WT/DS475/R  
 
19 August  2016 
(16-4447) Page: 1/381 
  Original: English  
 
 
  
RUSSIAN FEDERATION - MEASURES ON THE IMPO RTATION OF LIVE 
PIGS, PORK AND OTHER  PIG PRODUCTS FROM TH E EUROPEAN UNION  
REPORT OF THE PANEL  
 
 WT/DS475/R  
 
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  TABLE OF CONTENTS  
 
 
1  INTRODUCTION  ................................ ................................ ................................  32 
1.1  Complaint by the European Union  ................................ ................................ ..........  32 
1.2  Panel establishment and composition  ................................ ................................ ..... 32 
1.3  Panel proceedings  ................................ ................................ ...............................  33 
1.3.1  General  ................................ ................................ ................................ .............  33 
1.3.2  Working procedur es concerning Strictly Confidential Information (SCI)  .......................  33 
1.3.3  Arrangements for language interpretation  ................................ ...............................  33 
1.3.4  Consultation with experts and relevant international organizations  .............................  34 
2  FACTUAL ASPECTS  ................................ ................................ ............................  37 
2.1  The relevant disease: African swine fever  ................................ ...............................  37 
2.2  The measures at issue  ................................ ................................ .........................  38 
2.3  Products at issue  ................................ ................................ ................................  39 
2.4  Relevant international standards, guidelines, and recommendations  ...........................  39 
2.4.1  The OIE and its mandate  ................................ ................................ ......................  39 
2.4.2  The OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code (Terrestrial Code)  ................................ ........  40 
2.4.3  Relevant standards, guidelines or recommendations invoked by the parties  .................  41 
2.5  The parties' domestic ASF situations  ................................ ................................ ...... 41 
2.5.1  The European Union  ................................ ................................ ............................  41 
2.5.2  Russia  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...............  41 
3  PARTIES' REQUESTS FO R FINDINGS AND RECOM MENDATIONS  ........................  41 
4  ARGUMENTS OF THE PAR TIES  ................................ ................................ ...........  42 
5  ARGUMENTS OF THE THI RD PARTIES  ................................ ................................  42 
6  INTERIM REVIEW  ................................ ................................ .............................  42 
6.1  Introduction  ................................ ................................ ................................ ....... 42 
6.2  The purpose and scope of the interim review  ................................ ..........................  43 
6.3  Introduction of new evidence on the record at the  interim review stage  ......................  43 
6.4  Whether the measures in respect of the imports from Latvia and Estonia fall 
within the Panel's terms of reference  ................................ ................................ ..... 45 
6.5  Temporal framework for the Panel's assessmen t ................................ ......................  46 
6.6  Claims under Articles 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3 of the SPS Agreement (relating to the 
EU-wide ban)  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..... 46 
6.7  Claims under Articles 2.2, 5.1, 5.2, and 5.7 of the SPS Agreement (relating to 
the EU -wide ban)  ................................ ................................ ................................  47 
6.8  Claims under Articles 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3 of the SPS Agreement (relating to the 
bans on the imports of the products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and 
Poland)  ................................ ................................ ................................ .............  47 
6.9  Whether Russia's measures are inconsistent with Article 2.3 of the SPS 
Agreement  ................................ ................................ ................................ .........  50 
6.10  Panel's conclusions and recommendations  ................................ ..............................  50 WT/DS475/R  
 
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  6.11  Appendix 1 to the Panel Report  ................................ ................................ .............  51 
7  FINDINGS  ................................ ................................ ................................ .........  51 
7.1  Procedural issues  ................................ ................................ ................................  51 
7.1.1  Arrangements for simultaneous interpretation  ................................ .........................  51 
7.1.2  Industry representative in a Member's delegation  ................................ ....................  54 
7.2  Order of analysis  ................................ ................................ ................................ . 55 
7.2.1  Main arguments of the parties  ................................ ................................ ..............  55 
7.2.2  Main arguments of the third parties  ................................ ................................ ....... 56 
7.2.3  Analysis by the Panel  ................................ ................................ ...........................  56 
7.2.4  Conclusion  ................................ ................................ ................................ .........  56 
7.3  Preliminary issues  ................................ ................................ ...............................  57 
7.3.1  Introduction  ................................ ................................ ................................ ....... 57 
7.3.2  Whether the alleged EU -wide ban is a measure susceptible to challenge under 
the WTO dispute settlement mechanism  ................................ ................................ . 59 
7.3.3  Whether Russia's terms of accession limit the Panel's assessment of the 
European Union's claims in respect of the alleged EU -wide ban  ................................ .. 67 
7.3.4  Whether the measures in respect of the imports from Latvia and Estonia fall 
within the Panel's terms of reference  ................................ ................................ ..... 75 
7.3.5  Summary of the measures at issue in this dispute  ................................ ...................  85 
7.3.6  Temporal framework for the Panel's assessment  ................................ ......................  86 
7.4  Whether Russia's measures are within the scope of the SPS Agreement  ......................  88 
7.4.1  Introduction  ................................ ................................ ................................ ....... 88 
7.4.2  Main argum ents of the parties  ................................ ................................ ..............  89 
7.4.3  Main arguments of the third parties  ................................ ................................ ....... 90 
7.4.4  Analysis by the Panel  ................................ ................................ ...........................  90 
7.4.5  Conclusion  ................................ ................................ ................................ .........  99 
7.5  Claims re lating to the EU -wide ban  ................................ ................................ ...... 100 
7.5.1  Whether the EU -wide ban is "based on" relevant international standards (Claims 
under Articles 3.1 of the SPS Agreement)  ................................ .............................  100 
7.5.2  Claims under Articles 6.1, 6 .2, and 6.3 of the SPS Agreement  ................................ . 123 
7.5.3  Claims under Articles 3.1 of the SPS Agreement (continued)  ................................ ... 159 
7.5.4  Claims under Article 8 and Annex C of the SPS Agreement  ................................ ...... 160 
7.5.5  Claims under Articles 2.2, 5.1, 5.2, and 5.7 of the SPS Agreement  ...........................  182 
7.5.6  Claims under Articles 5.3, 5.4, 5.6, and 2.2 of the SPS Agreement  ...........................  207 
7.6  Claims relating to the bans o n the imports of the products at issue from Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland  ................................ ................................ ..............  228 
7.6.1  Claims under Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the SPS Agreement  ................................ .........  228 
7.6.2  Claims under Articles 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3 of the SPS Agreement  ................................ . 243 
7.6.3  Whether the bans on the imports of the products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, and Poland are "based on" the relevant international standards under 
Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreemen t (continued)  ................................ ........................  271 
7.6.4  Claims under Article 8 and Annex C of the SPS Agreement  ................................ ...... 272 
7.6.5  Claims under Articles 2.2, 5.1, 5.2, and 5.7 of the SPS Agreement  ...........................  286 WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.6.6  Claims under Articles 5.3, 5.4, 5.6, and 2.2 of the SPS Agreement  ...........................  301 
7.7  Claims under Articles 2.3 and 5.5 of the SPS Agreement  ................................ .........  310 
7.7.1  Introduction  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..... 310 
7.7.2  Relationship between Articles 2.3 and 5.5 of the SPS Agreement and order of 
analysis  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...........  311 
7.7.3  Whether Russia's measures are inconsistent with Article 2.3 of the SPS 
Agreement  ................................ ................................ ................................ ....... 312 
7.7.4  Europe an Union's claim pursuant to Article  5.5 of the SPS  Agreement  .......................  333 
7.8  Claims under Article 7 and Annex B of the SPS Agreement  ................................ ...... 336 
7.8.1  Main arguments of the parties  ................................ ................................ ............  336 
7.8.2  Analysis by the Panel  ................................ ................................ .........................  337 
7.8.3  Summary of conclusions in respect of the challenged measures  ...............................  343 
8  CONCLUSIONS AND RECO MMENDATIONS  ................................ .......................  343  
9  APPENDIX 1 CH RONOLOGY OF EXCHANGE S OF INFORMATION BET WEEN 
THE EUROPEAN UNION A ND RUSSIA FROM 24 JA NUARY 2014  .......................  348  
10  APPENDIX 2 DESCRIPTI ON OF COUNCIL DIRECT IVE 2002/60/EC  ..................  376  
 WT/DS475/R  
 
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  LIST OF ANNEXES  
ANNEX A  
WORKIN G PROCEDURES OF THE PANEL  
Contents  Page  
Annex  A-1 Working Procedures of the Panel  A-2 
Annex  A-2 Additional Working Procedures concerning strictly confidential information 
(SCI)  A-7 
Annex  A-3 Additional Working Procedures for Panel's expert consultation  A-9 
ANNEX B  
ARGUMENTS OF THE PAR TIES 
EUROPEAN UNION  
Contents  Page  
Annex  B-1 First part of integrated executive summary of the arguments of the European 
Union  B-2 
Annex  B-2 Second part of the integrated executive summary of the arguments of the 
European Union  B-17 
 
RUSSIAN FEDERATION  
Contents  Page  
Annex  B-3 First part of the integrated executive summary of the arguments of the Russian 
Federation  B-33 
Annex  B-4 Second part of the integrated executive summary of the arguments of the 
Russian Federation  B-44 
ANNEX C  
ARGUMENTS OF THE THIRD PARTIES  
Contents  Page  
Annex  C-1 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Australia  C-2 
Annex  C-2 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Brazil  C-4 
Annex  C-3 Integrated executive summary of the argume nts of India  C-8 
Annex C -4 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Japan  C-11 
Annex C -5 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Norway  C-13 
Annex C -6 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of the United States  C-17 
 
 WT/DS475/R  
 
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  CASES CIT ED IN THIS REPORT  
Short Title  Full Case Title and Citation  
Argentina – Import 
Measures  Appellate Body Reports, Argentina – Measures Affecting the Importation of 
Goods , WT/DS438/AB/R  / WT/DS444/AB/R  / WT/DS445/A B/R, adopted 26 
January 2015  
Argentina – Footwear (EC)  Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Safeguard Measures on Imports of 
Footwear , WT/DS121/AB/R , adopted 12 January 2000, DSR 2000:I, p.  515 
Australia – Apples  Appellate Body Report, Australia – Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples 
from New Zealand , WT/DS367/AB/R , adopted 17 December 2010, DSR 2010:V, 
p. 2175 
Australia – Salmon  
(Artic le 21.5 – Canada)  Panel Report, Australia – Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon – Recourse 
to Article  21.5 of the DSU by Canada , WT/DS18/RW , adopted 20 March 2000, 
DSR 2000:IV, p.  2031 
Canada – Aircraft  Appellate Body Report, Canada – Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian 
Aircraft , WT/DS70/AB/R , adopted 20 August 1999, DSR 1999:III, p.  1377 
Canada – Aircraft  Panel Report, Canada – Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft , 
WT/DS70/R , adopted 20 August 1999 , upheld by Appellate Body Report 
WT/DS70/AB/R, DSR 1999:IV, p.  1443 
Canada – Autos  Appellate Body Report, Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive 
Industry , WT/DS139/AB/R , WT/DS142/AB/R , adopted 19 June 2000, DSR 
2000:VI, p.  2985 
Canada – Continued 
Suspension  Appellate Body Report, Canada – Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC 
– Hormones Dispute , WT/DS321/AB/R , adopted 14 November 2008, DSR 
2008:XIV, p.  5373 
Canada – Dairy  Appellate Body Report,  Canada – Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk 
and the Exportation of Dairy Products , WT/DS103/AB/R , WT/DS113/AB/R , and 
Corr.1, adopted 27 October 1999, DSR 1999:V, p.  2057 
Canada – Wheat Exports 
and Grain Imports  Appellate Body Report, Canada – Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and 
Treatment of Imported Grain , WT/DS276/AB/R , adopted 27 September 2004, 
DSR 2004:VI, p.  2739 
Canada – Renewable Energy 
/ Canada – Feed-in Tariff 
Program  Appellate Body Report s, Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable 
Energy Generation Sector / Canada – Measures Relating to the Feed -in Tariff 
Program , WT/DS412/AB/R  / WT/DS426/AB/R , adopted 24 May 2013, DSR 
2013:I, p.  7 
Canada – Renewable Energy 
/ Canada – Feed-in Tariff 
Program  Panel Reports, Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy 
Generation Sector / Canada – Measures Relating to the Fee d-in Tariff Program , 
WT/DS412/R  and Add.1 / WT/DS426/R  and Add.1, adopted 24 May 2013, as 
modified by Appellate Body Reports WT/DS412/AB/R / WT/DS42 6/AB/R, DSR 
2013:I, p.  237 
China – Auto Parts  Panel Reports, China – Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile Parts , 
WT/DS339/R , Add.1 and Add.2 / WT/DS340/R , Add.1 and Add.2 / 
WT/DS342/R , Add.1 and Add.2, adopted 12 Janu ary 2009, upheld 
(WT/DS339/R) and as modified (WT/DS340/R / WT/DS342/R) by Appellate 
Body Reports WT/DS339/AB/R / WT/DS340/AB/R / WT/DS342/AB/R, DSR 
2009:I, p.  119 
China – GOES  Appellate Body Report, China – Countervailing and Anti -Dumping Duties on 
Grain  Oriented Flat -Rolled Electrical Steel from the United States , 
WT/DS414/A B/R, adopted 16 November 2012, DSR 2012:XII, p.  6251 
China – HP-SSST (Japan) / 
China – HP-SSST (EU)  Appellate Body Reports, China – Measures Imposing Anti -Dumping Duties on 
High-Performance Stainless Steel Seamless Tubes ("HP -SSST") from Japan / 
China – Measures Imposing Anti -Dumping Duties on High -Performance 
Stainless Steel Seamless Tubes ("HP -SSST") from the European Union , 
WT/DS454/AB/R  and Add.1 / WT/DS460/AB/R  and Add.1, adopted 28 October 
2015 
China – Intellectual 
Property Rights  Panel Report, China – Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of 
Intellectual Property Rights , WT/DS362/R , adopted 20 March 2009, DSR 
2009:V, p.  2097 WT/DS475/R  
 
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  Short Title  Full Case Title and Citation  
China – Publications and 
Audiovisual Products  Panel Report, China – Measu res Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution 
Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products , 
WT/DS363/R  and Corr.1, adopted 19 January 2010, as modified by Appellate 
Body Report WT/DS363/AB/R, DSR 2010:II, p.  261 
China – Rare Earths  Appellate Body Reports, China – Measures Related to the Exportation o f Rare 
Earths, Tungsten, and Molybdenum , WT/DS431/AB/R  / WT/DS432/AB/R  / 
WT/DS433/AB/R , adopted 29 August 2014  
China – Rare Earths  Panel Reports, China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths, 
Tungsten, and Molybdenum , WT/DS431/R  and Add.1 / WT/DS432/R  and Add.1 
/ WT/DS433/R  and Add.1, adopted 29 August 2014, upheld by Appellate Body 
Reports WT/DS431/AB/R / WT/DS432/AB/R / WT/DS433/AB/R  
China – Raw Materials  Appel late Body Reports, China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Various 
Raw Materials , WT/DS394/AB/R  / WT/DS395/AB/R  / WT/DS398/AB/R , adopted 
22 February 2012, DSR 2012:VII, p.  3295 
China – Raw Materials  Panel Reports, China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw 
Materials , WT/DS394/R , Add.1 and Corr.1 / WT/DS395/R , Add.1 and Corr.1 / 
WT/DS398/R , Add.1 and Corr.1, adopted 22 February 2012, as modified by 
Appell ate Body Reports WT/DS394/AB/R / WT/DS395/AB/R / WT/DS398/AB/R, 
DSR 2012:VII, p.  3501 
Chile – Price Band System  Appellate Body Report, Chile – Price Band System and Safeguard Measures 
Relating to Certain Agricultural Products , WT/DS207/AB/R , adopted 23 October 
2002, DSR 2002:VIII, p.  3045 (Corr.1, DSR 2006:XII, p.  5473)  
Dominican Republic – 
Import and Sale of 
Cigarettes  Appellate Body Report, Dominican Republic – Measures Affecting the 
Importation and Internal Sale of Cigarettes , WT/DS302/AB/R , adopted 19 May 
2005, DSR 2005:XV, p.  7367 
Dominican Republic – 
Safeguard Measures  Panel Report, Dominican Republic – Safeguard Measures on Imports of 
Polypropylene Bags and Tubular Fabric , WT/DS415/R , WT/DS416/R , 
WT/DS417/R , WT/DS418/R , and Add.1, adopted 22 February 2012, DSR 
2012:XIII, p.  6775 
EC – Approval and 
Marketing of Biotech 
Products  Panel Reports, European Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval and 
Marketing of Biotech Product s, WT/DS291/R , Add.1 to Add.9 and Corr.1 / 
WT/DS292/R , Add.1 to Add.9 and Corr.1 / WT/DS293/R , Add.1 to Add.9 and 
Corr.1, adopted 21 November 2006, DSR 2006:III, p.  847 
EC – Bananas III  Appellate Body Report, European Com munities – Regime for the Importation, 
Sale and Distribution of Bananas , WT/DS27/AB/R , adopted 25 September 1997, 
DSR 1997:II, p.  591 
EC – Bananas III  
(Article  21.5 – Ecuador II)  Panel Report, European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and 
Distribution of Bananas – Second Recourse to Article  21.5 of the DSU by 
Ecuador , WT/DS27/RW2/ECU , adopted 11 December 2008, as modified by 
Appel late Body Report WT/DS27/AB/RW2/ECU, DSR 2008:XVIII, p.  7329 
EC – Bananas III (US)  Panel Report, European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and 
Distribution of Bananas, Complaint by the United States , WT/DS27/R/USA , 
adopted 25 September 1997, as modified by Appellate Body Report 
WT/DS27/AB/R, DSR 1997:II, p.  943 
EC – Asbestos  Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos 
and Asbestos -Containing Products , WT/DS135/AB/R , adopted 5 April 2001, DSR 
2001:VII, p.  3243 
EC – Bed Linen  Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Anti-Dumping Duties on 
Imports of Cotton -Type Bed Linen from India , WT/DS141/AB/R , adopted 12 
March 2001, DSR 2001:V, p.  2049 
EC – Chicken Cuts  Appellate B ody Report, European  Communities – Customs Classification of 
Frozen Boneless Chicken Cuts , WT/DS269/AB/R , WT/DS286/AB/R , adopted 27 
September 2005, and Corr.1, DSR 2005:XIX, p.  9157 
EC – Export Subsidies on 
Sugar  Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Export Subsidies on Sugar , 
WT/DS265/AB/R , WT/DS266/AB/R , WT/DS283/AB/R , adopted 19 May 2005, 
DSR 2 005:XIII, p.  6365 
EC – Fasteners (China)  Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Definitive Anti -Dumping 
Measures on Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners from China , WT/DS397/AB/R , 
adopted 28 July 2011, DSR 2011:VII, p.  3995 WT/DS475/R  
 
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  Short Title  Full Case Title and Citation  
EC – Fasteners (China)  Panel Report, European Communities – Definitive Anti -Dumping Measures on 
Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners from China , WT/DS397/R  and Corr.1, adopted 
28 July 2011, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS397/AB/R, DSR 
2011:VIII, p.  4289 
EC – Hormones  Appellate Body Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products 
(Hormones) , WT/DS26/AB/R , WT/DS48/AB/R , adopted 13 February 1998, DSR 
1998:I, p.  135 
EC – Hormones (Canada)  Panel Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), 
Complaint by Canada , WT/DS48/R/CAN , adopted 13 February 1998, as 
modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB /R, DSR 
1998:II, p.  235 
EC – Hormones (US)  Panel Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), 
Complaint by the United States , WT/DS26/R/USA , adopted 13 February 1998, 
as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, DSR 
1998:III, p.  699 
EC – IT Products  Panel Reports, European Communities  and its member States – Tariff 
Treatment of Certain Information Technology Products , WT/DS375/R  / 
WT/DS376/R  / WT/DS377/R , adopted 21 September 2010, DSR 2010:III, 
p. 933 
EC – Sardines  Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Trade Description of Sardines , 
WT/DS231/AB/R , adopted 23 O ctober 2002, DSR 2002:VIII, p.  3359 
EC – Seal Products  Appellate Body Reports, European Communities – Measures Prohibiting the 
Importation and Marketing of Seal Products , WT/DS400/AB/R  / 
WT/DS401/AB/R , adopted 18 June 2014  
EC – Selected Customs 
Matters  Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Selected Customs Matters , 
WT/DS315/AB/R , adopted 11 December 2006, DSR 2006:IX, p.  3791 
EC – Selected Customs 
Matters  Panel Report, European Communities – Selected Cus toms Matters , 
WT/DS315/R , adopted 11 December 2006, as modified by Appellat e Body 
Report WT/DS315/AB/R, DSR 2006:IX, p.  3915 
EC – Tariff Preferences  Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Conditions for the Granting of 
Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries , WT/DS246/AB/R , adopted 20 April 
2004, DSR 2004:III, p.  925 
EC – Tube or Pipe Fittings  Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Anti-Dumping Duties on 
Malleable Cast Iron Tube or Pipe Fittings from Brazil , WT/DS219/AB/R , adopted 
18 August 2003, DSR 2003:VI, p.  2613 
Guatemala – Cement I  Appellate Body Report, Guatemala – Anti-Dumping Investigation Regarding 
Portland Cement from Mexico , WT/DS60/AB/R , adopted 25 November 1998, 
DSR 1998:IX, p.  3767 
India – Agricultural Products  Appellate Body Report, India – Measures Concern ing the Importation of Certain 
Agricultural Products , WT/DS430/AB/R , adopted 19 June 2015  
India – Agricultural Products  Panel Report, India – Measures Concerning the Importation of Certain 
Agricultural Products , WT/DS430/R  and Add.1, adopted 19 June 2015, as 
modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS430/AB/R  
India – Autos  Panel Report, India – Measures Affecting the Automotive Sector , WT/DS146/R , 
WT/DS175/R , and Corr.1, adopted 5 April 2002, DSR 2002:V, p.  1827 
India – Patents (US)  Appellate Body Report, India – Patent Protection for Pharmaceut ical and 
Agricultural Chemical Products , WT/DS50/AB/R , adopted 16 January  1998, DSR 
1998:I, p.  9 
India – Quantitative 
Restrictions  Appellate Body Report, India – Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of 
Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Products , WT/DS90/AB/R , adopted 22 
September 1999, DSR 1999:IV, p.  1763 
Japan – Agricultural 
Products II  Appellate Body Report, Japan – Measures Affecting Agricu ltural Products , 
WT/DS76/AB/R , adopted 19 March 1999, DSR 1999:I, p.  277 
Japan – Alcoholic Beverages 
II Appellate Body Report, Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages , WT/DS8/AB/R , 
WT/DS10/AB/R , WT/DS11/AB/R , adopted 1 November 1996, DSR 1996:I, p.  97 
Japan – Apples  Appellate Body Report, Japan – Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples , 
WT/DS245/AB/R , adopted  10 December 2003, DSR 2003:IX, p.  4391 
Japan – Apples  Panel Report, Japan – Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples , 
WT/DS245/R , adopted 10 December 2003, upheld by Appellate Body Report 
WT/DS245/AB/R, DSR 2003:IX, p.  4481 WT/DS475/R  
 
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  Short Title  Full Case Title and Citation  
Japan – Film Panel Report, Japan – Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and 
Paper , WT/DS44/R , adopted 22 April 1998, DSR 1998:IV, p.  1179 
Korea – Alcoholic Beverages  Panel Report, Korea – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages , WT/DS75/R , WT/DS84/R , 
adopted 17 February 1999, as modified by Appellate Body Report 
WT/DS75/AB/R, W T/DS84/AB/R, DSR 1999:I, p.  44 
Korea – Certain Paper  Panel Report, Korea – Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Certain Paper from 
Indonesia , WT/DS312/R , adopted 28 November 2005, DSR 2005:XXII, 
p. 10637  
Korea – Dairy  Appellate Body Report, Korea – Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of 
Certain Dairy Products , WT/DS98/AB/R , adopted 12 January 2000, DSR 2000:I, 
p. 3 
Korea – Various Measures 
on Beef  Appellate Body Report, Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled 
and Frozen Beef , WT/DS161/AB/R , WT/DS169/AB/R , adopted 10 January 2 001, 
DSR 2001:I, p.  5 
Mexico – Corn Syrup  
(Article  21.5 – US) Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Investigation of High Fructose 
Corn Syrup (HFCS) from the United States – Recourse to Article  21.5 of the 
DSU by the United States , WT/DS132/AB/RW , adopted 21 November 2001, 
DSR 2001:XIII, p.  6675 
Philippines – Distilled Spirits  Appellate Body Reports, Philippines – Taxes on Distilled Spirits , 
WT/DS396/AB/R  / WT/DS403/AB/R , adopted 20 January 2012, DSR 201 2:VIII, 
p. 4163 
Thailand – Cigarettes 
(Philippines)  Appellate Body Report, Thailand – Customs and Fiscal Measures on Cigarettes 
from the Philippines , WT/DS371/AB/R , adopted 15 July 2011 , DSR 2011:IV, 
p. 2203 
Thailand – H-Beams  Panel Report, Thailand – Anti-Dumping Duties on Angles, Shapes and Sections 
of Iron or Non -Alloy St eel and H -Beams from Poland , WT/DS122/R , adopted 5 
April 2001, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS122/AB/R, DSR 
2001:VII, p.  2741 
Turkey – Textiles  Appellate Body Report, Turkey – Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing 
Products , WT/DS34/AB/R , adopted 19 November 1999, DSR 1999:VI, p.  2345 
US – 1916 Act (Japan)  Panel Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, Complaint by Japan , 
WT/DS162/R  and Add.1, adopted 26 September 2000, upheld by Appellate 
Body Report WT/DS136/AB/R, WT/DS162/AB/R, DSR 2000:X, p.  4831 
US – Animals  Panel Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Importation of Animals, 
Meat and Other Animal Products from Argentina , WT/DS447/R  and Add.1, 
adopted 31 August 2015  
US – Anti-Dumping and 
Countervailing Duties 
(China)  Panel Report, United States – Definitive Anti -Dumping and Countervailing 
Duties on Certain Products from China , WT/DS379/R , adopted 25 March 2011, 
as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS379/AB/R, DSR 2011:VI, p.  3143 
US – Carbon Steel  Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervailing Duties on Certain 
Corrosion -Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Ge rmany , WT/DS213/AB/R  
and Corr.1, adopted 19 December 2002, DSR 2002:IX,  p. 3779 
US – Clove Cigarettes  Panel Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of 
Clove Cigarettes , WT/DS406/R , adopted 24 April 2012, as modified by Appellate 
Body Report WT/DS406/AB/R, DSR 2012: XI, p.  5865 
US – Continued Suspension  Appellate Body Report, United States – Continued Suspension of Obliga tions in 
the EC – Hormones Dispute , WT/DS320/AB/R , adopted 14 November 2 008, 
DSR 2008:X, p.  3507 
US – Continued Suspension  Panel Report, United States – Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC – 
Hormones Dispute , WT/DS320/R  and Add.1 to Add.7, adopted 14 November 
2008, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS320/AB/R, DSR 2008:XI, 
p. 3891 
US – COOL  Panel Reports, United States – Certain Co untry of Origin Labelling (COOL) 
Requirements , WT/DS384/R  / WT/DS386/R , adopted 23 July 2012, as modified 
by Appellate Body Reports WT/DS384/AB/R /  WT/DS386/AB/R, DSR 2012:VI, 
p. 2745 
US – Corrosion -Resistant 
Steel Sunset Review  Appellate Body Report, United States – Sunset Review of Anti -Dumping Duties 
on Corrosion -Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Japan , 
WT/DS244/AB/R , adopted 9 January 2004, DSR 2004:I, p.  3 WT/DS475/R  
 
- 10 - 
 
  Short Title  Full Case Title and Citation  
US – Cotton Yarn  Appellate Body Report, United Sta tes – Transitional Safeguard Measure on 
Combed Cotton Yarn from Pakistan , WT/DS192/AB/R , adopted 5 November 
2001, DSR 2001:XII, p.  6027 
US – Countervailing and 
Anti-Dumping Measures 
(China)  Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervailing and Anti -Dumping 
Measures on Certain Products from China , WT/DS449/AB/R  and Corr.1, adopted 
22 July 2014  
US – Gambling  Appellate Body Report, United Stat es – Measures Affecting the Cross -Border 
Supply of Gambling and Betting Services , WT/DS285/AB/R , adopted 20 April 
2005, DSR 2005:XII, p.  5663 (and Corr.1, DSR 2006:XII, p.  5475)  
US – Gasoline  Appellate Body Report, United States – Standards for Reformulated and 
Conventional Gasoline , WT/DS2/AB/R , adopted 20 May 1996, DSR 1996:I, p.  3 
US – Hot-Rolled Steel  Appellate Body Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot -
Rolled Steel Products from Japan , WT/D S184/AB/R , adopted 23 August 2001, 
DSR 2001:X, p.  4697 
US – Poultry (China)  Panel Report, United States – Certain Measures Affecting Imports of Poultry 
from China , WT/DS392/R , adopted 25 October 2010, DSR 2010:V, p.  1909 
US – Shrimp  Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp 
and Shrimp Products , WT/DS58/AB/R , adopted 6 November 1998, DSR 
1998:VII, p.  2755 
US – Shrimp II (Viet Nam)  Panel Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Shrimp from 
Viet Nam , WT/DS429/R  and Add.1, adopted 22 April 2015, upheld by Appellate 
Body Report WT/DS429/AB/R  
US – Upland Cotton  Appellate Body Report, United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton , 
WT/DS267/AB/R , adopted 21 March 2005, DSR 2005:I, p.  3 
US – Wool Shirts and 
Blouses  Appellate Body Report, United States – Measure Affecting Imports of Woven 
Wool Shirts and Blouses from India , WT/DS33/AB/R , adopted 23 May 1997, and 
Corr.1, DSR 1997:I, p.  323 
US – Zeroing (EC)  Appellate Body Report, United States – Laws, Regulations and Methodology for 
Calculating Dumping Margins ("Zeroing") , WT/DS294/AB/R , adopted 9 May 
2006, and Corr.1, DSR 2006:II, p.  417 WT/DS475/R  
 
- 11 - 
 
  TABLE OF EXHIBITS CITED  IN THIS REPORT* 
No. Full Title  Short Title (for frequently cited exhibits, 
where appli cable)  
EU-1 OIE Terrestrial Code, 23rd edition, introductory note.  Terrestrial Code  
EU-2 User's Guide, OIE Terrestrial  Code Terrestrial Code User Guide  
EU-3 Chapter 15.1., African Swine Fever, OIE Terrestrial 
Code  
EU-5 Chapter 2.8.1., African Swine Fever, OIE Terrestrial 
Manual   
EU-6 G/SPS/N/RUS/46 (Ukraine)  G/SPS/N/RUS/46  
EU-7 G/SPS/N/RUS/48 (Lithuania)  G/SPS/N/RUS/48  
EU-8 G/SPS/N/RUS/48/Add.1 (Lithuania)  G/SPS/N/RUS/48/Add.1  
EU-9 G/SPS/N/R US/49 (Poland)  G/SPS/N/RUS/49  
EU-10 G/SPS/N/RUS/48/Add.2 (Lithuania)  G/SPS/N/RUS/48/Add.2  
EU-11 G/SPS/N/RUS/49/Add.1 (Poland)  G/SPS/N/RUS/49/Add.1  
EU-12 G/SPS/N/RUS/64 (Latvia)  G/SPS/N/RUS/64  
EU-13 G/SPS/N/RUS/76 (Estonia)  G/SPS/N/RUS/76  
EU-14.a. a. (RU) Letter from Russia to the EU of 29 January 
2014, FS -SA-8/1277  Russia's letter to the European Union of 
29 January  2014, FS -SA-8/1277  
EU-14.b. b. (EN) translation   
EU-15.a. a. (RU) Letter from Russia to the EU of 14 February 
2014, НФ -12-26/1650  Russia's letter to the European Union of 
14 February  2014, FS - НФ-12-26/1650  
EU-15.b. b. (EN) translation   
EU-16.a. a. (RU) FSVPS announcement of 6 February 2014 
(http://fsvps.ru/fsv ps/news/8935.html)  Russian FSVPS announcement of 
6 February  2014 
EU-16.b. b. (EN) translation   
EU-17.a. a. (RU) List of returned consignments, Annex 2 to 
the Letter from Russia to the EU of 6 August 2014, 
FS-EN-7/14507 (irrelevant or confidential 
informa tion has been redacted)  List of returned consignments  
EU-17.b. b. (EN) translation   
EU-18.a. a. (RU) Instructions on Measures for the Prevention 
and Eradication of African Swine Fever, approved by 
the Chief Directorate of Veterinary Medicine at the 
USSR Ministry of Agriculture on 21 November 1980  Russian ASF prevention and eradication 
measures of 21 November 1980  
EU-18.b. b. (EN) translation   
EU-21 African Swine Fever from 2007 to 2014, compilation 
by the European Commission of maps from OIE   
EU-23 African Swine Fever spread in the Russian Federation 
and the risk for the region, FAO, December 2009   
EU-24 Scientific Opinion on African Swine Fever, EFSA Panel 
on Animal Health and Welfare (AHAW), EFSA Journal 
2010 8(3)1556  EFSA Scientific Opinion on A SF, EFSA Journal 
2010 8(3)1556  
EU-25 Scientific Report of EFSA, Evaluation of possible 
mitigation measures to prevent introduction and 
spread of African swine fever virus through wild 
boar, EFSA Journal 2014 12(3)3616  Scientific Report of EFSA on ASF, EFS A Journal 
2014 12(3)3616  
EU-26 Scientific Opinion on African Swine Fever, EFSA Panel 
on Animal Health and Welfare (AHAW), EFSA Journal 
2014 12(4):3628  EFSA Scientific Opinion on African Swine Fever, 
EFSA Journal 2014 12(4):3628  
                                               
* Exhibits cited in Appendices 1 and 2 below are not included in this table.  WT/DS475/R  
 
- 12 - 
 
  No. Full Title  Short Title (for frequently cited exhibits, 
where appli cable)  
EU-27 ASF diagnosis and m olecular characterization 
Lithuania, EURL -ASF, CISA -INIA, 1317, 28/10/2014   
EU-28 ASF diagnosis and molecular characterization Poland, 
EURL-ASF, CISA -INIA, 1145, 30/09/2014  ASF diagnosis and molecular characterization 
Poland, EURL -ASF, CISA -INIA, 1145, 
30/09/2014  
EU-29 ASF diagnosis and molecular characterization Latvia, 
EURL-ASF, CISA -INIA, 1232, 17/10/2014  ASF diagnosis and molecular characterization 
Latvia, EURL -ASF, CISA -INIA, 1232, 
17/10/2014  
EU-30 ASF diagnosis and molecular characterization 
Estoni a, EURL -ASF, CISA -INIA, 1375, 7/11/2014  ASF diagnosis and molecular characterization 
Estonia, EURL -ASF, CISA -INIA, 1375, 
7/11/2014  
EU-31 Council Directive 2002/60/EC of 27 June 2002 laying 
down specific provisions for the control of African 
swine fever an d amending Directive 92/119/EEC as 
regards Teschen disease and African swine fever, OJ 
L 192, p.27  Council Directive of 27 June 2002, 2002/60/EC  
EU-32 Commission Decision 2003/422/EC of 26 May 2003 
approving an African swine fever diagnostic manual, 
OJ L 143, p.35   
EU-33 Commission Implementing Decision 2014/43/EU of 
27 January 2014 concerning certain interim 
protective measures relating to African swine fever in 
Lithuania, OJ L 26, p.44   
EU-34 Commission Implementing Decision 2014/93/EU of 
14 February 2 014 concerning certain protective 
measures relating to African swine fever in Lithuania, 
OJ L 46, p.20   
EU-35 Commission Implementing Decision 2014/100/EU of 
18 February 2014 concerning certain interim 
protective measures relating to African swine fever i n 
Poland, OJ L 50, p.35   
EU-36 Commission Implementing Decision 2014/134/EU of 
12 March 2014 concerning certain protective 
measures relating to African swine fever in Poland, 
OJ L 74, p.63   
EU-37 Commission Implementing Decision 2014/178/EU of 
27 March 2 014 concerning animal health control 
measures relating to African swine fever in certain 
Member States, OJ L 95, p.47  Commission Implementing Decision of 
27 March  2014, 2014/178/EU  
EU-38 Commission Implementing Decision 2014/417/EU of 
27 June 2014 concern ing certain interim protective 
measures relating to African swine fever in Latvia, OJ 
L 192, p.66   
EU-39 Commission Implementing Decision 2014/448/EU of 
8 July 2014 amending Implementing Decision 
2014/178/EU as regards African swine fever in 
Latvia, OJ L 201, p.31  Commission Implementing Decision of 
8 July 2014, 2014/448/EU  
 
EU-40 Commission Implementing Decision 2014/502/EU of 
24 July 2014 concerning certain interim protective 
measures relating to African swine fever in Lithuania, 
OJ L 222, p.20  Commissi on Implementing Decision of 
24 July 2014, 2014/502/EU  
EU-41 Commission Implementing Decision 2014/513/EU of 
31 July 2014 amending the annex to Implementing 
Decision 2014/178/EU as regards the areas in 
Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia under restriction for 
African swine fever, OJ L 231, p.7   
EU-42 Commission Implementing Decision 2014/530/EU of 
13 August 2014 concerning certain interim protective 
measures relating to African swine fever in Latvia, OJ 
L 242, p.31   WT/DS475/R  
 
- 13 - 
 
  No. Full Title  Short Title (for frequently cited exhibits, 
where appli cable)  
EU-43 Commission Implementing Decision 2014/6 37/EU of 
28 August 2014 amending the Annex to 
Implementing Decision 2014/178/EU as regards the 
areas under restriction for African swine fever in 
certain Member States, OJ L 259, p.23   
EU-44 Commission Implementing Decision 2014/709/EU of 
9 October 2014 c oncerning animal health control 
measures relating to African swine fever in certain 
Member States and repealing Implementing Decision 
2014/178/EU, OJ L 295, p.63   
EU-50 Commission Implementing Decision 2014/442/EU of 
7 July 2014 approving the plans for th e eradication 
of African swine fever in feral pigs in certain areas of 
Lithuania and Poland, OJ L 200, p. 21   
EU-51 Guidelines to Further the Practical Implementation of 
Article 6 of the Agreement on the Application of 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures,  WTO 
Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, 
G/SPS/48  SPS Committee Guidelines on the 
Implementation of Article 6  
EU-52 Veterinary certificate for piglets for fattening, being 
exported from the EU into the Russian Federation, 
11/08/2006  Veterina ry certificate for piglets for fattening, 
11/08/2006  
EU-53 Veterinary certificate for pigs for breeding, exported 
from the EU into the Russian Federation, 11/08/2006  Veterinary certificate for pigs for breeding, 
11/08/2006  
EU-54 Veterinary certificate fo r pork meat and raw meat 
preparations, exported from the EU into the Russian 
Federation, 11/08/2006  Veterinary certificate for pork meat and raw 
meat preparations, 11/08/2006  
EU-55 Veterinary certificate for slaughter pigs, exported 
from the EU to the Rus sian Federation, 16/12/2009  Veterinary certificate for slaughter pigs, 
16/12/2009  
EU-56 Veterinary certificate for finished food products, 
containing raw material of animal origin, exported 
from the EU to the Russian Federation, 24/05/2011  Veterinary cert ificate for finished food products, 
containing raw material of animal origin, 
24/05/2011  
EU-57 Veterinary certificate for canned meat, salamis and 
other ready for consumption meat products, 
exported from the EU to the Russian Federation, 
24/05/2011  Veteri nary certificate for canned meat, salamis 
and other ready for consumption meat 
products, 24/05/2011  
EU-61 Memorandum between the European Community 
represented by DG Health and Consumer Protection 
and the Presidency and the Russian Federation 
represented by the Federal Service for Veterinary 
and Phytosanitary Surveillance concerning principles 
of zoning and compartmentalization in the veterinary 
field of 4 April 2006  European Union -Russia Memorandum of 
4 April 2006 concerning principles of zoning and 
compa rtmentalization in the veterinary field  
EU-62 Letter of 29 January 2014 from the EU to Russia and 
its Annex (pp. 1 -5), ARES(2014)209377, SANCO 
G7/RF/mh(2014)219959  European Union's letter to Russia of 
29 January  2014, ARES(2014)209377, SANCO 
G7/RF/mh(2014 )219959  
EU-63 Excel spreadsheet on Poland, Annex to the Letter of 
29 January 2014 (pp. 6 -8)  
EU-64 Letter of 31 January 2014 from the EU to Russia, 
ARES(2014)226547, SANCO 
G7/JP/mh(2014)241111, including (1) Annex to the 
Veterinary certificate for pork m eat and raw meat 
preparations, exported from the EU into the Russian 
Federation, (2) Annex to the Veterinary certificate 
for piglets for fattening, exported from the EU into 
the Russian Federation, (3) Annex to the Veterinary 
certificate for pigs for breed ing, exported from the 
EU into the Russian Federation and (4) Annex to the 
Veterinary certificate for slaughter pigs, exported 
from the EU into the Russian Federation  European Union's letter to Russia of 
31 January  2014, ARES(2014)226547, SANCO 
G7/JP/mh(20 14)241111  WT/DS475/R  
 
- 14 - 
 
  No. Full Title  Short Title (for frequently cited exhibits, 
where appli cable)  
EU-65 Letter of 7 February 2014 from the EU to Russia, and 
its Annexes I -IV, ARES(2014)304571, 
SANCO/G7/DP/tb(2014)328578  European Union's letter to Russia of 
7 February  2014, ARES(2014)304571, 
SANCO/G7/DP/tb(2014)328578  
EU-66 African swine fev er in Lithuania, presentation by the 
State Food and Veterinary Service of Lithuania, 6 –7 
February 2014   
EU-67 Protective measures introduced in Poland against the 
African swine fever threat, General Veterinary 
Inspectorate of Poland, 6 –7 February 2014   
EU-68 Protective measures against African swine fever in 
Latvia, 6 February 2014   
EU-69 Information on the implementation of protective 
measures against African swine fever in Estonia, 7 
February 2014   
EU-70.a. a. (LT) Order concerning Order No B1 -31 of 2 0 
January 2014 of the Director of the State Food and 
Veterinary Service on Measures to Prevent the 
spread of African Swine Fever No B1 -48 of 24 
January 2014   
EU-70.b. b. (EN) translation   
EU-71.a. a. (LT) Order on Measures to Control African Swine 
Fever No B1 -49 of 24 January 2014   
EU-71.b. b. (EN) translation   
EU-72.a. a. (LT) Order on the Slaughter of Pigs as Part of the 
Measures to Prevent the Spread of African Swine 
Fever, 30 January 2014, No B1 -60  
EU-72.b. b. (EN) translation   
EU-74.a. a. (LT) C ontingency Plan for Classical Swine Fever 
(CSF) and African Swine Fever (ASF) of Lithuania, 30 
December 2011   
EU-74.b. b. (EN) translation   
EU-75.a. a. (PL) Polish Veterinary African Swine Fever 
Contingency Plan, January 2014   
EU-75.b. b. (EN) translati on  
EU-76.a. a. (LV) Plan for  Combating Very Dangerous 
Infectious Animal Diseases of the Republic of Latvia, 
28 February 2013   
EU-76.b. b. (EN) translation   
EU-77.a. a. (EE) Code of Conduct for Control of African Swine 
Fever of Estonia, 11 April 2013   
EU-77.b. b. (EN) translation   
EU-79 Final Report of an Audit carried out in Lithuania from 
27 February to 2 March 2012 in order to Evaluate the 
Actions Taken during Recent Outbreaks of Classical 
Swine Fever and to Assess Contingency Planning of 
Epizootic  Disease, SANCO 2012 -6386;   
EU-80 Final Report of an Audit carried out in Latvia from 4 
to 8 March 2013 in order to Evaluate the 
Implementation of Contingency Plans in relation to 
Animal Health, including provisions on the Protection 
of Animals during Dep opulation for Disease Control, 
SANCO 2013 -6777  
EU-81 Final Report of a Specific Audit carried out in Latvia 
from 15 to 19 June 2009 in order to Evaluate the 
Contingency Plans for Epizootic Diseases and the 
Eradication Programme for Rabies in the context of a 
General Audit, SANCO 2009 -8259  WT/DS475/R  
 
- 15 - 
 
  No. Full Title  Short Title (for frequently cited exhibits, 
where appli cable)  
EU-82 Final Report of an Audit carried out in Estonia from 
15 to 19 April 2013 in order to Evaluate the 
Implementation of Contingency Plans in relation to 
Animal Health, including provisions on the Protection 
of Animal s during Depopulation for Disease Control, 
SANCO 2013 - 6781  
EU-83 Final Report of a Specific Audit carried out in Poland 
from 7 to 16 April 2008 in order to Evaluate the 
Contingency Plans for Epizootic Diseases (in 
particular Foot and Mouth Disease and C lassical 
Swine Fever) and to Follow -up Surveillance Activities 
for Bluetongue, SANCO 2008 -7789  
EU-84.a. a. (RU) Letter of 5 February 2014 from Russia to the 
EU, FS -SD 8/1640  Russia's letter to the European Union of 
5 February  2014, FS -SD 8/1640  
EU-84.b. b. (EN) translation   
EU-85 Letter of 14 February 2014 from the EU to Russia, 
ARES(2014)398065, SANCO/G7/PD(2014)428299   
EU-86 Letter of 6 March 2014 from the EU to Russia, 
ARES(2014)601346, 
SANCO/G7/PD/mh/(2014)630598  European Union's letter to Russia o f 
6 March  2014, ARES(2014)601346, 
SANCO/G7/PD/mh/(2014)630598  
EU-87 Letter of 6 March 2014 from the EU to Russia, 
ARES(2014)605187, SANCO G7/PD/mh 
(2014)640752   
EU-88 Working Document on EU preventive measures for 
ASF, Annex to the Letter ARES(2014)60518 7 European Union Working Document on ASF, 
ARES(2014)605187  
EU-89 Protocol of the technical meeting -consultation 
between the EU and the FGBI ARRIAH, FGBI VGNKI 
experts as well as Rosselkhoznadzor representatives 
which was held at the FGBI  Federal Center f or 
Animal Health, Vladimir, 7 March 2014  Protocol of technical meeting between the 
European Union and Russia of 7 March 2014  
EU-90.a. a. (RU) Letter of 12 March 2014 from Russia to the 
EU, FS -SD-4/3620  Russia's letter to the European Union of 
12 March  2014, FS-SD-4/3620  
EU-90.b. b. (EN) translation   
EU-91 Letter of 13 March 2014 from the EU to Russia, 
including a table with the EU replies the topics 
mentioned in the letter FS -SD-4/3620 from Russia, 
ARES(2014)709435, 
SANCO/G7/PD/mh(2014)745829  European Un ion's letter to Russia of 
13 March  2014, ARES(2014)709435, 
SANCO/G7/PD/mh(2014)745829  
EU-92 Letter of 21 May 2014 from the EU to Russia, 
including its 6 Annexes answering specific questions, 
ARES(2014)1658269, SANCO/G6/AB(2014)1782253  European Union's let ter to Russia of 
21 May 2014, ARES(2014)1658269, 
SANCO/G6/AB(2014)1782253  
EU-93.a. a. (RU) Letter dated 16 May 2014 from Russia to the 
EU (received on 4 June 2014), FS -EN-8/7999  Russia's letter to the European Union of 
16 May 2014, FS -EN-8/7999  
EU-93.b. b. (EN) translation   
EU-94 Letter of 13 June 2014 from the EU to Russia, 
ARES(2014)1941949, 
SANCO/G7/PD/mh(2014)2038505  European Union's letter to Russia of 
13 June 2014, ARES(2014)1941949, 
SANCO/G7/PD/mh(2014)2038505  
EU-95 African swine fever in Lithuan ia, State Food and 
Veterinary Service, Lithuania, 21 August 2014   
EU-96 African swine fever in Poland, Update on 
epidemiological situation and implemented actions, 
Brussels, 3 -4 November 2014   
EU-97 African swine fever in Latvia, Standing Committee on 
Plants, Animals, Food and Feed meeting, Brussels, 3 -
4 November 2014   
EU-98 African swine fever in Estonia, Standing Committee 
on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed, Brussels, 3 -4 
November 2014   WT/DS475/R  
 
- 16 - 
 
  No. Full Title  Short Title (for frequently cited exhibits, 
where appli cable)  
EU-100 Letter of 27 January 2014 lifting the ASF related 
restricti ons with respect to the Mogilev Oblast, 
Belarus, FR -EN-8/1093   
EU-101 Eradication plan of African swine fever in feral pigs in 
certain areas of Lithuania (communicated to Russia 
on 24 March 2015)   
EU-102 Eradication plan of African swine fever in feral p igs in 
certain areas of Poland (communicated to Russia on 
24 March 2015)   
EU-103 Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/570 
of 7 April 2015 approving the plans for the 
eradication of African swine fever in feral pigs in 
certain areas of Estonia and La tvia, OJ L93, p.80   
EU-104 Eurostat, trade statistics on exports of meat of 
swine, fresh, chilled or frozen from Poland to US and 
Canada   
EU-107 Commission Implementing Decision 2014/236/EU of 
24 April 2014 concerning a Union financial 
contribution towar ds surveillance and other 
emergency measures implemented in Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania and Poland against African swine 
fever, OJ L125, p.86   
EU-108 Standing Group of Experts on African swine fever in 
the Baltic and Eastern Europe region under the GF -
TADs umbrella, First meeting (SGE1), Minsk, 
Belarus, December 1 - 2 2014   
EU-109 EU Veterinary Emergency Team, Vilnius, 8 – 10 
October 2014   
EU-114 State Food and Veterinary Service, Lithuania, 
Protective measures against ASF in Lithuania, 
Brussels, 07.10.2 013  
EU-115 Sistemas de Circulación Ecológica (SICIREC), 
definitions, corridors   
EU-116 Eradication plan for African swine fever in wild boar 
in Latvia   
EU-117 Plan for the eradication of African swine fever from 
feral pig population in Estonia   
EU-118 Detailed account of the outbreaks in domestic pigs 
and notification of cases in wild boar in the EU, as 
notified to the OIE  ASF cases in the European Union notified to the 
OIE  
EU-119 Chronological maps of cases and outbreaks   
EU-120 Map with the thre e clusters of outbreaks outside the 
areas considered infected   
EU-121 Non-exhaustive statistics of exports from non -
affected areas in Poland to other countries   
EU-125 Better Training For Safer Food, contingency planning   
EU-126 Audit of the Lithuanian contingency planning system   
EU-129 Letter of 4 November 2014, Ref. Ares(2014)3660850   
EU-130 Rosell, C., Navàs, F. & Romero, S., 2012. 
Reproduction of wild boar in a cropland and coastal 
wetland area: implications for management. Animal 
Biodiversity and  Conservation, 35.2: 209 –217  
EU-132 Communication of 24 January 2014: African swine 
fever (ASF) in two wild boars in Lithuania, in 
Salcininkai and Varena Regions, at the border with 
Belarus   
EU-133 Communication of 27 January 2014: African swine 
fever ( ASF) in Lithuania. Interim protective measures   WT/DS475/R  
 
- 17 - 
 
  No. Full Title  Short Title (for frequently cited exhibits, 
where appli cable)  
EU-134 Communication of 30 January 2014: African swine 
fever (ASF) in Lithuania. Interim protective measures 
(adoption of implementing decision)   
EU-135 Communication of 6 February 2014: African swine 
fever (ASF) in Lithuania. Commission Implementing 
Decision concerning certain protective measures 
relating to African swine fever in Lithuania 
(Committee approval of implementing decision)   
EU-136 Communication of 17 February 2014: African swine 
fever (ASF) co nfirmed in Poland in a wild boar found 
900 meters from the border with Belarus   
EU-137 Communication of 18 February 2014: African swine 
fever (ASF) in Lithuania (adoption of implementing 
decision)   
EU-138 Communication of 18 February 2014: African swine  
fever (ASF) in Poland – Information on infected area   
EU-139 Communication of 18 February 2014: African swine 
fever (ASF) in Poland. Interim protective measures   
EU-140 Communication of 18 February 2014: African swine 
fever (ASF) in Poland. Adoption of Interim protective 
measures   
EU-141 Communication of 20 February 2014: African swine 
fever (ASF) in Poland (adoption of implementing 
decision)   
EU-142 Communication of 26 February 2014: African swine 
fever (ASF) in Poland. Measures put in place in the 
infected area   
EU-143 Communication of 5 March 2014: African swine fever 
(ASF) in Lithuania and Poland – Presentations on the 
situation   
EU-144 Communication of 5 March 2014: African swine fever 
(ASF) in Poland (Committee approval of 
implementing decision)     
EU-145 Communication of 17 March 2014: African swine 
fever (ASF) in Poland (Publication of implementing 
decision)   
EU-146 Communication of 27 March 2014: Adoption of 
control measures relating to African swine fever in 
certain Member States   
EU-147 Communication of 26 June 2014: African swine fever 
(ASF) detection in Latvia   
EU-148 Communication of 27 June 2014: African swine fever 
(ASF) in Latvia – Adoption of interim protective 
measures   
EU-149 Commission Regulation (EU) No 142/2011 of 25 
Februar y 2011 implementing Regulation (EC) No 
1069/2009 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council laying down health rules as regards animal 
by-products and derived products not intended for 
human consumption and implementing Council 
Directive 97/78/EC as reg ards certain samples and 
items exempt from veterinary checks at the border 
under that Directive, OJ L 54, p.1   
EU-150 Regulation (EC) No 1069/2009 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 21  October 2009 
laying down health rules as regards animal  by-
products and derived products not intended for 
human consumption and repealing Regulation (EC) 
No  1774/2002 (Animal by -products Regulation), OJ 
L 300, p.1   WT/DS475/R  
 
- 18 - 
 
  No. Full Title  Short Title (for frequently cited exhibits, 
where appli cable)  
EU-151 Maps with respect to domestic pigs in the EU   
EU-152 Follow -up report No.6, Reference OIE: 15045, Report 
Date: 31/03/2014, Country: Poland   
EU-153 Follow -up report No.34, Reference OIE: 17579, 
Report Date: 22/04/2015, Country: Latvia   
EU-154 Follow -up report No.41, Reference OIE : 17590, 
Report Date: 24/04/2015, Country : Lithuania   
EU-155 Follow -up report No.43, Reference OIE : 17604, 
Report Date: 28/04/2015, Country: Estonia   
EU-156 Follow -up report No.48, Reference OIE : 17628, 
Report Date: 29/04/2015, Country: Poland   
EU-157 Veterinary certificate for the export of beef meat 
with bo nes from the EU to the Russian Federation in 
force in 2011   
EU-
158.a.  a. (RU) Russian instruction FS -EN-2/11554 of 5 
September 2011   
EU-
158.b.  b. (EN) translation   
EU-159 Certificate for the export of live poultry and hatching 
eggs from Canada to the Ru ssian Federation   
EU-
160.a.  a. (RU) Russian instruction FS -EN-8/6139 of 15 April 
2015  
EU-
160.b.  b. (EN) translation   
EU-
161.a.  a. (RU) Instructions of Rosselkhoznadzor Nº FS -SA-
7/1275, of 29 January 2014  Russia's instructions of 29 January 2014, FS -
SA-7/1275  
EU-
161.b.  b. (EN) translation   
EU-
162.a.  a. (RU) Letter of 5 February 2014 FS -EN-8/1642  Russia's letter to the European Union of 
5 February  2014, FS -EN-8/1642  
EU-
162.b.  b. (EN) translation   
EU-165 Press release, Russian Federal Service for Veter inary 
Supervision, 2 August 2012 
(http://www.fsvps.ru/fsvps/news/5049.html)   
EU-
167.a.  a. (RU) Letter of 18 February 2015 from Russia to 
the EU   
EU-
167.b.  b. (EN) translation   
EU-
168.a.  a. (RU) Letter of the Russian Federal Service for 
Veterinary and P hytosanitary Supervision No. FS -EN-
8/5081, of 2 April 2014  Russia's letter of instruction of 2 April 2014, FS -
EN-8/5081  
EU-
168.b.  b. (EN) translation   
EU-
169.a.  a. (RU) Letter of the Russian Federal Service for 
Veterinary and Phytosanitary Supervision No . FS-NF-
8/11315, of 27 June 2014  Russia's letter of instruction of 27 June 2014, 
FS-NF-8/11315  
EU-
169.b.  b. (EN) translation   
EU-
171.a.  a. (RU) Letter from the Russian Federation to the 
European Union FS -EN-7/14507, of 6 August 2014  Russia's letter to t he European Union of 
6 August  2014, FS -EN-7/14507  
EU-
171.b.  b. (EN) translation   
EU-172 Letter of 27 January 2014 from DG SANCO to the 
authorities of the Russian Federation, Ref. 
Ares(2014)188318   WT/DS475/R  
 
- 19 - 
 
  No. Full Title  Short Title (for frequently cited exhibits, 
where appli cable)  
EU-173 Letter of DG SANCO of 10 March 2014 (ref 
SANCO/G7 /PD/mh(2014)6591200)   
EU-175 Letter of DG SANCO of 20 February 2014 (ref. 
SANCO/G7/PD/mh (2014) 450287)   
EU-177 Letter of DG SANCO of 26 September 2014, Ares 
(2014) 3176148   
EU-186 Communication of 7 July 2014: African swine fever 
(ASF) in wild boar in Poland in the restricted area 
listed in Part II of the Annex to Decision 
2014/178/EU   
EU-187 Communication of 22 July 2014:  African Swine 
Fever in Latvia   
EU-203 ASF epidemiological situation in Estonia – update, 
Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Fo od and 
Feed, Brussels, 9 -10 September 2015   
EU-206 Communication of 1 July 2014: African Swine fever 
(ASF) in domestic pigs and in wild boar in Latvia 
Commission Implementing Decision 2014/417/EU of 
27 June 2014   
EU-207 Communication of 8 July 2014: Adop tion of 
Commission Implementing Decision amending 
Decision 2014/178/EU as regards African swine fever 
in Latvia   
EU-208 Communication of 8 July 2014: African swine fever 
(ASF) in wild boar in Poland in the restricted area 
listed in Part II of the Annex to  Decision 
2014/178/EU   
EU-209 Communication of 9 July 2014: Epidemiological 
update and map displaying regionalisation set out in 
Decision 2014/178/EU, as last amended, as regards 
African swine fever   
EU-210 Communication of 10 July 2014: Publication of 
Decision amending Commission Implementing 
Decision 2014/178/EU as regards African swine fever 
regionalisation   
EU-211 Communication of 11 July 2014: African swine fever 
(ASF) in wild boar in Poland in the restricted area 
listed in Part II of the Annex to D ecision 
2014/178/EU   
EU-212 Communication of 14 July 2014: African swine fever 
(ASF) in Latvia in the restricted area listed in Part II 
of the Annex to Decision 2014/178/EU   
EU-214 Annotated annex to the letter of 7 February 2014, 
with references to the EU exhibit numbers 
corresponding to each document   
EU-215 Pigs statistics in the EU   
EU-217 Summary of FVO webpages concerning audits in 
Finland, Portugal, the Netherlands and Estonia   
EU-218 Final report of an audit carried out in Finland, 3 -7 
Septemb er 2012   
EU-219 Competent Authority Comments received on 17 
January 2013 (Finland)   
EU-220 Action plan received 17 January 2013 (Finland)   
EU-221 Annex 2, Summary of legal requirements related to 
contingency planning for epizootic disease (Finland)   
EU-222 Final report of an audit carried out in Portugal, 24 - 
28 September 2012   
EU- a. (PR) Competent Authority Comments received on  WT/DS475/R  
 
- 20 - 
 
  No. Full Title  Short Title (for frequently cited exhibits, 
where appli cable)  
223.a 16 January 2013 (Portugal)  
EU-
223.b  b. (EN) Translation   
EU-224 Action plan received on 16 January 2013 (Portugal)   
EU-225 Annex 2 Summary of legal requirements to 
contingency planning for epizootic disease (Portugal)   
EU-226 Final report of an audit carried out in the 
Netherlands, 28 January -6 February 2013   
EU-227 Annex 2: Summary of Legal Requirements for 
Conting ency Plans for Epizootic Disease Control (the 
Netherlands)   
EU-228 Competent Authority comments received on 16 April 
2013 (the Netherlands)   
EU-229 Response of the competent authorities of the 
Netherlands to the recommendations of draft report 
(DG SANCO 2013-6775), Action plan received on 16 
April 2013   
EU-230 Corrigendum to the English version of the report 
reference number: DG(SANCO)/  
2013-6775 - FVO audit in the Netherlands carried 
out from 28 January to 6 February  
2013  
EU-231 Final report of an aud it carried out in Estonia, 15 -19 
April 2013   
EU-
232.a a. (EE) Competent Authority comments - Received 
on 16 August 2013 (Estonia)   
EU-
232.b  b. (EN) Translation   
EU-
233a. a. (EE) Annex, Response of the Competent 
Authorities of Estonia to the recommendati ons of 
Report ref. DG(SANCO)/2013 -6781-MR of an audit 
carried out from 15 to 19 April 2013   
EU-
233.b  b. (EN) Translation   
EU-234 Annex, Response of the Competent Authorities of 
Lithuania to the recommendations of Report ref. 
DG(SANCO)/2012 -6386-MR of an audit carried out 
from 27 February to 02 March 2012, Updated Action 
plan received on 9 October 2012   
EU-235 Response of the Competent Authorities of Lithuania 
to the recommendations of Report ref. 
DG(SANCO)/2012 -6386-MR of an audit carried out 
from 27 Feb ruary to 02 March 2012 ,  Action plan 
received on 14 May 2012   
EU-236 Workshop, FVO Audits on Contingency Planning, 25 -
26 September 2013   
EU-237 Veterinary Control Programme on African swine fever 
Poland in 2014, 2013   
EU-238 Veterinary Control Programme  on African swine fever 
early detection in Lithuania and Belarus in 2014, 
2013  
EU-239 Veterinary Programme on African swine fever early 
detection in Latvia in 2014, 2013   
EU-240 Program of additional veterinary supervision 
measures in connection with th e outbreaks of African 
swine fever in Russia and Belorussia in 2014 in 
Estonia, approved for 2013   WT/DS475/R  
 
- 21 - 
 
  No. Full Title  Short Title (for frequently cited exhibits, 
where appli cable)  
EU-241 Liste des ateliers de découpe de viandes d'animaux 
de boucherie agréés CE / Meat of domestic ungulates 
cutting plant, France   
EU-242 Liste des abatt oirs d'ongulés domestiques agréés CE 
/ Meat of domestic ungulates slaughterhouse, France   
EU-243 Presentation about swine, Committee for the 
Common Organisation of the Agricultural Markets, 23 
January 2014   
EU-244 EU Pig Population, 2014   
EU-245 EU Pig Production, 2014   
EU-
248.a a. (LT) Lithuanian CA comments on Russia's 
inspection report, 2014   
EU-
248.b  b. (EN) Translation   
EU-
249.a a. (PL) Polish CA comments on Russia's inspection 
report, 2014   
EU-
249.b  b. (EN) Translation   
EU-250 Council Directiv e 2008/71/EC of 15 July 2008 on the 
identification and registration of pigs, OJ L 213, p. 31   
EU-253 Communication of 31 July 2014: African swine fever 
–  modification of regionalisation through 
amendment of the Annex to Commission 
Implementing Decision 2 014/178/EU   
EU-254 Communication of 4 August 2014:  African swine 
fever – modification of regionalisation through 
amendment of Annex of Commission Implementing 
Decision 2014/178/EU – published in Official Journal   
EU-255 Communication of 7 August 2014: U pdate on African 
swine fever situation in Latvia - ASF FAX 047/2014   
EU-256 Communication of 7 August 2014: New update on 
African swine fever situation in Latvia - ASF FAX 
048/2014   
EU-257 Communication of 12 August 2014: African Swine 
fever in wild boar  in Latvia - Adoption of urgent 
interim protective measures - ASF FAX 052/2014   
EU-258 Communication of 13 August 2014: African swine 
fever in wild boar in Latvia - Urgent interim 
protective measures adopted - ASF FAX 055/2014   
EU-259 Communication of 14  August 2014: African swine 
fever in wild boar in Latvia - Urgent interim 
protective measures published - ASF FAX 056/2014   
EU-260 Communication of 22 August 2014: Commission 
Implementing Decision amending Decision 
2014/178/EU as regards African swine fev er 
regionalisation - ASF FAX 058/2014   
EU-261 Communication of 28 August 2014: Correction on 
date of publication - African swine fever –  
modification of regionalisation through amendment 
of Annex to Commission Implementing Decision 
2014/178/EU - ASF FAX 060/2014   
EU-262 Communication of 1 September 2014: African swine 
fever (ASF) – Publication of revised regionalisation 
through amendment of Annex to Commission 
Implementing Decision 2014/178/EU - ASF FAX 
062/2014   
RUS-1 J.M. Sánchez -Vizcaíno et al., "An Update on the 
Epidemiology and Pathology of African Swine Fever 
", J. Comp. Path  Vol. 152 (2015), 9 -21  WT/DS475/R  
 
- 22 - 
 
  No. Full Title  Short Title (for frequently cited exhibits, 
where appli cable)  
RUS-3 FAO, "African swine fever in the Russian Federation: 
risk factors for Europe and beyond", EMPRES Watch  
Vol. 28 (May 2013)   
RUS-4 OIE General Dis ease Information Sheets: African 
Swine Fever   
RUS-5 B.V. Boev et al., "The wild boar.  Modelling and 
prognosis for cylvatic African swine fever"   
RUS-7 European Commission, "ASF: Biosecurity in the pig 
breeding sector", presentation by Mary Louise 
Penrit h (30 October 2014)   
RUS-8 The IUCN Red List of Threatened Species, "Sus 
Scrofa"   
RUS-13 Plan of the measures to prevent spreading and 
eradicate a virus of African swine fever (ASF) in the 
territory of the Russian Federation, approved by the 
Chairman of the Interdepartmental Commission, 
Ministry of Agriculture of the Russian Federation, 25 
September 2012   
RUS-
15.a a. (RU) Russian Federal Law on Veterinary Medicine, 
No. 4979 -I, 14 May 1993   
RUS-
15.b b. (EN) Translation   
RUS-
16.a a. (RU) Russian Federal  Decree on State Veterinary 
Supervision, No. 476, 5 June 2013  Russian Federal Decree on State Veterinary 
Supervision No. 476  
RUS-
16.b b. (EN) Translation   
RUS-
17.a a. (RU) Russian Federal Government Decree on State 
Program for Agricultural Development an d 
Regulation of Agricultural Commodities Markets for 
2013-2020 , No. 717, 14 July 2012.    
RUS-
17.b b. (EN) Translation   
RUS-
18.a a. (RU) Order by the Russian Federal Ministry of 
Agriculture on the Confirmation of the List of 
Contagious Animal Diseases T hat Require 
Containment Measures, No. 476, 19 December 2011   
RUS-
18.b b. (EN) Translation   
RUS-
19.a a. (RU) Order by the Russian Federal Ministry of 
Agriculture on the Confirmation of the Rules for 
Veterinary Transport Certificates and the Order of 
Issua nce of Veterinary Transport Certificates, No. 
281, 17 July 2014   
RUS-
19.b b. (EN) Translation   
RUS-
19.a 
(revised)  Order 281 of the Ministry of Agriculture of Russia, of 
July 17, 2014 "On approval of the Regulations for 
arrangement of work associated with  electronic 
drawing up of accompanying veterinary documents" 
(registered at the RF Ministry of Justice on July 18, 
2014, Reference 33161) (Exhibit RUS -19.a)   
RUS-
20.a a. (RU) Russian Federal Ministry of Natural 
Resources, Plan regarding the organizationa l and 
specific measures of monitoring, depopulation and 
reduction of migration activities of wild boar in the 
territory of the RF, including specially protected 
natural areas of regional and federal importance, 21 
November 2013 .  
RUS-
20.b b. (EN) Translat ion  WT/DS475/R  
 
- 23 - 
 
  No. Full Title  Short Title (for frequently cited exhibits, 
where appli cable)  
RUS-
21.a a. (RU) Russian Federal Government Decree on the 
Seizure of Animals and Animal Products in case of 
Eradication of Highly Dangerous Animal Disease 
Outbreaks, No. 310, 26 May 2006  Russian Federal Decree on the Seizure of 
Animals and Animal Pro ducts No. 310  
RUS-
21.b b. (EN) Translation   
RUS-
22.a a. (RU) Order by the Russian Federal Ministry of 
Agriculture on Approval of Guidelines to Determine 
Animal Health Status of Pig Holdings and 
Organizations Involved in Pig Slaughter, Pork 
Product Proces sing and Storage, No. 258, 23 July 
2010 Russian Federal Ministry of Agriculture Order 
No. 258  
RUS-
22.b b. (EN) Translation   
RUS-
25.a a. (RU) Decision by the Customs Union Commission 
on the Use of Veterinary -Sanitary Measures in the 
Customs Union, No. 317 , 18 June 2010   Customs Union Decision No. 317  
RUS-
25.b b. (EN) Translation   
RUS-27 OIE WAHIS Interface, Follow -up report No. 31 – 
Report reference: 1, Reference OIE: 17147, Report 
Date: 06/02/2015, Country: Lithuania   
RUS-
28.a a. (RU) Letter from the R ussian Veterinary Service to 
DG SANCO, FS -EN-8/1023, 25 January 2014  Russia's letter to the European Union of 
25 January  2014, FS -EN-8/1023  
RUS-
28.b b. (EN) Translation   
RUS-
29.a a. (RU) Letter from Russian Veterinary Service, FS -
NV-8/2972, 27 February 2 014 Letter from Russian Veterinary Service, FS -NV-
8/2972, 27 February 2014  
RUS-
29.b b. (EN) Translation   
RUS-
30.a a. (RU) Letter from DG SANCO to the Russian 
Veterinary Service, SANCO/G7/PD/mh(2014)542957, 
26 February 2014   
RUS-
30.b b. (EN) Translation   
RUS-31 Assignment Report, S.A. Dankvert , Head of Russian 
Veterinary Service, in the city of Madrid (Spain) from 
13 to 16 March 2014   
RUS-32 Glossary, OIE Terrestrial Code  Terrestrial Code Glossary  
RUS-33 OIE WAHIS Interface, Follow -up report No. 38 – 
Reference OIE: 17218, Report Date: 18/02/2015, 
Country: Poland   
RUS-34 OIE WAHIS Interface, Follow -up report No. 27 – 
Reference OIE: 17211, Report Date: 17/02/2015, 
Country: Latvia   
RUS-35 OIE WAHIS Interface, Follow -up report No. 33 – 
Reference OIE: 172 02, Report Date: 16/02/2015, 
Country: Estonia   
RUS-36 Commission Implementing Decision of 13 February 
2015 (EU) 2015/251, OJ L 41, 17.2.2015, pp. 46 -51  
RUS-
37.a a. (RU) Letter from the Russian Veterinary Service to 
DG SANCO, FS -NV-8/17431, 11 September 2014 Russia's letter to the European Union of 
11 September  2014, FS -NV-8/17431  
RUS-
37.b b. (EN) Translation   
RUS-
39.a a. (RU) Letter from the Russian Veterinary Service to 
DG SANCO, FS -EN-8/19574, 13 October 2014   
RUS-
39.b b. (EN) Translation   WT/DS475/R  
 
- 24 - 
 
  No. Full Title  Short Title (for frequently cited exhibits, 
where appli cable)  
RUS-41 Declaration of Lebedev   
RUS-42 Letter from the Russian Veterinary Service to 
Belarusian Veterinary Service, FS -EN-8/1089, 27 
January 2014   
RUS-43 Letter from the Russian Veterinary Service to 
Belarusian Veterinary Service, FS -EN-8/1093, 27 
January 2014   
RUS-
53.a a. (RU) Letter from the Russian Veterinary Service to 
DG SANCO, FS -EN-8/5095, 2 April 2014  Russia's letter to the European Union of 
2 April 2014, FS -EN-8/5095  
RUS-
53.b b. (EN) Translation   
RUS-
54.a a. (RU) Letter from the Russian Veterinary Ser vice to 
DG SANCO, FS -EN-8/5084, 2 April 2014  Russia's letter to the European Union of 
2 April 2014, FS -EN-8/5084  
RUS-
54.b b. (EN) Translation   
RUS-55 Letter from DG SANCO to the Russian Veterinary 
Service, SANCO/G&/PD/mh (2014) 1114118, 4 April 
2014  
RUS-
56.a a. (RU) Letter from DG SANCO to the Russian 
Veterinary Service, SANCO/G7/PD/mh (2014) 
1055360, 4 April 2014   
RUS.56.
b b. (EN) Translation   
RUS-69 European Commission, Final Report of an Audit 
Carried out in Lithuania from 14 to 16 April 2014 in 
order to evaluate the implementation of animal 
health controls in relation to African Swine Fever 
(2014 EU Veterinary Audit Report for Lithuania, 14 -
16 April 2014)   
RUS-
71.a a. (RU) Russian Veterinary Service, Report of Deputy 
Director, E.A. Nepoklonov on t he visit to the Republic 
of Lithuania (Vilnius) on 10 -12 February 2014   
RUS-
71.b b. (EN) Translation   
RUS-73 OIE WAHIS Interface, ASF Poland, Follow -up report 
No. 1 (24/02/2014)   
RUS-78 OIE presentation on "The OIE International 
standards on CSF and ASF  – recent developments", 
TAIEX Workshop on CSF and ASF, Vilnius, Lithuania, 
3-4 September 2013   
RUS-84 Chapter 3.1, Veterinary Services, OIE Terrestrial 
Code  
RUS-85 Rosselkhoznadzor News, "New Meat Product 
Smuggling Channel from the EU Detected by 
Rosse lkhoznadzor", 16 January 2014   
RUS-86 Pig Progress, "Russia: Measures needed to stop ‘pork 
fraud", 5 December 2014   
RUS-87 Rosselkhoznadzor News, "Working meeting between 
Head of Rosselkhoznadzor Sergey Dankvert and 
heads of national veterinary  Services  and Industrial 
Associations from Denmark, France, the Netherlands 
and Italy", 20 November 2014   
RUS-88 The Pig Site, "European Vets Support Swill Feeding 
Ban to Control African Swine Fever", 25 February 
2014  
RUS-89 European Commission, Working Document  
SANCO/G2/SB (14.01.2014), "Guidelines on 
surveillance and control of African swine fever in 
feral pigs and preventative measures for pig  WT/DS475/R  
 
- 25 - 
 
  No. Full Title  Short Title (for frequently cited exhibits, 
where appli cable)  
holdings", 14 January 2014  
RUS-99 Morelle et al., "Towards understanding wild boar Sus 
scrofa movement: a synthetic movement ecology 
approach", Mammal Review , (2014)   
RUS-104 OIE WAHIS Interface, Estonia follow -up report No. 
32 (9 February 2015)   
RUS-105 OIE WAHIS Interface, Lithuania follow -up report No. 
33 (20 February 2015)   
RUS-106 OIE WAHIS Interface, Latvia fol low-up report No. 26 
(10 February 2015)   
RUS-107 OIE WAHIS Interface, Poland follow -up report No. 2 
(6 March 2014)   
RUS-
108.a  a. (RU) Report by Voronezh Veterinary Service, No. 
1418, 22 July 2014   
RUS-
108.b  b. (EN) Translation   
RUS-
109.a  a. (RU) Decree  by the Governor of Voronezh region 
of the Russian Federation on the Imposition of ASF -
related Quarantine on the Territory of Anninsky 
municipal district of Voronezh region, No. 237 -y, 17 
July 2014   
RUS-
109.b  b. (EN) Translation   
RUS-
110.a  a. (RU) Report  by Voronezh Veterinary Service, No. 
1443, 25 July 2014   
RUS-
110.b  b. (EN) Translation   
RUS-
111.a  a. (RU) Order by the Governor of Voronezh Region 
on Compensation, No. 236, 17 July 2014   
RUS-
111.b  b. (EN) Translation   
RUS-
112.a  a. (RU) Rosselkhoznadzor  News, "To continue 
controlling of ASF, Voronezh Administration of 
Rosselkhoznadzor arrested a pork consignment from 
Ukraine" 23 January 2015   
RUS-
112.b  b. (EN) Translation   
RUS-113 G. A. Dzhailidi, R.A. Krivonos, A.A. Shevchenko, O. 
Yu. Chernykh, Measur es for prevention and 
eradication of African Swine Fever in Krasnodar 
Territory   
RUS-
114.a  a. (RU) Resolution  of the Head of Krasnodar 
Territory Administration (Governor), 16 August 2012   
RUS-
114.b  b. (EN) Translation   
RUS-115 Pig Progress, "Russian Ve t service: More African 
Swine Fever in Krasnodar region", 30 July 2012   
RUS-
116.a  a. (RU) Declaration of Dzhailidi, 24 February 2015   
RUS-
116.b  b. (EN) Translation   
RUS-
117.a  a. (RU) Letter from Anisimov to Vlasov report 
(Measures Belgorod), No. 06/1613 , 10 June 2014   
RUS-
117.b  b. (EN) Translation   
RUS-118 Pig Progress, "New ASF outbreak in Belgorod Oblast, 
Russia", 11 June 2014   WT/DS475/R  
 
- 26 - 
 
  No. Full Title  Short Title (for frequently cited exhibits, 
where appli cable)  
RUS-
119.a  a. (RU) Letter from Aleinik to Petrikov (Measures 
Belgorod), 6/17 -2502, 4 July 2014   
RUS-
119.b  b. (EN) Translati on  
RUS-
120.a  a. (RU) Resolution of Governor of Belgorod Oblast to 
Eliminate and Prevent Further Spread of African 
Swine Fever within the Infected Area, i.e. Grafskiy 
Les Stow of Agrotekhgarant "Alekseevsky" OOO 
Hunting Farm in Alekseevksy District of Bel gorod 
Oblast , 4 June 2014, No. 56.     
RUS-
120.b  b. (EN) Translation   
RUS-
121.a  a. (RU) Resolution of the Government of Belgorod 
Oblast on Implementing the "Preventing the 
Introduction and Spread of the African Swine Fever 
(ASF) virus in Belgorod Oblast f or 2014 -2016" long 
term target program, 5 May 2014, No. 173 -nn.  
RUS-
121.b  b. (EN) Translation   
RUS-
122.a  a. (RU) Letter from Anisimov to Vlasov (Measures in 
Belgorod), 27 August 2014   
RUS-
122.b  b. (EN) Translation   
RUS-127 Russian Veterinary Service, Guidelines for prevention 
of distribution of African swine fever among wild 
boars   
RUS-
130.a  a. (RU) Letter from the Russian Veterinary Service to 
DG SANCO, FS -SD-8/4168, 19 March 2014  Russia's letter to the European Union of 
19 March  2014, FS -SD-8/4168  
RUS-
130.b  b. (EN) Translation   
RUS-
131.a  a. (RU) Letter from the Russian Veterinary Service to 
DG SANCO, No. FS -AS-8/23743, 1 December 2014   
RUS-
131.b  b. (EN) Translation   
RUS-132 Letter from DG SANCO to the Russian Veterinary 
Service, SANCO/G7/PD/mh (2 014) 4703183, 23 
December 2014   
RUS-133 Letter from DG SANCO to the Russian Veterinary 
Service, Ref. Ares (2014)2495649, 28 July 2014   
RUS-
135.a  a. (RU) Letter from the Russian Veterinary Service to 
DG SANCO, FS -SD-4/3620, 12 March 2014  Russia's letter t o the European Union of 
12 March  2014, FS -SD-4/3620  
RUS-
135.b  b. (EN) Translation   
RUS-
137.a  a. (RU) Letter from the Russian Veterinary Service to 
DG SANCO, FS -SD-8/3196, 3 March 2014   
RUS-
137.b  b. (EN) Translation   
RUS-
138.a  a. (RU) Letter from the Ru ssian Veterinary Service to 
DG SANCO, FS -AS-8/6360, 18 April 2014   
RUS-
138.b  b. (EN) Translation   
RUS-
138.b 
(revised)  Letter from the Russian Veterinary Service to DG 
SANCO, FS -AS-8/6360, 18 April 2014   
RUS-140 Finnish veterinary authority (EVIRA) Resea rch Report 
on "Possible routes of entry into the country for 
African swine fever – Risk profile", published on 
September 2011   WT/DS475/R  
 
- 27 - 
 
  No. Full Title  Short Title (for frequently cited exhibits, 
where appli cable)  
RUS-144 OIE WAHIS Interface, Event summary Reports, 
African swine fever, Russia (2007 -2014)   OIE WAHIS Interface Reports, Russi a (2007 -
2014)  
RUS-145 OIE WAHIS Interface, ASF Poland, Immediate 
notification (17/02/2014)   
RUS-148 Declaration by Vladimir Maslow on the ASF Outbreak 
that occurred at One of the Enterprises of the 
AGOECO group in the Voronezh Region of the 
Russian Feder ation  
RUS-149 The Polish plan of measures in order to eradicate 
African Swine Fever in wild boar in infected area and 
buffer zone developed on the basis of Article 16 of 
the Council Directive 2002/60/EC. Ref. Areas (2015) 
1284836 – 24/03/2015   
RUS-151 Commission Implementing Decision of 1 April 2015 
(EU) 2015/558, OJ L 92, 8.4.2015   
RUS-152 Data from OIE WAHIS Interface – ASF Outbreaks 
and Cases per Month for Lithuania, Poland, Latvia 
and Estonia, January 2014 to March 2015   
RUS-153 Letter from Russian  Veterinary Service to the 
European Union Veterinary Service, FS -EN-8/4220, 
19 March 2015   
RUS-154 Letter of 24 March 2015 from the EU to Russia, Ref. 
Ares(2015)1284836   
RUS-156 ASF Eradication plan for African swine Fever in wild 
boars in the Southern p art of Lithuania, June 2014   
RUS-157 Letter from Russia to EU, EH -8/14006, 31 July 2014  Russia's letter to the European Union of 
31 July 2014, EH -8/14006  
RUS-159 Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the 
Russian Federation, WT/ACC/RUS/70 & 
WT/M IN(11)/2, circulated 17 November 2011, paras. 
893 and 1450   
RUS-160 Protocol of Accession of the Russian Federation, 
WT/MIN(11)/24 & WT/L/839  Russia's Accession Protocol  
RUS-164 Data from OIE WAHIS Interface – ASF Cases for 
Lithuania, Poland, Latvia and Estonia, January 2014 
to March 2015   
RUS-167 Letter from DG SANTE to FSVPS  
Ref. Ares(2015)1284836 – 24/03/2015; EU's replies 
to the questionnaire sent by FSVPS with the letter 
FS-AS-8/23743 dated 1  December  2014  
RUS-168 OIE WAHIS interface  OIE WAHIS int erface  
RUS-171 OIE Disease Information Sheet, African Swine Fever.   
RUS-172 C. Gallardo et al, "Experimental Infection of 
Domestic Pigs with African Swine Fever Virus 
Lithuania 2014 Genotype II Field Isolate, in 
Transboundary and Emerging Diseases (2015 )  
RUS-175 Mur L, Igolkin A, Varentsova A, Pershin A, Remyga 
S, Shevchenko I, Zhukov I, Sánchez -Vizcaíno JM. 
Detection of African Swine Fever Antibodies in 
Experimental and Field Samples from the Russian 
Federation: Implications for Control. Transbound 
Emerg. Dis. 2014 Nov 30. Doi: 10.1111/tbed.12304   
RUS-177 OIE-Listed diseases, infections and infestations in 
force in 2015   
RUS-
185.a  a. (RU) Letter from DG SANCO, 
G7/PD/(2014)312766 dated February 6, 2014   
RUS-
185.b  b. (EN) Translation   WT/DS475/R  
 
- 28 - 
 
  No. Full Title  Short Title (for frequently cited exhibits, 
where appli cable)  
RUS-186 OIE, A SF Technical  Disease Card   
RUS-191  Letter from the EU veterinary service to the Russian 
veterinary service, Ref. Ares (2014) 3176148 – 
26/09/2014,  26 September 2014   
RUS-194 Data from OIE WAHIS Interface and EUR -Lex, as at 
30 April 2015   
RUS-205 OIE p resentation on "The OIE International 
standards on CSF and ASF – recent developments", 
TAIEX Workshop on CSF and ASF, Vilnius, Lithuania, 
3-4 September 2013   
RUS-
209.a  a. (RU) Letter from Russian Veterinary Service, EC -
AC-8/3671, 13 March 2014   
RUS-
209.b  b. (EN) Translation   
RUS-217 Letter from DG SANCO to the Russian Veterinary 
Service, SANCO/G7/PD/mh(2014) 450287, 20 
February 2014   
RUS-218 Certificate chronology – negotiations between Russia 
and the EU with respect to amending the language in 
the vete rinary certificate(s)   
RUS-224 Letter from the EU Veterinary Service to the Russian 
Veterinary Service, 27 January 2014, SANCO 
G7/JP/mh(2014)197026   
RUS-231 Letter from the Russian Veterinary Service to the 
French Veterinary Service, 27  February  2014, ФС -
НВ-8/2964   
RUS-234 Rosselkhoznadzor news, "Negotiations between 
Sergey Dankvert, Head of Rosselkhoznadzor, and 
Alex Van Meeuwen, Ambassador of the Kingdom of 
Belgium," 4 March 2014   
RUS-240 Letter from the Russian Veterinary Service to the 
Polish Veterinary Service, 10 April 2014, FS -NV-
8/5827  Russia's letter to Poland of 10 April 2014, FS-
NV-8/5827  
RUS-250 Letter from the Russian Veterinary Service to the EU 
Veterinary Service, 30 June 2014, ФС -СД-8/11415   
RUS-251 Rosselkhoznadzor news, "Negot iations between 
Dankvert and DG SANCO," 6  July 2014  
RUS-263 Letter from Russian Veterinary Service to the 
European Union Veterinary Service, 29  July 2014, 
Ref C -EH-8/13771  Russia's letter to the European Union of 
29 July 2014, C -EH-8/13771  
RUS-268 Commi ssion Implementing Decision of 22  May 2015 
(EU) 2015/820, OJ L 129, 27.5.2015   
RUS-275 Data from OIE WAHIS Interface and EUR -Lex, as at 
5 June 2015   
RUS-277 D. Gavier -Widen et al., "African Swine Fever in Wild 
Boar in Europe: a notable challenge," Veteri nary 
Record, 23 February 2015   
RUS-291 Friedrich -Loeffler -Institut, "Qualitative 
Risikobewertung zur Einschleppung der Afrikanischen 
Schweinepest nach Deutschland aus Osteuropa," 2 
April 2014   
RUS-
291.b  b. (EN) Translation   
RUS-292 Society for Applied M icrobiology (SfAM), "Restrictions 
In Place As African Swine Fever Hits Lithuania," 31 
January 2014   
RUS-296 Data from OIE WAHIS Interface, as at 31 August   WT/DS475/R  
 
- 29 - 
 
  No. Full Title  Short Title (for frequently cited exhibits, 
where appli cable)  
RUS-296 
(revised)  Data from OIE WAHIS Interface, as at 31 August   
RUS-297 
(revised)  Overview of u pdated outbreaks, zone changes, and 
outbreaks out of zone, as of 31 August   
RUS-298 Commission Implementing Decision of 14  July 2015 
(EU) 2015/1169, OJ L 188, 16.7.2015, pp. 45 –54  
RUS-299 Commission Implementing Decision of 29  July 2015 
(EU) 2015/1318, OJ L 203, 31.7.2015, pp. 14 –24  
RUS-300 Commission Implementing Decision (EU) of 
7 August  2015 (EU) 2015/1372, OJ L 211, 8.8.2015, 
pp. 34 –44  
RUS-301 Commission Implementing Decision (EU) of  18 
August 2015 (EU) 2015/1405, OJ L 218, 19.9.2015, 
pp. 16 -26  
RUS-302 Commission Implementing Decision (EU) of 25 
August 2015 (EU) 2015/1432, OJ L 224, 27.08.2015, 
pp. 39 -49  
RUS-
307.a  a. (RU) Declaration by Georgy Djailidi, 
12 September  2015  
RUS-
307.b  Declaration by Georgy Djailidi, 12  September  2015  
RUS-
308.a a. (RU) Declaration by Tatyana Ausheva, 
12 September  2015  
RUS-
308.b  b. (EN) Translation   
RUS-309 Declaration by Konstantin Gruzdev, 
12 September  2015.   
RUS-319 Letter from the European Union Veterinary Service to 
the Russian Federation Veterinary Ser vice, Ref. Ares 
(2015)2518258. 16  January  2015.   
RUS-323 Letter from the Russian Veterinary Service to Heads 
of Veterinary authorities in the RF'entities, FS -EN-
8/1644, 5 February 2014   
RUS-324 Letter from the Russian Veterinary Service to Heads 
of Rosse lkhoznadzor’ Territorial administrations, FS -
AS-8/4443, 25  March  2014  
RUS-325 Letter from the Russian Veterinary Service to Chief 
Veterinary Inspector of the Republic of Belarus, FS -
EN-8/13779, 29 July 2014   
RUS-326 Fax, SANCO/G2/FR/is (2014) 2721683, 2 4 July 2014  
RUS-327 Fax, SANCO/G2/FB/is (2014) 2728623, 24  July 2014  
RUS-328 Fax, SANCO/G2/FB/is (2014) 2729207, 24  July 2014  
RUS-329 Letter from the Russian Veterinary Service, FS -NV-
8/5906, 10 April 2015   
RUS-330 Fax, SANCO/G2/MP/kh (2014) 2759647 , 
28 July 2014  
RUS-331 Letter from the Russian Veterinary Service to 
Director Bernard Van Goethem, FS -EN-8/2029, 12 
February 2014   
RUS-333 Table 41, Excerpts of list of goods subject to 
veterinary control. Working Party Report   
RUS-349 Commission Imple menting Decision "On measures to 
prevent the introduction into the Union of the African 
swine fever virus from certain third countries or 
parts of the territory of third countries in which the 
presence of that disease is confirmed and repealing 
Decision 20 11/78/EU (2013/426/EU)   WT/DS475/R  
 
- 30 - 
 
  No. Full Title  Short Title (for frequently cited exhibits, 
where appli cable)  
RUS-351 Letter from Rosselkhoznadzor to Russia 's regional 
offices, 2 March 2012, FS -EN-7/2793   
RUS-352 RF Government’s Decree 327 of June 30, 2004 
"Approval of the Regulation of the Federal Service for 
Veterinary and Phytosanitar y Surveillance 
(Rosselkhoznadzor)", par. 1, Rossiyskaya Gazeta // 
URL: http://www.rg.ru/2004/07/15/veterinar -
dok.html.  Russian Government Decree No. 327  
RUS-355 Letter from the Russian Veterinary Service to the 
Director of the State Food and Veterinary Se rvice of 
the republic of Lithuania, FS -NV-8/9668, 5 June 
2014  
RUS-359 Report on visit to Poland, Gruzdev, Pantuhov, 28 
February 2014   
RUS-379 Letter from the Russian Veterinary Service to the 
Director of Veterinary and International Affairs, 
European Co mmission, HB -8/25328, 19 December 
2014  
RUS-380 European Commission, ARES (2014) 2495649, 28 
July 2014   
RUS-386 Regulation on the Common Procedure of Veterinary 
Control at the Customs Border of the Customs Union 
and the Customs Territory of the Customs U nion, 
approved by the Decision of the Customs Union No. 
317, 18 June 2010  Veterinary Control in Customs Union Decision 
No. 317 
 WT/DS475/R  
 
- 31 - 
 
  ABBREVIATIONS USED I N THIS  REPORT  
Abbreviation  Description  
ASF African swine fever  
ASFV African swine fever virus  
CU Custom s Union  
DSB Dispute Settlement Body  
DSU Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes  
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations  
FSVPS  Russian Federal Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Supervision  
GATT 1994  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994  
OIE World Organization for Animal Health  
Vienna Convention  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Done at Vienna, 23 May 1969  
Russia's accession protocol  Protocol on the accession of the Russian Fe deration  
SPS Agreement  Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures  
Terrestrial Code  OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code  
WTO World Trade Organization  
 WT/DS475/R  
 
- 32 - 
 
  1  INTRODUCTION  
1.1  Complaint by the European Union  
1.1.  On 8 April 2014, the European Un ion requested consultations with the Russian Federation 
(Russia) pursuant to Articles 1 and 4 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement of Disputes (DSU), Article 11 of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanit ary Measures (SPS Agreement) and Article XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade 1994 (GATT 1994) with respect to the measures and claims set out below.1 
1.2.  Consultations were held on 30 April and 1 May 2014. Those consultations were unsuccessful 
in resolving this dispute.2  
1.2  Panel establishment and composition  
1.3.  On 27 June 2014, the European Union requested the establishment of a panel pursuant to 
Article  6 of the DSU with standard terms of reference as set out in Article 7.1 of the DSU.3 At its 
meeting on 22 July 2014, the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) established a panel pursuant to the 
request of the European Union in document WT/DS475/2, in accordance with Article 6 of the DSU .4 
1.4.  The Panel's terms of reference are the following:  
To examine, in the light of the relevant provisions of the covered agreements cited by 
the parties to the dispute, the matter referred to the DSB by the European Union in 
document WT/DS475/2 and to make such findings as will assist the DSB in making 
the recommendations or in  giving the rulings provided for in those agreements.5 
1.5.  On 13 October 2014, the European Union requested the Director -General to determine the 
composition of the panel pursuant to Article 8.7 of the DSU .  
1.6.  On 23 October 2014, the Director -General accordingly  composed the Panel as follows6: 
Chairperson:  Mr Mohammad Saeed  
 
Members:   Mr Juan Antonio Dorantes  
   Mr Ulrich Kihm  
 
1.7.  On 30 October 2014 , Mr Ulrich Kihm resigned from the Panel . Pursuant to a request from the 
European Union of 3 November 2014, the Directo r-General appointed Mr Steve Hathaway as Panel 
member on 6 November 2014.7 On 26 November 2014, Mr Steve Hathaway resigned from the 
Panel . Pursuant to a request from the European Union of 28 November 2014, the Director -General 
appointed Ms Delilah Cabb Aya la as Panel member on 4 December 2014. Accordingly, the 
composition of the Panel is as follows:8  
Chairperson:  Mr Mohammad Saeed  
Members:   Ms Delilah Cabb Ayala  
Mr Juan Antonio Dorantes  
 
1.8.  Australia, Brazil, China, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Norwa y, South Africa, 
Chinese  Taipei, and the United States reserved their rights to participate in the Panel proceedings 
as third parties.  
                                               
1 European Union's request for consultatio ns (WT/DS475/1).  
2 European Union's request for the establishment of a panel (WT/DS475/2).  
3 European Union's request for the establishment of a panel.  
4 See WT/DSB/M/348.  
5 Constitution of the Panel, para. 2. (WT/DS475/3)  
6 Constitution of the Panel, para . 4. 
7 Replacement of a Member of the Panel (WT/DS475/4).  
8 Replacement of a Member of the Panel (WT/DS475/5).  WT/DS475/R  
 
- 33 - 
 
  1.3  Panel proceedings  
1.3.1   General  
1.9.  On 8 December 2014, after consultation with the parties, the Panel adopted its Working 
Procedu res9 and timetable. Following the Panel's decision to consult with the World Organ ization  
for Animal Health (OIE) and individual scientific experts, and after consultation with the parties, 
the Panel adopted its revised timetable and additional Working Pro cedures for  the Panel's Expert 
Consultation on 2 June  2015.10 
1.10.  The Panel held a first substantive meeting with the parties on 20 and 23 April 2015. A 
session with the third parties took place on 21 April 2015. The Panel held a meeting with the 
experts and th e parties on 14 and 15 September 2015. The Panel held a second substantive 
meeting with the parties on 16 and 17 September 2015.  
1.11.  On 19 November 2015, the Panel issued the descriptive part of its Report to the parties. The 
Panel issued its Interim Report t o the parties on 11 February 2016. The Panel issued its Final 
Report to the parties on 7 April 2016 . 
1.3.2   Working procedures concerning Strictly Confidential Information (SCI)  
1.12.  At Russia's request and after consultation with both parties, the Panel adopted, on 
8 December 2014, additional working procedures concerning SCI.11  
1.3.3   Arrangements for language interpretation  
1.13.  On 16 April 2015, just before the first substantive meeting, Russia requested the Panel to 
authorize simultaneous English -to-Russian and Russian -to-English interpretation during the first 
substantive meeting. Following exchanges with the parties, and after listening to the parties' views 
in the course of the first substantive meeting, the Panel informed the parties, that for the purposes 
of the first sub stantive meeting with the parties  (i) interpreters could be present at the meeting, 
provided that Russia included their names in its delegation list and that the interpreters were 
provided and financed by Russia; (ii) the interpreters could use the interpr etation booths to 
provide only English -to-Russian simultaneous interpretation for the benefit of Russia's delegation; 
(iii) Russia's delegation must make statements and submissions to the Panel and other parties 
only in English; and (iv) for the purpose of  the proceedings, only statements and submissions 
made in English must form part of the record.  
1.14.   At the beginning of the third -party session, after listening to the third parties' views, the 
Panel authorized simultaneous English -to-Russian interpretation f or the third-party session with 
the same conditions as those for the first substantive meeting with the parties.  
1.15.  On 1 June 2015, well before the second substantive meeting with the parties, Russia 
renewed its request for simultaneous English -to-Russian an d Russian -to-English interpretation, in 
particular, in respect of the Panel's meeting with the experts. On 13 August 2015, following 
exchanges with the parties, and after consultation with the third parties12, the Panel informed the 
parties that it would authorize simultaneous English -to-Russian and simultaneous Russian -to-
English interpretation during the Panel's meeting with the experts, and simultaneous English -to-
Russian interpretation during the second substantive meeting with the parties (replicating t he 
arrangements at the first substantive meeting with the parties). The Panel also confirmed that the 
                                               
9 See the Panel's Working Procedures in Annex A -1. 
10 See the Panel's additional Working Procedures for Panel's Expert Consultation in Annex A -3. 
11 See the Panel's additional Working Procedures concerning Strictly Confidential Information in 
Annex  A-2. 
12 The Panel did not receive any request s for enhanced third-party rights from any third party. However, 
through a communication dated 19 June 2015, t he European Union invited the Panel to seek, due to the 
systemic interests involved, the third parties' views on Russia's request for interpretation during the second 
substantive meeting and the meeting with the experts. After consulting with the parties a nd pursuant to 
paragraph 12 of the Panel's Working Procedures, the Panel decided to ask the third parties to provide their 
views on the use of interpretation in any subsequent meeting of the Panel.  WT/DS475/R  
 
- 34 - 
 
  interpreters could use the interpretation booths, as available, in the rooms booked for the meeting 
with the experts and for the second substantive meetin g with the parties.  
1.16.  Furthermore, the Panel emphasized that the arrangements for interpretation were 
conditioned on the following: (i) the interpretation was conducted only by the interpreters included 
in Russia's delegation; (ii) the cost of the interpret ation was covered exclusively by Russia; 
(iii) only statements made in English would form part of the official record of the proceedings ; and 
(iv) the interpreters' statements, when interpreting what a member of Russia's delegation said in a 
language other  than English, would be considered the only statements forming part of the record.  
1.17.  The arrangements communicated to the parties by the Panel on 13 August 2015 were 
followed in the course of the meeting with the experts and of the second substantive meetin g. 
1.3.4   Consultation with experts and relevant international organizations  
1.3.4.1   Panel's decision to consult with experts  
1.18.  At the organizational meeting of the Panel with the parties held on 21 November 2014, the 
European Union indicated that at that point in time, it  did not see the need for the Panel to consult 
with experts. Russia suggested that the Panel's decision on whether to consult with experts should 
be made after the first substantive meeting. The Panel decided to postpone deciding on the matter 
until after the first substantive meeting.  
1.19.  On 28 April 2015, after  the first substantive meeting , the Panel asked the parties to identify 
issues that the parties considered would benefit from inputs from experts and international 
organizations, in the hypothetical eve nt the Panel were to consult experts and/or international 
organizations pursuant to Article 11.2 of the SPS Agreement. The Panel also asked for the parties' 
views on (i) the profiles of experts that would be most valuable for the Panel to consult in this 
dispute; (ii) whether the Panel should conduct written consultations, oral consultations, or both; 
(iii) whether the Panel should consult other relevant organizations – either international or 
regional; and (iv) a revised timetable and additional working pr ocedures.13  
1.20.  On 19 May 2015, the European Union and Russia expressed their views on these matters.  
1.21.  On 26 May 2015, the Panel informed the parties of its decision to consult the OIE as well as 
individual experts. The Panel also requested the parties to submi t the following : (i) the parties' 
agreed list of names of individual experts; (ii) a list of potential questions for the experts; and 
(iii) comments on the revised timetable and additional working procedures incorporating the 
expert consultation process. O n 1 June 2015, the parties submitted their comments on the revised 
timetable and additional working procedures.  
1.22.  On 2 June 2015, the Panel adopted the revised timetable and Additional Working Procedures 
for the Panel's consultation with experts.  
1.3.4.2   Expert sele ction  
1.23.   On 28 May 2015, the Panel requested the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations (FAO) and the OIE to provide names and contact details of possible individual experts who 
could assist the Panel in five areas related to African swine f ever: epidemiology, virology, wild boar 
behavioural ecology, monitoring and surveillance, and control and biosecurity. The Panel received 
lists of names from the OIE and FAO on 8 and 11 June 2015, respectively.  
1.24.  On 12 June 2015, in accordance with the time table, the parties submitted their suggested 
questions for the OIE and the individual experts. The parties did not submit any agreed list of 
names of individual experts. Russia, however, sent its own list of suggested names of experts. 
Except for one, the names submitted by Russia were already included in the lists of names 
submitted by the OIE and the FAO on 8 and 11 June 2015 , respectively .  
                                               
13 Panel question No. 1 following the first substantive mee ting. WT/DS475/R  
 
- 35 - 
 
  1.25.  On the same day, the Panel sent to the parties a communication noting the list of experts' 
names suggested by Russi a and requesting the European Union to comment on whether the Panel 
should contact the expert suggested by Russia but not included in the lists submitted by the FAO 
and the OIE.  
1.26.  On 15 June 2015, the European Union expressed its preference for the Panel to  contact only 
the persons on the list of potential experts who were suggested by the FAO and OIE.  On the same 
day, the Panel sent preliminary communications to the experts suggested by the FAO and OIE. On 
17 June 2015, Russia sent additional comments.  
1.27.  On 1 8 June 2015, the Panel informed the parties that it had contacted the experts 
suggested by the FAO and the OIE.  
1.28.  On 29 June 2015, the Panel sent to the parties a consolidated list of names of experts, 
along with the available relevant accompanying documenta tion.14 In addition, the Panel requested 
the parties to comment on whether the Panel should contact two additional experts whose names 
were suggested by one of the experts from the list submitted by the OIE and the expert suggested 
by Russia but not include d in the lists submitted by the FAO and the OIE. On 3 July 2015, the 
parties provided their comments. The European Union considered that the experts already 
contacted by the Panel provided sufficient basis for the next steps in the procedure. Russia 
consid ered that it was not appropriate to contact either of the experts suggested by the expert 
proposed by the OIE while supporting contacting the expert Russia had previously identified.  
1.29.  On 8 July 2015, following reception of the response from one of the exper ts recommended 
by the OIE, the Panel sent to the Parties an updated consolidated list of names of experts and 
requested the parties to comment on the list.  On 15 July 2015, the parties submitted their 
comments. The European Union welcomed the amount of exp ertise available in the experts 
contacted by the Panel and requested the Panel not to consider retaining one of the potential 
experts due to potential conflict of interests. Russia expressed its preference for the Panel to 
choose as its experts Professor P enrith, Dr Thomson, and Dr Thiermann.  
1.30.  On 21 July 2015, the Panel informed the parties that it had selected the following experts to 
assist the Panel: (i) Dr Gideon Brückner15; (ii) Professor Mary Louise Penrith16; (iii) Dr Alejandro 
Thiermann17; and (iv) Dr G avin Thomson.18 
1.3.4.3   Panel's questions to the OIE and to the individual experts  
1.31.  On 24 July 2015, the Panel sent written questions to the individual experts and to the OIE.  
On 13 August 2015, the Panel received written responses from Dr Thiermann. On 19 August 20 15, 
the Panel received written responses from Professor Penrith. On 21 August 2015, the Panel 
received written responses from Dr s Brückner and Thomson.  
1.32.  In light of the responses submitted by the experts, on 24 August 2015, the Panel requested 
the OIE to pr ovide an official electronic copy of the 23rd edition of the Terrestrial Code.19 The Panel 
                                               
14 This documentation included, where available for each candidate: (i) CV, (ii) list of publications, 
(iii) declaration of potential conflicts of interest, and (iv) response received from the expert to the Panel's 
communication requesting availabilit y and interest to serve as expert to the Panel.  
15 Dr Brückner is President of the OIE Scientific Commission for Animal Diseases and a former National 
Director of Veterinary Services of South Africa, former Head of the OIE Scientific and Technical Departmen t 
and former Deputy Director General of the OIE.  
16 Professor Penrith is a veterinary consultant and professor at the University of Pretoria in South Africa, 
former Assistant Director, Onderstepoort Veterinary Institute and Vice Chairperson of the Education  Committee 
of the South African Veterinary Association.  
17 Dr Thiermann is Senior International Organization Coordinator for the Animal and Plant Health 
Inspection Services of the US Department of Agriculture, based at the OIE, and former President of the 
OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Standards Commission.  
18 Dr Thomson is Co -director of TAD Scientific CC, a registered consulting company in South Africa, and 
formerly employed by the FAO as the principal Epidemiologist of the Pan -African Programme for the Cont rol of 
Epizootics, and former  Director of the Onderstepoort Veterinary Institute.  WT/DS475/R  
 
- 36 - 
 
  further requested the OIE to clarify whether any changes were made to Chapter 15.1 (African 
swine fever) of the 22nd edition of the Code that were reflected in the 23rd edition.  
1.33.  On 25 August 2015, the Panel received an electronic copy of the 23rd edition of the 
Terrestrial Code from the OIE. The OIE indicated that in its view, no material changes were made 
to Chapter 15.1 (African swine fever) from the 22nd to the 23rd editions of the Terrestrial Code. On 
26 August 2015, the OIE further opined that any perceptible changes in the text of Chapter 15.1 
as reflected in the 23rd edition of the Terrestrial Code were purely editorial. The Panel provided the 
parties with a cop y of the OIE correspondence.  
1.34.  On 24 August 2015, the Panel requested the experts to confirm whether and to what extent 
their responses to the Panel's questions would materially differ in light of the changes in 
Chapter  15.1 (African swine fever) from the 2 2nd to the 23rd editions of the Terrestrial Code. None 
of the individual experts indicated that the editorial changes would have any material impact on 
the responses they had submitted to the Panel's questions.  
1.35.  On 28 August 2015, the Panel received written  responses from the OIE to its questions.  
1.36.  On 7 September 2015, the parties submitted comments  on the responses provided by the 
OIE and the individual experts.  
1.37.  On 23 September 2015, the Panel sent additional questions to the OIE. On 
25 September  2015, the P anel received the OIE's written responses to the additional questions. 
The Panel requested the parties to comment on OIE's responses. The European Union directed the 
Panel to its response to Panel question No. 241; Russia did not submit any comments on the  OIE's 
responses.  
1.3.4.4   Panel's meeting with the experts and the parties  
1.38.  In preparation for the Panel's meeting with the experts and the parties, on 
7 September  2015, the parties submitted advance questions to the experts.  
1.39.  The Panel held a meeting with the expe rts and the parties on 14 and 15 September 2015.  
1.40.  On 1 October 2015, the Panel sent a transcript of the meeting to the individual experts and 
to the parties, with a request for them to verify that the transcript accurately reflected their 
interventions. Fol lowing receipt of comments on the transcript, and having made certain 
corrections requested by the experts and the parties, the Panel sent a final version of the 
transcript to the experts and the parties on 19 November 2015.20 
                                                                                                                                               
19 One of the experts brought to the attention of the Panel the fact that Exhibit EU -3, entitled  "Chapter 
15.1 of the 23rd edition of the Terrestrial Code", appears to corresp ond to the 22nd edition of the Terrestrial 
Code.  
20 Pursuant to paragraph 1.13 of the additional Working Procedures for Panel's Expert Consultation, this 
transcript will not be annexed to the Panel report.  On 8 October 2015, the Panel received Russia's comm ents to 
the transcript. Russia requested the Panel to change, among other things, a word in the intervention made by 
Ms. Ausheva, a member of Russia's delegation during the meeting with the experts consulted by the Panel. The 
Panel did not change that part icular word in the final version of the transcript sent to the parties and to the 
experts on 19 November 2015. On 3 December 2015, Russia, in its comments to the draft descriptive part, 
requested the Panel to introduce the change of that word. The Panel do es not accept this request. As we note 
in para. 1.16 above , the Panel would authorise simultaneous English -to-Russian and simultaneous Russian -to-
English interpretation during the Panel's meeting with the experts, on the unders tanding that the interpreters' 
statements, when interpreting what a member of Russia's delegation said in a language other than English, 
would be considered the only statements forming part of the record. After listening again to the recording of 
the meeti ng, it is clear that the word Russia requested to modify was clear in the recording of what was said by 
the interpreter addressing the Panel in English. In light of these considerations, the Panel will not modify the 
final transcript on record. Moreover we  note that in the context of the evidence on record, the change 
requested by Russia would not have materially affected our findings below.  WT/DS475/R  
 
- 37 - 
 
  2  FACTUAL ASPECTS  
2.1  The relevant d isease: African swine fever  
2.1.  African swine fever (ASF) is a highly contagious haemorrhagic disease of pigs, warthogs, 
European wild boar , and American wild pigs, equally susceptible to both genders and all age 
groups. The organism which causes ASF is the Af rican swine fever virus (ASFV), a DNA virus in the 
Asfarviridae  family; genus Asfivirus . Virulence of ASFV isolates vary greatly.21 Severe cases of ASF 
disease are characterized by high fever, loss of appetite, respiratory distress, diarrhoea, 
haemorrhages in the skin and internal organs, and death in 2 -10 days on average. Mortality rates 
may be as high as 100%.22  
2.2.  ASF is a disease covered by Chapter 15.1 of the Terrestrial Code and must be reported to the 
OIE.23 Chapter 15.1 of the Terrestrial Code distinguis hes between:  
a. domestic  pigs (including permanently captive and farmed free -range pigs) and wild pigs 
(including feral pigs and wild boars); and  
b. Sus scrofa  and African pig species (e.g. warthogs).24 
2.3.  ASF occurs through transmission cycles involving domestic p igs, wild boars, wild African 
swine, and soft ticks. African wild swine species, such as warthogs ( Phacochoerus aethiopicus ), 
bush pigs and giant forest hogs ( Hylochoerus meinertzhageni ) are usually inapparently infected 
and act as reservoir hosts of ASFV in Africa. However, domestic pigs ( Sus domestica ), European 
wild boar, American wild pigs, and Sus scrofa  are hosts that manifest the disease. Ticks of the 
genus Ornithodoros  are considered the natural arthropod host and there is some speculation that 
ASFV is a virus of arthropods, and that mammalian species, such as domestic swine, represent 
"accidental hosts".25  
2.4.  Direct transmission of ASFV can occur through contact between sick and healthy animals. As 
ASFV can remain infectious for 3 -6 months in uncooked pork products, indirect transmission can 
occur through feeding on garbage containing infected meat. Other indirect means of transmission 
include through biological vectors (soft ticks of the genus Ornithodoros ), and fomites, such as 
premises, vehicles, imp lements and clothes.26  
2.5.  The virus is found in blood, tissues, secretions and excretions of sick and dead animals, as 
well as soft ticks of the genus Ornithodoros . Animals that have recovered from either acute or 
chronic infections may become persistently in fected, acting as virus carriers, especially in African 
wild swine, and in domestic pigs in enzootic areas. The incubation period of ASFV in nature is 
usually 4 -19 days or 3 -4 days in acute form. For the purpose of the Terrestrial Code, the 
incubation peri od in Sus scrofa  is indicated as 15 days.27 
2.6.  According to the OIE, ASFV remains viable for long periods in blood, faeces and tissues, 
especially infected uncooked or undercooked pork products. ASFV also has the ability to multiply in 
vectors ( Ornithodoros sp .). The OIE's Technical Disease Card indicates that ASFV is highly 
resistant to low temperatures but can be heat -inactivated at 56°C for 70 minutes or 60°C for 20 
                                               
21 OIE General Disease Information Sheets: African Swine Fever (ASF Disease Information Sheet) 
(Exhibits RUS -4 and RUS -171). 
http://www.oie.int/fileadmin/Home/eng/Media_Center/docs/pdf/Disease_cards/ASF -EN.pdf  (last accessed 
23 October 2015).  
22 ASF Disease Information She et (Exhibits RUS -4 and RUS -171). 
23 OIE website, Listed diseases, infections and infestations in force in 2015  (Exhibit RUS -177). 
24 See Article 15.1.1 (first paragraph) of the 23rd edition of the Terrestrial Code.  OIE, Terrestrial Animal 
Health Code  23rd edn (2014), Vol.  II, p. 649. 
25 OIE Technical Disease Card: African Swine Fever (ASF Technical Disease Card) 
http://www.oie.int/fil eadmin/Home/eng/Animal_Health_in_the_World/docs/pdf/Disease_cards/AFRICAN_SWIN
E_FEVER.pdf  (last updated April 2013; last accessed 23 October 2015).  See OIE ASF Technical Disease Card 
(Exhibit RUS -186).  
26 ASF Technical Disease Card  (Exhibit RUS -186). 
27 ASF Technical Disease Card  (Exhibit RUS -186). See also Article 15.1.1 (General provisions) of the 
Terrestrial Code.  OIE, Terrestrial Animal Health Code  23rd edn (2014), Vol.  II, p. 649. WT/DS475/R  
 
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  minutes.28 The OIE's Technical Disease Card further indicates that ASFV is also inactivated at  a pH 
less than 3.9, or greater  than 11.5 in a serum -free medium; it is also susceptible to chemicals and 
disinfectants such as ether and chloroform.29 
2.7.  As indicated in the OIE's Technical Disease Card (last updated in April 2013), ASF is enzootic 
in most co untries of Sub -Saharan Africa including Madagascar. In Europe, it has been reported and 
successfully eradicated from the Iberian Peninsula but continues to be found in Sardinia. In the 
1970s, ASF was present in the Caribbean (Haiti and the Dominican Republ ic), and in one country 
in South America (Brazil), but was successfully eradicated. Most recently, it has appeared in the 
Caucasus (Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia) and Russia.30  The situation as of the time of this 
Panel proceeding will be further examin ed below.31 
2.2  The measures at issue  
2.8.  In these proceedings, the European Union challenges "certain Russian measures adopting, 
maintaining or applying an import ban or import restrictions, which prevent the importation of the 
products at issue from the EU into R ussia".32  
2.9.  In its panel request, the European Union enumerates the specific measures at issue as 
follows:  
A ban on imports from Lithuania as described in the administrative notice from the 
Russian Federal Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Supervision  of 
25 January  2014 (FS -EN-8/1023). This notice announced a temporary restriction on 
imports of "live pigs and its genetic material; pork products (which were not heat 
treated no less than 72ºC for at least 30 minutes); products from slaughter of wild 
boars; horn -hoofed and leather, intestinal materials; bristles; feed for pigs; hunting 
trophies, which were not subjected to full taxidermy treatment; previously used 
equipment for maintenance, transportation, slaughter and cutting of pigs" from 
Lithuania as o f 25 January 2014. This measure was notified to the WTO on 10 
February 2014 (G/SPS/N/RUS/48);  
A ban on imports from Poland as described in the administrative notice from the 
Russian Federal Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Supervision of 
27 Februar y 2014 (FS -NV-8/2972) announcing a temporary restriction on imports of 
"live pigs and its genetic material; pork products (which were not heat treated no less 
than 80ºC for at least 30 minutes); products from slaughter of wild boars; horn -
hoofed and leathe r, intestinal materials; bristles; feed for pigs; hunting trophies, 
which were not subjected to full taxidermy treatment; previously used equipment for 
maintenance, transportation, slaughter and cutting of pigs" from Poland as of 27 
February 2014. This mea sure was notified to the WTO on 4 March 2014 
(G/SPS/N/RUS/49);  
A ban on imports from Lithuania and Poland as described in the administrative notice 
of the Russian Federal Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Supervision of 
2 April 2014 (FS -EN-8/5081). This notice announced the extension of the import 
restrictions in force to processed products containing pork excluding ready -to-use feed 
for cats and dogs which underwent thermal treatment (temperature not lower than 
70ºC, duration of treatment not less t han 20 minutes), from Lithuania and Poland as 
of 7 April 2014. These measures were notified to the WTO on 4 April 2014 as updates 
to the original WTO notifications (G/SPS/N/RUS/48/Add.2 and 
G/SPS/N/RUS/49/Add.1);  
The refusal by Russia to accept imports of  the products at issue from the entire EU, 
amounting to an EU -wide ban. The EU identifies this specific measure at issue both as 
                                               
28 ASF Technical Disease Card  (Exhibit RUS -186). 
29 ASF Technical Disease C ard (Exhibit RUS -186). 
30 ASF Technical Disease Card  (Exhibit RUS -186). 
31 See paras. 2.22.  to 2.23 below. See also Appendix 1 and para. 7.208  below.  
32 European Union's panel request, p. 1.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  an action (an import ban or restriction) and, in the alternative, as an omission (failure 
to accept imports from the EU). The E U seeks review of this specific measure at issue 
as such and as applied, de jure  and de facto  (that is, based on all the relevant facts). 
The EU also seeks review of this specific measure at issue both insofar as it is written, 
and insofar as it is unwritt en. The EU notes the letter sent to the EU dated 
29 January  2014 (FS -SA-8/1277) from the Russian Federal Service for Veterinary and 
Phytosanitary Supervision referring to certain export certificates previously used for 
certain exports from the EU to Russia , and notably the phrase "healthy animals grown 
in farms and/or administrative territories officially free from contiguous animal 
diseases, including African Swine Fever during 3 years in the whole territory of the EU 
except Sardinia." In this respect, the  Russian authorities made the following 
statement: "veterinary doctors in the EU Member -States must stop certification of the 
abovementioned products. Otherwise these products accompanied with these 
veterinary certificates issued after 27.01.2014, cannot b e allowed into the territory of 
the Member States of the Customs Union and are subject to returns."33 
2.3  Products at issue  
2.10.  The products at issue comprise live pigs and their genetic material, pork and certain other 
pig products.34 
2.4  Relevant international standar ds, guidelines, and recommendations  
2.4.1   The OIE and its mandate  
2.11.  The OIE is an intergovernmental organization created through an international  agreement 
signed on 25 January  1924 as a response to the need to fight animal diseases at a global level. 
In May 2003,  the OIE  changed its name from Office International des Epizooties  to World 
Organ ization  for Animal Health, but kept its historical acronym.35 One of the OIE's stated 
objectives is "sanitary safety" for "international trade in animals and animal products".36 The OIE's 
activities in this field focus on the development of normative documents relating to rules that 
OIE members "can use to protect themselves from the introduction of diseases and pathogens, 
without setting up unjustified sanitary barriers".37  
2.12.  As of September  2015, the OIE  had 180 members38 whose national delegates constitute a 
World Assembly of Delegates.39 The European Union member States and Russia are OIE members, 
as are the third parties to this dispute.40 In addition to its headquarters in Paris,  the OIE  has 
regional and sub -regional offices on every continent.41 
                                               
33 European Union's panel request, pp. 1 -2. In its first written submission, the European Union also 
challenged the import restrictions that Russia imposed on Estonia and Latvia after the AS F outbreaks on their 
territories (European Union's first written submission, paras. 86 –87). The inclusion of this footnote in this 
section is without prejudice to the Panel's ruling on whether the measures concerning Estonia and Latvia fall 
within the Pane l's terms of reference.  
34 European Union's panel request, p. 1.  See also Table 1 below.  
35 OIE website, About us , http://www.oie.int/about -us/ (last accessed 21 September  2015).  
36 OIE website, Objectives , http://www.oie.int/index.php?id=53#c201  (last accessed 
21 September  2015).  
37 OIE website, Objectives , http://www.oie.int/index.php?id=53#c201  (last accessed 
21 September  2015).  
38 OIE website, The 180 OIE  Members , http://www.oie.int/about -us/our -members/member -countries/  
(last accessed 21 September 2015).  
39 OIE website, The World Assembly of Delegates , http://www.oie.int/about -us/wo/world -assembly/  
(last accessed 21 September 2015).  
40 OIE website http://www.oie.int/about -us/our -members/member -countries/  (last accessed 
21 September 2015). In its response to Panel question s Nos. 27 and 28, the OIE clarified that EU member 
States operate as individual countries within the OIE and have the s ame rights and obligations as all the other 
members of the OIE. The European Union per se , is neither a member nor an observer of the OIE.  
41 OIE website, OIE Regional Representations , http://www.oie.int/en/about -us/wo/regional -
representations/  (last accessed 21 September 2015).  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  2.4.2   The OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code  (Terrestrial Code)  
2.13.  The SPS  Agreement explicitly recognizes the standards, guidelines and recommendations 
developed under the auspices of the OIE as i nternational standards, guidelines and 
recommendations for animal health and zoonos is.42 The OIE has developed international standards 
relating to international trade in terrestrial animals (mammals, birds and bees) and their products. 
These standards are c urrently set out in the Terrestrial Code.43  
2.14.  The Terrestrial Code was first published in 1968 and is updated annually. The version 
relevant for the purposes of this dispute is the one that was in force on the date of the 
establishment of the Panel.44 The Pan el was established on 22 July 2014 and therefore the 
23rd edition of the Terrestrial Code, adopted at the 82nd OIE General Session in May 2014, is the 
relevant version for the purposes of this dispute.  
2.15.  The OIE has a voluntary procedure for the official re cognition of disease status, which is 
currently applied to six diseases. ASF is not one of these diseases.45  
2.4.2.1   Objectives and structure of the Terrestrial Code  
2.16.  The aim of the Terrestrial  Code is to set international "standards for the improvement of 
terrestr ial animal health and welfare and veterinary public health worldwide, including through 
standards for safe international trade in terrestrial animals (mammals, birds and bees) and their 
products".46 According to the Terrestrial Code, these standards consist  of health measures based 
on the latest available scientific evidence and "should be used" by the veterinary authorities of 
importing and exporting countries to, inter alia, prevent the transfer of agents pathogenic to 
terrestrial animals and/or humans via  international trade in terrestrial animals and terrestrial 
animal products, while avoiding unjustified sanitary barriers to trade.47 In sum, the 
Terrestrial  Code aspires to assure sanitary safety of international trade in terrestrial animals while 
avoiding  unjustified sanitary barriers to trade.48 
2.17.  The Terrestrial Code is divided into two volumes. Volume I, entitled "General provisions", 
contains horizontal standards that apply to a wide range of species, production sectors and 
diseases, organized into seven sections . For instance, this volume includes rules on animal disease 
diagnosis, surveillance and notification ( section  1), risk analysis ( section  2), quality of veterinary 
services ( section  3), disease prevention and control ( section  4), trade measures, im port/export 
procedures and veterinary certification ( section  5).  
2.18.  Volume II, entitled "Recommendations applicable to OIE listed diseases and other diseases 
of importance to international trade", in turn, contains standards, guidelines and recommendations 
applicable to specific diseases, including the recommendations regarding disease surveillance, risk 
assessment, and zoning and compartmentalization. In the case of ASF, Chapter 15.1 specifically 
outlines the factors to consider in the determination of the A SF status of a country, zone or 
compartment. In addition, it provides for factors to consider for the recovery of ASF -free status 
and recommendations for importation of specific products from ASF -free and ASF -infected 
countries, zones or compartments.  
                                               
42 Annex  A(3)(b) of the SPS  Agreement . The Terrestrial Code Glossary defines zoonosis as "any disease  
or infection  which is naturally transmissible from animals to humans". Terrestrial Code Glossary, p. x (Exhibit 
RUS-32). 
43 OIE website, Terrestrial Animal Health Code http://www.oie.int/international -standard -
setting/terrestria l-code/  (last accessed 21 September 2015).  
44 In this respect, we follow the approach of previous panels (Panel Report, US – Animals , para. 2.24; 
Panel Report, India – Agricultural Products , paras. 7.211 -7.213). Furthermore, we note that the parties agree 
that the relevant version of the Terrestrial Code is its 23rd edition (European Union's first written submission, 
para. 118; and Russia's first written submission, fn 119).  
45 OIE website, Official Diseases Status  http://www.oie.int/en/animal -health -in-the-world/official -
disease -status/  (last accessed 22 September  2015).  
46 OIE, Terrestrial Animal Health Code  23rd edn (2014), Vol.  I, p. v. 
47 OIE, Terrestrial Animal Heal th Code  23rd edn (2014), Vol.  I, p. v. 
48 OIE, Terrestrial Animal Health Code  23rd edn (2014), Vol.  I, p. v. WT/DS475/R  
 
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  2.19.  In the OIE  context, the term "sanitary measure" means "a measure, such as those 
described in various chapters of the Terrestrial Code, destined to protect animal or human health 
or life within the territory of the Member Country from risks arising from the en try, establishment 
and/or spread of a hazard".49 According to the Terrestrial Code, "risk" refers to the likelihood of 
the occurrence and the likely magnitude of the biological and economic consequences of an 
adverse event or effect to animal or human healt h.50 "Risk analysis" means the process composed 
of hazard identification, risk assessment, risk management , and risk communication, while "risk 
assessment" means the scientific evaluation of the likelihood and the biological and economic 
consequences of ent ry, establishment and spread of a hazard within the territory of an importing 
country.51  
2.4.3   Relevant standards, guidelines or recommendations invoked by the parties  
2.20.  According to the European Union, the relevant applicable standards for the respective 
measures  are mainly to be found in Chapter 15.1 (African swine fever) of the Terrestrial Code, 
which deals with trade in the products at issue, in conjunction with Chapter 4.3, which deals with 
regionalization.52 The European Union argues that Russia's measures are  contrary to 
Articles  15.1.5, 15.1.8, 15.1.10, 15.1.12, 15.1.13, 15.1.14, and 15.1.16 of the Terrestrial Code.53  
2.21.  According to Russia, the most pertinent provisions for ASF are set out in Terrestrial Code 
Articles 1.4.6, 1.6.1, Chapters 3.1 and 3.2, Chapter  4.3 (especially Articles 4.3.3.1, 4.3.3.5 and 
4.3.3.6), 5.3 (especially Articles 5.3.1 and 5.3.7), and 15.1.54 Initially, Russia also identified 
Chapter 4.4 as relevant.55   
2.5  The parties' domestic ASF situations  
2.5.1   The European Union  
2.22.  As of the beginning of 201 4, ASF was not present in the European Union, with the exception 
of the island of Sardinia.56 This situation changed with the outbreak in Lithuania on 
24 January  2014. In addition to Lithuania, ASF is currently present in Estonia, Latvia and Poland.57  
2.5.2   Russi a 
2.23.  ASF was introduced in Russia in November -December 2007, when five cases in wild boar 
were reported to the OIE.58 ASF is currently present in certain areas of the territory of Russia.59 
3  PARTIES' REQUESTS FO R FINDINGS AND RECOM MENDATIONS  
3.1.  The European Union r equests the Panel to find that Russia's measures at issue are 
inconsistent with Russia's obligations under Articles 2.2, 2.3, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, 
5.6, 5.7, 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, 7, 8, Annex B(1), (2), (5), (6), and Annex C(1)(a), (b), (c) of t he 
SPS Agreement.60 In its panel request, the European Union included claims under Articles I:1, 
III:4, and XI:1 of the GATT 1994.61 However, in response to Panel questioning at the first 
                                               
49 OIE, Terrestrial Animal Health Code  23rd edn (2014), Vol.  I, p. xviii. 
50 OIE, Terrestrial Animal Health Code  23rd edn (2014), Vol. I, p. xvii.  
51 OIE, Terrestrial Animal Health Code  23rd edn (2014), Vol.  I, p. xviii. 
52 European Union's first written submission, para. 122.  
53 European Union's first written submission, para. 139.  
54 Russia's second written submission, para. 21; response to Panel question  No. 101, para. 146 . 
55 Russia subsequently indicated that provisions relating to compartmentalization were not relevant in 
light of the European Union's clarification that it had not sought to establish compartments.  See, e.g. Russia's 
response to Panel q uestion No. 258 and Comments to Expert Responses to Panel question No. 31.  
56 European Union 's first written submission, para. 60 (referring to EFSA Scientific Opinion on A SF, EFSA 
Journal 2010 8(3)1556  (2010 EFSA Scientific Opinion)  (Exhibit EU -24), p. 9).  
57 Russia's first written submission, para. 42.  
58 European Union's first written submission, para. 47 (referring to African Swine Fever spread in the 
Russia n Federation  and the risk for the region, FAO, December 2009 ( Exhibit EU -23), p. 3).  
59 See Russia's first written submission, para. 23.  
60 European Union's first written submission, para. 358.  
61 European Union's panel request, p. 6.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  substantive meeting with the parties, the European Union confirmed tha t it was not pursuing the 
claims under the GATT 1994.62  
3.2.  The European Union further requests the Panel to recommend that the DSB request Russia to 
bring the contested measures into conformity with its obligations under the SPS Agreement.63  
3.3.  Russia requests t he Panel to find that the European Union has failed to sustain any of the 
claims raised in these proceedings, and that Russia's measures are not inconsistent with the 
obligations of Russia under the relevant WTO agreements .64 
4  ARGUMENTS OF THE PAR TIES  
4.1.  The ar guments of the parties are reflected in their executive summaries, provided to the 
Panel in accordance with paragraph 20 of the Working Procedures adopted by the Panel (see 
Annexes B -1, B-2, B-3 and B -4).65 
5  ARGUMENTS OF THE THIRD PARTIES  
5.1.  The arguments of Au stralia, Brazil, India, Japan, Norway, and the United States are reflected 
in their executive summaries, provided in accordance with paragraph 21 of the Working 
Procedures adopted by the Panel (see Annexes C -1, C-2, C-3, C-4, C-5, and C -6).66 China, the 
Republic of Korea, South Africa, and Chinese Taipei, did not submit written or oral arguments to 
the Panel.  
6  INTERIM REVIEW  
6.1  Introduction  
6.1.  On 11 February 2016, the Panel issued its Interim Report to the parties. On 
25 February  2016, the European Union and Russi a each submitted written requests for review of 
the Interim Report. Russia did not request an interim review meeting. However, the European 
Union requested a meeting with the Panel where Russia would have full opportunity to further 
comment on certain poin ts and documents served by the European Union, unless Russia and the 
Panel considered that unnecessary.  
6.2.  In light of the parties' comments to the Interim Report, on 4 March 2016 the Panel informed 
the parties that it had decided to have an interim review m eeting, which took place on 
10 March  2016. The Panel Chairman, Mr Mohammad Saeed, presided the meeting, whilst Ms 
Delilah Cabb Ayala and Mr Juan Antonio Dorantes participated by videoconference. The Panel 
decided that the meeting would deal only with issue s raised by the European Union with respect to 
paragraphs 7.991 and 7.993 of the Interim Report. On 10  March  2016, the parties also submitted 
comments on the other's request for review of other "precise aspects" of the Interim Report. On 
15 March 2016, the  parties submitted responses to questions from the Panel after the interim 
review meeting. On 21 March 2016, the parties submitted comments to the other's responses to 
questions from the Panel after the interim review meeting.  
                                               
62 European Union's response to Panel question No. 80, para. 155 ; and second written submission, para. 
194. 
63 European Union' s first written submission, para. 359 ; and second written submission, para. 194.  
64 Russia's first written submission, para. 447 ; and second written submission , para. 195.  
65 On 2 June 2015 the Panel received the parties' first executive summaries. Russia s ubmitted an 
executive summary of its first written submission, its opening statement and its closing statement, which in 
total exceeded the 15 page limit set forth in paragraph 20 of the Working Procedures. On 1 July 2015, after 
consulting with the parties , the Panel requested Russia to submit an integrated version of its first executive 
summary that did not exceed 15 pages. On 30 July 2015, Russia submitted its integrated first executive 
summary, which is attached hereto as Annex B -3. 
66 The Panel recalls t he importance of observing deadlines in the panel proceedings. In this respect, we 
note that Australia and India did not provide their executive summaries within the time -frame indicated in the 
timetable adopted by the Panel. Therefore, on 20 October 2015,  the Panel requested both third parties to 
clarify whether their written or oral statements should be considered as their executive summaries. On 
21 October 2015, India confirmed that its oral statement would serve as the executive summary of its 
arguments . On 30 October 2015, Australia provided its third-party executive summary.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  6.3.  In accordance with Article 15 .3 of the DSU, this section of the Report addresses the parties' 
requests for review of precise aspects of the Report made at the interim review stage. We discuss 
the parties' requests for substantive modifications below, generally in sequence according to  the 
paragraph or section to which the requests pertain. In addition to the requests discussed below, 
corrections were made for typographical and other non -substantive aspects of the Report, 
including those identified by the parties.  
6.4.  The numbering of some of the paragraphs and footnotes in the Final Report has changed 
from the numbering in the Interim Report. The discussion below refers to the numbering in the 
Interim Report and, where it differs, includes the corresponding numbering in the Final Report.  
6.2  The purpose and scope of the interim review  
6.5.  Before addressing the parties' individual requests for the review of our Interim Report, the 
Panel notes that a number of Russia's requests are addressed either at challenging the Panel's 
assessment of the evidence  on record or the Panel's assessment of the European Union's claims. 
The European Union has individually challenged, on various grounds, some of these comments 
made by Russia.  
6.6.  The Panel observes that Article 15.2 of the DSU, and paragraph 22 of the Panel's  Working 
Procedures, provide parties with an opportunity to request the Panel "to review precise aspects of 
the interim report". Previous panels have declined to expand the scope of interim review beyond 
that provided for in Article 15.2 and have according ly circumscribed their review to address only 
those comments related to "precise aspects" of the interim report.67 Previous panels have also 
noted that it is not appropriate to re -open (re -argue), at the interim review sta ge, arguments 
already put before a panel.68 
6.7.  Pursuant to our understanding of Article 15.2 of the DSU and consistent with the approach 
adopted by previous panels, we will review our Interim Report only in light of the comments made 
by the parties which relate to "precise aspects" of the Inter im Report. In addition, when we 
identify a particular request as amounting to a party relitigating arguments already put before us, 
we will reject such request.  
6.3  Introduction of new evidence on the record at the interim review stage  
6.8.  In the context of its c omments to paragraph 7.991 and 7.993, the European Union requests 
the Panel to accept ten new exhibits (EU -253 to EU -262). According to the European Union, these 
communications support its request for the Panel to review precise aspects of paragraph 7.991 and 
delete paragraph 7.993 to provide factual accuracy to the Panel Report. The European Union asked 
for a meeting with the Panel, in which Russia would have full opportunity to further comment (in 
addition to the written comments to the European Union's c omments to the Interim Report) on the 
points and documents served by the European Union, unless Russia and the Panel considered that 
unnecessary.  
6.9.  As indicated in paragraph 6.2 above, the Panel decided to have an interim review  meeting 
limited to discussing the issues raised by the European Union in pages 5  and 6 of its 
communication dated 25 February 2016, specifically pertaining to paragraphs 7.991 and 7.993 of 
the Interim Report.  
6.10.  The European Union's main reason to request t he Panel's acceptance of the new evidence is 
that the European Union could not have anticipated, and the Panel did not indicate at any moment 
during the proceedings, that the relevant date it would take into account with regard to Latvia 
would be a date su bsequent to that of the Panel's establishment. The European Union considers 
that the Panel should take into account relevant evidence not previously considered on due 
                                               
67 Panel Reports, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II , para. 5.2; Australia – Salmon , para. 7.3; Japan – 
Apples (Article 21.5 – US), para. 7.21; India – Quantitative Restrictions , para. 4.2; Canada – Continued 
Suspension , paras. 6.16 -6.17; US – Continued Suspension , paras. 6.17 -6.18; and India  - Agricultural 
Products , para. 6.5.  
68 Panel Reports, Japan – DRAMs (Korea) , para. 6.2; US – Poultry (China) , para. 6.32; and India – 
Agricultural Products , para. 6.5.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  process grounds. The European Union argues that accepting the new evidence would not go 
against the previous case law, because of the particular circumstances in this dispute, including 
Russia having had access to those exhibits before they were submitted to the Panel.69 Moreover, 
the European Union argues that its request amounts to requesting  the Panel to review a "precise 
aspect" of the Interim Report, falling within the realm of Article 15.2 of the DSU.70 
6.11.  Russia objects to the Panel accepting the new evidence submitted by the European Union. 
Russia's main reason for this objection is that the re is a well -established principle in WTO dispute 
settlement procedural jurisprudence according to which new evidence is not acceptable during the 
interim review stage.71 
6.12.  The Panel is cognizant of the limited scope of the interim review stage, as described in 
section 6.2 above. The Panel is also cognizant of the importance that due process has in the 
context of WTO dispute settlement proceedings.72 In this connection, we recall that the Appellate 
Body has indicated that due proces s is "intrinsically connected to notions of fairness, impartiality, 
and the rights of parties to be heard and to be afforded an adequate opportunity to pursue their 
claims, make out their defences, and establish facts in the context of the proceedings cond ucted in 
a balanced and orderly manner, according to the established rules."73  
6.13.  Previous panels and the Appellate Body have been faced with a similar question of whether 
a Panel may accept new evidence submitted by a party at the interim review stage.  
6.14.  In EC – Sardines , the Appellate Body explained that the interim review stage is not an 
appropriate time to introduce new evidence:  
We also reject the European Communities' contention relating to the letters it 
submitted at the interim review stage. The interim  review stage is not an appropriate 
time to introduce new evidence. We recall that Article 15 of the DSU governs the 
interim review. Article 15 permits parties, during that stage of the proceedings, to 
submit comments on the draft report issued by the pane l, and to make requests 'for 
the panel to review precise aspects of the interim report'.  At that time, the panel 
process is all but completed; it is only —in the words of Article 15 —'precise aspects' of 
the report that must be verified during the interim r eview. And this, in our view, 
cannot properly include an assessment of new and unanswered evidence. Therefore, 
we are of the view that the Panel acted properly in refusing to take into account the 
new evidence during the interim review, and did not thereby  act inconsistently with 
Article 11 of the DSU. 74 
6.15.  In EC – Selected Customs Matters , the Panel considered that "the terms of Article 15.2 
preclude us from taking into consideration evidence which is not reflected in the Interim Report", 
and therefore declin ed to consider certain new evidence submitted by the European 
Communities.75 On appeal, the Appellate Body found that the Panel did not err:  
With respect to Exhibits EC -167, EC -168, and EC -169 (which relate to the adoption of 
EC Regulation 2171/2005 and it s consequences), we are of the view that the Panel did 
                                               
69 European Union's opening statement at the interim review meeting of the Panel, paras. 3 -5. See also 
responses to Panel question No. 331.  
70 European Union's opening statement at the interim review meeting of the Panel, paras. 2 -3. See  also 
responses to Panel question No. 331  
71 Russia's opening statement at the interim review meeting of the Panel, para. 5 (referring to Appellate 
Body Reports, EC – Sardines , para. 301; EC – Selected Customs Matters , para. 6.6; and Panel Reports, EC – 
Seal Products , paras. 6.53 -6.55; EC – IT Products , paras. 6.47 -6.48; EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – US), 
paras. 6.5 -6.18; EC and certain member States – Large Civil Aircraft , para. 6.311; and EC – Approval and 
Marketing of Biotech Products , paras. 6.134 an d 6.162 -6.164). See also  responses to Panel question No. 331.  
72 See Appellate Body Reports, EC – Hormones, fn 138 to para. 152; India – Patents (US) , para. 95; 
Argentina – Textiles and Apparel , fn 68 to para. 79; EC – Computer Equipment , para. 70; US – FSC, para. 166; 
Australia – Salmon , paras. 272 and 278; US – Continued Suspension / Canada – Continued Suspension , para. 
433; and Thailand – Cigarettes (Philippines) , para. 147.  
73 Appellate Body Report, Thailand – Cigarettes (Philippines) , para. 147.  
74 Appell ate Body Report, EC – Sardines , para.  301. 
75 Panel Report, EC – Selected Customs Matters,  para. 6.6 . WT/DS475/R  
 
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  not err in declining to consider these pieces of evidence.76  As the Appellate Body 
stated in  EC – Sardines , "[t]he interim review stage is not an appropriate time to 
introduce new evidence."77  The Pan el's decision to decline to consider Exhibits EC -
167, EC -168, and EC -169 appears to us to be in line with the Appellate Body's 
statement in  EC – Sardines   that "only ... 'precise aspects' of the [interim] report ... 
must be verified during the interim rev iew ... [a]nd this ... cannot properly include an 
assessment of new and unanswered evidence."78  In any event, although Exhibits EC -
167, EC -168, and EC -169 might have arguably supported the view that uniform 
administration had been achieved by the time the Panel Report was issued, we fail to 
see how these exhibits showed uniform administration at the time of the 
establishment of the Panel.79 
6.16.  Mindful of this guidance, the Panel considers that the interim review phase cannot (and 
should not) be used to adduce " new and unanswered" evidence.80   
6.17.  In our view, contrary to what the European Union claims, the European Union had sufficient 
opportunity to submit the evidence related to Latvia during the previous stages of the proceeding. 
In fact, the European Union serve d exhibits which post -date the date of the Panel's establishment 
from early on in these proceedings. For example, Exhibits EU -40 to EU -44 and EU -95 to EU -98, 
which were submitted together with the European Union's first written submission,  are all dated 
after 22 July 2014.  
6.18.  In addition, the fact that the information served by the European Union to the Panel through 
exhibits EU -253 to EU -262 was publicly available as of the second part of 2014 does not mean that 
such information was brought to the Panel's at tention by the complainant. The European Union 
argues that the Panel did not ask for this evidence, however it is the complainant who bears the 
burden of making a prima facie  case.81 
6.19.  Lastly, we do not see cogent reasons in the present dispute that would jus tify that we 
depart from what previous panels have done in respect of rejecting new evidence submitted during 
the interim review stage.  
6.20.  Based on the foregoing, we find that the exhibits served by the European Union together 
with its comments to the Interim  Report (Exhibits EU -253 and EU -262) are not admissible and we 
shall not take them into account when examining the European Union's request for the Panel to 
review paragraphs 7.991 and 7.993 of the Interim Report.  
6.21.  We now turn to the individual comments ma de by the parties to the Interim Report.   
6.4  Whether the measures in respect of the imports from Latvia and Estonia fall within 
the Panel's terms of reference  
6.22.  Regarding Table 1 below paragraph 7.144, the European Union suggests adding "pork" and 
"raw pork pr oducts" under the description of the product coverage of the measures applied to the 
imports of the products at issue from Lithuania and from Poland. Russia did not comment on this 
request; however, Russia requests the Panel to add "pork" to the same table  in the description of 
the product coverage of the measures applied to the imports of the products at issue from both 
                                               
76 (footnote original)  See Panel Report, para.  6.6. 
77 (footnote original)  Appellate Body Report, EC – Sardines , para.  301. 
78 (footnote original)  Ibid. 
79 Appellate Body Report, EC – Selected Customs Matters,  para. 259. 
80 Appellate Body Report, EC – Sardines , para. 301; Appellate Body Report, EC – Customs Matters , 
para. 259. This approach was applied by the panels in EC – Biotech , EC – Bananas (Article 21.5 – US), and EC 
– IT Products . See Panel Reports, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products , paras. 6.162 –6.164, EC – 
Bananas (Article 21.5 – US), paras. 6.5 –6.18; and Panel Report, EC – IT Products , paras. 6.47 –6.48. In China 
– Auto Parts , the Panel als o applied this reasoning but noted that the evidence in question would have 
nevertheless left the Panel's view unchanged. See Panel Report, China – Auto Parts , para. 6.24 –6.37. It is also 
noted that the Panel in Dominican Republic –Safeguards permitted new  evidence after the interim report had 
been issued, though it changed only a date that was recorded in the factual section of the report. See Panel 
Report, Dominican Republic –Safeguards , para. 6.3.  
81 Appellate Body Report, Japan – Agricultural Products II , para. 122.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  Lithuania and Poland. In respect of this request from Russia, the European Union considers that it 
would be more accurate to refer to "raw  pork products". In light of the parties' comments and the 
evidence on record, the Panel has added "pork" and "raw pork products" to the description of the 
product coverage of the measures at issue applied to the imports from Lithuania and Poland in 
Table 1 below paragraph 7.144.  
6.5  Temporal framework for the Panel's assessment  
6.23.  Regarding paragraph 7.173, Russia requests the Panel to also reflect its argumentation in 
response to Panel question No. 311, where Russia requests the Panel to examine all evidence 
submitted by the parties. In connection with Russia's comment to paragraph 7.173, the 
European  Union observed that it would suggest modifying the phrase "as of" for "as at" when the 
Panel is making reference to a specific point in time, to avoid ambiguities w ith respect to the time -
frame referred to by the Panel. We find Russia's request acceptable and have included the 
requested changes to paragraph 7.173. We also find acceptable the European Union's request to 
replace "as of" with "as at" when the Panel is r eferring to a specific point in time. We have 
introduced this change in the following paragraphs 7.430, 7.435, 7.444, 7.449, 7.451, 7.673, 
7.935, 7.965, 7.974, 7.976, 7.977, 7.982, 7.985, 7.986, 7.995, 7.1001, 7.1003, 7.1004, 7.1015, 
7.1016, 7.1017, 7.1018 , 7.1030, 7.1151, 8.1.e.vii, and 8.1.e.viii.  
6.24.  In light of the parties' comments, especially to paragraphs 7.991 and 7.993, the Panel has 
decided to make editorial changes to paragraph 7.176 to provide a clearer explanation of the 
analytical time -frame used by the Panel. These changes are addressed so as to explain the Panel 
having examined the measures in respect of Lithuania, Poland and Latvia up to the date of the 
Panel's establishment (22 July 2014), and having reviewed the evidence up to 
11 September  2014, in order to further support its analysis up to 22 July 2014. In that sense, in 
our view, the European Union's comments with respect to the Panel's analytical time -frame in 
connection with paragraphs 7.991 and 7.993 provided in the course of the interim review meeting 
and in response to Panel questions following the interim review meeting misrepresent the Panel's 
analytical time -frame. As just noted, the Panel examined the measures applied to the imports of 
the products at issue from Lithuania, Poland, an d Latvia as existing up to 22  July 2014 and went 
up to 11 September 2014 in light of the measure on the imports from Estonia being within the 
Panel's terms of reference. In the Panel's view, this is acceptable based on the Panel's terms of 
reference and th e Appellate Body's guidance as to a panel's discretion to examine and weigh all 
the evidence on record that pre -dates and post -dates a panel's establishment.82 
6.6  Claims under Articles 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3 of the SPS Agreement (relating to the EU -
wide ban)  
6.25.  Regard ing paragraph 7.410, Russia requests the Panel to make a number of factual findings 
in respect of the efficacy and capacity of the veterinary services in each of the four affected 
EU member  States. The European Union considers that the Panel should reject Russia's request, 
and that should the Panel decide to include references to exhibits such as RUS -359, the 
European  Union considers that the Panel should also include references to exhibits such as EU -248 
and EU -249. In order to sufficiently reflect Russia' s arguments and views, the Panel has adjusted 
paragraph 7.410; however, the Panel has not modified its factual findings as reflected in this 
paragraph.  
6.26.  Regarding paragraph 7.432, Russia requests the Panel to add a sentence qualifying the 
evidentiary value of Exhibits EU -237, EU-238 and EU-239 to which the Panel refers in that 
paragraph. The European Union objects to Russia's request. In our view, Russia's comments in 
respect of the evidence referred to by the Panel in paragraph 7.432 are unnecessary. The Pa nel 
already observes the limited evidentiary value of those exhibits and the Panel clearly indicates 
what it considers that those exhibits illustrate in terms of the control measures of the EU member 
States referred to therein. Thus, we reject Russia's req uest. 
6.27.  Regarding paragraph 7.447, Russia requests the Panel to make factual findings in respect of 
the evidentiary value of the letter of 13 June 2014, the scope of the additional information 
contained in Poland's and Lithuania's ASF eradication plans, and the spread of ASF beyond the 
                                               
82 See section 7.3.6  below.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  originally established infection zones. The European Union rejects Russia's requests and refers to a 
number of documents that the European Union provided to Russia in this respect. In our view, 
Russia is attempting to reargue a nd challenge the manner in which the Panel assessed the 
evidence on record. Moreover, Russia's challenge to the evidentiary value of the letter of 13 June 
2014 is out of context, as the findings in paragraph 7.447 take into account the Panel's factual 
findings in the previous paragraphs. The Panel rejects Russia's request and considers it 
unnecessary to provide further references to the parties' submissions. Moreover, in our view, in 
paragraph 7.967, we have described the spread of ASF occurring beyond the originally established 
infected zones, thus making it unnecessary to also refer to that situation in this paragraph. As 
explained in paragraph 6.35 below, we have added references to the parties' submissions and to 
certain exhi bits on record in paragraph 7.967.  
6.7  Claims under Articles 2.2, 5.1, 5.2, and 5.7 of the SPS Agreement (relating to the 
EU-wide ban)  
6.28.  Regarding paragraph 7.730, the European Union suggests reformulating the reference that 
the Panel included to the European Un ion's description of the most probable vector for the spread 
of ASF to the European Union in 2014, by including a reference that this occurred via Belarus. The 
Panel finds this suggestion acceptable and has reflected it in paragraph 7.730. Moreover, the Pa nel 
considers it appropriate to complement the reference in footnote 1015 to paragraph 7.730 in order 
to better reflect the source of the European Union's views on this matter.  
6.8  Claims under Articles 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3 of the SPS Agreement (relating to the bans 
on the imports of the products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland)  
6.29.  In light of the parties' comments, especially to paragraphs 7.991 and 7.993, the Panel has 
decided to make editorial changes to paragraph 7.941 to provide a clearer e xplanation of the 
analytical approach followed by the Panel in respect of the bans on the imports of the products at 
issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland.  
6.30.  Regarding paragraph 7.945, Russia requests the Panel to include a number of factual 
findings relative to  the content and differences in the 2010, 2014 and 2015 EFSA scientific reports. 
The European Union did not provide any specific comment to this request. In our view, Russia's 
request seems off point in respect of the content of paragraph 7 .945, because that request  does 
not clarify the manner in which the 2010 EFSA report contains geographic information of the 
presence of ASF in the region and potential spread of the disease, as referred to in the respective 
paragraph. We therefore reject R ussia's request.  
6.31.  Regarding paragraph 7.948, Russia requests the Panel to include a number of factual 
findings pertaining to the alleged deficiencies of the information provided by the European Union in 
respect of the scientific basis for the limits of the new zones. The European Union reminds the 
Panel of the relevant communications and exhibits through which the European Union provided to 
Russia explanations as to how the zones were being established. We consider that the alleged 
deficiencies highlighted b y Russia, as well as the relevant communications from the European 
Union to Russia, are referred to in Appendix 1 to the Panel Report. Moreover, in our view, Russia's 
request to include certain factual findings is closer in nature to rearguing its claims, as it 
challenges the manner in which the Panel assessed the evidence on record. As we have explained 
in section 6.2 it is not acceptable for parties to reargue their case during the interim review stage. 
Based on the foregoing,  we reject Russia's requests in respect of paragraph 7.948.  
6.32.  Regarding paragraph 7.949, Russia requests the Panel to include certain factual findings 
related to the Panel's assessment of the European Union's ASF monitoring and surveillance 
measures. Russia  also requests the Panel to identify and explain the additional information on 
monitoring and investigations that was provided by the European Union through the letters of 
6 March, 13 March, and 13 June 2014. The European Union considers that this request should be 
dismissed because the Panel has made an objective assessment of the evidence before it and in 
doing so the Panel enjoys a certain margin of appreciation. In our view, Russia's request to include 
certain factual findings is closer in nature to rea rguing its claims, as it challenges the manner in 
which the Panel assessed the evidence on record. As we have explained in section 6.2 it is not 
acceptable for parties to reargue their case during the interim review stage. Base d on the 
foregoing, we reject Russia's requests in respect of paragraph 7.949. Moreover, we have added WT/DS475/R  
 
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  some references to Russia's arguments in paragraph 7.929 to further reflect some of the points 
that Russia requests the Panel to introduce as factual fin dings.  
6.33.  Regarding paragraph 7.951, Russia requests the Panel to add references to its 
argumentation reflecting the full extent of Russia's reservations about the ASF contingency plans. 
The European Union did not provide specific comments with respect to thi s request. The Panel 
considers that Russia's request is acceptable and has introduced the respective changes to 
paragraph 7.951.  
6.34.  Regarding paragraph 7.952, Russia requests the Panel to provide a more comprehensive 
summary of its arguments in respect of the  inadequacy of the European Union's ASF control 
measures. The European Union did not provide specific comments with respect to this request. The 
Panel considers that Russia's request is acceptable and has introduced the respective changes to 
paragraph 7.95 2. 
6.35.  In light of Russia's comments with respect to the need to include references indicating the 
expansions of the infected and buffer zones initially established in January 2014 by the European 
Union, we have added references to the relevant exhibits at the  end of the first sentence in 
paragraph 7.967, where we refer to the constantly shifting situation and expansion of the 
protection and surveillance zones.  Moreover, in paragraph 7.967 we have further explained that in 
the EU legislation (Council Directive 2002/60/EC)83 infected zones are called protection zones, and 
buffer zones are called surveillance zones. Throughout the report we refer to: infected zones, as 
those areas where there have been ASF outbreaks and have been identified by the EU legislation 
as protection zones; to buffer zones, as those areas referred to in the EU legislation as surveillance  
zones; and to ASF -free areas, as those areas where ASF has not been reported, excluding both 
infected and buffer zones.  
6.36.  Regarding paragraph 7.972, Russia r equests the Panel to include certain factual findings 
regarding the type of information contained in Lithuania's ASF eradication plan. The European 
Union did not provide specific comments with respect to this request. We consider that Russia's 
request to i nclude certain factual findings is closer in nature to rearguing its claims, as it 
challenges the manner in which the Panel assessed the evidence on record. As we have explained 
in section 6.2 it is not acceptable for parties t o reargue their case during the interim review stage. 
Based on the foregoing, we reject Russia's requests in respect of paragraph 7.972. Moreover, we 
have added some references to Russia's arguments in paragraph 7.9 67 to further reflect some of 
the points that Russia requests the Panel to introduce as factual findings.  
6.37.  Regarding paragraphs 7.975 and 7.976, Russia requests the Panel to include a number of 
factual findings with respect to the ASF outbreaks that occurred in Lithuania in 2014 as well as to 
the experts' responses regarding the consequences of outbreaks occurring outside infected zones. 
The European Union did not provide specific comments with respect to these requests. In light of 
Russia's requests we have adjusted the text of paragraphs 7.975 an d 7.976 and the references 
provided therein. We have also introduced additional text in paragraph 7.411, explaining the 
possible origin of discrepancies in the manner in which an OIE member reports the occurrence of 
notifiable diseases.  
6.38.  Regarding paragraph  7.980, Russia requests the Panel to include certain factual findings 
regarding the type of information contained in Poland's ASF eradication plan. The European Union 
did not provide specific comments with respect to this request. We consider that Russia's  request 
to include certain factual findings is closer in nature to rearguing its claims, as it challenges the 
manner in which the Panel assessed the evidence on record. As we have explained in section 6.2 it 
is not acceptable for parties to reargue their case during the interim review stage. Based on the 
foregoing, we reject Russia's requests in respect of paragraph 7.980. Moreover, we have added 
some references to Russia's arguments in paragraph 7.9 67 to further reflect some o f the points 
that Russia requests the Panel to introduce as factual findings.  
6.39.  Also regarding paragraph 7.984, Russia requests the Panel to introduce a factual finding 
that Poland's infected zone underwent three expansions between January 2014 and 
September  2014, each time reducing the ASF free -area. Russia refers to Exhibit RUS -297 (revised) 
                                               
83 See Art. 9  of Council Directive 2002/60/EC  (Exhibit EU -31). See also Appendix 2  below .  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  in support of this request. The European Union did not provide specific comments to this request. 
In our view, in paragraph 7.967, we have described the factual situati on which Russia requests to 
be included in paragraph 7.984, and thus we reject Russia's request. As indicated  in paragraph 
6.35 above, we have added references to certain exhibits on record in paragraph 7.967.  
6.40.  Regarding paragra phs 7.991 and 7.993, the European Union requests the Panel accepting 
ten new exhibits (Exhibits EU -253 to EU -262), based on which the European Union requests the 
Panel to provide factual accuracy in respect of the assertions made in those paragraphs. In 
particular, the European Union requests the Panel to indicate in paragraph 7.991 that the 
European Union promptly provided to Russia significant information on revised and updated control 
measures in Latvia, following the first outbreak in that EU member Sta te, until September 2014. 
Russia commented extensively with respect to this request in its statements at the interim review 
meeting and in its responses to the questions from the Panel after the interim review meeting. 
Russia's main contention is that new evidence cannot be presented at the interim review stage and 
that as such the European Union's request for review of paragraphs 7.991 and 7.993, based on the 
new evidence submitted as Exhibits EU -253 through  EU-262, should be rejected. Russia's supports 
its views on a number of previous panel and Appellate Body reports.84 
6.41.  In section 6.3 above, we have explained why, in our view, the ten new exhibits (exhibits 
EU-253 to EU -262) are inadmissible at this stage of the proceedings. Ba sed on this finding, we 
reject the European Union's request for review of paragraphs 7.991 and 7.993. However, we have 
adjusted the wording of paragraphs 7.991 and 7.993 to more accurately reflect the Panel's 
appraisal of the argumentation and evidence on record.  
6.42.  Also regarding paragraph 7.991, in connection with paragraph 7.1017, Russia requests the 
Panel to introduce a factual finding that Latvia's infected zone underwent four expansions between 
June 2014 and August 2014, each time reducing the ASF free -area. Russia refers to Exhibit 
RUS-297 (revised) in support of this request. The European Union makes reference to its 
comments to paragraph 7.991, as well as to the new exhibits indicating that Russia was 
immediately and consistently, informed about the A SF situation in Latvia. In our view, in 
paragraph 7.967, we have described the factual situation which Russia requests to be included in 
paragraphs 7.991 or 7.1017, and thus we reject Russia's request. As indicated  in paragraph 6.35 
above, we have added references to certain exhibits on record in paragraph 7.967.  
6.43.  Also regarding paragraph 7.993, Russia requests the Panel to introduce factual findings that 
there is some information in Latvia's ASF eradication plan that was not pre viously provided by the 
European Union to Russia SPS officials and that Latvia's ASF eradication plan highlights the risk of 
further spread of ASF through backyard farms. The European Union refers to its comments to 
paragraph 7.993 as well as to the new ex hibits  indicating  that Russia was immediately, and 
consistently, informed about the ASF situation in Latvia. The Panel has addressed Russia's views 
on the new information provided through Latvia's ASF eradication plan by means of a footnote to 
paragraph 7. 993. However, the Panel considers that Russia's requests to introduce these 
comments as new factual findings amount to rearguing Russia's claims rather than requesting the 
review of precise aspects of the Interim Report. Based on our explanation of the sco pe of the 
interim review stage in section 6.2 above, we reject Russia's requests with respect to paragraph 
7.993.  
6.44.  Regarding paragraph s 7.1015  and 7.1017 , Russia asks the Panel to provide more detail s of 
what is refer red to as the "most updated geographical information on the record". The European 
Union did not provide comments to this request. At the end of the sentence of paragraph 7.1015 
to which Russia refers, the Panel included a footnote that refers to Exhibits EU -119 and RUS-297 
(revised). It is to the information contained in those exhibits that the Panel refers to as the most 
updated geographical information on the record. The Panel has clarified this issue in the footnote 
which appears in paragraph 7.1015. This referenc e also appears, and has been adjusted, in 
paragraphs 7.1016, 7.1017 and 7.1018.  
6.45.  Regarding paragraph 7.1018, Russia requests the Panel to introduce a factual finding that 
Estonia's infected zone underwent six expansions, each time reducing the ASF free -area, and as of 
7 August 2015, all of mainland Estonia was considered and notified as ASF -infected. Russia refers 
                                               
84 See Russia's opening statement at the interim review meeting of the Panel, para. 5.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  to Exhibit RUS -297 (revised) in support of this request. Russia also requests the Panel to find that 
up until 7 August 2015, three outbreaks took place within ASF -free areas and 18 occurred in the 
buffer zones. The European Union did not provide specific comments to these requests. In our 
view, in paragraph 7.967, we have described the first factual situation which Russia requests to be 
included in paragraph 7.1018, and thus we reject Russia's request. As indicated  in paragraph 6.35 
above, we have added references to certain exhibits on record in paragraph 7.967. Regarding the 
second request, in our view, Russia's request  is closer in nature to rearguing its claims, as it 
challenges the manner in which the Panel assessed the evidence on record. As we have explained 
in section 6.2 it is not acceptable for parties to reargue their case during the  interim review stage. 
Based on the foregoing, we reject Russia's requests in respect of paragraph 7.1018.  
6.9  Whether Russia's measures are inconsistent with Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement  
6.46.  Regarding paragraph 7.1279, Russia requests the Panel to include Rus sia's argumentation 
that no arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination exists because measures that are structured or 
operate differently can reflect the same ALOP. The European Union did not provide specific 
comments with respect to this request. The Panel  considers that Russia's request is acceptable and 
has introduced the respective changes to paragraph 7.1279.  
6.47.  Regarding paragraph 7.1300, Russia requests the Panel to either refer explicitly to its 
decision to dismiss the European Union's discrimination cl aim with respect to Belarus, or to refer 
explicitly to the fact that the European Union has withdrawn such claim. The European Union 
considers that the Panel does not need to make changes to paragraph 7.1300, and notes that the 
Panel referred to the Europe an Union's arguments with respect to the discriminatory treatment, 
vis-à-vis Belarus, in paragraph 7.1398. We observe that paragraph 7.1300 portrays the parties' 
arguments in respect of the claims under the first sentence of Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreemen t, 
whilst the European Union's arguments in respect of Belarus are only pertinent pursuant to the 
second sentence of Article 2.3. As noted by the European Union, the Panel addresses the European 
Union's arguments with respect to Belarus later in the report . Based on the foregoing, the Panel 
rejects Russia's request.  
6.48.  Regarding paragraph 7.1353, Russia requests the Panel to include certain factual findings 
with respect to the effectiveness of ASF control measures applied in certain regions of Russia. The 
European Union did not provide comments in this respect. The Panel introduced additional 
references in paragraph 7.1353 to reflect the evidence referred to by Russia.  
6.49.  Regarding paragraph 7.1383, in connection with paragraph 8.1.f.i, Russia requests the 
Panel to make an explicit finding that the European Union failed to establish that Russia 
discriminated vis -à-vis the Ukraine. The European Union disagrees that the Panel needs to 
introduce any changes to paragraph 7.1383, because the Panel has made the necessar y findings 
to secure a positive solution to the dispute before it. In the Panel's view, Russia's request is closer 
in nature to rearguing its claims, as it challenges the manner in which the Panel exercised its 
discretion in assessing the European Union's claims. As we have explained in section 6.2 it is not 
acceptable for parties to reargue their case during the interim review stage. Based on the 
foregoing, we reject Russia's requests in respect of paragraphs 7.1383 and 8.1.f.i . 
6.10  Panel's conclusions and recommendations  
6.50.  Regarding paragraphs 8.1.d.viii, 8.1.e.xii and 8.6, Russia brings to the Panel's attention that 
the Panel should amend the language in these paragraphs to reflect the Panel's findings in 
paragraphs 7.783 and 7.1208 . In our view, paragraphs 8.1.d.vii, 8.1.e.xii and 8.6 correctly reflect 
the Panel's findings in paragraphs 7.783 and 7.1208.  
6.51.  Regarding paragraphs 8.1.d.ix and 8.1.e.xiv, Russia refers to its argumentation in respect of 
Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement and  requests the Panel to delete the reference to Russia's lack of 
arguments or evidence to rebut the presumption of inconsistency with Article 2.2 raised by a 
finding of inconsistency with Article 5.6 of the SPS Agreement. The European Union considers that 
these two paragraphs are correct and that the Panel should not change them. The Panel has made 
small changes to paragraphs 7.846, 7.1254, 8.1.d.ix, and 8.1.e.xiv.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  6.11  Appendix 1 to the Panel Report  
6.52.  Regarding Appendix 1 to the Panel Report, Russia requests the Panel to include a number of 
communications, press notes, reports and other documents on record. The European Union 
considers that the chronology provided by Russia cannot serve in any way as evidence of Russia 
acting in accordance with its WTO obligations . The purpose of Appendix 1 was to provide an 
account of the communications sent by the European Union to Russia and by Russia to the 
European Union in order to support the Panel's assessment of the evidence that the European 
Union had submitted to Russia in connection with the ASF outbreaks in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
and Poland. Those documents are referred to chronologically. Appendix 1 excludes press releases, 
unilateral reports of bilateral meetings or recollection of phone calls. Based on the objec tive of 
Appendix 1, we have accepted a limited number of the documents that Russia requests the Panel 
to include in Appendix 1.  
7  FINDINGS  
7.1  Procedural issue s 
7.1.1   Arrangements for simultaneous interpretation  
7.1.  As indicated in section 1.3.3 above, in response to requests from Russia, the Panel made 
particular arrangements concerning the use of simultaneous interpretation during the first 
substantive meeting with the parties, the meeting with the third parties, the meeting with the 
experts , and the second substantive meeting. In this section, the Panel explains the underlying 
rationale in support of the arrangements mentioned in paragraphs 1.13 to 1.16 above . 
7.2.  We recall that on 16 Apr il 2015 — shortly before the first substantive meeting with the 
parties, scheduled for Monday 20 April 2015 — Russia requested the Panel to authorize the use of 
simultaneous English -to-Russian and Russian -to-English interpretation. Russia explained that it  
would provide the interpreters and bear all the associated costs. On 17 April 2015, in response to 
the Panel's invitation, the European Union provided a communication regarding Russia's request. 
The European Union indicated that it could not provide its f inal views on such short notice.  
7.3.  On 17 April 2015, Russia reiterated its request to which the European Union responded on 
20 April 2015. Russia argued that its due process rights would not be ensured if the Panel were to 
decline its request, whereas  the Eu ropean Union was of the view that such request raised systemic 
considerations by inter alia  opening the possibility for Russian to become a de facto  working 
language in WTO dispute settlement. At the beginning of the meeting on 20 April 2015, Russia and 
the European Union exchanged oral comments, reiterating their divergent views.  
7.4.  As explained in paragraph 1.13 above, following exchanges with the parties, and after 
listening to the parties' views in the course of the first subst antive meeting, the Panel informed the 
parties that, for the purposes of the first substantive meeting with the parties  (i) interpreters could 
be present at the meeting, provided that Russia included their names in its delegation list and that 
the interpre ters were provided and financed by Russia; (ii) the interpreters could use the 
interpretation booths to provide only English -to-Russian simultaneous interpretation for the benefit 
of Russia's delegation; (iii) Russia's delegation must make statements and s ubmissions to the 
Panel and other parties only in English; and (iv) for the purpose of the proceedings, only 
statements and submissions made in English must form part of the record.  
7.5.  During the third-party session on 21 April 2015, several third parties pro vided their views on 
the use of simultaneous interpretation in the proceedings. Japan, Norway and the United States 
took the floor and noted that they did not have any objections to the arrangements the Panel had 
made regarding Russia's request in the sess ion with the parties to the dispute. As indicated in 
paragraph 1.14 above, the Panel authorized simultaneous English -to-Russian interpretation for the 
third-party session on the same conditions as those for the first substantive meeting with the 
parties.  
7.6.  On 1 June 2015, well before the second substantive meeting, Russia renewed its request for 
simultaneous English -to-Russian and Russian -to-English interpretation. According to Russia, the 
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  interpretation created a significant burden on Russia's ability to participate actively in the hearing. 
In particular, Russia noted that during the first meeting, knowledgeable Russian SPS officials were 
not able to easily res pond to comments made by the European Union or to respond to Panel 
questions. In its communication of 12 June 2015, the European Union opposed Russia's renewed 
request, elaborating on the views reflected in its communication of 20 April 2015.  
7.7.  On 19 June 20 15, Russia responded to the European Union's comments expressed in the 
communication of 12 June 2015. Russia opined that "the right balance" not to violate the due 
process  right of either one of the disputing parties would be struck if its request for "sim ultaneous 
interpretation during the Expert Panel" was accepted by the Panel.  
7.8.  On 2 and 3 July 2015 , in response to a question posed by the Panel, Brazil, Japan, Norway 
and the United States communicated their views on th e use of language interpretation dur ing the 
Panel's subsequent meetings.  
7.9.  On 15 July 2015, Russia clarified the scope of its second request for language interpretation. 
Russia explained that its most recent request for simultaneous Russian -to-English interpretation 
was limited to the Panel's  meeting with the experts. Russia emphasized the importance of such 
interpretation due to the scientific and technical nature of the Panel's meeting with the experts 
while expressing its appreciation for the simultaneous English -to-Russian interpretation a uthorised 
by the Panel at the first substantive meeting.  
7.10.  As indicated in paragraphs 1.15 and 1.16 above , on 13 August 2015 the Panel informed the 
parties of the arrangements for simultaneous interpretation during the meeting with the experts 
and the second  substantive meeting. The Panel informed the parties that it would authorise 
simultaneous English -to-Russian and simultaneous Russian -to-English interpretation during the 
Panel's meeting with the experts, and simultaneous English -to-Russian interpretation during the 
second substantive meeting with the parties (replicating the arrangements at the first substantive 
meeting with the parties). The Panel also confirmed that the interpreters could use the 
interpretation booths, as available, in the rooms booked f or the meeting with the experts and for 
the second substantive meeting with the parties.  
7.11.  Furthermore, the Panel emphasized that the arrangements for interpretation were 
conditioned on the following: (i) the interpretation was conducted only by the interpr eters included 
in Russia's delegation; (ii) the cost of the interpretation was covered exclusively by Russia; 
(iii) only statements made in English would form part of the official record of the proceedings; and 
(iv) the interpreters' statements, when inter preting what a member of Russia's delegation said in a 
language other than English, would be considered the only statements forming part of the record.  
7.12.  Turning to the rationale underlying the interpretation arrangements we made, the Panel first 
notes that Article XVI of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization 
provides that it was concluded in three authentic languages: English, French and Spanish. These 
three languages are also the working languages of the WTO.85 
                                               
85 The worki ng languages of the WTO have been identified in the rules of procedure of most of the WTO 
bodies. See: Rule 30 of the Rules of Procedure for Sessions of the Ministerial Conference and and Rule 35 of 
the Rules of Procedure  for Meetings of the General Counci l (WT/L/161 ); rule 1 of the Rules of Procedure for 
Meetings of the Dispute Settlement Body  (WT/DSB/9 ); para. 1 of the Rules of Procedure for Meetings of the 
Council for TRIPS (IP/C/1); para. 1 of the Rules of Procedure for Meetings of the Council for Trade  in Services 
(S/L/15);  rule 1 of the Rules of Procedure for Meetings of the Trade Policy Review Body (WT/TPR/6/Rev.3); 
para. 1 of the Rules of Procedure for Meetings of the Committee on Trade and Development (WT/COMTD/6);  
para. 1 of the Rules of Procedure for Meetings of the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements (WT/REG/1); 
rule 1 of the Rules of Procedure for Meetings of the Committee on Balance -of-Payments Restrictions 
(WT/BOP/10); para. 1 of the Rules of Procedure for Meetings of the Committee on Market  Access (G/L/148);  
para. 1 of the Rules of Procedure for Meetings of the Committee on Agriculture (G/L/142); para. 1 of the Rules 
of Procedure for Meetings of the Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (G/L/170); rule 35 of the 
Rules of Procedure  for Meetings of the Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (G/L/150); rule 35 of the 
Rules of Procedure for Meetings of the Committee on Anti -Dumping Practices (G/L/143); para. 1 of the Rules of 
Procedure for Meetings of the Committee on Rules of Origin  (G/L/149); para. 1 of the Rules of Procedure for 
Meetings of the Committee on Import Licensing (G/L/147); para. 1 of the Rules of Procedure for Meetings of 
the Committee on Trade -Related Investment Measures (G/L/151); rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure for  
 WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.13.  Second, the Panel a cknowledges that each WTO Member has an exclusive right to determine 
the composition of its delegation in dispute settlement proceedings.86 The Panel also notes that 
parties to dispute settlement  proceedings have the corresponding obligation to ensure that the 
confidentiality of WTO dispute settlement proceedings is fully respected.87 Russia's prerogative to 
determine the composition of its delegation would allow them to include interpreters as part of 
their delegation. Pursuant to paragraph 5 our Working Pro cedures, Russia must ensure that each 
member of Russia's delegation acts in accordance with the DSU and the Panel's Working 
Procedures, particularly with regard to the confidentiality of the proceedings.88 From the moment 
that Russia included the interprete rs within its delegation, Russia assumed this obligation in 
respect of these interpreters. In our view, the interpretation arrangements adopted in these 
proceedings ensured that the confidentiality of the proceedings was fully respected.  
7.14.  Third, we observe that the Appellate Body has noted that the DSU accords a panel "ample 
and extensive authority to undertake and to control the process by which it informs itself both of 
the relevant facts of the dispute and of the legal norms and principles applicable to s uch facts".89 
This broad authority and discretion to undertake and control the conduct of panel proceedings may 
be exercised within the limits of the DSU and due process.90 We are also mindful of our obligation 
under Article 11 of the DSU to assess objective ly the matter before us, including by making an 
objective assessment of the facts of this case. Moreover, Article 12 of the DSU requires panels to 
provide sufficient flexibility so as to ensure high  quality panel reports while not unduly delaying the 
proce ss. The Panel is also cognisant of Article 13 of the DSU, which provides for the right of panels 
to seek information, and Article 11.2 of the SPS Agreement, which deals with panels seeking 
advice from experts in disputes involving scientific or technical i ssues and consulting with relevant 
international organizations.  
7.15.  We are of the view that the interpretation arrangements adopted by the Panel did not 
unduly delay the process nor undermine due process , and neither party has suggested anything to 
the contra ry.  
7.16.  In terms of avoiding potential delays, the interpretation arrangements allowed the Panel to 
make the best use of the limited time that it had available with the experts and the parties during 
the meeting with the experts. Moreover, allowing for Englis h to Russian interpretation for the 
benefit of Russia's delegation allowed both the meetings with the parties and the third parties91 to 
run smoothly and avoided any potential delays in the Panel's timetable that might have been 
required to provide time for  translations in connection with the Panel's meetings.  
7.17.  In terms of due process, the Panel provided the parties and third parties an opportunity to 
explain their concerns in respect of interpretation arrangements, so the Panel could accommodate 
and take th em into account. Furthermore, keeping the official record of Panel proceedings in 
English and ensuring that statements by the interpreters, when interpreting what a member of 
Russia's delegation said in a language other than English, would be considered th e only statements 
forming part of the record, did not change or have a material detrimental impact on the way that 
the complainant participated in the Panel proceedings.   
                                                                                                                                               
Meetings of the Committee on Safeguards (G/L/145); para. 1 of the Rules of Procedure for Meetings of the 
Committee of Participants on the Expansion of Trade in Information Technology Products (G/IT/3); para. 1 of 
the Draft Rules of Procedure for Meetings of the Committee on Customs Valuation (G/VAL/W/2); rule 35 of the 
Draft Rules of Procedure for Meetings of the Committee on Trade and Environment (WT/CTE/W/13/Rev.1).  
86 Appellate Body Report, EC – Bananas III , paras. 10 -12; and Panel Reports, Korea – Alcoh olic 
Beverages , para. 10.31; and, Indonesia – Autos , para. 14.2.  See also Panel's Working Procedures, para. 5.  
87 See Appellate Body Report, Canada – Aircraft , para. 145.  This was acknowledged by the European 
Union in its communications of 17 and 20 April 2 015. 
88 This rule in the Panel's Working Procedures is in line with the Appellate Body finding that Members 
have an obligation to extend their obligation to maintain the confidentiality of appellate proceedings to 
individuals whom they select to act as its representatives, counsel and consultants. Appellate Body Report, 
Canada – Aircraft , para. 141.  
89 Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp , para. 106.  
90 Appellate Body Reports, India – Patents  (US), para. 92; and, EC – Hormones , para. 154.  
91 We note that in its c ommunication of 17 April 2015, the European Union referred to the "quite normal 
practice" of members of a delegation conferring with interpreters who are part of the delegation of that 
Member.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.18.  We are confident that the interpretation arrangements enabled the Panel to receive, on a 
timely basis, vital scientific and technical expertise, which assisted the Panel to meet its 
obligations under Article 11 of the DSU to make an objective assessment of the facts of the case 
and under Article 11.2 of the SPS Agreement to seek expert ad vice. We are presented in this 
dispute with complex scientific and technical issues. We determined that we would benefit from the 
input of relevant experts, including those relied upon by both parties. In our view, given the highly 
technical nature of the issues before us and the limited ability of Russia's scientific experts to 
contribute effectively in a ny language other than Russian, we determined that unless we made the 
interpretation arrangements we did, it would not have been possible for Russia to re spond to the 
Panel's questions in a timely fashion or to present relevant evidence and be in a position to defend 
itself in this case. We are also persuaded that we would not have been in a position to properly 
assess the arguments and evidence in this cas e in as timely and effective a manner and hence 
would not have been able to carry out as effectively our obligations set forth in the DSU.   
7.19.  We are mindful of the limited resources and infrastructure available  at the Panel's disposal , 
which  was consistentl y underlined also by the European Union and some of the third parties. We 
note that the interpretation arrangements authorized by the Panel did not entail any costs to the 
WTO.  The Panel emphasizes that these arrangements were addressed in the context of these 
Panel proceedings and, as such, take into account the particular nature of and circumstances 
present in this dispute. Any similar request would need to be assessed on case -by-case basis 
taking into account the feasibility of accepting arrangements fo r simultaneous interpretation. We 
make no assessment of the potential relevance, utility or otherwise of similar arrangements for 
other proceedings.  
7.1.2   Industry representative in a Member's delegation  
7.20.  At our first substantive m eeting with the parties, the Eur opean Union observed that Russia's 
delegation included a representative of the Russian pig industry, who had been identified as 
chairman of the Board of the AGROECO Group . In the European Union's view, it would be 
inappropriate for that person to participa te in the part of the meeting where the Panel would pose 
questions to the parties. Referring to paragraph 3 of the Panel's Working Procedures on Strictly 
Confidential Information92, the European Union noted that certain people, including the person 
concerne d from the Russian pig industry, should not have access to strictly confidential 
information. In response, Russia noted that Russia considered it important for that person to 
attend the session because he could be well  suited to answer some of the Panel's questions. Russia 
added that this person was included in their delegation and that Russia was responsible for 
ensuring that the delegate respected the confidentiality of information disclosed in the course of 
the meeting. Russia noted that the European Uni on had not labelled any information as "strictly 
confidential" and that all the information that would be discussed came from publicly available 
sources. The European Union replied that it would accept an arrangement by which that person 
would leave the ro om in case the European Union considered it would disclose strictly confidential 
information as part of an answer to a question from the Panel. Russia agreed to this arrangement.  
7.21.  Having listened to the parties' views, we decided not to grant the European U nion's request 
to exclude the member of Russia's delegation. We observed that, as provided in paragraph 5 of 
our Working Procedures, Russia was entitled to determine the composition of its delegation in 
these proceedings. We also stated that, in accordance  with Article 18.2 of the DSU and paragraph 
5 of our Working Procedures93, Russia assumed responsibility for its delegation, including respect 
                                               
92 Paragraph 3 of our additional Working Procedures Concerning S trictly Confidential Information 
provides:  
As required by paragraph 3 of the Working Procedures of the Panel, the deliberations of the Panel 
and the documents submitted to it shall be kept confidential. Further, as required by Article 18.2 
of the DSU a par ty or third party having access to information designated as SCI submitted in 
these Panel proceedings shall treat it as confidential and shall not disclose that information other 
than to those persons authorized to receive it pursuant to these additional w orking procedures. 
Each party and third party is responsible for ensuring that its employees, outside advisers and 
experts comply with these additional Working Procedures to protect SCI. An outside advisor is 
not permitted access to SCI if that advisor is an officer or employee of an enterprise engaged in 
the production, export, or import of the products that are subject of this dispute.  
93 Paragraph 5 of our Working Procedures provides:  
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  for confidentiality of information exchanged in the course of the first substantive meeting.94 We 
also noted the pa rties' agreement that in case the European Union were to present information 
designated as strictly confidential, the member of Russia's delegation in question would excuse 
himself from the meeting.  
7.22.  We are cognisant of the need to protect sensitive inform ation in WTO dispute settlement 
proceedings, and, in particular, of the importance of protecting information labelled by the parties 
as strictly confidential when a panel has adopted working procedures for the protection of such 
information.  We note that a t the time we made our decision on this issue, the European Union had 
not identified any  specific information for which it sought strictly confidential treatment. Rather, 
the European Union sought to exclude  a member of Russia's delegation from the part of  the first 
substantive meeting of the parties with the Panel devoted to the answers to questions from the 
Panel, as well as from subsequent meetings. In the course of the first substantive meeting and in 
the course of these proceedings, neither party ident ified any specific information as strictly 
confidential. Moreover, Russia subsequently indicated that the person whose presence was 
challenged by the European Union would not form part of their delegation for the rest of the first 
substantive meeting, and was not included as part of Russia's delegation in any subsequent 
meeting of the Panel with the parties, the third parties or the experts.  
7.2  Order of analysis  
7.23.  Before addressing certain preliminary issues and commencing the analysis of the European 
Union's cl aims, we first consider the order in which we will address such claims.  
7.24.  In this dispute, the European Union requests the Panel to find that Russia's measures at 
issue are inconsistent with Russia's obligations  under Articles 2.2, 2.3, 3.1, 3.2, 5.1, 5.2, 5 .3, 5.4, 
5.5, 5.6, 5.7, 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, 7 (and Annex B paragraphs 1, 2, 5 and 6) and 8 (and Annex C.1(a), 
(b) and (c)) of the SPS Agreement.95 Moreover, in responding to the European Union's claims 
under the SPS Agreement, Russia invokes Articles 3.1, 3.2, 5 .7 and 6.3  of that Agreement .  
7.25.  The Panel must decide the order in which it will examine the claims  under the SPS 
Agreement.  
7.2.1   Main arguments of the parties  
7.26.  The European Union points out that the panel in India – Agricultural Products  agreed with 
the responde nt on the order of analysis and started its assessment under the harmonization 
provisions of the SPS Agreement, proceeding only afterwards with the analysis of the claims 
related to the lack of a risk assessment. The European Union emphasizes that were that panel to 
have found that India's avian influenza measures "conform to" international standards, then they 
would have been presumed to be consistent with the relevant provisions of the SPS Agreement. 
                                                                                                                                               
Each party and third party has the right to determine the composition o f its own delegation when 
meeting with the Panel. Each party and third party shall have the responsibility for all members 
of its own delegation and shall ensure that each member of such delegation acts in accordance 
with the DSU and these Working Procedur es, particularly with regard to the confidentiality of the 
proceedings.  
94 The panel in Korea – Certain Paper  ruled on a similar request by Korea regarding the presence of 
representatives of the Indonesian paper industry in the Indonesian delegation. See Pa nel Report, Korea – 
Certain Paper , paras. 7.10 -7.12. See also Appellate Body Report, Canada – Aircraft , para. 141 (regarding the 
Members' obligation to extend their obligation to maintain the confidentiality of appellate proceedings to 
individuals whom the y select to act as its representatives, counsel and consultants); and Panel Reports, 
Thailand – H Beams , para. 5.3 (referring to the importance of maintaining confidentiality of information and 
the Members' obligation to do so pursuant to Article 18.2 of t he DSU); Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada 
II), paras. 3.5 -3.10 (regarding a request from Brazil that the panel consider that Canada breach ed the panel's 
working procedures by disclosing confidential information to persons that were not part of Cana da's 
delegation); and Indonesia – Autos , para. 14.1 (regarding the participation of two private lawyers in 
Indonesia's delegation during the first substantive meeting).  
95 Although the European Union's panel request initially included claims under the GATT 1994 (Articles 
I:1, XI:1 and III:4) in addition to its claims under the provisions of the SPS Agreement, the European Union 
subsequently clarified that it would no longer pursue these claims. Accordingly, we proceed directly to an 
examination of the Europe an Union's claims under the SPS Agreement. See European Union's response to 
Panel question No. 80, para. 155.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  The European Union, referring  to the foregoing  reasonin g, presents its claims starting with its 
claims relating to Article 3 of the SPS Agreement.96 
7.27.  Russia does not argue on the particular order the Panel should examine the European 
Union' s claims . 
7.2.2   Main arguments of the third parties  
7.2.2.1   Australia  
7.28.  Australia highlig hts that the Panel needs to determine, as a matter of fact, whether Russia's 
measures conform to, or are based on, the Terrestrial Code, noting that only measures which 
conform to international standards enjoy the presumption of consistency with the SPS Ag reement. 
Australia also notes that that presumption is rebuttable. Australia argues that in the context of the 
foregoing, it would be appropriate for the Panel to commence its analysis with the claims under 
Article 3, followed by a consideration, if necess ary, of the subsequent claims under Articles 5 and 6 
of the SPS Agreement.97 
7.2.3   Analysis by the Panel  
7.29.  A panel is generally free to determine in which order it examines the claims brought by the 
complaining party. Like the panel in US – Animals , we understand f rom the Appellate Body report 
in US – Zeroing (EC) (Article  21.5 – EC) that, in fulfilling its duties under Article  11 of the DSU, a 
panel may "depart from the sequential order suggested by the complaining party, in particular, 
when this is required by the  correct interpretation or application of the legal provisions at issue ".98 
Indeed, the Appellate Body has stated that, as a general rule, panels are free to structure the 
order of their analysis as they see fit99, provided that their analysis is consistent with the 
"structure and logic" of the provisions at issue in each dispute.100 There may be situations where a 
particular order is compelled by principles of valid interpretative methodology, which, if not 
followed, might constitute errors of law.101 In additio n, panels dealing with claims under provisions 
of the SPS Agreement have considered the particular circumstances of the dispute and the 
implications of their findings in the subsequent claims that they need to examine when deciding in 
which order to examin e the complainant's claims.102  
7.30.  Given the particular circumstances of this dispute and the nature of the parties' 
argumentation before this Panel, the issue of whether Russia's measures "conform to" or are 
"based on" the relevant international standards embo died in the Terrestrial Code under Articles 3.2 
and 3.1 of the SPS Agreement is of central relevance. This is so, in particular, due to the eventual 
impact of the Panel's findings under those provisions with respect to the European Union's other 
claims, an d their close relationship to other issues arising in this case, such as those pertaining to 
regionalization arising under Article 6 of the SPS Agreement.  
7.2.4   Conclusion  
7.31.  Accordingly, with respect to the order of analysis of the European Union's claims under t he 
SPS Agreement, the Panel will begin by determining which measures fall within its terms of 
reference to ensure that the Panel has the jurisdiction and mandate to examine them.  In 
addressing this issue, the Panel will examine Russia's arguments with resp ect to the attribution of 
the alleged EU -wide ban to Russia and to limitations that Russia's terms of accession to the WTO 
may create on the Panel's jurisdiction.  Once we have confirmed the parameters of our terms of 
reference, we will determine whether Ru ssia's measures at issue are SPS measures within the 
                                               
96 European Union's first written submission, paras. 108 -109. 
97 Australia's third -party submission, paras. 8 -9. 
98 Appellate Body Report, US – Zeroing (EC) (Article  21.5 – EC), para. 277. See Panel Report, US – 
Animals, para. 7.13.  
99 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Wheat Exports and Grain Imports , paras.  126-129. 
100 Appellate Body Reports, Canada – Autos , para.  151; and Canada – Wheat Exports and Grain  
Imports , para.  109. 
101 Panel Report, India – Autos , para. 7.154.  
102 Panel Report, US – Animals, paras. 7.7 -7.20.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  scope of the SPS Agreement. If they are, we will proceed to examine the claims and arguments in 
respect of the remaining provisions of the SPS Agreement invoked by the European Union. For the 
purposes of  clarity, the Panel will separately address the claims and arguments raised by the 
parties in respect of the  alleged  EU-wide ban; and the bans on the imports of the products at issue 
from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, in that particular order.  
7.32.  In addressing such claims and arguments, the Panel will begin with its examination of the 
issue of harmonization under Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the SPS Agreement, addressing , as relevant,  
the extent to which Russia's challenged measures "conform to" and/or ar e "based on" the relevant 
international standards. In this particular case, we deem it appropriate to evaluate the parties' 
claims pertaining to regionalization under Articles 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 of the SPS Agreement in the 
course of our assessment under Arti cle 3.  
7.33.  Once we have concluded our analysis with respect to harmonization and regionalization the 
Panel  will turn to the parties' remaining claims in the following sequence:  
a. Claims  under Article 8 and Annex C of the SPS Agreement;  
b. Claims  under Articles 2. 2, 5.1, 5.2 and 5.7 of the SPS Agreement;  
c. Claims  under Articles 5.3, 5.4 and 5.6 of the SPS Agreement;  
7.34.  The Panel will then assess in respect of both sets of the challenged measures the parties' 
arguments with respect to:  
a. Claims  under Articles 2.3 and 5.5 of the SPS Agreement; and  
b. Claims  under Article 7 and Annex B of the SPS Agreement.  
7.35.  Before addressing each of European Union's claims, the Panel will address a number of 
preliminary issues related to its terms of reference.  
7.3  Preliminary issues  
7.3.1   Introduction  
7.36.  As indicated in section 2.2 above , in its panel request, the European Union states that it 
challenges "certain Russian measures adopting, maintaining or applying an import ban or import 
restrictions, which prevent the importatio n of the products at issue [live pigs and their genetic 
material, pork and certain other pig products] from the EU into Russia".103  
7.37.  The European Union identifies, as the specific measures at issue in this dispute, two sets of 
measures:  
 the "refusal by Russ ia to accept imports for the products at issue from the entire EU", 
characterizing it as an "EU -wide ban"104; and  
 
 individual import bans on live pigs and pig products from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and 
Poland .105 The bans on imports of the products at issue  from Lithuania and Poland are 
explicitly referred to in the panel request.106 Those in respect of imports from Estonia and 
Latvia are not, because the former was adopted on the same date on which the European 
                                               
103 European Union's panel request, p. 1.  
104 Referred to in this Report as the "alleged EU -wide ban" or the "EU -wide ban".  
105 European Union's panel  request, pp. 1 -2; first written submission, paras. 82 -97; opening statement 
at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 24 -27; and response to Panel question No. 57, para. 135. In its first 
written submission, the European Union refers to the four EU member  States subject to the specific import 
bans, in the chronological order in which the measures were adopted with respect to each. However, for ease 
of reference, we list these four EU member States in alphabetical order.  
106 See para . 2.9 above.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  Union submitted the panel request (27 June 2014)107, whereas the latter was adopted on 
11 September  2014.108 However, the European Union included these two measures among 
the measures at issue challenged in its first written submission.109  
 
7.38.  Russia argues that the alleged EU -wide ban is not a measure attribut able to Russia. Rather, 
it is a consequence of the European Union's veterinary officials' inability to certify compliance of 
the products at issue for export with the conditions set out in the form of veterinary certificates 
bilaterally agreed by Russia an d the European Union for trade of the products at issue. Hence, 
Russia claims that the European Union has failed to demonstrate that the alleged EU -wide ban is a 
measure within the definition of Article 1 and Annex A of the SPS Agreement.110  
7.39.  According to Ru ssia, the validity of the veterinary certificates is itself a term of Russia's 
accession to the WTO. Thus, Russia's commitment to maintain the application of the bilateral 
certificates negates the European Union's claims, derived directly or indirectly fro m the application 
of the bilateral certificates, pursuant to the provisions of the SPS Agreement.111  
7.40.  The European Union rejects Russia's arguments regarding the consequences of the validity 
of the veterinary certificates. In the European Union's view, the r eference to the veterinary 
certificates in Russia's accession documents should be understood in the context of Russia's 
continuing obligation to adapt its measures to regional SPS characteristics.112 The European Union 
adds that the terms of Russia's accessi on to the WTO cannot be construed as preventing the 
adaptation of bilateral certificates to the ASF regionalization measures in the European Union.113  
7.41.  In addition, Russia has not raised any objection in respect of the country -wide measures 
concerning Latvia  and Estonia being within the Panel's terms of reference. Russia only commented 
on this matter in response to Panel questions addressing the fact that those measures are not 
mentioned explicitly in the panel request.114 Russia also added, "both Parties have agreed that it is 
appropriate for the Panel to consider the European Union claims as including a challenge to the 
Latvian and Estonian import bans … which were not included in the Panel request".115 
7.42.  The Panel first needs to determine whether the alleged EU -wide ban is a measure 
susceptible to challenge under the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. Then, the Panel needs to 
examine whether Russia's terms of accession, in respect of the validity of certain bilateral 
veterinary export certificates, limits the Panel 's assessment of the European Union's claims in 
respect of the alleged EU -wide ban. Then, independent of the parties' views on the matter, it is 
incumbent upon the Panel to determine whether the measures regarding imports from Latvia and 
Estonia are within  its terms of reference. The Panel will address each of these issues in turn.  
                                               
107 Russia's notification to the SPS Committee: G/SPS/N/RUS/64 (SPS notification on imports from 
Latvia ) (Exhibit EU -12); and Letter of the Russian Federal Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Supervision 
No. FS -NF-8/11315, of 27 June 201 4 (Measure on imports from Latvia) ( Exhibit EU -169).  
108 Russi a's notification to the SPS Committee: G/SPS/N/RUS/76 (SPS notification on imports from 
Estonia) ( Exhibit EU -13); and Letter from  the Russian Veterinary Service to DG SANCO, FS -NV-8/17431, 11 
September 2014 (Measure on imports from Estonia) (Exhibit RUS -37). 
109 European Union's first written submission, paras. 4 and 86 -87. 
110 Russia' response to Panel question No. 72, para. 108; second written submission, paras. 3 and 171 -
174; opening statement at th e second meeting of the Panel, paras. 50 -60; and response to Panel question 
No. 275, para. 111.  
111 Russia's response to Panel question No. 274, paras. 104 -110. See also response to Panel question 
No. 75, paras. 110 -118; and second written submission, paras.  177-184. 
112 European Union's second written submission, para. 27 (referring to Article 6.1 of the SPS Agreement 
and Appellate Body Report, India – Agricultural Products , para. 5.154).  
113 European Union's comments on Russia's response to Panel question No. 2 54, para. 12.  
114 Russia's response to Panel question No. 74, paras. 119 -123. In para. 123, Russia noted that even if 
the Panel were to find that the measures on imports from Estonia and Latvia do not fall within its terms of 
reference they are nevertheless relevant to the dispute as evidence, even if these measures post -date the date 
of the panel request.  
115 Russia's response to Panel question No. 279, para. 122.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.3.2   Whether the alleged EU -wide ban is a measure susceptible to challenge under the 
WTO dispute settlement mechanism  
7.3.2.1   Introduction  
7.43.  We begin our examination of the preliminary matters  related to the measures at issue with 
the question of whether the alleged EU -wide ban is a measure susceptible to challenge under the 
WTO dispute settlement mechanism. As part of Russia's challenge in respect of the 
characterization of the alleged EU -wide ban as an SPS measure, it posits that the alleged EU -wide 
ban is not attributable to Russia.116 In order to provide a coherent and comprehensive assessment 
of the preliminary questions before us related to the measures at issue, we will first focus on 
Russi a's argument that the alleged EU -wide ban is not a measure attributable to Russia.  
7.44.  In our view, Russia's argument that the alleged EU -wide ban is not attributable to Russia 
touches upon the question of whether Russia has in fact put in place a measure and  whether such 
measure is susceptible to challenge under the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. Therefore, 
after reviewing the parties' argument in this respect, the Panel will address that question.  
7.3.2.2   Main arguments of the parties  
7.45.  Live pigs and their genetic  material, pork and certain other pig products ("the products at 
issue") from the European Union have been exported to Russia on the basis of bilaterally agreed 
veterinary certificates which, among other things, attest to the ASF -status of the European 
Union.117 Following the ASF outbreaks that were confirmed in Lithuania on 24 January 2014118, 
Russia stopped accepting the imports of the products at issue subject to those bilateral veterinary 
certificates from all EU member States. This decision was adopted bec ause the epizootic situation 
in the European Union regarding ASF did not match the requirements set out in those 
certificates.119 
7.46.  While the European Union describes Russia's measure as an "EU -wide ban", Russia insists 
that this measure is properly characteri zed as its "provisional compliance" with the current 
bilateral veterinary certificates, reiterating that, in light of the ASF outbreaks, it is the European 
Union that is unable to comply with the requirements in the certificates.120 
                                               
116 The question of whether the EU -wide ban is an SPS measure is examined in section 7.4.4.2.1  below.  
117 Russia's first written submission, paras. 343 -344; and response to Panel question No. 69, para. 100; 
see also European Union's first written submission, fn 82 (referring  to the Veterinary certificate for pi glets for 
fattening, being exported from the EU into Russia, 11/08/2006) (Veterinary certificate for piglets for fattening) 
(Exhibit EU -52); the Veterinary certificate for pigs for breeding, exported from the EU into Ru ssia, 11/08/2006 
(Veterinary certific ate for pigs for breeding) (Exhibit EU -53); the Veterinary certificate for pork meat and raw 
meat preparations, exported from the EU into Russia, 11/08/2006 (Veterinary certificate for pork meat and raw 
meat preparation s) (Exhibit EU -54); the Veterinary ce rtificate for slaughter pigs, exported from the EU to 
Russia, 16/12/2009 (Veterinary certificate for slaughter pigs)( Exhibit EU -55); the Veterinary certificate for 
finished food products, containing raw material of anim al origin, exported from the EU to Ru ssia, 24/05/2011 
(Veterinary certificate for finished food products) (Exhibit EU -56); the Veterinary certificate for canned meat, 
salamis and other ready for consumption meat products, exported from the EU to Russia, 24 /05/2011 
(Veterinary certificate for canned meat, salamis and other ready for consumption meat products)(Exhibit EU -
57)). 
118 OIE WAHIS  Interface, Follow -up report No. 31 – Report reference: 1, Reference OIE: 17147, Report 
Date: 06/02/2015, Country: Lithuania (Exhibit RUS -27). 
119 Letter of the R ussian Federal Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Supervision to the European 
Union dated 29 January 2014 Ref. FS -SA-8/1277 (Letter of FSVPS of 29 January 2014 – FS-SA-8/1277) 
(Exhibit EU -14), para. 3; the announcement on the website of Rosselkhoznad zor of 6 February 2014 
(announcement of FSVPS) (Exhibit EU -16); List of returned consignments of pig products ( Exhibit EU -17); see 
also European Union's fi rst written submission, paras. 88 -97; and Russia's first written submission, paras. 343 -
344 and 346 -347. 
120 European Union's panel request, p. 2; first written submission, para. 88; opening statement at the 
first meeting of the Panel, para. 24; response to Panel question No. 57, para. 135; and second written 
submission, para. 21. Russia's first written sub mission, paras. 344 and 347; and opening statement at the first 
meeting of the Panel, para. 47.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.3.2.2.1   European Union  
7.47.  In the pa nel request, the European Union identifies as a distinct measure at issue the 
"refusal by Russia to accept imports of the products at issue from the entire EU, amounting to an 
EU-wide ban".121 The European Union refers to this alleged measure:  
[A]s an action  (an import ban or restriction) and, in the alternative, as an omission 
(failure to accept imports from the EU). The EU seeks review of this specific measure 
at issue as such and as applied, de jure and de facto (that is, based on all the relevant 
facts). The EU also seeks review of this specific measure at issue both insofar as it is 
written, and insofar as it is unwritten.122 
7.48.  In support of the existence of the alleged EU -wide ban the European Union explains in the 
panel request as follows:  
The EU notes the letter sent to the EU dated 29 January 2014 (FS -SA-8/1277) from 
the Russian Federal Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Supervision referring to 
certain export certificates previously used for certain exports from the EU to Russia, 
and notably the phr ase "healthy animals grown in farms and/or administrative 
territories officially free from contiguous animal diseases, including African Swine 
Fever during 3 years in the whole territory of the EU except Sardinia." In this respect, 
the Russian authorities made the following statement: "veterinary doctors in the EU 
Member -States must stop certification of the abovementioned products. Otherwise 
these products accompanied with these veterinary certificates issued after 
27.01.2014, cannot be allowed into the te rritory of the Member States of the Customs 
Union and are subject to returns."123 
7.49.  In the panel request, the European Union also refers to the following statement from the 
letter of 14 February 2014 (НF -12- 26/1650) from Russia's Ministry of Agriculture: "thi s incident 
considerably changes the epizootic status not only of Lithuania, but of the whole EU".124 
Additionally, the European Union finds support for its contention of the alleged EU -wide ban in the 
official announcement of Russia's Federal Service for Vet erinary and Phytosanitary Supervision 
(FSVPS)125 from 6 February 2014, according to which the importation of pork products (frozen 
heads and hearts) of Austrian and German origin was banned in the Tver and Pskov regions 
because of alleged ASF risks in the wh ole European Union.126 Finally, the European Union refers to 
the rejection by Russia of a frozen pork meat consignment because the export certificate would 
not correctly certify the situation on ASF as regards ASF outbreaks in the territory of Lithuania.127 
7.50.  The European Union further explains that it understands that "following the instruction FS -
SA-7/1275 of 29 January 2014128, Russia stopped issuing import permits for the products at issue 
from the European Union. In addition, exporters were informed of the let ter of 29 January 2014 
FS-SA-8/1277 according to which Russia stopped accepting imports.129"130 As a result, there were 
no more instances of rejected consignments, because "evidently, no operator was going to incur 
the ruinous costs of consigning shipments to the Russian border in the knowledge that they would 
                                               
121 European Union 's panel request, p.2.  
122 European Union's panel request, p. 2. See also first written submission, para. 88.  
123 European Union's panel request, p.  2. 
124 European Union's panel request, p. 2 , referring to the l etter of 14 February 2014 (Ref. HF -12- 
26/1650) from Russia to the European Union  (Letter of 14 February 2014 – HF-12-26/1650) ( Exhibit EU -15). 
125 FSVPS is also the English abbreviation of Rosse lkhoznadzor (the Russian abbreviation).  
126 European Union's panel request, p. 2  (referring to: http://fsvps.ru/fsvps/news/8935.html).  
127 European Union's panel request, p. 2. See also first written submission, paras. 89 -96. 
128 (footnote original) Russia's ins tructions of 29 January 2014, FS -SA-7/1275 (Exhibit EU -161). 
129 (footnote original) Russia's letter to the European Union of 14 January 2014, FS -SA-8/1277  (Exhibit 
EU-14). 
130 European Union's response to Panel question No. 56, para. 133 and second written su bmission, 
para. 23. WT/DS475/R  
 
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  be refused entry."131 According to the European Union, it has provided sufficient evidence to 
demonstrate that the alleged EU -wide ban is attributable to Russia.132  
7.51.  The European Union considers that " the Par ties in fact agree on the existence of the 
measure at issue. What the EU calls the EU -wide ban is referred to by Russia as 'provisional 
compliance with the terms of the veterinary certificates'.133"134 
7.52.  In addition, the European Union rejects Russia's argument that the alleged EU -wide ban is 
not attributable to Russia because it may be somehow also attributable to the European Union. 
The European Union posits that even if the current situation was somehow attributable to the 
European Union that would not lead to  the conclusion that it is not also attributable to Russia. The 
European Union further adds that it has not relinquished its rights to challenge Russia's measures 
under the DSU. 135  
7.3.2.2.2   Russia  
7.53.  Russia disagrees with the European Union's characterization of the m easure at issue as the 
alleged EU -wide ban. Rather, Russia considers the alleged EU -wide ban to be the consequence of 
the European Union's failure to "meet the ASF -related requirements contained in the veterinary 
certificates agreed to by the European Unio n and the Russian Federation" .136 Russia further notes 
that the alleged EU -wide ban "is actually the Russian Federation's continuing efforts to follow the 
agreed European Union -Russian Federation ASF -related requirements of the veterinary certificates, 
which  do not permit the importation of uncertified pigs and pork products."137 Therefore, the 
inability of products to enter Russia "is not directly attributable to the Russian Federation".138 
7.54.  Russia explains that the veterinary certificates bilaterally agreed by t he European Union and 
Russia require that the entire European Union has been free from ASF during the previous three 
years in order for live pigs and pork products to be exported to Russia.139 Russia thus maintains 
that in its letters of 29 January 2014 and of 14 February 2014 to the European Union, Russia 
simply acknowledges the fact that, due to the ASF outbreak in the European Union, the veterinary 
officials of the EU member States are unable, pursuant to the terms of the veterinary certificates 
and consis tent with Chapter 5.1 of the Terrestrial Code, to certify that the territory of the 
European Union, excluding Sardinia, has been free from ASF during the previous three years.140 
7.55.  According to Russia, the European Union has not demonstrated that implementing the 
conditions in the veterinary certificates, which is an act carried out by the European Union's 
veterinary authorities, is an act attributable to Russia.141 Russia argues that "the inability to accept 
imports from the European Union is not directly attrib utable to the Russian Federation. It is the 
European Union's – not the Russian Federation's veterinary officials who are not able to certify 
                                               
131 European Union's response to Panel question No. 56, para. 134 and second written submission, 
para. 24. 
132 European Union's second written submission, para. 22.  
133 (footnote original) Russia's first written submission, section H.2.  
134 European Union's second written submission, para. 23.  
135 European Union's response to Panel question No. 21, para. 89. See also second written submission, 
para, 25.  
136 Russia's first written submission, para. 343.  
137 Russia's first written submission, para. 345;  and response to Panel question No. 78, para. 129. See 
also response to Panel question No. 84, para. 138.  
138 Russia's response to Panel question No. 72, para. 108. See also second written submission, para. 3.  
139 Russia's first written submission, paras. 347,  351 and 343 (referring to Veterinary Certificates for 
piglets for fattening ( Exhibit EU -52), Veterinary Certificates for pigs for breeding ( Exhibit EU -53), Veterinary 
Certificates for pork meat and raw meat preparations ( Exhibit EU -54)). 
140 Russia's first written submission, para. 344. The reference to the letter of 29 January 2014 FS -SA-
8/1277 is understood as the reference to Letter of FSVPS of 29 January 2014 – FS-SA-8/1277 ( Exhibit EU -14) 
and the reference to the letter of 14 February 2014 is the refere nce to Letter of 14 February 2014 – HF-12-
26/1650 ( Exhibit EU -15). 
141 Russia's second written submission, para . 171.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  compliance of the products at issue for exports based on the conditions set out in the form of 
certificate that was  agreed bilaterally by the Russian Federation and the European Union."142 
7.3.2.3   Analysis by the Panel  
7.56.  The Appellate Body has stated, in respect of the scope of Article 3.3 of the DSU, that "[i]n 
principle, any act or omission attributable to a WTO Member can be a measure of that Member for 
purposes of dispute settlement proceedings."143  
7.57.  To determine whether the alleged EU -wide ban is susceptible to challenge under the WTO 
Agreement, we need to examine whether the alleged EU -wide ban is an act or omission 
attributabl e to Russia. In our view, this examination requires two steps. First, we need to 
understand what act or omission the European Union is referring to, that is, what is the content 
and extent of the alleged EU -wide ban. Second, we need to verify whether that act or omission is 
attributable to Russia.  
7.3.2.3.1   Whether the European Union has provided arguments and evidence of the 
content and import of the alleged EU -wide ban  
7.58.  The Appellate Body has referred in different contexts to the burden a complainant must 
meet in r espect of demonstrating the particular content of the measures it challenges. In US – 
Gambling, when referring to the evidence and arguments underlying a prima facie  case, the 
Appellate Body stated that they include the identification of the challenged mea sure and its basic 
import.144 
7.59.  In light of this guidance, we consider that in the present case the European Union has the 
burden of demonstrating the content and the basic import of the alleged EU -wide ban. Therefore, 
we need to examine the arguments and evid ence that the European Union has submitted in this 
respect.  
7.60.  The European Union has provided the following evidence in support of the content and 
import of the alleged EU -wide ban:  
 letter dated 29 January 2014 (FS -SA-8/1277)145 from the FSVPS to DG SANCO146; 
 
 instructions dated 29 January 2014  of FSVPS  (FS-SA-7/1275)147 to its Heads of Territorial 
Departments148; 
 
 letter of 14 February 2014 (НF -12-26/1650)149 from the Ministry of Agriculture of Russia150; 
  
                                               
142 Russia's second written submission, para. 173. See also response to Panel question No. 275, 
para. 111. 
143 Appellate Body Report, US – Corro sion- Resistant Steel Sunset Review , para. 81.  
144 Appellate Body Report, US – Gambling , para. 141.  
145 Letter of FSVPS of 29 January 2014 – FS-SA-8/1277 ( Exhibit EU -14). In its first written submission, 
the European Union notes that this letter refers to the following veterinary certificates: Veterinary certificate 
for piglets for fattening ( Exhibit EU -52); the Veterinary certificate for pigs for breeding ( Exhibit EU -53); the 
Veterinary certificate for pork meat and raw meat prep arations ( Exhibit EU -54); the V eterinary certificate for 
slaughter pigs ( Exhibit EU -55); the Veterinary certificate for finished food products ( Exhibit EU -56); the 
Veterinary certificate for canned meat, salamis and other ready for consumption meat product s (Exhibit EU -57) 
(European Uni on's first written submission, para. 89, fn 82).  
146 European Union's first written submission, para. 89.  
147 Letter of the Russian Federal Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Supervision 
(Rosselkhoznadzor) to the Heads of Territorial Departments of Rosse lkhoznadzor FS -SA-7/1275 of 29 January 
2014 (FSVPS instructions to its Territorial Departments  of 29 January 2014 )  (Exhibit EU -161).  
148 European Union's response to Panel question No. 56, para. 133; and second written submission, 
para. 23.  
149 Letter  of 14 February  2014, HF-12-26/1650 ( Exhibit EU -15). 
150 European Union's first written submission, para. 91.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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   announcement of the FSVPS from 6 February 2014 for the ban on  the importation of pork 
products (frozen heads and hearts) of Austrian and German origin in the Tver and Pskov 
regions, because of alleged ASF risks in the whole EU151; 
 
 instances of not allowing the importation into Russia of consignments of pork products from 
the European Union member States after 25 January 2014 because the ASF epizootic 
situation was not correctly represented in item 4.3 of the veterinary certificate or because of 
problems related with the date of issuance of the veterinary certificate.152  
 
7.61.  We move on to examine in more detail each of these pieces of evidence referred to by the 
European Union.  
7.3.2.3.1.1   Letter of 29 January 2014 (FS -SA-8/1277) from the FSVPS to DG SANCO  
7.62.  The letter of 29 January 2014 FS -SA-8/1277, says:  
Despite the mutual understan ding and close cooperation inherent in the relations 
between Rosselkhoznador and DG SANCO, any approaches aimed at simplifying the 
situation due to the detection of the African Swine Fever (ASF) in the EU territory, 
seem unproductive.  
Until now live pigs, pork and raw pork products from the EU to Russia have been 
exported on the basis of the veterinary certificates of 11.08.2006 and presently, upon 
mutual agreement, their validity covers the whole territory of the Customs Union of 
Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ru ssia. In line with these certificates, these products must 
originate from "healthy animals grown in farms and/or administrative territories 
officially free from contiguous animal diseases, including the ASF during 3 years in the 
whole territory of the EU e xcept Sardinia". In this regard and in line with the 
requirements of Items 4.3 and 4.1 of the existing certificates, veterinary doctors in 
the EU Member -States must stop certification of the above -mentioned products. 
Otherwise these products accompanied wi th these veterinary certificates issued after 
27.01.2014, cannot be allowed into the territory of the Member States of the Customs 
Union and are subject to returns .153 (emphasis added)  
7.63.  This letter provides a clear reference to the fact that, as a consequence  of the detection of 
ASF in the European Union's territory, and in light of the unproductive results of approaches aimed 
at simplifying that situation, products accompanied with veterinary certificates attesting to the 
veterinary requirements provided in t he bilateral certificates agreed by Russia and the European 
Union in 2006 would be returned upon arrival to Russia.  
7.3.2.3.1.2   Instructions  of 29 January 2014  of FSVPS  (FS-SA-7/1275) to its Heads of 
Territorial Departments  
7.64.  Through the instructions FS-SA-7/1275  of 29 January 2014, the FSVPS informed its Heads 
of Territorial Departments that "due to the African swine fever (ASF) in the Republic of Lithuania it 
is necessary to pay special attention to the fulfilment of the requirements in Item 4.3 of the 
agreed veterinar y certificate for exports from the European Union to the Russian Federation of 
pork and raw pork products, Item 4.1 of the agreed veterinary certificate for exports from the 
European Union to the Russian Federation for breeding pigs. " 154 Those requirements are precisely 
related to the absence of ASF, for the last three years, in the entire territory of the European 
Union, with the exception of Sardinia.  
                                               
151 European Union's first written submission, para. 93; and announcement of FSVPS (Exhibit EU -16). 
152 List of returned consignments ( Exhibit EU -17); and Europ ean Union's first written submission, paras. 
94-96. 
153 Letter of FSVPS  of 29 January 2014 - FS-SA-8/1277 (Exhibit EU -14), para 3. See also Russia's letter 
to the European Union of 2 April 2014, FS -EN-8/5095 (Exhibit RUS -53), paras. 3 -4. 
154 FSVPS instructions to its Territorial Departments  of 29 January 2014  (Exhibit EU -161). (emphasis 
added)  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.65.  Furthermore, through this letter, the FSVPS alerted its Heads of Territorial Departments that 
"[w]hen taki ng a decision concerning the above mentioned products going from the other 
countries of the European Union with the mentioned veterinary certificates issued after 27.01.2014 
with violations of the requirements of Items 4.3 and 4.1, be governed by the legis lation of the 
Customs Union and the Russian Federation in the veterinary field."155  
7.66.  As explained by Russia in response to a  Panel  question, the legislation to which the FSVPS 
refers includes Customs Union Decision No. 317 (which authorizes refusal of consig nments of 
products when not accompanied by veterinary certificates conforming to the content of Common 
Veterinary requirements).156 
7.3.2.3.1.3   Letter of 14 February 2014 from the Ministry of Agriculture of Russia  
7.67.  The letter of 14 February 2014 confirms Russia's view th at the two detected cases of ASF in 
wild boar in Lithuania had an effect on the epizootic situation in the entire European Union. In 
particular, Russia's Minister of Agricultur e noted, through this letter, that the occurrence of the two 
outbreaks of ASF "c onsiderably changes the epizootic status not only of Lithuania, but of the whole 
EU".157 
7.68.  This letter also confirmed that "in order to avoid a complete halt of trade in pork products 
with the EU, Rosselkhoznadzor agreed upon the imports of safe finished deep heated products." 158 
7.3.2.3.1.4   Announcement of the FSVPS from 6 February 2014  
7.69.  The instructions and communications from FSVPS led to instances where border agents in 
Russia banned or rejected consignments of the products at issue. In particular, the European 
Union add uces evidence in respect of an FSVPS  announcement , dated 6 February 2014. Through a 
press clipping in its webpage, FSVPS announced the ban on the importation of pork products 
(frozen heads and hearts) of Austrian and German origin in the Tver and Pskov reg ions, because of 
alleged ASF risks in the entire territory of the European Union.159 
7.3.2.3.1.5   Instances of not allowing the importation into Russia of consignments of 
pork products from the European Union Member States after 25 January 2014  
7.70.  Furthermore, the European Union has adduced evidence that the products at issue were not 
allowed entry into Russia due to the unreliability of information regarding the ASF status of the 
European Union's territory in the accompanying veterinary certificates.160 Russia admits  that it 
"imposed import restrictions with respect to the consignments of pork products accompanied by 
veterinary certificates dated later than 27 January 2014 —a few days after Lithuania experienced 
its first ASF outbreak".161 
                                               
155 FSVPS instructions to its Territorial Departments  of 29 January 2014  (Exhibit EU -161).  
156 Russia's response to Panel question No. 278, para. 116. See Articles 3.14 and 3. 15 of Veterinary 
Control in Customs Union Decision No.  317 (Exhibit  RUS-386).  
157 Letter of 14 February 2014 – HF-12-26/1650 (Exhibit EU -15). 
158 Letter of 14 February 2014 – HF-12-26/1650 ( Exhibit EU -15). See also para. 7.143  below, referring 
to the product coverage of the alleged EU -wide ban.  
159 European Union's first written submission, para. 93; and announcement of FSVPS  (Exhibit EU -16). 
160 List of returned consignments of pig products ( Exhibit EU -17) attached as A nnex 2 to the Letter from 
FSVPS to the European Union (DG SANCO) Ref. FS -EN-7/14507 dated 6 August 2014 (Letter of FSVPS of 6 
August 2014 - FS-EN-7/14507) ( Exhibit EU -171). Besides the reasons stated in the right -hand side of the list 
of the returned consi gnments, the text of the letter of FSVPS of 6 August 2014 - FS-EN-7/14507 ( Exhibit EU -
171) confirms that one of the reasons for the rejection of the consignments was the "receipt of supervised 
products with veterinary certificates not guaranteeing the fulf ilment of veterinary and sanitary requirements 
and norms of the Customs Union". See also announcement of FSVPS ( Exhibit EU -16). The existence of the 
facts mentioned in this announcement appears to be confirmed by Russia (Russia's  response to Panel question  
No.61, para. 88).  
161 Russia's response to Panel question No. 25, para. 10. In its responses to Panel question  Nos. 68 and 
69 in relation to whether there was any possibility for entry of the products at issue other than by means of the 
veterinary certifica te, Russia indicated that generally, it requires, for the importation of pigs and pork products, 
the procurement of a veterinary certificate agreed to by the European Union and Russia. The only products to 
 WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.3.2.3.1.6   Other supporting evidence  
7.71.  The letter of FSVPS of 2 April 2014 to DG SANCO, recognizes the existence of the import 
restrictions of the products at issue into Russia, by stating:  
Rosselkhoznadzor has restricted imports of pigs and pork products from all parts of 
Lithuania and Poland but has not r estricted imports from the entire EU. The imposed 
restrictions have been specified in the EU -Russia pork product certificates initialed in 
2006. The EU has requested the validity of these certificates be extended until an 
agreement is reached on new veteri nary certificates that include requirements 
different from those of the Customs Union.  
The EU pork products cannot be de facto  certified. However, the European 
Commission has not yet initiated any discussion or drafting of veterinary certificates 
for trad e between the European Union and the Customs Union. 162 
7.72.  According to the European Union this also confirms "the existence of an EU -wide ban, under 
the guise of an alleged administrative problem relating to supposed compliance with the wording 
of the veterina ry certificates, in light of the change in the epidemiological situation regarding 
ASF".163  
7.73.  The European Union further explains that the instruction FS -SA-7/1275 of 29 January and 
the letter of 29 January 2014 FS -SA-8/1277 led to the practical absence of ne w attempts by 
exporters to ship the products at issue to the Russian border due to the cost associated with 
Russia's refusal of entry for these products.164  
7.3.2.3.1.7   Preliminary conclusion  
7.74.  In our view, the evidence reviewed in this section — which comprises the letter from FSVPS 
to DG SANCO,  the instructions from FSVPS to its Heads of territorial Departments, the letter  from 
the Ministry of Agriculture, Russia's rejection of consignments of the products at issue from the 
European Union,  and the ensuing chilling effec t on exports from the European Union to Russia — 
supports the European Union's assertion that certain actions undertaken by Russia amount to an 
import ban applied to the importation of certain pig products from the entire European Union. We 
now turn to the  question of whether the actions that amount to this import ban are attributable to 
Russia.  
7.3.2.3.2   Whether the alleged EU -wide ban is a measure attributable to Russia  
7.75.  The Appellate Body, when considering the issue of which measures of a Member are subject 
to WTO  dispute settlement, stated that "[t]he acts or omissions that are so attributable are, in the 
usual case, the acts or omissions of the organs of the state, including those of the executive 
branch."165 
7.76.  According to the evidence examined in paragraphs 7.60 to7.70 above, the ban on the 
importation of the products at issue from the European Union was triggered on 25 January 2014, 
and effective from 29 January 2014, followin g three particular events: (i) an outbreak of ASF in 
wild boar in Lithuania on 24 January 2014; (ii) the issuance of FSVPS instructions to its Heads of 
                                                                                                                                               
enter after the triggering date were those "that w ere already in the process of being transported or 
quarantined."  
162 Letter of FSVPS of 2 April 2014 –FS-EN-8/5095  (Exhibit RUS -53). 
163 European Union's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 30.  
164 European Union's Response to Panel Questi on No. 56, paras. 133 -134; second written submission, 
paras. 23 – 24. FSVPS instructions to its Territorial Departments  of 29 January 2014  (Exhibit EU -161) and 
Letter of FSVPS of 29 January 2014 – FS-SA-8/1277  (Exhibit EU -14). 
165 Appellate Body Report, US – Corrosion - Resistant Steel Sunset Review , para. 81. See also Appellate 
Body Reports, Australia – Apples , para. 171; US – Shrimp , para. 173; and Panel Reports, Canada – Renewable 
Energy / Feed -In Tariff Program , fn 37; and Australia – Salmon (Article 21.5 – Canada) , para. 7.12 and fn 146. WT/DS475/R  
 
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  Territorial Departments on 29 January 2014166; and (iii) a letter dated 29 January 2014 of FSVPS 
to DG SAN CO.167  
7.77.  As we observed in the previous section, the evidence submitted by the European Union 
indicates that Russia was in fact undertaking specific actions that rendered it impossible to import 
products at issue from the European Union into Russia. Those act ions consist ed of (i) instructions 
from the FSVPS dated 29 January 2014 to its Heads of Territorial Departments to pay special 
attention to compliance with the veterinary requirements in items 4.1 and 4.3 of the agreed 
veterinary certificates applicable to  the products at issue168; (ii) refusal of imports of the products 
at issue between 25 January 2014 and 11 February 2014169; and (iii) informing the European 
Union that if veterinary doctors in the EU member States did not stop certification of the products 
at issue these products would not be allowed into the territory of the member States of the 
Customs Union and would be subject to returns.170 
7.78.  These actions are further complemented by Russia's confirmation through the Letter from 
FSVPS to DG SANCO dated 6 Augu st 2014 that the FSVPS departments in the Tver and Pskov 
regions, the St Petersburg and the Leningradskaya regions, the Bryansk and Smolensk regions, 
Moscow, the Moscow and Tula regions, the Kaliningrad region, the Primorsky Krai and the Sakhalin 
region de tected violations in some consignments of pig products and issued return declarations.171 
The evidence we have examined, taken together, demonstrates the refusal of imports of certain 
products at issue from the European Union by the territorial departments o f FSVPS.  
7.79.  Paragraph 1 of Russia's Government Decree 327 provides that FSVPS "is the federal 
executive authority exercising supervision and surveillance functions in the field of veterinary 
medicine."172 Russia clarifies that, as set out in Decree 327, "diffe rent territorial departments are 
obliged to follow the directions from the Federal Government".173 Therefore we understand that 
FSVPS and its territorial departments are organs of Russia's government. Consistent with the rule 
of attribution outlined in parag raph 7.75 above, FSVPS's actions, and those of the heads  of its 
territorial departments, are attributable to Russia.174 
7.80.  It is true that, as of 25 January 2014, the entire territory of the European Union except for 
Sardinia is not  free of ASF — thus not matching the exact wording in the bilaterally agreed 
veterinary certificates. Nevertheless, it is Russia, rather than the European Union, that takes the 
action that gives effect to the import ban. We also note that the terms of the veterinary certificates 
are not what is required by the European Union for imports into its territory, but what is required 
by Russia for products to enter into its territory. In this respect, we recall that the SPS Agreement 
acknowledges the role played b y veterinary certificates in international trade. This idea is 
enshrined in recital 3 of the preamble of the SPS Agreement, according to which " sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures are often applied on the basis of bilateral agreements or protocols".  
                                               
166 FSVPS instructions to its Territorial Departments  of 29 January 2014  (Exhibit EU -161).  
167 Letter of FSVPS of 29 January 2014 – FS-SA-8/1277 ( Exhibit EU -14). 
168 FSVPS instructions to its Territorial Departments  of 29 Januar y 2014  (Exhibit EU -161). See also 
Russia's response to Panel question 278, para. 116, where Russia refers to the scope of application of those 
instructions.  
169 Announcement of FSVPS  (Exhibit EU -16); and List of returned consignments ( Exhibit EU -17). 
170 Letter of FSVPS of 29 January 2014 – FS-SA-8/1277 ( Exhibit EU -14), para 3. See also Letter of 
FSVPS of 2 April 2014 –FS-EN-8/5095 (Exhibit RUS -53), paras. 3 -4. 
171 Letter of FSVPS of 6 August 2014 - FS-EN-7/14507 ( Exhibit EU -171); List of returned consignments 
of pig products (EU -17) attached as Annex 2 to this letter.  
172 RF Government's Decree 327 of June 30, 2004 "Approval of the Regulation of the Federal Service for 
Veterinary and Phytosanitary Surveillance (Rosselkhoznadzor)", para. 1 (Exhibit RUS -352). See als o 
Regulations on the State Veterinary Supervision Approved by Decree 476 of the Government of Russia of June 
5, 2013 (rev. 24.03.2014) (Exhibit RUS -16), paras. 1 and 4(a); and Russia's response to Panel question No. 
276, para. 112.  
173 Russia's response to P anel question No. 276, para. 113, referring to RF Government's Decree 327 of 
June 30, 2004 "Approval of the Regulation of the Federal Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Surveillance 
(Rosselkhoznadzor)", para. 4 (Exhibit RUS -352).  
174 This rule has been  applied in the following WTO disputes: Appellate Body Report, US – Corrosion -
Resistant Steel Sunset Review,  para. 81; Panel Reports, US – 1916 Act (Japan) , para. 5.10; and US – 
Countervailing and Anti -dumping Duties (China) , para. 7.250.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.81.  This i s further confirmed by the manner in which Russia more broadly regulates the 
importation of the products at issue. Pursuant to sections 3.7, 6.1 and 6.3 of Customs Union 
Decision No. 317, imports of the products at issue into Russia require a veterinary ce rtificate 
issued by the authorities of the exporting country as well as an import permit issued by the 
importing country.175 Similarly, pursuant to section 6.2 of the Customs Union Decision No. 317, 
Russia also requires that imports of certain products at is sue come from enterprises including 
abattoirs/processing plants registered in Russia's Third country Establishment Register. In the 
process of approving registration of such enterprises, Russian officials may undertake inspection of 
the premises of those e nterprises, including the farms that supply them with raw materials.176  
7.82.  As described in section 6.3 of the Customs Union Decision No. 317, the requirements 
mentioned in the previous paragraph, together with the presence of a valid veterinary certificate, 
form the basis for the veterinary inspectors to decide to permit, suspend transportation, prohibit 
import, or return the respective products at issue.177 In our view, this means that imports of the 
products at issue into Russia require not only the presentatio n of the veterinary certificates, but 
also compliance with a number of requirements under the control of Russia's authorities.  
7.83.  Based on the evidence on the record, we find that following an outbreak of ASF in wild boar 
in Lithuania on 24 January 2014, Russ ia refused to accept imports of the products at issue from 
the entire European Union. This refusal is grounded on the inability of the European Union's 
veterinarians to certify that those products meet the requirement set out in the bilaterally agreed 
veterinary certificates. According to this requirement, the entire European Union, except for 
Sardinia, has to be ASF-free for three years for the products at issue to be imported into Russia. 
Russia's authorities actively enforce this requirement by rejecting  consignments of the products at 
issue that fail to satisfy this requirement. Th ese actions taken together constitute a composite 
measure , and this  is what the European Union refers to as an "EU -wide ban", and this is what 
constitutes a measure at issue at tributable to Russia. It is this measure that we will assess for its 
conformity with the relevant provisions of the SPS Agreement.  
7.3.2.4   Preliminary conclusion  
7.84.  In our view, the European Union has demonstrated the existence of the alleged EU -wide ban 
as a composi te measure which reflects Russia's refusal to accept certain imports of the products at 
issue from the European Union. The basis for Russia's refusal is the general requirement contained 
in the template veterinary certificates negotiated with the European Union. According to this 
general requirement, the whole of the European Union's territory, except for Sardinia, has to be 
ASF-free for three years in order for the products at issue to be imported into Russia. Following 
the ASF outbreaks in Lithuania, the products from the European Union do not meet that general 
requirement. Therefore, the actions by Russia to apply this general requirement to the current 
situation in the European Union results in an EU -wide ban of the products at issue attributable to 
Russia. 
7.3.3   Whether Russia's terms of accession limit the Panel's assessment of the European 
Union's claims in respect of the alleged EU -wide ban  
7.3.3.1   Introduction  
7.85.  The parties disagree on the extent to which the EU -wide ban is part of Russia's terms of 
accession; and, if it is part of Russia's terms of accession , on what the consequences of this would 
be. In this section the Panel will examine the parties' arguments in this respect and determine 
whether Russia's terms of accession limit in any way our assessment of the European Union's 
claims in respect of the EU -wide ban.  
                                               
175 Sections 3.7, 6 .1 and 6.3 of Veterinary Control in Customs Union Decision No.  317 (Exhibit RUS -
386). See also Russia's response to Panel question No. 260, paras. 24 -25. 
176 Russia's response to Panel question No. 260, paras. 26 -30. See also Table 41, Excerpts of list of 
goods subject to veterinary control. Working Party Report (Exhibit RUS -333).  
177 Pursuant to section 3.15 of the Customs Union Decision No. 317, those are the four decisions that a 
control official may take in respect of the controlled goods. Veterinary Contro l in Customs Union Decision 
No. 317 (Exhibit RUS -386). WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.3.3.2   Main arguments of the parties  
7.3.3.2.1   European Union  
7.86.   The European Union points to the fact that several of the mentioned certificates contain a 
footnote which provides that "administrative territories, zone s and time periods may be modified 
with a mutual agreement on the basis of the Memorandum of 4 April 2006 on zoning and 
regionalisation".178 Thus the European Union maintains that Russia "could have easily avoided 
trade disruptions by applying the OIE princi ples with regard to zoning and regionalization".179 
7.87.  The European Union rejects Russia's arguments regarding the consequences of the validity 
of the veterinary certificates. In the European Union's view, the reference to the veterinary 
certificates in Russia' s accession documents should be understood in the context of Russia's 
continuing obligation to adapt its measures to regional SPS characteristics.180 The European Union 
thus emphasizes that "[t]he fact that the veterinary certificates remain in use after Rus sia's 
accession is a distinct element from the fact that the terms of such certificates should be 
continuously adapted to the SPS characteristics of specific regions in particular cases".181 
7.88.  The European Union adds that paragraphs 892 and 893 of the Working Party Report on the 
Accession of Russia "cannot by any means be construed as preventing the adaptation of the 
bilateral certificates to the ASF regionalisation measures in the EU".182 The European Union notes 
that those paragraphs of the Working Party Report  reflect the concern expressed by Members on 
the mandatory requirement to use common Customs Union Veterinary Certificates for the imports 
of certain products. In that context, those paragraphs reflect Russia's "commitment not to make 
mandatory such CU Vet erinary Certificates, maintaining the existing bilateral certificates (such as 
those between the EU and Russia), as well as their subsequent amendments".183  
7.3.3.2.2   Russia  
7.89.  Russia states that the validity of the EU -Russian veterinary certificates is "a term" of 
Russia's WTO membership.184 In Russia's view, "the recognition of the validity of these certificates 
implies the consistency of such certificates with the Russian Federation's obligations under the 
WTO Agreements, including the SPS Agreement."185 According to Russ ia, the validity and WTO 
consistency of such certificates, including their subsequent bilaterally agreed amendments, was a 
"term" of Russia's WTO membership by the interplay of paragraph 893 and paragraph 1450 of the 
Working Party Report on the Accession o f Russia, which refers to Protocol on the Accession of the 
Russian Federation (Russia's Accession Protocol).186 
7.90.  Russia posits that, by adopting Russia's Accession Protocol and the commitments to which it 
is referring (e.g., veterinary certificates), the Euro pean Union agreed that the form of veterinary 
certificates concluded between the European Union and Russia shall remain valid until the new 
certificates between the Customs Union and the European Union are agreed. Such validity also 
                                               
178 European Union's second written submission, para. 28; and response to Panel question No. 79, para. 
153. 
179 European Union's second written submission, para. 28; and response to Panel question No. 79,  para. 
153. 
180 European Union's second written submission, para. 27, (referring to Article 6.1 of the SPS Agreement 
and Appellate Body Report, India – Agricultural Products , para. 5.154).  
181 European Union's second written submission, para. 27.  
182 European Uni on's comments on Russia's response to Panel question No. 254, para. 12.  
183 European Union's comments on Russia's response to Panel question No. 254, para. 13.  
184 Russia's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 50; response to Panel questi ons 
Nos. 72, 73 and 82, paras. 109, 112, 113 and 135; and second written submission, para. 178.  
185 Russia's response to Panel question No. 73, para. 111  
186 Russia's opening statement, para. 50; second written submission, paras. 177 -178; Report of the 
Working  Party on the Accession of the Russian Federation, WT/ACC/RUS/70 & WT/MIN(11)/2, circulated 17 
November 2011 (Exhibit RUS -159), para. 893; Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the Russian 
Federation, WT/ACC/RUS/70 & WT/MIN(11)/2, circulated 17 N ovember 2011, para. 1450, incorporated by 
reference (Exhibit RUS -159), Protocol of Accession of the Russian Federation, WT/MIN(11)/24 & WT/L/839 
(Exhibit RUS -160), para. 3; Russia refers to Appellate Body Report s, China – Rare Earths , para. 5.27 
(interpret ing Article XII:1 of the Marrakesh Agreement and noting that "the 'terms' of accession . . . are not 
defined".)  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  implies that the reject ion of consignments on the basis of these veterinary certificates is consistent 
with the disciplines of the SPS Agreement.187  
7.91.  Russia argues that because up to the end of January 2014 there had been no agreement to 
introduce veterinary certificates at the Cu stoms Union level, it was under the obligation, pursuant 
to the terms of its WTO accession, to apply the certificates bilaterally agreed with the European 
Union.188  
7.92.  In Russia's view, the Panel could follow the analytical framework developed by the Appellate  
Body in China – Rare Earths to determine the relationship between Russia's Accession Protocol and 
Russia's commitments under the SPS Agreement. Russia considers that the consequence of such 
an analysis would be a finding that Russia's specific commitments  to maintain the application of 
the bilateral certificates, as a term of its WTO accession, "negates all the claims advanced by the 
European Union"189 under the SPS Agreement in respect of the EU -wide ban. This is because all of 
those claims are derived, dir ectly or indirectly, from the application of Russia's terms of 
accession.190  
7.93.  Based on these arguments, Russia requests the Panel to find that the continued validity of 
the certificates is a term of Russia's WTO membership, and that the European Union's clai ms 
derived from them should fail.191 Russia considers that if the Panel were to decide otherwise, its 
recommendations and rulings on this matter would lack sufficient legal basis.192  
7.3.3.3   Analysis by the Panel  
7.94.  The Panel is called upon to examine the relationship between the terms of Russia's 
accession to the WTO and the European Union's claims in respect of the EU -wide ban. In order to 
assess this relationship, we will first review any guidance available in prior panel and Appellate 
Body findings in respect of the  relationship between a Member's Accession Protocol and that 
Member's rights and obligations under the Marrakesh Agreement and the Multilateral Trade 
Agreements annexed thereto. We will then examine the terms of Russia's accession as they are 
relevant to t his dispute. Lastly, we will assess whether the terms of Russia's accession to the WTO 
limit in any way our evaluation of the European Union's claims in respect of the EU -wide ban.  
7.3.3.3.1   Relationship between a Member's Accession Protocol and its obligations und er 
a particular covered agreement  
7.95.  Article XII of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization 
(Marrakesh Agreement), titled "Accession", provides:  
1. Any State or separate customs territory possessing full autonomy in the conduct of 
its external commercial relations and of the other matters provided for in this 
Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements may accede to this Agreement, on 
terms to be agreed between it and the WTO. Such accession shall apply to this 
Agreement and the M ultilateral Trade Agreements annexed thereto.  
2. Decisions on accession shall be taken by the Ministerial Conference. The Ministerial 
Conference shall approve the agreement on the terms of accession by a two -thirds 
majority of the Members of the WTO.  
3. Accession to a Plurilateral Trade Agreement shall be governed by the provisions of 
that Agreement.  
                                               
187 Russia's response to Panel question No. 73, para. 118; and second written submission, paras. 177 
and 179.  
188 Russia's response to Panel questio n No. 274, para. 102.  
189 Russia's response to Panel question No. 274, para. 109.  
190 Russia's response to Panel question No. 274, para. 109. See also, paras. 105 -108. 
191 Russia's response to Panel question No. 274, para. 110.See also second written submission,  para. 
183. 
192 Russia's response to Panel question No. 274, para. 110.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.96.  Pursuant to this provision, on 16 December 2011 the Ministerial Conference decided that 
"the Russian Federation may accede to the WTO Agreement on the terms an d conditions set out in 
the Protocol annexed to this Decision" .193 Paragraph 1.2 of Russia's Accession Protocol, which is 
analogous to the corresponding paragraph in the Accession Protocol of other Members194, provides 
that: 
The WTO Agreement to which the Russ ian Federation accedes shall be the WTO 
Agreement, including the Explanatory Notes to that Agreement, as rectified, amended 
or otherwise modified by such legal instruments as may have entered into force 
before the date of entry into force of this Protocol.  This Protocol, which shall include 
the commitments referred to in paragraph 1450 of the Working Party Report, shall be 
an integral part of the WTO Agreement.  
7.97.  Previous panels and the Appellate Body have examined the relationship of a Member's 
Accession Pr otocol with certain provisions of the Multilateral Trade Agreements annexed to the 
Marrakesh Agreement.195 The latest decision in this line of cases came in the Appellate Body 
report s in China – Rare Earths . In that dispute, China appealed the panel's findin gs in respect of 
the relationship between Paragraph 1.2 of China's Accession Protocol and the Marrakesh 
Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements. China argued that Paragraph 1.2 of its 
Accession Protocol and Article XII:1 of the Marrakesh Agreement meant that a specific provision in 
China's Accession Protocol is an integral part of the Marrakesh Agreement or one of the Multilateral 
Trade Agreements to which it intrinsically relates.196 The Appellate Body rejected China's 
interpretation and stated that:   
In our view, Paragraph 1.2 of China's Accession Protocol serves to build a bridge 
between the package of Protocol provisions and the package of existing rights and 
obligations under the WTO legal framework. Nonetheless, neither obligations nor 
rights may  be automatically transposed from one part of this legal framework into 
another. The fact that Paragraph 1.2 builds such a bridge is only the starting point, 
and does not in itself answer the questions of whether there is an objective link 
between  an individual provision  in China's Accession Protocol and existing obligations 
under the Marrakesh Agreements and the Multilateral Trade Agreements, and whether 
China may rely on an exception provided for in those agreements to justify a breach 
of such Protocol provision. Such questions must be answered through a thorough 
analysis of the relevant provisions on the basis of the customary rules of treaty 
interpretation and the circumstances of the dispute. The analysis must start with the 
text of the relevant provisi on in China's Accession Protocol and take into account its 
context, including that provided by the Protocol itself and by relevant provisions of the 
Accession Working Party Report, and by the agreements in the WTO legal framework.  
The analysis must also ta ke into account the overall architecture of the WTO system 
as a single package of rights and obligations and any other relevant interpretative 
elements, and must be applied to the circumstances of each dispute, including the 
measure at issue and the nature  of the alleged violation.197 (emphasis added)  
7.98.  The issue we are dealing with here is clearly not identical to the issue addressed in China – 
Rare Earths : we are not addressing whether a Member may rely on an exception provided for in 
the Marrakesh Agreement  and the Multilateral Trade Agreements to justify a breach of an 
                                               
193 Protocol of Accession of the Russian Federation, WT/MIN(11)/24 & WT/L/839 (Exhibit RUS -160). See 
WT/MIN(11)/24 -WT/L/839.  
194 Appellate Body Report s, China – Rare Earths , para. 5.40.  For instance, paragraph 1.2 of China's 
Accession Protocol provides:  
2. The WTO Agreement to which China accedes shall be the WTO Agreement as rectified, 
amended or otherwise modified by such legal instruments as may have entered into force before 
the date of accession. This Protocol, which shall include the commitments referred to in 
paragraph  342 of the Working Party Report, shall be an integral part of the WTO  Agreement.  
195 Appellate Body Reports, China – Rare Earths , paras. 5.1 -5.74; China – Raw Materials , paras. 270 -
307; China – Publications and Audiovisual Products , paras. 205 -233; Panel Reports, - US – Shrimp II (Viet 
Nam) , paras. 7.173 -7.193; China – Rare Earths , paras. 7.73 -7.99; China – Raw Materials , paras. 7.116 -7.160; 
China – Publications and Audiovi sual Products , para. 7.281.  
196 Appellate Body Report s, China – Rare Earths , para. 5.73.  
197 Appellate Body Report s, China – Rare Earths , para. 5.74.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  Accession Protocol provision . Rather, we are asked to examine whether Russia can rely on its 
terms of accession to effectively shield the measure at issue from further scrutiny under the DSU 
and the SPS Agreement.  Nevertheless, taking into consideration the similarities in the text of 
Paragraph 1.2 in China's Accession Protocol with the text of paragraph 1.2 of Russia's Accession 
Protocol quoted above, we consider the Appellate Body's guidanc e appropriate in undertaking  an 
examination of Russia's Accession Protocol. In that respect, we first turn to review the terms of 
Russia's Accession Protocol invoked by Russia  in support of its argument that the application of the 
bilateral veterinary expo rt certificates is covered by the terms of its accession to the WTO.  
7.99.  After reviewing the text of the relevant provisions of Russia's Accession Protocol, we will 
then examine the parties' views on their efforts to amend the bilaterally agreed veterinary ex port 
certificates. With that context, we will move on to assess the merits of Russia's argument in 
respect of the validity of the bilateral veterinary export certificates and whether our findings have 
any implications for the European Union's claims in res pect of the EU -wide ban.  
7.3.3.3.2   Terms of Russia's accession to the WTO in respect of the application of 
bilateral veterinary export certificates  
7.100.   In support of its argument, Russia refers to paragraphs 2 and 3 of its Accession Protocol, 
as well as to paragraphs 89 3 and 1450 of the Working Party Report on the Accession of Russia. In 
response to Russia's arguments, the European Union also refers to paragraph 892 of the Working 
Party Report.198  
7.101.   The first three paragraphs of Russia's Accession Protocol199 provide:  
PART I - GENERAL  
1. Upon entry into force of this Protocol pursuant to paragraph 8, the Russian 
Federation accedes to the WTO Agreement pursuant to Article XII of that Agreement 
and thereby becomes a Member of the WTO.  
2. The WTO  Agreement to which the Russian F ederation accedes shall be the 
WTO Agreement, including the Explanatory Notes to that  Agreement, as rectified, 
amended or otherwise modified by such legal instruments as may have entered into 
force before the date of entry into force of this Protocol. This  Protocol, which shall 
include the commitments referred to in paragraph 1450 of the Working Party Report, 
shall be an integral part of the WTO  Agreement.  
3. Except as otherwise provided for in paragraph 1450 of the Working Party Report, 
those obligations i n the Multilateral Trade  Agreements annexed to the 
WTO Agreement that are to be implemented over a period of time starting with the 
entry into force of that  Agreement shall be implemented by the Russian Federation as 
if it had accepted that  Agreement on th e date of its entry into force.  
7.102.   Paragraphs 892, 893 and 1450 of the Working Party Report on the Accession of Russia200 
provide:  
892. Members expressed concern regarding a mandatory requirement to use a 
common CU [Customs Union] Veterinary Certificate. They noted that currently, some 
exporting countries had veterinary certificates that included requirements that differed 
significantly from those in the common form and the veterinary requirements of the 
Russian Federation. These differences reflected condition s in the exporting country or 
region, in line with Article 6 of the WTO SPS Agreement and other international 
agreements. These Members sought confirmation that the Russian Federation and its 
CU partners would negotiate specific certificates with requireme nts that could differ 
from the CU Common Requirements and that export certificates currently in effect 
                                               
198 See paras. 7.88, 7.89, and 7.92 above.  
199 Protocol of Accession of the Russian Federation, WT/MIN(11)/24 & WT/L/839 (Exhibit RUS -160).  
200 Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the Russian Federation, WT/ACC/RUS/70 & 
WT/MI N(11)/2, circulated 17 November 2011 (Exhibit RUS -159).  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  with the Russian Federation would remain valid until CU replacement had been 
agreed. Moreover, if there was no certificate governing trade in a regulated  product, 
these Members sought confirmation that an exporting country could negotiate a 
certificate with the CU Parties that included requirements that differed from the CU 
Common Requirements.  
893. The representative of the Russian Federation confirmed t hat the Russian 
Federation and its CU Parties would work with interested Members to negotiate 
veterinary certificates that included requirements that differed from the CU common 
form and specific CU Common Requirements, if an exporting country made a 
subst antiated request prior to 1 January 2013 to negotiate such a veterinary export 
certificate. Bilateral veterinary export certificates initialled by one of the CU Parties 
before 1  July 2010, as well as any subsequent amendments to such certificates 
agreed wi th the authorised body of such CU Party, would remain valid for exports 
from the relevant country into the customs territory of the CU until an export 
certificate was agreed with a CU Party based on the agreed positions of the other CU 
Parties.  Bilateral v eterinary export certificates initialled by one of the CU Parties 
between 1 July 2010 and 1 December 2010 would remain valid for import and 
circulation of relevant goods, only in the territory of the CU Party that initialled the 
certificate, until a bilate ral veterinary certificate was agreed with a CU Party based on 
the agreed positions of the other CU Parties. These new certificates would include 
terms on matters dealt within an international treaty that were no less favourable 
than the corresponding term s on that matter in such treaty that was concluded prior 
to 1 July 2010 between a Party and the relevant third country. While such bilateral 
veterinary export certificates could contain requirements that differed from the CU 
Common Form and specific provis ions of the Common Requirements, such certificates 
had to ensure the appropriate level of protection as determined by the CU Parties. The 
Working Party took note of these commitments.  
… 
1450. The Working Party took note of the explanations and statements o f the Russian 
Federation concerning its foreign  trade regime, as reflected in this Report. The 
Working Party took note of the commitments by the Russian Federation in relation to 
certain specific matters which are reproduced in paragraphs … 893 … The  Worki ng 
Party took note that these commitments had been incorporated in paragraph 2 of the 
Protocol of Accession of the Russian Federation to the WTO. (emphasis added)  
7.103.   We first note that according to the highlighted text of paragraph 893 of the Working Party 
Report: "[b]ilateral veterinary export certificates initialled by one of the CU Parties before 
1 July 2010, as well as any subsequent amendments to such certificates  agreed with the 
authorised body of such CU Party, would remain valid for exports from the re levant country into 
the customs territory of the CU until an export certificate was agreed with a CU Party based on the 
agreed positions of the other CU Parties." (emphasis added)  
7.104.   Russia argues that according to this language, as informed by paragraph 892,  "the Russian 
Federation is not allowed to require veterinary certificates issued other than agreed bilaterally if 
there is a bilaterally agreed certificate with any Member."201 Russia also states that paragraph 893 
"neither permits nor precludes the amendme nt of certificates while maintaining their validity".202 
7.105.   We recall the Appellate Body considered in China – Rare Earths that questions surrounding 
the relationship between the rights and obligations in China's Accession Protocol and those arising 
from the Mu ltilateral Trade Agreements "must be answered through a thorough analysis of the 
relevant provisions on the basis of the customary rules of treaty interpretation and the 
circumstances of the dispute."203 Bearing that in mind, in our view, Russia's interpreta tion does not 
accord with the text of paragraph 893 of the Working Party Report. Although the text of paragraph 
893, as read in conjunction with paragraph 892, refers to the validity of bilateral export certificates 
                                               
201 Russia's response to Panel question No. 274, para. 105.  
202 Russia's response to Panel question No. 274, para. 103.  
203 Appellate Body Report s, China – Rare Earths , para. 5.74.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  initialled before 1  July 2010, it also r efers to the validity of subsequent amendments to those 
certificates. In addition, the expression "would remain valid" refers to a particular purpose, that is, 
"for exports". This would seem to imply that Russia's commitment is to acknowledge the validity of 
the bilateral veterinary export certificates or their amendments for those imports from Members 
into Russia.  
7.106.   In EC – Bananas III , the Appellate Body examine d the scope of application of the Lomé 
Waiver.204 Among the legal questions the Appellate Body addr essed was whether such a waiver 
waived compliance with the obligations pursuant to Articles I:1 and XIII of the GATT 1994. When 
answering this question, the Appellate Body noted that  
The wording of the Lomé Waiver is clear and unambiguous. By its precise t erms, it 
waives only "the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article I of the General Agreement  … to 
the extent necessary" to do what is "required " by the relevant provisions of the Lomé 
Convention. The Lomé Waiver  does not refer to, or mention in any way, any o ther 
provision of the GATT 1994 or any other covered agreement. Neither the 
circumstances surrounding the negotiation of the Lomé Waiver, nor the need to 
interpret it so as to permit it to achieve its objectives, allow us to disregard this clear 
and plain wording of the Lomé Waiver by extending its scope to include a waiver from 
the obligations under Article XIII.205  
7.107.   In EC – Bananas III (Article  21.5 – Ecuador II)/(Article  21.5 – US) the Appellate Body 
further explained the nature and function of waivers wit hin the context of the WTO:  
In our view, the function of a waiver is to relieve a Member, for a specified period of 
time, from a particular obligation provided for in the covered agreements, subject to 
the terms, conditions, justifying exceptional circumst ances or policy objectives 
described in the waiver decision.  Its purpose is not to modify existing provisions in 
the agreements, let alone create new law or add to or amend the obligations under a 
covered agreement or Schedule.  Therefore, waivers are exc eptional in nature, subject 
to strict disciplines and should be interpreted with great care.206 
7.108.   In our view, this Appellate Body reasoning is useful in informing our assessment of 
Russia's arguments in respect of its Protocol of Accession. In particular, we consider that if a 
Member claims that a provision within its Protocol of Accession allows that Member to depart from 
other obligations enshrined in the Multilateral Trade Agreements, the text of such a provision 
should at least have clear and unambiguous l anguage to that effect. We thus consider that for a 
provision in Russia's Accession Protocol to serve as a basis to excuse Russia from complying with 
any of its substantive obligations under the Multilateral Trade Agreements, it would at least be 
necessary  for such a provision to have clear and unambiguous language to this effect.  
7.109.   The text of paragraph 893 does not refer in any way to Russia's substantive obligations 
under the SPS Agreement. Contrary to what Russia seems to imply, the text and context of 
paragraph 893 do not provide that the direct or indirect application of the veterinary requirements 
contained in the bilateral veterinary export certificates, in any situation, is automatically consistent 
with Russia's rights and obligations under the SPS A greement. Furthermore, we do not find any 
textual or contextual interpretative support for Russia's suggested interpretation of paragraph 893, 
nor can this be inferred from the language used in that paragraph.   
7.110.   We recall that paragraphs 1.2 and 1.3 of Rus sia's Accession Protocol each make explicit 
reference to paragraph 1450  of the Working Party Report . By virtue of Paragraph 1.2, Russia's 
Protocol of Accession, "which shall include the commitments referred to in paragraph 1450 of the 
Working Party Report,  shall be an integral part of the WTO Agreement."  Paragraph 1.3 points to 
the exceptional nature of the contents of paragraph 1450, beginning with the phrase: "Except as 
otherwise provided for in paragraph 1450 of the Working Party Report…".  We note that  paragraph 
1450 contains an explicit reference to paragraph 893.  We have found that paragraph 893 does 
not contain any clear and unambiguous language that would have the effect of shielding the 
                                               
204 Appellate Body Report, EC – Bananas III , paras. 164 -166. 
205 Appellate Body Report, EC – Bananas III , para. 183.  
206 Appellate Body Report, EC – Bananas III ( Article  21.5 – Ecuador II)/(Article  21.5 – US), para. 382.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  measure at issue from further scrutiny under the DSU and the SPS Agreement.  Accordingly, the 
explicit reference to paragraph 893 in paragraph 1450 does not lead us to consider that paragraph 
1450 "provides otherwise" or has any exceptional effect in respect of the application of the 
veterinary requirements containe d in the bilateral veterinary export certificates.  
7.111.   We are therefore not persuaded by Russia's argument that its terms of accession to the 
WTO render the direct or indirect application of the bilateral veterinary export certificates 
consistent with its obli gations under the SPS Agreement.  
7.3.3.3.3   Parties' efforts to re -negotiate the content of the bilaterally agreed veterinary 
certificates  
7.112.   The parties have extensively explained to the Panel the various efforts they have 
undertaken to review the requirement of the b ilaterally agreed veterinary certificates.207 It is clear 
to us that both parties have attempted to adjust the text of the bilateral veterinary export 
certificates for the products at issue in light of the ASF situation in the European Union since 
24 January  2014. The Panel welcomes those efforts and agrees with the sentiment Dr Thiermann 
expressed during the expert hearing, regarding the importance of trust between trading partners 
in order to find alternatives that would allow the resumption of safe trade.208 However, the Panel 
consider s that the parties' negotiating efforts to negotiate or their lack thereof are not dispositive 
of its task to undertake an objective assessment of the matter before it, as required by Article 11 
of the DSU.  
7.3.3.3.4   Whether the terms of  Russia's accession to the WTO limit the Panel's 
assessment of the European Union's claims in respect of the EU -wide ban  
7.113.   In the light of Russia's argument regarding the validity of the bilateral veterinary export 
certificates, we need to determine if our c onclusions in respect of the terms of Russia's accession 
limits, in any way, our analysis of the European Union's claims in respect of the EU -wide ban.  
7.114.   In section 7.3.3.3.2  above we explained why we are not persuaded by Russia 's argument 
that the continued validity of the bilateral veterinary export certificates is a term of Russia's WTO 
membership , and that the European Union's claims derived from them should fail.209 It is clear to 
us that paragraph 893 of the Working Party Rep ort, read in conjunction with Russia's Accession 
Protocol, does not refer to the consistency of measures adopted, directly or indirectly, in respect of 
the bilateral veterinary export certificates with Russia's obligations under the SPS Agreement.  
7.115.   In addi tion, those provisions are silent in respect of any potential implications of the 
continued validity of the veterinary certificates in WTO dispute settlement. We therefore find no 
limit in Russia's terms of accession to assessing the merits of the European  Union's claims brought 
in respect of the EU -wide ban.  
7.3.3.4   Conclusion  
7.116.   Based on the foregoing, the Panel finds, in Russia's terms of accession, no limitation to 
assessing the merits of the European Union claims brought in respect of the EU -wide ban.  
                                               
207 European Union's responses to Panel question No s. 21, 54, 184, 1 85, 186, and 231; and Russia's 
responses to Panel question No s. 39, 40, 54, 73, 184, 185 and 186; and comments to the European Union's 
response to Panel question No. 231. See also EU -Russian Certificate Negotiations Chronology (Exhibit RUS -
218).  
208 Dr Thier mann, Transcript , paras.  1.275, 1.368 and 1.454.  
209 Russia's response to Panel question No. 274, para. 110.  See also second written submission, 
para. 183. WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.3.4   Whether t he measures in respect of the imports from Latvia and Estonia fall 
within the Panel's terms of reference  
7.3.4.1   Introduction  
7.117.   As mentioned in section 2.2 above , in its panel request (dated 27 June 2014 and circulated 
30 June 2014), the European Union refers to res trictions on imports from Lithuania and from 
Poland.210 The European Union's first written submission also refers to restrictions on imports from 
Latvia (adopted on 27 June 2014) and from Estonia (adopted on 11 September 2014), neither of 
which were mentione d in the European Union's panel request.  
7.118.   Russia does not challenge the restrictions on imports from Latvia and from Estonia being 
within the Panel's terms of reference. On the contrary, Russia stated that "both Parties have 
agreed that it is appropriate f or the Panel to consider the European Union claims as including a 
challenge to the Latvian and Estonian import bans  …, which were not included in the Panel 
request".211 
7.119.   Despite the parties' agreement, it is incumbent on the Panel to determine whether the 
restrictions on imports from Latvia and Estonia are properly within its terms of reference. The 
Panel's terms of reference, as set out in the panel request, delimit the Panel's jurisdiction.212 As 
established by the Appellate Body, it is a panel's own responsib ility, even if not raised by the 
parties, to examine issues that go to the root of its jurisdiction.213 Thus, even though Russia has 
not raised any direct objection to the measures regarding Estonia and Latvia being within the 
Panel's terms of reference, the  Panel will consider this question on its own initiative.  
7.3.4.2   Main arguments of the parties  
7.3.4.2.1   European Union  
7.120.   The European Union explains that the measures in respect of the imports of products from 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland  are "distinct but closel y linked".214 According to the 
European Union, the individual import bans with respect to Estonia and Latvia extend the product 
coverage of the EU -wide ban and are thus an extension that falls within the scope of the panel 
request, when read in its totality.215 
7.121.   In response to Panel questioning concerning the lack of explicit reference in the panel 
request to the measures pertaining to Estonia and Latvia, the European Union maintains that the 
measures regarding Estonia and Latvia fall within the category of "ame ndments, supplements, 
extensions and implementing measures" referred to in its panel request.216 According to the 
European Union, these measures constitute an extension of the product coverage of the EU -wide 
ban217 and are therefore within the Panel's terms of  reference.218  
                                               
210 European Union's panel request, pp. 1 -2. See para. 2.9 above . 
211 Russia's response to Panel question No. 279, para. 122.  
212 Appellate Body Reports, China – HP-SSST (Japan)  / China – HP-SSST (EU) , para. 5.12.  
213 Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Corn Syrup (Article 21.5 – US), paras. 36 and 53.  
214 European Union's op ening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 24; and response to 
Panel question No. 57, para. 135.  
215 European Union's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 26 -27; and second 
written submission, paras. 17 -20. 
216 European Uni on's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 26 -27; response to 
Panel question No. 55, para. 129; and second written submission, paras. 17 -18. 
217 European Union's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 26; response to Panel 
question No. 55, para. 128; and second written submission, paras. 17.  
218 European Union's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 27; response to Panel 
question No. 55, para. 131; and second written submission, paras. 18.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.3.4.2.2   Russia  
7.122.   Russia has not explicitly challenged the European Union's argument that the measures 
regarding Estonia and Latvia are within the Panel's terms of reference.219 Russia stated that "both 
Parties have agreed that it is appropriate for the P anel to consider the European Union claims as 
including a challenge to the Latvian and Estonian import bans … which were not included in the 
Panel request".220 
7.3.4.3   Analysis by the Panel  
7.123.   Pursuant to Article 7 of the DSU, a panel's terms of reference are governed  by the panel 
request, unless the parties agree otherwise.221 As the Appellate Body has found "Under Article 6.2, 
the request for the establishment of a panel must identify the 'specific measure at issue', which 
together with the 'legal basis of the complain t', constitutes the 'matter referred to the DSB' that 
forms the basis of the panel's terms of reference."222 In other words, a panel request, including the 
measures identified therein, will determine the scope of the Panel's jurisdiction. 223 
7.124.   Article 6.2 of th e DSU requires that the panel request (i) is made in writing; (ii) indicates 
whether consultations were held; (iii) identifies the specific measures at issue; and (iv) provides a 
brief summary of the legal basis of the complaint sufficient to present the p roblem clearly.224  
7.125.   The European Union's panel request , which  was made in writing , indicated that on 30 April 
and 1 May 2014 consultations were held between the European Union and Russia.225 Thus, the first 
two requirements under Article 6.2 are satisfied by t he European Union's panel request.  
7.126.   In respect of the third requirement under Article 6.2, the identification of the specific 
measures at issue, the Panel recalls that the European Union's panel request clearly identifies the 
import restrictions on the pro ducts at issue from Lithuania and Poland. The European Union's panel 
request refers to the measure regarding Lithuania as "[a] ban on imports from Lithuania as 
described in the administrative notice from the Russian Federal Service for Veterinary and 
Phyto sanitary Supervision of 25 January 2014 (FS -EN-8/1023)", while it refers to the measure 
regarding Poland as "[a] ban on imports from Poland as described in the administrative notice 
from the Russian Federal Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Supervis ion of 
27 February  2014 (FS -NV-8/2972)". The European Union also refers to an amendment of these 
import restrictions through administrative notice from the Russian Service for Veterinary and 
Phytosanitary Supervision of 2 April 2014 (FS -EN-8/5081).226   
7.127.   In respect of the fourth requirement under Article 6.2, the European Union's panel request 
connects the EU -wide ban and the measures on the imports of the products at issue from Lithuania 
and Poland with the provisions of the covered agreements it claims to ha ve been violated. The 
European Union expressly mentions the provisions of the SPS Agreement that in its view are 
infringed by the measures at issue. Although this part of the panel request does not refer to each 
of the measures separately (with the excepti on of the measures alleged to violate Article 7 and 
Annex B), the explanation included by the European Union in respect of each of its claims indicates 
why and how, in its view, the measures at issue, including the EU -wide ban, breach certain 
                                               
219 However,  it set out the conditions under which a measure that post -dates the panel request could be 
deemed within the Panel's terms of reference. Russia's response to Panel question No. 74, paras. 119 -123. 
220 Russia's response to Panel question No. 279, para. 122.  
221 Appellate Body Report, US – Carbon Steel , paras. 124. See also, Appellate Body Report s, Argentina – 
Import Measures , para. 5.11.  
222 Appellate Body Report s, Argentina – Import Measures , para. 5.11.  
223 Appellate Body Reports, China – HP-SSST (Japan)  / China – HP-SSST (EU) , para. 5.12. See also 
Appellate Body Report, Guatemala – Cement I , para. 72.  
224 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Dairy , para. 120. See also Panel Report, China – Intellectual Property 
Rights , para. 7.4. For an appraisal of how a Panel should ex amine the satisfaction of these requirements in any 
given case, see Appellate Body Reports, US – Countervailing and Anti -Dumping Measures (China) , paras. 4.8 -
4.9; Argentina – Import Measures , paras. 5.40 -5.42; and China – Raw Materials , para. 220.  
225 Europe an Union's panel request, p. 1.  
226 European Union's panel request, pp. 1 -2. WT/DS475/R  
 
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  provisions of  the SPS Agreement.227 In our view, this summary complies with the fourth 
requirement under Article  6.2. 
7.128.   The main issue before us here flows from the third requirement of Article 6.2 in respect of 
the import restrictions of the products at issue from Latvia and Estonia.  We consider this now.  
7.129.   With regard to  the identification of the specific measures at issue (the third requirement 
under Article 6.2), the Appellate Body has observed that "the determination of whether a panel 
request is 'sufficiently precise' requires scrutiny of the panel request 'as a whole, and on the basis 
of the language used'."228 Such a determination, which is done on a case -by-case basis, may 
depend "on the particular context in which those measures exist and operate, and may require 
exam ining the extent to which those measures are capable of being precisely identified" .229 
7.130.   In previous cases, panels and the Appellate Body have examined whether a measure not 
explicitly mentioned in a panel request can still constitute a measure at issue in a particular 
dispute.230 The Appellate Body has clarified that, generally, "measures included in a panel's terms 
of reference must be measures that are in existence at the time of the establishment of the 
panel."231 The Appellate Body has also found that, except ionally, "a panel has the authority to 
examine a legal instrument enacted after the establishment of the panel that amends a measure 
identified in the panel request, provided that the amendment does not change the essence of the 
identified measure."232 For this exception to apply, the panel request should be broad enough to 
include amendments to a measure.233 
7.131.   Previous panels have also stated that a measure not expressly identified in a panel request 
may satisfy the requirements of Article 6.2 when it has a clea r and close relationship to a measure 
described in the panel request so that the responding party can reasonably be found to have 
received adequate notice of the claims asserted by the complaining party.234 The panel in Japan – 
Film noted that: "only if a 'm easure' is subsidiary or closely related to a specifically identified 
'measure' will notice be adequate" .235 
7.132.   Further guidance concerning a panel's review of closely linked measures that postdate a 
panel request can be found in EC – Fasteners (China) . In that  case, the panel examined whether 
an EC Council Regulation repealing and replacing the earlier EC Council Regulation identified by 
China in its panel request fell within its terms of reference. China's panel request did not include 
any broad reference to m easures amending or subsequent to those identified therein. Also, the 
subsequent EC Council Regulation contained – in almost identical terms and in identical substance 
– the same provision as the Council Regulation identified in China's panel request. The EC – 
Fasteners (China) panel found that even though China's panel request did not refer to amending or 
                                               
227 European Union's panel request, pp. 2-6. 
228 Appellate Body Reports,  Argentina – Import Measures , para. 5.41 (quoting Appellate Body Report, 
EC and certain member States – Large Civ il Aircraft , para. 641 ). See also Appellate Body Report,  China – HP-
SSST (Japan)  / China – HP-SSST (EU) , para. 5.13 (quoting Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners  (China) , 
para. 562) . 
229 Appellate Body Report s, Argentina – Import Measures , para. 5.4 1 (quoti ng Appellate Body Report s, 
China – Raw Materials , para. 220).  
230 See Appellate Body Report, Chile – Price Band System , paras. 143 -144. See also Panel Reports, 
Argentina – Financial Services , paras. 7.26 -7.33; India – Agricultural Products , para. 7.77, EC – IT Products , 
para. 7.140; and Japan – Film, para. 10.8; and Panel Preliminary Ruling, Australia – Tobacco Plain Packaging 
(Dominican Republic) , fn 139 to para. 5.16.  
231 Appellate Body Report, EC – Selected Customs Matters , para. 184 (quoting Appellate Body Report, 
EC – Chicken Cuts , para. 156).  
232 Appellate Body Report, EC – Selected Customs Matters , para. 184 (quoting Appellate Body Report, 
Chile – Price Band System , para. 139).  
233 Appellate Body Report, Chile – Price Band System , para. 144. See also Panel Re port, EC – IT 
Products , para. 7.140.  
234 See Panel Report, India – Agricultural Products , para. 7.78 -7.80, Panel Report, Japan -Film, paras. 
10.8-10.9; Panel Report, US-Carbon Steel , para. 8.11; Panel Report, Australia -Salmon (Article 21.5 -Canada) , 
para. 7.10 , subpara. 27 . 
235 Panel Report, Japan – Film, para. 10.8.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  subsequent measures the new Council Regulation was within its terms of reference as it was 
"substantively identical" to the Council Regulation identified  in China's panel request.236  
7.133.   Like other prior panels, the panel in EC – Fasteners (China)  also underlined the importance 
of a "close relationship" and "adequate notice", observing:  
It is now well established that a measure which is not identified in the c omplainant's 
panel request may nonetheless fall within a panel's terms of reference if it is 
sufficiently closely related to the measure identified in the panel request, such that 
the respondent can be found to have had adequate notice of the nature of the  claims 
that the complainant might raise during the panel proceedings.237 
7.134.   While the panel recognised the importance of a panel request's meeting the requirements 
of Article 6.2 by informing the respondent of the measure at issue and the nature of the claims 
raised, it held that "[t]o require China in such circumstances to restart the dispute settlement 
process, potentially requiring a new request for consultations, would defeat the purpose of the 
DSU to provide for the 'prompt settlement of situations in whic h a Member considers that benefits 
accruing to it' under a covered Agreement are being impaired by another Member's measure, as 
provided for in Article  3.3 of the DSU."238 The panel thus balanced the respondent's ability to 
defend itself, as derived from the  complainant's obligations under Article 6.2 of the DSU, and the 
objective of prompt dispute settlement pursuant to Article 3.3 of the DSU.  
7.135.   Similarly, in the present dispute the Panel is called upon to determine whether despite not 
being referred to specif ically in the European Union's panel request, the restrictions on the imports 
of the products at issue from Latvia and Estonia fall within its terms of reference. In order to 
address this question, the Panel will first examine the European Union's argument  that the 
measures on the imports from Estonia and Latvia constitute an amendment (or supplement, or 
extension) of a measure referred to specifically in the European Union's panel request (i.e. the EU -
wide ban or the measures regarding Lithuania and Poland ) in a manner that does not modify its 
essence.  
7.3.4.3.1   Whether the import restrictions on the products at issue from Estonia and 
Latvia constitute amendments, supplements, extensions, replacement measures, 
renewal measures or implementing measures that do not mo dify the essence of those 
identified in the European Union's panel request  
7.136.   The European Union argues that the measures regarding Estonia and Latvia are within the 
Panel's terms of reference because the two individual measures had the practical effect of 
extending the product coverage of the EU -wide ban to heat -treated and matured pig products .239 
The European Union's link between these measures and the panel request is based on the 
following statement in its panel request:  
This request relates to the measure s at issue and to any amendments, supplements, 
extensions, replacement measures, renewal measures and implementing measures.240 
7.137.   According to the European Union, although at the time of the panel request there were no 
individual bans on Estonia and Latvia, mo st of the products at issue "were already covered by the 
EU-wide ban imposed by Russia since the first case in Lithuania".241 The European Union adds that 
"[i]n practice, the two individual measures extended the ban to heat treated and matured pig 
products: 'ready to eat products, containing pork, except for cats and dog feed (which were heat 
                                               
236 Panel Report, EC – Fasteners ( China ), para. 7.38 (referring to Appellate Body Reports: Chile – Price 
Band System , para. 135; and US – Zeroing (Japan) (Article 21.5 – Japan) , para. 113; and Panel Re port, Japan 
– Film, para. 10.8).  
237 Panel Report, EC – Fasteners (China) , para. 7.38 (referring to Appellate Body Reports: Chile – Price 
Band System , para. 135; and US – Zeroing (Japan) (Article 21.5 – Japan) , para. 113; and Panel Report, Japan 
– Film, para . 10.8).  
238 Panel Report, EC – Fasteners ( China ), para. 7.34 (footnotes omitted).  
239 European Union's response to Panel question No. 55, para. 128.  
240 European Union's panel request, p. 6.  
241 European Union's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel , para. 26; response to Panel 
question No. 55, para. 128; and second written submission, para. 17.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  treated no less than 70ºC for at least 20 minutes)' and 'sausages and similar products of meat, 
canned meat'."242 The European Union maintains that these measures constitu te an extension of 
the product coverage of the EU -wide ban.243 On this basis, the European Union claims that "[t]he 
individual Russian bans with respect to Latvia and Estonia fall within the category of amendments, 
supplements, extensions and implementing me asures and are thus clearly covered by the panel 
request."244 The European Union further asserts that the measures regarding Estonia and Latvia 
"do not change the essence of the identified measures".245 
7.138.   Russia emphasizes that the European Union must demonstrat e to the Panel that Russia's  
measures post -dating the date of the Panel request, particularly the import restrictions on live 
pigs, pig and pork products from Latvia and Estonia, can be considered "amendments" . Russia 
considers that this  depends on whether  these later measures reflect different legal implications 
than the measures for Lithuania and Poland, and whether the consideration of those measures  is 
necessary to secure a positive resolution to the dispute.246 
7.139.   The Panel first notes that the European Uni on's panel request is formulated broadly. In 
order to determine whether the measures regarding Estonia and Latvia are covered by the broad 
formulation of the panel request, as argued by the European Union, the Panel will assess 
(i) whether the measures reg arding Estonia and Latvia constitute amendments, supplements, 
extensions, replacement measures, renewal measures and implementing measures; and 
(ii) whether the measures regarding Estonia and Latvia change the essence of the measures 
identified explicitly in the panel request.  
7.140.   To address these matters, the Panel has prepared Table 1 below, which shows the product 
coverage of the import restrictions on Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland  as well as of the EU -
wide ban. Table 1 below also indicates which pr oducts are excluded from the product coverage of 
the measures at issue.247 
7.141.   According to the European Union, the EU -wide ban applies to the following products 
exported from the European Union to Russia which are subject to the veterinary certificates 
bilatera lly agreed: piglets for fattening; pigs for breeding; slaughter pigs; pork meat and raw meat 
preparations.248 
                                               
242 European Union's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 26; response to Panel 
question No. 55, para. 128; and second written submission , para. 17.  
243 European Union's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 26; response to Panel 
question No. 55, para. 128; and second written submission, para. 17.  
244 European Union's second written submission, para. 18.  
245 European Union's second written submission, para. 20.  
246 Russia's response to Panel question No. 74, para. 120.  
247 The parties have referred in their arguments to a distinction between heat -treated and non -heat 
treated products. We recall that pursuant to Letter from the Rus sian Veterinary Service to Heads of Veterinary 
authorities in Russia , FS-EN-8/1644, 5 February 2014 (Exhibit RUS -323), three categories of treated products 
are not subject to the EU -wide ban and were not subject to the bans on imports from Lithuania and Po land 
from 6 February 2014 until 7 April 2014. Those categories include products subject to: thermal treatment, 
fermentation and maturation. We therefore refer to these as "treated products".  
248 European Union's response to Panel question No. 77, para. 147 ( referring to Exhibits Veterinary 
certificate for piglets for fattening (EU -52), Veterinary certificate for pigs for breeding (EU -53), Veterinary 
certificate for pork meat and raw meat preparations (EU -54) and Veterinary certificate for slaughter pigs (EU -
55). In fn 82 of the European Union's first written submission, there is additional reference to the Vete rinary 
certificate for finished food products ( Exhibit EU -56); the Veterinary certificate for canned meat, salamis and 
other ready for consumption meat products ( Exhibit EU -57) ((European Union's first written submission, para. 
89, fn 82). This conclusion also appears to be confirmed by announcement of FSVPS ( Exhibit EU -16) and List of 
returned consignments of pig products ( Exhibit EU -17) detailing the pr oducts the entry of which was denied by 
Russia: pork head meat frozen; frozen pig hearts; frozen pork; frozen pork skin; fat bacon; pork offal products 
(heart), frozen; Pork meat (from heads), frozen; pork meat. The European Union explains that the certifi ed 
heat treated products covered by the veterinary certificates, the copies of which were provided by t he 
European Union as Exhibit EU -56 and EU -57, are not subject to the EU -wide ban. European Union's response to 
Panel question No. 77, paras. 148 – 151. T he products covered by the veterinary certificate provided by the 
European Union as Exhibit EU -56 are finished food products, containing raw material of animal origin; the 
products covered by the veterinary certificate provided by the European Union as Exhibit EU-57 are canned 
meat, salamis and other ready for consumption meat products.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.142.   Russia does not contest the European Union's identification of the products at issue 
covered by the EU -wide ban, clarifying that the Russia -European  Union veterinary certificates on 
which its provisional compliance is based "concern piglets for fattening,249 pigs for breeding,250 and 
pork meat and raw meat preparation251."252 It is clear from the evidence submitted by the parties 
that the EU -wide ban applies to the following products, which are subject to the veterinary 
certificates bilaterally agreed on 11 August 2006: piglets for fattening and pigs for breeding (live 
pigs), and pork meat and raw meat preparations.253 Russia acknowledges that the terms of the 
veterinary certificates are enforced in respect of pigs for slaughter; however, Russia clarifies that 
pigs for slaughter have not been allowed into its territory because of measures applied in respect 
of classical swine fever.254  
7.143.   In addition, both parties ag ree that products subject to thermal treatment, fermentation 
and maturation are not subject to the EU -wide ban.255 
7.144.    As indicated in Table 1, the EU -wide ban does not apply to certain finished goods 
containing pork that have been subject to particular forms o f treatment. Nonetheless, the 
restrictions on imports from Estonia and Latvia cover most products in the category of heat -
treated finished pork products and the category of heat treated canned pork meat, sausages and 
other ready for consumption meat produ cts, except for certain feedstuffs and feed additives for 
animals.  
                                               
249 (footnote original ) Veterinary certificate for piglets for fattening, being exported from the EU into 
Russia, 11/08/2006 (Exhibit EU -52) 
250 (footnote original) Veterinary c ertificate for pigs for breeding, exported from the EU into Russia, 
11/08/2006 ( Exhibit EU -53) 
251 (footn ote original) Veterinary certificate for pork meat and raw meat preparations, exported from the 
EU into Russia, 11/08/2006 (Exhibit EU -54). 
252 Russia's re sponse to Panel question No. 77, para. 127 . 
253 Letter of FSVPS of 29 January 2014 – FS-SA-8/1277 (Exhibit EU -14), para. 3; Letter of 14 February 
2014 – HF-12-26/1650  (Exhibit EU -15), p. 2; FSVPS instructions to its Territorial Departments  of 29 January 
2014 (Exhibit -EU-161), para. 1; Letter Ref. FS -EN-8/5095 from the Russian Federal Service for Veterinary and 
Phytosanitary Supervision to the European Union dated 2 April 2014 (Letter of FSVPS of 2 April 2014 –FS-EN-
8/5095 )(Exhibit RUS -53), para. 3. This conc lusion also appears to be confirmed by announcement of FSVPS 
(Exhibit EU -16) and List of returned consignments of pig products (EU -17) detailing the products the entry  of 
which was denied by Russia: pork head meat frozen; frozen pig hearts; frozen pork; fr ozen pork skin; fat 
bacon; pork offal products (heart), frozen; Pork meat (from heads), frozen; pork meat.  
254 Russia's response to Panel question No. 267, paras. 57 -60. See also Letter from Rosselkhoznadzor to 
Russia’s regional offices, 2 March 2012, FS -EN-7/2793  (Exhibit RUS -351).  
255 Letter from the Russian Veterinary Service to Heads of Veterinary authorities in Russia , FS-EN-
8/1644, 5 February 2014 (Ex hibit RUS -323); and Russia's letter to the European Union of 5 February 2014, FS -
EN-8/1642  (Exhibit EU -162). See also European Union's comments to Russia's response to Panel question 
No. 256, paras. 21 -25; and Russia's response to Panel question No. 256, paras. 14 -16. WT/DS475/R  
 
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  Table 1 Product  coverage of the measures at issue256 
EU-wide257 Lithuania258 Poland259 Latvia260 Estonia261 
live pigs  
 live pigs  
its genetic 
material  live pigs  
its genetic 
material  live pigs  live pigs  
pig genetic material  
 finished products 
containing pork  finished products 
containing pork  finished 
products 
containing pork  end products containing 
pork 
 products from 
slaughter of wild 
boar  products from 
slaughter of wild 
boar  meat of wild boar  
pork meat  pork pork pork pork 
raw meat preparations  raw pork products  raw pork products  raw pork 
products  raw pork products  
 horn-hoofed 
materials  
leather  
intestinal 
materials  horn-hoofed 
materials  
leather  
intestinal 
materials   horn-hoofed materials  
leather  
intestinal materials  
 bristles  bristles   hair coat  
 feed for pigs  feed for pigs  
  all types of feed stuffs 
and feed additives for 
pigs 
 hunting trophies 
not subjected to 
full taxidermy 
treatment  hunting trophies 
not subj ected to 
full taxidermy 
treatment   hunter's trophies derived 
from sensible animal 
species without full 
taxidermy treatment  
 equipment 
previously used 
for keeping, 
transportation, 
slaughter and 
cutting of pigs  equipment 
previously used 
for keeping, 
transpo rtation, 
slaughter and 
cutting of pigs   equipment previously 
used for keeping, 
slaughter and cutting of 
pigs 
Excluded : treated 
(either through 
thermal treatment, 
fermentation or 
maturation): finished 
products, containing 
raw materials of 
animal origin (po rk) 
and canned meat; 
sausages and other 
ready -to-eat meat 
products (made of 
pork) intended for the 
production of pet food 
and food for fur 
animals.  Excluded : cats and dogs' feeds which 
are thermally treated (temperature not 
lower than 70ºC for not less tha n 20 
minutes).  
 
Note: This exclusion was introduced as 
of 7 April 2014. Before that time, these 
import restrictions were not applied to 
the categories of products excluded 
from the EU -wide ban, as described in 
this table.  
 Excluded : cats' 
and dogs' 
feeds which 
are thermally 
treated 
(temperature 
not lower than 
70ºC for not 
less than 20 
minutes).  Excluded : feed additives 
resulted from chemical 
or microbiological 
synthesis and heat -
treated ready -made 
feedstuffs (minimum 
temperature: 70 degrees 
in Celsius, mi nimum 
treatment time: 20 
minutes).  
                                               
256 The Panel prepare d this table on the basis of  the following exhibits: Exhibits EU -7, EU -8, EU-10, EU -
11, EU -168 and RUS -28 (regarding the measures in respect of Lithuania); Exhibits EU -9, EU -10, EU -11, EU -
168 and RUS -29 (regardi ng the measures in respect of Poland); Exhibits EU -12 and EU -169 (regarding the 
measures in respect of Latvia); and Exh ibits EU -13 and RUS -37 (regarding the measures in respect of Estonia). 
The parties provided comments on this Table in response to Panel q uestion No. 271.  See European Union's 
response to Panel question No.  271, paras. 83 -89; and Russia's response to Panel question No. 271, paras. 95 -
98. 
257 European Union's response to Panel question No. 77, paras. 148 – 151 and response to Panel 
question No. 271, paras. 85 -86. See also Russia's response to Panel question No. 77, para. 127 and response 
to Panel question No. 2 71, para. 97. See also Russia's letter to the European Union of 5 February 2014, FS -EN-
8/1642  (Exhibit EU -162). 
258 See Exhibit s EU-7, EU -8, EU -10, EU -11, EU -168, and RUS -28. 
259 See Exhibit s EU-9, EU -10, EU -11, EU -168, and RUS -29. 
260 See Exhibit s EU-12 and  EU-169. 
261 See Exhibit s EU-13 and RUS -37. WT/DS475/R  
 
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7.145.   It thus follows that the European Union's assertion that the measures regarding Estonia 
and Latvia extend the product coverage of the EU -wide ban is supported by the evidence on the 
record. However, if the EU -wide ban c oexists with the measures regarding Latvia and Estonia, it 
seems as if the extension of the product coverage would only be applicable to the imports of the 
products at issue from those two countries, and not the imports from the rest of the EU member 
State s. Furthermore, such an extension would apply to Estonia and Latvia on the specific terms of 
the bans for each country.  
7.146.   At the same time, the European Union's conclusion only refers to the overlap between the 
product coverage of the EU -wide ban and the me asures regarding Estonia and Latvia. By doing 
this, the European Union's rationale leaves unaddressed the link between the aspects of the 
measures on imports from Latvia and Estonia unrelated to the product coverage.  
7.147.   This circumstance would have a signific ant impact on the Panel's further assessment of 
whether or not such extension of product coverage changes the essence of the EU -wide ban, 
regardless of its classification as an amendment, supplement, extension, replacement measure, 
renewal measure or imple menting measure. Following the European Union's argument would entail 
considering the EU -wide ban as a measure modified by the measures regarding Estonia and Latvia 
to the extent its product coverage is broadened. However, the measures regarding those two EU 
member States contain other elements that would not be included into an amended version of the 
EU-wide ban.  
7.148.   If, on the other hand, all other aspects of the measures regarding Estonia and Latvia were 
included in such modification, they could change the essence of the EU -wide ban. As indicated by 
the evidence on the record, the EU -wide ban and the bans on imports of the products at issue 
from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland are distinct, even though related, sets of measures. 
These measures exist i n parallel. The adoption or revocation of the bans applied to imports from 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, or Poland does not affect the existence of the EU -wide ban and vice 
versa.  
7.149.   The application of the EU -wide ban and the measures regarding Estonia and Latv ia may 
overlap, for instance when both the EU -wide ban and the measures regarding Estonia and Latvia 
apply to the products at issue originating from Estonia and Latvia. It is in this context that the 
European Union argues that the measures regarding Estoni a and Latvia extend the product 
coverage of the EU -wide ban. However, the fact that such de facto  extension may take place as 
the result of the concurrent application of the measures regarding Estonia and Latvia and the EU -
wide ban, does not bring all aspe cts of these measures regarding Estonia and Latvia under the 
umbrella of the EU -wide ban. The two continue to exist separately.  
7.150.   For these reasons, the European Union's argument on how to bring all aspects of the 
measures regarding Estonia and Latvia withi n the panel's terms of reference by pointing to their de 
facto extension of the product coverage of the EU -wide ban does not seem persuasive.  
7.151.   In addition, the consequence of accepting the European Union's argument is that the Panel 
would be barred from ma king separate findings on the measures regarding the imports from 
Estonia and Latvia. This is b ecause the Panel would only be able to consider under its jurisdiction 
the amended EU -wide ban, including the modifications inserted through the import restricti ons on 
the products at issue from Estonia and Latvia, rather than each of those measures (i.e. the EU -
wide ban and the bans on Estonia and Latvia) considered individually. This would not allow us to 
make findings in such a manner that would satisfy the obj ective of prompt dispute settlement 
pursuant to Article 3.3 of the DSU and the aim of the dispute settlement mechanism to secure a 
positive solution to this dispute, as indicated in Article 3.7 of the DSU.  
7.152.   Because we are not persuaded by the European Unio n's argument that the import 
restrictions on the products at issue from Estonia and Latvia constitute amendments, supplements, WT/DS475/R  
 
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  extensions, replacement measures, renewal measures and implementing measures of the EU -wide 
ban, the Panel will examine below this matter pursuant to its own reasoning.262 
7.153.   In order for the Panel to be able to fulfil its obligation to make an objective assessment of 
the matter before it and prevent the possibility that the procedural requirements of WTO dispute 
settlement result in a s ituation where measures could completely evade a review, we will pursue 
our own reasoning on the basis of the evidence submitted by the parties.263 This reasoning entails 
examining whether the measures regarding Estonia and Latvia satisfy the legal standard for close 
link and adequate notice , as explained in paragraph 7.131  above.  
7.3.4.3.2   Whether the import restrictions on the products at issue from Estonia and 
Latvia are closely linked to the measures explicitly identified in the Europe an Union's 
panel request  
7.154.    As indicated in paragraph 7.123  above, for a measure to fall within a panel's terms of 
reference it has to satisfy the requirements of Article 7 of the DSU as informed by Article 6.2 of 
the DSU.264 When analysing those requirements, panels and the Appellate Body have found that 
there can be circumstances where a measure not explicitly included in the panel request could still 
fall within a panel's terms of reference. In this vein, the Appellate Body has s tated that compliance 
with the Article 6.2 requirements must be determined on the merits of each case, having 
considered the panel request as a whole, and in light of the attendant circumstances.265 In this 
regard, the Panel notes that the European Union ref ers to the EU -wide ban and the import 
restrictions on the products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland  as "distinct but 
closely linked".266 
7.155.   Based on the existing guidance in the jurisprudence, as described in paragraphs 7.130  to 
7.134  above, the Panel will examine whether the measures regarding Estonia and Latvia are 
closely related to the measures mentioned explicitly in the European Union's panel request, in such 
a manner that Russia  has had adequate notice of the nature of the claims that the European Union 
might have raised during the Panel proceedings. In assessing this matter, we will take into account 
the rationale of the DSU to provide for the "prompt settlement of situations in  which a Member 
considers that benefits accruing to it" under a covered Agreement are being impaired by another 
Member's measure, as provided for in Article  3.3 of the DSU, and the objective of securing a 
positive solution to the dispute as provided in Art icle 3.7 of the DSU.  
7.156.   On this basis, the central question we will address is whether the import restrictions on the 
products at issue from Estonia and Latvia are closely related to the EU -wide ban and/or to the 
import restrictions on the products at issue f rom Lithuania and Poland. The Panel notes that both 
the measures on imports from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland  and the EU -wide ban appear 
to be adopted in pursuit of the same regulatory purpose: protecting Russia's territory from entry 
and further  spread of ASF.267 Those import restrictions also appear similar in their design 
(including their product coverage as described in Table 1 above), structure (including the legal 
instruments through which they are applied) and impact, leading to the applicati on of restrictions 
on the importation of the products at issue from the European Union or its member States.  
7.157.   The two sets of measures are implemented by means of similar legal instruments. Russia 
explained that temporary restrictions on the products at is sue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and 
                                               
262 See e.g. Appellate Body Report, Canada – Renewable Energy / Canada – Feed-in Tariff Program , 
para. 5.215 ("While a panel cannot make the case for a complainant, it has the competence 'freely to use 
arguments submitte d by any of the parties – or to develop its own legal reasoning – to support its own findings 
and conclusions on the matter under its consideration.") (quoting Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones , 
para. 156).  
263 See Panel Report, US – Animals , paras. 7.444 -7.447.  
264 Appellate Body Report, US – Carbon Steel , paras. 124. See also, Appellate Body Report s, Argentina – 
Import Measures , para. 5.11.  
265 Appellate Body Report, US – Carbon Steel , para. 127.  
266 European Union's opening statement at the first meeting of t he Panel, para. 24.  
267 See Exhibits EU -13 and RUS -37 (regarding Estonia); EU -12 and EU -169 (regarding Latvia); EU -9, 
EU-10, EU -11, EU -168 and RUS -29 (regarding Poland); EU -7, EU -8, EU -10, EU -11, EU -168 and RUS -28 
(regarding Lithuania); and EU -14 and EU -161 (regarding the EU -wide ban). See also Russia's second written 
submission, para. 143; and response to Panel question No. 297, para. 165.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  Poland  were imposed based on FSVPS's "Directions which constitute the departmental enactments 
applicable throughout the Russian Federation".268 In addition, Russia explains that as set out in 
Decree 327, "different te rritorial departments are obliged to follow the directions from the Federal 
Government, including instructions with respect to import restrictions from the four ASF -infected 
EU Member States".269 Similarly, as described in paras. 7.77 to 7.79 above, the EU -wide ban is 
enforced through actions of Russia's federal and territorial departments.  
7.158.   Moreover, there is a geographic overlap between the EU -wide measure and the measures 
in respect of imports from L atvia and Estonia. As the European Union has explained, since the end 
of January 2014 imports of the products at issue (with the exception of heat treated, fermented or 
matured finished products) are no longer accepted from any EU member States, including Estonia 
and Latvia.270 Months later, when the measures in respect of imports from Latvia 
(27 June 2014)271 and Estonia (11 September 2014)272 were put in place, geographical areas 
covered by the EU -wide ban were subject to import restrictions on the products at issue from 
those two specific EU member States.  
7.159.   In addition, the measures are proximate in time, in both absolute and relative terms, to 
the measures identified in the panel request, to the panel request itself and to the date of 
establishment of the Pane l. We note that the measures regarding Estonia and Latvia were adopted 
at an early stage of the proceedings. The ban on Latvia was adopted the same day on which the 
panel request was presented (27 June 2014), while the measure on Estonia was adopted on 
11 September 2014. Both these measures were adopted prior to the composition of the panel 
(which took place on 23 October 2014), the organizational meeting (which took place on 
21 November  2014) and the parties' deadline for the presentation of their first wr itten submission 
(14 January 201 5 for the European Union and 25 February 2015 for Russia).273 
7.160.   Based on the foregoing, the Panel finds that there is (i) an identity of the regulatory 
purpose; (ii) proximity of design, structure and impact; and (iii) close geo graphic and temporal 
relation of the import restrictions on the products at issue from Estonia and Latvia with those of 
the import restrictions of the products at issue from Lithuania and Poland as well as from the rest 
of the European Union. We consider t hese factual findings to strongly support the preliminary 
conclusion that the import restrictions on the products at issue from Estonia and Latvia are closely 
related to the measures explicitly described in the European Union's panel request.  
7.161.   We move on to  address whether Russia has had adequate notice of the nature of the 
claims that the European Union might have raised during the Panel proceedings. This enquiry is 
necessary to ensure that the due process rights of Russia are not violated. The Panel recall s that 
our examination of adequate notice flows from the close relationship between the unnamed 
measures and those included in the panel request.274 To determine whether Russia's ability to 
defend itself would be prejudiced if the import restrictions on the products at issue from Estonia 
and Latvia were found to be within the Panel's terms of reference, we need to determine whether 
the measures regarding Estonia and Latvia are sufficiently closely related to the measures 
explicitly identified in the panel req uest, such that Russia could reasonably anticipate these 
measures to be challenged in these Panel proceedings.  
7.162.   We also consider  it relevant to underscore the factual circumstances of the present 
dispute. ASF outbreaks began at the end of January 2014 in Li thuania. As the evidence on record 
                                               
268 Russia's response to Panel question No. 276, para. 112.  
269 Russia's response to Panel question No. 276, para. 113, refe rring to RF Government's Decree 327 of 
June 30, 2004 "Approval of the Regulation of the Federal Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Surveillance 
(Rosselkhoznadzor)", para. 4 (Exhibit RUS -352).  
270 European Union's first written submission, para. 92.  
271 G/SPS/N/RUS/64 ( Exhibit EU -12) and Russia's letter of instruction of 27 June 2014, FS -NF-8/11315  
(Exhibit EU -169).  
272 G/SPS/N/RUS/76  (Exhibit EU -13) and Russia's letter to the European Union of 11 September 2014, 
FS-NV-8/17431 (Exhibit RUS-37). 
273 See para. 1.6 above.  
274 Panel Report, Japan – Film, para. 10.8.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  demonstrates275, the situation of the spread of the disease has shifted in the months following the 
initial outbreaks and continues to evolve. This led to new outbreaks in Poland, Latvia and Estonia 
during the course of 201 4. These particular circumstances further confirm the close relationship 
between the measures imposed on the imports of the products at issue from Estonia and Latvia 
with those imposed on imports from Lithuania and Poland as well from the rest of the Europ ean 
Union. In this context, this statement from Russia comes as no surprise: "both Parties have agreed 
that it is appropriate for the Panel to consider the European Union claims as including a challenge 
to the Latvian and Estonian import bans … , which were  not included in the Panel request" .276  
7.163.   It also seems clear from the European Union's arguments in the course of the proceedings, 
that the European Union would have provided the same arguments for the inconsistency of the 
measures regarding Estonia and Latv ia with the covered agreements as those of the measures 
regarding Lithuania and Poland. This also means that Russia's defence of the measures regarding 
Estonia and Latvia would have likely been the same as that for the measures regarding Lithuania 
and Pola nd. This is, in fact, confirmed by Russia's arguments as provided in its submissions.  
7.164.   Based on the foregoing, the Panel finds that Russia could reasonably anticipate that the 
European Union would challenge the measures regarding Estonia and Latvia.  
7.165.   The Pan el's review of the measures at issue regarding Estonia and Latvia as distinct 
measures would be in line with the objectives of prompt dispute settlement and securing the 
positive resolution of the dispute. The Panel would be able to make individual finding s concerning 
the conformity of these measures with the covered agreements, thus examining and making 
findings in respect of all the measures, and their particular features, related to the way in which 
Russia is handling the importation of the products at i ssue from the European Union. The Panel 
considers that not making a finding with respect to the import restrictions on the products at issue 
from Estonia and Latvia would neither be in line with the objective of prompt settlement of 
disputes nor that of s ecuring a positive solution to a dispute within the meaning of the DSU, in  as 
much as the European Union would have to challenge these measures in separate proceedings.  
7.166.   We consider that, given the particular facts and circumstances of this dispute, and in light 
of our findings in para graph  7.126  above, our findings concerning the measures regarding Estonia 
and Latvia also establish the required connection between the challenged measures and the 
provisions of the covered agreemen ts claimed to have been violated for the purposes of providing 
a brief summary of the legal basis of the complaint sufficient to present the problem clearly in 
satisfaction of the fourth requirement of Article 6.2.  
7.3.4.4   Conclusion  
7.167.   Based on the foregoing and in light of the particular circumstances of the present dispute, 
the Panel finds that the import restrictions on the products at issue from Estonia and Latvia are 
within its terms of reference.  
7.3.5   Summary of the measures at issue in this dispute  
7.168.   As indicated in  paragraph 7.84 above, we find that the EU -wide ban is a measure 
attributable to Russia. In addition, as indicated in paragraph 7.116  above, we find that the terms 
of Russia's accession to the WTO d oes not impose any limit to our assessment of the European 
Union's claims in respect of the EU -wide ban.  
7.169.   As indicated in paragraph 7.167  above, we find that the import restrictions on the products 
at issue from Estonia and Lat via are within our terms of reference.  
7.170.   Based on our previous findings, Table 2 below summarizes the measures at issue in this 
dispute, with an indication of the product coverage of each of the measures under examination.  
                                               
275 Detailed account of the outbreaks in domestic pigs and notification of cases in wild boar in the EU, as 
notified to the OIE ( Exhibit EU -118).  See also Data from OIE WAHIS  Interface, as of 31 August  (RUS-296 
revised).  
276 Russia's response to Panel question No. 279, para. 122.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  Table 2 Measures at issue  
Measure  Legal Instrument  Date of 
imposition  Date of 
Application  WTO Notification  Date of 
notification  
Restrictions on 
imports from  
Lithuania of 
certain non -heat 
treated pig 
products.277 
 Letter from FSVPS 
of 25 January 2014 
(FS-EN-8/1023).  25 January 
2014 25 January 
2014 G/SPS/N/RUS/48  
 10 February 
2014 
EU-wide ban of 
certain non -
treated pig 
products.  Constructed278 N/A 29 January 
2014279 Unnotified  N/A 
Restrictions on 
imports from  
Poland of 
certain non -heat 
treated pig 
products.280  
 Letter from FSVPS 
of 27 February 2014 
(FS-NV-8/2972)  27 
February 
2014 27 February 
2014 G/SPS/N/RUS/49  4 March 
2014 
Extension of the 
coverage of 
import 
restrictions from  
Lithuania and 
Poland to 
certain heat 
treated pig 
products.281  
 Letter from FSVPS 
of 2 April 2014 (F S-
EN-8/5081).  2 April  
2014 7 April 2014  G/SPS/N/RUS/48/Add.2 
G/SPS/N/RUS/49/Add.1  4 April 2014  
Restrictions on 
imports from  
Latvia of 
certain heated 
treated and 
non-heat 
treated pig 
products.282  
 Letter from the 
FSVPS of 27 June 
2014 (FS -NF-
8/11315).  27 June 
2014 28 June 
2014 G/SPS/N/RUS/64  16 July 
2014 
Restrictions on 
imports from  
Estonia  of 
certain heat 
treated and 
non-heat 
treated pig 
products. 283  
 Letter from FSVPS 
of 11 September 
2014 (FS -NV-
8/17431).  11 
September 
2014 11 
September 
2014 G/SPS/N/RUS/7 6 16 
September 
2014 
 
 
7.3.6   Temporal framework for the Panel's assessment  
7.3.6.1   Introduction  
7.171.   In light of the ongoing nature of the ASF outbreaks associated with the imposition of the 
measures at issue, the Panel asked the parties to express their views on the appropr iate time -
                                               
277 See G/SPS/N/RUS/48 (Exhibit EU -7), G/SPS/N/RUS/48/Add.1 (Exhibit EU-8) and Russia's letter to 
the European Union of 25 January 2014, FS -EN-8/1023 (Exhib it RUS-28). 
278 See section 7.3.2.3.1  above.  
279 European Union's first written submission, paras. 94 –95 (referring to the List of returned 
consignments of pig products (Exhibit EU -17), Items 7, 8, 9, 13, 14, 15 and  16). 
280 See Exhibits EU -9 and RUS -29. 
281 See Exhibits EU -10, EU -11 and EU -168. 
282 See Exhibits EU -12 and EU -169. 
283 See Exhibit EU -13 and RUS -37. WT/DS475/R  
 
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  frame for the Panel's assessment of the European Union's claims.284 Without prejudice to 
additional considerations regarding our substantive assessment, this section reflects our views 
regarding  the temporal dimension of the evidence and events tha t we will consider in our 
assessment of the European Union's claims.  
7.3.6.2   Main arguments of the Parties  
7.3.6.2.1   European Union  
7.172.   The European Union considers the relevant moment in time for assessing Russia's 
compliance with the provisions of the SPS Agreement to be the  date of the panel establishment 
(22 July 2014). For the European Union, symmetrically, the same moment in time should apply 
with respect to the evidence the European Union submitted to Russia in order to allow it to 
perform a risk assessment.285 However, th e European Union also made clear that at any point in 
time the European Union's ASF regionalization measures were properly adapted to the evolution of 
the disease. Subsequent developments, after the date of the panel establishment, can only 
confirm the rob ustness of the European Union's regionalization measures and, at the same time, 
the unnecessary and arbitrary character of Russia's measures at issue. The European Union 
asserts that more than 20 months after the first ASF cases in January 2014, Russia sti ll has not 
provided to the Panel and to the European Union any risk assessment.286 
7.3.6.2.2   Russia  
7.173.   Russia submits that it would be appropriate for the Panel to assess the compliance of the 
measures at issue with the cited provisions of the SPS Agreement at the time o f panel 
establishment, as well as after the date of panel establishment, up to and including developments 
until August 2015. According to Russia, this would enable the Panel to take into account the 
evolution of ASF infections and ASF -free and infected zon es in the four affected EU member 
States.287 Russia asserts that the relevant jurisprudence supports a choice of the end of 
August  2015 as the proper temporal benchmark.288 Russia's allegations differ according to the 
time-frame that the Panel selects in its examination of the European Union's claims in this dispute. 
For example, Russia submits  that if the Panel determines that the date of panel establishment is 
the relevant date for its enquiry, it would invoke Article 5.7 with respect to the bans on the 
impor ts of the products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,  and Poland.289 Moreover, Russia 
submits that, based on relevant jurisprudence, the Panel should consider all of the evidence before 
it, including  that dated after the establishment of the Panel.290 
7.3.6.3   Analysis by the Panel  
7.174.   The Appellate Body in EC – Selected Customs Matters  addressed the distinction between 
measures at issue and the evidence in support of the manner in which those measures are 
administered, for the purposes of Article X:3(a) of the GATT 1994. The Appellate Body reasoned 
that it is important to distinguish between measures and pieces of evidence; and added that  
While there are temporal limitations on the measures that may be within a panel's 
terms of reference, such limitations do not app ly in the same way to evidence. 
Evidence in support of a claim challenging measures that are within a panel's terms of 
reference may pre -date or post -date the establishment of the panel. A panel is not 
precluded from assessing a piece of evidence for the m ere reason that it pre -dates or 
                                               
284 European Union's responses to Panel question No s. 279, 309, and 311; and Russia's responses to 
Panel questions No. 279, 309, and 311; and comments to European Union's responses to Panel question No. 
236. 
285 European Union's response to Panel question No. 311, paras. 171 -173. 
286 European Union's opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para. 60.  
287 Russia  also points out the appropriateness of considering developments in the first and second 
quarters of 2015, taking into account the European Union's submission of the eradication plans for the four 
affected EU member States. Russia's response to Panel quest ion No. 279, paras. 117 -139. 
288 Russia's response to Panel question No. 279, para. 131.  
289 See Russia's response to Panel question no. 279, paras. 133 -134; response to Panel question No. 
293, para. 148; and response to Panel question No. 294, para. 150.  
290 Russia's response to Panel question No. 311, paras. 269 -272. WT/DS475/R  
 
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  post-dates its establishment. … A panel enjoys a certain discretion to determine the 
relevance and probative value of a piece of evidence that pre -dates or post -dates its 
establishment."291  
7.175.   We are mindful of our mandate and d uty under the DSU to make an objective assessment 
of the matter referred to us by the DSB in accordance with our terms of reference, by virtue of 
Articles 6.2, 7 and 11 of the DSU. As explained above, it is well  established that the Panel request 
frames a panel's terms of reference. However, as observed by the Appellate Body, there is a 
difference in the temporal limitations applicable to the measures at issue and those to the 
evidence considered in support of claims assessed by a panel. We are also mindful  of the aim of 
the WTO dispute settlement mechanism to secure a positive solution to a dispute, as enshr ined in 
Article 3.7 of the DSU.  
7.3.6.4   Conclusion  
7.176.   We recall our finding in paragraph 7.167  above that the bans on imports of the p roducts at 
issue from Latvia and Estonia fall within our terms of reference although they correspond with, or 
post-date, the date of the panel request. We recall that this finding takes into account , and is in 
line with,  the agreed view of the parties that  these measures fall within the Panel's terms of 
reference. In our view, our terms of reference , together with the date of the Panel's establishment,  
shed light on the appropriate time  frame for our examination of the matter before us. Given the 
particular  facts and circumstances of this case, we consider it appropriate to examine the matter 
referred to us up to and including the date of Russia's adoption of the measure in respect of 
Estonia, that is, up to and including 11 September 2014. At the same time,  we note that our 
identification of this particular time  frame for this purpose would not materially affect our findings 
in respect of the bans on imports of the products at issue from Lithuania,  Poland,  and Latvia,  
except to the extent that they would fur ther support our findings in respect of these measures, as 
well as in respect of the EU -wide ban, and the situation in existence at the date of panel 
establishment. In summary, the Panel has examined the evidence on record pre -dating and post -
dating the Pa nel's establishment, with a special focus on the factual situation as at 22  July 2014, 
for the measures in existence at that date,  and as at 11  September  2014, for the measures at 
issue. 
7.177.   The Appellate Body has found that a panel may weigh and determine the  probative value 
of evidence that pre -dates or post -dates its establishment.292 Following this guidance, we will 
weigh and consider any relevant evidence on record that pre -dates and post -dates the Panel 
establishment. This includes evidence and argumentatio n that post -dates the European Union's 
panel request.  
7.178.   Temporal considerations play a role in the assessment of many of the European Union's 
claims under the SPS Agreement, given the need to examine the state of sufficiency of scientific 
evidence, availabl e pertinent information, the adaptation of measures on an "ongoing basis" in 
cases involving regionalization under Article 6 and the existence of a "reasonable period of time" or 
any undue delays in respect of certain procedures. Each of these inquiries im poses particular 
demands.293 In respect of the assessment of the measures at issue before this Panel regarding 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland  and the EU -wide ban, we have adopted a case and 
provision -specific approach, taking into account the particu lar facts and circumstances of this 
dispute in light of the argumentation and evidence submitted by the parties.  
7.4  Whether Russia's measure s are within the scope of the SPS Agreement  
7.4.1   Introduction  
7.179.   As we detailed in section  2.2 above, the European Union raises claims, in respect of the 
measures at issue, under the SPS Agreement. A threshold issue in our examination of these claims 
                                               
291 Appellate Body Report, EC – Selected Customs Matters , para. 188.  
292 Appellate Body Report, EC – Selected Customs Matters , para. 188.  
293 For example, a general rule for the purposes of the Panel's d etermination of the timeline for 
assessment of "sufficiency" of relevant scientific evidence is the date of the adoption of the SPS measure in 
question. Panel Report s, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products , para. 7.3253.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  is whether Russia's measures are SPS measures subject to the disciplines of the SPS 
Agreement.294  
7.180.   At the  outset we note that neither party has challenged that the restrictions on imports 
from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland  are SPS measures subject to the disciplines set out in 
the SPS Agreement.295 However, they disagree on whether the EU -wide ban is a n SPS measure. 
Given our duty, pursuant to Article 11 of the DSU, to make an objective assessment of the 
applicability of the relevant covered agreements296, we will examine the parties' argument s in 
respect of this threshold issue.  
7.4.2   Main arguments of the pa rties 
7.4.2.1   European Union  
7.181.   The European Union argues that "[t]he Russian ban is enacted through 'relevant laws, 
decrees, regulations, requirements and procedures', consisting of the four administrative notices 
concerning the individual EU Member States and the r equirements and procedures related to the 
EU-wide ban."297 The European Union thus claims that the EU -wide ban and the ban on imports of 
the products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland constitute SPS measures that fall 
within the definition s of Annex A(1)(a) and (b) of the SPS Agreement, ASF being a disease in the 
context of Annex A(1)(a) and the ASF virus being a disease -causing organism within the scope of 
Annex  A(1)(b).298 According to the European Union, these measures also directly affect  
international trade within the meaning of Article 1.1 of the SPS Agreement.299 Therefore, according 
to the European Union, the SPS Agreement applies to the measures at issue.300  
7.182.   The European Union adds that the parties do not dispute that the "four individua l bans with 
respect to Lithuania, Poland, Latvia, and Estonia  are SPS measures within the meaning of Annex 
1(a) of the SPS Agreement. "301 
7.4.2.2   Russia  
7.183.   Russia claims that the European Union has failed to demonstrate that the EU -wide ban is a 
measure attributable to  it. Thus, such measure is not subject to the provisions of the 
SPS Agreement.302  
7.184.   In addition, Russia argues that the EU -wide ban is not a requirement or procedure within 
the meaning of Annex A(1) of the SPS Agreement and therefore does not constitute an 
SPS measure.303 In this context, Russia posits that the present case is similar to EC – Approval 
and Marketing of Biotech Products  insofar as the EU -wide ban is not a requirement or procedure 
itself, i.e. not the veterinary certificate, but the application of the requirements or procedures 
                                               
294 Panel Report, India – Agricultural Products, para. 7.132. See also Panel Report, US – Animals , 
para. 7.30.  
295 The Panel notes that Russia has not raised any challenge to the import restrictions on the products at 
issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland  being SPS measure s. See Russia's response to Panel question 
No. 84, para. 138. In addition, Russia grounds its defence of the import restrictions on the products at issue 
from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland  on the assumption that they are subject to the application  of the 
SPS Agreement. See Russia's  first written submission, para. 7. See also European Union's second written 
submission, para. 15.  
296 Panel Reports, US – Animals , para. 7.30; and India – Agricultural Products, para. 7.133.  
297 European Union's first writte n submission, para 103.  
298 European Union's first written submission, paras. 101 and 106.  
299 European Union's first written submission, paras. 104 -106. 
300 European Union's first written submission, para.106.  
301 European Union's second written submission, para . 15. 
302 Russia's opening statement at the second substantive meeting, para. 50; and response to Panel 
question No. 275, para. 111. See also  Russia's arguments in section 7.3.2.2.2  above claiming non-attribution 
of the alleged EU wide ban to Russia . 
303 Russia's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 49; and second written 
submission, para. 172 (referring to European Union's first written submission, para. 103).  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  which are set out in such veterinary certificates.304 On the basis of the refusal of the panel in EC – 
Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products  to hold that a general moratorium on approving the 
marketing of genetically modif ied organisms was an SPS measure, because that moratorium 
concerned only the application or operation of such procedures and not the procedures 
themselves, Russia claims that the EU -wide ban is not an SPS measure within the meaning of 
Annex A(1) of the SPS  Agreement.305 
7.185.   Russia further suggests that because the European Union did not allege in its panel request 
or its submissions to the Panel that the underlying bilaterally negotiated EU -Russian veterinary 
certificates are WTO -inconsistent, "the Panel should n ot make any findings with respect to the 
consistency of these certificates with the SPS Agreement".306 
7.186.   As mentioned above307, Russia has not challeng ed the restrictions on imports of the 
products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland  constitutin g SPS measures.308  
7.4.3   Main arguments of the third parties  
7.4.3.1   Brazil  
7.187.    In its responses to Panel questions Brazil referred to the scope of Annex A(1) of the 
SPS Agreement and the finding of the panel in EC - Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products 
that the de fa cto moratorium challenged in that case did not take the form of an  SPS measure. 
Brazil then concluded that in the present case, the characterization of the measures as an 
SPS measure in the context of Annex A(1) seems to be undisputable.309 
7.4.3.2   United States  
7.188.   In its responses to Panel questions the United States referred to the purported objectives 
of the challenged measures and the text of Annex A(1)(a) of the SPS Agreement, and noted that 
in its view the measures at issue constitute SPS measures.310  
7.4.4   Analysis by t he Panel  
7.4.4.1   Relevant legal provisions  
7.189.   Article 1 of the SPS Agreement provides  in its relevant part :  
1. This Agreement applies to all sanitary and phytosanitary measures which may, 
directly or indirectly, affect international trade. Such measures shall be de veloped and 
applied in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement.  
2. For the purposes of this Agreement, the definitions provided in Annex A shall apply.  
7.190.   Annex A(1) provides as follows:  
1. Sanitary or phytosanitary measure - Any measure applied:  
(a)   to protect animal or plant life or health within the territory of the 
Member from risks arising from the entry, establishment or spread of 
                                               
304 Russia's opening statement at th e first meeting of the Panel, para. 49; and second written 
submission, para. 172 (referring to Panel Report s, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products , 
paras.  7.1395, 7.1407, 7.1421, 7.1441, 7.1448 and 7.1465).  
305 Russia's opening statement at the fi rst meeting of the Panel, paras. 48 -49; second written 
submission, paras. 172 and 174; and response to Panel question No. 72, para. 107.  
306 Russia's response to Panel question No. 72, para 109.  
307 See e.g. para. 7.180  above.  
308 See also Russia's response to Panel question No. 84, para. 138.  
309 Brazil' third -party response to Panel question No. 5.  
310 United States' third -party response to Panel question No. 5.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  pests, diseases, disease -carrying organisms or disease -causing 
organisms;   
(b)   to protect human or animal life or health within the territory of the 
Member from risks arising from additives, contaminants, toxins or 
disease -causing organisms in foods, beverages or feedstuffs;  
(c)   to protect human life or health within the territory of the Member 
from risks arising  from diseases carried by animals, plants or products 
thereof, or from the entry, establishment or spread of pests; or  
(d)   to prevent or limit other damage within the territory of the 
Member from the entry, establishment or spread of pests.   
Sanitary or phytosanitary measures include all relevant laws, decrees, regulations, 
requirements and procedures including,  inter alia , end product criteria;  processes and 
production methods; testing, inspection, certification and approval procedures; 
quarantine treatm ents including relevant requirements associated with the transport 
of animals or plants, or with the materials necessary for their survival during 
transport; provisions on relevant statistical methods, sampling procedures and 
methods of risk assessment; an d packaging and labelling requirements directly related 
to food safety.  
7.191.   We agree with previous panels that based on these provisions, for the SPS Agreement to 
apply, the measures at issue must  (i) be an SPS measure within the meaning of Article 1 and 
Annex  A(1) of the SPS Agreement that (ii) may, directly or indirectly, affect international trade.311 
We therefore move to examine each of these requirements.  
7.4.4.2   Whether  Russia's measures are SPS measures within the meaning of 
Annex  A(1)  
7.192.   Pursuant to Article 1.1 and  Annex A(1) of the SPS Agreement, SPS measures are those 
falling within one or more of the definitions provided in letters (a) through  (d) of Annex A(1) of the 
SPS Agreement. A measure will fall within one or more definitions provided in Annex A(1) if it i s 
applied to protect at least one of the listed interests or to prevent or limit specified damage.312 In 
addition, "the determination of whether a measure is an SPS  measure requires an inquiry into 
whether the measure is of the type that may fall within the definition of an SPS  measure and 
whether it exhibits an appropriate nexus to one of the specified purposes in 
subparagraphs  (a) through (d)" .313  
7.193.   The Appellate Body in Australia – Apples  considered that a fundamental element for 
determining the applicability  of the SPS Agreement to the measures at issue is their purpose, that 
is, their application to protect the interest(s) listed in Annex A(1) or to prevent or limit the damage 
specified therein.314 With respect to this element, the Appellate Body has observed that the "word 
'to' in adverbial relation with the infinitive verb 'protect' indicates a purpose or intention.315 Thus, it 
establishes a required link between the measure and the protected interest ".316 The Appellate Body 
added that the "word 'applied' points to the application of the measure and, thus, suggests that 
the relationship of the measure and one of the objectives listed in Annex A(1) must be manifest in 
the measure itself or otherwise evident from the circumstances related to the application of the 
                                               
311 Panel Reports, US – Animals , para. 7.30 (ref erring to Panel Reports, EC – Hormones  (Canada) , 
para. 8.39; and EC – Hormones  (US), para. 8.36); and India – Agricultural Products , para. 7.136 (referring to 
Panel Reports, EC – Hormones  (Canada) , para. 8.39; EC – Hormones  (US), para. 8.36; EC – Approval and 
Marketing of Biotech Products , para. 7.2554; and US – Poultry (China), para. 7.82).  
312 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Apples , para. 172.  
313 Panel Report, US – Animals, para. 7.33.  
314 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Apples , para. 172.  
315 (footnote or iginal) Shorter Oxford English Dictionary , 6th edn, A. Stevenson (ed.) (Oxford University 
Press, 2007), Vol.  2, p. 3280.  
316 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Apples , para. 172.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  measure. This suggests that the purpose of a measure is to be ascertained on the basis of 
objective considerations317".318 
7.194.   Following the Appellate Body's guidance, a determination whether a measure is applied to 
protect one of the interests listed in Annex  A(1), or to prevent or limit the damage specified 
therein, must be ascertained not only from the objectives of the measure as expressed by the 
responding party. It must also be derived from the text and structure of the relevant measure, its 
surrounding regula tory context, and the way in which it is designed and applied. For any given 
measure to fall within the scope of one of the subparagraphs of Annex A(1), scrutiny of such 
circumstances must reveal "a clear and objective relationship" between that measure an d the 
specific purpose enumerated in one of the subparagraphs of Annex A(1). 319 
7.195.   The Appellate Body has explained that the first part of the second paragraph of Annex A(1) 
of the SPS Agreement provides an illustrative and expansive list of legal instruments through 
which SPS measures may be adopted ( relevant laws, decrees, regulations, requirements and 
procedures) .320 On this basis, the panel in US – Animals  understood its task in respect of this 
requirement as an inquiry into whether the measure is of the type  that may fall within the 
definition of an SPS measure, rather than being a measure that perfectly fits within one of the 
categories explicitly listed.321  
7.196.   In this respect, we agree with the panel in US – Poultry (China)  that the distinction drawn 
by the pan el in EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products between the legal form and the 
nature of an SPS measure is not the most appropriate approach to examine the second paragraph 
of Annex A(1).322 We agree that legal form may intrinsically determine the natu re of a measure for 
the purposes of determining whether a measure is of the type listed in the second paragraph of 
Annex A(1).323 
7.197.   Following this guidance, we will examine first whether the EU -wide ban is an SPS measure 
within the meaning of Annex A(1). We wi ll then move on to assess whether each of the import 
restrictions on the products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,  and Poland are SPS measures 
within the meaning of Annex A(1).  
7.4.4.2.1   Whether the EU -wide ban is an SPS measure within the meaning of 
Annex  A(1)  
7.4.4.2.1.1   Whether the EU -wide ban falls within subparagraphs (a)  through d) of 
Annex  A(1)  of the SPS Agreement  
7.198.   We begin our examination by addressing the question of whether the EU -wide ban falls 
within subparagraphs (a)  to (d) of Annex A(1)  of the SPS Agreemen t.  
7.199.   We have referred to the FSVPS letter to DG SANCO of 29 January 2014 and to the 
instructions of FSVPS to its heads of territorial departments of the same date as evidence of the 
EU-wide ban. In our view, those documents, together with certain elements o f the regulatory 
framework on veterinary  health applicable in Russia324, set out the normative context which we 
need to examine in order to assess the objectives of the EU -wide ban.  
                                               
317 (footnote original) See, to similar effect, Panel Report s, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech 
Products , para. 7.2558.  
318 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Apples , para. 172.  
319 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Apples , para. 173.  
320 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Apples, para. 175.  
321 Panel Report, US – Animals, paras. 7.32 -7.33. 
322 Panel Report, US – Poultry (China) , paras. 7.85 -7.86 and 7.100 -7.101. See also Panel Report, 
Australia – Apples , paras. 7.150 -7.153 (referring to the close connection between the elements that determine 
legal form and nature in the second paragraph of Annex A(1) of the SPS Agreement).  
323 Panel Report, US – Poultry (China) , para. 7.118.  
324 See Veterinary Control in Customs Union Decision No.  317 (Exhibit RUS -386); RF Government's 
Decree 327 of June 30, 2004 "Approval of the Regulation of the Federal Ser vice for Veterinary and 
Phytosanitary Surveillance (Rosselkhoznadzor)", para. 1, Rossiyskaya Gazeta // URL: 
http://www.rg.ru/2004/07/15/veterinar -dok.html . (Exhibit RUS -352). See also Regulati ons on the State 
 WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.200.   We note that both the letter from FSVPS to DG SANCO and the FSVPS instructi ons to its 
heads of territorial departments of 29 January 2014 refer to the ASF situation in the European 
Union, particularly in Lithuania. In addition, both documents refer to sections 4.1 and 4.3 of the 
agreed veterinary certificates for exports from the  European Union to Russia for a number of the 
products at issue (see Table 1 above for a list of the products subject to the EU -wide ban).325 The 
relevant sections of the veterinary certificates generally refer to the veterinary requirement for the 
exported products to originate "from premises and/or administrative territory of the EU Member 
State that are officially free from the following contagious diseases:326 African swine fever – during 
the last 3 years in the territory of the EU excluding Sardinia".327 
7.201.   In addition, the rest of the evidence adduced by the European Union in support of the 
existence and content of the EU -wide ban328 refers to the rejection of imports of products at issue 
on grounds related to the ASF situation in the European Union. In particula r, certain evidence 
refers to the lack of reliability in the representation of the ASF situation in the European Union, as 
described in certain veterinary certificates attached to products at issue.329  
7.202.   We consider that the EU -wide ban was adopted in light of the ASF situation in the territory 
of the European Union. As noted in section 7.3.2.3.1  above, it was adopted as a response to an 
ASF outbreak in wild boar in Lithuania at the end of January 2014.  
7.203.   Certain elements of Russia's  legal framework on veterinary health further clarify the 
objectives of the EU -wide ban in respect of ASF. Paragraph 1 of Russia's Government Decree 327 
provides that FSVPS "is the federal executive authority exercising supervision and surveillance 
functio ns in the field of veterinary medicine" .330 Such surveillance functions include oversight of 
compliance with veterinary requirements.331  
7.204.   Customs Union Decision No. 317  states that one of its objectives is "to ensure protection of 
the customs territory of the Customs Union against the import and spread of contagious animal 
disease pathogens, including diseases common to both animals and humans, and goods which do 
not comply with the Common Veterinary Requirements".332 This Customs Union Decision comprises  
chapter s containing veterinary requirements applicable to imports of a number of goods into the 
Customs Union territory. Those goods include the following, which are part of the products at 
issue: breeding and utility pigs  (Chapter 7); semen from boars (Chapter 8 ); pigs for slaughter 
(Chapter 9); meat and other edible meat raw materials (Chapter 22); meat of wild animals 
(Chapter 28); raw materials consisting of leather, horns and hooves, intestinal raw materials, fur, 
hair and bristle (Chapter 33); feed and feed additives of animal origin (Chapter 35); feed additives 
for cats and dogs, and prepared feed for cats and dogs which has been subjected to thermal 
                                                                                                                                               
Veterinary Supervision Approved by Decree 476 of the Government of Russia of June 5, 2013 (rev. 
24.03.2014) (Exhibit RUS -16), paras. 1 and 4(a); and Russia's response to Panel question No. 276, para. 112.  
325 Letter of FSVPS of 29 January 20 14 – FS-SA-8/1277 ( Exhibit EU -14) and FSVPS instructions to its 
Territorial Departments  of 29 January 2014  (Exhibit EU -161).  
326 (footnote original) Administrative territories, zones and time periods may be modified by mutual 
agreement on the basis of the Memorandum of 4 April 2006 on zoning and regionalization.  
327 This is the sample text of the Veterinary certificate for piglets for fattening (Exhibit EU -52). In its 
first written submission, the European Union notes that the letter from FSVPS to DG SANCO of  29 January 
2014 ( Exhibit EU -14) refers to the following veterinary certificates: Veterinary certificate for piglets for 
fattening ( Exhibit EU -52); the Veterinary certificate for pigs for breeding ( Exhibit EU -53); the Veterinary 
certificate for pork meat and  raw meat preparations ( Exhibit EU -54); the Veterinary certificate for slaughter 
pigs ( Exhibit EU -55); the Veterinary certificate for finished food products ( Exhibit EU -56); the Veterinary 
certificate for canned meat, salamis and other ready for consumptio n meat products ( Exhibit EU -57) (European 
Union's first written submission, para. 89, fn 82). The instructions from FSVPS to its heads of territorial 
departments of 29 January 2014 refers to item 4.3 of the veterinary certificates for exports of pork and r aw 
pork products, and to item 4.1 of the Veterinary certificate for pigs for breeding ( Exhibit EU -53). 
328 See para. 7.60 above.  
329 List of returned consignments ( Exhibit EU -17). See also  European Union's first wri tten submission, 
paras. 94 -96. 
330 RF Government's Decree 327 of June 30, 2004 "Approval of the Regulation of the Federal Service for 
Veterinary and Phytosanitary Surveillance (Rosselkhoznadzor)", para. 1 (Exhibit RUS -352). See also 
Regulations on the State Veterinary Supervision Approved by Decree 476 of the Government of Russia of June 
5, 2013 (rev. 24.03.2014) (Exhibit RUS -16), paras. 1 and 4(a).  
331 Russian  Government's Decree 327 of June 30, 2004 "Approval of the Regulation of the Federal 
Service for Veter inary and Phytosanitary Surveillance (Rosselkhoznadzor)", para. 5 (Exhibit RUS -352).  
332 Preamble to Customs Union Decision No. 317 (Exhibit RUS -25). WT/DS475/R  
 
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  treatment (Chapter 37); and hunting trophies (Chapter 38). All the chapters referring to these 
goods include reference to the ASF situation necessary for accepting imports of the respective 
products.333 The formulation of this requirement differs for each good as portrayed in Table 3 
below.  
Table 3 ASF veterinary  requirements of Customs Unio n Decision No. 317334 
Products  ASF veterinary requirement relative to the place of origin of the 
animals or processing facilities from which the product comes  
breeding and utility pigs; semen 
from boars; wild, zoo and circus 
animals; meat and other edible 
meat raw materials; raw materials 
consisting of leather, horns and 
hooves, intestinal raw materials, 
fur, hair and bristle; and hunting 
trophies  
 during the last 36 months in the territory of the country or 
administrative territory in accordance with  regionalization  
pigs for slaughter  during the last 36 months in the territory of the country or 
administrative territory in accordance with  regionalization  or during the 
last 12 months subject to confirmation of certain epizootic and 
entomological monitoring  
 
meat of wild animals  in the territory of the country or administrative territory in accordance 
with recommendations of the Terrestrial Code  
 
feed and feed additives of animal 
origin  in the territory of the country or administrative territory in accordan ce 
with  regionalization  during a three -year period  
 
feed additives for cats and dogs, 
and prepared feed for cats and 
dogs which has been subjected to 
thermal treatment  
 during the last 12 months in the administrative territory in accordance 
with  regiona lization  
 
7.205.   As shown in Table 3, the veterinary requirements for imports of the products at issue into 
Russia are similar to those used in the text of the veterinary certificates which serve as a basis for 
Russia's refusal of the imports of the products at issue. Both the provisions of Customs Union 
Decision No. 317 and the veterinary certificates refer to the ASF situation in the place of origin of 
the products at issue being imported to Russia.  
7.206.   In addition, pursuant to paragraph 4 of the Final and Transit ional Provisions of the 
Customs Union Decision No. 317, Russia continues to apply the veterinary certificates for the 
exportation of live pigs and pig products bilaterally agreed with the European Union.335 
7.207.   Measures taken pursuant to Annex A(1)(a) are taken with the objective of addressing risks 
to animal life or health "arising from the entry, establishment or spread" of pests, diseases, 
                                               
333 Customs Union Decision No. 317  (Exhibit RUS -25). We note that Customs Union Decision No. 317 
also refers to wild, zoo and circus animals (Chapter 16).  
334 Table prepared by the Panel based on the information available in Customs Union Decision No. 317  
(Exhibit RUS -25). 
335 Para. 4 of Customs Union Decision No. 317 reads as follows:  
  
Until 1 January 2013, in mut ual trade between the Parties and third countries, the import of 
goods subject to inspection shall be permitted using veterinary certificates valid as of 1 July 2010 
initialled by one of the Parties with the exporting countries, as well as any subsequent 
amendments thereto, agreed by the Party and the exporting country on the basis of a position 
agreed with other Parties. In the absence of initialled veterinary certificates, goods subject to 
inspection must be accompanied by veterinary certificates ensuring  compliance with the common 
veterinary (veterinary and health) requirements of the Customs Union (as amended by Decisions 
of the Customs Union Commission No 455 of 18 November 2010 and No 726 of 15 July 2011).  
 
Russia explained that by subsequent agreement  between the European Union and Federation prolonged 
the validity of bilateral veterinary certificates beyond 1 January 2013 (Russia's response to Panel question 
No. 177, para. 314).  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  disease -carrying organisms or disease -causing organisms. ASF is a highly contagious 
haemorrhagic disease of pigs and Europ ean wild boar. The organism which causes ASF is the 
African swine fever virus (ASFV), a DNA virus in the Asfarviridae  family; genus Asfivirus336, and as 
confirmed by the experts and the OIE, the ASF V is a disease -causing organism that can be 
transmitted eith er directly animal -to-animal or via the consumption of ASFV -contaminated food 
consumed by pigs. The risk to animal health resulting from the presence of a disease -causing 
organism in a food or feedstuff falls within the scope of Annex A(1)(b).  
7.208.   With respect  to risks arising from the "entry, establishment or spread" of ASF, we are 
aware  that ASF was already present in certain areas of Russia at the time it adopted the EU -wide 
ban337 and that the movement of infected wild boar from Russia (and Belarus) into the territory of 
the European Union was the likely means of introduction of the virus into the European Union. The 
risks associated with the "entry, spread or establishment" of a disease within a country where the 
disease already exists are often considerably different than the comparable risks to a country with 
no history of the disease and with  no regulatory structure and experience in dealing with the 
disease.338 
7.209.    At the same time, we recognize that Russia has put in place a number of measures 
directed to achi eve control and eradication of ASF within its territory.339 Based on the evidence on 
record, we find that ASF has been present in some areas of Russia's territory since the initial 
outbreaks of ASF in wild boar in Lithuania. However, there have been areas of  Russia that remain 
free of ASF, areas where ASF has been eradicated, and still other areas where the level of 
prevalence of ASF has decreased in terms of fewer outbreaks taking place in the most recent 
months.340 We recall that the preamble of the SPS Agree ment states "Desiring to improve the 
…animal health … situation in all Members". We therefore do not believe it would be reasonable to 
expect a Member to accept risks that could worse n its current SPS status, especially when they are 
taking measures to con trol a particular disease.  
7.210.   Bearing this situation in mind, as part of its responses to Panel questions, Russia notes 
that "[g]iven that the European Union has failed to demonstrate that its alleged ASF -free areas are 
and will remain ASF -free, there exists a non -negligible risk that presently uninfected areas of the 
Russian Federation will become infected through unsafe imports from the European Union and that 
the ASF disease situation will aggravate within those areas of the Russian Federation that are 
currently battling ASF."341  
                                               
336 OIE General Disease Information Sheets: African swine fever (ASF Diseas e Information Sheet) 
(Exhibits RUS -4 and RUS -171). 
http://www.oie.int/fileadmin/Home/eng/Media_Center/docs/pdf/Disease_cards/ASF -EN.pdf  (last accessed 15 
December 2015).  
337 Russia's first written submission, para. 23 (referring to OIE WAHIS  Interface, Event summary 
Reports, African swine fever, Russia (2007 -2014). (Exhibit RUS -144)); second written submission, paras. 146 -
147. 
338 See Dr Thomson, Transcript, pa ra. 2.128.  
339 Russia's first written submission, paras. 26 -35 (where Russia refers to the following exhibits: ASF 
Instructions  (Exhibit EU -18); Russian Federal Law on Veterinary Medicine, No. 4979 -I, 14 May 1993  (Exhibit 
RUS-15); 2012 Plan  (Exhibit RUS -13); Russian Federal Decree on State Veterinary Supervision, No. 476, 5 
June 2013  (Exhibit RUS -16); Russian Federal Government Decree on State Program for Agricultural 
Development and Regulation of Agricultural Commodities Markets for 2013 -2020 , No. 717, 14 J uly 2012   
(Exhibit RUS -17); Order by the Russian Federal Ministry of Agriculture on the Confirmation of the List of 
Contagious Animal Diseases That Require Containment Measures, No. 476, 19 December 2011   (Exhibit RUS -
18); Order by the Russian Federal Mini stry of Agriculture on the Confirmation of the Rules for Veterinary 
Transport Certificates and the Order of Issuance of Veterinary Transport Certificates, No. 281, 17 July 2014  
(Exhibit RUS -19); Russian Federal Ministry of Natural Resources, Plan regarding  the organizational and specific 
measures of monitoring, depopulation and reduction of migration activities of wild boar in the territory of the 
RF, including specially protected natural areas of regional and federal importance, 21 November 2013  (Exhibit 
RUS-20); Russian Federal Government Decree on the Seizure of Animals and Animal Products in case of 
Eradication of Highly Dangerous Animal Disease Outbreaks, No. 310, 26 May 2006  (Exhibit RUS -21); and Order 
by the Russian Federal Ministry of Agriculture on Approval of Guidelines to Determine Animal Health Status of 
Pig Holdings and Organizations Involved in Pig Slaughter, Pork Product Processing and Storage, No.  258, 23 
July 2010  (Exhibit RUS -22)) and  paras.  251-273 (and exhibits cited therein); responses to  Panel questions No. 
29 and 30 (and exhibits cited therein).  
340 Russia's response to Panel question No. 143, paras. 263 -264. 
341 Russia's response to Panel question No. 143, para. 264.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.211.   This confirms that one of the objectives of the EU -wide ban is the protection of animal life 
or health within Russia's territory from risks arising from the entry (or re -entry) and further spread 
of a disease and a disease -causing or ganism already present in parts of Russia's territory; and a 
disease -causing organism in feedstuffs, already present in parts of Russia's territory. Thus, the EU -
wide ban, read in the context of Russia's legal framework on veterinary surveillance and the 
situation in respect of the presence of ASF in Russia's territory, evidences a clear and objective 
relationship with the purposes set forth in Annex A(1) (a) and (b) of the SPS Agreement.  
7.4.4.2.1.2   Whether the EU -wide ban is of the type mentioned in part one of the s econd 
paragraph of Annex A(1)  of the SPS Agreement  
7.212.   Russia alleges that the EU -wide ban cannot be considered an SPS measure because it is 
not a measure attributable to it.342 We found in paragraph 7.84 above that the European Unio n 
demonstrated the existence of the EU -wide ban as a composite measure which reflects Russia's 
refusal to accept certain imports of the products at issue from the European Union, and that  the 
EU-wide ban is a measure attributable to Russia. Based on that f inding, we now turn to examine 
whether such measure, as described in paragraph  7.84 above, is of the type mentioned in part one 
of the second paragraph of Annex A(1).  
7.213.   Russia also argues that the EU -wide ban is not a requiremen t or procedure within the 
meaning of Annex A(1) of the SPS Agreement and therefore does not constitute an SPS 
measure.343 Russia relies on the fact that the European Union did not challenge the WTO -
consistency of the bilaterally negotiated EU -Russian veterin ary certificates, focusing instead on the 
application of the requirements or procedures which are set out in such veterinary certificates.344 
Distinguishing between the requirement or procedure itself and the application of such 
requirement or procedure, Rus sia concludes that the EU -wide ban does not fall within Annex A(1) 
of the SPS Agreement.345  
7.214.   In Australia – Apples , the Appellate Body unequivocally stated that the list of legal 
instruments in part one of paragraph 2 of Annex A(1) of the SPS Agreement is bo th illustrative and 
expansive.346 The panel in US – Animals elaborated on this interpretation, stating that measures of 
a type not expressly listed in part one of paragraph 2 of Annex A(1) may nevertheless constitute 
SPS measures when they are relevant, that  is, when they are applied for a purpose that 
corresponds to one of those listed in subparagraphs (a) through (d).347 
7.215.   We note that the text of Annex A(1) limits the scope of "laws, decrees, regulations, 
requirements and procedures" only by qualifying that th ey should be "relevant", which was 
interpreted by the Appellate Body to mean that they are "applied" for a purpose that corresponds 
to one of those listed in subparagraphs (a) through  (d).348  
7.216.   We recall that the EU -wide ban is a composite measure, applied on  the basis of mandatory 
instructions issued by FSVPS and enforced through the actions of veterinary control officers at 
Russia's borders.349 The result of that measure is the effective ban on some of the products at 
issue from the European Union. Pursuant to  the terms of the ban, the products at issue subject to 
the ban would only be accepted into Russia's territory when they originate from areas that have 
been free from ASF during the three years prior to their importation.  
                                               
342 Russia's second written submission paras. 171 and 173.  
343 Russia's openin g statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 49; and second written 
submission, para. 172 (referring to European Union's first written submission, para. 103).  
344 Russia's response to Panel question No. 72, para 109.  
345 Russia's opening statement at t he first meeting of the Panel, para. 49; and second written 
submission, para. 172 (referring to Panel Report s, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products , 
paras.  7.1395, 7.1407, 7.1421, 7.1441, 7.1448 and 7.1465).  
346 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Apples , para. 175.  
347 Panel Report, US – Animals , para.7.32. See also Panel Report, Australia – Apples , para. 7.169.  
348 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Apples , paras. 175 -176. 
349 See section 7.84 above.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.217.   The EU -wide ban can be understood  as a requirement350 formulated in the negative 
form.351 Such negative requirement consists of Russia's refusal to accept imports of the products 
at issue from the European Union that do not meet the current wording of the veterinary 
certificates agreed betwee n them in 2006. While the general substantive conditions of entry for the 
products at issue from the European Union into Russia are described in the veterinary certificates 
agreed by the parties, it is Russia's enforcement of the current wording of these c ertificates that 
constitutes a requirement within the meaning of the second paragraph of Annex A(1) of the 
SPS Agreement.  
7.218.   Furthermore, the EU -wide ban could be construed as a procedure. The panel in EC – 
Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products  considere d that although an approval procedure is not 
defined in Annex A(1), it is a concept further developed in Annex C(1). After examining the 
wording of both provisions, that panel concluded: "[o]n the basis of these elements, the term 
'approval procedures' can  be understood as encompassing procedures applied to check and ensure 
the fulfilment of one or more substantive SPS requirements the satisfaction of which is a 
prerequisite for the approval to place a product on the market."352 Following this definition, we 
consider that Russia's enforcement of the current wording of the veterinary certificates is the part 
of the procedure applied to check and ensure the fulfilment of the substantive SPS requirements 
set out in these veterinary certificates.  Thus, we consider  the EU -wide ban to fall within the scope 
of an approval procedure within the meaning of the second paragraph of Annex A(1) of the SPS 
Agreement.  
7.219.   In light of these considerations, we conclude that the EU -wide ban falls under the 
indicative list of measure s, "laws, decrees, regulations, requirements and procedures", provided in 
paragraph 2 of Annex A(1).  
7.4.4.2.1.3   Preliminary conclusion  
7.220.   Based on the foregoing we find that the EU -wide ban is an SPS measure within the 
meaning of Annex A(1) of the SPS Agreement.  
7.221.   We mo ve on to examine whether the bans on the imports of the products at issue from 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland  are also SPS measures within the meaning of Annex A(1) of 
the SPS Agreement.  
7.4.4.2.2   Whether the bans on imports from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,  and Poland  are 
SPS measures within the meaning of Annex A(1)  of the SPS Agreement  
7.4.4.2.2.1   Whether the bans on the imports of the products at issue from Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland fall within subparagraphs (a)  through (d) of Annex A(1)  of 
the SPS Agree ment  
7.222.   We begin our examination by addressing the question of whether the bans on the imports 
of the products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland fall within subparagraphs (a) -
(d) of Annex A(1)  of the SPS Agreement . The measures regarding Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and 
Poland  constitute restrictions on the importation of the products at issue from these countries to 
Russia. These restrictions were imposed by instructions of FSVPS with the purpose of addressing 
the ASF outbreaks taking place in the territory of each of those EU member States. In our view, 
those documents, together with certain elements of the regulatory framework on sanitary health 
applicable in Russia353, set out the normative context which we need to examine to assess the 
                                               
350 As the panel in Austra lia – Apples noted: "the dictionary definition of the word 'requirements' is 
'something called for or demanded; a condition which must be complied with'." Panel Report, Australia – 
Apples , para. 7 .160 (referring to The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary , Ed. Brown, L., Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, Vol. 2, p. 2557).  
351 The panel in EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products , when referring to the ban of the 
marketing of a particular product, stated that, as the reference to requirements in Annex A(1) is broad and 
unqualified, such a ban could "constitute a negative requirement".  Panel Report s, EC – Approval and Marketing 
of Biotech Products , para. 7.2597.  
352 Panel Report s, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products , para. 7.424.  
353 See para. 7.733  below.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  objectives of the bans on the imports of the products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and 
Poland . As we have already noted in our analysis of the objectives pursued by the EU -wide ban, 
we consider that the presence of ASF in certain areas of Russia a t the time it adopted the EU -wide 
ban354 can inform our understanding of the risks that Russia was seeking to address through the 
bans on the imports of the products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland.  
7.223.   As explained in paragraph 7.79 above, FSVPS is the federal authority in charge of 
supervision and surveillance in the field of veterinary medicine. In exercise of its authority, FSVPS 
issued instructions to the heads of its territorial departments imposing the spe cified import 
restrictions which explicitly refer to the ASF outbreaks in the respective EU member States.355 One 
of the instructions also expressly refers to the purpose of preventing the introduction of ASF into 
Russia from the respective EU member State.356 All instructions refer to the specific heat treatment 
of pig products, while some explicitly state that such treatment is necessary for the destruction of 
ASFV.357 
7.224.   In addition, as mentioned in the context of our examination of the objectives pursued by 
the EU-wide ban, we consider that Russia's legal framework in the field of veterinary health further 
confirms that the instructions issued by FSVPS are related to the protection of animal health from 
ASF.  
7.225.   Another element in support of this view are Russia's n otifications of the bans on imports of 
the products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland to the SPS Committee. In each of 
those notifications, Russia declared food safety and animal health as the objectives of each of the 
measures.358 
7.226.   Based o n the foregoing we consider that one of the objectives of each of the measures in 
respect of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland is to ensure protection of Russia's territory from 
the (re -)entry and further spread of ASF and ASFV.  
7.227.   As mentioned in paragr aph 7.207  above, according to the OIE ASF is a disease affecting 
pigs, and ASFV is the viral organism which causes ASF.  
7.228.   Considering the factors mentioned above, we find that the import restrictions on the 
products at issue fro m Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland  are applied by Russia with the 
purpose of protecting animal life or health within its territory from risks arising from the re -entry 
and further spread of a disease and a disease -causing organism already present in parts of 
Russia's territory; and of protecting animal life or health from a disease -causing organism in foods 
and feedstuffs. We therefore conclude that each of the bans on imports of the products at issue 
from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, read in the context of Russia's legal framework on 
veterinary surveillance and the situation in respect of the presence of ASF in Russia's territory, 
pursue the objectives laid out in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of Annex A(1) of the SPS Agreement.  
                                               
354 See para s. 7.207 - 7.209  above . 
355 See Letter from the Russian Veterinary Service to DG SANCO, FS -EN-8/1023, 25 January 2015  
(Exhibit RUS -28), Letter from Russian Vete rinary Service, FS -NV-8/2972, 27 February 2014  (Exhibit RUS-29), 
Russia's letter of instruction of 2 April 2014, FS -EN-8/5081  (Exhibit EU-168), and Russia's letter of instruction 
of 27 June 2014, FS -NF-8/11315  (Exhibit EU-169) and Letter from the Russian V eterinary Service to DG 
SANCO, FS -NV-8/17431, 11 September 2014  (Exhibit RUS-37). 
356 Instructions of FSVPS to the heads of its territorial departments as of 25 January 2014 Ref. FS -EN-
8/1023 (Exhibit RUS -28), para. 2.  
357 Instructions of FSVPS to the heads of  its territorial departments as of 25 January 2014 Ref. FS -EN-
8/1023 (Exhibit RUS -28), para. 1; Instructions of FSVPS to the heads of its territorial departments as of 
27 February 2014 Ref. FS -NV-8/2972 (Exhibit RUS -29), para. 1.  
358 Exhibits EU -7, EU -8, EU -9, EU-10, EU-12, EU -13. We note that in its notifications of the measures 
regarding Estonia and Latvia Russia stated, as their objective, human health. However, both parties in the 
proceedings confirmed that ASF does not pose risk to human health (European  Union's first written submission, 
para. 100; Russia's response to Panel question No. 24, para. 9). This was further confirmed by the OIE (see 
OIE's response to Panel question No. 10).  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.4.4.2.2.2   Whether the ba ns on imports from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland  are 
of the type mentioned in part one of paragraph 2 of Annex A(1)  
7.229.   The import restrictions on the products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland  
are applied by Russia pursuant to the instructions of FSVPS to the heads of its territorial 
departments.359 As clarified by Russia, pursuant to Decree 327 "different territorial departments 
are obliged to follow the directions from the Federal Government".360  
7.230.   Based on Russia's explanation of the mandatory nature of directions provided by FSVPS to 
the heads of its territorial departments, we consider those instructions to fall under the indicative 
list of measures, "laws, decrees, regulations, requirements and procedures", provided in paragraph 
2 of Annex A(1) of the SPS  Agreement . 
7.4.4.2.2.3   Preliminary conclusion  
7.231.   Based on the foregoing we find that the import restrictions on the products at issue from 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,  and Poland are SPS measures within the meaning of Annex A(1) of the 
SPS Agreemen t. 
7.232.   We turn to examine the second requirement for a measure to be deemed an SPS measure 
for the purposes of Article 1 of the SPS Agreement. This is, whether the measures at issue may, 
directly or indirectly, affect international trade.  
7.4.4.2.3   Whether the measures at issue may, directly or indirectly, affect international 
trade  
7.233.   As noted by previous panels, even if a measure falls within the definition of an 
SPS measure in Annex  A(1) of the SPS  Agreement, further to Article  1.1 of the SPS  Agreement, 
such measure stil l needs to be a measure that directly or indirectly affect[s] international trade to 
be covered by the disciplines of the SPS  Agreement.361 We agree with a previous panel that it is 
not necessary to demonstrate that an SPS measure has an actual effect on tra de. Article  1.1 
merely requires that an SPS measure "may, directly or indirectly, affect international trade".362 
7.234.   The panels in US – Animals, India – Agricultural Products , and EC – Hormones considered 
that an import ban affects international trade.363 In the words of the panel in India – Agricultural 
Products : "[i]ndeed, an import ban is, by its very nature, intended to affect international trade."364  
7.235.   As we have explained above, the EU -wide ban prohibits the importation of the products at 
issue from the Europea n Union, whereas each of the bans on imports of the products at issue from 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,  and Poland prohibits the importation of the products at issue from each 
of those EU member States.  
7.236.   Thus, consistent with the understanding of previous p anels, we conclude that the 
measures at issue directly or indirectly affect international trade.  
7.4.5   Conclusion  
7.237.   Based on the foregoing we find that the measures at issue are SPS measures pursuant to 
Article 1 and Annex A(1)  of the SPS Agreement . Therefore, the  measures at issue in this dispute 
are subject to the provisions of the SPS Agreement.  
                                               
359 Exhibits  RUS-28, RUS -29, EU -168, EU -169 and RUS -37. 
360 Russia's respon se to Panel question No. 276, para. 113, referring to RF Government's Decree 327 of 
June 30, 2004 "Approval of the Regulation of the Federal Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Surveillance 
(Rosselkhoznadzor)", para. 4 (Exhibit RUS -352).  
361 Panel Repor t, US – Poultry (China) , para. 7.87.  
362 Panel Report s, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products,  paras. 7.434 -7.435.  
363 Panel Reports, US – Animals, para. 7.44; India – Agricultural  Products , para. 7.157; EC  – Hormones 
(Canada) , para. 8.26; and EC – Hormones (US) , para. 8.23.  
364 Panel Report, India – Agricultural Pr oducts , para. 7.157.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.238.   As we explained in paragraph 7.31 above, we will now undertake an examination of the 
European Union's claims in respect of the EU -wide ban a nd the bans on the imports of the 
products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland.  
7.5  Claims relating to the EU -wide ban  
7.5.1   Whether the EU -wide ban is "based on" relevant international standards (Claims 
under Article s 3.1 of the SPS Agreement ) 
7.5.1.1   Main  arguments of the parties  
7.5.1.1.1   European Union  
7.239.   The European Union asserts that the EU -wide ban does not "conform to" and is not "based 
on" any relevant international standards within the meaning of Articles 3.2 and 3.1 of the 
SPS Agreement, respectively. Accordi ng to the  European Union,  the EU -wide ban rather goes 
against the relevant international standards.365 
7.240.   The European  Union posits that a measure that actually contradicts the international 
standards cannot be said to be based on the respective standards.366 
7.241.   The European Union argues that while the relevant international standards recommend 
trade from ASF -free areas in several products at issue, or trade in products which have been 
treated so as to ensure the destruction of the ASFV, Russia does exactly the contr ary and bans 
trade from ASF -free areas in the EU.367 
7.5.1.1.2   Russia  
7.242.   Russia argues that the European Union has failed to make a prima facie  case with respect 
to the existence of an EU -wide ban because it has not provided evidence and arguments sufficient 
to identify  an EU -wide ban.368 Russia argues that "what the European Union claims to be an 'EU-
wide ban' is actually the Russian Federation 's continuing efforts to follow the agreed European 
Union -Russian Federation ASF -related requirements of the veterinary certificate s, which do not 
permit the importation of uncertified pigs and pork products".369 
7.243.    Russia further stresses that the European Union "has not met its burden to make a prima 
facie case that the so -called 'EU -Wide Ban' is a measure under the SPS Agreement".370    
7.244.    As an alternative to its argument that the EU -wide ban does not exist, Russia asserts that 
the EU -wide ban is "based on the OIE standard to the extent possible".371 
7.5.1.2   Main arguments of the third parties  
7.5.1.2.1   Australia  
7.245.   Australia argues that in light of Article 3.2 of the SPS Agreement, the Panel will have to 
determine, as a matter of fact, whether Russia's measures conform to, or are based on, the 
Terrestrial Code, noting that only measures which conform to international standards enjoy the 
presumption of consistenc y with the SPS Agreement.372 
                                               
365 European Union's first written submission, paras. 113 and 122.  
366 European Union's oral statement at the second substantive meeting, para. 56.  
367 European Union's oral st atement at the second substantive meeting, para. 57.  
368 Russia's first written submission, para. 339.  
369 Russia's first written submission, para. 345.  
370 Russia's second written submission, para. 171.  
371 Russia's first written submission, para. 385.  
372 Australi a's third -party submission, para. 7.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.246.   Australia asserts that with the foregoing supposition in mind, it would be appropriate for 
the Panel to commence its analysis with the claims under Article 3, followed by consideration, if 
necessary, of the subsequent claims unde r Articles 5 and 6 of the SPS Agreement.373 
7.5.1.2.2    Brazil  
7.247.   Brazil emphasizes that while Members are allowed to deviate from the use of international 
standards and to adopt a higher level of protection than  those recognized by the OIE, Articles 3.2 
and 3.3, together  with Articles 5.1 and 6 of the SPS Agreement, require that such a higher level of 
protection in the context of the principle of regionalization should only be adopted based upon a 
risk assessment.  
7.248.   Brazil stresses that the Terrestrial Code also establishes  recommendations for importation 
from countries or zones considered infected with ASF and that consequently, if a Member decides 
to deviate from these standards and/or recommendations, then such decision should be based on 
scientific evidence, consubstanti ated in a risk assessment.374 
7.5.1.3   Analysis by the Panel  
7.5.1.3.1   Introduction  
7.249.   We recall that the Panel has already found that the alleged EU -wide ban exists and that it 
is an SPS measure that the Panel may properly look into.375 
7.250.   We thus begin our analysis by examining the legal provisions at issue in order to ascertain 
the applicable legal test.  
7.5.1.3.2   Relevant legal provisions  
7.251.   Article 3 of the SPS Agreement is entitled "Harmonization". It states, in relevant part:  
Article 3  
Harmonization  
1. To harmonize sanitary and phytosanitar y measures on as wide a basis as 
possible, Members shall base their sanitary or phytosanitary measures on 
international standards, guidelines or recommendations, where they exist, except as 
otherwise provided for in this Agreement, and in particular in par agraph 3.  
2. Sanitary or phytosanitary measures which conform to international standards, 
guidelines or recommendations shall be deemed to be necessary to protect human, 
animal or plant life or health, and presumed to be consistent with the relevant 
provis ions of this Agreement and of GATT  1994.  
3. Members may introduce or maintain sanitary or phytosanitary measures which 
result in a higher level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection than would be achieved 
by measures based on the relevant international s tandards, guidelines or 
recommendations, if there is a scientific justification, or as a consequence of the level 
of sanitary or phytosanitary protection a Member determines to be appropriate in 
accordance with the relevant provisions of paragraphs 1 throu gh 8 of Article 5.1 
Notwithstanding the above, all measures which result in a level of sanitary or 
phytosanitary protection different from that which would be achieved by measures 
based on international standards, guidelines or recommendations shall not be  
inconsistent with any other provision of this Agreement.  
                                               
373 Australia's third -party submission, para. 9.  
374 Brazil's third-party submission, para s. 12 and 14. 
375 See paras. 7.84, 7.220 , and 7.237 above.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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_____________________________________  
1 For the purposes of paragraph 3 of Article 3, there is a scientific justification if, on 
the basis of an examination and evaluation of available scientific information in 
conformity with the relevant provisions of this Agreement, a Member determines that 
the relevant international standards, guidelines or recommendations are not sufficient 
to achieve its appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protecti on. 
7.252.   The Appellate Body has indicated that Article 3 of the SPS Agreement encourages the 
harmonization of SPS measures on the basis of international standards, while at the same time 
recognizing the right of WTO Members to determine their appropriate level of protection.376 In this 
connection, the Appellate Body recalled that "[t] he preamble of the SPS Agreement states that one 
of its objectives is 'to further the use of harmonized sanitary and phytosanitary measures between 
Members, on the basis of internatio nal standards, guidelines and recommendations developed by 
the relevant international organizations, including … the International Office of Epizootics'".377  
7.253.   The first three paragraphs of Article  3 of the SPS  Agreement set out the obligation of 
Members to h armonize378 their SPS  measures by either basing them on or conforming them to 
international standards, while leaving open some margin, or leeway,379 for departing from those 
standards, subject to consistency with the remainder of the SPS  Agreement. The parties ' evidence 
and argumentation have focused on the issue of whether the EU -wide ban is "based on" the 
relevant international standard within the meaning of Articles 3.1 of the SPS Agreement, and we 
focus our analysis on that provision.  
7.254.   We note that Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement establishes that Members shall base their 
SPS measures on international standards, guidelines, or recommendations, where they exist. In 
EC – Hormones , the Appellate Body stated that "[a] thing is commonly said to be 'based on' 
another thing when the former 'stands' or is 'founded' or 'built' upon or 'is supported by' the 
latter".380 The Appellate Body considered that, to be "based on" an international standard, a 
measure "may adopt some, not necessarily all, of the elements of the int ernational standard".381 
The Member imposing this measure does not benefit from the presumption of consistency set up in 
Article  3.2. At the same time, however, the Member is not penalized by exemption of a 
complaining Member from the normal burden of showin g a prima  facie case of inconsistency with 
Article  3.1 or any other  relevant Article  of the SPS  Agreement or of the GATT  1994. That is, the 
burden of proof would still lie on a complainant to make a prima  facie case of violation of 
Article  3.1.382 In EC – Sardines , the Appellate Body remarked that "there must be a very strong 
and very close relationship between two things in order to be able to say that one is 'the basis for' 
the other".383 The Appellate Body thus stated that, where a technical regulation and t he relevant 
international standard contradict each other, it cannot properly be concluded that the international 
                                               
376 Appellate Body Report, India – Agricultural Products , para. 5.76.  
377 Appellate Body Report, India – Agricultural Products , footnote 396 to para. 5.76.  
378 In EC – Hormones, the Appellate  Body explained that:  
In generalized terms, the object and p urpose of Article  3 is to promote the harmonization of the 
SPS measures of Members on as wide a basis as possible, while recognizing and safeguarding, at 
the same time, the right and duty of Members to protect the life and health of their people. The 
ultimate goal of the harmonization of SPS  measures is to prevent the use of such measures for 
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between Members or as a disguised restriction on 
international trade, without preventing Members from adopting or enforcing m easures which are 
both 'necessary to protect' human life or health and 'based on scientific principles', and without 
requiring them to change their appropriate level of protection.  
Appellate  Body Report, EC – Hormones , para.  177. 
379 See Panel Report, India – Agricultural Products , para. 7.196.  
380 Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones , para. 163.  
381 Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones , para. 171.  
382 The Appellate  Body has clarified that there is no  "general rule – exception" relationship between the 
three releva nt paragraphs of Article  3. Accordingly, these three alternative scenarios are equally available to 
WTO Members. The Appellate  Body explained that "this right of a Member to establish its own level of sanitary 
protection under Article  3.3 of the SPS Agreem ent is an autonomous right and not an 'exception' from a 
'general obligation' under Article  3.1". (emphasis original) Appellate  Body Report, EC – Hormones , para.  172. 
383 Appellate Body Report, EC – Sardines , para. 245.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  standard has been used "as a basis for" the technical regulation.384 As the Appellate Body 
recognized in EC – Sardines , the term "as a basis for"  in Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement is 
similar to the language used in Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement.385 Furthermore, the panel in 
India – Agricultural Products  concluded that a fundamental departure from the relevant 
international standard amounts to a contradiction of such a standard.386  
7.255.   In EC – Hormones , the Appellate  Body defined the terms "based on" and "conform to" as 
forming concentric circles. It found that "[a] measure that 'conforms to' and incorporates 
a … standard is, of course, 'based on' that  standard".387 A measure that is "based  on" a standard 
may not necessarily "conform to" that same standard, as some elements of the standard may not 
be present in the measure at issue. Indeed, while it may be sufficient to adopt only some  of the 
elements of an international standard for the measure to be "based on" such standard, Article  3.2 
requires that an SPS  measure embodies the standard completely to be said to "conform  to" it. 
Hence, the language in Article  3.1 whereby an SPS  measure may be "based on" a n international 
standard establishes a less rigorous threshold than that contemplated in Article  3.2 ("conform 
to").388  
7.256.   This guidance is constructive in our consideration of the issues before us in the present 
case, and we understand that the Appellate Body 's guidance, in particular, should be read in light 
of the specific facts and circumstances of a given dispute. We consider that there may be 
situations where a departure or deviation of one element of a measure from a certain aspect of a 
standard may not necessarily constitute an outright contradiction of that aspect of the standard. 
Moreover, even if the deviation amounts to a contradiction, this may not necessarily lead to the 
conclusion that other elements of the measure cannot possibly be "based on" ot her aspects of that 
standard. For example, in cases where a standard applies for a particular set or subset of 
products, part of a measure pertaining to one product may be based on the international standard 
while another part of the measure pertaining to a different product, may not be based  on the 
international standard. Furthermore, distinctions may exist between standards. There may be 
standards that are conditional on the exporting  Member undertaking particular actions, whether on 
a one -off basis or as  part of an ongoing, continuous and dynamic SPS situation that may introduce 
temporal considerations or may require additional action.  
7.257.   In this case, the parties have agreed that the products that are subject to the EU -wide ban 
include: live pigs (piglets for fattening and pigs for breeding), pork meat, and raw meat 
preparations. Both parties have confirmed that the EU -wide ban does not apply to finished 
products that have been subject to a treatment that ensures destruction of ASFV and have 
remained silent  on whether it applies to pig genetic material.389  
7.258.   In the light of its product coverage, the EU -wide ban triggers different  Terrestrial Code 
Chapter 15.1 recommendations for the import of the following: live pigs (both domestic and wild); 
fresh meat (of dom estic and wild pigs); meat products of pigs (either domestic or wild); and 
products of animal origin (from fresh meat of pigs) intended for use in animal feeding, for 
agricultural or industrial use, or for pharmaceutical or surgical use; all of which have not been 
subject to treatment. Each of the different Articles (15.1.5 – 15.1.17 ) of Chapter  15.1  are tailored 
to a particular subset of the relevant products. Some of those recommendations refer to imports 
from ASF -free countries, zones or compartments, a nd others from countries or zones considered 
infected with ASF. Some of the mentioned Articles also provide for trade of products that have 
been processed so as to ensure destruction of the ASFV, if the necessary protections were taken 
after processing390 to avoid contact of the product with any source of ASFV. Likewise, as the 
experts confirmed, numerous horizontal Terrestrial Code provisions including, but not limited to, 
                                               
384 Appellate Body Report, EC – Sardines , para. 248.  
385 Appellate Body Report, EC – Sardines , para. 242. The panel in India – Agricultural Products  referred 
to this Appellate Body jurisprudence at paragraphs 7.265 -7.269 of its report when determining when an SPS 
measures could be "based on" an in ternational standard.  
386 Panel Report, India – Agricultural Products , para. 7.271.  
387 Appellate  Body Report, EC – Hormones , para.  163. 
388 Panel report, India – Agricultural Products , para. 7.202.  
389 See paras. 7.142  - 7.143   , and Table 1 above.  
390 As indicated in fn 247 above, we refer to products that are processed so as to ensure destruction of 
the ASFV as "treated products".  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  Chapter  4.3 and Article 5.3.7, are relevant in determining whether the exporting count ry has 
established an OIE -consistent ASF-free zone.391  
7.259.   The parties do not disagree that one element of a measure may be based on the 
international standard even if a different element of the measure is not.392 Given the range of 
standards and recommendations involved, we are mindful in our examination that a challenged 
measure may be "based on" the international standard with respect to one element, but not with 
respect to another element.  
7.260.   We note that , on the one hand,  certain provisions of the Terrestrial Co de contain clear 
proscriptive standards, which are more conducive to a clear -cut determination of what is "based 
on" those  standards . On the other hand, other Terrestrial Code provisions contain standards that 
provide for options and allow considerable fle xibility as to the means by which Members may base 
their measures on  those standards. These more flexible standards recognize the inherent 
discretion of Members to exercise judgment in a particular set of circumstances, and a panel's 
review must take into account the particular nature of the provision of the relevant international 
standard at issue, in light of the specific facts and circumstances of the dispute.393 Moreover, 
standards calling for interactive processes, where certain steps may be contingent u pon the 
satisfaction of other steps, may require a Panel to examine the actions of both the importing and 
exporting Members. The extent to which an importing Member's obligation to adhere to the 
international standard, guideline, or recommendation is excus ed or limited by the exporting 
Member's actions or inactions must be determined on a case -by-case basis.  
7.261.   With this approach in mind, we proceed to examine whether the EU -wide ban is "based on" 
the relevant international standards in the Terrestrial Code. In this examination, the normal WTO 
burden of proof applies in respect of the complainant's establishment of a prima facie  case. In EC 
— Hormones , the Appellate Body opined that if a measure enacted by a Member is based on (but 
does not conform to) an inte rnational standard, the complaining Member is not exempted from 
"the normal burden of showing a prima facie case of inconsistency with Article 3.1 or any other 
relevant Article of the SPS Agreement or of the GATT 1994" .394  
7.262.   Having ascertained the precise mea sure at issue and the applicable legal test, in our 
analysis under Article 3 of the SPS Agreement we will proceed as follows: (i) identifying the 
relevant international standards; (ii)  discerning the meaning of such international standards; and 
(iii) asses sing the measures at issue in light of these international standards in order to determine 
whether the measures are "based on" the standards.  
7.5.1.3.3   Identifying the relevant international standards  
7.263.   The panels in EC – Hormones  and India – Agricultural Products  observed that in examining 
whether a Member bases its SPS  measure on international standards in accordance with 
Article  3.1, a panel need only determine whether such standard exists. Therefore, a panel would 
not need to consider the levels of protection or t ypes of SPS  measures recommended by the 
standard, the consensus behind it, or its adoption process.395 We concur with such an approach, 
which we will follow in our examination.  
7.264.   In India – Agricultural Products , the Appellate Body observed that "the relevant 
international standards, guidelines or recommendations referred to in Article 3 are those 
established by or developed under the auspices of the international organizations referred to in 
                                               
391 See experts'  responses  to Panel questions Nos. 33, 34, and 35.   
392 See European Union's response to Panel question No. 306, paras. 149 -152; and Russia's  response 
to Panel question No. 306, paras. 227 -259. 
393 For example, Article 5.1.1 of the Terrestrial Code provides that "[b]ecause of differences between 
countries in their animal health situations, various options are offered by the Terrestrial Code ." (OIE, 
Terrestrial Animal Health Code  23rd edn (2014), Vol. I, p. 171) Article 4.3.1 of the Terrestrial Code provides 
that "[i]n most cases, the impor t regulations developed will rely in part on judgments made about the 
effectiveness of sanitary procedures undertaken by the exporting country , both at its borders and within its 
territory." (OIE, Terrestrial Animal Health Code  23rd edn (2014), Vol. I, p. 116) 
394 Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones , para. 171.  
395 Panel Reports, India – Agricultural Products , para. 7.20 5; EC – Hormones  (Canada) , para.  8.72; and 
EC – Hormones (US) , para.  8.69.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  Annex A(3) to the SPS Agreement".396 This Annex includes the OIE as the  relevant standard -
setting organization for matters of animal health and zoonosis .397 The OIE is, therefore, the 
relevant standard -setting organization for matters of animal health.398 One such set of standards, 
which includes recommendations relating to ASF ( a highly contagious haemorrhagic disease  which 
affects animal health)399, is embodied in the Terrestrial  Code. The parties agree that the relevant 
international standard for the purposes of this dispute is the Terrestrial Code.400 We endorse the 
parties' share d view that the relevant international standards for the purpose of this dispute are 
articulated in the Terrestrial Code.  
7.265.   Furthermore, the parties agree that the relevant version of the Terrestrial Code for the 
present dispute is the version in force at the date of establishment of this Panel, i.e. the 23rd 
edition, adopted in May 2014.401 We recall that the establishment of this Panel took place on 
22 July 2014. We concur with the agreed view of the parties that the relevant version of the 
Terrestrial Code i s the one in force on the date of establishment of the Panel: the 23rd edition of 
the Terrestrial Code. We note that the identification of the version of the Terrestrial Code in force 
on the date of establishment of the Panel concords with the approach of the India – Agricultural 
Products and US – Animals  panels.402 Keeping in mind the importance of reviewing SPS measures 
in light of the latest available scientific evidence, we must also bear in mind that the most 
appropriate prism through which the defendant 's measures should be assessed cannot possibly be 
a moving target. Rather, the dictates of due process demand certainty and predictability with 
regard to the standard against which the measures at issue will be assessed in this Panel 
proceeding. We conside r that the version of the Terrestrial Code in force at the date of the panel 
establishment fulfils the due process requirement, noting that was also the version in force at the 
time of Russia's adoption of the measures in respect of Latvia and Estonia, and  did not contain 
                                               
396 Appellate Body Report, India – Agricultural Products , para. 5.78.  Annex A(3) to the SPS Agreement 
provides:  
3. International standards, guidelines and recommendations  
(a) for food safety, the standards, guidelines and recommendations established by the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission relating to food additives, veterinary  drug and pesticide residues, 
contaminants, methods of analysis and sampling, and codes and guidelines of hygienic practice;  
(b) for animal health and zoonoses, the standards, guidelines and recommendations 
developed under the auspices of the Internationa l Office of Epizootics;  
(c) for plant health, the international standards, guidelines and recommendations developed 
under the auspices of the Secretariat of the International Plant Protection Convention in 
cooperation with regional organizations operating  within the framework of the International Plant 
Protection Convention; and  
(d) for matters not covered by the above organizations, appropriate standards, guidelines and 
recommendations promulgated by other relevant international organizations open for 
membership to all Members, as identified by the Committee.  
397 Annex  A(3)(b) of the SPS Agreement . The Terrestrial Code Glossary defines zoonosis as "any disease  
or infection  which is naturally transmissible from animals  to humans". Terrestrial Code Glossary, p . x (Exhibit 
RUS-32). 
398 The parties agree that ASF does not pose a risk to human health. European Union's first written 
submission, para. 100; Russia's response to Panel question No. 24, para. 9. The OIE does not consider ASF to 
be a zoonosis. Chapter 2.8. 1 of the OIE Manual of Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines for Terrestrial Animals states: 
"ASF is not a zoonotic disease and does not affect public health" . Chapter 2.8.1., African Swine Fever, 
OIE Terrestrial Manual  (Exhibit EU -5). See OIE response to Panel Qu estion 10 to the OIE. The experts 
concurred, in response to Panel Question 11: Dr Br ückner: "All available literature on ASF categorically state 
that the disease is not infective to huma ns"; Prof essor  Penrith : "No case of human infection with ASFV has 
ever been reported. The question of whether this can be scientifically confirmed is that it might be possible to 
provide strong evidence for inability to infect people by serological testing of people who have worked with pigs 
during outbreaks, but to the best  of my knowledge nobody has considered this worthwhile because no sign of 
illness among them has been reported…."; Dr Thomson: "There is no scientific or credible circumstantial 
evidence I am aware of to indicate that ASF virus can either infect or cause d isease in humans. The risk to 
humans is consequently negligible."  
399 See para. 7.207  above.  
400 European Union's first written submission, para. 115; and Russia's response to Panel question 
No. 105, para. 170.  
401 European Union's f irst written submission, paras. 116 -118. Russia's first written submission, fn 110. 
402 Panel Reports, India – Agricultural Products , para s. 7.211 -7.213; and US – Animals , para. 7.225, 
fn 681. WT/DS475/R  
 
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  material changes403 from the version in force at the time of Russia's adoption of the measures in 
respect of Lithuania and Poland.  
7.266.   While the parties agree that the Terrestrial Code contains the relevant international 
standard, the parties h ave differing views on the precise provisions of the Terrestrial Code that are 
relevant in this dispute, and in particular the hierarchy and interrelationships between and among 
the Terrestrial Code's zoning and regionalization (Chapters 4.3, 4.4 and 5.4) provisions and its 
ASF-specific provisions (Chapter 15.1).  
7.267.   According to the European Union, the "correct" applicable standards for the respective 
measures are mainly to be found in Chapter 15.1 (African swine fever) of the Terrestrial Code, 
which deals wi th trade in the products at issue, in conjunction with Chapter 4.3, which deals with 
regionalization.404 The European Union posits that it has established neither containment zones nor 
compartments as these terms are referred to in the Terrestrial Code; rath er, it has established 
areas considered to be infected with ASF and ASF -free zones. According to the European Union, 
such an approach is an option permitted under Article 4.3.3.3 (zoning and 
compartmentalization).405 The European Union alleges that the EU -wide ban and the bans on 
imports of the products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland  are inconsistent with 
the product -specific provisions of Chapter  15.1 of the Terrestrial Code.406  
7.268.   In the course of these proceedings Russia has shifted its v iew as to which provisions in the 
Terrestrial Code  are the most pertinent . At the outset, Russia identified as the most pertinent 
provisions for ASF those set out in Terrestrial Code Chapters 4.3 (zoning and 
compartmentalization), 4.4 (compartmentalization ), 5.3 (procedures relevant for the application of 
the SPS Agreement) , and 15.1 (African swine fever). Russia also indicated that the 
interrelationship between these chapters is sequential rather than linear.407 At a later stage in the 
proceedings, Russia dr opped its references to Chapter 4.4 and focused on the provisions of 
Chapter 4.3 pertaining to regionalization (especially Articles 4.3.3.1, 4.3.3.5, and 4.3.3.6), focused 
its references to particular provisions in Chapter 5.3 (specially Articles 5.3.1 and  5.3.7), and added 
references to Articles 1.4.6 (surveillance to demonstrate freedom from disease or infection), 1.6.1 
(self-declaration of disease -free country, zones or compartments), Chapters 3.1 (veterinary 
services) and 3.2 (evaluation of veterinary s ervices).  
7.269.   In particular, Russia asserts that the ASF -specific provisions on non-treated products  in 
Chapter 15.1 are triggered only when the exporting country has objectively demonstrated its 
establishment of OIE -consistent zones – corresponding to the pri nciples for defining and 
establishing zones or compartments in Article  4.3.3 – to the importing country.408 Chapter 5.3 of 
the Terrestrial Code sets out guidelines to follow for a zone or compartment to be recognized for 
international trade purposes. Russia maintains that an exporting country's failure to properly 
establish zones allows the importing country to apply country -wide import  restrictions on non -heat 
treated products.409 Russia asserts that it is willing and able to accept products from ASF -affected 
countries that meet OIE -consistent regionalization, compartmentalization and/or heat -treated 
standards.410 
7.270.   The Terrestrial Code comprises  a number of chapters. Those in "Volume I" relate to 
general (so -called "horizontal") matters, while those in "Volume II"  relate to recommendations 
applicable to specific diseases (OIE -listed diseases and other diseases important to international 
trade) and the adoption of measures relating to them. Chapter 15.1 specifically relates to ASF. W e 
focus on the ASF -relevant inter national standards set out in the Terrestrial Code, in particular, 
Chapter  15.1. We observe that each of the different Articles  (15.1.5 –15.1.17 ) of Chapter 15.1 are 
tailored to a particular subset of products. Some of those recommendations refer to imports  from 
                                               
403 Following a question from the Panel, the OIE confirmed that the re had been no material changes in 
Chapter 15.1 (African swine fever) from the 22nd to the 23rd edition of the Terrestrial Code. See para. 1.33 
above.  
404 European Union's first written submission, para. 122.  
405 European Union's s econd written submission, paras. 37 - 40. 
406 European Union's first written submission, para. 139.  
407 Russia's second written submission, para. 21; and response to Panel question No. 101, para. 146.  
408 Russia's second written submission, para. 33.  
409 Russia's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 17.  
410 Russia's response to Panel question No. 115, para. 206.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  ASF-free countries, zones or compartments, and from countries or zones considered infected with 
ASF. These Articles in turn refer to and should be analysed in respect of numerous horizontal 
Terrestrial Code provisions including Chapter 4.3 and Article 5.3.7.411 Some of the mentioned 
Articles of Chapter 15.1 also provide for trade of products that have been processed so as to 
ensure destruction of the ASFV, and that the necessary protections were taken after processing to 
avoid contact of the product wit h any source of ASFV.  
7.271.   In our view, the difference in the situations covered by the provisions of Chapter 15.1 (i.e. 
those related to goods originating in ASF-free countries zones or compartments and processed 
products to ensure destruction of ASFV) warran ts an independent examination of the standards 
applicable to the categories of products subject to each situation. In other words, we consider that 
the structure of Chapter 15.1 provides a clear identification of two sets of standards on which a 
measure co uld be based on. Those categories include standards for: (i) trade in pig products 
originating from ASF-free countries, zones or compartments; and (ii) trade in pig products subject 
to processing to ensure destruction of ASFV.  
7.272.   In light of the parties' com ments and the structure of the recommendations in 
Chapter  15.1 of the Terrestrial Code, we will focus our analysis of what is the meaning of the 
relevant international standards for the trade in the products subject to the EU -wide ban. That is, 
in this sec tion we will only examine the meaning of those provisions in the Terrestrial Code that 
refer to trade in non -treated products. We now turn to that examination.  
7.5.1.3.4   Discerning  the meaning of the relevant international standards  
7.273.   The Panel's identification of th e relevant international standards for the purposes of 
Article  3 of the SPS Agreement is intrinsically interlinked with the meaning of the Terrestrial Code 
provisions identified by the parties in this dispute. Before embarking upon our examination to 
discern the meaning of the identified provisions, we recall certain guiding considerations.  
7.5.1.3.4.1   Preliminary  observations  
7.274.   In India – Agricultural Products , the Appellate Body upheld the panel's finding that India's 
measures were not "based on" the relevant internati onal standards within the meaning of 
Article  3.1 of the SPS Agreement , and did not "conform to" the relevant international standards 
within the meaning of Article  3.2 of the SPS Agreement . In so doing, the Appellate Body offered an 
"overview" of Article 3,  which sheds light on how a panel may go about discerning the meaning of 
the relevant international standard. In relation to a panel's examination of a Member's measure 
under Article 3 and in light of the relevant international standard, in India – Agricul tural Products , 
the Appellate Body observed:  
The provisions of Article 3 establish a Member's obligations concerning harmonization 
with relevant international standards.412 In determining whether a particular SPS 
measure is based on, conforms to, or results in a higher level of protection than a 
relevant international standard, a panel must engage in a comparative assessment 
between the challenged measure and that international standard. In this respect, 
because the international standard serves as the benchm ark against which a 
Member's compliance under Article 3 is to be assessed, it is incumbent on a panel to 
discern the meaning of that standard. In conducting such an assessment, panels have 
various means available to them. A panel may be guided by any relev ant 
interpretative principles, including relevant customary rules of interpretation of public 
international law. In addition, a panel may find additional sources to be useful in 
discerning the meaning of the international standard. For example, panels may wish 
to have recourse to the views of the relevant standard -setting body, as referred to in 
Annex A(3) to the SPS Agreement, through evidence on the panel record or through 
                                               
411 See para s. 2.17-2.18 above.  
412 (footnote original) Although the provisions o f Article 3 and Annex A refer to "international standards, 
guidelines or recommendations", we will, for ease of reference, hereinafter use the terms "international 
standard" or "international standards".  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  direct consultation with that body, or with other experts  in the relevant fields , 
pursuant to Article 11.2 of the SPS Agreement and Article 13 of the DSU.413 
7.275.   In conducting our comparative assessment between the challenged measures and the 
international standards, we have benefited from various sources available to us.  
7.276.   In particular, w e have been guided by interpretative principles, including customary rules 
of interpretation of public international law. We recall that, in its consideration of the panel's 
reasoning and findings concerning the meaning of the Terrestrial Code in India – Agricultural 
Products , the Appellate Body bemoaned the vagueness of India's allegations concerning 
interpretative glitches in the panel's approach . The Appellate Body opined that India had not 
demonstrated why or how that panel's analysis departed from a proper  application of the 
customary rules of treaty interpretation or how, if properly applied, such rules would have 
produced a different outcome regarding the meaning of the Terrestrial Code. In this dispute, the 
European Union asserts that the Terrestrial Cod e is not an international agreement (treaty), but 
that it is a document adopted by the World Assembly of Delegates of the OIE.414 The European 
Union agrees that in interpreting the Code the WTO adjudicating bodies may seek guidance in the 
relevant customary rules of treaty interpretation, including in the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (Vienna Convention).415 Russia also believes that the Panel may apply customary rules of 
treaty interpretation to determine the meaning of the Terrestrial Code and the relevant 
international standards.416  
7.277.   Article 3.2 of the DSU refers to the customary rules of treaty interpretation. It is well  
established that these are articulated in the Vienna Convention, calling for examination of text, 
context, object and purpose in t he interpretation of international treaties. Pursuant to 
Article  2.1(a) of the Vienna Convention, for the purposes of that Convention, a treaty is an 
international agreement concluded between states in written form and governed by international 
law. The cu stomary rules of treaty interpretation in the Vienna Convention are clearly to be applied 
to our interpretation of the provisions of a "treaty" (i.e. the SPS Agreement as part of the WTO 
Agreement).  
7.278.   By contrast, the Terrestrial Code is a set of internatio nal standards, rather than a treaty. 
Therefore, the rules of interpretation in the Vienna Convention would not be directly applicable to 
the interpretation of the international standards set out in the Terrestrial Code in the same manner 
as they would to a  treaty. Nevertheless, we consider that they may serve as useful guidance in our 
examination of the provisions of the Terrestrial Code.   
7.279.   Furthermore, we have had recourse to the views of the OIE, as the relevant standard -
setting body referred to in Annex A (3) to the SPS Agreement, through direct written consultation 
with that body. We have also benefitted from oral and written consultation with experts in the 
relevant fields pursuant to Article 11.2 of the SPS Agreement and Article 13 of the DSU.  
7.280.   We find s upport in t he Appellate Body's decision in India – Agricultural Products  for this 
Panel's written consultation process with the OIE, and the questions to the OIE relating to the 
meaning of, and interrelationships between the relevant provisions of the Terr estrial Code. In that 
case, the Appellate Body recalled the comprehensive nature of the discretionary authority of a 
panel to "seek" information and technical advice from "any individual or body" it may consider 
appropriate, or from "any relevant source" u nder Article 13 of the DSU , underlining that it is 
particularly within the province and the authority of a panel to determine the need for information 
                                               
413 Appellate Body Report, India – Agricultural Produc ts, para. 5.79. We note that the Appellate Body's 
approach in respect of how to refer to international standards concurs with the approach of the panel in US – 
Animals , para. 7.231. Annex  A does not set forth a specific definition of any of the terms "stan dards", 
"guidelines", or "recommendations". No panel has yet been faced with determining the meaning of these terms 
in the context of the SPS  Agreement. The SPS  Agreement does not require a fine distinction between the three 
terms for its proper applicatio n. The OIE  seems to use the terms interchangeably, labelling the Terrestrial Code 
as part of its standard -setting activities, while individual ASF -related product -specific provisions ("Articles") 
within the Terrestrial Code are entitled "recommendations" ( see OIE's responses to Panel questions).  
414 European Union's response to Panel question No. 117, para. 235.  
415 European Union's response to Panel question No. 117, para. 235. (referring to the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties, done at Vienna, 23 May 1969, UN Treaty Series, Vol. 1155, p. 331).  
416 Russia's response to Panel question 117, para. 212.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  and advice in a specific case, to ascertain the acceptability and relevancy of information or advice 
received, and to decide what weight to ascribe to that information or advice or to conclude that no 
weight at all should be given to what has been received.417 
7.281.   The Appellate Body then observed that, under the special or additional rules set forth in 
Article 11.2  of the SPS  Agreement418, while a panel may generally be expected to consult with 
experts in SPS cases, the panel still retains discretion regarding which experts it wishes to consult, 
and how it wishes to structure such consultations. The Appellate Body fur ther underlined the 
comprehensive nature of a panel's fact -finding powers and the broad permissible scope of expert 
consultations conducted by a panel, encompassing consultations on the meaning of the Terrestrial 
Code.419 
7.282.   Moreover, the Appellate Body's decis ion in India – Agricultural Products  provided guidance 
for this Panel pertaining to the process of consultation with the experts and the conduct of the 
expert meeting . In essence, in connection  with our own assessment of the meaning of the 
Terrestrial Code , this Panel has remained vigilant in terms of how it has treated the responses 
received from the OIE and how it has undertaken its assessment of the meaning of the Terrestrial 
Code. In this respect, the Panel has remained mindful of the reasoning of the A ppellate Body in 
India – Quantitative Restrictions  that a panel may not delegate its judicial function to an 
international organization that it consults, but must instead critically assess the views of that 
international organization.420 The Appellate Body's  findings in India – Agricultural Products  reaffirm 
that the Panel must make its own assessment of the meaning of the Terrestrial Code and not 
simply rely on the views of the OIE regarding the meaning of the Terrestrial Code. A Panel may, in 
respect of eac h of the interpretative issues it addresses, refer to and accord weight to the OIE's 
responses to its questions; however, a Panel must indicate, in each instance, that its conclusions 
are also based on its own examination of the wording or text of the rele vant recommendations of 
the Terrestrial Code .421 
7.283.   Mindful of these considerations, we proceed to examine the relevant provisions of the 
Terrestrial Code as they correlate with the measures at issue in this dispute.  
7.5.1.3.4.2   Relevant provisions  of the Terrestrial Code  
7.284.   We note that the Terrestrial Code foreword indicates that the Code sets out standards for 
the improvement of terrestrial animal health and welfare and veterinary public health worldwide, 
including through standards for safe international trade in terrestri al animals. As stated in Part A 
point 2 of the User's Guide to the Terrestrial Code:  
Veterinary Authorities should use the standards in the Terrestrial Code  to set up 
measures providing for early detection, internal reporting, notification and control of 
pathogenic agents … and preventing their spread via international trade in animals 
and animal products, while avoiding unjustified sanitary barriers to trade.422 
7.285.   Part B point 10 of the User's Guide further provides that:  
The standards in each of the chapter s of Sections 8 to 15 are designed to prevent the 
aetiological agents of OIE listed diseases, infections or infestations from being 
introduced into an importing country. The standards take into account the nature of 
                                               
417 Appellate Body Report, India – Agricultural Products , para. 5.86 (quoting Appellate Body Report, US 
– Shrimp , para. 104).  
418 Article 1.2 of the DSU states th at the provisions of the DSU apply subject to special or additional 
rules and procedures identified in Appendix 2 thereto. Appendix 2 lists Article 11.2 of the SPS Agreement. 
Article  1.2 of the DSU further provides: "To the extent that there is a differenc e between the rules and 
procedures of this Understanding and the special or additional rules and procedures set forth in Appendix 2, 
the special or additional rules and procedures in Appendix 2 shall prevail."  
419 Appellate Body Report, India – Agricultural Products , paras. 5.87 -5.89.  
420 Appellate Body Report, India – Quantitative Restrictions , para. 149.  
421 Appellate Body Report, India – Agricultural Products , para s. 5.93-5.94.  
422 Terrestrial Code User Guide  (Exhibit EU -2), p. i. See also OIE response to Panel question No. 19.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  the traded commodity, the animal health status of the exporting country, zone or 
compartment, and the risk reduction measures applicable to each commodity.423 
7.286.   As noted above, the Terrestrial Code comprises a number of chapters. Those in Volume I 
relate to general (so -called horizontal) matters, wh ile those in Volume II relate to 
recommendations applicable to specific diseases (OIE -listed diseases and other diseases important 
to international trade) and the adoption of measures relating to them. Chapter 15.1 is the Chapter 
specifically relating to A SF. W e focus on the ASF -relevant international standards set out in the 
Terrestrial Code, in particular, Chapter  15.1. Together with other applicable, relevant provisions, 
Chapter 15.1 of the Terrestrial Code serves as the overarching benchmark against whi ch the EU -
wide ban must be compared in order to determine whether it is based on that standard. 
Accordingly, in keeping with the guidance outlined above, it is incumbent on the Panel to discern 
the meaning of relevant provisions of Chapter 15.1 and other r elevant provisions of the Terrestrial 
Code and to conduct the requisite comparative assessment of the EU -wide ban with these 
standards in order to determine whether the EU -wide ban satisfies  the elements of Article 3.1.424  
7.287.   Article 15.1.1 contains general pr ovisions. Articles 15.1.2 -15.1.4 deal with the ASF status 
of a country, zone or compartment (Article 15.1.2 sets out considerations to guide the 
determination of the ASF status of a country, zone or compartment; Article 15.1.3 sets forth 
considerations rel ating to historically ASF -free status and free status as a result of an eradication 
programme; and Article 15.1.4 addresses the recovery of ASF -free status). Articles 15.1.5 -
15.1.16425 contain product -specific recommendations on how to safely import ASF -susceptible pigs 
or pork products, or products derived from them depending upon the ASF -status of the exporting 
country, zone or compartment. Articles 15.1.14 -15.1.16 also provide for the situation where the 
products concerned have been processed in an approve d establishment so as to ensure the 
destruction of ASFV. According to the OIE, all the various combinations of testing, treatment and 
certification identified in Chapter 15.1 provide for safe trade of animals and animal products.426  
7.288.   Turning to the specific text of the provisions concerned, we note that Article 15.1.1, 
entitled "General provisions", reads as follows:  
Article 15.1.1 General provisions  
The pig and its close relatives are the only natural hosts for African swine fever virus 
(ASFV). These include  all varieties of Sus scrofa , both domestic and wild, warthogs 
(Phacochoerus spp.), bushpigs ( Potamochoerus spp.) and giant forest hog 
(Hylochoerus meinertzhageni ). For the purposes of this chapter, a distinction is made 
between domestic pigs (permanently captive and farmed free -range pigs) and wild 
pigs (including feral pigs and wild boar) as well as between Sus scrofa and African pig 
species.  
All varieties of Sus scrofa are susceptible to the pathogenic effects of ASFV, while the 
African wild pigs are not  and act as reservoirs of the infection . Ticks of the genus 
Ornithodoros are natural hosts of the virus and act as biological vectors of the 
infection . 
For the purpose of the Terrestrial Code , the incubation period in Sus scrofa is 15 days.  
Standards for diagnostic tests are described in the Terrestrial Manual . 
                                               
423 Terrestrial Code User Guide  (Exhibit EU -2), p. ii. See also OIE response to Panel question No. 19.  
424 We analyse the relevant Terrestrial Code provisions concerning regionalization below (see paras.  
7.292 -7.325  below . At this point in our analysis, we recall that Chapter  4.3 on "zoning and 
compartmentalization" states: "[t]his Chapter is to assist Member Countries wishing to establish and maintain 
different subpopulations within th eir territory using the principles of compartmentalization and zoning. These 
principles should be applied in accordance with the measures in the relevant disease chapter(s). This Chapter 
also outlines a process through which trading partners may recognize such subpopulations. This process is best 
implemented by trading partners through establishing parameters and gaining agreement on the necessary 
measures prior to outbreaks of disease." (emphasis added).  
425 Article 15.1.17, not invoked in this dispute, cont ains recommendations for the importation of litter 
and manure (from pigs).  
426 OIE responses to Panel's questions No. 19.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.289.   The provisions for a country or zone to be considered free from ASF are contained in 
Articles 15.1.2 and 15.1.3:  
Article 15.1.2 Determination of the ASF status of a country, zone or 
compartment  
The African swine fever (ASF) status of a country, zone or compartment can only be 
determined after considering the following criteria in domestic and wild pigs, as 
applicable:  
1) ASF is be [ sic] notifiable in the whole country, and all clinical signs suggesti ve of 
ASF are subjected to appropriate field and laboratory investigations;  
2) an ongoing awareness programme is in place to encourage reporting of all cases 
suggestive of ASF;  
3) the Veterinary Authority has current knowledge of, and authority over, all d omestic 
pigs in the country, zone or compartment ; 
4) the Veterinary Authority has current knowledge about the species, population and 
habitat of wild pigs in the country or zone. 
Article 15.1.3 ASF-free country, zone or compartment  
1. Historically free sta tus 
A country or zone may be considered free from ASF without formally applying a 
specific surveillance programme if the provisions of Article 1.4.6. are complied with.  
2. Free status as a result of an eradication programme  
A country or zone which does not  meet the conditions of point 1 above or a 
compartment may be considered free from ASF when:  
a) there has been no outbreak of ASF during the past three years; this period can be 
reduced to 12 months when there is no evidence of tick involvement in the 
epidemiology of the infection ; 
b) no evidence of ASFV infection has been found during the past 12 months;  
c) surveillance has been in place in domestic pigs for the past 12 months;  
d) imported domestic pigs comply with the requirements in Article 15.1.5. or Ar ticle 
15.1.6.  
AND 
Based on surveillance , ASF infection has been demonstrated not to be present in any 
wild pig population in the country or zone, and:  
e) there has been no clinical evidence, nor virological evidence of ASF in wild pigs 
during the past 12 m onths;  
f) no seropositive wild pigs have been detected in the age class 6 –12 months during 
the past 12 months;  
g) imported wild pigs comply with the requirements in Article 15.1.7.  
 
7.290.   The regaining of free status after an ASF outbreak is covered in Article 1 5.1.4.:  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  Article 15.1.4 Recovery of free status  
Should an ASF outbreak occur in a free country, zone or compartment , the free status 
may be restored where surveillance has been carried out with negative results, either:  
1) three months after the last case where a stamping -out policy is practised and in the 
case where ticks are suspected to be involved in the epidemiology of the infection , 
followed by acaricide treatment and the use of sentinel pigs; or  
2) where a stamping -out policy is not practised, the pro visions of point 2 of Article 
15.1.3. should be followed.  
AND 
Based on surveillance , ASF infection has been demonstrated not to be present in any 
wild pig population in the country or zone. 
7.291.   Following these provisions relating to the ASF -status of a country , zone or compartment, 
the remainder of Chapter  15.1 sets out product -specific  recommendations. We recall that the EU -
wide ban does not apply to products that have been subject to certain forms of treatment that 
would ensure destruction of ASFV.427 With this  in mind, Table 4 below sets out the product -specific 
provisions in Chapter  15.1 of the Terrestrial Code that pertain to the products at iss ue pursuant to 
the EU -wide ban.  
Table 4 Product -specific provisions  of Chapter 15.1 of the T errestrial Code428 
EU-wide429 Relevant international standard (relevant product -specific provisions of Chapter 
15.1 of the Terrestrial Code)  
live pigs  
 Article 15.1.5.  
Recommendations for importation from ASF-free countries, zones or 
compartments  
For domestic  pigs 
Veterinary Authorities should require the presentation of an international veterinary 
certificate attesting that the animals : 
1) showed no clinical sign of ASF on the day of shipment;  
2) were kept in an ASF-free country, zone or compartment since bir th or for at least the 
past 40 days.  
 
pork meat  
 Article 15.1.12.  
Recommendations for importation from ASF-free countries, zones or 
compartments  
For fresh meat of domestic pigs  
Veterinary Authorities should require the presentation of an international vet erinary 
certificate attesting that the entire consignment of fresh meat comes from animals which:  
1) have been kept in an ASF-free country, zone or compartment since birth or for at least 
the past 40 days, or which have been imported in accordance with Art icle 15.1.5. or 
Article 15.1.6.;  
2) have been slaughtered in an approved abattoir , have been subjected to ante - and 
post-mortem inspections in accordance with Chapter 6.2., and have been found free of 
any sign suggestive of ASF.  
 
raw meat 
preparations  Articles 15.1.12 and 15.1.14 (we reproduce the text of Article 15.1.13 to provide an 
indication of the conditions to which Article 15.1.14 refers)  
 
                                               
427 See para. 7.143  above.  
428 This Table contains the relevant product -specific provisions in Chapter 15.1 of Terrestrial Code and 
the products as identified in Russia's measures. Russia submitted that Article 15.1.6 was relevant for "piglets 
for fattening"/pigs for breeding for the EU -wide ban (e.g,. Russia's response to Panel question No. 272, para. 
119). As the  European Union does not practice "compartmentalization", and has not sought to rely on this 
concept in its argumentation under Article 3 of the SPS Agreement, Article 15.1.6 and other compartment -
specific provisions are excluded from Table 4.  
429 European U nion's response to Panel question No. 77, paras. 148 – 151; and response to Panel 
question No. 271, paras. 85 -89. See also Russia's response to Panel question No. 77, para. 127; and response 
to Panel question No. 271, paras. 97 -98. WT/DS475/R  
 
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  EU-wide429 Relevant international standard (relevant product -specific provisions of Chapter 
15.1 of the Terrestrial Code)  
Article 15.1.13  
Recommendations for importation from ASF-free countries or zones  
From fresh meat of wild pigs  
Veterinary Authorities  should require the presentation of an international veterinary 
certificate  attesting that:  
1) the entire consignment of fresh meat  comes from animals  which:  
a) have been killed in an ASF-free country or zone;  
b) have been subjected to  a post -mortem inspection in accordance with Chapter 6.2. in 
an approved examination centre, and have been found free of any sign suggestive of 
ASF; 
and, if the zone where the animal  has been killed is adjacent to a zone with infection  in 
wild pigs: 
2) a s ample has been collected from every animal  killed and has been subjected to a 
virological test and a serological test for ASF, with negative results.  
 
Article 15.1.14  
Recommendations for the importation of meat products of pigs (either domestic 
or wild), o r for products of animal origin (from fresh meat of pigs) intended for 
use in animal feeding, for agricultural or industrial use, or for pharmaceutical or 
surgical use, or for trophies derived from wild pigs  
Veterinary Authorities should require the presen tation of an international veterinary 
certificate attesting that the products:  
1) have been prepared:  
a) exclusively from fresh meat meeting the conditions laid down in Articles 15.1.12. or 
15.1.13., as relevant;  
b) in a processing establishment:  
i) approv ed by the Veterinary Authority for export purposes;  
ii) processing only meat meeting the conditions laid down in Articles 15.1.12. or 15.1.13., 
as relevant;  
OR 
2) have been processed in an establishment approved by the Veterinary Authority for 
export purpo ses so as to ensure the destruction of the ASFV, and that the necessary 
precautions were taken after processing to avoid contact of the product with any source 
of ASFV.  
 
 
7.292.   According to the European Union, the correct applicable standards for the respective  
measures are mainly to be found in Chapter 15.1 (African swine fever) of the Terrestrial Code, 
which deals with trade in the products at issue, in conjunction with Chapter 4.3, which deals with 
regionalization.430 The European Union posits that it has neith er established containment zones nor 
compartments as these terms are referred to in the Terrestrial Code; rather, it has established 
areas considered to be infected with ASF and ASF -free zones. According to the European Union, 
such an approach is an option  permitted under Article 4.3.3.3 (zoning and 
compartmentalization).431 Russia asserts that the ASF -specific provisions on non -treated products 
in Chapter 15.1 are triggered only when the exporting country has objectively demonstrated to the 
importing country  that it has established OIE -consistent zones – corresponding to the principles for 
defining and establishing zones or compartments in Article 4.3.3.432 In light of the parties' views, 
we will focus on ascertaining the manner in which , according to the Terre strial Code, an ASF-free 
country or zone  could be determined, and  will not refer to the establishment of compartments.  
7.293.   In this dispute, the reference in the pertinent Terrestrial Code provisions not only to the 
idea of an ASF -free "country", but also to an  ASF-free "zone" , is particularly significant. We need 
to have a firm  understanding of the concept of "zoning" and of any and all interrelationship(s) 
between the Terrestrial Code's disease -specific chapter (Chapter 15.1) and the "horizontal" 
chapters (Cha pters 4.3, 4.4 and 5.3) pertaining to "zoning and regionalization"  as this will have a 
material impact on our examination of the parties' argumentation and evidence submitted in 
support.  
                                               
430 European Union's first  written submission, para. 122.  
431 European Union's second written submission, paras. 37 -40. 
432 Russia's second written submission, para. 33.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.294.   One of the Panel's experts h as confirmed that "Chapter 15.1 of the T errestrial Code do[es] 
make provision for the imports from ASF infected countries provided the prescribed risk mitigation 
measures are applied to render the products 'safe' …".433 For countries with confirmed ASF 
outbreaks, Chapter 15.1 of the Terrestrial Co de permits exports of certain products from ASF -free 
zones and compartments. Thus, a country with a confirmed ASF outbreak may establish a free 
zone,  in accordance with the OIE provisions,  from which the specified products (e.g. live domestic 
pigs, pork me at from domestic pigs, and raw meat preparations from domestic pigs and wild pigs) 
may be imported according to the conditions described in Articles 15.1.5, 15.1.12 and 15.1.14  of 
the Terrestrial Code .  
7.295.   The a cceptance of non -treated products covered by Art icles 15.1.5 (live pigs), 15.1.12 
(fresh meat of domestic pigs), and 15.1.14 (meat products of pigs) is contingent upon the 
determination that the products in question come from ASF free countries, zones, or 
compartments. The conditions that should be met for a country, zone or compartment to be 
considered free from ASF , are set out in Articles 15.1.2, 15.1.3, and 15.1.4, while the more 
general provisions regarding the establishment of disease free areas are contained in Article 1.4.6, 
and Chapter s 4.3 and 5.3. 
7.296.   In particular, Article 15.1.2 of the Terrestrial Code lays out certain pre -conditions that 
need to be verified to determine the ASF status of a country, zone or compartment. Th ese include: 
(i) that ASF is notifiable in the whole country; (ii) that all  clinical signs suggestive of ASF are 
subjected to appropriate field and laboratory investigations; (iii) that an ongoing awareness 
programme is in place to encourage reporting of all cases suggestive of ASF; (iv) the Veterinary 
Authority434 has current know ledge of, and authority over, all domestic pigs in the country, zone or 
compartment; and (v) the Veterinary Authority has current knowledge about the species, 
population and habitat of wild pigs in the country or zone.435 In our view, these elements refer to  
animal traceability, as well as to epidemiological surveillance,  which is  a term used in Article 6.2 of 
the SPS Agreement when referring to the factors on which a Member should base its determination 
of disease -free areas.  
7.297.   Furthermore, Article 15.1.3 of the Terrestrial Code addresses the requirements for a 
country, zone or compartment to be considered free from ASF. This provision first addresses when 
a country or zone may be considered historically free from ASF. In that respect, the provision 
states tha t a "country or zone may be considered free from ASF without formally applying a 
specific surveillance programme if the provisions of Article 1.4.6 are complied with".  
7.298.   Article 1.4.6 of the Terrestrial Code is entitled "Surveillance to demonstrate freedom f rom 
disease or infection". It provides, in relevant part:  
1. Requirements to declare a country or a zone free from disease or infection without 
pathogen specific surveillance  
This article provides general principles for declaring a country or a zone free f rom 
disease or infection in relation to the time of last occurrence and in particular for the 
recognition of historical freedom.  
The provisions of this article are based on Article 1.4.3. and the following premises:  
– in the absence of disease and vaccina tion, the animal population would become 
susceptible over a period of time;  
– the disease agents to which these provisions apply are likely to produce identifiable 
clinical signs in susceptible animals;  
                                               
433 Dr Brϋckner's response to Panel question No. 3 6, Compil ation of the e xperts' responses,  para. 4.42.  
434 According to  the Glossary of the Terrestrial Code, Veterinary Authority "means the Governmental 
Authority of a Member Country, comprising veterinarians, other professionals and para -professionals, having 
the responsibility and competence for ensuring or supervising th e implementation of animal health and welfare 
measures, international veterinary certification and other standards and recommendations in the Terrestrial 
Code in the whole territory." Glossary, Terrestrial Code, p. x (Exhibit RUS -32). 
435 Article 15.1.2, OIE, Terrestrial Animal Health Code  23rd edn (2014), Vol.  II, p. 649.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  – competent and effective Veterinary Services will be  able to investigate, diagnose 
and report disease, if present;  
– disease or infection can affect both domestic animals and wildlife;  
– the absence of disease or infection over a long period of time in a susceptible 
population can be substantiated by effect ive disease investigation and reporting by a 
Member Country.  
a) Historically free  
Unless otherwise specified in the relevant disease chapter, a country or zone may be 
recognised as free from infection without formally applying a pathogen -specific 
surveilla nce programme when:  
i) there has never been occurrence of disease, or  
ii) eradication has been achieved or the disease or infection has ceased to occur for at 
least 25 years, provided that for at least the past 10 years:  
iii) the disease has been a notifia ble disease;  
iv) an early detection system has been in place for all relevant species;  
v) measures to prevent disease or infection introduction have been in place; no 
vaccination against the disease has been carried out unless otherwise provided for in 
the Terrestrial Code;  
vi) infection is not known to be established in wildlife within the country or zone. A 
country or zone cannot apply for historical freedom if there is any evidence of 
infection in wildlife.  
b) Last occurrence within the previous 25 years  
Countries or zones that have achieved eradication (or in which the disease or infection 
has ceased to occur) within the previous 25 years, should follow the pathogen -specific 
surveillance requirements in the Terrestrial Code if they exist. In the absence of 
specific requirements, countries should follow the general recommendations on 
surveillance outlined in this chapter provided that for at least the past 10 years:  
i) the disease has been a notifiable disease;  
ii) an early detection system has been in pla ce; 
iii) measures to prevent the introduction of the disease or infection introduction have 
been in place;  
iv) no vaccination against the disease has been carried out unless otherwise provided 
for in the Terrestrial Code;  
v) infection is not known to be es tablished in wildlife within the country or zone. A 
country or zone cannot apply for recognition of freedom if there is any evidence of 
infection in wildlife.  
… 
5. Demonstration of freedom from infection  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  A surveillance system to demonstrate freedom from in fection should meet the 
following requirements in addition to the general requirements outlined in Article 
1.4.3.  
Freedom from infection implies the absence of the pathogenic agent in the country, 
zone or compartment. Scientific methods cannot provide abso lute certainty of the 
absence of infection. Therefore, demonstrating freedom from infection involves 
providing sufficient evidence to demonstrate (to a level of confidence acceptable to 
Member Countries) that infection with a specified pathogen, if present , is present in 
less than a specified proportion of the population.  
However, finding evidence of infection at any prevalence in the target population 
automatically invalidates any freedom from infection claim unless otherwise stated in 
the relevant disease  chapter. The implications for the status of domestic animals of 
disease or infection present in wildlife in the same country or zone should be assessed 
in each situation, as indicated in the relevant chapter on each disease in the 
Terrestrial Code.  
Eviden ce from targeted, random or non -random data sources, as stated before, may 
increase the level of confidence or be able to detect a lower level of prevalence with 
the same level of confidence compared to structured surveys.  
7.299.   Article 1.4.6 is part of Chapter 1.4, which refers to animal health surveillance. As 
indicated, this provision refers to the options available to determine the disease status of a 
country, zone or compartment. According to Article 1.4.6, a country or zone may be recognized as 
free from in fection, ASF in this case, without formally applying a pathogen -specific surveillance 
programme, when (i) the disease has not occurred; or (ii) eradication has been achieved or the 
disease or infection has ceased to occur for at least 25 years. For the sec ond situation to qualify as 
disease freedom, the following conditions must be satisfied for the past ten years: (i) the disease 
is a notifiable disease; (ii) an early detection system is in place for all relevant species; 
(iii) measures to prevent disease or infection introduction are in place; and (iv) infection is not 
known to be established in wildlife within the country or zone.  
7.300.   Furthermore, Article 1.4.6 of the Terrestrial Code provides that in cases where the last 
occurrence has taken place within the  previous 25 years, the country or zone that has achieved 
eradication or where the disease has ceased to occur, should follow the pathogen -specific 
surveillance requirements in the Terrestrial Code if they exist.436 In the absence of such 
requirements, the s ame conditions described for the second situation for historical freedom, in the 
previous paragraph, should have been satisfied for the past ten years.  
7.301.   In respect of these requirements for the determination of ASF -free status of a country or 
zone, the OIE  explained that  
The provisions in Article 1.4.6 provide an objective basis that can be used by trading 
partners to reach agreement on the health measures applied to trade. Consistent with 
OIE policy on the management of disease risks, there are various app roaches, which 
should be used and adapted (within limits) according to the circumstances of the OIE 
Member Country. The first consideration is to conduct surveillance to ensure that the 
true situation with disease or infection is known, with an appropriate  level of 
confidence. After this, the challenge is to provide evidence and a scientific rationale to 
convince trading partners. This second aspect is influenced by several considerations, 
including the nature of the relationship between countries and the c redibility of the 
Veterinary Services of the exporting country. The OIE provides guidance on all 
aspects.437   
7.302.   Moreover, the OIE observed that  
                                               
436 We recall that in its responses to Panel questions the OIE confirmed that Chapter 15.1 of the 23rd 
edition of the Terrestrial Code "does not contain detailed requirements on surveillance for African swine fever."  
OIE response to Panel question No. 4.  
437 OIE response to Panel question No. 4.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  As already mentioned, the general recommendations in Chapter 1.4 may be  refined by 
the specific approaches describe d in disease -specific chapters (ital. added for 
emphasis). The use of ´may be´ reflects the fact that specific approaches are not 
provided in all such chapters, especially older ones that have not been revised for 
some years. Requirements for countries, zo nes or compartments to be considered free 
from African swine fever are found in Article 15.1.3. This article refers to Article 1.4.6 
regarding requirements for ´historically free´ status. The current Chapter 15.1 does 
not contain detailed requirements on s urveillance for African swine fever.438 (emphasis 
original)  
7.303.    In this context, we consider that Article 1.4.6 also addresses the recognition of disease -
free areas in the territory of an OIE member based on the application of pathogen specific 
surveillance in accordance with the recommendations of Chapter 1.4 of the Terrestrial Code. ASFV 
is the specific pathogen for which surveillance should be set up in the context of this case.  
7.304.   Article 15.1.3 of the Terrestrial Code also refers to the disease -free status of countries, 
zones or compartments as a result of an eradication plan. According to this Article, when a country 
or zone cannot be considered historically free from ASF, it can still be considered as ASF-free when 
(i) there have been no ASF outbreaks during the last three years, or 12 months if there is no 
evidence of tick involvement; (ii) there is no evidence of ASF infection in the last 12 months; 
(iii) surveillance has been in place in domestic pigs for the last 12 months; and (iv) imported 
domestic pigs show no clinical signs of ASF on the day of shipment and have been kept in an ASF-
free country, zone or compartment since birth or for the last 40 days (see Articles 15.1.5 and 
15.1.6 of the Terrestrial Code). In addition to these elements, for the country  or zone to be 
considered ASF-free Article 15.1.3 requires that (i) there has been no clinical nor virological 
evidence of ASF in wild pigs during the last 12 months; (ii) no seropositive wild pigs have been 
detected in the age class 6 -12 months during the  last 12 months; and (iii) imported wild pigs have 
shown no clinical sign of ASF on the day of shipment, have been captured in an ASF -free country 
or zone, and in case such zone is adjacent to a zone with an ASF infection in wild pigs, the animals 
were kep t in a quarantine station for 40 days prior to shipment, and were subjected to a 
virological test and a serological test performed at least 21 days after entry into the quarantine 
station, with negative results (see Article 15.1.7 of the Terrestrial Code).  
7.305.   Pursuant to the terms of Article 15.1.4, when an ASF outbreak has occurred in a free 
country, zone, or compartment, the free status may be restored when certain conditions are 
met.439  
7.306.   In summary, a country or zone may be historically free of ASF (when the conditions set 
out in Article 15.1.3.1 are satisfied – including those provided in Article 1.4.6); may be considered 
to be ASF-free as a result of an eradication programme (when the conditions set out in 
Article  15.1.3.2 are satisfied); or its ASF-free status may be restored after an outbreak has 
occurred (when the conditions set out in Article 15.1.4 are satisfied). Furthermore, the 
determination of the ASF status of a country, zone or compartment is contingent upon the 
consideration of certain factors rel ated to epidemiological surveillance.  
7.307.   We note that the provisions of the Terrestrial Code relating to ASF status provide for 
recognition of ASF -free countries, zones, and compartments. More specifically , Articles 15.1.2, 
15.1.3 and 15.1.4 each make refere nce to an ASF -free "country", "zone" or "compartment" on an 
equal footing,440 without imposing any sequence, preference or hierarchy amongst the three 
terms.  
7.308.   In addition to an examination of the ASF specific provisions in Chapter 15.1, we also need 
to take into consideration the relevant provisions in Chapters 4.3 (zoning and 
compartmentalization) and Article 5.3.7 (sequence of steps to be taken in establishing a 
zone/compartment and having it recognised for international trade purposes). Before examining 
the meaning of these two provisions, we will first consider the key question of the interrelationship 
between horizontal and specific provisions in the Terrestrial Code.  
                                               
438 OIE response to Panel question No. 4.   
439 See para. 7.290  above.  
440 See para s.  7.311 -7.316  below.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.309.   In addition to questioning the parties on the "horizontal" concept of zoning and its 
interrelationship with the ASF -specific provisions of the Terrestrial Code, the Panel posed a series 
of related questions to the OIE and to the experts. Particular questions were  formulated to better 
understand the interaction between the horizontal chapters  in Volume I and the disease -specific 
chapters in Volume II.  
7.310.   The OIE explained that the texts in Volume I, such as Chapter 1.4 on animal health 
surveillance and Chapter 4.3 on zoning and regionalization , establish a basic framework that can 
be applied to a ll diseases and host species. The goal is to establish a systematic approach to the 
prevention and control of disease, based on science and a series of key principles. In the disease -
specific chapters contained in Volume II, such as Chapter 15.1 (African s wine fever), the 
recommendations are tailored to the specific epidemiological characteristics of infectious agents. 
The role of wild animals in the epidemiology of a disease is an important risk factor for some 
diseases and not for others. The significance  of disease in wildlife is mentioned as a factor to be 
considered in general when designing surveillance programmes. Specific provisions are contained 
in Volume II, but only for those diseases where it is necessary to address infection in wild animals 
in order to control the disease in domestic animals.441 The OIE further explained that some points 
are covered in Volume II and not in Volume I, e.g. in Article 4.3.1:  
to regain free status following a disease outbreak  in a zone or compartment , Member 
Countries  should follow the recommendations in the relevant disease  chapter in the 
Terrestrial Code .442 
7.311.   The Terrestrial Code provisions on zoning and compartmentalization promote the goal of 
the Terrestrial Code, which is to provide for safe trade while avoiding unju stified sanitary barriers 
to trade.443 Article 4.3.1 states that zoning and compartmentalization are procedures implemented 
by an OIE member with a view to defining subpopulations of distinct health status within its 
territory for the purpose of disease cont rol and/or international trade. The purpose of establishing 
zones is to maintain separation in terms of the health status of distinct sub -populations of animals 
so that the appropriate health measures can be targeted to the appropriate population. Zoning a nd 
compartmentalization accomplish this goal by recognizing that disease status may not be country -
wide and that the application of import measures should be tailored to the status of the exporting 
area. This general principle is embodied in Articles 4.3.2  and 4.3.3. Article 4.3.2 provides that the 
importing country should recognize the existence of a zone or compartment: (i) when the 
appropriate measures recommended in the Terrestrial Code are applied; and (ii) the Veterinary 
Authority of the exporting cou ntry certifies that this is the case. Furthermore, Article 4.3.3 sets 
forth principles for defining and establishing a zone or compartment.444  
7.312.   According to the OIE, no attempt is made to differentiate the levels of protection provided 
by the provisions of t he disease chapters or the horizontal chapters (for example, to say that 
compartmental ization  provides a higher or lower level of protection than zoning).445 The approach 
taken in Chapter 4.3 and, for ASF in Chapter 15.1, is consistent with the approach to o ther 
diseases. Various risk management options are provided. Measures are recommended with 
reference to the ASF-free status at the level of a country, zone or compartment (e.g. Articles 
15.1.5, 15.1.7, 15.1.8, 15.1.10, 15.1.12 and 15.1.13) and with referen ce to the ASF infected 
status of a country or zone (Articles 15.1.6, 15.1.9, and 15.1.11). For the importation of processed 
products, the ASF status of the exporting country, zone or compartment may be free or infected 
(Articles 15.1.14 to 15.1.17 inclusiv e). 
                                               
441 OIE response to Panel question No. 6.  
442 OIE response to Panel question No. 6 (quoting OIE, Terrestrial Animal Health Code  23rd edn (2014), 
Vol. I, p. 116. (emphasis in the original)).  
443 See OIE response to Panel question No. 19, page 35 of OIE Response s to Questions from the Panel, 
where it states that  "[all] the various combinations of testing, treatment and certification identified in Chapter 
15.1 provide for safe trade of animals and animal products".  Moreover, paragraph 3 of the introduction of the 
Terrestrial Code User's Guide provides that "the OIE standards are based on the most recent scientific and 
technical information. Correctly applied, they protect animal health and welfare and veterinary pub lic health 
during production and trade in animals and animal products." Terrestrial Code User Guide  (Exhibit EU -2), p. i. 
444 OIE, Terrestrial Animal Health Code  23rd edn (2014), Vol.  I, pp. 116 -119. 
445 OIE responses to Panel question No. 19.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.313.   The Terrestrial Code Glossary indicates that a "zone/region" means a clearly defined part 
of a territory containing an animal subpopulation with a distinct health status with respect to a 
specific disease for which required surveillance, control and bi osecurity measures have been 
applied for the purpose of international trade. Zoning/ regionalization  is the act of establishing a 
zone/region. The OIE does not differentiate between zoning and regionalization .446 The terms zone 
and zoning are generally used i n the Terrestrial Code. Compartmental ization  is linked to zoning. All 
applications of zoning and compartmental ization  are based on the definition of a subpopulation of 
animals that has a different health status to that of the population in the rest of the national 
territory. As stated in Article 4.3.1 of the Terrestrial Code, "[w]hile zoning applies to an animal 
subpopulation defined primarily on a geographical basis (using natural, artificial or legal 
boundaries), compartmental ization  applies to an animal subpopulation defined primarily by 
management and husbandry practices related to biosecurity. In practice, spatial considerations 
and good management including biosecurity plans play important roles in the application of both 
concepts."447 
7.314.   As noted above, th e provisions of Chapter 15.1 refer to the concepts of ASF -free zones and 
ASF-infected zones. The Terrestrial Code Glossary defines an infected zone as an area where a 
disease has been diagnosed.448 A free zone "means a zone in which the absence of the diseas e 
under consideration has been demonstrated by the requirements specified in the Terrestrial Code 
for free status being met. Within the zone and at its borders, appropriate official veterinary control 
is effectively applied for animals and animal products,  and their transportation ".449 The Terrestrial 
Code Glossary additionally contains definitions of two kinds of zones, namely, "containment zones" 
and "protection zones":  
A containment zone means a defined zone around and including suspected or infected 
establishments, taking into account the epidemiological factors and results of 
investigations, where control measures to prevent the spread of the infection are 
applied.  
A protection zone means a zone established to protect the health status of animals in 
a free country or free zone, from those in a country or zone of a different animal 
health status.450 
7.315.   The OIE explained that both containment and protection zones are implemented using 
measures based on the epidemiology of the disease of interest to prevent the s pread of the 
causative pathogen. These measures may include vaccination, movement control, animal 
identification, biosecurity and disease surveillance. The OIE further explained that the main 
distinction between the two zones relates to the circumstances i n which they are used. A 
containment zone is implemented in response to a limited outbreak of disease in a free country or 
zone. Its purpose is to contain the outbreak i.e. limit it to a defined area, partly for the purposes of 
disease control but also for  the purpose of limiting impact on trade. In contrast, a protection zone 
is implemented to protect the health status of animals in a country or zone that is free from a 
given disease against the risk of infection from adjacent countries or zones of differe nt (lower) 
animal health status.451 
7.316.   According to the OIE, these zones are defined with sufficient precision, based on their 
objectives and the requirements for implementing them. The OIE allows for the possibility that 
countries will use different terminolog y (for example, based on the terminology used in the 
national veterinary legislation). However, this should not hinder the recognition of the equivalence 
of animal health safeguards. The OIE encourages harmonized approaches (if not the use of the 
same term s) to facilitate recognition of zones established and agreement on the requirements for 
the certification of commodities.452 
                                               
446 OIE responses to Panel question No. 16.  
447 OIE, Terrestrial Animal Health Code  23rd edn (2014), Vol.  I, pp. 116.  
448 Glossary, Terrestrial Code , p. v (Exhibit RUS -32). 
449 Glossary, Terrestrial Code , p. iv (Exhibit RUS -32). 
450 Glossary, Terrestrial Code , pp. ii and vii (Ex hibit RUS -32). 
451 OIE responses to Panel question No. 17.  
452 OIE responses to Panel question No. 16.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.317.   We consider that the concept of "zone" in the Terrestrial Code is broad . It includes, but is 
not exhausted by the concepts of "protec tion" and "containment" zones . The OIE's opinion lends 
support to our view .453 The OIE also opines that the  concept also includes infected zones, zones 
that are free of disease with or without vaccination, zones that are officially recognised by the OIE, 
and seasonally free zones , and that  various applications of the zoning concept are found in the 
disease -specific chapters as appropriate to the epidemiology of each disease.454  
7.318.   According to Russia, in order for it to be able to implement the recommendations se t out in 
certain provisions of Chapter 15.1 of the Terrestrial Code (African swine fever) the European Union 
first has to demonstrate that it has  established effective zones or compartments consistent with 
the principles set out in Article 4.3.3 and 5.3.7 of the Terrestrial Code. Russia argues that the 
Terrestrial Code envisages country -wide import restrictions when exporting countries have failed 
to effectively establish zones after an ASF outbreak.455 The European Union asserts that, the 
Terrestrial Code di sease -specific provisions "prevail over" the horizontal ones, at least whenever 
the disease -specific chapter is more specific or restricts options that are described in the horizontal 
chapters. The European Union asserts that it is not correct to go direct ly to Chapters 4.3 and 5.7 
while ignoring Articles 15.1.2 and 15.1.3 (which refer to the determination of ASF status of a 
country or zone and to historically free status of zones and the regaining of free status as a result 
of an eradication programme).456  
7.319.   With respect to the assertion by the European Union that "the disease specific chapters of 
the Terrestrial Code ( Volume II ) prevail over the horizontal chapters ( Volume I ), at least whenever 
the disease specific chapter is more specific or restricts option s that are described in the horizontal 
chapters"457, we recall the OIE's clarification that it considered the European Union's statement to 
be "generally correct".458 The OIE also agreed with the European Union's statement that: "it is not 
correct to extract s ome provisions of Chapters 4.3 and 5.7 ignoring Articles 15.1.2 and 15.1.3  
…".459 According to the OIE, in practice, it is usually the case that the provisions in Volume I and II 
apply in a complementary manner. There is rarely, if ever, conflict between the  provisions because 
those in Volume I are general and those in Volume II are specific and only apply to the disease 
that is the subject of the chapter. Hence it is not usually necessary for one provision to "prevail 
over" another.460 The OIE drew our attenti on to Article 1.4.1.1 on animal health surveillance, 
which, it asserted, helps to explain the relationship between the provisions in Volumes I and II.  
Article 1.4.1.1.  
The following recommendations may be applied to all diseases or infections and all 
susce ptible species (including wildlife). The general recommendations in this chapter 
may be refined by the specific approaches  described in the disease chapters (ital. 
added for emphasis). Where detailed disease or infection -specific information is not 
availab le, suitable approaches should be based on the recommendations in this 
chapter.  (emphasis added)  
7.320.   In a similar vein, Article 4.3.1 of the Terrestrial Code states:  
This chapter is to assist Member Countries wishing to establish and maintain different 
subpopu lations within their territory using the principles of compartmentalisation and 
zoning. These principles should be applied in accordance with the measures 
recommended in the relevant disease chapter(s) . (emphasis added)  
7.321.   The OIE indicated that the phrase "w ishing to establish" indicates that the use of zoning 
and compartmentalization is optional.461 In a country affected by an outbreak of ASF the 
                                               
453 OIE responses to Panel question No. 16.  
454 OIE responses to Panel question No. 16.  
455 See e.g. Russia's first written submission, para. 60; and second writte n submission, para. 40.  
456 European Union's response to Panel question No. 20, paras. 83 -86. 
457 European Union's response to Panel question No. 20, para. 85.  
458 OIE responses to Panel question No. 6, referring to European Union's responses to Panel question 
No. 20, para s. 84-85.  
459 OIE responses to Panel question No. 6.  
460 OIE responses to Panel question No. 6.  
461 OIE responses to Panel question No. 26.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  veterinary authority is responsible for deciding whether to use these approaches or not. We agree 
with this view, w hich is reinforced with the text of Article 4.3.1, which also states:  
Before trade in animals or their products may occur, an importing country needs to be 
satisfied that its animal health status will be appropriately protected. In most cases, 
the import r egulations developed will rely in part on judgements made about the 
effectiveness of sanitary procedures undertaken by the exporting country, both at its 
borders and within its territory.  
7.322.   Furthermore, Article 4.3.2 states:  
The exporting country should be a ble to demonstrate, through detailed documentation 
provided to the importing country, that it has implemented the recommendations in 
the Terrestrial Code for establishing and maintaining such a zone or compartment.  
An importing country should recognise the  existence of this zone or compartment 
when the appropriate measures recommended in the Terrestrial Code are applied and 
the Veterinary Authority of the exporting country certifies that this is the case.  
7.323.   In response to a Panel question pertaining to zoning  under the Terrestrial Code, the OIE 
explained as follows:  
An importing country may choose to take measures only on a country -wide basis, or 
only on a zone basis, or only on a compartment basis, subject to the 
recommendations in the Terrestrial Code….  
Article 5.1.2 sets out the responsibilities of an importing country in relation to 
international trade. Point 1 advises that import requirements ... should assure that 
commodities introduced into the importing country c omply with the standards of the 
OIE (ital. added for emphasis).462 
7.324.   We recall Dr Thiermann's statement that "[w]hatever zoning approach is used, the 
sequence of steps to be taken in establishing a zone/compartment and having it recognized for 
international trade purposes is as outlined in Article 5.3.7 of the Terrestrial Code."463  
7.325.   Article 5.3.7 deals with the establishment of specific subpopulations (zone or 
compartment) and their recognition for the purpose of international trade.464 Article 5.3.7 spells 
out an approach to the obtaining of recognitio n of specific subpopulations from trading partners. If 
it does not prove possible to reach agreement, Article 5.3.8 contains a process to resolve 
differences between countries, such as the refusal to recognise a zone. We observe, however, that 
Article 5.3. 7 itself clearly states:  
There is no single sequence of steps which should be followed in establishing a zone or 
a compartment . The steps that the Veterinary Services of the importing country and 
the exporting country choose and implement will generally de pend on the 
circumstances existing within the countries and at their borders, and their trading 
history. (emphasis original)  
7.326.   Recognizing the optional465 nature of the establishment of disease -free zones and their 
form under the Terrestrial Code, and the furt her clarification in Article 5.3.7 that different 
                                               
462 OIE response to Panel question No. 26. (emphasis original)  
463 Dr Thiermann's response to Panel question No. 34, para. 4.35.  
464 As the OIE explained: "The article does not provide explicit guidance on how to establish  the 
subpopulation. Rather, it refers the reader to other parts of the Code, e.g:  
In Article 5.3.7.1(b):'The exporting country describes in the bios ecurity plan for the zone the measures 
which are being, or will be, applied to distinguish such an area epidemiologically from other parts of its 
territory, in accordance with the recommendations in the Terrestrial Code. '(ital. added for emphasis)" OIE 
responses to Panel question No. 6 (emphasis original).  
465 See also Dr Thomson's response to Panel question No. 31, para. 4.19 of the Compilation of the 
experts' responses , where he opines that "how a country manages risk associated with ASF need not concern 
 WT/DS475/R  
 
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  processes may be used for the recognition of such zones between trading partners, we examine 
whether Russia's measures amount to a "fundamental departure" from, that is, they contradict, 
the regionalization  and trade provisions of the Terrestrial Code. This will be the basis to reach a 
conclusion as to whether or not the measures are "based on" the relevant international standard 
within the meaning of Article 3.1.  
7.5.1.3.5   Whether the EU -wide ban is "based on" the st andards contained in the 
Terrestrial Code in respect of non -treated products  
7.327.   With these considerations in mind, we read the provisions in Volumes I and II of the 
Terrestrial Code together. In our view, the text of Chapter 15.1, read in conjunction with the  
general obligations on zoning and compartmentalization in Article 4.3.2, and the sequence of steps 
set out in Article 5.3.7, indicates that the import recommendations contained therein are not only 
intended for country -wide purposes, but are intended to a pply to zones and compartments. The 
application by an importing Member of the product -specific recommendations to zones or 
compartments presupposes that the exporting Member has established such zones or 
compartments within its territory according to the T errestrial Code (in this case, Articles 4.3.3 and 
15.1.2 -4).466 If an exporting country does so, Chapter 15.1 envisages that the importing Member 
will allow the importation from that zone or compartment subject to the specific recommendations 
therein. This m eans that the Terrestrial Code envisages that importing Members, when applying 
measures to address the risk of entry, establishment or spread of ASF, will recognize that if an 
exporting Member is not entirely free of ASF, it may have zones or compartments that are ASF -
free where these have been properly established by the exporting Member.  
7.328.   In our view, the particular structure and nature of the relevant international standard 
applicable to trade in non -treated pork and pig products, as enshrined in the pro visions of the 
Terrestrial Code already examined, have clear parallels with the substantive obligations Members 
have in the context of Article 6 of the SPS Agreement. The Appellate Body has observed that 
Article 6 establishes, through its three paragraphs,  a series of obligations regarding the adaptation 
of SPS  measures to regional conditions.467 Among the characteristics to which a Member has the 
obligation to adapt its SPS measures are " pest-or disease -free areas". This is clearly indicated in 
the title of Article 6 (Adaptation to Regional Conditions, Including Pest - or Disease -Free Areas and 
Areas of Low Pest or Disease Prevalence) and in the text of Articles 6.2 and 6.3, which refer to 
"disease -free areas". Furthermore, according to Annex A(6) of the SPS A greement a disease -free 
area is an "area, whether all of a country, part of a country, or all parts of several countries, as 
identified by the competent authorities, in which a specific … disease does not occur". The Glossary 
of the Terrestrial Code define s a free zone as one in "which the absence of the disease under 
consideration has been demonstrated by the requirements specified in the Terrestrial Code for free 
status being met. Within the zone and at its borders, appropriate official veterinary control  is 
effectively applied for animals and animal products, and their transportation."468 In our view, both 
definitions refer to the same substantial question, whether a disease is present in a particular 
area. 
7.329.   We recall that Russia's alternative defence that t he EU -wide ban is "based on the OIE 
standard to the extent possible" is largely grounded on Russia's argument that it "objectively 
decided not to recognise"469 the ASF-free zones identified by the European Union. In our view, this 
clearly touches upon the pa rties' arguments in respect of Article 6.3 of the SPS Agreement.   
                                                                                                                                               
an importer as long as the overall risk is effectively managed and the exporting country certifies that the TAHC 
standards for the commodity or product in question have been fulfilled" . 
466 We find support for this approach in Panel Report, US – Animals, para. 7.249 ("[t]he application by 
an importing Member of the product -specific recommendations to zones or compartments presupposes that the 
exporting Member has established such zones or compartments within its territory according to the Terrestrial 
Code (in t his case Articles 4.3.3 and 8.5.4)"); and in Panel Report, India – Agricultural Products , para. 7.262 
("the application by an importing country of the product -specific recommendations to zones or compartments 
presupposes that the exporting country has esta blished such zones or compartments within its territory 
according to the Terrestrial Code.").  
467 Appellate Body Report, India – Agricultural Products , para. 5.131.  
468 Glossary, Terrestrial Code, p. iv (Exhibit RUS -32). 
469 See e.g. Russia's second written subm ission, section II.A.3.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.330.   We have  examin ed the meaning of the relevant international standards applicable to 
non-treated products in the light of the parties' arguments and the circumstances in this dispute . 
We conclude that before comparing the EU -wide ban with those standards for the purposes of 
determining whether that measure is "based on" them, it is appropriate and instructive for us to 
turn to our examination of the European Union's claims under Article 6 of t he SPS Agreement.  
7.331.   We note that this approach is appropriate in the circumstances of the present case, where 
our conclusions under Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement will have no impact on the complainant's 
burden of proof in respect of claims brought under other provisions of the SPS Agreement 
(i.e. Article 6). That would not be the case when a panel is faced with examining a justification 
that the challenged measures "conform to" the relevant international standard pursuant to 
Article  3.2, because an affirm ative finding of such justification would raise a presumption of 
consistency with the relevant provisions of the SPS Agreement and of the GATT 1994.470  
7.332.   Therefore, we will suspend our analysis of the parties' claims under Article 3 in respect of 
the EU -wide ban to examine such measure under Article 6. Following our analysis of the 
consistency of the EU -wide ban with Article 6 we will resume our analysis of whether that measure 
is "based on" the relevant international standard and provide our findings in that respect. We now 
turn to examine the European Union's claims under Article 6 in respect of the EU -wide ban.  
7.5.2   Claims under Articles 6.1, 6.2 , and 6.3 of the SPS Agreement  
7.5.2.1   Main arguments of the parties  
7.5.2.1.1   European Union  
7.333.   The European Union argues that instead of " provisionally" complying with the terms of the 
veterinary certificates, as Russia contends it is doing, Russia was under an obligation to adapt  its 
measures to the sanitary characteristics from which the products at issue originate and to which 
they are de stined.471 
7.334.   The European Union claims that the EU -wide ban is inconsistent with Articles 6.1 and 6.2  
of the SPS Agreement , because Russia has not ensured, and does not ensure, that the EU -wide 
ban is adapted to the sanitary characteristics of the area from wh ich the products at issue 
originate and to which they are destined. The European Union further contends that the EU -wide 
ban failed to take into account, inter alia, the level of prevalence or absence of ASF, the existence 
of eradication and control progra ms in the affected EU member States (immediately implemented 
in accordance with international standards laid down by the OIE), and appropriate criteria or 
guidelines developed by the relevant international organizations.472 
7.335.   Regarding  the first sentence of Ar ticle 6.2, the European Union argues that Russia failed to 
recognize the concepts of disease -free areas with respect to ASF in the European Union.473 The 
European Union claims that this is evidenced by Russia's application of an indiscriminate EU -wide 
ban.474 Regarding the second sentence of Article 6.2, the European Union further argues that these 
bans were applied without taking into account relevant factors such as geography, ecosystems, 
epidemiological surveillance and the effectiveness of sanitary controls .475 The European Union 
claims that given its large geographical territory, the geographical factor must be taken into 
account and highlights its control measures in this regard. The European Union outlines the 
various steps taken to control ASF in live pigs  and wild boars.476 
7.336.   The European Union submits that with respect to Article 6.3, it has provided Russia with 
information beyond what is necessary for objectively demonstrating that disease -free areas or 
                                               
470 See Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones , paras. 102 and 170.  
471 European Union's second written submission, para. 95.  
472 European Union's first written submission, para. 216.  
473 European Union's first written submission, para. 215.  
474 European Union's first written submission, para. 210.  
475 European Union's first written submission, para. 210.  
476 European Union's first written submission, paras. 211 -214. WT/DS475/R  
 
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  areas of low disease prevalence are and are likely to r emain disease -free areas or areas of low 
disease prevalence, respectively.477  
7.5.2.1.2   Russia  
7.337.   Russia argues that, taking into consideration the very factors listed in Article 6.1 of the 
SPS Agreement, it objectively and reasonably did not accept the European Union's  zones.478 Russia 
asserts that in evaluating whether there is an objective basis for Russia's decision not to recognize 
the proposed ASF -free zones in conformity with the applicable Terrestrial Code standards and 
consistent with Article 6 of the SPS Agreemen t, the Panel must determine whether Russia's 
decision regarding the various European Union zones was "objectively justifiable". Russia stresses 
that in conducting that review, the Panel must not substitute its own judgement of the weight to 
be given to cer tain evidence for that given by the importing country. Rather, it must determine 
whether the totality of the circumstances and evidence (or lack thereof) was sufficient to support 
the objectivity of Russia's decision in light of the relevant provisions of the Terrestrial Code and 
SPS Agreement Article 6 criteria and the available information.479 Russia further argues that if the 
Panel finds that Russia was objectively justified in not accepting the EU zones in conformity with 
the Terrestrial Code zoning/regio nalization standards, recommendations, and guideline 
benchmarks, it should also find that it acted consistently with Article 6 of the SPS Agreement.480 
7.338.   Russia responds to the European Union's claim under the first sentence of Article  6.2 of the 
SPS Agreement  by contending that the obligation contained therein to recognize the concepts of 
pest- or disease -free areas and areas of low pest or disease prevalence relates to an abstract idea 
and is not linked to specific areas of a given exporting Member.481 Russia a ccordingly draws the 
attention of the Panel to existing Customs Union legislation - specifically, Customs Union Decision 
No. 317  – which, Russia asserts, recognizes the concept of disease -free areas in the abstract and 
explicitly recognizes the concept of disease -free areas as applied to ASF.482 In addition, Russia 
refers to the 2006 Memorandum between the European  Union and Russia which includes 
provisions aimed at applying the principles of zoning and regionalization in the international 
movement of animals  and products of animal origin between EU member States and Russia.483 On 
this basis, Russia argues that clearly, Russia recognizes the concept of disease -free areas not only 
in the abstract as required under Article 6.2 of the SPS Agreement, but also specif ically as applied 
to ASF and as applied with respect to the European Union.484 Russia further argues, specifically in 
respect of the EU -wide ban, that the language of the agreed veterinary certificates considers the 
concept of disease -free areas.485 
7.339.   Russia arg ues that the European Union has failed to objectively demonstrate to Russia that 
the alleged ASF -free areas in the four infected EU Member States "are, and are likely to remain, 
pest- or disease -free areas", in accordance with Article 6.3 of the SPS Agreem ent.486 In Russia's 
view, the European Union has failed to effectively establish ASF containment zones in accordance 
with the OIE guidelines and therefore the entirety of the four infected EU member States should be 
considered ASF -infected.487 Russia argues th at the European Union failed to provide timely, 
comprehensive and accurate information relevant for assessing its zones and ASF -control 
measures inconsistently with Article 6.3 of the SPS Agreement and Terrestrial Code Article  5.3.7. 
Furthermore, the Europ ean Union withheld national eradication plans from Russia until March 2015 
and May 2015 despite acknowledging that these reports contain highly relevant information.488 
                                               
477 European Union's first written submission, para. 218.  
478 Russia's first written su bmission, para. 231.  
479 Russia's second written submission, para. 49. See also response to Panel question No. 113, paras. 
190-196. 
480 Russia's second written submission, para. 56.  
481 Russia's first written submission, para. 222.  
482 Russia's first written submi ssion, para. 223 and 224 (referring to Exhibit -RUS 25).  
483 Russia's first written submission, para. 225.  
484 Russia's first written submission, para. 225.  
485 Russia's first written submission, para. 411.  
486 Russia's first written submission, para. 236.  
487 Russia 's first written submission, para. 237.  
488 See Russia's second written submission, paras. 58 -77. WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.5.2.2   Main arguments of the third parties  
7.5.2.2.1   Australia  
7.340.   Australia asserts that it agrees with Russi a that the first sentence of Article 6.2 of the SPS 
Agreement requires only the recognition of the concept of "pest- or disease -free areas and areas 
of low pest or disease prevalence". Australia however, also stresses that the Appellate Body in 
India - Agricultural Products held that "to  comply with Article 6.2, SPS measures adopted by WTO 
Members must at a minimum not deny or contradict the recognition of the  concepts of such areas 
when these concepts are relevant with respect to the disease at issue".489 
7.341.     Australia emphasizes that it will be necessary for the Panel to determine whether Russia 's 
measures, notified or otherwise, operate in a manner such as to deny or contradict the recognition 
of such areas. Such a finding may be informed by the Panel 's other  findings under Article 3 and 
Article 5 of the SPS Agreement.490 
7.5.2.2.2   Brazil  
7.342.   Brazil argues that the main question under discussion in this topic is whether it is possible 
to rightfully impose an import prohibition (country and/or EU -wide ban) if the importing Mem ber 
considers that the measures adopted by the exporting Member were not sufficient to establish 
disease - or pest -free zones or compartments.491 
7.343.   Brazil asserts that adaptation to regional conditions in the context of Article 6.1 of the SPS 
Agreement entails taking into account, inter alia , appropriate criteria or guidelines which may be 
developed by the relevant international organizations.492 
7.344.   Brazil argues that a Member has the right to consider that the measures adopted by 
another Member are not satisfactory for the determination of the containment zone, if (i) there 
was no conformity with the standard in the sense of Article 3.2 or (ii) the level of protection sought 
by the importing Member is higher than the one established by the standard. In Brazil's view,  if an 
importing Member considers that the measures adopted by the exporting Member do not conform 
to the international standard in the sense that the measures adopted do not "embody the 
international standard completely", then there could be a basis for t he establishment of an import 
prohibition. On the other hand, a Member may choose to adopt a higher level of protection and 
decide that the mechanism established by the exporting country is not sufficient according to its 
own appropriate level of protectio n. Brazil points out that if this is the case, a risk assessment to 
provide scientific justification must be elaborated to justify the SPS measure.493 
7.5.2.2.3   Norway  
7.345.   Norway argues that in examining the claims relating to regionalization, the Panel should 
first asses s whether Russia properly has recognized the concepts of pest - or disease -free areas 
and areas of low pest or disease prevalence, and whether any determination of such areas is 
based on relevant factors, including geography, ecosystems, epidemiological sur veillance, and the 
effectiveness of sanitary and phytosanitary control. Second, the panel should assess whether 
Russia has ensured that the measures at issue are adapted to the SPS characteristics of the 
affected area, as set out in Article 6.1. According to the second sentence of this provision, the 
Panel should consider whether Russia in its assessment of the SPS characteristics of a region , has 
taken into account relevant factors, such as the level of prevalence of ASF, the existence of 
eradication and c ontrol programmes, and appropriate criteria or guidelines developed by the 
relevant international organizations.  
                                               
489 Australia's third -party submission, para. 19 (citing Panel Report, India – Agricultural Products , para. 
7.698).  
490 Australia's third -party submission, para. 20 . 
491 Brazil's third -party submission, para. 4.  
492 Brazil's third -party submission, para. 5.  
493 Brazil's third -party submission, paras. 7 -9. WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.346.   Norway emphasizes that that a finding that the respondent party has not recognized the 
concepts of pest - or disease -free areas and areas of low  pest or disease prevalence, will lead to a 
finding that this party has not ensured that its measures are adapted to the SPS characteristics of 
those areas pursuant to the first sentence of Article 6.1, and that conversely, where there is a 
finding that th e respondent party has recognised these concepts, a consideration must be 
undertaken, of whether this party has ensured that its measures are adapted to the 
SPS characteristics of the affected areas and whether it took into account relevant factors when 
assessing the SPS characteristics of a region, consistent with Article 6.1.494 
7.5.2.2.4   United States  
7.347.   The United States argues that the provisions of Article 6 contain separate but inter -related 
obligations that must be read together in context. The United States empha sizes that while the 
first sentence of Article 6.1 of the SPS Agreement imposes an obligation with respect to measures, 
the first sentence of Article 6.2 requires recognition of concepts, i.e. pest - or disease -free areas 
and areas of low pest or disease pr evalence.495 
7.348.   The United States highlights that neither the obligations in the first sentence of Article 6.2 
of the SPS Agreement, nor those in Article 6.1, arise only following a request under Article 6.3 to 
recognize a specific area as a pest - or disease -free area or area of low pest or disease 
prevalence.496 
7.5.2.3   Analysis  by the Panel  
7.5.2.3.1   Introduction  
7.349.   The issues before the Panel are whether the EU -wide ban is consistent with Articles 6.1 
and 6.2 of the SPS Agreement, and whether the European Union has satisfied the r equirements of 
Article 6.3 of the SPS Agreement in respect of the EU -wide ban.  
7.350.   We now look at the se legal provisions.  
7.5.2.3.2   The legal provisions at issue  
7.351.   Article 6 of the SPS Agreement states:  
Article 6  
Adaptation to Regional Conditions, Including Pest - or Dis ease- Free Areas and   
Areas of Low Pest or Disease Prevalence  
1. Members shall ensure that their sanitary or phytosanitary measures are adapted to 
the sanitary or phytosanitary characteristics of the area — whether all of a country, 
part of a country, or a ll or parts of several countries — from which the product 
originated and to which the product is destined. In assessing the sanitary or 
phytosanitary characteristics of a region, Members shall take into account, inter alia, 
the level of prevalence of speci fic diseases or pests, the existence of eradication or 
control programmes, and appropriate criteria or guidelines which may be developed 
by the relevant international organizations.  
2. Members shall, in particular, recognize the concepts of pest - or diseas e-free areas 
and areas of low pest or disease prevalence. Determination of such areas shall be 
based on factors such as geography, ecosystems, epidemiological surveillance, and 
the effectiveness of sanitary or phytosanitary controls.  
                                               
494 Norway's third -party submission, paras. 27 -30. 
495 United States' third -party submission, paras. 3 -6. 
496 United States' third-party submission, paras. 7 -11. WT/DS475/R  
 
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  3. Exporting Members c laiming that areas within their territories are pest - or disease -
free areas or areas of low pest or disease prevalence shall provide the necessary 
evidence thereof in order to objectively demonstrate to the importing Member that 
such areas are, and are lik ely to remain, pest - or disease -free areas or areas of low 
pest or disease prevalence, respectively. For this purpose, reasonable access shall be 
given, upon request, to the importing Member for inspection, testing and other 
relevant procedures.  
7.352.   Annex A(6)  and A(7) of the SPS Agreement set forth the definitions of "pest - or disease -
free areas" and "areas of low pest or disease prevalence", respectively, as:  
6. Pest- or disease -free area – An area, whether all of a country, part of a country, 
or all or parts  of several countries, as identified by the competent authorities, in which 
a specific pest or disease does not occur.  
NOTE:  A pest - or disease -free area may surround, be surrounded by, or be 
adjacent to an area – whether within part of a country or in a geographic region which 
includes parts of or all of several countries – in which a specific pest or disease is 
known to occur but is subject to regional control measures such as the establishment 
of protection, surveillance and buffer zones which will conf ine or eradicate the pest or 
disease in question.  
7. Area of low pest or disease prevalence – An area, whether all of a country, part 
of a country, or all or parts of several countries, as identified by the competent 
authorities, in which a specific pest o r disease occurs at low levels and which is 
subject to effective surveillance, control or eradication measures.  
7.353.   The Appellate Body observed in India – Agricultural Products  that Article 6 of the SPS 
Agreement establishes, through its three paragraphs, a se ries of obligations regarding the 
adaptation of SPS  measures to regional conditions. The Appellate Body started by noting:  
[B]oth the title of this provision and the first sentence of Article 6.1 refer to the 
requirement to "adapt" SPS measures to certain regional conditions. Whereas the title 
speaks more generally of "Adaptation to Regional Conditions", the first sentence of 
Article 6.1 imposes on WTO Members a specific obligation to ensure that their SPS 
measures are "adapted" to the "sanitary or phytosan itary characteristics" of the areas 
from which the product originated and to which the product is destined. Moreover, we 
observe that, among the regional conditions in respect of which adaptation is 
envisaged, the title to Article 6 refers to "Pest - or Dis ease-Free Areas and Areas of 
Low Pest or Disease Prevalence". We see a link between this language and the second 
sentence of Article 6.1, which identifies the "level of prevalence of specific diseases or 
pests" as one of the relevant SPS characteristics of  a region in respect of which 
adaptation is envisaged. Similarly, the reference to "Pest - or Disease -Free Areas and 
Areas of Low Pest or Disease Prevalence" in the title of Article 6 is also directly 
connected with the second and third paragraphs of this p rovision, which deal explicitly 
with these types of areas.497 
7.354.   The first sentence of Article 6.1 stipulates that "Members shall ensure that their sanitary or 
phytosanitary measures are adapted to the sanitary or phytosanitary characteristics of the area … 
from which the product originated and to which the product is destined." In relation to the text of  
the first sentence of Article 6.1, the Appellate Body observed:  
The verb "ensure" is defined as to make certain the occurrence of a situation or 
outcome.498 In turn, the term "adapt" means "fit, adjust, ( to); make suitable ( to or 
                                               
497 Appellate Body Report, India – Agricultural Products , para. 5.131.  
498 (footnote original) Relevant definitions of the term "ensure" are "guarantee, warrant" and "make 
certain the occurrence of (an event, situation, out come, etc.) (Foll. by that)". (Shorter Oxford English 
Dictionary , 6th edn, A.  Stevenson (ed.) (Oxford University Press, 2007), Vol. 1, p. 840)  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  for)".499 Two areas are relevant to the obligation in the first sentence of Article 6.1: 
the area from which the product originated and the area to which the product is 
destined. Article 6 .1 indicates that the term "area" encompasses "all of a country, part 
of a country, or all or parts of several countries". The "areas" that are relevant for 
purposes of Article  6.1 can therefore vary, and may entail a territory that can be 
smaller than, th e same size as, or bigger than, a country. We observe that, pursuant 
to the first sentence of Article 6.1, a Member's obligation to ensure adaptation applies 
in respect of "SPS measures" in the plural, suggesting that it applies generally, as well 
as in co nnection with each specific SPS measure maintained by a Member. 
Furthermore, the use of the present tense "are adapted", and the absence of any 
language limiting the temporal scope of application of this obligation, suggest that the 
obligation in Article 6 .1 does not apply only at one specific point in time (e.g. when an 
SPS measure is adopted), but is, instead, an ongoing one. Indeed, both the notion of 
"adaptation", as well as the fact that the relevant SPS characteristics of regions may 
fluctuate500, point  to an obligation that is not static, but rather ongoing, requiring that 
SPS measures be adjusted over time so as to establish and maintain their continued 
suitability in respect of the relevant SPS  characteristics of the relevant areas. We also 
see the us e of the verb "ensure" in connection with the adaptation of "SPS measures" 
in the plural as indicating something that should  be done consistently and 
systematically by Members.501 
7.355.   In relation to the text of the first sentence of Article 6.2, the Appellate Bo dy stated:  
The first sentence of Article 6.2 establishes that "Members shall, in particular, 
recognize the concepts of pest - or disease -free areas and areas of low pest or disease 
prevalence."502 We observe that the use of the words "in particular" in the fi rst 
sentence of Article  6.2 underscores the link between Articles 6.1 and  6.2. Similarly, 
the title to Article 6, which refers to "Adaptation to Regional Conditions Including  Pest- 
or Disease -Free Areas and Areas of Low Pest or Disease Prevalence"503, read t ogether 
with the first sentence of Article 6.1, indicates that "pest - or disease -free areas" and 
"areas of low pest or disease prevalence" are a subset of all the SPS  characteristics of 
an area that may call for the adaptation of an SPS measure. We read th e words "in 
particular", together with the title to Article 6, as underlining the interlinkages 
between the first and second paragraphs of Article 6. More specifically, we consider 
that these elements point to the particular saliency of "pest - or disease -free areas" 
and "areas of low pest or disease prevalence" as factors to be taken into account in 
assessing the SPS characteristics of a region, pursuant to the second sentence of 
Article  6.1. These considerations, in our view, indicate that, together, Artic les 6.1 
and 6.2 accord prominence to the content of Article 6.2 as one particular way through 
which a Member can ensure that its SPS measures are "adapted", as required by 
Article  6.1.504  
7.356.   The Appellate Body then went on to note that the structure of the fir st two paragraphs of 
Article 6 is similar in certain respects. Each has two sentences, and in each paragraph the nature 
of the obligation under the first sentence is more general than under the second sentence. The 
first sentence of Article 6.2 establishes  the obligation to recognize "the concepts of pest - or 
                                               
499 (footnote original) Shorter Oxford English Dictionary , 6th edn, A. Stevenson (ed.) (Oxford University 
Press, 20 07), Vol.  1, p. 24.  
500 (footnote original) Thus, for example, a pest may be introduced into an area where it was not 
previously present, or there may be an outbreak of a disease in an area that was previously disease free. 
Alternatively, pests or diseases m ay be eradicated in specific areas.  
501 Appellate Body Report, India – Agricultural Product s, para. 5.132.  
502 (footnote original) Paragraph 6 of Annex A to the SPS Agreement defines the term "pest - or disease -
free area" as "[a]n area, whether all of a country , part of a country, or all or parts of several countries, as 
identified by the competent authorities, in which a specific pest or disease does not occur." Paragraph 7 of 
Annex A, in turn, defines the term "area of low pest or disease prevalence" as "[a]n area, whether all of a 
country, part of a country, or all or parts of several countries, as identified by the competent authorities, in 
which a specific pest or disease occurs at low levels and which is subject to effective surveillance, control or 
eradica tion measures."  
503 (footnote original) Emphasis added.  
504 Appellate Body Report, India – Agricultural Products , para. 5.133.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  disease -free areas and areas of low pest or disease prevalence". Neither of the first sentences of 
Article 6.1 or Article  6.2 is explicitly linked to a specific assessment or determination. Rather, the  
first sentence of Article  6.1 speaks of an obligation to "ensure" adaptation in respect of SPS 
measures generally, and the first sentence of Article 6.2 refers to a general obligation to 
"recognize" the "concepts" listed therein.505 The Appellate Body conti nued:  
In turn, the second sentences of Articles 6.1 and 6.2 both identify how a specific 
action is to be taken. The second sentence of Article 6.1 specifies, in a non -exhaustive 
manner, the elements that Members must take into account in assessing the SPS 
characteristics of a region. These elements include: the level of prevalence of specific 
diseases or pests; the existence of eradication or control programmes; and 
appropriate criteria or guidelines that may be developed by the relevant international 
organ izations. The second sentence of Article  6.2 indicates how the specific action of 
determining the existence of "such areas" (that is, pest - or disease -free areas and 
areas of low pest or disease prevalence) is to be taken. This sentence establishes that 
the following factors must be used as a basis for making such a determination: 
geography, ecosystems, epidemiological surveillance, and the effectiveness of sanitary 
or phytosanitary controls. Thus, the second sentences of Article 6.1 and of Article 6.2, 
respectively, identify how a Member is required to "assess" the SPS characteristics of 
a region and "determine" pest - or disease -free areas and areas of low pest or disease 
prevalence.506 
7.357.   The Appellate Body emphasized the existence of important common elements throughout 
Article 6, which reveal the interlinkages that exist among the paragraphs of this provision. All 
three paragraphs of Article 6 are interconnected, addressing different aspects of the obligation to 
adapt SPS  measures to regional conditions. The m ain and overarching obligation under Article 6 
for a Member to ensure that its SPS measures are adapted to regional SPS characteristics is set 
out under t he first sentence of Article  6.1. In turn, the remainder of Article  6 elaborates on the 
specific aspec ts of such obligation, notably, with respect to pest- or disease -free areas and areas 
of low pest or disease prevalence , as well as the respective  duties that apply to importing and 
exporting Members in this connection.507  
7.358.   Article  6.3 refers to a situation that is distinct from those in Articles 6.1 and 6.2. It is not 
addressed to Members generally, as are the first two paragraphs of Article  6. Rather, Article  6.3 
relates to the particular situation where an exporting Member is claiming that an area within i ts 
territory is a pest - or disease -free area or an area of low pest or disease prevalence. This provision 
specifies what must be objectively demonstrated by an exporting Member seeking recognition of a 
specific area within its territory as a pest - or disea se-free area or an area of low pest or disease 
prevalence through the provision of the necessary evidence. The Appellate Body in India – 
Agricultural Products  has indicated that, t hrough the phrase "[f]or this purpose", Article 6.3 also 
stipulates, in its second sentence, that such Member must allow the importing Member adopting or 
maintaining an SPS measure to have access to its territory for the purpose of verifying such 
demonstration.508 Like Article 6.2, Article 6.3 relates to pest - or disease -free areas and areas of 
low pest or disease prevalence, which are a subset of the SPS  characteristics that are relevant 
under Article 6.1.  
7.359.   The Appellate Body has clarified, in respect of the relationship between Articles 6.1 and 
6.3, that while it agreed that there w as "no explicit conditional language linking Article 6.1 and 
Article 6.3", it emphasized the need for Article 6.1 and the remainder of Article 6 to be read 
together.509 The Appellate Body has observed that, depending on the nature of the claims raised 
and th e circumstances of the case, a panel may be called upon to scrutinize whether a Member 
has determined that a specific area is free of disease and adapted its SPS measures accordingly. 
While a Member may act inconsistently with the obligation under the firs t sentence of Article 6.1 
absent the objective demonstration provided for in Article 6.3 by an exporting Member510, the 
                                               
505 Appellate Body Report, India – Agricultural Products , para. 5.134.  
506 Appellate Body Report, India – Agricultural Products , para. 5. 135. 
507 Appellate Body Report, India – Agricultural Products , para. 5.141.  
508 Appellate Body Report, India – Agricultural Products , para. 5.140.  
509 Appellate Body Report, India – Agricultural Products , para. 5.155.  
510 Appellate Body Report, India – Agricultura l Products , para. 5.157.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  scrutiny by the panel may involve examining whether the importing Member received a request 
from an exporting Member to recognize an area within its territory as "disease -free". In such 
cases, an exporting Member may be able to establish that the importing Member's failure to 
recognize and determine that disease -free area, and to adapt its SPS measure accordingly, is 
inconsistent with Articl es 6.1 and 6.2 only if that exporting Member can also establish that it took 
the steps prescribed in Article  6.3.511 The Appellate Body indicated that  
[A]n exporting Member claiming, for example, that an importing Member has failed to 
determine a specific a rea within that exporting Member's territory as "pest - or 
disease -free" – and ultimately adapt its SPS measures to that area – will have 
difficulties succeeding in a claim that the importing Member has thereby acted 
inconsistently with Articles 6.1 or 6.2,  unless that exporting Member can demonstrate 
its own compliance with Article 6.3.  
This is not to suggest, as India does, that a Member adopting or maintaining an 
SPS measure can only be found to have breached the obligation in the first sentence 
of Articl e 6.1 after an exporting Member has made the objective demonstration 
provided for in Article  6.3. Indeed, as noted above, even in the absence of such 
objective demonstration by an exporting Member, a Member may still be found to 
have failed to ensure that an SPS measure is adapted to regional conditions within the 
meaning of Article 6.1 in a situation where, for example, the concept of pest - and 
disease -free areas is relevant, but such Member's regulatory regime precludes the 
recognition of such concept. Moreover, as noted above, pest- or disease -free areas 
and areas of low pest or disease prevalence, which are specifically addressed in 
Articles 6.2 and 6.3, are only a subset of the SPS  characteristics that may call for the 
adaptation of an SPS measure pursu ant to the first sentence of Article 6.1. We also 
observe that Article 6.1 expressly identifies "criteria or guidelines" developed by 
relevant organizations as relevant for the assessment of the SPS  characteristics of 
regions, which suggests that, under ce rtain circumstances, the adaptation of an SPS 
measure to regional SPS characteristics may be accomplished by taking into account 
relevant criteria and guidelines developed by such organizations, if any. Finally, we 
recall that the overarching requirement u nder Article 6.1 to ensure the adaptation of 
SPS measures is an ongoing obligation that applies upon adoption of an SPS measure 
as well as thereafter. All of these considerations reinforce that a Member may act 
inconsistently with the obligation under the first sentence of Article  6.1 absent the 
objective demonstration provided for in Article  6.3 by an exporting Member. For these 
reasons, we agree with the Panel that "the obligations in Articles  6.1 and 6.2 are not 
triggered by an invocation of Article 6.3,  as argued by India" .512  
7.360.   The panel in US – Animals  also found that once the importing Member determines that the 
area subject to the exporting Member's claim is pest -or disease -free or of low pest or disease 
prevalence, it is required to "adapt" its measure  to the pest - or disease status of that area. In this 
regard, the importing Member "shall take into account", besides pest - or disease -prevalence, the 
other factors listed in the second sentence of Article 6.1.513 While the panel in US – Animals  also 
indicat ed that the obligations in Articles 6.1 and 6.2 are not necessarily contingent on the actions 
of the exporting Member under Article 6.3, the panel took the view that "in some circumstances 
the ability of the importing Member to adapt a measure under Articl e 6.1 is dependent on the 
exporting Member's compliance with Article 6.3".514  
7.361.   In respect of the exporting Member's obligation to comply with the specific provisions set 
out in Article 6.3 of the SPS Agreement, the panel in US—Animals  stated:  
Article 6.3 rec ognizes that, in certain cases, exporting Members are well if not best 
placed to gather information about the SPS conditions of geographical areas located 
within their territories, and that, without their cooperation, the "objective 
demonstration" of the p est-or disease status of the areas concerned to the importing 
                                               
511 Appellate Body Report, India – Agricultural Products , para. 5.156.  
512 Appellate Body Report, India – Agricultural Products , paras. 5.156 -5.157. (footnotes omitted)  
513 Panel Report, US – Animals , para. 7.661.  
514 Panel Report, US – Animals , para. 7.664.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  Member may prove impossible. Furthermore, it would not be logical to expect an 
importing Member to necessarily adapt its measures to the disease statuses of any 
and all areas, regions or parts o f countries the world over absent solicitation or 
provision of relevant information on the part of the exporting Members wishing to 
obtain market access.515 
7.362.   The panel in US – Animals  also determined that in the case where an importing Member 
has an appropria te regulatory framework in place, the exporting Member may submit a claim that 
specific areas within its territory are pest - or disease -free or of low pest or disease prevalence. The 
panel determined that Article 6.3 "contemplates an exchange of informatio n between the exporting 
and importing Members, whereby the former provides evidence concerning the pest or disease 
status of areas located within its territory, and the latter evaluates such information with a view to 
adapting its measure to the SPS charac teristics of the areas concerned."516 Furthermore, the panel 
in US – Animals highlighted the obligation of the exporting Member to not only objectively 
demonstrate that areas within its territory are pest - or disease -free or of low pest or disease 
prevalence  at a given point in time, but also that such areas are "likely to remain" in the same 
pest- or disease -condition.517  
7.5.2.3.3   Order of analysis of claims under Article 6  
7.363.   We note that the panel in India – Agricultural Products  found it appropriate to begin its 
analy sis of the consistency of the respondent's measures with Article 6, by focusing on Article 6.2 
and then Article 6.1  of the SPS Agreement . The panel further interpreted Article 6.2 such that a 
finding that a Member has failed to recognize the concepts of pe st- or disease -free areas and areas 
of low pest or disease prevalence as required by  the first sentence of  Article  6.2, leads inevitably 
to a finding that such Member has also failed to determine those areas based on factors such as 
geography, ecosystems, epidemiological surveillance, and the effectiveness of sanitary or 
phytosanitary controls.518 We consider that the factual pattern in that dispute is different from the 
one in this dispute. In particular, we note that in India – Agricultural Products  the Uni ted States 
had not raised claims in respect of certain areas of its territory being free of avian influenza , rather 
it focused on the fact that India's measures preclude d recognition of disease -free areas or areas of 
low disease  prevalence .519  
7.364.   In the instan t case, the European Union indicates that it formally requested Russia to 
recognize the ASF -disease -free status of regions other than where ASF outbreaks have 
occurred.520 The evidence on record indicates that the European Union submitted a request for the 
recognition of a particular d isease -free area(s) to Russia, and subsequently insisted  that Russia 
accepts this  request .521 The European Union sent letters to the competent authorities in Russia, 
seeking acceptance of the sanitary status of the EU member State s and their regions on 
31 January  2014.522 In its letter to Russia, the European Union indeed requested "the Competent 
Authorities of the Russian Federation to accept the ASF-free sanitary status of EU Member States 
(and their regions under the principle of regionalization ) and the animal health standards for 
international trade in live pigs and pig products in line with the sanitary and trade standards and 
criteria of the OIE and the memorandum between the EC and the RF concerning the principles of 
zoning an d  regionalization  in the veterinary field of 2006".523 While Russia does not dispute that 
the European Union submitted such a request, it asserts that the European Union did not submit 
the "necessary evidence" to adequately or appropriately substantiate its  request within the 
                                               
515 Panel Report, US – Animals , para. 7.664.  
516 Panel Report, US – Animals , para. 7.659.  
517 Panel Report, US – Animals, para. 7.649.  
518 Panel Report, India – Agricultural Products , para. 7.689.  
519 Panel Report, India – Agricultural Products , para. 7.693.  
520 European Union's response to Panel question No. 133, para. 279.  
521 European Union's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 109 (referring to 
European Union's letter of 31 January 2014 , ARES(2014)226547, SANCO G7/ JP/mh(2014 )241111  (Exhibit EU -
64)). See also Exhibits EU -65, EU -85, EU -86, EU -173, EU -91, EU -92,EU -94, RUS -154, and RUS-319.  
522 European Union's letter of 31 January 2014 , ARES(2014)226547, SANCO G7/JP/mh(2014)241111  
(Exhibit EU -64). 
523 European Union's letter of 31 January 2014, ARES(2014)226547, SANCO G7/JP/mh(2014)241111  
(Exhibit EU -64). WT/DS475/R  
 
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  meaning of Article 6.3, and subsequent requests in light of subsequent outbreaks of the disease, 
and that, consequently, the European Union's claims under Articles 6.1 and 6.2 must fail.524 
7.365.   The Panel considers that it may be difficult ind eed for any exporting country to seek 
recognition of a disease -free area in the absence of a regulatory scheme in the importing country 
that permits the recognition of such a concept. Therefore, the Panel first examines whether Russia 
recognizes the concep t of disease -free areas within the meaning of Article 6.2 of the 
SPS Agreement. Should we find that Russia recognizes such a concept, we will proceed to examine 
whether the European Union provided the necessary evidence thereof in order to objectively 
demo nstrate to Russia that within the European Union there are areas that are, and are likely to 
remain, pest - or disease -free in accordance with Article 6.3  of the SPS Agreement . Informed by 
the Panel's findings on this issue, the Panel will continue by consi dering whether Russia complied 
with the obligation in Article 6.1 to ensure the adaptation of its measures to the 
SPS characteristics of the area from which the products originate and to which they are destined.  
7.5.2.3.4   Whether Russia recognizes the concept of pe st – or disease -free areas and 
areas of low pest or disease prevalence pursuant to the first sentence of Article 6.2  
7.366.   We turn to the European Union's claim that Russia acted inconsistently with the first 
sentence of Article 6.2 of the SPS Agreement by fail ing to recognize the concepts of pest - or 
disease -free areas and areas of low pest or disease prevalence.525  
7.367.   Article 6 does not specify any particular manner in which a Member must "recognize" the 
concepts set out in Article 6.2.526 The first sentence of Arti cle 6.2 does not prescribe whether a 
Member's recognition of the relevant concepts must be done in writing through a formal 
governmental act, or whether it may be accomplished in some other manner.527 From this, the 
Appellate Body surmised:  
We consider that the fact that Article 6 does not prescribe the particular manner by 
which Members must "ensure" adaptation of their SPS measures or "recognize" the 
relevant concepts suggests that Members enjoy a degree of latitude  in determining 
how to do so within their domestic SPS regime. Accordingly, assessing whether or not 
a Member has complied with the obligations in Articles 6.1 and 6.2 will necessarily be 
a function of the nature of the claims raised by the complainant and the circumstances 
of each case. This may involve scrutiny of the specific steps and acts that the Member 
has or has not taken in the light of the SPS characteristics of the relevant areas, which 
may include pest - or disease -free areas or areas of low pest or disease prevalence, as 
well as of broa der aspects of the importing Member's regulatory regime, if any, 
governing SPS matters. The second sentence of Article 6.1 also points to the 
relevance of appropriate criteria and guidelines developed by relevant international 
organizations to the obligati on set out in that paragraph. We note, in this regard, that 
the Panel appears rightly to have acknowledged that the fact that a relevant 
international organization has determined that the concepts of pest - or disease -free 
areas and areas of low pest or dis ease prevalence are, or are not, relevant with 
respect to a specific pest or disease may have a bearing on the assessment of a 
Member's compliance with Article 6 with respect to such pest or disease.528 This, too, 
underscores the case -specific nature of asse ssing whether a Member has complied 
with its Article 6 obligations.  
While the assessment of the consistency of a Member's SPS measure with Articles 6.1 
and 6.2 will be a function of the claims brought by the complainant and the 
circumstances of each parti cular case, it is nevertheless clear that compliance with the 
obligations in Articles 6.1 and 6.2 will be facilitated in circumstances where WTO 
Members put in place a regulatory scheme or structure that accommodates adaptation 
                                               
524 Russia's second written submission, paras. 131 -132. 
525 European Union's second written submission, para s. 89-93. 
526 Appellate Body Report, India – Agricultural Products , para. 5.13 6. 
527 Appellate Body Report, India – Agricultural Products , para. 5.136; and Panel Report, India – 
Agricultural Products , para. 7.698.  
528 (footnote original) Panel Report, fn 1217 to para. 7.698.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  of SPS measures on an ongoin g basis.529 Furthermore, notwithstanding the 
circumstance -specific nature of the inquiries under Articles 6.1 and 6.2, we agree with 
the Panel's observation that SPS measures or regulatory schemes that explicitly 
foreclose the possibility of recognition of t he concepts of pest - or disease -free areas 
and areas of low pest or disease prevalence cannot, when these concepts are relevant 
with respect to the diseases addressed by such SPS measures, be found to be 
consistent with Article 6.2.530  
The interlinkages bet ween Articles 6.1 and 6.2 of the SPS Agreement, in turn, 
illuminate the close nexus between a Member's satisfaction of the obligation to 
recognize the concepts of pest - or disease -free areas and areas of low pest or disease 
prevalence set out in Article 6. 2, on the one hand, and its satisfaction of the obligation 
to ensure that its SPS measures are adapted to the relevant SPS characteristics within 
the meaning of Article 6.1, on the other hand. More specifically, in a situation where 
pest- or disease -free a reas or areas of low pest or disease prevalence are relevant, a 
Member may be required to recognize the concepts of these areas not only by virtue 
of the express obligation in Article  6.2, but also so as to be in a position properly to 
"assess" the SPS cha racteristics of relevant areas under the second sentence of 
Article  6.1, and ultimately ensure, as required under the first sentence of Article 6.1, 
that its SPS measures are adapted accordingly.531  
7.368.   Mindful of these considerations, we recall that Russia res ponds to the European Union's 
claim under the first sentence of Article  6.2 of the SPS Agreement  by contending that the 
obligation contained therein to recognize the concepts of pest - or disease -free areas and areas of 
low pest or disease prevalence relate s to an abstract idea and is not linked to specific areas of a 
given exporting Member.532 Russia accordingly draws the attention of the Panel to existing 
Customs Union legislation - specifically, Customs Union Decision No. 317  – which, Russia asserts, 
recogn izes the concept of disease -free areas in the abstract and explicitly recognizes the concept 
of disease -free areas as applied to ASF.533 In addition, Russia refers to the 2006 Memorandum 
between the European  Union and Russia which includes provisions aimed a t applying the principles 
of zoning and regionalization in the international movement of animals and products of animal 
origin between EU member States and Russia.534 On this basis, Russia argues that clearly,  Russia 
recognizes the concept of disease -free ar eas not  only in the abstract as required under Article 6.2 
of the SPS Agreement, but also specifically as applied to ASF and as applied with respect to the 
European Union.535 Russia further argues, specifically in respect of the EU -wide ban, that the 
languag e of the agreed veterinary certificates considers the concept of disease -free areas.536 
7.369.   Turning to the evidence proffered by Russia in support of its contention that its SPS 
regulatory framework recognizes the concept of "regionalization" in the abstract, we  note that  
Customs Union Decision No. 317  states:  "'Regionalisation' is the determination of the well -being or 
otherwise of a country or its administrative territory (republic, region, district, land, county, state, 
province, etc.) in terms of the contagio us animal diseases included in the list of dangerous and 
quarantinable diseases of the Party, and in the control entities of third countries – in terms of the 
diseases referred to in these Requirements"; and that "Regionalization is carried out in accordan ce 
with the recommendations of the World Organization for Animal Health (hereinafter referred to as 
'OIE')(as amended by Decision of the Customs Union Commission No 830 of 18 October 2011)".537  
                                               
529 (footnote original) This would be the case, for example, whe re a Member has established a 
mechanism for recognition of specific pest - and disease -free areas and areas of low pest and disease 
prevalence upon a properly substantiated request being made by an exporting Member seeking such 
recognition and allowing veri fication of the same.  
530 (footnote original) Panel Report, para. 7.698.  
531 Appellate Body Report, India – Agricultural Products , paras. 5.137 -5.139.  
532 Russia's first written submission, para. 222.  
533 Russia's first written submission, para. 223 and 224 (refer ring to Exhibit -RUS 25).  
534 Russia's first written submission, para. 225.  
535 Russia's first written submission, para. 225.  
536 Russia's first written submission, para. 411. See also second written submission, paras. 215 -218. 
537 Section on  "Terms used in the Com mon Veterinary (Veterinary and Health) Requirements" of 
Customs Union Decision No. 317  (Exhibit RUS -25), p. 1. WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.370.   Moreover, Customs Union Decision  No. 317  comprise s chapters con taining veterinary 
requirements applicable to imports of a number of goods into the Customs Union territory. For 
instance, Chapter 7 provides that "[t]he import into the customs territory of the Customs Union 
and/or the transfer between Parties of healthy breeding and commercial pigs originating from 
territories free from the following contagious animal diseases shall be permitted . . . [including] 
African swine fever – during the last 36 months in the territory of the country or administrative 
territory in  accordance with regionalization ."538 All the chapters of Customs Union Decision No.  317 
that refer to the products at issue include reference to the ASF situation necessary for accepting 
imports of the respective products.539 For each of the products, the req uirement clearly states "in 
the territory of the country or administrative territory ." (emphasis added)  
7.371.   On the basis of the evidence on record , we find that Russia's SPS ASF -related regulatory 
framework set out in Customs Union Decision No. 317 , did, and continues to, expressly recognize 
the concept of regionalization and the possibility for regionalization to be considered and carried 
out. Moreover, the 2006 Memorandum between the European  Union and Russia includes provisions 
aimed at applying the princip les of zoning and regionalization in the international movement of 
animals and products of animal origin between EU member States and Russia540, and the bilateral 
veterinary certificates also contain language recognizing the concept of regionalization in tra de 
between Russia and the European Union.541 In particular, most of the bilaterally agreed veterinary 
certificates, referring to the veterinary requirements contained in each certificate, provide that 
"[a]dministrative territories, zones and time periods may  be modified with a mutual agreement on 
the basis of the Memorandum of 4 April 2006 on zoning and regionalisation".542 Furthermore, t he 
bilaterally agreed veterinary certificates recognize the concept of regionalization, in that they 
require certification of  the freedom of the entire territory of the EU from ASF "except Sardinia", 
thereby providing for a different treatment for this area of the European Union.543 
7.372.   We are therefore not in a situation like the one envisaged by the panel and Appellate Body 
in India – Agricultural Products544 where the regulatory scheme of the importing Member explicitly 
                                               
538 Other relevant  chapters  include: Chapters 8, 9, 22, 28, 33, 35, 37 and 38. See para. 7.204  and 
Table  3. 
539 See e.g.  Chapter 7 on "Veterinary Requiremen ts for the import into the customs territory of the 
Customs Union and/or transfer between Parties of breeding and utility pigs" of Customs Union Decision No. 317  
(Exhibit  RUS-25). 
540 European Union -Russia Memorandum of 4 April 2006 concerning principles of zoning and 
compartmentalization in the veterinary field  (Exhibit EU -61). 
541 See fn 248 above.  
542 For instance, see fn 1 of Veterinary certificate for piglets for fattening  (Exhibit EU -52). See  also fn 
248 above.  
543 See fn 248 above.  
544 In India - Agricultural Products , the panel determined that according to its first sentence , Article 6.2 
("Members shall … recognize the concepts of pest - or disease -free areas and areas of low pest or disease 
prevalence") imposes the obligation to recognize the "concepts". The panel clarified that the term concept is 
defined as an "abstract idea" ((footnote original) The Oxford Dictionaries Online, accesse d 10 April 2014, 
<http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/concept?q=concept >.) or "an idea of a class of objects, 
a general notion or idea". ((footnote orig inal) The Oxford English Dictionary, OED Online, Oxford University 
Press, accessed 10 April 2014, < http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/38130?rskey=vaS8sT&result=1#eid >.) The 
panel further explained that this means that Members are required to recognize the idea or notion of pest - or 
disease -free areas and areas of low pest or disease prevalence in the abstract; the obligation under the first 
sentence of Article  6.2, is not linked to specific areas of a given exporting Member. Panel Report, India - 
Agricultural Products , para. 7.695.  The panel also recalled that the relevant implementing instrument 
prohibited the importation of the relevant products on a country -wide basis. The pane l found nothing on the 
face of this instrument that allows for the recognition of disease -free areas and/or areas of low disease 
prevalence within a country that notifies NAI to the OIE. To the contrary, the panel considered that S.O. 
1663(E) "reflects the  opposite",  Panel Report, India – Agricultural Products , para. 7.702 , and that it does so in 
"clear and unequivocal language" Panel Report, India – Agricultural Products,  para. 7.703. Therefore, the panel 
held that, "by imposing a prohibition on a country -wide basis, [S.O.  1663(E)] contradicts the requirement to 
recognize the concept of disease -free areas and areas of low disease prevalence".  Panel Report, India – 
Agricultural Products , para. 7.702.  The Appellate Body found that the panel did not err in its  application of 
Article 6.2 by not relying solely on certain legislative provisions that were silent on the concepts of disease -free 
areas and areas of low -disease prevalence in assessing whether India recognized the concepts of disease -free 
areas and area s of low -disease prevalence. Appellate Body Report,  India – Agricultural Products , paras. 5.173 -
5.175. Furthermore, the Appellate Body did not exclude the possibility that recognition of the concepts could 
be done through and upon adoption of the very SPS measure that is adapted to the SPS characteristics of the 
relevant areas. Appellate Body Report, India – Agricultural Products , para. 5.175.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  forecloses the possibility of recognition of the concepts of pest - or disease -free areas and areas of 
low pest or disease prevalence such that it cannot be found to be  consistent with Article 6.2.  
7.373.   Recalling that the acknowledgement of particular "abstract ideas" for the purposes of 
Article 6.2 is less stringent than the obligation of "ensuring" that a measure is "adapted" to the 
SPS characteristics of an area under Art icle 6.1, w e find that Russia's legislative framework  
recognizes the concept of regionalization within the meaning of Article 6.2  of the 
SPS Agreement .545   
7.374.   However, the parties' arguments press us to further examine whether such recognition in a 
Member's le gislative/regulatory framework suffices for a Member to comply with its obligations 
under the first sentence of Article 6.2 in respect of the specific SPS measures at issue in a given 
case. The European Union posits that although Russia contends that its l egislation recognizes the 
concept of disease -free areas in the abstract, this understanding of "recognition" contradicts the 
recent guidance from the Appellate Body in India – Agricultural Products . According to the 
European Union, what matters for the pre sent analysis "is not the abstract, distinct from and taken 
prior to , recognition of the concept of disease -free areas in the Russian legislation, but the 
recognition of this concept through and upon adoption of the very SPS measure  that is required to 
be adapted to the SPS characteristics of the relevant areas."546 The European Union refers to the 
existence of the EU -wide ban as evidence that Russia has failed to distinguish between ASF -free 
areas and areas considered infected with ASF.547 Moreover, the Europe an Union argues that 
Russia's recognition of regionalization is contradicted by the facts of this case.548 For its part, with 
reference to the same Appellate Body ruling in India – Agricultural Products , Russia argues that 
there is considerable flexibility i n the ways that Members can demonstrate that their recognition of 
the concept of regionalization is consistent with the SPS Agreement.549 Russia distinguishes 
between the recognition of the concept of regionalization and the acceptance of specific 
regionaliz ation measures in a particular case, contending that Article 6.2 of the SPS Agreement 
and the SPS Committee Guidelines on the Implementation of Article 6  do not impose an obligation 
on the importing country to actually recognize an exporting country's zone . Russia argues that 
instead, Article 6.2 merely requires the importing country to allow for the consideration of 
regionalization.550 
7.375.   We note that the European Union's reference to the Appellate Body report in India – 
Agricultural Products  corresponds to the  paragraphs where the Appellate Body examined the 
rationale on which the panel in that dispute grounded the relationship between Articles 6.1 and 
6.2. In particular, the Appellate Body expressed disagreement with the panel's idea that "the 
obligation to en sure that a Member's SPS measures are 'adapted' within the meaning of Article 6.1 
always  presupposes that a Member must have recognized the concepts mentioned in Article 
6.2".551 In the context of such disagreement, the Appellate Body observed that "we quest ion the 
Panel's statement to the extent that it may be read as excluding that recognition of the concepts 
could be done through and upon adoption of the very SPS measure that is adapted to the SPS 
characteristics of the relevant areas".552 In our view, the A ppellate Body's considerations were 
aimed at addressing a situation where an SPS measure adopted by a Member could recognize the 
concepts mentioned in Article 6.2 even in the absence of a pre -existing regulatory framework that 
did so.  
                                               
545 We find support in the approach of the panel in US – Animals , which referred to the reasoning of the 
panel in India – Agricultural Products and concluded that "Members are required to accept the authority and 
validity of the general notions of 'pest - or disease -free areas and areas of low pest or disease prevalence' and 
to treat them as worthy of consideration in the  adoption and application of their SPS measures." Panel Report, 
US – Animals , para. 7.647. In particular, the Panel referred to the "less exigent obligation" of the first sentence 
of Article 6.2, which "simply requires" acknowledgement of particular "abstr act ideas", as compared to the 
obligations under Article 6.1 of "ensuring" that a measure is "adapted" to the SPS characteristics of an area 
under Article 6.1. Panel Report, US – Animals , para. 7.647.  
546 European Union's second written submission, para. 90.  (emphasis original)  
547 European Union's second written submission, para. 91.  
548 European Union's second written submission, para. 92.  
549 Russia's second written submission, para. 133 , citing  Appellate Body Report , India – Agricultural 
Products , para. 5.137.  
550 Russia's second written submission, para. 135  (referring to SPS Committee Guidelines on the 
Implementation of Article 6 (Exhibit EU -51)). 
551 Appellate Body Report, India – Agricultural Products , para. 5.143.  
552 Appellate Body Report, India – Agricultural P roducts , para. 5.143.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.376.   However, in the curr ent case, we are faced with a different situation. As we have described  
above , we are faced with a set of measures that were adopted in the context of a regulatory 
framework that , in our view, provides a general recognition of the concepts mentioned in the first 
sentence of Article 6.2 of the SPS Agreement. This was not the case in the context of the 
measures adopted by India and examined by the  panel and the  Appellate Body in India – 
Agricultural Products . In addition, in the current dispute, the measures at issue allegedly fail to 
accept the existence of any disease -free area within the territory of the European Union. As we 
have alluded to in paragraph 7.373  above, in our view, such a claim is best examined in the 
context of o ur analysis of a Member's obligation under Article 6.1, rather than under Article 6.2 of 
the SPS Agreement .  
7.377.   We consider this to be the best approach for the following reasons. The European Union's 
proposed interpretation of the concept "recognition" seems  to rely on the assumption that the only 
manner in which a Member could satisfy its obligation under Article 6.2 is by granting the 
recognition of the concepts listed in the first sentence of Article 6.2 through the challenged SPS 
measure. In our view, thi s assumption does not always apply. It could be the case that the 
challenged SPS measure would be a means to determine whether a Member recognizes the 
relevant concepts of the first sentence of Article 6.2. However, as noted by the Appellate Body,  the 
text of the first sentence of Article 6.2, does not refer to the manner in which a Member shall 
recognize those concepts.553 As we have explained, we do not consider this to be a case where the 
challenged SPS measure is the most suitable way to determine complia nce with Article  6.2. 
7.378.   Moreover, we consider that the European Union's proposed interpretation would lead the 
first sentence of Article 6.2 of the SPS Agreement to redundancy and inutility in the present case. 
If we accept the European Union's suggested int erpretation, we would be examining a crucial 
element of our assessment under Article 6.1, i.e. whether Russia calibrated the measures at issue 
to the existence or not of ASF -free areas within the European Union, through the lens of 
Article  6.2. In our view , the European Union's approach might lead to a situation where a panel 
faced with an SPS measure adopted by a Member which has in place a legal framework that 
recognizes the concepts described in the first sentence of Article 6. 2, to still find an inconsi stency 
of a challenged measure with the first sentence of Article 6. 2. In our view, this could lead us to act 
against the principle of effective treaty interpretation ( ut res magis valeat quam pereat ), 
recognized by the Appellate Body as that which require s an interpreter to give meaning and effect 
to all the terms of the treaty, and precludes an interpreter from adopting a reading that would 
result in reducing whole clauses or paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy or inutility.554 
7.379.   Based on the foregoing, we c onsider that Russia recognizes the concepts mentioned in the 
first sentence of Article 6.2 in respect of ASF and as a consequence , the EU -wide ban is not 
inconsistent with Russia's obligations under  the first sentence of  Article 6.2 of the SPS Agreement. 
Following this finding we turn to examine the European Union's compliance with the provisions of 
Article 6.3 in order to have findings that will inform our analysis of Russia's  compliance with its  
obligations under Article 6.1.  
7.5.2.3.5   Whether the European Union o bjectively demonstrated that there are disease -
free areas or areas of low disease prevalence outside the territory of Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, and Poland, pursuant to Article 6.3 of the SPS Agreement  
7.5.2.3.5.1   Introduction  
7.380.   The European Union argues that since the  detection of ASF in wild boar in Lithuania in 
January 2014 , the European Union has provided Russia with  information that it considers as 
beyond what is necessary for objectively demonstrating that disease -free areas or areas of low 
disease prevalence are and are likely to remain disease -free areas or areas of low disease 
prevalence, respectively.555 The European Union contends that it has provided in a timely manner 
all the necessary information with respect to its ASF regionalization measures in Lithuania, Poland, 
                                               
553 Appellate Body Report, India – Agricultural Products , para. 5.1 36. 
554 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Dairy , para. 80 (referring to Appellate Body Reports, United States –  
Gasoline , p. 23; Japan – Alcoholic Beverages , p. 12; Canada –Dairy , para. 133; and Argentina – Footwear 
(EC), para. 88.)  
555 European Union's first written submission, paras. 218 and 219 -232. WT/DS475/R  
 
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  Latvia and Estonia, to objectively demonstrate to Russia that the areas  in these  EU member States 
and the rest of the European Union, except Sardinia, are and are likely to remain disease -free 
areas; and that reasonable access has been given to Rus sia for inspection, testing and other 
relevant procedures. The European Union asserts that Russia failed to conclude its recognition 
process without undue delays, in violation of its obligations under Article 6 of the 
SPS Agreement.556 
7.381.   The European Union opi nes that under Article 6.3 of the SPS Agreement, an importing 
Member is under no obligation to automatically accept a regionalization proposal from the 
exporting Member. However, its decision must take into account objective factors such as those 
enunciate d in the second sentence of Article 6.2 of the SPS Agreement: geography, ecosystems, 
epidemiological surveillance and the effectiveness of sanitary controls . In case of disagreement 
between the importing and the exporting Members, the exporting Member can refer the dispute to 
the WTO adjudicating bodies. A panel presented with such a case has the duty to make an 
objective assessment of the matter before it according to Article 11 of the DSU.557 
7.382.   Russia argues that the European Union has failed to objectively d emonstrate to Russia that 
the alleged ASF -free areas in the four infected EU Member States "are, and are likely to remain, 
pest- or disease -free areas", in accordance with Article 6.3 of the SPS Agreement.558 In Russia's 
view, the European Union has failed t o effectively establish ASF containment zones in accordance 
with the OIE guidelines and therefore the entirety of the four affected EU member States should 
be considered ASF -infected.559 Russia argues that the European Union failed to provide timely, 
compreh ensive and accurate information relevant for assessing its zones and ASF -control 
measures inconsistent ly with Article 6.3 of the SPS Agreement and Terrestrial Code Article 5.3.7. 
Furthermore, the European Union withheld national eradication plans from Russ ia until March 2015 
and May 2015 , despite acknowledging that these reports contain highly relevant information.560 
7.5.2.3.5.2   Legal test  
7.383.   Pursuant to Article 6.3 of the SPS Agreement, an exporting Member claiming that an area 
within its territory is pest – or disease -free or an area of low pest or disease prevalence  shall 
provide the necessary evidence to objectively demonstrate to the importing Member that such 
areas are, and are likely to remain, pest - or disease -free areas or areas of low pest or disease 
prevalence, r espectively . 
7.384.   We consider that an assessment under  Article 6.3 requires us to examine  a number of 
aspects.  We observe that the exporting Member must provide "evidence", and not merely 
"information", to support its claim of a disease -free area. Moreover, suc h evidence must not only 
"demonstrate", but must rather "objectively demonstrate" to the importing Member that such 
areas are, and are likely to remain, pest - or disease -free areas or areas of low pest or disease 
prevalence, respectively. With this in mind , first, we need to determine what is the "necessary 
evidence" that must be provided by the exporting Member . We also need to determine  what is 
meant by "objectively demonstrating" the disease status of an area.  In our view, the examination 
of these two el ements needs to be done in relation to the disease status an exporting Member is 
claiming to exist, in the light of the circumstances of a particular dispute. In the instant case, the 
European Union claims that there are areas within the European Union tha t are ASF -free and are 
likely to remain so.561 In our consideration of  what is the "necessary evidence" the European Union 
should have provided to Russia, we will look at  both areas being ASF -free and the likelihood of 
those areas rem aining free of the disea se. Similarly, we consider it appropriate  for our analysis of 
the parties' claims in this dispute to articulate the standard of what is required to "objectively 
demonstrate" in respect of an area being ASF -free and also in respect of that area being likely  to 
remain so. We turn to examine the meaning of "necessary evidence".   
                                               
556 European Union's first written submission, para. 236.  
557 European Union's response to Panel question No. 112, paras. 219 -220. 
558 Russia's first written submission, para. 236.  
559 Russia's first written submission, para. 237.  
560 See Russia's second written submission, paras. 58 -77.  
561 European Union's opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para. 46 (referring to first 
written submission, paras. 218 -236; and second written submission, paras. 101 -125).  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.385.    The panels in India – Agricultural Products  and US – Animals  observed that Article 6.3 
does not specify what evidence would be necessary for the exporting Member to provide to the 
importing Member to objectively demonstrate that an area within its territory is, and is likely to 
remain, pest - or disease -free or with low pest or disease prevalence.562  
7.386.   The panel in India – Agricultural Products acknowledged the potential link between the 
information required for the assessment of SPS characteristics envisaged by the second sentence 
of Article 6.1, and the obligation of an exporting Member to provide the "necessary evidence" 
under  the first sentence of Article 6.3, that an area within its te rritory is pest - or disease -free or of 
low pest or disease prevalence. In this context, that panel observed that  
Article 6.1, second sentence, provides a non -exhaustive list of factors that a Member 
could consider in assessing the SPS  characteristics of t he area in question. Thus 
although Article  6.1 may inform the inquiry that an importing Member may conduct in 
order to determine whether an exporting Member has 'objectively demonstrated' that 
there is an area within its territory that is pest - or disease -free or is an area of low 
pest or disease prevalence, there is nothing in the language of either provision that 
requires this particular approach.563 
7.387.   The panel in US – Animals , observed that the second sentence of Article 6.2 provides a 
non-exhaustive list o f factors that the importing Member shall consider in reaching a conclusion 
concerning the disease status of an area. That panel observed that "if an exporting Member wishes 
to 'objectively demonstrate' the disease free status of an area the information su bmitted should 
address the factors listed in Article  6.2 in addition to any other information that would assist the 
importing Member in making its determination. The Article  6 Guidelines are also informative 
regarding the evidence that should be provided b y the exporting Member, as well as the factors 
that should normally be considered by the importing Member in such a situation.564"565 
7.388.   We agree that the factors listed in the second sentence of Article 6.1 as well as the second 
sentence of Article 6.2 may form part of the "necessary evidence" that an exporting Member needs 
to provide to the importing Member in order to "objectively demonstrate" that an area within its 
territory is, and is likely to remain, pest - or disease -free or with low pest or disease preval ence. 
Furthermore, we also consider the SPS Committee Guidelines on the Implementation of Article 6  to 
be informative in this respect.566 
7.389.   In sum, an exporting Member seeking to "objectively demonstrate" the disease status of a 
particular area within its terr itory should provide among the supporting "necessary evidence", the 
following about the respective area, as relevant to the particular situation: (i) geography; 
(ii) ecosystems; (iii) epidemiological surveillance; (iv) effectiveness of sanitary or phytosan itary 
controls; (v) level of prevalence of specific diseases or pests; (vi) existence of eradication or 
control programmes; and (v ii) information corresponding to appropriate criteria or guidelines 
developed by the relevant international organizations. We highlight that the categories and 
amount of evidence in respect of each has to be determined on a case -by-case basis, taking due 
account of the actual circumstances being analysed by a panel.  
7.390.   We recall that pursuant to Article 6.3 such evidence should amo unt to that which is 
"necessary" to "objectively demonstrate" the disease status of the particular area. In our view, an 
examination of the compliance of an exporting Member with this obligation requires a clear 
understanding of what such an objective demo nstration entails. Neither previous panels nor the 
Appellate Body have ruled on the meaning of "objectively demonstrate" in the context of 
Article  6.3.  
                                               
562 Panel Reports, India – Agricultural Products , para. 7.676; and US – Animals , para. 7.660.  
563 Panel Report, India – Agricultural Products , para. 7.676.  
564 (footnote original ) See Article  6 Guidelines, paras.  8-10. 
565 Panel Report, US – Animals , para. 7.660.  
566 We consider of special importance in this dispute the characteristics of the veterinary and  
phytosanitary infrastructure and authorities in the exporting Member, as relev ant for the determination of 
epidemiological surveillance, the effectiveness of sanitary or phytosanitary controls, and the existence of 
eradication or control programmes. See Article 6 Guidelines, paras. 8 -10. WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.391.    The adverb "objectively" is defined in the dictionary as "without being influenced by 
personal feeling s or opinions; in an impartial or detached manner."567 The verb "demonstrate" is 
defined in the dictionary as "[t]o establish the truth of (a proposition, theory, claim, etc.) by 
reasoning or deduction or (in later use) by providing practical proof or eviden ce"; "to prove"; "[o]f 
a thing, fact, situation, etc.: to show the truth of"; "to be proof of or constitute evidence for (a 
claim, theory, etc.)"; and "[t]o establish the truth of something; to show that a proposition, 
conclusion, etc., is a necessary cons equence of axioms or previously accepted statements."568 It 
thus seems that "objectively demonstrate" means to prove something in an impartial manner. We 
consider thus that the exporting Member cannot merely provide general information in support of 
its clai m, but rather sufficient relevant scientific and technical evidence, as relevant for the 
circumstances of the particular dispute, to prove in an impartial manner that an area within its 
territory is free of a disease and is likely to remain so.  
7.392.   We consider  this conclusion to be in line with the manner in which the Appellate Body 
interpreted the meaning of a similar expression in Article 3.1 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement. 
Although this interpretation was made by the Appellate Body in the context of a differe nt WTO 
Agreement, we consider this to be informative in the current dispute. Article  3.1 of the Anti -
Dumping Agreement  provides that a "determination of injury for the purposes of Article VI of the 
GATT 1994 shall be based on positive evidence and involve an objective examination of…". The 
Appellate Body has found that the term "objective examination" requires "that an investigating 
authority's examination 'conform to the dictates of the basic principles of good faith and 
fundamental fairness', and be condu cted 'in an unbiased manner, without favouring the interests 
of any interested party, or group of interested parties, in the investigation'".569 In essence, the 
term "objective" requires a standard of impartiality.  
7.393.   In our view, Article 6.3 requires an export ing Member to provide the "necessary evidence", 
which includes the categories described in paragraph 7.389  above, in order to "objectively 
demonstrate", that is, in order to prove in an impartial manner, the disease status of a n area 
within its territory.  The Panel underlines that this standard is not met with the provision of some 
information in respect of the relevant categories described above. Rather, it implies the provision 
to the importing Member of the necessary evidence  to make the objective demonstration of the 
disease status in the territory of the exporting Member.   
7.394.   The disease status relevant for this dispute includes the existence of ASF -free areas as well 
as the likelihood of those areas remaining ASF -free. This re quires examining, as relevant to the 
circumstances of the present dispute, the information that would constitute the "necessary 
evidence" that the European Union should have provided to Russia to objectively demonstrate that 
there are ASF -free areas  within  the European Union . We also need to examine separately what 
would constitute the "necessary evidence" that the European Union should have provided to Russia 
to objectively demonstrate that the alleged ASF -free areas are likely to remain so.  
7.395.   We have identi fied among the "necessary evidence" required to "objectively demonstrate" 
the disease status in a particular area, a Member should provide evidence of (i) geography; 
(ii) ecosystems; (iii) epidemiological surveillance; (iv) effectiveness of sanitary or phy tosanitary 
controls; (v) level of prevalence of specific diseases or pests; (vi) existence of eradication or 
control programmes; and (vi i) information corresponding to appropriate criteria or guidelines 
developed by the relevant international organizations . We note that this is an illustrative list, and 
that these elements are not cumulative. Furthermore, some of these elements are interrelated. For 
example, geography may not be a relevant factor in the spread of all pests or diseases, and 
control and eradi cation programmes are relevant only when a particular disease is known to exist 
within an area. At the same time, the level of prevalence of a specific disease can only be 
established through assessing the effectiveness of surveillance programmes.  
                                               
567 Online Oxford English Dictionary , "objectiv ely (adverb, entry 5)", 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/129636?redirectedFrom=objectively#eid  (accessed 17 December 2015)  
568 Online Oxford English Dictionary , "demonstra te (verb, Entries 2.a, 2.b, and 2.c.) 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/49840?rskey=9X3Glf&result=2&isAdvanced=false#eid  (accessed 17 
December 2015).  
569 Appella te Body Report, China – GOES , para. 126. See also Appellate Body Report, US – Hot Rolled 
Steel, para. 193.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.396.   In our v iew, the amount  and type  of evidence that a Member should present in support of 
the disease status of a particular area needs to be determined on a case -by-case basis. Therefore, 
we will review certain aspects relevant to this dispute that will enable us t o identify in a more 
specific manner the categories  of information the European Union should have provided Russia to 
objectively demonstrate that there are areas within its territory free of ASF.  
7.397.   Especially relevant in determining  the categories of eviden ce germane to a particular 
dispute are the nature of the disease and the type of characteristics that an exporting Member is 
claiming to prevail within an area of its territory. As we have already indicated, the European 
Union claims that it has objectivel y demonstrated that an area within its territory is free of ASF 
and is likely to remain so.570 We consider that the European Union's claim should be examined in 
light of the absence of ASF in most of its territory.  
7.398.   We recall the definition in the SPS Agreeme nt of a pest - or disease -free area. Paragraph 6 
of Annex A of the SPS Agreement provides  
An area, whether all of a country, part of a country, or all or parts of several 
countries, as identified by the competent authorities, in which a specific pest or 
disease does not occur.  
NOTE: A pest - or disease -free area may surround, be surrounded by, or be adjacent 
to an area – whether within part of a country or in a geographic region which includes 
parts of or all of several countries – in which a specific pest o r disease is known to 
occur but is subject to regional control measures such as the establishment of 
protection, surveillance and buffer zones which will confine or eradicate the pest or 
disease in question.  
7.399.   This definition provides useful elements to unde rstand what a Member needs to prove to 
demonstrate the existence of a disease -free area. In particular, paragraph 6 of Annex A defines a 
disease -free area as one where the specific disease does not occur. Reading Article 6.3 in the 
context of paragraph 6 o f Annex A leads us to consider that an exporting Member seeking to 
objectively demonstrate the existence of a disease -free area has to objectively demonstrate that 
the pertinent disease does not occur in the relevant area (i.e. all of a country, part of a country, or 
all or parts of several countries). Based on our interpretation of the term s "necessary evidence" in 
Article 6.3, we have already identified some categories of evidence that would be necessary to 
objectively demonstrate the disease status of an  area. However, we consider it appropriate to 
further examine relevant scientific sources to have a more detailed understanding of what each of 
those categories of information refer s to in the context of a specific disease.  
7.400.   We are aware that it is impossib le for any Member to provide a laboratory -type scientific 
proof that a particular disease is not present in a certain area. What an exporting Member claiming 
that an area within its territory is disease free must objectively demonstrate depends on the 
specific disease and on the situation in that particular Member. This may include that evidence of 
the existence of the disease has been sought and not found, that monitoring, surveillance and 
reporting systems are in place to ensure that any evidence of the e xistence of the disease would 
be promptly reported, that measures to prevent the entry of the disease are in place, among other 
aspects. These elements are linked to the existence of a pathogen specific surveillance system, as 
applicable in the context of the international standards contained in Chapter 1.4 of the Terrestrial 
Code.571 
7.401.   We recall that Chapter 1.4 of the Terrestrial Code contains a number of provision s relevant 
for the type of surveillance that OIE members should follow in order to demonstrate t he disease 
status of a particular area. Among the provisions of Chapter 1.4, Article 1.4.6  illustrates the type 
of evidence that should be provided by a Member exporting products subject to SPS measures 
because of the presence of a disease covered by the T errestrial Code. This provision applies to 
ASF, as indicated in Article 15.1.3 of the Terrestrial Code.  As we have explained above, 
                                               
570 European Union's opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para. 46 (referring to first 
written submission, paras. 218 -236; and second written submission, paras. 101 -125).  
571 See para. 7.299  above.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  Article  1.4.6 contemplates the possibility that ASF -free areas may be determined on the basis of 
pathogen specific surveilla nce.572  
7.402.   In connection with the OIE 's explanation on the demonstration of disease -free areas 
pursuant to Article 1.4.6 of the Terrestrial Code573, during the Panel's meeting with the experts, 
the Panel asked the experts what type of evidence they consider an e xporting member would need 
to provide to demonstrate the historically free status of a zone. In reply to this question, 
Dr Thiermann referred to the historic monitoring and surveillance of pathogens as documented in 
the OIE's WAHIS information system. Furt hermore, Professor  Penrith noted that it would be hard 
to imagine a situation where the infection would be present in domestic pigs and be completely 
undetected and not cause any disease in a certain percentage of the pig population.574 
7.403.   The elements describe d above as articulated in Article 1.4.6 of the Terrestrial Code and as 
explained by the OIE and the experts in respect of demonstration of the disease status of a 
country, zone or compartment illustrate how we can understand the scope of certain categories  of 
the necessary evidence required, pursuant to Article 6.3, to objectively demonstrate the existence 
of ASF -free areas.  
7.404.   Based on the foregoing, we consider that the European Union should have provided to 
Russia necessary evidence in respect of (i) epide miological surveillance of ASF; (ii) the 
effectiveness of sanitary or phytosanitary controls in respect of ASF; (iii) regarding ecosystems, 
the presence of ASF in wildlife; and (iv) the level of prevalence of ASF. The information provided 
by the European U nion to Russia in respect of these categories should objectively demonstrate 
that there are ASF -free areas within the European Union.  
7.405.   No previous panel has been required to examine pursuant to  Article  6.3 what is the 
necessary evidence to objectively demo nstrate that a disease -free area is likely to remain so . The 
terms "likely to remain " as contained in Article 6.3 of the SPS Agreement, seem to be close to  the 
term "likelihood " in paragraph 4 of Annex A as referred to in the definition of a risk assessmen t. 
"Likely " is used as an adverb in the last sentence of Article 6.3. "Likelihood " is used as a noun in 
the context of the first sentence of paragraph 4 of Annex A. According to the dictionary definition, 
both "likely" and "likelihood " refer to "probabilit y".575 We recall that the Appellate Body has 
interpreted the term "likelihood " in the context of paragraph 4 of Annex A. In Australia – Salmon , 
the Appellate Body observed:  
[W]e note that the first definition in paragraph 4 of Annex A speaks about  the 
evalua tion of "likelihood ". In our report in European Communities – Hormones , we 
referred to the dictionary meaning of "probability " as "degrees of likelihood " and "a 
thing that is judged likely to be true ", for the purpose of distinguishing the terms 
"potential " and "probability ".576 For the present purpose, we refer in the same manner 
to the ordinary meaning of "likelihood ", and we consider that it has the same meaning 
as "probability ".577 On this basis, as well as on the basis of the definition of "risk" and 
"risk assessment " developed by the Office international des épizooties ( "OIE") and the 
OIE Guidelines for Risk Assessment , we maintain that for a risk assessment to fall 
within the meaning of Article 5.1 and the first definition in paragraph 4 of Annex A, it 
is not sufficient that a risk assessment conclude that there is a possibility  of entry, 
establishment or spread of diseases and associated biological and economic 
consequences. A proper risk assessment of this type must evaluate the "likelihood ", 
i.e., the "probability ", of entry, establishment or spread of disease and associated 
biological and economic consequences as well as the "likelihood ", i.e., "probability ", of 
                                               
572 See para. 7.303  above.  
573 OIE response to Panel question No. 4.  
574 Professor Penrith, Transcript, paras. 1.303 and 1.308  
575 See Online O xford English Dictionary , "likely" (adj. and adv. - 2.a), 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/108315?rskey=cgzqFH&result=1&isAdvanced=false#eid   (accessed 
2 February 2016) and Online Oxford English Dictionary , "likelihood" (noun - 2.a), 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/108313?redirectedFrom=likelihood#eid  (accessed 2 February 2016).  
576 (footnote original) Adopted 13 February 1998, WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, para. 184.  
577 (footnote original) " Likelihood: probability ", The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English (9th ed., 
Clarendon Press).  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  entry, establishment or spread of disease according to the SPS measures which might 
be appli ed.578  
7.406.   Based on this guidance, we consider that the objective demonstration of whether an area 
is likely to remain free of a disease requires the exporting Member to provide the necessary 
evidence to support that there is "probability " that the disease -free status will be maintained  in the 
particular area. In respect of an exporting Member's qualitative assertion that a disease -free area 
is likely to remain so, we consider that the necessary evidence is also informed by the nature of 
the disease and the natu ral vectors that could spread the disease in the context of the 
effectiveness of the control measures that the exporting Member has in place for the particular 
disease.  
7.407.   As we have explained, ASF is a highly contagious haemorrhagic disease of pigs and 
European wild boar, caused by ASFV. Wild boars are hosts that manifest the disease.579 It is 
therefore relevant for the determination of the probability of the spread of the disease to provide 
evidence in respect of the presence of the disease in wild boar and t he exact location of where 
such presence has been identified. This will be of particular relevance in situations where the areas 
claimed to be free of ASF by the exporting Member are located in geographic proximity to areas 
where ASF i s present in wild boa rs. 
7.408.   In our view, in addition to the evidence that we have already identified with respect to the 
demonstration of an area being disease -free, an exporting Member  should  provide evidence of the 
effectiveness of its control measures. We consider that this evidence should at least include 
evidence with respect to measures to prevent the entry and spread of the disease, the emergency 
actions adopted in case of an outbreak of the disease, and , when relevant,  the eradication 
programmes of the disease in areas wh ere it occurs.  
7.409.   Moreover, we  consider that pursuant to the Terrestrial Code, the evaluation of veterinary 
services in the exporting Member is relevant in the context of the assessment of the effectiveness 
of the control measures applied by that exporting Mem ber. The relevant provisions in this respect 
are found in Chapter 3 of the Terrestrial Code; specifically in Chapter 3.2. In our view, for an 
importing Member to feel confident about the assurances provided by the veterinary authorities of 
the exporting Me mber, it should have the necessary evidence that demonstrates that the exporting 
Member's veterinary authorities are capable.  
7.410.   In this case, the facts demonstrate that there has been a long trading history in animal 
products from the European Union to Russi a, and that, until the first case of ASF in the European 
Union's territory, the trade in the products at issue in this dispute took place on the basis of 
veterinary certificates issued by the competent authorities in the EU member States. Thus, until 
the time of the first ASF case in the European Union, Russia apparently had confidence in the 
capacity and credibility of the EU member State veterinary services. We consider this to be the 
case despite Russia's alleged "reasonable doubts about the capacity of the veterinary authorities in 
the infected EU member States to effectively control ASF".580 In our view , the instances of 
smuggling and fraudulent certificates to which Russia refers are by no means evidence that would 
support putting into question the capac ity of the veterinary authorities in the European Union or in 
the affected EU member States.581 There is no indication whatsoever that such capacity and 
                                               
578 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon , para. 123 (some footnotes omitted)  (emphasis original  
).  
579 OIE Technical Disease Card: African Swine Fever (ASF Technical Disease Card) 
http://www.oie.int/fileadmin/Home/eng/Animal_Health_in_the_World/docs/pdf/Disease_cards/AFRICAN_SWIN
E_FEVER.pdf  (last updated April 2013; last accessed 23 October 2015).  See OIE ASF Technical Disease Card 
(Exhibit RUS -186).  
580 Russia's first written submission, paras. 160 -175; and second written submission, paras. 122 -124. 
581 Russia's first written submission, paras. 163 -168 (referring to Declaration of Lebedev, paras. 30 -33 
(Exhibit RUS -41), Rosselkhoznadzor News, "New Meat Product Smuggling Channel f rom the EU Detected by 
Rosselkhoznadzor", 16 January 2014.  (Exhibit RUS -85), Pig Progress, "Russia: Measures needed to stop pork 
fraud", 5 December 2014.  (Exhibit RUS -86), Rosselkhoznadzor News, "On the working meeting between 
Sergey Dankvert, Head of Ro sselkhoznadzor, and Senior Officials of State Veterinary Services and Heads of 
Industry Unions and Associations from Denmark, France, the Netherlands and Italy", 20 November 2014.  
(Exhibit RUS -87); and second written submission, para. 124 ((referring to i nstances of shortcomings related to 
certificates dating back to 2007, 2010 EFSA Scientific Opinion, p. 37 (Exhibit EU -24)). WT/DS475/R  
 
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  credibility ceased to exist solely because of the incidence of ASF within the European Union 
territory. O n the contrary,  despite Russia's observations regarding the credibility and capacity of 
the relevant veterinary services582, in light of the volume and frequency of information provided by 
the European Union veterinary services to Russia regarding the ASF ca ses and outbreaks, the 
numerous bilateral exchanges and control visits that both parties have reported, it would appear 
that the capacity and credibility of the European Union veterinary services was confirmed by their 
actions in response to the ASF outbre aks.  
7.411.   One useful element for the assessment of the effectiveness of these control measures, to 
the extent it is available, is data regarding the actual spread of a disease within a given time 
frame. If such data is available to the exporting Member at the time it claims that disease -free 
areas within its territory are likely to remain free, this real world evidence could support – or 
undermine – its claims of the likelihood of a designated area remaining disease free. There may be 
situations when an exporti ng Member claims on several occasions that disease -free areas within its 
territory are likely to remain free. In that situation, the assessment of the real world evidence 
could include the most updated information available to an exporting Member . In this particular 
dispute, the EU member States provide information to the OIE that is then registered in the 
WAHIS database.583 In response to a question from the Panel, both parties explained that there 
might be discrepancies in the information they have identifi ed regarding the number of cases and 
of outbreaks, probably due to the use of different sources and to distinct readings of the 
information available in the WAHIS database.584 These differences have raised some difficulties in 
identif ying the specific time a nd location of some of the cases or outbreaks. However, the evidence 
on record has supported our understanding of the presence and spread of ASF in the territory of 
the four affected EU member States throughout 2014 and part of 2015.   
7.412.   In our view, it is o f paramount importance to indicate whether the presence of the disease 
has occurred in wildlife or in domestic pigs. This is because, as the experts consulted by the Panel 
have explained, there is a difference in the risks associated with the spread of ASF  disease through 
wild boar and through infection of live domestic pigs. Professor Penrith585 and Dr Thomson586 
indicated that it is unlikely that wild boars will become the most important source of infection. 
While ASF may be difficult to eradicate in wild boa r, controls on the movement of wild boar may be 
sufficient to reduce the risks of spread to and infection of large commercial pig holdings subject to 
biosecurity measures. It is primarily these large commercial pig holdings which provide the 
animals used i n the production of products for export.  
7.413.   Based on the foregoing, we consider that to objectively demonstrate that ASF -free areas 
are likely to remain so the European Union should have provide d to Russia the necessary evidence 
in respect of the effectivenes s of its control measures on ASF (including information on their 
effectiveness in the real world) . For this purpose, we will address the information provided on: 
(i) the surveillance programme; (ii) diagnostic analysis; (iii) measures for early detection a nd 
response , including movement control ; and (iv) eradication of the disease.  
                                               
582 Russia's first written submission, paras. 80 -110 and opening oral statement in the second meeting of 
the Panel, para. 8 (regarding  the appropriateness of the zones established in the four affected EU member 
States to control the spread of ASF); Exhibit RUS -297 (revised) (referring to the effectiveness of the ASF -
infected zones set by each of the four affected EU member States after t he first outbreak in the respective EU 
member State); Exhibits EU -15, EU -84, RUS -31, RUS -53, and RUS -263 (referring to certain aspects of the 
effectiveness of the ASF protection measures adopted by the European Union and the four affected EU member 
States) ; first written submission, paras. 117 -130 (referring to the risks of ASF spreading arising from wild boar 
density and levels of establishments and holdings maintaining pigs in backyard farms in the four affected EU 
member States); Exhibits RUS -71, RUS -309, and RUS -359 (reports of Russian officials who visited certain 
areas in the affected EU member States in 2014). The Panel notes that there is evidence on record that 
Lithuanian and Polish veterinary authorities challenged some of the incidents reported by  Russian veterinary 
officials who visited those EU member States in 2014; see Exhibits EU -248 (comments from Lithuanian 
veterinary authorities to the inspection report of the veterinary officials from the Customs Union) and EU -249 
(comments from Polish vet erinary authorities to the inspection report of veterinary officials from the Customs  
Union).  
583 See para. 7.425  below.  
584 See European Union's response to Panel question No. 52, paras. 118 -120; and Russia' response to 
Panel que stion No. 52, paras. 75 -76. 
585 Professor Penrith's response to Panel question No. 2.  
586 Dr Thomson's response to Panel question No. 2.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.414.   If we find that the European Union provided to Russia the necessary evidence in respect of 
the freedom of ASF in certain areas, and the likelihood of those areas remaining ASF -free, 
regardless of subsequent developments, the European Union would have succeeded in objectively 
demonstrating that at any given point in time the areas it claims to be ASF -free, are free of such 
disease and are likely to remain so.  
7.415.   With these considerati ons in mind we will examine whether the European Union provided 
to Russia the necessary evidence to objectively demonstrate that there are areas in the European 
Union, outside Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, that are ASF -free and are likely to rema in 
so. 
7.416.   Our task , then, is to make an objective assessment, pursuant to Article 11 of the DSU, of 
whether the European Union provided Russia with the necessary evidence to objectively 
demonstrate that areas within the European Union are, and are likely to r emain, free of ASF. We 
will undertake our examination by assessing the parties' arguments and evidence. We will also 
support our analysis, as relevant, with the guidance we received through the responses from the 
experts. We recall that the following exami nation is focused on the geographical scope of the EU -
wide ban, this is, those areas in the European Union outside the territories of Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, and Poland. In section  7.6.2.3.2  below we pursue this same examin ation in respect of 
the allegedly  disease -free areas within those territories.  
7.417.   We recall that the EU -wide ban was initially put in place on 2 9 January 2014. The 
European Union's first request for recognition of disease -free areas was addressed to Russia o n 
31 January 2014. At that time, the EU -wide ban included the entire territory of the European Union 
with the exception of Lithuania. This situation changed on 27 February 2014, when the ban on 
Poland was put in place, then again on 27 June 2014 when the b an on Latvia was put in place, and 
finally on 11 September 2014 when the ban on Estonia was put in place. In section 7.3.6 above, 
we have set out the general temporal framework that we will follow in our examination of the 
European Union's claims. Based on that general approach and the temporal considerations referred 
to above, we will examine the information provided by the European Union in the period between 
29 January and 11 September 2014, as well as any subsequent informat ion on record, in order to 
determine if and at which points in time the European Union provided the necessary evidence 
pursuant to its obligation under Article 6.3 of the SPS Agreement. We note that this approach is 
justified in the context of the present dispute and it may not be the case for other disputes where 
the situation in respect of the disease in question has different temporal circumstances.  
7.418.   In the following section, the Panel presents, according to the evidence on record, the 
information that th e European Union provided to Russia from January 2014 until September 2015. 
This section will be followed by the Panel's examination of such evidence in light of the parties' 
arguments  and the applicable legal test . 
7.5.2.3.5.3   Information provided by the European Uni on to Russia from January 2014  
7.419.   From 24 January 2014 , the European Union sent correspondence to Russia relating to the 
ASF outbreaks, first in Lithuania, then in Poland, Latvia, and Estonia. The European Union's 
correspondence can be divided in to three broad categories .  
7.420.   The first category includes updates, at times daily, on the status of new ASF outbreaks in 
the affected EU member States. This information was normally addressed to Permanent Missions 
in Brussels, including Russia's, and provided through fa xes. These faxes normally forwarded the 
report of the national veterinary authority of the EU member State where the outbreak had taken 
place, together with the Commission Implementing Decision587 (Draft or Final) adopted in respect 
of identifying the protec tion and surveillance zones mandated in Council Directive 2002/60/EC  in 
the territory where the outbreak had occurred .588 
                                               
587 See Exhibits EU -33, EU -34, EU -35, EU -36, EU -37, EU -38, EU -39, EU -40, EU -41, EU -42, EU -43, 
EU-44, EU -103, EU -107, RUS -36, RUS -151, RUS -268, RUS -298, RUS. 299, RUS -300, RUS -301, and RUS -302. 
588 See Exhibits EU -132, EU -133, EU -134, EU -135, EU -136, EU -137, EU -138, EU -139, EU -140, EU -141, 
EU-142, RUS-30, EU-143, EU -144, EU -145, EU -146, EU -147, EU -148, EU -206, EU -186, EU -207, EU -208, EU -
209, EU -210, EU -187, RUS -326, RUS -327, RUS -328, EU -177, EU -211, and EU -212.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.421.   The second category relates to communications sent by the European Union in connection 
with meetings that both parties planned in order to undertake consultations on the manner in 
which it would be best to address the situation.589 
7.422.   The third category are letters that the European Union sent to Russia with information in 
support of its claim that there are ASF-free areas, which are likely to remain so, in the European 
Union. Most of those communications were sent in response to information requests sent by 
Russia.590 These letters are those sent by DG SANCO to FSVPS on 7 February591, 6 March592, 
13 March593, 21 May594 and 13 June595 2014 and by DG SANTE t o FSVPS on 24 March 2015596, and 
on 16 June 2015.597 These communications included information on, among other things, the 
applicable regulatory framework for ASF control, contingency planning for infectious diseases, 
audits of national contingency plans, exam ples of national legislation adopted in response to ASF 
outbreaks, pig population, pig holdings, and the pig industry.  
7.423.   The Panel has carefully examined the preceding evidence. In Appendix 1 of the report, the 
Panel provides a detailed chronology of the com munications exchanged between the European 
Union and Russia, as available on record, together with an indication of the documents attached to 
those communications that have been submitted by either party in the record of these 
proceedings.  
7.424.   The European Uni on points out that , in addition to providing the above -described 
information to Russia, on several occasions  it also invited  Russia's authorities to send experts to 
join on -the-spot visits of the Community Veterinary Emergency Team to the affected EU membe r 
States as observers. Russian experts visited the affected areas on the following occasions: 28 -
31 January 2014 (Lithuania), 25 -28 February 2014 (Poland) and 13 -14 October 2014 (Estonia).598 
7.425.   We note that in addition to this information, the veterinary autho rities of the EU member 
States have regularly notified ASF outbreaks on wild boar or domestic pigs to the OIE. We recall 
that the OIE explained that "EU member States operate as individual countries within the OIE" and 
that each EU member State is responsi ble for "reporting disease status information in the country, 
through the application in the respective country" of the Terrestrial Code.599 Furthermore, the 
European Union explains that disease notification to the OIE is done entirely by each EU member 
State, without European Union's Commission coordination.600 Both parties have submitted to the  
Panel's  record exhibits that are based on or contain notification reports from the WAHIS database 
                                               
589 See Exhibits EU -62, EU -64, RUS -185, EU -175, RUS -217, EU -87, EU -89, EU -173, RUS -56, RUS -133, 
RUS-380, RUS -330, and RUS -132. 
590 Russia's information requests and observatio ns on information provided by the European Union  were 
made through the following communications: letter of 29 January 2014 (Exhibit EU -62); letter of 5 February 
2014 ( Exhibit EU -84); letter of 27 February 2014 (Exhibit RUS -231); letter of 3 March 2014 (Exh ibit RUS -137); 
letter of 12 March 2014 (Exhibits  EU-90/RUS -135); letter of 13 March 2014 (Exhibit RUS -209); letter of 19 
March 2014 (Exhibit RUS -130); letter of 2 April 2014 (Exhibit RUS -54); letter of 2 April 2014 (Exhibit RUS -53); 
letter of 10 April 2014  (Exhibit RUS -240); letter of 16 May 2014 ( Exhibit EU -93); letter of 30 June 2014 
(Exhibit RUS -250); letter of 29 July 2014 (Exhibit RUS -263); letter of  31 July 2014 (Exhibit RUS -157); letter of 
13 October 2014 (RUS -39); letter of 1 December 2014 (Exhibit RUS-131); letter of 19 December 2014 (Exhibit 
RUS-379); letter of 19 March 2015 (Exhibit RUS -153); and letter of 10 April 2015 (Exhibit RUS -329).  
591 European Union's letter to Russia of 7 February 2014, ARES(2014)304571, 
SANCO/G7/DP/tb(2014)328578  (Exhibit EU-65). 
592 European Union's letter to Russia of 6 March 2014, ARES(2014)601346, 
SANCO/G7/PD/mh/(2014)630598 (Exhibit EU -86). 
593 European Union's letter  to Russia of 13 March 2014, ARES(2014)709435, 
SANCO/G7/PD/mh(2014)745829 ( Exhibit EU -91). 
594 European Union 's letter to Russia of 21 May 2014, ARES(2014)1658269, 
SANCO/G6/AB(2014)1782253  (Exhibit EU -92). 
595 European Union's letter to Russia of 13 June 2014 , ARES(2014)1941949, 
SANCO/G7/PD/mh(2014)2038505 ( Exhibit EU -94). 
596 European Union's  answers to questions se nt by Russia in the attachment to letter FS -AS-8/23743 
dated 1 December 2014 (24 March 2015) ( Exhibit  RUS-167). See also Letter of 24 March 2015 from the EU to 
Russia, Ref. Ares(2015)1284836 (Exhibit RUS -154).  
597 Letter from the European Union Veterinary Se rvice to the Russian Federation Veterinary Service, Ref. 
Ares (2015)2518258. 16 January 2015.  (Exhibit RUS-319).  
598 European Union's response to Panel question No. 47, para. 106. See Appendix 1 below.  
599 OIE response to Panel question No. 28.  
600 European Unio n's response to Panel question No. 241, para. 47.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  regarding the reports of ASF outbreaks and cases in the four affected  EU member States.601 The 
experts recognized the above -average notification rate with respect  to the EU member States , 
particularly in the backyard sector .602 
7.426.   There is a final category of information that the European Union provided to Russia. That 
is, informa tion that seems to have been provided only through the submissions and exhibits on 
record in these proceedings. Among such information are the compilations of maps on the ASF 
situation in the European Union between 2007 and 2014603 and the eradication plans for Estonia 
and Latvia.604 
7.5.2.3.5.4   Panel's assessment of the evidence provided by the European Union to 
Russia  
7.427.   In the previous section we explained that in the present dispute the European Union has 
the burden to demonstrate it provided to Russia the necessary evide nce to objectively 
demonstrate two aspects of its ASF situation. The first, that there are ASF -free areas within the 
European Union, outside Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. The second, that those areas are 
likely to remain ASF -free. We will first a ddress the issue with respect to the existence of ASF -free 
areas within the European Union and then move on to examine whether such areas are likely to 
remain so.  
7.428.   As we have explained in the preceding section, we consider that  to objectively 
demonstrate t hat there are ASF -free areas in the  European Union outside Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, and Poland , the European Union's burden,  pursuant to its obligation under Article 6.3 of 
the SPS Agreement, is to demonstrate that it provided Russia the necessary evide nce in respect of  
(i) epidemiological surveillance of ASF; (ii) the effectiveness of sanitary or phytosanitary controls 
in respect of ASF; (iii) regarding ecosystems, the presence of ASF in wildlife; and (iv) the level of 
prevalence of ASF. Moreover, this information should objectively demonstrate that ASF does not 
occur in the territory of the European Union outside the four affected EU member States.  
7.429.   In our view, the European Union has provided evidence in respect of each of the preceding 
categories. We t urn to examine when such information was made available to Russia and to what 
extent it would suffice to substantiate the European Union's objective demonstration of the ASF-
free status of those areas in the European Union outside Estonia, Latvia, Lithuani a, and Poland.  
7.430.   We begin by considering first the requirement for evidence relating to the epidemiological 
surveillance of ASF. The first question we address in this respect is whether ASF is a notifiable 
disease in the European Union. The package of infor mation attached to the letter sent by DG 
SANCO to FSVPS on 7 February 2014 included a website link to the text of 
                                               
601 Those exhibits include: EU -118; RUS -27 (referred to in Russia's first written submission, regarding 
the ASF situation in Lithuania), RUS -33 (referred to in Russia's first written submission, regarding the  ASF 
situation in Poland), RUS -34 (referred to in Russia's first written submission, regarding the ASF situation in 
Latvia), RUS -35 (referred to in Russia's first written submission, regarding the ASF situation in Estonia), RUS -
73 (referred to in Russia's first written submission, regarding the ASF situation in Poland); RUS -104 (referred 
to in Russia's first written submission, para. 238, regarding the ASF situation in Estonia); RUS -105 (referred to 
in Russia's first written submission, para. 238, regarding  the ASF situation in Lithuania), RUS -106 (referred to 
in Russia's first written submission, para. 238, regarding the ASF situation in Latvia), RUS -107 (referred to in 
Russia's first written submission, para. 238, regarding the ASF situation in Poland), RU S-145 (referred to in 
Russia's first written submission, regarding the ASF situation in Poland), RUS -152 (referred to in Russia's 
opening oral statement in the first meeting with the Panel, paras. 27 -28, ASF Outbreaks and Cases per Month 
for Lithuania, Pol and, Latvia and Estonia, January 2014 to March 2015), RUS -164 ( referred to in Russia's 
opening oral statement in the first meeting with the Panel, para. 30 ), RUS -168 (referred to in para. 12 of 
Russia's closing statement at the first meeting of the Panel - referring to WAHIS interface), RUS -194 (Russia's 
response to Panel question No. 26, para. 14), RUS -275 (referred to in Russia's second written submission, 
para. 94),  RUS -296 (referred to in Russia's comments to experts' responses to Panel question No. 52 , para. 
134) and RUS -296 revised (exhibited to Russia's opening statement in the second meeting with the Panel).  
602 See experts' responses to Panel question No. 50, Compilation of experts responses, paras. 4.124 -
4.129.  
603 African Swine Fever from 2007 to 201 4, compilation by the European Commission of maps from OIE 
(Exhibit EU -21). 
604 See European Union's response to Panel question No. 19, para. 82 . These were submitted as Exhibits 
EU-116 and EU -117. See also Exhibit EU -103. WT/DS475/R  
 
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  Council  Directive  2002/60/EC, laying down specific provisions for the control of ASF.605 Through 
the letter from DG SANCO to FSVPS, the European  Union explained that, pursuant to Council 
Directive 2002/60/EC, EU member States have the obligation to ensure that the presence or the 
suspected presence of ASF is compulsorily and immediately notified to the competent authority.606 
Indeed Article 3 of Cou ncil Directive 2002/60/EC, entitled "African swine fever notification", 
provides the obligation described by the European Union in its letter of 13 March 2014.607 In our 
view, the European Union provided Russia at least as at 7 February 2014 with the necessa ry 
evidence to objectively demonstrate that ASF has been a notifiable disease in the European Union. 
In addition, we consider that the ASF notifications  by the EU member States to the OIE, and the 
reliability of those notifications through the WAHIS inform ation system to verify the ASF situation 
in the EU member States at any given point in time, further reinforces this finding.608  
7.431.   The second question in respect of epidemiological surveillance is whether the European 
Union has had in place appropriate monito ring and surveillance mechanisms for ASF. The package 
of information attached to the letter sent by DG SANCO to FSVPS on 7 February 2014 included, in 
addition to the already mentioned Council Directive 2002/60/EC, a website link to the text of 
Commission D ecision 2003/422/EC, approving an ASF diagnostic manual.609 In our view, these 
regulations provide a clear legal framework in respect of the monitoring and surveillance 
mechanisms for ASF in the European Union. Article 18 of Council Directive 2002/60/EC, ent itled 
"Diagnostic procedures and bio -safety requirements" provides the general obligations that 
EU member States have in respect of a uniform approach to diagnostic procedures, sampling and 
laboratory testing to detect ASF. The detailed description of the diagnostic procedures is laid out in 
Commission Decision 2003/422/EC.  
7.432.   In this respect, the European Union also referred in its letter of 7 February 2014 to 
surveillance programmes approved for 2013 for Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland . The 
European Union indicated that updated revisions of these programmes to be implemented in 2014 
with European Union's financial support were under internal discussion.610 We are mindful of the 
limited evidentiary value of these documents, which seem to be applications for financial resources 
submitted to the European Union. However, we find them to provide an indication of the type of 
surveillance that was put in place by some of the EU member States which were more at risk due 
to their proximity with areas in Belarus a nd Ukraine w here there had been ASF outbreaks. These 
surveillance programmes included activities such as  (i) laboratory testing of dead wild boar and 
domestic pigs; (ii) strengthening of biological security at road borders (including disinfection of 
trucks ); (iii)  regular inspections of pig holdings; (iv) information campaigns to raise awareness and 
sensitize the public and relevant stakeholders to the threat of an ASF outbreak; and (v) training 
for relevant stakeholders designed to convey knowledge of ASF.611 Furthermore, these documents 
generally refer to domestic regulations that provide the conditions for the application of the 
surveillance obligations foreshadowed in Council Directive 2002/60/EC and in accordance with 
Commission Decision 2003/422/EC.   
7.433.   Also in respect of monitoring and surveillance mechanisms for ASF, the European Union 
explained in the letter from DG SANCO to FSVPS of 6 March 2014 that the Council Directive 
2002/60/EC and the diagnostic manual for ASF had already been provided.612  Moreover , through 
                                               
605 European Union's letter to Russia  of 7 February 2014, ARES(2014)304571, 
SANCO/G7/DP/tb(2014)328578  (Exhibit EU -65). The text of Council Directive  2002/60/EC is on record as 
Exhibit EU -31. 
606 European Union's letter to Russia of 13 March 2014, ARES(2014)709435, 
SANCO/G7/PD/mh(2014)745829  (Exhibit EU -91), p. 6. 
607 Council Directive  of 27 June 2002, 2002/60/EC  (Exhibit EU -31), p. L 192/28.  
608 See para. 7.425  above.  
609 European Union's letter to Russia of 7 February 2014, ARES(2014)304571, 
SANCO/G7/DP/t b(2014)328578 (Exhibit EU -65). The text of Commission Decision 2003/422/EC is on record as 
Exhibit EU -32. 
610 European Union's letter to Russia of 7 February 2014, ARES(2014)304571, 
SANCO/G7/DP/tb(2014) 328578 ( Exhibit EU -65), p. 5 of the Annex.  
611 See Veterin ary Control Programme on African swine fever Poland in 2014, 2013  (Exhibit EU -237), 
Veterinary Control Programme on African swine fever early detection in Lithuania and Belarus in 2014, 2013  
(Exhibit EU -238), and Veterinary Programme on African swine fever  early detection in Latvia in 2014, 2013 
(Exhibit EU -239).  
612 European Union's letter to Russia of 6 March 2014, ARES(2014)601346, 
SANCO/G7/PD/mh/(2014)630598  (Exhibit EU -86), p. 6. WT/DS475/R  
 
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  the letter from DG SANCO to FSVPS of 13 March 2014, the European Union explained that 
"[s]urveillance demonstrating absence of ASF in the EU in not high risk territories not adjacent to 
infected areas is based on passive surveillance by means of structured non -random surveillance 
activities as described in Article 1.4.5. of the OIE Terrestrial Code".613 The European Union further 
explained that such surveillance is based on the obligation of EU member States to ensure that the 
presence or the suspec ted presence of ASF is compulsorily and immediately notifiable to the 
competent authority, pursuant to Article 3 of Council Directive 2002/60/EC. The European Union 
also explained that active surveillance is applied in designated risk areas covering in 201 4 four 
EU member States (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland), and that it would be expanded to other 
EU member States adjacent to high risk areas like Finland or Romania, e.g., areas bordering 
countries with active ASF outbreaks.614  
7.434.   Through the letter f rom DG SANCO to FSVPS of 21 May 2014, the European Union referred 
to the surveillance programmes approved for the four affected EU member States for 2013 that 
were provided with the letter of 7 February 2014. This letter of 21 May also provided updated 
versions of these programmes for the year 2014.615  Lastly, through the letter from DG SANCO to 
FSVPS of 13 June 2014, the European Union reiterated its explanation of the type of surveillance 
programmes it applies contingent on the risk of ASF due to geographi cal proximity. In the 
European Union's words "[a]s a general rule, non -specific or passive surveillance is applied all over 
the EU. ASF -targeted (active) surveillance is applied where there is a differentiated risk, such as 
in the territories or countries  that neighbour infected countries. In 2013, surveillance was 
implemented in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland . In 2014, as a result of the detected cases, 
surveillance in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland  was further intensified. Such surveillan ce is 
also being intensified in other EU Member States countries who consider themselves to be at risk, 
due to their close proximity to the border with the Russian Federation, Belarus and/or Ukraine."616 
7.435.   In our view, the explanations and information provided  by the European  Union  through the 
communications referred to in respect of epidemiological surveillance of ASF sufficiently 
demonstrate that the European Union has had in place appropriate monitoring and surveillance 
mechanisms for ASF. The European Union  provided information to Russia regarding its ASF 
regulatory framework through its letter of 7 February 2014. A lthough some of the explanations 
that the European Union provided in this respect were made through the communications of 
6 March and 21 May 2014 , because such explanations are grounded on the legal framework that 
was already provided to Russia in the letter of 7 February 2014, we find that the European Union 
provided Russia at least as at 7 February 2014 with the necessary evidence to objectively 
demonstrate that the European Union has had in place appropriate monitoring and surveillance 
mechanisms for ASF.  
7.436.   The second cluster of evidence we will examine refers to the effectiveness of sanitary or 
phytosanitary controls in respect of ASF. Regarding this cluster of information we will examine 
whether the European Union has had in place measures to prevent introduction of ASF. We find 
the most useful guidance in this respect in the attachment to the letter of 13 March 2014 entitled 
"Working Document on  EU preventive measures for ASF (SANCO/7037/2014 Rev 1)".617 We 
consider this document to be indicative, on a scientific and technical level, of the ASF preventative 
measures the European Union has in place. Through this document, dated 6 March 2014, the 
European Union indicated six areas that summarize the measures in force in the European Union 
to prevent the introduction and spread of ASF. The first of these areas is called "Baseline measures 
for keeping and moving pigs in MSs" and refers to Directive 2008 /71/EC in respect of 
identification, marking, and database registration of animals and to the regulations applicable to 
feeding of animal products to pigs, which prohibit feeding of swill and ensure only safe ingredients 
                                               
613 European Union's letter to Russia of 13 March 2014, ARES(2014)709435, 
SANCO/G7/PD/mh(2014)745829  (Exhibit EU -91), p. 6. 
614 European Union's letter to Russia of 13 March 2014, ARES(2014)709435, 
SANCO/G7/PD/mh(2014)745829  (Exhibit EU -91), pp. 6-7. 
615 European Union's letter to Russia of 21 May 2014, ARES(2014)1658269, 
SANCO/G6/AB( 2014)1782253 (Exhibit EU -92), p. 9. 
616 European Union's letter to Russia of 13 June 2014, ARES(2014)1941949, 
SANCO/G7/PD/mh(2014)2038505  (Exhibit EU -94), p. 5.  
617 See European Union's letter to Russia of 13 March 2014, ARES(2014)709435, 
SANCO/G7/PD/mh(2014)74 5829 (Exhibit EU -91), p. 7 and European Union Working Document on ASF, 
ARES(2014)605187 ( Exhibit EU -88). WT/DS475/R  
 
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  can come into contact with pigs.618 We have no clear evidence on record that the European Union 
provided Russia with copies of Directive 2008/71/EC619 or the regulations applicable to feeding of 
animal products to pigs.620 
7.437.   The second area indicated by the European Union as part of the measures in  force to 
prevent the introduction and spread of ASF refers to "Baseline measures for intra -EU trade in live 
pigs". In this respect, the European Union described the conditions applicable to new born pigs 
regarding where they should be kept for the first 3 0 days, the veterinary clinical inspections they 
should be subjected to, the conditions for issuance of veterinary certificates, their registration in 
the TRACES system once the consignment destination is defined, and conditions for 
transportation.621  
7.438.   The t hird area that the European Union identified as part of the measures in force to 
prevent introduction and spread of ASF is "Baseline measures on the introduction into the Union of 
personal consignments of products of animal origin". In this respect, the Eu ropean Union explained 
that there are controls in place that aim at detecting the presence of personal consignments of 
products of animal origin, which are organized on the basis of a risk assessment and involve the 
use of scanners and dogs leading to seiz ure and destruction of personal consignments and 
penalties; the EU member States submit annual reports on this area to the Commission.622  
7.439.   The fourth area identified by the European Union as part of the measures in force to 
prevent introduction and spread of  ASF is "Baselines measures in food hygiene". The European 
Union explained that this area covers veterinary ante -mortem and post -mortem inspection of all 
pigs; post -mortem inspection of wild game and initial examination by trained hunters; and official 
inspection of pigs slaughtered outside slaughterhouses for personal consumption.623 
7.440.   As a fifth area, the European Union refers to "Specific rules upon occurrence of ASF in 
Member States". The European Union explained that these rules consist of surveillance in all 
suspected and in -contact pig holdings, as well as all holdings included in the infected area; 
standstill of pigs around every outbreak in a farm as well as pig holdings in the infected area; 
creation of protection and surveillance zones in response to outbreaks in domestic pigs and 
creation of an infected area in cases  of outbreaks  in wild boars; movement restrictions on pig 
products; cleansing and disinfection of infected holdings; enhanced farmed bio -security; stamping 
out of all pigs in infected and in-contact holdings; and eradication programmes.624 We note that 
these correspond to those enshrined in the relevant articles of Council Directive 2002/60/EC, 
which was provided by the European Union to Russia through the letter of 7 February 2014.625 The 
European Union further explained that EU member States applied additional measures to ensure 
that certain pork products are not dispatched from their territory or from the part of the territory 
subject to restrictions for ASF.626   
7.441.   Lastly, the European Union refers to "Specific measures to mitigate risk of introducing ASF 
from neighbouring countries". These measures refer to requirement of proof of cleansing and 
disinfection of livestock vehicles on arrival from third countries; and requirement of cleansing and 
                                               
618 European Union Working Document on ASF, ARES(2014)605187  (Exhibit EU -88), p. 2.  
619 The European Union exhibited Directive 2008/71/EC as Exhibit EU -250, which the Europ ean Union 
quotes in its comments to Russia's response to Panel question No. 306, paras. 158 -160. 
620 It is our understanding that the legal framework applicable to swill feeding are described in European 
Union's response to Panel question No  49, paras. 109-112, which refers to Commission Regulation (EU) No 
142/2011 of 25 February 2011 implementing Regulation (EC) No 1069/2009 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council laying down health rules as regards animal by -products and derived produ cts not intended for 
human consumption and implementing Council Directive 97/78/EC as regards certain samples and items 
exempt from veterinary checks at the border under that Directive, OJ L 54, p.1  (Exhibit EU -149) and 
Regulation (EC) No 1069/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21  October 2009 laying down 
health rules as regards animal by -products and derived products not intended for human consumption and 
repealing Regulation (EC) No  1774/2002 (Animal by -products Regulation), OJ L 300,  p.1 (Exhibit EU-150). 
621 European Union Working Document on ASF, ARES(2014)605187  (Exhibit EU -88), p. 2.  
622 European Union Working Document on ASF, ARES(2014)605187  (Exhibit EU -88), p. 4. 
623 European Union Working Document on ASF, ARES(2014) 605187  (Exhibit E U-88), p. 4.  
624 European Union Working Document on ASF, ARES(2014)605187 (Exhibit EU -88), pp. 4-5. 
625 See Appendix 1 below.  
626 European Union Working Document on ASF, ARES( 2014)605187  (Exhibit EU -88), p. 5.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  disinfection in case it has not been satisfactorily carried out on the incoming livestock vehicle.627 
Through the letter of 13 March 2014 , the European Union provided Russia with  
Committee  Implementing  Decision 2013/426/EU, on measures to prevent the introduc tion into the 
Union of ASFV from certain third countries, which contains the above mentioned measures to 
mitigate risk of introducing ASF from neighbouring countries.628 Furthermore, the ASF surveillance 
programmes of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland  provided through the letter of 7 February 
2014, refer to this type of activity.629  
7.442.   In addition to the "Working Document on EU preventive measures for ASF", the European 
Union provided Russia with information on the measures in place to prevent introduction o f ASF. 
These include the guidelines for contingency planning for EU member States, the contingency 
plans of certain EU member States, and the audits of some of those contingency plans. This 
information was provided through the letter of 7 February 2014.630 Russia objects to the use of 
this information, because in its view, the information does not reflect conditions and appropriate 
control measures that should be taken after an outbreak .631 In our view, the documents provided 
by the European Union to Russia in respect of contingency planning, included general information 
on the type of emergency plans that would be carried out in case of an outbreak of an epidemic 
disease, further explaining what type of preventive measures were mandated to be in place 
pursuant to the European Union's legal framework applicable to the prevention of ASF.  
7.443.   We also note that the European Union has been keen to clarify and address situations that 
have caused Russia concern in respect of the prevention of ASF. In particular, we are re ferring to 
the letter of 4 April 2014 where the European Union explained and responded to Russia's enquiries 
in respect of the movement of pig products from ASF affected areas of the European Union and 
suspected violations on third country product tranship ment.632  
7.444.   In our view, the European Union provided to Russia information pertaining to the measures 
in place to prevent introduction of ASF. Of particular relevance to us is the document that the 
European Union sent to Russia attached to the letter of 13 Mar ch 2014 entitled "Working 
Document on EU preventive measures for ASF (SANCO/7037/2014 Rev 1)".633 As described in the 
preceding paragraphs, some of that information was already provided to Russia together with the 
European Union's  letter of 7 February 2014 . We note  that the European Union's explanations 
presented in the above mentioned "Working Document on EU preventive measures for ASF" failed 
to identify the regulatory basis for some of the measures described therein. However we consider 
that d espite these limitations, we find that the general information submitted by the 
European  Union as at 7 February 2014 amounts to the necessary evidence to objectively 
demonstrate that the European Union has had in place measures to prevent the introduction of 
ASF.  
7.445.   The third c ategory  of evidence that we consider necessary for the European Union to 
objectively demonstrate that certain areas in the European Union are ASF-free refers to 
ecosystems. The first aspect that we will examine is whether there is knowledge  of the 
establishment of  ASF in wildlife in the areas claimed to be free of ASF. In paragraphs 7.430  to 
7.435  we examine the fact that ASF is a notifiable disease and the monitoring and surveillance 
mechanis ms that the European Union has in place for ASF. Based on those considerations, 
together with the manner in which individual EU member States provided updated and reliable 
notifications to the OIE to include in the WAHIS database, we find merit in the fact  that ASF is not 
known to be established in wildlife outside the four affected EU member States (Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, and Poland) , with the exception of Sardinia .  
                                               
627 European Union Working Document on ASF, ARES(2014) 605187   (Exhibit EU -88), p. 5. 
628 Commission Implementing Decision "On measures to prevent the introduction into the Union of the 
African swine fever virus from certain third countries or parts of the territory of third countries in which the 
presence of th at disease is confirmed and repealing Decision 2011/78/EU (2013/426/EU) " (Exhibit RUS -349) 
629 See para. 7.432  above.  
630 See section "Emergency response in case ASF in the EU member States/Contingency Plans" in 
Table A4 in Appendix 1  below . 
631 Russia's comments to the European Union's response to Panel question No. 322, para. 198.  
632 Letter from DG SANCO to the Russian Veterinary Service, SANCO/G7/PD/mh (2014) 1055360, 4 
April 2014  (Exhibit RUS -56). 
633 European Union' s letter to Russia of 13 March 2014, ARES(2014)709435, 
SANCO/G7/PD/mh(2014)745829   (Exhibit EU -91) p. 7. This document was exhibited as Exhibit EU -88. WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.446.   Our view on this matter is further reinforced by the evidence provided by the Europea n 
Union on behavioural ecology of wild boars. In this regard, attached to the letter of 7 February 
2014, the European Union sent Russia the 2010 EFSA scientific opinion. That document explains 
that:  
[W]ild boar do not migrate, at least according to the cl assic definition of migration. 
Some small seasonal movements are registered but always inside the usual individual 
home range that varies from 20 -100 km2. Infections can spread between larger 
regions, however, where there is continuity in the geographical distribution of the wild 
boar, as observed for CSF (EFSA, 2009c). In this respect, the Ukraine (Crimea), 
Poland and Romania may be at risk due to the continuous distribution and the high 
density of wild boar. Possible corridors may also exist from the infe cted Russian areas 
into Lithuania or Latvia. Where wild boar are absent or natural/artificial barriers 
prevent direct contact between infected and susceptible populations, infections usually 
fade out spontaneously (Artois et al., 2002); for ASF, this patte rn has been observed 
in Sardinia only (Firinu and Scarano, 1988).634   
7.447.   This was further confirmed through the explanation provided in the attachment  to the 
letter sent by DG SANCO to FSVPS on 13 June 2014, where the European Union explained the 
criteria used  to identify the borders of the infected/free/high risks zones in the territory of Poland 
and Lithuania.635 The Panel's experts confirmed the scientific merit of this information .636 In our 
view, this scientific justification demonstrates the negligible risk o f ASF spreading through wild 
boar populations from the most eastern territories of the European Union to the central and 
western areas. Furthermore, the European Union's explanations of the measures adopted for the 
prevention of the spread of ASF support t he objective demonstration that ASF-free areas within 
the European Union are likely to remain so.  
7.448.   The last category  of evidence refers to the level of prevalence of ASF in the areas claimed 
to be free of ASF. As we observed earlier, evidence regarding the level of prevalence of ASF is 
directly related to the surveillance programmes. In this regard, we have already noted that the EU 
member States have provided updated and reliable notifications to the OIE for inclusion in the 
WAHIS database. This information  clearly confirms that there is no presence of ASF and ASFV in 
the areas outside Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland that the European Union claims to be free 
of ASF.  
7.449.   In our view, the examination of the preceding evidence supports a conclusion that the  
European Union provided to Russia, as at 7 February 2014, the necessary evidence to objectively 
demonstrate that the ASF-free areas within the European Union were ASF-free and were likely to 
remain so. However, we are mindful of the changing nature of the  ASF situation in the eastern part 
of the European Union from that date and until 11 September 2014. We are also mindful that we 
are examining the EU -wide ban independent from the bans on the imports of the products at issue 
from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania , and Poland . This means that we are examining the EU -wide ban as 
it was after 11 September 2014, following the adoption of the bans on the imports of the products 
at issue from Estonia. In light of these considerations, in section 7.6.2.3.3  below we will examine 
whether there are any changes in the necessary evidence that the European Union had to provide 
to Russia in order to objectively demonstrate the existence of ASF-free areas in Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, and Poland. Wit h this in mind, our preliminary conclusion based on examination of the 
preceding evidence is only applicable in respect of the ASF-free areas within European Union that 
are located outside Estonia,  Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland.  
                                               
634 2010 EFSA Scientific Opinion (Exhibit EU -24). 
635 European Union's letter to Russia of 13 June 2014, ARES (2014)1941949, 
SANCO/G7/PD/mh(2014)2038505  (Exhibit EU -94), p. 4. 
636 See Professor Penrith's response to Panel question Nos. 9.d, 21.a, and 22.a; and Dr Thomson's 
response to Panel question No. 9d.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.450.   We recall that Russia has c hallenged the sufficiency of the information examined in support 
of the European Union's satisfaction of its obligation under Article 6.3. We have these objections in 
mind as we pursue our analysis.637 
7.451.   In addition to the evidence that we have referred to, th e European Union provided 
explanations and additional information to complement the necessary evidence provided as at 
7 February 2014. Among such information we highlight the explanations on  the detailed 
emergency response  action plan  provided through the letter of 21 May 2014638; and the detailed 
information regarding monitoring/surveillance of wild boars in each EU member State, data 
regarding the role of wild boars in the spread of ASF in EU member States, the detailed 
information regarding the measures ta ken by each EU member State to prevent the trans -
boundary spread of ASF in the European Union, the detailed information regarding the measures 
taken by each EU member State to prevent the trans -boundary spread of ASF through the 
movement of wild boars in t he European Union, and the detailed information on measures 
intended to prevent the spread of ASF to/from small and average -sized farms and farms/facilities 
with low level protection (e.g., premises where pigs are not indoors) in each EU member State, all 
provided through the letter of 24 March 2015.639  
7.452.   Moreover, it is relevant to highlight that before the first ASF outbreak in Lithuania, Russia 
had viewed the entire territory of the European Union as free of ASF, with the exception of 
Sardinia. This was the  case at least as of 2006, when the text of the bilateral veterinary 
certificates was agreed.640  We recall that, pursuant to the 2006 Memorandum, the wording of the 
bilateral veterinary certificate that had been agreed between the European Union and Russia 
allows importation of the products concerned accompanied by an attestation that the products at 
issue "…originate from premises and/or administrative territory of the EU Member State that are 
officially free from the following contagious diseases: African swine fever - during the last 3 years 
in the territory of the EU excluding Sardinia…."641. Up to and until the first outbreak of ASF in 
Lithuania in January 2014, the entire European Union territory (with the exception of Sardinia) had 
been recognized by Rus sia as free of ASF for at least the "last 3 years". It was under that basis 
and mutual trust that the European Union was able to trade in pig products with Russia.642 
7.453.   In addition to the preceding analysis regarding the information provided by the European 
Union to Russia to objectively demonstrate that there are ASF -free areas within the European 
Union outside Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, we will examine the information provided by 
the European Union with respect to those ASF -free areas being likel y to remain so.  
7.454.   In paragraph 7.406  above we explained that for an exporting Member to objectively 
demonstrate that a disease -free area is likely to remain so, it should provide to the importing 
Member the necess ary evidence to support that there is "probability " that the disease -free status 
will be maintained  in the particular area. We also observed that  an objective demonstration of a 
disease -free area being likely to remain so requires,  in addition to the infor mation required to 
objectively demonstrate there are disease -free areas, the necessary evidence to support the 
effectiveness of  the control measures.  
7.455.   We have provided a detailed examination with respect to the effectiveness of the control 
measures in place  for the EU member States not affected with ASF.643 We have identified evidence 
in support of our conclusion that the European Union provided to Russia the necessary evidence to 
objectively demonstrate that the European Union has had in place measures to pre vent the 
introduction of ASF. In addition, we consider the fact a t the time of the establishment of the Panel 
on 22 July 2014 and even at the time the parties provided the latest information on the spread of 
ASF in the European Union, on 22 October 2015, t here had been no cases of ASF reported outside 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, as further "real world" evidence of the effectiveness of the 
                                               
637 Russia's second written submission para. 131-132; commen ts to the expert' s responses to Panel 
questions No. 12 and 13; and comments to European Union's response to Panel question No. 322. 
638 See Table A5 in Appendix 1 below.  
639 See Table A8 in Appendix 1 below . 
640 See fn 117 above.  
641 Veterinary certificate for piglets for fattening  (Exhibit EU -52). 
642 See European Union's opening statement at the second panel meeting, para. 103.  
643 See paras. 7.436  - 7.444  above.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  European Union's control measures for ASF .644 We therefore conclude that the European Union 
provided to Russia  the necessary evidence to objectively demonstrate that the ASF -free areas in 
the European Union, outside Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, are likely to remain ASF -free.  
7.456.   Based on the foregoing, we conclude that in the period between 7 February 2014  and 
11 September 2014, the European Union objectively demonstrated to Russia that there are areas 
within the European Union territory, outside of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, which are 
free of ASF and are likely to remain so. Furthermore the re levant evidence on record that the 
European Union has submitted to Russia subsequent to 11 September 2014 serves to confirm and 
support our finding.  
7.5.2.3.6   Whether Russia, through the EU -wide ban, ensured adaptation to the SPS 
characteristics of the European Unio n and of Russia in respect of ASF, pursuant to 
Russia's obligations under Article 6.1 of the SPS Agreement  
7.5.2.3.6.1   Introduction  
7.457.   The European Union argues that Russia fails, through the EU -wide ban, to adapt its 
measures to the SPS characteristics of the European U nion and of Russia in respect of ASF. This is 
because in assessing the sanitary characteristics of the affected area, Russia failed to take into 
account, inter alia , the level of prevalence or absence of ASF, the existence of eradication and 
control progra mmes (immediately implemented in accordance with international standards laid 
down by the OIE), and appropriate criteria or guidelines developed by the relevant international 
organizations.645 The European Union further stresses that despite the implementati on of 
appropriate regionalization  measures within the European Union, Russia fails to recognize the 
EU territory, excluding the restricted areas, as disease -free areas.646 The European Union also 
points out that Article 6.1 of the SPS Agreement requires that  measures are adapted not only to 
the area from which a product originates, but also to the area to which it is destined. In this 
regard, the European Union highlights that there are regions in Russia where wild boars do not 
occur and that to the extent to  which domestic pigs do not occur in those regions in Russia, the 
introduction of the products at issue would not present ASF -related sanitary risks , and importation 
to consumers in those regions should be allowed.647 
7.458.   Russia argues that taking into considera tion the very factors listed in Article 6.1 of the 
SPS Agreement, it objectively and reasonably did not accept the European Union's zones.648 Russia 
asserts that in evaluating whether there is an objective basis for Russia's decision not to recogn ize 
the pro posed ASF -free zones in conformity with the applicable Terrestrial Code standards and 
consistent with Article 6 of the SPS Agreement, the Panel must determine whether Russia's 
decision regarding the various European Union zones was "objectively justifiable ". Russia stresses 
that in conducting that review, the Panel must not substitute its own judgement of the weight to 
be given to certain evidence  for that given by the importing country . Rather, it must determine 
whether the totality of the circumstances an d evidence (or lack thereof) was sufficient to support 
the objectivity of Russia's decision in light of the relevant provisions of the Terrestrial Code and 
SPS Agreement Article 6 criteria and the available information.649 Russia further posits that there 
exist considerable parallels between the more specific zoning provisions in Terrestrial Code 
Chapter 4.3 and Article 5.3.7 and the more general relevant factors listed in Articles 6.2 and 6.1 of 
the SPS Agreement.650 In this regard Russia argues that first, Ar ticle 6.1 makes mandatory taking 
into account "the appropriate criteria and guidelines which may be developed by the relevant 
international organizations", meaning any objective assessment of an ASF-free zone consistent 
with Article 6.1 of the SPS Agreemen t would have to include the assessment of the zoning 
"principles" set out in Terrestrial Code Article 4.3.3 as well as the related Article 5.3.7.651 Second, 
all of the general factors listed in SPS Agreement Articles 6.1 and 6.2 for importing countries to 
                                               
644 See Data from OIE WAHIS  Interface, as of 31 August 2015 ( Exhibit RUS -296 revised ).  
645 European Union's first written submission, para. 215.  
646 European Union's first written submission, para. 215.  
647 European Union's second written submissio n, para. 128.  
648 Russia's first written submission, para. 231.  
649 Russia's second written submission, para. 49. See also Russia's response to Panel question No. 113, 
paras. 190 -196. 
650 Russia's second written submission, para. 50.  
651 Russia's second written su bmission, para. 51.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  take into account when deciding to accept  regionalization  are also included in the more specific 
provisions of Chapter 4.3 of the Terrestrial Code, and that regardless of whether the 
Terrestrial  Code provisions in Articles 4.3.3 and 4.3.3.3 are binding  on the European Union in 
seeking to establish an ASF -free zone, at a minimum, these provisions are relevant benchmarks 
for assessing the general criteria of Article 6 of the SPS Agreement.652 Third, Article 6.3 of the 
SPS Agreement also overlaps considerably wit h Terrestrial Code Article 5.3.7, which addresses the 
"sequence of steps to be taken in establishing a zone/compartment and having it recognized for 
international trade purposes".653 Russia concludes that the Terrestrial Code is a more detailed and 
elaborate d version of the general provisions set out in Article 6 of the SPS Agreement.  
Accordingly, if the Panel finds that Russia was objectively justified in not accepting the EU zones in 
conformity with the Terrestrial Code zoning/ regionalization  standards, re commendations, and 
guideline benchmarks, it should also find that it acted consistently with Article 6 of the 
SPS Agreement.654 
7.459.   In light  of the parties' arguments , the Panel is faced with the question of whether Russia, 
in applying the EU -wide ban, adapted i ts measures to the SPS characteristics of the European 
Union and of Russia in respect of ASF, pursuant to Russia's obligations under Article 6.1 of the 
SPS Agreement. In addressing  this question, the Panel will first examine the applicable legal test, 
including a review of Russia's argument of the applicable standard of review.  
7.5.2.3.6.2   Legal test  
7.460.   The first sentence of Article 6.1 of the SPS Agreement stipulates that "Members shall 
ensure that their sanitary or phytosanitary measures are adapted to the sanitary or p hytosanitary 
characteristics of the area … from which the product originated and to which the product is 
destined." Pursuant to the second sentence of Article 6.1, in "assessing the sanitary or 
phytosanitary characteristics of a region, Members shall take into account, inter alia, the level of 
prevalence of specific diseases or pests, the existence of eradication or control programmes, and 
appropriate criteria or guidelines which may be developed by the relevant international 
organizations."  
7.461.   The Appellate Body in India – Agricultural Products  observed, in respect of the first 
sentence of Article 6.1, that the "verb 'ensure' is defined as to make certain the occurrence of a 
situation or outcome.655 In turn, the term "adapt" means 'fit, adjust, ( to); make suita ble (to or 
for)'656."657  The Appellate Body further noted that there are two relevant areas to the obligation in 
the first sentence of Article 6.1, the area from which the product originated and the one to which it 
is destined.658  The Appellate Body indicated that the adaptation of an SPS measure does not only 
occur a single time; rather,  the obligation to ensure that a Member's SPS measures are "adapted" 
to the relevant areas is "a continuing obligation".659 
7.462.   The panel in US – Animals stated that the obligation u nder Article 6.1 requires the 
"adaptation" of a measure, which, it explained, entails that the measure in question must be 
tailored or calibrated to the specific SPS characteristics of the area concerned.660 It also 
highlighted that there was an inherent obl igation for the regulating Member to adapt its measure 
not only to the area of origin, but also to the area of destination of a product.661 
                                               
652 Russia's second written submission, para. 52.  
653 Russia's second written submission, para. 53.  
654 Russia's second written submission, para. 56.  
655 (footnote original) Relevant definitions of the term "ensure" are "guarantee, warrant" and  "make 
certain the occurrence of (an event, situation, outcome, etc.) (Foll. by that)". (Shorter Oxford English 
Dictionary , 6th edn, A.  Stevenson (ed.) (Oxford University Press, 2007), Vol. 1, p. 840)  
656 (footnote original) Shorter Oxford English Dictionary , 6th edn, A. Stevenson (ed.) (Oxford University 
Press, 2007), Vol.  1, p. 24.  
657 Appellate Body Report, India – Agricultural Product s, para. 5.132. See also Panel Reports, India – 
Agricultural Products , para. 7.668; and US – Animals , para. 7.641.  
658 Appellat e Body Report, India – Agricultural Product s, para. 5.132.  
659 Appellate Body Report, India – Agricultural Products , para. 5.154.  
660 Panel Report, US – Animals , para. 7.642.  
661 Panel Report, US – Animals , para. 7.642.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.463.   Regarding the second sentence of Article 6.1, the Appellate Body in India – Agricultural 
Products  observed that it "sp ecifies, in a non -exhaustive manner, the elements that Members must 
take into account in assessing the SPS characteristics of a region. These elements include: the 
level of prevalence of specific diseases or pests; the existence of eradication or control 
programmes; and appropriate criteria or guidelines that may be developed by the relevant 
international organizations."662   
7.464.   The panel in US – Animals  agreed with the panel in India – Agricultural Products that the 
second sentence of Article 6.1 "presupposes t hat Members undertake an assessment of the SPS 
characteristics of a region" and contains "a list of factors that shall be taken into account by 
Members in undertaking such assessment."663  
7.465.   The panel in US - Animals  concluded that the two sentences of Article  6.1 provide a 
"logical progression" in that a Member must "assess" the SPS characteristics of a given area, 
taking into account, inter alia, the identified factors in the second sentence of Article 6.1. Once the 
SPS characteristics of the area have been a ssessed, the Member is required to "adapt" its SPS 
measure to such characteristics.664 
7.466.   The panel in India – Agricultural Products  explained that if a determination is made that 
the concepts of disease -free areas and areas of low disease prevalence – as requi red by the first 
sentence of Article  6.2 - have not been recognized, then this will lead to a finding that the 
measures are not adapted to the SPS characteristics of the area from which products originate or 
to which they are destined, pursuant to the firs t sentence of Article 6.1.665 
7.467.   The panel in India – Agricultural Products  further clarified that a Member's failure to ensure 
that its SPS  measures are adapted to the SPS  characteristics of an area for the purpose of the first 
sentence of Article  6.1 may warr ant a concomitant finding that the Member has not taken into 
account the factors in the second sentence of Article  6.1, in assessing the SPS  characteristics of a 
region. That panel indicated that the language of the first sentence of Article  6.1 is framed in the 
present tense ("are adapted"), which leads to the consideration that the adaptation of the measure 
to the SPS  characteristics of the area is an element of the SPS  measure as such , which the 
implementing Member must ensure.666 The first sentence of Article 6.1 denotes that a Member 
must make certain of its measures' suitability  (in this case, suitable for the SPS  characteristics of 
the area).667 
7.468.   We agree with the panel in US – Animals , that  
"[A]daptation" of a measure entails that the measure in question must be tailored or 
calibrated to the specific SPS  characteristics of the area concerned. If, for instance, 
the area from which a product originates presents a lower level of risk than the rest of 
the territory of an exporting Member, an importing Member w ould be required to 
impose less stringent conditions on imports of products therefrom. The contrary may 
also be true. If, indeed, the area from which a product originates presents a higher 
level of risk than the rest of the exporting Member's territory, su ch an 
SPS characteristic may warrant the imposition of particularly stringent import 
restrictions targeting that specific area. We also note that the first sentence of 
Article  6.1 refers to both the area "from which the product originated" and the area 
"to which the product is destined". This indicates that the regulating Member is 
required to adapt its measure not only to the area of origin, but also to the area of 
destination of a product. If, for instance, a particular area within the territory of an 
importing Member has a similar SPS  status as the area of origin of a product (e.g. has 
                                               
662 Appellate Body Report, India – Agricultu ral Products , para. 5.135.  
663 Panel Report, US – Animals , para. 7.643.  
664 Panel Report, US – Animals , para. 7.646  
665 Panel Report, India - Agricultural Products , para. 7.709.  
666 Panel Report, India - Agricultural Products , para. 7.675.  
667 Panel Report, India - Agricultural Products , para. 7.669.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  the same level of prevalence of a given disease), that Member may be required to 
tailor its measure by relaxing the restrictions on imports into that area.668 
7.469.    In examining w hether the United States adapted its measure to the SPS characteristics of 
Patagonia, the panel in US – Animals  assessed whether the United States' omission to recognize 
Patagonia as separate from the rest of the Argentinian territory was justified by Arge ntina's failure 
to objectively demonstrate that, at the time of the panel's establishment, Patagonia was and was 
likely to remain FMD -free.669 After being satisfied that Argentina had met its burden of providing 
the evidence necessary to "objectively demonst rate" that Patagonia as a whole was, and was likely 
to remain FMD -free, the panel concluded that the United  States' failure to recognize Patagonia as 
FMD-free was a failure to adapt its general prohibition on imports of FMD -susceptible animals and 
animal p roducts from Argentina to the specific SPS  characteristics of the Patagonia region and is 
thus inconsistent with Article  6.1 of the SPS  Agreement.670  
7.470.   In this dispute Russia posits that the Panel must not substitute its own judgement of the 
weight to be give n to certain evidence  for that given by the importing country . Rather, it must 
determine whether the totality of the circumstances and evidence (or lack thereof) was sufficient 
to support the objectivity of Russia's decision in light of the relevant provis ions of the Terrestrial 
Code and SPS Agreement Article 6 criteria and the available information.671  
7.471.   In our view, the approach followed by the panel in US – Animals provides some clarity as 
to the type of assessment that should be made in the context of Arti cle 6.1. The Panel needs to 
examine the evidentiary record and make an objective assessment, pursuant to its obligation 
under Article 11 of the DSU, of whether the challenged measure is adapted to the relevant ASF 
characteristics of the area where the prod ucts at issue originate and of the area to which they are 
destined. Such an objective assessment is framed in the broader context of panels' standard of 
review, which has been described by the Appellate Body in respect of fact -finding, "as neither de 
novo review as such, nor 'total deference', but rather the 'objective assessment of facts'"672 and in 
respect of legal questions, Article 11 of the DSU requires a panel to "make an objective 
assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of  the facts of the case and 
the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements."673 
7.472.   Based on the foregoing, we turn to examine whether the EU -wide ban is adapted to certain 
areas within the European Union outside the territories of Eston ia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland 
and to the SPS characteristics in Russia.  
7.5.2.3.6.3   Whether the EU -wide ban is adapted to the relevant SPS characteristics of 
areas within the European Union outside the territories of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and 
Poland and to t he SPS characteristics of Russia  
7.473.   We recall that pursuant to Article 6.1 of the SPS Agreement Russia has the obligation to 
adapt its SPS measures to the sanitary and phytosanitary characteristics of the area from which 
the product originated and to which th e product is destined. In this case, this means adaptation to 
the SPS characteristics of the European Union's territory outside Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and 
Poland and to the SPS characteristics of Russia.674 In order to determine whether Russia has made 
such an adaptation, we will first examine the SPS characteristics in each of those areas and then 
analyse whether the EU -wide ban is indeed adapted to them.  
                                               
668 Panel Report, US – Animals , para. 7.642.  
669 Panel Report, US – Animals, para. 7.670.  
670 Panel Report, US – Animals, para. 7.674.  
671 Russia's second written submission, para. 49. See also Russia's response to Panel questio n No. 113, 
paras. 190 -196. 
672 Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones , para. 117.  
673 Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones , para. 118.  
674 See also Professor Penrith's response to Panel question No. 13, para. 2.126 of the Compiled 
Individual Experts' Replies, whe re she opines that "[t]here are 27 states in the EU; all of these cannot be 
considered to pose an equal risk of ASF for Russia. For instance, at least in terms of spread by migrating wild 
boars, there would be little sense in UK and Ireland, as well as Mal ta, Cyprus and any other islands within the 
EU, including Sardinia in spite of not being free of ASF, needing to supply detailed information about wild boar 
populations and their movements…".  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.474.   In section 7.5.2.3.5  above, we examine whether the European Union obj ectively 
demonstrated that there are disease -free areas, which are likely to remain so, outside the territory 
of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, pursuant to Article 6.3 of the SPS Agreement. Our 
finding, after reviewing the evidence provided by the  European Union to Russia, as indicated in 
paragraph 7.449  above, is in the affirmative.  
7.475.   An important element in support of this conclusion is the surveillance and control 
programmes that the European Union has in place for AS F. These programmes are contained in 
the overarching legal framework for ASF, Council Directive 2002/60/EC, which we describe in 
paragraph 7.433  above  and in Appendix 2 below . Furthermore, the limited home -range of wild 
boars s upports the conclusion that the ASF-free areas in the European Union are likely to remain 
so.675  
7.476.   Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the areas of the European Union outside Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland are characterized as being free of ASF a nd likely to remain so. It is to 
that particular characteristic to which Russia has the obligation to adapt its measures.  
7.477.   In our view, imposing an outright ban on the non -treated products at issue, such as the 
one imposed by Russia through the EU -wide ban , and failing to recognize the existence of ASF-free 
areas within the European Union's territory amounts to not adapting the measure to the sanitary 
and phytosanitary characteristics of the European Union territory outside Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, and P oland .  
7.478.   Moreover, we have observed that starting in 2007, there have been ASF outbreaks in 
Russia and that ASF has not been eradicated from Russia.676 In our view, this forms part of the 
SPS characteristics of the territory to which the products at issue fro m the European Union are 
destined and to which Russia must also adapt its measure. The SPS experts consulted by the Panel 
stressed many times that it "needs to be remembered that the RF [Russia]  is not an ASF -free 
country". 677 
7.479.   The panel in US – Animals observed, "[i]f for instance, a particular area within the territory 
of an importing Member has a similar SPS status as the area of origin of a product (e.g. has the 
same level of prevalence of a given disease), that Member may be required to tailor its measur e 
by relaxing the restrictions on imports into that area".678 We agree with this statement, in the 
sense that the level of prevalence of a given disease in the territory of the importing Member is 
part and parcel of what that importing Member must adapt its SPS measures to. We recall also the 
comment by Dr Thomson that: "it seems to me that the problem under discussion is a regional one 
encompassing the Caucuses, Baltic States, the Russian Federation and eastern parts of the EU. As 
indicated elsewhere, from a n ASF perspective, the whole region seems to be in roughly the same 
position. Most of the vast surface area of the EU lies outside this region …" .679  This is not to say 
that a country in which a disease occurs cannot impose any import restrictions to preven t the 
further entry of the disease into regions in which control measures are in place, or its spread into 
areas of the importing country which are free of the disease. Rather, the fact that a disease 
already exists within the importing area and it is unde r official control , are factors  to be considered 
in determining if  a particular measure , applied to imported products,  is adapted to the SPS 
characteristics of the region to which a product is destined.  
7.480.   In addition, pursuant to the second sentence of Artic le 6.1, in assessing the SPS 
characteristics of a region, Members shall take into account, among other things, the level of 
prevalence of the specific diseases, the existence of eradication or control programmes, and 
appropriate criteria or guidelines whic h may be developed by the relevant international 
organizations. In our view, because a Member needs to know what are the SPS characteristics to 
which its SPS measures need to be adapted, it would be difficult for a Member to act in accordance 
                                               
675 See para. 7.446  above.  
676 See Russia's first written submission, para. 23 (referring to OIE WAHIS Interface, Event summary 
Reports, African swine fever, Russia (2007 -2014). (Exhibit RUS -144)); response to Panel question No. 143, 
para. 264; and second written submission, par as. 146 -147. See also paras. 4.22 -4.24 above . 
677 Dr Thomson,  response to Panel question 13 , para. 2.128 . 
678 Panel Report, US – Animals , para. 7.642.  
679 Dr Thomson's response to EU Question No.5 , Transcript,  para. 1.128.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  with its obli gations under Article 6.1 if it ha d not made an assessment of the areas from where the 
products at issue originate and to which they are destined.  
7.481.   We agree with the panel in US – Animals that "the obligation to 'take into account' the 
factors enumerated in  the second sentence [of Article 6.1] is intrinsically connected to the 
obligations relating to the assessment of risks under Article  5 of the SPS  Agreement. In particular, 
Article  5.2 requires Members conducting a risk assessment to 'take into account', inter alia, the 
'prevalence of specific diseases or pests' and the 'existence of pest - or disease -free areas' when 
assessing the risks as required by Article  5.1. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the 
assessment of the SPS  characteristics of an a rea, taking into account the factors listed in the 
second sentence of Article  6.1 could be conducted as part of a Member's risk assessment.680"681 
7.482.   It is undisputed that Russia did not base its  EU-wide ban on a risk assessment . In section 
7.5.5 below, we examine the justifications raised by Russia to excuse compliance with its 
obligation, pursuant to Article 5.1, to base its SPS measures on a risk assessment. 
Notwithstanding our examination in section 7.5.5 below, we consider it relevant to our analysis 
under Article 6.1 that Russia has not made an assessment of the risks arising from the imports of 
the products at issue from the territory of the European Union outside Estonia, Latvia, Lith uania, 
and Poland. In particular, we consider that the lack of risk assessment limits a Member's ability to 
assess the SPS characteristics from where the products in question originate.  
7.483.   In this case, we consider that rejecting the imports of goods from any  of the areas of the 
European Union outside Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, that the European Union 
demonstrated to be free of ASF and are likely to remain so, and not tailoring the EU -wide ban in a 
manner that ensures adaptation to the presence of  ASF in certain areas in Russia, constitute a 
breach of Russia's obligation under Article 6.1. This breach is further corroborated  by Russia's 
failure to make a risk assessment as appropriate to the circumstances, which in this case entail s 
an exhaustive e xamination, including the corresponding scientific justification, of the 
regionalization measures adopted by the European Union.  
7.5.2.3.6.4   Conclusion  
7.484.   Based on the foregoing, we find that Russia did not adapt the EU -wide ban to the SPS 
characteristics related to ASF  of the areas where the products subject to that measure originated 
nor to the SPS characteristics related to ASF in Russia. We therefore find that the EU -wide ban is 
inconsistent with Article 6.1 of the SPS Agreement.  
7.5.2.4   Conclusion in respect of the EU -wide ban consistency with Article 6 of the SPS 
Agreement  
7.485.   In this section we find that Russia recognizes the concepts of pest - or disease -free areas 
and areas of low pest or disease prevalence in respect of ASF, and therefore, the EU -wide ban is 
not inconsistent  with Russia's obligations under Article 6.2 of the SPS Agreement.682  
7.486.   We also find that in the period between 7 February and 11 September 2014, the European 
Union objectively demonstrated to Russia, pursuant to Article 6.3, that there are areas within the 
European Union territory, outside Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, which are free of ASF and 
are likely to remain so.683  
7.487.   Lastly we find that Russia did not adapt the EU -wide ban to the SPS characteristics related 
to ASF of the areas where the products  subject to that measure originated nor to the SPS 
characteristics related to ASF in Russia. Therefore, the EU -wide ban is inconsistent with Article 
6.1.684 
                                               
680 (footnote original) Our statement sho uld not be read to preclude the possibility of other situations 
where Article  6.1 could be applied in the absence of a risk assessment.  
681 Panel Report, US – Animals , para. 7.644.  
682 See section 7.5.2.3.4  above.  
683 See section 7.5.2.3.5  above.  
684 See section 7.5.2.3.6  above.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.5.3   Claims  under Article s 3.1 of the SPS Agreement (continued)  
7.5.3.1   Assessing the EU -wide ban in light of the relevant international standard in 
order to determine whether it is "based on" such standard  
7.488.   In section 7.5.1.3.4  above we discerned the meaning of the relevant international 
standards in this dispute, articulated in the Terres trial Code. At the end of that section we 
observed that as a result of our examination of the meaning of the relevant international standards 
applicable to non -treated products in the light of the parties' arguments and of the circumstances 
in this dispute , we concluded that before comparing the EU -wide ban with those standards for the 
purposes of determining whether that measure is "based on" them, we considered it appropriate 
and instructive for us to turn to our examination of the European Union's claims  under Article 6 of 
the SPS Agreement.685 After conducting our examination of the European Union's claims under 
Article 6 and reaching the respective findings, we now resume our examination of whether the EU -
wide ban is based on the relevant provisions of th e Terrestrial Code applicable to the non -treated 
products at issue.  
7.489.   In section 7.5.1.3.2  above we explained the applicable legal standard under Article 3.1 of 
the SPS Agreement. For a measure to be based on a relevant internat ional standard it should be 
"founded", "built upon" or "supported by" such a standard. Moreover, if a measure is found to 
contradict, that is, fundamentally depart s from the standard , it cannot be properly concluded that 
such an international standard has been used "as a basis for" the respective measure.686 In light of 
these criteria, we now turn to examine the question of whether the EU -wide ban is "based on" the 
relevant provisions of the Terrestrial Code.  
7.490.   We recall that the provisions of the Terrestrial Code relating to ASF status provide for 
recognition of ASF -free countries, zones, and compartments. Thus, Articles 15.1.2, 15.1.3 and 
15.1.4 each make reference to an ASF -free "country", "zone" or "compartment" on an equal 
footing , without imposing any seq uence, preference or hierarchy amongst the three terms. 
Moreover, pursuant to Articles 15.1.5 (applicable to trade of live pigs), 15.1.12 (applicable to trade 
in pork meat and pork meat preparations) and 15.1.14 (applicable to pork meat preparations), 
trade of certain pig and pork products is safe when they originate from animals located in an ASF-
free country or zone.687  
7.491.   In section 7.5.2.3.5  above we conclude that the European Union provided Russia with the 
necessary evidence to  objectively demonstrate that areas in the European Union outside Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland are free of ASF and are likely to remain so.688 
7.492.   We also recall that, pursuant to the 2006 Memorandum689, the wording of the bilateral 
veterinary certificat e that had been agreed between the European Union and Russia allows 
importation of the products concerned accompanied by an attestation that the products at issue 
"…originate from premises and/or administrative territory of the EU Member State that are 
officially free from the following contagious diseases: African swine fever - during the last 3 years 
in the territory of the EU excluding Sardinia" .690 Up to and until the first outbreak of ASF in 
                                               
685 See para. 7.330  above.  
686 See para. 7.254  above.  
687 See section 7.5.1.3.4.2  above.  
688 See section 7.5.2.3.5.4  above.  
689 European Union -Russia Memorandum of 4 April 2006 concerning pri nciples of zoning and 
compartmentalization in the veterinary field  (Exhibit EU -61). 
690 Veterinary certificate for piglets for fattening  (Exhibit EU -52). A similar language can be found in the 
following certificates :  Veterinary certificate for pigs for bree ding, exported from the EU into Russia, 
11/08/2006 (Veterinary certificate for pigs for breeding) (Exhibit EU -53); the Veterinary certificate for pork 
meat and raw meat preparations, exported from the EU into Russia, 11/08/2006 (Veterinary certificate for pork 
meat and raw meat preparations) (Exhibit EU -54); the Veterinary certificate for slaughter pigs, exported from 
the EU to Russia, 16/12/2009 (Veterinary certificate for slaughter pigs)(Exhibit EU -55); the Veterinary 
certificate for finished food product s, containing raw material of animal origin, exported from the EU to Russia, 
24/05/2011 (Veterinary certificate for finished food products) (Exhibit EU -56); the Veterinary certificate for 
canned meat, salamis and other ready for consumption meat products, exported from the EU to Russia, 
24/05/2011 (Veterinary certificate for canned meat, salamis and other ready for consumption meat 
products)(Exhibit EU -57). WT/DS475/R  
 
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  Lithuania in January 2014, the entire European Union territory (with the exception of Sardinia) had 
been recognized by Russia as free of ASF for at least the "last 3 years". Following the outbreak of 
ASF in Lithuania, Russia banned certain products from all EU member States, even the other EU 
member States who had not  experienced an outbreak of ASF. The Panel recalls that each of the EU 
member States is individually a member of the OIE.691 
7.493.   Given that the relevant provisions of the Terrestrial Code call upon OIE members to allow 
for the possibility of recognitio n of ASF-free status (whether historically or on the basis of 
eradication) on a country or "zone" basis, the failure of Russia to even allow for the possibility for 
imports from the unaffected EU member States since January 2014 amounts, in our view, to a 
"fundament al departure" from the provisions of the Terrestrial Code  dealing with ASF -free status , 
in particular, Articles 15. 1.2 through 15.1.4. Accordingly, we find that, in respect of non -treated 
products, the EU -wide ban contradicts the relevant international sta ndards and therefore it cannot 
be considered to be "based on" that standard for the purposes of Article 3.1 of the SPS 
Agreement.  
7.5.3.2   Conclusion  
7.494.   Based on the foregoing, we find that the EU -wide ban is not based on the Terrestrial Code 
and is consequently  incon sistent with Russia's obligation to base its SPS measures on international 
standards, pursuant to Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement.  
7.5.4   Claims under Article 8 and Annex C of the SPS Agreement  
7.5.4.1   Main arguments of the parties  
7.5.4.1.1   European Union  
7.495.   The European Union clai ms that Russia did and continues to fail to modify the measures at 
issue in order to permit the resumption of imports to Russia of the products at issue from non -
affected areas in the European Union and/or with respect to appropriately treated or processed  
products.  The European Union's claim under Article 8 and Annex C of the SPS Agreement refers to 
"the acceptance of EU regionalization measures".692 The European Union argues that Russia failed 
to ensure that procedures for checking and ensuring the fulfilm ent of SPS measures were 
undertaken and completed without undue delays and in a manner no less favourable for imported 
products than for like domestic products under Annex C(1)(a). The European Union further 
contends that Russia failed to observe its oblig ations in the operation of approval procedures as 
embodied in Annex C(1)(b). The European Union also claims that Russia failed to ensure that 
information requirements are limited to what is necessary for appropriate control, inspection and 
approval procedu res in Annex C(1)(c). In this respect, the European Union concludes that Russia's 
measures are in breach of Annex C(1)(a), (b) and (c) of the SPS Agreement and, consequently, of 
Article 8 of the SPS Agreement.  
7.5.4.1.2   Russia  
7.496.   Russia contends that the scope of contr ol, inspection and approval procedures as set out in 
Article 8 and Annex C of the SPS Agreement do not cover the European Union's claims and the 
evidence presented. In addition, Russia submits that even if the scope of Annex C did cover the 
measures subjec t to the European Union's claims, the European Union has not put forward 
sufficient evidence and has not met its burden of proof to establish the prima facie  case of a 
violation of Article 8 and Annex C(1)(a), (b) and (c) of the SPS Agreement. In respect o f the EU -
wide ban, Russia argues that the European Union failed to demonstrate that the "provisional" 
measures applied by Russia to the non -affected European Union areas are inconsistent with 
Article  8 and Annex C of the SPS Agreement. Russia asserts that it reviews its provisional 
measures on a regular basis, but the European Union's failure to provide sufficient information has 
resulted in the current delay. According to Russia, one or more of the Panel's experts has 
                                               
691 OIE responses to Panel question No. 27.  
692 European Union's second written submission, para. 161.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  considered relevant a number of the qu estions asked by Russia with respect to all the EU member 
States.693 
7.5.4.2   Main arguments of the third parties  
7.5.4.2.1   Brazil  
7.497.   Brazil refers to Russia's argument that negotiations leading up to the adoption of a 
procedure fall outside of the purview of Article 8 and Annex C of the SPS Agreement. Brazil 
considers that the existence of negotiations involving certain procedures is not, in itself, a decisive 
criterion for the determination of the applicability of Article 8.694 In addition, Brazil refers to the 
requirement to comp lete SPS procedures without undue delay, and highlights that the delay will be 
undue when it is unjustified, excessive, unwarranted or disproportionate.695 
7.5.4.2.2   United States  
7.498.   The United States considers that the European Union's claim under Article 8 and Annex C  
of the SPS Agreement is based on the incorrect premise that the measures at issue fall under the 
purview of those provisions, because they are not control, inspection, nor approval procedures of 
an existing SPS measure, but rather a request for modifying the scope of such a measure.696 
7.5.4.3   Analysis by the Panel  
7.5.4.3.1   Introduction  
7.499.   The European Union presents it claims under the provisions of the SPS Agreement related 
to control, inspection and approval procedures, in the following order: (i) Annex C(1), with 
particul ar reference to (a), (b) , and (c); and (ii) Article 8. The European Union argues that in light 
of its arguments presented under Annex  C(1), Russia has breached the provisions of Annex C(1) 
(a), (b) , and (c), and, consequently, Article 8.697 Russia presents i ts arguments under both Article 
8 and Annex C(1), including the relevant sub -provisions of Annex C(1)(a), (b) , and (c).  
7.500.   The Panel is called upon to examine the scope of application of Article 8 and Annex C of 
the SPS Agreement, and to assess the claims of inconsistency raised by the European Union in 
respect of Annex C(1)(a), (b), and (c). Before turning to the corresponding assessment, we refer 
to the relevant legal provisions.  
7.5.4.3.2   Relevant legal provisions  
7.501.   Article 8 of the SPS Agreement, entitled "Control, I nspection and Approval Procedures", 
provides:  
Members shall observe the provisions of Annex C in the operation of control, 
inspection and approval procedures, including national systems for approving the use 
of additives or for establishing tolerances for contaminants in foods, beverages or 
feedstuffs, and otherwise ensure that their procedures are not inconsistent with the 
provisions of this Agreement.  
7.502.   Annex C of the SPS Agreement is entitled "Control, Inspection and Approval Procedures". 
An accompanying f ootnote is attached to the title of Annex C, which states that:  
[7] Control, inspection and approval procedures include inter alia, procedures for 
sampling, testing and certification.  
                                               
693 Russia's Comment to the experts' responses to Panel Questions 12 -13. 
694 Brazil's third -party submission, paras. 22 -27 
695 Brazil's third -party submission, paras. 28 -33. 
696 United States' third -party submission, paras. 12 -18. 
697 European Union's first written su bmission, para. 344.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.503.   Annex C(1) provides , in relevant part, that:  
1. Members shall ensure, w ith respect to any procedure to check and ensure the 
fulfilment of sanitary or phytosanitary measures, that:  
(a) such procedures are undertaken and completed without undue delay 
and in no less favourable manner for imported products than for like 
domestic products;  
(b) the standard processing period of each procedure is published or that 
the anticipated processing period is communicated to the applicant upon 
request; when receiving an application, the competent body promptly 
examines the completeness of the  documentation and informs the 
applicant in a precise and complete manner of all deficiencies; the 
competent body transmits as soon as possible the results of the 
procedure in a precise and complete manner to the applicant so that 
corrective action may be taken if necessary; even when the application 
has deficiencies, the competent body proceeds as far as practicable with 
the procedure if the applicant so requests; and that upon request, the 
applicant is informed of the stage of the procedure, with any dela y being 
explained;  
(c) information requirements are limited to what is necessary for 
appropriate control, inspection and approval procedures, including for 
approval of the use of additives or for the establishment of tolerances for 
contaminants in food, be verages or feedstuffs;  
7.504.   Article  8 of the SPS Agreement requires Members to "observe the provisions of Annex  C in 
the operation of control, inspection and approval procedures", thereby incorporating the disciplines 
of Annex  C into the operative part of the S PS Agreement. This is consistent with the language of 
Article  1.3 of the SPS Agreement, which states that "[t]he annexes are an integral part of 
th[e] Agreement". Thus, the non -observance of the obligations in Annex  C(1) "implies a violation 
of Article  8".698  Accordingly, the Panel will first determine whether Russia has breached its 
obligations under Annex  C(1)(a), (b) , and (c). A ruling that Russia has breached obligations under 
Annex  C will consequently mean that Article  8 has also been breached.  
7.505.   As Russi a contests that the challenged actions of Russia fall within the scope of Article  8 
and Annex  C(1) of the SPS Agreement, the Panel will first address whether Article  8 and 
Annex  C(1) of the SPS Agreement are applicable to Russia's actions. If we find that the challenged 
actions fall within the scope of these provisions, we will proceed to assess the European Union's 
claims of inconsistency with Annex  C(1)(a)  through  (c), and, consequently, Article 8.  
7.5.4.3.3   Whether the challenged actions of Russia fall within the scope of Article 8 and 
Annex C(1) of the SPS Agreement  
7.5.4.3.3.1   The European Union's complaint  
7.506.   In its panel request, the European Union alleges that the measures at issue breach:  
Article 8 and Annex C.1(a), (b) and (c) of the SPS Agreement , because Russia failed 
and fails to modify the measures at issue in order to permit the resumption of imports 
to Russia of the products at issue from non -affected areas in the EU and/or with 
respect to appropriately treated or processed products. The EU repeatedly approached 
Russia since early February 2014 in order to achieve an adaptation of the measures at 
issue to the regional conditions in the EU. Russia was provided with all requested 
information, in addition to further information, provided at the EU's own initiative. 
                                               
698 Panel Report, US – Poultry (China) , para.  7.394. See also Panel Report, US – Animals , para. 7.62. 
The panel in EC - Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products  found that failure to observe the provisions of 
Annex C of the SPS Agreeme nt implies a consequential breach of Article 8.  Panel Report s, EC – Approval and 
Marketing of Biotech Products , para. 7.1569. WT/DS475/R  
 
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  Furth ermore, a series of bilateral meetings were held between the EU authorities and 
the Russian authorities between February and June 2014, at which further information 
and explanations were provided. The resulting undue delay is reflected, inter alia , in: 
- the letter of the Russian Federal Service for Veterinary and 
Phytosanitary Supervision of 12 March 2014 (FS -SD-4/3620);  
- the failure to reply to invitations by EU authorities of 31 January 
and 14  February  2014 for urgent meetings;  
- the failure to reply to  additional information and explanations 
provided by the EU, with letter of 21 May 2014 ;  
- requesting answers to questions where the EU already provided 
exhaustive replies – with a letter dated 16 May 2014, which however 
reached the EU only on 4 June 2014  (FS-EN-8/7999);  
- requesting answers to questions irrelevant to the case (e.g. 
information on establishments in unaffected areas graded by production 
volume and biosecurity);  
- the belated provisions of invitations for visas for a technical 
meeting agre ed on 21  February to take place 24 -25 February 2014, which 
finally only took place on 7  March 2014. Accordingly, Russia failed to 
observe the provisions of Annex C of the SPS Agreement on the operation 
of control, inspection and approval procedures and oth erwise failed to 
ensure that its procedures are not inconsistent with the provisions of the 
SPS Agreement, as required by Article 8 of the SPS Agreement.  
Furthermore, Russia failed to ensure, with respect to its procedures for checking and 
ensuring the ful filment of sanitary measures, that such procedures have been 
undertaken and completed without undue delay and in no less favourable manner for 
imported products than for like domestic products, as required by Annex C.1(a) to the 
SPS Agreement.  
With respect  to Annex C.1(b) to the SPS Agreement, Russia failed to ensure that the 
standard processing period of each procedure is published or that the anticipated 
processing period is communicated to the applicant upon request; that when receiving 
an application, t he competent body promptly examines the completeness of the 
documentation and informs the applicant in a precise and complete manner of all 
deficiencies; that the competent body transmits, as soon as possible, the results of 
the procedure in a precise and complete manner to the applicant, so that corrective 
action may be taken if necessary; that even when the application has deficiencies, the 
competent body proceeds, as far as practicable, with the procedure if the applicant so 
requests; and that upon reque st, the applicant is informed of the stage of the 
procedure, with any delay being explained.  
Finally, as regards Annex C.1(c) to the SPS Agreement, Russia failed to ensure that 
information requirements are limited to what is necessary for appropriate cont rol, 
inspection and approval procedures.699 
7.507.   In the course of the Panel proceedings the European Union posits, in respect of Article  8 
and Annex  C of the SPS Agreement, that the acceptance of the European Union's regionalization 
measures is not a negotiation between two Members, as argued by Russia, but instead an 
objective exchange of information requiring the decision of the importing Member.700 The 
European Union enumerates a series of events, dating from early February 2014, which it argues 
constitutes undue  delay encountered in the process, including  (i)  Russia's repeated request for 
                                               
699 European Union's panel request, p. 5 (WT/DS475/2).  
700 European Union's second written submission, para. 162.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  information previously provided; (ii) Russia's requests for irrelevant information; or (iii) Russia's 
failure to reply to additional information and explanations submitted by t he European Union.701  
7.508.   Russia argues that the European Union, in its claim of Russia's undue delay in responding 
to communications/meeting requests, only provides some information on discussions and 
exchanges that have taken place between Russia and the Euro pean Union.702 Russia argues that 
the evidence the European Union provided distorts the overall picture of the constant information 
exchange and intensive negotiations concerning regionalization, including the numerous 
explanations provided by Russia in rela tion to the insufficiency of submitted information. Russia 
concludes that the European Union has merely asserted a violation of Article 8 and Annex C(1)(a) 
by pointing to alleged delays in evaluating requests for regionalization without demonstrating that 
these delays were "undue". Russia submits that even if the scope of the procedures covered the 
measures subject to the European Union's claims the European Union has not put forward 
sufficient evidence and has not met its burden of proof to establish the prima facie  case of a 
violation of Article 8 and Annex C(1)(a), (b) and (c) of the SPS Agreement.  
7.509.   To the extent that the European Union is challenging Russia's non -acceptance to date of 
the European Union's request for recognition of ASF -free areas, we see no obligation in Article 8 or 
Annex C(1)(a)  through  (c) that mandates a particular outcome  in respect of the procedures they 
address.703 We understand, nevertheless, that the European Union is challenging Russia's process 
of consideration of its request for recognition of ASF -free areas, in particular, relating to certain 
information requested by Russia.704  
7.510.   Accordingly, we first examine whether such a process falls within the scope of application 
of Article 8 and Annex C. In this examination, we will consider whether the identified actions of 
Russia, as the responding Member, constituted "any procedures" that fall within the scope of 
Article 8 and Annex C(1). If so, we will consider whether those procedures were aimed at 
"checking and ensuring the fulfilment of  sanitary or phytosanitary measures."705  
7.5.4.3.3.2   Scope of control, inspection and approval procedures  
"Any" procedure  
7.511.   The European Union highlights  several provisions within the SPS Agreement to support its 
argument that Russia's challenged actions fall within the scope of Annex C(1) and Article 8, such 
as Article 6.3, footnote 7 to the SPS Agreement, Article 4.1, as well as making reference to the 
SPS Committee Guidelines on Article 6. 706 The European Union does not view the acceptance of 
the regionalization measure s as a "negotiation" between two different Members. It is rather an 
objective exchange of information and the decision of the importing Member is to be taken with 
                                               
701 European Union's f irst written submission, para. 339; response to Panel question No. 194, 
paras.  383-384; and second written submission, paras. 161, and 167 -183. 
702 Russia's first written submission, paras. 432 -433. With regard to Article 8 and Annex C(1)(a), Russia 
highligh ts that the European Union in its claims refers to "non -affected areas in the EU", but does not identify 
what it means by this reference. Russia indicates that it presents its arguments on the assumption that the 
European Union refers to Estonia, Latvia, L ithuania, and Poland.  
703 We do not mean to say that there is no core obligation in these provisions to reach a decision (see 
Panel Reports, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products , para. 7.1494) . Rather, these provisions 
foresee a requirement to con duct a procedure and reach a final determination, whether it be positive or 
negative. See, for example, Panel Report, US – Animals , para. 7.112.  
704 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Apples , para. 420 ff.  The Appellate Body report on Australia – 
Apples  clarified that a complainant enjoys discretion in identifying the measures at issue and the panel should 
not conflate the requirement to identify the measures at issue with the requirement to identify the legal basis 
of the complaint.  This clarification was g iven in the part of the report in which the Appellate Body determined 
whether the panel erred in finding that the claims under Annex C(1)(a) and Article 8 of the SPS Agreement 
were outside of its term of reference. Article 6.2 of the DSU does not impose an y additional requirement, as 
the Panel's analysis implies, that a complainant must, in its request for establishment of a panel, demonstrate 
that the identified measure at issue causes the violation of, or can violate, the relevant obligation.  The 
questio n of whether the measures identified in the panel request can violate , or cause the violation of , the 
obligation in Annex C(1)(a) and Article 8 is a substantive issue to be addressed and resolved on the merits. 
Appellate Body Report, Australia – Apples , para. 42 5. 
705 See, for example, Panel Report, US - Animals , para 7.71.  
706 European Union's second written submission, para. 155.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  consideration of the objective and rational factors of the kind non -exhaustively enunciated i n the 
second sentence of Article 6.2 of the SPS Agreement. It follows from the above that the European 
Union's claims pursuant to Annex C and Article 8 fall within the type of situations contemplated by 
those legal texts.707 
7.512.   Russia argues that the definition  of control, inspection and approval procedures as set out 
in Article 8 and Annex C does not cover the European Union's claims and the evidence 
presented.708 Russia submits that the scope of these procedures must be understood in light of 
Footnote 7 to Annex  C which emphasizes procedural aspects of sampling, testing and certification. 
Russia also notes that the term "approval" procedure is conspicuously absent from the language of 
Article 6.3 of the SPS Agreement. In Russia's view, this provides additional su pport to the 
argument that "inspection, testing and other relevant procedures" mentioned in Article  6.3 should 
be read to include only procedures to check and ensure fulfilment  of measures adopted in 
response to regionalization requests.  Russia  asserts th at the provisions concern procedures of 
putting products on a market and not actions or events leading to adoption or revision of 
procedures.709  Thus, Article 8 and Annex C do not apply to Russia because neither the text in 
Article 8 and Annex C of the SPS Agreement nor the case law suggests that the interpretation of 
the term "control, inspection and approval procedures" can be stretched to include negotiations 
between Members leading up to the adoption of a procedure.710 
7.513.   In addition, Russia endorses, in its response to the Panel's questions711, the argument of 
the United States in its third-party submission that "processes for modifying a measure" must be 
distinguished from "procedures to check and ensure fulfilment of that (unmodified) measure" and 
that Articl e 8 of the SPS Agreement covers the latter and not the former.712 Russia also supports 
the United States' argument that Annex C applies to "products" and not "countries or regions of 
origin"713, stating that Annex C procedures concern products and not negotiat ions related to 
regionalization requests or revisions to a certification mechanism, as the European Union asserted 
in its first written submission.714  
7.514.   We consider that Article 8 and Annex C cover a broad range of procedures.715 Apart from 
specifying that the procedures be aimed at "checking and ensuring the fulfilment of sanitary or 
phytosanitary measures"716, Annex C(1) does not specify or exclude any type of procedures from 
its application .717 The use of the terms "including" (Article 8) and "include, inter alia " (footnote 7 to 
Annex C), in conjunction with the reference to "any procedure" (Annex C(1)) shows that the lists 
of measures contained in the provisions at issue are merely illustrative and not exhaustive.718 In 
particular, we see nothing in Article 8 and A nnex  C(1) that would exclude procedures linked to the 
                                               
707 European Union's second written submission, para. 162. See also second written submission, 
paras.  158-162. 
708 Russia's first writt en submission, para. 418.  
709 Russia's first Written submission, para. 420.  
710 Russia's first written submission, para. 423.  
711 Russia's response to Panel question No. 200, paras. 383 -385. 
712 Russia's response to Panel question No. 200, para. 383.  
713 United Stat es' third -party submission, para. 17.  
714 Russia's response to Panel questions, para. 384.  
715 We find support for our approach in the panel report in US – Animals , where the panel agreed with 
the Appellate Body finding in Australia – Apples  and the panel find ing in US – Poultry (China)  that Article 8 and 
Annex C cover a broad range of procedures (Panel Report, US – Animals , paras. 7.67 -7.68). In particular, we 
agree with the view of the Panel in US-Poultry  (China)  that the application of Annex C(1) (and other SPS 
provisions) is not dictated by the title or the characterization given to a measure by the Member maintaining it. 
"…the Panel considers that the application of specific provisions of the SPS Agreement, such as Annex C(1), is 
by no means restricted to t he title or the characterization of an SPS measure given to that measure by the 
WTO Member maintaining it". Panel Report, US – Poultry (China) , para. 7.372.  
716 Panel Report, US - Animals , para 7.71.  
717 Article 6.3 of the SPS Agreement refers to "inspection a nd…other relevant procedures".  Annex C and 
Article 8 also refer to "inspection, control and approval procedures." The language used in Article 6.3 contains 
no express reference to "approval" procedures.  However, the inclusive nature of its reference to " other 
relevant procedures" does not exclude the possibility that approval procedures could be covered in that 
provision (an issue which we do not need to decide here). Moreover, the context of the reference in Article 6.3 
relates to access being granted by  the exporting Member to the importing Member for such procedures, which 
is not an issue central to the parties' arguments in this case.  
718 Panel Report, US - Animals , para. 7.68 (referring to Appellate Body Report, Australia – Apples , 
para. 76 in the conte xt of Annex A(1) of the SPS Agreement).  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  determinations of the disease status of certain geographic regions from their scope of 
application.719  
7.515.   Contrary to Russia's arguments, we see no basis in the language of these provisions that 
would supp ort the view that the covered procedures are limited to those addressing products, and 
thus that the process of consideration/determinations of the disease -status of certain geographic 
regions would be excluded from the scope of Article 8 and Annex C. Cont rary to Russia's 
arguments, and those of the United States as a third party in this dispute, the references in 
subparagraphs (a), (d), (f) and (h) of Annex C as referring to "products" and not "countries or 
regions of origin" does not preclude the possibil ity that the process of consideration of requests for 
regionalization may fall within the scope of Annex C(1).  
7.516.   We recall that the process at issue in this dispute is Russia's process of consideration of 
the European Union's request for the recognition of ASF-free areas within the European Union. 
While the immediate objective of such process concerns the recognition of ASF -free status of 
certain areas within the European Union, the ultimate effect of this process is to determine 
whether, and which, imports w ould be authorized from the European Union. We agree with the 
view of the panel in US – Animals  that "[t]he ultimate effect of any procedure to designate a 
particular region with a 'disease status' is to determine what SPS measures should be applied to 
the products originating from that region."720 We further agree with the determination of that 
panel that the impact of the challenged procedures on imports must be taken into account in 
determining whether such procedures are "any procedures" under the meaning  of Article 8 and 
Annex C(1).721  
7.517.   As we have explained, Russia's SPS framework applicable to animal diseases refers in the 
case of ASF to accepting products that come from ASF-free areas.722 In this respect, Russia's 
process of consideration of the European Un ion's request for recognition of ASF -free areas is 
interlinked with the imposition and perpetuation, as well as the geographical and product scope, of 
the EU -wide ban. It is therefore determinative for the placing of products from the European Union 
on Rus sia's market.  
7.518.   We therefore find that that Russia's challenged actions constitute "procedures" that fall 
within the scope of Article 8 and Annex C(1). Having reached this conclusion, we next turn to 
consider whether these procedures were "to check and ensur e the fulfilment of sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures".  
7.5.4.3.3.3   To "check and ensure" the "fulfilment" of SPS measures  
7.519.   Article 8 and Annex C(1) apply to the procedures dealing with control, inspection and 
approval "which are aimed at checking and ensuring the fu lfilment of SPS measures ".723 
Annex  A(1) defines "sanitary or phytosanitary measure" as any measure applied to achieve any of 
the objectives set out therein. We consider that the phrase "to check and ensure the fulfilment of 
an SPS measure" means that Article 8 and Annex C cover any procedure to make certain that a 
measure applied to achieve one of the objectives in Annex A(1) is fulfilled, that is, fully 
implemented.724 The Appellate Body observed in this respect that "since the procedures referred to 
in Annex  C(1) are those that check and ensure fulfilment of SPS measures, this suggests that such 
measures exist prior to the operation, undertaking, or completion of, the relevant procedures, as 
the latter seek and ensure fulfilment with the former" .725 
                                               
719 Panel Report, US - Animals , para 7.71.  
720 Panel Report, US - Animals , paras. 7.69 (emphasis original).  
721 Panel Report, US - Animals , para. 7.70 (referring to Panel Report, US – Poultry (China) , para. 
7.368).  The pa nel explained that "[…] focusing solely on the immediate object of an importing Member's 
procedures, while losing sight of the ultimate effect of the completion of such procedures, might enable 
Members to avoid the application of Article 8 and Annex C by s imply parsing their regulatory processes 
between regional determinations and approvals to import".  
722 See Customs Union Decision No. 317  (Exhibit RUS -25).   
723 Panel Report, US – Poultry (China) , para. 7.356 . 
724 We find support for this approach in Panel Repo rt, US - Animals , para 7.73.  
725 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Apples , para. 436.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.520.   We therefor e examine whether Russia's procedure at issue checks and ensures the 
fulfilment of an SPS measure as defined in Annex A(1).  
7.521.   We recall our findings in paragraph  7.219  above that the EU -wide ban constitutes an 
SPS measure within the meaning of Annex A(1), and, our findings in paragraph 7.517  above, that 
the procedures at issue – Russia's process for considering the European Union's request for ASF 
regionalization – are interlinked with the imposition a nd perpetuation, as well as the geographical 
and product scope, of the EU -wide ban and the country -wide bans on imports of the products at 
issue into Russia.  We therefore find that the procedures at issue are aimed at checking and 
ensuring fulfilment of an  SPS measure and thus  fall within the scope of Article 8 and Annex  C(1).  
7.522.   Russia has insisted726 that the EU -wide ban was adopted on the basis of the 2006 
memorandum727 and of the bilateral veterinary certificates728; both which were already in 
existence. Furth ermore, the EU -wide ban was clearly adopted in connection with Russia's 
overarching SPS regulation on animal diseases, as contained in Customs Union Decision 317.729 
Against this backdrop, we consider that the procedure at issue (i.e. Russia's process of 
consideration of the European Union's request for the recognition of ASF-free areas within the 
European Union ), is focused on determining whether the epizootic situation in the European Union 
warrants an adaptation of the veterinary certificates bilaterally a greed in 2006. In this vein, the 
procedure at issue concerns checking fulfilment of a measure that is already in existence  covered 
by Article 8 and Annex C(1) of the SPS Agreement  (rather than constituting "negotiations" 
concerning regionalization and revi sions to certificates that would fall into the category of 
processes for modifying a measure).  
7.523.   We now turn to our examination of the consistency of the process at issue with paragraphs 
(a) through (c) of Annex C(1).  
7.5.4.3.4   Whether the procedure at issue was under taken in accordance with 
Annex  C(1)(a)  through (c) of the SPS Agreement  
7.5.4.3.4.1   Order of analysis  
7.524.   We recall that the European Union has raised claims in respect of paragraphs (a) through 
(c) of Annex C(1) of the SPS Agreement. As we have already noted730, we are fre e to structure the 
order of our analysis of the European Union's claims taking into account the circumstances of the 
present case, in a manner that is consistent with the structure and logic of the provisions at 
issue.731 Most of the European Union's argumen ts and evidence have focused on the fact that 
Russia has requested unnecessary evidence, which was not examined in a timely fashion, raising 
alleged violations of paragraphs (c) and (a) of Annex C(1). Furthermore, the European Union, in a 
summary fashion, addresses other potential violations concerning paragraph (b) of Annex C(1).  
7.525.   Based on the foregoing, we will continue our analysis with the formulation of the legal test 
in respect of paragraphs (a) through (c) of Annex C(1). Following the legal test we wi ll examine 
whether the procedures at issue breach paragraph (c) of Annex C(1), followed by our 
corresponding examination in respect of paragraphs (a) and then (b) of Annex C(1).  
                                               
726 Russia's first written submission, paras. 343 and 345; response to Panel question No. 78, para. 129; 
and second written submission, paras. 171 -174. 
727 European Union -Russia Memorandum of 4 April 2006 concerning principles of zoning and 
compartmentalization in the veterinary field  (Exhibit EU -61). 
728 See fn 117 above.  
729 Customs Union Decision No. 317  (Exhibit RUS -25). 
730 See para. 7.29 above . 
731 Appellate Body Reports, Canada – Autos , para.  151; and Canada – Wheat Exports and Grain 
Imports , para.  109. See also Panel Report, US – Animals , para. 7.13.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.5.4.3.4.2   Legal test  
Annex C(1)(a) of the SPS Agreement, first clause  
7.526.   In this section we  provide an overview of the legal test applicable to the first clause of 
subparagraph (a) of Annex C(1).  
"Undertaken and completed"  
7.527.   The terms of Annex C(1)(a) require the Panel to ascertain whether the procedures at issue 
were "undertaken and completed wit hout delay". The terms "undertaken" and "completed" are 
distinct, and the obligations flowing from these distinct terms are susceptible to being interpreted 
separately. The term "undertake" refers to the beginning732 or commencement733 of the approval 
procedur e, while the term "complete" indicates that "approval procedures are not only to be 
undertaken, but are also to be finished, or concluded".734 Accordingly, "undertaken and completed 
without undue delay" includes not only no undue delay in the commencement of  the procedure 
and its completion, but also in the intervening process that leads from commencement to 
completion.735 It is important to distinguish between the obligation to initiate, conduct and 
conclude a procedure (which is envisaged by this provision), and any requirement to come to a 
particular outcome (which is not envisaged by this provision): the requirement embodied in Annex 
C(1)(a) is simply to issue a final determination regardless of whether it be positive or negative.736 
Without undue delay  
7.528.   Annex C(1)(a) requires that the procedures at issue are undertaken and completed 
"without undue delay". The analysis of an "undue delay" claim under Article 8 and Annex C(1)(a) 
requires two steps.  
7.529.   First, the complainant must establish that there has been a dela y. We recall that the panel 
in US – Animals  opined that "an inaction or an inability to proceed on the substance of the 
application would constitute something outside the normal course of the procedure and should be 
considered a delay within the meaning of  Article 8 and Annex C(1)(a)."737 The panel in US – 
Animals viewed Annex C(1)(a) as requiring competent authorities to actively engage with the 
applicant Member on the substance of the application. That panel further highlighted that a 
determination of "dela y" must be made in light of the nature and complexity of the procedure to 
be undertaken and completed.738 With these considerations in mind, in our examination of whether 
there have been delays, we consider whether there have been periods of inaction or inab ility to 
proceed on the substance of the application.  
7.530.   Second, the complainant must establish that the delay was undue.739 The panel in EC — 
Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products found that based on its ordinary meaning the phrase 
"without undue delay" i n Annex C(1)(a), first clause, requires that "approval procedures be 
undertaken with no unjustifiable loss of time".740 The Appellate Body in Australia — Apples referred 
to the dictionary meanings of the words "undue" and "delay" in establishing the meaning of the 
phrase "without undue delay". The Appellate Body stated:  
Annex C(1)(a) contains an obligation that relevant procedures be undertaken and 
completed "without undue delay". In this regard, the ordinary meaning of the word 
"delay" relates to "(a period of) time lost by inaction or inability to proceed". The term 
"undue" means something "that ought not to be or to be done, inappropriate, 
                                               
732 Panel Report s, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech  Products , para.  7.1494.  
733 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Apples , para.  438. 
734 Panel Report s, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products , para.  7.1494 . 
735 Panel Report, US - Animals , para 7.112.  
736 Panel Report, US - Animals , para 7.112.  
737 Panel Rep ort, US - Animals , para 7.113.  
738 Panel Report, US - Animals , para 7.114.  
739 We find support for this approach in Panel Report, US - Animals , para 7.115.  
740 Panel Reports, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products , para. 7.1495. See Panel Reports, 
US – Animals , para. 7.115; and US – Poultry (China) , para.  7.354.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  unsuitable, improper, unrightful, unjustifiable", or "going beyond what is warranted or 
natural; excessive, disproporti onate". Thus, Annex C(1)(a) requires Members to 
ensure that relevant procedures are undertaken and completed with appropriate 
dispatch, that is, they do not involve periods of time that are unwarranted, or 
otherwise excessive, disproportionate or unjustifi able.741 
7.531.   In Australia — Apples , the Appellate Body concluded that "[w]hether a relevant procedure 
has been unduly delayed is therefore not an assessment that can be done in the abstract, but one 
which requires a case -by-case analysis as to the reasons for th e alleged failure to act with 
appropriate dispatch, and whether such reasons are justifiable".742 
7.532.   The panel in US – Animals  relied on the guidance provided by the panel in EC – Approval 
and Marketing of Biotech Products  on the types of circumstances that mig ht justify a delay.743 
First, delays attributable to action or inaction of an applicant cannot be held against the Member 
carrying out the procedure.744 Second, delays which "are justified in their entirety" by the 
Members' need "to determine with adequate con fidence whether their relevant SPS  requirements 
are fulfilled" should not be considered undue.745 Third, if "new or additional information becomes 
available at a late stage in an approval procedure" and that information may reasonably be 
considered to "have a potential impact on a Member's determination", it "might be justifiable for 
the Member concerned to delay the completion of the procedure" in order to assess the 
information.746  
7.533.   Moreover, the panel in EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products noted that:  
[A] Member which finds it appropriate to follow a prudent and precautionary approach 
in assessing and approving applications concerning GMOs or GMO -derived products, 
might, for instance, be justified in requesting for further information or clarific ation of 
an applicant in a situation where another Member considers that the information 
available is sufficient to carry out its assessment and reach a decision on an 
application.747  Whether a particular request is a reflection of genuine caution and 
prude nce or whether it is a pretext to delay the completion of a procedure would need 
to be determined in the light of all relevant facts and circumstances.748 
7.534.   The Panel in EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products also referred to situations 
where the time  to complete an approval procedure might entail an undue delay. A first example 
would be when a Member exceeds the time that is reasonably needed to check and ensure the 
fulfilment of its relevant SPS requirements, for instance because that Member did not proceed as 
expeditiously as could be expected in the circumstances.749 A second situation would be when 
there are delays caused by measures which, absent other causes for delay (such as natural 
disasters or unexpected sharp increase in workload), are not bas ed on scientific evidence.750 In 
addition, the panel found that if a "Member causes undue delay at any stage in an approval 
procedure, this would constitute a breach of the provisions of Annex C(1)(a), first clause" .751 
Where information requested is unnecessa ry or irrelevant, an applicant cannot be held responsible 
for any delays in relation to the gathering of such information.   
                                               
741 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Apples , para. 437.  
742 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Apples , para. 437.  
743 Panel Report, US - Animals , para . 7.116.  
744 Panel Reports, EC – Approval and Marke ting of Biotech Products , para.  7.1497; and US- Poultry 
(China) , para. 7.354.  
745 Panel Reports, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products , para.  7.1498.  
746 Panel Reports, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products , para.  7.1498.  
747 (footnote origin al) We recall that pursuant to Annex  C(1)(c) of the SPS Agreement  information 
requirements must be limited to what is necessary for appropriate approval procedures.  
748 Panel Reports, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products , para.  7.1522.  
749 Panel Rep orts, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products , para.  7.1499.  
750 Panel Reports, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products , para.  7.1500.  
751 Panel Reports, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products , para.  7.1502.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.535.   Mindful of this guidance, w e consider that a delay is undue if it is "unwarranted, or 
otherwise excessive, disproportionate or unju stifiable" .752 In considering whether the European 
Union's allegation of "delay" can be considered to be "undue  delay", we will examine whether the 
delay is unwarranted, or otherwise excessive, disproportionate or unjustifiable.  
7.536.   The panel in US – Animals  disagreed with the responding Member that the need to "re -
confirm and update" pre -existing information constitutes, in and of itself, a justification for the 
delay in the completion of a control, inspection or approval procedure.753 In its explanation, the 
panel in US – Animals referred to the panel report for EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech 
Products  which found that when " new or additional " relevant information becomes available, a 
Member may reasonably "delay the completion of the procedure" in order to assess it. However, 
the panel in US – Animals further explained that "taking time to assess relevant new or additional 
information is not the same as taking time to re -confirm and update information already 
received" .754 The panel further determined that "[i]t is inevitable that the situation in any Member 
or region will change and cannot remain static; the longer the evaluation process takes, the more 
likely the need to 're -confirm and update' the submitted information."755 In that panel's view, to 
accept t he respondent's argument as justifying the delay in that case "would seriously undermine 
the obligations in Annex  C(1)(a), for if a WTO Member could indefinitely postpone the completion 
of a procedure by invoking the need to reconfirm information that had become outdated by virtue 
of its own inaction, this would create a dangerous loophole in the disciplines of that provision and 
would reward behaviour opposite to the diligence called for by Annex  C(1)" .756 
Distinction between undue delay and a refusal to tak e SPS action  
7.537.   Although the Panel in EC — Approval and Marketing of Biotech Product declined to settle 
on a definitive meaning of what constitutes "undue delay", it did determine that Members cannot 
justify refusing to take substantive SPS decisions because of evolving science, scientific 
complexity, uncertainty, or limited available scientific information or data.757 In EC — Approval and 
Marketing of Biotech Products , the panel acknowledged that, in cases where scientific discoveries 
are likely to occur in a g iven field, delays could allow decisions that take into account latest 
evidence or fill the existing gaps in the scientific justification of the measure. However, the Panel 
took the view that the SPS Agreement, in Articles 5.1 and 5.7, offers the possibili ty to grant time -
limited approvals or refuse approvals at any stage of scientific knowledge, without occasioning 
undue delays.758 
Delay as a means of avoiding risk assessment  
7.538.   Moreover, the panel in EC — Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products observed tha t a 
Member may deliberately use delays as an instrument to manage or control risks: the Member 
would postpone the adoption of a measure which is at odds with the present legal framework, 
awaiting occurrence of better legislative conditions. The panel comme nted that this attitude would 
be inconsistent with Annex C(1)(a) and the SPS provisions addressing the risk assessment 
regime.759 
Annex C(1)(a) of the SPS Agreement, second clause  
7.539.   The second clause of Annex C(1)(a) requires that the procedures are undertaken  and 
completed in no less favourable manner for imported products than for like domestic products. In 
order to establish an inconsistency with Annex C(1)(a) second clause, a complainant must 
establish that the imported products have been treated in a "less  favourable manner" than 
                                               
752 Panel Report, US – Animal s, para. 7.129. With reference to the Appellate Body Report, Australia – 
Apples , para. 437 (referring to Panel Reports, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, para. 7.1495).  
753 Panel Report, US – Animals, para. 7.143.  
754 Panel Report, US – Animals,  para. 7.143 (emphasis original).  
755 Panel Report, US – Animals, para. 7.143.  
756 Panel Report, US – Animals, para. 7.143.  
757 Panel Report s, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products , para. 7.1526.  
758 Panel Report s, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products , para . 7.1527.  
759 Panel Report s, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products , para. 7.1517.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  domestic products with respect to the undertaking and completion of approval procedures.760 As 
Annex C(1)(a) second clause sets out a "national treatment obligation", the panel in EC — 
Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products referred to the past panel and Appellate Body rulings 
on Article III:1 and Article III:4 of the GATT 1994. The panel concluded that differential treatment 
of like products does not by itself demonstrate less favourable treatment. Additionally, an 
unfavourable r esult for an application for placing an imported product on the market would not be 
sufficient to establish less favourable treatment.761 
Annex C(1)(b) of the SPS Agreement  
Introduction  
7.540.   Annex C(1)(b) sets out five separate, but related, procedural obligation s to be observed by 
Members in the operation of their control, inspection and approval procedures:  
i. the publication or communication to applicants of the processing period of each 
procedure;  
ii. the examination of the completeness of the documentation and the communication 
to applicants of deficiencies;  
iii. the transmission of the results of the procedure;  
iv. the processing of applications which have deficiencies; and   
v. the provision of information about the stage of a procedure and the provision of an 
explanation of a ny delay.762 
Annex C(1)(b)(i): Publication or communication of processing period  
7.541.   Annex C(1)(b)(i) requires that "the standard processing period of each procedure is 
published or that the anticipated processing period is communicated to the applicant upon 
request".763 The words "upon request" indicate that the applicant must have formally asked the 
Member to communicate the information before a claim can be brought alleging the Member's 
breach of the provision.764  
Annex C(1)(b)(ii): Completeness of documentation  
7.542.   Annex C(1)(b) also requires that the competent body of a Member, when receiving an 
application, promptly examines the completeness of the documentation and informs the applicant 
in a precise and complete manner of all deficiencies.  
7.543.   In EC — Approval and Ma rketing of Biotech Products , the United States argued that 
because of the general moratorium on approvals, the European Communities did not promptly 
examine the completeness of documentation and inform applicants of any deficiencies. The Panel 
                                               
760 We find support for this approach in Panel Report s, EC - Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products , 
para. 7.2400 . We note that that panel set out a t wo-step test, with the second element being that the products 
at issue and the domestic products are "like" in nature.  In this dispute, the parties have not disagreed that the 
products at issue are "like ". We proceed on the basis that the products at iss ue are "like" for the purposes of 
our analysis here.  
761 Panel Report s, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products , para. 7.2408.  
762 Panel Report s, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products , paras. 7.1574  and 7.1582.  Similar 
to the panel's findings  in EC - Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, the panel in US – Animals  confirmed 
that Annex  C(1)(b) contains five procedural requirements to be observed by Members in carrying out control, 
inspection or approval procedures. Panel Report, US – Anima ls, para. 7.181.  
763 In EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products , the United States argued that as a result of its 
general moratorium on approvals, the European Communities did not follow the standard processing periods 
which are published in its appl icable approval legislation, the Panel ruled that the lack of publication was not a 
result of the measure at issue. Panel Reports, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products , paras. 7.1575 -
7.1576 and 7.1585 -7.1590.  
764 We find support for this approach in Panel Report, US – Animals , paras. 7.188 and 7.193.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  rejected thi s argument observing that the United States' challenge was not supported by evidence. 
The Panel concluded that the alleged lack of completed documentation was not the result of the 
measure at issue.765 
Annex C(1)(b)(iii): Transmission of results  
7.544.   Annex C(1)(b ) provides that the competent body of a Member transmits as soon as 
possible the results of the procedure in a precise and complete manner to the applicant so that 
corrective action may be taken if necessary.  
7.545.   In EC — Approval and Marketing of Biotech Produ cts, the United States raised the 
contention that under the measure at issue, the results of procedures were not promptly 
communicated to applicants so that corrective action could be taken. The Panel considered that the 
United States had failed to establi sh its claim under the third obligation contained in Annex C(1)(b) 
as it did not identify the results that were to be transmitted.766 
Annex C(1)(b)(iv): Processing of deficient applications  
7.546.   Annex C(1)(b) also provides that in a situation where the applicatio n has deficiencies, the 
competent body of a Member is expected to proceed as far as practicable with the procedure if the 
applicant so requests.  
7.547.   In EC — Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products , the United States complained that 
under the general morator ium, the respondent in that dispute did not proceed as far as practicable 
in the approval process. The panel disagreed with this view and commented that the complainant 
did not provide evidence of the applicant making such request and had the applicant mad e such 
request, the European Communities failure to proceed with procedures would not be a result of the 
measure at issue.767 
Annex C(1)(b)(v): Explanation of delay  
7.548.   Lastly, pursuant to Annex C(1)(b), upon request, the applicant is informed of the stage of 
the procedure, with any delay being explained.  
7.549.   The panel in EC — Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products , dismissed the United 
States' argument that the respondent did not comply with the fifth obligation under Annex C(1)(b). 
The panel found that the Uni ted States did not submit any evidence that it had made a request for 
an explanation of the delay.768 
7.550.   The panel in US – Animals carried out its analysis on the fifth obligation of the provision 
stating that the requirement of Annex  C(1)(b) is qualified by th e words "upon request", which 
indicate that the applicant must have formally asked the Member to communicate the information 
before a claim can be brought alleging the Member's breach of the provision.769 In that dispute, 
the panel found that the complaining  Member had contacted the responding Member repeatedly 
requesting explanations as to the state of progress of its import requests. On this basis, the panel 
in US – Animals determined that the responding Member was under an obligation to explain the 
delays in its approval processes in light of the inquiries by the complainant. In this regard, the 
panel concluded that the responding Member had violated Annex C(1)(b) by failing to inform the 
complainant of the precise stage of procedures or the reasons for the  delays.770 
Annex C(1)(c) of the SPS Agreement  
7.551.   Annex C(1)(c) necessitates that information requirements are limited to what is necessary 
for appropriate control, inspection and approval procedures, including for approval of the use of 
                                               
765 Panel Report s, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products , para. 7.1592.  
766 Panel Report s, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products , para.  7.1595.  
767 Panel Report s, EC – Approval and Market ing of Biotech Products , para. 7.1598.  
768 Panel Report s, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products , para. 7.1601.  
769 Panel Report, US – Animals , paras. 7.188 and 7.193.  
770 Panel Report, US – Animals, para. 7.195.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  additives or for the es tablishment of tolerances for contaminants in food, beverages or 
feedstuffs.771 
7.5.4.3.5   Whether the procedure at issue is consistent with Article 8 and Annex C(1)(a), 
C(1)(b) and C(1)(c)  
7.5.4.3.5.1   Introduction  
7.552.   As we have indicated, we consider that it is most appropriate for us to begin our 
examination of the European Union's claims under Article 8 and Annex C(1) with an assessment of 
the consistency of the procedure at issue with Annex C(1)(c). We thus begin with such assessment 
and then proceed with our examination pursuant to Annex C(1)(a) and C(1)(b).  
7.5.4.3.5.2   Whether the procedure at issue is inconsistent with Annex C(1)(c)  
7.553.   The European Union posits that Russia's information requirements were not limited to what 
was necessary for the assessment of the European Union's regionalizati on measures in respect of 
ASF, thus breaching Annex C(1)(c).772 In support of this contention, the European Union referred 
to specific information requests that we examine below. Russia argues that the European Union did 
not make a prima facie  case and faile d to meet its burden of demonstrating that Russia violated 
Annex C(1)(c).773 
7.554.   In particular, t he European Union claims that Russia made certain requests of unnecessary 
information. Such requests are reflected in the letters that FSVPS sent to DG SANCO on 5 
February and 12 March 2014. Regarding the letter of 5 February 2014774, the European Union 
identifies the follow ing information as unnecessary and irrelevant: (i) swine population in personal 
subsidiary farming with detailed density by region; (ii) production volume of different farms and 
factories; (iii) volumes of exported wild boar meat and trophies; and, (iv) detailed information 
about foreign hunters. In its arguments, the European Union claims that the aforementioned 
requests were unnecessary to assess th e European Union's regionalization measures.775 In 
addition, the European Union contests the relevance of Russia's requests for information, done 
through the letter of 5 February 2014, which pertains to (i) pig farms and meat processing 
factories, including information about the suppliers and production volumes; and (ii) rough 
estimation of enterprises attested to ship animal products, by level of zoosanitary condition.776 The 
European Union argues that while this information might be relevant for compartmental ization, it 
is not relevant for regionalization. The European Union further claims that not only was Russia 
already in possession of the information with regard to attested pig farms and processing factories, 
but also that the requested information on the level of sanitary condition was also irrelevant for 
regionalization, as all farms in the free -regions are ASF -free.777 
7.555.   Regarding the letter of 12 March 2014778, the European Union considers that Russia 
requested the following unnecessary and irrelevant informa tion: (i) absence of any proof of non -
existence of ASF in the territory of other EU member States; and (ii) absence of any proof of 
                                               
771 Panel Report, Australia – Salmon (Arti cle 21.5 – Canada) , paras. 7.154 –7.157.  This is the only panel 
ruling to date on Annex C(1)(c).   The panel in Australia – Salmon (Article 21.5 – Canada)  ruled that only 
"procedures to check and ensure the fulfilment of sanitary or phytosanitary measures" fall under the scope of 
paragraph 1(c) of Annex C and not "substantive sanitary measures in their own right".  Panel Report, 
Australia  – Salmon (Article 21.5 – Canada) , para . 7.156.  
772 European Union's second written submission, para. 184.  
773 Russia's first w ritten submission, para. 441 . 
774 Russia's letter to the European Union of 5 February 2014, FS -SD 8/1640 (Exhibit EU –84). 
775 European Union's second written submission, paras. 168 -169. 
776 European Union's second written submission, para. 172. See also first wr itten submission, para. 339.  
777 European Union's second written submission, paras. 172 – 173. The European Union referred to 
similar information requests formulated through the letter of 16 May 2014, see second written submission, 
paras. 177 -178 (referring to Russia's letter to the European Union of 16 May 2014, FS -EN-8/7999  
(Exhibit  EU-93)). 
778 Russia's letter to the European Union of 12 March 2014, F S-SD-4/3620 (Exhibit EU -90/RUS -135). WT/DS475/R  
 
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  impossibility of getting meat of animals infected by ASF virus in the production cycle of pork from 
other EU member States.779  
7.556.   The European Union also claims that Russia, through the letter from FSVPS to DG SANCO 
dated 16 May 2014, requested answers to questions where the European Union had already 
provided exhaustive replies.780 Furthermore, the European Union contends that this letter also 
requested unnecessary information, such as that referring to  (i) zoo sanitary status of small farms 
(due to the big number of them in the territories of the infected/high risk zones with regard to 
ASF) and measure of their bio protection (possi bility of free range, feed base, the regime of 
introducing the newly arrived animals in the herd, etc.); and (ii) cartographical visual ization  of the 
establishments attested to supply live pigs and swine products from the EU member States 
(Poland and Lithu ania, in particular) to the Russia with indication of the raw material bases of 
these establishments.781 
7.557.   Moreover, the European Union argues that it has made clear to Russia that "no [infected] 
establishment is allowed to supply pig meat or pig meat products  to the establishments authorised 
to export to the Russian Federation."782 On this basis, the European Union posits that it has 
provided abundant evidence to substantiate its claims under Annex C and Article 8 of the SPS  
Agreement .783 
7.558.   In turn, Russia has argue d that these information requests are justified. According to 
Russia, the experts have confirmed that there has been an objective basis for Russia's requests .784  
7.559.   Among the questions that the Panel addressed to the experts, the Panel asked them to 
comment on  the relevance of the questions included in some of Russia's information requests for 
the purposes of assessing the relevant risks.785 The communications to which the Panel's question 
referred are those sent by Russia to the European Union or certain EU memb er States, dated 
                                               
779 European Union's first written submission, para. 339; and second writt en submission, para. 176.  
780 European Union's first written submission, para. 339 (referring to Russia's letter to the European 
Union of 16 May 2014, FS -EN-8/7999  (Exhibit EU -93)). 
781 European Union's second written submission,  paras. 177 -181. 
782 European Uni on's second written submission, para. 182.  
783 In its response to Panel Question 194, the European Union identified information requested by Russia 
in March 2014 that had already been provided or which was not relevant for the purposes of Russia's 
assessment  of the European Union's regionalization measures:  
– proof that the historically ASF -free regions all over the EU are actually free, contrary to the provisions 
of the OIE Terrestrial Code;  
- information about swine population in the industry sector and pe rsonal subsidiary farming with 
detailed density by region; detailed information about pig farms, pork processing factories and semi -finished 
products, graded by production volume; regulatory acts, providing for wild boar hunting and further utilization 
of killed animals (for food, as trophies); regulations on export of wild boar meat and trophies, number of killed 
animals and exported meat and trophies during 2013 -2014; detailed information about foreign hunters, who 
entered the EU member States to hunt wil d boar during the period 2013 -2014, detailed by region (including 
information about the number and the country of origin); detailed information about pig farms and meat 
processing factories attested to ship animals and products to the territory of the Cust oms Union, including 
information about the suppliers (number, country, region) and production volumes, detailed by region; rough 
estimation of enterprises attested to ship animal products to the territory of the Customs Union, by level of 
zoosanitary condi tion, equivalent to the previously conducted evaluation of the Russian and Belarusian 
enterprises, detailed by regions and graded by production volumes.  
784 Russia's closing statement at the second meeting with the Panel, para. 4. See also Russia's 
comments to the European Union's response to Panel question No. 322; and Russia's comments to the experts' 
responses to Panel questions Nos. 12 and 13.  
785 Panel question No. 13 to the experts.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  5 February 2014786, 12 March 2014787, 10 April 2014788, 16 May 2014789, 31 July 2014790, and 
1 December 2014.791 
7.560.   In his response to this question, Dr Brückner noted that the "intention and the magnitude 
of the information required is unclear." Dr Brüc kner further observed that  
The information normally required from an exporting country would be restricted to 
the pathogen concerned and the potential hazards related to that pathogen and from 
the area under dispute (ASF affected area) and would in general  require information 
that are not yet available from the exporting country (which in the case of exports 
from the EU to the Russian Federation would by default already be available for other 
animal and animal product exports). However, the information requ ested in Exhibit 
RUS-131, is in my opinion "an overkill" of which many of the questions are not relative 
or needed to conduct either a sensible quantitative or qualitative risk analysis.792 
7.561.   In her response to this question, Professor Penrith indicated that s uch information 
"appears to be the information that the EU might use to perform a very detailed risk assessment 
for spread of the virus in the EU".793 Professor Penrith further explained that all of the EU member 
States "cannot be considered to pose an equal  risk of ASF for Russia". Therefore, some information 
requested by Russia is irrelevant for certain areas in the European Union (i.e. wild boar 
populations and their movement in insular territories; and stamping out policies in territories which 
have never  experienced ASF or haven't done so in more than 20 years).794 Moreover, Professor 
Penrith indicated that the information required by Russia should be limited to a list of items she 
identified, and mentioned that more detail might be required from countries that have experienced 
outbreaks.795 Professor Penrith concluded her response by indicating that the "great majority of 
the information required is not relevant or necessary for a risk assessment by Russia".  
7.562.   In respect of the letter dated 5 February 2014 (Ex hibit EU -84), Dr Thomson noted that 
some of the questions contained in this exhibit are variations of other questions posed elsewhere 
by Russia, and indicated that for a country "that is not itself free of ASF this strikes me as an 
overkill and possibly an  attempt to 'muddy the water'."796 Regarding the letter dated 10  April 2014 
(Exhibit RUS -240), Dr Thomson noted that the three questions posed are of doubtful relevance, 
partly because "it would be reasonable to ask the EU for the results and conclusions dra wn from 
surveys conducted in its territory generally", not so asking for the surveys themselves from 
Poland.797 Regarding the letter dated 16 May 2014 (Exhibit EU -93) Dr Thomson noted that, with 
the exception of the information regarding the presence of ASF vector in the EU member States, 
                                               
786 Russia's letter to the European Union of 5 February 2014, FS -SD 8/1640  (Exhibit EU -84). 
787 Russia's letter to the European Union of 12 March 2014 , FS-SD-4/3620  (Exhibit EU -90/Exhibit 
RUS-135). 
788 Russia's letter to Poland of 10 April 2014, FS -NV-8/5827  (Exhibit RUS -240). 
789 Russia's letter to the European Union of 16 May 2014, F S-EN-8/7999  (Exhibit EU -93). 
790 Russia's letter to the European Union of 31 July 2014, EH -8/14006  (Exhibit RUS -157). 
791 Letter from the Russian Veterinary Service to DG SANCO, No. FS -AS-8/23743, 1 December 2015  
(Exhibit RUS -131). 
792 Dr Brückner's response to Panel question No. 13, Compilation  of the experts' responses, para.  2.123.  
793 Professor Penrith's response to Panel question No. 13, Compilation of the experts' responses, para. 
2.125.  
794 Professor Penrith's response to Panel question No. 13, Compilation of the experts' responses, para. 
2.125.  
795 Professor Penrith's response to Panel question No. 13, Compilation of the experts' responses, para. 
2.125. The list of information Professor Penrith referred to was provided in her response to Panel question No. 
12. S uch list comprises  the following information: (i) Whether the disease is notifiable throughout the country 
and what means are used to ensure that this is known; (ii) if diagnostic capacity for ASF is available in the 
country (veterinary personnel and pig v alue chain actor trained in field diagnosis and laboratory capacity for 
confirmation of a field diagnosis); (iii) legislation in place for prevention and management of serious disease 
outbreaks including ASF; (iv) veterinary knowledge of and authority over  all domestic pigs in the country or 
zone; (v) veterinary knowledge of the species, population, distribution and habitat of wild pigs in the country 
or zone; (vi) the epidemiological basis for recognition of a zone including all relevant topographical feat ures; 
and (vii) the scope and extent of active surveillance for ASF undertaken in the country or zone to support the 
contention that the country or zone is free of ASF. Professor Penrith's response to Panel question No. 12, 
Compilation of the experts' resp onses, para.  2.114.  
796 Dr Thomson's response to Panel question No. 13, Compilation of the experts' responses, para. 2.131.  
797 Dr Thomson's response to Panel question No. 13, Compilation of the experts' responses, para. 2.130.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  the questions posed appear to be relevant.798 Regarding the letter dated 31 July 2014 (Exhibit 
RUS-157) Dr Thomson indicated that this "request seems to me relevant and justified".799 Lastly, 
in respect of the letter dated 1 Dec ember 2014 (Exhibit RUS -131), Dr Thomson indicated that he 
could find relevance and therefore justification for the questions pertaining to  (i) ASF early 
detection and contingency plans for each EU member State; (ii) detailed information regarding 
monitori ng and surveillance of wild boars in each EU member State; (iii) detailed information 
regarding the measures taken by each EU member State to prevent trans -boundary spread of ASF 
in the European Union (excluding data demonstrating their effectiveness); and  (iv) information 
regarding the role of ticks in the spread of ASF in the EU member States. Dr Thomson added, 
referring to the other questions in that letter, that they "strike me either as repetition or as 
questions which few if any countries in the world , including the RF, would be able to provide 
satisfactory answers to. It needs to be remembered that Russia  is not an ASF -free country".800   
7.563.    In our view, the expert's responses indicate that some of the information requested by 
Russia through its communica tion requests is excessive for what would be necessary for Russia to 
perform a risk analysis of the spread of ASF from the European Union into Russia. To our mind this 
links directly with the issue before us.  
7.564.   As we have described in paragraph 7.516  above, the immediate objective of the procedure 
at issue is to assess whether there are ASF-free areas in the territory of the European Union. In 
respect of the EU -wide ban, we examine this assessment as related to such areas in the E uropean 
Union that are outside the territory of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. We thus consider that 
the information requirements that would be necessary for the procedure at issue, are those 
directed at the verification of the ASF-free character of the territories under scrutiny.  
7.565.   We recall that in section  7.5.2.3.5  above we examined in detailed the necessary evidence 
that the European Union should provide to Russia to objectively demonstrate that there are ASF-
free areas within its territory.  
7.566.   In our view, the type of information that the European Union was required to provide to 
Russia to objectively demonstrat e the existence of ASF-free areas within the European Union, 
pursuant to Article 6.3 of the SPS Agreement, is  aimed at demonstrating exactly what the 
procedure at issue seeks to verify.  
7.567.   Against this backdrop we consider that Russia's information requirements, in respect of the 
verification of the existence of ASF -free areas within the European Union outside Esto nia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, and Poland should be limited to  (i) ASF surveillance measures (including whether the 
disease was notifiable) ; (ii) measures adopted to prevent introduction and spread of ASF (i.e. 
control measures) ; (iii)  measures foreseen in case t here is an outbreak of ASF (i.e. contingency 
plans), and (iv) information on the domestic and wild pig population. In our view, the information 
requests made by Russia between February and July 2014 go beyond these areas. As indicated by 
the experts, some of the information requested by Russia seems unnecessary and unjustified.   
7.568.   In particular, excessive information requests were made through the letter of 
5 February  2014 in respect of  (i) detailed information about pig farms, pork processing factories 
and semi- finished products, graded by production volume; (ii) regulatory acts, providing for wild 
boar hunting and further utilization of killed animals (for food, as trophies); (iii) regulations on 
export of wild boar meat and trophies, number of killed anim als and exported meat and trophies 
during 2013 -2014 (for regions adjacent to the infected zone); (iv) detailed information about 
foreign hunters, who entered the country to hunt the wild boar during 2013 -2014 (including 
information about the number and the  country of origin), detailed by country and region; 
(v) detailed information about pig farms and meat processing factories approved to ship animals 
and products to the territory of the C ustoms Union (CU) , including information about the suppliers 
(number,  country, region) and production volumes, detailed by country and region; and (vi) rough 
estimation of enterprises approved to ship animal products to the territory of the CU, by level of 
zoosanitary condition, equivalent to the previously conducted evalua tion of the Russian and 
Belarusian enterprises, detailed by regions and graded by production volume. Furthermore, the 
                                               
798 Dr Thomson's response to Panel  question No. 13, Compilation of the experts' responses, para. 2.132.  
799 Dr Thomson's response to Panel question No. 13, Compilation of the experts' responses, para. 2.129.  
800 Dr Thomson's response to Panel question No. 13, Compilation of the experts' respon ses, para. 2.128.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  degree of details requested in respect of certain other information seems to be excessive, in 
particular  (i) detailed density by region of  wild boar population; (ii) detailed density by region of 
swine population in the industry sector and subsidiary farming; and (iii) number of swine and wild 
boars monitoring researches carried out during 2013 -2014, detailed by region .801  
7.569.   In addition, throug h the letter of 12 March 2014, Russia indicated that exchanges that had 
taken place up to that time had not yet provided information in respect of  (i) absence of any proof 
of non -existence of ASF in the territory of other EU member States; and (ii) absence  of any proof 
of impossibility of getting meat of animals infected by ASFV in the production cycle of pork from 
other EU member States.802 Requesting information in this regard beyond that related to the 
surveillance and control programmes, which by that tim e had already been provided by the 
European Union to Russia seems excessive. The Panel notes, in particular, the virtual impossibility 
of "proving" the non -existence or impossibility of the potential occurrence of an event, however 
unlikely that occurrence  may be.  
7.570.   Moreover, through the letter dated 16 May 2014, Russia requested the following 
information, which seems excessive in respect of the assessment of ASF-free areas in the 
European Union outside Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland: (i) cartographi cal visual ization  of 
the establishments approved to supply live pigs and swine products from the EU member States 
(Poland and Lithuania, in particular) to Russia with indication of the raw material bases of these 
establishments; (ii) zoo sanitary status of  small farms (due to the big number of them in the 
territories of the infected/high risk zones with regard to ASF) and measure of their bio protection 
(possibility of free range, feed base, the regime of introducing the newly arrived animals in the 
herd, e tc.); (iii) data on internal evaluation by the veterinary services of the EU member States of 
resources (human, technical, financial ones) needed for the creation and maintenance of 
abovementioned ASF-free zones; (iv) data on functional isolation of sub -populations of domestic 
and wild animals in zones with the proofs of the absence of migration/seasonal movements of wild 
boars between the zones; and (v) data on the presence of the ASF vector in the EU member 
States.803 We recall that some of this information  is irrelevant in light of the particular geographical 
distance between the places where ASF outbreaks have occurred and other areas in the European 
Union.  
7.571.   Based on the foregoing, we consider that Russia formulated information requirements that 
were not l imited to what was necessary for the procedure at issue, thus breaching Annex C(1)(c).  
7.5.4.3.5.3   Whether the procedure at issue is inconsistent with Annex C(1)(a)  
7.572.   The European Union argues that through the request of unnecessary information, as well 
as through certa in actions, Russia failed to undertake and complete the procedure at issue without 
undue delay.804 Furthermore the European Union contends that, based on the discriminatory 
treatment provided by Russia to the products at issue imported from the European Unio n as 
compared with the like domestic products, Russia conducted the procedure with respect to the 
products at issue from the European Union in a less favourable manner than for the like domestic 
products.805 
7.573.   Russia refers to the panel report in EC - Approval  and Marketing of Biotech Products which 
observed that "not every delay" caused by a Member is contrary to Annex C(1)(a), and that a 
Member is not liable for delays not attributable to it.806 In addition, Russia highlighted that this 
panel found that the nee d for additional information does not amount to an undue delay, but that 
the determination of whether a procedure has been unduly delayed requires a case -by-case 
analysis taking into account all of the relevant facts and circumstances. On this basis, Russi a 
argues that the evidence the European Union provided distorts the overall picture of the constant 
                                               
801 Russia's letter to the European Union of 5 February 2014, FS -SD 8/1640  (Exhibit EU -84). 
802 Russia's letter to the European Union of 12 March 2014, FS -SD-4/3620  (Exhibit EU -90/RUS -135). 
803 Russia's letter to the European Union of 16 May 20 14, FS -EN-8/7999  (Exhibit EU -93). 
804 European Union's first written submission, paras. 338 -339; and second written submission, paras. 
185-186. 
805 European Union's second written submission, para. 186.  
806 Russia's first written submission, para. 434 (referring  to Panel Reports, EC – Approval and Marketing 
of Biotech Products , paras. 7.1495  and 7.1497).  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  information exchange and intensive negotiations concerning regionalization, including the 
numerous explanations provided by Russia in relation to the insuff iciency of submitted information. 
Russia also argues that it made several offers to resume trade with the European Union on the 
condition that trade would be conducted in an ASF -free manner.807 Russia concludes that the 
European Union has merely asserted a v iolation of Article 8 and Annex C(1)(a) by pointing to 
alleged delays in evaluating requests for regionalization without demonstrating that these delays 
were "undue". On the contrary, Russia argues that it has taken reasonable time to assess the 
European U nion's regionalization requests, especially in light of the deteriorating ASF situation in 
the European Union.808 In this regard, Russia contends that the European Union has not put 
forward sufficient evidence to make a prima facie  case and failed to meet it s burden of proof in 
demonstrating that Russia violated Article 8 and Annex C(1)(a).809 
7.574.   We recall that a determination of whether a delay in an approval, control or inspection 
procedure is undue, for the purposes of Annex C(1)(a) has to be examined in light of the 
circumstances of a particular case.810 The Appellate Body has also indicated that:  
[T]he obligation to ensure that relevant procedures are undertaken and completed 
without undue delay may be infringed through measures other than the control, 
inspectio n, and approval procedures themselves, such as actions that prohibit, 
prevent, or impede undertaking and completing such procedures "without undue 
delay", or omissions in the form of a failure to act "without undue delay".811  Such 
measures, even when they a re not, themselves, procedures, could equally give rise to 
a violation of Annex C(1)(a) and Article  8.812  
7.575.   In paragraph 7.535  above we noted that mindful of the guidance provided by previous 
panels and the Appellate Body, w e cons ider that a delay is undue if it is "unwarranted, or 
otherwise excessive, disproportionate or unjustifiable."813 In considering whether the European 
Union's allegation of "delay" can be considered to be "undue", we will examine whether the delay 
is unwarrant ed, or otherwise excessive, disproportionate or unjustifiable.  
7.576.   As part of this examination, we consider whether there were any periods of inaction or 
inability to proceed on the substance of the application which would constitute delays within the 
meaning  of Annex C(1)(a).814 This entails not only a consideration of the total period of time 
during which Russia, as the importing Member, conducts the procedure, but also requires an 
overall assessment of the facts and circumstances in this case. The absolute le ngth of time 
required for a Member to evaluate a particular request – and the time needed for any interim 
series of steps required in order to ascertain the comprehensiveness, accuracy and pertinence of 
the information – will depend on the specific circums tances of the case.815 We agree with the view 
of the panel in US – Animals  on the importance of having a point of reference in order to gauge 
the reasonableness of the length of time of the review process, referring to such indicators like the 
                                               
807 Russia's first written submission, paras 435 – 436. 
808 Russia's first written submission, para 437.  
809 Russia's first written submission, para 438.  
810 Appellate B ody Report, Australia – Apples , para. 437.  
811 (footnote original) We note that, in previous disputes involving claims under Annex C(1)(a) and 
Article 8, panels have been faced with measures other than procedures .  In EC – Approval and Marketing of 
Biotech P roducts , the panel dealt with a general de facto moratorium consisting of the suspension of 
consideration of applications for approval, and a failure to consider specific applications for approval. 
(Panel  Report s, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Pro ducts , para. 7.47)  In US – Poultry (China) , the 
measure at issue was a legislative provision prohibiting any use of funds to allow for the importation of poultry 
products from China that, thereby, impeded the undertaking and completion of a procedure that  was "a 
prerequisite for the importation of [poultry] products ". (Panel Report, US – Poultry (China) , paras. 7.92  and 
7.152 ) 
812 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Apples , para. 438.  
813 Panel Report, US – Animals, para. 7.129. With reference to the Appellate Body Report, Australia – 
Apples , para. 437 (referring to Panel Reports, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, para. 7.1495).  
814 Using the order analysis by the panel in US – Animals , para. 7.127.  
815 Panel Report, US – Animals, para. 7.114 . That pa nel observed that applicant Members present 
different SPS circumstances that "may also be affected by law, policy, governance, and veterinary 
infrastructures".  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  standard proce ssing time reflected in the policy and practice of the Member carrying out the 
procedure, as well as guidelines provided by the OIE.816 
7.577.   Furthermore, we recall our observations in section 7.3.6 above on the importance of 
temporal considerations in this case. We note that the panel in US – Animals identified an end -
date for the period of time it would take into account for the purpose of assessing the alleged 
undue delays in the conduct of the responding Member's procedures.817 With r eference to the 
Appellate Body ruling in EC – Chicken Cuts  and the panel ruling in EC – Approval and Marketing of 
Biotech Products, the panel in US – Animals determined that the appropriate end -date for which to 
examine the complainant's claims would be th e date of the establishment of the Panel.818 
7.578.   The European Union's request for recognition of ASF-free areas in the European Union was 
initially presented through the letter dated 31 January 2014.819. At that time, there had only been 
two outbreaks in wild boar s in Lithuania. The record  shows that  Russia only provided a negative 
response to this request through the letter dated 29 July 2014 (after the date of the establishment 
of the Panel), after the outbreaks in Poland and Latvia had already occurred. Russia's  letter 
indicated that:  
The worsening epizootic situation in the EU, as well as the absence of conclusive 
evidence of efficient supervision and proper functioning of the determined zones , 
complying with the provisions of Articles 1.4.6 and 4.3.3 of the OI E Terrestrial Animal 
Health Code (as amended 2013) currently preclude the Russian Federation from 
accepting the EU regionalization terms, proposed by the European Commission at the 
meeting held on 4 July 2014 in Moscow, as well as from pronouncing the enti re EU 
territory free from AFS  [ASF] .820 (emphasis added)  
7.579.   Russia sent another communication to the European Union in connection with this 
procedure on 1 December 2014. In that communication Russia indicated that the process of 
discussion of veterinary certifi cates and resumption of trade in breeding pigs and pork products is 
getting "protracted" due to the European Union's failure to provide sufficient information required 
for the objective assessment of risks associated with the spread of ASF in the EU member  States. 
The letter also referred to the European Union's unwillingness to follow compartmentalization as 
provided in the Terrestrial Code. Moreover, the letter requested that the European Union provide 
detailed information in respect of a particular list of questions.821  
7.580.   The European Union replied to this letter on 23 December 2014. The letter refers to the 
communications sent by DG SANCO to FSVPS on 7 February, 6 and 13 March, 21 May, and 
13 June of 2014. The letter observed the following in respect of the  first three of these five 
communications, "I am confident that this information is more than sufficient to allow your 
services to conclude on the safety of pigs and their products, originating in unaffected areas of the 
EU". The letter concluded that it w as surprising that Russia had submitted a new set of questions 
despite the fact that during the last five months they had not provided any feedback on the 
European Union's latest responses as requested by Russia, and that Russia was claiming once 
again tha t the European Commission had not provided all the information needed to carry out a 
risk assessment.822 
7.581.   Against this background, we need to determine whether the procedure at issue, aimed at 
the recognition of ASF-free areas in the European Union, was under taken and completed without 
any undue delay.  
                                               
816 Panel Report, US - Animals , para 7.117.  
817 Panel Report, US - Animals , para 7.118.  
818 Panel Repo rt, US - Animals , para 7.118.  
819 European Union's letter to Russia of 31 January 2014, ARES(2014)226547, SANCO 
G7/JP/mh(2014)241111  (Exhibit EU -64). 
820 Russia's letter to the European Union of 29 July 2014, C -EH-8/13771 (Exhibit RUS -263). 
821 Letter from the R ussian Veterinary Service to DG SANCO, No. FS -AS-8/23743, 1 December 2015 
(Exhibit RUS -131). 
822 Letter from DG SANCO to the Russian Veterinary Service, SANCO/G7/PD/mh (2014) 4703183, 23 
December 2014 (Exhibit RUS -132). WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.582.   As we have indicated in our analysis of the European Union's claims pursuant to 
Annex  C(1)(c), Russia made a number of information requests that went beyond the information 
that was necessary for the procedure at issue. We underline that this was the case in respect of 
those areas located in the EU member States not affected with ASF outbreaks.  
7.583.   In our view, when a Member makes unnecessary information requests, which go far 
beyond what would be required to make a substantive assessment of the situation subject to the 
procedure at issue, a Member would be acting in a manner that impedes undertaking and 
completing the respective procedures. In the instant case, Russia's excessive and unjustified 
information request s in respect of the surveillance and control measures in non -ASF affected EU 
member States amount to that situation. In light of the Appellate Body's guidance quoted 
above823, such situation may constitute an infringement of the obligation to undertake and 
complete a procedure without undue delay.  
7.584.   Based on the foregoing we conclude that the procedure at issue was undertaken and 
completed with undue delay, thus breaching Annex C(1)(a)'s first clause.  
7.585.   We now turn to the European Union's claim in respect of th e second clause in Annex 
C(1)( a), this is, that the procedure at issue was undertaken and completed in a manner less 
favourable for imported products than for like domestic products.  
7.586.   Regarding this claim, the Panel will examine whether the European Union has established 
that the products at issue from the European Union have been treated in a "less favourable 
manner" than domestic products with respect to the undertaking and completion of the procedure 
at issue.  
7.587.   In response to the Panel's question invitin g the European Union to elaborate on the less 
favourable treatment it alleged in the context of this provision, the European Union responded:  
The EU has already explained [in the answer to question 194] that the Russian 
authorities repeatedly requested mor e information, including information already 
submitted or information irrelevant to the case.  
This clearly results in a less favourable treatment of the imported products, which are 
subject to a ban, in comparison to the domestic products, which can freely  circulate 
from non -affected areas of Russia. In order to reach a regionalization decision with 
regard to its own territory Russia clearly did not need more than one year and the 
type and quantity of evidence it required from the EU.824 
7.588.   We understand the rat ionale behind the European Union's argument to be that the 
unnecessary and excessive information requests addressed by Russia to the European Union in 
respect of the recognition of ASF-free areas within the European Union were not requested in 
respect of t rade of the like products originating in ASF-free areas within Russia.  
7.589.   We recall that the Appellate Body has concluded that generally accepted canons of 
evidence (in civil law, common law, and, in fact, in most jurisdictions) apply in WTO dispute 
settleme nt, i.e.  that the burden of proof rests upon the party, whether complaining or defending, 
who asserts the affirmative of a particular claim or defence.825 To make a prima facie  case, a 
complaining party must present sufficient evidence that, "in the absence of effective refutation by 
the defending party, requires a panel, as a matter of law, to rule in favour of the complaining party 
presenting the prima facie case."826 Pursuant to this understanding, it is the European Union who 
bears the burden of demonstrati ng that the procedure at issue provides less favourable treatment 
to imported products than for like domestic products.827  
                                               
823 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Apples , para. 438.  
824 European Union response to Panel Question 196, paras. 386 -387. 
825 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Dairy (Article  21.5 – New Zealand and US II), para.  66; see also 
Appellate Body Report, US – Wool Shirts and Blouses , p. 14, DSR 1997:I, 32 3 at 335 -337. 
826 Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones , para. 104. 
827 Appellate Body Report, US – Wool Shirts and Blouses , p. 14. WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.590.   We address in detail the European Union's arguments in respect of its discrimination claims 
pursuant to Articles 2.3 and 5.5 of the SP S Agreement in section 7.7 below. In our view, the 
European Union has not provided sufficient evidence that would support its contention that this 
type of information is not required by Russia in order to determine which areas within Russia are 
ASF-free. In addition, the European Union has not clearly explained the internal process in Russia 
to determine the recognition of ASF -free areas in Russia, beyond stating that there is no ban on 
internal trade of the products at issue or iginating from ASF -free areas within Russia.  The European 
Union only refers to the limited nature of bans of intra Russia trade.828 Without further 
information, we are not in a position to ascertain whether Russia took more than one year or 
which type and qu antity of evidence Russia required from its regional authorities to determine the 
existence of ASF-free areas in Russia. We consider therefore, as explained in the previous 
paragraph, that the European Union has not satisfied its burden of demonstrating th at Russia's 
procedure does not comply with the second clause of Annex C(1)(a).  
7.591.   In light of our finding above with respect to the first clause of Annex C(1)(a), we find that 
to the extent Russia undertook and completed the procedure at issue with undue del ay, the 
procedure at issue is inconsistent with Annex C(1)(a).  
7.5.4.3.5.4   Whether the procedure at issue is inconsistent with Annex C(1)(b)  
7.592.   The European Union contends that Russia violates all five of the obligations contained in 
Annex C(1)(b).829 Russia argues that t he European Union merely recites the obligations of the 
provisions, without explaining how the specific procedural obligations were breached.830 
7.593.   In the present dispute, t he European Union contends that Russia did not publish or 
otherwise communicate to the E uropean Union the standard processing period and did not comply 
with any of the other requirements in Annex C(1)(b) of the SPS Agreement.831 The European 
Union further argues that despite the repeated requests from Russia for more evidence with regard 
to the  European Union's regionalization measures, Russia never provided any information as to the 
anticipated period of time for the approval proceedings.832 The Panel833 requested the European 
Union to indicate whether it had requested information from Russia regar ding the anticipated 
processing period of the European Union's regionalization request, and to indicate the relevant 
evidence in support of the presentation of such request. The European Union responded as follows:   
The EU stressed on several occasions tha t the information provided should enable 
Russia to assess and accept the EU ASF regionalisation measures.834 
Despite the unprecedented amount of information provided to Russia, it insisted on 
not having received sufficient information so as to enable it to p erform a risk 
assessment.  
Given Russia's refusal to acknowledge it received all relevant information, the EU's 
efforts were focused on the provision of the supplementary information requested. 
                                               
828 See European Union's first written submission, paras. 54 -55. The Panel has identified the scope of 
the limits to intra Russia t rade of the products at issue as foreseen in Article 5 of the 1980 Instructions, pp. 7 -
10 (Exhibit EU -18). 
829 In US - Animals , the panel first examined whether the challenged measures fell under its term of 
reference. Panel Report, US – Animals, paras. 7.18 8 and 7.190. The panel opined that in order for it to comply 
with Article 6.2 of the DSU, a complainant was required to specify in a sufficiently clear manner which of the 
five obligations in the provision it was challenging in its panel request. In this c ase, we consider that the 
European Union has indicated that it is challenging all five obligations in Annex C(1)(b). See European Union's 
panel request, p.5, cited above.  
830 Russia's first written submission, para. 439.  
831 European Union's second written sub mission, para. 187.  
832 European Union's response to Panel question No. 197, para. 388.  
833 Panel Question 289, seeking clarification of paragraph 342 of the European Union's first written 
submission.  
834 (footnote original) Letters of 20 February 2014 (Exhibit EU-175), 6 March 2014 ( Exhibit EU -86) and 
of 13 March 2014 ( Exhibit EU -91). WT/DS475/R  
 
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  Under those circumstances a specific request on the anticipated  processing period of 
the EU's request was not addressed to Russia.835 
7.594.   We therefore find that the European Union did not make a request within the meaning of 
this provision, and thus did not trigger an obligation on the part of Russia to communicate the 
anticipated processing period.836 
7.595.   Furthermore, we recall that a prima facie  case "is one which, in the absence of effective 
refutation by the defending party, requires a panel, as a matter of law, to rule in favour of the 
complaining party presenting the prima f acie case."837 
7.596.   The European Union has not attempted to provide any sort of argument or evidence in 
support of its claim that the procedure at issue is inconsistent with Annex C(1)(b) of the SPS 
Agreement. We therefore consider that the European Union has fai led to make a prima facie case 
in respect of the alleged inconsistency of the procedure at issue with Annex C(1)(b).  
7.5.4.4   Conclusion  
7.597.   As explained in the previous sections, we find that Russia's process of consideration of the 
European Union's request for recogn ition of ASF -free areas within the European Union falls within 
the scope of Article 8 and Annex C(1) of the SPS Agreement. We also find that Russia formulated 
information requirements that were not limited to what is necessary for the procedure at issue, 
thus breaching Annex C(1)(c). Moreover we  find that Russia undertook and completed the 
procedure at issue with undue delay, thus rendering the procedure at issue inconsistent with 
Annex C(1)(a). In light of these findings, we also find that the procedure at  issue is inconsistent 
with Article 8 of the SPS Agreement.  We consider that the European Union has failed to make a 
prima facie case in respect of the alleged inconsistency of the procedure at issue with Annex 
C(1)(b).  
7.5.5   Claims under Articles 2.2, 5.1, 5.2 , and 5.7 of the SPS Agreement  
7.5.5.1   Main arguments of the parties  
7.5.5.1.1   European Union  
7.598.    The European Union argues that because Russia 's measures do not "conform to " and are 
not "based on " the OIE recommendations, it is necessary to establish whether there is a solid  
scientific basis for their imposition.838 
7.599.   The European Union highlights that an analysis under Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement 
entails addressing two issues: whether there is a "risk assessment " within the meaning of the SPS 
Agreement and whether the SPS m easures at issue are "based on " the mentioned risk 
assessment.839 
7.600.   The European Union argues that Russia did not provide any risk assessment  in support of 
its EU -wide ban, although such a risk assessment was requested during the numerous contacts 
that took pl ace between the Russian and the EU competent veterinary authorities.840 
7.601.   The European Union points out that Article 5.2 of the SPS Agreement contains a list of 
factors that have to be taken into account while performing a risk assessment.841 The European 
                                               
835 European Union's response to Panel Question 289, paras. 135 -137. 
836 We note that the panel in EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products  considered that the 
anticipated proce ssing period is to be provided to applicants upon request and in that dispute, no evidence of 
applicants' requests was provided. Panel Report s, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products , 
paras.  7.1587 –7.1589.  
837 Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones , para. 104. 
838 European Union's first written submission, para. 153.  
839 European Union's first written submission, para. 154.  
840 European Union's first written submission, para. 165.  
841 European Union's first written submission, para. 168.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  Union argues that in adopting, maintaining and/or applying the measures at issue, Russia did not 
and does not take into account those factors.842 
7.602.   The European Union posits that because  Russia did not provide any risk assessment for the 
measures at issue, Russia th erefore violates the provisions of Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement, 
and that it follows that the provisions of Article 2.2 are also breached .843 
7.603.   The European Union points out that while solely Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement may still 
shelter a Member's me asure in such circumstances, Russia does not fulfil any of the requirements  
of such provision.844 
7.5.5.1.2   Russia  
7.604.    Russia argues that the European Union has failed to make a prima facie  case with respect 
to the existence of an EU -wide ban because it has not provided evidence and arguments sufficient 
to identify an EU -wide ban.845 Russia posits that there is no such EU -wide ban because the 
perceived restrictions on pigs and pork products are a result of the inability of the veterinary 
officials of the EU member States to  deliver veterinary certificates to EU producers in accordance 
with the requirements previously agreed to by the parties.846 
7.605.   Russia argues that in the alternative, what it considers to be Russia's provisional 
compliance with the veterinary certificates, is justified  under Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement.847 
Russia argues there is insufficient  scientific evidence  to conduct a risk assessment regarding the 
entry of ASF into the Russian Federation from the importation of uncertified pigs and pork products 
from ot her EU Member States.848 Russia also argues that its decision to provisionally comply with 
the terms of the veterinary certificates was based on available pertinent information.849 
7.5.5.2   Main arguments of the third parties  
7.5.5.2.1   Australia  
7.606.   Australia emphasizes that Russia does not appear  to have conducted a risk assessment in 
relation to trade in relevant products from those areas affected by ASF, whether within the four 
affected EU member States or EU -wide.850 
7.607.   Australia highlights that it is necessary for the Panel to consid er whether the level of 
scientific information was insufficient so as to justify Russia 's provisional adoption of SPS measures 
not based on a risk assessment in accordance with Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement.851 
7.608.   Australia stresses that the insufficiency of  evidence must relate to information that is 
relevant to the risk assessment in question. Australia also notes that the reasonable period of time 
requirement has to be established on a case -by-case basis, and that, as in the present case, 
where, in its view, the apparent uncertainty relates to containment zones for ASF, the Panel may 
wish to take into account related rules and guidelines on regionalization.852 
7.5.5.2.2   Brazil  
7.609.   Brazil argues that there is no fixed or rigid reference for the determination of what means 
"sufficient scientific evidence" for the purpose of this provision, and the amount of scientific 
                                               
842 European Union's fir st written submission, para. 170.  
843 European Union's first written submission, para. 176.  
844 European Union's second written submission, para. 68.  
845 Russia's first written submission, para. 339.  
846 Russia's first written submission, para. 346.  
847 Russia's sec ond written submission, para. 185.  
848 Russia's second written submission, para. 186.  
849 Russia's second written submission, para. 197.  
850 Australia's third -party submission, para. 10.  
851 Australia's third -party submission, para. 11.  
852 Australia's third -party s ubmission, para. 14.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  evidence may vary according to the circumstances of the case. Brazil however highlights that while 
amount of scientific evidence considered sufficient to justif y a provisional measure in the context 
of Article 5 may vary, the ruling by the Appellate Body in Japan – Apples  where the Appellate Body 
considered that there was a large quantity of scientific evidence when it verified the existence "of 
scientific studie s as well as practical experience having accumulated for the past 200 years ", may 
serve as a reference.853   
7.5.5.2.3   Norway   
7.610.   Norway highlights that while under Article 2.1 of the SPS Agreement, Members have the 
right to take SPS measures "necessary for the protectio n of human, animal or plant life or health, 
provided that such measures are not inconsistent with provision of the [..] Agreement ", such right 
carries with it certain obligations, including those in Article 5 of the SPS Agreement.854 
7.611.   Norway asserts that Arti cle 5.1 of the SPS Agreement is viewed as a "specific application " 
of the basic obligation set out in Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement and that the Appellate Body has 
clarified that where a measure is not based on a risk assessment in accordance with Artic le 5.1, it 
will be presumed to be inconsistent with the second and third prongs of Article 2.2 of the 
SPS Agreement.855 
7.612.   Norway stresses that with respect to Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement, the Appellate Body 
has identified four cumulative requirements that  must be fulfilled for a Member to have recourse to 
Article 5.7: (i) it must be imposed in respect of a situation where "relevant scientific information is 
insufficient "; (ii) it must be adopted "on the basis of available pertinent information "; (iii) the 
Member must "seek to obtain the additional information necessary for a more objective 
assessment of risk "; and (iv) the Member must "review the […] measure accordingly within a 
reasonable period of time ".856 
7.613.   Norway emphasizes that the threshold condition for  the application of Article 5.7 of the 
SPS Agreement is that evidence is insufficient, and that the main question will be whether the 
available scientific evidence permits, in quantitative or qualitative terms, an assessment of risks 
within the meaning of Article 5.1.857 
7.614.   Norway highlights that "insufficient" in the context of Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement 
refers to both situations where there is not enough scientific evidence (in quantitative terms) and 
to situations where there is enough evidence, but it does not give reliable results (in qualitative 
terms).858 
7.615.   Norway posits that with respect to the second element, the "available pertinent 
information" must equate to "some evidence of a risk ", even if it is not enough to perform a proper 
risk assessment. In addition, there must be a rational relationship between the evidentiary basis 
and the provisional measure, and that even if the rigorous standards of Article 5.1, together with 
Articles 5.2 and 5.3 and Annex A(4), do not apply under Article 5.7, those stan dards must be 
considered as relevant context, and thus indicate what types of information may be considered as 
"available pertinent information ".859 
7.616.   With respect to the third element which is to "seek to obtain the additional information 
necessary for a more  objective assessment of risk ", Norway emphasizes that this reflects the 
temporary  nature of the provisional  measures within the meaning  of Article 5.7 of the 
SPS Agreement, and that while the  "the information sought must be germane to conducting 'a 
more objective assessment of the risk ', i.e. the evaluation of the likelihood of entry, establishment 
or spread of, in casu, a pest, according to the SPS measures that might be applied ", a Member "is 
                                               
853 Brazil's third -party submission, para. 21 (citing Appellate Body Report, Japan – Apples , paras. 180, 
186, and 188).  
854 Norway's third -party submission, paras. 3 -4.  
855 Norway's third -party submission, para. 5.  
856 Norway's third -party su bmission, para. 8.  
857 Norway's third -party submission, paras. 10 -12. 
858 Norway's third -party submission, para. 14 (citing Appellate Body Report, Japan – Apples , para. 185).  
859 Norway's third -party submission, para. 19.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  not expected to guarantee specific results […] [n]or is it e xpected to predict the actual results of 
its efforts to collect additional information at the time when it adopts the SPS measure ".860 
7.617.   With respect to the requirement of review within a reasonable period of time, Norway 
highlights that what constitutes a "reasonable period of time " should be conducted on a case -by-
case basis, and that it will depend "upon the specific circumstances of each case, including the 
difficulty of obtaining the additional information necessary for the review and the characteristics o f 
the provisional SPS measure ".861 
7.5.5.3   Analysis by the Panel  
7.5.5.3.1   Introduction  
7.618.   The European Union framed its claims under Articles 2.2, 5.1, 5.2 and 5.7 of the 
SPS Agreement in the same manner for both the EU -wide ban and the bans on imports of the 
products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,  and Poland. The European Union argues that the 
measures at issue are not based on a risk assessment conducted in accordance with Articles 5.1 
and 5.2.862 Furthermore, the European Union contends that because it concludes that  Russia 
violated Article 5.1 by not providing a risk assessment for the measures at issue, consequentially, 
Russia also violated Article 2.2.863 In respect of Article 5.7, the European Union argues this is not a  
situation where scientific evidence is insuffi cient and that Russia has failed to comply with any of 
the conditions of Article 5.7.864 According to the European Union, the sufficiency of scientific 
evidence should be assessed at the time of adoption of the measure. Furthermore, following the 
measure's a doption, the Member is obliged to seek to obtain the additional information necessary 
for a more objective assessment of risk. According to the European Union, the moment a Member 
asks for information that is not necessary for a more objective assessment o f risk, including the 
type of information characterized by the individual experts in the present proceedings as an 
"overkill" or as an attempt to "muddy the water", that Member can no longer benefit from the 
provisional shelter of Article 5.7. Such informa tion requests are a clear warning sign that the 
Member is not genuinely seeking to perform a more objective risk assessment (objective in the 
sense of being based on the pertinent information available). Russia has not performed and has 
not provided any ri sk assessment in support of the measures at issue.865 
7.619.   In respect of the EU -wide ban, Russia argues that, should the Panel find that the EU -wide 
ban exists866, it is justified under Article 5.7.867 
7.620.   In light of the parties' arguments, this section cites the releva nt legal provisions and then 
addresses the relationship between Articles 5.1, 5.2, 2.2 and 5.7 with a view to determining the 
Panel's order of analysis. The Panel will then present the legal test that will guide its assessment 
under the respective provisio ns. Lastly, the Panel will address the application of the cited 
provisions to the EU -wide ban.  
7.5.5.3.2   Relevant legal provisions  
7.621.   Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement provides:  
Article 2  
                                               
860 Norway's third -party submission, para.  20 (citing Appellate Body Report, Japan – Agricultural 
Products II , para. 92) . 
861 Norway's third -party submission, para. 21.  
862 European Union's first written submission, paras. 165 and 170.  
863 European Union's first written submission, para. 176. See also o pening statement at the first meeting 
with the Panel, paras. 78 -80; response to Panel question No. 122, paras. 255 -257; and second written 
submission, para. 65.  
864 European Union's first written submission, para. 202; opening statement at the first meeting of the 
Panel, paras. 81 -95; and second written submission, para. 68.  
865 See European response to Panel question No. 309, para. 161 and European Union's comments to 
Russia's response to Panel question No. 309, para. 172.  
866 Russia's  first written submission, paras. 339 -349. In its second written submission, paras. 171 -174, 
the Russian Federation sustains that the EU -wide ban is not an SPS measure.  
867 Russia's  first written submission, paras. 352 -354; second written submission, paras. 185 -203. WT/DS475/R  
 
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  Basic Rights and Obligations  
2. Members shall ensure that any sanitary or phytosa nitary measure is applied only to 
the extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health, is based on 
scientific principles and is not maintained without sufficient scientific evidence, except 
as provided for in paragraph 7 of Article 5.  
7.622.   The relevant paragraphs of Article 5 of the SPS Agreement provide:  
Article 5  
Assessment of Risk and Determination of the Appropriate Level  
of Sanitary or Phytosanitary Protection  
1. Members shall ensure that their sanitary or phytosanitary measures are based  on 
an assessment, as appropriate to the circumstances, of the risks to human, animal or 
plant life or health, taking into account risk assessment techniques developed by the 
relevant international organizations.  
2. In the assessment of risks, Members sha ll take into account available scientific 
evidence; relevant processes and production methods; relevant inspection, sampling 
and testing methods; prevalence of specific diseases or pests; existence of pest - or 
disease -free areas; relevant ecological and en vironmental conditions; and quarantine 
or other treatment.  
… 
7. In cases where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient, a Member may 
provisionally adopt sanitary or phytosanitary measures on the basis of available 
pertinent information, including that  from the relevant international organizations as 
well as from sanitary or phytosanitary measures applied by other Members. In such 
circumstances, Members shall seek to obtain the additional information necessary for 
a more objective assessment of risk and  review the sanitary or phytosanitary measure 
accordingly within a reasonable period of time.  
7.623.   Paragraph 4 of Annex A of the SPS Agreement provides the following definition of a risk 
assessment:  
The evaluation of the likelihood of entry, establishment or s pread of a pest or disease 
within the territory of an importing Member according to the sanitary or phytosanitary 
measures which might be applied, and of the associated potential biological and 
economic consequences; or the evaluation of the potential for adverse effects on 
human or animal health arising from the presence of additives, contaminants, toxins 
or disease -causing organisms in food, beverages or feedstuffs.  
7.5.5.3.3   Relationship between Articles 5.1, 5.2, 2.2 and 5.7 and the order of analysis  
7.624.   Articles  2.2, 5.1 and 5.2 of the SPS Agreement  are "intimately related".868 They deal with 
the scientific foundation of SPS  measures.869 This does not mean that they are identical 
provisions.870 In its relevant part, Article  2.2 refers to scientific principles and sufficien t scientific 
evidence. With respect to the specific obligation that SPS measures be based on scientific 
principles and not maintained without sufficient scientific evidence, Article  2.2 directly focuses on 
the necessary link that must exist between the SPS  measure and the scientific principles and 
evidence, while Articles  5.1 and 5.2 concern the assessment of risk. Under Articles  5.1 and 5.2, 
                                               
868 Panel Report, India – Agricultural Products , paras. 7.281.  
869 Panel Report, US – Poultry (China) , para.  7.167.  
870 Panel Report, Australia – Apples , para. 7.21 4. WT/DS475/R  
 
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  such link is still necessary, but it rests on the requirement for a risk assessment.871 Prior panels 
have found that A rticles  5.1 and 5.2 of the SPS  Agreement directly inform each other because 
Article  5.2 sheds light on the elements that are of relevance in the assessment of risks as foreseen 
in Article  5.1.872 
7.625.   As for the relationship between Articles 2.2 and 5.1, the Appe llate Body has explained that 
Article  5.1 constitutes "a specific application of the basic obligations contained in Article  2.2" of the 
SPS Agreement873, and that Article  2.2 informs Article  5.1 because "the elements that define the 
basic obligation set out in Article  2.2 impart meaning to Article  5.1".874 Thus the Appellate  Body 
stated that "Articles  2.2 and 5.1 should constantly be read together ".875 
7.626.   Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement allows Members to provisionally adopt SPS measures in 
cases where relevant scie ntific evidence does not allow performance of an adequate risk 
assessment.876 Article 5.7 becomes applicable when the body of available scientific evidence does 
not allow, in quantitative or qualitative terms, the performance of an adequate assessment of ris ks 
as required under Article  5.1 and as defined in paragraph 4 of Annex A.877 As the panel in US – 
Animals  noted: "[t]he Appellate Body has explained that Article  5.7 operates as a 'qualified 
exemption' from the obligation under Article  2.2 'not to maintain SPS measures without sufficient 
scientific evidence'.878 In turn, Article  5.1 is 'a specific application of the basic obligations contained 
in Article  2.2'.879 Thus, if a measure meets all the requirements of Article  5.7, Articles  2.2 and 5.1 
do not apply."880 
7.627.   The Appellate Body and past panels have found that where a measure is not based on a 
risk assessment pursuant to Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement, it can be presumed not to be based 
on scientific principles or to be maintained without sufficient scientific evidence within the meaning 
of Article 2.2.881 The Appellate Body has further clarified that such a presumption is rebuttable, 
since although a finding of violation of Articles 5.1 and 5.2 may give rise to a presumption of 
inconsistency with Article 2.2, it might not invariably lead to a finding of inconsistency with 
Article  2.2.882 The Appellate Body has also observed that:  
[E]ven though the presumption of inconsistency under Article 2.2 flowing from a 
violation of Articles 5.1 and 5.2 is rebuttable, establish ing that there exists a rational 
or objective relationship between the SPS measure and the scientific evidence for 
purposes of Article 2.2 would, in most cases, be difficult without a Member 
demonstrating that such measure is based on an assessment of the risks, as 
appropriate to the circumstances.883 
                                               
871 Panel Report, Australia – Apples , para. 7.214.  
872 Panel Reports, Japan – Apples , para.  8.230; and US – Poultry ( China) , para.  7.172.  
873 Appellate  Body Reports, EC – Hormones , para.  180; and Australia – Apples , para.  209. 
874 Appellate  Body Report, EC – Hormones , para.  180. 
875 Appellate  Body Reports, EC – Hormones , para.  180; and Australia – Apples , para.  209. 
876 Appellat e Body Report, US/Canada – Continued Suspension , para. 701.  
877 Appellate Body Report, Japan – Apples , para. 179.  
878 (footnote original) Appellate Body Report, Japan – Agricultural Products II , para.  80. We note that 
the panel in EC – Approval and Marketing o f Biotech Products  referred to it as a "qualified right". Panel Report s, 
EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products , paras.  7.2939, 7.2945, and 7.2969 (finding that Article  5.7 is 
a "right" to maintain a measure otherwise inconsistent with Article  2.2) and paras.  7.2996 -7.2998 (finding that 
Article  5.7 is a right to maintain a measure otherwise inconsistent with Article  5.1), and para.  7.3004.  
879 (footnote original) Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones , para.  180. 
880 Panel Report, US – Animals, para. 7.2 87. 
881 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon , para. 138. The panel in EC – Approval and Marketing of 
Biotech Products , followed this approach. See Panel Report s, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products , 
para. 7.3396.  
882 Appellate Body Report, India – Agricultural Products , para. 5.24.  
883 Appellate Body Report, India – Agricultural Products , para. 5.29 . In fn 305 to paragraph 5.29, the 
Appellate Body in India – Agricultural Products  further added: "[i]n cases where an SPS measure is found to be 
inconsistent with Articles 5.1 and 5.2 for reasons relating to the scientific basis underlying the relevant risk 
assessment, it would be all the more difficult for a Member to establish that such a measure is nonetheless 
based on scientific principles and is n ot maintained without sufficient scientific evidence, within the meaning of 
Article 2.2."  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.628.   This means that, having found a measure is inconsistent with Article 5.1 of the 
SPS Agreement, panels need to determine whether the presumption of inconsistency with Article 
2.2 would arise in the particular cas e and whether such presumption has been rebutted by the 
respondent. Thus, a panel's finding of inconsistency with Article 2.2 cannot be solely based on the 
presumption arising from a finding of inconsistency with Articles 5.1 and 5.2.884 
7.629.   The Panel is faced w ith claims under both Article s 5.1 and 5.7 of the SPS Agreement. 
Accordingly, the Panel will first determine the applicability of Article 5.7.885 As part of this 
examination, the Panel will assess the sufficiency of the scientific evidence.886 Moreover, if Art icle 
5.7 is found to be applicable, due to the insufficiency of scientific evidence, but any of its other 
three conditions , as enumerated 7.632 below , is not met, the Panel would need to further examine 
the consistency of the measure with Articles 5.1, 5.2 and 2.2.887 
7.630.   If the Panel finds Article 5.7 is inapplicable to the measure, the Panel would then examine 
whether the EU -wide ban is inconsistent with Article 5.1. The Panel would examine the measure's 
complianc e with Article 5.2 in the context of its examination of the measure's consistency with 
Article 5.1.888 If the Panel finds the measure to be inconsistent with Articles 5.1 and 5.2, the Panel 
would then need to determine whether  Russia has rebutted the presump tion of the measure's 
inconsistency with Article 2.2 .  
7.631.   Bearing in mind that order of analysis the Panel proceeds to examine the legal test in 
respect of Articles 5.7, 5.1, 5.2 and 2.2 of the SPS Agreement.  
7.5.5.3.3.1   Legal test  
Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement  
7.632.   Article 5.7 of the SPS  Agreement sets out four cumulative requirements that must be met 
for a Member to justify its measure on the basis of this article: (i) it is imposed in respect of a 
situation where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient; (ii) it is p rovisionally adopted on the 
basis of available pertinent information; (iii) the Member maintaining the measure seeks to obtain 
the additional information necessary for a more objective assessment of risk; and (iv) the Member 
reviews the measure within a re asonable period of time.889 The Appellate Body has explained that 
the first two requirements relate to the adoption of the measure while the latter two requirements 
"relate to the maintenance  of a provisional SPS measure and highlight the provisional  nature of 
measures adopted pursuant to Article 5.7."890 As these four requirements are cumulative in nature 
and are equally important for the purpose of determining consistency with this provision, 
whenever one of these four requirements is not met, the measure at issue is inconsistent with 
Article 5.7.891 However, following the logic for the application of Article 5.7, it is the first condition, 
namely the existence of a situation where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient, that initially 
triggers its applica bility.892 
Articles 5.1 and 5.2 of the SPS Agreement  
7.633.   Article 5.1 obliges Members to ensure that their SPS measures are based on an 
assessment, as appropriate to the circumstances, of the risks to human, animal or plant life or 
                                               
884 Appellate Body Report, India – Agricultural Products , paras. 5.24, 5.37 and 5.39.  
885 Panel Report, US – Animals, para. 7.264 (referring to Panel Report s, EC – Approv al and Marketing of 
Biotech Products , paras. 7.3005 -7.3007).  
886 Panel Report, US – Animals, para. 7.264 (referring to Panel Report s, EC – Approval and Marketing of 
Biotech Products , paras. 7.3005 -7.3007).  
887 Panel Report, US – Animals , para. 7.304.  
888 See Pan el Reports, US – Animals , para. 7.320; India – Agricultural Products , paras. 7.307 -7.308; US 
– Poultry (China) , para. 7.172; Australia – Apples , para. 7.211; and Japan – Apples , para. 8.230.  
889 Appellate Body Report, Japan – Agricultural Products II , para. 89. See also Appellate Body Report, 
Japan – Apples , para. 179, and Panel Report, US – Animals , para. 7.287.  
890 Appellate Body Report, Japan – Apples , fn 318 to para. 176 (emphasis original).  
891 Appellate Body Report, Japan – Agricultural Products II , para. 9 1. Panel Report, US – Animals, para. 
7.290.  
892 Appellate Body Report, Japan – Apples , para. 184; and Panel Report s, EC – Marketing and Approval 
of Biotech Products , para. 7.2939.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  health, taking into account ris k assessment techniques developed by the relevant international 
organizations. Article 5.2 contains an illustrative list of elements to be taken into account in the 
assessment of risks: available scientific evidence; relevant processes and production metho ds; 
relevant inspection, sampling and testing methods; prevalence of specific diseases or pests; 
existence of pest - or disease -free areas; relevant ecological and environmental conditions; and 
quarantine or other treatment.  
7.634.   Furthermore, Articles 5.1 and 5. 2 are "inextricably interlinked".893 These two provisions 
directly inform each other because Article  5.2 sheds light on the relevant elements in the 
assessment of risks as foreseen in Article  5.1.894 As noted by the panel in US – Animals , the 
elements of Artic le 5.2 should be assessed when examining compliance with Article 5.1.895  
7.635.   The following steps need to be examined in order to determine whether SPS measures are 
consistent with Articles 5.1 and 5.2: (i) whether there is a risk assessment within the meaning o f 
paragraph 4 of Annex A of the SPS Agreement; (ii) whether that risk assessment is appropriate to 
the circumstances; (iii) whether the science supports the conclusions in the risk assessment; and 
(iv) whether the measure is based on that risk assessment.896  
7.636.   Regarding the first step, and guided by previous panel and Appellate Body reports, we 
understand  that a risk assessment is a scientific process aimed at establishing the scientific basis 
for a Member's sanitary measures, both based on laboratory methods as well as on the situation of 
the particular area where the risk is being assessed.897  
7.637.   Regarding the second step, that is, the appropriateness of a risk assessment to the 
circumstances, at least two considerations should be taken into account. The first is  the type of 
risk assessment (as identified in paragraph 4 of Annex A)898 that should be performed depending 
on what risks the measure is seeking to avoid (i.e. entry, establishment or spread of pest, 
diseases, etc. or arising from additives, contaminants, t oxins or disease -causing organisms in 
foods, beverages or feedstuffs).899 The second is whether the risk assessment was undertaken in 
line with the relevant elements set out in Articles 5.1 (i.e. taking into account risk assessment 
techniques developed by th e relevant international organizations), 5.2 and 5.3. The Appellate Body 
has stated that the appropriate level of protection of the importing Member may affect the scope 
or method of the risk assessment.900 
7.638.   The third step entails assessing the quality of sci entific information relied on by the 
Member imposing the SPS measure and whether that scientific information supports the 
conclusions in the risk assessment.901 When e valuating the quality of scientific information used in 
the risk assessment, panels should review whether it constitutes "legitimate science according to 
the standards of the relevant scientific community".902 Assessing the latter element, panels are 
                                               
893 Panel Report, Australia – Apples , para. 7.211. See also Panel Report, US – Poultry (China) , 
para. 7.172.  
894 Panel Reports, Japan – Apples , para.  8.230; and US – Poultry (China) , para.  7.172.  
895 Panel Report, US – Animals , para. 7.320 (referring to Panel Report, Australia – Apples , para. 7.211).  
896 Panel Report, US – Animals , para. 7. 321. 
897 Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones , para. 187. See also Appellate Body Reports, Australia – 
Apples , para. 207; US/Canada – Continued Suspension , paras. 527; and Panel Report , India – Agricultural 
Products , para. 7.311.  
898 The Appellate Body in Australia – Salmon  found that, in respect of the two types of risk assessments 
contemplated in paragraph 4 of Annex A, while the first type of risk assessment demands an evaluation of the 
likelihood of entry, establishment or spread of a disease, and of the as sociated potential biological and 
economic consequences, the second requires only the evaluation of the potential adverse effects on human or 
animal health. Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon , para. 123 and fn 69. 
899 Panel Report, US – Animals , para.  7.322 (where the Panel considered that an element to be taken 
into account when determining if a risk assessment is appropriate to the circumstances is which type of risk 
assessment is required). See also Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon , fn 67. 
900 Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones , para.  129 and Panel Report, Australia – Salmon , para. 8.57. 
See also Appellate Body Reports , Australia – Salmon , para. 130; US/Canada – Continued Suspension , 
para. 562 and Australia – Apples , paras.  237 and 244.  
901 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Apples , para. 215.  
902 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Apples , para. 215.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  required to examine "whether the reasoning of the risk assessor is objective and coherent, that is , 
whether the conclusions find sufficient support in the scientific evidence relied upon."903 
7.639.   After examining the preceding three steps, a panel should then determine whether the 
specific SPS measure is based on that risk assessment. This entails verifying i f there is a "rational 
or objective relationship that persists and is observable" between the SPS measure and the risk 
assessment.904 In this context, "a measure that contradicts the conclusions of a risk assessment 
cannot be said to be based upon it."905 In addition, the Appellate Body has clarified that Article 5.1 
requires SPS measures be based on a risk assessment, which does not mean that they have to 
"conform to" that risk assessment.906 
Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement  
7.640.   If a breach of Articles 5.1 and 5.2 i s found, the presumption of a measure's inconsistency 
with the Article 2.2 obligation  will arise. This obligation  requires that measures are based on 
scientific principles and not maintain ed without sufficient scientific evidence . If this is the case , the 
Panel would have to further consider whether there are any arguments and evidence that would 
indicate that the importing Member has rebutted this presumption . 
7.641.   According to Article  2.2, an SPS measure must: (i) be applied only to the extent necessary 
to pro tect human, animal or plant life or health; (ii) be based on scientific principles; and (iii) not 
be maintained without sufficient scientific evidence, except as provided for in Article 5.7.907 In 
assessing whether SPS measures are consistent with these requ irements, panels must consider: 
the particular circumstances of the dispute, including the characteristics of the challenged 
measures and the quality and quantity of the scientific evidence908; and the relationship of that 
evidence to the specific risks agai nst which the measures seek to protect.909 
7.642.   In assessing the parties' arguments relating to Article 2.2, the Panel derives guidance from 
the approach of the panel in Japan – Apples  which found that the scientific evidence to be 
considered, "should be evidence  gathered through scientific methods, excluding by the same token 
information not acquired through a scientific method." This "may include evidence that a particular 
risk may occur (e.g., the entry, establishment or spread of the bacteria that causes fire blight 
disease) as well as evidence that a particular requirement may reduce or eliminate that risk (e.g., 
the effectiveness of chlorine treatment in eliminating the bacteria)."910 That panel also noted that 
"requiring 'scientific evidence' does not limit th e field of scientific evidence available to Members to 
support their measures. 'Direct' or 'indirect' evidence may be equally considered. The only 
difference is not one of scientific quality, but one of probative value within the legal meaning of the 
term,  since it is obvious that evidence which does not directly prove a fact might not have as much 
weight as evidence directly proving it, if it is available."911 
7.5.5.3.4   Whether Article 5.7 applies to the EU -wide ban  
7.5.5.3.4.1   Introduction  
7.643.   In terms of  the burden of proof, we rec all that the panel in EC – Approval and Marketing of 
Biotech Products, operating under the  premise that Article 5.7 is a "qualified right", concluded that 
because Article 5.1 is only applicable if Article 5.7 is not, "when a complaining party presents a 
                                               
903 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Apples , para. 215. See also Panel Report, US – Animals , para. 
7.324 (referring to Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones , paras. 193 -194).  
904 Panel Report, US – Animals , para. 7.324 (quoting Appellate Body Reports, Japan – Agricultural 
Products II , para. 84 and EC – Hormones , para. 189). See also Appellate Body Report, Japan – Apples , paras. 
162 – 163.  
905 Panel Report , US – Animals , para. 7.324.  
906 Panel Report, US – Animals , para. 7.324 (referring to Appellate Body Report, US/Canada – Continued 
Suspension , para. 528).  
907 Panel Report s, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products , para. 7.1424.  
908 Appellate Body Repor t, India – Agricultural Products , para. 5.26 (referring to Appellate Body Reports, 
Japan – Agricultural Products II , para. 84; and Japan – Apples , para. 164).  
909 Appellate Body Report, India – Agricultural Products , para. 5.26.  
910 Panel Report, Japan – Apple s, paras. 8.92 -8.93.  
911 Panel Report, Japan – Apples , paras. 8.92 -8.93 and 8.98.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  claim of violation under Article 5.1, the burden is on the complaining party to establish a prima 
facie case of inconsistency with both Articles 5.1 and 5.7."912 The panel in US – Animals observed 
that " nothing in the case law on Article 5.7 or other provision s which establish exemptions or 
provide the ability to derogate from certain WTO obligations supersedes the basic premise that the 
party asserting something bears the burden of proving it.913"914 Accordingly , the Panel finds that 
the initial burden was on the European Union as part of its  case under Article 5.1 to raise the 
inapplicability of Article 5.7 – which it did in its Panel request and first written  submission.915 As 
Russia has asserted that its EU -wide ban falls within the scope of  Article 5.7, it carrie s the burden 
to prove that each of the four cumulative requirements has been  satisfied.916 
7.644.   In this dispute, in respect of Article 5.7, the European Union argues that this is not a 
situation where scientific evidence is insufficient and that Russia has failed  to comply with any of 
the conditions of Article 5.7.917  
7.645.   Russia maintains that the EU -wide ban (referred to as provisional compliance with the 
veterinary certificates) is justified under Article  5.7. Russia claims that the scientific information is 
insuffic ient for it to perform a risk assessment within the meaning of Article 5.1 and that it 
complies with all conditions of Article 5.7.918  
7.646.   The parties have addressed all four requirements in their arguments. The European Union's 
concerns relate both to the adop tion and to the continued application, or maintenance, of the 
measure at issue. Most of the evidence cited by the European Union in support of its assertions 
under Article 5.7 relates to the period following adoption of the measure, including material that  
the European Union sent to Russia on its own initiative and in response to Russia's requests.919 
Therefore, the Panel finds it appropriate to begin by examining the sufficiency of scientific 
evidence. The Panel will then examine the extent to which the EU -wide ban is based on available 
pertinent information; followed by an assessment of whether Russia has sought to obtain 
additional information necessary for a more objective assessment of risk. Lastly, the Panel will 
assess whether Russia has reviewed the EU -wide ban accordingly within a reasonable period of 
time. As these requirements are cumulative, if we find that Russia has failed to comply with any of 
these four requirements Russia would be precluded from relying on Article 5.7 to exclude the 
applicabili ty of other provisions of the SPS Agreement.  We consider this approach to be appropriate 
in order to provide sufficient findings in respect of the parties' claims.  
7.5.5.3.4.2   Whether relevant scientific information was insufficient at the time the 
EU-wide ban was ad opted  
7.647.   The first condition for the application of Article  5.7 is insufficiency of scientific evidence. As 
we have noted, according to the Appellate Body in Japan – Apples , this is the case when the body 
of available scientific evidence does not allow, in qu antitative or qualitative terms, the performance 
                                               
912 Panel Report s, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products , para. 7.3000. Like the Panel in US – 
Animals , para. 7.292, we note that the panel in EC – Approval and Marketi ng of Biotech Products based its 
reasoning on the Appellate Body decision in EC – Tariff Preferences on similar language in the Enabling Clause, 
which was issued later in time than the Appellate Body decision that discussed Article 5.7 of the SPS 
Agreement . The Appellate Body in EC – Tariff Preferences stated that where the permissive provision 
constitutes a right rather than an exception, "the complaining party bears the burden of establishing that a 
challenged measure is inconsistent with the provision pe rmitting particular behaviour ." Appellate Body Report, 
EC – Tariff Preferences , para. 88.  
913 (footnote original) See e.g. Appellate Body Report, Japan – Apples , para. 157 ("t he party that asserts 
a fact is responsible for providing proof thereof."). Appella te Body in Canada – Renewable Energy / Canada – 
Feed-in Tariff Program (where the Appellate Body concluded that "the characterization of [a] provision as a 
derogation does not pre -determine the question as to which party bears the burden of proof with rega rd to the 
requirements stipulated in the provision ".) (Appellate Body Report, Canada – Renewable Energy / Canada – 
Feed-in Tariff Program , para. 5.56 (referring to Appellate Body Report, China – Raw Materials , para. 334)).  
914 Panel Report, US – Animals , para. 7.292.  
915 European Union's panel request (WT/DS475/2), p. 3; first written submission, paras. 177 -202; and 
second written submission, paras. 66 -83. 
916 We find additional support for this approach in Panel Report, US – Animals , para. 7.293.  
917 European Uni on's first written submission, para. 202; opening statement at the first meeting of the 
Panel, paras. 81 -95; and second written submission, para. 68.  
918 Russia's first written submission, paras. 351, 352, 354, 374, 379, 381.  
919 For a detailed account of such  exchanges see Appendix 1 below.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  of an adequate assessment of risks as required under Article  5.1 and as defined in paragraph 4 of 
Annex A.920 Russia has argued that the sufficiency of scientific evidence should be examined in an 
ongoing mann er. Russia refers to the observation made by the panel in Japan – Apples  regarding 
the time -frame for the examination of the sufficiency of scientific evidence under Article 5.7.921 In 
Japan – Apples , the panel was faced with the question of whether the SPS measure was 
maintained without sufficient scientific evidence.922 In this case, we are faced with a question that 
touches upon the sufficiency of scientific evidence in respect of the adoption of the measures and 
the maintenance of the challenged measures. W e agree with the view expressed by the panel in 
EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products that the (in)sufficiency of the relevant scientific 
evidence should be assessed with respect to the time when the SPS measure is adopted.923 
Accordingly, we will focus our examination on the date of adoption of the EU -wide ban in 
January  2014.  
7.648.   Paragraph 4 of Annex A defines a "risk assessment" as "[t]he evaluation of the likelihood 
of entry, establishment or spread of a pest or disease within the territory of an im porting Member 
according to the sanitary or phytosanitary measures which might be applied, and of the associated 
potential biological and economic consequences; or the evaluation of the potential for adverse 
effects on human or animal health arising from t he presence of additives, contaminants, toxins or 
disease -causing organisms in food, beverages or feedstuffs." Accordingly, we will examine whether 
there is (in)sufficient scientific evidence for Russia to adequately assess the risks of the likelihood 
of entry, establishment or spread of ASF within the territory of Russia, as the importing Member, 
according to the sanitary or phytosanitary measures which might be applied, and of the associated 
potential biological and economic consequences. We recall our ea rlier observations that ASF is 
already present in parts of Russia924, particularly in areas that border the territories of Estonia, 
Latvia and Belarus. The risks to be assessed in this case, therefore, are those of the potential re -
entry or further spread of  ASF into Russia, and especially into the ASF -free regions of Russia.  
7.649.   According to Russia, the type of risk assessment under Annex A, paragraph 4, relevant to 
the situation at hand is the "evaluation of the likelihood of entry, establishment or spread of a  pest 
or disease within the territory of an importing Member according to the SPS measure which might 
be applied, and of the associated potential biological and economic consequences".925 It claims 
that, consistently with Article 5.1, it follows the approach  and methodologies suggested by the 
Terrestrial Code's risk assessment provisions in Chapter 2.1. and Articles 2.1.3. and 2.1.4., which 
list four sequential components of risk assessment: (a) entry assessment; (b) exposure 
assessment; (c) consequence asses sment; and (d) risk estimation.926 The final component of risk 
assessment consists of integrating the results from the first three components to produce overall 
measures of risks associated with the hazards identified.927  
7.650.   According to Russia, the estimation o f the ASF risk related to the importation of uncertified 
pigs and pork products from non -affected EU member States must begin with an entry 
assessment, which within the meaning of Article 2.1.4. of the Terrestrial Code:  
[C]onsists of describing the biologi cal pathway(s) necessary for an importation activity 
to introduce pathogenic agents into a particular environment, and estimating the 
probability of that complete process occurring, either qualitatively (in words) or 
quantitatively (as a numerical estimate ). The entry assessment describes the 
probability of the 'entry' of each of the hazards (the pathogenic agents) under each 
                                               
920 Appellate Body Report, Japan – Apples , para. 179.  
921 Russia's response to Panel question No. 309, para. 265 (referring to Panel Report, Japan – Apples , 
para. 7.10).  
922 Panel Report, Japan – Apples , Section VII.D . 
923 Panel Re ports, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products , para. 7.3253. We recall our general 
comments on the Panel's temporal framework in section 7.3.6  above.  
924 See para. 7.208  above . 
925 Russia's first written submission, para. 357 (citing Annex A, paragraph 4, to the SPS Agreement).  
926 Russia's first written submission, para. 363.  
927 Russia's first written submission, para. 363.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  specified set of conditions with respect to amounts and timing, and how these might 
change as a result of various actions, events or measures.928 
7.651.   Russia, therefore, argues that to conduct an entry assessment with respect to the 
importation of uncertified pigs and pork products from non -affected EU member States, Russia 
must assess and have access to information regarding "the pathways nec essary for the 
importation of ASF and the probability of an importation event occurring in relation to each 
exporting country and each imported pig and pork product" .929 Russia further elaborates:  
Such an assessment would involve many key factors, including the ASF control regime 
in the exporting EU Member States (e.g. surveillance mechanisms; preparedness to 
implement a contingency plan in the event of ASF outbreaks, including zoning and 
movement control, stamping out, etc.; product identification and tracea bility systems; 
level of biosecurity measures in place etc.); the incidence of ASF in the EU Member 
States; the quantity of pigs and pork products imported from the EU Member States 
into the Russian Federation; the movement of wild boar across borders and the 
density of wild boar populations in the EU Member States; the levels of legal and 
illegal trade of pigs and pork products in the EU Member States, and evaluations of 
the EU Member States' veterinary services, and diagnostic laboratories.930 
7.652.   Russia assert s that much of this information was, and still is, not available to it.931 Russia 
further claims that the European Union's responses Russia's  questions provided on 24 March 2015 
"should be given little, if any, weight by the Panel in its analysis of the SPS Agreement Article 5.7 
issue" since, in its view, the insufficiency of scientific evidence must be assessed at the time the 
relevant provisional SPS measure was adopted.932 It adds that the provided information is anyway 
incomplete.933 
7.653.   Furthermore, relying on t he European Commission Working Document of January 2014 
and several statements made in the EFSA 2010 Opinion, Russia points out uncertainty or 
insufficiency of scientific data regarding: the role of wild boar in the epidemiology of the 
disease934; whether wi ld boar could have a reservoir role or are only infected in areas where there 
are ongoing outbreaks in domestic pigs, and potential involvement of other biological vectors935; 
and the role of ticks in spreading the disease.936 Russia, in addition, refers to th e epidemiological 
                                               
928 Russia's first written submission, para. 364 (citing Ter restrial Code, Article 2.1.4. (emphasis 
original)).  
929 Russia's first written submission, para. 365.  
930 Russia's first written submission, para. 365.  See also Russia's first written submission, para. 367 
(referring to Letter from the Russian Veterinary Servi ce to DG SANCO, FS -AS-8/23743, 1 December 2014 
(Exhibit RUS -131))  
931 Russia's first written submission, para. 365 (referring to Letter from the Russian Veterinary Service 
to DG SANCO, FS -SD-8/1640, 5 February 2014 ( Exhibit EU -84) ("Preliminary estimates sug gest that the AS F 
control and containment measures impl emented by DG SANCO are  inconsistent with the OIE procedures. To 
build up a more accurate picture for further decisions on ASF regionalisation, CU experts are now compiling an 
extensive list of questio ns, including an update on the ASF epizootic situation in the EU after the occurrence of 
the disease in Lithuanian wild boar, implemented and envisaged ASF monitoring measures, and a 
comprehensive assessment of the risk of this dangerous animal disease spr eading to unaffected areas in the 
EU."); Letter from the Russian Veterinary Service to DG SANCO, FS -SD-8/4168, 19 March 2014 (Exhibit 
RUS-130) ("Regrettably we could find no common ground on the process of ASF regionalisation in the EU, and 
the issue of su fficiency of the EU reply and of conclusive evidence that the rest of the EU is not affected by the 
disease."); Letter from the Russian Veterinary Service to DG SANCO, FS -EN-8/5084, 2 April 2014 (Exhibit 
RUS-54) ("Regrettably Russian experts are still wait ing to receive detailed information on ASF -control 
measures, which are being taken by EU veterinary authorities, particularly arrangements for localisation of the 
disease in the affected countries as well as preventing the introduction of the ASF virus in other 
EU countries.").  See also  Appendix 1 below for a detailed account of the information requested through these 
communications.  
932 Russia's second written submission, para. 194 (referring to Panel Report s, EC – Approval and 
Marketing of Biotech Products , para. 7.3253).  
933 Russia's second written submission, para. 194.  
934 Russia's second written submission, para. 187 (referring to  European Commission, 
Working  Document SANCO/G2/SB (14.01.2014), "Guidelines on surveillance and control of African swine fever 
in feral pigs and preventative measures for pig holdings," 14 January 2014  (Exhibit RUS -89). 
935 Russia's second written submission, para. 188 (2010 EFSA Scientific Opinion, p. 8 (Exhibit EU -24). 
936 Russia's second written submission, para. 189 (2010 EFSA Scien tific Opinion, p. 4 (Exhibit EU -24)). WT/DS475/R  
 
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  uncertainty with respect to the distance in which wild boar may carry the disease and the absence 
of scientific evidence regarding the level of contagion of the disease, in particular the degree of 
survival of wild boar.937 Furthermore, Rus sia argues that it is prevented from conducting a risk 
assessment of the ASF spread to the non -affected EU member States because of "only limited data 
on the disease situation in the other [non -affected] EU Member States".938  
7.654.   Moreover, Russia alleges that t he European Union failed to provide proof that the non -
infected EU member States are historically ASF free, which links to the alleged failure of the 
European Union to provide data regarding the affected EU member States, such as information on 
the density  of the swine population and personal subsidiary farming, necessary to determine the 
risk of ASF spread from the affected countries to the rest of the European Union.939 
7.655.   Russia maintains that each of the categories of information it requested is highly relev ant. 
Given the key role of wild boar and backyard farms in the spread of ASF, Russia requested the EU -
wide data and control measures relating to wild boar and backyard farms in order to assess the 
likelihood of continued spread of ASF within the European U nion. Likewise, given free movement of 
goods in the European Union, Russia considers it relevant to have information about control 
measures regarding the movement of pork and pork products to processing plants, as well as the 
location of the processing pla nts exporting products to Russia. With reference to what Russia 
describes as instances of falsified certificates and other problems relating to veterinary control 
services, it considers it appropriate to request information about factors relating to veteri nary 
services performance.940 
7.656.   Since the European Union did not provide the requested information, and in view of the 
mentioned epidemiological uncertainties, Russia concludes that there is insufficient scientific 
evidence available to Russia to perform a ris k assessment with respect to the non -affected 
EU member States.941  
7.657.   In response to Russia's arguments, the European Union maintains that the relevant 
scientific information is sufficient and asserts that such information was provided by it to Russia.942 
In sup port of this assertion, the European Union refers to letters, emails, faxes, meetings and 
inspections through which such information was provided.943 
7.658.   We note that Russia refers to the potential risks associated with the importation of 
uncertified  pigs and po rk products from the unaffected EU member States. The European Union, 
however, has made no claim with regard to uncertified  pigs and pork products. Rather, the 
European Union takes issue with Russia's  EU-wide ban which Russia con siders as its provisional 
compliance with the current wording of the veterinary certificates.944 
7.659.   We bear in mind that insufficiency of scientific evidence does not extend to situations of 
"scientific uncertainty" (i.e. when there is unresolved scientific uncertainty)945, nor to situatio ns of 
scientific controversy.946 Moreover, the possibility to supplement the underlying scientific evidence 
does not, by itself, render it insufficient.947 
7.660.   Mindful of these elements and the parties' arguments, the Panel will review whether the 
qualitative and quantitative aspects of the available scientific evidence, including information the 
European Union has provided to Russia, is of the type and scope that is (in)sufficient for Russia to 
conduct a risk assessment appropriate to the circumstances.  
                                               
937 Russia's second written submission, paras. 190 - 191. 
938 Russia's second written submission, para. 192.  
939 Russia's second written submission, paras. 193 and 83 – 88. 
940 Russia's second written submission, para. 196.  
941 Russia's second written submission, para. 196.  
942 European Union's second written submission, para. 68.  
943 European Union's second written submission, para. 68 (referring to Exhibit s EU-62, EU -64, EU -65, 
EU-89, EU -91, EU -92, EU -94, EU -132 to EU -148).  See App endix I  below . 
944 See section s 7.3.2.3.1  and 7.3.2.3.2  above . 
945 Appellate Body Report, Japan – Apples , paras. 183 -184. 
946 Appellate Body Reports, US/Canada – Continued Suspension , para. 677.  
947 Appellate Body Reports, US/Canada – Continued Suspension , para. 702.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.661.   On the record we note that there are three main sources of scientific evidence that we 
need to examine. First, there is the general scientific evidence available in respect of ASF which 
has been exhibited by the parties or referred to in those exhibits. Second, ther e is the scientific 
evidence referred to in the written responses of the experts consulted by the Panel to the Panel's 
questions. Third, there is the scientific evidence available in respect of the relevant international 
standards. Before examining each of  these categories, we recall that our analysis in respect of the 
availability of this information is focused on January 2014. Based on that time -frame, we have 
excluded relevant scientific evidence submitted by the parties which was published after the end  of 
January 2014.948  
7.662.   Regarding the first source of scientific evidence, we note that ASF is a well -known disease 
in respect of which many scientific studies have been pursued. The parties have referred to a 
number of scientific reports or opinions produced by international organizations and by domestic 
veterinary authorities, which in our view reflect clear scientific evide nce in respect of ASF. In 
Table  5 below we provide an overview of the documents containing such information.   
 
Table 5 List of scientific reports or publications from international organizations  
Reference  Exhibit No.  
FAO report entitled "EMPRES Watch … African swine fever spread in the 
Russian Federation and the risk for the region" dated December 2009949 EU-23 
EFSA scientific opinion on ASF, published on 19 April 2010950 EU-24 
FAO report entitled "EMPRES W atch … African swine fever spread in the 
Russian Federation: risk factors for Europe and beyond" dated May 
2013951 RUS-3 
OIE presentation on "The OIE International s tandards on CSF and ASF – 
recent developments", TAIEX Workshop on CSF and ASF, Vilnius, 
Lithuania, 3 -4 September 2013.  RUS-78 and RUS -205 
Finnish veterinary authority (EVIRA) Research Report on "Possible routes 
of entry into the country for African swine fever – Risk profile", published 
on September 2011.  RUS-140 
 
7.663.   Also in the context of this first category of information, the parties have referred to specific 
scientific articles published in diverse academic journals. These include the following:  
Table 6 List of scientific articles published in journals referred to by the parties  
Reference  Exhibit No.  
Rosell, C., Navàs, Fl, & Romero, S, 2012. Reproduction of wild boar in a EU-130 
                                               
948 Such information includes 2014 EFSA scientific report ( Exhibit EU -25); EFSA Scientific Opinion on 
African Swine Fever, EFSA Journal 2014 12(4):3628  (2014 EFSA Scientific Opinion ) (Exhibit EU -26); Standing 
group of experts on ASF in the Baltic and Eastern European region, December 2014 (Exhibit EU -108); EU 
Veterinary Emergency Team, Vilnius, 8 – 10 October 2014  (Exhibit EU -109); J.M. Sánchez -Viscaíno et al, 
publis hed on January 2015 (Exhibit RUS -1); Presentation on ASF: Biosecurity in the pig breeding sector by 
Professor Mary Louise Penrith, on 30 October 2014 (Exhibit RUS -7); Species information on sus scrofa  from the 
IUCN Red List of Threatened Species (Exhibit R US-8); Morelle et al., "Towards understanding wild boar Sus 
scrofa  movement: a synthetic movement ecology approach", Mammal Review , (2014) (Exhibit RUS -99); C. 
Gallardo et al, "Experimental Infection of Domestic Pigs with African Swine Fever Virus Lithuani a 2014 
Genotype II Field Isolate", Transboundary and Emerging Diseases  (2015) (Exhibit RUS -172); L. Mur et al, 
"Detection of African Swine Fever Antibodies in Experimental and Field Samples from the Russian Federation: 
Implications  for Control (2014) (Exhi bit RUS -175); D. Gavier -Widen et al, "African swine fever in wild boar in 
Europe: a notable challenge", Veterinary Record , Vol. 176, No. 8 (2015), 199 -200 (Exhibit RUS -277); German 
Federal Research Institute for Animal Health (Friedrich -Loeffler -Institut),  Qualitative Risk Analysis  on the 
Introduction of African swine fever from Eastern Europe into Germany , 2 April 2014 (Exhibit RUS -291).  
949 This report contains references to a number of scientific reports and articles. See FAO report entitled 
"EMPRES W atch … African swine fever spread in the Russian Federation and the risk for the region" dated 
December 2009 (Exhibit EU -23), p. 9.  
950 This report contains references to a number of scientific reports and articles. See FAO report entitled 
"EMPRES W atch … Afric an swine fever spread in the Russian Federation and the risk for the region" dated 
December 2009  (Exhibit EU -23), pp. 81 -91. 
951 This report contains r eferences to a number of scientific reports and articles. See EMPRES  Watch  Vol. 
28 (May 2013), "African swi ne fever in the Russian Federation: risk factors for Europe and beyond", 
(Exhibit  RUS-3),  p. 13.   WT/DS475/R  
 
- 196 - 
 
  Reference  Exhibit No.  
cropland and coastal wetland area: implications for manag ement. Animal 
Biodiversity and Conservation, 35.2:209 -217. 
B.V. Boev et al, "The wild boar. Modelling and prognosis for cylvatic 
African swine fever", Журнал Ветеринария (Veterinary Journal) , 
December 2010.  RUS-5 
K. Jerina et al., "First evidence of long -distance dispersal of adult female 
wild boar ( Sus scrofa ) with piglets", European Journal of Wildlife 
Research , Vol. 60, No. 2 (2014), pp. 367 -370. RUS-9 
O. Keuling et al., "How does hunting influence activity and spatial usage 
in wild boar Sus scrofa  L.?", European Journal of Wildlife Research , 
Vol. 54, No. 4 (2008), 729.  RUS-10 
L. Mur et al. , "Risk of African swine fever introduction into the Europea n 
Union through transport -associated routes: returning trucks and waste 
from international ships and planes", BMC Veterinary Research , Vol. 8, 
No. 149 (2012)  RUS-11 
T.G. Burrage "African Swine Fever virus infection in Ornithodoros ticks", 
Virus Research 173 (2013), 131 -139. RUS-12 
A.Dors, E. Czyzewska et al. , "Effect of various husbandry conditions on 
the production parameters of swine herds in Poland", Polish Journal of 
Veterinary Sciences , Vol. 16, No. 4 (2013), 707 -713. RUS-65 
A. Thiermann, "Practical  Application of OIE standards and guidelines on 
compartmentalisation", 2008.  RUS-83 
R. Leaper et al. , "The feasibility of reintroducing Wild Boar ( Sus scrofa ) 
to Scotland", Mamal Review, Vol. 29, No. 4, (1999)  RUS-98 
M.L. Penrith et al. , "An investigatio n into natural resistance to African 
swine fever in domestic pigs from an endemic area in Southern Africa", 
Scientific and Technical Review of the OIE , Vol. 23, No. 3 (2004), 965 -
977 RUS-173 
E. Okoth et al. , "Comparison of African swine fever virus preval ence and 
risk in two contrasting pig -farming systems in South -west and Central 
Kenya", Preventive Veterinary Medicine , Vol. 110, No. 2, 198 -205 RUS-174 
S. Costard et al.,  "Epidemiology of African swine fever virus", Virus 
Research , Vol. 173, No. 1 (2012),  191-197 RUS-176 
O. Keuling et al. , "Commuting, shifting or remaining? Different spatial 
utilisation patterns of wild boar Sus scrofa L.  in forest and filed crops 
during summer", Institute of Forest Botany and Forest Zoology, Dresden 
University of Technol ogy, 2008.  RUS-182 
M.L. Penrith and W Vosloo, "Review of African swine fever: transmission, 
spread and control", Journal of the South African Veterinary Association , 
Vol. 80, No. 2 (2009), 58 -62. RUS-200 
 
7.664.   The second category of scientific evidence is the  expert studies referred to by the experts 
in their written responses to the Panel's questions. Dr Brückner, Professor Penrith, and 
Dr Thomson provided with their responses a list of references. Together, those references include 
a significant number of scientific studies in respect of ASF which predate the cut -off date of our 
analysis.952 
7.665.   The third category of scientific evidence relates to  the Terrestrial Code. We recall our 
findings in section 7.5.3 above, relative to Article  3.1, that the EU -wide ban, in respect of non -
treated products, is not "based on" the relevant international standard, as it imposes a ban in 
respect of the entire territory of the European Union, whereas the relevant provisions of the 
Terrestrial Code envis age trade from ASF -free countries, zones and compartments. On the 
question of whether the relevant scientific evidence may be insufficient when an international 
standard exists, we note the Appellate Body's clarification that:  
There is no indication in Art icle 5.7 that a WTO Member may not take a provisional 
SPS measure wherever a relevant international organization or another Member has 
performed a risk assessment. Information from relevant international organizations 
may not necessarily be considered "suf ficient" to perform a risk assessment, as it may 
be part of the "available pertinent information" which provides the basis for a 
provisional SPS measure under Article 5.7. Moreover, scientific evidence that may 
                                               
952 Section 5 of the Compilation of the experts' responses.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  have been relied upon by an international bod y when performing the risk assessment 
that led to the adoption of an international standard at a certain point in time may no 
longer be valid, or may become insufficient in the light of subsequent scientific 
developments.953 
7.666.   The Appellate Body added that whi le it is reasonable for a Member challenging the 
inconsistency of an SPS measure with Article 5.7 to argue that the risk assessment supporting 
international standards demonstrates the existence of sufficient relevant scientific evidence to 
perform a risk a ssessment, this evidence is not dispositive and may be rebutted by the Member 
adopting the provisional SPS measure.954 
7.667.   In this context, the Appellate Body further explained that "[t]he 'insufficiency' requirement 
in Article 5.7 does not imply that new scient ific evidence must entirely displace the scientific 
evidence upon which an international standard relies. It suffices that new scientific developments 
call into question whether the body of scientific evidence still permits of a sufficiently objective 
assessment of risk" .955 
7.668.   In this case, Russia has claimed from the outset that the EU -wide ban is "based on the 
OIE standard to the extent possible".956 In our view, this implies a clear recognition by Russia of 
the scientific basis of the international standard re levant for this dispute. In this respect, we 
consider that the Appellate Body's guidance regarding the relationship between the existence of an 
international standard and the sufficiency of scientific evidence for the purposes of Article 5.7 does 
not apply  to the situation before us. Rather, we see that Russia has consistently relied on the 
scientific basis in the Terrestrial Code to adopt and justify its measures.  
7.669.   Moreover, the parties have provided certain exhibits in connection with the scientific 
evide nce related with the relevant international standard. These include the OIE ASF General 
Disease Information Sheets957 and the OIE Technical Disease Card on ASF.958 We consider that the 
existence of international standards enshrined in Chapter 15.1 of the Terre strial Code, and their 
respective scientific basis, further confirms our view that by January 2014 there was ample 
scientific evidence in respect of ASF.959  
7.670.   Further reinforcing  the extent to which the preceding scientific evidence was available to 
Russia by  January 2014, we recall that Russia has experienced ASF outbreaks as of 2007960 and 
has expressed on various occasions its broad scientific knowledge of ASF.961 In this respect, we are 
of the view that Russia is well placed to manage any potential risk of the  further entry and spread 
of ASF through imports of the products at issue from the European Union, excluding the four 
affected EU member States.  
                                               
953 Appellate Body Reports, US/Canada – Continued Suspension , para. 695.  
954 Appellate Body Reports, US/Canada – Continued Suspension , para. 696.  
955 Appellate Body Reports, US/Canada – Continued Suspension , para. 725.  
956 Russia's first written submission, para. 385.  
957 OIE General Disease Information Sheets: African Swine Fever   (Exhibit RUS -4) and OIE Diseas e 
Information Sheet, African Swine Fever. Available at: http://www.oie.int/doc/ged/D13953.PDF  (Exhibit RUS -
171) (updated on May 2013).  
958 OIE, African Swine Fever, available at:  
http://www.oie.int/fileadmin/Home/eng/Animal_Health_in_the_World/docs/pdf/Disease_cards/AFRICAN_SWIN
E_FEVER.pdf . OIE ASF Technical Disease Card (Exhibi t RUS -186) (last updated on April 2013; last accessed 
23 October  2015). 
959 We note that the Terrestrial Code's edition in place at the time of our cut -off date for the analysis of 
(in)sufficiency of scientific evidence was the 22nd edition of the Terrestria l Code. In our view, this in no way 
affects our analysis in this section, because the OIE explained that Chapter 15.1 only underwent editorial 
changes from the 22nd to the 23rd edition. In that respect there is no modification in the scientific basis of th e 
standards contained in Chapter 15.1. See OIE response communication to the Panel dated 26 August 2015.  
960 Russia's first written submission, para. 23 (referring to Exhibit RUS -144); response to Panel question 
No. 132, paras. 263 -264; and second written su bmission, paras. 146 -147.  
961 Russia's first written submission, paras. 32 -33, 252 -273; and second written submission, paras. 143 -
153. WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.671.   Moreover, we consider that the European Union provided information to Russia in the 
course of January 2014, that includes further relevant scientific evidence in respect of ASF. 962 This 
information includes the reports on surveillance activities in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and 
Poland963 and a detailed annex on surveillance activities in Poland964 sent on 29 January 2 014.  
7.672.   After examining the information mentioned above, we consider that the body of scientific 
evidence available to Russia was abundant. In our view, this information includes knowledge of the 
epidemiology of the disease, the potential vectors for the tra nsmission and spread of the disease 
(including behavioural ecology of wild boars), potential risks of spread of the disease in the 
Baltic  region, and the type of control measures that could be applied.  
7.673.   We recall that the Appellate Body has found that ther e will be insufficient scientific 
evidence when the body of available scientific evidence does not allow, in quantitative or 
qualitative terms, the performance of an adequate assessment of risks as required under 
Article  5.1 and as defined in paragraph 4 o f Annex A of the SPS Agreement.965 We consider that 
the evidence in respect of ASF on record, existing in January 2014, amounts to that which would 
be sufficient for Russia to conduct an assessment appropriate to the circumstances in respect of 
the potential  risk of the re -introduction and further spread  of ASF associated with imports of the 
products at issue from the non -affected EU member States.  
7.674.   Moreover, we note that Article 5.2 refers to the information that a Member shall take into 
account in the asses sment of risks. This constitutes available scientific evidence; relevant process 
and product methods; relevant inspection, sampling, and testing methods; prevalence of specific 
diseases or pests; existence of pest - or disease - free areas; relevant ecologic al and environmental 
conditions; and quarantine or other treatment. In our analysis in the context of Article 6, we 
concluded that a considerable amount of such information is available to Russia.966 
7.675.   Based on the foregoing , we find that in January 2014 the r elevant scientific evidence was 
sufficient for Russia to conduct an assessment appropriate to the circumstances in respect of the 
potential risk of the re -introduction and further spread ASF associated with imports of the products 
at issue from the non -affected EU member States.  
7.676.   While the preceding finding is sufficient to conclude that the EU -wide ban does not fall 
within the scope of Article 5.7 and the qualified exemption to the obligations in Articles 5.1, 5.2 
and 2.2 is not available to Russia , the Pan el deems it prudent to examine the EU -wide ban in the 
context of the other three elements of Article 5.7.  
7.5.5.3.4.3   Whether the EU -wide ban was adopted on the basis of available pertinent 
information  
7.677.   With respect to the second condition of Article 5.7 — that the mea sure should be adopted 
on the basis of available pertinent information  — we consider that information is pertinent when 
there is a rational and objective relationship between the information concerning the risk and the 
measure.967 The Appellate Body in US/Ca nada – Continued Suspension explained how this 
requirement should be assessed:  
WTO Members' right to take provisional measures in circumstances where the relevant 
scientific information is "insufficient" is also subject to the requirement that such 
measur es be adopted "on the basis of available pertinent information". Such 
information may include information from "the relevant international organizations" or 
                                               
962 See Appendix 1 below for a detailed account of additional information provided by the European 
Union to Russia throughou t 2014 and the be ginning of 2015.  
963 European Union's letter to Russia of 29 January 2014, ARES(2014)209377, SANCO 
G7/RF/mh(2014)219959 (Exhibit EU -62). Also on  the record are presentations of the State Food and 
Veterinary Service of Lithuania on the prote ctive measures against ASF in Lithuania, made on 7 October 2013  
(Exhibit EU -114).  
964 Excel spreadsheet on Poland, Annex to the Letter of 29 January 2014 (pp. 6 -8) (Exhibit EU -63).  
965 Appellate Body Report, Japan – Apples , para. 179. 
966 See section 7.5.2  above.  
967 See Appellate Body Reports, US/Canada – Continued Suspension , para. 678.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  deriving from SPS measures applied by other WTO Members. Thus, Article 5.7 
contemplates situations where there is some evidentiary basis indicating the possible 
existence of a risk, but not enough to permit the performance of a risk assessment. 
Moreover, there must be a rational and objective relationship between the information 
concerning a certain ris k and a Member's provisional SPS measure. In this sense, 
Article 5.7 provides a "temporary 'safety valve' in situations where some evidence of a 
risk exists but not enough to complete a full risk assessment, thus making it 
impossible to meet the more rigor ous standards set by Articles 2.2 and  5.1".968 
7.678.   The European Union also posits that a measure being manifestly unnecessary and 
disproportionate would be pertinent to determining whether such a measure is based on pertinent 
information or whether it is rather a disguised restriction on international trade.969 In this respect, 
the European Union sustains that in "case of a well -known disease like ASF, if there is only one 
case in wild boar only a few kilometres from the border with Belarus, Russia should have not 
banned, even provisionally, the products at issue from the whole territory of the European Union, 
including areas thousands of kilometres away, given the robustness of the EU measures and the 
epidemiology of the disease."970 
7.679.   Russia argues that the European U nion has failed to make a prima facie  case that Russia 
does not comply with Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement. In its view, the available pertinent 
information indicates a high risk that the currently non ASF -infected countries may become 
ASF infected. Russ ia describes the situation as where there is "some evidentiary basis indicating 
the possible existence of a risk, but not enough to permit the performance of a risk 
assessment."971 
7.680.   Russia maintains that scientific research, dated July 2014, on domestic pigs and wild boar 
suggests that ASF may easily spread within regions of the European Union.972 Russia refers to the 
studies that have reported that some domestic pigs and wild boar have been  found in the field with 
antibodies to ASF, which, according to Russia, may mean that they have survived the infection.973 
In the view of Russia, this could expand the period of time during which the infected animals can 
infect other animals.974 Russia also mentions the possibility that recovered animals will remain 
persistently i nfected and transmit the disease through tissues.975 Finally, according to Russia, long -
distance movements of long term carrier wild pigs would likely lead to further spread of ASF across 
the European Union's territory, which is most likely via a northern ro ute through the 
Baltic  countries and Poland, due to the dense, large population of wild boar in Northeast Europe.976 
7.681.   Russia refers to the estimation made by the German Federal Research Institute for Animal 
Health that the risk of entry of ASF into Germany th rough illegal transportation and disposal of 
contaminated material is estimated as high; and the risk of entry of contaminated pork meat and 
                                               
968 Appellate Body Reports, US/Canada – Continued Suspension , para. 678 (footnote omitted).  
969 European Union's response to Panel question No. 148, para s. 305 -307; and second written 
submission, para. 77.  
970 European Union's second written submission, para. 78.  
971 Russia's second written submission, para. 197 (referring to Appellate Body Report, US/Canada – 
Continued Suspension , para. 678).  
972 Russia's first  written submission, para. 376 (referring to 2014 EFSA Scientific Opinion , at 18 (citing 
Mur et al., personal communication, 2014)  (Exhibit EU -26) and B.V. Boev et al., "The wild boar. Modeling and 
prognosis for sylvatic African swine fever"  (Exhibit RUS -5)). 
973 Russia's first written submission, para. 376.  
974 Russia's first written submission, para. 376 (referring to 2014 EFSA Scientific Opinion (Exhibit EU -26) 
p. 17).  
975 Russia's first written submission, para. 376 (referring to 2014 EFSA Scientific Opinion (Exhibit EU -26) 
p. 18, citing PJ. Wilkinson, "The persistence of African swine fever in African swine fever in Africa and the 
Mediterranean", Preventive Veterinary Medicine , Vol. 2 (1984), pp. 71 -82). 
976 Russia's first written submission, para. 377 (referri ng to EFSA, "Evaluation of possible mitigation 
measures to prevent introduction and spread of African swine fever virus through wild boar", EFSA Journal  
(2014),12(3):3616, (Exhibit EU -25), p. 6).  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  from pork derived products by vehicles or people along the main traffic routes is as high in the 
context of a "wors t case scenario".977 
7.682.   Similarly, Russia relies on an academic publication that allegedly supports its arguments. 
In particular, it refers to the study by Gallardo and others who concluded that the fact that nearly 
501 ASF cases or outbreaks have occurred in w ild boar and domestic pigs in Latvia, Lithuania, and 
Poland, combined with the uncertain situation in Belarus, "represents a permanent risk for ASF 
spreading into new regions of the EU" .978 
7.683.   According to Russia, the existence of the risk of ASF spread into no n-affected EU member 
States was also highlighted during negotiations between Messrs. Dankvert (head of FSVPS) and 
Van Goethem (head of DG SANCO).979 
7.684.   Russia argues that the high risk of ASF spread into new regions and countries in the 
European Union can furth er be derived from the fact that there is  evidence of wild boar moving 
from the four ASF -affected EU member States to Western Europe .980 Based on evidence regarding 
Classical swine fever in the European Union, Russia stresses that the high density of wild bo ar 
population in Europe can easily sustain viruses. 981 
7.685.   Russia also argues that the insufficiency of the European Union's zones to contain and 
control ASF demonstrates that the risk that ASF will spread further westwards or northwards is 
high.982 Additionally,  it points to the absence of any guarantees from the European Union that the 
products originating in its ASF -affected EU member States do not end up in the stream of 
commerce in the European Union.983  
7.686.   Russia thus concludes that the evidence indicates that s ignificant risk exists with respect to 
allowing imports from the non -affected EU member States but that such evidence is not enough to 
conduct a risk assessment under Articles 5.1 and 5.2 of the SPS Agreement.984 
7.687.   With these considerations in mind, the Panel will examine whether there is a rational and 
objective relationship between the available pertinent information concerning the risks arising from 
the potential re -entry and further spread of ASF within Russia through the imports of the products 
at issue fr om the entire European Union, excluding the four affected EU member States.  
7.688.   We recall that, pursuant to the 2006 Memorandum, the wording of the bilateral veterinary 
certificate that had been agreed between the European Union and Russia allows importation of the 
products concerned accompanied by an attestation that the products at issue "…originate from 
premises and/or administrative territory of the EU Member State that are officially free from the 
following contagious diseases: African swine fever - during the last 3 years in the territory of the 
EU excluding Sardinia".985 Up to and until the first outbreak of ASF in Lithuania in January 2014, 
the entire EU territory (with the exception of Sardinia) had been recognized by Russia as free of 
ASF for at least t he "last 3 years". Following the outbreak of ASF in Lithuania, Russia banned 
certain products from all member States of the European Union, including all other European Union 
member States who had not themselves experienced an outbreak of ASF. Pertinent in formation 
available to Russia included the fact that the initial situation in Lithuania was limited in scope, and 
                                               
977 Russia's second written submission, para. 198  (referring t o Friedrich -Loeffler -Institut, "Qualitative 
Risikobewertung zur Einschleppung der Afrikanischen Schweinepest nach Deutschland aus Osteuropa," 2 April 
2014 (Exhibit RUS -291), p p. 1-2). 
978 Russia's second written submission, para. 199 (referring to C. Gallard o et al., "Experimental Infection 
of Domestic Pigs with African Swine Fever Virus Lithuania 2014 Genotype II Field Isolate," in Transboundary 
and Emerging Diseases (2105) (Exhibit RUS -172), p. 1).  
979 Russia's second written submission, para. 199 (referrin g to Rosselkhoznadzor news, "Negotiations 
between Dankvert and DG SANCO," 6 July 2014 (Exhibit RUS -251).  
980 Russia's second written submission, para. 199 (referring to the Society for Applied Microbiology 
(SfAM), "Restrictions In Place As African Swine Feve r Hits Lithuania," 31 January 2014 (Exhibit RUS -292)).  
981 Russia's second written submission, para. 199 (referring to 2010 EFSA Scientific Opinion , p. 28 
(citing EFSA 2009c) (Exhibit EU -24)). 
982 Russia's second written submission, para. 200.  
983 Russia's secon d written submission, para. 201.  
984 Russia's second written submission, para. 203.  
985 See fn 117 above.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  that the European Union had in place a regionalization regime for surveillance and control of ASF, 
and was also obliged to comply with its obl igations flowing from the relevant international 
standards in the Terrestrial Code. Furthermore, pertinent information available on the 
epidemiology of ASF, potential vectors for the transmission and spread of the disease (including 
the behavioural ecology  of wild boars), and potential risks of spread of the disease in the Baltic 
region, indicated that, in terms of geography, wild boar ecology and epidemiology, the likelihood of 
ASF entry and spread to non -adjacent countries, let alone countries or zones lo cated much further 
away within the large expanse of the European Union's territory, was remote.986 We recall our 
examination of the relevant information in the context of our consideration under Article 6 of the 
SPS Agreement, which addressed similar matters  and which we found to be sufficient.987 
7.689.   We consider it also relevant to recall that the ASFV is already present and widespread 
within the territory of Russia. In fact, it could be  that ASF was introduced into the territory of the 
four affected EU member Sta tes by infected wild boar originating in Russia and Belarus. Russia has 
described in some detail the various measures it has in place to attempt to control ASF within its 
territory.988 Given that Russian authorities clearly have extensive knowledge of this d isease and 
procedures in place to address potential risks relating to the further spread of ASF, we are of the 
view that Russia is well placed to manage any potential risk of the further entry and spread of ASF 
through imports of the products at issue from  the European Union, excluding the four affected 
EU member States. Accordingly, we are unable to find, on the basis of evidence on the record, a  
rational and objective relationship between the EU -wide ban and the available pertinent 
information concerning the risks arising from the potential further entry and spread of ASF within 
Russia through the imports of the products at issue from the entire European Union, excluding the 
ASF-affected EU member States. W e therefore find that the EU -wide ban was not adop ted by 
Russia on the basis of available pertinent information.  
7.5.5.3.4.4   Whether Russia has sought to obtain the additional information necessary 
for a more objective assessment of risk in respect of the EU -wide ban  
7.690.   The third requirement of Article 5.7 is that the i mporting Member applying the measure 
seeks to obtain the additional information necessary for a more objective assessment of risk.989 
7.691.   The European Union argues that Russia "abused the process instead of seeking information 
germane for the risk assessment" be cause the information that Russia claims to seek was either 
already provided by the European Union or was irrelevant for the purposes of the 
European  Union's ASF regionalization measures.990 Following the adoption of a provisional 
measure, the respective Mem ber is under an obligation to seek to obtain additional information for 
a more objective assessment of risk. According to the European Union, the moment a Member is 
asking for information which is not necessary for a more objective assessment of risk, incl uding 
the type of information characterized by the individual experts in the present proceedings as an 
"overkill" or as an attempt to "muddy the water", that Member can no longer benefit from the 
provisional shelter of Article 5.7. The European Union argue s that such information requests are a 
clear warning sign that the respective Member is not genuinely seeking to perform a more 
objective risk assessment (objective in the sense of being based on the information available).  
7.692.   Russia argues that it is reques ting additional information from the European Union in order 
to perform a proper risk assessment based on a complete picture of the epizootic situation of ASF 
in each EU member State, with a view to better understanding the likelihood of entry of ASF into 
Russia "from the importation of uncertified pigs and pork products from other [non -affected] 
EU member States."991 Russia asserts that it has repeatedly requested from the European Union 
and member State officials information germane to conducting a risk ass essment.992 
                                               
986 See paras. 7.445 - 7.447  above.  
987 See section 7.5.2.3  above.  
988 See fn 1048 below.  
989 Article 5.7 places the burden of seeking to obtain the additional scientific information necessary to 
perform a more objective risk assessment on the importing Member.  See e.g. A ppellate Body Report, 
US/Canada – Continued Suspension , para. 679; Panel Report, US – Animals , para. 7.294.  
990 European Union's first written submission, para. 196.  
991 Russia's first written submission, para. 379.  
992 Russia's first written submission, para. 3 80. WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.693.   Article 5.7 does not impose explicit prerequisites regarding the additional information to be 
collected or a specific collection procedure .993 Nevertheless, the Appellate Body has concluded 
that: 
[T]he WTO Member adopting a provisional SPS measure should be able to identify the 
insufficiencies in the relevant scientific evidence, and the steps that it intends to take 
to obtain the additional information that will be necessary to address these 
deficiencies in order to make a more objective assessment  and review the provisional 
measure within a reasonable period of time. The additional information to be collected 
must be "germane" to conducting the assessment of the specific risk.994 
7.694.   The obligation in the second sentence of Article 5.7 requires that the Member adopting a 
provisional SPS measure "must make best efforts to remedy the insufficiencies in the relevant 
scientific evidence with additional scientific research or by gathering information from relevant 
international organizations or other sources.995"996 However, this does not mean that the  Member 
is expected to guarantee specific results, nor is it expected to predict the actual results of its 
efforts to collect additional information at the time when it adopts the SPS measure.997 
7.695.   Mindful of these consi derations, we recall that, f ollowing the outbreak of ASF in Lithuania, 
Russia banned certain products from all EU member States, including the EU member States that 
had not experienced an outbreak of ASF. We note that the scope of the requested information  in 
contention between the parties relates largely to the situation in the entire territory and all 
EU member States, over and above the four ASF -affected member States.998  
7.696.   In our analysis in respect of Russia's compliance with Annex C(1)(c), we found that Russia 
requested information that went beyond what was necessary for undertaking and completing the 
procedure for the verification of the presence of ASF in the territory of the non -affected 
EU member States.999 We recall that such unnecessary requests inclu de particular proof that each 
and every one of the non -affected EU member States are historically ASF free1000 as well as other 
categories of information which Russia claimed was necessary to determine the risk of ASF spread 
from the affected countries to the  rest of the European Union.1001  
7.697.   We also recall that, pursuant to the 2006 Memorandum, the wording of the bilateral 
veterinary certificate agreed between the European Union and Russia allows importation of the 
products concerned accompanied by an attestation  that the products at issue "originate from 
premises and/or administrative territory of the EU Member State that are officially free from the 
following contagious diseases: African swine fever - during the last 3 years in the territory of the 
EU excluding Sardinia" .1002 Up to and until the first outbreak of ASF in Lithuania in January 2014, 
the entire EU territory (with the exception of Sardinia) had been recognized by Russia as free of 
ASF for at least the "last 3 years".  
7.698.   In light of this, and given that the European Union had in place a regionalization regime for 
surveillance and control of ASF and that all EU member States were obliged to respect their 
obligations flowing from the Terrestrial Code, and that, in terms of geography, wild boar ecology 
and epide miology, the likelihood of ASF entry and spread to non -adjacent countries — let alone 
                                               
993 Appellate Body Report, Japan – Agricultural Products II , para. 92, Panel Report, US – Animals , para. 
7.295.  
994 Appellate Body Report, US/Canada – Continued Suspension , para. 679 (original footnote omitted); 
Panel Report, US – Animals , para. 7.295.  
995 (footnote original) Pursuant to Article 10.1 of the SPS Agreement , due account shall be taken of the 
special needs of developing country Members in respect of their ability to procure the additional information for 
a more objective assessment of risk.  
996 Appellate Body Reports, US/Canada – Continued Suspension , para. 679.  
997 Appellate Body Reports, US/Canada – Continued Suspension , para. 679. See also Panel Report, US – 
Animals, paras. 7.295 -7.297.  
998 See Appendix 1  below . 
999 See paras. 7.563  - 7.571  above.  
1000 The letter of 12 March 2014 refers to "absence of any proof of non -existence of ASF in the territory 
of other [non -affected] EU member states" ( Exhibit EU -90). 
1001 See para. 7.563  above.  
1002 See fn 117 above.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  countries or zones located far away in the westernmost parts of the European Union's territory — 
was remote, we find no basis in the evidence on record to support Russia' s assertion that all of the 
information it requested was "germane" to conducting a more objective assessment1003 of the 
specific risk within the meaning of this element of Article 5.7. As we have already noted, the 
experts consulted by the Panel characterized  certain of the information requested by Russia as 
"overkill" or as an attempt to "muddy the water".1004 While Article 5.7 requires that a Member 
must actively make best efforts to remedy the insufficiencies in the relevant scientific evidence 
with additional  scientific research or by gathering information from relevant international 
organizations or other sources, it does not envisage that a Member will use this process to seek 
information that is not germane to the specific risk involved.  
7.699.   We therefore find t hat Russia did not seek to obtain additional information that was 
"necessary" for a more objective assessment of risk within the meaning of Article 5.7.  
7.5.5.3.4.5   Whether Russia has reviewed the EU -wide ban within a reasonable period of 
time 
7.700.   The fourth condition un der Article 5.7 is that the Member applying the measure reviews it 
within a reasonable period of time. What constitutes a reasonable period of time has to be 
established on a case -by-case basis1005, based upon the particular facts and circumstances of a 
given  case. In Japan – Agricultural Products II , the Appellate Body stated that what constitutes a 
"reasonable period of time" within the meaning of Article 5.7 depends, inter alia , on the difficulty 
of obtaining the information necessary for a more objective a ssessment of risk.1006  
7.701.   We recall that the  panel in EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products interpreted 
the term "reasonable period of time" in Article 5.7 in a manner similar to the term "undue delay" 
in Annex C(1)(a).1007 This concept is not dependent on the length of the delay, but rather on 
whether any delay is legitimate and justifiable  as opposed to unwarranted or excessive.1008 
7.702.   The European Union argues that Russia has failed to review its measures within a 
reasonable period of time. The European Unio n identifies the six months from the date of the first 
outbreak in Lithuania, at the end of January 2014, to the date of the establishment of the Panel, 
on 22 July 2014 and the period from the time the European Union provided additional information 
in June  2014 until the time Russia contacted the European Union again, at the beginning of 
December 2014.1009 Russia posits that its measure is subject to an on -going process of review that 
                                               
1003 By this we refer to the distinction in degree of objectivity, based on available scientific evidence, 
drawn from the situations covered by Articles 5.7 and 5.1. Article 5.7 requires Members applying a provisional 
SPS measure on the basis of pertinent available information to "seek to obtain the additional information 
necessary for a more objective assessment of risk " (emphasis added). In our view, this refers to the type of 
risk assessment re quired pursuant to Articles 5.1 and 5.2, as defined in Annex A(4) of the SPS Agreement.  
1004 Dr Brückner's response to Panel question No. 13 (who stated "the information requested in Exhibit 
RUS-131 [ Letter from the Russian Veterinary Service to DG SANCO, No.  FS-AS-8/23743, 1 December 2014 ], is 
in my opinion 'an overkill' of which many of the questions are not relative or needed to conduct either a 
sensible quantitative or qualitative risk analysis "); and Dr Thomson's response to Panel question No. 13 (who 
stated in respect of the questions asked through Letter of 5 February 2014 from Russia to the EU, FS -SD 
8/1640 ( Exhibit EU -84) "[t]hese  questions are mostly variations on other questions posed by the RF. For a 
country that is not itself free of ASF this strik es me as an overkill and possibly an attempt to 'muddy the 
water'").  
1005 Appellate Body Report, Japan – Agricultural Products II , para. 93.  
1006 Appellate Body Report, Japan – Agricultural Products II , para. 93. Panel Report, US – Animals , para. 
7.300.  
1007 Panel Report s, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products , paras. 7.1495 -7.1497 (concerning  
Annex C(1)(a)) and 7.3245 (concerning Article 5.7). Panel Report, US – Animals , para. 7.301.  
1008 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Apples , para. 437; Panel Report, US – Animals , para. 7.301. 
Additionally, the panel in US – Animals  looked to the context of Article 21.3(c) arbitrations – which determine 
the reasonable period of time for Members to implement the rulings and recommendations of the DSB – in 
which arbitrators  have interpreted the term "reasonable period of time" to mean "the shortest period possible 
within the legal system of the [implementing] Member". Award of the Arbitrator, EC – Hormones (Article 
21.3(c)) , para. 26. That panel observed that, while not dire ctly applicable in these circumstances, it does 
suggest an understanding that when WTO Members must take legislative or regulatory actions involving 
complex legal processes to bring their measures into conformity with their WTO obligations reasonableness c an 
be understood to mean as quickly as legally possible while accepting legitimate reasons for delay.  
1009 European Union's first written submission, para. 201.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  will be completed in a reasonable period of time .1010 In Russia's view, the per iod of time has been 
reasonable, taking into consideration the difficulty of obtaining the additional information 
necessary to conduct a review.1011 
7.703.   With these considerations in mind, we examine whether Russia has reviewed the measure 
within a reasonable peri od of time, in light of the particular facts and circumstances of this case, 
and taking into account the timeframe for the Panel's analysis (i.e. from January to the date of 
Panel establishment on 22 July  2014, also encompassing the dates of adoption of th e measures in 
respect of Estonia and Latvia (September 2014)).  
7.704.   The panel in US – Animals  examined the question of whether the United States reviewed 
the measures at issue in that dispute within a reasonable period of time. In its analysis, that panel 
relied on its findings under Annex C(1)(a) in respect of whether the United States had incurred 
undue delays in its review of Argentina's application for Northern Argentina.1012 We agree with the 
approach of the panel in US – Animals . We consider that our assessme nt of this matter is closely 
linked with our examination of Russia's compliance with its obligations under Annex  C(1)(a). In 
that respect, we found that Russia's excessive and unjustified information requests in respect of 
the surveillance and control meas ures in non -ASF affected EU member States amount to acting in 
a manner that impedes undertaking and completing the procedure for the verification of the 
existence of ASF -free areas. In light of the Appellate Body's guidance,1013 we found that situation 
to con stitute an infringement of the obligation to undertake and complete a procedure without 
undue delay. We therefore found that Russia undertook and completed the procedure at issue with 
undue delay.  
7.705.   Our findings in respect of Annex C(1)(a) inform our analys is of Russia's compliance with 
the last requirement under Article 5.7. In particular, we consider that Russia's excessive 
information requests led to continued delays in considering the information that the 
European  Union provided. We do not ignore that a Member may require certain time to process 
detailed and complex information. A Member may even need to translate such information in order 
to properly assess it. However, we consider that in the situation before us concerning  the non -
affected EU member Sta tes, where Russia has been in possession of information for several 
months (from January  2014 to September 2014) and insisted on the insufficiency of such 
information in an unjustified manner, Russia is not reviewing its SPS measures within a reasonable 
period of time.  
7.706.   We therefore find that the fourth requirement for the application of Article 5.7 is not 
satisfied in the present case, because Russia did not review the EU -wide ban within a reasonable 
period of time.  
7.5.5.3.4.6   Conclusion  
7.707.   We have found that there was s ufficient scientific evidence for Russia to conduct a risk 
assessment of the ASF situation in the non -affected EU member States, as appropriate to the 
circumstances. Moreover, we found that Russia did not provisionally adopt the measure on the 
basis of ava ilable pertinent information, did not seek to obtain additional information, and did not 
review the EU -wide ban within a reasonable period of time. Having found that Russia did not 
satisfy any of the four requirements for the application of Article 5.7, we  find that the EU -wide ban 
does not fall within the scope of Article 5.7 and the qualified exemption to the obligations in 
Articles 5.1, 5.2 and 2.2 is not available to Russia. Thus, we now turn to assess the conformity of 
Russia's measures with Articles 5 .1, 5.2 and 2.2 of the SPS Agreement.  
                                               
1010 Russia's first written submission, para. 381.  
1011 Russia's first written submission, para. 381 (ci ting Appellate Body Report, Japan – Agriculture 
Products , para. 93).  See also Russia's comments to the European Union's response to Panel question No. 236, 
paras. 29 and 31.  
1012 Panel Report, US – Animals , para. 7.303.  
1013 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Apples, para. 438.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.5.5.3.5   Whether Russia's measures are based on a risk assessment  
7.708.   In EC – Hormones , the Appellate Body referred to the importance of basing an 
SPS measure on a risk assessment, in the context of the SPS Agreement:  
The requireme nts of a risk assessment under Article 5.1, as well as of "sufficient 
scientific evidence" under Article 2.2, are essential for the maintenance of the delicate 
and carefully negotiated balance in the SPS Agreement  between the shared, but 
sometimes competin g, interests of promoting international trade and of protecting the 
life and health of human beings".1014  
7.709.   In our view, this same balance holds true in respect of measures adopted for the 
protection of animal life and health. We are mindful that the introduct ion of a highly contagious 
disease like ASF into a previously disease -free area or into an area where the spread of the 
disease is subject to control measures, may have devastating economic and social effects on 
animal health and on human communities. Also , the presence of the disease may be highly 
disruptive to the ecosystem and the domestic and wild species that may be affected by such 
disease. In this context, we note the paramount importance of satisfying the requirements related 
to scientific evidence set out in Articles 2.2 and 5.1. We note that it may be the case that in a 
particular situation, a risk assessment that satisfies the requirements of Articles 5.1 and 5.2 and 
paragraph 4 of Annex A of the SPS Agreement can serve as a basis for a measure wh ich restricts 
trade of certain products. However, such a determination can only be made through the 
examination of the corresponding measures in light of the risk assessment on which it is based.  
7.710.   In this dispute, Russia has argued that it is under no obli gation to provide a risk 
assessment in respect of the EU -wide ban, because it is a measure that, if found to be attributable 
to Russia, was adopted on the basis of Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement.1015  
7.711.   As indicated in paragraph 7.707 above, we have found that the conditions required under 
Article 5.7 have not been met in respect of the EU -wide ban. Therefore, the foundation of Russia's 
justification for not having a risk assessment on which the EU -wide ban is based does not have 
merit. In light of this, we need to examine whether there is a risk assessment within the meaning 
of paragraph 4 of Annex A.  
7.712.   We recall that we found in paragraph 7.249  above that the EU -wide ban pursues the 
objectives enshrined  in both Annex A(1)(a) and A(1)(b). The first type of risk assessment required 
under paragraph 4 of Annex A (i.e. "evaluation of the likelihood of entry, establishment or spread 
of a pest or disease") is appropriate for measures seeking the objective in An nex(1)(a). The 
second type of risk assessment required under paragraph 4 of Annex A (i.e. "evaluation of the 
potential adverse effects on human or animal health arising from the presence of … disease -
causing organisms in … feedstuffs") is appropriate for m easures seeking the objective in Annex 
(1)(b).1016 Therefore, Russia's risk assessment should encompass both types of risk assessment 
referred to in paragraph 4 of Annex  A. 
7.713.   Throughout these proceedings , Russia has not argued that it has conducted a risk 
asses sment in the sense of Article 5.1 and paragraph 4 of Annex A.1017 We therefore find that the 
first requirement for our enquiry under Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement is not satisfied. As we 
have indicated above, our analysis of the European Union's claims und er Article 5.2 should be 
done together with the one corresponding to Article 5.1. In a situation where there is no risk 
assessment, it is clear that a Member does not comply with any of the requirements of Article 5.2.  
7.714.   Based on the foregoing, we find that the EU -wide ban is inconsistent with Articles 5.1 and 
5.2 of the SPS Agreement.  
                                               
1014 Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, para. 177.  
1015 Russia's second written submission, paras. 185 -203. 
1016 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon , para. 123, fn 69. See also Appellate Body Report, 
Australia – Salmon, para. 120, and Pane l Report, Australia – Salmon , paras. 8.72 and 8.116.  
1017 Russia rather explains why it was under no obligation to conduct a risk assessment.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.5.5.3.6   Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement  
7.715.   We recall that according to the Appellate Body in India – Agricultural Products , a finding of 
inconsistency with Articles 5.1 and 5.2 of the S PS Agreement raise a rebuttable presumption of 
inconsistency with Article 2.2.1018 Therefore, we need to examine whether Russia has put forward 
any arguments  or adduced any evidence  in to rebut this presumption.   
7.716.   Russia's arguments in respect of the lack of a  risk assessment have focused on the 
applicability of Article 5.7 to the EU -wide ban, and the corresponding justification in respect of 
Articles 5.1, 5.2, and 2.2.  
7.717.   Russia argues that a holistic view of the available pertinent information indicates a high 
risk that the currently non ASF -infected countries may become ASF infected .1019 Russia poin ts out 
that European scientists opine that there is a continuing risk of ASF spread to other 
EU member  States, for instance Germany.1020 According to Russia, the high risk  of ASF spread into 
new regions in the European Union can further be derived from the fact that there is evidence of 
wild boar moving from the four ASF -infected EU Member States to western Europe.1021 Russia also 
argues that significant number of outbreaks th at continue to take place in the ASF -infected 
EU Member States, indicating that the infection remains very active.1022 Russia further argues  that 
the European Union has not provided Russia with guarantees that the products originating in its 
ASF-infected EU M ember States do not end up in the stream of commerce in the 
European  Union.1023 Russia also asserts that Article 5.7 operates as an autonomous right of the 
importing Member to provisionally deviate from certain disciplines of the SPS Agreement, 
particularly f rom Articles 2.2 and 2.3.1024 
7.718.   We have found that  the EU -wide ban is not based on pertinent available information under 
Article 5.7 and that there is no  risk assessment on which the EU -wide ban is based . This  confirms 
our view that the measure is neither based  on scientific principles nor maintained with sufficient 
scientific evidence. Russia has not raised any arguments that would rebut such findings. In our 
view Russia has failed to rebut the presumption of inconsistency raised by our findings of 
inconsistenc y with Articles 5.1 and 5.2.  
7.719.   Based on the foregoing, we find the EU -wide ban is inconsistent with Article 2.2 of the 
SPS Agreement.  
7.5.5.4   Conclusion  
7.720.   We have found that there was sufficient scientific evidence for Russia to conduct a risk 
assessment of the ASF si tuation in the non -affected EU member States, as appropriate to the 
circumstances. Moreover, we found that Russia did not provisionally adopt the measure on the 
basis of available pertinent information, did not seek to obtain additional information, and di d not 
review the EU -wide ban within a reasonable period of time. Having found that Russia did not 
satisfy any of the four requirements for the application of Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement, we 
find that the EU -wide ban does not fall within the scope of A rticle 5.7 and the qualified exemption 
to the obligations in Articles 5.1, 5.2 and 2.2 of the SPS Agreement is not available to Russia. We 
have also found that Russia did not base the EU -wide ban on a risk assessment within the meaning 
of paragraph 4 of An nex A of the SPS Agreement, thus breaching Articles 5.1 and 5.2. We have 
also found that Russia has not rebutted the presumption of inconsistency that our findings raised 
in respect of Article 2.2 . Therefore , the EU -wide ban is also inconsistent with Artic le 2.2.  
                                               
1018 Appellate Body Report, India – Agricultural Products , para. 5.24.  
1019 Russia's second written submission, para. 197.  
1020 Russia's second written submission, para. 198, citing Friedrich -Loeffler -Institut, "Qualitative 
Risikobewertung zur Einschleppung der Afrikanischen Schweinepest nach Deutschland aus Osteuropa, " 2 April 
2014, p. 1 -2 (Exhibit RUS -291) 
1021 Russia's second wri tten submission, para. 199, citing Society for Applied Microbiology (SfAM), 
"Restrictions In Place As African Swine Fever Hits Lithuania, " 31 January 2014 (Exhibit RUS -292). 
1022 Russia's second written submission, para. 200.  
1023 Russia's second written submiss ion, para. 201.  
1024 Russia's response to Panel question No. 154, para. 276 (citing Panel Report s, EC – Approval and 
Marketing of Biotech  Products , paras . 7.2962 -7.2983). WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.5.6   Claims under Articles 5.3, 5.4, 5.6 , and 2.2 of the SPS Agreement  
7.5.6.1   Relevant legal provisions  
7.721.   Annex A(5) of the SPS Agreement defines the appropriate level of sanitary or 
phytosanitary protection (ALOP) as:  
The level of protection deemed appropriate by the Member establishing a sanitary or 
phytosanitary measure to protect human, animal or plant life or health within its 
territory.  
NOTE: Many Members otherwise refer to this concept as the "acceptable level of risk".  
7.722.   The European Union makes claims in respect of four provisions in Article 5 of the 
SPS Agreement that relate to the ALOP: Articles 5.3, 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6. The European Union frames 
its claims in respect of Article 5.5 together with those under Article 2.3 in connection with the 
alleged discri minatory treatment arising from the measures at issue. We acknowledge that our 
examination of the claims under Article 5.5 is contingent upon our determination of what is 
Russia's ALOP. In addition, we are mindful of the analytical convenience to group our  analysis of 
the claims raised in respect of Articles 2.3 and 5.5. Therefore we address the European Union's 
claims under Articles 2.3 and 5.5 in section 7.6.6 below. In this section we will focus on the 
European Union's claims  under Articles 5.3, 5.4 and 5.6.  
7.723.   An analysis of the European Union's claims under Articles 5.3, 5.4 and 5.6, and the alleged 
consequential breach of Article 2.2, in respect of both the EU -wide ban and the bans on the 
imports of the products at issue from the four affected EU member States, requires the 
identification of the level of protection that Russia has set as appropriate for ASF. The Appellate 
Body has reasoned that a first step in the analysis of claims under Article 5.6 is the identification of 
the Member's ALOP.1025 Because of the close relationship between Articles 5.6 and 2.2, the 
identification of a Member's ALOP also becomes relevant for making findings under Article 2.2.1026 
In addition, we agree with the Panel in US – Animals , which considered tha t it would be difficult to 
make a finding as to what a Member took into account in determining its ALOP if we do not know 
what that Member's ALOP  is.1027 In a similar vein, Russia's ALOP may inform our assessment of 
whether Russia took into account certain ec onomic factors in determining the measures it would 
apply to achieve its ALOP, pursuant to Article 5.3.  
7.724.   Article 5 of the SPS Agreement states in the relevant part:  
Article 5  
Assessment of Risk and Determination of the Appropriate Level  
of Sanitary or Phyt osanitary Protection  
… 
3. In assessing the risk to animal or plant life or health and determining the measure 
to be applied for achieving the appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary 
protection from such risk , Members shall take into account as relev ant economic 
factors: the potential damage in terms of loss of production or sales in the event of 
the entry, establishment or spread of a pest or disease; the costs of control or 
eradication in the territory of the importing Member; and the relative cost -
effectiveness of alternative approaches to limiting risks. (emphasis added)  
                                               
1025 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Apples , para. 344 (referred to in Panel Report, US – Animals , 
para. 7.368).  
1026 Panel Report, US – Animals , para. 7.368 (referring to Panel Report s, EC – Approval and Marketing of 
Biotech Products , para. 7.1433).  
1027 With respect to the importance of determining a Member's ALOP for an assessment of its measure s 
under Article 5.4 see Panel Report, US – Animals , para. 7.368.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  4. Members should, when determining the appropriate level of sanitary or 
phytosanitary protection, take into account the objective of minimizing negative trade 
effects.  
… 
6. Withou t prejudice to paragraph 2 of Article 3, when establishing or maintaining 
sanitary or phytosanitary measures to achieve the appropriate level of sanitary or 
phytosanitary protection, Members shall ensure that such measures are not more 
trade-restrictive th an required to achieve their appropriate level of sanitary or 
phytosanitary protection, taking into account technical and economic feasibility.3 
3 For purposes of paragraph 6 of Article 5, a measure is not more trade -restrictive 
than required unless there is another measure, reasonably available taking into 
account technical and economic feasibility, that achieves the appropriate level of 
sanitary or phytosanitary protection and is significantly less restrictive to trade.  
7.725.   Before turning to the substance of the European Union's claims, the Panel will first 
determine what Russia's ALOP is in respect of ASF  as relevant for the assessment of both the 
EU-wide ban and the bans on the imports of the products at issue from the four affected 
EU member States. Subsequ ently, we will examine whether the European Union has established 
the elements of its claims under Articles 5.3, 5.4, and 5.6 of the SPS  Agreement in respect of the 
EU-wide ban. At the end of this section the Panel will examine the alleged consequential br each of 
Article 2.2 through the EU -wide ban. In section 7.6.6 below , we will examine the consistency of 
the bans on the imports of the products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland with 
Articles 5.3, 5.4, 5.6, a nd 2.2.  
7.5.6.2   Russia's appropriate level of protection for ASF  
7.5.6.2.1   Main arguments of the parties  
7.5.6.2.1.1   European Union  
7.726.   In the European Union's opinion, the ALOP, as defined in Annex A(5) of the 
SPS Agreement, is a political choice of each government and cannot be questione d by the 
WTO adjudicating bodies.1028 However, once a Member has chosen its desired level of protection, it 
should calibrate the measures according to that level.1029 
7.727.   The European Union maintains that Russia has not expressly stated its ALOP, and hence 
requests that the panel infer Russia's ALOP from the SPS measures applied in practice.1030 The 
European Union further suggests that the evidence on record indicates that Russia has "a rather 
low ALOP", which cannot support an inference of "a zero -risk policy".1031 
7.728.   The Eu ropean Union submits that the present case is significantly similar to India – 
Agricultural Products , where the panel made findings regarding India's ALOP.1032 According to the 
European Union,  in that dispute , India did not clearly identify its ALOP and impos ed a country -wide 
ban for the disputed imported products. The European Union adds that the panel in that case has 
found that it could not be implied from the ban that India pursued a zero -risk policy, in part 
because Low Pathogenic Avian Influenza (LPAI) c an be transmitted through wild birds and the 
                                               
1028 European Union's first written submission, paras. 238 and 239. The ALOP is also referred to as the 
acceptable level of risk (European Union's first written submission, para. 239, citing App ellate Body Report,  
Australia  – Apples, para. 369).  
1029 European Union's first written submission, para. 239.  
1030 European Union's first written submission, paras. 242 and 243 (citing Appellate Body Report, 
Australia – Salmon , para. 207).  
1031 European Union's fi rst written submission, para. 248.  
1032 European Union's first written submiss ion, para. 245.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  trade ban was not apt to restrict wildlife movements. The European Union notes that the panel 
thus concluded that India's ALOP was very high or very conservative, but not zero risk.1033 
7.729.   The European Union argues th at Russia imposed a country -wide ban with regard to the 
products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland , as well as an EU -wide ban, despite 
the fact that parts of these four member States, and the entirety of the rest of the European 
Union's territory are not affected by ASF. The European Union, however, notes that these bans are 
not combined with a Russia -wide ban, as the products associated with the risk of ASF from the 
non-affected zones of Russia are allowed to be traded.1034 In addition, the  European Union asserts, 
these bans are not able to achieve restrictions in wildlife movements.1035 
7.730.    The European Union contends that the ASF measures undertaken by Russia — whereby 
pig products from the non -infected areas of Russia are allowed to be traded i n the rest of the 
country  — failed to contain the spread of ASF within Russia.1036 Furthermore, the European Union 
mentions that an important factor of ASF transmission is the wild boar population.1037 As explained 
by the European Union, more ample movements of wild boars, normally non -migratory species, 
could be triggered during mating season, as a result of a lack of sufficient food or by their 
displacement as a result of hunting.1038 According to the European Union, wild boars seeking to 
escape hunters in Russia are the most probable vector for the spread of ASF to the European 
Union, via Belarus,  in 2014.1039 
7.5.6.2.1.2   Russia  
7.731.   Russia asserts that its ALOP with respect to imports from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and 
Poland  is high, and explains it seeks to accomplish what the O IE requires through that high 
ALOP.1040 Russia adds that in determining the meaning and scope of a defending Member's ALOP, 
a panel should have recourse to all relevant evidence, including the substance of the text of the 
relevant import and domestic measures . It adds that there should be no particular limits on the 
evidence used to determine that ALOP.1041 
7.732.   Russia asserts that its ALOP with respect to imports of live pigs and pork products from the 
European Union is high, and it is the same ALOP it applies for pi gs and pork products traded within 
its territory.1042 In its own words, Russia stresses that it has the "important objective of preventing 
the introduction of ASF into areas of the Russian Federation that are not infected with ASF. It has 
the further objectiv e of eradicating and controlling ASF outbreaks in areas of Russia  where ASF has 
                                               
1033 European Union's first written submission, para. 244 (citing Panel Report, India – Agricultural 
Products , paras. 7.550 - 7.575).  
1034 European Union's first written su bmission, para. 245. The European Union adds that the poor 
effectiveness of Russia's measures is confirmed by scientific assessments (European Union's first written 
submission, para. 246, referring to 2014 EFSA Scientific Opinion (Exhibit EU -26), pp. 11 -15). 
1035 European Union's first written submission, para. 245.  
1036 European Union's first written submission, para. 246.  
1037 European Union's first written submission, para. 245  
1038 European Union's first written submission, para. 247 (referring to 2010 EFSA Scienti fic Opinion, 
(Exhibit EU -24), p. 29, quoting Office National de la  Chasse et de la Faune  Sauvage (ONCFS), 2004, La gestion 
du sanglier. Des pistes et des outils pour réduire les populations. DER Cnera Cervidés -sanglier, ONCFS, St 
Benoist).  
1039 European Union 's first written submission, para. 247. In fn 201 to para. 247, t he European Union 
noted: "The ASF virus strain in the EU MS concerned matches 100% the virus strain in Belarus. ASF diagnosis 
and molecular characterization Lithuania, EURL -ASF, CISA -INIA, 13 17, 28/10/2014  (Exhibit EU -27); ASF 
diagnosis and molecular chara cterization Poland, EURL -ASF, CISA -INIA, 1145, 30/09/2014  (Exhibit EU -28); 
ASF diagnosis and molecular characterization Latvia, EURL -ASF, CISA -INIA, 1232, 17/10/2014  (Exhibit EU -29); 
ASF diag nosis and molecular characterization Estonia, EURL -ASF, CISA -INIA, 1375, 7/11/2014 ( Exhibit EU -
30)." See also first written submission, paras. 48 and 56 -58. 
1040 Russia's response to Panel question No. 159, para.  298. See also second written submission, 
paras . 7, and 12 -19. 
1041 Russia's response to Panel question No. 160, para. 302.  
1042 Russia's first written submission, para. 250. See also, response to Panel question No. 159, 
para. 298; second written submission, paras. 1, 7, 12 -19, and 143; response to Panel que stion No. 297, 
para. 165; response to Panel question No. 304, para. 219  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  occurred, but is in the process of being eradicated."1043 Russia posits that this reflects the 
application of a "high" ALOP domestically.1044 
7.733.   Russia submits extensive evidence in sup port of its assertion that it applies a domestically 
high ALOP. That evidence includes reference to Russia's domestic legal framework and 
administrative plans for surveillance, monitoring, control and eradication of ASF.1045 Russia also 
provided evidence in r espect of the measures it applied to control and eradicate ASF in the regions 
of Voronezh1046, Krasnodar1047 and Belgorod.1048 
7.734.   Russia specifically identifies certain sections of its domestic legislation as confirmation of 
its high ALOP domestically applied. Accordi ng to Russia "the ASF Instructions aim to 'prevent . . . 
and eradicate . . . African Swine Fever'1049 in the Russian Federation, a goal also shared by the 
2012 ASF Plan which aims to 'prevent spreading and eradicate a virus of African swine fever (ASF) 
in the  territory of the Russian Federation.'1050"1051 
                                               
1043 Russia's first written submission, para. 251.  
1044 Russia's first written submission, para. 251.  
1045 See Russia's first written submission, paras. 24 -35 and 251 -261; responses to Panel qu estions No. 
29 and 30; and the following Exhibits: ASF Instructions ( Exhibit EU -18); 2012 Plan (Exhibit RUS -13); Russian 
Federal Ministry of Natural Resources, Plan regarding the organizational and  specific measures of monitoring, 
depopulation and reductio n of migration activities of wild boar in the territory of the RF, including specially 
protected natural areas of regional and federal importance, 21 November 2013 (Wild Boar Plan) (Exhibit RUS -
20); Russian Veterinary Service, Guidelines for prevention of distribution of African swine fever among wild 
boars (Exhibit RUS -127); Russian Federal Government Decree on the Seizure of Animals and Animal Products 
in case of Eradication of Highly Dangerous Animal Disease Outbreaks, No. 310, 26 May 2006 (Exhibit RUS -21); 
Order by the Russian Federal Ministry of Agriculture on Approval of Guidelines to Determine Animal Health 
Status of Pig Holdings and Organizations Involved in Pig Slaughter, Pork Product Processing and Storage, No. 
258, 23 July 2010  (Exhibit RUS -22); O rder by the Russian Federal Ministry of Agriculture on the Confirmation 
of the List of Contagious Animal Diseases That Require Containment Measures, No. 476, 19 December 2011  
(Exhibit RUS -18); Order by the Russian Federal Ministry of Agriculture on the Con firmation of the Rules for 
Veterinary Transport Certificates and the Order of Issuance of Veterinary Transport Certificates, No. 281, 
17 July 2014 (Exhibit RUS -19). 
1046 See Russia's first written submission, paras. 262 -263. The following exhibits were submit ted in 
support of the measures applied to control and eradicate ASF in Voronezh: Report by Voronezh Veterinary 
Service, No. 1418, 22 July 2014, pp. 1 -2.  (Exhibit RUS -108); Decree by the Governor of Voronezh region of 
the Russian Federation on the Impositi on of ASF -related Quarantine on the Territory of Anninsky municipal 
district of Voronezh region, No. 237 -y, 17 July 2014.   (Exhibit RUS -109); Report by Voronezh Veterinary 
Service, No. 1443, 25 July 2014, p. 3.  (Exhibit RUS -110); Order by the Governor of Voronezh Region on 
Compensation, No. 236, 17 July 2014.  (Exhibit RUS -111); and Rosselkhoznadzor News, "To continue 
controlling of ASF, Voronezh Administration of Rosselkhoznadzor arrested a pork consignment from Ukraine" 
23 January 2015. (Exhibit RUS -112). 
1047 See Russia's first written submission, paras. 264 -268. The following exhibits were submitted in 
support of the measures applied to control and eradicate ASF in Krasnodar: G. A. Dzhailidi, R.A. Krivonos, 
A.A. Shevchenko, O. Yu. Chernykh, Measures for pr evention and eradication of African Swine Fever in 
Krasnodar Territory (Exhibit RUS -113); Resolution of the Head of Krasnodar Territory Administration 
(Governor), 16 August 2012  (Exhibit RUS -114); Pig Progress, "Russian Vet service: More African Swine Feve r 
in Krasnodar region", 30 July 2012.  (Exhibit RUS -115); and Declaration of Dzhailidi, para. 13.  (Exhibit 
RUS-116).  
1048 See Russia's first written submission, paras. 269 -272. The following exhibits were submitted in 
support of the measures applied to contr ol and eradicate ASF in Belgorod: Letter from Anisimov to Vlasov 
report (Measures Belgorod), 10 June 2014. (Exhibit RUS -117); Pig Progress , "New ASF outbreak in Belgorod 
Oblast, Russia", 11 June 2014.  (Exhibit RUS -118); Letter from Aleinik (Chairman of Be lgorod Government) to 
Petrikov (Deputy Minister of Agriculture of the Russian Federation) on Implementing the Plan of ASF Measures, 
(Letter from Aleinik to Petrikov (Measures Belgorod)), 4 July 2014.  (Exhibit RUS -119); Resolution of Governor 
of Belgorod O blast to Eliminate and Prevent Further Spread of African Swine Fever within the Infected Area, 
i.e. Grafskiy Les Stow of Agrotekhgarant "Alekseevsky" OOO Hunting Farm in Alekseevksy District of Belgorod 
Oblast , 4 June 2014, No. 56  (Exhibit RUS -120); Resolu tion of the Government of Belgorod Oblast on 
Implementing the "Preventing the Introduction and Spread of the African Swine Fever (ASF) virus in Belgorod 
Oblast for 2014 -2016" long term target program, 5 May 2014.   (Exhibit RUS -121); Letter from Anisimov to  
Vlasov (Measures in Belgorod), 27 August 2014.  (Exhibit RUS -122).  See also Exhibits RUS -307 and RUS -308. 
1049 (footnote original) Russian instructions on ASF prevention and eradication measur es of 21 
November 1980  (Exhibit EU -18). 
1050 (footnote original) 2012  Plan of Measures (Exhibit RUS -13). 
1051 Russia's second written  submission, para. 143.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.735.   In addition, Russia argues that its ALOP, in respect of imported goods (including those 
from the European Union), is expressed through the objective of the Customs Union Decision No. 
317 which is to "ensure protect ion of the customs union territory of the Customs Union against the 
import and spread of contagious disease pathogens, including diseases common to both animals 
and humans, and goods which do not comply with the Common Veterinary Requirements."1052 
7.736.   Russia als o asserts that when faced with the "deadly" combination of high density in wild 
boar and high percentages of low -biosecurity backyard farms, import measures based on 
compartmentalization are the least trade -restrictive measures that would achieve Russia's 
ALOP.1053 Russia posits that it has communicated to the European Union that it has applied a high 
ALOP in accordance with the provisions set out in the Terrestrial Code.1054  
7.737.   Russia further explains that the European Union's failure to demonstrate the establishm ent 
of ASF -free zones or compartments in a manner consistent with the Terrestrial Code or compliance 
with conditions for safe trade of treated products1055, render the bans on imports of the products 
at issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland consis tent with the provision s of the Terrestrial 
Code.1056 
7.5.6.2.2   Analysis by the Panel  
7.738.   We recall that Annex A(5) of the SPS Agreement defines the ALOP as "[t]he level of 
protection deemed appropriate by the Member establishing a sanitary or phytosanitary measure to 
protect human, animal or plant life or health within its territory". The note to Annex A(5) further 
states that "[m]any Members otherwise refer to this concept as the 'acceptable level of risk'".  
7.739.   The Appellate Body in India – Agricultural Products  indicated t hat Members have the 
prerogative and the obligation to specify their appropriate level of protection.1057 It also highlighted 
that in the context of WTO dispute settlement proceedings, a responding Member is generally 
better placed than the complainant to kno w what objective it has set in terms of its ALOP. 
Therefore, the Appellate Body stated that a panel "would be expected to accord weight to the 
respondent's articulation of its  appropriate level of protection ", especially when it has been 
specified in advan ce of the adoption of the SPS measure, with sufficient precision, and has been 
consistently expressed by the responding Member. However, "this does not mean that a panel 
must defer completely to a respondent's characterization of its own" ALOP, rather, "a panel is 
required to ascertain the respondent's appropriate level of protection on the basis of the totality of 
the arguments and evidence on the record".1058  
7.740.   To ascertain Russia's ALOP, we need to examine whether Russia has articulated an ALOP, 
within the m eaning of Annex A(5) of the SPS Agreement, in respect of ASF. We also need to 
determine whether Russia has defined its ALOP "'with sufficient precision to apply Article 5.6'1059; 
that is without 'such vagueness or equivocation that the application of the rele vant provisions of 
the SPS Agreement, such as Article 5.6, becomes impossible'.1060".1061 In this respect we will 
examine the manner in which Russia identified its ALOP and the supporting evidence it has 
submitted. We will also examine the European Union's objec tions to Russia's formulation of its 
                                               
1052 Russia's response to Panel question No. 297, para. 165 (referring to Customs Union Decision No. 
317 (Exhibit RUS -25)). See also second written submission, para. 143.  
1053 Russia's response to Panel question No. 159, para. 300.  
1054 Russia's second written submission, paras. 12 -18 and 143.  
1055 See fn 247 above.  
1056 Russia's comments to the European Union's response to Panel question No. 286, para. 149.  
1057 Appellate Body Report, India – Agricultural Products , para. 5.221  (referring to Appellate Body 
Reports, Australia – Salmon, paras. 199 and 205 -206; and Australia – Apples , para. 343).  
1058 Appellate Body Report, India – Agricultural Products , para. 5.221. T he Appellate Body has provided 
additional guidance on how to identify a Member's ALOP in: Appellate Body Reports, India – Agricultural 
Products , para. 5.226; and Australia – Salmon , paras. 203 -204, 207. See also Panel Reports, US – Animals, 
paras.7.377 -7.381; and India – Agricultural Products , paras. 7.583 -7.586.  
1059 (footnote original) Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon , para. 207.  
1060 (footnote original) Appellate Body Reports, Australia – Salmon , para. 206; and US – Continued 
Suspension , para. 523.  
1061 Panel Report, India – Agricultural Products , para. 7.556.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  ALOP. After reviewing the parties' views and their supporting evidence, we will provide our views 
on what we consider to be Russia's ALOP.  
7.741.   Russia argues that its ALOP, in respect of imported goods (including those from the 
European Union), is expressed through the objective of the Customs Union Decision No. 317 to 
"ensure protection of the customs union territory of the Customs Union against the import and 
spread of contagious disease pathogens, including diseases common  to both animals and humans, 
and goods which do not comply with the Common Veterinary Requirements."1062 
7.742.   The European Union argues that the Panel should infer Russia's ALOP from the measures 
applied in practice1063 and it further suggests that the evidence on th e record indicates that 
Russia's ALOP is "rather low".1064 According to the European Union, the ineffectiveness of Russia's 
domestic measures for the control and eradication of ASF support its view that Russia applies a 
rather low ALOP.1065  
7.743.   The European Union a dds that it does not agree with Russia's argument that if an ALOP is 
derived from the challenged measure, then the ALOP can never be more trade restrictive than 
required to achieve the ALOP. According to the European Union a measure could reveal purely 
protectionist objectives, in which case the ALOP would be inferred only from those elements that 
are not overtly protectionist.1066 The European Union considers that bans on imports of the 
products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland as well as the EU -wide ban reveal 
purely protectionist objectives. Therefore, the European Union could not identify non-protectionist 
elements on the basis of which to correctly infer Russia's ALOP.1067 The European Union also 
considers that a conclusion about necessity  can only be reached on the basis of a consideration of 
the alternatives.1068 
7.744.   We recall that the Appellate Body in Australia – Salmon  reasoned that the ALOP "is an 
objective, and that the SPS measure is an instrument chosen to attain or implement that 
objecti ve."1069 In this respect, the panel in US – Animals  observed that "[a]s expressions of a 
general objective, ALOPs are often set forth in a qualitative and generic manner."1070  
7.745.   As we have examined in section 7.4.4 above, among the ob jectives of the measures at 
issue is to ensure protection of Russia's territory from the further entry and spread of ASF and 
ASFV. Russia seems to argue this to be the level of protection it applies to the imports of the 
products at issue.1071 In our view thi s formulation is rather broad. However, it provides an 
indication of what level of protection is being sought.  
7.746.   It may or may not be the case that the measures at issue are protectionist. The Panel will 
only address that issue as necessary for its substant ive assessment of the European Union's 
claims. However, the European Union's argument that because of their protectionist nature such 
measures should not be considered when ascertaining Russia's ALOP in respect of ASF, seems to 
run contrary to the Appellat e Body's guidance. Accepting the European Union's argument would 
                                               
1062 Russia's response to Panel question No. 297, para. 165 (referring to Customs Union Decision 
No. 317 (Exhibit RUS -25)). See also second written submission, para. 143.  
1063 European Union's first writt en submission, paras. 242 and 243 (citing Appellate Body Report, 
Australia – Salmon , para. 207).  
1064 European Union's first written submission, para. 248.  
1065 European Union's first written submission, paras.9 and 245 -248; response to Panel question 
No. 161, p ara. 328; second written submission, para. 150; and response to Panel question No. 287, para. 130.  
1066 European Union's opening statement at the first meeting with the Panel, para. 125.  
1067 European Union's response to Panel question No. 152, para. 317; second  written submission, 
paras.  82 and 152; response to Panel question No. 287, paras. 127 -130, comments to Russia's response to 
Panel question No. 304, para. 141..  
1068 European Union's opening statement at the first meeting with the Panel, para. 125.  
1069 Appellat e Body Report, Australia – Salmon , para. 200.  
1070 Panel Report, US – Animals, para. 7.380.  
1071 Russia's response to Panel question No. 297, para. 165 (referring to Customs Union Decision No. 
317 (Exhibit RUS -25)). See also second written submission, para. 143.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  bar this Panel from examining Russia's ALOP on the basis of the totality of arguments and 
evidence on the record.1072  
7.747.   We are mindful of the Appellate Body's caution against a circular analysis of determining a 
Member's ALOP through the SPS measures it applies. However, as noted by the Appellate Body, 
there may be circumstances in which it may be necessary to adopt this approach.1073 We consider 
the measures at issue to be an important element in su pporting the determination of what is 
Russia's ALOP in respect of ASF. In particular, we consider that an examination of the measures at 
issue will provide an indication of the risk that Russia is willing to accept in respect of the entry 
and further sprea d of ASF in its territory, especially in respect of those areas not yet affected by 
ASF.  
7.748.   Refusing imports of the products at issue from the European Union, irrespective of whether 
they come from areas that may be free of ASF, reflects a stringent standard  to ensure protection 
of Russia's territory from the entry and further spread of ASF. This is further confirmed by the 
refusal of treated (through thermal treatment, fermentation or maturation) products from Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland . 
7.749.   We also note that according to the evidence on record, despite the measures that Russia 
has put in place, ASF remains present in certain areas of Russia's territory.1074 Such measures 
include standstill of the products at issue from areas surrounding the epizootic ho t-bed where ASF 
outbreak occurred, but do not include a blanket ban on the movement of susceptible products 
from other areas within Russia itself. This calls into doubt that Russia's ALOP could be considered 
as zero risk. Moreover, Russia has not claimed t hat it is seeking a zero risk policy.  
7.750.   We further note that Russia states that as it has "consistently expressed in its 
communication with the European Union … [that] the Russian Federation has applied a high ALOP 
in accordance with the provisions set out i n the OIE Terrestrial Code." 1075 In our view, this seems 
to confirm that Russia acknowledges that its ALOP for ASF, as applied to imports of the products at 
issue, could be achieved by measures that conform to the standards enshrined in the Terrestrial 
Code.  As examined in detail in paragraph s 7.825  -7.826  below, those standards do not purport to 
set a zero risk, but they are designed to avoid the spread of ASF, hence could be described as 
setting a hi gh level of protection.  
7.751.   The objective of Customs Union Decision No. 317 , which Russia claims reflects its ALOP in 
respect of ASF, read in conjunction with the stringent measures applied to imports from the 
European Union and the existence of some control m easures on the movement of susceptible 
products within its own territory, confirms that Russia's ALOP is high. However, it does not support 
a conclusion that Russia's ALOP is zero risk or tolerance.  
7.5.6.2.3   Conclusion  
7.752.   We find that Russia's ALOP applied to the impo rts of the products at issue from the 
European Union in respect of ASF is high or conservative. This general finding in respect of 
Russia's ALOP for ASF, as applicable to the imports of the products at issue from the 
European  Union, will be relevant in our analysis in respect of the European Union's claims under 
Article 5.5, which we address in section 7.7.4 below. This finding is also relevant for our analysis of 
the European Union's claims under Articles 5.3, 5.4, 5.6 and 2.2 of the SPS Agreement. We 
examine these claims in turn.  
                                               
1072 Appellate Body Report, India – Agricultural Products , para. 5.221.  
1073 Appellate Body Report, India – Agricultural Products , para. 5.226.  
1074 See paras. 7.208 -7.209  above.  
1075 Russia's second written s ubmission, para. 143.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.5.6.3   Whether the EU -wide ban is inconsistent with Article 5.3 of the SPS Agreement  
7.5.6.3.1    Main arguments of the parties  
7.5.6.3.1.1   European Union  
7.753.   The European Union notes that the existence of unknown and uncertain elemen ts does not 
justify a departure from the requirements under Article 5.3 (as read together with Articles 5.1 and 
5.2 and paragraph 4 of Annex A) for a risk assessment.1076 
7.754.   According to the European Union, Russia's measures at issue do not conform to the 
requir ements of Article 5.3 due to the fact that in assessing the risk to animal health and 
determining the measures to be applied for achieving the appropriate level of sanitary protection, 
Russia failed to take into account the relative cost  effectiveness of a lternative approaches to 
limiting risks, as well as all other relevant economic factors referred to in Article 5.3 of the 
SPS Agreement.1077 
7.5.6.3.1.2   Russia  
7.755.   Russia argues that the measures with respect to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland  are 
presumed to be consi stent with Articles 5.3, 5.4 and 5.6 because they conform to the relevant 
standards of the Terrestrial Code.1078  
7.756.   Regarding the EU -wide ban, Russia asserts that it has complied with the obligation to take 
into account the relevant economic factors in adopting  the EU -wide ban, as it did examine the 
potential damages in terms of loss of production, the costs of control and the relative 
cost-effectiveness of alternative approaches, as illustrated in the Declaration of V. Maslov.1079 
7.5.6.3.2   Analysis by the Panel  
7.757.   Article 5. 3 of the SPS Agreement identifies a number of relevant economic factors that 
Members "shall" take into account in assessing the risk to animal or plant life or health and 
determining the measure to be applied for achieving the ALOP from such risk.  
7.758.   In ligh t of the parties' arguments, the question we need to address is whether Russia took 
into account all relevant economic factors listed in Article 5.3, including the relative cost  
effectiveness of alternative approaches, when assessing the risk to animal hea lth and determining 
the measure to be applied for achieving Russia's ALOP.  
7.5.6.3.2.1   Scope of a Member's obligation under Article 5.3 of the SPS Agreement  
7.759.   We consider that Article 5.3 refers to two different situations. The first situation is when a 
Member is "asse ssing the risk to animal or plant life or health". The second is when a Member is 
"determining the measure to be applied for achieving the appropriate level of sanitary or 
phytosanitary protection". Pursuant to Article 5.3, in both these situations Members  "shall take 
into account" as relevant economic factors, those listed at the end of this provision. We observe 
that there is no indication in the text that the factors listed are only by way of example, rather this 
is presented as a complete list. In order  to interpret the scope of a Member's obligation under 
Article 5.3, we first need to address the meaning of the expression "shall take into account".  
7.760.   No previous panel has addressed claims under Article 5.3. However, previous panels have 
examined the mean ing of expressions similar to "shall take into account", in the context of other 
provisions of the Multilateral Trade  Agreements.  
                                               
1076 European Union's first written submission, para. 261 (citing Appellate Body Report, Australia – 
Salmon , para. 130).  
1077 European Union's first written submission, para. 262.  
1078 Russia's first written submission, para. 216.  
1079 Russia's r esponse to Panel question No. 154, para. 279 (referring to the Declaration by Vladimir 
Maslov on the ASF Outbreak that Occurred at One of the Enterprises of the AGROECO Group in the Voronezh 
Region of the Russian Federation (Exhibit RUS -148)).  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.761.   For instance, the panel in Japan – Apples  examined a Member's obligation, under Article 
5.1 of the SPS Agreement, to take int o account risk assessment techniques of international 
organizations. In this respect the panel reasoned that this obligation does not impose that a risk 
assessment be "based on" or "in conformity with" such risk assessment techniques. Rather, "such 
techniq ues should be considered relevant, but a failure to respect each and every aspect of them 
would not necessarily, per se , signal that the risk assessment on which the measure is based is 
not in conformity with the requirements of Article 5.1".1080 This approac h was confirmed by the 
panels in Canada – Continued Suspension  and in US – Continued Suspension when referring to the 
same obligation under Article 5.1.1081 
7.762.   Similarly, the panel in US – Continued Suspension referred to a Member's obligation, 
pursuant to Artic le 5.2 of the SPS Agreement, to take into account available scientific information 
as well as other criteria listed therein when performing an assessment of risks. The panel reasoned 
that "taking available scientific evidence into account does not require that a Member conform its 
actions to a particular conclusion in a particular scientific study."1082 
7.763.   The panel in US – Animals examined the meaning of the expression "should take into 
account" in the context of Article 5.4 of the SPS Agreement. The panel confi rmed the 
interpretation of the expression "take into account" provided by the Appellate Body and a previous 
panel. According to such guidance, to take into account means to "take into consideration, notice" 
and does not require any particular result of tha t consideration.1083  
7.764.   Other panels have addressed the scope of the obligation "shall take account of" in other 
provisions of the Multilateral Trade Agreements that refer to the special needs of developing 
country Members. Although the expression "shall take a ccount of" is not identical to "shall take 
into account", the dictionary refers to both verbal phrases as having the same meaning.1084 Those 
phrasal verbs mean: "to take into consideration".1085 We thus consider that previous decisions in 
respect of provisions t hat contain the obligation to "take account of" may provide additional 
support to our interpretation of the obligation contained in Article 5.3 of the SPS Agreement.  
7.765.   The panel in EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products referred to Members' 
obligat ion, pursuant to Article 10.1 of the SPS Agreement, to take account of the special needs of 
developing country Members in the preparation and application of SPS measures. Regarding the 
scope of this obligation, the panel reasoned that "[t]he dictionary def ines the expression 'take 
account of' as 'consider along with other factors before reaching a decision'.1086 Consistent with 
this, Article  10.1 does not prescribe a specific result to be achieved."1087   
7.766.   The panels in US – Cool and US – Clove Cigarettes examined  a Member's obligation, 
pursuant to Article 12.3 of the TBT Agreement, to take into account the special needs of 
developing country Members in preparing and applying technical regulations, standards and 
conformity assessment procedures.1088 The panel in US – Clove Cigarettes  agreed with the 
reasoning of the panel in EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products  cited above.1089 The 
panel in US - Cool concluded that Article 12.3 does not amount to a requirement for Members to 
                                               
1080 Panel Repo rt, Japan – Apples , para. 8.241.  
1081 Panel Reports, Canada – Continued Suspension , paras. 7.452 -7.459; and  US – Continued 
Suspension , paras. 7.462 -7.469.  
1082 Panel Report, US – Continued Suspension , para. 7.480.  
1083 Panel Report, US – Animals , para. 7.401 (quoti ng Appellate Body Report, Korea – Various Measures 
on Beef , para. 111; and Panel Report s, US – Cool, para. 7.776).  
1084 Online Oxford English Dictionary , "account (verbal phrases P2.g(a) to take account of and P2.g(c) to 
take into (the) account)", 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/1194?redirectedFrom=take+into+account#eid36657016  (accessed 26 
January  2016) 
1085 Online Oxford English Dictionary , "account (verbal phras es P2.g(a) to take account of) ", 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/1194?redirectedFrom=take+into+account#eid36657016  (accessed 26 
January  2016). 
1086 (footnote original) The Concise Oxford Dictionary , 10th edn., J.  Pearsall (ed.) (Clarendon Press, 
1999), p.  8. 
1087 Panel Report s, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products , para. 7.1620.  
1088 Panel Reports, US – Cool, paras. 7.775 -7.788; and US – Clove Cigarettes , paras. 7.610 - 7.649.  
1089 Panel Report, US – Clove Cigarettes , paras. 7.632 -7.634.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  conform their actions to the special  needs of developing countries but merely to give consideration 
to such needs along with other factors before reaching a decision.1090 
7.767.   We agree with the interpretation of the expression "shall take into account" provided by 
the panels described above. In the context of Article 5.3, we consider that a Member has the 
obligation to give consideration to the relevant economic factors listed therein when either 
assessing the risk to animal or plant life or health or determining the measure to be applied for 
achievi ng the appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection, and not to other economic 
factors. This obligation does not imply, however, that consideration of the relevant economic 
factors will require a particular course of action from the Member imp osing an SPS measure.  
7.768.   The panels mentioned above also concluded that the complainant bears the burden of 
demonstrating that the responding Member did not take into account the particular aspect 
mandated in the relevant provision.1091 We consider that under Ar ticle 5.3 it is the complaining 
party who bears the burden to demonstrate that the responding party did not take into account 
the relevant economic factors listed therein.  
7.769.   In our view, the second aspect that we need to consider is the role of this obligat ion within 
the SPS Agreement. The text of Article 5.3 refers to the obligation of taking into account the 
relevant economic factors listed therein when (i) assessing the risk to animal or plant life and 
health, and (ii) determining the measure to be applie d to achieve the appropriate level of sanitary 
of phytosanitary protection.  
7.770.   The first situation is informed by the obligations that a Member imposing an SPS measure 
has pursuant to Articles 2.2, 5.1, and 5.2 of the SPS Agreement. These include the obligat ion to 
base SPS measures on scientific principles (Article 2.2), through an assessment of risk appropriate 
to the circumstances (Articles 5.1 and 5.2). In this respect, the obligation to take into account 
relevant economic factors when assessing the risk t o animal life and health is contingent upon the 
obligation to base an SPS measure on a risk assessment pursuant to Articles 5.1 and 5.2 of the 
SPS Agreement. If a Member does not base its measures on a risk assessment it has performed or 
that is otherwise available to it, unless such Member is justified in not do ing so (due to conformity 
to an international standard or adoption of a provisional measure pursuant to Article 5.7), it would 
not be in conformity with Article 5.3.  
7.771.   The second situation is informed  by the text of Articles 2.2, 5.4 and 5.6 of the 
SPS Agreement. Among other aspects, Article 2.2 provides that Members shall ensure that their 
SPS measures are applied only to the extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or 
health. Pursuant to Article 5.4, when determining their ALOP, Members should take into account 
the objective of minimizing negative trade effects. In addition, according to Article 5.6, Members 
shall ensure that their SPS measures are not more trade -restrictive than requir ed to achieve their 
ALOP. It is in the context of complying with these other obligations that a Member shall take into 
account the relevant economic factors listed in Article 5.3 when determining the measure it will 
apply to achieve its ALOP.  
7.772.   The Panel no tes that if a measure is adopted pursuant to Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement, 
a Member does not have the obligation to base its provisional measure on an assessment of risk 
pursuant to Article 5.1. As a consequence, a Member in such situation will not hav e to take into 
account the relevant economic factors listed in Article 5.3 for the purposes of assessing the risk to 
animal or plant life and health. However, even when a Member has adopted a provisional 
SPS measure pursuant to Article 5.7, it will still h ave the obligation to take into account, in 
                                               
1090 Panel Reports, US – Cool, para. 7. 781. 
1091 Panel Reports, US – Animals , para. 7.406 (referring to the complaining party's burden to 
demonstrate that the responding party did no t take into account the objective of minimizing negative trade 
effects when determining its ALOP);  US – Clove Cigarettes , para. 7.633 (referring to the complaining party's 
burden of proving that the Member adopting the technical regulation did not "take ac count of" developing 
country Member's needs, pursuant to Article 12.3 of the TBT Agreement); US – Cool, para. 7.774 (referring to 
the complaining party's burden of proving that the Member adopting the technical regulation did not "take 
account of" developi ng country Member's needs, pursuant to Article 12.3 of the TBT Agreement); and   EC – 
Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products , para. 7.1622 (referring to Argentina's burden to adduce evidence 
and argument sufficient to raise a presumption that the Europe an Communities has failed to take into account 
its special needs as a developing country Member pursuant to Article 10.1 of the SPS Agreement).  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  determining the measure it will apply to achieve its ALOP, the relevant economic factors listed in 
Article 5.3.  
7.773.   Based on the foregoing, we need to determine whether the European Union adduced 
sufficient evidence and arguments to make a prima facie  case that Russia did not take into account 
the relevant economic factors listed in Article 5.3 in respect of either of the situations provided 
therein.  
7.5.6.3.2.2   Whether Russia took into account relevant economic factors when ass essing 
the risk to animal or plant life and health  
7.774.   We will first examine the European Union's arguments and evidence in respect of Russia's 
non-compliance with its obligation under the first situation. The European Union has systematically 
argued that Russ ia has failed to comply with its obligation to perform an assessment of risk. In 
respect of Article 5.3 of the SPS Agreement, it suggests that the obligation under Article 5.3 with 
respect to the assessment of risk to animal life and health should be made in conjunction with the 
obligations under Articles 5.1 and 5.2. This seems to imply that if a Member had an obligation to 
perform a risk assessment pursuant to those provisions, it also has the obligation to take into 
account the relevant economic factors listed in Article 5.3 when assessing those risks, and only 
those economic factors identified as being relevant.  
7.775.   As noted above, we consider that if there is sufficiency of scientific evidence but there is 
non-conformity with the relevant international stan dard, by not basing its SPS measures on a risk 
assessment, as defined in Article 5.1 and Annex A(4) of the SPS Agreement, a Member would not 
be in a position to act in manner consistent with Article 5.3.  
7.776.   We have found that the EU -wide ban is not based on t he relevant international 
standard1092 and is not based on a risk assessment as appropriate to the circumstances, in a 
situation where there was sufficient scientific evidence for Russia to conduct an assessment of 
risks as appropriate to the circumstances.1093 Based on these findings and on the reasoning 
explained above, we find that the EU -wide ban is inconsistent with Article 5.3.  
7.5.6.3.2.3   Whether Russia took into account relevant economic factors when 
determining the measure to be applied to achieve the appropriate l evel of sanitary or 
phytosanitary protection  
7.777.   We now turn to the second situation. This is, when a Member is determining the measure 
to be applied for achieving the appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection. In this 
respect, we consider that  the obligation under Article 5.3 in respect of the determination of the 
measure to be applied is triggered once a Member has set its ALOP in respect of a disease or a 
disease -causing organism and normally after having assessed the risks related therewith.  
However, as we observed in paragraph 7.772  above even when a measure is adopted pursuant to 
Article  5.7, without a risk assessment, the obligation under Article  5.3 still applies with respect to 
the choice of the measure to be  applied. In any event, as mentioned above, the obligation to take 
into account the relevant economic factors does not require a Member to adopt a particular SPS 
measure; rather a Member has to give consideration to those relevant economic factors in 
determining such a measure, and only to those factors.  
7.778.    In this dispute, the European Union has not provided evidence or arguments in support of 
its claim that Russia did not consider the relevant economic factors listed in Article 5.3, and only 
those factors, when determining that it would impose the measures at issue. In this respect, the 
European Union limited its argument to a single paragraph in its first written submission, where it 
states without further explanation that "[i]n assessing the risk to animal  health and determining 
the measures to be applied for achieving the appropriate level of sanitary protection, Russia failed 
to take into account all relevant economic factors referred to in Article 5.3 of the SPS Agreement, 
including the relative cost -effectiveness of alternative approaches to limiting risks."1094 
                                               
1092 See para. 7.718  above . 
1093 See para. 7.719  above . 
1094 European Union's first written submission, para. 262.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.779.   The Panel has noted that the complaining party bears the burden to adduce sufficient 
evidence and arguments to raise a prima facie  case that the responding party did not take into 
consideration the relevant economic factors listed in Article 5.3. In our view, the European Union 
has not met this burden in respect of its claim that Russia did not consider those relevant 
economic factors, including the relative cost -effectiveness of alternative approach es to limiting 
risks.  
7.780.   The European Union seems to infer that the adoption of stringent SPS measure on its 
exports of the products at issue necessarily entails a lack of consideration of the relevant economic 
factors listed in Article 5.3. In our view, thi s does not suffice to support such a claim.  
7.781.   In addition, the Panel notes Russia's assertion that it did take into account the potential 
damages in terms of loss of production, the costs of control and the relative cost -effectiveness of 
alternative approach es.1095 The European Union did not challenge this statement during the course 
of the proceedings.  
7.782.   Based on the foregoing, we consider that the European Union failed to meet its burden of 
making a prima facie  case that the EU -wide ban is inconsistent with Arti cle 5.3 of the SPS 
Agreement, in respect of Russia taking into account the relevant economic factors when 
determining the measure to be applied for achieving the appropriate level of sanitary or 
phytosanitary protection.  
7.5.6.3.3   Conclusion  
7.783.   We find that the EU -wide ban is inconsistent with Article 5.3 of the SPS Agreement, 
because by not basing that measure on a risk assessment in circumstances in which Article  5.7 is 
not applicable, Russia could have not taken into account the relevant economic factors listed in 
Article 5.3 when assessing the risks of entry and spread of ASF in accordance with Article 5.1 and 
paragraph 4 of Annex A of the SPS Agreement. However, the European Union failed to make a 
prima facie  case of inconsistency of the EU -wide ban with Russia's ob ligation to take into account 
relevant economic factors listed in Article 5.3 when determining the measure to be applied for 
achieving the appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection in respect of ASF.  
7.5.6.4   Whether Russia took into account the obj ective of minimizing negative trade 
effects when determining the appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection  
7.5.6.4.1   Main arguments of the parties  
7.5.6.4.1.1   European Union  
7.784.   The European Union refers to the statement of the panel in EC – Hormones that Article 5 .4 
does not impose an obligation on the Members but it has to be taken into account when 
interpreting other provisions of the SPS Agreement.1096 
7.785.   The European Union notes that the SPS Agreement contains an implicit obligation that 
WTO Members determine their A LOP.1097 Because Russia did not expressly specify its ALOP, the 
European Union deduces from an analysis of Russian domestic measures that Russia's ALOP is 
"rather low".1098  
7.786.   Because Russia applies an EU -wide ban and four individual country -wide bans, the 
Europea n Union submits that Russia has not taken into account the objective of minimizing 
                                               
1095 Russia's response to Pan el question No. 154, para. 279 ( referring to the Declaration by Vladimir 
Maslow on the ASF Outbreak that occurred at One of the Enterprises of the AGOECO group in the Voronezh 
Region of the Russian Federation  (Exhibit RUS -148)). 
1096 European Union's first written submission, para. 264 (referring to Panel Report, EC – Hormones 
(Canada) , para. 8.169).  
1097 European Union's first written submission, para. 265 (citing Appellate Body Report , Australia – 
Salmon , paras. 205 –207).  
1098 European Union's first written submission, para. 265.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  negative trade effects when determining its ALOP, and has thus breached the provisions of Article 
5.4 of the SPS Agreement.1099 
7.5.6.4.1.2   Russia  
7.787.   Russia argues that the measures with resp ect to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,  and Poland are 
presumed to be consistent with Articles 5.3, 5.4 and 5.6 because they conform to the relevant 
legal standards in the Terrestrial Code.1100 Furthermore, Russia contends that the European Union 
failed to support  claims against the EU -wide ban, which Russia considers to be justified under 
Article 5.7, and therefore consistent with any other provision of Article 5.1101 
7.788.   Russia submits that Article 5.4 does not impose any obligation and that, bearing in mind 
the objecti ve of minimizing negative trade effects as set out in both Articles 5.4 and 5.6, it offered 
the European Union to put in place less trade restrictive measures, such as trade from ASF -free 
compartments or amendment to the requirements of the veterinary cert ificates. However, the 
failure of the EU member States to take adequate ASF -control and eradication measures led to the 
impossibility to adopt such alternative measures.1102 
7.5.6.4.2   Analysis by the Panel  
7.789.   Article 5.4 of the SPS Agreement stipulates that Members "shou ld" take into account the 
objective of minimizing negative trade effects when determining their ALOP.  
7.790.   The panels in EC – Hormones  and in US – Animals , have concluded that Article 5.4 does 
not impose a positive obligation on Members, because of its hortato ry nature. 1103 However, they 
also found this provision to be relevant for the interpretation of other provisions of the SPS 
Agreement.1104 Moreover, the Appellate Body in US/Canada – Continued Suspension , considered 
that a Member should respect the disciplines of Article 5.4 when choosing its ALOP.1105  
7.791.   The European Union seems to agree with this interpretation. However, it requests the 
Panel to make findings that the measures at issue are inconsistent with Russia's obligations under 
Article  5.4.1106 
7.792.   In light of the h ortatory nature of Article 5.4, the Panel will not make findings with respect 
to whether Russia took into account the objective of minimizing negative trade effects when 
determining its ALOP. However, this is without prejudice to the Panel considering the objective of 
minimizing negative effects on international trade in its interpretation of other provisions of the 
SPS Agreement in light of the European Union's claims.  
7.5.6.5   Whether the EU -wide ban is more trade restrictive than required pursuant to 
Article 5.6 of the SPS Agreement  
7.5.6.5.1   Main arguments of the parties  
7.5.6.5.1.1   European Union  
7.793.   Referring to the factual evidence on the record, the European Union concludes that Russia 
has "a rather low ALOP".1107 At the same time, the European Union alleges that even if one were to 
                                               
1099 European Union's first written submission, para. 266.  
1100 Russia's first written submission, para. 216.  
1101 Russia's response to Panel question No. 154, para. 277.  
1102 Russia's response to Panel question No. 154, para. 280.  
1103 Panel Reports , US - Animals , para. 7.404;  EC – Hormones (Canada) , para. 8.169; and EC – 
Hormones (US) , para. 8.166. The panel in US – Animals  provided a detailed explanation of why Article 5.4 
does not provide for a positive obligation. See Panel Report, US – Animals , paras. 7.397 -7.404.  
1104 Panel Reports , EC – Hormones (Canada) , para. 8.169; and EC – Hormones (US) , para. 8.166.  
1105 Appellate Body Report, US/Canada – Continued Suspension , fn 1088.  
1106 European Union's, first written submission, para. 358; and second written submission, para. 194.  
1107 European Union's first written submission, para. 248.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  assume that Russia has a very high or conservative ALOP, there is an alternative measure that 
cumulatively meets the conditions of footnote 3 of the SPS Agreement.1108 
7.794.   The European Union argues that Russia's measures at issue are more trade restrictive than 
required because, in the European Union's view, the application of the Terrestrial Code standards 
is an alternative SPS measure which:  
(1) is reasonably available, taking into account technical and economic feasibility,  
(2) achieves the Member's appropriate l evel of SPS protection and  
(3) is significantly less trade restrictive than the contested measure.1109  
7.795.   The European Union submits that the application of the Terrestrial Code, which 
recommends regionalization and trade from the ASF -free countries/zones or f rom any part of a 
country notifying ASF if the products underwent specific treatments, is an alternative measure that 
fulfils all the legal requirements in Article 5.6 of the SPS Agreement.1110 
7.796.   The European Union maintains that the adoption of the Terrestrial  Code recommendations 
is a reasonably available measure because it will not impose on Russia an additional economic 
burden so as to make it unfeasible.1111 The control measures are the responsibility of the European 
Union, as an exporting country, and verific ation of the sanitary certificates for trade in different pig 
products from the European Union into Russia is already carried out by the competent Russian 
authorities.1112 
7.797.   The European Union also holds that applying regionalisation as recommended in the 
Terre strial Code will achieve Russia's ALOP.1113 The OIE standards are based on the most recent 
scientific and technical information and, if correctly applied, protect animal health and welfare and 
veterinary public health during production and trade in animals an d animal products.1114 According 
to the European Union, the application of the Terrestrial Code, in particular regionalisation, will 
satisfy both "a rather low" and "a very high" ALOP.1115 
7.798.   The European Union also states that its control measures have proven high ly effective to 
contain ASF. Being one of the largest exporters of pig products in the world, there is no evidence 
that any of the European Union's trade partners has suffered ASF outbreaks due to exports from 
the European Union after January 2014.1116 
7.799.   The Eu ropean Union argues that applying regionalisation as recommended in the 
Terrestrial Code is significantly less trade restrictive than Russia's measures. The European Union 
elaborates that the Terrestrial Code allows trade from ASF -free zones within countri es notifying 
ASF, while Russia's measures at issue are the most trade restrictive option possible – a ban on 
such trade.1117 
7.800.   In the European Union's opinion, a country -wide ban on the products at issue that may 
come from areas thousands of kilometres distant from an infected zone is "blatantly 
                                               
1108 European Union's first written submission, para. 249.  
1109 European Union's first written submission, par a. 250, footnote omitted (citing Appellate Body 
Report, Australia – Salmon , para. 194, referring to the Panel Report, Australia -Salmon , para. 95) and para. 
252. 
1110 European Union's first written submission, para. 252 ; and second written submission, para. 13 4. 
1111 European Union's first written submission, para. 253 and 254.  
1112 European Union's first written submission, paras. 254.  
1113 European Union's first written submission, para. 255.  
1114 European Union's first written submission, para. 256 (quoting User's Guide  to the Terrestrial Code, 
paras. A.2 and A.3  (Exhibit EU -2).   
1115 European Union's first written submission, para. 255.  
1116 European Union's first written submission, para. 257.  
1117 European Union's first written submission, para. 258.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  disproportionate", as long as the necessary containment measures are taken in the limited areas 
where ASF outbreaks have occurred.1118 
7.801.   The European Union concludes that because of the reasons explained in the previous 
parag raphs, the measures at issue are inconsistent with the provisions of Article 5.6.1119 
7.5.6.5.1.2   Russia  
7.802.   Russia argues that the European Union has failed to establish a prima facie  case that there 
is an alternative measure that meets all three requirements of Article 5.6 .1120 According to Russia, 
there are no less  trade-restrictive alternative measures available to achieve Russia's ALOP, which 
is based on the relevant international standard.1121  
7.803.   Russia submits the Panel should dismiss the European Union's claim under Article 5 .6. 
First, to the extent the European Union derives Russia's ALOP from the measures applied to 
imports, such measures, in Russia's view, cannot logically be more trade -restrictive than required 
to achieve their ALOP.1122 Second, Russia contends that to the ex tent the European Union derives 
a different ALOP from the measures applied by Russia domestically, the European Union re -asserts 
a claim of allegedly distinct ALOPs that falls under Article 5.5 and should therefore be dismissed by 
the Panel in its consider ation under Article 5.6.1123 
7.804.   Russia further elaborates that, if the exporting country fails to discharge its burden to 
establish, and to objectively demonstrate that it has established, containment zones in accordance 
with the OIE guidelines, the importing co untry may reject the exporting country's proposed zones, 
which do not reflect the same ALOP, and impose country -wide import restrictions.1124 Russia 
asserts it acted accordingly and in compliance with the Terrestrial Code.1125 
7.805.   Russia also asserts that when faced  with what it considers to be the "deadly " combination 
of high density of wild boar and high percentages of low -biosecurity backyard farms, import 
measures based on compartmentalization are the least trade -restrictive measures that would 
achieve Russia's A LOP.1126 Later in the proceedings Russia also stated that as it has "consistently 
expressed in its communication with the European Union … , the Russian Federation has applied a 
high ALOP in accordance with the provisions set out in the OIE Terrestrial Code."1127 We 
understand this to mean that Russia acknowledges that measures that conform to the 
recommendations (i.e. on regionalization, compartmentalization or treatment to ensure destruction 
of ASFV) provided in the Terrestrial Code for safe trade of the produc ts covered by Chapter 15.1 
would meet Russia's ALOP.  
7.5.6.5.2   Analysis by the Panel  
7.5.6.5.2.1   Legal test  
7.806.   Article 5.6 of the SPS Agreement requires Members to ensure that their SPS measures are 
not more trade -restrictive than necessary to achieve that Member's ALOP, taking in to account 
technical and economic feasibility.  
                                               
1118 European Union's first written submission, para. 258.  
1119 European Union's first written submission, para. 259.  
1120 Russia's first written submission, para. 337.  
1121 Russia's first written submission, para. 334.  
1122 Russia's first written submission, para. 336.  
1123 Russia's first written submission, para. 336. Russia notes that it does not apply distinct ALOPs for 
domestic live and imported live pigs and pork products (Russia's first written submission, fn 637 to para. 336 
referring to Russia's first written submission, paras.  275-287).  
1124 Russia's first written submission, para. 337; and comments to the European Union's response to 
Panel question No. 286, para. 149 . 
1125 Russia's first written submission, para. 337; and comments to the European Union's response to 
Panel question No. 286, para.  149. 
1126 Russia's response to Panel question No. 159, para. 300.  
1127 Russia's second written submission, para. 143.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.807.   Pursuant to footnote 3 of Article 5.6, in order for a measure to be considered more trade 
restrictive than necessary, the complainant has to demonstrate1128 that there is an alternative 
measure that: (i) is reaso nably available taking into account technical and economic feasibility; 
(ii) achieves the Member's ALOP; and (iii) is significantly less trade restrictive than the contested 
measure.1129 The Appellate Body has observed that these three requirements are cumula tive in 
nature such that, in order to establish an inconsistency with Article 5.6, all the elements must be 
demonstrated.1130  
7.808.   We recall that the Appellate Body has observed that "[t] he alternative measure proposed 
by a complainant contesting another Member's  SPS measure is a 'conceptual tool ' to be used for 
the purpose of the analysis under Article  5.6.1131 Consequently, a demonstration that an 
alternative measure meets the relevant Member's appropriate level of protection does not imply 
that the Member whose SP S measure is found to be inconsistent with Article 5.6 must adopt that 
alternative measure or that the alternative measure is the only option that would achieve the 
desired level of protection.1132"1133  
7.809.   The European Union claims the measures at issue are incons istent with Article 5.6 because 
applying regionalization pursuant to the Terrestrial Code is an alternative measure reasonably 
available to Russia, which does not involve technical difficulties or an unfeasible economic burden, 
while achieving Russia's ALO P and being significantly less trade -restrictive.1134 The European Union 
posits that following the Terrestrial Code (i.e. allowing trade from disease free areas consistent 
with regionalization) and recognizing regionalization would constitute a significantly less 
trade-restrictive alternative.1135  
7.810.   In respect of the EU -wide ban, Russia argues that Article 5.7 "obviates" the need to 
comply with other provisions of Article 5, including 5.6.1136  
7.811.   The Panel would be required to address the issue whether Article 5.7 "obv iates" the need 
to comply with Article 5.6 only in case it finds that Russia complies with Article 5.7.1137 In 
paragraph 7.707  above we found that the EU -wide ban is not subject to Article 5.7. We therefore 
find no need to address  Russia's argument in respect of the relationship between Articles 5.7 and 
5.6.  
7.812.   We recall that in paragraph 7.494  above, we found that the EU -wide ban is not based on 
the international standards articulated in the Terrestrial Code.  
7.813.   Based on the foregoing, the Panel needs to determine whether the European Union has 
identified one or more alternative measures. Then the panel needs to examine whether the 
alternative measures submitted by the European Union: (i) are reasonably avai lable to Russia 
taking into account technical and economic feasibility; (ii) achieve Russia's ALOP; and (iii) are 
                                               
1128 The complainant has the burden of demonstrating each of the three elements. Panel Report, US – 
Animals, para. 7.431 (referring to Appellate B ody Report, Japan – Agricultural Products II , para. 126, and 
Panel Report, India – Agricultural Products , para. 7.525).  
1129 Appellate Body Report, India – Agricultural Products , para. 5.203.  
1130 Appellate Body Report, India – Agricultural Products , para. 5.203 . See also A ppellate Body Reports, 
Australia – Salmon , para. 194; and Japan – Agricultural Products II , para. 95; as well as Panel Reports, US – 
Animals , paras. 7.430 -7.431; India – Agricultural Products , para. 7.521 -7.522; US – Poultry (China) , 
para. 7.331; and Australia – Apples , para. 7.1098.  
1131 (footnote original) Appellate Body Report, Australia  – Apples , para. 363.  
1132 (footnote original) Appellate Body Report, Australia  – Apples , para. 363.  
1133 Appellate Body Report, India – Agricultural Products , para. 5 .203. 
1134 European Union's first written submission, para. 259.  
1135 European Union's second written submission, para. 134.  
1136 Russia's first written submission, para. 409 (citing Panel Report s, EC – Approval and Marketing of 
Biotech Products , para.  7.2969 findi ng that "Article 2.2 excludes from its scope of application the kinds of 
situations covered by Article 5.7"). Russia asserts that  this exclusion extend s to the provisions under Article 5 
invoked by the European Union. See also Russia's response to Panel qu estion No. 154, paras. 276 -278; 
comments to the European Union's response to Panel question No. 286, para. 148.  
1137 This reflects the approach taken in US – Animals  whereby the panel, having found the United States' 
measures were not covered by the exemption  in Article 5.7, decided not to consider the United States' 
argument that the maintenance of a provisional measure under Article 5.7 would preclude the applicability of 
Article 5.6 (Panel Report, US – Animals , para. 7.439).  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  significantly less trade restrictive than the EU -wide ban.1138 We turn to examine the alternative 
measures identified by the European Union.  
7.5.6.5.2.2   Whether the European Union has identified one or more alternative 
measures  
7.814.   The measures that the European Union submits as an alternative are those derived from 
the application of the Terrestrial Code, which recommends regionalization and trade from the 
ASF-free countries/zones or from any part of a country notifying ASF if the products underwent 
specific treatments .1139 In particular, the European Union argues that instead of an EU -wide ban, 
Russia should allow trade of certain products according to specific pro visions of Chapter 15.1 of 
the Terrestrial Code. Table 7 below contains the alternative measures identified by the European 
Union, as relevant for the EU -wide ban, on the basis of the specified provisions of the Terrestrial 
Code.  
Table 7 Alternative measures  identified by the European Union1140 
Product  Terrestrial Code provision  Recommendation  
Live pigs  Article 15.1.5  Allow trade from the ASF free 
zones in the EU.  
Semen of domestic pigs and in 
vivo derived embryos of 
domestic pigs  Articles 15.1.8 and 15. 10 Allow trade from the ASF free 
zones in the EU.  
Fresh meat of domestic pigs 
and of wild boar  Articles 15.1.12. and 15.1.13  Allow trade from the ASF free 
zones in the EU.  
 
7.815.   In our view, the European Union has clearly identified the alternative measures for the 
products at issue. We now proceed to examine whether the measures based on the 
recommendations of the Terrestrial Code identified by the European Union meet the three 
cumulative elements of Article 5.6 of the SPS Agreement.  
7.5.6.5.2.3   Whether measures based on the recommendations on regionalization in the 
Terrestrial Code are reasonably available, taking into account technical and economic 
feasibility  
7.816.   Having determined the alternative measures identified  by the European Union, we first 
need to examine whether such alternative measures are reasonably available to Russia, taking into 
account technical and economic feasibility. Regarding the first requirement, panels have noted that 
the examination of technical and economic feasibility should  be done in light of the circumstances 
in the real world.1141 In addition, the panel in India – Agricultural Products  found that "measures 
based on the recommendations of the Terrestrial Code are technically and economically feasible, 
and reasonably available  alternatives to" India's (the defending party's) AI measures.1142 
7.817.   Russia has not challenged the technical and economic availability of measures in line with 
the Terrestrial Code. On the contrary, Russia has claimed that its measures on imports of the 
product s at issue from the European Union are "based to the extent possible" on the international 
standards articulated in the Terrestrial Code, hence implying that it considers these standards to 
be technically and economically available.  
7.818.   As indicated by the Eu ropean Union, the alternative measures arising from the 
Terrestrial  Code include accepting the imports of the products at issue originating from ASF -free 
areas, in line with the Terrestrial Code. In our view, accepting such imports from the European 
Union does not entail a high technical or economic burden. Rather, it requires appropriate 
cooperation between the European Union's and Russia 's veterinary services in order to recognize 
                                               
1138 Appellate Body Report, India – Agricultural Products , para. 5.203.  
1139 European Union's first written submission, para. 252 ; and second written submission, para. 134 . 
1140 This table is prepared on the  basis of the  European Union's opening statement at the second 
meeting of the Panel, paras . 72-76. 
1141 Panel Report, Japan – Apples (Article 21.5 – US), para. 8.171. This approach was endorsed in Panel 
Report, India – Agricultural Products , para. 7.540.  
1142 Panel Report, India – Agricultural Products , para. 7.546.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  which areas are ASF -free and take the necessary steps for trade of the prod ucts at issue from 
those areas to resume. We recall that a primary element in permit ting such trade would be 
modification of the text in the veterinary certificates required by Russia. According to the evidence 
on record, Russia has done this in the past1143, including in respect of the acceptance of treated 
products at issue from the non -affected EU member States.1144 
7.819.   Examining these elements, we consider that the recommended measures under the 
Terrestrial Code in respect of regionalization are reasonably availa ble to Russia, because they are 
technically and economically feasible.  
7.5.6.5.2.4   Whether measures based on the recommendations on regionalization in the 
Terrestrial Code achieve Russia's ALOP  
7.820.   Regarding the second requirement that the proposed alternative measure ach ieves 
Russia's ALOP, the Panel recalls that it has found Russia's ALOP to be high or conservative.1145  
7.821.   We recall that Russia asserts that the European Union's failure to demonstrate the 
establishment of ASF -free zones or compartments in a manner consistent w ith the Terrestrial Code 
or compliance with conditions for safe trade of treated products renders the bans on imports of the 
products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland  in compliance with the provision of 
the Terrestrial Code.1146 In our vie w, this confirms Russia's statement that if it were to apply 
measures in accordance with the recommendations provided in the Terrestrial Code, such 
measures would achieve Russia's ALOP.  
7.822.   Referring to the obligation of a Member to accept products that meet one or more of the 
alternatives contemplated in a relevant international standard, the European Union argues that 
contrary to what Russia seems to believe, a country may not choose ASF -free zones or 
compartments according to its ALOP.1147 The European Union a rgues that the alternatives 
described in the Terrestrial Code (ASF -free country, zone or compartment) are related to the 
objective characteristics of the ASF situation and not to a subjective choice of the importing 
Member.1148 The European Union considers th is to be supported by the rejection of the panel in 
India – Agricultural Products  of India's contention that it could choose which recommendation of 
the Terrestrial Code to apply in respect of Avian Influenza.1149 We now turn to the application of 
the legal t est to the facts of this case.  
7.823.   While referring to the second requirement – particularly to identifying the level of 
protection that would be achieved by the alternative measure – the panel in India – Agricultural 
Products  examined the level of protection of an alternative measure based on the relevant 
international standards. The panel  found that the Terrestrial Code provides for an optimal level of 
security, under which safe trade may be facilitated in order to prevent Avian Influenza from being 
introduce d into an importing country.1150  
7.824.   We find it appropriate to follow a similar approach as the panel in India – Agricultural 
Products . In this dispute, Russia does not claim that its measures seek to achieve an ALOP higher 
than the one that would be achieved th rough the application of the recommendations of the 
                                               
1143 See exhibits EU -159 and EU -160. 
1144 See exhibits EU -162 and RUS -324. 
1145 See para. 7.752  above.  
1146 Russia's comments to the European Union's response to Panel question No. 286, para. 149.  
1147 European Union's second written submission, para. 131.  
1148 European Union's second written submission, para. 132.  
1149 European Union's second written submission, para. 133 (quoting Panel Report, India – Agricultural 
Products , para. 7.270; and Appellate Body Report, India – Agricultural Products , para. 5.102).  
1150 Panel  Report, India – Agricultural Products , paras. 7.580 – 7.581. The Appellate Body noted that 
this approach was not appealed, however the Appellate Body  considered it to reflect an assessment of the 
proposed alternative measures meeting India's ALOP. Appella te Body Report, India – Agricultural Products , 
para. 5.224.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  Terrestrial Code. Rather, Russia posits that its measures are in conformity with or based on the 
Terrestrial Code.1151  
7.825.   In its responses to the Panel's questions , the OIE refers to the Terrestrial Code Forew ord, 
which indicates that "the Code sets out standards for the improvement of terrestrial animal health 
and welfare and veterinary public health worldwide, including through standards for safe 
international trade in terrestrial animals".1152 The OIE also obse rved that "[a]ll the various 
combinations of testing, treatment and certification identified in Chapter 15.1 provide for safe 
trade of animals and animal products".1153 Furthermore, the OIE concludes that "[r]egardless of a 
country's policy on the ALOP, the O IE considers that the application of the measures recommended 
in the Terrestrial Code provide conditions for safe trade in animals and animal products."1154 
7.826.   In our view, the OIE's responses confirm that the provisions in Chapter 15.1 would provide 
an optimal level of security1155 for trade in the products at issue. Based on the foregoing , we 
consider that the level of protection that would be achieved by the alternative measures, that is, 
those resulting from the application of the recommendations on regionalizat ion in the Terrestrial 
Code is high or conservative.  
7.827.   On that basis, we need to examine whether the level of protection that would be achieved 
by the alternative measures suggested by the European Union meets Russia's ALOP in respect of 
ASF.1156 We recall tha t we have found that both Russia's ALOP and the level of protection achieved 
through the alternative measures suggested by the European Union are high. We also recall that 
Russia acknowledges that its ALOP for ASF, as applied to imports of the products at issue, could be 
achieved by means of measures that conform to the standards enshrined in the Terrestrial 
Code.1157 We therefore conclude that the level of protection achieved through measures in line 
with the provisions of Chapter 15.1 of the Terrestrial Code  meets Russia's ALOP.  
7.828.   We thus move on to make the comparison between the trade restrictiveness of the 
EU-wide ban and the alternative measures identified by the European Union.  
7.5.6.5.2.5   Whether the measures based on the recommendations on regionalization in 
the Ter restrial Code are significantly less trade -restrictive than the EU -wide ban  
7.829.   Previous panels have examined the third requirement through comparing the alternative 
measures proposed by the complaining party with the challenged measures.1158 The panel in 
India – Agricultural Products , agreeing with the panel in Australia – Salmon , observed that "any 
measure imposing conditions upon importation, even if stringent, 'would still be significantly less 
restrictive to trade than an outright prohibition'".1159 
7.830.   With this in  mind, we move on to analyse whether measures applied pursuant to the 
recommendations on regionalization in Chapter 15.1 of the Terrestrial Code are significantly less 
trade restrictive than the  EU-wide. 
7.831.   In paragraph 7.494  above we found that the EU -wide ban is not based on the international 
standards articulated in the Terrestrial Code. Moreover, we recall that the European Union has 
demonstrated that the EU -wide ban is a composite measure which reflects Russia's refusal to 
                                               
1151 This is different situation than the one in US – Animals , where the panel examined whether the 
alternative measure suggested by Argentina, which was different from an international standard, wou ld 
achieve the United States' ALOP in respect of FMD. Panel Report, US – Animals , para. 7.454 -7.548. See also 
paras. 7.435 -7.437 and 7.442 . 
1152 OIE response to Panel question No. 19.  
1153 OIE response to Panel question No. 19.  
1154 OIE response to Panel question N o. 19.  
1155 Panel Report, India – Agricultural Products , paras. 7.580 – 7.581.  
1156 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Apples , para. 344.  
1157 See para s. 7.750  and 7.805  above . 
1158 Panel Reports, US- Animals , para. 7.425; India – Agricultural  Products , para. 7.591; and 
Australia  -Salmon , para. 8.182  
1159 Panel Report, India – Agricultural Products , para. 7.590 (quoting Panel Report, Australia – Salmon , 
para. 8.182).  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  accept certain imports of the products at issue from the European Union.1160 As we have 
explained, this means an import ban of the non -treated products at issue from the territory of the 
non-affected EU member States.  
7.832.   In our assessment of the relevant provision s in the Terrestrial Code, we have explained 
that certain provisions in Chapter 15.1 provide for safe trade from ASF -free areas. In our findings 
under Article 6.3, we found that the European Union provided to Russia the necessary evidence to 
objectively de monstrate that there are ASF -free areas, which are likely to remain so, within the 
European Union's territory outside the four affected EU member States.  
7.833.   Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the alternative proposed by the European Union, 
namely that R ussia base the EU -wide ban on the recommendations on regionalization in the 
Terrestrial Code, which allows for safe trade of certain  products  at issue  from ASF -free areas 
covered by Articles 15.1.5, 15.1.12, and 15.1.13, is significantly less restrictive t o trade than a 
ban on the same products.  
7.5.6.5.3   Conclusion  
7.834.   We have found that the European Union identified measures based on the 
recommendations on regionalization in the Terrestrial Code as a reasonably available alternative to 
the EU -wide ban as applied to pro ducts covered by Articles 15.1.5, 15.1.12, and 15.1.13. We have 
also found that the alternative is technically and economically feasible, would achieve Russia's 
ALOP, and is significantly less restrictive to trade than the EU -wide ban. Therefore, we conclu de 
that the EU -wide ban is inconsistent with Article 5.6 of the SPS Agreements, with respect to non -
treated products covered by Chapter 15.1 of the Terrestrial Code , because it is significantly more 
restrictive to trade than required to achieve Russia's AL OP. 
7.5.6.6   Whether the measures at issue are more than is necessary for the protection of 
animal health pursuant to Article 2.2  
7.5.6.6.1   Main arguments of the Parties  
7.5.6.6.1.1   European Union  
7.835.   The European Union argues that  Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement is a more general 
provisi on and that Articles 5.1, 5.2 and 5.6 are more specific provisions.1161 According to the 
European Union , it follows that a finding of a violation of Article 5.6 with regard to risk 
management will consequentially result in a violation of Article 2.2 of the SP S Agreement, more 
precisely with regard to the necessity requirement.1162 
7.836.   The European Union argues that Russia does not comply with the requirements  in 
Article  5.6 and footnote 3 of the SPS Agreement.1163 
7.5.6.6.1.2   Russia  
7.837.   Russia argues that what it considers as Russia's  provisional compliance with the terms of 
the veterinary certificates is justified under Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement.1164 Russia also points 
out that Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement excludes from its scope of application the kinds of 
situations covered by Article 5.7.1165 
                                               
1160 See paras. 7.83-7.84 above.  
1161 European Union's second written submission, para. 129.  
1162 European Union's second written submission, para. 130.  
1163 European Union's second written submission, para. 134.  
1164 Russia's fi rst written submission, para. 382.  
1165 See Russia's first written submission, fn 697, referring to Panel Reports, EC – Approval and 
Marketing of Biotech Products, para. 7.2969.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.5.6.6.2   Analysis by the Panel  
7.5.6.6.2.1   Relevant legal provision  
7.838.   Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement provides:  
Members shall ensure that any sanitary or phytosanitary measure is applied only to 
the extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or h ealth, is based on 
scientific principles and is not maintained without sufficient scientific evidence, except 
as provided for in paragraph 7 of Article 5.  
7.839.   According to Article  2.2, an SPS measure must: (i) be applied only to the extent necessary 
to protect  human, animal or plant life or health; (ii) be based on scientific principles; and (iii) not 
be maintained without sufficient scientific evidence, except as provided for in Article 5.7.1166 The 
European Union's claims relative to Article 5.6 pertain solely t o (i): the SPS measure being applied 
only to the extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health.  
7.840.   The Appellate Body has found that the basic obligations set out in Article 2 inform, impart 
meaning to, and are made operative in other pro visions of the SPS Agreement, including through 
certain of the more specific obligations set out in Article 5. The obligation that a Member shall 
ensure that an SPS measure is applied only to the extent necessary to protect human, animal or 
plant life or h ealth is closely linked to the obligation set out in Article 5.6.1167 
7.841.   This close relationship has been interpreted to mean that a finding of inconsistency with 
Article 5.6 may lead to a presumption of inconsistency with the obligation in Article 2.2 to ensure  
that an SPS measure is applied only to the extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant life 
or health. This means that a panel should verify if such presumption has been rebutted in order to 
confirm a breach of Article 2.2 after finding an inconsis tency under Article 5.6.1168 
7.842.   The panel in India – Agricultural Products examined the "necessity" requirement in the 
context of other relevant provisions of the covered agreements and concluded that, similarly to the 
requirements of Article 5.6, they focus on the trade restrictiveness of a measure, its contribution 
to the purported objective, and whether that contribution may be made by a less trade -restrictive 
alternative.1169 The panel also found that "a finding that a measure is inconsistent with Article 5.6 
may lead to a presumption that the same measure is inconsistent with the obligation in Article 2.2 
to ensure that an SPS measure is applied only to the extent necessary to protect human, animal or 
plant life or health".1170 We agree with the panel in India – Agricultural Products  that the 
"necessity" requirement in Article 2.2 is closely linked to the determination under Article 5.6.  
7.843.   The European Union argues that, based on the relationship between Articles 2.2 and 
5.61171, a finding of violation of Article 5.6 wi th regard to risk management will consequentially 
result in a violation of the necessity requirement enshrined in Article 2.2.1172 The Appellate Body 
has been clear in endorsing the analysis provided by the panel in India – Agricultural Products in 
considerin g that a breach of Article 5.6 does not result in a consequential violation of Article 2.2. 
Rather, such a finding may lead to a rebuttable presumption.1173 
7.844.   In our view, Russia has not provided any arguments or evidence that would rebut the 
presumption raised  from a finding of inconsistency with Article 5.6. Rather, it has focused its 
arguments on the consistency of the measures at issue with its obligations under Article 5.6.  
                                               
1166 Panel Report s, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products , para. 7.1424.  
1167 Appellate Body Report, India – Agricultural Products , para. 5.208. See also Panel Report, US – 
Animals , para. 7.367 (quoting Appellate Body Report, Australia – Apples , para. 339).  
1168 Appellate Body Report, India – Agricultural Products , paras. 5.37 -5.38.  
1169 Panel Report, India – Agricultural Products,  paras. 7.607 -7.613.  
1170 Panel Report, India – Agricultural Products , para. 7.614.  
1171 European Union's second written submission, para. 129 (referring to Panel Report, EC – Hormones 
(Canada) , para. 8.99 ). 
1172 Europea n Union's second written submission, para. 130.  
1173 Appellate Body Report, India – Agricultural Products , paras. 5.37 -5.38.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.845.   We recall our finding that the EU -wide ban is significantly more restrictive to trad e than the 
alternative measures identified by the European Union. The Panel also found that the alternative 
measures are available to Russia and met Russia's ALOP in respect of ASF.  
7.5.6.6.2.2   Conclusion  
7.846.   In light of our findings under Article 5.6 and the arguments and  evidence raised by Russia 
in order to rebut the presumption of inconsistency with Article 2.2 raised by a finding of 
inconsistency of the EU -wide ban with Article 5.6, we find that the EU -wide ban is inconsistent with 
Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement be cause it is applied beyond the extent necessary to protect 
human and animal life or health.  
 
7.6  Claims relating to the bans on the imports of the products at issue from Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland  
7.6.1   Claims under Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the SPS Agreem ent 
7.6.1.1   Main arguments of the parties  
7.6.1.1.1   European Union  
7.847.   The European Union asserts that Russia's measures do not "conform to" and are not 
"based on" any relevant international standards within the meaning of Articles 3.2 and 3.1 of the 
SPS Agreement, respectively , but rather, they go against the relevant international standards.1174 
7.848.   The European Union posits that a measure that actually contradicts the international 
standards cannot be said to be based on the respective standards.1175 
7.849.   The European Union argues that whil e the relevant international standards recommend 
trade from ASF -free areas in several products at issue, or trade in products which have been 
treated so as to ensure the destruction of the ASFV, Russia does exactly the contrary and bans 
trade from ASF-free areas in the EU.1176 
7.6.1.1.2   Russia  
7.850.   Russia focuses its arguments on conformity of bans on imports of the products at issue 
from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, with the relevant international standards under Article 
3.2, which would create a (rebuttable) pre sumption of consistency with relevant provisions of the 
SPS Agreement.1177 In the alternative, Russia asserts that its measures in respect of imports from 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland  are "based on" the relevant international standards within 
the me aning of Article 3.1.1178  
7.6.1.2   Main arguments of the third parties  
7.6.1.2.1   Australia  
7.851.   Australia argues that in light of Article 3.2 of the SPS Agreement, the Panel will have to 
determine, as a matter  of fact, whether Russia's measures conform to, or are based on, the 
Terrestrial Code, noting that only measures which conform to international standards enjoy the 
presumption of consistency with the SPS Agreement.1179 
                                               
1174 European Union's first written submission, paras. 113 and 122.  
1175 European Union's oral statement at the second substantive meeting, para. 56.  
1176 European Union's oral statement at the second substantive meeting, para. 57.  
1177 Russia's first written submission, paras. 215 – 217. 
1178 Russia's first written submission, para. 214.  
1179 Austra lia's third -party submission, para. 7.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.852.   Australia asserts that with the foregoing supposition in mind, it would be appropriate for 
the Panel to commence its analysis with the claims under Article 3, followed by consideration, if 
necessary, of the subsequent claims under Articles 5 and 6 of the SPS Agreement.1180 
7.6.1.2.2   Brazil  
7.853.   Brazil emphasizes that while Members are allowed to deviate from the use of international 
standards and to adopt a higher level of protection than  those recognized by the OIE, Articles 3.2 
and 3.3, together with Articles 5.1 and 6 of the SPS Agreement, require that such a higher level of 
protection in the context of the principle of regionalizat ion should only be adopted based upon a 
risk assessment.  
7.854.   Brazil stresses that the Terrestrial Code also establishes recommendations for importation 
from countries or zones considered infected with ASF and that consequently, if a Member decides 
to deviate f rom these standards and/or recommendations, then such decision should be based on 
scientific evidence, consubstantiated in a risk assessment.1181 
7.6.1.3   Analysis by the Panel  
7.6.1.3.1   Introduction  
7.855.   The questions before the Panel are: whether Russia's measures in respect of im ports of the 
products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland  "conform to" the relevant provisions 
of the Terrestrial Code within the meaning of Article 3.2 of the SPS Agreement; and/or whether 
they are  more simply  "based on" such relevant int ernational standards for the purposes of Article 
3.1 of the SPS Agreement. In the case of the bans on imports of the products at issue from 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland , the "based on" and "conform to" assessments are  
alternative s. 
7.856.   In section 7.5.1.3.2  above, we have examined the text of Article 3 of the SPS Agreement. 
To avoid unnecessary repetition, we will not replicate the text of Article 3.  
7.857.   We recall that the parties' evidence and argumentation have focused on the  issue of 
whether Russia's bans on the imports of the products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and 
Poland are "based on" and/or "conform to" the relevant international standard within the meaning 
of Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the SPS Agreement . We thus centre our analysis on these provisions.  
7.858.   In section 7.5.1.3.2  above, we referred to the manner in which the Appellate Body and 
previous panels have understood the meaning of Articles 3.1 and 3.2, and focused on the legal 
standard that needs to be met for a measure to be considered to be based on the relevant 
international standards pursuant to Article 3.1.  
7.859.   We note that Article  3.2 of the SPS Agreement provides that SPS measures that conform 
to international standards, guide lines, or recommendations shall be deemed to be necessary to 
protect human, animal or plant life or health, and presumed to be consistent with the relevant 
provisions of the SPS Agreement and the GATT 1994. If a Member promulgates an SPS  measure 
that confo rms to an international standard, such a measure would embody the international 
standard completely and, for practical purposes, convert it into a municipal standard. Such a 
measure thus enjoys the benefit of a presumption (albeit a rebuttable one) that it  is consistent 
with the relevant provisions of the SPS  Agreement and of the GATT  1994.1182  
7.860.   We further note that Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement establishes that Members shall base 
their SPS measures on international standards, guidelines, or recommendations , where they exist. 
In EC – Hormones , the Appellate Body stated that "[a] thing is commonly said to be 'based on' 
another thing when the former 'stands' or is 'founded' or 'built' upon or 'is supported by' the 
                                               
1180 Australia's thi rd-party submission, para. 9.  
1181 Brazil's third-party submission, para. 14.  
1182 Appellate  Body Report, EC – Hormones, para. 170 . WT/DS475/R  
 
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  latter".1183 The Appellate Body considered that, to be "based on" an international standard, a 
measure "may adopt some, not necessarily all, of the elements of the international standard".1184 
The Member imposing this measure does not benefit from the presumption of consistency set up in 
Article  3.2, but th e Member is not penalized by exemption of a complaining Member from the 
normal burden of showing a prima  facie case of inconsistency with Article  3.1 or any other  relevant 
article  of the SPS  Agreement or of the GATT  1994. That is, the burden of proof would  still lie on a 
complainant to make a prima  facie case of violation of Article  3.1.1185 In EC – Sardines , the 
Appellate Body remarked that "there must be a very strong and very close relationship between 
two things to be able to say that one is 'the basis for ' the other".1186 The Appellate Body thus 
stated that, where a technical regulation and the relevant international standard contradict each 
other, it cannot properly be concluded that the international standard has been used "as a basis 
for" the technical reg ulation.1187 As the Appellate Body recognized in EC – Sardines , the term "as a 
basis for" in Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement is similar to the language used in Article 3.1 of the 
SPS Agreement.1188 Furthermore, the panel in India – Agricultural Products  conclud ed that a 
fundamental departure from the relevant international standard amounts to a contradiction of such 
a standard.1189 
7.861.   In respect of the relationship between the obligations in Articles 3.1 and 3.2, the Appellate 
Body and previous panels have found that a measure that is "based on" a standard does not 
necessarily conform to that same standard, as some of the elements of the standard may not be 
present in the measure at issue.1190 Following this approach, the panel in India – Agricultural 
Products  observed th at failure to meet the "based on" threshold in Article  3.1 would also result in 
not meeting the more rigorous "conform to" threshold in Article  3.2.1191  
7.862.   In paragraph 7.256  above,  we explained that there may be sit uations where a departure 
or deviation of one element of a measure from a certain aspect of a standard may not necessarily 
constitute an outright contradiction of that aspect of the standard.  For example, in cases where a 
standard applies for a particular  set or subset of products, part of a measure pertaining to one 
product may be based on the international standard while another part of the measure pertaining 
to a different product, may not be based  on the international standard. Furthermore, distinction s 
may exist between standards. There may be standards that are conditional on the exporting  
Member undertaking particular actions, whether on a one -off basis or as part of an ongoing, 
continuous and dynamic SPS situation that may introduce temporal conside rations or may require 
additional action.  
7.863.   In this case, the parties have agreed on the products that are subject to the bans on the 
imports of the products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. Those include live 
pigs; pig genetic material (excluding Latvia); finished products containing pork; products from 
slaughter of wild boar; raw pork raw products (excluding Lithuania and Poland); horn -hoofed 
materials, leather and intestinal materials; bristles; feed for pigs1192; and hunting trophies not  
subjected to full taxidermy treatment.1193  
                                               
1183 Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones , para. 163.  
1184 Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones , para. 171.  
1185 The Appellate  Body has cla rified that there is no  "general rule – exception" relationship between the 
three relevant paragraphs of Article  3. Accordingly, these three alternative scenarios are equally available to 
WTO Members. The Appellate  Body explained that "this right of a Memb er to establish its own level of sanitary 
protection under Article  3.3 of the SPS Agreement  is an autonomous right and not an 'exception' from a 
'general obligation' under Article  3.1". (emphasis original) Appellate  Body Report, EC – Hormones , para.  172. 
1186 Appellate Body Report, EC – Sardines , para. 245.  
1187 Appellate Body Report, EC – Sardines , para. 248.  
1188 Appellate Body Report, EC – Sardines , para. 242. The panel in India – Agricultural Products  referred 
to this Appellate Body jurisprudence at paragraphs 7 .265-7.269 of its Report.  
1189 Panel Report, India – Agricultural Products , para. 7.271.  
1190 Appellate  Body Report, EC – Hormones , para.  163. 
1191 Panel Report, India – Agricultural Products , para. 7.202.  
1192 Heat-treated ready -made feedstuffs (minimum temperature: 70 degrees in Celsius, minimum 
treatment time: 20 minutes) are excluded from the ban on the products at issue from Estonia. See Exhibits 
EU-13 and RUS -37. 
1193 See Exhibits EU -7, EU -8, EU -10, EU -11, EU -168 and RUS -28 (regarding the measures in respect of 
Lithuania); Exhibits EU -9, EU -10, EU -11, EU -168 and RUS -29 (regarding the measures in respect of Poland); 
Exhibits EU -12 and EU -169 (regarding the measures in respect of Latvia); and Exhibits EU -13 and RUS -37 
 WT/DS475/R  
 
- 231 - 
 
  7.864.   In light of their product coverage, the bans on the imports of the products at issue from 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland trigger different  Terrestrial Code Chapter 15.1 
recommendations for the import of liv e pigs (both domestic and wild); semen of domestic pigs; in 
vivo derived embryos of domestic pigs; fresh meat (of domestic and wild pigs); meat products of 
pigs (either domestic or wild); products of animal origin (from fresh meat of pigs) intended for use  
in animal feeding, for agricultural or industrial use, or for pharmaceutical or surgical use; trophies 
derived from wild pigs; products of animal origin (from pigs, but not derived from fresh meat) 
intended for use in animal feeding and for agricultural o r industrial use; and bristles (from pigs). 
As we have already observed1194, Articles 15.1.5 – 15.1.17 are  each tailored to a particular subset 
of the relevant products. Some of those recommendations refer to imports from ASF-free 
countries, zones or compartm ents, and from countries or zones considered infected with ASF. 
Some of the mentioned articles also provide for trade of products that have been processed so as 
to ensure destruction of the ASFV, and that the necessary protections were taken after processi ng 
to avoid contact of the product with any source of ASFV. Likewise, as the experts confirmed, 
numerous horizontal Terrestrial Code provisions including, but not limited to, Chapter 4.3 and 
Article 5.3.7, are relevant in determining whether the exporting country has established an OIE -
consistent ASF-free zone.1195 
7.865.   In paragraph 7.260  above  we explained that certain of the Terrestrial Code's provisions 
contain clear proscriptive standards, which are more conducive to a clear -cut det ermination of 
"based on" in light of whether the standard has been implemented. On the other hand, other 
Terrestrial Code provisions contain standards that allow considerable flexibility as to the means by 
which Members may base their measures on, and/or o ffer a range of options to a Member in order 
to be based on the relevant international standard, sometimes on the basis of certain defined 
exhaustive or non -exhaustive criteria or factors. Such more flexible standards recognize the 
inherent discretion of M embers to exercise judgment in a particular set of circumstances, and a 
panel's review must take the particular nature of the provision of the relevant international 
standard at issue into account in light of the specific facts and circumstances of the dis pute.1196 
Moreover, standards calling for interactive processes, where certain steps may be contingent upon 
the satisfaction of other steps, may require a panel to examine the actions of both the importing 
and exporting Members. The extent to which an importi ng country's obligation to adhere to the 
international standard, guideline, or recommendation is excused or limited by the exporting 
country's actions or inactions must be determined on a case -by-case basis.  
7.866.   With this approach in mind, we proceed to exami ne whether the bans on the imports of 
the products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland are "based on" and/or "conform 
to" the relevant international standards in the Terrestrial Code.  
7.867.   Having ascertained the precise measures under review a nd the applicable legal test, in our 
analysis under Article 3 of the SPS Agreement , we will proceed as follows: (i) identifying the 
relevant international standards; (ii)  discerning the meaning of such international standards; 
(iii) assessing the measures at issue in light of these international standards in order to determine 
whether the measures "conform to" and/or are "based on" the standards.  
                                                                                                                                               
(regarding the measures in respect of Estonia). See  also European Union's response to Panel question No. 77, 
paras. 148 -151; response to Panel question No.271, paras. 83 -89; and Russia's response to Panel question No. 
77, para. 127; response to Panel question No. 271, paras. 95 -98. 
1194 See section 7.5.1.3.3  above . 
1195 See e.g. Dr Thomson's response to Panel Question 31, para. 4.19 of Compiled Experts' Replies , 
referring to Chapters 4.3 and 4.4 of the Terrestrial Code;  Dr Brϋckner's response to Panel Question 34, para. 
4.31 of Compi led Experts' Replies , referring to Article 5.3.7 of the Terrestrial Code; and Dr Brϋckner's response 
to Panel Question 55, para. 4.151 of Compiled Experts' Replies , referring to Chapters 4.3 and 15.1 of the 
Terrestrial Code.  
1196 For example, Article 5.1.1 of  the Terrestrial Code provides that "[b]ecause of differences between 
countries in their animal health situations, various options are offered by the Terrestrial Code." (OIE, 
Terrestrial Animal Health Code  23rd edn (2014), Vol. I, p. 171) Article 4.3.1 of the Terrestrial Code provides 
that "[i]n most cases, the import regulations developed will rely in part on judgments made about the 
effectiveness of sanitary procedures undertaken by the exporting country, both at its borders and within its 
territory." (OI E, Terrestrial Animal Health Code  23rd edn (2014), Vol. I, p. 116)  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.6.1.3.2   Identifying the relevant international standards  
7.868.   In section 7.5.1.3.3  above, we ref erred to the manner in which the Appellate Body and 
panels have indicated that a panel should identify the relevant international standards in a 
particular dispute. Based on that guidance we endorse the parties' shared view that the relevant 
international standards for the purpose of this dispute are articulated in the 23rd edition of the 
Terrestrial Code.1197 
7.869.   We considered above that while the parties agree that the Terrestrial Code contains the 
relevant international standards, the parties have differing vie ws on the precise provisions of the 
Terrestrial Code that are relevant in this dispute, and in particular the hierarchy and 
interrelationships between and among the Terrestrial Code's zoning and regionalization 
(Chapters  4.3, 4.4 and 5.4) provisions and it s ASF -specific provisions (Chapter 15.1).  
7.870.   In section s 7.5.1.3.3  and 7.5.1.3.4  above,  we have described in detail our understanding 
of the structure and content of the Terrestrial Code and recalled the parties' arguments in that 
respect. In paragraph 7.271  above , we also observed in this respect that the difference in the 
situations covered by the provisions of Chapter 15.1 (i.e. those related to goods originating in 
ASF-free countries zones or compartments and processed products processed to ensure 
destruction of ASFV) warrants an independent examination of the standards applicable to the 
categories of products subject to each situation. In other words, we consider that t he structure of 
Chapter 15.1 provides a clear identification of two sets of standards that a measure could be based  
on. Those categories include standards for  (i) trade in pig products originating from ASF-free 
countries, zones or compartments; and (ii) tr ade in pig products subject to processing to ensure 
destruction of ASFV.  
7.871.   In light of the parties' comments and the structure of the recommendations in Chapter 
15.1 of the Terrestrial Code, we will pursue an independent analysis in respect of the two 
catego ries of standards applicable in respect of ASF. We will therefore first discern the meaning of 
the relevant international standards contained in Chapter 15.1 of the Terrestrial Code applicable to 
non-treated products, which refers to those pig products ori ginating from ASF-free countries, 
zones or compartments. We will then discern the meaning of the relevant international standards 
contained in Chapter 15.1 of the Terrestrial Code applicable to treated products. We now turn to 
that examination.  
7.6.1.3.3   Discerning  the meaning of the relevant international standards  
7.872.   Table 8 below sets out the product -specific provisions in Chapter 15.1 of the 
Terrestrial  Code that pertain to the products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland 
that are subject to the ba ns. 
 
                                               
1197 See paras. 7.263 -7.264  above.   
  WT/DS475/R  
 
- 233 - Table 8 Product -specific  provisions of Chapter 15.1 of the Terrestrial Code  relevant to each product category covered by the measures 
at issue1198 
Lithuania
1199 Poland1200 Latvia1201 Estonia
1202 Relevant international standard (relevant prod uct-specific provisions of 
Chapter 15.1 of the Terrestrial Code)  
live pigs  live pigs  live pigs  live pigs  Article 15.1.5.  
Recommendations for importation from ASF-free countries, zones or 
compartments  
For domestic pigs  
Veterinary Authorities should requir e the presentation of an international 
veterinary certificate attesting that the animals : 
1) showed no clinical sign of ASF on the day of shipment;  
2) were kept in an ASF-free country, zone or compartment since birth or for at 
least the past 40 days.  
 
genetic 
material  genetic 
material  N/A pig genetic 
material  Article 15.1.8.  
Recommendations for importation from ASF-free countries, zones or 
compartments  
For semen of domestic pigs  
Veterinary Authorities should require the presentation of an international 
veterinary certificate attesting that:  
1) the donor animals : 
a) were kept in an ASF-free country, zone or compartment since birth or for at 
least 40 days prior to collection;  
b) showed no clinical sign of ASF on the day of collection of the semen;  
2) the seme n was collected, processed and stored in conformity with the 
provisions of Chapters 4.5 and 4.6.  
 
Article 15.1.10  
Recommendations for importation from ASF-free countries, zones or 
compartments  
For in vivo derived embryos of domestic pigs  
                                               
1198 This Table contains the relevant product -specific provisions in Chapter 15.1 of Terrestrial Code and the products as identified in Russia's measures. As the 
European Union does not practice "compartmentalization", and has not sought to rely on this concept in its argumentation unde r Article 3 of the SPS Agreement, Article 
15.1.6 and other compartment -specific provisions are excluded from Table  8. 
1199 See Exhibits EU -7, EU -8, EU -10, EU -11, EU -168 and RUS -28. 
1200 See Exhibits EU -9, EU -10, EU -11, EU -168 and RUS -29. 
1201 See Exhibits EU -12 and EU -169. 
1202 See G/SPS/N/RUS/76 ( Exhibit EU -13) and  Russia's letter to th e European Union of 11 September 2014, FS -NV-8/17431  (Exhibit RUS-37).  
  WT/DS475/R  
 
- 234 - Lithuania
1199 Poland1200 Latvia1201 Estonia
1202 Relevant international standard (relevant prod uct-specific provisions of 
Chapter 15.1 of the Terrestrial Code)  
Veterinary Authori ties should require the presentation of an international 
veterinary certificate attesting that:  
1) the donor females:  
a) were kept in an ASF-free country, zone or compartment since birth or for at 
least 40 days prior to collection;  
b) showed no clinical si gn of ASF on the day of collection of the embryos;  
2) the embryos were collected, processed and stored in conformity with the 
provisions of Chapters 4.7. and 4.9., as relevant.  
 
finished 
products 
containing 
pork1203 finished 
products 
containing 
pork finished  
products 
containing 
pork1204 end 
[finished] 
products 
containing 
pork1205 Articles 15.1.14 and 15.1.15  
 
Article 15.1.14  
Recommendations for the importation of meat products of pigs (either 
domestic or wild), or for products of animal origin (from fresh meat of 
pigs) intended for use in animal feeding, for agricultural or industrial use, 
or for pharmaceutical or surgical use, or for trophies derived from wild 
pigs;  
Veterinary Authorities should require the presentation of an international 
veterinary certificate attesting that the products:  
1) have been prepared:  
a) exclusively from fresh meat meeting the conditions laid down in Articles 
15.1.12. or 15.1.13., as relevant;  
b) in a processing establishment:  
i) approved by the Veterinary Authority for export purposes;  
ii) processing only meat meeting the conditions laid down in Articles 15.1.12. or 
15.1.13., as relevant;  
OR 
2) have been processed in an establishment approved by the Veterinary Authority 
for export purposes so as to ensure the destruction of the ASFV, and  that the 
necessary precautions were taken after processing to avoid contact of the product 
with any source of ASFV.  
                                               
1203 Through Letter of the Russian Federal Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Supervision No. FS -EN-8/5081, of 2 April 2014 ( Exhibit EU -168), products 
excluded from the bans on impor ts from Lithuania and Poland were limited to cats and dogs' feeds which are thermally treated (temperature not  lower than 70ºC for not 
less than 20 minutes).  
1204 Excluding cats' and dogs' feeds which are thermally treated (temperature not lower than 70ºC for  not less than 20 minutes).  
1205 Excluding feed additives resulted from chemical or microbiological synthesis and heat -treated ready -made feedstuffs (minimum temperature: 70 degrees in 
Celsius, minimum treatment time: 20 minutes).   
  WT/DS475/R  
 
- 235 - Lithuania
1199 Poland1200 Latvia1201 Estonia
1202 Relevant international standard (relevant prod uct-specific provisions of 
Chapter 15.1 of the Terrestrial Code)  
 
Article 15.1.15.  
Recommendations for the importation of products of animal origin (from 
pigs, but not derived from fresh meat) intended fo r use in animal feeding 
and for agricultural or industrial use  
Veterinary Authorities should require the presentation of an international 
veterinary certificate attesting that these  
products:  
1) have been prepared:  
a) exclusively from fresh meat meeting th e conditions laid down in Articles 
15.1.12. or 15.1.13., as relevant;  
b) in a processing establishment:  
i) approved by the Veterinary Authority for export purposes;  
ii) processing only meat meeting the conditions laid down in Articles 15.1.12. or 
15.1.13.,  as relevant;  
OR 
2) have been processed in an establishment approved by the Veterinary Authority 
for export purposes so as to ensure the destruction of the ASFV, and that the 
necessary precautions were taken after processing to avoid contact of the product  
with any source of ASFV.  
 
products 
from 
slaughter 
of wild 
boar  products 
from 
slaughter 
of wild 
boar N/A meat of 
wild boar  Articles 15.1.13. and 15.1.14.  
 
Article 15.1.13  
Recommendations for importation from ASF-free countries or zones  
From fresh meat of  wild pigs  
Veterinary Authorities  should require the presentation of an international 
veterinary certificate  attesting that:  
1) the entire consignment of fresh meat  comes from animals  which:  
a) have been killed in an ASF-free country or zone;  
b) have been subjected to a post -mortem inspection in accordance with Chapter 
6.2. in an approved examination centre, and have been found free of any sign 
suggestive of ASF;  
and, if the zone where the animal  has been killed is adjacent to a zone with 
infection  in wild pigs: 
2) a sample has been collected from every animal  killed and has been subjected to 
a virological test and a serological test for ASF, with negative results.  
 
N/A N/A pork pork Articles 15.1.12 and 15.1.14   
  WT/DS475/R  
 
- 236 - Lithuania
1199 Poland1200 Latvia1201 Estonia
1202 Relevant international standard (relevant prod uct-specific provisions of 
Chapter 15.1 of the Terrestrial Code)  
raw pork 
products  
 
 raw port 
products  
 
  
Article 15.1.12.  
Recommendations for importation from ASF-free countries, zones or 
compartments  
For fresh meat of domestic pigs  
Veterinary Authorities should require the presentation of an international 
veterinary certificate attesting that the entire  
consign ment of fresh meat comes from animals which:  
1) have been kept in an ASF-free country, zone or compartment since birth or for 
at least the past 40 days, or which have been imported in accordance with Article 
15.1.5. or Article 15.1.6.;  
2) have been slaught ered in an approved abattoir , have been subjected to ante - 
and post -mortem inspections in accordance with Chapter 6.2., and have been 
found free of any sign suggestive of ASF.  
 
horn-
hoofed 
materials,  
leather,  
intestinal 
materials  horn-
hoofed 
materials,  
leather,  
intestinal 
materials  N/A horn-
hoofed 
materials,  
leather,  
intestinal 
materials  We note that although the European Union and Russia agree that Articles 15.1.1 -
15.1.4 are the relevant standard for this product (European Union's response to 
Panel que stion No.272; Russia's response to Panel question No. 272), we consider 
that there is no Article in Chapter 15.1 which directly or specifically deals with 
these categories of products. As such, we consider them not to be subject to an 
international standar d.  
bristles  bristles  N/A hair coat  Article 15.1.16.  
Recommendations for the importation of bristles (from pigs)  
Veterinary Authorities should require the presentation of an international 
veterinary certificate attesting that these  
products:  
1) come from  an ASF-free country, zone or compartment ; or 
2) have been processed in an establishment approved by the Veterinary Authority 
for export purposes so as to ensure the destruction of the ASFV, and that the 
necessary precautions were taken after processing to  avoid contact of the product 
with any source of ASFV.  
 
feed for 
pigs feed for 
pigs  
 N/A all types of 
feed stuffs 
and feed 
additives 
for pigs  Article 15.1.14.  
hunting 
trophies hunting 
trophies N/A hunter's 
trophies Article 15.1.14   
  WT/DS475/R  
 
- 237 - Lithuania
1199 Poland1200 Latvia1201 Estonia
1202 Relevant international standard (relevant prod uct-specific provisions of 
Chapter 15.1 of the Terrestrial Code)  
not 
subjected 
to full 
taxidermy 
treatment  not 
subjected 
to full 
taxidermy 
treatment  derived 
from 
sensible 
animal 
species 
without full 
taxidermy 
treatment  WT/DS475/R  
 
- 238 - 
 
  7.6.1.3.3.1   Non-treated products  
7.873.   In section  7.5.1.3.4.2  above we pursued an inquiry into the meaning of t he relevant 
international  standards in the Terrestrial Code applicable to certain categories of non -treated 
products originating from ASF-free countries, zones or compartments. In particular, we examined 
the provisions applicable to live pigs (piglets for fattening and pigs for breeding), pork meat, and 
raw meat preparations. These include Articles 15.1.5, 15.1.12 and 15.1.14.  
7.874.   Acceptance of non -treated products covered by the articles in Chapter 15.1 listed in 
Table  8 above, is contingent upon the determina tion that the products in question come from 
ASF-free countries, zones, or compartments.  
7.875.   Articles 15.1.2, 15.1.3, and 15.1.4 provide the conditions that should be met for a country, 
zone or compartment to be considered free of ASF. In paragraphs 7.288 -7.326  above , we 
examined in detail the meaning of those provisions in the Terrestrial Code. We will rely on our 
analysis provided above for our assessment of whether the bans on the imports of the prod ucts at 
issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland "conform to" or are "based on" the standards 
articulated in those provisions.  
7.6.1.3.3.2   Treated  products  
7.876.   The second category of products covered by the standards contained in the Terrestrial 
Code is treated products. In particular, Articles 15.1.14 (meat products of pigs), 15.1.15 (products 
of animal origin (from pigs, but not derived from fresh meat) intended for animal feeding and for 
agricultural or industrial use), and 15.1.16 (bristles from pigs) contain  the standards applicable for 
trade in certain pig products that have been processed so as to ensure destruction of ASFV, 
regardless of whether they originate from animals in ASF-free countries, zones or compartments.  
7.877.   The specific conditions required by th e standards applicable to treated products, as 
enshrined in Articles 15.1.14, 15.1.15 and 15.1.16, are that such pig products "have been 
processed in an establishment approved by the Veterinary Authority for export purposes so as to 
ensure the destruction of the ASFV, and that the necessary precautions were taken after 
processing to avoid contact of the product with any source of ASFV."  
7.878.   These standards lay down two cumulative requirements. The first has to do with the 
processing of the pig products concerne d. Such processing should be done in an establishment 
approved by the veterinary authority for export purposes and it should be so as to ensure the 
destruction of the ASFV.  
7.879.   Chapter 15.1 does not indicate how the destruction of the ASFV can be achieved. Thi s 
being a matter of science, we see the need to rely on certain elements on record of a scientific 
nature. Among them, we have reference to the responses from the OIE to the Panel questions, the 
responses from the experts to the Panel questions, experts' i nterventions during the meeting with 
the Panel, and the relevant exhibits submitted by the parties.  
7.880.   The OIE explained that Chapter 15.1 does not contain specific recommendations on the 
processing required to "ensure the destruction of the ASFV".1206 While th e Terrestrial Code does 
not currently contain specific recommendations on the inactivation of ASFV, there is some 
guidance in the OIE Technical Disease Card on ASF, which states that the virus may be inactivated 
by heat at 56°C for 70 minutes or 60°C for 2 0 minutes.1207 The OIE explained that these 
recommendations are based on a 1977 study carried out in the United States, which is cited in the 
EFSA report, 2010.1208 The OIE cautioned that the OIE Technical Disease Cards are not adopted 
standards. Rather, they ar e short summaries of scientific evidence. Attention must be paid to 
                                               
1206 OIE responses to Panel's q uestions No. 8 and 9.  
1207 OIE, ASF Technical Disease Card  (Exhibit RUS -186). 
http://www.oie.int/fileadmin/Home/eng/Animal_Health_i n_the_World/docs/pdf/Disease_cards/AFRICAN_SWIN
E_FEVER.pdf  (last updated on April 2013 , last accessed on 20 November 2015).  
1208 OIE response to Panel questions No. 8 and 9.  WT/DS475/R  
 
- 239 - 
 
  scientific information that is published subsequent to the publication of a Technical Disease 
Card.1209  
7.881.   The experts advising the Panel indicated that studies undertaken using both the classi cal 
swine fever virus and the ASF virus conclude d that both require similar times and temperatures for 
inactivation. Chapter 15.2 on classical swine fever provides details that are proposed for inclusion 
in the updated version of Chapter 15.1 that is curre ntly in progress.1210 More specifically, 
Drs Bruckner and Thomson stated that it is accepted that heating virus -containing material to an 
internal temperature of 70° C will inactivate most animal pathogens including ASF virus.1211 Thus, 
while the relevant intern ational standards do not precise the time and duration of heat treatment 
that would ensure ASFV destruction, the Panel's experts have indicated that an internal 
temperature of 70° C  would achieve this and should lead to acceptance of such heat -treated 
products. 
7.882.   This statement is in line with what is expressed in the 2010 EFSA scientific opinion, 
according to which ASFV "is inactivated by heat treatment at 60 °C for 30 min and by many 
solvents that disrupt lipid bilayers and by commercial disinfectants."1212 Furthermore, the cited 
scientific opinion indicates that "In products prepared by curing, such as Parma ham, viral 
infectivity was not demonstrated in ham 300 days after processing and curing. … The virus 
survived for 140 days in Iberian and Serrano hams and for 112 days in loin."1213 The scientific 
opinion concludes that no "infectious ASFV has been found in cooked or canned hams when 
processed at 70 °C."1214 
7.883.   We further note that based on the evidence on record, Russia accepted certain forms of 
processing for allowi ng the imports of specific products originating from the European Union's 
territory outside the four affected EU member States, and, for the period between 
6 February  20141215 and 7  April 2014,1216 also from areas within Lithuania and Poland. Such 
categories of processing are  (i) thermal treatment in a hermetically sealed container with index 
F0 3,001217; (ii) thermal treatment at a minimum temperature  of 80°C which should be provided 
over the entire layer of the meat; (iii) thermal treatment in a hermetically seale d container at 
60°C during minimum of 4 hours, while the temperature in the centre should be kept during 
30 minutes at a minimum of 700C; (iv) natural fermentation and maturation within the time of not 
less than 9 months for boneless meat, thereby achievin g the following indicators: Aw not more 
                                               
1209 OIE response to Panel questions No. 2, 8 and 9.  
1210 Expert responses to Panel Questi ons 16 and 17. The OIE indicated that the OIE had decided to 
update Chapter 15.2 Classical swine fever (CSF) then use this revised text as a model for the review of Chapter 
15.1, taking account of the similarities in the epidemiology of the two diseases wh ile respecting the specific 
features of each one. Chapter 15.2 contains specific articles on the requirements for the inactivation of CSF in 
swill (Article 15.2.22), in meat (Article 15.2.23), in casings and in skins and trophies (19). Consistent with this  
approach and recognising the need for Chapter 15.1 to contain more specific information on the inactivation of 
ASFV by processing, the ad hoc expert Group on African swine fever, which met in April 2014 recommended 
certain modifications and a draft revise d text was distributed to Member Countries by the TAHSC in February 
2015 (submitted to the Panel as Annex 1 to the OIE responses). The OIE clarified that this draft text is a 
proposal of an elected Commission but does not have the status of a standard at t his time. Member Countries 
submitted extensive comments on the draft and the final wording of the adopted text cannot be predicted. 
However, the OIE indicated, it is expected that the revised Chapter 15.1 will contain specific recommendations 
on the inacti vation of African swine fever virus, including in swill and in meat. The ad hoc Group on African 
swine fever reported that there is limited scientific information on the inactivation of the virus and that more 
research is needed on this topic. Information from a 2010 report of the European Food Safety Agency was used 
in the development of these recommendations (20). OIE Member Countries are encouraged to provide 
additional scientific evidence to assist in refining the proposals in the draft revised text cir culated in February 
2015.  
1211 Dr Thomson, Transcript, paras. 1.387 and Dr Brückner, Transcript, para.  1.388.  
1212 2010 EFSA Scientific Opinion (Exhibit EU -24), p.  11. 
1213 2010 EFSA Scientific Opinion (Exhibit EU -24), p. 12.  
1214 2010 EFSA Scientific Opinion (Exhibit  EU-24), p. 12.  
1215 Russia's letter to the European Union of 5 February 2014, FS -EN-8/1642  (Exhibit EU -162). 
1216 Exhibits EU -10, EU -11 and EU -168. 
1217 (F0 – calculated damaging effect on bacterial spores. F 0 = 3 means that the coldest point of the 
product was he ated enough to get the same damaging effect achieved with the help of immediate heating and 
cooling (1210C (2500F) in 3 minutes) . WT/DS475/R  
 
- 240 - 
 
  than 0,93 or pH not more than 6 .0; and (v) for ham and fillets, treatment using natural 
fermentation and maturing during minimum 190 days for ham and 140 days for fillets.1218 
7.884.   The second requirement laid down by the sta ndards is that the necessary precautions were 
taken after processing to avoid contact of the product with any source of ASFV.  
7.6.1.3.4   Whether the bans on the imports of the products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, and Poland " conform  to" the relevant in ternational standards  
7.885.   We recall that the panel in India – Agricultural Products  examined first whether India's 
measures were "based on" the international standard before going into the question of whether 
they conformed to such a standard. That panel consi dered this to be the appropriate order of 
analysis under Article 3 of the SPS Agreement because the "based on" threshold in Article 3.1 is 
lower than the "conform to" threshold in Article 3.2.1219 In our view, this approach is not 
appropriate in these proceed ings. 
7.886.   We consider that it is appropriate for us to first examine the more stringent "conform to" 
threshold. As we have explained above, a challenged measure may be "based on" the international 
standard with respect to one element, but not with respect to a nother element. This, however, 
does not hold true in respect of a challenged measure "conforming to" the same international 
standard. The Appellate Body's guidance is very clear in indicating that a measure that conforms 
to an international standard would embody the international standard completely, and, for 
practical purposes, convert it into a municipal standard.1220  
7.887.   We therefore consider that it is most appropriate for us to first examine whether the 
import bans on the products at issue from Estonia, Latv ia, Lithuania, and Poland "conform to" the 
international standards contained in the Terrestrial Code . If they are found not to conform to the 
standards, we  would proceed to examine whether such measures are "based on" those standards. 
We turn to the first of these questions.  
7.888.   Prior panels and the Appellate Body have not been called upon to delve in detail into the 
meaning of "conform[ity] to" the relevant international standard for the purposes of Article 3.2 of 
the SPS Agreement. Pursuant to the terms of A rticle 3.2, a finding that Russia's measures 
"conform to" relevant international standards would establish a presumption of consistency of 
Russia's measures with its relevant SPS obligations, and thus would have implications for this 
Panel's disposition of  other claims in this dispute. Should we find "conformity to", as we 
understand that this presumption is "rebuttable"1221, we would further need to consider how to 
assess whether or not this presumption has been rebutted in respect of each of the relevant 
provisions. In this respect, Russia asserts that, as the bans on the products at issue from Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland conform to the Terrestrial Code, they benefit from a presumption of 
consistency with the relevant provisions of the SPS Agreemen t pursuant to Article 3.2, which 
Russia identifies as Articles 2.2, 2.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, 5.6, 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3.1222 The European Union 
posits that the relevant provisions, closely related to the subject in an appropriate way, are those 
related to risk assessme nt and scientific evidence, but not to discrimination.1223 The parties thus 
agree that SPS provisions relating to discrimination would not be classified as "relevant" in this 
context.  
7.889.   On their face, none of the bans on the imports of the products at issue fro m Estonia1224, 
Latvia1225, Lithuania1226, and Poland1227 embody the relevant international standards contained in 
                                               
1218 Russia's letter to the European Union of 5 February 2014, FS -EN-8/1642  (Exhibit EU -162). 
1219 Panel Report, India – Agricultur al Products , para. 7.203.  
1220 Appellate  Body Report, EC – Hormones, para. 170 . See Panel Report, India – Agricultural Products , 
paras. 7.197 and 7.202.  
1221 Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones , para. 170.  
1222 Russia's first written submission, para. 216.  
1223 Europ ean Union's response to Panel question No. 118, paras. 237 – 239. 
1224 G/SPS/N/RUS/76 (Exhibit EU -13) and Letter from the Russian Veterinary Service to DG SANCO, FS -
NV-8/17431, 11 September 2015  (Exhibit RUS-37). 
1225 G/SPS/N/RUS/64 (Exhibit EU -12) and Russia's letter of instruction of 27 June 2014, FS -NF-8/11315 
(Exhibit EU-169). WT/DS475/R  
 
- 241 - 
 
  the Terrestrial Code applicable to both treated and non -treated pig products. While the provisions 
of Chapter 15.1 of the Terrestrial Code contain specifi c recommendations as to how safe trade can 
happen in respect of certain pig products, the measures applicable to the four affected 
EU member  States provide bans on the imports of most of those products.  For example, whereas 
Article  15.1.15 would permit im ports of pig products for use in animal feeding if these have been 
processed so as to ensure the destruction of the ASFV, Russia applies an unconditional ban on 
these products. Similarly, Article 15.1.16 would permit imports of bristles from an ASF -free zo ne 
subject to processing to destroy the ASFV, but these are unconditionally banned by Russia. In our 
view, the challenged measures cannot be construed as embodying the relevant international 
standards.  
7.890.   Based on the foregoing, we find that the import bans on the products at issue from 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland  do not conform to the relevant international standards 
contained in the Terrestrial Code, and thus are inconsistent with Article 3.2 of the SPS Agreement.  
7.6.1.3.5   Whether the bans on the imports of the products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, and Poland are "based on" the relevant international standards  
7.6.1.3.5.1   Introduction  
7.891.   We recall the distinction that we have identified in Chapter 15.1 of the Terrestrial Code in 
respect of the standards appl icable to treated and non -treated products. Based on that distinction, 
we will undertake an independent examination on whether the bans on the imports of the products 
at issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland are "based on" the standards applica ble to 
each of those categories of products.  
7.6.1.3.5.2   Treated products  
7.892.   In respect of the measures applied to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland , for treated 
products, the European Union asserts that the relevant Terrestrial Code provisions 
(Articles  15.1.14 th rough 16) permit trading of pork products that have been processed in an 
approved establishment so as to ensure the destruction of the ASFV. To the extent that Russia's 
measures ban the importation of products  addressed in Articles 15.1.14 through 16 from Estonia, 
Latvia Lithuania and Poland, regardless of whether they have been subject to any form of 
treatment, they are in contradiction of the relevant international standards contained in the 
Terrestrial Code. Thus, t hey are not in conformity with these st andards.1228  
7.893.   According to Russia, its measures "conform to" the Terrestrial Code. The exporting country 
bears the burden of demonstrating that the necessary precautions were taken, which the European 
Union has failed to do in respect of exports from Estonia,  Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland .1229 Russia 
further asserts that it is able to accept products from ASF -infected countries that meet 
OIE-consistent regionalization, compartmentalization and/or heat -treated standards.1230  
7.894.   The issue before the Panel is whether Rus sia's bans on treated products from Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland , are "based on" the relevant international standard in respect of 
products processed so as to ensure destruction of ASFV.  
7.895.   When discerning the meaning of the international standards  articulated in the relevant 
Terrestrial Code provisions (Articles 15.1.14 -.16),1231 we noted that those Articles envisage tradin g 
                                                                                                                                               
1226 G/SPS/N/RUS/48 (Exhibit EU -7), G/SPS/N/RUS/48/Add.1  (Exhibit EU -8), G/SPS/N/RUS/48/Add.2  
(Exhibit EU -10), Letter from the Russian Veterinary Service to DG SANCO, FS -EN-8/1023, 25 Janu ary 2015  
(Exhibit RUS-28) and OIE WAHIS interface  (Exhibit RUS-168). 
1227 G/SPS/N/RUS/49 (Exhibit EU -9), G/SPS/N/RUS/49/Add.1  (Exhibit EU -11), Letter from Russian 
Veterinary Service, FS -NV-8/2972, 27 February 2014  (Exhibit RUS -29) and  OIE WAHIS interface  
(Exhibit RUS-168).  
1228 European Union's first written submission, paras. 132 -135 and 140.  
1229 Russia's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 37; and second written 
submission, para. 29.  
1230 Russia's response to Panel question No. 115, para. 206;  
1231 See section 7.6.1.3.3.2  above.   WT/DS475/R  
 
- 242 - 
 
  of pork products that have been processed in an approved establishment so as to ensure the 
destruction of the ASFV. The provisio ns of the Terrestrial Code relating to the processing of 
products indicate that the import recommendations are not related to the ASF status of a 
particular country, zone, or compartment, but rather to the certification that an adequate 
processing method h as been undertaken to ensure destruction of ASFV. These provisions foresee 
that importation should be permitted if requisite processing has been undertaken and certified. As 
mentioned above, t he Panel's experts have indicated that an internal temperature o f 70° C  would 
achieve this and should lead to acceptance of such heat -treated products.1232 
7.896.   In contrast, Russia imposed general import bans on treated products from Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, and Poland.1233 Furthermore, Russia exempts from the import ban "fini shed feed for cats 
and dogs" (Latvia, Lithuania and Poland) and synthesized feed additives and heat treated ready -
made feedstuffs (Estonia).1234. 
7.897.   Russia has questioned the effectiveness of the processing plants within the four affected 
EU member States in ens uring the destruction of ASFV and in taking the necessary precautions 
after processing to avoid contact of the product with any source of ASFV.1235 The European Union 
has rejected Russia's claim and provided certain information in that respect through a letter dated 
4 April 2014.1236 
7.898.   We note that Article  15.1.14 of the Terrestrial Code established the processing 
requirement to ensure destruction of ASFV of products made from fresh pork that are intended for 
animal feeding (i.e. cat and dog food) and does not diff erentiate between these and heat -treated 
products for human consumption with regard to virus inactivation. The same is true with respect to 
Article  15.1.15 for products not made from fresh pork. Dr Brückner and Professor Penrith 
confirmed that there would be no reason for the heat treatment to differ in respect of pet feed.1237 
Russia has provided no justification for accepting the adequacy of the heat -treatment for certain 
products, while at the same time excluding the importation of the other heat -treated pr oducts at 
issue.  Moreover, we recall that between 6 February 2014 and 7 April 2014, Russia accepted the 
imports of treated products from Lithuania and Poland, even when there had been ASF outbreaks 
in the territory of these EU member States.1238 
7.899.   Processing ad equate to ensure the destruction of ASFV should permit safe international 
trade in the products concerned pursuant to the relevant international standards, rather than the 
imposition of an import ban. However, to the extent that Russia's measures at issue ban the 
products addressed in Articles 15.1.14 through 16, they depart fundamentally from the relevant 
international standards. In our view, this constitutes a contradiction, which according to the 
applicable legal test would lead to the conclusion that th e international standard has not been used 
"as a basis for" the challenged measures.  
7.900.   Based on the foregoing we find that the bans on the imports of the products at issue from 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, to the extent they apply to treated prod ucts, are not "based 
on" the relevant international standards and are thus inconsistent with Article 3.1 of the 
SPS Agreement.  
7.6.1.3.5.3   Non- treated products  
7.901.   The European Union argues that the bans imposed on the products at issue contradict the 
relevant provisions  of the Terrestrial Code, and therefore do not conform to the relevant 
international standards.1239 
                                               
1232 Transcript, paras. 1.387 – 1.388.  
1233 See para. 7.889  above.  Also note that, as described in para. 7.883 , in the period between 
6 February 2014 and 7 April 2014, Russia accepted imports of treated products from Lithuania and Poland.  
1234 As indicated in Tables 1 and 4 above.  
1235 Russia's second written submission, para. 29. See also Exhibit RUS -209. 
1236 See Exhibit RUS -56. 
1237 Reference to Expert responses to Panel question 17.  
1238 See para. 7.871  above. See Exhibits EU -162 and EU -10, EU -11, and EU -168. 
1239 European Union’s first written submission, paras. 126, 131, 133 -138, and 140.  WT/DS475/R  
 
- 243 - 
 
  7.902.   Russia argues that it has objectively rejected the ASF -free zones claimed by the 
European  Union to exist, relying on the relevant provisions of the Terrestrial  Code. Russia argues 
that its measures at issue are based on the relevant international standards.1240 
7.903.   As a result of our examination of the meaning of the relevant international standards 
applicable to non -treated products, we come to the conclusion that bef ore comparing the bans on 
the imports of the products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland with those 
standards for the purposes of determining whether those measure are "based on" them, we 
consider that it is appropriate and instructive fo r us to turn to our examination of the European 
Union's claims under Article 6 of the SPS Agreement.  
7.904.   We consider this approach to be appropriate in the circumstances of the present case, 
where our conclusions under Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement will hav e no impact on the 
complainant's burden of proof in respect of claims brought under other provisions of the SPS 
Agreement (i.e. Article 6). We recall our finding that the bans on the imports of the products at 
issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Pol and do not "conform to" the relevant international 
standards. In that context, we are not barred from following this approach. That would not be the 
case when a panel is examining a justification that the challenged measures "conform to" the 
relevant inter national standard pursuant to Article 3.2, because an affirmative finding of such 
justification would raise a presumption of consistency with the relevant provisions of the 
SPS Agreement and of the GATT 1994.1241 
7.905.   Therefore, we will suspend our analysis of the  parties' claims under Article 3 in respect of 
the bans on the imports of the products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, to the 
extent they apply to non -treated products, being "based on" the international standards applicable 
to non -treated products, with a view to informing our analysis through an examination of such 
measures under Article 6 of the SPS Agreement. Following our analysis of the consistency of the 
bans on the imports of the products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuani a, and Poland with 
Article 6 , we will resume our analysis of whether those measures, to the extent they apply to non -
treated products, are "based on" the relevant international standards applicable to non -treated 
products and provide our findings in that r espect. We now turn to examine the European Union's 
claims under Article 6 in respect of the bans on the imports of the products at issue from Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland.  
7.6.2   Claims under Articles 6.1, 6.2 , and 6.3 of the SPS Agreement  
7.6.2.1   Main argumen ts of the parties  
7.6.2.1.1   European  Union  
7.906.   The European Union claims that the bans on the imports of the products at issue from 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland are inconsistent with Articles 6.1 and 6.2, because Russia 
has not ensured, and does not ensure, th at the measures at issue are adapted to the sanitary 
characteristics of the area from which the products at issue originate and to which they are 
destined. The European Union further contends that these measures fail to take into account, inter 
alia, the level of prevalence or absence of ASF, the existence of eradication and control programs 
(immediately implemented in accordance with international standards laid down by the OIE), and 
appropriate criteria or guidelines developed by the relevant internationa l organizations.1242 
7.907.   Regarding  the first sentence of Article 6.2, the European Union argues that Russia failed to 
recognize the concepts of disease -free areas with respect to ASF in the European Union.1243 The 
European Union claims that this is evidenced by Russ ia's application of four indiscriminate bans on 
the products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland.1244 With respect to the second 
sentence of Article 6.2, the European Union further argues that these bans were applied without 
taking into accou nt relevant factors such as geography, ecosystems, epidemiological surveillance 
                                               
1240 Russia's first wr itten submission, paras. 78 -79, and 214.  
1241 See Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones , paras. 102 and 170.  
1242 European Union's first written submission, para. 216.  
1243 European Union's first written submission, para. 215.  
1244 European Union's first written submis sion, para. 210.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  and the effectiveness of sanitary controls.1245 The European Union claims that given its large 
geographical territory, the geographical factor must be taken into account and highl ights its 
control measures in this regard. The European Union outlines the various steps taken to control 
ASF in live pigs and wild boars.1246 
7.908.   The European Union submits that with respect to Article 6.3, it has provided Russia with 
information beyond what is necessary for objectively demonstrating that disease -free areas or 
areas of low disease prevalence are and are likely to remain disease -free areas or areas of low 
disease prevalence, respectively.1247 
7.6.2.1.2   Russia  
7.909.   Russia's defence in respect of the bans on the impo rts of the products at issue from 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland is premised on compliance with Articles 6.1, 6.2 and 6.31248 
because of its objective decision not to recognize the various European Union zones, based on the 
appropriate Terrestrial Cod e benchmarks and the more general criteria outlined in Article 6 of the 
SPS Agreement.1249 According to Russia, the Panel should examine if Russia's decision not to 
recognize the European Union's zones is objectively justifiable, rather than engaging in a de novo 
examination of that decision.1250 Russia argues that the conformity of the bans on the imports of 
the products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland with the Terrestrial Code (as 
provided for under Article 3.2) vests them with a presumptio n of consistency, which the European 
Union has failed to rebut.1251  
7.910.   In the alternative, Russia argues that the European Union failed to act consistently with 
the provisions set out in Article 6.3 of the SPS Agreement in relation to the requested recognition 
of zones, and as a consequence is unable to establish that Russia acted inconsistently with 
Articles  6.1 and 6.2 of the SPS Agreement .1252  
7.911.   Russia also posits that independently of Article 6.3, the European Union failed to 
demonstrate that Russia violates Art icle 6.2, because, among other things, Russia has in place 
laws (e.g. CU Decision No. 317 and the 2006 Memorandum) that explicitly recognize the concept 
of regionalization.1253 
7.6.2.2   Main  arguments of the third parties  
7.6.2.2.1   Australia  
7.912.   Australia asserts that it agrees wit h Russia that the first sentence of Article 6.2 of the 
SPS Agreement requires only the recognition of the concept of "pest- or disease -free areas and 
areas of low pest or disease prevalence". Australia however, also stresses that the 
"Appellate  Body [sic] in India - Agricultural  Products  went on to find  '… in our view, to comply with 
Article 6.2, SPS measures adopted by WTO Members must at a minimum not deny or contradict 
the recognition of the concepts of such areas when these concepts are relevant with re spect to the 
disease at issue '".1254 
                                               
1245 European Union's first written submission, para. 210.  
1246 European Union's first written submission, paras. 211 -214. 
1247 European Union's first written submission, para. 218.  
1248 Russia's second written submission, paras. 50 -56. Russia contend s that any objective assessment of 
an ASF -free zone, consistent with the factors identified in Articles 6.1 and 6.2 of the SPS Agreement, would 
have to include the assessment of the zoning principles as set out in the Terrestrial Code Article 4.3.3 as well  
as the related principles in Article 5.3.7.  
1249 Russia's second written submission, para. 127.  
1250 Russia's second written submission, para. 49.  
1251 Russia's second written submission, paras. 128 -129. See also response to Panel question No. 118, 
paras. 215 -224. 
1252 Russia's second written submission, paras. 130 -132. 
1253 Russia's second written submission, paras. 133 -141. 
1254 Australia's third -party submission, para. 19 (citing Panel  Report, India – Agricultural Products , para. 
7.698  (not yet adopted at the time of the  filing of the submission) ). WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.913.     Australia emphasizes that it will be necessary for the Panel to determine whether Russia 's 
measures, notified or otherwise, operate in a manner such as to deny or contradict the recognition 
of such areas. Such a finding may be informed by the Panel 's other findings under Article 3 and 
Article 5 of the SPS Agreement.1255 
7.6.2.2.2   Brazil  
7.914.   Brazil argues that the main question under discussion in this topic is whether it is possible 
to rightfully impose an import prohibition (country and/ or EU -wide ban) if the importing Member 
considers that the measures adopted by the exporting Member were not sufficient to establish 
disease - or pest -free zones or compartments.1256 
7.915.   Brazil asserts that adaptation to regional conditions in the context of Artic le 6.1 of the 
SPS Agreement  entails taking into account , inter alia , appropriate criteria or guidelines which may 
be developed by the relevant international organizations.1257 
7.916.   Brazil argues that a Member has the right to consider that the measures adopted by 
another Member are not satisfactory for the determination of the containment zone, if (i) there 
was no conformity with the standard in the sense of Article 3.2 or (ii) the level of protection sought 
by the importing Member is higher than the one establishe d by the standard. In Brazil's view, if an 
importing Member considers that the measures adopted by the exporting Member do not conform 
to the international standard in the sense that the measures adopted do not "embody the 
international standard completely ", then there could be a basis for the establishment of an import 
prohibition. On the other hand, a Member may choose to adopt a higher level of protection and 
decide that the mechanism established by the exporting country is not sufficient according to it s 
own appropriate level of protection. Brazil points out that if this is the case, a risk assessment to 
provide scientific justification must be elaborated to justify the SPS measure.1258 
7.6.2.2.3   Norway  
7.917.   Norway argues that in examining the claims relating to regionali zation, the Panel should 
first assess whether Russia properly has recognized the concepts of pest - or disease -free areas 
and areas of low pest or disease prevalence, and whether any determination of such areas is 
based on relevant factors, including geogra phy, ecosystems, epidemiological surveillance, and the 
effectiveness of sanitary and phytosanitary control. Second, the panel should assess whether 
Russia has ensured that the measures at issue in this case are adapted to the SPS characteristics 
of the aff ected area, as set out in Article 6.1. According to the second sentence of this provision, it 
should be considered whether Russia in its assessment of the SPS characteristics of a region has 
taken into account relevant factors, such as the level of prevale nce of African Swine Fever, the 
existence of eradication and control programmes, and appropriate criteria or guidelines developed 
by the relevant international organizations.  
7.918.   Norway emphasized that that a finding that the respondent party has not recognize d the 
concepts of pest - or disease -free areas and areas of low pest or disease prevalence, will lead to a 
finding that this party has not ensured that its measures are adapted to the SPS characteristics of 
the those areas pursuant to the first sentence of Article 6.1, and that conversely, where there is a 
finding that the respondent party has recognised these concepts, a consideration must be 
undertaken, of whether this party has ensured that its measures are adapted to the 
SPS characteristics of the affect ed areas and whether it took into account relevant factors when 
assessing the SPS characteristics of a region, consistent with Article 6.1.1259 
7.6.2.2.4   United States  
7.919.   The United States argues that the provisions of Article 6 contain separate but inter -related 
obligati ons that must be read together in context. The United States emphasizes that while the 
                                               
1255 Australia's third -party submission, para. 20.  
1256 Brazil's third -party submission, para. 4.  
1257 Brazil's third -party submission, para. 5.  
1258 Brazil's third -party submission, paras. 7 -9. 
1259 Norway's third -party submission, paras. 27 -30. WT/DS475/R  
 
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  first sentence of Article 6.1 of the SPS Agreement imposes an obligation with respect to measures, 
the first sentence of Article 6.2 requires recognition of concepts, i. e. pest - or disease -free areas 
and areas of low pest or disease prevalence.1260 
7.920.   The United States highlights that neither the obligations in the first sentence of Article 
6.2 of the SPS Agre ement, nor those in Article 6.1, arise only following a request under  Article 
6.3 to recognize a specific area as a pest - or disease -free area or area of low pest or disease 
prevalence.1261 
7.6.2.3   Analysis by the Panel  
7.6.2.3.1   Introduction  
7.921.   The issues before the Panel are whether Russia's bans on the imports of the products at 
issue from Esto nia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland are consistent with Articles 6.1 and 6.2 of the 
SPS Agreement, and whether the European Union has satisfied the requirements of Article 6.3 of 
the SPS Agreement.  
7.922.   In section 7.5.3.2  above, we h ave examined the text of Articles 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3 of the 
SPS Agreement, the relationship between these provisions, the order in which to analyse them, 
and the legal test corresponding to each of these provisions. We then examined the EU -wide ban 
in light  of the guidance identified in those sections. To avoid unnecessary repetition, we will not 
replicate the general guidance on which we will base our assessment of the bans on the imports of 
the products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland.  Rather, we will include cross -
references to the relevant sections and findings, when necessary.  
7.923.   We recall that as explained i n paragraph 7.365  above that it may be difficult for any 
exporting country to seek recognition of a d isease -free area in the absence of a regulatory scheme 
in the importing country that permits the recognition of such a concept.  Similar to the analytical 
process the Panel undertook in that section of the report , the Panel will first examine  whether 
Russia  recognizes the concept of disease -free areas within the meaning of Article 6.2 of the 
SPS Agreement. Should we find that Russia recognizes such a concept, we will proceed to examine 
whether the European Union provided the necessary evidence thereof in ord er to objectively 
demonstrate to Russia that such areas are, and are likely to remain, pest - or disease -free in 
accordance with Article 6.3. Informed by the Panel's findings on this issue, we will continue by 
considering whether Russia complied with the ob ligation in Article 6.1 to ensure the adaptation of 
its measures to the SPS characteristics of the area from which the products originated and to 
which they are destined . 
7.6.2.3.2   Whether Russia recognizes the concept of pest – or disease -free areas and 
areas of low  pest or disease prevalence pursuant to the first sentence of Article 6.2  
7.924.   In section 7.5.2.3.4  above we examined this question in respect of the EU -wide ban. Our 
reasoning in that section is grounded on the recognition of the concepts foreseen in the first 
sentence of Article 6.2 of the SPS Agreement. As part of our analysis, we addressed the European 
Union's argument that the recognition of such concepts may not be done in the abstract, but 
rather that it requires such recogni tion in the application of the challenged SPS measure.  
7.925.   The result of our analysis led us to find that Russia recognizes the concepts mentioned in 
Article 6.2 in respect of ASF, and as a consequence the EU -wide ban is not inconsistent with 
Russia's obligat ions under Article 6.2 of the SPS Agreement. We consider that such finding is 
equally applicable with respect to  the bans on the imports of the products at issue from Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. We therefore find that such measures are not inco nsistent with 
Russia's obligations under Article 6.2 of the SPS Agreement.  
                                               
1260 United States' third -party submission, paras. 3 -6. 
1261 United States' third -party submission, paras. 7 -11. WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.926.   Following this finding we turn to examine the European Union's compliance with the 
provisions of Article 6.3 in order to have findings that will inform our analysis of Russia's 
obligations under Article 6.1.  
7.6.2.3.3   Whether the European Union objectively demonstrated that there are disease -
free areas or areas of low disease prevalence within the territory of Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, and Poland, pursuant to Article 6.3 of the SPS Agreemen t 
7.6.2.3.3.1   Introduction  
7.927.   The European Union argues that since the detection of ASF in wild boar in Lithuania in 
January 2014 the European Union has provided Russia information which it considers as beyond 
what is necessary for objectively demonstrating that disease -free areas or areas of low disease 
prevalence are , and are likely to remain , disease -free areas or areas of low disease prevalence, 
respectively.1262 The European Union contends that it has provided in a timely manner all the 
necessary information with respec t to its ASF regionalization measures in Lithuania, Poland, Latvia 
and Estonia, to objectively demonstrate to Russia that the rest of these EU member States and the 
rest of the European Union, except Sardinia, are and are likely to remain disease -free areas; and 
that reasonable access has been given to Russia for inspection, testing and other relevant 
procedures. The European Union asserts that Russia failed to conclude its recognition process 
without undue delays, in violation of its obligations under Arti cle 6 of the SPS Agreement.1263 
7.928.   The European Union opines that under Article 6.3 of the SPS Agreement, an importing 
Member is under no obligation to automatically accept a regionalization proposal from the 
exporting Member. However, its decision must take int o account objective factors such as those 
enunciated in the second sentence of Article 6.2 of the SPS Agreement: geography, ecosystems, 
epidemiological surveillance and the effectiveness of sanitary controls, and that in case of 
disagreement between the im porting and the exporting Members, the exporting Member can refer 
the dispute to the WTO adjudicating bodies. According to the European Union, a  Panel presented 
with such a case has the duty to make an objective assessment of the matter before it according  
to Article 11 of the DSU.1264 
7.929.   Russia argues that the European Union has failed to objectively demonstrate to Russia that 
the alleged ASF -free areas in the four affected EU m ember States " are, and are likely to remain, 
pest- or disease -free areas", in accord ance with Article 6.3 of the SPS Agreement.1265 In Russia's 
view, the European Union has failed to effectively establish ASF containment zones in accordance 
with the OIE guidelines and as such, the European Union has failed to demonstrate that ASF-free 
region s "are and are likely to remain, pest - or disease -free areas," and the entirety of the four 
affected EU m ember States should be considered ASF -infected.1266 Russia argues that the 
European Union failed to provide timely, comprehensive and accurate information  relevant for 
assessing its zones and its ASF -control measures, in a manner inconsistent with Article 6.3 of the 
SPS Agreement and Terrestrial Code Article 5.3.7.  Russia also indicates that the European Union's 
legal framework is relevant as a theoretical matter and is similar to Russia's legislation, however, it 
does not contain information about the effectiveness or the extent to which the ASF control 
measures described therein have been implemented.1267 Furthermore, the European Union 
withheld national erad ication plans from Russia, until March 2015 and May 2015 despite 
acknowledging that these reports contain ed highly relevant information.1268 
7.6.2.3.3.2   Legal test  
7.930.   In section 7.5.2.3.5.2  above we explained the legal test applicable to our exa mination of 
the European Union's claims under A rticle 6.3 of the SPS Agreement. As explained below, we will 
follow the same legal test in our examination of the European Union's claims under Article 6.3 in 
                                               
1262 European Union's first written submission, paras. 218 and 219 - 232. 
1263 European Union's first written submission, para. 236.  
1264 European Union' s response to Panel question No. 112, paras. 219 -220. 
1265 Russia's first written submission, para. 236.  
1266 Russia's first written submission, para. 237.  
1267 Russia's comments to the European Union's response to Panel question No. 322, para. 193.  
1268 See Russia's second written submission, paras. 58 -77. WT/DS475/R  
 
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  respect of the bans on the imports of the products  at issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and 
Poland. We recall that this examination referred to the assessment  of what is the necessary 
evidence to objectively demonstrate both the existence of ASF -free areas and that those  areas are 
likely to remain so . In our view, the differences in the ASF situation in each of the four affected 
EU member States, as well as in the type of information that the European Union provided in 
respect of each of the affected EU member States, justify that we examine the infor mation 
provided by the European Union to Russia separately  in respect of each of the four affected 
EU member States. We recall that some of the categories of information are common to the four 
affected EU member States. Therefore, we will address the categ ories of common information 
where relevant  and indicate when we will pursue our assessment specific to  each of the four  
EU member State s.  
7.6.2.3.3.3   Information provided by the European Union to Russia from January 2014  
7.931.   In section 7.5.2.3 .5.3 above we provide a detailed account of the information, according to 
what is on record, which the European Union provided to Russia from January 2014. This 
information, together with other relevant exhibits on record, is the basis for the assessment that 
we undertake in respect of whether the European Union provided to Russia the necessary evidence 
to objectively demonstrate that there are areas within Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, and Poland free 
of ASF and likely to remain so. In the next section we u ndertake such an examination.  
7.6.2.3.3.4   Panel's assessment of the evidence provided by the European Union to 
Russia  
Introduction  
7.932.   In paragraph 7.395  above, we indicated that among the "necessary evidence" required to 
"objectively demonst rate" the disease status in a particular area, pursuant to Article 6.3 of the 
SPS Agreement, a Member should provide evidence of  (i) geography; (ii) ecosystems; (iii) 
epidemiological surveillance; (iv) effectiveness of sanitary or phytosanitary controls; ( v) level of 
prevalence of specific diseases or pests; (vi) existence of eradication or control programmes; and 
(vii) information corresponding to appropriate criteria or guidelines developed by the relevant 
international organizations. We also noted that t his is an illustrative list, and that these elements 
are not cumulative. Furthermore, some of these elements are interrelated. For example, 
geography may not be a relevant factor in the spread of all pests or diseases, and control and 
eradication programme s are relevant only when a particular disease is known to exist within an 
area. At the same time, the level of prevalence of a specific disease can only be established 
through effective surveillance programmes.  
7.933.   We recall that the preceding categories and t he amount of evidence that a Member should 
present in support of the disease status of a particular area needs to be determined on a case -by-
case basis. Therefore, before examining to what extent the European Union provided evidence in 
respect of each of t hese categories, we will review certain aspects relevant to this dispute that will 
enable us to identify in a manner more specific to this dispute the clusters of information the 
European Union should have provided  to Russia in order to objectively demonst rate that there are 
areas within its territory free of ASF and likely to remain so.  
7.934.   A particularly relevant aspect of what categories of evidence are germane to a particular 
dispute has to do with the nature of the disease and the type of characteristics that an exporting 
Member is claiming to prevail within an area of its territory. The European Union claims that it has 
objectively demonstrated that an area within its territory is free of ASF and is likely to remain 
so.1269 In section 7.5.2.3.5.4  we analysed the information that the European Union provided in 
support of the absence of ASF in those areas of the European Union outside Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, and Poland (those EU member States affected with ASF outbreaks througho ut 2014). In 
this section we will focus our examination on the alleged ASF-free character of certain areas within 
those EU member States affected with ASF.  
                                               
1269 European Union's opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, paras. 46 -54. WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.935.   The difference in approach is primarily based on the distinct geographic scope of 
application of the  challenged measures. In our view, the EU -wide ban, following the imposition of 
the ban on the imports of the products at issue from Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia and Poland, is not 
applicable to the imports of the products  at issue  from those territories. In  this vein, we consider 
that the most appropriate analytical approach in considering the situation as at 11 September 
2014, is to separately examine the "necessary evidence" that the European Union should  have 
submit ted to Russia to "objectively demonstrat e" that there are areas within the four affected 
EU member States that are disease -free and likely to remain so. To do this, we will take into 
account that among the SPS characteristics of certain parts in  the countries where the areas under 
examination ar e located is the presence of ASF.   
7.936.   We recall that according to the definition of pest - or disease -free area in paragraph 6 o f 
Annex A of the SPS Agreement  
a pest - or disease -free area may surround, be surround ed by, or be adjacent to an 
area – whether wit hin part of a country or in a geographic region which includes parts 
of all of several countries – in which a specific pest or disease is known to occur but is 
subject to regional control measures such as the establishment of protection, 
surveillance and b uffer zones which will confine or eradicate the pest or disease  in 
question.  
7.937.   We will keep in mind in pursuing our examination of  whether  the European Union provided 
to Russia the necessary evidence to objectively demonstrate the  existence of ASF -free area s within 
each of the affected EU member States and that those areas are likely to remain ASF -free. In 
particular, we note that pursuant to this definition of a disease -free area, the presence of a disease 
in the territory of a country does not imply the im possibility of establishing disease free areas that 
surround, are surrounded by, or are adjacent to an area in which a specific disease is known to 
occur but is subject to control measures.  
7.938.   In paragraph 7.404  above, we describe d the type of evidence that the European Union 
should provide to Russia in respect of demonstrating two aspects of the ASF -status of areas within 
its territory. The first type of evidence refers to those areas being ASF -free. The second refers to 
the likel ihood of those areas remaining free of ASF.  We find guidance in those observations to 
engage in our assessment of what is the necessary evidence  the European Union should have 
provided to Russia to objectively demonstrate the existence of ASF-free areas, w hich are likely to 
remain so, within the territories of Estonia,  Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland.  
7.939.   Based on the foregoing, we consider that the European Union should have provided to 
Russia necessary evidence in respect of  (i) geography; (ii) epidemiological surveillance of ASF; 
(iii) the effectiveness of sanitary or phytosanitary controls in respect of ASF; (iv) regarding 
ecosystems, in particular the presence of ASF in wildlife and the patter ns of behavioural ecology in 
wildlife; (v) the level of prevalence of ASF; and (vi) the existence of eradication or control 
programmes. Furthermore, the information provided by the European Union to Russia in respect of 
these categories should objectively demonstrate that there are ASF -free areas within each of the 
four a ffected EU member States . 
7.940.   In paragraph s 7.412  and 7.413  above we identified the categories of necessary evidence 
that the European Union should have provided to Russia to objectively demonstrate tha t ASF -free 
areas are likely to remain so. These categories include  the necessary evidence in respect of the 
effectiveness of its control measures on ASF (including information on their effectiveness in the 
real world). For this purpose, we will address the  information provided on: (i)  the surveillance 
programme; (ii) diagnostic analysis; (iii) measures for early detection and response , including 
movement control ; and (iv)  eradication of the disease.  
7.941.   We are mindful of the difference in time in respect of the  occurrence of ASF outbreaks in 
the four affected EU member States. We recall that the first outbreak in Lithuania was confirmed  
on 24  January  20141270, the first outbreak in Poland was confirmed  on 17 February  20141271, the 
                                               
1270 Communication of 24 January 2014: African swine fever (ASF) in two wild boars in Lithuania, in 
Salcininkai and Varena Regions,  at the border with Belarus  (Exhibit EU -132). See also ASF cases in the 
 WT/DS475/R  
 
- 250 - 
 
  first outbreak in Latvia  was confirme d on 26 June 20141272, and the first outbreak in Estonia was 
confirmed  on 8 September  2014.1273 We also recall our observation in respect of our analysis of 
the European Union's obligation under Article 6.3 with respect to the EU -wide ban, that we would 
examine the European Union's obligation in the time -frame between the adoption of the EU -wide 
ban and the cut -off date of 11 September 2014.1274 We have examined each measure individually. 
Moreover, in the particular circumstances of this case and in light of the tem poral considerations 
we have outlined above1275, we have decided to undertake a composite and progressive 
examination of the bans on the imports of the products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
and Poland. Where relevant, we will refer to particular information pertaining to each one of the 
four affected EU member States.  
Assessment of common evidentiary elements regarding the ASF -free areas within 
the four affected EU member States  
7.942.   The first type of information relates to geography. In our view, this  category includes 
information relative to the place where the outbreaks of ASF have occurred, as well as to any 
other relevant geographic features of the territories which  are claimed to be free of ASF.  
7.943.   According to the evidence on record, between 24 Janu ary 2014 and 27 June 2014, the 
European Union sent Russia's Permanent Mission in Brussels communications reporting the 
occurrence of new ASF outbreaks in the affected EU member States.1276 Attached to those 
communications, the European Union usually sent the reports received from the national 
veterinary authorities of the respective EU member State. Most of those reports included detailed 
geographic information in respect of the sit e where the outbreaks occurred.  
7.944.   In addition, the European Union informed Russia 's Permanent Mission in Brussels of the 
Commission Implementing Decisions that were adopted to adjust the existing protection and 
surveillance zones to the geographical scope of the new outbreaks that occurred within each of the 
four affected EU member Sta tes.1277  
7.945.   Attached to the letter of 7 February 2014, the European Union provided Russia with the 
2010 EFSA scientific opinion on ASF. This document contains information relevant to 
understanding the geographic situation of the four affected EU member States.1278 
7.946.   Moreover, as we have already explained1279, the veterinary authorities in the EU member 
States constantly report the occurrence of any outbreak to the OIE in order for such information to 
be included in the weekly follow up reports of the OIE WAHIS database.  The information published 
                                                                                                                                               
European Union notified  to the OIE (Exhibit EU -118) and Data from OIE WAHIS  Interface, as of 31 August 
2015 (Exhibit RUS -296 revised).  
1271 Communication of 17 February 2014: African swin e fever (ASF) confirmed in Poland in a wild boar 
found 900 meters from the border with Belarus (Exhibit EU -136). See also ASF cases in the European Union 
notified  to the OIE (Exhibit EU -118) and Data from OIE WAHIS  Interface, as of 31 August  2015 (Exhibit 
RUS-296 revised). The report to the OIE indicates that the event started on 13 February 2014 and was 
confirmed on 17  February 2014. See Follow -up report No.6, Reference OIE: 15045, Report Date: 31/03/2014, 
Country: Poland (Exhibit EU -152).  
1272 Communication of 26 June 2014: African swine fever (ASF) detection in Latvia (Exhibit EU -147). See 
also ASF cases in the European Union notified  to the OIE (Exhibit EU -118) and Data from OIE WAHIS  Interface, 
as of 31 August  2015 (Exhibit RUS -296 revised). The report to the OIE indicates the event started on 25 June 
2014 and was confirmed on 26 June 2014. See Follow -up report No.34, Reference OIE: 17579, Report Date: 
22/04/2015, Country: Latvia  (Exhibit EU -153).  
1273 See also ASF cases in the European Union notified to the O IE (Exhibit EU -118) and Data from OIE 
WAHIS  Interface, as of 31 August  2015 (Exhibit RUS -296 revised). The report to the OIE indicates the event 
started on 2 September 2014 and was confirmed on 8 September 2014.  See Follow -up report No.43, 
Reference OIE :  17604, Report Date: 28/04/2015, Country: Estonia  (Exhibit EU -155).  
1274 See section 7.3.6  above.  
1275 See section 7.3.6  above.  
1276 See Exhibits EU -132, EU -133, EU -134, EU -135, EU -136, EU -137, EU -138, EU -139, EU -140, EU -141, 
EU-142, RUS -30, EU -143, EU -144, EU -145, EU -146, EU -147, EU -148, EU -206, EU -186, EU -207, EU -208, EU -
209, EU -210, EU -187, RUS -326, RUS -327, RUS -328, EU -177, EU -211, and EU -212.     
1277 See Exhibits EU -33-EU-44. See also Appendix 1 below for  a description of other communications.  
1278 2010 EFSA Scientific Opinion (Exhibit EU -24). 
1279 See para. 7.425  above . WT/DS475/R  
 
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  in this database includes information on the place where the reported outbreaks have occurred, as 
well as maps on the location of these sites.1280 
7.947.   The European Union also provided to the Panel and to Russia, as an exhibit to its fir st 
written submission, a compilation of maps indicating the changes in the ASF situation in the 
European Union from 2007 to 2014.1281 Furthermore, some of the other pieces of evidence 
referred to below provide relevant information on the geographic si tuation in the four affected 
EU member States.1282  
7.948.   In our view, the European Union provided ample evidence in respect of the geographic 
situation of the disease  in each of the four affected EU member States . This information included 
constant updates that provided a n understanding of the situation on the ground as it was evolving.  
7.949.   We have already examined evidence provided by the European Union to Russia in respect 
of the second category  of information, that is, epidemiological surveillance of ASF. Such 
information r efers to  (i) the legal framework contained in Articles 3 and 18 of Council Directive 
2002/60/EC; (ii) the European Union's ASF diagnostics manual (contained Commission Decision 
2003/422/EC); (iii) an indication of the reliability of the European Union's no tifications through the 
WAHIS information system to verify the ASF situation in the EU member States at any given point 
in time; (iv) surveillance programmes approved for 2013 for Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and 
Poland ; and (v)  an indication of the type of  active surveillance applied in the designated risk areas 
in 2013 covering the four affected EU member States.1283 After examining this evidence, we 
concluded that the explanations and information provided by the European  Union , sufficiently 
demonstrate that the European Union has had in place appropriate ASF monitoring and 
surveillance mechanisms. To further reinforce this conclusion, we recall that the European Union 
complemented the information on the monitoring investigations conducted in the four affected  
EU member States throughout 2014, through its letters to FSVPS 6 March 20141284, 
13 March  20141285 and 13 June 2014.1286 
7.950.   The third category  of evidence concerns the effectiveness of sanitary or phytosanitary 
controls in respect of ASF. Regarding this cluster of in formation we have already referred to the 
measures that the European Union adopted to prevent the introduction of ASF both in the affected 
and the non -affected EU member States.1287 Such measures include identification of pigs and 
oversight of their movement (pursuant to Directive 2008/71/EC); regulations applicable to feeding 
of animal products to pigs (including the prohibition of swill feeding); limitations on intra -EU trade 
in live pigs; measures on the introduction into the European Union of personal cons ignments of 
animal products; surveillance and inspection of food hygiene, including pig and wild boar products; 
specific rules upon occurrence of ASF in EU member States (as provided in Council Directive 
2002/60/EC); and measures to mitigate the risk of in troduction of ASF from neighbouring 
countries. We also noted that in addition to these measures, the European Union provided 
information in respect of contingency plans for infectious diseases and audits thereof.1288 Finally, 
we also noted that the European U nion has been keen to clarify and address situations that have 
caused Russia concern in respect of the prevention of ASF.1289 
                                               
1280 See Exhibits EU -152-156. 
1281 African Swine Fever from 2007 to 2014, compilation by the European Commission of maps from OIE 
(http://ec.europa.eu/food/animal/diseases/docs/presentation_asf_en.pdf)  (Exhibit EU -21). 
1282 See, e.g. the eradication plans for Estonia ( Exhibit EU -117), Latvia  (Exhibit EU -116), Lithuania 
(Exhibit EU -101) and Poland ( Exhibit EU -102), which were  provide d to Russia in the course of the first months 
of 2015.  
1283 See para s. 7.430 -7.435  above.  
1284 European Union's  letter to Russia of 6 March 2014, ARES(2014)601346, 
SANCO/G7/PD/mh/(2014) 630598  (Exhibit EU -86). 
1285 European Union's letter to Russia of 13 March 2014, ARES(2014)709435, 
SANCO/G7/PD/mh(2014)745829  (Exhibit EU -91) 
1286 European Union's letter to Russia of 13 J une 2014, ARES(2014)1941949, 
SANCO/G7/PD/mh(2014)2038505  (Exhibit EU -94). 
1287 See paras. 7.422 -7.425  above . 
1288 See para.  7.442  above.  
1289 See para . 7.443  above . WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.951.   In addition to such information, the European Union provided to Russia copies of the 
contingency plans for Estonia1290, Latvia1291, Lithuan ia1292, and Poland1293 through the letter of 
21 May 2014.1294 Russia objects to the usefulness of these plans, as Russia argues that they are 
not exclusively applicable to ASF but to other infectious diseases as well, and that they are not 
updated.1295 Moreover, Russi a considers the substance of the control measures described in the 
contingency plans inadequate, as they fail to make reference to a wild boar reduction strategy and 
a backyard farm elimination/reduction strategy.1296 Russia also objects to the usefulness of these 
plans as they do not constitute evidence of implementation of the measures in a timely, complete, 
and effective manner in the event of an ASF outbreak.1297 In this regard, Russia points to the 
European Union's own audit reports regarding countries' prep aredness to implement contingency 
plans, which raise significant doubts about the veterinary services' preparedness and capacity to 
implement the measures set out in the contingency plans.1298 Despite this objection, in our view, 
these documents provide a cle ar indication of the measures  that would  be applied  in each of these 
four affected EU  member  States in case of an outbreak of ASF. Furthermore, the European Union 
provided information, in respect of Lithuania, in support of the legal orders at the national  level 
requiring the application of those measures.1299 Although this could be useful to further support 
the effectiveness of the control measures in Estonia, Latvia, and Poland, we do not consider 
provision of similar information for these three EU member St ates as essential in light of the  
general exchange of informatio n in this respect.  
7.952.   Russia challenges the effectiveness of the control measures that the European Union has in 
place. Russia's main argument is that because of the continued ASF outbreaks  and the geographic 
spread of these outbreaks  in the territory of the four affected EU member States , the continuous 
redrawing of the contours of the infected zones and the numerous outbreaks occurring outside the 
infected zones,  the European Union's control mea sures are ineffective.1300 Russia examines these 
measures from the comments that its experts provided throughout 2014 on their scepticism in 
respect of the positive outcomes that the European Union measures might achieve. In Russia's 
view, the European Union system is flawed.1301 
7.953.   In our view, the experts consulted by the Panel provided a valuable explanation as to the 
manner in which it would be best to understand the current situation in the 
eastern  European  region. The experts noted that controlling and eradica ting ASF is very difficult 
because of its highly contagious and virulent nature , and its presence in wild boar . In that context, 
the experts indicated that ASF is very hard to control.1302 In these circumstances, it is hard for us 
to assess the effectiveness of the measures exclusively based on the extent of the spread of the 
disease following the initial outbreaks. Given that this dispute concerns measures imposed by 
Russia in 2014, i t does not seem to be appropriate to rely solely on an examination made with  the 
benefit of hindsight. Thus, we consider and take into account the structure and design of the 
control measures, together with the rest of the relevant necessary evidence, including the level of 
prevalence of the disease, in order to examine the Europe an Union's compliance with its obligation 
under Article 6.3.  We assi gn particular importance to these  considerations in the context of our 
assessment of whether the European Union provided to Russia the necessary evidence to 
                                               
1290 Code of Conduct for Control of African Swine Fever of Estonia, 11 April 2013  (Exhibit EU -77). 
1291 Plan for  Combating Very Dangerous Infectious Animal Diseases of the Republic of Latvia, 28 
February 2013  (Exhibit EU -76). 
1292 Contingency Plan for Classical Swine Fever (CSF) and African Swine Fever (ASF) of Lithuania, 30 
December 2011  (Exhibit EU -74). 
1293 Polish Veterinary African Swine Fever Con tingency Plan, January 2014  (Exhibit EU -75). 
1294 European Union's letter to Russia of 21 May 2014, ARES(2 014)1658269, 
SANCO/G6/AB(2014)1782253  (Exhibit EU -92). 
1295 See Russia's comments to the European Union's response to Panel question No. 322, para. 198.  
1296 See Russia's response to Panel question No. 322, paras. 293 -298. 
1297 Russia's responses to Panel question No. 322, para. 292.  
1298 Russia's responses to Panel question No. 322, paras. 299 -310. 
1299 Order on Measures to Control African Swine Fever No B1 -49 of 24 January 2014  (Exhibit EU -71) and 
Order on the Slaughter of Pigs as Part of the Measures to Prevent the Spr ead of African Swine Fever, 30 
January 2014, No B1 -60 (Exhibit EU-72). 
1300 Russia's opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, paras. 8 -29. 
1301 Russia's response to Panel question No. 279, para. 137.  
1302 Professor  Penrith , Transcript para. 1.195 ; Dr Brückner , Transcript, para. 1.196 ; Dr Thomson , 
Transcript, para. 1.198; and Dr Thiermann , Transcript, para. 1.199 . WT/DS475/R  
 
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  objectively demonstrate that AS F-free areas within each of the four affected EU member States  
are likely to remain ASF -free. 
7.954.   The next type of evidence that we consider necessary for the European Union to 
objectively demonstrate that certain areas in the four affected EU member States ar e ASF-free, 
concerns  the relevant ecosystems. The first aspect that we will examine in this respect is whether 
there is knowledge of ASF not being established in wildlife in the areas claimed to be free of ASF.  
7.955.   The evidence on record indicates that ASF ou tbreaks in the four affected 
EU member  States have occurred in wild boars.1303 In our view, this is a risk factor that needs to 
be considered in light of the information we have examined in respect of wild boar behavioural 
ecology. In this regard, we noted th at the 2010 EFSA scientific opinion on ASF indicated that"[w]ild 
boar do not migrate, at least according to the classic definition of migration. Some small seasonal 
movements are registered but always inside the usual individual home range that varies from  20-
100 km2. Infections can spread between larger regions, however, where there is continuity in the 
geographical distribution of the wild boar, as observed for CSF (EFSA, 2009c). In this respect, 
Ukraine  (Crimea), Poland and Romania may be at risk due to the continuous distribution and the 
high density of wild boar. Possible corridors may also exist from the infected Russian areas into 
Lithuania or Latvia. Where wild boar are absent or natural/artificial barriers prevent direct contact 
between infected and  susceptible populations, infections usually fade out spontaneously (Artois et 
al., 2002); for ASF, this pattern has been observed in Sardinia only (Firinu and Scarano, 
1988)."1304  This was further confirmed through the explanation provided in the attach ment to the 
letter sent by DG SANCO to FSVPS on 13 June 2014, where the European Union explained the 
criteria used to identify the borders of the infected/free/high risks zones in the territories of Poland 
and Lithuania.1305 The Panel's experts confirmed the scie ntific merit of this fact.1306  
7.956.   Another important category  of information  to consider  relates to the prevalence of the 
disease. The European Union has provided almost daily information to Russia in respect of every 
new ASF outbreak in the four affected EU mem ber States. Whenever such information has not 
been made directly available, it was provided through the information reports done by each 
EU member State to the OIE to be published through the WAHIS database. This information, 
together with the estimates of  the wild boar population in the four affected EU member States 
provided by the European Union to Russia, would allow Russia to know the level of prevalence of 
ASF in the territory of the four affected EU member States.1307  
7.957.   The final type of information that  we will examine relates to the existence of eradication or 
control programmes for ASF. According to the overarching European Union's legal framework on 
ASF, following an ASF outbreak EU member States should ensure that eradication and control 
programmes a re put in place. However, as explained below, it was not until March and May 2015 
that the European Union provided to Russia the approved ASF eradication programmes for Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. Russia acknowledged in the course of these proc eedings, such 
programmes provided valuable information in order to substantiate a claim that certain areas are 
ASF-free, and likely to remain so.1308 Russia also argues that the type of information set out in 
Lithuania's , Poland's, Latvia's, and Estonia's  eradication plan s was not previously provided by the 
European Union to Russia, specifically with respect to the borders of Lithuania's initial zones.1309 
7.958.   Article 16 of Council Directive 2002/60/EC1310 requires EU member States to submit to the 
Commission, within 90  days of the confirmation of a primary case of ASF in wild boar, a written 
plan of measures taken in order to eradicate African swine fever in wild boar. The plan must 
contain a description of the measures taken to eradicate the disease in wild boar in the  infected 
area, and the measures applied on the pig holdings in the above -mentioned infected area. 
According to Article 16, the EU Commission shall then examine the plan in order to determine 
                                               
1303 Pig Progress, "New ASF outbreak in Belgorod Oblast, Russia", 11 June 2014  (RUS-118). 
1304 2010 EFSA Scientific Opinion (Exhibit EU -24), p.29  
1305 European Union's letter to Russia of 13 June 2014, ARES(2014)1941949, 
SANCO/G7/PD/mh(2014)2038505  (Exhibit EU -94), p. 4. 
1306 See fn 636 above.  
1307 See fn 588 above.  
1308 Russia's comments to the European  Union's response to Panel question No. 236, para. 59 -60. 
1309 Russia's second written submission, para. 67.  
1310 Council Directive  of 27 June 2002, 2002/60/EC  (Exhibit EU -31). WT/DS475/R  
 
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  whether it permits the desired objectives to be attained. The pl an, if necessary with amendments, 
shall be approved in accordance with the accelerated regulatory procedure contained in 
Article  24(2) of Council Directive 2002/60/EC.  
7.959.   In response to the Panel's questions, the European Union indicated that Lithuania initia lly 
submitted its eradication plan to the European Commission on 22 April 2014; Poland on 
14 May 2014; Latvia on 26 September 2014, and Estonia on 12 December 2014.1311 The 
European  Commission formally approved the submitted plans by Decision 2014/442 on 
7 July 2014 (Lithuania and Poland)1312 and by Decision 2015/570 on 7 April 2015 (Estonia and 
Latvia)1313. Poland submitted a modification of the plan that was accepted formally by means of a 
letter on 24  November  2014.1314 
7.960.   The Panel notes with some bewilderment, howeve r, that the European Union sent the 
Polish and Lithuanian eradication plans to Russia only on 24 March 20151315; the Estonian and 
Latvian plans were provided to Russia  in the context to the European Union's answers to the 
Panel's questions  on 19  May 2015 .1316 The European Union provides no explanation for the delay in 
sending the Lithuanian and Polish plans, and explains that the Estonian and Latvian plans were not 
sent at that time (March 2015) as they were not yet formally approved.1317 No explanation was 
provided  either for the delays in the approval of the various eradication plans, especially for that 
submitted by Latvia.  
7.961.   The Panel is cognizant of the fact that the development of an eradication plan, while 
required by the European Union legislation, is not nece ssarily required in order to recognize an 
area as free of a pest - or disease and likely to remain so. Article  6.1 refers, inter alia , to the 
existence of eradication or control programmes, and we are aware that many animal diseases, 
especially those affect ing wildlife may be impossible to fully eradicate. However, the existence of 
effective control programmes should nonetheless make it possible to establish disease -free areas.  
7.962.   In the present case, as eradication plans were indeed dev eloped for the four affe cted 
EU member States, the Panel has examined each of these plans to determine to what extent they 
provide evidence that was not previously made available to Russia and that would have been 
necessary for Russia to assess whether the European Union could de monstrate that areas within 
each one of these four EU member States were free of ASF.  The result of this examination , as 
explained in detail below with respect to each affected EU member State,  is that although these 
eradication plans provided the informat ion in a more organized and readily accessible manner, 
they generally  do not include information which had not yet been provided by the European Union 
to Russia.  
7.963.   Based on the foregoing, we consider that the European Union provided to Russia the 
necessary evidence to objectively demonstrate that, at any given point in time, there were 
ASF-free areas within each of the four affected EU member States.  
7.964.   However, it is more difficult for the Panel to determine whether the information provided 
by the European Uni on was sufficient to objectively demonstrate that the disease -free areas within 
each of the four affected EU member States were "likely to remain"  so. As we have indicated 
above1318, our assessment of this matter will be focused on whether in addition to the necessary 
evidence to objectively demonstrate that there are ASF -free areas within each of the affected 
EU member States, the European Union provided to Russia the necessary  evidence in respect of 
the effectiveness of its control measures.  
                                               
1311 European Union's response to Panel question No. 19.  
1312 Exhibits  EU-50, EU -101 and EU -102. 
1313 Exhibits  EU-103, EU -116 and EU -117. 
1314 Letter of 4 November 2014, Ref. Ares(2014)3660850  (Exhibit EU -129). 
1315 Letter of 24 March 2015 from the EU to Russia, Ref. Ares(2015)1284836  (RUS-154).  See also 
Exhibits  RUS-167, EU-101, and EU -102. 
1316 Eradicatio n plan for African swine fever in wild boar in Latvia  (Exhibit EU -116) and Plan for the 
eradication of African swine fever from feral pig population in Estonia (Exhibit EU -117).  
1317 See European Union's response to Panel question No. 19.  
1318 See paras. 7.939 - 7.941  above.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.965.   We are cognizant  that we must make our ruling on the basis of the information that the 
European Union had provided to Russia as at 11 September  2014. While both parties have 
provided information regarding subsequent cases  of ASF within the four affected 
EU member  States  until the second half of 2015, neither party could have known, in 
September  2014, what the situation would be almost one year later.  Moreover,  no previous Panel 
has dealt with a complaint brought during the course of an active outbreak of a highly contagiou s 
disease, at a time when the situation continued to evolve rapidly.  
7.966.   We have explained in our analysis of the temporal framework that the Panel needs to 
pursue, that we are entitled to weight the evidence that predates and postdates the establishment 
of the Panel.1319 Moreover, pursuant  to our duty to examine the totality of the evidence on record 
in order to make an objective assessment of the matter before us1320, as well as in the  light of  the 
importance of subseq uent events in the context of the present dispu te, we will examine the 
evidence on record that post -date the establishment of the Panel.  
7.967.   In our view, one of the largest challenges in the context of the ASF outbreaks within the 
four affected EU member States is the constantly shifting situation and freq uent expansion of the 
protection and surveillance zones.1321 The European Union has explained that this is not at all 
problematic because the ASF control system applied in the European Union is designed to 
continually adjust in order to be a step ahead of the  disease.1322 The European Union noted that 
whenever an outbreak occurred near to or within the buffer zone (which is ASF -free), the buffer 
zone was further enlarged to ensure a safety margin around the designated ASF -free zone. This 
view is to a certain exte nt endorsed by Dr Brückner who described the process of adaptation of 
measures to the spread of ASF.1323 In our view, the provision of information in this context should 
be detailed and efficient. Otherwise, it would be very difficult to consider that such ev idence 
amounts to w hat is necessary to objectively demonstrate that there are ASF -free areas, which are 
likely to remain so.  
7.968.   With th ese considerations in mind we turn to examine whether the European Union 
provided  to Russia the necessary evidence to objec tively demonstrate that  ASF-free areas within 
each of the four affected EU member States  are likely to remain ASF -free. We will examine this 
question in respect of each of the four affected EU member States, following  the chronological 
order of the outbrea ks (i.e. Lithuania, Poland, Latvia, and Estonia).  
                                               
1319 See para.  7.177  above  (referring to Appellate Body Report, EC – Selected Customs Matters , para. 
188.  
1320 See, e.g. Appellate Body Report s, EC – Hormones , para. 133; Japan – Apples , para.  221; EC – 
Asbestos , para.  161; Australia – Salmon , para.  266; EC – Bed Linen (Article  21.5 – India) , paras.  170, 177, 
and 181; EC – Sardines,  para. 299; EC – Tube or Pipe Fitti ngs, para. 125; Japan – Agricultural Products II , 
paras.  141 and 142; Korea – Dairy , para. 138; Korea – Alcoholic Beverages , paras.  161 and 162; US – Oil 
Country Tubu lar Goods Sunset Reviews , para. 313; US – Gambling , para. 363; EC – Selected Customs Matte rs, 
para. 258; US – Carbon Steel , para. 142; and Brazil – Retreaded Tyres , para. 185.  
1321 See Exhibits EU -119, EU -120, EU -121, EU -33 to EU -44, and RUS -297 (revised). We recall that 
Article 9 of Council Directive 2002/60/EC (Exhibit EU -31) refers to infected  zones as protection zones and to 
buffer zones as  surveillance zones, where there have been ASF outbreaks in domestic pig holdings. Article 15 
of Council Directive 2002/60/EC (Exhibit EU -31) provides for the establishment of disease control measures, 
including the establishment of protection and surveillance zones. Throughout the report we refer to: infected 
zones, as those areas where there have been ASF outbreaks and have been identified by the EU legislation as 
protection zones; to buffer zones, as those  areas referred to in the EU legislation as surveillance  zones; and to 
ASF-free areas, as those areas where ASF has not been reported, excluding both infected and buffer zones. We 
further note that after the issuance of Commission Implementing Decision 201 4/178/EU (Exhibit EU -37) on 27 
March 2014, the protection zones in the affected EU member States were divided into those concerning 
domestic pigs and wild boar (feral pigs) population, called Part III, and those concerning only wild boar 
population, called  Part II. Surveillance zones were identified as Part I. On 9 October 2014, Commission 
Implementing Decision 2014/709/EU (Exhibit EU -44) further distinguished the areas concerning domestic and 
wild boar population (Part III as per Commission Implementing De cision 2014/178/EU) between those areas 
where the epidemiological situation has been established and the disease has become endemic, now called Part 
IV, and those where the situation is still dynamic with uncertain evolution, now called Part III.  
1322 See Eur opean Union's response to Panel question No. 19.  
1323 Dr Brückner's response to Panel oral question No. 7,  Transcript,  para. 1.196 . WT/DS475/R  
 
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  Assessment of the evidence provided by the European Union to Russia to 
objectively demonstrate that ASF -free areas in Lithuania are likely to remain so  
7.969.   We now turn to examine the extent to which the Europea n Union provided to Russia the 
necessary evidence to objectively demonstrate that ASF -free areas in Lithuania were likely to 
remain so. As we noted in paragraph 7.940  above, the most important evidence for demonstrating 
that a disease -free area is likely to remain so relates to the effectiveness of control measures. We 
will thus consider the evidence provided in respect of the effectiveness of control measures applied 
in Lithuania. For this purpose, we will address the informati on provided on: (i)  the surveillance 
programme; (ii) diagnostic analysis; (iii) measures for early detection and response; and (iv) 
eradication of the disease. In undertaking this task, w e will address the information  provided by 
the European Union to Russ ia, including that  contained in the eradication plan of Lithuania. We will 
assess how much of the information contained therein had already been provided by the European 
Union to Russia. In pursuing this examination we will focus on reviewing the necessary  evidence 
that the European Union provided to Russia in respect of the effectiveness of the control measures 
in Lithuania. We will  also examine the outbreaks that took place in Lithuania after January 2014 
and until the establishment of the Panel on 22  July 2014, as well as the subsequent situation. Our 
examination of this matter is also informed by our analysis in respect of the categories of 
necessary evidence that we have examined  in the previous section  to determine the European 
Union's objective demons tration of the existence of ASF -free areas in the four affected EU member 
States.  
7.970.   Our examination of the documentation provided by the European Union to Russia shows 
that information regarding the initial cases and their location was provided to Russia on 
24 January  2014, the same day the disease was confirmed.1324 Russia was informed of the 
establishment of control zones, including the infected area, and the measures applied within each 
of these zones to control the spread of ASF, on 27 January 2014.1325 More in formation relating to 
the surveillance and sampling strategy, as well as to protective measures in Lithuania, was 
provided to Russia on 7  February 2014.1326 Reports on the emergency response measures of 
Lithuania were also provided in February and March 2014,  and the contingency plan as well as 
further information on surveillance, eradication and monitoring were provided in April, May and 
June 2014.1327 
7.971.   As we noted above1328, the ASF eradication plan for Lithuania1329 was approved in July 
2014, but provided to Russia o nly in March 2015. The Panel notes that the plan contains: 
                                               
1324 Communication of 24 January 2014: African swine fever (ASF) in two wild boars in Lithuania, in 
Salcininkai and Varena Regions , at the border with Belarus  (Exhibit EU -132). 
1325 Commission Implementing Decision 2014/43/EU of 27 January 2014 concerning certain interim 
protective measures relating to African swine fever in Lithuania, OJ L 26, p.44  (Exhibit EU -33), 
(Communication of 24  January 2014: African swine fever (ASF) in two wild boars in Lithuania, in Salcininkai 
and Varena Regions, at the border with Belarus (Exhibit EU-132) and Communication of 27 January 2014: 
African swine fever (ASF) in Lithuania. Interim protective measure s (Exhibit EU-133). 
1326 African swine fever in Lithuania, presentation by the State Food and Veterinary Service of Lithuania, 
6–7 February 2014 (Exhibit EU -66), Order on Measures to Control African Swine Fever No B1 -49 of 24 January 
2014 (Exhibit EU -71(b) ), and Order on the Slaughter of Pigs as Part of the Measures to Prevent the Spread of 
African Swine Fever, 30 January 2014, No B1 -60 (Exhibit EU -72).  
1327 Contingency Plan for Classical Swine Fever (CSF) and African Swine Fever (ASF) of Lithuania, 30 
December 2011 (Exhibit EU -74), Final Report of an Audit carried out in Lithuania from 27 February to 2 March 
2012 in order to Evaluate the Actions Taken during Recent Outbreaks of Classical Swine Fever and to Assess 
Contingency Planning of Epizootic Disease, SANCO 2012-6386;  (Exhibit EU -79), Annex, Response of the 
Competent Authorities of Lithuania to the recommendations of Report ref. DG(SANCO)/2012 -6386-MR of an 
audit carried out from 27 February to 02 March 2012, Updated Action plan received on 9 October 2012  (Exhibit 
EU-234), Response of the Competent Authorities of Lithuania to the recommendations of Report ref. 
DG(SANCO)/2012 -6386-MR of an audit carried out from 27 February to 02 March 2012 , Action plan received 
on 14 May 2012  (Exhibit EU -235), Veterinary Cont rol Programme on African swine fever early detection in 
Lithuania and Belarus in 2014, 2013  (Exhibit EU -238), and European Commission, Final Report of an Audit 
Carried out in Lithuania from 14 to 16 April 2014 in order to evaluate the implementation of ani mal health 
controls in relation to African Swine Fever (2014 EU Veterinary Audit Report for Lithuania, 14 -16 April 2014)  
(Exhibit RUS -69). 
1328 See paras.  7.959 - 7.960  above  
1329 Eradication plan of Afri can swine fever in feral pigs in certain areas of Lithuania (communicated to 
Russia on 24 March 2015) (Exhibit EU -101) and ASF Eradication plan for African swine Fever in wild boars in 
the Southern part of Lithuania, June 2014 (Exhibit RUS -156).  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  (i) a chronology of events and recalls the EU legal requirements to develop an eradication plan; 
(ii) describes the epidemiological investigations undertaken and the various hypothesis regarding 
the source of the introduction of ASFV; ( iii) defines the infected and risk areas; ( iv) describes the 
surveillance programmes and preventive measures applicable to wild boars; and ( v) describes the 
surveillance programmes and preventive measures applicable t o pig holdings in the infected and 
risk areas.  
7.972.   While the prompt provision of the Lithuanian eradication plan could have facilitated the 
assessment by Russia of whether there was an effective establishment and maintenance of a 
disease -free area within that  country, a careful examination of the content of the eradication plan 
reveals that most of the information contained therein was previously made available to Russia 
through various different communications and their respective attachments. We are unable t o 
identify any significant information in the eradication plan that was not previously made available 
to Russia.  
7.973.   In examining the different categories of information provided to Russia, we see that even 
before the first outbreak in Poland, the European Uni on had submitted to Russia on 
7 February  2014, a summary report of ASF surveillance activities implemented in Lithuania, 
Poland, Latvia and Estonia.1330 This report covers the period 1 November 2013 to 28 January 2014 
and provides information on the surveilla nce undertaken on the basis of sampling of wild boars 
and domestic pigs.  
7.974.   We have already examined above the information that the European Union provided to 
Russia to objectively demonstrate the existence of ASF -free areas. We have concluded that, as at 
22 July 2014, the European Union had provided to Russia the necessary evidence to objectively 
demonstrate that there were ASF -free areas within Lithuania. In considering, in particular, the 
information in respect of the effectiveness of the sanitary controls  established in Lithuania, we 
have examined the information regarding the evolution of ASF within Lithuania from the first case 
in January 2014 until the time of establishment of the panel on 22 July 2014.1331 During this period 
of time, following the first o utbreak of ASF in Lithuania, subsequent cases occurred only either 
within the designated infected area or within the immediately surrounding buffer zone. It would 
thus appear that until 22  July 2014, the European Union had effectively demonstrated that the  
designated ASF -free area within Lithuania would remain ASF -free.1332 As at the time of 
establishment of the Panel, it would appear that the European Union had effectively demonstrated 
the effectiveness of the control measures to ensure that the ASF -free area  of Lithuania would 
remain so. We recall, however, that we have agreed to consider the information provided by the 
parties until September 2014.  
7.975.   The Panel is aware that immediately following the establishment of the Panel, on 
24 July 2014, a new outbreak occurred in a part of Lithuania that was unrelated to the first cases 
and zones , in an area located outside the infected and buffer zones established through 
Commission Implementing Decision 2014/178/EU of 27 March 2014 .1333 This outbreak was in a 
large holdi ng of domestic pigs (19,411 pigs)1334, and could raise concerns about whether the 
control and prevention programmes were effective. In response to this outbreak, the European 
Union issued Commission Implementing Decision 2014/502/EU of 24 July 2014, expanding  the 
infected and buffer zones.1335 We also recall that the experts have indicated that further cases of 
ASF among wild pigs and outbreaks in domestic holdings could be expected to occur , and such 
occurrence does not amount to a failure of the ASF control mea sures.1336 The experts also 
indicated  that as long as additional outbreaks remained confined to the declared infected zone 
                                               
1330 Exhibits  EU-62 and EU -63. 
1331 We have examined the data provided by both parties in this respect. We have focused our attention 
in Exhibits EU -118 and RUS -275 and RUS -296 revised.  
1332 ASF cases in the European Union notified to the OIE (Exhibit EU -118) and Data from OIE WAHIS  
Interface, as of 31 August 2015 (Exhibit RUS -296 revised).  
1333 Exhibit EU -37. 
1334 ASF cases in the European Union notified to the OIE (Exhibit EU -118) and Data from OIE WAHIS 
Interface, as of 31 August 2015 (Exhibit RUS -296 revised).  
1335 Exhibit EU -40. 
1336 Professor Penrith, Transcript  para. 1.195 ; Dr Brückner , Transcript, para. 1.196 ; Dr Thomson , 
Transcript, para. 1.198; and Dr Thiermann , Transcript, para. 1.199 . WT/DS475/R  
 
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  then there should not be any consequence for free zones .1337 Furthermore, as explained by the 
experts, the purpose of a buffer zone, which is itself free of ASF, is to ensure that the designated 
ASF-free areas are physically separated from ASF infection areas. A case or outbreak in a buffer 
zone, therefore, does not call into question the disease -free status of the designated disease -free 
area. It does, however, change the status of the buffer zone to an ASF -infected area. Also, as 
according to the European Union regulation, no trade is permitted from the buffer zone, hence a 
case or outbreak within the buffer zone would not affect the risk of  Russia importing ASF -infected 
products. An outbreak within a free zone, however, has the effect of immediately changing the 
status of that zone to an ASF -infected zone.1338  
7.976.   The next case in Lithuania was also in a domestic holding (albeit a very small one w ith only 
2 pigs),  this time within the buffer zone.1339 The incident began on 29 July 2014,  when a pig 
became sick in a farm in the Utena district in Lithuania. The pig died on 5 August 2014 and was 
tested for ASF. On 6 August 2014 the test confirmed the pres ence of ASF. This is highly indicative 
of an effective  monitoring and surveillance programme . Moreover, as this situation evolved, on 31 
July 2014 the European Union issued Commission Implementing Decision 2014/513/EU which 
expanded the protection zone to include the Utena district.1340 On 22 August 2014, there was 
another incident in a domestic holding (again of only 2 pigs) which occurred outside the infected 
and the buffer zones. Following this case, on 28 August 2014, the European Union issued 
Commission I mplement Decision 2014/673/EU which expanded the infected and buffer zones in 
Lithuania.1341 Subsequently, except for one infected wild boar found in the buffer zone on 10 
December 2014, all other cases in Lithuania occurred within already infected zones.1342 Based on 
the information available as at 11 September 2014, we consider that the European Union had 
provided sufficient evidence to objectively demonstrate that the disease -free areas within 
Lithuania were likely to remain ASF -free. 
7.977.   We are fully aware that, according to information provided by both parties1343, further 
cases of ASF occurred in Lithuania after September  2014. While we consider this information to be 
important for Russia's consideration of the European Union's claim that it had established disease -
free areas within Lithuania that were likely to remain disease -free, it was clearly not possible for 
the European Union to have provided such information as at 11 September 2014.  We will thus 
examine this information in the context of our consideration of  Article 6.1, below.   
Assessment of the evidence provided by the European Union to Russia to 
objectively demonstrate that ASF -free areas in Poland are likely to remain so  
7.978.   We will now examine the extent to which the European Union provided to Russia the 
necessary evidence to objectively demonstrate that ASF -free areas in Poland were likely to remain 
                                               
1337 See experts' responses to Panel question No. 32, Compilation of experts' responses, paras . 4.20 -
4.24. See in particular, Professor Penrith's response.  
1338 See Dr Thomson's response to Panel question No. 32, Compilation of experts' responses, para. 4.22. 
See also Article 15.1.4 of the Terrestrial Code and Russia's opening statement at the second meeting of the 
Panel, paras. 30 -32. 
1339 There is a discrepancy between the data provided by the European Union in Exhibit EU -118 and by 
Russia in Exhibit RUS -296 revised in respect of the outbreak happening in Lithuania on 29 July 2014. According 
to Exhibit EU-118 there were no outbreaks in Lithuania on 29 July 2014, however, one was confirmed on 
6 August 2014. Exhibit RUS -296 revised identifies an outbreak happening on 29 July 2014. As reported in the 
OIE WAHIS Interface, the starting date of this incident i s 29 July 2014, see Exhibit EU -154, p. 1/17.  
1340 Commission Implementing Decision 2014/513/EU of 31 July 2014 amending the annex to 
Implementing Decision 2014/178/EU as regards the areas in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia under restriction for 
African swine fe ver, OJ L 231, p.7 (Exhibit EU -41). 
1341 Commission Implementing Decision 2014/637/EU of 28 August 2014 amending the Annex to 
Implementing Decision 2014/178/EU as regards the areas under restriction for African swine fever in certain 
Member States, OJ L 259, p.23 (Exhibit EU -43). We note that there is a discrepancy between the information 
provided by the European Union in EU -118 and Russia in Exhibit RUS-296 (revised) on whether this incident 
occurred in the infected zone. According to Exhibit EU -118 this inci dent occurred in an infected zone. According 
to Exhibit RUS-296 (revised) this incident occurred outside the infected and the buffer zone. Comparing the 
infected and buffer zones in place in Lithuania at that time (as reflected in Exhibits EU -37 and EU -41), we 
conclude that this incident occurred in an area not yet designated as infected or buffer zone.  
1342 ASF cases in the European Union notified to the OIE (Exhibit EU -118) and Data from  OIE WAHIS  
Interface, as of 31 August  2015 (Exhibit RUS -296 revised).  
1343 Exhibits EU -118 and RUS -296 revised.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  so. As we noted in paragraph  7.940  above , the most important evidence for demonstrating that a 
disease -free area is likely to remain  so relates to the effectiveness of control measures. We will 
thus consider the evidence provided in respect of the effectiveness of control measures applied in 
Poland. For this purpose, we will address the information provided on: ( i) the surveillance 
programme; (ii) diagnostic analysis; ( iii) measures for early detection and response; and 
(iv) eradication of the disease. In undertaking this task, the Panel will analyse the information  
provided by the European Union to Russia, including that  in the eradica tion plan  of Poland. The 
Panel will assess how much of the information contained therein had already been provided by the 
European Union to Russia. In pursuing this examination, the Panel will focus on reviewing the 
necessary evidence that the European Uni on provided to Russia in respect of the effectiveness of 
the control measures in Poland. The Panel will also examine   other information submitted by the 
European Union to Russia , as well as examine the outbreaks that took place in Poland after 
February 201 4 and until the establishment of the Panel on 22 July 2014, as well as the subsequent 
situation . Our consideration of this matter is also informed by our analysis in respect of the 
categories of necessary evidence that we have examined in in the previous s ection  to determine 
the European Union's objective demonstration of the existence of ASF -free areas in the four 
affected EU member States.  
7.979.   Our examination of the documentation provided shows that information regarding the 
initial cases and their location w as provided to Russia on 17 February 2014,1344 following the first 
outbreak on 13 February 2014. Russia was informed through this communication, as well as 
through subsequent ones in February, March and April 2014,1345 of the establishment of control 
zones, incl uding the infected area, and a risk area, and the measures applied within each of these 
zones to control the spread of ASF. Information relating to the surveillance and sampling strategy, 
as well as to protective measures in Poland, was also provided in th ese communications. Reports 
on the emergency response measures of Poland were also submitted in February and March 2014, 
and the contingency plan, as well as further information on surveillance, eradication and 
monitoring were provided in April, May and Ju ne 2014.1346 The Panel further notes that the 
eradication plan for Poland was not provided to Russia in a timely manner as previously discussed 
in paragraph  7.960 . 
7.980.   In particular, the Polish eradication plan1347 contains information o n: (i) eradication 
measures; ( ii) epidemiological investigations and controls carried out in the infected area; 
(iii) designation of infected area and buffer zone; and ( iv) surveillance programmes and prevention 
measures applicable to wild boar in the infe cted and buffer zone; and ( v) surveillance programmes 
and prevention measures applicable to pig holdings in the infected areas. While the prompt 
provision of the Polish eradication plan could have facilitated the assessment by Russia of whether 
there was a n effective establishment and maintenance of a disease -free area within that country, a 
careful examination of the content of the eradication plan reveals that most of the information 
contained therein was previously made available to Russia through differ ent communications and 
their respective attachments. We have been unable to identify any significant information in the 
eradication plan that was not previously made available to Russia.  
7.981.   In examining the different categories of information provided to Russ ia, we see that even 
before the first outbreak in Poland, the European Union had submitted to Russia on 7  February 
2014, a summary report of ASF surveillance activities implemented in Lithuania, Poland, Latvia 
and Estonia.1348 This report covers the period 1 November 2013 to 28 January 2014 and provides 
information on the surveillance undertaken on the basis of risk based and statistically valid 
sampling of wild boars and domestic pigs to allow for early detection of the disease in Poland, 
among other countrie s. Information on the protective measures introduced in Poland against 
                                               
1344 Communication of 17 February 2014: African swine fever (ASF) confirmed in Poland in a wild boar 
found 900 meters from the border with Belarus  (Exhibit EU -136). 
1345 Exhibits EU -138, EU -139, EU -140, EU -141, EU -142, EU -143. See also Appendix 1  below . 
1346 Exhibits EU -92, EU -94. See also Appendix 1 below.  
1347 Eradication plan of African swine fever in feral pigs in certain areas of Poland (communicated to 
Russia on 24 March 2015)  Exhibit EU -102. 
1348 European Union's letter to Russi a of 29 January 2014, ARES(2014)209377, SANCO 
G7/RF/mh(2014)219959  (Exhibit EU -62) and Excel spreadsheet on Poland, Annex to the Letter of 29 January 
2014 (pp. 6 -8) (Exhibit EU -63). WT/DS475/R  
 
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  ASF,1349 was also submitted by the European Union on 7 February 2014, which provided 
information on the risk analysis undertaken to determine the possible pathways of ASF in Europe, 
and th e actions implemented to curb ASF spread, including before and after the outbreak in 
neighbouring Lithuania. Further to the 17 February 2014 outbreak in Poland, the European Union 
provided, at the beginning of March 2014, specific information on its monito ring and surveillance 
activities to address the outbreaks, including its implementation of Directive 2002/60/EC.1350 
During March 2014 to September 2014, the Panel notes that the European Union submitted 
various documents to Russia related to the adoption of additional control measures in Poland to 
curb ASF spread, epidemiological updates or other surveillance related information.1351 
7.982.   We have already examined the measures taken by the European Union above in the 
context of determination of ASF -free areas. We have  concluded that, as at 22 July 2014, the 
European Union had taken the appropriate measures to establish ASF -free areas within Poland. In 
considering, in particular, the effectiveness of the sanitary controls established in Poland, we have 
examined the info rmation regarding the evolution of ASF within Poland from the first case in 
February 2014 until the time of establishment of the panel on 22 July 2014.1352 During this period 
of time, following the first outbreak of ASF in Poland, subsequent outbreaks occurre d only within 
the designated infected area. It would thus appear that until 22  July 2014, the European Union 
had effectively demonstrated that the designated ASF -free area within Poland would remain 
ASF-free.1353 We recall, however, that we have decided to consider the information provided by the 
parties until 11 September 2014.  
7.983.   The Panel notes that following the establishment of the Panel, there were other outbreaks 
which occurred only within the designated infected area. Two of these incidents occurred in s mall 
domestic holdings (maximum of 8 pigs, of which at most 5 pigs were infected) before 
11 September 2014.1354  
7.984.   The maps provided by Russia also corroborate that there has been little expansion of the 
designated infected or buffer zones in Poland, all of whi ch correspond to a small north -eastern part 
of the country.1355  
7.985.   Based on the information available as at 11 September 2014, we consider that the 
European Union had provided  to Russia the  necessary evidence to objectively demonstrate that 
the disease -free are as within Poland were likely to remain ASF -free.  
7.986.   While we are aware that some further ASF cases occurred in Poland after September 2014, 
as noted earlier this information was clearly not available to the European Union as at 
11 September  2014. We will thu s consider this evidence when examining Russia's measures in the 
context of Article  6.1. 
Assessment of the evidence provided by the European Union to Russia to 
objectively demonstrate that ASF -free areas in Latvia are likely to remain so  
7.987.   We now turn to exa mine the extent to which the European Union provide d to Russia the 
necessary evidence to objectively demonstrate that ASF -free areas in Latvia were likely to remain 
so. As we noted in paragraph  7.940 , the most important evidenc e for demonstrating that a 
disease -free area is likely to remain so relates to the effectiveness of control measures. For this 
purpose, we will consider the necessary evidence provided in respect of the effectiveness of control 
                                               
1349 Protective measures introduced in Poland against the African swine fever  threat, General Veterinary 
Inspectorate of Poland, 6 –7 February 2014  (Exhibit EU -67). 
1350 Communication of 5 March 2014: African swine fever (ASF) in Lithuania and Poland – Presentations 
on the situation  (Exhibit EU -143).  
1351 Communication of 27 March 2014: A doption of control measures relating to African swine fever in 
certain Member States  (Exhibit EU -146).  
1352 We have examined the data provided by both parties in this respect. We have focused our attention 
on Exhibits EU -118 and RUS -275 and RUS -296 revised.  
1353 ASF cases in the European Union notified  to the OIE (Exhibit EU -118) and (Exhibit RUS -296 
revised).  
1354 ASF cases in the European Union notified  to the OIE (Exhibit EU -118).  
1355 Overview of updated outbreaks, zone changes, and outbreaks out of zone,  as of 31 August 2015. 
(Exhibit RUS -297 revised).  WT/DS475/R  
 
- 261 - 
 
  measures applied in Latvia b efore and after the first outbreak on 26 June 2014, namely, 
information on: (i) the surveillance programme; (ii)  diagnostic analysis; (iii)  measures for early 
detection and response; and (iv) eradication of the disease. In undertaking this task, we will 
address the information provided by the European Union to Russia, including that contained in the 
eradication plan of Latvia. We will assess how much of the information contained therein had 
already been provided by the European Union to Russia. In pursuing this examination we will focus 
in reviewing the necessary evidence that the European Union provided to Russia in respect of the 
effectiveness of the control measures in Latvia.  
7.988.   In examining the information provided by the European Union to Russia before th e first 
outbreak in Latvia, we see that the European Union had submitted to Russia on 7  February  2014, a 
summary report of ASF surveillance activities implemented in Lithuania, Poland, Latvia and 
Estonia. This report1356 covers the period 1 November 2013 to 2 8 January 2014 and provides 
information on the surveillance undertaken on the basis of risk based and statistically valid 
sampling of wild boar and domestic pigs to allow for early detection of the disease in Latvia, 
among other countries. Furthermore,  the European Union provided to Russia  Latvia -specific 
reports on the 2013 audit of animal health contingency plans1357 and ASF preventative measures 
that were implemented in 20131358 in February 2014. These reports show that Latvia had 
surveillance and monitoring m echanisms in place prior to the outbreaks. In regards to the early 
detection programme for implementation in 20141359 which was provided to Russia as an 
attachment to the document provided on 7 February 20141360, the Panel notes the document itself 
indicates tha t the attached programme was for implementation in 2013 and that the revision for 
2014 was still under discussion.  
7.989.   The first ASF case in Latvia occurred on 26 June 2014, and information regarding the 
outbreak was provided to Russia on the same day the dis ease was confirmed.1361 In this 
communication,  the European Union provided to  Russia information on the location and scope of 
the outbreaks, establishment of protection and surveillance zones, and confirmation that 
implementation of the measures applied withi n each zone had begun. Throughout July 2014, the 
European Union provided to Russia m ore information relating to the adoption and amendment of 
the Commission Implementing Decision on protective measures, and updates and maps of new 
outbreaks in Latvia.1362  
7.990.   On 22 July 2014, the European Union notified Russia about new outbreaks which occurred 
in Latvia outside the designated buffer or infected areas.1363 At this point in time, the previously 
ASF-free areas were no longer ASF -free, which would call into question th e effectiveness of the 
previously developed surveillance and protection zones. This situation differs from that in Lithuania 
and Poland, because of the frequency of cases occurring outside the zones designated as 
protection and surveillance zones, and beca use of the large distance between the new incidents. 
The Panel notes that since the first outbreak until 11 September 2014, three of 31 outbreaks in 
domestic holdings occurred outside of designated buffer or infected areas, including the first 
outbreak, ac cording to the information provided by the European Union.1364 Despite the low 
prevalence, the large distance between the outbreaks and the distance of the new outbreaks from 
the borders of the designated infected and buffer zones raise questions regarding th e effectiveness 
of control measures in Latvia.  
                                               
1356 European Union's letter to Russia of 29 January 2014, ARES(2014)209377, SANCO 
G7/RF/mh(2014)219959 (Exhibit EU -62). 
1357 Final Report of an Audit carried out in Latvia from 4 to 8 March 2013 in order to Evaluate th e 
Implementation of Contingency Plans in relation to Animal Health, including provisions on the Protection of 
Animals during Depopulation for Disease Control, SANCO 2013 -6777 (Exhibit EU -80). 
1358 Protective measures against African swine fever in Latvia, 6 F ebruary 2014 ( Exhibit EU -68). 
1359 Veterinary Programme on African swine fever early detection in Latvia in 2014, 2013 
(Exhibit  EU-239). 
1360 European Union's letter to Russia of 7 February 2014, ARES(2014)304571, 
SANCO/G7/DP/tb(2014)328578 ( Exhibit EU -65) and Annotated annex to the letter of 7 February 2014, with 
references to the EU exhibit numbers corresponding to each document  (Exhibit EU-214). 
1361 Communication of 26 June 2014: African swine fever (ASF) detection in Latvia (Exhibit EU -147). 
1362 (Exhibit EU -148), (Exhibit EU -206), (Exhibit EU-207), (Exhibit EU-209), (Exhibit EU-210), (Exhibit 
EU-212).  
1363 Communication of 22 July 2014:  African Swine Fever in Latvia  (Exhibit EU -187). 
1364 See Exhibit EU -118. WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.991.   The European Union  submitted evidence that demonstrates it  promptly provided to Russia 
updates and maps of new outbreaks  in Latvia. However,  the European Union failed to meet this 
burden with respect to signif icant information on revised or updated control measures following 
this outbreak until September 2014.  
7.992.   On 19 May 2015, the eradication plan of Latvia was provided to Russia1365, almost eleven 
months after the initial ASF outbreak and five weeks after the pla n was approved by the 
EU Commission. The plan contains information on: ( i) the chronology of ASF outbreaks and EU 
legal requirements to develop an eradication plan; ( ii) epidemiological investigations and findings 
in wild boars and domestic pigs; ( iii) def inition of infected and risk areas; ( iv) surveillance 
programmes and preventive measures applicable to wild boars and pig holdings in the infected and 
risk areas; and ( v) implementation of measures and administrative issues.  
7.993.    There is insufficient evidenc e on record supporting the European Union's provision to 
Russia of evidence pertaining to the implementation or modification of control measures following 
the first outbreak  in Latvia  and until September 2014 . In our view,  the timely provision of Latvia's 
eradication plan would have amplified the information available to Russia to assess the situation in 
Latvia.1366 
7.994.    We are aware that ASF continued to spread in Latvia after September 2014. We will 
examine the information provided by both parties in this regard  in the context of our analysis 
under Article 6.1, below.  
7.995.   After examining the information regarding ASF outbreaks, protection measures, 
surveillance programmes, and early detection and response plans against ASF, as well as the 
evolution of ASF within Latv ia before and after the first outbreak, the Panel observes that although 
the European Union provided to Russia a fair amount of information in respect of the measures 
applied in Latvia, including  swiftly communicat ing the facts of the outbreaks to Russia,  the 
European Union  failed to provide updated and additional information on Latvia's early detection, 
surveillance and eradication plans after the outbreaks. Such information would have been 
necessary for Russia to evaluate the capacity and effectiveness of  Latvia's  ASF control plans. We 
therefore conclude that, as at 11 September 2014, the European Union had not provided sufficient 
information to "objectively demonstrate" to Russia that the designated ASF free areas in Latvia 
were likely to remain free of A SF, pursuant to Article 6.3 of the SPS Agreement.  
Assessment of the evidence provided by the European Union to Russia to 
objectively demonstrate that ASF -free areas in Estonia are likely to remain so  
7.996.   We now turn to examine the extent to which the European Union provided to Russia the 
necessary evidence to objectively demonstrate that ASF -free areas in Estonia were likely to remain 
so. As we noted in paragraph  7.940  above , the most important evidence for demonstrating that a 
disease-free area is likely to remain so relates to the effectiveness of control measures. We will 
thus consider the evidence provided  by the European Union to Russia  in respect of the 
effectiveness of control measures applied in Estonia. For this purpose, we will address the 
information provided on: (i) the surveillance programme; (ii) diagnostic analysis; (iii) measures for 
early detection and response; and (iv) eradication of the disease. In undertaking this task, the 
Panel will analyse the information  provided by the European Union to Russia, including that  in the 
eradication plan  of Estonia. The Panel will assess how much of the information contained therein 
had already been provided by the European Union to Russia. In pursuing this examination, the 
Panel w ill focus in reviewing the necessary evidence that the European Union provided to Russia in 
respect of the effectiveness of the control measures in Estonia . The Panel will also examine  other 
information submitted by the European Union to Russia , as well as  examine the outbreaks that 
took place in Estonia. Unlike the other affected member States, the first case in Estonia occurred 
only on 8  September  2014 well after the establishment of the Panel. Therefore, all of the 
information regarding actual cases date s from this time. Our consideration of this matter is also 
                                               
1365 Eradication plan for African swine fever in wild boar in L atvia (Exhibit EU -116). 
1366 Russia claims that the following information included in Latvia's eradication plan had not been 
previously provided to Russia by the European Union, and was useful for Russia's assessment of the 
regionalization measures in Latvia:  identification of the likely cause of ASF spread and compensation of farms 
in the infected and risk areas (mostly backyard farms). Russia's second written submission, para. 69.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  informed by our analysis in respect of the categories of necessary evidence that we have examined 
in the preceding section  to determine the European Union's objective demonstration of the 
existence  of ASF -free areas in the four affected EU member States.  
7.997.   Our examination of the documentation provided  by the European Union to Russia , as 
available on record,  shows that unlike the case in the other three EU member States, where the 
European Union offici ally communicated the existence of the first ASF outbreak in writing to 
Russia,  we have no indication that  the European Union sent a similar letter in the case of Estonia. 
However, we recall that the veterinary authorities in the EU member States regularly  report the 
disease outbreaks to the OIE.  
7.998.   The Panel observes that prior to the 8 September 2014 outbreak in Estonia, the European 
Union provided to Russia, in February 2014, information on the ASF preparedness and surveillance 
measures in Estonia.1367 In addi tion, in February 2014  the European Union submitted to Russia the  
results of a 2013 audit ,1368 and a contingency plan was provided in May 2014.1369 Given the 
temporal parameters of this dispute and the fact that the first outbreak took place in September 
2014, t he Panel considers that the shorter time -frame for the consideration of the necessary 
evidence of the effectiveness of control measures necessitates an examination of additional 
information provided by the European Union after September 2014. The Panel fur ther notes that 
the eradication plan for Estonia was not provided to Russia in a timely manner as previously 
discussed in paragraph  7.960 .   
7.999.   In particular, the Estonian eradication plan1370 contains information on: (i) epidemiolog ical 
investigations and controls carried out in the infected area; (ii) surveillance programmes and 
prevention measures in the infected area; (iii) coordination with hunters, wildlife services and 
veterinary controls; (iv) campaigns to increase hunters' aw areness of preventive measures; and 
(v) management of the wild boar population. While the prompt provision of the Estonian 
eradication plan could have facilitated the assessment by Russia of whether there was an effective 
establishment and maintenance of a  disease -free area within that country, a careful examination 
of the content of the eradication plan reveals that most of the information contained therein was 
previously made available to Russia through different communications and their respective 
attach ments. We have been unable to identify any significant information in the eradication plan 
that was not previously made available to Russia.  
7.1000.   In examining the different categories of information provided to Russia, we see that even 
before the first outbreak  in Estonia, the European Union had submitted to Russia on 
7 February  2014, a summary report of ASF surveillance activities implemented in Lithuania, 
Poland, Latvia,  and Estonia.1371 This report covers the period 1 November 2013 to 28 January 
2014 and provide s information on the surveillance undertaken on the basis of risk based and 
statistically valid sampling of wild boars and domestic pigs to allow for early detection of the 
disease in Estonia , among other countries. The European Union presented information  to the 
Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed at the beginning of November 2014 in 
relation to the surveillance and monitoring activities following the first outbreak.1372 An 
examination of the information on record shows that the European Unio n also submitted a code of 
conduct for control of African swine fever in Estonia in January 2015,1373 however, the Panel notes 
that the information contained in this document does not provide updated information on the 
monitoring and surveillance activities i n Estonia following the outbreak.  
                                               
1367 European Union's letter to Russia of 7 February 2014, ARES(2014)304571, 
SANC O/G7/DP/tb(2014)328578 (Exhibit EU -65). 
1368 Final Report of an Audit carried out in Estonia from 15 to 19 April 2013 in order to Evaluate the 
Implementation of Contingency Plans in relation to Animal Health, including provisions on the Protection of 
Animals during Depopulation for Disease Control, SANCO 2013 - 6781 (Exhibit EU -82). 
1369 European Union's letter to Russia of 21 May 2014, ARES(2014)1658269, 
SANCO/G6/AB(2014)1782253 (Exhibit EU -92). 
1370 Plan for the eradication of African swine fever from feral pig pop ulation in Estonia (Exhibit EU -117).  
1371 European Union's letter to Russia of 29 January 2014, ARES(2014)209377, SANCO 
G7/RF/mh(2014)219959 (Exhibit EU -62). 
1372African swine fever in Estonia, Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed, Brussels, 3 -4 
November 2014  (Exhibit EU -98). 
1373 Code of Conduct for Control of African Swine Fever of Estonia, 11 April 2013  (Exhibit EU -77). WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.1001.   We have already examined the measures taken by the European Union above in the 
context of determination of ASF -free areas. We have concluded that, as at 22 July 2014, the 
European Union had  provided to Russia the necessar y evidence to objectively demonstrate that 
there were  ASF-free areas within Estonia on the basis of the  surveillance and control  measures 
taken on the basis of the European Union's legal framework . In considering, in particular, the 
effectiveness of the sa nitary controls established in Estonia, the Panel has borne in mind that most 
of the evidence available for Estonia in this respect  post-dates the establishment of the Panel. 
During the period of time, following the first outbreak of ASF in neighbouring Li thuania, to the time 
of the establishment of the Panel, it would appear that the European Union had effectively 
demonstrated that the designated ASF -free area within Estonia would remain ASF -free.1374 As 
previously explained in paragraph  7.941 , we decided to consider the information provided by the 
parties until 11 September 2014.  
7.1002.   We are aware that ASF continued to spread in Estonia after September 2014. We will 
examine the information provided by both parties in this regard in th e context of our analysis 
under Article 6.1 , below . 
7.1003.   All of the evidence available for Estonia post -dates the establishment of the Panel, but it 
seems to demonstrate a n effective control system that has prevented movement of infected boar 
into the ASF -free area and contained outbreaks in domestic pig holdings within infected zones, 
with few cases affecting a small pig population. Hence this subsequent evidence does not 
undermine our conclusion that as at 11 September 2014, the European Union had provided to 
Russia the necessary evidence to objectively demonstrate that the ASF -free areas within Estonia 
were likely to remain so.  
Conclusion  
7.1004.   Based on the foregoing analysis, we conclude that at least as at 11 September  2014, the 
European Union failed to  provide t o Russia the necessary evidence to  objectively demonstrate, 
pursuant to Article 6.3 of the SPS Agreement, that there are areas within Latvia , which are likely 
to remain free of ASF.  We also conclude that the same does not hold true in respect of  Estonia , 
Lithuania, and Poland, because the European Union provided to Russia the necessary evidence to 
objectively demonstrate that in these three EU member States there are ASF -free areas which are 
likely to remain so.  Furthermore, the evidence on the record regar ding the information that the 
European Union has submitted to Russia subsequent to 11 September 2014 serves to confirm and 
support our finding s.  
7.6.2.3.4   Whether Russia, through the bans on the imports of the products at issue from 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, ensured adaptation to the SPS characteristics of 
the European Union and of Russia in respect of ASF, pursuant to Russia's obligations 
under Article 6.1 of the SPS Agreement  
7.6.2.3.4.1   Introduction  
7.1005.   The European Union argues that Russia fails, through the bans  on the products at issue 
from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, to adapt its measures to the SPS characteristics of the 
European Union and of Russia in respect of ASF. This is because in assessing the sanitary 
characteristics of the affected area, R ussia failed to take into account, inter alia , the level of 
prevalence or absence of ASF, the existence of eradication and control programmes (immediately 
implemented in accordance with international standards laid down by the OIE), and appropriate 
criteri a or guidelines developed by the relevant international organizations.1375 The European Union 
further stresses that despite the implementation of appropriate  regionalization  measures within 
the European Union, Russia fails to recognise the EU territory, exclu ding the restricted areas, as 
disease -free areas.1376 The European Union also points out that Article 6.1 of the SPS Agreement 
requires that measures are adapted not only to the area from which a product originates, but also 
to the area to which it is destine d. In this regard, the European Union highlights that there are 
                                               
1374 ASF cases in the European Union notified to the OIE (Exhibit EU -118) and Data from OIE WAHIS  
Interface, as of 31 August 2015 ( Exhibit RUS-296 revised ).  
1375 European Union's first written submission, para. 215.  
1376 European Union's first written submission, para. 215.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  regions in Russia where wild boars do not occur and that to the extent to which domestic pigs do 
not occur in those regions in Russia, the introduction of the products at issue would not prese nt 
ASF-related sanitary risks and importation to consumers in those regions should be allowed.1377 
7.1006.   Russia argues that taking into consideration the very factors listed in Article 6.1 of the 
SPS Agreement, it objectively and reasonably did not accept the Europ ean Union's zones.1378 
Russia asserts that in evaluating whether there is an objective basis for Russia's decision not to 
recognise the proposed ASF -free zones in conformity with the applicable Terrestrial Code 
standards and consistent with Article 6 of the S PS Agreement, the Panel must determine whether 
Russia's decision regarding the various European Union zones was "objectively justifiable". Russia 
stresses that in conducting that review, the Panel must not substitute its own judgement of the 
weight to be g iven certain evidence  for that given by the importing country . Rather, it must 
determine whether the totality of the circumstances and evidence (or lack thereof) was sufficient 
to support the objectivity of Russia's decision in light of the relevant provis ions of the Terrestrial 
Code and SPS Agreement Article 6 criteria and the available information.1379 Russia further posits 
that there exist considerable parallels between the more specific zoning provisions in Terrestrial 
Code Chapter 4.3 and Article 5.3.7 an d the more general relevant factors listed in Articles 6.2 and 
6.1 of the SPS Agreement.1380 In this regard Russia argues that first, Article 6.1 makes mandatory 
the taking into account "the appropriate criteria and guidelines which may be developed by the 
relevant international organizations", meaning any objective assessment of an ASF-free zone 
consistent with Article 6.1 of the SPS Agreement would have to include the assessment of the 
zoning "principles" set out in Terrestrial Code Article 4.3.3 as well as the related Article 5.3.7.1381 
Second, all of the general factors listed in SPS Agreement Articles 6.1 and 6.2 for importing 
countries to take into account when deciding to accept  regionalization  are also included in the 
more specific provisions of Chapter 4 .3 of the Terrestrial Code, and that regardless of whether the 
Terrestrial Code provisions in Articles 4.3.3 and 4.3.3.3 are binding  on the European Union in 
seeking to establish an ASF -free zone, at a minimum, these provisions are relevant benchmarks 
for assessing the general criteria of Article 6 of the SPS Agreement.1382 Third, Article 6.3 of the 
SPS Agreement also overlaps considerably with Terrestrial Code Article 5.3.7, which addresses the 
"sequence of steps to be taken in establishing a zone/compartment  and having it recognized for 
international trade purposes".1383 Russia concludes that the Terrestrial Code is a more detailed and 
elaborated version of the general provisions set out in Article 6 of the SPS Agreement. Accordingly, 
if the Panel finds that Rus sia was objectively justified in not accepting the EU zones in conformity 
with the Terrestrial Code zoning/ regionalization  standards, recommendations, and guideline 
benchmarks, it should also find that it acted consistently with Article 6 of the SPS Agreem ent.1384 
7.1007.   In light  of the parties' arguments , the Panel is faced with the question of whether Russia, 
in applying the bans on the products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, adapted 
its measures to the SPS characteristics of the European Uni on and of Russia in respect of ASF, 
pursuant to Russia's obligations under Article 6.1 of the SPS Agreement. To address this question, 
the Panel will first examine the applicable legal test, including a review of Russia's argument of the 
applicable standar d of review.  
7.6.2.3.4.2   Legal test and standard of review  
7.1008.   In section 7.5.2.3.6.2  above we examined the applicable legal test pursuant to 
Article  6.1. In that section we also addressed the standard of review that we should follow in the 
instant case.  
7.1009.   In addition to the considerations set out in that section, we consider  it relevant to address 
Russia's argument that according to the Appellate Body in India – Agricultural Products , "an 
exporting Member claiming, for example, that an importin g Member has failed to determine a 
                                               
1377 European Union's second written submission, para. 128.  
1378 Russia's first written submission, para. 231.  
1379 Russia's se cond written submission, para. 49. See also Russia's response to Panel question No. 113, 
paras. 190 -196. 
1380 Russia's second written submission, para. 50.  
1381 Russia's second written submission, para. 51.  
1382 Russia's second written submission, para. 52.  
1383 Russi a's second written submission, para. 53.  
1384 Russia's second written submission, para. 56.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  specific area within that exporting Member's territory as "pest - or disease -free" – and ultimately 
adapt its SPS measures to that area – will have difficulties succeeding in a claim that the importing 
Member has thereby a cted inconsistently with Articles 6.1 or 6.2, unless that exporting Member 
can demonstrate its own compliance with Article 6.3."1385 
7.1010.   However, we note that the Appellate Body continued:  
This is not to suggest, as India does, that a Member adopting or maintaini ng an 
SPS measure can only be found to have breached the obligation in the first sentence 
of Article 6.1 after an exporting Member has made the objective demonstration 
provided for in Article  6.3. Indeed, as noted above, even in the absence of such 
objecti ve demonstration by an exporting Member, a Member may still be found to 
have failed to ensure that an SPS measure is adapted to regional conditions within the 
meaning of Article 6.1 in a situation where, for example, the concept of pest - and 
disease -free a reas is relevant, but such Member's regulatory regime precludes the 
recognition of such concept. Moreover, as noted above, pest - or disease -free areas 
and areas of low pest or disease prevalence, which are specifically addressed in 
Articles 6.2 and 6.3, ar e only a subset of the SPS  characteristics that may call for the 
adaptation of an SPS measure pursuant to the first sentence of Article 6.1.  We also 
observe that Article 6.1 expressly identifies "criteria or guidelines" developed by 
relevant organizations as relevant for the assessment of the SPS  characteristics of 
regions, which suggests that, under certain circumstances, the adaptation of an SPS 
measure to regional SPS characteristics may be accomplished by taking into account 
relevant criteria and guidel ines developed by such organizations, if any. Finally, we 
recall that the overarching requirement under Article 6.1 to ensure the adaptation of 
SPS measures is an ongoing obligation that applies upon adoption of an SPS measure 
as well as thereafter. All of  these considerations reinforce that a Member may act 
inconsistently with the obligation under the first sentence of Article  6.1 absent the 
objective demonstration provided for in Article  6.3 by an exporting Member.1386 
(emphasis added)  
7.1011.   We understand the Appe llate Body's guidance as indicating that a determination of 
whether a Member ensures adaptation of its measures to the SPS characteristics of the importing 
Member or prevailing in its territory, pursuant to Article 6.1 of the SPS Agreement, can be found 
even when an exporting Member has failed to make the objective demonstration pursuant to 
Article 6.3. In light of this guidance, we will assess whether the import bans on the products at 
issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, are adapted to the S PS characteristics of areas 
within those affected EU member States and of Russia.  
7.6.2.3.4.3   Whether the bans of the products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
and Poland are adapted to the relevant SPS characteristics of areas within those EU 
member States and to the SPS characteristics of Russia  
7.1012.   We recall that pursuant to Article 6.1 of the SPS Agreement Russia has the obligation to 
adapt its SPS measures to the sanitary and phytosanitary characteristics of the area from which 
the product originated and to which the product is destined. In this case, this means adaptation to 
the SPS characteristics of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland and to the SPS characteristics of 
Russia. To determine whether Russia has made such an adaptation , we will first determi ne and 
examine the SPS characteristics in each of those areas and then analyse whether Russia's bans on 
the products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland are  indeed  adapted to these 
characteristics.  
7.1013.   In section 7.6.2.3.3  above, we examine d whether the European Union provided to Russia 
the necessary evidence to objectively demonstrated that there are disease -free areas, which are 
likely to remain so, within the territory of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, p ursuant to 
Article 6.3 of the SPS Agreement. Our finding, after reviewing the evidence provided by the 
European Union to Russia  together with the evidence on the record , as indicated in paragraph 
                                               
1385 Russia's second written submission, para . 130 (quoting Appellate Body Report, India – Agricultural 
Products , para. 5.156 ). 
1386 Appellate Body Report, India – Agricultu ral Products , para. 5.157. (footnotes omitted)  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.1004  above, is in the negativ e with respect to  Latvia ; and in the positive with respect to  Estonia , 
Lithuania, and  Poland . We recall that we found that the European Union has provided the 
necessary evidence  in support of its claims that there are ASF-free areas within the four affecte d 
EU member States.  However, t he European Union fa iled to provide the necessary evidence  to 
Russia to objectively demonstrate that the ASF -free areas in Latvia  are likely to remain ASF -free. 
7.1014.    Based on our finding under Article 6.3 with respect to  Estonia , Lithuania, and  Poland, we 
consider that the  European Union has provided the necessary evidence to objectively demonstrate 
that there  are areas within each of these three EU member States  characterized as being free of 
ASF and likely to remain so.  In additi on, based on our finding under Article 6.3 with respect to 
Latvia, we consider that the European Union provided the necessary evidence to objectively 
demonstrate that there are areas within Latvia characterized as being free of ASF. However, 
because of the  ongoing nature of the obligation to ensure adaptation pursuant to Article 6.1, we 
consider that to determine the SPS characteristics in the four affected EU member States, it is 
appropriate for us to further consider the most updated information on record  in respect of the 
ASF outbreaks. We turn to examine the SPS characteristics in each of the affected EU member 
States, particularly in respect of the most updated status of the presence of ASF.  
7.1015.   According to the information provided by the European Union th ere were 
77 incidents/cases in Lithuania between January 2014 and April 2015, the last occurring on 
16 April 2015. Of these 77 cases, six occurred in domestic pig holdings – and the last of these 
outbreaks was on 31 August 2014.1387 We also note that accordin g to the more updated 
information provided by Russia, an additional 38 cases of ASF outbreaks were reported between 
4 June 2015 and 27  August 2015, of which only one occurred outside the designated infected area, 
but within the buffer zone, in a wild boar.  11 outbreaks were reported in domestic pigs in the 
infected zone within this period. Based on Russia's updated information, a total of 123 incidents 
occurred in Lithuania between 24 January 2014 and 27 August 2015.1388 Examining these figures 
together with t he most updated geographical information on record1389, we consider it to be clear 
that in August 2015, there were areas in Lithuania that remained free of ASF.  
7.1016.   According to the information provided by the European Union there were 59 incidents of 
ASF reporte d in Poland between February 2014 and April 2015, the last occurring on 
16 April 2015. Of these 59 cases, only three occurred in domestic pig holdings – and the last of 
these outbreaks was on 31 January 2015. We also note that according to the more updated  
information provided by Russia, an additional 13 cases of ASF outbreaks were reported between 
29 May 2015 and 21 August 2015, of which no additional outbreaks were reported outside of the 
designated infected area. Based on Russia's updated information, a total of 80 outbreaks occurred 
in Poland between 13 February 2014 and 21 August 2015.1390 Examining these figures together 
                                               
1387 ASF cases in the European Union notified to the OIE (Exhibit EU -118).  
1388 Exhibit RUS -296 revised. According to the data submitted by Russia on the outbreaks in Lithuania 
(RUS-275), there are some differences indicated in the number of outbreaks and their location (i.e. within the 
buffer, infected or disease -free zones), as compared to the information provided by the European Union in 
Exhibit EU -118. Russia indicates 85 cases of ASF outbreaks in Lithuania betwe en 24 January 2014 to 
4 June 2015, of which: (i) 2 cases occurred in domestic pigs outside of the buffer and infected zones (29 July 
2014 and 22 August 2014); and (ii) 2 cases occurred in wild boars in the buffer zone (10  December 2014 and 
18 May 2015). Th e updated exhibit provided by Russia (RUS -296 Revised) provides additional information on 
the number of outbreaks in Lithuania up to 27 August 2015. An additional 38 cases of ASF outbreaks are 
reported between 4 Junes 2015 and 27 August 2015, of which only  one related to an outbreak in wild boar in 
the buffer zone. 11 outbreaks are also reported in domestic pigs in the infected zone within this period. Based 
on Russia's updated information, a total of 123 outbreaks occurred in Lithuania between 24 January 2 014 and 
27 August 2015.  
1389 According to the information available in Exhibits EU -119 and RUS -297 revised.  
1390 Exhibit RUS -296 revised. According to the data submitted by Russia on the outbreaks in Poland 
(RUS-275), whilst having some differences in dates, cor roborates the three incidents of outbreak in domestic 
pigs in the infection zone (17 July 2014, 5 August 2014 and 30 January 2015) and one case of infected wild 
boar within the buffer zone (19 March 2015) indicated in EU's exhibit (EU -118). In total, 67 in cidents are 
reported for Poland between 13 February 2014 and 29 May 2015. The updated exhibit provided by Russia 
(RUS-296 Revised) provides additional information on the number of outbreaks in Poland after 
13 February  2014 and up to 21 August 2015. An addi tional 13 cases of ASF outbreaks are reported between 
this period, of which no additional outbreaks are reported outside of the designated infected area. Based on 
Russia's updated information, a total of 80 outbreaks occurred in Poland between 13 February 2014 and 
21 August 2015.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  with the most updated geographical information on record1391, we consider it to be clear that in 
August 2015, there were areas in Poland th at remained free of ASF.  
7.1017.   According to the information provided by the European Union, Latvia reported a total of 
251 incidents between 26 June 2014 and 17 April 2015. Ten of the cases in wild boar were found 
in the ASF -free area, and seven infected boar we re found within the buffer zones. According to the 
information provided by Russia, five outbreaks occurred in domestic pigs outside of the designated 
buffer or infected zones, between 26 June 2014 and 1 September 2015.1392 We recall our finding 
under Article 6.3 that the European Union failed to provide information to Russia that objectively 
demonstrated that the ASF -free areas in Latvia were likely to remain free of the disease. This 
finding was largely based on the fact that  the evidence on record regarding the information in 
respect of Latvia that had been provided by the European Union to Russia as at 11 September 
2014 called into question the effectiveness of the ASF control measures applied in Latvia. Despite 
such findings, examining the figures mentioned  above together with the most updated 
geographical information on record1393, we consider that in August 2015, there were areas in 
Latvia that remained free of ASF.  
7.1018.   According to the information provided by the European Union,  there were 84 incidents of 
ASF in  Estonia between September 2014 and April 2015, the last occurring on 17 April 2015. Of 
these 84 cases, none had occurred in domestic pig holdings and none of the infected wild boar had 
been found in ASF -free zones. Seven of the infected boars (including t he first one) were found in 
the buffer zone. The last one of which, was found on 16 April 2015. Based on the information 
available as at 11 September 2014, we consider that the European Union had provided sufficient 
evidence to objectively demonstrate that  the disease -free areas within Estonia were likely to 
remain ASF -free. We also note that according to the more updated information provided by Russia, 
on 18 May 2015 there was a case in wild boar outside the infected and buffer zones. In addition, 
the Pane l observes that the first three outbreaks in domestic pigs occurred within a designated 
infected zone on 18 July 2015, affecting only 4 animals. The situation in domestic pigs changed as 
the summer progressed, with 14 cases in small holdings (ranging from affecting 1 to 15 animals) 
in designated infected zones, between 25 July and 27 August 2015. The number of outbreaks in 
wild boar grew, always occurring within the infected and buffer zones (there were only 8 cases in 
the buffer zone). Based on Russia's up dated information, a total of 250 outbreaks occurred in 
Estonia between 2 September 2014 and 2 September 2015. Examining these figures together with 
the most updated geographical information on record1394, we consider it to be clear that in 
August  2015, there  were areas in Estonia that remained free of ASF.  
7.1019.    It is to th ese particular characteristic s in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland  to which 
Russia has the obligation to adapt the ban s on the imports of the products at issue from these 
affected EU membe r States .  
7.1020.   In our view, imposing an outright ban on the products at issue, such as the one imposed 
by Russia on the imports of the products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, and 
failing to recognize the existence  of ASF -free areas withi n these four EU member States , amount 
to not adapting the measure to the sanitary and phytosanitary characteristics of each of the four 
affected EU member States . Moreover, this conclusion is reinforced by our subsequent analysis in 
respect of the adaptati on of the bans on the imports of the products at issue from the four affected 
EU member States to the SPS characteristics in Russia.  
7.1021.   Moreover , our examination on Russia's obligation under Article 6.1 will address  whether 
there are elements in the SPS chara cteristics of the area to which the products are destined to 
which the challenged measures should have been adapted. We will also examine if there are 
additional factors, which in the light of the circumstances of the present case, would shed light on 
our examination of Russia's obligations under Article 6.1.  
                                               
1391 According to the information available in Exhibits EU -119 and RUS -297 revised.  
1392 Exhibit RUS -296 revised . 
1393 According to the information available in Exhibits EU -119 and RUS -297 revised.  
1394 According to the information available  in Exhibits EU -119 and RUS -297 revised.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.1022.   We note that starting in 2007, there have been ASF outbreaks in Russia and that ASF has 
not been eradicated in Russia.1395 In our view, this forms part of the SPS characteristics of the 
territory to which  the products at issue from the European Union are destined and to which Russia 
must adapt its measure s. The SPS experts consulted by the Panel stressed many times that it 
"needs to be remembered that the RF  [Russia]  is not an ASF -free country". 1396 
7.1023.   In our e xamination of this matter in respect of the EU -wide ban, we have noted that the 
panel in US – Animals observed, "[i]f for instance, a particular area within the territory of an 
importing Member has a similar SPS status as the area of origin of a product (e .g. has the same 
level of prevalence of a given disease), that Member may be required to tailor its measure by 
relaxing the restrictions on imports into that area".1397 We agree with this statement, in the sense 
that the level of prevalence of a given disease  in the territory of the importing Member is part and 
parcel of the situation to which what that importing Member must adapt its SPS measures  to. We 
recall also the comment by Dr Thomson that "it seems to me that the problem under discussion is 
a regional one encompassing the Caucuses, Baltic States, the Russian Federation and eastern 
parts of the EU. As indicated elsewhere, from an ASF perspective, the whole region seems to be in 
roughly the same position. Most of the vast surface area of the EU lies outsi de this region …"1398  
This is not to say that a country in which a disease occurs cannot impose any import restrictions to 
prevent the further entry of the disease into regions in which control measures are in place, or its 
spread into areas of the importing  country which are free of the disease. Rather, the fact that a 
disease already exists within the importing area and that control measures on in place, are factors 
that affect the potential risks presented by imported products and that thus must be conside red 
when determining whether a particular measure is adapted to the SPS characteristics of the region 
to which a product is destined.  
7.1024.   In addition, pursuant to the second sentence of Article 6.1, in assessing the 
SPS characteristics of a region, Members sha ll take into account, among other things, the level of 
prevalence of the specific diseases, the existence of eradication or control programmes, and 
appropriate criteria or guidelines which may be developed by the relevant international 
organizations. In ou r view, because a Member needs to know which are the SPS characteristics to 
which its SPS measures need to be adapted, it would be difficult for a Member to act in accordance 
with its obligations under Article 6.1 if it has not pursued an assessment of the  areas from where 
the products at issue originate and to which they are destined.  
7.1025.   As we have noted in our examination of this matter in respect of the EU -wide ban, we 
agree with the panel in US – Animals that "the obligation to 'take into account' the fact ors 
enumerated in the second sentence [of Article 6.1] is intrinsically connected to the obligations 
relating to the assessment of risks under Article  5 of the SPS  Agreement. In particular, Article  5.2 
requires Members conducting a risk assessment to 'take  into account', inter alia, the 'prevalence of 
specific diseases or pests' and the 'existence of pest - or disease -free areas' when assessing the 
risks as required by Article  5.1. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the assessment of the 
SPS charac teristics of an area, taking into account the factors listed in the second sentence of 
Article  6.1 could be conducted as part of a Member's risk assessment.1399"1400 
7.1026.   It is undisputed that Russia did not base either its EU -wide ban or the bans on products 
at issu e from the four ASF -affected member States  on a risk assessment. In section 7.6.5 below, 
we examine the justifications raised by Russia to excuse compliance with its obligation, pursuant 
to Article 5.1, to base its SPS measures  on a risk assessment. Notwithstanding our examination in 
section 7.6.5 below  in respect of the European Union's claims under Articles 5.1, 5.2, 2.2 and 5.7 , 
we consider it relevant to our analysis under Article 6.1 that Russia  has not made an assessment 
of the risks arising from the imports of the products at issue from the territory of the European 
Union, including Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. In particular, we consider that the lack of 
                                               
1395 See Russia's first written submission, para. 23 (referring to OIE WAHIS Interface, Event summary 
Reports, African swine fever, Russia (2007 -2014). (Exhibit RUS -144)); response to Panel question No. 143, 
para. 264 ; and second written submission, paras. 146 -147. See also paras. 4.22 -4.24 above.  
1396 Dr Thomson, para. 2.128 (response to Panel question 13 ). 
1397 Panel Report, US – Animals , para. 7.642.  
1398 Dr Thomson's response to EU Question No.5, para. 1.128.  
1399 (footnote or iginal) Our statement should not be read to preclude the possibility of other situations 
where Article  6.1 could be applied in the absence of a risk assessment.  
1400 Panel Report, US – Animals , para. 7.644.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  risk assessment limits a Memb er's ability to assess the SPS characteristics of the areas from where 
the products in question originate and of the areas to which they are destined.  
7.1027.   In this case, we consider that rejecting the imports of goods from the entire territory of 
Estonia, Latvi a, Lithuania, and Poland, and not tailoring the bans on the imports of the products at 
issue from these four affected EU member States in a manner that ensures adaptation to the 
presence of ASF in certain areas in Russia, constitutes a breach of Russia's o bligation under 
Article  6.1. This breach is further reinforced by Russia's failure to make a risk assessment as 
appropriate to the circumstances, which in this case entail an exhaustive examination, including 
the corresponding scientific justification, of the regionalization measures adopted by the European 
Union and the potential risks to different areas within Russia. We consider, for example, that the 
risk posed by imports into those areas of Russia where ASF currently exists, including among wild 
boar, may be significantly different than the risk to areas of the Russian territory that are free of 
ASF. This would in particular be the case if the control and surveillance measures that Russia 
applies to ASF within its territory are indeed as effective as cl aimed by Russia.  
7.6.2.3.4.4   Conclusion  
7.1028.   Based on the foregoing, we find that Russia did not adapt the bans on the imports of the 
products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland  to the SPS characteristics related to 
ASF of the areas where the products sub ject to the ban on the imports from these four EU member 
States  originated  nor to the SPS characteristics related to ASF in Russia.   Furthermore, Russia did 
not perform or refer to a risk assessment on which it could base its evaluation of the relevant 
elements to determine the SPS characteristics of the areas from which the products at issue 
originate. We therefore find that the ban s on the imports of the products  at issue  from Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland  are inconsistent with Article 6.1 of the  SPS Agreement.  
7.6.2.4   Conclusion in respect of the consistency of the bans on the products at issue 
from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, with Article 6 of the SPS Agreement  
7.1029.   In this section we find that Russia recognizes the concepts of pest - or disease -free areas 
and areas of low pest or disease prevalence in respect of ASF, and therefore, the bans on the 
imports of the products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland are not inconsistent 
with Russia's obligations under Article 6.2 of the SPS  Agreement.1401  
7.1030.   We also find that at least as at 11 September 2014, the European Union failed to provide 
to Russia the necessary evidence to objectively demonstrate, pursuant to Article  6.3 of the 
SPS Agreement, that there are areas within  Latvia , which are free of ASF and are likely to remain 
so. We also find that the European Union provided to Russia the necessary evidence to objectively 
demonstrate, pursuant to Article 6.3 of the SPS Agreement, that there are areas with in Estonia , 
Lithuania, and Poland tha t are ASF -free and are likely to remain so.1402 
7.1031.   Lastly we find that Russia did not adapt the bans  on the imports  of the products at issue 
from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland to the SPS characteristics related to ASF of the areas 
where the products sub ject to the ban on the imports from these four EU member States 
originated nor to the SPS characteristics related to ASF  in Russia. Furthermore, Russia did not 
perform a risk assessment on which it could base its evaluation of the relevant elements to 
determine the SPS characteristics of the areas from which the products at issue originate. 
Therefore, the bans on the imports of the products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and 
Poland are inconsistent with Article 6.1.1403 
                                               
1401 See section 7.5.2.3.4  above.  
1402 See section 7.5.2.3.5  above.  
1403 See section 7.5.2.3.6  above.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.6.3   Whether  the bans on the impor ts of the products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, and Poland are "based on" the relevant international standards under Article 
3.1 of the SPS Agreement (continued)  
7.6.3.1    Assessing whether the bans on the imports of the products at issue from 
Estonia,  Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland , as applicable  to non -treated products, are "based 
on" the international standards applicable to non -treated products  
7.1032.   In section 7.6.1.3.3  we discerned the meaning of the relevant international st andards in 
this dispute, articulated in the Terrestrial Code. At the end of that section we observed that as a 
result of our examination of the meaning of the relevant international standards applicable to 
non-treated products in the light of the parties' arguments and of the circumstances in this 
dispute, we concluded that before comparing the bans on the imports of the products at issue from 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland with those standards for the purposes of determining 
whether those measures are "based on" them, we considered it appropriate and instructive for us 
to turn to our examination of the European Union's claims under Article 6 of the SPS Agreement. 
After conducting our examination of the European Union's claims under Article 6 and rea ching the 
respective findings, we now resume our examination of whether the bans on the imports of the 
products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland are based on the relevant provisions 
of the Terrestrial Code applicable to the non -treated products at issue.  
7.1033.   In section s 7.6.1.3.1  and 7.6.1.3.2  above, we expounded on the applicable legal standard 
under Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement. For a measure to be based on a relevant internati onal 
standard it should be "founded", "built upon" or "supported by" such a standard. Moreover, if a 
measure is found to contradict, that is, it fundamentally departs from, the standard it cannot be 
properly concluded that such an international standard ha s been used "as a basis for" the 
respective measure.1404  In light of these criteria, we now turn to examine the question of whether 
the bans on the imports of the products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland are 
"based on" the relevant provi sions of the Terrestrial Code.  
7.1034.   We recall that the provisions of the Terrestrial Code relating to ASF status provide for 
recognition of ASF -free countries, zones, and compartments. Thus, Articles 15.1.2, 15.1.3 and 
15.1.4 each make reference to an ASF -free "country", "zone" or "compartment" on an equal 
footing,1405 without imposing any sequence, preference or hierarchy amongst the three terms. 
Moreover, pursuant to certain Articles in Chapter 15.1 of the Terrestrial Code1406, trade of certain 
pig and pork product s is safe when they originate from animals located in an ASF-free country or 
zone.1407 The relevant provisions of the Terrestrial Code thus require recognition of ASF-free areas, 
contingent upon the proper establishment of those areas.  
7.1035.   In section 7.5.2.3.5  above we concluded that the European Union did not provide Russia 
with the necessary evidence to objectively demonstrate that areas in Latvia  are free of ASF and 
are likely to remain so.1408 This failure, read in the context of the information on record available 
to Russia up to September 2014, would support the fact that there are uncertainties in respect of 
the existence of ASF-free areas within Latvia  which are likely to  remain ASF-free. In this respect, 
we understand that the sta ndards articulated in the Terrestrial Code for the trade of non -treated 
pig products are the basis for the bans on the imports of the products at issue from Latvia . 
7.1036.   In section 7.5.2.3.5  above we also concluded that the European  Union provided to Russia 
the necessary evidence to objectively demonstrate that areas in  Estonia , Lithuania, and  Poland are 
free of ASF and are likely to remain so.1409. Given that the relevant provisions of the Terrestrial 
Code call upon OIE members to allow for the possibility of recognitio n of ASF -free status (whether 
historically or on the basis of eradication) on a country or "zone" basis, the failure of Russia to 
even allow for the possibility for imports from Poland since February 2014 amounts, in our view, to 
                                               
1404 See para. 7.254  above.  
1405 For defi nitions of these concepts, see paras. 7.293 -7.297  above.  
1406 For a list of the Articles of Chapter 15.1 of the Terrestrial Code relevant to our examination of 
non-treated products see Table 8 above . 
1407 See section 7.5.1.3.4.2  above.  
1408 See section 7.5.2.3.5.4  above.  
1409 See section 7.5.2.3.5.4  above.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  a "fundamental departure" from the provisions of the Terrestrial Code  dealing with ASF -free 
status , in particular, Articles 15.2 -15.4. Accordingly, we find that, the ban s on the imports of the 
products at issue from  Estonia , Lithuania, and  Poland,  as applicable to non -treated products, 
contradict the relevant international standards and therefore it cannot be considered to be "based 
on" that standard for the purposes of Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement.  
7.1037.   Based on the foregoing, we find that the bans  on the imports of the products at issue 
from Latvia , as applicable to non -treated products originating from ASF -free areas,  are based on 
the Terrestrial Code and are in consequence consistent with Russia's obligation to base its 
SPS measures on internatio nal standards, pursuant to Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement.  
7.6.3.2   Conclusion on whether the bans on the imports of the products at issue from 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland are "based on" the relevant international 
standards  
7.1038.   We recall that we considered  it most appropriate to pursue an examination of whether the 
bans on the imports of the products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland in respect 
to two categories of products covered by such measures. The first relates to the scope of the 
challenged measures in respect of products subject to treatment, which we examined in light of 
the Terrestrial Code provisions that articulate the standards for the trade of treated pork products 
(Articles 15.1.14 -15.1.16). The second relates to the scope o f the challenged measures in respect 
of non -treated products originating from ASF-free areas, which we examined in light of the 
Terrestrial Code provisions that articulate the standards for the trade of non -treated products 
(Articles 15.1.2 -15.1.4, 15.1.5,  15.1.8, 15.1.10, 15.1.12, 15.1.13, 15.1.14, 15.1.15, and 
15.1.16).  
7.1039.   Regarding the scope of the challenged measures in respect of treated products we find 
that the bans on the imports of the products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland 
are not "based on" the relevant international standards, as articulated in Articles 15.1.14 -15.1.16 
of the Terrestrial Code; and are therefore, to the extent applicable to treated products, 
inconsistent with Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement.  
7.1040.   Regarding the scop e of the challenged measures in respect of non -treated products we 
find that the bans on the imports of the products at issue from Latvia  are "based on" the relevant 
international standards, as articulated in the relevant articles of Chapter 15.1 of the Te rrestrial 
Code; and are therefore, to the extent applicable to non -treated products, consistent with 
Article  3.1 of the SPS Agreement.  We also find that the ban s on the imports of the products at 
issue from Estonia , Lithuania, and Poland, as applicable to non-treated products, are not "based 
on" the relevant international standards as articulated in the relevant articles of Chapter 15.1 of 
the Terrestrial Code  and are therefore, to the extent applicable to non -treated products, 
inconsistent with Article 3.1  of the SPS Agreement .  
7.6.4   Claims under Article 8 and Annex C of the SPS Agreement  
7.6.4.1   Main arguments of the parties  
7.6.4.1.1   European Union  
7.1041.   The European Union claims that Russia failed and fails to modify the measures at issue in 
order to permit the resumption of imports  to Russia of the products at issue from non -affected 
areas in the European Union and/or with respect to appropriately treated or processed 
products.1410 The European Union's claim under Article 8 and Annex C of the SPS Agreement refers 
to "the acceptance of EU regionalization measures".1411 The European Union argues that Russia 
failed to ensure that procedures for checking and ensuring the fulfilment of SPS measures were 
undertaken and completed without undue delays and in a manner no less favourable for importe d 
products than for like domestic products under Annex C(1)(a). The European Union further 
contends that Russia failed to observe its obligations in the operation of approval procedures as 
                                               
1410 European Union's firs t written submission, para. 337.  
1411 European Union's second written submission, para. 161.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  embodied in Annex C(1)(b). The European Union also claims that Russ ia failed to ensure that 
information requirements were limited to what was necessary for appropriate control, inspection 
and approval procedures in Annex C(1)(c). In this respect, the European Union concludes that 
Russia's measures are in breach of Annex C (1)(a), (b) and (c) of the SPS Agreement and, 
consequently, of Article 8 of the SPS Agreement.1412 
7.6.4.1.2   Russia  
7.1042.   Russia contends that the scope of control, inspection and approval procedures set out in 
Article 8 and Annex C of the SPS Agreement does not cover the Eu ropean Union's claims and the 
evidence presented. In addition, Russia submits that even if the scope of Annex C did cover the 
measures subject to the European Union's claims, the European Union has not put forward 
sufficient evidence and has not met its bu rden of proof to establish a prima facie  case of a 
violation of Article 8 and Annex C(1)(a), (b) and (c) of the SPS Agreement In respect of the 
measures on imports from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland , Russia asserts that the record 
supports the con clusion that the four European Union member States failed to provide Russia with 
comprehensive, timely and adequate information of implementation of effective ASF control 
measures, not only in its initial ASF -free zone regionalization request, but also sub sequently with 
respect to each legislative change to the borders of the alleged ASF -free zone. Russia asserts that 
it reviews its provisional measures on a regular basis, but the European Union's failure to provide 
sufficient information has resulted in th e current delay. According to Russia, one or more of the 
Panel's experts has considered relevant a number of the questions asked by Russia with respect to 
all the EU member States.1413 
7.6.4.2   Main arguments of the third parties  
7.6.4.2.1   Brazil  
7.1043.   Brazil refers to Russia's argum ent that negotiations leading up to the adoption of a 
procedure fall outside of the purview of Article 8 and Annex C of the SPS Agreement. Brazil 
considers that the existence of negotiations involving certain procedures is not, in itself, a decisive 
criter ion for the determination of the applicability of Article 8.1414 In addition, Brazil refers to the 
requirement to complete SPS procedures without undue delay, and highlights that the delay will be 
undue when it is unjustified, excessive, unwarranted or dispro portionate.1415 
7.6.4.2.2   United States  
7.1044.   The United States considers that the European Union's claim under Article 8 and Annex  C 
of the SPS Agreement is based on the incorrect premise that the measures at issue fall under the 
purview of those provisions, because they a re not control, inspection, nor approval procedures of 
an existing SPS measure, but rather a request for modifying the scope of such a measure.1416 
7.6.4.3   Analysis by the Panel  
7.6.4.3.1   Introduction  
7.1045.   The European Union presents its claims under the provisions of the SPS Agre ement 
related to control, inspection and approval procedures, in the following order: (i) Annex C(1), with 
particular reference to subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c); and (ii) Article 8. The European Union 
argues that in light of its arguments presented under Article C(1), Russia has breached the 
provisions of Annex C(1) (a), (b) and (c), and, consequently, Article 8.1417 Russia presents its 
                                               
1412 European Union's first written submission, paras. 343 -344; European Union's second written 
submission, paras. 167 -185. 
1413 Russia's comment to the experts' responses to Panel questions 12 -13. See also Russia's second 
written submission, paras. 61 -77 and 83 -86, and 196.  
1414 Brazil's third -party submission, paras. 22 -27. 
1415 Brazil's third -party submission, paras. 28 -33. 
1416 United States' third-party submission, paras. 12 -18. 
1417 European Union's first written submission, para. 344.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  arguments under both Article 8 and Annex C(1), including the relevant sub -paragraphs of Annex 
C(1)(a), (b) and (c).  
7.1046.   The Pane l is called  upon to examine the scope of application of Article 8 and Annex C of 
the SPS Agreement, and to assess the claims of inconsistency raised by the European Union in 
respect of Annex C(1)(a), (b), and (c). Before turning to the corresponding assess ment, we refer 
to the relevant legal provisions.  
7.6.4.3.2   Relevant legal provisions  
7.1047.   Article 8 of the SPS Agreement, entitled "Control, Inspection and Approval Procedures", 
provides:  
Members shall observe the provisions of Annex C in the operation of control, 
inspe ction and approval procedures, including national systems for approving the use 
of additives or for establishing tolerances for contaminants in foods, beverages or 
feedstuffs, and otherwise ensure that their procedures are not inconsistent with the 
provisi ons of this Agreement.  
7.1048.   Annex C of the SPS Agreement is entitled "Control, Inspection and Approval Procedures". 
An accompanying footnote is attached to the title of Annex C, which states that:  
[7] Control, inspection and approval procedures include inter al ia, procedures for 
sampling, testing and certification.  
7.1049.   Annex C(1) provides , in relevant part, that:  
1. Members shall ensure, with respect to any procedure to check and ensure the 
fulfilment of sanitary or phytosanitary measures, that:  
(a) such procedures  are undertaken and completed without undue delay 
and in no less favourable manner for imported products than for like 
domestic products;  
(b) the standard processing period of each procedure is published or that 
the anticipated processing period is communi cated to the applicant upon 
request; when receiving an application, the competent body promptly 
examines the completeness of the documentation and informs the 
applicant in a precise and complete manner of all deficiencies; the 
competent body transmits as s oon as possible the results of the 
procedure in a precise and complete manner to the applicant so that 
corrective action may be taken if necessary; even when the application 
has deficiencies, the competent body proceeds as far as practicable with 
the proce dure if the applicant so requests; and that upon request, the 
applicant is informed of the stage of the procedure, with any delay being 
explained;  
(c) information requirements are limited to what is necessary for 
appropriate control, inspection and approva l procedures, including for 
approval of the use of additives or for the establishment of tolerances for 
contaminants in food, beverages or feedstuffs;  
7.1050.   Article  8 of the SPS Agreement requires Members to "observe the provisions of Annex  C 
in the operation of  control, inspection and approval procedures", thereby incorporating the 
disciplines of Annex  C into the operative part of the SPS  Agreement. This is consistent with the 
language of Article  1.3 of the SPS Agreement, which states that "[t]he annexes are an integral 
part of th[e]  Agreement". Thus, the non -observance of the obligations in Annex  C(1) "implies a WT/DS475/R  
 
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  violation of Article  8".1418 Accordingly, the Panel will first determine whether Russia has breached 
its obligations under Annex  C(1)(a), (b) and (c). A ru ling that Russia has breached obligations 
under Annex  C will consequently mean that Article  8 has also been breached.  
7.1051.   As Russia contests that the challenged actions of Russia fall within the scope of 
Article  8 and Annex  C(1) of the SPS Agreement, the Panel  will first address whether Article  8 and 
Annex  C(1) of the SPS Agreement are applicable to Russia's actions. If we find that the challenged 
actions fall within the scope of these provisions, we will proceed to assess the European Union's 
claims of inconsi stency with Annex  C(1)(a) -(c), and, consequently, Article  8. 
7.6.4.3.3   Whether the challenged actions of Russia fall within the scope of Article 8 and 
Annex C(1) of the SPS Agreement  
7.1052.   In section 7.5.4.3.3  above we summarized and addresse d the parties' arguments in 
respect of whether the procedure at issue, as identified by the European Union, falls within the 
scope of Article 8 and Annex C(1) of the SPS Agreement. We recall the parties' arguments and 
then examine them in light of the mann er in which the procedure at issue is applied for the 
purposes of the ASF areas within the four affected EU member States.  
7.6.4.3.3.1   The European Union's complaint  
7.1053.   The European Union posits, in respect of Article  8 and Annex  C of the SPS Agreement, 
that the accepta nce of the European Union's regionalization measures is not a negotiation between 
two Members, as argued by Russia, but instead an objective exchange of information requiring the 
decision of the importing Member.1419 The European Union enumerates a series of events, dating 
from early February 2014, which it argues constitutes undue delay encountered in the process, 
including  (i) Russia's repeated request for information previously provided; (ii) Russia's requests 
for irrelevant information; and (iii) Russia's failure to reply to additional information and 
explanations submitted by the European Union.1420  
7.1054.   Russia argues that the European Union, in its claim of Russia's undue delay in responding 
to communications  or meeting requests, only provides some information  on the discussions and 
exchanges that have taken place between Russia and the European Union.1421 Russia argues that 
the evidence the European Union provided distorts the overall picture of the constant information 
exchange and intensive negotiations concernin g regionalization, including the numerous 
explanations provided by Russia in relation to the insufficiency of submitted information. Russia 
concludes that the European Union has merely asserted a violation of Article 8 and Annex C(1)(a) 
by pointing to alle ged delays in evaluating requests for regionalization without demonstrating that 
these delays were "undue". Russia submits that even if the scope of the procedures covered the 
measures subject to the European Union's claims the European Union has not put f orward 
sufficient evidence and has not met its burden of proof to establish the prima facie  case of a 
violation of Article 8 and Annex C(1)(a), (b) and (c) of the SPS Agreement.1422 
7.1055.   To the extent that the European Union is challenging Russia's actual non -acceptance to 
date of the European Union's request for recognition of ASF -free areas, we see no obligation in 
Article 8 or Annex C(1)(a) -(c) that mandates a particular outcome  in respect of the procedures 
                                               
1418 Panel Report, US – Poultry (China) , para.  7.394. See also Panel Report, US – Animals , para. 7.62. 
The panel in EC - Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products  found that failure to observe the prov isions of 
Annex C of the SPS Agreement implies a consequential breach of Article 8.  Panel Report s, EC – Approval and 
Marketing of Biotech Products , para. 7.1569 . 
1419 European Union's second written submission, para. 162.  
1420 European Union's first written subm ission, para. 339; response to Panel question No. 194, paras. 
383-384; and second written submission, paras. 161, and 167 -183. 
1421 Russia's first written submission, paras. 432 -433. With regard to Article 8 and Annex C(1)(a), Russia 
highlights that the Europ ean Union in its claims refers to "non -affected areas in the EU", but does not identify 
what it means by this reference. Russia indicates that it presents its arguments on the assumption that the 
European Union refers to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Pol and. 
1422 Russia's closing statement at the second meeting with the Panel, para. 3.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  they address.1423 We understand, nevertheless, that the Eu ropean Union is challenging Russia's 
process of consideration of its request for recognition of ASF -free areas, in particular, relating to 
certain information requested by Russia.1424  
7.1056.   Accordingly, we first examine whether such a process falls within the scop e of application 
of Article 8 and Annex C. In this examination, we will consider whether the identified actions of 
Russia, as the responding Member, constituted "any procedures" that fall within the scope of 
Article 8 and Annex C(1). If so, we will conside r whether those procedures were aimed at 
"checking and ensuring the fulfilment of sanitary or phytosanitary measures."1425  
7.6.4.3.3.2   Scope of control, inspection and approval procedures  
"Any" procedure  
7.1057.   In section 7.5.4.3.3.2  above, we exam ined this issue in respect of the EU -wide ban. As 
we noted, the alleged procedure at issue by the European Union concerns recognition of ASF-free 
areas in the European Union. In our view, this refers both to areas within and outside Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithua nia, and Poland. For the purposes of our analysis, we examine separately the 
situation of how Russia considered the areas outside these four affected EU member States (which 
we have assessed in section 7.5.2 above, vis-a-vis the EU-wide ban) and how Russia considered 
the areas inside these four affected EU member States. In this section, we focus on the latter of 
these situations. However, in our view, our examination of whether Russia's consideration of the 
ASF-free areas withi n Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland amounts to "any procedure" is 
common for the consideration of areas inside and outside the four affected EU member States. We 
therefore rely on our analysis of this matter as explained in section 7.5.4.3.3.2  above. We now 
turn to our assessment of whether Russia's consideration of the ASF-free areas within the four 
affected EU -member States was to "check or ensure the fulfilment" of SPS measures."  
To "check and ensure" the "fulfilment" of  SPS measures  
7.1058.   Article 8 and Annex C(1) apply to the procedures dealing with control, inspection and 
approval "which are aimed at checking and ensuring the fulfilment of SPS measures."1426 Annex 
A(1) defines "sanitary or phytosanitary measure" as any measure a pplied to achieve any of the 
objectives set out therein. We consider that the phrase "to check and ensure the fulfilment of an 
SPS measure" means that Article 8 and Annex C cover any procedure to make certain that a 
measure applied to achieve one of the ob jectives in Annex A(1) is fulfilled, that is, fully 
implemented.1427 The Appellate Body observed in this respect that "since the procedures referred 
to in Annex C(1) are those that check and ensure fulfilment of SPS measures, this suggests that 
such measures exist prior to the operation, undertaking, or completion of, the relevant 
procedures, as the latter seek and ensure fulfilment with the former." 1428 
7.1059.   We therefore examine whether Russia's procedure at issue checks and ensures the 
fulfilment of an SPS measure as defined in Annex A(1).  
                                               
1423 We do not mean to say that there is no core obligation in these provisions to reach a decision. 
Rather, these provisions foresee a requirement to conduct a procedure and rea ch a final determination, 
whether it be positive or negative. See, for example, Panel Report, US – Animals , para. 7.112.  
1424 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Apples , para. 420 ff.  The Appellate Body report on Australia – 
Apples  clarified that a complainant  enjoys discretion in identifying the measures at issue and the Panel should 
not conflate the requirement to identify the measures at issue with the requirement to identify the legal basis 
of the complaint.  This clarification was given in the part of the report in which the Appellate Body determined 
whether the panel erred in finding that the claims under Annex C(1)(a) and Article 8 of the SPS Agreement 
were outside of its term of reference. Article 6.2 of the DSU does not impose any additional requirement , as 
the Panel's analysis implies, that a complainant must, in its request for establishment of a panel, demonstrate 
that the identified measure at issue causes the violation of, or can violate, the relevant obligation.  The 
question of whether the measure s identified in the panel request can violate , or cause the violation of , the 
obligation in Annex C(1)(a) and Article 8 is a substantive issue to be addressed and resolved on the merits. 
Appellate Body Report, Australia – Apples , para. 423.  
1425 See, for exam ple, Panel Report, US - Animals , para 7.71.  
1426 Panel Report, US – Poultry (China) , para. 7.356 . 
1427 We find support for this approach in Panel Report, US - Animals , para 7.73.  
1428 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Apples , para. 436.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.1060.   We recall our findings in paragraph  7.231  above  that the bans on imports of the products 
at issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland  constitute SPS  measures within the meaning of 
Annex A(1), a nd, our findings in paragraph 7.517  above, that the procedures at issue - Russia's 
process for considering the European Union's request for ASF regionalization - are interlinked with 
the imposition and perpetuation, as well as the geographical and product scope, of the bans on the 
imports of the products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland.  
7.1061.   Russia has insisted1429 that the ban s on the imports of the products at issue from Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, we re adopted in part on the basis of the 2006 memorandum1430 and 
of the bilateral veterinary certificates1431; both  of which were already in existence. Furthermore, 
the bans on the imports of the products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland were 
clearly adopted in connection with Russia's overarching SPS regulation on animal diseases, as 
contained in Customs Union Decision 317.1432 Against this backdrop, we consider that the 
procedure at issue (i.e. Russia's process of consideration of the European Un ion's request for the 
recognition of ASF-free areas within the European Union including the four affected EU -member 
States ), is focused on determining whether the epizootic situation in the European Union warrants 
an adaptation of the veterinary certificat es bilaterally agreed in 2006. In this vein, the procedure 
at issue concerns checking fulfilment of a measure that is already in existence  covered by Article 8 
and Annex C(1) of the SPS Agreement  (rather than constituting "negotiations" concerning 
regional ization and revisions to certificates that would fall into the category of processes for 
modifying a measure).  
7.1062.   We now turn to our examination of the consistency of the process at issue with 
paragraphs (a) through (c) of Annex C(1).  
7.6.4.3.4   Whether the procedure at  issue was undertaken in accordance with 
Annex  C(1)(a) -(c) of the SPS Agreement  
7.6.4.3.4.1   Order of analysis  
7.1063.   We recall that the European Union has raised claims in respect of paragraphs (a) through 
(c) of Annex C(1) of the SPS Agreement. As we have already noted1433, we are free to structure 
the order of our analysis of the European Union's claims taking into account the circumstances of 
the present case, in a manner that is consistent with the structure and logic of the provisions at 
issue.1434 Most of the European Union's  arguments and evidence have focused on the fact that 
Russia has requested unnecessary evidence, which was not examined in a timely fashion, raising 
alleged violations of paragraphs (c) and (a) of Annex C(1). Furthermore, the European Union, in a 
summary f ashion, addresses other potential violations concerning paragraph (b) of Annex C(1).  
7.1064.   Based on the foregoing, we will continue our analysis by addressing whether the 
procedures at issue breach paragraph (c) of Annex C(1), followed by our corresponding 
exami nation in respect of paragraphs (a) and then (b) of Annex C(1).  
7.6.4.3.4.2   Legal test  
7.1065.   In section 7.5.4.3.4.2  above we have examined in detail the applicable legal test under 
Annex C(1)(a) through (c). We will rely on our considerations pr ovided in that section when 
addressing the subsequent questions concerning the manner in which Russia undertook and 
                                               
1429 Russia's first written su bmission, paras. 343 and 345; Russia's response to Panel question No. 78, 
para.129; and Russia's second written submission, paras. 172 -174. 
1430 European Union -Russia Memorandum of 4 April 2006 concerning principles of zoning and 
compartmentalization in the veterinary field  (Exhibit EU -61). 
1431 Veterinary certificate for piglets for fattening (Exhibit EU -52); Veterinary certificate for pigs for 
breeding (Exhibit EU -53); the Veterinary certificate for pork meat and raw meat preparations (Exhibit EU -54); 
Veterinar y certificate for slaughter pigs(Exhibit EU -55); Veterinary certificate for finished food products (Exhibit 
EU-56); Veterinary certificate for canned meat, salamis and other ready for consumption meat products(Exhibit 
EU-57).  
1432 Customs Union Decision No. 317 (Exhibit RUS -25). 
1433 See para 7.29 above.  
1434 Appellate Body Reports, Canada – Autos , para.  151; and Canada – Wheat Exports and Grain 
Imports , para.  109. See also Panel Report, US – Animals , para. 7.13.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  completed the procedure at issue in respect of the ASF-free areas the European Union claimed to 
exist within Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and  Poland.  
Whether the procedure at issue is consistent with Article 8 and Annex C(1)(a), 
C(1)(b) and C.(1)(c)  
Introduction  
7.1066.   As we have indicated, we consider that it is most appropriate for us to begin our 
examination of the European Union's claims under Ar ticle 8 and Annex C(1) with an assessment of 
the inconsistency of the procedure at issue, in respect of the products at issue from Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, with Annex C(1)(c). We thus begin with this assessment and then 
proceed with our exam ination pursuant to Annex C(1)(a) and C(1)(b).  
Whether the procedure at issue is inconsistent with Annex C(1)(c)  
7.1067.   The European Union posits that Russia's information requirements were not limited to 
what is necessary for the assessment of the European Union 's  regionalization  measures in respect 
of ASF, thus breaching Annex  C(1)(c).1435 In support of this contention, the European Union 
referred to specific information requests that we examine below. Russia argues that the European 
Union did not make a prima fac ie case and failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that Russia 
violated Annex C(1)(c).1436 
7.1068.   In particular, t he European Union claims that Russia request ed unnecessary information. 
Such requests are reflected in the letters that FSVPS sent to DG SANCO on 5 February and 12 
March 2014.  
7.1069.   The European Union's arguments are formulated as generally applicable to ASF-free areas 
in its entire territory, this is, including areas both inside and outside the four affected EU member 
States. As we have explained above, w e consider that we need to undertake our analysis 
separately in respect of the information requirements related to ASF-free areas inside and outside 
EU member States where ASF outbreaks have occurred. We consider that this distinct approach is 
appropriate,  flowing from our understanding that there is a difference between what needs to be 
demonstrated in support of the existence of an ASF-free area inside and outside a country where 
an ASF outbreak has occurred. We recall that this difference is called for b ased on the levels of risk 
posed by products originating from a territory that is close to an area affected by ASF, especially in 
the light of the home range of wild boar and potential links between wild boar populations. 
Moreover, in our assessment under Article 6.3 in sections 7.5.2.3.5  (in respect of the EU -wide 
ban) and 7.6.2.3.3  (in respect of the bans on the imports of the products at issue from Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland), we expla ined the different necessary evidence that the European 
Union had to provide to Russia to objectively demonstrate the existence of ASF-free areas, and the 
likelihood of those areas remaining ASF-free, both inside and outside the four affected EU member 
States.  
7.1070.   In addition, we recall that the ASF situation in the four affected EU member States 
changed throughout 2014. The differences in the degree of spread of ASF in the territory of each 
affected EU member State could affect the amount of information neces sary for Russia to 
undertake and complete the procedure at issue. We will therefore identify the type of information 
that Russia was requesting in respect of the territories affected by ASF throughout 2014 in order 
to assess the extent to which such inform ation was necessary for Russia's completion of the 
procedure at issue. We generally refer to the information requested in respect of the four affected 
EU member States, as we consider that regardless of when the outbreaks took place in each of 
those EU mem ber States, the information requests made in respect of Lithuania in February 2014 
reflected the type of information that Russia considered necessary for the completion of the 
procedure at issue. Such standard of requested information, as modified througho ut the 
subsequent communications of 2014, will serve as our benchmark in respect of the completion of 
the procedure at issue for the four ASF affected EU member States.  
                                               
1435 Europ ean Union's second written submission, para. 184.  
1436 Russia's first written submission, para. 441 . WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.1071.   We turn to the European Union's arguments in respect of the information requested by 
Russia for the assessment of ASF-free areas within Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland .  
7.1072.   Regarding the letter of 5 February 20141437, the European Union identifies the follow ing 
information as unnecessary and irrelevant : (i) swine population in personal sub sidiary farming with 
detailed density by region; (ii) production volume of different farms and factories; (iii) volumes of 
exported wild boar meat and trophies; and, (iv) detailed information about foreign hunters. In its 
arguments, the European Union clai ms that the aforementioned requests were unnecessary to 
assess the European Union's regionalization measures.1438 In addition, the European Union 
contests the relevance of Russia's requests for information, done through the letter of 5 February 
2014, pertaini ng to (i) pig farms and meat processing factories, including information about the 
suppliers and production volumes; and (ii) rough estimation of enterprises attested to ship animal 
products, by level of zoosanitary condition.1439 The European Union argues th at while this 
information might be relevant for compartmentalization, it is not relevant for regionalization. The 
European Union further claims that not only was Russia already in possession of the information 
with regard to attested pig farms and processi ng factories, but that the requested information on 
the level of sanitary condition was also irrelevant for regionalization, as all farms in the free -
regions are ASF -free.1440 
7.1073.   Regarding the letter of 12 March 20141441, the European Union considers that Russia 
requested the following unnecessary and irrelevant information: (i) absence of any proof of non -
existence of ASF in the territory of other EU member states; and (ii) absence of any proof of 
impossibility of getting meat of animals infected by ASF virus in th e production cycle of pork from 
other EU member states.1442  
7.1074.   The European Union also claims that Russia, through the letter from FSVPS to DG SANCO 
dated 16 May 2014, requested answers to questions where the European Union had already 
provided exhaustive repli es.1443 Furthermore, the European Union contends that this letter also 
requested unnecessary information, such as that referring to  (i) zoo sanitary status of small farms 
(due to the big number of them in the territories of the infected/high risk zones with r egard to 
ASF) and measure of their bio protection (possibility of free range, feed base, the regime of 
introducing the newly arrived animals in the herd, etc.); and (ii) Cartographical visual ization  of the 
establishments attested to supply live pigs and sw ine products from the EU Member States (Poland 
and Lithuania, in particular) to the Russian Federation with indication of the raw material bases of 
these establishments.1444 
7.1075.   Moreover, the European Union argues that it has made clear to Russia that "no [infect ed] 
establishment is allowed to supply pig meat or pig meat products to the establishments authorised 
to export to the Russian Federation."1445 On this basis, the European Union posits that it has 
provided abundant evidence to substantiate its claims under An nex C and Article 8 of the SPS.1446 
                                               
1437 Russia's letter to the European Union of 5 February 2014, FS -SD 8/1640  (Exhibit EU –84). 
1438 European Union's second written submission, paras. 168 -169. 
1439 European Union's second written submission, para. 172. See also first written submission, para. 
339. 
1440 European Union's second written submission, paras. 172 – 173. The European Union referred to 
similar information requests formulated through the letter of 16  May 2014, see second written submission, 
paras. 177 -178 (referring to  Russia's letter to the European Union of 16 May 2014, FS -EN-8/7999  (Exhibit EU -
93)). 
1441 Russia's letter to the European Union of 12 March 2014, FS -SD-4/3620  (Exhibit EU -90/RUS -135). 
1442 European Union's first written submission, para. 339; and second written submission, para. 176 . 
1443 European Union's first written submission, para. 339 (referring to Russia's letter to the European 
Union of 16 May 2014, FS -EN-8/7999  (Exhibit EU -93)). 
1444 Europe an Union's second written submission, paras. 177 -181. 
1445 European Union's second written submission, para. 182.  
1446 In its response to Panel Question 194, the European Union identified information requested by 
Russia in March 2014 that had already been provid ed or which was not relevant for the purposes of Russia's 
assessment of the European Union's regionalization measures:  
– proof that the historically ASF -free regions all over the EU are actually free, contrary to the provisions 
of the OIE Terrestrial Code ; 
- information about swine population in the industry sector and personal subsidiary farming with 
detailed density by region; detailed information about pig farms, pork processing factories and semi -finished 
 WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.1076.   In turn, Russia has argued that these information requests are justified. According to 
Russia,  the experts have confirmed that there has been an objective basis for Russia's 
requests.1447   
7.1077.   The Panel asked the experts to comme nt on the relevance of the questions included in 
some of Russia's information requests for the purposes of assessing the relevant risks.1448 
7.1078.   In his response to this question, Dr Brückner noted that the "intention and the magnitude 
of the information required is unclear ". Dr Brückner further observed that  
The information normally required from an exporting country would be restricted to 
the pathogen concerned and the potential hazards related to that pathogen and from 
the area under dispute (ASF affected area) and would in general require information 
that are not yet available from the exporting country (which in the case of exports 
from the EU to the Russian Federation would by default already be available for other 
animal and animal product exports). However, the information requested in Exhibit 
RUS-131, is in my opinion "an overkill" of which many of the questions are not relative 
or needed to conduct either a sensible quantitative or qualitative risk analysis.1449 
7.1079.   In her response to this question, Professor Penr ith indicated that such information 
"appears to be the information that the EU might use to perform a very detailed risk assessment 
for spread of the virus in the EU".1450 Professor Penrith further explained that all of the EU member 
States "cannot be conside red to pose an equal risk of ASF for Russia". Therefore, some information 
requested by Russia is irrelevant for certain areas in the European Union (i.e. wild boar 
populations and their movement in insular territories; and stamping out policies in territor ies which 
have never experienced ASF or haven't done so in more than 20 years).1451 Moreover, Professor 
Penrith indicated that the information required by Russia should be limited to  the list of items she 
identified, and mentioned that more detail might be re quired from countries that have experienced 
outbreaks.1452 Professor Penrith conclude her response by indicating that the "great majority of the 
information required is not relevant or necessary for a risk assessment by Russia".  
                                                                                                                                               
products, graded by production volume; regulato ry acts, providing for wild boar hunting and further utilization 
of killed animals (for food, as trophies); regulations on export of wild boar meat and trophies, number of killed 
animals and exported meat and trophies during 2013 -2014; detailed information  about foreign hunters, who 
entered the EU member States to hunt wild boar during the period 2013 -2014, detailed by region (including 
information about the number and the country of origin); detailed information about pig farms and meat 
processing factorie s attested to ship animals and products to the territory of the Customs Union, including 
information about the suppliers (number, country, region) and production volumes, detailed by region; rough 
estimation of enterprises attested to ship animal products to the territory of the Customs Union, by level of 
zoosanitary condition, equivalent to the previously conducted evaluation of the Russian and Belarusian 
enterprises, detailed by regions and graded by production volumes.  
1447 Russia's closing statement at the  second meeting with the Panel, para. 4. See also Russia's 
comments to the European Union's response to Panel question No. 322; and Russia's comments to the experts' 
responses to Panel question Nos. 12 and 13.  
1448 Panel question No. 13 to the experts. The co mmunications to which the Panel's question referred 
are those sent by Russia to the European Union or certain EU member States, dated 5 February 2014 ( Exhibit 
EU-84), 12 March 2014 ( Exhibit EU -90/Exhibit RUS -135), 10 April 2014 (Exhibit RUS -240) , 16 May 2 014 
(Exhibit EU -93), 31 July 2014 (Exhibit RUS -157), and 1 December 2014 (Exhibit RUS -131).  
1449 Dr Brückner's response to Panel question No. 13,  Compilation of the experts' responses, para. 
2.123.  
1450 Professor Penrith's response to Panel question No. 13, Compilation  of the experts' responses, para.  
2.125.  
1451 Professor Penrith's response to Panel question No. 13, Compilation of the experts' responses, para. 
2.125.  
1452 Professor Penrith's response to Panel question No. 13, Compilation of the experts' responses, pa ra. 
2.125. The list of information Professor Penrith referred to was provided in her response to Panel question No. 
12. Such list is comprised by the following information: (i) Whether the disease is notifiable throughout the 
country and what means are use d to ensure that this is known; (ii) if diagnostic capacity for ASF is available in 
the country (veterinary personnel and pig value chain actor trained in field diagnosis and laboratory capacity 
for confirmation of a field diagnosis); (iii) legislation in place for prevention and management of serious disease 
outbreaks including ASF; (iv) veterinary knowledge of and authority over all domestic pigs in the country or 
zone; (v) veterinary knowledge of the species, population, distribution and habitat of wild pigs in the country 
or zone; (vi) the epidemiological basis for recognition of a zone including all relevant topographical features; 
 WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.1080.   In his response to this quest ion, Dr Thomson expressed his views on the relevance of the 
information requested through the five letters identified by the Panel. In respect of the letter dated 
5 February 2014 (Exhibit EU -84), Dr Thomson noted that some of the questions contained in thi s 
exhibit are variations of other questions posed elsewhere by Russia, and indicated that for a 
country "that is not itself free of ASF this strikes me as an overkill and possibly an attempt to 
'muddy the water'."1453 Regarding the letter dated 10 April 2014 (Exhibit RUS -240), Dr Thomson 
noted that the three questions posed are of doubtful relevance, partly because "it would be 
reasonable to ask the EU for the results and conclusions drawn from surveys conducted in its 
territory generally", not so asking for t he surveys themselves from Poland.1454 Regarding the letter 
dated 16 May 2014 (Exhibit EU -93) Dr Thomson noted that, with the exception of the information 
regarding the presence of ASF vector in the EU member States, the questions posed appear to be 
relevant.1455 Regarding the letter dated 31 July 2014 (Exhibit RUS -157) Dr Thomson indicated that 
this "request seems to me relevant and justified".1456 Lastly, in respect of the letter dated 1 
December 2014 (Exhibit RUS -131), Dr Thomson indicated that he could find rele vance and 
therefore justification for the questions pertaining to  (i) ASF early detection and contingency plan 
for each EU member State; (ii) detailed information regarding monitoring and surveillance of wild 
boars in each EU member State; (iii) detailed i nformation regarding the measures taken by each 
EU member State to prevent trans -boundary spread of ASF in the European Union (excluding data 
demonstrating their effectiveness); and (iv) information regarding the role of ticks in the spread of 
ASF in the E U member States. Dr Thomson added, referring to the other questions in that letter, 
that they "strike me either as repetition or as questions which few if any countries in the world, 
including the RF, would be able to provide satisfactory answers to. It ne eds to be remembered that 
the RF is not an ASF -free country".1457 
7.1081.    In our view, the expert's responses indicate that some of the information requested by 
Russia is excessive for what would be necessary for Russia to perform a risk analysis of the spread 
of AS F from the European Union into Russia. To our mind this is directly relevant to the issue 
before us.  
7.1082.   As we have described in paragraph 7.516  above, the immediate objective of the 
procedure at issue is to assess whether there ar e ASF-free areas in the territory of the European 
Union, including those areas in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. As explained in paragraphs 
7.1069  and 7.1070  above, the information requirem ents that we would examine in this section are 
those that would be necessary for undertaking and completing the procedure at issue, as directed 
at the verification of the ASF-free character of certain areas in ASF affected EU member States. 
This would incl ude the information we have already identified as constituting the necessary 
evidence that the European Union should have provided to Russia in order to objectively 
demonstrate the existence of ASF-free areas, which are likely to remain so, in the affected  EU 
member States.1458 
7.1083.   Against this backdrop we consider that Russia's information requirements, in respect of 
the verification of the existence of ASF -free areas within ASF affected EU member States should be 
limited to  (i) geography; (ii) epidemiological su rveillance of ASF; (iii) the effectiveness of sanitary 
or phytosanitary controls in respect of ASF; (iv) ecosystems, in particular the presence of ASF in 
wildlife and the patter ns of behavioural ecology in wildlife; (v) the level of prevalence of ASF; and 
(vi) the existence of eradication or control programmes.1459 In our view, some of the information 
                                                                                                                                               
and (vii) the scope and extent of active surveillance for ASF undertaken in the country or zone to support the 
contention t hat the country or zone is free of ASF. Professor Penrith's response to Panel question No. 12, 
compilation 2.114.  
1453 Dr Thomson's response to Panel question No. 13, Compilation of the experts' responses, para. 
2.131.  
1454 Dr Thomson's response to Panel questio n No. 13, Compilation of the experts' responses, para.  
2.130.  
1455 Dr Thomson's response to Panel question No. 13, Compilation of the experts' responses, para. 
2.132.  
1456 Dr Thomson's response to Panel question No. 13, Compilation of the experts' responses, par a. 
2.129.  
1457 Dr Thomson's response to Panel question No. 13, Compilation of the experts' responses, para. 
2.128.  
1458 See paras. 7.935 -7.936  above.  
1459 See para. 7.935  above.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  requests made by Russia between February 2014 and July 2014 go beyond these areas. As 
indicated by the experts, some of the information requested by Russia seems  to us to be  
unnecessary and unjustified.  
7.1084.   As we have explained, the type of information that Russia was justified in request ing in 
respect of EU member States where ASF outbreaks have occurred differs from that which Russia 
was justified in request ing in support of the assessment of ASF -free areas outside affected EU 
member States. We recall Professor  Penrith's view that the former category of information could 
be more detailed. With this in mind, we move on to identify the information that in our view is 
excessive in respect of what Russia was justified in requesting for undertaking and completing the 
procedure at issue in respect of the ASF-free areas within affected EU member States.  
7.1085.   In particular, excessive information requests were made through the lett er of 
5 February  2014 in respect of  (i) detailed information about pig farms, pork processing factories 
and semi -finished products, graded by production volume; (ii) regulations on export of wild boar 
meat and trophies, number of killed animals and exporte d meat and trophies during 2013 -2014 
(for regions adjacent to the infected zone); (iii) detailed information about foreign hunters, who 
entered the country to hunt the wild boar during 2013 -2014 (including information about the 
number and the country of or igin), detailed by country and region; (iv) detailed information about 
pig farms and meat processing factories approved to ship animals and products to the territory of 
the CU, including information about the suppliers (number, country, region) and product ion 
volumes, detailed by country and region; and (v) rough estimation of enterprises approved to ship 
animal products to the territory of the CU, by level of zoosanitary condition, equivalent to the 
previously conducted evaluation of the Russian and Belaru sian enterprises, detailed by regions and 
graded by production volume.  
7.1086.   Moreover, through the letter dated 16 May 2014, Russia requested the following 
information, which seems  to us to be  excessive in respect of the assessment of ASF-free areas in 
Estonia,  Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland: (i) cartographical visual ization  of the establishments 
approved to supply live pigs and swine products from the affected EU member States (Poland and 
Lithuania, in particular) to Russia with indication of the raw material ba ses of these 
establishments; (ii) zoo sanitary status of small farms (due to the large number of them in the 
territories of the infected/high risk zones with regard to ASF) and measure of their bio protection 
(possibility of free range, feed base, the regi me of introducing the newly arrived animals in the 
herd, etc.); (iii) data on internal evaluation by the veterinary services of the EU member States of 
resources (human, technical, financial ones) needed for the creation and maintenance of 
abovementioned ASF-free zones; (iv) data on functional isolation of sub -populations of domestic 
and wild animals in zones with the proves of the absence of migration/seasonal movements of wild 
boars between the zones; and (v) data on the presence of the ASF vector in the EU member 
States.1460 We recall that some of the preceding information might have been relevant to assess 
the situation in an affected EU member State. However, the level of detail required in respect of 
these categories of information seems excessive. We rec all that the information that Russia would 
be justified in asking for  is the kind that would be necessary for undertaking and completing the 
procedure at issue. In the instant case, Russia requested  an excessive amount of detail in respect 
of several categ ories of information that, in our view, go beyond what we have identified as 
necessary for an objective demonstrative of the existence of ASF -free areas in an affected EU 
member State.  
7.1087.   Based on the foregoing, we consider that Russia formulated information requirements 
there were not limited to what was necessary for the procedure at issue, thus breaching Annex 
C(1)(c).  
Whether the procedure at issue is inconsistent with Annex C(1)(a)  
7.1088.   We have outlined above the parties' arguments pertaining to Annex C(1)(a),  which also 
relate to the affected EU member States.  
7.1089.   Russia argues that the evidence the European Union provided distorts the overall picture 
of the constant information exchange and intensive negotiations concerning regionalization, 
                                               
1460 Russia's letter to the European Union of 16 May 2014, FS -EN-8/7999  (Exhibit EU -93). WT/DS475/R  
 
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  including the numerou s explanations provided by Russia in relation to the insufficiency of 
submitted information. Russia also argues that it made several offers to resume trade with the 
European Union on the condition that trade would be conducted in an ASF -free manner.1461 Russi a 
concludes that the European Union has merely asserted a violation of Article 8 and Annex C(1)(a) 
by pointing to alleged delays in evaluating requests for regionalization without demonstrating that 
these delays were "undue". On the contrary, Russia argues  that it has taken reasonable time to 
assess the European Union's regionalization requests, especially in light of the deteriorating ASF 
situation in the European Union.1462 In this regard, Russia contends that the European Union has 
not put forward sufficien t evidence to make a prima facie  case and failed to meet its burden of 
proof in demonstrating that Russia violated Article 8 and Annex C(1)(a).1463 
7.1090.   We recall that a determination of whether a delay in an approval, control or inspection 
procedure is undue, for  the purposes of Annex C(1)(a), has to be examined in light of the 
circumstances of a particular case.1464 Moreover, "not every delay" caused by a Member is 
contrary to Annex C(1)(a), and a Member is not liable for delays not attributable to it.1465  
7.1091.   In paragrap h 7.571  above we noted that, mindful of the guidance provided by previous 
panels and the Appellate Body, w e consider that a delay is undue if it is "unwarranted, or 
otherwise excessive, disproportionate or unjustifiable."1466 In considering whether the European 
Union's allegation of "delay" can be considered to be "undue", we will examine whether the delay 
is unwarranted, or otherwise excessive, disproportionate or unjustifiable.  
7.1092.   As part of this examination, we consider whether th ere were any periods of inaction or 
inability to proceed on the substance of the application that would constitute delays within the 
meaning of Annex C(1)(a).1467 This entails not only a consideration of the total period of time 
during which Russia, as the im porting Member, conducts the procedure, but also requires an 
overall assessment of the facts and circumstances in this case. The absolute length of time 
required for a Member to evaluate a particular request – and the time needed for any interim 
series of steps required in order to ascertain the comprehensiveness, accuracy and pertinence of 
the information – will depend on the specific circumstances of the case.1468 We agree with the view 
of the panel in US – Animals  on the importance of having a point of refe rence in order to gauge 
the reasonableness of the length of time of the review process, referring to such indicators like the 
standard processing time reflected in the policy and practice of the Member carrying out the 
procedure, as well as guidelines prov ided by the OIE.1469 
7.1093.   Furthermore, we recall our observations in section 7.3.6 above on the importance of 
temporal considerations in this case. We note that the panel in US – Animals identified an end -
date for the period of time it  would take into account for the purpose of assessing the alleged 
undue delays in the conduct of the responding Member's procedures.1470 With reference to the 
Appellate Body ruling in EC – Chicken Cuts  and the panel ruling in EC – Approval and Marketing of 
Biotech Products, the panel in US – Animals determined that the appropriate end -date for which to 
examine the complainant's claims would be the date of the establishment of the Panel.1471 
7.1094.   In the instant case, we recall the exchanges that took place between the parties in 
connection with the European Union's request for recognition of ASF-free areas in the European 
                                               
1461 Russia's first written submission, paras , 435 – 436. 
1462 Russia's first written submission, para . 437. 
1463 Russia's first written submission, para .438. 
1464 Appellate Body Rep ort, Australia – Apples , para. 437.  
1465 Russia's first written submission, para. 434 (referring to Panel Reports, EC – Approval and Marketing 
of Biotech Products , paras. 7.1495  and 7.1497).  
1466 Panel Report, US – Animals, para. 7.129. With reference to the App ellate Body Report, Australia – 
Apples , para. 437 (referring to Panel Reports, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, para. 7.1495).  
1467 Using the order analysis by the panel in US – Animals , para. 7.127.  
1468 Panel Report, US – Animals, para. 7.114 . That panel observed that applicant Members present 
different SPS circumstances that "may also be affected by law, policy, governance, and veterinary 
infrastructures".  
1469 Panel Report, US - Animals , para 7.117.  
1470 Panel Report, US - Animals , para 7.118.  
1471 Panel Report, US - Animals , para 7.118.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  Union was initially presented through the letter dated 31 January 20141472 (at that time, there had 
only been two outbreaks in wild boars in Lithuania) a nd Russia's negative response to this request 
through the letter dated 29 July 2014 (after the date of the establishment of the Panel and after 
the outbreaks in Poland and Latvia had already occurred. We further recall the subsequent 
exchanges, including R ussia's communication of 1 December 2014 and the European Union's 23 
December 2014 response.  
7.1095.   Against this background, we need to determine whether the procedure at issue, aimed at 
the recognition of ASF-free areas in the affected Member states, was undert aken and completed 
without any undue delay.  
7.1096.   As we have indicated in our analysis of the European Union's claims pursuant to Annex 
C(1)(c), Russia made a number of information requests that went beyond the information that was 
necessary for the procedure a t issue. We underline that this was the case in respect of those areas 
located in the EU member States affected with ASF outbreaks, regardless of the moment when the 
initial outbreak occurred in the respective EU member State.  
7.1097.   In our view, when a Member m akes unjustified and unnecessary information requests, 
which go beyond what would be required to make a substantive assessment of the situation 
subject to the procedure at issue, a Member would be acting in a manner that impedes 
undertaking and completing the respective procedures. In the present case, Russia's excessive and 
unjustified information requests in respect of detailed information on the pig sector and foreign 
hunters in ASF -affected EU member States amount to that situation. In light of the Appe llate 
Body's guidance quoted above1473, such a situation may constitute an infringement of the 
obligation to undertake and complete a procedure without undue delay.  
7.1098.   Moreover, we consider that Russia's references to its preferred tools for control and 
eradicat ion of ASF in the affected EU member States, including safe trade from compartments as 
opposed to ASF -free zones (or areas)1474, is indicative of Russia's reluctance to consider the 
European Union's request in a timely fashion.  
7.1099.   Based on the foregoing we conc lude that the procedure at issue was undertaken and 
completed with undue delay, thus breaching Annex C(1)(a)'s first clause.  
7.1100.   We now turn to the European Union's claim in respect of the second clause in 
Annex  C(1)( a), this is, the procedure at issue was un dertaken and completed in a manner less 
favourable for imported products than for like domestic products. Regarding this claim, the Panel 
will examine whether the European Union has established that the products at issue from the 
European Union have been t reated in a "less favourable manner" than domestic products with 
respect to the undertaking and completion of the procedure at issue.  
7.1101.   We recall and refer to our analysis above in the context of the EU -wide ban.1475 Similarly, 
we understand the rationale behin d the European Union's argument here is that the unnecessary 
and excessive information requests addressed by Russia to the European Union in respect of the 
recognition of ASF-free areas within the affected EU member States were not made  in respect of 
the corresponding trade of like products in Russia.  
7.1102.   In our view, the European Union has not provided sufficient evidence that would support 
its contention that such type of information is not required by Russia in order to determine which 
areas within Russia a re ASF-free. In addition, the European Union has not clearly explained the 
internal process in Russia to determine the recognition of ASF-free areas in Russia, beyond stating 
that there is no ban on the internal trade of the products at issue originating f rom ASF-free areas 
in Russia. Without this information, we are not in a position to ascertain whether Russia took more 
than one year or which type and quantity of evidence Russia required from its regional authorities 
                                               
1472 European Union's letter to Russia of 31 January 2014, ARES(2014)226547, SANCO 
G7/JP/mh(2014)241111  (Exhibit EU -64). 
1473 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Apples , para. 438.  
1474 Letter from the Russian Veterinary Service to DG SANCO, No. FS -AS-8/23743, 1 December 2015  
(Exhibit RUS -131). 
1475 See paras. 7.572 -7.591  above.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  to determine the existence of ASF-free areas in Russia. We therefore consider that the European 
Union has not satisfied the burden of demonstrating that Russia's procedure does not comply with 
the second clause of Annex C(1)(a).  
7.1103.   In light of our finding above with respect of the first clause o f Annex C(1)(a), that Russia 
undertook and completed the procedure at issue with undue delay, we conclude that the procedure 
at issue is inconsistent with Annex C(1)(a).  
Whether the procedure at issue is inconsistent with Annex C(1)(b)  
7.1104.   The European Union contends that Russia violates all five of the obligations contained in 
Annex C(1)(b).1476 Russia argues that the European Union merely recites the obligations of the 
provisions, without explaining how the specific procedural obligations were breached.1477 
7.1105.   Accord ing to the European Union,  Russia did not publish or otherwise communicate to the 
European Union the standard processing period and did not comply with any of the other 
requirements in Annex C(1)(b) of the SPS Agreement.1478 The European Union further argues,  in 
its responses to the Panel question No. 197, that despite the repeated requests from Russia for 
more evidence with regards to the European Union's regionalization measures, Russia never 
provided any information as to the anticipated period of time for the approval proceedings.1479 The 
Panel1480 requested the European Union to indicate whether it had requested from Russia 
information regarding the anticipated processing period for the European Union's regionalization 
request, and to provide the relevant eviden ce in support of its presentation of this request. The 
European Union responded as follows:   
The EU stressed on several occasions that the information provided should enable 
Russia to assess and accept the EU ASF regionalisation measures.1481 
Despite the unpr ecedented amount of information provided to Russia, it insisted on 
not having received sufficient information so as to enable it to perform a risk 
assessment.  
Given Russia's refusal to acknowledge it received all relevant information, the EU's 
efforts were  focused on the provision of the supplementary information requested. 
Under those circumstances a specific request on the anticipated processing period of 
the EU's request was not addressed to Russia.1482 
7.1106.   We therefore find that the European Union did not make  a request within the meaning of 
this provision, and thus did not trigger an obligation on the part of Russia to communicate the 
anticipated processing period.1483 
                                               
1476 In US - Animals , the panel first examined whether the challenged measures fell under its term of 
reference. Panel Report, US – Animals, paras. 7.188 and 7.190. The panel opined that to comply with Article 
6.2 of the DSU, a complainant was required to specify in a sufficiently clear manner which of the five 
obligations in the provision it was challengi ng in its panel request. In this case, we consider that the 
European  Union has indicated that it is challenging all five obligations in Annex C(1)(b). See European Union's 
panel request, p.5 . 
1477 Russia's first written submission, para. 439.  
1478 European Union 's second written submission, para. 187.  
1479 European Union's response to Panel question  No. 197 , para. 388.  
1480 Panel Question 289, seeking clarification of paragraph 342 of the European Union's first written 
submission.  
1481 (footnote original) Letters of 20 Fe bruary 2014 ( Exhibit EU -175), 6 March 2014 ( Exhibit EU -86) and 
of 13 March 2014 ( Exhibit EU -91). 
1482 European Union's response to Panel  Question No. 289, paras. 135 -137. 
1483 We note that the panel in EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products  considered t hat the 
anticipated processing period is to be provided to applicants upon request and in that dispute, no evidence of 
applicants' requests was provided. Panel Report s, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products , 
paras.  7.1587 –7.1589.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.1107.   Furthermore, we recall that a prima facie  case "is one which, in the absence of effective 
refutation by the defending party, requires a panel, as a matter of law, to rule in favour of the 
complaining party presenting the prima facie case."1484 
7.1108.   The European Union has not attempted to provide any sort of argument or evidence in 
support of its claim that the procedure at issue is inconsistent with Annex C(1)(b) of the SPS 
Agreement. We therefore consider that the European Union has failed to make a prima facie case 
in respect of the alleged inconsistency of the procedure at issue with Annex C(1)(b).  
7.6.4.4   Conclu sion 
7.1109.   As explained in the previous sections, we find that Russia's process of consideration of 
the European Union's request for recognition of ASF -free areas within the European Union 
including the four affected EU member States falls within the scope of Ar ticle 8 and Annex C(1) of 
the SPS Agreement. WE also find that Russia  formulated information requirements that were not 
limited to what was necessary for the procedure at issue, thus breaching Annex C(1)(c). Moreover , 
Russia undertook and completed the pro cedure at issue with undue delay, thus rendering the 
procedure at issue inconsistent with Annex C(1)(a). We consider that the European Union has 
failed to make a prima facie case in respect of the alleged inconsistency of the procedure at issue 
with Annex C(1)(b).  In light of these findings, we find that the procedure at issue is inconsistent 
with Article 8 of the SPS Agreement.  
7.6.5   Claims under Articles 2.2 , 5.1, 5.2 , and 5.7 of the SPS Agreement  
7.6.5.1   Main arguments of the parties  
7.6.5.1.1   European Union  
7.1110.   The European Union  argues that because Russia 's measures do not "conform to " and are 
not "based on " the OIE recommendations, it is necessary to establish whether there is a solid 
scientific basis for their imposition.1485 
7.1111.   The European Union highlights that an analysis under Ar ticle 5.1 of the SPS Agreement 
entails addressing two issues: whether there is a "risk assessment " within the meaning of the 
SPS Agreement and whether the SPS measures at issue are "based on " the mentioned risk 
assessment.1486 
7.1112.   The European Union argues that R ussia did not provide any risk assessment  in support of 
its EU -wide ban, although such a risk assessment was requested during the numerous contacts 
took place between the Russian and the EU competent veterinary authorities.1487 
7.1113.   The European Union points out t hat Article 5.2 of the SPS Agreement contains a list of 
factors that have to be taken into account while performing a risk assessment.1488 The 
European  Union argues that in adopting, maintaining and/or applying the measures at issue, 
Russia did not and does n ot take into account those factors.1489 
7.1114.   The European Union posits that since Russia did not provide any risk assessment for the 
measures at issue, Russia therefore violates the provisions of Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement, 
and that it follows that the provi sions of Article 2.2 are also breached1490 
7.1115.   The European Union points out that while solely Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement may 
still shelter a Member's measure in such circumstances, Russia does not fulfil any of the 
requirements  of such provision.1491 
                                               
1484 Appellate Body  Report, EC – Hormones , para. 104. 
1485 European Union's first written submission, para. 153.  
1486 European Union's first written submission, para. 154.  
1487 European Union's first written submission, para. 165.  
1488 European Union's first written submission, para. 16 8. 
1489 European Union's first written submission, para. 170.  
1490 European Union's first written submission, para. 176.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.6.5.1.2   Russia  
7.1116.   Russia argues that its import restrictions  on the four affected EU member States are in 
line with international  standards, and that thus, they are presumed to be consistent with the 
relevant provisions of the SPS Agreement, including Article 2.2.1492 
7.6.5.2   Main argu ments of the third parties  
7.6.5.2.1   Australia  
7.1117.   Australia emphasizes that Russia does not appear to have conducted a risk assessment in 
relation to trade in relevant products from those areas affected by ASF, whether within the four 
affected EU member States or EU -wide.1493 
7.1118.   Australia highlights that it is necessary for the Panel to consider whether the level of 
scientific information was insufficient so as to justify Russia 's provisional adoption of SPS measures 
not based on a risk assessment in accordance with Article 5 .7 of the SPS Agreement.1494 
7.1119.   Australia stresses that the insufficiency of evidence must relate to information that is 
relevant to the risk assessment in question. Australia also notes that the reasonable period of time 
requirement has to be established on a c ase-by-case basis, and that, as in the present case, 
where, in its view, the apparent uncertainty relates to containment zones for ASF, the Panel may 
wish to take into account related rules and guidelines on regionalization.1495 
7.6.5.2.2   Brazil  
7.1120.   Brazil argues that ther e is no fixed or rigid reference for the determination of what means 
"sufficient scientific evidence" for the purpose of this provision, and the amount of scientific 
evidence may vary according to the circumstances of the case. Brazil however highlights th at while 
amount of scientific evidence considered sufficient to justify a provisional measure in the context 
of Article 5 may vary, the ruling by the Appellate Body in Japan – Apples  where the Appellate Body 
considered that there was a large quantity of sc ientific evidence when it verified the existence "of 
scientific studies as well as practical experience having accumulated for the past 200 years ", may 
serve as a reference.1496   
7.6.5.2.3   Norway   
7.1121.   Norway highlights that while under Article 2.1 of the SPS Agreement, Me mbers have the 
right to take SPS measures "necessary for the protection of human, animal or plant life or health, 
provided that such measures are not inconsistent with provision of the [..] Agreement ", such right 
carries with it certain obligations, includ ing those in Article 5 of the SPS Agreement.1497 
7.1122.   Norway asserts that Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement is viewed as a "specific application " 
of the basic obligation set out in Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement and that the Appellate Body has 
clarified that wher e a measure is not based on a risk assessment in accordance with Article 5.1, it 
will be presumed to be inconsistent with the second and third prongs of Article 2.2 of the SPS 
Agreement.1498 
7.1123.   Norway stresses that with respect to Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreemen t, the Appellate 
Body has identified four cumulative requirements that must be fulfilled for a Member to have 
recourse to Article 5.7: (i)  It must be imposed in respect of a situation where "relevant scientific 
                                                                                                                                               
1491 European Union's second written submission, para. 68.  
1492 Russia's second written submission, para. 296; see also Russia's second written sub mission, fn 664.  
1493 Australia's third -party submission, para. 10.  
1494 Australia's third -party submission, para. 11.  
1495 Australia's third -party submission, para. 14.  
1496 Brazil's third -party submission, para. 21 (citing Appellate Body Report, Japan – Apples , para s. 180, 
186, and 188).  
1497 Norway's third -party submission, paras. 3 -4.  
1498 Norway's third -party submission, para. 5.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  information is insufficient "; (ii) It must b e adopted "on the basis of available pertinent 
information "; (iii) The Member must "seek to obtain the additional information necessary for a 
more objective assessment of risk "; and (iv) The Member must "review the […] measure 
accordingly within a reasonab le period of time ".1499 
7.1124.   Norway emphasizes that the threshold condition for the application of Article 5.7 of the 
SPS Agreement is that evidence is insufficient, and that the main question will be whether the 
available scientific evidence permits, in quantitat ive or qualitative terms, an assessment of risks 
within the meaning of Article 5.1.1500 
7.1125.   Norway highlights that "insufficient" in the context of Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement 
refers to both situations where there is not enough scientific evidence (in quanti tative terms) and 
to situations where there is enough evidence, but it does not give reliable results (in qualitative 
terms).1501 
7.1126.   Norway posits that with respect to the second element, the "available pertinent 
information" must equate to "some evidence of a r isk", even if it is not enough to perform a proper 
risk assessment. In addition, there must be a rational relationship between the evidentiary basis 
and the provisional measure, and that even if the rigorous standards of Article 5.1, together with 
Articles  5.2 and 5.3 and annex A(4), do not apply under Article 5.7, those standards must be 
considered as relevant context, and thus indicate what types of information may be considered as 
"available pertinent information ".1502 
7.1127.   With respect to the third element whic h is to "seek to obtain the additional information 
necessary for a more objective assessment of risk ", Norway emphasizes that this reflects the 
temporary  nature of the provisional  measures within the meaning  of Article 5.7 of the 
SPS Agreement, and that w hile the  "the information sought must be germane to conducting 'a 
more objective assessment of the risk ', i.e. the evaluation of the likelihood of entry, establishment 
or spread of, in casu, a pest, according to the SPS measures that might be applied ", a Member "is 
not expected to guarantee specific results […] [n]or is it expected to predict the actual results of 
its efforts to collect additional information at the time when it adopts the SPS measure ".1503 
7.1128.   With respect to the requirement of review within a r easonable period of time, Norway 
highlights that what constitutes a "reasonable period of time " should be conducted on a case -by-
case basis, and that it will depend "upon the specific circumstances of each case, including the 
difficulty of obtaining the ad ditional information necessary for the review and the characteristics of 
the provisional SPS measure ".1504 
7.6.5.3   Analysis by the Panel  
7.6.5.3.1   Introduction  
7.1129.   The European Union framed its claims under Articles 2.2, 5.1, 5.2 and 5.7 of the 
SPS Agreement in the same manner for  both the EU -wide ban and the bans on imports of the 
products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland . The European Union argues that the 
measures at issue are not based on a risk assessment conducted in accordance with Articles 5.1 
and 5.2.1505 Furthermore, the European Union contends that because Russia has violated 
Article  5.1 by not providing a risk assessment for the measures at issue, consequentially, Russia 
has also violated Article 2.2.1506 In respect of Article 5.7, the European Union argues  that this is 
                                               
1499 Norway's third -party submission, para. 8.  
1500 Norway's third -party submission, paras. 10 -12. 
1501 Norway's third -party submission, para. 14 (cit ing Appellate Body Report, Japan – Apples , para. 
185).  
1502 Norway's third -party submission, para. 19.  
1503 Norway's third -party submission, para. 20 (citing Appellate Body Report, Japan – Agricultural 
Products II , para. 92) . 
1504 Norway's third -party submission, p ara. 21.  
1505 European Union's first written submission, paras. 165 and 170.  
1506 European Union's first written submission, para. 176. See also opening statement at the first 
meeting with the Panel, paras. 78 -80; response to Panel question No. 122, paras. 255 -257; and second written 
submission, para. 65.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  not a situation where scientific evidence is insufficient , and  that Russia has failed to comply with 
any of the conditions of Article 5.7.1507 According to the European Union, the sufficiency of 
scientific evidence should be assessed at the time  of adoption of the measure. Furthermore, 
following the measure's adoption, the Member is obliged to seek to obtain the additional 
information necessary for a more objective assessment of risk. According to the European Union, 
the moment a Member asks for information that is not necessary for a more objective assessment 
of risk, including the type of information characterized by the individual experts in the present 
proceedings as an "overkill" or as an attempt to "muddy the water", that Member can no longe r 
benefit from the provisional shelter of Article 5.7. Such information requests are a clear warning 
sign that the respective Member is not genuinely seeking to perform a more objective risk 
assessment (objective in the sense of being based on the pertinen t information available). Russia 
has not performed and has not provided any risk assessment in support of the measures at 
issue.1508 
7.1130.   Russia relies on different approaches to defend the bans on the imports of the products at 
issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuan ia, and Poland and the EU -wide ban. In respect of the former, it 
counters that the measures regarding Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland  are presumed to be 
consistent with Articles 2.2, 5.1 and 5.2 because they conform to the relevant legal standards i n 
the Terrestrial Code within the meaning of Article 3.2.1509 At a late state in the proceedings, 
Russia's  argument was , to the extent the Panel were to  find that Article 6 of the SPS Agreement 
does not provide a basis for importing Members to take precaution ary trade actions pending 
compliance by an exporting country with Article 6.3 of the SPS Agreement, and that the 
appropriate temporal analysis is the time of the Panel's establishment, those measures would be 
justified under Article 5.7.1510 Russia argues tha t accordingly, it would obviate any basis for claims 
by the European Union with respect to Articles 5.1, 5.2, and 2.2 of the SPS Agreement regarding 
Russia's bans on imports of the products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland.1511 
7.1131.   In section 7.5.5.3.3.1  above, we have examined the text of Articles 5.1, 5.2, 2.2 and 5.7 
of the SPS Agreement, the relationship between these provisions, the order in which to analyse 
them, and the legal test corresponding to each of the se provisions. We then examined the EU -wide 
ban in light of the guidance identified in those sections. To avoid unnecessary repetition, we will 
not replicate the general guidance on which we will base our assessment of the bans on the 
imports of the produc ts at issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. Rather, we will 
include cross -references to the relevant sections and findings, when necessary.  
7.1132.   Based on our understanding of Russia's arguments and our findings in respect of Article 6 
of the SPS A greement and the temporal framework in light of which we examine the measures at 
issue, we consider that the conditions for the consideration of Russia's alternative argument are 
met. Therefore, we turn to examine whether the bans on the imports of the pro ducts at issue from 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland fall under Article 5.7.  
                                               
1507 European Union's first written submission, para. 202; opening statement at the first meeting of the 
Panel, paras. 81 -95; and second written submission, para. 68.  
1508 European Union's first written submission, pa ras. 165 and 170.  
1509 Russia's first written submission, paras. 216 and 296; and response to Panel question No. 126, 
para. 235.  
1510 We note that Russia raised this argument in response to Panel question No. 279, and included 
additional arguments in support of this argument in Russia's responses to Panel questions No. 293 and 294. All 
of these questions were posed by the Panel after the second substantive meeting, and replied to by Russia on 
8 October 2015. We are concerned with the impact that such timing may h ave on due process. In this respect, 
we note that the European Union did not raise any issue with the timing of the formulation of this alternative 
argument and from the outset of the proceedings challenged the applicability of Article 5.7 in respect of bo th 
the EU -wide ban and the bans on the imports of the products at issue from the four affected EU member 
States. We recall that the Appellate Body has found that "[i]t follows that the principles of good faith and due 
process oblige a responding party to a rticulate its defence promptly and clearly. This will enable the 
complaining party to understand that a specific defence has been made, 'be aware of its dimensions, and have 
an adequate opportunity to address and respond to it. ' Whether a defence has been made at a sufficiently early 
stage of the panel proceedings to provide adequate notice to the opposing party will depend on the particular 
circumstances of a given dispute. " (Appellate Body Report, US – Gambling , para. 272 (quoting Appellate Body 
Report, Chile – Price Band System , para. 164 )). In the light of the circumstances of the present case, we 
consider that, although Russia could well have raised this particular alternative defence in respect of the EU 
member State -specific bans earlier, the European  Union had adequate opportunity to address this argument.  
1511 Russia's response to Panel question No. 279, para. 134.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.6.5.3.2   Whether Article 5.7 applies to the bans on the imports of the products at issue 
from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland  
7.1133.   In terms of burden of proof, we recall that the p anel in EC – Approval and Marketing of 
Biotech Products, operating under the  premise that Article 5.7 is a "qualified right", concluded that 
because Article 5.1 is only applicable if Article 5.7 is not, "when a complaining party presents a 
claim of violati on under Article 5.1, the burden is on the complaining party to establish a prima 
facie case of inconsistency with both Articles 5.1 and 5.7."1512 The panel in US – Animals observed 
that " nothing in the case law on Article 5.7 or other provisions which establ ish exemptions or 
provide the ability to derogate from certain WTO obligations supersedes the basic premise that the 
party asserting something bears the burden of proving it.1513"1514 Accordingly , the Panel finds that 
the initial burden was on the European Union  as part of its  case under Article 5.1 to raise the 
inapplicability of Article 5.7 – which it did in its Panel request and first written  submission.1515 As 
Russia has asserted that its measures fall within the scope of  Article 5.7, it carries the burden to 
prove that each of the four cumulative requirements has been  satisfied.1516 
7.1134.   The European Union argues that this is not a situation where scientific evidence is 
insufficient and that Russia has failed to comply with any of the conditions of Article 5.7.1517  
7.1135.   Russia  argues, in the alternative, that the bans on the imports of the products at issue 
from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland are justified under Article  5.7 of the SPS 
Agreement.1518 Russia does not provide clear argumentation in respect of the manner in wh ich the 
four prongs of Article 5.7 are satisfied in respect of the bans on the imports of the products at 
issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. Rather, Russia makes limited references to some 
of those four prongs.  
7.1136.   Regarding the sufficiency of  scientific evidence, Russia considers that the Panel is not 
limited to examin ing the sufficiency of scientific evidence at the time of the adoption of the 
challenged measure, but rather on an ongoing basis. In that respect, Russia posits that the 2015 
EFSA scientific report confirms the continuing scientific uncertainty with respect of ASF spread and 
ASF eradication, in particular in the context of the European Union as a whole.1519  
7.1137.   In addition, Russia indicates that the initial imposition of the four measur es for each of 
the affected EU  member States corresponds to provisional import bans on various live pig and pork 
products upon the notification by the individual EU member State of the initial ASF outbreaks. 
Such initial bans were precautionary measures.1520 We understand this to mean that Russia based 
                                               
1512 Panel Report s, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products , para. 7.3000. Like the Panel in US 
– Animals , para. 7.292, we note that th e panel in EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products based its 
reasoning on the Appellate Body decision in EC – Tariff Preferences on similar language in the Enabling Clause, 
which was issued later in time than the Appellate Body decision that discus sed Article 5.7 of the SPS 
Agreement. The Appellate Body in EC – Tariff Preferences stated that where the permissive provision 
constitutes a right rather than an exception, "the complaining party bears the burden of establishing that a 
challenged measure i s inconsistent with the provision permitting particular behaviour". Appellate Body Report, 
EC – Tariff Preferences , para. 88.  
1513 (footnote original) See e.g. Appellate Body Report, Japan – Apples , para. 157 ("t he party that 
asserts a fact is responsible for  providing proof thereof."). Appellate Body in Canada – Renewable Energy / 
Canada – Feed-in Tariff Program (where the Appellate Body concluded that "the characterization of [a] 
provision as a derogation does not pre -determine the question as to which party  bears the burden of proof with 
regard to the requirements stipulated in the provision.") (Appellate Body Report, Canada – Renewable Energy / 
Canada – Feed-in Tariff Program , para. 5.56 (referring to Appellate Body Report, China – Raw Materials , para. 
334)).  
1514 Panel Report, US – Animals , para. 7.292.  
1515 European Union's panel request (WT/DS475/2), p. 3; first written submission, paras. 177 -202; and 
second written submission, paras. 66 -83. 
1516 We find additional support for this approach in Panel Report, US- Animals , para. 7.293.  
1517 European Union's first written submission, para. 202; opening statement at the first meeting of the 
Panel, paras. 81 -95; and second written submission, para. 68.  
1518 Russia's response to Panel question No. 279, para. 134. See also resp onse to Panel question No. 
293, para. 148; response to Panel question No. 294, para. 150.  
1519 Russia's response to Panel question No. 309, paras. 266 -267. 
1520 Russia's response to Panel question No. 295, para. 156. Russia also refers to responses to Panel's 
questions No. 279, 293, and 294.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  its measures on pertinent available information related to the presence of ASF in the four affected 
EU member States.  
7.1138.   Russia argues that i t then sought additional information. In particular, Russia indicates 
that it actively engaged the European Union and sent top Russian SPS officials to conduct in -
country visits and to meet with veterinary officials in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland at 
various moments throughout 2014.1521 Russia concludes that based on th e spread of ASF in the 
affected EU member States, as well as on the evidence regarding ASF outbreaks in the second half 
of 2014 and through the middle of 2015, and on the European Union's failure to objectively 
demonstrate its ASF -free zones would remain A SF-free, it continued the maintenance of the 
measures.1522 
7.1139.   In the Panel's examination to determine whether Russia's measures fall within the scope 
of Article 5.7, we turn first to determining whether scientific evidence was (in)sufficient for Russia 
to assess  the relevant risks within the meaning of Articles 5.1  and 5.7 and as defined by paragraph 
4 of Annex A. If the Panel finds that scientific information is insufficient, we would examine 
whether the bans on the imports of the products at issue from Estonia,  Latvia, Lithuania, and 
Poland meet the other three conditions of Article 5.7.  
7.1140.   The parties have addressed all four requirements in their arguments. The European 
Union's concerns relate both to the adoption and to the continued application, or maintenance, of 
the measure at issue. Most of the evidence cited by the European Union in support of its assertions 
under Article 5.7 relates to the period following adoption of the measure in respect of Lithuania 
and extends throughout 2014, including the dates on whi ch the measures were adopted in respect 
of the imports of the products at issue from Poland (February 2014), Latvia (June 2014) and 
Estonia (September 2014). The information referred to by the European Union includes material 
that it sent to Russia on its own initiative and in response to Russia's requests.1523 Therefore, the 
Panel finds it appropriate to begin by examining the sufficiency of scientific evidence, throughout 
the relevant dates of 2014. The Panel will then examine the extent to which the bans on  the 
imports of the products at issue from the affected EU member States were based on available 
pertinent information; followed by an assessment of whether Russia has sought to obtain 
additional information necessary for a more objective assessment of ris k. Lastly the Panel will 
assess whether Russia has reviewed the challenged measures accordingly within a reasonable 
period of time. As these requirements are cumulative, if we find that Russia has failed to comply 
with any one of these four requirements Ru ssia would be precluded from relying on Article 5.7 to 
exclude the applicability of other provisions of the SPS Agreement.  We consider this approach to 
be appropriate in order to provide sufficient findings in respect of the parties' claims.  
7.1141.   We will pursue  a comprehensive  examination of the four prongs of Article 5.7 in respect 
of the bans on the products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. Where relevant, 
we will refer to information specifically pertaining to any of the four affected EU member States.  
7.6.5.3.2.1   Whether relevant scientific information was insufficient at the time the bans 
on the imports of the products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland were 
adopted  
7.1142.   The first condition for the application of Article  5.7 is insuffic iency of scientific evidence. 
As we have noted, according to the Appellate Body in Japan – Apples , this is the case when the 
body of available scientific evidence does not allow, in quantitative or qualitative terms, the 
performance of an adequate assessme nt of the risks as required under Article  5.1 and as defined 
in paragraph 4 of Annex A.1524, Russia has argued that the sufficiency of scientific evidence should 
be examined in an ongoing manner. Russia refers to the observation made by the panel in Japan – 
Apples regarding the time -frame for the examination of the sufficiency of scientific evidence under 
Article 5.7.1525 However, we agree with the view expressed by the panel in EC – Approval and 
                                               
1521 Russia's response to Panel question No. 295, para. 157.  
1522 Russia's response to Panel question No. 295, paras. 158 -159. 
1523 For a detailed account of such exchanges see Appendix 1 below.  
1524 Appellate Body Report, Japan – Apples , para. 179.  
1525 Russia's response to Panel question No. 309, para. 265 (referring to Panel Report, Japan – Apples , 
para. 7.10).  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  Marketing of Biotech Products that the (in)sufficiency of the relev ant scientific evidence should be 
assessed with respect to the time the SPS measure is adopted.1526 Accordingly, we will focus our 
examination on the dates, as relevant for each affected EU member States, throughout 2014, 
starting with January 2014, when the ban on the imports from Lithuania was adopted.  
7.1143.   As we indicated above, Russia does not provide a detailed basis for its alternative claim 
under Article 5.7. We understand Russia's argument that there is insufficient scientific evidence to 
be formulated in t he broader context of Russia's claims in respect of the EU -wide ban and the 
overall insufficiency of scientific evidence for it to perform a risk assessment appropriate to the 
circumstances.1527 In respect of the sufficiency of scientific evidence for Russia' s assessment of the 
risks from the ASF situation in the affected EU member States, Russia posits that the 2015 EFSA 
scientific report confirms the continuing scientific uncertainty with respect of ASF spread and ASF 
eradication, in particular in the contex t of the European Union as a whole.1528  
7.1144.   In response to Russia's arguments, the European Union maintains that the relevant 
scientific information is sufficient and asserts that such information was provided by it to 
Russia.1529 In support of this assertion, the European Union refers to letters, emails, faxes, 
meetings and inspections through which such information was provided.1530 
7.1145.   We bear in mind that insufficiency of scientific evidence does not extend to situations of 
"scientific uncertainty" (i.e. when there is unresolved scientific uncertainty)1531, nor to situations of 
scientific controversy.1532 Moreover, the possibility to supplement the underlying scientific evidence 
does not, by itself, render it insufficient.1533 
7.1146.   We also note that Russia refers to the potential ris ks associated with the importation of 
pigs and pork products from the affected EU member States, including certain categories of those 
which have been subject to treatment for the inactivation of ASFV.1534 While The European Union's 
complaint is with respect to Russia's bans on the imports of the products at issue from the affected 
EU-member States and the failure to adapt these bans  pursuant to the SPS Agreement . 
7.1147.   We recall our earlier observations that ASF is already present in parts of Russia1535, 
particularly in areas that border the territories of Estonia, Latvia and Belarus. The risks to be 
assessed in this case, therefore, are those of the potential re -entry or further spread of ASF into 
Russia, and especially into the ASF -free regions of Russia.  
7.1148.   Mindful of these elements and the parties' arguments, the Panel will review whether the 
qualitative and quantitative aspects of the available scientific evidence, including information the 
European Union has provided to Russia, is of the type and scope that is (in)su fficient for Russia to 
conduct a risk assessment appropriate to the circumstances.  
7.1149.   In section 7.5.5.3.5  above , we examined the sources of scientific evidence on record in 
order to determine whether, for the purposes of the risk s associated with the ASF situation in the 
non-affected EU member States, there was (in)sufficient evidence for Russia to conduct a risk 
                                               
1526 This accords with the view of previous panels, e.g. the Panel in EC – Approval and Marketing of 
Biotech Products , that an asses sment of whether relevant scientific evidence is insufficient should be made 
with reference to the time of adoption of the relevant provisional SPS measure. Panel Report s, EC – Approval 
and Marketing of Biotech Products , para. 7.3253. We recall our general  comments on the Panel's temporal 
framework in section 7.3.6  above . 
1527 Russia's response to Panel question No. 309, paras. 266 -267. 
1528 Russia's response to Panel question No. 309, paras. 266 -267. 
1529 European Union's second written  submission, para. 68.  
1530 European Union's second written submission, para. 68 (referring to Exhibits EU -62, EU -64, EU -65, 
EU-89, EU -91, EU -92, EU -94, EU -132 to EU -148).  See Appendix 1 below . 
1531 Appellate Body Report, Japan – Apples , paras. 183 -184. 
1532 Appell ate Body Reports, US/Canada – Continued Suspension , para. 677.  
1533 Appellate Body Reports, US/Canada – Continued Suspension , para. 702.  
1534 Exhibits EU -7, EU -8, EU -10, EU -11, EU -168 and RUS -28 (regarding the measures in respect of 
Lithuania); Exhibits EU -9, EU -10, EU -11, EU -168 and RUS -29 (regarding the measures in respect of Poland); 
Exhibits EU -12 and EU -169 (regarding the measures in respect of Latvia); and Exhibits EU -13 and RUS -37 
(regarding the measures in respect of Estonia) . See tables 1 and 2 above.  
1535 See para. 7.208  above.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  assessment appropriate to the circumstances. We will rely on that examination for our assessment 
of the (in)sufficiency  of scientific evidence in respect of the ASF situation in the affected EU 
member States.  
7.1150.   In our view, the presence of ASF in the territory of a country is a factor that needs to be 
considered in the context of an assessment of risks as appropriate to the circumstances. However, 
we consider that in the case of a disease like ASF – which, as we have found, is widely known, has 
been studied in detail and for which a great deal of scientific evidence is available — the 
uncertainties that may surround the intro duction and spread of such disease in a previously un -
affected territory should not impede a Member's ability to conduct a risk assessment. In our view, 
this has been particularly true in respect of the ASF -affected EU member States, especially at the 
time that Russia adopted each of the bans on the imports of the products at issue from Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland.  
7.1151.   We recall that as of January 2014, and furthermore thereafter, there has been a lot of 
scientific evidence available in respect of t he epidemiology of ASF, the potential vectors for the 
transmission and spread of ASF (including behavioural ecology of wild boars), potential risks of 
spread of ASF in the Baltic region, and the type of control measures that could be applied. 
Moreover, Rus sia received (at least by 7 February 2014), information in respect of contingency 
planning in the European Union and the affected EU member States, as well as the general 
regulatory framework applicable within the European Union in respect of control of AS F.  
7.1152.   This information has been available to Russia in a very particular context. Russia had 
first hand experience in dealing with ASF for at least seven years at the time the first outbreaks 
occurred in the European Union. In our view, Russia was equipped w ith publicly available scientific 
evidence on the disease, together with trained experts who understood the risks and the manner 
to assess them. Russia rejects this view, largely based on the argument that the European Union 
did not provide detailed inform ation in a number of areas, thus raising scientific uncertainty in 
respect of ASF spread and ASF eradication. It might be the case that some of the information 
requested by Russia could supplement the information already available for conducting a risk 
assessment as appropriate to the circumstances. However, the Appellate Body has clearly stated 
that the "application of Article 5.7 is triggered not by the existence of scientific uncertainty, but 
rather by the insufficiency of scientific evidence."1536 On that basis, the Appellate Body concluded 
that it was "unable to endorse Japan's approach of interpreting Article 5.7 through the prism of 
'scientific uncertainty'".1537 Following the Appellate Body's guidance, we cannot accept Russia's 
approach of assessing the (i n)sufficiency of scientific evidence in the light of persistent scientific 
uncertainties.  
7.1153.   We recall that we have found that the European Union did not provide Russia with the 
necessary evidence to objectively demonstrate that there were ASF -free areas, wh ich were likely 
to remain so, within each of the four affected EU member States. In our view, our examination 
under Article 6.3 does not mirror our examination under Article 5.7 for the purposes of 
determining the (in)sufficiency of scientific evidence. Wh ile under Article 6.3 our focus is on a 
particular type of evidence provided by the European Union to Russia (i.e. the necessary evidence 
to objectively demonstrate the existence of ASF -free areas, which are likely to remain so), under 
Article 5.7 we are m aking a broader examination in respect of the available scientific evidence that 
was available to Russia to conduct a risk assessment of the ASF situation in the four affected 
EU member States. Our findings under Article 6.3 thus only inform our analysis o f the evidence on 
record that we are addressing in this section. As we have explained, the information provided by 
the European Union to Russia supports our view that there was sufficient scientific evidence 
available for Russia to conduct a risk assessmen t as appropriate to the circumstances. We further 
note that our finding under Article 6.3 in respect of the affected EU member States relates to the 
failure of the European Union to objectively demonstrate that there were ASF -free areas, which 
were likely to remain so, within the affected EU member States. In this respect, the basis for our 
finding on the European Union's failure does not affect the sufficiency of the scientific evidence 
which we consider was available to Russia to conduct a risk assessment  in respect of the ASF 
situation in affected EU member States at the time of the adoption of each of the bans on the 
imports of the products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland.  
                                               
1536 Appellate Body Report, Japan – Apples , para. 184.  
1537 Appellate Body Report, Japan – Apples , para. 184. WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.1154.    Our finding that there was sufficient evidence for Russia to  conduct a risk assessment 
does not mean that the conclusions of such an assessment would necessarily have been 
favourable to permitting imports from the four affected EU member States. That is, Russia's risk 
assessment might well have identified levels of  risk for the re -introduction and further spread of 
ASFV associated with imports from the four affected EU member States that might, hypothetically, 
have supported Russia's decision to ban such imports.  
7.1155.   Based on the foregoing, we consider that there was, t hroughout 2014 and at the time of 
adoption of each of the bans on the imports of the products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, and Poland, sufficient scientific evidence for Russia to conduct a risk assessment as 
appropriate to the circumstances i n respect of the ASF situation in each of those four 
EU member  States.  
7.1156.   While the preceding finding is sufficient to conclude that the ban s on the imports of the 
products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland  do not fall within the scope of A rticle 
5.7 and the qualified exemption to the obligations in Articles 5.1, 5.2 and 2.2 is not available to 
Russia , the Panel deems it prudent to examine the se bans in the context of the other three 
elements of Article 5.7.  
7.6.5.3.2.2   Whether the bans on the imports o f the products at issue from Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland were adopted on the basis of available pertinent 
information  
7.1157.   We have found that there is sufficient scientific evidence in respect of ASF for Russia to 
conduct a risk assessment of the ASF  situation in the affected EU member States, as appropriate 
to the circumstances. However, in order to provide a complete overview of the measures at issue, 
we will examine the remaining requirements of Article 5.7.  
7.1158.   With respect to the second condition of  Article 5.7 – that the measure should be adopted 
on the basis of available pertinent information, we have indicated that it is pertinent when there is 
a rational and objective relationship between the information concerning the risk and the 
measure.1538  
7.1159.   The European Union also posits that a measure being manifestly unnecessary and 
disproportionate would be pertinent to determining whether such a measure is based on pertinent 
information or whether it is rather a disguised restriction on international trade.1539 In this respect, 
the European Union sustains that in "case of a well -known disease like ASF, if there is only one 
case in wild boar only a few kilometres from the border with Belarus, Russia should have not 
banned, even provisionally, the products at issu e from the whole territory of the European Union, 
including areas thousands of kilometres away, given the robustness of the EU measures and the 
epidemiology of the disease."1540 
7.1160.   Russia indicates that the initial imposition of the four measures for each of the  affected 
EU member States corresponds to provisional import bans to various live pig and pork products 
upon the notification by the individual EU member State of the initial ASF outbreaks. Such initial 
bans were precautionary measures.1541 We understand this  to mean that Russia based its 
measures on pertinent available information related to the presence of ASF in the four affected EU 
member States.  
7.1161.   Moreover, we consider that our review of the evidence that we have identified as 
available for Russia to conduc t a risk assessment of the situation in the four affected EU member 
States, may inform our examination of the pertinent available information on which Russia 
allegedly based its measures in respect of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland.  
                                               
1538 See Appellate Body Reports, US/Canada – Continued Suspension , para. 678.  See also para. 7.675  
above.  
1539 European Union's response to Panel question No. 148, paras. 305 -307; and second written 
submission, para. 77.  
1540 European Union's second written submission, para. 78.  
1541 Russia's response to Panel question No . 295, para. 156. Russia also refers to its responses to Panel 
question Nos. 279, 293, and 294.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.1162.   With these con siderations in mind, the Panel will examine whether there is a rational and 
objective relationship between the available pertinent information concerning the risks arising from 
the potential re -entry and further spread of ASF within Russia through the impo rts of the products 
at issue from the four affected EU member States and each of the bans on the imports of the 
products at issue from those EU member States, as applied in respect of treated and non -treated 
products. We begin our examination in respect of  non-treated products.  
7.1163.   Russia indicates that its measures were adopted on the basis of precaution under Article 
5.7 as an immediate response to the ASF outbreaks in Lithuania (January 2014), Poland 
(February  2014), Latvia (June 2014), and Estonia (Septembe r 2014). To assist us in our analysis, 
we classify  pertinent information available to  Russia as follows: (i) scientific reports available to 
Russia, (ii) Russia's experience in handling ASF outbreaks, and (iii) the notifications provided by 
the European Un ion in respect of the ASF outbreaks in each of the four affected EU member 
States.1542  
7.1164.   Within the first category of information, we find the 2010 EFSA scientific opinion. 
Section  4.2.1.4 of this opinion explains the presence of ecological corridors connectin g indirectly 
the Trans Caucasian Countries (TCC) and Russia's wild boar population with that of the European 
Union. In this respect, the opinion observes that the "wild boar populations of Belarus are well 
connected with those of Poland and Lithuania, whil e the Ukrainian wild boar populations are 
connected with the wild boar populations of Poland and Romania and, to a lesser extent, the 
Slovak Republic and Hungary."1543 When explaining the ecology of wild boar and the non -migratory 
nature of sus scrofa , the op inion indicates that infections "can spread between larger regions, 
however, where there is continuity in the geographical distribution of the wild boar … In this 
respect, Ukraine  (Crimea), Poland and Romania may be at risk due to the continuous distributi on 
and the high density of wild boar. Possible corridors may also exist from the infected Russian areas 
into Lithuania to Latvia".1544 The FAO E MPRES  Watch 2013 report further confirms the risks 
associated with the transmission of ASF through wild boar.1545 
7.1165.   Further to the scientific evidence we referred to in the preceding paragraph, we recall the 
information in respect of the outbreaks that occurred in each affected EU member State. As we 
have noted, according to the evidence on record, the European Union direct ly informed Russia of 
the outbreaks in Lithuania, Poland and Latvia.1546 In addition, the EU member States regularly 
notified the OIE of the outbreaks taking place in the territory of the four affected EU member 
States.1547  
7.1166.   We consider it also relevant to recal l that the ASFV is already present and widespread 
within the territory of Russia. In fact, it could be  that ASF was introduced into the territory of the 
four affected EU member States by infected wild boar originating in Russia and Belarus. Russia has 
described in some detail the various measures it has in place to attempt to control ASF within its 
territory. We understand that Russia relies on the experience of its authorities in respect of ASF as 
an additional element in support of its contention that the  initial measures on the four affected EU 
member States are based on pertinent available information.  
7.1167.   We find that there is a rational and objective relationship between the occurrence of ASF 
in the territory of each of the affected EU member States and t he adoption of a ban on the imports 
of those products. This finding is of course limited to the initial moment of the adoption of such 
measures and in respect of non -treated products. We recall our findings under Article 6.1 that 
Russia still has an obliga tion to ensure adaptation of its measures (i.e. the bans on the imports of 
the products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland) to the SPS characteristics in the 
areas where the products originate and in the areas to which they are destined.  
                                               
1542 See fn 587 to para. 7.420  above  and Exhibits EU -152-156. See also A ppendix 1  below .  
1543 2010 EFSA Scientific  Opinion  (Exhibit EU -24), p. 29.  
1544 2010 EFSA Scientific  Opinion  (Exhibit EU -24), p. 30.  
1545 FAO, E MPRES  Watch, May 2013  (Exhibit RUS -3), p. 9.   
1546 In respect of the outbreaks in Lithuania see Exhibit EU -132; regarding the outbreaks in Poland see 
Exhibit EU -136; and regarding the outbreaks in Latvia see Exhibit EU -147. See also Appendix 1 below.  
1547 See ASF cases in the European Union notified  to the OIE (Exhibit EU-118). See fn 587 to 
para. 7.420  above  and Exhibits EU -152-156. See also Appendix 1  below . WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.1168.   Based on the foregoing, we consider that there is a  rational and objective relationship 
between the bans on the products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, and the 
available pertinent information concerning the risks arising from the po tential re -entry and further 
spread of ASF within Russia through the imports of non -treated products at issue from the affected 
EU member States.  
7.1169.   We turn to examine whether the application of the bans on the imports of the treated 
products at issue from th e four affected EU member States are based on pertinent available 
information. In paragraphs 7.876 -7.878  above we examined the available pertinent information in 
respect of the existing treatments f or the inactivation of ASFV, including that available throughout  
2014. We recall that in paragraphs  7.1029 -7.1031  above, we found that the bans on most of the 
treated products at issue from the four  affected EU member States contradict the international 
standards contained in the Terrestrial Code in respect of treated products. As part of our analysis, 
we indicated that Russia does not provide any justification for limiting the "acceptable" treated 
products to certain categories of cat and dog feed. Based on our reasoning regarding the 
contradiction of the bans on most treated products at issue from the four affected 
EU member  States, we consider that such measures, in respect of treated products, are  not based 
on available pertinent information.  
7.1170.   We move on the third requirement under Article 5.7 of the SPS  Agreement.  
7.6.5.3.2.3   Whether Russia has sought to obtain the additional information necessary 
for a more objective assessment of risk in respect of the bans  on the imports of the 
products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland  
7.1171.   The third requirement of Article 5.7 is that the importing Member applying the measure 
seeks to obtain the additional information necessary for a more objective assessment  of risk.1548 
7.1172.   The European Union argues that Russia "abused the process instead of seeking 
information germane for the risk assessment" because the information that Russia claims to seek 
was either already provided by the European Union or was irrelevant for the purposes of the 
European Union's ASF regionalization measures.1549 Following the adoption of a provisional 
measure, the respective Member is under an obligation to seek to obtain additional information for 
a more objective assessment of risk. According to  the European Union, the moment a Member is 
asking for information which is not necessary for a more objective assessment of risk, including 
the type of information characterized by the individual experts in the present proceedings as an 
"overkill" or as a n attempt to "muddy the water", that Member can no longer benefit from the 
provisional shelter of Article 5.7. The European Union argues that such information requests are a 
clear warning sign that the respective Member is not genuinely seeking to perform a more 
objective risk assessment (objective in the sense of being based on the information available).  
7.1173.   Russia argues that it sought additional information. In particular, Russia indicates that it 
actively engaged the European Union and sent top Russian SP S officials to conduct in -country 
visits to meet with veterinary officials in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland at various moments 
throughout 2014.1550 
7.1174.   Article 5.7 does not impose explicit prerequisites regarding the additional information to 
be collecte d or a specific collection procedure .1551 Nevertheless, the Appellate Body has concluded 
that: 
[T]he WTO Member adopting a provisional SPS measure should be able to identify the 
insufficiencies in the relevant scientific evidence, and the steps that it intend s to take 
to obtain the additional information that will be necessary to address these 
                                               
1548 Article 5.7 places the burden of seeking to obtain the additional scientific information necessary to 
perform a more objective ris k assessment on the importing Member.  See e.g. Appellate Body Report, 
US/Canada – Continued Suspension , para. 679; Panel Report, US – Animals , para. 7.294.  
1549 European Union's first written submission, para. 196.  
1550 Russia's response to Panel question No. 295, para. 157.  
1551 Appellate Body Report, Japan – Agricultural Products II , para. 92, Panel Report, US – Animals , 
para. 7.295.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  deficiencies in order to make a more objective assessment and review the provisional 
measure within a reasonable period of time. The additional information to be collect ed 
must be "germane" to conducting the assessment of the specific risk.1552 
7.1175.   The obligation in the second sentence of Article 5.7 entails that the Member adopting a 
provisional SPS measure "must make best efforts to remedy the insufficiencies in the relevant 
scientific evidence with additional scientific research or by gathering information from relevant 
international organizations or other sources.1553"1554 However, this does not mean that such a 
Member is expected to guarantee specific results, nor is it expected t o predict the actual results of 
its efforts to collect additional information at the time when it adopts the SPS measure.1555 
7.1176.   Mindful of these considerations, we recall that, f ollowing the outbreak of ASF in each 
affected EU member State, Russia banned certai n products from each of those EU member States. 
We note that the scope of the requested information in contention between the parties relates 
largely to the situation in the entire territory and all EU member States, over and above the four 
ASF-affected me mber States.1556  
7.1177.   In our analysis in respect of Russia's compliance with Annex C(1)(c), we found that 
Russia requested information that went beyond what was necessary for undertaking and 
completing the procedure for the verification of the presence of ASF in the territory of the affected 
EU member States.1557 We recall that such unnecessary requests include: (i) detailed information 
about pig farms, pork processing factories and semi -finished products, graded by production 
volume ; (ii) regulations on export of wi ld boar meat and trophies, number of killed animals and 
exported meat and trophies during 2013 -2014 (for regions adjacent to the infected zone); (iii) 
detailed information about foreign hunters, who entered the country to hunt the wild boar during 
2013-2014 (including information about the number and the country of origin), detailed by country 
and region; (iv) detailed information about pig farms and meat processing factories approved to 
ship animals and products to the territory of the CU, including inform ation about the suppliers 
(number, country, region) and production volumes, detailed by country and region ; (v) rough 
estimation of enterprises approved to ship animal products to the territory of the CU, by level of 
zoosanitary condition, equivalent to th e previously conducted evaluation of the Russian and 
Belarusian enterprises, detailed by regions and graded by production volume ;(vi) cartographical 
visualisation of the establishments approved to supply live pigs and swine products from the 
affected EU me mber States (Poland and Lithuania, in particular) to Russia with indication of the 
raw material bases of these establishments; (vii) zoo sanitary status of small farms (due to the big 
number of them in the territories of the infected/high risk zones with r egard to ASF) and measure 
of their bio protection (possibility of free range, feed base, the regime of introducing the newly 
arrived animals in the herd, etc.); (viii) data on internal evaluation by the veterinary services of 
the EU member States of resour ces (human, technical, financial ones) needed for the creation and 
maintenance of abovementioned ASF free zones; (ix) data on functional isolation of sub -
populations of domestic and wild animals in zones with the proves of the absence of 
migration/seasonal  movements of wild boars between the zones; and (x) data on the presence of 
the ASF vector in the EU member States.1558 In our examination under Annex C(1)(c) we recalled 
that some of the preceding information might have been relevant to assess the situation in an 
affected EU member State. However, the level of detail required in respect of these categories of 
information seems excessive. We recall that the information that Russia would be justified in 
asking  for is the kind that would be necessary for underta king and completing the procedure at 
issue. We concluded that, Russia is request ed an excessive amount of detail in respect of several 
                                               
1552 Appellate Body Report, US/Canada – Continued Suspension , para. 679 (original footnote omitted); 
Panel Report, US – Animals , para. 7.295.  
1553 (footnote original) Pursuant to Article 10.1 of the SPS Agreement , due account shall be taken of the 
special needs of developing country Members in respect of their ability to procure the additional information for 
a more objective assessment of r isk. 
1554 Appellate Body Reports, US/Canada – Continued Suspension , para. 679.  
1555 Appellate Body Reports, US/Canada – Continued Suspension , para. 679. See also Panel Report, US 
– Animals, paras. 7.295 -7.297.  
1556 See Appendix 1  below.  
1557 See para. 7.1087  above.  
1558 Russia's letter to the European Union of 16 May 2014, FS -EN-8/7999 (Exhibit EU -93). WT/DS475/R  
 
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  categories of information that, in our view, go beyond what we have identified as necessary for an 
objective demonstratio n of the existence of ASF -free areas in an affected EU member State.1559 
7.1178.   Furthermore, we consider that our finding under Article 6.3 that the European Union 
failed to objectively demonstrate that there are ASF -free areas, likely to remain so, within Latvia , 
is not dispositive of the existence of such ASF -free areas. It could very well be the case that the 
European Union may be able to demonstrate through the provision of additional information, some 
of which was provided to Russia in the course of these procee dings, that there are ASF -free areas, 
likely to remain so, within at least some of the four affected EU member States.  
7.1179.   In light of this, we find no basis in the evidence on record to support Russia's assertion 
that all of the information it requested was "germane" to conducting a more objective 
assessment1560 of the specific risk within the meaning of this element of Article 5.7. As we have 
already noted, the experts consulted by the Panel characterized certain of the information 
requested by Russia as "overk ill" or as an attempt to "muddy the water".1561 While Article 5.7 
requires that a Member must actively make best efforts to remedy the insufficiencies in the 
relevant scientific evidence with additional scientific research or by gathering information from 
relevant international organizations or other sources, it does not envisage that a Member will use 
this process to seek information that is not germane to the specific risk involved.  
7.1180.   We therefore find that Russia did not seek to obtain additional information that was 
"necessary" for a more objective assessment of risk within the meaning of Article 5.7.  
7.6.5.3.2.4   Whether Russia has reviewed the bans on the imports of the products at 
issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland within a reasonable period of time  
7.1181.   The fourth condition under Article 5.7 is that the Member applying the measure reviews it 
within a reasonable period of time. What constitutes a reasonable period of time has to be 
established on a case -by-case basis1562, based upon the particular facts and circu mstances of a 
given case. In Japan – Agricultural Products II , the Appellate Body stated that what constitutes a 
"reasonable period of time" within the meaning of Article 5.7 depends, inter alia , on the difficulty 
of obtaining the information necessary for  a more objective assessment of risk.1563  
7.1182.   We recall that the  panel in EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products interpreted 
the term "reasonable period of time" in Article 5.7 in a manner similar to the term "undue delay" 
in Annex C(1)(a).1564 This concep t is not dependent on the length of the delay, but rather on 
whether any delay is legitimate and justifiable  as opposed to unwarranted or excessive.1565 
                                               
1559 See para. 7.1086  above.  
1560 By this we refer to the distinction in degree of objectivity, based on available scie ntific evidence, 
drawn from the situations covered by Articles 5.7 and 5.1. Article 5.7 requires Members applying a provisional 
SPS measure on the basis of pertinent available information to "seek to obtain the additional information 
necessary for a more o bjective assessment of risk " (emphasis added). In our view, this refers to the type of 
risk assessment required pursuant to Articles 5.1 and 5.2, as defined in Annex A(4) of the SPS Agreement. In 
the past, panels such as US – Animals  have refer red to the t ext of Article 5.7 without clarifying a particular 
definition of the term "more objective assessment of risk". Rather they focused on what we mention in para. 
6.55, which is the type of additional information that would be necessary.  
1561 Dr Brückner's respon se to Panel question No. 13 (who stated "the information requested in Exhibit 
RUS-131 [ Letter from the Russian Veterinary Service to DG SANCO, No. FS -AS-8/23743, 1 December 2014 ], is 
in my opinion 'an overkill' of which many of the questions are not relati ve or needed to conduct either a 
sensible quantitative or  qualitative risk analysis"); and Dr Thomson's response to Panel question No. 13 (who 
stated in respect of the questions asked through Letter of 5 February 2014 from Russia to the EU, FS -SD 
8/1640  (Exhibit EU -84) "[t]hese questions are mostly variations on  other questions posed by the RF. For a 
country that is not itself free of ASF this strikes me as an overkill and possibly an attempt to 'muddy the 
water'").  
1562 Appellate Body Report, Japan – Agricult ural Products II , para. 93.  
1563 Appellate Body Report, Japan – Agricultural Products II , para. 93. Panel Report, US – Animals , para. 
7.300.  
1564 Panel Report s, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products , paras. 7.1495 -7.1497 (concerning  
Annex C(1)(a)) and 7.3245 (concerning Article 5.7). Panel Report, US – Animals , para. 7.301.  
1565 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Apples , para. 437; Panel Report, US – Animals , para. 7.301. 
Additionally, the panel in US – Animals  looked to the context of Article 21.3(c) arbi trations – which determine 
 WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.1183.   The European Union argues that Russia has failed to review its measures within a 
reasonable period of time . The European Union identifies this period as the six months from the 
date of the first outbreak in Lithuania, at the end of January 2014, to the date of the 
establishment of the Panel, on 22 July 2014 and the period from the time the European Union 
provided additional information in June 2014 until the time Russia contacted the European Union 
again, at the beginning of December 2014. Russia posits that based on the spread of ASF in the 
affected EU member States, as well as on the evidence regarding ASF ou tbreaks during the second 
half of 2014 and through the middle of 2015, and on the European Union's failure to objectively 
demonstrate its ASF -free zones would remain ASF -free, it continued the maintenance of the 
challenged measures.1566 
7.1184.   With these considerati ons in mind, we examine whether Russia has reviewed the 
measures in respect of the affected EU member States within a reasonable period of time, and 
taking into account the timeframe for the Panel's analysis (i.e. from January to the date of Panel 
establis hment on 22 July  2014, also encompassing the dates of adoption of the measures in 
respect of Estonia and Latvia (September 2014)).  
7.1185.   The panel in US – Animals  examined the question of whether the United States reviewed 
the measures at issue in that dispute within a reasonable period of time. In its analysis, that panel 
relied on its findings under Annex C(1)(a) in respect of whether the United States had incurred 
undue delays in its review of Argentina's application for Northern Argentina.1567 We agree with the  
approach of the panel in US – Animals . We consider that our assessment of this matter is closely 
linked with our examination of Russia's compliance with its obligations under Annex  C(1)(a). In 
that respect we found that Russia's excessive and unjustified information requests in respect of the 
surveillance and control measures in non ASF -affected EU member States amount to acting in a 
manner that impedes undertaking and completing the procedure for the verification of the 
existence of ASF -free areas. In lig ht of the Appellate Body's guidance1568, we found that situation 
to constitute an infringement of the obligation to undertake and complete a procedure without 
undue delay. We therefore found that Russia undertook and completed the procedure at issue with 
undue delay.  
7.1186.   Our findings in respect of Annex C(1)(a) inform our analysis of Russia's compliance with 
the last requirement under Article 5.7. In particular, we consider that Russia's excessive 
information requests led to continued delays in considering the in formation that the European 
Union provided. We do not ignore the proposition that a Member may require certain time to 
process of detailed and complex information. A Member may also need to translate such 
information in order to properly assess it. However , we consider that in a situation like the one of 
the affected EU member States, where Russia has received information during more than seven 
months (from January to September 2014) and insisted on the insufficiency of such information in 
an unjustified ma nner, Russia is not reviewing its SPS measures within a reasonable period of 
time. 
7.1187.   We therefore find that the fourth requirement for the application of Article 5.7 is not 
satisfied in the present case, because Russia did not review the bans on the products  at issue from 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland within a reasonable period of time.  
7.6.5.3.2.5   Conclusion  
7.1188.   We have found that there was sufficient scientific evidence for Russia to conduct a risk 
assessment of the ASF situation in the Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,  and Poland, as appropriate to the 
circumstances. Moreover, we found that Russia provisionally adopted the measure on the basis of 
                                                                                                                                               
the reasonable period of time for Members to implement the rulings and recommendations of the DSB – in 
which arbitrators have interpreted the term "reasonable period of time" to mean "the shortest period possible 
within the legal system of the [implementing] Member". Award of the Arbitrator, EC – Hormones (Article 
21.3(c)) , para. 26. That panel observed that, while not directly applicable in these circumstances, it does 
suggest an understanding that when WTO Members must take legis lative or regulatory actions involving 
complex legal processes to bring their measures into conformity with their WTO obligations reasonableness can 
be understood to mean as quickly as legally possible while accepting legitimate reasons for delay.  
1566 Russia 's response to Panel question No. 295, paras. 158 -159. 
1567 Panel Report, US – Animals , para. 7.303.  
1568 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Apples , para. 438.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  available pertinent information, except in respect of treated products at issue. However, Russia did 
not seek to obtain addit ional information, and did not review the bans on the imports of the 
products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland within a reasonable period of time. 
Having found that Russia did not satisfy three of the four requirements for the applicati on of Article 
5.7, we find that the each of the bans on the imports of the products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, and Poland, do not fall within the scope of Article 5.7 and the qualified exemption to the 
obligations in Articles 5.1, 5.2 and 2. 2 is not available to Russia. Thus, we now turn to assess the 
conformity of Russia's measures with Articles 5.1, 5.2 and 2.2 of the SPS Agreement.  
7.6.5.3.3   Whether Russia's measures are based on a risk assessment  
7.1189.   We have noted the importance of Members basing their  SPS measures on a risk 
assessment in order to maintain the "delicate and carefully negotiated balance in the SPS 
Agreement between the shared, but sometimes competing, interests of promoting international 
trade and of protecting the life and health of hum an beings"1569, as well of animals.1570 With this in 
mind, we move on to assess whether Russia's measures are based on a risk assessment.  
7.1190.   In this dispute, Russia has argued that it is under no obligation to provide a risk 
assessment in respect of the bans on th e imports of the products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, and Poland, because they are measures that conform to the relevant international 
standards, or alternatively, were adopted on the basis of Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement.1571 
7.1191.   In paragraph 7.890  above, we have found that the bans on the imports of the products at 
issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, do not conform to the Terrestrial Code. 
Furthermore, as indicated in paragraph 7.1188  above, we have found that the conditions required 
under Article 5.7 have not been met in respect of the bans on the four affected EU member States. 
Therefore, the foundation of Russia's justification for not having a risk assessment on which t hose 
bans are based does not have merit. In light of this, we need to examine whether there is a risk 
assessment within the meaning of paragraph 4 of Annex A.  
7.1192.   We recall that we found in paragraph 7.1188  above that the bans on the imports of the 
products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland pursue the objectives enshrined in 
both Annex A(1)(a) and A(1)(b). The first type of risk assessment required under paragraph 4 of 
Annex A (i.e. "evaluation of the likelihood of entry, establishment or spread of a pest or disease") 
is appropriate for measures seeking the objective contained in Annex(1)(a). The second type of 
risk assessment required under paragraph 4 of Annex A (i.e. "evaluation of the potential adverse 
effects  on human or animal health arising from the presence of … disease -causing organisms in … 
feedstuffs") is appropriate for measures seeking the objective contained in Annex (1)(b).1572 
Therefore, Russia's risk assessment should encompass both types of risk asse ssment referred to in 
paragraph 4 of Annex  A. 
7.1193.   Russia has acknowledged throughout these proceedings that it has not conducted a risk 
assessment in the sense of Article 5.1 and paragraph 4 of Annex A.1573 We therefore find that the 
first requirement for our enq uiry under Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement is not satisfied. As we 
have indicated above1574, our analysis of the European Union's claims under Article 5.2 should be 
done together with the one corresponding to Article 5.1. In a situation where there is no ris k 
assessment, it is clear that a Member does not comply with any of the requirements of Article 5.2.  
7.1194.   Based on the foregoing, we find that the bans on the imports of the products at issue 
from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland is inconsistent with Arti cles 5.1 and 5.2 of the SPS 
Agreement.  
                                               
1569 Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, para. 177.   
1570 See para. 7.712  above. 
1571 Russia's first written submission, paras. 216 and 296; Russia's response to Panel question No. 126, 
para. 235; and Russia's response to Panel question No. 279, para. 134.  
1572 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon , para. 123, fn 69. See also Appell ate Body Report, 
Australia – Salmon, para. 120, and Panel Report, Australia – Salmon , paras. 8.72 and 8.116.  
1573 Russia's second written submission, paras. 185 -203. 
1574 See para. 7.713  above.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.6.5.3.4   Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement  
7.1195.   We recall that according to the Appellate Body in India – Agricultural Products , a finding 
of inconsistency with Articles 5.1 and 5.2 of the SPS Agreement raises a rebuttable presumpt ion of 
inconsistency with Article 2.2.1575 Therefore, we need to examine whether Russia has raised any 
arguments in support of such a rebuttal.  
7.1196.   Russia's arguments in respect of the lack of a risk assessment have focused on the 
conformity of the bans on the i mports of the products at issue from the affected EU member 
States with the Terrestrial Code. As an alternative argument, Russia referred to the applicability of 
Article 5.7 to these measures, and the corresponding justification in respect of Articles 5.1,  5.2, 
and 2.2. However, we do not understand Russia to have raised arguments in support of the bans 
on the imports of the products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland being based on 
scientific principles and not being maintained without su fficient scientific evidence.  
7.1197.   In our view, our findings in respect of the bans on the imports of the products at issue 
from the affected EU member States not conforming to the Terrestrial Code and not falling under 
Article 5.7 and the lack of a risk assess ment on which these measures are based, confirms that 
such measures are neither based on scientific principles nor maintained with sufficient scientific 
evidence. Russia has not rebutted such findings. In our view, Russia has failed to rebut the 
presumptio n of inconsistency raised by our findings of inconsistency with Articles 5.1 and 5.2.  
7.1198.   Based on the foregoing we find the bans on the imports of the products at issue from 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland to consequentially violate  Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement.  
7.6.5.4   Conclusion  
7.1199.   We have found that there was sufficient scientific evidence for Russia to conduct a risk 
assessment of the ASF situation in the affected EU member States, as appropriate to the 
circumstances. Moreover, we found that Russia provisi onally adopted the measures on the basis of 
available pertinent information, except with respect to treated products at issue. We also found 
that Russia did not seek to obtain additional information, and did not review the bans on the 
imports of the produc ts at issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland within a reasonable 
period of time. Having found that Russia did not satisfy three of the four requirements for the 
application of Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement, we find that the bans on the affect ed EU member 
States do not fall within the scope of Article 5.7 and the qualified exemption to the obligations in 
Articles 5.1, 5.2 and 2.2 of the SPS Agreement is not available to Russia. We have also found that 
Russia did not base the bans on the affecte d EU member States on a risk assessment within the 
meaning of paragraph 4 of Annex A of the SPS Agreement, thus breaching Articles 5.1 and 5.2. 
We have also found that Russia has not rebutted the presumption of inconsistency that our 
findings raised in res pect of Article 2.2, therefore the bans on the affected EU member States are 
also inconsistent with Article 2.2.  
7.6.6   Claims under Articles 5.3, 5.4, 5.6 , and 2.2 of the SPS Agreement  
7.6.6.1   Introduction  
7.1200.   In section 7.5.6 above we explained  that the European Union makes claims in respect of 
four provisions in Article 5 of the SPS Agreement that relate to the ALOP: Articles 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, 
and 5.6. In the light of this approach, we decided that before turning to the substance of the 
European U nion's claims, we would first examine what is Russia's ALOP in respect of ASF. In 
paragraph 7.752  above, we found that Russia's ALOP for ASF is high or conservative. We have also 
explained that our examination in respect of Rus sia's ALOP for ASF is common for the assessment 
of the European Union's claims in respect of both the EU -wide ban and the bans on the imports of 
the products at issue from the four affected EU member States.  
7.1201.   In section 7.5.6  above we examined the consistency of the EU -wide ban with Articles 5.3, 
5.4, 5.6, and 2.2 of the SPS Agreement. In that section we reproduced the text of the relevant 
                                               
1575 Appellate Body Report, India – Agricu ltural Products , para. 5.24.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  legal provisions1576 and the applicable legal test in respect of each of those provisions.1577 We will 
rely on that analysis for our examination of the European Union's claims under Articles 5.3, 5.4, 
5.6, and 2.2 in respect of the bans on the imports of the products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, and Poland. We turn to our corresponding a ssessment of those European Union's claims.  
7.6.6.2   Whether the bans on the imports of the products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, and Poland are inconsistent with Article 5.3 of the SPS Agreement  
7.1202.   In section 7.5.6.3  above w e have presented the parties' arguments, set out the applicable 
legal test under Article 5.3 of the SPS Agreement, and undertaken our examination of the 
consistency of the EU -wide ban with Article 5.3. We rely on that analysis for our examination of 
the co nsistency of the bans on the imports of the products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
and Poland with Article 5.3 of the SPS Agreement.  
7.1203.   In our analysis above, we examined two questions in respect of the EU -wide ban. The 
first is whether Russia too k into account relevant economic factors when assessing the risk to 
animal or plant life and health. The second is whether Russia took into account relevant economic 
factors when determining the measure to be applied to achieve the appropriate level of san itary or 
phytosanitary protection.  
7.1204.   As noted above,1578 in respect of the first question, we consider that if there is sufficiency 
of scientific evidence but lack of conformity with the relevant international standard, by not basing 
its SPS measures on a risk assessment, as defined in Article 5.1 and Annex A(4) of the SPS 
Agreement, a Member would not be in a position to act in manner consistent with Article 5.3.  
7.1205.   In the instant dispute we have found that the ban on the imports of the products at issue 
from Latvia, as applicable to non -treated products,  is based on the relevant international 
standard1579. We have also found that the bans on the imports of the products at issue from  
Estonia , Lithuania, and Poland, as applicable to non -treated products, are not based on the 
relevant international standard.1580 In addition, we have found that the bans on the imports of the 
products at issue from the four affected EU member States, as applicable to treated products, are 
not based on the relevant international standards.1581 Moreover, we have found that the bans on 
the imports of the products at issue from the four affected EU member States, as applicable both 
to treated and non -treated products, are not based on a risk assessment as appropriate to the 
circumstances, in a situat ion where there was sufficient scientific evidence for Russia to conduct an 
assessment of risks as appropriate to the circumstances.1582 Based on these findings and on the 
reasoning explained above, we find that the bans on the imports of the products at issu e from 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland are inconsistent with Article 5.3.   
7.1206.   In 7.5.6.5.1.1  above  we addressed the question of whether Russia took into account 
relevant economic factors when determining the measure to be a pplied to achieve Russia's ALOP 
for ASF. In respect of this second question, we found that the European Union failed to meet its 
burden of making a prima facie  case that the EU -wide ban is inconsistent with Article 5.3 of the 
SPS Agreement, in respect of R ussia taking into account the relevant economic factors when 
determining the measure to be applied for achieving the appropriate level of sanitary or 
phytosanitary protection.1583 
7.1207.   We see no distinction in the manner in which the European Union argued its case  in 
respect of the EU -wide ban and the bans on the imports of the products at issue four affected EU 
member States. Rather, the European Union formulated its arguments under Article 5.3 for both 
                                               
1576 See section 7.5.6.1  above.  
1577 See above paras. 7.762 -7.776  in respect of Article 5.3; paras. 7.789 -7.792  in respect of Article 5.4; 
paras. 7.806 -7.813  in respect of Article 5.6; and paras. 7.839 -7.845  in respect of Articl e 2.2 of the SPS 
Agreement.  
1578 See para. 7.775  above.  
1579 See para. 7.1040  above.  
1580 See para. 7.1040  above  
1581 See para. 7.1039  above  
1582 See para . 7.1199  above.  
1583 See para. 7.783  above.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  sets of measures.1584 Therefore, we consider our finding in para graph 7.783  above in respect of 
the EU -wide ban is also applicable to the bans on the imports of the bans on the products at issue 
from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland.  
7.1208.   Based on the foregoing we find that the bans on the  products at issue from Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland are inconsistent with Article 5.3 of the SPS Agreement, because by 
not basing those measures on a risk assessment in circumstances in which Article  5.7 is not 
applicable, Russia could have not taken into account the relevant economic factors listed in Article 
5.3 when assessing the risks of entry and spread of ASF in accordance with Article 5.1 and 
paragraph 4 of Annex A of the SPS Agreement. However, the European Union failed to make a 
prima fa cie case of inconsistency of the bans on the imports of the products at issue from Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland with Russia's obligation to take into account relevant economic 
factors listed in Article 5.3 when determining the measure to be appli ed for achieving the 
appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection in respect of the entry and spread of ASF.   
7.6.6.3   Whether Russia took into account the objective of minimizing negative trade 
effects when determining the appropriate level of sanitar y or phytosanitary protection  
7.1209.   In section 7.5.6.4  above we have presented the parties' arguments, set out the applicable 
legal test under Article 5.4 of the SPS Agreement, and undertaken our examination of the 
consistency of the  EU-wide ban with Article 5.4. We rely on that analysis for our examination of 
the consistency of the bans on the imports of the products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
and Poland with Article 5.4 of the SPS Agreement.  
7.1210.   In our analysis above, we concluded that in light of the hortatory nature of Article 5.4, we 
would not make findings with respect to whether Russia took into account the objective of 
minimizing negative trade effects when determining its ALOP. However, this is without prejudice to 
the Panel considering the objective of minimizing negative effects on international trade in its 
interpretation of other provisions of the SPS Agreement in light of the European Union's claims.  
7.6.6.4   Whether the bans on the imports of the products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, and Poland are more trade restrictive than necessary pursuant to 
Article  5.6 of the SPS Agreement  
7.6.6.4.1   Introduction  
7.1211.   In section 7.5.6.5  above we have presented the parties' arguments, set out the applicabl e 
legal test under Article 5.6 of the SPS Agreement, and undertaken our examination of the 
consistency of the EU -wide ban with Article 5.6. We rely on that analysis for our examination of 
the consistency of the bans on the imports of the products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
and Poland with Article 5.6 of the SPS Agreement.  
7.1212.   We note that Russia has formulated specific arguments in respect of the bans on the 
imports of the products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. Therefore,  we briefly 
refer to Russia's arguments before turning to our analysis of whether these measures are 
inconsistent with Article 5.6. We will rely on the European Union's argument as summarized in 
section 7.5.6.5.1.1  above.  
7.6.6.4.2   Main arguments of the parties  
7.6.6.4.2.1   European Union  
7.1213.   The European Union argues that Russia has not expressly stated its ALOP.1585 According 
to the European Union if the level of protection is not specified in writing, a panel should infer it 
from the SPS measures applied in practice.1586 
                                               
1584 European Union's first written submission, para. 262.  
1585 European Union's first written submission, para. 242.  
1586 European Union's first written submission, para. 243.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.1214.   The European Union asserts that while Russia has imposed a country -wide ban in respect 
to the products at issue for each of the four affected EU member States, it has not combined this 
ban with a Russia -wide ban.1587 The European Union also argues that factual evidence indicates 
that in fact, Russia has a rather low ALOP1588, and that even assuming that Russia has a very high 
or conservative ALOP, there is a possible alternative that cumulatively meets the conditions of 
footnote 3 of the SPS Agreeme nt.1589  
7.1215.   The European Union stresses that the application of the OIE standards, which recommend 
regionalization and trade from the ASF -free countries/zones or for any part of a country notifying 
ASF if the products underwent specific treatments, is such an al ternative, fulfilling all the legal 
requirements in Article 5.6 of the SPS Agreement.1590 The European Union argues that such an 
alternative is reasonably available to Russia, and does not involve technical  difficulties or an 
unfeasible  economic burden, while  at the same time, achieving Russia's ALOP and being 
significantly less trade -restrictive.1591 The European Union concludes that Russia's measures at 
issue are thus inconsistent with the provisions of Article 5.6 of the SPS Agreement.1592 
7.6.6.4.2.2   Russia  
7.1216.   Russia argues th at the European Union has failed to establish a prima facie  case that 
there is an alternative measure that meets all three requirements of Article 5.6.1593 According to 
Russia, there are no less -restrictive alternative measures available to achieve Russia's A LOP, which 
is based on the relevant international standard.1594  
7.1217.   Russia submits the Panel should dismiss the European Union's claim under Article 5.6. 
First, to the extent the European Union derives Russia's ALOP from the measures applied to 
imports, such mea sures, in Russia's view, cannot logically be more trade -restrictive than required 
to achieve their ALOP.1595 Second, Russia contends that to the extent the European Union derives 
a different ALOP from the measures applied by Russia domestically, the European Union re -asserts 
a claim of allegedly distinct ALOPs that falls under Article 5.5 and should therefore be dismissed by 
the Panel in its consideration under Article 5.6.1596 
7.1218.   According to Russia, the application of the Terrestrial Code is not a less trade restr ictive 
measure, as argued by the European Union, because Russia's measures concerning Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland already "conform to and/or are based" on the relevant standards of 
the Terrestrial Code.1597 Russia further elaborates that, if the ex porting country fails to discharge 
its burden to establish, and to objectively demonstrate that it has established, containment zones 
in accordance with the OIE guidelines, the importing country may reject the exporting country's 
proposed zones, which do n ot reflect the same ALOP, and impose country -wide import 
restrictions.1598 Russia asserts it acted accordingly and in compliance with the Terrestrial Code.1599 
7.1219.   Russia also asserts that when faced with what it considers to be the "deadly" combination 
of high dens ity of wild boar and high percentages of low -biosecurity backyard farms, import 
                                               
1587 European Union's first written submission, para. 245.  
1588 European Union's first written submission, para. 248.  
1589 European Union's first written submission, para. 249.  
1590 European Union's first written submission, para. 252.  
1591 European Union's fi rst written submission, para. 258.  
1592 European Union's first written submission, para. 259.  
1593 Russia's first written submission, para. 337.  
1594 Russia's first written submission, para. 334.  
1595 Russia's first written submission, para. 336.  
1596 Russia's first writ ten submission, para. 336. Russia notes that it does not apply distinct ALOPs for 
domestic live and imported live pigs and pork products (Russia's first written submission, fn 637 to para. 336 
referring to Russia's first written submission, paras.  275-287). 
1597 Russia's first written submission, para. 337.  
1598 Russia's first written submission, para. 337; comments to the European Union's response to Panel 
question No. 286, para. 149 . 
1599 Russia's first written submission, para. 337; and comments to the European U nion's response to 
Panel question No. 286, para. 149 . WT/DS475/R  
 
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  measures based on compartmentalization are the least trade restrictive measures that would 
achieve Russia's ALOP.1600;1601 
7.6.6.4.3   Analysis by the Panel  
7.1220.   As explained above1602, in order to asse ss the consistency of the bans on the imports of 
the products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland with Article 5.6 of the SPS 
Agreement, the Panel needs to determine whether the European Union has identified one or more 
alternative measure s. Then the panel needs to examine whether the alternative measures 
submitted by the European Union: (i) are reasonably available to Russia taking into account 
technical and economic feasibility; (ii) achieve Russia's ALOP; and (iii) are significantly less  trade 
restrictive than the bans on the imports of the products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
and Poland.1603  
7.1221.   Before turning to our examination of the alternative measures identified by the European 
Union, we recall that t he Panel would be requir ed to address the issue whether Article 5.7 
"obviates" the need to comply with Article 5.6 only in case it finds that Russia complies with Article 
5.7.1604 In section 7.719  we found that the bans on the imports of the products at issue from 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland are not subject to Article 5.7. We therefore find no need to 
address Russia's argument in respect of the relationship between Articles 5.7 and 5.6.  
7.1222.   We also recall that in paragraph 7.1037  above, we found that  the ban  on the imports of 
the products at issue from Estonia, as applicable to non -treated products, is based on the relevant 
international standard. We have also found that the bans on the imports of the products at issue 
from Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, as applicable to non -treated products, are not based on the 
relevant international standard. In addition, we have found that the bans on the imports of the 
products at issue from the four affected EU member States, as ap plicable to treated products, are 
not based on the relevant international standards.  
7.1223.   With these considerations in mind we turn to examine the alternative measures identified 
by the European Union.  
7.6.6.4.3.1   Whether the European Union has identified one or more alter native 
measures  
7.1224.   The measures that the European Union submits as an alternative are those derived from 
the application of the Terrestrial Code, which recommends regionalization and trade from the ASF -
free countries/zones or from any part of a country notify ing ASF if the products underwent specific 
treatments .1605 In particular, the European Union argues that instead of an EU -wide ban, Russia 
should allow trade of certain products according to specific provisions of Chapter 15.1 of the 
Terrestrial Code. Table 9 below contains the alternative measures identified by the 
European  Union, as relevant for the EU -wide ban, on the basis of the specified provisions of the 
Terrestrial Code.  
Table 9 Alternative  measures identified by the European U nion1606 
Product  Terrestrial Code provision  Recommendation  
Live pigs  Article 15.1.5  Allow trade from the ASF free 
zones in the EU.  
Semen of domestic pigs and in Articles 15.1.8 and 15.1.10  Allow trade from the ASF free  
                                               
1600 Russia's response to Panel question No. 159, para. 300.  
1601 Russia's second written submission, para. 143.  
1602 See para. 7.810  above.  
1603 Appellate Body Report, India – Agricult ural Products , para. 5.203.  
1604 This reflects the approach taken in US – Animals  whereby the panel, having found the United States' 
measures were not covered by the exemption in Article 5.7, decided not to consider the United States' 
argument that the mainte nance of a provisional measure under Article 5.7 would preclude the applicability of 
Article 5.6 (Panel Report, US – Animals , para. 7.439).  
1605 European Union's first written submission, para. 252 ; and second written submission, para. 134 . 
1606 This table is pr epared on the  basis of the  European Union's opening statement at the second 
meeting of the Panel, paras. 72 -76. WT/DS475/R  
 
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  Product  Terrestrial Code provision  Recommendation  
vivo derived embryos of domestic 
pigs zones in the EU.  
Fresh meat of domestic pigs and of 
wild boar  Articles 15.1.12. and 15.1.13  Allow trade from the ASF free 
zones in the EU.  
Pig products which have been 
processed so as to ensure the 
destruction of the ASFV (e.g. heat 
treatment, maturatio n) Article 15.1.14  Allow from the entire territory of 
the four partially affected EU 
Member States  
Bristles  Article 15.1.16  Allow trade from the ASF free 
country, zones or compartment; or 
which have been processed in an 
establishment approved by the 
Veter inary Authority for export 
purposes so as to ensure the 
destruction of the ASFV, and that 
the necessary precautions were 
taken after processing to avoid 
contact of  
the product with any source of 
ASFV.  
 
7.1225.   In our view, the European Union has clearly identifie d which would be the alternative 
measures for the products at issue. We now proceed to examine whether the measures based on 
the recommendations of the Terrestrial Code identified by the European Union meet the three 
cumulative elements of Article 5.6 of t he SPS Agreement.  
7.6.6.4.3.2   Whether measures based on the recommendations in the Terrestrial Code 
are reasonably available, taking into account technical and economic feasibility  
7.1226.   Having determined the alternative measures identified  by the European Union, we first 
need to examine whether such alternative measures are reasonably available to Russia, taking into 
account technical and economic feasibility. In section 7.5.6.5.2.3  above we  have found that the 
measures recommended in the Terre strial Code in respect of regionalization are reasonably 
available to Russia, because they are technically and economically feasible. We rely on this finding 
for the purposes of the analysis we are undertaking in respect of the bans on the imports of the 
products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland.  
7.1227.   Moreover, we note that the European Union has also identified as an alternative measure 
to the bans on the imports from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland the recommendations in the 
Terrestr ial Code in respect of treated products. This is, accepting trade of products treated 
(processed) in an establishment approved for export purposes so as to ensure destruction of ASFV, 
and that the necessary precautions were taken after processing to avoid contact of the product 
with any source of ASFV, as enshrined in Articles 15.1.14 and 15.1.16.  
7.1228.   We have observed that Russia has not challenged the technical and economic feasibility  
of measures in line with the Terrestrial Code. On the contrary, Russia has  claimed that its 
measures on imports from the four affected EU member States "conform to" or "are based on" the 
international standards articulated in the Terrestrial Code, hence implying that it considers these 
standards to be technically and economicall y feasible .  
7.1229.   As indicated by the European Union, the alternative measures arising from the Terrestrial 
Code include accepting the imports of the treated products, in line with Chapter 15.1 of the 
Terrestrial Code. In our view, accepting such imports from t he European Union does not entail a 
high technical or economic burden. Rather, it requires appropriate cooperation between the 
European Union's and Russia 's veterinary services in order to verify compliance with the 
processing requirements for safe trade i n each of the four affected EU member States.  
7.1230.   Examining these elements, we consider that the recommended measures under the 
Terrestrial Code in respect of regionalization are reasonably available to Russia, because they are 
technically and economically fea sible.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.6.6.4.3.3   Whether measures based on the recommendations in the Terrestrial Code 
achieve Russia's ALOP  
7.1231.   In section 7.5.6.5.2.4  we found that the measures recommended in the Terrestrial Code 
in respect of regionalization achieve Russ ia's high ALOP. We rely on this finding for the purposes of 
the analysis we are undertaking in respect of the bans on the imports of the products at issue from 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland.  
7.1232.   Moreover, we recall that the European Union has also ide ntified as an alternative measure 
to the bans on the imports from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland the recommendations in the 
Terrestrial Code in respect of treated products. This is, accepting trade of products treated 
(processed) in an establishmen t approved for export purposes so as to ensure destruction of ASFV, 
and that the necessary precautions were taken after processing to avoid contact of the product 
with any source of ASFV, as enshrined in Articles 15.1.14 and 15.1.16.  
7.1233.   In its responses to th e Panel's questions the OIE refers to the Terrestrial Code Foreword, 
which indicates that "the Code sets out standards for the improvement of terrestrial animal health 
and welfare and veterinary public health worldwide, including through standards for safe  
international trade in terrestrial animals".1607 The OIE also observed that "[a]ll the various 
combinations of testing, treatment and certification identified in Chapter 15.1 provide for safe 
trade of animals and animal products".1608 Furthermore, the OIE concl udes that "[r]egardless of a 
country's policy on the ALOP, the OIE considers that the application of the measures recommended 
in the Terrestrial Code provide conditions for safe trade in animals and animal products."1609 In our 
view, the OIE's explanations in clude reference to the recommendations for safe trade arising from 
treatment (processing) of products at issue as provided in Chapter 15.1 of the Terrestrial Code.  
7.1234.   On that basis, we need to examine whether the level of protection that would be achieved 
by the alternative measures suggested by the European Union meets Russia's ALOP in respect of 
ASF.1610 We recall that we have found that both Russia's ALOP and the level of protection achieved 
through the alternative measures suggested by the European Union are high. We also recall that 
Russia acknowledges that its ALOP for ASF, as applied to imports of the products at issue, could be 
achieved by means of measures that conform to the standards enshrined in the Terrestrial 
Code.1611 We therefore conclude that the lev el of protection achieved through measures in line 
with the provisions of Chapter 15.1 of the Terrestrial Code in respect of treated products meet 
Russia's ALOP.  
7.1235.   We thus move on to make the comparison between the trade restrictiveness of the bans 
on the im ports of the products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, and the 
alternative measures identified by the European Union.  
7.6.6.4.3.4   Whether the measures based on the recommendations in the Terrestrial 
Code are significantly less trade -restrictive th an the bans on the imports of the products 
at issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland  
7.1236.   We recall that previous panels have examined the third requirement through comparing 
the alternative measures proposed by the complaining party with the challen ged measures.1612 The 
panel in India – Agricultural Products , agreeing with the panel in Australia – Salmon , observed that 
"any measure imposing conditions upon importation, even if stringent, 'would still be significantly 
less restrictive to trade than an ou tright prohibition'".1613 
                                               
1607 OIE response to Panel question No. 19.  
1608 OIE response to Panel question No. 19.  
1609 OIE response to Panel question No. 19.  
1610 Appellate Body Repo rt, Australia – Apples , para. 344.  
1611 See para s. 7.750  and 7.805  above.  
1612 Panel Reports, US- Animals , para. 7.425; India – Agricultural Products , para. 7.591; and Australia – 
Salmon , para. 8.182  
1613 Panel Report, India – Agricultural Products , para. 7.590 (quoting Panel Report, Australia – Salmon , 
para. 8.182).  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.1237.   With this in mind, we move on to analyse whether measures applied pursuant to the 
recommendations on regionalization in Chapter 15.1 of the Terrestrial Code are significantly less 
trade restrictive than the  bans on the imports of the  products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, and Poland.  
7.1238.   In paragraph  7.871  above we explained that we would separately examine the bans on 
the imports from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland  as applicable to treated  and non -treated 
products at issue. Following that distinction, we made separate findings on whether those 
measures, as applied to treated and non -treated products at issue, are based on the relevant 
international standards articulated in the Terrestrial C ode. In order to properly examine the 
measures at issue, we consider that we should follow the same analytical approach in the context 
of our assessment of whether the measures based on the recommendations on regionalization in 
the Terrestrial Code are sig nificantly less -trade restrictive than the bans on the imports from the 
four affected EU member States. We will begin our examination with an assessment of the matter 
in respect of treated products, followed by the corresponding analysis of non -treated pro ducts.   
Treated products  
7.1239.   In paragraph  7.898  above we found that the bans on the imports from Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, and Poland, applicable to treated products, are not based on the international standards 
articulated in t he Terrestrial Code. Moreover, we recall that these measures impose a general 
import ban to most treated products from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland .1614  
7.1240.   In our assessment of the relevant provisions in the Terrestrial Code, we have explained 
that ce rtain provisions in Chapter 15.1 provide for safe trade of pig products, regardless of 
whether they originate from ASF -free areas, that have been subject to treatment (processed) in an 
establishment approved for export purposes so as to ensure destruction of ASFV, and that the 
necessary precautions were taken after processing to avoid contact of the product with any source 
of ASFV.1615  
7.1241.   Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the alternative proposed by the European 
Union, namely that Russia accept pig produc ts which have been certified to satisfy the treatment 
requirements explained above, which allows for safe trade of those treated pigs products covered 
by Articles 15.1.14, 15.1.15, and 15.1.16, is significantly less restrictive to trade than a ban on the 
same products.  
Non-treated products  
7.1242.   In paragraph  7.1040  above we found that the ban on the imports from Latvia , as 
applicable to non -treated products,  is based on the international standards articulated in the 
Terrestrial Code i n respect of non -treated products coming from ASF -free areas. We also found 
that the ban s on the imports from Estonia , Lithuania, and Poland , as applicable to non -treated 
products,  are not based on the relevant international standard.  
7.1243.   In our assessment of  the relevant provisions in the Terrestrial Code, we have explained 
that certain provisions in Chapter 15.1 provide for safe trade from ASF -free areas. In our findings 
under Article 6.3, we found that the European Union failed to provide to Russia the nece ssary 
evidence to objectively demonstrate that there are ASF -free areas, which are likely to remain so, 
within Latvia . We also found that the European Union provided to Russia the necessary evidence to 
objectively demonstrate that there are ASF -free areas,  which are likely to remain so, in Estonia , 
Lithuania, and Poland.1616 
7.1244.   Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the European Union has failed to demonstrate 
that the alternative it identified in respect of non -treated products, namely that Russia base the 
                                               
1614 Excluding thermally treated (temperature not lower than 70ºC for not less than 20 minutes) cat and 
dog food fr om Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland ; as well as f eed additives resulted from chemical or 
microbiological synthesis from Estonia. See Table 1 (Product coverage of the measures at issue) below 
para. 7.144  above.  
1615 See para.  7.287  above.  
1616 See para. 7.1004  above.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  challenged measures on the recommendations on regionalization in the Terrestrial Code, which 
allows for safe trade of pigs products from ASF -free areas covered by Articles 15.1.5, 15.1.8, 
15.1.10, 15.1.12, 15.1.13, and 15.1.16, is significantly less restricti ve to trade than a ban on the 
same products  from Latvia . We also conclude that the alternative proposed by the European 
Union, namely that Russia base the ban s on the imports from  Estonia , Lithuania, and  Poland on 
the recommendations on regionalization in the Terrestrial Code, which allows for safe trade of pig 
products from ASF -free areas covered by Articles 15.1.5, 15.1.12, and 15.1.13, is significantly less 
trade restrictive to trade than a ban on the same products from  Estonia, Lithuania, and  Poland.  
7.6.6.4.4   Conclusion  
7.1245.   We have found that the European Union identified measures based on the 
recommendations on treated (processed) products in the Terrestrial Code as a reasonably 
available alternative to the bans on the imports from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Po land, as 
applied to treated products covered by Articles 15.1.14, 15.1.15, and 15.1.16  of the Terrestrial 
Code. We have also found that the alternative is  available to Russia,  technically and economically 
feasible  to Russia , would achieve Russia's ALOP, an d is significantly less restrictive to trade than 
the bans on the imports from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. Therefore, we conclude that 
those measures, as applicable to treated products, are inconsistent with Article 5.6 of the SPS 
Agreements, w ith respect to treated products covered by Chapter 15.1 of the Terrestrial Code , 
because they are significantly more trade restrictive than required to achieve Russia's ALOP . 
7.1246.   We have also found that the European Union identified measures based on the 
recom mendations on regionalization in the Terrestrial Code as a reasonably available alternative to 
the bans on the imports from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, as applied to non -treated 
products covered by Articles 15.1.5, 15.1.8, 15.1.10, 15.1.12, and  15.1.13  of the Terrestrial Code . 
We have also found that the alternative is technically and economically feasible and would achieve 
Russia's ALOP , and is significantly less restrictive to trade than the ban s on the imports of the 
products at issue from Estonia, Lithuania, and Poland.  However, we have found that the European 
Union failed to demonstrate that the alternative measure is significantly less restrictive to trade 
than the ban on the imports of the products at issue from  Latvia . Therefore, we concl ude that the 
European Union failed to demonstrate that the ban on the imports from Latvia , as applicable to 
non-treated products, is inconsistent with Article 5.6 of the SPS Agreements.  We also conclude 
that the ban s on the imports of the products at issue  from Estonia , Lithuania, and Poland, as 
applicable to non -treated products, are inconsistent with Article 5.6 of the SPS Agreement , 
because they are significantly more trade restrictive than required to achieve Russia's ALOP . 
7.6.6.5   Whether the measures at issu e are more than is necessary for the protection of 
animal health pursuant to Article 2.2  of the SPS Agreement  
7.6.6.5.1   Main arguments of the Parties  
7.6.6.5.1.1   European Union  
7.1247.   The European Union argues that Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement is a more general 
provision and tha t Articles 5.1, 5.2 and 5.6 are more specific provisions.1617 According to the 
European Union, it follows that a finding of a violation of Article 5.6 with regard to risk 
management will consequentially result in a violation of Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreemen t, more 
precisely with regard to the necessity requirement.1618 
7.1248.   The European Union argues that Russia does not comply with the requirements  in 
Article  5.6 and footnote 3 of the SPS Agreement.1619 
                                               
1617 European Union's second written submission, para. 129.  
1618 European Union's second written submission, para. 130.  
1619 European Union's second written submissio n, para. 134.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.6.6.5.1.2   Russia  
7.1249.   Russia argues that its import restrictions on the four infe cted EU Member States are in 
line with the international standards. Russia argues that consequently, they are presumed to be 
consistent with the relevant provisions of the SPS Agreement, including Article 2. 2.1620 
7.6.6.5.2   Analysis by the Panel  
7.1250.   In section 7.5.6.6.2.1  above we set out the legal test applicable in respect of Article 2.2 
and indicated that agree with the panel in India – Agricultural Products  that the "necessity" 
requirement in Article 2.2 is closely linked to the determinati on under Article 5.6.  
7.1251.   In its second written submission, the European Union argues that, based on the 
relationship between Articles 2.2 and 5.61621, a finding of violation of Article 5.6 with regard to risk 
management will consequentially result in a violatio n of the necessity requirement enshrined in 
Article 2.2.1622 The Appellate Body has been clear in endorsing the analysis provided by the panel 
in India – Agricultural Products in considering that a breach of Article 5.6 does not result in a 
consequential viol ation of Article 2.2. Rather, such a finding may lead to a rebuttable 
presumption.1623  
7.1252.   In our view, Russia has not provided any arguments or evidence that would rebut the 
presumption raised from a finding of inconsistency with Article 5.6. Rather, it has foc used its 
arguments on the consistency of the measures at issue with its obligations under Article 5.6.  
7.1253.   We recall our finding that the bans on the imports of the products at issue, as applicable 
to treated products, from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Pol and, are significantly more trade 
restrictive than the alternative measures identified by the European Union. The Panel also found 
that the alternative measures are available to Russia  and met the Russia 's ALOP in respect of ASF.  
7.6.6.5.3   Conclusion  
7.1254.   In light of ou r findings under Article 5.6 and the arguments and evidence raised by Russia 
in order to rebut the presumption of inconsistency with Article 2.2 raised by a finding of breach of 
Article 5.6, we find that the bans on the imports of the products at issue, as  applicable to treated 
products, from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland,  are inconsistent with Article 2.2 of the SPS 
Agreement because they are applied beyond the extent necessary to protect human and animal 
life or health.  
7.7  Claims under  Articles 2.3 and 5.5 of the SPS Agreement  
7.7.1   Introduction  
7.1255.   The Panel will now examine the European Union's claims that Russia's measures are 
inconsistent with Articles 2. 3 and 5.5 of the SPS Agreement.  
7.1256.   At the outset, we observe that the European Union has formulated indivi dual and 
independent claims in respect of Russia's obligations under Articles 2.3 and 5.5 of the SPS 
Agreement.1624 In light of this, before we proceed to examine each of the European Union's claims, 
we must first determine the relationship between Articles 2 .3 and 5.5 and decide the order of our 
analysis of the European Union's claims in respect of these two provisions.  
                                               
1620 Russia's first written submission, para. 296.  
1621 European Union's second written submission, para. 129 (referring to Panel Report, EC – Hormones 
(Canada) , para. 8.99.  
1622 European Union's second written submission, para. 130.  
1623 Appellate Body Report, India – Agricultural Products , paras. 5.37 -5.38.  
1624 European Union's first written submission, section IV.E; and second written submission, section 
III.E. WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.7.2   Relationship between Articles 2.3 and 5.5 of the SPS Agreement and order of 
analysis  
7.1257.   Article 2.3 addresses sanitary measures which  (i) arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate 
between Members where identical or similar conditions prevail; or (ii) are applied in a manner 
which would constitute a disguised restriction on trade. Article 5.5  deals with a situation where  
(i) the imposing Member ha s adopted ALOPs in several different situations; (ii) those levels of 
protection exhibit arbitrary or unjustifiable "differences"/"distinctions" in their treatment of 
different situations; and (iii) these arbitrary or unjustifiable differences result in di scrimination or a 
disguised restriction on trade.  
7.1258.   The Appellate Body has found that Articles 2.3 and 5.5 are closely related.1625 Both 
articulate non -discrimination obligations and condemn disguised restrictions on international trade. 
Article  2.3 is of a mor e general character than Article  5.5. A violation of Article  2.3 will not 
necessarily imply a violation of Article  5.51626, and arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination in the 
sense of the first sentence of Article  2.3, can be found to exist without any exam ination under 
Article  5.5.1627  
7.1259.   On the basis of this relationship, panels faced with claims under both Articles 2.3 and 5.5 
have typically adopted the approach of examining the claim under Article  5.5 before turning to the 
claim under Article  2.3. Indeed, in most disputes in which a claim under Article  2.3 was made, it 
was argued, not as an independent claim, but rather as a consequential breach of the alleged 
breach of Article  5.5.1628  
7.1260.   In India – Agricultural Products , the complainant, the United States, ordere d its analysis 
such that its primary claim was under Article  2.3 of the SPS  Agreement and, in the 
"alternative"1629, under Article  5.5 of the SPS  Agreement. That panel addressed the Article 2.3 
claim first  and then exercised judicial economy in respect of the  United States' "alternative" claim 
under Article 5.5.1630 
7.1261.   In this Panel proceeding, the European Union orders its claims following the approach 
undertaken by the panel in India – Agricultural Products .1631 Thus, the European Union first 
addresses its claims in respect of Article  2.3, followed by those claims under Article 5.5.1632 The 
European Union indicates that it prefers this approach because of the broader nature of the non -
discrimination obligations contained in Article  2.3, as opposed to the focus of Article  5.5 on 
discrimination that may arise in respect of distinctions in levels of protection.1633 In its first written 
submission, Russia rebutte d the European Union's claims starting with Article 5.5 followed by 
Article 2.3. However, Russia was silent on the ord er of analysis the Panel should follow.  
7.1262.   We recall that the Appellate Body has recognized a panel's discretion to depart from the 
sequential order suggested by the complaining party when this is required in the light of the 
correct interpretation or applic ation of the legal provisions at issue.1634 
                                               
1625 Appellate Body Report, EC - Hormones , para. 212.  
1626 Panel Report, Australia – Salmon , para.  8.109.  
1627 Appellate  Body Report, Australia – Salmon , para.  252; and Panel Report, US – Poultry (China) , 
para. 7.318.  
1628 Panel Reports, Australia – Salmon (Article  21.5 - Canada) , paras.  7.112 -7.114; EC – Approval and 
Marketing of Biotech Products , paras.  7.1446-7.1448, 7.1765 -7.1766 and 7.3405 -7.3406; US – Poultry 
(China) , paras.  7.318 -7.319; and Australia – Apples , para.  7.1095.  
1629 Panel Report, India – Agricultural Products , para. 7.336 (referring to United  States' first written 
submission, Section VIII.H).  
1630 Panel Report, India – Agricultural Products , para. 7.481.  
1631 European Union's first written submission, paras. 270 -271. 
1632 European Union's second written submission, para. 135.  
1633 European Union's first written submission, para. 268.  
1634 Appellate Body Report , US – Zeroing ( Article  21.5 – EC), para.  277. See also Appellate Body 
Reports, Canada – Renewable Energy/Feed in Tariff Program , para.  5.8; and Appellate Body Report, Canada – 
Wheat Exports and Grain Imports , paras. 126 -129; and Panel Report, US – Animals , para. 7.13; and Australia 
– Salmon , paras. 8.42 -8.48.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.1263.   Furthermore, we recall that Article 2.3 has a broader scope than Article 5.5. In this 
particular case, the European Union has framed distinct, although related, arguments in respect of 
why the measures at issue run contrary to Russia's obligations under Articles 2.3 and 5.5. The 
European Union has not framed its claims under Article 2.3 as consequential to find ings in respect 
of Article  5.5. 
7.1264.   In light of the above, we will adopt the order of analysis suggested by the European 
Union and begin by examining the European Union's claim that Russia's measures result in 
arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination inconsistent with Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement. We 
will then examine the European Union's claim that Russia is in breach of Article 5.5 of the SPS 
Agreement as it makes arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions in the levels it considers to be 
appropriate in different situations, because such distinctions result in discrimination or a disguised 
restriction on interna tional trade.  
7.7.3   Whether Russia's measures are inconsistent with Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement  
7.7.3.1   Main a rguments of the parties  
7.7.3.1.1   European Union  
7.1265.   The European Union argues that Russia's measures violate the obligations contained in 
both sentences of Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement. The European Union clarifies that the 
obligations in the two sentences of Article 2.3 should not be mechanistically distinguished, as the 
respective concepts impart meaning to one another.1635 
7.7.3.1.1.1   First sentence of Article 2.3 –arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination  
7.1266.   The European Union stresses that there are three cumulative conditions that should be 
satisfied before a violation of the first sentence of Article 2.3 can be established. Those conditions 
are (i) the measure discriminates betw een the territories of Members other than the Member 
imposing the measure, or between the territory of the Member imposing the measure and that of 
another Member; (ii) the discrimination is arbitrary or unjustifiable; and (iii) identical or similar 
conditi ons prevail in the territor ies of the Members compared. 1636 
7.1267.   The European Union argues that in the present dispute, the three cumulative conditions 
are satisfied in respect of two instances of discrimination.1637 The first instance refers to the 
difference in tr eatment afforded to imported products from the European Union and internal trade 
of Russian domestic products at issue. The products at issue from the entire territory of the 
European Union (including the entire territory of the four affected EU member Sta tes) are subject 
to a total import ban, which runs against regionalization that would allow trade of the products at 
issue from the entire European Union, except the ASF -affected areas in the four EU member States 
and Sardinia. By contrast, there is only a  limited ban on trade of Russian domestic products, 
applied only to those products from a limited area around an ASF epizootic hotbed.1638 
7.1268.   In respect of that situation, the European Union argues that  (i) the difference in 
treatment results in discrimination a s Russia allows intra -Russian trade in live pigs and pig 
products from the non -affected areas and does not apply a Russia -wide ban on the products 
associated with the risk of ASF; (ii)   the discrimination between the Russian territory and the 
European Unio n's territory is arbitrary and unjustifiable because the difference in treatment cannot 
be explained by a different epizootic status; and (iii) the same or similar conditions prevail ed both 
in the European Union (including in the four affected EU member St ates) and in Russia, i.e. the 
existence of the ASF virus within both the Russian and the European Union territories, which was 
                                               
1635 European Union's first written submission, para. 273.  
1636 European Union's first written submission, para. 274 (citing Australia – Salmon (Article 21.5 – 
Canada) , para. 7.111).  
1637 European Union's firs t written submission, para. 286.  
1638 European Union's first written submission, para. 287 -289. WT/DS475/R  
 
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  the relevant feature triggering the import prohibition imposed by Russia on live pigs and certain 
pig products from the European Union.1639 
7.1269.   The second instance of discrimination, according to the European Union, refers to the 
initial acceptance of regionalization measures of other WTO Members, like Ukraine, while not 
recognizing the "state -of-the art" ASF regionalization measures in th e European Union.1640 In 
particular, the European Union refers to two situations, both pre -dating the panel establishment. 
One occurred in 2012, when Russia selectively did not apply any ban to Ukrainian products 
following an ASF case in the Zaporozhye region . A second situation occurred in early 2014 with 
respect to the Lugansk region. The European Union highlights in this regard that on 15 January 
2014 Russia announced a ban on the trade from the Lugansk region, while accepting pig products 
from the rest of Ukraine. This regional ban was notified to the WTO on 21 January 2014.1641 
7.1270.   In respect of this second instance, the European Union argues that  (i) the difference in 
treatment of the Ukrainian and European Union territory (and the four affected EU member State 
territories) results in discrimination because, in the case of Ukraine, a country -wide ban was not 
imposed as a reaction to the notification of an ASF outbreak; (ii) such discrimination is arbitrary 
and unjustifiable because the difference in treatment can not be explained by a different epizootic 
status; and (iii) the same or similar conditions prevailed both in the European Union and in 
Ukraine, because the existence of the ASFV within both territories was the relevant feature 
triggering the import prohibi tion imposed by Russia on the products at issue from the entire 
European Union, on the one hand, and the limited territorial import ban on Ukrainian like pig 
products, on the other hand.1642 
7.7.3.1.1.2   Second sentence of Article 2.3 — disguised restriction on internatio nal trade  
7.1271.   The European Union argues that Russia's measures at issue amount to a disguised 
restriction on international trade for several reasons: first, Russia's application of drastic measures 
towards imports from the European Union while being far less s tringent with regard to the internal 
movement of domestic products or with regard to imports from other countries, including other 
WTO Members, amounts to a disguised restriction on international trade. Second, Russia's attempt 
to justify its measures by t he OIE standards is a clear misreading of the Terrestrial Code and the 
OIE Terrestrial Manual. Third, Russia did not provide any risk assessment in support of its 
measures, which is required under Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement for measures that do not 
"conform to" and are not "based on" international standards.1643 
7.1272.   The European Union concludes that the measures at issue are therefore contradictory, 
contrary to international standards, protectionist, discriminatory and not based on scientific 
evidence and sc ientific principles, thus constituting a disguised restriction on international trade 
within the meaning of the second sentence of Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement.1644 
7.1273.   The European Union further posits that while for the purposes of Article 2.3 first 
sentenc e, the discrimination should occur between WTO Members, the concept of disguised 
restriction on international trade in the second sentence of Article 2.3 does not have such a 
limitation.1645 
7.1274.   The European Union contends that in practice, this means that simila r factors should be 
taken into account by the Panel in its analysis of the Russian treatment of Belarussian products 
and the conditions of discrimination between WTO Members. In  particular, the European Union 
explained that such distinction is relevant tak ing into account the  context of the similarly worded 
chapeau  of Article XX of the GATT 1994 , which  the Appellate Body took into account  in its analysis 
                                               
1639 European Union's first written submission, paras. 288 -294. 
1640 European Union's first written submission, para. 299.  
1641 European Union's second written submission, paras. 139 -140. 
1642 European Union's first written submission, paras. 301 -304. 
1643 European Union's first written submission, paras. 313 -322. 
1644 European Union's first written submission, para. 323.  
1645 European Union's second written submission, para. 136 (refer ring to the United States' third -party 
responses to Panel question No. 24, para. 45).  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  regarding "arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination" in reaching its conclusions on "disguised 
restric tion on international trade".1646 
7.7.3.1.2   Russia  
7.1275.   Russia separates its defence on this claim into two main streams: one pertaining to the 
country -wide measures in respect of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland; and a second 
concerning the EU -wide ban.  
7.7.3.1.2.1   First sentenc e of Article 2.3 – arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination  
7.1276.   In respect of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, Russia submits that its measures are 
not inconsistent with Article 2.3 as they do not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate against the 
European Union, neither in comparison with Russia's internal movement restrictions, nor in 
comparison with Russia's treatment of Belarus and Ukraine.  
7.1277.   Russia asserts, in the first instance, that its import restrictions on products from 
ASF-infected EU membe r States are not discriminatory compared to Russia's internal movement 
restrictions.1647 Russia explains that its measures do not de jure treat live pigs and pork products 
imported from the ASF -infected EU member States differently from the way it treats its own 
products after a domestic ASF outbreak, and that any de facto  difference in the application of 
measures is based on and caused by the inability of the European Union to objectively 
demonstrate that its alleged ASF -free regions are and will remain ASF -free. In Russia's view, 
taking into account the "conditions prevailing in the EU's ASF -infected countries," Russia's decision 
to reject the European Union's zones while upholding its domestic zones is not discriminatory.1648  
7.1278.   Russia further considers that assu ming arguendo that there are differences between 
Russia's measures with respect to imports from the four infected EU member States and its 
domestic measures, such differences are neither arbitrary nor do they result in unjustifiable 
discrimination under Ar ticle 2.3 of the SPS Agreement. Furthermore, Russia argues that contrary 
to the European Union's suggestion, any formal difference in treatment or formal differences 
between measures does not suffice to establish arbitrary discrimination within the meaning  of 
Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement. Rather, Russia posits that an assessment of whether a 
difference in treatment is arbitrary or unjustified needs to be based on the rationale put forward to 
explain its existence.1649  
7.1279.   Russia argues that the difference in treatment is not arbitrary because it results from the 
European Union's inability to provide a reasonably objective basis for the zones it has established 
and on whether  its alleged ASF -free areas are and will remain ASF -free.1650 Moreover, Russia 
argues that  there is no arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination because measures that are 
structured or operate differently can reflect the same ALOP.1651 
7.1280.   Russia also argues that the European Union has failed to demonstrate that identical or 
similar conditions prevail . Russia  argues that first, any larger size of the geographic area covered 
by the import measures compared to the domestic measures is due to the European Union's 
inability and unwillingness to propose reasonably -sized ASF -infected zones or any compartment s, 
and by contrast, Russia applies strict and extensive domestic zoning measures. Second , imports 
from these infected EU member States to Russia pose a greater risk of spreading the ASF virus, 
particularly in light of the lax standstill provisions mandated  by European Union legislation, and by 
contrast, Russia applies strict standstill provisions coupled with a wide variety of other eradication 
and control measures.1652 
                                               
1646 European Union's second written submission, para. 137. See also European Union's response to 
Panel question No. 169, paras. 349 -350. 
1647 Russia's first written submission , para. 304.  
1648 Russia's first written submission, para. 305.  
1649 Russia's first written submission, para. 307 -308. 
1650 Russia's first written submission, para. 309.  
1651 Russia's second written submission, paras. 143 -159. 
1652 Russia's first written submission, para s. 311 -314. WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.1281.   In respect of the EU -wide ban and the European Union's claims of discrimination between 
other EU member States and Ukraine/Belarus, Russia asserts that the European Union has failed 
to establish that Russia's provisional compliance with the terms of the veterinary certificates 
results in treatment of imports of pigs and pig products from the oth er EU member States that is 
less favourable than the treatment of similar imports from Ukraine and Belarus.  
7.1282.   With respect to Ukraine, Russia asserts that it agreed upon and complied with a 
veterinary certification system similar to the certification system  agreed with the European Union: 
the veterinary certificates indicate that the products originate from Ukraine territory that has been 
ASF-free for three years; and provide for the possibility of discontinuation of certification of pigs 
and pork products i f the territories are no longer ASF -free for the past three years. Russia's 
provisional compliance with the veterinary certificates is not arbitrary or unjustifiable; not 
permitting the importation of uncertified pig products is consistent with treatment o f all uncertified 
pigs and pork products from any other Member with which Russia has a certification system. At the 
time of the panel request, Russia did not discriminate between live pigs and pork products from 
other EU member States and Ukraine . The alle ged arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination flows 
from the failure of the European Union to meet the ASF -related requirements contained in the 
agreed veterinary certificates.  
7.1283.   With respect to Belarus, Russia submits that any different treatment between B elarus and 
the European Union is justified and not arbitrary as it reflects the fact that Belarus recognized and 
established compartments with high levels of biosecurity, whereas the European Union failed to 
provide information sufficient to assess the lik elihood of entry of ASF into Russia from the 
importation of uncertified pig and pork products from other EU member States. The claimed 
discrimination flows from the failure of the European Union to meet the ASF -related requirements 
contained in the agreed veterinary certificates.  
7.7.3.1.2.2   Second sentence of Article 2.3 — disguised restriction on international trade  
7.1284.   In respect of the bans on imports of the products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
and Poland, Russia relies on its evidence and argumentation u nder Article 5.5 in asserting that its 
measures do not constitute a disguised restriction on international trade.  
7.1285.   In respect of the EU -wide ban, Russia submits that the European Union has failed to 
demonstrate that such measure constitutes a disguised res triction on international trade 
inconsistent with the second sentence Article 2.3. The situation flows from the failure of the 
European Union to meet the ASF -related requirements contained in the agreed veterinary 
certificates. Russia believes importation would be unsafe until a proper risk analysis has been 
conducted, and that it has been acting in good faith.1653 
7.1286.   With regard to the first claim of discrimination, Russia asserts that it did not engage in 
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination in its treatme nt of the European Union when compared 
with the treatment of live pigs and pork products in its own territory.  
7.1287.   Russia reiterates that this dispute may be distinguished from India - Agricultural Products  
in that whereas in that dispute, the same condition i.e. the presence of NAI in India or another 
Member, "is the relevant distinction that triggers the import prohibition imposed by India's AI 
measures", in this dispute, the mere presence of ASF did not automatically "trigger" the relevant 
measures, i.e. th e domestic  regionalization  measures versus country -wide import restrictions with 
respect to the four ASF -infected EU Member States. Instead, the presence of ASF triggered an 
assessment of the adequacy of the EU  regionalization  measures.  In Russia's view,  unlike the 
India - Agricultural Products , this dispute does not involve identical or similar conditions.1654 
7.1288.   Russia also refers to and reiterates it s arguments under Article 5.3 of the SPS Agreement 
in claiming that it did not engage in arbitrary or unjustif iable discrimination under Article 2.3 of the 
SPS Agreement.1655 
                                               
1653 Russia's first written submission, para. 407.  
1654 Russia's second written submission, para. 163.  
1655 Russia's second written submission, para. 164.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.1289.   With regard to the second discrimination claim, Russia argues that it did not engage in 
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination with respect to either Ukraine or Belarus.  
7.1290.   Russia highlights tha t with respect to Belarus, the European Union has changed its 
position. Russia points out that the European Union has acknowledged that Belarus is not a WTO 
Member and the non -discrimination obligation contained in Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement is 
applicable only to WTO Members.1656 
7.1291.   With respect to Ukraine, Russia argues that following an examination that revealed the 
inadequacy of Ukraine's containment measures, Russia decided not to accept Ukraine's zones, just 
as it did with respect to the affected EU me mber States. Russia also claims that such alleged 
discrimination is no longer in place today, nor was it in place at the date of the Panel 
establishment.1657 
7.1292.   Finally, Russia argues that relevant jurisprudence has established that evidence post -
dating the pane l establishment is relevant in assessing whether or not Russia has violated its 
obligations under Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement. Russia asserts that not taking into account the 
ongoing dynamic ASF developments in the European Union would limit the abili ty of the Panel to 
assist the parties in "secur[ing] a positive solution to a dispute" and to help them arrive at the 
"satisfactory settlement of the matter" in accordance with the aim of the dispute settlement 
mechanism.1658 
7.7.3.2   Analysis by the Panel  
7.7.3.3   Introductio n 
7.1293.   The European Union formulates its claims jointly in respect of both sets of measures at 
issue (i.e. the bans on the imports of the products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and 
Poland and the EU -wide ban), with reference to three alleged instanc es of discrimination. Russia 
raises its defence separately in respect of the bans on the products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, and Poland and in respect of the EU -wide ban. We consider it appropriate to undertake a 
joint analysis in order to r each conclusions under Article 2.3 in respect of both sets of measures at 
issue.  
7.1294.   We note that the European Union refers to three situations of discrimination. Therefore, 
for the sake of clarity, the Panel will structure its analysis by first addressing th e legal provision at 
issue and then examining the relevant parts thereof in respect of each of the situations of 
discrimination invoked by the European Union. When necessary, the Panel will clarify whether its 
findings refer to the bans on the imports of t he products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
and Poland or to the EU -wide ban.  
7.7.3.4   The legal provisions at issue  
7.1295.   Article 2 of the SPS Agreement is entitled "Basic Rights and Obligations". Article 2.3 
provides:  
Members shall ensure that their sanitary and phytosanitary measures do not 
arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between Members where identical or similar 
conditions prevail, including between their own territory and that of other Members. 
Sanitary and phytosanitary measures shall not be app lied in a manner which would 
constitute a disguised restriction on international trade.  
7.1296.   Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement contains two primary obligations. Pursuant to the first 
obligation, provided in the first sentence, Members "shall ensure that their sa nitary and 
phytosanitary measures do not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between Members where 
identical or similar conditions prevail, including between their own territory and that of other 
                                               
1656 Russia's second written submission, para. 165.  
1657 Russia's second written submission, paras. 167 -168. 
1658 Russia's second written submission, para. 169.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  Members." According to the second obligation, containe d in the second sentence, Members' SPS 
measures: "shall not be applied in a manner which would constitute a disguised restriction on 
international trade."1659 We will examine whether each of the measures at issue meet each of 
these obligations.  
7.7.3.5   The first sen tence of Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement  
7.1297.   A claim under the first sentence of Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement consists of three 
cumulative elements: (i) the measure discriminates between the territories of Members other than 
the Member imposing the measur e, or between the territory of the Member imposing the measure 
and that of another Member; (ii) the discrimination is arbitrary or unjustifiable; and (iii) identical 
or similar conditions prevail in the territory of the Members compared.1660 
7.1298.   The Appellate Bod y has clarified that these three requirements inform each other, such 
that the analysis of each element cannot be undertaken in isolation from that of the other two. The 
Appellate Body added that the sequence of analysis of the three requirements may vary as a 
function of the circumstances of each dispute. The Appellate Body also observed that the first 
sentence of Article 2.3  does not appear to mandate a particular order for analysing these 
requirements. In the Appellate Body's view, logically, identifying  the relevant conditions, and 
assessing whether they are identical or similar, will often provide a good starting point for an 
analysis under this provision.1661 
7.1299.   Based on this guidance, we will first examine the legal test for each of the requirements. 
Then w e will examine whether identical or similar conditions prevail in the territory of the Members 
compared, whether discrimination exists in each of the situations identified by the European Union, 
and, if we find there are instances of discrimination, we wil l then examine whether such 
discrimination is arbitrary or unjustifiable. We will perform this assessment separately in respect of 
each situation of discrimination identified by the European Union.1662  
7.1300.   Before proceeding to examine these three elements, we ob serve that the European Union 
constructs its arguments under the first sentence Article 2.3 on the basis of its allegations of two 
"instances" of discrimination, the second of which refers to two "situations" of discrimination. First, 
the European Union ch allenges the fact that Russia maintains a total ban on imported products 
from the entire territory of the European Union (including the entire territory of the four affected 
EU member States) compared with a ban on Russian domestic products limited to area s encircling 
the epizootic hotbed. Second, the European Union challenges the fact that Russia initially accepted 
regionalization measures of other WTO Members, like Ukraine, while not recognizing the ASF 
regionalization measures in the European Union. Acco rding to the European Union such difference 
in treatment happened on two occasions: first, in 2012 when Russia selectively did not apply any 
ban to Ukrainian products following an ASF case in the Zaporozhye region; and second, on 15 
January 2014 when Russi a announced a ban on the trade from the Lugansk region, while 
accepting pig products from the rest of Ukraine.  
7.1301.   We now turn to the legal test applicable when assessing a claim under the first sentence 
of Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement. We will then exami ne the three elements required to 
determine a breach of the first sentence of Article 2.3 , in respect of each of the three situations of 
discrimination id entified by the European Union.  
                                               
1659 Panel Report, India – Agricultural Products , para. 7.388 (referring to  Appellate Body Report, 
Australia – Salmon , para. 252).  
1660 Panel Reports, India – Agricultural Products , para. 7.389; and Australi a – Salmon (Article  21.5 – 
Canada) , para.  7.111.  
1661 Appellate Body Report, India – Agricultural Products , para. 5.261.  
1662 We note that this approach was followed by the panel in US – Animals.  See Panel Report, US – 
Animals , paras. 7.578, 7.600 and 7.618.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.7.3.5.1   Legal test  
7.7.3.5.1.1   Whether identical or similar conditions prevail in the ter ritory of the 
Members compared  
7.1302.   To facilitate our consideration of this issue, we first discern the meaning of the terms 
used in this provision. In this respect, the dictionary definition of the term "identical" is 
"designating a proposition whose terms exp ress an identity or denote the same thing; of a thing or 
set of things viewed at different times – the very same; or of two or more separate things; 
agreeing in every detail".1663 In turn, the term "similar" is defined as "of the same substance or 
structure t hroughout – homogenous; having a resemblance or likeness; of the same nature or 
kind".1664 Finally, the term "condition" is defined as "a way of living or existing"; "the state of 
something"; "the physical state of something"; and "the physical or mental stat e of a person or 
thing".1665 
7.1303.   The panel in India – Agricultural Products  noted, first, that the same facts that inform the 
assessment of whether or not discrimination is arbitrary or unjustifiable may also inform the 
assessment of whether or not identical or s imilar conditions prevail; and, second, that the relevant 
"conditions", for the purpose of a given analysis, may be the presence of a disease within a 
territory (and the concomitant risk associated with that disease).1666  
7.1304.   The panel thus agreed with India's c ontention that, if the relevant disease is present in 
one country but not in another, this may be an indication that identical or similar conditions do not 
exist. However, in view of the fact that India had not discharged its burden of proving that 
LPNAI1667 was exotic to India, and the panel's finding that India did not maintain a surveillance 
mechanism adequate to detect reliably the presence or absence of LPNAI within its territory, there 
was no foundation upon which the panel could, in that dispute, take a ccount of any such 
indication.1668 
7.1305.   This finding was challenged on appeal by India. In India's view, the panel had incorrectly 
shifted the burden of proof when requiring it to demonstrate that LPNAI was exotic to India. The 
Appellate Body found that the panel had not erred in make that finding, mainly because the panel 
had been correct in assigning the burden to India of demonstrating one of the evidentiary pillars of 
its argumentation.1669  
7.1306.   That panel also observed that the risk against which India was protecting  was LPNAI, and 
that there was no evidence before the panel to suggest that the risks associated with LPNAI were 
in any way different on the basis of the origin of the relevant product. Thus, the panel considered 
that India was protecting against an identi cal or similar risk when it took measures to protect 
against LPNAI, regardless of whether the relevant product originated in India or in the United 
States or somewhere else. Therefore, the panel found that the risks against which India was 
protecting in In dia constituted conditions that were similar to those in other Members, including 
the United States.1670 
7.1307.   Following this analytical approach, the panel in India – Agricultural Products  opined that 
the "relevant conditions" referred to the presence of NAI1671 in India or another Member. The panel 
explained that under conditions where NAI is present in a country other than India, India applies 
an import prohibition. In contrast, the panel stated, under conditions where NAI is present in 
                                               
1663 Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles , 6th ed. (Oxford University Press, 2007) 
Vol. 1, p. 1319 as quoted in Panel Report, US – Animals , para. 7.572.  
1664 Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles , 6th ed. (Oxford Universit y Press, 2007), 
Vol. 2, p. 2838 as quoted in Panel Report, US – Animals , para. 7.572.  
1665 Merriam -Webster , available at http://www.merriamwebster.com /dictionary/condition  (last accessed 
9 December 2014) as quoted in Panel Report, US – Animals , para. 7.572 . 
1666 Panel Report, India – Agricultural Products , para. 7.460.  
1667 Low pathogenicity notifiable avian influenza (LPNAI).  
1668 Panel Report,  India – Agricultural Products , para. 7.467.  
1669 Appellate B ody Repo rt, India – Agricultural Prod ucts, para. 5.280.  
1670 Panel Report, India – Agricultural Products , paras. 7.468 -7.470.  
1671 Notifiable avian influenza (NAI).  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  India, the relevant provision s of India's legislation1672 permit movement and trade outside the 
surveillance zone. For the panel, the measures in question thus addressed the same condition – 
the presence of NAI – and they did so differently. The panel clarified that it was not stating th at 
the disease situation of India was identical or similar to the disease situation of the United States, 
but rather that the relevant condition for an analysis under this element of Article  2.3 was the 
presence of NAI in India or another Member because th is was the relevant distinction that 
triggered the import prohibition imposed by India's AI measures. That panel therefore concluded 
that the relevant conditions were identical or similar between India and other countries (including 
the United States) for the purpose of this element of the first sentence Article 2.3 of the SPS 
Agreement.1673 
7.1308.   We note that the situation in this case is clear in respect of the presence of the relevant 
disease, ASF, in the territory of the Members compared. Russia recognizes that ASF exists in its 
territory.1674 Because of the fact that ASF is not exotic to Russia, and that, as described by Russia, 
there are extensive programmes in place to control ASF spread within Russia's territory1675, the 
comparisons identified by the panel in India – Agricultural Products  are particularly relevant to this 
case. 
7.1309.   We recall that the panel in US – Animals  stated:  
In the context of the chapeau of Article XX, the Appellate Body stated in EC – Seal 
Products  that "only 'conditions' that are relevant for the  purpose of establishing 
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination in the light of the specific character of the 
measure at issue and the circumstances of a particular case" should be considered.1676 
It further observed that the regulatory objective pursued b y the measure at issue may 
also provide useful guidance on the question of which "conditions" prevailing in 
different Members are "relevant"1677.1678 
7.1310.   The panel in US – Animals  considered that the challenged measure aimed to ensure that 
imports of foot and mouth Disease (FMD) -susceptible animals and products were allowed only if 
the level of risk posed by such imports met the United States' ALOP for FMD.1679 The panel found 
that the condition that had to be identical or similar in the two regions compared was the lev el of 
risk of FMD -introduction posed by imports of the product at issue from the two regions, as well as 
their ability to meet the United States' ALOP. 1680 A salient fact in that case was that FMD is not 
present anywhere within the United States.  
7.1311.   We agree wi th the panel in India – Agricultural Products  that the relevant "conditions" for 
the purposes of a given analysis in the first sentence of Article 2.3 may be the presence of a 
disease within a territory and the concomitant risk associated with that disease . In addition, we 
consider that unlike the situation examined by the panel in US – Animals , the approach of the 
panel in India – Agricultural Products  addresses the risks associated with the entry of a disease 
that is already present and widespread in India, hence the approach in India – Agricultural 
Products  is more fitting to the situation.  
7.1312.   Therefore, with a view to informing the Panel's interpretation of the relevant conditions 
prevailing in the territory of Russia, the Panel will take into account whet her ASF is present in the 
territories of the Members compared, as well as the risks associated with that disease. The Panel 
will assess these elements in the territory of the Members compared in each of the three situations 
of alleged discrimination.  
                                               
1672 India's National Action Plan for 2012 (NAP 2012).  
1673 Panel Report, India – Agricultural Products , para s. 7.463 -7.464.  
1674 See paras. 7.207 -7.208  above.  
1675 See paras. 7.1336 -7.1337  below.  
1676 (footnote original) Appellate Body Report, EC – Seal Products , para. 5.299 . 
1677 (footnote original) Appellate Body Report, EC – Seal Products , para. 5.300.  
1678 Panel Report, US – Animals , para. 7.572.  
1679 Panel Report, US – Animals , para. 7.5 80. 
1680 Panel Report, US – Animals , para. 7.580.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.7.3.5.1.2   Wheth er the measure discriminates between the territories of Members 
other than the Member imposing the measure, or between the territory of the Member 
imposing the measure and that of another Member  
7.1313.   Examining the meaning of "discrimination" under the first sen tence of Article 2.3, the 
Panel draws guidance from how this term has been interpreted in the context of this provision, as 
well as other provisions of the covered agreements, and in particular, the chapeau of Article XX of 
the GATT 1994. The chapeau of Ar ticle XX states:  
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which 
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries 
where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on intern ational trade, 
nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement 
by any contracting party of measures [enacted for the purposes listed in the 
subparagraphs of Article XX.]  
7.1314.   The Appellate Body has elaborated on the meaning o f "discrimination" in this context as 
resulting "not only when countries in which the same conditions prevail are differently treated, but 
also when the application of the measure at issue does not allow for any inquiry into the 
appropriateness of the regu latory program me for the conditions prevailing in those exporting 
countries".1681 
7.1315.   Citing this guidance, the panel in  India – Agricultural Products  went on to state  
We note that the language of Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement is similar to that of the 
chapea u to Article XX. Both provisions speak of "arbitrary" and "unjustifiable" 
discrimination, and a comparison between conditions prevailing in different "countries" 
(in the context of Article XX) or "Members" (in the context of Article 2.3). We also 
note that  the last recital of the preamble to the SPS Agreement states that the SPS 
Agreement "elaborate[s] rules for the application of the provisions of GATT 1994 
which relate to the use of [SPS] measures, in particular the provisions of Article 
XX(b)", which inc ludes the chapeau. Given the similarities between these provisions 
and the reference to Article XX of the GATT 1994 in the preamble of the SPS 
Agreement, we consider it appropriate to interpret "discrimination" in Article 2.3 of the 
SPS Agreement in a mann er similar to that which the Appellate Body adopted in the 
context of Article XX of the GATT 1994. Hence, in the context of Article 2.3 of the SPS 
Agreement, we consider that discrimination may result not only (i) when Members in 
which the same conditions prevail (including between the territory of the Member 
imposing the measure, and that of other Members) are treated differently, but also 
(ii) where the application of the measure at issue does not allow for any inquiry into 
the appropriateness of the regu latory programme for the conditions prevailing in the 
exporting country.1682  
7.1316.   The panel in US – Animals  agreed that the language of the chapeau of Article XX of the 
GATT 1994 presents a number of similarities with that of Article 2.3: both provisions speak of  
arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination, and a comparison between the "conditions" prevailing in 
different Members.1683 That panel also observed that the last recital of the preamble of the SPS 
Agreement states that the Agreement "elaborate[s] rules for t he application of the provisions of 
GATT 1994 which relate to the use of [SPS] measures, in particular the provisions of Article 
XX(b)", which includes the chapeau.1684 Therefore, it considered that the chapeau of Article XX 
provided useful context for its in terpretation of the terms of Article 2.3.1685  
7.1317.   Turning to the requirement that the measures discriminate between Members that are in 
identical or similar conditions, the US – Animals  panel noted that  
                                               
1681 Appellate Body Repor t, US – Shrimp , para. 165.  
1682 Panel Report, India – Agricultural Products , para. 7.400.  
1683 Panel Report, US – Animals , para. 7.570.  
1684 Panel Report, US – Animals , para. 7.570 . 
1685 Panel Report, US – Animals , para. 7.570.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  [T]he Appellate Body consistently stated that different tre atment does not necessarily 
amount to discrimination. The focus of a discrimination analysis is whether the 
measure at issue alters the conditions of competition to the detriment of products 
originating in the territories of Members other than the Member i mposing the measure 
or between the territory of the Member imposing the measure and that of another 
Member. 1686 In US – Shrimp , the Appellate Body found that "discrimination" in the 
context of the chapeau of Article XX may result not only when Members in whi ch the 
same conditions prevail are treated differently, but also where the application of the 
measure at issue does not allow for any inquiry into the appropriateness of the 
regulatory programme for the conditions prevailing in the exporting country.1687 
Further, according to the Appellate Body, discrimination may arise not only from "the 
detailed operating provisions" of a measure, but also from the application of a 
measure "otherwise fair and just on its face".1688 Finally, the panel in US – Poultry 
(China)  stated that discrimination may stem from both "'substantive' SPS measures" 
and "procedural and information requirements"1689.1690 
7.1318.   Therefore, the Panel may consider that discrimination in the context of Article 2.3 may 
result not only when Members in which the same conditions prevail are treated differently, but also 
where the application of the measure at issue does not allow for any inquiry into the 
appropriateness of the regulatory programme for the conditions prevailing in the exporting 
country. Furthermore, disc rimination may arise not only from "the detailed operating provisions" of 
a measure, but also from the application of a measure "otherwise fair and just on its face". 
Moreover, discrimination may stem from both "'substantive' SPS measures" and "procedural and 
information requirements". While the Panel derives substantive guidance from prior cases relating 
to Article XX (chapeau), we are also mindful of the "preliminary observation" relating to the 
characterization of Article 2.3 made by the Appellate Body i n India – Agricultural Products   
We begin by observing that, notwithstanding certain similarities between its language 
and that of the chapeau of Article XX of the GATT 1994, Article 2.3, first sentence, of 
the SPS Agreement, sets out an obligation and is not expressed in the form of an 
exception. Thus, a complainant raising a claim that a Member's SPS measure is 
inconsistent with Article 2.3, first sentence, bears the overall burden of establishing its 
prima facie  case of inconsistency.1691 
7.1319.   This "preliminary observation" serves as an important reminder that, although the 
language of Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement and the chapeau of Article XX of the GATT 1994 may 
be similar, they are of a different legal character and accordingly require a different allocati on in 
the applicable burden of proof. For the purposes these proceedings , this means that the European 
Union, as complainant, retains the burden of establishing its prima facie  case of inconsistency with 
the elements of Article 2.3 with respect to each of its specific claims.  
7.7.3.5.1.3   Whether the discrimination is arbitrary or unjustifiable  
7.1320.   To facilitate our consideration of this issue, we first discern the meaning of the terms 
used in this provision. In this respect, the dictionary definition of the term "arbitrary " is "based on 
mere opinion or preference as opp[osed] to the real nature of things, capricious, unpredictable, 
inconsistent".1692 In turn, the term "unjustifiable" is defined as "not justifiable, indefensible"1693, 
                                               
1686 (footnote original) See e.g. Appellate  Body Reports, EC – Asbestos , paras. 98 -99; Dominican 
Republic – Import and Sale of Cigarettes , para. 96; and Philippines – Distilled Spirits , para. 256.  
1687 (footnote original) Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp , para. 165. See also Panel Report, India – 
Agricultural Products , para. 7.400;  and Panel Report, US – Poultry (China) , para. 7.292.  
1688 (footnote original) Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp , para. 160.  
1689 (footnote original) Panel Report, US – Poultry (China) , para. 7.147. In the context of the chapeau  of 
Article XX of the GATT 1994, see Appellate Body Reports, US – Shrimp , para. 160; EC – Seal Products , para. 
5.302.  
1690 Panel Report, US – Animals , para. 7.573.  
1691 The Appellate Body made this "preliminary observation" on Article 2.3 before addressing India 's 
claims under Article 11 of the DSU. Appellate Body Report, India – Agricultural Products , para. 5.260.  
1692 Online Oxford English Dictionary  (as quoted in Panel Report, US – Poultry (China) , para.  7.259; and 
Panel Report, US – Animals , para. 7.587).  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  with "justifiable" meaning "[c]apable of being  legally or morally justified or shown to be just, 
righteous, or innocent; defensible" and "[c]apable of being maintained, defended, or made 
good".1694 
7.1321.   In a number of cases, the Appellate Body has explained that an analysis of whether 
discrimination is arbitr ary or unjustifiable within the meaning of the chapeau of Article  XX "should 
focus on the cause of the discrimination, or the rationale put forward to explain its existence".1695 
In particular, in Brazil – Retreaded Tyres  the Appellate Body focused its analys is on whether the 
measure at issue bore a " rational connection to" its stated objective of protecting human life or 
health under subparagraph  (b) of Article  XX.1696 This approach was adopted by the panels in US – 
Poultry (China), India – Agricultural Products  and US – Animals  in their analysis under Article  2.3 
of the SPS  Agreement.1697  
7.1322.   In the context of an analysis of Article  5.5 of the SPS  Agreement, which constitutes a 
specification of the basic obligation contained in Article  2.3, the Appellate Body in Austr alia - 
Salmon  upheld the panel's finding that the measure at issue was arbitrarily and unjustifiably 
discriminatory because it treated differently two products that presented the same level of risk.1698 
7.1323.   Based on this guidance , the focus of our analysis will b e the rationale that Russia puts 
forward to explain each of the situations of discrimination alleged by the European Union in respect 
of the measures at issue. As part of the assessment of whether the discrimination against imports 
of the products at issue  from the European Union ( vis-à-vis Russia) or between imports from the 
European Union and Ukraine1699 stemming from Russia's measures is "arbitrary or unjustifiable", 
the Panel will examine whether the regulatory distinction between the two situations/sets o f 
imports bears a rational connection to the stated objective of the measures.1700 
7.7.3.5.2   First instance of discrimination: treatment of domestic products in Russia  
7.7.3.5.2.1   Whether identical or similar conditions prevail in Russia and in the European 
Union  
7.1324.   According to the European Union, the same or similar conditions prevailed both in the 
European Union (including in the four affected EU member States) and in Russia, i.e. the existence 
of the ASFV in both the Russian and the European Union territories. The European Union p osits 
that the first occurrence of ASF within the European Union was the relevant feature triggering the 
import prohibition imposed by Russia on the products at issue from the European Union.1701  
7.1325.   Russia asserts that there are differences in "conditions" betw een the situation in the 
European Union and in Russia with respect to ASF control measures in at least two instances. The 
first refers to the differences in the size of zones established in Russia and in the European Union 
                                                                                                                                               
1693 Online Oxford English Dictionary  (as quoted in Panel Report, US – Poultry (China) , para.  7.259; and 
Panel Report, US – Animals , para. 7.587).  
1694 Online Oxford English Dictionary  (as quoted in Panel Reports, US – Poultry (China) , para.  7.259; 
and US – Animals , para. 7.587).  
1695 Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres , paras.  225-226 (in turn referring to Appellate Body 
Reports, US – Gasoline pp. 25 -26 and 28 ; US – Shrimp , paras. 163 -172; and US – Shrimp (Article  21.5 – 
Malaysia) , paras. 144 and 147 ). See al so Appellate Body Report, EC – Seal Products , para.  5.303; and Panel 
Report, US – Poultry (China) , para.  7.261.  
1696 Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres , para.  227. 
1697 Panel Report, US – Poultry (China) , para.  7.261. See also Panel Report, India – Agricultural 
Products , para.  7.429.  
1698 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon , para.  158. 
1699 The European Union clarified , in the course of the proceedings  that its references to Belarus were 
only relevant in the context of the second, and not the first, sentence of Article 2.3. See European Union's 
second written submission, paras. 136 -137. We therefore do not examine allegations pertaining to Belarus in 
connection with the first sentence of Article 2.3.  However we note that the following exhibits pertain  to this 
argument: Exhibits EU -100, RUS -42, and RUS -43. 
1700 The same approach was followed by the panel in US – Animals . See Panel Report, US – Animals , 
para. 7.589.  
1701 European Union's first written submission, para. 294.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  to contain ASF.1702 The second refer s to the different standstill provisions in place in the affected 
zones both in the European Union and in Russia.1703  
7.1326.   In this regard, Russia further posits that this dispute may be distinguished from 
India - Agricultural Products  in that whereas in that disp ute, the same condition i.e. the presence 
of NAI in India or another Member, was "the relevant distinction that triggers the import 
prohibition imposed by India's AI measures", in this dispute, the mere presence of ASF did not 
automatically "trigger" the r elevant measures, i.e. the domestic  regionalization  measures versus 
country -wide import restrictions with respect to the four ASF -infected EU member States. Instead, 
the presence of ASF triggered an assessment of the adequacy of the EU  regionalization  measures.  
In Russia's view, unlike India - Agricultural Products , this dispute does not involve identical or 
similar conditions.1704 
7.1327.   As described in paragraph 7.1312  above, to determine whether similar conditions prevail 
in the Euro pean Union and in Russia in respect of trade of the products at issue, we will consider 
the presence of ASF in each territory, and the risks thereof.  
7.1328.   We recall that it is an undisputed fact that ASF and ASFV have been present in Russia 
from 2007. It is als o an undisputed fact that ASF and ASFV were introduced to the European Union 
territory on January 2014 through infected wild boar in Lithuania near the border with Belarus.  
There have been infected wild boars in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. In a ddition, certain 
domestic pig holdings have been infected with ASF, throughout 2014 and up to the second half of 
2015, in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland.1705 
7.1329.   The experts have identified the different risks associated with the presence of ASF in a 
particular area.  We recall the view of Dr Thomson that "the problem under discussion is a regional 
one encompassing the Caucuses, Baltic States, the Russian Federation and eastern parts of the 
EU. As indicated elsewhere, from an ASF perspective, the whole regi on seems to be in roughly the 
same position."1706 We also recall Dr Thomson's view that  
In my opinion the crux of this trade issue is that both the EU and the RF are 
confronted by a similar problem, i.e. both have suffered incursion of ASF into their 
territor ies and both, as part of their ASF management strategy, have established ASF -
free zones. The RF seems to be insinuating that the risk of importing ASF from ASF -
free zones in countries comprising the eastern part of the EU is greater than for 
internal trade  in the same commodities and products derived from ASF -free zones 
within the RF. I do not have sufficient experience of the situation on the ground to 
either accept or reject this insinuation. However, it seems to me that the risks are 
probably similar. If  that is so, to be consistent with Article 6, the risks of internal and 
this proposed external trade are not significantly different. If that is so there is no 
sanitary reason to prevent the proposed cross -border trade.1707 
7.1330.    From the experts' answers, we disc ern that those risks associated with the disease are 
present both in the territory of the European Union and of Russia.  
7.1331.   Based on the foregoing, we consider that the relevant conditions are identical or similar 
between Russia and the European Union for the purposes of the first sentence of Article 2.3 of the 
SPS Agreement.  
                                               
1702 Russia's response to Panel questio n No. 174, para. 307.  
1703 Russia's response to Panel question No. 174, para. 308.  
1704 Russia's, response to Panel question No. 174, para. 309; and second written submission, para. 163.  
1705 Exhibits EU -118 and RUS -296 revised. See paras. 7.1015 -7.1018  above . 
1706 Dr Thomson's response to Panel question No. 5, C ompilation of the experts' responses, para.  1.128  
1707 Dr Thomson's response to Panel question No. 54, C ompilation of the experts' responses, 
para. 4.149.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.7.3.5.2.2   Whether Russia's measures discriminate between imported and domestic 
products  
7.1332.   The European Union argues that the difference in treatment of imports of the products at 
issue, as compared to intra -Russian trade of such products, results in discrimination. In particular, 
the European Union posits that Russia bans imports of the products at issue from the entire 
territory of the European Union, while it allows for trade in the products at iss ue from non -affected 
areas within Russia, based on regionalization measures surrounding an ASF epizootic hotbed.1708  
7.1333.   Russia asserts that the import restrictions on products from the ASF -infected EU member 
States are not discriminatory compared with the restr ictions applied on the internal movement of 
products coming from ASF infected areas. From a de jure  perspective, Russia claims to apply 
regionalization and compartmentalization both to imported and domestic products. From a de facto 
perspective, Russia arg ues that any difference in treatment is solely the consequence of the 
European Union's inability to objectively demonstrate that its ASF -free regions are and will remain 
ASF-free.1709  
7.1334.   We first recall that as indicated in paragraph 7.1318  above, in order to find that there is a 
discriminatory treatment, we have to determine that the same or similar conditions prevailing in 
both Members are treated differently, or that the application of the measure at issue does not 
allow for any i nquiry into the appropriateness of the regulatory programme for the conditions 
prevailing in the exporting country.  
7.1335.   We have found that  the EU -wide ban bars the importation of products originating from 
non- ASF affected areas .1710 We have also found that the E U-wide ban is not based on the relevant 
international standards. We recall that the bans on imports of the products at issue from Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland  impose nation -wide import prohibitions. We have found that those 
measures do not confor m to the relevant international standards.1711 We have also found that the 
bans on the imports of the products at issue from Estonia, Lithuania, and Poland are not based on 
the relevant international standard while the ban on non -treated products from Latvia is based on 
the relevant international  standard.1712 
7.1336.   We are called upon t o examine how Russia treats intra -Russian trade in the products at 
issue. After examining the content of the 1980 ASF Instructions ,1713 together with the evidence on 
how they have been appl ied in different areas within Russia,1714 it is clear to us that Russia's 
domestic legislation does not mandate the imposition of a ban on the products at issue coming 
from certain regions, zones or compartments beyond the first and second endangered areas 
surrounding the epizootic hotbed (section 5 of the 1980 ASF Instruction s). Furthermore, we note 
that Russia contend s that it does not maintain a Russia -wide ban in respect of the domestic trade 
of the products at issue.1715  
7.1337.   In addition, Russia has acknowledged  that it allows for trade of the products at issue from 
certain facilities that meet Level IV biosecurity standards even if they are located within an area 
                                               
1708 European Union's first written submission, paras. 287 -290. 
1709 Russia's first written submission, para. 305.  
1710 See paras. 7.83-7.84 above.  
1711 See para. 7.890  above.  
1712 See paras. 7.1039 -7.1040  above.  
1713 Russian instructions  on ASF prevention and eradication measures of 21 November 1980 
(Exhibit  EU-18). 
1714 See fn 1048 above.  
1715 Russia's r esponses to Panel question No. 266, para. 51.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  considered to be infected with ASF.1716 Level IV refers to high -level protected holdings which may 
be certified as such if they meet specific biosecurity standards described in Russia's legislation.1717 
7.1338.   Based on this evidence, it is clear for us that Russia allows for internal trade of the 
products at issue originating in areas  that it considers to be ASF-free. 
7.1339.   In this respect, there is a clear distinction in the treatment of the products under the 
same conditions, i.e. imports of products from areas not affected by ASF. The imported products 
coming from non - ASF affected areas within the European Union are not  allowed to enter into 
Russia's market, while intra -Russian trade is possible for those products coming from non -ASF 
affected areas. In this respect, we find that the EU -wide ban discriminates against products 
originating in the non -ASF affected areas of t he European Union compared to the treatment 
granted to trade in domestic products.  The bans on imports of the products at issue from Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland  discriminate because they impose nation -wide import prohibitions.  
As we have seen, there is no Russia -wide ban on intra -Russian trade in the products concerned.  
7.1340.   If we were to accept Russia's argument that the distinction in treatment does not amount 
to discrimination, due to Russia's objective refusal of the European Union's regionalizat ion 
measures, we would need to examine the second scenario of potential discrimination. That is, 
whether the application of the measure at issue does not allow for any inquiry into the 
appropriateness of the regulatory programme for the conditions prevaili ng in the exporting 
country.  
7.1341.   We note that previous panels have focused their assessment of discrimination pursuant to 
the first sentence of Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement on the question of whether there has been a 
difference in treatment. However, the A ppellate Body in US – Shrimp  examined measures adopted 
by the United States in respect of the importation of certain shrimp and shrimp products, 
specifically Section 609 of Public Law 101 -162 (Section 609). Pursuant to those measures, the 
United States did  not permit imports of shrimp harvested by commercial shrimp trawl vessels 
using mechanisms for the protection of turtles comparable in effectiveness to those required in the 
United States, if those shrimp originated in waters of countries not certified un der Section 609. 
The Appellate Body considered that the measures at issue were, in their application, more 
concerned with effectively influencing WTO Members to adopt essentially the same comprehensive 
regulatory regime as that applied by the United States  to its domestic shrimp trawlers. In this 
regard, the Appellate Body noted that "discrimination results not only when countries in which the 
same conditions prevail are differently treated, but also when the application of the measure at 
issue does not all ow for any inquiry into the appropriateness of the regulatory program for the 
conditions prevailing in those exporting countries."1718 
7.1342.   We note that Russia's regulation in respect of imports of veterinary products refers to the 
adaptation of SPS measures to pa rticular sanitary conditions based on the principles of 
regionalization.1719 Russia allows for the establishment of particular ASF-free regions, zones or 
compartments from which internal trade of the products at issue is allowed. However, as described 
above, pursuant to the measures at issue, Russia imposes a nation -wide import ban on the 
products at issue from the four ASF affected EU member States, as well as an EU -wide ban on 
products at issue from the rest of the European Union's territory. Nevertheless, i n light of our 
analysis and findings under Article 61720 and the regionalization dialogue outlined in Appendix 1 , 
we do not consider that the application of the measures at issue do not allow for any inquiry into 
the appropriateness of the regulatory programm e for the conditions prevailing in the exporting 
members in such a way as to lead to another form of discrimination within the meaning of the first 
sentence of Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement.  
                                               
1716 Russia's first written submission, para. 34; and response to Panel question No. 138, paras. 247 -249. 
See also Order by the Russian Federal Ministry of Agriculture on Approval of Guidelines to Determine Animal  
Health Status of Pig Holdings and Organizations Involved in Pig Slaughter, Pork Product Processing and 
Storage, No. 258, 23 July 2010.  (Exhibit RUS -22). 
1717 Order by the Russian Federal Ministry of Agriculture on Approval of Guidelines to Determine Animal 
Health Status of Pig Holdings and Organizations Involved in Pig Slaughter, Pork Product Processing and 
Storage, No. 258, 23 July 2010. (Exhibit RUS -22). 
1718 Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp , para. 165.  
1719 See para. 7.204  and Tabl e 3 above.  
1720 Section 7.6.2  above.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.1343.    We consider that Russia's argument regarding its objective re fusal of the European 
Union's regionalization measures does not affect our previous finding that there has been 
discriminatory treatment. The reason underlying such treatment, as discussed in the following 
section, might be relevant to determine whether th e discrimination is arbitrary or unjustifiable, not 
whether the discrimination itself exists.  
7.1344.   Based on the foregoing, we find that through the measures at issue Russia discriminates 
between imports of the products at issue from non ASF -affected areas in th e European Union and 
domestic trade of the products at issue from non ASF -affected areas within Russia.  
7.7.3.5.2.3   Whether the discrimination is arbitrary or unjustifiable  
7.1345.   The European Union argues that the difference in treatment is arbitrary and unjustifiable 
because it cannot be explained by a different epizootic status. According to the European Union its 
regionalization and control measures are effective, which cannot be said of Russia's measures.1721 
In the European Union's view, Russia imposed a disproportionate ban on the products at issue 
from the European Union after the ASF notifications to the OIE. On the other hand, while the 
Russian domestic measures have limited efficiency in ensuring proper detection and containment 
of ASF within Russia, trade in the prod ucts associated with the risk of ASF of Russian origin is in 
principle permitted.1722 
7.1346.   Russia argues that the difference in treatment is not arbitrary because it results from the 
European Union's inability to provide a reasonably objective basis for the inadeq uate zones it has 
established and the European Union 's failure to demonstrate that its alleged ASF -free areas are 
and will remain ASF -free.1723 In this respect, Russia notes that the Panel's assessment should 
focus on the cause of the discrimination or the ra tionale put forward in support of its existence.1724  
7.1347.   We agree with Russia that our examination of whether the discrimination is arbitrary or 
unjustifiable should focus on the cause of the discrimination or rationale put forward in support of 
its existence. I n this respect, the Panel finds useful guidance in the panel reports in US – Animals 
and US – Poultry (China) . Those panels considered that the meaning of "arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination" pursuant to Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement involves a c onsideration of whether 
there is a "rational connection" between the reasons given for the discriminatory treatment and 
"the stated objective of the measure".1725 We therefore need to examine whether the regulatory 
distinction between imports from the Europea n Union and domestic trade bears a rational 
connection to the stated objectives of the measures.  
7.1348.   In section 7.4.4.2.1.1  above the Panel examined the scope of the EU -wide ban. Based on 
the evidence examined there, we find that the EU -wide ban's objective is to ensure that non -
treated products from any of the territories of the European Union not affected by ASF are not 
imported into Russia, because of the European Union's veterinarians inability to certify the 
veterinary require ments set forth in the veterinary certificates agreed by both parties in 2006. 
Such requirements refer to the absence of ASF during three years in the whole territory of the 
European Union except Sardinia.  
7.1349.   In addition, in section 7.4.4.2.2.1  above the Panel examined the objectives of the bans 
imposed on imports of the products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland . After 
reviewing the text of each of those measures, as well as their notifications to the WTO by Rus sia, 
we concluded that the objective of the four EU member States specific bans is to ensure the 
protection of Russia's territory from ASF and ASFV.  
7.1350.   Based on the foregoing, broadly speaking the regulatory objective of the measures at 
issue is to limit the  re-entry and further spread of ASF from additional sources into Russia's 
                                               
1721 European Union's first written submission, para 291.  
1722 European Union's first written submission, para 297.  
1723 Russia's first written submission, para. 309.  
1724 Russia's first written submission , para. 308.  
1725 Panel reports, US – Animals, para. 7.574 and 7.588; and US – Poultry (China) , para. 7.147. In the 
context of the chapeau of Article XX of the GATT 1994, see Appellate Body Reports, US – Shrimp , para. 160; 
and EC – Seal Products , para. 5.302.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  territory. The European Union has provided a detailed explanation of the surveillance, control and 
eradication measures that its regulation envisages.1726 The European Union has also pr ovided 
information on the measures that it has applied to ensure protection from entry and spread of ASF 
into its territory.1727 In our view, the European Union's ASF -related measures provide evidence 
that they also pursue the objective of ensuring protection  against the further entry and spread of 
ASF.  
7.1351.   Furthermore, we understand that Russia has acknowledged that pursuant to the 
Terrestrial Code the European Union is entitled to select an ASF control strategy of its choice, and 
that the crux of the parties' d isagreement stems from Russia's view that the European Union has 
not demonstrated the actual effectiveness of the zones it has established. Such discrepancy does 
not speak to the regulatory objective of the ASF -related measures adopted by the European Unio n. 
7.1352.   We recall our finding that Russia has set a high or conservative ALOP in respect of 
ASF.1728 Based on the objective of the European Union's measures, we can deduce the ALOP of 
those measures to be ensuring protection from entry and spread of ASF.1729 In our v iew, that is a 
high or conservative ALOP that at least matches Russia's in respect of ASF. Such an objective has 
been applied through a number measures aimed at controlling the spread of ASF from those areas 
currently infected and at eradicating the diseas e within the four affected EU member States.1730 
7.1353.    The Panel is cognizant of Russia's claims that the European Union's  control methods have 
not been effective in preventing the entry and further spread of ASF within the four affected  EU 
member States.1731 The evi dence on the Panel's record also demonstrates that  despite Russia's 
best efforts1732, Russia's control methods have not been entirely successful in prevent ing the 
spread of ASF within Russia's territory since its initial introduction. Indeed, at the first mee ting 
with the Panel, Russia detailed how despite costly and extensive efforts to establish an ASF -free 
compartment, particular enterprises were nonetheless infected with ASF.1733 The Panel is not 
convinced that Russia's control methods, while somewhat differe nt from those applied in the 
European Union, have been any more effective in preventing the further spread of ASF over time.  
7.1354.   As described in paragraph s 7.211 , 7.228 , and 7.748  above, the objective of the measures 
at issue is to ensure protection of Russia's territory from the further entry and spread of ASF. 
When assessing the European Union's claims under Article 3 of the SPS Agreement, we observed 
that the evidence on r ecord, including the experts' views, support the proposition that there are 
ASF-free areas within the European Union.1734 However, Russia has refused to accept any of them 
on the basis of a number of factors that Russia considers to objectively support such r efusal.1735 
We also found that Russia allows for domestic trade of the products at issue that come from areas 
or compartments considered to be free of ASF pursuant to Russia's regulatory framework.1736  
7.1355.   Taken together, these findings constitute strong indicators , or warning signals1737, that 
Russia's measures arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between domestic and imported 
products. However, before reaching our conclusions, we find it appropriate to consider Russia's 
explanations as to the rationale underlyin g the regulatory distinction between the products at issue 
imported from the European Union and those domestically produced.  
                                               
1726 See Appendix 1 and Appendix 2 below.  
1727 See Appendix 1 and Appendix 2 below.  
1728 See para. 7.752  above.  
1729 Council Directive  of 27 June 2002, 2002/60/ EC (Exhibit EU -31), Article 1 .  
1730 See Appendix 1 and Appendix 2 below.  
1731 See e.g. Russia's first written submission, paras. 309 and 313.   
1732 See fns 1045, 1046, 1047, 1048 to para. 7.733 above, where the Panel refers to the measures 
adopted by Russia in the regions of Voronezh , Krasnodar and Belgorod . 
1733 See Exhibit RUS -148. 
1734 See sections 7.5.2  and 7.6.2 above.  
1735 See Russia's se cond written submission, paras. 57 -127. 
1736 See para. 7.1338  above.  
1737 Using the same expressions of the panel in US – Animals . Panel Report, US – Animals , para. 7.590.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.1356.   Russia explains, when referring to the ban on imports of the products at issue from 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,  and Poland, that th e European Union has not been able to demonstrate 
that its alleged ASF-free zones are indeed free of ASF and are likely to remain so.1738  
7.1357.   We are mindful that according to the provisions of the Terrestrial Code (especially Article 
5.3.7.1), the importing coun try has a certain degree of flexibility to recognize or reject a zone for 
international trade purposes. However, we are also mindful that pursuant to its obligations under 
the SPS Agreement, in the circumstances of the present dispute, Russia should at lea st explicitly 
recognize, in the measure itself, the possibility for such recognition to take place. Russia is not 
doing this either on the face of the measures at issue nor on the basis of their application. We 
consider that this conclusion is without prej udice to our findings under Article 6.2 of the SPS 
Agreement, that Russia has recognized the concept of disease free areas in its overarching SPS 
legislation in respect of ASF.1739 This is because in our analysis under Article 6.2 we are addressing 
a separate  question that does not directly relate to the existence of instances of discrimination as 
the ones we are examining in this context.  
7.1358.   None of the measures at issue contains any explicit indication that there is a possibility to 
recognize ASF - free zones or  compartments from the territory of the European Union. The 
instruments through which the EU -wide ban is enforced only refer to the inability of the European 
Union to issue the veterinary certificates that attest ASF-freedom for the last 3 years in the ent ire 
European Union excepting Sardinia. Based on such inability they require the European Union to 
refrain from issuing those veterinary certificates. In addition, Russia has ordered border authorities 
to pay special attention to compliance with this requir ement.  
7.1359.   The measures on Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland  impose a "temporary restriction" 
on imports of the products at issue. However, on their face, they do not explicitly provide for 
potential regionalization in the European Union.  
7.1360.   This holds true  also in respect of the application of both sets of measures. Although 
Russia has requested additional information1740 and has formally rejected the European Union's 
recognition of ASF - free zones1741, up to this point Russia has not been open to recogniz ing any 
area outside the four affected member States (and Sardinia), regardless of the particular 
characteristics of the different areas within the European Union. Rather, Russia has remained 
closed to the possibility that there are ASF -free zones within the Euro pean Union outside the four 
affected member States (and Sardinia). Russia has kept in place its EU -wide ban on imports of the 
products at issue.  Russia has also maintained its country -wide "temporary restrictions" on the 
imports of the products at issue f rom the entire territory of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland .  
7.1361.   We have already noted that trade in the products at issue on the basis of the OIE 
standards would ensure protection to Russia from the re -entry and further spread of ASF and 
ASFV. Such me asures include trade from ASF -free countries, zones or compartments. We have 
also observed that both parties agree that the Terrestrial Code offers certain flexibilities in respect 
of the manner in which a Member may establish its ASF - free zones. In addit ion, considering the 
evidence on record as well as the experts' responses, it seems to us that at least certain areas 
from the European Union's territory could be considered as free from ASF.1742 
7.1362.   Based on the foregoing, we conclude that, by allowing domestic trade of the products at 
issue from ASF - free areas outside the first and second endangered zones and from ASF - free 
compartments, and prohibiting imports of the same products from ASF - free areas within the 
European Union, as well as denying through its m easures and through their application the 
recognition of ASF - free areas, Russia's measures arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between 
Members (including the territory of the Member imposing the measure) where the same conditions 
prevail. This amoun ts to a violation of the first sentence of Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement.  
                                               
1738 Russia's first written submission, para. 309.  
1739 See para . 7.379  above.     
1740 See Appendix 1 below.  
1741 Russia's letter to the European Union of 29 July 2014, C -EH-8/13771  (Exhibit RUS -263). 
1742 See in section . 7.6.2.3.4  above our analysis in respect of the SPS c haracteristics in certain areas in 
the European Union.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.7.3.5.3   Preliminary considerations regarding the two situations involved in the second 
instance of discrimination  
7.1363.   We recall that regarding the second instance of discrimination, the Eur opean Union refers 
to two situations: first, in 2012 when Russia selectively did not apply any ban on Ukrainian 
products following an ASF case in Zaporozhye region; and second, on 15 January 2014, when 
Russia announced a ban on the trade from the Lugansk r egion, while accepting pig products from 
the rest of Ukraine.  
7.1364.   Russia asserts that the situations described in respect of the second instance of 
discrimination are no longer in place and were not in place at the date of the establishment of the 
Panel.1743 In Russia's view, this demonstrates that the European Union has failed to meet its 
burden to demonstrate that the second instance of discrimination breaches Russia's obligations 
under Article 2.3.  
7.1365.   The European Union considers that even if a measure is no lon ger in force, a panel may 
still make findings in respect of such measure without issuing recommendations.1744  
7.1366.   We recall that the measures at issue are the bans imposed by Russia on the imports of 
the products at issue from the four affected EU member States and from the rest of the European 
Union. In this sense, the objection raised by Russia is not whether a challenged measure that pre -
dates the establishment of a panel can be considered for the purposes of dispute settlement. 
Rather, the question is whether  in assessing a claim of discrimination under the first sentence 
Article  2.3, the situation compared with the measure challenged can be one that pre -dates the 
establishment of the Panel and is no longer in place.  
7.1367.   The Appellate Body and panels have examine d whether it is appropriate for them to make 
findings on an expired measure.1745 In this regard, the Appellate Body stated that "[w]hether a 
measure is still in force is not dispositive of whether that measure is currently affecting the 
operation of any cover ed agreement. Therefore, we disagree with the United States' argument that 
measures whose legislative basis has expired are incapable of affecting the operation of a covered 
agreement in the present, and that, accordingly, expired measures cannot be subjec t of 
consultations under the DSU."1746 However, the fact that a measure has expired may affect the 
recommendations that a Panel may make pursuant to Article 19.1 of the DSU.1747  
7.1368.   The Appellate Body has also noted that temporal limitations to the measures that ma y be 
within a panel's terms of reference do not apply in the same way to evidence. Rather, evidence in 
support of a claim may pre -date or post -date the establishment of the panel.1748 Thus, a panel is 
not precluded from assessing a piece of evidence for the m ere reason that it pre -dates or 
post-dates its establishment.1749 The Appellate Body added that a "panel enjoys a certain 
discretion to determine the relevance and probative value of a piece of evidence that pre -dates or 
post-dates its establishment".1750· 
                                               
1743 Russia's second written submission, para. 169.  
1744 European Union's comments to Russia's response to Panel question No. 259, para. 41.  
1745 Appellate Body Reports, China – Raw Materials , para. 263 (referr ing to Panel Report, US – Wool 
Shirts and Blouses , para. 6.2; Panel Report, Indonesia  – Autos , para. 14.9; Panel Report, Chile – Price Band 
System , para. 7.126; Panel Report, Dominican Republic – Imports and Sale of Cigarettes , para. 7.344; and 
Panel Repor ts, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products , paras.  7.1303 -7.1312).  
1746 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton , para. 262.  
1747 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton , para. 272.  
1748 See section 7.3.6  above.  
1749 The Appell ate Body  has noted that "However, we recall that, in US – Cotton Yarn , the Appellate 
Body stated (when reviewing a textile safeguards determination) that a Member cannot be expected to 
examine "evidence that did not exist and that, therefore, could not pos sibly have been taken into account 
when the Member made its determination.  ...  Consequently, a panel must not consider evidence which did 
not exist  at that point in time ." (Appellate Body Report, US – Cotton Yarn , paras. 77 and 78 (original 
emphasis;  f ootnote omitted))  We also note the Appellate Body's statement in  EC – Sardines  that "[t]he 
interim review stage is not an appropriate time to introduce new evidence." (Appellate Body Report, EC – 
Sardines , para. 301)". Appellate Body Report, EC – Selecte d Customs Matters , para. 188.  
1750 Appellate Body Report, EC – Selected Customs Matters , para. 188.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.1369.   In ou r view, the situations that the European Union is requesting us to consider under the 
second instance of discrimination are to be regarded as evidence. We are mindful that such 
evidence predates the establishment of the Panel. However, this does not preclu de us from 
addressing such evidence considering the European Union's claims under the first sentence of 
Article 2.3  of the SPS Agreement  in respect of the second instance of discrimination.  
7.7.3.5.4   Second situation of discrimination: treatment of imports from Ukra ine in 2012  
7.7.3.5.4.1   Whether identical or similar conditions prevail in Ukraine in 2012 and in the 
European Union at the time of the establishment of the Panel  
7.1370.   The European Union refers to the second situation of discrimination in the following 
terms: "The first i nstance occurred in 2012, when Russia did not apply any ban to Ukrainian 
products following an ASF case in the Zaporozhye region. Russia considered at the time that the 
Ukrainian measures were sufficient to prevent any spread of the ASFV.1751"1752 However, neith er in 
its second written submission nor in its responses to the Panel's questions does the European 
Union explain in which manner the relevant conditions are similar or identical between the 
situation in Ukraine in 2012 and the situation in the European Un ion at the time of the 
establishment of this Panel.  
7.1371.   Russia neither  challenge s this assertion nor put s forward arguments in respect of this 
alleged instance of discrimination.  
7.1372.   As we mentioned in paragraph 7.1312  above, to dete rmine whether similar conditions 
prevail in the European Union and in Ukraine in respect of trade of the products at issue, we will 
consider the presence of ASF in each territory, and the risks thereof.  
7.1373.   The only exhibit that the European Union provides in order to support the existence of 
ASF in Ukraine in 2012 is a n FSVPS press note that refers to a letter from the deputy head of 
FSVPS to the president of the State Veterinary and Phytosanitary Service of Ukraine.1753 That letter 
refers to "self -imposed restri ctions on exports of African swine fever susceptible animals in 
connection with the occurrence of disease outbreaks in the village of Kamyshevatka, Primorsk 
district in the Zaporozhia region of Ukraine." This demonstrates the presence of ASF in the 
territo ry of the Zaporozhia region of Ukraine.  
7.1374.   However, we consider that the European Union does not adduce any type of evidence in 
support of the particular characteristics of the presence of ASF in that region. Furthermore, the 
European Union does not formulate  any type of arguments as to why the prevailing conditions in 
Ukraine in 2012 are similar or identical to those in the European Union at the time of the 
establishment of the Panel. The European Union seems to consider, without a clear indication in 
this re spect, that the arguments it formulated in its first written submission in respect of the 
second instance of discrimination are applicable to the situation relative to the imports of the 
products at issue from Ukraine in 2012.  
7.1375.   The flaws and shortcomings i n the European Union's case largely limit our ability to 
perform the comparison between the relevant conditions in Ukraine in 2012 and in the European 
Union at the time of the establishment of the Panel1754 in order to determine whether such 
conditions are si milar or identical. Without such assessment, we are not in a position to continue 
the rest of the examination pursuant to the first sentence of Article 2.3, in respect of the second 
situation of discrimination.  
7.1376.   Based on the foregoing, we consider that the  European Union has failed to adduce 
sufficient evidence and arguments that would allow us to determine that relevant conditions were 
identical or similar between Ukraine in 2012 and the European Union at the time of the 
                                               
1751 (footnote original) Press release,  Russian Federal Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary 
Supervision, 2 August 2012, http://www.fsvps.ru/fsvps/ news/5049.h tml (Exhibit EU -165).  
1752 European Union's second written submission, para. 139.  
1753 Press release,  Russian Federal Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Supervision, 2 August 2012, 
http://www.fsvps.ru/fsvps/news/5049. html ( Exhibit EU -165).  
1754 See section 7.3.6  above.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  establishment of this Panel1755, for t he purposes of the first sentence of Article 2.3 of the SPS 
Agreement.  
7.7.3.5.5   Third situation of discrimination: treatment of imports from Ukraine between 
15 and 30 January 2014  
7.7.3.5.5.1   Whether identical or similar conditions prevail in Ukraine and in the 
European Union and whether Russia's treatment of imports from Ukraine in 2014 are 
arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminatory in respect of the treatment provided to imports 
from the European Union  
7.1377.   The third situation of discrimination to which the European Union refers  arises from 
Russia's acceptance of regionalization in the Lugansk region in Ukraine between 15 and 30 January 
2014. According to the European Union, on 15 January 2014 Russia announced a ban on the trade 
from the Lugansk region, while accepting pig produc ts from the rest of Ukraine. Such ban was 
notified to the WTO on 21 January 2014.1756 The European Union considers that identical or similar 
conditions prevailed both in the European Union and in Ukraine, because the presence of ASFV on 
both territories was t he relevant feature triggering the import prohibitions imposed by Russia.1757  
7.1378.    Russia underlines that the European Union's claim is based on a situation that was no 
longer in place at the time of the establishment of the Panel, and focuses on the justified c haracter 
of any different treatment that it provided to the imports from Ukraine during those two weeks.1758 
7.1379.   As we mentioned in paragraph 7.1312  above, to determine whether similar conditions 
prevail in the European Union and in U kraine in respect of trade of the products at issue, we 
consider the presence of ASF in each territory, and the risks thereof.  The European Union has 
referred to the notification to the WTO of the import ban imposed by Russia on the products at 
issue from  Ukraine. Together with other exhibits submitted by the parties, this serves as evidence 
of the presence of ASF in the territory of Ukraine on 15 January 2014. As described by the 
European Union, accepted by Russia, and supported on the record, Russia's in itial reaction to this 
outbreak was to impose a ban limited to those products originating from the Lugansk region.1759 
The Lugansk region was the only region affected by ASF at the time. A couple of weeks later, 
Russia reassessed this measure and imposed a ne w ban, which does not appear on the Panel's 
record as  having been notified to the WTO, and which applies to products from the entire territory 
of Ukraine.  
7.1380.   It is also clear from the record that as of 25 January 2014, Russian imposed a ban on the 
imports of  the products at issue from Lithuania. In addition, a couple of days later, Russia notified 
the European Union that it would no longer accept the veterinary certificates attesting that the 
entire European Union, except Sardinia, has been free of ASF for th e last three years. Such 
notification, as described above, together with internal instructions in Russia and their 
enforcement, has led to a ban on the imports of the products at issue from the entire territory of 
the European Union.  
7.1381.   When comparing those two situations, it is clear that during the brief time -period in 
January 2014 mentioned by the European Union, Russia initially responded to the ASF outbreak in 
Ukraine by immediately recognizing  ASF- free areas or zones  within Ukraine , while it was not op en 
to such possibility from the European Union.  
7.1382.   For the purposes of our analysis, we need to further understand whether there were any 
substantive differences between the ASF situation in Ukraine and in the European Union which 
would distinguish the risks  associated with the presence of ASF in the territory of each of these 
                                               
1755 See section 7.3.6  above.  
1756 See G/SPS/N/RUS/46 (Exhibit EU -6). 
1757 European Union's first written submission, paras. 300 -305; and second written submission, paras. 
140-142. 
1758 See Russia's second written submission, paras. 138 and 169; See also Russia's response to Panel 
question No. 166, para. 340.  
1759 See European Union's first written submission, para. 302; Russia's first written submission, para. 
325; and  G/SPS/N/RUS/46 (Exhibit EU -6). WT/DS475/R  
 
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  Members. According to the descriptions of the risks associated with ASF provided by the experts, 
there does not seem to be any material difference between the conditions of risks associ ated with 
the presence of ASF in those Members.  
7.1383.   However, we have difficulties in continuing our examination of a claim of discrimination 
based on something that lasted 15 days and which occurred almost seven months before the date 
of the establishment of this Panel. We have difficulties seeing , and the European Union has not 
provided us with a compelling rationale concerning, the value and significance of any findings in 
respect of these allegations given the particular facts and circumstances with which w e are faced. 
Accordingly, we are of the view that it is appropriate to exercise judicial economy on these 
allegations of discrimination by the European Union under Article 2.3. This is so as the Panel 
considers that findings on these elements of the claims  are not necessary in order to enable the 
DSB to make sufficiently precise recommendations and rulings as to allow for prompt compliance 
with those recommendations and rulings "in order to ensure effective resolution" of the dispute.1760 
7.7.3.5.6   Conclusion on claims pursuant to the first sentence of Article 2.3 of the SPS 
Agreement  
7.1384.   The Panel has found that Russia's measures on the imports of the products at issue from 
the European Union (including those imposed on imports from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and 
Poland , as well as from the rest of the European Union) arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate in 
respect of domestic trade in the products at issue and imports of the products at issue from  the 
European Union.  
7.7.3.6   Article 2.3, second sentence, of the SPS Agreement  
7.1385.   Having found that the measures at issue arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate, we now 
turn our attention to the second sentence of Article  2.3 to consider whether the measures have 
been applied in a manner that would constitute a disguised restriction on trade. We note that this 
second sentence of Article 2.3 contains an obligation that is not conditioned upon a finding of 
arbitrary or unjustified discrimination. That is, the obligations contained in the first and second 
sentences of Article  2.3 are not  cumulative in nature. Nonetheless, they are closely related.  
7.7.3.6.1   "disguised restriction on international trade"  
7.1386.   The phrase "disguised restriction on international trade" has been interpreted by a panel 
for the first time, in the context of Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement, in India Agricultural Produ cts. 
The panel relied on previous observations of the Appellate Body within the context of Article 5.5 of 
the SPS Agreement. In addition to Article 5.5 of the SPS Agreement, further guidance may be 
sought from the previous interpretations reached within the framework of an analysis of the 
chapeau to Article XX of the GATT 1994, which contains similar language. Concerning the meaning 
of "disguised restriction on international trade", the Appellate Body in US – Gasoli ne stated that 
such a notion, as contained in the chapeau of Article  XX of the GATT 1994, "includes disguised 
discrimination in international trade".1761 More specifically, the Appellate Body found that 
"'disguised restriction', whatever else it covers, may p roperly be read as embracing restrictions 
amounting to arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination".1762 
7.1387.   The panel in India – Agricultural Products  applied the same reasoning, in its interpretation 
of "disguised restriction on international trade" in Article 2. 3 of the SPS Agreement, and stated 
that such terms "encompass measures that constitute arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination".1763  
7.1388.   The panel in US – Animals  stated:  
We see no reason to depart from the above -mentioned approach in our assessment of 
Argenti na's claims in this dispute. We thus consider that a finding that the United 
States' measures result in arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination would necessarily 
                                               
1760 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon , para. 223.  
1761 Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline , p. 25.  
1762 Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline , p. 25.  
1763 Panel Report, India – Agricultural Products , para. 7.476.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  entail a finding that they are applied in a manner which would constitute a disguised 
restriction on international trade.1764 
7.1389.   We agree with the approach followed by the panels in India – Agricultural Products  and in 
US – Animals  in respect of the relationship of a finding of arbitrary or unjustified discrimination 
and a finding of a disguised restri ction on international trade, pursuant to Article 2.3.  
7.1390.   Moreover, we recall that, in Australia – Salmon , the Appellate Body stated that a finding 
that an SPS measure is not based on a risk assessment is a strong indication that the measure "is 
not really c oncerned with the protection of human, animal or plant life or health but is instead a 
trade restrictive measure taken in the guise of an SPS measure, i.e., a 'disguised restriction on 
international trade'". The Appellate Body also took into account the di fference in treatment 
associated with a certain risk between the internal movement of products within the territory of a 
Member and the treatment accorded to the same imported products.  
7.1391.   We have found above that Russia's SPS measures at issue are not based  on a risk 
assessment under Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement, and do not benefit from provisional 
justification under Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement.1765 We agree that the lack of a risk 
assessment for the SPS measures at issue in this case further support s the view that they 
constitute disguised restrictions on international trade.  
7.1392.   Having found that Russia's measures at issue arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminat e in 
respect of domestic trade in the products at issue and of imports of those products, and  they are 
not based on a risk assessment, we find the measures at issue are applied in a manner that 
constitutes a disguised restriction on international trade. Therefore, the measures at issue are 
inconsistent with the second sentence of Article 2.3 of th e SPS Agreement.  
7.7.3.7   Conclusion on the European Union's claim pursuant to Article 2.3 of the SPS 
Agreement  
7.1393.   On the basis of the foregoing, the Panel concludes that Russia's ASF measures are 
inconsistent with the first sentence of Article  2.3 of the SPS  Agreeme nt because they arbitrarily 
and unjustifiably discriminate between Members where identical or similar conditions prevail. We 
also find that Russia's ASF measures are inconsistent with the second sentence of Article  2.3, 
because they are applied in a manner  which constitutes a disguised restriction on international 
trade.  
7.7.4   European Union's claim pursuant to Article  5.5 of the SPS  Agreement  
7.7.4.1   Main arguments of the parties  
7.7.4.1.1   European Union  
7.1394.   The European Union argues that Russia has adopted its own "appropriate leve ls" of 
sanitary protection against risks to animal life or health. In the absence of a clear statement from 
Russia regarding its ALOPs, these should be inferred from the measures that the Russian 
Federation applies to the domestically produced products ass ociated with the risk of ASF and from 
the measures that the Russian Federation applies with respect to the European Union products at 
issue.1766 
7.1395.   The European Union emphasizes that Russia's measures with respect to European Union 
products are far more stringen t than those applied with respect to the internal movement of the 
domestic products associated with the ASF risk within Russia. The European Union argues that 
Russia also failed domestically to take effective measures in order to eradicate and contain the 
ASFV. In the European Union's view, it follows that Russia's ALOP with regard to domestic goods is 
                                               
1764 Panel Report, US – Animals , para. 7.575.  
1765 See paras. 7.720  and 7.1199  above.  
1766 European Union's first written submission, para. 326.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  rather low, while Russia's ALOP with respect to the European Union products at issue is very 
high.1767 
7.1396.   In the European Union's view, as long as ASF transmission  through domestically -
produced products and through products from the European Union are viewed as distinct 
situations, Russia breaches the provisions of Article 5.5, by applying different levels of protection 
without any justification.1768 The European Union  highlights that in the present case, the situations 
are "comparable" in the sense that they involve the same virus and the same health effects.1769 
7.1397.   The European Union considers that the differences exhibited by Russia's  measures are 
arbitrary and unjustifiab le. The European Union argues that Russia 's WTO notifications concerning 
the bans on the imports from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland  are imprecise, contradictory 
and prove a profound misunderstanding of the Terrestrial  Code. According to the Europe an Union, 
Russia's  measures not only do not "conform to" and are not "based on" international standards, 
but they go against the relevant OIE standards. Moreover, Russia  did not conduct any risk 
assessment. Consequently, the European Union considers that t he measures at issue should be 
considered to amount to a disguised restriction on international trade, inconsistent with the 
provisions of Article 5.5 of the SPS Agreement.1770 In addition, the breach of Article 5.5 results in a 
consequential breach of Articl e 2.3 of the SPS Agreement.1771 
7.1398.   Moreover, the European Union considers that for the purposes of Article 5.5 claims, the 
discrimination with regard to Belarus is also relevant.1772 
7.7.4.1.2   Russia  
7.1399.   In respect of the bans on the imports of the products at issue from Estonia , Latvia, 
Lithuania, and Poland Russia argues that the European Union confuses the concepts of "ALOP" and 
"measure". According to Russia a Member may adopt a high ALOP with the objective of preventing 
the entry or spread of a disease. A Member may then see k to achieve the objective through 
various legal instruments and on -the-ground prevention and eradication measures taken by 
various government and private sector entities and organizations. Russia explains that the 
question of whether Russia's ALOP is "low " or "high", must be judged by examining the acceptable 
level of risk expressed through the goal and objective of Russia's measures, and the fact that there 
may be circumstances when the objective was not achieved does not lower or diminish the 
objective i tself.1773 
7.1400.   According to Russia, it applies the same ALOP to imported live pigs and pig products from 
infected EU member States as to those products within domestic ASF -infected zones.  There are no 
de jure  or de facto  distinctions in ALOP. Russia recognizes a nd applies regionalization to both 
domestic and imported products after an ASF outbreak. Its measures as applied to Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, and Poland conform to, or are based on, international standards, and are presumed to 
be consistent with the rele vant provisions of the SPS Agreement (including Articles 5.1 and 2.2 on 
risk assessment) and GATT 1994. Moreover, the Russian Veterinary Service has engaged in a 
"transparent and open" discussion with the European Union Veterinary Service, and Russia' 
meas ures have caused very large losses for its pork producers. Russia is one of many Members to 
deem pork imports from infected EU member States as unsafe and imposed country -wide 
restrictions (China, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Chinese Taipei and Ukraine).   In the 
alternative, any alleged distinctions between Russia's treatment of domestic products and products 
from the European Union are not arbitrary or unjustified, and do not result in discrimination or a 
disguised restriction on international trade.  
                                               
1767 European Union's first written submission, paras. 328 -329. See also second written submission, 
paras. 144, 1 50-153. 
1768 European Union's first written submission, para. 327.  
1769 European Union's first written submission, para. 330.  
1770 European Union's first written submission, para. 331. See also second written submission, paras. 
143-149. 
1771 European Union's first wri tten submission, para. 332.  
1772 European Union's second written submission, para. 154.  
1773 Russia's first written submission, para. 248.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.1401.   Regarding the EU -wide ban, Russia  submits that the European Union has failed to 
establish that Russia 's provisional compliance with the agreed veterinary certificate arbitrarily or 
unjustifiably discriminates between other EU member States and Russia . Because  Russia 's 
provisional compliance is justified under Article 5.7, the European Union has failed to support its 
claims under any provision of Article 5, including Article 5.5 .1774 
7.7.4.2   Analysis by the Panel  
7.1402.   Article 5.5 of the SPS Agreement calls for non -discriminat ion in the management of risks 
to human, animal or plant life or health. Three cumulative elements must be demonstrated to 
establish an inconsistency with Article 5.5 (i) the Member imposing the measure complained of has 
adopted its own appropriate levels of sanitary protection against risks to [human] life or health in 
several different situations; (ii) those levels of protection exhibit arbitrary or unjustifiable 
differences ("distinctions") in their treatment of different situations; and (iii) the arbitr ary or 
unjustifiable differences result in discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade.1775 
7.1403.   In section 7.7.2 above, we addressed the relationship between Articles 2.3 and 5.5 of the 
SPS Agreement. We noted tha t the Appellate Body has found that Articles 2.3 and 5.5 are closely 
related.1776 Both articulate non -discrimination obligations and condemn disguised restrictions on 
international trade. Article  2.3 is of a more general character than Article  5.5. A violatio n of 
Article  2.3 will not necessarily imply a violation of Article  5.51777, and arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination in the sense of the first sentence of Article  2.3, can be found to exist without any 
examination under Article  5.5.1778 
7.1404.   The Appellate Body i n Argentina  – Import Measures  observed:  
The Appellate Body has explained that the principle of judicial economy "allows a 
panel to refrain from making multiple findings that the same measure is inconsistent  
with various provisions when a single, or a certa in number of findings of 
inconsistency, would suffice to resolve the dispute."1779 Thus, panels need address 
only those claims "which must be addressed in order to resolve the matter in issue in 
the dispute"1780, and panels "may refrain from ruling on every clai m as long as it does 
not lead to a 'partial resolution of the matter'."1781 Nonetheless, the Appellate  Body 
has cautioned that "[t]o provide only a partial resolution of the matter at issue would 
be false judicial economy", and that "[a] panel has to address those claims on which a 
finding is necessary in order to enable the DSB to make sufficiently precise 
recommendations and rulings so as to allow for prompt compliance by a Member with 
                                               
1774 Russia's first written submission, paras. 382 and 409. See also response to Panel question No. 129, 
paras. 240 -241; respo nse to Panel question No. 154, para. 277; and second written submission, paras. 
204-205.  
1775 Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones , para. 214.  
1776 Appellate Body Report, EC - Hormones , para. 212.  
1777 Panel Report, Australia – Salmon , para.  8.109.  
1778 Appellate  Body Report, Australia – Salmon , para.  252; and Panel Report, US – Poultry (China) , 
para. 7.318.  
1779 (footnote original) Appellate Body Report, Canada – Wheat Exports and Grain Imports , para.  133. 
(emphasis original)  
1780 (footnote original) Appellate Body Reports , US – Wool Shirts and Blouses , p. 19, DSR 1997:I, p. 
340; US – Tuna II (Mexico) , para.  403. 
1781 (footnote original) Appellate Body Reports, US – Upland Cotton , para. 732; US – Tuna II (Mexico) , 
para. 404. WT/DS475/R  
 
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  those recommendations and rulings 'in order to ensure effective resolutio n of disputes 
to the benefit of all Members.'"1782;1783 
7.1405.   In Argentina – Imports Measures the Appellate Body also noted that:  
In our view, the fact that two provisions have a different "scope and content" does 
not, in and of itself, imply that a panel must address  each and every claim under 
those provisions. Indeed, if this were so, then only in the rarest of circumstances 
would a panel be able to exercise judicial economy on a claim. As the Appellate Body 
has explained in previous disputes, what should guide panel s in their decision to 
exercise judicial economy is the need to address all of those claims whose resolution 
is necessary to resolve the dispute so as to avoid a partial resolution of the 
dispute.1784 
7.1406.   In light of this guidance, we consider it is appropriate t o exercise judicial economy in 
respect of the European Union's claims under Article 5.5 of the SPS Agreement. This is, because 
we have already made findings in respect of the European Union's arguments on discrimination 
under both the first and the second sentence of Article 2.3. As the Appellate Body noted, "when 
read together with Article 2.3, Article 5.5 may be seen to be marking out and elaborating a 
particular route leading to the same destination set out in Article 2.3".1785 Thus, in the context of 
this particular dispute, we consider our findings under Article 2.3 to be enough to provide a 
solution of the matters of discrimination raised by the European Union.  
7.1407.   Moreover, we have made a number of findings under other provisions of the SPS 
Agreement which s upport our recommendation to the DSB to request Russia to bring the measures 
at issue into conformity with its obligations under the SPS Agreement. In our view, the totality of 
our findings resolves the matter at issue in this dispute. We therefore conside r that we are not 
exercising false judicial economy, or providing a partial resolution of this dispute.  
7.1408.   If this report is appealed and the Appellate Body were to disagree with our approach, we 
have made factual findings in respect of Russia's ALOP and in s upport of our findings that the 
measures at issue breach the first and the second sentence of Article 2.3. In our view, these 
factual findings would provide a basis for the Appellate Body to complete its analysis under Article 
5.5. 
7.8  Claims under Article 7 a nd Annex B of the SPS Agreement  
7.8.1   Main arguments of the parties  
7.8.1.1   European Union  
7.1409.   The European Union claims that the measure s in respect of Lithuania is inconsistent with 
Russia's obligations under Article 7 and Annex B paragraphs 1, 2, 5 and 6 of the SPS Agree ment, 
because certain measures at issue were taken by Russia against Lithuania on 25 January 2014 
(ref. FS -EN-8/1032), but only notified to the WTO on 10 February 2014, that is, 16 days after their 
                                               
1782 (footnote original) Appellate Body Report, Austral ia – Salmon , para. 223. (fns omitted) For instance, 
in Australia – Salmon , the Appellate Body considered that the fact that the panel made findings concerning a 
violation of Article  5.1 of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Meas ures 
(SPS Agreement) with respect to certain Canadian salmon, without findings under Articles  5.5 and 5.6 of the 
SPS Agreement, would not enable the DSB to make sufficiently precise recommendations and rulings so as to 
allow for compliance by Australia wit h its obligations under the SPS  Agreement. (Ibid., para.  224) The 
Appellate Body reached a similar conclusion in EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar , explaining that findings under 
Articles  3 and 8 of the Agreement on Agriculture  were not sufficient to "fully r esolve" that dispute because, by 
declining to rule on the claims under Article  3 of the SCM  Agreement, that panel precluded the possibility of a 
remedy being made available, pursuant to Article  4.7 of the SCM Agreement, in the event of a finding of 
inconsi stency under Article 3 of the SCM Agreement. (Appellate Body Report, EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar , 
para. 335) 
1783 Appellate Body Reports, Argentina – Import Measures , para. 5.190.  
1784 Appellate Body Reports, Argentina – Import Measures , para. 5.194.  
1785 Appell ate Body Report, EC – Hormones , para. 212.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  imposition.1786 The European Union also argues , with respect to the EU -wide ban,  that Russia  has 
neither published  it nor notified it to the WTO.1787 In addition, the European Union assert s that 
Russia similarly notified the ban on the products at issue from Latvia only on 16 July 2014, more 
than two weeks after its im position on 27 June 2014.1788 
7.1410.   With respect to the ban concerning Lithuania, the European Union argues that Russia 
failed to immediately notify other Members, through the WTO Secretariat, of the products covered, 
with a brief indication of the objective and th e rationale of the regulation, including the nature of 
the urgent problem. The European Union also argues that Russia failed to provide copies of the 
regulation to other Members and to allow other Members to make comments in writing, discuss 
these comments  upon request, and take the comments and the results of the discussions into 
account, and that it took more than two weeks for Russia to notify the measure to the WTO after 
its adoption.1789 
7.8.1.2   Russia  
7.1411.   Russia argues that it duly notified the measure s affecting Lithuania.1790 Russia argues 
that it immediately notified the European Union through correspondence and by telephone 
regarding the temporary import restrictions affecting exports from Lithuania that were 
implemented on 25  January 2014.1791 With regard to the EU -wide ban, Russia argues that the 
European Union has failed to establish that the EU -wide ban constitutes a measure subject to the 
requirements of Article 7 and Annex B of the SPS Agreement.1792 
7.8.2   Analysis by the Panel  
7.8.2.1   Introduction  
7.1412.   The Panel underlines that transp arency is of fundamental importance to the operation of 
the multilateral trading system. We agree with the SPS Committee that the term "transparency " is 
used in the context of the WTO to signify one of the fundamental principles of its agreements: the 
aim is to achieve a greater degree of clarity, predictability and information about trade policies, 
rules and regulations of Members.1793 
7.1413.   In examining the European Union's claims pertaining to transparency under Article 7 and 
Annex B of the SPS Agreement, the Pan el will first reproduce the relevant legal provisions. Then, 
the Panel will provide a summary of the applicable legal test in respect of those provisions. After 
clarifying the legal test, the Panel will examine the European Union's claims in respect of the  bans 
on the imports of the products at issue from Lithuania followed by  the EU -wide ban.  
7.8.2.2   Relevant legal provisions  
7.1414.   Article 7 of the SPS Agreement provides:  
Members shall notify changes in their sanitary or phytosanitary measures and shall 
provide informa tion on their sanitary or phytosanitary measures in accordance with 
the provisions of Annex B.  
7.1415.   The relevant provisions of Annex B of the SPS Agreement provide:  
                                               
1786 European Union's first written submission, para. 349.  
1787 European Union's first written submission, para. 350. See also the European Union's response to 
Panel question No. 201, para. 391  
1788 European Union's second  written submission, para. 191.  
1789 European Union's first written submission, para. 353.  
1790 Russia's first written submission, para. 442 -443. 
1791 Russia's first written submission, para. 443, citing the l etter from Russia  to the European Union of 
25 January 20 14, FS -EN-8/1023 (Exhibit RUS -28). 
1792 Russia's first written submission, para. 446.  
1793 G/SPS/7/Rev.3, para . 1. WT/DS475/R  
 
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  Publication of regulations  
1. Members shall ensure that all sanitary and phytosanitary regulatio ns5 which have 
been adopted are published promptly in such a manner as to enable interested 
Members to become acquainted with them.  
2. Except in urgent circumstances, Members shall allow a reasonable interval between 
the publication of a sanitary or phytos anitary regulation and its entry into force in 
order to allow time for producers in exporting Members, and particularly in developing 
country Members, to adapt their products and methods of production to the 
requirements of the importing Member.  
… 
Notifica tion procedures  
5. Whenever an international standard, guideline or recommendation does not exist or 
the content of a proposed sanitary or phytosanitary regulation is not substantially the 
same as the content of an international standard, guideline or reco mmendation, and if 
the regulation may have a significant effect on trade of other Members, Members 
shall:  
(a) publish a notice at an early stage in such a manner as to enable 
interested Members to become acquainted with the proposal to introduce 
a particu lar regulation;  
(b) notify other Members, through the Secretariat, of the products to be 
covered by the regulation together with a brief indication of the objective 
and rationale of the proposed regulation. Such notifications shall take 
place at an early s tage, when amendments can still be introduced and 
comments taken into account;  
(c) provide upon request to other Members copies of the proposed 
regulation and, whenever possible, identify the parts which in substance 
deviate from international standards, g uidelines or recommendations;  
(d) without discrimination, allow reasonable time for other Members to 
make comments in writing, discuss these comments upon request, and 
take the comments and the results of the discussions into account.  
6. However, where urg ent problems of health protection arise or threaten to arise for 
a Member, that Member may omit such of the steps enumerated in paragraph 5 of 
this Annex as it finds necessary, provided that the Member:  
(a) immediately notifies other Members, through the S ecretariat, of the 
particular regulation and the products covered, with a brief indication of 
the objective and the rationale of the regulation, including the nature of 
the urgent problem(s);  
(b) provides, upon request, copies of the regulation to other Me mbers;  
(c) allows other Members to make comments in writing, discusses these 
comments upon request, and takes the comments and the results of the 
discussions into account.  
5 Sanitary and phytosanitary measures such as laws, decrees or ordinances which are 
applicable generally.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.8.2.3   Legal test  
7.8.2.3.1   Introduction  
7.1416.   Article 7 of the SPS Agreement imposes an obligation on Members to notify changes in, 
and provide information on, SPS measures, in accordance with the provisions of Annex B of the 
SPS Agreement.1794 The provision s of Annex B pertain to transparency of SPS regulations, touching 
upon publication of regulations, enquiry points and notification procedures. These provisions 
should be read together, and a finding of inconsistency with the provisions of Annex B would res ult 
in an inconsistency with Article 7.1795 On this basis, previous panels have begun their examination 
of claims pursuant to Article 7 and Annex B by assessing the particular elements under Annex 
B.1796  
7.1417.   Before exploring the particular elements of the legal tes t in respect of the relevant 
paragraphs of Annex B of the SPS Agreement, the Panel recalls the allocation of the burden of 
proof in the context of claims brought pursuant to Article 7 and Annex B. The panel in Japan – 
Apples  found that "Article 7 of the SPS Agreement  requires Members to notify 'changes' in their 
SPS measures."1797 In this respect, we recall that in order to establish a prima facie  case of 
inconsistency with Article 7 and Annex B, whenever a claim is made regarding the notification of 
changes t o an SPS measure, a complainant should not only raise the claims under these 
provisions, but also provide evidence in support of the changes in the SPS measures that should 
have been notified. This includes explaining how much the new regulations depart fr om the 
previous ones.1798 
7.1418.   Having addressed these preliminary considerations, the Panel now turns to examine the 
legal test in respect of the relevant obligations provided in Annex B of the SPS Agreement.  
7.8.2.3.2   Annex B  
7.1419.   The provisions of Annex B relate to publicatio n and notification requirements. Some of 
the applicable obligations provided therein depend on whether there is any urgency involved, 
whether an international standard exists, and whether a Member's measure is substantially the 
same as the content of an in ternational standard, guideline or recommendation.  
7.1420.   We agree with the panel in India – Agricultural Products , that the "transparency 
provisions of Annex B apply only to measures that qualify as 'SPS regulations'."1799 That panel 
further indicated that:  
The te rm "SPS regulations" is defined in the footnote to Annex B(1) as "[SPS] 
measures such as laws, decrees or ordinances which are applicable generally". The 
Appellate Body in Japan – Agricultural Products II  clarified that the footnote to Annex 
B(1) includes an illustrative list of instruments, as indicated by the words, "such as". 
This list is therefore not exhaustive. The Appellate Body explained that the scope of 
the term "SPS regulation" also includes, in addition to "laws, decrees or ordinances", 
other in struments which are "applicable generally" and are "similar in character" to 
the instruments explicitly referred to in the illustrative list of the footnote to Annex 
B(1).1800;1801 
                                               
1794 Panel Report s, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products , para. 7.47, subpara. 85.  
1795 Panel Report, India – Agricultural Products , para. 7.7 41 (referring to Panel Report, Japan – 
Agricultural Products II , para. 8.116; and Appellate Body Report, Japan – Agricultural Products II , para. 108).  
1796 Panel Report, India – Agricultural Products , para. 7.741  
1797 Panel Report, Japan – Apples , para. 8.319. I n fn 425 to para. 8.319, that panel further noted that 
"we do not believe that changes of legal instruments require, in all instances, notification".  
1798 Panel Report, Japan – Apples , paras. 8.316 -8.318.  
1799 Panel Report, India – Agricultural Products , para. 7 .737. 
1800 (footnote original) Appellate Body Report, Japan – Agricultural Products II , para. 105. The Appellate 
Body further explained that:  
The object and purpose of paragraph 1 of Annex B is "to enable interested Members to become 
acquainted with" the sani tary and phytosanitary regulations adopted or maintained by other Members and thus 
to enhance transparency regarding these measures. In our opinion, the scope of application of the publication 
 WT/DS475/R  
 
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  7.1421.   As a threshold matter, it is therefore necessary to determine whether a measure f alls 
within the scope of Article 7 and Annex B, deriving guidance from the text and footnote of Annex 
B(1). 
7.8.2.3.2.1   Annex B(1)  
7.1422.   Annex B(1) obliges Members to ensure that their adopted SPS regulations are published 
promptly in such a manner as to enable interested M embers to become acquainted with them.  In 
addition to constituting an SPS regulation, for  a measure to be subject to the publication 
requirement in Annex B  (i) the measure must have "been adopted"; and (ii) the measure must be 
"applicable generally".1802 
7.8.2.3.2.2   Anne x B(2)  
7.1423.   Annex B(2) requires Members, except in urgent circumstances, to allow for a reasonable 
interval between the publication of the SPS regulation and its entry into force.  
7.1424.   At the Doha Ministerial Conference, Members decided that:  
Subject to the condit ions specified in paragraph 2 of Annex B to the Agreement on the 
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, the phrase "reasonable interval" 
shall be understood to mean normally a period of not less than 6 months. It is 
understood that timeframes for specific measures have to be considered in the 
context of the particular circumstances of the measure and actions necessary to 
implement it. The entry into force of measures which contribute to the liberalization of 
trade should not be unnecessarily de layed.1803 
7.1425.   To examine consistency with paragraph 2 of Annex B , a panel should first determine 
whether it is inapplicable to the circumstances of the particular case due to the existence of urgent 
circumstances.1804 Thereafter, a panel would need to examine wheth er the measure was published 
within a reasonable interval.  
7.8.2.3.2.3   Annex B(5)  
7.1426.   Pursuant to its chapeau , Annex B(5) will apply when the following circumstances are met: 
(a) where a relevant international standard does not exist or the content of the proposed measure  
is not substantially the same as the content of an international standard, guideline or 
recommendation, and (b) if the regulation may have a significant effect on trade of other 
Members.1805 
7.1427.   Regarding the first element, the panel in India – Agricultural Prod ucts considered that the 
analysis for the purposes of the chapeau  of Annex B(5) is different from the determination of 
whether a measure is "based on" or "conforms to" an international standard pursuant to 
Articles  3.1 and 3.2 of the SPS Agreement. That pa nel reasoned that for the purposes of its 
analysis, "substantially the same" means that "something closely approximating 'sameness' is 
                                                                                                                                               
requirement of paragraph 1 of Annex B should be interpreted in the light of the object and purpose of this 
provision.  
Appellate Body Report, Japan – Agricultural Products II , para. 106.  
1801 Panel Report, India – Agricultural Products , para. 7.738.  
1802 Panel Report, Japan – Agricultural Products II , para. 8.109.  
1803 WT/MIN(0 1)/17, para. 3.2. The Appellate Body in US – Clove Cigarettes  examined the legal status 
of paragraph 5.2 of this decision of the Ministerial Conference in the context of determining whether the 
definition of a "reasonable interval" in Article 12.2 of the T BT Agreement was a multilateral interpretation in the 
sense of Article IX:2 of the WTO Agreement. The Appellate Body concluded that paragraph 5.2 does not qualify 
as a multilateral interpretation within the meaning of Article IX:2 of the WTO Agreement; how ever, it upheld 
the panel's finding that it constitutes a subsequent agreement between the parties, within the meaning of 
Article  31(3)(a) of the Vienna Convention, on the interpretation of the term "reasonable interval" in Article 12.2 
of the TBT Agreemen t. See Appellate Body Report, US – Clove Cigarettes , paras. 247 -268. 
1804 Panel Report, India – Agricultural Products , paras. 7.752 -7.753.  
1805 Panel Report, Japan – Apples , para. 8.310. See also Panel Report, India – Agricultural Products , 
paras. 7.771 -7.772.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  required".1806 That panel added that, in the circumstances of that case, "for the content of an SPS 
regulation to be 'substa ntially the same' as the content of an international standard, the former 
must be at least 'based on' the latter according to Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement."1807  
7.1428.   Regarding the second element, the panel in India – Agricultural Products  considered that 
an outright prohibition on the importation of the products in question into India constituted the 
most restrictive measure a Member could take in respect of trade, thus having a "significant" effect 
on trade.1808  
7.1429.   We note that the Recommended Procedures for Imple menting the Transparency 
Obligations of the SPS Agreement (Article 7), adopted by the SPS Committee with effect as of 
1 December 2008, encourage Members to notify all regulations that are based on, conform to or 
are substantially the same as an internation al standard, guideline or recommendation, if they are 
expected to have a significant effect on trade of other Members. Furthermore, the Recommended 
Procedures indicate:  
For the purposes of Annex  B, paragraphs 5 and 6 of the SPS Agreement, the concept 
of "significant effect on trade of other Members" may refer to the effect on trade:  
 - of one sanitary or phytosanitary regulation only or of various sanitary or 
phytosanitary regulations in combination;  
 - in a specific product, group of products or products i n general;  and  
 - between two or more Members.  
To assess whether the sanitary or phytosanitary regulation may have a significant 
effect on trade, the Member concerned should consider relevant available information 
such as:  the value or other importance o f imports to the importing and/or exporting 
Members concerned, whether from other Members individually or collectively;  the 
potential development of such imports;  and difficulties for producers in other 
Members, particularly in developing country Members , to comply with the proposed 
sanitary or phytosanitary regulations.  The concept of a significant effect on trade of 
other Members should include both import -enhancing and import -reducing effects on 
the trade of other Members, as long as such effects are significant.1809 
7.1430.   If a panel is satisfied that the requirements for the application of Annex B(5) are met, it 
would then have to examine whether, in that particular case, the responding party has complied 
with each of the relevant obligations under paragraphs (a) through (d).1810 Although the 
Committee guidelines do not provide any legal interpretation or modification to the SPS Agreement 
itself, they may assist in our understanding of the obligations on Members.1811 
7.8.2.3.3   Annex B(6)  
7.1431.   Where urgent problems of health protect ion arise or threaten to arise, a Member may 
omit the steps described in Annex B(5) in respect of proposed measures. Annex  B(6) imposes 
three additional conditions that must be met for a Member to take advantage of this exceptional 
approach, namely (a) to notify immediately other Members, through the Secretariat, of that 
particular regulation and the products covered, with a brief indication of the objective and the 
rationale of the regulation, including the nature of the urgent problem(s); (b) to provide, upon 
request, copies of the regulation to other Members; and (c) to allow other Members to make 
comments in writing, and to discuss these comments upon request and take the comments and 
                                               
1806 Panel Report, India – Agricultural Products , para. 7.779. That panel reached that conclusion based 
on the Appellate Body's interpretation of the term "substantially the same" as used in Article XXIV:8(a)(ii) of 
the GATT 1994. Appellate Body Report, Turkey  – Textiles , para. 50.  
1807 Panel Report, India – Agricultural Products , para. 7.780.  
1808 Panel Report, India – Agricultural Products , para. 7.773.  
1809 G/SPS/7/Rev.3, paras. 8 -10. 
1810 Panel Report, India – Agricultural Products , para. 7.782.  
1811 G/SPS/7/Rev.3, para. 3. WT/DS475/R  
 
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  the results of the discussions into account. These conditions , includi ng the condition in the 
chapeau  are cumulative, such that all four conditions must be met before the provisions Annex 
B(6) are triggered.1812 
7.8.2.3.4   Order of analysis  
7.1432.   The European Union has raised claims under Article 7 of the SPS Agreement in connection 
with Annex B(1), B(2), B(5) and B(6) of the SPS Agreement. In determining the order in which we 
will examine those claims, we take account of the relationship between Article 7 and Annex B of 
the SPS Agreement.  
7.1433.   In light of the considerations outlined above in paragr aph 7.1416  and the circumstances 
of this dispute, the Panel will begin by examining the threshold question of whether the measures 
challenged under Article 7 and Annex B fall within the scope of these provisions,  deriving guida nce 
from the text and footnote of Annex B(1) .  Depending on the outcome of our analysis under Annex 
B(1) the Panel may then address the claims under  Annex B(2), Annex B(6), and Annex B(5). The 
Panel turns to examine these elements in respect of the bans o n the imports of the products at 
issue from Lithuania and the EU -wide ban.  
7.8.2.3.5   Whether the challenged measures  fall within the scope of Article 7 and 
Annex  B 
7.1434.   It is uncontested that the measures regarding Lithuania have been adopted. We recall 
that the bans on  the imports of the products at issue from Lithuania are maintained through 
instructions from FSVPS to the heads of territorial departments. The Panel found that those 
measures constitute SPS measures that have been applied as of 25 January and 27 June 201 4, 
respectively.1813 The Panel also found that the EU -wide ban is a measure attributable to the 
Russian Federation, adopted as of 2 9 January 2014.1814 
7.1435.   The term "SPS regulations" is defined in the footnote to Annex B(1) as "[SPS] measures 
such as laws, decrees, o r ordinances which are applicable generally". The Appellate Body has 
clarified that the term "SPS regulation" includes "laws, decrees or ordinances", as well as other 
instruments which are "applicable generally" and are "similar in character" to the instru ments 
explicitly referred to in the illustrative list of the footnote to Annex B(1).1815  
7.1436.   We are confronted with the issue whether the measures at issue here, which relate to 
specific actions in the aftermath of outbreaks of ASF taken within the context of a more general 
legislative and regulatory framework1816, qualify as "laws, decrees or ordinances" or, at the very 
least, legal instruments of general application, within the terms of the footnote to Annex  B(1). 
Russia's requirement that products come from areas  that have been free of ASF for at least three 
years has been in existence at least since 2006, when this requirement was reflected in the text of 
the bilaterally -agreed veterinary certificate. This requirement by Russia has not been changed. 
What has chan ged is the ASF situation within the European Union, and in particular within the four 
affected EU member States.  
7.1437.    We have carefully examined the arguments of the parties in respect to whether this 
change in the application of an existing requirement is sub ject to notification. In particular, we 
have scrutinized the European Union's argumentation before us. We note that the European Union 
has focused its arguments exclusively on the timeliness of the notification and publication of these 
actions.1817 We have co me to the conclusion that the European Union has failed to establish a 
prima facie  case that the measures at issue here qualify as generally applicable laws, decrees or 
ordinances that would fall within the scope of Article 7 and Annex B(1) of the SPS Agre ement. 
                                               
1812 Panel Report, India – Agricultural Products , para. 7.762.  
1813 See para. 7.170  above.  
1814 See para. 7.84 above.  
1815 Appellate Body Report, Japan – Agricultural Products II , para. 105. See Panel Report , India – 
Agricultural Products , para. 7.738.  
1816 See Customs Union Decision No. 317  (Exhibit RUS -25). 
1817 European Union's first written submission, paras. 351 -357; and second written submission, paras. 
190-193. WT/DS475/R  
 
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  Having reached this conclusion, it is not necessary for us to proceed any further with our 
examination of the European Union's claims under Annex B.  
7.1438.   In the alternative, the Panel considers it appropriate to exercise judicial economy on the 
claims b y the European Union under Annex B. This is so as the Panel considers that findings on 
these elements of the claims are not necessary in order to enable the DSB to make sufficiently 
precise recommendations and rulings as to allow for prompt compliance with  those 
recommendations and rulings "in order to ensure effective resolution" of the dispute.1818 The 
measures at issue are now well known to the European Union and no action by Russia at this stage 
would increase the transparency of these measures , in a timel y manner,  to the benefit of the 
European Union  or other WTO Members . 
7.8.3   Summary of conclusions in respect of the challenged measures  
7.1439.   Based on the foregoing, the Panel finds that the European Union has failed to establish a 
prima facie  case that the measures at issue fall within the scope of Article 7 and Annex B. In the 
alternative, the Panel exercises judicial economy in respect of these claims of the European Union.  
8  CONCLUSIONS AND RECO MMENDATIONS  
8.1.  As described in greater detail above, the Panel finds that: 
a. The European Union has demonstrated the existence of the alleged EU -wide ban as a 
composite measure which reflects Russia's refusal to accept certain imports of the 
products at issue from the European Union. The basis for Russia's refusal is the 
requiremen t contained in the veterinary certificates negotiated with the European Union. 
According to this general requirement, the whole of the European Union's territory, 
except for Sardinia, has to be ASF free for three years in order for the products at issue 
to be imported into Russia. Following the ASF outbreaks in Lithuania, the products from 
the European Union do not meet that requirement. Therefore, the actions by Russia to 
apply this general requirement to the current situation in the European Union results  in 
an EU -wide ban of the products at issue attributable to Russia. Hence , the EU -wide ban 
is a measure susceptible to challenge under the WTO dispute settlement mechanism . 
b. There is no limitation in Russia's Protocol of Accession to the Panel's assessment of the 
merits of the European Union's claims brought in respect of the EU -wide ban . 
c. The import restrictions on the products at issue from Estonia and Latvia are within the 
Panel's terms of reference . 
d. In respect of the European Union's claims regarding the EU-wide ban, pursuant to the 
SPS Agreement:  
i. the EU -wide ban is an SPS measure within the meaning of Annex A(1) of the SPS 
Agreement;  
ii. the EU -wide ban is not based on the Terrestrial Code and is in consequence 
inconsistent with Russia's obligation to base it s SPS measures on international 
standards, pursuant to Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement;  
iii. Russia recognizes the concepts of pest - or disease -free areas and areas of low pest 
or disease prevalence in respect of ASF, and therefore, the EU -wide ban is not 
inconsistent with Russia's obligations under Article 6.2 of the SPS Agreement;  
iv. in the period between 7 February 2014 and 11 September 2014, the European Union 
objectively demonstrated to Russia, pursuant to Article 6.3  of the SPS Agreement , 
that there are area s within the European Union territory, outside Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, and Poland, which are free of ASF and are likely to remain so;  
                                               
1818 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon , para. 223.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  v. Russia did not adapt the EU -wide ban to the SPS characteristics related to ASF of the 
areas where the products subject  to that measure originated nor to the SPS 
characteristics related to ASF in Russia. Therefore, the EU -wide ban is inconsistent 
with Article 6.1;  
vi. Russia's process of consideration of the European Union's request for recognition of 
the ASF -free areas within  the European Union falls within the scope of Article 8 and 
Annex C(1) of the SPS Agreement. Russia formulated information requirements, in 
respect of the EU -wide ban, that were not limited to what is necessary for the 
procedure at issue, thus breaching An nex C(1)(c). In addition, Russia undertook and 
completed the procedure at issue with undue delay, thus rendering the procedure at 
issue inconsistent with Annex C(1)(a). Consequently the procedure at issue is 
inconsistent with Article 8 of the SPS Agreement ;  
vii. there was sufficient scientific evidence for Russia to conduct a risk assessment of the 
ASF situation in the non -affected EU member States, as appropriate to the 
circumstances. Moreover, Russia did not provisionally adopt the measure on the 
basis of ava ilable pertinent information, did not seek to obtain  the additional 
information  necessary for a more objective assessment of risk , and did not review 
the EU -wide ban within a reasonable period of time. Therefore,  the EU -wide ban does 
not fall within the sc ope of Article 5.7 and the qualified exemption to the obligations 
in Articles 5.1, 5.2 and 2.2 of the SPS Agreement is not available to Russia. 
Moreover, Russia did not base the EU -wide ban on a risk assessment within the 
meaning of paragraph 4 of Annex A of the SPS Agreement, thus breaching Articles 
5.1 and 5.2; and Russia has not rebutted the presumption of inconsistency that our 
findings raised in respect of Article 2.2 therefore the EU -wide ban is also inconsistent 
with Article 2.2 ; 
viii. the EU -wide ban is i nconsistent with Article 5.3 of the SPS Agreement, because by 
not basing that measure on a risk assessment in circumstances in which Article  5.7 is 
not applicable, Russia could have not taken into account the relevant economic 
factors listed in Article 5.3  when assessing the risks of entry and spread of ASF in 
accordance with Article 5.1 and paragraph 4 of Annex A of the SPS Agreement;  
ix. the EU -wide ban is inconsistent with Article 5.6 of the SPS Agreement, with respect 
to non -treated products covered by Chap ter 15.1 of the Terrestrial Code , because it 
is significantly more trade restrictive than required to achieve Russia's ALOP . In light 
of our findings under Article 5.6 and the arguments and evidence raised by Russia in 
order to rebut the presumption of inc onsistency with Article 2.2 raised by a finding of 
inconsistency of the EU -wide ban with Article 5.6, the EU -wide ban is inconsistent 
with Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement because it is applied beyond the extent 
necessary to protect animal life or health.  
e. In respect of the European Union's claims regarding the bans on the imports of the 
products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, pursuant to the SPS 
Agreement:  
i. the import restrictions on the products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuani a, and 
Poland  are SPS measures within the meaning of Annex A(1) of the SPS Agreement ; 
ii. the import bans on the products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland  
do not conform to the relevant international standards contained in the Terrestrial 
Code, and thus are inconsistent with Article 3.2 of the SPS Agreement. Therefore, 
Russia is not entitled to benefit from the presumption of consistency of the bans on 
the imports of the products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland with 
the other relevant  provisions  of the SPS Agreement and of the GATT 1994;  
iii. the bans on the imports of the products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and 
Poland, as applicable to treated products, are not "based on" the relevant 
international standards, a s articulated in Articles 15.1.14 -15.1.16 of the Terrestrial WT/DS475/R  
 
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  Code; and are therefore, to the extent applicable to treated products, inconsistent 
with Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement;  
iv. the bans on the imports of the products at issue from Estonia, Lithuania , and Poland, 
as applicable to non -treated products, are  not "based on" the relevant international 
standards, as articulated in the relevant Articles of Chapter 15.1 of the Terrestrial 
Code; and are therefore, to the extent applicable to non -treated produc ts, 
inconsistent with Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement;  
v. the ban on the imports of the products at issue from Latvia, as applicable to non -
treated products, is "based on" the relevant international standards, as articulated in 
the relevant Articles of Chapt er 15.1 of the Terrestrial Code; and is therefore, to the 
extent applicable to non -treated products, consistent with Article 3.1 of the SPS 
Agreement;  
vi. Russia recognizes the concepts of pest - or disease -free areas and areas of low pest 
or disease prevalence  in respect of ASF, and therefore, the bans on the imports of 
the products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland are not inconsistent 
with Russia's obligations under Article 6.2 of the SPS Agreement;  
vii. at least as at 11 September 2014, the Eur opean Union provided to Russia the 
necessary evidence to objectively demonstrate, pursuant to Article 6.3 of the SPS 
Agreement, that there are areas within Estonia, Lithuania, and Poland, that are free 
of ASF and are likely to remain so;  
viii. at least as at 11 September 2014, the European Union failed to  provide to Russia the 
necessary evidence to  objectively demonstrate, pursuant to Article 6.3 of the SPS 
Agreement, that there are areas within Latvia that are free of ASF and are likely to 
remain so ; 
ix. Russia did not adapt the  bans on the  imports of the products at issue from Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland to the SPS characteristics related to ASF  of the areas 
where the products subject to the bans on the imports from these four EU member 
States originated nor to the SPS characteristics related to ASF in  Russia. 
Furthermore, Russia did not perform a risk assessment on which it could base its 
evaluation of the relevant elements to determine the SPS characteristics of the areas 
from which the products at issue  originate. Therefore, the bans on the imports of the 
products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland are inconsistent with 
Article 6.1;  
x. Russia's process of consideration of the European Union's request for recognition of 
ASF-free areas withi n the European Union including the four affected EU member 
States falls within the scope of Article 8 and Annex C(1) of the SPS Agreement. 
Russia formulated, in respect of the bans on the imports of the products at issue 
from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, an d Poland, information requirements that were not 
limited to what is necessary for the procedure at issue, thus breaching 
Annex  C(1)(c). Russia undertook and completed the procedure at issue with undue 
delay, thus rendering the procedure at issue inconsiste nt with Annex C(1)(a). 
Consequently the procedure at issue is inconsistent with Article 8 of the SPS 
Agreement ; 
xi. there was sufficient scientific evidence for Russia to conduct a risk assessment of the 
ASF situation in the affected EU member States, as appro priate to the circumstances. 
Moreover, Russia provisionally adopted the bans on the imports of the products at 
issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, on the basis of available pertinent 
information, except with respect to those measures as appl icable to the treated 
products at issue. In addition, Russia did not seek to obtain  the additional 
information  necessary for a more objective assessment of risk , and did not review 
the bans on the imports of the products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lith uania, and 
Poland within a reasonable period of time. Therefore, the  bans on the affected EU 
member States do not fall within the scope of Article 5.7 and the qualified exemption WT/DS475/R  
 
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  to the obligations in Articles 5.1, 5.2 and 2.2 of the SPS  Agreement is not a vailable 
to Russia in respect of these measures. Furthermore, Russia did not base the bans 
on the affected EU member States on a risk assessment within the meaning of 
paragraph 4 of Annex A of the SPS Agreement, thus breaching Articles 5.1 and 5.2. 
Russia has not rebutted the presumption of inconsistency that our findings raised in 
respect of Article 2.2, therefore the bans on the affected EU member States are also 
inconsistent with Article 2.2 ; 
xii. the bans on the products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithua nia, and Poland are 
inconsistent with Article 5.3 of the SPS Agreement, because by not basing those 
measures on a risk assessment in circumstances in which Article  5.7 is not 
applicable, Russia could have not taken into account the relevant economic factor s 
listed in Article 5.3 when assessing the risks of entry and spread of ASF in 
accordance with Article 5.1 and paragraph 4 of Annex A of the SPS Agreement;  
xiii. the bans on the imports from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, as applicable to 
treated produc ts, are inconsistent with Article 5.6 of the SPS Agreement, with 
respect to treated products covered by Chapter 15.1 of the Terrestrial Code , because 
they are significantly more trade restrictive than required to achieve Russia's ALOP . 
In light of our find ings under Article 5.6 and the lack of arguments or evidence raised 
by the Russian Federation in order to rebut the presumption of inconsistency with 
Article 2.2 raised by a finding of breach of Article 5.6, we find that the bans on the 
imports of the prod ucts at issue, as applicable to treated products, from Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland,  are inconsistent with Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement 
because they are applied beyond the extent necessary to protect animal life or 
health . 
xiv. the bans on the imp orts of the products at issue from Estonia, Lithuania, and Poland, 
as applicable to non -treated products, are inconsistent with Article 5.6 of the 
SPS Agreement, with respect to non -treated products covered by Articles 15.1.5, 
15.1.8, 15.1.10, 15.1.12, and  15.1.13  of the Terrestrial Code , because they are 
significantly more trade restrictive than required to achieve Russia's ALOP. In light of 
our findings under Article 5.6 and the arguments and evidence raised by Russia in 
order to rebut the presumption of inconsistency with Article 2.2 raised by a finding of 
breach of Article 5.6, we find that the bans on the imports of the products at issue, 
as applicable to non -treated products, from Estonia, Lithuania, and Poland, are 
inconsistent with Article 2.2 of the  SPS Agreement because they are applied beyond 
the extent necessary to protect animal life or health.  
f. In respect of the European Union's claims pursuant to Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement 
with respect to the measures at issue:  
i. Russia's measures at issue a re inconsistent with Article  2.3, first sentence, of the 
SPS Agreement because they arbitrarily and unjustifiably discriminate between 
Members where identical or similar conditions prevail. We also find that Russia's ASF 
measures are inconsistent with Arti cle 2.3, second sentence, because they are 
applied in a manner which constitutes a disguised restriction on international trade.  
8.2.  Having found that Russia's ASF measures are inconsistent with Article 2.3 of the SPS 
Agreement, the Panel declines  to rule  on the European Union's claim under Article 5.5 of the 
SPS Agreement.  
8.3.  The Panel also declines to rule  on the European Union's claims in respect of the ban on the 
imports of the products at issue from Latvia, as applicable to non -treated products, pursuant to 
Articles 5.6 and 2.2 of the SPS Agreement, because the European Union failed to make a prima 
facie case that the alternative identified by the European Union in respect of non -treated products 
is significantly less r estrictive to trade than thi s measure.  
8.4.  The Panel also declines to rule on the European Union's claims in respect of the measures at 
issue pursuant to Article 7 and Annex B of the SPS Agreement, because the European Union has WT/DS475/R  
 
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  failed to establish a prima facie  case that the measures at issue fall w ithin the scope of those 
provisions, thus failing to make a prima facie  case of inconsistency thereof.  
8.5.  The Panel also declines to rule on the European Union's claims in respect of the measures at 
issue pursuant to Annex C(1)(b) of the SPS Agreement because  the European Union failed to make 
a prima facie case of inconsistency thereof.  
8.6.  The Panel also declines to rule  on the European Union's claims in respect of Russia not taking 
into account the relevant economic factors listed in Article 5.3 when determining  the measure to 
be applied for achieving the appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection in respect of 
ASF, because the European Union failed to make a prima facie  case of inconsistency thereof.  
8.7.  The Panel also declines to rule  on the European  Union's claims in respect of Russia not taking 
into account the objective of minimizing negative trade effects when determining the appropriate 
level of sanitary and phytosanitary protection, because the Panel finds that Article 5.4 does not 
impose a posi tive obligation on WTO Members.  
8.8.  Under Article 3.8 of the DSU, in cases where there is an infringement of the obligations 
assumed under a covered agreement, the action is considered prima facie  to constitute a case of 
nullification or impairment. We conclud e that, to the extent that the measures at issue are 
inconsistent with the specified provisions of the SPS Agreement, they have nullified or impaired 
benefits accruing to European Union under that agreement.  
8.9.  Pursuant to Article 19.1 of the DSU, having foun d that Russia acted inconsistently with its 
obligations under Articles 3.1, 3.2, 5.1, 5.2, 2.2, 5.3, 5.6, 6.1, and 8 as well as Annex C(1)(a) and 
C(1)(c) of the SPS Agreement,  we recommend that the DSB request Russia to bring its measures 
into conformity with its obligations under the SPS Agreement.  
 
 
_______________  
 
 
 WT/DS475/R  
 
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  9  APPENDIX 1 CHRONOLOG Y OF EXCHANGES OF IN FORMATION BETWEEN TH E 
EUROPEAN UNION AND R USSIA FROM 24 JANUAR Y 2014  
9.1.  On 24 January 2014, DG SANCO sent a fax to Russia's delegation in Brussels, rep orting on 
two outbreaks in wild boar in Lithuania, in Salcininkai and Varena regions , at the border with 
Belarus . Attached to the fax was the report of the director of Lithuania's State Food and Veterinary 
Service. This report included a detailed indicatio n of where the outbreaks had taken place, the 
date on which the reported cases were found to be ASF positive (22 January 2014), as well as an 
indication of surveillance and control measures that were put in place.1819 
9.2.  On 27 January 2014, DG SANCO sent a fax t o Russia's delegation in Brussels with the draft 
Commission Implementing Decision with the areas in Lithuania that should be considered 
infected.1820 This draft was adopted on 27 January 2014 as Commission Implementing Decision 
No. 2014/43/EU.1821 On 30 January 2014, DG SANCO sent this Commission Implementing Decision 
to Russia's delegation in Brussels.1822 On the same day, DG SANCO  sent a letter to the head  (Mr 
Dankvert)  of FSVPS referring to the fruitful conversation Mr Miko had with Mr Dankvert that day, 
and indi cating that it is the European Union's understanding following that conversation that the 
import restrictions introduced by Russia due to ASF apply only to Lithuania (in addition to those 
that already apply to Sardinia), and indicate d the points that c ould still be certified.1823 
9.3.  On 29 January 2014, DG SANCO sent a letter to the head of FSVPS (Mr Dankvert) referring 
to the certification of live pigs and their products in relation to the ASF outbreaks in Lithuania. In 
this letter, it was stated that the Europea n Union has followed all the provisions of the 2004 and 
2006 Memoranda having notified immediately the two cases of ASF in Lithuania. The letter further 
noted that the European Union had been informing Russia on a daily basis about all the control and 
prevention measures, surveillance activities and data which have been applied. The letter also 
referred to the invitation extended to Russian and Belarusian experts to join the emergency teams 
set up. Attached to the letter was the most recent data on ASF surv eillance carried out in the 
EU member States at risk (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland). This included data on the 
testing undertaken in 2013 and in the first months of 2014 in these EU member States. In 
addition, the letter requested an additional a ttestation to the veterinary certificates of pork meat 
and raw meat preparations, piglets for fattening, pigs for breeding, and pigs for slaughter, in order 
to adapt the principles of regionalization to the ASF situation in the European Union.1824 
9.4.  On 29 Janua ry 2014, FSVPS sent DG SANCO a letter indicating, in respect of the information 
necessary for the acceptance of regionalization in the European Union, that DG SANCO should 
provide FSVPS "with the exhaustive data (items 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 [of the 2006 Mem orandum]) 
as well as with the provisions foreseen by recommendations of the OIE Code of Terrestrial 
Animals, - grounded proposals on  regionalization  and zoning of the EU territory with regard to the 
ASF taking into consideration the risk assessment carrie d out by the EU."1825 The items of the 
2006 Memorandum referred to in this letter include: zones established (item 5); control and 
prevention measures, including surveillance programmes (item 6); epidemiological investigations 
and surveillance (item  7); reass essment of status of zones because of outbreaks (item 8); control 
measures taken and changes in the situation (item 9); and set up of a joint permanent working 
group.1826  
                                               
1819 Communication of 24 January 2014: African swine fever (ASF) in two wild boars in Lithuania, in 
Salcininkai and Varena Regions, at the border with Belarus  (Exhibit EU -132). 
1820 Communication of 27 January 2014: African swine fever (ASF) in Lithuani a. Interim protective 
measures  (Exhibit EU -133).  
1821 Commission Implementing Decision 2014/43/EU of 27 January 2014 concerning certain interim 
protective measures relating to African swine fever in Lithuania, OJ L 26, p.44  (Exhibit EU -33). 
1822 Communication of  30 January 2014: African swine fever (ASF) in Lithuania. Interim protective 
measures ( adoption of implementing decision)  (Exhibit EU -134).  
1823 Exhibit EU -172 and Exhibit RUS -224. 
1824 European Union's letter to Russia  of 29 January 2014, ARES(2014)209377, SANC O 
G7/RF/mh(2014)219959  (Exhibit EU -62). 
1825 Russia's letter to the European Union of 29 January 2014, FS -SA-8/1277  (Exhibit EU -14). 
1826 European Union -Russia Memorandum of 4 April 2006 concerning principles of zoning and 
compartmentalization in the veterinary field (Exhibit EU -61). WT/DS475/R  
 
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  9.5.  On 31 January 2014, DG SANCO sent a letter to the head of FSVPS with a request to accep t 
the sanitary status of EU member States and their regions under the principle of regionalization in 
relation to the ASF outbreaks in Lithuania. In this letter DG SANCO recalls what had happened 
from 22 January  2014 up to that point, refers to the Europea n Union's legal framework, as well as 
the effectiveness of the European Union's measures to control and eradicate ASF. The letter also 
refers to the participation of experts from Russia in the emergency veterinary team set up in 
Lithuania. DG SANCO also ma kes a formal request that competent authorities in Russia "accept the 
ASF-free sanitary status of EU member States." To that end, DG SANCO requests amending the 
wording in the veterinary certificates for pork meat and raw meat preparations, piglets for 
fattening, pigs for breeding, and pigs for slaughter, in the manner suggested in the annexes 
attached to that letter.1827   
9.6.  On 5 February 2014, FSVPS sent a letter to DG SANCO in response to the letter from DG 
SANCO dated 31 January 2014. Attached to this letter , FSVPS sent a preliminary list of 
questions1828 that the European Union should provide to understand the situation objectively for 
further decisions on whether ASF regionalization was possible.1829 The list of questions was divided 
in respect of Lithuania, the adjacent countries located in the obvious risk zone (Latvia, Estonia, 
and Poland), and other EU member States. However, some of the same information was requested 
for the three groups. These questions are listed in Table A1 below.  
Table A 1 List of information requested through  FSVPS's letter of 5 February 2014  
Countries  Information required  
All EU member 
States  - Detailed action plan of emergency response at regional and national level in case of an 
ASF outbreak;  
- Information ab out wild boar population with detailed density by region;  
- Swine population in the industry sector and personal subsidiary farming with detailed 
density by region;  
- The number of swine and wild boars monitoring researches rolled out during 2013 -2014, 
detailed by region;  
- Detailed information about pig farms, pork processing factories and semi-finished  
products, graded by production volume;  
- Regulatory acts, which provide for and specify monitoring procedures and epidemic 
investigations in cases of suspi cion/ mortality/ disease (differential diagnostics)/ disposal 
of animals susceptible to ASF – swine and wild boars;  
-Regulatory acts, providing for wild boar hunting and further utilization of killed animals 
(for food, as trophies);  
Lithuania  - Regulatory  acts, providing for wild boar hunting and further utilization of killed animals 
(for food, as trophies): regulations on export of wild boar meat and trophies, number of 
killed animals and exported meat and trophies during 2013 -2014;  
- Detailed information  about foreign hunters, who entered the country to hunt the wild 
boar during 2013 -2014 detailed by region (including information about the number and 
the country of origin);  
- Detailed information about pig farms and meat processing factories attested to s hip 
animals and products to the territory of the CU, including information about the suppliers 
(number, country, region) and production volumes, detailed by region;  
- Rough estimation of enterprises attested to ship animal products to the territory of the 
CU, by level of zoosanitary condition, equivalent to the previously conducted evaluation of 
the Russian and Belarusian enterprises, detailed by regions and graded by production 
volumes.  
Latvia, Estonia, 
and Poland  
and 
Other EU 
member States  - Regulatory acts, providing for wild boar hunting and further utilization of killed animals 
(for food, as trophies): regulations on export of wild boar meat and trophies, number of 
killed animals and exported meat and trophies during 2013 -2014 (for regions adjacent to  
the infected zone);  
- Information about measures taken/being taken to prevent introduction of the etiologic 
agent to the swine industry sector/personal subsidiary farming sector/wild boar 
                                               
1827 European Union's letter to Russia of 31 January 2014, ARES(2014)226547, SANCO 
G7/JP/mh(2014)241111  (Exhibit EU -64). 
1828 Through a letter dated 18 February  2014, FSVPS seems to acknowledge that this list of preliminary 
questions, sent  on 5 February 2014, is the basis on which Russia is willing to pursue an "objective evaluation of 
the epizootic situation in Lithuania and neighbouring countries in the zone of clear risk (Latvia, Estonia, and 
Poland) and other EU Member States". The lett er further indicates that FSVPS is "looking forward to receive the 
information requested by us". See Letter of 18 February 2015 from Russia to the European Union ( Exhibit EU -
167).  
1829 Russia's letter to the European Union of 5 February 2014, FS -SD 8/1640  (Exhibit EU -84). WT/DS475/R  
 
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  Countries  Information required  
population;  
- Description of measures taken/being taken at the terr itories of the EU member states, 
which are in the zone of the obvious ASF risk (security/ border check points);  
- Description of the disease and sanitation inspection process (indicating the regulatory 
acts) and pre -export certification at all the stages o f production cycle;  
- Description of measures taken/being taken to control movement of live animals and pig 
farming products (swine products in the case of other EU member States);  
- Detailed information about foreign hunters, who entered the country to hu nt the wild 
boar during 2013 -2014 (including information about the number and the country of 
origin), detailed by country and region;  
- Detailed information about pig farms and meat -processing factories attested to ship 
animals and products to the territor y of the CU, including information about the suppliers 
(number, country, region) and production volumes, detailed by country and region;  
- Rough estimation of enterprises attested to ship animal products to the territory of the 
CU, by level of zoosanitary condition, equivalent to the previously conducted evaluation of 
the Russian and Belarusian enterprises, detailed by regions and graded by production 
volume.  
 
9.7.  On 6 February 2014, DG SANCO sent a fax to Russia's delegation in Brussels with the draft 
Commiss ion Implementing Decision and two presentations regarding the ASF situation in 
Lithuania, as well as the control and surveillance mechanisms put in place.1830  
9.8.  On 6 February 2014, DG SANCO sent a letter to the deputy head of FSVPS (Dr Nepoklonov), 
requesting the acceptance of declarations from official veterinarians in the EU member States 
attesting that certain products at issue had undergone certain forms of treatment.1831  
9.9.  On 7 February 2014, DG SANCO sent a letter to the head of FSVPS with additional 
informat ion relevant to the preparedness and surveillance of the disease in the European Union. Of 
particular interest for this part of our assessment, the European Union provided information on 
"the structure of the pig sector in the whole of the EU as well as an  overall assessment by the 
Commission of the contingency plans in place in the EU Member States".1832 The communication 
further noted that "almost all of this information has been and still is publicly accessible including 
to your services". This letter is am ong the communications that the European Union identified as 
addressing Russia's information requests.1833 
9.10.  DG SANCO attached four annexes to the above -mentioned letter of 7 February 2014. In 
response to a question from the Panel, the European Union clarified and identified the pieces of 
information it has submitted as part of the record in this dispute and the correspond ing exhibit 
number .1834 We will therefore refer to the information contained in those annexes through the 
exhibit number to which they correspond , as provided by the European Union . Table A2 below 
provides an overview of the information that the European Union annexed to its communication 
dated 7 February 2014.  
Table A 2 Overview of Evidence attached by the European  Union  
Category of information  Piece of information  
Legislation 
on ASF  EU legislation 
applicable to all 
EU member 
States  - Council Directive 2002/60/EC, laying down specific provisions for the control 
of ASF (Exhibit EU -31) 
- Commission Decision 2003/422/EC , app roving an ASF diagnostic manual 
(Exhibit EU -32) 
EU 
implementing 
decisions 
adopted - Commission Decision 2014/43/EU, concerning certain interim protective 
measures relating to ASF in Lithuania (Exhibit EU -33) 
- Commission Decision (draft) concerning certain protective measures relating 
to ASF in Lithuania (Exhibit EU -135)  
                                               
1830 Exhibit EU-135. The first of these presentations is the same as that contained in Exhibit EU -66 
referred to in Table A2 below.  
1831 Letter from DG SANCO, G7/PD/(2014)312766 dated February 6, 2014  (Exhibit RUS -185).  
1832 European Union's letter to  Russia of 7 February 2014, ARES(2014)304571, 
SANCO/G7/DP/tb(2014)328578 (Exhibit EU -65), p. 1.  
1833 European Union's first written submission, para. 221.  
1834 European Union's response to Panel question No. 322, to which the European Union exhibited 
Exhibit EU -214, indicating precisely to which exhibit each piece of information annexed to the letter of 7 
February 2014 corresponds.  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  Category of information  Piece of information  
following the 
detected 
outbreaks in 
Lithuania   
National 
legislation in 
Lithuania 
adopted 
following the 
detected 
outbreaks in 
Lithuania  - Order of Lithuania's Director of State Food and  Veterinary Service on the 
slaughter of pigs as part of the measures to prevent the spread of ASF –No. 
B1-60 of 30 January 2014, (Exhibit EU -72) 
- Order of Lithuania's Director of State Food and Veterinary Service 
concerning order No. B1 -31 of 20 January 2 014 on measures to prevent the 
spread of ASF - No. B1 -48 of 24 January 2014 (Exhibit EU -70) 
- Order of Lithuania's Director of State Food and Veterinary Service on 
measures to control ASF –No. B1 -49 of 24 January 2014, (Exhibit EU -71) 
 
Pig sector structur e in the 
European Union  Spreadsheet containing data on the number of farms and heads by 
agricultural size of  farm and size of pig he rd for 27 EU member States, 
between 2007 and 2010 ( Exhibit EU-215) 
Data on the pig industry (pig production (Exhibit EU -245)) and pig population 
at EU level of all EU member States in 2011, 2012 and 2013 ( Exhibit EU-244) 
Updated outlook on the pig sector (Presentation of the Committee for the 
Common Organization of the Agricultural Market of 23 January 2014 
(Exhibit  EU-243) 
Detailed information on the 
pig sector in Lithuania  The letter indicates that "there are 18,526 pig farms with 657,288 pigs in total 
in Lithuania. In the infected area (six districts) there are 369 pig keepers with 
13732 pigs (12,288 pigs kept in 5 pig farms and 1,444 pigs kept in back yard 
farms)." The letter also states that the list of establishments authorised for 
export to Russia is available to Russian authorities (as evidenced in the 
dedicated website of FSVPS ( Exhibit EU-216).  
Emergency respons e in case 
ASF in the EU member 
States/Contingency Plans  Guidelines for preparing contingency plans for epidemic disease – Document 
SANCO/10101/2002 (Exhibit EU -73) 
Presentation on Contingency Planning as part of the high level training (Better 
Training F or safer Food) by Fred Landeg CBE BVetMed MRCVS 
(Exhibit  EU-125) 
Report of audit of contingency plans for epizootic diseases and the eradication 
programme for rabies in Lithuania, carried out from 20 to 24 July 2009 
(Exhibit EU -78) 
Report of audit of a ctions taken during recent outbreaks of classical swine 
fever and of contingency planning of epizootic disease in Lithuania, carried out 
from 27 February to 2 March 2012 (Exhibit EU -79) 
Report of audit of the implementation of contingency plans in relati on to 
animal health, including provisions on the protection of animals during 
depopulation for disease control in Latvia, carried out from 4 to 8 March 2013 
(Exhibit EU -80) 
Report of audit of contingency plans for epizootic diseases and the eradication 
programme for rabies in Latvia, carried out from 15 to 19 June 2009 (Exhibit 
EU-81) 
Report of audit of the implementation of contingency plans in relation to 
animal health, including provisions on the protection of animals during 
depopulation for disease control in Estonia, carried out from 15 to 19 April 
2013 (Exhibit EU -82) 
Report of audit of disease contingency plans for epizootic diseases (in 
particular foot and mouth disease and classical swine fever) and surveillance 
activities for bluetongue in Po land, carried out from 7 to 16 April 2008 (Exhibit 
EU-83) 
Information 
relevant to a 
recent audit 
of the 
Lithuanian 
contingency 
planning 
system  Report of audit of actions taken during recent outbreaks of 
classical swine fever and of contingency planning o f epizootic 
disease in Lithuania, carried out from 27 February to 2 March 
2012 (Exhibit EU -79) – Available in the European Union's 
dedicated website (Exhibit EU -126) 
Contingency Plan for classical swine fever and ASF of 
Lithuania, approved by Order No. B1-831 of the Director of 
the State Food and Veterinary Service of 30 December 2011 
(Exhibit EU -74) 
Annex with response of competent authorities of Lithuania to 
report of an audit carried out from 27 February to 2 March 
2012 of actions taken actions tak en during recent outbreaks of 
classical swine fever and of contingency planning of epizootic 
disease in Lithuania, updated on 9 October 2012 (Exhibit EU -
234).  
Annex with response of competent authorities of Lithuania to WT/DS475/R  
 
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  Category of information  Piece of information  
report of an audit carried out f rom 27 February to 2 March 
2012 of actions taken actions taken during recent outbreaks of 
classical swine fever and of contingency planning of epizootic 
disease in Lithuania, updated on 14 May 2012 (Exhibit EU -
235).  
Examples of 
audits in 
other EU 
member 
States  Screen shots with the available information in respect of the 
audit reports of Finland, Portugal, the Netherlands, and 
Estonia (Exhibit EU -217) The website also provides access to 
similar audit reports to other EU member States.  
Report of audit of the implementation of contingency plans in 
relation to animal health, including provisions on the 
protection of animals during depopulation for disease control 
in Finland, carried out from 3 to 7 September 2012 (Exhibit 
EU-218) 
Annex with general com ments of competent authorities of 
Finland to the draft audit report DG(SANCO)/2012 -6401, 
carried out from 3 to 7 September 2012, received on 17 
January 2013 (Exhibit EU -219) 
Annex with response of competent authorities  of Finland to 
recommendations of a udit report DG(SANCO)/2012 -6401-MR, 
carried out from 3 to 7 September 2012, received on 17 
January 2013 (Exhibit EU -220) 
Annex 2 summarizing legal requirements related to 
contingency planning of epizootic disease, including ASF 
(Exhibit EU -221) 
Repor t of audit of the implementation of contingency plans in 
relation to animal health, including provisions on the 
protection of animals during depopulation for disease control 
in Portugal, carried out from 24 to 28 September 2012 
(Exhibit EU -222) 
General comments of competent authorities  of Portugal to the 
draft audit report DG(SANCO)/2012 -6402, carried out from 24 
to 28 September 2012, received on 16 January 2013 (Exhibit 
EU-223) 
Annex with response of competent authorities  of Portugal to 
recommendatio ns of audit report DG(SANCO)/2012 -6402-MR, 
carried out from 24 to 28 September 2012, received on 4 
January 2013 (Exhibit EU -224) 
Annex 2 summarizing legal requirements related to 
contingency planning of epizootic disease, including ASF 
(Exhibit EU -225) 
Report of audit of the implementation of contingency plans in 
relation to animal health, including provisions on the 
protection of animals during depopulation for disease control 
in the Netherlands, carried out from 28 January to 6 February 
2013 (Exhibi t EU-226) 
Annex 2 summarizing legal requirements related to 
contingency planning of epizootic disease, including ASF 
(Exhibit EU -227) 
General comments of competent authorities  of the 
Netherlands to the draft audit report DG(SANCO)/2013 -6775, 
carried out from 28 January to 6 February 2013, received on 
16 April 2013 (Exhibit EU -228) 
Response of competent authorities  of the Netherlands to 
recommendations of the draft audit report DG(SANCO)/2013 -
6775, carried out from 28 January to 6 February 2013, 
received on 16 April 2013 (Exhibit EU -229) 
Corrigendum to the English version of the report of audit of 
the implementation of contingency plans in relation to animal 
health, including provisions on the protection of animals 
during depopulation for disease control in the Netherlands, 
carried out from 28 January to 6 February 2013 (Exhibit EU -
230) 
Report of audit of the implementation of contingency plans in 
relation to animal health, including provisions on the 
protection of animals during depopulation fo r disease control 
in Estonia, carried out from 15 to 19 April 2013 (Exhibit EU -
231) 
General comments of competent authorities  of Estonia to the WT/DS475/R  
 
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  Category of information  Piece of information  
draft audit report DG(SANCO)/2013 -6781, carried out from 15 
to 19 April 2013, received on 16 August 2013 (Exh ibit EU -232) 
Response of competent authorities  of Estonia to 
recommendations of audit report DG(SANCO)/2013 -6781, 
carried out from 15 to 19 April 2013, received on 16 August 
2013 (Exhibit EU -233) 
Presentation to the Working group on contingency planni ng and emergency 
preparedness made on 25 -26 September 2013 (Exhibit EU -236) 
Information on processing 
establishments  Information on all establishments in all EU member States (Example of the list 
in France (Exhibits EU -241 and 242)) – The letter provided  a website with 
links to the information from all of the 28 EU member States  
The letter provided a summary table with statistics on establishments in 
Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Poland.  
Emergency measures taken 
for the prevention and early 
detection  of ASF  Programme aimed at early detection of infection with ASFV and increasing 
knowledge about the risk of ASF in the territory of Poland approved for 2013 
(Exhibit EU -237) 
Veterinary Control Programme on ASF early detection in Lithuania and 
Belarus, a pproved for 2013 (Exhibit EU -238) 
Veterinary Control Programme on ASF early detection in Latvia in 2014, 
approved for 2013 (Exhibit EU -239) 
Program of additional veterinary supervision measures in connection with the 
outbreaks of African swine fever in  Russia and Belorussia in 2014 in Estonia, 
approved for 2013 (Exhibit EU -240) 
Additional information on ASF 
surveillance in Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland  Presentation to the Animal Food Chain and Health on 6 February 2014 by 
Lithuania's State Foo d and Veterinary Service (Exhibit EU -66) 
Presentation to the Animal Food Chain and Health on 7 February 2014 by 
Poland's General Veterinary Inspectorate (Exhibit EU -67) 
Presentation to the Animal Food Chain and Health on 7 February 2014 by 
Latvia's Vet erinary Authority (Exhibit EU -68) 
Presentation to the Animal Food Chain and Health on 7 February 2014 by 
Estonia's Veterinary Food Board (Exhibit EU -69) 
Additional information  EFSA Scientific Opinion on ASF published on 19 April 2010 (Exhibit EU -24) 
 
9.11.  On 12 February 2014, FSVPS sent a letter to DG SANCO  in reply to the letter sent by DG 
SANCO  to FSVPS on 6 February 2014. In this letter, FSVPS indicates its approval of the proposed 
annex to the veterinary certificate for finished food products containing raw material of animal 
origin, canned meat, sausages and other ready -to-eat meat products, and animal (porcine) origin 
raw material for the manufacture of pet food and fur -bearing animal feed.1835 
9.12.  On 17 February 2014, DG SANCO sent a fax to Russia's delegatio n in Brussels informing it 
of a wild boar infected with ASF in Poland, 900 meters from the border with Belarus in the 
Podlaskie Province. Attached to the fax was a letter from Poland's chief veterinary officer, 
indicating that all measures had been impleme nted according to Council Directive 2002/60/EC as 
well as with SANCO Guidelines on surveillance and control of ASF. The fax also attached a map 
with the approximate location of the place where the dead wild boar was found.1836  
9.13.  On 18 February 2014, DG SANCO s ent a fax to Russia's delegation in Brussels forwarding 
Commission Implementing Decision 2014/93/EU of 14 February 20141837 concerning certain 
protective measures relating to ASF in Lithuania.1838 On the same day DG SANCO sent another fax 
to Russia's delegation in Brussels forwarding a communication from Polish veterinary authorities 
indicating the area considered to be infected in accordance with Article 15 of Council Directive 
2002/60/EC.1839 Also on 18 February 2014, DG SANCO provided to Russia's delegation in Br ussels, 
via fax, the draft Commission Implementing Decision concerning certain interim protective 
                                               
1835 Exhibit RUS -331. 
1836 Communication of 17 February 2014: African swine fever (ASF) confirmed in Poland in a wild boar 
found 900 meters  from the border with Belarus  (Exhibit EU -136). 
1837 Commission Implementing Decision 2014/93/EU of 14 February 2014 concerning certain protective 
measures relating to African swine fever in Lithuania, OJ L 46, p.20  (Exhibit EU -34). 
1838 Communication of 18 Febr uary 2014: African swine fever (ASF) in Lithuania (adoption of 
implementing decision) (Exhibit EU -137). 
1839 Communication of 18 February 2014: African swine fever (ASF) in Poland – Information on infected 
area (Exhibit EU -138). WT/DS475/R  
 
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  measures relating to ASF in Poland.1840 Finally, on the same day, the European Union informed 
Russia's delegation in Brussels that the draft Decision concerning interim protective measures had 
been adopted with the number C(2014)11791841 and attached a map with the areas covered by 
protective measures in Lithuania and Poland along the border with Belarus.1842 
9.14.  On 20 February 2014, DG SANCO sent a fax to Russia's delegati on in Brussels forwarding 
Commission Implementing Decision 2014/100/EU of 18 February 2014 concerning certain 
protective measures relating to ASF in Poland.1843 On the same day, DG SANCO sent a letter to the 
head of FSVPS indicating that "all the relevant inf ormation which should enable Russia to accept 
the  regionalization  of the EU as regards African swine fever were submitted" on 7 February 2014. 
The letter noted that on 8 February 2014 Mr Y. Nepoklonov acknowledged receipt of such 
communication. The letter  also referred to the additional information that Russia's veterinary 
services were able to obtain in the meeting of 11 February 2014 in Vilnius.1844  
9.15.  On 26 February 2014, DG SANCO sent a fax to Russia's delegation in Brussels forwarding 
information submitted  by the Polish General Veterinary Inspectorate regarding certain interim 
protective measures relating to ASF in Poland.1845 On the same day, DG SANCO sent a letter to the 
head of FSVPS recalling the information sent to Russia up to that point, as well as a ma p 
illustrating the European Union's regionalization for ASF in Lithuania and Poland, and Commission 
Implementing Decisions 2014/93/EU of 14 February 2014 and 2014/100/EU of 18 February 2014 
concerning certain protective measures relating to ASF in Lithuani a and in Poland, respectively.1846 
9.16.  On 27 February 2014, FSVPS sent a letter to DG SANCO indicating that the European Union 
was holding expert consultations with bodies of the Customs Union and the Eurasian Economic 
Commission member states authorized in veter inary terms in respect of the amendment of the 
veterinary certificates agreed in 2006 and the implementation of zoning and regionalization 
measures in the European Union. The letter also indicated that a questionnaire had been 
submitted in order to build a n unbiased picture for the subsequent decision on regionalization. The 
letter concluded indicating that following the expert consultation and reception of the answers to 
the questionnaire submitted, the authorized bodies of the Customs Union would consider  further 
supplies of pigs and pork products from the EU member States to Russia.1847 
9.17.  On 3 March 2014, FSVPS sent a letter to DG SANCO referring to previous letters received 
from DG SANCO on 7, 20, 25 and 26 February 2014. The letter indicated that "[u]nfortun ately the 
approval of conditions of regionalisation in the EU is hindered by the fact that Russian experts are 
still waiting to receive exhaustive information on anti -AFS [ASF]  efforts undertaken by EU 
veterinary authorities to contain the disease (in the affected countries) and to prevent the 
introduction of AFSV  [ASFV]  into other neighbouring  countries as well as other data for risk 
assessment, as specified in the question list" that was "provided in the letter of 05 February 
2014". The letter also noted that so far, FSVPS had received reply to only 5 out of 37 questions. 
Moreover, the letter referred to the upcoming meeting in Vladimir and requested that the 
                                               
1840 Communication of 18 February  2014: African swine fever (ASF) in Poland. Interim protective 
measures  (Exhibit EU -139).  
1841 Commission Implementing Decision 2014/100/EU of 18 February 2014 concerning certain interim 
protective measures relating to African swine fever in Poland, OJ L 50, p.35 (Exhibit EU -35). 
1842 Communication of 18 February 2014: African swine fever (ASF) in Poland. Adoption of Interim 
protective measures  (Exhibit EU -140).  
1843 Communication of 20 February 2014: African swine fever (ASF) in Poland (adoption of implementing 
decision)  (Exhibit EU -141). 
1844 Letter of DG SANCO of 20 February 2014 (ref. SANCO/G7/PD/mh (2014) 450287 (Exhibit EU -175) 
and Letter from DG SANCO to the Russian Veterinary Service, SANCO/G7/PD/mh(2014) 450287, 20 February 
2014 (Exhibit RUS -217). 
1845 Communicati on of 26 February 2014: African swine fever (ASF) in Poland. Measures put in place in 
the infected area  (Exhibit EU -142). 
1846 Letter from DG SANCO to the Russian  Veterinary Service, SANCO/G7/PD/mh(2014)542957, 26 
February 2014  (Exhibit RUS -30). 
1847 Letter from  the Russian Veterinary Service to the French Veterinary Service, 27 February 2014, ФС -
НВ-8/2964  (Exhibit RUS -231). WT/DS475/R  
 
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  European Union submit the required information concerning the items mentioned in the questions 
in the list prior to such meeting.1848  
9.18.  On 5 March 2014, DG SANCO sent a fax to Russia's delegation in Brussels forwarding the 
presentations made at the Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health on 4  March 
2014 on the ASF situation in Lithuania and Poland, and in respect of the outcome of the mission of 
the Community Veterinary Emergency Team to Poland. The fax includes a link to the dedicated 
webpage where these presentations were available.1849 On the same day, the European Union sent 
another fax to R ussia's delegation in Brussels attaching a draft Commission Implementing Decision 
concerning certain protective measures relating to ASF in Poland.1850 
9.19.  On 6 March 2014, DG SANCO sent a letter to the head of FSVPS referring to logistical 
arrangements for a mee ting scheduled to take place on 7 March 2014. The letter also included a 
table indicating the information that the European Union had provided to Russia in response to a 
letter of 5 February 2014.1851  
9.20.  Table A3 below provides an overview of the information pr ovided by the European Union in 
the above mentioned letter of 6 March 2014.  
Table A 3 Overview of information and explanations provided by 6 March  2014  
Category of information  Piece of information/Explanation  
Detailed action plan of emergency response 
at regional and national level in case of 
African swine fever outbreak  - Indicated that information on contingency plans, including 
audits from the Commission and measures improving the plans 
had been provided.  
- Noted that "the cont ingency plan of each country cannot be 
provided as they contain confidential information".  
Wild boar population with detailed density 
by country and region  - Indicated that the reply was provided as regards Poland in the 
Polish presentation to the Standi ng Committee on the Food 
Chain and Animal Health on 4 March 2014.  
- Indicated that further information on the wild boar density in 
the European Union is available in FAO EMPRES Watch Vol. 28 of 
May 2013, page 8 (provided a website link to the document).  
Swine population in the industry sector and 
personal subsidiary farming with detailed 
density by country and region  - Indicated that information on the structure of the pig sector in 
the EU has been already provided.  
- Indicated that further information o n the density of pigs in low 
biosecurity holding in the European Union is available in FAO 
EMPRES Watch Vol. 28 of May 2013, page 8 (provided a website 
link to the document).  
The number of swine and wild boars 
monitoring investigations during 2013 -
2014, d etailed by region  - Indicated that reports on monitoring investigations in Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland had been provided because they 
were the EU member States at risk.  
- Explained that active laboratory surveillance in other EU 
member States i s not considered necessary given the limited 
movements of wild boars; and that any suspicion of ASF is 
compulsorily notifiable in all EU member States.  
Detailed information about pig farms, swine  
processing factories and semi -finished 
products, graded by production volume.  - Explained that further detailed data, including per region, is 
publicly available on the EUROSTAT website (provided a 
dedicated webpage where such information could be accessed).  
- Provided an example of the data for each EU member St ate on 
pig holdings from such database on a pdf file entitled 
"Pig_sector".  
Regulatory acts, which provide for and 
specify monitoring procedures and epidemic 
investigations in cases of suspicion/ 
mortality/ disease (differential diagnostics)/ 
disposal of  animals susceptible to ASF - - Explained that Council Directive 2002/60/EC and the 
diagnostics manual for ASF had been already provided.  
                                               
1848 Letter from the Russian Veterinary Service to DG SANCO, FS -SD-8/3196, 3 March 2014  (Exhibit 
RUS-137). 
1849 Communication of 5 March 2014: Afr ican swine fever (ASF) in Lithuania and Poland – Presentations 
on the situation  (Exhibit EU -143). 
1850 Communication of 5 March 2014: African swine fever (ASF) in Poland (Committee approval of 
implementing decision) (Exhibit EU -144). 
1851 European Union's letter  to Russia of 6 March 2014, ARES(2014)601346, 
SANCO/G7/PD/mh/(2014)630598  (Exhibit EU -86). WT/DS475/R  
 
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  Category of information  Piece of information/Explanation  
swine and wild boars  
Regulatory acts, providing for wild boar 
hunting and further utilization of killed 
animals (for food, as trophies): regulations 
on export of wild boar meat and trophies, 
number of killed animals and exported meat 
and trophies during 2013 - 2014 (for regions 
adjacent to the infected zone)  - Explained that the rules applicable to the affected zones in t he 
European Union as regards hunting are included in the 
documents mentioned in the previous point.  
- Further explained that such information as regards unaffected 
areas of the European Union is not relevant for the purposes of 
approval of regionalization.  
Information about measures taken/being 
taken to prevent introduction of the 
etiologic agent to the swine industry sector/ 
personal subsidiary farming sector/wild 
population  - Explained that the information is included in the plans that had 
already been m ade available (in respect of all EU member 
States except Lithuania).  
Description of measures taken / being 
taken at the territories of the EU member 
states, which are in the zone of the obvious 
ASF risk (security/ border check points)  - Explained that th e information is included in the plans that had 
already been made available (in respect of Poland, Latvia, and 
Estonia).  
Description of the disease and sanitation 
inspection process (indicating the 
regulatory acts) and pre­export certification 
at all the stages of production cycle  - Explained that Regulation (EC) No. 882/2004 defines the 
official controls for the verification of compliance with the 
European Union animal health rules and is applicable to all the 
EU member States (provided a website link whe re the text of 
the regulation could be accessed).  
Description of measures taken / being 
taken to control movement of live animals 
and pig farming products   - Explained that Council Directive 64/432/ECC defines the rules 
for the movement of bovines and pig s in the European Union 
(provided a website link where the text of the regulation could 
be accessed).  
Detailed information about foreign hunters, 
who entered the country to hunt the wild 
boar during 2013 -2014 (including 
information about the number and t he 
country of origin), detailed by country and 
region  - Indicated that such information could not be given.  
Detailed information about pig farms and 
meat processing factories attested to ship 
animals and products to the territory of the 
CU, including inf ormation about the 
suppliers (number, country, region) and 
production volumes, detailed by country 
and region  - Explained that information on the approved establishments for 
export is already available to Russia's authorities.  
- Further indicated that det ails on suppliers and production 
volumes cannot be dispatched.  
Rough estimation of enterprises attested to 
ship animal products to the territory of the 
CU, by level of zoosanitary condition, 
equivalent to the previously conducted 
evaluation of the Russian  and Belarusian 
enterprises, detailed by regions and graded 
by production volume.  - Explained that this information cannot be compiled easily, and 
lacks relevance for the purpose.  
 
9.21.  Also on 6 March 2014, DG SANCO sent a letter to the deputy head of FSVPS i nforming that 
a European Union Veterinary Emergency Team would visit Lithuania on 12 -14 March 2014 in 
relation to the detection of ASF, and invited Russia to nominate an expert to join the mission 
team.1852 Attached to the letter DG SANCO sent a draft "Workin g Document on EU preventive 
measures for ASF".1853 
9.22.  On 7 March 2014, experts from the European Union and Russia met in Vladimir. The 
representatives of Russia and the European Union produced a protocol of such meeting, recording 
the views of the parties expres sed. The representatives of the European Union reported on the 
measures taken to localize and prevent further spread of ASF, and provided a map on which the 
zones affected by ASF are marked. The European Union's experts further observed the strengths 
of th e measures in place. Russia's experts made some remarks on the European Union's 
measures. It is noteworthy that Russia's experts indicated, in respect of the questionnaire sent on 
5 February 2014, that in "respond [sic] either outdated data on pig census f rom whole EU (until 
                                               
1852 Letter of 6 March 2014 from the European Union to Russia, ARES(2014)605187, SANCO G7/PD/mh 
(2014)640752  (Exhibit EU -87). 
1853 The final version of which was exhibited  as Exhibit EU -88. WT/DS475/R  
 
- 357 - 
 
  2010) while updated information had been provided for Poland and Lithuania or insufficient 
information was provided which does not allow to analyse  the risks objectively." According to 
Russia's experts that is an underestimation of outg oing risks. The European Union's expert 
guaranteed that it would provide all non -confidential information requested by Russia as regards 
contingency plans.1854  
9.23.  On 10 March 2014, DG SANCO sent a letter to the head of FSVPS referring to the exchanges 
that took  place in the course of the meeting of 7 March 2014 in Vladimir and seeking confirmation 
of the meeting in Madrid scheduled for 14 March 2014. The letter noted that during the meeting in 
Vladimir, "the European Commission has provided to your services all requested clarifications in 
relation to the EU situation and measures for ASF demonstrating the safety of trade from the 
unaffected areas of the EU."1855 
9.24.  On 12 March 2014, FSVPS sent a letter to DG SANCO indicating that the technical experts 
did not have time  to discuss certain matters during the meeting in Vladimir, namely (i) remarks on 
the measures taken in Lithuania and Poland, which were made by the FGBU "VNIIZH" expert 
participating in the investigation of sources of distribution of ASF within the group of immediate 
response; (ii) availability of only situational response and lack of systematic approach by the 
European Union to avoid further distribution of ASFV; (iii) absence of any proof of non -existence of 
ASF in the territory of other EU member States ; and (iv) absence of any proof of impossibility of 
getting meat of animals infected by ASFV in the production cycle of pork from other EU member 
States. The letter further confirmed the meeting in Madrid.1856  
9.25.  On 13 March 2014, FSVPS sent a letter to DG SANC O regarding certain incidents of 
"violations of veterinary rules" in connection with trade of certain products, supplied from 
Lithuanian refrigeration plants, subject to veterinary control and surveillance because they were 
produced in third countries or i n the EU member States that do not have the right to export to the 
Customs Union. In this respect, FSVPS requested that DG SANCO provide them with information 
concerning "the EU enterprises which have been receiving pork products from Lithuanian and 
Polish  establishments or plants since the outbreaks of" ASF in Lithuania and Poland.1857  
9.26.  On 13 March 2014, DG SANCO sent a letter to the head of FSVPS referring to the questions 
considered outstanding by Russia in respect of the information presented by the Europe an Union 
during the meeting with Russia's experts on 7 March 2014. Attached to that letter, the European 
Union provided a table listing the topics Russia consider remaining outstanding indicating the 
answers provided during the meeting as well as evidence provided by the European Union.1858  
9.27.  Table A4 below provides a list of the information and explanations that the European Union 
provided to Russia attached to the above mentioned letter dated 13 March 2014.  
Table A 4 Overview of info rmation and explanations provided  by the European Union on 
13 March 2014  
Category of information  Piece of information/Explanation  
Measures adopted to control 
ASF in Poland  - Evidence was made available during on -the-spot-visit.  
- Presentations from EU me mber States at the Standing Committee of Food 
Chain and Animal Health ( SCoFCAH).  
- Evidence is available in full reports of the Community Veterinary Emergency 
Team (CVET).  
- Further evidence gathered in the second visit of CVET to Lithuania.  
- Example of biosecurity applied in Poland in pictures taken by CVET 
(annexed).  
Emergency Plans for 
emergency response to ASF - Explanation on the approach to emergency response to ASF through 
contingency plans.  
                                               
1854 Protocol of technical meeting between the European Union and Russia of 7 March 2014  (Exhibit EU -
89). 
1855 Letter of DG SANCO of 10 March 2014 (ref SANCO/G7/PD/mh(2014)6591200)  (Exhibit EU -173). 
1856 Russia's letter to the European Union of 1 2 March 2014, FS -SD-4/3620  (Exhibit EU -90/Exhibit RUS -
135). 
1857 Letter from Russian Veterinary Service, EC -AC-8/3671, 13 March 2014  (Exhibit RUS -209). 
1858 European Union's letter to Russia of 13 March 2014, ARES(2014)709435, 
SANCO/G7/PD/mh(2014)745829  (Exhibit  EU-91). WT/DS475/R  
 
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  Category of information  Piece of information/Explanation  
outbreaks  
 - Example of audits by the European Union's  Food and Veterinary Office (FVO) 
for CFS contingency plan in Lithuania (provided through a website link).  
- Example of application of Spanish ASF contingency plan (provided through a 
website link).  
- Measures put in place due to the risk posed by the pr esence of ASF in 
countries neighbouring the European Union (Decision 2013/426/EU – Exhibit 
RUS-349). Those measures were the object of FVO inspections (examples of 
those audit reports were provided through website links).  
Measures taken by non -
affected E U member States in 
respect of ASF/Proof of non -
existence of ASF in non -
affected EU Member States  
 - Explanation of the passive surveillance applied in the European Union, 
pursuant to Article 1.4.5 of the Terrestrial Code, to demonstrate absence of 
ASF in t he European Union in territories that are not high -risk not adjacent to 
infected areas.  
- Explanation that the evidence provided by the above referred surveillance 
proves that the vast majority of the territory of the European Union complies 
with the requi rements in Article 1.4.6 paragraph 1(b) of the Terrestrial Code 
to be considered historically free of ASF.  
- Explanation that EU member States shall notify the presence or the 
suspected presence of ASF to the competent authority that shall proceed to 
fully investigate the suspicion (Directive 2002/60/EC).  
- Explanation of the active surveillance put in place in Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, and Poland and information regarding reports on such programmes 
(provided through website links).  
- Explanation that ac tive surveillance would be expanded in 2014 to other EU 
member States adjacent to high risk areas, for example, Finland or Romania.  
- Explanation that this surveillance approach has been applied to other 
disease such as FMD, CSF, sheep pox etc., for which  the European Union has 
a free status recognised worldwide.  
Absence of proof of 
impossibility of getting meat 
of animals infected by ASFV 
in the production cycle of 
pork from other EU member 
States  - Explanation that the European Union's rules, fully in force in all EU member 
States, guarantee for the EU and for third countries trading partners that it is 
impossible to transmit ASF or any other similar disease like CSF by meat or 
animals infected by ASFV in the production cycle of pork from other EU 
membe r States.  
- Reference to the attached "Working Document on EU preventive measures 
for ASF" (SANCO/7073/2014/Rev1 (Exhibit EU -88)). 
- Indication that the operation and implementation of relevant regulation is 
regularly audited by FVO (with an website link where those reports could be 
accessed).  
 
9.28.  On 17 March 2014, DG SANCO sent a fax to Russia's delegation in Brussels forwarding 
Commission Implementing Decision 2014/134/EU of 12 March 20141859 concerning certain 
protective measures relating to ASF in Poland.1860 
9.29.  On 19 March 2014, FSVPS sent a letter to DG SANCO referring to a teleconference between 
FSVPS and DG SANCO that took place on 18 March 2014, in respect of ASF regionalization and 
veterinary certificate redrafting. The letter noted that "[r]egrettably we c ould find no common 
ground on the process of ASF regionalisation in the EU, and the issue of sufficiency of the EU reply 
and of conclusive evidence that the rest of the EU is not affected by the disease." The letter also 
noted that Belgium had been the onl y EU member State that had provided them with 
"comprehensive answers to our questions about endemicity of ASF in the European Union".1861  
9.30.  On 27 March 2014, DG SANCO sent a fax to Russia's delegation in Brussels forwarding draft 
Commission Implementing Decisi on concerning animal health control measures relating to ASF in 
certain EU member States, adopted under the number C(2014)1979.1862  
                                               
1859 Commission Implementing Decision 2014/134/ EU of 12 March 2014 concerning certain protective 
measures relating to African swine fever in Poland, OJ L 74, p.63  (Exhibit EU -36). 
1860 Communication of 17 March 2014: African swine fever (ASF) in Poland (Publication of implementing 
decision) (Exhibit EU -145). 
1861 Letter from the Russian Veterinary Service to DG SANCO, FS -SD-8/4168, 19 March 2015  (Exhibit 
RUS-130). 
1862 Communication of 27 March 2014: Adoption of control measures relating to African swine fever  in 
certain Member States  (Exhibit EU -146). See also Commission Implementing Decision of 27 March 20142, 
014/178/EU  (Exhibit EU -37). WT/DS475/R  
 
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  9.31.  On 2 April 2014, FSVPS sent a letter to DG SANCO indicating that "Russian experts are still 
waiting to receive detailed inform ation on ASF -control measures which are being taken by EU 
veterinary authorities, particularly arrangements for localisation of the disease in the affected 
countries as well as preventing the introduction of the ASF virus in other EU countries ". The letter  
also indicated that FVSPS had received no response to the request of information sent on 13 March 
2014 regarding European Union traders that have received pork products originating in Lithuania 
and Poland following the outbreaks. Moreover, the letter note d the concerns FSVPS had raised in 
respect of the absence of veterinary borders within the European Union and the fact that DG 
SANCO "cannot guarantee that fresh porcine meat from the ASF -affected EU countries will not 
enter the production chain of finishe d food products exported to Russia." On that basis, the letter 
concluded by informing  of the decision to impose, as of 7 April 2014, temporary restrictions on the 
exports of finished food products, except hot processed pet food for cats and dogs (with 
processing temperature above 70 degree Celsius and processing time of more than 20 minutes) 
from Lithuania and Poland to Russia.1863 
9.32.  On the same day, FSVPS sent a letter to DG SANCO observing, among other things, that the 
"measures announced by the European Commi ssion seem ed insufficient to ensure ASF 
regionalisation in the EU. Introducing restrictions in certain areas of Lithuania and Poland does not 
effectively prevent the risk of further spread of ASFV."1864  
9.33.  On 4 April 2014, DG SANCO sent a letter to the deputy h ead of FSVPS (Mr Saurin) reporting 
on developments related to incidents of suspected violations of Russian import conditions. In 
addition, the letter provided information concerning the list of establishments approved for the 
storage of animal by -products not intended for human consumption.1865 
9.34.  On 10 April 2014, FSVPS sent a letter to the Chief Veterinary Officer of Poland requesting 
information for evaluating the effectiveness of the control measures to contain the ASF outbreak 
and prevent its further spread.  The following information was requested: (i) a number of 
surveillance studies conducted in March and April 2014 in order to detect ASFV in domestic pig 
populations (in the private and industrial sectors) and in wild boar populations within the 
quarantine and buffer zones (both in absolute numbers and proportionally in the total number of 
susceptible wild and domestic animals in the herd); (ii) a number of surveillance studies conducted 
in March and April 2014 in order to detect ASFV in domestic pig populat ions (in the private and 
industrial sectors) and in wild boar populations within administrative territories which are adjacent 
to the quarantine and buffer zones (both in absolute numbers and proportionally in the total 
number of susceptible wild and domes tic animals in the herd); and, (iii) volumes of deliveries of 
pork and ready -to-eat products containing pork from the Lithuanian enterprises located in the 
quarantine and buffer zones to any enterprises located outside these zones, including in other 
Europ ean Union countries.1866 
9.35.  On 18 April 2014, FSVPS sent a letter to the Director of State Food and Veterinary Service 
of Lithuania indicating that in order to consider lifting the temporary restrictions on importation of 
certain finished pork products FSVPS was  ready to carry out within two months an inspection of 
the Lithuanian animal product manufacturing establishments interested in exporting products to 
the Customs Union member states.1867 
9.36.  On 16 May 2014, FSVPS sent a letter to DG SANCO expressing its regret th at the European 
Union had not provided the information concerning "additional risks" as noted by Russia's experts 
at the Vladimir meeting on 7 March 2014. The letter further noted that due to that, FVSPS would 
like to remind DG SANCO of the need to provide  information on the following issues: 
(i) Justification of criteria of identification of borders of infected/free/high risk zones in the territory 
of Poland and Lithuania, namely regulatory and legislative acts and scientific data used as a basis 
for zonin g in the EU member States with regard to ASF; (ii) cartographical visual ization  of the 
                                               
1863 Letter from the Russian Veterinary Service to DG SANCO, FS -EN-8/5084, 2 April 2015  (Exhibit 
RUS-54) 
1864 Russia's letter to the European Union of 2 April 2014, FS -EN-8/5095  (Exhibit RUS -53). 
1865 Letter from DG SANCO to the Russian Veterinary Service, SANCO/G7/PD/mh (2014) 1055360, 4 
April 2015  (Exhibit RUS -56). 
1866 Russia's letter to Poland of 10 April 2014, FS -NV-8/5827  (Exhibit R US-240). 
1867 Letter from the Russian Veterinary Service to DG SANCO, FS -AS-8/6360, 18 April 2014  (Exhibit 
RUS-138.b revised ). WT/DS475/R  
 
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  establishments attested to supply live pigs and swine products from the EU member States 
(Poland and Lithuania, in particular) to Russia with indication of the raw mater ial bases of these 
establishments; (iii) zoo sanitary status of small farms (due to the number of them in the 
territories of the infected/high risk zones with regard to ASF) and measure of their bio protection 
(possibility of free range, feed base, the reg ime of introducing the newly arrived animals in the 
herd, etc.); (iv) whether there were  plans to implement surveillance programmes (ASF early 
detection) in the EU member States neighbouring Poland and Lithuania in view of the change in 
the ASF epizootic s ituation in these two countries; (v) data on internal evaluation by the veterinary 
services of the EU member States of resources (human, technical, financial ones) needed for the 
creation and maintenance of above  mentioned zones; (vi) data on functional is olation of sub -
populations of domestic and wild animals in zones with the proves of the absence of 
migration/seasonal movements of wild boars between the zones; and (vii) Data on the presence of 
the ASF vector in the EU member States.1868 
9.37.  On 21 May 2014, DG S ANCO sent a letter to the deputy head of FSVPS (Mr Nepoklonov) 
with follow -up information requested by Russia in the framework of consultations held on 30 April 
and 1 May 2014. The letter refers to European Union's communications sent on 7 February and 13 
March 2014, and clarifies certain information requested by Russia. The letter states "I trust that 
the Russian Federation will now be in a position not only to properly assess the regionalisation 
measures of the European Union, but more pressingly, to allo w the export of pigs and pig products 
to the Russian Federation to resume without delay" .1869 
9.38.  Table A5 below provides a list of the information and explanations that the European Union 
provided to Russia attached to the above mentioned letter dated 21 May 201 4. 
Table A 5 Overview of information and explanations provided by the European Union on 
21 May 2014  
Category of information  Piece of information/Explanation  
Further information or 
clarification to Russia's 
request to provide a det ailed 
action plan of emergency 
response  - Clarification that contingency plans are set up individually at the EU member 
State level. Recalls that information on those contingency plans was provide d 
with the letter of 7 February 2014.  
- Provided a copy of the contingency plans of Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and 
Estonia, indicating that all sensitive information had been removed from them.  
- Recalled that in the letter of 7 February 2014 the European Union had 
already provided comprehensive information in re spect contingency planning 
in the other 24 EU member States.  
- Recalled that in the letter of 13 March 2014 the European Union sent the 
contingency plan of Spain, which could serve as an example of the methods 
and actions that make up the contingency plan s used throughout the 
European Union.  
Further information regarding 
wild boar population data, 
with detailed density by 
country and region  - Recalled that in the letter of 6 March 2014 a map based on a published FAO 
study (covering 2005 -2011) was forward ed with estimated densities of wild 
boar population in Europe, by region.  
- Provided an updated table (apparently as of 2014) with estimated wild board 
population in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland.  
Detailed information about 
pig farms and inform ation 
about swine population with 
detailed density by region  
 - Recalled the spread -sheet with data on the number of farms and heads by 
agricultural size of farm and size of pig herd for 27 EU member States, as of 
2010, that was provided with the letter of  7 February 2014.  
- Provided a table with pigs kept on holdings as of December 2013 for all the 
28 EU member States.  
- Provided a table with the number of pig holdings as of 2010 for all 28 EU 
member States. The letter indicates that this information is collected every 
three years and 2010 was the last time it was done.  
- Provided tables with more detailed information on swine populations in 
Lithuania and Poland updated to 2014, based on their Control and 
Surveillance Programmes.  
Further information on  
measures taken to prevent 
the introduction of ASF  - Recalled the information provided in respect of control and surveillance 
programmes of ASF in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland in 2013, sent 
with the letter of 7 February 2014.  
- Provided the plan s with the control and surveillance activities foreseen in 
                                               
1868 Russia's letter to the European Union of 16 May 2014, FS -EN-8/7999 ( Exhibit EU -93). 
1869 European Union's letter to Russia of 21 May 2014, ARES(2014)1658269, 
SANCO/G6/AB(2014)1782253  (Exhibit EU -92). WT/DS475/R  
 
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  Category of information  Piece of information/Explanation  
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland in 2014.  
Information on foreign 
hunters who entered the 
country to hunt wild boar 
during 2013 -2014 - Explained the regulatory framework applicable to the tr eatment of carcasses 
of wild boar, wild boar meat, wild boar products and trophies, including 
movement restrictions.  
- Indicated the irrelevance, against this backdrop, of information about 
individual hunters who entered the country to hunt wild boar.  
Information about pig farms 
and meat processing factories 
attested to ship animals and 
products to the territory of 
the Customs Union  Pig population (farms 
and pigs)  The letter refers to the information sent with the 
letter of 7 February 2014 and indicates that an 
update of that information with more exhaustive 
information was provided in that communication.  
Establishments  The letter refers to the information sent with the 
letter of 7 February 2014 and indicates that such 
information is available to Russi an authorities through 
their dedicated webpage.  
Suppliers of pig meat 
to establishments  Explains the clear prohibitions on the dispatch and 
supply of live pigs and pig meat from the legally 
defined infected areas, as provided in Article 8 of 
Commission Implementing Decision 2014/178/EU.  
 
9.39.  On 5 June 2014, FSVPS sent a letter to the Director of the State Food and Veterinary 
Service of Lithuania indicating the names of Russia's experts that would participate on a joint 
inspection at the Lithuanian plants pr oducing products and willing to export their products to 
Customs Union member states. That inspection was scheduled to take place for 7 -days starting on 
15 June 2014. The inspection would cover: plants producing ready -to-eat meat products, the 
epizootic si tuation in Lithuania, and effectiveness of the measures taken by the veterinary services 
of Lithuania to monitor ASF and to prevent its spread.1870 
9.40.  On 13 June 2014, DG SANCO sent a letter to the deputy head of FSVPS (Mr Nepoklonov) 
with follow -up information requested by Russia through a letter sent to the European Union on 16 
May 2014. The letter refers to the European Union's communications sent to FSVPS on 7 February, 
6 and 13 March 2014, and 21 May 2014, and provides certain explanations and information in  
respect of the information requested by Russia. The letter underlines that the epidemiological 
situation of ASF in the European Union remains unchanged, because since February 2014 only two 
further ASF cases were discovered in wild boar in Poland.1871 
9.41.  Table A6 below provides a list of the information and explanations that the European Union 
provided to Russia attached to the above mentioned letter dated 13 June 2014.  
Table A 6 Overview of information and explanations  provided by the E uropean Union on 
13 June 2014  
Category of information  Piece of information/Explanation  
Justification of criteria of identification of 
borders of ASF infected/free/high risk zones 
in the territory of Poland and Lithuania  Provided an explanation of the scie ntific data, including the 
home range of wild boars, taken into account in the definition 
of zones.  
Cartographical visual ization  of the 
establishments attested to supply live pigs 
and swine products from the EU member 
States (Poland and Lithuania, in par ticular) to 
Russia with indication of the raw material 
bases of these establishments  Referred to the responses it had provided through its letter of 
21 May 2014 in respect to the information about pig farms and 
meat processing factories attested to ship an imals and 
products to the territory of the CU, including information about 
suppliers and production volumes, detailed by country and 
region (last item in Table A5 above ).  
Zoo sanitary status of small farms (due to the 
big number of them in the territories  of the 
infected/high risk zones with regard to ASF) 
and measures of their bio protection 
(possibility of free range, feed base, the 
regime of introducing the newly arrived 
animals in the herd, etc.).  Explained that in accordance with the Terrestrial Code,  the 
animal health status of farms/holdings, independently of their 
size, as regards ASF is defined by the status of the zone where 
they are located. This may be either infected/restricted or free 
from disease. Assigning such a status to individual farms - 
regardless of where they are located - does not exist in the 
Terrestrial Code, nor as a consequence, in European Union 
legislation.  
Whether it is foreseen  to plan and implement Explained that as general rule, non -specific or passive 
                                               
1870 Letter from the Russian Veterinary Service to the Director of the State Food and Veterinary Service 
of the republic of Lithuania, FS -NV-8/9668, 5 June 2014  (Exhibit RUS -355). 
1871 European U nion's letter to Russia of 13 June 2014, ARES(2014)1941949, 
SANCO/G7/PD/mh(2014)2038505  (Exhibit EU -94). WT/DS475/R  
 
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  Category of information  Piece of information/Explanation  
surveillance programmes (ASF early 
detection) in the European Union countries  
neighbouring Poland and Lithuania in view of 
the change in the ASF epizootic situation in 
these two countries.  surveillance is applied all over the European Union. ASF –
targeted (active) surveillance  is applied where there is a 
differentiated risk, such as in the territories or countries that 
neighbour infected countries. In 2013, surveillance was 
implemented in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland . 
Further explained  that in 2014, as a result of the  detected 
cases, surveillance in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland  
was further intensified. Such surveillance is also being 
intensified in other EU member States countries who consider 
themselves to be at risk, due to their close proximity to the 
border with Russia, Belarus and/or Ukraine.  
Data on internal evaluation by the veterinary 
services of the EU countries of resources 
(human, technical, financial ones) needed for 
the creation and maintenance of above  
mentioned zones.  Responded that there is a systematic evaluation of the 
veterinary services of each EU member State through audits 
by the FVO. The necessary human, technical and financial 
resources are made available as required. Detailed reports of 
the audits conducted to date are publicly availab le through the 
FVO dedicated web page (the letter provides a website link 
where those reports could be accessed).  
Data on functional isolation of sub -
populations of domestic and wild animals in 
zones with proof of the absence of 
migration/seasonal movemen ts of wild boars 
between the zones.  Referred to the EFSA scientific papers that were sent to Russia 
with the letter dated 7 February 2014, according to which wild 
boars do not migrate and that movements of these animals 
between areas is very limited.  
Obser ved that the risk of contact between domestic and wild 
animals in the infected areas exists, but that this is the reason 
for which restrictive measures have been applied on the 
movements of domestic pigs from the affected areas. The 
European Union pointed out that intensive surveillance 
continues to confirm the absence of the disease in farms.  
Data on the presence of the ASF vector in the 
European Union countries.  Explained that it does not have available data yet for the 
infected areas of its territory an d that concerns about vectors 
in case of ASF relate to their role in the persistence of the 
infection in already affected areas, thus, any question about 
the presence of vectors in this case, is in the European Union's 
view with no relevance as regards are as unaffected by ASF.  
 
9.42.  On 26 June 2014, DG SANCO sent a fax to Russia's delegation in Brussels informing the 
confirmation of ASF in a backyard pig holding in Kraslava district and in three wild boars found 
dead in Dagda district in Latvia, at the border w ith Belarus and forwarding a communication from 
Latvia's Food and Veterinary Service. The fax indicated that measures in accordance with Council 
Directive 2002/60/EC were being implemented and that ASF had been confirmed in the area that 
was already under restriction because of CSF established in Latvia (Commission Implementing 
Decision 2013/764/EU).1872 
9.43.  On 27 June 2014, DG SANCO sent a fax to Russia's delegation in Brussels forwarding the 
draft Commission Implementing Decision adopted on that day concerning c ertain interim 
protective measures relating to ASF in Latvia.1873  On 1 July 2014, DG SANCO sent a fax to 
Russia's delegation in Brussels forwarding the Commission Implementing Decision 2014/417/EU 
adopted on 27 June 2014, the draft of which it had sent on 27  June 2014, concerning certain 
interim protective measures relating to ASF in Latvia.1874  
9.44.  On 30 June 2014, FSVPS sent a letter to DG SANCO indicating that in the light of the 
continuing spread of ASF throughout the European Union, specifically referring to t he outbreaks in 
wild boar and domestic pigs in Latvia, believed that consideration of amending the veterinary 
                                               
1872 Communication of 26 June 2014: African swine fever (ASF) detection in Latvia  (Exhibit EU -147). 
1873 Communication of 27 June 2014: African swine fever ( ASF) in Latvia – Adoption of interim 
protective measures  (Exhibit EU -148). 
1874 Communication of 1 July 2014: African Swine fever (ASF) in domestic pigs and in wild boar in Latvia 
Commission Implementing Decision 2014/417/EU of 27 June 2014  (Exhibit EU -206). See also Commission 
Implementing Decision 2014/417/EU of 27 June 2014 concerning certain interim protective measures relating 
to African swine fever in Latvia, OJ L 192, p.66  (Exhibit EU -38). WT/DS475/R  
 
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  certificates of certain pork products should be postponed. The letter concludes referring to it being 
practicable to organize consultations on the  issue as soon as possible.1875 
9.45.  On 7 July 2014, DG SANCO sent a fax to Russia's delegation in Brussels informing of the 
confirmation of ASF in five dead wild boars found at Poland's border with Belarus. The fax 
forwarded the corresponding report of Poland's V eterinary Inspection and indicated that these 
cases had occurred within the restricted area listed in Part II of the Annex to Commission 
Implementing Decision 2014/178/EU.1876 
9.46.  On 8 July 2014, DG SANCO sent a fax to Russia's delegation in Brussels forwarding t he draft 
Commission Implementing Decision adopted on that day under number C(2014)4925, listing 
certain regions in Latvia affected by ASF in Part I and Part II of the Annex to Decision 
2014/178/EU.1877 On the same day, DG SANCO sent a fax to Russia's delegati on in Brussels 
informing the confirmation of ASF in six wild boars found near Poland's border with Belarus. The 
fax forwarded the corresponding report of Poland's Veterinary Inspection and indicated that these 
cases had occurred within the restricted area listed in Part II of the Annex to Commission 
Implementing Decision 2014/178/EU.1878 
9.47.  On 9 July 2014, DG SANCO sent a fax to Russia's delegation in Brussels providing a map 
displaying the areas as presented in the updated Annex to Commission Implementing Decisi on 
2014/178/EU concerning animal health control measures relating to ASF in certain EU member 
States.1879  
9.48.  On 10 July 2014, DG SANCO sent a fax to Russia's delegation in Brussels forwarding 
Commission Implementing Decision 2014/448/EU, adopted on 8 July 2014,  amending the Annex to 
Commission Implementing Decision 2014/178/EU as regards ASF in Latvia.1880  
9.49.  On 22 July 2014, DG SANCO sent a fax to Russia's delegation in Brussels informing of the 
confirmation of one ASF outbreak in domestic pigs and a positive case i n wild boar in the novads of 
Valkas. The fax forwarded the corresponding report of Latvia's Food and Veterinary Service and 
indicated that these cases had been confirmed outside the restricted area listed in Part I and Part 
II of the Annex to Commission Im plementing Decision 2014/178/EU.1881 
9.50.  On 24 July 2014, DG SANCO sent a fax to Russia's delegation in Brussels informing of a 
strong suspicion of ASF in a commercial pig farm located in Rupinskai village in the Kazitiskis sub -
district within Ignalina district i n the eastern part of Lithuania close to the border with Belarus.1882 
On the same day, DG SANCO sent a fax to Russia's delegation in Brussels informing about the 
confirmation of ASF in one holding with domestic pigs located in the Ignalina region in Lithuania  
and forwarded the corresponding report of Lithuania's State Food and Veterinary Service. The fax 
indicated that the outbreak had been confirmed outside the restricted area listed in Part I and Part 
II of the Annex to Commission Implementing Decision 2014/ 178/EU.1883 Also on 24 July 2014, DG 
                                               
1875 Letter from the Russian Veterinary Service to the EU Veterinar y Service, 30 June 2014, ФС-СД-
8/11415  (Exhibit RUS -250).  
1876 Communication of 7 July 2014: African swine fever (ASF) in wild boar in Poland in the restricted 
area listed in Part II of the Annex to Decision 2014/178/EU  (Exhibit EU -186). 
1877 Communication of 8 July 2014: Adoption of Co mmission Implementing Decision amending Decision 
2014/178/EU as regards African swine fever in Latvia  (Exhibit EU -207). See also C ommission Implementing 
Decision  of 8 July 2014, 2014/448/EU (Exhibit EU -39). 
1878 Communication of 8 July 2014: African swine fev er (ASF) in wild boar in Poland in the restricted 
area listed in Part II of the Annex to Decision 2014/178/EU  (Exhibit EU -208). 
1879 Communication of 9 July 2014: Epidemiological update and map displaying regionalisation set out in 
Decision 2014/178/EU, as la st amended, as regards African swine fever  (Exhibit EU -209). 
1880 Communication of 10 July 2014: Publication of Decision amending Commission Implementing 
Decision 2014/178/EU as regards African swine fever regionalisation  (Exhibit EU -210). See also Commission  
Implementing Decision  of 8 July 2014, 2014/448/EU (Exhibit EU -39). 
1881 Communication of 22 July 2014:  African Swine Fever in Latvia  (Exhibit EU -187). 
1882 Fax, SANCO/G2/FR/is (2014) 2721683, 24 July 2014  (Exhibit RUS -326). 
1883 Fax, SANCO/G2/FB/is (2014) 2728623 , 24 July 2014  (Exhibit RUS -327). WT/DS475/R  
 
- 364 - 
 
  SANCO sent another fax with the draft Commission Implementing Decision adopted that day 
concerning certain interim protective measures relating to ASF in Lithuania.1884  
9.51.  On 28 July 2014, DG SANCO sent a letter to FSVPS report ing on the confirmed ASF 
outbreak in Ignalina region in Lithuania, inviting Russian authorities to participate in the EU 
Emergency Team that would visit Lithuania on 30 -31 July. Attached to the letter the European 
Union sent draft Implementing Decisions re vising the annex of Commission Implementing Decision 
2014/178/EU.1885 On the same day DG SANCO sent a fax to Russia's delegation in Brussels 
forwarding Commission Implementing Decision 2014/502/EU of 24 July 2014 concerning certain 
interim protective measures  relating to ASF in Lithuania.1886 
9.52.  On 29 July 2014, FSVPS sent a letter to DG SANCO pointing out that, among other things, 
reports of ASF outbreaks in domestic pigs in areas of Latvia and Lithuania located outside the 
"quarantine zones" confirms the inefficie ncy of the preventive measures approved by the European 
Commission. The letter further noted that there is clear evidence of additional risks mentioned by 
Russia's experts at the meeting held on 7 March 2014, related to the possibility that infected meat 
may enter the pork production chain. The letter concluded by observing that the worsening 
epizootic situation in the European Union, as well as the absence of conclusive evidence of 
sufficient supervision and proper functioning of the determined zones, "cur rently preclude the 
Russian Federation from accepting the EU regionalization terms, proposed by the European 
Commission at the meeting held on 4 July 2014 in Moscow, as well as from pronouncing the entire 
EU territory free from AFS  [ASF] ."1887 
9.53.  On 31 July 2014 , FVSPS sent a letter to DG SANCO indicating that due to the worsening 
epizootic situation in the EU member States and the growing number of outbreaks reported 
outside the "quarantine zones", they require an updated proposal regarding  regionalization  in the 
European Union. Moreover, based on the ASF outbreak at one of Lithuania's biggest pig -breeding 
farms located outside of the "quarantine" area, FSVPS requested that DG SANCO send "an update 
on whether the European Commission has introduced any additional  measures restricting the 
movement of live animals and livestock products outside of the quarantine areas and in the EU 
territory."1888 
9.54.  On 26 September 2014, DG SANCO sent a letter to FSVPS in connection with a new case of 
ASF in a wild boar near the border b etween Estonia and Russia, located in Ida -Viru county, around 
40 km from Russia's border and 220 km from the closest outbreak in Estonia. The letter underlines 
that "[w]e are particularly concerned regarding the possible origin of this case, in particular taking 
into account that so far investigations indicate no epidemiological link with other cases or 
outbreaks in the EU".1889 
9.55.  On 13 October 2014, FSVPS sent a letter to DG SANCO in response to the letter of 26  
September 2014. This letter indicates that the co nclusion regarding the introduction of ASF 
through the Leningrad region into Estonia is not sufficiently grounded. In that respect, the letter 
referred to the notifications Russia provided to the OIE in respect of the number of outbreaks and 
controls measu res put in place in that area. The letter also noted that increasing ASF spread within 
the affected EU member States caused by non -controlled movement of animal products from the 
affected foci and due to absence of rigid measures to control wildlife, and u nderlined the benefits 
of compartmentalization for safe trade.1890 
                                               
1884 Fax, SANCO/G2/FB/is (2014) 2729207, 24 July 2014  (Exhibit RUS -328). See also Commission 
Implementing Decision  of 24 July 2014, 2014/502/EU  (Exhibit EU -40). 
1885 Exhibits RUS -133 and RUS -380. 
1886 Fax, SANCO/G2/MP/kh (2014) 275 9647, 28 July 2014  (Exhibit RUS -330). See also Commission 
Implementing Decision  of 24 July 2014, 2014/502/EU  (Exhibit EU -40). 
1887 Russia's letter to the European Union of 29 July 2014, C -EH-8/13771 (Exhibit RUS-263). 
1888 Russia's letter to the European Union o f 31 July 2014, EH -8/14006  (Exhibit RUS -157). 
1889 Exhibits EU -177 and RUS -191. This letter refers to letters sent by DG SANCO to FSVPS on 1 and 10 
July 2014 (both contained in Exhibits EU -177 and RUS -191) concerning the potential links between the ASF 
situat ion in Russia and in the affected EU member States (at that time, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland).  
1890 Letter from the Russian Veterinary Service to DG SANCO, FS -EN-8/19574, 13 October 2015  (Exhibit 
RUS-39). WT/DS475/R  
 
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  9.56.  On 1 December 2014, FSVPS sent a letter to DG SANCO indicating that the process of 
discussion of veterinary certificates and resumption of trade in breeding pigs and pork products is 
getting " protracted" due to the European Union's failure to provide sufficient information required 
for the objective assessment of risks associated with the spread of ASF in the EU member States. 
The letter also referred to the European Union's unwillingness to fo llow compartmentalization as 
provided in the Terrestrial Code. Moreover, the letter requested that the European Union provide 
detailed information in respect of particular list of questions.1891 Such questions are listed in 
Table A7 below.  
Table A 7 Questions attached to FSVPS's letter  of 1 December 2014  
No. Question  
1 Please provide the ASF early detection and contingency plan for each EU member State. For each plan 
which has been implemented in response to the current epizootic situ ation, provide evidence of the 
effectiveness of that plan and explain the steps officials are taking to actively enforce the plan. Discuss 
the budget for enforcement, the number of inspection personnel, reports of successful elimination of 
ASF, and plans t o increase resources dedicated to enforcement.  
2 Please provide detailed information regarding monitoring/surveillance of wild boars in each EU member 
State.  
3 Please provide the characteristics of the population of wild boars in each EU member State, i ncluding 
detailed data on the density of the wild boar population in each region of each EU member State.  
4 Please provide data regarding the role of wild boars in the spread of ASF in EU member States, including 
evidence regarding the functional isolati on, migration, and seasonal movements of sub -populations of 
wild boars between different EU member States.  
5 Please provide detailed information regarding the measures taken by each EU member State to prevent 
the trans -boundary spread of ASF in the Europe an Union. For each measure, provide data demonstrating 
its effectiveness and explain the steps officials are taking to actively enforce this measure.  
6 Please provide detailed information regarding the measures taken by each EU member State to prevent 
the trans-boundary spread of ASF through the movement of wild boars in the EU. For each measure, 
provide data demonstrating its effectiveness and explain steps officials are taking to actively enforce this 
measure.  
7 Please provide detailed information on me asures intended to prevent the spread of ASF to/from small 
and average -sized farms and farms/facilities with low level protection (e.g., premises where pigs are not 
indoors) in each EU member State. For each measure, provide data demonstrating its effectiv eness and 
explain the steps officials are taking to actively enforce this measure.  
8 Please explain how each EU member State control and monitors the movement of foreign hunters and 
the hunting of wild boars by foreign hunters. Provide data on the moveme nts of foreign hunters between 
different ASF risk zones in the European Union.  
9 Please provide detailed information regarding the measures taken by each EU member State to prevent 
the trans -boundary spread of ASF through the movement of foreign hunters a nd hunting -related 
carcasses and trophies in the European Union. For each measure, provide data demonstrating its 
effectiveness and explain the steps officials are taking to actively enforce this measure.  
10 Please provide data regarding the role of tick s in the spread of ASF in EU member States, including data 
regarding their distribution and host preferences.  
11 Please provide detailed information regarding the measures taken by each EU member State to prevent 
the trans -boundary spread of ASF through tick in the European Union. For each measure, provide data 
demonstrating its effectiveness and explain the steps officials are taking to actively enforce this 
measure.  
12 Please provide detailed information regarding the measures taken by each EU member S tate to control 
and monitor the raw materials (e.g., animals for slaughterhouses, carcasses for meat production plants) 
used by companies that supply live swine and pork products to Russia. Provide evidence that these raw 
materials are not sourced from ASF  infected/high risk zones.  
13 Please explain whether companies in the European Union that supply live swine and pork products to 
Russia revised their raw material sourcing plans as a result of the changed epizootic situation in the 
European Union.  
14 Please provide justification for the criteria used to identify borders of ASF infected / free \ high risk 
zones. Explain whether these criteria should be applied to other EU member States.  
15 Please explain what regulations and research findings underlie principles of ASF zoning in EU member 
States.  
16 Please provide detailed information regarding the measures taken by each EU member State to stamp 
out ASF. For each measure, provide data demonstrating its effectiveness and explain the steps officials 
are taking to actively enforce this measure. Discuss the budget for enforcement, the number of 
inspection personnel, reports of successful elimination of ASF, and plans to increase resources dedicated 
to enforcement. For each EU member State that has not take n measures to stamp out ASF, explain 
whether these EU member States have prepared plans to stamp out ASF and provide us with all such 
                                               
1891 Exhibit Letter from the Russian Veterinary Servic e to DG SANCO, No. FS -AS-8/23743, 1 December 
2015 (RUS-131). WT/DS475/R  
 
- 366 - 
 
  No. Question  
plans.  
17 Please provide detailed information regarding the measures taken by each EU member State to prevent 
the spread of ASF through the slaughter of ASF -infected swine. For each measure, provide data 
demonstrating its effectiveness and explain the steps officials are taking to actively enforce this 
measure.  
18 Please provide detailed information regarding the measures taken by each EU member State to prevent 
the spread of ASF through the improper destruction/disposal of carcasses of ASF -infected swine. For 
each measure, provide data demonstrating its effectiveness and explain the steps officials are taking to 
actively e nforce this measure.  
19 Please provide detailed information on the procedures each EU member State has in place to control and 
monitor the burial sites of ASF -infected swine. Explain the steps officials are taking to ensure that these 
procedures are foll owed.  
20 Please provide detailed information regarding the procedures each EU member State has in place 
concerning the cleaning and disinfection of premises on which ASF -infected swine were located. Explain 
the steps officials are taking to ensure that t hese procedures are followed.  
21 Please provide data regarding the role of the following factors in the spread of ASF in EU member 
States: frozen meat; chilled meat; skin fat; vehicles used to transport ASF infected swine/products; 
smoked meat; fermented  meat; vehicles driven through ASF -infected areas; people involved in pig -
keeping; slurry; animal feed; litter; fomites; vegetables; crops; pests (e.g. rodents); pets; hay and 
straw; and insects.  
22 Please provide detailed information regarding the measu res taken by each EU member State to prevent 
the trans -boundary spread of ASF in the European Union through the factors listed in Question 21 
above. For each measure, provide data demonstrating its effectiveness and explain the steps officials 
are taking t o actively enforce this measure.  
23 Data on measures being taken/taken for prevention of ASF introduction in the industrial pig 
farms/backyard pig farms/wild population, on measures being taken/taken in the EU member States 
(checkpoints/BIPs) as well as i nformation describing procedure of veterinary and sanitary inspection and 
pre-export certification at all stages along the whole production chain.  
24 In view of a large number of small farms (pig population under 200 animals) in ASF infected / high risk 
zones the animal health status of these farms should be clarified as well as biosecurity measures taken 
there (feasibility of free range, feed supply, procedure of new -coming animal introduction in the herd).  
25 Map location of plants approved for export ation of live pigs and pork products into Russia along with 
indication of sources of raw materials.  
26 Description of measures being taken/taken for movement control of live animals and pork products, 
aspects of traceability of feed, equipment and tools (including used ones), approaches to passive/active 
surveillance of susceptible animal populations.  
27 What is the procedure for ASF differential diagnosis in case of salmonellosis, erysipelas, classical swine 
fever and Aujesky's? Statistical data (numbe r of disease suspects/confirmed cases).  
28 Submit contact details of the competent authority in the EU member States responsible for 
establishment of zones with different ASF status (for each country).  
29 Was evaluation of performance of veterinary serv ice (PVS) performed (human, technical, financial and 
other resources) in the EU member States including evaluation of the competent authorities  responsible 
for establishment of zones with different ASF status for each country?  
30 What criteria / factors a re used to evaluate PVS in the EU member States and their equivalence with the 
OIE recommended criteria for evaluation of performance of veterinary services (OIE PVS Tool)?  
31 ASF emergency plans including data on staff number and logistics.  
 
9.57.  On 19 Dece mber 2014, FSVPS sent a letter to DG SANCO addressing the ASF situation in 
Estonia. Through the letter FSVPS request that DG SANCO provide detailed information on the 
epizootic research of the outbreak, as well as a detailed description of the measures imp lemented 
in Estonia to prevent the spread of ASF into the neighbouring disease -free regions of Russia.1892 
9.58.  On 23 December 2014, DG SANCO sent a letter to FSVPS in response to Russia's letter 
dated 1 December 2014 requesting additional information in relation to ASF. The letter refers to 
the communications sent by DG SANCO to FSVPS on 7 February, 6 and 13 March, 21 May, and 13 
June of 2014. The letter observed the following in respect of the first three of these five 
communications, "I am confident that this in formation is more than sufficient to allow your 
services to conclude on the safety of pigs and their products, originating in unaffected areas of the 
EU". The letter concluded that it was surprising that Russia had submitted a new set of questions 
despite the fact that during the last five months they had not provided any feedback on the 
European Union's latest responses as requested by Russia, and that Russia was claiming once 
                                               
1892 Letter from the Russian Veterinary Service to the Director of Veterinary and International Affairs, 
European Commission, HB -8/25328, 19 December 2014 (Exhibit RUS -379). WT/DS475/R  
 
- 367 - 
 
  again that the European Commission had not provided all the information needed t o carry out a 
risk assessment.1893  
9.59.  On 19 March 2015, FSVPS sent a letter to DG SANTE requesting an explanation on the 
procedure of notification of outbreaks of animal diseases by EU member States to the OIE. The 
letter explained that such request is based on  certain doubts that FSVPS has in respect of the 
manner in which competent authorities in Estonia notify new outbreaks in wild boars. According to 
the letter, the "approach of the Estonian service prevents a comprehensive assessment of the ASF 
spread in th e wild".1894  
9.60.  On 24 March 2015, DG SANTE sent to FSVPS a letter referring to the European Union's 
previous communications and providing answers to the questions sent by Russia in the attachment 
to letter FS -AS-8/24743 dated 1 December 2014. The letter include s a description of what 
information had already been provided by the European Union in its communications of 7 
February, 6 and 13 March, 21 May, and 13 June 2014, as well as additional information 
complementing the information already provided to Russia.1895  
9.61.  Table A8 below provides an overview of the information provided by the European Union in 
the above mentioned communication of 24 March 2015. In addition, this communication had 
attached the eradication plans for Lithuania1896 and Poland.1897  
Table A 8 Overview of information  and explanations provided by the European Union on 
24 March 2015  
Category of information  Information already provided  Additional information  
ASF early detection and 
contingency plan for each EU 
member State, includ ing 
evidence of the effectiveness 
of the plan, steps for its 
enforcement, budget, 
staffing, reports of successful 
elimination of ASF, and plans 
to increase resources 
dedicated to enforcement.  Through the letter of 7 February 
2014, the following information  was 
provided: (i) general information on 
development and content of 
contingency plans; (ii) presentation 
from a Better Training for Safer Food 
training on the operation of 
contingency plans; (iii) FVO audit 
reports on contingency planning in 
Estonia, Latv ia, Lithuania, and 
Poland; (iv) examples of audits in 
other EU member States; and (v) 
FVO presentation on contingency 
planning.  
Through the letter of 13 March 2013, 
the following information was 
provided: (i) ASF contingency plan of 
Spain; and (ii) FVO au dit report in 
Lithuania.  
Through the letter of 21 May 2014, 
general information on contingency 
plans and the ASF contingency plan 
of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and 
Poland was provided.  
 The European Union explained that 
sufficient information had alread y 
been provided to Russia.  
The letter also indicated that during 
the consultations in Geneva on 30 
April to 1 May 2014, it was agreed 
that only contingency plans of ASF 
affected countries were relevant.  
                                               
1893 Letter from DG SANCO t o the Russian Veterinary Service, SANCO/G7/PD/mh (2014) 4703183, 23 
December 2014  (Exhibit RUS -132). 
1894 Letter from Russian Veterinary Service to the European Union Veterinary Service, FS -EN-8/4220, 19 
March 2015 (Exhibit RUS -153). 
1895 Letter of 24 March 2015  from the EU to Russia, Ref. Ares(2015)1284836 (Exhibit RUS -154) and 
Letter from DG SANTE to FSVPS  
Ref. Ares(2015)1284836 - 24/03/2015; EU's replies to the questionnaire sent by FSVPS with the letter 
FS-AS-8/23743 dated 1 December 2014 (Exhibit RUS -167).  
1896 Eradication plan of African swine fever in feral pigs in certain areas of Lithuania (communicated to 
Russia on 24 March 2015)  (Exhibit EU -101) and ASF Eradication plan for African swine Fever in wild boars in 
the Southern part of Lithuania, June 2014  (Exhibit RUS-156). 
1897 Eradication plan of African swine fever in feral pigs in certain areas of Poland (communicated to 
Russia on 24 March 2015)  (Exhibit EU -102) and the Polish plan of measures in order to eradicate African Swine 
Fever in wild boar in infected area and buffer zone developed on the basis of Article 16 of the Council Directive 
2002/60/EC. Ref. Areas (2015) 1284836 – 24/03/2015  (Exhibit RUS-149). WT/DS475/R  
 
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  Category of information  Information already provided  Additional information  
Detailed information 
regarding 
monitoring/surveill ance of 
wild boars in each EU 
member State  Through the letter of 7 February 
2014, the 2013 ASF control and 
surveillance programmes of Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland  was 
provided.  
Through the letter of 21 May 2014, 
the 2014 ASF control and 
surveill ance programmes of Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland  were 
provided.  Provided website links to DG SANTE's 
dedicated webpage with the most 
updated data from the Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. The 
European Union observes that such 
information is  permanently available 
and regularly updated.  
Characteristics of the 
population of wild boars in 
each EU member state, 
including detailed data on the 
density of the wild boar 
population in each region of 
each EU member country.  Through the letter of 21 M ay 2014, 
data on the estimated wild boar 
population in Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, and Poland was provided.  
Through the letter of 6 March 2014, 
a map based on an FAO study (with 
data from various statistical sources 
from the years 2005 -2011) and 
indicatin g the estimated densities of 
wild boar population in the European 
Union by region was provided.  Explained that a lot of scientific 
information was made available on 
the GF -TADS website after the 
discussion of the meeting of the 
Standing Group of Experts o n ASF in 
the Baltic and Eastern Europe region 
held on 1 -2 December 2014 in Minsk 
(provided the website link where that 
information is available).  
Data regarding the role of 
wild boars in the spread of 
ASF in EU member States, 
including evidence regarding  
the functional isolation, 
migration, and seasonal 
movements of sub -
populations of wild boars 
between different EU member 
States.  Through the letter of 7 February 
2014, the 2010 EFSA scientific 
opinion on ASF was provided 
(provided the website link where t hat 
information is available).  
Through the letter of 13 June 2014, 
the 2014 EFSA scientific opinion on 
ASF was provided (provided the 
website link where that information is 
available).  Explained that in addition to the 
information provided before, 
extens ive and didactic discussions 
were held on this matter at the GF -
TAD meeting on 1 -2 December 2014 
in Minsk (which would be available in 
the website link provided in that 
letter).  
Detailed information 
regarding the measures taken 
by each EU member State to  
prevent the trans -boundary 
spread of ASF in the 
European Union. For each 
measure, provide data 
demonstrating its 
effectiveness and explain the 
steps officials are taking to 
actively enforce this measure.  Through the letter of 7 February 
2014, Council Dire ctive 2002/60/EC, 
laying down specific provisions for 
the control of ASF, was provided.  
Through the letters of 6 and 13 
March 2014, the "Working Document 
on the EU preventive measures on 
ASF" was provided.  
 Explained that in addition, 
Commission Implemen ting Decision 
2014/709/EU of 9 October 2014 
concerning animal health control 
measures relating to ASF in certain 
EU member States and repealing 
Implementing Decision 
2014/178/EU, provides for detailed 
rules on prohibitions and other 
restrictions to avoid l ocal and trans 
boundary spread of the disease.  
Detailed information 
regarding the measures taken 
by each EU member State to 
prevent the trans -boundary 
spread of ASF through the 
movement of wild boars in 
the EU. For each measure, 
provide data demonstrating  
its effectiveness and explain 
the steps officials are taking 
to actively enforce this 
measure.  Explained that the measures to 
prevent ASF spread are laid down in 
a comprehensive set of legislation 
based on Council Directive 
2002/60/EC and the rest of the EU's 
veterinary legislation.  
Through the letter of 7 February 
2014, Council Directive 2002/60/EC, 
laying down specific provisions for 
the control of ASF, was provided.  Explained that in addition, when wild 
boar is involved in the epidemiology 
of ASF, speci fic targeted measures 
are specified in national eradication 
plans.  
Provided a copy of Lithuania's and 
Poland's eradication plans approved 
by Commission Implementing 
Decision 2014/442/EC (provided the 
website link where that information 
is available).  
Explained that The eradication plan 
of Estonia and Latvia were revised in 
line with the Minsk GF -TAD 
recommendations and the draft 
Decision approving those plans was 
voted at the Standing Committee on 
Plants, Animals Food and Feed on 5 
March 15; and that it wo uld be 
expected to be adopted in the 
coming weeks (provided the website 
link to the GF -TAD 
recommendations).  
Provided a copy of report of the 
European Union's veterinary 
emergency team (CVET) mission that 
took place in Vilnius on 8 -10 October WT/DS475/R  
 
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  Category of information  Information already provided  Additional information  
2014.  
Detai led information on 
measures intended to prevent 
the spread of ASF to/from 
small and average -sized 
farms and farms/facilities 
with low level protection 
(e.g., premises where pigs 
are not indoors) in each EU 
member State. For each 
measure, provide data 
demon strating its 
effectiveness and explain the 
steps officials are taking to 
actively enforce this measure.  Through the letter of 7 February 
2014, Council Directive 2002/60/EC, 
the cornerstone of ASF legislation, 
was provided. Explained that these 
rules apply across the European 
Union, regardless of the size of the 
holdings.  Explained that In addition to the 
control measures, preventive actions 
have also been taken voluntarily by 
some EU member States. These 
actions have been co -financed by the 
European Union as described in 
Commission Implementing Decision 
2014/236/EU of 24 April 2014 
concerning a Union financial 
contribution towards surveillance and 
other emergency measures 
implemented in Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, and Poland  against ASF 
(provided the websit e link where that 
information is available).  
In addition provided information 
presented by Latvia and Lithuania in 
the Standing Committee meeting of 
November 2014.  
Regarding Latvia, pig farmers who 
cannot implement biosecurity 
requirements, must slaughter  pigs 
under official control - there were 
3600 pigs slaughtered under this 
program and 1501 pig keepers within 
the restricted areas have been 
compensated since July 2014 
(provided the website link where that 
information is available).  
Regarding Lithuania, by 15 of 
December 2014, in the Part III area 
of the Commission Implementing 
Decision 2014/709/EU, all pigs in 
holdings with low biosecurity 
measures will be early slaughtered 
after ASF tests (provided the website 
link where that information is 
available).  
Manner in which each EU 
member State controls and 
monitors the movement of 
foreign hunters and the 
hunting of wild boars by 
foreign hunters. Provide data 
on the movements of foreign 
hunters between different 
ASF risk zones in the EU.  Through the letter of  21 May, 
information on foreign hunters was 
provided.  Explained that the free movement of 
persons is a fundamental European 
Union's principle enshrined in Article 
45 of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union. As explained 
during the consultat ion meeting held 
on 30 April -1 May 2014 in Geneva, 
no differentiation is made between 
national and foreign hunters 
(provided the website link where that 
information is available).  
Detailed information 
regarding the measures taken 
by each EU member State to 
prevent the trans -boundary 
spread of ASF through the 
movement of foreign hunters 
and hunting -related carcasses 
and trophies in the European 
Union. For each measure, 
provide data demonstrating 
its effectiveness and explain 
the steps officials are taking 
to actively enforce this 
measure.  Through the letter of 21 May, 
information on foreign hunters was 
provided.  Explained that the free movement of 
persons is a fundamental European 
Union's principle enshrined in Article 
45 of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union. As explained 
during the consultation meeting held 
on 30 April -1 May 2014 in Geneva, 
no differentiation is made between 
national and foreign hunters 
(provided the website link where that 
information is available).  
Further explained that  preventive 
measures to avoid ASF spread by 
commodities such as trophies carried 
by hunters are laid down in Council 
Directive 2002/60/EC in particular in 
point 2(c) of Article 15.  
Data regarding the role of 
ticks in the spread of ASF in Explained that the role of vectors 
(ticks) has been explained by EFSA Explained that EFSA has stated that 
"Ticks do not, play an active role in WT/DS475/R  
 
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  Category of information  Information already provided  Additional information  
EU member states,  including 
data regarding their 
distribution and host 
preferences.  in its scientific opinions on ASF of 
2010 (provided through the letter of 
7 February 2014) and of 2014 
(provided throug h the letter of 13 
June 2014).  
Indicated that additional information 
was also provided with the letter of 
13 June 2014.  the geographical spread of the virus. 
Wild boar have never bee n found 
infested because they do not rest 
inside burrows potentially infested by 
ticks."  
Further indicated that in the four 
affected EU member States, soft 
ticks have never been mentioned in 
relation with ASF. No evidence has 
been found so far that they, i f they 
exist, play a role in ASF 
epidemiology. Their 
existence/distribution in those EU 
member States is not documented.  
Also noted with importance that the 
role of the Ornithodoros spp. ticks as 
vectors in the epidemiology of ASF, 
relates to the persisten ce of the 
disease in infected premises after 
stamping -out and repopulation. The 
ticks have no role regarding the 
geographical spread of the disease 
and therefore such information is not 
relevant for the acceptance of  
regionalization . 
Detailed information  
regarding the measures taken 
by each EU member State to 
prevent the trans -boundary 
spread of ASF through ticks in 
the European Union. For each 
measure, provide data 
demonstrating its 
effectiveness and explain the 
steps officials are taking to 
actively enf orce this measure.  Provided the same explanation and 
references as indicated in the 
previous point.  Provided the same explanation as 
indicated in the previous point.  
Detailed information 
regarding the measures taken 
by each EU member state to 
control an d monitor the raw 
materials (e.g. animals for 
slaughterhouses, carcasses 
for meat production plants) 
used by companies that 
supply live swine and pork 
products to Russia. Provide 
evidence that these raw 
materials are not sourced 
from ASF infected/high risk  
zones.  Through the letter of 7 February 
2014, Council Directive 2002/60/EC, 
the cornerstone of ASF legislation, 
was provided.  
Explained that additional detailed 
information had already been 
provided about relevant European 
Union measures through the lette rs 
of 13 March and 21 May 2014.  
Observed that it has been stated that 
from the defined areas, as listed in 
the annex to the European Union 
decision establishing  regionalization , 
no establishment is allowed to supply 
pig meat or pig meat products to 
establ ishments authorised to export 
to Russia.  Explained that Commission 
Implementing Decision 2014/709/EU 
of 9 October 2014 concerning animal 
health control measures relating to 
ASF in certain EU member States 
provides for detailed rules (provided 
the website l ink where that 
information is available).  
Indicated that further information on 
implementation of ASF control 
measures may be found in the most 
recent audit reports of the FVO 
(provided the website link where the 
audit reports for Latvia, Lithuania 
and Pol and are available, and 
explained that FVO audit in Estonia 
took place on 2 -6 March 2015).  
Information regarding 
whether companies in the 
European Union that supply 
live swine and pork products 
to Russia revised their raw 
material sourcing plans as a 
result of the changed 
epizootic situation in the 
European Union.  Provided the same explanation as 
indicated in the previous point.  Provided the same explanation as 
indicated in the previous point.  
Justification for the criteria 
used to identify borders of 
ASF infected / free / high risk 
zones. Explain whether this 
criteria should be applied to 
other EU member States.  Indicated that information had 
already been provided through the 
letter of 13 June 2014.  Explained that as already stated, the 
European Union's  regionalization  is 
based on the criteria laid down in 
point 3.(b) and(c) of Article 16 of 
Council Directive 2002/60/EC, which 
is applied across the European 
Union. When defining an infected WT/DS475/R  
 
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  Category of information  Information already provided  Additional information  
area, the existence of major natural 
or artificial obstacles is t aken into 
account as in the particular case of 
Lithuania and Estonia where a lake 
or river was considered as natural 
obstacles.  
Examples are:  
for Estonia: Võrtsjärv lake  
for Latvia: Daugava river  
Please explain what 
regulations and research 
findings under lie principles of 
ASF zoning in EU member 
States  Through the letter of 7 February 
2014, Council Directive 2002/60/EC, 
the cornerstone of ASF legislation, 
was provided.  
Explained that additional information 
had already been provided through 
the letter of 13  June 2014.  Explained that the European Union's  
regionalization  measures are in line 
with Chapter 4.3 of the Terrestrial 
Code (zoning and 
compartmental ization ), and are also 
in line with Article 6 of the WTO SPS 
Agreement.  
In addition, Commission 
Implemen ting Decision 2014/709/EU 
of 9 October 2014 concerning animal 
health control measures relating to 
ASF in certain EU member States 
provides for detailed rules (provided 
the website link where that 
information is available).  
Detailed information 
regarding t he measures taken 
by each EU member State to 
stamp out ASF, including 
evidence of its effectiveness, 
staff enforcing this measure, 
budget for enforcement, 
number of inspection 
personnel, reports of 
successful elimination of ASF, 
and plans to increase 
resou rces dedicated to 
enforcement. For each EU 
member state that has not 
taken measures to stamp out 
ASF, explain whether these 
EU member states have 
prepared plans to stamp out 
ASF and provide us with all 
such plans.   Indicated that information on 
implementat ion of specific ASF 
control measures may be found in 
the most recent audit reports of the 
FVO (provided the website link where 
the audit reports for Latvia, Lithuania 
and Poland are available, and 
explained that FVO audit in Estonia 
took place on 2 -6 March  2015).  
Detailed information on the 
measures taken by each EU 
member State to prevent the 
spread of ASF through the 
slaughter of ASF -infected 
swine. For each measure, 
provide data demonstrating 
its effectiveness and explain 
the steps officials are taking 
to actively enforce this 
measure.  Referred to the provisions in Articles 
5 (point 1, letters a, c and d), 10, 
11, and 14 of Directive 2002/60/EC.  
Indicated that as an additional layer 
of protection, Commission 
Implementing Decision 2014/709 
contains furth er provisions.  Indicated that information on 
implementation of ASF control 
measures may be found in the audit 
reports of the FVO (provided the 
website link where the audit reports 
for Latvia, Lithuania and Poland are 
available, and explained that FVO 
audit in Estonia took place on 2 -6 
March 2015).  
Detailed information 
regarding the measures taken 
by each EU member State to 
prevent the spread of ASF 
through the improper 
destruction/disposal of 
carcasses of ASF -infected 
swine. For each measure, 
provide data demonstrating 
its effectiveness and explain 
the steps officials are taking 
to actively enforce this 
measure.  Provided the same explanation as 
indicated in the previous point.  Provided the same explanation as 
indicated in the previous point.  
Detailed inf ormation on the Referred to the provisions in Articles Explained that, furthermore, some  of WT/DS475/R  
 
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  Category of information  Information already provided  Additional information  
procedures each EU member 
State has in place to control 
and monitor the burial sites of 
ASF infected swine. Explain 
the steps officials are taking 
to ensure that these 
procedures are followed.  5 (point  1, letters a, c and d), 10, 
11, and 14 of Directive 2002/60/EC.  
Indicated that as an additional layer 
of protection, Commission 
Implementing Decision 2014/709 
contains further provisions.  
Further explained that in addition, 
detailed rules apply to the di sposal of 
carcasses by burial in Commission 
Regulation (EU) No 142/2011 of 25 
February 2011 implementing 
Regulation (EC) No 1069/2009 of the 
European Parliament and of the 
Council laying down health rules as 
regards animal by -products and 
derived products not intended for 
human consumption and 
implementing Council Directive 
97/78/EC as regards certain samples 
and items exempt from veterinary 
checks at the border under that 
Directive (provided the website link 
where that information is available).  
The carcas ses of pigs, which have 
been compulsorily killed due to an 
infectious virus disease, must be 
disposed under official supervision 
and in a manner, which avoids any 
risk of spread of the virus causing 
the disease.  
Destruction of such carcasses should 
normall y be carried out in a 
rendering facility approved for the 
purpose by the official veterinary 
service. Under certain circumstances 
the competent authority may 
consider burial as an alternative 
method of carcass destruction.  the contingency plans prepared by 
EU member States provide for 
further national rules. As an 
example, such measures may be as 
follows:  
The dimensions of a burial pit shall 
be large enough for 60 adult pig 
carcasses with a 2 meter cover 
(length 6 m; wid th 3 m; depth 4 m);  
It is recommended that animals are 
only placed in 2 layers;  
To prevent carcasses in a burial pit 
from rising to the surface, the 
abdomen should be cut open before 
burial to allow gases to escape from 
the alimentary tract and the 
abdomen  cavity.  
Detailed information 
regarding the procedures 
each EU member state has in 
place concerning the cleaning 
and disinfecting of premises 
on which ASF -infected swine 
were located. Explain the 
steps officials are taking to 
ensure that these procedures 
are followed.  Explained that detailed rules can be 
found in point 1 (g) of Article 5, point 
2. (c) of Article 14 and Annex II of 
Directive 2002/60/EC.   
Data regarding the role of the 
following factors in the spread 
of ASF in EU member States: 
frozen meat;  chilled meat; 
skin fat; vehicles used to 
transport ASF infected 
swine/products; smoked 
meat; dried meat; fermented 
meat; vehicles driven through 
ASF infected areas; people 
involved in pig keeping ; 
slurry; animal feed: litter; 
fomites; vegetables; crops; 
pests (e.g., rodents); pets; 
hay and straw; and insects.  Referred for detailed information to 
the EFSA scientific opinions on ASF of 
2010 (provided through the letter of 
7 February 2014) and of 2014 
(provided through the letter of 13 
June 2014) (provided th e website 
links where both reports are 
available).  
 Referred to pages 36 -40 of the 2010 
EFSA scientific opinion.  
Detailed information 
regarding the measures taken 
by each EU member State to 
prevent the trans -boundary 
spread of ASF in the 
European Union through the Indicated that a full package of 
information on preventive 
(survei llance) and control 
(eradication) measures has already 
been provided in all letters referred 
above.  Explained that information on 
implementation of ASF control 
measures may be found in the audit 
reports of the FVO (provided the 
website link where the audit  reports 
for Latvia, Lithuania and Poland are WT/DS475/R  
 
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  Category of information  Information already provided  Additional information  
factors listed in the previous 
point. For each measure, 
provide data demonstrating 
its effectiveness and explain 
the steps officials are taking 
to actively enforce this 
measure.  available, and explained that FVO 
audit in Estonia took place on 2 -6 
March 2015).  
Data on measures being 
taken/ taken for prevention of 
ASF introduction in the 
industrial pig farms/ backyard 
pig farms/ wild po pulation, on 
measures being taken/ taken 
in the EU member states 
(checkpoints/ BIPs) as well as 
information describing 
procedure of veterinary and 
sanitary inspection and pre - 
export certification at all 
stages along the whole 
production chain.   Explained that due to the perceived 
threat of the spread of ASF from 
countries neighbouring the European 
Union in the East, audits by the FVO 
to evaluate the implementation of 
border controls against ASF started 
already in 2013 and continued during 
2014 (provided th e website link 
where the audit reports for Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland  are 
available).  
Furthermore, detailed rules can be 
found in Regulation (EC) No 
882/2004 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 29 
April 2004 on official controls 
performed to ensure the verification 
of compliance with feed and food 
law, animal health and animal 
welfare rules (provide the website 
link where such information is 
available).  
Further explained that EU member 
States affected by ASF regularly 
report to the  Standing Committee 
about the outcome of reinforced 
controls that they perform on 
imported commodities. The results 
show that due to the increased 
controls the number of findings has 
dropped.  
The rules to be observed with regard 
to certification are laid d own Council 
Directive 96/93/EC on the 
certification of animals and animal 
products (provided the website link 
where such information is available).  
Invited to see the links to the 
presentations that Latvia and 
Lithuania made at the Standing 
Committee in N ovember 2014. In 
respect of Latvia, highlights that 
there was strengthened control of 
personal luggage; and random 
sampling from confiscated products 
of animal origin (out of 20 samples 3 
have been found positive for ASF 
genome) (provided the website links  
where such information is available).  
Explained that according to the 
Memorandum of Understanding of 
2004, pre - export certificates should 
be issued only for animals or animal 
products moving between two or 
more EU member States where the 
animals or the p roducts are destined 
for products intended for exports to 
Russia and where the pre -export 
certificate is necessary to ensure that 
the final product meets the Russian 
import conditions. Requirements of 
Council Directive 96/93/EC on WT/DS475/R  
 
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  Category of information  Information already provided  Additional information  
veterinary certification are 
applicable.  
Data on small farms (pig 
population under 200 
animals) in ASF infected/ high 
risk zones, regarding: the 
animal health status of these 
farms and the biosecurity 
measures taken there 
(feasibility of free range, feed 
supply, procedure of new -
coming animal introduction in 
the herd).   Explained that this issue has already 
been discussed on previous 
occasions and it was the main 
subject of the GF -TADS meeting in 
Tallinn held on 11 - 12 February 2015 
(provided the website link where 
such informatio n is available).  
Map location of plants 
approved for exportation of 
live pigs and pork products 
into the RF along with 
indication of sources of raw 
materials.   Explained that all farms in the 
European Union, except those in the 
infected areas, are approve d for 
exportation to Russia.  
As far as food producing 
establishments are concerned, the 
list of approved establishments is 
established and maintained by 
Russia, not by the European Union.  
Description of measures being 
taken/ taken for movement 
control of live animals and 
pork products, aspects of 
traceability of feed, 
equipment and tools 
(including used ones), 
approaches to passive/ active 
surveillance of susceptible 
animal populations   Noted that this question is rather 
general therefore the entire 
Europe an Union's veterinary acquis  
could be cited by way of an answer.  
Explained that the basic European 
Union legislation is: Council Directive 
of 26 June 1964 on animal health 
problems affecting intra -Community 
trade in bovine animals and swine 
(64/432/EEC) (p rovided the website 
link where such information is 
available).  
Information regarding the 
procedure for ASF differential 
diagnosis in case of 
salmonellosis, erysipelas, 
classical swine fever and 
Aujeszky'; including statistical 
data (number of disease 
suspects/ confirmed cases).   Explained that the relevant European 
Union legislation is: Commission 
Decision 2003/422/EC of 26 May 
2003 approving an African swine 
fever diagnostic manual (provided 
the website link where such 
information is available).  
Contact details of the 
competent authority in the EU 
member responsible for 
establishment of zones with 
different ASF status (for each 
country)   Explained that the information 
regarding European Union delegates 
can be consulted in the OIE webpage 
(provided the web site link where 
such information is available).  
Indication of whether 
evaluation of performance of 
veterinary service (PVS) was 
done (including human, 
technical, financial and other 
resources) in the EU member 
States including evaluation of 
the competent authority 
responsible for establishment 
of zones with different ASF 
status for each country.   Explained that the Competent 
Authorities of the EU member States 
are regularly audited by the Food 
and Veterinary Office (FVO) of the 
Commission's Health and Food  
Safety Directorate General to ensure 
that European Union legislation in 
areas such as food safety, animal 
health and animal welfare is properly 
implemented and enforced. It 
considers risk and trade factors, plus 
the status of legislation, to prioritise 
visits. The reports of the FVO, 
including the country profiles of 
Member States, are publicly available 
on the Commission's website 
(provided the website link where 
such information is available).  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  Category of information  Information already provided  Additional information  
Indication of What criteria/ 
factors are used to evaluate 
PVS in the EU member States 
and their equivalence with the 
OIE recommended criteria for 
evaluation of performance of 
veterinary services (OIE PVS 
Tool).   Explained that the OIE PVS tool is a 
voluntary instrument offered by the 
OIE to those member countries 
wishing to engage in the OIE PVS 
pathway. EU member States have 
not requested OIE PVS evaluations 
from the OIE (with the exception of 
Bulgaria and Romania before joining 
the European Union), which to a 
certain extent would duplicate or 
overlap the activitie s of the FVO 
described above. However, some EU 
Member States have performed pilot 
PVS self -evaluations using the OIE 
PVS tool.  
Information regarding ASF 
Emergency plans including 
data on staff number and 
logistics.   Referred to the comments provided 
in the first point of the table.  
 
9.62.  On 10 April 2015, FSVPS sent a letter to DG SANTE referring to the ASF situation in the 
European Union. The letter referred to the inefficiency of the measures in place in the European 
Union and to the problems of proper noti fication to the OIE by authorities in Estonia. The letter 
also noted that Russia only received the letter dated 21 May 2014, in January 2015. In respect of 
this letter, FSVPS observed that it did not contain the requested information on the results of 
active surveillance in EU member States that border the EU member States affected with ASF. The 
letter also underlined that some of the information attached to the letter of 21 May 2014 was in 
the national language, which made its analysis more complicated.1898 
9.63.   On 16 June 2015, DG SANTE sent a letter to FSVPS in response to an information request 
from FSVPS. The letter referred to an information request regarding ASF surveillance results in the 
EU member States bordering ASF -affected EU member States. In that res pect, DG SANTE 
indicated that such information is not "relevant to the acceptance of regionalisation", in particular, 
taking into account the distance of the territories of those EU member States from the affected 
area and the favourable results of intensi ve surveillance in the ASF -free areas of the four affected 
EU member States. The letter explained that the latter information including regular updates, as 
presented at the meetings of the Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed, is 
publicly a vailable (provided the website link where such information is available). The letter also 
provided a copy of the English translations of the contingency plans of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
and Poland.1899  
                                               
1898 Letter from the Russian Veterinary Service, FS -NV-8/5906, 10 April 2015  (Exhibit RUS -329). 
1899 Letter f rom the European Union Veterinary Service to the Russian Federation Veterinary Service, 
Ref. Ares (2015)2518258. 16 January 2015.  (Exhibit RUS -319). In response to Panel question No. 321, para. 
177, the European Union confirmed that those contingency plans  correspond to Exhibits EU -74, EU -75, EU -76 
and EU -77. WT/DS475/R  
 
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  10  APPENDIX 2 DESCRIPTI ON OF COUNCIL DIRECT IVE 2002/60/ EC 
10.1.  Council Directive 2002/60/EC1900 lays down specific provisions for the control of ASF. This 
Directive provides a series of surveillance and control mechanisms that EU member States' 
veterinary authorities have to put in place in respect of ASF.  
10.2.  The survei llance mechanism set up in Article 3 of Council Directive 2002/60/EC provides 
that EU member States shall ensure that the presence or the suspected presence of ASF is 
compulsorily and immediately notifiable to the competent authority. Furthermore, this pro vision 
indicates that an EU member State in whose territory ASF has been confirmed shall  (i) give 
notification of the disease and provide to the Commission and other EU member States on1901: 
confirmed outbreaks of ASF in holdings; confirmed cases of ASF in sl aughter houses or in means of 
transport; confirmed primary cases of ASF in feral pigs; and results of epidemiological enquiry; 
and (ii) provide information to the Commission and other EU member States on further cases 
confirmed in feral pigs in an ASF infe cted area.  
10.3.  Article 4 of Council Directive 2002/60/EC foresees a detailed list of measures that EU 
member States shall adopt in cases where the presence of ASF on a holding is suspected. These 
measures include (1) ensuring the competent authorities immedia tely set in motion official means 
of investigation to confirm or rule out the presence of ASF, including a verification of the register 
of the pig identification marks; (2) when the competent authority considers that the presence of 
ASF in a holding cannot  be ruled out, it shall have the holding placed under official surveillance and 
shall order that: all pigs on the holding are counted and a list of the number of pigs already sick, 
dead or likely to be infected is compiled and updated; all pigs on the hold ing are restricted to their 
living quarters of confined in a place where they can be isolated; no pigs can enter or leave the 
holding (such ban on leaving the holding may be extended to other species of animals and 
destruction of rodents or insects may be required); no pig carcasses may leave the holding without 
an author ization  issued by the competent authority; certain products, feed, materials and waste 
likely to transmit ASF may not leave the holding without an author ization  issued by the competent 
authority, and meat, pig products, semen, ova or embryos shall not be moved from the holding for 
intra-Community trade; movement of persons to or from the holding shall be subject to written 
authorization by the competent authority; appropriate means of disinf ection shall be applied; and, 
an epidemiological enquiry shall be carried out; (3) where required by the epidemiological 
situation, the competent authority: may apply the measures mandated in cases where ASF on a 
holding is confirmed, including a limited a pplication of those measures to the pigs suspected of 
being infected or contaminated with ASFV, provided certain conditions are met; may establish a 
temporary control zone around the holding where the suspicion of contamination exists, in which 
some or all  of the previous measures shall be applied; and (4) once adopted, the previous 
measures shall not be lifted until the presence of ASF has been officially ruled out.  
10.4.  Measures that EU member States shall adopt in cases where the presence of ASF on a 
holding  is confirmed are provided in Article 5 of Council Directive 2002/60/EC. These measures 
include, in addition to the ones described in numeral (2) in the previous paragraph: killing all pigs 
in the holding without delay under official supervision in such a way as to avoid the risk of ASF 
spreading during transport or killing; taking of a sufficient number of samples from the pigs when 
they are killed in order to that the manner of introduction of ASFV into the holding and the length 
of time during which it m ay have existed on the holding before the disease was notified may be 
established; processing of carcases of pigs that have died or have been killed under official 
supervision; wherever possible tracing and processing under official supervision of the meat  of pigs 
slaughtered during the period between the probable introduction of ASF into the holding and the 
taking of official measures  ; tracing and destruction under official supervision, in such a way 
as to avoid the risk of ASFV spreading, of semen, ova o r embryos of pigs collected from the 
holding during the period between the probable introduction of ASF into the holding and the taking 
of official measures; carrying out in accordance with the instructions of the official veterinarian 
processing of all su bstances and waste likely to be contaminated (such as feedingstuffs) and 
destruction of all materials for single use which may be contaminated (particularly those used for 
                                               
1900 Council Directive  of 27 June 2002, 2002/60/EC   (Exhibit EU -31). 
1901 Such information shall be provided in accordance with Annex I of Council Directive 2002/60/EC, 
which includes a detailed list of the information that an EU member State should provide to the Commission 
and to other EU member States upon confirmation of ASF. ( Exhibit EU -31).   WT/DS475/R  
 
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  the killing operations); after the pigs have been eliminated, cleaning, and if neces sary, disinfecting 
buildings used for housing the pigs, vehicles used to transport them or their carcasses and the 
equipment, bedding, manure and slurry likely to be contaminated; in the case of a primary 
outbreak of disease1902, subjecting the ASFV isolate t o the laboratory procedure to identify the 
genetic type; and carrying out an epidemiological enquiry. Article 5 further provides that the 
Commission shall immediately review the situation with the EU member State concerned in the 
Standing Veterinary Commit tee (SVC) at the earliest possible opportunity, and that if necessary, 
additional measures to prevent the spread of ASF shall be adopted.  
10.5.  Article 6 of Council Directive 2002/60/EC provides for special rules applicable to holdings 
consisting of various prod uctions units. These rules include possible derogations, as regards 
healthy pig population, from the measures provided in Articles 4 and 5 when the official 
veterinarian confirms that the structure, size and distance apart of these production units and the  
operations carried out there are such that the production units provides completely separate 
facilities for housing, keeping and feeding, so that ASFV cannot spread from one production unit to 
another. Furthermore, Article 7 provides specific rules for me asures in contact holdings, which are 
those where the official veterinarian finds, or considers on the basis of an epidemiological enquiry, 
that ASF may have been introduced from other holdings.  
10.6.  The conditions for undertaking an epidemiological inquiry in  relation to suspected cases or 
outbreaks of ASF are laid out in Article 8 of Council Directive 2002/60/EC. Such enquiry is carried 
out on the basis of questionnaires prepared within the framework of contingency plans. The 
enquiry shall deal at least with:  (a) length of time during which ASFV may have existed on the 
holding before the disease was notified or suspected; (b) possible origin of ASF on the holding and 
the identification of other holdings in which pigs may have become infected or contaminated fr om 
the same source; (c) movement of persons, vehicles, pigs, carcases, semen, meat or any material 
which could have carried ASFV to or from the holdings in question; and (d) the possibility that 
vectors of feral pigs cause the disease to spread. Article 8 also provides that if the results of this 
inquiry suggest that ASF may have spread from or to holdings located in other EU member States, 
the Commission and the Member States concerned shall be immediately informed.  
10.7.  Following the official confirmation of A SF diagnosis in pigs on a holding, Article 9 of Council 
Directive 2002/60/EC mandates the competent authority to establish a protection zone with a 
radius of at least three kilometres around the outbreak site, and a surveillance zone, which shall 
include t he protection of zone, of a radius of at least 10 kilometres. Article 9(2) provides that when 
establishing these zones, the competent authority must take account of: (a) the results of the 
epidemiological enquiry; (b) the geographical situation, particular ly natural or artificial boundaries; 
(c) the location and proximity of holdings; (d) patterns of movements and trade in pigs and the 
availability of slaughterhouses and facilities for processing carcases; and (e) the facilities and 
personnel available to c ontrol any movement of pigs within the zones, in particular if the pigs to be 
killed have to be moved away from their holding of origin. Article 9(3) provides that when a zone 
includes parts of the territory of several EU member States, the competent autho rities of the EU 
member States concerned shall collaborate to establish the zone. Lastly, Article 9(4) provides that 
the competent authority shall take all necessary measures, including the use of prominent signs 
and warning notices and the use of media re sources, such as the press and television, to ensure 
that all persons in the protection and surveillance zones are fully aware of the restrictions in force 
in accordance with Articles 10 and 11, and shall take such measures as it considers appropriate to 
ensure the adequate enforcement of these measures.  
10.8.  The measures that EU member States shall ensure are applied within a protection zone are 
contemplated in Article 10 of Council Directive 2002/60/EC. These measures include: (a) carrying 
out a census of all holdings as soon as possible; after the establishment of the protection zone, 
undertaking visits to the holdings by an official veterinarian, within not more than seven days, in 
                                               
1902 The term primary outbreak is defined for the purposes of Council Directive 2002/60/EC, as the 
outbreak within the meaning of Article 2(d) of Council Directive 82/894/EEC of 21 December 1982 on the 
notification of animal diseases within the Community (Article 2(h) of Council Directive 2002/60/EC ( Exhibit EU -
31)). Article 2(d) of Council Directive 8 2/894/ECC provide s: 'primary outbreak' means an outbrake [sic] not  
epizootiologically linked with a previous outbreak in the same region of a Member State as defined in Article 2 
of Directive 64/432/EEC or the first outbreak in a different region of the same Member State. (available at: 
http://eur -lex.europa.eu/legal -content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:31982L0894&from=en , last visited on 
5 January 2016).  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  order to conduct a clinical examination of the pigs and to check the register and pig identification 
marks; (b) prohibiting the movement and transport of pigs on public or private roads, excluding 
when necessary the service roads of holdings, unless approved by the competent authority when 
allowing the movements referred to in point  (f) below1903; (c) cleaning, disinfection, and if 
necessary, disinsectication and treatment, as soon as possible after contamination, of trucks and 
other vehicles and equipment used to transport pigs or other livestock or material which may be 
contaminated; and prohibiting trucks or vehicles which have been used for the transport of pigs to 
leave the zone without being cleaned and disinfected and then inspected and re -authorised for 
transport by competent authority; (d) prohibiting that other domestic animals  enter or leave a 
holding without the author ization  of the competent authority; (e) immediately notifying all dead or 
diseased pigs on a holding to the competent authority, which shall carry out the appropriate 
investigations; (f) prohibiting removing pigs  from the holding in which they are kept for at least 40 
days1904 after the completion of the preliminary cleansing and disinfection, and if necessary, 
desinsectication of the infected holdings; following those 40 days1905, subject to certain conditions 
(laid ou t in Article 10(3)), the competent authority may authorize the removal of pigs from the 
said holding to be directly transported to specific sites1906; (g) prohibiting that semen, ova or 
embryos of pigs leave from the holdings situated in the zone; and (h) ens uring that any person 
entering or leaving pig holdings complies with appropriate hygiene measures as necessary to 
reduce the risk of ASFV spreading. Article 10(2) provides specific conditions, where the described 
measures are maintained beyond 40 days,1907 when the competent authority may authorize the 
removal of pigs from a holding within the protection zone, to be directly transported to specific 
sites.  
10.9.  Article 10(3) provides the conditions under which the competent authority may authorise 
the removal of pi gs from the holding concerned. Article 10(4) mandates that these measures shall 
continue to be applied at least until: cleansing, disinfection and, if necessary, disinsect ization  in 
the infected holdings have been carried out; and pigs on all holdings have  undergone clinical and 
laboratory examinations (which shall not take place until 45 days1908 have elapsed since the 
completion of the preliminary cleansing) carried out in accordance with the diagnostic manual in 
order to detect the possible presence of ASF.  
10.10.   Article 11 of Council Directive 2002/60/EC provides the measures applicable within the 
surveillance zones. These measures include: (a) carrying out a census of all holdings; 
(b) prohibiting the movement and transport of pigs on public or private roads, ex cluding when 
necessary the service roads of holdings, unless approved by the competent authority;1909; 
(c) cleaning, disinfection, and if necessary, disinsectication and treatment, as soon as possible 
after contamination, of trucks and other vehicles and equi pment used to transport pigs or other 
livestock or material which may be contaminated; and prohibiting trucks or vehicles which have 
been used for the transport of pigs to leave the zone without being cleaned and disinfected; 
                                               
1903 This prohibition does not ex tend to transit of pigs by road or rail without unloading or stopping; and 
derogations may be granted for slaughter pigs coming from outside the protection zone and on their way to a 
slaughterhouse situated in the said zone for immediate slaughter. Article  10.1.(b).  
1904 This period may be reduced to 30 days if, in accordance with the diagnostic manual, the EU member 
States have applied an intensive sampling and testing programme making it possible to rule out the presence 
of ASF on the holding in question (Ar ticle 10(5) of Council Directive 2002/60/EC).  
1905 This period may be reduced to 30 days if, in accordance with the diagnostic manual, the EU member 
States have applied an intensive sampling and testing programme making it possible to rule out the presence 
of ASF on the holding in question (Article 10(5) of Council Directive 2002/60/EC).  
1906 Those sites are: (i) a slaughterhouse designated by the competent authority, preferably within the 
protection or surveillance zone for the purpose of immediate slaughter; (i i) a processing plant or a suitable 
place where the pigs are immediately killed and their carcases are processed under official supervision; and 
(iii) in exceptional circumstances, to other premises located within the protection zone (EU member States 
making use of this provision shall immediately inform the Commission thereof in the SVC).  
1907 This period may be reduced to 30 days if, in accordance with the diagnostic manual, the EU member 
States have applied an intensive sampling and testing programme making  it possible to rule out the presence 
of ASF on the holding in question (Article 10(5) of Council Directive 2002/60/EC).  
1908 This period may be reduced to 30 days if, in accordance with the diagnostic manual, the EU member 
States have applied an intensive sa mpling and testing programme making it possible to rule out the presence 
of ASF on the holding in question (Article 10(5) of Council Directive 2002/60/EC).  
1909 This prohibition does not need to be applied to the transit of pigs by road or rail, without unloa ding 
or stopping, or to slaughter pigs coming from outside the surveillance zone and on their way to a 
slaughterhouse situated in the said zone for immediate slaughter. Article 11.1.(b).  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  (d) prohibiting that other dom estic animals enter or leave a holding during the first seven days 
after establishment of the zone without the author ization  of the competent authority; 
(e) immediately notifying all dead or diseased pigs on a holding to the competent authority, which 
shall carry out the appropriate investigations; (f) prohibiting removing pigs from the holding in 
which they are kept for at least 30 days1910 after the completion of the preliminary cleansing and 
disinfection, and if necessary, desinsectication of the infected h oldings; following those 
30 days1911, subject to certain conditions (laid out in Article 10(3))1912, the competent authority 
may authorize the removal of pigs from the said holding to be directly transported to specific sites ; 
(g) prohibiting that semen, ova or embryos of pigs leave from the holdings situated in the zone; 
and (h) ensuring that any person entering or leaving pig holdings complies with appropriate 
hygiene measures as necessary to reduce the risk of ASFV spreading. Article 11(2) provides 
specific co nditions, where the described measures are maintained beyond 40 days1913, when the 
competent authority may authorize the removal of pigs from a holding within the surveillance 
zone, to be directly transported to specific sites.  
10.11.   Article 11(3) mandates that the se measures shall continue to be applied at least until: 
cleansing, disinfection and, if necessary, disinsect ization  in the infected holdings have been carried 
out; and pigs on all holdings have undergone clinical and laboratory examinations (which shall n ot 
take place until 40 days1914 have elapsed since the completion of the preliminary cleansing) carried 
out in accordance with the diagnostic manual in order to detect the possible presence of ASF.  
10.12.   The measures applicable in cases where ASF is suspected or co nfirmed in a slaughter 
house or means of transport are indicated in Article 14 of Council Directive 2002/60/EC. In case of 
suspicion of ASF in a slaughter house or means of transport, the first measure that EU member 
States shall ensure is that the compete nt authority immediately sets in motion official means of 
investigation to confirm or to rule out the presence of ASF. Should a case of ASF be detected in a 
slaughter house or means of transport, the competent authority shall ensure that: (a) all 
susceptib le animals in the slaughterhouse or in the means of transport are killed without delay; 
(b) the carcases, offal and animal waste of possibly infected and contaminated animals are 
processed under official supervision; (c) cleansing, disinfection and, if nec essary, disinsect ization  
of buildings and equipment, including vehicles, takes place under the supervision of the official 
veterinarian; (d) an epidemiological inquiry is carried out; (e) the ASFV isolate is subject to the 
laboratory procedure to identify the genetic type of virus; (f) measure regarding contact holdings 
are in the holding where the infected pigs or carcases came from and in the other contact holdings 
(unless otherwise indicated by the epidemiological inquiry, the measures laid down in respe ct of 
cases where the presence of ASF on a holding is confirmed, shall be applied in the holding of origin 
of the infected pigs or carcases); and (g) no animals are reintroduced for slaughter or transport 
until at least 24 hours after completion of the cle ansing, disinfection and, if necessary, 
disinsect ization  operations.  
10.13.   Article 15 of Council Directive 2002/60/EC provides the measures applicable in cases 
where ASF is suspected or confirmed in feral pigs. According to this provision, immediately after 
the competent authority of an EU member State has information that feral pigs are suspected of 
being infected, it shall take all appropriate measures to confirm or rule out the presence of the 
disease, by giving information to the owners of pigs and to hunters , and by investigations of all 
                                               
1910 This period may be reduced to 21 days if, in accordance with the di agnostic manual, the EU member 
States have applied an intensive sampling and testing programme making it possible to rule out the presence 
of ASF on the holding in question (Article 11(4) of Council Directive 2002/60/EC).  
1911 This period may be reduced to 21  days if, in accordance with the diagnostic manual, the EU member 
States have applied an intensive sampling and testing programme making it possible to rule out the presence 
of ASF on the holding in question (Article 11(4) of Council Directive 2002/60/EC).  
1912 Article 11.1(f) also provides that "[h]owever, if the pigs are to be transported to a slaughterhouse, 
at the request of a Member State, accompanied by appropriate justification, and in accordance with the 
procedure referred to in Article 24(2), derogati ons from Article 10(3)(e) and (f), fourth indent, may be 
authorised, in particular with respect to the marking of the meat from these pigs and its subsequent use, and 
the destination of the treated products."  
1913 This period may be reduced to 30 days if, in accordance with the diagnostic manual, the EU member 
States have applied an intensive sampling and testing programme making it possible to rule out the presence 
of ASF on the holding in question (Article 11(4) of Council Directive 2002/60/EC).  
1914 This perio d may be reduced to 20 days if, in accordance with the diagnostic manual, the EU member 
States have applied an intensive sampling and testing programme making it possible to rule out the presence 
of ASF on the holding in question (Article 11(4) of Council Directive 2002/60/EC).  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  feral pigs shot or found dead, including laboratory testing. As soon as confirmation of a primary 
case of ASF in feral pigs has taken place, in order to reduce the spread of ASF, the competent 
authority of an EU member State shall immediately: (a) establish an expert group including 
veterinarians, hunters, wild life biologists and epidemiologists, that shall assist the competent 
authority in: studying the epidemiological situation and defining an infected area in accordance 
with Article  16(3)(b), establishing appropriate measures to be applied in the infected area1915, 
drawing up the eradication plan to be submitted to the Commission in accordance with Article 16, 
and carrying out checks to verify the effectiveness of the measures  adopted to eradicate ASF from 
the infected area; (b) place under official surveillance pig holdings in the defined infected area, 
and shall in particular order that: an official census be carried out of all pigs on all holdings, and be 
kept up to date by the owner (the information in the census shall be produced on request and may 
be checked at each inspection)1916; all pigs on the holding be kept in their living quarters or some 
other place where they can be isolated from feral pigs (feral pigs must not have  access to any 
material which may subsequently come in contact with the pigs on the holding); no pigs enter or 
leave the holding, except where authorised by the competent authority having regard to the 
epidemiological situation; appropriate means of disinf ection and if necessary disinsect ization  be 
used at the entrance and exits of buildings housing pigs and of the holding itself; appropriate 
hygiene measures be applied by all persons coming into contact with feral pigs, to reduce the risk 
of ASFV spreading ; all dead or diseased pigs with ASF symptoms on a holding be tested for the 
presence of ASF; no part of any feral pig, whether shot or found dead, nor any material or 
equipment which could be contaminated with ASFV, shall be brought into a pig holding; pi gs, their 
semen, embryos or ova shall not be moved from the infected area for intra -Community trade; 
(c) arrange that all feral pigs shot or found dead in the defined infected area are inspected by an 
official veterinarian and examined for ASF (and follow the applicable rules on processing of 
carcases of all animals found positive or negative); (d) ensure that the ASFV isolate is subject to 
the laboratory procedure to identify the genetic type of virus.  
10.14.   Article 15(3) further provides that if a case of ASF has occurred in feral pigs in an area of 
an EU member State close to the territory of another EU member State, the EU member States 
concerned shall collaborate in the establishment of disease control measures.  
10.15.   The regulations in respect of plans for the er adication of ASF from a feral pig population 
are contained in Article 16 of Council Directive 2002/60/EC. According to Article 16 EU member 
States shall submit the Commission within 90 days of the confirmation of the a primary case of 
ASF in feral pigs a w ritten plan of the measures taken to eradicate the disease in the area defined 
as infected, and of the measures applied on the holdings in that area. The Commission shall then 
examine the plan in order to determine whether it permits the desired objectives  to be attained. 
The plan, if necessary with amendments, shall be approved in accordance with the accelerated 
regulatory procedure contained in Article 24(2) of Council Directive 2002/60/EC. Such plan may be 
subsequently amended or supplemented to take acc ount of developments in the situation, 
including the definition of the infected area. In cases where such re -definition takes place, the 
respective EU member States shall ensure that the Commission and the other EU member States 
are informed of these amend ments without delay. If the amendments concern other provisions of 
the plan, the EU member States shall submit the amended plan to the Commission for examination 
and eventual approval in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 24(2).  
10.16.   As indica ted in Article 16(3), the eradication plan shall contain information on: (a) the 
results of the epidemiological investigations and controls carried out in accordance with Article 15 
and the geographical distribution of the disease; (b) the definition of th e infected area within the 
territory of the EU member State concerned1917; (c) the organ ization  of close cooperation between 
biologists, hunters, hunting organ ization s, the wildlife services and veterinary authorities (animal 
health and public health); (d) th e information campaign to be enforced to increase hunters' 
awareness of the measures they have to adopt in the framework of the eradication plan; 
(e) specific efforts made to determine the extent of the infection in the feral pig population, by 
                                               
1915 Such measures may include suspension of hunting and a ban on feeding feral pigs.  
1916 However, as regards open -air pig holdings, the first census carried out may be done on the basis of 
an estimate (Article 15.2(b)).  
1917 When defining t he infected area, the competent authority shall take into account: the results of the 
epidemiological investigations carried out and the geographical distribution of the disease; the feral pig 
population in the area; and the existence of major natural or a rtificial obstacles to movements of feral pigs. 
(Article 16.3.(b)).  WT/DS475/R  
 
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  investigati ng feral pigs shot by hunters or found dead, and by laboratory testing, including age -
stratified epidemiological investigations; (f) the requirements to be complied with by hunters in 
order to avoid any spread of the disease; (g) the method of removal of f eral pigs found dead or 
shot1918; (h) the epidemiological inquiry which is carried out on each1919; (i) surveillance 
programmes and prevention measures applicable to the holdings situated in the defined infected 
area, and, if necessary, in its surroundings, incl uding the transport and movement of animals 
within, from and to the area1920; (j) other criteria to be applied for lifting the measures taken; 
(k) the authority with responsibility for supervising and coordinating the departments responsible 
for implementing the plan; (l) the information system established in order that the expert group 
appointed in accordance with Article 15(2)(a) can review on a regular basis the results of the 
eradication plan; and (m) the disease monitoring measures which shall be enforced  at the earliest 
12 months after diagnosis of the last case of ASF in feral pigs in the defined infected area; these 
monitoring measures shall stay in place for at least 12 additional months and shall at least include 
the provisions already enforced in acc ordance with points (e), (g) and (h).  
10.17.   Article 16 also contemplates the obligation of the respective EU member States to transmit 
a report concerning the epidemiological situation in the defined infected area and the results of the 
eradication plan to the C ommission and to other EU member States. This report shall be 
transmitted to the Commission every six months. In addition, Council Directive 2002/60/EC 
contains provisions on: cleansing, disinfection and treatment with insecticides (Article 12); 
repopulati on of pig holdings following disease outbreaks (Article 13); measures to prevent the 
spread of ASFV by means of vectors (Article 17); diagnostic procedures and bio -safety 
requirements (Article 18); use, manufacture and sale of ASF vaccines (Article 19); co mmunity 
controls (Article 20); contingency plans (Article 21); and disease control centres and expert groups 
(Article 22).  
 
 
__________  
                                               
1918 Such method of removal shall be based on: processing under official supervision; or inspection by 
an official veterinarian and laboratory tests (Article 16.3(g)).  
1919 This inquiry must inc lude the completion of a questionnaire which supplies information about: the 
geographical area where the animal was found dead or shot; the date on which the animal was found dead or 
shot; the person who found or shot the animal; the age and sex of the pig ; if shot, symptoms before shooting; 
if found dead, the state of the carcase; and laboratory findings (Article 16.3(h)).  
1920 These measures shall at least include the ban on moving pigs, their semen, embryos or ova from 
the infected area for intra -Community trade and may include a temporary ban on pig production and on the 
establishment of new holdings (Article 16.3(i)).