Risk Management Proposal:  
 
Craft Risk Management  Standard for 
Vessels  
 
 
FOR PUBLIC CONSULTATION  
 
 
June 2016   
Ministry For Primary Industries   Page 1 of 43   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Plants, Food & Environment  
Ministry for Primary Industries  
Pastoral House  
25 The Terrace  
PO Box 2526  
Wellington 6140  
New Zealand  
Tel: +64 4 894 0100  
Email: standards@mpi.govt.nz  
 
 
  
Ministry For Primary Industries   Page 2 of 43   
Disclaimer  
 
This risk management document  does not constitute, and should not be regarded as, legal advice. 
While every effort has been made to ensure the information in this document is acc urate, the Ministry 
for Primary Industries does not accept any responsibility or liability whatsoever for a ny error of fact, 
omission, interpretation or opinion that may be present, however it may have occurred.  
 
Requests for further copies should be dire cted to:  
Biosecurity and Environment Group  
Plants, Food & Environment  
Ministry for Primary Industries  
PO Box 2526  
Wellington 6140  
New Zealand  
Email:  standards@mpi.govt.nz  
 
   
Ministry For Primary Industries   Page 3 of 43 Submissions  
The Ministry for Pr imary Industries (MPI) invites comment from interested parties on the proposed 
Craft Risk Management Standard : Vessels (CRMS Vessels) and the associated draft Guidance 
Document .  The proposed measures are  supported by this risk management proposal . 
 
A craf t risk management standard (CRMS ) “specifies requirements to be met for the effective 
management of risks that are associated with the entry of craft into New Zealand territory ” (section 
24E(1) Biosecurity Act 1993).  
 
MPI seeks comment on the proposed CRMS  Vessels . MPI has developed this proposal based on 
best available scientific evidence and assessment of this evidence. If you disagree with the measures 
proposed to manage the risks, please provide either data or published references to support your 
commen ts. This will enable MPI to consider additional evidence which may change how risks are 
proposed to be managed.  
 
The following points may be of assistance in preparing comments:  
• wherever possible, comments should be spe cific to  CRMS  requirements or a ques tion 
asked in this document (referencing section numbers or commodity names as 
applicable);  
• where possible, reasons, data and supporting published references to support comments 
are requested;  
• the use of examples to illustrate particular points is encour aged.   
 
The requirements  proposed in this document are intended to support  the new CRMS  to 
ensure that the biosecurity risks associated with vessels  are managed in response to 
scientific knowledge and commercial practice s. 
 
MPI encourages respondents to f orward comments electronically. Please include the following in your 
submission:  
• the title of the consultation document in the subject line of your email;  
• your name and title (if applicable);  
• your organisation’s name (if applicable); and  
• your address.  
Send submissions to: standards@mpi.govt.nz , however, should you wish to forward submissions in 
hard copy format (writing), please send them to the following address to arrive by close of business 
on the 5 August  2016 .   
 
 
Biosecurity and Environment Group  
Plant, Food and Environment Directorate  
Ministry for Primary Industries  
PO Box 2526, Wellington  
Fax 04 894 0733  
 
Submissions received by the closure date will be considered during the development of the final 
versions of the standard and guidance document. Submissions received after the closure date may 
be held on file for consideration when the standard and guidance document are subsequently 
reviewed.   
Ministry For Primary Industries   Page 4 of 43 Official Information Act 1982  
Please note that submitted doc uments are public information. These documents may be the subject 
of requests for information under the Official Information Act 1982 (OIA). The OIA specifies that 
information is to be made available to requesters unless there are sufficient grounds for wi thholding i t, 
as set out in the OIA. Submitters may wish to indicate grounds for withholding specific information 
contained in their submission, such as the information is commercially sensitive or they wish personal 
information to be withheld. Any decisio n to withhold information requested under the OIA is 
reviewable by the Ombudsman.  
© Crown Copyright - Ministry for Primary Industries   
Ministry For Primary Industries   Page 5 of 43 Contents  
Disclaimer  2 
Submissions  3 
Official  Information Act 1982  4 
Contents  5 
Introduction  6 
Context  7 
Summary of above -water biosecurity risks  7 
Risk Management  11 
Existing arrival procedures  11 
Proposed risk management  11 
Feasibility and practicality of the proposed risk mitigation measures  16 
Summary  18 
References  19 
Definitions and Acronyms  20 
Appendix 1 - Technical advice on: Review and update of risk analyses related to vessels 
(above water)  22 
Appendix 2 - Vessel Risk Analysis 2009  28 
Appendix 3 – Summary of existing vessel arrival procedures  38 
Appendix 4 - Comparison of the existing arrival procedures  and the proposed 
requirements.  40 
  
Ministry For Primary Industries   Page 6 of 43 Introduction  
Purpose  
1. The purpose of this document is to:  
 Clarify the formalisation of the existing Operational Standard for the Requirements for 
Vessels Arriving in New Zealand in the prop osed Craft Risk Management Standard for 
Vessels.  
 Provide the rational for the proposed requirements  being considered for managing the above -
water biosecurity risk; and  
 Seek stakeholder feedback on the proposed measures in the Craft Risk Management 
Standar d (“CRMS ”) and supporting guidance document.   
This document is not the subject of consultation but  the Ministry for Primary Industries (“MPI”) will 
accept comments and suggestions in order to improve future consultation.  
2. MPI acknowledges that no biosecuri ty system is capable of reducing risk to zero.  The proposed 
requirements in the CRMS seek to minimise the likelihood of all above -water regulated pests 
associated with vessels from establishing in New Zealand.  
Background  
3. It is internationally acknowledged  that the movement of international sea craft (“vessels”) have 
inadvertently been responsible for the introduction of non -indigenous species to new countries 
(MAF, 2009).  
4. The Biosecurity Act 1993 (“the Act”) sets out the requirements for the arrival of cra ft in New 
Zealand, including that cargo can only be unloaded from a craft with the permission of an 
inspector.  In order to clarify the requirements that need to be met before an inspector gave such 
permission, in 2007 the then Ministry of Agricultural and  Forestry Biosecurity New Zealand 
(“MAFBNZ ”) issued the Operational Standard for the Requirements for Vessels Arriving in New 
Zealand (“the operational standard”).  Then in 2009, MAFBNZ undertook  a vessel monitoring 
survey and risk a nalysis which confirmed  that the vessel pathway remains a biosecurity risk 
pathway to New Zealand  (Appendices 1 and 2) . 
5. The Act has since been  amended to enable MPI to issue a CRMS  in order  manage the 
biosecurity risks associated with the arrival of craft (such as vessels) in Ne w Zealand  territory 
(“NZT”) .  As a result, the Act assu mes that a CRMS is issued for craft where its arrival requires 
the management of biosecurity risks.  As such, MPI is formalising the existing arrival procedures 
outlined  in the operational standard int o a CRMS. W here necessary the proposed biosecurity 
requirements have been developed  to either reflect changes to the industry, above -water 
biosecurity risks or the requirements of the Act.  
6. The proposed requirements of the CRMS for Vessels is intended to appropriately  manage all 
known above -water biosecurity risks on the vessels pathway . 
Out o f Scope  
7. In April 2014 , MPI issued the CRMS for Biof ouling, which manages the below -water biosecurity 
risks associated with the entry and arrival of ve ssels in New Zeala nd territory .  This risk 
management proposa l does not re -address any below -water biosecurity risks .  Although the  
Ministry For Primary Industries   Page 7 of 43 CRMS for Vessels and the CRMS for Biofouling  will both manage the entry and arrival of vessels 
in New Z ealand, t he CRMS for Vessels excludes a ll matters and below -waster risk s related to the 
CRMS for Biofouling.  
Context  
International  
8. The W orld Trade Organisation  (“WTO”) and S anitary and Phytosanitary  (“SPS”) Agreements  set 
in place rules that protect each country’s sovereign right to take the me asures necessary to 
protect the life or health of its people, animals, and plants while at the same time facilitating trade. 
It embodies and promotes the use of science -based risk assessments to manage the risks 
associated with the international movement o f goods.  
 
9. “The SPS Agreement will continue to guide how New Zealand sets standards and makes 
decisions related to biosecurity. In particular, it will be important to maintain the standards of 
transparency and scientific rigour required by the SPS Agreemen t, and to make decisions as 
quickly as possible. This will encourage other countries to comply with the rules of the SPS 
Agreement, and also demonstrate that New Zealand’s strict controls are justified to countries that 
challenge them.” Balance in Trade [o nline reference ISBN 978 -0-478-33881 -2]. 
Domestic  
10. The New Zealand biosecurity system is regulated through the Biosecurity Act 1993. Section 
24(E) of the Act describes a craft risk management  standard and requires all risks associated 
with the arrival of a craft in  New Zealand to be managed  by one.  
 
11. MPI is the government authority responsible for maintaining biosecurity standards for the 
effective management of risks associated with the importation of risk goods  and the arrival of 
craft into New Zealand (Par t 3, of the Act ). 
12. MPI is committed to the principles of transparency and evidence -based technical justification for 
all measures, new and amended, imposed on importing pathways.  
Summary of above -water biosecurity  risks  
13. The 2009 MAF  BNZ Vessel Monitoring Su rvey and Risk Analysis  highlighted that hitchhikers and 
contaminants are only considered to be a biosecurity risk if they have certain characteristics.  
These characteristics include:  
i. the potential to harm New Zealand (regarding agriculture, the environmen t, horticulture, 
or human health);  
ii. have a regular mechanism of association with the vessel pathway; and  
iii. having a means of departing the vessels (either aided or unaided) while close to New 
Zealand shoreline .   
Animal species are referred to as hitchhikers,  whereas  plant material, soil and other organic 
debris are referred to as contaminants . 
14. The CRMS for Vessels seeks to mitigate  the above -water biosecurity risks  (regulated species  
and contaminants)  associated with the entry and arrival of vessels in NZT.  The CRMS does not  
Ministry For Primary Industries   Page 8 of 43 manage cargo, ballast water, crew or passengers .  While other pathways may present a higher 
biosecurity risk, risk analyses have shown that some  above -water biosecurity risks associated 
with vessels require management (MAF, 2009) . 
15. Hitchhi kers that pose a risk to New Zealand and are associated with vessels include ants, 
spiders, moths, mosquitoes, geckoes , termites  and other species  (MAF, 2009 ).  These 
hitchhikers  generally  come aboard a vessel during loading and unloading of the vessel in  off-
shore  ports, remain  on-board throughout its journey and at times even maintain viable 
populations on -board the vessel for prolonged periods of time.    
16. Contaminants that are found on vessels include seeds and grain as a result of cargo spillage, 
soil, a nd plant and animal debris that are transferred from packaging material and cargo 
(predominantly sea containers and machinery) (MAF, 2009) .  Such contaminants may be 
regulated pest s or provide a habitat for invasive weed s, insect species and microbial orga nisms 
that are considered a biosecurity risk ( MAF, 2009 ). Therefore some form of management is 
required to mitigate the potential risk to New Zealand from these contaminants.  
17. A 2009  survey by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF) (now MPI) conduct ed 89 
inspections on 66 international vessels arriving in New Zealand .  It identified the type and 
quantity of hitchhiker organisms that were  a biosecurity risk directly associated with the vessel.  
Eighty five percent of the hitchhikers and contaminants found on -board the vessels were classed 
as quarantine species  or contained quarantine species .  The vessel holds were identified as the 
area that is the area most likely to be contaminated and also has the highest level contamination .  
Approximately  88% of holds were  contaminated on average with 16 cont aminants or hitchhikers.  
Hitchhiker species  found that were  known biosecurity risks to New Zealand included brown 
widow spiders, Asian house gecko, mosquito, Asian gypsy moth, transverse ladybird, giant 
African snail and crazy ant.  Some of which had established viable  on-board populations (MAF, 
2009) . 
18. The mobility of the hitchhikers plays an important role in determin ing the level of risk a hitchhiker 
on vessels poses to New Zealand.  Many of these species on ly pose a risk if they have the ability 
to depart from vessels.  Species with the means to depart from the vessel includes those that are 
mobile by themselves (for example, moths, mosquitoes, or other flying species) and those that do 
so with human assista nce (on cargo or other items leaving the vessels).   
Hitchhikers on vessels  
19. Mosquitoes are acknowledged internationally as vectors of human and animal diseases that have 
been spread via the movement of international aircraft and vessels ( MAF , 2007 ).  New Zealand is 
not known to have the species of mosquito that are known vectors of diseases such as Malaria or 
viruses like Dengue and Yellow Fever, West Nile, and Zika.  Mosquitoes have been identified as 
a biosecurity risk to New Zealand in risk analyses for  pathways such as vehicles and used tyres 
as a result of their presence in pooling water on or within other commodities ( MAF , 2007 ).  
Mosquitoes require suitable habitat on -board vessels, in this case pooled water, in order to 
survive the journey and then have a means of transport off the vessel in order to pose a threat to 
New Zealand.  When vessels with pooled water infested  with mosquito  eggs or larvae  enter NZT 
there exists the likelihood that the larvae hatch and mosquitoes disperse into New Zealand.  It is 
considered that  the biosecurity risk associated with mosquitoes on vessels is significant  and 
requires some form of appropriate management ( MAF , 2007  and 2009 ). 
20. Some species of t ermites , not indigenous to New Zealand , are considered invasive and 
biosecurity risks to New Zealand  e.g. Coptotermes acinaciformis , Australian subterranean termite 
(MAF , 2007 ).  As such, several import health standards require the treatment of wood based 
commodities to manage  the potential risk posed by  invasive termite speci es.  Invasive termites  
Ministry For Primary Industries   Page 9 of 43 have  also been intercepted on vessels that arrive in New Zealand, inc luding in on -board wood 
based products  (not imported under a n import health standard) as well as in wooden panels and 
structures of the vessels themselves.   Termite s are considered to be organisms associated with 
the microhabitats on a vessel as defined by the 2009 vessel risk analysis and species in this 
category require appropriate management.  Therefore, vessels that are infested  with invasive 
termite species arri ve in  New Zealand  present a  biosecurity risk that requires  some form of 
management . 
21. The Giant African Snail  (GAS)  is an invasive species that is not present in New Zealand and is 
considered a biosecurity risk to New Zealand (MAF, 2009) .  It is predominantl y associated as a 
hitchhiker with cargo and machinery (MAF, 2007 ).  It is also a mobile species that has been 
intercepted within the holds and on the decks of vessels , making its association with vessels 
unpredictable .  Unpredictable hitchhikers on vessels , which include  GAS and Brown Marmorated 
Sink Bugs, require some form of mitigation in order to reduce a nd detect the presence of such 
high consequence biosecurity risk species on vessels  (Appendices 1 and 2 ; MAF, 2009).   
 
Asian Gypsy Moth   
22. Moths in the g enus Lymantria  are pests of a broad range of coniferous and deciduous trees in 
temperate and subtropical parts of the world, including New Zealand ( MAF, 2008 ). They feed on 
the foliage of a wide range of hosts of agricultural, forestry, horticultural or en vironmental 
importance. The regulated species of concern include  Lymantria albescens, Lymantria umbrosa, 
Lymantria postalba  and the Asian strains of Lymantria dispar ; together commonly referred to as 
the Asian Gypsy Moth (AGM) ( Appendix 2, MAF, 2008 ). 
23. AGM is not known to occur in New Zealand, but environmental conditions in this country are 
known to be suitable for the establishment of AGM ( MAF, 2008;  Ross 2005).  This was confirmed 
in 2003 when AGM was discovered as part of the routine AGM monitoring progr amme.  AGM 
was subsequently reported as being eradicated from New Zealand in 2005 after an intense 
eradication program me was conducted  (Ross 2005).  
24. AGM egg masses have been intercepted at New Zealand borders in association with several 
pathways including u sed vehicles ( MAF , 2007 ), sea containers ( MAF, 2008 ) and vessels ( MAF 
2008 and 2009 ).  AGM comes from multiple source countries including China, Korea, Japan and 
Far East Russia ( MAF, 2008 ; NAPPO, 2009 ).  During the peak population season , ports in 
infeste d areas of these  countries experience increased presence from AGM and during the flight 
season females frequently fly at night and are attracted to lights at ports and on vessels.  As a 
result eggs masses are routinely  laid on ship structures and cargo ( NAPPO, 2009 ).  Each egg 
mass may also have greater than 1000 eggs resulting in huge population pressure.  For example, 
Far East Russian ports experienced peak populations during the 2014 flight season resulting in 
large numbers ( greater than  1000) of eggs ma sses being removed from single vessels prior to 
departure for New Zealand ( Unpublished MPI Data, 2015 ). 
25. AGM eggs are long -lived and can tolerate extreme temperature s and varying moisture 
conditions, which enables them to survive aboar d vessels and in the p ort areas.   The risk 
associated from AGM egg masses results with emerging larvae that disperse from the egg 
masses into the surrounding environment on the wind with silk threads in a natural process 
known as ballooning.  AGM have been recorded to balloon several kilometres under  the right 
conditions ( MAF , 2008 ).  
26. When vessels infe sted with AGM egg masses enter New Zealand there exists the likelihood that 
the larvae disperse from the vessels and establish in  the vegetation surrounding New Zealand’s  
Ministry For Primary Industries   Page 10 of 43 ports ; therefore the biosecurity risk associated with AGM along the vessel pathway requires 
management ( MAF, 2008 ). 
27. This biosecurity risk also exists for Canada, Chile, Mexico and the United States of America 
(NAPPO, 2009 ). 
28. For MPI’s detailed risk analysis, please refer to Appendices 1 and 2 and MAF,  2008.  
   
Ministry For Primary Industries   Page 11 of 43 Risk Management  
Existing arrival procedures   
29. In 2007, MAF BNZ issued the Operational Standard for the Requirements for Vessels Arriving in 
New Zealand .  This was done to clarify the procedures that needed to be undertaken under the 
Act for a vessel to arrive in New Zealand.  For a summary of the existing arrival procedures, 
please refer to Appendix 3. 
Formalising the existing arrival procedures  in the proposed CRMS  
30. MPI is formalising the current arrival procedure s (specified in the operational standard) as 
requirements in the proposed CRMS to be an effective way for managing biosecurity  risk 
associated with vessels, i n doing so, MPI gave due consideration to a number of factors.  These 
included whether New Zealand ’s existing border systems remained appropriate and effective risk 
mitigation measures, and looked at current scientific knowledge and inter nationally accepted best 
practic es.  Where appropriate existing border procedures have been incorporated into the 
proposed requirements as outlined in the following section.  The explanations for the alteration of 
existing procedures in the CRMS are outlined in the feasibility and practicality of risk mitigation 
measures section of this document.  
31. The CRMS and supporting  Guidance Document have been set out in the new MPI Requirements 
& Guidance format to ensure consistency, to clarify legal requirements and to assist the reader in 
understanding the requirements and how they will be applied.  
Prop osed risk management  
32. The v essel pathway is complex, as there are a  variety of  factors considered:  
i. ports visited prior to departing for New Zealand (including ports in regions with known 
risks and those with unknown risks);  
ii. vessels types entering New Zealand Territory (NZT) and arri ving in New Zealand 
(vessels specifically for cargo (containerised, bulk carriers, tankers, and general cargo), 
passengers (cruise liners), fishing and recreational vessels such as yachts);  
iii. activities undertaken (including discharging cargo, tourism, fishi ng, dredging, exploration 
and military);  
iv. ports to be visited (including ports approved as a place of first arrival ( POFA ), ports  not a 
POFA and places that are not ports); and  
v. lengths of stay, from less than 24 hours through to indefinitely.   
 
33. All of these  factors  have a n effect on the potential above -water biosecurity risks that are often  
associated with vessels.  MPI acknowledges the complexity of this pathway and is seeking to 
establish a set of requirements that are easy to understand and only triggered  when mitigation 
actions are necessary to protect New Zealand.  
34. In order for MPI to effectively ma nage the biosecurity risks as well as facilitate the movement of 
vessels in NZT and international trade, MPI has grouped  the proposed management of above -
water  biosecurity risks into three generic risk mitigation measure categories:  
i. information,  
ii. on-board risk goods ; and   
Ministry For Primary Industries   Page 12 of 43 iii. specific regulated pest species  
These will be managed  depending on the length (≤ 21 (short stay) or > 21 (long stay) 
consecutive days) and loc ation (either at a POFA or places not POFA) of the vessel’s stay in 
New Zealand.  
35. The proposed risk mitigation measures are outlined below in the sequential  order in which 
vessels  enter NZT and then subsequently  arrive in a New Zealand port or place; such as A)  prior 
to entry into NZT, B) upon entry into NZT and C) upon arrival at a New Zealand  port. 
 
A)  Prior to entry into New Zealand territor y 
36. To facilitate entry into NZT and the subsequent arrival of vessels at New Zealand ports, MPI 
proposes the follow ing risk mitigation measures.  These measures are intended to occur prior to 
the vessel’s entry into NZT.  This is to ensure that off -shore inspection and decontamination has 
been undertaken and that MPI has all the information it needs to make accurate ri sk 
assessments of each vessel.  
Proposed i nformation requirements  
37. The CRMS proposes that  the operator or person in charge of any vessel entering NZT and 
subsequently arriving in a New Zealand port needs to provide MPI with specific information.  
They need t o inform MPI of the details of the vessel  and its voyage , and its risk goods on board.  
This needs to be provided  at least 48 hours prior to the  vessel’s entry into NZT .  Other biosecurity 
information may also be appropriate such as if any pests have been seen on -route to New 
Zealand and if any risk goods will remain on -board a vessel that seeks to remain in NZT for less 
than 21 consecutive days.  All these details provide MPI with the information needed for a risk 
assessment and to determine what level of intervention, if any, is required for the vessel’s entry 
and arrival in New Zealand.  
38. This information can be provided to MPI via a third party such as the agent for the vessel.  
39. The proposed information requirements concern the vessel and voyage details an d are set out in 
clause 1.4 of the CRMS.  
Proposed Asian Gypsy Moth requirements  
40. The CRMS seeks to require all vessels that enter NZT to be  free of all life stages of AGM , the 
proposed AGM requirements are set out in clauses of Part 3 of the CRMS.  
41. Not all v essels that enter NZT have the potential to be contaminated with AGM, as current 
scientific knowledge has define d the risk of AGM to specific locations at specific times of the 
year.  Currently, known AGM source countries  include Far East Russian, China , Korea, and 
Japan.  The risk of vessel contamination arises  when the AGM in these countries are in their 
flight season (usually the summer months).  The biosecurity risk posed by vessels potentially 
contaminated with AGM may differ depending on the time of y ear.  This is due to AGM egg 
masses having varying viability over time and different  climat ic conditions  also influences viability 
(see s ummary of above -water biosecurity risks for details).   As such, MPI has based its proposed 
risk mitigation measures on the flight seasons in the known source countries and when the 
vessel last visited the ports there.  MPI did this so the proposed mitigation measures will only 
affect the vessels that have the potential to be contaminated with AGM.  
42. The proposed requirements  are based on the set of source countries and their ports (referred to 
as “risk areas”) and their respective flight seasons (referred to as “risk periods”); these are listed  
Ministry For Primary Industries   Page 13 of 43 in full in Schedule 2 of the CRMS.  The risk areas and periods are harmonised with  the North 
American Plant Protection Organisation  (NAPPO) Regional Standard for Phytosanitary Measures 
33 - AGM requirements.  
43. It is proposed that i f a vessel has visited risk areas  during the risk period within the last 12 
months preceding  to arrival in NZ T, the CRMS will require the operator or person in charge of the 
vessel to ensure that the vessel has been inspected, any AGM egg masses removed and a 
certificate of freedom issued by an approved inspection body  prior to entering NZT.  The 
certificate also  needs to be provided to MPI as part of the pre -arrival information.  With these 
proposed requirements, MPI is satisfied that it is taking all practicable steps to mitigate the 
presence of AGM on arriving vessels without undue disruption to their movement.  
Proposed general requirement before  entry into NZT  
44. The CRMS proposes a general requirement for all vessels as they enter NZT  regarding the 
general cleanliness of the vessel .  This sets  the expectation that the operator or person in charge 
of the vessel ta ke all reasonable steps to ensure that the vessel is as clean as practicable .  This  
ensures that  as few as possible hitchhikers or habitats for regulated pest to survive in are 
available  and that the vessel is generally free of re gulated pests and biosecur ity contamination as 
they enter and remain in NZT.  With this proposed requirement MPI is seeking to reduce the 
potential for random regulated pest  and contaminants  arriving in New Zealand, see summary of 
above -water biosecurity risk for details.   In propo sing this general requirement for all vessels in 
conjunction with the requirements for specific regulated pests, MPI is satisfied that it is taking all 
practicable steps to mitigate the presence of regulated pests and biosecurity contamination on 
arriving vessels without undue disruption to their movement.  
45. This proposed requirement is set out in clause 1.5(1) of the CRMS . 
 
B)  Upon entering New Zealand territor y  
46. In conjunction with the proposed requirements prior to entry, the CRMS proposes requirements 
for vessels upon entry into NZT  in order to facilitate the vessel’s stay into NZT and an y 
subsequent arrival of vessels.  MPI proposes the following risk mitigation measures during the 
vessel’s entire stay within NZT to ensure that any potential biosecurity risks are effectively 
managed . 
Proposed On -board Risk goods management  
47. The CRMS proposes a requirement to manage on -board risk goods for the durations of  the 
vessel ’s stay within NZT , especially before the vessel reaches its intended port of first arrival 
where MPI inspectors are present .  This requirement ensures that all risk goods are secured on -
board the vessel thereby  reducing the potential for regulated pests  and biosecurity contamination  
from arriving in New Zealand .  This includes ensuring that wast e, rubbish or trash, food stuffs that 
do not meet Rule 170.6 of the New Zealand Maritime Protection Rules , and any domestic pets 
(for example birds, cats, dogs, fish and other domesticated animals) or house plants  are 
prevented from being disposed of  overb oard or otherwise leaving  the vessel except  for 
biosecurity clearance at a place of first arrival. In proposing this general requirement for potential 
risk goods on vessels, MPI is satisfied that all reasonable and practica ble steps are taken to 
manage the  all potential biosecurity risks (including unpredictable hitchhikers on cargo such as 
GAS (MAF, 2009) and Brown Marmorated Sink Bugs (App endix 1)) on vessels during its time 
within NZT without presenting undue disruption to their movement . 
48. This proposed r equirement is set out in clause 1.5(2) of the CRMS . 
  
Ministry For Primary Industries   Page 14 of 43 C)  Upon arriving in New Zealand  
49. In conjunction with the proposed general requirements triggered prior to and u pon entry into NZT , 
the proposed CRMS also has requirements that are triggered on arrival in  a New Zealand port  in 
order to facilitate the vessel’s stay in ports and NZT.  MPI proposes the following risk mitigation 
measures during  and after  a vessel’s arrival at a port to ensure that MPI can continu e to manage 
any potential biosecurity risks  while the vessel remains in NZT . 
Proposed on-board risk goods management  for short stay vessels  
50. The proposed CRMS  seeks to re -classify “coastwise vessels” as “short stay vessels”.  
51. The proposed requirements for short stay vessels ensure that the risk goods to remain on-board 
are secure d during the vessel’s entire stay within NZT.  In managing the risk goods that remain  
on-board in this manner (including dunnage, foodstuffs and garbage not destined to be imported 
into or disposed of in New Zealand), MPI is satis fied that the biosecurity risks associated with 
these risk goods have been mitigated to such an extent that they need not be removed from the 
vessel and disposed of.  
52. The CRMS proposes a requirement to manage risks goods on short stay vessels .  This can be  
achieved either with an inspector ’s approval for the secure manner in which risk goods are 
managed  on-board or that the risk goods are removed using  an approved system at a POFA .  
53. This proposed requirement is set out in clause 1. 5(2) of the CRMS . 
54. The prop osed CRMS is designed  to restrict the length of the stay to 2 1 days (or less ) and the 
movement of short stay vessels only to ports approved to receive vessels  and risk goods  from 
another country.  In restricting the length of stay and movement of short sta y vessels the CRMS 
ensures that:  
i. Vessels cannot stay indefinitely within NZT while retaining risk goods on board; and  
ii. Vessels only travels to approved ports with the right biosecurity systems in places to 
manage any biosecurity risk, should the need arise.   
55. In managing the length of stay and locations of vessels that are permitted to retain risk goods on 
board, MPI is satisfied that the opportunities for potential biosecurity risks arrival into New 
Zealand are mitigated to such an extent that further manage ment of these vessels  and risk goods  
(i.e. such as those for long stay vessels) is not considered necessary.  
56. This proposed requirement is set out in clause 2.1 of the CRMS . 
Proposed long stay vessels requirements  
57. Under the proposed requirements, operators or persons in charge of vessels that intend to be in 
NZT longer than 21 days or wish to visit places or ports not approved as places of first arrival will 
need to comply with the following.  Such vessels need to be  free of regulated pests and  
biosecurity c ontamination , and obtain a written CRMS compliance certificate from an inspector.   
By ensuring that every practical  step has been taken to remove all biosecurity risks from the 
vessel in a secure and approved manner and location, MPI is satisfied that bios ecurity risks have 
been mitigated to such an extent that the vessel can be released from biosecurity monitoring.  
58. To ensure that the operators or persons in charge of a vessel do not delay obtaining a written 
compliance certificate to the extent that it inc reases the potential for biosecurity risks arriving in 
New Zealand, the CRMS  propose s a 21 day limit before MPI will take further action  to mitigate on 
board risk goods.  
59. This proposed requirement is set out in clause 2.2 of the CRMS.   
Ministry For Primary Industries   Page 15 of 43    
Ministry For Primary Industries   Page 16 of 43 Feasibility and prac ticality of the proposed risk mitigation 
measures  
Proposed Information requirements  
61. Most of the proposed information requirements are already part of the existing arrival procedures .  
The only changes include the length of stay in New Zealand and for those  vessels affected by the 
increased AGM source area.  
62. Currently, all the  pre-arrival and voyage  information is collected via the Master’s Declaration and 
Advanced Notice of Arrival forms  which are  available on MPI’s website.  The proposed CRMS 
does not alter  the method with which MPI collects the arrival information, rather MPI anticipates 
the addition to or alteration of questions in the existing forms; similar to:  
i. Adding a question about the length of stay in NZT.  The CRMS assumes that vessels will 
stay le ss than 2 1 consecutive days as the vast majority of vessels visiting New Zealand 
are short stay commercial vessels.  As a result the forms will ask vessel operators to 
indicate if they intend to stay for more than 2 1 consecutive days.  
ii. Altering questions re lating to AGM to include Japan, China and Korea as AGM source 
countries and their respective risk periods.  This will include asking operators to indicate 
whether they have obtained a certificate of freedom if they have visited any of the source 
countries within their risk period.  
63. As such, MPI does not consider the proposed information requirements to significantly alter the 
existing arrival procedures and thus will only a very minor effect on vessel operators.  
Proposed requirements for risk goods  
64. Risk good s on vessels have been managed under the Biosecurity Act 1993 since it come into 
force on 1 October 1993.  For vessels arriving in New Zealand this has meant either securing risk 
goods on board in an appropriate manner or removing risk goods through an app roved process  
at a POFA.  Such risk goods are  either dispos ed of, re -shipp ed or import ed under the 
requirements of an import health standard.  These arrival procedures were clarified in the 
Operational Standard issued in 2007.   
65. While the proposed CRMS ref ers to risk goods generically rather than listing specific risks as in 
the operational standard, it does not significantly alter existing arrival procedures for vessels in 
regards to risk goods management.  The proposed CRMS will continue to enable some ri sk 
goods to remain secured on board vessels that stay in NZT for a short time .  Otherwise  risk 
goods are removed from the vessel through an approved process  at a POFA.  Such risk goods 
are either disposed of, re -shipped or imported under the requirements o f an import health 
standard .  All of which are existing options .  
66. Currently , vessels that only stay for a limited time in NZT are classed as “coastwise vessels’ and 
have the ability to retain risk goods on board during their stay.  Under the proposed CRMS these 
vessels will be classed “short stay vessels” and have the ability to retain risk goods on board.  
Coastwise vessel are currently limited to only visiting ports approved as places of first arrival due 
to the risk goods that remain on board  and this wi ll be the same under the proposed 
requirements for short stay vessel.  The only proposed alteration to the procedures for short stay 
vessels is that the proposed CRMS has defined the limited time they can remain in NZT as up to 
21 consecutive days  only.  The 21 day limit is proposed as it is consistent with the requirements 
of the CRMS Biofouling issued in 2014 and that will come into force in 2018. 
67. If vessel operators intend to stay longer than the 2 1 consecutive days or visit places  that are  not 
POFAs, th en the proposed CRMS requires them to have all the risk goods obtain biosecurity  
Ministry For Primary Industries   Page 17 of 43 clearance or be removed via an approved process  at a POFA and vessel compliance confirmed 
by an inspector.   
68. Currently , vessels that stay for a long periods in NZT are classed  as “fully cleared vessels” and 
these have the ability to visit non POFAs during their stay in NZT.  The proposed CRMS will class 
these vessels as “long stay vessels”.   Under the current procedures, vessels that either stay for 
long periods or visit place s not approved as a POFA are required to have all risk goods managed 
appropriately.  This is by having risk goods removed or obtaining  biosecurity clearance for them 
at a POFA and then obtain ing vessel clearance from an inspector to travel freely within NZ T.  The 
CRMS does not propose to change s this process.  The proposed requirement will still require all 
risk goods to be removed or obtain biosecurity clearance, then obtain confirmation of compliance 
with the CRMS from an inspector before the vessel can m ove freely within NZT.  The only 
difference in the proposed CRMS is in terminology, where  the term  “clearance” becomes 
“compliance”.  
69. As such, MPI does not consider the proposed requirements for risk goods to significantly alter the 
existing arrival procedu res and thus having only a minor effect on vessel operators.  
 
Asian Gypsy Moth  
70. AGM is an regulated species  of significance  in New Zealand ( MAF, 2008 ) and the pathways 
AGM is known to be associated with have been managed in some form since 1992 (NAPPO, 
2009 ) and 1993 (New Zealand) .  Internationally Japan, Korea, Far East Russia and China have 
been recognised as source countries of AGM  on vessels , with Canada, Chile, Mexico and United 
States of America having established mitigation measures for vessels that h ave visited ports in 
any of the kn own source countries during their flight seasons ( NAPPO, 2009 ). 
71. As a result of the known biosecurity risk AGM poses , New Zealand has had an AGM risk 
mitigation and monitoring program me since 1993, which enabled the detecti on and eradication of 
AGM from New Zealand in 2005.  
72. Since 1993 New Zealand has been successfully managing  the AGM risk from Far East Russia 
with the Russian Federations’ Federal Services for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Surveillance by 
requiring certificat es of freedom of AGM prior to vessel arrival  in NZT .   
73. In order to further manage  the known AGM risks, MPI begun informally requesting and accepting 
certificates of freedom of AGM from the Japanese (2010), Korean and Chinese (2015) inspection 
bodies recogn ised by National Plant Protection Agencies of North America  Organisation 
(NAPPO) .  The proposed requirements seek to formalise these informal requirements.  
74. In alignment  with NAPPO  and the national regulatory agency of Chile AGM requirements  
(NAPPO, 2009, SAG, 2013 ), the proposed risk management  measures of the proposed CRMS  
MPI will be  continuing New Zealand’s AGM risk management  policy to reduce the risk of any 
future introductions of AGM.   In harmonis ing the proposed  requirements with those of the 
NAPPO  (NAPPO, 2009 ) as much as possible , MPI will reduce  the impact  on the movement of 
vessels and international trade .   
75. While MPI acknowledges that the proposed AGM requirements will require some vessel 
operators to alter some of their procedures prior to arriving in  New Zealand, Canada, Chile, 
Mexico and the United State of America have similar requirements for AGM.  Many vessels that 
visit New Zealand also visit these countries and MPI does not consider its proposed AGM 
requirements to be impractical or to unj ustifiably impede  the movement of such vessels.  
  
Ministry For Primary Industries   Page 18 of 43 Summary  
76. In developing the CRMS MPI gave due consideration to:  
i. New Zealand’s existing vessel arrival requirements (in terms of practicality and 
effectiveness);  
ii. changes to international requirements for vesse ls; 
iii. the biosecurity risks to New Zealand associated with  the vessel pathway; and  
iv. the practical implications of proposed requirements on the industry and trade.  
77. In proposing these requirements for all vessels, MPI is satisfied that all practicable steps  will be 
taken  to mitigate the presence of regulated pest s and biosecurity contamination under the 
Biosecurity Act 1993.  These include unpredictable hitchhikers, those associated with micro -
climates on a vessel, those associated with the vessel only, and thos e associated with the cargo 
on vessels arriving in New Zealand.  
78. The proposed CRMS requirements are considered to be consistent with other standards that 
relate to the arrival of vessels in New Zealand, including the IHS Ballast Water, CRM S Biofouling, 
Place of First Arrival Standard and the Standard for General Transitional Facilities for Uncleared 
Goods.  
79. MPI considers there to be significant scientific justification in proposing these requirements in 
order to protect New Zealand from regulated pests and bi osecurity contamination while still 
enabling international trade and vessel movement, as is required for a member of the WTO and 
signatory of the SPS Agreement.  
  
Ministry For Primary Industries   Page 19 of 43 References  
 
MAF (2007) Import Risk Analysis: Vehicle and Machinery. Ministry of Agriculture a nd Forestry, 
Wellington, New Zealand  
MAF (2008); Pest risk analysis for six moth species. Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 
Wellington, New Zealand.  
MAF (2009 ) Vessel survey risk analysis. U npublished report  from the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Forestr y, Wellington, New Zealand  
MPI (2015) The likelihood of establishment of Brown marmorated stink bug in the New Zealand 
autumn/winter period. Ministry for Primary Industries, Wellington, New Zealand.  
MPI (2012) Risk analysis of Halyomorpha halys (brown marm orated stink bug) on all pathways. 
Ministry for Primary Industries, Wellington, New Zealand.  
NAPPO (2009). RSPM 33: Guidelines for Regulating the Movement of Ships and Cargo from 
Areas Infested with the Asian Gypsy Moth. North American Plant Protection Org anisation.  
Ross, M G July (2005). Response to a gypsy moth incursion within New Zealand. 
http://www.b3.net.nz/gerda/refs/18.pdf  
SAG (2013). Exempt Resolution No 4412/2013, Phytosanitary entry requireme nts for vessels 
from areas with Asian gypsy moth (AGM) presence (Lymantria dispar Asiatica Vnukovskij  AND 
Lymantria dispar  Japonica (Motschulsky) ( Lepidoptera, Lymantriidae ).  Agriculture and Livestock 
Service (SAG), Ministry of Agriculture, Government of Chile.   
http://www.leychile.cl/Navegar?idNorma=1053556&idVersion=2014 -02-12 
 
 
  
Ministry For Primary Industries   Page 20 of 43 Definitions  and Acronyms  
Unless a term has a specific definition listed below, then the mean ing should be taken to be the same 
as that found in section 2 of the Biosecurity Act 1993.  
 
Asian Gypsy Moth (AGM)  means all life stages of the following species of Asian Gypsy Moth 
Lymantria dispar asiatica, Lymantria dispar japonica, Lymantria umbrosa, L ymantria albescens  and 
Lymantria postalba . 
Approved system  means a system approved as part of the approval of a place of first arrival under 
section 37 of the Act.  
New Zealand territory (NZT)  means the land and the waters enclosed by the outer limits of th e 
territorial sea.  Where territorial sea has the meaning given to it in section 3  of the Territorial Sea, 
Contiguous Zone, and Exclusive Econo mic Zone Act 1977.  
Place of first arrival (POFA)  means a seaport that has been approved under section 37 of the Act 
as a place of first arrival for vessels and risk goods.  
Regulated pest and biosecurity contamination  means a risk good not intended for cle arance 
under the Act. For the purposes of this CRMS the following are examples of regulated pests and 
biosecurity contamination that are managed by this CRMS:  
Domestic waste and the vacuums from cabin, deck, hold and other internal areas;  
 Domestic waste a nd the vacuums from cabin, deck, hold and other internal areas  
 Animals and plants and parts thereof (for example, fruit, house plants, floral arrangements, 
animal and plant waste);  
 Soil; 
 spillage from previous cargo in the hold; and  
 Pests and their materia l such as nests or egg masses.  
Risk area means a country or an area of a country that a vessel may have visited where 
contamination with AGM is likely to occur. If a vessel visits one or more of these areas during the risk 
period the CRMS imposes requireme nts on a vessel operator to obtain certification of freedom from 
AGM after visiting there; and listed in column 1 of Table 1 (Schedule 2).  
Risk goods :  as defined in section 2 of the Act.  For the purposes of this CRMS the following are 
examples of risk g oods that are managed by this CRMS:  
 Uncleared goods or cargo (for example cargo destined for another country and spillage 
from previous cargo in the hold); and  
 Wood packaging (for example dunnage).  
Risk period  means the period in respect to a risk area whe n a visiting vessel is likely to become 
contaminated with AGM due to it being the time for flight and egg laying by the female adults; and 
listed in column 3 of Table 1 (Schedule 2).   
Secured means prevented from leaving or being removed from the vessel, including being removed 
by birds or vermin or prevented from releasing organisms that may establish in New Zealand. 
Appropriate methods of securing risk goods include the cook preventing access to prohibited food  
Ministry For Primary Industries   Page 21 of 43 items; garbage being kept in a leak -proof, vermin, insect and bird proof container or room; 
contaminated dunnage being kept inside a locker.  
Substantially clean  means substantially free of rubbish, uncontained food, standing water, insects, 
rodents and other pest -type organisms (including their nes ts and other signs).  
Valid certificate of freedom from AGM  means a document that certifies that the vessel is free of 
AGM and that is:  
 issued by  an inspection body that has been approved by the DG and  listed  on the website 
at the time the certificate was i ssued ; and  
 based on an inspection undertaken by that inspection body:  
 during daylights hours on the same day as the vessel departs from the risk area; or  
 at a later time outside the risk period; or  
 after the vessel has departed from the risk area.  
 
Vessel  means a ship as defined in the Maritime Transport Act 1994.  
Written CRMS Compliance  means an official document issued by an inspector that confirms, that at 
time of inspection, the vessel meets the requirements of the CRMS and clears the vessel from 
biose curity monitoring . 
 
Acronyms  
Act  Biosecurity Act, 1993.  
AGM   Asian Gypsy Moth  
CRMS  Craft Risk Management Standard  
MPI  Ministry for Primary Industries  
NZT  New Zealand Territory  
POFA  Place of First Arrival  
  
Ministry For Primary Industries   Page 22 of 43 Appendix 1 - Technical advice on: Review and u pdate of risk 
analyses related to vessels (above water)  
 
Date: 10 Dec 2015  
Name: Melanie Newfield  
Position: Manager Plants and Pathways risk assessment  
Purpose of document : 
A Craft Risk Management Standard has been drafted for vessels and will be released for consultation 
in December 2015 or January 2016. There are risk analyses supporting this standard, but they are 
relatively old. These risk analyses are the pest risk assessment for Asian gypsy moth (MAF 2008) and 
the pathway risk assessment for vessels ( MAF 2009).In addition, there are other pieces of work which 
cover the period since the risk analyses, including the brown marmorated stink bug risk analysis, 
technical advice on Asian gypsy moth and records from the emerging risk system.  
This document summ arises all the new information and is intended to be included as an appendix in 
the risk management proposal.  
Summary : 
 The scope of the 2008 risk analysis for Asian gypsy moth (AGM) was defined as forms of L. 
dispar “from Eastern Asia with predominantly fl ying females”. The geographical area considered 
was Japan, China, the Korean Peninsula and Russia west of the Ural Mountains.  
 The taxonomy of Lymantria dispar has been updated and the definition of AGM used in the 
2008 risk analysis includes:  
o Lymantria dis par asiatica  Vnukovskij  
o Lymantria dispar japonica  (Motschulsky)  
o Lymantria umbrosa  (Butler)  
o Lymantria albescens  Hori and Umeno  
o Lymantria postalba  Inoue  
 Some new information has been published on the seasonality of the risk of Asian gypsy moth. 
While there i s a lower risk of Asian gypsy moth establishing during the New Zealand winter, the 
information is not sufficient to determine a season of minimal risk.  
 Some new hitchhiker pests have been identified which are potentially associated with the vessel 
pathway.  All of these fit within the existing grouping in the vessels risk analysis, indicating that 
the risk analysis is still relevant.  
 The brown marmorated stink bug (Halyomorpha halys) is the most important emerging risk 
associated with the vessels pathway. It  is most likely to occur on vessels when brought on in 
cargo.  
 
  
Ministry For Primary Industries   Page 23 of 43 Advice : 
Updated taxonomy for Asian gypsy moth  
The most recent MPI pest risk analysis for AGM (MAF 2008) was based on the taxonomy of 
Schintlmeister (2004). Schintlmeister (2004) distinguished only L. dispar dispar  and L. dispar  japonica . 
Because this taxonomy was too broad to be useful for the risk analysis, the scope was narrowed to 
specific biological traits and geographical areas.  
The scope of the MPI risk analysis was defined as forms of L. dispar  “from Eastern Asia with 
predominantly flying females”. The geographical area considered was Japan, China, the Korean 
Peninsula and Russia west of the Ural Mountains (MPI 2008).  
A taxonomic review of the genus Lymantria  by Pogue and Schaefer (2007) became available at 
around the same time as the MPI risk analysis was completed. The risk analysis did not take that 
review into account. However since then, that review has been widely accepted and incorporated into 
regulations for the management of Asian  gypsy moth.  
Using the taxonomy of Pogue and Schaefer (2007), the following species fit the definition of AGM used 
in the MPI risk analysis:  
 Lymantria dispar asiatica  
 Lymantria dispar japonica  
 Lymantria umbrosa  
 Lymantria albescens  
 Lymantria postalba  
This definition of AGM is consistent with that used in the regulations of other countries, for example the 
USA and Canada (NAPPO 2009).  
Seasonality of AGM  
MPI’s pest risk analysis for AGM (MAF 2008) recognises that the spring period when deciduous host 
trees are leafing out is the most likely time for establishment of AGM in New Zealand. However it 
concludes that establishment cannot be ruled out at other times. Based on the available information at 
that time, hatching time was considered difficult to predic t, due to different phenology dependent on 
the latitude and different weather conditions, as well as the unpredictable conditions that egg masses 
will have been exposed to prior to arrival in New Zealand (depending on the route of the ship and 
conditions i n transit).  
Since that time further models have been published indicating variation in the seasonal risk of Asian 
gypsy moth (e.g., Pitt et al. 2007, Gray 2010).  
The work of Pitt et al. (2007), based on European gypsy moth ( Lymantria dispar dispar ) in Nort h 
America, looked at establishment in parts of Canada and New Zealand following adult emergence at 
different times of year. Their work does indicate a period of minimal risk. The period when 
establishment was unlikely according to the model ran from mid -June to mid -September in the North 
Island of New Zealand (about 3 months), while in the South Island it is slightly longer, starting earlier 
and ending later. The New Zealand results were compared with results from the area of Canada with a 
similar climate t ype to New Zealand (New Brunswick, Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island). The 
results from Canada showed a much longer period when establishment was unlikely – from the end of  
Ministry For Primary Industries   Page 24 of 43 October until the start of May (about 7 months). Note that the model was based o n dates of adult 
emergence, and the dates need to be earlier to consider arriving egg masses.  
Based on the model, the period of minimal risk for egg arrival in New Zealand runs from about mid -
April to mid -July. 
Although Pitt et al. (2007) do indicate a per iod of minimal risk, they indicate that the model may 
underestimate the risk when applied to AGM, based on differences in diapause and egg  hatch. 
Depending on the differences among species which make up AGM, this period of minimal risk may be 
shorter or lo nger. Overall though, the model indicated that New Zealand does appear to have a much 
longer period suitable for establishment of L. dispar  than does Canada.  
There are additional reasons to think that Pitt et al. (2007) may have underestimated the suitable  time 
period. The model makes the specific assumption that host plants are deciduous and therefore 
unavailable during mid -winter. However at least some species of AGM have evergreen hosts such as 
Eucalyptus spp. which are common in New Zealand (e.g. see Ma tsuki et al. 2011, MAF 2008).  
Gray (2010) considered the likelihood of eggs hatching from ships and cargo shipped from Japan to 
New Zealand. His model also shows a seasonal pattern, with eggs on cargo arriving directly from Kobe 
hatching in New Zealand in November and December, with egg hatch completed before January. The 
model doesn’t quite match the New Zealand experience with L. umbrosa , which was detected as an 
adult in March and assessed as most likely to have hatched in January (Ross 2006). However gi ven 
that L. umbrosa  occurs at higher latitudes that Kobe (Hokkaido northwards), a later egg hatch is not 
unlikely.  
The model of Gray (2010) notes that eggs on ships which do not leave the northern hemisphere would 
not hatch until spring of the following ye ar. It doesn’t indicate what would happen if ships with egg 
masses stayed in the northern hemisphere for a period of time before travelling to New Zealand.  
Together the two models are indicative of a period when there are unlikely to be viable eggs on ship s 
and when hatched eggs are unlikely to survive. However they indicate that this period is likely to be 
much shorter than in the northern hemisphere, perhaps as short as three months. There is also still 
significant uncertainty due to the scope and assumpt ions of the models.  
As a result, there is currently insufficient evidence to define a season when arriving AGM egg masses 
are unlikely to establish. There are some references indicating that a “minimal risk” season may exist. 
These references also indicate  that if there is a “minimal risk” season, it is much shorter for the 
southern hemisphere than it is for the northern hemisphere.  
New pests since the vessels risk analysis  
The vessels risk analysis (MAF 2009 unpublished report) was one of a relatively smal l number of risk 
analyses done for “inanimate” pathways, rather than biological commodities like fresh produce or 
animal products. For most risk analyses the hazard identification is based on pest -commodity 
associations recorded in the scientific literatur e. Because associations between pests and inanimate 
pathways (often termed “hitchhiker” associations) are seldom recorded in the scientific literature, the 
hazard identification was based on interception records.  
The pests recorded in the interception reco rds were classified into five groups according to their 
method of association with ships. The five groups and the examples assessed are summarised in the 
table below.   
Ministry For Primary Industries   Page 25 of 43 Table 1  Characteristics of groups of hazards associated with vessels above the water line  
Grouping  Characteristics  Example organisms  
Human -associated 
hitchhikers  * can complete its life cycle entirely in human -
modified environments;  
* can enter a vessel by any means and then 
establish long term ship -board populations.  Latrodectus geometricus  
(brown widow spider) 
Hemidactylus frenatus  (Asian 
house gecko) Paratrechina 
longicornis  (crazy ant)  
 
Vessel micro -habitat -
associated hitchhikers  
 * have specific habitat requirements for at least 
part of the life cycle;  
* can enter a vessel by any means , but will 
only survive if the specific habitat requirements 
are met on the vessel;  
* the presence of these habitats aids 
predictions of an association between a risk 
organism and the vessel.  Culex annulirostris  (mosquito)  
 
Aggregated vessel 
jumpers  
 * association with a vessel and means of 
getting off it in New Zealand is through the 
organisms’ own propulsion;  
* have life history traits that result in 
aggregation.  
 Agrotis infusa  (bogong moth) 
Lymantria dispar  (Asian gypsy 
moth)  Coccinella transversali s 
(transverse ladybird)  
 
Cargo -associated 
hitchhikers  
 * have specific host or habitat associations for 
much of their life cycle, but also have a life 
stage that can survive periods away from their 
host and which can be transported;  
* get on and off a v essel in association with 
cargo.    Achatina fulica  (giant African 
snail)  
 
Unpredictable 
hitchhikers  
 * the circumstances behind the association 
with vessels do not follow a discernible pattern;  
* for vessels, the common features are flight 
ability and o ccurrence in sufficiently small 
numbers that establishment is unlikely.  Gryllodes sigillatus  (tropical 
house cricket)  
The grouping of the pests was aimed at covering all types of pests associated with vessels above the 
waterline. It allows the risk analys is to be robust even if there are new pests recorded, unless those 
pests do not fit into the existing categories.  
Table 2  Alerts to the emerging risk system which are relevant to the vessels risk analysis (MPI 
unpublished data, Sep 2012 -Nov 2015)  
Emerging risk alert  Group  
 
Seasonal outbreaks or increased populations of Asian gypsy moth, 
multiple alerts.  Aggregated vessel jumpers  
Vineyard snail ( Cernuella virgata ) – increased awareness of this species 
as a risk to New Zealand. Recognised as a hitchhiker on cargo.  Cargo -associated hitchhikers  
Spread of brown widow spider ( Latrodectus geometricus ) to new 
countries. Recognised as a hitchhiker on a range of inanimate pathways.  Human -associated hitchhikers  
 
Spread of Turkestan cockroach ( Blatta lateralis ) in the USA. Able to live in 
houses and other buildings.  Human -associated hitchhikers  
Yellow spotted stink bug ( Erthesina fullo ) detected at the New Zealand 
border. Has some life history traits indicating it may be a hitchhiker.  Cargo -associated hitchhiker s  
Spread of brown marmorated stink bug ( Halyomorpha  Cargo -associated hitchhikers   
Ministry For Primary Industries   Page 26 of 43 halys ), multiple alerts.  
Spread of tiger mosquito ( Aedes albopictus ) to new  
countries. A container -breeding mosquito.  Vessel micro -habitat -
associated hitchhikers.  
Portuguese millipede ( Ommatoiulus moreletii ) outbreaks reported in 
Australia. Reported as a hitchhiker in passenger baggage and some 
cargo.  Cargo -associated hitchhikers  
 
All of the hitchhiker alerts in the emerging risk system fit within the groups identifie d in the 2009 risk 
analysis, indicating that the risk analysis is still applicable to the types of pests associated with vessels.  
Brown marmorated stink bug  
The most important new hitchhiker pest to emerge since the vessels risk analysis was done is the 
brown marmorated stink bug ( Halyomorpha halys ). The brown marmorated stink bug was considered 
briefly at the time of the vessels risk analysis but at this point there was limited information about it. It 
was considered to be one of the species that fitted in to the “aggregated vessel jumpers” group, given 
its aggregation behaviour and flight ability.  
Brown marmorated stink bug has some of the traits associated with the aggregated vessel jumpers 
group of hitchhikers. As stated in the 2012 pest risk analysis (MA F 2012), it:  
 is usually associated with a wide range of plant species  
 has adults which aggregate away from host plants in the autumn  
 enters diapause and can then survive for months away from the their host plants  
 has sufficient flight ability to fly onto v essels.  
However the aggregation usually occurs relatively close to host plants, for example a number of recent 
vehicle interceptions came from factories directly adjacent to soybean fields (MPI unpublished data). It 
therefore doesn’t meet the criterion for  aggregated vessel jumpers that “association with a vessel 
depends on the location of the vessel in relation to the critical life stage which is transported”.  
In addition to a number of emerging risk alerts, an all pathway pest risk analysis has been condu cted 
on the brown marmorated stink bug (MAF 2012). The pest risk analysis considered vessels (vessel 
holds) and aircraft as a pathway for brown marmorated stink bug. Brown marmorated stink bug was 
considered most likely to get onto vessels and into vessel holds by being transported on cargo and 
then moving from that cargo in transit. This  
conclusion was based on the limited likelihood of a vessel or aircraft being adjacent to areas 
containing host plants.  
The 2012 pest risk analysis conclusions indicate tha t brown marmorated stink bug best fits into the 
category of cargo -associated hitchhikers. Recent interceptions of brown marmorated stink bug in 
association with used vehicles and machinery, or in ship holds carrying used vehicles and machinery 
(summarised in MPI 2015) support the conclusion that brown marmorated stink bug fits into the cargo -
associated group of hitchhikers.  
 
 
  
Ministry For Primary Industries   Page 27 of 43 References  
Gray, D. R. (2010). Hitchhikers on trade routes: A phenology model estimates the probabilities of 
gypsy moth introduction  and establishment. Ecological Applications, 20(8), 2300 -2309.  
MAF (2008); Pest risk analysis for six moth species. Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, Wellington, 
New Zealand.  
MAF (2009) Vessel survey risk analysis. unpublished report  
MPI (2015) The lik elihood of establishment of Brown marmorated stink bug in the New Zealand 
autumn/winter period. Ministry for Primary Industries, Wellington, New Zealand.  
MPI (2012) Risk analysis of Halyomorpha halys (brown marmorated stink bug) on all pathways. 
Ministry f or Primary Industries, Wellington, New Zealand.  
Matsuki, M., Kay, N., Serin, J., & Scott, J. K. (2011). Variation in the ability of larvae of phytophagous 
insects to develop on evolutionarily unfamiliar plants: a study with gypsy moth Lymantria dispar and 
Eucalyptus. Agricultural and Forest Entomology, 13(1), 1 -13. 
NAPPO (2009). RSPM 33: Guidelines for Regulating the Movement of Ships and Cargo from Areas 
Infested with the Asian Gypsy Moth. North American Plant Protection Organisation.  
Pitt, J. P. W., Régni ère, J., & Worner, S. (2007). Risk assessment of the gypsy moth, Lymantria dispar 
(L), in New Zealand based on phenology modelling. International journal of biometeorology, 51(4), 
295-305. 
Pogue, M. G., & Schaefer, P. W. (2007). A review of selected specie s of Lymantria Hübner [1819] 
including three new species (Lepidoptera: Noctuidae: Lymantriinae). United States Department of 
Agriculture, Forest Health Technology Enterprise Team, USA, 223.  
Ross, M G July (2005). Response to a gypsy moth incursion within N ew Zealand. 
http://www.b3.net.nz/gerda/refs/18.pdf  
Schintlmeister, A. (2004). The taxonomy of the genus Lymantria Hubner, [1819] (Lepidoptera: 
Lymantriidae). Quadrifina 7: 1 -248. 
   
Ministry For Primary Industries   Page 28 of 43 Appendix 2  
 
Extract from MAF Biosecurity New Zealand’s unpublished:  
Data A nalysis,  
Survey, and Risk Analysis  
Teams  
Vessel Monitoring Survey and Risk  
Analysis  
March 2009 - June 2009  
BMR 08 –09/05  
 
Section 7: Risk Analysis pages 27 -35 
   
Ministry For Primary Industries   Page 29 of 43 7  Risk Analysis  
 
The draft standard for vessel clearance instigates a more risk-targeted approa ch to 
biosecurity inspection and management  (MAFBNZ, 2007). Vessel inspectors will 
specifically search areas of vessels that past compliance records, profiling and intelligence 
indicate as high risk.  
 
To implement this approach, the above -water as well as  below -water biosecurity risk from 
vessels arriving in New Zealand needs to be understood. Further, the organisms that pose a 
biosecurity risk on this pathway need to be identified in addition to the vessels likely to carry 
them.  Organisms associated with the above -water parts of vessels are hitch -hiker organisms, 
that is, they have an opportunistic association with the vessel rather than a biological host 
relationship. Because vessels are a hitch -hiker pathway, literature reviews are of limited 
value in de termining which organisms may pose a biosecurity risk. Instead, records of 
organisms intercepted during the course of vessel inspections or surveys are essential to 
provide evidence of an association between an organism and the pathway and its ability to 
survive translocation to New Zealand. Interception records used in combination with 
information about the biology of the organisms enables the most likely types of organism to 
be associated with vessels to be determined and allows the identification of repr esentative/ 
example species.  
 
The results of the vessel survey, the vessel organism identification study and historical 
interception records from vessels provide the data to enable potential hazard organisms to be 
identified. For this analysis, these inter ception records have been used to identify groups of 
organisms with similar characteristics. Example species in each group of organisms have 
been subjected to more detailed assessment, to determine whether there is a risk worth 
managing. Note that this ana lysis only addresses biosecurity hazards above the water line. 
Hazards associated with biofouling and ballast water are considered elsewhere.  
 
The vessel survey has demonstrated that vessels have a large number and varying types of 
organisms associated wit h them. However, these organisms are only likely to be a 
biosecurity risk if they have a mechanism for regular association with the vessel pathway 
and a means of departing the vessel whilst it is close to shore in New Zealand. These two 
factors have been u sed to group the intercepted organisms.  Table 1 outlines the 
characteristics of the groups, and Annex 1 allocates all live organisms intercepted during the 
vessel survey to one of these groups. Grouping is a means to understand a nd effectively 
manage the risk posed by a large range of organisms. It helps separate hitch -hikers that are 
regularly associated with the pathway from the very occasional ones. It takes account of 
organisms that have not been detected in the course of the short duration survey but may be a 
biosecurity risk. The identification of risk factors, using example organisms for each group, 
should make the analysis robust for other organisms with similar characteristics. The groups 
are not absolute: they merely prov ide a means of understanding the different types of hitch -
hiker likely to be associated with vessels.  
 
 
27      Data Analysis, Survey and Risk Analysis Teams    Vessel Survey and Risk Analysis   Mar 2009 – June 2009  
 
   
Ministry For Primary Industries   Page 30 of 43 Table 1 Chara cteristics of groups of potential hazards associated with vessels above the water line  
Grouping  Characteristics  Example organisms  Number 
of 
samples  
Human -
associated 
hitch -hiker s - can complete its life cycle entirely in human -modified environments;  
- can ente r a vessel by any means and then establish long term ship -
board populations.  Latrodectus geometricus 
(brown widow spider)  
Hemidactylus frenatus  
(Asian house gecko)  
Paratrechina longicornis  
(crazy ant)  554 
Vessel micro -
habitat 
associated 
hitch -hiker s 
 - have  specific habitat requirements for at least part of the life cycle;  
- can enter a vessel by any means, but will only survive if the specific 
habitat requirements are met on the vessel;  
- the presence of these habitats aids predictions of an association 
between  a risk organism and the vessel.  Culex annulirostris  
(mosquito)  
 316 
Aggregated 
vessel jumpers  
 - have specific host or habitat associations for much of their life cycle, 
but also have a life stage that can survive periods away from their host 
and which can  be transported;  
- association with a vessel depends on the location of the vessel in 
relation to the critical life stage which is transported;  
- association with a vessel and means of getting off it in New Zealand is 
through the organisms’ own propulsion;  
- have life history traits that result in aggregation.  Agrotis infusa  (bogong 
moth)  
Lymantria dispar (Asian 
gypsy moth)  
Coccinella transversalis  
(transverse ladybird)  173 
Cargo -
associated 
hitch -hiker s 
 - have specific host or habitat associations for much of t heir life cycle, 
but also have a life stage that can survive periods away from their host 
and which can be transported;  
- get on and off a vessel in association with cargo.   Achatina fulica (giant 
African snail)  
5 
Unpredictable 
hitch -hiker s 
 - the circumstan ces behind the association with vessels do not follow a 
discernable pattern;  
- for vessels, the common features are flight ability and occurrence in 
sufficiently small numbers that establishment is unlikely.  Gryllodes sigillatus (tropical 
house cricket)  122 
 
The risk from at least one example organism in each group is assessed, more where the range 
of biology within the group is diverse. Well known, high consequence organisms are 
selected as examples where possible. It is assumed that risk management for the se species 
will also manage risks associated with other species in the same group. If hitch -hikers are 
later identified that have not been assessed and are not likely to be managed under the 
identified approaches, further assessment will be needed.  
 
Optio ns for managing the risk from biosecurity hazards identified on this pathway are 
considered below.  
 
 
Data Analysis, Survey and Risk Analysis Teams    Vessel Survey and Risk Analysis   Mar 2009 – June 2009                           28 
  
Ministry For Primary Industries   Page 31 of 43 7.1 Human associated organisms  
Some organisms can complete their entire life cycle in anthropogenic environments with no 
requirement to be associated with host plants or other features of the natural environment. 
They are frequent hitch -hikers on inanimate pathways (e.g. Biose curity New Zealand, 
2007a). They can enter a vessel by a variety of means and establish a long -term population 
on board a vessel.  
Potential hazards within the group of human associated hitch -hikers that establish a 
population on a vessel include: many spi ders, reptiles and social insects particularly ants, as 
well as less visible organisms such as earwigs (Annex 1).  
Risk assessments for Latrodectus geometricus, brown widow spider, Hemidactylus frenatus, 
Asian house gecko and Paratrechina longicornis, crazy ant were undertaken  as examples of 
this group.  
Conclusion of the risk assessments  
Latrodectus geometricus  appears to establish populations on board vessels. It is only likely 
to enter New Zealand from vessels in association with cargo or containers infe sted while 
being transported in a vessel. This likelihood is considered to be low and the likelihood of 
establishment in New Zealand is high in restricted parts of New Zealand. The consequences 
of establishment are non -negligible.   
The risks from Hemidact ylus frenatus and Paratrechina longicornis  on vessels are similar to 
that from L. geometricus.  
Overall, the risk for the human associated group of organisms on the vessel pathway is much 
lower than it is for the same organisms on other pathways, such as im ported vehicles or 
containers. This is because of the low likelihood of these organisms departing a vessel and 
getting to a location in New Zealand where the organism is able to establish. However, the 
risk is such that risk management options are worth co nsidering.  
Opportunities for risk management  
Populations of some organisms, particularly cockroaches and ants, in the human associated 
group of potential biosecurity hazards are already being managed in the inhabited parts of 
some vessels. It may be diffic ult to further manage the risk from these organisms. Options 
include control of on -board populations, or preventing the organisms getting on and off the 
ship. For either option it is first necessary to identify the vessels for which management is 
required.  
Since organisms in this group establish ship -board populations, voyage characteristics of the 
vessel and the type and origin of the cargo are irrelevant. Visual inspection is not an 
effective way to detect these organisms. This is because many spiders and  geckos are 
nocturnal and actively hide from sources of light. Other organisms are difficult to detect, 
particularly in the hold of a vessel. For instance, very few spiders and ants were detected 
during the organism identification study. The routine vessel  inspections in that study did not 
include holds.  
However, examination of vessel contamination rates indicates that the overall level of 
infestation of a vessel may be used as an indicator to identify the vessels most likely to be  
29        Data Analysis,  Survey and Risk Analysis Teams    Vessel Survey and Risk Analysis   Mar 2009 – June 2009  
   
Ministry For Primary Industries   Page 32 of 43 infested with spiders and ants, and conversely that the presence of spiders, ants or 
cockroaches is likely to be an indicator that the vessel is infested with other organisms 
(Figure 1). Therefore, visual inspection for overall contamination rates can be used to 
indicate the vessels that are highest risk for this group  
Figure 1  Relationship between Ar aneae, Blattodea and Hymenoptera and other orders found during the 
vessel survey.  
 
Visual inspection of holds to identify the most highly infested vessels may be practical. Only 
six out of the 66 surveyed vessels fit the description of “highly infested” ( defined as having 
more than 50 contaminants). These vessels could be flagged for more intensive management 
using baits, traps or general cleaning. Alternatively the ships could be required to be 
fumigated.  
Managing the risk from geckos on vessels is a par ticular challenge. They are likely to have 
been under -recorded in the survey due to their nocturnal nature and lack of association with 
obvious signs, such as webbing (by which many nocturnal spiders are detected). The vessels 
in which geckos were found in  the survey are not, with one exception, those with high levels 
of other contaminants. On the basis of current information, profiling vessels to identify those 
likely to be higher risk for geckos is not possible. Given the uncertainty about consequence 
and the low likelihood of entry via vessels, this may be considered acceptable.  
7.2    Organisms associated with micro habitats on a vessel  
Some hitch -hikers have specific habitat requirements for at least part of their life cycle. If 
these requirements are k nown, the presence of these habitats on a pathway may enable 
predictions of an association between a risk organism and the pathway. These hitch -hikers 
can enter a vessel by any means, but will only survive if the specific habitat requirements are 
met on th e vessel. Habitats such as soil, plant debris, dead animal material, water, food or 
cargo residues may occur on vessels. Many organisms in this group of hitch -hikers are small, 
often microscopic, and therefore difficult to detect.  
Potential hazards within  the group of hitch -hikers associated with micro habitats on board 
vessels include:  
Data Analysis, Survey and Risk Analysis Teams    Vessel Survey and Risk Analysis   Mar 2009 – June 2009                                       30  
 
Alive and dead organisms
R2 = 0.4456
010203040506070
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Number of interceptions of  all other ordersNumber of interceptions of Araneae, 
Blattodea, and Hymenoptera 
Ministry For Primary Industries   Page 33 of 43  stored product/food pests (beetles, flies, moths, silverfish, psocids, diseases associated 
with seeds). However, many of the organisms of this type intercepted in the survey are 
already established in New Zealand;  
 organisms associated with pooled water (mosquitoes);  
 organisms assoc iated with wood (beetles, a cockroach, carpenter ants, millipedes).  
A risk assessment was undertaken for the mosquito, Culex annulirostris as an example of 
this group.  
Conclusion of the risk assessment  
The likelihood of Culex annulirostris  entering New Zea land from vessels is considered to be 
moderate. The likelihood of establishment in New Zealand is moderate and the potential 
consequences of establishment are high.   
 
C. annulirostris  has been assessed as a high consequence example of hitch -hiker organism s 
associated with particular micro habitats on a vessel. Mosquitoes such as C. annulirostris 
can enter New Zealand via vessels either as adults accidentally trapped in the vessel, or as 
desiccation -tolerant eggs, or as larvae in water -containing receptacle s on a ship. The 
likelihood of entry by trapped adults is low and it is difficult to predict which vessels are 
likely to be affected. Specific risk mitigation is not likely to be practical. The risk from life 
stages associated with receptacles that can con tain water is higher, although lower than 
pathways such as imported tyres. The risk is such that risk management options are worth 
considering. The likelihood is higher from recreational vessels that spend longer periods 
within flying distance of shore.  
 
The risk from organisms associated with other micro habitats on vessels such as stored 
products and cargo residues has not been assessed in detail. The main risk factors in all cases 
are the presence of the relevant habitat on the vessel, whether the habita t remains 
permanently on the vessel and the mobility of the potential hazards. The risk will be higher 
when the habitat occurs on deck, such as water -containing receptacles in the case of 
mosquitoes or dunnage in the case of wood -associated organisms. This  is because 
opportunities for getting off the vessel to a suitable location in New Zealand are increased.  
 
Opportunities for risk management  
Biosecurity risk from this group of potential hazards can be managed through management 
of the habitats on the vess el with which they are associated.  
 
The biosecurity risks from potential hazards associated with stored products or cargo 
residues in vessels could be managed through requirements for cleaning holds, decks and 
stores and appropriate disposal of the sweepin gs. Whilst the biosecurity risks associated with 
the management of ships stores are outside the scope of this assessment, it should be possible 
to manage them effectively through the existing processes for ships stores. Similarly 
biosecurity risks associat ed with timber and dunnage are likely to be adequately managed 
through existing procedures. The risks associated with grain spilt from grain containers has 
not been assessed, but could be managed through a requirement to seal the doors prior to 
shipment. H owever, the older, more battered containers are likely to pose a greater risk from 
spillage and these are likely to be most difficult to seal effectively.  
 
31        Data Analysis, Survey and Risk Analysis Teams    Vessel Survey and Risk Analysis   Mar 200 9 – June 2009  
  
Ministry For Primary Industries   Page 34 of 43 The information required to identify which vessels carry receptacles that can contain water is 
not available. Therefore, it is not currently possible to identify and target vessels that are a 
high risk for mosquitoes. Risk mitigation options  may include highlighting the need to 
ensure that no receptacles likely to contain water are available on deck and any that are (for 
instance those that are part of the structure of the vessel) are treated. The MAFBNZ 
approved treatment for pooled water is  to drain it and treat the cavity with 1 % solution of a 
range of chlorination solutions (Biosecurity New Zealand, 2007b). Note that since chlorine is 
potentially corrosive, treated parts of a vessel should be adequately flushed with water at the 
end of th e required treatment period. Disinsection of inhabited parts of vessels with a 
residual insecticide, similar to the process used for aircraft, could be an option to manage the 
risk from adult mosquitoes.  
7.3   Organisms associated with vessels determined b y access 
through their own mobility (aggregated vessel jumpers)  
Some organisms (many of which are plant pests) have specific host or habitat associations 
for much of their life cycle, but have a life stage that can survive periods away from their 
host and which can be transported. The association of these organisms with a pathway 
depends on the location of the transported item in relation to the critical life -stage which is 
transported.  
In the case of vessels, there are two components to this group, the fir st of which is organisms 
whose association with a vessel and means of getting off it in New Zealand is through their 
own propulsion.  
Hitchhiking organisms that are capable of flight can readily enter and exit a vessel. However, 
in order for establishment to occur, life history traits that result in aggregation are necessary. 
Different biological life cycles can have this effect. Either,  
 Multiple individuals (or a gravid female) must be trapped on a vessel and  
 The voyage must be short enough for the organi sms to survive or  
 The flighted adults must lay large numbers of desiccation tolerant eggs on the vessel 
and these must hatch synchronously while the vessel is in New Zealand waters.  
Potential hazards within the aggregated vessel jumpers group of hitch -hikers (Annex 1) 
include some moths, beetles, locusts and Hemiptera that form mass aggregations, and some 
moths that lay multiple egg masses on ships.  
Risk assessments were undertaken for Bogong moth, ( Agrotis infusa),  Asian gypsy moth, 
(Lymantria dispar ), and transverse ladybird ( Coccinella transversalis),  as examples of this 
group of potential hazards.  
Conclusion of the risk assessments  
The likelihood of entry of mass aggregating species of Australian moth species such as 
Agrotis infusa  into New Zealand via  large numbers of adults arriving on vessels is 
considered to be high when particular meteorological conditions coincide with vessel 
loading at some Australian ports . These vessels are also likely to have other hitch -hikers 
whose risk has not been assessed . The likelihood of establishment in New Zealand is 
uncertain but non -negligible.  The consequences of establishment of A. infusa  could be 
moderate.   
A. infusa  has been assessed as a well known example of the vessel jumper group of hitch -
hiker organisms. Asian gypsy moth, Lymantria dispar  is also a high consequence example of  
Data Analysis, Survey and Risk Analysis Teams    Vessel Survey and Risk Analysis   Mar 2009 – June 2009                                 32   
Ministry For Primary Industries   Page 35 of 43 this group, although its biology is very dif ferent. In this case, female moths are attracted to 
lights and can lay large numbers of egg masses on vessels. Simultaneous hatching of eggs 
while an infested ship is in a New Zealand port provides the opportunity for large numbers 
of larvae to jump ship b y ‘ballooning’ ashore. The likelihood of L. dispar  entering and 
establishing in New Zealand via this means is lower than for other pathways, however 
synchronous arrival of large numbers of larvae would increase the likelihood of 
establishment. As for A. in fusa only a few vessels are a risk.  
The association between Coccinella transversalis  and vessels is uncertain, but it appears that 
there are occasions when particular weather conditions and vessel loading procedures 
coincide with large aggregations of beet les on the east coast of Australia. These vessels are 
also likely to have other hitch -hikers whose risk has not been assessed. The numbers of 
beetles associated with vessels in these circumstances greatly increases the likelihood of 
their surviving shipmen t to New Zealand, leaving the vessel and establishing in New 
Zealand. The number of vessels involved is likely to be small but the risk is considered non -
negligible. A similar species is Hippodamia variegata , a predatory ladybird.  This species is 
native t o Europe and Asia and has recently been introduced to Australia: it is likely to 
present a similar risk to that from C. transversalis.   
Opportunities for risk management  
Instances of multiple arrivals of adult moths and beetles have been associated with ve ssels 
whose last port of call is on the east coast of Australia, particularly Brisbane. Other risk 
factors include weather conditions at the time of loading and night loading. The number of 
vessels involved in multiple arrival events is small. Provision of  accurate information from 
the crew prior to the vessels’ arrival in New Zealand could enable these vessels to be 
identified and targeted for management. Liaison with the Australian Quarantine and 
Inspection Service may also help identify high risk periods  and vessels.  
Possible options for managing the risk from multiple egg masses of species such as L. dispar  
are discussed in MAFBNZ (2008). At present, targeted inspection are undertaken on all 
vessels that have been in known high -risk ports within the pre vious 1 -2 flight seasons. 
Information gained from these inspections should help narrow down either the list of vessels 
which require this intensive inspection, or the regions on these vessels that require 
inspection.  
7.4   Organisms whose association with a vessel is determined by 
cargo/container storage factors  
A fourth group of organisms is similar to the previous group, in that they have a life -stage 
that can be transported on vessels.  They differ from the previous group in that they get on 
and off the vessel in association with cargo, rather than under their own propulsion.  Snails 
are considered to be potential hazards in this group (Annex 1). A risk assessment for giant 
African snail, Achatina fulica,  was undertaken as an example of this group of pote ntial 
hazards.  
Conclusion of risk assessment  
The likelihood of A. fulica  entering New Zealand from vessels would only be in association 
with cargo or containers infested while being transported on a vessel. This likelihood is 
considered to be very low. The  likelihood of establishment in New Zealand is uncertain. The 
potential consequences of establishment are considered to be high. The risk is such that risk 
management options are worth considering.  
 
33         Data Analysis, Survey and Risk Analysis Teams    Vessel Survey and Risk Analysis   Mar 2009 – June 2009   
Ministry For Primary Industries   Page 36 of 43 A. fulica  has been assessed as a well known, high consequence example of hitch -hiker 
organisms whose entry onto and exit from a vessel is via cargo or containers. Relevant risk 
factors are the prese nce of high populations of snails in locations where they can infest cargo 
and an ability of the snails to survive extended periods of adverse conditions. The latter 
factor is common to many snails. Although the data are limited, the association between 
vessels and A. fulica  appears related to conditions at ports in the Pacific islands.  
 
Opportunities for Risk Management  
Snails were recorded from only a small proportion of vessels in both the survey and the 
organism identification study. Since the risk is associated with infested cargo or containers, 
it can be managed by preventing or reducing infestation of the cargo/containers prior to 
loading. An example is the programme operating at some Pacific island ports to improve the 
cleanliness of containers, pre vent re -infestation, and modify habitats to reduce the population 
levels of pests in the vicinity of ports (Lach et al, 2009).  
 
All vessels from which A. fulica was intercepted had multiple other interceptions. This 
suggests that snails might be a more vi sible indicator of contaminated vessels. Historical 
evidence indicates that vessels infested with snails often carried cargo or containers with a 
variety of biosecurity contaminants. The presence of snails in a vessel may therefore also be 
used as an indic ator to identify infested cargo/containers. An option could be for 
cargo/containers from these vessels could be flagged for more intensive management.  
 
7.5   Unpredictable hitch -hikers  
Some hitch -hiker organisms are accidentally associated with a pathway. The circumstances 
behind the association do not follow a discernable pattern and the likelihood of association is 
therefore very difficult to predict and manage. These organisms are trapped in a vessel but 
the reason for their presence in the vessel is not  clear. In the case of vessels, the 
characteristic features of organisms in this group appear to be flight ability and occurrence in 
sufficiently small numbers that establishment is unlikely.  
 
Potential hazards within the unpredictable group of hitch -hikers (Annex 1) include a wide 
range of organisms including some in the following Orders: Hymenoptera, Coleoptera, 
Diptera, Hemiptera, Isopoda, Neuroptera, Odonata, Psocoptera and Orthoptera as well as 
some seeds.  A risk assessment for tropical house cricket,  Gryllodes sigillatus was undertaken  
as an example of this group of potential hazards.  
Conclusion of risk assessment  
The likelihood of Gryllodes sigillatus  entering New Zealand from vessels in sufficient 
numbers for a population to occur is considered to b e negligible. G. sigillatus has been 
assessed as an example of hitch -hiker organisms whose association with vessels is 
unpredictable. The risk is likely to be similar for other organisms in this group that occur as 
single individuals in vessels.  
Opportunit ies for risk management  
Risk management is unlikely to be necessary for this group of organisms occurring on 
vessels because the risk is considered to be negligible.  
 
Data Analysis, Survey and Risk Analysis Teams    Vessel Survey and Risk Analysis   Mar 20 09 – June 2009                                 34  
     
Ministry For Primary Industries   Page 37 of 43 Summary of findings  
There were five groups of contaminants that were associated with vessels. These were human 
associated hitch -hikers, vessel micro - habitat -associated hitch -hikers, aggregated vessel 
jumpers, cargo -associated hitch -hikers, and unpredictable hitch -hikers ( Table 2). Most of 
these groups of species can be managed according to the risk management options outlined in 
Table 2. Species that are considered as unpredictable hitch -hikers are more difficult to 
manage. However, the risk associated with these types of species is considered minimal.  
Table 2  Summary of groups, characteristics, e xamples and risk management options for organisms 
found contaminating vessels.  
Grouping  Characteristics  Example organisms  Risk management options  
Human 
associated 
hitch -hiker s - can complete its life cycle entirely in 
human -modified environments;  
- can enter a vessel by any means and 
then establish long term ship -board 
populations.  Latrodectus 
geometricus (brown 
widow spider)  
Hemidactylus frenatus  
(Asian house gecko)  
Paratrechina longicornis  
(crazy ant)  - use the overall level of infestation of a 
vessel as an in dicator to identify the vessels 
most likely to be infested with risk 
organisms.  
- require more intensive management of 
these vessels using baits, traps or general 
cleaning, alternatively these vessels could 
be fumigated.  
Vessel micro -
habitat 
associated 
hitch-hiker s 
 - have specific habitat requirements for 
at least part of the life cycle;  
- can enter a vessel by any means, but 
will only survive if the specific habitat 
requirements are met on the vessel;  
- the presence of these habitats aids 
predictions of an assoc iation between 
a risk organism and the vessel.  Culex annulirostris  
(mosquito)  
 - manage the habitats on the vessel with 
which risk organisms are associated;  
- require cleaning of holds, decks and stores 
and appropriate disposal of the arisings ; 
- require treatme nt of any water containing 
receptacles on a vessel deck;  
- disinsection of the inhabited parts of 
vessels.  
Aggregated 
vessel jumpers  
 - have specific host or habitat 
associations for much of their life 
cycle, but also have a life stage that 
can survive period s away from their 
host and which can be transported;  
- association with a vessel depends on 
the location of the vessel in relation to 
the critical life stage which is 
transported;  
- association with a vessel and means of 
getting off it in New Zealand is throu gh 
the organisms own propulsion;  
- have life history traits that result in 
aggregation.  Agrotis infusa  (bogong 
moth)  
Lymantria dispar (Asian 
gypsy moth)  
Coccinella transversalis  
(transverse ladybird)  - require accurate information from the crew 
prior to a ves sels’ arrival in New Zealand to 
identify vessels carrying mass aggregations 
of insects and target these for management. 
Liaise with the Australian Quarantine and 
Inspection Service to identify high risk 
periods and vessels;  
- inspect the subset of vessels th at have 
been in a port in countries in which L. dispar 
(& other insects that lay multiple egg 
masses on vessels) occurs, within the 
previous 1 -2 flight seasons. Remove 
infestations or treat affected vessels and 
record results.  
Cargo -
associated 
hitch -hiker s 
 - have specific host or habitat 
associations for much of their life 
cycle, but also have a life stage that 
can survive periods away from their 
host and which can be transported;  
- get on and off a vessel in association 
with cargo.   Achatina fulica (giant 
African snail)  - prevent snails (and organisms with similar 
traits) entering vessels by reducing 
infestation of the cargo/containers prior to 
loading. For instance expand the container 
hygiene programme;  
- use the presence of snails in a vessel as an 
indicator ofbiosecurity contamination in the 
vessel and associated containers.  
Unpredictabl e 
hitch -hiker s 
 - the circumstances behind the 
association with vessels do not follow 
a discernable pattern;  
- for vessels, the common features are 
flight ability and occurrence  in 
sufficiently small numbers that 
establishment is unlikely.  Gryllodes sigillatus 
(tropical house cricket)  - none required since the risk is considered to 
be negligible.  
 
35         Data Analysis, Survey and Risk Analysis Teams    Vessel Survey and Risk A nalysis   Mar 2009 – June 2009   
Ministry For Primary Industries   Page 38 of 43 Appendix 3 – Summary of existing vessel arrival procedures  
from the  
Operational Standard for the Requirements for Vessels Arriving in New Zealand  
 
Arrival of vessels  
1. Requirement 5.1 sets out that:  
i. vessels are required to onl y arrive in ports approved as places of first arrival pursuant to 
S37 of the Act, unless approval has been given to arrive in non -approved place under 
S37A of the Act; and  
ii. an advance notice of arrival specifying the port of arrival is to be sent to MPI 48 hours 
prior to arrival;  
2. Requirement 5.2 sets out the classifications of vessels upon arrival;  
i. Coastwise vessels:  vessels that do not receive biosecurity clearance and remain under 
biosecurity surveillance within New Zealand territorial waters and these ve ssels can only 
visit ports approved as place of first arrival subsequent to its arrival in New Zealand.  
ii. Fully cleared vessels:  vessels that have received biosecurity clearance and are no 
longer under biosecurity surveillance  within New Zealand territorial  waters.  The following 
vessels are required to become fully cleared vessel at the place of first arrival:  
A. Vessels cruising New Zealand territorial waters and visiting places that are 
not approved places of first arrival;  
B. Vessels that will remain in New Z ealand territorial waters for more than 1 
year.  
iii. To become fully cleared the following criteria must be met:  
A. All stores food be that are risk goods are too be removed from the vessels  
B. All cargo either removed or obtain biosecurity clearance  
C. All animals eith er removed to a quarantine facility, re -shipped or destroyed.  
D. All passengers and crew processed for entry into New Zealand  
E. All risk goods have been either removed or obtain biosecurity clearance . 
 
3. Requirement 5.3 sets out the information requirements that must be sent to MPI 48 hours before 
arrival, as follows:  
i. Master’s declaration  
ii. Advanced notice of arrival  
iii. Ballast water declaration  
Specific biosecurity risk area requirements  
4. Requirement 6.1 – foodstuff :  sets out that no foodstuff is to be taken off the v essel unless the 
following criteria have been met:  
i. Permission has been given by an inspector; AND  
ii. They are being transferred to another vessel under supervision; or  
iii. Being held ashore in a transitional facility; or  
iv. Removed for disposal as refuse; or  
v. biosecu rity clearance has been received.   
Ministry For Primary Industries   Page 39 of 43 5. Requirement 6.2 – refuse :  requires all galley and food waste to be securely stored and can only 
be removed from the vessel via an approved system. No waste is to be discharge into the sea 
within 3nm from shore.  
6. Requiremen t 6.3 – other waste : all waste that is not galley or food waste is required to be 
disposed of on -shore via an approved system.  
7. Requirement 6.4 – holds and decks : MPI encourages vessel masters to maintain clean and tidy 
decks and holds in order to reduce th e presence of contaminants such as ants, moths, 
mosquitoes, and spiders, and to dispose of materials that harbour such contaminants.  
8. Requirement 6.5 – dunnage : must comply with the IHS for Wood Packaging Material from All 
Countries.  
9. Requirement 6.6 – balla st water : must comply with the IHS for Ship’s Ballast Water from All 
Countries.  
10. Requirement 6.7 – hull fouling : sets out MPI’s intention to bring in requirements for hull fouling in 
the future and encourages vessel master to maintain a clean hull.  
11. Requirem ent 6.8 – animals kept on board vessels : all animals must comply with the relevant 
IHSs if they are to come off -board; otherwise cats and dogs are to be securely stored on -board 
with permission from an inspector.  
12. Requirement 6.9 – plants : sets out that pla nts can only be taken off the vessels if they can be 
imported under an HIS, otherwise they are to be securely stored on -board with permission from 
an inspector.  
13. Requirement 6.10 – passengers and crew : sets out that all persons are to complete an arrival 
declaration and present themselves and their declaration and belonging (luggage) to an inspector 
on disembarkation.  
 
Appendix 1 – Asian Gypsy Moth Risk Vessels  
14. This appendix sets out the requirements for vessels that have visited the specified ports at the 
specified times of the year – including off -shore inspection, certification and potential for off -shore 
or in-port inspections.  This section also sets out MPIs intention to risk assess and potential 
inspect vessels for AGM that have visited other Asian por ts in order to mitigated the risk AGM 
poses to New Zealand.  
 
  
Ministry For Primary Industries   Page 40 of 43 Appendix 4 - Comparison of the existing arrival procedures and 
the proposed requirements.  
 
Risks  Existing procedure in the Operational 
Standard  Proposed Requirements within the 
proposed Standar d 
Food stuffs  Requirement 6.1 – foodstuff :  sets out that 
no foodstuff is to be taken off the vessel 
unless the following criteria have been 
met: 
i. Permission has been given by an 
inspector; AND  
ii. They are being transferred to 
another vessel under supervision ; 
or 
iii. Being held ashore in a transitional 
facility; or  
iv. Removed for disposal as refuse; 
or 
v. biosecurity clearance has been 
received.  
 All foodstuffs meet the definition of a risk 
good under the Biosecurity Act and are 
subject to existing import health standar ds.   
Under the proposed CRMS, all foodstuffs 
are risk goods.  
All risk goods are managed with the 
requirements of CRMS until such time as 
the relevant import health standard is 
triggered, i.e. when the foodstuffs are 
about to be removed from the vessel.  
Proposed requirements that manage risk 
goods are:  
 Clause 1.5(2).  
 Clause 2.2 
Refuse  Requirement 6.2 – refuse :  requires all 
galley and food waste to be securely 
stored and can only be removed from the 
vessel via an approved system. No waste 
is to be discharg e into the sea within 3  
nautical miles from shore  All refuse meets the definition of a risk 
good under the Biosecurity Act and some 
refuse may be subject to existing import 
health standards.   
Under the proposed CRMS, all foodstuffs 
are risk goods.  
All ris k goods are managed with the 
requirements of CRMS until such time as 
the relevant import health standard is 
triggered, i.e. when the refuse is about to 
be removed from the vessel.  
Proposed requirements that manage risk 
goods are:  
 Clause 1.5(2).  
 Clause 2.2 
Other waste  Requirement 6.3 – other waste : all waste 
that is not galley or food waste is required 
to be disposed of on -shore via an 
approved system  All other waste meets the definition of a 
risk good under the Biosecurity Act and 
some other waste may be s ubject to 
existing import health standards.   
Under the proposed CRMS, all other 
wastes are risk goods.   
Ministry For Primary Industries   Page 41 of 43 All risk goods are managed with the 
requirements of CRMS until such time as 
the relevant import health standard is 
triggered, i.e. when the other waste is 
about to be removed from the vessel.  
Proposed requirements that manage risk 
goods are:  
 Clause 1.5(2).  
 Clause 2.2  
Holds and 
Decks Requirement 6.4 – holds and decks : MPI 
encourages vessel masters to maintain 
clean and tidy decks and holds in order to 
reduce the presence of contaminants such 
as ants, moths, mosquitoes, and spiders, 
and to dispose of materials that harbour 
such contaminants  Under the proposed CRMS, the 
cleanliness of and the present of regulated 
pests on the vessel are managed by:  
 Clause 1 .5(1).  
 
Dunnage  Requirement 6.5 – dunnage : must comply 
with the IHS for Wood Packaging Material 
from All Countries  All dunnage meets the definition of a risk 
good under the Biosecurity Act and are 
subject to existing import health standards.   
Under the p roposed CRMS, all dunnage 
are risk goods.  
All risk goods are managed with the 
requirements of CRMS until such time as 
the relevant import health standard is 
triggered, i.e. when the dunnage is about 
to be removed from the vessel.  
Proposed requirements that  manage risk 
goods are:  
 Clause 1.5(2).  
 Clause 2.2 
Ballast water  Requirement 6.6 – ballast water : must 
comply with the IHS for Ship’s Ballast 
Water from All Countries  This is not covered by the CRMS as it is 
covered by an IHS.  This information is 
made ava ilable in the “Other requirements 
of the Act” section of the CRMS  
Hull Fouling  Requirement 6.7 – hull fouling : sets out 
MPI’s intention to bring in requirements for 
hull fouling in the future and encourages 
vessel master to maintain a clean hull  This is not covered by the CRMS as it is 
covered by another CRMS.  This 
information is made available in the “Other 
requirements of the Act” section of the 
CRMS.  
Animals on -
board - including 
Cats and Dogs  Requirement 6.8 – animals kept on board 
vessels : all anima ls must comply with the 
relevant IHSs if they are to come off -
board; otherwise cats and dogs are to be 
securely stored on -board with permission 
from an inspector  All animals meet the definition of a risk 
good under the Biosecurity Act and are 
subject to ex isting import health standards 
(and permits are required).    
Ministry For Primary Industries   Page 42 of 43 Under the proposed CRMS, all animals 
are risk goods.  
All risk goods are managed with the 
requirements of CRMS until such time as 
the relevant import health standard is 
triggered.  
Proposed require ments that manage risk 
goods are:  
 Clause 1.5(2).  
 Clause 2.2 
Plants  Requirement 6.9 – plants : sets out that 
plants can only be taken off the vessels if 
they can be imported under an HIS, 
otherwise they are to be securely stored 
on-board with permission fro m an 
inspector  All plants or parts thereof meet the 
definition of a risk good under the 
Biosecurity Act and are subject to existing 
import health standards.   
Under the proposed CRMS, all plants or 
parts thereof are risk goods.  
All risk goods are managed w ith the 
requirements of CRMS until such time as 
the relevant import health standard is 
triggered, i.e. when the plants or parts 
thereof are about to be removed from the 
vessel.  
Proposed requirements that manage risk 
goods are:  
 Clause 1.5(2).  
 Clause 2.2 
Passengers and 
Crew  Requirement 6.10 – passengers and crew : 
sets out that all persons are to complete 
an arrival declaration and present 
themselves and their declaration and 
belonging (luggage) to an inspector on 
disembarkation  This is not covered by the CRM S as it is 
covered by sections of the Act.  This 
information is made available in the “Other 
requirements of the Act” section of the 
CRMS.