WT/DS521/1  
G/L/1175  
G/ADP/D117/1  
 
2 February  2017 
(17-0663) Page: 1/4 
  Original: English  
 
 EUROPEAN UNION – ANTI -DUMPING MEASURES ON CERTAIN  
COLD -ROLLED  FLAT STEEL PRODUCTS FROM RUSSIA  
REQUEST FOR CONSULTA TIONS BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATI ON 
The following communication, dated 27 January 2017 , from the delegation of the Russian 
Federation  to the dele gation of the European Union  and to the Chairperson of the Dispute 
Settlement Body, is circulated in accordance with Article  4.4 of the DSU.  
 
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My authorities have instructed me to request consultations with the European Union pursuant 
to Articles 1 and 4 of the Understanding of Rules and Procedures Governing  the Settlement of 
Disputes ("DSU"), Article XXII:1 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994  
("GATT  1994"), and Articles 17.2 and 17.3 of the Agreement on Implementation of Art icle VI of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994  ("AD Agreement ") with respect to the anti -dumping 
measures imposed by the European Union on imports of certain cold -rolled flat steel products 
originating in the Russian Federation pursuant to the following:  
(a) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/181 of 10 February 2016 imposing a 
provisional anti -dumping duty on imports of certain cold -rolled flat steel products 
originating in the People 's Republic of China and the Russian Federation,1 
(b) Commis sion Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/1328 of 29 July 2016 imposing  a 
definitive anti -dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on 
imports of certain cold -rolled flat steel products originating  in the People's Republic of 
China  and the Russian Federation,2 
(c) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/1329 of 29 July 2016 levying  the 
definitive anti -dumping duty on the registered imports of certain cold -rolled flat steel 
products originating in the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation,3 
as well as other related acts,4 and the underlying investigation.  
These measures appear to be inconsistent with the European Union's obligations under the 
following provisions of the GATT 1994 and the AD Agreement:  
1. Articles 2.1, 2. 2 and 2.2.1.1 of the AD Agreement because the European Union failed 
to calculate the costs on the basis of the records kept by certain Russian producers under 
investigation, although these records were in accordance with the generally accepted 
accounting p rinciples ( "GAAP ") of the Russian Federation and reasonably reflected the costs 
associated with the production and sale of the product under consideration.  
                                                
1 OJ L 37, 12.2.2016, p. 1 -39. 
2 OJ L 210,  4.8.2016, p. 1 -26.  
3 OJ L 210, 4.8.2016, p. 27 -42.  
4 For instance, Notice of initiation of an anti -dumping proceeding con cerning imports of certain 
cold-rolled flat steel products originating in the People’s Republic of China and t he Russian Federation of 
14 May 2015 (OJ C 161, 14.5.2015, p. 9 -19); and Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/2325 of 
11 December 2015 making imports of certain cold -rolled flat steel products originating in the People's Republic 
of China and the Russian Federation subj ect to registration (OJ L 328, 12.12.2015, p. 104 -107).  WT/DS521/1 • G/L/1175 • G/ADP/D117/1  
 
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  2. Articles 2.2, 2.2.1 and 2.2.1.1 of the AD Agreement because the European Union 
treated the majority of domestic sales of the like product of the Russian producer considered  
as partially non -cooperating ( "the first Russian producer ") as not being in the ordinary course  
of trade due to upward adjustments which artificially inflated costs actually incurred.  
3. Articles 2.1, 2.2 and 2.2.1 of the AD Agreement because the European Union failed to 
take into account, within the ordinary course of trade test,  all domestic sales of the like 
product of the first Russian producer.  
4. Articles 2.1, 2 .2 and 2.2.1.1 of the AD  Agreement because the European Union failed 
to determine the normal value for the Russian producer treated as entirely non -cooperating 
("the second Russian producer ") on the basis of the data provided by that producer on actual 
sales of the like product i n the ordinary course of trade when destined for consumption  in the 
exporting country.  
5. Articles 2.2 and 2.2.1.1 of the AD Agreement because the European Union failed  to 
determine  a correct normal value for the first Russian producer  due to an upward adjust ment 
to the costs of manufacturing and the selling, general and administrative ( "SG&A ") costs.  
6. Articles 2.2 and 2.2.2 of the AD Agreement because the European Union failed  to use 
any of the grounds allowed under these provisions in order to determine SG&A costs by not 
basing them on actual data and by artificially inflating them for the amount of alleged 
difference in value resulting from the re -evaluation of loans in foreign currency reflected  in the 
records kept by certain Russian producers in their statu tory accounting currency  (the Russian 
Rouble)  and because the European Union  failed to use a reasonable amount for profits based 
on actual data.  
7. Articles 2.1 and 2.3 of the AD Agreement because the European Union failed  to 
properly determine the export p rice for the second Russian producer although this producer 
had made available for the investigating authority all the necessary data on the actual export 
price, which had been verified by the investigating authority of the European Union.  
8. Articles 2.3 and  2.4 of the AD Agreement because the European Union did not make a 
fair comparison between the export price and the normal value , for instance  due to downward 
adjustment of the export price for reasonable SG&A costs and profit of a hypothetical 
unrelated i mporter applied to the price at which the intra -group trading arms of certain 
Russian producers located outside the European Union sold the product under consideration to 
unrelated customers in the European Union, which exceeded the allowance for costs inc urred 
between importation and resale, and for profits accruing allowed under those provisions.  
9. Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the AD Agreement because the European Union's determination 
of injury to the Union industry failed to make an objective examination,  on the basis of positive 
evidence, of the volume of the allegedly dumped imports, of the effect  of those imports on 
prices in the domestic market for like products, and of the consequent impact of the allegedly 
dumped imports on domestic producers of such prod ucts. For instance,  the European Union 
failed to conduct an objective examination as it did not properly take into account in its 
analysis  with regard to the effect of the dumped imports on prices and price undercutting, the 
free and captive market consump tion, as well as aggregate market trends;  the European 
Union 's analysis did not take into account the volume of the allegedly dumped imports 
purchased by the Union industry itself; the European Union failed to establish  a significant 
increase in the allege dly dumped imports, and any significant effect on prices  of the Union 
industry; the European Union failed to properly consider whether the effect  of the imports 
under investigation was to depress prices to a significant degree or prevent price increases, 
which otherwise would have occurred, to a significant degree.  
10. Articles 3.1 and 3.4 of the AD Agreement because in the course of injury 
determination the European Union failed to make an objective examination, based on positive 
evidence, of the impact of the  allegedly dumped imports on domestic producers of like 
products . For instance , the European Union 's findings regarding a three -way assessment of the 
free, captive and aggregate markets were not based on an objective examination of the 
evidence on the reco rd; the European Union failed to make a proper evaluation of all relevant WT/DS521/1 • G/L/1175 • G/ADP/D117/1  
 
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  economic factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the Union industry, in particular, 
market share, capacity and capacity utilisation; the European Union failed to make a proper 
evaluation of the state  of the domestic industry, overall developments and interaction among 
the injury factors and indices taken together.  
11. Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the AD Agreement because the European Union failed  to make 
an objective examination b ased on positive evidence before the authorities, that  the dumped 
imports were causing injury. Specifically, the European Union failed to demonstrate that the 
imports under investigation were, through the effects of dumping, causing injury  to the 
domestic industry; the European Union failed to base the examination of the alleged causal 
relationship between the imports under investigation and the alleged injury to the domestic 
industry on all relevant evidence before the authorities; the European Union faile d to examine 
properly all known factors other than the imports under investigation that were injuring  the 
Union industry at the same time, and therefore incorrectly attributed the injuries caused  by 
these other factors to the imports under investigation.  
12. Articles 5.2, 5.3 and 5.8 of the AD Agreement because the European Union failed to 
examine the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence provided in the application to initiate the 
investigation which did not include sufficient evidence of dumping, injury and c ausal link as 
required by Article 5.2 of the AD Agreement, the European Union failed to determine whether 
there was sufficient evidence to justify the initiation of the investigation; the European Union 
failed to examine the accuracy and adequacy of the in formation provided in the application 
relative to items (i) and (iv) of Article 5.2, and, by doing so, failed to reject the application  and 
to promptly terminate the investigation.  
13. Article 6.5.1 of the AD Agreement because: (a) the European Union failed  to require 
the applicant to furnish non -confidential summaries of the information submitted  in 
confidence; and (b) where such summaries were provided, the European Union d id not ensure 
that they were  in sufficient detail  to permit a reasonable understanding of the substance of the 
information submitted  in confidence.  
14. Article 6.2 of the AD Agreement because the European Union failed to grant  to certain 
Russian producers a full opportunity to defend their interests. For instance,  the European 
Union failed to re quire the applicant to provide adequate non -confidential summaries of 
allegedly confidential information; the European Union  failed to provide timely opportunities to 
certain Russian producers to examine the information that was relevant  to the presentati on of 
their cases, and denied certain Russian producers ' right to submit further information for the 
defence of their interests, including such that would be necessary to defend against double 
counting of certain costs of manufacturing; the European Union denied certain Russian 
producers an opportunity to hold follow -up verification visits, while follow -up verification visits 
were granted to the parties with adverse interests.  
15. Articles 6.1, 6.8 and paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 of Annex II to the AD Agreemen t 
because the European Union failed to give certain Russian producers ample opportunity  to 
present all evidence they considered relevant in respect of the investigation, and failed  to 
establish properly any of the grounds allowed under these provisions in order to apply facts 
available when making its preliminary and final determinations. In doing so, the European 
Union failed to take into account all the information which was verifiable, appropriately 
submitted, and supplied in a timely fashion by those Ru ssian producers. With respect  to 
certain Russian producers, the European Union improperly applied facts available, inter alia , 
due to: failure to conduct unbiased and objective verification visits; failure to give notice  to 
certain Russian producers at an appropriate stage of the investigation of the information 
required by the authority and of its evolving concerns with regard to the information provided; 
non-acceptance of evidence submitted by certain Russian producers after they were informed 
of new reas ons for the application of Article 6.8 of the AD Agreement  by way of the provisional 
disclosure; failure to provide certain Russian producers with an effective opportunity to provide 
additional information within a reasonable period.  
16. Article 6.1, 6.8 and p aragraph 7 of Annex II to the AD Agreement because  the 
European Union improperly based its findings with respect to normal value and export price for 
certain Russian producers on facts available and failed to base its findings on information from 
a seconda ry source with special circumspection.  WT/DS521/1 • G/L/1175 • G/ADP/D117/1  
 
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  17. Article 6.9 of the AD Agreement because the European Union failed to inform all 
interested parties of the essential facts under consideration which formed the basis  for the 
decision to impose definitive anti -dumping m easures in respect of certain Russian producers, 
including the essential facts underlying the determinations of the existence  of dumping and the 
calculation of the margins of dumping and the determinations on injury  and causation.  
18. Article 6.13 of the AD Ag reement because the European Union failed to take due 
account of difficulties experienced by certain Russian producers in supplying the information 
requested and to provide any practicable assistance during the on -spot verification visits and 
thereafter. T hese omissions had an impact on the investigation and on the decision  of the 
authority to apply facts available to certain Russian producers.  
19. Articles 9.1, 9.2 and 9.3 of the AD Agreement and Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994 
because the European Union failed  to impose and to collect duties in the appropriate amounts 
in each case, by assessing them at an amount that exceeds the margin of the dumping that 
should have been established under Article 2 of the AD Agreement and failed to impose and to 
collect lesser  duties adequate to remove the injury to the domestic industry; the European 
Union failed to name all suppliers involved by failing to name the second Russian producer 
when this was not impracticable.  
20. Articles 10.6 and 3.3 of the AD Agreement because the E uropean Union 's cumulative 
assessment of imports from the Russian Federation and the People 's Republic  of China for the 
purposes of imposing duties retroactively was inappropriate in light  of the conditions of 
competition between the imported products and like domestic products.  
21. Article 10.6 of the AD Agreement because the European Union imposed definitive anti -
dumping duties retroactively, even though the conditions for levying definitive anti -dumping 
duties retroactively set out in that provision, includi ng the condition  in Article 10.6(i) which the 
European Union chose to rely upon, were not met and/or not supported by sufficient evidence, 
either individually or taken together.  
22. Articles 12.2, 12.2.1 and 12.2.2 of the AD Agreement because the European Uni on 
failed to provide in sufficient detail the findings and conclusions reached on all issues of fact  
and law that the investigating authorities considered material, as well as all relevant 
information on the matters of fact and law and reasons which have l ed to the imposition of 
definitive measures. The European Union failed, inter alia , to include in relation  to the assessed 
anti-dumping duties (1) a full explanation of the reasons for the methodology used in the 
establishment and comparison of the dumping  margin, the export price and normal value 
required under Article 12.2.1(iii) of the AD Agreement, (2) considerations relevant to the 
injury determination required under Article 12.2.1(iv) of the AD Agreement; and (3) the main 
reasons leading to the Europe an Union 's determination required under Article 12.2.1(v) of the 
AD Agreement.  
23. Articles 1 and 18.1 of the AD Agreement and Article VI of the GATT 1994  as a 
consequence of the above -mentioned inconsistencies with the AD Agreement  and the 
GATT  1994.  
The abov e-mentioned anti -dumping measures of the European Union in relation to certain 
cold-rolled flat steel  products originating in the Russian Federation, therefore appear to nullify or 
impair, directly or indirectly, the benefits accruing to the Russian Federa tion under the mentioned 
agreements.  
The Russian Federation reserves the right to address additional measures and claims  in respect of 
the mentioned issues, including any amendments, replacements, extensions, implementing 
measures or other related measures , in the course of the consultations.  
The Russian Federation awaits the response of the European Union to this request  in order to 
coordinate a mutually convenient date and place for the consultations.  
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