RESTRICTED  
  
G/SG/M/53  
 
25 July 2018  
(18-4722) Page: 1/15 
Committee on Safeguards   
 
MINUTES OF THE REGUL AR MEETING  
HELD ON 23 APRIL 201 8 
CHAIRPERSON: MR KENS UKE TSUNODA (JAPAN)  
1.  The Committee on Safeguards (the "Committee") held a regular meeting on 23 April 2018.  
2.  The Committee adopted the following agenda:  
1   NATIONAL LEGISLATION ................................ ................................ .............................  2 
1.1   Review of Notifications of New or Amended Legislation or Regulatio ns Not Previously 
Reviewed by the Committee (Including Supplemental Notifications of Existing Provisions 
Not Previously Reviewed)  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..... 2 
1.1.1    Brazil – Review of New Legislative Notification (G/SG/N/1/BRA/3/Suppl.3)  ......................  2 
1.1.2    Liberia – Review of New Legislative Notification (G/SG/N/1/LBR/1 and 
G/SG/N/1/LBR/1/Corr.1)  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..... 3 
1.2   Continuing Review of Previously Reviewed Notifications  ................................ ....................  3 
1.2.1    Afghanistan – Continuing Review of Previously Reviewed Notifications 
(G/SG/N/1/AFG/1)  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..............  3 
1.2.2    Cameroon – Continuing review of previously reviewed notifications 
(G/SG/N/1/CMR/1/Suppl.1) ................................ ................................ ................................ .. 3 
1.2.3    El Salvador – Continuing review of previously reviewed notifications 
(G/SG/N/1/SLV/3/Suppl.1)  ................................ ................................ ................................ .. 3 
2   NOTIFICATIONS OF ACT IONS RELATED TO SAFE GUARD MEASURES  ...........................  4 
2.1   Chile - Powdered Milk and Gouda Cheese (G/SG/N/6/CHL/20) ................................ ...........  4 
2.2   Costa Rica - Bars and Rods of Steel for Concrete Reinforcement (G/SG/N/6/CRI/4)  .............  5 
2.3   European Union - Certain Steel Products (G/SG/N/6/EU/1/)  ................................ ..............  5 
2.4   India - Solar Cells (G/SG/N/7/IND/11 -G/SG/N/8/IND/31 –G/SG/N/11/IND/17 and 
G/SG/N/6/IND/44)  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..............  6 
2.5   Indonesia - I and H Sections of Other Alloy Steel (G/SG/N/8/IDN/17/Suppl.3 –
G/SG/N/10/IDN/17/Suppl.3 –G/SG/N/11/IDN/15/Suppl.1 and G/SG/ N/8/IDN/17/Suppl.2 –
G/SG/N/10/IDN/17/Suppl.2)  ................................ ................................ ................................  6 
2.6   Indonesia - Ceramic Flags and Paving, Heart or Wall Tiles; Ceramic Mosaic Cubes 
and the Like, Whether or Not on a Backing (G/SG/N/6/IDN/28)  ................................ ................  6 
2.7   Jordan - Aluminium Bars, Rods and Profiles (G/SG/N/11/JOR/6/Suppl.5) ............................  6 
2.8   Turkey - Pneumatic Tyres (G/SG/N /6/TUR/22/Suppl.1 –G/SG/N/7/TUR/12/Suppl.1 – 
G/SG/N/11/TUR/21/Suppl.1)  ................................ ................................ ................................  7 
2.9   Turkey - Polyethylene Terephthalate (G/SG/N/8/TUR/13 /Suppl.2 –
G/SG/N/10/TUR/13/Suppl.3 –G/SG/N/11/TUR/16/Suppl.2)  ................................ .......................  7 
2.10   Turkey - Wallpaper and Similar Wallcoverings (G/SG/N/6/TUR/20 /Suppl.1)  ......................  7 G/SG/M/53  
 
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  2.11   Turkey - Toothbrushes (G/SG/N/8/TUR/16 –G/SG/N/10/TUR/16 –
G/SG/N/11/TUR/22)  ................................ ................................ ................................ ............  7 
2.12   United States - Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Cells (G/SG/N/8/USA/9/Suppl.4 –
G/SG/N/10/USA/7 –G/SG/N/11/USA/6)  ................................ ................................ ..................  7 
2.13   United States – Large Residential Washers (G/SG/N/8/USA/10/Suppl.3)  ..........................  9 
2.14   Viet Nam - Monosodium Glutamate (G/SG/N/7/VNM/3/Rev.1 –G/SG/N/8/VNM/5 –
G/SG/N/10/VNM/4 –G/SG/N/11/VNM/3/Rev.1)  ................................ ................................ ........  9 
2.15   Viet Nam - Diammonium Phosphate and Monoammonium Phosphate Fertilizers 
(G/SG/N/8/VNM/6 –G/SG/N/10/VNM/5 –G/SG/N/11/VNM/7)  ................................ .....................  9 
2.16   Zambia - Flat–Rolled Products of Iron, Non -Alloy Steel, Trailers and Semi -trailers 
(G/SG/N/6/ZMB/1 –G/SG/N/7/ZMB/1)  ................................ ................................ .................. 10 
3   MEASURES TAKEN BY TH E US FOLLOWING ITS S ECTION 232 
INVESTIGATIONS (G/SG /161, G/SG/162, G/SG /168 AND G/L/1218 –
G/SG/N/12/CHN/1) (IT EM REQUESTED BY CHIN A) ................................ ......................  10 
4   ADDITION OF CERTAIN INFORMATION INTO THE  ANNUAL REPORT (ITEM 
REQUESTED BY AUSTRAL IA) ................................ ................................ ..........................  12 
5   REQUEST UNDER ARTICL E 13.1(E) OF THE AGR EEMENT ON SAFEGUARDS  
(G/L/1213/REV.1 –G/SG/158/REV.1) (ITE M REQUESTED BY THAIL AND)  .....................  12 
6   UKRAINE'S INVESTIGAT ION ON FLEXIBLE PORO US PLATES, BLOCKS AN D 
SHEETS OF POLYURETHA NE FOAMS (G/SG/Q2/UK R/5) (ITEM REQUESTED  BY 
THE EU)  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..........................  13 
7   TREATMENT OF DEVELOP ING COUNTRIES AND NO TIFICATIONS PERTAINI NG 
TO ARTICLE 9 OF THE AGREEMENT ON SAFEGUA RDS (ITEM REQUESTED BY 
BRAZIL)  ................................ ................................ ................................ .........................  14 
8   DISCUSSION GROUP REG ARDING SAFEGUARD PRO CEEDINGS ................................ .. 14 
9   OTHER BUSINESS  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 14 
10   DATE OF NEXT REGULAR MEET ING ................................ ................................ ..........  15 
11   ELECTION OF OFFICERS  ................................ ................................ ..........................  15 
 
 
1  NATIONAL LEGISLATION  
1.1  Review of Notifications of New or Amended Legislation or Regulations Not 
Previously Reviewed by the Committee (Including Supplemental Notifications of Existing 
Provisions Not Previously Reviewed)  
1.1.1   Brazil – Review of New Legislative Notification (G/SG/N/1/BRA/3/Suppl.3)  
3.  The Chair stated that written questions had been received from the United States ("US") in 
document G/SG/Q1/BRA/4 and from Mexico in document G/SG/Q1/BRA/5. The Chair also noted 
that the US wi shed that the review of its questions be conducted in the Anti -Dumping Committee.  
4.  Brazil  had received the written answers from the capital. However, given the lengthy answers, 
it proposed that the written answers would be circulated to all Members at a lat er stage.1 
5.  Mexico  looked forward to receiving the written answers from Brazil.  
                                                
1 Subsequently circulated in documents G/SG/Q1/BRA/6 and G/SG/Q1/BRA/7.  G/SG/M/53  
 
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  1.1.2   Liberia – Review of New Legislative Notification (G/SG/N/1/LBR/1 and 
G/SG/N/1/LBR/1/Corr.1)  
6.   The Chair stated that written questions had been received from the US in document 
G/SG/Q1/LBR/1.  
7.  Liberia  was not present at the meeting.  
1.2  Continuing Review of Previously Reviewed Notifications  
1.2.1   Afghanistan – Continuing Review of Previously Reviewed Notifications 
(G/SG/N/1/AFG/1)  
8.  The Chair stated that written questions received from the US in document G/SG/Q1/AFG/1 
were left unanswered.  
9.  Afghanistan  was preparing the answers which would be submitted soon. It explained that if 
there was any discrepancy between Afghanistan's law and the WTO A greement on Safeguards, the 
latter shall take precedence.  
10.  The US looked forward to the written answers from Afghanistan.   
1.2.2   Cameroon – Continuing review of previously reviewed notifications 
(G/SG/N/1/CMR/1/Suppl.1)  
11.  The Chair  stated that written questions rec eived from the US in document G/SG/Q1/CMR/3 
were left unanswered.  
12.  Cameroon  was not present at the meeting.  
1.2.3   El Salvador – Continuing review of previously reviewed notifications 
(G/SG/N/1/SLV/3/Suppl.1)  
13.  The Chair stated that written questions had been receiv ed from the US in document 
G/SG/Q1/SLV/7 and from Mexico in document G/SG/Q1/SLV/8 were left unanswered.   
14.  El Salvador  stated that its capital was preparing the responses which would be provided in 
writing.   
15.  The US reminded El Salvador that it had posed th e questions in March 2017 and that it 
continued looking forward to the written responses to its questions.  
16.  Mexico  stated that it also looked forward to El Salvador's written responses.   
17.  The Chair recalled that the deadline for written questions concerning any legislation reviewed 
at this meeting was 14 May 2018. The deadline for written answers to all written questions, 
including questions submitted in writing prior to this meeting, was 4 June 2018.  
18.  The Chair informed the Committee that 21 Members had not y et made a legislative 
notification.2 This notification was one of the important obligations of the Safeguards Agreement 
("Agreement"). Members that did not yet have legislation need only submit a simple "nil" 
notification.  
19.  The US noted that many Members h ad not yet made a notification. For nearly all of those who 
had not made a notification, their Trade Policy Review reports indicated whether they did or did 
not have any SG legislation. The US reiterated that the notification was simple if there was no 
                                                
2 These Members were: Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Cabo Verde, Central African Republic, Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Eswatini, Grenada, Guinea -Bissau, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, 
Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenad ines, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Tonga 
and Yemen.  G/SG/M/53  
 
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  legislation, and encouraged Members who had not yet made their legislative notifications to review 
their situations and to make the applicable notification. The US encouraged Members to think 
creatively how to improve compliance with notification obligations.  It had a proposal in the Council 
for Trade in Goods ("CTG"), circulated as document JOB/CTG/10/Rev.1, which sought to address 
the issue of missing notifications across various Committees. The US continued to be interested in 
hearing Members' ideas on its proposal.  
20.  New Zealand  also urged Members to make their applicable notifications.  
21.  The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
2  NOTIFICATIONS OF ACT IONS RELATED TO SAFE GUARD MEASURES  
22.  Japan  remained concerned over the use of safeguards ("SG"), especially  over the rapidly 
increasing use of SG in the steel sector in the recent years. Japan understood that production 
capacity in the steel sector had recently been expanded, especially in developing countries without 
regard to economic rationale, thereby leadi ng to the global excess production capacity. The 
increasing use of SG and retaliatory trade restrictive measures jeopardized the benefits of both 
importers and exporters. Japan urged Members to avoid resorting to SG measures unless the 
prerequisites under the WTO Agreements were truly met. Japan requested the Committee to 
monitor the situation closely, and asked Members to duly abide by the rules.    
2.1  Chile - Powdered Milk and Gouda Cheese (G/SG/N/6/CHL/20)  
23.  The US was concerned that in general, the speed of SG investigations in Chile did not allow 
sufficient time for the authority to gather the relevant information required in making an 
appropriate determination. In this case as well, the US urged Chile to give due care in conducting 
the investigation and ens ure that its final determination was consistent with the Agreement.  
24.  The European Union  ("EU") noted that domestic industry as defined in Article 4.1(c) of the 
Agreement referred to the producers of the like or directly competitive products. Nevertheless, the 
Chilean investigating authority considered that fresh milk was directly competitive with powdered 
milk and Gouda cheese, and that the domestic industry in this investigation was represented by 
the fresh milk producers. While powdered milk was arguably directly competitive with fresh milk, 
Gouda cheese was not directly competitive with fresh milk. Thus, the EU requested Chile to 
remove Gouda cheese from the scope of investigation.  
25.  Argentina  noted that it was the third investigation by the Chilean invest igating authority on 
the same dairy products following the ones in 2006 and 2009, both of which were terminated 
without any measure. The investigation was initiated without sufficient information, and the 
definitions of the domestic industry and like produ ct were incorrect. Argentina noted that Chile 
decided not to impose any preliminary measure in this case and hoped that this investigation 
would not lead to the imposition of a definitive measure.  
26.  As a dairy product exporter, Australia  was concerned that t his SG would cause trade diversion 
and would impact other markets of Australia's commercial interest. It noted that Chile had initiated 
SG investigations on dairy products on three previous occasions, with the most recent 
investigation in 2009 terminated w ithout imposing any definitive measure. Australia asked Chile to 
closely follow the relevant WTO requirements.  
27.  New Zealand  echoed Australia's statement with regard to the possible impacts if the SG 
measures were to be imposed. In particular, it had doubts with the existence of serious injury as 
well as the definition of like pr oducts used in the investigation . New Zealand urg ed Chile to 
conduct this investigation in accordance with the Agreement and Article XIX of the GATT 1994.  
28.  Chile asked Members to submit their comments in writing. It pointed out the exceptional 
circumstances that required this investigation to be conducted  expeditiously. As for the issue of 
products under investigation, Chile encouraged Members to refer to a document submitted G/SG/M/53  
 
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  together with its initiation notification3 wherein the details of how this investigation was 
undertaken and arguments regarding the product scope were contained.         
2.2  Costa Rica - Bars and Rods of Steel for Concrete Reinforcement (G/SG/N/6/CRI/4)  
29.  Turkey  was concerned that this investigation would negatively impact global trade in steel, 
and urged Costa Rica to terminate the investig ation. Turkey reserved its rights under the WTO 
Agreements.      
30.  Costa Rica  stated that this investigation had just begun, and that Turkey could participate in 
the relevant proceedings.  
2.3  European Union - Certain Steel Products (G/SG/N/6/EU/1/)  
31.  The EU expla ined that this investigation was initiated on 26 March 2018. There was no 
provisional measure imposed for the time being, as it was still in the early stage of the 
investigation.  
32.  Korea, Republic of  was concerned with the increased resort to protectionist measures in 
general. Since SG affected fair trade, the requirements for such measures must be strictly abided 
by. In Korea's view, this EU's SG investigation did not meet the requirements under the WTO 
Agreements. Statistics during the period of investigation did not show a recent, sudden, 
significant, and sharp increase of imported steel products. There was an apparent fluctuation of 
total volume of imports during the last five years. The global ove rcapacity in steel industry, which 
had continued to exist since the 1970s, could not be regarded as unforeseen developments. It was 
not convincing that serious injury was caused giv en that the financial situation  of the EU's 
domestic industry had improved in 2017. Korea urged the EU to terminate this investigation 
without any measure.   
33.  Turkey  was of the view that the EU's action worsened the protectionist trend in global trade.  
34.  Argentina  was concerned with this investigation. The average amount of its exp orts during 
2013-2016 was just 0.077 % of the total of the EU imports of the product under investigation. 
Argentina asked EU to exclude its exports from the investigation.  
35.  China  expressed its concern on this investigation and asked the EU to strictly abide by the 
WTO rules in conducting the investigation. It was also generally concerned over the high level of 
SG actions taken by Members on steel products. Article 5.1 of the Agreement allowed Members to 
use SG only to the extent necessary to prevent or remedy  serious injury and to facilitate 
adjustment. It asked Members to act accordingly.  
36.  Egypt  was of the view that the increase of imports during the period of investigation could not 
be considered as a recent, sudden, significant, and sharp increase. Nor did t he EU 's notification 
indicate serious injury. In addition, Egypt requested the EU to exclude its exports from this 
investigation by virtue of Article 9.1.  
37.  Viet Nam  also asked that its export be excluded from this investigation by virtue of 
Article  9.1.  
 
38.  Chile was concerned with its participation as an interested party in this investigation. In 
concrete, it had not received, to date, any response to its request for participation submitted on 
6 April 2018. In addition, there was uncertainty with regard to t he product under investigation. 
While this investigation covered a wide range of products, CN codes provided in the EU's notice of 
initiation were "for information purposes only", and thus made it difficult for Chile to defend its 
rights.  
39.  India was concern ed with this investigation. While the EU cited global excess capacity and 
trade -restrictive measures by other countries as the reason for this investigation, the EU's 
domestic industry did not seem to be suffering serious injury. Regarding global oversuppl y of steel, 
                                                
3 G/SG/N/6/CHL/20.  G/SG/M/53  
 
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  India noted that the Global Forum on steel excess capacity was established on 16 December 2016 
to be a platform to discuss this issue. India was closely following the developments.  
40.  The EU reiterated that it was currently at the start of the in vestigation, and that there was no 
decision taken yet. As for Chile 's concern, the EU reassured Chile that it was already registered as 
an interested party in this investigation.   
2.4  India - Solar Cells (G/SG/N/7/IND/11 -G/SG/N/8/IND/31 –G/SG/N/11/IND/17 
and G/ SG/N/6/IND/44)  
41.  The EU understood that the cause of the problem was imports from one country, and stated 
that in such situation, SG was not the right instrument to use. In addition, analysis on injury and 
causal links were insufficient. Any injury suffered by the domestic industry was caused by factors 
other than imports. The EU urged India to act in compliance with the WTO obligations and to 
refrain from imposing any final measure.  
42.  Japan  noted that even though India initiated this investigation on 19 Decemb er 2017, its 
notification of initiation was not made until 28 December, which was ultimately circulated on 
3 January 2018. Japan urged India to carefully consider its compliance with all WTO requirements.  
43.  India informed the Committee that the preliminary f inding of this case was notified to the 
WTO already. There was an issue brought before India's domestic court, but that was now cleared. 
The Standing Board of Safeguard was currently considering the preliminary recommendations from 
the Directorate General of Safeguards.    
2.5  Indonesia - I and H Sections of Other Alloy Steel (G/SG/N/8/IDN/17/Suppl.3 –
G/SG/N/10/IDN/17/Suppl.3 –G/SG/N/11/IDN/15/Suppl.1 and 
G/SG/N/8/IDN/17/Suppl.2 –G/SG/N/10/IDN/17/Suppl.2)  
44.  There were no comments or questions raised at the meeting.  
2.6  Indonesia - Ceramic Flags and Paving, Heart or Wall Tiles; Ceramic Mosaic Cubes 
and the Like, Whether or Not on a Backing (G/SG/N/6/IDN/28)  
45.  The EU noted that Indonesia tended to use SG when a bilateral trade remedy instrument 
would be more appropriate. In  this case, Indonesia was using SG to address the situation where 
96-99% of the imports came from one country, China. In addition, indexation of injury indicators 
was not appropriate since that impeded the full exercise of the right of defence. Causal link  was 
also not properly established.  
46.  Japan  asked Indonesia to closely examine all WTO requirements, especially unforeseen 
developments. While the applicants pointed to excess production capacity in China and the global 
recession, Japan was of the view that such factors could not be considered as u nforeseen 
developments.  
47.  Indonesia  explained that its SG investigation was in compliance with the Agreement as well as 
Article XIX of the GATT 1994. It would exclude developing Members in line with Article 9 of the 
Agreement.   
2.7  Jordan - Aluminium Bars, Rods  and Profiles (G/SG/N/11/JOR/6/Suppl.5)  
48.  The US noted that Jordan 's notification provided an amended list of developing country 
Members for the purpose of Article 9.1 of the Agreement and asked Jordan to clarify how it carried 
out the analysis, and how it e nsured that other products that may come in under the same tariff 
number were  not inappropriately included.  
49.  Jordan  clarified that the amended list of developing country Members for the purpose of 
Article 9.1 of the Agreement was based on the import statist ics of the full calendar year 2017 
whereas the previous list was based on the import statistics of the first half of 2017.  G/SG/M/53  
 
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  2.8  Turkey - Pneumatic Tyres (G/SG/N/6/TUR/22/Suppl.1 –
G/SG/N/7/TUR/12/Suppl.1 – G/SG/N/11/TUR/21/Suppl.1)  
50.  There were no comments or quest ions raised at the meeting.  
2.9  Turkey - Polyethylene Terephthalate (G/SG/N/8/TUR/13/Suppl.2 –
G/SG/N/10/TUR/13/Suppl.3 –G/SG/N/11/TUR/16/Suppl.2)  
51.  The EU noted that Turkey had extended this measure for the maximum of 10 years, and 
wondered what the rationale beh ind it was. The EU reminded Turkey that SG was intended for 
exceptional circumstances only.  
52.  Turkey  stated that the information collected during the course of the investigation clearly 
showed that this measure continued to be necessary to prevent injury, an d that its domestic 
industry was currently in the adjustment process. Therefore, it decided to extend the SG for 
another 3 years. Turkey stated that it was well aware of the exceptional nature of the SG and that 
it used this instrument only when the condit ions were fulfilled.  
2.10  Turkey - Wallpaper and Similar Wallcoverings (G/SG/N/6/TUR/20/Suppl.1)  
53.  As with the previous item, the EU was concerned with Turkey 's extension of the SG. After the 
imposition of the SG, imports decreased dramatically. With regard to serious injury, all economic 
indicators improved considerably and the difficulties incur red by the domestic industry were  not 
caused by imports but by increase of costs and declining demand. This review investigation should 
not have been initiated, and the E U requested Turkey to terminate this investigation without 
taking any measures.   
54.  Turkey  stated that the process was still ongoing.   
2.11  Turkey - Toothbrushes (G/SG/N/8/TUR/16 –G/SG/N/10/TUR/16 –
G/SG/N/11/TUR/22)  
55.  There were no comments or questions raised at th e meeting.  
2.12  United States - Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Cells (G/SG/N/8/USA/9/Suppl.4 –
G/SG/N/10/USA/7 –G/SG/N/11/USA/6)4 
56.  The US clarified that this statement also covered the next item, investigations on large 
residential washers. These two investigati ons were initiated based on petitions submitted to the 
ITC. The factual information and data were gathered from interested parties, with interested 
parties given ample opportunity to present their views, including public hearings. The ITC first 
published i ts determination detailing the reasons for its various serious injury findings. The ITC 
then submitted its recommendations to the President for consideration, after which the President 
adopted the SG measure that he considered necessary. All of the major a ctions were immediately 
notified to the WTO in accordance with Article 12 of the Agreement.  
57.  The US also reported on the results of the consultations held under Article 12.3 of the 
Agreement with relevant Members during February – April 2018. In most instan ces, the US and 
the Members involved agreed to continue examining the impact of the SG and that the 90 -day 
period set forth in Article 8.2 of the Agreement and Article XIX:3 (a) of the GATT 1994 shall be 
considered to expire, as between the two parties, by  a date specified in the respective 
notifications. Specifically regarding solar products, the US explained that it was currently 
examining product -specific exclusions, the outcome of which was to be announced in the coming 
months.  
58.  Korea, Republic of  was of  the view that this measure on crystalline silicon photovoltaic cells 
was an excessive reaction and was also inconsistent with the Agreement. In the bilateral 
consultation, Korea requested the withdrawal or reduction of the measures and also asked for 
adequate compensation under Article 8.1 of the Agreement if the US enforced the SG. 
                                                
4 For the symbols of all the documents placed under this agenda item, see document WTO/AIR/SG/7.  G/SG/M/53  
 
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  Nevertheless, such compensation plan could not be agreed upon. Korea notified the CTG of its 
proposed suspension of concessions in accordance with Article 8.2 of the Agreement.  Korea urged 
the US to withdraw the SG as soon as possible.  
59.  In the bilateral consultations, the Philippines  sought clarification from the US with respect to 
the calculations of its export to the US and the causal link between increased imports and injury. 
Both sides agreed to continue the discussions and that the 90 -day period under Article 8.2 of the 
Agreement  would expire, as between them, on 6 February 2021. The Philippines reserved its right 
to suspend concessions earlier than 6 February 2021 if the DSB found that the measure did not 
conform to the Agreement. The Philippines noted that 8 other countries have  requested 
consultations on the investigation of crystalline silicon photovoltaic cells, which indicated the 
importance of this issue. It also underlined the negative effect of this measure on the Philippines' 
efforts to encourage the development of solar energy and renewable energy.  
60.  The EU was concerned with the measures taken by the US, who was not a traditional user of 
SG. This SG investigation was triggered predominantly by the increased imports from a limited 
number of Asian countries. SG was not an a ppropriate instrument in such a case, as it would cause 
too much collateral damage to imports that were not causing injury. The EU's exports of solar cells 
and modules to the US were clearly not causing injury. This SG was unjustified because the 
imports d id not cause injury to the domestic industry, and that the alternative measures such as 
minimum import price or determined quota would be more appropriate. In the consultations, both 
sides could not agree upon the compensations. Thus, the EU would monitor trade flows between 
the EU and the US with a view to exercising its rights under the Agreement.  
61.  China  had concerns on this measure. First, almost all important data was labelled as 
confidential in the US report, which was inconsistent with the Agreement. S econd, the indicators 
evaluated by the US pertaining to the determination of serious injury did not cover the non -
attribution analysis, e.g. the domestic industry's bankruptcy, the limited capacity of domestic 
industry, and the impacts of the global market  downturn. Third, although Members were required 
to make an unforeseen development analysis before it applied the SG, the USITC was mandated 
by the USTR to produce the unforeseen development analysis after the final report was already 
published. Finally, t he US had taken frequent trade remedy measures on the same kind of 
products. According to Article 5.1 of the Agreement, a Member shall apply SG only to the extent 
necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury and to facilitate adjustment. China urged the U S to 
respect the Agreement.  
62.  Singapore  was concerned with the measure. This measure would dampen the growth of the 
US solar industry and result in increased cost of consumers, particularly those products that were 
not produced domestically. Like others, Si ngapore had bilateral consultations with the US. It 
looked forward to continuing engagement with the US to develop positive and mutually beneficial 
resolutions to this issue.  
63.  Switzerland  regretted that the US decided to impose this measure. The US downstre am 
industries would be seriously affected by the insufficient amount of solar cells and modules 
produced domestically. Switzerland was affected by this measure, and was currently analysing all 
appropriate options to defend its interests. It requested the U S to provide more details on the 
procedures pertaining to product exclusion.  
64.  Norway  also regretted the US decision and doubted that it met all criteria under WTO rules. 
Norway was of the view that free trade partners should be exempted from the SG, and tha t SG 
should be put in place only in an emergency situation.  
65.  Malaysia  stated that this SG measure had a significant negative effect on its domestic 
industry. It sought clarifications on various issues during the consultations with the US, including 
the exem ptions, the calculation of the SG duty, and how the US derived the quota volume for 
exemptions. Both sides agreed to continue exchanging views.  
66.  The US took note of the statements and stated that most of the issues raised were thoroughly 
addressed in the context of th e bilateral discussions.  G/SG/M/53  
 
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  2.13  United States – Large Residential Washers (G/SG/N/8/USA/10/Suppl.3)5 
67.  The US stated that the statement made under the previous agenda item covered this item as 
well, and so there was nothing more to add.  
68.  Korea, Republic of  stressed that the US measure was excessive, and that it did not meet the 
requirements of the Agreement. During the bilateral consultation, Korea re quested that 
compensation be provided under Article 8.1 of the Agreement if the US pushed ahead with the SG. 
Since there was no agreement on compensation, Korea notified the CTG of suspension of 
substantially equivalent level of concessions. Korea urged th e US to withdraw the SG as soon as 
possible.  
69.  China  did not see any unforeseen development analysis in the US decision. It regretted that 
the USITC did not comply with its obligation under Article XIX:1 of the GATT 1994. China urged 
the US to abide by the W TO rules.  
70.  Mexico  noted that the US stance regarding SG had been that it was an instrument to be used 
only in exceptional situation s. Mexico wondered about the change of US position. The criteria for 
imposing such measure were not met. Mexico's exports of l arge residential washers were affected 
by this measure despite the fact that the USITC had made it clear that Mexico should be excluded 
from the measure. The unjustified SG undermined the functioning of the multilateral trading 
system.  
71.  The US explained tha t regarding exclusions, the President had discretion to decide which 
countries, if any, to be excluded from the SG. Similarly, the USTR had statutory discretion t o 
exclude certain products. Presidential  discretion also accounted for the fact that there was  a 
separate report requested from the ITC on unforeseen developments for solar cells but not for 
large residential washers.  
2.14  Viet Nam - Monosodium Glutamate (G/SG/N/7/VNM/3/Rev.1 –
G/SG/N/8/VNM/5 –G/SG/N/10/VNM/4 –G/SG/N/11/VNM/3/Rev.1)  
72.  There were no comments or questions raised at the meeting.  
2.15  Viet Nam - Diammonium Phosphate and Monoammonium Phosphate Fertilizers 
(G/SG/N/8/VNM/6 –G/SG/N/10/VNM/5 –G/SG/N/11/VNM/7)  
73.  Saudi Arabia, Kingdom of  regretted Viet Nam's classification of developing country Members 
for the purpose of Article 9.1 of the Agreement. Saudi Arabia was categorized as a developing 
country in the UN's latest country classification in 2017. Saudi Arabia requested Viet Nam to 
reconsider the list of developing country Members to make it in line with ot her Members' measures 
where Saudi  Arabia was regarded as a developing country Member.  
74.  The US noted that Viet Nam identified its measures in the form of duties to be in effect over a 
three -year period. However, the measure was identified as the same value per ton for the first two 
years. The US sought clarification from Viet Nam on how keeping the measure at the same level 
from the first year to the second year was consistent with the progressive liberalization 
requirement under Article 7.4 of the Agreement .  
75.  Viet Nam  explained that its list of developing country Members was based on the objective 
criteria of the international organizations and that it was willing to engage in a bilateral discussion 
with Saudi Arabia. As for the US question, Viet Nam explain ed that the duty indicated for the first 
period, that is, 19 August 2017 -6 March 2018, was the rate of the provisional SG measure. There 
was a progressive liberalization as required by the Agreement. Viet Nam abided by the WTO rules.   
                                                
5 For the symbols of all the documents placed under this agenda item, see document WTO/AIR/SG/7.  G/SG/M/53  
 
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  2.16  Zambia - Flat–Rolled  Products of Iron, Non -Alloy Steel, Trailers and Semi -trailers 
(G/SG/N/6/ZMB/1 –G/SG/N/7/ZMB/1)  
76.  The Chair stated that the US questions, contained in document G/SG/Q2/ZMB/3, regarding 
this investigation were left unanswered.  
77.  Zambia was not present at the me eting.  
78.  The Chair reminded delegations that any questions for which written responses were 
requested should be submitted to the Member concerned and to the Secretariat no later than 
14 May 2018. Written responses to questions, including questions submitted  in writing prior to this 
meeting, should be submitted to the Secretariat no later than 4 June 2018. As with legislative 
notifications, any unanswered questions would be indicated in the draft annotated agenda of the 
next meeting.  
79.  The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
3  MEASURES TAKEN BY THE US FOLLOWING ITS SECTION 232 INVESTIGATIONS 
(G/SG/161, G/SG/162, G/SG/168 and G/L/1218 –G/SG/N/12/CHN/1) (ITEM 
REQUESTED BY CHINA)  
80.  China  explained that it requested for consultations with the US under Article 12.3 of the 
Agreement, as it understood that the US Section 232 measures were in fact SG measures. Given 
that the US failed to respond to such a request, it notified to the CTG the pr oposed suspension of 
concessions under Article 12.5 of the Agreement. The US Section 232 measures had damaged the 
stability of the multilateral trading system. The measures have also distorted the international 
trade supply chain, with considerable follow -up negative impacts. Some Members were forced to 
take certain measures due to their concerns over trade -distortive effects caused by the US 
measures. Furthermore, the US had exempted several Members from its measures, whose exports 
constituted a large sour ce of steel and aluminium for the US. This clearly violated the MFN 
treatment principle. For instance, the US exempted some Members from its Section 232 measure 
on steel, whose collective exports of steel to the US amounted to more than 50 % of the US total  
imports of steel. The US expected to use exemption from the measures as leverage in trade 
negotiations, to push the other Member to agree on voluntary export restriction. Such 
discriminatory approach was clearly forbidden under WTO rules. Moreover, the la ck of 
transparency in the product exclusion procedures underlined the discriminatory nature of the 
measures. The US Section 232 measures simply protected the US domestic industry without any 
basis under the WTO. China asked the US to abide by the WTO rules  and withdraw the measures 
as soon as possible.  
81.  The US did not agree with China's characterization of the measures as SG. The President 
issued the steel and aluminium proclamations on the grounds that tariffs were necessary to adjust 
imports of steel and a luminium that threatened to impair its national security. Given that these 
actions were not SG, there was no basis to conduct consultations under Article 12.3 of the 
Agreement. In addition, the US noted that China implemented th e suspension of concession o n 
2 April 2018. Because the US measures are not SG measures, Article 8.2 did not justify China's 
suspension of concessions. The US understood that China's action had no basis under the WTO 
rules. China had adopted non -market -oriented policies that resulted  in significant excess capacity. 
Even though several Members repeatedly urged China to refrain from harmful government 
intervention in these sectors, China did not address its practices. Instead, China was apparently 
planning to increase its government int ervention in other sectors as outlined in China's "Made in 
China 2025" document. Until China adopted the necessary reforms to alleviate this situation, 
Members were left with no choice but to address China's actions in the most appropriate form 
possible.  
82.  Russian Federation , like certain other Members, understood that the US Section 232 measures 
were in essence SG. These measures violated the Agreement and Article XIX of the GATT 1994. 
The investigations were initiated by the US authorities without an applic ation from the industry. 
The investigatory process also lacked transparency. Contrary to Article 3.1 of the Agreement, 
Russian producers were deprived of their rights to present evidence in the oral hearings. As for the 
application of the measures, these m easures were imposed for an unlimited period, in contrast to G/SG/M/53  
 
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  a 4-year limit envisaged in Article 7.1 of the Agreement. While progressive liberalization of 
measures was required under Article 7.4 of the Agreement, such liberalization was indiscernible. In 
addition, there was massive exemption of imports from a handful of countries that were the main 
suppliers of the relevant products. Russia wondered how the US could reach the goals of the SG 
measure as provided for in Article XIX of the GATT 1994 when its m ain suppliers of the products 
retained their right to export to the US. Russia was concerned that the basic principles of the 
Agreement were  eroded, and requested the US to bring its measures into conformity with the WTO 
rules.  
83.  Venezuela, Bolivarian Republ ic of raised its concerns that the US measures affected the 
economic and trade interests of Members and that they brought about serious consequences to the 
multilateral trading system.  
84.  Turkey  pointed out that the US had more experience than any Members in conducting 
investigations within the legal boundary available under the WTO. Although the US explained that 
these measures were based on national security grounds, Turkey was not convinced that such an 
extensive product coverage targeted security interests . Measures taken on the grounds of national 
security should be predicated on exceptional circumstances. As such, Turkey viewed these 
measures as SG and expected the US to give positive consideration for the consultation request 
made under Article 12.3 of t he Agreement. Turkey was well aware of the overcapacity problem in 
the steel sector and had been actively involved in the Global Forum on steel excess capacity. 
Turkey was ready to contribute to an accelerated solution to this problem and believed that a 
solution could be achieved through coordinated effort rather than unilateral actions that triggered 
protectionism.  
85.  Norway  was also concerned with the US Section 232 measures on steel and aluminium. Steel 
and aluminium made up a significant share of Norway's  exports. Therefore, its exports were likely 
to suffer from these measures. Its primary concern was the risk of undermining the multilateral 
trading system. Any measures on steel and aluminium must be consistent with the WTO rules. 
Norway would continue to  follow this closely and consider appropriate steps.  
86.  Switzerland  echoed the concerns expressed by other Members. It was affected by these tariffs 
despite the fact that its exports to the US were relatively modest and mainly represented high 
quality niche p roducts that the US customers may not be able to find at home. It failed to 
understand the rationale behind the exemptions of some selected Members while other Members 
with similar characteristics remained subject to the measure. Such practices disrupted t he global 
value chain and endangered many jobs and companies worldwide. Switzerland was certainly aware 
of the serious problem of global overcapacity in the steel and aluminium sectors. However, this 
issue should be addressed through dialogues among the Me mbers concerned. The OECD's Global 
Forum on steel excess capacity had been established precisely to address this problem. 
Switzerland urged the Members to work constructively on the solutions and to refrain from 
unilateral measures.  
87.  India expressed its concerns with the US measures. Members needed to exercise restraints 
regarding the security exception under the GATT 1994. Such measures should not be applied with 
an objective of creating trade barriers. Like others, India requested for con sultations with the US 
under Articles 12.3 and 8.2 of the Agreement. Nevertheless, that request was not accepted by the 
US. India was monitoring the developments carefully, and would take appropriate actions in the 
future.  
88.  Singapore  clarified that its stat ement was without prejudice to the nature of the US measure.  
Singapore was concerned with the US measures. Such tariffs were adversely affecting global 
supply chains and global trade growth, and resulted in downstream impacts on the US industries 
that dep ended on these imports. Singaporean companies also expressed their concerns over the 
effect of measures as well as over the uneven treatment of exporting countries. Singapore was 
closely monitoring the developments and continued to engage with the US on th is issue.  
89.  China  responded to the US statements. First, China maintained the view that the US 
Section  232 measures were essentially SG measures. The US reports on Section 232 investigation s 
concluded that the imports of steel and aluminium had injured the d omestic industry, and 
therefore, the global tariffs on such products were warranted. As a consequence, China was of the G/SG/M/53  
 
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  view that such conclusions were analogous to the criteria for imposing SG as laid down in the 
Agreement and Article XIX of the GATT 1994 . Given that the US Section 232 measures would 
cause irreparable damage to China, it was necessary to undertake countermeasures. It had 
simultaneously sought to resolve the issues under the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. It 
would continue to work with a ll Members to resolve the concerns under the multilateral trading 
system. With regard to the overcapacity issue, there were other appropriate fora to discuss this 
matter such as the G20's global steel forum. Overcapacity was a global issue, and global issu es 
required collective response s. China had significantly reduce d the capacity by more than 
200 million tons over the last two years, and would reduce another 30 million tons in 2018. 
Overcapacity issue should not be a reason for unilateral action.              
90.  The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
4  ADDITION OF CERTAIN INFORMATION INTO THE  ANNUAL REPORT (ITEM REQUESTED 
BY AUSTRALIA)  
91.  The Chair explained that this item was requested by Australia. He recalled that this issue was 
first discussed at th e 2016 spring Committee meeting. He also noted that the US had submitted 
questions to India on this issue.  
92.  Australia  continued to keep this item on the agenda as it was an important element in 
increasing transparency. Australia's proposal was the simple ad dition to the Committee's annual 
report to indicate the date of circulation of any notifications submitted during the review period. 
India suggested during the Committee meeting in October 2017 that what should be indicated are 
the dates of submission of n otifications rather than the date of circulation. Although Australia was 
willing to consider that proposal, it recalled that referring to notifications using the circulation date 
was a practice at the WTO. Australia was surprised by the lack of agreement t o its proposal 
despite the fact that it tracked closely that of Japan, which was agreed to by India. It remained 
open to further discussions with India and other Members on this issue.    
93.  The US reiterated that it had consistently advocated for the improve ment of transparency in 
notifications and continued to support Australia's proposal. The US recalled that its questions were 
submitted to India in December 2016 to seek India's views on Australia's proposal and continued 
to look forward to India's written responses to its questions.  
94.  New Zealand , Canada , Singapore , Chinese Taipei , Switzerland , and Russia n Federation  
reiterated their continued support for Australia's proposal.  
95.  India was well aware of the importance of transparency, and it was willing to consi der 
Australia's proposal. India understood that there were two elements proposed by Australia: (i) 
indicating the date of the notification and (ii) including footnotes for clarity. India could consider 
the latter element. For the former element, India woul d be agreeable to this proposal if the date of 
submission by the Member concerned as well as the circulation date was indicated. India looked 
forward to having bilateral discussions with Australia. It would also submit written responses to the 
US questions  in due course.  
96.  Australia  stated that it would conduct bilateral discussions with India. Australia might also 
submit a mock -up, similar to what was done in the room document under discussion, by the next 
Committee meeting to see whether it was doable to ha ve two different dates included in the 
annex.  
97.  The Chair  stated that the Committee would revert to this item in future meetings.  
98.  The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
5  REQUEST UNDER ARTICL E 13.1(E) OF THE AGR EEMENT ON SAFEGUARDS  
(G/L/1213/R EV.1–G/SG/158/R EV.1) (ITEM REQUESTED BY THAILAND)  
99.  Thailand  explained that this issue related to Turkey's suspension of concessions taken under 
Article 8.2 of the Agreement. The issue of substantially equivalent level of concessions did not 
come up in the pri or consultation with Turkey. Turkey's exports of the subject product to Thailand G/SG/M/53  
 
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  accounted for only 5.14 % of Thailand's total imports. Nevertheless, as suspension of concessions, 
Turkey increased the import duty of air -conditioning machine s from Thailand b y 9.27 % for three 
years starting from 5 September 2017 until 4 September 2020. This calculation was based on the 
import value of non -alloy hot rolled steel flat products in 2013. In addition, the end time of this 
suspension, 4 September 2020, extended to a fter the planned duration of the measure, which was 
6 June 2020. The amount suspended was not substantially equivalent as laid down in Article 8.2 of 
the Agreement. It should be calculated based on a 3 -year average of import value preceding the 
original me asure. By calculating the retaliation measure on the basis of the imports in 2013 alone, 
Turkey arbitrarily exceeded the feasible limit of retaliation which should be at most 5.70 % rather 
than 9.27 % additional duty. Therefore, Thailand requested the Commit tee to review whether the 
application of such suspension of concessions was substantially equivalent and to report to the 
CTG. 
100.  For the information of the Committee, the Chair recalled that Article 13.1(e) of the 
Agreement set out the functions of this Comm ittee to "review, at the request of the Member taking 
a SG measure, whether proposals to suspend concessions or other obligations are 'substantially 
equivalent', and report as appropriate to the CTG".  
101.  Turkey  pointed out that it requested for compensation on 21 April 2017. Since the 
compensation was not provided, Turkey notified its proposal of suspension of concessions in line 
with Article 8.2 of the Agreement. This proposal was not disapprove d by the CTG, and so it came 
into effect on 5 September 2017. Im mediately after the imposition of the retaliatory measure, 
Thailand requested to hold a bilateral meeting in order to find an amicable solution. While these 
discussions were ongoing, Thailand submitted a request to the Committee under Article 13.1(e) of 
the Agreement. Turkey's views were the following: First, Article 13.1(e) did not deal with 
measures already in force, but dealt with "proposals". Thus, Thailand's request was not 
appropriate. Second, there was no rule in the Agreement indicating which period s should be taken 
as a basis for the calculation of the substantially equivalent level of concessions. There were 
examples of other countries' past notifications where the same method as Turkey's was used. 
Third, Turkey disagreed with Thailand's statement that there was no discussion on maintaining 
substantially equivalent level of concessions during the consultations prior to the imposition of the 
measure.  
102.  The US recalled that there was a request under Article 13.1(b) of the Agreement in 2011 in 
which a Me mber requested the Committee to find whether the procedural requirements of the 
Agreement had been complied with. In that case, the Chair of the Committee provided her own 
factual report to the CTG when the Committee was unable to reach a consensus on the finding. 
The Committee discussed the Member's request during a regular Committee meeting and also met 
informally on subsequent occasions. For Thailand's request at hand, the Committee should 
consider proceeding in similar steps as taken in 2011 –2012. That is, listen to the views of the 
Members and come up with a result consistent with Article 13.1(e) of the Agreement.  
103.  Australia  supported having further discussions, including in the form of informal 
consultations. Like the US, it recalled a similar request m ade in 2011. The Chair of the Committee 
at that time submitted the report to the CTG on his/her own responsibility. Informal consultations 
as well as formal discussions in the Committee took place. Australia suggested that the Committee 
consider taking a s imilar approach.  
104.  The Chair  stated that he would ask the incoming Chair to hold informal consultations on this 
issue as soon as possible.       
105.  The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
6  UKRAINE'S INVESTIGAT ION ON FLEXIBLE PORO US PLATES, BLOCKS AN D SH EETS OF 
POLYURETHANE FOAMS ( G/SG/Q2/UKR/5) (ITEM  REQUESTED BY THE EU)  
106.  The EU raised its concerns with the Ukrainian 1998 legislation implementing the Agreement. 
In a recent national litigation related to the investigation on polyurethane foams, the Ukraini an 
court found that this law did not implement the Agreement. Moreover, the wording in that 
legislation did not coincide with the wording notified to the WTO.  G/SG/M/53  
 
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  107.  Ukraine  reiterated that this investigation was conducted in accordance with the law On 
Applicati ons of SG Measures against Imports to Ukraine  and in full compliance with the Agreement. 
Currently, this case was considered by the constitutional court of Ukraine. The judiciary was an 
independent branch of state. Ukraine confirmed that this measure was a  SG under the Agreement, 
and that the relevant laws of Ukraine did not exclude the application of such measures.    
108.  The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
7  TREATMENT OF DEVELOP ING COUNTRIES AND NO TIFICATIONS PERTAINI NG TO 
ARTICLE 9 OF THE AGR EEMEN T ON SAFEGUARDS (ITE M REQUESTED BY BRAZI L) 
109.  Brazil  suggested that the existing mechanism under the Agreement could be improved to 
increase transparency and legal certainty for developing country Members who were exporters to a 
country imposing a SG measure.  Specifically, the footnote to Article 9.1 of the Agreement required 
Members to notify immediately all developing country Members excluded from a SG measure. The 
format for such notification was set forth in document G/SG/1/Rev.1. This format required 
Memb ers to specify the developing country Members to which the SG was not applied as well as 
the import share of those Members. The period of time used for making determinations under 
Article 9.1 together with the information regarding the volume of imports of  all exporting Members 
should be included in such notifications as well. Brazil encouraged Members to either include this 
information in notifications under Article 12.1(b) and (c) of the Agreement or to disclose it in the 
public notice as required by Arti cle 3.1 of the Agreement. Brazil urged Members to consider 
amending the guideline for the notifications in order to address this issue.  
110.  Australia  was willing to consider this proposal and happy to have discussions on this issue. It 
asked Brazil whether it was considering putting a written proposal.  
111.  The EU was in favour of any proposal increasing transparency in notifications in the SG 
proceedings.  
112.  Argentina  asked for informal consultations to continue discussions on this issue.  
113.  Brazil  stated that it would first approach the interested Members bilaterally so as to discuss 
the way forward.  
114.  Chile wished to be considered as one of the Members interested  in this proposal.     
115.  The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
8  DISCUSSION GROUP REG ARDING SAFEGUARD PRO CEEDINGS  
116.  The Chair explained that this item was placed on the agenda at the request of the 
delegations of Australia, Canada, the EU, Israel, Japa n, Korea, New Zealand, Norway, 
Chinese  Taipei, Singapore, Ukraine and the US.  
117.  The US reminded Members that the informal discussion group meeting would take place 
after the present meeting. The discussion was open to all Members. The idea behind this 
discus sion group was to provide a broader perspective than the one in normal Committee 
meetings, removed from discussions of individual cases, and to focus more on each other's 
experiences and to learn from each other. The topics for the day's discussion were: ( i) notifications 
under Article 12, and (ii) reports of findings and public disclosure.   
118.  The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
9  OTHER BUSINESS  
119.  There were no issues raised under this agenda item.  G/SG/M/53  
 
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  10  DATE OF NEXT REGULAR  MEETING  
120.  The Chair  suggested that the Committee meet in the week of 23 October 2018. The exact 
date would be confirmed later.  
121.  The Committee so decided . 
11  ELECTION OF OFFICERS  
122.  The Chair stated that the C hair of the CTG had carried out informal consultations on the 
nomination o f chairs for the different bodies operating under the auspices of the CTG. The 
proposed nominations were taken note of by the CTG. Concerning this Committee, the CTG C hair 
proposed the nomination of Mr Hyouk Woo Kwon. He therefore proposed that the Committ ee elect 
Mr Hyouk Woo Kwon as Chair.  
123.  The Committee so decided . 
124.  Regarding the position of Vice -Chair of the Committee, the Chair stated that he had 
conducted consultations with a number of Members, and on the basis of those consultations he 
proposed that th e Committee elect Ms Katherine Dellar as Vice -Chair of the Committee.  
125.  The Committee so decided . 
__________