TN/RL/W/275  
 
8 May 2018  
(18-2809) Page: 1/3 
Negotiating Group on Rules  Original: English  
 
ADVANCING FISHERIES SUBSIDIES PROHBITION S ON SUBSIDIES CONTR IBUTING  
TO OVERCAPACITY AND OVERFISHING  
NEW ZEALAND/ICELAND  
The following communication, dated 7 May 2018, is being circulated at the request of the 
Delegations of New Zealand and Iceland.  
 
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Introduction  
 
1. World Leaders made a time bound commitment in 2015 in Sustainable Development Goal 
(SDG) Targe t 14.6 to reform fisheries subsidies: 'By 2020, prohibit certain forms of fisheries 
subsidies which contribute to overcapacity and overfishing, eliminate subsidies that contribute to 
illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing and refrain from introducing new such subsidies, 
recognizing that appropriate and effective special and differential treatment for developing and 
least developed countries should be an integral part of the World Trade Organization fisheries 
subsidies negotiation'.  
 
2. In recognition of t he limited time to meet this commitment, and the need for multilateral 
disciplines to be meaningful and not undermined through exceptions, Ministers gave a clear and 
unambiguous directive to WTO Members at the 11th Ministerial Conference to deliver 
'compre hensive and effective ' disciplines by 2019, and thus fulfil and implement SDG Goal 14.6 . 
 
3. For the purposes of the discussions in the week of 14 May as outlined in the Work 
Programme on overcapacity and overfishing, this submission poses some questions on disciplines 
in the texts referred to in the Ministerial Decision with respect to prohibitio ns related to 
overcapacity and overfishing. Subsidies which contribute to overcapacity and overfishing form the 
most harmful fisheries related subsidies, and it is appropriate that considerable efforts be 
expended in getting these disciplines right, in add ition to the other important elements, including 
IUU fishing, enhanced transparency, and Special and Differential Treatment.  
 
4. Overcapacity and Overfishing . The scope of prohibitions on overcapacity and overfishing 
related subsidies are critical to impleme nting SDG Target 14.6 and the Ministerial Decision. At 
times during the 2017 RNG negotiations, the distinctions between the concepts of overcapacity 
and overfishing became somewhat blurred. It is therefore worth recalling the meanings of these 
terms (see N ew Zealand 's Technical Paper ( TN/RL/W/261 )): 
 
2.5 The term 'overfishing' refers to the situation where the percentage or proportion 
of a stock that is removed  by fishing each year exceeds the level associated with 
MSY. Where overfishing is occurring, the percentage of the fish stock being caught is 
not sustainable so, unless reduced, a stock will either become or remain overfished. 
Overfishing is therefore a pr ecursor to a stock becoming overfished.  
 
2.6. Overfishing can occur on fish stocks that are not overfished (i.e. fully or under 
exploited stocks) as well as those that are already overexploited. If one thinks of 
overfishing as the action, then overfished s tocks are the result of that action.  
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  2.7. The term 'overcapacity' refers to the situation where the number of fishing 
vessels or the size of a fishing fleet exceeds that required to harvest the sustainable 
or allowable catch. Overfishing is therefore a re sult of overcapacity, with both leading 
to stocks becoming overfished. Overcapacity is sometimes also referred to as excess 
capacity or overcapitalisation.  
 
5. Document TN/RL/W/274/Rev.2 contains a number of bracketed prohibitions of subsidies that 
contribute  to overcapacity and overfishing with varying scope and approach i.e. prohibiting 
subsidies. The following usefully demonstrates the potential range of options available for 
structuring the prohibitions:  
 
 which impact capacity e.g. that increase or mainta in capacity with listed examples;  
 
 by type e.g. operating costs with listed examples;  
 
 to fishing in a specified area e.g. limited to beyond national jurisdiction; and/or  
 
 depending on the context e.g. where stocks are overfished or quotas are absent . 
 
6. SDG Target 14.6 is clear that subsidies that contribute to both overcapacity and overfishing 
must be prohibited. An outcome which excluded the most harmful types of subsidies which 
contribute to overcapacity and overfishing would therefore not satisfy SDG Target 14.6. An 
outcome that addressed capacity or overfishing in just a hortatory way or in a manner that applied 
disciplines only to a small subset of subsidies or the world 's fishing fleet would similarly fail to 
meet the requirements of SDG Target 14.6 . 
 
7. For example, the current emphasis on subsidies to fishing beyond national jurisdiction is 
warranted given the weaker governance and resource and development impacts of such fishing. 
This however must not be at the exclusion of waters under national juri sdiction where the vast 
majority of global catch – 88% – is taken .1 Similarly, the emphasis on overfished stocks should not 
equate to an exception for other stocks as doing so would exclude nearly 70% of the world 's 
fisheries .2 Taken together, these two ap proaches alone would result in barely 8% of the world 's 
fisheries being subject to subsidy prohibitions .3 
 
8. With this context in mind, we propose questions for Members to bear in mind when 
presenting information about their subsidy programmes at a technical  level, and in discussing 
issues arising from the various text proposals in order to help focus our discussions. These are 
aimed at complementing the questions submitted by the RNG for the thematic discussion.   
 
Technical sessions: Members with fisheries subsidies for fishing operating and capital costs  
 
a. are the programmes consistent with SDG Target 14.6 and the 2020 deadline, and if so 
how? 
b. what is the duration of the programmes?  
c. to what extent have the programmes met the policy objectives and impacted 
environmental and economic sustainability?  
d. what sectors are supported? e.g. large or small scale?  
e. how, if at all, do Members define their sectors (subsistence, artisanal and small scale 
fisheries)?  
                                                
1 Winners and losers in a world where the high seas is closed to fishing, 12 February 2015. U. Rashid 
Sumaila, Vicky W. Y. Lam, Dana D. Miller, Louise Teh, Reg A. Watson, Dirk Zeller, William W. L. Cheung, 
Isabelle M. Côté, Alex D. Rogers, Callum Roberts, E nric Sala & Daniel Pauly. Scientific Reports 5, 8481 
https://www.nature.com/articles/srep08481   
2 FAO. 2016. The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture 2016. 
3 Two thirds of fish stocks managed by RFMOs are overfished or depleted: Cullis -Suzuki, S. & Pauly, D. 
(2010). Failing the high seas: a global evaluation of regional fisheries management organization. Marine Policy 
34: 1036 –1042.  TN/RL/W/275  
 
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  f. what is the status of the fish stocks in the fishery for whi ch the subsidy is provided (for 
example, overfished, fully fished, underfished)?  
g. what is the fleet capacity status in the fishery for which the subsidy is provided?  
h. how do Members ensure the subsidies do not contribute to IUU, overfishing and 
overcapacity?   
Thematic Session: Ensuring comprehensive and effective prohibitions  
 
a. taken individually or collectively, are the proposed subsidy prohibitions in Document 
TN/RL/W/274/Rev.2 of sufficient scope given the breadth of SDG Target 14.6 and the 
MC11 Decision?  
b. a number of Members have proposed S&DT for artisanal fishing on the basis of national 
definitions. How can proponents of such S&DT ensure that such an approach does not 
allow the continuation of subsidies that contribute to IUU, overfishing and overcapacity ? 
What alternative approaches are proponents of S&DT considering for artisanal fishing 
that avoids inadvertently carving out larger scale fishing?  
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