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TN/CTD/M/52/Add.1  
 
9 February 2018  
(18-0897) Page: 1/30 
Committee on Trade and Development  
Fifty-Second Special Session    
 
 
NOTE ON THE RECONVEN ED MEETINGS OF 12 , 19 OCTOBER ,  
20 AND 23 NOVEMBER 2 017 
Chairperson: Ambassador Tan Yee Woan (Singapore)  
Addendum  
RECONVENED SESSION ( 12 OCTOBER 2017)  ................................ ................................ ... 1 
RECONVENED SESSION ( 19 OCTOBER 2017)  ................................ ................................ . 13 
RECONVENED SESSION ( 20 NOVEMBER 2017)  ................................ ...............................  20 
RECONVENED SESSION ( 23 NOVEMBER 2017)  ................................ ...............................  24 
 
 
RECONVENED SESSION ( 12 OCTOBER 2017)  
1. The 52nd Special Session of the Committee on Trade and Development (Special Session) was 
reconvened on 12 October 2017 . 
2. The Chairperson  presented a report on the bilateral and plurilateral informal consultations 
she had held from 26 September to 5 October with the proponents, a number of developed 
Members as well as some non -G90 developing Members. She explained that her objective had 
been to solicit delegations' views on three points: (i) how the delegations saw the work of the 
Special Session proceed in the coming weeks and whether they had any suggestion s that could 
help harvest tangible outcomes at the 11th WTO Ministerial Conference (MC11 ); (ii) what 
alternative approaches could be explored to ensure meaningful progress in the work of the 
Special  Session ; and (iii) whether the delegations sensed or ident ified any areas of convergence, if  
they had flexibility for any one or more proposa ls and, if yes, which proposals.  
3. She stated that t he proponents wished to have a meaningful outcome on the 
Agreement -specific Proposals ( ASPs) at the MC11 , and in order to achi eve that  goal they 
expressed their intention to engage substantively with other  partners. They realized that 
differentiation was one of the sticking issues in the negotiations and had made a n honest attempt 
to address the  issue in the proposals. They had also said that they were working on the written 
questions they had received and hoped to provide responses at the meeting today. The proponents  
believed that the level of engagement and the nature of  reactions they would receive at the 
current  meeting  from other partners would help shape the course of work and their future 
strategy. T he proponents had also reiterated that all the proposals were equal in terms of 
importance . However,  she sensed that the proponents attached greater priority to the 
industrialization cluster, i.e.,  the proposals relating to the Agreement on Trade -Related I nvestment 
Measures ( TRIMS ), GATT Article XVIII Sections A  and C  and the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures  (SCM) .  
4. On their part, while recognizing that the number of proposals ha d been reduced, the 
developed Members were unanimous in flagg ing their continued concern s with the scope of the 
proposals both in terms of coverage and nature of flexibilities. The proposals  seemed to be 
premised on the  belief that WTO rules were bad for development and for the integration of 
developing Members into  the multilateral trading system  (MTS) . The developed Members held the 
view that a rules -based WTO was beneficial to all, and helped developing Members in particular to TN/CTD/M/52/Add.1  
 
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  develop through integrating into the MTS. Therefore, the proposed flexibilities could n egatively 
impact on the integration of the beneficiaries in the MTS. Furthermore, the proposals were 
open-ended in nature and lacked any meaningful differentiation. They also felt that the proposals 
had not evolved from 2015. However, they attached high im porta nce to addressing some of the 
underlying  issues and to finding realistic and pragmatic solutions. Almost all of them stated  that 
without taking into account the political reality of differentiation, any outcome on the ASPs was 
inconceivable. On the al ternative approaches , some pointed towards exploring the avenue of 
waivers, based on real need and fact -based individual cases that could possibly be considered by 
the Membership subject to procedures and certain conditions. In the developed Members'  view,  
the next step in the work of the Special Session was to receive responses to their questions. Based 
on their evaluation of the responses from the proponents, the developed partners would have 
better clarity on the next steps in the special and differentia l treatment ( S&D) work.  
5. She went on to state that she had also met with a number of non -G90 developing Mem bers 
and had heard messages of support from some for the G90 proposals. Others, however, held 
views that were somewhat similar to those expressed by t he developed Members. The latt er group 
of Members stated that  though they had, thus far, chosen only t o listen to other Members  and had 
not been vocal in meetings, they had a number of concerns with the proposals on the table. They 
also flagged that in the interest of pragmatism , work should be focused on LDC -specific proposals .  
6. Having heard different perspectives from Members co vering all geographical regions, she 
said that it had beco me clear to her that even within the developing Members, perceptions on the 
G90 proposals were divided.  She added that her  consultations with Members did not help her 
much in drawing a clearer map o n the way forward. In fact, nothing concrete had come  out of 
these consultations other than the fact that the proponents persisted that these proposals were 
essential for their economic growth and industrialization efforts, and the developed Members and 
some developing Members reiterate d that they saw no chances of convergence on the request for 
such open -ended flexibilities. Some even hinted towards thinking about a work plan in the 
post-MC11 context.  Nonetheless , she believed that the consultations did he lp her in identifying  
some common elements in the consultations, such as : the issues that Members were trying to 
grapple with were highly complex ; they could have far -reaching implications  for the system; and 
Members wished to avoid a repeat of the 2015 pr ocess, so there was little benefit in going through 
each proposal again and again.  In the context of the work of the Special Session  in the coming 
weeks and perhaps after MC11, a lot would  depend on the proponents' responses to the questions 
posed by other  Members.  This concluded her report.  
7. The Chairperson invited the G90 to present their answers to the questions that had been 
posed by other Members.  
8. In making introductory remarks, t he representative of Rwanda  stated  that the principle of 
S&D was introduced in the WTO in recognition of the aspirations and socio -economic challenges 
faced by developing and least  developed Members.  Least developed countries (L DCs) and many 
developing countries had serious weaknesses regarding their levels of industria lization and 
manufacturing production capacity, which was the engine of development and employment 
creation. Nevertheless, the manufacturing sector had made little progress and had even declined 
in some LDCs since the 1980s. Quoting the examples of Tanzania and Zambia, he added that the  
trend of decreasing contribution of manufacturing to gross domestic product ( GDP) had also been 
observed , among others,  in Zimbabwe, Nepal, Rwanda, C ameroon, Solomon Islands,  etc. 
Developed country Members  had pursued strong industrialization policies  in the late 19th and in the 
20th centuries and t he manufacturing sector had played a key role in broadening the production 
base and the export basket, as well as in creating jobs and stimulating technological development  
in thos e economies . Manufacturing had a positive multiplier effect on employment whereby each 
job created in the manufacturing sector created  2.2 jobs in other sectors. That  had contributed 
towards sound economic diversification and structural transformation  as well.  
9. He went on to state that t he G90 had brought down the proposals from 88  in 2001 to 25 in 
2015 and now to 10 in 2017. The proponents  had made every effort to  ensure continuation of 
meaningful  work on S&D in line with P aragraph 44 of the Doha Ministeri al Declaration and the 
commitment shown by Ministers in the MC10 Declaration to conclude the D oha Development 
Agenda (D DA) with development at the centre  of WTO work . The proposals sought to address the 
necessity to create a MTS that served all its Members  and was conducive to industrialization. 
Developed countries had in the past benefitted from the absence of rules, through the utilization of TN/CTD/M/52/Add.1  
 
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  policy space and closing the policy space through GATT Agreements. This was the very reason why 
there was a Doha D evelopment Round to address the imbalances inherent in GATT/WTO 
Agreements. He recalled that specific S&D provisions in the existing Agreements gave legitimate 
hope to  developing country Members  and LDCs and that these obligations would be implemented 
and complied with. The  current  multilateral rules were constraining their ability to industrialize and 
their domestic policy space. Denying the legitimate expectations of the G 90 and the mandated 
work in the  Special Session was not acceptable.  
10. Thereafter the  representative of Uganda  took the floor and provided answers to  the 
questions posed on proposal no. 1. He stated  that they had received seven questions from 
Australia and the European Union (EU) . In tabling the 10 proposals in the Special S ession , the G90 
had several  goals in mind,  i.e. to ensure structural transformation, diversification and 
industria lization of their economies with the view to building the future they wanted for their 
people,  to promote the effective integration of the G90 into the MTS; to ensure that their people 
had adequate employment opportunities,  improve d household incomes ; and to alleviate high levels 
of poverty. He added that it was important for Members to recall  and fulfil the founding objective 
inscribed in the Marrakesh Agreemen t with the view to recognizing the need for positive efforts 
designed to ensure that developing country Members , and especially the least developed among 
them, secure d a share in the growth in international trade commensurate with the needs of their 
econom ic development. One of the cross -cutting questions that was in  everyone' s mind was what 
had changed  in the proposals tabled in the Special Session . Why table the same proposals that 
were rejected in the past?  The problem was that nothing had  changed, neither in the lives of their 
people, nor in their respective economies. O n the contrary , the situation had  either remained 
stagnant or in some cases had worse ned. In 1964, Africa’s share in world trade in goods was a 
staggering 6%. However betwe en 2009 and 2016, Africa's share in world exports had dropped 
from 3.1% to 2.2% in goods and from 2.4% to 2.0% in services. In 2016, exports of primary 
commodities accounted for almost 80% in comparison to about 30% for manufactured goods. 
Viet Nam, a coun try whose economy declined in the 1960s and  in the 1970s due to the war had  
now overtaken Africa in exports of manufactured goods. In 1995, Africa's export was  US$28 billion 
and Viet Nam's  only US$2 billion. Yet, in 2016, Africa’s exports stood  at US$92 billion compared to 
about US$140 billion  for Viet Nam. Fifty-four per  cent of the population in 46 African countries was 
still living in poverty. Out of the 420 million youth, one -third was unemployed, another third was 
vulnerably employed, and only one in s ix was in wage employment. While 10 to 12 million youth 
enter ed the workforce each year, only 3.1 million jobs were created. Africa’s Manufactured Value 
Added (MVA) accounted for just 1.6% of the global total in 2014 and its growth had  lagged far 
behind th at of other regions since 1990.  
11. It was also important to recall that at about the same time in 2015 , world leaders had also 
agreed to deliver on SDG  9 on Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure. A number of studies had 
shown that the main reason why devel oping countries, especially LDCs , had not been able to 
participate effectively in the MTS was that they were lagging behind in terms of industrialization, in 
particular the production of value added and competitive manufactured products. In order to catch 
up with developed countries, developing countries, in particular LDCs and low -income economies 
needed the fl exibility to use local content requirements in order to direct investments into the 
productive sectors and catalyse industrialization. LDCs had low levels of industrialization, their 
exports were concentrated on a few products, and their share in world tra de was very low. LDCs 
account ed for less than 1% of world exports of goods and commercial services, 1.9% of global 
investment inflows and 1% share of manufacturing value added. They also depend ed on exports of 
primary commodities, mainly minerals and fuels , which were subjected to global price fluctuations. 
Further more, LDC status was not self -designated. According to the UN , the classification of LDCs 
was contingent on a number of key human development indicators including levels of poverty, 
literacy, infa nt mortality and economic vulnerability. There were currently 48 countries that met 
those criteria.  The good news was that 16 LDCs were projected to graduate by 2024  and 32 LDCs 
by 2025. It, therefore, meant  that the request s for flexibilities in the tabl ed proposals were  not 
infinite. Given the fact that LDCs had spent a lot of time and resources negotiating extensions , 
there was a need to exempt LDCs from TRIMS until they graduate d from LDC status. This would  
create investor certainty and allow LDCs to u se the T RIMS flexibility to industrializ e and transform 
their economies.  
12. The representative went on to state that i ndustrializ ed economies had over the years used 
specific interventions and performance requirements to attract and harness investment toward s 
productive capacities in order to structu rally transform and industrializ e their economies. In the TN/CTD/M/52/Add.1  
 
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  context of global value chains ( GVCs ), the need for policy space was still as relevant as ever, 
particularly to facilitate upgrading of production networks  to participate in GVCs. Developing 
country Members  were significantly constrained in applying policy space to structurally transform 
and diversify the ir economies in this area. As fo r specific examples , the record of questions in the 
TRIMS C ommit tee again st developing country Members on this issue  was illustrative: at the most 
recent TRIMS Committee meeting, out of the nine TRIMS measures re -tabled for continued 
discussion, eight were imposed by developing country Members and were subject to ri gorous 
scrutiny by industrializ ed countries. Within the TRIMS C ommittee, previous attempts to invoke the 
flexib ility in Article 4 had  been blocked, notably with respect to various trade balancing measures 
developing country M embers had sought to apply . In additio n to rigorous questioning of 
developing country  Members'  measures within the TRIMS Committee, the jurisprudence was 
prolific with respect to challenges against developing country  Members'  use of TRIMS measures. 
Between 1996 and 2016, there were 27 recorded  TRIMS challen ges against developing country 
Members  with onl y 15 against developed Members . Recent jurisprudence over the l ast two years, 
that stru ck down TRIMS measures invoked  by certain developing country Members  that would 
have diversified their econo mies and assisted development of their domestic industries , illustrated  
the inherent difficulties and lack of flexibility within the TRIMS Agreement, as well as th e fact that 
developing country Members  still require d this flexibility. Quoting the Indonesia –Autos case, the 
representative viewed that the Panel's decision showed how the WTO A greements could potentially 
constrain industrial policy. By 2015, 41 dispute settlement proceedings had been initiated, which 
included a claim under the TRIMS Agreement. O f these 41 proceedings, 27 involved a developing 
country Member as a respondent, and 25 out of 27 included an allegation relating to local content. 
This showed  that a number of developing country Members  still require d flexibility to use local 
content requ irements to promote upstream and downstream linkages with the local economy and 
achieve industrialization and economic transformation.  
13. The representative recalled  that the Hong Kong Decision allowed  LDCs flexibility to maintain 
these measures until 2020 s ubject to procedural requirements. The notification date had expired 
as LDCs did not have the capacity to take advantage of the notification period. Nevertheless,  the 
flexibility beyond 2020 was imperative, as LDCs still required protec tion and policy spac e. 
Regarding differentiation, the representative said that  the relevant Articles of the TRIMS 
Agreement did  not differen tiate among developing country Members . However, what the proposal  
sought to do was to ensure that d eveloping country Members  and LDCs were distinguished in the 
degree of benefit that would accrue to them. Most of the developi ng and least developed country 
Members  were in the process of developing their industrialization policies and strategies. 
Trade -related investment m easures when used in conjunction with other measures, such as local 
content/performance requirements and technology transfer requirements play ed a vital role in the 
industrialisation process.  Indeed most developed country Members , while in the early stages of 
their industri al development, had employed protective industrial, trade and technological measures 
including local content. The local content requirement could strengthen the backward and forward 
linkages which could be supportive in achieving  the sustainable developmen t goals ( SDGs ), 
specifically the SDG  9. 
14. The representative of Bangladesh  took the floor to answer ques tions on proposal no. 2. He 
stated  that 11 questions from Australia, the European Union and Japan were received on the 
proposal on Article XVIII A and C. Those, who were present in the discussions before and during 
Nairobi, might recall that there had been discussions on the use of Article XVIII A and C and the 
Special Session also had a briefing  from the Secretaria t on this issue . Before the establishment of 
the WTO, some developing country Members  had invoked these sections and releases were 
granted to them. However, af ter 1995 , no developing country Member was allowed to use tho se 
sections despit e the fact that Ar ticle XVIII was  designed to allow developing country Members to 
provide assistance to their industry. From 1995 through July 2002, three developing country 
Members, Colombia, Bangladesh and Malaysia had sought recourse to Article XVIII:C. In the case 
of Ma laysia and Colombia, despite the fact that both Members argued that  their cases should be 
taken up in the C ommittee on Trade and Development  (CTD) , they were heard in the C ouncil for 
Trade in Goods  (CTG) . Bangladesh's  case was addressed in the Balance -of-Payments ( BoP) 
Committee. Discussions on those requests did not yield positive results. Burdensome consultation 
procedures made it difficult for devel oping country Members,  especially the P aragraph 4 (a) 
Members, to seek recourse to tho se sections.   
15. The pr oposal of the G90 intended to bring clarity in the procedures of application of 
Sections  A and C of Article XVIII. The existing text fell short of specify ing that where  a Member  TN/CTD/M/52/Add.1  
 
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  should notify to invoke  those sections. Accordingly, P aragraph 2.4 of the proposal proposed to 
make notifications to the CTD. Paragraph 2.4 of the proposal also brought clarity in the 
consultations process and implementation of the outcome through consultations which were in line 
with the WTO Agreement on Safeguards. It also proposed that a ny rebalancing measures and the 
application of substantially equivalent concessions or other obligations were subject to a time 
delay of five years before they could be introduced or exercised. This was desig ned to give 
developing countr y Members  some breathing space before retaliatory measures were  taken as the 
introducing M embers would  take recourse to th ose sections for development purpose. He added 
that Paragraph 4 (a) of Article XVIII defined the coverage of Members which  could  resort to tho se 
sections. By adding the phrase " developing co untry Member facing constraints"  the G90 had tried 
to focus on the developing country Members  which  were in actual need.   
16. As regards the question relating to Paragraph 20 of Article XVIII, he mention ed that the 
Decision on Safeguard Action for Development Purposes of 28 November 1979 (L/4897) provided 
similar language, but did not give Members the leeway to deviate to the extent deemed necessary. 
Reference to the terms "Member having substantial inter est" and " principle supplying interest" 
could be found in Article XXVIII of GATT 1994 and in the Understanding on Interpretation of 
Article  XXVIII of GATT 1994. He recalled that the present texts, which had been substantially 
modified by taking into consid eration the discussions held in 2015, were proposed in December 
2015, just before the 10th WTO Ministerial Conference (MC10 ), and Members did not have 
sufficient time to discuss the proposal in detail. The G90 believed that Members were now in a 
position t o discuss the proposal more elaborately. He noted that the adoption of the SDGs at the 
end of 2015 , especially Goal 9 , required p olicy measures for P aragraph 4 (a) Members to meet 
their structural transformation, industrialization and diversification needs .  
17. The representative of Egypt  was given the floor to respond to questions on proposal no. 3. 
He requested more time to coordinate with the rest of the proponents and said that he would 
present the answers at the next meeting.  
18. In responding to questions on proposals no. 4 and no. 5, the representative of South Africa  
stated that questions presented  on the proposals  gave the G90 the opportunity , once more , to 
explain and highlight , in a detailed manner , the challenges inherent in the application of subject 
S&D provisions  in the sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures and technical barriers to trade 
(TBT) Agreements. Some of th ose issues had repeatedly bee n raised by developing country 
Members  during the work of the  SPS and TBT C ommittees with no  solutions provided thu s far. The 
G90 had evaluated tho se challenges in drafting the current proposals. The questions they had 
received cover ed the following issues: re -introduction of proposals discussed in 2015; capacity 
constraints; adversely affected M embers; longer time period for comments and compliance; and 
capacity building and technical assistance. These issues continued to be relevant to the G90  
membership , as they were closely linked to the obligation to provide S&D more generally. They 
had previ ously stated that the incorporation of provisions on technical assistance and capacity 
building in the SPS and the TBT Agreement s had been an acknowledgement that there were 
challeng es faced by developing country Members  and LDCs in complying with non-tariff measures 
(NTMs). Furthermore, Members had acknowledge d that the S&D provisions in tho se Agreements 
provided leg ally weak and vague commitments , which could not be translated into specific 
obligations and , therefore , were not enforceable. The TBT Committee had encouraged Members to 
continue to exchange information on the implementation of Article 12 of the TBT Agreement. In 
the SP S Committee , developing country Members  had indicated that although a substantial 
amount of technical assistance was provided in the SPS area, in many cases it was not appropriate 
and did not correspond to their needs. Therefore, developing Members continued to call for the 
implementation of S&D provisions under Article 9 of the SPS Agreement.  On the re -introduction of 
proposals discussed in 2015, the reason why it has been done so by the G90 was that  the 
underlying concerns had not been considered in a meaningful way in the previous  discussions. The 
revised  proposals aimed to find concrete way s to strengthen S&D provisions and to make them 
more precise , effective and o perational , as envisaged by the m andate provided in P aragraph 44 of 
the Doha Ministerial Declaration.  
19. The G90 continued to bear witness that market access for products of export interest to 
developing country Members  was increasingly dependent on the ability to comply with trad e 
regulatory measures. While tho se measures were legitimate, they continued to fragment trade. A 
WTO report on challenges facing small economies revea led th at as small economies beca me more 
specialized in products, they were  increasingly exposed to NTMs. In fact, one major developed TN/CTD/M/52/Add.1  
 
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  Member had just announced that it had to align its regulatory framework to comply with the EU's 
complex SPS measures, which pres ented significant barriers. She specifically mentioned that its 
agricultural producers might have to introduce new handling logistics, which was a costly 
commitment. D eveloping country Members  and LDCs which  lacked the necessary capacity 
continued to grapp le with complex regulatory measures. A technical note prepared  by UNCTAD in 
2015 showed  that developing country Members  encountered significant additional costs while 
adapting their production processes to comply with foreign regulatory measures and standa rds. 
This led to de facto  discrimination against exports of those countries that faced  the highest 
difficulties to comply with the regulations in export markets due to capacity constraints and/or lack 
of finance. The adverse effect of such measures and sta ndards could be reduced by assisting 
developing c ountry Members  and LDCs to comply. Regarding Members facing capacity constraints 
and adversely affected, the G90 noted that food safety and agricultural health capacity referred to 
as SPS management capacity  was an important requirement to ensure compliance with SPS 
measures in exports markets, particularly in developed countries. Most often, capacity con straints 
in developing country Members  and LDCs prevented them from complying  with stringent SPS 
requireme nts and undertaking  the necessary conformity checks. The term referred to in the 
proposal as “developing country Members facing capacity constraints” was meant to assist 
Members to examine and determine the extent to which a Member could or could not compl y with 
a regulatory measure. This determination should ensure that exports of a Member, facing capacity 
constraints were not adversely affected by a measure i ntroduced by a developed Member . The 
representative referred to the case of The Gambia on pesticid e residue testing for hor ticultural 
product exports. That  case d emonstrated  the impact of SPS measures on a developing country  
Member  that had experienced capacity constraints. Exports of horticultural products to the EU from 
The Gambia were  relatively sma ll, but they we re of great economic importance to a country of the 
size of The Gambia and we re also considered an important element of the country’s programme of 
export development. Although public authorities had implemented the necessary procedures to 
perform SPS certification, as required by the EU, they had experienced a number of problems in 
meeting the EU’s requirements. Indeed, some consignments of product had been rejected 
following border ins pection. The problems faced by The Gambian authorities we re two -fold. Firstly, 
they found it difficult to obtain reliable information on the EU’s SPS requirements for the products 
that they exported  - in particular, the time taken for information to reach the appropriate 
authorities when the EU’s requirements ch ange could  delay implementation and , in the meantime , 
there was  a risk that product consignments would  be rejected. Secondly, in certain cases , the 
appropriate testing equipment was not available in The Gambia. This was a particular problem in 
the case of maximum residue levels for pesticides, which could be beyond the detection capability 
of the equipment that was available. Thus, in certain cas es, tests could be undertaken and 
certificates issued, but there could be no guarantee that the product complied with the EU’s 
requirements. In other cases  involving developing country Member  when exports had been 
stopped, despite the adequate compliance p eriod allowed and the s tandards board approved as the 
"competent authority " to issue licenses to export, they were not able to go back to earlier levels of 
exports. In certain cases, companies were unable to comply with SPS requirements in the time 
permitt ed and/or the cost of doing so was prohibitively high.  
20.  Regarding the longer time period for comments and compliance, the representative said 
that the limited time period provided had also presented a ch allenge for developing country 
Members. In the SPS C ommittee , over the years, developing country Members  had requested that 
longer periods for comments be allowed in the case of products of sp ecial export interest to them . 
Specifically, they  had requested that notification procedures  must give them adequate opportunity 
to identify where they might have potential problems meeting new requirements affecting their 
exports, so that they could request a phased -in introduction of the proposed measures. Some 
developing country Members had even requested longer time frames for compliance, as long as 
12 months. Even thoug h in the TBT C ommittee it had been agreed that the normal time for 
comments on notified technical regulations and conformity assessment procedures should be 
60 days, developed country Members were enco uraged to provide more than a 60 -day comment 
period in order to deal with the challenges related to transparency and to improve the ability of 
developing country Members to comment on notifications. During the meeting of the TBT 
Committee held in June 2017 , a developed country  Member expressed concern regarding the 
possibility of having  enough time to comment on new regulation. If  a developed count ry Member  
could request for more time to comment on regulations imposed by developing country Members, 
the oppo site situation was even more true. The representative noted that due to the large number 
and complexity of SPS and TBT measures, a longer time period for comment was requir ed to allow 
developing country Members  time to review the notifications and to infor m various stakeholders at TN/CTD/M/52/Add.1  
 
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  the national level , including the private sector , and also to provide feedback. Such notifications 
often required some training and capacity -building initiatives to stakeholders for them to 
understand the proposed measure and asse ss the possible implication of the measures. The focus 
here was not only on the comments but on other considerations such as the capacity to comply 
with the SPS measure, including technology, human resources and infrastructure needs, with a 
view to explori ng solutions to preserve market access for developing country Members, especially 
LDCs. Responding to these complex and stringent measures including the determination of the 
appropriate financial and technical assistance could not be done in 60 days, hence  the requirement 
for a longer time period for comments and compliance.  
21. She also added that t he G90 proposals allow ed Members to determine the extent of the 
technical and financial assistance to be provided to developi ng country Members. A 2002 WTO 
Survey  sought to determine the priority needs of 45 developing country Members  for technical 
assistance and capacity building in TBT, with reference to the implementation of the TBT 
Agreement  and found that the responses varied across diff erent priority areas. Th is showed  that 
the extent of technical and financial assistance could not  be pre -defined but had to  respond to 
specific country needs. This would  enable even investments in appropriate technology to ensure 
that developing country Members complied with SPS and TBT measures so as to  allow them to 
effectively partici pate in GVC s and integrate into  the MTS . 
22. The representative of Cameroon  answered questions on  proposal no. 6. He stated  that the 
G90 had received 12 questions from three delegations: Australia, E U and Japan. After considering 
and analysing the issues and concerns raised, the G90 was able to  merge them into seven 
questions or seven points.  
23. Point 1  related to e xamples showing how WTO agreements limit ed developing country 
Members ' ability  to take meas ures necessary for development. Before and during the GATT years, 
developing country Members  had a considerably freer hand in the use of industrial subsidies until 
the Uruguay Round, as a preferred instrument to support structural transformation . Historica lly, 
many developed M embers had used subsidies to grow, diversify and industrializ e targeted sectors, 
including the revitalization of distressed regions and the restructuring and rationalization of 
existing industries, as well as providing government suppo rt in the form of research and 
development ( R&D) to specific sectors, aerospace being particularly relevant. Furthermore, 
support contingent on the use of local content (Buy American) and environmental support 
program mes such as commencing production of mo re fuel -efficient vehicles had also been 
employed. The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures ( SCM) had entailed much 
tighter constraints on subsidy use , just when developing country Members  had sought to 
industrializ e and diversify and grow th eir economies. The A greement was originally a Tokyo Round 
Plurilateral Code, imposed on G90 m embers to adopt and multilateralize in the Uruguay Round, 
when they had weak capacity to negotiate. They were not part of the negotiation s of that 
Agreement or any  of the Tokyo Round Codes. Recent jurisprudence had also shown that 
notwithstanding the S&D provisions in Article 27 of the Agreement on  SCM, and the Doha 2001 
Decision on Implementation -Related Issues  and Concerns with regard to subsidies, these had not 
really assisted developing country Members  seeking to industrializ e, diversify and structurally 
transform their economies. Therefore, the flexibility they sought under the SCM Agreement was 
not any more than  had been afforded to and utiliz ed by industrializ ed Members with first mover 
advantages in the past.  
24. Point 2 pertained to d eveloping c ountries facing constraints. He said that t he intention  of the 
proposal was to recognize that not all developing country Members  were facing capacity 
constraints. Criteria were meant to limit  the sought flexibility for those who really needed it - to 
assist in the concept of distinguish ing between developing country Members . The granting Member 
would examine and determine the extent of capacity constraint on a case -by-case basis, relevan t 
to the specific proposal and A greements. T he notification referred to in P aragraph 6.3 of the 
proposal required to demonstrate the evidence of the criteria referred to in P aragraph 6.2. Any of 
the criteria could be demonstrated and they were not cumulative.  
25. Point 3 referred to c onditioning proposal upon expired Article 8. At the outset, the 
non-renewal of A rticle 8 of the Agreement on  SCM in 1999 was due to a lack of consensus by all 
Members. However, the issue of non -actionable sub sidies was also considered in 2001 and 
consensus was reached under P aragraph 10.2 of the Doha Ministerial Decision on 
Implementation -Related Issues and Concerns. Under that Decision , Ministers took note of the TN/CTD/M/52/Add.1  
 
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  proposal to treat measures imp lemented by deve loping country Members  with a view to achieving 
legitimate development goals, such as regional growth, technology research and development 
funding, production diversification and development and implementation of environmentally sound 
methods of production  as non -actionable subsidies, and agreed that the  issue must be addressed . 
It was only logical to address this proposal now after more than a decade the Doha 
Implementation -Related  Issues Decision had been in place. The proposal was even more relevant 
now given the declining trade balance, lack of industrialization and diversification of their 
countries. G90 urged Member s to agree to a decision on the  matter as reflected in the proposals 
tabled in 2015 for MC10 and now for MC11.  
26. Point 4 related to t he legal ity of inclusion by making reference to the requirements of an 
expired provision, which has disappeared. It was legally possible to re -craft any WTO provision 
that M embers by consensus deemed useful, either in the same or similar terms to what existed 
before. Furthermore, the SCM Agreement was currently on the DDA agenda of r ules negotiating 
issues, under P aragraph 28 (of Doha Declar ation 2001); with a mandate to " clarify and improve " 
the Agreement. In fact, in 2004 and 2006, some developed country Members sought to reinsert 
the perceived expired provision in Article 6.1 (a) in relation to serious prejudice which also expired 
at the same time as  Article 8 of the SCM  Agreement . Even now , in October 2017, a current 
proposal under review in the Negotiating Group on Rules by a developed Member proposed to 
re-introduce a rebuttable presumption of serious prejudice in the case of non -notification of 
subsidy programmes .  
27. Point 5 pertained to t he so -called o pen list of development goals and closed list of Article 8. 
The representative read the question as it was formulated: " How do you reconcile the open list of 
development goals in your proposal with the closed list of Article 8, if the latter would be 
applicable? And how would you see the rest of the r equirements of Article 8 apply?" . The 
representative felt that  the question was not clear. He asked if Members were suggesting that they 
would agree to these proposals if the criteria proposed und er Proposal 6 were utilized for the other 
proposals as well.  
28. Point 6 referred to  the reference to developing country Members  listed in Annex VII of the 
Agreement on  SCM. Annex VII of the SCM Agreement, which included LDCs and listed countries, 
was the tri gger for this element. It was intended to narrow the scope of the application. The G90 
recognized that the WTO Secretariat had issued a periodic note reporting the status of the listed 
countries, plus Honduras (added by rectification decision in 2000),  in terms of eligibility if a 
Member  fell below US$1,000 per capit a for three consecutive years (s ee most recent reference 
G/SCM/110/Add.14).  The intention was that the procedure be maintained and applicable to the 
G90 proposal.  
29. Point 7 related to the s ignificance of the insertion of the condition " only when the products 
concerned are destined to exports"  since t he scope of the provision referred  to import substitution 
subsidies. Article 3 of the Agreement on  SCM referred to two types of prohibited subsidies.  While 
recognizing the importance of subsidies in the economic develop ment of the developing country 
Members  in Paragraph 27.1, the Agreement allowed  Annex VII country Members  to provide only 
export subsidies but not subsidies contingent upon the use of do mestic over imported goods. Since 
the G90  proposal was directed towards industrialization, it was propo sed to allow Annex VII 
Members  to provide 3.1 (b) type subsidies to the products only when products concerned were 
destined for export.  T hat would limit  the use of 3.1 (b) subsidies and link this type of subsidy with 
the 3.1 (a) type subsidies to promote industri alization in Annex VII country Members .  
30. In concluding his intervention the representative of Cameroon  added two  points: (i) if 
subsidies allowed  developed country Members to develop , it recognized that  these were useful for 
development; and (ii)  if the WTO wanted to be considered as an Organization that supported 
development, it should allow for pro -develop ment measures to be implemented.  He encou raged 
Members to consider the creativity reflected in this proposal and how the solution proposed by G90 
took into consideration the issues  of concerned developing c ountry Members without changing 
existing rules frameworks.  
31. The representative of Senegal  presented the G90's answers to the q uestions  raised by the 
EU, Japan and Switzerland  on proposal 7 relating to  the Agreement on Customs Valuation . He 
explained  that the proposal aimed, on the one hand, to combat under -invoicing, a common 
practice in many dev eloping country Members  and LDCs. On the other hand, it aimed to facilitate TN/CTD/M/52/Add.1  
 
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  access for LDCs to price databases in order to better monitor the veracity of declared values by 
economic agents through effective cooperation between LDCs and  exporting Member cou ntries. 
Lifting tho se constraints faced by LDCs would mobilize more budgetary resources to finance the 
economic and social needs of LDCs and improve the efficiency of control operations of customs 
administrations. Alluding to t he EU's and Switzerland's  questions about the difficulties faced by 
LDCs in implementing the Agreement on the Implementation of Article 7 of the GATT, and the 
results of the technical assist ance provided for several years, he explained that t he application of 
alternative customs va luation methods in a strict order was burdensome, expensive and 
time-consuming. It required up -to-date information on the values of identical and like products, as 
well as information that was not readily available or required complicated calculations. The  
application of the computed value also required inves tigations in exporting country Members. 
Difficult procedures,  financial constraints and limited human resources  exacerbated difficulties of 
the LDCs. He drew the EU's attention to its communi cation in d ocument G/VAL/W/112 which  set 
out the reasons for the concerns regarding the veracity or accuracy of declared values. The 
elements stated by the EU included the following: the lack of mutual trust between companies and 
customs; the lack of experience with regard to regular trade flows; situations that encouraged 
importers to take risks by making false customs declarations; cases of fraud or attempted fraud 
leading to a generalization of conclusions concerning the loss of revenue; lack of training of 
customs  officers and inadequate management; conflicts in relations between customs officers and 
traders; the uncooperative attitude of certain traders and/or non-structured trade : traders did not 
keep accounts (or did not keep proper accounts); it was not possibl e to reach them or rely upon 
them to cooperate in case of controls or post import controls or audit; insufficient knowledge of 
the Customs Valuation Agreement and its applicability to various trade flows; and the inadequacy 
of national legislation concerni ng customs powers. LDC customs administrations were still faced 
with the shortcomings and problems described  by the E U, in spite of all the efforts made and the 
technical assistance provided. Indeed, technical assistance was not an end in itself. It was a 
contribution which went hand -in-hand with the human and financial efforts of the beneficiaries to 
improve a particular situation. Not all LDCs had benefited from technical assistance. In addition, 
the projects and activities financed in this context were l imited in time and resources and did not 
guarantee results, especially if an exit strategy was not put in place and if there was  no long -term 
provision in the s tate budget, under the beneficiaries own resources, to ensure that the project's 
achievements we re preserved indefinitely . LDCs had much more serious budgetary constraints, to 
which under -invoicing largely contributed. He said that Japan, like many Members, recognized the 
difficulties faced by LDCs, particularly those related to under -invoicing. Neve rtheless, it was 
concerned about the potential negative effects of using minimum values .  He said that Japan also 
shared  with Switzerland the systemic concerns regarding the prohibition of minimum values by the 
Customs Valuation Agreement.  
32. The representat ive recalled that S&D was an exception or derogation from the rules. From 
this perspective, compliance with the Customs Valuation Agreement should not be an issue. 
Moreover, the use of minimum values had been allowed under Annex III of the Customs Valuatio n 
Agreement. The fact that no LDC had applied the reservation under Paragraph  2 of Annex III since 
2007 was not linked to the improvement in LDC capacities, or their need for the use of minimum 
values, but rather to the conditions established by the Committee on Customs Valuation when 
granting S&D to requesting Member . What the LDCs asked  for in the proposal actually  came  under 
the mandate of P aragraph 44 of the Doha Declaration, namely to make S&D provisions effective 
and operational, and above all to ensure that they addressed the economic and social needs of the 
LDCs in a meaningful way . He indicated that the G90  members  were open to examining the 
modalities that Japan believed  could address their  concerns about the potential negative effects of 
using minimum values, taking into account the needs and constraints of LDCs. He said that in 
response to the question from the E U on the contribution of the Trade Facilitation Agreement  (TFA)  
to access price data, Article 12 of the TFA was a significant step in strengthening customs 
cooperation between WTO Members. However, the procedures, limitations and the discretion left 
to the Member to whom the request for assistance was addressed , could prove burdensome or 
counterproductive for the LDCs, in that no spec ific provisions were included to take account of 
their particular situation . Moreover, under Article 10.5.1 of the TFA, Members no longer had the 
possibility of requiring the use of pre -shipment inspections in relation to tariff classification and 
customs valuation . For some Members  that had recourse to pre -shipment inspection firms, this 
meant a transfer of those obligations to the customs administrations. This was the case for certain 
LDCs which had contracts with pre-shipment inspection firms and were fa ced with the dual 
challenge of bringing their TFA commitments into conformity and implementing the procedures of 
the Customs Valuation Agreement ( CVA). Given the limitations related to the provision and TN/CTD/M/52/Add.1  
 
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  effectiveness of technical assistance , in his view,  the TFA could  only be able to provide any 
possibilities in this respect  if it enabled those constraints to be properly addressed . It was  
premature to reach any conclusions at this stage given that the Agreement had only entered into 
force recently , that LDC s were still far from receiving the support they needed in this framework . 
33. The representative of Bangladesh  provided a response to the questions on proposal  no. 8. 
He stated that  the G90 had received five questions on this proposal from Australia, the EU and 
Japan. He explained that  the proposal was not necessarily an obligation of result. It merely so ught 
that developed country Members  gave due consideration to meaningful market access. 
Paragraph  2(a) of the Enabling Clause, envisaged the establishment  of "generalized, 
non-reciprocal and non -discriminatory preferences benefic ial to the developing countries" . It was 
not impractical for developed M embers  to proactively consider how meaningful market access 
could be best secured for developing and least de veloped country Members  in designing their 
generalized system of preferences ( GSP) schemes. The G90 sought that developed countries, in 
formulating their GSP schemes, considered how the export interests of relevant developing and 
least developed country Me mbers could be ensured, and make the market access under the 
various GSP schemes meaningful. In this regard, the G90 had  some pertinent questions about GSP 
schemes. First, he asked, if  the WTO Members did not consider that the GSP regime  was agreed 
upon by  the WTO Members for expanding export opportuni ties of the developing country Members , 
especially those whic h had limited export products. In fact, Paragraph 3 (a) of the Enabling Clause 
maintained that  any differential and more favourable treatme nt provided under this Clause shall be 
designed to facilitate and prom ote the trade of developing Members.  Second, he wondered 
whether Me mbers did not think that the G90 proposal would  facilitate operationalization of this 
provision through consultations .  Finally, he asked if WTO  Members did not consider that there was 
a responsibility for the GSP gran ting Members  to design their scheme s to facilitate and promote 
the trade of developing country Members.  
34. When given the floor to answer the questions on prop osal no. 9, the representative of Egypt  
said that, as had been the case with the proposal no. 3, he would provide G90 response at the 
next meeting of the Special Session.  
35. In responding to the questions posed on proposal  no. 10, the representative of Rwanda  
stated  that t he G90 had received questions from  Australia, Canada and the EU mainly seeking 
clarification of the term "full restraint ", the meaning of "fast track"  accession process, and as to 
what would be the G90's suggestions to discipline accession process. He recalled that 30 LDCs 
were original WTO Members and the accession of nine LDCs had been approved from amongst 
36 LDCs since the establishment of the WTO. But there were still a signif icant number of LDCs out 
of the system. Currently , eight LDCs were in the process of accession negotiations with another 13 
developing countries in the queue. Because of increasing appetite and demand for a wider market 
access from the other Members , combi ned with other constraints associated with LDCs ' own 
limitations of development, human, institutional, infrastructural and regulatory capacities, 
accession processes for LDCs were becoming more and more onerous and challenging. From the 
records so far, acc ession processes on average took nearly 11 years for developing country 
Members and 13 years for LDCs. To this effect, the 2002 LDC Accession Guidelines , in addition to 
the 2012 General Council Decision , were  intended to further strengthen, streamline and 
operationalize LDC accession. The Guidelines urged Members to exercise restraint in seeking 
market access concessions and commitments from acceding LDCs that were beyond their levels of 
development in order to facilitate their accession. The Guidelines sti pulated that Members 
exercised restraint in seeking market access concessions from acceding LDCs, while the latter were 
expected to offer reasonable concessions commensurate with their individual development, 
financial and trade needs. The Guidelines allow ed flexibilities to acceding LDCs consistent with 
their individual development, financial and trade needs as broader fundamental development 
objectives. They also required LDCs to make a comprehensive binding coverage on both 
Agriculture and NAMA. The Guid elines set basic principles both for goods and services negotiations. 
On goods , the principles were comprehensive binding coverage of 50% for Agriculture and 35% for 
NAMA; tariff negotiations that ensured an appropriate balance between predictability of ta riff 
concessions and the legitimate developmental needs of LDCs to address their specific constraints 
or difficulties; and establishing benchmarks on average bound rates. On services, the principles 
were that Members were to respect the provision of specia l treatment for LDCs contained in 
Articles IV and XIX of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). In particular, Members 
would take into account the serious difficulty of acceding LDCs in undertaking commitments, in 
view of their special economic  situation and their individual development, financial and trade TN/CTD/M/52/Add.1  
 
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  needs; flexibility for acceding LDCs for opening fewer sectors, liberalizing fewer types of 
transactions, and progressively extending market access in line with their development situation. 
In addition, acceding LDCs would not be expected to offer full national treatment, nor were they 
expected to undertake additional commitments under Article XVIII of the GATS on regulatory 
issues which might go beyond their institutional, regulatory, and adm inistrative capacities. With 
these principles, the Guidelines gave flexibilities for acceding LDCs to identify their priority services 
sectors and sub -sectors and make reasonable offers commensurate with their individual 
development, financial and trade ne eds as well as their regulatory and institutional capacities; to 
be provided with technical assistance, as appropriate, to enhance their regulatory and institutional 
capacities; to not be required to undertake commitments in services sectors and sub -sector s 
beyond those that had been committed by existing WTO LDC Members, nor in sectors and 
sub-sectors that did not correspond to their individual development, financial and trade needs. 
Accordingly, WTO Members must exercise restraint in seeking commitments i n trade in services 
from acceding LDCs. Though LDCs in accession were willing to take commitments that were 
consistent with their level of development, human, institutional, infrastructural and regulatory 
capacities, the size and depth of commitments that acceding LDC countries took indicated the 
depth of demands and pressures on LDCs for more market access. The commitments were 
excessive and some commitment terms were even much beyond the level of development and 
ability of LDCs to meet their obligations i n tandem with their developmental ambitions to get their 
people out of poverty and benefit from the global trading system on balanced terms after 
accession. Acceding LDC Members were thus still exposed to WTO plus commitments by developed 
Members.  
36.  The G90  formally and solemnly condemned these extractions of concessions. It sought 
respect from Members to the principle of special treatment for LDCs contained in Articles IV and 
XIX of the GATS . In particular, Members must take into account the serious difficu lty of acceding 
LDCs in undertaking commitments, in view of their special economic situation and their individual 
development, financial and trade needs.  Therefore, the G90 sought to discipline the Guidelines as 
an LDC Accession Instrument and ensure that  LDCs acceded on fair and equal terms, and that 
their conditions of access to the WTO should not be more onerous than those of founding 
Members. As per the principles of the Guidelines, Members must show restraint in seeking market 
access concessions and c ommitments from acceding LDCs in trade in goods and services that they 
were not ready to make. Because of their limited technical financial resources capacity, accession 
should not be a lengthy process and should be exercised in a fast -track approach. With  the 
principles of universalizing the MTS on balanced terms , consistent with the level of development, 
ambition and developmental needs of LDCs, the G90 hoped that the MC11 outcomes would ensure 
the principle of not leaving anyone behind in benefiting from  the global trading system with full 
implementation of the Guidelines that set a benchmark for goods and services commitments by 
disciplining the Guidelines as part of S&D for LDCs accession. The G90 also hoped that Members 
would re -affirm their commitment  to restrain from seeking market access concessions and 
commitments from acceding LDCs that they were not ready to make because of their level of 
development capacities and developmental ambition.  
37. The representative of the European Union  thanked the propon ents for their detailed 
responses and took note of the request for clarification on some of her delegation's questions.  
38. The representative of Canada  thanked the G90 for the hard work undertaken  in providing 
answers to the questions raised.  
39. The representative of Australia also joined the delegations of EU and Canada in thanking the 
G90 for the answers provided.  
40. The representative of Japan  thanked the proponents for their efforts to prepare and deliver 
the responses to the questions raised in the previous sessions. He said that as discussed in the 
Heads of Delegation meeting in September and in the recently held Marrakesh meeting, Members 
could not take all unresolved issues to MC11 so there should be a moment of truth, at which point 
the Membe rship would have to choose some potential issues for deliverables at MC11, and start 
considering post -MC11 work program mes on the remaining issues. In Marrakesh , some M inisters 
had shown strong interest in S&D , but it was also evident that the views among the M embership 
on this matter remained  divergent. In this vein, the Director -General had called for the Ministers of 
the G90  to have a political engagement in this matter, and not to outsource this important task  to 
the Geneva colleagues given the sensitiv ity of the issue. He thus call ed for colleagues from the TN/CTD/M/52/Add.1  
 
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  proponents to have more dialogues with their own capitals, to consider a way forward and how 
much flexibility could  be extended for convergence  at MC11 or beyond.  
41. He added that it was rather unfortun ate that, as of now, S&D was not seen in the list of 
issues with high potential of deliverables at MC11. Members needed to face this reality and think 
seriously what they could do in the remaining two months in the lead -up to MC11. Nonetheless, he 
stated  that the comprehensive responses by the G90 were very useful and he highlighted the 
importance of dialogue with capitals.  
42. The representative of Cameroon  said that , in Marrakesh , his Minister had clearly stated that 
his country wanted industrialization, str uctural transformation and diversification of its economy. 
His President had also said that Cameroon should become an emerging economy. He questioned 
the ability of the Director -General to advise on what objectives a Member country could set out for 
itself in pursuit of development, industrialization, structural transformation and diversification. He 
did not think that  any Member should advise the proponents on what to raise or to take to 
Buenos  Aires.  
43. The representative of Uganda  asked whether it was the understanding of Japan that the 
Director -General was suggesting that the work in the Special Session should be shut down so that 
Ministers in capitals would take up that work. He had not understood the concept of outsourcing 
vis-à-vis Geneva and the capita ls and asked for clarification of Japan's understanding of what the 
Director -General  had said . 
44. The representative of Mexico  said that her delegation understood the needs and challenges 
faced by some Members in fully integrating into international markets,  particularly LDCs. Mexico 
was open to debating the proposals in more detail , to find a way to avoid possible distorting effects 
of the sought flexibilities.  
45. The representative of Cuba stated that, as a Member of the G90, her delegation supported 
the state ments made by the propo nents. She said that her delegation  believed that there must be 
an outcome on development at MC11. She  encouraged Members to continue discussions in a 
constructive and positive way.  
46. The representative of Thailand  said that his delega tion had always been supportive of a 
rules-based, transparent and predictable MTS. He believed that the issues before the 
Special  Session merited further discussion, particularly proposal 4 on SPS, 5 on TBT and 9 on 
Transfer of Technology.  
47. The representati ve of the United States  stated  that as her delegation had already made clear 
at the July and September  meetings of the Special Session, it did not consider the G90  proposals 
as a basis for work. No amount of tinkering would allow a productive discussion. T he discussion in 
the Special Session last month and today had not changed her delegation's view s, in fact, they had 
reconfirmed its views already expressed at previous meetings . She said that in their co nsultations 
with the Chair , some Members had expr essed openness to working on tho se proposals should they 
apply only to LDCs. The United States was not able to support this approach or to consider 
weakening WTO  rules for any group of Members. The United States  firmly believed that t he 
benefits of the global trading  system should  only accrue to those who participated in it.  
48. The representative of Rwanda  said that the G90 aimed at achieving an MTS that was 
beneficial to all by simply respecting mandates to relax some rules for industrializatio n and 
structural transformation of those who really needed flexibilities.  
49. Responding to Cameroon's question, the representative of Japan  said that he was not in a 
position to explain what the Director -General had tried to convey in his remarks. Nevertheless, his 
understand ing was that the Director -General had spoken broadly of the importance of having 
some moment of truth before Buenos Aires, so that Members could avoid sending a full set of 
unresolved issues to MC11 for Ministers to consider. In the assessment he presented  to Ministers 
about S&D, he had said that given the difficult nature of the proposals, it was not good for 
Ministers to rely totally on the discussions based in Geneva and that some political engagement 
from Ministers would be required.  TN/CTD/M/52/Add.1  
 
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  50. The representative of Bangladesh  asked for clarification from the United States about why 
the responses given by the G90 had confirmed its view that work could not be continued on the 
basis of these proposals.  
51. The representative of Uganda  asked for clarification from the del egation of the United States 
as to whether it would block consensus if the Special Session managed to arrive at a degree of 
convergence with the other Members. He asked whether it would be accurate to report that the 
United States would block consensus to adopt a decision on any of the provisions in the proposals.  
52. The representative of the United States  said that her delegation had for several years asked 
the proponents to make a good faith attempt to be constructive by considering a new approach 
focused on  facilitating their full integration into the trading system and which recognized that full 
implementation of WTO rules was an important foundation for sustainable development. That was 
not the premise of the proposals. The United States was ready to work with Members that were 
seeking to promote a more fulsome integration into the global trading system. If Members had 
been working on implementation for the past couple of decades , this discussion would not be 
necessary. In response to the question from Ugan da, she said that the Special Session was quite 
away from consensus , so she believed it was an unrealistic scenario and hence the question did 
not merit a response.  
53. The Chairperson  announced that the next meeting of the Special Session would be held on 
19 October.  
54. The meeting was suspended . 
 
RECONVENED SESSION ( 19 OCTOBER 2017)  
55. The 52nd Special Session of the Committee on Trade and Development  was reconvened on 
19 October 2017.  
56. The Chairperson  recalled that at the last meeting of the Special Session on 12 October 2017, 
Members had heard the G90's responses to the questions asked by other Members on eight out of 
the ten proposals. Also, it was agreed to reconvene in formal mode to hear proponent s' responses 
to the questions on the remaining two proposals. i.e., nos. 3 and 9 that related to 
GATT  Article  XVIII B and Transfer of Technology. She said that after having heard these 
responses, she would suspend the meeting and switch into an informal mo de so as to undertake 
substantive consideration of the proposals that constitu ted the industrialization cluster i.e., the 
proposals relating to the Agreement on TRIMS, GATT Article XVIII , Sections  A and C, and the 
Agreement on SCM . 
57.  The representative of Egypt said that with reference to the proposal on Article XVIII 
Section  B on BoP, the G90 had received around six specific questions from Japan and the E U in 
addition to two general ones from Australia. The questions and concerns raised , sought 
clarificatio ns regarding the underlying problems and the challenges facing developing country 
Members; the rationale for improving Article  XVIII:B; the reactions towards related cases within 
the WTO especially the most recent ones; the issue of deviation from the curr ent measures; the 
comparison between the current proposal and the one tabled in 2015  with special consideration on 
Paragraphs 3.2 and 3.3 in the revised proposal; and the issue of differentiation. Paragraph 44 of 
the Doha Declaration mandated a review of t he S&D provisions with a view to strengthening them 
and making them more effective and operational. The rationale and the reasoning for 
reintroducing , once again,  the proposals in the Special Session was obvious , because despite the 
fact that the proposals  had been on the table for almost 16 years , the concerns of the proponents 
remained unaddressed. With regard to the problems and challenges behind the proposal and the 
challenges faced by the G90 members, it was pertinent to point out that many developing country 
Members and LDCs had demonstrated declines in manufacturing and insufficient or no growth that 
had devastated their potential for sustained industrialization, structural transformation and 
follow -on diversification. The end of the commodity price c ycle had negatively impacted the 
current accounts and financial markets. Since the decline in commodity prices in 2014, revenues 
had not managed to keep up with expenditures. Over the past two years, the aggregate 
macroeconomic environment of Africa had wo rsened due to higher debt, higher public deficit and 
lower savings. B oP resided at the crux of development. B oP crises among developing country TN/CTD/M/52/Add.1  
 
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  Members stemmed from the basic obstacles that they faced in trying to become industrialized. The 
causes of such difficulties were often varied and complex. Key factors included weak domestic 
financial systems; large and persistent fiscal deficits; high levels of external and/or public debt; 
exchange rates fixed at inappropriate levels; natural disasters; armed confl icts or a sudden and 
strong increase in the price of key commodities such as food and fuel. Some of those factors could 
directly affect a country's trade account, reducing exports or increasing imports. Others could 
reduce the financing available for inter national transactions. For example, investors could lose 
confidence in a country's prospects, leading to massive asset sales, or "capital flight." In many 
cases, diagnoses of, and responses to, crises were complicated by linkages between various 
sectors of  the economy. Imbalances in one sector could quickly spread to other sectors, leading to 
widespread economic disruption.  
58. Regarding the economic rationale behind the current proposal on improving Article XVIII: B, 
many developing country Members were enteri ng into debt and having to go to the I nternational 
Monetary Fund  (IMF) /World Bank (WB) for a bail out. That was due to low commodity prices and 
the reversal of capital flows away from developing country Members. On the economic front, 
instability in capital flows and in relative currency rates continued. According to UNCTAD data, 
2015 witnessed a rever sal of capital flows in developing country Members, with net outflows of 
US$656 billion or 2.7% of their GDP. That was a big change from a net inflow of 1.3% of GDP in 
2013. Because of those large fluctuations in perceptions and actual flows, many developi ng 
country Members remained vulnerable to financial instability. Going through those cycles, the debt 
of developing country Members had risen from US$2.1 trillion in 2000 to US$6.8 trillion in 2015. 
Their overall debt jumped by over US$31 trillion with tot al debt -to-GDP ratios reaching over 120% 
in many countries and over 200% in some others. More low -income countries had to turn to 
institutions like the IMF and WB for financial assistance. Regarding the reaction to related cases 
within the WTO, especially the most recent ones, he explained that since the establishment of the 
WTO there had been about 104 notifications of B oP restrictions. In recent years, some WTO 
Members had applied B oP measures in order to address specific economic concerns. On 
25 February  2015, Ukraine adopted B oP measures. The representative  said that he understood 
that Ukraine's B oP measures were no longer in force. With respect to the question regarding 
measures from Nigeria, it illustrated even more obviously the need for flexibility b y the  G90 
members and developing country Members to be able to diversify their economies, industrialize 
and structurally transform. Ecuador had applied B oP measures in 2009 and again in 2015. In its 
2015 notification, Ecuador referred to the highly unfavou rable economic climate prevailing in the 
country and its impact on the B oP as the grounds for imposing a temporary and 
non-discriminatory tariff surcharge for a period of up to 15 months , in order to regulate the 
general level of imports and , thereby , resolving Ecuador's critical B oP situation. The imposed 
surcharges were in response to a sharp drop in oil prices starting in late 2014, which led to 
deterioration  in the country’s B oP. Ecuador's measures had been subject to extensive discussions 
as part of th e consultations process which lasted for six consecutive rounds, with some Members 
expressing concern as to whether they complied with the relevant requirements of Article XVIII of 
GATT 1994. Ecuador began to phase those measures out in 2016, but following  the earthquake in 
April of that same year, it had informed the B oP Committee that it intended to delay the phase -out 
for a year to facilitate recovery from the economic effects of the earthquake . Ecuador informed the 
WTO' s Committee on B oP restrictions on  21 July 2017 that the final phase -out of the surcharges 
was made effective on 1 June 2017. It was important to emphasize the newly -added pressing 
challenges that developing country Members currently faced due to climate change and its 
negative impact on t heir efforts towards sustainable development. Moreover, the need for B oP 
measures would remain pertinent due to instabilities in the global monetary system. Based on IMF 
data, many developing country Members had continuous B oP deficits in the period 2008 -2015. 
Such deficit combined with another deficit in the net of international investment positions within 
the same period. Furthermore , many developing country Members, and in particular LDCs overall , 
the B oP had been in deficit since the 1970s. And again, d ue to onerous procedural requirements, 
developing country Members, small and vulnerable economies (SVEs) and LDCs had not been able 
to fully utilize those provisions.  
59. On the concerns relating to deviation from the current available measures, the G90 would  
like to confirm that it was  not deviating from the current measures to address B oP concerns. 
Articles XII and XVIII :B of the GATT 1994 established rules allowing WTO Members to impose 
restrictive import measures specifically in order to address BoP concer ns. Both provisions operate d 
as an exception to Article XI: 1 of the GATT, which imposed a general prohibition on quantitative 
restrictions and other trade restrictions on imports and exports. Article XII could be invoked by all TN/CTD/M/52/Add.1  
 
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  WTO Members, whereas Article  XVIII: B could be invoked only by developing country Members. 
Article  XVIII: B covered measures to safeguard a Member's financial position, and also permitted 
measures to ensure a level of reserve  adequate for the implementation of the Member's 
programme of  economic development. Article XVIII: B authorized measures to forestall the threat 
of or to stop a serious decline in its monetary reserves and to achieve a reasonable rate of 
increase in its inadequate monetary reserves. In terms of procedural requirement s, measures 
taken under Articles XII and XVIII: B must be taken in accordance with the procedures laid out in 
the Understanding on the Balance -of-Payments  Provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade 1994. Pursuant to the Understanding, Members must give preference to measures that had 
the least restrictive effect on trade. In addition, measures taken for B oP purposes could only be 
applied to control the general level of imports and could not exceed what was necessary to 
address the B oP situation . In effect, this meant that B oP measures should not be used to provide 
protection to specific sectors. Members could exclude from the scope of B oP measures certain 
"essential products". In the case of developing country Members, under Article XVIII, that meant 
products which were more essential in the light of the Member's policy for economic development , 
provided that the restrictions were applied , so as to avoid unnecessary damage to the commercial 
or economic interests of any other Member. B oP measures had to be progressively relaxed as the 
BoP situation improved. The Committee on B oP had to carry out consultations in order to review 
BoP measures. Members imposing Bo P measures had to notify the General Council and the B oP 
Committee.  
60. On the specific questions related to the current proposal and the one tabled in 2015, with 
special considerations on P aragraphs 3.2 and 3.3 of the revised proposal, the reasoning for 
reintroducing a proposal which had been rejected back in 2015 , was that r ejection had been 
clearly motivated by disinterest on the part of developed Members in the proposals in the first 
place. The adoption of the SDGs was also a determining event at the end of 2015, which had 
helped the G90 members to closely examine their str uctural transformation, industrialization and 
diversification needs and the policy measures required to realize them. With respect to Article 3.3 
of the proposal, in the 2001 Doha Ministerial Declaration on Implementation -Related Issues and 
Concerns , Ministers reaffirmed that it was a n S&D provision for developing country Members and 
that recourse to it should be less onerous than to Article XII of the GATT 1994. With regard to 
Paragraph 3.2, concerns had been raised that it could be very difficult to achie ve consensus in the 
Committee. The G90 was not adding further discretion to the assessment of adequacy by 
stipulating what the Committee should consider in assessing adequacy of monetary reserves for a 
developing  country Member referred to in P aragraph 4(a ) of Article XVIII. That provision was 
designed to ensure that the unique challenges facing developing country Members, including 
commodity price volatility and volatile financial capital flows , were taken into account. In 
particular, it served to clarify that short -term financial flows should not be included in determining 
the adequacy of a developing country Member’s external financial position. The representative 
recalled that that was an outstanding implementation issue, notably Annex C of the Canc ún 28 
S&D provisions. He reminded Members that one of the positive findings of the India -Autos Panel 
had been that GATT Article XVIII: B allowed the use of B oP provisions for development purposes. 
The G90 was of the view that considerat ion of the issues describe d in P aragraph 3.2 of the 
proposal would facilitate the decision -making process with regard to application of Article XVIII: B.  
61. Another concern had been raised about the issue of differentiation. Article XVIII :B clearly 
dealt with the issue, as it had to b e utilized by developing country Members in the early stages of 
development and with a low standard of living. To conclude, he highlighted that Article XVIII :B of 
GATT 1994 established rules allowing WTO Members to impose restrictive import measures 
specif ically in order to address B oP concerns. He also said that the main objectives of the G90 
proposal were to simplify the procedures for invoking BoP measures to achieve the objectives of 
the Article. With regard to the concerns about the WTO consistency and  the importance of avoiding 
excessive use of those provisions, he clarified that the proposal respected the WTO -related 
provisions and did not aim to change them. The proposal only sought to allow developing country 
Members to use their right, which all Me mbers had agreed upon. The G90 proposed better 
guidelines for deter mining the adequacy of Member s' reserves within the contex t of developing 
country Members'  economic development programmes. It also proposed the suspension of the 
right to retaliate against  such Members that used that Article.  
62. Explaining the questions raised on proposal 9, related to transfer of technology, the 
representative of Egypt stated that the G90 had received around seven written questions on the 
proposal from Members , including the EU and Canada. The questions sought clarifications about TN/CTD/M/52/Add.1  
 
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  the rationale for introducing the new proposal and how existing WTO Agreements were limi ting 
developing country Members'  abilities to take measures necessary for development. There wer e 
also concerns about the correlation between TRIPS  Article 66.2 and the proposed P aragraph 9.3 in 
the proposal. Some other questions relate d to the meaning of the phrase " under the contr ol of 
developed country Members"  and w hether that meant technologies owned by a government. 
Clarification had als o been sought about the phrase " technologies developed with public funding" 
and specific questions were raised to understand better the concerns of LDCs with regard to the 
current practices and initiatives relate d to transfer of technology. The representative said that the 
aim of the G90 proposals was to address the industrialization, structural transformation and 
diversification needs of the proponents. The proposal on transfer of technology complemented the 
rest of the proposals tabled by them. In his view, there could not be meaningful productivity 
without adequate technology. Technological progress was a key factor in economic development 
and decreasing the technology gap between developed and developing countr y Members would 
have a positive impact on enhancing proponents' participation in international trade. Many 
developing country Members had had declines in manufacturing and insufficient or no growth that 
had devastated their potential for sustained industri alization and structural transformation of their 
economies. As developing country Members and LDCs continued to struggle with industrialization, 
specific measures needed to be taken within the WTO to encourage flows of technology to 
complement their effort s.  
63. On the question of how existing WTO Agreements lim ited developing country Members'  
abilities to take the measures necessary for development , the representative explained that a 
number of provisions in the WTO Agreements mentioned the need for transfer of technology from 
developed to developing country Members. However, it was not clear how such transfers should 
take place in practice. Major aspects of the technology and knowledge deficits in many developing 
country Members were easily spotted by observi ng indicators such as the share of GDP devoted to 
scientific and technological research or the share of manufacturing and technology products in 
exports. Nevertheless, a more comprehensive perspective could be gained by making further 
assessments. For that , technology and knowledge stocks and flows, as well as supporting 
institutional and policy frameworks, needed to be brought into picture. There were clear barriers to 
technology flows to developing country Members. He explained that technology transfer wa s a 
four-stage process consisting of acquisition, learning, adaptation and diffusion. Market failures 
could act as barriers to technology acquisition and diffusion of technology. Some forms of market 
failure could be particularly important barriers to tech nology transfers for developing country 
Members. The process of technology transfer to developing country Members could also encounter 
major obstacles in the phases of learning and adaptation. In that context, there were two types of 
barriers to technology  transfer to developing country Members: (i) firm -level problems that 
derived from the spe cific characteristics of a firm;  and (ii) systemic problems that derived from the 
environment in which firms operated. At the firm level, possible barriers to technol ogy transfers 
included insufficient knowledge about all ranges of technological alternatives; inability to identify 
the technology that best suited its needs; limited access to finances; inadequate workforce skills 
and mechanisms for their upgrading; slowe r pace of technological development in downstream or 
upstream firms that inhibited the upgrading of technology; and organizational rigidities within 
firms. At the systemic level, barriers to technology transfers included : lack of access to information 
on new technologies and innovations; market distortions, including barriers to trade; lack of 
education and skills; ineffective institutions for carrying out R&D; insufficient or weak linkages 
between businesses, universities and research institutions resultin g in little knowledge about the 
needs of the industry; inadequate development of the financial and insurance markets; lack of 
resources, knowledge and capabilities within policy institutions; and other regulatory constraints.  
64. On the concerns pertaining to  the correlation between the proposed provisions 9.2, for LDCs 
only, and 9.3, for developing country Members in general with TRIPS Article 66.2, the 
representative said that the proposal benefited from the existing related discussions on trade and 
technolo gy transfer within the WTO. The proposed provisions 9.2 and 9.3 dealt with the 
fundamentals like the enabling environment and the role of home country measures. He further 
clarified that Members had discussed the vital role of domestic policy and framework  in the 
generation, transfer and diffusion of technology. There was a recognition that development of 
human capital, infrastructure, legal framework, macroeconomic conditions and the level of skill of 
workers and the domestic education system were key elem ents in creating a suitable enabling 
environment for the flow and diffusion of technology. A number of presentations in the Working 
Group on Trade and Transfer of Technology (WGTTT)  and elsewhere in the WTO , had also 
emphasized the role of absorptive capac ity in deriving economic gains from technology transfer. TN/CTD/M/52/Add.1  
 
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  Underlying the importance of partnership in technology transfer , and for t hat to be a win -win 
situation, the evolving discussions had seemed to recognize that both home and host countries 
measures we re important factors in facilitating transfer of technology. Members shared the 
understanding that transfer of technology was a two -way process , but had somewhat different 
views on the relative importance of home and host country measures. From the develop ing 
country Members' perspective, the G90 continued to hold the view that home country measures, 
including financing for transfer of technology, incentives to stimulate foreign direct investment 
(FDI) with a technology transfer component, incentives for sm all and medium enterprises seeking 
partners in developing country Members, simplification of rules of origin and the establishment of a 
database to ensure the flow of all relevant information on technology were much more important 
in facilitating technolog y transfer.  
65. With regard to requests for clarification of the concerns of LDCs, the representative stated 
that technology transfer initiatives to developing country Members , in particular LDCs , had not 
been operationalized. For instance, in the TRIPS Counc il, with regard to actions taken or 
contemplated under Article 66.2, some Members had said that the programmes reported by some 
developed Members , wherein they were providing technology transfer under Article 66.2, were not 
necessarily specifically tailore d towards LDCs. Indeed, the EU had reported that those programmes 
were not necessarily targeted to LDCs but often had a regional scope which included a variety of 
countries. Furthermore, many of the programmes and policies reported were not technical in 
nature and did not include a technology transfer component. On the more general question that 
sought further clarification on the proposal, the related paragraph in the proposal had requested 
targeted technical assistance to be provided to support LDCs' dome stic efforts to enhance their 
technological base and improve their innovation c apacities. Regarding the terms " publicly owned 
technology or publicly funded research ", the representative explained that historically, 
governments had played a key role in supp orting R&D through national laboratories, universities, 
and through international collaborative ventures. Many governments emphasized the contribution 
that public support to R&D could make to economic competitiveness and the importance of 
commercializing p ublicly funded R&D. Country case studies indicated that public funding remained 
a major source for R&D activities. Public funding of R&D, according to the UNCTAD, UNEP and 
UNDESA, usually took two forms: general support to national R&D institutions and lab oratories, 
and direct funding of specific projects according to set government priorities. One example of 
publicly funded research being made available to the public was the mandatory Public Access 
Policy of the US National Institutes of Health (NIH) which  required all researchers funded by the 
NIH to make available their publications through the National Library of Medicine no later than 
12 months after the official date of publication, thus improving the sharing of scientific findings, 
the pace of medical  advances, and the rate of return on benefits to the taxpayer. A similar concept 
could also be envisaged to address prompt availability of publicly funded technologies to 
developing country Members.   
66. On the concerns related to the mandate and working of the WGTTT, the proposal  sought to 
enhance and revitaliz e the work of the WGTTT by mandating the Group to examine certain issues. 
The Group, established by the Ministers in Doha in 2001, was mandated to examine the 
relationship between trade and the transfer  of technology from developed to developing country 
Members, and identify ways to increase the flows of technology to developing country Members. 
He concluded the statement by stating that after about 16 years, the Working Group still remained 
far from ful filling the Ministerial mandate.  
67. The Chairperson  asked whether the proponents were ready to provide answers or 
clarifications on the remaining aspects of proposal 6 relating to subsidies which had remained 
unanswered at the last meeting.  
68. The representativ e of Rwanda  stated that it was a request for clarification from the G90's 
focal point to the EU with regard to their its question on the open list of development goals and the 
close list of Article 8 , and how to reconcile both lists. Therefore, it was the EU which  was supposed 
to provide clarification to the question it had raised.  
69. The representative of the European Union  said that indeed there had been a question from 
the G90's focal point asking her delegation to clarify its question regarding the open list of 
development goals and the close list of Article 8. The question was how to reconcile both lists and 
whether the latter would be applicable. Also, how would the G90 see the rest of the requirements 
of Article 8 apply. Comparing the list of non -actionable subsidies in Article 8 with the proposal, the TN/CTD/M/52/Add.1  
 
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  proposal mentioned product diversification and contained the word "i ncluding" so it did not seem 
to be a closed list, whereas Article 8 was a closed list, and had very specific requirements listed.  
70. The representative of Bangladesh  said that in the G90's view , Article 8.1 regarding 
non-actionable subsidies covered many thi ngs. The G90  understood that its proposal was more 
closed than the one in Article 8.1.  
71. The representative of Rwanda  said that the G90 would consider the clarifica tions by the EU 
and come back  with a response . 
72. At this stage the Chairperson  switched the meet ing into an informal mode. Later , at the 
delegation of Canada's request , the meeting was again switched back to formal mode.  
73. The representative of Canada  took the floor to state that there were many paths to 
development. Economic circumstances were not wh at they were 200 years ago or 100 years ago 
or in 2001 or even 2009. Because certain policy tools were employed in the past, did not mean 
that there was no better way to develop or that they would yield positive results today. Her 
delegation did not think a discussion of history was appropriate for the Special Session. She had 
heard the proponents indicate that performance requirements, infant industry protection and 
WTO-inconsistent subsidies were needed to fos ter development. Her delegation' s view was tha t 
they created inefficiencies in domestic markets and distorted international trade, to the long -term 
detriment of all. With such fundamental differences, it was difficult to see how Members could 
bridge the gaps and find consensus on the proposals. Her de legation also questioned the 
usefulness of a proposal -by-proposal review in informal mode. Nonetheless , Canada remained 
open to whatever approach was agreed among Members and assured its participation. The 
representative encouraged the proponents to consid er what other policy tools could be used to 
achieve their development goals, ones which were sustainable in the long run, transparent and 
predictable, available only for Members that required them, and that supported the continued 
integration of developing  country Members and the LDCs into the MTS. In that respect, her 
delegation would continue to encourage a discussion of the specific problems being faced rather 
than a one -size-fits-all-approach and would welcome an exchange of views on what policy tools 
might be useful in addressing those challenges, within or outside the WTO.  
74. The representative of Japan  reiterated his country's basic position that S&D should be 
considered in exceptional cases for those developing country Members that really needed it and 
only to the extent necessary. He noted and appreciated the efforts of the proponents to present 
concrete cases in explaining some of the proposals or in the responses to the questions. However, 
it was, unfortunately not the case for all the proposals. He h ad seen some statistical figures 
indicating low market shares and stagnation of African countries and LDCs. The representative 
understood that those Members continued to face a challenging environment, and that 
industrialization and structural transformati on and diversification were urgently needed, but those 
aggregate figures did not necessarily show direct causal links with the need to introduce some 
ASPs. In his view, counting the cases where alleged non -conforming measures were tabled in the 
Committees concerned, and counting the relevant dispute settlement cases, was not a productive 
approach. Those were the cases where those alleged non -conforming measures were not notified 
and no practical effort to maintain the consistency of those measures with the WTO Agreement 
was made by the Member concerned. It did not prove that the WTO Agreement should 
accommodate those measures by providing for flexibility. In fact, the opposite was true. Members 
should also bear in mind that those alleged non -conforming measu res could well involve serious 
systemic concerns as well as real commercial risks, which in some cases would also negatively 
affect other developing country Members, including G90 members. The representative then spoke 
about the need for efficient review m echanisms. He said that as stated previously, his delegation 
was not in a position to agree on a blank cheque which allowed automatic and unlimited deviations 
from the existing WTO rules. Therefore, for any proposal, Japan would need to see efficient revie w 
mechanisms to scrutinize and approve any requests for deviation on a case -by-case basis in 
advance of the introduction of the measures concerned. The representative considered that 
deepening the discussion on review mechanisms was also helpful to address  some outstanding 
questions such as differentiation and open -or-close criteria. Lastly, he repeated his call for the 
Membership to consider other possible solutions to address the real challenges and difficulties 
which developing country Members and LDCs w ere facing, including a better and more efficient 
use of waivers. He understood that there would be a question of how much commonality or 
differences existed between the utilization of waivers and adding some procedural clarity to the TN/CTD/M/52/Add.1  
 
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  existing S&D provisio ns. Japan was open to those  sort of questions and looked forward to an 
informal debate with the proponents within the remaining time available from now on to MC11.  
75. The representative of the European Union  said that her delegation had on many occasions 
expressed its readiness to engage constructively on development issues, in particular those 
concerning LDCs, on the basis of analysis that clearly explained where specific problems lay and 
justified specific courses of action. In that respect , the EU had enco uraged Members to work on 
realistic proposals , taking into account the views and concerns expressed with regard to previous 
S&D proposals. She recalled the EU's position that deviating from existing commitments and rules 
should be considered an exception, not the rule; that fundamental WTO principles like 
most-favoured nation ( MFN) and National Treatment could not be undermined or weakened; and 
most importantly, the different levels of industrial, trade and developmental situation s of WTO 
Members would have  to be duly reflected in any proposal. She stressed that without meaningf ul 
differentiation and prioritiz ation of the needs of the LDCs, any process of defining S&D would not 
go very far. The EU's reaction to the proposals remained one of disappointment. S pecifically , on 
the proposals in the industrializ ation cluster, she said that they went against all of the three 
principles just mentioned, not the least that of meaningful differentiation, and a prioritiz ation of 
the needs of the LDCs. The EU would like t o hear from the proponents how they planned to take 
into account its concerns about the process and what they saw as the outcome of that process, in 
light of the numerous and fundamental concerns expressed in the proposals under discussion. The 
representat ive underlined that her delegation by no means trivializ ed the development challenges 
that some developing country Members and especially LDCs faced in being competitive and in 
integrating into global trade.  The EU fundamentally believed that WTO rules an d the MTS were the 
best insurance to achieve a level -playing field. It had also repeatedly stressed that it would like to 
see the needs of LDCs addressed as a priority, which had not been the case in the process 
followed in the Special Session. In fact, th e EU's view was that many of those proposals, certai nly 
the ones in the industrializ ation cluster, had the potential to be explicitly detrimental to the LDCs. 
The representative said that if the process were to start afresh, her delegation would call upon the 
proponents to explain beyond quoting statistics, which it did not question, and beyond the 
generalities, what were the specific difficulties they were experiencing and ask them to make their 
case about the challenges that they aimed to resolve concrete ly.  
76. The representative of Australia  said that he echoed the views expressed by the EU on 
differentiation. In their response to questions on proposal 1, proponents had noted that TRIMS did 
not differentiate between developing country Members. The represent ative commented that, 
without prejudice to Australia's position on that proposal, if proponents were seeking amendments 
to existing WTO rules , and in particular amendments which provided additional flexibilities , the 
question of differentiation between developing country Members would be very important. On 
proposal 6, he stated that from Australia's point of view , historical debates were least useful. He 
requested that proponents needed to point to specific policy  measures, policy statements, policy 
frameworks, laws or regulations that their governments had in place or were proposing to have in 
place but were prevented from doing so by the WTO rules.  
77. The representative of Korea  said that as he had stated in the mee tings in July and 
September, S&D should contribute to integrating developing country Members, in particular LDCs, 
into the MTS. He believed that any deviation from multilateral trade rules for S&D purposes should 
be strictly limited to the extent necessary , both in substance and coverage, and by definition it 
should be temporary. He understood the G90 argument for industrialization, which would play an 
important role in the G90's  development efforts and to integrate into the MTS. However, he was 
not convinc ed that the proposals on th e table would serve industrializ ation objectives or the 
multilateral trade, because the impact of those measures on the trading system itself was 
unknown. The issue grew more complicated if the growing trend of South -South trade was taken 
into consideration. After the discussions and the responses from the G90 , his view was that wide 
and deep gaps remained and time was ticking away. Therefore, Members should start thinking of a 
scenario where no agreement was possible and what cou ld they do in future.  
78. Responding to some Members' concerns about deviation from the WTO rules, the 
representative of Bangladesh  said that there were only two proposals which sought exemptions, 
and one of them only partially. The G90 had thought that discu ssing proposal -by-proposal would 
bring more clarity. His delegation agreed that history was not important, and that it was better to 
discuss specific problems and come up with solutions. However, there had been repeated 
references to different development paths and that was when references to history were drawn in TN/CTD/M/52/Add.1  
 
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  the discussion. He believed that it would be better if Members did not get into discussing different 
paths. Instead , Members needed to focus on the proposals and how to reach an agreement on 
them.  With regard to the suggestion on country -specific waivers, the representative of Bangladesh 
recalled that the Doha Declaration established a mandate to review S&D provisions with a view to 
strengthening them and making them more precise, ef fective and ope rational. Also, P aragraph 31 
of the Nairobi Declaration called for Members to work on the remaining DDA issues, including 
development. Therefore, in his view, the proponents' demands as envisaged in the tabled 
proposals were within the mandate. Members cou ld discuss whether the proposals could or could 
not contribute to make the provisions effective and operational. That was the reason why the 
proponents thought that it was important to continue a proposal -by-proposal discussion. He did 
not think that the p roposals were asking for a deviation from the MFN principle, but if there were 
concerns about the proposals containing any element that did, proponents were ready and open to 
correct it, because they did not want to deviate from the fundamental principles of the WTO. 
Regarding the concerns about the inconsistencies of the proposal 6 with the Agreement on SCM, 
the G90 thought that the proposal was consistent, based on Article 27.1, which acknowledged that 
subsidies might contribute to the development of deve loping country Members.  
79. The representative of Senegal  said that he had concerns about suggestions that had been 
made regarding other policies that could help to reach the goals that the G90 sought. In his view , 
the Special Session was not the forum to disc uss those options. Members were discussing the 
tabled proposals made by the G90 under a clear mandate to make S&D provisions more precise, 
effective and operational. Those proposals fell within that framework and contributed to reach 
wider general policy g oals. Therefore, although it might be true that there could be other policy 
options to accomplish the proponents' objectives, they could possibly play a complementary role to 
what was proposed in the tabled proposals while remaining within the Ministerial mandate. On the 
comments that S&D should be exceptional and temporary, he believed that those conditions were 
already reflected in the proposals. The G90 did not wish to disintegrate from the MTS but rather to 
alleviate certain barriers that could prevent the G90's  economies from achieving their development 
goals.  
80. The representative of Rwanda  said that the proposals under the industrializ ation cluster 
were extremely important. Issues such as local content requirements, subsidies, and infant 
industry protect ion were not part of history. They were the present and the future, particularly for 
economies that were still in the early stages of development. Korea was the best example. Along 
with Japan, their historical development exemplified exactly how those poli cies were critical. That 
was why the G90 was very surprised to hear comments from Korea,  as a developing country 
Member that had benefitted fully from policy space before GATT closed that space through 
Article  XVIII:A and C without any implementable infant  industry protection. What the G90 asked 
was a relaxation of those stringent GATT/WTO rules to create a conduc ive environment for 
industrializ ation and structural transformation. Regarding comments about how t he proposals in 
the industrializ ation cluster w ould be detrimental to LDCs, empirical evidence showed that those 
policies were developmental. Therefore, the G90 called for m oving from ideological rhetoric s to 
pragmatic debate.  
81. The Special Session took note  of the statements.  
82. The meeting was suspended . 
 
RECONVENED SESSION ( 20 NOVEMBER 2017)  
83. The 52nd Special Session of the Committee on Trade and Development was reconvened on 
20 November 2017.  
84. The representative of the European Union  took the floor to state that on many occasions in 
the past, her delegation had expressed its readiness to engage constructively  on development 
issues, in particular those concerning LDCs, on the basis of analysis that clearly explained where 
specific prob lems lay and justified specific courses of action. In this respect , the EU delegation had 
encouraged Members to work on realistic proposals  taking into account the views and concerns 
expressed with regard to previous S&D proposals. The EU's examination of the recently tabled S&D 
proposals was guided by the following principles namely : (i) deviation from existing commitments 
and rules must be considered as an exception – not the rule ; (ii) fundamental principles of the 
WTO-like MFN and National Treatment mus t not be undermined or weakened ; and (iii) most TN/CTD/M/52/Add.1  
 
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  importantly, the different levels of industrial, trade and developmental situation of WTO Members 
would have to be duly reflected in any S&D that is agreed by Members. From the very start the EU 
had expressed  disappointment with the G90 proposals and had been honestly trying to explain in 
more detail the reasoning and context behind the EU's concerns and objections to the particular 
proposals.  
85. She went on to state that the discussions in the Special Session h ad been interesting, 
engaging and useful , though not successful in terms of advancing towards a consensus. The 
reason why much progress could be made and why there were lean chances of an outcome on the 
proposals included : (i) differences of view on the fu ndamentals ; (ii) no convergence on the 
substance of the proposals ; (iii) many of the EU questions had not been addres sed or addressed 
satisfactorily;  and (iv) difficulty of even discussing flexibilities beyond the LDCs in the absence of a 
meaningful way of making distinctions between Members that would benefit from them. While 
some Members had spent time and effort in discussing the proposals and expla ining difficulties 
with the proposals and the underlying assumptions that characterized the m, the vast majority of 
Members , despite the informal mode, had not taken the floor on the proposals. In EU's mind, this 
lack of engagement was a signal that the Special Session 's discussions on the basis of the tabled 
ASPs had reached its limits. It was also manifest that no progress could be expected in the short 
run-up to the Ministerial at Buenos Aires and any further readings of the proposals would at best 
be a r epetition , and at worst a degeneration of the emerging dialogue on an issue the importance 
of which the EU had never denied. Without prejudice to future work on this important topic, the EU 
suggested that the Chair report to the Trade Negotiating Committee  (TNC) that, despite serious 
engagement, proposals remained extremely unripe, the differences wide and deep, to the extent 
that no outcome on the basis of the specific proposals would be possible for MC11. This did, by no 
means, signal that the EU would no t continue engaging on the topic of development in a 
constructive manner. However, the EU did not consider it constructive to continue to harp on the 
proposals in the charged pre -MC period.  
86. The representative of Rwanda , speaking on behalf of G90, stated th at the current WTO rules 
denied developing country Members and the LDCs the same policies that some of the more 
fortunate Members were allowed to use in the past. The G90 firmly believed th at concretizing the 
mandate in P aragraph 44 of the Doha Declaration  to operationalize the henceforth ineffective and 
imprecise S&D provisions was extremely import ant for the credibility of the O rganization. While 
this should be the case with the existing WTO provisions, it must also be true for any future 
disciplines that  the Members might agree. The underlying objective of the ten S&D proposals was 
to foster industrialization, facilitate structural transformation and promote diversification in the 
economies which were at the lower rung of the development ladder. It was di sappointing that 
despite hard work and the able leadership provided by the Chair, Members have failed to converge 
on the proposals. Regrettably, there had been scant engagement on some of the proposals 
including on the ones included in the industrializatio n cluster. This manifested lack of political will 
from the developed partners to engage on issues of fundamental interest to the  less developed 
Members of the O rganization. In the G90's view , the perceptions and differences on the proposals 
were purely ide ological. The discussion on the G90 p roposal should continue to ensure that 
Members could forge a way that would enable the Ministers at Buenos Aires to meaningfully 
engage. The issues were important enough to be brought to the attention of Ministers at MC 11.   
87. The representative of China  stated that the past few weeks had witnessed a frank and open 
discussion on the proposals where questions had been asked and detailed explanations had been 
provided. Clearly progress had been made in developing a better un derstanding of the concerns on 
both sides. It was, therefore, important that the work in the Special Session continue in a positive 
spirit with the objective of securing an outcome at Buenos Aires.  
88. The representative of Japan  found that the second reading of the proposals had been useful 
in learning more on the viewpoints of the proponents and in better understanding the underlying 
difficulties faced by them. Japan had tried to articulate its concerns and difficulties and contributed 
to the debate in a cons tructive manner. Having said that , and in sharing the concerns expressed by 
some previous speakers, he believed that the second reading had, in fact, further revealed the 
wide divergences that existed among the Membership. With this backdrop , his delegatio n had no 
reason to be optimistic about how much convergence Members  could forge on the proposals in the 
lead up to MC11 and even beyond. Whil e taking note of the proponents'  insistence for continuing 
the discussions on the proposal, he said that while Japa n remained open to any course the 
Membership would wish to pursue, his delegation  would wish that the following be borne in mind TN/CTD/M/52/Add.1  
 
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  before Members chose to continue engaging in this process. First, it should be further articulated 
how those proposals would se rve to address the current challenges and difficulties facing 
developing country Members including LDCs. In that connection, in many areas sufficient specific 
cases needed to be provided to justify the modification and adjustment of the existing rules in 
conformity with the idea of "needs should come first" . Second, more focused and precise 
responses to the questions from some Members, including Japan, would be needed as not all 
questions were fully covered in the responses by the proponents during the firs t and even second 
readings. If Members were to enter into the text -based third reading, then it would be only 
possible to have a meaningful discussion if the proponents were to table revised proposals duly 
reflecting the discussion Members had had during t he previous readings.  
89. The representative of the United States  stated that the three questions asked by the 
Chairperson , in fact, pointed towards the necessity for the Membership to make a realistic 
assessment of the discussion on the tabled proposals. It i s an undeniable fact that the discussions 
on the ten proposals had not, and would not, yield a consensus. The U nited States had listened 
carefully throughout both rea dings of the proposals. Members'  positions were clear, and these had 
been so for a long ti me. In the spirit of transparency, she wanted to make it clear that the 
United States delegation did neither intend to send those proposals, or any variation of them, to 
its Minister for work at MC11, nor could her delegation consider negotiations on them at MC11. 
The differences on those proposals remained extremely sharp and it only reconfirmed the 
United States view that they were not a good basis for work. Incidentally, this was the 
United States'  message two years ago in the run -up to MC10, when Members were discussing 
essentially the same proposa ls that were on the table now. The U nited States'  disagreement, 
however, was much more profound than just the content of the proposals. Her delegation wa s 
unable to overcome the deep differenc es in philosophical outlook on " trade and development " in 
general, and S&D in particular. The U nited States held a firm conviction that the trade rules 
developed in the system, over the decades, were inherently positi ve building blocks for 
development, and that S&D provisions were intended to be applied narrowly in order to facilitate 
the ability of developing country Members to integrate into that framework of rules. However, the 
vision put forward by the G90 appeared  to contend that the framework of rules was onerous and 
unfair, and conceived of S&D as a means for developing country Members to effectively disconnect 
from the rules indefinitely. Her delegation believed that Members could spend 12  hours a day in 
the Special Session  from now until MC11 and well beyond, but they would not overcome the 
profound gaps in understanding. Pretending that the differences could be overcome if Members 
just continue to politely engage in the Special Session  would only result in a fu rther deepening of 
the differences on the proposals. That was a scenario that the Members should avoid. Therefore, 
the step that remain ed before Members, particularly the proponents, was to acknowledge that 
convergence on any of the proposals was impossibl e – prior to MC11, at MC11, and after MC11.  
90. The representative of Canada  took the floor and stated  that today was an opportune time to 
have an honest and frank assessment of future prospects for the work of this negotiating group , 
both in the short and lon ger term. While acknowledging the hard work that the proponents had put 
into responding to the questions submitted , she hoped that this was a useful process for everyone, 
both in terms of clarifying the concerns expressed, as well as identifying specific c hallenges being 
faced by Members of the G90. She recalled that the Chair person  had put three questions to 
Members at the last informal open -ended meeting of the Special Session – what to do with the 
time remaining before MC11, what should be put to Ministe rs, and how to prepare ourselves for 
Buenos Aires – but before turning to those, she thought that Members needed to first ask 
ourselves the following: (i) did Members see prospects for reaching consensus on the proposals for 
MC11? ; and (ii)  did Members see  prospects for reaching consensus on the proposals after 
Buenos  Aires?  
91. In Canada's view the answers to both the questions, unfortunately though, were not in the 
positive. As fl agged by Canada, time and again – in 2015 and again this year - substantive 
concerns with these proposals remained. In essence the proposals would mean that basic 
prohibitions, including on local content requirements, trade -distorting subsidies, and reference 
prices, would not apply to developing country Members and the LDCs. That wo uld undermine 
certainty by watering -down existing commitments on advance notice, consultations, and 
compensation. They had the potential to reinterpret W TO Agreements, to limit Members'  ability to 
protect the health and safety of their people, and to impin ge upon governments’ budgetary and 
legislative processes. From Canada' s perspective, S&D should assist developing country Members 
integrate into the MTS, be based on identified nee ds, and be tailored to a Member' s level of TN/CTD/M/52/Add.1  
 
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  development. Canada had fundament al concerns with the substance of the proposals and what 
those could entail for the system. Those were points that Canada had stressed over and over and 
should come as no surprise. Perhaps more important, however, was Canada's deep concern about 
the messag e that the proposals would send to the world at a time when globalization and trade 
were facing increasing scrutiny. They sen t the message that trade rules were bad for development. 
That was something that Canada did not believe and hence could not support . Canada, together 
with other Members , remained committed to upholding the MTS, in the face of a backlash against 
globalization. Canada was committed to keeping markets open and fighting protectionism. Her 
country's approach in the Special Session 's work w as consistent with this commitment. At the 
same time, Canada – and many other Members were redoubling their efforts to make trade policy 
more inclusive, both at home and abroad with their trading partners. It recognized that the gains 
from trade had not be en shared equally or widely enough and that governments could and should 
do more to help their people reap the benefits. But those efforts should not include weakening the 
rules-based MTS. Members benefited from the stability and predictability of the syst em, as long as 
they followed the rules. And smaller economies, with less of a voice on the international stage, 
benefited the most. She reiterated that Canada did not see prospects for consensus on the 
proposals on the table for Buenos Aires or beyond. The  proposals were not worth revisiting again 
and again and hence Canada would be disappointed to  see them reappear in 20 months'  time, at 
which point the proponents could be assured that its position would remain the same.  
92. She went on to state that Canada f irmly believed that a new approach was needed to 
discuss trade and development in the WTO and encouraged the proponents to consider alternative 
ways of achieving their policy objectives. In saying so , Canada had not and was not questioning  
the mandate of t his group, nor was she suggesting that there were no problems that need to be 
addressed. Rather, s he believed that a new conversation was needed. To move forward, Member s 
would have to first tackle fundamentally different perspectives on the relationship b etween trade 
rules and development. Members also needed to have a frank discussion on individual needs 
commensurate with their levels of development, without which the discussions in the 
Special  Session would continue to encounter difficulties when discuss ing S&D. Finally, turning to 
the Chair person ’s questions on next steps, she was skeptical that there was anything that could be 
accomplished between now and MC11.  She did not see prospects for consensus on the G90’s 
proposal for MC11 or after MC11. Any pro spect for pr ogress rested on the proponents'  willingness 
to consider new approaches, which would recognize the need to address the fundamental 
differences in positions. That required the proponents to shift focus and leave the tabled and 
similar proposals behind. If proponents were willing to consider this approach, Members could 
begin to see a path forward. Any Member had the prerogative to submit a proposal to the 
Ministerial Conference – this was an important principle that her country respected. However , 
Canada would caution the proponents to think carefully and holistically about the potential 
consequences of putting forward proposals that were unacceptable to the Membership and their 
systemic implications to the rules -based MTS. 
93. The representative of Chinese Taipei  stated that it was obvious that wide unbridgeable gaps 
remained despite hard work by Members. It would be wise if Members utilized the remaining time 
from now on to MC11 in discussing post -MC11 work plan on S&D.  
94. The representative of Rwanda  stated that the centrality of development had repeatedly been 
reiterated by the Ministers at various WTO Ministerial Conferences. Development was the only 
raison d'etre  for developing countries and the LDCs membership of this Organization and it must 
not be denied to them. The proposals must be transmitted to the Ministers to engage and 
pronounce a political decision on them at MC11.  
95. The representative of Korea  stated that there were still big gaps in positions and his 
delegation did not see any prospects for an outcome at MC11. It would be realistic and pragmatic 
for Members to start identifying broad principles that could lead discussions on the S&D after MC11 
avoiding sim ilar discussions they had had during the past two years. S&D remained an important 
tool for helping developing country Members and the LDCs to facilitate their integration into the 
MTS. It was also very clear from the discussion on the issue that any S&D t reatment must be 
limited in coverage and content i.e., to those who really need ed it and to the extent necessary. 
However, it was necessary that Members engaged with an open mind recognizing difficulties 
developing country Members, especially LDC Members, were faced with. Having said that, he 
viewed that the discussions on the proposals were unlikely to bear any fruit. It might help if the 
proponents revised the proposals in light of the discussion to date.  TN/CTD/M/52/Add.1  
 
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  96. The representative of India stated that his delega tion joined Bangladesh, EU, China and 
others in thanking the Chair person  for her tireless efforts. The S&D provisions were an integral 
part of the MTS, and were meant to enable developing country Members and the LDCs to 
meaningfully integrate into the MTS so as to derive maximum economic benefits. Given the 
concerns expressed by Members regarding the effectiveness and operation of S&D provisions, 
Ministers at Doha had given  a mandate as contained in P aragraph 44 of the Doha Declaration to 
review all S& D provisions with a view to strengthening them and making them more precise, 
effective and operational. Although Members had been discussing these issues since 2002, 
unfortunately, it had not been possible to secure tangible progress with regard to the Min isterial 
mandate. In that context, India believed that the G90 proposals provided a useful input and basis 
to advance work in this important area. These would enable developing country Members and the 
LDCs in promoting much needed industrialization, struct ural transformation and diversification of 
their economies for raising the standard of living of their population and integration into the MTS. 
For India,  subst antial progress and outcome on "development aspects"  of the Doha Work 
Programme was essential. T herefore, Members needed to continue and intensify work in this area 
in the run -up to the forthcoming Ministerial.  
97. The representative of Swaziland  took the floor to support Rwanda and insisted that the G90 
would not let go of the proposals both in Geneva and at MC11.  
98. The representative of South Africa  supported the stance taken by Rwanda and others in 
having Ministerial engagement on the proposal at MC11. In expressing her disappointment at what 
she perceived as a lack of meaningful engagement on issues of  interest for the weaker Members, 
she reiterated  that the G90 proposals must form part of Ministerial agenda at Buenos Aires.  
99. The representative of Canada  took the floor to state that S&D was a core principle of the 
WTO rules. The difference among Members  was on the perception on how development could be 
pursued and the approach that had been suggested in the G90 proposals. That was exactly why 
Canada had proposed discussion on alternative approaches.  
100.  In wrapping up the meeting, the Chairperson  stated that it had been  an interesting 
exchange of views on the questions that she had posed to Members at the last informal meeting of 
the Special Session. The discussion had provided her enough food for thought. She indicated her 
intention to continue h er consultation with Members to have better clarity on how to proceed.  
101.  The Special Session took note of the statements made.  
102.  The meeting was suspended.  
 
RECONVENED SESSION ( 23 NOVEMBER 2017)  
103.  The 52nd Special Session of the Committee on Trade and Developme nt was reconvened on 
23 November 2017.  
104.  Speaking on behalf of the G -90, Rwanda  took the floor and stated that , at the outset, the 
G90 wished to extend its deep gratitude to the Chair person , for facilitating a critical process on an 
issue that was most fundamental for the majority of WTO Members. In 2001, in  Doha, Ministers 
agreed, under P aragraph 44 of the Doha Declaration, to review all S&D provisions co ntained in all 
GATT agreements " with a view to strengthening them and making them more precise, effective 
and oper ational" . In 2002, out of around 148 S&D provisions , 88 S&D proposals were identified by 
the African Group, the LDCs and other developing country Members for the review mandated by 
Ministers. In the lead up for WTO Ministerial Conference held in Canc ún in 2003, 28 proposals were 
agreed in principle (though the proposals had very little economic value for the proponents' 
economies) and were transmitted to Ministers fo r adoption. The failure of the Cancú n Ministerial 
Conference resulted in the non-adoption of the 28 proposals. In 2005, during the Hong Kong 
Ministerial Conference, five S&D provisions were adopted for LDCs. To date, this had been the only 
harvest – five out of the 88 S &D proposals - on this issue.  
105.  In 2014 , the G90 decided  to undertake an intensive review of the 88 S&D proposals, 
including the 28 proposals transmitted to the Canc ún Ministerial Conference. In 2015, the G90 
narrowed those to a total of 25 A SPs. Unfortunat ely, despite some intensive work in the TN/CTD/M/52/Add.1  
 
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  Special  Session in the run up to Nairobi, Members failed to agree on any of those proposals. 
However, Ministers pronounced themselves in favo ur of development under P aragraph 32 of the 
Nairobi Declaration; Ministers emphasized that: "This work shall maintain development at its 
center and we reaffirm that provisions for special and differential treatment shall remain 
integral …". Encouraged by this strong commitment to d evelopment by Ministers, and in responding 
to partners’ request for pragmatism and realism, the G90 revisited the S&D proposals in 2017. 
This fresh review of the S&D regime resulted in narrowing down the number to only ten ASPs. As 
explained in the G90 sub mission, and in a number of meetings and consultations, the rationale 
behind selecting the ten proposals was to foster industrialization, structural transformation and 
economic diversification. The proposals were selected in line with the national and regi onal 
development objectives of the G 90 members, as well as in line with the current international 
development discourse, i.e. SDG  9 aiming at building infrastructure for inclusive industrialization.   
106.  Regrettably, despite the strong commitment to developme nt as clearly expressed by 
Ministers in the Nairobi Declaration, and all Ministerial Declarations before that, some Members 
continued to question and undermine the relevance and legitimacy of issues of crucial interest to 
developing country Members and the  LDCs, despite them having benefitted from a system that 
supported their development and industrial processes. There had been a total disconnect between: 
the clear commitment to development by Ministers; who the WTO was intended to serve; what the 
WTO inte nded to promote; and its stiff rejection by some Members. A concerning observation was 
the lack of consistency by some Members displaying this stiff rejection to the G90 submission and 
discussions. Some of those Members actually were proponents of issues t hat had mandates that 
even predated the D DA. The arguments and critiques made by some of those Members in the 
discussion on G90 proposals remained untenable and actually confusing.  A blanket rejection of 
proposals was unacceptable. The question the G90 wan ted to ask was if this emphatic outright 
rejection applied horizontally to all issues, and not only to the core development -related work of 
the WTO.  The G90 would request that whatever treatment that would be a ccorded to all other 
proposals o n all other is sues for MC11 , the same treatment should also be accorded  to the G90 
proposal.  The G90 was firm in its view that the Chair person  should recommend transmission of the 
S&D proposals on the table to the Ministers for their deliberation and action at MC11.  
107.  In supporting Rwanda's statement , the representative of Nigeria  stated that since the 
Geneva experts have failed to converge on the proposals, it was only appropriate that political 
guidance be sought from Ministers at Buenos Aires o n a structural engagement on the package for 
concrete deliverable. He also reiteration on  parallelism in treatment among all issues being 
considered for MC11.  
108.  The representative of Venezuela  took the floor to support Rwanda and Nigeria.  
109.  The representative of Bangladesh  thanked  the Chairperson  for her commitment and hard 
work. He also thanked the Members that had participated in the discussions by posing questions, 
seeking clarification and expressing their concerns on the G90 proposals. He stated that before 
starting work on S&D la st year , the proponents had carefully gone through the Na irobi Ministerial 
Declaration, P aragraphs 31 and 32 of which showed strong commitment to advance the work on 
development i.e. on the S&D proposals. That strong commitment by the Ministers had tempted the 
G90 to put forward ten ASPs . He recalled that in the run -up to and during MC10 , Members had 
worked hard to have an outcome on S&D. However, due to divergences on some aspects Members 
could  not achieve the desired objective. In 2017 , the G90 had honestly tried to formulate 
proposals with a view to accommodate the concerns raised by other Members in the past 
discussions. The idea was to raise the comfort level of trading partners through a re alistic and fact -
based approach in addressing the challenges of those developing country Members, which  were in 
actual need. It was disappointing to note that even that good faith effort had not found favo ur with 
some of the Members. He went on to reiterat e an appeal, on behalf of the G90, that Members 
demonstrate political will and accommodat e as well as continue  the exercise so that an outcome 
on the long -standing issues could be found.  
110.  The representative of  Egypt  stated that his delegation fully supporte d the statement made 
by Rwanda on behalf of the G90. Special and differential treatment  for developing country 
Members and the LDCs was one of the fundamental principles of the WTO and it represented an 
integral part of the MTS. In recalling Paragraph 44 o f the Doha Declaration, he stated that it had 
given Members a clear mandate to review all S&D provisions with a view to strengthening them 
and making them more effective. The only way the S&D provisions could be effective was that TN/CTD/M/52/Add.1  
 
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  these must help developin g country Members facing constraints , as well as  LDCs, achieve the 
legitimate goals of industrialization, structural transformation and diversification of their 
economies. Egypt firmly believed that achieving those goals would result in more integration fo r 
the developing country Members and the LDCs  into the MTS . His delegation hoped to see a 
positive outcome on S&D at MC11.   
111.  The representative of Jamaica  stated that Members could not be expected to commit in the 
face of challenges and beyond their capacity. Members needed to seriously reflect and positively 
respond to a call for much needed policy space and appropriate flexibilities that would garner 
industrialization, structural transformation and diversification. Policy space was a systemic issue 
and posed a conceptual challenge to the MTS. 
112.  The representative of South Africa  supported the statement delivered by Rwanda on behalf 
of the G90. She stated tha t the argument and the rationale for S&D in the multilateral rules could 
be traced back to the earlier years of the GATT/WTO. The continued structural imbalances in the 
WTO Agreements justified S&D for the less developed Members of the system. Throughout v arious 
Rounds of trade negotiations , developing country Members had continued to raise concerns and 
identified special challenges that they faced in the implementation of WTO Agreements. Those 
trade concerns had not been effectively addressed because the S &D provisions contained in the 
WTO Agreements involved complex procedures , couched in best endeavo ur language that was not 
legally binding and did not confer tangible benefits to developing country Members. The current 
S&D provisions in the WTO disciplines  failed to provide adequate flexibility and predictability that 
developing country Members needed in order to promote trade and development in their 
economies. Rightfully so, the developing country Members had never failed in pointing to the much 
doubted v alue of the language that characterize those provisions , as these hardly afforded enough 
policy space to pursue development goals. In the past few weeks , during which Members had been 
discussing the G90 revised proposals, the proponents had not sensed any willingness to engage in 
a meaningful way to discuss these issues from their trading partners. In spite of some fairly 
comprehensive responses to questions , including experience -sharing and real examples of the of 
challenges faced by developing country Mem bers, some Members had gone back to ask the same 
questions they had posed at the beginning of the process. The G90 had made an honest effort in 
responding to the concerns raised by the other side. Regrettably the detailed explanations on each 
of the tabled  proposals were not considered worthy of consideration. The G90 firmly believed that 
the WTO rules should be development friendly and should play a pivotal role in promoting the 
industrial and economic development of developing country Members and the LDCs . Towards that 
end, it was imperative that the S&D provisions across all WTO Agreements were strengthened and 
made more precise , effective and operational as mandated in Paragraph 44 of the Doha Ministerial 
Decision. That also served to fulfil the agreement reached in the Preamble of the Marrakesh 
Agreement that Members must make positive efforts to ensure that developing country M embers, 
and especially the LDCs among them, secure a share in the growth in international trade 
commensurate with the needs of their economic development. It was also important to note, as 
the G90 had consistently mentioned , that  developed country Members had used different kinds of 
S&D in their development journey, and many still continued to use trade and tariff policies in some 
form in their agriculture and non -agriculture sensitive sectors. This was shown by the large bound 
aggregate measure of support,  remaining tariff peaks and escalation in the areas of interest to 
them. It was only fair that meaningful S&D be accorded to developing country Members and the 
LDCs that allow pursuit of policies for much needed diversification, industrialization and struc tural 
transformation of their economies.  Lastly, in South Africa's view , S&D was a key development 
issue that deserved Ministerial intervention at MC11 as the experts in Geneva had failed to deliver.  
113.  The representative of Senegal  stated that his  delegation  associated itself with the statement 
made by Rwanda and others in support of G90 stance . He also thanked  the Chair person  for her 
honest report and tireless efforts in guiding the negotiations in this difficult area. He shared 
Members' assessment of the situation with respect to the divergences on the S &D propo sals and 
also took note of the M embers' skepticism for a result i n Buenos Aires. In expressing his 
delegation's disappointment at the lack of political will and hence progress in forging a consensus 
on the proposals , he stated that under the circumstances any potential revision of the proposals 
was unlikely to result in  an outcome at MC11. Unless developed country Members demonstrated 
much needed political will to find solutions to the underlying concerns in the tabled proposals , 
there were little chances of any progress. Development and S&D were important and must remai n 
at the h eart of the work of WTO m ultilateral trade rules , must foster industrialization process, 
structural transformation and diversification of the developing country Me mbers, in particular the TN/CTD/M/52/Add.1  
 
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  LDCs' economies. Senegal asked  that if certain issues, as divergent as the S&D proposals, were 
brought to the attention of Ministers in Buenos Aires, then the S&D proposals must also be put 
before the Ministers.  
114.  The r epresentative of Ecuador  thanked the Chair person  for her tireless efforts . The 
representative tha nked the G90 for its efforts in taking the negotiations on S&D forward . The 
ultimate goal of the WTO at the time of its creation was not free trade per se . Instead the 
objective was that all Members could access the benefits of the MTS and reach a level of 
development commensurate with their needs. From that point of view, the principle of S&D was 
established by Members ' recognition that developing country Members might deviate from the 
WTO rules to achieve those objectives. Since then , S&D had remained an integral part of the MTS. 
It was one of the basic principles that gave meaning and purpose to the participation of developing 
country Members in the Organization. Today, unfortunately for some Members, the S&D had lost 
its meaning, whi le the needs and limitations of the developing country continue d to affect their 
ability to better integrate into and benefit from the MTS. As indicated by several delegates who 
have spoken today, most of the S&D provisions of the WTO Agreements were embod ied in best 
endeavo ur language and, therefore, were not binding and did not confer tangible benefits to the 
intended beneficiaries. That was why the work of this Committee was fundamental and should 
crystallize the legitimate aspirations of the developing country Members by meaningfully 
strengthening S&D provisions. The delegation of Ecuador was deeply disappointed by the 
inflexibility shown by developed country Members in resolving fundamental issues of concern to 
developing country Members and the LDCs. E cuador fully supported that the G90 proposals be 
presented to the Ministers in Buenos Aires, with a view to overcoming the blockages that had 
impeded any meaningful progress in the S&D negotiations. Ministers could also provide political 
guidance on a futu re course of action in line with P aragraph 44 of the Doha Declaration.  
115.  The representative of Nepal  stated that the LDCs, including Nepal, were staunch supporter s 
of the rule s–based, fair and inc lusive global system. However, t he LDCs had been facing 
consid erable challenges in their efforts to integrate into the MTS. The LDCs accounted for 12% of 
the global population, yet, their share in global GDP and export trade was less than 2% and 1% 
(at present only 0.90) , respectively. This was in contrast to the Istanbul Programme of Action 
(IPoA) targets supported by SDGs that hoped to double the export of LDCs by 2020. She recalled 
the fundamental objective of the WTO mentioned in the Marrakesh Agreement and the spirit of 
Paragraph  44 of the Doha Declaration, P aragraph s 35 to 38 of the Hong Kong Ministerial 
Declaration and Annex F, as well as LDC -specific Decisions in the Bali and Nairobi Ministerial 
Declarations . She  invited Members to make an honest assessment, in light of those Ministerial 
reiterations, as to whether  the LDCs were integrated or further marginalized in the global trading 
system.  The Marrakesh Agreement establishing the WTO aimed at raising standards of living, 
ensuring employment, increasing income and achieving sustainable development. Similar ly, 
Paragraph  44 of Doha Ministerial Declaration clearly mandated a review of S&D provisions with a 
view to strengthening them and making them more precise, effective and operational. The studies 
revealed that the industrialization had a multiplier , positi ve effect on the inclusive and sustainable 
economic development, that is, every one job in manufacturing created 2.2 jobs in other sectors. 
Accordingly, the manufacturing was regarded as the principal driver of employment creation, 
export promotion and ove rall economic development.  She went on to request developed partners 
to support LDCs in their efforts for promoting industrialization, product diversification and 
structural transformation , addressing as well as other supply -side constraints by agreeing to  the 
G90 proposals which would ensure necessary policy space and flexibility to the LDCs . The S& D 
proposal aimed to help LDCs in overcoming the marginalization challenges and would facilitate a 
smooth path to achieving shared global targets, explicitly mentioned in the IPoA and SDG  9.  
116.  The representative of Korea  started off by  thanking the Chair person and the proponents for 
their efforts in advancing the discussions in the Committee. Unfortunately , the discussions showed 
that, even though all Members shared the same objective, there remained big gaps in Members' 
positions and, in particular, in their  perceptions on the nexus between trade and development. 
That hinted towards the difficulties that Members faced in proceeding ahead and making progress 
on the issues under discussion. Under the circumstances, it was a moment of truth for the 
Membership which needed to reflect on identifying alternative ways which could support economic 
growth and development efforts at the same time without prejudicing the core values of the 
rules-based trading system. Korea did not support the view that the G90 proposals could be 
forwarded to the Ministers at Buenos Aires.  TN/CTD/M/52/Add.1  
 
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  117.  The representative of Burkina Faso  invited Members to engage decisively in order to find 
solutions to the different sticking points in the discussion. There were many countries in the G90 
that needed th e proposed measures to complement their own efforts to improve the standards of 
living of their people and to advance towards graduation.  
118.  The representative of Cameroon  said that experts in Geneva had shown that they were not 
capable of getting the job done. When Members had been close to reaching an agreement in 2003, 
the Ministerial Conference in Canc ún had failed and, therefore, the 28 proposals that had been 
agreed in principle could not get Ministers' endorsement. Afterwards, the G90 had examined th e 
content of those proposals and had realized that they did not have real economic value. In 2013, 
all that Members had accomplished was a Monitoring Mechanism that did not monitor anything 
because it was inadequate. He said that in the same room where they were sitting today , very 
strange discussions had taken place because Members wanted to use a meaningless and inactive 
instrument that served no purpose. Those who seemingly opposed the very premise and rationale 
of S&D today had , at that time, and contin ued to do so, held the view that only the Monitoring 
Mechanism would solve all development problems. Furthermore  in 2013, the ACP Group and the 
African Group had also suggested, on behalf of the G90, to re -examine the 28 proposals with a 
take it or leave i t approach. They only received an answer in the negative from the developed 
partners as they demonstrated total inflexibility and lack of insensitivity to the challenges faced by 
the G90. Again in 2015, on its part, the G90 undertook a fresh review of the 88 S&D proposals and 
tabled a revised and reduced set of 25 proposals. The subsequent process was very frustrating and 
disappointing for the G90, as it showed how difficult it was to reach consensus in the area of 
development. More recently , in 2016 , the G 90 undertook another review of the proposals based on 
the views previously expressed by Members and the lessons learnt in the discussions on the 
proposals. That resulted in the tabling of the ten revised S&D proposals in July 2017 , which 
currently were the  focus of discussion in the Special Session. Even the revised proposals had not 
attract ed much engagement from the other side ; instead they received new levels of resistance 
and obstruction from the developed partners. It appeared that no dialogue was possible and 
positions remained dogmatically opposed. It was now clear that the negotiation pillar of the WTO 
was no longer relevant. The conclusions and arguments expressed by some delegations revealed 
that Geneva -based experts had only exposed their limi tations in the negotiations. It was no longer 
possible to discuss development issues in the WTO, an Organization where developing country 
Members constituted a majority. Given the level of obstructionism, the representative wonder ed as 
to what was left to do. He reiterated  that Ministers should be consulted and that they should 
decide what was meant by development, and what was the meaning of their messages in each 
Ministerial Conference. He added that in future, Members would have to think about their 
negotiating and implementation capacities. He wondered whether a developing country Member 
that pledged to open its borders to e -commerce knew what that entailed and that it did not have 
the capacity to implement the obligations it was contracting.  
119.  The represe ntative of Pakistan  thanked the Chair person  for her leadership and resolute 
commitment in under taking the work of the Committee which was engaged in tackling one of the 
most fundamental issues in the debate on international trade. For his delegation, the i ssue of 
development was absolutely inseparable from trade and must not be excluded at any cost from the 
debate at Buenos Aires or even beyond MC11. A large number of Members in the O rganization 
were developing and LDC Members with their own peculiar challe nges, but largely seeking the 
same end – that of inclusive economic prosperity for their people. In that respect, Pakistan felt 
that developing country Members must be heard, their opinions valued and their concerns 
addressed. If Members were to strengthen  the MTS, then it was important not to isolate the issues 
that represented one of the very basic principles of the system . He suggested that Members 
intensify efforts and continue to discuss the issues at length , here at Geneva, at MC11 and , if need 
be, beyond MC11. He reiterated that trade issues should not go forward without development.  
120.  The representative of Uganda  stated that in the G90's view, the failure to achieve an 
outcome on this file was due to many challenges including the lack of political will and reluctance 
of Members to deliver on this mandate. He agreed with the suggestion that the only way forward 
now was to bring the issue to the attention of Ministers as the issue was no longer technical in 
nature and had to be dealt with by Ministers at a political level. The G90 w as convinced that its 
submission was in fulfilment of the objective enshrined in the M arrakesh Agreement which 
recognized the need to continue making positive efforts designed to ensure that developing 
country Members and LDCs secured a share in the growth of international trade commensurate 
with the needs of their economic development. The  G90 w as further emboldened by P aragraph 5 TN/CTD/M/52/Add.1  
 
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  of the Nairobi Ministerial Declaration, in which Ministers pledged to ensure inclusive prosperity and 
welfare for all Members and to respond to the specific development needs of developing country 
Members, in part icular LDCs. Nevertheless, the G90 had now come to learn that in this 
Organization , Members' commitments meant nothing. Ministerial pronouncements and mandates 
were a lot of hot air. This posed systemic concerns for the G90 and for posterity. The 
represent ative wondered whether it was still useful to talk about development being at the centre 
of this Organization. It was also important to reflect on the fact that if this Organization did not 
respond to the specific needs and concerns of the majority of its Members, what was the use of 
this Organization and its M embership? He said that the rules as currently crafted did not work for 
the G90. They needed to industrialize. They could not become post -industrial societies without 
having been industrialized first.  The WTO rules must not be viewed as an instrument that was 
anti-development. The world was already fac ing many challenges, including high levels of 
unemployment, low household incomes, poverty, disease, immigration, among others. The world 
was trying to f ind solutions to these and many more but with limited success. Part of the reason 
for this failure was the inability to address the root cause as opposed to the symptoms of the 
problems and granting palliative care. The question had been what could be the role of the WTO in 
all of this? How could Members use trade policy instruments to provide employment, increase 
household incomes, and promote backward and forward linkages between agriculture, industry 
and manufacturing. There had already been cr ies elsewh ere about anti -globaliz ation, including 
attacks on this very institution because of its inability to be responsive to Members' needs. It was 
not enough to ask Members to support the system if they could not derive immediate benefits out 
of it.  
121.  He also w ondered how elected leaders would inform their electorates that they could not 
intervene in certain sectors of the economy because of the constraints of the commitments that 
had been undertaken many years ago. Did Members want their people to call a time -out on further 
rule-making? For more than 16 years , Members had rejected the instruct ions of Ministers found in 
Paragraph 44 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration to review all S&D provisions with a view to 
strengthening them and making them more precise, effec tive and operational. And yet , they 
continued to seek new rules to further constrain the policy space of developing country Members, 
especially LDCs. It had been suggested that what the G90 was asking for would be negative for its 
economies and would not h elp them integrate into the MTS. He wondered how was it that when 
rich countries used these measures they helped them prosper and improve the lives of their 
people. They had used these measures , to protect their infant industries of wool, cotton, leather 
and clothing. The G90 had been accused of tampering with the state of free trade championed by 
this Organization. In the G90's  view, the notion of free trade could not be cherry -picked. There 
could be no talk of free trade when agriculture was highly protected with billions of US  dollars  in 
domestic support. However the G90's request for a time -limited relief under the A greement on 
SCM was rejected. It did not make sense. It was important for Memb ers to reflect deeply on the 
kind of message they intended to send to the world. In Bali , they had failed to deliver on 
development. In Nairobi they had failed. Was it the intention to do the same in Buenos Aires? It 
would have implications that would tran scend this Special Session. The question would be why 
should developing country Members engage in a process that would write away their policy space 
and limit their right to regulate, and by extension stifle their development ? What substantial 
message did Members intend to send about development and about the future multilateral rule 
making? What message did Members intend to send about fairness and justice and inclusiveness? 
The ultimate aim of the WTO Agreements was not to promote freer trade just for the  sake of it, 
but rather to support economic development by improving market access conditions and terms of 
trade in a manner that would steadily raise the living standards of Members and eradicate poverty. 
The G90 looked forward to tabl ing its  proposals be fore Ministers for their consideration in Buenos 
Aires. He said that for the avoidance of doubt there should be no discriminatory treatment 
accorded to their submission.  
122.  The representative of Bangladesh  said that the intervention of Korea had prompted him to 
intervene again. Korea had proposed to have a discussion on trade and development. He wanted 
to ask two questions. First, did the delegates not think that there had been enough discussions on 
trade and development before launching of the D DA? There had been long sessions which 
discussed what was meant by trade and development. At that moment, the proponents of the 
Round had told Members that development meant addressing implementation challenges faced by 
developing country Members and addressing the inef fectiveness, imprecision and 
non-operationalization of S&D in the WTO Agreements. In his view , it was not necessary to have 
that debate again. He asked Members whether the assessment by his delegation was correct. It TN/CTD/M/52/Add.1  
 
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  was important to send the proposals to Ministers, because it w as the Ministers who had made a 
strong commitment under P aragraph 44 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration and had repeated the 
same at subsequent Ministerials.  
123.  The representative of Benin  said that his delegation wished to underline t hat it was not 
necessary to prove the relevance of the link between trade and development. The founding texts 
of the WTO and successive Ministerial Declarations had reaffirmed it. Members were at a 
crossroad. The G90 was disappointed about the fact that Me mbers were not ready to overcome 
their differences based on stereotyped positions, and had refused to negotiate at a technical level. 
The differences were not based on substance or technical aspects, but were rather ideological. 
That was why it would be mo re useful to refer the proposals to Ministers, who had given a c lear 
and precise mandate under P aragraph 44 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration. The representative 
said that his delegation called on the experts to draw some lessons from the process that th ey had 
followed and to make a factual and accurate report to their Ministers. Experts should clearly tell 
their Ministers that Members had refused to discuss the substance of the proposals and that they 
had not been willing to understand, despite the concr ete examples that the G90 had provided to 
illustrate the relevance and need of the adoption of their proposals.  
124.  The representative  of Zimbabwe  said that the mandate  of the Doha Declaration  was very 
clear and yet Members  had gone through  a rigorous  exercise  and faced  frustration  as a result  of 
disengagement  and lack of acknowledgement  of the challenges  faced  by developing  country  
Members  and the LDCs.  That was in spite of the efforts  of the G90 to demonstrate  the need for 
these  proposals  for industrialization,  diversification  and structural  transformation  of its economies.  
For her delegation  it was difficult  to imagine  development  in the WTO witho ut fulfilling  the 
mandate  of Paragraph  44 of the Doha Declaration.  Towards  that end, she was of the view that 
Ministers  at MC11  should  consider  the proposals.  Special  and differential  treatment  was central  in 
the WTO and experts  could  not report  to Ministe rs that they had failed  to implement  the mandate  
on one of the key principles  of the WTO.  That would  erode  the credibility  of this Organization.  
125.  The representative  of Nigeria  said that he would like to reference  and add Paragraph  5 and 
Paragraph  32 of the Nairobi  Declaration  to his previous  statement  for the record.  Regarding  the 
process  and the next steps,  he had heard  that this would  be the last meeting  of the 
Special  Session.  He said that the process  of drafting  part one of the Preamble  of the Ministerial  
Declaration  for MC11  had ended  the day before,  but the continuation  of work was not over in other  
areas,  including  in the Special  Session.  He, therefore,  asked  the Chair what to expect  between  
today  and the MC11.  His delegation  felt that there  could  still be a window  of opportunity  to try to 
see how to take this dossier  forward.  
126.  The Chairperson  stated  that Members  would  have heard  the strong  call by the G90 to take 
the ten ASPs to Ministers  for their discussion.  Although  views  to the contrary had not been 
expressed  today,  at the informal  plurilateral  consultations  that she had conducted  the day before , 
opinions  were articulated  in the sense  that since no consensus  had been reached,  the Special  
Session  should  not transmit  the proposal  for Ministers'  consideration.  Nevertheless,  there  was also 
acknowledgement  that it was the prerogative  of Members  to table or raise any matters  they 
deemed  appropriate  for Ministers'  consideration  directly  at Ministerial  Conferences.  Some  
delegations  had made  requests  for the Chairperson  to convey  those  messages  to the Chair of the 
TNC and to the Chair of MC11.  There  had been a very clear articulation  from the proponents  on 
the demand  for parallelism  of treatment  of all issues  being  discussed  in the house,  that is, the 
G90's  proposals  must be accorded  the same  treatment  as would  be accorded  to other  issues  which  
still remained  unripe.  On the next steps  from now to Buenos  Aires,  she stated  that there  were 
clear indications  in her informal  plurilateral  consultatio ns that the Special  Session  could  not 
transmit  the proposals.  There  had also been disagreement  on what Ministers  should  discuss  in 
Buenos  Aires.  She added  that, nevertheless , she had not heard  opposition  to Ministers  discussing  
development  issues  at MC11.  She suggested  using  the time until Buenos  Aires to prepare  all 
Ministers  on the issues  that Members  wanted  them to address.  
127.  The Special Session took note  of the statements made.  
128.  The meeting was adjourned . 
 
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