover, could Argentina provide information on  the measures taken to ensure due consideration 
to the effects of such export restrictions on importing Members' food security, in accordance with 
Article 12.1 (a)  of the Agreement on Agriculture?  
Answer by Argentina  
Argentina would like to congratulate yo u on your appointment as Chair of this Committee and assure 
you of our cooperation during your term. We also thank Uruguay, and Marcos in particular, for their 
tireless work over the past year.   
 
With regard to the questions addressed to Argentina, we once  again thank Switzerland, the United 
States, the United Kingdom and Japan for their timely submissions. We shall respond to questions 
101015 and 101030 together.   
 
Argentina has a strong commitment to global food security.  This has been part of our history  
and will continue to be so. In 2021, our agri -food exports to the world amounted to almost 
USD 54,000 million (69% of our total exports), which represents a 42% increase on 2020. We have 
always been an exporter of agricultural products and food, which is a key sector for generating the 
foreign exchange that our country's economy needs to operate and address our long -standing 
external restrictions.  
 
Our exports to the world of wheat, maize and beef have neither ceased nor declined in 
structural terms.  Rather, exports of these products have reached historic levels:   
• As we indicated at the 100th meeting of the Committee on Agriculture, in 2020/2021, the 
volume of beef exports increased by 26% on the previous biennium and by 227% compared 
to 2016/2017.  
• Moreover, 2021 was a record year for maize and wheat exports, with our country's maize 
exports reaching a 10 -year high and wheat exports at their second highest level in the past 
10 years.  
• In addition, in the first four months of this year, our country expor ted 10.9 million tonnes of 
maize and 9.5 million tonnes of wheat, which represents an increase of 10.5% and 77% 
respectively compared to the first four months of 2021.   
It is important to clarify that the " balance volumes " published on the website of the M inistry of 
Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries are amounts that are updated as new production -related 
information is confirmed. In this connection, it is worth clarifying that Argentina: (i) has no public, 
pro-cyclical or counter -cyclical stocks; (ii) doe s not make government -to-government sales; and 
that (iii) production, storage, transport and marketing are undertaken by private actors under 
market conditions, so the information available is ever -changing and comes from private commercial 
acts. 
 
Argentin a's objective is to provide predictability, confidence and stability to the domestic market in 
order to guarantee domestic food security amid global shortages and inflation. These objectives also 
benefit the international market, since the "balance volumes " ensure that our trading partners are 
aware in advance of the quantity that they may purchase in Argentina, which enables them to 
organize their domestic supply to guarantee their own food security. Argentina stresses that it has G/AG/W/235  
 
- 116 - 
 
  in no way contributed to aggravating either the global food situation or that of any of our individual 
trading partners.  
 
In terms of reasons , Argentina, like the vast majority of the world's countries, is being hit by the 
adverse effects of a global inflationary process that has a particular impact on food. This affects us 
especially; our history shows that we are highly vulnerable to such processes. Our inflation was 
already high and it has skyrocketed as a result of, inter alia , the war in Ukraine.   
 
Argentina has been exporting  more and more products that are better quality and sustainably 
produced. Through major public -private efforts, Argentina has been developing new technologies; 
encouraging the implementation of good agricultural practices to increase our productivity witho ut 
harming the environment and while ensuring social inclusion; and adopting regulatory systems that 
meet high quality and biosecurity standards. However, we are being increasingly affected by the 
consequences of climate change , even though we are responsi ble for less than 0.5% of global 
emissions. If our country (like most agro -exporting developing countries) were not exposed to 
extreme climatic events (such as droughts, floods and fires) and if it were to receive international 
financing to adapt to these events, it would produce and export in much greater volumes than it is 
currently doing, thereby making an even more significant contribution to global food security by 
providing quality food for a world with steadily increasing demand.   
 
Argentina is respo nding to the current major global crisis caused by the COVID -19 pandemic, climate 
change and the war in Ukraine without increasing trade -distorting domestic support, without 
increasing agricultural protectionism and without adversely affecting global food security. We hope 
that each Member will do their part to resolve these issues in line with their specific responsibilities.   
 
Lastly, it should be noted that all the issues of interest to the Members that sent questions are 
published in our official journa l and/or communicated on the website of the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Livestock and Fisheries of the Argentine Republic. In addition, even though our exports have not 
stopped or decreased structurally, for the purposes of transparency, we have been respondi ng 
systematically to all of the questions put to us in the WTO Committee on Agriculture and will continue 
to do so.  
2.1.1.2   Question by United  States of America, United Kingdom, Japan (AG -IMS 
ID 101030 ) 
We take note that Argentina has imposed an increasing number of export restrictions affecting 
agricultural products, including beef, wheat, corn, and b arley.  For example, in December 2021, the 
Argentinian Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Fisheries published Resolution 276/2021 and 
Circular 06/2021 – an export quota on maize and wheat; however, the quotas for maize in 2021 -22 
and wheat in 2022 -23 are below average export volumes in recent years.  
a. Please confirm when these export restrictions will be permanently lifted.  
b. When will Argentina notify these export restrictions to the Committee on Agriculture 
through the required Table ER:1 notification?  
Answer by Argentina  
Argentina would like to congratulate you on your appointment as Chair of this Committee and assure 
you of our cooperation during your term. We also thank Uruguay, and Marcos in particular, for their 
tireless work over the past year.   
With regard to the questions addressed to Argentina, we once again thank Switzerland, the United 
States, the United Kingdom and Japan for their timely submissions. We shall respond to questions 
101015 and 101030 together.   
Argentina has a  strong  commitment to global food security.  This has been part of our history 
and will continue to be so. In 2021, our agri -food exports to the world amounted to almost 
USD 54,000  million (69% of our total exports), which represents a 42% increase on 2020. We have 
always been a n exporter of agricultural products and food, which is a key sector for generating the G/AG/W/235  
 
- 117 - 
 
  foreign exchange that our country's economy needs to operate and address our long -standing 
external restrictions.  
 
Our exports to the world of wheat, maize and beef have neither ceased nor declined in 
structural terms.  Rather, exports of these products have reached historic levels:   
 
• As we indicated at the 100th meeting of the Committee on Agriculture, in 2020/2021, the 
volume of beef exports increased by 26% on the p revious biennium and by 227% 
compared  to 2016/2017.  
•  
• Moreover, 2021 was a record year for maize and wheat exports, with our country's maize 
exports reaching a 10 -year high and wheat exports at their second highest level in the past 
10 years.  
• In addition, i n the first four months of this year, our country exported 10.9 million tonnes of 
maize and 9.5 million tonnes of wheat, which represents an increase of 10.5% and 77% 
respectively compared to the first four months of 2021.   
 
It is important to clarify that  the "balance  volumes " published on the website of the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries are amounts that are updated as new production -related 
information is confirmed. In this connection, it is worth clarifying that Argentina: (i) has no p ublic, 
pro-cyclical or counter -cyclical stocks; (ii) does not make government -to-government sales; and 
that (iii) production, storage, transport and marketing are undertaken by private actors under 
market conditions, so the information available is ever -changing and comes from private commercial 
acts. 
 
Argentina's  objective  is to provide predictability, confidence and stability to the domestic market in 
order to guarantee domestic food security amid global shortages and inflation. These objectives also 
benefit the international market, since the "balance volumes" ensure that our trading partners are 
aware in advance of the quantity that they may purchase in Argentina, which enables them to 
organize their domestic supply to guarantee their own food security. Argentina stresses that it has 
in no way contributed to aggravating either the global food situation or that of any of our individual 
trading partners.  
 
In terms of  reasons , Argentina, like the vast majority of the world's countries, is being hit by the 
adverse effects of a global inflationary process that has a particular impact on food. This affects us 
especially; our history shows that we are highly vulnerable to such processes. Our inflation was 
already high and it has skyrocketed as a result of, inter alia, the war in Ukraine.   
 
Argentina has been exporting more and more products that are better quality and sustainably 
produced. Through major public -private efforts, Argentina has been developing new technologies; 
encouraging the implementation of good a gricultural practices to increase our productivity without 
harming the environment and while ensuring social inclusion; and adopting regulatory systems that 
meet high quality and biosecurity standards. However, we are being increasingly affected by the 
consequences of  climate  change , even though we are responsible for less than 0.5% of global 
emissions. If our country (like most agro -exporting developing countries) were not exposed to 
extreme climatic events (such as droughts, floods and fires) and if it we re to receive international 
financing to adapt to these events, it would produce and export in much greater volumes than it is 
currently doing, thereby making an even more significant contribution to global food security by 
providing quality food for a wor ld with steadily increasing demand.   
 
Argentina is responding to the current major global crisis caused by the COVID -19 pandemic, climate 
change and the war in Ukraine without increasing trade -distorting domestic support, without 
increasing agricultural pr otectionism and without adversely affecting global food security. We hope 
that each Member will do their part to resolve these issues in line with their specific responsibilities.   
 
Lastly, it should be noted that all the issues of interest to the Members that sent questions 
are published  in our official journal and/or communicated on the website of the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries of the Argentine Republic. In addition, even though our exports 
have not stopped or decreased structurally,  for the purposes of transparency, we have been 
responding systematically to all of the questions put to us in the WTO Committee on Agriculture and 
will continue to do so.  G/AG/W/235  
 
- 118 - 
 
  Follow -up: Switzerland asked Argentina to give an update regarding when it intends t o submit the 
relevant notification. New Zealand and the US supported the follow -up question. The US asked all 
WTO Members to lift export restriction measures on agricultural products with immediate effect and 
notify such measures consistently with WTO rule s. Argentina reiterated the first point in its response 
that its exports of the products in question had not decreased nor stopped since the introduction of 
the measure.   
2.1.2   Canada's review of the TRQ system  
2.1.2.1   Question by Australia, United Kingdom (AG -IMS ID 101016 ) 
At CoA 100, in response to question AG -IMS ID 100059 , Canada informed the Membership that it 
would soon be releasing the findings from Phase two of its Review of the Allocation and 
Administration of Tariff Rate Quotas (TRQs) for  Dairy, Poultry and Egg Products. Can Canada provide 
an update of when it plans to finalise and release the conclusions of the review?   
Answer by Canada  
Canada appreciates Australia 's continued interest in the Comprehensive Review of the Allocation and 
Administration of Tariff Rate Quotas (TRQs) for Dairy, Poultry and Egg Products (the Review). 
All feedback received from stakeholders throughout the consultations has been considered and will 
help inform decisions on long -term TRQ policies.  While a number of events have impacted Canada 's 
ability to conclude this process, Canada is aiming to finalize the Review as soon as possible.  Updates 
on the process will be shared in due course.  
Follow -up: The United Kingdom reiterated its interest in the  results of the review and asked Canada, 
given considerable time has elapsed since the commencement of the review, to provide an indicative 
timeline for when it intends to conclude and publish the findings.  
2.1.3   Canada's Special Milk Class Scheme  
2.1.3.1   Question by Ne w Zealand (AG -IMS ID 101013 ) 
New Zealand has previously raised a question around milk classes, in particular milk class 4(a). 
To follow up from question AG -IMS ID 100064  - New Zealand would welcome further information on 
why there is a difference in price paid by processors for the milk class 4(a) protein, for when the 
product is exported onto the global market.  
Answer by Canada  
New Zealand should refer to Canada 's response in AG -IMS 100064 , with particular emphasis on the 
following part: "…there are no export performance requirements with any Canadian milk class. " 
2.1.4   Canada's dairy policies   
2.1.4.1   Question by New Zealand, United Kingdom (AG -IMS ID 101014 ) 
New Zealand has previously raised a question relating to compensation available for dairy producers 
under Canada's Dairy Direct Payment Program (DDPP), questio n AG-IMS ID 100107 . New Zealand 
continues to consider the compensation being offered to dairy farmers disproportionate to any 
market access concessions. How does Canada calculate the impacts of preferential trade agreements 
on Canada 's supply -managed sectors?  
Answer by Canada  
To date, the Government of Canada has  launched compensation programs for dairy, poultry and egg 
producers for the impacts of CETA and CPTPP.  The intent of Canada 's programs is to address the 
domestic impact of Canada 's market access concessions in Canada 's supply -managed sectors, 
ensuring tha t they remain competitive and resilient in the face of evolving markets.  The programs 
will be administered in a way that is consistent with Canada 's obligations under its trade agreements, 
including at the WTO.   G/AG/W/235  
 
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  Follow -up: Uruguay supported the question an d expressed interest in receiving a more detailed 
information regarding how Canada regulates its market access concessions for dairy products and 
other mentioned products.  
2.1.5   China's agricultural inputs subsidies  
2.1.5.1   Question by Canada (AG -IMS ID 101043 ) 
Canada notes that on 22 May 2022, the Ministry of Finance announced a Rmb 10 billion ( USD 
1.5 billion) subsidy to farms to subsidize the cost of agricultural inputs such as fertilizer, pesticides 
and fuel for farm machinery.  This subsidy to farmers follows an announcement in March of a Rmb 
20 billion ( USD 3 billion) to also subsidize the cost of agricultural inputs.  
a. Could China elaborate on which farmers or farming en tities are eligible for these subsidies 
and what are the eligibility criteria to receive a payment?  
b. Could China provide an update as to how much of the March Rmb 20 billion and May 
Rmb 10 billion has been disbursed to agricultural producers?  
Answer by Chin a 
a. These subsidies are available to all entities engaged in agricultural production.  
b. The expenditure data is not yet available.  
Follow -up: Canada sought China's clarification regarding whether the inputs subsidies were available 
to all agricultural producer s regardless of what they produced and asked China to indicate how these 
funds were disbursed to producers. The European Union, Paraguay and the United States supported 
the question. The US expressed its interest in learning more about China's agricultural  policies. 
The US noted that China's most recent DS:1 notification covered the period 6 years ago for 2016. 
The US stressed the importance of China's transparency in this Committee given its significant role 
in agricultural production, trade and subsidization. The US noted that in 2021, China had already 
informed Members that it would provide its overdue DS notifications in early 2022 and those had 
not yet arrived.  In addition, China provided written responses to only 2 out of the 11 questions 
raised by Member during the last two Committee meetings and those 2 responses simply stated that 
China would reply once it has the information.  The US encouraged China to provide overdue 
responses and notifications as soon as possible. Paraguay echoed Canada' s request for additional 
clarification on whether all producers would be eligible for the subsidies and echoed U.S. comment 
regarding China's outstanding DS notifications. Brazil supported previous speakers' interventions 
and asked China to provide a timet able regarding when it could present its overdue DS:1 
notifications. China noted that it would submit its DS:1 notifications soon and would respond to other 
queries at a later stage.  
2.1.6   Egypt's import requirement   
2.1.6.1   Question by European Union (AG -IMS ID 101003 ) 
The European Union would like to express its concerns concerning the mandatory usage of Letters 
of Credit as un ique method of payment for imports into Egypt.  
This requirement has increased the administrative burden and cost of exporting to Egypt, and has 
led to significant delays and import blockages, including for strategic and/or perishable agricultural 
products (seeds, apples).  
Taking into account Article X (1) of GATT 1994, as well as the Agreement on Trade facilitation 
Article  1: Publication and availability of information:  
a. Can Egypt explain the reasons behind this restriction of payments methods – economic as  
well as administrative?  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  b. Which measures has Egypt taken to ensure that this change will not delay the import of 
strategic and perishable food products?  
Answer by Egypt  
2.1.7   Italy's "local content" requirement   
2.1.7.1   Question by Brazil (AG -IMS ID 101017 ) 
Brazil would like to consult the EU and Italy in relation to the recently -approved "Norme per 
la valorizzazione e la promozione dei prodotti agricoli e alimentari a chilo metro zero e di quelli 
provenienti  da filiera corta".  
To the extent of Brazil's knowledge, one of the  provisions establishes that at least 30% of market 
areas must be reserved to products "da filiera corta e a chilometro zero".  
Brazil would appreciate if t he EU and Italy could confirm the existence of such "local content" rules 
and explain how the legislation complies with GATT Article III, which prevents discrimination against 
imported goods during internal sale or offering for sale.  
Answer by European Uni on 
The EU is gathering  necessary  information  and will reply to Brazil 's question as soon as possible.  
We will upload the reply in the AG -IMS when available.  
2.1.8   EU's deforestation and forest degradation strategy  
2.1.8.1   Question by Brazil, Paraguay (AG -IMS ID 101033 ) 
In its answer to question AG -IMS-ID 100071 , the EU has  informed Brazil that is was "gathering 
necessary  information and will reply to Brazil's question as  soon as possible. We will uploa d the reply 
in the  AG-IMS when available."  
 
Brazil would like to consult if the EU is already in a  position to provide the answer.  
 
Furthermore, could the EU explain the specific  criteria used to discriminate Members according 
to risk of producing commodit ies or products that are not  deforestation -free or not in accordance 
with the  legislation of the producer country.  
Answer by European Union  
The E uropean Union  apologies for the delay in replying to question AG -IMS ID 100071 . It has bee n 
uploaded recently.  
EU Reply to AG -IMS 101033  
Article 27  of the Commission proposal on deforestation  indeed introduces the country 
benchmarking system, which is a key feature of this Regulation. The objective of the benchmarking 
is to incentivise countries to ensure stronger forests protection and governance, to facilitate trade 
and to better calibrate e nforcement efforts by helping competent authorities to focus resources 
where they are most needed, and to reduce companies ' compliance costs.  
The country benchmarking system will assign a risk level to countries or parts of countries taking 
into account a  range of criteria . The assessment will be based on  rate of deforestation, rate of 
expansion of agriculture land for relevant commodities and, production trends of relevant 
commodities and products, together with further criteria reflecting countries ' engagement in the 
fight against deforestation: their nationally determined contributions (NDCs) to the UNFCCC, 
national laws and enforcement of those laws, and the existence of relevant agreements with the EU G/AG/W/235  
 
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  and their effective implementation. These criteria will result in three categories of country risk: low, 
standard and high risk.  All countries will be standard risk at the outset by default.  
The Commission will make the country risk categorisation publicly available and update the list 
regularly. Countries  will be informed of the intention to change classification and will be given the 
opportunity to comment. The Commission will also make publicly available the  information used 
for benchmarking , the reasons for the proposed changes of classification and the  replies from the 
countries concerned. The obligations for operators and member States authorities will depend on 
the level of risk of the country of production, with simplified due diligence duties for low risk and 
enhanced scrutiny for high risk.  
The lis t of the countries or parts thereof that present a low or high risk shall be published by means 
of implementing act(s) to be adopted at a later stage. That list shall be updated as necessary in light 
of new evidence.  
For more details about the proposals, p lease also see: Proposal for a regulation on deforestation -
free products (europa.eu)  
Follow -up: Indonesia voiced support to the que stion. Brazil and Paraguay were surprised that the 
EU forgot to respond to the question which was raised by Brazil and two co -sponsors three  months 
ago and received follow up comments from five Members.  
Paraguay sought the EU's clarification, regarding it s reply to the second part of the question, if the 
EU took into account the level of deforestation within the EU itself vis a vis the countries exporting 
to the EU. Paraguay recalled that on the one hand, Members had common but differentiated 
responsibilit ies, and on the other many Members, including Paraguay, had forests that have been 
preserved throughout the years in bigger proportion than those in the EU.  
Brazil delivered a detailed statement as follows:  
Brazil believes that such proposal establishes an  illegitimate obstacle to international trade, is 
strongly discriminatory in nature, and will have little, if any, impact on its alleged goal of reducing 
deforestation and forest degradation.  
1. The proposed regulation does not contribute to the fight against  deforestation  
Deforestation is a multivariable problem that should be dealt with through comprehensive public 
policies in the short, medium and long term. Illegal activities linked to deforestation must be halted. 
Alternative means of livelihood must be m ade available to the millions of people that live near 
forests. Sustainable production practices must be fostered and scaled -up. 
Trade restrictions, in that sense, have very serious limitations. They unfairly punish most of rural 
producers and do not provi de any other remedy against direct and indirect drivers of deforestation. 
By acting as an obstacle to economic development, trade restrictions actually reinforce some of the 
dynamics that led to deforestation and reduce governments' capacity to deal with t his issue.  
The proposed regulation is also heavily skewed towards punishment and disengagement by 
excluding from the EU market any producer suspected of having links to deforestation (or worse 
still, based on an area regarded as high risk, regardless of the specific sustainability credentials of 
each producer) with no flexibilities or margin for remedial or compensatory action such as 
reforestation. Once cut off, producers no longer have any incentives to improve their practices and 
will pro bably also lack the means for doing so.  
2. International trade contributes to the fight against deforestation  
Sustainable development only materializes through the simultaneous improvement of its three core 
dimensions: economic, social and environmental. It i s precisely because international trade helps 
improve conditions in all three that it can be such a powerful tool in that process. International trade 
has a proven beneficial effect by providing opportunities for medium and small companies, as well 
as for families, to access new markets and improve their income, escape poverty and improve their 
economic and social conditions. Frequently that is also what is necessary to enable those G/AG/W/235  
 
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  stakeholders to improve their environmental practices and to abandon enviro nmentally harmful 
production methods. These effects have been repeatedly acknowledged and demonstrated by 
several UN agencies, the WTO, and the EU itself, which is one of the leading providers of Aid for 
Trade.  
The European proposal, nevertheless, disregar ds such positive effects and instead proposes to 
restrict trade by imposing a potential ban on the trade of several commodities based on an 
unnecessarily strict concept of "deforestation -free products" which diverges from the 2030 Agenda 
for Sustainable De velopment and all relevant multilateral environmental agreements, including the 
UNFCCC and the CBD, which acknowledge the importance of notions such as sustainable use, 
ecosystem regeneration, reforestation, among others.  
The EU's proposed regulation is, t herefore, likely to have very little impact in terms of actually 
reducing deforestation. It lacks any provisions or pathways for rehabilitation and  offers no incentive 
for struggling producers to improve their practices. Instead, it promotes disengagement and 
punishes even those producers that may have been acting in accordance with domestic law and with 
international standards of sustainability. In Brazil`s view, a policy of trade promotion within a 
cooperative framework that engages producers and producin g countries to promote and incentivize 
change towards better and more sustainable production practices is the only effective means to 
reduce deforestation and forest degradation rates.  
3. The Benchmarking system is discriminatory and distorts trade  
The propos ed country benchmarking system, with its tier classification, will not contribute to fighting 
deforestation and forest degradation. On the contrary, it will only promote trade diversion. 
There  are several reasons to believe that a benchmarking system in ge neral, and more specifically, 
the benchmarking system proposed by the Commission, is an entirely inefficient tool when trying to 
halt deforestation and forest degradation.  
First, the benchmarking system is inherently discriminatory and will impose differen t treatment to 
producer countries, based on a unilateral decision, by the European Commission, in light of criteria 
as subjective as the suitability of a country`s environmental laws and enforcement capabilities 
(Art. 27.2(f)).  
Second, by mandating "enhanc ed scrutiny" over products originating from high-risk countries it 
stigmatizes entire countries and penalizes those producers that produce in a sustainable manner in 
those countries.  
Third, it creates a significant incentive for trade diversion as operator s interested in escaping the 
heavy administrative and financial burdens related to the due diligence system - and in avoiding the 
possibility of heavy penalties as well as the reputational risk associated with importing from a 
high-risk area - would tend t o simply abandon all exchanges with those countries/areas and merely 
switch to other sources.  
The benchmarking system, therefore, far from creating incentives for improving sustainability 
practices and credentials, will promote disengagement in precisely t hose areas that would most 
benefit from, and perhaps most require, cooperation and engagement. For this reason, it is very 
unlikely to have any positive effect, and may even have negative effects, on forest degradation and 
deforestation rates.  
4. The proposed regulation must be adapted to the production reality on the ground  
The proposed regulation has been designed in such a manner as to be disconnected from the actual 
production practices and the way the supply chains have been organized over th e past decades. For 
the Regulation to work, it is imperative that the due diligence system is adapted to the production 
characteristics and needs of each covered commodity.  
It imposes a "top -down", "one size fits all", very detailed and cumbersome due dili gence obligation 
on traders and operators within the EU Market, which includes a heavy informational and 
documentary burden as well as full geo -localization and traceability requirements throughout the 
supply chain. This system is then complemented by comp rehensive and strict provisions on G/AG/W/235  
 
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  monitoring and enforcement, and by heavy penalties in case of non -compliance, not to mention the 
possibility of transferring the costs of enforcement to traders and operators.  
Such a system completely disregards the very significant differences in the way the covered 
commodities are produced and their supply chains organized. It ignores, for instance, the fact that 
some of the commodities are largely produced by smallholders (like coffee), as well as the fact that 
supply c hain for several commodities (coffee and soya, for example) usually includes several links 
between producer and trader/operator. It also does not take into account the fact that those 
commodities are usually stored, along the supply chain, not according to  origin/producer, but to 
other criteria related to their physical characteristics, quality and chemical composition.  
All of this means that the system of geo -localization and traceability envisaged by the European 
Commission and supposed to apply to all s ix commodities is simply not feasible in the short or even 
medium term, as confirmed by several stakeholders, both Brazilian and European, across several of 
the affected commodities' supply chains.  
It also completely disregards all efforts made by producer s and traders/operators alike, during the 
past several years, to improve their own sustainability, due diligence and traceability practices and 
to adapt them to the necessities of their respective supply chains. Instead of taking into 
consideration the exp erience gained during that process, the Commission now simply aims to replace 
everything with a unified and overly rigid and demanding new system.  
As a result, the regulation, if approved, will likely result in significant disruptions of supply and even 
shortages as operators and traders will be unable to comply with the stringent requirements 
contained therein and forced to restructure entire supply chains. It will also likely result in significant 
price surges for European consumers and for European produ cers using the covered commodities as 
inputs, in a time where inflationary pressures are already intensifying and food security is under 
stress.  
5. The proposed regulation should foster cooperation and focus on the future  
It is disappointing that the Europea n Commission has decided to pursue an avenue of unilateral 
legislation and enforcement when it comes to an issue of such importance as reducing deforestation 
worldwide. There are several appropriate multilateral fora in which initiatives to reduce deforest ation 
could have been discussed with a more significant participation and engagement from producing 
countries. Brazil is convinced that the EU`s proposal would have benefited, during its inception, from 
a more open and participative process which actually took into account the realities, challenges and 
experiences of producing countries. At the very least, such a process would have contributed to a 
fairer, less commercially harmful legislation, with less of the aforementioned technical and 
conceptual proble ms.  
6. The proposed regulation should have objective criteria  
The criteria used to evaluate the risk of non -compliance with the regulation are not sufficiently clear 
and objective. It contains unclear parameters, including governance criteria, which are not always 
related to deforestation risk. Furthermore, they may be applied in a discretionary manner by the 
Commission, which is not required to justify country categorization or decisions regarding (non) 
compliance with the regulation. In addition, those crit eria are not internationally agreed and there 
is no harmonized methodology to assess and evaluate them. This lack of objective criteria, besides 
reinforcing the perception of a unilateral and arbitrary legislation, is an obstacle to the very 
participation of countries and producers in the evaluation process, which is not guided by 
international and consensual values and measures. Only legislation with shared and objective 
parameters would allow producer countries to participate in the conformation and imple mentation 
of the system and give them more predictability in their evaluations.  
7. The proposed regulation is not compatible with WTO rules  
The proposal poses evident challenges to the spirit and letter of the multilateral trading system. 
Several of its elem ents are potentially inconsistent with one or more provisions of the WTO 
Agreements. For instance, the proposed regulation and, more specifically, the benchmarking system 
appears to be inherently discriminatory and has the potential to severely limit and d istort trade. G/AG/W/235  
 
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  A significant number of other provisions contains elements of arbitrariness and discrimination, 
ranging from the scope of the measure to the monitoring and enforcement mechanisms set out in 
it. 
While the EU is free to pursue legitimate public  policies objectives, it must do so in a manner that is 
consistent with the EU's commitments under the multilateral trade rules.  
2.1.9   EU's agricultural policies funded by national resources  
2.1.9.1   Question by Brazil (AG -IMS ID 101031 ) 
France's Insurance policy.  According to information available online, on March  2022 the French 
Parliament approved the reform of the  harvest insurance system, with the mobilization of 
EUR 600 million. As per the information Brazil was able to raise, the  farmers will be fully liable to 
losses due to  weather -related events of up to 20% of their average  income over the last five years. 
Losses in the range of 20% and 50% will be covered by priv ate insurers,  who will be required to 
adhere to the new system. The  State will be liable for the losses exceeding 50% of  the average 
income in the indicated interval. In the light of the above, could the EU and France  explain if:  
a. Will this insurance be fun ded by CAP funds?  
b. Does the European Commission establish criteria for  national insurance policies?  
c. Should Brazil expect the expenditures under this  programme to be notified under the 
Green Box or the  Amber Box? ( Please  note that both in Supporting Table  DS:1 and in 
Supporting Table DS:9 there is an "insurance subsidies" item).  
Answer by European Union  
a. Yes, it will be.  
b. Regulation (EU) 2021/2115 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
2 December  2021 laying down rules on support for strategic plans to be drawn up by the 
member States under the common agricultural policy (CAP strategic plans) and financed 
by the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and by the European Agricultural 
Fund for R ural Development (EAFRD) and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1305/2013 and 
(EU) No 1307/2013, lays down the criteria for member States to subsidise, through the 
European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development, risk management schemes covering 
crop losses fr om 20%.  
c. Programme expenditure will be notified in accordance with WTO agreements and EU 
commitments.  
Follow -up: Brazil reiterated interest in finding out whether the programme would be notified under 
the Green or Amber Box. India and Paraguay echoed Brazil 's question. The EU confirmed that the 
programme would be notified as Amber Box support.   
2.1.10   India's public stockpiling   
2.1.10.1   Question by United States of America, Japan, Brazil, Canada, European Union, 
Uruguay, Australia, Thailand, Paraguay (AG -IMS ID 101028 ) 
The Members jointly submitting this question continue to express significant concern with India 's 
failure to provide any information regarding its domestic supp ort measures for rice or any indication 
of why the information has not been able to be provided for a number of years.  Therefore, AG -IMS 
ID 10000 6 is resubmitted:  
  
Again in AG -IMS 99005 , which was a follow -up question to AG -IMS 98099 which was asked by a 
number of WTO Members, India stated it would respond "in due course " with the requested 
information regarding state bonuses provided, in addition to the minimum support price provided 
for both wheat and rice.  The information has been requested repeatedly in this Committee.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  The United States and other Members have provided India with both official state government 
announcements and reports in the media.  Further, India has not explained the reason for the delay 
in providing this information or if this is the relevant support that India has referenced but not 
notified in its r ecent domestic support notifications as "other support for rice, that is, other than 
public stockholding for food security purposes, will be notified subsequently. " 
  
a. Is India in a position to provide the requested information in 
AG-IMS IDs 99005 , 98099 , 97010 , 97012 , 97060 , 95032 , 93271 , 93251 , 92009 ? 
b. If not, please update this Committee on what issues India is experiencing that has 
prevented it from providing this longstanding requested information in a timely manner.  
Answer by India  
The Government has sought information from the State Go vernments and will inform the COA as 
soon as it is available.  
2.1.10.2   Question by United States of America, Japan, Brazil, Canada, Uruguay, Australia, 
Thailand, Paraguay, European Union (AG -IMS ID 101038 ) 
The co -sponsors of this question take note that India has not provided a written response to AG -IMS 
ID 100005  and the oral response provided during the 100th Committee on Agriculture  failed to 
provide the requested information.  Therefore, AG -IMS ID 100005  is resubmitted:  
 
In response to AG -IMS ID 99103 , itself a follow up to AG -IMS ID 98103 , we continues to seek 
clarification from India.  
 
The United States and o ther WTO Members had requested India's annual quantitative levels of 
current, historical, and pre -determined levels of wheat and rice stocks since 2010, to which India 
replied that such information was already duly noted in its domestic support notificatio ns. 
 
In that same question, the United States and other WTO Members also inquired if India publishes 
summaries of consultative meetings between the government and the Food Corporation of India 
(FCI), which are held to assess the availability of wheat and r ice for procurement at Minimum 
Support Prices (MSP) in order to meet the food security requirements of citizens, to which India 
replied that such information could also be found in its domestic support notifications.  
 
Please recreate the requested informat ion here as it was not obvious where such information could 
be found in India's domestic support notifications.  
Answer by India  
The required information as required under the Agreement on Agriculture has been duly submitted 
in India's Domestic Support notifications to the WTO regularly.  
Follow -up: Paraguay asked if India could give an estimated time regarding when it could provide the 
requested information. The US noted that the two questions with AG -IMS ID s 101028 , 101038 , 
co-sponsored by nine Members, requested India to give responses to 13 previously unanswered 
questions. India had failed to provide information regarding state bonuses following each request 
for such information by Members and it had not given any explanation to date on why it  could still 
not share such information.  
The US further pointed out that, India had also failed to respond to its request for confirmation on 
India's state bonuses programmes documented by the US in previous questions posed to India and 
the counter notifi cation submitted by the US and other co -sponsors. The US reiterated its request 
for India to update Members on the level of stocks and the actual components of the PSH 
programmes so Members could better understand how India's programmes operate. The US not ed 
that India's earlier comment that Members at this Committee were targeting India may be due to 
the number of questions raised to India which was a result of India's non -responsiveness. 
The US invited India to elaborate its responses to take into account  Members' specific questions. 
The US underlined that transparency from the world's second largest agricultural producer and the G/AG/W/235  
 
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  major or largest exporter of various agricultural commodities is critical to the functioning of the 
Committee. The US remained o pen to find effective ways to engage in policy dialogues with India to 
exchange information. New Zealand supported the two questions raised on this subject and looked 
forward to engaging with India on this issue. Australia underlined its ongoing interest i n the issue 
and encouraged India to provide the specific information in accordance with these questions given 
rice and wheat are key global commodities which are of significant interests to other WTO Members. 
Canada and Uruguay expressed disappointment wit h India's lack of responses.  
Regarding AG -IMS ID 101038, Canada sought to understand where the requested information could 
be found in India's DS:1 notifications. Uruguay reiterated the request to seek information such as 
current and historical levels of stocks for wheat and rice. Ukraine considered that PSH related policies 
should be as transparent as possible, and Members should ensure that the policy measures adopted 
towards achieving national food security objectives do not undermine food security obje ctives of 
other Members. Ukraine noted that market price support is the most distortive agricultural policy; 
when procurements to build stocks are made through market price support, they could not be left 
unchecked. Ukraine reiterated that Member's policie s in this area should not be used to hamper 
results of the Uruguay Round on agricultural reform. Ukraine looked forward to examining India's 
response and receiving further relevant information when available. The EU, Japan, and Thailand 
also echoed previou s interventions for India to provide the requested information in line with the 
Committee's transparency requirements. India reiterated its commitment to providing the 
information as requested and noted that it's an enormous task to collect information fro m 28 state 
governments and such process may take a long time. Regarding U.S. comment on Members 
targeting India, India explained that it was referring to the question on wheat export ban where 
Members had accused India's measure as the main source of volat ility in wheat prices. India stressed 
that the spike in wheat prices was not caused by its measure which was consistent with WTO rules 
and temporary in nature. The main reason for imposing the ban, India explained that, was to ensure 
that wheat exported by  India was not held by large buyers. India stated that many large countries 
held an excess of COVID -19 vaccines which had to be destroyed and it wanted to avoid the same 
situation for wheat.   
2.1.11   India's oilseeds policies  
2.1.11.1   Question by United States of America, Paraguay, Canada, European Union 
(AG-IMS ID 101044 ) 
The co -sponsors of this question take note that India has not provided a written response to AG -IMS 
ID 100004  and the oral response provided during the 100th Committee on Agriculture  failed to 
provide the requested information.  Therefore, AG -IMS ID 100004  is resubmitted:  
 
The United States refers to AG -IMS ID 97009 , submitted in Ma rch 2021 on India 's oilseed policies, 
to which India responded that the scheme was yet to be implemented and the details sought were 
"not available at this stage. " The United States understands that the Union Cabinet of India approved 
a new National Missio n Edible Oils - Oil Palm on 18 August 2021 with a budget of Rs. 110.4 billion.  
 
The government 's press release ( https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1746942 ) 
states "Due to heavy dependence on imports for edible oils, it is important to make efforts for 
increasing domestic production of edible oils… " It is understood that India will provide a price 
assurance to oil palm farmers and will substantially increase t he assistance of inputs/interventions.  
 
a. Please provide additional details with regards to the recently announced price assurance 
scheme for oil palm farmers, including how this measure is implemented and eligibility 
requirements for farmers to receive said  price assurance, along with any limitations either 
at the farmer, state, or national level.  
b. Please provide additional details with regards to increases in assistance of 
inputs/interventions for oil palm.  
c. Please provide a link to the operational guidelines  and any laws or implementing measures 
for the price assurance scheme, the input/interventions scheme, and any other measures 
introduced in 2021 or 2022 aimed at the edible oils sector.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  Answer by India  
It is requested to refer to the link given below for t he required information about the 
measure:  https://nfsm.gov.in/Guidelines/NMEO -OPGUIEDELINES.pdf . 
Follow -up: The US noted that the objective of this committee is to have dial ogues on polices 
implemented by Members with respect to the Agreement on Agriculture and this objective is best 
achieved by Members sharing information. The US noted that India responded to the third part of 
question, but its response does not include the specific information requested by Members and 
instead India directed Members to read a 90 -page document to search for answers. Paraguay noted 
that the link is not working on their side and requested India to send the link again by email. The 
EU and Canada requested India to provide precise reply to questions rather than directing Members 
to read lengthy document.   
2.1.12   India's other support for rice   
2.1.12.1   Question by United States of America, Australia, Canada, Thailand, Paraguay, 
Japan, Brazil, European Union, Urugu ay (AG -IMS ID 101037 ) 
The co -sponsors of this question take note that India has not provided a written response to 
AG-IMS ID 100007 and stated in response to AG -IMS ID 100079 that India is in the "process of 
collecting information on 'other support ' and will notify in due course. " Therefore, AG -IMS ID 100007 
is resubmitted with an emphasis on any more detailed explanation of what difficulties India is 
encountering in collecting this information or providing any details at all with regards to what this 
"other support " might include and a timeline for what India considers "due course " given the amount 
of time that has already passed:   
 
We would like to repeat the request for information in AG -IMS ID 99006 : This is a follow -up on 
AG-IMS ID 98039 , which was submitted by multiple WTO Members.   
 
In its reply to this question, India has once again stated that it is "in the process of collecting 
information on 'other support' and it will be notified in due course. " Could India please provide an 
update on when this could be expected to be notified?   
 
We reiterate that this information is necessary to verify whether India has adhered to paragraph 5 
of the Bali Ministerial Decision, which requires that ther e be no increase of Amber Box support for 
programs other than public stockholding. We also reiterate our concern that given the lack of any 
indication of what type of other support may be involved, it is difficult to assess whether India is 
complying with the commitments outlined in the Bali Decision on Public Stockholding for Food 
Security.  
Answer by India  
After consulting the relevant Ministries/Departments, it was found that no support other than that 
for the PSH purposes has been provided for rice.  
Follow-up: The United States welcomed India's confirmation that no other support was provided to 
rice and asked if this confirmation included state -level support or concerned support just by the 
central government. Canada, Paraguay, Thailand, and Uruguay suppo rted this question. 
New Zealand noted its interest in India's PSH programmes and requested India to provide additional 
information on the programme. Australia, Canada, and Japan underlined the importance of 
transparency of Members' domestic support policie s, particularly in relation to a commodity such as 
rice which is a staple crop for many countries. As India is the world's largest exporter of rice, its 
support to rice has significant implications for the global market. India noted that a response to 
the US's. follow -up questions is included in its response to another question which would be provided 
later.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  2.1.13   India's export restrictions on wheat  
2.1.13.1   Question by Australia (AG -IMS ID 101019 ) 
On 13 May 2022, the government of India announced export restrictions on wheat, citing the sudden 
spike in global wheat prices and the resulting food security risks to India.  
a.  
i. Does India intend to notify the WTO of this export restriction?  
ii. Can India inform the Committee of how long it intends the restriction to remain in 
place?  
b. As a follow -up question, Australia notes that on 12 May 2022 the Indian Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry announced  it would be deploying trade delegations with the stated 
goal of increasing India 's wheat exports to 10  million tonnes in 2022 -23 (April -March). 
Given the announcement the following day to introduce wheat export restrictions, can 
India confirm if it is still seeking to achieve this goal?  
c. While deteriorating seasonal conditions may affect production levels, various institutions 
(including the USDA ) are forecasting that India is likely to produce almost 
100 million  tonnes of wheat in 2022 -23 (April -March). While this is below last year 's record 
crop of approximately 108  million tonnes, it is above the average annual volume of 
production achieved during the five years to 2020 of 96  million  tonnes (FAOSTAT). 
Can India explain why export restrictions are  necessary to meet food security targets in a 
year with forecast above -average production, when that has not been the case in previous 
years when production was lower?  
Answer by India  
The measure would be notified, in accordance with the Agreement on Agric ulture, in the relevant 
format, in due course.  The rationale for the measure and conditions of its implementation have been 
explained in the Notification dated 13 May 2022 issued by the Directorate General of Foreign 
Trade  (DGFT) and subsequent DGFT Trade Notices have clarified its implementation.  The measure 
was undertaken to manage the food security of the country.  
2.1.13.2   Question by Switzerland (AG -IMS ID 101057 ) 
Switzerland has noted that India is prohibiting exports of wheat. Can India give an update on when 
it intends to submit the corresponding notification? Moreover, could India provide information on the 
measures taken to ensure due consideration to the effe cts of such an export ban on importing 
Members' food security, in accordance with Article 12.1 (a)  of the Agreement on Agriculture?   
Answer by India  
The measure would be notified, in accordance with the  Agreement on Agriculture, in the relevant 
format, in due course. The rationale for the measure and conditions of its implementation have been 
explained in the Notification dated 13 May 2022 issued by the Directorate General of Foreign 
Trade  (DGFT) and subsequent DGFT Trade Notices have clarified its implemen tation.  
2.1.13.3   Question by United States of America, Canada, Japan, Brazil, Paraguay, 
European Union, United Kingdom, Ukraine (AG -IMS ID 101032 ) 
On 13 May 2022 India announced Notification No.06/2015 -2020 –an export ban for wheat, 
implemented via the Indian Ministry of Commerce and Industry Trade Notice No. 06/2022 -23 
(here). Global wheat prices spiked by 6 % on the first day of trading on the Chicago Board of Trade 
wheat futures following the Indian announcement.  Actions by governments, such as the imposition 
of export restrictions, can contri bute to price volatility or price rises.  These effects can worsen the 
situation already caused by the COVID -19 pandemic and Russia 's invasion of Ukraine.  
  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  Trade Notice No. 06/2022 -23 states that exports of wheat will be allowed "on the basis of permission  
granted by the Government of India to other countries to meet their food security needs and based 
on the request of their governments. " It also states that "export of wheat on Humanitarian ground, 
as Aid/Assistance/Government to Government shall be allowe d, on case to case basis, with the 
specific approval of competent authority. "  
 
Taking note that some of the largest importers of wheat from India, including in the first months of 
2022, include least developed countries and other low -income developing cou ntries, these additional 
requirements increase the administrative burden and inefficiencies in getting wheat to where it is 
most needed.  
 
a. What criteria will the government of India use to determine whether to grant this special 
permission?  For example, wha t criteria must a country meet for provision of wheat to be 
considered humanitarian aid?  Or what criteria must a country meet to demonstrate need 
of wheat to "meet their food security needs "? 
b. Please explain the length of time that the ban will be in place.  If the length of time is 
contingent on certain conditions, please explain those conditions, as well as the metrics 
used to measure when those conditions are satisfied.  
c. When will India notify this export restriction to the Committee on Agriculture through the 
required Table ER:1 notification?  
Answer by India  
As explained in the Notification referenced above, India 's measure was necessitated by the need to 
manage the food security concerns in the country. As the Notification amplifies, the Government of 
India is committed to support the needs of neighbouring  and vulnerable countries that are adversely 
affected by sudden changes in the global market for wheat and are unable to access adequate wheat 
supplies and  will accordingly consider requests made by other governments.  The measure would be 
notified, in accordance with the Agreement on Agriculture, in the relevant format, in due course.  
Follow -up: Paraguay did not consider India had responded to sub -questions a and b and noted that 
it would raise additional questions at the next Committee meeting.  
Australia, Canada, the E uropean Union, Japan, the U nited Kingdom , the U nited States condemned 
the Russ ian Federation's attack on Ukraine as being fundamentally in breach of international law 
and incompatible with the values and principles of the multilateral trading system of the WTO. Those 
Members considered the Russian  Federation's war against Ukraine as  primarily responsible for the 
current global food security situation. They expressed support to Ukraine and the Ukrainian people 
and called on the Russian Federation to immediately end the war. They noted that ending the war 
would be the fastest and best way to prevent a global food security crisis. Allowing Ukrainian farmers 
to plant, harvest and tend to their fields would help ensure food security not only for Ukrainians but 
also for those in need around the world, given Ukraine's role as one of the worl d's top exporters of 
wheat, maize, barley and sunflower oil and major suppliers to the World Food Programme. Those 
Members further emphasized the need for open, predictable and transparency markets and efforts 
by all Members to ensure a stable supply chain .  
Canada, the EU and the US supported the questions raised by Australia and Switzerland. The US 
stressed that export restrictions could have harmful effects on international markets and could lead 
to a domino effect of distortive policy decisions by gover nments. The US noted that India's imposition 
of export ban on wheat exacerbated the already concerning global food security crisis and had 
immediate effect on global wheat prices as was documented. For example, food security concern in 
Bangladesh had been exacerbated by India's export restrictions of Wheat. Bangladesh's traders were 
paying less than 400 USD per tonne for Indian wheat but after the ban importers were forced to 
turn to more expensive sources which had raised local prices in Bangladesh.  Furthe r, as Australia 
had pointed out, India's forecasted wheat production remained in excess of that during 
the 2016-2020 period. India's consumption was also forecasted to be less than production which 
combined with India's large stock would indicate India's p olicy decisions may have been taken out 
of abundant caution rather than those arising from immediate food security concern. The US 
encouraged India and all WTO Members imposing export bans or restrictions on agricultural G/AG/W/235  
 
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  productions to lift those bans with  immediate effect and commit not imposing such measures, 
particularly during the current global situation. The US reminded India that, should they deem such 
harmful measure necessary, the measures should be implemented in a transparent manner 
consistent wi th WTO rules; notifications of such measures should be made as soon as possible in 
advance of the imposition of such measures. Canada urged India to consider how its action could 
potentially affect the food security of other countries and to take actions t o alleviate any additional 
restrictive burden on those countries most in need of wheat. Canada noted that export restrictions 
by large wheat producers such as India had further unsettled international markets and urged India 
to submit an export restriction  notification as soon as possible. Canada encouraged all Members that 
were considering taking trade actions to ensure that such measures are targeted, predictable and 
proportional to the action needed. Japan called on Members not to impose export restricti ons 
measures in a manner inconsistent with WTO provisions.  
Ukraine noted that its decision to co -sponsor the question was due to its particular interest in the 
issue of food security. Ukraine condemned the Russian Federation's action, noting that it not o nly 
caused immense destruction and suffering in Ukraine, but also placed unprecedented pressure on 
the multilateral trading system, adversely affecting agricultural and food supply chains and 
exacerbating the negative effects of the COVID -19 pandemic. Ukra ine noted that, faced with 
unpreceded increase in prices, shortage in supplies and as a result of an unfolding food crisis 
exacerbated by Russian aggression against Ukraine, a number of countries were taking steps to 
improve their national food security, i nter alia, by seeking to minimise the imbalance on the internal 
market. However, such policy changes contributed to further uncertainty on the world food markets. 
In particular, actions by governments, such as the imposition of export restrictions, could c ontribute 
to price volatility or price rises. Ukraine underlined that smooth, undistorted and uninterrupted trade 
is essential in solving the current and long -term challenges of food security. Ukraine noted that, as 
a significant exporter of several agricu ltural products, it is doing its best to maintain stable supply 
to the international agricultural markets. Despite the horrors of the war unleashed by the 
Russian  Federation, Ukraine took steps to remain transparent and demonstrated its commitment to 
the fundamental rules of this Organization. Necessary measures introduced  to ensure national food 
security in these terrifying times for Ukrainian people and their lives  were regularly reviewed and, if 
possible, replaced by less restrictive alternatives, or abo lished altogether.  Ukraine encouraged other 
WTO Members to ensure that any emergency measures introduced to address food security concerns 
shall minimize trade distortions as far as possible, be temporary, targeted, transparent, and 
proportionate. Ukraine stressed the need to adhere to the WTO commitments, including those 
contained in the newly adopted Ministerial Declaration that underscores the need for agri -food trade 
to flow. To conclude, Ukraine re -emphasized its call to the international community to demand the 
withdrawal of Russia's troops from Ukraine and to end the blockade of the Ukrainian ports, to ensure 
that Ukrainian grains re -enter international markets and to prevent further humanitarian catastrophe 
and worsening of world hunger situation. In  the light that  around 500,000 tonnes of grain had been 
stolen by  the Russian Federation from the temporary occupied territories of Kherson and 
Zaporizhzhia regions, Ukraine called on all states to stay vigilant and refrain from buying grain from 
the Feder ation if there is no certainty about its origin.  
The Russian Federation noted that the statements delivered by several Members went beyond the 
scope of the Committee and served as an instrument to promote their political agenda.  The 
Russian  Federation exp ressed its commitment to the WTO principles of transparency and 
non-discrimination, and to respecting its obligations in the WTO and the rights of all other WTO 
Members.  
Thailand registered interest in the matter and voiced support to Switzerland's questi on on how to 
ensure that the measure would be taken with due consideration for its effect on importing Members' 
food security  and to ensure that the measure would not have an impact on the global food market. 
Thailand looked forward to India's notification  on this measure.   
In response to Members' interventions, particularly the U.S. comment that wheat prices increased 
beyond 400 USD per tonne after India's imposition of the export restriction, India underlined that it 
is not a significant wheat exporter an d hence its measure does not have a significant bearing on the 
world wheat market. The primary purpose of India's measure was to ensure its food security and of 
those countries that were affected by the volatility of the world market. India noted that, bef ore its 
action, wheat prices had already increased by 96% % in May 2022 from their lower value  in 
June 2021. Increase in wheat prices after India's measure was small and lasted only a week. India G/AG/W/235  
 
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  urged those Members who asked India to reconsider its measure, particularly those who are major 
wheat exporters, to provide information on how much wheat they had exported during the crisis.   
2.1.14   Indonesia's palm oil export restrictions  
2.1.14.1   Question by United States of America, Japan (AG -IMS ID 101058 ) 
The United States and Ja pan welcome the news that Indonesia has lifted its ban on crude palm oil, 
refined palm oil, and other related products, which was issued on 27 April 2022 in Decree No.  22 
of 2022 "Temporary Export Ban on Crude Palm Oil, Refined, Bleached and Deodorized Pal m Oil, 
Refined, Bleached and Deodorized Palm Olein, and Used Cooking Oil ". In 2021, the United States 
imported 1.4 billion metric tonnes  of palm oil from Indonesia and had substantial interest in the 
effects of this export ban.  When does Indonesia intend t o notify the measure to the Committee on 
Agriculture?  
Answer by Indonesia  
Indonesia would like to thank the United States and Japan for raising their concerns regarding this 
issue.  Indonesia is aware of the transparency obligation and strives to the best of its ability to comply 
with WTO regulations.  On this occasion, Indonesia would like to inform that in accordance with the 
Ministry of Trade Regulation Number 22 in 2022, our delegation would like to emphasize that the 
regulation was applied temporar ily due to the emergency situation of domestic food insecurity 
resulting from critical shortages of the commodity.  Indonesia wishes to emphasize that crude palm 
oil; refined, bleached, and deodorized palm oil; refined, bleached and deodorized palm olein; a nd 
used cooking oil are among the most essential products, as they are parts of the basic foodstuffs for 
most households in Indonesia. The regulation was taken as an urgent measure in unexpected 
circumstances, of which the implementation is in line with GA TT Article XI.2.  
a. The aforementioned regulation was issued on 27 April 2022 has been lifted as of 
23 May 2022 and is no longer applied.  
Follow -up: The U nited States  stressed the importance of transparency for export restriction 
measures.   
2.1.15   Malaysia's chicken export prohibition  
2.1.15.1   Question by Switzerland (AG -IMS ID 101059 ) 
Switzerland has noted that Malaysia is prohibiting exports of chicken. Can M alaysia give an update 
on when it intends to submit the corresponding notification? Moreover, could Malaysia provide 
information on the measures taken to ensure due consideration to the effects of such an export ban 
on importing Members' food security, in accordance with Article 12.1 (a)  of the Agreement on 
Agriculture?   
Answer by Malaysia  
Malaysia has submitted its notification of ER:1 to the Secretariat on 24 June 2022.  Prior to the 
implementation of the export restriction, Malaysia has consulted the majo r importing partner for 
chicken and undertaken bilateral consultations to inform on the measure to be undertaken. 
Subsequently, after due consideration, Malaysia agreed to have several categories of chicken to be 
exempted from the prohibition, namely villa ge chicken, black chicken, coloured birds, day old chicks 
parent stock and value -added products of chicken.  
Follow -up: The US supported the question and welcomed Malaysia's export restriction notification. 
The US encouraged Malaysia and all WTO Members imp osing export bans or restrictions on 
agricultural products to lift those measures with immediate effect and commit  not to impose  such 
measures particularly during the current situation as those measures would have devastating impact 
on the most vulnerable consumers around the world who could not cope with unexpected price 
increases.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  2.1.15.2   Question by United States of America, Japan (AG -IMS ID 101060 ) 
According to a statement by Prime Minister Ismail Sabri Yaakob, Malaysia imposed an export 
restriction on chickens beginning 23 May 2022. No end date for when the ban would be lifted was 
given, other than that it will last "until domestic prices and production stabilize. " 
 
a. Noting paragraph 1(a) of Article 12 of the Agreement on Agriculture, has Malaysia given 
due consideration to the effects of this export restriction on importing Members ' food 
security? If Malaysia has done so already, please provide any analysis of thes e 
considerations.  
b. Please identify which products and HS codes are affected under this restriction.  
c. Please confirm when these export restrictions will be permanently lifted.  
d. When will Malaysia notify this export restriction to the Committee on Agriculture t hrough 
the required Table ER:1 notification?  
Answer by Malaysia  
a. Prior to the implementation of the export restriction, Malaysia has consulted the major 
importing partner for chicken and undertaken bilateral consultations to inform on the 
measure to be undertaken. Subsequently, after due consideration, Malaysia agreed to 
have several categories of chicken to be exempted from the prohibition, namely village 
chicken, black chicken, coloured birds, day old chicks parent stock and value -added 
products of chi cken.  
b. The products covered are live day -old chick broilers and live broilers (except coloured birds 
and village chicken), whole chicken, chicken cuts and parts. The affected tariff lines are:  
▪ 0105.11.90 00;  
▪ 0105.94.91 00;  
▪ 0105.94.99 00;  
▪ 0207.11.00 00;  
▪ 0207.12.00 00;  
▪ 0207.13.00 00;  
▪ 0207.14.10 00;  
▪ 0207.14.20 00;  
▪ 0207.14.30 00;  
▪ 0207.14.91 00; and  
▪ 0207.14.99 00.  
c. The measure will be applied for six months, starting from the effective date of 1 June 2022 
to 30 November 2022.  
d. Malaysia has submit ted its notification of ER:1 to the Secretariat on 24 June 2022.  
2.1.16   Philippines - Sanitary and Phytosanitary Import Clearance (SPSIC) permits  
2.1.16.1   Question by United States of America (AG -IMS ID 101061 ) 
The United States takes note of the following response by the Philippines to AG -IMS ID 98131 : 
"Sanitary and Phytosanitary Import Clearance (SPSIC) applications, in particular for importation of 
whole chicken from the United States, were rejected because the decision on the application for 
accred itation status of the United States was deferred in 2019.  In effect, there should be no 
additional establishments and meat formats beyond those that were previously endorsed to the 
Philippines".  
The United States notes that all U.S. federally inspected pou ltry slaughter/packing establishments 
in the United States are eligible to export the full range of poultry and poultry products (including 
whole chickens) to the Philippines.   G/AG/W/235  
 
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  a. Why are U.S. whole chicken Sanitary and Phytosanitary Import Clearance SPSIC pe rmits 
rejected despite the Philippines accrediting the U.S. system to export poultry to the 
Philippines?  
According to Philippine Department of Agriculture (DA) data, the Philippines imported 
570,455  kilograms of whole chicken from the world in 2020.  Import  data for 2021 and the 
latest for 2022 are absent of whole chicken figures, according to DA 's website accessed 
through https://www.bai.gov.ph/index.php/importation -data.  
b. Please explain the absence of whole chicken import data for 2021 and 2022?  
Answer by Philippines  
a. With reference to the rejection of the SPSIC for the importation of whole chicken from the 
US, the Philippines would like to inform that said action was based on the deferment of 
the US application for accreditation in 2019. This resulted in non -accreditation of additional 
meat establishments and meat formats other than those previously endorsed to the 
Philippines. We would like to further inform the US that in line with SPSIC issuances, the 
country 's Department of Agriculture will update its regulations with a view to streamlining, 
harmonizing or strengthening, and adopting best practices in global trade.  
b. With regard to the absence of whole chicken import data f or 2021 and 2022, the Philippines 
is taking note of this query. Moreover, it is seeking to obtain data from other sources to 
verify the import data on whole chicken that was published by the country 's Bureau of 
Animal Industry (BAI) for 2021 and  2022.  
2.1.17   Türk iye's export restrictions on agricultural products  
2.1.17.1   Question by Switzerland (AG -IMS ID 101063 ) 
Switzerland has noted that Türkiye is restricting exports on a number of agricultural goods. Can 
Türkiye give an update on when it intends to submit the corresponding notifications? Moreover, 
could Türkiye provide information on the measures taken to ensure due consideration to the effects 
of such export restrictions on importing Members' food security, in accordance with Article 12.1 (a)  
of the Agreement on Agriculture?   
Answer by Türkiye  
Türkiye thanks Switzerland for the questions.  
As known, Türkiye is aware that food supply and security of supply are of great importance for 
international trade since Türkiye is an important exporter country for agricultural products. However, 
due to reasons such as the war in Ukraine, major floods in the Black Sea region of Türkiye, and the 
unfavorable conditions caused by the C OVID -19 pandemic in the production and supply chain, 
problems related to food safety have emerged in the country. On the other hand, due to the recent 
increases in food prices and volatility, there has been a tendency to export in the domestic market 
and a s a result, there have been concerns about the balance of the domestic market and the security 
of food supply.  
Türkiye, as other countries, has brought temporary restrictions on the export of some products, 
provided that they are temporary within the fram ework of the rights granted to countries with the 
GATT 1994 Agreement. Above all, we would like to emphasize that these temporary measures taken 
by Türkiye do not adversely affect global food security or the food security of our trading partners 
in any way . As in the past, Türkiye is one of the most important countries in the export of agricultural 
products, its contribution to world food security continues and will continue in this way in the future.   
Additional Information  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  When the Turkish Statistical Ins titute data is analysed, the products that exports are restricted are:  
• Red lentil exports amounted to 82,268,404 kg in the February -April 2021 period, 
and 122,981,564 kg in the same period of 2022, despite the restriction decision ; 
• Butter exports amounted to 243,611 kg in the February -April 2021 period, and 8,325,589 kg in 
the same period of 2022 despite the restriction decision ; 
• Orange exports amounted to 48,933,607 kg in the February -April 2021 period, 
and 130,260,970 kg in the same period of 2022, despite the restriction decision ; 
• Lemon exports amounted to 167,462,071 kg in the February -April 2021 period, 
and 215,509,218 kg in the same period of 2022 despite the restriction decision.  
Considering these data, it is realized that exports do not decreas e, on the contrary, there is a periodic  
increase in exports. It is clearly understood that the restriction made by Türkiye is not a strict one, 
does not restrain international trade, and does not pose a threat to global supply security. Türkiye 
aims to ens ure both the security of supply in the domestic market and the sustainability of the whole 
world food supply, especially its close neighbours through the measures it takes, and within this 
framework, it continues to work on agricultural production planning . 
2.1.17.2   Question by United States of America, Japan, United Kingdom 
(AG-IMS ID 101042 ) 
Japan and the United States understand that in January 2022 the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Forestry  (MinAF) was given the authority to restrict exports of 20 different agricultural commodities. 
It has been reported that MinAF began exercising this authority in February 2022 to suspend exports 
of lentils, beans, and olive oil.  In March, the list of products for which exports are suspended was 
extended to include all cooking oil (soy, sunflower, safflower, cottonseed, rape, mustard, and 
margarine), beef, sheep, and goat meat.  Further, we are concerned with  Türkiye 's lack of 
transpar ency as  Türkiye  has not publicly announced the export restrictions nor has it notified them 
to this Committee.  Türkiye 's lack of notification has caused confusion and disruption of trade in 
agricultural products during a period of increased global concern about food security.  
a. Please provide a copy of or link to both the authorities given to MinAF and the 
regulations/documentation of MinAF implementing these authorities for specific 
commodities.  We would remind  Türkiye  that, as a WTO Member, it agreed to the  provisions 
in paragraph 2(a) of Article XI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) that 
allow for quantitative restrictions under certain circumstances provided that they be 
temporary.  It also committed to the provisions of Article 12 of the Agreement on 
Agreement (AOA) that when  Türkiye  applies export prohibitions under paragraph 2(a) of 
Article  XI of GATT, it would give due consideration to the effects of such restrictions on 
importing Members ' food security and notify the Committee on Agric ulture before 
implementation of such measures.  We are concerned with  Türkiye 's lack of transparency 
because it has not publicly announced the export restrictions nor has it notified the WTO 
Committee on Agriculture.  Türkiye 's lack of notification has caused confusion and 
disruption of trade in agricultural products during a period of increased global concern 
about food security.  
b. Please provide a list of all agricultural commodities subject to quantitative export 
restrictions, including  confirmation of the above -mentioned commodities.  
c. Please provide the timeframe for the implementation of the export restrictions, including 
start dates and end dates.  
d. Please explain the reason  Türkiye  is applying restrictions on exports of certain agricult ural 
commodities.  
e. Noting paragraph 1(a) of Article 12 of the Agreement on Agriculture, has  Türkiye  given 
due consideration to the effects of its export restrictions on importing Members ' food 
security? If  Türkiye  has done so already, please provide any ana lysis of these 
considerations.  G/AG/W/235  
 
- 135 - 
 
  f. When will  Türkiye  notify its export restrictions to the Committee on Agriculture through 
the required Table  ER:1 notification?  
Answer by Türkiye  
Türkiye thanks to the U nited States of America , Japan, and the U nited Kingdom  for their questions.  
As known, Türkiye is aware that food supply and security of supply are of great importance for 
international trade since Türkiye is an important exporter country for agricultural products. However, 
due to reasons such as the war in Ukrai ne, major floods in the Black Sea region of Türkiye, and the 
unfavorable conditions caused by the COVID -19 pandemic in the production and supply chain, 
problems related to food safety have emerged in the country. On the other hand, due to the recent 
increa ses in food prices and volatility, there has been a tendency to export in the domestic market 
and as a result, there have been concerns about the balance of the domestic market and the security 
of food supply.  
Türkiye, as other countries, has brought temp orary restrictions on the export of some products, 
provided that they are temporary within the framework of the rights granted to countries with the 
GATT 1994 Agreement. Above all, we would like to emphasize that these temporary measures taken 
by Türkiye d o not adversely affect global food security or the food security of our trading partners 
in any way. As in the past, Türkiye is one of the most important countries in the export of agricultural 
products, its contribution to world food security continues an d will continue in this way in the future.   
Additional Information  
When the Turkish Statistical Institute data is analysed, the products that exports are restricted are:  
• Red lentil exports amounted to 82,268,404 kg in the February -April 2021 period, and  
122,981,564 kg in the same period of 2022, despite the restriction decision ; 
• Butter exports amounted to 243,611 kg in the February -April 2021 period, and 8,325,589  kg 
in the same period of 2022 despite the restriction decision ; 
• Orange exports amounted to 48,933,607 kg in the February -April 2021 period, and 
130,260,970 kg in the same period of 2022, despite the restriction decision ; 
• Lemon exports amounted to 167,462,071 kg in the February -April 2021 period, and 
215,509,218 kg in the same period of 2022 despite the restriction decision.  
Considering these data, it is realized that exports do not decrease, on the contrary, there is a 
periodic  increase in exports. It is clearly understood that the restriction made by Türkiye is not a 
strict one, does  not restrain international trade, and does not pose a threat to global supply security. 
Türkiye aims to ensure both the security of supply in the domestic market and the sustainability of 
the whole world food supply, especially its close neighbours throug h the measures it takes, and 
within this framework, it continues to work on agricultural production planning.  
Follow -up: The US shared the concern that Members neglect to notify export restrictions or not 
submit the notifications in a timely manner. The US  reiterated its questions AG -IMS ID s 98140 
and 100126 raised at previous committee where it enquired about Türkiye's various export 
restriction measures and asked Türkiye when those measures would be notified. Ukraine referred to 
its previous intervention that the imposition of export restrictions coul d contribute to price volatility 
or price rises and negatively affect international agricultural markets. Ukraine once again encouraged 
Members that introduced export restrictions to ensure that measures undertaken are consistent with 
the WTO rules and adh ere to recently adopted Ministerial Declaration on Emergency Response to 
Food Insecurity. The UK noted it had co -sponsored AG -IMS ID 101030  and stressed that having 
clarity on export restrictions is key to supporting global food trade especially in dealing with the 
ongoing global food supply issues. The UK strongly encouraged Türki ye to notify the export 
restrictions as early as possible. Türkiye noted that as a major exporter of agricultural products it 
fully understood the impact of export restriction measures on importing Members and it remained 
committed to supplying agricultura l goods to the international market.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  2.1.18   U.S. crop production support   
2.1.18.1   Question by European Union, Paraguay (AG -IMS ID 101004 ) 
Recently the U.S. Administration r equested to US Congress for an additional USD 500 million for 
US farmers to increase crop production. The proposal includes USD  100 million for a 
USD 10-per-acre payment to farmers who plant a soybean crop after a winter wheat crop in 2023. 
A further USD 4 00 million would fund a two -year increase in loan rates for U.S. producers.  
a. Can the US confirm that the 100 million payment for soybean and wheat will be notified 
as Amber Box support?  
b. Can the US indicate what will be the budget expenditure effect of the i ncrease loan rates 
in future year if the world market price decrease from their current very high to to the 
levels in previous years?  
Answer by United States of America  
On 28 April 2022, the U.S. Administration submitted a request to Congress for USD 33 billion in 
security, economic, and humanitarian aid for Ukraine. While these proposals noted by the European 
Union were a small part of that request, they were not included in the Ukraine assistance bill that 
was passed and signed into law (P.L. 117 -228) in May. 
Follow -up: Brazil recognized the gains of having two or three crops within the same crop year both 
in terms of productivity and sustainability and observed that the choices of the crop should be 
determined by market factors and scientific and technolo gical agricultural improvements and not 
mandated by the government.  Brazil noted that, as pointed out by the US, high world market prices 
should provide enough stimulus to U.S. producers. New Zealand voiced concern with the impact and 
distortion of such support on the world market and sought U.S. clarification regarding how the 
support would be notified. The US noted that this programme does not exist. It was proposed but 
not passed into law.  
2.1.19   U.S. Conservation Reserve Program   
2.1.19.1   Question by Brazil (AG -IMS ID 101035 ) 
According to information available online, the U.S.  Department of Agriculture (USDA) will allow 
farmers who are part of the federal conservati on land contracts to voluntarily terminate their 
contracts and plant on that land. Additionally, participants approved for this one -time, voluntary 
termination will  not have to repay rental payments. Brazil understands that expenditures under the 
CRP are n otified in U.S. Supporting Table DS:1 as environmental programmes. In the light of the 
above, could the US confirm the information above and clarify if it will include the  rental payments 
that are not compensating for environmental requirements in the sens e of AoA Annex 2 (paragraph 
12) in its aggregate measurement of support for the relevant year.  
Answer by United States of America  
On 26 May 2022, USDA announced that participants in the Conservation Reserve Program  (CRP) 
who are in the final year of their CRP contract may request voluntary termination of their contract 
following the end of the primary nesting season for grassland nesting birds. Participants approved 
for this one -time, voluntary termination will not have to repay rental payments. There is no  
requirement for an eligible participant to request voluntary termination of their CRP contract and no 
requirement to produce a specific crop, or any crop, on the expiring acres. USDA has also provided 
eligible participants with other conservation options,  such as re -enrolling sensitive acres in the CRP 
continuous signup and considering growing organic crops, given that CRP land typically does not 
have a recent history of pesticide or herbicide application. Given that this flexibility was just 
announced at the end of May, it is too early to determine the extent to which eligible participants 
will exercise this option.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  2.2  POINTS RAISED IN CONNECTION WITH INDIVIDUAL NOTIFICATIONS  
2.2.1   Administration of tariff and other quota commitments  (Table MA:1)  
2.2.1.1   European Union (G/ AG/N/EU/72)  
AG-IMS ID 101062: Question by United States of America - Country -specific allocation  
In the European Union 's Table MA:1 for 2022/2023, TRQ ID EU -Q022 for chicken carcasses, fresh, 
chilled, or frozen, lists the allocation of quotas to supplying countries as "Erga omnes ".  
Please confirm if the United Kingdom is an eligible supplying country in TRQ ID EU -Q022.  
Answer by European Union  
The EU confirms that TRQ ID EU -Q022 is allocated to supplying countries which include all third 
countries except the United Kingdom. The EU will take appropriate steps to correct this information 
in the most recent MA:1 notification (G/AG/N/EU/72 ).  
Follow -up: Brazil remained interested in the implications of the Brexit for both the EU and the UK at 
the WTO, including for issues related to bilateral market access. Brazil noted that despite the bilateral 
agreement between the EU and the UK, this issue remained on  the news and more legal certainty is 
important for WTO Members. Uruguay called upon the EU to specify in future notifications that the 
UK is not a potential beneficiary of the TRQs so this question could be avoided. The EU took note of 
Uruguay's suggestio n.  
2.2.2   Imports under tariff and other quota commitments (Table MA:2)  
2.2.2.1   Canada (G/AG/N/CAN/149, G/AG/N/CAN/150)  
AG-IMS ID 101020: Question by Australia - Tariff quota fill  
Australia thanks Canada for its submission of MA:2 notifications  G/AG/N/CAN/149  and 
G/AG/N/CAN/150 . Australia notes that Canada has once again r eported nil, or close to nil, fill rates 
for multiple dairy product tariff -rate quotas.  
Given that Canada has assured Members in the past that that its TRQs are WTO -compliant and free 
from measures which discourage import competition, can Canada provide an  explanation for the low 
fill rates of its dairy TRQs? Can Canada explain what it is doing to increase utilisation of underfilled 
tariff-rate quotas, as per the Bali Decision on TRQ Administration?  
Answer by Canada  
A variety of market circumstances can inf luence fill rates. Depending on the TRQ, this can include: 
low domestic demand, quality considerations, product availability and prices in export markets, 
market proximity, and transportation and insurance costs. Generally, commodities that are 
by-products , such as whey and buttermilk, have prices in Canada that are similar to those in world 
markets. It is also important to note that the existence of a TRQ cannot create market demand for 
goods where no demand exists.  Canada has put in place TRQ administrati on policies designed to 
maximize TRQ fill, such as "return and reallocation" policies and "under -utilization" penalties. Canada 
has also been undertaking its Comprehensive Review of the Allocation and Administration of Tariff 
Rate Quotas (TRQs) for Dairy, Poultry and Egg Products (the Review). The Review will consider all 
policy questions and considerations related to TRQ administration. All feedback received from 
stakeholders throughout the consultations has been considered and will help inform decisions o n 
long-term TRQ policies. While a number of events have impacted Canada 's ability to conclude this 
process, Canada is aiming to finalize the Review as soon as possible.  
AG-IMS ID 101036: Question by Brazil - Tariff quota fill  
Brazil has noticed a decrease in CANQ004 (Beef and Veal) fill rate from 55.9% ( G/AG/N/CAN/149 ) 
to 40.7% ( G/AG/N/CAN/150 ) between 2020 and 2021. Such decrease seems to indicate a trend of 
reduction of imports under CANQ004, which, in 2014/2015, registered a 90% fill rate G/AG/W/235  
 
- 138 - 
 
  (G/AG/N/CAN/112 ) Could Canada provide data or information on any circumstances that would 
explai n the relatively low volume of imports under the aforementioned TRQs?  
Answer by Canada  
Canada thanks Brazil for its question. Ultimately, it is a business decision by Canadian importers to 
decide how and whether to utilize this quota to import beef or veal from the countries from which 
commercial importation of meat products is allowed. We would note that while the overall utilization 
rate of the TRQ has decreased over the two years in question, the MFN pool has seen complete, or 
nearly complete, utiliz ation during this period. Variations in the import of beef and veal may be due, 
in part, to on -going supply -chain issues. In addition, a decrease in imports under the quota may be 
due to member countries of the CPTPP agreement being granted lower -duty acce ss, as well as other 
countries ' trade diversification efforts.  
Follow -up: In light of Canada's response which seemed to suggest that the corresponding 
information is available, Uruguay asked if Canada would consider notifying this information 
separately.  
2.2.2.2   China (G/AG/N/CHN/3)  
AG-IMS ID 101064: Question by United States of America - Tariff quota fill  
China – G/AG/N/CHN/3 , G/AG/N/CHN/5 , G/AG/N/CHN/7 , G/AG/N/CHN/9 , G/AG/N/CHN/11 , 
G/AG/N/CHN/14 , G/AG/N/CHN/16 , G/AG/N/CHN/19 , G/AG/N/CHN/22 , G/AG/N/CHN/25 , 
G/AG/N/CH N/26 , G/AG/N/CHN/30 , G/AG/N/CHN/39 , G/AG/N/CHN/41 , G/AG/N/CHN/50 , 
G/AG/N/CHN/55 , G/AG/N/CHN/56  
  
The United States thanks China for its Table MA:2 submissions for calendar year 2002 through 202 0 
(G/AG/N/CHN/3 ), (G/AG/N/CHN/5 ), (G/AG/N/CHN/7 ), (G/AG/N/CHN/9 ), (G/AG/N/CHN/11 ), 
(G/AG/N/CHN/14 ), (G/AG/N/CHN/16 ), (G/AG/N/CHN/19 ), (G/AG/N/CHN/22 ), (G/AG/N/CHN/25 ), 
(G/AG/N/CHN/26 ), (G/AG/N/CHN/30 ), (G/AG/N/CHN/39 ), (G/AG/N/CHN/41 ), (G/AG/N/CHN/50 ), 
(G/AG/N/CHN/55 ), (G/AG/N/CHN/56 ). 
In its Table MA:1 notification ( G/AG/N/CHN/2 ), China notified the administration of two separate, 
distinct TRQ obligations for rice - a TRQ for short - and medium -grain rice and a separate TRQ for 
long-grain rice.  However, the United States notes that in several of its Table MA:2 submissions, 
China has not provided separate fill rates for either of these two rice TR Qs. Instead, China has 
provided a single, aggregated fill rate for all rice for each calendar year, with the exceptions of 2006 
and 2019, when China correctly notified a fill rate for short - and medium -grain rice and a fill rate for 
long-grain rice ( G/AG/N/CHN/11 ) and ( G/AG/N/CHN/55 ).  
a. Please explain China's p lans to notify fill rates for short - and medium -grain rice and for 
long grain rice TRQs in its Table MA:2 notifications for each calendar year from 2002 
through 2005, from 2007 through 2018, and 2020.   
b. Please provide the quantity of in -quota imports under the TRQ for short and medium grain 
rice for each calendar year from 2002 through 2005, from 2007 through 2018, and 2020.   
c. Please provide the quantity of in -quota imports under the TRQ for long grain rice for each 
calendar year from 2002 through 2005, from 2007 through 2018, and 2020.   
d. Please confirm that China will notify the fill rate for each rice TRQ in its Table MA:2 
notifications for subsequent years.  G/AG/W/235  
 
- 139 - 
 
  Answer by China  
China has notified the quantities and fill rates of Rice, medium and short grain (CHNQ 003) and Rice, 
long grain (CHNQ004) respectively since 2021.  
2.2.2.3   El Salvador (G/AG/N/SLV/82)  
AG-IMS ID 101018: Question by Paraguay, Brazil - Tariff quota fill  
We wish to thank El Salvador for submitting notification G/AG/N/SLV/82 , yet note the low fill rate 
for quota SLVQ007 (only 40%). Could El Salvador please indicate the reasons for this low fill rate?  
 
We also note that, as in its previous notifications, El Salvador has failed to noti fy the fill rate for 
other quotas included in its schedule of commitments. Nor has El Salvador responded to the query 
in question AG -IMS ID 100075  regarding the reason for omitting this information from its 
notifications, and the question is therefore being asked once again.  
Answer by El Salvador  
The quota fill rate for cheddar che ese reflects the interests of domestic buyers of the product, 
i.e. it is a function of the market forces of supply and demand, bearing in mind also that El Salvador 
has a small market. It should be noted that the process of opening and allocating the quota  continues 
to be transparent, and has not changed with respect to previous years when the fill rates were 
higher. Recent fill rates are a reflection of the alternative forms of import regime for these products, 
including bilateral tariff preferences.  In accordance with its notification obligations and multilateral 
commitments, El  Salvador notifies the quota that is open, which is currently that for cheddar -type 
cheeses.  
Follow -up: Paraguay noted that the response is incomplete and reserved the right to rais e follow 
up questions.   
2.2.2.4   European Union (G/AG/N/EU/76)  
AG-IMS ID 101045: Question by Brazil - Tariff quota fill  
Considering that quota EU -Q028 (turkey) has an erga omnes  part and a country -specific part, could 
the EU provide import volumes (and fill rates) in a disaggregated manner?  
Answer by European Union  
The tariff quota EU -Q028 (frozen cuts of  turkey ) is split in EU legislation under three order numbers, 
namely: 09.4420 (country -allocation for Brazil), 09.4422 (allocation for all third countries 
except  the United Kingdom) and 09.0158 (allocation for all third countries except Brazil and 
United  Kingdom). Import volumes in a disaggregated manner for those or der numbers managed 
by import licences - 09.4420 and 09.4422 - are publicly available on the EU Commission 's 
Agri--food Data portal in form of a downloadable multilingual PDF file:  
https://agridata.ec.europa.eu/extensions/DataPortal/trade.html . 
Import volumes in a disaggregated manner for order number 09.0158 which is managed on a first -
come, first -served basis, are publicly available in the EU Commission QUOTA databa se: 
https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/dds2/taric/quota_consultation.jsp?Lang=en . 
Internal order numbers corresponding to the EU import tariff qu otas may be found in the 
latest  EU MA:1 notification ( G/AG/N/EU/72  and G/AG/N/EU/72/Corr.1 ). 
In 2021, for order number 09.4420 out of 4,227,000 kilograms available, 3,665,191 kilograms were 
imported. For order number 09.4422 out of 2,121,000 kilograms available 1,130,171 kilograms were 
imported. The quota having order number 09.0158 was not used at all.  
Follow -up: Uruguay considered that in the spirit of increasing transparency, submitting 
disaggregated information on import volume within each HS heading would be a good pr actice. It 
registered particular interest in reviewing the EU's reply concerning EUQ011.   G/AG/W/235  
 
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  AG-IMS ID 101085: Question by Paraguay, Brazil - Tariff quota fill  
We wish to thank the EU for submitting notification G/AG/N/EU/76 , yet note the low fill rate for the 
following quotas for products of interest, in view of our exportable supply: EUQ005, EUQ008, 
EUQ011, EUQ014, EUQ015, EUQ016, EUQ017, EUQ018, EUQ019, EUQ052, EUQ052, EUQ053, 
EUQ057, E UQ066, EUQ067, EUQ071, EUQ098 and EUQ109. Could the EU please indicate:   
a. The reasons for the low fill rate of those quotas?  
b. Whether the application of sanitary and phytosanitary measures and technical criteria has 
had any impact on them?  
c. For quotas adminis tered by licences (EUQ005, EUQ008 and EUQ071), please indicate 
whether consideration has been given to amending the administration method.  
Answer by European Union  
a. The reasons for the low utilization of these quotas?  
First and foremost, the EU would like to refer Paraguay to EU 's reply to a similar question 
in the last EU Trade Policy Review (WT/TPR/M/395/Add.1, page 391) as well as to replies 
provided to questions AGIMS 93061 and 93237. As explained before, any underfill of EU 
WTO TRQs is for economic rea sons only. After successive reforms of its agricultural policy, 
prices of EU agricultural products are aligned with global market prices, making them 
internationally competitive and hence reducing the attractiveness of certain tariff rate 
quotas. As a resu lt, a number of TRQs have become less interesting economically 
speaking. This is the case for TRQs EUQ011, EUQ14 to EUQ19, EUQ052, EUQ053, EUQ 
66, EUQ067, EUQ098 and EUQ109. Moreover, specifically for EUQ066, EUQ067 and 
EUQ071, in the recent years, import duties were set by the European Union at zero for all 
imports (for all origins, without quantity limitations) therefore there was no interest for 
operators to apply for these specific tariff rate quotas.  
Second, the EU has also concluded many bilateral tra de agreements, liberalising further 
its agricultural sector. Economic operators and consumers therefore have more choices, 
influencing the attractiveness of  certain EU WTO TRQs. This is the case for example for 
EUQ005, EUQ008 and EUQ057.  
b. If the application  of sanitary and phytosanitary measures and technical criteria have had 
any impact on them?  
There are certain general technical, health and food safety conditions which are necessary 
in order to be able to market products in the EU which concern domestic a nd imported 
products alike. The specific description of the products under TRQs results either from the 
EU's Uruguay Round commitments or subsequent renegotiations in line with WTO 
provisions. These are known to WTO Members in a transparent manner.  
As expl ained under point a. the reasons for the low utilisation of these tariff rate quotas 
are linked to market circumstances and are therefore not related to specific sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures and/or technical criteria.  
c. In the case of the quotas admin istered by licenses (EUQ005, EUQ008 and EUQ071), 
indicate if they have considered modifying the administration method?  
As shown in different fora within WTO, the EU is fully committed to the Bali Decision on 
tariff rate quotas and has been covered by its u nderfill mechanism provisions since 2013. 
Moreover, the EU legislation on TRQs management is fully in line with the provisions of 
this Decision. As long as there are no valid reasons, the EU does not intend to change the 
method of administration of these T RQs.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  Follow -up: Uruguay considered that in the spirit of increasing transparency, submitting 
disaggregated information on import volume within each HS heading would be a good practice. It 
registered particular interest in reviewing the EU's reply concerni ng EUQ011.  
2.2.2.5   Kazakhstan (G/AG/N/KAZ/13)  
AG-IMS ID 101065: Question by United States of America - Tariff quota fill  
The United States thanks Kazakhstan for its Table MA:2 submission for calendar year 2020 
(G/AG/N/KAZ/13 ). However, it i s concerned by Kazakhstan 's notified fill rate for beef (KAZQ001) of 
1.1%  and poultry (KAZQ003) of 46.9%.  
 
a. Please explain what factors led to the low fill rates of TRQs for beef and poultry.  
b. Kazakhstan allocates its TRQs based on historical share of import s and allocates a certain 
%age to new market entrants. Please explain if new market entrants that received 
allocations in 2020 filled their share of the quota.  
Answer by Kazakhstan  
The distribution of tariff quotas for the import of certain types of meat i n the territory of the Republic 
of Kazakhstan is carried out in accordance with the Order of the Minister of National Economy of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan dated 20 January 2015 No. 30 "On approval of the Rules for the distribution 
of tariff quotas between  participants in foreign trade activities for the import of certain types of meat 
into the Republic of Kazakhstan".  Additional administrative measures for the distribution of tariff 
quotas are not implemented in Kazakhstan.  In 2020, the import of beef meat  within the tariff quota 
amounted to 224 ton nes or the filling capacity was 1.1% of the approved tariff quota 
(21 thousand  tonnes), poultry meat – 105.2 thousand tonnes  or 82.2% of the approved tariff quota 
(128 thousand  tonnes ), 5.6 thousand tonnes  of other types of poultry meat included in the 
commodity group 0207, or 46.9% of the approved tariff quota (12 thousand tonnes ).The non -filling 
of tariff quotas for the import of beef and poultry is due to the prevailing market circu mstances in 
Kazakhstan, as well as restrictive measures related to the COVID -19 pandemic.  In 2019, the import 
of cattle meat within the tariff quota amounted to 0.9 thousand tonnes  and decreased in 2021 to 
0.4 thousand tonnes  (a reduction of 56%). At the s ame time, the production of cattle meat in 
Kazakhstan increased from 501.4 thousand tonnes  in 2019 to 540.2 thousand tonnes  in 2020 (or 
an increase of 7.2%). Thus, the share of domestic production in domestic consumption is about 
97%.  In addition, we note that imported meat is delivered in deep -frozen form, the shelf life of 
which cannot be determined, while domestic production is gradually switching to chilled products. 
In this way, preference is given to fresh meat, while imported frozen beef is used only  for further 
processing in the production of other products. Thus, consumer preference and an increase in 
production volume leads to a reduction in imports of beef meat.  Similarly, the situation with the 
filling of tariff quotas for the import of poultry m eat. The low level of imports of poultry meat within 
the tariff quota is explained by their sufficient production on the domestic market and consumer 
preferences.  Also, we note that a significant share in the import of beef and poultry meat is occupied 
by the Russian Federation and Ukraine, with which mutual trade is carried out duty -free and without 
the use of tariff quotas, which is one of the factors reducing imports of beef and poultry meat from 
third countries.  
2.2.2.6   Panama (G/AG/N/PAN/60)  
AG-IMS ID 101021: Question by Australia - Tariff quota fill  
Australia thanks Panama for submitting its 2021 calendar year MA:2 notification G/AG/N/PAN/60 . 
Australia notes that Panama has again reported nil, or close to nil, fill rates for ten TRQs across dairy 
and other agricultural products. We note  that multiple TRQs remain underfilled from the 2020 
notification ( G/AG/N/PAN/59 ). Can Panama explain the reasons for the underfill of its quotas? Could 
Panama explain what it is doing to increase utilisation of underfilled tariff quotas, as per the 
Bali Decision on TRQ Administrati on? 
Answer by Panama  
Follow -up: Uruguay registered interest in the questions.   G/AG/W/235  
 
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  AG-IMS ID 101005: Question by European Union - Tariff quota fill  
Can Panama explain the reasons behind the 0% fill rate of its "Milk and milk products " quotas 
(PANQ008, PANQ009, PANQ011), its "liquid Milk " and related "other " quota (PANQ004, PANQ005), 
and its "Processed cheese " quota (PANQ013) in Table MA:2 for the cale ndar year 2021?  
Answer by Panama  
Follow -up: Uruguay registered interest in the questions.   
2.2.2.7   Thailand (G/AG/N/THA/121)  
AG-IMS ID 101022: Question by Australia - Tariff quota fill  
Australia thanks Thailand for submitting its recent MA:2 notification G/AG/N/THA/121 . 
Australia  notes tha t Thailand has reported nil, or close to nil, fill rates across multiple TRQs and less 
than 65% fill rate across other TRQs. We note that multiple TRQs remain underfilled from Thailand 's 
previous notification ( G/AG/N/THA/115 ). Can Thailand explain the reasons for the underfill of it s 
quotas? Could Thailand explain what it is doing to increase utilisation of underfilled tariff quotas, as 
per the Bali Decision on TRQ Administration?  
Answer by Thailand  
Thailand thanks Australia for the question regarding the market access notification that recently 
submitted to the CoA. Thailand would like to inform that low utilization of various TRQs can be 
explained by the fact that Thailand is a globally important pr oducer and exporter of products such 
as rice, dried longan and sugar. The utilization rates of such products then remained low from the 
previous notification. While many TRQs, such as coffee beans, tobacco and maize, were underfilled 
as those products were  imported through preferential trade agreements, ie. ASEAN FTA, with 0% 
import tariff rates.   
AG-IMS ID 101046: Question by Brazil - Tariff quota fill  
Thailand reported on its latest MA:2 notifications, pertaining to calendar 2021, the following fill rates 
for tariff -rate quotas:  
THAQ008 (coffee) : 55.4%;  
THAQ011 (Maize for feedstuff) : 0%; 
THAQ016 (Soya bean oil and its fractions) : 0%; 
THAQ019 (Cane or beet sugar) : 3.4%.  
Brazil would appreciate if Thailand could provide the following information:  
a. Data o n market circumstances that would explain the low volume of imports under the 
aforementioned TRQs;  
b. Updates on policy developments that would explain the relatively low volume of imports 
under the aforementioned TRQs;  
c. volume of imports taking place outside the TRQ.  
Answer by Thailand  
Thailand thanks Brazil for its interest in Thailand's market access notification. Thailand would like to 
inform you as follow:   
• Coffee: Thailand imported a total of 60,066.23 tonnes for coffee in 2021 in which 92% were 
imported through ASEAN FTA with lower tariff than under the WTO. Other sources of 
importation were from Switzerland, USA, UK, Brazil, and Italy respectively. This consequences 
the fill rates for quotas of coffee below 65%.  
• Maize for food stuff: Thailand imported a total of 1.8 million tonnes for maize for foodstuff 
only from ASEAN countries through ASEAN FTA with the zero tariff without quota. This caused 
the zero fill rate for maize for foodstuff.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  • Soya bean oil:  The low fill rate of soya bean oil can be explained b y market condition. 
Thailand imported  soya beans (THAQ013) 3.9 million tonnes in 2021 mainly from Brazil, in 
which soya beans were typically crushed by soya bean oil facilities for oil extraction and protein 
meal. In this connection, a large importation of  soya beans implied a large production of 
soybean oil, which caused low rate of soya bean oil.  
• Cane or beet sugar: The low fill rate for cane or beet sugar thus can be explained by the 
market circumstances, notably low demand. Thailand is one of the world's largest sugar 
exporters. In 2021, its production was around 7.5 million tonnes while domestic demand was 
approximately 2.5 million tonnes.  
TQ ID  Products  Tariff  
quota  
quantity  
 
(Tonnes)  Total  
Import  
 
 
(Tonnes)  Sources of Import  FTAs/  
Tariff  
Rates  
THAQ008  Coffee  5.25 60,066.23  1. Viet Nam (66.83%)  
2. Lao People's Democratic 
Republic (13.82%)  
3. Indonesia (6.49%)  
4. Malaysia (4.07%)  
5. Switzerland (3.22%)  ASEAN/5%  
THAQ011  Maize for feedstuff  54,700  1,837,648.68  1. Myanmar (98.50%)  
2. Lao People's Democratic 
Republic (0.63%)  
3. Cambodia (0.33%)  ASEAN/0%  
THAQ013  Soya beans  10,922  3,925,821.27  1. Brazil (73.69%)  
2. USA (24.57%)  
3. Canada (1.43%)  
4. Cambodia (0.20%)  
5. France (0.08%)    
THAQ016  Soya bean oil and 
its fractions  2,281  31.78  1. Germany (59.89%)  
2. The Netherlands 
(40.09%)  
3. USA (0.01%)  
4. Malaysia (0.01%)    
THAQ019  Cane or beet sugar  13,760  85,710.80  1. India (67.35%)  
2. Pakistan (21.81%)  
3. United Arab Emirates  
(3.30%)  
4.Korea, Republic of 
(2.50%)  
5. Guatemala (1.39%)    
2.2.2.8   United States of America (G/AG/N/USA/162)  
AG-IMS ID 101047: Question by Brazil - Transparency issues  
Considering that quota USAQ001 (beef) has an "others" part and four country -specific parts, could 
the US provide import volumes (and f ill rates) in a disaggregated manner?  
Answer by United States of America  
Quota USAQ001 included the following country specific quota fill rates for calendar year 2021:  
− Argentina: 18,973  MT out of 20,000  MT quota limit ; 
− Australia: 135,023  MT out of 378,214  MT quota limit ; 
− New Zealand: 161,974  MT out of 213,402  MT quota limit ; 
− Uruguay: 19,499  MT out of 20,000MT quota limit ; 
− "Other Countries ": 64,381  MT out of 65,005  MT quota limit . 
Additionally, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) maintains a website that is updated weekly 
with quota status fill here:  
https://www.cbp.gov/trade/quota/tariff -rate-quotas?language_content_entity=en   G/AG/W/235  
 
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  Follow -up: Uruguay registered interest in the questions and reiterated its view that submitting 
disaggregated information on import volume within each HS heading would be a good practice for 
future notifications.   
AG-IMS ID 101026: Question by Australia - Tariff quota fill  
Australia thanks the United States for submitting its recent MA:2 notification G/AG/N/USA/162 . 
Australia notes that the United States has reported nil, or close to nil, fill rates across multiple TRQs 
(USAQ009, USAQ023, USAQ036, USAQ046, USAQ049, USAQ050, USAQ051,  USAQ052 and 
USAQ054) and less than 65% fill rate across other TRQs (USAQ001, USAQ002, USAQ006, USAQ013, 
USAQ018, USAQ019, USAQ021, USAQ022, USAQ024, USAQ026, USAQ035, USAQ041, USAQ047 
and USAQ053). We note that multiple TRQs remain underfilled from the Un ited States ' previous 
notifications ( G/AG/N/USA/153 ). Can the United States explain the reasons for the underfill 
[below  65%] of its quotas? Could the United States explain what it is doing to increase utilisation of 
underfilled tariff quotas, as per the Bali Decision on TRQ Adminis tration?  
Answer by United States of America  
The fill rates of U.S. TRQs in any particular year are affected by a variety of market factors, including 
price trends, exchange rates, supply and demand. No changes are currently envisioned as the 
underfill is a  result of market factors.  
Follow -up: Uruguay registered interest in the questions and reiterated its view that submitting 
disaggregated information on import volume within each HS heading would be a good practice for 
future notifications.  
AG-IMS ID 101048: Question by Brazil - Tariff quota fill  
According to G/AG/N/USA/162 , none of the US TRQs for cotton (049, 050, 051, 052) has a fill rate 
above 0.5%.  
In the light of the above, could the US provide the following information:  
a. Data on market circumstances that would explain the low volume of imports under the 
aforementioned TRQs;  
b. Updates on any policy developments, including domestic support policies, that could help 
to explain the relatively low volume of imports under the aforementioned TRQs.  
Answer by United States of America  
The fill rates of U.S. TRQs in any particular year are affected by a variety of market factors, including 
price trends, exchange rates, supply and demand. U.S. TRQ fill rates for cotton in calendar year 
2021 are in line with historical trends and a ffected primarily by lack of demand. No changes to policy 
are currently envisioned as the underfill is a result of market factors.  
Follow -up: Uruguay registered interest in the questions and reiterated its view that submitting 
disaggregated information on import volume within each HS heading would be a good practice for 
future notifications.  
AG-IMS ID 101079: Question by New Zealand - Tariff quota fill  
New Zealand notes that the fill rates for dairy and dairy related products vary between 0.6% and 
80%. Does  the United States have any plans to change tariff quota administration with the aim of 
increasing the low fill rates for dairy products in the future?  
Answer by United States of America  
The fill rates of U.S. TRQs in any particular year are affected by a variety of market factors, including 
price trends, exchange rates, supply and demand. No changes are currently envisioned as the 
underfill is a result of market factors.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  Follow -up: Uruguay registered interest in the questions and reiterated its view that s ubmitting 
disaggregated information on import volume within each HS heading would be a good practice for 
future notifications.  
2.2.3   Domestic Support Commitments  (Table DS:1 ) 
2.2.3.1   Canada (G/AG/N/CAN/151)  
AG-IMS ID 101077: Question by United Kingdom - Transparency iss ues (including 
Table  DS:2)  
The United Kingdom thanks Canada for their latest DS:1 notification G/AG/N/CAN/151  for 
Calendar  Year 2018. The United Kingdom notes that  whilst keeping within its total AMS commitment 
level, Canada's product -specific domestic support for Milk has increased on previous years. Can 
Canada please describe what steps it is taking to ensure this support avoids distortions to trade?  
Answer by Canada  
As noted by the United Kingdom, Canada 's Current Total AMS is well within its annual domestic 
support commi tment.  
Canada notes that according to the Note by the Secretariat, Members ' Participation in the Normal 
Growth of World Trade in Agricultural Products – Article 18.5  of the Agreement on Agriculture 
(G/AG/W/32/Rev.20) circulated on 24  February  2022, that Ca nada's share of global trade in butter 
and butter oil  in 2020 was 0.4%.  This support is not distorting trade.   
Follow -up: The U nited Kingdom  reiterated the concern over potential support to distort trade in 
Canada's dairy sector particularly given low fill  rates of Canada's dairy TRQs as highlighted in 
question AG -IMS ID 101020 . The UK encouraged Canada to share any analysis on how this could be 
avoided. New Zealand supported the question by the UK. Uruguay noted that to have a fair view of 
trade distortion one should also consider the domestic market of those products. Canada reiterated 
that its support to butter and butter oil is not trade distorti ng given its share of global trade in these 
products in 2020 was only 0.4%. Regarding fill rates, Canada directed Members to previous 
responses on the market factors affecting fill rates of dairy TRQs.   
AG-IMS ID 101002: Question by Thailand - Non-product -specific AMS  
According to the notification from Canada ( G/AG/N/CAN/151 ), the Supporting Table DS:9 Non -
Product Specific AMS, Thailand would like to request Canada to provide more details on two 
programmes, the Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency (ACOA) and the Agri -Opportunities Pr ogram, 
as well as the differences between the two programs.  
Answer by Canada  
The Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency (ACOA) is a federal -funded regional economic 
development agency that creates and promotes opportunities for economic growth in the Atlantic 
region by helping businesses become more competitive, innovative and productive.  It works with 
communities to develop their economies, helping them create jobs and a better quality of life for all 
Atlantic Canadians, including women, Indigenous pe oples, racialized Canadians, persons with 
disabilities and the LGBTQ2+ community.  It champions the strengths of Atlantic Canada.  
Additional details on ACOA can be found here:  
https://www.canada.ca/en/atlantic -canada -opportunities.html   
The Agri -Opportunities Program is designed to encourage the development of value -added 
opportunities for the agriculture and agri -product sectors and to enhance the economic situation of 
agricultural producers.   
Agri-Opportunities shares part of business commercialization risk by providing access to risk capital. 
The amount captured in Supporting Table DS:9 reflects the portion of government -backed financing 
that is deemed as non -repayable,  the interest on loans that the government covers (i.e., based on G/AG/W/235  
 
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  an average commercial interest rate), and any default loan amounts for the fiscal year 2018 -19. 
These data are intended to represent the expenditure or cost to government under this program.  
AG-IMS ID 101039: Question by Türkiye - Non-product -specific AMS  
Türkiye thanks Canada for submitting its domestic support notification.  Supporting Table DS:9: 
Canada has been notifying "Advance Payment Program " for STDS:9 table. Türkiye  notes that the 
amount of support for this measure type has increased compared to previous years.  
a. What are the eligibility criteria for this payment?  
b. Can Canada explain the reason behind this increase?  
Answer by Canada  
In 2018 Advance Payment Program (APP)  interest paymen ts were greater than previous years due 
to Stay of Defaults which were granted for 2018 Grains and Oilseeds and Cattle and Bison Advances. 
The Stay of Defaults were granted following two major market impacts:  
a. 2019 Grains and Oilseeds Trade Events: Followin g the 2019 embargo with China and its 
impact on Canadian producer 's ability to repay their 2018 APP advances, all existing 
programme participants with grains and oilseeds advances were granted a six month s 
programme payment extension until 31 March 2020 in  order to seek other market 
opportunities to sell their products.  
b. 2020 COVID Pandemic: Repayments of 2018 cattle and bison advances were due  
31 March  2020. Following the World Health Organization 's announcement in March 2020 
of a global pandemic, all produ cers with existing cattle and bison advances were granted 
a six month Stay of Default for the 2018 programme year until 30 September  2020.  The 
previously issued six month Stay of Default granted to grains and oilseed producers was 
also extended an addition al six months until 30 September 2020.  As per standard APP 
programme terms and conditions, the Government of Canada pays the interest on the first 
CAD 100,000 of each producer 's cash advance until it is repaid.  As a result of the Stays of 
Default,  the 2018 programme year payments were higher than previous years because 
the Government of Canada continued to pay interest on the interest -free portion for a 
longer period of time.  All of these costs are allocated to the 2018 programme year as this 
was th e year in which these loans were issued.  
2.2.3.2   Côte d'Ivoire (G/AG/N/CIV/34)  
AG-IMS ID 101066: Question by United States of America - Transparency issues (including 
Table DS:2)  
The United States takes note that Côte d 'Ivoire submitted its domestic notification f or calendar 
year 2021. While timely notifications are essential to this Committee, so too are complete and 
accurate notifications. Côte d 'Ivoire has still not responded to any questions in this committee, 
including AG -IMS ID 99064 , 98113 , and 98114 , posed by several Members on its domestic support 
notifications particularly with regard to its notification of providing no domestic support.  Further, it 
is concerning that Côte d 'Ivoire has once again notified no domestic support in its Ta ble DS:1 
notifications.  The United States encourages Côte d 'Ivoire to respond to these questions regarding 
its notifications.  
a. Please confirm whether Côte d 'Ivoire took these concerns expressed by Members into 
account as it has continued to submit blank Table DS:1 notifications.  
b. Does Côte d 'Ivoire consider the measures identified in the aforementioned questions not 
to be domestic support?  If so, please elaborate.  
Answer by Côte d'Ivoire  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  2.2.3.3   India (G/AG/N/IND/27)  
AG-IMS ID 101007: Question by European Union - Transparency issues (including  
Table  DS:2)  
Supporting Table DS:4  
India has not included VoP in this table for the products in question. In previous meetings several 
Members have encouraged India to do so. Most other Members do so, as it si gnificantly increases 
transparency, and greatly reduces the workload for those who have to analyse the Indian 
notifications, including developing countries with less resources than the E uropean Union .  
a. Can India explain why it seemingly refuses to include data on VoP in Supporting 
Table  DS:4 despite its own earlier indication that this would be done?  
b. Can India indicate VoP for:  
• Coarse cereal,  
• Cotton  
• Groundnut  
• Pulses  
• Soyabean yellow  
• Sunflower and  
• Wheat  
Answer by India  
As per the Handbook on Notifications Requirements it is not mandatory to include a specific column 
for the Value of Production in the Notification.  
 
The provisional value of production data for the agricultural products referred in the question 
for 2020-21 is as follows:  
Product  VoP ( USD Million)  
Coarse Cereal  11,764.69  
Cotton  11,276.16  
Groundnut  7,407.57  
Pulses  19,955.83  
Soyabean Yellow  6,821.30  
Sunflower  123.64  
Wheat  28,597.22  
AG-IMS ID 101010: Question by European Union - Transparency issues (including  
Table  DS:2)  
Bali Annex  
The E uropean Union  does not consider that the Annex as presented by India fulfils the requirement 
as set in the Bali Ministerial Decision. In particular, the annex does not include data on all the 
programmes for which India has a PSH programme - Wheat, Coarse Grain and Pulses. Point 3c of 
the Bali Ministerial clearly states:  
"have provided and continue to provide on an annual basis, …, for each public stockholding 
programme that it maintains for food security purposes; and … "  
Can India please forward an Annex for the four crops not included in it, i.e. wheat, coarse grain and 
pulses.  
Answer by India  
India met the requirements of the Annex to the Bali Ministerial Decision and accordingly notified its 
data for the PSH programme for rice. For, product -specific support for other products covered under 
India's food security programmes, support was less than the prescribed de minimis  limit, and 
information regarding the same has been given under the Supporting Tables 4 -5 of India's D omestic 
Support notification in document G/AG/N/IND/27 . G/AG/W/235  
 
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  Follow -up: Paraguay disagreed with India's interpretation of its commitments under the Bali PSH 
Decision and underlined that all PSH programmes must be notified in the annex, not only those for 
which India had exceeded the de m inimis limit. India voiced disagreement with Paraguay's 
statement.  
AG-IMS ID 101011: Question by European Union - Transparency issues (including  
Table  DS:2)  
Bali Annex Trade data   
Can India please indicate the trade data for its trade in rice. The Bali ind ex is not written in a way, 
where it is only covering trade of PSH stocks. The EU is looking forward to India indicating realised 
trade for rice in 2020 and 2021.  
Answer by India  
Trade data for rice in 2020 and 2021 can be accessed from the following webl ink: 
https://tradestat.commerce.gov.in/eidb/default.asp . 
Follow -up: The US supported questions AG -IMS ID s 101029 , 101011 , 101012 . The US reiterated 
concern regarding the completeness and accuracy of the information contained in the statistical 
appendix notified by India. The US pointed out that India only reported export and import data 
pertaining to those from the PSH. India had unilaterally determined to provide a subset of import 
and export data. India had introduced a footnote stating that the notified data only pertained to that 
from PSH. The US asked India to provide a link to trade  data noting that such information is required 
in the statistical appendix. The US took note of the question regarding discrepancy of as large as 
14 million tonnes in the data reported in the appendix and noted that a country that had produ red 
14 million t onnes would be a top ten global rice producer. Considering India as the world's second 
largest rice producer and largest rice exporter, the US encouraged it to be fully transparent and 
provide all required data in a complete and accurate manner.   
AG-IMS ID  101029: Question by European Union - Transparency issues (including  
Table  DS:2)  
Bali Annex point d)  
a. Can India please list all the legal Acts which have been used in preparing this notification 
with reference where these acts can be found.  
b. Can India indica te the amounts related to each and every of these Acts.  
Answer by India  
The required information has been duly provided in the Annex to India 's DS:1 notification.  
Follow -up: The U nited States supported questions AG -IMS ID s 101029 , 101011 , 101012 . The US 
reiterated concern regarding the completeness and accuracy of the information contained in the 
statistical appendix notified by India. The US pointed out that India only reported export and import 
data pertaining to those from the PSH. India had unilaterally determined to provide  a subset of 
import and export data. India had introduced a footnote stating that the notified data only pertained 
to that from PSH. The US asked India to provide a link to trade  data noting that such information is 
required in the statistical appendix. The US took note of the question regarding discrepancy as large 
as 14  million tonnes in the data reported in the appendix and noted that a country that had procured 
14 million tonn es would be a top ten global rice producer. Considering India as the world's second 
largest rice producer and largest rice exporter, the US encouraged it to be fully transparent and 
provide all required data in a complete and accurate manner.   G/AG/W/235  
 
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  AG-IMS ID 10 1012: Question by European Union, Paraguay - Transparency issues 
(including Table DS:2)  
Bali Annex – Balance Sheet  
As in previous years the statistical annex show again there is a huge difference in the quantities 
going in and out.   
Mio. T   
2016 -17 2017 -18 2018 -19 2019 -20 2020 -21 
Opening stocks  A 28,81  29,78  30,04  29,39  32.23  
Annual 
purchase  B 38,11  38,13  44,33  52 60.08  
Total availability  c=a+b  66,92  67,91  74,37  81,39  92.31  
Annual releases  D 33,52  34,2 34,4 33,36  53.81  
Open market 
sales  E 0,19 0,46 0,85 1,61 2.46 
Total release  F=e+d  33,71  34,66  35,25  34,97  56.27  
Total 
Availabilities - Tot
al release  G=c-f 33,21  33,25  39,12  46,42  36.04  
End stocks 
IND/25  H 29,78  30,04  29,39  32,23  29.12  
Discrepancies  I=g-h 3,43 3,21 9,73 14,19  6.92 
a. Can India explain this discrepancy of nearly seven million tonnes that represent a loss of 
USD 2.6 billion?  
b. In its reply to question AG -IMS ID 98056  India indicated that some of the quantities in 
end stocks was not husked rice. Can India indicate which quantity in the end stocks that 
husked, semi -milled or milled rice for the years 2019 -20 and 2020 -21. 
Answer by India  
The Government of India announces  minimum support price for paddy rather than rice. For 
comparison with the external reference price, the minimum support price of paddy is converted into 
that of rice by using an average conversion ratio, which is also provided in our DS:1 domestic support  
notifications.  The stocks mentioned in the table above, are of rice rather than of paddy. Some stocks 
are in the form of un -milled paddy. The difference in figures is because of damage due to various 
factors, including moisture and transportation.  
Follow -up: Paraguay expressed concern that some of the elements where discrepancies have been 
noted such as the opening stocks and open market sales are elements which had been suggested to 
be removed from the transparency exercise in recent proposals sponsored b y India. Paraguay 
reserved the right to raise additional questions. The US supported questions AG -IMS ID s 101029 , 
101011 , 101012 . The US reiterated concern regarding the completeness and accuracy of the 
information contained in the  statistical appendix notified by India. The US pointed out that India only 
reported export and import data pertaining to those from the PSH. India had unilaterally determined 
to provide a subset of import and export data India had introduced a footnote st ating that the notified 
data only pertained to that from PSH. The US asked India to provide a link to trade data noting that 
such information is required in the statistical appendix. The US took note of the question regarding 
discrepancy as large as 14 mil lion tonnes in the data reported in the appendix and noted that a 
country that had produced 14 million tonnes would be a top ten global rice producer. Considering 
India as the world's second largest rice producer and largest rice exporter, the US encourage d it to 
be fully transparent and provide all required data in a complete and accurate manner.   
AG-IMS ID 101087: Question by Paraguay, United States of America - Transparency issues 
(including Table DS:2)  
We thank India for submitting notification G/AG/N/IND/27 . We note that the inf ormation on the 
current total AMS, public stockholding for food security purposes at market prices and the calculation G/AG/W/235  
 
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  of the product -specific AMS for rice is based on available provisional data, as in India's previous 
notification, G/AG/N/IND/25 . Could India please:   
 
a. Confirm when exactly it will notify the final data. Paraguay is still waiting for this data for 
notification G/AG/N/IND/25 , and, in this respect, India has not yet been able to provide a 
satisfactory response. In this regard, we refer India to question AG -IMS ID 100079 , to 
which it has not yet replied, and the 17 questions referred to in that question, the replies 
to which provide no indication of when the final data could be expected.   
b. Specify what constitutes other support for rice, that is, other than public stockholding for 
food security purposes, that will be notified subsequently, which i s mentioned by India in 
a note to Supporting Table DS:5. The same note is found in previous notifications, and we 
therefore reiterate that this information is needed to verify whether India has respected 
paragraph 5 of the Bali Ministerial Decision, which requires that there be no increase of 
Amber Box support for programmes other than public stockholding.   
c. Explain the reason for the steady increase in its current total AMS between the period 
2018-2019 and the period 2020 -2021 and what policies or reforms i t is implementing to 
return its expenditure levels to those authorized under its WTO commitments.   
d. Explain the reasons justifying the steady increase in open market sales of public stocks 
between 2018 and 2021. We note with particular concern how initial s ales of 0.85 million 
tonnes rose to 2.46 million tonnes, thereby increasing threefold. We also recall that India 
is the world's leading exporter of rice, with a trade share of more than 30% of the world 
market, and that we are still awaiting information on  monitoring mechanisms to ensure 
that these sales do not end up in international markets.   
e. When examining the Statistical Appendix on public stockholding, we note that the opening 
balance of stocks at the end of the year does not correspond to the opening balance of 
stocks added to purchases and minus releases under the programme and open market 
sales. Could India please explain what is happening with the annual difference?  
Answer by India  
As mentioned in the response to question ID s 98059 , 99008 , the data for Value of Production in the 
notification is provisional in nature and was used, as per the estimates available at the time of 
preparation of the notifica tion. It has also been conveyed to the Committee that any significant 
difference between the provisional and final data would be considered for notification.  However,  we 
can now confirm that data of VoP do not have significant impact on the calculation of market price 
support as a %age of VoP and therefore, have not been considered for Notification again.  
 
After consulting the relevant Ministries/Departments, it was found that no support other than that 
for the PSH purposes has been provided for rice.  
 
The factors behind the increase in the product -specific support to rice can be found in supporting 
table DS:5 of India 's domestic support notifications.   
 
Exports are not allowed from open market sales of food grains from public stockholding. Guidelines 
for em panelment and registration under the Open Market Sales Scheme (Domestic) stipulate that 
products under said scheme will be utilized domestically and not exported by the bidder.  
 
These guidelines can be accessed from http://fci.gov.in/sales.php?view=224 . 
 
The Government of India announces minimum support price for paddy rather than rice. For 
comparison with the external reference price, the minimum support price of paddy is converted into 
that of rice by using an average conversion ratio, which is also provided in our DS:1 domestic support 
notifications. The stocks mentioned in the table above, are of rice rather than of paddy. Some stocks 
are in the form of un -milled paddy. The difference in fi gures is because of damage due to various 
factors, including moisture and transportation.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  Follow -up: Paraguay noted that, in relation to question c, it would review India's notification again 
and would provide further comments on this question at a later s tage. Concerning India's response 
on question d, Paraguay noted that India did not provide information on monitoring mechanism 
which in its view is important to ensure that exports were not allowed. Regarding question e, 
Paraguay referred to its statement on questions AG -IMS ID 101002  which also related to 
discrepancy. The United S tates echoed Paraguay's comments.   
AG-IMS ID 101078: Question by United Kingdom - Transparency issues (including  
Table  DS:2)  
The United Kingdom thanks India for its recent DS:1 notification G/AG/N/IND/27 . 
The United  Kingdom notes  that the description and itemisation of Green Box commitments under 
"2. General Services " is absent. Could India please provide a description of these measures?   
Answer by India  
India would direct the UK to Page 3 of DS:1 notification G/AG/N/IND/27  which lists support under 
General Services. The programmes like Integrated Scheme on Agriculture Census and Statistics, 
Livestock Census, National Animal Disease Control Programme, Mission on Plant Protection and  Plant 
Quarantine, are included in the General Services under India 's DS:1 notifications.  
Follow -up: The United States supported the question and noted that the concern regarding India not 
including necessary information in Supporting Table DS:1 was not new and had been repeatedly 
raised previously.  
AG-IMS ID 101050: Question by Brazil - Public stockholding for food security purposes  
In India's DS:1 notification regarding the marketing year from 1 October 2020 to 
30 September  2021 ( G/AG/N/IND/27 ), India has invoked the peace clause  set out in the Bali 
Ministerial Decision on Public Stockholding for Food Security Purposes, due to domestic support 
provided for rice. India informed the Membership that "other support for rice, that is, other than 
public stockholding for food security pu rposes, will be notified subsequently" (Supporting 
Table  DS:5, footnote 3).  
 
Could India provide further clarification on the issue, especially:  
a. An estimation of expenditures and a description of the kind of support it has granted to 
rice producers beyond the PSH programme;  
b. When will this additional support be notified?   
Also in relation to the support policies for rice, more specifically to PSH, Brazil notices that 
the value of purchases and the amount purchased has increased from USD  19.97  billion 
to USD 22.68 billion, and from 52 million ton nes to 60.1 million ton nes in a year.  
 
Furthermore, the value and the amount of rice disposed in the market grew from 
USD 1.41 billion to USD 2.17 billion and form 33.36 million ton nes to 53.81 million ton nes. 
 
In the light of the above, could India also inform  about:  
c. Policy and statistical developments, including targets and goals set by the Indian 
government related to the accumulation, holding and disposal of stocks, that would explain 
the evolution of values and amo unts notified under the PSH programs.  
Answer by India  
After consulting the relevant Ministries/Departments, it was found that no support other than that 
for the PSH purposes has been provided for rice.  For other requested information, India's DS:1 
Notifica tion may be referred.  
Follow -up: Brazil noted that India's answer is incomplete and reserved its right to follow up with 
further questions. Canada expressed interest in improving the transparency of India's 
PSH programmes.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  AG-IMS ID 101049: Question by Brazil - Direct payments: decoupled income support  
Brazil notices that, since the programme Pradhan Mantri Kisan Samman Nidhi (PM -KISAN) has 
entered into force, there has been an increase in the decoupled income support notif ied by India.  In 
its DS:1 notification for 2018 -2019 ( G/AG/N/IND/18 ), outlays amounted to USD 852 million. For 
2019-2020 ( G/AG/N/IND/25 ), they amounted to USD 6.87 billion.  Finally, for 2020 -2021 
(G/AG/N/IND/27 ), expenditures reached USD 8.21 billion.  It is worth noticing that, in its DS:2 
notification ( G/AG/N/IND/19 ), the cost of the measure was indicated as US D 852.70 
Million.  Therefore, Brazil would appreciate if India could provide details on changes of the 
implementation of the PM -KISAN that could explain this large increase in expenditures. For instance, 
has there been any change in the eligibility criteria  or in the amount each farmer is entitled to 
receive?  
Answer by India  
In India 's DS:2 notification, the cost of measure for PM -KISAN was reflected for year 2018 -19. For 
year 2018 -19, only one instalment was paid under the scheme and the same was notified in the 
relevant DS:1 notification. For 2019 -20 onwards, all three instalments for the year were made and 
hence notified accordingly in the DS:1 notification of the years concerned.  
Follow -up: Brazil noted that India's answer is incomplete and rese rved its right to follow up with 
further questions.  
AG-IMS ID 101006: Question by European Union, Paraguay - Input subsidies available to 
low-income or resource -poor producers  
The European Union notes a substantial increase in notified support under "input subsidies available 
to low -income or resource -poor producers " in Supporting Table DS:2 in Marketing Year 2020/2021 
as compared to Marketing Year 2019/2020. The notified amount increased from 
USD 25,097.52  million in Marketing Year 2019/2020 to USD 30,923.35 million in Marketing 
Year 2020/2021, which corresponds to an increase by 23.2 %.  
a. What are the reasons for this increase in support under "input subsidies available to low -
income or resource -poor producer s" in Marketing Year 2020/2021?  
b. Could India please provide a breakdown of how much subsidies are provided to each kind 
of input that are covered by the programmes?  
Answer by India  
The increase in support under "input subsidies" for 2020 -21 was mainly on ac count of fertiliser 
subsidies. The breakdown of support notified by India in the DS:1 notification for 2020 -21, is as 
follows: Fertiliser (USD 17,679.96 million), Irrigation (USD 3,768.24 million), and Power 
(USD  9,475.15 million).  
Follow -up: Paraguay and the US expressed concern with the continuing increase of India's input 
subsidies.  
AG-IMS ID 101080: Question by United Kingdom - Other product -specific AMS/EMS  
The United Kingdom thanks India for its recent DS:1 notification ( G/AG/N/IND/27 ) and notes India 
has again stated that 'Other support for rice, that is, other than public stockholding for food security 
purposes, will be notified subsequently '. This information allows other Members to assess whether 
India is complying with the require ments of the Bali Ministerial Decision.  
Please could India confirm when this information will be published?   
Answer by India  
After consulting the relevant Ministries/Departments, it was found that no support other than that 
for the PSH purposes has been p rovided for rice.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  Follow -up: Uruguay supported the questions on India's PSH programmes. Uruguay reiterated the 
need for more transparency for India's PSH policies given its role as a large rice exporter. Uruguay 
voiced its optimism about maintaining an ope n and constructive discussion with India on this topic. 
India expressed commitment to transparency and to responding to Members' questions. India stated 
that sometimes its responses were delayed as collecting, formatting and submitting data to the WTO 
takes time.   
2.2.3.4   Japan (G/AG/N/JPN/276)  
AG-IMS ID 101051: Question by Brazil - General services: marketing and promotion 
services  
Brazil notices a twenty -fold increase in expenditures in  "marketing and promotion services" 
(Supporting Table DS:1), from JPY  9.6 bill ion to JPY 190.6 billion between 2019/2020 to 2020/2021.  
Could Japan  inform if it has introduced a new programme to provide support under this measure  
type?  
Answer by Japan  
159.4  billion yen out of the noted 181  billion increase in the "Marketing and promotion services " 
category is due to the emergency measures implemented in FY2020 to address the COVID -19 
pandemic.  These measures were to support a part of the cost of sales p romotion activities, such as 
e-commerce, or the cost of provision to school lunch of agricultural, forestry and fishery products 
whose stocks have been piled excessively caused by the substantial reduction in demand, including 
reduced inbound related consu mption, due to the COVID -19 pandemic.  
Follow -up: Brazil asked if these expenditures are one -off for the period of 2020 -2021 due to the 
pandemic or if Japan anticipates that the same amount of support would be provided for 2021 -2022. 
Japan stated that it wo uld reply to the question at a later stage.  
2.2.3.5   Japan (G/AG/N/JPN/277)  
AG-IMS ID 101086: Question by Paraguay, Brazil - Transparency issues (including 
Table  DS:2)  
We wish to thank Japan for submitting notification G/AG/N/JPN/277 , yet note a significant increase 
in AMS expenditures. In particular, we are concerned about the increase in the MPS granted to 
sugar, which rose from 27.6% to 30.5% of the VOP and seems to account for most of Japan's 
higher  AMS expenditures from 2019 -2020 to 2020 -2021. Could Japan please explain the reasons for 
this increase?  
Answer by Japan  
The increase in AMS for Sugar from FY2019/20 to FY2020/21 is JPY 2.7billion, constituting only a 
small part of the increase in th e Current Total AMS (JPY  46.8 billion).  
While the direct payment to sweet resource crop is made based on the volume of production, the 
market price of sweet resource crop fluctuates every year, and thus the %age of AMS to VOP differs 
from year to year.  
Follow-up: Paraguay thanked Japan for including information on production value and %age of 
support to production value in its notification for the first time and noted that this is a good practice 
for increasing transparency. China registered concern on Japan's AMS expenditure beyond de 
minimis and noted that such product -specific support could be heavily distorting. China voiced 
support for the domestic support analytical tool discussed during the informal session of the CoA 
and noted that support beyond  de minimis  must be analysed for future discussions on agricultural 
reform.  
AG-IMS ID 101040: Question by Türkiye - Transparency issues (including Table DS:2)  
Türkiye thanks Japan for submitting its domestic support notification.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  a. Supporting Table DS:1: Jap an has been notifying "Extension and advisory services " under 
the "General Services " measure for STDS:1 table.  Türkiye  notes that the amount of 
support for this measure type has significantly increased compared to previous years.  
Can Japan explain the reas on behind this increase?   
b. Supporting Table DS:1: Japan has been notifying "Marketing and promotion services " 
under the "General Services " measure for STDS:1 table.  Türkiye  notes that the amount of 
support for this measure type has increased by more than 20  times compared to previous 
years.  
Can Japan explain the reason behind this increase?  
Answer by Japan  
a. The increase in the support under the "Extension and advisory services " is due to the 
increased budget allocation to the existing programs, such as 'Progr am for Demonstration 
and Dissemination of Smart Agriculture '. 'Program for Demonstration and Dissemination 
of Smart Agriculture ' is one of the highly expected programs to deal with labor shortage 
in the agriculture sector due to the aging population especi ally in the rural area. It aims 
at dissemination of advanced technologies such as robots, AI, and IoT in collaboration with 
private companies, universities, research institutes, and other organizations.   
b. 159.4  billion yen out of the noted 181  billion incre ase in the "Marketing and promotion 
services " category is due to the emergency measures implemented in FY2020 to address 
the COVID -19 pandemic.  These measures were to support a part of the cost of sales 
promotion activities, such as e -commerce, or the cost  of provision to school lunch of 
agricultural, forestry and fishery products whose stocks have been piled excessively 
caused by the substantial reduction in demand, including reduced inbound related 
consumption, due to the COVID -19 pandemic.  
Follow -up: Paraguay thanked Japan for including information on production value and %age of 
support to production value in its notification for the first time and noted that this is a good practice 
for increasing transparency. China registered concern on Japan's AMS expenditure beyond de 
minimis and noted that such product -specific support could be heavily distorting. China voiced 
support for the domestic support analytical tool discussed during the informal session of the CoA 
and noted that support beyond de minimis must be analysed for future discussions on agricultural 
reform.  
AG-IMS ID 101052: Question by Brazil - Non-product -specific AMS  
Japan has included in Supporting Table DS:9 (Non -Product -Specific AMS) a new measure called 
"Support for production in the next crop season to cope with the COVID -19 pandemic", with 
expenditures of JPY 158.5 billion.  
Could Japan provide further details on the measure, including the type of payments, the eligibility 
criteria and the duration of the measure?  
Answer by Japan  
To prevent farmers affected by the decrease in sales due to the COVID -19 pandemic from going out 
of business, "Support for production in the next crop season to cope with the COVID -19 pandemic " 
supports their efforts to plant crops for the next crop season.  
Eligible farmers are those who produce vegetables, flowers, fruit and/or tea, who have shipped or 
disposed of their products between February and April 2020, and whose wholesale market sales 
have dropped by more than 20% from the same month of the previous y ear due to the COVID -19 
pandemic. Farmers who apply to the programme are required to implement two of the initiatives 
specified in the program, such as improvement of the work environment, formulation of a business 
continuity plan, and soil improvement.   G/AG/W/235  
 
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  The procedures of the programme are as follows : 
i. Farmers who apply to the programme must submit an implementation plan describing 
the activities to be taken.  
ii. The implementation plan is adopted when approved by the government.  
iii. The farmers must submit a report  on the results of the activities and documentary 
evidence after the completion of the activities.  
iv. When it is confirmed that the activities were completed properly, the grant will be paid 
to the farmers.  
v. Duration of the measure is from 30 April 2020 to 31 March 2021.  
AG-IMS ID 101001: Question by Thailand - Non-product -specific AMS  
With regard to Japan 's notification ( G/AG/N/JPN/277 ) on domestic support for fiscal year 2020/2021, 
Japan had spent 44.7 billion yen as payments for producers (beef and veal) affected by the 
COVID -19 pande mic (Page 6) and 158.5 billion yen as non -product -specific payments to support the 
production in the next crop season to cope with the COVID -19 pandemic (Page 8). Could Japan 
provide more information on the criteria for those affected by the COVID -19 pande mic and the 
procedure for applying for support from the government?  
Answer by Japan  
a. Due to the COVID -19 outbreak, movement restrictions were requested, and resulted in 
remarkable decrease of the demand and the price of beef produced in Japan. The 
governmen t supported producers and wholesalers who worked on, for instance, production 
cost reduction and additional promotion efforts even in those difficult situations. The 
government also provided financial assistance to producers who were forced to spend 
additi onal costs due to the cancelation or postponement of the livestock market.  The 
procedures of the programme are as follows:  
i. Producers and/or wholesalers who apply to the programme must submit a project 
implementation plan.  
ii. The implementation plan is adopted when approved by government agency. 
The producers and/or wholesalers submit a report on the approved project after the 
completion of the project.  
iii. When it is confirmed that the project was completed properly, the grant will be paid 
to the producers and /or wholesalers.  
b. To prevent farmers affected by the decrease in sales due to the COVID -19 pandemic from 
going out of business, "Support for production in the next crop season to cope with the 
COVID -19 pandemic" supports their efforts to plant crops for  the next crop season.  Eligible 
farmers are those who produce vegetables, flowers, fruit and/or tea, who have shipped or 
disposed of their products between February and April 2020, and whose wholesale market 
sales have dropped by more than 20% from the sam e month of the previous year due to 
the COVID -19 pandemic. Farmers who apply to the programme are required to implement 
two of the initiatives specified in the program, such as improvement of the work 
environment, formulation of a business continuity plan,  and soil improvement.  
The procedures of the programme are as follows:   
i. Farmers who apply to the programme must submit an implementation plan describing 
the activities to be taken.  
ii. The implementation plan is adopted when approved by the government.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  iii. The farmers must submit a report on the results of the activities and documentary 
evidence after the completion of the activities.  
iv. When it is confirmed that the activities were completed properly, the grant will be paid 
to the farmers.  
2.2.3.6   Mauritiu s (G/AG/N/MUS/17)  
AG-IMS ID 101067: Question by United States of America - Transparency issues (including 
Table DS:2)  
The United States thanks Mauritius for its most recent Table DS:1 notification.  It is noted that 
Mauritius introduced several new sugar -related domestic support measures in 2020/2021, including 
a "money grant ' notified in Supporting Table DS:6 and "Sugar Service Providing Institutions " notified 
in Supporting Table DS:1. It is also noted that Mauritius ' Trade Policy Review ( WT/TPR/S/417 ) states 
in paragraph 4. 30, "Price support via controlled or guaranteed prices is provided for various 
agricultural products.  None of the price support was notified to the WTO Committee on 
Agriculture.  According to the authorities, price support will henceforth be notified. " The Report goes 
on to mention support for onions, garlic, potatoes, green tea leaves, and sugar.   
a. Please confirm whether these price supports mentioned in the Secretariat 's Report were 
in place for 2020/21 and when Members may expect Mauritius to begin notifyi ng these 
measures.  
b. Please explain whether "money grant " for sugar is related to the aforementioned price 
support for sugar and if not, how this measure is implemented.  
c. Please provide a description of the measure "Sugar Service Providing Institutions " as 
required in Supporting Table DS:1 and whether a required Table DS:2 notification will be 
submitted.  
Answer by Mauritius  
a. Sugar : We do confirm that for the financial year 2020 -2021, Mauritius provided a 
guaranteed price of MUR 25,000 per tonne for the first 60 tonnes of sugar produced by 
sugar cane planters. However, we wish to emphasize that this is not a recurrent measure 
and was exceptionally put in place as a result of the significant downfall in world sugar 
prices. Same was notified in document G/A G/N/MUS/17 (Table DS:2)  
Onions, garlic and potatoes:  Onions, garlic and potatoes are considered as strategic 
crops and are regulated by the Agricultural Marketing Board (AMB). Based on the cost of 
producing onions, garlic and potatoes locally, relevant Com mittees at the AMB decide on 
the guaranteed prices for locally produced onions, potatoes and garlic as per agreed 
specifications.  
Hence, there was no budgetary outlays incurred in the said financial year for these 
products. Same will be notified in the fut ure in the event that there are budgetary outlays 
involved.  
Green tea leaves : The National Agricultural Products Regulatory Office (NAPRO) sets the 
prices for green tea leaves paid by tea factories. No budgetary outlays was incurred for 
the financial year  2020-2021.   
b. Yes. We do confirm that the aforementioned price support also include the guaranteed 
price of MUR 25,000 per tonne provided to the first 60 tonnes of sugar produced by sugar 
cane planters.   
c. This refers to services being provided in the sugar s ector by various 
departments/organizations, amongst others, for research & development of sugarcane 
varieties, arbitration of disputes, promoting setting up of cane nurseries & efficient G/AG/W/235  
 
- 157 - 
 
  agricultural practices, technical assistance, mechanization services and sugar storage & 
handling. This measure has been duly notified under supporting table DS:1.  
Follow -up: The US strongly encouraged all Members to be as detailed as feasible in their agriculture 
notifications especially DS:1 notifications. The US noted th at the use of specific programme titles 
and descriptions provide greater understanding of Members' support measures. Further, submitting 
DS:2 notifications on new measures help facilitate discussions and understanding of best practices.  
2.2.3.7   Nigeria (G/AG/N/NGA /19)  
AG-IMS ID 101068: Question by United States of America, Paraguay - Transparency issues 
(including Table DS:2)  
The United States takes note and appreciates the efforts taken by Nigeria to bring its Table DS:1 
notifications up to date. It is noted that prior to calendar year 2017, Nigeria notified that it had 
provided no domestic support measures.  Nigeria 's most recent notifications indicate the introduction 
of exempt domestic support measures under both Annex 2 and Article 6.2 of the Agreement on 
Agriculture.  Further, these notifications indicate Nigeria has provided no non -exempt domestic 
support measures, such as product -specific or non -product -specific amber box support.   
a. When will Nigeria provide a Table DS:2 notification for all of its recently  introduced 
measures?  
b. Please confirm whether all measures taken to support the agricultural sector in Nigeria are 
covered by the 2017 Appropriation Act.  
c. For "other input subsidies for resource poor producers ", please describe what inputs are 
subsidized and  how Nigeria has defined its eligible "low-income or resource -poor 
producers."  
Answer by Nigeria  
Follow -up: Paraguay indicated interest in sub -questions a and c and reminded Nigeria that it still 
hadn't provided responses to its questions AG -IMS ID s 99011 , 99012  and 99013 . The US welcomed 
Nigeria's upcoming DS:2 notification and hoped that it would include the information as requested 
in part c of the question. The US also echoed the comments by Paraguay regarding Nigeria's 
outstanding responses. Canada flagged interest in part c of the question on input subsidies and how 
Nigeria defined low income or resource -poor producers.   
2.2.3.8   Nigeria (G/AG/N/NGA/19, G/AG/N/NGA/2 0, G/AG/N/NGA/21)  
AG-IMS ID 101069: Question by United States of America - Transparency issues (including 
Table DS:2)  
The United States understands the Nigerian Ministry of Agriculture introduced the National Egg 
Production Scheme in 2016 with the aim of i ncreasing egg production.  
Please explain if and how this measure is notified in Nigeria 's Table DS:1 notification and the 
implementation period for this measure.  
Answer by Nigeria  
AG-IMS ID 101070: Question by United States of America - Transparency issues  (including 
Table DS:2)  
According to official guidelines published by the Central Bank of Nigeria, Nigeria operates a measure 
entitled Anchor Borrowers ' Program (ABP), which states the aim of the measure is to "boost 
agricultural production, create jobs, r educe food import bills. "The United States understands this 
measure was introduced in 2015 and, according to media reports, more than USD 2 billion has been 
disbursed under the ABP.   G/AG/W/235  
 
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  The United States understands the ABP targets several commodities, especi ally cereals, including 
rice, corn, wheat, roots and tuber crops like cassava, potatoes, yam, and ginger.  Other targeted 
crops include tomato, oil palm, and sugarcane.   
According to the Central Bank of Nigeria, it is estimated that ABP financial resources have reached 
over 4.52 million smallholder farmers cultivating 21 commodities across Nigeria.   
a. Please confirm whether Nigeria has notified this measure.  If not, please explain why.  
b. Please describe how this measure is implemented.  
Answer by Nigeria  
2.2.3.9   Panama ( G/AG/N/PAN/61)  
AG-IMS ID 101072: Question by United States of America - Transparency issues (including 
Table DS:2)  
The United States ' request for more information about Panama 's support provided to rice, milk, and 
maize, outlined in AG -IMS ID 99082  and in reference to G/AG/N/PAN/58 , remains valid for Panama 's 
most recent Table DS:1 notification ( G/AG/N/PAN/61 ). As Panama has yet to provide a response to 
AG-IMS ID 99082, the United States repeats the question:  
 
The United States understands, based on AG -IMS ID 93196 , that the notified value represents 
payments made for any rice sold during  the notified calendar year – whether production is from the 
current agricultural year or a previous agricultural year.  This is also noted in AG -IMS ID 92062  where 
the United States understands Panama to state that the eligible production figure represented 2018 
production as well as production from the last few months of 2017.   
 
Further, the United States notes that the same measure as for rice is notified for milk and maize in 
Supporting Table DS:6.  It was the United States' understanding that all outlays made during the 
given calendar year, for rice, milk, and maize regardless of when production occurred was the 
notified outlay value.  However, in G/AG/N/PAN/58 , Panama includes a new footnote only for rice in 
Supporting Table DS:4 stating, "Amount includes support for previous years. "  
 
a. Please provide further clarification on what the reporting year for notif ied outlays in 
Supporting Table DS:4 and Supporting Table DS:6 represent and whether there is a 
difference for rice versus other commodities.  
b. Please provide further clarification as to what the eligible production listed represents 
specifically.  For exampl e, does the volume notified in G/AG/N/PAN/58  represent all 
production sold during specific months at the end of 2019 and most/all of 2020?  
Answer by Panama  
AG-IMS ID 101088: Question by Paraguay, United States of America - Scheduled 
commitment level  
We wish to thank Panama for submi tting notification G/AG/N/P AN/61 , and while we note a 
progressive reduction in AMS expenditures between 2019 and 2021, Panama appears to be steadily 
exceeding its domestic support entitlement limits on rice. Could Panama report what actions are 
being taken to remedy this situation a nd to go back to honouring its WTO commitments on domestic 
support?  
Answer by Panama  
AG-IMS ID 101071: Question by United States of America - Scheduled commitment level  
The United States remains concerned regarding Panama 's compliance with its domestic sup port 
commitments, particularly with respect to notified support for rice, which remained above de minimis 
in calendar year 2021 ( G/AG/N/PAN/61 ).  
 G/AG/W/235  
 
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  As Panama h as yet to provide an answer to AG -IMS ID 99081 , the United States repeats the 
question:  
 
In Panama 's response to AG -IMS ID 97141 , Panama stated that a commi ssion would review Law 17 
of 2018 in the first half of 2021.  
 
Please provide an update on this review and what the findings were.  
Answer by Panama  
Follow -up: Uruguay reiterated its concern regarding Panama's support over the de minimis level and 
encouraged  Panama to take appropriate measures to be compliant with the WTO rules.  
2.2.3.10   Paraguay (G/AG/N/PRY/34)  
AG-IMS ID 101081: Question by United Kingdom - Classification of measures  
The United Kingdom thanks Paraguay for its recent DS:1 G/AG/N/PRY/34  notification submission. 
The UK notes that in G/AG/N/PRY/33  (Calendar Year 2019) a sum of USD 14,841,547 for the 'Project 
to Restore Farming Production Systems (RESIPROAF) ' was categorised under Supporting Table DS:1 
(Green Box) as '11. Structural adjustment assistance provided through investment aids '. 
 
In notification G/AG/N/PRY/34  (Calendar Year 2020) a similarly titled 'Restoration of family farming 
production systems ' with a sum of USD 7,808,387 was categorised under Supporting Table DS:2 
(Develo pment Programmes) as a measure linked to 'Agricultural input subsidies for low -income or 
resource - poor producers '.  
 
Could Paraguay clarify whether this is the same programme, and if so, the reason as to why this 
has changed category between notifications ?  
Answer by Paraguay  
The Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock, through its Institutional Strategic Plan (PEI), defines the 
contributions according to the services to be provided to its beneficiaries and organizes its resources 
accordingly. The PEI is developed by both public and private -sector actors involved in the agricultural 
sector and is the main administrative instrument informing the institution's actions and expenditures 
on a multi -annual basis.  
In 2020, internal administrative factors within t he institution, such as the creation of the new 
Vice-Ministry of Rural Family Farming, as well as external factors such as the outbreak of the 
COVID -19 pandemic, affected the configuration of the PEI.  
As a result, the RECIPROAF programme for 2020 was resc heduled and redirected to support only 
the most vulnerable farmers in rural areas for subsistence purposes. The original programme 
contained in previous notifications covered all farmers and the type of support provided was within 
the parameters of paragra ph 11 of Annex 2.  
As not only the type of support but also the beneficiaries were modified, the classification of the 
programme also changed to respond to the immediate needs and challenges created by the 
pandemic. The rescheduling that occurred in 2020 ca me about under the emergency legislation to 
respond to the COVID -19 pandemic throughout the country, Law No. 6524/2020.  
By 2021, RECIPROAF was re -established as an ongoing programme of the MAG. It should be noted, 
however, that with the creation of the Vi ce-Ministry of Family Farming, new programmes aimed at 
rural family farming will be introduced and previous programmes will be modified.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  2.2.3.11   Switzerland (G/AG/N/CHE/114)  
AG-IMS ID 101082: Question by United Kingdom - Other product -specific AMS/EMS  
The United K ingdom notes that Switzerland 's product -specific domestic support for Milk and Milk 
Products was 16.66% of the value of production in 2020. Has Switzerland carried out any analysis 
regarding the potential trade distorting impacts of this support that it is  able to share?   
Answer by Switzerland  
Switzerland 's support for milk and milk products does not benefit from the exemption in Annex 2 
and is notified in the Amber Box. Within the general reform process of its domestic agricultural 
policy, Switzerland cont inuously evaluates specific payments, their features and whether they meet 
their set objectives. However, Switzerland has not undertaken a quantifying analysis of the trade 
distorting impact of the payments referred to in this question.  
Follow -up: New Zeal and, Brazil and Uruguay supported the question. New Zealand expressed 
concern on the trade distorting impact of the support and looked forward to further information from 
Switzerland. Brazil noted that according to previous notifications, this is Switzerla nd's first breach of 
de minimis level in a product for which Switzerland has dominant position in the global market as a 
significant exporter. Regardless of the final bound AMS limit Brazil considered this as an important 
case for Members to reflect on neg otiations on concentration of product -specific support. Switzerland 
voiced its commitment to transparency in this Committee.  
2.2.3.12   United Kingdom (G/AG/N/GBR/11)  
AG-IMS ID 101053: Question by Brazil - Transparency issues (including Table DS:2)  
In what regards me asures notified under Supporting Table DS:1 (Measures exempt from the 
reduction commitment - "Green Box"), Brazil would like to invite the UK to inform specifically, if 
possible, in the cases of "decoupled income support" and "direct payments", the amount of 
expenditures under each measure in a discriminated manner.  
Brazil also takes the opportunity to recall that document G/MA/TAR/RS/570 is under objection by 
several Members. In that sense, Brazil points to the importance of the UK not to provide AMS above  
the "de minimis ", relying on an AMS that is still being negotiated.  
Answer by United Kingdom  
The UK thanks Brazil for their question on DS:1 notification G/AG/N/GBR/11 . The UK believe s that 
the level of detail included in G/AG/N/GBR/11  provides a high degree of transparency and is 
consistent with the notification requirements under G/AG/2 . However, on this occasion a breakdown 
of payments under "decoupled income support" and "direct payments" is provided below in response 
to Brazil's request.  
 
In the case of 6. "decoupled income support", the breakdown of expenditure is as follows (cost of 
support is provided in GBP million): Basic Payment Scheme (GBP 2482.39), Greening payments 
(GBP 175.41), reimbursement of direct payment s in relation to financial discipline (GBP 32.75), 
redistributive payments (GBP 77.51), payments for young farmers (GBP 7.73), direct support for 
farmers and land managers in Protected Landscapes (GBP 0.01), Rural Support Scheme 
(Bailiwick  of Jersey) (GBP 0.06) and a wheat subsidy (Isle of Man) (GBP 0.04). Total figure includes 
recoveries under Single Payment Scheme (SPS) of GBP 0.01 million.  
 
In the case of 14. "other direct payments", the breakdown of expenditure is as follows (cost of 
support is pro vided in GBP million): State Aid support in Northern Ireland (GBP 6.24), National Basic 
Payment Support Scheme (Scotland) (GBP 2.60), Bovine TB controls and compensation payments 
(GBP 39.77) Covid -response measures including compensation for closure of pro cessing facilities 
and income support schemes (GBP 10.52), business development grants to support commercial 
businesses to make investments in agricultural, horticultural and food business sustainability 
(GBP 0.27), support for Tree Production Innovation F und (GBP 0.01) and an Agriculture and Fisheries 
Grant Scheme in the Isle of Man (GBP 0.53).  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  Follow -up: Brazil stressed the last part of its questions on the importance of the UK not to provide 
AMS above the "de minimis" level, as its bound AMS is still bei ng negotiated. Canada echoed Brazil's 
comments. Paraguay supported the question and noted that the EU had not made the proportional 
reduction to its Bound Total AMS following the UK's exit from the EU. Uruguay supported previous 
interventions and noted tha t the currency in which the UK reported its post -Brexit notification does 
not reflect the position of Uruguay and other Members.  
AG-IMS ID 101089: Question by Paraguay - Transparency issues (including Table DS:2)  
We wish to thank the United Kingdom for sub mitting notification G/AG/N /GBR/11 .  
In this regard, we have the following observations to make:   
a. The United Kingdom has once again notified an AMS commitment of close to GBP 5 billion 
as a consequence of its exit from the European Union, despite the fact that this right is 
still be ing questioned by a number of Members. It is important to note that Members have 
not yet been notified by the EU of the same reduction in its schedule of commitments.  
b. The United Kingdom has notified "support for the conversion to and maintenance of 
organic  farming systems for environmental benefits", could the United Kingdom 
breakdown the environmental benefits of organic farming systems which are considered 
environmental payments?  
Answer by United Kingdom  
The UK thanks Paraguay for their question on DS:1 n otification G/AG/N/GBR/11 . Support for the 
conversion to and maintenance of organic production systems for their environmental benefits is 
provided under the Countryside Stewardship scheme, which aims to look after and improve the 
environment by increasing biodiversity, improving ai r quality, water quality and flood risk 
management. The main focus of support for organic farming systems is that producers must work 
with nature, with emphasis on protecting and supporting the natural biological processes that deliver 
sustainable, product ive, fertile soils.   
Organic farming promotes the following environmental benefits:  
a. Climate change mitigation through care for soil structure and fertility, particularly on 
carbon sequestration and conservation of water resources;  
b. Increasing biodiversity, particularly of pollinators;  
c. Improved water quality;  
d. Higher animal welfare standards.   
It achieves these benefits through:   
a. Building healthy and strong soil reduces soil compaction and erosion;  
b. Prohibiting the use of artificial fertilisers and pesticides and using natural alternatives 
creates richer diversity of grasses and wildflowers to improve biodiversity, especially for 
pollinators, and results in cleaner water as pollutants from run -off are reduced;  
c. Organic standards mean livestock must be  free-range with access to pasture which 
reduces stress and disease.   
The territorial extent of the support measures reported is England only.  
Follow -up: Paraguay stated that although soil preservation is one of the benefits of organic farming, 
the mechani c sowing of soil through organic farming can in fact lead to soil erosion.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  AG-IMS ID 101083: Question by New Zealand - Livestock payments made on a fixed 
number of head  
New Zealand would appreciate if the United Kingdom offered additional information regar ding the 
notified Livestock payments made on a fixed number of head  for beef and sheep in supporting 
table DS:3.  
What are the requirements to receive these payments?  
What is the purpose of these payments?   
Answer by United Kingdom  
The U nited Kingdom  thanks New Zealand for their question on DS:1 notification G/AG/N/GBR/11 . 
These livestock payments were made under schemes introduced under the EU Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) and were made on a fixed number of head set out in legislation. They are designed to 
help slow the rate of long -term decline in sheep and beef cattle numbers on extensive grazing 
systems in Scotland 's more challenging landscapes.  
The requirements to receive payments for the Scottish Upland Sheep Support Scheme are that 
participating farms must have 80% or more of thei r agricultural land classed as poorer quality rough 
grazing with less than 200 hectares of good quality grazing and that there is a payment cap of 
1 hogg (ewe) to every 4 hectares of rough grazing. For the Scottish Suckler Beef Support Scheme 
(Scotland 's Mainland and Islands) payments are only for herds maintained in Scotland with calves 
at least 75% beef bred, born on the Scottish holding and kept there continuously for a minimum 
30 days with a valid cattle passport.  
The purpose of these livestock payments  is to maintain the environmental benefits, including 
biodiversity and protecting species rich grasslands in crofting systems which arise from extensive 
grazing of beef suckler herds and sheep – and - to maintain the social and historic cultural benefits 
to rural communities from traditional crofting systems in Scotland 's Mainland and Islands. The 
payments support the maintenance of specialist beef suckler herds, maintain sufficient critical mass 
in the Scottish beef industry - and - maintain sheep flocks i n farm businesses reliant on Scotland 's 
poorer quality rough grazing to deliver the benefits described above.   
2.2.3.13   United States of America (G/AG/N/USA/157)  
AG-IMS ID 101054: Question by Brazil - General services: infrastructural services  
Brazil would like to thank the US for providing an answer to question 100108 .  
However,  Brazil  remains unsure regarding the U.S. decision to notify such expenditure a s a measure 
exempt from reduction commitments.   
In Brazil 's view, paragraph 2(g) is restrictive to capital work, a term that must be read in the light 
of the examples given in the paragraph itself.   
a. Considering that "administrative & operating reimbursemen ts to insurers" and 
"underwriting gains to insurers" are supporting the Federal Crop Insurance Program, a 
programme that is notified as Product -Specific Aggregate Measurement of Support, how 
does the US consider them not to have trade -distorting effects or  effects on production?   
b. Could the US confirm that the "institutional infrastructure" mentioned in its answer refers 
to the administrative and operating costs and the sharing of underwriting risk owed to 
private companies due to the reinsurance agreement?  If not, could the US provide 
additional explanation of the term?  
Answer by United States of America  
a. As explained in the response to Question ID 100108 , the U.S. crop insurance programme 
is unique in that its structure combi nes government oversight and administrative control G/AG/W/235  
 
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  with delivery and servicing of crop insurance through a reinsurance agreement. The United 
States has notified the budgetary outlays associated with the delivery of the crop insurance 
programme similar to how it notifies budgetary outlays for delivery of services to 
agricultural producers by government agencies. These expenditures to administer the 
programme do not distort trade or have effects on production and meet the criteria for 
exemption as explained in our previous response.  
b. As explained in the response to Question ID 100108 , the term "institutional infrastructure " 
refers to the fact that the outlays to private insurers to deliver and service products, based 
on the terms of the reinsurance agreement, support the institutional infrastructure for 
delivery of the Federal crop ins urance program. Those outlays cover administrative and 
operating costs, as well as underwriting gains, incurred by the private insurance 
companies that service the insurance product.  
Follow -up: New Zealand registered interest in the issue.  
2.2.4   New or modified domestic support measures  (Table DS:2)  
2.2.4.1   United Kingdom (G/AG/N/GBR/9)  
AG-IMS ID 101055: Question by Brazil - Transparency issues (including Table DS:2)  
Brazil appreciates the UK's comprehensive answer to question AG -IMS ID  100051 . 
 
Brazil also understands the logic behind the UK's decision not to deviate from the EU notification 
practice when programs have been rolled -over, however Brazil believes t hat the UK could have 
avoided inconsistencies, such as notifying that one -off non -refundable payments could be classified 
as general services.  
 
Even though the UK has explained that "The FIF does not currently provide subsidised services to 
farmers as outl ined in paragraph 2, Annex 2", document G/AG/N/GBR/9  creates uncertainties to 
other Members.  
 
Having said that, Brazil would like to ask the UK the following additional points regarding items "b" 
and "c" of question 100051 . 
i. Could the UK explain how does the "score" influences in the payment received?  
ii. Is the UK presuming that any agricultural producer that inves ts "in equipment and 
technology for improved sustainable agricultural, horticultural, and forestry 
productivity" is in a state of demonstrable structural disadvantage?  
iii. Is the agricultural producer allowed to declare any farming or husbandry practice as 
environmentally sustainable for the sake of receiving the payments?  
Answer by United Kingdom  
The UK thanks Brazil for their question 101055  and sets out responses below:  
• The scoring does not influence the payment received, only whether or not the application is 
successful to receive a payment.  
• The UK does not presume this, all applicants must go through a competitive application process 
where not all applicants are successful. Applicants are assessed against the specified policy 
priorities that aim to address structural disadvantage that impacts on productivity, 
environmental su stainability (including biodiversity), animal health and welfare, water 
sustainability and innovation, which in turn determines which are successful. Less than 3% of 
producers in England were offered funding through Round 1 of the Farming Equipment and 
Technology Fund (FETF).   
• No, the applicant must demonstrate how they will seek to improve environmental sustainability 
as part the application process. Applicants are then scored based on what environmental 
sustainability improvements they can demonstrate. Au diting processes are then in place G/AG/W/235  
 
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  involving site visits to a sample of applicant projects to check and verify claims in relation to 
the original application.  
AG-IMS ID 101073: Question by United States of America - Transparency issues (including 
Table DS: 2) 
On page 4 of G/AG/N/GBR/ 9, the United Kingdom describes the Farming Investment Fund (FIF).  
The notification states "environmental sustainability " is a scoring criterion for choosing projects 
under the FIF.  As WTO Members tackle the challenge of climate change, we can learn from e ach 
other 's efforts to promote environmental sustainability.  What kinds of project activities has the 
United Kingdom determined improve environmental sustainability in the context of the FIF?  
Answer by United Kingdom  
The U nited Kingdom  thanks U nited States of America  for their question. The UK's approach is to 
appraise environmental sustainability measures as part of the application process on a project -by-
project basis. Every farming system is eligible to apply, and their application is scored based on what 
improveme nts they will make, which includes sustainability. For example, in the case of Adding Value 
theme of the Farming Investment Fund (FIF), projects need to consider how their proposals will 
deliver against the following areas - reducing harmful emissions and pollutants, renewable energy, 
energy efficiency, water efficiency, waste efficiency, sustainable packaging measures. Applicants are 
then scored based on what environmental sustainability improvements they can demonstrate.   
The Farming Transformation Fund ( FTF), part of the Farming Investment Fund, provides grants 
towards large capital items to help businesses improve environmental sustainability, productivity 
and profitability. For example, the Water Management Grants 
(https://www.gov.uk/guidance/farming -transformation -fund-water -management -grant -manual ) 
help to mitigate against the impact of climate change by helping to secure water supply for c rop 
irrigation that enables water use in a more sustainable way. For example, constructing on farm 
reservoirs that allow a move away from summer abstraction to rainwater harvesting or peak 
flow/winter abstraction. It will also encourage more efficient wate r application by seeking to 
encourage trickle or boom application.   
The UK supports the premise that Members can learn from each other's efforts to promote 
environmental sustainability, responding to the urgent challenge of climate change, and is happy to 
discuss this with the USA and other interested Members.  
Follow -up: The US, in the view that Members worked to achieve measurable progress towards 
combating climate change, expressed interest in factors used to determining environmental 
sustainability and h ow they could be measured and verified. The US reserved the right to raise follow 
up questions. Canada looked forward to hearing how Members address challenges presented by 
climate change which affect all Members.  
2.2.5   Export subsidy commitments  (Tables  ES:1, E S:2 and ES:3) 
2.2.5.1   Canada (G/AG/N/CAN/148)  
AG-IMS ID 101023: Question by Australia - Transparency issues  
Australia thanks Canada for its export notifications.  
Can Canada please advise the Membership why its reporting under ES:2 submission 
G/AG/N/CAN/148  changed from Marketing -Year (MY) to Calendar Year (CY) reporting for all notified 
significant products?  
Answer by Canada  
Canada indicated in its ES:2 notification for marketing year 2020 ( G/AG/N/CAN/144 ) that with the 
elimination by the end of 2020  of its export subsidy quantity commitments, which were notified on 
a marketing year, Canada's ES:2 notification will now be reported on a calendar year basis.  
We believe that data on a calendar year basis would be more timely.   G/AG/W/235  
 
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  2.2.5.2   European Union (G/AG/N/EU/75)  
AG-IMS ID 101074: Question by United States of America - Quantity of total exports  
Section III of the European Union 's Table ES:2 notification for 2020/2021 lists the product 
disaggregation for wheat and wheat flour as "101: 36,495.9 thousand tonnes. " It appears there may 
be an error.  Please clarify the harmonized tariff co de this is referring to and clarify the product 
disaggregation as it relates to the total quantity of wheat and wheat flour, which is only 
26,666.9  thousand tonnes.  
Answer by European Union  
The E uropean Union thanks to the U nited States for spotting this e rror. 
The EU has verified the information submitted in Notification G/AG/N/EU/75  on 1 March  2022. 
The EU confirms that the tariff code for soft wheat grain should be 1001 99 00 and the quantity is 
26,666.9  tonnes.  
As concerns the wheat flour (in grain equivalent), the EU ha s 524,972 tonnes of export. The tariff 
code is 1101 00 15. EU will prepare a correction to the notification.  
2.2.5.3   Japan (G/AG/N/JPN/270, G/AG/N/JPN/271, G/AG/N/JPN/272)  
AG-IMS ID 101024: Question by Australia - International food aid  
Australia welcomes Japan 's notification under ES:3 for Calendar years 2017 through to 
Calendar  Year 2020 ( G/AG/N/JPN/270 , G/AG/N/JPN/271 , G/AG/N/JPN/272 , G/AG/N/JPN/273 ). 
Australia fully supports the provision of assistance to address humanitarian emergencies and support 
food security in lo cations that have poor access to sufficient nutrition. With respect to food aid, can 
Japan advise:  
a. Which Members or countries were the recipients of the food aid?  
b. As only aid volumes were reported, is Japan able to advise on the monetised value 
amount of  aid for each year?  
Answer by Japan  
Japan appreciates Australia 's supportive comments on our food assistance.  
a. Recipient countries and region of our food assistance programme from 2017 to 2020 are 
as follows.  
CY2017:  Mauritania, Democratic Republic of the C ongo, Comoros, Sao Tome and Principe, 
Eritrea, Togo, Haiti, Burkina Faso, Nepal, Niger, Mali, Senegal, Central African Republic, 
Chad, Djibouti, The Gambia, Guinea, Kenya, Madagascar, Myanmar, Sierra Leone, 
Uganda, Yemen, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Palestine an d Zimbabwe.  
CY2018:  Namibia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Benin, Djibouti, Burundi, Comoros, 
Nepal, Niger, Haiti, The Gambia, Mali, Togo, Sao Tome and Principe, Afghanistan, Burkina 
Faso, Central African Republic, Chad, Guinea, Liberia, Madagascar, Si erra Leone, South 
Sudan, Yemen, Cabo Verde, Cameroon and Palestine.  
CY2019:  Senegal, C ôte d'Ivoire, Mauritania, Burundi, Lesotho, Eritrea, Burkina Faso, 
Comoros, Uganda, Benin, Liberia, Madagascar, Niger, Mali, Nepal, Togo, Haiti, 
Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eswatini, 
Guinea, Guinea -Bissau, Lao People 's Democratic Republic, South Sudan, Yemen, 
Cabo Verde, Cameroon and Palestine.  
CY2020:  Mauritania, Senegal, The Gambia, Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger,  Togo, Sao Tome and 
Principe, Afghanistan, Chad, Central African Republic, Eswatini, Guinea, Guinea -Bissau, 
Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Cabo Verde, Palestine and Zimbabwe.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  b. The total FOB values of our food assistance programme from 2017 to 2020 are as 
follows :  
• CY2017: USD 44,956,831  
• CY2018: USD 40,153,907  
• CY2019: USD 53,726,108  
• CY2020: USD 27,751,681  
2.2.5.4   United States of America (G/AG/N/USA/161)  
AG-IMS ID 101025: Question by Australia - International food aid  
Australia thanks the United States for its ES:3 notification G/AG/N/USA/161  for FY 2020. We note 
that volumes are significantly higher for wheat and rice compared with previous 2019 and 
2018 financial years. (Wheat exports FY 2020 reported at 1,520,400 tonnes compared to  756,860  
in 2019 and 988,950 in 2018. Rice exports of 148,320 tonnes compared with  114,100 in 2019 
and 81,940 in 2018). Australia fully supports the provision of assistance to address humanitarian 
emergencies and improve food security in regions that have poor access to sufficient nutrition but 
continues to note that the volumes of physical food aid notified by the United States for specific 
products are significant.  
Australia requests that the United States provide advice on:  
a. Which Members or countries received the food aid?  
b. As only aid volumes were reported, is the United States able to advise on the monetised 
value amount of aid for each year?  
c. How the United States ensures the physical food aid does not cause adverse effects on 
recipient Members' agricultural indus tries, nor on their region's production and commercial 
markets of either like -products or substitute products?  
Answer by United States of America  
a. In U.S. Fiscal Year 2021 ( 1 October 2020 to 30 September 2021), the United States sent 
food aid listed in its 2020 Table ES:3 notification ( G/AG/N/USA/161 ) to the following 
countries: Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central 
African Republic, Colombia, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, 
Dominican Republic, East Timor, Ethiopia, Georgia, G hana, Guatemala, Guinea -Bissau, 
Haiti, Honduras, Kenya, , Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, 
Nepal, Niger, Peru, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Togo, Uganda, 
Uzbekistan, and  Yemen.   
b. Of the commodities and volumes l isted in the 2020 Table ES:3 notification 
(G/AG/N/USA/161 ), the United States sent USD 313 million worth of food aid that was 
monetized.   
c. The U.S. Government works with recipient governments and implementing organizations 
to analyze markets and choose agricultural products that will not disrupt local production, 
prices, local markets, or commercial trade. Prior to the approval of a proposed U.S. food 
aid programme in a recipient country, the U.S. Government must make a positive 
"Bellmon  Determination." The local and regional market analysis informing the 
Bellmon  Determination takes into consideration quantitative and qualitative market data, 
timing of harvests or a close substitute of the commodity in the country, suitability of 
commodity, and potential policy issues.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  2.2.6   Export prohibitions and restrictions  (Table ER:1)  
2.2.6.1   European Union (G/AG/N/EU/77)  
AG-IMS ID 101027: Question by Australia - Trans parency issues  
Australia thanks the EU for its reporting and transparency on export restriction notifications 
G/AG/N/EU/77  and notes that the EU is a proponent and signatory of several initiatives that commit 
and encourage countries not to impose export restrictions. Australia stand s in solidarity with Ukraine 
and all those affected by Russia 's unilateral, illegal and immoral aggression against the people of 
Ukraine. We note the safeguards put in place by the EU, including the Hungarian Ministry of 
Agriculture 's first right of refusa l to purchase within 30 days at market prices.  
Australia requests further updates as to:  
a. whether this right has been exercised since the notification;  
b. whether this measure will likely be extended and for how long;  
c. whether any other EU member States are li kely to follow suit; and  
d. whether there are any intentions to expand the list beyond cereals?  
Answer by European Union  
a. The EU confirms that the right of first refusal has not been exercised. The permission to 
export was given to every single request within a matter of days. Therefore, the traditional 
trade flows stayed open and unaffected by this legislation.  
The objective of the measure has been to collect data on the quantities being exported.  
The EU remains committed to the initiatives aimed at avoiding e xport restrictions on food 
in the WTO and elsewhere. The EU reiterates that unilateral restrictive measures can only 
make matters worse, they undermine resilience, cause panic, and they are ultimately self -
defeating.  
b. The measure has been extended until 15 July. The EU is preparing a revision of notification 
G/AG/N/EU/77  to inform of this extension.   
c. We are not aware of any such intentions.  
AG-IMS ID 101090: Question by Paraguay - Transparency issues  
The E uropean Union is a Member committed to transparency, the proponent and signatory of various 
initiatives that commit to and promote refraining from imposing unnecessary restrictions on imports 
and, in the event that restrictions are imposed, they should be notified in a dvance. We note that 
Paraguay is a co -signatory of at least two of these initiatives with the EU and other Members, and 
that is why we wish to express our concern that this measure was notified almost one month after 
its adoption.  
Could the EU please expl ain: 
a. Why the notification was delayed and what precautions are being taken in order to comply 
with the early notification commitments?  
b. Whether there are plans to extend the measure?  
c. Whether any other EU member State is considering implementing similar meas ures?  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  Answer by European Union  
a. The E uropean Union  has prepared the notification as soon as it was practically possible in 
view of EU 's internal procedures. Indeed the notification was submitted after adoption of 
the legislation but considering the trade restrictions were never applied, this notification 
is intended to inform about the intention contained in the legislation rather than about 
actual restrictions. This is the first export restrictions notification ever submitted by the 
European Union. Instead of hiding information, the EU wanted to share our own struggles 
with this measure. I trust that this transparency can contribute to our discussions on 
export restrictions. I  would also like to note that many of the export restrictions actually 
applied recently remain un -notified to the WTO. EU repeats our earlier calls to improve 
the transparency record on these measures.   
b. The measure has been extended until 15 July. The EU is preparing a revision of notification 
G/AG/N/EU/77  to inform of this extension. Please refer  to the reply provided to question 
AG-IMS ID  101027 . The measure remains focu sed on statistical monitoring of trade flows.   
c. We are not aware of any such intentions.  
Follow -up: Paraguay welcomed the EU's confirmation that it is not considering similar measures in 
other member States but regretted that the measure would be extended t o 15 July. Paraguay 
reminded the EU, as a Member always committed to transparency, to revise the notification 
G/AG/N/EU/77  accordingly and to submit ER notifications in a timely manner. Brazil welcomed the 
EU's recognition of the difficulties to comply with transpa rency requirements, a challenge often faced 
by Members. Brazil stressed the importance of the MC12 Ministerial Declaration on the Emergency 
Response to Food Insecurity and called for Members' efforts to fulfil this commitment and apply 
trade restrictive me asures in a manner consistent with WTO provisions, including notifying ERs in 
accordance with WTO rules.  
Brazil flagged concern regarding the proliferation of restrictive measures in recent times. Brazil 
pointed out, according to IFPRI, around 30 countrie s still implemented export restrictions or other 
restrictive measures in June 2022 and those measures affected around 18% of all agricultural trade.  
Brazil underlined that this situation was different from that in early 2020 when the pandemic hit, 
and was  similar to 2007 and 2008, a moment when prices of agricultural products rose exponentially, 
e.g. 45% in the case of rice.  
Brazil urged Members not to adopt trade -restrictive measures as those measures, in a short term, 
may isolate economy from volatility  of international markets but in the medium and long run, send 
wrong signals to markets and make producers lose incentive to increase production and therefore, 
the measures' effects on prices would not be as expected when they were adopted.  
Brazil reitera ted the importance of Members fulfilling the commitments under paragraphs 3,  4, and  5 
in the Ministerial Declaration on the Emergency Response to Food Insecurity adopted at MC12. 
Noting that the EU took a strong stance on the importance of avoiding ERs in light of the current 
fragile and unstable food security situation and the importance of Members' efforts to ensure stable 
supply chain, Australia looked forward to further updates from the EU on the measure in question.   
AG-IMS ID 101075: Question by Unite d States of America - Transparency issues  
The United States thanks the European Union for the transparency provided in G/AG/N/EU/77  on its 
export re striction in Hungary. The restrictions were notified to end on 15 May 2022.   
Please confirm the restrictions listed in G/AG/N/EU/77  are no longer in effect.  
Answer by European Union  
The measure has been extended until 15 July. The EU is preparing a revision of notification 
G/AG/N/EU/77  to inform of t his extension. Please refer to the reply provided to question 
AGIMS  101027 . The measure remains focused on statistical monitoring of trade flows.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  2.3  OVERDUE NOTIFICATIONS  
2.3.1   Canada  
AG-IMS ID 101076: Question by United States of America  
The United States notes that Canada last submitted a Table NF:1 notification covering calendar 
year 2017 ( G/AG/N/CAN/130 ) in 20 19. Please provide an update on the steps being taken by Canada 
to submit its overdue notifications in this area.   
Answer by Canada  
Canada has submitted Table NF:1 notification covering calendar year 2018 into AG -IMS and work 
is underway on the other  NF:1 notifications.   
2.4  EXPORT COMPETITION  
2.4.1   Australia  
AG-IMS ID 101008: Question by European Union  
Notification G/STR/N/19/AUS circulated on 2 May 2021 . 
Australia has provided the following information in section III.A:  
"In March 2021, the NSW Government commenced a review and consultation into rice vesting in 
NSW to determine whether the vesting arrangements are delivering a net benefit to the  NSW 
community, and to inform whether vesting should continue beyond the current rice -vesting 
proclamation expiry date of  30 June 2022. " 
Could Australia provide a reply whether vesting will continue beyond the current rice vesting 
proclamation expiry date of 30 June 2022 since this information was not included in the relevant 
section of the questionnaire?  
How does Australia ensure that a possible prolongation of the NSW Rice Marketing Board does not 
contradict the Nairobi Ministerial Decision provisions rel ated to minimizing trade distorting effects of 
STEs and their impacts on displacing or impeding the exports of another Member?  
Could Australia explain how the three objectives as stated in the section II.A, namely:  
The objectives of the Rice Marketing Boar d NSW include:  
1. to encourage the development of a competitive domestic market for rice;  
2. to ensure the best possible returns from NSW -grown rice sold outside Australia, based on 
the quality differentials or attributes of Australian -grown rice;  
3. to liaise with  and represent the interests of all NSW rice growers in relation to the Board's 
functions and objects,   
can be achieved through through a monopolistic market structure forces?  
Answer by Australia  
Australia thanks the EU for its question regarding the New S outh Wales (NSW) Rice Marketing Board 
(the Board).   
The NSW Government undertakes regular reviews of the vesting arrangements. As specified in Part 
VI of Notification G/STR/N/19/AUS , on 20 April 2022 the New South Wales Minister for 
Agriculture, and the Deputy Premier, jointly announced that the NSW Government was extending 
the vesting powers of the NSW Rice Marketing Board, with vesting in the Rice M arketing Board 
extended until 30 June 2027.   G/AG/W/235  
 
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  Australia is a small exporter of mostly medium grain rice, representing 0.4% of total global rice 
exports in 2019. This very small share of global rice exports means that Australia 's rice exports – as 
traded by Ricegrowers Limited trading as SunRice, – have no influence over the world price of rice 
and have no trade distorting effects. Australia is a niche participant and therefore a price taker in 
the global rice market. The NSW Government, in its most recent re view, found that a range of 
external factors such as targeted high value market placement, product and quality differentiation, 
market positioning, year -round supply, commercial expertise, and supply chain cost differences 
influenced the price received. As  such, Australian rice exports are fully subject to market forces and 
competition from major exporters of similar rice varieties, such as the United States and China, and 
do not displace or impede exports of rice from other Members.   
The Australian domestic market is open to competition from imports and significant 
quantities of rice are imported. There are no tariffs or quantitative restrictions applied on 
the import of rice into Australia and the NSW Rice Marketing Board has no role in 
regulating imports of rice into Australia. There are many domestic and international 
suppliers of rice in the Australian market. The Board achieves the stated objectives by:  
1. encouraging the development of a competitive domestic market by facilitating p articipation 
of Australian rice producers in a manner that is transparent and places minimal requirements 
upon new entrants ; 
2. independently monitoring the export performance of NSW -grown rice against global market 
conditions, and independently monitoring the efficiency of the related export supply chain 
freight task ; and  
3. liaising regularly with the NSW rice industry via peak industry bodies representing NSW rice 
growers, directly with Authorised Buyers license holders and with growers directly to 
understand their interests and priorities. All NSW rice growers are also invited to the Board 's 
Annual General Meeting.   
2.4.2   India  
AG-IMS ID 101009: Question by European Union  
No replies to the Questionnaire circulated on 3 December 2021.  
 
Can India indicat e the quantity of sugar, skimmed milk and rice exported during the 2020/21 
marketing year (total and with subsidies) and the total amount spent on subsidy for these exports 
(by both national and provincial authorities?  
 
The internal support of India for su gar and its sugar export subsidies have been ruled illegal at the 
first step of ruling at WTO (WTO Panel ruling on India 's measures concerning sugar and sugarcane 
in the disputes brought by Australia, Brazil and Guatemala).  
 
Could India explain why no repl ies were provided to the Export subsidies part of the Questionnaire 
for sugar and sugarcane, given the WTO Panel ruling on these measures?  
Answer by India  
India has filed appeal against the WTO Panel findings.  
 
The export quantity data for sugar, skimmed m ilk and rice for Marketing year 2020 -21 can be 
accessed from the following weblink: https://tradestat.commerce.gov.in/eidb/default.asp . 
 
Export subsidies for relevant products w ould be notified.  
Follow -up: The EU suggested India to give a precise answer to the question rather than pointing to 
general links to lengthy documents. Uruguay looked forward to reviewing the requested information 
from India.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  2.4.3   New Zealand  
AG-IMS ID 101091:  Question by Chile  
Regarding New Zealand's notification, we note that Zespri's exports increased in terms of quantity 
and value during the 2020 -2021 period in comparison to the 2019 -2020 period.  We also see that 
the company's annual report for the 2020-2021 period shows a 23% increase in the company's 
kiwifruit exports from places other than New Zealand in terms of volume.  In this context, we would 
be grateful if New Zealand could clarify whether the changes in Zespri's exports in terms of value 
and quantity have occurred because the company's exports from other origins are being promoted, 
and, if so, explain the measures being taken to help promote them.  
Answer by New Zealand  
Zespri  is a private commercial entity, which receives no government benefits or  support, including 
trade-distorting subsidies, tax advantages, special  financing or preferential access to foreign 
exchange.  The New Zealand government does not provide financial support for any promotional 
activities specifically in  support of Zespri. Zespri 's representation in export statistics from origins 
other than New Zealand is a consequence of its own commercial activities, not of any intervention 
by the New Zealand Government.  
2.4.4   United Kingdom  
AG-IMS ID 101056: Question by Braz il 
Brazil would like to consult UK on the "Slaughter  Incentive Payment Scheme (SIPS)".  
According to information from the UK 's government  website 
(https://www.go v.uk/guidance/slaughter -incentive -payment -scheme -sips), SIPS is a financial 
subsidy for pig  slaughterers to work extra shifts, increasing the  amount of animals slaughtered. The 
processed swine  meat should be destined for export or kept in private  storage, in which case it would 
benefit from aid under  another programme - Private Storage Aid (PSA).  
Therefore, payments under SIPS seems to be contingent  upon exports. However, in 
G/AG/W/125/Rev.16/Add.1 , there is no information regarding the issue.  In the light of the above, 
could the UK:  
a. Confirm on whether it has provided an export  subsidy;  
b. Inform how much it has paid under SIPS in its  export subsidy component.  
c. Provide a full and detailed answer to the export  subsidy section of the EC questionnaire.  
Answer by United Kingdom  
The UK thanks Brazil for their question and sets out its responses below.   
a. No. No export subsidy has been provided under the Slaughter Incentive Payment (SIP) 
Scheme. The scheme was not established to incentivise exports, but to increase the 
throughput of pigs in abatto irs in order to address the animal welfare implications of the 
backlog of up to 200,000 pigs on farm due to a combination of Covid -19, disruption to 
domestic CO² supplies, and a temporary shortage of labour in the processing sector.   
b. There were no payments  made under the SIP Scheme in 2021. In any event, the 
requirement for product to go into Private Storage Aid (PSA) or for export was removed 
for shifts worked on or after 18 February 2022 with no scheme payments having been 
made for SIP Scheme shifts worke d prior to that date. Further details about the 
requirements for SIP Scheme shifts worked on or after 18 February 2022 can be found at 
the updated webpage: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/slaughter -incentive -payment -
scheme -sips-2022-for-shifts -worked -on-or-after-18-february -2022.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  c. As no export subsidy was provided under the SIP Scheme in the 2021 Calendar Year it 
was not included in the UK's ECQ return.   
  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  3  COMPILATION OF RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS RAISED DURING THE COMMITTEE ON 
AGRICULTURE MEETING ON 14 -15 SEPTEMBER 2022  
3.1  MATTERS RELEVANT TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF COMMITMENTS:  ARTICLE 18.6  
3.1.1   Argentina's export restrictions   
3.1.1.1   Question by United States of America, United Kingdom, Japan, Switzerland 
(AG-IMS ID 102076 ) 
As Argentina has yet to provide a response to the United States ', United Kingdom 's, and Japan 's 
request for more information about Argentina 's export restrictions in AG -IMS ID 101030 , the United 
States repeats the question:  
 
We take note that Argentina has imposed an increasing number of export restrictions affecting 
agricultural products, including beef, wheat, corn, and barley. For example, in  December 2021, the 
Argentinian Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Fisheries published Resolution 276/2021 and 
Circular 06/2021 – an export quota on maize and wheat; however, the quotas for maize in 2021 -22 
and wheat in 2022 -23 are below average expor t volumes in recent years.  
 
a. Please confirm when these export restrictions will be permanently lifted.  
b. When will Argentina notify these export restrictions to the Committee on Agriculture 
through the required Table ER:1 notification?  
Answer by Argentina  
Argentina would like to congratulate you on your appointment as Chair of this Committee and assure 
you of our cooperation during your term. We also thank Uruguay, and Marcos in particular, for their 
tireless work over the past year.   
With regard to the questi ons addressed to Argentina, we once again thank Switzerland, the United 
States, the United Kingdom and Japan for their timely submissions. We shall respond to questions 
101015 and 101030 together.   
Argentina has a strong commitment to global food security . This has been part of our history 
and will continue to be so. In 2021, our agri -food exports to the world amounted to almost 
USD 54,000 million (69% of o ur total exports), which represents a 42% increase on 2020. We have 
always been an exporter of agricultural products and food, which is a key sector for generating the 
foreign exchange that our country's economy needs to operate and address our long -standi ng 
external restrictions.   
Our exports to the world of wheat, maize and beef have neither ceased nor declined in 
structural terms.  Rather, exports of these products have reached historic levels:   
a. As we indicated at the 100th meeting of the Committee on Agr iculture, in 2020 -21, the 
volume of beef exports increased by 26% on the previous biennium and by 227% 
compared to 2016 -17. 
b. Moreover, 2021 was a record year for maize and wheat exports, with our country's maize 
exports reaching a 10 -year high and wheat exp orts at their second highest level in the 
past 10 years.  
c. In addition, in the first four months of this year, our country exported 10.9 million tonnes 
of maize and 9.5 million tonnes of wheat, which represents an increase of 10.5% and 77% 
respectively compa red to the first four months of 2021.   
It is important to clarify that the " balance volumes " published on the website of the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries are amounts that are updated as new production -related 
information is confirmed. In this connection, it is worth clarifying that Argentina: (i) has no public, 
pro-cyclical or counter -cyclical stocks; (ii) does not make government -to-government sales; and G/AG/W/235  
 
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  that (iii) production, storage, transport and marketing are undertaken by private actors under 
market conditions, so the information available is ever -changing and comes from private commercial 
acts.  
Argentina's objective  is to provide predictability, confidence and stability to the domestic market in 
order to guarantee dome stic food security amid global shortages and inflation. These objectives also 
benefit the international market, since the "balance volumes" ensure that our trading partners are 
aware in advance of the quantity that they may purchase in Argentina, which ena bles them to 
organize their domestic supply to guarantee their own food security. Argentina stresses that it has 
in no way contributed to aggravating either the global food situation or that of any of our individual 
trading partners.   
In terms of reasons , Argentina, like the vast majority of the world's countries, is being hit by the 
adverse effects of a global inflationary process that has a particular impact on food. This affects us 
especially; our history shows that we are highly vulnerable to such proce sses. Our inflation was 
already high and it has skyrocketed as a result of, inter alia , the war in Ukraine.   
Argentina has been exporting more and more products that are better quality and sustainably 
produced. Through major public -private efforts, Argenti na has been developing new technologies; 
encouraging the implementation of good agricultural practices to increase our productivity without 
harming the environment and while ensuring social inclusion; and adopting regulatory systems that 
meet high quality and biosecurity standards. However, we are being increasingly affected by the 
consequences of climate change , even though we are responsible for less than 0.5% of global 
emissions. If our country (like most agro -exporting developing countries) were not exp osed to 
extreme climatic events (such as droughts, floods and fires) and if it were to receive international 
financing to adapt to these events, it would produce and export in much greater volumes than it is 
currently doing, thereby making an even more sig nificant contribution to global food security by 
providing quality food for a world with steadily increasing demand.   
Argentina is responding to the current major global crisis caused by the COVID -19 pandemic, climate 
change and the war in Ukraine without increasing trade -distorting domestic support, without 
increasing agricultural protectionism and without adversely affecting global food security. We hope 
that each Member will do their part to resolve these issues in line with their specific responsibiliti es.  
Lastly, it should be noted that all the issues of interest to the Members that sent questions are 
published  in our official journal and/or communicated on the website of the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Livestock and Fisheries of the Argentine Republic. I n addition, even though our exports have not 
stopped or decreased structurally, for the purposes of transparency, we have been responding 
systematically to all of the questions put to us in the WTO Committee on Agriculture and will continue 
to do so.  
Follow-up: The United  Kingdom  recognized the wide -ranging challenge on food insecurity faced 
across the globe and recognized the acute situations faced by some Members. As a net food importer, 
the UK highlighted that export restrictions (ER) further exacerbated  global supply issue and led to 
further food insecurity and potential volatility in global agricultural markets. The UK urged Argentina 
to take transparent approaches to its use of ER. The UK noted that having clarity and transparency 
on ER is a key elemen t in supporting smooth global food trade, which is especially necessary when 
Members are collectively dealing with ongoing food security and supply issue. Switzerland reminded 
Argentina that it is waiting for response to this question as well as to a quest ion posed at the last 
Committee meeting, AG -IMS ID 101015 . Switzerland emphas ized that notifications of ER would be 
beneficial for transparency and the well -functioning of international markets. Supporting the 
statements by the UK and Switzerland, the United  States  reiterated the importance of transparency 
and looked forward to rev iewing Argentina's ER notification. Ukraine noted that ER have an impact 
on price volatility and negatively affect international agricultural markets. Ukraine encouraged 
Members introducing ER measures to ensure that those measures are consistent with WTO rules and 
adhere to the Ministerial Declaration on the Emergency Response to Food Insecurity.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  3.1.2   Canada's Special Milk Class Scheme  
3.1.2.1   Question by New Zealand (AG -IMS ID 102073 ) 
New Zealand has previously raised questions around Canada's milk classes, and notes Canada's 
responses in AG -IMS ID 101013 , AG-IMS ID  100064  and AG -IMS ID  99098 . New Zealand continues 
to seek further explanation on how setting milk class 4(a) prices at only CAD 4.2127/kg – 
substantially below the cost of production for milk protein, (which the Cana dian Dairy Commission 
estimates to be CAD 5.41/kg), is substantively different to the implementation of the previous 
Classes 6 and 7.  
Further, New Zealand seeks to clarify the effect on the increased Canadian value -added protein 
products onto the world mar ket. Canadian exports of refined lactose, as a by -product of highly 
processed Milk Protein Concentrate (MPC), has risen dramatically since 2019. Of Canada's total 
production of value -added milk protein products including milk protein concentrates, infant f ormula, 
skim milk powder (SMP) and SMP blends, what %age was accounted for by domestic Canadian 
demand as compared to exports annually since 2019?  
Answer by Canada  
Canada has already explained how Class 4(a) prices are set.  In AG -IMS ID 96004 , Canada directed 
Members to more information on how milk prices are set, w hich includes details on Class 4(a) 
prices.  This information has been reiterated in Canada 's response in AG -IMS IDs 97003  and 99098 . 
With respect to the fig ure used by New Zealand, which is claimed to be a figure published by the 
Canadian Dairy Commission (CDC) in relation to cost of production, this is inaccurate. The CDC has 
only ever published cost of production figures on the basis of standard hectolitres  of milk and does 
not publish cost of production on the basis of kilograms of milk protein. According to its most recent 
publication, which was published in October 2021 using data from 2020, the cost of production for 
one standard hectolitre of milk in 20 20 was CAD 85.42. The CDC 's cost of production studies are 
publicly available at the following link: https://cdc -ccl.ca/index.php/en/about -the-canadian -dairy-
commission/publications/production -cost-studies/   
With respect to New Zealand 's interest in Canada 's exports o f refined lactose, which is classified 
under Chapter 17 of the Harmonized System (i.e., "Sugars and Sugar Confectionary "), this is not 
indicative of Canada 's exports of milk protein. First, lactose is a sugar (the carbohydrate component) 
in milk, which sho uld not be confused with whey and casein (the protein components) in milk. 
Second, refined lactose is neither subject to import controls nor export controls in Canada and is 
traded duty -free and quota -free under Canada 's free trade agreements. Third, as Ca nada has 
previously stated in AG -IMS ID 100064 it is ultimately the business decision of a processor or 
exporter in Canada to either sell dairy products on the domestic market, or to export them. It is also 
the business decision of foreign importers to sel ect the products they wish to import. Fourth, Canada 
has already demonstrated by using publicly available data in AG -IMS ID 100064 that its exports of 
dairy products have declined between 2020 and 2021, including for skim milk powder, whey 
products, casein  and casein products, and products consisting of natural milk constituents (such 
as MPC70).   
As to the comparison between Canada 's domestic market for dairy products in relation to its exports, 
please refer to Statistics Canada 's data on the supply and dis position of milk products in Canada 
which includes monthly data including total supply, beginning stocks, production, imports, exports, 
ending stocks and domestic disappearance.  This data is available at the following link: 
https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=3210010901&pickMembers%5B0%5D=1.
1&pickMembers%5B1%5D=2.9 &cubeTimeFrame.startMonth=01&cubeTimeFrame.startYear=2021
&cubeTimeFrame.endMonth=12&cubeTimeFrame.endYear=2022&referencePeriods=20210101%2C
20221201 . 
Follow -up: New Zealand reiterated its interest in how Canada undertakes pricing of milk inputs and 
its impact on producers' decisions and trade.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  3.1.3   Canada 's Review of the TRQ System  
3.1.3.1   Question by United Kingdom (AG -IMS ID 102090 ) 
As a follow up to AG -IMS ID 99110 , 100065  and 101016 , the United Kingdom wishes to reiterate its 
interest in the results of Canada 's Comprehensive Review of the Allocation and Administration of 
Tariff Rate Quotas (TRQs) for Dairy, Poultry and Egg Products. Is Canada able to provide an update 
on the expected delivery date of the review 's results?  
Answer by Canada  
Canada appreciates the United Kingdom 's continued interest in the Comprehensive Review of the 
Allocation and Administration of Tariff Rate Quotas (TRQs) for D airy, Poultry and Egg Products (the 
Review).  All feedback received from stakeholders throughout the consultations has been considered 
and will help inform decisions on long -term TRQ policies.  While a number of events have impacted 
Canada 's ability to concl ude this process, Canada continues to aim to finalize the Review as soon as 
possible. Updates on the process will be shared in due course.  
Follow -up: While the UK understood that events had contributed to delay of the release of the review, 
noting it was t he 4th time it had asked the question, it urged Canada to provide an indicative timeline 
for when Canada intended to complete and publish the findings of the review.  
3.1.4   Canada – Financial support for wine production  
3.1.4.1   Question by European Union (AG -IMS ID 102009 ) 
Canada has introduced a new support programme for wine production 
(https://agriculture.canada.ca/en/agricultural -programs -and-services/wine -sector -support -
program ), whereby Canada will support its wine  industry with a total amount of CAD 166 million 
over two years, which is in the order of CAD 1.11 per litre and per year. We understand that this 
programme was initially proposed by the Government of Canada in Budget 2021 for a total amount 
of CAD 101 mil lion over two years, under the title "Support for Jobs in the Canadian Wine Sector ". 
a. Can Canada explain the reasons for introduction of such a significant aid scheme for its 
wine industry, and why the total amount was increased by 64%, compared to the init ial 
proposal?  
b. Can Canada elaborate how this new aid scheme is in line with the ongoing discussion in 
WTO to reduce Trade Distorting support measures and  
c. Which measures has Canada taken to ensure that such a significant aid schemes for a 
specific sector doe s not influence trade patterns?  
Answer by Canada  
Canada 's new Wine Sector Support Program (WSSP) will provide up to CAD 166.2 million to Canadian 
wine licensees, with up to CAD 83.2 million in funding to be provided in 2022 -2023, and 
CAD 83 million in  2023-2024.  
The Program will provide grant payments to licensed Canadian wineries based on their volume of 
eligible production. To be eligible, wine must be produced in Canada using fermented domestic 
and/or imported primary agricultural products in the previous fiscal year from the one in which a 
grant payment is issued. Only the portion of wine that is produced and originates from domestic 
and/or imported primary agricultural products will be considered in grant payment calculations, 
including for Inter national Domestic Blend wine.  
Budget 2021 proposed to provide CAD 101 million over two years, starting in 2022 -23, to Agriculture 
and Agri -Food Canada, to implement a programme for the wine sector that will support wineries in 
adapting to ongoing and emerg ing challenges, in line with Canada 's trade obligations. Stakeholders 
raised concern that the CAD 101 million was insufficient and would not provide the certainty needed 
to support transitional investments given the repeal of the Excise Duty Exemption on C anadian wines G/AG/W/235  
 
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  and the lingering impacts of COVID -19. The total programme budget was thus increased by 
CAD 65.2 million.  
This support is consistent with Canada's WTO domestic support commitments and is a temporary 
transition measure.  
The Excise Duty Exempti on on Canadian wines was implemented in 2006 and repealed in 2022. 
During this time, the Canadian wine industry has not increased its share of the domestic market and 
foreign entities have maintained a majority share of 60%. Canada 's share of the global wi ne market 
remains very small at less than 2% of volume, and at about 0.2% in value. No additional measures 
outside of this programme are being taken, therefore trade patterns will remain unaltered.  
Follow -up: New Zealand and Uruguay registered interest in the question.  
3.1.5   China's grain reserve  
3.1.5.1   Question by Australia (AG -IMS ID 102075 ) 
Australia notes that the China Grain Reserves Corporation Group (Sin ograin), which manages the 
national grain reserve, purchased 110,000 metric tonnes of wheat.  
Could China please explain:  
a. What was the purchase price paid for the wheat?  
b. What are the influencing factors whereby the Sinograin determines the volume of the 
reserve?  
c. How does the Sinograin determine the price at which grains are sold on the open market?  
d. Will the stocks of wheat procured be from the domestic market only?  
Answer by China  
a. The purchase price paid for the wheat is market price.  
b. The main influencing fa ctor is market situation of grains.  
c. The grains are sold at market price.  
d. Yes. 
Follow -up: New Zealand and Uruguay registered interest in the question. The U nited States noted 
that the role of Chinese government in the agricultural sector including for both wheat and cotton 
remains an issue of interest and concern. According to the US, China targeted to increase grain 
production in  2022 through various policies and incentives including USD 4.5 billion  - or 30 -billion -
yuan one -off subsidies.  
The US noted that  China plays a significant role in global agricultural markets and its overdue 
domestic support notifications are equally important to the Committee's work.  Brazil observed that 
the period covered in China's latest notifications (2011 -2016) seemed to repre sent the end of an 
agricultural policy cycle. Brazil noted that, according to information available online, Chinese 
agricultural support policy seemed to have changed substantially since 2016.  
It would be in the best spirit of Member -led, cooperative and transparent work undertaken in the 
Committee on Agriculture (CoA) if Members could benefit from information directly provided by 
China. Brazil took the opportunity to consult China on its intended timeframe for submitting a new 
DS:1 notification and, if ap plicable, its DS:2 notifications to CoA.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  3.1.6   China's cotton policies  
3.1.6.1   Question by United States of America (AG -IMS ID 102034 ) 
In AG -IMS ID 90075 , the United States asked for statistics on the volume of cotton production for 
both Xinjiang and for China, nationally, for each of the years from 2012 to 2017. China stated that 
statistics were being updated and the response would be provided later.  However, the data has not 
yet been provided to this Committee.   
Please provide the volume  of cotton production for both Xinjiang and for China, nationally, for each 
of the years from 2012 to 2021.  
Answer by China  
Year  2012  2013  2014  2015  2016  2017  2018  2019  2020  2021  
China 
Nationwide  6.61 6.28 6.30 5.91 5.34 5.65 6.10 5.89 5.91 5.73 
Xinjiang 
Uygur 
Autonomous 
Region  3.88 3.94 4.15 4.19 4.08 4.57 5.11 5.00 5.16 5.13 
Unit: million tonnes.  
Follow -up: Brazil observed that the period covered in China's latest notifications (2011 -2016) 
seemed to represent the end of an agricultural policy cycle. Brazil noted that, according to 
information available online, Chinese agricultural support policy seemed to have changed 
substantially since 2016. It would be in the best spirit of Member -led, cooperative and transparent 
work und ertaken in the Committee on Agriculture (CoA) if Members could benefit from information 
directly provided by China. Brazil took the opportunity to consult China on its intended timeframe 
for submitting a new DS:1 notification and, if applicable, its DS:2 n otifications to CoA.  
3.1.6.2   Question by United States of America (AG -IMS ID 102035 ) 
In AG -IMS ID 90075 , China stated that the cotton target price subsidy was only being provided to 
the Xinjiang autonomous region, and not to any other cotton p roducing provinces during the 
transition period.  
a. Has the transition period concluded?  
b. Is Xinjiang still the only region that receives the cotton target price subsidy?  
c. Has there been any change to the calculation of the base period cotton production?  
d. What w as the rationale for setting a limit against national production, but limiting 
production that can be procured to only one sub -national region?  
Answer by China  
a. Yes. 
b. Yes. 
c. There is no change.  
d. Please clarify the question.  
Follow -up: Brazil observed that the p eriod covered in China's latest notifications (2011 -2016) 
seemed to represent the end of an agricultural policy cycle. Brazil noted that, according to 
information available online, Chinese agricultural support policy seemed to have changed 
substantially si nce 2016. It would be in the best spirit of Member -led, cooperative and transparent 
work undertaken in the Committee on Agriculture (CoA) if Members could benefit from information G/AG/W/235  
 
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  directly provided by China. Brazil took the opportunity to consult China on its intended timeframe 
for submitting a new DS:1 notification and, if applicable, its DS:2 notifications to CoA.  
3.1.7   China's cotton reserves purchasing system  
3.1.7.1   Question by United States of America (AG -IMS ID 102033 ) 
On 13 July 2022, the China State Cotton Reserve Corporation began buying cotton. Since this date 
the China State Cotton Reserve Corporation has procure d 58,660 tonnes of cotton at an average 
price of 15,951 yuan/tonne.  The following table includes the daily volume and prices of cotton 
purchases made by the China State Cotton Reserve Corporation as of 19 August 2022, according to 
notices posted on the Chi na National Cotton Exchange website 
(http://www.cottonchina.org.cn/news/newsser.php?relnews1=2022%C2%D6%C8%EB&relnews=
%C2% D6%C8%EB%C6%C0%CA%F6 ).  
Date  Purchase Quantity 
(tonnes)  Average Price 
(yuan/tonne)  
7/13/2022  5,000  16,254  
7/14/2022  6,000  16,286  
7/15/2022  6,000  16,057  
7/18/2022  480 16,490  
7/19/2022  2,960  15,950  
7/20/2022  3,040  16,130  
7/21/2022  2,960  15,928  
7/22/2022  2,360  15,776  
7/25/2022  2,860  15,849  
7/26/2022  2,600  15,872  
7/27/2022  2,000  15,891  
7/28/2022  2,200  15,868  
7/29/2022  1,400  15,793  
8/1/2022  3,800  15,829  
8/2/2022  4,960  15,797  
8/3/2022  3,600  15,779  
8/4/2022  1,920  15,703  
8/5/2022  2,120  15,706  
8/8/2022  1,600  15,712  
8/9/2022  800 15,658  
a. Please confirm whether these purchases were made under an extension of the measure 
entitled "Deepening the Target Price Policy Reform of Cotton", which was notified in 
G/AG/N/CHN/48 , or under some new measure.  
b. Please confirm whether any other government or state -owned enterprise pur chases were 
made for the current season.  If so, please provide the quantities and purchase prices.  
c. Have similar purchases occurred in 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020 or 2021? If so, please provide 
the quantities and purchase prices made by the China State Cotton Re serve Corporation 
or other entities for each year, as well as a clarification of the measure under which 
purchases were made for each year, if different.  
d. Please explain the processes for these auctions, including how it is determined how much 
the governmen t will purchase and how the price is determined.  
e. Please indicate whether there are any limits placed on the maximum quantity of cotton 
that the government may purchase.  
f. What entities are allowed to participate in these auctions?  
g. Please explain the rules fo r eventual release of these stocks of cotton.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  h. Please provide the regulation that governs the release of government or state -owned 
stocks of cotton.  
Answer by China  
a. The purchases were made for central cotton reserve, not made under an extension of the 
measure entitled "Deepening the Target Price Policy Reform of Cotton".  
b. No. 
c. The amount of purchase is determined by such factors as optimizing the structure of cotton 
reserve, replenishing cotton reserve, etc. The cotton is purchased at market price. Certai n 
amount of cotton was purchased in 2019.  
d. The amount of cotton purchased by the government is determined by such factors as 
optimizing the structure of cotton reserve, replenishing cotton reserve, etc. The highest 
auction price is determined according to t he domestic spot price of cotton.  
e. The maximum amount purchased by the government shall not exceed the reserve scale.  
f. In principle, all of the processing enterprises and trading enterprises of cotton may 
participate in the auction.  
g. The release of cotton res erve is made according to the need of optimizing the structure of 
cotton reserve.  
h. Please refer to the circulars issued by China National Food and Strategic Reserve 
Administration or China Cotton Reserve Corporation.  
Follow -up: Brazil observed that the peri od covered in China's latest notifications (2011 -2016) 
seemed to represent the end of an agricultural policy cycle. Brazil noted that, according to 
information available online, Chinese agricultural support policy seemed to have changed 
substantially since  2016. It would be in the best spirit of Member -led, cooperative and transparent 
work undertaken in the Committee on Agriculture (CoA) if Members could benefit from information 
directly provided by China. Brazil took the opportunity to consult China on its  intended timeframe 
for submitting a new DS:1 notification and, if applicable, its DS:2 notifications to CoA. The 
United  States sought further information concerning China's cotton reserves purchasing system in 
the absence of a DS:1 notification after 2016 . 
3.1.8   China's Blue Box support to cotton   
3.1.8.1   Question by United States of America (AG -IMS ID 102032 ) 
On 14 December 2018, China submitted a Table DS:2 notification ( G/AG/N/CHN/48 ) on a measure 
entitled "Deepening the Target Price Policy Reform of Cotton."  According to the notifi cation, "The 
amount of subsidized cotton is subject to a limit, which is 85% or less of the average cotton 
production in the base period (2012 -2014) " and the period of application was 2017 -2019.   
 
Taking note that China's most recent Table DS:1 notificatio n is for 2016 and noting the notified 
measure ended in 2019:   
 
Please provide an update on whether this measure continued to be applied after 2019.  
Answer by China  
Yes, please refer to "Circular on Improving the Target Price Policy of Cotton" (Fagaijiage [ 2020] 
No. 474).  
Follow -up: The US noted that the role of Chinese government in the agricultural sector including for 
both wheat and cotton remains an issue of interest and concern. According to the US China targeted 
to increase grain production in 2022 thr ough various policies and incentives including USD 4.5 billion G/AG/W/235  
 
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  or 30 billion yuan one -off subsidies. The US noted that China plays a significant role in global 
agricultural markets and its overdue domestic support notifications are equally important to the  
Committee's work . Brazil observed that the period covered in China's latest notifications (2011 -
2016) seemed to represent the end of an agricultural policy cycle. Brazil noted that, according to 
information available online, Chinese agricultural support p olicy seemed to have changed 
substantially since 2016. It would be in the best spirit of Member -led, cooperative and transparent 
work undertaken in the Committee on Agriculture (CoA) if Members could benefit from information 
directly provided by China. Bra zil took the opportunity to consult China on its intended timeframe 
for submitting a new DS:1 notification and, if applicable, its DS:2 notifications to CoA.  
3.1.9   Ecuador 's new milk law  
3.1.9.1   Question by United States of America (AG -IMS ID 102131 ) 
The United States is concerned with Ecuador 's "Organic Law to Promote the Production, Marketing, 
Industrialization, Consumption, and Fixation of the Price of Milk and its Derivatives"  registered on 
August 17 that bans the importation of powdered milk for ten years, as of the date of 
registration.  Moreover, the law does not specify how such a ban would be implemented.  
a. How will Ecuador implement this ban on imports of powdere d milk?  
b. Please explain how this complies with Ecuador 's WTO commitments.  
Answer by Ecuador  
We appreciate the interest of the United States in this matter. Ecuador invariably seeks to comply 
with WTO rules and obligations. We have been unable to obtain all the necessary information from 
our capital to give an appropriate response to this question. As soon as we have completed the 
internal consultations, we hope to have a response which we will send to the delegation concerned 
through the official channels. E cuador is open to following up on this matter with the trading partners 
concerned.  
Follow -up: The European  Union shared United  States. concern. Noting that the import ban of milk 
powder had lasted for 10 years, the EU asked how such a blanket ban is compat ible with WTO 
obligations. The EU informed Members of its bilateral contact with Ecuador on this matter and invited 
Ecuador to reconsider the measure and explore alternative solutions to ensure trade would not be 
disturbed.  
3.1.10   Egypt's Export Prohibitions on A gricultural Products  
3.1.10.1   Question by New Zealand, Paraguay, United Kingdom, Australia (AG -IMS ID 
102074 ) 
New Zealand recognizes the significant challenges to foo d security that Egypt is facing. We 
understand that Egypt has introduced two export restrictions in June of 2022. Firstly, on the 10  June, 
a restriction on Flour, oils, lentils, pasta, and beans. Secondly, on the 12th of June, a restriction on 
Vegetable oi l and maize. New  Zealand is interested in any further information that Egypt can provide 
on their export restriction policies.   
Answer by Egypt  
Currently, those products are not subject to any export restrictions. Those products were subject to 
a temporary  export restriction of a renewed three months ' period  as per Ministerial Decree No.  335 
for the year 2022. This period has expired on September 7th, 2022. It is noteworthy that the decree 
allowed for exporting quantities in excess of the domestic market 's needs as estimated  by the 
Ministry of Supply and Internal Trade and after the approval of the Minister of Trade and Industry.  
Follow -up: Australia, New Zealand, Paraguay, the UK and the US welcomed the news that the export 
restriction measure had been lift ed. The UK asked how the WTO could support Egypt to ensure timely 
notification of such measures.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  3.1.11   Egypt's import requirement  
3.1.11.1   Question by European Union (AG -IMS ID 102010 ) 
The EU would like to reiterate its question AG -IMS 101003  to Egypt and ask for a reply:   
The European Union would like to express its concerns concerning the mandatory usage of Letters 
of Credit as unique method of payment for i mports into Egypt.  
This requirement has increased the administrative burden and cost of exporting to Egypt, and has 
led to significant delays and import blockages, including for strategic and/or perishable agricultural 
products (seeds, apples).   
Taking into account Article X (1) of GATT 1994, as well as the Agreement on Trade facilitation 
Article  1: Publication and availability of information:  
a. Can Egypt explain the reasons behind this restriction of payments methods – economic as 
well as administr ative?  
b. Which measures has Egypt taken to ensure that this change will not delay the import of 
strategic and perishable food products?  
Answer by Egypt  
At the outset, it is important to note that letters of credit are one of the well -acknowledged methods 
of payments and in many cases required by the exporters given the fact that it provides a high level 
of reassurance to the exporter. Letters of credits do not create import blockages.  
 
In case delay occurs, it is important to note that the current unprecedent ed global challenges have 
put the monetary reserves of a Net Food Importing Developing Country like Egypt under pressure.  
This in turn may cause the delay referred to and  affect  the ability to finance imports  including those 
of goods essential for the live lihood of our people.  
 
Concerning the availability and publication of information, since the introduction of mandatory use 
of letters of credit in February 2022, the  Central Bank of Egypt  (CBE)  has ensured transparency 
through issuance  a number of circular s (the latest dated 6 June 2022  (to clarify the scope of the 
requirement (in terms of  entities,  products, trade regimes) and the relevant administrative 
procedures.  
 
The link to the latest circular is found on:  
https://www.cbe.org.eg/en/Pages/HighlightsPages/Regarding -updating -the-Inquiries -about -
LCs.aspx  
 
Furthermore, letters of credit are not the unique payment method, there are also other acce pted 
payment methods as explained in the above hyperlink. The above circular explains that there are 
many products that do not fall within the product coverage including inter alia : 
 
• Medicines, vaccines and relevant chemicals, medical supplies and their in puts, and supplies 
for medical testing laboratories.  
• Tea, meat, poultry, fish, wheat, oil, powder milk, infant milk, beans, lentils, butter, and corn.  
• Live cattle and poultry, in addition to veterinary medicines and their relevant chemicals . 
• Raw materials and production inputs including seeds, chemicals used in agricultural activities 
and raw cocoa powder.  
Finally, to ensure that no shipments of perishable goods (agricultural and food products) face any 
delay in Egyptian ports, there are currently instructions that all perishable shipments  (agricultural 
and food products)  be cleared from customs provided the importer pledges to finalize the 
administrative procedures with the bank within a maximum of one year.  
Follow -up: Brazil noted that Members sho uld avoid resorting to administrative and financial 
requirements that unnecessarily obstruct trade. Brazil sought a detailed explanation from Egypt G/AG/W/235  
 
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  concerning the objectives of the measures and the reasons why limiting payment methods would be 
the only for m to meet such objectives.  
3.1.12   Egypt's increase in planted area  
3.1.12.1   Question by European Union (AG -IMS ID 102011 ) 
According to press report in Agricensus, Egypt is targeting an increase in planted area of up to one 
million acres in 2023. Egypt had managed to add 200,000 acres to its planted area, reclaiming it 
back from unusable land in order to plant more corn.   
Can Egypt explain which support measures were implemen ted to achieve this increase in planted 
area?  
Answer by Egypt  
The support measures implemented by the Egyptian government to increase the planted areas is 
mainly focused on infrastructural services of a general nature such as establishing roads and 
transpo rts networks  and land clearing to facilitate access to un -reclaimed  land areas.  It is worth 
mentioning that  the farmers take full responsibility of  the installation of the necessary on -farm 
facilities  required for reclaiming and planting their farms includ ing drilling ground water wells and 
connecting electricity.  
3.1.13   EU's new CAP  
3.1.13.1   Question by Korea, Republic of (AG -IMS ID 102091 ) 
As far as we know with regard to " The new CAP 2023 -2027", the European Commission (EC) sent 
observation letters to all of the member States in May. According to the latest press release on 
31 August, the Commission approved the first package of CAP strategic plans for seven countries: 
Denm ark, Finland, France, Ireland, Poland, Portugal, and Spain. The Republic of Korea would like to 
request additional information from the EU on the progress made in the preparation of "The new 
CAP" which is scheduled to implement on 1 January 2023.  
Answer by  European Union  
The E uropean Union  thanks the Republic of Korea for the question.  The Republic of Korea has 
correctly observed that the first package of seven CAP Strategic Plans was adopted. The remaining 
CAP Strategic Plans will be approved by the Europe an Commission in the coming months after all 
remaining issues are clarified.  At present, all remaining CAP Plans are on track to being approved 
by the end of 2022 in time to start its implementation as of 2023.  The EU intends to submit a DS:2 
notification to WTO at the beginning of the calendar year 2023, after all the Strategic Plans have 
been approved fulfilling its obligation under AoA to notify new or changed Blue and Green Box 
measures.  
3.1.14   India's export restrictions on wheat  
3.1.14.1   Question by Australia (AG -IMS ID 102092 ) 
Australia thanks India for its response to its previous question on India 's announcement of export 
restrictions on wheat (AG -IMS ID 101019 ). In its response, India answered that the conditions of it 
the implementation of t he export restriction is notified in Notification 13 May 2022 issued by the 
Directorate General of Foreign Trade (DGFT) and subsequent DGFT notices. Australia notes the 
length of the restriction has not been indicated in DGFT notices.   
 
In light of this, c ould India please indicate how long it intends the restriction to remain place?  
Answer by India  
India's measure was necessitated by the need to manage the food security concerns in the country. 
The Government of India is committed to supporting the needs o f neighbouring and vulnerable G/AG/W/235  
 
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  countries that are adversely affected by sudden changes in the global market for wheat based on 
the request of their governments. India accordingly considers requests made by other 
governments.  This measure is temporary in nat ure and the situation is under continuous monitoring.  
Follow -up: The US registered its continued concern regarding India's export restrictions (ER) on 
wheat, wheat flour and other related wheat product. In its view, the ER had adversely affected global 
availability of wheat during the ongoing food crisis which was already exacerbated by Russia's war 
against Ukraine. The US encouraged India to immediately lift the ER, provide the outstanding ER 
notification promptly and indicate when the ER would b e lifted. The US stated that India's previous 
responses had indicated that ER were put in place to manage food security concern but according to 
various media reports Indian government had stated there was no shortage of wheat stocks in 
government stockpil e. Indian agricultural administration had been quoted that wheat stock were in 
excess of necessary buffer stock level. Given the above -average production forecast in March, the 
US repeated the question when India would lift the restriction. Ukraine noted t hat the imposition of 
ER may contribute to price volatility and adversely affect international market and food supply. 
Despite the war launched by Russia, Ukraine noted that it had taken steps to remain transparent 
and had demonstrated its commitment to th e fundamental rules of the WTO and doing its best to 
maintain supply to the international agricultural markets. Highlighting the absence of ER on its 
exported food products, Ukraine encouraged WTO Members to ensure that any emergency measure 
introduced to address food security concerns should minimize trade distortion as far as possible and 
be temporary, transparent, and proportionate to the needs. Ukraine underlined that Members 
applying those measures should also adhere to the WTO commitments including th ose contained in 
the recently adopted Ministerial declaration which underscores the need for agri -food trade to flow. 
Given India's response that the measure was of temporary nature, Canada asked India to provide 
an indicative timeframe regarding when the measure would be removed. Japan, as a net food 
importing country, registered its interest in transparency on ER and looked forward to India's 
notification on the measure.  
3.1.14.2   Question by Paraguay (AG -IMS ID 102078 ) 
In follow -up to the reply received from India to question AG -IMS ID 101032 , in which it states that 
the notification would be submitted "in due cou rse", we ask India to explain the current state of 
preparation of the notification and provide any other update with regard to its submission "in due 
course" to this Committee.   
Answer by India  
The notification for the export restriction is under preparati on and would be submitted in due 
course.  
Follow -up: The US registered its continued concern regarding India's export restrictions (ER) on 
wheat, wheat flour and other related wheat product. In its view, the ER had adversely affected global 
availability of wheat during the ongoing food crisis which was already exacerbated by Russia's war 
against Ukraine. The US encouraged India to immediately lift the ER, provide the outstanding ER 
notification promptly and indicate when the ER would be lifted.  
The US state d that India's previous responses had indicated that ER were put in place to manage 
food security concern but according to various media reports Indian government had stated there 
was no shortage of wheat stocks in government stockpile. Indian agricultural  administration had 
been quoted that wheat stock were in excess of necessary buffer stock level. Given the above -
average production forecast in March, the US repeated the question when India would lift the 
restriction.  
Ukraine noted that the imposition of  ER may contribute to price volatility and adversely affect 
international market and food supply. Despite the war launched by Russia, Ukraine noted that it had 
taken steps to remain transparent and had demonstrated its commitment to the fundamental rules 
of the WTO and doing its best to maintain supply to the international agricultural markets. 
Highlighting the absence of ER on its exported food products, Ukraine encouraged WTO Members to 
ensure that any emergency measure introduced to address food security  concerns should minimize 
trade distortion as far as possible and be temporary, transparent, and proportionate to the needs.  G/AG/W/235  
 
- 185 - 
 
  Ukraine underlined that Members applying those measures should also adhere to the WTO 
commitments including those contained in the  recently adopted Ministerial declaration which 
underscores the need for agri -food trade to flow. Given India's response that the measure was of 
temporary nature, Canada asked India to provide an indicative timeframe regarding when the 
measure would be rem oved. Japan, as a net food importing country, registered its interest in 
transparency on ER and looked forward to India's notification on the measure.  
 
3.1.14.3   Question by European Union, United States of America, Switzerland, United 
Kingdom (AG -IMS ID 102012 ) 
a. Export restriction on wheat  
On 13 May, India has announced a ban on wheat exports, with domestic prices at a record 
high as a heatwave cut production (ban imple mented via the Indian Ministry of Commerce 
and Industry Trade Notice No. 06/2022 -23. 
According to it, the restriction would not apply in cases where prior commitments have 
been made by private trade through Letter of Credit as well as in situations where 
permission is granted by the government of India to other countries to meet their food 
security needs and on the requests of their governments. The government said the order 
served three main purposes: ensure India's food security and check inflation, it he lps other 
countries facing food deficit, and it maintains India's reliability as a supplier.  
The ban on wheat exports imposed by India in May was already subject to several 
questions during the 101st CoA in June, some of them still to be replied by India.  
In this context, could India reply to the following 2 additional questions?  
i. What is India's latest soft wheat production forecast?   
ii. Considering the lately adopted decision by the Membership at the MC 12 on exempting 
the World Food Programme humanitarian p urchases from export restrictions, could 
India confirm that humanitarian purchases by the World Food Programme are not 
under this export restriction?   
b. Export restriction on wheat flour  
On 6 July 2022 India announced Notification No.18/2015 -2020 – an expor t ban for wheat 
flour.  
According to it, the Export Policy of wheat flour (atta) remains 'Free', but export shall be 
subject to recommendation of Inter -Ministerial Committee (IMC) on export of wheat. The 
Notification came into effect on 12 July 2022. The p rovisions as under Para  1.05 of the 
Foreign Trade Policy, 2015 -2020 regarding transitional arrangement shall not be 
applicable under this Notification. Necessary modalities with regard to quality of wheat 
flour will be notified separately.  
i. Could India expl ain how, and on what basis the Inter - Ministerial Committee (IMC) on 
export of wheat issued the recommendations?  
ii. What will be the duration of the measure?  
iii. When does India intend to submit official notification to the WTO on export restriction 
of wheat flou r? 
Answer by India  
a.  
i. The latest 4th advance estimate for wheat production for the year 2021 -22 is 
106.84  million tonnes.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  ii. The EU is aware the MC 12 decision on WFP purchases was on 17 June 2022 and the 
India's notification of 13 May 2022, hence it is not understood how EU is trying to link 
it retrospectively. India request EU to read the MC12 decision in entirety and not 
selectively pick one paragraph over the other. As regards the humanitarian purposes 
is concerned, the notification has clearly spelt out the exemption it makes, this is also 
acknowledged by the EU in its question. We appreciate the  concern expressed by EU 
towards the WFP procurement. And this question is asked under  transparency, we 
would like to encourage EU to secure and provide the follo wing information in the COA.  
a. The details of the food procured by the WFP after the MC12 decision.  b. How much 
procurement has been done by the WFP from the EU after the MC12 Decision?  c. How 
many countries have applied export restrictions on WFP post MC 12 Decision?  
India's measure was necessitated by the need to manage the food security concerns in the country. 
The Government of India is committed to support the needs of neighbouring and vulnerable countries 
that are adversely affected by sudden changes in the global market for wheat based on the request 
of their governments. India accordingly considers requests made by other governments.  This 
measure is temporary in nature and the situation is under continuous monitoring. The relevant 
notification would be submitted in due course.  
Follow -up: The United  States registered its continued concern regarding India's export 
restrictions  (ER) on wheat, wheat flour and other related wheat product. In its view, the ER had 
adversely affected global availability of wh eat during the ongoing food crisis which was already 
exacerbated by Russia's war against Ukraine. The US encouraged India to immediately lift the ER, 
provide the outstanding ER notification promptly and indicate when the ER would be lifted. The US 
stated t hat India's previous responses had indicated that ER were put in place to manage food 
security concern but according to various media reports Indian government had stated there was no 
shortage of wheat stocks in government stockpile. Indian agricultural ad ministration had been 
quoted that wheat stock were in excess of necessary buffer stock level. Given the above -average 
production forecast in March, the US repeated the question when India would lift the restriction. 
Ukraine noted that the imposition of ER may contribute to price volatility and adversely affect 
international market and food supply. Despite the war launched by Russia, Ukraine noted that it had 
taken steps to remain transparent and had demonstrated its commitment to the fundamental rules 
of th e WTO and doing its best to maintain supply to the international agricultural markets. 
Highlighting the absence of ER on its exported food products, Ukraine encouraged WTO Members to 
ensure that any emergency measure introduced to address food security con cerns should minimize 
trade distortion as far as possible and be temporary, transparent, and proportionate to the needs. 
Ukraine underlined that Members applying those measures should also adhere to the WTO 
commitments including those contained in the rece ntly adopted Ministerial declaration which 
underscores the need for agri -food trade to flow. Given India's response that the measure was of 
temporary nature, Canada asked India to provide an indicative timeframe regarding when the 
measure would be removed.  Japan, as a net food importing country, registered its interest in 
transparency on ER and looked forward to India's notification on the measure.  
On AG -IMS ID 102012 , the European Union requested India to provide a reply to its question instead 
of posing counter questions. The EU reiterated its concern on India's export restriction measures 
(ER) especially in the context of the current food shortage worldwide and encouraged India to respect 
the MC12 Declaration on the Emergency Response to Food Insecurity. The UK noted that in the 
current global food security crisis ER lead to more volatile and  unpredictable markets and that 
greater transparency in the WTO around the use of ER supports mitigation of those harmful effects. 
The UK suggested that India provide further information on the ER including its duration through a 
notification. Australia su pported the question and asked whether India had provided in -kind food aid 
in the form of wheat since its announcement of the export ban for wheat flour. Switzerland echoed 
the concern and looked forward to India's ER notification.   
 
3.1.14.4   Question by United Sta tes of America, Japan, Brazil, Paraguay, United Kingdom, 
Canada, Ukraine, New Zealand, European Union (AG -IMS ID 102021 ) 
In AG -IMS ID 101032  several Members asked for the criteria that India will use to determine which 
countries are e ligible for exceptions to India's wheat export ban, how long the ban will be in place, 
and when India will notify the export restriction.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  India responded to AG -IMS ID 101032  by giving its reason for the ban, stating that India will consider 
requests from other country governments for wheat exports, and stating that the notification will be 
made in due course.   
Given this did not answer the questions in AG -IMS ID 101032  and that no Table ER:1 notification 
has been submitted, we re -submit the questions from AG -IMS ID 101032 :  
a. What criteria will the government of India use to determine whether to grant this special 
permission?  For example, what criteria must a country meet for provision of wheat to be 
considered humanitarian aid?  Or what criteria m ust a country meet to demonstrate need 
of wheat to "meet their food security needs"?  
b. Please explain the length of time that the ban will be in place. If the length of time is 
contingent on certain conditions, please explain those conditions, as well as the  metrics 
used to measure when those conditions are satisfied.  
c. When will India notify this export restriction to the Committee on Agriculture through the 
required Table ER:1 notification?  
Answer by India  
a. to c. India's measure was necessitated by the need to manage the food security concerns in the 
country. The Government of India is committed to support the needs of neighbouring and vulnerable 
countries that are adversely affected by sudden changes in the global market for wheat based on 
the request o f their governments. India accordingly considers requests made by other 
governments.  This measure is temporary in nature and the situation is under continuous monitoring. 
The relevant notification would be submitted in due course.  
Follow -up: The United  States registered its continued concern regarding India's export 
restrictions  (ER) on wheat, wheat flour and other related wheat product. In its view, the ER had 
adversely affected global availability of wheat during the ongoing food crisis which was already 
exacerbated by Russia's war against Ukraine. The US encouraged India to immediately lift the ER, 
provide the outstanding ER notification promptly and indicate when the ER would be lifted. The US 
stated that India's previous responses had indicated that ER were put in place to manage food 
security concern but according to various media reports Indian government had stated there was no 
shortage of wheat stocks in government stockpile. Indian agricultural administration had been 
quoted that wheat stock were in  excess of necessary buffer stock level. Given the above -average 
production forecast in March, the US repeated the question when India would lift the restriction. 
Ukraine noted that the imposition of ER may contribute to price volatility and adversely affe ct 
international market and food supply. Despite the war launched by Russia, Ukraine noted that it had 
taken steps to remain transparent and had demonstrated its commitment to the fundamental rules 
of the WTO and doing its best to maintain supply to the in ternational agricultural markets. 
Highlighting the absence of ER on its exported food products, Ukraine encouraged WTO Members to 
ensure that any emergency measure introduced to address food security concerns should minimize 
trade distortion as far as poss ible and be temporary, transparent, and proportionate to the needs. 
Ukraine underlined that Members applying those measures should also adhere to the WTO 
commitments including those contained in the recently adopted Ministerial declaration which 
underscore s the need for agri -food trade to flow. Given India's response that the measure was of 
temporary nature, Canada asked India to provide an indicative timeframe regarding when the 
measure would be removed. Japan, as a net food importing country, registered i ts interest in 
transparency on ER and looked forward to India's notification on the measure. Paraguay urged India 
to provide a response to AG -IMS 102021  by the next Committee meeting. Australia supported the 
question.  
3.1.15   India's public stockpiling  
3.1.15.1   Question by Paraguay (AG -IMS ID 102079 ) 
In follow -up to the reply received from India to question AG -IMS ID 101028 , we note that India 
indicated that the information would be provided "as  soon as it is available". In this connection, we G/AG/W/235  
 
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  ask India to explain how the collection of this information is currently progressing and provide any 
other update with regard to its submission to this Committee.  
Answer by India  
The information will be pro vided when available.  
Follow -up: Paraguay asked India to indicate a specific timeframe when the requested information 
would be provided. With regards to AG -IMS IDs 102079 , 102081  and 102083 , the US noted that 
information on additional support provided for rice, wheat and other commodities are still not 
available despite severa l requests by Members. The US welcomed India's response at the last 
Committee meeting that such information had been sought from state governments and urged India 
to provide the requested information. Uruguay supported the questions and U.S. comments.   
3.1.15.2   Question by Paraguay (AG -IMS ID 102081 ) 
In follow -up to the reply received from India to question AG -IMS ID 101038 , we note that India 
indicated that the information was included in its DS:1 notification. In this connection, we ask India  
to indicate in which specific section of the DS:1 notification this information can be found.  
Answer by India  
The required information as required under the Agreement on Agriculture has been duly submitted 
in India's Domestic Support notifications to the WTO regularly.  
Follow -up: Paraguay asked India to indicate in which specific section the requested information could 
be found and noted that the information contained in India's DS:1 did not meet its expectation. The 
US noted that the information on the qu antitative levels of current, historical, and pre -determined 
levels of wheat and rice stocks are not contained in India's notifications and urged India to provide 
it. With regards to AG -IMS IDs 102079, 102081 and 102083, the US noted that information on 
additional support provided for rice, wheat and other commodities are still not available despite 
several requests by Members. The US welcomed India's response at the last Committee meeting 
that such information had been sought from state governments and urg ed India to provide the 
requested information. Uruguay supported the questions and U.S. comments.  
3.1.15.3   Question by New Zealand (AG -IMS ID 102083 ) 
New Zealand reco gnises well -targeted and appropriately safeguarded public stockholding 
programmes under the AoA as important for some countries' development needs. New Zealand 
would like to thank India for their engagement thus far with Members on questions raised regardi ng 
their public stockholding programmes that make use of the Bali Ministerial Decision on Public 
Stockholding for Food Security Purposes. However, New Zealand is concerned with the lack of 
detailed responses by India to these questions (i.e. AG -IMS IDs 101087 , ID 101028 , ID 101032 , 
ID 101037 , ID 101038  amongst others). As India knows, domestic support reform is New  Zealand's 
key pri ority in the agricultural negotiations, and accurate and timely notification and transparency 
of support is crucial. New Zealand is particularly concerned by the lack of information on how India 
ensures its minimum support price (MSP) programme for rice an d wheat (as notified in 
G/AG/N/IND/27 ) does not distort trade or adversely affect the food security of other Members, in 
compliance with paragraph 4 of the Bali Ministerial Decision on Public Stockholding for Food Security 
Purposes.  
India is the world's largest exporter of rice and India's exports have doubled over recent years. 
And at the same time India's MSP for rice has increased by approximately 32% (2018 -2021) and 
sales on to the open market have increased from 0.85 million tonnes to 2.46 million tonnes according 
to G/AG/N/IND/27 . We are concerned th at the scale of India's procurement of rice and wheat under 
the MSP programme has the potential to distort world markets for these products.  
To address these concerns, could India please:  
a. Provide full details of the measures and safeguards it has in place to ensure its MSP 
programme does not have production or trade distorting effects? The details provided in G/AG/W/235  
 
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  G/AG/N/IND/27 , Annex, paragraph 4 lacks information in this regard, therefore could India 
please provide the policy documents that outline measures in place to prevent exports 
from public stockholdings, including from open market sales.  
b. Provide the relevant statistical information on the volume of wheat and rice exports and 
explain how it guarantees such exports do not originate from government stockpiles?  
Answer by India  
India thanks New Zealand for this question. New Zealand has noted responses by India to the 
questions by other Members in the past are not detailed. India assures New Zealand that India had 
provided all the information in its notification as per its commitments.  It would be helpful to respond 
to New Zealand question if New Zealand can provide the specific concerns it has with regard to the 
Food Security Programmes of India and how are they affecting the food security of NZ or other 
Members.  
For the benefit of the  Committee, India would like to repeat that  
a. Exports are not allowed from the Open Market Sales of Scheme (OMSS) (Domestic) of 
food grains from public stockholding. Guidelines for empanelment and registration under 
the OMSS (Domestic) stipulate that product s under said scheme will be utilized 
domestically and not exported by the bidder. If the Bidder violates any of the terms and 
conditions of the empanelment or found to be furnishing any wrong/false information at 
any stage, then in addition to forfeiture o f earnest money deposit (EMD), bidder is 
debarred from participating in future tenders floated by FCI for disposal of food grains and 
coarse grains for a period of one year. Further guidelines can be accessed from - 
http://fci.gov.in/sales.php?view=224.  
b. India's global export of wheat and rice for various years can be accessed from:  
https://tradestat.commerce.gov.in/eidb/default.asp . 
Follow -up: Noting that India is the world's largest exporter of rice with increasing exports, New 
Zealand expressed interest in understanding the scale of India's procurement of rice and wheat 
under the public stockholding programmes and its potential impa ct on the world markets. With 
regards to AG -IMS IDs 102079 , 102081  and 102083 , the US noted that information on additional 
support provided for rice, wheat and other commodities are still not available despite several 
requests by Members. The US welcomed India's response at the last Committee meeting that such 
information had been sought from state governments and urged India to provide the requested 
information. Uruguay supported the questions and U.S. comments.  
3.1.15.4   Question by United States of Am erica, Thailand, Japan, Brazil, Australia, 
Paraguay, Canada, European Union, Ukraine, Uruguay (AG -IMS ID 102019 ) 
On a number of occasions, including most rec ently in AG -IMS ID 101038 , Members have requested 
that India provide:  
a. where a nnual quantitative levels of current, historical, and pre -determined levels of wheat 
and rice stocks since 2010 can be found in India's notifications and  
b. summaries of consultative meetings between the government and the Food Corporation 
of India (FCI), wh ich are held to assess the availability of wheat and rice for procurement 
at Minimum Support Prices (MSP).   
In response, India again stated that the information is in its notifications despite no Member being 
able to identify this information in the notification and requesting clarification.   
We kindly request India to provide a responsive answer as to where exactly the information can be 
found. If it is indeed in the notification, please provide document numbers, page numbers and table 
numbers/line l etters to assist Members that have been unable to find this information.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  Answer by India  
a. The procurement data for wheat and rice has been consistently provided under the 
supporting table DS5 in India's earlier domestic support notifications as per the mark eting 
year for which commitments have been notified. The government procures foodgrains to 
provide food security through the provision of subsidized foodgrains to 75% of rural and 
50% of urban population at the all -India level. In terms of absolute number,  more than 
800 million people are covered under the National Food Security Act, 2013.   
b. We have noted there is a request to provide summaries of internal meetings of a sovereign 
state. We believe this goes beyond the remit of CoA and AOA notification requir ements.  
Follow -up: Canada and Paraguay expressed disappointment on India's failure to provide the 
information sought by Members and encouraged India to expedite the progress. Canada noted that 
transparency is key to the ability of Members and this Committe e to monitor the implementation of 
commitments and Members should strive to maintain the operation of their domestic support 
programmes transparent. Thailand reiterated its concern regarding India's lack of clarity on its public 
stockholding (PSH) programm es. Thailand emphasized that India should provide more detailed 
information concerning these programmes which are crucial in finding a permanent solution to PSH 
and should ensure that such programmes do not negatively impact other Members' food security. 
Ukraine expressed interest in Members' PSH programmes and underlined that relevant policies 
should be transparent and in line with WTO requirements and should not undermine food security 
objectives of other Members. The EU flagged concern about India's PSH programmes particularly in 
the current context of global food insecurity. The European  Union noted that India had underlined 
in various occasions the importance of PSH in the food security context and agreed that it is an 
important element which could impr ove or worsen the situation. The EU looked forward to a 
constructive exchange with India on this topic and the transparency provided by India on its 
programmes.  
3.1.15.5   Question by United States of America, Thailand, Japan, Brazil, Australia, 
Paraguay, Canada, Eur opean Union, Uruguay (AG -IMS ID 102018 ) 
In AG -IMS ID 101028 , several Members requested information regarding state bonuses provided in 
addition to the minimum support price from India that has been outstanding for many Committee 
on Ag riculture meetings.  
India responded that the government has sought information from the State governments and will 
inform the CoA as soon as it is available.  
a. Is the requested information available?  
b. If not, please provide an update including:  
i. when the reque st was made to the State governments;  
ii. the time frame which India gave State governments to respond; and  
iii. whether any preliminary information has been collected.  
Answer by India  
The information would be provided when available.  
Follow -up: Canada and Paraguay  expressed disappointment on India's failure to provide the 
information sought by Members and encouraged India to expedite the progress. Canada noted that 
transparency is key to the ability of Members and this Committee to monitor the implementation of 
commitments and Members should strive to maintain the operation of their domestic support 
programmes transparent. Thailand reiterated its concern regarding India's lack of clarity on its public 
stockholding (PSH) programmes. Thailand emphasized that India sho uld provide more detailed 
information concerning these programmes which are crucial in finding a permanent solution to PSH 
and should ensure that such programmes do not negatively impact other Members' food security. G/AG/W/235  
 
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  Ukraine expressed interest in Members' PSH programmes and underlined that relevant policies 
should be transparent and in line with WTO requirements and should not undermine food security 
objectives of other Members. The EU flagged concern about India's PSH programmes particularly in 
the current  context of global food insecurity. The European  Union noted that India had underlined 
in various occasions the importance of PSH in the food security context and agreed that it is an 
important element which could improve or worsen the situation. The EU lo oked forward to a 
constructive exchange with India on this topic and the transparency provided by India on its 
programmes.  
3.1.16   India's oilseeds policies  
3.1.16.1   Question by Paraguay (AG -IMS ID 102080 ) 
In follow -up to the reply received from India to question AG -IMS ID 101044 , we note that, as was 
indicated at the previous meeting of this Committee, the hyperlink provided in the reply is inactive 
and inaccessible. We therefore  reiterate the request already made to India in the room to submit 
the requested information in an accessible format, including via email to the Mission of Paraguay.   
Answer by India  
It is requested to refer to the link given below for the required informa tion about the measure:  
https://nfsm.gov.in/Guidelines/NMEO -OPGUIEDELINES.pdf . 
The hyperlink is active and accessible.  
Follow -up: Paraguay requested India to send the documents by email as it could not access the 
link provided in India's response.  
3.1.17   India 's price support   
3.1.17.1   Question by United States of America, Australia, Paraguay (AG -IMS ID 102017 ) 
The United States remains concerned by India 's aggregation of price supports for different 
commodities in G/AG/N/IND/27 . India establishes unique and different price supports for each 
coarse cereal, including barley, maize, millet, and sorghum, and each pulse  including gram 
(chickpeas), arhar/tur (pigeon peas), urad (black matpe), moong (mung beans), and lentils.  In past 
Committee responses India has noted that it has consistently aggregated these commodities, such 
as in response to AG -IMS ID 91177 . However, India has yet to provide an explanation as to what 
policy action resulted in In dia changing its notification methodology as compared to its Agricultural 
Supporting Tables, which are the basis of India 's domestic support commitments.  
a. Please explain what policy change occurred prior to 1995 -96 that necessitated a change 
in how India no tifies support for these commodities, which resulted in India 's subsequent 
consistent notification of price supports on an aggregate basis.  
b. Please provide the level of procurement for the following commodities for the notification 
period 2020/21 in G/AG/N/IND/27  for each of the foll owing commodities: jowar, bajra, 
maize, tur, moong, urad, barley, gram, and masur.  
c. Please provide the value of production for each of the following commodities for the 
notification period 2020/21 in G/AG/N/IND/27 : jowar, bajra, maize, tur, moong, urad, 
barley, gram, and masur.  
Answe r by India  
Pulses are a major source of protein and form an integral part of the Indian diet and food security. 
Tur, urad, moong, gram, and others are different varieties of pulses and therefore, it is reasonable 
to calculate product -specific support for a ggregated pulses. The external reference price is calculated 
based on the simple average of external reference price of various pulses given in AGST and used 
to calculate product specific support for pulses. Similarly, the applied administered price is the  simple 
average of minimum support price for various pulses. In 2020 -21, the government procured G/AG/W/235  
 
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  2.191  million tonnes  of pulses. In case of coarse grains, the procurement was 1.162 million tonnes . 
The value of production for the same year was US D 19,955.83 million and US D 11,764.69 million 
for pulses and coarse cereals, respectively.  
Follow -up: The U nited States reiterated the concern that there has been no identified change in 
policy that would necessitate a change in the way India notified its p rice support for barley, maize, 
millet, sorghum, chickpeas, pigeon peas, urad, mung beans and lentils. The US noted that, for each 
of the identified commodities, the government of India announces a unique minimum support 
price (MSP), which not only differs , and values substantially, but also increases by varying rates 
each year. For example. In 2020 -21, the MSP for lentils was only two thirds of the rate for mung 
beans and the increases in the MSP for various pulses range from 2 -7% as compared to 2019 -20. 
The US further noted that while there were methodological changes in the past in India's 
notifications, it is clear today that India makes specific policy decision for each commodity and there 
is considerable basis for considering these commodities, with di fferent and specific policy decisions, 
separately for notification purposes. The US requested India's explanation as regards why these 
measures and commodities have been aggregated in the notifications despite the differences in 
policies. India was also re quested to provide data on the basis of individual commodities rather than 
on an aggerated basis.   
3.1.18   India's other support for rice   
3.1.18.1   Question by United States of America, Thailand, Japan, Brazil, Australia, 
Paraguay, Canada, European Union, Uruguay (AG -IMS I D 102020 ) 
In response to AG -IMS ID 101037  India stated that "After consulting with relevant 
Ministries/Departments, it was found that no support other than that for the PSH purposes has been 
provided for rice. " At the last Committee m eeting, a number of Members asked a follow up question 
to this, requesting that India confirm a) whether this response referred to only central -government 
support or if it also included state -level support and b) whether any support has been provided for 
rice other than that which India has already notified.   
a. Please explain whether India has consulted with state governments to confirm whether 
there are any additional sub -national rice support measures and if there are any other 
state-level support measures that are not notified.  
b. Please explain whether there are any other support measures related to PSH purposes 
that have not been notified, beyond the state bonuses India is currently collecting.  
Answer by India  
As has been already conveyed in the previous CoA meeting, after consulting the relevant 
Ministries/Departments, it was found that no support other than that for the PSH purposes has been 
provided for rice. Other support does not include the State bonuses.  
Follow -up: The United  States welcome d India's confirmation that no additional support was provided 
according to the relevant ministries and departments but sought additional clarification as regards 
the relevant ministries and departments India referred to. Paraguay, Thailand, Uruguay, Canad a, 
and Australia echoed the follow -up question by the US. The European  Union looked forward to 
constructive follow -up discussion on the issue. Brazil noted that some questions to India it 
co-sponsored remained unanswered or not completely answered and requested Members to ensure 
that responses provided at the Committee are as complete as possible.  
3.1.19   Indian Export Restriction measures on rice  
3.1.19.1   Question by European Union (AG -IMS ID 102132 ) 
Members takes note of India 's ban on export of broken rice (according to the Directorate General of 
Foreign Trade (DGFT) notification 8/9 -2022)  which follows the introduction of a 20% export duty 
and the ban on wheat export.  
(Source : After Ban On Wheat Exports, Government Bans Export Of Broken Rice (outlookindia.com) ) G/AG/W/235  
 
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  a. When can WTO Member s expect to receive the notification on the above -mentioned  
measures, which is required according to  document G/AG/2?  
b. Has India taken into account the consequences of these measures of the food security 
situation in the traditional developing countries buy ing the product in question?   
Answer by India  
Follow -up: The United  States supported the question. The United  States  noted that on 8 September, 
India applied 20% export duty on paddy, brown, semi -milled and wholly milled rice and prohibited 
the export of broken rice. Beyond globally exacerbating impacts of new ER on rice prices, the US 
believed those ERs would particularly affect developing and African countries as according to Indian 
export statistics, in 2021, 9 out of the 10 top WTO export mar kets by volume for rice are developing 
countries. The US agreed with India on the importance of creating transparent and predictable 
trading system but noted that policies that one day incentivise excess production leading to growth 
in exports and the next  day ban exports drive uncertainty in the global market and are inappropriate 
and inconsistent. The EU reminded India of the transparency obligations in the Committee and noted 
that India could introduce export ban under certain conditions and one of those  conditions is to 
submit an appropriate notification. Senegal expressed interest in the question. As a major importer 
of rice including broken rice which it mostly imports from India, Senegal noted that markets for 
staple food such as rice should remain op en in the current difficult context of food insecurity, 
regardless of India's efforts to increase supplies including incentivising local rice production. Senegal 
asked India to confirm that the measure would not affect the exports of broken rice. India too k note 
of EU's comment regarding the notification. Concerning U.S. comment on the export duty, India 
clarified that the 20% duty is not imposed on parboiled and  basmati rice  which are India's primary 
rice exports and thus the food security of importing cou ntries is not at risk. Further, India reiterated 
that the ER measures were imposed to examine where its exports were channelled, and which 
countries were holding rice stocks using rice purchased from India. India expressed interest in 
understanding the eff ects of such stockholding via imports by those who do not otherwise need 
imports as in its view those actions would also undermine the interest of rice importing countries.  
3.1.20   Japan's stockpiles of skim milk powder  
3.1.20.1   Question by Australia (AG -IMS ID 102093 ) 
Australia notes that in April 2022 Japan has introduced a scheme ( https://www.j -
milk.jp/ gyokai/2022zaiko.html ) to reduce excess stockpiles of skim milk powder (SMP), which was 
expected to have reached a record high of 100,000 tonnes at the end of August.  
In relation to butter and SMP, could Japan please:   
a. Clarify whether Japan expects that th ese stockpiles will continue to increase?  
b. Explain whether existing government and industry -led efforts have led to a reduction in 
the level of stockpiles?  
c. Clarify whether the existence of these stockpiles will have any long -term structural impacts 
to its d airy industry?  
Answer by Japan  
Skim milk powder (SMP) : 
a. Excess stockpiles of skim milk powder (SMP) reached the peak of 104 kilotonnes in 
May 2022 and these have now started to decrease through industry -led efforts (Japan 
Dairy Association (J-milk)). The SMP stock level in July was 99 kilo tonnes  and we expect 
that it will continuously decrease through industry -led efforts.  
b. Although the stockpiles of SMP still remain at a high level, we believe that existing efforts 
have certainly been effect ive in preventing the further accumulation of stock.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  c. We are concerned that the consistent excessive stock level could affect the overall stable 
trade of milk and dairy products.  
Butter : 
a. The amount of butter stockpiles as of July 2022 was 41 kilo tonnes , decreased from the 
same period of the previous year, as the commercial demand for butter has been 
recovering. It is anticipated that the stockpiles will remain at a certain level, depending on 
the coming demand and supply trend.  
b. We believe that the recovery i n demand for butter for commercial use, etc. are effective 
in preventing the further accumulation of stock and leading to a reduction in the level 
stockpiles.  
c. We are concerned that the consistent excessive stock level could affect the overall stable 
trade of milk and dairy products.  
Follow -up: Australia sought further information regarding the policies on butter.  
3.1.21   Kazakhstan's export quotas on meslin, wheat, and wheat flour  
3.1.21.1   Question by United States of America, Switzerland, Japan (AG -IMS ID 102028 ) 
Kazakhstan has instituted export quotas on meslin, wheat, and wheat flour beginning 16 April 2022 
and extended until 30 September 2022 under Orders of the Minister of Agriculture No. 110 and 214. 
The United States reminds Kazakhstan that as a WTO Member it agreed to notify export restrictions 
implemented on products for which Kazakhstan is a net -food exporter to the WTO Committee on 
Agriculture.  
a. Please expla in the reasoning for instituting these quantitative export restrictions.  
b. When will Kazakhstan notify its export restrictions to the WTO Committee on Agriculture?   
c. According to paragraph 5 of Order 110, the export quotas will be distributed to applicants 
who have sold 10 % of the quota volume declared for export at a fixed price, published 
by the Ministry of Agriculture.  Please explain the purpose of this provision.  
d. Please clarify what Kazakhstan means by a fixed price. Has Kazakhstan instituted set 
prices a t which meslin, wheat, or wheat flour must be sold, if applicants are to receive 
quota allocations?   
Answer by Kazakhstan  
a. Temporary quantitative restrictions on Kazakhstan's exports of meslin, wheat and wheat 
flour were introduced under Articles XI: 2 (a) and XX (b) of GATT 1994 in order to prevent 
their critical shortage in the domestic market.  
Currently, export quotas on meslin, wheat, and wheat flour from the Republic of 
Kazakhstan have been lifted (by Order of the Ministry of Agriculture of the Republic  of 
Kazakhstan No. 291 dated  13 September 2022).  
b. Notification of Kazakhstan ( G/AG/N/KAZ/19 ) on quantitative restrictions on wheat, meslin 
and flour was sent to the WTO Committee on Agriculture on 26 April 2022.  
At the same time, all quantitative restrictions of Kazakhstan in force t oday will be reflected 
in the upcoming biennial notification of Kazakhstan on quantitative restrictions for the 
period from 2022 to 2024 in accordance with the Decision of the Council for Trade in Goods 
on the procedure for notification of quantitative res trictions.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  c. and d. The requirement for the applicants to sell 10% of the volume of the declared quota 
(for wheat exports) at a fixed price to the grain market Operator is directed to the 
processing and production of flour and bread, aimed at providing it to socially vulnerable 
segments of the population of the country, as well as for its subsequent sale through 
specialty stores.  
For reference: the grain market operator is a national company (JSC "NC "Food 
Corporation") in the field of agro -industrial complex, involved in ensuring food security 
through the implementation of the stabilization function in the grain market and the 
authority to manage the reserve stock of grain.  
3.1.22   Mexico's  Tariff reductions on foodstuffs to improve food security  
3.1.22.1   Quest ion by New Zealand (AG -IMS ID 102101 ) 
New Zealand commends Mexico for their recent tariff reductions on foodstuffs to improve Mexican 
food security, demonstr ating how trade liberalisation can be used to address domestic food security 
concerns. New Zealand would appreciate more detail on the effects of this tariff reduction on Mexico 's 
food security.  
Answer by Mexico  
We thank New Zealand for the question and fo r the comments made in relation to the measure 
adopted by Mexico.   
This tariff waiver on various foodstuffs is part of a package to combat inflation and high living costs, 
which was announced last month by the Government of Mexico in order to curb inflatio n and the 
drop in Mexican household consumption.   
On 16 May 2022, a decree exempting the listed goods from import tariffs was published in the Official 
Journal of the Federation, temporarily exempting various foodstuffs classified under 73 Mexican tariff 
headings from import duties in order to counter the effect of inflation on prices. The Decree can be 
viewed at:  
https://www.dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?co digo=5652070&fecha=16/05/2022#gsc.tab=0   
We believe that the measures adopted by Mexico are having the intended results, as inflation has 
been stable in recent months despite external economic and inflationary pressures.  
Follow -up: Brazil, New Zealand, Paraguay and the United  States welcomed the tariff reduction 
measure adopted by Mexico and the positive results it achieved from the policy. New Zealand noted 
that the measure is a good example of the use of trade -liberalising policies rather than  barriers to 
address food security. Brazil welcomed Mexico's decision on choosing a pro -trade path towards food 
security. Brazil noted that it had also chosen to reduce import tariffs in the past couple of years in 
order to increase domestic supply of some  very important agricultural products. Brazil hoped that at 
least part of recent tariff reductions could be made permanent by Mexico, so that the trade relations 
that are currently being strengthened could be preserved in the future. The US noted that desp ite 
progress made in unilateral, multilateral and regional tariff reductions, tariffs remain the primary 
source of global support and protection. In its view, removing all tariffs could help ensure the 
available food to move from food surplus regions to fo od deficit regions and help ensure overall food 
availability and affordability. The US noted that exchange of information and experiences of 
implementing different policy decisions is a useful and practical exercise which could benefit all 
Members.   
3.1.23   Panama 's support to rice, milk, and maize  
3.1.23.1   Question by United States of America (AG -IMS ID 102023 ) 
The United States ' request for more information about Panama 's support provided to rice, milk, and 
maize, outlined in AG -IMS ID 99082  and in re ference to G/AG/N/PAN/58 , remains valid for Panama 's 
most recent Table DS:1 notification ( G/AG/N/PAN/61 ). As Panama has yet to provide a response to 
AG-IMS ID 99082 , the United States repeats the question:  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  The United States understands, based on AG -IMS ID 93196 , that the notified value represents 
payments made for any rice sold during the notified calendar year – whether production is from the 
current agricultural year or a previous agricultural year.  This is al so noted in AG -IMS ID 92062  where 
the United States understands Panama to stat e that the eligible production figure represented 2018 
production as well as production from the last few months of 2017.  
Further, the United States notes that the same measure as for rice is notified for milk and maize in 
Supporting Table DS:6.  It was the  United States ' understanding that all outlays made during the 
given calendar year, for rice, milk, and maize, regardless of when production occurred, was the 
notified outlay value.  However, in G/AG/N/PAN/58 , Panama includes a new footnote only for rice in 
Supporting Table DS:4 stat ing, "Amount includes support for previous years. " 
a. Please provide further clarification on what the reporting year for notified outlays in 
Supporting Table DS:4 and Supporting Table DS:6 represent and whether there is a 
difference for rice versus other com modities.  
b. Please provide further clarification as to what the eligible production listed represents 
specifically.  For example, does the volume notified in G/AG/N/PAN/58  represent all 
production sold during specific months at the end of 2019 and most/all of 2020?  
Answer by Panama  
First, I will respond to AG -IMS ID 102023 ,  
a.  
The outlays notified in Supporting Table DS:4 represent the payments made to the 
producer in the corresponding reporting year. It should be noted that the payment for one 
year does not necessary correspond to production in the reporting year for all three 
products.   
In the specific case of rice, the amounts paid to the producers are greater owing to the 
scale of the programme and, for budgetary reasons, the disbursements cannot be made 
in full in the corresponding year.   
For AG -IMS ID 102023 ,  
b. the response is as follows:   
The eligible production listed in notification G/AG/N/PAN/58  represents the number of 
kilograms sold or, more specifically, the quantity purchased by the processors of the 
product (rice, maize or milk). In other words, it is the number of quintals (kilograms) or 
litres (kilograms) sold, multiplied by the support for the product in question. This is what 
was paid out in support and what was notified.  
3.1.24   Panama 's compliance with its domestic support commitments  
3.1.24.1   Question by United States of America, Canada, European Union 
(AG-IMS ID 102022 ) 
The United States takes note that Panama has not responded to any Members ' questions since the 
97th Committee meeting regarding Panama 's compliance with its domestic support commitments, 
particularly with respect to notified support for rice.  In addition to Panama 's lack of engagement in 
this Committee, the United States is concerned that notified domestic support for rice remained 
above de minimis in calendar year 2021 ( G/AG/N/PAN/61 ).  
 
We request that Panama answer all outstanding questions, in particular those raised by Members 
concerned with Panama 's notified non -compliance with its WTO commitments.   
 
The United States remains keenly interested to learn more from  Panama with regards to Panama 's 
response to AG -IMS ID 97141 , which notes that  a commission would review Law 17 of 2018 in the G/AG/W/235  
 
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  first half of 2021.  As requested in AG -IMS ID 99081 and 101071 , please provide an update on this 
review and  what the findings were.  
 
As requested in AG -IMS ID 101088 , what actions are being taken by Panama to bring its domestic 
support for rice within the de minimis level?  
Answer by Panama  
Given that rice is the main consumer product in Panama's basic food basket, policies need to be 
established to ensure the production, availability an d accessibility to consumers of this product in 
order to guarantee the country's food security. This is all the more important given the situation that 
the world is currently facing as a result of the COVID -19 pandemic in recent years, the increase in 
the price of fertilizers and other extraordinary events that have had an impact on this product.  
Follow -up: Canada, the European  Union, the United States, and Uruguay looked forward to receiving 
the remaining answers as well as further information on Panama's review of Law 17 and the primary 
cause for breach of commitments.  
3.1.25   Philippines - Sanitary and Phytosanitary Import Clearance (SPSIC) permits  
3.1.25.1   Question by United States of America (AG -IMS ID 102036 ) 
The United States thanks the Philippines for providing the import volume data for whole chicken for 
2018-May 2021 in its response to AG -IMS ID 98131 .  
a. Has the Philippines imported any whole chicken in 2021 and 2022?  
b. If so, please provide the volume and country -of-origin of the imports.   
c. Does the Philippines restrict imports of whole  chickens from trading partners other than 
the United States and, if so, why?  
Answer by Philippines  
Follow -up: The United  States reiterated its concern on the matter and looked forward to a response 
by the Philippines.   
3.1.25.2   Question by United States of America  (AG-IMS ID 102037 ) 
The United States remains concerned that the SPSIC system is used to restrict the flow of trade.   
On 22 February  2022, the Department of Agriculture Secretary announced that the Department of 
Agriculture "aims to address the concerns of the onion industry to manage onion importation while 
ensuring its availability for the local market, thus additional guidelines and requirements shall be 
implemented on the issuance of [SPSIC] " and "that the issuance of SPSICs for fresh onion will be 
based on the importation period specified in the Certificate of Necessity to Import (CNI), which shall 
include the volume to be imported and the specific period for import arrival. " This measure is cited 
to be based on the 14 December 2021 Department Circular No. 08, series of 2021 or the Additional 
Guidelines on the Importation of Fresh Onions.   
a. Please explain how restricting the volume of imports over a given pe riod via the 
CNI requirement prior to the issuance of SPSIC is different from a quantitative restriction, 
and explain the phytosanitary justification for implementing the CNI.   
b. Has 2021 Department Circular No. 08, Series of 2021, or the Additional Guidelin es on the 
Importation of Fresh Onions been notified to the appropriate World Trade Organization 
committee(s), and could the Philippines provide a copy to Members?   
c. What is the volume of the CNI and how is it determined?   G/AG/W/235  
 
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  On 10 August 2022, the Department o f Agriculture Under Secretary stated the Department 
is looking at importing white onions and "how much we will import and up to when we will 
do so, we will have to discuss this with producers so as not to have the imported onions 
come in at the same time f armers harvest their crops. "  
d. Please explain the role of the Department of Agriculture and the domestic Philippine onion 
industry in determining the volume of onions allowed to be imported.  
Answer by Philippines  
As a new administration has taken over the l eadership of the Department of Agriculture, the capital 
authorities could possibly review this measure. We will inform the Committee of developments on 
this regard.  
Follow -up: The United  States reiterated its concern on the matter and looked forward to a r esponse 
by the Philippines.   
3.1.26   Philippines' import regime for rice  
3.1.26.1   Question by United States of America (AG -IMS ID 102038 ) 
According to media reports, the Department of Agriculture is reviewing the role of the National Food 
Authority in importing rice (Source: "DA reviewing  Rice Tariffication Law, role of NFA, " GMA News, 
21 July 2022, https://www.gmanetwork.com/news/money/economy/838900/ da-reviewing -rice-
tariffication -law-role-of-nfa/story/?amp ).  
Is the Philippines considering modifying its import regime for rice, and if so, how?  
Answer by Philippines  
We would like to inform the Committee that the Philippines is not considering modifying its import 
regime on rice.  
Follow -up: Thailand expressed interest in the question and asked the Philippines to provide further 
details regarding whether there would be any adjustment to rice impot policies in the future to 
ensure dome stic food security.  
3.1.27   Saudi Arabia's tariff increases on agricultural goods  
3.1.27.1   Question by Australia (AG -IMS ID 102109 ) 
On 12 June 2022, the Kingdom of  Saudi Arab ia announced ( https://uqn.gov.sa/?p=13904 ) that it 
would increase tariffs on a range of imported products, including agricultural goods. Australia notes 
that these tariff increases  are now set to the upper bound limit. In the announcement the Zakat, 
Customs and Taxation Authority stated the justification for these increases was for the purpose of 
protecting and encouraging national industries and local agricultural products.  
a. Given the diverse range of agricultural products subject to the tariff increases, can the 
Kingdom of  Saudi Arabia explain the domestic circumstances and policy rationale for 
increasing these tariffs?  
b. Could the Kingdom of  Saudi Arabia please indicate how long it expects these tariffs  to 
remain at the higher rate?  
c. Does the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia envisage further tariff increases on other products in 
the short -to-medium term?  
d. Is the Kingdom of  Saudi Arabia intending on introducing any other measures to protect 
their national agricultur al industries?  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  Answer by Saudi Arabia, Kingdom of  
a. Tariff increases is in WTO tariff bound limits, it aims to enhance the competitiveness of 
local agriculture products given that the very low level of the applied tariff rates. In 
addition to encourage agric ultural production to achieve the objectives of the food security 
strategy in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.  
b. There is no specific date for these tariffs to remain at the higher bound rates.  
c. All necessary measures will be taken into consideration including fu rther tariff increase to 
maintain the competitiveness of agricultural and other products, in accordance with the 
WTO rules and agreements.  
d. All necessary measures will be taken into consideration including further tariff increase to 
maintain the competitiveness of national agricultural products and industry, in accordance 
with the WTO rules and agreements.  
Follow -up: Brazil noted that as Members laud Mexico's decision on resorting to more trade 
liberalization as a tool against food insecurity, it regretted seeing Members pursue policies that go 
the other way. Brazil noted that more trade means more food security for all; policies toward "food 
sovereignty" are a mirage that threatens to reduce globally available food.  
3.1.28   Chinese Taipei's import tariff on Champagne  
3.1.28.1   Question by Australia (AG -IMS ID 102085 ) 
On 26 April 2022 Chinese Taipei Legislature passed an amendment bill to halve the import tariff on 
Cham pagne to 10%. Statements made by Democratic Progressive Party Legislator Lin Chu -yin 
(https://focustaiwan.tw/business/202204260022 ) explained that the reduction of the tariff of 
champ agne was to address "unfair international trade practice", as champagne was taxed at double 
the rate of non -sparkling wine. The tariff rate on sparkling wines which were produced outside of 
Champagne region of France remains unchanged at 20%.  
 
Can Chinese Taipei please explain how this measure is in line with their commitments under the 
GATT, specifically that Members should not discriminate between like goods originating in different 
countries, as the reduction only applies to sparkling wine produc ed in the Champagne region of 
France, not like products produced elsewhere.  
Answer by Chinese Taipei  
In our current tariff schedule, the tariff line for Champagne is 2204.10.10, and the tariff line for 
other sparkling wines is 2204.10.90. The categorizatio n remains exactly the same in the 
Consolidated Tariff Schedule submitted to the WTO upon our accession in 2002.  Champagne and 
other sparkling wines are different products in our tariff classification. Tariffs of all goods are to apply 
to all WTO Members eq ually, and we believe this is neither discriminating against individual Members 
nor violating relevant GATT commitments.  
3.1.29   Tajikistan's poultry tariffs  
3.1.29.1   Question by United States of America (AG -IMS ID 102030 ) 
The United States would like to thank the Republic of Tajikistan for its responses to U.S. questions 
concerning Tajikistan 's poultry tariff resolution ( G/MA/W/167 ) in the Committee on Agriculture 
(AG-IMS ID 98139 ) and through Tajikistan 's Trade Policy Review.  
  
The United States notes t hat Tajikistan 's reasoning for raising its poultry tariff rate to 15 %, above 
its bound rate of 10 %, was due to concerns about the potential for low quality of imported product 
and the effect on public health, significant increases in imports of poultry pro ducts, and the 
development of Tajikistan 's poultry industry.  Based on this response, the United States has 
additional questions for Tajikistan.   
 G/AG/W/235  
 
- 200 - 
 
  a. Please clarify which specific articles of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
1994, WTO Agreemen t on Agriculture, or other WTO agreements it is citing to justify the 
tariff increase above the bound rate.  
b. Please clarify what Tajikistan meant by "low quality of imported product and the effect on 
public health, " in its response to the Committee on Agric ulture (AG -IMS ID 98139 ). 
Is Tajikistan referencing a specific WTO agreement? If so, which one(s)?  
c. Have poultry imports violated Tajikistan 's sanitary and phytosanitary regulatory 
standards?  If so, please provide the specific standards.  
d. Please explain how raising tariffs on imported poultry is an effective measure towards 
protecting  public health.  
e. Noting Tajikistan 's concern with "significant increases in imports of poultry, " has Tajikistan 
conducted an economic study pursuant to Article XIX of the GATT which demonstrates a 
significant increase in imports and that the level of import ed poultry products caused or 
threatens serious injury to domestic industry? If so, please share this study.  
f. Please clarify how long Tajikistan intends to keep this tariff rate above its bound rate.  
Answer by Tajikistan  
Follow -up: Brazil noted that the bin ding of import tariffs is one of the cornerstones of the WTO 
system. Brazil encouraged Tajikistan to bring the applied tariffs back to the bound levels and 
indicated its readiness to engage in the GATT Article XXVIII negotiations if the current tariff leve ls 
are maintained in the long term.  
3.1.30   Tajikistan's new Tax Code  
3.1.30.1   Question by United States of America (AG -IMS ID 102031 ) 
The United States would like to thank t he Republic of Tajikistan for responding to U.S. questions 
regarding tax incentives in Tajikistan 's tax code (AG -IMS ID 98138 ).  
 
In its response, Tajikistan confirms that Article 414, Chapter 57 of the tax code exempts domestic 
"business entities in the field of poultry farming, fish farming, and the production of combined feed 
for bird and animals " from paying taxes on income, VAT, real estate, and land for a period of 6 
years.   
 
a. Please confirm that the exemption (Article 414, Chapter 57) in the tax code still applies.   
b. Please clarify if imports of foreign poultry products are subject to a VAT or any other 
internal taxes.  
Answer by Tajikistan  
3.1.31   Türkiye's export restrictions on agricultural products  
3.1.31.1   Question by United States of America, Switzerland, Japan, United Kingdom 
(AG-IMS ID 102029 ) 
The United States thanks Türkiye for its response to the joint question by the United States, United 
Kingdom, and Japan (AG -IMS ID 101042 ).  
 
In Türkiye 's reply it cited authorities granted in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 
(GATT) for its justifi cation for imposing these export bans on 20 different agricultural 
commodities.  The United States would remind Türkiye that as a WTO Member it agreed to notify 
export restrictions imposed on products for which Türkiye is a net -food exporter, even for those  
temporary in nature, to the WTO Committee on Agriculture.   
 G/AG/W/235  
 
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  a. When does Türkiye intend to notify its export restrictions to the Committee on Agriculture 
through the required Table ER:1 notification?  
The United States remains concerned with Türkiye 's export restrictions and the lack of 
transparency around them, including the inability to find the announcement of the export 
restrictions, the start or end date of the restrictions, or the regulation giving the Ministry 
of Agriculture and Forestry (MinAF) the aut hority to impose restrictions.  As a signatory of 
the WTO Agreement on Trade Facilitation, Türkiye agreed to promptly publish in an easily 
accessible manner import, export, or transit restrictions or prohibitions (Article 1, 
paragraph 1.1:f).  
 
b. Please provid e a copy of or link to both the authorities given to MinAF and the 
regulations/documentation of MinAF implementing these authorities for specific 
commodities.   
Answer by Türkiye  
Türkiye would like to thank the United States, the  United  Kingdom, Japan and S witzerland for 
expressing their concerns on this issue again. Türkiye is well aware of its obligations with WTO rules. 
As it has been mentioned in the previous response, the price fluctuations due to reasons such as the 
war in Ukraine; the C OVID -19 pandemi c; the shortage, demand and other countries ' excess storage 
of the commodities may create short -term food security concerns for Turkish authorities. 
Consequently, temporary measures are implemented based on need, considering the country's yield, 
stock, imp ort, export, and consumption data.  
 
We would like to reemphasize that these are temporary measures taken by Türkiye and they do not 
affect global food security or food security of our trading partners adversely.  
 
The authority for taking measure to ensure the food security of the nation has been given  to the 
Ministry of Agriculture. The concerning regulation is available at 
https://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2022/0 1/20220127 -7.htm  and the temporariness of the 
measure can be seen throughout the regulation.  
Follow -up: The United  Kingdom reiterated the importance of having further clarity of  Türkiye 's export 
restriction (ER) and explanation of the timing and submission of the ER:1 notification. While 
recognizing the difficult position faced by  Türkiye , the UK reinforced the need to keep food and 
agricultural market open, predictable and transparent. The US shared the UK's concern. Japan, as a 
net food importin g country, underlined its interest in transparency of ER. Switzerland reminded  
Türkiye  of the ER notification obligation for the sake of transparency and understanding of the 
measure.  
3.1.32   UK's SSG entitlements   
3.1.32.1   Question by India (AG -IMS ID 102095 ) 
The UK has replicated its market access concessions from the EU -28 schedule. In this context, India 
seeks clarification on the following:  
a. According to World Tariff Profile 2022, the UK has claimed agricultural special 
safeguards  (SSG) on 30.2 % of agricultural tariff lines, while EU -27 has claimed SSGs only 
on 23.0 % of their agricultural tariff lines. Could the UK elaborate on why there is a 
difference in the  percent of agriculture SSGs between UK and EU -27 despite replicating 
EU-28 concessions?  
b. The UK has claimed the right to impose SSGs on certain agricultural products as evident 
from its schedule of concession, which includes both volume -based and price -based SSGs. 
India understands that a price -based SSG can be imposed when the import price falls 
below the product -specific trigger price. In this context, could the UK provide details on 
how the trigger prices for products entitled with SSG have been determined?  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  Answe r by United Kingdom  
In establishing its independent Goods Schedule, the UK has, insofar as was possible, replicated the 
concessions and commitments applicable to the UK as expressed in the EU -28 Schedule, including 
Special Safeguards (SSGs). The UK was not  involved in preparing the World Tariff Profile 2022 and 
is therefore not able to comment on any of the figures presented within this publication.  The UK 's 
approach to SSGs was to replicate the rights and obligations it maintained at the WTO after the UK 
re-took its seat as an independent Member. As a Member of the EU, the UK committed to undertaking 
reforms to convert all its non -tariff measures into tariffs during the Uruguay Round, and as such is 
entitled to the relevant SSGs it held when it was a member  of the EU. The UK has not currently 
operationalised any SSG for any product, but any trigger prices will be determined in accordance 
with Article 5 of the Agreement on Agriculture.  
Follow -up: Brazil reiterated its disappointment with how the European Unio n and the United  Kingdom 
had managed to turn Brexit into an opportunity to reduce their market access commitments. Brazil 
noted that nowhere in the WTO law was it agreed that a Member can "inherit" SSG, a portion of final 
bound total AMS or replicate other s' schedules as the UK had claimed. In this sense, Brazil reiterated 
the call for previous commitments made by the EU, including in relation to the administration of 
TRQs, to be upheld by the UK. Uruguay noted that it maintained its position on this topic,  as was 
expressed both bilaterally with the UK and at previous meetings of the Committee on Agriculture 
and the Council for Trade in Goods . 
3.1.33   UK's Bound Total AMS   
3.1.33.1   Question by India (AG -IMS ID 102094 ) 
The UK has claimed an AMS of 5,914.1 million Euros, which was later redenominated in  as 
4,949.3  million GBP. In the document no. G/MA/TAR/RS/570, the U K has mentioned that the AMS 
has been calculated by rerunning the original calculation undertaken in the Uruguay Round for the 
UK only, including the 20% reduction and apportionment for credit for reform measures already 
taken at the time. In this context,  India requests the UK to furnish further details on:  
a. How was the AMS calculated?  
b. What is the basis of apportionment of credit between the UK and the remaining members 
of the EU?  
Answer by United Kingdom  
a. The UK has been transparent in its approach to extra cting its AMS entitlement from that 
of the EU28 and has shared the methodology that was utilised with all interested WTO 
Members through dialogues that began in 2018, before the UK had submitted its Goods 
Schedule. The approach is outlined in document G/MA /TAR/RS/570 which sets out that 
the UK 's AMS entitlement has been calculated by rerunning the original calculation 
undertaken in the Uruguay Round for the UK only, including the 20% reduction and 
apportionment of credit for reform measures already taken at  the time. This equates to 
what the UK's entitlement would have been if the EC12 AMS was disaggregated by Member 
State. The original EC12 calculation can be seen in the Supporting Tables that accompany 
Schedule LXXX (EC -12). The UK has utilised this calcul ation table but has used production 
data for the UK only.  
b. Credit for measures taken was agreed during the Uruguay Round and reflected reform 
measures Members had already taken to reduce AMS. The UK 's approach has been to 
apportion the credit for measures t aken in line with the proportion of EC -12 AMS applied 
to the EC -11 and UK, which for the UK is just under 10% of the total EC -12 credit.   
Follow -up: Paraguay registered interest in the question and reiterated the concern regarding the 
UK's claim of its AMS  rights. Paraguay looked forward to the UK's reduction of its AMS commitment 
to avoid potential expansion of committed subsidies. Brazil reiterated its disappointment with how 
the European  Union and the United  Kingdom had managed to turn Brexit into an opp ortunity to 
reduce their market access commitments. Brazil noted that nowhere in the WTO law was it agreed G/AG/W/235  
 
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  that a Member can "inherit" SSG, a portion of final bound total AMS or replicate others' schedules 
as the UK had claimed. In this sense, Brazil reite rated the call for previous commitments made by 
the EU, including in relation to the administration of TRQs, to be upheld by the UK. Uruguay noted 
that it maintained its position on this topic, as was expressed both bilaterally with the UK and at 
previous meetings of the Committee on Agriculture and the Council for Trade in Goods.   
3.1.34   U.S. funding for environmental action  
3.1.34.1   Question by New Zealand, Paraguay (AG -IMS ID 102102 ) 
New Zealand appreciates the United States ' support for environmental action in agriculture through 
the Inflation Reduction Act.  New Zealand hopes that the funding provided under the act will be 
consistent with the United States ' WTO obligations , and that it will be notified in due course. Can 
the United States please advise:  
 
a. When and how the act will be notified as part of the Agreement on Agriculture?  
b. How the United States is giving respect to their WTO obligations when providing farmers 
with funding for environmental action?  
Answer by United States of America  
The Inflation Reduction Act invests in rural communities to build critical infrastructure, protect 
communities against extreme climatic events, and drive climate -smart agriculture and renewable 
energy initiatives.  The Act will invest in helping farmers, ranchers, and forest landowners to deploy 
climate -smart practices that will reduce greenhouse gas emissions, increase storage of carbon in 
soils and trees, and make their operations more efficient; support innovative, cost -effective ways to 
measure and verify climate benefits; and help farmers and ranchers apply conservation practices.  
The Act 's provisions related to agriculture primarily authorize additional  funding for existing 
conservation and renewable energy programs.  For any potential new programs, the U.S. Department 
of Agriculture takes various considerations into account, including WTO obligations as appropriate.  
Relevant agricultural components of th e Inflation Reduction Act will be notified consistent with 
WTO rules in the relevant years.  
Follow -up: Highlighting the significant amount of spending of at least 20 billion USD through this 
act, New Zealand flagged concern regarding the act's potential im pact on international markets. New 
Zealand expressed interest in understanding the act's compliance with WTO obligations and how it 
would be reported in U.S. notification. Brazil registered interest in the question. Noting several 
Members had introduced en vironmental reasons to justify protectionist and distortive measures, 
Brazil drew Members' attention to what is notified as environmental programmes at this Committee.  
3.1.35   United States - Climate Smart Agriculture and Forestry Strategy  
3.1.35.1   Question by New Zealand,  Paraguay (AG -IMS ID 102103 ) 
New Zealand would appreciate an update from the United States ' on the progress of its Climate 
Smart Agriculture and Forestry Str ategy , including how the US intends to meet its WTO obligations 
when developing this Strategy?  
Answer by United States of America  
Following the publication of Executive Order 14008 Tackling the Climate Crisis at Home and Abroad 
directing the U.S. Secretary  of Agriculture to develop a climate smart agriculture and forestry (CSAF) 
strategy, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) has developed, in consultation with U.S. 
stakeholders, a strategy that employs proven conservation practices to achieve enhanced 
productivity and economic sustainability for U.S. agriculture and forestry; improve ecological, social, 
and economic resilience to climate change; increase carbon sequestration; and reduce greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions.   
 
This strategy has been outlined a nd operationalized in several key publications including: a 90 -Day 
CSAF Strategy in May 2021 (link: https://www.usd a.gov/sites/default/files/documents/climate -G/AG/W/235  
 
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  smart -ag-forestry -strategy -90-day-progress -report.pdf  ), a Departmental Regulation (DR) 
1070-001 Policy Statement on Climate Change Adaptation in May 2021 (link: 
https://www.usda.gov/directives/dr -1070-001), and the USDA Action Plan for Climate Adaptation 
and Resilience in August 2021 (link: https://www.sustainability.gov/pdfs/usda -2021-cap.pdf ). 
Building off the framework of USDA 's Climate Adaptation Plan and pursuant to DR 1070 -001, 
USDA  Mission Areas, agencies, and departmental offices have developed climate adaptation plans 
unique to their organizations ' climate vulnerabilities, w hich were published in August 2022 (link: 
https://www.usda.gov/oce/energy -and-environment/climate/adaptation ). These plans identify 
climate risks and prioritize actions the agencies will implement to integrate climate adaptation into 
their planning, programs, operations, and management. Adaptation  is an iterative process that will 
evolve based on lessons learned and emerging climate risks.  
 
USDA takes various considerations into account, including WTO obligations as appropriate, in the 
development and evolution of these strategies and action plans.  
Follow -up: Brazil and New Zealand registered interest in the question. New Zealand sought further 
information regarding the strategy and its compliance with WTO rules. Noting several Members had 
introduced environmental reasons to justify protectionist an d distortive measures, Brazil drew 
Members' attention to what is notified as environmental programmes at this Committee. Paraguay 
reserved its right to raise follow up questions as necessary.  
3.1.36   U.S. support to biofuel producers  
3.1.36.1   Question by India (AG -IMS ID 102096 ) 
In December 2021, USDA announced that it will provide USD 800 million as economic relief to biofuel 
producers impacted by the pandemic ( https://www.usda.gov/media/press -
releases/2021/12/07/usda -make -800-million -available -provide -economic -relief-biofuel ). Out of  
this, USD 700 million will be directly paid to biofuel producers and the rest USD 100 million will be 
used to increase the sales of biofuel. By making payments to biofuels producers, the programme 
will help agricultural producers maintain and create more viable markets for products that supply 
biofuel production, such as corn, soybeans, or biomass. India requests the United States to provide 
details on the following:  
 
a. How would this support be categorized in the domestic support notification?  
b. What are the eligibility criteria for producers to  benefit  under this scheme?  
Answer by United States of America  
a. These programs will be notified consistent with WTO rules and at the appropriate time.  
b. Payments under the programme are made to eligible biofuel pro ducers based on the 
volume of market losses the producer experienced during calendar year 2020 as compared 
to eligible biofuel produced in calendar year 2019.  An eligible biofuel for purposes of this 
programme is defined as a "renewable fuel produced in th e United States from renewable 
biomass and used to replace or reduce the amount of fossil fuel in transportation fuels. " 
Follow -up: Brazil noted that it is a stout defender of the role of ethanol as an environment -friendly 
alternative to fossil fuels. For instance, electric vehicles powered by ethanol are one of the more 
viable and effective alternatives to prompt a global transition in transport systems. However, Brazil 
expressed concern regarding the situation when policies to promote the production of bi ofuels are 
not accompanied by policies to promote domestic consumption. Considering the U.S. position in the 
global market and its relatively low usage of ethanol compared to its market potential, Brazil feared 
that such support becomes 'de facto' export s ubsidies.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  3.1.37   U.S. domestic support programmes  
3.1.37.1   Question by India (AG -IMS ID 102129 ) 
a. The United States may please provide details and explain the differences in t he operation 
of the following programmes:   
i. Price Loss Coverage;   
ii. Counter Cyclical Payments; and   
iii. Agri Risk Payments. " 
b. It is seen that there is a rise in support for Marketing and Promotion Services under Green 
Box in the year 2019 -20; the US may kindly pro vide the reasons for such an increase. " 
Answer by United States of America  
a. The three identified programs are distinct programs established under various farm bills 
and for various implementing periods.   
i. Originally established under the 2014 Farm Act, the Price Loss Coverage (PLC) 
programme makes payments to producers when market prices fall below the legislated 
reference price, is decoupled from production as current planting decisions and levels 
of produ ction do not affect payments, but rather is based on 85% of historical "base" 
acres. Producers may choose which of their covered commodities to enroll in PLC. See 
AG-IMS ID 73043 for more details.  
ii. Originally established under the 2002 Farm Act, the Counter -cyclical programme (CCP) 
made payments to producers when the effective price for a commodity was below the 
legislated target price for the commodity.  The CCP programme was repealed by the 
2014 Farm Act.  
iii. Originally established under the 2014 Farm Act, the Agriculture Risk Coverage (ARC) 
programme is a revenue -based programme that ma kes payments to producers when 
revenue drops below a %age of the "benchmark" revenue. As with the PLC 
programme, the ARC programme bases payments on 85% of historical "base" acres.  
See AG -IMS ID 73043 for more details.   
b. From 2018/2019 to 2019/20, support for Marketing and Promotion Services increased by 
less than 7%. The reason for this increase was primarily driven by increased 
expenditures for developing marketing standards and providing news and inspection 
services through the U.S. Department of Agriculture 's Agricultural Marketing Service.  
Follow -up: India noted its particular in terest in U.S. response to question b and would follow up on 
the matter. Canada registered interest in U.S. DS programmes.  
3.2  POINTS RAISED IN CONNECTION WITH INDIVIDUAL NOTIFICATIONS  
3.2.1   Imports under tariff and other quota commitments  (Table MA:2)  
3.2.1.1   Brazil (G/AG/N/BRA/70)  
AG-IMS ID 102002: Question by European Union - Tariff quota fill  
The EU would like to thank Brazil for the submission of the MA:2 notification for the calendar 
year 2021. Could Brazil explain the reasons behind the underfill of BRAQ002? Wha t changes did the 
Ordinance n°38 of 19 June 2020, referenced in the footnote to BRAQ002, introduce to the 
administration of BRAQ002?  
 G/AG/W/235  
 
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  Answer by Brazil  
a. The fill rate is a result of market circumstances and trade decisions taken by private 
operators. For example, there was an increase of approximately 20% in wheat imports 
from MERCOSUR countries in 2021 compared to 2020. From Argentina alone, imports in 
volume grew more than the total volume of BRAQ002. This fact seems to indicate that 
impor ters opted to source wheat from within the trade bloc instead of resorting to the 
import quota.  
General trade data is available, in English, at: 
http://comexstat.mdic.gov.br/en/geral/6 5864  
 
There were no operational or regulatory changes in relation to the administration of the 
TRQ that could have affected imports under BRAQ002 in 2021, compared to 2020.  
  
b. Exceptionally, and in parallel to Brazil's commitment to the WTO, in 2020, throu gh 
Resolution GECEX nº 53, of 17 June 2020, Brazil increased the scheduled volume of the 
import quota by 450,000 tonnes . Thus, in 2020 alone, the amount of the import quota for 
wheat totalled  1,200,000 tonnes . 
Ordinance n°38 of 19 June 2020, mentioned in G /AG/N/BRA/70, regulated the distribution 
of the increased quota volume and extended the deadline (from 31 May to 30 June) for 
companies that received quota allocations under the import performance criterion to use 
their share of the TRQ.  
3.2.1.2   Dominican Republic  (G/AG/N/DOM/48)  
AG-IMS ID 102003: Question by European Union - Tariff quota fill  
The EU would like to thank the Dominican Republic for the submission of the MA:2 notification for 
the calendar year 2021. When analysing previous MA:2 notifications the EU no ted that for many 
years the tariff quota for poultry (DOMQ001) has constantly had a fill rate of 0%, whereas the fill 
rate in 2021 soared to over 100%. Could the Dominican Republic explain what changed that allowed 
the full use of this quota?  
Answer by Dom inican Republic  
The Dominican Republic thanks the European Union for its question. The fill rate for the quota for 
chicken meat (DOMQ001) has historically remained at lower levels or nil because the price of local 
chicken meat has always been competitive in relation to imported chicken. Under one of the 
preferential agreements concluded by the Dominican Republic, these subheadings are exempt from 
duties or their tariffs are lower than that applied within the WTO quota, so the commercial sector 
prefers to source the product locally or to import it under one of the trade agreements. In addition, 
production is sufficient to meet local market demand. Over the period 2016 20, 88% of products 
consumed were sourced locally.  The fill rate in 2021 can be  explained by the convergence of two 
factors: that year, the pig population of the Dominican Republic was hit by an outbreak of African 
swine fever, which meant that many of the live backyard animals had to be slaughtered, leading 
consumers to replace pork  with chicken meat as their source of protein. This brought about an 
increase in imports to meet the sudden demand.  
3.2.1.3   El Salvador (G/AG/N/SLV/82)  
AG-IMS ID 102064: Question by Paraguay, Brazil - Transparency issues  
In follow -up to the reply received from El Salvador to question AG -IMS ID 101018 , could El Salvador 
explain the reasons why the other tariff quotas are not open?  
Answer by El Salvador  
In compliance with its commitments assumed under Article 18.2 of the WTO Agreement on 
Agriculture and as agreed by the Committee, El Salvador submits its notifications on the basis of G/AG/W/235  
 
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  document  G/AG/2, which specifies the information that needs to be notified. However, we take note 
of the suggestion made by Brazil and Paraguay at COA meeting number 102 on the submission of 
all tariff rate quotas in the MA:2 notification. This suggestion is being  analysed by the relevant 
authorities in El Salvador.  
Follow -up: Brazil invited the Committee to reflect on the practices of TRQ notifications. It referred 
to its practice of including in the notifications of non -opened TRQs such as its TRQ for pears and 
apples and providing an explanation why the TRQ was not opened. Brazil encouraged other Members 
to follow this practice. Paraguay echoed Brazil's comment.   
3.2.1.4   European Union (G/AG/N/EU/76)  
AG-IMS ID 102098: Question by India - Tariff quota fill  
In the MA: 2 notifications ( G/AG/N/EU/ 76), the EU has notified zero or near zero fill rate on husked 
(brown) rice and broken rice. India requests the European Union to provide details on the following:  
 
a. Reasons for such a low fill rate?  
b. What actions are being undertaken to increase the fill ra tes? 
Answer by European Union  
a. As already explained for similar questions in the recent past, but also during the last EU 
TPR, if EU TRQs are not filled this is essentially due to economic reasons. Thanks to 
continuous reforms, EU internal prices have conve rged towards world prices so making EU 
products more competitive against imports in many agricultural sectors. The EU has also 
concluded many bilateral trade agreements, further liberalising its agricultural sector. 
Economic operators and consumers have th erefore more choices that influence the 
attractiveness of WTO bound TRQs. Any low fill rate is thus normally linked to market 
circumstances. The EU confirms that this is the case also for the two erga omnes rice TRQs 
for which India requested clarification s as regards their low fill rate.  
b. Given the reasons explained above, no specific actions are envisaged with regards to the 
two rice TRQs mentioned by India.  
Follow -up: Paraguay and Uruguay supported the question. Noting that India had recently imposed 
export restrictions and prohibitions on rice, including broken rice, Brazil urged Members to adopt 
trade-facilitating measures and refrain from adopting trade -distorting policies. In Brazil's view, this 
is essential to guarantee growth, development, protection  of the environment and food security 
globally.  
3.2.1.5   India (G/AG/N/IND/28)  
AG-IMS ID 102110: Question by Brazil - Tariff quota fill  
Brazil has raised the underfill issue regarding India 's TRQ INDQ002 - Maize (corn) in previous 
occasions (AG -IMS ID s 97128  and 99048 ). Once again, there have been no imports under such TRQ 
during financial year from 2021 -04-01 to 2022 -03-31.  
 
In this regard, Brazil would like to request India to provide the following information:   
 
a. Are imports taking place outside the TRQ? How much has India imported under tariff line 
100590 from 1 April 2021 to 31 March 2022?   
b. What were the applied intra -quota and extra -quota tariffs?  
c. Who/what bo dy is entitled to apply for the allocation of the tariff rate quota?  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  Answer by India  
a. The information can be accessed at 
https://tradestat.commerce.gov.in/eidb/Icomq.asp?hs=100590  . 
b. Maize (corn), other than seed quality, falling under sub heading 1005 90, attracts effective 
import duty on MFN basis of 50% and in -quota rate of 15%.  
c. The relevant body is the Directorate General  of Foreign Trade (DGFT).  
Follow -up: Paraguay registered interest in the matter.  
3.2.1.6   Japan (G/AG/N/JPN/278)  
AG-IMS ID 102111: Question by Australia - Tariff quota fill  
Australia thanks Japan for submitting its most recent MA:2 notification ( G/AG/N/JPN/278 ). In that 
submission, Australia  notes very low fill rates for the following quotas:   
JPNQ001 - Skimmed milk powder (For school lunch) – 20.7% filled of 7,264 metric tonne quota ; 
JPNQ002 - Skimmed milk powder (For other purposes) – 22% filled of 74,973 metric tonne quota ; 
JPNQ007 - Prepa red whey (For infant formula) – 15.3% filled of 25,000 metric tonne quota ; 
JPNQ008 - Butter and butteroil – 3.8% filled of 581 metric tonne quota . 
Australia also notes that tariff rate quotas for butter (7,600 MT) and non -fat dairy milk (750 MT) 
for Japan' s current fiscal year have been maintained at the same level as Japan's last fiscal year.   
Can Japan please explain the need to maintain these special TRQ, given that existing skimmed 
milk powder and butter quotas remain underfilled?  
Answer by Japan  
The quotas of these items have been unfilled as the domestic consumption related to these quotas 
have not been increasing and also the impact of COVID -19 has been considerable in the recent 
years. For instance, JPNQ008 (butter and butter oil) is for consumptio n in the international airlines, 
international fairs and other specialized purposes, and the quota was not fully utilized due to the 
cancellation/reduction of international airlines affected by the COVID -19 outbreak.  
3.2.1.7   Kazakhstan (G/AG/N/KAZ/13)  
AG-IMS ID 10 2004: Question by European Union - Transparency issues  
The E uropean Union  would like to thank Kazakhstan for the submission of the MA:2 notification for 
the calendar year 2020. Could Kazakhstan inform the Membership when it expects to submit its 
MA:2 notif ication for 2021? Could Kazakhstan also provide a reply to the question asked by the EU 
under AG -IMS 93189  from 93rd CoA meeting?  
Answer by Kazakhstan  
Notification of Kazakhstan ( G/AG/N/KAZ/20 ) concerning imp orts under tariff quotas (MA:2) for 2021 
was sent to the WTO Committee on Agriculture on 23 September 2022.  
3.2.1.8   Korea, Republic of (G/AG/N/KOR/89)  
AG-IMS ID 102084: Question by New Zealand - Tariff quota fill  
In Korea 's latest MA:2 notification, the fill rates  for dairy products and natural honey ranged between 
40% and 4%. Does the Republic of Korea have any plans to change tariff quota administration with 
the aim of increasing the low fill rates for dairy and honey products in the future?  
Answer by Korea, Repu blic of  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  a. There was an error in Korea 's previous notification ( G/AG/N/KOR/89 ) for natural honey. 
The fill rate of natural honey in 2021 was 98.7% with the amount of 414.58 ton nes. Please 
check the corrigendum ( G/AG/N/KOR/89/Corr.1 ) which was circulated on  5 September.  
b. Some dairy products such as KORQ008, KORQ009, KORQ010 and KORQ011 with 4 to 40% 
fill rates are managed by the first -come, first -out method which is the most favourable  
TRQ management system for exporting countries. Therefore, the Republic of Korea is not 
considering changing the T RQ management method. The main reason for the low TRQ fill 
rates of these commodities is that the Republic of Korea imports these products through 
0% FTA tariff rates.  
3.2.1.9   Norway (G/AG/N/NOR/121)  
AG-IMS ID 102065: Question by Paraguay, Brazil - Transparency is sues 
Paraguay and Brazil thank Norway for submitting notification G/AG/N/NOR/121  on the fill of its tariff 
quotas (MA:2). On the cover page of this document, Norway states that: " For other current access 
quotas included in Norway's Schedule, as of 2000 the bound MFN tariff has been at the level of the 
in-quota tariff. A tariff -only regime applies to these TRQs from 2000 and onwards. Since Norway has 
fulfilled its commitments, for the current access quotas with a tariff -only regime, these will not be a 
part of the notification ". 
While  we note that this declaration has been included in Norway's MA:2 notifications since 2001 
(G/AG/N/NOR/38 ), we recall that Paraguay an d Brazil, along with a number of other Members, has 
reservations about Norway's proposed modification of its schedule of commitments, which has 
sought to eliminate these tariff quotas since 2020. The reasons for these reservations have been 
fully explained  to the delegation of Norway at the bilateral level and stem from systemic concerns 
that Norway has been unable to address to our satisfaction.  
Could Norway indicate which section of the current transparency obligations provides the grounds 
for this unilat eral decision to not notify certain quotas that continue to form part of its schedule of 
commitments and have not been eliminated? We ask that Norway indicate the specific rules that 
allow a Member to decide which quotas form part of its notification and w hich do not, particularly in 
cases where the proposed changes to the schedule of commitments have not been accepted.   
Answer by Norway  
Norway thanks Paraguay and Brazil for the question regarding the Norwegian MA:2 notification.  In 
Norway 's market access o ffer in the Uruguay Round, accepted by all Members, 211 current access 
import quotas were introduced that would only have a tariff advantage in the implementation period 
of tariff reductions up to the year 2000. Starting from the year 2000, the out -of-quota bound 
MFN tariff has been the same as the in -quota tariffs for these import quotas, meaning that the import 
quotas have no tariff advantage and that a tariff only regime has been applied for these products.  
The technical rectification submitted by Norway on 13 December 2019, contained in 
G/MA/TAR/RS/592, does not affect the way we notify MA:2. As is rightly pointed out, Norway has 
consistently notified our import quota commitments in MA:2 in the same manner throughout the 
years, where information re garding the scheduled import quotas with no tariff advantage, and that 
has a tariff -only regime, is included in a head -note to the MA:2 table. We believe this is a transparent 
and practical way of notifying imports under our tariff quotas.   
Follow -up: Paraguay informed the Committee of the bilateral discussions with Norway and a few 
other Members on this issue and hoped to receive further information on not -opened quotas. Brazil 
noted that the question remained unanswered as Norway did not provide a clear i ndication as to 
which specific section of the current transparency obligations provides the grounds for the unilateral 
decision to not notify the 211 TRQs. The European  Union shared Paraguay and Brazil's concern. The 
EU noted that it had repeatedly asked s imilar questions to Norway since 1996 and had not been 
satisfied with Norway's response. The EU reiterated its view that all TRQs in a Members' schedule of 
commitments should be included in its MA:2 notifications.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  AG-IMS ID 102112: Question by United Kingd om - Tariff quota fill  
The United Kingdom thanks Norway for its recent submission of G/AG/N/NOR/121 . We note that 
Norway has recorded a 100% fill rate for NORQ032. Could Norway please confirm whether the fill 
rate reported excludes imports under any preferential terms offered by Nor way on the same product 
bilaterally? If not, could Norway please explain how usage of this TRQ has been determined?  
Answer by Norway  
Norway thanks the UK for the questions regarding the fill rate for the cheese quota NORQ032.The 
quantity reported imported under the quota, is cheese imported under the TRQs as listed in Note 3 
to the notification. This includes the following quotas: EU – 8 101 tonnes, UK – 299 tonnes, 
Switzerland/Iceland 200 tonnes. When the WTO quota NORQ032 was established after the Uruguay  
round, this quota was country allocated with a total quantity of 2 494 tonnes. The respective bilateral 
quotas have since increased, hence the large in quota imports. No new preferential TRQs have been 
included in the fill rate reported, except the quota to the UK, which was a part of the original 
EU quota.  
Follow -up: The United Kingdom expressed appreciation towards Norway's transparency on the 
bilateral discussions on this issue.  
3.2.1.10   Panama (G/AG/N/PAN/60)  
AG-IMS ID 102113: Question by Australia - Tariff quo ta fill  
Australia thanks Panama for submitting its 2021 calendar year MA:2 notification G/AG/N/PAN/60 . 
Australia note s that Panama has again reported nil, or close to nil, fill rates for ten TRQs across dairy 
and other agricultural products. We note that multiple TRQs remain underfilled from the 2020 
notification ( G/AG/N/PAN/59 ). 
a. Can Panama explain the reasons for the underfill of its quotas?  
b. Could Panama explain what it is doing to increase utilisation of underfilled tariff quotas, as 
per the Bali Decision on TRQ Administration?  
Australia has asked this question previously (AG -IMS ID 101021 ) and note Panama has still not 
provided a response. Australia would appreciate Panama updating the Membership as to whether 
this infor mation is available.  
Answer by Panama  
a. In the case of the tariff quotas made available, economic operators are on many occasions 
unable to agree on a price with their sellers and therefore do not carry out the commercial 
transactions.  We believe that the ni l, or close to nil, fill rates for these products are 
fundamentally due to market circumstances.  
b. Panama reiterates that it fulfils its commitment to make the products and annual quantities 
for the quotas available to ensure that economic operators have acc ess to them. For the 
moment, Panama has not considered using the TRQ underfill mechanism.  
AG-IMS ID 102005: Question by European Union - Tariff quota fill  
Can Panama explain the reasons behind the 0% fill rate of its "Milk and milk products " quotas 
(PANQ00 8, PANQ009, PANQ011), its "liquid Milk " and related "other " quota (PANQ004, PANQ005), 
and its "Processed cheese " quota (PANQ013) in their  Table MA:2 for the calendar year 2021?  
Answer by Panama  
We make the following comments regarding the products referenc ed:  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  • For PANQ004, PANQ005, PANQ008 and PANQ009, Panama is in the process of withdrawing 
the tariff quotas at the World Trade Organization, which is why they have not been made 
available for 2021.   
• Panama has made PANQ011 available as a raw material in which economic operators have 
no commercial interest and therefore do not carry out the commercial transactions.   
• In the case of PANQ013, Panama has an efficient production process for yellow cheese which 
is made using imported raw materials (quota PANQ010 ), which makes product PANQ013 
less attractive than Panama's supply of processed cheese.  
3.2.1.11   Philippines (G/AG/N/PHL/82)  
AG-IMS ID 102039: Question by United States of America - Transparency issues  
WTO Notification G/AG/N/PHL/82  indicates in 2021, Philippine in -quota corn imports 
totalled  216,940  metric tonnes.  
According to the Philippines Statistics Authority, in 2021, the Philippines imported a total 
of 459,581  metric tonnes of corn under Harmonized System (HS) heading 1005; As sociation of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) accounted for 439,278 metric tonnes or 96% of total imported 
corn. 
It is noted that ASEAN members, including the Philippines eliminated all Tariff -Rate Quotas (TRQs) 
for other ASEAN members under Article 20 of t he ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement and the 
Philippines' schedule has a tariff of 5%. This compares to the most -favoured -nation (MFN) in -quota 
rate of 35% and out -quota rate of 50%.   
This disadvantages the MFN trading partners of the Philippines who do not h ave access to the lower 
in-quota tariff because the MFN in -quota volume is filled by trading partners with preferential tariff 
treatment.  The United States also notes that other ASEAN members exclude preferential imports 
from other ASEAN members in the cal culation of their WTO tariff -rate quota fill.   
a. Please confirm the total quantity of corn that was imported in 2021 at a preferential rate, 
and the total quantity imported at the MFN rate during that same time period.   
b. Why does the Philippines count its cor n imports from regional trade agreements such as 
ASEAN, as part of its WTO tariff rate quota fill when many of the Philippines' regional trade 
agreement partners exclude preferential imports from the calculation of their WTO tariff 
rate quota fill?   
c. Please  confirm whether the Philippines includes imports of popcorn (1005.90.10) and seed 
corn (1005.10.00) as part of its in -quota volume fill.  
Answer by Philippines  
The Philippines is reviewing the MA:2 notifications for corn and will issue appropriate informat ion. 
The Philippines would like to inform the United States that corrigendum notifications for 2020 
and 2021 MA:2 notification, specific on corn, was submitted to the Secretariat to rectify the 
previously submitted notifications.  
Follow -up: New Zealand wel comed the changes to Philippines' TRQ administration towards some 
good practices such as first come and first served and looked forward to receiving further information 
in this area. Brazil asked the Philippines to provide in its written response the infor mation on the 
details sought in its question.   
AG-IMS ID 102114: Question by Brazil - Tariff quota fill  
Brazil has noticed a reduced fill -rate (11.2%) in Philippines ' TRQ PHLQ006 (Beef) during calendar -
year 2021.Could the Philippines provide data or inform ation on any circumstances, including the 
difference of applied intra -quota and extra -quota tariffs and extra -quota import volume, that would 
explain the relatively low volume of imports under the aforementioned TRQ?  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  Answer by Philippines  
The Philippines T RQ PHL006 on beef with HS 0201 (fresh or chilled beef) is normally imported at 
minimal volume.  
Follow -up: New Zealand welcomed the changes to Philippines' TRQ administration towards some 
good practices such as first come and first served and looked forward  to receiving further information 
in this area. Brazil asked the Philippines to provide in its written response the information on the 
details sought in its question.   
AG-IMS ID 102099: Question by New Zealand - Tariff quota fill  
The latest MA:2 notificati on put forward by the Philippines records the fill rate for beef at 11.2%. 
Does the Philippines have any plans to change tariff quota administration with the aim of increasing 
the low fill rate for beef products in the future?  
Answer by Philippines  
The Philippines TRQ PHL006 on beef with HS 0201 (fresh or chilled beef) is normally imported at 
minimal volume.  
Follow -up: New Zealand welcomed the changes to Philippines' TRQ administration towards some 
good practices such as first come and fi rst served and looked forward to receiving further information 
in this area. Brazil asked the Philippines to provide in its written response the information on the 
details sought in its question.   
3.2.1.12   United Kingdom (G/AG/N/GBR/13)  
AG-IMS ID 102115: Question b y Australia - Tariff quota fill  
Australia thanks the United Kingdom for submitting its 2021 marketing year MA:2 notification, 
G/AG/N/GBR/13 . Australia has previously questioned in AG -IMS ID 100090  low rill rates for a range 
of the UK 's quotas and notes that this is the second year of very low utilisation rates of a range of 
quotas, including the meat of bovi ne animals quotas (GBRQ001 – GBRQ007). While fill rates of these 
quotas has improved over the past year, given COVID -19 related restrictions have now largely been 
lifted in the United Kingdom, they still remain very low.  
Could the UK please provide additio nal detail on the administration of these quotas?  
Answer by United Kingdom  
The United Kingdom thanks Australia for their question on our MA:2 notification (G/AG/N/GBR/13).   
Quotas GBRQ001 to GBRQ005 are administered using a license on demand system.  To qualify for 
these quotas, the meat must satisfy specific conditions set out in UK legislation.  Importers are 
required to submit a valid Certificate of Authenticity, issued by the recognised authority of the 
exporting country, alongside their application to  obtain a quota license. The fill rates of these quotas 
have increased compared with our previous notification.  In particular, the fill rate of quotas GBRQ003 
and GBRQ005 were 100% and 85.6% respectively for the period 1 July 2021 to 30 June 2022.   
Quota G BRQ006 is administered using a license system.  Further details can be found on the 
UK Government 's website at Notice to Traders 48/21 - GOV.UK ( www.gov.uk ).  
Quota GBRQ007 is administered using a first -come first -served sy stem. Meat imported under this 
quota must be used for processing into specified products.   
AG-IMS ID 102116: Question by Brazil - Tariff quota fill  
Brazil has raised the underfill issue regarding some of the UK 's TRQs in previous occasions (AG -IMS 
ID 99052  and ID 100043 ).  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  According to notification G/AG/N/GBR/13 , there have been no imports under TRQ GBRQ007 during 
marketing year from 2021 -07-01 to 2022 -06-30 and imports under TRQs GBR Q064 and GBRQ067 
were 58.2% and 6.2% lower, respectively.   
a. Could the UK provide data or information on any circumstance, including the difference of 
applied intra -quota and extra -quota tariffs and extra -quota import volumes, that would 
explain the low volu me of imports under the aforementioned TRQs?   
b. Is Regulation 1432/2020, which establishes a performance requirement to apply for 
licenses, affecting fill -rates of such TRQs?  
Answer by United Kingdom  
The United Kingdom thanks Brazil for their questions on ou r MA:2 notification ( G/AG/N /GBR/13 ).  
a. Quota GBRQ007 is administered using a first -come first -served system.  The in -quota duty 
rate ranges from 20% to 20% + GBP 1,789.56/tonne.  Meat imported under this quota 
must be used for processing into specified products.  The products covered by GBRQ007 
are also covered by preferential agreements under various UK bilateral FTAs. We estimate 
that over 85,000 tonnes8 of products covered by this quota were imported under 
preferential terms during the same period the quota was open for (1 July – 30 June).   
The fill rate for quota GBRQ064 has increased compared with our previous notification 
from 11.6% to 58.2%.  The in -quota duty rate is GBP 527.23/tonne.  However, we estimate 
that approximately over 34,000 tonnes1 of product covered by this quota were imported 
under preferential terms during the same period the quota was open for 
(1 July – 30 June).   
The fill rate for quota GBRQ067 has also increased although by a smaller extent from zero 
to 6.2%.  The in -quota duty rate is 10.9%.  However , we estimate that approximately over 
4,900 tonnes of product covered by this quota were imported under preferential terms 
during the same period the quota was open for (1 July – 30 June).   
b. Regulation 1432/2020 sets out the measures for tariff quota admini stration in the 
United  Kingdom.  The measures are designed to ensure that tariff quotas are allocated in 
an open, fair and transparent manner.  In some instances, quota volumes are allocated on 
previous performance (reference quantity).  Having consulted with  stakeholders, and 
conducted further data analysis, there is no evidence to suggest that this requirement is 
having an impact on the fill rates of these quotas.  We regularly review our TRQ 
administration systems in light of experience gained and in consult ation with 
stakeholders.  We will adapt quota administration where necessary.   
AG-IMS ID 102066: Question by Paraguay - Tariff quota fill  
Paraguay thanks the United Kingdom for submitting notification G/AG/N/GBR/13  on tariff quota fill  
(MA:2). We note with concern the underfill of quotas GBRQ001 (20.7%), GBRQ002 (15%), 
GBRQ004  (30.2%) and GBRQ007 (0%). In this connection, could the United Kingdom:  
a. Explain the reasons for the underfill of these quotas?  
b. Indicate whether it is considering amending its administration method , in accordance with 
the Bali Decision, in order to guarantee an increased fill of these quotas?  
c. Explain notes (1) and (2) on the joint administration of quotas GBRQ003 and GBRQ005 
with quota GBRQ001 and the impact that this may have on the fill of these t hree tariff 
quotas?  
 
8 Note that import data for 2022 is still subject to revisions and may change. In addition, data collection 
changes following EU exit have impacted trade data uncertainty for 2021 and 2022.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  Answer by United Kingdom  
The United Kingdom thanks Paraguay for their questions on our recent MA:2 notification 
(G/AG/N/GBR/13 ).  
a. Quotas GBRQ001, GBRQ002 and GBRQ004 are administered using a license on demand 
system.  To qualify for these quotas, the meat must sat isfy specific conditions set out in 
UK legislation.  Importers are required to submit a valid Certificate of Authenticity, issued 
by the recognised authority of the exporting country, alongside their application to obtain 
a quota licence. The products cover ed by these quotas are also covered by preferential 
arrangements under various bilateral FTAs. We estimate that approximately over 
240,000  tonnes9 of products covered by this quota were imported under preferential terms 
during the same period the quota wa s open for (1 July – 30 June).   
Quota GBRQ007 is administered using a first -come first -served system.  The in -quota duty 
rate ranges from 20% to 20% + GBP 1,789.56/tonne.  Meat imported under this quota 
must be used for processing into specified products.  Having spoken with stakeholders and 
conducted further data analysis, our estimate is that approximately over 85,000 tonnes1 
of products covered by this quota were imported under preferential terms during the same 
period the quota was open for (1 July – 30 Ju ne).  
b. As previously mentioned, these quotas are already administered using a license on 
demand or first -come first -served system.   
c. As explained in our MA:1 notification ( G/AG/N/GBR/2 ), quota GBRQ001 is sub -divided into 
several country specific quotas including Argentina and  Uruguay.  These quota volumes for 
Argentina and Uruguay under GBRQ001 are administered jointly with the country specific 
volumes covered by quotas GBRQ003 and GBRQ005 respectively.  The fill rate of the quota 
volumes made available to Argentina and Uruguay were 100% and 85.6% respectively for 
the period 1 July 2021 to 30 June 2022.   
Follow -up: Uruguay expressed interest in finding out the reasons for the underfill of several 
United  Kingdom's TRQs particularly the TRQs for meat, rice and apples and pears. Uruguay noted 
that the United  Kingdom made reference to the country -specific quotas GBRQ003 and 005 which 
were allocated to Argentina and Uruguay respectively and sought clarification as regards whether 
the 85.6% fill rate associated with GBRQ005 al so covered imports under GBRQ001.  
AG-IMS ID 102117: Question by Thailand - Tariff quota fill  
Thailand thanks the United Kingdom for its notification G/AG/N/GBR/13  and would like to have more 
information concerning imports under tariff rate quota during the marketing year from 1  July 2021 
to 30 June 2022.  
a. Could the United Kingdom explain the reason for the empty fill rate of the UK TRQ ID. 
GBRQ015 (Fresh chicken cuts chilled or frozen)?  
b. Could the United Kingdom explain the reason for the TRQ's underfill rate for the UK TRQ 
ID. GBRQ064  (Process uncooked chicken meat containing 57% or more weight of poultry 
meat or offal)?  
c. Thailand noted in this notification that the United Kingdom did not report the tariff rate 
quota fill rate for rice imports. As a result, could the UK explain why the aforementioned 
information was not included in the notification?  
Answer by United Kingdom  
The United Kingdom thanks Thailand for their questions on our MA:2 notification ( G/AG/N/GBR/13 ).  
 
9 Note that import data for 2022 is still subject to revisions and may change. In addition, data collection 
changes following EU exit have impacted trade data uncertainty for 2021 and 2022.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  a. The in -quota  duty rate for quota GBRQ015 ranges from GBP 77.82/tonne to 
GBP 428.47/tonne. However, we estimate that approximately over 249,000 tonnes1 of 
products covered by this quota were imported under preferential terms during the same 
period the quota was open fo r (1 July – 30 June).   
b. The fill rate for quota GBRQ064 has increased compared with our previous notification 
from 11.6% to 58.2%. The in -quota duty rate is GBP 527.23/tonne. However, we estimate 
that approximately over 34,000 tonnes10 of product covered by  this quota were imported 
under preferential terms during the same period the quota was open for (1 July – 
30 June).   
c. This notification covers tariff quotas open during the marketing year 1 July 2021 to 30  June 
2022.  Tariff quotas covering rice products are open on a calendar year basis.  Quota fill 
rates for rice imports during 2021 were notified under G/AG/N/GBR/6/Rev.1  in 
February  2022.  Quota fill rates for rice imports during 2022 will be notified in early 2023.   
3.2.1.13   United States of America (G/AG/N/USA/162)  
AG-IMS ID 10210 4: Question by India - Tariff quota fill  
In the recent MA:2 notification ( G/AG/N/USA/162 ) of the USA, the fill rates for many agricultural 
products such as cotton -related products (USAQ049, USAQ050, USAQ051), chocolate (USAQ036), 
cheese (USAQ019, USAQ023) and dried milk (USAQ006) is  significantly low. India requests the 
United  States to provide details on the following:  
a. the reasons for the underfill, or zero -fill rate of the products?  
b. What actions are being undertaken to increase the fill rates?  
Answer by United States of America  
a. The fill rates of U.S. TRQs in any particular year are affected by a variety of market factors, 
including price trends, exchange rates, supply and demand.  
b. No changes are currently envisioned as the underfill is a result of market factors.  
Follow -up: New Zeala nd flagged interest in learning more about U.S. quota fill and whether the US 
was fulfilling requirements on its market access commitments.  
AG-IMS ID 102001: Question by Switzerland - Tariff quota fill  
Switzerland welcomes the United States of America 's notification on imports under tariff quotas 
(Table MA:2) during 2021. We note the low fill rate of 56% of TRQ USA Q024 concerning "Swiss and 
Emmentaler cheese with eye formation ". The quota is subdivided into several country specific 
quotas. Their respective  quantities no longer seem to reflect current trade flows.   
a. Is the United States of America planning any specific steps in order to increase the fill 
rates of this quota?  
b. The Bali Decision on tariff rate quota administration requests the importing Member to 
contact private operators holding unused entitlements in order to make them available to 
other potential users (para. 9). Is the USA issuing such requests to holders of unused 
entitlements in order to make them available for other importers?  
 
10 Note that import data for 2022 is still subject to revisions and may change. In addition, data 
collection changes following EU exit have impacted trade data uncertainty for 2021 and 2022.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  Answ er by United States of America  
a. The fill rates of U.S. TRQs in any particular year are affected by a variety of market factors, 
including price trends, exchange rates, supply and demand. No changes are currently 
envisioned as the underfill is a result of ma rket factors.  
b. The United States manages its licensed TRQs in a manner that promotes the full utilization, 
including through globalization and by administering a surrender and reallocation process 
for unused portions. Additional information is published und er the "Program Notices" 
section of the Foreign Agricultural Service's website 
(https://www.fas.usda.gov/programs/dairy -import -licensing -program ), including the 
shares available for globalization, by Commodity and Country.  
Follow -up: New Zealand flagged interest in learning more about U.S. quota fill and whether the 
United  States was fulfilling requirements on its market access commitments.  
3.2.2   Special safeguards  (Tables MA:3 to MA:5)  
3.2.2.1   Philippines (G/AG/N/PHL/53)  
AG-IMS ID 102040: Question by United States of America - Trigger calculations  
In G/AG/N/PHL/53 , the Philippines states the average Trigger Price is "weighted average by import 
volume. " Further, it is noted that the same Trigger Price is us ed for both chicken wings (0207.14.10), 
frozen poultry offal and other cuts (0207.14.99), and fresh or chilled poultry meat and edible offal 
(0207.11.00).  
Please provide calculation methodology, including all necessary data (e.g., the volume of imports 
(in kilograms)), used to derive the special safeguard trigger -price for tariff item number 0207.14.10, 
0207.14.99, and 0207.11.00.  
Answer by Philippines  
This trigger price which was calculated using the weighted average methodology was already notified 
in 200 2 in G/AG/N/PHL/27 (up -front notification) which has not changed as reflected in 
G/AG/N/PHL/53 .  
The SSG trigger price for tariff item number 0207.14.10, 0207,14.99, and 0207.11.00 was calculated 
using the weighted average from 1986 -1988 import data, in accordance with Article 5 of the 
Agreemen t on Agriculture.  
3.2.2.2   Philippines (G/AG/N/PHL/81)  
AG-IMS ID 102118: Question by Indonesia - Transparency issues  
Indonesia notes that the Philippines has notified recently the application of SSG for instant coffee 
products that has been carried out for more tha n four years in the document G/AG/N/PHL/81  for the 
calendar year of 2021.   
Indonesia has raised questions on the said issue at the 100th Meeting of the COA in March  2022. 
Indonesia appreciates the Philippines for its response.   
Following the Philippines' response, Indonesia would like to inform the Philippines that Indonesia has 
adjusted the CIF price for instant coffee, in particular for the single packs, above the trigger price.  
Subsequently, Indonesia would like to inquire to the Philippines whether they have been informed 
about this updated price?   
Furthermore, Indonesia also would like to seek clarification and explanation whether the application 
of the SSG will still be in place for Indonesian instant coffee in light of the adjusted CIF price?   G/AG/W/235  
 
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  Lastly, Indonesia would like to request the Philippines to further explain the progress on the 
implementation of the SSG measure. In this regard, Indonesia wishes to refer to Paragraph  5.7, 
Article  5 of the AoA, which requires the applicant Member to provide transparency in the 
implementation of SSG in writing, including the latest data.   
Therefore, would the Philippines kindly elaborate fur ther on this matter?  
Answer by Philippines  
The Philippines thanks the delegation of Indonesia for its continued interest on the Philippines ' 
Special Safeguard on Instant Coffee. We note that Indonesia has also raised this matter in the 
previous Committee o n Agriculture and Committee on Market Access meetings, to which we have 
provided our responses.  
We have already conveyed to Indonesia, that in accordance with Article 5.1 of the Agreement on 
Agriculture, SSG may be invoked on an SSG -eligible product if its  CIF import price falls below the 
trigger price. The trigger price for instant coffee was among those provided in the Philippines ' 
up-front notification in document G/AG/PHL/27 in 2002, which is the basis for the imposition of 
price-based SSG.  
The price -based SSG in instant coffee was imposed in August 2018. Its imposition remained as 
reflected in the Philippines MA:5 notifications for 2019 and 2020. The application of SSG on this 
product continued in 2021 as notified in G/AG/N/PHL/81. For as long as import ed instant coffee 
arrives in the Philippines at a price lower than the trigger price, the SSG will continue to be applied 
on this product in accordance with the rules of the Agreement on Agriculture.  
Our delegation continues to coordinate this matter with Manila, and the Philippines stands ready to 
further discussing this issue with Indonesia and we remain committed to addressing this matter in 
the appropriate forum.  
Follow -up: Indonesia noted that the Philippines had been imposing SSG on Indonesia's instan t coffee 
products since 2018. Indonesia highlighted that the application of SSG should be in line with 
paragraphs 1b and 5 of Article 5 and invited the Philippines to further elaborate on the trigger price 
calculation as well as the method and data used in  the determination of imposing SSG.  
3.2.3   Domestic support commitments  (Table DS:1)  
3.2.3.1   Argentina (G/AG/N/ARG/50, G/AG/N/ARG/51)  
AG-IMS ID 102006: Question by European Union - Transparency issues (including 
Table  DS:2)  
The EU has noticed that Argentina prepared its notifications by using the "1992 peso ". In this regard:  
a. Can Argentina indicate the exchange rate used for calculation from "current peso " to "1992 
peso"?  
The applied administered price was 0.69 per kg ( G/AG/N/ARG/50  for agricultura l year 
2018/2019). The administered price was increased to 1 per kg for agricultural year 
2019/2020 ( G/AG/N/ARG/51 ) and also the quantity of the eligible production was 
increased by  approx. 10 million kg.  
b. Could Argentina explain the reasons behind the increased administered price fo r tobacco?  
c. Could Argentina confirm the link between the increased price and the increase in the 
production?  
Answer by Argentina  
a. As we explained at the 98th and 99th COA, the 1992 pesos bound in our Schedule of 
Commitments LXIV (64) are equivalent to US dol lars.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  The exchange rate used for the purposes of the corresponding conversion is that offered 
by the Central Bank of Argentina.   
b. The applied administered price (1992 peso) for the periods 2018 -19 and 2019 -20 covered 
by notifications G/AG/N/ARG/50  and G/AG/N/ARG/51  was 0.66 pesos per kilogram.   
In notification G/AG/N/ ARG/51 , there must have been a mistake when the notification was 
being prepared by the Secretariat. Excel probably rounded up the figure, which is why the 
price of 1 peso per kilogram was published. It should be noted that the applied 
administered price in  question did not increase between the two periods mentioned above. 
We have contacted the Secretariat to correct the error.   
The applied administered price for the 2017 -18 was 0.69 pesos per kilogram, which is in 
line with the administered price for the other two periods mentioned above.   
The volume of production between 2018 -19 and 2019 -20 rose by 5,507,000 kg as a 
result of the modernization of the production process and the increase in yield per 
hectare.  
Follow -up: The United  States supported the quest ion. 
3.2.3.2   Argentina (G/AG/N/ARG/51)  
AG-IMS ID 102120: Question by United Kingdom - Direct payments: structural adjustment 
assistance provided through investment aids  
The United Kingdom thanks Argentina for its recent submission of G/AG/N/ARG/51 . The United 
Kingdom is interested in the support notified under Measure Type 11: 'Structural adjustment 
assistance provided through investment aids ' in Supporting Table DS:1. In particular, the United 
Kingdom would appreciate further information on:  
 
a. How Argentina interprets the concept of "objectively demonstrated structural 
disadvantage " in relation to eligibility for payments?   
b. How does Argentina ensure that such payments are 'limited to the amount required to 
compensate for the structural disadvantage '? 
Answer by Argentina  
The Green Box work programmes within the scope of Annex 2, paragraph 11, of the Agreement on 
Agriculture, "Structural adjustment assistance provided through investment aids", under notification 
G/AG/N/ARG/51 , aim to provide technical and financial assi stance and support the physical 
restructuring of the activities of small and disadvantaged producers on low incomes.   
The aim of the programmes implemented during the period in question was to build storage centres 
designed to provide the necessary infrast ructure to bring community drying centres into operation.   
Small and disadvantaged producers were thus given access to the technology they need to improve 
the quality of the final product, and were able to coordinate the processing and storage of their 
production in better conditions. At the same time, the infrastructure of the centres was also used 
for the main production diversification programmes.  
Follow -up: The United  Kingdom noted that the information provided by Argentina is helpful from a 
learning pe rspective on how Members interpret and implement Annex 2 of the Agreement on 
Agriculture. The United  States supported the question.  
AG-IMS ID 102119: Question by Australia - Other product -specific AMS/EMS  
Australia thanks Argentina for submitting its 2019 -20 agricultural year DS:1 notification 
G/AG/N/ARG/51 . Australia notes Argentina has reported soya beans as receiving product -specific 
support as part of a stimulus programme measure.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  Could Argentina please provide further details of the measures, including the type of payments, the 
eligibility criteria and the duration of the measure?  
Answer by Argentina  
The compensation and stimulus programme was launched by Decree No. 786 of 2020 with the aim 
of establishing stimulus measures to improve the profitability and competitiveness of smal l soybean 
producers and cooperatives.   
Joint Resolution No. 1/2020 of the Ministry of the Economy and the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock 
and Fisheries provides that, in order to be eligible for finance, producers must meet certain 
requirements. For example, they must have produced soybeans during the 2019 -20 season; be 
registered with the Simplified Agricultural Information System (SISA); have declared a maximum 
turnover net of value -added tax (VAT) of 20 million pesos in their swor n VAT declarations during the 
2019 fiscal year; and have, as at 31 July 2020, a soybean cultivation area declared to the SISA not 
exceeding 400 hectares.  
Lastly, each beneficiary was compensated for sales of soybeans between 1 February 2020 and 31 
December  2020 up to a limit of 2.9 tonnes of soybeans per hectare of soybean crops declared to the 
SISA for producers in the provinces of Buenos Aires, Entre Ríos, Córdoba and Santa Fe, and 2.5 
tonnes of soybeans per hectare of soybean crops declared to the SISA f or producers in other 
provinces.  
Follow -up: Australia stated its concern about direct payments to producers and their distortionary 
impact on world markets. The United States supported the question.  
3.2.3.3   Argentina (G/AG/N/ARG/51, G/AG/N/ARG/49, G/AG/N/ARG/50)  
AG-IMS ID 102041: Question by United States of America - Other product -specific 
AMS/EMS  
In 2017/2018, Argentina reported a support price of 0.69 1992 pesos per kilogram for tobacco, 
applied to 104,093,000 kilograms, and market price support of 71,983,580 in  1992 pesos.   
In 2018/2019, Argentina reported a support price of 0.66 1992 pesos per kilogram for tobacco, 
applied to 107,349,000 kilograms, and market price support of 71,056,788 in 1992 pesos.   
In 2019/2020, Argentina reported a support price of 1 1992 peso per kilogram for tobacco, applied 
to 112,856,000 kilograms, and market price support of 74,181,773 in 1992 pesos.  
Based on this information, the support price provided to farmers went down slightly from 2017/2018 
to 2018/2019, and then went up qu ite sharply in 2019/2020.  
Does Argentina take into account market conditions when setting the support price for tobacco, or 
is the support price based solely on the calculation of the maximum support Argentina has policy 
space to provide?  
Answer by Argenti na 
It should be clarified that the applied administered price (1992 peso) for the periods 2018 -19 and 
2019-20, covered by notifications G/AG/N/ARG/50  and G/AG/N/ARG/51 , was 0.66 pesos per 
kilogram, and remained within the levels notified for previous periods.   
The Amber Box subsidy granted to the Special Fund for Tobacco (F ET) rose slightly in 2019 -20 (by 
around 4% compared to the previous period), explained mostly by the increase in production.   
However, we should point out that the budgetary outlay is below our country's WTO commitment 
level.   G/AG/W/235  
 
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  The administered minimum pric e (FET price) established by the Secretariat for Agriculture is applied 
proportionally among the provinces, bearing in mind from the outset Argentina's bound AMS limit at 
the WTO.  
3.2.3.4   Bolivia, Plurinational State of (G/AG/N/BOL/30)  
AG-IMS ID 102042: Question b y United States of America - Transparency issues (including 
Table DS:2)  
The United States welcomes the efforts undertaken by the Plurinational State of Bolivia to bring its 
Table DS:1 notifications up to date.   
It is noted that calendar year 2019 was the f irst year the Plurinational State of Bolivia has notified 
domestic support, which is comprised solely of support under Supporting Table DS:1.   
Since 2019, the Plurinational State of Bolivia has notified support for "Implementing the plant health 
system for  the coffee sector at the national level. Persons with disabilities".  
In 2020, this measure references Law 223, which the United States understands was enacted 
in 2012.  
The Plurinational State of Bolivia has also notified support for research under "The Na tional 
Agricultural and Forestry Initiate…", which references Supreme Decree No. 2454.  
The United States understands that this Decree is dated from 2015.   
a. Please confirm whether or not the Plurinational State of Bolivia provided any domestic 
support prior to 2019.  
b. When will the Plurinational State of Bolivia be submitting a Table DS:2 notification as 
required for all newly notified exempt domestic support measures?  
c. In light of no Table DS:2 notification to date, please explain how "persons with 
disabi lities"/"personas con discapacidad" at the end of the description of the 2 (b) Pest 
and disease control measure in Supporting Table DS:1 relates to the pest and disease 
control measures notified.  
Answer by Bolivia, Plurinational State of  
In order to answer  the question "Please confirm whether or not the Plurinational State of Bolivia 
provided domestic support before 2019", information is being obtained so that a response can be 
provided.  
With reference to question c., the explanation is that the words "pers ons with disabilities"/"personas 
con discapacidad" were added due to a transcription error. The correct wording of the draft 
description is "implementation of the plant health system for the coffee sector at the national level", 
so the words highlighted be ar no relation.  
Regarding administering the measure in 2020, in which Law No. 223 enacted on 2 March 2012 is 
referenced, this is the general law for persons with disabilities, a law that aims to ensure that persons 
with disabilities fully exercise their ri ghts and duties in equal conditions, with equalization of 
opportunities and preferential treatment under a comprehensive protection system. One of these is 
access to sources of employment in public institutions, which is covered as a current expenditure 
under the department responsible for persons with disabilities.  
This explains that, due to an error in the copying of data, these words and the law referred to were 
added.  
Follow -up: The United  States welcomed the updated notification and may follow up with  an additional 
question regarding whether domestic support was provided before 2019.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  3.2.3.5   Botswana (G/AG/N/BWA/35)  
AG-IMS ID 102121: Question by Thailand - Input subsidies available to low -income or 
resource -poor producers  
According to notification G/AG/N/BWA/35  on domestic support for fiscal year 2 020/2021, Botswana 
spent BWP 738.70 million  to support low -income or resource -poor producers. Could Botswana 
provide more information on the eligibility criteria for low -income or resource -poor producers to 
participate in the aforementioned project, as wel l as the payment rate for farmers?  
Answer by Botswana  
In Botswana, a resource -poor farmer is defined as a subsistence or smallholder farmer who does 
not produce for commercial purposes, but produces mainly for home consumption. Resource -poor 
farmers mainly practice traditional food systems.  
With respect to crop farming, a resource -poor farmer ploughs less than five hectares with a low crop 
yield of approximately 150 kg/hectare. They mainly use dr aught power to plough their fields. Most 
agricultural ac tivities such as cultivation, weeding, harvesting and threshing are done by hands 
and/or hand -held implements like hoes.  
Regarding livestock farming, resource -poor farmers own a small herd size of less than 20  cattle in 
communal/rural areas. Calving rate i s low and mortality rate is high as a result of poor management 
systems and shortage of the necessary farm tools. Farmers do not provide supplementary feeding 
and mainly depend on natural vegetation. Minimal vaccination is undertaken as and when necessary 
except for the ones carried -out by Government to prevent diseases of economic importance like Foot 
and Mouth Disease (FMD), Rabies, Anthrax and Black Quarter, in accordance with Annex 2 
paragraph  2 (b) on pest and disease control of the Agreement on Agricu lture.  
Resource poor farmers are mainly low income rural dwellers who depends on Government subsidies 
and extension staff as they can 't afford private practitioners.  
These subsidies are used as some of the poverty eradication initiatives and therefore are based on 
the economic status of the beneficiary. They are in the form of inputs which depend on the size of 
the field in relation to crops and the size of the herd for livestock.  I thank  you. 
3.2.3.6   Cuba (G/AG/N/CUB/66)  
AG-IMS ID 102014: Question by Japan - Gener al services: training services  
Japan thanks Cuba for its submission of DS:1 notifications, G/AG/N/CUB/66  and G/AG/N/CUB/67 . 
Japan would like to ask Cuba to explain the reason behind and illustrate the details of "Education 
and vocational training in rural areas" under 2 (c). The monetary value of support unde r training 
services in Supporting Table DS:1 of G/AG/N/CUB/66  (CY2021) soared by 1,280% from the previous 
year (CY2020: 2,682.4 million CUP to CY2021: 37,094 million CUP).  
Answer by Cuba  
The difference between the 2020 and 2021 values is determined by the "Tarea Ordenamiento" 
(ordering task) reform programme and by the impact of the devaluation of the Cuban peso.  
The "Tarea Ordenamiento", which is interdisciplinary and cross -cutting in nature, began in the 
country on 1 January 2021. It is a process for monetary an d exchange rate unification that seeks to 
reorganize and modernize the national economy, which has been affected by the COVID -19 
pandemic, the complex international situation and the tightening of the economic, commercial and 
financial blockade imposed on Cuba by the United States. Among other aspects, it aims to transform 
incomes and introduce new values for goods and services, which are key elements for optimizing 
the economy and adapting the country to new changes and transformations.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  3.2.3.7   European Union (G/A G/N/EU/79)  
AG-IMS ID 102122: Question by Australia - Transparency issues (including Table DS:2)  
Australia thanks the EU for submitting its 2019 -20 marketing year DS:1 notification G/AG/N/EU/79 . 
Australia notes  the significant increase in Green Box spending between MY17 -18 to MY19 -20 from 
EUR 65,846 million to EUR 68,516 million largely owing to increases in spending to structural 
adjustment assistance provided through investment aids.  
Could the EU please explai n the policy rationale for this significant increase under this programme?  
Answer by European Union  
The EU thanks Australia for the questions.   
It is normal for the implementation cycles of Rural development measures that towards the end of 
a programming p eriod the payments increase. 2020 budget year was the end year in the 2014 -2020 
programming period, and therefore significant payments will take place during 2020, 2021 and 2022 
budget years, taking into account that beneficiaries and member States have tw o years to finalise 
payments on the projects which have been granted support in this programming period. The increase 
comes mainly from 'investment ' type of measures which require longest period to be implemented 
and therefore, payments are executed within  two years (after the completion of the investments).  
AG-IMS ID 102068: Question by Paraguay, Brazil - Transparency issues (including 
Table  DS:2)  
Paraguay and Brazil thank the European Union for submitting notification G/AG/N/EU/79  and notes 
the following:   
Could the EU explain the  reasons for this increase?   
a. For the following items in particular: fruit and vegetables, common wheat, potatoes, other 
crops products, flowers and cider; and  
b. For non -product -specific AMS.  
Answer by European Union  
The EU thanks Paraguay and Brazil for the question.  
As Paraguay indicates the DS:1 notification includes an increase in the total current AMS of 
EUR 192,5 million for Marketing year 2019/2020. This increase equals 0.266% of the EU AMS 
commitment level.  
The reason behind this increase is the aid granted to support the farmers following the COVID -19 
outbreak. The measures are duly reflected in this DS:1 notification.  
a. The increase of EUR 192,5 million concerns aid granted to support the farmers due to 
COVID -19 in the following sectors: fruit and veg etables, common wheat, potatoes, other 
crops products, flowers and cider  
b. The design of the measures in question and the current reporting tools do not allow to 
report more detailed information, including different/specific crops of this type of support 
which is why the support is notified as non -product specific (COVID  measures).  
AG-IMS ID 102069: Question by Paraguay, Brazil - Transparency issues (including 
Table  DS:2)  
Paraguay and Brazil thank the European Union for submitting notification G/AG/N/EU/79  and notes 
the following:  
Change in the reporting format of non -product -specific AMS and the inclusion of new items . G/AG/W/235  
 
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  a. Could the EU explain the reason for the change in format of the reported measures?   
b. Could the EU provide more information on the new measures, including: "Horizontal 
support in the Fruit and Vegetables sector: green harvesting and non -harvesting" and 
"Horizontal support in the Fruit and Vegetables sector: harvest insurance"?  
c. Could the EU clarify the criteria for the classification as non -product -specific AMS of 
programmes  geared specifically towards fruit and vegetables?  
Answer by European Union  
The EU thanks Paraguay and Brazil for the question.  
a. The EU has changed the format in order to include the exceptional support granted 
following the COVID -19 outbreak.  
b. The two measu res included in supporting table DS:9: "Horizontal support in the Fruit and 
Vegetables sector: green harvesting and non -harvesting" and "Horizontal support in the 
Fruit and Vegetables sector: harvest insurance" are not new measures and were included 
in the  DS:1 notification for 2019/2020 due to a mistake when the headings of the 
measures were copied. The measures did not exist in 2019/2020. The EU will provide a 
revised version of the DS:1 notification for 2019/2020 without the two measures in 
question. The  removal of the two measures from the DS:1 notification will not in any case 
change the current total AMS ( de minimis ).  
c. See reply for point a) and the reply to question AG -IMS ID  102068 . 
Follow -up: In Brazil's view, the increase of EUR 192 million is signifi cant and should not be dismissed. 
The United  States supported the question and sought information on what specific measures are 
included in the exceptional support including COVID -19 loans and COVID -19 cash payments and 
what measures are included in the ot her category of non -product -specific support. The 
European  Union was encouraged to include this information in the upcoming revised notification.  
AG-IMS ID 102070: Question by Paraguay, Brazil - Transparency issues (including 
Table  DS:2)  
Paraguay and Brazi l thank the European Union for submitting notification G/AG/N/EU/79  and note 
a EUR 629.9 million increase in the Green Box, particularly paragraphs 2(a), 2(g), 4 and 11.   
a. Could the EU explain the reasons for the increase in these types of measures?  
b. Could the EU explain how animal welfare is related to pest and disease control, or whether 
this programme should be included under another category? Could the EU also explain the 
EUR 217.8 million increase in this paragraph?   
Answer by European Union  
a. The increase in these types of  measures is due to increase in the amounts paid from the 
national budgets of the EU member states. It is normal for the implementation cycles of 
Rural Development Measures that towards the end of a programming period, the payments 
increase. 2020 budget ye ar was the end year in the 2014 -2020 programming period, and 
therefore significant payments will take place during 2020, 2021 and 2022 budget years, 
taking into account that beneficiaries and member States have two years to finalise 
payments on projects fo r which support was granted in this programming period.  
b. As indicated in earlier replies in this committee (see AG -IMS 97152), the EU notifies other 
support to animal welfare schemes under paragraph 12 of Annex 2 of the Agreement on 
Agriculture.  However, it  is correct that under pest and disease control (2 b), some actions 
taken by MS in relation to verification of compliance with feed and food law, animal health 
and animal welfare rules are notified here (under para 2 b). Only expenditure related to G/AG/W/235  
 
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  verific ation of compliances is notified under this category, therefore, it is not support to 
farmers.  
AG-IMS ID 102097: Question by India - Scheduled commitment level  
India thanks the European Union for its submission of DS:1 notification ( G/AG/N/EU/79 ) for the 
marketing year 2019-20. The AMS entitlement of the EU is mentioned as EUR 72,378 million in the 
submitted notification. The U nited Kingdom  on the other hand has claimed an AMS entitlement of 
EUR 5,914.1  million or GBP 4 ,949.3 million in its latest DS notification ( G/AG/N/GBR/11 ) for 
calendar  year 2021. In this context, what would be the applicable AMS entitlement for the remaining 
member of the EU (EU -27)? 
Answer by European Union  
The EU thanks India for the questions.   
The position of the EU on this subject has not changed since its presentation i n February 2018 in 
Geneva. In practice, the EU plans to apportion the commitment on domestic support (AMS) between 
the UK and EU.   
The AMS apportionment is best done on a historical basis reflecting the fact that the basis of the 
commitment stems from supp ort provided in the UK at the time the limit was first set.   
This means apportioning the AMS commitment based on production and budget figures for 1986 -88 
as in the original EU calculation, in order to recalculate the separate amounts for the UK and EC -11. 
This implies that the EU 's current annual and final bound commitment of EUR 72,378m is to be 
apportioned as follows:  
• UK: EUR 5,914  m (arising from the EC -12's original commitment of EUR 61,204m) ; 
• EU: EUR 66,464  m. 
The EU 's DS:1 notification covering the 2 020/2021 marketing year, the first year when UK will not 
be included under the EU 's AMS, will take the situation into account, in line with EU 's past practice 
in the regular CoA related to the enlargements of the European Union.   
Follow -up: India reiterate d its concern about the basis used for the apportionment  of the AMS 
entitlement between the UK and the remaining EU member States. Uruguay registered an interest 
in the matter.   
AG-IMS ID 102067: Question by Paraguay, Brazil - Scheduled commitment level  
Paraguay and Brazil thank the European Union for submitting notification G/AG/N/EU/79  and notes 
the fo llowing:   
The maintenance of the total AMS commitment level:   
Could the EU provide an update on the status of the amendment to its commitments to reflect a 
reduction in its AMS entitlement that is identical to that notified by the United Kingdom as part of  
its withdrawal from the European Union?   
Answer by European Union  
See reply to question AG -IMS ID 102097 .  
AG-IMS ID 102123: Question by Australia - Other product -specific AMS/EMS  
Australia thanks the EU for submitting its 2019 -20 marketing year (MY) DS:1 notification 
G/AG/N/EU/79 . Australia notes an increase in spending shown in Supporting Table DS:6 of EUR 320 
millio n between MY19 -20 and MY18 -19. This is across a range of commodities including milk, beef, 
sheep, pig, fruit and vegetables.  The EU has listed the measure types as national aid 
"COVID  measure ".  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  a. Could the EU please elaborate on the variation to the level o f support reported in this 
table?  
b. Could the EU please indicate whether it expects further increases to this level of support 
and are similar variations expected for other commodities listed in Supporting Table DS:6?  
Answer by European Union  
a. The largest lev el of the increased support is linked to the COVID measures. Some of these 
national schemes concern general sectors, therefore no possibility to make a stringent 
reporting per sector.  
b. The EU does not exclude further increases to this level of support consi dering the duration 
of the COVID -19. The EU has given in its ad -hoc reports to this Committee in documents 
G/AG/GEN/159 and its rev1 to 5 detailed explanations about the measures taken by the 
EU and its member States.  
Follow -up: New Zealand supported the q uestion and reiterated its interest in European  Union's 
environmental measures. Given the aggregated reporting for milk, beef, sheep, pig, fruit and 
vegetables in the COVID measure, the United  States requested the European  Union to provide 
information on t he name of the measure for each product and the associated budgetary outlays.  
AG-IMS ID 102124: Question by Thailand - Other product -specific AMS/EMS  
According to notification G/AG/N/EU/79  on domestic supp ort for fiscal year 2020/2021, the European 
Union spent 130.10 million euros on national aid for the sugar support measure.  
Could the European Union provide more information on the above - mentioned measures, as well as 
the procedures and criteria for farme rs to apply for such government assistance?  
Answer by European Union  
The most significant part of the expenditure is attributed to the two schemes reported by 
France.  Under Regulation (EU) No 228/2013 (art 23.3), France is authorised to pay national aid to  
the sugar sector in its outermost regions for a maximum amount of EUR 90 million per marketing 
year. The Ministry of Agriculture funds three support schemes for a total of EUR  86.4 million per 
year. 
These three support schemes are managed via framework ag reements. These are mainly commercial 
agreements, but they also provide information on the circuits and envelopes (amounts involved, 
distribution, who pays what, etc.).   
AG-IMS ID 102016: Question by Japan - Non-product -specific AMS  
Japan thanks the  EU for  its submission of DS:1 notification G/AG/N/EU/79 . 
Japan notes EU 's 2.9 million EUR of fertilizer subsidy notified as Non -Product -Specific AMS in 
Supporting Table DS:9 of DS:1 notification, which were notified twice in the last decade (MY2016/17: 
EUR 1.0 million, MY2017/18: EUR 1.1 million), an d no notification in MY2018/19 DS:1.  
Would EU please provide some details of this support programme including its eligibility criteria?   
Recognizing that the EU Farm to Fork Strategy in May 2020 set a target of reducing fertilizer use by 
at least 20% by 2030, Japan would like to know whether the programme would be adjusted to 
achieve the F2F target or it is to be phased out.  
Answer by European Union  
These are temporary national schemes, that overall are quite insignificant in the total use of 
fertilisers in the European Union considering the needs of the industry. The average spending for 
fertilisers per year in the EU 's agriculture is around 10 billion EUR, therefore the amount of 2.9  million G/AG/W/235  
 
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  represents only 0,03% of the total fertilisers expenditure paid  by farmers in the EU. The schemes 
mentioned by Japan are linked to credit schemes for buying fertilisers for the production of field and 
greenhouse vegetables and/or fruits, harvest 2020 and are not directly aimed at intense use on 
arable land.  When the G reen Deal objectives on reduced fertilisers use are agreed, they will apply 
to all member States.  
Follow -up: Paraguay expressed interest in all the questions raised to the European  Union concerning 
G/AG/N/EU/79  and reserved the right to raise follow up questions. Brazil sup ported the question by 
Japan AG -IMS ID 102016 . Brazil note that fertilizer prices have in creased sharply since 2021, causing 
production costs to rise around the world. Developing countries that practise tropical agriculture, 
like Brazil, are among the most affected, owing to the dependence on imports that take place without 
this kind of couple d support. Brazil noted that these domestic support measures by the EU, with a 
high level of monetary support, have an enormous potential to distort markets, by increasing 
EU farmers' competitiveness based solely on the Commission's budget. Brazil thanked Japan for 
stressing the linkages between the measure and the Farm to Fork strategy. Considering the EU's 
adoption of trade measures that burden third countries with unilateral ly established targets and 
strategies Brazil regretted to see an increase in subsidies by the EU that tilt even further the playing 
field in the agricultural trading system. Brazil registered continued interest in EU's domestic support 
notifications. Refer ence was made to the issue of Common Agricultural Policies (CAP) raised by the 
Republic of Korea. Brazil welcomed additional information on CAP especially potential changes to 
EU's Green, Blue and Amber Box measures.  
3.2.3.8   Georgia (G/AG/N/GEO/25)  
AG-IMS ID 10204 3: Question by United States of America - Transparency issues (including 
Table DS:2)  
In Georgia 's January 2022 Trade Policy Review (TPR) the Secretariat reported that Georgia 's Ministry 
of Environmental Protection and Agriculture provided 243.5 million Geo rgian lari (GEL) in subsidies 
to the agricultural sector in 2020 ( WT/TPR/S/420/Rev.1  page 102).  In Georgia 's 2020 Table DS:1 
domestic support notification ( G/AG/N/GEO/25 ) the total notified domestic support was GEL 
150.9  million.  There also appeared to be other discrepancies noted in the TPR with regards to 
measures that appear to have not been included in Georgia 's domestic support notifications and a 
lack of required Table DS:2 notifications.  In responses to questions raised by Members, Georgia 
informed Members that it would submit the respective notificatio ns in the first half of 2022.  
 
a. Please provide an update on the status of Georgia submitting revised Table DS:1 
notification to account for noted discrepancies.  
b. Please provide an update on the status of submitting the required Table DS:2 notifications 
for any new or modified domestic support measures exempt from reduction commitments.  
Answer by Georgia  
Follow -up: The United  States looked forward to reviewing the DS:2 notification.  
3.2.3.9   Hong Kong, China (G/AG/N/HKG/52)  
AG-IMS ID 102044: Question by United States o f America - Transparency issues (including 
Table DS:2)  
The United States thanks Hong Kong , China  for submitting G/AG/N/HKG/52 .  
Hong Kong 's prior Table DS:1 notification ( G/AG/N/HKG/50 ) included expenditures for Anti -epidemic 
fund 2.0 under "6. Decoupled income support".  G/AG/N/HKG/52  includes expenditures for Anti -
epidemic fund 5.0 and Anti -epidemic fund 6.0.   
Please explain why Anti -epidemic fund 3.0 and Anti -epidemic fund 4.0 were not listed in  
Hong Kong's DS:1 notifications.  Did these funds not contain support for agriculture?  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  Answer by Hong Kong, China  
The Anti -epidemic Fund (AEF) was established to enhance Hong Kong, China's capability in 
combatting the epidemic, and to provide relief to busi nesses and members of the public hard hit by 
the present epidemic or affected by the anti -epidemic measures.  The coverage of different rounds 
of AEF was different and targeted, aiming to provide support to those businesses and individuals 
that were hard hi t by the pandemic and the tightening of social distancing measures at that time.  
As the AEF 3.0 and 4.0 did not involve agricultural domestic support measures, they are not required 
to be included in Hong Kong, China's DS:1 notifications.  
3.2.3.10   India (G/AG/N/IND/27)  
AG-IMS ID 102007: Question by European Union - Transparency issues (including 
Table  DS:2)  
The EU thanks India to its partial reply to the question AG -IMS 101012 , and recall point (b) of that 
question:  
b. In its reply to question AG -IMS ID 98056  India indicated that some of the quantities in 
end stocks was not husked rice. Can India indicate which quantity in the end stocks that 
husked, semi -milled or milled rice for the years 2019 -20 and 2020 -21. 
Can India reply to this question using comparable  figures preferably by indicating in the stock figures 
(both beginning and end stocks) on how much is:  
• Paddy;  
• Semi-milled; and   
• milled.  
Answer by India  
The Government of India announces a minimum support price for paddy rather than rice. However, 
for compa rison with the external reference price, the minimum support price of paddy is converted 
into that of rice by using an average conversion ratio, which is also provided in our DS:1 domestic 
support notifications. The stocks mentioned in the table are of ric e rather than of paddy. Some 
stocks are in the form of un -milled paddy. The discrepancies are also on account of losses due to 
various factors including loss of moisture and also due to inter -state movement of stock.  
Efforts are underway to verify the data  and the same would be informed to the Committee.  
The stock information can be accessed at https://fci.gov.in/  
Follow -up: The United  States supported the question and sought further clarity on information 
reported by India regarding beginning and ending stock quantities.  
AG-IMS ID 102082: Question by Paraguay - Transparency issues (including Table DS:2)  
In follow -up to the reply received from India to question AG -IMS ID 101087 , we note that, as was 
indicated at the previous meeting of this Committee, the hyperlink provided in the reply  is inactive 
and inaccessible. We therefore reiterate the request already made to India in the room to submit 
the requested information in an accessible format, including via email to the Mission of Paraguay.   
Answer by India  
These guidelines can be access ed from the following active link:  
http://fci.gov.in/sales.php?view=224.  
Follow -up: Paraguay and the United  States pointed out that the link provided by India does not 
work. The US noted concern with th e steady increase in support to producers of various commodities 
and in the prices guaranteed by the government for the production of those commodities. The US 
also found it concerning that there had been steady increases in the stocks procured and, in the  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  amount of rice sold in the open markets indicating that the government procured more than it 
needed for its domestic food security needs. Uruguay registered interest in the question.  
AG-IMS ID 102025: Question by United States of America, Paraguay, New Ze aland - 
Transparency issues (including Table DS:2)  
We would like thank India for the responses it provided to AG -IMS ID 101087 ; however, India did 
not respond to all of the questions. We therefore re submit the following questions:  
a. We recognize the mathematical reason for the steady increase in Current Total AMS 
between the period 2018 -2019 and the period 2020 -2021, but would appreciate a 
more explanatory reason for the factors behind the changes in th e applied administered 
price and eligible production.  
b. What policies or reforms is India implementing or considering to achieve its food security 
objectives in a manner consistent with WTO rules?  
c. Please explain the steady increase in open market sales of pu blic stocks between 2018 
and 2021.  
d. Please provide information on monitoring mechanisms to ensure that these sales do not 
end up in international markets. The link provided ( http://fci.gov.in/sales.php?view=224 ) 
times out without ever loading and gives the error "This site can 't be reached. "  
Answer by India  
a. Minimum Support Prices or Applied Administered Prices (AAP) are announced by the 
Government, after considering the recom mendations of the Commission for Agricultural 
Costs and Prices (CACP), which takes into account various factors including the cost of 
cultivation/production, changes in input prices, input/output price parity, inter -crop price 
parity, effects on the cost o f living, effects on general price level, parity between prices 
paid and prices received by farmers, etc. These are the factors that have resulted in the 
change in AAP over the years.   
b. Furthermore, in addition to coverage under the National Food Security A ct, the 
Government of India also implemented the Pradhan Mantri Garib Kalyan Yojana (PMGKY) 
to provide food to vulnerable sections of the society during the pandemic. Owing to this, 
among other factors, there was increase in the eligible production. Open m arket sale is 
done by Food Corporation of India (FCI) based on market situation.   
c. and d.  
Exports are not allowed from the Open Market Sales Scheme (OMSS) (Domestic) of food 
grains from public stockholding. Guidelines for empanelment and registration under  the 
OMSS (Domestic) stipulate that products under said scheme will be utilized domestically 
and not exported by the bidder. If the Bidder violates any of the terms and conditions of 
the empanelment or is found to be furnishing any wrong/false information at any stage, 
then in addition to forfeiture of earnest money deposit (EMD), bidder is debarred from 
participating in future tenders floated by FCI for disposal of food grains and coarse grains 
for a period of one year. Further guidelines can be accessed f rom - 
http://fci.gov.in/sales.php?view=224 . 
Follow -up: Paraguay and the United  States pointed out that the link provided by India does not 
work. The US noted concern with the steady increase in support to producers of various commodities 
and in the prices guaranteed by the government for the production of those commodities. The US 
also found it concerning that there had been steady increases in the stocks procured and, in the 
amount of rice so ld in the open markets indicating that the government procured more than it 
needed for its domestic food security needs. Uruguay registered interest in the question.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  3.2.3.11   Japan (G/AG/N/JPN/277)  
AG-IMS ID 102100: Question by New Zealand - Public stockholding for  food security 
purposes  
New Zealand would appreciate further information regarding the public stockholding programme 
notified in Japan 's DS:1 table for 2020/2021:  
Public stockholding: public stockholding of rice, wheat and feedgrains - 18 JPY, billion  
Can Japan give more insight into the programme, and confirm when a DS:2 notification will be 
provided?  
Answer by Japan  
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) operates government rice reserve, targeting 
1 million tonnes , against a possible short age of supply caused by a substantial poor harvest. The 
government purchases rice at market price through a tender before sowing.  With regards to wheat, 
MAFF supports the flour milling companies to maintain the stockholding of wheat equivalent to 
2.3 month s of demand against a possible shortage of supply, under the guidance of the MAFF. 
(MAFF  bears stockholding cost for 1.8 months of demand) . With regards to feed grains, the 
government partially supports the storing costs for the feed grains stockholding, b ased on business 
continuity plans developed by compound feed manufacturers to prepare for contingencies such as 
suspension of imports. The level of stock, together with the domestic distribution stock by the private 
sector is approximately 1 million tonnes  of feed grains.  The public stockholding programmes have 
been notified since our first DS:1 notification for 1995.  
Follow -up: Brazil registered interest in the question.  
AG-IMS ID 102105: Question by India - Direct payments: structural adjustment assistance 
provided through investment aids  
We thank Japan for submitting its DS:1 notification G/AG/N/JPN/277  for the fiscal year 2020 -2021. 
In 2019 -2020 notification ( G/AG/N/JPN/276 ), under the Green box (Supporting Table DS:1), an 
expenditure of JPY 4.7 billion was notified for the measure 'Agricultural lo ans: interest concessions 
for government programmed agricultural loans ', while in 2020 -21 notification ( G/AG/N/JPN/277 ) the 
expenditure for the same measure was JPY 49.9 billion which amounts to an increase by 961.70%. 
In this context, India requests Japan to provide:  
a. the reason for  this increase;  
b. provide the details related to agricultural loans eligible for interest concession under this 
measure; and  
c. what is the term of these loans?  
Answer by Japan  
a. The reason for the increase of Agricultural loans is that the government provided th e Japan 
Finance Corporation with the necessary costs to provide urgent monetary loans smoothly 
to the farmers who have been affected by the spread of COVID -19. 
b. The loans by the Japan Finance Corporation are for the farmers with insufficient funds to 
mainta in and continue to manage their businesses, due to decreased sales or increased 
expenses, which were the impacts of the spread of COVID -19. 
c. The redemption term of the representative loan ( "the agriculture, forestry and fisheries 
safety net fund ") is within 15 years.  
Follow -up: Brazil registered interest in the question.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  AG-IMS ID 102106: Question by India - Non-product -specific AMS  
In DS:1 notification G/AG/N/JPN/277 , Supporting Table DS:9 (Non -Product Specific AMS), Japan 
has mentioned a measure "Support for production in the next crop season to cope with the COVID -19 
pandemic " with 158.5 billion JPY. India requests Japan to provide the details of this measure?  
Answer by Japan  
As we explained at the previous COA meeting (AG -IMS ID 101052 : question from Brazil), to prevent 
farmers affected by the decrease in sales due to the COVID -19 pandemic from going out of business, 
"Support for production in the next crop season to cope with the COVID -19 pandemic " supports their 
efforts to plant crops for the next crop season.  
Eligible farmers are those who produce vegetables, flowers, fruit and/or tea, who have ship ped or 
disposed of their products between February and April 2020, and whose wholesale market sales 
have dropped by more than 20% from the same month of the previous year due to the COVID -19 
pandemic. Farmers who apply to the programme are required to impl ement two of the initiatives 
specified in the program, such as improvement of the work environment, formulation of a business 
continuity plan, and soil improvement.  
Follow -up: Brazil registered interest in the question.  
3.2.3.12   Malaysia (G/AG/N/MYS/53)  
AG-IMS ID 1 02125: Question by Thailand - Input subsidies available to low -income or 
resource -poor producers  
According to notification G/AG/N/MYS/53  on domestic support for fiscal year 2020/2021, Malaysia 
spent 497 million MYR on the Paddy Price Subsidy (PPS) measure to support low -income or 
resource -poor rice farmers and to improve rice farmers' socioeconomic well -being. Could Malaysia 
provide more information on the eligibility criteria for low -income or resource -poor producers to 
participate in the aforementioned?  
Answer by Malaysia  
Malaysia  thanks Thailand for the question submitted.  
The notification  G/AG/N/MYS/53  reported that  RM497 million was spent on the Paddy Price Subsidy 
(PPS) for 2015, not 2020/2021.   
The PPS is to ensure farmers receive a reasonable income. The eligible producers are determined by 
clearly def ined criteria based on the status of the recipient as low income and resource -poor paddy 
farmers.  Thank you.  
3.2.3.13   Philippines (G/AG/N/PHL/85)  
AG-IMS ID 102126: Question by Brazil - Input subsidies available to low -income or 
resource -poor producers  
Brazil notices that the Philippines has notified, in Supporting Table DS:2, a notable increase in 
expenditures under "Input subsidies available to low -income or resource -poor producers ", from 
PHP 5,593,702 thousand in 2020 to PHP 14,188,318 thousand in 202 1. 
Brazil would appreciate it if the Philippines could explain the reason(s) behind such a difference 
between 2020 and 2021.  
Answer by Philippines  
The increase in the utilization of funds under the Philippines Development Programme was the result 
of the in crease in the allocated budget. This is to rejuvenate agricultural production which has been 
severely affected by the outbreak of animal diseases, global health crisis, and natural calamities.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  Follow -up: Paraguay expressed interest in the matter.  
AG-IMS ID  102015: Question by Japan - Input subsidies available to low -income or 
resource -poor producers  
Japan thanks Philippines for its submission of DS:1 notification G/AG/N/PHL/85 . 
Regarding Philippines ' Development Programme (b) Provision of access to farm inputs, Japan notices 
that the increase of the support is more than double (CY2020: PHP 5,593,702 thousand to 
CY2021:  14,188,318 thousand PHP). Could Philippines please explain the reason behind and 
illustrate the details of the support?  
Answer by Philippines  
The increase in the utilization of funds under the Philippines Development Programme was the result 
of the increase in the allocated budget. This is to rejuvenate agricultural production which has been 
severely affected by the outbreak of animal diseases, global health crisis, and natural calamities.  
3.2.3.14   Switzerland (G/AG/N/CHE/114)  
AG-IMS ID 102077: Question by Paraguay, Brazil - Direct payments: payments under 
regional assistance programmes  
Paraguay a nd Brazil thank Switzerland for submitting notification G/AG/N/CHE/114 . We note that in 
paragraph  13 of the Green Box "Regional assistance programmes" Switzerland includes 
"Contribution to the maintenance of an open landscape" and "Contribution to landscape quality":  
a. Which disadvant aged regions are receiving those payments?  
b. What impartial and objective criteria, set out in law or regulation, are used to identify 
those regions as underprivileged?  
c. How would direct payments related to landscape maintenance and landscape quality lead 
to overcoming the difficulties faced by this region?  
d. What are the additional costs or income losses resulting from carrying out agricultural 
production in this region that direct payments seek to compensate?  
Answer by Switzerland  
Please note that the following answer applies with respect to the open landscape maintenance 
payments. What concerns the landscape quality payments, we have noticed that these payments 
are categorized incorrectly in our DS:1 notifications. For the correct categorization and explanation 
of those payments as "environmental programs ", please refer to our DS:2 notification 
G/AG/N/CHE/68 . A corrigendum of the relevant DS:1 notifications will be submitted shortly.  
a.The open landscape maintenance payments are provided for agricultural land  in higher lying 
regions in order to compensate for the disadvantages regarding cultivation. Payments are made to 
farms that cultivate land in the hill region or in mountain regions I - IV. The exact amount of the 
payment depends on the specific region. Fo r land in the plain region, no contribution is paid.  
b. The "Ordonnance sur le cadastre de la production agricole et la délimitation de zones " 
(SR 912.1) stipulates the criteria used to determine whether land is located in the plain, hill or 
mountain region. According to Article 2 of that Ordinance, the following criteria are to be taken 
into account for the delimitation and subdivision of the various regions:  
− the climate, in particular the duration of the vegetation period;  
− the situation conc erning connectivity, in particular the accessibility from the nearest village 
and the nearest center;  
− the surface configuration, in particular the proportion of sloping and steep sites.   G/AG/W/235  
 
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  c. The open landscape maintenance payments compensate the producer fo r the additional effort 
necessary to maintain the landscape open in hill and mountain regions and steep sites. For example, 
they compensate for measures taken to prevent forest growth (e.g. by removing overgrown shrubs 
and trees).  
d. The additional costs a nd income losses result from the described farming disadvantages in hill 
and mountain regions. Agroscope, the Swiss centre of excellence for agricultural research, collects 
region -related data on farm income. An evaluation from 2020 shows that the average working 
income per family labor unit was 40% higher in the plain region than in the hill region and 66% 
higher than in the mountain region.  
Follow -up: Paraguay sought further clarification on how open landscape maintenance payments work 
with other program mes for the same region and its connection with the landscape quality 
programme. In Paraguay's view, the payments may be part of an environmental programme.  
3.2.3.15   United Kingdom (G/AG/N/GBR/11)  
AG-IMS ID 102108: Question by India - Transparency issues (including  Table DS:2)  
With regard to UK 's DS:1 Notification G/AG/N/GBR/11  dated 4 April/2022, the Calendar Year 2021, 
the following is requested:  
a. As per the Supporting Table DS:1 Para 2 (f): Marketing and promotion services, the UK 
has disbursed 42.18 million GBP through payment agencies to wards marketing 
campaigns; support to producer groups; stimulation of farmer/producer markets; 
promotion of quality and accreditation schemes. The UK may explain how it supports the 
producer groups and provide the details of the programmes.  
b. As per the Supp orting Table DS:1 Para 6: Decoupled income support, the UK is continuing 
with the previous EU Common Agriculture Policy (CAP). Is the UK planning changes in the 
decoupled income support measures? If so, details of the same may be provided.  
c. As per the Suppo rting Table DS:1 Para 13, the UK has mentioned it provides annual 
support to farmers and crofters operating in constrained areas (Scotland). It is requested 
to provide details of these programmes, including the eligibility criteria to receive support 
under  this measure.  
d. As per the Supporting Table DS:1 Para 14: other Direct Payments, certain COVID response 
measures are provided by the UK. The UK may provide details of the programme of direct 
payment under COVID -response measures?  
e. As per the Supporting Table DS:3 Measures Exempt from the Reduction Commitment – 
Direct Payments under Production -limitin g Programmes - "Exempt Direct Payments, the 
UK has mentioned two programmes - Voluntary Coupled Support fixed area payments: 
Protein Crops (Northern Ireland) and Livestock payments made on a fixed number of head 
Voluntary Coupled Support headage payments: Beef and sheep. The UK is requested to 
provide details of the programme, including eligibility conditions. We may also ask to 
clarify if these programmes satisfy the production limiting condition. If so, how?  
f. For measures notified under the Supporting Tabl e DS:5, the UK is requested to elaborate 
as to how the eligible production determined for the programmes?  
Answer by United Kingdom  
The UK thanks India for their question on DS:1 Notification G/AG/N/GBR/11.   
a. A number of domestic support schemes are classified under Measure type 2 (f) marketing 
and promotion services in Supporting Table DS:1. Two of these schemes provide support 
to producer groups: the Fruit and Vegetable Aid Support Scheme and the Meat Industry 
Development Scheme run by Quality Meat Scotland (QMS).   G/AG/W/235  
 
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  Firstly, for Fruit and Vegetable Aid, the support of producer groups, commonly known as 
Producer Organisations, is one activity that contributes to the measure of marketing and 
promotion services.  The UK has implemented this compulsory EU Scheme (under Pillar 1 
of the EU Common Agricultural Policy) since its inception in the 1990s, and since the UK 's 
Exit from the EU, continues to operate under Retained EU Law - maintaining the 
functionality, structure and goals of the EU Scheme. Details ca n be found about the 
Scheme more broadly in the following public Guidance  and the UK's latest National 
Strategy for the Scheme .  
The Scheme was developed to support collaboration within the fruit and vege table sectors 
with the aim to improving the competitiveness and market orientation of the sector, 
reducing fluctuations in producers ' income resulting from crises, promoting consumption 
and enhancing environmental safeguards. Funding is given to actions wh ere they are 
shown to meet the objectives of the Scheme. Two specific objectives are linked to 
marketing and promotion services, as set out in Article 33 of Regulation (EU) 1308/2013:  
• Boosting products' commercial value [marketing]  
• Promotion of the produ cts, whether in a fresh or processed form   
Examples of actions funded under these objectives are given in Annex 1 of the above 
linked National Strategy.  
Secondly, the QMS Meat Industry Development Scheme provides support for producers 
of quality red meat and red meat products as well as quality pork by helping to facilitate 
best practice and knowledge exchange initiatives that are accessible to all sectors within 
the red meat industry.  
b. The Rural Payment Agency plans to replace the Basic Payment Scheme (BPS ) in England 
with delinked payments in 2024 (BPS is expected to end after the 2023 scheme year). 
Delinked payments will be based on the average BPS payments (including any young 
farmer payment or greening payment) made to beneficiaries in the BPS 2020, BPS  2021 
and BPS 2022 scheme years. Progressive reductions will be applied for the years 2024 to 
2027 as delinked payments are gradually phased out in England. These changes will be 
notified in due course. Further information is available online at Delinked payments: 
replacing the Basic Payment S cheme . Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland are currently 
developing their future agricultural policies and the UK will notify any resulting changes to 
BPS payments when further information is available.  
c. The measure referred to in the question provides vi tal annual income support to help 
maintain viable farms in Scotland 's extensive Less Favoured Area and reduce the risk of 
land abandonment, therefore creating the basis for farms to improve their economic 
performance. While support is designed to ensure th at farms in these constrained areas 
remain viable and sustainable, the natural and climatic constraints faced by the farms 
means that large scale intensification is not possible, and modernisation will also be limited 
by the capability of the land, so farm ing based on traditional sustainable practice 
dominates and reduce the risk of land abandonment, therefore creating the basis for farms 
to improve their economic performance.  
The current measure, which is the Less Favoured Area Support Scheme, will contin ue until 
2024. It is open to livestock farmers and crofters actively farming Scottish land designated 
as a Less Favoured Area.  
To qualify, the farmer must be at least 16 years of age, must  declare at least three 
hectares of eligible land in their Single Ap plication Form, be actively farming the eligible 
land they claim for scheme for the majority of the calendar year they claim in; and meet 
cross compliance conditions on all the land declared in their Single Application Form.  
The land eligible for the schem e may include land farmers own, seasonal land and common 
grazings. It must be forage land and must have the Integrated Administration and Control 
System land use codes that are allowed for the scheme, as set out in the full scheme 
guidance. The land must b e declared in the Single Application Form that farmers submit G/AG/W/235  
 
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  in the scheme claim year and should be accepted as Severely Disadvantaged or 
Disadvantaged within the area classed as Less Favoured Areas in Scotland.  
d. The COVID response schemes referenced in Supporting Table DS:1 as "Other direct 
payments " include compensation for closure of processing facilities, income support 
schemes and business development grants to support commercial businesses to make 
investments in agricu ltural, horticultural and food business sustainability.  
e. Regarding the Voluntary Coupled Support fixed area payments: Protein Crops (Northern 
Ireland), further information can be found in notification G/AG/N/GBR/4. As stated in the 
UK's response to question AG -IMS ID 98193 , the 1,000 hectares cap is consistent with 
Blue Box criteria according to Article 6.5 which states that direct paymen ts under 
production -limiting programmes shall not be subject to the commitment to reduce 
domestic support if such payments are based on fixed area and yields. The 1,000 hectares 
cap is not a target for future production levels but is a limit on the total a rea that can 
receive support under this scheme.  The area limit corresponds to 0.1% of total agricultural 
area in Northern Ireland and less than 0.01% of total agricultural area in the UK.  
On Livestock payments made on a fixed number of head Voluntary Coupl ed Support 
headage payments for Beef and sheep, further information can be found in the UK 's 
response to question AG -IMS ID 101083 . The livestock payments are production limiting 
as they were made on a fixed number of head set out in legislation. The payments are 
designed to help slow the rate of long -term decline in sheep and beef  cattle numbers on 
extensive grazing systems in Scotland 's more challenging landscapes.   
f. The UK response to part (b) of  AG-IMS ID 102107  applies.  
AG-IMS ID 102072: Question by Paraguay - Transparency issues (including Table DS:2)  
In follow -up to the reply received from the United Kingdom to question AG -IMS ID 101089 , could 
the United Kingdom:   
a. Confirm that mechanical harrowing is not used in organic crop fa rming? We note that the 
United Kingdom has pointed to carbon sequestration and the fact that organic farming 
prevents erosion as elements demonstrating that organic farming is sustainable. We ask 
the United Kingdom to indicate how it is only organic crops,  and not conventional crops, 
that sequester carbon and how the former prevent erosion.   
b. Which criteria are used to categorize organic farming as a climate change mitigation 
measure, considering that this type of farming can increase the carbon footprint of  
products by requiring more land and water use than conventional farming to produce the 
same amount of food? In this connection, we also ask how organic farming helps conserve 
water.   
c. How is organic farming considered to be linked to animal welfare?  
Answer  by United Kingdom  
The U nited Kingdom thanks Paraguay for their follow -up question to the UK 's response to question 
AG-IMS ID 101089 . 
a. The UK does not prohibit the use of mechanical raking in organically pr oduced crops and 
considers the overall benefits of doing so, that is that it supports pest management without 
the use of synthetic pesticides, outweigh the perceived negatives in organic production. 
Organic farming and other regenerative farming methods ha ve been shown to positively 
impact soil structure in comparison to conventional methods, which in turn reduces 
erosion. This is achieved via stabilizing soil aggregation and higher soil organic carbon in 
the topsoil layer, which can positively impact soil stabilisation as well as improving water 
retention, and thereby helping water conservation. The increased level of organic carbon 
in the soil, via sequestration and organic inputs, is influenced by organic matter recycling 
and the type of crop used in a ro tation, both key elements of organic farming.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  b. Biodiversity loss is a direct consequence and compounding factor of the negative impacts 
of climate change.  Improving biodiversity supports agricultural ecosystems ' adaptation to 
those impacts. Biologically div erse communities are more likely to contain species that 
confer resilience to that ecosystem because, as a community accumulates species, there 
is a higher chance of any one of them having traits that enable them to adapt to a changing 
environment. Organic  production has been shown by numerous studies to improve 
biodiversity in agricultural systems, mitigating the impacts of climate change in those 
systems whilst also reducing the carbon footprint associated with the extraction, 
processing, and transport of  synthetic agricultural inputs. The UK recognises that this must 
be balanced against lower yields of organic farming systems. Nonetheless, the UK 
considers organic and regenerative production methods as part of a mix of actions and 
approaches to delivering  positive environmental outcomes, whilst also exploring ways of 
supporting farmers to improve the sustainability of conventional farming systems.  
c. Organic production requirements in the UK demand best practice in terms of animal 
welfare. For example, all an imals must be free range and have access to pasture, and 
strict limits on stocking density are imposed, minimising social stress and providing 
opportunity for animals to exhibit natural behaviours. Prophylactic medicines are also 
prohibited in organic prod uction (with the exception of vaccinations) and the use of 
antibiotics is limited, reducing the risk of antimicrobial resistance which again is supportive 
of positive animal welfare.  
Follow -up: Paraguay noted that its country has different practices concer ning the role of mechanical 
raking and soil erosion and would review the UK's response and follow up. Brazil thanked Paraguay 
for once again raising the issue of how organic production is being characterized within domestic 
support notifications to the Com mittee. Brazil took the opportunity to share the following findings of 
a recently published report by the OECD: "(…) broadly speaking, organic agriculture tends to have 
better environmental performance per unit of land, but, due to lower yields (generally 20% smaller 
than conventional yields), the environmental performance of organic agriculture per unit of product 
is not necessarily superior. Moreover, for a given production volume, organic agriculture would 
require greater land use. Expansion of agricultu ral land at the expense of natural ecosystems is a 
major driver of greenhouse gas emissions and biodiversity loss, yet such land use effects are 
generally not included in empirical studies comparing organic versus conventional agriculture." Brazil 
noted th at, in sum, there is no automatic correlation between organic farming and environmental 
sustainability. No Member notifying such outlays as non -trade distorting subsidies has actually 
demonstrated how it is only refunding cost increases or profit losses. I n Brazil's view, the types of 
support included in Annex 2 of the Agreement on Agriculture have very specific descriptions because 
they help limit their effects on trade and production and this is another cornerstone of the system. 
Brazil stressed that if a  programme does not meet the strict requirements in Annex 2, it should be 
included in a Member's AMS, not in the Green Box.  
AG-IMS ID 102107: Question by India - Market price support  
We thank the United Kingdom for submitting its DS:1 notification G/AG/N/GBR/11 . India observes 
that the UK has provided market price support calculation for butter, skimmed milk powder and 
common wheat in Supporting Table DS:5. In this context, India requests the UK to provide details 
on the following:  
a. Whether the UK government is still announcing the ap plied administered price for butter, 
skimmed milk powder and common wheat? If yes, then what is the applicable applied 
administered price and coverage of products for the year 2022?  
b. India observes that the production eligible to receive market price suppor t for all three 
products mentioned in the notification is zero tonnes. Could the UK provide reasons on 
why the eligible production is zero?  
c. How was the ERP for butter, skimmed milk powder and common wheat calculated?  
d. It is observed that the administered price and the external reference prices in the DS:5 
supporting table have been redenominated using the exchange rate that prevailed on 
31 December 2020, 1 EUR = 0.89903. This is in contrast with the UK 's communication via 
document no. G/MA/TAR /RS/570/Add.1, where the currency components of the schedule G/AG/W/235  
 
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  of concessions were redenominated using the average exchange rate of 2015 -19, 1 
EUR = 0.83687 GBP. Could the UK explain the rationale behind using different exchange 
rates in the Schedule and DS: 1 notification?   
e. As per the notification requirements and format under G/AG/2 , Members with Total AMS 
commitment in Part IV of their Schedule are required to notify the domestic support 
measures no later than 90 days following the end of the calendar (or, marketing, fiscal, 
etc.) year in question. In the context, India would like to know the reasons for not notifying 
the domestic support notification by the UK as per the timeline of G/AG/2 . 
Answer by United Kingdom  
a. The applied administered price is set out in retained EU legislation (Article 1a of retained 
Regulation 1370/2013 (when read with Article 2 of Regulation 1370/2013)).  These 
schemes have not yet been used in 2022.  
b. Prices have remained significantly higher than the applied administered price throughout 
the reporti ng period and no applications for support were received during the reporting 
period - the level of production eligible for support is therefore zero.  
c. The UK 's external references prices, including the reference prices for butter, skimmed 
milk powder and co mmon wheat, are those set out in WTO document G/AG/AGST/EEC.  
d. Through document G/MA/TAR/RS/570/Add.1 the United Kingdom notified of its intention 
to redenominate all currency components of Schedule XIX from Euro to Pound Sterling. 
This was done to provide p redictability and stability in relation to relevant UK 
commitments. The exchange rate utilised for establishing the United Kingdom 's 
commitments in Schedule XIX was representative of the value of the Pound Sterling at 
that time and does not represent an in definite value of the currency.  
e. The United Kingdom made its first DS:1 notification on 31 March 2022 which is clearly 
indicated on the notification and falls no later than 90 days following the end of the 
calendar year in question (Calendar Year 2021). The  date of circulation was a few days 
later which allows the CoA Secretariat time for processing these large notifications. The 
UK is fully compliant with the DS:1 timing requirement set out in G/AG/2.  
Follow -up: India noted that it would follow up on the ba sis for calculating market price support and 
the exchange rate used specifically in reference to question d . 
AG-IMS ID 102071: Question by Paraguay, Brazil - Classification of measures  
Paraguay and Brazil thank the United Kingdom for submitting notificatio n G/AG/N/GBR/11 . On this 
matter, further to the questions submitted at the previous meeting of the Committee on Agriculture, 
we note that the United Kingdom includes "verification of compliance with feed and food law, animal 
welfare rules " in paragraph 2(b) of the Green Box.   
Could the United Kingdom explain how animal welfare is related to pest and disease control, or 
whether this programme should be included under another category?   
Answer by United Kingdom  
The United Kingdom welcomes this question from Paraguay and Brazil followin g the submission of 
our first DS:1 notification ( G/AG/N/GBR/11 ) and notes the interest of Members ' in the interpretations 
of Green box requirements which we also share.  
The domestic support measures notified under 2b do not involve direct payments to producers or 
processors and involve expendit ures (or revenue foregone) in relation to programmes which provide 
pest and disease control services to the agriculture or rural community. These services deliver animal 
welfare benefits by controlling, quarantining and eradicating disease in livestock.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  For these reasons we retain the view that this measure can fall under this classification but welcome 
dialogue with Paraguay, Brazil and other Members to understand if there are other views on 
classification, in the absence of policy -specific criteria and co nditions relating to animal welfare 
support in Annex 2 of the Agreement on Agriculture.  
3.2.3.16   United States of America (G/AG/N/USA/157)  
AG-IMS ID 102130: Question by Australia - General services: extension and advisory 
services  
Australia thanks the US for submit ting its DS:1 notification G/AG/N/USA/157  and notes the 
Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), administered by the US Farm Service Agency (FSA), valued 
at USD 2,868 million. Australia notes the "other environmental benefits " described in this 
notification, as well as the FSA fact shee t (https://www.fsa.usda.gov/Assets/USDA -FSA-
Public/usdafiles/FactSheets/2022/conservation -reserve_program -fact_sheet_2022.pdf ) which 
outlines other 'on-farm benefits ' from reduced erosion.  
a. Could the US please clarify what the 'on-farm benefits ' are in relation to this programme?  
b. Could the US please elaborate on who the CRP participants are who receive payments 
from the FSA?  
Answer by United States of America  
a. On-farm benefits from reduced erosion is one of several Environmental Benefit Index  (EBI) 
factors that USDA uses to rank offers submitted by landowners for CRP (Conservation 
Reserve Program). CRP he lps maintain the long -term productivity of the land for future 
generations. This factor is an evaluation of the potential for the land to erode as the result 
of either wind or water erosion. This factor is measured using an Erodibility Index (EI), 
which is  a numerical value that expresses the potential erodibility of soil in relation to its 
soil loss tolerance value and is used to identify highly erodible land (HEL).  
b. CRP participants are landowners  and operators who meet certain eligibility requirements 
and are approved to enter into long -term, voluntary contracts (10 -15 years) to remove 
environmentally -sensitive land from production and to establish long -term, resource -
conserving plant species (e.g., approved grasses and trees) to control soil erosion, 
improve water quality, and develop wildlife habitat.  
3.2.4   New or modified Domestic Support Measures  (Table DS:2)  
3.2.4.1   Argentina (G/AG/N/ARG/52)  
AG-IMS ID 102045: Question by United States of America - Transparency issues (including 
Table DS:2)  
In G/AG/N/ARG/52  Argentina notified a domestic support measure entitled "Programme for the 
promotion of local employment, integration and procurement.  "The description only states "Advisory 
service and technical support to facilitate local food production and creation of jobs for producers 
engaged in family farming. " 
Please provide further details with regards to this measure and how the measure facilitates local 
food production and creation of jobs for producers.  
The title of the measure includes the word "procurement "; does the government of Argentina 
purchase food from producers under this measure and, if so, how?  
Answer by Argentina  
The programme for the promotion of local employment, integration and procurement (PROTAAL) is 
aimed at creating genuine new jobs and streng thening rural integration.  As part of the programme's 
implementation method, associative production units for family agriculture (UPAFs) have been set 
up. These units represent small producer associations, whose beneficiaries are unemployed persons, G/AG/W/235  
 
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  undere mployed persons and/or producers engaged in family farming who are on the National 
Register of Family Agriculture (RENAF).  The programme's beneficiaries are trained on technical and 
motivational issues and aspects of group and association management. They receive technical 
support throughout the entire process, which allows them to evaluate the progress of the projects 
under way.  The programme seeks to promote and facilitate the formation of these units to build and 
enhance the productive force and capacity  of family agriculture units (NAFs), with a holistic approach 
to local development.  As for the second question, there might have been a problem with the 
translation because the Spanish title does not imply any notion of purchases by the State.  
3.2.4.2   Argentina (G /AG/N/ARG/53)  
AG-IMS ID 102046: Question by United States of America - Transparency issues (including 
Table DS:2)  
In G/AG/N/ARG/53  Argentina notified a domestic support measure entitled "Programme for direct 
and critical assistance for family, rural and indigenous farming. "The descr iption only states "Aid for 
producers engaged in family, rural and indigenous farming, whose production is at risk from the 
effects of climatic events (bad weather), social crises or extreme occurrences (geographical 
isolation). " 
 
a. Please provide further de tails with regards to this measure and how the measure aids 
producers, including how levels of payment are determined.  
b. Please elaborate on what is meant by "extreme occurrences (geographical isolation) " and 
how this relates to adherence with paragraph 8 of  Annex 2 of the Agreement on 
Agriculture.  
Answer by Argentina  
The programme for direct and critical assistance for family, rural and indigenous farming helps 
producers who are on the National Register of Family Agriculture and whose production is at risk 
from climatic events (such as droughts, floods, fires, snow and frost), social crises or extreme 
occurrences (such as animal deaths as a result of disease outbreaks or pest 
infestations).  Furthermore, at least 50% of the overall production or production cap acity of each 
producer must be affected in the case of an emergency, or at least 80% in the case of a disaster.  The 
programme meets the criteria established in paragraph 8 of Annex 2 of the Agreement on Agriculture 
since eligibility for the payments arises  only following a formal recognition by government authorities 
that a natural or like disaster has occurred and is determined by a production loss which exceeds 
30%. Payments are applied only in respect of losses of income, livestock, land or other production 
factors due to the natural disaster in question.  
AG-IMS ID 102127: Question by United Kingdom - Direct payments: payments for relief 
from natural disasters  
The United Kingdom thanks Argentina for its submission of G/AG/N/ARG/53  and notes that some 
additional supporting information would be beneficial. Could Argentina provide further information 
on how this support meets the criteria set out in paragraph 8 (a) that eligibility for such payments 
"shall be determined by a production loss which exceeds 3 0% of the average of production in the 
preceding three -year period or a three -year average based on the preceding five -year period, 
excluding the highest and the lowest entry"?  
Answer by Arg entina  
Within the framework of the programme for direct and critical assistance for family, rural and 
indigenous farming, support will be provided to producers in the sector whose production, at the 
time of applying, is at risk from climatic events (such a s droughts, floods, fires, snow and frost), 
social crises or extreme occurrences (such as animal deaths as a result of disease outbreaks or pest 
infestations).  
At least 50% of the overall production or production capacity of each producer must be affected in 
the case of an emergency, or at least 80% in the case of a disaster.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  Follow -up: The United  Kingdom noted that the information provided by Argentina is helpful from a 
learning perspective on how Members interpret and  implement Annex 2 of the Agreement on  
Agriculture.  
3.2.5   Export prohibitions and restrictions  (Table ER:1)  
3.2.5.1   Kazakhstan (G/AG/N/KAZ/19)  
AG-IMS ID 102128: Question by United Kingdom - Transparency issues  
The United Kingdom thanks Kazakhstan for notification G/AG/N/KAZ/19 . The United Kingdom 
welcomes the transparency that Kazakh stan has provided to the WTO by notifying this export 
restriction and would encourage other Members, especially net exporters, to follow this example 
where they have restrictive measures in place. The United Kingdom notes that Kazakhstan 's 
restriction on w heat and wheat flour has been extended to the 30th of September 2022.  
Could Kazakhstan indicate whether it plans to further extend this restriction and what factors will 
inform its decision?  
Answer by Kazakhstan  
Currently, export quotas on meslin, wheat, and wheat flour from the Republic of Kazakhstan have 
been lifted (by Order of the Ministry of Agriculture of the Republic of Kazakhstan No. 291 dated 
13 September 2022).  
Follow -up: The United  States supported the question.  
3.2.5.2   Malaysia (G/AG/N/MYS/52)  
AG-IMS ID 102047: Question by United States of America, Japan, United Kingdom - 
Transparency issues  
On 1 August  2022, Malaysia's Minister of Agriculture and Food Industry stated  that Malaysia's 
chicken supply has re -stabilized, and the country is now dealing with a chicken oversupply.  
The Minister also stated that Malaysia has the capacity to export chic ken supplies but will not yet lift 
its export ban. (Source: https://www.theedgemarkets.com/article/ ronald -malaysia -currently -
facing -slight -chicken -oversupply -after-effective -measures -taken ). 
The stated purpose of the original export ban was "to ensure sufficient domestic supply to address 
the ongoing domestic chicken shortage situation in Malaysia."  
Given that Malaysia now has an oversupply of chicken and the capacity to export, and taking into 
consideration the effects that export bans may have on an importing Member's food security, is 
Malaysia considering lifting its export ban on poultry sooner than the recently notified dates of 
30 November ( G/AG/N/MYS/52 ) and 7  December ( G/AG/N/MYS/52/Add.1 )? 
Answer by Malaysia  
Malaysia would like to thank the United States, Japan and the United Kingdom for the question in 
relation to Malaysia 's notification on chicken export restriction.  The measure taken by the Malaysian 
Government in imposing the temporary export restriction as notified on 27 June 2022 is to increase 
domestic availability and lowering domestic prices of chickens in the country. This interim measure 
has also given time for local farm s to increase their production before resumption of export.  
Malaysia  may revise the export restriction subject to sufficient domestic chicken supply and will issue 
the notification in due time.  
Follow -up: The U nited States noted that, according to media re ports, the Malaysian government had 
signalled that it would allow some chicken exports to resume in October. Noting that this was not 
mentioned by Malaysia in its response, the US sought further information on the changes in policies, 
including the specifi c date and the process for resuming exports, as well as the estimated total G/AG/W/235  
 
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  quantality of exports that would be allowed. The UK underlined that, in the current context, Members 
should ensure measures taken to address food security are targeted, proportiona l, limited, and 
transparent. The UK welcomed the transparency provided by Malaysia to the WTO thus far and 
looked forward to receiving further information. The UK noted that transparency to notifications is 
key to ensure importers have reliable information  in order to keep prices down and prevent pre -
emptive restrictions. Members could then adapt measures and potentially mitigate the impact on 
their domestic food security. The UK highlighted with regret that in the last six months only nine 
export restricti on measures had been notified to the Committee. The UK underlined that trade 
restrictive measures could increase market volatility and the uncertainty of how these measures 
were applied could exacerbate price hikes. The UK urged Members, especially net exp orters, to take 
more transparent approaches by notifying any restrictive measure to the WTO. Japan flagged 
continued concern about export restriction.  
AG-IMS ID 102008: Question by European Union, United Kingdom - Other  
On 24 June, Malaysia has submitted a notification to the WTO - G/AG/N/MYS/52  (issued 
on 27/06/2022) as well as an addendum to it on 21/07/2022, informing of an export restrictions on: 
Live day old chick broilers and live broilers (except coloured birds and village chicken), whole  
chicken, chicken cuts and parts . The measure is in force from 1 June 2022 until 07 December 2022. 
The EU thanks Malaysia for notifying this measure.  
Could Malaysia explain what would be the expected impact of the measure on trade in the products 
concerned ? 
Answer by Malaysia  
Malaysia thanks the European Union and the United Kingdom for the question in relation to Malaysia 's 
notification on chicken export restriction. The measure as notified on 27 June 2022 is applied on 
11 tariff lines (live day -old chick broilers and live broilers (except coloured birds and village chicken), 
whole chicken, chicken cuts and parts) which would involve export value of approximately 
RM 81.7 million per month. The addendum to the measure as notified on 21 July 2022 revise s the 
restriction to only cover one HS code (0105.94.9900) - live broilers (except coloured birds and village 
chicken) and would involve the export value of RM  73.7 million per month. Thank you.  
3.3  OVERDUE NOTIFICATIONS  
3.3.1   Botswana  
AG-IMS ID 102048: Question by United States of America  
The United States thanks Botswana for submitting its DS:1 notification ( G/AG/N/BWA/35 ) for 
financial year 1 April 2020 to 31 March 2021.  
The next most recent DS:1 notification Botswana submitted was for the financial year 1 April 2017 
to 31 March 2018.  
When does Botswana plan to submit the notifications for the period from 1 April 2018 to 
31 March  2020? 
Answer by Botswana  
Botswana Thanks United States of America for the question.  
The outstanding notifications have been submitted to crn@wto.org on Monday 10 O ctober 2022 . 
Thank you . G/AG/W/235  
 
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  3.3.2   Canada  
AG-IMS ID 102086: Question by New Zealand  
New Zealand notes that Canada 's last DS:1 notification was for the calendar year 2018. Can Canada 
please advise when they plan to submit their outstanding DS:1 notifications covering the 
years  2019-2021?  
Answer by Canada  
Canada thanks New Zealand for its question and interest.  Work is underway to prepare the annual 
domestic support notifications from 2019 onwards. The notifications will be submitted in due course.  
3.3.3   China  
AG-IMS ID 10204 9: Question by United States of America  
Table ES:3 and Table NF:1 Notifications   
 
As a follow up to AG -IMS IDs 93166 , 92029  and 88082 , China stated that it was conducting a study 
to determine whether it is re quired to submit notifications of tables ES:3 (showing total volume of 
food aid) and NF:1 (reporting the quantity of food aid as well as technical and financial assistance 
provided to least -developed and net food importing developing countries).  
  
a. What was  China 's conclusion as to whether it needs to submit these notifications?   
b. Please clarify when the Committee can expect these notifications , or explain why China 
believes it does not need to notify them.   
Answer by China  
The study is still under way, and t he reply would be provided if there is any progress.   
3.3.4   Egypt  
AG-IMS ID 102013: Question by European Union  
Egypt – DS:1 notifications  
The latest DS:1 notification from Egypt covers the marketing year 2016/17.  When will Egypt 
introduce its notifications for t he following years? Can Egypt indicate a timeline?  
Answer by Egypt  
Egypt is currently taking the necessary steps to update the required data for the notifications and 
the updates will be duly notified.  
Follow -up: Paraguay stressed the importance of having updated notifications from Egypt to support 
evidence -based discussions in the Committee.  
AG-IMS ID 102087: Question by New Zealand, Paraguay  
New Zealand notes that Egypt 's last DS:1 notification was for 2017.  
Can Egypt please advise when they plan to subm it their outstanding DS:1 notifications covering the 
years 2018 -2021?  
Answer by Egypt  
Egypt is currently taking the necessary steps to update the required data for the notifications and 
the updates will be duly notified.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  Follow -up: Paraguay stressed the im portance of having updated notifications from Egypt to support 
evidence -based discussions in the Committee.  
AG-IMS ID 102050: Question by United States of America  
The United States notes that Egypt's most recent notification submission ( G/AG/N/EGY/3 ) 
concerning domestic support comm itments (Tables DS:1 and DS:2) covering financial years 
2005/2006 to 2016/2017 is from February 2017.   
Please specify when Egypt will submit Tables DS:1 and DS:2 notifications for financial 
years  2017/2018 and 2018/2019.  
Answer by Egypt  
Egypt is currently taking the necessary steps to update the required data for the notifications and 
the updates will be duly notified.  
Follow -up: Paraguay stressed the importance of having updated notifications from Egypt to support 
evidence -based discussions in th e Committee.  
3.3.5   Kazakhstan  
AG-IMS ID 102024: Question by United States of America  
The United States takes note that Kazakhstan implements a number of domestic support 
measures.  Kazakhstan 's Ministry of Agriculture published two policy documents: "Concept Note of 
Industrial Agricultural Development of the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2021 -2030, " and "National 
Agricultural Sector Development Project: 2021 -25." 
 
In the documents, the Ministry of  Agriculture noted Kazakhstan provided approximately 260.5 billion 
Kazakhstani Tenge (KZT) in 2020 and 471.9 billion KZT in 2021 of domestic support to its agricultural 
sector through various subsidies, loans, and developmental programs.  The United States is 
concerned as Kazakhstan has never notified a Table DS:1 or Table DS:2 notification to the 
Committee on Agriculture despite stating in response to AG -IMS ID 92040  in October 2019 that 
notifications would be submitted "in the nearest future. "  
 
When will Kazakhstan provide its overdue domestic support notifications (Tables DS:1 and  DS:2)?   
Answer by Kazakhstan  
3.3.6   Malaysia  
AG-IMS ID 102088: Question by New Zealand  
New Zealand thanks Malaysia for their recent submission of their DS:1 notification for 2015. Can 
Malaysia please advise when they plan to submit their outstanding DS:1 notific ations covering the 
years 2016 -2021?  
New Zealand is particularly interested in further information on Malaysia 's support to the poultry 
sector, any information Malaysia can provide on the scale and nature of this support would be greatly 
appreciated.  
Answe r by Malaysia  
Malaysia thanks New Zealand for its question.  With respect to the domestic support notifications, 
Malaysia is working on finalising its domestic process and strive to the best of its ability to fulfil its 
transparency obligations in order to provide accurate information to the Members. Malaysia will 
submit the notifications once it is finalised.  Thank you.  G/AG/W/235  
 
- 243 - 
 
  3.3.7   Morocco  
AG-IMS ID 102051: Question by United States of America  
As a follow up to AG -IMS ID 91182 , the United States would like to reiterate the following question, 
for which Morocco has not provided a written answer:   
"The United States notes that Morocco is overdue in notifying (Table ES:1 and Supporting 
Table  ES:2), and responses to the export competition questionnaire (ECQ) from calendar year 2016 
to the present. "  
Please provide all overdue Table ES:1 and S upporting Table ES:2 notifications, and a response to 
the ECQ on operational changes in export subsidy measures.  
Answer by Morocco  
3.3.8   South Africa  
AG-IMS ID 102089: Question by New Zealand, Paraguay  
New Zealand notes that South Africa 's last DS:1 notification  was for 2014. Can South Africa please 
advise when they plan to submit their outstanding DS:1 notifications covering the years 2015 -2021?  
Answer by South Africa  
South Africa would like to thank New Zealand and Paraguay for their question.   
South Africa is currently working on the outstanding Domestic Support notifications, and will submit 
them once completed.  
3.4  EXPORT COMPETITION  
3.4.1   Australia  
AG-IMS ID 102052: Question by United States of America  
The United States notes Australia reported in its Export Competition Questionnaire that Export 
Finance Australia (EFA) issued bonds worth AUD  11.86 million for food product manufacturing 
exports and responded "n/a" for the maximum repayment term. In the past, Australia reported a 
maximum repayment of 18 months u nder the EFA bonds program.  
a. Please clarify why the maximum repayment term is "n/a" for bonds issued.  Australia only 
provided a value figure for "food product manufacturing " but did not provide which product 
groups are included or its value figures under th e bond programs.  
b. Please provide the value figures for each product or product group for the bond program.  
Australia reported that EFA issued Risk Participation Agreements (RPA) risk cover worth 
AUD 8.84 million for basic material wholesaling.  Australia only provided a value figure for 
"basic material wholesaling " but did not provide which product groups are included or its 
value figure under the RPA program.  
c. Please explain why value figures for agricultural product or product group for the RPA 
programme were not provided.  
Answer by Australia  
Australia thanks the United States for its question on Export Finance Australia (EFA). The EFA 
provides complementary finance at commercial terms. The fees and premiums payable to EFA are 
above those that wo uld typically be charged by commercial credit providers or from international 
credit markets.   G/AG/W/235  
 
- 244 - 
 
  a. Verification has revealed that the maximum repayment is "no more than 18 months " for 
Bonds and should not be 'n/a'. 
b. The commodity relates to dairy and as indicat ed in Table 2, the value is AUD 11.86 million.  
c. Products under 'basic material wholesaling ' include barley, rapeseed, wheat and wool. As 
indicated in Table 2, the value is AUD 8.84 million.  
3.4.2   Canada  
AG-IMS ID 102053: Question by United States of America  
The U nited States notes that Canada reported in its Export Competition Questionnaire for item  7 
that CAD 3,324 million was used for North America under Credit Insurance.  
a. Please list what agricultural products were being financed to North America during the 
notification period.  
b. What countries are covered under the geographic area of "North America, " as Canada 
reports Mexico with Central America and the Caribbean?  
Answer by Canada  
Canada and the United States are the two countries included in Export Development Ca nada (EDC) 
reporting of North America.  List of agricultural products financed to North America during the 
notification period:   
− Soybean farming  
− Oilseed (except soybean) farming   
− Wheat farming   
− Rice farming   
− Other grain farming  
− Other vegetable (except potato) and melon farming  
− Non-citrus fruit and tree nut farming  
− Nursery and tree production  
− All other miscellaneous crop farming  
− Hog and pig farming  
− Aquaculture  
− All other miscellaneous animal production  
− Salt water fishing  
− Freshwater fishing  
− Support activities for crop production  
− Dog and cat food manufacturing  
− Other animal food manufacturing  
− Flour milling  
− Rice milling and malt manufacturing  
− Wet corn milling  
− Oilseed processing  
− Fat and oil refining and blending  
− Non-chocolate confectionery manufa cturing  
− Frozen food manufacturing  
− Fruit and vegetable canning, pickling and drying  
− Fluid milk manufacturing  
− Butter, cheese, and dry and condensed dairy product manufacturing  
− Ice cream and frozen dessert manufacturing  
− Animal (except poultry) slaughtering  
− Rendering and meat processing from carcasses  
− Seafood product preparation and packaging  
− Retail bakeries  
− Commercial bakeries and frozen bakery product manufacturing  
− Flour mixes, dough, and pasta manufacturing from purchased flour  
− Roasted nut and peanut butter manufacturing  G/AG/W/235  
 
- 245 - 
 
  − Other snack food manufacturing  
− Coffee and tea manufacturing  
− Flavouring syrup and concentrate manufacturing  
− Seasoning and dressing manufacturing  
− All other food manufacturing  
− Soft drink and ice manufacturing  
− Breweries  
− Wineries  
− Distilleri es 
− Fibre 
− Yarn and thread mills  
− Textile and fabric finishing  
− All other textile product mills  
− Other basic organic chemical manufacturing  
− Pharmaceutical and medicine manufacturing  
− Soap and cleaning compound manufacturing  
− All other miscellaneous chemical produ ct manufacturing  
− All other miscellaneous manufacturing  
− Fresh fruit and vegetable merchant wholesalers  
− Other recyclable material merchant wholesalers  
3.4.3   China  
AG-IMS ID 102054: Question by United States of America  
The United States notes China did not provide a reply to the 2021 Export Competition Questionnaire 
(ECQ).  Please provide a data update for year 2021 in the ECQ.  
Answer by China  
China is still working on it, and the reply will be provided later.  
AG-IMS ID 102055: Question by United States of Am erica  
Export Credit  
The United States notes that China responded to the 2020 ECQ for item 8 with "Nil". On 
15 March  2022, China responded to AG -IMS ID 100026  that "There are no readily available statistics 
on usage by product or product group ".  
 
a. Please clarify when will China provide data for "program use by product or product gro up".  
b. If SINOSURE is not able to provide this data, please explain why that is the case, and what 
steps are being taken to correct this information gap for information required to be 
reported to Members of this Committee.   
We note that China responded in t he ECQ that the Export -Import Bank under the export 
order financing programme covered a total of USD 272 million of agricultural products.  
c. Please provide the annual average premium rates/fees for this programme.   
Answer by China  
a. Such date is not available.  
b. SINOSURE does not disaggregate agricultural products for its projects.  
c. The Export -Import Bank charges the interest, not premium fees of export order financing 
programme.  
AG-IMS ID 102056: Question by United States of America  
Food Assistance   G/AG/W/235  
 
- 246 - 
 
   
In its 2020 ECQ response, China stated that it provided USD 6 million in food assistance to 
developing countries through the UN 's World Food Program and the United Nations Children 's Fund, 
which is multilateral food assistance in nature.   
a. Please clarify and confi rm that China did not provide bilateral food assistance of any kind 
in 2019 and 2020.   
b. If bilateral food aid was provided by means of cash transfers, vouchers, or locally and 
regionally procured food, please provide the total value of food aid for years 2019 and 
2020.   
Answer by China  
The question has been transferred to competent department for reply.  
3.4.4   European Union  
AG-IMS ID 102057: Question by United States of America  
In the Export Competition Questionnaire response, related to export credits, EU  member States of 
Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak 
Republic, Spain, and Sweden did not provide a value figure for each agricultural product or product 
group exported under their programmes.  
 
a. For each of these EU member states, please provide the figures for programme use (i.e., 
the monetary value of export) by product or product group (e.g., agricultural products) in 
2021.  
b. For each of these EU member states, if the information is not readily ava ilable, what 
specific steps is each of these countries taking to gather the information and when will it 
be made available to WTO Members as required by the Nairobi Decision on Export 
Competition ( WT/MIN(15)/45 )?  
Answer by European Union  
a. Programme use by product or product group:   
Austria   
Breakdown of the export credits for agricultural products, as follows:   
• vegetables:0.5million EUR  
• meat: 0.2 million  EUR 
• dairy products: 0.16 million  EUR 
• alcoholic beverages:0.2 million  EUR 
• food supplements: 0.1 million  EUR  
Bulgaria   
Programme use by product or product group in 2021  
Product group  Monetary value of export  
(million EUR)  
Dairy  5.20 
Nuts 14.40 
Spices  0.50 
Tea 0.01 
Vegetables  0.50 
Fruits  1.75 
Total 22.40 G/AG/W/235  
 
- 247 - 
 
  Croatia   
Product  Programme  Insured  amount  
in 2021  
Cereals and oilseeds  Insurance  of short-term export  receivables  1.9 million EUR  
Meat products,  vegetable  products, 
flours and mixtures  Reinsurance of short -term export 
receivables  1.8 million EUR  
Hazelnuts  Insurance of short -term export receivables  0.7 million EUR  
Live pigs for slaughter  Insurance of short -term export receivables  0.4 million EUR  
Appels  Insurance of short -term export receivables  0.15 million EUR  
Bee food  Insurance of short -term export receivables  0.14 million EUR  
Vine Insurance of short -term export receivables  0.06 million EUR  
Corn extrudates  Insurance of short -term export receivables  0.04 million EUR  
Pasta  Insurance of short -term export receivables  0.02 million EUR  
Cornflakes  Insurance of short -term export receivables  0.02 million EUR  
Spices for the meat  industry  Insurance of short -term export receivables  0.02 million EUR  
Total  Insurance of short -term export 
receivables  5.3 million EUR  
Czech Republic   
Product group  Monetary  value  export  
(CZK mil)  
Beer 46.6 
Food supplements  34.1 
Food granulates  3.5 
Alcoholic beverages  6.4 
Spices  15.6 
Pates  25.4 
Hungary   
Product/product group  EUR millions  
Cattle breeding  2.94 
Wholesale of tobacco, seeds and fodder  1.92 
Processing and preservation of poultry  1.87 
Processing of dairy products  1.53 
Production of sweets (confection)  0.10 
Grape vine cultivation,  0.07 
Manufacture of other food products*  0.04 
Production of farm animal feed  0.03 
Total  8.49 
Latvia   
− 10.2 Processing and preserving of fish, crustaceans and molluscs - EUR 0.5 million;   
− 10.3 Processing and preserving of fruit and vegetables - EUR 0.2 million;  
− 10.5 Manufacture of dairy products - EUR 3.5 million;  
− 10.6 Manufacture of grain mill products, st arches and starch products - EUR 0.3 million;  
− 10.7 Manufacture of bakery and farinaceous products – EUR 0.0 million;  
− 10.8 Manufacture of other food products - EUR 0.06 million;  
− 10.9 Manufacture of prepared animal feeds - EUR 0.2 million;  
− 11.0 Manufacture o f beverages - EUR 0.9 million.  
Lithuania  
− Lithuania submitted amount of 379,000 EUR but the actual amount is EUR 384 000.  
− Grains, flakes, cereals – EUR 0.04 million  
− Fish feed – EUR 0.04 million  
− Crispy bread – EUR 0.08 million  
− Beer and non -alcoholic beverages – EUR 0.04 million  
− Confectionery products (sweets) – EUR 0.2 million  G/AG/W/235  
 
- 248 - 
 
  Poland  
Programme use by product or product group (2021):  
− Dairy products ( EUR 23.9 million ),  
− Cereals ( EUR 34 million ),  
− Meat (EUR 11.4 million ),  
− Fruits a nd vegetables ( EUR 15.9 million ),  
− Soft drinks ( EUR 10.1 million ),  
− Agricultural products ( EUR 1.7 million ) and  
− Other food products ( EUR 64 million ). 
Slovakia  
INSURANCE 
ACTIVITIES  
 
 
 
commodity/  
comm. group  %age 
(%) Value 
export 
million   
Of (EUR) BANKING 
ACTIVITIES 
(credits and 
guarantees)  
 
commodity/comm. 
group  % age 
(%) Value of 
export 
(EUR) 
dairy products  6,09   0.4  barley malt  32,12  1.4 
cereal 
products  43,93    2.7  cereal products  67,88  3 
edible 
products and 
food 
preparations  23,76    1. 4  edible products and 
food preparations  0,00 0 
beverages  0,66   0.04  beverages  0,00 0 
animal feed  25,56    1.6  animal feed  0,00 0 
Sweden  
See below (in SEK million):  
− Cakes & Confectionary - 2.6 
− Vegetable oils and fats - 2.5  
− Food additives - 47.2 
− Honey - 0.3 
− Mayonnaise - 0.3 
− Mineral water & Soft drinks - 16.8 
− Juice - 0.3 
− Cider & Beer - 2.3 
− Spirits - 1.9 
− Malt - 0.4  
− Powdered eggs - 2.5 
− Readymade soups - 5.2 
− Snacks - 1.1 
− Vitamins and minerals - 0.4  
b. The EU as well as its member States attaches utmost  importance to collect and dutifully 
report all data required by the Nairobi Decision on Export Competition. All available data 
is duly transmitted for transparency purposes in the CoA review process. If new 
information becomes available it will be shared with the Members via replies to the 
questionnaire or replies to CoA questions.  
AG-IMS ID 102058: Question by United States of America  
Food Assistance  
In the Export Competition Questionnaire response, the United States notes that the European Union 
omitted information for Denmark, which is a signatory to the Food Assistance Convention (FAC).  
a. Please provide an update on Denmark 's food assistance data.  G/AG/W/235  
 
- 249 - 
 
  b. While Belgium, Ireland, Italy, and Netherlands are not FAC members yet, would the 
European Union please provi de information on their bilateral food assistance programmes 
and include this information in subsequent ECQ responses?  
Answer by European Union  
1. Denmark 's annual FAC -report 2021:  
In the excel file (below) can be found the following information:  
1. Product Description (detailed information in the excel file)  
2. Quantity and/or value of food aid provided  
3. Description of whether food aid is provided on in -kind, untied cash -based basis and whether 
monetisation was permitted  
  
  G/AG/W/235  
 
- 250 - Recipient 
Country  Part-
ner Type of 
Partner  Total 
Contribu -
tion in 
million kr.  Earmarking 
level Over-
head 
Rate Multi-
Year 
Funding 
(Y/N)  Associa -
ted Costs  
(tied aid, 
twinning)  %age of 
Associated 
Costs  Contribution amount by modality (donor intent)  Contribu -
tion 
amount 
targeting 
specific 
activities 
(donor 
intent)        Notes and 
Comments  
Cash/ 
vou-
chers  Ca-
sh Vou 
chers  Direct 
Food 
distribution  Other  Unspecified 
(under mar-
ked at 
modality 
level)  General 
food 
assistance  Nutrition  Livelihoods  Unspecified 
(unearmar -
ked at 
activity level)   
Global / 
Core 
funding  WFP UN 
Organisa -
tion 210 Unearmarked  6.50%  n 0 0%           y  
    y Core funding, 
yearly 
contribution  
Djibouti  WFP UN 
Organisa -
tion 7.1 Country  6.50%  y 0 0%           y  
    y Contribution 
to desert 
locust 
response in 
the Horn of 
Africa, tied at 
regional level  
Ethiopia  WFP UN 
Organisa -
tion 7.1 Country  6.50%  y 0 0%              
  y   Strengthening  
livelihoods 
and 
agricultural 
development 
in rural 
Ethiopia  
Kenya  WFP UN 
Organisa -
tion 7.1 Country  6.50%  y 0 0%   y          
  y   Food 
assistance 
through cash -
based 
transfers to 
urban 
refugees in 
Uganda  
Uganda  WFP UN 
Organisa -
tion 7.1 Country  6.50%  y 0 0%             y y y   Food security, 
nutrition, 
resilience and 
school 
feeding in 
Mali 
Afghanis -
tan FAO UN 
Organisa -
tion 16.2 Country  6.50%  n 0 0%   y         y   y   Work for cash 
and cash 
based 
transfers, 
contribution 
to Productive 
Safety Net 
Programme 
(PSNP)  
Afghanis -
tan WFP UN 
Organisa -
tion 20 Country  6.50%  n 0 0%              
        
Afghanis -
tan WFP UN 
Organisa -
tion 38 Country  6.50%  y 0 0%              
         
  G/AG/W/235  
 
- 251 - Recipient 
Country  Part-
ner Type of 
Partner  Total 
Contribu -
tion in 
million kr.  Earmarking 
level Over-
head 
Rate Multi-
Year 
Funding 
(Y/N)  Associa -
ted Costs  
(tied aid, 
twinning)  %age of 
Associated 
Costs  Contribution amount by modality (donor intent)  Contribu -
tion 
amount 
targeting 
specific 
activities 
(donor 
intent)        Notes and 
Comments  
Cash/ 
vou-
chers  Ca-
sh Vou 
chers  Direct 
Food 
distribution  Other  Unspecified 
(under mar-
ked at 
modality 
level)  General 
food 
assistance  Nutrition  Livelihoods  Unspecified 
(unearmar -
ked at 
activity level)   
Afghanis -
tan FAO UN 
Organisa -
tion 20 Country  6.50%  n 0 0%              
        
Myanmar  WFP UN 
Organisa -
tion 25 Country  6.50%  y 0 0%              
        
 
 G/AG/W/235  
 
- 252 - 
 
  1. Description of whether in fully grant form or concessional terms – see the table:  
Breakdown of contributions in million kr.  
Contributions provided in fully grant form    Contributions 
not made in 
fully grant 
form  %age of 
contribution 
provided in 
fully grant 
form  TOTAL  
Amount fully 
unearmarked  Amount of 
contributions 
earmarked at 
a regional or 
country level  Amount of 
contribution 
earmarked 
at country 
and activity 
or modality 
level Amount of 
tied 
contributions  
260.6  194 0 0 0 100.0%  454.6  
  
  
1. Denmark 's humanitarian assistance in response to food insecurity is provided on the basis of 
emergency declarations and appeals by UN agencies and other international organizations, 
including through humanitarian needs assessments in the form of HRPs, WFP assessments, and 
reporting from the IPC global platform.   
1. The re -export of food aid is NOT an option under the terms of the provision of food aid.  
Information on the bilateral food assistance programmes:  
The Netherlands  
The Netherlands has no bilateral food aid programs nor do they provide food aid in kind . This is the 
information submitted earlier this year in the ECQ.  
The Netherlands does support the World Food Program with an an nual unearmarked contribution, 
which for 2022 was a total of EUR 71 million.  
The Netherlands does also finance other organisations, such as the Dutch Relief Alliance and the Red 
Cross, which funds they may in certain situations also use for food.  
Belgium  
Belgium doesn 't have any kind of bilateral food assistance programs.  
Ireland  
Ireland does not provide in kind food aid only provides assistance in the form of a cash transfer. 
In 2021 that figure amounted to EUR 25 million which is Ireland's multil ateral contribution to WFP, 
with no data on specific beneficiaries which it uses across its various programmes. However, some 
EUR 8 million was directed towards programmes related to the Syrian crisis and a further 
EUR 5 million to climate -related spending . 
Let me use this opportunity to encourage all Members to apply cash based international food aid 
and to avoid in kind assistance due to possible market distorting impacts, both domestically and in 
the destination markets. In line with the Nairobi provisio ns, in kind food aid should be limited to 
emergency situations. Indeed, as I mentioned in the earlier discussions, we see need for more 
coherence and also synergy between the information reported to the FAC and the WTO. The EU is 
interested to look into th ese aspects as part of the review.   
3.4.5   Ghana  
AG-IMS ID 102059: Question by United States of America  
State Trading Enterprises  
The United States notes Ghana's Cocoa Board (COCOBOD) has not yet been notified to the WTO as 
a state trading enterprise (STE) under Article XVII of the GATT 1994 and has also not been reported 
in the Export Competition Questionnaire 's (ECQ) STE section in the WTO Committee on Agriculture.  
Since COCOBOD is a state -owned enterprise having monopoly rights over the export of all coco a G/AG/W/235  
 
- 253 - 
 
  beans from Ghana, and in 2021 Ghana was the world's largest exporter of cocoa beans (42% of 
total export value), the United States requests the following information:  
a. Please provide an update on the steps Ghana is taking to notify COCOBOD as a STE to the  
Working Party on STEs, which Ghana informed the Working Party it would do eight years 
ago. 
b. What steps is Ghana taking to respond to the WTO Committee on Agriculture Export 
Competition Questionnaire 's (ECQ) STE section, taking note of COCOBOD 's role in Gha na's 
dominant position in cocoa bean exports?  
Answer by Ghana  
3.4.6   India  
AG-IMS ID 102026: Question by United States of America  
The United States notes that India did not provide a response to the 2021 Export Competition 
Questionnaire (ECQ).  
When can Members ex pect India to provide the required information?  
Answer by India  
The required information will be made available in due course.  
AG-IMS ID 102027: Question by United States of America  
In AG -IMS ID 100028 , India provided a breakdown of agricultural products for its 2020 ECQ but 
there was no value for cotton, and also reported "others " valued at USD 2.89 billion.   
 
a. Please confirm whether "others " refers to cotton or any other commodities.   
b. If it refers to something other than only cotton, please specify the total value of cotton 
financed under ECGC Credit risk insurance programme for 2019 -20, and for 2020 -21 in 
the 2021 ECQ.   
Answer by India  
"Others " includes cotton and the total risk value of "cotton " covered under the ECGC Credit risk 
insurance programme for 2019 -20 amounts to 2.33 USD Billion.  
3.4.7   Indonesia  
AG-IMS ID 102060: Question by United States of America  
The United States notes that Indonesia has not provided data updates of its export credit 
programmes in the required Export Competition Questionnaire (ECQ) for years 2019, 2020 
and 2021.  
Please provide these updates for years 2019, 2020 and 2021.   
Answer by Indonesia  
3.4.8   Korea, Republic of  
AG-IMS ID 102061: Question by United States o f America  
The United States notes that the Republic of Korea, in responding to the Export Competition 
Questionnaire (ECQ), said, "There is no data as regards agricultural export value covered by export 
credit guarantees or export insurance programmes since  they do not separately manage agricultural 
products from other exports. "  G/AG/W/235  
 
- 254 - 
 
  Please explain what steps is the Republic of Korea taking to correct these information gaps and make 
this data available to Members of this Committee in the future as required by th e Nairobi Decision 
on Export Competition ( WT/MIN(15)/45 ). 
Answer by Korea, Republic of  
The Korea Trade Insurance Corporation (K -sure) is the main agency that operates the export 
insurance program, which the exporting companies of both agricultural and non -agricultural products 
can apply to. The refore, we do not yet have separate insurance data only on agricultural products. 
In order to provide separate export insurance data on agricultural products, we will cooperate with 
the Korea Trade Insurance Corporation and provide proper data starting fro m next year.   
3.4.9   Thailand  
AG-IMS ID 102062: Question by United States of America  
The United States notes that in the Export Competition Questionnaire response, Thailand did not 
provide a value figure for agricultural products listed in item 8 for both the Exp ort Credit and Export 
Credit Insurance Programs for 2019 and 2020.  Also, Thailand did not provide a data update for 2021.  
Please provide the value figure for the agricultural products listed in item 8 for both programmes 
for 2019 and 2020.   
Answer by Thail and 
Programme use by product or product group.  
A. Export Credit Pr ogramme:   
Unit: m illion baht  
Agricultural Product Group  2019  2020  
Rice 2,994.22  2,497.04  
Maize  0.5 0.5 
Cassava  170 201.22  
Fresh/Chilled/Frozen Vegetables and Fruits  676.03  770.41  
Plants and Flowers  56.41  65.88  
Spices and Medicinal Plants  62.35  60.66  
Other Agricultural Crops  2,226.88  2,249.26  
Fresh/Chilled/Frozen Poultry Cuts  516.72  339.02  
Other Chilled or Frozen Meat  44.86  47.86  
Lac and Wax  0.81 0.01 
Total  6,748.78  6,231.86  
B. Export Credit Insurance Pr ogramme  
Unit: million baht  
Agricultural Product Group  2019  2020  
Rice 5,319.60  6,491.29  
Fresh/Chilled/Frozen Vegetables and Fruits  32.68  52.65  
Plants and Flowers  - 6.82 
Spices and Medicinal Plants  - 9.68 
Fresh/Chilled/Frozen Poultry Cuts  5.15 8.88 
Other Chilled or Frozen Meat  - 0.60 
Other Agricultural Crops  8.61 9.00 
Total 5,366.04  6,578.92  
3.4.10   Türkiye  
AG-IMS ID 102063: Question by United States of America  
The United States notes that Türkiye in its 2020 and 2021 ECQs did not provide in item 8 a 
breakdown of products or product groups (e.g., agricultural products) and value figures exported 
under its short export credit insurance programme.  Please provide the figures for programme use 
by product or pr oduct group in 2020 and 2021.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  Answer by Türkiye  
Turk Eximbank does not classify sub -category products under sector groups. Since we do not have 
a sector specific program, short term export credit insurance programme applies to all agricultural 
exports. The  shipment volumes supported under the programme for the sector are given as the 
answer to the question 3 of the questionnaire.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  4  COMPILATION OF RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS RAISED DURING THE COMMITTEE ON 
AGRICULTURE MEETING ON 21 -22 NOVEMBER 2022  
4.1  MATTERS RELEVANT TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF COMMITMENTS:  ARTICLE 18.6  
4.1.1   Argentina's export restrictions  
4.1.1.1   Question by United Kingdom, Switzerland, Japan, New Zealand, European Union 
(AG-IMS ID 103048 ) 
The United Kingdom thanks Argentina for their response to AG -IMS ID 102076  and understands the 
challenges they are facing including high in flation and extreme weather events. Nevertheless, we 
would remind Argentina of their obligations under Article 12.1(b) and the importance of transparency 
to facilitate reliable information for importers in order to keep prices down and prevent pre -emptive 
restrictions. Could Argentina therefore provide an update on when they plan to notify this export 
restriction to the Committee on Agriculture through the required ER:1 Table.  
Answer by Argentina  
As stated during the 102nd Session of the Committee on Agricu lture, all decisions taken by the 
Government of Argentina were published in our Official Journal and/or posted on the website of the 
then Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries of Argentina.  
In addition, with a view to contributing to transparenc y, we have been systematically responding to 
all the questions put to us in the WTO Committee on Agriculture.  
Follow -up: The United Kingdom noted that the response by Argentina was not a substitute for 
Argentina's obligation under Article 12 of the Agreeme nt on Agriculture and urged Argentina to 
submit the details of the measure through a Table ER:1 notification as soon as possible. The UK 
asked Argentina to consider a more transparent approach with regards to its export restriction, 
noting transparency thr ough notifications is critical to ensure importers have reliable information in 
order to keep markets and prices stable and can help prevent pre -emptive restrictions by others. 
Other Members could then adapt measures and potentially mitigate the impact on their domestic 
food security situations. Japan noted its intention to keep monitoring the measure and looked 
forward to the ER:1 notification by Argentina. Switzerland shared the UK and Japan's concern and 
echoed their comments. Switzerland repeated its co mments made at the last Committee meeting 
that the notification obligation of export restriction applies regardless of export volumes if a Member 
is a net exporter of the concerned product.  
4.2  Argentina's  currency controls and import licensing rules  
4.2.1   Question by United  States of America (AG -IMS ID 103012 ) 
Argentina 's currency controls and import licensing rules have made it more difficult for farmers to 
import crucial inputs such as seeds, fertilizers, and agricultural machinery.  At a time when world 
grain and oilseed stocks are low and prices are elevated, does Argentina have a plan to eliminate 
these measures to allow farmers to meet global demand for fo od? 
Answer by Argentina  
First, we should emphasize that Argentina's import licensing regime is in full compliance with the 
WTO Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures and capital control is one of the tools available to 
the monetary authority to counter e xchange rate volatility. The rules governing it have been issued 
in accordance with the provisions of the GATT.  
The import licensing regime, in particular, is a horizontal regime that is not specific to the agricultural 
sector and is continuously monitored  and assessed by the authorities. Changes may only be made 
where considered necessary for the purpose of continually improving its efficiency, as well as to 
cover the product range strictly necessary to ensure compliance and conformity with the underlying 
measures that are applicable. There is no reason to believe that the import licensing system may G/AG/W/235  
 
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  distort or affect our food supply to the world. Argentina is deeply committed to the fight against food 
insecurity by producing healthy, nutritious and sustain ably produced food.  
While over the past decade we have been exporting on average USD  40 billion in agro -industrial 
exports, in 2021 those reached a record USD 53.77 billion. Despite the tariff and non -tariff barriers 
faced by Argentina, we are leaders in e xports of meat products (beef and poultry), fruit (lemons, 
oranges, apples, pears, grapes and berries), fishery products (prawns and hake), oilseeds (soya and 
sunflower beans, oil and flour), cereals (wheat, maize and flours), dairy products (powdered milk  
and cheese), and vegetables, and we are constantly working to ensure remaining so in the future.  
4.3   Argentina's  foreign exchange regime to facilitate soy exports  
4.3.1   Question by European  Union (AG -IMS ID 103041 ) 
Argentina 's has announced in September a special exchange rate for the country 's soy producers in 
a bid to incentivise exports, shore up central bank reserves and avoid a currency devaluation. 
Exporters of soy, the country 's top commodity, will be able to sell dollars from their shipments 
abroad at a rate of 200 pesos per dollar, more lucrative than the official rate of 139 per dollar.  
 
a. Could Argentina provide more descriptive information on the justificatio ns for such a 
measure and the application of the new exchange rate for soy exports, including as of 
when it will become applicable?   
b. Has Argentina noted any recent change of trade patterns for soy in the region?   
c. How does this measure affect Argentina 's commitments in relation to export subsidies?  
Answer by Argentina  
The so -called "soy dollar" ( Programa de Incremento Exportador , PIE) was a temporary window 
aimed at boosting the Central Bank's international reserves. The measure involved a temporary 
exchange rate of ARS 200 to USD 1 for those exchange settlements and pre -financing and post -
financing of exports carried out between  5 and 30 September 2022.  
The measure was intended for producers, brokers, and traders who have exported over the past 18 
months and have registered sworn declarations of foreign sales (DJVE). The products included were 
soya beans and derivatives. The mea sure was applied to products that could generate a swift foreign 
exchange settlement to help strengthen international reserves.  
In addition, under Argentina's programme with the IMF, the measure in question was analysed by 
IMF staff, who stated in their r eview report that: IMF "staff supports the approval of the new and 
revised exchange restrictions and the new and modified MCPs [multiple currency practices], which 
are all maintained for balance of payment reasons. The [Argentine] authorities have requeste d 
approval of these restrictions on the basis that they are temporary, expected to be gradually lifted 
over the programme period, and do not give rise to an unfair competitive advantage over other 
Members or discriminate among Members. While the one-month FX incentive for soy exports results 
in a multiple currency practice, the measure is expected to expire by end -September".  
In fact, the measure expired on 30 September last.  
Follow -up: The United States  supported the question by the European  Union. The US expressed 
concern regarding how this measure complies with WTO rules and its distortion effect. The US noted 
that according to the Argentinian government farmers sold a record volume of soybeans of more 
than 13.7 million metric tonnes in Septembe r, after the government offered a special exchange rate 
for producers. The US welcomed the conclusion of the measure.   
4.3.2   Question by United States  of America (AG -IMS ID 103013 ) 
In September 2022, Argentine Minister of Economy Sergio Massa announced a special foreign 
exchange regime to facilitate soy exports. The measure allows soy farmers to receive a preferential G/AG/W/235  
 
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  exchange rate of 200 pesos per U.S. dollar – compared to the official rate of 142 pesos per U.S.  dollar 
– until the end of September.  
 
a. Please provide additional information on the rules that applied to this programme and its 
payment mechanism to producers.  
b. Please explain how this measure complies with W TO rules, in particularly export subsidy 
and export subsidy circumvention rules.  
Answer by Argentina  
The so -called "soy dollar" ( Programa de Incremento Exportador , PIE) was a temporary window 
aimed at boosting the Central Bank's international reserves. The  measure involved a temporary 
exchange rate of ARS 200 to USD 1 for those exchange settlements and pre -financing and 
post-financing of exports carried out between 5 and 30 September 2022.  
The measure was intended for producers, brokers, and traders who ha ve exported over the past 
18 months and have registered sworn declarations of foreign sales (DJVE). The products included 
were soya beans and derivatives. The measure was applied to products that could generate a swift 
foreign exchange settlement to help s trengthen international reserves.  
In addition, under Argentina's programme with the IMF, the measure in question was analysed by 
IMF staff, who stated in their review report that: IMF "staff supports the approval of the new and 
revised exchange restrictio ns and the new and modified MCPs [multiple currency practices], which 
are all maintained for balance of payment reasons. The [Argentine] authorities have requested 
approval of these restrictions on the basis that they are temporary, expected to be graduall y lifted 
over the programme period, and do not give rise to an unfair competitive advantage over other 
Members or discriminate among Members. While the one -month FX incentive for soy exports results 
in a multiple currency practice, the measure is expected to expire by end -September".  
In fact, the measure expired on 30 September last.  
Follow -up: The United  States supported the question by the European  Union. The US expressed 
concern regarding how this measure complies with WTO rules and its distortion effect . The US noted 
that according to the Argentinian government farmers sold a record volume of soybeans of more 
than 13.7 million metric tonnes in September, after the government offered a special exchange rate 
for producers. The US welcomed the conclusion of  the measure.   
4.4  Australia, Canada, European Union, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, United Kingdom, 
Unite d States – Restrictions on agricultural and agriculture -related services   
4.4.1   Question by Russian Federation  (AG-IMS ID 103078 ) 
The following restrictive measures have been introduced against the Russian Federation with severe 
negative effects on domestic agricultural production  cycle and the global food security:   
a. Prohibitions to provide technical assistance, brokering services or other services related to 
certain goods, including agriculture goods, for any sale, supply, transfer or export of those 
goods.   
b. Prohibitions to provide financing or financial assistance related to certain goods, including 
agriculture goods, for any sale, supply, transfer or export of those goods.  
c. Prohibitions to provide insurance and reinsurance for any sale, supply, transfer or ex port 
of those goods.  
d. Application of financial restrictions on Russian Agriculture Bank assets, as well as 
prohibitions to deal with their assets.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  To our regret, we have to acknowledge that for the most part, these are the developing, including 
net-food-importing developing countries and the least -developed countries, that pay the highest 
price for such restrictive measures.  
Could Australia, Canada, European Union, Iceland, Norway, Japan, New Zealand, United Kingdom 
and the United States, please, clarify how  the application of such measures contributes to global 
food security. In particular, whether they believe that the observed disruptions in the supply chains 
of goods and services related to the production and distribution of agricultural products, includi ng 
wheat and fertilizers, and increased volatility in the global agricultural market should be considered 
as useful contributions to food security.   
Answer by Australia  
In light of the Russian Federation 's unilateral, illegal, and immoral invasion of Ukrai ne, Australia will 
not engage in business -as-usual activity in the WTO with the delegation of the Russian Federation.  
4.4.2   Question by Russian Federation  (AG-IMS ID 103079 ) 
The following restrictive measures have been introduced against the Russian Federation with severe 
negative effects on domestic agricultural production cycle and the global food security:   
a. Prohibitions to provide technical assistance, brokering services or other services related to 
certain goods, including agriculture goods, for any sale, supply, transfer or export of those 
goods.  
b. Prohibitions to provide financing or financial assistance related to certain goods, including 
agriculture goods, for  any sale, supply, transfer or export of those goods.  
c. Prohibitions to provide insurance and reinsurance for any sale, supply, transfer or export 
of those goods.  
d. Application of financial restrictions on Russian Agriculture Bank assets, as well as 
prohibitio ns to deal with their assets.  
To our regret, we have to acknowledge that for the most part, these are the developing, including 
net-food-importing developing countries and the least -developed countries, that pay the highest 
price for such restrictive meas ures. 
Could Australia, Canada, the European Union, Iceland, Norway, Japan, New Zealand, the 
United  Kingdom and the United States, please, clarify how the application of such measures 
contributes to global food security. In particular, whether they believe that the observed disruptions 
in the supply chains of goods and services related to the production and distribution of agricultural 
products, including wheat and fertilizers, and increased volatility in the global agricultural market 
should be considered a s useful contributions to food security.   
Answer by Canada  
Canada is not engaging with the Russian Federation  due to its unprovoked war of aggression on 
Ukraine.  
4.4.3   Question by Russian Federation (AG -IMS ID 103080 ) 
The following restrictive measures have been introduced against the Russian Federation with severe 
negative effects on domestic agricultural production  cycle and the global food security:   
a. Prohibitions to provide technical assistance, brokering services or other services related to 
certain goods, including agriculture goods, for any sale, supply, transfer or export of those 
goods.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  b. Prohibitions to provide financing or financial assistance related to certain goods, including 
agriculture goods, for any sale, supply, transfer or export of those goods.  
c. Prohibitions to provide insurance and reinsurance for any sale, supply, transfer or ex port 
of those goods.  
d. Application of financial restrictions on Russian Agriculture Bank assets, as well as 
prohibitions to deal with their assets.  
To our regret, we have to acknowledge that for the most part, these are the developing, including 
net-food-importing developing countries and the least -developed countries, that pay the highest 
price for such restrictive measures.  
Could Australia, Canada, the European Union, Iceland, Norway, Japan, New Zealand, the 
United  Kingdom and the United States, please, cl arify how the application of such measures 
contributes to global food security. In particular, whether they believe that the observed disruptions 
in the supply chains of goods and services related to the production and distribution of agricultural 
products , including wheat and fertilizers, and increased volatility in the global agricultural market 
should be considered as useful contributions to food security.  
Answer by European Union  
In light of the Russian Federation's unprovoked and illegal war of aggress ion against Ukraine, the 
European Union will not engage in business -as-usual activity in the WTO with the delegation of the 
Russian Federation.  
4.4.4   Question by Russian Federation (AG -IMS ID 103081 ) 
The following restrictive measures have been introduced against the Russian Federation with severe 
negative effects on domestic agricultural production cycle and the global food security:   
a. Prohibitions to provide techni cal assistance, brokering services or other services related to 
certain goods, including agriculture goods, for any sale, supply, transfer or export of those 
goods.  
b. Prohibitions to provide financing or financial assistance related to certain goods, includ ing 
agriculture goods, for any sale, supply, transfer or export of those goods.  
c. Prohibitions  to provide insurance and reinsurance for any sale, supply, transfer or export 
of those goods.  
d. Application of financial restrictions on Russian Agriculture Bank ass ets, as well as 
prohibitions to deal with their assets.  
To our regret, we have to acknowledge that for the most part, these are the developing, including 
net-food-importing developing countries and the least -developed countries, that pay the highest 
price for such restrictive measures.  
Could Australia, Canada, the European Union, Iceland, Norway, Japan, New Zealand, the 
United  Kingdom and the United States, please, clarify how the application of such measures 
contributes to global food security. In particu lar, whether they believe that the observed disruptions 
in the supply chains of goods and services related to the production and distribution of agricultural 
products, including wheat and fertilizers, and increased volatility in the global agricultural mar ket 
should be considered as useful contributions to food security.   
Answer by Iceland  
In light of Russia's ongoing illegal invasion of Ukraine - Iceland will not engage with the Russian 
delegation to the WTO in a business -as-usual manner.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  4.4.5   Question by Russi an Federation (AG -IMS ID 103082 ) 
The following restrictive measures have been introduced against the Russian Federation with severe 
negative effects on domes tic agricultural production cycle and the global food security:  
a. Prohibitions to provide technical assistance, brokering services or other services related to 
certain goods, including agriculture goods, for any sale, supply, transfer or export of those 
goods.  
b. Prohibitions to provide financing or financial assistance related to certain goods, including 
agriculture goods, for any sale, supply, transfer or export of those goods.  
c. Prohibitions to provide insurance and reinsurance for any sale, supply, transfer o r export 
of those goods.  
d. Application of financial restrictions on Russian Agriculture Bank assets, as well as 
prohibitions to deal with their assets.  
To our regret, we have to acknowledge that for the most part, these are the developing, including 
net-food-importing developing countries and the least -developed countries, that pay the highest 
price for such restrictive measures.  
Could Australia, Canada, the European Union, Iceland, Norway, Japan, New Zealand, the 
United  Kingdom and the Unit ed States, please, clarify how the application of such measures 
contributes to global food security. In particular, whether they believe that the observed disruptions 
in the supply chains of goods and services related to the production and distribution of agricultural 
products, including wheat and fertilizers, and increased volatility in the global agricultural market 
should be considered as useful contributions to food security.   
Answer by Japan  
Russia's aggression against Ukraine is a unilateral attempt t o change the status quo by force, and 
is an act that shakes the very foundation of the international order. This is a clear violation of 
international law and is totally unacceptable. Japan condemns in the strongest terms. It is to be 
expected that the int ernational community, including Japan, imposes sanctions on the Russian 
Federation for its aggression against Ukraine.  
Russia's aggression against Ukraine is causing global economic turmoil. The impact on Ukraine's 
internationally important agricultural se ctor places a serious burden on global food security, for 
which the Russian Federation is responsible. We continue to work with our partners, including 
international organizations, to proactively address the impact of Russia's aggression against Ukraine 
on areas such as energy and food, among others, across many countries.  
Japan and other countries have been carefully addressing the situation by imposing sanctions in a 
manner that does not hinder the provision of humanitarian assistance or the operation of global 
agricultural trade.  
4.4.6   Question by Russian Federation (AG -IMS ID 103083 ) 
The following restrictive measures have been introduced against the Russian Fede ration with severe 
negative effects on domestic agricultural production cycle and the global food security:   
a. Prohibitions to provide technical assistance, brokering services or other services related to 
certain goods, including agriculture goods, for any s ale, supply, transfer or export of those 
goods.  
b. Prohibitions to provide financing or financial assistance related to certain goods, including 
agriculture goods, for any sale, supply, transfer or export of those goods.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  c. Prohibitions to provide insurance and  reinsurance for any sale, supply, transfer or export 
of those goods.  
d. Application of financial restrictions on Russian Agriculture Bank assets, as well as 
prohibitions to deal with their assets.  
To our regret, we have to acknowledge that for the most part , these are the developing, including 
net-food-importing developing countries and the least -developed countries, that pay the highest 
price for such restrictive measures.  
Could Australia, Canada, the European Union, Iceland, Norway, Japan, New Zealand, the  
United  Kingdom and the United States, please, clarify how the application of such measures 
contributes to global food security. In particular, whether they believe that the observed disruptions 
in the supply chains of goods and services related to the pro duction and distribution of agricultural 
products, including wheat and fertilizers, and increased volatility in the global agricultural market 
should be considered as useful contributions to food security.   
Answer by New Zealand  
In light of the Russian Fed eration's unprovoked and unjustified attack against Ukraine, New Zealand 
will not engage in business -as-usual activity in the WTO with the delegation of the Russian 
Federation.   
4.4.7   Question by Russian Federation (AG -IMS ID 103084 ) 
The following restrictive measures have been introduced against the Russian Federation with severe 
negative effects on domestic agricultural production  cycle and the global food security:   
 
a. Prohibitions to provide technical assistance, brokering services or other services related to 
certain goods, including agriculture goods, for any sale, supply, transfer or export of those 
goods.   
b. Prohibitions to provi de financing or financial assistance related to certain goods, including 
agriculture goods, for any sale, supply, transfer or export of those goods.  
c. Prohibitions to provide insurance and reinsurance for any sale, supply, transfer or export 
of those goods.  
d. Application of financial restrictions on Russian Agriculture Bank assets, as well as 
prohibitions to deal with their assets.  
To our regret, we have to acknowledge that for the most part, these are the developing, including 
net-food-importing developing countries and the least -developed countries, that pay the highest 
price for such restrictive measures.  
Could Australia, Canada, the European Union, Iceland, Norway, Japan, New Zealand, the United 
Kingdom and the United States,  please, clarify how the application of such measures contributes to 
global food security. In particular, whether they believe that the observed disruptions in the supply 
chains of goods and services related to the production and distribution of agricultur al products, 
including wheat and fertilizers, and increased volatility in the global agricultural market should be 
considered as useful contributions to food security.   
Answer by United Kingdom  
In light of the Russian Federation's unprovoked and illegal wa r of aggression against Ukraine, the 
United Kingdom will not engage in business -as-usual activity in the WTO with the delegation of the 
Russian Federation.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  4.4.8   Question by Russian Federation (AG -IMS ID 103085 ) 
The following restrictive measures have been introduced against the Russian Federation with severe 
negative effects on domestic agricultural production cycle and the global food security:   
a. Prohibitions to pr ovide technical assistance, brokering services or other services related to 
certain goods, including agriculture goods, for any sale, supply, transfer or export of those 
goods.   
b. Prohibitions to provide financing or financial assistance related to certain g oods, including 
agriculture goods, for any sale, supply, transfer or export of those goods.  
c. Prohibitions to provide insurance and reinsurance for any sale, supply, transfer or export 
of those goods.  
d. Application of financial restrictions on Russian Agricult ure Bank assets, as well as 
prohibitions to deal with their assets.  
To our regret, we have to acknowledge that for the most part, these are the developing, including 
net-food-importing developing countries and the least -developed countries, that pay the hi ghest 
price for such restrictive measures.  
Could Australia, Canada, the European Union, Iceland, Norway, Japan, New Zealand, the United 
Kingdom and the United States, please, clarify how the application of such measures contributes to 
global food security.  In particular, whether they believe that the observed disruptions in the supply 
chains of goods and services related to the production and distribution of agricultural products, 
including wheat and fertilizers, and increased volatility in the global agric ultural market should be 
considered as useful contributions to food security.   
Answer by United States of America  
In light of the Russian Federation's unprovoked and illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, the 
United States will not engage in business -as-usual activity in the WTO with the delegation of the 
Russian Federation.  
Follow -up: The Russian Federation noted that the WTO is not a platform to raise political issues 
beyond the mandate of the WTO and the agenda of the Committee on Agriculture. The WT O should 
focus dedicatedly and exclusively on issues related to trade and the Committee should remain the 
platform for technical and professional discussions within its mandate. The Russian Federation 
pointed out that some WTO Members promoted its politica l agenda in the committee which was a 
misuse of the forum. In Russia's view, statements regarding the situation on Ukraine had not 
changed in essence since the last meeting and the repetition of those statements disrupts Members 
from their joint work on ma ndated issues and are disrespectful to other Members. The Russian 
Federation invited Members to discuss the consequences of the Ukrainian crisis in other relevant 
organizations and diplomatic agencies.  
In addition, the Russian Federation noted that the at tempts to accuse the Russian Federation for 
triggering the global food crisis are not economically founded and longstanding difficulties in ensuring 
food security are part of the microeconomic crisis which had evolved over the years. The Russian 
Federation  stated that a range of factors contributed to the process, including the COVID -19 
outbreak and post -pandemic recovery challenges, soaring inflation, booming commodities prices and 
false introduction of biofuel technologies, as well as unilateral economic restrictive measures. The 
Russian Federation referred to the figures presented by FAO which showed food prices reached its 
peak in March after long growth period and started to decrease consistently and remained unchanged 
in October. The Russian Federation  noted that this trend demonstrated clearly that price movements 
are independent of current situation in Ukraine and are driven by other factors. The Russian 
Federation called on International Organizations to make objective assessment of the fundamental 
drivers of the current crisis so Members could take appropriate policy decisions at the WTO. On the 
grain deal which was concluded between Ukraine and the Russian Federation in Istanbul on July 22 
as a response to the global shortage of food stuff, the Russ ian Federation noted that exports of food 
began on 1 August in the framework of implementation of first part of the deal. Since then, 11.1 G/AG/W/235  
 
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  million tonnes of foodstuffs including cereal and oilseeds had been safely transferred from southern 
Ukrainian ports.  However, the Russian Federation pointed out that the geography of the recipient 
countries does not correspond to the declared humanitarian objectives. The main volume of the food 
exports from Ukraine had been sent not only to developing and poor countries  but also to developed 
ones. According to the Russian Federation, UN data on the quantities of the food shipped in the 
framework of implementation of first part of the deal showed that out of the 11.1 million tonnes 
which had left Ukraine, only 2 million t onnes which represented 21% destined for lower income or 
lower -middle income countries. Out of the 3.3 million tonnes of wheat exports these countries 
received only 45 % of the shipment. The Russian Federation noted that this prevented the 
announced object ive of the deal and elevated the global shortage of food despite the claim that the 
deal would the facilitate flow of agricultural goods in the word markets. The Russian Federation also 
believed that the effects of the Black Sea initiative on prices were n ot straightforward. After entering 
into force in August 2022 the FAO cereal price index decreased by just 1.2% followed by 1% increase 
in September. The Russian Federation noted that those Members that urged to improve the 
vulnerable economies did not unde rtake envisaged actions to provide free access for Russian grain 
and fertilisers to world markets. The Russian Federation drew attention of WTO Members to the 
unilateral trade and economic decisions applied over the last few months by certain Members again st 
Russian goods, banking and logistic sectors. The Russian Federation underlined that, despite 
repeated calls for the exemption of restrictions on the supplies of Russian grain, fertilizers and 
agricultural products, WTO trade policy reports as well as re ports from World Food Programme still 
indicated the existence of difficulties to export faced by commercial clients. Russian exporters are 
facing increased import tariffs, blocking of payments, limited access to ports and infrastructure, 
restrictions for f reight and road transport insurance and legal services, and failed purchases of spare 
parts of agricultural equipments. The Russian Federation stated that some of the cases were 
questioned and described in detail under the review recess of the Committee. S uch action resulted 
in increased transaction costs and de facto quantitative restrictions on Russia's supply of food and 
fertilisers leading to global food shortage and price hikes. According to International Food Policy 
Reach Institute (IFPRI) the imports  of fertilisers from The Russian Federation decreased by more 
than 30% to the EU countries and 14% to the world. The Russian Federation noted that such 
irresponsible approaches of certain Members contradicted recent G20 commitments to ensure 
accessibility of food products and avoid adverse impact on food security.  
The Russian Federation reiterated its continued commitment to participate in global efforts aimed at 
prevention of global food insecurity and huger in developing countries and least developed cou ntries. 
The Russian Federation noted that on 17 November the first part of the grain deal was extended for 
120 days, a result of several rounds of negotiations between the Russian Federation and the UN on 
the necessity of urgent measures of accelerating Ru ssian agricultural and fertilizer supplies to the 
global market. The Russian Federation believed that prompt restitution of business as usual between 
Russian agricultural and fertilizer exporters, foreign banks, shippers and other actors could provide 
accessibility of Russian grain food stuffs and fertilisers and positively impact the global food security 
situations. The Russian Federation also stressed that removing the remaining obstacles to exporting 
food and fertilizers from the Russian Federation is cr itical for its exporters, global agricultural supplies 
and people around the world in need of food. The Russian Federation expressed systematic concern 
regarding the failure of the concerned Members to engage with other WTO Members on this issue 
as they ha d refused to respond on substance of the question. The Russian Federation emphasized 
the importance of transparency at the WTO and noted that unwillingness to respond to questions on 
substance is contrary to the commitments to transparency. The Russian Fed eration noted that the 
only way to deal with the economic crisis is to talk economics, not policies, and to prevent the 
violation of multilateral trade rules. The Russian Federation underlined its commitments to the WTO 
principles and to respecting the rig hts of other Members, and called for the same approach from 
other Members.  
Switzerland echoed the concern expressed by responding Members with regard to the critical 
situation of global food insecurity further exacerbated by Russia's action in Ukraine. Swi tzerland 
strongly condemned the Russian Federation's attack on Ukraine as being fundamentally in breach of 
international law and infringed the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. Switzerland called 
on the Russian Federation to respect its int ernational obligations, reverse its actions and withdraw 
its troops. Switzerland also called on all actors to respect international law including international 
humanitarian law.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  Ukraine condemned Russia's invasion of its country as one of the biggest mili tary acts of aggression 
of today and a brutal war of extermination against an independent state. Ukraine noted that, 
according to the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP), military aggression is the top driver 
of acute food insecurity. The Russia's mi litary aggression against Ukraine has been particularly 
disrupting global trade pushing up transport costs and lead times, while leaving farmers lacking 
access to the agricultural inputs they need. The knock -on effect on upcoming harvests will 
reverberate around the world. Ukraine stated that Russian invasion of Ukraine brought colossal direct 
and indirect losses in the agricultural sector. According to preliminary estimates, the direct damage 
to the Ukraine's agricultural sector exceeds USD 4 billion. Indi rect losses amount to more than 
USD 35 billion. According to FAO estimates, at the end of 2021, Ukraine was the leader in the world 
sunflower oil market with a share of about 45%, the third largest producer of corn, barley and 
rapeseed. In 2021, Ukraine wa s also the sixth largest producer of wheat in the world, and accounted 
for a tenth of global exports. This is the crop that is considered the most important when it comes 
to immediate consumption, and therefore the threat of famine in the poorest countries . Ukraine 
noted that it was one of the main suppliers of grain not only to developing countries, but also to 
countries with a "food deficit". At the same time, the World Food Programme estimated that an 
unprecedented 345 million people would be acutely foo d insecure in 2022 across the 82 countries 
where it operates, representing an increase of almost 200 million people from the pre -pandemic 
levels. Additionally, hunger has grown more deeply entrenched, with approximately 50  million 
people in 45 countries fa cing severe hunger emergencies.  
Ukraine underlined its commitment to its obligations as an agricultural exporter and its readiness to 
continue shipping agricultural products to ensure global food security and price stability on the 
international market. Uk raine noted that, since the beginning of the war, it had already exported 
26.3 million tonnes of agricultural products. In this regard, Ukraine welcomed the continuation of 
the work of the grain corridor. As within this corridor Ukraine had already exporte d over 11 million 
tonnes of agricultural products. Food was delivered to more than 40 countries of the world. About 
2/3 of the vessels went to Asian, African and the Middle East countries. Ukraine took the opportunity 
to inform Members of the launch of the  Grain from Ukraine humanitarian programme initiated by 
President Zelensky. This initiative was aimed at alleviating the food crises caused by Russian armed 
aggression against Ukraine and was implemented in partnership with the World Food Programme. 
Ukrain e noted that the first vessel with 27 thousand tonnes of wheat left its border to Ethiopia last 
week, an amount of food that could feed nearly 100 thousand people for a year. Ukraine noted its 
readiness to provide any additional information regarding Grain  from Ukraine programme to all 
interested Members. In Ukraine's view, these initiatives became a significant contribution to the 
stabilization of world food prices according to the FAO and World Food Programme.  
Ukraine further noted that it was not surpris ing that after Ukrainian ports were blocked in 
February  2022, world food prices which were already quite high after the coronavirus pandemic 
began to set new records in March. And they began to decrease together with the first reports about 
the possibility  of opening a "grain corridor" from Ukrainian Black Sea ports. Ukraine referred to 
Russia's invasion as acts of state terrorism against Ukraine and the Ukrainians and noted that 
Russia's attacks on energy and water supply infrastructure are war crimes and damaged nearly 50% 
of Ukraine's energy facilities. Ukraine strongly disagreed with the Russian Federation that the 
situation of food insecurity was caused by sanctions that many countries had imposed in response 
to Russia's aggression against Ukraine. In U kraine's view, any sanctions against the Russian 
Federation are not related to food and are legitimate security measures against Russia's devastating 
war. Ukraine believed that trade ties with the Russian Federation should be severed, as they are 
actively used by the Russian Federation as a tool of pressure. Ukraine called on Members to reflect 
on how much fewer challenges in the world there would be, or would not have happened at all, if 
the Russian Federation had not invaded Ukraine. Ukraine said that the  continuation of the war would 
threaten the rules based international order and would continue to destroy the world economy and 
undermine food security of the world. Ukraine expressed appreciation towards the support by 
Members, including sanctions imposed  in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine and called on 
other WTO Members to make every effort in order to limit Russia's ability to wage war, to kill 
Ukrainians and to undermine the rules -based multilateral trading system.  
The US delivered a statement on behalf of the responding Members. It reiterated those Members' 
strong support for Ukraine and their commitments in working with allies and partners to impose a 
severe economic and diplomatic price on the Russian Federation for its illegal war of aggress ion. The 
US underlined that the common and coordinated efforts of the US and its allies and partners in G/AG/W/235  
 
- 266 - 
 
  response to Russia's aggression in Ukraine are critical to demonstrate their determination and unity 
to amplifying their actions. Sanctions and export c ontrols were one critical part of their overall 
strategy to hold the Russian Federation accountable for the war and to strengthen Ukraine's hands 
on the battlefield and at the negotiating table. The US pointed out that sanctions and export controls 
targete d key sectors of the Russian economy, such as defence, aviation and technology which were 
known important to President Putin's ability to project power including the ability to finance the war 
against Ukraine. The US reiterated that the sanctions imposed b y them deliberately included 
carve -outs for food, fertilizers and seeds from the Russian Federation as well as carve -outs to make 
clear that banks ensure shippers and other actors to continue bring Russian food and fertilizers to 
the world. Sanctions also exempted transactions related to trade and medicine and medical devices. 
The US noted that their sanctions did not target civilians and were not destroying farmland while 
Russia's actions are.  
Türkiye reiterated its commitments in being constructive to en sure the sustainability of global food 
trade and in its continued diplomatic efforts in helping the countries that faced difficulties in food 
security. The Russian Federation repeated its view that the statements delivered by some Members 
were beyond the s cope of the WTO and the agenda of the Committee. The Russian Federation called 
on Members and the Chair to comply with the rules of conduct and to refrain from repeating political 
statements which disrupted the constructive work of the committee and wasted  time of the other 
Members. The Russian Federation clarified that the mentioned exemptions are not de facto working 
and led to de facto quantitative restrictions and urged Members to rely on statistical data and not 
on political statements.   
4.5  Australia,  Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom, United States - Import duties in 
excess of the bound rates applied on agricultural goods  
4.5.1   Question by Russian Federation  (AG-IMS ID 103061 ) 
In 2022, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, United Kingdom, United States have introduced import 
tariffs on agricultural products in excess of their bound  rates violating a number of their bound rate 
commitments.  Such an apparent violation of the WTO commitments contributed to deteriorations in 
the agricultural markets.  We expect information from mentioned Members about timing of 
elimination of the inconsis tencies as part of their contributions to world food security and complying 
with tariff commitments.  
Answer by Australia  
In light of the Russian Federation 's unilateral, illegal, and immoral invasion of Ukraine, Australia will 
not engage in business -as-usual activity in the WTO with the delegation of the Russian Federation.  
4.5.2   Question by Russian Federation (AG -IMS ID 103062 ) 
In 2022, Canada, Austr alia, New Zealand, United Kingdom, United States have introduced import 
tariffs on agricultural products in excess of their bound rates violating a number of their bound 
rate commitments.  
Such an apparent violation of the WTO commitments contributed to det eriorations in the 
agricultural markets.  
We expect information from mentioned Members about timing of elimination of the inconsistencies 
as part of their contributions to world food security and complying with tariff commitments.  G/AG/W/235  
 
- 267 - 
 
  Answer by Canada  
Canada is  not engaging with the Russian Federation due to its unprovoked war of aggression on 
Ukraine.  
4.5.3   Question by Russian  Federation (AG -IMS ID 103063 ) 
In 2022, Cana da, Australia, New Zealand, United Kingdom, United States have introduced import 
tariffs on agricultural products in excess of their bound rates violating a number of their bound rate 
commitments.  Such an apparent violation of the WTO commitments contribut ed to deteriorations in 
the agricultural markets.  We expect information from mentioned Members about timing of 
elimination of the inconsistencies as part of their contributions to world food security and complying 
with tariff commitments.  
Answer by New Zea land 
In light of the Russian Federation's unprovoked and unjustified attack against Ukraine, New Zealand 
will not engage in business -as-usual activity in the WTO with the delegation of the 
Russian  Federation.   
4.5.4   Question by Russian Federation ( AG-IMS ID 103064 ) 
In 2022, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, United Kingdom, United States have introduced import 
tariffs on agricultural products in excess of their bound r ates violating a number of their bound rate 
commitments.  Such an apparent violation of the WTO commitments contributed to deteriorations in 
the agricultural markets.  We expect information from mentioned Members about timing of 
elimination of the inconsiste ncies as part of their contributions to world food security and complying 
with tariff commitments.  
Answer by United Kingdom  
In light of the Russian Federation's unprovoked and illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, the 
United Kingdom will not engage in  business -as-usual activity in the WTO with the delegation of the 
Russian Federation.  
4.5.5   Question by Russian Federation (AG -IMS ID 103065 ) 
In 2022, Canada, Aust ralia, New Zealand, United Kingdom, United States have introduced import 
tariffs on agricultural products in excess of their bound rates violating a number of their bound rate 
commitments.  
Such an apparent violation of the WTO commitments contributed to deteriorations in the agricultural 
markets.  
We expect information from mentioned Members about timing of elimination of the inconsistencies 
as part of their contributions to world food security and complying with tariff commitments.  
Answer b y United States of America  
In light of the Russian Federation's unprovoked and illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, the 
United States will not engage in business -as-usual activity in the WTO with the delegation of the 
Russian Federation.  
Follow -up: The Russian Federation noted that the WTO is not a platform to raise political issues 
beyond the mandate of the WTO and the agenda of the Committee on Agriculture. The WTO should 
focus dedicatedly and exclusively on issues related to trade and the Committee  should remain the 
platform for technical and professional discussions within its mandate. The Russian Federation 
pointed out that some WTO Members promoted its political agenda in the committee which was a 
misuse of the forum. In Russia's view, statements  regarding the situation on Ukraine had not 
changed in essence since the last meeting and the repetition of those statements disrupts Members G/AG/W/235  
 
- 268 - 
 
  from their joint work on mandated issues and are disrespectful to other Members. The Russian 
Federation invited Me mbers to discuss the consequences of the Ukrainian crisis in other relevant 
organizations and diplomatic agencies.  
In addition, the Russian Federation noted that the attempts to accuse the Russian Federation for 
triggering the global food crisis are not e conomically founded and longstanding difficulties in ensuring 
food security are part of the microeconomic crisis which had evolved over the years. The Russian 
Federation stated that a range of factors contributed to the process, including the COVID -19 
outbreak and post -pandemic recovery challenges, soaring inflation, booming commodities prices and 
false introduction of biofuel technologies, as well as unilateral economic restrictive measures. The 
Russian Federation referred to the figures presented by FAO w hich showed food prices reached its 
peak in March after long growth period and started to decrease consistently and remained unchanged 
in October. The Russian Federation noted that this trend demonstrated clearly that price movements 
are independent of cur rent situation in Ukraine and are driven by other factors. The Russian 
Federation called on International Organizations to make objective assessment of the fundamental 
drivers of the current crisis so Members could take appropriate policy decisions at the WTO. On the 
grain deal which was concluded between Ukraine and the Russian Federation in Istanbul on 22  July 
as a response to the global shortage of food stuff, the Russian Federation noted that exports of food 
began on 1 August in the framework of impleme ntation of first part of the deal. Since then, 
11.1 million tonnes of foodstuffs including cereal and oilseeds had been safely transferred from 
southern Ukrainian ports. However, the Russian Federation pointed out that the geography of the 
recipient countr ies does not correspond to the declared humanitarian objectives. The main volume 
of the food exports from Ukraine had been sent not only to developing and poor countries but also 
to developed ones. According to the Russian Federation, UN data on the quanti ties of the food 
shipped in the framework of implementation of first part of the deal showed that out of the 
11.1 million tonnes which had left Ukraine, only 2 million tonnes which represented 21% destined 
for lower income or lower -middle income countries.  Out of the 3.3 million tonnes of wheat exports 
these countries received only 45 % of the shipment. The Russian Federation noted that this 
prevented the announced objective of the deal and elevated the global shortage of food despite the 
claim that the dea l would the facilitate flow of agricultural goods in the word markets. The Russian 
Federation also believed that the effects of the Black Sea initiative on prices were not 
straightforward. After entering into force in August 2022 the FAO cereal price index  decreased by 
just 1.2% followed by 1% increase in September. The Russian Federation noted that those Members 
that urged to improve the vulnerable economies did not undertake envisaged actions to provide free 
access for Russian grain and fertilisers to wor ld markets. The Russian Federation drew attention of 
WTO Members to the unilateral trade and economic decisions applied over the last few months by 
certain Members against Russian goods, banking and logistic sectors. The Russian Federation 
underlined that,  despite repeated calls for the exemption of restrictions on the supplies of Russian 
grain, fertilizers and agricultural products, WTO trade policy reports as well as reports from World 
Food Programme still indicated the existence of difficulties to export  faced by commercial clients. 
Russian exporters are facing increased import tariffs, blocking of payments, limited access to ports 
and infrastructure, restrictions for freight and road transport insurance and legal services, and failed 
purchases of spare p arts of agricultural equipments. The Russian Federation stated that some of the 
cases were questioned and described in detail under the review recess of the Committee. Such action 
resulted in increased transaction costs and de facto quantitative restrictio ns on Russia's supply of 
food and fertilisers leading to global food shortage and price hikes. According to International Food 
Policy Reach Institute (IFPRI) the imports of fertilisers from The Russian Federation decreased by 
more than 30% to the EU countr ies and 14% to the world. The Russian Federation noted that such 
irresponsible approaches of certain Members contradicted recent G20 commitments to ensure 
accessibility of food products and avoid adverse impact on food security.  
The Russian Federation reiterated its continued commitment to participate in global efforts aimed at 
prevention of global food insecurity and huger in developing countries and least developed countries. 
The Russian Federation noted that on 17 November the first part o f the grain deal was extended for 
120 days, a result of several rounds of negotiations between the Russian Federation and the UN on 
the necessity of urgent measures of accelerating Russian agricultural and fertilizer supplies to the 
global market. The Russ ian Federation believed that prompt restitution of business as usual between 
Russian agricultural and fertilizer exporters, foreign banks, shippers and other actors could provide 
accessibility of Russian grain food stuffs and fertilisers and positively imp act the global food security 
situations. The Russian Federation also stressed that removing the remaining obstacles to exporting 
food and fertilizers from the Russian Federation is critical for its exporters, global agricultural supplies 
and people around the world in need of food. The Russian Federation expressed systematic concern G/AG/W/235  
 
- 269 - 
 
  regarding the failure of the concerned Members to engage with other WTO Members on this issue 
as they had refused to respond on substance of the question. The Russian Federation  emphasized 
the importance of transparency at the WTO and noted that unwillingness to respond to questions on 
substance is contrary to the commitments to transparency. The Russian Federation noted that the 
only way to deal with the economic crisis is to ta lk economics, not policies, and to prevent the 
violation of multilateral trade rules. The Russian Federation underlined its commitments to the WTO 
principles and to respecting the rights of other Members, and called for the same approach from 
other Members . 
Switzerland echoed the concern expressed by responding Members with regard to the critical 
situation of global food insecurity further exacerbated by Russia's action in Ukraine. Switzerland 
strongly condemned the Russian Federation's attack on Ukraine as  being fundamentally in breach of 
international law and infringed the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. Switzerland called 
on the Russian Federation to respect its international obligations, reverse its actions and withdraw 
its troops. Swit zerland also called on all actors to respect international law including international 
humanitarian law.  
Ukraine condemned Russia's invasion of its country as one of the biggest military acts of aggression 
of today and a brutal war of extermination agains t an independent state. Ukraine noted that, 
according to the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP), military aggression is the top driver 
of acute food insecurity. The Russia's military aggression against Ukraine has been particularly 
disrupting global  trade pushing up transport costs and lead times, while leaving farmers lacking 
access to the agricultural inputs they need. The knock -on effect on upcoming harvests will 
reverberate around the world. Ukraine stated that Russian invasion of Ukraine brought  colossal direct 
and indirect losses in the agricultural sector. According to preliminary estimates, the direct damage 
to the Ukraine's agricultural sector exceeds USD 4 billion. Indirect losses amount to more than 
USD 35 billion. According to FAO estimate s, at the end of 2021, Ukraine was the leader in the world 
sunflower oil market with a share of about 45%, the third largest producer of corn, barley and 
rapeseed. In 2021, Ukraine was also the sixth largest producer of wheat in the world, and accounted 
for a tenth of global exports. This is the crop that is considered the most important when it comes 
to immediate consumption, and therefore the threat of famine in the poorest countries. Ukraine 
noted that it was one of the main suppliers of grain not only t o developing countries, but also to 
countries with a "food deficit". At the same time, the World Food Programme estimated that an 
unprecedented 345 million people would be acutely food insecure in 2022 across the 82 countries 
where it operates, representin g an increase of almost 200 million people from the pre -pandemic 
levels. Additionally, hunger has grown more deeply entrenched, with approximately 50  million 
people in 45 countries facing severe hunger emergencies.  
Ukraine underlined its commitment to its obligations as an agricultural exporter and its readiness to 
continue shipping agricultural products to ensure global food security and price stability on the 
international market. Ukraine noted that, since the beginning of the war, it had already exported  
26.3 million tonnes of agricultural products. In this regard, Ukraine welcomed the continuation of 
the work of the grain corridor. As within this corridor Ukraine had already exported over 11 million 
tonnes of agricultural products. Food was delivered to more than 40 countries of the world. About 
2/3 of the vessels went to Asian, African and the Middle East countries. Ukraine took the opportunity 
to inform Members of the launch of the Grain from Ukraine humanitarian programme initiated by 
President Zelensk y. This initiative was aimed at alleviating the food crises caused by Russian armed 
aggression against Ukraine and was implemented in partnership with the World Food Programme. 
Ukraine noted that the first vessel with 27 thousand tonnes of wheat left its b order to Ethiopia last 
week, an amount of food that could feed nearly 100 thousand people for a year. Ukraine noted its 
readiness to provide any additional information regarding Grain from Ukraine programme to all 
interested Members. In Ukraine's view, the se initiatives became a significant contribution to the 
stabilization of world food prices according to the FAO and World Food Programme.  
Ukraine further noted that it was not surprising that after Ukrainian ports were blocked in 
February  2022, world food prices which were already quite high after the coronavirus pandemic 
began to set new records in March. And they began to decrease together with the first reports about 
the possibility of opening a "grain corridor" from Ukrainian Black Sea ports. Ukraine re ferred to 
Russia's invasion as acts of state terrorism against Ukraine and the Ukrainians and noted that 
Russia's attacks on energy and water supply infrastructure are war crimes and damaged nearly 50% 
of Ukraine's energy facilities. Ukraine strongly disag reed with the Russian Federation that the 
situation of food insecurity was caused by sanctions that many countries had imposed in response G/AG/W/235  
 
- 270 - 
 
  to Russia's aggression against Ukraine. In Ukraine's view, any sanctions against the Russian 
Federation are not relat ed to food and are legitimate security measures against Russia's devastating 
war. Ukraine believed that trade ties with the Russian Federation should be severed, as they are 
actively used by the Russian Federation as a tool of pressure. Ukraine called on M embers to reflect 
on how much fewer challenges in the world there would be, or would not have happened at all, if 
the Russian Federation had not invaded Ukraine. Ukraine said that the continuation of the war would 
threaten the rules based international ord er and would continue to destroy the world economy and 
undermine food security of the world. Ukraine expressed appreciation towards the support by 
Members, including sanctions imposed in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine and called on 
other WTO Memb ers to make every effort in order to limit Russia's ability to wage war, to kill 
Ukrainians and to undermine the rules -based multilateral trading system.  
The US delivered a statement on behalf of the responding Members. It reiterated those Members' 
strong support for Ukraine and their commitments in working with allies and partners to impose a 
severe economic and diplomatic price on the Russian Federation for its illegal war of aggression. The 
US underlined that the common and coordinated efforts of the US and its allies and partners in 
response to Russia's aggression in Ukraine are critical to demonstrate their determination and unity 
to amplifying their actions. Sanctions and export controls were one critical part of their overall 
strategy to hold the Russ ian Federation accountable for the war and to strengthen Ukraine's hands 
on the battlefield and at the negotiating table. The US pointed out that sanctions and export controls 
targeted key sectors of the Russian economy, such as defence, aviation and techn ology which were 
known important to President Putin's ability to project power including the ability to finance the war 
against Ukraine. The US reiterated that the sanctions imposed by them deliberately included 
carve -outs for food, fertilizers and seeds f rom the Russian Federation as well as carve -outs to make 
clear that banks ensure shippers and other actors to continue bring Russian food and fertilizers to 
the world. Sanctions also exempted transactions related to trade and medicine and medical devices. 
The US noted that their sanctions did not target civilians and were not destroying farmland while 
Russia's actions are.  
Türkiye reiterated its commitments in being constructive to ensure the sustainability of global food 
trade and in its continued diploma tic efforts in helping the countries that faced difficulties in food 
security. The Russian Federation repeated its view that the statements delivered by some Members 
were beyond the scope of the WTO and the agenda of the Committee. The Russian Federation c alled 
on Members and the Chair to comply with the rules of conduct and to refrain from repeating political 
statements which disrupted the constructive work of the committee and wasted time of the other 
Members. The Russian Federation clarified that the men tioned exemptions are not de facto working 
and led to de facto quantitative restrictions and urged Members to rely on statistical data and not 
on political statements.   
Follow -up: The Russian Federation noted that the WTO is not a platform to raise politic al issues 
beyond the mandate of the WTO and the agenda of the Committee on Agriculture. The WTO should 
focus dedicatedly and exclusively on issues related to trade and the Committee should remain the 
platform for technical and professional discussions with in its mandate. The Russian Federation 
pointed out that some WTO Members promoted its political agenda in the committee which was a 
misuse of the forum. In Russia's view, statements regarding the situation on Ukraine had not 
changed in essence since the la st meeting and the repetition of those statements disrupts Members 
from their joint work on mandated issues and are disrespectful to other Members. The 
Russian  Federation invited Members to discuss the consequences of the Ukrainian crisis in other 
relevant  organizations and diplomatic agencies.  
In addition, the Russian Federation noted that the attempts to accuse the Russian Federation for 
triggering the global food crisis are not economically founded and longstanding difficulties in ensuring 
food security  are part of the microeconomic crisis which had evolved over the years. The Russian 
Federation stated that a range of factors contributed to the process, including the COVID -19 
outbreak and post -pandemic recovery challenges, soaring inflation, booming comm odities prices and 
false introduction of biofuel technologies, as well as unilateral economic restrictive measures. The 
Russian Federation referred to the figures presented by FAO which showed food prices reached its 
peak in March after long growth period and started to decrease consistently and remained unchanged 
in October. The Russian Federation noted that this trend demonstrated clearly that price movements 
are independent of current situation in Ukraine and are driven by other factors. The Russian 
Federation called on International Organizations to make objective assessment of the fundamental 
drivers of the current crisis so Members could take appropriate policy decisions at the WTO. On the G/AG/W/235  
 
- 271 - 
 
  grain deal which was concluded between Ukraine and the Russian Federation in Istanbul on 22 July 
as a response to the global shortage of food stuff, the Russian Federation noted that exports of food 
began on 1 August in the framework of implementation of first part of the deal. Since then, 
11.1 million tonnes of foods tuffs including cereal and oilseeds had been safely transferred from 
southern Ukrainian ports. However, the Russian Federation pointed out that the geography of the 
recipient countries does not correspond to the declared humanitarian objectives. The main v olume 
of the food exports from Ukraine had been sent not only to developing and poor countries but also 
to developed ones. According to the Russian Federation, UN data on the quantities of the food 
shipped in the framework of implementation of first part o f the deal showed that out of the 
11.1 million tonnes which had left Ukraine, only 2 million tonnes which represented 21% destined 
for lower income or lower -middle income countries. Out of the 3.3 million tonnes of wheat exports 
these countries received on ly 45 % of the shipment. The Russian Federation noted that this 
prevented the announced objective of the deal and elevated the global shortage of food despite the 
claim that the deal would the facilitate flow of agricultural goods in the word markets. 
The Russian  Federation also believed that the effects of the Black Sea initiative on prices were not 
straightforward. After entering into force in August 2022 the FAO cereal price index decreased by 
just 1.2% followed by 1% increase in September. The Russian F ederation noted that those Members 
that urged to improve the vulnerable economies did not undertake envisaged actions to provide free 
access for Russian grain and fertilisers to world markets. The Russian Federation drew attention of 
WTO Members to the uni lateral trade and economic decisions applied over the last few months by 
certain Members against Russian goods, banking and logistic sectors. The Russian Federation 
underlined that, despite repeated calls for the exemption of restrictions on the supplies o f Russian 
grain, fertilizers and agricultural products, WTO trade policy reports as well as reports from World 
Food Programme still indicated the existence of difficulties to export faced by commercial clients. 
Russian exporters are facing increased import  tariffs, blocking of payments, limited access to ports 
and infrastructure, restrictions for freight and road transport insurance and legal services, and failed 
purchases of spare parts of agricultural equipments. The Russian Federation stated that some of  the 
cases were questioned and described in detail under the review recess of the Committee. Such action 
resulted in increased transaction costs and de facto quantitative restrictions on Russia's supply of 
food and fertilisers leading to global food shorta ge and price hikes. According to International Food 
Policy Reach Institute (IFPRI) the imports of fertilisers from The Russian Federation decreased by 
more than 30% to the EU countries and 14% to the world. The Russian Federation noted that such 
irresponsi ble approaches of certain Members contradicted recent G20 commitments to ensure 
accessibility of food products and avoid adverse impact on food security.  
The Russian Federation reiterated its continued commitment to participate in global efforts aimed at 
prevention of global food insecurity and huger in developing countries and least developed countries. 
The Russian Federation noted that on 17 November the first part of the grain deal was extended for 
120 days, a result of several rounds of negotiations be tween the Russian Federation and the UN on 
the necessity of urgent measures of accelerating Russian agricultural and fertilizer supplies to the 
global market. The Russian Federation believed that prompt restitution of business as usual between 
Russian agri cultural and fertilizer exporters, foreign banks, shippers and other actors could provide 
accessibility of Russian grain food stuffs and fertilisers and positively impact the global food security 
situations. The Russian Federation also stressed that removi ng the remaining obstacles to exporting 
food and fertilizers from the Russian Federation is critical for its exporters, global agricultural supplies 
and people around the world in need of food. The Russian Federation expressed systematic concern 
regarding the failure of the concerned Members to engage with other WTO Members on this issue 
as they had refused to respond on substance of the question. The Russian Federation emphasized 
the importance of transparency at the WTO and noted that unwillingness to res pond to questions on 
substance is contrary to the commitments to transparency. The Russian Federation noted that the 
only way to deal with the economic crisis is to talk economics, not policies, and to prevent the 
violation of multilateral trade rules. The  Russian Federation underlined its commitments to the WTO 
principles and to respecting the rights of other Members, and called for the same approach from 
other Members.  
Switzerland echoed the concern expressed by responding Members with regard to the criti cal 
situation of global food insecurity further exacerbated by Russia's action in Ukraine. Switzerland 
strongly condemned the Russian Federation's attack on Ukraine as being fundamentally in breach of 
international law and infringed the sovereignty and ter ritorial integrity of Ukraine. Switzerland called 
on the Russian Federation to respect its international obligations, reverse its actions and withdraw 
its troops. Switzerland also called on all actors to respect international law including international 
humanitarian law.  G/AG/W/235  
 
- 272 - 
 
  Ukraine condemned Russia's invasion of its country as one of the biggest military acts of aggression 
of today and a brutal war of extermination against an independent state. Ukraine noted that, 
according to the United Nations World Food Pr ogramme (WFP), military aggression is the top driver 
of acute food insecurity. The Russia's military aggression against Ukraine has been particularly 
disrupting global trade pushing up transport costs and lead times, while leaving farmers lacking 
access to  the agricultural inputs they need. The knock -on effect on upcoming harvests will 
reverberate around the world. Ukraine stated that Russian invasion of Ukraine brought colossal direct 
and indirect losses in the agricultural sector. According to preliminary  estimates, the direct damage 
to the Ukraine's agricultural sector exceeds USD 4 billion. Indirect losses amount to more than 
USD 35 billion. According to FAO estimates, at the end of 2021, Ukraine was the leader in the world 
sunflower oil market with a sh are of about 45%, the third largest producer of corn, barley and 
rapeseed. In 2021, Ukraine was also the sixth largest producer of wheat in the world, and accounted 
for a tenth of global exports. This is the crop that is considered the most important when it comes 
to immediate consumption, and therefore the threat of famine in the poorest countries. Ukraine 
noted that it was one of the main suppliers of grain not only to developing countries, but also to 
countries with a "food deficit". At the same time, th e World Food Programme estimated that an 
unprecedented 345 million people would be acutely food insecure in 2022 across the 82 countries 
where it operates, representing an increase of almost 200 million people from the pre -pandemic 
levels. Additionally, hu nger has grown more deeply entrenched, with approximately 50  million 
people in 45 countries facing severe hunger emergencies.  
Ukraine underlined its commitment to its obligations as an agricultural exporter and its readiness to 
continue shipping agricultur al products to ensure global food security and price stability on the 
international market. Ukraine noted that, since the beginning of the war, it had already exported 
26.3 million tonnes  of agricultural products. In this regard, Ukraine welcomed the conti nuation of 
the work of the grain corridor. As within this corridor Ukraine had already exported over 11 million 
tonnes of agricultural products. Food was delivered to more than 40 countries of the world. About 
2/3 of the vessels went to Asian, African and the Middle East countries. Ukraine took the opportunity 
to inform Members of the launch of the Grain from Ukraine humanitarian programme initiated by 
President Zelensky. This initiative was aimed at alleviating the food crises caused by Russian armed 
aggre ssion against Ukraine and was implemented in partnership with the World Food Programme. 
Ukraine noted that the first vessel with 27 thousand tonnes of wheat left its border to Ethiopia last 
week, an amount of food that could feed nearly 100 thousand people  for a year. Ukraine noted its 
readiness to provide any additional information regarding Grain from Ukraine programme to all 
interested Members. In Ukraine's view, these initiatives became a significant contribution to the 
stabilization of world food price s according to the FAO and World Food Programme.  
Ukraine further noted that it was not surprising that after Ukrainian ports were blocked in 
February  2022, world food prices which were already quite high after the coronavirus pandemic 
began to set new records in March. And they began to decrease together with the first reports about 
the possibility of opening a "grain corridor" from Ukrainian Black Sea ports. Ukraine referred to 
Russia's invasion as acts of state terrorism against Ukraine and the Ukrain ians and noted that 
Russia's attacks on energy and water supply infrastructure are war crimes and damaged nearly 50% 
of Ukraine's energy facilities. Ukraine strongly disagreed with the Russian Federation that the 
situation of food insecurity was caused by sanctions that many countries had imposed in response 
to Russia's aggression against Ukraine. In Ukraine's view, any sanctions against the Russian 
Federation are not related to food and are legitimate security measures against Russia's devastating 
war. Ukr aine believed that trade ties with the Russian Federation should be severed, as they are 
actively used by the Russian Federation as a tool of pressure. Ukraine called on Members to reflect 
on how much fewer challenges in the world there would be, or would not have happened at all, if 
the Russian Federation had not invaded Ukraine. Ukraine said that the continuation of the war would 
threaten the rules based international order and would continue to destroy the world economy and 
undermine food security of the  world. Ukraine expressed appreciation towards the support by 
Members, including sanctions imposed in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine and called on 
other WTO Members to make every effort in order to limit Russia's ability to wage war, to kill 
Ukrainians and to undermine the rules -based multilateral trading system.  
The US delivered a statement on behalf of the responding Members. It reiterated those Members' 
strong support for Ukraine and their commitments in working with allies and partners to impo se a 
severe economic and diplomatic price on the Russian Federation for its illegal war of aggression. The 
US underlined that the common and coordinated efforts of the US and its allies and partners in 
response to Russia's aggression in Ukraine are critica l to demonstrate their determination and unity G/AG/W/235  
 
- 273 - 
 
  to amplifying their actions. Sanctions and export controls were one critical part of their overall 
strategy to hold the Russian Federation accountable for the war and to strengthen Ukraine's hands 
on the battl efield and at the negotiating table. The US pointed out that sanctions and export controls 
targeted key sectors of the Russian economy, such as defence, aviation and technology which were 
known important to President Putin's ability to project power includ ing the ability to finance the war 
against Ukraine. The US reiterated that the sanctions imposed by them deliberately included 
carve -outs for food, fertilizers and seeds from the Russian Federation as well as carve -outs to make 
clear that banks ensure ship pers and other actors to continue bring Russian food and fertilizers to 
the world. Sanctions also exempted transactions related to trade and medicine and medical devices. 
The US noted that their sanctions did not target civilians and were not destroying fa rmland while 
Russia's actions are.  
Türkiye reiterated its commitments in being constructive to ensure the sustainability of global food 
trade and in its continued diplomatic efforts in helping the countries that faced difficulties in food 
security. The Ru ssian Federation repeated its view that the statements delivered by some Members 
were beyond the scope of the WTO and the agenda of the Committee. The Russian Federation called 
on Members and the Chair to comply with the rules of conduct and to refrain fro m repeating political 
statements which disrupted the constructive work of the committee and wasted time of the other 
Members. The Russian Federation clarified that the mentioned exemptions are not de facto working 
and led to de facto quantitative restricti ons and urged Members to rely on statistical data and not 
on political statements.   
4.6  Canada's Special Milk Class Scheme  
4.6.1   Question by New Zealand (AG -IMS ID 103130) 
New Zealand continues to raise questions around Canada's milk classes, due to the continued 
clarification needed with regards to answers provided in Canada's responses in AG -IMS ID s 102073 , 
101013 , 100064  and 99098 .  
Canada 's answer to AG -IMS ID 102073  states that New Zealand 's calculation of the CDC published 
cost of production for milk protein is inaccurate.  
New Zealand believes it has calculated the cost of production accurately but welcomes Canada 's 
review in more detail.  The cost of production (COP) for solids non fat (SNF) is calculated as follows: 
first, the cost  of production of SNF per hl is established by calculating 57% of the total COP of 
CAD 84.57  per one standard hl of milk (as per the table in page 5 of the  CDC Cost of Production 
study dated October 2022 which allocates 57% of the total COP to SNF and 43% to Butterfat), which 
comes to CAD 48.20  hl ; second, because the sample milk composition is 9.026 kg/hl of SNF, 
CAD 48.20 is divided by 9.026  kg to obtain the COP per kg for SNF which is CAD 5.34 kg. 
Alternatively, standard milk composition of 8.9177 kg/hl  could be used, resulting in the COP per kg 
for SNF which is CAD 5.40 kg. Irrespective of the use of sample or standard milk composition, setting 
milk class 4(a) for October  2022 at CAD  3.8549/kg for protein and other solids remains substantially 
below the  cost of production for milk protein.  
a. Can Canada please confirm that Class 4(a) is set below the cost of production for milk 
proteins?  
b. Can Canada  please explain how the benefit to exporters resulting from Class 4(a) pricing 
is materially different from the  benefit to exporters under the Commercial Export Milk 
scheme above?  
Regarding the Canadian value -added protein products onto the world market, New Zealand would 
appreciate if Canada could fully respond to the question in AG -IMS ID 102073.  
c. Of Canada's tot al production of value -added milk protein products including milk protein 
concentrates, infant formula, skim milk powder (SMP) and SMP blends, (specifically 
including HS 0404.90, HS 0402.10, HS 1901.10, HS 1901.90 and 3504.00 respectively) 
what %age was ac counted for by domestic Canadian demand as compared to exports 
annually since 2019?  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  d. What are the reasons for the growth in exports under these tariff lines (in particular their 
dairy component), given the supply managed system?  
New Zealand would particula rly appreciate detailed information that includes all forms of milk protein 
products. The product coverage in Canada 's previous replies, as well as the data from Statistics 
Canada on the supply and disposition of milk products, does not take into account t he higher %age 
protein products being exported through SMP blends.  
Answer by Canada  
a. The prices for solids non -fat in Class 4(a) are set according to a pricing formula set in the CUSMA 
agreement.  
 
With respect to New Zealand 's assertion about the calculated cost of production, their figure is 
inaccurate. As previously stated in AG -IMS ID 102073, the CDC has only ever published cost of 
production figures on the basis of standard hectolitres of milk and does not publish cost of production 
on the basi s of kilograms of milk protein. The most recent CDC cost of production survey for 2021 
can be found here:  
http://3.98.240.212 /sites/default/files/2022 -10/CoP%20Booklet%20English%202022 -10-
13%20%28FINAL%29.pdf   
 
b. As part of Canada 's obligations under CUSMA, on June 1, 2020, the Canadian dairy industry 
eliminated milk classes 6 and 7. The products in milk classes 6 and 7 were re classified into Class 
4(a), which is an existing milk class. The prices for skim milk solids in Class 4(a) are priced exactly 
as stipulated under the CUSMA.   
 
c. As to the comparison between Canada 's domestic market for dairy products in relation to its 
exports, please refer to Statistics Canada 's data on the supply and disposition of milk products in 
Canada which is available at the following link:  
https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=3210010901&pickMembers%5B 0%5D=1.
1&pickMembers%5B1%5D=2.9&cubeTimeFrame.startMonth=01&cubeTimeFrame.startYear=2021
&cubeTimeFrame.endMonth=12&cubeTimeFrame.endYear=2022&referencePeriods=20210101%2C
20221201  
 
The value of Canada 's dairy exports, including the specific tariff lines nam ed by New Zealand, can 
be found at the following link: https://agricu lture.canada.ca/en/canadas -agriculture -sectors/animal -
industry/canadian -dairy-information -centre/dairy -statistics -and-market -information/exports   
 
d. Canada has previously stated in AG -IMS ID 102073 and AG -IMS ID 100064 that it is ultimately 
the business d ecision of a processor or exporter in Canada to either sell dairy products on the 
domestic market, or to export them. It is also the business decision of foreign importers to select 
the products they wish to import.  
 
Canada has already demonstrated by usin g publicly available data in AG -IMS 100064 that its exports 
of dairy products have declined between 2020 and 2021, including for skim milk powder, whey 
products, casein and casein products, and products consisting of natural milk constituents (such 
as MPC7 0).  
 
e. For further information about Canada 's dairy exports, including SMP, MPC and other products, 
please refer to Canadian Dairy Information Centre (CDIC) data on exports of dairy products which 
are available at the following link: https://agriculture.canada.ca/en/canadas -agriculture -
sectors/animal -industry/canadian -dairy-information -centre/dairy -statistics -and-market-
information/exports  
Follow -up: New Zealand and the European  Union reserved their rights to follow up with additional 
questions in future Committee meetings.   G/AG/W/235  
 
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  4.7  Canada, European Union, Iceland, Norway, New Zealand, Japan – Prohibitions and 
restrictions on  agricultural machinery supplies   
4.7.1   Question by Russian Federation  (AG-IMS ID 103070 ) 
On 9 April 2022, the European Union has prohibited the sale, supply, tran sfer or export of goods 
which, according to the Council Regulation № 833/2014, could contribute to the enhancement of the 
Russian Federations ' industrial capacities. Such goods, in particular, include tractors, track -laying 
tractors and road tractors for s emi-trailers, etc., which are used in the agricultural sector.  
Similar trade restrictions were undertaken by Iceland (Regulation No 281/2014), Norway (Decision 
No. 1076), New Zealand (Regulation SL 2022/74), Canada (Regulation SOR/2014 -58) and Japan 
(Cabinet of Ministers Decision of 7 June 2022 on Measures Concerning the Situation in Ukraine).As 
one of the major suppliers of agricultural products, including critical foodstuffs and grains, in 
particular wheat, the Russian Federation ensures food securi ty of a large number of countries, 
net-food importing developing countries included. However, the trade prohibitions and restrictions 
applied on agricultural machinery including spare parts already now has a negative impact on 
Russia 's agricultural output,  which, in turn, will progressively contribute to the food crisis and 
jeopardize global food security in the long run.  
In this regard, we would like to find out how the application of such measures correlates with the 
declared objective to mitigate the foo d security concerns.   
Answer by Canada  
Canada is not engaging with the Russia n Federation  due to its unprovoked war of aggression on 
Ukraine.  
4.7.2   Question by Russian Federation  (AG-IMS ID 103069 ) 
On 9 April 2022, the European Union has prohibited the sale, supply, transfer or export of goods 
which, according to the Council Regulation № 833/2014, could contribute to the enhancement of the 
Russian Federations' indus trial capacities. Such goods, in particular, include tractors, track -laying 
tractors and road tractors for semi -trailers, etc., which are used in the agricultural sector.  
Similar trade restrictions were undertaken by Iceland (Regulation No 281/2014), Norwa y (Decision 
No. 1076), New Zealand (Regulation SL 2022/74), Canada (Regulation SOR/2014 -58) and Japan 
(Cabinet of Ministers Decision of 7 June 2022 on Measures Concerning the Situation in Ukraine).As 
one of the major suppliers of agricultural products, inc luding critical foodstuffs and grains, in 
particular wheat, the Russian Federation ensures food security of a large number of countries, net -
food importing developing countries included. However, the trade prohibitions and restrictions 
applied on agricultu ral machinery including spare parts already now has a negative impact on 
Russia's agricultural output, which, in turn, will progressively contribute to the food crisis and 
jeopardize global food security in the long run.In this regard, we would like to fin d out how the 
application of such measures correlates with the declared objective to mitigate the food security 
concerns.   
Answer by European Union  
In light of the Russian Federation's unprovoked and illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, the 
European Union will not engage in business -as-usual activity in the WTO with the delegation of the 
Russian Federation.  
4.7.3   Question by Russian Federation  (AG-IMS ID 10307 1) 
On 9 April 2022, the European Union has prohibited the sale, supply, transfer or export of goods 
which, according to the Council Regulation № 833/2014, could contribute to the enhancement of the 
Russian Federations' industrial capacities. Such goods, in  particular, include tractors, track -laying 
tractors and road tractors for semi -trailers, etc., which are used in the agricultural sector.  
 G/AG/W/235  
 
- 276 - 
 
  Similar trade restrictions were undertaken by Iceland (Regulation No 281/2014), Norway (Decision 
No. 1076), New Zeal and (Regulation SL 2022/74), Canada (Regulation SOR/2014 -58) and Japan 
(Cabinet of Ministers Decision of 7 June 2022 on Measures Concerning the Situation in Ukraine).As 
one of the major suppliers of agricultural products, including critical foodstuffs and grains, in 
particular wheat, the Russian Federation ensures food security of a large number of countries, net -
food importing developing countries included. However, the trade prohibitions and restrictions 
applied on agricultural machinery including spare p arts already now has a negative impact on 
Russia's agricultural output, which, in turn, will progressively contribute to the food crisis and 
jeopardize global food security in the long run.  
 
In this regard, we would like to find out how the application of such measures correlates with the 
declared objective to mitigate the food security concerns.   
Answer by Iceland  
In light of Russia´s ongoing illegal invasion of Ukraine - Iceland will not engage with the Russian 
delegation to the WTO in a business -as-usual manner.  
4.7.4   Question by Russian Federation  (AG-IMS ID 103074 ) 
On 9 April 2022, the European Union has prohibited the sale, supply, transfer or export of goods 
which, according to the Council Regulation № 833/2014, could contribute to the enhancement of the 
Russian Federations' industrial capacities. Such goods, in particular, include tractors, track -laying 
tractors and road tractors for semi -trailers, etc., which are used in the agricultural sector.  
Similar trade restrictions were undertaken by Iceland (Regulation No 281/2014), Norway (Decision 
No. 1076), New Zealand (Regulation SL 2022/74), Canada (Regulation SOR/2014 -58) and Japan 
(Cabinet of Mi nisters Decision of 7 June 2022 on Measures Concerning the Situation in Ukraine).As 
one of the major suppliers of agricultural products, including critical foodstuffs and grains, in 
particular wheat, the Russian Federation ensures food security of a large number of countries, net -
food importing developing countries included. However, the trade prohibitions and restrictions 
applied on agricultural machinery including spare parts already now has a negative impact on 
Russia's agricultural output, which, in tur n, will progressively contribute to the food crisis and 
jeopardize global food security in the long run.In this regard, we would like to find out how the 
application of such measures correlates with the declared objective to mitigate the food security 
concerns.  
Answer by Japan  
Russia's aggression against Ukraine is a unilateral attempt to change the status quo by force, and 
is an act that shakes the very foundation of the international order. This is a clear violation of 
international law and is totally un acceptable. Japan condemns in the strongest terms. It is to be 
expected that the international community, including Japan, imposes sanctions on the Russian 
Federation for its aggression against Ukraine.  
Russia's aggression against Ukraine is causing global  economic turmoil. The impact on Ukraine's 
internationally important agricultural sector places a serious burden on global food security, for 
which the Russian Federation is responsible. We continue to work with our partners, including 
international organi zations, to proactively address the impact of Russia's aggression against Ukraine 
on areas such as energy and food, among others, across many countries.  
Japan and other countries have been carefully addressing the situation by imposing sanctions in a 
manne r that does not hinder the provision of humanitarian assistance or the operation of global 
agricultural trade.  
4.7.5   Question by Russian Federation  (AG-IMS ID 1030 73) 
On 9 April 2022, the European Union has prohibited the sale, supply, transfer or export of goods 
which, according to the Council Regulation № 833/2014, could contribute to the enhancement of the 
Russian Federations' industrial capacities. Such goods, i n particular, include tractors, track -laying 
tractors and road tractors for semi -trailers, etc., which are used in the agricultural sector.  G/AG/W/235  
 
- 277 - 
 
  Similar trade restrictions were undertaken by Iceland (Regulation No 281/2014), Norway (Decision 
No. 1076), New Zeal and (Regulation SL 2022/74), Canada (Regulation SOR/2014 -58) and Japan 
(Cabinet of Ministers Decision of 7 June 2022 on Measures Concerning the Situation in Ukraine).As 
one of the major suppliers of agricultural products, including critical foodstuffs and grains, in 
particular wheat, the Russian Federation ensures food security of a large number of countries, net -
food importing developing countries included. However, the trade prohibitions and restrictions 
applied on agricultural machinery including spare p arts already now has a negative impact on 
Russia's agricultural output, which, in turn, will progressively contribute to the food crisis and 
jeopardize global food security in the long run.  
In this regard, we would like to find out how the application of s uch measures correlates with the 
declared objective to mitigate the food security concerns.   
Answer by New Zealand  
In light of the Russian Federation's unprovoked and unjustified attack against Ukraine, New Zealand 
will not engage in business -as-usual acti vity in the WTO with the delegation of the 
Russian  Federation.   
4.7.6   Question by Russian  Federation (AG -IMS ID 103072 ) 
On 9 April 2022, the European Union has prohibited the sale, supply, transfer or export of goods 
which, according to the Council Regulation № 833/2014,  could contribute to the enhancement of the 
Russian Federations' industrial capacities. Such goods, in particular, include tractors, track -laying 
tractors and road tractors for semi -trailers, etc., which are used in the agricultural sector.  
Similar trade r estrictions were undertaken by Iceland (Regulation No 281/2014), Norway 
(Decision  No. 1076), New Zealand (Regulation SL 2022/74), Canada (Regulation SOR/2014 -58) and 
Japan (Cabinet of Ministers Decision of 7 June 2022 on Measures Concerning the Situation i n 
Ukraine).As one of the major suppliers of agricultural products, including critical foodstuffs and 
grains, in particular wheat, the Russian Federation ensures food security of a large number of 
countries, net -food importing developing countries included.  However, the trade prohibitions and 
restrictions applied on agricultural machinery including spare parts already now has a negative 
impact on Russia's agricultural output, which, in turn, will progressively contribute to the food crisis 
and jeopardize glo bal food security in the long run.  
In this regard, we would like to find out how the application of such measures correlates with the 
declared objective to mitigate the food security concerns.   
Answer by Norway  
Because of the Russian Federation's unprovoke d, unjustified and illegal war of aggression against 
Ukraine, Norway will not engage with the Russian federation in a business -as-usual fashion at 
the WTO.   
Follow -up: The Russian Federation noted that the WTO is not a platform to raise political issues 
beyond the mandate of the WTO and the agenda of the Committee on Agriculture. The WTO should 
focus dedicatedly and exclusively on issues related to trade and the Committee should remain the 
platform for technical and professional discussions within its manda te. The Russian Federation 
pointed out that some WTO Members promoted its political agenda in the committee which was a 
misuse of the forum. In Russia's view, statements regarding the situation on Ukraine had not 
changed in essence since the last meeting a nd the repetition of those statements disrupts Members 
from their joint work on mandated issues and are disrespectful to other Members. The Russian 
Federation invited Members to discuss the consequences of the Ukrainian crisis in other relevant 
organizatio ns and diplomatic agencies.  
In addition, the Russian Federation noted that the attempts to accuse the Russian Federation for 
triggering the global food crisis are not economically founded and longstanding difficulties in ensuring 
food security are part of  the microeconomic crisis which had evolved over the years. The Russian 
Federation stated that a range of factors contributed to the process, including the COVID -19 
outbreak and post -pandemic recovery challenges, soaring inflation, booming commodities pric es and G/AG/W/235  
 
- 278 - 
 
  false introduction of biofuel technologies, as well as unilateral economic restrictive measures. The 
Russian Federation referred to the figures presented by FAO which showed food prices reached its 
peak in March after long growth period and started to decrease consistently and remained unchanged 
in October. The Russian Federation noted that this trend demonstrated clearly that price movements 
are independent of current situation in Ukraine and are driven by other factors. The Russian 
Federation calle d on International Organizations to make objective assessment of the fundamental 
drivers of the current crisis so Members could take appropriate policy decisions at the WTO. On the 
grain deal which was concluded between Ukraine and the Russian Federation i n Istanbul on 22 July 
as a response to the global shortage of food stuff, the Russian Federation noted that exports of food 
began on 1 August in the framework of implementation of first part of the deal. Since then, 
11.1 million tonnes of foodstuffs includ ing cereal and oilseeds had been safely transferred from 
southern Ukrainian ports. However, the Russian Federation pointed out that the geography of the 
recipient countries does not correspond to the declared humanitarian objectives. The main volume 
of the  food exports from Ukraine had been sent not only to developing and poor countries but also 
to developed ones. According to the Russian Federation, UN data on the quantities of the food 
shipped in the framework of implementation of first part of the deal s howed that out of the 
11.1 million tonnes which had left Ukraine, only 2 million tonnes which represented 21% destined 
for lower income or lower -middle income countries. Out of the 3.3 million tonnes of wheat exports 
these countries received only 45 % of t he shipment. The Russian Federation noted that this 
prevented the announced objective of the deal and elevated the global shortage of food despite the 
claim that the deal would the facilitate flow of agricultural goods in the word markets. The Russian 
Federation also believed that the effects of the Black Sea initiative on prices were not 
straightforward. After entering into force in August 2022 the FAO cereal price index decreased by 
just 1.2% followed by 1% increase in September. The Russian Federation no ted that those Members 
that urged to improve the vulnerable economies did not undertake envisaged actions to provide free 
access for Russian grain and fertilisers to world markets. The Russian Federation drew attention of 
WTO Members to the unilateral trad e and economic decisions applied over the last few months by 
certain Members against Russian goods, banking and logistic sectors. The Russian Federation 
underlined that, despite repeated calls for the exemption of restrictions on the supplies of Russian 
grain, fertilizers and agricultural products, WTO trade policy reports as well as reports from World 
Food Programme still indicated the existence of difficulties to export faced by commercial clients. 
Russian exporters are facing increased import tariffs, bl ocking of payments, limited access to ports 
and infrastructure, restrictions for freight and road transport insurance and legal services, and failed 
purchases of spare parts of agricultural equipments. The Russian Federation stated that some of the 
cases w ere questioned and described in detail under the review recess of the Committee. Such action 
resulted in increased transaction costs and de facto quantitative restrictions on Russia's supply of 
food and fertilisers leading to global food shortage and price  hikes. According to International Food 
Policy Reach Institute (IFPRI) the imports of fertilisers from The Russian Federation decreased by 
more than 30% to the EU countries and 14% to the world. The Russian Federation noted that such 
irresponsible approach es of certain Members contradicted recent G20 commitments to ensure 
accessibility of food products and avoid adverse impact on food security.  
The Russian Federation reiterated its continued commitment to participate in global efforts aimed at 
prevention o f global food insecurity and huger in developing countries and least developed countries. 
The Russian Federation noted that on 17 November the first part of the grain deal was extended for 
120 days, a result of several rounds of negotiations between the Ru ssian Federation and the UN on 
the necessity of urgent measures of accelerating Russian agricultural and fertilizer supplies to the 
global market. The Russian Federation believed that prompt restitution of business as usual between 
Russian agricultural and  fertilizer exporters, foreign banks, shippers and other actors could provide 
accessibility of Russian grain food stuffs and fertilisers and positively impact the global food security 
situations. The Russian Federation also stressed that removing the remai ning obstacles to exporting 
food and fertilizers from the Russian Federation is critical for its exporters, global agricultural supplies 
and people around the world in need of food. The Russian Federation expressed systematic concern 
regarding the failure of the concerned Members to engage with other WTO Members on this issue 
as they had refused to respond on substance of the question. The Russian Federation emphasized 
the importance of transparency at the WTO and noted that unwillingness to respond to ques tions on 
substance is contrary to the commitments to transparency. The Russian Federation noted that the 
only way to deal with the economic crisis is to talk economics, not policies, and to prevent the 
violation of multilateral trade rules. The Russian Fed eration underlined its commitments to the WTO 
principles and to respecting the rights of other Members, and called for the same approach from 
other Members.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  Switzerland echoed the concern expressed by responding Members with regard to the critical 
situatio n of global food insecurity further exacerbated by Russia's action in Ukraine. Switzerland 
strongly condemned the Russian Federation's attack on Ukraine as being fundamentally in breach of 
international law and infringed the sovereignty and territorial int egrity of Ukraine. Switzerland called 
on the Russian Federation to respect its international obligations, reverse its actions and withdraw 
its troops. Switzerland also called on all actors to respect international law including international 
humanitarian l aw.  
Ukraine condemned Russia's invasion of its country as one of the biggest military acts of aggression 
of today and a brutal war of extermination against an independent state. Ukraine noted that, 
according to the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP), mi litary aggression is the top driver 
of acute food insecurity. The Russia's military aggression against Ukraine has been particularly 
disrupting global trade pushing up transport costs and lead times, while leaving farmers lacking 
access to the agricultural  inputs they need. The knock -on effect on upcoming harvests will 
reverberate around the world. Ukraine stated that Russian invasion of Ukraine brought colossal direct 
and indirect losses in the agricultural sector. According to preliminary estimates, the d irect damage 
to the Ukraine's agricultural sector exceeds USD 4 billion. Indirect losses amount to more than 
USD 35 billion. According to FAO estimates, at the end of 2021, Ukraine was the leader in the world 
sunflower oil market with a share of about 45%,  the third largest producer of corn, barley and 
rapeseed. In 2021, Ukraine was also the sixth largest producer of wheat in the world, and accounted 
for a tenth of global exports. This is the crop that is considered the most important when it comes 
to immed iate consumption, and therefore the threat of famine in the poorest countries. Ukraine 
noted that it was one of the main suppliers of grain not only to developing countries, but also to 
countries with a "food deficit". At the same time, the World Food Prog ramme estimated that an 
unprecedented 345 million people would be acutely food insecure in 2022 across the 82 countries 
where it operates, representing an increase of almost 200 million people from the pre -pandemic 
levels. Additionally, hunger has grown mo re deeply entrenched, with approximately 50  million 
people in 45 countries facing severe hunger emergencies.  
Ukraine underlined its commitment to its obligations as an agricultural exporter and its readiness to 
continue shipping agricultural products to en sure global food security and price stability on the 
international market. Ukraine noted that, since the beginning of the war, it had already exported 
26.3 million tonnes  of agricultural products. In this regard, Ukraine welcomed the continuation of 
the wo rk of the grain corridor. As within this corridor Ukraine had already exported over 11 million 
tonnes of agricultural products. Food was delivered to more than 40 countries of the world. About  2/3 
of the vessels went to Asian, African and the Middle East c ountries. Ukraine took the opportunity to 
inform Members of the launch of the Grain from Ukraine humanitarian programme initiated by 
President Zelensky. This initiative was aimed at alleviating the food crises caused by Russian armed 
aggression against Ukr aine and was implemented in partnership with the World Food Programme. 
Ukraine noted that the first vessel with 27 thousand tonnes of wheat left its border to Ethiopia last 
week, an amount of food that could feed nearly 100 thousand people for a year. Ukra ine noted its 
readiness to provide any additional information regarding Grain from Ukraine programme to all 
interested Members. In Ukraine's view, these initiatives became a significant contribution to the 
stabilization of world food prices according to th e FAO and World Food Programme.  
Ukraine further noted that it was not surprising that after Ukrainian ports were blocked in 
February  2022, world food prices which were already quite high after the coronavirus pandemic 
began to set new records in March. And they began to decrease together with the first reports about 
the possibility of opening a "grain corridor" from Ukrainian Black Sea ports. Ukraine referred to 
Russia's invasion as acts of state terrorism against Ukraine and the Ukrainians and no ted that 
Russia's attacks on energy and water supply infrastructure are war crimes and damaged nearly 50% 
of Ukraine's energy facilities. Ukraine strongly disagreed with the Russian Federation that the 
situation of food insecurity was caused by sanctions t hat many countries had imposed in response 
to Russia's aggression against Ukraine. In Ukraine's view, any sanctions against the Russian 
Federation are not related to food and are legitimate security measures against Russia's devastating 
war. Ukraine believ ed that trade ties with the Russian Federation should be severed, as they are 
actively used by the Russian Federation as a tool of pressure. Ukraine called on Members to reflect 
on how much fewer challenges in the world there would be, or would not have ha ppened at all, if 
the Russian Federation had not invaded Ukraine. Ukraine said that the continuation of the war would 
threaten the rules based international order and would continue to destroy the world economy and 
undermine food security of the world. Ukr aine expressed appreciation towards the support by 
Members, including sanctions imposed in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine and called on G/AG/W/235  
 
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  other WTO Members to make every effort in order to limit Russia's ability to wage war, to kill 
Ukrainians and to undermine the rules -based multilateral trading system.  
The US delivered a statement on behalf of the responding Members. It reiterated those Members' 
strong support for Ukraine and their commitments in working with allies and partners to impose a 
severe  economic and diplomatic price on the Russian Federation for its illegal war of aggression. The 
US underlined that the common and coordinated efforts of the US and its allies and partners in 
response to Russia's aggression in Ukraine are critical to demons trate their determination and unity 
to amplifying their actions. Sanctions and export controls were one critical part of their overall 
strategy to hold the Russian Federation accountable for the war and to strengthen Ukraine's hands 
on the battlefield and at the negotiating table. The US pointed out that sanctions and export controls 
targeted key sectors of the Russian economy, such as defence, aviation and technology which were 
known important to President Putin's ability to project power including the abi lity to finance the war 
against Ukraine. The US reiterated that the sanctions imposed by them deliberately included 
carve -outs for food, fertilizers and seeds from the Russian Federation as well as carve -outs to make 
clear that banks ensure shippers and ot her actors to continue bring Russian food and fertilizers to 
the world. Sanctions also exempted transactions related to trade and medicine and medical devices. 
The US noted that their sanctions did not target civilians and were not destroying farmland whil e 
Russia's actions are.  
Türkiye reiterated its commitments in being constructive to ensure the sustainability of global food 
trade and in its continued diplomatic efforts in helping the countries that faced difficulties in food 
security. The Russian Feder ation repeated its view that the statements delivered by some Members 
were beyond the scope of the WTO and the agenda of the Committee. The Russian Federation called 
on Members and the Chair to comply with the rules of conduct and to refrain from repeating  political 
statements which disrupted the constructive work of the committee and wasted time of the other 
Members. The Russian Federation clarified that the mentioned exemptions are not de facto working 
and led to de facto quantitative restrictions and urg ed Members to rely on statistical data and not 
on political statements.   
4.8  Canada's review of the TRQ system  
4.8.1   Question by United Kingdom (AG -IMS ID 103086 ) 
In follow-up to AG -IMS ID 99110 , 100065 , 101016  and 102090 , the United Kingdom wo uld like to 
reiterate its interest in the results of Canada 's Comprehensive Review of the Allocation and 
Administration of Tariff Rate Quotas (TRQs) for Dairy, Poultry and Egg Products. The United Kingdom 
would once again request clarity from Canada on the  timeframe for the review 's release.   
Answer by Canada  
Canada appreciates the United Kingdom 's continued interest in the Comprehensive Review. All 
feedback received from stakeholders throughout the consultations has been considered and will help 
inform dec isions on long -term TRQ policies. Canada continues to aim to finalize the Review as soon 
as possible. Updates on the process will be shared in due course.  
Follow -up: The United Kingdom  noted that it was the 5th time the issue is raised and requested 
Canada  to indicate a timeline as regards when it intended to conclude the review and publish the 
findings.   
4.9  Canada's compensation for farmers after trade concessions  
4.9.1   Question  by India (AG -IMS ID 103135 ) 
In 2019, Canada announced a Dairy Direct Programme with the objective to support dairy producers 
as a result of market access commitments made under th e international trade agreements, namely 
the Canada –European Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) and the 
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans -Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). As informed by 
Canada in its reply to AG -IMS ID 1000 40, under the programme CAD 937 million is being provided 
as direct payments to dairy producers, where CAD 469 million is given for the years 2021 -22 and 
CAD 468 million for 2022 -23.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  a. What are the specific measures taken under this programme?  
b. What is the criteria for dairy producers to be eligible to get this support?  
c. How and when  would Canada notify this at the WTO under the Agreement on Agriculture?  
Answer by Canada  
a. The Dairy Direct Payment Program issues annual payments to eligible dairy producers who 
registers under the programme in proportion to milk production/quota. As dairy farms 
vary significantly by size and region, direct payments provide producers with the flexibility 
to use their compensation based on the unique needs of their operations. Althou gh no 
formal reporting is required under the DDPP, the Canadian Dairy Commission (CDC), who 
is responsible for delivering this program, has informally reported that producers are using 
DDPP payments to reduce debt levels or to make on -farm investments.   
b. To be eligible for a programme payment, dairy producers must  
i. have a valid dairy license registered with a provincial milk marketing board; and  
ii. hold dairy quota from a provincial milk marketing board  
To receive a payment, dairy producers must register to the programme each year.  
c. The payments provided under the Dairy Direct Payment Program are consistent with 
Canada 's international obligations and will be notified in due course.   
Follow -up: India raised  the following follow -up questions: 1 . how production -based financial support 
is WTO -compliant; 2. How it is different from other support which is given in proportion to the 
production; 3. When was the first notification made to the WTO of this scheme; and  4. When was 
the first notification due for the scheme. New Zealand supported the questions by India. New Zealand 
noted that it had raised a few questions in the past on Canada's dairy programme and reiterated its 
view that the compensation offered by Cana da to its dairy farmers is disproportionate to any market 
access concessions. New Zealand also expressed interest in understanding more about the sector's 
experience following implementation of these preferential trade agreements. Noting that Canada's 
latest Domestic Support notification was for 2018, New Zealand invited Canada to update its 
notification to examine how dairy programmes are notified.   
4.10  China's grain subsidies  
4.10.1   Question by Australia  (AG-IMS ID 103087 ) 
Australia notes recent media reports 
(https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202209/07/WS6317eab3a310fd2b29e765a5.html ) that "China 
has pledged to provide grain farmers with subsidies totaling 10 billi on yuan (USD 1.44  billion) from 
its central government budget to ease the impact of the rising prices of farm supplies and to boost 
farmers ' incentives to keep producing food.  
This year, the central government has already allocated 40 billion yuan in subsi dies to grain 
farmers in three outlays, according to the Ministry of Finance. " 
Australia asks that China:  
a. outline the eligibility criteria for farmers receiving this subsidy, and  
b. note how these measures will be classified in the context of notifications to  the Committee 
on Agriculture.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  Answer by China  
a. The subsidies are available to all entities engaged in agricultural production.  
b. The subsidies will be classified in accordance with the Agreement on Agriculture.  
Follow -up: The United  States supported the ques tion and sought information on the following 
questions: 1. How the level of payment for eligible beneficiaries is determined including whether this 
determination differs by province or other sub -national level of government; and 2. How payments 
differ in t erms of eligibility and payment rates compared to the previous 40 billion yuan, roughly 
4.3 billion USD that were already allocated. Canada noted that it had asked a question to China at 
the June Committee meeting regarding an announcement of an additional  RMB 10 million payments 
to subsidize the costs of agricultural inputs such as fertilizers, pesticides and fuel for farming 
machinery. According to Canada, all farmers were eligible for the support and the additional funding 
of 20 billion announced later. In view of the large amount of support linked to production provided 
by China, Canada Urged China to update its domestic support notifications. Paraguay highlighted 
the importance of notifications and transparency in this Committee. Until China submits its  
notifications, Paraguay invited it to share some information on its agricultural policies, either through 
a presentation or partial notification.   
4.11  China's recent agricultural policy modifications  
4.11.1   Question by Brazil (AG -IMS ID 103004 ) 
According to information available online, the period covered in China's latest notifications 
(2011 -2016) seems to represent the end of an agricultural policy cycle.   
For instance, according to a publication from the World Bank Group (Learning from Experience: 
Insights from China's Progress in Disaster Risk Management, available at 
https: //openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/34090 ), China has put in place a large rural 
insurance programmes, which, since 2014, has led to an insure area coverage of more than 80% of 
its agricultural land. However, expenditures related to the government`s  financial participation in 
such programs are not discernible in China`s notification.   
Recently the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs of the People's Republic of China announced a 
new stimulus package, which includes, among others, a focus on stab ilizing grain production, 
expanding soybean and oilseed production, and firming up supplies of seeds, and attaches 
importance to the role of finance and insurance in supporting agriculture, would have been launched 
(http://www.moa.gov.cn/xw/zwdt/202206/t20220610_6402176.htm ).  
In light of the above, could China inform:   
a. when it would be submitting its new DS:1 and, if applicable, DS:2 notifications;   
b. details of its rural insurance and in which supporting table it will be notified;   
c. if it would be open to make a descriptive presentation on its agricultural policies in the 
meantime.  
Answer by China  
a. China  has submitted the Notifications DS:1 2017 -2020 and relevant DS:2  on 
14 December  2022.  
b. The agriculture insurance will be notified in accordance with the requirements of the 
Agreement on Agriculture.  
c. China will elaborate its agricultural support policies, i f necessary,  after the notification is 
submitted.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  Follow -up: Brazil flagged strong concern regarding China's outstanding domestic support 
notifications. Noting that the previous notification was made in December 2018, Brazil urged China 
to update its notif ications, particularly in view of its role as a main subsidizer. China was invited to 
make a presentation on its agricultural policies while it works its notifications. The US supported the 
question and noted that China's outstanding notifications includin g Tables DS:1, DS:2, ES:3, and 
NF:1 as well as responses to the Export Competition Questionnaire have been on the agenda of the 
Committee for a long time. The US stated that China's agricultural policies had changed substantially 
since its last Table DS:1 notification for 2016 and transparency with regards to China's agricultural 
trade policies is vital to the functioning of this Committee. The US welcomed the update by China 
that it is working on its notifications but noted that similar responses had been provided in previous 
meetings. The US sought further information with regards to China's notification process and invited 
China to submit notifications in a timely manner. Canada also invited China to make presentation 
on its agricultural polices and to su bmit notifications in a timely manner. Paraguay highlighted the 
importance of notifications and transparency in this Committee. Until China submits its notifications, 
Paraguay invited it to share some information on its agricultural policies, either throug h a 
presentation or partial notification. The European Union expressed interest in China's domestic 
support notifications. Australia supported the question and highlighted the importance of updated 
notifications in having an informed discussions at the Com mittee.   
4.12  China's pork reserve programme   
4.12.1   Question by United States of America, Canada, Australia (AG -IMS ID 103015 ) 
Media reports on China 's purchases of por k for public stocks suggest the Chinese government 
announced purchases of pork for national reserves in June 2021 in order to support prices, and, at 
the time, the Chinese National Development and Reform Commission had issued a level 1 warning 
on low hog f armer profits based on its monitoring of the hog -to-grain price ratio. Further, media 
reports indicated in early March that China undertook its first round of 2022 hog reserve purchases 
in an attempt to raise prices after a post -Lunar New Year slump.   
 
a. Please explain what factors are used to determine when to purchase pork for the central 
reserve.  
b. Please provide a copy of the measures that govern the hog price monitoring system and 
reserve purchases.  
c. Does the National Development and Reform Commission 's price monitoring system 
provide a price floor for pork?  
d. Please explain how reserve purchase prices are determined for pork.  
e. Please provide data on the quantities of pork purchased and the purchase prices for all 
reserve procurement instances in the last three  years.  
Answer by China  
a. The factors mainly include hog -to grain price ratio and stock of productive sows.  
b. The copy of the measures could be found in the website of National Development and 
Reform Commission (NDRC):  https://www.ndrc.gov.cn . 
c. Chinese government does not set a price floor for pork.  
d. The prices are determined by open bidding.  
e. The data is not available yet.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  4.12.2   Question by United States of America, Canada, Aust ralia (AG -IMS ID 103016 ) 
On 6 September 2022 the State Council of the People 's Republic of China reported on its website 
that Chinese authorities would relea se pork from central reserves on 8 September.  The notice 
indicated that the action was being taken because "public holidays such as the Mid -Autumn Festival 
and the National Day Holiday are around the corner. " In AG -IMS ID 92047, China stated that release 
of pork reserves would be made when there is a serious natural disaster, accident, or unexpected 
public sanitary events, etc.   
 
On 22 September 2022 the State Council of the People 's Republic of China reported on its website 
that two releases of re serve pork had already taken place in September, one on 8 September and 
one on 18 September.  The notice also reported that a third release of pork would take place that 
week.  The National Pork Reserve website reported a fourth release of pork planned for 
30 September.  News sources reported expectations that the amount of reserve pork released in 
September 2022 would reach 200,000 tonnes, the highest for any month on record.  
 
a. Please provide an update on what factors are used to determine when to release pork  onto 
the domestic market.  
b. Please provide data on the quantities of pork released and the sale prices for the 
September 2022 releases, and any other releases of pork since 2012.  
Answer by China  
a. The factors to determine when to release pork mainly include h og-to-grain price ratio and 
the price of pork.  
b. Chinese government released around 200,000 tonnes  pork in September 2022.  
4.12.3   Question by United  States of America, Canada, Australia (AG -IMS ID 103017 ) 
On 16 September 2022 China News Service reported that the sale price of pork reserves in China 
nationally and in all regions was less than the domestic market price.  
 
For example: on 9 September 2022 Heilongjiang News  reported that the Harbin Municipal 
Government began a reserve pork release on 8 September.  The report indicated that Harbin would 
release 500 tonnes of reserve pork in two batches, one from 8 September through 13, and the other 
from 25 September through 3 0, to correspond with local holidays.  The article also stated, "the retail 
price of the stocked pork at the delivery point is unified at 12 yuan/half kilogram, which is more 
than 10% lower than the average retail price of the same grade pork in the domesti c 
market.  Residents are limited to 10 kilograms of reserve meat. " 
 
a. Please explain how reserve sale prices are determined for pork.  
b. Please explain how the sale price is determined when reserve pork is released at the 
municipal level in China.  
c. Please share with the Committee the price of reserve pork released in Harbin in 
September  2022.  
Answer by China  
The details of the pork reserve of local government is not available yet.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  4.13  China's swine support  
4.13.1   Question by United States of America, Canada, Brazil, A ustralia (AG -IMS ID 
103014 ) 
It is understood that China implements various measures to support pork production in China beyond 
the "subsidy for breeding prod uctive sows ", the only pork -related measure notified by China in its 
last domestic support notification for 2016.   
According to various Chinese media reports, it is estimated that China 's central government 
reportedly paid national support measures to the swine industry of RMB 6.9 billion 
(USD  998.8  million) in 2019, of which RMB  814 million was paid as a culling subsidy, as part of a 
preferential loan policy, and as increased swine insurance coverage.  In addition, various Chinese 
media reports also ind icate that several provinces, including Sichuan, Hubei, Guangdong, and 
Jiangsu, have also undertaken their own pork -related support measures.  Combined with national 
support, it is estimated based on various Chinese media reports that China provided at leas t 
RMB 10,860 million (USD  1,572 million) in support in 2019.  
For each support measure provided to the swine industry between 2019 and 2021 by the central 
government or sub -national level government, please provide:  
 
a. the name of the measure;  
b. a copy of or li nk to the regulation or legislation implementing the measure; and  
c. the expenditures under the measure for each year : 2019, 2020, and 2021.  
Answer by China  
In accordance with the Animal Epidemic Prevention Law and the Animal Husbandry Law, Chinese 
government  has implemented policies of subsidies for compulsory culling of key animal diseases, 
and swine industry can get the subsidies according to relevant regulations. During 2019 to 2021, 
Chinese government allocated 6.9 billion yuan annually for animal epidemi c prevention, including 
subsidies for compulsory immunization and culling of key animals like swine.   
Follow -up: The United  States noted that China media report indicated that China had provided at 
least USD 1.6 billion swine support expenditure in 2019, p roviding a clear indication of how China's 
agricultural policies had changed substantially since its last Table DS:1 notification for 2016. The US 
asked China to confirm that it would soon provide the information and the data that was not available 
at the meeting.   
4.14  China's cotton reserves purchasing system  
4.14.1   Question  by United States of America (AG -IMS ID 103019 ) 
In AG -IMS ID 102033 , China indicated that the cotton purchases were made for central cotton 
reserves, and not made under an ex tension of the measure entitled "Deepening the Target Price 
Policy Reform of Cotton. " In response to a request for the regulation that governs the release of 
government - or state -owned stocks of cotton, China instructed interested parties to refer to the 
circulars issued by China National Food and Strategic Reserve Administration or China Cotton 
Reserve Corporation.  
 
Please provide copies or website links to the circulars issued by the China National Food and Strategic 
Reserve Administration or China Cotton  Reserve Corporation that govern the release of government - 
or state -owned stocks of cotton.  
Answer by China  
The circulars on the purchase and release of central cotton reserve are published in the 
CNCOTTON.com ( http://www.cncotton.com ). G/AG/W/235  
 
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  Follow -up: Noting that China continued to provide only a general website, the United States 
requested China to share links with respect to specific information requested. China re sponded that 
it would provide the requested links in due time.   
4.14.2   Question by United  States of America (AG -IMS ID 103020 ) 
In AG -IMS ID 102033 , the United States asked whether there are any limits placed on the maximum 
quantity of cotton that the Government of China may purchase for the cotton reserve.  China 
responded that the maximum amount purchased by the government shall not exceed the reserve 
scale.  
 
Please clarify, what is the "reserve scale "? 
Answer by China  
The notice on the  purchase of central cotton reserve will publish the total amount within which the 
cotton will be purchased.  
Follow -up: Noting that China continued to provide only a general website, the United States 
requested China to share links with respect to specific  information requested. China responded that 
it would provide the requested links in due time.   
4.14.3   Question  by United States of America (AG -IMS ID 103021 ) 
In AG -IMS ID 102033 , China stated that reserve cotton was purchased in 2019 at market 
prices.Pl ease provide the quantities and prices for each of the 2019 purchases of reserve cotton.  
Answer by China  
The purchase of central cotton reserve including amount and price has been published in 
CNCOTTON.com ( http://ww w.cncotton.com ). 
Follow -up: Noting that China continued to provide only a general website, the United States 
requested China to share links with respect to specific information requested. China responded that 
it would provide the requested links in due tim e.  
4.14.4   Question by United States of America (AG -IMS ID 103022 ) 
In AG -IMS ID 102033 , China stated that the amount of cotton purchased by the government is 
determined by factors including optimizing the structure of the cotton reserve and replenishing the 
cotton reserve. China also stated that the highest auction price is determined according to the 
domestic spot price of cotton.  
 
a. Please provide the formula that the Government of China uses to determine the highest 
auction price from the do mestic spot price of cotton.  
b. Please provide the sources that the Government of China uses to identify the domestic 
spot price of cotton.  
Answer by China  
The formulas to determine the prices of purchase and release and the sources of domestic spot 
prices ar e attached to the notice on the purchase or release of central cotton reserve, which are 
published in CNCOTTON.com ( http://www.cncotton.com ). 
Follow -up: Noting that China continued to provide only a general website, the United  States 
requested China to share links with respect to specific information requested. China responded that 
it would provide the requested links in due time.   G/AG/W/235  
 
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  4.15  China's Cotton Policies  
4.15.1   Question by United  States of America (AG -IMS I D 103018 ) 
In AG -IMS ID 102034 , China provided the following table of the volume in millions of tonnes of 
cotton production for both Xinjiang and for China, nationally, for each of the years from 2012 
to 2021.  
Year  2012  2013  2014  2015  2016  2017  2018  2019  2020  2021  
China  Nationwide  6.61 6.28 6.30 5.91 5.34 5.65 6.10 5.89 5.91 5.73 
Xinjiang Uygur 
Autonomous 
Region  3.88 3.94 4.15 4.19 4.08 4.57 5.11 5.00 5.16 5.13 
In AG -IMS ID 102035 , China asked that the United States clarify part d. of the question. Her e, we 
seek to clarify.   
 
In G/AG/N/CHN/48 , which notified the "Deepening the Target Price Policy Reform of Cotton" 
measure, China stated "According to Article 6, paragraph 5 (b) of the Agreement on Agriculture, 
such payments are made based on 85% or less of the base level production . ("Blue Box" measure) 
The amount of subsidized cotton is subject to a limit, which is 85% of the average cotton production 
in the base period (2012 -2014)." The average of the China nationwide cotton production figures 
provided above for 2012 through 2014 is 6.40 million tonnes. 85% of the average nationwide cotton 
production from 2012 to 2014 would be 5.44 million tonnes.  
 
The average of the Xinjiang cotton production figures provided above for 2012 through 2014 is 
3.99 million tonnes. 85% of the average X injiang cotton production from 2012 to 2014 would be 
3.39 million tonnes.  
 
If the limit had been set based on Xinjiang production, rather than nationwide production, the limit 
would have been much smaller. A limit of 5.44 million tonnes is 136% of Xinjiang 's average cotton 
production from 2012 to 2014.   
 
Please explain why China chose to use nationwide production figures to set the limit instead of 
Xinjiang production figures, given that the programme only operates in Xinjiang.  
Answer by China  
In light of t he limit resource endowment in Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, China applies 
subsidies of "blue box" to the cotton produced in Xinjiang and set a limit. The cotton production in 
Xinjiang equals around 85% of China national cotton production in the base p eriod.  
4.16  China's Export Restrictions on corn starch  
4.16.1   Question by European Union (AG -IMS ID 103042 ) 
Customs data show China 's corn starch exports fell to just 900 tones in August from more than 
40,000 tonnes  in July and 23,240 tonnes  a year earlier.  
 
The government has asked companies to suspend shipments to stabilize corn prices and contain 
inflation risks, according to an ana lyst at the Beijing Orient Agribusiness Consultant Co.  
 
In this regard and in the absence of any official notification on Export restrictions, could China 
provide more information on:  
 
a. Duration of the measure – since when the measure has been in force? Wha t is the 
envisaged end date of the measure?  
b. Could China provide more descriptive and detailed information on the nature of the 
measure?  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  c. When does China intend to submit official notification to the WTO on export restriction of 
the staples concerned by the measure?  
d. What is the expected impact on the exports of corn starch in the Region?  
Answer by China  
There is no export restriction on corn starch in China.  
Follow -up: The European Union welcomed China's confirmation on the absence of export restriction 
and invited China to explain the reason for the significant fall of corn starch exports. The 
United  Kingdom echoed the question by the European  Union and noted that there had been no 
change in demand for corn starch and the change in the export  figures seems unusual. Noting the 
need for further information to fully understand the situation, Japan reserved its right to follow up 
on the question. Switzerland echoed the comments by the EU, the UK and Japan.   
4.16.2   Question by United  Kingdom, Switzerland,  Japan (AG -IMS ID 103051 ) 
The United Kingdom understands that China has introduced an export restriction on corn starch. 
Could China please explain what cons ideration it has given to the effects of this measure on importing 
Members ' food security in accordance with Article 12.1(a)? Additionally, could China please provide 
an update on when it plans to notify this measure through the required ER:1 table?   
Answe r by China  
There is no export restriction on corn starch in China.  
Follow -up: The European  Union welcomed China's confirmation on the absence of export restriction 
and invited China to explain the reason for the significant fall of corn starch exports. The  
United  Kingdom echoed the question by the EU and noted that there had been no change in demand 
for corn starch and the change in the export figures seems unusual. Noting the need for further 
information to fully understand the situation, Japan reserved it s right to follow up on the question. 
Switzerland echoed the comments by the EU, the UK and Japan.  
4.17  Ecuador's new milk law  
4.17.1   Question by United  States of America, New Zealand, Australia, European Union 
(AG-IMS ID 103023 ) 
At the previous Committee on Agriculture meeting, the United States added AG -IMS ID 102131  to 
the agenda due to serious concerns related to Ecuador 's "Organic Law to Promote the Production, 
Marketing, Industrialization, Consumption, and Fixation of the Price of Milk and i ts Derivatives" that 
bans the importation of powdered milk for ten years, as of the date of registration.  Registered on 
August 17, 2022, the law is a comprehensive regulatory law on milk products in Ecuador.  The law 
includes regulations on all aspects of m ilk production, processing, and sale.  Concerning the ban of 
powdered milk, the law reads (translated): "It is prohibited the importation of milk powder for the 
next ten years while the conditions are created so that the industry can compete in better 
condi tions. " 
 
Noting that Ecuador has not yet provided a substantive response to AG -IMS ID 102131 , the United 
States resubmits and expands its questions as follows:  
 
a. How will Ecuador implement this ban on imports of powdered milk?  
b. Please explain how this import ban complies with Ecuador 's WTO commitments and 
obligations.   
c. What steps is Ecuador taking in implementing this law to ensure that Ecuador remains 
compliant with its WTO obligations?  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  Answer by Ecuador  
Thank you, Chair.  We would like to thank the United States, Australia, New Zealand and other trading 
partners for expressing their interest in the questions posed.  
In this regard, please note that on 23  September 2022, the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock of 
Ecuador consulted the Office of the Attorney -General of the State about the legal legitimacy of the 
ban on imports of powdered milk established by the fifth transitional provision of the Organic  Law 
to Promote the Production, Marketing, Industrialization, Consumption, and Fixation of the Price of 
Milk and its Derivatives, which entered into force in August 2022.  
In letter No. 20503 of 3 October 2022, the Attorney -General of the State stated that "there can be 
no bans or restrictions on the importation of powdered milk" since the WTO rules in force for Ecuador 
and the provisions of bilateral trade instruments "take precedence because of their hierarchy in 
respect of the fifth transitional provision  of the Organic Law", which established the ban in question.  
The opinion of the Attorney -General of the State is binding and therefore mandatory for the Public 
Administration in view of the power vested in the Attorney -General by Article 237 of the Constit ution 
of the Republic.  
We would also like to notify the trading partners concerned that, by virtue of the  Attorney -General 
of the State's determination referred to above, the importation of powdered milk into Ecuador has 
not been restricted or banned by th e law in question. For instance, 107 metric tonnes of powdered 
milk were imported into Ecuador in September 2022, and 68 metric tonnes in October. These figures 
fall within the usual range for monthly imports of this product into our country.  
Follow -up: The United States and New Zealand welcomed Ecuador's response on the absence of the 
import ban.  
4.18  Egypt's Export Prohibitions on Agricultural Products  
4.18.1   Question by Switzerland , United Kingdom (AG -IMS ID 103088 ) 
Switzerland welcomes the decision that Egypt lifted its ban on the export of staple goods such as 
wheat, flour, fava beans, vegetable oils, corn, lentils and pasta in September. However, we have 
noted that t he ban on rice export was extended in order to meet local market needs. Could Egypt 
please  
a. clarify how this measure is in accordance with Article 12 of the Agreement on Agriculture?  
b. provide information on the measures taken to ensure due consideration to the effects of 
such an export ban on importing Members' food security, in accordance with Article 12.1 
(a) of the Agreement on Agriculture  
c. give an update on when it intends to submit the corresponding notification?  
Answer by Egypt  
Follow -up: Switzerland flagged concern about export restrictive measures. Underlining the 
importance of transparency, Switzerland considered notification as the best means available to 
inform Members about the details of the restrictive measures taken and provide exp lanation. The 
United  Kingdom  supported the intervention by Switzerland. While recognizing the particular 
challenging circumstances faced by Egypt in the current context, the UK urged Egypt to address the 
transparency concerns raised by Members by providing  an ER:1 notification to the Committee.   
4.19  EU's Deforestation And Forest Degradation Strategy  
4.19.1   Question by Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay  (AG-IMS ID 103006 ) 
Brazil  thanks the EU for its replies to questions AG -IMS-IDs 100071  and 101033 .  G/AG/W/235  
 
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Taking into account the explanation provided regarding the country benchmarking system the  EU is 
adopting, Brazil would like to consult on the following:   
 
a. since one of the criteria of the benchmarking system relates to a Multilateral Environmental 
Agreement (MEA) - a country's "nationally determined contributions (NDCs) to the 
UNFCCC" -, how d oes the EU follow the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities, set out in the same Convention and its Paris 
Agreement?   
b. How does the EU assess risk in countries which have all but eliminated their native 
vegetation and forests through their development process?  
c. Does the EU intend to adopt legislation, as a criterion to define market access conditions, 
to oblige countries to reforest their territory to bring forest cover levels to levels similar to 
those fo und in the Members that will be most affected by the current legislation?  
Answer by European Union  
First of all, the EU would like to warmly welcome the declarations of President -elect Luiz Inácio Lula 
da Silva  to have "zero deforestation the by 2030". As the President -elect said, there is no planetary 
security without a protected Amazon. The EU is looking forward to working with Brazil to address 
the pressing global cha llenges of deforestation and climate change.   
As a major economy and consumer of these commodities linked to deforestation and forest 
degradation, the EU is partly responsible for deforestation. The EU can reduce its impact on global 
deforestation by adopt ing rules to regulate the entry into the EU market and the export from the EU 
of these commodities, in a way that makes sure these products and supply chains are 'deforestation -
free', as proposed in the Commission's proposal published on 17 November 2021.   
A benchmarking system operated by the Commission would notably identify countries as presenting 
a low, standard or high risk of products that are not deforestation -free or in accordance with the 
legislation of the producer country. Obligations for operato rs and authorities will vary according to 
the level of risk of the country or region of production, with simplified due diligence duties for 
products coming from low -risk and enhanced scrutiny for high -risk areas.   
The identification of low and high risk c ountries will be based on the most recent scientific data, and 
reflect both quantitative, objective and internationally recognised data, and indications that the 
countries are actively engaged in fighting deforestation and forest degradation:  
[ (a) rate of  deforestation and forest degradation,  
(b) rate of expansion of agriculture land for relevant commodities,  
(c) production trends of relevant commodities and products,  
(d) whether the nationally determined contribution (NDC) to the United Nations Framewo rk 
Convention on Climate Change covers emissions and removals from agriculture, forestry and land 
use which ensures that emissions from deforestation and forest degradation are accounted towards 
the country's commitment to reduce or limit greenhouse gas em issions as specified in the NDC;  
(e) agreements and other instruments concluded between the country concerned and the Union that 
address deforestation or forest degradation and facilitates compliance of relevant commodities and 
products with the requireme nts of this Regulation and their effective implementation;  
(f) whether the country concerned has national or subnational laws in place, including in accordance 
with Article 5 of the Paris Agreement, and takes effective enforcement measures to avoid and 
sanction activities leading to deforestation and forest degradation, and in particular whether 
sanctions of sufficient severity to deprive of the benefits accruing from deforestation or forest 
degradation are applied….]   
On questions a. and b. raised by Braz il, the EU cannot provide details at this stage as these criteria 
will be further developed only once the regulation is adopted. The Commission's Proposal for a G/AG/W/235  
 
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  regulation on deforestation -free products is still under negotiations with the European Parliam ent 
and Council.   
The criteria will apply to all countries, both for European and other countries. As a party of UNFCCC 
and Paris agreement, the EU will respect the fundamental principle of 'common but differentiated 
responsibilities' and respective capabi lities for the protection of the global environment. According 
to this CBDR principle, it is necessary to balance, on the one hand, the need for all countries to take 
responsibility for global environmental problems and, on the other hand, the need to reco gnize the 
wide differences in levels of economic development between countries.   
In that respect, the EU will support partner countries abroad to ensure the uptake of the new rules. 
Its approach to forests and forest communities is holistic and comprehensi ve, and advances 
sustainable development. The EU has notably pledged EUR 1 billion to facilitate protection, 
restoration and sustainable management of forests in the partner countries, for the benefit of people, 
climate and environment. The EU is committed  to help partners to reduce deforestation and forest 
degradation, by supporting them to strengthen forest governance, develop legislation and foster 
capacities. The Forest Partnerships, a new development cooperation tool, will tackle deforestation 
as one o f its objectives. Acknowledging that one size does not fit all, Forest Partnerships will be 
tailor-made for partner country needs. Attention will also be paid to increase the transparency of 
supply chains, while taking into account the rights of forest dep endent communities and indigenous 
peoples as well as smallholders' needs. In addition, the EU will engage in bilateral and multilateral 
discussion on policies and actions to halt deforestation and forest degradation.   
As regards question C,  the EU is well aware that primary and old -growth forests are rare on its 
territory. In Europe, these forests have been modified since the mid -Holocene and represent below 
3% of the total forest extent of the EU. Nevertheless, unlike in many parts of the w orld where 
deforestation is still a major problem, in the EU the area of land covered by forests is growing; 
by 2010, forest coverage had increased by approximately 11  million hectares since  1990, as a result 
of both natural growth and afforestation work.   
The new EU forest strategy for 2030  sets out how to protect and restore forests in the European 
Union. It is is one of the flagship initiatives of the  European Green Deal  and builds on the EU 
biodivers ity strategy for 2030.  The strategy will contribute to achieving the EU's biodiversity 
objectives as well as greenhouse gas emission reduction target of at least 55% by 2030 and climate 
neutrality by 2050.The new EU forest strategy will also protect, resto re and enlarge the EU's forests 
to combat climate change, reverse biodiversity loss and ensure resilient and multifunctional forest 
ecosystems, notably by ensuring forest restoration, including by planting 3 billion additional trees 
by 2030 . 
Follow -up: Brazil stressed that the green transition initiative should not be achieved at the expenses 
of other Members, a point not only stated by Brazil, but also by the EU to the US on th e Inflation 
Reduction Act. In Brazil's view, the legislation for forest protection established by the EU with 
extraterritorial effects was exactly an attempt to promote the green transition at expense of other 
Members. It raised a concern to Brazil that th e legitimate imperative of protecting environment had 
been used as an excuse to adopt a legislation that could impose trade restrictive measures in a 
unilateral, extraterritorial and discriminatory way to the detriment mainly of developing countries 
becaus e developing countries were those more harmed by system of benchmarking, by the cut of 
date established by the EU, by the requirements of geolocalization, by the concepts they unilaterally 
crafted on  deforestation and forest degradation in a moment when th e world was still recovering 
from the economic impact of the pandemic and also facing negative consequences of the conflict of 
Ukraine. Brazil noted that the adoption of trade restrictive measures on food and agricultural 
products harms globally the econom ic recovery, the fight against food insecurity crisis and the well -
functioning of the international trading system, a system that should be based on multilateral rules 
and market -oriented rules. Brazil concluded its intervention by quoting once more the le tter sent by 
the EU to the US "if implemented in its current form, the act risks causing not only economic damage 
to both the US and its closest trading partners, resulting in inefficiencies and market distortions, but 
could also trigger harmful global sub sidy race to the bottom. Maybe someone has to look at the 
mirror…".  
Argentina noted that the main principle of the common but differentiated responsibility is not 
necessarily based on the social and economic level of Members but the historical responsibil ity of 
environment degradation. In Argentina's view, this should not be confused with special and G/AG/W/235  
 
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  differential treatment and in this case, the EU must respond to both obligations, the historical 
responsibility and special and differential treatment, which are two different kinds of obligations. 
While recognizing the EU's commitment in environmental issues given its promise of billions of EUR 
in the area, Argentina pointed out that this only represents 1% of the 93 billion EUR that the EU 
grants in agricultu ral subsidies, through which they fund greenhouse gas emissions, the waste of 
water and finances, the degradation of their soils and the loss in biodiversity. Argentina questioned 
that if the EU could not compensate the 99% of the current environmental dam age with 1% of its 
budget, how does the EU expect to meet its historical responsibility in environmental degradation. 
Argentina reserved its rights to follow up on the question after reviewing EU's written responses.  
Paraguay expressed disappointment that  the EU's long statement did not respond to any of the 
specific questions contained in points a to c. For instance, regarding point a, Paraguay noted that, 
despite the EU's statement that no information was available to present a response at this juncture,  
the criteria mentioned by the EU clearly indicated that it would take on board whether the social and 
economic state have reductions of agricultural emissions as part of their nationally determined 
contributions (NDCs). Paraguay pointed that, as Members a re not obliged to have the same 
contributions, the EU is clearly not following the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities. Paraguay echoed Argentina's statement that although 
billions of Euros  seems to be a larg e amount, when compared to nearly 100 billion in subsidies, the 
amount was insignificant.  
Ecuador registered interest in the measures and their implications on its economy.   
Indonesia supported the question and reiterated its concern on the EU's Deforesta tion and Forest 
Degradation Strategy. Indonesia viewed that tackling climate change is among the objectives which 
could only be achieved with international engagement rather than through an unilateral policy. 
Indonesia raised the following concerns to the EU: 1. While the definition of deforestation could have 
brought clarity on the scope and understanding, what is the definition of deforestation in this policy; 
2. Could the EU elaborate on the scientific evidence for using the deforestation free policy as the 
only approach to achieve its goal rather than applying a less restrictive approach to achieve the 
same objective; 3. What is the due diligence mechanism required by the policy? Is it required to be 
applied to all products and to all suppliers?; and 4. How does the EU set out the criteria for low 
standard and high risk countries set out in the policy? Indonesia suggested that the EU could conduct 
more consultations with developing countries, as it would potentially affect the livelihoods of poor 
and smal l farmers and supported a cooperative approach.   
Thailand registered its continued interest in the policy and noted its intention to continue evaluating 
the policy to ensure it would not create any barrier for future trade.  
Guatemala voiced concern regard ing this new policy and its limitation as well as the impact it would 
have on the export of agricultural products, in particular from developing countries. Guatemala noted 
its prior questions on environment and lack of clarity on the issue. Guatemala said it would submit 
more questions in due course.  
Nigeria, Colombia and Côte d'Ivoire also registered interest in the issue. Nigeria and Colombia viewed 
the policy as an attempt to adopt environmental policies with extraterritorial implications which 
would undermine the competitiveness of their products. Nigeria considered that the policies 
constitute a new form of protectionism and called on the EU to take Members' comments into 
consideration. Colombia believed that three areas of sustainability, name ly, environment, economy 
and society, in the territories of some Members such as Colombia, should be considered for the 
implementation of environmental policies such as the one from the EU. Colombia noted that its 
producers faced increasingly rigorous and demanding legislations. Many Members like Colombia had 
more than 50% of their territory covered by primary forest which made them more vulnerable to 
illegal impacts on its forests and made it harder for the government to control due to the complexity 
and c osts. Given the humid and tropical climates of these countries the patterns were very different 
to those in northern and European countries. Therefore, Colombia stressed that, EU's measures 
should consider the environmental, geographical and biological con ditions of other countries. Côte 
d'Ivoire noted that the implementation of EU's measure could create trade distortions and other 
distortions with regard to the multilateral trading system and its associated rules. It could also create 
injury, particularly in terms of the competitiveness of Côte d'Ivoire's exporting enterprises, and could 
have an impact on its economy and citizens. Côte d'Ivoire encouraged the EU to adopt a multilateral 
approach and to continue consultations with their partners, including Co te d'Ivoire, in order to find G/AG/W/235  
 
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  a more efficient, effective and appropriate method to implement a measure which is useful for 
Members to fight against deforestation and to address Members' concerns. The EU took note of 
Members' comments and voiced commitment  to continue discussing the matter. The EU also invited 
Indonesia to submit the follow up questions through AG -IMS.  
4.20  European Union, Iceland, Norway – Prohibitions on road freight transport  
4.20.1   Question by Russian Federation (AG -IMS ID 103075 ) 
On 9 April 2022, the European Union has prohibited for any road transport undertaking established 
in the Russian Federation to transport goods by road within the territory o f the EU, including in 
transit (Council Regulation № 833/2014). Similar measures were adopted by Norway (Decision No. 
1076) and Iceland (Regulation No 281/2014).  
Application of such measures only creates impediments for trade and imposes conditions that can 
negatively affect the stability of global agricultural market.  
At the same time, according to the above -mentioned regulations, competent authorities of the 
EU/Norway/Iceland may authorize the transport of goods by a road transport undertaking 
established in the Russia n Federation  if the competent authorities have determined that such 
transport is necessary for the purchase, import or transport of agricultural an d food products, 
including wheat and fertilizers whose import, purchase and transport is allowed under the 
Regulation.  
In our view, the above -mentioned provisions of the regulations can be interpreted ambiguously, and 
are inherently discretionary. Such sit uation can lead to overcompliance, which, in turn, results in 
non-application of the exemptions de -facto restrictions  in respect of agricultural products.  
In this regard, we would be grateful if the EU, Norway and Iceland could clarify the following:  
a. Can the competent authorities withhold authorizations for the transport of goods by a road 
transport undertaking established in the Russia n Federation  even if such transport is 
necessary for the purchase, import or transport of agricultural and food products, i ncluding 
wheat and fertilizers, given the wording used in the Regulation?  
b. What is the procedure for obtaining such an authorization? And what regulations govern 
this procedure?  
c. How many authorizations have been issued under this Regulation to date?  
d. Is the re an approved form of such an authorization?  
Answer by European Union  
In light of the Russian Federation 's unprovoked and illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, the 
European Union will not engage in business -as-usual activity in the WTO with the deleg ation of the 
Russian Federation.  
4.20.2   Question by Russian Federation (AG -IMS ID 103076 ) 
On 9 April 2022, the European Union has prohibited for any road transport undertaking established 
in the Russian Federation to transport goods by road within the territory of the EU, including in 
transit (Council Regulation № 833/2014). Similar measures were adopted by Norway (Decision 
No. 1076) and Iceland (Regulation No 281/20 14). 
Application of such measures only creates impediments for trade and imposes conditions that can 
negatively affect the stability of global agricultural market.  
At the same time, according to the above -mentioned regulations, competent authorities of th e 
EU/Norway/Iceland may authorize the transport of goods by a road transport undertaking 
established in the Russian Federation if the competent authorities have determined that such G/AG/W/235  
 
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  transport is necessary for the purchase, import or transport of agricultur al and food products, 
including wheat and fertilizers whose import, purchase and transport is allowed under the 
Regulation.  
In our view, the above -mentioned provisions of the regulations can be interpreted ambiguously, and 
are inherently discretionary. Suc h situation can lead to overcompliance, which, in turn, results in 
non-application of the exemptions de -facto restrictions in respect of agricultural products.  
In this regard, we would be grateful if the EU, Norway and Iceland could clarify the following:  
• Can the competent authorities withhold authorizations for the transport of goods by a road 
transport undertaking established in  the Russian Federation even if such transport is 
necessary for the purchase, import or transport of agricultural and food produ cts, including 
wheat and fertilizers, given the wording used in the Regulation?  
• What is the procedure for obtaining such an authorization? And what regulations govern 
this procedure?  
• How many authorizations have been issued under this Regulation to date?  
• Is there an approved form of such an authorization?  
Answer by Iceland  
In light of Russia's ongoing illegal invasion of Ukraine - Iceland will not engage with the Russian 
delegation to the WTO in a business -as-usual manner.  
4.20.3   Question by Russian Federation (A G-IMS ID 103077 ) 
On 9 April 2022, the European Union has prohibited for any road transport undertaking established 
in the Russian Federation to transport goo ds by road within the territory of the EU, including in 
transit (Council Regulation № 833/2014). Similar measures were adopted by Norway (Decision 
No. 1076) and Iceland (Regulation No 281/2014).  
 
Application of such measures only creates impediments for tr ade and imposes conditions that can 
negatively affect the stability of global agricultural market.  
 
At the same time, according to the above -mentioned regulations, competent authorities of the 
EU/Norway/Iceland may authorize the transport of goods by a roa d transport undertaking 
established in the Russian Federation if the competent authorities have determined that such 
transport is necessary for the purchase, import or transport of agricultural and food products, 
including wheat and fertilizers whose impor t, purchase and transport is allowed under the 
Regulation.  
 
In our view, the above -mentioned provisions of the regulations can be interpreted ambiguously, and 
are inherently discretionary. Such situation can lead to overcompliance, which, in turn, results in 
non-application of the exemptions de -facto restrictions  in respect of agricultural products.  
 
In this regard, we would be grateful if the EU, Norway and Iceland could clarify the following:  
 
a. Can the competent authorities withhold authorizations for the transport of goods by a road 
transport undertaking established in the Russian Federation even if such transport is 
necessary for the purchase, import or transport of agricultural and food products, including 
wheat and fertilizers, given the wording used in  the Regulation?  
b. What is the procedure for obtaining such an authorization? And what regulations govern 
this procedure?  
c. How many authorizations have been issued under this Regulation to date?  
d. Is there an approved form of such an authorization?  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  Answer by Norway  
Because of the Russian Federation's unprovoked, unjustified and illegal war of aggression against 
Ukraine, Norway will not engage with the Russian federation in a business -as-usual fashion at 
the WTO.   
Follow -up: The Russian Federation noted that the WTO is not a platform to raise political issues 
beyond the mandate of the WTO and the agenda of the Committee on Agriculture. The WTO should 
focus dedicatedly and exclusively on issues related to trade and the Committe e should remain the 
platform for technical and professional discussions within its mandate. The Russian Federation 
pointed out that some WTO Members promoted its political agenda in the committee which was a 
misuse of the forum. In Russia's view, statement s regarding the situation on Ukraine had not 
changed in essence since the last meeting and the repetition of those statements disrupts Members 
from their joint work on mandated issues and are disrespectful to other Members. The Russian 
Federation invited M embers to discuss the consequences of the Ukrainian crisis in other relevant 
organizations and diplomatic agencies.  
In addition, the Russian Federation noted that the attempts to accuse the Russian Federation for 
triggering the global food crisis are not economically founded and longstanding difficulties in ensuring 
food security are part of the microeconomic crisis which had evolved over the years. The Russian 
Federation stated that a range of factors contributed to the process, including the COVID -19 
outbreak and post -pandemic recovery challenges, soaring inflation, booming commodities prices and 
false introduction of biofuel technologies, as well as unilateral economic restrictive measures. The 
Russian Federation referred to the figures presented by FAO which showed food prices reached its 
peak in March after long growth period and started to decrease consistently and remained unchanged 
in October. The Russian Federation noted that this trend demonstrated clearly that price movements 
are independent of cu rrent situation in Ukraine and are driven by other factors. The Russian 
Federation called on International Organizations to make objective assessment of the fundamental 
drivers of the current crisis so Members could take appropriate policy decisions at the  WTO. On the 
grain deal which was concluded between Ukraine and the Russian Federation in Istanbul on 22 July 
as a response to the global shortage of food stuff, the Russian Federation noted that exports of food 
began on 1 August in the framework of implem entation of first part of the deal. Since then, 11.1 
million tonnes of foodstuffs including cereal and oilseeds had been safely transferred from southern 
Ukrainian ports. However, the Russian Federation pointed out that the geography of the recipient 
count ries does not correspond to the declared humanitarian objectives. The main volume of the food 
exports from Ukraine had been sent not only to developing and poor countries but also to developed 
ones. According to the Russian Federation, UN data on the quant ities of the food shipped in the 
framework of implementation of first part of the deal showed that out of the 11.1 million tonnes 
which had left Ukraine, only 2 million tonnes which represented 21% destined for lower income or 
lower -middle income countries . Out of the 3.3 million tonnes of wheat exports these countries 
received only 45 % of the shipment. The Russian Federation noted that this prevented the 
announced objective of the deal and elevated the global shortage of food despite the claim that the 
deal would the facilitate flow of agricultural goods in the word markets. The Russian Federation also 
believed that the effects of the Black Sea initiative on prices were not straightforward. After entering 
into force in August 2022 the FAO cereal price inde x decreased by just 1.2% followed by 1% increase 
in September. The Russian Federation noted that those Members that urged to improve the 
vulnerable economies did not undertake envisaged actions to provide free access for Russian grain 
and fertilisers to wo rld markets. The Russian Federation drew attention of WTO Members to the 
unilateral trade and economic decisions applied over the last few months by certain Members against 
Russian goods, banking and logistic sectors. The Russian Federation underlined that , despite 
repeated calls for the exemption of restrictions on the supplies of Russian grain, fertilizers and 
agricultural products, WTO trade policy reports as well as reports from World Food Programme still 
indicated the existence of difficulties to expor t faced by commercial clients. Russian exporters are 
facing increased import tariffs, blocking of payments, limited access to ports and infrastructure, 
restrictions for freight and road transport insurance and legal services, and failed purchases of spare 
parts of agricultural equipments. The Russian Federation stated that some of the cases were 
questioned and described in detail under the review recess of the Committee. Such action resulted 
in increased transaction costs and de facto quantitative restricti ons on Russia's supply of food and 
fertilisers leading to global food shortage and price hikes. According to International Food Policy 
Reach Institute (IFPRI) the imports of fertilisers from The Russian Federation decreased by more 
than 30% to the EU count ries and 14% to the world. The Russian Federation noted that such G/AG/W/235  
 
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  irresponsible approaches of certain Members contradicted recent G20 commitments to ensure 
accessibility of food products and avoid adverse impact on food security.  
The Russian Federation re iterated its continued commitment to participate in global efforts aimed at 
prevention of global food insecurity and huger in developing countries and least developed countries. 
The Russian Federation noted that on 17 November the first part of the grain d eal was extended for 
120 days, a result of several rounds of negotiations between the Russian Federation and the UN on 
the necessity of urgent measures of accelerating Russian agricultural and fertilizer supplies to the 
global market. The Russian Federatio n believed that prompt restitution of business as usual between 
Russian agricultural and fertilizer exporters, foreign banks, shippers and other actors could provide 
accessibility of Russian grain food stuffs and fertilisers and positively impact the globa l food security 
situations. The Russian Federation also stressed that removing the remaining obstacles to exporting 
food and fertilizers from the Russian Federation is critical for its exporters, global agricultural supplies 
and people around the world in need of food. The Russian Federation expressed systematic concern 
regarding the failure of the concerned Members to engage with other WTO Members on this issue 
as they had refused to respond on substance of the question. The Russian Federation emphasized 
the importance of transparency at the WTO and noted that unwillingness to respond to questions on 
substance is contrary to the commitments to transparency. The Russian Federation noted that the 
only way to deal with the economic crisis is to talk economics,  not policies, and to prevent the 
violation of multilateral trade rules. The Russian Federation underlined its commitments to the WTO 
principles and to respecting the rights of other Members, and called for the same approach from 
other Members.  
Switzerland  echoed the concern expressed by responding Members with regard to the critical 
situation of global food insecurity further exacerbated by Russia's action in Ukraine. Switzerland 
strongly condemned the Russian Federation's attack on Ukraine as being fundam entally in breach of 
international law and infringed the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. Switzerland called 
on the Russian Federation to respect its international obligations, reverse its actions and withdraw 
its troops. Switzerland also called on all actors to respect international law including international 
humanitarian law.  
Ukraine condemned Russia's invasion of its country as one of the biggest military acts of aggression 
of today and a brutal war of extermination against an independ ent state. Ukraine noted that, 
according to the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP), military aggression is the top driver 
of acute food insecurity. The Russia's military aggression against Ukraine has been particularly 
disrupting global trade pushin g up transport costs and lead times, while leaving farmers lacking 
access to the agricultural inputs they need. The knock -on effect on upcoming harvests will 
reverberate around the world. Ukraine stated that Russian invasion of Ukraine brought colossal dir ect 
and indirect losses in the agricultural sector. According to preliminary estimates, the direct damage 
to the Ukraine's agricultural sector exceeds USD 4 billion . Indirect losses amount to more than 
USD 35 billion . According to FAO estimates, at the end  of 2021, Ukraine was the leader in the world 
sunflower oil market with a share of about 45%, the third largest producer of corn, barley and 
rapeseed. In 2021, Ukraine was also the sixth largest producer of wheat in the world, and accounted 
for a tenth of global exports. This is the crop that is considered the most important when it comes 
to immediate consumption, and therefore the threat of famine in the poorest countries. Ukraine 
noted that it was one of the main suppliers of grain not only to developing countries, but also to 
countries with a "food deficit". At the same time, the World Food Programme estimated that an 
unprecedented 345 million people would be acutely food insecure in 2022 across the 82 countries 
where it operates, representing an increase  of almost 200 million people from the pre -pandemic 
levels. Additionally, hunger has grown more deeply entrenched, with approximately 50  million 
people in 45 countries facing severe hunger emergencies.  
Ukraine underlined its commitment to its obligations a s an agricultural exporter and its readiness to 
continue shipping agricultural products to ensure global food security and price stability on the 
international market. Ukraine noted that, since the beginning of the war, it had already exported 
26.3 million  tonnes  of agricultural products. In this regard, Ukraine welcomed the continuation of 
the work of the grain corridor. As within this corridor Ukraine had already exported over 11 million 
tonnes of agricultural products. Food was delivered to more than 40 countries of the world. About 
2/3 of the vessels went to Asian, African and the Middle East countries. Ukraine took the opportunity 
to inform Members of the launch of the Grain from Ukraine humanitarian programme initiated by 
President Zelensky. This initi ative was aimed at alleviating the food crises caused by Russian armed 
aggression against Ukraine and was implemented in partnership with the World Food Programme. G/AG/W/235  
 
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  Ukraine noted that the first vessel with 27 thousand tonnes of wheat left its border to Ethi opia last 
week, an amount of food that could feed nearly 100 thousand people for a year. Ukraine noted its 
readiness to provide any additional information regarding Grain from Ukraine programme to all 
interested Members. In Ukraine's view, these initiative s became a significant contribution to the 
stabilization of world food prices according to the FAO and World Food Programme.  
Ukraine further noted that it was not surprising that after Ukrainian ports were blocked in 
February  2022, world food prices which were already quite high after the coronavirus pandemic 
began to set new records in March. And they began to decrease together with the first reports about 
the possibility of opening a "grain corridor" from Ukrainian Black Sea ports. Ukraine referred to 
Russia's invasion as acts of state terrorism against Ukraine and the Ukrainians and noted that 
Russia's attacks on energy and water supply infrastructure are war crimes and damaged nearly 50% 
of Ukraine's energy facilities. Ukraine strongly disagreed with the  Russian Federation that the 
situation of food insecurity was caused by sanctions that many countries had imposed in response 
to Russia's aggression against Ukraine. In Ukraine's view, any sanctions against the Russian 
Federation are not related to food an d are legitimate security measures against Russia's devastating 
war. Ukraine believed that trade ties with the Russian Federation should be severed, as they are 
actively used by the Russian Federation as a tool of pressure. Ukraine called on Members to ref lect 
on how much fewer challenges in the world there would be, or would not have happened at all, if 
the Russian Federation had not invaded Ukraine. Ukraine said that the continuation of the war would 
threaten the rules based international order and would continue to destroy the world economy and 
undermine food security of the world. Ukraine expressed appreciation towards the support by 
Members, including sanctions imposed in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine and called on 
other WTO Members to make e very effort in order to limit Russia's ability to wage war, to kill 
Ukrainians and to undermine the rules -based multilateral trading system.  
The US delivered a statement on behalf of the responding Members. It reiterated those Members' 
strong support for U kraine and their commitments in working with allies and partners to impose a 
severe economic and diplomatic price on the Russian Federation for its illegal war of aggression. The 
US underlined that the common and coordinated efforts of the US and its allie s and partners in 
response to Russia's aggression in Ukraine are critical to demonstrate their determination and unity 
to amplifying their actions. Sanctions and export controls were one critical part of their overall 
strategy to hold the Russian Federatio n accountable for the war and to strengthen Ukraine's hands 
on the battlefield and at the negotiating table. The US pointed out that sanctions and export controls 
targeted key sectors of the Russian economy, such as defence, aviation and technology which w ere 
known important to President Putin's ability to project power including the ability to finance the war 
against Ukraine. The US reiterated that the sanctions imposed by them deliberately included 
carve -outs for food, fertilizers and seeds from the Russi an Federation as well as carve -outs to make 
clear that banks ensure shippers and other actors to continue bring Russian food and fertilizers to 
the world. Sanctions also exempted transactions related to trade and medicine and medical devices. 
The US noted that their sanctions did not target civilians and were not destroying farmland while 
Russia's actions are.  
Türkiye reiterated its commitments in being constructive to ensure the sustainability of global food 
trade and in its continued diplomatic efforts i n helping the countries that faced difficulties in food 
security. The Russian Federation repeated its view that the statements delivered by some Members 
were beyond the scope of the WTO and the agenda of the Committee. The Russian Federation called 
on Memb ers and the Chair to comply with the rules of conduct and to refrain from repeating political 
statements which disrupted the constructive work of the committee and wasted time of the other 
Members. The Russian Federation clarified that the mentioned exempt ions are not de facto working 
and led to de facto quantitative restrictions and urged Members to rely on statistical data and not 
on political statements.   
4.21  European Union, Iceland, Norway  – Prohibitions on access to ports   
4.21.1   Question by Russian Federation, Nicaragua , Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of 
(AG-IMS ID 103066 ) 
On 16 April 2022, the European Union has prohibited access to ports in the EU territory to any vessel 
registered under the flag of the Russian Federation, as well as to vessels that have changed their 
Russian flag or their registration to the flag or register of any other State after 24 February 2022 G/AG/W/235  
 
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  (Council Regulation № 833/2014).  Similar measures were adopted by Norway (Decision No. 1076) 
and Iceland (Regulation No 281/2014).  
At the same time, according to the mentioned regulations, competent authorities of the 
EU/Norway/Iceland may authorize a vessel to access a port under such c onditions as they deem 
appropriate, after having determined that the access is necessary for the purchase, import or 
transport of agricultural and food products, including wheat and fertilizers whose import, purchase 
and transport is allowed under the Regu lation.  
There is no settled procedure or conditions for obtaining such authorization. There is no form of 
proof of such authorization. No information on the number of permits issued.   
Such artificial logistical barriers, as well as non -transparent and ambi guous regulations are 
destabilizing global agricultural markets and have even more severe consequences for the global 
food security. For instance, according to the last estimations of the WTO, fertilizer prices rose 60% 
year-on-year in August. Meanwhile, i mposing prohibitions on logistical capabilities of one of the 
major suppliers of fertilizers, will only consolidate this upward trend, which, in turn, will lead to food 
insecurity and debt distress in developing countries.  
We expect Members concerned to ex plain how they are willing to ensure effective elimination of the 
above -mentioned restrictions in respect of agricultural products. Currently their exemptions to 
regulations are not working.  
Answer by European Union  
In light of the Russian Federation 's unp rovoked and illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, the 
European Union will not engage in business -as-usual activity in the WTO with the delegation of the 
Russian Federation.  
4.21.2   Question by Russian  Federation, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of 
(AG-IMS ID 103067 ) 
On 16 April 2022, the European Union has prohibited access to ports in the EU territory to any vessel 
registered under the flag of the Russian Federation, as well as to vessels that have changed their 
Russian flag or their registration to the flag or register of any other State after 24 February 2022 
(Council Regulation № 833/2014). Similar measures were adopted by Norway (Decision No. 10 76) 
and Iceland (Regulation No 281/2014).  At the same time, according to the mentioned regulations, 
competent authorities of the EU/Norway/Iceland may authorize a vessel to access a port under such 
conditions as they deem appropriate, after having determin ed that the access is necessary for the 
purchase, import or transport of agricultural and food products, including wheat and fertilizers whose 
import, purchase and transport is allowed under the Regulation.  
There is no settled procedure or conditions for o btaining such authorization. There is no form of 
proof of such authorization. No information on the number of permits issued.  
Such artificial logistical barriers, as well as non -transparent and ambiguous regulations are 
destabilizing global agricultural ma rkets and have even more severe consequences for the global 
food security. For instance, according to the last estimations of the WTO, fertilizer prices rose 60% 
year-on-year in August. Meanwhile, imposing prohibitions on logistical capabilities of one of the 
major suppliers of fertilizers, will only consolidate this upward trend, which, in turn, will lead to food 
insecurity and debt distress in developing countries.  
We expect Members concerned to explain how they are willing to ensure effective elimination  of the 
above -mentioned restrictions in respect of agricultural products. Currently their exemptions to 
regulations are not working.  
Answer by Norway  
Because of the Russian Federation's unprovoked, unjustified and illegal war of aggression against 
Ukraine,  Norway will not engage with the Russian federation in a business -as-usual fashion at 
the WTO.   G/AG/W/235  
 
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  4.21.3   Question by Russian Federation , Nicaragua, Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of (AG -
IMS ID 103068 ) 
On 16 April 2022, the European Union has prohibited access to ports in the EU territory to any vessel 
registered under the flag of the Russian Federation, as well as to vessels that have changed their 
Russian flag or their registration to the flag or register of any other State after 24 February 2022 
(Council Regulation № 833/2014). Similar measures were adopted by Norway (Decision No. 1076) 
and Iceland (Regulation No 281/2014).  
At the same time, according to the menti oned regulations, competent authorities of the 
EU/Norway/Iceland may authorize a vessel to access a port under such conditions as they deem 
appropriate, after having determined that the access is necessary for the purchase, import or 
transport of agricultu ral and food products, including wheat and fertilizers whose import, purchase 
and transport is allowed under the Regulation.  
There is no settled procedure or conditions for obtaining such authorization. There is no form of 
proof of such authorization. No i nformation on the number of permits issued.  
Such artificial logistical barriers, as well as non -transparent and ambiguous regulations are 
destabilizing global agricultural markets and have even more severe consequences for the global 
food security. For ins tance, according to the last estimations of the WTO, fertilizer prices rose 60% 
year-on-year in August. Meanwhile, imposing prohibitions on logistical capabilities of one of the 
major suppliers of fertilizers, will only consolidate this upward trend, which , in turn, will lead to food 
insecurity and debt distress in developing countries.  
We expect Members concerned to explain how they are willing to ensure effective elimination of the 
above -mentioned restrictions  in respect of agricultural products. Currentl y their exemptions to 
regulations are not working.   
Answer by Iceland  
In light of Russia's ongoing illegal invasion of Ukraine - Iceland will not engage with the Russian 
delegation to the WTO in a business -as-usual manner.  
Follow -up: The Russian Federation  noted that the WTO is not a platform to raise political issues 
beyond the mandate of the WTO and the agenda of the Committee on Agriculture. The WTO should 
focus dedicatedly and exclusively on issues related to trade and the Committee should remain the 
platform for technical and professional discussions within its mandate. The Russian Federation 
pointed out that some WTO Members promoted its political agenda in the committee which was a 
misuse of the forum. In Russia's view, statements regarding the situat ion on Ukraine had not 
changed in essence since the last meeting and the repetition of those statements disrupts Members 
from their joint work on mandated issues and are disrespectful to other Members. The Russian 
Federation invited Members to discuss the consequences of the Ukrainian crisis in other relevant 
organizations and diplomatic agencies.  
In addition, the Russian Federation noted that the attempts to accuse the Russian Federation for 
triggering the global food crisis are not economically founded a nd longstanding difficulties in ensuring 
food security are part of the microeconomic crisis which had evolved over the years. The Russian 
Federation stated that a range of factors contributed to the process, including the COVID -19 
outbreak and post -pandemi c recovery challenges, soaring inflation, booming commodities prices and 
false introduction of biofuel technologies, as well as unilateral economic restrictive measures. The 
Russian Federation referred to the figures presented by FAO which showed food pric es reached its 
peak in March after long growth period and started to decrease consistently and remained unchanged 
in October. The Russian Federation noted that this trend demonstrated clearly that price movements 
are independent of current situation in Ukr aine and are driven by other factors. The Russian 
Federation called on International Organizations to make objective assessment of the fundamental 
drivers of the current crisis so Members could take appropriate policy decisions at the WTO. On the 
grain dea l which was concluded between Ukraine and the Russian Federation in Istanbul on 22 July 
as a response to the global shortage of food stuff, the Russian Federation noted that exports of food 
began on 1 August in the framework of implementation of first part  of the deal. Since then, 
11.1 million tonnes of foodstuffs including cereal and oilseeds had been safely transferred from G/AG/W/235  
 
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  southern Ukrainian ports. However, the Russian Federation pointed out that the geography of the 
recipient countries does not correspo nd to the declared humanitarian objectives. The main volume 
of the food exports from Ukraine had been sent not only to developing and poor countries but also 
to developed ones. According to the Russian Federation, UN data on the quantities of the food 
shipped in the framework of implementation of first part of the deal showed that out of the 
11.1 million tonnes which had left Ukraine, only 2 million tonnes which represented 21% destined 
for lower income or lower -middle income countries. Out of the 3.3 milli on tonnes of wheat exports 
these countries received only 45 % of the shipment. The Russian Federation noted that this 
prevented the announced objective of the deal and elevated the global shortage of food despite the 
claim that the deal would the facilitat e flow of agricultural goods in the word markets. The Russian 
Federation also believed that the effects of the Black Sea initiative on prices were not 
straightforward. After entering into force in August 2022 the FAO cereal price index decreased by 
just 1. 2% followed by 1% increase in September. The Russian Federation noted that those Members 
that urged to improve the vulnerable economies did not undertake envisaged actions to provide free 
access for Russian grain and fertilisers to world markets. The Russi an Federation drew attention of 
WTO Members to the unilateral trade and economic decisions applied over the last few months by 
certain Members against Russian goods, banking and logistic sectors. The Russian Federation 
underlined that, despite repeated cal ls for the exemption of restrictions on the supplies of Russian 
grain, fertilizers and agricultural products, WTO trade policy reports as well as reports from World 
Food Programme still indicated the existence of difficulties to export faced by commercial clients. 
Russian exporters are facing increased import tariffs, blocking of payments, limited access to ports 
and infrastructure, restrictions for freight and road transport insurance and legal services, and failed 
purchases of spare parts of agricultural equipments. The Russian Federation stated that some of the 
cases were questioned and described in detail under the review recess of the Committee. Such action 
resulted in increased transaction costs and de facto quantitative restrictions on Russia's supply  of 
food and fertilisers leading to global food shortage and price hikes. According to International Food 
Policy Reach Institute (IFPRI) the imports of fertilisers from The Russian Federation decreased by 
more than 30% to the EU countries and 14% to the wo rld. The Russian Federation noted that such 
irresponsible approaches of certain Members contradicted recent G20 commitments to ensure 
accessibility of food products and avoid adverse impact on food security.  
The Russian Federation reiterated its continued  commitment to participate in global efforts aimed at 
prevention of global food insecurity and huger in developing countries and least developed countries. 
The Russian Federation noted that on 17 November the first part of the grain deal was extended for 
120 days, a result of several rounds of negotiations between the Russian Federation and the UN on 
the necessity of urgent measures of accelerating Russian agricultural and fertilizer supplies to the 
global market. The Russian Federation believed that prompt  restitution of business as usual between 
Russian agricultural and fertilizer exporters, foreign banks, shippers and other actors could provide 
accessibility of Russian grain food stuffs and fertilisers and positively impact the global food security 
situat ions. The Russian Federation also stressed that removing the remaining obstacles to exporting 
food and fertilizers from the Russian Federation is critical for its exporters, global agricultural supplies 
and people around the world in need of food. The Russ ian Federation expressed systematic concern 
regarding the failure of the concerned Members to engage with other WTO Members on this issue 
as they had refused to respond on substance of the question. The Russian Federation emphasized 
the importance of trans parency at the WTO and noted that unwillingness to respond to questions on 
substance is contrary to the commitments to transparency. The Russian Federation noted that the 
only way to deal with the economic crisis is to talk economics, not policies, and to prevent the 
violation of multilateral trade rules. The Russian Federation underlined its commitments to the WTO 
principles and to respecting the rights of other Members, and called for the same approach from 
other Members.  
Switzerland echoed the concern ex pressed by responding Members with regard to the critical 
situation of global food insecurity further exacerbated by Russia's action in Ukraine. Switzerland 
strongly condemned the Russian Federation's attack on Ukraine as being fundamentally in breach of 
international law and infringed the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. Switzerland called 
on the Russian Federation to respect its international obligations, reverse its actions and withdraw 
its troops. Switzerland also called on all actors t o respect international law including international 
humanitarian law.  
Ukraine condemned Russia's invasion of its country as one of the biggest military acts of aggression 
of today and a brutal war of extermination against an independent state. Ukraine not ed that, 
according to the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP), military aggression is the top driver G/AG/W/235  
 
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  of acute food insecurity. The Russia's military aggression against Ukraine has been particularly 
disrupting global trade pushing up transport costs a nd lead times, while leaving farmers lacking 
access to the agricultural inputs they need. The knock -on effect on upcoming harvests will 
reverberate around the world. Ukraine stated that Russian invasion of Ukraine brought colossal direct 
and indirect losse s in the agricultural sector. According to preliminary estimates, the direct damage 
to the Ukraine's agricultural sector exceeds USD 4 billion . Indirect losses amount to more than 
USD 35 billion . According to FAO estimates, at the end of 2021, Ukraine was the leader in the world 
sunflower oil market with a share of about 45%, the third largest producer of corn, barley and 
rapeseed. In 2021, Ukraine was also the sixth largest producer of wheat in the world, and accounted 
for a tenth of global exports. This i s the crop that is considered the most important when it comes 
to immediate consumption, and therefore the threat of famine in the poorest countries. Ukraine 
noted that it was one of the main suppliers of grain not only to developing countries, but also to  
countries with a "food deficit". At the same time, the World Food Programme estimated that an 
unprecedented 345 million people would be acutely food insecure in 2022 across the 82 countries 
where it operates, representing an increase of almost 200 million  people from the pre -pandemic 
levels. Additionally, hunger has grown more deeply entrenched, with approximately 50  million 
people in 45 countries facing severe hunger emergencies.  
Ukraine underlined its commitment to its obligations as an agricultural expo rter and its readiness to 
continue shipping agricultural products to ensure global food security and price stability on the 
international market. Ukraine noted that, since the beginning of the war, it had already exported 
26.3 million tonnes  of agricultura l products. In this regard, Ukraine welcomed the continuation of 
the work of the grain corridor. As within this corridor Ukraine had already exported over 11 million 
tonnes of agricultural products. Food was delivered to more than 40 countries of the world . About 
2/3 of the vessels went to Asian, African and the Middle East countries. Ukraine took the opportunity 
to inform Members of the launch of the Grain from Ukraine humanitarian programme initiated by 
President Zelensky. This initiative was aimed at all eviating the food crises caused by Russian armed 
aggression against Ukraine and was implemented in partnership with the World Food Programme. 
Ukraine noted that the first vessel with 27 thousand tonnes of wheat left its border to Ethiopia last 
week, an amo unt of food that could feed nearly 100 thousand people for a year. Ukraine noted its 
readiness to provide any additional information regarding Grain from Ukraine programme to all 
interested Members. In Ukraine's view, these initiatives became a significant  contribution to the 
stabilization of world food prices according to the FAO and World Food Programme.  
Ukraine further noted that it was not surprising that after Ukrainian ports were blocked in 
February  2022, world food prices which were already quite hig h after the coronavirus pandemic 
began to set new records in March. And they began to decrease together with the first reports about 
the possibility of opening a "grain corridor" from Ukrainian Black Sea ports. Ukraine referred to 
Russia's invasion as acts  of state terrorism against Ukraine and the Ukrainians and noted that 
Russia's attacks on energy and water supply infrastructure are war crimes and damaged nearly 50% 
of Ukraine's energy facilities. Ukraine strongly disagreed with the Russian Federation th at the 
situation of food insecurity was caused by sanctions that many countries had imposed in response 
to Russia's aggression against Ukraine. In Ukraine's view, any sanctions against the Russian 
Federation are not related to food and are legitimate secur ity measures against Russia's devastating 
war. Ukraine believed that trade ties with the Russian Federation should be severed, as they are 
actively used by the Russian Federation as a tool of pressure. Ukraine called on Members to reflect 
on how much fewer  challenges in the world there would be, or would not have happened at all, if 
the Russian Federation had not invaded Ukraine. Ukraine said that the continuation of the war would 
threaten the rules based international order and would continue to destroy th e world economy and 
undermine food security of the world. Ukraine expressed appreciation towards the support by 
Members, including sanctions imposed in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine and called on 
other WTO Members to make every effort in order t o limit Russia's ability to wage war, to kill 
Ukrainians and to undermine the rules -based multilateral trading system.  
The US delivered a statement on behalf of the responding Members. It reiterated those Members' 
strong support for Ukraine and their commi tments in working with allies and partners to impose a 
severe economic and diplomatic price on the Russian Federation for its illegal war of aggression. The 
US underlined that the common and coordinated efforts of the US and its allies and partners in 
response to Russia's aggression in Ukraine are critical to demonstrate their determination and unity 
to amplifying their actions. Sanctions and export controls were one critical part of their overall 
strategy to hold the Russian Federation accountable for the war and to strengthen Ukraine's hands 
on the battlefield and at the negotiating table. The US pointed out that sanctions and export controls G/AG/W/235  
 
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  targeted key sectors of the Russian economy, such as defence, aviation and technology which were 
known important to  President Putin's ability to project power including the ability to finance the war 
against Ukraine. The US reiterated that the sanctions imposed by them deliberately included 
carve -outs for food, fertilizers and seeds from the Russian Federation as well as carve -outs to make 
clear that banks ensure shippers and other actors to continue bring Russian food and fertilizers to 
the world. Sanctions also exempted transactions related to trade and medicine and medical devices. 
The US noted that their sanctions d id not target civilians and were not destroying farmland while 
Russia's actions are.  
Türkiye reiterated its commitments in being constructive to ensure the sustainability of global food 
trade and in its continued diplomatic efforts in helping the countrie s that faced difficulties in food 
security. The Russian Federation repeated its view that the statements delivered by some Members 
were beyond the scope of the WTO and the agenda of the Committee. The Russian Federation called 
on Members and the Chair to c omply with the rules of conduct and to refrain from repeating political 
statements which disrupted the constructive work of the committee and wasted time of the other 
Members. The Russian Federation clarified that the mentioned exemptions are not de facto working 
and led to de facto quantitative restrictions and urged Members to rely on statistical data and not 
on political statements.   
4.22  EU's Temporary Framework for State Aid  
4.22.1   Question by Brazil  (AG-IMS ID 103089 ) 
According to information available online, on 28 October, the European Commission announced the 
extension of the EU's Temporary Framework for state aid , which was supposed to have been 
terminated by 30 June 2022.   
 
Sources:  https://competition -policy.ec.europa.eu/state -aid/coronavirus/temporar y-framework_en  
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_22_4622  
 
In light of the above, Brazil would appreciate if the EU could provide the followi ng clarifications:   
 
a. Is this programme the same that was originally adopted upon the outbreak of the 
COVID -19 pandemic?  
b. Has the programme been operating under the same rules regarding eligibility and 
maximum payments since its adoption?  
c. How should Members expect to identify such state aid in future DS:1 notifications by 
the EU? 
Answer by European Union  
a. The E uropean Union confirms that the programme is the same.   
b. In May 2022, the Commission announced that it will phase out the COVID Temporary 
Framework. The COVID Temporary Framework was not extended beyond 30  June 2022 
for most of the tools provided. To avoid a cliff -edge effect and to allow sufficient time for 
the roll -out and implementation especially of the recovery tools set out in sections 3.13 
and 3.14, those sections of the COVID Temporary Framework have a later expiry date. 
Section 3.13 offers the possibility for member States to provide specific investment 
support until 31  December 2022 and section 3.14 allows for solvency support measures 
31 December  2023. Section 3.13 is now prolonged until December 2023 with the same 
rules.  
The EU takes note of labour shortages and continued disruptions in supply chains following the 
COVID -19 pandemic. The EU also notes that the economic recovery from the COVID cris is is delayed 
even further, in view of the consequences on the economies of member States caused by the 
unprovoked attack by the Russia n Federation  on Ukraine. In view of these facts, the EU considers 
that it is justified to provide more time for the measu re allowing for investment support towards a 
sustainable recovery to achieve its objectives."  In short, recovery from the pandemic has slowed G/AG/W/235  
 
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  down due to the Ukraine crisis and more time is needed to ensure sustainable recovery, thus, to 
implement the plan ned investments.   
c. The support granted under this programme will be included in its DS:1  notifications for 
the years in question and according to agreed WTO categorisation (Amber, Blue or 
Green  Box).  
4.23  EU's Blue Box programmes  
4.23.1   Question by India (AG -IMS ID 103136 ) 
EU plans to implement a new Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) at the start of 2023. In the past, 
the EU implemented Blue ox programmes to support the farmers. As per the domestic support 
notification for the marketing year 2019/2020, the EU provided the Blue box support based on fixed 
area and yields; and livestock payments were made on a fixed number of heads.  
a. It is requested to provide information about the level of support to various crops and 
livestock under this production limiting programme for the marketing years 2020/2021 
and 2021/2022.  
b. Does the EU intend to implement the Blue Box programmes under the new Common 
Agricultural Policy  (CAP)?  
Answer by European Union  
The EU thanks India for the questions.  
 
a. As concerns marketing year 2020/2021, the EU is actively working on the finalisation of 
DS:1 notification, which will be available in the beginning of 2023. For marketing year 
2021/20 22, the internal data necessary for the notification will be only available by the 
end of 2023. Therefore, the DS:1 notification for 2021 -2022 will be available in the 
beginning of 2024.   
b. Once all CAP Strategic Plans of the EU member States are approved, t he EU will notify the 
Membership of all programmes, including those falling under the Blue Box. As mentioned 
in earlier replies by the EU in this Committee, most of the current Blue Box measures will 
in the new CAP no longer be required to fulfil Blue Box criteria and therefore be included 
in Amber Box support in future DS:1 notifications from marketing year 2022/2023.  
Follow -up: India urged the European Union  to supply the information relating to marketing year 
2021 as soon as possible. Considering the EU' s interest in transparency and information sharing at 
the Committee, India hoped it would lead by example and provide the requested information. 
Paraguay noted that many Article 18.6 questions were raised due to delay in notifications and could 
be avoided if Members keep their notifications up to date. Paraguay also invited Members to respond 
to questions in a clear manner to help understand each other's policies. Brazil acknowledged that 
the EU had already indicated earlier that it intended to present to t he Committee more detailed 
information on its agricultural policies. Brazil noted that EU's new Common Agricultural Policy in the 
context of the Green Deal, Farm to Fork, and member States' strategic plans seem to bring 
significant changes to EU's agricult ural policies and to the way how it conforms to the Agreement on 
Agriculture and classifies its expenditures. Brazil stressed the importance of getting the information 
about these changes before they are implemented.   
4.24  France - "European Food and Agricultur al Resilience Mission" initiative  
4.24.1   Question by Brazil, Paraguay  (AG-IMS ID 103005 ) 
Brazil would like to consult France on the "European Food and Agricultural Resilience Mission" (FARM) 
initiative. In a recent Communiqué issued by the Presidency of the Republic 
(https://franceintheus.org/spip.php?article10921 ), it was explained that:   G/AG/W/235  
 
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  " (.) The private sector is encouraged to collaborate with WFP by providing food commodities, supply 
chain solutions, and agricultural inputs at favorable costs to ensure that WFP operations are 
sustained and able to reach countries and people most in need. To this end, WFP has started 
discussions with the Global Business for Food Security (GFS) coalition."   
Furthermore, in document G/AG/GEN/205, circulated by the WFP to the last CoA meeting, it is 
explained that:   
"3.3. The principle underpinning the initiat ive is global solidarity - a multisectoral response 
mechanism where countries with surpluses of cereals avail these surpluses to deficit countries."   
Taking into account the food aid rules in the AoA and in the Nairobi Ministerial Decision on Export 
Compet ition, could France provide further information:   
a. on the proposition that sales to the WFP should occur at favorable costs and whether and 
to what extent will European governments be involved with such sales at favorable costs?   
b. On the nature of the stocks  that it intends to export through the initiative.  
Answer by European Union  
The European Food and Agricultural Resilience Mission (FARM) was launched following Russia's 
unlawful invasion of Ukraine. The initiative is a solidarity mechanism with a component  steered by 
the World Food Programme (WFP).  
The Global Business for Food Security (GSF) coalition was launched to mobilize the private sector 
and invite it to contribute to solidarity efforts.  This coalition and the WFP have begun discussions 
with a view to reaching agreement on the specific steps they can take together, so that the WFP's 
operating costs, which have been impacted by energy, transport and food price inflation, can be 
reduced as much as possible thanks to the support of private sector a ctors.  
As indicated in a recent WFP press release, "[t]he 'Solidarity Mechanism' that is being launched 
offers a platform for a multi -sectoral response and the private sector plays a pivotal role. The private 
sector is encouraged to collaborate with WFP by providing food commodities, supply chain solutions 
and agricultural inputs at favourable costs to ensure that WFP operations are sustained and able to 
reach countries and people most in need. To this end, WFP has started discussions with the Global 
Business for Food Security (GFS) coalition.  
WFP's deep field presence, network of partners of the ground, advanced data analytics capacity, 
global logistics network, and significant purchasing power put the agency in a unique position to 
work in solidarity wit h the private sector and key international partners and organisations, including 
the Food Agricultural Organization [sic] (FAO) and International Fund for Agricultural Development 
(IFAD), to address the acute food needs of the most fragile countries, espec ially in Africa."  The 
private sector can contribute via in -kind or cash donations or by providing logistics support at their 
own expense. There are no plans for governments to mobilize any public stocks within this 
framework, or to subsidize the private se ctor in this context.  
Governments are, however, urged to increase their support and contributions to the WFP, in 
accordance with usual procedures.  
4.25  India's export restrictions on  wheat  
4.25.1   Question by United Kingdom, Switzerland , Ukraine, European Union (AG -IMS ID 
103060 ) 
The United Kingdom thanks India for their response to AG -IMS ID s 102012  and 102021  but notes 
that the required ER:1 table, notifying the Committee on Agriculture of India 's export restriction on 
wheat, is still outstanding. We would therefore like to remind India of their obligations under 
Article  12.1(b) of the Agreement  on Agriculture and request an update on when the required ER:1 
table will be provided to this Committee.   G/AG/W/235  
 
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  Answer by India  
The relevant notification is under preparation and would be submitted in due course.  
Follow -up: The United  Kingdom expressed concern regarding India's export restrictions on wheat 
and rice as referenced in AG -IMS ID 103028 and the impact these measures may have on other 
Members' food security. The UK encouraged India to fulfil its obligation and notify these measures 
to the Committee on  Agriculture. To help address the transparency concerns, the UK urged India to 
submit the required Table ER:1 as soon as possible. Switzerland echoed UK's comments and looked 
forward to Switzerland's ER:1 notification. Ukraine noted that the imposition of export restrictions 
may contribute to price volatility and adversely affect international food markets. Ukraine 
encouraged other WTO Members to ensure that any emergency measures introduced to address 
food security concerns shall minimize trade distortions  as far as possible and be temporary, targeted, 
transparent and proportionate. Ukraine underscored the need for Members to adhere to the WTO 
commitments, including those contained in recently adopted Ministerial declarations, for agricultural 
food trade to  flow. The EU echoed the UK and Ukraine's comments.   
4.25.2   Question by Australia  (AG-IMS ID 103092 ) 
Australia asked India a follow -up question at 102nd CoA (AG -IMS ID 102092 ) on export restrictions 
on wheat. As this was not answered, it is asked again.  
Australia thanks India for its response to its previous question on India' s announcement of export 
restrictions on wheat (AG -IMS ID 101019 ). In its response, India  answered that the conditions of 
its implementation of the export restriction is notified in Notification 13 May 2022, issued by the 
Directorate General of Foreign Trade (DGFT) and subsequent DGFT notices. Australia notes the 
length of the restriction has not been indicated in DGFT notices.  
In light of this, Australia asks that India indicate how long it intends for the restriction to remain 
place.  
Answer by India  
The measure is being reviewed from time to time to enable necessary amendments based on 
domes tic demand and supply situation.  
4.26  India's dairy subsidies   
4.26.1   Question by Australia (AG -IMS ID 103090 ) 
Australia notes public reporting ( https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/kerala/subsidy -for-
dairy-farmers -societies -minister/article65775341.ece  and https://www.business -
standard.com/article/economy -policy/milk -scheme -benefits -more-than-800-000-producers -in-
rajasthan -official -122102001163_1.html ) that dairy farmers across multiple Indian states will be 
receiving or have already received payments per litre of milk produced; subsidies in the form of 
cows to farms; and payments per acre to promote fodder gras s cultivation. Payments have also 
been made to state -level dairy cooperatives.  
Australia asks that India provide information on the measures, including:  
a. the different payments available to dairy farmers at the national and state levels ; 
b. the intended duration of these payment programmes ; 
c. eligibility and calculation of payments for each of the agents identified ; and  
d. the allocated budget for the programmes.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  Answer by India  
a. to d. The information with regard to this question is being sought from the Department concerned 
and would be provided in due course.  
Follow -up: New Zealand and the United States  supported the question. The US noted that media 
reports indicated that multiple Indian states provided payments to the dairy industry and  one such 
measure published by the government of Rajasthan website included a per litre payment to milk 
that was recently increased from 2 to 5 rupees per litre, with payments had been made in both 
2020-21 and 2021 -22. According to the state Government of Rajasthan, the purpose of the 
programme was to increase the number of producers and the state government had confirmed that 
the number of producers had been increasing as a result of the measure. Noting the absence of this 
measure in India's notifications,  the US requested India to provide more information on its 
subnational measures for dairy and other sectors.   
4.27  India's public stockholding  
4.27.1   Question by United States of America, Canada, Japan, Thailand, Brazil, Paraguay, 
Uruguay, Australia, New Zealand, Euro pean Union (AG -IMS ID 103025 ) 
In AG -IMS ID 102018  several Members asked India about information on state bonuses provided in 
addition to the Indian central government 's minimum support prices.  In response, India stated "The 
informatio n would be provided when available " but did not respond to parts b(i), b(ii), or b(iii) of 
the question. Given that no information has been provided since the last Committee meeting, we 
therefore ask the following questions:  
 
a. Please provide an update on if  the information on state bonuses is available.  
b. If the information is not available, please provide a time estimate for when the information 
will be available.  
c. If the information is not available, please provide an update including:  
i. when the request was ma de to the State governments;  
ii. the time frame which India gave State governments to respond; and  
iii. whether any preliminary information has been collected.   
Answer by India  
a. to c. With regard to State bonuses, efforts are being made to compile the data. It ma y happen 
that the few States who announced bonuses for a crop may not have actually implemented it. The 
information would be provided as and when available, and are able to compile the data in a manner 
suitable for notification.  
4.27.2   Question by United States o f America, Canada, Japan, Thailand, Ukraine, Brazil, 
Paraguay, Uruguay, Australia, New Zealand, European Union (AG -IMS ID 103026 ) 
In AG -IMS ID 102019 , the Members asked for India to show where annual quantitative levels of  
current, historical, and pre -determined levels of wheat and rice stocks since 2010 can be 
found.  India's response discusses notified procurement levels, which is not the same as current, 
historical, and pre -determined levels of wheat and rice stocks.  Further, India went on to state that 
the government procures food grains to provide food security to 75%  of the rural and 50%  of the 
urban population.  However, the share of the population receiving subsidized food grains does not 
answer the question asked.  
 
Also in AG -IMS ID 102019 , India stated that it believes summaries of consultative meetings between 
the government and the Food Corporation of India (FCI) held to assess the availability of wheat and 
rice for procurement at Minimum Support Prices (MSP) constitute information that is beyond the 
remit of CoA and AoA notification requirements. Membe rs have requested this information as it was G/AG/W/235  
 
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  India that stated in AG -IMS ID 87156 that the government of India decides target levels for wheat 
and paddy/ric e procurement based on this information. India also referred generally to the 
Department of Food and Public Distribution homepage, but not to any specific location for the 
requested information, which Members have been unable to identify.  
 
Please provide c urrent, historical, and pre -determined levels of wheat and rice stocks since 2010.   
 
a. If unable to provide the quantitative levels for each, please confirm that India does not maintain 
predetermined targets for the quantity and procurement of wheat and r ice annually.  
Answer by India  
The response to this question has already been provided in reply to Question AG -IMS ID 102019 . 
Follow -up: Ukraine stressed that PSH -related policies should be as transparent as possible and 
Members should ensure that the policy measures adopted towards achieving national food security 
objectives do not  undermine food security objectives of other Members and be in line with 
transparency requirements. Brazil noted that Members have been seeking information from India on 
state bonuses, other support provided by subnational entities, predetermined targets a s well as on 
other relevant information since India's DS:1 notification circulated in March 2020 presented a 
breach of its de minimis level. Brazil noted that the requested information had been pending for 
more than two and a half years and the information  is indispensable for the assessment of India's 
compliance with its WTO commitments. Brazil noted that this situation explained Brazil's and other 
Members' interest in engaging in consultations with India under paragraph 6 of the Bali Decision as 
a means t o gain a deeper understanding of its PSH programmes. With the understanding that the 
requested data is available at an aggregated level, Paraguay once again requested India to provide 
disaggregated data. The US echoed the comments from Brazil and Paraguay and noted its concern 
with the lack of full responses and the information that had been requested. Thailand expressed 
concern regarding India's PSH programmes and the lack of transparency on those programmes. 
Thailand reminded India that the additional inf ormation requested, and the statistics outlined in the 
annex to the Bali Ministerial decision is an obligation that any Member who seeks to benefit from the 
decision must fulfil. Australia, the EU, Canada, Japan New Zealand, and Uruguay registered interest  
in the issue and echoed previous interventions. India stated that the requirement for invoking the 
Bali peace clause is to provide certain information which India had provided in each of its three 
notifications and the additional information sought by som e Members was beyond what is required 
for invoking the Bali Decision. India disagreed with Members' comments on the lack of transparency 
on its PSH programmes and voiced commitment to make its best efforts to providing the additional 
information. India als o reminded that some Members who mentioned about transparency were not 
up to date with their own DS notifications.   
4.28  India's other support for rice  
4.28.1   Question by United States of America, Canada, Japan, Thailand, Brazil, Paraguay, 
Uruguay, Australia, New Zeal and, European Union (AG -IMS ID 103029 ) 
In AG -IMS ID 102020 , several Members sought clarity with regards to India 's response to AG -IMS 
ID 101037 , which states "After consulting with relevant Ministries/Departments, it was found that 
no support other than that for the PSH purposes has been provided for rice. " India re -stated this 
statement without any further clarification than that 'other support for rice ' does not include the 
state bonuses.  
 
Please confirm whether India has consulted with state governments to confirm whether there are 
any additional sub -nationa l rice support measures (other than state bonuses) and if there are any 
other state -level support measures that are not notified.  
Answer by India  
As has already been  conveyed in the previous CoA meeting, after consulting the relevant 
Ministries/Departments, it was found that no support other than that for the PSH purposes has been 
provided for rice. Other support does not include the State bonuses.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  Follow -up: Brazil n oted that Members have been seeking information from India on state bonuses, 
other support provided by subnational entities, predetermined targets as well as on other relevant 
information since India's DS:1 notification circulated in March 2020 presented a  breach of its de 
minimis level. Brazil noted that the requested information had been pending for more than two and 
a half years and the information is indispensable for the assessment of India's compliance with its 
WTO commitments. Brazil noted that this situation explained Brazil's and other Members' interest in 
engaging in consultations with India under paragraph 6 of the Bali Decision as a means to gain a 
deeper understanding of its PSH programmes. With the understanding that the requested data is 
available at an aggregated level, Paraguay once again requested India to provide disaggregated 
data. The US echoed the comments from Brazil and Paraguay and noted its concern with the lack of 
full responses and the information that had been requested. Thailand expressed concern regarding 
India's PSH programmes and the lack of transparency on those programmes. Thailand reminded 
India that the additional information requested, and the statistics outlined in the annex to the Bali 
Ministerial decision is an obligati on that any Member who seeks to benefit from the decision must 
fulfil. Australia, the EU, Canada, Japan New Zealand, and Uruguay registered interest in the issue 
and echoed previous interventions. India stated that the requirement for invoking the Bali pea ce 
clause is to provide certain information which India had provided in each of its three notifications 
and the additional information sought by some Members was beyond what is required for invoking 
the Bali Decision. India disagreed with Members' comments  on the lack of transparency on its 
PSH programmes and voiced commitment to make its best efforts to providing the additional 
information. India also reminded that some Members who mentioned about transparency were not 
up to date with their own DS notifica tions.   
4.29  India's food security policies  
4.29.1   Question by United States of America, Japan , Paraguay, New Zealand (AG -IMS ID 
103027 ) 
In AG -IMS ID 102025 , India did not respond to part b. or part c., and gave the same non -working 
website link in response to part d., and also responded to part a. by saying that factors such as the 
cost of cultivation/production, changes in input prices, input/output price parity, inter -crop price 
parity, effects on the cost of living, effects on general pri ce level, and parity between prices paid and 
prices received by farmers, have resulted in the change in applied administered price over the years.  
 
a. Which of these factors changed between the period 2018 -2019 and the period 2020 -2021, 
and how did any such c hange cause the government to change the applied administered 
prices?  
b. We ask part b. again: What policies or reforms is India implementing or considering to 
achieve its food security objectives in a manner consistent with WTO rules?  
c. We ask part c. again: P lease explain the steady increase in open market sales of public 
stocks between 2018 and 2021.  
d. The link provided ( http://fci.gov.in/sales.php?view=224 ) times out without ever loading 
and gives the error "This site can 't be reached. " Please provide a working link to the 
information or provide the requested information directly in written response to this 
question.  
Answer by India  
a. Minimum Support Prices or Applied Administered Prices (AAP) are announced by the 
Government, after considering the recommendations of the Commission for Agricultural 
Costs and Prices (CACP), which takes into account various factors including the cost of 
cultivation/production, changes in input prices, input/output price parity, int er-crop price 
parity, effects on the cost of living, effects on general price level, parity between prices 
paid and prices received by farmers, etc. These are the factors that have resulted in the 
change in AAP over the years.   
b. Furthermore, in addition to coverage under the National Food Security Act, the 
Government of India also implemented the Pradhan Mantri Garib Kalyan Yojana  (PMGKY) G/AG/W/235  
 
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  to provide food to vulnerable sections of society during the pandemic. Owing to this, 
among other factors, there was an increase in eligible production. Open market sale is 
done by the Food Corporation of India (FCI) based on the market situation.   
c. The quantities released through open -market sales are demand driven. As explained 
previously in reply to Question ID 98066, mos t of the OMSS (D) quantity has been taken 
up by the State Governments for meeting the requirements under various food security 
and welfare schemes, and a small proportion was taken up by the private traders.   
d. The provided link ( http://fci.gov.in/sales.php?view=224 ) has been rechecked and it is 
working. Since the issue of the link not working has been raised again, we will send the 
required information over email to the concerned Members who ha ve raised this issue.  
4.30  India's price support   
4.30.1   Question by United States of America, Paraguay , Australia (AG -IMS ID 103024 ) 
In AG -IMS ID 102017 , WTO Members (United States, Australia, and Paraguay) asked what policy 
change occurred prior to 1995 -96 that necessitated a change in how India notifies support for 
commodities including barley, maize, millet, sorghum, gram (chickpeas), arhar/tur (pigeon peas), 
urad (black matpe), moong (mung beans), and lentils, which resulted in India 's subsequent 
consist ent notification of price supports on an aggregate basis. The Members also asked for India to 
provide the level of procurement for the following commodities for the notification period 2020/21 
in G/AG/N/IND/27 : jowar, bajra, maize, tur, moong, urad, barley, gram, and masur.  In addit ion, 
the Members asked for India to provide the value of production for each of the following commodities 
for the notification period 2020/21 in G/AG/N/IND/27: jowar, bajra, maize, tur, moong, urad, barley, 
gram, and masur.  
 
India provided a few sentences of reasoning related to why India has notified various pulses on an 
aggregated basis, but did not provide information on any policy change that occurred prior to 
1995-1996.  India did not provide any levels of procurement for any of the commodities 
requeste d. India provided aggregated value of production for pulses and coarse cereals, but did not 
provide value of production for any of the individual commodities requested.  Thus, we resubmit all 
three questions:  
 
a. Please explain what policy change occurred prio r to 1995 -96 that necessitated a change 
in how India notifies support for these commodities, which resulted in India 's subsequent 
consistent notification of price supports on an aggregate basis.  
b. Please provide the level of procurement for the following com modities for the notification 
period 2020/21 in G/AG/N/IND/27: jowar, bajra, maize, tur, moong, urad, barley, gram, 
and masur.  
c. Please provide the value of production for each of the following commodities for the 
notification period 2020/21 in G/AG/N/IND/27 : jowar, bajra, maize, tur, moong, urad, 
barley, gram, and masur.  
Answer by India  
a. to c. Pulses are a major source of protein and form an integral part of the Indian diet and food 
security. Tur, urad, moong, gram, and others are different varieties of pulses and therefore, it is 
reasonable to calculate product -specific support for aggregated pulses. The external reference price 
is calculated based on the simple average of external reference price of various pulses given in AGST 
and used to calculate product specific support for pulses. Similarly, the applied administered price 
is the simple average of minimum support price for various pulses. The same practice is consistently 
used for coarse cereals. India is consistently notifying product s pecific support for pulses and coarse 
cereal at aggregate level since 1995 -96 (G/AG/N/IND/1 ). In 2020 -21, the government procured 
2.191 million tonnes  of pulses. In case of coarse grains, the procurement was 1.162 million tonnes . 
The value of production for the same year was US D 19,955.83 million and US D 11,764.69 million 
for pulses and coarse cereals, respectively.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  Follow -up: Brazil noted that Members have been seeking information from India on state bonuses, 
other support provided by subnational entities, predetermined targets as well as on other relevant 
information since India's DS:1 notification circulated in March 2020 presented a breach of its de 
minimis level. Brazil noted that the requested information had been pending for more than two and 
a half years and the informatio n is indispensable for the assessment of India's compliance with its 
WTO commitments. Brazil noted that this situation explained Brazil's and other Members' interest in 
engaging in consultations with India under paragraph 6 of the Bali Decision as a means to gain a 
deeper understanding of its PSH programmes. With the understanding that the requested data is 
available at an aggregated level, Paraguay once again requested India to provide disaggregated 
data. The US echoed the comments from Brazil and Paraguay  and noted its concern with the lack of 
full responses and the information that had been requested. Thailand expressed concern regarding 
India's PSH programmes and the lack of transparency on those programmes. Thailand reminded 
India that the additional in formation requested, and the statistics outlined in the annex to the Bali 
Ministerial decision is an obligation that any Member who seeks to benefit from the decision must 
fulfil. Australia, the EU, Canada, Japan New Zealand, and Uruguay registered interes t in the issue 
and echoed previous interventions. India stated that the requirement for invoking the Bali peace 
clause is to provide certain information which India had provided in each of its three notifications 
and the additional information sought by so me Members was beyond what is required for invoking 
the Bali Decision. India disagreed with Members' comments on the lack of transparency on its 
PSH programmes and voiced commitment to make its best efforts to providing the additional 
information. India al so reminded that some Members who mentioned about transparency were not 
up to date with their own DS notifications.   
4.31  India's export restriction on sugar  
4.31.1   Question by Australia (AG -IMS ID 103091 ) 
Australia notes India 's Directorate General of Foreign Trade has extended for one year India 's export 
restrictions on sugar, which were set to expire on 31 October (Public notice no 40/2015 -20). 
In relation to these exp ort restrictions, Australia asks that India:  
a. confirm when these export restrictions will be permanently lifted, and  
b. indicate when they intend on notifying these export restrictions to the Committee on 
Agriculture through the required Table ER:1 notificatio n? 
Answer by India  
a. The measure is temporary and is being reviewed from time to time, to enable necessary 
amendments based on domestic demand and supply situation.  
b. The relevant notification would be submitted in due course.  
4.32  India's export restriction measur es on rice  
4.32.1   Question by United States of America, Canada, Japan, Switzerland, United 
Kingdom, Paraguay, Australia, New Zealand, European Union (AG -IMS ID 1030 28) 
On 8 September 2022, India announced an export ban on broken rice, as well as export restrictions 
on rough, semi -, and wholly -milled rice.  It is also noted that these export restrictions have not been 
notified to the Committee on Agriculture.  As the wo rld's largest and growing exporter of rice – 
accounting for more than 40%  of global rice exports – these restrictions during a period of already 
increased market and price volatility will contribute to and exacerbate market volatility and 
contribute to inc reased food insecurity.  It has been reported in the media that India 's restrictions 
could result in a decrease of 16 -17 million tonnes  of rice from being exported this year.   
Beyond this global impact, the effects will likely be felt most strongly by developing and African 
countries. Nine out of the top ten export markets for Indian rice were developing countries, which 
have grown to depend on imported Indian rice, now affected by these export restrictions.  The most 
significant impact of this export ba n and restrictions may occur in West and Central Africa, areas G/AG/W/235  
 
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  that were already experiencing a major food crisis.  According to the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS), West and Central Africa rely on imported rice to cover 40%  of local 
dema nd, despite increases in local production in recent years.  In several ECOWAS countries, rice is 
a major or main staple crop, and a majority of imports were from India prior to the restrictions.   
In 2007, when India imposed a rice export ban, the result was  increased food inflation, which 
contributed to Asian rice prices increasing by almost 80%, according to news sources, creating a 
food security issue in many countries that relied on rice as a staple.   
a. When will these export restrictions and bans be lifted ? If there is no set date, please 
explain what factors will be used to end these measures.  
b. When will India notify these export restrictions/bans to this Committee?  
c. At the September 2022 meeting of this Committee, India responded to the European Union 
that developing countries ' food security was not at risk due to these export 
restrictions.  Given India 's primary export markets are developing countries, a number of 
these countries primarily import rice from India, and the export ban and export restriction 
directly limits the types of rice imported by these Members from India, please explain how 
developing countries ' food security is not at risk.  
d. With numerous countries around the globe experiencing unprecedented food security 
issues, please explain why India h as decided to implement these export restrictions on 
rice. 
e. Please confirm whether the World Food Program is exempt from the export duty and the 
export ban imposed by India. We note that neither notification by the Directorate General 
of Foreign Trade of In dia directly provides such an exemption and the ban only provides 
an exemption until 15 September for a limited number of circumstances relating to exports 
that began before the date of the announcement.  
Answer by India  
a. to e.  This is a temporary measure and is being reviewed from time to time to enable necessary 
amendments based on domestic demand and supply situation.  India's measure was necessitated by 
the need to manage the food security concerns in the country.  
 
• Prohibition of export s is imposed only on broken rice used in India's poultry feed. In recent 
months, we have seen abnormal growth in broken rice exports impacting the domestic 
market.  
• This unprecedented and exponential growth in exports of broken rice is being examined 
whethe r this is leading to hoarding like the way vaccines were hoarded during the C OVID -19 
Pandemic.  
• As a result of this unprecedented growth, broken rice is unavailable for domestic poultry 
feed and the manufacture of ethanol.  
• The 20 per export duty is not impo sed on the par -boiled and basmati rice, which are the 
major constituents of Indian rice exports. This is primarily done to lower the price rise of 
rice in the domestic market and soften food inflation, and on specific types of rice, that is; 
Rice in the hu sk (paddy or rough), Husked (brown) rice, Semi -milled or wholly -milled rice, 
whether or not polished or glazed.  
The notification for the export restriction is under preparation.  
Based on the available information, WFP has not faced any issues with this not ification.  
India has always been proactive in extending food aid and has been a significant contributor to the 
WFP over the years. India remains committed to supporting the WFP.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  4.33  Indonesia's stockholding programmes  
4.33.1   Question by Canada (AG -IMS ID 103093 ) 
According to media reports, authorities in Indonesia have been seeking to build up adequate reserves 
of various staple foods to ensure price stability at a time of soaring inflation (Source: 
https://www.world -grain.com/articles/17664 -indonesia -building -rice-stocks -amid-inflation ). Under 
a new presid ential regulation, which took effect 24 October 2022, the Indonesia National Food 
Agency (Bapanas) with the help of state -owned enterprises plans to secure stocks of 11 staple foods, 
such as rice, corn, soybeans, shallots, chili, sugar for household, cooki ng oil, as well as some meat 
and fish.  
Could Indonesia please explain:  
 
a. What criteria is Bapanas using to determine the volume of the reserves of each staple food 
product?  
b. Will the stocks of staple foods be procured from the domestic and international mark ets 
based on market prices?  
Answer by Indonesia  
We thank Canada for its interest on Indonesia's food reserves policy.  
The Indonesian government has plans to secure main staple food stocks for food security purpose. 
It is important to underline that the government food reserves policy is intended to be used only 
under a special condition, namely in emergency situations.  
Moreover, the government food reserves programme has not been fully implemented yet for the 
11 staple foods. The government is still coor dinating with relevant stakeholders to draft the 
implementing regulations.  
Prior to the implementation of the policy, the Government has set a number of criteria that need to 
be fulfilled, such as the occurrence of food insecurity due to an emergency situa tion, a decrease in 
production, scarcity of the commodity in the market, and price volatility.  
Lastly, we would like to assure that once the underlying situation no longer occurs, or the criteria 
are no longer met, the Government will cease implementing th e food reserves policy. When 
implementing the food reserves policy, the Government will also refer to the FAO and APTERR  for 
calculating the food reserves,  to be in line with WTO rules.  
Follow -up: While recognizing the importance of governments adopting adequate policies to 
guarantee food security for their populations, Brazil viewed that unlimited stockpiling policies could 
have deleterious effects especially when market price -based mechanisms were not used for the 
accumulation and sale of these  stocks. Brazil considered that there are systemic risks when this 
accumulation of stocks amounts to hoarding which can cause an imbalance between supply and 
demand and in agricultural markets. Brazil noted that demand is already growing rapidly, partially  
as a result of higher incomes in emerging economies. A policy of stockpiling by governments at this 
time could aggravate the problem of volatility and increase prices. Further, Brazil remained 
convinced that it is important that Members do not adopt polic ies for market stabilisation that would 
not occur under normal conditions.   
4.34  Japan's stockpiles of skim milk powder  
4.34.1   Question by Australia (AG -IMS ID 103094 ) 
Australia thanks Japan for its response to Australia 's question (AG -IMS ID 102093). Australia would 
like to request further details on Japan 's efforts to decrease its skim milk powder stockpiles.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  In relation to Japan 's efforts, Australia asks that Japan:  
a. indicate the target weight goal for its skim milk powder stockpile and whether a timeframe 
has been set to achieve that goal ; 
b. indicate whether alternative options are being considered if the target weight goal is not 
achieved ; 
c. indicate whether the scheme may be extended beyond September 2023 ; 
d. indicate whether exports of Japanese skim  milk powder are being directed at particular 
countries ; and 
e. note any anticipated long -term impacts this might have on skim milk powder imports to 
Japan.  
Answer by Japan  
a. and b. As the efforts to decrease skim milk powder (SMP) stockpiles are led by the industry (Japan 
Dairy Association (J -milk)), the Government of Japan sets neither the target weight goal, timeframe 
to achieve the goal, nor the alternative options for when the goal not achieved. We are aware that 
the industry has been trying to decrease,  with its ongoing efforts, the SMP stockpiles to the level 
in 2019 (approx. 76 kilo tonnes ).  
 
c. Whether the industry needs to keep the current efforts beyond September 2023 would highly 
depend on how the level of SMP stockpile would go. As we answered at the last COA (AG -IMS 
ID 102093), the stockpile is decreasing,  and we expect that the current downward trend continues.  
 
d. Each business has its own partners and the routes to export SMP.  We have no idea of whether 
these exports are directed at  particular destinations.  
 
e. SMP Imports could be affected by the world market prices and the currency exchange rate. At the 
moment, the international price is high, JPY is depreciating and SMP imports are in a downward 
trend, however they could turn the other way round in the future.  
4.35  Korea's tariff policies   
4.35.1   Question by New Zealand (AG -IMS ID 103124 ) 
New Zealand notes Korea 's measures to combat avian inf luenza and inflationary pressure by 
introducing a zero -tariff policy on eggs, and a reduction in tariff rates from 30% to 0% on other 
imported fruits. New Zealand would welcome more details on how effective these trade -liberalizing 
measures were in achievi ng Korea 's goals.  
Answer by Korea, Republic of  
The legal basis for Korea 's introduction of tariff quota can be found in Article 71.1 of Customs Act. 
This provision stipulates that a specified quantity of imports to be entered at a reduced tariff rate 
where  it is necessary to ensure the smooth supply and demand of goods, bolster the industrial 
competitiveness, or stabilize the domestic prices of goods.  
A zero -tariff policy on eggs are aiming at better responding to the future damage caused by a wide 
spread o f AI. In case of imported fruits  (banana, mango, pineapple), it is a part of the measures for 
price stabilization.  
These measures were implemented as of 10 November in accordance with the Partial Amendment 
Decree (Presidential Decree No. 32988) to the Regu lation on the Application of Quote Tariff pursuant 
to Article 71 of Customs Act.  G/AG/W/235  
 
- 314 - 
 
  Considering that it has been only 10 days since These measures were introduced, it is too early to 
talk about its effectiveness in detail. We will continue to monitor this.  
Follow-up: Noting that the Committee had focused more on discussions on export resections, 
Paraguay reminded Members of the role tariffs could play in facilitating imports of food. Brazil noted 
that the increased trade flows that had been made possible by ad option of these trade liberalization 
measures demonstrated the effects of high tariffs on trade restrictions. Brazil also pointed out that 
while there was doubt on the ability of trade to contribute to food security and criticism of the 
vulnerability of va lue chains but cases such as these demonstrated that when minimal distortion 
conditions were in place, agricultural value chain functions and help ensure that food reach where it 
is needed. With the acknowledgement that the Republic of Korea adopted these measures in specific 
context, Brazil encouraged the Republic of Korea to maintain these measures in the future. New 
Zealand echoed the comments by Paraguay and Brazil and welcomed the use of trade liberalising 
measure to address issues such as avian influe nza. 
4.35.2   Question by Australia  (AG-IMS ID 103095 ) 
Australia notes Korea 's decision to apply zero tariff quotas for a number of agricultural commodities 
until the end of 2022, including beef (chilled and frozen), chicken, powdered milk (whole and skim), 
green onions, coffee beans (green and roasted), refined spirits, manioc chip, and pork belly.  
In relation to these quotas, Australia asks that the Republic of Korea:  
a. provide an update on how much of this year 's quota has been filled for each commodity ; 
b. advise whether these quotas apply to all tariff lines for each commodity ; and  
c. advise whether this measure has been successful in reducing prices . 
Answer by Korea, Republic of  
a. For question a, the legal basis for Korea 's introduction of tariff quota can be found in Article 71.1 
of Customs Act. This provision stipulates that a specified quantity of imports to be entered at a 
reduced tariff rate wh ere it is necessary to ensure the smooth supply and demand of goods, bolster 
the industrial competitiveness, or stabilize the domestic prices of goods. These measures were 
implemented in accordance with the Partial Amendment Decree (Presidential Decree No.  32988) to 
the Regulation on the Application of Quote Tariff pursuant to Article 71 of Customs Act. Just one 
correction to the question of Australia, quota tariffs for 7 commodities are applied by the end 
of 2022, but for green onion, it was applied until 20 October, not end of this year. Accordingly, quota 
tariffs for 7 commodities excluding green onions are still applied. The fill rates for these commodities 
are different based on various backgrounds. They are around 60 to 100 %. 
b. For question b, the tariff lines for these commodities are as below: Beef (0201.20 -1000, 0201.20 -
9000, 0201.30 -0000, 0202.20.1000, 0202.20 -9000, 0202.30 -0000), Chicken (0207 -12-0000, 
0207-14-1010, 0207 -14-1020, 0207 -14-1030, 0207 -14-1090, 0207 -14-2090, 1602 -32-1090, 
1602-32-9000), Powdered milk (0402.10 -1010, 0402.10 -1090, 0402.10 -9000, 0402.21 -1000, 
0402.21 -9000), Green onions (0703 -90-2000), Coffee bean (0901.11 -0000, 0901.12 -0000, 
0901.21 -0000, 0901.22 -0000), Refined spirits (2207.10 -0000), Manioc chip (0714.10 -2010), Pork 
belly (0203.19 -1000, 0203.29 -1000) . 
c. For question c, in theory, as tariff quota temporarily allows a specified quantity of imports to be 
entered at a reduced tariff rate for a certain period of time, we consider this measure effective to 
some extent by low ering unit cost of imports.  
Follow -up: Noting that the Committee had focused more on discussions on export resections, 
Paraguay reminded Members of the role tariffs could play in facilitating imports of food. Brazil noted 
that the increased trade flows tha t had been made possible by adoption of these trade liberalization 
measures demonstrated the effects of high tariffs on trade restrictions. Brazil also pointed out that 
while there was doubt on the ability of trade to contribute to food security and critic ism of the 
vulnerability of value chains but cases such as these demonstrated that when minimal distortion 
conditions were in place, agricultural value chain functions and help ensure that food reach where it G/AG/W/235  
 
- 315 - 
 
  is needed. With the acknowledgement that the Re public of Korea adopted these measures in specific 
context, Brazil encouraged the Republic of Korea to maintain these measures in the future. New 
Zealand echoed the comments by Paraguay and Brazil and welcomed the use of trade liberalising 
measure to addre ss issues such as avian influenza.  
4.36  Malaysia's chicken and egg subsidies and export restrictions for chicken  
4.36.1   Question by Australia  (AG-IMS ID 103096 ) 
Australia understands that Malaysia has extended production subsidies for chicken and egg 
producers until the end of 2022.  
Can Malaysia provide inform ation on whether export restrictions for chicken will remain in place until 
the end of 2022? Can Malaysia give an update on when it intends to submit the corresponding 
Domestic Support notification?  
Answer by Malaysia  
Malaysia thanks Australia for the ques tions submitted in relation to our notification on chicken 
export restriction.  
At this juncture, the decision with regards to the export restriction is being reviewed by our 
Capital. Malaysia will provide an update on the notification in due course.  
With r espect to the domestic support notifications, Malaysia is working on finalising its domestic 
process. Rest assured that we strive to the best of our ability to fulfil transparency obligations in 
order to provide accurate information to Members. Malaysia wi ll submit the notifications once it is 
finalised.  Thank you.  
4.37  Mexico's ban on exports  of agricultural products  
4.37.1   Question by European  Union (AG -IMS ID 103043 ) 
The Mexican President announced trade -related measures affecting a number of agrifood products, 
in another attempt to curb inflation. These include lifting red tape related to SPS requirements, 
eliminating import tariffs, and an outright export ban on a num ber of staple foods. The measures 
were designed with the country 's major food producers and retailers ' consent, and will be enforced 
once the official legal instrument is published in the Official Gazette. Initial reactions are not positive, 
arguing the me asures run the risk of being WTO -incompatible, discriminatory towards SMEs and 
counterproductive (in reducing prices).  
Halting exports of popular foods such as beans, white corn and sardines are amongst the measures 
which aim to reduce by February 2023 the ir price as it stands today by 8% (3% only for corn flour).  
Could Mexico provide more information:  
a. What will be the duration of the measure?  
b. When does Mexico intend to submit official notification to the WTO on export restriction of 
the staples concerned b y the measure?  
c. Could this measure possibly impact the World Food Programme humanitarian purchases 
(if such)?  
d. What is Mexico 's latest production forecast for those staples?  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  Answer by Mexico  
The Government of Mexico announced the Paquete Contra la Inflación y la Carestía  (package of 
measures to combat inflation and high living costs) in order to curb inflation and the drop in Mexican 
household consumption.  
On 16 May and 19 October 2022, two decrees temporarily exempting various foodstuffs from the 
payment of import tariffs in order to counter the effects of inflation on prices, were published in the 
Official Journal of the Federation. These decrees can be viewed at:  
https://www.dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5652070&fecha=16/05/2022#gsc.tab=0 ; 
https://www.dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5669005&fecha=19/10/2022#gsc.tab=0 . 
These measures have neither established nor implemented restrictions on exports of agri -food 
products.  
4.37.2   Question by Switzerland  (AG-IMS ID 103097 ) 
Switzerland understands that Mexico has announced the Opening Agreement against Inflation and 
Scarcity (APECIC) on 3 October 2022. This a greement included a ban on Mexico 's exports of, 
amongst others, white corn, beans and sardines until February 2023. However, the decree 
implementing the APECIC that was published in the Official Federal Gazette on 19 October 2022 
does not contain such an e xport ban. Could Mexico please clarify whether export bans were 
implemented according to the earlier announcement or whether it has refrained from imposing the 
export restrictions? Switzerland is interested in any further information that Mexico can provid e on 
its export restriction policy.  
Answer by Mexico  
The Government of Mexico announced the Paquete Contra la Inflación y la Carestía  (package of 
measures to combat inflation and high living costs) in order to curb inflation and the drop in Mexican 
househ old consumption.  
On 16 May and 19 October 2022, two decrees temporarily exempting various foodstuffs from the 
payment of import tariffs in order to counter the effects of inflation on prices, were published in the 
Official Journal of the Federation. These decrees can be viewed at:  
https://www.dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5652070&fecha=16/05/2022#gsc.tab=0 ; 
https://www.dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5669005&fecha=19/10/2022#gsc.tab=0 .  
These measures have neithe r established nor implemented restrictions on exports of agri -food 
products.  
Follow -up: Switzerland asked Mexico to confirm if the ban had not been implemented and noted that 
keeping the markets open plays an important role in minimizing food insecurity in  NFIDCs. The EU 
and the US supported the follow -up question by Switzerland. Mexico responded that the only 
information it had as of now was that no export ban had been implemented so far.   
4.37.3   Question by United  States of America (AG -IMS ID 103030 ) 
On 3 October 2022, the Office of the President of Mexico announced the Opening Agreement against 
Inflation and Scarcity (APECIC) between the Government of Mexico and fi fteen private companies, 
aimed at combatting food price inflation. The agreement extends through February 2023 and pledges 
to reduce the prices of 24 basic goods (mostly food items) by 8%. Provisions include a ban on 
Mexico 's exports of white corn, beans, sardines, and some food packaging materials. The United 
States is concerned about this measure and submits the following questions:  
 
a. Please explain the reasoning for instituting these export restrictions.  
b. How did Mexico determine the agricultural products for which it will restrict exports?  
c. How does Mexico plan to implement these export restrictions?  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  d. Does Mexico plan to notify its export restrictions to the WTO Committee on Agriculture?  
Answer by Mexico  
The Government of Mexico announced the Paquete Contra la Inflación y la Carestía  (package of 
measures to combat inflation and high living costs) in order to curb inflation and the drop in Mexican 
household consumption.  
On 16 May and 19 October 2022, two decrees temporarily exempting various foodstuffs from the 
payment of import tariffs in order to counter the effects of inflation on prices, were published in the 
Official Journal of the Federation. These decrees can be viewed at:  
https://www.dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5652070&fecha=16/05/2022#gsc.tab=0 ; 
https://www.dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5669005&fecha=19/10/2022#gsc.tab=0 .  
These measures have neither established nor implemented restrictions on exports of agri -food 
products.  
Follow -up: Switzerland asked Mexico to confirm if the ban had not been implemented and noted that 
keeping the markets open plays an important role in minimizing food insecurity in NFIDCs. The 
European  Union and the United  States supported the follow -up question by Sw itzerland. Mexico 
responded that the only information it had as of now was that no export ban had been implemented 
so far.   
4.38  Morocco's export restriction of chickpea (Licence exportation pois chiches)  
4.38.1   Question by European  Union (AG -IMS ID 103044 ) 
With circular N° 6368/311, the export of chickpea was banned until 27 June 2022. The measure has 
been extended without end date (permanent character) as published in O fficial Journal n  2256-22 
of 25.08.2022.  
a. Could Morocco provide more information on the expected impact on the exports of 
chickpea?  
b. What is Morocco's latest production forecast for chickpea?  
c. When does Morocco intend to submit official notification to the WT O on export restriction 
measure?  
Answer by Morocco  
Follow -up: The United Kingdom  reiterated the importance of having clarity on export restrictions 
and of the consideration that had been given to the effects of the restrictions on importing Members' 
food s ecurity, which, in the UK's view, could be best achieved through a notification in accordance 
with Article 12 of the Agreement on Agriculture.   
4.39  South Africa's poultry TRQ administration  
4.39.1   Question by Uruguay (AG -IMS ID 103045 ) 
Uruguay would like to ask the following questions regarding South Africa's TRQ for meat and edible 
offal of poultry (ZAFQ005), which according to South Africa's most recent MA:2 notificati ons has not 
been opened in the years 2017 -2020 given that "the MFN applied rates for the corresponding tariff 
lines were below the in -quota tariff rate ". 
 
a. Is this a fully erga omnes TRQ, or are there any country -specific allocations?  
b. We understand that South Africa is in the process of elaborating its MA:2 for 2021; 
however, we would like to ask if this TRQ has been opened in the years 2021 and 2022. 
In other words, is this TRQ currently functional?  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  c. According to South Africa 's WTO Schedul e, we understand that maximum in -quota tariff 
rates would equal 20% of the MFN bound rates, which vary from 82% (for HS 0207.11, 
0207.12 and 0207.14) to 37% (for HS 0207.13). This would mean that maximum in -quota 
tariff rates would equal 16,4% and 7,4% ad valorem (i.e. 20% of the bound rates). Is this 
understanding correct? If not, could South Africa indicate its maximum in -quota tariff rates 
for the relevant products?  
d. Which have been the applied MFN rates for the relevant products, and in particular tariff  
lines 020714 91, 020714 93, 020714 95, 020714 96, 020714 97, 020714 98 and 
020714  99, in the years 2020, 2021 and 2022?  
e. Paragraph 3.19 of Annex 4 (South Africa) of the last WTO Secretariat's TPR report for 
SACU (2015) says that TRQs for agricultural produ cts "are administered through import 
licences issued by the Department of Agriculture on a quarterly or bi -annual basis and 
applicants need to register with SARS and the DTI. The licence allocation system takes 
into account: Black Economic Empowerment (BEE ) status of the applicants, i.e. eligibility 
of companies under the Broad -Based Black Economic Empowerment Act (Act No.  53 
of 2003); the market share of applicants, derived from historical data for the past three 
years; the number of applicants; and the qu ota available. Out -of-quota imports are subject 
to the SACU CET, while lower (reduced) tariff rates apply to in -quota imports". Could South 
Africa confirm whether this information is still accurate, and whether it is applicable 
to ZAFQ005?  
f. Are there any ot her TRQs for the import of poultry meat to South Africa, in addition to the 
aforementioned ZAFQ005?  
Answer by South Africa  
Follow -up: Noting that South Africa had not provided responses to its questions raised bilaterally in 
August 2022, Uruguay invited South Africa to respond to all the questions, including those not related 
to MA:2 notifications. Brazil flagged concern regarding changes in South Africa's agricultural trade 
policies that could harm trade in poultry. Brazil noted that, since Decem ber 2021, South Africa had 
applied antidumping tariffs against Brazilian exporting companies, ranging from 6% to 265%. Brazil 
reported that it had been engaging in constant dialogues with South African authorities, including 
through technical manifestation s related to the dumping investigations. It had received news of 
suspension for up to 12 months of the application of antidumping duties against Brazilian exporters 
of frozen chicken meat to South Arica. Its expectation was that the temporary suspension of  
antidumping tariffs would become definitive.   
4.40  Thailand's Paddy Pledging Scheme  
4.40.1   Question by India (AG -IMS ID 103137 ) 
It is known that Thailand's Rice Policy and Management Committee has approved a budget, 
amounting to about 150 billion baht, to guarantee the income of more than 4.6 million rice farming 
households for their 2022/2023 rice crops. The Committee also agreed to extend the period for the 
rice pledgi ng scheme for another year. In this context, Thailand is requested to provide the following 
information:   
 
a. Details of the working of the rice pledging scheme?  
b. What are the eligibility criteria prescribed to receive support under farmer's rice income 
guaran tee scheme, as approved by Thailand's Rice Policy and Management Committee?  
c. Under the rice pledging scheme, how is the administered price determined?  
d. What quantity of rice is eligible to be sold to the government?  
e. How much quantity of rice is currently in stock under the rice pledging scheme?  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  f. What is the mechanism to dispose of the rice stock accumulated under the rice pledging 
scheme?  
g. How will this support be notified in the domestic support notification?  
Answer by Thailand  
Thailand thanks India for its qu estions. The responses are as follows:  
a. The Income Guarantee Scheme for Rice Farmers 2022/23 aims to ensure that selling price 
received by rice farmers will not be lower than the administered price. Under the scheme, 
registered rice farmers will only receiv e the difference between reference rice price (which 
is in line with market price) and the administered price during the 2022/23 season.  
b. This scheme is eligible for all rice farmers who registered with the Department of 
Agriculture from 1 April 2022, throu gh 31 October  2022 (or 16 June 2022, through 
28 February  2023, for farmers in the South).  
The scheme covers five main types of rice, which are: (1) unmilled Hom Mali rice grown 
in the Northeast region; (2) unmilled Hom Mali rice grown elsewhere; (3) unmill ed Pathum 
Thani rice; (4) unmilled short -grained rice; and (5) unmilled sticky rice. The administered 
prices for these five main types of rice range between 10,000 - 15,000 baht per ton, given 
the limited amount of each type of rice per household.  
c. The admi nistered price will be calculated based on the costs of rice farming.  
d. Under the Income Guarantee Scheme for Rice Farmers 2022/23, the government does not 
buy any rice from farmers. Only the registered rice farmers will be paid when the reference 
price of r ice is below the administered price during the 2022/23 season.  
e. and f.  There is no rice in stock because the government does not buy rice from farmers.  
g. This scheme will be notified under the Non -Exempt Support of DS1 notification, which will 
be submitted to the CoA later.  
4.41  Türkiye 's export restrictions on agricultural products  
4.41.1   Question by United  Kingdom, Switzerland, Japan, New Zealand, European Union 
(AG-IMS ID 103054 ) 
As a follow up to AG -IMS ID 101042 and 102029 , the United Kingdom would like to reiterate its 
concern with the lack of transparency around Türkiye 's export restrictions and would appreciate a 
response to the following questions:  
 
a. Firstly, could Türkiye please confirm that these measures will expire on th e 
31 December  2022?  
b. Regardless of the temporary nature of these measures, the United Kingdom would like to 
reiterate the importance of compliance with Article 12.1(b) in order to ensure transparency 
and support predictable trade.  Could Türkiye therefore co nfirm when they will be notifying 
these restrictions to the Committee on Agriculture through the required ER:1 table?   
Answer by Türkiye  
Türkiye thanks United Kingdom, Switzerland, Japan, New Zealand, European Union for their 
question.  
The Communiqué No 2 022/1 gives authorization to the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry to apply 
measures needed for agricultural commodities until 31/12/2022. The mentioned Communiqué will 
be expired on the same date.  As mentioned in our previous responses, Türkiye is well  aware of its G/AG/W/235  
 
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  obligations and makes efforts to contribute to global food security. The Presidency of Türkiye 
underlines the importance of the Black Sea Grain Initiative, which is implemented under the 
leadership of Türkiye and welcomed by countries.  
In ad dition, the Trade Policy Review of Turkiye will be conducted next year whereas the detailed 
information has already been shared with the Secretariat about the implementation. The last 
notification in this respect covers the period May -October 2022 within t he context of coming 
TPRM  meeting.  
Follow -up: While acknowledging the wide -ranging food security challenges faced by Türkiye and 
other Members, the United  Kingdom flagged continued concern with the lack of transparency around 
export restrictions. The UK ur ged Members to promptly notify these restrictions to the Committee 
on Agriculture.  Switzerland echoed UK's comments and urged Türkiye to submit an ER:1 notification. 
Japan voiced concern with Türkiye's measure. New Zealand welcomed the information provided  by 
Türkiye in the TPR process and encouraged Türkiye to also share it with the Committee on 
Agriculture. The US supported the question. It flagged its continued concern regarding Türkiye's 
export restrictions as well as the introduction and continued use of measures described by Türkiye 
as aiming to "increase both the export level of enterprises and the export level to specified countries 
by support through freight expenses in the export". The US encouraged Türkiye to provide its various 
overdue notificati ons soon.   
4.42  Türkiye's freight support  
4.42.1   Question by United States  of America, Brazil, Australia (AG -IMS ID 103031 ) 
The United States remains concerned with Türk iye's reimbursement of freight costs for certain 
exports and resubmits AG -IMS ID 100014, which has not yet received a response in AG -IMS. 
 
The United States understands that the Turkish Ministry of Industry and Trade reimburses freight 
costs for certain ag ricultural products exported from Türkiye beginning in 2016, as reported by 
various exporter associations and trade consulting firms, such as here: 
(https://igeme.com.tr/ ihracat -tasimalarina -navlun -destegi/ ). The Turkish Ministry of Industry and 
Trade's KUSGEM agency describes the purpose of the measure as intended to "increase both the 
export level of enterprises and the export level to the specified countries by support in the freight 
expenses in the expor ts…" (translated from: 
https://www.kosgeb.gov.tr/site/tr/ulusaldestekler/destekkategorileri/13/pazara -giris). 
 
a. Please provide a copy of or link  to the legal measures authorizing the reimbursement of 
freight costs for certain exports, specifically a 2016 decision entitled "İhraç Taşımalarına 
Navlun Desteği Sağlanması Hakkında Karar" (Decision on Freight Support for Exports) and 
subsequent implemen ting measures.  
b. What products are eligible to receive freight support?  
c. What are the eligible destinations?  
d. How is the freight support determined? How much may an exporter receive per shipment?  
e. Please confirm the years, and periods within each year, that Türkiye has authorized such 
freight support since 2016, including for 2022 and beyond, if applicable.  
f. Please provide quantities of goods receiving support by tariff code (at least the 4 -digit 
level) and the total amount of reimbursement and amount of reimb ursement per tariff 
code. In addition, please identify the quantities and total amount of reimbursement for 
goods exported to the United States, including for dry milled corn products (HS 1104.23).  
g. Noting the apparent contingency on export performance and understanding these 
measures were introduced following the 2015 Nairobi Decision on Export Competition and 
may still be authorized to provide support, please explain how these measures comply 
with Türkiye 's export subsidy scheduled commitments and its comm itments under the 
Nairobi Decision on Export Competition.   G/AG/W/235  
 
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  Answer by Türkiye  
Türkiye  does not provide freight support.  Türkiye  is well aware of its commitments stemming from 
the WTO Agreement on Agriculture and the Nairobi Ministerial Decision on Export Co mpetition.  
Türkiye  attaches utmost importance to the implementation of the WTO Ministerial Decisions. In this 
regard,  Türkiye 's agricultural policies are in compliance with its commitments and the Nairobi 
Decision on Export Competition.  
Follow -up: Canada r egistered concern with the measure as it appears to be contingent on export 
performance of agricultural products. Canada reminded Members of the need to respect the 2015 
Nairobi Ministerial Decision on Export Competition.   
4.43   Türkiye's stone fruit support   
4.43.1   Question by Australia  (AG-IMS ID 103098 ) 
Australia understands that Türkiye has approved measures to support its stone fruit industry, which 
include payments to producers.  
Australia asks that Türkiye provide information on the measures, including : 
a. the policy objectives of the support ; 
b. the different components of the support programme ; 
c. eligibility and calculation of payments ; and  
d. the allocated budget for the p rogramme?  
Answer by Türkiye  
Türkiye thanks Australia for its question.  
 
Support related to stone fruit production is included in certified sapling support and this support is 
not a new instrument. In this context, there is no new payment to producers relat ed to stone fruit.  
 
The support given under the name of "certified sapling " is a general support not specifically given to 
a certain agricultural product which the beneficiary is obliged to use the saplings that have been 
certified. In addition the support  is also given to the producers of saplings that are certified as well.  
 
The aim of the support is to increase the efficiency, product quality, by way of environmentally 
friendly methods.  
 
The related legislation can be reached:  https://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2021/12/20211208 -
3.htm  
4.44  U.S. Inflation Reduction Act 2022  
4.44.1   Question by Australia (AG -IMS ID 103100 ) 
Australia notes that a public release 
(https://www.agriculture.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/ag_ reconciliation_one -pager.pdf ) on the 
US Inflation Reduction Act  2022 states that USD 14  billion will be provided to lower costs for families 
including farmers and support good -paying, clean energy jobs in rural communities.  
Australia asks that the United S tates:  
a. elaborate on how the Inflation Reduction Act  2022 will lower costs for families ; G/AG/W/235  
 
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  b. outline the eligibility requirements for farmers to receive this support, and  
c. outline how the United States intends to report notifiable expenditure relating to support  
provided to farmers under this Act to the Committee on Agriculture.  
Answer by United States of America  
a. Given the breadth of the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 (IRA), the United States refers 
Australia to this White House Fact Sheet, which provides a good  overview of how the Act 
will help lower costs for working families, including those in rural communities: 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing -room/statements -releases/2022/08/17/fact -sheet -
how-the-inflation -reduction -act-helps -rural-communities/  
b. It is unclear what Australia means by "this support, " but if Australia is referring to the 
IRA's conservation funding, that support will be provided through these existing USDA 
conservation programs: the Environmental Quality Incentives Program, the Regional 
Conservation Partnership Program, the Agricultural Conservation Easement Program, and 
the Cons ervation Technical Assistance Program.  
c. All relevant expenditures under the Inflation Reduction Act will be notified consistent with 
WTO rules and at the appropriate time.  
Follow -up: India supported the question and asked the United  States when its notification could be 
expected. The European  Union expressed interest in U.S. notification.   
4.45  United States' soybean programmes  
4.45.1   Question by China (AG -IMS ID 103046 ) 
China notices that in marketing year 2018/2019, the US provides nearly USD  85 billion 
product -specific AMS for soybeans, compared with around 16 billion dollars in previous years.  
 
According to the US soybean quality annual reports and the U.S. Cens us Bureau, every year the 
US exports are around half volume of its soybean production.  
 
a. Please explain reasons for raising soybean subsidy in 2018/2019.  
b. Could the US provide data on domestic consumption of soybean during last 10 years?  
c. In case of declining export, how did the US government deal with domestic production 
surplus?  
d. Please clarify the difference between the US subsidies for soybean and a subsidy for 
export.  
Answer by United States of America  
a. The product -specific AMS values referenced by  China in its question are incorrect.  The 
value notified by the United States for soybeans in 2018/19 was USD 8.5 billion and 
USD 1.6 billion in 2017/18.  The increase in 2018/19 was primarily the result of 
expenditures under the 2018 Market Facilitation Pr ogram (MFP), which is no longer in 
effect.  
b. The following  table provides domestic consumption of soybeans for the past 10 years.  
United States Domestic Consumption of Soybean (1,000 MT)  
USDA Foreign Agricultural Service Production, Supply and Distribution  
2012/  
2013  2013/  
2014  2014/  
2015  2015/  
2016  2016/  
2017  2017/  
2018  2018/  
2019  2019/  
2020  2020/  
2021  2021/  
2022  
48,550  50,043  54,989  54,475  55,719  58,873  60,360  61,750  60,905  62,784  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  c. The Market  Facilitation Program (MFP) provided payments to producers to manage 
disrupted markets, deal with surplus commodities, and expand and develop new markets 
at home and abroad. The 2018 MFP provided direct payments based on 2018 production 
of nine affected co mmodities, including soybeans.  
d. Payments under the 2018 Market Facilitation Program (MFP) were based on 2018 
production of the eligible commodity, irrespective of how it was ultimately marketed or 
utilized.  An export subsidy is a payment contingent  on the export of a commodity and 
there was no such contingency or requirement for a producer to receive a payment under 
the MFP.  
4.45.2   Question by China (AG -IMS ID 103047 ) 
According to the U.S. Census Bureau, after a short decrease in 2018, the export value of soybeans 
experienced a strong increase in 2019 , 2020, and 2021, the USDA website reported that "In 2021, 
the value of U.S. soybean exports to the world reached a new  record at USD  27.4 billion, up 7% 
from the prior year's record." However, in 2021, the US still raised its product -specific AMS for 
soybeans from 1.9 billion dollars to 2.3 billion dollars, compared to 2020.   
a. Please explain the reason.  
b. Please explain how subsidies for soybeans are determined, e.g. what factors are used to 
determine when to raise the amount of subsidies?  
c. Please evaluate the influence that US soybean subsidies have on the international market 
during last 10 years.  
Answer by United States of America  
a. The volume of U.S. soybean exports in 2021 is on par with the volume of exports prior to 
2018, when exports fell significantly due to retaliatory tariffs.  The record value of exports 
in 2021 is primarily due to higher commodity prices, including fo r soybeans, resulting from 
market conditions.  The product -specific AMS values referenced by China in its question 
are incorrect.  The rise in product -specific support for soybeans in 2019/20 of 
USD 1.837  billion to USD 2.323 billion in 2020/21 was primarily the result of higher 
payments under the Coronavirus Food Assistance Program (CFAP), which was designed to 
minimize the negative economic impacts of COVID -19 on U.S. agriculture without 
impacting producers ' planting decisions. CFAP was a short -term measure designed to help 
address the adverse market impacts due to the COVID -19 pandemic and is no longer in 
effect.  
b. If this question pe rtains to CFAP, we can provide an explanation of how the programme 
was designed. The first round of CFAP payments, including those for soybeans, were made 
on the lesser of the producer 's unpriced inventory of crop year 2019 production as of 
15 January  2020, or 50% of their crop year 2019 production.  The payment rates were 
based on the change in prices (or other economic factors) for each commodity during a 
specified time period, which generally corresponded to the first quarter of 2020 when the 
pandemic fir st began. The formula for calculating the second round of CFAP payments 
continued to be directed towards mitigating the negative impacts of the pandemic on U.S. 
agricultural producers through the fourth quarter of 2020 and was based on planted 
acreage for crop year 2020 and the estimated share of the 2020 crop that would be 
marketed in 2020. Payment rates were not announced until September 2020, after 
planting, which means the programme could not influence planting decisions or production 
levels.  
c. With regar ds to the slight increase in product -specific soybean AMS in 2020/21, there are 
no market impacts because the increase was due to a temporary programme (CFAP) that 
provided ad hoc emergency assistance to producers based on past production or acres 
already planted.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  4.46  U.S. funding for environmental action  
4.46.1   Question by New Zealand (AG -IMS ID 103107 ) 
Following question AG -IMS ID 102102 , New Zealand is seeking further information on the Inflation 
Reduction Act ahead of a DS:2 notification.  
Can the United States outline:  
a. How the implementing agency is planning to measure the c limate impact of this 
investment at the farm and sector level.  
b. Whether the funds will be reallocated should they not have the desired impact?  
c. How the tax credits to help rural communities transition away from fossil fuels will be 
implemented?  
d. How payments will be limited to the extra costs or loss of income for the agricultural 
producer in deploying climate -smart practices.  
Answer by United States of America  
a. to d.  Any relevant changes in existing measures or new measures from the Inflation Reduction 
Act will be notified consistent with WTO rules and at the appropriate time. With respect to 
conservation, the IRA provides additional funding to existing agricultural conservation programs 
already notified by the United States in its various Table DS:1 and DS: 2 notifications, which outline 
how the measures operate and how they comply with WTO rules. Specifically, the existing 
conservation programs that will receive additional funding are:  
USD 8.45 billion for the Environmental Quality Incentives Program  
USD 4.95 billion for the Regional Conservation Partnership Program  
USD 3.25 billion for the Conservation Stewardship Program  
USD 1.4 billion for the Agricultural Conservation Easement Program  
USD 1 billion for the Conservation Technical Assistance Program  
The Conservation Technical Assistance Program includes funding for the development of 
measurement tools to quantify carbon sequestration and emissions and is currently under 
development.  
The IRA also includes provisions that modify, extend, or provide new tax credits for electricity from 
clean and renewable resources.  These provisions are outside the scope of this Committee and are 
not administered by the U.S. Department of Agriculture.   
4.47  U.S. expanded insurance coverage for soybean and grain sorghum  
4.47.1   Question by  Brazil (AG -IMS ID 103002 ) 
According to information available online, the United States has approved a plan to expand soybean 
and grain sorghum double -croppi ng insurance coverage in hundreds of additional counties for 2023, 
as part of the administration`s effort to boost US agricultural production to help counter food price 
volatility linked to supply chain disruptions and the conflict in Ukraine (source: 
https://www.usda.gov/media/press -releases/2022/07/12/usda -makes -it-easier -american -farmers -
grow-food-ease-burdens ).  
 
Brazil notes  that the US has provided support above the " de minimis " for both sorghum and 
soybeans, mainly because it notifies their expenditures under crop insurance premium subsidy as 
product -specific ( G/AG/N/USA/157  and G/AG/N/USA/166 ).  
 
Therefore, Brazil would appreciate it if the US could explain to Members how it envisions that the 
"Double Cropping - Expanded Insurance Coverage" will affect its compliance to domestic support 
entitlements.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  Answer by United States of America  
The crop insurance coverage changes identified will have no impact on the United States ' comp liance 
with its domestic support commitments.  
Follow -up: The European Union  and Paraguay noted interest in the question.   
4.48  U.S. corn support  
4.48.1   Question by China (AG -IMS ID 103049 ) 
According to the US domestic support notifications, during 2018 -2021, product -specific AMS for corn 
were: 2.2 billion dollars, 2.1 billion dollars, 4.6 billion dollars and 4.9 billion dollars. In marketing 
year 2019/2020 and 2020/2021, Crop Insurance subsidy and CFAP specialty crop subsidy constitute 
a 50-50 split of corn subsidies, as a result, subsidies for corn doubled in 2020 and 2021.  
 
The US ranks top for corn production and export; the data from the U.S. Census Bureau show that 
in 2021, corn exports of the US rose by 34.6% compared to those in 2020.  
 
a. Please explain in the case of rising export, why the US government believed that corn 
producers were in a position to receive higher subsidies.  
b. Please clarify different policy targets of Crop Insurance subsidy and CFAP subsidy.  
c. Could the US provide data on domestic consumption of corn during the last 10 years?  
Answer by United States of America  
a. The reason for the increase in the corn AMS in 2019/20 and 2020/21 from 2018/19 is th e 
inclusion of Coronavirus Food Assistance Program (CFAP) payments for corn that were 
disbursed during calendar year 2020 but are reported on a fiscal year basis depending on 
the timing of the payment. CFAP was a temporary programme and is no longer in eff ect. 
The increase in U.S. corn exports in calendar year 2021 compared to calendar year 2020 
reflects higher corn prices and increased export volumes, reflecting market conditions 
in 2021, and is unrelated to U.S. farm programs.  
b. CFAP was a temporary program me designed to minimize the negative economic impacts 
of COVID -19 on U.S. agriculture and is no longer in effect.  Crop insurance is a long -
standing risk management programme that provides insurance products to indemnify 
producers against losses in yield, c rop revenue, margin, whole farmer event, and other 
types of losses.  
c. The following table provides domestic consumption of corn for the past 10 years.  
United States Domestic Consumption of Corn (1,000 MT)  
USDA Foreign Agricultural Service Production, Supply and Distribution  
2012/  
2013  2013/  
2014  2014/  
2015  2015/  
2016  2016/  
2017  2017/  
2018  2018/  
2019  2019/  
2020  2020/  
2021  2021/  
2022  
262,973  293,002  301,837  298,845  313,785  313,991  310,391  309,504  306,686  317,115  
Follow -up: China flagged continued concern about the trade distorting effects of U.S. subsidies. 
Paraguay expressed interest in U.S. responses to questions a. and b. Brazil noted that policies in 
addition to the Farm Bill may create uncertainty for Members.   
4.49  U.S. fertilizers  
4.49.1   Question by Eur opean Union (AG -IMS ID 103053 ) 
The US Biden -Harris Administration made USD 500 million available to increase innovative 
American -made fertilizer production.  
 G/AG/W/235  
 
- 326 - 
 
  a. Could the US provide more details on the criteria to benefit from financing under 
"Innovative American -Made Fertilizer Production"?  
b. What type of measures are available under this programme?   
c. Who are the targeted beneficiaries?  
Answer by United States of A merica  
The Fertilizer Production Expansion Program is part of a broader government effort to promote 
competition in agricultural markets.  The programme is part of an effort to address global food 
security through investments in making markets more resilien t and sustainable, particularly in light 
of the rising costs of fertilizers caused by a variety of factors.  
Grants will be used to support independent, innovative, and sustainable American fertilizer 
production. Funds also will expand the manufacturing and processing of fertilizer and nutrient 
alternatives in the United States and its territories. Examples of how grants may be used include: 
construction of facilities, purchasing modern and climate -smart equipment that reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions or improve air/water quality, ensuring compliance with safety requirements, and 
workforce recruitment.  
Eligible entities under the Fertilizer Production Expansion Program are for ‑profit businesses and 
corporations, nonprofit entities, Tribes and Tribal organizations, producer ‑owned cooperatives and 
corporations, certified benefit corporations, and state or local governments.  
4.50  U.S. biofuel infrastructure grants  
4.50.1   Question by European Union (AG -IMS ID 103055 ) 
USDA announced in August 2022 a USD 100 biofuel Infrastructure grants.  
 
a. Can the United States  indicate how it intends to notify this subsidy in its DS:1 notification?  
Answer by United States of Americ a 
These program mess will be notified consistent with WTO rules and at the appropriate time.  
Follow -up: The European Union  looked forward to reviewing U.S. upcoming DS:1 notification.   
4.51  U.S. Urban Agriculture and Innovative Production   
4.51.1   Question by India (AG -IMS ID 103138 ) 
Recently, the US invested USD  14.2 million in Urban Agriculture and Innovative Production  (UAIP) 
efforts. The UAIP provi des support through two types of grants: planning projects and 
implementation projects.  
 
a. What is the eligibility criteria for beneficiaries under this measure?  
b. What type of produce/ products are covered under this support?  
c. How and when will this programme be notified under the domestic support notification?  
Answer by United States of America  
a. Eligible entities are nonprofit organizations, local or Tribal governments, and schools that 
serve any of the Grades K -12 in areas of the United States, as defined by a uthorizing 
legislative language.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  b. No specific products are covered by this program. The grants may include any agricultural 
product or may be aimed at other activities that are not specific to a certain commodity 
(e.g., education, job mentoring, training, e tc.). 
c. UAIP is a broadly available programme that is targeted at supporting projects designed to 
improve access to local foods in areas where access to fresh, healthy food is limited or 
unavailable. We will review this programme to determine if it falls wit hin the scope of the 
notification requirements for domestic support.  
Follow -up: India asked when the review of the programmes would take place and requested details 
on the outcome of the review.   
4.52  U.S. Farm Bill 2023  
4.52.1   Question by India (AG -IMS ID 103139 ) 
It is understood that the US would implement the new Farm Bill to support its farmers and 
agriculture. In the Agricultural Improvement Act of 2018, the US imple mented various programs 
including the price loss coverage (PLC). In this context, the US is requested to provide the following 
information:  
 
a. Whether the US intends to implement the PLC in the forthcoming Farm Bill 2023?  
b. Whether the product coverage under the programme would be expanded?  
c. How the reference prices for various agricultural products under the PLC would be 
determined?  
Answer by United States of America  
a. to c.  The Administration is unable to indicate what the U.S. Congress 's future intents may be with 
regards to the structure of any future farm bill program mes. 
Follow -up: India reiterated its interest in the topic particularly how the United  States had determined 
the reference prices of various products.   
4.53  U.S. American Rescue Plan Ac t 
4.53.1   Question by Australia ( AG-IMS ID 103099 ) 
Australia notes that the USDA has announced ( https://www.usda.gov/media/press -
releases/2022/08/22/usda -invest -300-million -new-organic -transition -initiative ) that it is making 
USD 300 million of American Rescue Plan Act  funding available for an  Organic Transition Initiative. 
Australia understands that the initiative will include direct support through financial assistance and 
crop insurance assistance to producers, as well as market development projects.  
How does the US intend to classify these  payments in the context of notifications to the Committee 
on Agriculture?  
Answer by United States of America  
Measures within the new Organic Transition Initiative will be notified consistent with WTO rules and 
at the appropriate time.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  5  POINTS RAISED IN CON NECTION WITH INDIVIDUAL NOTIFICATIONS  
5.1  Imports under tariff and other quota commitments  (Table MA:2)  
5.1.1   China (G/AG/N/CHN/57)  
AG-IMS ID 103101: Question by Australia - Tariff quota fill  
Australia thanks China for submitting its MA:2 notification for calendar y ear 2021 ( G/AG/N/CHN/57 ). 
Australia not es that the tariff rate quota (TRQ) for short and medium grain rice (CHNQ003) had a 
fill rate of just 8.9% in 2021, well below the 65% fill rate threshold. This follows a 54.7% fill rate 
reported in 2020 (reflecting China reporting the combined usage of bo th its rice quotas against the 
same quota line) and 10% fill rate in 2019.  
Australia notes it previously asked questions relating to low fill rates for China 's TRQ in AG -IMS 
ID 93090  at the 93rd CoA and in AG -IMS ID  97123  at the 97th CoA with respect to underfills in 
calendar years 2018 and 2019. China 's response to these questions was that their 
TRQ administration is in line with the obligations of WTO Members.   
Australia asks that China provide additional details on how the TRQ for short and medium grain rice 
(CHNQ003) is administered and reasons for why t he TRQ remains significantly underfilled.  
Answer by China  
The administration of TRQ of the medium and short grain rice applies to Interim Regulation on the 
Administration of TRQ of Agricultural Products and Rules for the Application and Distribution of TRQ  
of Grains, which are both published.  
The TRQ of the medium and short grain was underfilled due to market factors.  
AG-IMS ID 103102: Question by Paraguay - Tariff quota fill  
The delegation of Paraguay thanks the delegation of the People's Republic of China for submitting 
notification G/AG/N/CHN/57 . We note the low fill rate for quota CHNQ003, 8.9%, corresponding to 
short and medium grain rice. Could you please indicate:  
 
a. The reasons for the low fill rate of this ta riff quota?  
b. Whether there are plans to modify the TRQ administration mechanism in line with the Bali 
Decision for a better TRQ fill rate?  
Answer by China  
a. The TRQ  CHNQ003  Rice, medium and short grain was underfilled due to the market 
factors.  
b. The TRQ admini stration mechanism of China has been specified in its  Schedule of 
Concessions. There is no plan to modify the mechanism.   
AG-IMS ID 103103: Question by Thailand - Other  
Thailand appreciates the submission on Market Access Notification of Calendar Year 2021  by China.   
With respect to TQ ID CHNQ003 (Rice, short and medium grain) and CHNQ004 (Rice, long grain) 
under G/AG/N/CHN/57  Notification, China has only reported total import of short, medium and long 
grain rice. Would China be able to provide more specific information on the import  of rice flours 
under TQ ID CHNQ003 and CHNQ004?  
Answer by China  
The in -quota import of rice flours under ID CHNQ003 and CHNQ004 of China in 2021 were 
32,845  tonnes  and 6,872 tonnes  respectively.   G/AG/W/235  
 
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  Follow -up: Brazil noted that the use of TRQs is a topic of both direct and systemic interests to Brazil 
and continued to encourage Members to provide information that contribute to more efficient use of 
existing TRQs leading to effective market access reform.   
5.1.2   Iceland (G/AG/N/ISL/65, G/AG/N/ISL/66)  
AG-IMS ID 10310 4: Question by Paraguay - Tariff quota fill  
The delegation of Paraguay thanks the delegation of Iceland for submitting notifications 
G/AG/N/ISL/65  and G/AG/N/ISL/66 . We note the low fill rate for the f ollowing tariff quotas:  
 
• ISLQ057: 0.4% in both years, corresponding to other prepared or preserved meat, meat offal 
or blood;  
• ISLQ082: 0% and 0.3%, corresponding to meat and edible offal of sheep;  
• ISQL085: 0% in both years, corresponding to meat and edible offal of horses;  
• ISQL088: 0% and 9.4%, corresponding to butter.  
Could you please indicate:  
a. The reasons for the low fill rate of these tariff quotas?  
b. Whether there are plans to modify the TRQ administration mechanism in line with the Bali 
Decision fo r a better TRQ fill rate?  
Answer by Iceland  
a. 
• ISLQ057: Import data reported for ISLQ083 covers imports under ISLQ057 as noted in 
notifications G/AG/N/ISL/65 and G/AG/N/ISL/66. These two TRQs have historically been 
combined and allocated together because o f low quantity in ISLQ057 (0.4 tonnes ) and the 
combined quota is applicable for all products under heading 1602. Imports during the 
period  2020/2021 and 2021/2022 are well over 100% fill rate of ISLQ083, or 735 tonnes and 
796 tonnes respectively.  
• ISLQ082 a nd ISLQ085: For various reasons there does not seem to be any interest in taking 
advantage of the tariff quotas for meat and edible offal of sheep and horses, or ISLQ082 and 
ISLQ085. The reason is most likely the very strong market position of the domestic  production 
of these products.  
• ISQL088: The Icelandic TRQ in question for butter has been opened in every reporting year, 
including the marketing years referred to in the question by the delegation of Paraguay. 
However, there has been little interest in im ports as domestically produced butter enjoys a 
strong market position.   
b. Since August 2022, Iceland has changed its allocation method to a so -called equilibrium -auction 
method, where the lowest accepted bid determines the price for all the allocated quot a and is 
i.a. supposed to decrease the import cost. This allocation methodology will be applied by Iceland for 
the first time for the next allocation of WTO quotas in July 2023. However, it is likely that ISLQ082, 
ISLQ085 and ISLQ088 will be allocated base d on applications and not be auctioned, due to a lack of 
interest as experienced in recent years.  
5.1.3   Iceland (G/AG/N/ISL/66)  
AG-IMS ID 103105: Question by New Zealand - Tariff quota fill  
In G/AG/N/ISL/66 , New Zealand no tes the low fill rate for Iceland's butter TRQ (ISLQ088) at 9.4% 
in marketing year 2021/2022. New Zealand also notes that the fill rate for this quota has remained 
below 15% over the past three marketing years. Could Iceland please explain:   
 
a. the reasons f or underfill of this quota, including historically; and   
b. confirm how Iceland administers its TRQ for butter, and whether Iceland plans to change 
the TRQ administration scheme, to increase fill rates?  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  Answer by Iceland  
a. The Icelandic TRQ in question for butt er, ISLQ088, has been opened in every reporting 
year, including the marketing years referred to in the question by the delegation of 
New Zealand. However, there has been little interest in imports as domestically produced 
butter enjoys a strong market posi tion. 
b. he TRQ for butter is allocated based on applications as demand has not exceeded the 
quota quantity. In the case of applications exceeding the quota quantity, the quota would 
be auctioned, and the auction price would be determined by the lowest accept ed bid.  
Follow -up: Paraguay noted that it would follow closely the impact of the changes introduced by 
Iceland to the administration of the TRQs to their fill rates and may raise some follow up questions. 
New Zealand registered interest in the new developm ents in TRQ administration.   
5.1.4   Malaysia (G/AG/N/MYS/54)  
AG-IMS ID 103003: Question by Brazil - Tariff quota fill  
Malaysia reported on its latest MA:2 notifications, pertaining to calendar year 2017 and 2018, the 
following fill rates for tariff -rate quotas:  
• MYSQ002 (Meat of swine, fresh, chilled or frozen) : 0%/0%;  
• MYSQ007 (Meat and edible offal of poultry, of heading 0105 fresh, chilled or frozen) : 
0%/0,1%.  
Brazil would appreciate if Malaysia could provide the following information:  
a. Data on market circumstances that would explain the low volume of imports under the 
aforementioned TRQs;  
b. Updates on policy developments that would explain the relatively low volume of imports 
under the aforementioned TRQs;  
c. volume of imports taking place outside the TRQ.  
Answer by Malaysia  
Malaysia would like to thank Brazil for the questions in relation to Malaysia 's notifications in 
document G/AG/N/MYS/54 and G/AG/N/MYS/55.  
Based on Malaysia 's MA:2 notifications for 2017 and 2018, the low volume of imports under the 
aforementioned TRQs reflected the domestic demand for products under MYSQ002 (Meat of swine, 
fresh, chilled or frozen) and MYSQ007 (Meat and edible offal of poultry, of heading 0105 fresh, 
chilled, or frozen).  
We also wish to inform that has been no change  in policy and no restriction has been put in place 
during the review period.  
In addition, no import has been recorded outside the TRQ for both products.  Thank you.  
5.1.5   United States of America (G/AG/N/USA/162)  
AG-IMS ID 103001: Question by Brazil, Argentina - Tariff quota fill  
Brazil is thankful for the information provided by the United States in its reply to question AG -IMS 
ID 101047 , including the indication of the website containing up -to-date data on quota fill status.   
Brazil notices that there seems to be a sustained underfill of country -specific quota shares for the 
past few ye ars.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  In this regard, and taking into account the experience related to the administration of the U.S. Raw 
Sugar Tariff -Rate Quota, Brazil would like to consult if the US is considering any action to improve 
fill rates, such as a surrender and reallocation  process for unused portions, an alternative that was 
mentioned in the U.S. answer to question AG -IMS ID 102001 . 
Answer by United States of America  
The fill rates of U.S. beef TRQs in any particular year are affected by a variety of market factors, 
including price trends, exchange rates, supply and demand.  No changes are currently envisioned a s 
the underfill is a result of market factors.  
5.2  Domestic support commitments (Table DS:1)  
5.2.1   Australia (G/AG/N/AUS/129/Rev.1, G/AG/N/AUS/129)  
AG-IMS ID 103140: Question by India - Non-product -specific AMS  
India thanks Australia for issuing the modified DS:1 ( G/AG/N/AUS/129/Rev.1 ) for the financial 
year 2017/2018. In footnote 17 regarding the Queensland (QLD) Exceptional Disaster Assistance 
Scheme: "Category C Community Recovery package, cash grants of up to AUD 25,000 to assist with 
repair work due to major flooding. Category B concessional loans an d freight subsidies to assist with 
recovery activities". In this context India requests Australia for providing the following information:  
 
a. Kindly provide the details about the nature of repair works eligible for receiving assistance 
under Queensland (QLD)  Exceptional Disaster Assistance Scheme.  
b. Further, kindly provide the difference in nature of Category C Community Recovery 
package and Category B concessional loans and freight subsidies to assist with recovery 
activities.  
Answer by Australia  
Australia tha nks India for its question with respect to Australia 's modified DS:1 notification 
(G/AG/N/AUS/129/Rev.1 ) of fina ncial year 2017 -18 and the Queensland (QLD) Exceptional Disaster 
Assistance Scheme.  
a. Repair work eligible for funding assistance under the Queensland Exceptional Disaster Assistance 
Scheme includes:  
• Equipment and materials to undertake clean -up; 
• Additional labour costs (above and beyond normal wage expenditure) ; 
• Disposing of damaged goods and injured or dead livestock, including associated costs ; 
• Repairs to buildings (other than housing) ; 
• Fencing not covered by any other assistance• Reconditioning / repairing essential plant and 
equipment ; 
• Salvaging crops, grain and feeds ; 
• Replacing dead livestock ; 
• Purchase or hire/ lease costs for equipment essential to the immediate resumption of the 
business ; 
• Payment for tradespeople to conduct safety inspections ; 
• Essential repairs to premises and internal fittings that is not covered by insurance.  
b. Category B concessional loans  are available for re -establishing the viable operation of a small 
business or to primary producers by repairing or replacing damaged pl ant and equipment, repairing 
or replacing buildings, supplying stock to replace lost stock, and/or maintaining the liquidity of the 
business.  
Category B freight subsidies  are available to assist primary producers impacted by an eligible disaster 
with the t ransport of livestock, fodder and water for livestock, building and fencing equipment, or 
machinery.  
Category C assistance  offers exceptional circumstances assistance for severely affected 
communities, regions or sectors following disaster events. It inclu des clean -up and recovery grants G/AG/W/235  
 
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  for small businesses and primary producers and/or the establishment of a Community Recovery 
Fund.   
5.2.2   Australia (G/AG/N/AUS/142)  
AG-IMS ID 103032: Question by United States of America - Other product -specific 
AMS/EMS  
In G/AG/N/AUS/142  Australia notified  AUD 2.668 million for the Dairy Recovery Concessional Loans 
Scheme, down from AUD 3.2397 million in in 2017/18 in G/AG/N/AUS/129/Rev.1 .  
 
Australia notes that, though the scheme stopped taking applications at the end of October 2016, 
businesses will continue to benefit over the 10 -year loan terms.  According to a February 2021 
independent review of Australia 's Regional Investment Corporation, Australia had announced up to 
AUD 555 million in Dairy Recovery Concessional Loans  
(https://www.awe.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/independent -review -of-the-regional -
investment -corporation.docx ). 
 
Please explain how Australia calculates the level of notified support for each year under this scheme.  
Answer by Australia  
Australia thanks the United States for its question with respect to Australia 's DS:1 notification 
(G/AG/N/AUS/142 ) of financial year 2018 -19. 
The level of notified support represents the amount of loan interest saved annually by Australian 
dairy farmers who are eligible to participate in this concessional loan scheme.  
In the case of the period from 1/7/2018 to 30/06/2019, this equated to AUD2. 668 million based 
upon the total number of active loans at 30 June 2019 (the end of the Australian 2018 -19 financial 
year) and the interest rate differential applied between the indicator interest rate published by the 
Reserve Bank of Australia (as at July  2019) and the lowest concessional rate applied for the 2018 -19 
period.  
5.2.3   Canada (G/AG/N/CAN/151)  
AG-IMS ID 103106: Question by India - Market price support  
India thanks Canada for submitting their DS:1 notification ( G/AG/N/CAN/151 ) for the calendar 
year 2018. India observes that Canada provides market price support of CAD 655 million for Butter, 
as reported under the supporting table DS:5.   
 
a. Canada is requested to provide the value of production of Butter for the year 2018.  
b. Canada is requested to elaborate on the factors considered in determinati on of the applied 
administered price for Butter and skim milk powder.  
c. As per supporting table DS:5, the eligible production for skim milk powder is indicated as 
zero. Could Canada provide the reasons behind the zero level of eligible production for 
skim mi lk powder in 2018.  
d. Please provide the eligible production for skim milk powder for the year 2019 to 2021. 
(The Notifications for 2019 to 2021 are still not filed by Canada as asked in the subsequent 
question below).  
e. When will Canada submit the outstanding DS:1 notification for the calendar years 2019, 
2020, 2021?  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  Answer by Canada  
a. The value of production for butter for the year 2018 was CAD 1,06 billion. Data for the 
most recent years available is maintained online at the following CDC web site: 
https://agriculture.canada.ca/en/market -information -system/rp/index -
eng.cfm?action=pR&r=235&pdctc  
The value of Canada 's butter production is b est represented by the revenue from butterfat in 
class 4A.  
b. Milk component  prices for butter are indexed annually based on a formula that uses 50% 
of the annual change in cost of production and 50% of the annual change in CPI.  
The price for skim milk powde r is established using the formula prescribed by the Canada United 
States Mexico Agreement, using the USDA non -fat dry milk price, minus Canadian margin times 
yield.   
 
c. Footnote 2, Supporting Table DS:5 of Canada 's notification ( G/AG/N/CAN/151 ) says that 
"Following the implementation  of some elements of the National Ingredient Strategy, the 
Canadian Dairy Commission announced that they will no longer purchase Skim milk 
powder under the Surplus Removal and Domestic Seasonality Programs as of 
1 February  2017. As of this date, no product ion of skim milk powder was eligible to receive 
the applied administered price. "  
d. Footnote 2, Supporting Table DS:5 of Canada 's notification ( G/AG/NCAN/151 ) says that 
"Following the implementation of some elements of the National Ingredient Strategy, the 
Canadian Dairy Commission announced that they will no longer purchase Skim milk 
powder under the Surplus Removal and Domestic Seasonality Programs as of 
1 February  2017. As of this date, no production of skim milk powder was eligible to receive 
the applied administered p rice."  
e. Work is underway on Canada 's domestic support notifications and these will be circulated 
to the Committee as soon as they are ready.   
Follow -up: India noted that the link provided by Canada for the value of production of butter is not 
working and requested Canada to provide a valid link. Regarding the national ingredient strategy, 
India asked what elements of the strategy had stopped purchase of skim milk under the surplus 
removal and domestic seasonality programme as of 1 September of 2017. India urged Canada to 
improve the transparency record since its domestic support notifications for 2019, 2020 and 2021 
remain pending. Canada stated that it would update the link. On notifications, Canada said that its 
federal government is working c losely with provincial and territorial partners to compile the 
information and would submit the notifications as soon as possible.   
5.2.4   European Union (G/AG/N/EU/79)  
AG-IMS ID 103108: Question by Australia - Other product -specific AMS/EMS  
Australia asked the E uropean Union  a question at 102nd CoA (AG-IMS ID 102123 ). As this was not 
answered, it is asked again.  
Australia thanks the EU for submitting its 2019 -20 marketing year DS:1 notification G/AG/N/EU/79 . 
Australia notes an increase in spending shown in Supporting Table DS:6 of EUR 320  million between 
marketing year 2019 -20 and marketing year 2018 -19. T his is across a range of commodities, 
including milk, beef, sheep, pig, fruit, and vegetables. The EU has listed the type of measure as a 
national aid 'COVID measure '. 
a. Could the EU please elaborate on the reasons for variation in the levels of support repo rted 
in this table?  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  b. Could the EU please indicate whether it expects further increases to this level of support 
and whether similar variations are expected for other commodities listed in Supporting 
Table DS:6?  
Australia would appreciate the EU updating the  Membership as to whether this information is 
available, and if so, providing it in AG -IMS. 
Answer by European Union  
a. The largest level of the increased support is linked to the COVID  measures. Some of these 
national schemes concern general sectors, therefo re no possibility to make a stringent 
reporting per sector.  
b. The EU does not exclude further increases to this level of support considering the duration 
of the COVID -19. The EU has given in its ad -hoc reports to this Committee in documents 
G/AG/GEN/159  and its Rev.1 to Rev.5 detailed explanations about the measures taken by 
the EU and its member States.  
5.2.5   Georgia (G/AG/N/GEO/28)  
AG-IMS ID 103033: Question by United States of America - General services: 
infrastructural services  
In G/AG/N/GEO/2 8 for calendar year 2021, Georgia notified in Supporting Table DS:1 the measure 
"Modernization of Amelioration System. " This measure was not notified in Georgia 's domestic 
support notifications for calendar years 2017 through 2020, but did appear in notifications for 
calendar years 2015 and 2016.   
 
a. Please confirm whether the measure notified in 2021 is the same as the measure last 
notified in 2016.  
b. If the same, what was the reason for the measure not being notified from 2017 to 2020?  
Answer by Georgia  
5.2.6   Georgia (G/AG/N/GEO/28, G/AG/N/GEO/25)  
AG-IMS ID 103034: Question by United States of America - Transparency issues (including 
Table DS:2)  
The United States remains concerned with some of the information in Georgia 's domestic support 
notifications.   
 
At the September 2022 WTO Committee on Agriculture, the United States asked Georgia a question 
about its 2020 Table DS:1 notification in AG -IMS ID 102043 , which has not been answered. The 
United States is resubmitting the question again, noting that we also have similar concerns with 
Georgia 's 2021 DS:1 notificatio n (G/AG/N/GEO/28 ), and as such, request  that Georgia also respond 
with regards to revising both Table DS:1 notifications for 2020 and 2021 to account for the noted 
discrepancies.  
 
From AG -IMS ID 102043: in Georgia 's January 2022 Trade Policy Review (TPR) the Secretariat 
reported that Georgia 's Ministry of Environmental Protection and Agriculture provided 243.5  million 
Georgian lari (GEL) in subsidies to the agricultural sector in 2020 (WT/TPR/S/420/Rev.1 page 102).  
In Georgia 's 2020 Table DS:1 domestic support notification ( G/AG/N/GEO/25 ) the total notified 
domestic support was GEL 1 50.9 million.  There also appeared to be other discrepancies noted in the 
TPR with regards to measures that appear to have not been included in Georgia 's domestic support 
notifications and a lack of required Table DS:2 notifications.  In responses to questio ns raised by 
Members, Georgia informed Members that it would submit the respective notifications in the first 
half of 2022.  
 
a. Please provide an update on the status of Georgia submitting revised Table  DS:1 
notification to account for noted discrepancies.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  b. Please provide an update on the status of submitting the required Table DS:2 notifications 
for any new or modified domestic support measures exempt from reduction commitments.  
Answer by Georgia  
5.2.7   Japan (G/AG/N/JPN/277)  
AG-IMS ID 103141: Question by India - Public stockholding for food security purposes  
In DS:1 notification ( G/AG/N/JPN/277 ) of Japan for the Fiscal Year 2020/2021, Supporting 
Table  DS:1 (Measures exempt from the reduction commitment - "Green Box"), Japan has notified a 
measure "Public stockholding for food security purposes" with JPY 18 billion as support. In this 
regard, India requests Japan to:  
 
a. Provide details of this measure.  
b. Provide information at what price the foodstuffs are acquired and released? How are these 
prices determined?  
c. Provide information about the quantity of acquired  and released stocks during 2019/2020 
and 2020/2021.  
Answer by Japan  
The public stockholding programme concerned covers rice, wheat and feed grains.  
With regards to rice, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) operates government 
reserve, targeting 1 million tonnes , against a possible shortage of supply caused by a substantial 
poor harvest. The government purchases approximately 200,000  tonnes  of rice at market prices 
through tenders before sowing, and releases them within five years time to the market at market 
prices.  
With regards to wheat, we support the stockholding by flour milling companies who maintain their 
stock under the guidan ce of the MAFF. The overall stock amounts to the level equivalent to 
2.3 months (900,000 tonnes ) of annual demand against a possible shortage of supply. The flour 
milling companies (private business) purchase and sell wheat at market prices while maintaini ng the 
stock level consistently described above. The government bears a part of their storing costs (for the 
period of 1.8 months). It has never been released due to insufficient supplies of imported wheat.  
With regards to feed grains, the compound feed ma nufacturers (private business) purchase and sell 
feed grains at market prices via private traders. The government supports about one third of storing 
costs of the stockholding (approx. 750,000 tonnes ) by the manufactures that is based on their 
business con tinuity plans to prepare for contingencies such as suspension of imports. The stock is 
maintained at the level equivalent to 1 month of annual demand (approx. 1 million tonnes ), including 
distribution stock held by the industry (approx. 250,000 tonnes ). 
  Stock  Quantity  FY 2019  FY 2020  
Rice acquired  183,000  210,000  
released  170,000  229,000  
Wheat  acquired  900,000  900,000  
released  900,000  900,000  
Feed acquired  1,000,000  1,000,000  
Grain  released  1,000,000  1,000,000  
(Unit: tonnes . 
5.2.8   Malaysia (G/AG/N/MYS/53)  
AG-IMS ID 103035: Question by United States of America, Australia - Transparency issues 
(including Table DS:2)  
In G/AG/N/MYS/53  for 2015, Malaysia notified two rice -specific domestic support measures: Paddy 
Price Subsidy Income Support (497 million Malaysian ringgit) in Supporting Table DS:1 and the 
fertilizer subsidy scheme for rice (465 million Malaysian ringgit) in Supporting T able DS:2.  However, 
Malaysia 's Ministry of Finance government expenditure report for 2016 includes estimated G/AG/W/235  
 
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  expenditures on rice support for the year 2015 in section B/P21 (found on pages 257 and 258  here: 
https://www.mof.gov.my/portal/arkib/expenditure/2016/b21_2.pdf ), which includes other support 
for rice. The other measures include the Incentive to Increase Rice Yield (20  million Malaysian 
ringgit), the Paddy Prod uction Incentive (563 million Malaysian ringgit), the Certified Paddy Seed 
Subsidy (85 million Malaysian ringgit), the Subsidy for Fertilizer for Hill Paddy (70 million Malaysian 
ringgit), and Price Rice Subsidy (528 million Malaysian ringgit).  
 
a. Please con firm the budgetary expenditures for each of the identified measures for 2015 
and confirm whether each measure is included in G/AG/N/MYS/53 and if so, where.  
b. If not, please explain why Malaysia has not included the measure in its domestic support 
notificati on. 
c. Noting that 2015 was more than six years ago, please provide an update on Malaysia 's 
plans to bring its domestic support notifications up to date.  
Answer by Malaysia  
AG-IMS ID 103036: Question by United States of America, Australia - Transparency issue s 
(including Table DS:2)  
In G/AG/N/MYS/53 , Malaysia notified Paddy Pr ice Subsidy Income Support (497 million Malaysian 
ringgit) in Supporting Table DS:1.  In response to AG -IMS ID 91185 , Malaysia noted that payments 
are "based on the context of poverty redressal and upliftment of the socio -economic well -being of 
paddy farmers ". Further, Malaysia did not specifically confirm that payments were not tied  to the 
type or volume of current production, noting only which farmers were eligible to receive payment.  
According to the Malaysian Parliament website (here), the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Industries 
is described as subsidizing "agricultural output " through the Skim Subsidi Harga Padi (SSHP), the 
Malay name for the Paddy Price Subsidy Income Support scheme.  Media reports indicate that the 
SSHP in 2021 was allocated 1.53 billion Malaysian ringgit, a substantial increase over the notified 
level of sup port in 2015.  Further, the Parliament website indicates that eligible producers in 2021 
will receive 360 Malaysian ringget per metric ton ne in 2019, indicating payments are not decoupled 
income support.  
 
a. Please confirm that the SSHP is the same measure as the Paddy Price Subsidy Income 
Support measure notified by Malaysia in G/AG/N/MYS/53.  
b. Please explain how the actual value of payments are determined for eligible producers for 
the Paddy Price Subsidy Income Support measure notified in 2015, including wheth er 
support was based on the quantity of output sold or produced by eligible producers and 
the payment rate per unit of output.  
c. Please indicate whether there has been any change in the programme since 2015 as 
compared to the SSHP measure described by the Ma laysian Parliament website for 2021.  
Answer by Malaysia  
5.2.9   Mexico (G/AG/N/MEX/56)  
AG-IMS ID 103109: Question by Australia - Transparency issues (including Table DS:2)  
Australia thanks Mexico for submitting its 2020 DS:1 notification G/AG/N/MEX/56 . Mexico has 
notified that u nder the Strategic Programme of Guaranteed Prices, eligible rice production increased 
to 165,900 tonnes in 2020 from 53,000 tonnes in 2019.  
Australia asks that Mexico indicate what proportion of eligible rice production is being exported.  
Answer by Mexico  
That is correct. In 2019, 53,000 tonnes were eligible under the Programme of Guaranteed Prices, 
and in 2020, 165,900 tonnes. It should be noted that the rice produced under this programme is 
used entirely for domestic consumption; it is purchased from sma ll-scale producers and distributed G/AG/W/235  
 
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  to highly and very highly marginalized communities through DICONSA shops.  Mexico is a country 
with a rice shortage, and its output is used for domestic consumption.  
AG-IMS ID 103110: Question by Canada - Transparency issu es (including Table DS:2)  
Canada thanks Mexico for its 2020 DS:1 notification ( G/AG/N/MEX/56 ). Canada is seeking further 
information related to the Supporting Table DS:1.  
 
a. Could Mexico provide additional information on the types of projects that fall under the 
heading "2(g) Infrastr uctural services "?  
b. Could Mexico provide additional information on the types of programs or activities that are 
covered under a measure called "Production for welfare " notified under "Structural 
adjustment assistance provided through investment aids "?  
Answer by Mexico  
a. Infrastructural projects concern mainly water infrastructure, for example:  
• Modernization and upgrading of infrastructure in irrigation and technified rainfed 
districts ; 
• Hydro -agricultural infrastructure support programme ; 
• Upgrading and modernization of dams and related infrastructure ; 
• Technified irrigation systems . 
b. Production  for welfare programme: The programme provides direct economic support, 
prior to planting and without the involvement of intermediaries, to small and medium -sized 
producers of eligible crops, mainly grains (maize, milling wheat, beans and rice), coffee 
and sugar cane.  
Eligibility requirements: To benefit from this programme, the only requirement is to be 
registered under the programme and to meet the eligibility criteria and limits set out in 
the programme's rules of operation for 2021.  
Follow -up: Brazil lo oked forward to receiving more detailed replies to the question.   
AG-IMS ID 103112: Question by Japan - Transparency issues (including Table DS:2)  
Japan would like to thank Mexico for its submission of DS:1 notification for MY2020 
(G/AG/N/MEX/56 ). We also appreciate that Canada raised a questio n regarding expenditures related 
to fertilizers at the 100th COA, and Mexico 's detailed description of in -kind support programme on 
fertilizers. (AG -IMS ID  100099 ). 
According to an article (20/07/2022) on the website Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Fo od Quality 
of the Netherlands , the Mexican President Lopez Obrador announced an ambitious investment plan 
to reactivate national fertilizers production. Furthermore, the Mexican Government is tackling the 
price inflation with several policies : 1) New inves tments in fertilizer plants; 2) Expansion of free 
fertilizer handout programme; 3) Duty -free fertilizer imports; 4) Organic fertilizers.  
Mexico 's most recent DS:1 notification shows that the expenditure on fertilizer increased by 
MXN 64.2 million  to MXN 186.9 million  in CY2020.  Could Mexico break down this fertilizer subsidy 
for 2020 and provide an outline?  
Answer by Mexico  
The fertilizer programme seeks to improve the availability of chemical and organic fertilizers for 
small -scale producers of basic grain s such as maize, beans and rice who are based in highly and 
very highly marginalized areas. The aim is to increase the production of foodstuffs and improve 
the productive capacity of rural producers.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  AG-IMS ID 103113: Question by New Zealand - Transparency  issues (including 
Table  DS:2)  
New Zealand notes Mexico has not provided full information in Supporting Table DS:1. New  Zealand  
would appreciate further information regarding the name and description of the domestic support 
measures notified, in Supporting  Table DS:1 including: 2(a); 2(b); 2(e); 2(g); 4; and 11.  
Answer by Mexico  
2(a) Research  
• National Institute for Forestry, Agricultural and Livestock Research (INIFAP) ; 
• Mexican Water Technology Institute (IMTA) ; 
• National Institute for Capacity -Building in the Rural Sector (INCA) ; 
• National Seed Inspection and Certification Service (SNICS) ; 
• Autonomous University of Chapingo ; 
• Postgraduate College (CP) ; 
• Agricultural College of the State of Guerrero (CSAEGRO) ; 
• Antonio Narro Autonomous Agrarian University (SEP) . 
2(b) Pest and disease control  
• Health component . 
2(e) Inspection services  
• SENASICA: Operating expenditure in terms of public policy regulation, monitoring and 
implementation . 
2(g) Infrastructural services  
• Modernization and upgrading of infrastructure in irrigation and technified rainfed districts ; 
• Hydro -agricultural infrastructure support programme ; 
• Upgrading and modernization of dams and related infrastructure . 
4. Food aid  
• DICONSA  rural supply programme ; 
• LICONSA  milk su pply programme . 
11. Structural adjustment assistance provided through investment aids  
• Production for welfare  
• Agriculture, livestock, fisheries, and aquaculture promotion programme  
Follow -up: The U nited Kingdom  noted its interest in the question. Brazil looked forward to receiving 
more detailed replies to the question.   
AG-IMS ID 103037: Question by United States of America - Direct payments: structural 
adjustment assistance provided through investment aids  
G/AG/N/MEX/56 , covering calendar year 2020,  contains a measure called "Agriculture, Livestock, 
Fisheries and Aquaculture Promotion Programme " valued at 96.4 million Mexican 1991 pesos.  
G/AG/N/MEX/55 , covering calendar year 201 9, contained the "Agriculture Promotion Programme " 
valued at 99.9 million Mexican 1991 pesos, and the "Livestock Promotion Programme " valued at 
5.7 million Mexican 1991 pesos.   
Please indicate whether the "Agriculture Promotion Programme " and the "Livestoc k Promotion 
Programme " were merged into the "Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries, and Aquaculture Promotion 
Programme " between 2019 and 2020.  
If so, please explain the changes that were made to the programme as a result of the merger.  
Please indicate whether  the notified budgetary outlays represent only funding provided to 
agricultural commodities and livestock or also includes non -agricultural commodities, such as fish.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  Answer by Mexico  
a. That is correct. In 2020, the Agriculture Promotion Programme, the Lives tock Production 
Programme and the Programme for the Promotion of Fisheries and Aquaculture 
Productivity were merged into the Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries and Aquaculture 
Promotion Programme, which seeks to contribute to self -sufficiency and food secur ity by 
increasing agricultural and livestock productivity through sustainable practices, the 
development of regional value chains and small -scale producers.  
b. The change concerns the merging of the promotion programmes into one sole programme 
covering agricu lture, livestock and fisheries, with a smaller budget than before. The 
essence and components of the programme have not changed the objectives or modes of 
operation of the previously separate programmes. The programmes have merely been 
merged and the amoun t granted for their implementation reduced.  
c. The notified outlays represent only the amounts provided for the promotion of agriculture 
and livestock.  
Follow -up: Brazil looked forward to receiving more detailed replies to the question.   
AG-IMS ID 103038: Que stion by United States of America - Input subsidies available to 
low-income or resource -poor producers  
G/AG/N/MEX/56  contains an "electric power subsidy " in Supporting Table DS:2.  A note on the table 
indicates that funds were spent on electricity charges for agricultural use.  
 
a. Does the Mexican government provide funding for electricity charges for uses other than 
agriculture?  
b. If so, does the Mexican government use one programme for funding all electricity 
programmes, or is there a separate programme specifically to fund electricity for 
agriculture?  
c. How did the Mexican government determine what electricity charges are for agricultural 
use for the purposes of notifying this electric power subsidy?  
Answer by Mexico  
a. In addition to the agricultural sector, funding is granted for services provi ding energy 
exclusively for household use and where customers are considered low -consumption 
consumers.   
b. For agricultural use, a single -charge stimulus tariff has been established for the pumping 
of water for agricultural irrigation. This rate will be appl ied for the electricity used to 
operate water pumping equipment for agricultural irrigation. Producers on the list of 
beneficiaries of agricultural energy sources may benefit from this tariff.   
c. Regarding the electricity tariff subsidy for agricultural pump ing in Mexico, the Energy 
Regulatory Commission (CRE) determines the methodology for calculating basic supply 
tariffs.  
The scheme aims to cover the total costs of wholesale electricity market (MEM) participants, as 
established by the CRE to invoice end cus tomers, which comprise the cost of the energy plus the 
transmission and distribution service and operating costs of the National Energy Control 
Centre  (CENACE) and the basic supplier.  
However, on 30 November 2017, the Federal Executive issued a decision es tablishing, through the 
Ministry of Finance and Public Credit (SHCP), a basic supply tariff -setting mechanism different from 
that of the CRE, with which it guaranteed that the way of determining household, agricultural 
stimulus and aquaculture tariffs woul d not change.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  The night -time period will be between 00:00:01 hours and 08:00:00 hours and will be applicable 
every day.  
The day -time period will run from 8:00:01 hours until 00:00:00 hours and will be applicable every 
day. 
Follow -up: Brazil looked forward to receiving more detailed replies to the question.   
5.2.10   Mexico (G/AG/N/MEX/56, G/AG/N/MEX/55)  
AG-IMS ID 103039: Question by United States of America - Direct payments: structural 
adjustment assistance provided through investment aids  
Mexico's notification G/AG/N/MEX/55  contained "Rural Development Programme " and "Cooperation 
Programme, " both of which do not appear in G/AG/N/MEX/56 . 
Have these two measures been terminated? If not, please provide an update on their status . 
Answer by Mexico  
No resources were assigned to these programmes in the Federal Expenditure Budget.  
They have not been terminated; they remain on the federal programme list, but have not been 
assigned any resources.  
5.2.11   New Zealand (G/AG/N/NZL/132)  
AG-IMS ID 103142: Question by India - General services: pest and disease control  
In DS:1 notification of New Zealand for the Financial Year 2020/2021, it has been noted that one of 
the programme titled as "Biosecurity Incursion Response and Long Term Pest Management" notified 
under Green Box measure "2(b) Pest and disease control" show s a sharp increase of 47.85% from 
NZD 48.29  million to NZD 71.4 million when compared with the previous DS:1 notification.  New 
Zealand is requested to describe the factors responsible for this growth and also provide a detailed 
description of "Biosecurity Incursion Response and Long Term Pest Management."  
Answer by New Zealand  
The spending increase between New Zealand 's DS:1 Notifications for the financial years 2019/20 
and 2020/21 was primarily caused due to an increased spend of NZD 23.913 million in the wilding 
conifer control programme. The programme 's purpose is to increase the control of a nationally 
significant pest to improve environmental outcomes for New Zealand and protect productive land 
and culturally significant sites from infestation. Further information about the programme can be 
found here: Wilding conifer control in NZ | NZ Government (mpi .govt.nz) . 
"Biosecurity Incursion Response and Long Term Pest Management" refers to the spending on 
initiatives such as the wilding conifer control programme and responses which aim to eradicate high 
risk new to New Zealand invasive species. As an island n ation New Zealand has unique native 
ecosystems and it is important that our biodiversity, and production systems, are protected from 
new incursions of invasive species, and that we effectively control established pests. These 
expenditures all fall under An nex 2 paragraph 2. (b) of the Agreement on Agriculture.  
Follow -up: India invited New Zealand to elaborate on what factors led to the increase in spending 
under the wilding conifer programme. New Zealand noted that  the increased spending recognized 
the inve stment required to achieve the aim and objectives of the New Zealand Wilding Conifer 
Management Strategy 2015 -2030 [ New Zeal and Wilding Conifer Management Strategy 
(wildingpines.nz) ]. Previous national and regional management programme investment was 
insufficient to control invasive conifers which have been spreading rapidly in many areas of New 
Zealand. The increased spend was  further notified in G/AG/N/NZL/122 , in table DS:2 under "National 
Wilding Confer Control Programme to Boost Regional Economies and Employment: NZD 100 million".  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  5.2.12   Pakistan (G/AG/N/PAK/17/Corr.1, G/AG/N/PAK/18/Corr.1, 
G/AG/N/PAK/19/Corr.1)  
AG-IMS ID 103114: Question by European Union - Public stockholding for food security 
purposes  
Pakistan has submitted corrigendum to the DS:1 notificat ions in relation to MY2012 -2013 
(G/AG/N /PAK/17/ Corr.1); MY2013 -2014 ( G/AG/N/PA K/18/ Corr.1); MY2014 -2015 
(G/AG/N/PAK/1 9/Corr.1) and MY2015 -2016 ( G/AG/N/PAK/2 0/Corr.1). 
 
a. Could Pakistan provide more information on the Public stockholding measures included in 
the corrigendum of the notifications (as listed above)?  
b. Could Pakistan provide the quantities of the wheat concerned?  
c. Could Pakistan confirm whether the mea sure concerned only wheat or other agricultural 
products as well?  
Answer by Pakistan  
a. Could Pakistan provide more information on the Public stockholding measures included in the 
corrigendum of the notifications (as listed above)?  
Year  Exchange Rate  Procu rement (Million tonnes ) 
2012-13 96.73  5.9 
2013-14 102.86  6.1 
2014-15 101.29  5.2 
2015-16 104.24  5.8 
2015-16 104.24  5.8 
b. Could Pakistan provide the quantities of the wheat concerned?  
The quantity of wheat procured for food security purpose:  
Year  Quantity (Million 
Tonnes ) 
2012-13 5.9 
2013-14 6.1 
2014-15 5.2 
2015-16 5.8 
c. Could Pakistan confirm whether the measure concerned only wheat or other agricultural products 
as well?  
The measure concerned only wheat.  
5.2.13   Paraguay (G/AG/N/PRY/34)  
AG-IMS ID 103143: Question by India - Domestic food aid  
In DS:1 notification ( G/AG/N/PRY/ 34) of Paraguay for the calendar year 2020, Supporting 
Table  DS:1 (Measures exempt from the reduction commitment - "Green Box"), Paraguay has notified 
a new scheme "Improving market integration of the eastern region (PIMA)" under measure 
"Domestic Food aid " with USD 14.43 million. In this context, India requests Paraguay:  
 
a. to elaborate upon the Scheme for improving market integration?  
b. How does this measure comply with provisions under para 4 of Annex 2 of the AoA?  
Answer by Paraguay  
The delegation of Paragu ay wishes to thank the delegation of India for its question. As a result of 
this question, we have identified an error in the way the measure was originally classified, and this G/AG/W/235  
 
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  has been corrected. Corrigenda for notification G/AG/N/PRY/34  and the subsequent notifi cation, 
G/AG/N/PRY/36 , have al ready been submitted to the Secretariat.  
Notification DS:2 corresponding to this measure has also been submitted for circulation.  
5.2.14   Philippines (G/AG/N/PHL/85)  
AG-IMS ID 103115: Question by Japan - Input subsidies available to low -income or 
resource -poor pro ducers  
Japan would appreciate if Philippines could reply to our question raised at the last COA meeting 
(AG-IMS ID 102015 ) on Philippines ' DS:1 notification G/AG/N/PHL/85 . 
Regarding Philippines ' Development Programme (b) Provision of access to farm inputs, Japan notices 
that the increase of the support is more than double (CY2020: PHP 5,593,702 thousand to CY2021: 
PHP 14,188,318 thousand). Could Philippines please explain the reason behind and illustrate the 
details of the support?  
Answer by Philippines  
The Philippines would like to thank the delegation of Japan for its interest on the Philippines ' support 
under Item b o f the Development Programmes.   
Chair, the Philippines would like to note that a reply has been provided on this question during 
the 102nd CoA Meeting on 14 -15 September 2022.  
Nevertheless, we would like to inform the Committee that in September 2020, the P hilippines passed 
into law Republic Act 11494, which mandated the provision of funds to government 's priority 
programs to drive speedy recovery from the COVID -19 pandemic.  This included agriculture support.  
The implementation of the said law increased the support provided in Item b under the "development 
programmes ", as notified in 2021. A large part of this was channeled into the Production Support 
Services of the Philippines National Rice Program, amounting  to around P HP 12.1 billion. This was 
used for the provision of high-quality  seeds and fertilizer support in the form of discount voucher, 
to encourage rice farmers to plant rice paddy amid the pandemic and ensure that rice supply in the 
country will not b e compromised.  
Follow -up: Japan noted that agricultural inputs such as fertiliser is an important element of food 
security.  
5.2.15   Russian Federation (G/AG/N/RUS/37)  
AG-IMS ID 103007: Question by Brazil - Direct payments: other  
Brazil would appreciate it if the Russian Federation could provide further details on the nature of the 
"subsidies to legal entities for forming, holding, insuring of intervention fund, for loan servicing, and 
relevant measures" that it has been notifying under Supporting Table DS:1 (M easures exempt from 
the reduction commitment - "Green Box"), as "other direct payment".  
Answer by Russian Federation  
Subsidies to legal entities for forming, holding, insuring of intervention fund, for loan servicing, and 
relevant measures are linked to th e mechanism of state procurement and commodity intervention 
of grains. In 2020, purchasing and commodity interventions were not carried out, so funding had 
been used to cover the costs of storage of the products. The maximum funding for this purpose is 
set for a period of three years. The maximum funding on the monthly basis, in 2018 -20, were 
78 rubles per tonne of the grains and will be 103 rubles per ton ne, in 2022 -24. 
AG-IMS ID 103117: Question by Thailand - Direct payments: other  
Thailand appreciates th e notification concerning domestic support commitments of 
Russian  Federation. Under Supporting table DS1, the Russia n Federation  notified measures under G/AG/W/235  
 
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  the other direct payment as "Subsidies to legal entities for forming, holding, insuring of intervention  
fund, for loan servicing, and relevant measures " at federal and sub -federal level.  
Thailand would like to seek clarification from Russian Federation on the above -mentioned projects. 
What are the functions and roles of the legal entities? Please, provide a n example as it will be helpful 
in understanding above mentioned legal entities.   
Answer by Russian Federation  
Please, see  the answer to the question  AG-IMS ID 103007.  
AG-IMS ID 103116: Question by Paraguay - Other product -specific AMS/EMS  
The delegation o f Paraguay thanks the delegation of the Russian Federation for submitting 
notification G/AG/N/RUS/37  concerning its domestic support. We note a substantial increase in 
product specific subsidies granted to flax and hemp, from 13% of value of production in 2019 
to 38.7% of value of production in  2020. Could you please provide:  
 
a. the reasons for such an increase and the programmes that have been implemented that 
may have caused it?  
b. Disaggregated data on flax and hemp subsidies, if available?  
c. The main export destinations of Russian hemp?  
Answer by Russian Federation  
a. The growth of production of flax and hemp is caused by better crop conditions and as a 
result a significant increase in planted area. Therefore, the technical modernization of 
Agro-Industrial Complex and plant protection are pr iorities of the State Programme for 
Agricultural Development and Regulation of Agricultural Products, Raw Materials and Food 
Markets.  
b. This disaggregated data is not available now.  
c. The export of flex and hemp is relatively small and most of the products are  processed 
and used to meet domestic market demand afterwards.  
5.2.16   United Kingdom (G/AG/N/GBR/11)  
AG-IMS ID 103050: Question by European Union - Market price support: Eligible 
production  
In United Kingdom 's reply to India 's question AG -IMS ID 102107 , the United Kingdom explained that 
the eligible productions for butter, skimmed milk p owder and common wheat were reported as zero 
in Supporting Table DS:5 because "prices have remained significantly higher than the applied 
administered price throughout the reporting period and no applications for support were received 
during the reporting period ". 
Is it a correct interpretation that the United Kingdom applies administered prices for all three 
mentioned commodities and still reports eligible production as zero? If so, can the United Kingdom 
explain how that is compatible with its obligations under the WTO Agreement on Agriculture?  
Answer by United Kingdom  
The U nited Kingdom  thanks the E uropean Union for their question.  We note that this relates to our 
first DS:1 submission and, as part of our internal processes, we can confirm that  we are currently 
reviewing our interpretation to ensure the UK 's approach and our associated reporting aligns with 
our obligations within the Agreement on Agriculture and will update once this is completed.  
Follow -up: No comments.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  5.2.17   United States of America  (G/AG/N/USA/157)  
AG-IMS ID 103118: Question by Canada - Transparency issues (including Table DS:2)  
a. In G/AG/N/USA/157  Supporting Table DS:1 General notes, it is mentioned that "Wages 
and salaries and administrative expenses were excluded except where such outlays reflect 
the level o f service provided to agriculture. "  
Could the United States elaborate on how it determines which wages and salaries and 
administrative expenses reflect the level of service provided to agriculture?   
b. In G/AG/N/USA/157 Supporting Table DS:4, the United Stat es reports the Current Total 
Aggregate Measurement of Support (CTAMS)  for beef cattle and calves, sheep and lambs 
and livestock. In notes (2) of the same table, the U.S. indicates: "Livestock category 
includes all species eligible for Livestock Forage Prog ram (LFP), Livestock Indemnity 
Program (LIP), and Emergency Assistance for Livestock Program (ELAP) programme cattle 
& calves, sheep & lambs, poultry, swine, goats, llamas, alpacas, emus, deer, elk, reindeer, 
and equine. Value of production does not includ e reindeer, for which data are not 
reported. "  
Can the United States explain why support provided under the LFP, LIP and 
ELAP programmes for cattle, calves, sheep and lambs is not reported under their 
respective categories?  
c. Can the United States clarify wh y it has decided to report the support provided by the 
Coronavirus Food Assistance Program (CFAP) 1 and CFAP 2 as a single programme even 
though both programmes covered different commodities and used different calculation 
formulas?  
Answer by United States of America  
a. Many USDA agencies and offices provide services to agriculture, as described under the 
General Services category of the notification. Budgetary outlays related to wages, salaries, 
and administrative expenses are included to the extent to which they are related to the 
provision of these general services. It excludes any outlays that are unrelated to the 
delivery of these services.  
b. Please see the answer to AG -IMS 81090  and see also G/AG/N/USA/135/Rev.1 , page, 1, 
para. 3 and page 14, note 1.  
c. The Coronavirus Food Assistance Program (CFAP) is a single program, developed to assist 
agricultural producers who we re negatively impacted by market disruptions due to the 
effects of the COVID -19 pandemic. The CFAP was implemented through two rounds of 
payments. The application period for the first round of payments was 26 May 2020, to 
11 September  2020, and the applica tion period for the second round of payments was 
20 September  2020, to 11 December  2020. Adjustments to the payment formulas for the 
second round of payments reflect market conditions in the second and third quarters 
of 2020, compared to the first CFAP pay ment formulas, which were based on conditions 
in the first quarter of 2020.  
Follow -up: Brazil and China registered interest in the question which brought to the attention of the 
Committee the substantial increase in U.S. agricultural subsidies. China expre ssed concern regarding 
the concentration of U.S. subsidies on specific products such as soybeans.   
AG-IMS ID 103119: Question by Canada - Other product -specific AMS/EMS  
In G/AG/N/USA/157  Supporting Table DS:6, the United States reported support provided to the 
dairy sector through t he Dairy Margin Coverage (DMC) program. In December 2021, the United 
States retroactively modified the DMC regulations as follows:  
 G/AG/W/235  
 
- 345 - 
 
  These changes were made retroactive to January 2020 and increase both the likelihood and the size 
of potential payments unde r the program. Can the United States clarify if these retroactive payments 
were reported in the G/AG/N/USA/166  since they are associated with production in 2020 and 2021?   
 
a. Premium alfalfa hay is now being used instead of blended alfalfa hay in the feed cost 
calculation which is then used to determine the National average margin for each month, 
and; 
b. The supplemental DMC provision allows producers to update their annual milk production 
history to levels produced in 2019 instead of the baselines created in 2011, 2012, or 2013.  
Answer by United S tates of America  
Budgetary outlays under the Dairy Margin Coverage (DMC) programme are notified in the year in 
which they were disbursed. Any increase in DMC indemnity payments resulting from this adjustment 
will be reflected in the relevant year in which they occurred.  
Follow -up: Brazil and China registered interest in the question which brought to the attention of the 
Committee the substantial increase in U.S. agricultural subsidies. China expressed concern regarding 
the concentration of U.S. subsidies on specific products such as soybeans.   
5.2.18   United States of America (G/AG/N/USA/166)  
AG-IMS ID 103122: Question by Australia - Transparency issues (including Table DS:2)  
Australia thanks the United States for submitting its 2020 -21 DS:1 notification  G/AG/N/USA/166 . 
Australia notes that t he US has reported substantial year -on-year product specific AMS growth for 
barley (158% growth), buckwheat (374% growth), millet (173% growth), oats (232% growth), rye 
(446% growth), and safflower (209% growth) – predominantly due to payments made under t he 
Coronavirus Food Assistance Program (CFAP). The US has also reported an increase in the proportion 
of support relative to the value of production of these products.  
Australia asks that the United States indicate the reason for these increases and the m ain export 
markets for these products for the year to which this notification refers.  
Answer by United States of America  
The rise in product -specific support was primarily the result of higher payments under the 
Coronavirus Food Assistance Program (CFAP), which was designed to minimize the negative 
economic impacts of COVID -19 on U.S. agriculture without impacting producers ' planting decisions. 
CFAP was a short -term measure designed to help address the adverse market impacts of these and 
other commodities d ue to the COVID -19 pandemic and is no longer in effect.  
Top Destinations for U.S. Exports of Select Products, By Value  
October 2020 – September 2021  
Barley  Buckwheat  Millet  Oats  Rye Safflower  
Canada  Japan  Indonesia  Canada  Korea,  Republic  of Canada  
Japan  Korea,  Republic  of Canada  China  Japan  Netherlands  
Mexico  Canada  Mexico  Belgium  Canada  Mexico  
Top Destinations for U.S. Exports of Select Products, By Volume  
October 2020 – September 2021  
Barley  Buckwheat  Millet  Oats  Rye Safflower  
Canada  Japan  Indonesia  Canada  Korea,  Republic  of Canada  
Mexico  Korea,  Republic  of Canada  Belgium  Canada  Netherlands  
Japan  New Zealand  Mexico  United Kingdom  Mexico  Mexico  
Source:  U.S. Census Bureau . 
Follow -up: Brazil and China registered interest in the question which brought to the attention of the 
Committee the substantial increase in U.S. agricultural subsidies. China expressed concern regarding 
the concentration of U.S. subsidies on specific products such as soybeans.   G/AG/W/235  
 
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  AG-IMS ID 103131: Question by New Zealand, Paraguay - Annex 2 (Green Box)  
New Zealand commends the US on a decreased AMS expenditure from USD 18,247 million in 2019 
20 to USD 15,984 million in 2020 -21 (decrease of USD 2,263 million). However, New Zealand notes 
that US Annex 2 spending has significantly increased over this period from USD  139,220 to 
USD 188,735.958 mill (increase of USD 49,515.958 million).  
Could the US please:  
a. explain the reasons for this significant increase;  
b. indicate the policies in place to ensure such a significant increase in spend is in compliant 
with the chapeau of Annex 2 and has no, or at most minimal, trade -distorting effects or 
effects on production;  
c. advise if this is the result of a change in policy, and if the US intends to continue  to increase 
support under Annex 2?   
Answer by United States of America  
a. The primary reason for the increased expenditures in the Green Box is increased domestic 
food aid expenditures.  The majority of domestic food aid expenditures and the increase in 
domes tic food aid expenditures are due to increased SNAP expenditures.  
b. Food purchases through SNAP are made directly by beneficiaries at retail food outlets; 
beneficiaries using SNAP benefits purchase the same food products as other consumers at 
market prices, which may be domestically produced or imported.  
c. The increase in SNAP expenditures from FY 2019/20 to FY 2020/21 is largely a result of 
the negative impacts of the COVID -19 pandemic on individuals resulting in an increase in 
the number of people applying an d being eligible to receive benefits or additional benefits 
under SNAP as well as additional funding and flexibilities under the programme to meet 
the unprecedented challenges of the COVID -19 pandemic.  The United States will continue 
to support people in n eed and who are food insecure, and the level of expenditures in the 
future will be based in part on the number of people in need who meet the eligibility 
requirements.  It should be noted that the COVID -19 pandemic was an unprecedented 
event.  
AG-IMS ID 1031 20: Question by Australia - General services: infrastructural services  
Australia thanks the United States for submitting its 2020 -21 DS:1 notification G/AG/N/USA/166 .  
 
Australis n otes that the US has reported that expenditure under the "Risk Management 
Agency  (RMA): Underwriting gains to insurers – Underwriting gains provided to insurance companies 
under the Standard Reinsurance Agreement program" has increased by almost USD 1 bill ion, from 
USD 583 million in marketing year 2019 -20 to USD 1,517 million in marketing year 2020 -21. 
Australia notes that the US has responded to questions by Brazil (AG -IMS ID 101054  and 100108 ) 
that "the agreement specifies the payment of administrative and operating costs and the sharing of 
underwriting risk to support that delivery and servicing activity."   
 
Australia asks that the US:   
 
a. indicate if this will permit  the USDA RMA to increase the provision of crop insurance, and   
b. outline its assessment of whether an increase in the provision of crop insurance would 
have no or at most minimal effects on production.  
Answer by United States of America  
a. No. The Standard Rei nsurance Agreement (SRA) is a cooperative financial agreement 
between the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation and approved insurance providers to G/AG/W/235  
 
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  deliver crop insurance contracts to farmers and ranchers on behalf of the United States 
government. The SRA doe s not affect the policy premiums paid by farmers and by law 
must be budget -neutral.  
b. The increase in underwriting gains has no effect on production.  
Follow -up: Brazil and China registered interest in the question which brought to the attention of the 
Commit tee the substantial increase in U.S. agricultural subsidies. China expressed concern regarding 
the concentration of U.S. subsidies on specific products such as soybeans.   
AG-IMS ID 103121: Question by Australia - Domestic food aid  
Australia thanks the Unit ed States of America (US) for its submission of DS:1 notification 
G/AG/N/USA/166 . Australia seeks further clarification from the US on its Table DS:1 and Supporting 
Tables.  
Expenditure for domestic food aid increased significantly between 2019 -20 and 2020 -21 
(G/AG/N/USA/157 ), mainly due to an increas e in expenditure on the Food & Nutrition Service 's 
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) of USD 48.8  billion.  
Australia asks that the United States explain the reason for this increase.   
Answer by United States of America  
The increase in SNAP ex penditures from FY 2019/20 to FY 2020/21 is largely a result of the negative 
impacts of the COVID -19 pandemic on individuals resulting in an increase in the number of people 
applying and being eligible to receive benefits or additional benefits under SNAP as well as additional 
funding and flexibilities under the programme to meet the unprecedented challenges of the COVID -
19 pandemic.  
AG-IMS ID 103009: Question by Brazil, Paraguay - Domestic food aid  
According to G/AG/N/USA/166 , expenditures under "Food & Nutrition Service (FNS): Supplemental 
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP)" have increased more than 50% from 2019/2020 to 
2020/2021. Could the US provide any clarification on the causes of this increase, such as changes 
in the number of beneficiaries, volume or prices of th e food purchased?  
Answer by United States of America  
The increase in SNAP expenditures from FY 2019/20 to FY 2020/21 is largely a result of the negative 
impacts of the COVID -19 pandemic on individuals resulting in an increase in the number of people 
applyi ng and being eligible to receive benefits or additional benefits under SNAP, as well as additional 
funding and flexibilities under the programme to meet the unprecedented challenges of the COVID -
19 pandemic.  Some such temporary changes in SNAP during the p andemic included a 15 % increase 
in SNAP benefits to all participants, investments in expanding online grocery purchases using SNAP, 
additional funding to deliver more fruits and vegetables, additional funding for seniors ' nutrition, and 
additional nutriti onal assistance funding for residents of American Samoa, Commonwealth of the 
Northern Mariana Islands, and Puerto Rico.   
AG-IMS ID 103126: Question by Japan - Domestic food aid  
Japan would like to thank the US for its submission of DS:1 notification for MY 2020 
(G/AG/N/USA/166 ). 
 
We note 40% increase of subsidies for "domestic food aid, " which accounts for 90% of "Green Box ", 
from 85.6  billion USD in MY2019 to 134.5  billion USD in MY2020.  
 
The 48.8  billion USD increase (57% up) in "Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) " is 
more than remarkable above all.  Could the US please outline the eligibility criteria related to 
nutritional objectives of SNAP, in accordance with paragraph 4, Annex 2 of AOA?  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  Answer by United States of America  
The increase in SNAP expenditures from FY 201 9/20 to FY 2020/21 is largely a result of the negative 
impacts of the COVID -19 pandemic on individuals resulting in an increase in the number of people 
applying and being eligible to receive benefits or additional benefits under SNAP as well as additional 
funding and flexibilities under the programme to meet the unprecedented challenges of the COVID -
19 pandemic.  
The nutritional objectives of SNAP are to provide nutrition benefits to supplement the food budgets 
of needy families so they can purchase healthy food and move towards household self -
sufficiency.  Food purchases through SNAP are made directly by beneficiaries at retail food outlets; 
beneficiaries using SNAP benefits purchase the same food products as other consumers at market 
prices, which may be dom estically produced or imported.  
AG-IMS ID 103132: Question by New Zealand - Domestic food aid  
New Zealand acknowledges the impact of COVID -19 on food affordability over the period covered 
by G/AG/N/USA/166. New  Zealand notes the US has significantly increased support from the 
previous marketing year (USD 49,633 million) under Annex 2 (4) Domestic food (increase from 
USD 120,315 million (2019 -20) to USD 169,948 million (2020 -21)). Could the US please provide 
the policy rationale for such a significant increase in support?  
New Zealand is particularly interested in the Milk Donation Reimbursement Program notified under 
Annex 2 (4). New  Zealand is of the understanding that the purpose of the Milk Donation 
Reimbursement Program is to allow "eligible dairy organisations to partner with non -profit 
organizations that distribute food to low -income individuals " (taken from the USDA website: Milk 
Donation Reimbursement Program | Agricultural Marketing Service (usda.gov) ), and then the eligible 
dairy organisations receive limited reimbursements relating to these donations. According to the 
USDA website, these reimbursements are only open to domestic processors. Does the United States 
have any plans to expand this programme to international dairy processors?  
Answer by United States of America  
The increase in SNAP expenditures from FY 2019/20 to FY 2020/21 is largely a result of the negative 
impacts of the COVID -19 pandemic on individuals resulting in an increase in the number of people 
applying and being eligible to receive benefits or additional benefits under SNAP, as well as additional 
funding and flexibilities under the programme to meet the unprecedented challenges of the COVID -
19 pandemic.  
The Milk Donation Reimbursement Program is designed to address food waste and loss within the 
United States. There is no statutory authority to expand the programme to international dairy 
processors.  
AG-IMS ID 103056: Question by European Union - Direct payments: payments under 
environmental programmes  
The European Union notes a decrease in not ified support under Environmental Programmes from 
USD 6,019 million in Marketing Year 2019/2020 to USD 4,513 million in Marketing Year 2020/2021. 
What are the reasons for this decrease in support?   
Answer by United States of America  
The United States thank s the European Union for the question and is currently reviewing why there 
was a decrease in notified support for these programs and will revert back at a later date with a 
response.  
AG-IMS ID 103052: Question by European Union - Current Total AMS (Amber B ox) 
Amber Box Support - Overall Current Total AMS plus de minimis  support.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  The EU notes, that since the 2017 DS:1 notification the overall support within the Amber Box 
support, the figures were:  
2017 USD 12.6 billion  of which Current Total AMS  USD 4.0 billion 
2018 USD 23.4 billion    USD 13.1 billion  
2019 USD 36.0  billion    USD 18.2 billion and  
2020 USD 37.7 billion    USD 16.0 billion.  
In fact, the amount in the current notification is the highest since before the year 2000. The US  AMS 
commitment is USD  19.1 billion. Total De minimis  support (Product Specific and Non -Product Specific 
is USD  20.8 billion. So, the US support under de minim is is higher than the actual AMS limit of 
USD 19.1 billion, which is fully within the 5% de minimis  limit – NPS arriving at 4.3% of VoP.  
The E uropean Union  would like to ask the US the following question:  
Does the U nited States see this trend of Amber Box support to be in line with the aim of the reform 
in the Agreement on Agriculture "to provide for substantial progressive reductions in agricultural 
support?  
Answer by United States of America  
The United States remains committed  to abiding by its WTO commitments.  Increased expenditures 
in 2018 through 2020 have been designed to be targeted, temporary, and to minimize or remove 
any impacts on producer decisions and markets.  
The United States is actively engaged in advancing agricu ltural reform at the WTO and looks forward 
to working with other Members to find solutions that reduce distortions in agricultural markets, while 
also increasing the resiliency and sustainability of food systems to reduce global food insecurity.  
Follow -up: The European Union  welcomed U.S. statement that the increase in AMS spending is 
temporary. The European  Union looked forward to working with the US and other Members on the 
reduction of trade distorting support and finding ways to cope with current challe nges of 
sustainability and food security in a sustainable manner.   
AG-IMS ID 103133: Question by New Zealand - Current Total AMS (Amber Box)  
New Zealand notes that applications for the CFAP closed on 12  October 2021. Will the United States ' 
next DS:1 notif ication reflect decreased levels of assistance, considering the CFAP currently accounts 
for 67.6% of the U.S. total AMS?  
Answer by United States of America  
The contributions of CFAP to the Current Total AMS will decrease in 2021/22 due to CFAP no longer 
being in effect.  
AG-IMS ID 103010: Question by Brazil - Market price support: Eligible production  
In G/AG/N/USA/166 , Supporting Table DS:5, the US has informed that eligible production for sugar 
during market -year 2020 -2021 was 8.376 billion tonnes, which represented an increase of almost 
1 billion eligible tonnes in comparison to marketing -year 2019 -2020. Additionally, the value of the 
U.S. sugar production grew around 36% on a year -to-year basis.  
In light of the above, could the US provide an update on recent developments of its sugar polic ies 
that could explain the growth in eligible production and in value of production?  
Answer by United States of America  
There are no changes to the U.S. nonrecourse marketing assistance loan programme for sugar.  
Eligible production is actual sugar product ion in both the 2019/20 and 2020/21 notifications. The 
increase in eligible production in 2020/21 reflects that the 2019/20 crop was significantly reduced 
due to adverse weather conditions, particularly affecting the sugarbeet harvest. The value of G/AG/W/235  
 
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  product ion for sugar in 2020/21 increased relative to 2019/20 due to both higher production and 
higher prices received by producers in 2020/21.  
AG-IMS ID 103123: Question by Australia - Other product -specific AMS/EMS  
Australia thanks the United States for submitt ing its DS:1 notification G/AG/N/USA/166 . Australia 
seeks further clarification from the US on its Table DS:1 and Supporting Tables.  
Over several years, including 2020 -21, the US has reported direct payments issued under the Market 
Facilitation Program (MFP) and the Coronavirus Food  Assistance Program (CFAP). Specifically in 
relation to Supporting Table DS:6:  
• In 2020 -21 the US reported direct payments under MFP of roughly USD 23 billion and 
under CFAP of USD 24 billion.  
• In 2019 -20 the US reported direct payments under MFP of roughly USD 26 billion and 
under CFAP of USD 26 billion.  
• In 2018 -19 the US reported direct payments under MFP of roughly USD 19 billion.  
Based on the MFP information, direct payments to producers spiked sharply between 2018 -19 
and 2019-20, and fell slightly in 2020 -21. The case is similar for CFAP.  
a. Does the US expect these decreases to continue, based on market conditions?  
b. Does the decrease in the spending from these programs mean they have achieved their 
policy objectives?   
Answe r by United States of America  
a. Both the MFP and CFAP programs are no longer in effect and notified expenditures will 
eventually reduce to zero.  
b. CFAP was a temporary programme designed to minimize the negative economic impacts 
of COVID -19 on U.S. agriculture , while MFP was a temporary programme designed to help 
assist producers with meeting the additional costs associated with disrupted markets for 
commodities targeted by retaliatory tariffs.  In both cases, a specific amount of funding 
was authorized for thes e programs. That funding is no longer available and as previously 
stated, both programs are no longer in effect.  
AG-IMS ID 103125: Question by Australia - Other product -specific AMS/EMS  
Australia thanks the US for its submission of DS:1 notification G/AG/N/USA/166 . Australia seeks 
further clarification from the US on its Table DS:1 and Supporting Tables.  
Australia also notes that cherries, cranberries, dairy, ginseng, grapes/raisins, hogs and pigs, and 
tree nuts have not been receiving direct MFP payments since 2018 -19. 
Could the US please indicate the reason why these products are no longer receiving direct payments?  
Answer by United States of America  
The last tranche of 2019 MFP payments were issued in February 2020. Given that MFP was an ad hoc 
emergency payment, we have notified a ctual expenditures in the years they were provided. For 
some commodities, there may have been adjustments made to 2019 MFP payments that were 
disbursed in FY 2021 and are therefore included in this notification.  
AG-IMS ID 103144: Question by New Zealand - Other product -specific AMS/EMS  
New Zealand notes the US has notified a significant increase in product -specific AMS for sheep and 
lamb from the previous marketing year. Could the US please provide further information on the 
policy developments that led to the increased product -specific outlay?  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  Answer by United States of America  
Product -specific support for sheep and lamb increased by USD 12 million from 2019/20 to 2020/21 
due to an increase in payments made under CFAP, a short -term measure that is no longer  in effect 
aimed at addressing the ongoing impacts of the COVID -19 pandemic.  
AG-IMS ID 103057: Question by European Union - Non-product -specific AMS  
What are the reasons for the large increase in support under the Coronavirus Food Assistance 
Program (CFAP)  in Supporting Table DS:9 in Marketing Year 2020/2021 as compared to the 
Marketing Year before?   
Answer by United States of America  
There was a very small amount of payments for sales commodities under the second round of CFAP 
disbursed in FY 2020, which w as reported in the 2019/20 notification. Most of the CFAP payments 
made in the second round were disbursed in FY 2021 and are therefore notified in the 2020/21 
notification.  
AG-IMS ID 103008: Question by Brazil - Classification of measures  
Brazil notices t hat the US has once again notified  operating costs related to the federal crop 
insurance as "infrastructural services" subsidies.   
Taking note of the answers provided to questions AG -IMS ID s 100108 and 10154, Brazil would like 
to consult the US if it has given further consideration on the possibility of notifying such outlays in 
another category of the Agreement on Agriculture.   
Answer by United States of America  
The United States notified these expenditures under paragraph 2(g) as these outlays support the 
institutional infrastructure for delivery of the Federal Crop Insurance Program.  These outlays go to 
private insurers to deliver and service products under the Federal Crop Insur ance programme on 
behalf of the U.S. government. The United States has notified the budgetary outlays associated with 
delivery of crop insurance similarly to the way it notifies budgetary outlays for delivery of services 
to agricultural producers by govern ment agencies.  
AG-IMS ID 103134: Question by New Zealand - Classification of measures  
New Zealand notes that there has been a significant increase in the level of spending 
(USD  1,927. 807million ) under the PLC between the marketing years 2019 -2020 and 2020 -2021, 
and a smaller, albeit still significant increase in spend (USD 297.797 million) under the 
ARC-CO programme. Can the US offer more information on the reasons behind the increases in 
spending under each programme?  
New Zealand appreciates the informati on the US has previously provided on PLC and ARC -CO. 
However, New  Zealand reiterates question AG -IMS ID 100109 (and numerous other Member 's 
questions) on the U.S. justification for notifying these payments as Non -Product -Specific AMS when 
a farmer 's eligibility to receive payments under these programmes is based on whether they hav e 
produced a specific type of crop. Can the US please explain how PLC and ARC -CO payments comply 
with the requirement for non -product -specific support to be provided in favour of agricultural 
producers in general?   
Answer by United States of America  
The in crease in Price Loss Coverage (PLC) outlays in FY 2021 reflects the market conditions in 
marketing year 2019/20. Prices in 2019/20 were lower than the reference price for certain 
commodities, due to market conditions at that time. For Agriculture Risk Cove rage (ARC -CO), the 
increase would reflect a reduction in actual revenue at the county level in 2019/20 relative to the 
benchmark revenue at the county level. The United States would remind New Zealand that farmers' 
eligibility to receive payments under the se programs is not tied to the production of a specific 
commodity or even to produce a commodity.   G/AG/W/235  
 
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  5.3  New or modified domestic support measures  (Table DS:2)  
5.3.1   Brazil (G/AG/N/BRA/68)  
AG-IMS ID 103145: Question by India - Transparency issues (including Table DS:2 ) 
As per the DS:2 notification ( G/AG/N/BRA/68 ) submitted on 9 February 2022, Programme "Feed 
Brazil" replaces "Program of acquisition of agricultural products from family farming". The 
Programme "Feed Brazil" is intended to promote food security and nutritional actions and building 
stocks. In this context, India requests Brazil to provide the following details:  
 
a. How does "Feed Brazil" differ from "Program of acquisition of agricultural products from 
family farming"?  
b. What are the agricultural products covered under the programme?  
c. At what price does the "Feed Brazil" programme procure from farmers? How this price is 
determined?  
d. What is the eligibility criteria for farmers to be covered under this programme?  
Answer by Brazil  
a. The relevant difference is the update of the maximum annual pay ments to eligible small 
farmers, family farmers, and agricultural cooperatives. Brazil has provided this information 
in its answer to question A G-IMS ID 100117 . 
b. Considering that the purpose of the programme is to increase access to food for people 
and groups in vulnerable situations, through the acquisition of production from family 
farmers, extractivists, artisanal fishermen, indigenous peoples and other traditional 
populations, there is no predetermined  role of products that can benefit.  
The programme has allowed for the acquisition of several food items produced by family 
farming, some commercial crops and others with little or no market insertion and only 
regional importance (such as some socio -biodiversity products), in order to enable the 
provision of diversified, healthy and balanced diets.   
c. The general rule for purchase is through a bidding process, to assure public transparency 
and wide participation of interested suppliers, in order to obtain market rate prices.  
In exceptional cases when a bidding process is not possible, Law no. 14,284/2021 
establishes that pu rchases can only be carried out if prices are compatible with prevailing 
market prices, at a local  or regional level. Brazil has provided this information in its answer 
to question Ag -IMS 100034 . 
d. In Brazilian legislation, family farming is an economic activity defined in Law No. 
11,326/2004. According to the law, a family farmer and a rural fa mily entrepreneur are 
those (i) who carry out activities in rural areas, (ii) have an area of up to four fiscal 
modules, (iii) uses labour from the family itself, (iv) has a minimum %age of family income 
originating from economic activities of its establis hment; (v) the management of the 
establishment is undertaken by the family itself.  
The farmer needs to have obtained a Declaration of Eligibility for the National Program for 
Strengthening Family Agriculture (DAP), an instrument used to identify and qualif y the 
Family Units of Agrarian  Production in family farming.  
In addition to family farmers, artisanal fishermen, aquaculturists, mariculturists, foresters, 
extractivists, quilombolas, indigenous people, agrarian reform settlers can obtain the DAP.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  5.3.2   United K ingdom (G/AG/N/GBR/14)  
AG-IMS ID 103011: Question by Brazil, Paraguay - Transparency issues (including 
Table  DS:2)  
Brazil appreciates the United Kingdom's transparency in relation to its new Green Box programmes. 
Overall, the programmes descriptions are cl ear. Nonetheless, Brazil has some specific questions, as 
follows:  
a. In what regards the "Environmental Land Management: Sustainable Farming Incentive 
(SFI)", the UK has explained that farmers are required to choose land -based actions in 
order to be entitled for the benefits arising from the SFI. Could the UK provide a listing, 
or at least some examples, of such land -based actions?  
b. In what regards the "Landscape Recovery (LR)" Project Development Phase (PDP)", the 
UK has claimed that it meets the policy -specif ic criteria set out in Annex 2, paragraph 11. 
Could the UK indicate what "structural disadvantages" the programme seeks to remedy?  
c. In what regards the "National Test Programme (NTP) Scotland", the UK listed, as an 
example of a loss of income, a producer pa rticipating in a survey. Could the UK further 
elaborate on this circumstance  and why it could lead to loss of income?  
Answer by United Kingdom  
a. In 2022, there are three  standards available in the Sustainable Farming Incentive (SFI):  
- arable and horticultu ral soils ; 
- improved grassland soils ; 
- Moorland.  
Each standard is a group of land –based actions with a set of aims. Farmers must complete all actions 
in the standards they sign up to. For example, the introductory level of the arable and horticultural 
soils standard includes such actions as: completion of a soil assessment and production of a soil 
management plan; soil organic matter testing; adding organic matter to all land in the standard at 
least once during the 3 -year SFI standards agreement and finally,  to have green cover on at least 
70% of land in the standard over winter. Further information on the actions in each standard is 
available via this link: How the SFI standards work and future standards . 
The levels of actions which are currently available (in 2022) are either introductory or intermediate 
for each standard. Details of these actions can be found here.  The SFI will expand each year, with 
the full set of standards in place by 2025.  
b. The Landscape Recovery Project Development Grant provides targeted support to help land 
managers address delivery barriers and ensure value for money. It includes, but is not limited to,  
support provided to ensure effective planning and governance structures, local engagement, data 
collection, specialised technical inputs, and other activities set out in our notification. These activities 
are essential prior to implementing large -scale, l ong-term projects, such as those under Landscape 
Recovery. Many English land managers, particularly small landowners, do not have access to the 
requisite capital and expertise required to undertake these activities, putting them at a structural 
disadvantag e. The project development grant is designed to address this disadvantage.  
c. Loss of income in relation to National Test Programme (Scotland) refers to time producers spend 
on completing research and feedback tasks in order to support Government evaluatio n and 
reporting, which prevents them carrying out their usual business activities. Payments in respect of 
such activity reflect the average time needed to complete them.  
AG-IMS ID 103059: Question by European Union - Transparency issues (including 
Table  DS:2) 
In most cases the U nited Kingdom  indicates that the measures notified fulfill Green Box criteria and 
in particular "Annex 2 Para 1 ". G/AG/W/235  
 
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  However, could the UK for every single measure notified please indicate how it intends to notify in 
the DS:1  notificati on the different measures according to paragraphs 2 (preferably separately point 
a to g) to 12 of the Annex 2.  
Answer by United Kingdom  
The U nited Kingdom  thanks the E uropean Union  for their question. For each measure notified in 
G/AG/N/GBR/14 , details of compliance with policy -specific criteria according to paragraphs 2 to 12 
of Annex 2 has been provided in part 3) 'detailed description of measure with reference to criteria ' 
of the notification tables. The measures will  be notified in Supporting Table DS:1 of the UK 's next 
DS:1 notification accordingly.  
 
Where a measure meets more than one policy -specific criteria under Annex 2, the payments will be 
split out accordingly e.g., for the Farming Innovation Programme, some p ayments will be reported 
under measure type 2. (a) Research, and some payments will be reported under measure type 14. 
Other direct payment. Whilst the information is provided in the DS:2 notification, on this occasion 
the UK has also provided the followin g list to directly respond to the EU 's request:  
 
- ACRE Grant: 2. (h) Other general services ; 
- Farming Innovation Programme: 2. (a) Research, 14. Other direct payment ; 
- England Coast Path Establishment Grant: 2. (g) Infrastructural services ; 
- Sustainable Farmin g Incentive: 12. Environmental programmes, 14. Other direct payment ; 
- Future Farming Resilience Funding: 2. (d) Extension and advisory services ; 
- Grant support for Hops Breeding Programme: 2. (a) Research, 2. (b) Pest and disease 
control ; 
- Landscape Recovery PDP: 11. Structural adjustment assistance provided through 
investment aids ; 
- Lump Sum Exit Scheme: 9. Structural adjustment assistance provided through producer 
retirement programmes ; 
- National Test Programme (Scotland): 12. Environmental programmes ; 
- New Ent rant Support Scheme Pilot: 2. (c) Training services, 6. Decoupled income support ; 
- Food and Drink Sector Recovery Plan (Scotland): 2. (a) Research, 2. (c) Training services, 
2. (d) Extension and advisory services, 2. (f) Marketing and promotion services ; 
- The Institute for Agriculture and Horticulture: 2. (a) Research, 2. (c) Training services, 2. 
(d) Extension and advisory services . 
AG-IMS ID 103146: Question by India - Transparency issues (including Table DS:2)  
India thanks the U nited Kingdom  for submitti ng its DS:2 notification ( G/AG/N/GBR/14 ) on 
24 August  2022, under which UK has mentioned about a "Lump Sum Exit Scheme". From the 
notification, it is found that the period of application of this measure is from April 2022 to 
September  2022.  
 
a. India requests the UK to inform whether t he Scheme still continues or has been 
terminated?  
b. What is the actual amount disbursed under the Scheme during the period April to 
September 2022?  
c. Under the heading "Detailed Description of Measure With Reference To Criteria", it is 
written that " Recipients  must have transferred their agricultural land in England (with 
limited exceptions for up to 5 hectares of that land and for any land planted with trees 
under certain woodland creation schemes )". India requests the UK to kindly share details 
of the "certai n woodland creation schemes".  
Answer by United Kingdom  
The United Kingdom thanks India for its question.   
a. Farmers were able to apply to the 'Lump Sum Exit Scheme ' during the period April 2022 
to September 2022, after which, the period of application has closed.   G/AG/W/235  
 
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  b. No payments were disbursed under the scheme during the period April 2022 to 
September  2022. Payments will be made to eligible applicants once they have met  the 
scheme rules. Some payments have started to be made in November 2022 and will be 
reported in the relevant DS:1 notification.   
c. The details of relevant 'woodland creation schemes ' will be provided, where appropriate, 
in the form of DS:2 notifications in  due course.   
AG-IMS ID 103040: Question by United States of America - Transparency issues (including 
Table DS:2)  
In G/AG/N/GBR/14  the United Kingdom provided a Table DS:2 notification for the Sustainable 
Farming Incentive (SFI).  The notification indicates the measure is to help maintain food p roduction 
while "Farmers will be incentivized to produce public goods by meeting standards relating to water 
quality, biodiversity, animal health and welfare standards, climate change mitigation. "  
 
a. Please provide additional details with regards to the SFI  standards, how they were 
developed and whether the United Kingdom has developed metrics to determine the 
effectiveness of the standards in delivering positive environmental benefits.  
b. Please provide some examples of the kinds of environmental benefits this  measure is 
designed to produce and how producers will be incentivized to continue the practices 
beyond the lifecycle of the initiative.  
Answer by United Kingdom  
The United Kingdom thanks the U nited States  for its question on the UK 's recently notified 
Sustainable Farming Incentive (SFI) measure.   
a. SFI standards   
The Sustainable Farming Incentive launched this year with the following core elements:   
• arable and horticultural soils standard (introductory and intermediate level) ; 
• improved grassland soils standard (introductory and intermediate level) ; 
• and moorland standard (introductory level) . 
We anticipate that the advanced level soils standards and the intermediate and advanced moorland 
standards will be available by 2024.  It is also expected that a further 12 standards will be introduced 
by 2025, including a nutrient management standard, an integrated pest management standard and 
a hedgerows standard. Further information about the current a nd future standards can be found at 
https://www.gov.uk/guidance/how -the-sfi-standards -work. 
Developing the standards  
The Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs i n England  published key aims for the 
scheme at the start of 2022 ( Environmental land management schemes: outcomes - GOV.UK ), and 
there is a comprehensive monitoring and evaluation strategy for the scheme, assessing 
environmental benefits, value for money and farmer experience (Monitoring, evaluating and learning 
in the Future Farming and Countryside Programme - Future Farming (blog.gov.uk) .  
The UK Government is developing a wider set of environmental objectives, alongside the statutory 
Environment Act targets, and have also begun to review the 25 Year Environment Plan, due for 
completion in January 2023. This refreshed plan will set out how England expects to achieve its 
environmental goals and meet its long term and interim targets, inclu ding the contribution from SFI 
and the other Environmental Land Management schemes.  
b. The SFI standards are designed to contribute to a range of environmental and climate change 
outcomes, including better water quality,  biodiversity,  climate change mitiga tion, and animal health 
and welfare.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  Our approach to designing standards uses both co -design and behavioural insight to ensure the 
scheme will both encourage pro -environmental behavioural change and reflect the lived experience 
and needs of participants.   
In addition to collaborating with external academic experts, internal analysts and agricultural and 
environmental stakeholder organisations, we are working closely with farmers and land managers 
throughout the standard development process to identify solut ions to behavioural barriers. This 
includes making sure that the standards are straightforward to understand and apply for, and 
feasible to achieve, while still delivering on our environmental targets. We will continue to design 
the scheme in this way, tes ting specific interventions and services to determine that they work for 
users, checking whether they drive measurable changes in behaviour, then adapting and developing 
the scheme in the early years of the roll -out as required.   
Follow -up: Canada expresse d interest in the programme which, in its view, provided incentives to 
producers to maintain production levels as well as meeting certain government standards. The 
United  States agreed with the importance of helping farmers adopt sustainable production pra ctices 
that would increase not only the resilience of farmers but also global food security. The US noted 
that being able to measure the public goods and benefits from such incentives would be critical to 
helping establish a data and evidence based approac h to the work of this Committee and the special 
session. The European Union voiced interest in UK's sustainability policies.   
5.3.3   United Kingdom (G/AG/N/GBR/4)  
AG-IMS ID 103127: Question by Australia - Classification of measures  
Australia thanks the United Kingdom for its submission of DS:2 notification G/AG/N/GBR/4  on 
6 April 2021. The DS:2 submission states that this measure is not subject to reduction commitments 
as it is consistent with Blue Box criteria according to Article 6.5 of the AoA.  
Australia no tes public reporting that the programme aims to create a domestically produced source 
of protein for animal feed ( https://www. farminguk.com/news/ni -protein -crops -scheme -payments -
extended -until-end-of-2023_61105.html ) in place of imported soya and other protein 
(https://www.daera -ni.gov.uk/consultations/daera -consultation -proposal -introduce -protein -crops -
payment -pilot-scheme -2021). 
Australia seeks clarification on the Coupled Support for Protein Crops programme and its notification 
as a programme consistent with Article 6.5 of the AoA.  
Australia asks that the UK explain how this measure limits production. In this regard, Australia notes 
that this measure is targeted at producers that grow protein crops; that the total area eligible for 
payment under the pilot scheme of this measure is capped at 1,000 hectares (ha); and that in 2020, 
only 153 h ectares  of protein crops were grown in Northern Ireland. Australia 's understanding is that 
these factors combined suggest the measure would tend to increase, rather than limit, the 
production of protein crops.  
Answer by United Kingdom  
The U nited Kingdom  thanks Australia for its question. The "Coupled Support for Protein Crops " 
scheme is consistent with the Blue Box criteria as payments are based on fixed area and yields. The 
1,000  hectares cap is not a target for future production levels but is a limit on the total area that 
can receive support under this scheme.  
The scheme wil l not result in a significant increase in the production of protein crops in the UK.  The 
area limit corresponds to 0.1% of total agricultural area in Northern Ireland and less than 0.01% of 
total agricultural area in the UK.  
Follow -up: Brazil recalled that  its position on this issue presented during the 98th and 99th meeting 
of the Committee remained valid.  The European  Union supported the question. The United  States 
noted interest to learn more about the production limiting criteria of the programme includ ing if any 
limitations are placed on individual producers.  G/AG/W/235  
 
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  5.4  Export prohibitions and restrictions (Table ER:1)  
5.4.1   European Union (G/AG/N/EU/77/Rev.2)  
AG-IMS ID 103147: Question by Paraguay - Timely notification  
The delegation of Paraguay thanks the delegation of the European  Union for submitting notification 
G/AG/N/EU/77/Rev.2 . We note again with concern the considerable delay in notifying the measure, 
which was already extended from 15  July, for a second time, and was not notified until m ore than 
two months later.  
Paraguay has already expressed its concerns regarding this notification, its delay and the continuous 
renewal of the measure at the meeting of the Committee on Agriculture in June. We regret that the 
scenario both for renewal and  for the delay continues to recur. In this regard, we request the EU to 
report on:  
a. The reasons for the notification's further delay.  
b. Whether the measure will be extended again.  
Answer by European Union  
a. As already replied to Paraguay, CoA 101 question AG IMS 101090 , the E uropean Union  has 
prepared the notification as soon as it wa s practically possible in view of EU 's internal procedures. 
Indeed the notification was submitted after adoption of the legislation but considering the trade 
restrictions were never applied, this notification is intended to inform about the intention conta ined 
in the legislation rather than about actual restrictions.  
 
The EU would like to repeat its answer to question AGIMS 101090 :  
 
This is the first export restrictions notification ever submitted by the European Union. Instead of 
hiding information, the EU wanted to share our own struggles with this measure. I trust that this 
transparency can contribute to our discussions on export restrictions. I would also like to note that 
many of the export restrictions actually applied recently remain un -notified to the WTO. EU repeats 
our earlier calls to improve the transparency record on th ese measures.   
 
b. The duration of the measure has been extended with one month – until 30 November 2022. The 
extension of the measure is linked with the state of emergency in the EU member State, which was 
also prolonged (Gov. Decree 83/2022).  
 
The EU wil l notify the WTO Members of the new duration period of the measure by submitting a 
revised ER:1 notification.  
Follow -up: Paraguay noted that it fully agreed with the last points from the European  Union on the 
effects of export restrictive measures and was surprised to see a third extension of the measure in 
a member State of the EU. Paraguay requested a new response from the EU to its new question 
given there was a renewal of the measure. Paraguay stated that, should there be another extension 
of the measur e, the EU would be urged to notify it before it comes into effect. Given the numerous 
initiatives to promote transparency put forward by the EU at the WTO, Paraguay encouraged the EU 
to lead by example and to notify timely ER:1 notifications. Switzerland e xpressed interest in the 
matter echoed the concern on the lack of transparency in export restrictions.   
5.4.2   Malaysia (G/AG/N/MYS/52/Add.1)  
AG-IMS ID 103058: Question by United Kingdom, Switzerland, Japan, European Union - 
Importing Members' food security  
The U nited Kingdom would like to thank Malaysia for its response to AG -IMS ID 102047  and 102008 .  
The United Kingdom understands that Malaysia is planning to ease their export restriction on live 
commercial broiler chickens in phases but that restrictions will be retained on round chickens, 
chicken cuts and day -old chickens. The United Kingdom would th erefore welcome an update on the G/AG/W/235  
 
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  analysis that has been undertaken on how these continued restrictions will impact the food security 
of importing Members and when they will be fully lifted.   
Answer by Malaysia  
Malaysia thanks the United Kingdom for their continued interest in Malaysia 's notification on chicken 
export restriction.  Since July 2022, Malaysia has revised the notification to apply only to live broiler 
chicken. Based on Malaysian statistics, 1.2 million birds were exported in July, while 1 .4 million birds 
were exported in August 2022.  At this juncture, the decision with regards to the export restriction 
is being reviewed. Malaysia will provide an update on the notification in due course.  Thank you.  
Follow -up: The United  Kingdom welcomed the  news that Malaysia was reviewing these restrictions 
and would welcome further information, including timelines regarding plans to fully lift the remaining 
restrictions.   
5.5  Notifications in the context of the NFIDC decision  (Table NF:1)  
5.5.1   Japan (G/AG/N/JPN/269 ) 
AG-IMS ID 103128: Question by Australia - NFIDC  
Australia thanks Japan for its food aid support to LDCs and NFIDCs and the transparency provided 
regarding this support over 2017, 2018, 2019 and 2020. Australia notes Japan 's breakdown of in -
kind commoditi es shipped, and other technical and financial support given, including in 
G/AG/N/JPN/269 . 
Australia asks that Japan indicate whether it is considering aligning its food aid support with other 
OECD DAC peers via the provision of cash rather than in -kind support and in line with the Food 
Assistan ce Convention.  
Answer by Japan  
Japan 's grant aid for food assistance programme provides recipient countries with not in -kind food 
commodities but funds to procure foods. Therefore, main actors procuring foods are the government 
of recipient countries or UN  organizations. In addition, Japan recognizes that some of the food 
assistance programme activities implemented by UN organizations promote direct cash distribution 
to beneficiaries. However, the Government of Japan is responsible for accountability and fo llow-up 
to its people for the use of taxpayers'  funds and the effect of programmes, and Japan considers that 
the current form of food assistance programme is appropriate for the purposes.  
6  OVERDUE NOTIFICATIONS  
6.1.1   Uruguay  
AG-IMS ID 103111: Question by India  
The last DS:1 notification ( G/AG/N/URY/63 ) issued by Uruguay is for the calendar year 2016. 
Uruguay may kindly update the Committee by when the pending notifications would be issued.  
Answer by Uruguay  
 
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