WT/DS437/16  
 
9 October 2015  
(15-5270)  Page: 1/26  
  Original: English  
 
 UNITED STATES – COUNTERVAILING DUTY MEASURES ON CERTAIN 
PRODUCTS FROM CHINA  
ARB-2015-1/28 
Arbitration 
under Article 21.3(c) of the 
Understanding on Rules and Procedures 
Governing the Settlement of Disputes 
Award of the Arbitrator 
Georges M. Abi-Saab 
 WT/DS437/16 
 
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  CONTENTS  
1   INTROD UCTION  .......................................................................................................... 7  
2   ARGUMENTS OF  THE PARTIES ..................................................................................... 7  
3   REASONABLE PE RIOD OF TIME ................................................................................... 8  
3.1   Mandate of the arbitrator und er Article 21.3(c) of the DSU .............................................. 8  
3.2   Measures to be br ought into co nformity ........................................................................ 9  
3.3   Factors affecting the determinatio n of the reasonable period of time ................................ 12 
3.3.1   Means of implementation ........................................................................................ 13 
3.3.2   Steps of the im plementation process ........................................................................ 14 
3.3.3   Legal analysis ....................................................................................................... 18 
4   AWARD ...................................................................................................................... 22  
 
  WT/DS437/16 
 
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   ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS AWARD 
Abbreviation Description 
Appellate Body Report Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervailing Duty Measures 
on Certain Products from China , WT/DS437/AB/R 
DSB Dispute Settlement Body 
DSU Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes  
GOC Government of China 
OCTG  Oil country tubular goods  
Panel Report  Panel Report, United States – Countervailing Duty Measures on 
Certain Products from China , WT/DS437/R, 14 July 2014 
Preliminary Ruling Preliminary Ruling by the Panel, WT/DS437/4, incorporated by 
reference into the Panel Report as Annex A-8, WT/DS437/R/Add.1, 
pp. A-34 to A-46 
SCM Agreement  Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
SOEs State-owned enterprises  
USDOC United States Department of Commerce 
USTR United States Trade Representative 
URAA Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Public Law No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 
4809, codified under United States Code , Title 19, Chapter 22 
WTO World Trade Organization  
 
 WT/DS437/16 
 
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  USDOC COUNTERVAILING DUTY INVEST IGATIONS CITED IN THIS AWARD 
 
Short Title USDOC  
Investigation No. Full Title 
Thermal Paper C-570-921 Lightweight Thermal Paper From the People's Republic of 
China   
Pressure Pipe C-570-931 Circular Welded Austenitic Stainless Pressure Pipe from 
the People's Republic of China   
Line Pipe C-570-936 Certain Circular Welded Carbon Quality Steel Line Pipe 
from the People's Republic of China   
Citric Acid C-570-938 Citric Acid and Certain Citrate Salts From the People's 
Republic of China   
Lawn Groomers C-570-940 Certain Tow Behind Lawn Groomers and Certain Parts 
Thereof from the People's Republic of China   
Kitchen 
Shelving C-570-942 Certain Kitchen Appliance Shelving and Racks from the 
People's Republic of China   
OCTG C-570-944 Certain Oil Country Tubular Goods from the People's 
Republic of China   
Wire Strand C-570-946 Pre-Stressed Concrete Steel Wire Strand from the 
People's Republic of China   
Magnesia Bricks C-570-955 Certain Magnesia Carbon Bricks From the People's 
Republic of China   
Seamless Pipe C-570-957 Certain Seamless Carbon and Alloy Steel Standard, Line, 
and Pressure Pipe from the People's Republic of China   
Print Graphics C-570-959 Certain Coated Paper Suitable for High-Quality Print 
Graphics Using Sheet-Fed Presses From the People's 
Republic of China   
Drill Pipe C-570-966 Drill Pipe From the People's Republic of China   
 
Aluminum 
Extrusions C-570-968 Aluminum Extrusions From the People's Republic of 
China  
Steel Cylinders C-570-978 High Pressure Steel Cylinders From the People's Republic 
of China   
Solar Panels C-570-980 Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Cells, Whether or Not 
Assembled Into Modules, From the People's Republic of China  
Wind Towers C-570-982 Utility Scale Wind Towers From the People's Republic of 
China  
Steel Sinks C-570-984 Drawn Stainless Steel Sinks From the People's Republic 
of China   
 WT/DS437/16 
 
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  WTO CASES CITED IN THIS AWARD 
Short Title Full Case Title and Citation 
Argentina – Hides and 
Leather (Article 21.3(c)) Award of the Arbitrator, Argentina – Measures Affect ing the Export of Bovine 
Hides and Import of Finished Leather – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the 
DSU, WT/DS155/10, 31 August 2001, DSR 2001:XII, p. 6013 
Australia – Salmon 
(Article 21.3(c)) Award of the Arbitrator, Australia – Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon – 
Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU,  WT/DS18/9, 23 February 1999, 
DSR 1999:I, p. 267 
Brazil – Retreaded Tyres 
(Article 21.3(c)) Award of the Arbitrator, Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded 
Tyres – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU, WT/DS332/16, 29 August 
2008, DSR 2008:XX, p. 8581 
Canada – Pharmaceuticals 
Patents 
(Article 21.3(c)) Award of the Arbitrator, Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products 
– Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU,  WT/DS114/13, 18 August 2000, 
DSR 2002:I, p. 3 
Chile – Price Band System 
(Article 21.3(c)) Award of the Arbitrator, Chile – Price Band System and Safeguard Measures 
Relating to Certain Agricultural Products – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU, WT/DS207/13, 17 March 2003, DSR 2003:III, p. 1237 
China – GOES 
(Article 21.3(c)) Award of the Arbitrator, China – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Duties on 
Grain Oriented Flat-Rolled Electrical Steel from the United States – Arbitration 
under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU,  WT/DS414/12, 3 May 2013, DSR 2013:IV, p. 
1495 
Colombia – Ports of Entry 
(Article 21.3(c)) Award of the Arbitrator, Colombia – Indicative Prices and Restrictions on Ports of 
Entry – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU,  WT/DS366/13, 2 October 
2009, DSR 2009:IX, p. 3819 
EC – Chicken Cuts 
(Article 21.3(c)) Award of the Arbitrator, European Communities – Customs Classification of 
Frozen Boneless Chicken Cuts – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU,  
WT/DS269/13, WT/DS286/15, 20 Febr uary 2006, DSR 2006:XII, p. 5441 
EC – Export Subsidies on 
Sugar  (Article 21.3(c)) Award of the Arbitrator, European Communities – Export Subsidies on Sugar – 
Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU,  WT/DS265/33, WT/DS266/33, 
WT/DS283/14, 28 October 2005, DSR 2005:XXIII, p. 11581 
EC – Fasteners (China) Panel Report, European Communities – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on 
Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners from China,  WT/DS397/R and Corr.1, adopted 
28 July 2011, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS397/AB/R, DSR 
2011:VIII, p. 4289 
EC – Hormones 
(Article 21.3(c)) Award of the Arbitrator, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat 
Products (Hormones) – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU, WT/DS26/15, WT/DS48/13, 29 May 1998, DSR 1998:V, p. 1833 
EC – Tariff Preferences 
(Article 21.3(c)) Award of the Arbitrator, European Communities – Cond itions for the Granting 
of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries  – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) 
of the DSU,  WT/DS246/14, 20 September 2004, DSR 2004:IX, p. 4313 
Japan – DRAMs (Korea) 
(Article 21.3(c)) Award of the Arbitrator, Japan – Countervailing Duties on Dynamic Random 
Access Memories from Korea – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU, 
WT/DS336/16, 5 May 2008, DSR 2008:XX, p. 8553 
Korea – Alcoholic Beverages 
(Article 21.3(c)) Award of the Arbitrator, Korea – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages – Arbitration 
under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU,  WT/DS75/16, WT/DS84/14, 4 June 1999, 
DSR 1999:II, p. 937 
US – 1916 Act  
(Article 21.3(c))  Award of the Arbitrator, United States – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 – Arbitration 
under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU,  WT/DS136/11, WT/DS162/14, 
28 February 2001, DSR 2001:V, p. 2017 
US – COOL  
(Article 21.3(c)) Award of the Arbitrator, United States – Certain Country of Origin Labelling 
(COOL) Requirements  – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU, 
WT/DS384/24, WT/DS386/23, 4 Dece mber 2012, DSR 2012:XIII, p. 7173 
US – Gambling 
(Article 21.3(c)) Award of the Arbitrator, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border 
Supply of Gambling and Betting Services – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of 
the DSU , WT/DS285/13, 19 August 2005, DSR 2005:XXIII, p. 11639 WT/DS437/16 
 
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  Short Title Full Case Title and Citation 
US – Offset Act (Byrd 
Amendment  
(Article 21.3(c)) Award of the Arbitrator, United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy 
Offset Act of 2000 – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU , 
WT/DS217/14, WT/DS234/22, 13 June 2003, DSR 2003:III, p. 1163 
US – Oil Country Tubular 
Goods Sunset Reviews (Article 21.3(c)) Award of the Arbitrator, United States – Sunset Reviews of Anti-Dumping 
Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina  – Arbitration under 
Article 21.3(c) of the DSU,  WT/DS268/12, 7 June 2005, DSR 2005:XXIII, 
p. 11619 
US – Section 110(5)  
Copyright Act  
(Article 21.3(c)) Award of the Arbitrator, United States – Section 110(5) of the US Copyright 
Act – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU , WT/DS160/12, 15 January 
2001, DSR 2001:II, p. 657 
US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) 
(Article 21.3(c)) Award of the Arbitrator, United States – Final Anti-Dumping Measures on 
Stainless Steel from Mexico – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU,  
WT/DS344/15, 31 October 2008, DSR 2008:XX, p. 8619 
 
  
 WT/DS437/16 
 
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  WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION  
AWARD OF THE ARBITRATOR  
  
 
United States – Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from China  
 
Parties:  China 
United States 
 ARB-2015-1/28 
 
Arbitrator:  
 Georges M. Abi-Saab  
 
 
1  INTRODUCTION 
1.1.  On 16 January 2015, the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) adopted the Appellate Body Report1 
and the Panel Report2, as modified by the Appellate Body Report, in  
United States — Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from China . This dispute 
concerns China's challenge of countervailing duti es imposed by the United States on certain 
products from China following 17 countervailing duty investigations initiated by the US Department 
of Commerce (USDOC) between 2007 and 2012. Th e Panel and the Appellate Body found the 
measures at issue to be inconsistent with several provisions of the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement).3 By a letter to the Chair of the DSB dated 13 February 
2015, the United States indicated its intention to implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in this dispute in a manner that respects its WTO obligations, and stated that it would require a reasonable period of time within which to do so.
4 
1.2.  On 26 June 2015, China informed the DSB that consultations with the United States had not 
resulted in an agreement on the reasonable peri od of time for implementation. China therefore 
requested that this period be determined throug h arbitration pursuant to Article 21.3(c) of the 
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU).5 
1.3.  China and the United States were unable to agree on an arbitrator within 10 days of the 
referral of the matter to arbitration. Consequently, by letter dated 9 July 2015, China requested 
that the Director-General of the World Trade Organization (WTO) appoint an arbitrator pursuant to 
footnote 12 of Article 21.3(c) of the DSU. The Di rector-General appointed the undersigned as the 
Arbitrator on 17 July 2015, after consulting with the parties.6 The parties were informed of the 
acceptance of the appointment by letter dated 22 July 2015.  
1.4.  The United States and China filed their wri tten submissions, as well as executive summaries 
thereof, on 4 and 17 August 2015, respectively. A hearing was held on 9 September 2015. The parties have agreed that this award will be deemed to be an arbitration award under 
Article 21.3(c) of the DSU, notwithstanding th e expiry of the 90-day period stipulated in 
Article 21.3(c).
7  
2  ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES 
2.1.  The arguments of the parties are reflecte d in the executive summaries of their written 
submissions, which are contained in Annexes A and B to this Award.   
                                               
1 WT/DS437/AB/R.  
2 WT/DS437/R.  
3 See section 3.2 of this Award. 
4 WT/DS437/12. See also WT/DSB/M/357, paras. 2.2-2.5. 
5 WT/DS437/14. 
6 WT/DS437/15. 
7 See WT/DS437/13. WT/DS437/16 
 
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  3  REASONABLE PERIOD OF TIME 
3.1.  This section begins by setting out the mand ate of the arbitrator under Article 21.3(c) of the 
DSU, as defined in the text of the DSU and outlin ed in past awards under Article 21.3(c). It then 
addresses the measures to be brought into conf ormity with the recommendations and rulings of 
the DSB, before considering the parties' arguments on what constitutes a reasonable period of 
time for implementation in this dispute.   
3.1  Mandate of the arbitrator und er Article 21.3(c) of the DSU  
3.2.  Article 21.3 of the DSU provides, in relevant part: 
If it is impracticable to comply immediately with the recommendations and rulings [of 
the DSB], the Member concerned shall have a reasonable period of time in which to 
do so. The reasonable period of time shall be:  
... 
(c) a period of time determined through binding arbitration within 90 days after the 
date of adoption of the recommendations and rulings. In such arbitration, a guideline 
for the arbitrator should be that the reasonable period of time to implement panel or 
Appellate Body recommendations should no t exceed 15 months from the date of 
adoption of a panel or Appellate Body repo rt. However, that time may be shorter or 
longer, depending upon the particular circumstances.8   
3.3.  According to this provision, the mandate of  the Arbitrator in the present proceeding is to 
determine the time period within which the implementing Member must comply with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in this dispute. Consistent with previous arbitrations 
under Article 21.3(c), the implementing Member has a measure of discretion in choosing the 
means of implementation that it deems most ap propriate. However, the implementing Member 
does not have an unfettered right to choose any method of implementation. Rather, the arbitrator 
"must consider, in particular, 'whether the im plementing action falls within the range of 
permissible actions that can be taken in order to implement the DSB's recommendations and rulings'."
9 Thus, the means of implementation chosen must be apt in form, nature, and content to 
effect compliance and should otherwise be consistent with the covered agreements.10 In that vein, 
an implementing Member's chosen method of implem entation must be capable of bringing it into 
compliance with its WTO obligations within a reasonable period of time, in accordance with the guidelines contained in Article 21.3(c) of the DSU.
11  
3.4.  The means of implementation available to the Member concerned is a relevant consideration 
for determining the reasonable period of time.12 At the same time, there are certain limitations on 
the mandate of the arbitrator under Article 21.3(c). In particular, it is not for the arbitrator to 
determine the consistency with the covered agreements of the measure taken to comply. Rather, 
if this question is raised, it is to be answered by a compliance panel pursuant to Article 21.5 of the DSU. Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) is limited to determining the time period within which 
implementation of the recommendations and rulings of the DSB must occur.  
3.5.  It is to be noted that Article 21.1 of the DSU provides that "prompt compliance" is essential 
for the effective resolution of WTO disputes. Furthe rmore, the first clause of Article 21.3 stipulates 
that a "reasonable period of time" for implementation shall be available only "[i]f it is impracticable 
to comply immediately" with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB. According to the last 
                                               
8 Fns omitted. 
9 Award of the Arbitrator, US – COOL (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 69 (quoting Awards of the Arbitrators,  
Brazil – Retreaded Tyres (Article 21.3(c)),  para. 48; and Japan – DRAMs (Korea) (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 27). 
10 See Awards of the Arbitrators, China – GOES (Article 21.3(c)) , para 3.2; and Colombia – Ports of 
Entry (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 64. 
11 See Awards of the Arbitrators, Japan – DRAMs (Korea) (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 27; and EC – Export 
Subsidies on Sugar (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 69. 
12 See Awards of the Arbitrators, Japan – DRAMs (Korea) (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 26; and China – GOES 
(Article 21.3(c)), para. 3.2 .  WT/DS437/16 
 
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  sentence of Article 21.3(c), the "particular circumstances" of a dispute may affect the length of the 
reasonable period of time, making it "shorter or longer".13 In principle, therefore, the reasonable 
period of time for implementation should be the sh ortest period possible within the legal system of 
the implementing Member14, in the light of the "particular circumstances" of a dispute. It has been 
held in previous arbitration awards that the implem enting Member must utilize all the "flexibilities" 
available within its legal system in order to implement the relevant recommendations and rulings of the DSB in the shortest period of time possible.
15 At the same time, an implementing Member is 
not required to utilize "extraordinary procedures" to bring its measures into compliance.16 
3.6.  Finally, with regard to the burden of proof , it is well established that the implementing 
Member bears the overall burden to prove that the time period requested for implementation 
constitutes a "reasonable period of time".17 In response to questioning at the hearing in this 
arbitration, both China and the United States agreed that the principles set out above are relevant 
for the determination of the reasonable period of time for implementation in this dispute. 
3.2  Measures to be brought into conformity 
3.7.  The dispute underlying this arbitration conc erns China's challenge of countervailing duties 
imposed by the United States following 17 countervailing duty investigations initiated by the USDOC between 2007 and 2012 with respect to a variety of products.
18 Before the Panel, China 
challenged several aspects of the investigations leading to the imposition of these duties, including 
their initiation, conduct, and preliminary and final determinations as being inconsistent with the United States' obligations under the SCM Agreement. In particular, with respect to 14 of these investigations, China's "as applied" claims related to the USDOC's determinations that: (i) Chinese 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are public bodies; (ii) the provision of certain inputs by Chinese 
SOEs conferred a benefit; (iii) subsidies arising fr om the provision of inputs for less than adequate 
remuneration are specific; and (iv) there was sufficient evidence with respect to the specificity of 
the alleged subsidies to justify the initiation of the underlying countervailing duty investigations.
19 
With regard to seven investigations, China raised "as applied" claims relating to the USDOC's determinations that subsidies in the form of the provision of land-use rights are specific. With 
respect to 15 of the investigations, China's "as applied" claims concerned the USDOC's resort to 
the use of "adverse" facts available. Finally, with  respect to two of the investigations, China's "as 
applied" claims related to the USDOC's initiation of investigations into export restraints and the determinations made by the USDOC that such export restraints are financial contributions.
20 China 
also challenged "as such" the USDOC's policy of using a "rebuttable presumption" to determine 
                                               
13 See Awards of the Arbitrators, US – COOL  (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 69; Japan – DRAMs (Korea) 
(Article 21.3(c)) , para. 25; and EC – Chicken Cuts (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 49. 
14 See Awards of the Arbitrators, China – GOES (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 3.3; and EC – Hormones 
(Article 21.3(c)) , para. 26. See also Awards of the Arbitrators, EC – Chicken Cuts (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 49; 
Chile – Price Band System (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 34; Canada – Pharmaceutical Patents (Article 21.3(c)) , 
para. 47; EC – Tariff Preferences  (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 26; US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews  
(Article 21.3(c)) , para. 25; and EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar  (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 61.  
15 See Awards of the Arbitrators, China – GOES (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 3.4; US – Stainless Steel 
(Mexico) (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 42; Brazil – Retreaded Tyres (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 48; Japan – DRAMs 
(Korea) (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 25; EC – Chicken Cuts (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 49; Chile – Price Band System 
(Article 21.3(c)) , para. 39; EC – Tariff Preferences (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 36; and US – Offset Act (Byrd 
Amendment) (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 64. 
16 See Awards of the Arbitrators, China – GOES (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 3.4; US – COOL (Article 21.3(c)) , 
para. 70; US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 42; Brazil – Retreaded Tyres (Article 21.3(c)) , 
para. 48; Japan – DRAMs (Korea) (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 25; EC – Chicken Cuts (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 49; 
Korea – Alcoholic Bevera ges (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 42; Chile – Price Band System (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 51; 
and US – Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 74. 
17 See Awards of the Arbitrators, China – GOES (Article 21.3(c)) , para 3.5; Canada – Pharmaceutical 
Patents (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 47; US – 1916 Act (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 33; and  EC – Tariff Preferences 
(Article 21.3(c)) , para. 27. 
18 The 17 countervailing duty  investigations are listed on p. 4 of  this Award and concern the following 
products: thermal paper; pressure pi pe; line pipe; citric acid; lawn groomers; kitchen shelving; oil country 
tubular goods (OCTG); wire strand; magnesia bricks; seamless pipe; print graphics; drill pipe; aluminum 
extrusions; steel cylinders; solar panels; wind towers; and steel sinks. 
19 With respect to four of these 14 investigations, China also challenged the USDOC's treatment of 
Chinese SOEs as public bodies fo r the purposes of the initiation of the relevant investigation. 
20 See Appellate Body Report, para. 1.3; and Panel Report, paras. 3.1 and 3.2. WT/DS437/16 
 
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  whether Chinese SOEs can be characterized as "public bodies" within the meaning of the 
SCM Agreement.21  
3.8.  The Panel found that the United States had acted inconsistently with: 
a. Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement in 12 countervailing duty investigations22 
because the USDOC found that Chinese SOEs are public bodies based solely on the 
grounds that these enterprises were (majorit y) owned, or otherwise controlled, by the 
Government of China23; 
b. Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement, on the basis that the USDOC's policy, 
articulated in the Kitchen Shelving investigation, to presume that a majority government-owned entity is a public body, is inconsistent, as such, with that provision
24;  
c. the last sentence of Article 2.1(c) of the SCM Agreement in 12 countervailing duty 
investigations25 because the USDOC failed to take account of the two factors listed 
therein26;  
d. Article 2.2 of the SCM Agreement in six countervailing duty investigations27 because the 
USDOC made determinations of regional specificity while failing to establish that the 
alleged subsidy was limited to certain enterprises located in a designated geographical region within the jurisdiction of the granting authority
28; and  
e. Article 11.3 of the SCM Agreement in two countervailing duty investigations29 because 
the USDOC initiated investigations in respect of certain export restraints.30 
3.9.  The Panel found that China had failed to establish that the USDOC had acted inconsistently 
with the United States' obligations under: 
a. Article 11 of the SCM Agreement in four countervailing duty investigations31 by initiating 
the challenged investigations without sufficient evidence of a financial contribution32; 
b. Article 14(d) or Article 1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement in 12 countervailing duty 
investigations33 by rejecting in-country private prices in China34; 
c. Article 2.1 of the SCM Agreement in 12 countervailing duty investigations35 by failing to 
apply the first of the "other factors" under  Article 2.1(c) in the light of a prior 
"appearance of non-specificity" resulting from the application of subparagraphs (a) and 
(b); by failing to identify a "subsidy programme"; or by failing to identify a "granting authority"
36; 
                                               
21 See Appellate Body Report, para. 1.2.  
22 Pressure Pipe, Line Pipe, Lawn Groomers, Kitchen Shelving, OCTG, Wire Strand, Seamless Pipe, Print 
Graphics, Drill Pipe, Aluminum Extrusions, Steel Cylinders, and Solar Panels. 
23 Panel Report, paras. 7.75 and 8.1.i. 
24 Panel Report, para. 8.1.ii. 
25 Pressure Pipe, Line Pipe, Lawn Groomers, Kitchen Shelving, OCTG, Wire Strand, Seamless Pipe, Print 
Graphics, Drill Pipe, Aluminum Extrusions, Steel Cylinders, and Solar Panels. 
26 Panel Report, para. 8.1.v. 
27 Line Pipe, Thermal Paper, Citric Acid , OCTG, Wire Strand, and Seamless Pipe. 
28 Panel Report, para. 8.1.viii. 
29 Magnesia Bricks and Seamless Pipe. 
30 Panel Report, para. 8.1.ix. 
31 Steel Cylinders, Solar Panels, Wind Towers, and Steel Sinks. 
32 Panel Report, para. 8.1.iii. 
33 Pressure Pipe, Line Pipe, Lawn Groomers, Kitchen Shelving, OCTG, Wire Strand, Seamless Pipe, Print 
Graphics, Drill Pipe, Aluminum Extrusions, Steel Cylinders, and Solar Panels. 
34 Panel Report, para. 8.1.iv. 
35 Pressure Pipe, Line Pipe, Lawn Groomers, Kitchen Shelving, OCTG, Wire Strand, Seamless Pipe, Print 
Graphics, Drill Pipe, Aluminum Extrusions, Steel Cylinders, and Solar Panels. 
36 Panel Report, para. 8.1.v. WT/DS437/16 
 
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  d. Article 11 of the SCM Agreement in 14 countervailing duty investigations37 by initiating 
the challenged investigations without sufficient evidence of specificity38; 
e. Article 12.7 of the SCM Agreement in 13 countervailing duty investigations39 by not 
relying on facts available on the record40; and 
f. Article 2.2 of the SCM Agreement in the Print Graphics investigation by making a positive 
determination of regional specificity while failing to establish that the alleged subsidy was limited to certain enterprises located within a designated geographical region within 
the jurisdiction of the granting authority.
41 
3.10.  China appealed the Panel's findings with respect to Articles 14(d) and 1.1(b) regarding 
benefit, Article 2.1 regarding specificity, and Ar ticle 12.7 regarding the use of "facts available". 
With respect to Articles 14(d) and 1.1(b), the Appellate Body reversed the Panel's finding42 
upholding the USDOC's rejection of private prices as potential benchmarks in the investigations at 
issue on the grounds that such prices were distor ted. The Appellate Body also reversed the Panel's 
finding43 that China had failed to establish that the USDOC had acted inconsistently with the 
obligations of the United States under Articles 14(d) or 1.1(b) by rejecting in-country private 
prices in China as benefit benchmarks in the OCTG, Solar Panels, Pressure Pipe, and Line Pipe countervailing duty investigations.
44 The Appellate Body completed the legal analysis and found 
that the USDOC had acted inconsistently with the obligations of the United States under 
Article 14(d) and Article 1.1(b) in the OCTG, Solar Panels, Pressure Pipe, and Line Pipe 
countervailing duty investigations, and consequently with Articles 10 and 32.1 of the SCM Agreement.
45  
3.11.  With respect to the Panel's findings on the USDOC's determinations of de facto  specificity 
under Article 2.1, the Appellate Body upheld the Panel's finding that the USDOC did not act inconsistently with the obligations of the United States under Article 2.1 by analysing specificity 
exclusively under Article 2.1(c).
46 However, the Appellate Body modified the Panel's interpretation 
of Article 2.1(c) and, in particular, its interpreta tion of the concepts of "subsidy programme" and 
"granting authority", and reversed the Panel's finding that China had not established that the 
USDOC had acted inconsistently with Article 2.1 by failing to identify a "subsidy programme"47, as 
well as the Panel's finding that China had not established that the USDOC had acted inconsistently with Article 2.1 by failing to identify a "granting authority".
48 The Appellate Body was unable to 
complete the legal analysis with respect to China's claims under Article 2.1.49 Finally, with respect 
to the use of "facts available" by the USDOC, the Appellate Body reversed the Panel's finding that 
China had not established that the USDOC had acted inconsistently with Article 12.7 by not relying on facts available on the record, but it was unable to complete the analysis in this regard.
50 
3.12.  For its part, the United States claimed that the Panel erred in finding that China's panel 
request, as it related to its claims under Article 12.7 of the SCM Agreement, failed to meet the requirements of Article 6.2 of the DSU. However,  the Appellate Body upheld the Panel's finding
51 
that China's claims under Article 12.7 were within the Panel's terms of reference.52 
                                               
37 Pressure Pipe, Line Pipe, Lawn Groomers, Kitchen Shelving, OCTG, Wire Strand, Seamless Pipe, Print 
Graphics, Drill Pipe, Aluminum Extrusions, Steel Cylinders, Solar Panels, Wind Towers, and Steel Sinks. 
38 Panel Report, para. 8.1.vi. 
39 Pressure Pipe, Line Pipe, Citric Acid, Lawn Groom ers, OCTG, Wire Strand, Magnesia Bricks, Seamless 
Pipe, Print Graphics, Drill Pipe, Aluminum Extrusions, Steel Cylinders, and Solar Panels. 
40 Panel Report, para. 8.1.vii. 
41 Panel Report, para. 8.1.viii. 
42 Panel Report, para. 7.195. 
43 Panel Report, paras. 7.197 and 8.1.iv. 
44 Appellate Body Report, para. 5.1.b.ii. 
45 Appellate Body Repo rt, para. 5.1.b.iii. 
46 Appellate Body Report, para. 5.1.c.i. 
47 Appellate Body Repo rt, para. 5.1.c.ii. 
48 Appellate Body Repo rt, para. 5.1.c.iii. 
49 Appellate Body Report, para s. 5.1.c.ii and 5.1.c.iii. 
50 Appellate Body Report, para. 5.1.d. 
51 Panel's Preliminary Ruling, para . 5.1; Panel Report, para. 1.16. 
52 Appellate Body Report, para. 4.28. WT/DS437/16 
 
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  3.13.  At the hearing in this arbitration, the parties agreed that the United States' implementation 
efforts must focus on: 
a. the five unappealed findings by the Panel that the United States had acted inconsistently 
with: 
i. Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement in 12 countervailing duty 
investigations53 because the USDOC found that Chinese SOEs are public bodies 
based solely on the grounds that these enterprises were (majority) owned, or 
otherwise controlled, by the Government of China54; 
ii. Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement, on the basis that the USDOC's policy, 
articulated in the Kitchen Shelving investigation, to presume that a majority 
government-owned entity is a public body, is inconsistent, as such, with that 
provision55; 
iii. the last sentence of Article 2.1(c) of the SCM Agreement in 12 countervailing 
duty investigations56 because the USDOC failed to take account of the 
two factors listed therein57;  
iv. Article 2.2 of the SCM Agreement in six countervailing duty investigations58 
because the USDOC made positive determinations of regional specificity while 
failing to establish that the alleged subsidy was limited to certain enterprises 
located within a designated geographical region within the jurisdiction of the 
granting authority59; and  
v. Article 11.3 of the SCM Agreement in two countervailing duty investigations60 
because the USDOC initiated investigations concerning certain export 
restraints61; and 
b. the Appellate Body's findings that the United States had acted inconsistently with 
Articles 14(d) and 1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement in four investigations62 because the 
USDOC rejected in-country prices in China as benefit benchmarks.63 
3.3  Factors affecting the determinatio n of the reasonable period of time 
3.14.  The United States argues that a reasonable period of time for implementation of the 
recommendations and rulings of the DSB in this dispute is 19 months. The United States asserts 
that this is the shortest period of time within which the USDOC can modify the 15 countervailing 
duty determinations at issue and bring them into compliance with the recommendations and 
rulings of the DSB, in the light of the procedural requirements under US law, the complexity of the 
issues involved, and the current workload of the USDOC.64 
                                               
53 Pressure Pipe, Line Pipe, Lawn Groomers, Kitc hen Shelving, OCTG, Wire Strand, Seamless Pipe, 
Print Graphics, Drill Pipe, Aluminum Extrusions, Steel Cylinders, and Solar Panels. 
54 Panel Report, paras. 7.75 and 8.1.i. 
55 Panel Report, para. 8.1.ii. 
56 Pressure Pipe, Line Pipe, Lawn Groomers, Kitc hen Shelving, OCTG, Wire Strand, Seamless Pipe, 
Print Graphics, Drill Pipe, Aluminum Extrusions, Steel Cylinders, and Solar Panels. 
57 Panel Report, para. 8.1.v. 
58 Line Pipe, Thermal Paper, Citric Acid , OCTG, Wire Strand, and Seamless Pipe. 
59 Panel Report, para. 8.1.viii. 
60 Magnesia Bricks and Seamless Pipe. 
61 Panel Report, para. 8.1.ix. 
62 OCTG, Solar Panels, Pressure Pipe, and Line Pipe. 
63 In response to questioning at the hearing, the Un ited States acknowledged that the Appellate Body's 
interpretation of certain other provisions of the SC M Agreement may also bear upon the implementation 
obligation in this dispute. See supra , para. 3.11 and infra, para. 3.45. 
64 United States' submis sion, paras. 12 and 63. WT/DS437/16 
 
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  3.15.   In response, China contends that the United States should be granted a period of 
10 months to implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in this dispute. China 
argues that the United States has not discharged its burden of demonstrating that its proposed implementation period of 19 months is the "shortest period possible" to implement the 
recommendations and rulings of the DSB in this dispute.
65 
3.16.  This section begins by noting the means of implementation in the present dispute, before 
considering the parties' arguments relating to certain steps in the implementation process specific 
to this dispute. 
3.3.1  Means of implementation 3.17.  The United States asserts that it is following the procedure set out in Section 129(b)(1) of 
the Uruguay Round Agreements Act
66 (URAA) to modify the countervailing duty determinations at 
issue so as to bring them into compliance with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB.67 
Thus, for the United States, its chosen means of implementation is modification of the measures 
found to be WTO-inconsistent by remedial administrative action. For all but two of the 
countervailing duty investigations at issue68, China agreed at the hearing that implementation of 
the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in th is dispute can be achieved by modifying the 
measures at issue through administrative action, i.e. through the process set out in 
Section 129(b)(1) of the URAA. 
3.18.  Article 21.3(c) of the DSU states that a Me mber shall have a reasonable period of time to 
implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB "[i]f it is impracticable to comply immediately". While withdrawal may therefore be the preferred means to secure prompt 
compliance
69, modification of the inconsistent measure is within the range of permissible actions 
available to the implementing Member70, provided that this is done in the shortest time possible, 
and that such modification is permissible under the DSB's recommendations and rulings.71 Thus, 
the withdrawal of a measure found to be WTO-inconsistent or the modification of such a measure 
by remedial action are both courses of ac tion available to an implementing Member.72  
3.19.  In this respect, it is also to be note d that the nature of the steps to be taken for 
implementation has a bearing on the reasonable period of time required to implement the 
recommendations and rulings of the DSB.73 Previous awards under Article 21.3(c) have recognized 
that, when implementation requires legislative acti on, the reasonable period of time required may 
be longer than in cases where only administrative action is required.74 However, there may well be 
circumstances in which the administrative process may be lengthy and complex.75 In the present 
case, the United States contends that, rather than pursuing legislative action, it will use an administrative procedure to modify the countervailin g duty determinations at issue so as to bring 
them into compliance with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB. The reasonable period of 
time for implementation in this case must thus be determined in the light of the volume and complexity of the administrative action required.  
                                               
65 China's submission, paras. 2, 51, and 52; China's opening statement at the hearing. 
66 Public Law No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4837, codified under United States Code , Title 19, Section 3538. 
67 United States' submission, para. 26. 
68 The parties disagree over the means for implemen ting the Panel's finding that the USDOC acted 
inconsistently with Article 11.3 of the SCM Agreement by  initiating investigations concerning certain export 
restraints in the Magnesia Bricks and Seamless Pipes investigations. See infra paras. 3.21 and 3.47-3.48. 
69 See Awards of the Arbitrators, Colombia – Ports of Entry (Article 21.3(c)), para. 77; Japan – DRAMs 
(Korea) (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 37; Australia – Salmon (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 30; and Argentina – Hides and 
Leather (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 40. 
70 See Awards of the Arbitrators, Colombia – Ports of Entry (Article 21.3(c)), para. 77; and US – COOL 
(Article 21.3(c)) , para. 77. 
71 See Award of the Arbitrator, Japan – DRAMs (Korea) (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 37. 
72 See Awards of the Arbitrators, US – Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 50; Japan – 
DRAMs (Korea) (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 37; and US – COOL (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 77. 
73 See Award of the Arbitrator, US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews (Article 21.3(c)) , 
para. 26. 
74 See Award of the Arbitrator, US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews (Article 21.3(c)) , 
para. 26. 
75 See Awards of the Arbitrators, Canada – Pharmaceutical Patents (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 49; and US – 
Offset Act (Byrd Amendm ent) (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 57. WT/DS437/16 
 
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  3.20.  With respect to the Panel's "as such" finding of inconsistency of the policy articulated in the 
Kitchen Shelving investigation to presume that a majority government-owned entity is a public body, China submits that implementation should  be achievable by renouncing this policy.
76 At the 
hearing, the United States pointed out that it wa s still considering the means of implementing this 
finding by the Panel, and explained that it did no t request additional time for the implementation 
of this "as such" finding beyond the time required for implementation of the "as applied" findings in respect of the USDOC's "public body" determinations. The United States thus clarified that the 
implementation of this "as such" finding should not be a separate factor in arriving at the 
reasonable period of time for implementation.
77 China, for its part, agreed that, as long as the 
implementation of this "as such" finding was not relevant to the determination of the reasonable period of time, as suggested by the United States , it did not take issue with the United States' 
chosen means of implementation for purposes of  this arbitration proceeding. Accordingly, the 
means for implementing the Panel's "as such" finding of inconsistency with respect to the policy articulated in Kitchen Shelving investigation shall not be taken into account for determining the 
reasonable period of time in this arbitration. N eedless to say, however, the implementation of this 
finding will have to be effected within the reason able period of time dete rmined by this Award. 
3.21.  As noted above, the parties disagree over  the means of implementing the Panel's finding 
that the USDOC acted inconsistently with Article 11.3 of the SCM Agreement by initiating 
investigations concerning certain export restraints in the Magnesia Bricks and Seamless Pipes investigations. China considers that implementation of this finding can only be achieved by revocation of the relevant component of the count ervailing duty margin that the USDOC attributed 
to those export restraints in its investigations.
78 China explains that, if the very initiation  of a trade 
remedy proceeding is found to be WTO-inconsistent, "it must follow that compliance requires revocation of the offending measure, in whole or in part".
79 According to the United States, the 
Panel's finding of inconsistency concerns the lack of information or insufficient amount of evidence 
for initiation, and therefore the USDOC is considering its initiation of these investigations in the light of the new information supplied by the US domestic industry. If the USDOC determines that 
the new information meets the standard for initiation, an investigation will be initiated.
80 The 
implementation of the Panel's finding of inconsistency under Article 11.3 is considered in the analysis of the reasonable period of time below.  
3.3.2  Steps of the implementation process 
3.22.  The implementation process for the counter vailing duty investigations at issue in this 
dispute, as outlined by the United States, consists  of the following specific administrative steps: 
(i) pre-commencement analysis and consultations; (ii) seeking information from interested parties 
and analysing that information; (iii) verification of the information received; (iv) issuing of 
preliminary determinations; (v) receipt of case and rebuttal briefs; (vi) issuing of final determinations; (vii) correction of ministerial errors; and (viii) consultations with the US Congress 
and implementation.
81 In response to questioning at the hearing, China confirmed that it considers 
that taking these steps is capable of placing the United States in compliance with its WTO obligations. Moreover, the parties agreed that, while the administrative process in principle comprises all of the above steps, the extent to which the investigating authority undertakes 
verification of the information received lies within its discretion.  
3.23.  As to the time period for each of these steps, China does not take issue with the time 
periods proposed by the United States for three ac tions: (i) issuing of preliminary determinations 
(2 months); (ii) receipt of case and rebuttal briefs (1 month); and (iii) issuing of final 
determinations (2 months).
82 China mainly disagrees with, and presents arguments and evidence 
in respect of, the time periods proposed by the United States for the remaining five steps, namely: 
(i) pre-commencement analysis and consultations; (ii) seeking information from interested parties 
                                               
76 China's submission, para. 9. 
77 United States' response to questioning at the hearing. 
78 China's submission, para. 9 and fn 41 thereto. 
79 China's submission, fn 41 to para. 9 (referring to Award of the Arbitrator, Japan - DRAMs (Korea) 
(Article 21.3(c)) , para. 27; and Panel Report, EC – Fasteners (China) , para. 8.8).   
80 United States' submis sion, paras. 54 and 56. 
81 United States' submission, paras. 26-37.  
82 China's submission, para. 27. WT/DS437/16 
 
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  and analysing that information; (iii) verification of the information received; (iv) correction of 
ministerial errors; and (v) consultations with the US Congress and implementation.83 
3.24.  China asserts that, although Sections 129(b)-(d) of the URAA do not impose minimum 
timeframes for the steps identified above, Section 129(b)(2) of the URAA84 indicates that the 
maximum amount of time for the USDOC to issue a redetermination implementing the 
recommendations and rulings of the DSB in every case is 180 days.85 The United States disagrees 
with China's reading of Section 129(b)(2), and asserts that the time period of 180 days specified in 
that provision refers only to the period between  a formal request by the United States Trade 
Representative (USTR) to the USDOC to issue a new determination, and the issuing of such a determination by the USDOC. According to the United States, however, Sections 129(b)(1), (3), and (4) contemplate additional steps to be taken by the US Government both before and after the 
step set out in Section 129(b)(2). Accordingly, the 180-day period specified in that provision 
relates only to one step of a multi-step implementation process.
86  
3.25.  China also argues that, under US law, the maximum timeframe for the conduct of an 
original countervailing duty investigation is 140 days, or 4.5 months, in standard cases, and 
205 days, or 7 months, in "extraordinarily complicated" cases.87 The United States asserts that, 
under its laws, an original countervailing duty investigation can take up to a maximum of 
16 months.88  
3.26.  Turning to the parties' disagreement over th e specific steps of the implementation process, 
it is to be noted, first, that, with respect to pre-commencement analysis and consultations necessary to implement the recommendations and ru lings of the DSB, the United States proposes 
a period of 3.5 months from the date of adop tion of the Panel and Appellate Body Reports.
89 
China, however, considers that a period of 1 month would be sufficient for this step of the implementation process.
90 China points out that five of the six findings that require implementation 
action on the part of the United States were made by the Panel and were not appealed. China 
asserts that, once it was clear that five findings of the Panel would not be appealed, the United States could have begun its pre-commencement analysis and consultations with respect to 
the majority of the findings requiring implementati on even before the simultaneous adoption of the 
Panel and the Appellate Body Reports by the DSB.
91  
3.27.  In response, the United States contends th at, pursuant to Article 21.3(c) of the DSU, the 
reasonable period of time for implementation  begins after the adoption of the panel and 
Appellate Body reports by the DSB, and therefor e the obligation to implement arises only after 
adoption.92 The United States also asserts that, as a matter of fact, after the Panel Report was 
issued in this dispute, it began to assess whether or not to appeal the findings of the Panel, and 
how, in the absence of a successful appeal, implementation would occur.93 Finally, the 
United States points out that the "most complicated area of implementation" relates to the Appellate Body's finding of benchmark distortion , as the Appellate Body prescribed a new and 
different analytical framework than that used by the USDOC in the original investigations. Given 
that the Appellate Body suggested analysing se veral new parameters concerning the relevant 
                                               
83 China's submission, para. 27.  
84 Section 129(b)(2) of the URAA reads as follows: 
(2) DETERMINATION BY ADMINISTERING AUTHORITY. Notwithstanding any provision of the Tariff Act of 1930, the administering authority shall, within 180 days after receipt of a written request from the Trade Representative, issue a de termination in connection with the particular 
proceeding that would render the administering au thority's action describe d in paragraph (1) not 
inconsistent with the findings of the panel or the Appellate Body. 
85 China's submission, paras. 21-24.  
86 United States' opening statement at the hearing.  
87 China's submission, para. 25 (referring to United States Code of Federal Regulations , Title 19, 
Section 351, Annex 1, and Section 351.205(b)(2)). 
88 United States' opening statement at the hearing (referring to United States Code , Title 19, 
Sections 1671b(g)(2) and 1671d(a)(1); and United States Code of  Federal Regulations , Title 19, 
Section 351.210(b)(3)-(4)). 
89 United States' submis sion, table at p. 12. 
90 China's submission, para. 31. 
91 China's submission, para. 30.  
92 United States' opening statement at the hearing. 
93 United States' opening statement at the hearing. WT/DS437/16 
 
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  market, the United States asserts that implementation of this particular finding requires 
considerable preparation by the USDOC.94 
3.28.  China explained at the hearing that it was not suggesting that the USDOC needed to begin 
substantive work, such as issuing questionnaires and seeking information, in the investigations at 
issue prior to adoption of the Panel and Appellate Body Reports, but that the USDOC could have 
begun its pre-commencement analysis and consul tations prior to adoption. In response, the 
United States acknowledged that Section 129(b)(1) of the URAA allows consultations between the 
USTR, the administering authority, and Congressi onal committees to begin "promptly" after a 
panel or Appellate Body report is issued, and not only after such reports are adopted by the DSB. 
3.29.  Second, the parties disagree over the time period for seeking information from interested 
parties and analysis of such information. The United States proposes a period of 6 months for this 
step of the implementation process in the light of the number of investigations at issue, the 
complexity of the findings by the Panel and the Appellate Body, as well as the incomplete responses to questionnaires issued by the USDOC.
95 China, on the other hand, submits that this 
step could be completed within a period of 3 months.96  
3.30.  China states that it has made clear to the United States that it will not be responding to the 
questionnaires issued by the USDOC in a majority of the investigations.97 Noting that it is 
participating and providing information in only six of the investigations at issue, China highlights 
that all six investigations concern products in the steel industry and that, therefore, much of the information that China has submitted is identical across the investigations.
98 At the hearing, the 
parties confirmed that China submitted new information in six investigations and that this 
information was similar in all investigations. China also refers to the original OCTG countervailing 
duty investigation and points out that the time that the United States is seeking to complete the questionnaire process in the redetermination proceeding under Section 129 is essentially the same 
as the amount of time that the USDOC took to complete the entire OCTG investigation, even 
though redetermination proceedings concern only two of the 38 individual subsidy programmes that were at issue in the original investigation.
99 Finally, China asserts that the Government of 
China has sought only two extensions for responding to the USDOC's questionnaires, and that, 
therefore, the granting of extensions by the USDOC cannot be a reason for increasing the amount of time required to complete this step.
100 
3.31.  For its part, the United States argues that the fact that China will be selectively participating 
in only six of the investigations at issue is not relevant for the determination of the reasonable 
period of time for implementation because, even if China were not to submit new information in other investigations, submission of further information by Chinese companies cannot be 
excluded.
101 The United States also takes issue with China's reliance on the time period for the 
original OCTG investigation, pointing out that, even though the scope of the redetermination proceedings may be narrower in terms of the subsidy programmes at issue, the analysis required 
in the redetermination proceedings would be more complex and novel in the light of the new 
analytical framework and parameters identified by the Appellate Body in arriving at its benchmark distortion finding.
102 At the hearing, the United States expl ained that, even though the information 
submitted by China may be the same or similar across the six investigations, the analysis that the 
USDOC would be required to undertake with respect to such information may be different in the 
                                               
94 United States' opening statement at the hearing. 
95 United States' submission, table at p. 12; United States' opening statement at the hearing. 
96 China's submission, para. 43. 
97 China's submission, para. 35. 
98 China's submission, para. 35. 
99 China's submission, paras. 36-38. 
100 China's submission, paras. 40-41. China states that  it has sought one extens ion in relation to the 
original public body questionnaire,  and one extension for responding to the benchmark questionnaire. With 
respect to the public body questionna ire, the Government of China was originally given 1 week to respond in 
12 investigations, and the USDOC subsequently gave an ex tension of 1 additional week for the Government of 
China to respond to the public body questionnaire.  With respect to the benchmark questionnaire, the 
Government of China was given 2 weeks to respond in four investigations, and was subsequently granted a 
2-week extension by the USDOC.  
101 United States' opening statement at the hearing. 
102 United States' opening statement at the hearing. WT/DS437/16 
 
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  light of the context of each individual determinat ion and issue. The United States further pointed 
out that, besides the Government of China, other interested parties also sought extensions for responding to the questionnaires issued by the USDOC. Finally, the United States noted that, to 
the extent that China chooses not to provide the information requested by the USDOC in the 
investigations at issue, the USDOC will have to re ly on the "facts available" to fill any information 
gap. In response to questioning at the hearing, the United States referred to the Appellate Body's 
interpretation of Article 12.7 of the SCM Agreem ent in the underlying dispute and explained that a 
substantial amount of analysis would be required on the part of the USDOC in cases where China 
does not provide the requested information. 
3.32.  Third, the parties' positions with respect to  the amount of time required for verification of 
information diverge substantially. The United States confirmed at the hearing that a period of 
2.5 months is required for the verification phase in the investigations at issue. China argues that, 
because verification is a "discretionary" step under US law, and because the USDOC does not appear to have conducted verifications in the past in relation to the vast majority of its 
redeterminations under Section 129 of the URAA, ti me for verification should not be taken into 
account for determining the reasonable period of time for implementation.
103 Even if verification is 
considered in determining the reasonable period of time for implementation, China asserts that 
this phase should take no longer than 2 weeks, given that, in original investigations and 
administrative reviews conducted by the USDOC,  a typical verification lasts between 1 and 
2 weeks.104 Moreover, China highlights that the Government of China has submitted factual 
information in only six of the 15 countervailing duty investigations at issue and, even for the 
information that it has submitted, verification is unnecessary as it consists overwhelmingly of laws 
and regulations of China.105 
3.33.  In response, the United States contends that, although verifications are not required in 
every investigation, the USDOC still requires time to verify new factual information if 
circumstances warrant it.106 The United States highlights that, in the particular circumstances of 
this dispute, verification is necessary as new information and more complex analysis is required in 
the light of the complexity of the re commendations and rulings of the DSB.107 The United States 
also points out that, under Article 12.6 of the SCM Agreement, an investigating authority possesses the discretion to determine whether verification is necessary.
108 According to the 
United States, the verification process in the investigations at issue cannot be completed in 
2 weeks because it involves: the preparation of ve rification outlines and questionnaires, which are 
sent to the parties before verification; travel to China for collection and analysis of data on-site; and preparing and issuing verification  reports after returning from China.
109  
3.34.  Fourth, the parties disagree over the time period required for noting and correcting 
ministerial errors, and for consultations with the US Congress, before the final determinations are implemented. The United States proposes a period of 1 month to address ministerial errors in the 
final determinations, and a period of 1.5 months to consult with the US Congress and to 
implement the final determinations.
110 China considers that a period of 1.5 months would be 
sufficient to carry out all of these tasks.111 N o t i n g  t h a t  m i n i s t e r i a l  e r r o r s  a r e ,  b y  d e f i n i t i o n ,  
non-substantive clerical errors, China contends that it should not be laborious or time-consuming 
for the USDOC to address them expeditiously.112 China also submits that the consultation and 
implementation processes were consistently conc luded less than 2 weeks after the USDOC issued 
its final determination, and that there is no reason that a comparable time would not suffice in this 
case. 
                                               
103 China's submission, para. 44 (referring to Award of the Arbitrator, Canada – Pharmaceutical Patents 
(Article 21.3(c)) , para. 51).  
104 China's submission, para. 45. 
105 China's submission, para. 46. 
106 United States' opening statement at the hearing. 
107 United States' opening statement at the hearing. 
108 United States' opening statement at the hearing. 
109 United States' opening statement at the hearing.  
110 United States' submission, p. 13. 
111 China's submission, para. 48. 
112 China's submission, para. 48. WT/DS437/16 
 
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  3.35.  At the hearing, the United States asserted that, whilst not substantive, ministerial errors are 
more than mere clerical errors, as they also include arithmetic errors. Moreover, before such 
errors can be addressed and corrected, there may be threshold issues about whether something constitutes a clerical error or a methodological issue. The United States explained that, generally, 
ministerial errors are addressed within 30 days afte r a final determination, but that, in the present 
case, additional time is needed for consultation s and implementation because of the number of 
investigations at issue. 
3.36.  Fifth, the parties also disagree whether the current workload of the USDOC is a factor that 
should be taken into account in determining the reasonable period of time for implementation. The United States points out that, in addition to conducting the redeterminations at issue here, the USDOC also needs to continue working on other ongoing anti-dumping and countervailing duty 
investigations, and that the USDOC is experiencing a 12-year "record high" for original 
investigations.
113 According to the United States, the 15 investigations at issue are a significant 
addition to the USDOC's workload, and, even though the USDOC is giving priority to the 
investigations at issue, statutory deadlines and other legal obligations that the USDOC has in other 
investigations should also be taken into account.  
3.37.  China contends that the high workload of  the USDOC cannot be a reason for extending the 
period of time needed for implementation in th e light of the fundamental obligations assumed by 
the Members of the WTO.114 In this regard, China recalls that the arbitration award in US – 1916 
Act (Article 21.3(c)) considered that factors such as the volume of legislation proposed before the 
US Congress could not be a reason for extending th e reasonable period of time for implementation 
in that dispute.115  
3.3.3  Legal analysis 3.38.  Article 21.3(c) of the DSU lays down the guideline for the arbitrator that the reasonable 
period of time for implementation should not exce ed 15 months from the date of adoption of the 
panel and/or the Appellate Body reports. The text  of Article 21.3(c) further provides that the 
reasonable period of time may be shorter or lo nger, depending on the particular circumstances. 
Having reviewed in the preceding section the positions of the parties concerning the particular 
circumstances invoked in the present case, it is necessary to assess their bearing, if any, on the reasonable period of time for implementation.  
3.39.  For the United States, a reasonable period of time of 19 months is justified in the present 
case on account of the number of countervailing duty investigations at issue, the number of 
findings by the Panel and the Appellate Body that  must be addressed, the complexity of these 
findings, as well as the current workload of the USDOC.
116 China, for its part, submits that 
10 months would be a reasonable period of time for the United States to implement the 
DSB's recommendations and rulings, arguing that several steps of the implementation process require less time than requested by the United States.
117  
3.40.  The first point of contention concerns China's proposition that Section 129(b)(2) of the 
URAA imposes a maximum timeframe of 180 days for the USDOC to issue a redetermination implementing the recommendations and rulings of the DSB.
118 The parties agree that 
implementation of the recommendations and ruli ngs of the DSB in the present case may be 
achieved through the process set out in Section 129 of the URAA. However, they disagree as to 
whether that provision prescribes a maximum timeframe for the implementation process. Section 129(b) of the URAA reads: 
                                               
113 United States' submission, para. 59.  
114 China's submission, para. 49 (referring to Award of the Arbitrator, US – 1916 Act (Article 21.3(c)) , 
para. 38). 
115 China's opening statement at the hearing (referring to Award of the Arbitrator, US – 1916 Act 
(Article 21.3(c)) , para. 38). 
116 United States' opening statement at the hearing. 
117 China's submission, para. 27 and table thereto. 
118 China's submission, paras. 21-24.  WT/DS437/16 
 
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  (b) ACTION BY ADMINISTERING AUTHORITY. 
(1) CONSULTATIONS WITH ADMINISTERING AUTHORITY AND CONGRESSIONAL 
COMMITTEES. Promptly after a report by a dispute settlement panel or the Appellate Body is issued that contains findings that an action by the administering authority in a 
proceeding under title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930 is not in conformity with the 
obligations of the United States under the Antidumping Agreement or the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, the Trade Representative shall consult with 
the administering authority and the congressional committees on the matter. 
(2) DETERMINATION BY ADMINISTERING AUTHORITY. Notwithstanding any provision 
of the Tariff Act of 1930, the administerin g authority shall, within 180 days after 
receipt of a written request from the Trade Representative, issue a determination in 
connection with the particular proceeding that would render the administering 
authority's action described in paragraph (1) not inconsistent with the findings of the panel or the Appellate Body. 
(3) CONSULTATIONS BEFORE IMPLEMENTATION. Before the administering authority 
implements any determination under paragraph (2), the Trade Representative shall consult with the administering authority and the congressional committees with 
respect to such determination. 
(4) IMPLEMENTATION OF DETERMINATION. The Trade Representative may, after 
consulting with the administering authority and the congressional committees under paragraph (3), direct the administering authority to implement, in whole or in part, 
the determination made under paragraph (2). 
3.41.  China argues that Section 129(b)(2) of the URAA imposes a maximum timeframe of 
180 days for the USDOC to issue a determination implementing the recommendations and rulings 
of the DSB. According to the text of the pr ovision, the period of 180 days specified in 
Section 129(b)(2) refers to the period within which,  following the receipt of a written request from 
the USTR, the USDOC shall issue a determination implementing the recommendations and rulings 
of the DSB. However, Sections 129(b)(1), (3), and (4) set out other actions involving the USTR, 
the USDOC, and the US Congress, both befo re and after the step contemplated in 
Section 129(b)(2). It has not been established, therefore, that the 180-day time period specified in Section 129(b)(2) is, as argued by China, the ma ximum amount of time for the USDOC to issue a 
determination implementing the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in every case.  
3.42.  Second, concerning the size of the dispute insofar as it may be relevant for the 
determination of the reasonable period of ti me for implementation, the parties agree that 
five findings by the Panel and one finding by the Appellate Body give rise to the implementation 
obligations in the present case. These six findings relate to different aspects of 15 countervailing duty investigations found to be WTO-inconsistent. While these numbers serve to highlight the size 
of the dispute and the extensive nature of the United States' implementation obligations, the 
United States clarified at the hearing that it does  not seek additional time for the implementation 
of the Panel's "as such" finding of inconsistency concerning the policy articulated in the Kitchen Shelving investigation in addition to what it has requested for implementing the "as applied" 
rulings regarding the USDOC's "public body" determinations.
119 Therefore, the "as such" finding of 
inconsistency concerning the policy articulated in Kitchen Shelving should not be taken into consideration in arriving at the reasonable period of time for implementation. Effectively, 
therefore, five findings by the Panel and the Appellate Body are relevant for determining the 
reasonable period of time in this dispute.  
3.43.  Third, in addition to the number of findin gs and the investigations at issue, the complexity 
of several legal interpretations and findings made  by the Panel and the Appellate Body are also 
relevant insofar as they bear upon the United States' implementation process. For example, with respect to the USDOC's "public body" determinations , the Panel found that the United States acted 
inconsistently with Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement when the USDOC treated SOEs as 
public bodies based solely on the grounds that these enterprises were (majority) owned, or 
                                               
119 United States' response to questioning at the hearing.  WT/DS437/16 
 
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  otherwise controlled by the Government of China.120 Therefore, in implementing this finding, the 
USDOC would be required to consider additional factors and undertake "further inquiry"121 
compared to the original investigations. Similarly, as the parties agreed at the hearing, implementation of the Appellate Body's benchmark distortion finding in four of the investigations 
at issue would require the USDOC to consider factors other than those considered in the original 
proceedings when assessing whether the proposed benchmark prices are market determined or distorted by government intervention (e.g. the structure of the relevant market and the behaviour 
of the entities operating in that market).
122  
3.44.  Fourth, regarding the time for pre-commencement analysis and consultations, the 
United States explained at the hearing that this  phase concerns preparatory work by the USDOC, 
such as determining what information needs to be sought from the interested parties in the light of 
the recommendations and rulings of the DSB, as well as consultations between the USTR, USDOC, 
and the US Congress.123 With respect to these actions, it is worth noting that the United States 
chose not to appeal five of the Panel's findings  of inconsistency. Thus, as of the moment the 
United States filed its other appeal in this dispute on 27 August 2014, it became clear that these 
five findings by the Panel would not be appealed and that action to implement these findings would be required on the part of the United States on ce the Panel and the Appellate Body Reports were 
adopted.
124 Therefore, with respect to these five findin gs of inconsistency by the Panel, it seems 
reasonable to expect that the US authorities entrusted with implementation could begin their 
preparatory work and consultations once it became clear that the Panel's findings would not be appealed. Indeed, the United States confirmed at the hearing that some preparatory work for the 
implementation of these findings was undertaken prior to the adoption of the Panel and Appellate 
Body Reports by the DSB on 16 January 2015. At the same time, the text of the DSU makes it clear that formal steps for implementing the reco mmendations and rulings of the DSB need to be 
taken only after the adoption of the panel and Appellate Body reports. 
3.45.  Fifth, insofar as the time for seeking info rmation from interested parties and analysing that 
information is concerned, China confirmed that it will be providing further information in only 
six countervailing duty investigations at issue, all concerning the steel industry. At the hearing, the 
parties agreed that the information submitted by the Government of China across the six investigations is similar, if not the same. On the one hand, the fact that the Government of China will be providing new information in only six investigations, as well as the similarity of the 
information submitted by it across these investigations, weighs in favour of a shorter period of 
time for analysing such information. On the other hand, there is merit in the United States' argument that, besides the Government of China, other interested parties may provide additional 
information; as well as in the point that, though the information submitted by the Government of 
China may be similar, the analysis of such information may be different in the light of the specific determination that needs to be made in each investigation. Furthermore, although China has 
stated that it had sought only two extensions to respond to the questionnaires issued by the 
USDOC, the United States confirmed at the hearing that other interested parties have also sought extensions of the deadlines for responding to the USDOC's questionnaires. Moreover, in the investigations where China will not be providing the information requested by the USDOC, the 
USDOC will have to rely on the "facts available" to fill any information gap. Though China argues 
that "past experience indicates that the USDOC's analysis when it resorts to 'facts available' will likely be limited"
125, at the hearing, the United States ex plained that, in view of the Appellate 
Body's interpretation of Articl e 12.7 of the SCM Agreement, a su bstantial amount of additional 
analysis would be required on the part of the USDOC in cases where China does not provide the 
requested information. 
                                               
120 Panel Report, para. 7.75. 
121 Panel Report, para. 7.72. 
122 Appellate Body Report, para. 4.62. Moreover, it is to be noted that, as acknowledged by the 
United States at the hearing, inte rpretations by the Appellate Body of  certain other provisions of the 
SCM Agreement may also bear upon the implementation process and, consequently, upon the reasonable period of time for implementation. (See supra , fn 65 and infra, para. 3.45) 
123 See also United States' submission, para. 26. 
124 It is also to be noted in this regard that Section 129(b)(1) of the URAA states that consultations 
between the USTR, USDOC, and the US Congress should  begin "promptly" after a panel or Appellate Body 
report is issued, and not just after th e adoption of such reports by the DSB.  The fact that US law provides for 
such flexibility was confirmed by the United States at the hearing. 
125 China's submission, fn 43 to para. 35.  WT/DS437/16 
 
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  3.46.  Sixth, with respect to the time required for verification of the information received by the 
USDOC, and regardless of whether or not the USDOC is required under US law to conduct verification in all of the investigations at issu e, Article 12.5 of the SCM Agreement requires that 
investigating authorities " shall … satisfy themselves as to the accuracy of the information supplied 
by interested Members or interested parties".
126 In the present dispute, given that the USDOC may 
have to examine factors other than those considered by it in its original analyses in the light of the findings by the Panel and the Appellate Body, it may seek and receive new information from the 
Government of China or other interested parties for which verification may be warranted. With 
respect to the time period for the identification and correction of ministerial errors, as well as consulting with the US Congress, these two steps could reasonably be carried out simultaneously for some investigations where the correction of the ministerial errors would not affect the 
substance of the determination. 
3.47.  Seventh, the parties also disagree over the means to implement the Panel's finding of 
inconsistency relating to the initiation of investigations concerning certain export restraints in the 
Magnesia Bricks and Seamless Pipe investigations. China asserts that withdrawal of the 
inconsistent measures is the only means to implement the Panel's finding, while the United States asserts that modification of the measure can also bring them into compliance with the Panel's 
finding. As a threshold matter, an arbitrator may consider whether the implementing action falls 
within the range of permissible actions that can be taken in order to implement the DSB's recommendations and rulings.
127 Although the arbitrator's mandate does not include reviewing the 
consistency with WTO law of the measure taken to comply with the recommendations and rulings 
of the DSB, in determining the reasonable peri od of time for implementation, the means of 
implementation available to the Member concerned is necessarily a relevant consideration.128 
Moreover, the task of the arbitrator includes scrutinizing the actions an implementing Member 
takes towards implementation during the period after the adoption of a panel and/or 
Appellate Body report, and prior to any arbitration proceeding.129 If the arbitrator perceives that 
the implementing Member has not adequately begun implementation so as to effect "prompt 
compliance", as set out in Article 21.1 of the DSU, this must be taken into account in determining 
the reasonable period of time for implementation. 
3.48.  Even assuming that, as the United States asserts, modification of the determinations at 
issue falls within the range of permissible actions to implement the Panel's finding of inconsistency 
concerning export restraints, it is to be noted that the United States confirmed at the hearing that, 
at that time, the USDOC was still analysing the new information supplied by the United States' domestic industry to assess whether it meets the standard of initiation.
130 If the 
USDOC determines that the new information on the administrative record is sufficient for initiation, 
the United States submits that an investigation will be initiated, which will include all the component steps of the redetermination process identified in paragraph 3.22.  above.
131 It has 
been more than 7 months since the adoption of the Panel and Appellate Body Reports in this 
dispute. In this period, the USDOC received new information from the US domestic industry on 11 May 2015.
132 Nearly 4 months after receiving this information, the USDOC has not reached a 
decision on whether modification of the measures at issue is possible. This shows that the 
implementation process in the Magnesia Bricks and Seamless Pipes investigations, as it relates to 
the Panel's finding concerning export restraints, could reasonably have proceeded further than it 
has. Consequently, the implementation process in these investigations should not be considered as 
a reason for extending the reasonable period of time for implementation. 
3.49.  Finally, with respect to the relevance of the workload of the USDOC, in view of the 
fundamental obligations assumed by the Members of the WTO133, the current workload of the 
USDOC should not be considered as relevant to the determination of the reasonable period of time 
for implementation in this dispute. While the United States' assertion that the USDOC is 
                                               
126 Emphasis added. 
127 Award of the Arbitrator, Japan – DRAMs (Korea) (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 27. 
128 Award of the Arbitrator, Japan – DRAMs (Korea) (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 27. 
129 Award of the Arbitrator, US–Section 110(5) Copyright Act (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 46. 
130 United States' submis sion, paras. 54 and 56. 
131 United States' submis sion, paras. 54 and 56. 
132 Exhibit USA-15. 
133 Award of the Arbitrator, US – 1916 Act (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 38. WT/DS437/16 
 
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  experiencing a 12-year "record high" for original investigations134, and that therefore the 
15 investigations at issue are a significant addition to the USDOC's workload elicit sympathy, it is 
to be recalled that the implementing Member is expected to use all available flexibilities within its legal system to ensure "prompt compliance" with the DSB's recommendations and rulings in 
accordance with Article 21 of the DSU.
135 As the United States confirmed at the hearing, 
prioritizing these investigations reflects the exercise  of a flexibility that is available to the USDOC, 
and which it is expected to utilize.  
3.50.  In conclusion, in the light of the above considerations relating to the quantitative and 
qualitative aspects of implementation in the presen t case, and the margin of flexibility available to 
the implementing Member within its legal system, the Arbitrator considers that the particular 
circumstances of this case justify a reasonable period of time for implementation close to the 
15-month guideline laid down in Article 21.3(c) of the DSU, but do not justify a longer period. 
4  AWARD 4.1.  In the light of the foregoing considerat ions, the "reasonable period of time" for the 
United States to implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in this dispute is 
14 months and 16 days from 16 January 2015, that is, from the date on which the DSB adopted the Panel and Appellate Body Reports in this dispute. Thus, the reasonable period of time will 
expire on 1 April 2016. 
Signed in the original at Geneva this 7th day of October 2015 by:  
 
 
________________________ 
Georges M. Abi-Saab 
Arbitrator 
   
                                               
134 United States' submission, para. 59.  
135 Award of the Arbitrator, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 73. WT/DS437/16 
 
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 ANNEX A 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE UN ITED STATES' SUBMISSION  
1. At its meeting on January 16, 2015, the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) adopted its 
recommendations and rulings in United States – Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products 
from China (DS437). Pursuant to Article 21.3 of the DSU, the United States circulated a letter to 
the DSB on February 13, 2015, stating that it intends to comply with the DSB's recommendations and rulings in a manner that respects its WTO obligations, and that it would need a reasonable 
period of time (RPT) to do so. The United States engaged in discussions with China in an effort to 
reach agreement on the RPT, but the parties were  unable to reach agreement and China requested 
arbitration pursuant to Article 21.3(b) of the DSU. 
2. The amount of time that a Member requires for implementation of DSB recommendations 
and rulings depends on the particular facts and circumstances of the dispute, including the scope 
of the recommendations and rulings and the type s of procedures required under the Member's 
domestic laws to make the necessary changes in the measures at issue. As a prior arbitrator 
found, "what constitutes a reasonable period … shou ld be defined on a case-by-case basis, in the 
light of the specific circumstances of each investigation." Specific circumstances include: (1) the legal form of implementation; (2) the technical complexity of the measure the Member must draft, 
adopt, and implement; and (3) the period of time in which the implementing Member can achieve 
that proposed legal form of implementation in accordance with its system of government. 
3. In this arbitration, a specific circumstance of overarching import is that this dispute is one of 
the most extensive in the history of the World Trade Organization. As the complaining party, China 
decided how to structure this dispute, including how many countervailing duty (CVD) 
investigations to include in this single dispute and which claims to file. China sought findings on multiple claims with respect to each of 22 separate investigations. The panel and Appellate Body 
appropriately rejected many of China's claims. None theless, the findings in the panel and Appellate 
Body reports have resulted in an extens ive, and arguably unprecedented, number of 
DSB recommendations and rulings. 
4. As the Arbitrator considers the time required for the United States Department of Commerce 
(Commerce) to address these rulings, a key factor is that neither the Appellate Body nor the Panel found with respect to any of the CVD investigations at issue that the subject imports were not subsidized. Instead, a fact-intensive inquiry is necessary to determine whether and how the 
determinations in the 15 investigations need to be modified to implement the 
DSB recommendations and rulings with respect to each obligation at issue. In particular, implementation requires a reexamination of existi ng record evidence, the possible solicitation and 
review of new information, and re-examination of  the disputed issues according to the guidance 
set out in the specific findings in the panel and Appellate Body reports. 
5. The RPT determined by the arbitrator shou ld be of sufficient length to allow the 
United States to implement all of the various DSB recommendations and rulings in a manner 
consistent with the DSB findings. This result would preserve the rights of the United States to have 
a reasonable time for compliance and to impose CVD duties where appropriate, while at the same time would preserve China's rights, and enforce ob ligations on the United States, to ensure that 
CVD duties are imposed only in accordance with WTO rules. On the other hand, if the RPT is too 
short to allow for effective implementation, the likelihood of a "positive solution" to the dispute would be reduced.  
6. Any single investigation in this dispute requires a multi-step process to ensure that it meets 
both WTO rules and U.S. domestic legal obligations. The United States has already completed many of the necessary steps to bring these 15 measures into compliance. However, although the 
United States has made meaningful progress on im plementation, the bulk of the work required for 
implementation remains to be completed. Ques tionnaire responses need to be reviewed, and 
supplementary questionnaires will need to be issued . Verifications of the data, as needed, will need 
to be completed and Commerce will need to reconsider, where appropriate, redo its calculations 
from the original final determinations. While any single investigation requires considerable time WT/DS437/16 
 
- 24 - 
 
  and effort, coordinating the modification of 15 investigations, each with diverse fact patterns and 
parties will require a significant demand on the authority's time and resources.  
7. Article 21.3(c) addresses situations such as this one where the implementation obligations 
require many steps and require an exceptional period  of time for completion. Article 21.3(c) states 
that in general the reasonable period of time should not exceed 15 months, but "that time may be 
shorter or longer, depending on the particular circumstances" of the dispute. 
8. The United States is taking the necessary administrative actions to bring these 
15 investigations into compliance with the DSB's recommendations and rulings. The number of 
investigations in this dispute, the volume and complexity of the rulings and recommendations, and Commerce's current workload should all be considered in determining the appropriate RPT to secure a "positive solution" for this dispute. For the reasons outlined in this submission, an RPT of 
at least 19 months is a reasonable period of time for implementation in this dispute. 
 
 
_______________ 
 WT/DS437/16 
 
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 ANNEX B 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF CHINA'S SUBMISSION  
1. The United States argues in its submission that the reasonable period of time for it to 
implement the recommendations and rulings of the Dispute Settlement Body ("DSB") in the 
dispute US – Countervailing Measures  (China) should be 19 months from the adoption of the panel 
and Appellate Body reports. The United States maintains that this period, which is substantially longer than the recommended guideline in Arti cle 21.3(c) of the Understanding on Rules and 
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes  ("DSU"), is necessitated by domestic legal 
requirements, the alleged complexity of the issues  involved, and the USDOC's current workload. In 
China's view, however, these are not "particular circ umstances" that justify a reasonable period of 
time ("RPT") for implementation longer than the 15-month guideline provided in Article 21.3(c) of 
the DSU. The United States has failed to establish that a reasonable period of time longer than 
10 months is required to implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in this dispute.  
2. Based on the language in Article 21 of the DSU, it is well established that any "reasonable 
period of time" under Article 21.3(c) must be "the shortest period possible within the legal system 
of the Member to implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB".
1 The implementing 
Member is expected to use whatever flexibility is available within its legal system to promptly 
implement those recommendations and rulings.2  
3. In this dispute, the recommendations and rulings  of the DSB are limited to particular aspects 
of the USDOC's analysis in specific countervailing duty determinations. Thus, at issue in this arbitration is the "shortest period possible" for the United States to modify the relevant 
determinations pursuant to the procedures outlined in Sections 129(b)-(d) of the Uruguay Round 
Agreements Act ("URAA"). 
4. China notes that pursuant to Sections 129(b)-(d) of the URAA, the USDOC has considerable 
flexibility to implement the recommendations and ru lings of the DSB in a much shorter period than 
it has proposed. This is evident from the abse nce of mandatory minimum timeframes for any of 
the component steps for a redetermination.
3 In fact, the only timeframe that appears in 
Sections 129(b)-(d) of the URAA is the maximum  timeframe in Section 129(b)(2), which provides 
that the administering authority "shall, within 180 days after receipt of a written request from the Trade Representative, issue a determination in connection with the particular proceeding that would render the administering authority's action described in paragraph (1) not inconsistent with 
the findings of the panel or the Appellate Body."
 4 This 180-day deadline in Section 129(b)(2) is 
undoubtedly an indication of the maximum amount of time that the U.S. government  thought 
would be necessary for the USDOC in every case  to issue a determination not inconsistent with the 
findings of a panel or the Appellate Body.  
5. In its written submission, the United States explains that it needs 19 months in order to 
come into compliance with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB. This is more than three 
times the 180-day timeframe in Section 129(b)(2 ) of the URAA, and more than four times the 
normal timeframe for a standard USDOC countervailing duty investigation.5 The United States 
seeks to justify the lengthy RPT that it proposes by reference to a breakdown of what it considers   
                                               
1 See, e.g. Award of the Arbitrator, EC – Hormones (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 26. 
2 See, e.g. Award of the Arbitrator, Colombia – Ports of Entry (Article 21.3(c)), para. 65. 
3 See, e.g. Award of the Arbitrator, Colombia – Ports of Entry (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 83; Award of the 
Arbitrator, China – GOES (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 3.47. 
4 See Award of the Arbitrator, US – Hot Rolled Steel (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 34. 
5 See 19 CFR §§ 351.201-351.211. WT/DS437/16 
 
- 26 - 
 
  to be the necessary steps in the Section 129 proceedings. In China's view, certain of the time 
periods proposed by the United States are both unsupported and unsupportable. For example:   The United States maintains that 3.5 months is the "shortest period possible" for USTR to 
consult with Congress and the USDOC, and fo r "pre-commencement analysis preparation".
6 
However, China notes that the final panel report in this dispute, containing five of the six relevant findings, was issued to the parties in May 2014. Accordingly, it is unclear to 
China why the United States needed an additional 3.5 months after the report was adopted 
by the DSB in January 2015 to engage in "pre-commencement analysis preparation".
7  
 The United States maintains that six months is the "shortest period possible" for the USDOC 
to collect and analyse the information from interested parties, arguing that this dispute is 
"one of the most extensive in the history of the World Trade Organization".8 However, the 
United States fails to account for the fact that China has made clear that it will not be responding to the USDOC's questionnaires in the majority of the relevant investigations, 
meaning that there will be no new information for the USDOC to analyse. And while the 
United States devotes a substantial portion of its submission to the complexity of the analysis that the USDOC confronts in relation to each of the relevant issues, the 
United States fails to acknowledge that in an ordinary countervailing duty investigation, an 
examination of these issues would encompass a mere fraction of the USDOC's overall analysis.  
6. The United States has the burden of proof as  the implementing Member to demonstrate that 
its proposed RPT is the "shortest period possible" for it to implement the recommendations and 
rulings of the DSB. For the reasons discussed above, China does not believe that the United States has come close to meeting its burden in relation to its proposed RPT of 19 months.  
 
  
__________  
                                               
6 See U.S. submission, paras. 26-27, 37. 
7 See, e.g. Award of the Arbitrator, China – GOES (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 3.37. 
8 See U.S. submission, p. 12 ("DS437 – Approximate 19 Month Case Calendar") and para. 4