G/AG/W/144  
 
29 May 2015  
(15-2804)  Page: 1/11  
Committee on Agriculture  Original: English  
 
ANNUAL EXPORT COMPETITION REVIEW 
SUBMISSION FROM THE CAIRNS GROUP TO THE 77TH MEETING 
OF THE COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE (COA) IN JUNE 2015 
The following communication, received on 28 May 2015, is being circulated at the request of 
the Cairns Group. 
 
_______________ 
  At the 9
th WTO Ministerial Conference (MC9) Ministers adopted the Declaration on Export 
Competition (WT/MIN(13)/40). Amongst other things, this established annual dedicated 
discussions in the Committee on Agriculture (CoA) in support of the reform process, and more 
specifically in furtherance of the final objective set out in the 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial 
Declaration i.e. the parallel elimination of all forms of export subsidies and disciplines on all export 
measures with equivalent effect. 
The first such discussion was held on 5 June  2014 based on the Secretariat's background 
document G/AG/W/125. The Cairns Group supplemented this with its own report G/AG/W/129 
which included key conclusions drawn from the analysis. Likewise, to inform the dedicated discussions on 4 June 2015 the Secretariat circulated on 19 May 2015 document G/AG/W/125/Rev.2 on "Export Subsidies, export credits, export credit guarantees or 
insurance programmes, international food aid and agricultural exporting state trading enterprises" 
(hereafter "the report") pursuant to the Ministerial Declaration. 
The Cairns Group again welcomes and supports the report as an important contribution to the 
dedicated annual discussions in the CoA to ex amine developments in the field of export 
competition. As it did before, the Cairns Group supplements the report with some key conclusions 
drawn from the analysis. These include considerin g the alignment of Members' policies with the 
latest revised draft modalities for agriculture (T N/AG/W/4/Rev.4) given that they were considered 
by Ministers at MC9 as remaining an important basis for an ambitious final agreement in the 
export competition pillar and have since been the basis of negotiations. 
1  EXPORT SUBSIDIES 
1.1.  Export subsidy use at an aggregate and individual Member level has dramatically decreased, 
and in some cases has been discontinued, in th e period since 1995 when notifications became 
mandatory as part of the Uruguay Round. Exceptions to this are Canada and Norway, and it would 
appear Switzerland which has a proposal before its Pa rliament for a decision in June to increase its 
export subsidy outlays for processed agricultural products
 by almost a third (CHF 20 million). 
Several other Members, including India, Mauritius, Morocco, Mexico, Pakistan and Thailand, have 
also been posed questions in the Committee on Agri culture regarding the use of export subsidies in 
recent years.  
1.2.  While this overall trend may be a result of high world commodity prices, it is also the case 
that some WTO Members have taken positive steps to reduce their export subsidy use. For 
example, under the 2014 Farm Bill the United States of America repealed the Dairy Export 
Incentive Program (DEIP). In addition, Norway ha s discontinued the use of export subsidies for 
several products and the EU's Common Agricultural Policy, adopted in December 2013, stated that 
export subsidies may only be used as an "exceptional measure". G/AG/W/144 
 
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  1.3.  Of the 18 Members1 that had scheduled export subsidy reduction commitments, eight have 
notified zero use of export subsidies since the Doha Round of WTO negotiations started in 2001: Australia, Brazil, Colombia, Iceland, Indonesia, New Zealand, South Africa and Uruguay. 
1.4.  Of the remaining Members with scheduled reduction commitments, seven have notified 
recent use of export subsidies: Canada, the European Union (EU), Israel, Norway, 
Switzerland-Liechtenstein and the United States of America (Table 1)
2. Many of the Members that 
are currently using export subsidies are doing so on a small proportion of their scheduled product 
lines and utilising a low percentage of their available export subsidy budgetary allowance. The 
types of products for which export subsidies have been notified include dairy products, wheat and wheat flour, coarse grains, beef meat, pig meat, poultry, eggs and incorporated products. The highest total spending in absolute numbers and in  terms of percentage of total budgetary outlay 
commitments appears to be on dairy products, poultry meat, and incorporated products. 
1.5.  Clear conclusions can be drawn regarding the extent to which Members' export subsidies 
policies and expenditure align with the final objective of the full elimination of export subsidies. 
This is due to Members' notifications and the supplementary information provided in response to 
the Secretariat's questionnaire. With the exception of a few Members, who continue to provide export subsidies, the value of ou tlays, the percentage of products  subject to export subsidies and 
the number of Members using export subsidies has declined dramatically. In most cases export 
subsidy use has fallen to zero and where this is not the case there are some reports of steps being taken to reduce their use. 
1.6.  The Secretariat's report and Cairns Group conclusions herein are based on the information 
that Members have provided or notified on their export subsidy use in relation to their scheduled 
commitments. This does not fully capture all export subsidies such as those not covered by budgetary expenditure, and export subsidies purp ortedly made under Article 9.4 of the Agreement 
on Agriculture by a small number of Members and which have been the subject of 
Members' questions in recent meetings of the Committee on Agriculture. 
                                               
1 Counting all EU Members with expo rt subsidy commitments as one. 
2 In Mexico’s notification for 2008-2012 it notified the export subsidies for wheat and maize 
under Article 9.4.  
  G/AG/W/144  
 
- 3 - Table 1 Export subsidy outlay details by Member 
Member Sum of 
budgetary outlay  
(USD thousand)3 Date of latest 
information Total notified budgetary 
outlays as % total 
commitments Budgetary outlay as % pr oduct level commitments4 
Canada USD 87,579 2011 21% – Butter, skim milk powder (100%), cheese (88.6%), other milk 
products (99.9%), incorporated products (100%) 
Switzerland-Liechtenstein USD 75,608 2013 16% – Milk products, cattle for br eeding and racehorses (0.4%), 
fruits, potatoes, processed ag ricultural products (60.9%) 
European Union USD 45,569 2012 0.7%  – Wheat and wheat flour, coarse grains, sugar, butter and butter 
oil, skim milk powder, cheese, other milk products, beef meat (0.1%), pig meat, poultry meat (30.3%), sugar
5, eggs, wine, 
fruit and vegetables, incorp orated products (0.5%) 
Norway USD 44,749 2013 54% – Swine meat (97.2%), sheep and lamb meat, eggs and egg 
products (96.5%), butter, cheese (53.9%), processed 
agricultural products (84.1%) 
Israel USD 798 2012 2% – Fresh flowers (1.2%), fruit other than citrus (9.5%), fresh 
vegetables (2.5%), citrus fruits 
United States of America 0 2012 0% – Butter and butter oil, skim milk powder, cheese 
 
                                               
3 Conversions to USD from other currencies are based on the IMF's av erage annual real exchange rates as reproduced in the USDA E RS exchange rate data sets, 
available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/data -products/agricultural-exc hange-rate-data-set.aspx# . 
4 Products listed have been the subject of notified export subsidies since 2004. Where percentage is not specified against the p roduct, the outlay at the most 
recent notification was 0. 
5 Only notified quantities, representing 98. 2% of the corresponding export subsidies qu antity commitment level, as expressed in G/MA/TAR/RS/357. G/AG/W/144 
 
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  1.7.  Room for improvement remains in Members'  notification performance (Table 2), with the 
most dated being Venezuela (1998), Turkey (2000) and Panama (2003).  
Table 2 Members' most recent export su bsidy notifications vary from 1998 to 20146 
Member Year last notified for  
New Zealand 2014 
Uruguay 2014 
Australia 2013 
Brazil 2013 
Norway 2013 
Switzerland–Liechtenstein 2013 
Iceland 2013 
Israel 2012 
European Union 2012 
United States of America 2012 
Mexico 2012 
Indonesia 2011 
Canada 2011 
Colombia 2010 
South Africa 2010 
Panama 2003 
Turkey 2000 
Venezuela, Bolivari an Republic of 1998 
 
1.8.  In January 2014 the EU Commissioner for Agriculture and Rural Development announced 
plans to entirely eliminate export subsidies in the framework of preferential partnership 
agreements with African countries7. A review of trade agreements signed from 2008 by Members 
who have recently used export subsidies reveals that the majority (20 of 35) include provisions 
restricting Parties' abilities to use export subsidies beyond WTO commitments (Table 3). It is 
common for the use of export subsidies to be limited or prohibited between Parties although often only taking effect after the eliminat ion of tariffs for relevant products. 
Table 3 Treatment of export subsidies in FT As signed since 2008 by Members recently 
using export subsidies 
Trade Agreement No export 
subsidy 
commitments Export subsidies limited 
or prohibited between 
Trade Agreement Parties  
United States of America   
United States - Republic of Korea (2011) X  
United States - Colombia (2011)  X 
United States - Panama (2011)  X 
US Total 1 2 
European Union    
European Union - Georgia (2014) X  
European Union – Moldova, Republic of (2014)  X  
European Union - Ukraine (2014)  X 
European Union – Korea (2014) X  
European Union - Central America (2012)  X 
European Union – Iraq (2012) X  
European Union - Colombia, Peru (2012)  X 
European Union – Eastern an d Southern African States8 
(2009)  X  
                                               
6 As of 21 May 2015. 
7 A modern farming sector, producing in line with society's expectations. European Commission - 
SPEECH/14/33, 16/01/2014. Accessed 23 May 2014 at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-14-
33_en.htm . 
8 Madagascar, Mauritius, th e Seychelles and Zimbabwe. G/AG/W/144 
 
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  Trade Agreement No export 
subsidy 
commitments Export subsidies limited 
or prohibited between 
Trade Agreement Parties  
European Union – CARIFORUM9 (2008)  X 
European Union – Bosnia and Herzegovina (2008)  X 
European Union – Serbia (2008)  X 
EU Total 5 6 
Canada   
Canada - European Union (2014)  X 
Canada - Republic of Korea (2014) X  
Canada – Honduras (2013)  X 
Canada – Panama (2010)  X 
Canada – Jordan (2009) X  
Canada – Colombia (2008)  X 
Canada – Peru (2008)  X 
Canada – Colombia (2008)  X 
Canada Total 2 6 
Switzerland-Liechtenstein and Norway (EFTA)10   
EFTA - Bosnia-Herzegovina (2013)  X 
Switzerland-Liechtenstein - China (2013) X  
EFTA - Central American States (Panama & Costa Rica) 
(2013)  X 
EFTA - Montenegro (2011) X  
EFTA - Hong Kong (2011) X  
EFTA - Ukraine (2010) X  
EFTA - Peru (2010)  X 
EFTA - Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf 
(GCC) (2009) X  
EFTA – Canada (2009)  X 
EFTA – Albania (2009) X  
EFTA – Serbia (2009) X  
Switzerland – Japan (2009)  X 
EFTA - Colombia (2008)  X 
EFTA Total 7 6 
Grand Total 15 20 
 
2  EXPORT FINANCING SUPPORT  
2.1.  Forty seven Members11 replied to the questionnaire on export credits, export credit 
guarantees and insurance programmes ("export fi nancing support") provided by Members for the 
export of agricultural products. This was an increase on the 35 Members providing replies during 
the last review period. Twenty replied that th ey provided no export financing support (as 
compared to 23 last year) and 27 (as compared to 12 last year) provided replies with information 
on their export financing support programmes. Analysis here is based on these 27 Members plus 
Turkey who replied during the last review period. 
2.2.  The more complete reporting was due to re sponses by Colombia and the Russian Federation 
and the EU disaggregating its response by EU Memb er State. While the EU response was limited to 
half of its Member States12, the enhanced detailed information is welcomed and appreciated. While 
positive, the more complete reporting increases the sample size in the analysis which should be 
considered in comparing conclusions with those drawn last year. 
                                               
9 Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize,  Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, 
Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago. 
10 Switzerland-Liechtenstein and Norway negotiate trad e agreements as part of the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA), which comprises of Iceland, Liec htenstein, Norway and Sw itzerland. The EFTA FTA 
agreements cover processed agricultural goods in the main agreement, and have separate bilateral 
agreements for other ag ricultural products. 
11 Counting individually the EU Member States that replied but not counting the EU itself. 
12 The EU provided responses for 14 of its 28 Member  States: Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Latvia , The Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, United Kingdom. G/AG/W/144 
 
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  2.3.  Of the four types of export financing suppo rt mentioned in the Rev.4 modalities, risk cover 
(comprising export credit insurance or reinsura nce and export credit guarantees) is the most 
common form of such support to agricultural goods. Of the 43 types of programmes in the sample, 35 (81%) fall within the category of risk cover and 25 out of 28 (89%) Members reported having 
such programmes.  
2.4.  Around 80% of agricultural exports that received export financing in 2014 were supported by 
some type of risk cover, with most of this provided by Canada (46%) and the United States of 
America (33%)
13. Comparing 2013 with 2014 data, the value of agricultural exports from the US 
supported by risk cover decreased from around US D 3 billion to USD 2 billion while exports from 
Canada increased from USD 2 billion to nearly USD 3 billion. 
2.5.  The second most used kind of programme within the sample is direct financing support 
(comprising direct credits/financing, refinancing,  and interest rate support). Brazil, Canada, EU 
(Croatia, Estonia, Hungary), Malaysia and Viet Nam (25%) provide at least one type of direct financing support and nine types of programmes were reported in total. 
2.6.  Clear conclusions cannot be drawn on the alignment of Members' export financing 
programmes with the Rev.4 modalities, mostly because most Members did not provide information on whether the programmes are self-financing, one of the conditions established by the modalities. 
The report suggests up to four exceptions. New Zealand stated clearly that its programme covers 
all operating costs and expected losses. Canada indi cated that its official Export Credit agency is 
self-financing and Australia reported the EFIC to be self-funded. The United States did not report as it did last year that its programme must cover the operating costs and losses of the programme 
"over the long term" (but not over a four year rolling period as required by the modalities). It is 
unclear whether this represents a change in policy or a change in reporting.  
2.7.  More than half of the programmes repo rted have a repayment term that exceeds the 
180 days maximum repayment term set out in the Rev.4 modalities. This includes the Export 
Credit Guarantee Programme of the United Stat es (GSM-102), which, despite the decline as 
compared to last year, finances the second greatest share of agricultural exports in the sample. 
The repayment term of Canada's risk cover however, which accounted for the greatest share 
in 2014, does not exceed 180 days. 
2.8.  The export destination or group of destinations of Members' programmes varies greatly 
without a clear pattern across them, if each programme is given equal weight. However, from an 
exports-weighted point of view, at least around 70% of financed agricultural goods are exported 
from a developed to a developing country. 
3  AGRICULTURAL EXPORTING STATE TRADING ENTERPRISES 
3.1.  As was the case during the last review period, twenty Members notified or reported 
agricultural exporting STEs covering a wide range of products (Table 4). These Members notified or reported a total of 67 agriculture exporting STEs, which is ten fewer than during the last review 
period. Four more Members also confirmed they do not have agricultural exporting STEs, bringing 
the total to 29 Members
14. A continued positive transparency development is that new and 
updated information was reported on agricultural exporting STEs by several Members as compared 
to current STE notifications. However, it is disappointing that there was no overall improvement in 
the response rate. 
3.2.  China (25) and India (14) reported by far the most agriculture exporting STEs, accounting for 
58% of the total reported number by all Member s. Notably, Colombia reported only four 
agriculture exporting STEs, whereas it reported 14 last year15. 
                                               
13 Members’ shares of the total are approximate becaus e of variations in time periods reported by each 
Member (e.g. financial versus calendar year, incomplete  data or average annual values), but are nonetheless 
indicative of their role in global trends in export financing. 
14 Counting the EU and its Member States as one. 
15 Colombia’s most recent notification to th e Working Party on Stat e Trading Enterprises 
(G/STR/N/15/COL) clarified that only 4 of their 14 STEs are active exporters. G/AG/W/144 
 
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  3.3.  The distribution by product grouping shows a similar concentration with two product 
categories (fruits and vegetables and tobacco) accounting for 52% of the reported agriculture exporting STEs. The next most numerous product category is "wheat and wheat flour, coarse 
grains and rice" with five such STEs reported. 
3.4.  Only nine of the 20 Members (Australia; Colombia; Costa Rica; Ecuador; Indonesia; Israel; 
Moldova, Republic of; New Zealand; and Ukraine)  responded to the section of the questionnaire 
requesting information on export values, prices and destinations. This is an improvement over the 
last reporting period when 6 Members responded to this portion of the questionnaire. 
Notwithstanding this improvement and the fact the responses may have been limited by commercial confidentiality considerations, these Members account for just 14 STEs (21% of those reported), making it difficult to assess the overall influence of agriculture exporting STEs on global 
markets. Where such information is provided, export volumes and values generally (but not 
always) appear small relative to overall global trade in the products in question. 
3.5.  Of the four developed countries that reported agriculture exporting STEs (one each in 
Australia, Canada, New Zealand and Ukraine), those in Australia, New Zealand and Ukraine appear 
to have export monopoly powers. Of the 63 agriculture exporting STEs reported by 16 developing countries, several appear to have export monopoly powers or other special privileges. The report 
does not however contain sufficiently detailed trade statistics to determine whether these STEs 
would meet the Rev.4 modalities general de minimis  criteria (Annex K, footnote 5). Similarly, while 
many of the developing country STEs would likely meet the Rev.4 modalities special and differential treatment criteria (Annex K, paragraphs 4-6), in most cases more information would be 
required to make a complete assessment, particularly with respect to paragraph 6. 
Table 4 Reported Agriculture Exporting STEs by Member 
Member Number of agricultural 
exporting STEs Product Coverage 
Australia 1 rice 
Brazil 1 any agriculture products 
Canada 1 wheat, barley, canola 
China 25 rice, maize, cotton, tobacco, tea, soybeans 
Colombia 4 various alcoholic beverages 
Costa Rica 1 cane sugar 
Dominica 1 bananas 
Ecuador 1 maize, rice, cereals 
Fiji 1 raw sugar, molasses 
Grenada 1 cocoa beans 
India 14 onions, gum karaya, sugar,  
Indonesia 1 rice 
Israel 3 groundnuts, eg gs, fruits, vegetables 
Moldova, Republic of 1 wine 
Morocco 1 loose leaf cigarettes 
New Zealand 1 kiwifruit 
Trinidad and Tobago 1 cocoa, coffee 
Tunisia 2 snuff, leak tobacco, olive oil  
Ukraine 1 undenatured ethyl alcoho l of an alcoholic strength by 
volume of 80% vol. or higher; ethyl alcohol and other spirits, denatured, of any strength 
Viet Nam 5 salt, rice, coffee, tea, fruits, vegetables, etc. 
 G/AG/W/144 
 
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  4  INTERNATIONAL FOOD AID 
4.1.  Sixty Members16 responded to the elements of the questionnaire relating to International 
Food Aid. Of these, 15 Members are donors of international food aid17, with Chinese Taipei being a 
new questionnaire respondent. In general terms, the majority of donors provided a greater level of 
detail on their food aid programmes when compared  with the responses to the 2014 survey. This 
greater level of detail enables us to draw firmer conclusions about the extent to which food aid donors' programmes are already consistent with the food aid disciplines contemplated in 
Rev.4 (Annex L). 
4.2.  Based on the information available, 13 of the 15 food aid donors' programmes are consistent 
or partially consistent with the proposed food aid disciplines. Cuba and Viet Nam did not provide enough information to make an assessment. Ten food aid donors appear to have programmes that 
are completely or what would appear to be completely consistent with the proposed disciplines 
(Australia, Brazil, Canada, EU, New Zealand, Sout h Africa, Switzerland, Chinese Taipei, Thailand, 
and the United States of America). Three Members have programmes that are partially consistent 
with the proposed disciplines, in that they have significant food aid operations that are completely 
consistent whilst also having other food aid programmes that may or may not be completely consistent (China
18, Japan19, and the Russian Federation20).  
4.3.  Nine Members provide untied cash based food  assistance (Australia, Canada, EU, Japan, New 
Zealand, the Russian Federation, South Africa, Swit zerland, and the US) of which five provide cash 
exclusively (Australia, Canada, EU, New Zealand and South Africa). In value terms, the majority of food aid that is provided by the donors is unt ied cash based food assistance. Under Annex L, 
untied cash based food assistance is presumed to be consistent with the Article. 
4.4.  Ten Members provide in-kind food assistance  (i.e. they provide actual commodities as aid) 
(Brazil, Cuba, China, Japan, the Russian Federation, Switzerland, Chinese Taipei, Thailand, the US 
and Viet Nam). Of these ten, four also provide untied cash based assistance (Japan, the Russian 
Federation, Switzerland and the United States). Based on the information provided, it would appear that eight of the ten Members provide in-k ind food assistance in response to emergency 
situations (paragraph 6 of Annex L) (Brazil, Ch ina, Japan, the Russian Federation, Switzerland, 
Chinese Taipei, Thailand and the US). Two Member s did not provide enough information to gauge 
the extent to which their in-kind food aid is in response to emergency situations (Cuba and Viet Nam).  
4.5.  Twelve donors confirmed that all of their aid is untied and in fully grant form (Australia, 
Brazil, Canada, China, EU, Japan, New Zealand, South Africa, Switzerland, Chinese Taipei, Thailand, and the US). Three donors did not answer  this question (Cuba, the Russian Federation 
and Viet Nam). 
4.6.  Three Members permit monetization (Japan , China and the US). Of these, the US places 
conditions on monetization and has arrangements to try and avoid commercial displacement. Four 
Members did not specify whether or not they permit monetization (Cuba, the Russian Federation, 
Thailand and Viet Nam). 
                                               
16 Counting the EU as 28 plus 1. 
17 EU is counted as one Member for the purposes of discussing donors. 
18 It is possible that China is completely consistent with the proposed disciplines. Whilst China does not 
prevent re-export of food aid and permits monetisation its aid has been donated to  the World Food Programme 
or what would appear to be emergency appeals to co untries listed where there are World Food Programme 
emergencies.  
19 The majority of Japan’s programmes are consistent with the proposed disciplines. Much food aid is 
donated through the World Food Programme. More info rmation on the "counterpart funds" system should 
enable a complete assessment. 
20 It is possible that the Russian Federation’s prog rammes are entirely consistent with the proposed 
disciplines. The Russian Federation gives much aid to  the World Food Programme. It did make two in-kind 
donations to Nicaragua and North Korea (both of whom are listed as emergency countries by the World Food 
Programme). If we had more information on these donati ons, particularly whether monetisation was permitted 
or re-export permitted then a complete assessment could be made.  G/AG/W/144 
 
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  4.7.  Only two Members (China and Thailand) specifically allow their food aid to be re-exported. 
Three members did not specify whether or not they  permit food aid to be re-exported (Cuba, 
Thailand and Viet Nam). 
4.8.  The responses to the questionnaire detail an impressive record of food aid provision, the vast 
majority of which is donated, on the basis of the information available, on terms that are 
substantially or fully consistent with the proposed disciplines in Annex L. The majority of respondents provided detailed answers in respon se to the questions. Transparency would be 
improved if Members were to answer all the qu estions rather than just providing their ES1 
and ES3 notifications. Notwithstanding this, the Membership should take some comfort in the 
excellent picture of food aid practices and that th e majority of food aid provision reported already 
being fully consistent with Annex L.  
  G/AG/W/144  
 
- 10 - Table 5 Overview of Members' food aid programmes21 
Member Is aid provided on a cash 
basis and if so how 
much?22 Is aid provided "in-kind"  
i.e. actual commodities 
and if so how much? If aid is provided "in-kind"  is it 
provided to the WFP, relevant 
international organisation or in 
response to an emergency? Is the aid 
provided in 
fully grant form 
(i.e. not tied)? Is monetization 
of the aid 
prohibited or 
not possible? Is re-export of 
"in-kind" food 
aid permitted? Most Recent 
Year of 
Reporting in 
Response 
Australia Yes- AUD 355 million 
in 2013/14 No N/A  Yes Yes N/A 2013/14 
Brazil  No Yes- 2014: 12,100 tonnes  of 
polished rice worth USD 
5,744,58423 Yes Yes Yes No 2014 
Canada Yes- 360,265 tonnes of 
commodities purchased in 
2011 No N/A  Yes Yes N/A 2011 
Cuba No Yes- 2010: 2500 tonnes of 
raw sugar Not specified24 Not specified  Not specified  Not specified  2010 
China No Yes- USD 6 million in 2014  Yes Yes No Yes 2014 
European 
Union Yes- amount not specified No N/A Yes Yes N/A 2012 
Japan Yes- amount of cash based 
food assistance not 
disaggregated total food aid in 2014: 10 billion Yen  Yes-
 amount of in-kind 
assistance is not 
disaggregated total food aid in 2014:10 billion Yen Yes
 Yes No No 2014 
New 
Zealand Yes- 2013/14: NZD 9.45 
million No N/A Yes Yes No 2013/14 
Russian 
Federation Yes- 2014: USD 34 million Yes-  2014: 82337 tonnes of 
agricultural commodities Yes Not specified  Not specified  Not specified  2014 
South Africa Yes- 2014: ZAR 5.5 million No N/A Yes Yes N/A 2014 
Switzerland Yes -2011/12: 25685 tonnes 
of grain cash equivalent Yes- 2011/12: 3240 tonnes of 
dairy products Yes Yes Yes No 2011/12 
Chinese 
Taipei No Yes- 16,400 tonnes of rice  Yes Yes Yes No 2014 
Thailand No Yes- 500 metric tonnes  Yes Yes Not specified  Yes 2014 
United 
States Yes- 2014: USD 866 million Yes- 2014: 1.31 million 
metric tonnes worth USD 794 
million Yes Yes Monetization is 
permitted in 
certain 
circumstances No 2014 
Viet Nam No Yes- 14,000 tonnes of rice  Not specified  Not specified  Not specified  Not specified  2011 
                                               
21 This summary is limited to programmes since 2010 so does no t include those of Argentina and Norway which predate this. 
22 The information summarised here is only on  the basis of submissions made to the export competition questionnaire and the infor mation compiled 
in G/AG/W/125/Rev.2/Add.3 
23 The value or volume of aid listed herein is taken from the last  available year listed for the Member in document G/AG/W/125/Re v.2/Add.3. 
24 The phrase "not specified" means there is not a specific answer to the question for that Member in G/AG/W/125/Rev.2/Add.3. G/AG/W/144 
 
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  5  CONCLUSIONS 
5.1.  As compared to 2014 there has been an impr ovement in the level, and quality of Members' 
responses to the Secretariat questionnaire, and consequently the Secretariat's report is also an improvement. The quality of responses on export credits is a good example of Members providing 
much more information about their programmes when compared with last year. It is notable that 
some of the smaller developing countries have responded, demonstrating that the questionnaire is not overly burdensome. 
5.2.  We encourage Members to make further effo rts to improve transparency, such as submitting 
overdue notifications of export subsidies (whether or not in relation to scheduled commitments) and submitting outstanding questionnaire responses. This includes providing nil responses where appropriate and, if necessary, providing information in the first instance that it is available.  
5.3.  While a number of gaps in Members' notifications and responses to the Secretariat 
questionnaire remain, the Secretariat's report provides Members with an informed view of the export competition landscape, in particular amongst most of the major exporters. The report 
reaffirms the fact that since the launch of the Doha Round there have been positive developments 
in the export competition pillar. In particular, export subsidy expenditure has fallen significantly and some Members' FTAs constrain their use of export subsidies in some, albeit limited, 
circumstances. There are also examples of individu al Members' reforms in the other pillars. This 
generally positive trend, however, is not withou t exception as not all Members have reformed.  
5.4.  Since MC9 some new export subsidy programmes have been introduced, or are under 
consideration, by a relatively small number of Members. These developments, whilst inconsistent 
with the Bali Declaration undertaking to exercise the utmost restraint with regard to any recourse 
to all forms of export subsidies, are in both dollar terms and in terms of the Membership an aberration in an otherwise clear downwards trend in the use of export subsidies. 
5.5.  The conclusions drawn from the 2014 dedica ted discussions on export competition continue 
to hold true, namely that this positive but mixed story demonstrates two key points. Firstly, judging by the reported policy settings, the Rev. 4 modalities on export competition are doable. 
Secondly, the Rev.4 modalities on export compet ition are necessary because domestic reform and 
FTA commitments are neither a guarantee nor a substitute for the elimination of all forms of export subsidies and disciplines on all export meas ures with equivalent effect through WTO reform. 
It is important that domestic reforms continue but it is essential that the Doha negotiation 
objectives on export competition be met without delay, as reflected in the Bali Declaration on 
Export Competition (paragraph 9, WT/L/915) wher e Ministers agreed that the elimination of all 
forms of export subsidies remains a priority issue. The overall policy and price environment as we 
approach the post Bali work programme deadline an d Tenth WTO Ministerial Conference presents a 
valuable opportunity to deliver on this objective.  
__________