G/AG/W/186  
 
19 September 2018  
(18-5793) Page: 1/3 
Committee on Agriculture  Original: English  
 
REVIEW OF BALI DECIS ION ON TRQ ADMINISTR ATION  
SUBMISSION BY AUSTRA LIA 
The following submission, dated 18 September 2018, is being circulated at the request of the 
delegation of Australia . 
 
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Australia welcomes the opportunity to make a submission as part of the review of the Understanding 
on Tariff Rate Quota Administration Provisions of Agricultural Products, as defined in Article  2 of the 
Agreement on Agriculture (WT/MIN (13)/39  - WT/L/914 ) (hereinafter known as the Bali Decision). 
This submission builds on the Cairns Group submission from 6  June 2018 (G/AG/W/179).  
 
We reiterate our commitment to ensuring this review process delivers an outcome that improves the 
operation and utility of the Bali Decision. The Bali Decision was agreed by  consensus and 
demonstrated our shared commitment to the reform process enshrined in Article  20 of the 
Agreement on Agriculture.  
 
Australia believes the reform process was developed to facilitate access to highly protected markets, 
and to help those market s adjust to open, rules -based trade. It is now almost five years since 
Members agreed on the administration provisions in Bali, but we continue to see TRQs used in ways 
not in the spirit of reform. Furthermore, we remain in an information -poor, contestable  and 
ambiguous space concerning TRQ administration and the practical utility of the Bali Decision.  
 
We consider it important to consider and resolve outstanding issues, including on clarity and 
timeliness of notifications, reasons for underfill ing of quot as, and the practical function and utility of 
the underfill  mechanism to ensure the Bali Decision achieves its objectives.  
 
We thank the Secretariat for its background paper G/AG/W/183 , which provides updated 
(at 30 July 2018) TRQ administration methods a nd fill rates for the period 2007 through 2016. This 
paper is an important transparency tool and assists all Members better understand the use of TRQs.  
1  TRANSPARENCY: CLEAR AND TIMELY NOTIFICAT IONS AND REASONS FOR  
UNDERFILLING OF QUOT AS 
1.1.  We reiterate th e importance of submitting informative notifications in a timely manner and 
urge Members with outstanding notifications to submit them as soon as possible. The submission of 
notifications is fundamental to the monitoring and applicability of the Bali Decision, and possibly 
invoking the underfill  mechanism in applicable cases.  
1.2.  All Members with a tariff quota should commit to submitting timely, comprehensive and 
harmonious notifications on tariff quota administration and fill rates to ensure transparency and 
allow the objectives agreed in the Bali Decision to be achieved.  
1.3.  With t his in mind, we recognise some M embers may find it challenging to provide required 
notifications in a timely manner, or that information pertaining to the reason for quota underfill  is 
often clear to the Member with the tariff quota, but not clear to other Members.  G/AG/W/186  
 
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  1.4.  That noted, we are pleased a number of the MA:2 notifications submitted since the June 
meeting contain more detailed information to explain and justify underfill . However, other 
MA:2 notifications submitted since the June meeting lack such information.  Clearly there is some 
way to go before notifications contain the level of information that provides other Members with 
clear and justified reasons as to why there has been an underfi ll. Within this context, the AGIMS is 
proving a useful resource to review notifications, questions and answers.  
1.5.  We reiterate our support for the EU Submission (G/AG/W/175) suggesting guidelines be 
considered to harmonise notifications. This issue is not on ly relevant to tariff quotas, but also the 
broader range of notifications within the remit of the Committee on Agriculture. Improvements in 
transparency through the provision of clearer and more timely notifications can help make the Bali 
Decision work mor e effectively, including the utility of the underfill  mechanism.  
2  THE UNDERFILL  MECHANISM  
2.1.  We stress the importance of having up to date information on genuine underfill ed TRQs for 
transparency purposes and in order for the underfill  mechanism to be utilised effectively. We echo 
our Statement from the June meeting, noting that a list of underfilled TRQs maintained by the 
Secretariat would be helpful to address this issue.  
2.2.  With that in mind, we highlight that the underfill  mechanism is  yet to be invoked by any 
Member. We believe this warrants a detailed discussion by Members, including sharing information 
in a non -prejudicial way to understand why this is the case. We would be interested to know if any 
Member has considered invoking the  underfill  mechanism, but subsequently did not proceed.  
2.3.  If any Member can provide such information, we would be interested to know what aspects of 
the Bali Decision or the underfilled quota in question stopped the invocation of the mechanism. For 
example,  was the decision not to pursue the underfill  via the mechanism based on:  
- precedence (i.e. since the mechanism has not been used, was there a fear of being first)?  
- the underfill  being better addressed through other mechanisms/avenues?  
- limited data availab ility to allow an informed assessment?  
- resourc e limitations/constraints? or  
- a lack of support or hesitation from industry?  
2.4.  We believe discussing the practical applicability of the underfill  mechanism requires Members 
with hands -on experience to share this information. By doing so, we will be better placed to review 
the Bali Decision in its entirety.  The Bali Decision was a fundamental step forward in the reform 
process enshrined in the Agree ment on Agriculture and deserves the consideration of all its 
constituent parts, even where theory has yet to be put into practice, as in the case of the underfill  
mechanism.  
2.5.  As part of this review, we believe Members need to consider a number of questions , including:  
- whether the underfill  mechanism is too difficult to understand and utilise?  
- are the remedies offered by the underfill  mechanism of sufficient value for Members?  
- did the Membership find the right balance initially in terms of  coverage and appl icability? 
and 
- how can we make the mechanism more usable and meaningful?  
3  REALLOCATION  
3.1.  Reallocation of chronically underfilled quotas is an area that could be addressed more fully in 
the Bali Decision, and is worthy of further discussion.  As the Bali Decisi on stands, paragraph  9 
addresses reallocation (in the sense of reallocating unused quota to alternative suppliers).  This 
paragraph simply requires Members to request private operators to consider handing back in their 
unused quota for potential use by othe rs. Whilst paragraph 10 refers to Members needing to provide 
effective reallocation in accordance with Annex A, the Annex does not go into details on reallocation 
methodologies or all the specific circumstances.  
3.2.  Consideration should be given to further mea sures to help promote the reallocation of tariff 
quotas, including additional transparency initiatives, examining the approach taken in regional trade G/AG/W/186  
 
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  agreements to reallocation, or the exchange of information on best practice TRQ reallocation 
methods.  Consideration could also be given to the specific issues surrounding reallocation of 
chronically underfilled country -specific allocations, and what could be done to ensure th at 
implementing Members are doing all they can to provide the access to their markets  specified in 
their WTO scheduled TRQs.  
 
 
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