RESTRICTED  
  
G/SCM/M/113  
 
25 February 2021  
(21-1662) Page: 1/22 
Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures    
 
 
MINUTES OF THE REGULAR MEETING  
HELD ON 27 OCTOBER 2020  
CHAIR: MICH ÈLE LEGAULT DOOLEY (CANADA)  
1. The Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures ("Committee") held a regular 
meeting on 27 October 2020 , convened in WTO/AIR/SCM/3 4 dated 16 October 2020 . 
2. The Chair recalled that some participants were joining the meeting in person and others online  
via Interprefy.  The Chair recalled the technical arrangements that therefore applied to the meeting, 
which were also described in the "Organizational and Technical Arrangements Note" sent to Members 
on 20 October 2020.  
3. Canada  and Norway  requested  to be in cluded as the co -sponsors of the agenda item 9.  
4. The Committee adopted  the following agenda:  
1   NATIONAL LEGISLATION ................................ ................................ .............................  2 
1.1   Review of notifications of new or amended legislation or regulations not previously 
reviewed  by the Committee (including Supplemental Notifications of existing provisions 
not previously reviewed)  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 2 
1.1.1    Angola (G/SCM/N/1/AGO/1/Corr.1) ................................ ................................ .............  2 
1.1.2    Argentina (G/ADP/N/1/ARG/1/Suppl.9 - G/SCM/N/1/ARG/1/Suppl.9)  ..............................  3 
1.1.3    Bolivia, Plurinational State of (G/ADP/N/1/BOL/3 - G/SCM/N/1/BOL/3 - G/SG/N/1/BOL/2) . 3 
1.1.4    Costa Rica (G/ADP/N/1/CRI/3/Suppl.1 - G/SCM/N/1/CRI/4/Suppl.1 - 
G/SG/N/1/CRI/4/Suppl.1)  ................................ ................................ ................................ .... 3 
1.1.5    Ghana (G/ADP/N/1/GHA/2 - G/SCM/N/1/GHA/2 - G/SG/N/1/GHA/2) ...............................  3 
1.1.6   India (G/SCM/N/1/IND/2/Suppl.9 and G/SCM/N/1/IND/2/Suppl.10)  ...............................  3 
1.1.7    Lao, People's Democratic Republic ("LAO, PDR") (G/ADP/N/ 1/LAO/2 - G/SCM/N/1/LAO/1)  . 4 
1.1.8    United Kingdom (G/ADP/N/1/GBR/1 - G/SCM/N/1/GBR/1 - G/SG/N/1/GBR/1 and 
Supplements 1 to 11)  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..........  4 
1.1.9    United States (G/ADP/N/1/USA/1/Suppl.26 - G/SCM/N/1/ USA/1/Suppl.25 to ; 
G/ADP/N/1/USA/1/Suppl.30 - G/SCM/N/1/ USA/1/Suppl.29)  ................................ ....................  4 
1.1.10    Viet Nam (G/ADP/N/1/VNM/3 - G/SCM/N/1/VNM/2 - G/SG/N/1/VNM/3)  ........................  5 
1.2   Review of notifications of new or amended legislation with outstanding written questions  ..... 6 
1.2.1    Cameroon (G/ADP/N/1/CMR/1/Suppl.1 - G/SCM/N/1/CMR/1/Suppl.1 - 
G/SG/N/1/CMR/1/Suppl.1)  ................................ ................................ ................................ ... 6 
2   NATIONAL LEGISLATION – CONTINUING REVIEW OF LEGISLATIVE 
NOTIFICATIONS  PREVIOUSLY REVIEWED BY THE COMMITTEE  ................................ ........  6 
2.1   Japan (G/ADP/N/1/JPN/2/Suppl.10)  ................................ ................................ ...............  6 
2.2   Kenya (G/ADP/N/1/KEN/3 - G/SCM/N/1/KEN/3 - G/SG/N/1/KEN/2)  ................................ ... 6 
2.3   Liberia (G/ADP/N/1/LBR/1)  ................................ ................................ ...........................  6 G/SCM/M/113  
 
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  2.4   United Arab Emirates (G/ADP/N/1/ARE/2/Suppl.1 - G/SCM/N/1/ARE/ 2/Suppl.1 - 
G/SG/N/1/ARE/2/Suppl.1)  ................................ ................................ ................................ ... 6 
3   SEMI -ANNUAL REPORTS OF COUNTERVAILING DUTY ACTIONS (ARTICLE  25.11) – 
(G/SCM/N/356 AND G/SCM/N/363)  ................................ ................................ ...............  7 
4   PRELIMINARY AND FINAL COUNTERVAILING DUTY ACTIONS: NOTIFICATIONS 
(ARTICLE 25.11)  ................................ ................................ ................................ ............  11 
5   ARTICLE 27.4 EXTENSIONS OF THE TRANSITION PERIOD FOR THE ELIMINATION 
OF EXPORT SUBSIDIES  ................................ ................................ ................................ .. 11 
6   IMPROVING THE TIMELINESS AND COMPLETENESS OF NOTIFICATIONS AND 
OTHER  INFORMATION FLOWS ON TRADE MEASURES UNDER THE SCM AGREEMENT  ...... 12 
7   CONSTANT DOLLAR METHODOLOGY FOR GRADUATION FROM SCM ANNEX VII(B)  .... 15 
8   PERMANENT GROUP OF EXPERTS  ................................ ................................ ..............  16 
9   SUBSIDIES AND OVERCAPACITY – ITEM REQUESTED BY CANADA, THE EUROPEAN 
UNION, JAPAN, NORWAY, AND THE UNITED STATES  ................................ .....................  16 
10   ARTICLE 25. 8 QUESTIONS TO CHINA ON POTENTIAL STEEL SUBSIDIES – ITEM 
REQUESTED BY THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE UNITED STATES  ................................ . 20 
11   SUBSIDY TRANSPARENCY AND CHINA'S PUBLICATION AND INQUIRY POINT 
OBLIGATIONS UNDER CHINA'S PROTOCOL OF ACCESSION – ITEM REQUESTED 
BY THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE UNITED STATES  ................................ ....................  21 
12   OTHER BUSINESS  ................................ ................................ ................................ .... 22 
13   DATE OF NEXT REGULAR MEETIN G ................................ ................................ ..........  22 
14   ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON SUBSIDIES AND COUNTERVAILING 
MEASURES TO THE COUNCIL FOR TRADE IN GOODS (ARTICLE  32.7)  .............................  22 
15   ELECTION OF OFFICERS  ................................ ................................ ..........................  22 
 
1  NATI ONAL LEGISLATION  
1.1  Review of notifications of new or amended legislation or regulations not previously 
reviewed by the Committee (including Supplemental Notifications of existing provisions 
not previously reviewed)  
5. The Chair noted that, in accordance with the Committee's procedures (G/SCM/W/293/Rev.1), 
the new legislative notifications on the agenda were those that had been circulated in all three 
languages not less than six weeks before the meeting. The deadline for written questions on these 
notifications was 5 October 2020.  
6. Oral questions could be asked at the meeting, and any Member wishing to receive a written 
answer to any such question would have to submit its question in writing to the Member concerned 
and to the Secre tariat not later than 16 November 2020. Written answers were due not later than 
7 December  2020.1 
7. The primary review of these notifications would be held in the Committee on 
Anti-Dumping  Practices. Members were thus requested to limit their questions to i ssues specifically 
related to countervailing measures, and to save horizontal and anti -dumping -specific questions for 
the Anti -Dumping Committee.  
1.1.1   Angola (G/SCM/N/1/AGO/1/Corr.1)  
8. No Member raised any questions or comments about this notification.  
 
1 Relevant  deadlines for written follow -up questions and written answers regarding the notifications of 
legislation reviewed in the October 2020 meeting can be found in section 1 of document G/ADP/W/506 - 
G/SCM/W/581 - G/SG/W/250.  G/SCM/M/113  
 
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  9. The Commit tee took note  of the notification.  
1.1.2   Argentina  (G/ADP/N/1/ARG/1/Suppl.9 - G/SCM/N/1/ARG/1/Suppl.9)  
10. No Member raised any questions or comments about this notification.  
11. The Committee took note  of the notification . 
1.1.3   Bolivia, Plurinational State of (G/ADP/N/1/BOL /3 - G/SCM/N/1/BOL/3 - 
G/SG/N/1/BOL/2)  
12. Written questions with respect to this notification can be found in:  
• G/ADP/Q1/BOL/4 - G/SCM/Q1/BOL/4 - G/SG/Q1/BOL/1 – Questions from the 
United  States  
13. No written answers had been received to date.  
14. The Committee took note of the notification and questions.  
1.1.4   Costa Rica (G/ADP/N/1/CRI/3/Suppl.1 - G/SCM/N/1/CRI/4/Suppl.1 - 
G/SG/N/1/CRI/4/Suppl.1)  
15. Written questions with respect to this notification can be found in:  
• G/ADP/Q1/CRI/15 - G/SCM/Q1/CRI/15 - G/SG/Q1/ CRI/9 – Questions from the 
United  States  
• G/ADP/Q1/CRI/16 - G/SCM/Q1/CRI/16 - G/SG/Q1/CRI/10 – Replies to the United  States  
16. The Committee took note  of the notification, questions and answers.  
1.1.5   Ghana (G/ADP/N/1/GHA/2 - G/SCM/N/1/GHA/2 - G/SG/N/1/GHA/2)  
17. Writte n questions with respect to this notification can be found in:  
• G/ADP/Q1/GHA/1 - G/SCM/Q1/GHA/1 - G/SG/Q1/GHA/1 – Questions from the United 
States  
18. Written answers were subsequently provided and can be found in:  
• G/ADP/Q1/GHA/2 - G/SCM/Q1/GHA/2 - G/SG/Q1/GHA/ 2 – Replies to the United  States  
19. The Committee took note  of the notification and questions.  
1.1.6   India (G/SCM/N/1/IND/2/Suppl.9 and G/SCM/N/1/IND/2/Suppl.10)  
20. No Member raised any questions about these notifications.  
21. India indicated that these notifications woul d provide additional clarity and transparency with 
respect to its domestic laws. In addition, they would bring the domestic laws in conformity with 
the WTO Agreement . India further stated that these notifications issued by India, among other 
things, also strengthened  anti-circumvention mechanism in anti -dumping, since,  in the past it came 
across several instances where the efficacy and effectiveness of trade remedy measures were being  
undermined by exporting countries. India introduced anti -circumvention p rovision  in countervailing 
duty rules too, on the lines similar to the ones with respect to anti -dumping measures.  G/SCM/M/113  
 
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  22. The Committee took note of the notifications and statement made.  
1.1.7   Lao, People's Democratic Republic ("LAO, PDR") (G/ADP/N/1/LAO/2 - 
G/SCM/N/1/ LAO/1)  
23. Written questions and responses with respect to this notification can be found in:  
• G/ADP/Q1/LAO/1 - G/SCM/Q1/LAO/1 - G/SG/Q1/LAO/1 – Questions from the 
United  States  
• G/ADP/Q1/LAO/2 - G/SCM/Q1/LAO/2 - G/SG/Q1/LAO/2 – Replies to the United  States  
24. Lao, PDR  stated that the law on antidumping and countervailing duty measures comprised of 
69 articles and has been adopted by its General Assembly on 14 September 2019 and notified to 
the WTO on 15 November 2019.  
25. The Committee took note  of the notification, questi ons, answers and the statements made.  
1.1.8   United Kingdom (G/ADP/N/1/GBR/1 - G/SCM/N/1/GBR/1 - G/SG/N/1/GBR/1 
and Supplements 1 to 11)  
26. Written questions with respect to these notifications can be found in:  
• G/ADP/Q1/GBR/1 - G/SCM/Q1/GBR/1 - G/SG/Q1/GBR/1 – Questions from the United 
States  
• G/ADP/Q1/GBR/2 - G/SCM/Q1/GBR/2 – Questions from the United  States  
• G/ADP/Q1/GBR/3 - G/SCM/Q1/GBR/3 - G/SG/Q1/GBR/2 – Questions from the 
United  States  
27. No written answers had been received to date.  
28. The Committee took note  of the n otifications and questions.  
1.1.9   United States (G/ADP/N/1/USA/1/Suppl.26 - G/SCM/N/1/ USA/1/Suppl.25 to ; 
G/ADP/N/1/USA/1/Suppl.30 - G/SCM/N/1/ USA/1/Suppl.29)  
29. No Member raised any questions about these notifications.  
30. China  expressed its concerns regarding the United States' new countervailing duty ("CVD")  
legislation entitled "Modification of Regulations Regarding Benefit and Specificity in Countervailing 
Duty Proceedings" which was circulated in document G/SCM/N/1/USA/1/Suppl.31.  
31. China indicated that t he new r egulation allowed the United States Department of Commerce 
("USDOC") to initiate CVD investigations on so called "currency undervaluation " program against 
countries with single exchange rate system. The new regulation empowered the USDOC and the 
United Sta tes Department of Treasury to determine the "equilibrium real effective exchange rate" 
or "equilibrium REER " of other countries' currencies. Once the exchange rate of any Member's 
currency was lower than the theoretical exchange rate calculated unilaterall y by the United States, 
the currency might be deemed as "undervalued " and that Member would face the risk of CVD 
investigations by the United States . The new regulation also allowed the investigating authority to 
find "specificity " by regarding all enterpr ises that buy or sell goods internationally as a "group". 
According to China, this was not consistent with Article 2.1 of the Agreement and it was also different 
from the previous views of the United States in the US — Upland Cotton (DS 267) that the agric ulture 
sector was already "too broad and diverse to constitute a single enterprise or industry or group of 
enterprises or industries ". 
32. China further noted that the United States had launched so called "currency undervaluation " 
CVD investigations against Viet Nam and China. In China's view, all other Members are also exposed G/SCM/M/113  
 
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  to the risk of such investigations, as long as the United States declares their currencies to be 
undervalued.  
33. China expressed its opposition to the new regu lation as well as the actions based thereupon 
noting that;  
 (i) Systemically, the exchange rate issue was beyond the jurisdiction of the WTO. China was 
of the view that the SCM Agreement did not and could not authorize a Member to conduct 
CVD investigation s on other Members ' exchange rate issues which would be an abuse of the 
CVD instrument if a Member unilaterally determined whether the exchange rate of other 
Members was "undervalued" and levied countervailing duty on that basis.  
 (ii) Technically, the sub sidy program of so called "currency undervaluation" alleged by the 
United States would not meet the standards stipulated by the SCM Agreement for financial 
contribution, benefit conferred and specificity. In particular, on the issue of specificity, the 
exchange rate of a single exchange rate system would be universally applicable to all and no 
investigating authority would determine that it was specific.  
34. According to China, the regulation and practices of the United States were typically unilateral 
and protectionist . It considered the new regulation as a move to further undermine multilateral rules 
referring to an IMF statement dated 17 July 2020 which indicated that the United States ' relevant 
action would pose a major risk to multilatera l trade and the international monetary system.  
35.  China invited all Members to jointly oppose to the new currency undervaluation regulation 
and practices of the United States and urged the United States to comply with multilateral rules as 
soon as possible. It further asked the United States to clarify whether it intended to take all 
enterprises that buy or sell goods internationally as a group when determining the specificity of other 
subsidy programs.  
36. The United States  noted that the USDOC published a new r egulation on 4 February 2020 titled 
"Modification of Regulations Regarding Benefit and Specificity in Countervailing Duty Proceeding" to 
govern the determinations of undervaluation and benefit when examining potential subsidies 
resulting from the exchange of undervalued currency. Under the regulation, in its analysis of whether 
there is a benefit from alleged undervalued currency, Commerce will request the United States  
Department of Treasury to provide its evaluation and conclusion with respect to whether the 
currency at issue is undervalued. As the notified regulations were not on the agenda of the meeting , 
the United States  expected to discuss them more fully at the next meeting.  
37. Confirming that it was not on the agenda of the meeting, China  noted that th e regulation was 
in force and two investigations ha d been initiated based on it. China called all Members to focus on 
this regulation and reiterated its willingness to  have further discuss ion at the next meeting of the 
Committee.  
38. The Committee took note  of the notifications and statements made.  
1.1.10   Viet Nam (G/ADP/N/1/VNM/3 - G/SCM/N/1/VNM/2 - G/SG/N/1/VNM/3)  
39. Written questions and responses with respect to this notification can be found in:  
• G/ADP/Q1/VNM/9 - G/SCM/Q1/VNM/9 - G/SG/Q1/VNM/9  – Questions from the 
United States  
• G/ADP/Q1/VNM/10 - G/SCM/Q1/VNM/10 - G/SG/Q1/VNM/10  – Replies to the 
United  States  
40. The Committee took note  of the notification, questions and answers.  G/SCM/M/113  
 
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  1.2  Review of notifications of new or amended legislation with outstanding written 
questions  
1.2.1   Cameroon (G/ADP/N/1/CMR/1/Suppl.1 - G/SCM/N/1/CMR/1/Suppl.1 - 
G/SG/N/1/CMR/1/Suppl.1)  
41. Written questions with respect to this notification can be found in:  
• G/ADP/Q1/CMR/3 - G/SCM/Q1/CMR/3 - G/SG/Q1/CMR/3 – Questions from the 
United  States  
42. Cameroon  was not present at the time. Oral answers were not provided at the meeting , 
nor had written answers been received to date.  
43. The Committee took note  of the notification and questions.  
2  NATIONAL LEGISLATION – CONTINUING REVIEW OF LEGISLATIVE NOTIFICATIONS 
PREVIOUSLY REVIEWED BY THE COMMITTEE  
2.1  Japan (G/ADP/N/1/JPN/2/Suppl.10)  
44. Written questions and answers with respect to this notification can be found in:  
• G/ADP/Q1/JPN/18 - G/SCM/Q1/JPN/18 – Questions from Canada  
• G/ADP/Q1/JPN/19 - G/SCM/Q1/JPN/19 – Replies to Canada  
45. The Committee took note  of the notification, questions and answers.  
2.2  Kenya (G/ADP/N/1/KEN/3 - G/SCM/N/1/KEN/3 - G/SG/N/1/KEN/2)  
46. Written questions with respect to this notification can be found in:  
• G/ADP/ Q1/KEN/6 - G/SCM/Q1/KEN/6 - G/SG/Q1/KEN/5 – questions from the 
United  States  
47. Kenya was not present at the time and no written answers had been received to 
date.  
48. The Committee took note  of the notification and questions.  
2.3  Liberia (G/ADP/N/1/LBR/1)  
49. Written questions with respect to this notification can be found in:  
• G/ADP/Q1/LBR/3 - G/SCM/Q1/LBR/3 – follow -up questions from the United States  
50. Liberia was not present at the time. Oral answers were not provided at the meeting,  nor 
had written answers been received to date.  
51. The Committee took note of the notification and questions.  
2.4  United Arab Emirates (G/ADP/N/1/ARE/2/Suppl.1 - G/SCM/N/1/ARE/2/Suppl.1 - 
G/SG/N/1/ARE/2/Suppl.1)  
52. Written questions and answers with respect to this notification can be found in:  
• G/ADP/Q1/ARE/5 - G/SCM/Q1/ARE/5 – G/SG/Q1/ARE/5 – follow -up questions from the 
United States  
• G/ADP/Q1/ARE/6 - G/SCM/Q1/ARE/6 - G/SG/Q1/ARE/6 – replies to the United States  G/SCM/M/113  
 
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  53. The Committee took note  of the notification, questions  and answers.  
54. The Chair informed Members that, pursuant to the Committee's agreed procedures, in order 
for a new legislative notification to be placed on the agenda of the April 2021 meeting of the 
Committee, the notification should be circulated in all th ree languages by 15 March 2021. Shortly 
after that date, the Secretariat would circulate a document informing Members of all legislative 
notifications to be reviewed at the next meeting.  
55. Pursuant to paragraph 8 of document G/SCM/W/293/Rev.1, all unanswered  written questions 
pertaining to new legislative notifications reviewed at the meeting, as well as the subject 
notifications, shall automatically be retained on the agenda of the next Committee meeting and on 
the agendas of subsequent Committee meetings un til written answers are submitted.  
56. The Chair noted that new legislative notifications from Brazil, Canada and the 
United  States , as well as any others received and circulated by the applicable deadlines, would be 
on the agenda for review at the regular meeting of the Committee in April 2021.  
57. The Chair also noted that in order to place previously -reviewed legislation on the agenda of 
the next meeting for further review, written questions must be submitted to the Member concerned 
and the Secretaria t, not less than six weeks before the meeting; and written answers to such 
questions must be submitted to the Member concerned and the Secretariat, not less than two weeks 
before the meeting. The Secretariat would circulate the usual triple -symbolled docum ent containing 
these and the other deadlines shortly after the meeting.2 
58. Some Members had yet to submit any notification concerning legislations. The Chair 
underlined the importance of these notifications in terms of transparency and recalled that for man y 
Members all that would be required was a single nil notification. For any Members that conducted 
countervailing duty investigations but had not yet notified their legislation, it was all the more 
important for the Committee to have the opportunity to rev iew and ask questions about that 
legislation. Therefore, the Chair encouraged all Members that had not yet made a legislative 
notification to do so as promptly as possible.  
59. The Chair referred to the document G/SCM/N/18/Add.53 which contained the latest rev ision 
of the list of authorities competent to initiate and conduct investigations within the meaning of 
Article  25.12 of the SCM Agreement and invited all Members with such an authority to submit the 
required notification pursuant to Article 25.12 of the S CM Agreement, or to review and update as 
necessary their previously -submitted notifications.  
60. The Committee took note  of the Chair's statement.  
3  SEMI -ANNUAL REPORTS OF COUNTERVAILING DUTY ACTIONS (ARTICLE  25.11) – 
(G/SCM/N/356 AND G/SCM/N/363)  
61. The Chair  recalled that a request and a reminder for submission of semi -annual reports for 
the second half of  2019 had been circulated in documents G/SCM/N/356 and G/SCM/N/356/Suppl.1, 
respectively. Also, a request and reminder for submission of semi -annual reports for the first half of 
2020 had been circulated in documents G/SCM/N/363 and G/SCM/N/363/Suppl.1, respectively. 
Members taking no countervailing duty actions should submit a simple letter to that effect twice per 
year. This would not apply to those Members that  had already submitted a one -time notification 
under Articles 25.11 and 25.12 of the Agreement.  
62. Documents G/SCM/N/356/Add.1/Rev.1 and G/SCM/N/363/Add.1 provided the current status 
of Members' reporting for the second half of 2019 and the first half of 2020 , respectively. 
Paragraph  5 of both documents listed the 44  Members that had submitted a one -time notification 
that they had no investigating authority, had taken no countervailing actions to date, and did not 
anticipate taking any such actions in the fore seeable future. The Chair urged Members to comply 
with this important notification requirement.  
 
2 G/ADP/W/506 - G/SCM/W/581 - G/SG/ W/250.  G/SCM/M/113  
 
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  63. The Committee reviewed the semi -annual reports for the second half of 2019 and first half of 
2020. No comments or questions were raised concerning the semi -annual reports of Australia, 
Canada, Colombia, India, Mexico, Peru, Chinese Taipei, and the United Kingdom.  
64. On the semi -annual report of China , the United States  expressed its concerns regarding the 
ongoing countervailing duty investigation on its exports of N -propanol.  In its preliminary 
determination, China found that dozens of subsidy programmes alleged to confer countervailable 
subsidies to the oil and natural gas industries in the United States passed through in their entirety 
to producers of N -propanol, r esulting in subsidy rates exceeding 30 percent. China 's findings failed 
to consider that N -propanol was a chemical product that was two stages downstream from oil and 
natural gas and to conduct a proper pass -through analysis, contrary to its own CVD regula tions. In 
addition, China determined that the mere existence of subsidization in a sector was sufficient to 
deem the entire sector distorted and domestic prices unsuitable for use as benchmark prices. 
According to the United States, China 's conclusions lac ked evidentiary support and contradict other 
record evidence concerning the relative insignificance of any upstream subsidization on the 
downstream products. China 's findings did not contain adequate explanation or analysis to support 
its benchmark selecti ons in determining whether and to what extent any subsidy to oil and gas 
passed through to N -propanol producers. China did not address the United States ' comments 
submitted after issuance of the preliminary disclosure and maintained its erroneous findings in its 
Final Disclosure without substantively addressing any of the comments provided by the United States 
or respondent companies. The United States urged China to correct those errors in its final 
determination and not to make the same methodological err ors in the three other ongoing 
petrochemical cases against the United States.  
65. Australia  indicated that this was Australia's first occasion to respond to a countervailing duty 
investigation conducted by China's competent authority and raised a number of concerns about the 
procedures and analysis of the investigation into Australian barley imp orts. 
66. In terms of Australia's procedural concerns, in Australia's view th e investigation was 
improperly initiated. The domestic industry was not properly identified; the legal standing of the 
applicant was not properly established; the product under invest igation was not properly identified, 
and there was limited opportunity for Australian exporters to fully and properly defend their 
interests. Despite Australia 's full disclosure of material relating to more than 40 programs cited by 
the applicant, China did not establish the existence, amount or nature of any countervailable 
subsidies. The deficiencies in procedures became apparent during the course of the invest igation. 
Australia noted that there were thousands of barley growers and exporters in Australia. No sampling 
was undertaken by China, despite Australia's requests for clarification on how China would manage 
the investigation. Following an initial registrat ion process, around 12 Australian producers, exporters 
and the Australian Government completed exporter or government questionnaires. The process 
appeared to end there. There were no follow -up communications indicating any deficiencies in the 
information s upplied or seeking further information, and there were no verification visits to 
Australian respondents nor to the Australian Government. From March 2019 until the issuance of 
China's disclosure report on 8 May 2020, neither Australian producers/exporters,  nor the Australian 
Government were advised that there were any deficiencies in the extensive information submitted. 
On issuing its disclosure report, China provided a 10 -day comment period. The disclosure report 
revealed that China had made recourse to 'f acts available' which was without advising respondents 
and thereby misapplying the use of 'facts available'. China alleged that the Australian Government 
had not provided complete information. The Australian Government completed the government 
questionnair e fully and completely and submitted over 10,000 pages of evidence, including lists of 
recipients of subsidy programs cited in the initiation notice. This included also providing lists of 
recipients of generally available, non -specific subsidy programs for  a 10-year period, as requested 
by China, to indicate that no barley producer or exporter had received a benefit under any of these 
programs. Despite the difficulty of proving a negative , Australia did so by demonstrating all recipients 
of the program were  not barley growers or exporters. On 18  May 2020, China's final determination 
was issued before the end of the 10 -day comment period of the disclosure report – clearly not taking 
into account any of the comments provided on the disclosure report by the Aus tralian Government. 
China selected three programs alleging injurious countervailable subsidies and the final 
determination stated that , apart from these three programs,  China had not "reviewed " the more 
than 40 programs on which China had sought informatio n. 
67. None of the three programs selected by China were countervailable – either the program was 
not specific , or no funding had actually been provided to the barley industry.  This was supported by G/SCM/M/113  
 
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  the evidence provided. The methodology to determine subsidisa tion set out in the final determination 
demonstrated a serious misunderstanding of key elements in establishing the existence of 
countervailable subsidies – and deficiencies in how the level of subsidisation should be determined 
under WTO rules. Australia remained open to further discussions with China on this case, in order 
to find a mutually beneficial solution.  
68. In response to the comments by the United States, China  noted that the case was an ongoing 
investigation and the Chinese investigation authority would fully consider the information and 
comments of all interested parties including the Government  of the United States . The investigation 
would be conducted objectively and impartially in accordance with China's  laws and regulations as 
well as the relev ant WTO rules.  
69. Regarding the comments raised by Australia, China  noted that the investigation was fully in 
line with Chinese laws and also consistent with WTO rules. The investigating authority had provided 
sufficient opportunity to all interested parties to present their comments. All the essential facts and 
the legal basis were disclosed in detail in the final conclusion. The identification of subsequent grants  
was based on the comprehensive and objective examination of the answers, comments and other 
materials submitted by all parties, including Australian Government. Due to an ongoing review of 
Australia's request, there would be no further response before the outcome was reached.  
70. On the semi -annual report of the  European Union , Egypt  referred to two cou ntervailing duty  
proceedings concerning imports of certain woven and/or stitched glass fibre fabrics (GFF) originating 
in China and Egypt and imports of continuous filament glass fibre products (GFR) originating in 
Egypt, which were initiated on 16 May 201 9 and 7 June 2019, respectively. In June 2020, the 
European Commission published the Executive EU Regulations No. (776/2020) and (870/2020) on 
the imposition of definitive countervailing measures on both products in the Official Gazette. 
According to Egypt , the measures were not in full consistency with EU's obligations under the 
Agreement, and some statements made in the definitive disclosure were biased and not in line with 
the provisions of neither the Agreement nor the EU legislation.  The EU reverted to  Article 11 of the 
ILC articles on the responsibility of states for internationally wrongful acts to claim that "by way of 
acknowledgement and adoption, the Government of Egypt was the granting authority ". Egypt 
strongly disagreed with the EU 's interpretation of the concept of attribution in that case. As the 
financial contributions granted to the Egyptian companies could not be attributed to the Government 
of Egypt, they could not be considered specific as per Article 2 of the Agreement which stipulates 
that the principles on specificity are applicable to "an enterprise or industry or group of enterprises 
or industries within the jurisdiction of the granting authority ". Egypt also noted that the measures 
in question shall not be viewed only fro m a commercial view, but caution shall be made to the impact 
of such practice not to encourage misleading or biased interpretations of WTO Agreements and 
international law. Egypt urged the EU to reconsider the measures taken and noted that it reserved 
its right to undertake all necessary measures to safeguard its legitimate rights and interests as 
provided under WTO rules.  
71. China  considered that any alleged loans given by the Chinese financial institutions to Egyptian 
exporting producers did not qualify as a  financial contribution by the Government of China , in 
violation of Article 1.1 of the Agreement. The EU could not overlook that the establishment of a 
financial contribution by a government or public body as far as the Egyptian GFF producers were 
concerne d was to be made on the basis of Article 1.1 of the Agreement which provided that the 
scope of countervailing investigation should be within the territory of a Member. China urged the EU 
to conduct its investigation strictly in consisten cy with WTO rules.  
72. According to the European Union  the two investigations confirmed that the subsidies provided 
by the Governments of China and Egypt allowed Egypt -based producers to sell their products in the 
EU at very low prices which had led to significant loss of market  shares and decreasing profitability 
for EU producers. The Commission measures fully respected the WTO rules and took into account 
comments received from all interested stakeholders. The Commission has been carrying out a third 
investigation with a potenti al transnational element on stainless steel hot -rolled flat products from 
China and Indonesia. The investigation was initiated on 10 October 2019 and no measures have 
been adopted yet. At this stage of the proceedings, the Commission could not prejudge the  outcome 
and the findings of the investigation which was in conformity with both the Agreement and EU's 
internal regulation.  G/SCM/M/113  
 
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  73. On the semi -annual report of the  United States , China  noted that during the second half 
of 2019 and the first half of 2020, there w ere 23 countervailing duty determinations against China 
by the United States . According to China, the United States  has been using a certain mode of 
investigation which was unreasonable and not consistent with WTO rules. It was mostly concerned 
with the us e of adverse facts available (AFA) in CVD investigations conducted by the United States . 
Article 12.7 of the SCM Agreement and Article 6.8 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement require that the 
proper use of facts available was to fill the gaps rather than punishi ng the investigated government  
or responding enterprises. However, despite the DSB cases, in numerous cases the United States' 
investigating authority applied AFA to punish the responding governments and enterprises. For 
example, with respect to the export  buyer's credit programme, which appeared in almost all cases 
launched by the United States, the USDOC  accepted simple allegations by the petitioners that the 
exporting Chinese companies and their trading partners, the importers, had received export buyer 
credit from the Chinese Export and Import Bank, although those companies denied such allegations. 
All those companies had provided sufficient evidence to prove that, which was also verified by the 
United States. The USDOC, however, rejected those pieces of  evidence on the ground that the 
Chinese Government had not provided a full list of the recipient companies of the export buyer credit 
during the period of investigation.  
74. According to China, the information provided by the Chinese Government could only pro ve 
the nature of those programs but had no meaning regarding whether the responding companies had 
received any benefit from this program. China was disappointed because the USDOC had rejected 
all of the pieces of evidence and applied AFA to punish Chinese companies and their trading partners. 
The United States Court of  International Trade (USCIT) has already ruled in its decisions that 
the USDOC's use of AFA to the export buyer credit program was nothing more than "an attempt by 
Commerce to manufacture a co nclusion that is not supported by recorded evidence and in violation 
of applicable statutes and code".  
75. China was of the view that those concerns stemmed from the lack of clarity of the subsidy and 
countervailing duty rules. According to China, it had repea tedly tried to promote the negotiation of 
these rules before Nairobi and before Buenos Aires. However, it was disappointing that its attempts 
did not have any effect because of the rejection by certain Members. China hoped to do something 
in the future to clarify and improve the subsidy and countervailing duty rules.  
76. In response to China, the United States  stated that it conducted its proceedings in an open 
and transparent manner in accordance with its laws and international obligations and by taking into 
account the views of all interested parties. With respect to the use of AFA, the Department of 
Commerce  only used AFA when it was fully justified and when there was a failure of the respondent 
company or government to fully reply to the questionnaires. With respect to the export buyer credit, 
China had never provided the requested information needed to anal yse the program. As this was an 
ongoing issue under litigation, the United States would not comment further.  
77. China  agreed that facts available could be used to fill the gap in investigations because the 
investigating authority could not always gather all t he necessary information. However, as 
determined by the USCIT, there was no such gap with respect to the export buyer credit programme 
because the evidence provided by the respondents had already been verified by the investigating 
authority. Therefore, it did not matter whether the Chinese Government had provided the 
information requested by the United States. When there was no such gap to be filled, facts available 
could not be used to punish the respondents, according to the WTO rules.  
78. The United States  denied any punishment element involved in the administration of the 
countervailing duty law in the United States. It encouraged the Government of China and the 
respondent Chinese companies to fully cooperate with the countervailing duty investigations such 
that AFA was not needed.  
79. The Committee took note  of the semi -annual reports, the statements made, the questions 
posed, and the answers provided.  G/SCM/M/113  
 
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  4  PRELIMINARY AND FINAL COUNTERVAILING DUTY ACTIONS: NOTIFICATIONS 
(ARTICLE 25.11)  
80. The Chair  reported that since the Committee's November 2019 regular meeting, notifications 
under Article 25.11 of the SCM Agreement with respect to preliminary and final countervailing duty 
actions had been received from Australia, Canada, China, the European Union, India, the 
United  Kingdom, and  the United States. Those notifications were listed in documents G/SCM/N/357, 
G/SCM/N/358, G/SCM/N/359, G/SCM/N/360, G/SCM/N/360/Rev.1, G/SCM/N/361, G/SCM/N/362, 
G/SCM/N/364, G/SCM/N/365, G/SCM/N/366, G/SCM/N/367, and G/SCM/N/368.  
81. The European U nion regretted that Canada  had decided to initiate another expiry review 
investigation on refined sugar from the EU. In the EU's view, after 25 years of application, those 
measures should expire , as the situation in the sugar market in the EU had changed d rastically  and 
the conditions to continue these measures were no longer met. The EU sugar quota regime has been 
eliminated since 2017 , minimum prices no longer apply and the cross -subsidization from the 
production of quota sugar to the production of out -of-quota sugar has ceased. The EU agricultural 
policy has undergone a profound reform. EU direct support measures were "green box " measures, 
hence not trade -distorting. EU farmers and sugar producers made decisions according to market 
signals and EU sugar pr ices were now aligned or slightly above market prices. If the Canadian 
measures were to expire, it was unlikely that EU exports would resume in significant quantities and 
cause injury to the domestic producers. The EU sugar industry has restructured produc tion capacities 
and production volumes have been reduced. Additionally, EU prices were expected to remain in line 
with world markets in the future.  
82. The European Commission has been working on the completion of a questionnaire and would 
provide all the requ ested information to Canada before 12 November 2020. The European Union 
trusted that all the information provided would show that the measures should be terminated , and 
the market should be left to adjust to the situation without unwarranted protection. Th e 
European  Union urged Canada to terminate the measures on refined sugar after 25 years.  
83. In response to the EU, Canada  explained that on 2 October 2020, the Canadian International 
Trade Tribunal has initiated an expiry review  which would be conducted on an  arm's -lengths basis 
by the authorities. Canada encouraged the EU to participate in the expiry review process.  
84. The Committee took note  of the notifications and statements made.  
5  ARTICLE  27.4 EXTENSIONS OF THE TRANSITION PERIOD FOR THE ELIMINATION OF 
EXPORT SUBSIDIES  
85. The Chair  recalled that Members that had been granted extensions under Article 27.4 pursuant 
to the procedures in WT/L/691 were required, under paragraph 2(c) of the procedur es, to submit 
transparency notifications in respect of each year of the final two -year phase -out period, i.e. calendar 
years 2014 and 2015. The deadline for the notification pertaining to 2014 was 30  June 2015. 
A reminder to this effect had been circulated  in document G/SCM/N/290/INF.  
86. Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El  Salvador, 
Guatemala, Jamaica, Jordan, Mauritius, Papua New Guinea, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, and 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines had submitte d these notifications, which had been circulated in 
the G/SCM/N/290 series.  
87. Furthermore, given that 2015 was the final year of the two -year phase -out period pursuant 
to the previously mentioned procedures, the Members with extensions needed to have complet ed 
the elimination of their export subsidies by 31 December 2015. They also had to provide a final 
transparency notification in respect of calendar year 2015 not later than 30 June 2016. A reminder 
concerning that final round of Article 27.4 –related notifi cations had been circulated in document 
G/SCM/N/299. For the information of Members, the Secretariat previously circulated a room 
document indicating the current status of notifications and of actions reported by Members with 
extensions under Article  27.4.3 
 
3 RD/SCM/36/Rev.4.  G/SCM/M/113  
 
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  88. To date, fifteen of the beneficiary Members – Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Costa  Rica, 
Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Jamaica, Jordan, Mauritius, 
Papua  New Guinea, Saint Kitts and Navis, Saint Lucia, and Saint Vincent and th e Grenadines - had 
submitted those final notifications. The Chair reminded other Members with extensions to submit 
their final transparency notifications as soon as possible. The deadline for the elimination of the 
export subsidies had been almost five yea rs earlier while for submitting the final notification had 
been more than four years earlier. She emphasized the importance for the system that both the 
Members benefit from extensions complete their compliance with the corresponding substantive and 
transp arency obligations.  
89. The United States  urged remaining Members to provide their pending notifications.  
90. The Chair  noted that the Committee would revert to that issue at the next meeting.  
91. The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
6  IMPROVING THE TIMELINES S AND COMPLETENESS OF NOTIFICATIONS AND OTHER 
INFORMATION FLOWS ON TRADE MEASURES UNDER THE SCM AGREEMENT  
92. The Chair  recalled that since the request of the Chairman of the Trade Policy Review Body in 
spring 2009, the Committee had been discussing, at formal  and informal meetings, "ways to improve 
the timeliness and completeness of notifications and other information flows on trade measures". 
The substance of those discussions was reflected in the minutes of the previous meetings.  
93. The Chair also recalled that  at the Committee's November 2019 meeting a number of Members 
had indicated their willingness to continue discussions on ways to improve timeliness and 
completeness of notification obligations under the SCM Agreement, with the notification of subsidies 
being the most fundamental. In this regard, there were two topics to cover under this agenda item, 
(i) the status of Members' notifications of subsidies and (ii) the US proposal regarding a written 
process for questions and answers under Articles 25.8 and 25. 9 of the SCM Agreement.  
94. Regarding the status of subsidy notifications, the Chair noted that the Secretariat had 
prepared and updated a background note at the request of Members, providing a snapshot of the 
level of compliance with the various notification obligations under the SCM Agreement since 1995, 
the most recent of which had been circulated in document G/SCM/W/546/Rev.11.  
95. The Chair noted that Members were required to submit their 2019 new and full notifications 
by 30 June 2019. She had called for an o pen-ended informal meeting on 27 June 2019 to provide 
an update on the state of compliance with subsidy notification obligations. At the same meeting the 
Secretariat had informed Members about the technical assistance offered on subsidy notifications. 
In addition, she sent individual reminder letters to the delegations of Members who had at least one 
pending new and full subsidy notification in June 2020. Following those reminder letters seven 
Members submitted their pending notifications while seventeen Me mbers submitted their 2019 
notifications since the November 2019 meeting of the Committee.  
96. Despite those efforts, however, the chronic low compliance with this fundamental 
transparency obligation constitute s a serious problem in the proper functioning of t he Agreement. 
She recalled that at previous meetings Members had stressed the importance of the information 
provided through subsidy notifications and the value of complying with the relevant provisions of 
the SCM Agreement. Members also had recommitted to  implementing  existing notification 
obligations under Article 25.3 of the SCM Agreement in the Ministerial Decision of 
13 December  2017.  
97. Despite Ministers' recommitment to the notification obligation as well as her various reminders 
as the Chair of the Com mittee, the level of compliance with subsidy notification obligation remained 
low. Eighty -three  Members had not made their 2019 new and full subsidy notifications. Sixty -eight 
Members still had not made their 2017 new and full subsidy notification, althoug h the deadline had 
been more than three years earlier. Further, fifty -eight Members still had not made their 2015 
notifications, which had been due more than five years earlier. Many of those Members either had 
never notified or had done so only in the dis tant past.  G/SCM/M/113  
 
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  98. The Members that had not yet made their 2019 notifications were: Afghanistan; Albania; 
Angola; Antigua and Barbuda; Armenia; Bahrain, Kingdom of; Bangladesh; Barbados; Belize; Benin; 
Bolivia, Plurinational State of; Botswana; Burundi; Cabo Verde ; Cambodia; Cameroon; Central 
African Republic; Chad; Congo; Côte d'Ivoire; Democratic Republic  of Congo; Djibouti; Dominica; 
Egypt; Fiji; Gabon; the Gambia; Ghana; Grenada; Guatemala; Guinea; Guinea -Bissau; Guyana; 
Haiti; Jamaica; Jordan; Kuwait, the Stat e of; Kyrgyz Republic; Lao People's Democratic Republic; 
Lesotho; Liberia; Lichtenstein; Madagascar; Malawi; Maldives; Mali; Mauritania; Mongolia; 
Mozambique; Myanmar; Nepal; Nicaragua; Niger; Nigeria; Oman; Pakistan; Panama; 
Papua  New Guinea; Peru;  Qatar;  Rwanda; Saint Kitts and Nevis; Saint  Vincent and the Grenadines; 
Samoa; Senegal; Seychelles; Sierra Leone; Solomon Islands; South Africa; Sri Lanka; Suriname; 
Tanzania; Tonga; Trinidad and Tobago; Tunisia; Uganda; United Arab Emirates; Uruguay; Vanuatu; 
Venezuela, Bolivarian  Republic of; Yemen; Zambia; and Zimbabwe.  
99. The Chair invited the Members that had not yet submitted their 2019 notifications to provide 
an update to the Committee on their progress in preparing those notifications. No such delegation 
took the floor.  
100.  The Chair urged Members that had not yet submitted their notifications to do so, and recalled 
that the Secretariat continued to be available for enquiries about compliance with notification 
obligations. The Secretariat had assisted many Membe rs in the past and Members finding themselves 
unable to comply with their obligations were encouraged to consult the Secretariat. There was a 
range of resources that delegations could draw upon in working to rectify the situation, including the 
Secretariat  Handbook on Notification Requirements for the SCM  Agreement and the two Geneva -
based Internship Programmes coordinated by the Secretariat.  
101.  The United Kingdom  indicated that the notification of subsidies was an integral part of the 
Committee work and essen tial for a transparent system.  While appreciating the work undertaken by 
Members  in understanding the notification requirements and making all the required notifications in 
a timely manner, the United Kingdom also noted the importance of all Members taking  the steps 
needed to fulfil their obligations . It also encouraged Members to seek assistance from the Secretariat 
if needed.  
102.  Referring to the Secretariat report, the European Union  noted the poor notification 
performance by the Membership. The last subsidy notifications were due by 30 June 2019 and the 
Secretariat report was updated in May 2020 , meaning that , eleven months after the due date, 
ninety -one Members, 55% of the Membershi p, had not filed a subsidy notification which undermined 
the working of the Agreement.  The purpose of the notifications was to allow Members to see what 
specific subsidies have been granted by their trading partners and how these might affect 
international  trade. Based on the latest record it was clear that over half of the picture was missing. 
Although it was not an easy task to compile the information and many authorities had pressures on 
their resources, Members had to find the time and resources to do t his. The European Union recalled 
that this exercise was not a voluntary task but rather an obligation under the Agreement and 
encouraged Members to submit their notifications without further delay.  
103.  Canada  remained  concerned with the status of notifications  and encouraged Members to fulfil 
their notification requirements without further delay. Canada reiterated the importance of complying 
with notification requirements of the SCM Agreement. It acknowledged  that it was a resource -
intensive undertaking that re quired coordination between multiple levels of government, but also 
fundamentally important for the functioning of the Agreement. Canada encouraged Members to 
make their best efforts to fulfil their notification obligations , including by making nil notific ations, 
and to seek assistance from the Secretariat when necessary.  
104.  The United States  found the Secretariat report as an enlightening and excellent measurement 
of how Members were doing collectively in meeting their notification obligations. The United Sta tes 
had thought that the Ministerial Decision in Buenos Aires would lead to greater compliance but was 
disappointed with the poor record of notifications. Members needed to rectify this problem , otherwise 
it would continue to undermine th is institution.  
105.  Japan echoed the concerns raised by the Chair and other Members and noted that 
transparency and notification obligations were fundamental to the WTO system full implementation 
of which would bring benefits to all Members. Under the situation of COVID -19 pand emic, G/SCM/M/113  
 
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  transparency was ever more important as many Members have taken various countermeasures to 
address the damage caused by the pandemic. Japan reiterated that all Members were required to 
make their notifications properly within the deadlines in accorda nce with the Agreement.  
106.  Australia  indicated that it attached considerable importance to the transparency of subsidy 
programmes. It also noted that the low compliance with the notification obligation was of continuing 
concern and of great disappointment giv en the Ministerial Decision at the MC11.  
107.  The Russian Federation  welcomed the Secretariat 's efforts to monitor Members ' compliance 
with notification obligations and its readiness to assist Members in providing well -prepared 
notifications. The Russian Federa tion submitted its 2019 new and full notification pursuant to 
Аrticle  XVI:1 of the GATT 1994 and Аrticle 25 of the Agreement which could be found in document 
G/SCM/N/343/RUS.  
108.  New Zealand  welcomed the notifications that were made to date and underscored the 
importance of notifications — including "nil" notifications — for transparency and ensuring the 
smooth functioning of the WTO 's monitoring function.  
109.  With respect to the second topic under this agenda item, the Chair recall ed that at the 
Committee's last meeting, a number of Members had indicated their willingness to continue 
discussions on the proposal from the United States  regarding procedures for questions and answers 
under Articles 25.8 and 25.9 of the SCM  Agreement. Th e revised version of the proposal could be 
found in document G/SCM/W/557/Rev.4.  
110.  The United States  recalled that previously it had introduced  in its formal proposal that written 
answers to initial questions under Article 25.8 be provided within sixty days a nd that follow -up 
questions be answered in thirty days. Although the United States  was of the view that the mandatory 
deadlines were preferable, it recognized the concerns raised by some developing countries with 
respect to strict deadlines. Therefore, it proposed at the last meeting that Members simply agree to 
make their best efforts to submit written responses within sixty days and written responses to follow -
up questions within thirty days.  
111.  The United States noted that the proposed approach had generall y been well received together 
with some expressed concerns about the need to take into account time for consulting with sub -
central governments which was explicitly recognized in the recently revised proposal. In order to 
address the concern raised at the last meeting regarding the question 'who would decide that the 
questions were adequately answered', the United States removed the word "adequately".  
112.  The United States expected that the proposal could move forward with the proposed changes. 
It also reitera ted that the proposal simply mirrored the existing accepted practice of Members for 
providing answers to questions in the normal review of subsidy notifications and it was also a 
reflection of the practice that most Members have followed when answering Art icle 25.8 questions.  
113.  The European Union  referred to the previous statements made in support of the proposal , 
which was reasonable and took into account demands on resources without creating any 
unreasonable burdens on Members. A written question and answer process under Article 25.8 
and 25.9 would enhance the transparency provisions in the Agreement which was ve ry important 
especially in light of the fact that the subsidy notification exercise was not giving a full picture of 
subsidies granted.  The EU welcomed the discussions on the proposal and urged all Members to 
support it so that it could move forward.  
114.  Austr alia remained interested and supportive of the proposal which was directly pertinent to 
the request from the Chair of the Trade Policy Review Body to discuss ways to improve the timeliness 
and completeness of notifications. Australia was supportive of effo rts by Members to clarify the 
procedures for implementing existing notification and review procedures. The proposal fell within 
the scope of the Committee 's work to determine procedures for the review of notifications. The 
United States identified a gap in  the Committee 's procedures for review of notifications and greater 
clarity in the procedures would encourage compliance with the notification obligations and improve 
the completeness and timeliness of notifications. Australia welcomed the flexibility of t he 
United  States  in responding to some of the concerns identified by some Members and found the G/SCM/M/113  
 
- 15 - 
 
  addition of language to take into account situations where Members needed to consult sub -central 
governments helpful.  
115.  Japan  continued to support the proposal wh ich would contribute to establishing good practice 
for transparency of subsidies and expected Members to follow the proposal as a best effort basis.  
116.  The United Kingdom  welcomed the proposal.  
117.  Canada  welcomed the United States'  constructive approach as well as the flexibility in 
responding to the concerns raised by other Members. It encouraged all Members to similarly engage 
constructively.  
118.  The Russian Federation  expressed its general support for the proposal and expected that 
complex state structure and budg etary system of particular Members would be taken into account. 
It could be demanding to provide responses within short deadlines if questions concerned subsidies 
granted at local or municipal level. Therefore, the proposed non -mandatory deadlines should b e 
increased at least to 90 days for initial questions and 60 days for follow -up questions. Setting those 
deadlines means that Members agree to make their best efforts to meet them. However, Members 
should not lower the quality of written responses when str iving to meet these deadlines. For that 
reason, if necessary, it should be possible to further extend the proposed deadlines.  
119.  China  reiterated its position at the previous meetings noting that Article 25.9 neither stipulates 
that Members should submit writ ten replies, nor specifies a deadline for submitting answers. The 
requirement for making written answers would impose newly -added substantial obligations on 
Members. China recalled that many questions raised by the Members pursuant to Article 25.8 had 
been incorporated into the normal questions upon subsidies notifications. Therefore, the proposal 
would not only cause difficulties to the LDC Members but would also pose challenges to many 
developing Members facing capacity constraints increasing their worklo ad and distracting their focus 
on preparing the notifications.  
120.  India requested a clarification from the United States with respect to the significance of words 
used in paragraph 4 and the automatic inclusion of the questions to the agenda of the following 
meeting.  
121.  Chinese Taipei  reiterated its support noting that the revis ed proposal had merits to enhance 
transparency.  
122.  The United States  welcomed all the support for the proposal and recognized that other 
Members might need additional time to fully digest as it had been submitted the day before  the 
meeting . It also thanked th e Russian Federation for its specific comments. In response to India, 
noting that it was ready to have a bilateral discussion, the United States indicated that the purpose 
of paragraph 4 was to put Article 25.8 procedure on par with the normal notification  procedures 
where a Member does not answer a written question on its notification  and the question and the 
notification are kept on the agenda of the following meeting. The United States would like to have 
the same procedure with respect to Article 25.8 qu estions.  
123.   The Chair stated that it appeared that Members wished to continue discussions on those 
issues at the next regular meeting of the Committee.  
124.  The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
7  CONSTANT DOLLAR METHODOLOGY FOR GRADUATION FROM SCM ANNEX VII(B)  
125.  The Chair  recalled that, pursuant to the Doha Ministerial Decision on Implementation -Related 
Issues and Concerns (document WT/MIN (01)/17, paragraph 10.1), Annex VII (b) to the 
SCM Agreement listed Members until their GNP per capita reached US$1,000  in constant 1990 dollars 
for three consecutive years. As of 1 January 2003, the methodology set forth in G/SCM/38, 
Appendix  2 had applied for making those calculations. In accordance with that Decision, since then 
the Secretariat had circulated annual not es in document series G/SCM/110 updating the GNP per 
capita figures for the Members listed in Annex VII (b) based on that methodology. The most recent 
version, Addendum 17, was circulated on 19 March 2020.  G/SCM/M/113  
 
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  126.  No Member took the floor and the Committee took no te of the Chair's statement.  
8  PERMANENT GROUP OF EXPERTS  
127.  The Vice Chair  of the Committee recalled that the term of office of Mr Ichiro Araki as a member 
of the Permanent Group of Experts had expired in April 2020 and the Committee should elect a new 
member to replace him. Two nominations, Mr Donald Orth (Canada) and Ms Tomoko Ota (Japan) 
were received.  
128.  The initial consultations were postponed due to the COVID -19 pandemic in March 2020. The 
outcome of the consultations, which were reinitiated in September 202 0, however, was inconclusive 
as both candidates had received the same amount of support from interested Members. In her email 
dated 19 October 2020, the Vice Chair had shared the outcome of her consultations indicating that 
the current situation did not al low her to recommend the election of any of the nominees. The issue 
would therefore be taken up by the next Chair of the Committee.  
129.  No Member took the floor and the Committee took note  of the Vice Chair's statement.  
9  SUBSIDIES AND OVERCAPACITY – ITEM REQUES TED BY CANADA, THE EUROPEAN 
UNION, JAPAN, NORWAY, AND THE UNITED STATES  
130.  The United States  referred to an OECD report titled "Measuring Distortions in International 
Markets: The Semiconductor Value Chain " dated December 2019. The report which examined a 
sample of twenty -one of the largest semiconductor companies operating at various stages of the 
supply chain, provided details on subsidies and other support measures in the global semiconductor 
market.  
131.  According to the report, the total government support for  all of the examined firms exceeded 
USD50 billion over the period 2014 -2018. The majority of all budgetary support, which excluded 
government equity investment and state -owned bank lending, targeted R&D activities, provided 
through either grants or prefere ntial tax treatment of R&D spending. The United States indicated 
that the support given under China 's National Integrated Circuit Fund (National IC Fund), which had 
been established in 2014 but not yet been notified to the Committee, was particularly notew orthy.  
132.  The National IC Fund had been making large -scale equity investments throughout the 
industry, resulting in very significant government ownership and control throughout the sector. 
According to the report, China was the largest provider of support.  
133.  The United States noted that continued support at those levels threatened to put China 's 
semiconductor industry on the same path as steel, aluminium, and solar panels, among others.  
134.  The United States  summarized some recommendations made by the report:  
• R&D support measures should be transparent, non -discriminatory and targeted towards 
firms facing financing constraints or pre -competitive research collaborations that undertake 
basic, fundamental R&D;  
• Greater transparency is needed for government equity investments, building on existing 
agreements and initiatives to disclose information on SOEs, such as the EU -Japan Economic 
Partnership Agreement; the United States -Mexico -Canada Agreement; and the OECD 
Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State -Owned Ent erprises.  
• Scrutiny of equity investments should continue beyond the point of the initial investment 
and include the ensuing behaviour of government -invested firms as well.  
• Specific disciplines on state enterprises and government -invested firms should a lso be 
considered, such as a requirement that government -invested firms be audited independently 
and that they be subject to required rates of return.  
135.  The European Union  recalled that this agenda item arose following the G20 Summit in 
Hangzhou in September  2016 where the Leaders highlighted the role of subsidies and other types G/SCM/M/113  
 
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  of government support in creating excess capacity and noted that those market -distorting support 
measures required immediate attention. According to the European Union this was a cru cial issue 
which Members had to continue to examine in depth in order to (i) understand the role and impact 
of subsidies as contributing to overcapacity in several sectors; and (ii) to find ways to address it.  
136.  The EU was equally concerned that massive publ ic support directed to China 's semiconductor 
industry evoked a sequence of events already seen in the steel, aluminium, and solar panels 
industries previously.  
137.  Of particular concern were a number of equity funds in support of the integrated circuit 
industr y which were owned and controlled by various combinations of government bodies and state 
owned enterprises that were deploying large amounts of capital. These funds were managed in a 
way akin to private equity funds but without disclosure obligations, as b oth their investment 
strategies and articles of association were considered business secrets. The European Union noted 
that China did not consider those funds as subsidies and therefore did not notify them.  
138.  The OECD report shed light on the operation of th ose funds providing solid evidence and 
estimates that distortions were emerging  in the semiconductor market. Segments such as data 
storage were already showing indications of overcapacity. The European Union therefore asked 
Members  to increase transparency  in this sector and supported the continuation of further quality 
research building on the OECD work.  
139.  The European Union also referred to the ongoing work in the context of the Global Forum on  
Steel Excess Capacit y (GFSEC)  and reiterated global concerns regarding steelmaking capacity and 
related policy developments. While steel production in most economies adjusted downwards since 
the onset of the Covid -19 pandemic, in response to the weaker market conditions, notably Chinese 
production ca pacity has continued to increase. The global capacity -demand gap was going to 
increase significantly in 2020 reaching to a level of at least 606 million metric tonnes, and it would 
likely remain high for the foreseeable future which might lead to further t rade disturbances, trigger 
lower steel prices and hurt the economic sustainability of the industry.  
140.  Under the co -Chairmanship of the European Union and the Republic of Korea, the work of the 
Global Forum on Excess Capacity had proceeded in 2020 on the basi s of the agreements expressed 
in Tokyo Chair 's Report, as well as the recommendations and instructions contained in the Berlin 
and Paris reports and the statements of G20 Leaders. According to the EU, GFSEC had an excellent 
set of tools for assessing both the support measures and capacity developments in the steel sector 
in view of addressing the problem. Although GFSEC's work was limited to steel sector, there might 
be lessons to learn. Paragraph 57 of the GFSEC 2017 Berlin Ministerial Report set out a lis t of support 
measures that might contribute to excess capacity which were not limited in scope to WTO 
Agreements but covered the value chain from inputs to the final steel product.  
141.  Those measures included;  
(i) Preferential financing inconsistent with marke t-based conditions;  
(ii) Equity infusions and conversions (including debt -for-equity swaps) inconsistent with market 
based conditions;  
(iii) Grants, awards and cost refunds;  
(iv) Tax exemptions, reductions, and credits;  
(v) Provision of goods and services by a government (for less than adequate remuneration); 
and 
(vi) Distortive discretionary policy measures.  
 
142.  The GFSEC policy recommendations together with the definitions of the support measures 
were the key pillar of the GFSEC work on assessing whether sup port measures fell under the 
mentioned paragraph 57.  
143.  Outcomes of the recent GFSEC Ministerial meeting proved the value of the GFSEC work. While 
it was a transparency mechanism, it had made a difference. Its members had committed to 
refraining from support measures contributing to excess capacity; it had increased stability in the 
steel market and contributed to levelling the playing field.  EU has been an active participant of the G/SCM/M/113  
 
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  GFSEC and found it a useful forum to find solutions to the overcapacity proble m. EU itself had 
abolished subsidies supporting increased capacity of steel production.  
144.  The EU strongly supported the work of the Global Forum and saw great value in it. The Global 
Forum was a multilateral way forward, albeit limited in scope to tackle the  persistent problem of 
steel overcapacity. It would be essential to see all major steel producing economies at the GFSEC 
table.  
145.  The EU regretted that China had withdrawn from the GFSEC which was a dedicated space to 
discuss the issue of subsidies and overc apacity in the steel sector , while stating that the Committee 
was not an appropriate forum to discuss those issues. Members had to work together in whatever 
fora were available to address those crucial issues. Therefore, it urged China to come back to the 
GFSEC, because , as a large steel producer, China's participation was of particular importance to 
tackle subsidies and overcapacity.  
146.  According to Japan  the OECD report had a significant value in analysing market distorting 
effects of government support measures such as equity injection through governmental funds and 
pointing out the need to establish relevant international rules to address those distorti ons. Japan 
would also like to expect valuable analysis on below market finance which the OECD has been 
working on.  
147.  Regarding the Global Forum on Steel Excess Capacity, Japan welcomed and supported the 
issuance of the Ministerial Report the day before, whic h showed significant concerns on market -
distorting government support measures by non -participating jurisdictions that had significant 
structural excess capacity as well as cautions to COVID -19 related government support measures. 
In order to achieve its o bjectives to solve global excess capacity issue, Japan would continue to 
engage actively with relevant Members in this forum.  
148.  Considering current international economic circumstances, including long -standing effects of 
the COVID -19 pandemic, Japan reiterat ed its concern on overcapacity. Subsidies and other types of 
market distorting supports by governments was one of the major causes of overcapacity in 
industries , not only steel and semiconductor, but also aluminium and shipbuilding, among others. 
Referring  to the importance of ensuring level playing field in the middle of COVID -19 pandemic, 
Japan reiterated the importance of having further discussions on this issue including enhancing 
transparency of subsidies.  
149.  Canada  remained concerned with the role govern ment interventions play in the global excess 
capacity in certain sectors which resulted in trade and market distortions affecting all manufacturing 
economies. It welcomed the work of the Global Forum which had served as an important venue for 
constructive exchanges and co -operation between Members on global steel excess capacity.  
150.  The Global Forum 's work on the issue of excess capacity remained important, particularly in 
light of market disruptions caused by COVID -19. The latest figures from the World Steel Association 
indicated that the capacity -demand gap had increased significantly since 2019. This magnitude of 
excess capacity was extremely unhealthy for the industry.  
151.  Canada encouraged all major steel producing countries  to be at the table, as noted by Min isters 
at the GFSEC Ministerial meeting on October 26, in order to find a lasting and long -term solution to 
global overcapacity in steel.  
152.  Brazil  supported the idea of reducing subsidies that lead to overcapacity, in both the industrial 
and the agricultural sectors. It was also supportive of the GFSEC which had an important role as a 
transparency and coordination mechanism to mitigate overcapacity in the steel sector. Brazil recalled 
the progress made under this mechanism with regard to the defin ition of guiding principles and 
recommendations to reduce excess capacity.  The reduction in steel demand due to the pandemic 
had increased the chronic problem of the difference between capacity and demand in the sector, 
thus reinforcing the relevance of th e Global Forum's work. Brazil also invited China and Saudi Arabia 
to reengage with the Global Forum.  
153.  The United Kingdom  was interested to see the OECD report on semi -conductors and would 
also be interested to hear the views of other Members.  Overcapacity i n the steel sector continued to G/SCM/M/113  
 
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  be a significant global issue that has been distorting markets and weaken ing the steel industry. The 
UK was proactively working with G20 partners on efforts to find a global solution and continued to 
attach importance to the  work of the Global Forum on Steel Excess Capacity. It would call on all 
relevant Members to continue to engage with the Forum.  
154.  Australia  indicated that the OECD report on measuring distortions in the semiconductors value 
chain was a valuable work which th e Committee could usefully draw upon. While the majority of 
government support was directed at R&D, the report also observed that government support through 
below -market equity appeared to be particularly large in that sector.  The report acknowledged that 
disciplining such support via subsidy rules alone would be challenging and exacerbated by an opacity 
of firms' ownership structures. The report also noted that a first critical step would be strengthened 
transparency mechanisms. Australia considered this a s an appropriate and valuable area of 
discussion by Members consistent with the competency and scope of responsibilities of the 
Committee. It agreed that current subsidy rules were insufficient and needed to be further clarified 
and updated. Transparency o f government support policies was fundamental if Members were to 
understand impacts of those policies. Australia remained willing to be involved in further work in the 
Committee.  
155.  The Russian Federation  reaffirmed the importance of the issue of overcapacity  noting that the 
impact of COVID -19 on global and regional steel markets was significant. According to the latest 
forecasts of the World Steel Association, global steel demand would reduce in 2020 by 2.4%. Partial 
recovery would be possible only in 2021 (4 .1%). Need for cooperation in this sphere was obvious to 
ensure healthy international trade and economic recovery. In order to achieve tangible results, due 
consideration should be accorded not only to subsidies but also to other factors contributing to 
overcapacity such as trade protectionism, including large numbers of trade remedy measures which 
negatively affected trade flows and hampered competition. According to the Russian Federation, 
reactivation of international trade and financial flows would play  a critical role in speedy recovery of 
economies and industrial sectors. The Global Forum on Steel Excess Capacity remained a unique 
venue to tackle the problem of global excess overcapacity and a place where multilateral action 
could be taken to address t he issue. It further noted that the issue of overcapacity existed not only 
in the steel sector , but the aluminium sector also required attention.  
156.  China  noted that  the issue of excess capacity in China 's steel industry had been preliminarily 
resolved. The f ight against the COVID -19 outbreak and the resumption of work and production were 
not stimulated by large -scale investment, so there would be no excess capacity. It further noted 
that it was deepening the supply -side structural reform. It would strictly co ntrol excess capacity and 
take market -based and law -based approaches to promote the market clearing and supply -demand 
balance of relevant industries.  
157.  On the platform of G20 Global Forum on Steel Excess Capacity (GFSEC), China noted that the 
issue of steel excess capacity had been fully discussed, and this platform had fulfilled its mission. 
The global steel industry could continue to conduct exchanges and cooperation on steel, and China 
would be willing to conduct bilateral exchanges with major trading part ners on steel trade.  
158.  China indicated that the National Integrated Circuit Industry Investment Fund was a corporate 
equity investment fund owned by the National Integrated Circuit Industry Investment Fund Co., Ltd. 
("the Fund Company "). Incorporated on September 26, 2014, the Fund Company was a joint stock 
enterprise established in accordance with the Company Law and was not affiliated with any 
government departments. The employees of the company were not government -administered public  
servants and had no administrative ranks. In the principle of separation between ownership and 
management, the fund entrusted a professional management company to be responsible for the 
management and independently conducted investment business based on m arket-oriented 
principles. The Fund 's investment management and decision -making were completely market -
oriented, and governmental departments did not intervene or participate in any investment decision -
making programs of the Fund. As the Fund adopted the f orm of equity investment, its shareholders 
had clear demands on financial returns of the Fund. Therefore, it was impossible for the Fund to 
provide subsidies to the enterprises the Fund Company had invested, and there was no subsidy in 
any form for the ent erprises invested by it.  G/SCM/M/113  
 
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  159.  Norway4 noted that updating the rule -book to the challenges of the 21st century was an 
important part of the reform agenda in the WTO. It was of outmost importance that possible changes 
to strengthen existing WTO rules on industri al subsidies were developed within the WTO framework. 
The discussions at the Committee were an important step in this process.  
160.  The OECD study on semiconductors as well as an earlier one on the aluminum industry had 
showed that capital subsidies were on the  rise and that such subsidies were usually provided through 
state owned firms.  
161.  Norway further indicated that multilateral challenges demanded multilateral solutions. It 
therefore urged all major producers to engage to find solutions to the problems of over capacity and 
industrial subsidies faced by traders in many sectors. It also encouraged China and the Kingdom of 
Saudi  Arabia to reengage with the Global Forum on Steel Excess Capacity. Finding solutions on steel 
and other sectors of high political importan ce would send a welcome signal in a time when 
protectionist sentiments were on the rise.  
162.  The Committee took note  of the statements.  
10  ARTICLE 25.8 QUESTIONS TO CHINA ON POTENTIAL STEEL SUBSIDIES – ITEM 
REQUESTED BY THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE UNITED STATES  
163.  The United States  reiterated that it had been concerned with the lack of transparency of 
China's industrial subsidy regime since 2001. As steel was a vital sector in the United States , it had 
raised questions and counter -notified numerous possible steel subs idy measures in China. 
Notwithstanding its claim to the contrary at prior meetings, however, China had not notified the vast 
majority of its steel subsidy programmes over the last eighteen years of its WTO Membership.  
164.  The Article 25.8 questions co -submitte d by the EU and the United States  enquired about 160 
government subsidies or government grants listed in the annual reports of six of the largest steel 
companies in China. All 160 of the listed government subsidies or government grants might not be 
subject  to the notification requirements of Article 25 of the SCM Agreement; however, there were 
certainly more than the three non -specific programmes China had claimed to be the exclusive 
instances of government intervention in the steel industry or the few othe r programmes that China 
claimed it had notified under different names.  
165.  The Article 25.8 questions also asked about several government equity infusions into China's 
steel companies relying on their annual reports. In light of the rapid expansion of the indu stry - at 
times seemingly in disregard to market demand – The United States  and the EU asked whether 
those government investments could be commercially justified.  
166.  The European Union  recalled that this was the seventh meeting since April 2017 where the 
issue was being addressed but the explanations received from China to date had not offered clarity 
on the questions raised. While China was insisting that its notification covered all s ubsidies in the 
steel sector, in its latest notification made in June 2019 steel subsidies appeared only in five 
instances all of which related to reduction of overcapacity. It has been frustrating that despite many 
questions being put to China on those ma tters, there was no more clarity than when this item was 
first placed on the agenda over three and a half years ago. The EU encouraged China to engage 
more precisely to answer those questions.  
167.  Japan  noted that as a matter of transparency, full implementati on of the notification 
obligations was essential for  the proper functioning of the Agreement, bearing in mind effects of 
COVID -19 on both demand and supply sides as well as exacerbating overcapacity in industries such 
as iron and steel. To this end, Japan supported continuous discussion on this issue in the Committee.  
168.  China  noted that the annual reports of the six steel enterprises had been sent to the competent 
local governments for further verifications and the  verified  subsidies relating to steel ha d been 
included in China's 2017 -2018 local subsidy notification submitted  in 30 June 2019. China had 
incorporated more subsidies involving steel sector in its latest notification covering 2017 and 2018. 
 
4 This statement was read by the Chair. Due to technical issues, Norway could not connect remotely and 
asked the Chair to read out its intervention.  G/SCM/M/113  
 
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  Those policies were not specific to the  steel industry but  were included in the notification for the 
purpose of improving transparency.  
169.  For example, at the central governmental level there were : preferential tax treatment for 
environmental protection, water and energy conservation;  clean development mechanism; fu nd for 
energy conservation and emission reduction; fund for air pollution prevention and control; R&D super 
deduction for enterprises; reward and support fund for the structural adjustment of industrial 
enterprises.  
170.  At the local governmental level, there were:  
(i) Fund for energy conservation and emissions reduction as well as environmental protection;  
(ii) Fund for energy conservation;  
(iii) Funds for air pollution prevention and control ; 
(iv) Grant for low carbon and environment -friendly industries ; 
(v) Fund for water pollution prevention and contro l; 
(vi) Funds subsidizing energy conservation and emission reduction.  
 
171.  While the annual report was formulated upon supporting programmes, China 's notification has 
been based on policies. In this case, dif ferent programmes sometimes might come from the same 
policy and there was no one -to-one correlation between these two. Even with the same program, 
there could be duplication of statistics among different subsidiaries. According to the Agreement, 
however, n ot every programme released in the annual report shall be notified and not every program 
disclosed in the enterprises ' annual reports corresponded to the ones in the notifications.  
172.  The United States  found China's response helpful but recalled that 160 diff erent grants had 
been cited in the Article 25.8 questions which seemed to be more than the programmes notified by 
China.  
173.  The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
11  SUBSIDY TRANSPARENCY AND CHINA'S PUBLICATION AND INQUIRY POINT 
OBLIGATIONS UNDER CHINA' S PROTOCOL OF ACCESSION – ITEM REQUESTED BY THE 
EUROPEAN UNION AND THE UNITED STATES  
174.  The United States  noted that together with other Members, it had numerous concerns with 
respect to the transparency of China 's industrial subsidy regime. It took five year s for China to 
submit its first subsidy notification which only covered the central government level programmes. 
China's notifications were normally late and grossly incomplete according to the United States . It 
was 15 years after becoming a Member that Ch ina submitted its first subsidy notification covering 
sub-central governments – entities which played a significant role in China 's industrial subsidy 
regime. When researching a trade topic in China, it is usual to see references to legal measures, 
normall y with a legal citation, that the United States  then tries to locate. While those measures 
usually can be found in one place or another, sometimes it is not possible no matter how hard the 
United States  looks which can be particularly frustrating when thos e "missing measures, " are 
repeatedly cited elsewhere and appear to be foundational to a particular subsidy programme.  
175.  The United States  recalled that in China 's Protocol of Accession, China had agreed to publish 
all trade -related measures in a single journal, which China had designated as the MOFCOM Gazette.  
Often – if not normally – however, subsidy measures – especially normative measures and sub -
central measures – are not published in the MOFCOM Gazette. In addition, sometimes those 
measures are now here to be found anywhere else. The United States recently ha s come across 
references to five of such missing measures, two relating to fuel subsidies for fishermen, one relating 
to the development of China 's distant water fishing fleet, and two relating t o the semiconductor 
industry. Since it could not find these measures in the MOFCOM Gazette, or anywhere else, the 
United States  had submitted a request to China 's WTO inquiry point.  
176.  Under China 's Protocol of Accession, China had agreed to "establish or des ignate an enquiry 
point where, upon request of any individual, enterprise or WTO Member all information relating to 
the measures required to be published … may be obtained. " Although the United States  had 
submitted its initial request in April re -submittin g the same in May, no formal response had been G/SCM/M/113  
 
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  provided. The United States  therefore urged China to respond to its request by providing all the 
requested documents as soon as possible in accordance with its obligations under its Protocol of 
Accession.  
177.   The European Union  urged China to comply with the United States'  request and to provide 
the requested information both in the interest of transparency as well meeting its obligations under 
its Protocol of Accession.  
178.  China  noted that China's Ministry of Commer ce (MOFCOM) published eighty issues of China 
Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation Gazette annually, which was the official journal dedicated 
to the publication of trade policies. The Gazette could be subscribed through mail and has been 
published on the website of MOFCOM, with over 3.9 million page views annually. As required by 
Article 2 (C)  3 of the Protocol on the Accession of the People 's Republic of China, the Chinese 
Government has established China WTO Notification and Enquiry Division to serve as an enquiry 
point to earnestly fulfil the transparency obligations of Chinese Government under the WTO 
framework.  
179.  Canada  stated  that promoting a transparent, rules -based international trading system was a 
core objective of the WTO and the processes around n otification were a core element to that. In 
order to achieve collective goals, it was important that all Members adhered to those requirements 
which included Member -specific commitments stemming from specific protocols of accession  and 
that they notified  their subsidies and revised laws or regulations in accordance with WTO 
requirements.  
180.  The United States  reiterated that it had searched the MOFCOM Gazette and also other sources 
but was unable to find the measures that it was interested in.  
181.  The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
12  OTHER BUSINESS  
182.  No Member raised any items under other business.  
13  DATE OF NEXT REGULAR MEETING  
183.  The Committee decided  to hold its next regular meeting during the week of 26  April 2021, 
with the exact date to be confirmed in due course. As usual, that meeting would be immediately 
preceded by a special meeting for review of subsidy notifications.  
14  ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMI TTEE ON SUBSIDIES AND COUNTERVAILING 
MEASURES TO THE COUNCIL FOR TRADE IN GOODS (ARTICLE 32.7)  
184.  The Committee adopted  its Annual Report (2020) to the Council for Trade in Goods.5 
15  ELECTION OF OFFICERS  
185.  The Chair recalled Rule 12 of the Committee's Rules of P rocedure which provides that the 
election of the new Chair shall take place at the first regular meeting of the year and that the election 
shall take effect at the end of that meeting. The first regular meeting of the year was supposed to 
be held in April 2020, but due to the COVID -19 pandemic, it never took place such that the meeting 
in October 2020 became the first regular meeting of 2020. Accordingly, the election of the new 
Chair, and subsequently the new Vice -Chair took place under this agenda item.  
186.  The Committee elected by acclamation Ms Sung -yo Choi (Korea) as Chair and Mr Erik Philip 
Greger Solberg (Norway) as Vice -Chair to hold office until the end of the Committee's first regular 
meeting of 2021.  
187.  The meeting was closed . 
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5 G/L/13 68 - G/SCM/15 7.