RESTRICTED  
  
WT/CTE/M/63  
 
27 September  2017 
(17-5109) Page: 1/32 
Committee on Trade and Environment   
 
 REPORT OF THE MEETIN G HELD ON 20 JUNE 2017  
NOTE BY THE SECRETAR IAT1  
 
The Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE Regular) met on  20 June 2017 , chaired by the 
Permanent Representative of  Kazakhstan , Ambassador  Mrs. Zhanar Aitzhanova . The Committee  
adopted the Airgram, WTO/AIR/CTE/5 , issued on 3 May 2017 . The latest list of documents of 
the Committee was circulated on 29 February 2016 in document WT/CTE/INF/ 5/Rev.12 . The 
Report of the last CTE  meeting, held on 14-15 November  2016, is contained in WT/CTE/M/62 .  
 
 
_______________  
 
 
Contents  
1   PARAGRAPH 32 OF THE DOHA MINISTERIAL DEC LARATION  ................................ ....... 4 
1.1   Paragraph 32(i)  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...........  4 
1.1.1    Fisheries  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..................  4 
1.1.1.1    Presentation by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
(FAO)  ................................ ................................ ................................ ................................  4 
1.1.1.2    Presentation by Canada  ................................ ................................ ..........................  6 
1.1.1.3    Presentation by Fiji  ................................ ................................ ................................  8 
1.1.1.4    Presentation by the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)  ....................  9 
1.1.1.5    Presentation by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development  (OECD)  ................................ ................................ ................................ ......... 11 
1.1.1.6    Presentation by the WTO Secretariat  ................................ ................................ .......12 
1.1.1.7    Presentation by UN Environment (UNEP)  ................................ ................................ ..14 
1.1.2    Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform (FFSR)  ................................ ................................ ............. 14 
1.1.3    International Organization for Standardization's (ISO) work on carbon footprint  .............. 16 
1.2   Other items of the CTE work programme (Items 1, 2, 3(a), 4, 5, 7, 9, and 10)  .................. 18 
1.2.1    Item 1  ................................ ................................ ................................ .................... 18 
1.2.1.1    The Montreal Protocol  on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer 
(Montreal  Protocol)  ................................ ................................ ................................ ............ 18 
1.2.1.2    The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)  .................... 19 
1.2.1.2.1    Presentation by the UNFCCC  ................................ ................................ ................ 19 
                                                
1 This document has been prepared under the Secretariat's own responsibility and is without prejudice 
to the positions of Members or to their rights and obligations under the WTO.  WT/CTE/M/6 3 
 
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  1.2.1.2.2    Presentation on Korea's NDC  ................................ ................................ ............... 20 
1.2.1.2.3    Presentation  on New Zealand's NDC  ................................ ................................ .....21 
1.2.1.2.4    Presentation on Peru's NDC  ................................ ................................ ................. 23 
1.2.1.2.5    Presentation on renewable energy in China  ................................ ........................... 23 
1.2.1.2.6    Presentation by Kazakhstan  ................................ ................................ ................. 25 
1.2.1.2.7    Presentation by Chinese Taipei  ................................ ................................ ............ 25 
1.2.1.2.8    Presentation on the Workshop on Trade and Climate Change organized by 
Costa Rica, Canada, Korea, Mexico, Norway, Switzerland and Chinese Taipei ............................. 25 
1.2.2    Item 4 ................................ ................................ ................................ .................... 27 
2   OTHER BUSINESS  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 28 
2.1   Update on the Environmental Goods Agreement (EGA) negotiations  ................................ .28 
2.2   Update on the plurilateral negotiations on fisheries subsidies  ................................ ........... 29 
3   BRIEFINGS BY OBSERVE R ORGANIZATIONS  ................................ .............................  30 
4   DATE OF NEXT MEETING ................................ ................................ ............................  30 
ANNEX 1: ITEMS OF TH E CTE WORK PROGRAMME  ................................ ..........................  31 
ANNEX 2: PARTS OF TH E DOHA MINISTE RIAL DECLARATION THA T RELATE  TO 
THE WORK  OF THE CTE  ................................ ................................ ................................ .. 32 
 
 
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  ACRONYMS  
ACP African, Caribbean and the Pacific group on States  
ASEAN  Association of Southeast Asian Nations   
CETA Comprehensive Economic and Trad e Agreement  
CFPA Coastal Fisheries Protection Act  
CH4 Methane  
CO2 Carbon dioxide  
COFI Committee on Fisheries  
CoP Conference of the Parties  
CTE Committee on Trade and Environment  
EDB WTO Environmental  Database  
EGA Environmental Goods Agreement  
ETS Emission Trading Scheme  
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations  
FFSR Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform  
FSE Fisheries Support Estimate  
GDP Gross Domestic Product  
GHG Greenhouse Gas  
GW Gigawatts  
HFCs Hydrofluorocarbons  
IISD International  Institute for Sustainable Development  
IPOA-IUU International Plan of Action to prevent, deter and eliminate Illegal, Unreported and 
Unregulated Fishing  
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change  
ISO International Organization for Standardization  
IUU fishing  Illegal, unreported and unregulated  fishing  
LDC Least developed country  
MoP Meeting of Parties  
N2O Nitrous Oxide  
NDC Nationally Determined Contribution  
NGO Non-governmental organization  
NTMs  Non-Tariff Measures  
ODS Ozone Depleting Substan ces 
OECD  Organi sation for Economic Co -operation and Development  
PSMA  Port State Measures Agreement  
PV Photovoltaic  
RFMOs  Regional Fisheries Management Organizations  
SDG Sustainable Development Goal  
SMEs  Small and medium sized enterprises  
SPS Sanita ry and phytosanitary  
TBT Technical barriers to trade  
TIF Transfer to Individual Fisheries  
TMB Technical Management Board  
TPR Trade Policy Review  
UN United Nations  
UNCLOS  United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea  
UNCTAD  United Nations Conferenc e on Trade and Development  
UNEP  United Nations Environment Programme  
UNFCCC  United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change  WT/CTE/M/6 3 
 
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  1  PARAGRAPH 32 OF THE DOHA MINISTERIAL DEC LARATION  
1.1  Paragraph 32(i)  
"The effect of environmental measures on market access, e specially in relation to 
developing countries, in particular the least  developed among them, and those 
situations in which the elimination or reduction of trade restrictions and distortions 
would benefit trade, the environment and development."  
1.1.1   Fisheries  
1.1.1.1   Presentation by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
(FAO)  
1.1.  The representative of FAO updated the CTE on instruments and recent initiatives related to 
addressing illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing.2 IUU fishing was origi nally defined in 
2001 within the context of the International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter, and Eliminate Illegal, 
Unreported and Unregulated Fishing  (IPOA -IUU).  "Illegal"  fishing comprised fishing and related 
activities  conducted in contravention of n ational, regional and international laws. "Unreported " 
fishing covered: non -reporting , misreporting , or under -reporting of information on fishing 
operations  and their catches . And "unregulated" fishing included : (i) fishing by s tateless vessels; 
(ii) fishi ng in con vention  areas of Regional Fisheries Management Organisations (RFMOs)  by non -
party vessels; (iii) fishing activities not regulated by states and with monitoring and accounting 
difficulties; and (iv) fishing in areas or stocks for which there were no conservation or 
management measures.  
1.2.  According to an estimate by Agnew et al.  (2009) , US$10 to 23  billion  were lost annually  as a 
result of IUU fishing . However, t his baseline was outdated and  annual estimations included only 
illegal and unreported fishing as  unregulated fishing was difficult to estimate. Following the request 
by the FAO Committee on Fisheries (COFI), FAO was developing  technical guidelines on 
methodologies for the estimation of IUU fishing and indicators . This  would enable the formulati on 
of a second , more updated global estimate.  
1.3.  Moreover, t he 32nd COFI meeting had requested the FAO Secretariat to prepare  a global 
study on tran shipment to understand the current regulations and the type of operations. This was 
relevant since IUU fishing  activities were  carried out by both fishing and transhipments vessels, 
which transported  fish to the harbour on behalf of fishing vessels . IUU fishing occurred everywhere 
and was found in all types and dimensions of fisheries. It put serious stress on the environment 
and populations, particularly coastal populations in developing countries that depend ed on fishing  
for income or food. Combatting IUU fishing required concerted action, including at  the regional 
level through RFMOs, by flag states, port states , coastal states  and market states  in order to cover 
all the gaps . 
1.4.   International fisheries instruments and tools to combat  IUU fishing included: the 
United  Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea  (UNCLOS) ; the United Nations  (UN) 
Fish Stocks  Agreement; a nd the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries. Instruments 
within the FAO  Code of Conduct include d: the International Plan of Actions to Prevent IUU  fishing ; 
the Voluntary Guidelines on Catch Documentation Schemes, which w ould be adopted at the next  
FAO Conference; strategies on information; the Port State Measures Agreement (PSMA), which 
entered in to force in 2016; the FAO Compliance  Agreement  (1993) , which sought  to avoid  double 
flagging in the high seas ; and  the Global Record of fishing vessels, r efrigerated transport vessels 
and supply vessels  (Global Record) , an information sharing mechanism to support other 
instruments.  
1.5.  Responsibilities of  flag states includ ed: general responsibilities such as compliance with 
international and regional conserva tion and management measures; fisheries management 
responsibilities (e.g. effective implementation of conservation and management measures); 
responsibilities with regard to information sharing, registration and records; responsibilities 
                                                
2 The presentation is available in document RD/CTE/117.  WT/CTE/M/6 3 
 
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  regarding authoriza tion procedures and conditions for fishing and  fishing -related activitie s; 
monitoring, control , surveillance, and enforcement ; and cooperation  between flag states and 
coastal  states. Part VI of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement highlighted the crucial importanc e of 
internationa l, regional and sub -regional co operation in enforcement. This was a tool for countries 
to assess their performance in controlling and monitoring their own fleets.  
1.6.  The Global Record was a global information system that provided relevant in formation to 
fight IUU fishing. The information was publicly available and mainly used to verify information prior 
to entry into the port. Inspectors in the port could access relevant information to: identify the 
vessel; conduct risk assessments; and  check  the legality of the vessels ' activities. The Global 
Record was based on the Unique Vessel Identifier , which was a global unique number assigned to 
a vessel . The International Maritime Organizat ion number had been  endorsed by the C OFI as a 
Unique Vessel Id entifier for phase  1 vessels, which were the large scale vessels.  FAO's current 
work on this issue included: a Global Record Working Group  that met annually ; speciali zed Core 
Working Groups on technical matters;  the implementation of a pilot project with 1 1 pilot partners; 
and the release in April 2017 of the first working version of the Global Record. FAO's next steps on 
IUU fishing  included: the call for inclusion of more countries with more data, with a possible public 
release before the next C OFI of July 2018;  and the development of implementation guidelines to 
enhance the participation of  countries in the G lobal Record .  
1.7.  The PSMA  was the only binding agreement to fight  specifically IUU fishing and was a n 
important and effective tool. Its focus was on  inspections at the harbors  when vessels offload ed 
their catches. Inspections focused on vessels with higher risk of carrying out IUU fishing and 
consisted in evaluating the available information on the vessel and of taking actions (e.g. denial of 
the entry o f the fish or fish products into the national or int ernational market ). The re were 
48 parties including the E uropean  Union. This was a significant number tak ing into account that 
the number  doubled from 25 to 48 since the entry into force in 2016 . Pursuant  to this Agreement, 
the port state needed  to verify the vessel infor mation, which had to be sent 48  hours prior to 
coming to the port, and take a decision to grant or deny access to the port , for example because 
of lack of port capacity.  
1.8.  The PSMA had to b e implemented at three levels: policy and legislation; institutional set -up 
and capacity; and operational , procedures and training.  The first meeting of the Parties to the 
PSMA had taken place in Oslo in May 2017 with decisions on the following aspects: re view of 
responsibilities with agreement on the need for concerted actions; transmittal, electronic exchange 
and publication of information, with agreement to take a staged approach  for data exchange  and 
to establish a technical working group to provide further guidance; requirements of developi ng 
States; and on m onitoring, review and assessment of implementation of the Agreement,  with 
FAO building a web -based questionnaire. FAO was also broadening its capacity development 
programme to combat IUU fishing.  The PSMA assistance fund allowed Parties and non -Parties to 
provide funds to different projects.    
1.9.  Several market measures specifically addressed IUU such as: IUU vessel list s, the 
IUU regulations  of the European Union , the U nited States Lacey Act, among ot hers. FAO was 
directly involved in the development and implementation of Catch Documentation Schemes , which 
had been  drafted recently and would be approved in the FAO Conference in July 2017. Combatting 
IUU fishing required : strong commitment and concerted  action among flag states, port states, 
coastal states and market states  together with regional and international organizations ; 
performance monitoring and assessment of states' responsibilities;  increased transparency and 
traceability of information throu gh broad participation in the Global Record ; widespread global 
coverage of the implementation of the PS MA; implementation of the Catch Documentation 
Scheme s; strengthen ed international cooperation and directed capacity development;  and 
increase d advocacy, for example through the International Day for the fight against IUU fishing 
that was expected to be announ ced by the U N General Assembly in 2017.  
1.10.   The representative of the European Union  (EU) supported  FAO activities in fighting 
IUU fishing and welcomed th e important steps taken by FAO COFI 32. His delegation looked 
forward to work ing with all interested parties in implementing these steps and preparing COFI 33 
in 2018. The E uropean Union was actively involved in the negotiations of the three major 
instrume nts to combat  IUU fishing that were mentioned by FAO : the PSMA; the Voluntary 
Guidelines for Catch Documentation Schemes; and the Global Record.  He highlighted the relevance WT/CTE/M/6 3 
 
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  of these three instruments  in tackling IUU fishing and in the EU ocean governance strategy. The 
European Union was currently working to ensure their full implementation.  
1.11.   The representative of Sri Lanka  asked how the FAO management system could be linked to 
WTO discussions on fisheries subsidies.  
1.12.   The representative of New Zealand  considered the three  measures mentioned in previous 
interventions to be highly relevant in the fight against IUU fishing. It was important  to make the 
implementation of the PSMA simple and not overly prescriptive  and to encourage non-parties to 
accede to the Agreement . New Zealand welcomed  the adoption of the Voluntary Guidelines for 
Catch Documentation Schemes, which ensured that all catch documentation schemes me t 
international agreed standards  and FAO's work to develop a Global Record. Her delegation 
supporte d collaboration and coordination amoung  national administrations, intergovernmental 
organizations  and non-governmental organizations ( NGOs ) to combat IUU  fishing.  
1.13.   The representative of Mexico  took note of the information provided by FAO and said that he 
would share the information with relevant national agencies.  
1.14.   The representative of Canada  stressed the importance of raising awareness among Members 
on FAO 's work o n IUU fishing in light of the ongoing work at the WTO on fisheries subsidies. 
FAO supported t he work at the WTO including through  providing  informative presentations and 
answering questions. Canada strongly supported an outcome on fisheries subsidies at the 11th 
Ministerial Conference ( MC 11), including on the prohibition of  subsidies to vessels e ngaged in 
IUU fishing.  
1.15.   The representative of Norway  noted that Norway had been for years a ke y supporte r of the 
PSMA, which  was a milestone in the fight against IUU fishing. The PSMA was the result of 
combined efforts involving the FAO and experts from sev eral countries , including Norway. A t the 
first meeting of the Parties to the Agreement in Oslo, Norway's Minister of Fisheries along with 
other Ministers of Fisheries were present  to lay the ground work for future follow -up and 
implementation of the Agreem ent. Norway had allocated approximately 1 million euro s to support 
FAO's implementation of  the Agreement in developing countries. The number of ratification s was 
increasing, which meant that fewer ports would be  available  for landings of  illegally caught f ish. 
Norway looked forward to new Members joining the Agreement.  
1.16.   The representative of the FAO stated that if disciplines on IUU fishing subsidies were agreed 
it would be important to take into account: the existence of other actors in IUU fishing besides the 
fishing vessels  (for reference,  the Global Record also included information on  the beneficial 
ownership, i.e. the final actor interested in the economic gain from the illegal activity ); and  the 
broad variety of criteria  to identify  IUU activities and the fact that certain fishing activities could be  
illegal in one country and legal in another , depending on national legislation.  
1.1.1.2   Presentation by Canada  
1.17.   The representative of Canada  presented on Canada's  efforts to combat IUU fishing.3 The 
commercial  fisher ies and aquaculture sectors contributed  approximately CAN$9 billion per year  to 
Canada's economy with Canadian fish and seafood exports valued at CAN$6.6 billion in 2016, 
representing almost 80% of Canada's seafood production, by value . Canada's key  export  markets 
included the United States, the European Union and China , and two thirds of its  wild captured  
fisheries were certified as sustainable by the Marine Stewardship Council. This certification  not only  
indicated the sustainability of a fisher y but also  recognized that there were strong measures in 
place to prevent IUU fishing.  
1.18.   Canada's legislative and regulatory framework was designed to manage and protect 
fisheries resources in a biologically sustainable manner and outlined potential actions to preven t 
destructive practices while continuing to seek effective international solutions. Legislation on 
fisheries included: the Department of Fisheries and Oceans Act (1985), the Oceans Act (1996), the 
                                                
3 The presentation is available in document RD/CTE/111.  WT/CTE/M/6 3 
 
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  Fisheries Act (1985), the Coastal Fisheries Protection Act (1985) and the Species at Risk 
Act (2002).  
1.19.   The Fisheries Act  and associated regulations (e.g. the Fishery (General ) Regulations) 
provided the authority to set quotas, size and weight  limits , and to implement time and area 
closures , and set the framework t o apply penalties for illegal fishing activities. The Coastal 
Fisheries Protection Act (CFPA) regulated the entry of foreign fishing vessels into Canadian waters 
for any purpose, including offloading in ports . It also  provided the authority for foreign ves sels to 
be inspected by Canadian fishery officers. The Coastal Fisheries Protection Regulations set out the 
terms and conditions for licences to be issued pursuant to the CFPA. The CFPA required licences for 
any foreign fishing vessel entering Canad ian wat ers, even if only to off load fish products to a 
Canadian port. The CFPA was being updated with an expected date of entry into force of end-
2017. The update  aimed at enabling Canada to ratify the PSMA , expanding  the authority of 
fisheries officers to conduc t inspections and the ability for information sharing related to the 
identification of illegal fishing activities.  
1.20.   Turning to international efforts, Canada was committed to protect and conserve the 
sustainable harvest of fisheries resources around the wor ld. Canada employed over 550 fishery 
officers to monitor compliance, gather intelligence, enforce laws for domestic fisheries and to 
participate in regional and international initiatives aimed at combatting IUU fishing. As the fight 
against IUU fishing was  beyond the capacity of any  one state, multilateral approaches were 
required to create effective deterrents that enhanced  the likelihood of  detection and the 
effectiveness of sanctions. Canada participated actively in international and multilateral efforts  in 
the fight against IUU fishing , for example in RFMOs, the FAO and the UN. Trade agreements were 
an important tool to support efforts against IUU fishing, for example the Canada -European Union  
Comprehensive and Economic Trade Agreement  (CETA)  recognized the environmental, economic 
and social importance of conservation and the sustainable and responsible management of 
fisheries an d aquaculture. Canada and the European  Union  had undertaken  to adopt and maintain 
appropriate measures aimed at the conservation  of fish stocks, to prevent overfishing , to combat 
IUU fishing  and to cooperate in regional fisher ies management organizations. Canada was playing  
an active role in the WTO to establish fisheries subsidies disciplines  and was also  chairing the 
plurilateral  fisheries subsidies negotiations.  
1.21.   Canada had ratified , and was implementing , national versions of all international 
agreements identified in the IPOA-IUU, including : UNCLOS , the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, the 
FAO Compliance Agreement and the Code of Conduc t for Responsible Fishing Operations. Canada 
had signed  the PSMA in 2010 and was working on its ratification , which would  occur once domestic 
regulatory updates were finalized.  Also, Canada had participated actively in the development of 
Voluntary Guidelin es on Catch Documentation Schemes , which were expected to be adopted at the 
FAO Conference in July 2017.  
1.22.   Canada participated in numerous RFMOs, including  the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries 
Organization, the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas and the 
North  Pacific Anadromous Fish Commission. RFMOs set clear measures regarding the management 
and enforcement of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks . In addition to regular 
implementation of RFMO measures , Canada participated in  larger  program efforts to address 
IUU fishing in the Northwest Atlantic and North Pacific Oceans.  
1.23.   In the North Pacific Ocean, Operation DRIFTNET delivered Canada's participation in 
multinational efforts to control driftnetting and other forms of IUU fish ing, including through 
surveillance flights by military aircraft s. Canada had also engaged in numerous enforcement -
related exchanges to collaborate with partners in combatting IUU fishing. Canada supported the 
International Monitoring Control  and Surveilla nce Network , including hosting meetings and 
providing financ ial support to the organization . Canada offered access to best industry practices 
and promoted capacity building. Canada actively contributed to INTERPOL's Fisheries Crime 
Working Group to link fi sheries enforcement practitioners from different countries, the focus of 
which was on intelligence gathering and sharing to combat IUU fishing, and on capacity building in 
the developing world. Finally,  Canada also supported the Safe O ceans Network led by the 
United  States by contributing to joint intelligence initiatives aimed at IUU  fishing. His deleg ation 
looked forward to continuing  engaging domestically, regionally, multilater ally and internationally 
on IUU  initiatives.  WT/CTE/M/6 3 
 
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  1.24.   The representative of the Europe an Union  welcomed Canada's efforts in tackling IUU fishing 
at various levels. The E uropean Union looked forward to continue cooperating with Canada and 
mentioned the  example s of CETA, which included  commitments to tackle IUU fishing , and of a 
recent declar ation on IUU fishing signed by the European Union and Canada in April 2017 to 
advance disciplines on this subject.  
1.1.1.3   Presentation by Fiji  
1.25.   The representative of Fiji, as co -sponsor of the UN Ocean Conference, delivered a joint 
statement on behalf of the Gove rnments of Fiji and Sweden. Heads of State, ministers and other 
high-level representatives had met from 5 to 9  June 2017 for the UN Ocean Conference to Support 
the Implementation of Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 14. The Conference was a multi -
stakehol der event with three main components.   
1.26.   The first element was the adoption of a  Call for Action on "Our Oceans, Our Future"  that 
reaffirmed the UN member States commitment towards SDG 14. Most members also confirmed 
the importance of the Paris Agreement an d the threat of climate change on oceans , and 
accentuated the need to take actions for a healthy marine environment.  The Call for A ction 
highlighted, among other s, the importance of strengthening capacity building and technical 
assistance to small scale an d artisanal fishers in developing countries , and of support ing 
sustainable ocean -based economies. On f isheries subsidies, m embers would "act decisively to 
prohibit certain forms of fisheries subsidies which contribute to overcapacity and overfishing, 
eliminate subsidies that contribute to illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing and refrain from 
introducing new such subsidies, including through accelerating work to complete negotiations at 
the World Trade Organization on this issue, recognizing that appr opriate and effective special and 
differential treatment for developing and least developed countries (LDCs) should be an integral 
part of the negotiations." There had been  some reservations noted on fisheries subsidies.  
1.27.   The second element of the Conferen ce included seven partnership dialogue sessions on:  
(i) addressing marine pollution; (ii) managing, protecting, conserving and restoring marine and 
coastal ecosystems; (iii) minimizing and addressing ocean acidification; (iv) making fisheries 
sustainable; (v) increasing economic benefits to Small Island Developing States and LDCs and 
providing access for small -scale artisanal fisheries to marine resources and markets;  
(vi) increasing scientific knowledge and developing research capacity and transfer of mari ne 
technology; and (vii) enhancing the conservation and sustainable use of oceans and their 
resources by implementing international law as reflected in the UNCLOS.  
1.28.   The third element of the Conference was the vol untary commitments made by 
government s, the private sector and NGOs. There were 1372 voluntary commitments, of which 
612 we re from g overnments, 111 from  UN entities, 277 from NGOs, 79  from the private sector, 
18 from philanthropic organizations and 16 from other relevant actors. In addition, more th an 
130 side events had been  organized by in ternational organizations, NGOs  and governments. The 
topics for the side events correlated with the themes of the targets under SDG 14. The Ocean 
Conference had demonstrated UN members' willingness to collaborate and work together, despite 
differences, to conserve the oceans. Cooperation was important at the national, regional and 
international level to ensure implementation of SDG 14. Portugal  offered to host a follow -up 
UN Ocean Conference in 2020 with the same o bjectives as laid out in UN General Assembly 
resolution 70/303. This offer was a contribution to the follow -up and review proc ess of the 
2030 Agenda. Kenya  also expressed willingness to host the next Ocean Conference as it had 
generated mom entum for SDG  14 implementation .4 
1.29.   The representative of the European Union  said that the E uropean Union had participated 
actively in the preparatory process of th e Conference and had submitted 19 voluntary 
commitments. These commitments reiterated  its support to the 2030 Agenda and to achieve  
SDG 14. Ocean problems could not be solved by any one country, ministry or company. This 
Conference had brought together all stakeholders and had started the holistic discussions needed 
on the pressures fac ed and the solutions requir ed. In this context, the European Union would 
organize a conference i n October 2017 in Malta to continue the discussions started in New York 
                                                
4 Further information  on the Ocean Conference could  be accessed from the Ocean Conference website  
https://oceanconference.un.org/ . WT/CTE/M/6 3 
 
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  and maintain focus on the oceans.  It would also prepare for the next UN Ocean Conference in 
Portugal in 2020.  
1.30.   The r epresentative of Australia  thanked Fiji for its report and for co -hosting the UN Ocean 
Conference. His delegation was committed to work ing with its Pacific neighbours to implement 
UNCLOS. At the Ocean Conference, Australia had announced its commitment of AUS$2 million over 
three  years to support ongoing work of the Pacific island countries on maritime boundary 
delimitation. This would build on the AUS$5.9 million support by the Australian Government under 
the Enhancing Ocean Governance Project. Australia ha d also committed AUS$4.4 million over four 
years to build ing capacity in the Pacific to prevent, deter, and eliminate IUU fishing.  
1.31.   The representative of New Zealand  commended Fiji and Sweden for successfully co -hosting 
the Conference which had drawn  attent ion to the state of the world's oceans. New Zealand, like 
other Pacific countries, placed great importance on taking action to protect and use ocean 
resources sustainably. With over 1 300 voluntary commitments, the legacy of the Conference was 
already assur ed. New Zealand had made 22 voluntary commitments and had participated in two 
side events on the prohibition of fisheries subsidies. The Call for Action called on  members to 
accelerate work to complete the WTO  negotiations on fi sheries subsidies and New  Zealand looked 
forward to working with other delegations for an outcome at Buenos Aires.  
1.32.   The representative of Norway  congratulated Fiji and Sweden and said that the Conference 
had successfully showcased global willingness to achieve SDG 14. There was agreem ent on the 
main threats to healthy oceans and the international community had been  able to find solutions at 
the Conference. There was a need to keep these issues on the global agenda. Norway would 
contribute and looked forward to cooperation on this issue  in the future.  
1.33.   The representative of Haiti thanked Fiji and Sweden for the initiative and joint statement. 
The results of the Ocea n Conference were encouraging. The 1300 voluntary commitments 
demonstrated  the will of the UN membership to implement the SDG s, especially  Goal 14, to 
preserve oceans and fisheries resources, and would benefit vulnerable small coastal countries like 
Haiti.  
1.1.1.4   Presentation by the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)  
1.34.   The representative of UNCTAD  presented the report  "Trad e and Environment Review 2016: 
Fish Trade" and other activities  related to the UN Ocean Conference.5 Developing countries  were 
the main exporters of fish since 2010 and ac counted for 56 % of the total value of exports in 2014. 
Fish and sea food trade  reache d the record  value of 146 billion USD in 201 4 and grew in volume 
from 15 million tonnes in 1991 to 45 million tonnes in 2014. Aquaculture was the main driver of  
fish supply  with an 8% annual growth rate and was expected to account for  62% of total fish 
output by 2030. Wild marine fish catch was estimated to remain at  its 2010 level of  approximately 
90 million tonnes.  
1.35.   The impact of climate change  on ocean temperature , salinity , currents, sea levels and 
seasonal fluctuations  was likely to  affect fish stock's  migration, reproduction and feeding patterns. 
In particular, higher sea levels, temperature and acidification would affect  migratory patterns 
towards higher latitudes with deeper and co oler waters . Climate change would also affect the 
location of feeding and reproduction areas. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) had identified that climate effects could be irreversible in some cases, such as the bleaching 
of the Great Barrier Reef. Ocean -based economies and communities had limited margin of 
manoeuvre besides enhancing their own adaptation and resilience.  
1.36.   It was important to address  the trade related aspects of SDG 14 , particularly  in relation to 
overfishing, overcapacity and IUU fishing , which  accounted for  US$10 to 23.5 billion annually, i.e. 
US$1 out of US$5 in fisheries trade  was illegal, and  represented between 11 and 26  million tonnes 
of fish catch .  
                                                
5 The presentation is available in RD/CTE/115/Rev.1  and the report at 
http://unctad.org/en/pages/PublicationWebflyer.aspx?publicationid=1662 . WT/CTE/M/6 3 
 
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  1.37.   Regarding  fish-related  tariff and non -tariff measures (NTMs) , tariff levels  had decrease d 
over the  years with bound tariffs at approximat ely 33 % and applied tariffs at 11.5%. As a 
consequence, NTMs  were increasingly important for future market access discussions. According to 
UNCTAD 's NTMs  database , there we re 2.5 times more NTMs  applicable to  fish products  than to 
manufactured products . This could be explained by  the perishab ility of fish products and a very 
well-developed regulatory environment  in the fishery sector in developed countries  but also 
increasingly  in developing countries and LDCs. An increasing number of countries were 
establi shing market access regulations on fish, sea food products and non -edible fish products. 
Currently, about 1250 fish -related sanitary and phytosanitary ( SPS) and technical barriers to trade 
(TBT) measures had been notified  to the WTO  with an annual growth r ate of 11.2% . Even though  
this sector was becoming increasingly regulated , only a dozen of specific trade concerns related to 
fish had been  brought to the TBT and SPS  Committees. He recalled that SDG 14 provided for 
facilitating small -scale artisanal  fisheries access to markets  as they  faced constraints in terms of 
capacity, technology and knowledge . He underscored the need to find ways to regulate and enable 
trade for the weakest in the value chain, and to increase transparency an d harmonization .  
1.38.   The use of voluntary standards and certification schemes was increasing and concerned  
14.2% of total sea food market in 2016. The se schemes  were becoming de facto mandatory 
because many distribution chains required  them, particularly in  developed countries.  South 
America was the region with the largest  certified production in the world , mostly for shrimp and 
tuna. Fisheries  subsidies were not adequate policies in environmental, social and trade  terms  and 
could contribute to : IUU fishing ; overfishing and resource de pletion ; overcapacity ; increased 
greenhouse gases ( GHG) emissions through fuel subsidies ; trade concerns for unsubsidized 
operators; and inequality , as m ost subsidies were allocated  to industrial fleets and s mall scale 
fisher s benefitted from these subsidi es only in a ratio of 1 to 5.  
1.39.   The Call for Action  called on UN member States  to act decisively in prohibiting certain forms 
of subsidies that contribute d to overcapacity, overfishing and IUU fishing. UNCTAD, FAO and 
UN Environment had announced their volu ntary commitment at the Ocean Conference to support 
negotiations and the implementation of SDG 14.6 under the followin g lines of action: provide 
research; support dialogue related to the Ocean s Forum in Geneva during  the next three years; 
and support count ries in negotiations or regional and national reforms , upon request.  
1.40.   The representative of Haiti asked about  UNCTAD's activities to support developing countries' 
implementation of SDG 14.6.  
1.41.   The representative of Peru thanked UNCTAD for its support to the  Permanent 
Representative of Peru, Ambassador Luis Enrique Chavez Basagoitia, as Chair of the 
UNCTAD  Oceans Forum on Trade -related Aspects of SDG 14 , held in March  2017. As Chair of the 
event , Ambassador  Chavez had developed conclusions reflect ing the discussions which were 
communicated to  the Ocean Conference. Fiji's presentation at this CTE meeting had shown that 
the conclusions and suggestions had been  taken into a ccount and debated at the 
Ocean  Conference.  
1.42.   The representative of  Chinese Taipei  explained  that, as a  subtropical island with 1200 
kilometres of coastline , Chinese  Taipei was an important fishery economy and  had developed a 
Plan of Action to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing , in accordance with FAO's IPOA-IUU. 
Also, p articular  efforts were being made for the sustainable management of larval fisheries, flying 
fish, egg fisheries and coral fisheries. There were also m anagement measures that included 
conservation policies o f shark resources, such as  prohibiting  the catching of whale sharks a nd 
restricting shark fin imports.  
1.43.   The representative of UNCTAD  would continue co -organizing for the next three years the 
Ocean s Forum on Trade related Aspects of SDG 14 with FAO, UN  Environment , the Commonwealth 
Secretariat, the African, Caribbean and the  Pacific (ACP) group of States, and the International 
Oceans Institute , among other s. The objective was to discuss  in an informal  setting,  provide 
recommendations and facilitate consensus  building . In addition, UNCTAD was planning to start a 
new project on "Oceans Economy and Trade strategies" in three countries in order to help 
developing countries optimize the use of marine  resources, especially for small -island and coastal 
states. Small-island states could  represent large  territories in terms of exclusiv e economic zone. 
UNCTAD reaffirmed its commitment to support Members i n linking SDG  14 with trade in order to 
promote sustainable economic growth and called on donors and other Members to support efforts WT/CTE/M/6 3 
 
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  to diversify and strengthen economies in Small Island Developing S tates and LDCs. Finally, h e said 
that Chinese Taipei's shark  policies  were very important and  aligned with the Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES).  
1.1.1.5   Presentation by the Organisation for Econo mic Cooperation and 
Development  (OECD)6 
1.44.   The representative of the OECD  noted  that the OECD had made five voluntary commitments 
at the UN Ocean Conference, including on Measuring Support to Fisheries which was the  subject of 
this presentation.7 The term "su pport" at the OECD was used in a broader sense; all subsidies 
were support but not all support were subsidies as defined in the WTO. There was presently no 
comprehensive and authoritative accounting of support to fisheries in the wo rld. The work done by 
Professor  Sumaila, at the University of British Colombia, who evaluated  subsidies at US$35 billion, 
of which US$20-25 billion were most harmful , was often cited; but it dated back to 2009 and more 
than half of the data was estimated. Various organizations ha d been calling for greater 
understanding and analysis on the effects and impact of su pport since the 1990s. The 
OECD  Fisheries Committee had started work in this area as there was not enough information to 
assist international discussions on fisheries supp ort, including in the context of SDG 14.6 and in 
the WTO.  
1.45.   OECD had developed the Fisheries Suppo rt Estimate (FSE) database8 with data submissions 
from 31 countries. More than half of all global fishing by landings would be covered once data from 
seven  more countries was added to the database this year. The database was an authoritative and 
trustworthy source of information largely collected through direct contact with national authorities. 
It was based on a clear set of definitions and agreed method that w ere transparent and reflected 
policies relevant to international discussions. The OECD collected information on fuel support only 
for countries that were willing to provide it and did not report this information in the totals, 
indicators or charts presente d. The reports were tabulated on an annual basis to allow  for tracking 
progress over time.  
1.46.   The main goal of the FSE database was to provide a comprehensive global database to help 
the international community understand the scale and scope of policy effort  in fisheries and 
identify how policies could affect outcomes in fisheries. This would help countries better match 
policy tools to the objectives set.  This was done by classifying policies with a classification system 
based on implementation criteria. In t he database, there were two main types of support reported: 
Transfers to Individual F ishers (TIF) which was income or other support to fishers as individuals; 
and General Transfers or General Services and Support Estimate (GSSE), such as port 
infrastructur e for the sector as a whole. He noted that the OECD countries average support 
amounted to 20 % as a share of the value of landings. In terms of decomposition of this support, 
most of the GSSE was directed towards fisheries management, followed by infrastruc ture, research 
and development, and other general services. For TIF, most transfers were based on fishers'  
income . There was variation in support across countries and time with some move away from TIF 
support to General Services. Decomposition of support c ould change as new countries were added 
to the database.  
1.47.   For the future, OECD planned to develop indicators on the impact of support on capacity, 
fishing effort, and fish stocks. OECD would develop a comprehensive bio -economic model that took 
into account biological aspects of fisheries, policies, management system, production and costs of 
fishing. This would be a tool for more analysis on the effects of support. The OECD was also 
interested in increasing the scope and coverage of the FSE database. The obje ctive was to achieve 
at least representative coverage in most regions of the world. This would include increasing 
participation by Small Island Developing States and countries from Africa and South -East Asia.   
1.48.   Finally, the  OECD was starting data collectio n on steps t aken by countries to combat 
IUU fishing in their domestic jurisdictions. This included collecting practical information on the 
criminal justice system, police enforcement, regulatory vis -à-vis criminal activities, and the actual 
                                                
6 The presentation is available in document RD/CTE/116.  
7 The latest OECD report on "Support to Fisheries: Levels and Impacts" is available  at 
http://www.oecd.org/agricult ure/fisheries/support -to-fisheries.pdf . 
8 http://oe.cd/fse . WT/CTE/M/6 3 
 
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  outcomes and ef fects of activities. This work was intended to help countries identify weaknesses or 
gaps in their systems and to point to ways to make efforts against IUU fishing more effective over 
time. The IUU fishing project would develop a database of information fr om OECD members with 
non-members also encouraged to participate.  
1.49.   The representative of New Zealand  welcomed the work done by the OECD to provide 
research and data on fisheries and trade. There had been calls for more transparency and 
understanding on the e ffects of fisheries support. These calls were motivated by concerns that 
some forms of support may promote overcapacity and overfishing and affect sustainable 
management of fisheries. At the WTO, there had never been a complete inventory or common 
understa nding of the impacts of subsidies under discussion. OECD expertise on policy 
measurement and evaluation could help bridge this gap by providing a process through which 
information could be disseminated. Filling this information gap would be helpful for som e threshold 
and definitional issues in the ongoing multilateral fisheries subsidies negotiations at the WTO.  
1.1.1.6   Presentation by the WTO Secretariat  
1.50.   The representative of the WTO Secretariat  reported on the state -of-play of the ongoing 
negotiations on fisherie s subsidies. She noted that since the beginning of these negotiations 
launched in 2001 with the Doha Development Agenda , sustainability was underlying the 
negotiations , i.e.  the extent to which certain subsidies contribute d to unsustainable fishing 
practic es, overcapacity, overfishing and whether  disciplines  could be developed to address these 
effects . She noted that existing  subsidies rules addressed trade distortions caused by subsidies 
and did not reflect the concept of sustainability. SDG 14.6 set a tar get for eliminating fisheries 
subsidies that contributed to overcapacity, overfishing and IUU  fishing by 2020.  
1.51.   Subsidies n egotiations were reinvigorated by  the adoption of the SDG Agenda, with 
proposals before  MC10  in 2015 addressing some  aspects of fishe ries subsidies. No outcome was 
reached at MC10  but more proposals had been submitted , in particular since fall 2016. The first 
proposal was submitted by the European Union, followed by proposals by : a group of Latin 
America n countries ; the LDC Group; the ACP Group; Indonesia ; and New Zealand, Pakistan and 
Iceland. All propo sals seemed to converge towards  the prohibition of IUU  fishing subsidies, even 
though there were  on-going technical discussions on the methodology to identify vessels engaged 
in IUU  fishing and the mechanisms for ensuring that subsidies did not support them. There was 
also some  convergence on banning overfishing subsidies. Some proposals were considering that 
other types of subsidies, such as capital costs subsidies, were also contributing  to overcapacity and 
overfishing.  
1.52.   An important element of the discussion  referred to in SDG 14.6 concerned  the need for 
special and differential treatment  for developing Members  and the recognition of  the key ro le that 
the fishing sector played  in developi ng Members. Members were debating  on ways to reflect these 
concerns and whether there was a  need for disciplines. The re was also the  question of small scale 
operators and activities, which many Members considered should be treated differently than very 
large scale industrial fishing.  
1.53.   The negotiating process continued to be based on the submission of proposals by Members . 
Some revisions and new proposals were expected in the comin g weeks, including from the 
LDC and ACP group s, Norway and  Indonesia. There was  a sense of urgency in working on these 
issues and Members were working towards streamlining ideas to reach an outcome at MC11 . 
Proposal s were also linked to the 2020 deadline in SDG 14.6. 
1.54.   The representative of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia  noted  the CTE was  not the appropriate 
forum to discuss the issue of fisheries subsidies  since it was under the Negotiating Group on R ules 
track.  
1.55.   The representative of Peru said that in the Negotiating Group on Rules, Argentina, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Panama, Peru and Urugu ay had submitted a proposal9 to eliminate 
IUU fishing  subsidies  and to adopt disciplines on  overfishing  and overcapacity subsidies, including 
                                                
9 See document TN/RL/GEN/187  submitted on 29 May 2017.  WT/CTE/M/6 3 
 
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  provisions to deal with small scale and artisanal fisheries . The proposal was the result of  a large 
consultation  process . It identified convergences , followed  a pragmatic approach  and recognized 
Members' right to  economic development. Peru and co -sponsors were engaged in bilateral 
consultations with other Members  to receive comments, suggestions and critic isms to improve the 
proposal.  His delegation looked forward to the circulation in the second half of 2017 of a  
compilation  document  with the different proposals on the table in order to achieve  a significant 
outcome at MC11 , which could be  a starting point for  SDG 14.6 and 14.b.  
1.56.   The representative of Norway  said that Norway participated actively in the negotiations on 
fisheries subsidies in the WTO Negotiating Group on Rules and  in the plurilateral discussions . 
Norway considered that all Members should recognize that fisheries subsidies were related to the 
environment, trade and development and supported a discuss ion on  this issue in the CTE. Norway 
appreciated that  Members submit ted proposals on fisheries and looked forward to a consolidated 
draft text before the summ er break,  which would provide a basis for MC11. Norway hoped for a 
meaningful outcome to implement SDG 14.6 at MC11.  
1.57.   The representative of Canada  underscored the importance of  reaching an agreement on  
disciplining fisheries subsidies and that an outcome at MC11  needed to be the objective . Given the 
time constraint before MC11, Canada believed Members should take a practical approach , focus on 
areas  where progress was most likely and give priority to the most egregious subsidies.  
Further more, linking progre ss in one area of the negotiation s, such as fisheries subsidies, to  
progress in other areas of trade rules  might result in failure . Canada encouraged Members to 
consider proposals on their own merit s and to avoid linking this issue to outcomes on other iss ues.  
1.58.   The representative of Mexico  thanked Members for their proposals in the Negotiating Group 
on Rules  and reiterated Mexico's preference for a multilateral and  ambitious outcome in this area.  
1.59.   The representative of New Zealand  noted that  the WTO had bee n working over  many years 
on establishing effective multilateral fisheries subsidies prohibitions  and an outcome at MC11 was 
now a realistic prospect . He noted that SDG 14.6 established a political commitment and a sense 
of urgency  and called on UN me mbers  to prohibit  by 2020 certain forms of subsidies that 
contributed to overcapacity and  overfishing , and to eliminate subsidies that led to  IUU fish ing. As 
foreseen in SDG 14.6 , the circumstance s of developing countries and LDCs needed to be a n 
integral part of the WTO fisheries subsidies negotiations . New Zea land highlighted the importance 
of engaging effectively and actively to work towards an outcome.   
1.60.   The representative of the European Union  said that only a multilateral  outcome  could ensure  
the full  implementation of SDG 14. The E uropean Union was actively engaged in  the Negotiating 
Group on Rules and  had tabled a proposal . The European  Union was currently working on 
convergence between proposals and intended to table a revised proposal in the near future . He 
noted that the recent dynamics in the Negotiating Group on Rules injected by the proposals from 
Iceland, New Zealand and Pakistan , from Indonesia, and from a group of Latin American countries  
showed that an increasing number of Members had realized th e advantages of the multilateral 
process . The European Union welcomed the fact that some participants in the plurilateral initiative 
had also engaged in the Negotiating Group on Rules and encouraged all Members to actively 
engage in discussions to work tow ards a deliverable for MC11.   
1.61.   The representative of Haiti, on behalf of the LDC Group, stated that the LDC Group had 
submitted a proposal and actively engaged in negotiations to achieve an outcome to implement 
SDG 14.6 and to reflect the needs of the LDC G roup.  
1.62.   The representative of Australia  considered the issue to be at the intersection of trade 
disciplines and global resources sustainability  and was particularly relevant to the work of the CTE. 
Australia was a long -time proponent of an outcome on fisher ies subsidies in the WTO. Australia 
had pushed for the inclusion of  fisheries subsidies in the DDA Mandate and was an active 
proponent since. Australia reaffirmed its commitment to a multilateral outcome and would 
continue to actively engag e in ongoing dis cussions  in the Negotiating Group on Rules.  WT/CTE/M/6 3 
 
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  1.1.1.7   Presentation by  UN Environment ( UNEP ) 
1.63.   The representative of UNEP  provide d an update on recent activities related to fisheries 
subsidies. In mid -2016,  UN Environment, UNCTAD and FAO  had jointly submitted a statem ent on 
fisheries subsidies, aiming to move forward trade -related targets under the SDGs and signing onto 
a roadmap to end harmful fisheries subsidies. So far, 91 countries, 4 intergovernmental 
organizations, and 15 civil society groups had signed on to thi s global roadmap to eliminate 
damaging subsidies by 2020. In March  2017, the three organizations had co-hosted an Oceans 
Forum on the Trade -related Aspects of SDG 14, paving the way for both the high -level Ocean 
Conference in New York and the WTO Ministeri al Meeting in Argentina.  
1.64.   UN Environment actively participated in the Ocean Conference  and convened many events 
on various topics ranging from fighting plastic pollution in the oceans to promoting the 
strengthening of r egional cooperation.  Among these event s, UN Environment, UNCTAD and 
FAO had hosted a High Level Panel on fisheries subsidies. Next steps for accelerating the removal 
of harmful fisheries subsidies and for converging on a global agreement in Buenos Aires  had been  
discussed . All speakers had highlighted the urgency to find an agreement in Buenos Aires in order 
to meet SDG 14.6 by 2020. Speakers had also emphasized the importance of strengthening 
coherence between action -oriented agreements at the Ocean Conference and ongoing 
WTO negotiations.  
1.1.2   Fossil Fuel Subsid y Reform  (FFSR)  
1.65.   The representative of New Zealand  provide d an update on recent developments i n FFSR on 
behalf of C osta Rica, New Zealand, Norway,  Switzerland and Uruguay.10 Trade was a powerful 
enabling force that would be indispensable in pr ogress towards s ustainable development. The 
WTO had a  key role to play in the reform  process  of fossil fuel subsidies. The momentum on FFSR 
had been maintained and advanced across various forums since the last update at the November 
2016 meeting of the CTE .     
1.66.   To build on this momentum, New Zealand had facilitated two events at the WTO to highlight 
the relationship between FFSR and trade. In Novem ber 2016, together with the International 
Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) , New Zea land had hosted an event entitled " Fossil 
Fuel Subsidies and International Trade: Worth a closer look " that had brought together high level 
panellists from a range of international trade and economic institutions and think tanks including 
the WTO, UNCTA D, the Internationa l Trad e Cent re, OECD, IISD and  the International Centre for 
Trade and Sustainable Development  (ICTSD) . Key messages from that event included:  (i) fossil 
fuel subsidies pose d a broad range of policy problems, not ju st for the environment, climate  and 
sustai nable development, but also for the international trading system;  and (ii) the international 
lines of effort s supporting FFSR and the implementation of S DG 12 need ed to be bet ter 
coordinated, and the WTO had  an important role to play in this regar d.  
1.67.   In Ma y 2017 , New Zealand had also facilitated a workshop held at the WTO by Climate 
Strategies, IISD and the Stockholm E nvironment Institute entitled " Reforming Fossil Fuel Subsidies 
through the WTO and International Trade Agreements ". The workshop sought to id entify the 
various types of subsidies, their impacts on trade, and more concrete steps that could be taken to 
advance  FFSR at the WTO and within international trade agreements.  
1.68.   The representative mentioned a few k ey developments in other areas . First, in the context 
of the Paris Agreement on climate change,  a number of countries  addressed FFSR in their Intended 
Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC) . Second, t he Addis Agenda inter -agency task  force' s 
annual report on financin g for development in 2017 s tated that "member States of the Addis 
Agenda reaffirmed their commitment to rationalise inefficient fossil fuel subsidies that encourage 
wasteful consum ption" and again recognised the  financial potential of FFSR to generate substantial 
revenues for govern ments. Third, the G20  Finance Ministers had reaffirmed in March 2017 their 
long-standing commitment " to rationalise and phase out, over the medium term, inefficient fossil 
fuel subsidies that encourage wasteful consumption, recognising the need to support the poor " and 
encour aged all G20 countries that had  not yet done so, to initiate as soon as feasible , a peer 
review of inefficient fossil fuel subsidies that encourage d wasteful consumption.   
                                                
10 The statement is available in document RD/CTE/124.  WT/CTE/M/6 3 
 
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  1.69.   Fourth, i ndividual G20 and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (AP EC) members continued 
their engagement with peer review processes. Mexico and Germany' s G20 fossil fuel s ubsidy peer 
review reports would be released this year, and Indonesia and Italy would  begin the process. In 
the APEC system, reports this year would  be released from Chinese Taipei and Viet Nam, and 
Brunei would  begin the process . Fifth, s upport for the FFSR Communiqué  launched in 
November  2015 continued  to grow amongst countries, international institutions, the private sector, 
and consumer groups.  42 countrie s had  so far endorsed the Communiqué.   
1.70.   Sixth, the V20 Group of Ministers of Finance (a group of 43 vulnerable developing and  
LDCs) had called in April 2017 "for market distorting fossil fuel production subsidies to be removed 
immediately and no later  than 2020, and urged the G20 to set such a clear timeframe for fossil 
fuel subsidy eliminati on". They had further stated that "f ossil fuel consumption subsidies need to 
be checked rigorously whether they provide an actual benefit to the poor, and subseque ntly should 
be replaced worldwide without harm to those relying on them for their basic energy needs". 
Finally, t he private sector had called  for the G20 to set "a clear timeline for the full and equitable 
phase -out by all G20 members of all fossil fuel su bsidies by 2020 " and to commit "all G20 
members to complete fossil fuel subsidy  peer review by the end of 2018".   
1.71.   These developments demonstrat ed the growing consensus amongst developed and 
develo ping countries, the private sector  and citizens, that fossil  fuel subsidies pose d negative 
implications for sustainable developmen t, the climate, the economy, international trade , and 
investment , and need ed to be reformed, noting the need to protec t the poor and the vulnerable.  
1.72.   The economic costs of fossil fuel su bsidies were significant : fossil fuel subsidies amount ed to 
roughly 20% of the value of internationally traded fuels . As made clear in the P aris Agreement, 
SDGs, and  in the  Addis  Agenda, and as recognised by a growing number of WTO Members in 
statements as  part of G20, V20 or other initiatives, this money could be better spent on other 
development priorities and in pursuit of renewable energy alternatives.  The trade and investment 
distortions caused by such subsidies also reinforce d the need for WTO action.   
1.73.   The representative of Switzerland , as a member of the friends of FFSR, highlighted  the 
importance of trade for the re form of fossil fuel  subsidies. There were different ways of addressing 
FFSR in a trade agenda. It could take the form of a political decl aration or the laun ch of 
negotiations for a plurilateral trade agreement. At this point , without prejudging the outcome,  
Switzerland  supported  the continu ation of discussion s on fossil fuel  subsidies in the WTO and in  the 
CTE. Switzerland was in favour of deepening the discussions in the CTE for instance on the effects 
on trade of fossil fuel subsidies and was of the view that the CTE had a role to play in defining the 
next steps of a discussion on this topic in the WTO.  
1.74.    The representative of  the Kingdom o f Saudi Arabia  noted that the issue of phasing out  
inefficient fossil fuel subsidies was a voluntary G20 initiative with no link to the WTO process. 
Saudi  Arabia did not agree to discuss this issue in the WTO.  
1.75.   The representative of Norway  explained that ma ny WTO Members were in the process of 
reducing or eliminating fossil fuel subsidies. Given the large impact of fossil fuel subsidies on 
climate change, it was important to discuss these issues in the WTO. Norway saw merit in an open 
and frank discussion  in the CTE , which  was mandated to carry out discussion on a broad  spectrum 
of environment, trade and development related issues.  
1.76.   The representative of Venezuela  supported Saudi Arabia' s statement that the G20 initiative 
was not related to the WTO.  
1.77.   The repres entative of Uruguay  reiterated Uruguay's commitment to FFSR as it contributed 
to climate change mitigation and to achieving the objectives of the Paris  Agreement.  Uruguay 
recognized the need to strengthen  coherence  among the different bodies responsible for the 
implementation of SDG 12 and the need to explore the links between international trade and fossil 
fuel subsidies given their impact on trade flows.  The WTO had an important role to play and the 
CTE was the right forum to address these issues.  WT/CTE/M/6 3 
 
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  1.1.3   Intern ational Organization for Standardization 's (ISO)  work on carbon footprint  
1.78.   A representative of ISO provide d an update on ISO/TS 14067:2013 on the quantification 
and communication of the carbon footprint of a product.11 The standard was currently under 
revisi on and a final publication was expected in October 2018. The most controversial aspect 
related to the communication part of the standard. There were also some similar concerns  with 
ISO 14046:2014 ("Environmental management  - Water footprint  - Principles, r equirements and 
guidelines "). The water standard was accompanied by a technical report with illustrative examples 
on how to apply the standard as requested by industry. The development of ISO 14026 containing 
the guidelines on communication of carbon footp rint was also causing  concerns to developing 
countries.  
1.79.   Concerns related mainly to the perception that the standards would cause barriers to trade 
for products from developing countries . There was a broad debate  on this topic with no actual 
evidence to sup port it. The ISO Technical Committee (TC) 207 agreed to set up an Ad Hoc Group 
on Int ernational Standards and Trade  to examine this matter. The Ad Hoc Group carried out its 
work in 2016 and submitted a report in June 2017 to the Technical Management Board  (TMB) . In 
addition to a survey carried out among ISO members to determine the impact of carbon standards 
on trade, the Ad Hoc Group looked at work on ISO/ International Electrotechnical Commission ( IEC) 
standards used to support public policy; the OECD's re port on ISO's role in international regulatory 
cooperation , which casted a very positive light on ISO's role; the results of a survey and data on 
implementation of standards as national standards; the reference to  standards in domestic 
legislation; and the  potential impact of legislation on trade (positive or negative).  The group was 
chaired by Canada and India and was comprised of  Canada, China, India, Korea, Mexico, Sweden, 
the United Kingdom and the United  States . 
1.80.   The results illustrated protectionist co ncerns from  a number of  developing countries about 
barriers to trade which could emerge if ISO 14000 standards and others were adopted as 
regulations by states and became mandatory requirements for imports.  The report highlighted that 
technical barrier s to trade could be w ider than just carbon standards . The TMB would review the 
report and issue recommendations to its technical committees. These recommendations could 
emphasi ze, among others, the importance of focusing on standards related to the performance  of 
the product itself (thereby avoiding  standards that address ed design or process and production 
methods ), and the need for continuous dialogue with governments . The TMB saw no evidence of 
barriers to trade.  
1.81.   At the  last ISO/TC 207  technical committee  meeting, discrepancies between developed and 
developing countries continued . Some developing countries , fearing that a lack of international 
standards would result in  the development of national schemes , had said that  they would  prefer to 
have a consensus bas ed international standard.  
1.82.   The representative of India noted that India was a founding member of ISO and had 
actively participated in ISO activities since its inception. India had been a  member in no less than 
648 ISO T echnical Committees . India's commitme nt to quality international standards had been 
recorded since 1947 with the establishment of the Indian Standards Institution as a society. In 
1952, the Institution was also given the responsibility of operating a certification marking scheme 
under an Act of Parliament, which was further strengthened through the Bureau of Indian 
Standards  Act, 1986. India considered positively n ot only product standards but also process 
standards, including standards on environment.  
1.83.   However, India had expressed  some concer ns on standard -making in ISO. The first concern 
related to  the uncertain and selective science in making measurable, reportable and verifiable 
standards , as in draft ISO 14067 (Carbon footprint of products  - Requirements and guidelines for 
quantification ). This standard , which had moved quickly to the draft inquiry stage , suffered from 
inherent technical limitations related to  life cycle assessment , as laid out in ISO  14044 . Draft ISO 
14067 attempted to base itself scientifically on IPCC 's 5th Assessment Re port, but avoided 
alternate causality and ignored short term GHG sources like carbon black and tropospheric ozone. 
Some  other scientific definitions like "uncertainty"  and "arbitrary value"  were not harmonized with 
established ISO definitions. Considering the uncertainty in the scientific basis of the calculation, 
                                                
11 The presentation is available in document RD/CTE/110 . WT/CTE/M/6 3 
 
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  getting a rational number value to be communicated through a label on a product raised concerns.  
Moreover,  if Draft ISO 14067 were published as a standard, it might assume a scientific rationality  
that it otherwise did not possess. The life cycle approach to calculate carbon footprint  could  be 
published only as a guide or a "document" , but not as an international standard. This request from 
India had been  dismissed in ISO as a few consultant -member s prevailed . And since the c arbon 
footprint of an imported product or a service is likely to be high, a few countries might be 
prompted to take refuge under this standard to frame a Regulation or a Directive to protect 
domestic industry.  
1.84.   An additional  concern related to  ISO's standards making process, particularly in the 
environment sector and when tested against  the six principles  in the WTO TBT Committee's 
Decision on Principles for the Development of International Standards, Guides and 
Recommendation s with relation to Articles 2, 5 and Annex 3 of the TBT Agreement. 
Draft ISO 14067 Standard was in conflict with the WTO principle of  differentia ted obligations for 
developing countries and LDCs . This standard also militated  against the United Nations Framewo rk 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)  principle of "Common but Differentia ted 
Responsibilit ies". The c arbon footprint of a product was calculated and sought to be communicated 
as a label (through ISO 14026) regardless of the economic stage of developmen t of the producing 
country. Despite concerns of developing countr ies, this draft standard managed  to move to 
subsequent stages and this was  also due to the system of voting in ISO. Even though ISO was 
claiming  that its standards were based on consensus, this was not the case  in its voting process, 
as abstention s were not counted in the approval ballot , but were considered for disapproval. ISO 
stakeholder consultation s were also dubious as they did not consult consumers directly but only 
through a few NGOs.  
1.85.   There were also concern s regarding the neutrality principle. There was a  clear and growing 
bias of ISO standards in areas like management system and environmental management towards 
the consultant w orldview, which eroded  neutrality . ISO's  discussion and c irculated drafts suffer ed 
from unitary perspectives and often the output was a uni dimensional approach to standardize 
process, product or service.  
1.86.   India was not alone in raising  concerns with this standard ; many other developing countries 
shared the same understanding. TC207 had constituted an ad -hoc working group to study the 
possible trade impact of this standard on developing countries. Its report submitted to ISO was 
wished away summarily and suggested options like a tr ade disclaimer  were sought to be shot 
down in the recent sub-committee meeting in Halifax, despite the recommendations from all 
experts in the Working Group . 
1.87.   The representative of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia  noted that environmental foot printing 
schemes could impose burdensome requirement s for developing countries and thereby imped e 
access to important export markets. An assessment of carbon footprint on a life cycle basis was 
not appropriate because it would raise concerns similar to those related to processes and 
product ion methods , and could not  provide a basis to distinguish like products.  Standards that 
differentiated products on this basis raised serious concerns under WTO rules and could be used as 
restrictions on trade. Finally, any environmental requirements should be consistent wi th applicable  
WTO rules, be based on appropriate scientific evidence , should follow a transparent and inclusive 
consultation process and should take into account the special situation and needs of developing 
countries.  
1.88.   The representative of Egypt  was conce rned that carbon and water footprint standards could 
create barriers to trade and de facto discrimination between products made by producers in 
developing countries and the same products produced in other countries.  WT/CTE/M/6 3 
 
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  1.2  Other items of the CTE work programme ( Items 1, 2, 3(a), 4, 5, 7, 9, and 10)  
1.2.1   Item 1  
"The relationship between the provisions of the multilateral trading system and trade 
measures for environmental purposes, including those pursuant to multilateral 
environmental agreements (MEAs)."  
1.2.1.1   The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer  
(Montreal  Protocol)  
1.89.   A representative of the Ozone Secretariat (UNEP)  briefed the CTE on the Kigali Amendment 
to the Montreal Protocol , adopted on 15 October 2016 in Kigali  (Rwanda) .12 He started by noting 
that 99% of the ozone depleting substances (ODS) covered by the Montreal Protocol had already 
been phased  out, while the Protocol, its amendments and the Vienna Convention for the Protection 
of the Ozone Layer had reached a milestone in 2016, becoming the first treat y in the history of the 
UN to achieve universal ratification, with 197 parties.  
1.90.   The inclusion of control measures for hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) had taken 6 years of 
negotiations culminating with the adoption of the Kigali Amendment. The amendme nt had already 
been ratified by four parties (Rwanda, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshal Islands and 
Mali) and the Ozone Secretariat aimed at achieving at least the required 16 additional ratifications 
before 1st January 2019, when the amendme nt would enter into force.  
1.91.   According to the representative, an important aspect of the Kigali Amendment was its 
expected impact on the climate. It was estimated that, under a "business as usual" scenario, if the 
provisions agreed upon in the Kigali Amendme nt were implemented by the parties, four to five 
gigatons of carbon dioxide (CO 2) equivalent emissions from HFCs would be prevented by 2050. 
Such emissions would otherwise have added up to a 0.5°C temperature increase on top of other 
climate effects by 210 0. With the amendment, the contributions of HFCs to global warming would 
still increase slightly, peaking mid -century at about 0.07°C.  
1.92.   Parties to the Montreal Protocol had chosen to regulate the consumption and production of 
HFCs, even though they  were no t ODS, because they had been used as replacement chemicals to 
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs). While CFCs had been phased  
out and HCFCs were on their way to complete phase -out, the consumption of HFCs would now be 
tackled us ing the same mechanisms of the Montreal  Protocol. Between 1990 and 2010, the phase -
down of ODS through the Montreal Protocol had already contributed towards the reduction of an 
estimated net amount of more than 135 billion tonnes of CO 2 equivalent.  
1.93.   The Kig ali Amendment required parties to gradually reduce production and consumption of 
HFCs listed in annex F of the Montreal Protocol by 80-85% by the late 2040s. According to the 
representative, non -Article 5 parties (industrialized countries) were divided int o two  groups: the 
"earlier starters"  and the "later starters" . Earlier starters would reduce their production and 
consumption of HFCs by 10% from 2019, while later starters would do so from 2020. All non -
Article 5 parties would gradually increase the perce ntage reducti on up to 85% by 2036. 
Article  5 parties were also divided into two groups . Group 1 parties would be required to freeze 
their production and consumption of HFCs from 2024 and gradually reduce it in the following years 
up to 80% by 2045. Group 2  would freeze its production and consumption from 2028, but would 
gradually reduce it up to 85% by 2047. In contrast to  other chemicals covered by the Montreal 
Protocol, a complete phase -out of HFCs was not agreed upon due to technological limitations. 
Finally, along with the Kigali Amendment, parties had adopted a decision on technology transfer, 
financial provisions and other aspects related to the challenges of phasing  down the use of HFCs.  
1.94.   The representative also briefed the CTE on trade measures includ ed in the 
Kigali  Amendment. Unlike past amendments, Article 4 of the Montreal Protocol, which prohibit ed 
imports and exports of covered substances between parties and non -parties to the Protocol, would 
not enter into force regarding HFCs at the same time a s the Kigali Amendment. Due to concerns 
                                                
12 The presentation is available in document RD/CTE/112.  WT/CTE/M/6 3 
 
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  about the effects of such provision expressed by parties during the negotiations, Article 4 would 
only enter into force regarding HFCs on 1st January 2033 and only if ratified by at least 70 parti es. 
On the other han d, the licensing system for trade in HFCs would enter into force at the same time 
as the Kigali Amendment, by 1st January 2019 if ratified by at least 20 parties. Data on 
HFCs consumption and production would be required to be reported to the Ozone Secreta riat 
(Article 7 of the Montreal Protocol), wh ich would evaluate and present such information to the 
implementation committee of the Meeting of the Parties (MoP) to the Montreal Protocol in order to 
allow parties to monitor compliance with the provisions of  the Kigali Amendment (Article 8 of the 
Montreal Protocol). Finally, according to the representative, parties would be able to apply for 
exemptions from the HFCs reduction requirements for a period of time necessary to find 
appropriate technology solutions .  
1.95.   The representative of Canada  noted that Canada would host the next MoP to the Montreal 
Protocol in Montreal in November 2017, which would commemorate the 30th anniversary of the 
Montreal Protocol. Canada continued to be a strong supporter of the Kigali Amendment and 
intended to ratify the amendment in 2017.  
1.96.   The representative of the European Union  noted that his delegation welcomed the ado ption 
of the Kigali Amendment. Gl obal action on HFCs was a substantial contribution to reaching the 
objectives of the  Paris Agreement and the European Union and  its member States had started the 
ratification process. The European Union urged all other parties to ratify soon in order  to ensure 
that the amendment ca me into force on 1 January 2019.  
1.97.   The representative of Norway said that  her delegation was delighted that Parties to the 
Montreal Protocol had managed to reach an agreement in Kigali in 2016. The amendment marked 
a significant step in the fight against climate change and was also an example of mutual 
supportivene ss by ensuring that actions taken to phase  out ODS did not undermine the fight to 
address climate change. The Norwegian parliament had approved a decision to ratify the Kigali 
Amendment on 14 June 2017. Norway would be depositing its instrument of ratifica tion in the 
following weeks and urged all parties to follow suit.  
1.98.   The representative of Mexico  informed that Mexico was willing to ratify the Kigali 
Amendment as soon as possible.  
1.99.   The Ozone Secretariat (UNEP)  welcomed the positive comments and expressions  of intent to 
ratify the Kigali Amendment in the following months, which was a very welcome development. He 
noted that Canada had been very supportive of the implementation of the Montreal Protocol from 
the start, and hosted  a number of meetings, including  the upcoming meeting marking the 30th 
anniversary of the Protocol. Finally, the Ozone Secretariat urged parties to ratify the amendment.  
1.2.1.2   The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change ( UNFCCC ) 
1.2.1.2.1   Presentation by the UNFCCC  
1.100.   A representative of the UNFCCC  briefed delegations on recent developments regarding the 
climate change negotiations.13 The 22nd  Conference of the Parties (C oP 22) to the UNFCCC, held 
in November 2016 in Marrakech, Morocco, marked an important milestone with the rapi d entry 
into fo rce of the Paris  Agreement. A s a consequence, CoP 22 also hosted the first meeting of the 
CoP serving as the Meet ing of the Parties to the Paris  Agreement (CMA1). In Marrakech, parties 
had agreed on  a clear and ambitious deadline  to complete the work progr amme for the 
implementation of the Paris Agreement by the end of 2018. Some progress had also been achieved 
in other areas, including  on climate finance, adaptation, capacity building for developing countries, 
technology , gender responsiveness, and on indi genous peoples.  
1.101.   The Kingdom of Morocco, as host country,  had convened Heads of State and Government 
of several countries around the "Marrakech Action Proclamation for Our Climate and Sustainable 
Development". The Paris Agreement had already been ratified by 148 parties and a new phase of 
negotiations was starting on  the work programme to ensure the implementation of the  
                                                
13 The presentation is available in document RD/CTE/118.  WT/CTE/M/6 3 
 
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  Paris Agreement and of the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). Other stakeholders were 
also involved in implementation  as recogniz ed by the Marrakesh Partnership for Global Climate 
Action, a sector -based framework for continuous engagement of all actors involved in 
implementation. The sectors covered were land -use, oceans, water, human settlements, transport, 
energy  and industry.  
1.102.   The representative also briefed delegations on the results of the intersessional meetings 
that had taken  place in May 2017, in Bonn  (Germany) . Once again, negotiations had focused on 
further defining certain aspects of the Paris Agreement and towards complet ing the work 
programme by the end of 2018. Although the process involved highly complex issues, the 
negotiations had confirmed that parties were on track to respect the set deadline. One essential 
step in the  climate negotiations in 2018 would be the "faci litative dialogue", the first stocktaking 
exercise . The dialogue would be the first opportunity for parties to look at collective progress made 
towards the long -term objectives of the Paris Agreement, culminating at C oP 24, hosted by Poland, 
at the end of 2018.   
1.103.   Finally, the intersessional meetings clearly indicated a desire by countries to scale u p 
climate action, as promoted by  the work of the "High -Level Champions" for climate action, who 
provided the bridge between the negotiations and the action agenda . The champions were 
representatives from the current p residency of the UNFCCC process , Morocco, and from the 
incoming presidency, Fiji. The presidency of Fiji also offered a significant opportunity for a small 
island state to chair such an important event  and to indicate its priorities in the process.   
1.104.   The representative of the European Union  stressed that the European Union would 
continue its  efforts to keep up the momentum and global ownership of the Paris Agreement , 
including by supporting and  working with developing countries and by participating actively  in the 
negotiations to establish a detailed rulebook for the Agreement.  There was still significant technical 
work to do, but the latest intersessional meeting in May 2017 had been an important step t owards 
delivering the rulebook, demonstrating a steady progress in turning the commitments made in 
Paris into concrete action . Finally, the 2018 "facilitative dialogue" would be a key political moment 
and the first opportunity since Paris to look at collec tive efforts to limit global warming and at what 
parties had done concretely in terms of delivering on the commitments made. The European Union 
strongly encouraged all the parties to the Paris Agreement to work together towards establishing a 
detailed rule book for implementing the Paris Agreement before the deadline of 2018.  
1.2.1.2.2   Presentation on Korea's NDC  
1.105.   The representative of Korea14 presented Korea's  NDC submitted to the UNFCCC in 
June 2015.15 Korea's objective was  to reduce its GHG emissions by 37% from the b usiness as 
usual level by  2030 across all economic sectors. The pledge was economy -wide and cover ed 
energy, industrial processes and product use, agriculture and waste. A decision on whether to 
include l and use , land use change  and forestry would  be made a t a later stage . The NDC cover ed 
six gases: CO 2, methane (CH 4), nitrous oxide  (N2O), HFCs, perfluorocarbons and sulphur 
hexafluoride . Korea  intended  to use carbon credits from international market mechanisms to 
achieve its 2030  mitigation target .  
1.106.   Korea's NDC ha d been developed by a government task force composed of relevant 
ministries (e.g. the Ministry of Environment and Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy) and 
chaired by the Prime Minister's office. Technical analysis was provided by a Joint Working Group of 
Experts from national research institutions  working on climate change issues. Experts from 
business and civil society had reviewed the findings  of the Working Group , and public hearings had 
been organized. The NDC had been  finalized by the Committ ee on Green Growth in accordance 
with national authorization procedures.   
1.107.   On sectoral implementation, t he representative explained that the GHG and Energy Target 
Management System  for the industrial sector introduced in 2009 had been  enhanced in 2012 to 
match the 2010 Copenhagen Pledge.  In promoting cost -effective measures for mitigation,  a 
                                                
14 The representative of Korea explained that as a member of the Korea Environmental Institute his 
presentation did not necessarily represent t he official views of the Korean government.  
15 The presentation is available in document RD/CTE/119.  WT/CTE/M/6 3 
 
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  nation -wide emission trading s cheme (ETS) had been  announced in 2012 and implemented in 
2015 for a three year cycle. The ETS cover ed 525 business entities which account ed for 67.7 % of 
national GHG emissions in 2015 , and  602 business entities  in 2017. Korea was also pursuing 
efforts in other sectors, for instance with the adoption of a Green Building Standards Code and 
Performance Evaluation of Eco -friendly Homes  and the introduction of low -carbon standards for 
fuel efficiency and emissions from automobiles. Together with the sectoral measures for 
mitigation, Korea had established a domestic measurement, reporting and verification system to 
monitor businesses with large am ounts of GHG emissions in the industry, power generation, 
building and transport sector s.   
1.108.   On adaptation, the National Climate Change Adaptation Plan developed in 2010 was 
currently in its second planning period . Korea was also developing guidance and too ls to support 
the assessment of vulnerability and risks and implementing projects on research and development 
for quantitative analysis  of climate change impacts.   
1.109.   Korea ha d set an  ambitious target even though it accounted  for approximately 1.4 % of 
global GHG emissions. Korea's mitigation potential was  limited due to its industrial structure with a  
large share of manufa cturing  and the  already  high e nergy efficien cy of major industries . Korea's 
Gross Domestic Product ( GDP) had a high share of energy -intens ive manufacturing (higher than 
Japan, the U nited States and the U nited Kingdom ), and Korea was experiencing faster growth in 
energy consumption than GDP, primarily because of exports . The economy was highly dependent 
on international energy and na tural resou rce markets, with 96 % of the country's energy imported. 
CO2 emissions had doubled from 1990 to 2007 while economic growth ha d decreased continuously 
since the early 1990s. The annual mean temperature in Korea ha d increased by 2.4°C, three times 
more than t he world average of 0.74°C  and a nnual average damage s from extreme weather 
events had become 3.6 times higher from the 1990s to 2000s.  
1.110.   The representative explained that  new engines for economic growth could  be created 
through technological innovation in th e low carbon and green growth sector s. This was supported 
by the wide -scope planning followed from 2011 to 2015  with the second national sustainable 
development strategy implementation plan. They were now in the third period of planning.  
1.111.   The representative  stated that climate change and the multilateral trad ing regime should 
work together because climate change require d global solutions in mitigation and adaptation  that 
included  (i) the efficient allocation of resources, goods and services of low carbon con tents, (ii)  the 
equitable sharing of loss and benefit s from climate change mitigation and adaptation, and (iii)  the 
wider diffusion o f green and clean technologies. The representative also expressed the view that  
the discussion of NDCs being  implemented in national legislation  fell within  work item s 1 and 4  of 
the CTE  agenda .  
1.2.1.2.3   Presentation on New Zealand's NDC  
1.112.   The presentation by the representative  of New Zealand  on the country's  NDC began  with a 
video message from New Zealand's Acting Climate Change Ambass ador. The Ambassador  
explained that the preparation of the NDC had  involved  a broad  examination of mitigation options, 
supported by economic modelling and analytical research , and a wide public consultation process. 
As a result , a 2030 target to reduce New  Zealand's emission s to 30% below the 2005 level  had 
been set . New  Zealand was an outlier amongst developed countries, with an emission s profile 
similar to that of Brazil, where emissions from agriculture accounted for half of the emission s, 
along with a very high level of renewable  electricity generated from hydro power  and increasingly 
from geothermal and wind. Although New Zealand contributed only about 0.1%  of total global 
emissions, the intention was  to show leadership on climate action.   
1.113.   The Ambassador  indicated that the Paris Agreement was a game changer, with cities, 
states, and businesses all joining central government s to factor climate ch ange into their decision 
making . The climate change narrative used to be negative, e.g. linked to  cost and oblig ations , but 
it started to change as government s and business es began to see  opportunities from climate -
related technologies, investments and behaviour. The concept of c ircular economy  was a more 
sustainable approach to the economy  and promoted  technologies  that turned waste into energy. 
Finally, t here was increasing evidence demonstrating that climate action would in no way stifle 
economic growth.  WT/CTE/M/6 3 
 
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  1.114.   Following  the video, the  representative of New Zealand noted that  one of the core 
principles of the Paris Agre ement was national determination, where countries decided their 
actions with the expectation that it should be as ambitious as possible in its own circumstances, 
and that it would progress over time .16 As a developed country, New Zealand was expect ed to 
table an economy -wide target that showed progression beyond its previous commitment s under 
the Kyoto Protocol and the UNFCCC  and that did not result in any  backsliding  in terms of  the 
robust reporting and accounting obligation already applied to  developed countries.  
1.115.   For all other developed countries, the main mitigation challenge was in the energy sector. 
New Zealand faced a different challenge with 81% of its electricity already coming from renewable 
resources and half  of its emissions concentrated in agricul tural production. Therefore, New Zealand 
planned to meet its 2030 target through a combination of: accessing international carbon markets; 
domestic emissions reductions; and, increasing carbon removals through forest planting. The key 
focus areas for domes tic reductions would be transport, industrial energy and the farming sector.  
1.116.   Regarding  New Zealand's emission s profile , the share of CH4 and CO 2 were identical  and 
the emission s per unit of GDP had shown a consistently declining trend since 1992, despite 
continuous population and economic growth over the period.  In fact, New Zealand relied heavily on 
the primary sector which constituted about 70% of its export s; there were no  technological 
solutions yet to reduce biological emissions, namely CH4 from cows a nd sheep. Balanced against 
that, forestry removal accounted for a third of gross emissions . In addition, New Zealand's 
population had also increased significantly since 1990, growing over 12% between 2003 and 2015, 
and the trend was predicted to continue w ith immigration.  
1.117.   In order to achieve its target  of 30% below the 2005 emission s level by 2030 , New 
Zealand would need to  use international carbon market s to supplement domestic reduction s, given 
the limited abatement options.  New Zealand's  NDC was ambitio us and would cost approximately 
NZ$3.7 billion annually.  The 2050 target was to reduce 50% of its emissions below the 1990 level, 
which was a major challenge. She noted  that finding solution s to agricultural  emission s would be 
critical and over NZ$20 milli on were invested  annually  in agricultur al GHG research. While there 
were some early promising results related to breeding low emi tting sheep, experimenting different 
types of feed, and developing CH4 inhibitors and even a vaccine, moving from research to 
commercial deployment would take time. She pointed out that biological emission s would also 
become a greater focus for other countrie s as they r educed fossil fuel emission s over time.  
1.118.   A range of policy initiat ives had been  taken to meet the NDC  target. The  main policy was a 
comprehensive ETS , with surrender obligation s for  all sectors of the economy other than 
agricultur al production. The ETS was currently under review to ensure that it was aligned to  the 
Paris Agreement target. Even t hough 80% of New Zeala nd's electricity was already generat ed from 
renewable sources , the target was to increase the share  to about 90% by 2025.  There was also a 
programme to reach 64 000 electric vehicles by 2021 . On forest planting, 17 million new trees were 
expected to be plan ted by 2020.  
1.119.   It was important to enable emissions reductions to occur where they were most cost -
effective . The World Bank had calculated that using market s could reduce the cost of meeting the 
2030 target by 32%. New Zealand was taking  the lead in develop ing carbon market s with a  multi-
pronged approach . New Zealand was looking to: partner ing with other governments  (many of 
whom had identified carbon market s in their NDCs ), and pursu ing market s architecture and 
guidance through the UNFCCC ; finding opportuni ties to link ETSs;  and wor king with others to 
ensure market s operated  on the basis of environmental integrity, without double counting or 
double claiming of the emission reductions achieved.   
1.120.   In addition to carbon markets , New Zealand was working on two  other initiatives . First, the 
Global Research Alliance on Agricultural Greenhouse Gases (GRA) had been established by New 
Zealand and other countries  in 2009 . The  GRA currently had 46 members, both  developed and 
developing countries. It was a mechanism to p ool resources to grow more food supplies for  an 
expanding global population, without increasing emission s. The focus sectors were livestock, paddy  
rice and crop s, and there were two cross -cutting groups dealing with soil carbon and data 
management. The second initiative was the Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform. Total global subsid ies 
                                                
16 The presentation is available in document RD/CTE/120.  WT/CTE/M/6 3 
 
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  accounted for  400 to 700 billion  US dollars annually, and only 8% were well targeted,  i.e. reaching 
the poor for whom they were  intended. It was illogical to put a price on carbon wh ile at the same 
time subsidiz ing fossil fuel that encouraged wasteful  consumption and tilt ed the level playing field 
against renewable energy investments. Removing such subsidies  could result in a 10% reduction 
in global emission s by 2030.  New Zealand, as a developed country, had the responsibility to 
provide finance to support developing countr ies to manage the impact of climate change, with a 
particular focus on clean energy and climate resilient project s in the Pacific.  
1.121.   New Zealand was preparing for the  submission of its long -term low emission s strateg y by 
2020, as encouraged by the Paris Agreement. The government had established a number of 
advisory groups with government and external experts and stakeholders, including groups  looking 
at biological emis sions and the forest ry sector. In addition, a Productivity Commission had been  
tasked with producing a report by mid -2018 on options for New Zealand's transition to a low 
emission s future. Additional funding had been allocated to the Ministry of the Enviro nment to 
develop costed  policy options to make the transition.  
1.2.1.2.4   Presentation on Peru's NDC  
1.122.   The representative of Peru presented Peru's NDC submitted to the UNFCCC in  July 2016.17 
Peru was a megadiverse country  with 10% of world flora species . Peru had a pop ulation of 
30.7 million people. Peru's GHG emissions were equivalent to 0.3% of world emissions. Peru's NDC 
followed two fundamental principles  of Paris Agreement negotiations: (i) a sense of urgency; and 
(ii) a high -level of ambition. It envisaged a 30% r eduction  in relation to the GHG emissions of the 
projected business -as-usual  in 2030 ; 20% would be implemented through domestic investment 
and expenses and 10% was subject to the availability of international financing.  The baseline 
scenario started in 2010 and the projection included  the total emissions of the land use, land use 
change and forestry sectors.  
1.123.   Peru's NDC mainly covered CO 2, CH 4 and N2O, and had an implementation period from 
January 2021 to December 2030. The p rincipal sector  for potential mit igation in 2030 was the land 
use, land use change and forestry sector. The methodology used corresponded to the  1996 and 
2006 International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) practical guidelines.  
1.124.   On adap tation, Peru fulfilled several  of the  criteria of Article 4.8 of the UNFCCC on 
particularly vulnerable parties. With 84 of the 117 different types of living zones in the world, Peru 
was exposed to some threats: (i) hydro -meteorological dangers , which accounted for 72% of 
droughts, rains, flooding, frosts, among other  emergencies ; and (ii) climate impacts of "El Niño" , 
which  had affected 1 million people in Peru in  the first quarter of 2017. Even i n the most  moderate 
climate change scenario, Peru's potential growth would be negatively affected as many activi ties of 
high economic potential depend ed on eco -systemic and biodiversity resources , including the 
hydropower, agriculture and tourism sectors.  
1.125.   Peru had identified five priority sectors  for adaptation : water, agriculture, fishery, forestry 
and health. Nat ional plans had been  developed for these sectors to protect populations vulnerable 
to climate change (e.g. subsistence agriculture, small scale agriculture, artisanal fishers, native 
communities, small scale forestry producers , and from a health perspectiv e, infants, women and 
seniors).  Peru's objective was to adapt to adverse effects and take advantage of climate change 
opportunities. Climate change adaptation policies were implemented in five areas: (i) disaster risk 
management; (ii) resilient infrastruct ure; (iii) poverty and vulnerable populations approach ; 
(iv) gender  and intercultural approach ; and (v) private investment promotion in climate change 
adaptation. Peru was preparing a multi -sectoral plan in 2017 to implement its NDC. NDCs were 
dynamic and could be readjusted to each Party 's circumstances. Peru was also planning a budget 
revision and readjustment for the implementation of its NDC.  
1.2.1.2.5   Presentation on renewable energy in China  
1.126.   The representative  of China  made a presentation on the latest developm ents in renewable 
energy in China. He  noted that China had been  the world's largest investor in renewable energy 
                                                
17 The presentation is available in document RD/CTE/121 . WT/CTE/M/6 3 
 
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  over the last five years. In 2006, China had promulgated  its first Renewable Energy Law, which 
was the foundation for the development of renewa ble energy. In its 12th Five Year Plan (2011 to 
2015) renewable energy development was introduced  for the first time  as a recommended sector . 
China established feed -in tariff rate policies for photovoltaic  (PV) power generation along with 
offshore wind pow er and wastes incineration power plants and  continuously  improved the 
renewable energy grid connection and the mana gement system.  
1.127.   The ongoing  13th Five Year Plan  (2016 to 2020 ) further established a comprehensive 
development strategy for renewable energy.  It set detailed plans and goals, and provided 
complementary supporting policies for five specific areas, including hydro power, wind power, 
solar, biomass, and geothermal energy. Currently, China's renewable energy accounted for 12% of 
primary energy cons umption, almost double compared with  2005. The goal was to reach 15% by 
2020, and 20% by 2030. Over the last ten years, China's renewable energy growth had accounted 
for more than 40% of the world's total increase, driven mainly  by its fast growing solar a nd wind 
power sectors , with respective annual growth of 33% and 120% in the last  five years.  
1.128.   According to its 13th Five Year Plan, China would continue to expand renewable energy 
power generation capacity.  For example, the total installed capacity of wind  power was targeted to 
increase from 120 gigawatts (GW) to 210 GW, and the  total installed capacity of PV  power would 
be raised from 40 GW to 100 GW. At the same time , China would also optimize the utilization of 
renewable energy resources by making improv ement s in the allocation of resources, innovati ng, 
and perfecting the industrial system , among other  measures. For example, in  the hydro -electric 
sector , regional governments would focus on environmental restoration, support for the poor with 
the income of  local hydro power stations , and the construction  of new pumped storage power 
stations. In the wind power sector, the government would  improve trad itional large windfarms in 
the n orthern region while ensuring  a balance of utilization of wind power between the mid-east 
and the southern parts of China. In the PV sector, more resources would be devoted to research 
and development, with the goal of reducing the price of PV power generation by 50% from the 
2015 benchmark.  
1.129.   The representative presented  two example s to illustrate China's progress in developing 
renewable energy. First, in Yunnan, a water -rich province in the s outhwest of China, the average 
annual  water runoff was 200 cubic kilometres. To make full use of the abundant water resource s, 
hydro power capac ity installed in Yunnan had increased ten-fold to 62 GW from 2000 to 2016. 
Currently, Yunnan's non -fossil energy accounted for up to 93% of energy consumption. Besides 
fulfilling its own electricity needs, Yunnan was  a major participant in China's West -East Power 
Transmission Project  and provided 56% of the power transmitt ed from the southern power grid . In 
addition, in 2016, Yunnan transmitted 14.73 billion kilowatt hou rs (kWh) to Vietnam, 
97 million  kWh to Laos  and 165 million kWh to Myanmar . Yunnan also launched the "Rural Small 
Hydropower Poverty Relief Proje ct". The construction of small hydro power projects in remote areas 
provided jobs for the local people, and part of the power plant income was used to subsidize the 
poor people and to support the upgr ading of the rural power grid.  
1.130.   Second, h e explained  that cities were  major energy consumers  and were undergoing major 
challenges such as  industrial transformation  and upgrading , resource depletion and environmental 
degradation. Making more  use of renewabl e energy was therefore a natural choice in the process. 
In order to promote renewable energy, China had identified 8 1 cities and 8 industry parks as 
Renewable Energy Demonstration Cities in 2012. To be selected, there were two requirements: 
(i) the renewab le energy consumption of the city or industrial park needed to  account for more 
than 6% of the total primary energy consumption;  and (ii) there needed to  be two or more types 
of large -scale renewable energy projects. Located on the ancient Silk Road , Dunhu ang was one of 
the Renewable Energy Demonstration Cities . With many historical and cultural sites, Dunhuang 
received more than one million tourists each year. Today , Dunhuang was on its way to make 
renewable energy consumption account for 100% of its total  energy consumption. This involved 
the construction of PV power generation project s totalling  3000 million watts, wind power farms of 
2000 million watts,  the improvement of the  powe r transmission network connecting  nearby 
regions, and the upgrade of the ci ty's heating system. Since 2009, more than 30 domestic and 
foreign companies had established power plants in Dunhuang Optoelectronic Industry Park, 
creating China's largest solar power demonstration ba se. With advanced technology and declined 
cost, rene wable energy would be the natural  choice to achieve SDGs . WT/CTE/M/6 3 
 
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  1.131.   The representative of Kazakhstan  noted that her delegation put emphasis on the 
development of renewable energy. In 2012 Astana had been chosen by the Bureau International 
des Expositions as the venue t o host Expo 2017. More than 100 countries and 10 international 
organizations were taking part in the event and around 3 million people were expected to visit the 
international pavilions between 10 June and 10 September 2017. The Expo's theme was "Future 
Energy"; it would showcase 17 energy -generating projects. Following the Expo, the exhibition 
complex would become an innovation hub and research and cultural centre. The Ministerial 
Conference and 8th International Forum on Energy had taken place from 11 to 14 June 2017 in the 
margins of the Expo. The ministerial dialogues had sought to improve understanding of sustainable 
energy and the possible policy drivers to achieve a common goal on sustainable energy, promote a 
policy dialogue, and to raise awareness o f different outcomes that could emerge over time. 
Participants had adopted a ministerial declaration during the event's closing ceremony.18 
1.2.1.2.6   Presentation by Kazakhstan  
1.132.   The representative of Kazakhstan  reported on Kazakhstan's commitment to renewable 
energy . At the 66th Session of the  UN General Assembly in September 2011, Kazakhstan had 
called for inter -regional cooperation in an effort to implement the UN various initiatives on 
sustainable development and green energy. This idea had been reflected in the tex t of the Astana 
Green Bridge Initiative, which had led to the creation of the Green Bridge Partnership Programme 
for 2011 -2020. Building on these ideas and actions, at the 70th session of the UN General 
Assembly, President Nazarbayev had proposed to open t he International Centre for Green 
Technology and Investment in Astana. The concept note on the Centre had been adopted during 
the Ministerial Conference held in the margins of the Expo.19 The Centre  main goal was to assist in 
implementing the transition to a green economy by providing a framework for necessary support 
for renewable energy, green technologies and sustainable development, and by strengthening 
international cooperation in the Green Bridge Partnership Programme.  
1.2.1.2.7   Presentation by Chinese Taipei  
1.133.   The representative of Chinese Taipei  noted that Chinese Taipei's economy was highly 
dependent on international trade. Demand for energy had increased significantly during the past 
20 years in line with rapid economic growth. Being an island with its own elec tricity grid and the 
North Gas pipeline, Chinese Taipei relied on imported energy for 98% of total energy demand. 
Chinese Taipei had implemented the "Greenhouse Gas Reduction and Management Act" in 2015, 
which provided the legal basis for responding to cli mate change. A working group had been set up 
to coordinate measures with a view to enhancing adoption capabilities and reducing social 
vulnerabilities. In 2010, a policy framework had been introduced in a proposal called "Adoption 
Strategy to Climate Chang e". Chinese Taipei had a n ambitious target for reducing carbon. In the 
short and medium terms, Chinese Taipei would deliver significant reductions of GHG emissions.  
1.2.1.2.8   Presentation on the Workshop on Trade and Climate Change organized by 
Costa Rica, Canada, K orea, Mexico, Norway, Switzerland and Chinese Taipei  
1.134.   The representative of the Republic of Korea  on behalf of Costa Rica, Canada, Mexico, 
Norway, Switzerland, Chinese Taipei  and Korea  reported on the Workshop on Trade and Climate 
Change held back-to-back w ith the CTE on 19 June 2017. He recalled that Korea, Canada, Costa 
Rica and Mexico had proposed to discuss trade and climate change  in June 2016 . Norway, 
Switzerland and Chinese Taipei had joined this initiative at a later stage. In light of  some Members' 
different position s on holding such  discussions, the co -sponsors had decided to organize a 
workshop in order to improve the understanding of the relationship between trade and climate 
change and to explore ways to further discussions in the WTO and other f ora.  
1.135.   At the workshop , the WTO Director -General stated that climate dialogue could  be useful 
to: inform Members' views on the role the WTO could play in supporting  climate action; spark 
innovation in climate -friendly solutions; and ensure the mutual suppor tiveness between trade and 
climate policies. In the first session, speakers informed participants of the IPCC assessment of 
global warming; the challenges of implementing the Paris Agreement from a national perspective; 
                                                
18 http://energyministerial.kz/about/outcome -document . 
19 The concept note is available in document RD/CTE/114.  WT/CTE/M/6 3 
 
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  and of past climate -related discussi ons in the WTO. At the second session, trade -related elements 
in NDCs were highlighted together with analysis of the direct and indirect impacts of climate 
change on trade. Speakers in this session also highlighted opportunities for green growth and 
econom ic diversification as well as a number of policies to support a low carbon transition such as 
FFSR, standards, labelling and government procurement. In the third session, speakers highlighted 
lessons from RTAs on environmental provisions, including those w ith climate -related elements; 
initiatives o n mainstreaming environment into projects to help small and medium sized enterprises 
(SMEs ) in developing countries succeed ; and possible ways to improve synergies between climate 
measures and trade disciplines.  In the wrap -up session , the following  next steps  were highlighted: 
(i) climate change was a reality and demanded urgent actions; (ii)  there were close interactions 
between trade and climate change , and trade could play a role in c ombatting climate change; 
(iii) unique solutions to tackle the particular challenges of climate change were necessary; and 
(iv) more Members needed to be engaged in an open-ended dialogue on the relationship between 
trade and climate change. Korea considered this workshop an opportu nity to exchange views on 
the reasons to discuss this issue at the CTE and on the ways trade could contribute in tackling 
climate change. The co -sponsors would circulate a reflection note of the  workshop and the 
presentations .  
1.136.   The representative of Canada  noted that Canada considered tackling climate change a 
priority and was committed to play a role internationally. Canada believed that trade and climate 
change policies should be mutually supportive and underlined the importance of enhancing the 
understan ding on the relationship between trade and climate change as Members implemented the 
Paris Agreement. Canada remained open to discussions and encourag ed Members to support the 
joint proposal.  
1.137.   The representative of Japan  said that  the workshop had been  very useful to understand 
the relationship between trade and climate change. The informative presentations and comments 
deepened the understanding of this issue and his delegation looked forward to engage in 
discussions.  
1.138.   The representative of the Kingdom of S audi Arabia  stated that her delegation 's position 
remained unchanged. Saudi Arabia did not support discussing climate change at the WTO as this 
issue was being addressed under the Paris Agreement , which had a long -term negotiating 
timeframe from May 2016 t o 2020. UNFCCC parties would discuss climate change under the UN 
system  and not in the WTO in  the following three  years and her delegation continued to believe 
that the issue of climate change could not be discussed or be open for interpretation under any 
forum other than the UNFCCC.  
1.139.   The representative of New Zealand  underscored the urgency, trade relevance and need for 
action. Her delegation believed that the workshop raised awareness on the opportunities and 
impacts on trade and the need for more coordina tion between both regimes. New Ze aland looked 
forward to engag ing in future discussions.  
1.140.   The representative of Chinese Taipei , as one of the co -sponsors, supported Korea's 
statement and believed that climate change was a threat. Her delegation shared the  sense of 
urgency and believed this discussion was timely. Chinese Taipei supported discussing the interface 
between trade and climate change regimes at the CTE as it was part of the mandate and an 
important current issue.  
1.141.   The representative of Switzerland  noted that t he workshop had shown the linkages 
between trade and climate change policies and his delegation considered that the climate change 
and trade communities should reflect on how trade could contribute to the implementation of t he 
Paris Agreement. Agenda  2030 recognized trade as an effective tool to implement sustainable 
development goals, including combatting climate change. Switzerland believed that there were 
different ways to address climate change and underlined the need to solve the question o f the role 
of trade in combatting climate change. Switzerland remained open to discuss these complex issues 
and supported continue d discussions in the WTO. Switzerland believed the CTE was the 
appropriate forum for th ese discussions and did not pre -judge t heir format.  
1.142.   The representative of Norway  supported Korea's statement. Her delegation continued to 
support trade and climate change discussions.  WT/CTE/M/6 3 
 
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  1.143.   The representative of the European Union  highlighted the importance of discussions on 
trade and climate change . 
1.144.   The representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela  stated that this issue should  not 
be discussed in the WTO as the UNFCCC was the only appropriate forum.  
1.2.2   Item 4  
"The provisions of the multilateral trading system with respect to the transparency of trade 
measures used for environmental purposes and environmental measures and requirements 
which have significant trade effects. " 
1.145.   A representative of the  WTO Secretariat  introduce d the Environmental Database  (EDB)  for 
2014 circulated on 2  May 2017 in do cument WT/CTE/EDB/14 (and Add.1).20 Over the last two 
decades, t he number of notifications had been growing every year, in particular environment -
related ones , which  increas ed from 165 in 1997 to 551  in 2014 . Environment -related entries  in 
trade policy revi ews (TPRs) had increased  too, with 720 entries  in 2014. The proportion of 
environment -related notifications had also increased with fluctuations in some years. The TBT and 
SPS Agreements  accounted for the largest number of environment -related notifications . Support 
measures in the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures  Agreement and the Agreement on 
Agriculture accounted for an important number of environment -related notifications  too, 
particularly in 2014.  
1.146.   In 2014, 1277 environment -related measures  (contain ed in the 551 notifications)  were 
identified and included in the EDB. The database enabled users to search through information 
according to specific criteria such as Member, Agreement, objective, sector  and type  of measure. 
Seventy -four Members  had submitt ed environment -related notifications  in 2014. The EDB used 25 
harmonized categories of environment -related objectives  to organize the measures notified and 
the following five categories were  mostly referred to: general  environmental protection, natural 
resources conservation, energy conservation and efficiency , and renewable energy.  
1.147.   The EDB report included charts illustrating the different sectors, objectives and types of 
measures. The re were two broad  types of measures : regulatory measures and support mea sures. 
Eighteen  TPRs were analysed in 2014, containing 721 environment -related entries. There were a 
large number of quantitative restrictions (e.g. bans and import and expor t licensing requirements), 
TBT measures (e.g. technical regulations or specificati ons and conformity assessment procedures), 
price, and market based (e.g. taxes) and support measures.  
1.148.   Efforts were already being made to prepare the EDB for 2015 with the aim of issuing this 
document  also in 2017 and to enhance the user interface, despite  difficulties in securing the 
necessary resources.  
1.149.   The representative of Egypt  asked whether future  EDB documents  could provide more 
detail s on the most  common tariff lines captured in environment -related measures.  
1.150.   The representative of Switzerland  recog nized that  updating the EDB  required  a large 
amount of resources. Switzerland considered the EDB a unique and very useful tool and 
encouraged further work o n the database . 
1.151.   The representative of China  considered the EDB  to be very comprehensive and 
informat ive. His delegation would continue using the EDB.  
1.152.   The representative of the European Union  said that the EDB had proven to be useful  to his 
delegation . 
                                                
20 Documents WT/CTE/EDB/14  and WT/CTE/EDB/14/Add.1 were circulated on 2 May 2017 . The 
presentation is available in document  RD/CTE /113. See also WTO website: 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/envdb_e.htm . WT/CTE/M/6 3 
 
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  1.153.   The representative of the WTO Secretariat  thanked Members for the positive feedback. On 
Egypt's questio n, the EDB included one column  with Harmonized System (HS) references and the 
WTO Secretariat was making  efforts to link the EDB to  the Integrat ed Trade Intelligence Portal 
(I-TIP) database . While the EDB included  a HS classification where possible, in som e areas there 
were obstacles in assigning a unique tariff number to measures across different sectors.  
2  OTHER BUSINESS  
2.1   Update on the Environmental Goods Agreement (EGA) negotiations  
2.1.  The representative of Australia  provided an update on the EGA negotiations . In November 
2016, EGA participants had been preparing for a meeting of ministers and senior officials designed 
to explore whether the time was right to move the EGA negotiations towards a final conclusion. 
Since the launch of the negotiations in 2014, co nsiderable progress had been made. There was a 
clear understanding among EGA members on the type of products that might be included in the 
agreement, including many products in the area of renewable energy, and EGA participants well 
understood each other's  priorities and sensitivities. Against that backdrop, EGA ministers had 
gathered in December 2016 to see whether a consensus agreement on a final EGA list was within 
reach. It had not been possible for EGA ministers to reach a final conclusion during their  meeting 
in December. The meeting had been very constructive, with ministers and senior officials 
developing an even clearer understanding of core priorities and sensitivities. While consensus had 
not been reached, EGA participants had further defined the contours of the EGA, and EGA 
participants were reflecting on future work. As previously stated and as demonstrated  in the Trade 
and Climate Change Workshop  held on 19  June 2017 , the EGA would provide significant 
commercial benefits, boosting exports and pr oviding cheaper access to environmentally beneficial 
technologies. It would also help efforts to overcome serious environmental challenges. Membership 
of the EGA had always been open to other WTO Members, and EGA participants  urged others to 
join the EGA  process  as soon as possible.  
2.2.  The representative of Norway  noted that the Trade and Climate Change Workshop had 
highlighted the environmental benefits the EGA could provide. Her delegation supported EGA work 
and looked forward to engage in negotiations.  
2.3.  The representative of Canada  reaffirmed Canada's  commitment in concluding an ambitious 
and futur e-oriented EGA covering a broad range of goods. The EGA was in line  with Canada's  
progressive trade agenda, which recognized the need for trade policies to contrib ute to economic, 
social and environmental objectives. The EGA would: (i) facilitate trade in environmental goods; 
(ii) create a new market for innovative firms and SMEs; and (iii) contribute to sustainable 
development creating win -win outcomes. His delegat ion encou raged renewed engagement in 
the EGA. 
2.4.  The representative of Singapore  considered the EGA an important initiative that 
demonstrated the role trade could play in mitigating climate change and environmental protection. 
Her delegation hoped for an earl y resumption and outcome to the EGA negotiations.  
2.5.  The representative of New Zealand  echoed other Members in highlighting that the Trade and 
Climate Change Workshop had clarified that the EGA was an example where the WTO could 
contribute to tackle climate c hange.  Her delegation considered it important to achieve an 
ambitious and timely outcome , and supported renewed EGA engagement.  
2.6.  The representative of the European Union  reaffirmed his delegations'  commitment to 
concluding  an ambitious and forward -looking E GA. Progress was made in the intersessional period 
in 2016 on the list of environmental good s and the EGA text. The EGA could contribute in the fight 
against climate change and the European Union  supported re -launching negotiations when 
participants were r eady and circumstances appropriate.  
2.7.  The representative of Japan  stated that Japan was an EGA participant seeking early 
resumption of negotiations. As mentioned by Australia and other delegations,  membership of the 
EGA had always been open to other WTO Memb ers. His delegation looked forward to early 
reengagement in negotiations.  WT/CTE/M/6 3 
 
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  2.8.  The representative of Chinese Taipei  said that Chinese Taipei was an active EGA participant 
committed to conclud ing a list of environmental goods. His delegation hoped early resumpti on of 
the EGA negotiations, encouraged other Members to engage in negotiations and remained open to 
continue EGA work. The EGA would: (i) provide significant commercial and environmental benefits 
(e.g. boost trade, provide cheaper a ccess to environmentally  friendly technologies); and 
(ii) support efforts to address climate change, implement the Paris Agreement and tackle other 
environmental challenges.  
2.9.  The representative of Hong Kong , China  echoed Australia and previous delegations and 
reaffirmed its commit ment to continue EGA negotiations and achieving an early and meaningful 
outcome.  
2.10.   The represe ntative of Turkey  said that Turkey was an EGA participant and that progress had 
been made at the meeting in December 2016. His delegation believed EGA negotiations would 
continue and that a meaningful outcome would be achieved both commercially and 
environ mentally.  
2.11.   The representative of Switzerland  joined other Members' statements and reaffirmed 
Switzerland's  commitment towards a meaningful EGA outcome. His delegatio n supported and 
encouraged other Members to resum e negotiations early.  
2.12.   The representative of the Republic of Korea  said that Korea, as an EGA participant , hoped 
for early resumption of EGA negotiations.  
2.13.   The representative of China  underlined the importanc e of the EGA and considered  it to be 
an area where the WTO could contribute to fighting climate ch ange. China believed the EGA was 
important to achieve triple -win outcomes and said that the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilit ies was essent ial in combatting climate change and should be reflect ed in the final 
outcome.  
2.2  Update on the plurilateral negotiations on fisheries subsidies  
2.14.   The representative of Canada  updated the CTE on the plurilateral negotiations on fisheries 
subsidies  launched in September 2016. Fifteen  developed and developing WTO Members 
representing a broad range of the membership had agreed to launch plurilateral negotiations to 
eliminate harmful fisheries subsidies. The first round had been  held in January 2017 with 
subsequent  rounds in March and May. The fourth round was being held and the fifth round would 
be held in July 2017. Participants had explored several issues in developing disciplines on 
IUU fishing, overcapacity and overfishing. Participants were discussing core dis ciplines, 
transparency and the agreement form , and reiterated that a Fisher ies Subsidies Agreement (FSA) 
would be open to all WTO Members. Canada considered these negotiations to complement 
multilateral discussions.  
2.15.   The representative  of Australia  reaffirm ed Australia's  commitment to multilateral fisheries 
subsidies negotiations and noted that Australia was participating  in the FSA negotiations . Her 
delegation was guided by SDG  14.6 and considered both multilateral and plurilateral dis cussions to 
complement  each other. Active engagement in both tracks increased the possibility of a 
meaningful outcome  on fisheries subsidies . 
2.16.   The representative of New Zealand  said SDG 14.6 provided a strong political commitment 
and a sense of urgency in fisheries subsidies neg otiations. Her delegation focused on a multilateral 
outcome and was an active participant in plurila teral discussions. As mentioned by previous 
delegations, multilateral and plurilateral discussions were complementary and New Zealand's 
objective was to con clude a high -standard agreement.  
2.17.   The representative of Singapore  looked forward to speed ing up EGA negotiations and a 
timely conclusion of the FSA.  WT/CTE/M/6 3 
 
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  3  BRIEFINGS BY OBSERVE R ORGANIZATIONS  
3.1.  The representative from  UN Environment (UNEP)  briefed the CTE on recent activities of the 
Enviro nment and Trade Hub , which served as the overarching delive ry mechanism for 
UN Environment' s work on trade and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development , and provided 
capacity building and related policy advice on sustainable trad e and investment.21 UN Environment  
and IISD  had launched the sustainability toolkit for trade negotiators in Berlin in March 2017 to 
enhance UN members drafting and negotiating skills on environment -related provisions in regional 
trade and investment agreem ents. The toolkit was an online portal that p rovided: (i) access to 
over 200  examples from 90 regional trade and investment agreements; (ii) analysis on ways to 
include environment  and trade provisions , process related issues (e.g. e nvironmental impact 
assessments, public participation, review and reporting) and investment provisions in regional 
trade agreements. The Hub and the UN Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) had jointly 
developed an online learning course on Trade and Green Economy within the framework of the 
Partnership for Action for a Green Economy (PAGE ). The interactive and practice -oriented course 
provided governments, businesses and civil society with basic information on different approaches 
to profit from sustainable trade opportun ities.  
3.2.  The Environment and Trade Hub had recently undert aken a scoping study and organized two 
workshops on value chain cooperation and trade in energy efficiency and renewable energy 
technologies in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations  (ASEAN ) region.22 Technologies had 
been selected based on the ir economic importance, energy savi ng potential, contribution to a low 
carbon economy and the potential for significant production, trade and regional value chain 
integration. Technologies included electric m otors, distribution transformers, refrigerators for 
household applications and ligh ting, among others.  
3.3.  UN Environment  had recently convened a workshop in Mongolia on sustainable development 
and trade opportunities, consisting of training and a workshop. 1 50 participants from 
government s, ministries, associations, the private sector and civil society had attended. The 
meeting had resulted in concrete recommendations on trade strategies. China had hosted a 
workshop on 5  June 2017 en titled " Unlocking South -South Trade in Environmental Goods and 
Services " in Nanjing. The objective of this workshop was to discuss opportunities and challenges of 
Jiangsu 's green trade and value chain cooperation with developing countries as a way to facilitate 
the transition to an  Inclusive Green Economy. UNEP had co-hosted the first national academy for a 
Green Economy in Burkina Faso bringing together relevant national and international stakeholders. 
The UN Environment Assembly (UNEA) would be held on 4-6 December in Nairobi, Ken ya under  
the overarching theme of pollution. UNEA aimed to deliver commitments to eliminate pollution  of 
air, land, water ways and oceans and the safe management of chemicals and waste. UNEP was 
already discussing with governments voluntary commitments on t his matter.  
3.4.  The representative said that t he thirteenth meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (COP -13),the eighth meeting of the Parties to the Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety (COP MOP 8) and the second meeting  of the Parties to the Nagoya Protocol 
on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their 
Utilization (COP MOP 2)  had taken place in Cancun, Mexico, from 4 to 17 December 2016 . A note 
containing information on relevant decisions taken at these meetings would be circulated to 
Members after the meeting.23 
4  DATE OF NEXT  MEETING  
4.1.  The next meeting of the Committee would take place in November . The precise date would 
be communicated to Members in due course.  
 
___________ ___ 
                                                
21 The presentation is available in document RD/CTE/122 . 
22 The report is available at: www.unep.org/trade . 
23 The note is available in document R D/CTE/123.  WT/CTE/M/6 3 
 
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ANNEX 1: ITEMS OF TH E CTE WORK PROGRAMME  
 
Item 1:  The relationship between the provisions of the multilateral trading system and 
trade measures for environmental purposes, including those pursuant to 
multilateral environmental agreements.  
Item 2:  The relationship between environmental policies relevant to trade and 
environmental measures with significant trade effects and the provisions of the 
multilateral trading system.  
Item 3(a):  The relationship between the provisions of the multilateral trading s ystem and 
charges and taxes for environmental purposes.  
Item 3(b):  The relationship between the provisions of the multilateral trading system and 
requirements for environmental purposes relating to products, including standards 
and technical regulations, p ackaging, labelling and recycling.  
Item 4:  The provisions of the multilateral trading system with respect to the transparency 
of trade measures used for environmental purposes and environmental measures 
and requirements which have significant trade effects . 
Item 5:  The relationship between the dispute settlement mechanisms in the multilateral 
trading system and those found in multilateral environmental agreements.  
Item 6:  The effect of environmental measures on market access, especially in relation to 
devel oping countries, in particular to the least developed among them, and 
environmental benefits of removing trade restrictions and distortions.  
Item 7:  The issue of exports of domestically prohibited goods.  
Item 8:  The relevant provisions of the Agreement on Trade -Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights.  
Item 9:  The work programme envisaged in the Decision on Trade in Services and the 
Environment.  
Item 10:  Input to the relevant bodies in respect of appropriate arrangements for relations 
with intergover nmental and non -governmental organizations referred to in 
Article  V of the WTO.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 WT/CTE/M/6 3 
 
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  ANNEX 2: PARTS OF TH E DOHA MINISTERIAL D ECLARATION THAT RELA TE  
TO THE WORK  OF THE CTE  
 
32. We instruct the Committee on Trade and Environment, in pursuing work on all  items on its 
agenda within its current terms of reference, to give particular attention to:  
 
(i) the effect of environmental measures on market access, especially in relation to 
developing countries, in particular the least  developed among them, and those  situations 
in which the elimination or reduction of trade restrictions and distortions would benefit 
trade, the environment and development;  
 
(ii) the relevant provisions of the Agreement on Trade -Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights; and  
 
(iii) labelling requirements for environmental purposes.  
 
Work on these issues should include the identification of any need to clarify relevant WTO rules. 
The Committee shall report to the Fifth Session of the Ministerial Conference, and make 
recommendations,  where appropriate, with respect to future action, including the desirability of 
negotiations. The outcome of this work as well as the negotiations carried out under 
paragraph  31(i) and  (ii) shall be compatible with the open and non -discriminatory nature o f the 
multilateral trading system, shall not add to or diminish the rights and obligations of members 
under existing WTO agreements, in particular the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures, nor alter the balance of these right s and obligations, and will take into 
account the needs of developing and least  developed countries.  
 
33. We recognize the importance of technical assistance and capacity building in the field of trade 
and environment to developing countries, in particular  the least  developed among them. We also 
encourage that expertise and experience be shared with members wishing to perform 
environmental reviews at the national level. A report shall be prepared on these activities for the 
Fifth Session.  
 
51. The Committee  on Trade and Development and the Committee on Trade and Environment 
shall, within their respective mandates, each act as a forum to identify and debate developmental 
and environmental aspects of the negotiations, in order to help achieve the objective of having 
sustainable development appropriately reflected.  
 
 
__________