RESTRICTED  
  
G/ADP/M/55  
 
20 December 2018 
(18-8065) Page: 1/15 
Committee on Anti -Dumping Practices    
 
MINUTES OF THE REGUL AR MEETING  
HELD ON 24 OCTOBER  2018 
CHAIR: MS KARINE  MAHJOUBI ERIKS TEIN (NORWAY ) 
1.  The Committee on Anti -Dumping Practices (the "Committee ") held a regular meeting on 
24 October  2018.  
2.  The Committee adopted the following agenda contained in document WTO/AIR/ADP/ 22: 
1   NATIONAL LEGISLA TION ................................ ................................ ............................  2 
1.1   Review of notifications of new or amended legislatio n or regulations not previously  
reviewed by the Committee (including supplemental notifications of e xisting provisions not 
previously reviewed)  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..........  2 
1.1.1    Afghanistan ( G/ADP/N/1/AFG/1 ) ................................ ................................ ................  2 
1.1.2    Cambodia (G/ADP/N/1/KHM/2 -G/SCM/N/1/KHM/2 -G/SG/N/1/KHM/2)  ............................  2 
1.1.3    Canada (G/ADP/N/1/CAN/4/Suppl.2 -G/SCM/N/1/CAN/4/Suppl.2 -
G/SG/N/1/CAN/3/Suppl.1)  ................................ ................................ ................................ .. 2 
1.1.4    China (G/ADP/N/1/CHN/2/Suppl.7 -G/SCM/N/1/CHN/1/Suppl.5 - 
G/SG/N/1/CHN/2/Suppl.5)  ................................ ................................ ................................ .. 2 
1.1.5    European Union (G/ADP/N/1/EU/3/Suppl.3 -G/SCM/N/1/EU/2/Suppl.3)  ...........................  3 
1.1.6    Japan (G/ADP/N/1/JPN/2/Suppl.9 -G/SCM/N/1/JPN/2/Suppl.9)  ................................ ...... 4 
1.1.7    Chinese Taipei (G/ADP/N/1/TPKM/1/Suppl.2 -G/SCM/N/1/TPK M/1/Suppl.2)  .....................  4 
1.2   Review of notifications of new or amended legislation or regulations with  
outstanding written questions  ................................ ................................ ..............................  4 
1.2.1    Cameroon (G/ADP/N/1/CMR/1/Suppl.1 -G/SCM/N/1/CMR/1/Suppl.1 -
G/SG/N/1/CMR/1/Suppl.1)  ................................ ................................ ................................ .. 4 
1.2.2    El Salvador (G/ADP/N/1/SLV/3/Suppl.1 -G/SCM/N/1/SLV/3/Suppl.1 -
G/SG/N/1/SLV/3/Suppl.1)  ................................ ................................ ................................ ... 4 
1.2.3    European Union (G/ADP/N/1/EU/3/Suppl.2 -G/SCM/N/1/EU/2/Suppl.2)  ...........................  4 
1.2.4    Liberia (G/ADP/N/1/LBR/1)  ................................ ................................ .......................  6 
2   SEMI -ANNUAL REPO RTS OF ANTI -DUMPING ACTIONS (ARTICLE 16. 4) 
(G/ADP/N/314) ................................ ................................ ................................ ..............  7 
3   PRELIMINARY AND FINAL ANTI -DUMPING A CTIONS: NOTIFICATION S ...................  13 
4   CHAIRPERSON' S REPORT ON THE MEET ING OF THE INFORMAL GROUP ON 
ANTI -CIRCUMVENTION  ................................ ................................ ................................ . 14 
5   CHAIRPERSON'S RE PORT ON THE MEETING OF THE WORKING GROUP  ON 
IMPLEMENTATION  ................................ ................................ ................................ ........  15 
6   OTHER BUSINESS  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..... 15 
7   DATE OF THE NEXT  REGULAR MEETING  ................................ ................................ .... 15 
8   ANNUAL REPORT TO  THE COUNCIL FOR TRA DE IN GOODS (ARTICLE  18.6)  .............  15 G/ADP/M/55  
 
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  1  NATIONAL LEGISLATION  
1.1  Review of notifications of new or amended legislation or regulations not previously 
reviewed by the Committee (including supplemental notifications of existing provisions 
not previously reviewed)1 
1.1.1   Afghanistan (G/ADP/N/1/ AFG/1) 
3.  No written questions were posed regarding the notification of Afghanistan.   
4.  Afghanistan  explained that  pursuant to Article 18.5 of the Anti -Dumping ("AD") Agreement, it 
had notified the Committee that it had no laws and/or regulations rele vant to the Agreement .   
1.1.2   Cambodia (G/ADP/N/1/ KHM/2-G/SCM/N/1/ KHM/2-G/SG/N/1/ KHM/2) 
5.  Written questions regarding this notification were posed and can be found in document:  
• G/ADP/Q1/ KHM/1-G/SCM/Q 1/KHM/1-G/SG/Q1/ KHM/1 – Submitted by the United States 
("US")  
6.  Cambodia  was not present at the time . Oral answers were not provided at the meeting nor 
had written answers been received to date.  
1.1.3   Canada  (G/ADP/N/1/ CAN/4/Suppl. 2-G/SCM/N/1/ CAN/4/Suppl. 2-
G/SG/N/1/CAN/3/Suppl.1 ) 
7.  Written questions regarding this notification  were posed and can be found in document:  
• G/ADP/Q1/ CAN/18-G/SCM/Q1/CAN/18-G/SG/Q1/CAN/2  – Submitted by the US  
8.  Canada  provided oral explanations  on the key elements of the amendments to the Special Import 
Measures Act, the Special Import Measures Regulation s, the Canadian International Trade Tribunal 
("CITT" ) Regulations, and the  CITT Rules, which included  the establishment of anti -circumvention 
proceedings, scope proceedings  to determine if a particular product falls within the definition of the 
goods cover ed by the AD or countervailing measures, an alternative methodology of calculating 
dumping margins  in situations where domestic prices in the exporting country were distorted due to 
a particular market situation, and the labour union's explicit right to pa rticipate in trade remedy 
investigations.  
9.  Written answers to the US' written questions were provided and can be found in document:  
• G/ADP/Q1/ CAN/19 -G/SCM/Q1/CAN/19 -G/SG/Q1/CAN/3 – Replies to the US  
1.1.4   China (G/ADP/N/1/ CHN/2/Suppl.7 -G/SCM/N/1/CHN/1/Suppl.5 -
G/SG /N/1/CHN/2/Suppl.5 ) 
10.  Written questions were posed regarding this notification and can be found in the following 
document s: 
• G/ADP/Q1/ CHN/71-G/SCM/Q1/CHN/71 -G/SG/Q1/CHN/31  – Submitted by the US  
• G/ADP/Q1/ CHN/72 -G/SCM/Q1/CHN/72 -G/SG/Q1/CHN/32 – Submitted by Canada  
11.  China  explained that it had notified the Interim Rules on Implementation of the WTO Ruling in 
Dispute Concerning Trade Remedy Measure  ("Interim Rules")  to the Committee  and confirmed that 
written answers had already been provided to the US and Canad a. 
                                                
1 Relevant deadlines for written follow -up questions and written answers regarding the notifications of 
legislation reviewed in the October 2018 meeting can be found in section 1 of document G/ADP/W/502 -
G/SCM/W/577 -G/SG/W/244.  G/ADP/M/55  
 
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  12.  Canada  recalled that China's Interim Rules had been in place  since July 2013 and underlined 
that a timely notification  of new legislations and regulations was  a fundamental aspect of the 
AD Agreement.    
13.  Written answers to the written questions were prov ided and can be found in documents:  
• G/ADP/Q1/ CHN/73 -G/SCM/Q1/CHN/73 -G/SG/Q1/CHN/33 – Replies to the US  
• G/ADP/Q1/ CHN/74 -G/SCM/Q1/CHN/74 -G/SG/Q1/CHN/34 – Replies to Canada  
1.1.5   European Union ( G/ADP/N/1/EU/3/Suppl.3 -G/SCM/N/1/EU/2/Suppl.3 ) 
14.  Written questions regarding this notification were posed and can be found in document:  
• G/ADP/Q1/ EU/9-G/SCM/Q1/EU/9  – Submitted by the US  
15.  The European Union  ("EU") provided oral explanations in response to the questions posed . 
16.   Written answers to the US' written questions were provided and can be found in document:  
• G/ADP/Q1/EU/ 14-G/SCM/Q1/EU/ 14 – Replies to the US  
17.  The US requested  the EU to provide examples of export restrictions that might  be considered 
in the injury margin  calculation . 
18.  In response to the US, the EU referr ed to Article 1(4)(b) of the notified  Regulation that contained 
a list of relevant export restrictions, including,  for instance,  export taxes  and export quota s. The 
EU added that this list was nearly identical to th at of the OECD . 
19.  The Russian Federation  regretted that the EU had adopted  and implemented the 
Regulation  2018/825 envisaging the right of the European Commission not to apply the lesser duty 
rule in case of price distortions for raw materials in the exporting country. An application of the 
lesser duty rule depending on the country of export seemed to contradict  Article 9.2 of the 
AD Agreement that requires the collection of  anti-dumping dut ies on a non -discriminatory basis from 
all sources found to be dumped and causing injury. The new methodolog y led to a misuse of 
instruments designed to counteract unfair pricing behaviours of exporters, as neither Article VI of 
the GATT 1994 nor the AD Agreement was intended to address pricing policies of States. The 
Russian  Federation urged the EU to cease con sidering raw material price distortions  in anti -dumping 
proceedings and to treat imports from WTO Members without discrimination.  
20.  In response to the Russia n Federation, the EU explained that  the notified  law was not intend ed 
to address  pricing policies of States , but to  address dumped imports from a country.  Moreover , the 
AD Agreement neither  prescribes an obligation to apply the lesser duty rule nor a methodology for 
its application . The notified  law called upon the investigati ng autho rity ("IA") to look for export 
restrictions in the exporting country as part of its analysis. In practice,  the notice of init iation would 
refer to export restrictions that would be subject to the investigation and a determination concerning 
the application  of the lesser duty rule.  Thus, the EU failed to see how this practice could lead to a 
discriminatory use.  
21.  The Russian Federation  queried why in certain EU investigations  questionnaires requesting 
information to ascertain the existence of price distortions  for purposes of determining the application 
of the lesser duty rule were addressed only to Russian producers , but not to producers from other 
countries.  
22.  In response, the EU clarified that the issue of export restrictions , as per the  notice of initiation,  
falls within the scope of investigation . In this context, each country's export restrictions would be 
considered individually in the specific context of each country. The notice of initiation  would normally 
limit the issues to be investigated, and only the countries specifically identified in the notice of 
initiation in respect of the issue of export restrictions would be investigated in this regard . The IA 
may only extend the scope of the investigation in respect of export restrictions to other cou ntries 
subject to the same investigation , but whose export restrictions were not identified in the notice of G/ADP/M/55  
 
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  initiation, provided that there is evidence submitted during the investigation substantiating that such  
other  countries are operating export restri ctions . 
1.1.6   Japan (G/ADP/N/1/JPN/ 2/Suppl.9 -G/SCM/N/1/JPN/ 2/Suppl.9 ) 
23.  No written answers were posed regarding the notification of Japan.  
24.  There were no comments or questions raised at the meeting . 
1.1.7   Chinese Taipei (G/ADP/N/1/TPKM/1/Suppl.2 -G/SCM/N/1/TPKM/1/Suppl.2)  
25.  Written questions regarding this notification were posed and can be found in document:  
• G/ADP/Q1/ TPKM/7 -G/SCM/Q1/TPKM/7  – Submitted by the US  
26.  Written answers to the US' written questions were provided and can be found in document:  
• G/ADP/Q1/ TPKM/8 -G/SCM/Q1/ TPKM/8 – Replies to the US  
27.  The Committee took note  of the notifications, statements, questions and answers.  
1.2  Review of notifications of new or amended legislation or regulations with outstanding 
written questions  
1.2.1   Cameroon ( G/ADP/N/1/CMR/1/Suppl.1 -G/SCM/N/1 /CMR/1/Suppl.1 -
G/SG/N/1/CMR/1/Suppl.1 ) 
28.  Written questions were posed regarding this notification and can be found in document:  
• G/ADP/Q1/CMR/3 -G/SCM/Q1/CMR/3 -G/SG/Q1/CMR/3 – Submitted by the US  
29.  Cameroon was not present at the time . Oral answers were not provided at the meeting, nor 
had written answers been received to date.  
1.2.2   El Salvador ( G/ADP/N/1/SLV/3/Suppl.1 -G/SCM/N/1/SLV/3/Suppl.1 -
G/SG/N/1/SLV/3/Suppl.1 ) 
30.  Written questions were posed regarding this notification and can be found in  the following 
documents:  
• G/ADP/Q1/SLV/8 -G/SCM/Q1/SLV/8 -G/SG/Q1/SLV/7 – Submitted by the US  
• G/ADP/Q1/SLV/9 -G/SCM/Q1/SLV/9 -G/SG/Q1/SLV/8 – Submitted by Mexico  
31.  El Salvador  stated that its capital was still working on the responses to the questions by the US 
and Mexico.  
32.  The US and Mexico  looked forward to receiving written responses  to their  written  questions . 
1.2.3   European Union (G/ADP/N/1/ EU/3/Suppl. 2-G/SCM/N/1/ EU/2/Suppl. 2) 
33.  Written questions were posed regarding this notification and can be found in the followin g 
documents:  
• G/ADP/Q1/ EU/5-G/SCM/Q1/ EU/5 – Submitted by Mexico  
• G/ADP/Q1/ EU/6-G/SCM/Q1/ EU/6 – Submitted by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia  
• G/ADP/Q1/EU/7 -G/SCM/Q1/EU/7 – Submitted by the Russian Federation  G/ADP/M/55  
 
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  • G/ADP/Q1/EU/ 8-G/SCM/Q1/EU/ 8 – Submitted by  Kazakhstan  
34.  Written answers were provided and can be found in documents:  
• G/ADP/Q1/ EU/10-G/SCM/Q1/ EU/10 – Replies to Mexico  
• G/ADP/Q1/ EU/11-G/SCM/Q1/ EU/11 – Replies to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia  
• G/ADP/Q1/EU/12 -G/SCM/Q1/EU/12 – Replies to the Russian Federation  
• G/ADP/Q1 /EU/13-G/SCM/Q1/EU/ 13 – Replies to Kazakhstan  
35.  The EU also provided  oral explanations in response to the questions posed by Kazakhstan.   
36.  The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia  reiterated  its concerns regarding  the EU's notified Regulation . 
Referring to Article 16 of the AD Agreement, i t contended that  the Committee was an appropriate  
forum  for discussion and for seeking clarifications  in this regard . The EU's new rules appeared to 
depart from the AD Agreement and the rules of most Members. Moreover, the EU's respon ses did 
not fully engage with the questions raised and remained vague on many aspects. The Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia  thus sought clarifications from the EU on h ow a determination of significant distortion s 
would be made; how normal value would be constructed  when such distortions were established ; 
and how this new methodology was consistent with the EU's WTO obligations . In addition , the 
AD instrument , addressing private pricing behaviour, should not be used to address government 
behaviour . The Kingdom of Sau di Arabia remained  open to continuing the dialogue with the EU  to 
better understand the EU's  revised AD rules.  
37.  The Russian Federation  was concerned with the WTO -consistency of the methodology 
introduced in the EU's notified Regulation.  It pointed to the DSB rulings according to which an 
evaluation of the costs based on benchmarks unrelated to the cost of production in the country of 
origin  was WTO -inconsistent . With respect to the EU's responses, the Russian Federation sought 
clarification s from the EU  in respect of  what is meant by  the reference in recital (3) of the Regulation 
to experience gained in past proceedings, as well as the availability of an exhaustive list of relevant 
labour and environmental conventions.  
38.  In response to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Russian Federation, the EU stressed that 
the Committee meeting was not an appropriate forum to discuss the legal issues. It also explained 
that its notified Regulation dealt with government interventions o nly to the extent that  they 
translated into price distortions or had an impact on normal value.  This was because pricing 
behaviour , albeit private practice,  could be influenced by government interventions.  The EU looked 
forward to receiving written follow -up questions from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the 
Russian  Federation.  
39.  Argentina  referred to its concerns expressed at the Committee meeting in April 2018.  
40.  China  continued to have concerns regarding the EU's new rules for establishing normal value in 
case of significant market distortions  in the exporting country . The EU's approach  would damage the 
AD legal system and increase uncertainty for foreign exporters . The WTO rules did not set forth  the 
concept of significant market distortions, nor did they  allow for the alternative methodology to 
calculate dumping margins when  market distortions existed.  Article 2 of the AD Agreement did not 
provide a legal basis for determining normal value using methodologies not based on a strict 
comparison with the domestic price or cost in the country of origin. Moreover, it was of the view that 
publishing  a report on market distortions  in a particular country or industry  would likely create de 
facto discrimination. China urged the EU to  abide by the WTO rules and to annul all discriminatory 
approaches.  
41.  In response, the EU reiterated its position that this was not the forum to have a pro found legal 
discussion on what could be done or what could not be done under the AD  Agreement . With respect 
to the report on market distortions, the EU clarified that it had not seen any submission that called  
into question the facts compiled therein . G/ADP/M/55  
 
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  1.2.4   Liberia (G/ADP/N/1/ LBR/1) 
42.  Written questions were posed regarding this notification and can be found in document:  
• G/ADP/Q1/ LBR/1 – Submitted by the US  
43.  Liberia was not present at the time . Oral answers were not provided at the meeting, nor 
had written answers be en received to date.  
44.  The Chair indicated that with respect to the agenda item pertaining to continuing review of 
legislative notifications previously reviewed by the Committee, no Member submitted – by 
10 September 2018 deadline - any written questions relating to such notifications. Thus the item 
entitled "National Legislation – Continuing Review of Legislative Notifications Previously 
Reviewed by the Committee " was not on the agenda of the Committee 's October meeting.  
45.  The Chair informed Members that pursuant to the Committee 's agreed procedures in order for 
a new legislative notification to be placed on the agenda of the April meeting of the Committee, the 
notification should be circulated in all three languages by 18 March 2019. Shortly after this date, the 
Secretariat will circulate a document informing Members of all legislative notifications to be reviewed 
at the next Committee meeting in April 2019. 
46.  The Chair reminded Members that pursuant to paragraph 8 of document  G/ADP/W/284/Rev.1, 
all unanswered written questions pertaining to new legislative notifications reviewed at the meeting, 
as well as the subject notifications, shall automatically be retained on the agenda of the next 
Committee meeting and on the agendas o f subsequent Committee meetings until written answers 
are submitted.  
47.  The Chair noted that a new legislative notification from Ecuador , as well as any others received 
and circulated by the applicable deadlines2, would be on the agenda for review at the regu lar meeting 
of the Committee in April 2019.  
48.  The Chair expressed concern that some Members had yet to submit a notification on legislation, 
particularly where all that would be required is a nil notification. The Chair  encouraged Members that 
had not yet ma de a legislative notification to do so as promptly as possible.  
49.  Concerning the revised list of competent authorities contained in document 
G/ADP/N/14/Add. 46, the Chair invited Members that had not done so to submit the information 
required by Article 16.5 of the AD Agreement, and encouraged Members to review and update 
previously submitted information where necessary.  
50.  The US appreciated the fact that most Members had submitted a notification with their domestic 
AD legislation or a one -time nil notification . However, some countries which had not provided a 
notification of their legislative status had indicated in the context of their trade policy review reports 
that they had AD laws in effect. In other words, the respective WTO  Members had already gone to 
the effort of informing the WTO of their AD legislation status, albeit in another forum. The US, 
therefore, encouraged Members to review their respective situations and to make the appropriate 
notification promptly. It added that i n addressing the issue of m issing notifications across a number 
of WTO Committees, the US' proposal in the Council for Trade in Goods was circulated in document 
JOB/CTG/10/Rev.1 on which it had continued to hear additional ideas from Members.  Currently, t he 
EU and Japan were  co-sponsors for the updated version of this proposal.  
51.  New Zealand  was supportive of the US' proposal and encouraged those Members whose 
notification of legislative status had not yet been provided to do so in the interest of transparency.  
52.  The Committee took note  of the notifications, statements, questions and answers.  
                                                
2 Relevant deadlines can be found in Section 1 of document G/ADP/W/502 -G/SCM/W/577 -G/SG/W/244.  G/ADP/M/55  
 
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  2  SEMI -ANNUAL REPORTS OF ANTI -DUMPING ACTI ONS (ARTICLE 16.4) ( G/ADP/N/ 314) 
53.  The Chair recalled that a request for submission of semi -annual reports for the first half of  2018 
had been circulated in doc ument G/ADP/N/ 314. Members taking no AD actions should submit a 
simple letter to that effect twice per year. This would not apply to those Members that had already 
submitted a one -time notification under Articles 16.4 and 16.5 of the AD  Agreement.  
54.  The Cha ir noted that a significant number of Members had not yet responded to the request for 
semi-annual reports. This notification requirement applied to all Members, whether or not they had 
taken AD  actions during the period in question, except for the 49 Memb ers that had already 
submitted a one -time notification.3 The Chair urged Members to comply with this important 
notification requirement.  
55.  The Committee reviewed the semi -annual reports for the first half of 201 8. No Member raised 
questions or made comments concerning the reports of  Argentina; Australia; Canada; Chile; 
Costa  Rica; Dominican Republic; Egypt; Japan; Kazakhstan; Korea , Republic of ; the Member States 
of the Gulf  Cooperation Council (Bahrain, Kingdom of; Kuwait, the State of; Oman; Saudi Arabia, 
Kingdom of; Qatar and United Arab Emirates);  Kyrgyz Republic; Malaysia; Moroc co; New  Zealand;  
Pakistan;  Philippines; Russia n Federation; South Africa; Chinese Taipei; Thailand; Turkey;  Ukraine; 
and Viet Nam . 
56.  On the semi -annual report of Armenia , Ukraine  expressed its concern with the AD investigation 
by the Eurasian Economic Union ("EAEU ") on zinc plated or coated flat -rolled steel products.  It 
pointed out that the petition by the domestic industry did not contain sufficient information and 
evidence of dumped imports and injury to the EAEU  domestic industry, nor the causal link between 
them.  It recalled that many indicators of the EAEU domest ic industry demonstrated a positive trend  
during the period of investigation , for instance, a 68% increase in profit, a 26% increase in return 
on sales, a 24 % increase in salaries, and 2.7 time s increase in investment . Citing Article 5.8 of the 
AD Agreemen t, it was of the view that the petition by the domestic industry should have been 
rejected by the IA.  Moreover, the imposition of AD measures  on the heels of this investigation would 
be in violation of Articles 3.3 and 3.5 of the AD Agreement. Ukraine urge d the EAEU to terminate 
this investigation without imposing AD  measures . 
57.  In response to Ukraine's concerns, Armenia  explained that  the common external tariffs and  
other regulations, including  the regulation on special, protective AD and compensation measur es, 
had been applicable to Armenia since it became a member of the EAEU . According to its accession 
treaty, a decision of the Eurasian Economic Commission on the application of special, protective 
AD and compensat ion measures shall be directly applicable to the territory of Armenia.  Armenia 
confirmed that it would respond to Ukraine's concerns in writing.  
58.  On the semi -annual report of Brazil , Brazil  explained that its notifications concerning trade 
remedy measures  reflected the  results of its public interes t analysis  which could lead to the 
suspension o r alteration of the measures. Brazil's AD legislation was amended in 2013 with a view 
to strengthening  the mechanism to conduct public interest analyses , either ex officio  or upon 
requests of the private secto r. The Technical Group was responsible for evaluating the public interest 
whereby the evaluation encompassed backward and forward changes of positive and negative 
impacts of the trade remedy measures. Subsequently, the results of public interest analys es would 
be submitted to the Ministers in order to help them  decide  whether to apply, suspend, or alter trade 
remedy measures . Brazil  recalled that so far  seven decisions had been based on public interest  
reasons ; in many instances measures were suspended or no duties collected.   
59.  On the semi -annual report of China , Brazil  voiced its concerns with China's investigation on 
broiler or chicken products and the provisional AD measure imposed. It pointed out that  none of the 
requirements to initiate the AD investiga tion or to apply the AD measure had been  met. Specifically, 
the injury analysis  was flawed  because  the Chinese  IA disregarded  that virtually all financial 
indicators of the Chinese domestic industry were improving during the period of investigation. With 
respect to the determination  that the domestic industry could not reach reasonable performance or 
did not do as well as it should be doing due to the allegedly dumped imports from Brazil, Brazil 
contended that  such assessment was inconsistent with Article s 3.1 and 3.4 of the AD Agreement . 
With regard to other aspects of concern  to Brazil, China applied facts available to a fully cooperative 
                                                
3 All such notifications are contained in the G/ADP/N/193  series of documents.  G/ADP/M/55  
 
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  exporter; other known factors injuring the domestic industry were not distinguished from Brazilian 
exports;  the AD meas ure imposed exceeded the dumping margins assigned to the Brazilian 
companies; and there were clerical errors in the calculation of individual dumping margins.  Brazil 
requested that China review its finding s, revoke the provisional measures, and refrain fro m imposing 
definitive AD measures.  
60.  Japan  expressed its concerns with  the preliminary determination in the AD investigation on 
Acrylonitrile -butadiene rubber. It  underlined that the dumping margin was not properly calculated 
and excessive as its calculation  included (i) the cost of research and development  and (ii) the 
external purchase price for raw materials instead of the actual price paid by the company . It urged 
the Chinese IA to reconsider the normal value , to fully take into account the views of interested 
parties, and to adhere to the requirements of the AD Agreement in the final determination.  
61.  In response to Brazil, China  clarified that the IA had full y consider ed Brazil’s concerns during 
the investigation to the extent permitted by relevant law s, including by extending deadline s and 
holding hearings . The Chinese domes tic industry ha s been injured by the imports from Brazil and 
has experienced losses for a long time. According to China, the assessment of material injury could 
not be based on cert ain injury factors alone but has to take into account the impact of the economic 
indicators as a whole on the domestic industry. China confirmed that the IA strictly abided  by China's 
relevant laws and the WTO rules.  
62.  In response to Japan, China  explained t hat after the initiation of the AD investigation on 
Acrylonitrile -butadiene rubber, the Chinese IA carried out  the investigation in accordance with the 
relevant laws and  fully guarantee d the legal rights of  all interested parties to submit information and 
comments. It made the preliminary determination in July 2018 and informed the interested parties 
of the essential facts before the final determination in October 2018 . China welcomed comments 
from all interested parties.  
63.  On the semi -annual report of Colombia , the EU raised concerns with respect to the 
AD investigation on frozen fries. Already the initiation had been problematic  because the complainant 
did not meet the standing requirement s. The evidence on injury and causality had not been 
adequately substantiated . As for the recently issued essential facts, the EU requested Colombia to 
reconsider the disclosed information that reflected critical shortcomings. First, the data on export 
prices submitted by the EU exporters was rejected without any expla nation by the Colombian  IA, 
and Colombian import statistics were used instead.  Second,  the information on domestic prices  was 
very limited, and there was no information on price depression or suppression.  Third, in the EU's 
view, it was difficult to demons trate that the Colombian domestic industry had been  injured , as 
required by the AD Agreement. The EU urged Colombia to take into account the arguments and 
evidence submitted and to refrain from imposing the measure , the possible adoption of which  would 
be in breach of the WTO requirements.  
64.  Chile voiced its concern s over the AD measure imposed on cylindrical metal drums. In Chile's 
view, certain aspects of  the procedures  undertaken by the Colombian IA contravened Colombia's 
obligations under the AD Agreement  as well as  Article VI of the GATT 1994.  With regard to the 
analysis of likeness, the Colombian IA recognized in its own report d ifferences between the imported 
products and  the domestic products, particularly in the aspects of raw materials used and 
manuf acturing procedures. Referring to Article 2.6 of the AD Agreement, Chile contended that these 
differences cast ed doubts on the likeness assessment between the products under investigation and 
the domestic products. In addition, the calculation of individua l dumping margin s excluded the 
exports that entered the free zone.  Contrary to Article 2.4 of the AD Agreement , such exclusion  
could result in  an unfair comparison b etween normal value and export price.  Regarding material 
injury and causal links , Chile was  of the view that there  was clear evidence to conclude that the 
Colombian domestic industry was not suffering any  injury  arising from imports from Chile . In fact, 
the petitioner had maintained the majority market share throughout the period of investigatio n. 
Among various economic indicators , the domestic industry suffered material injury only in respect 
of inventories . The average price was higher  throughout the period of investigation with the lowest 
cost of production in the second half  of 2016.  Citing A rticle 3.4 of the AD Agreement, Chile opined 
that the examination of the impact of the dumped imports must include an evaluation of all relevant  
economic factors . Specifically, the evolution of the world price of steel and its repercussions on the 
product under investigation was not taken into account by the Colombian IA. Moreover, the Ministry 
of Trade, Industry and Tourism of Colombia adopted the definit ive measur e which 
differed  substantially from the result reported by the Colombian IA to the Government of Chile at G/ADP/M/55  
 
- 9 - 
 
  the end of 2017.  According to the report on essential facts, the du mping margin was established 
at 2.4% which was close to the de minimis  dumping marg in set  forth in Article 5.8 of the 
AD Agreement.  However, the AD duty of 10.35%  imposed by the Resolution No. 55 of the Ministry 
of Trade, Industry and Tourism of Colombia exceed ed the dumping margin reported earlier  by more 
than four times . Some last-minute methodological changes were made of which the  Chilean  
exporters were not made aware.  Citing Article 12.2 of the AD Agreement, Chile contended that this 
situation undermined the minimum guarantees of due process and Colom bia’s commitments under 
the WTO. Bilateral consultations did not result in  a satisfactory solution . Chile was considering 
proceeding  further to the dispute settlement mechanism.  
65.  In response to the EU,  Colombia  stated  that both sides had a lengthy exchange, and  that the 
EU's concerns presented at this meeting would be conveyed to capital.  
66.  In response to Chile, Colombia  explained that  the IA took into account all requirements under 
the AD Agreement in the course of the investigation in question. S ubsequently, the final results of 
the AD investigation were considered by  the Committee on Trade and Practices which ha s the 
authority to impose the AD  duties . With r egard to the likeness analysis, it confirmed that the 
imported products and like domestic products were similar. There wa s no difference between the 
products in terms of tariff headings, raw materials, production processes, physical characteristics, 
and usage.  In respect of due process, the IA took actions in conformity with the relevant legal 
provisions and respected  the du e process requirements in the AD investigation.  All determinations 
were published and communicated to the Chilean representatives. Furthermore, the calculation of 
export prices was bas ed on the import data  disclosed as part of the essential facts. Other factors 
causing the injury were also taken into consideration.  Finally, all elements related to the dumping 
margin calculation were published.  Therefore, Columbia reiterated that this investigation was 
conducted in compliance with all parameters set forth in the AD Agreement, and that it would 
continue bilateral consultations with Chile in order to find a mutually satisfactory solution.  
67.  On the semi -annual report of the EU, the Russian Federation  referred to the sunset review of 
the AD measure on seamless st eel pipes and tubes.  This measure was recently extended for another 
five years after the expiry review. Nevertheless, the levels of duty  had not been changed following 
the review. They had been calculated earlier with the cost adjustment methodology which was 
challenged by certain Members under the WTO dispute settlement mechanism.  Panels and the 
Appellate Body found it inconsistent with Articles 2.2 and 2.2.1.1 of the AD Agreement.  The 
Russian  Federation was of the view that these levels of duty  should hav e been revised and urged 
the EU to bring its measure into conformity with the WTO rules.  
68.  On the concerns raised by the Russian Federation, the EU explained that the levels of duty could 
not be changed in the expiry review , but rather through an interim rev iew for which the EU had not 
receive d any request  from Russian exporters . It also confirmed that the methodology criticized by 
the Russian Federation was not used in this expiry review. The calculation of dumping was essentially 
based on the export prices to the EU and the domestic sales price in the Russian Federation.  
69.  On the semi -annual report of India , Turkey  referred to the sunset review of the AD measure 
on soda ash. It regretted that the High Court  of Gujarat  overturned the IA's decision not to continue 
the measure  and expected this sunset review to be terminated as soon as possible.  Citing Article  3.1 
of the AD Agreement, it contended that there was no evidence of significant increase in imports.  
There was no injury to the domestic industry as t he average profits  earned by the petitioners 
were 41% and 58%. Turkey believed that the Indian IA would not change its position compared to 
its earlier analysis and requested that the sunset review be terminated without imposing any 
measure.  
70.  India stated that the IA had investigated and concluded that there was no ground for continu ing 
the AD measure. However, the High Court of Gujarat had remanded the case back to the  IA. India 
emphasized that any  outcome would be based on the facts of the case.  
71.  On the se mi-annual report of Indonesia , Kazakhstan  expressed its concerns with the AD  duty 
imposed on hot -rolled coil (" HRC"). It recalled that Indonesia extended the imposition of AD  duties 
on HRC imports from the Russian Federation to those originat ing in Kazakhstan without making any 
original  determination s of dumping, injury, and causation , as well as subsequent determinations of 
likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury . The Indonesian IA had never G/ADP/M/55  
 
- 10 - 
 
  investigated imports of HRC from K azakhstan. Nonetheless, the only justification for Indonesia's 
extension of the imposition of AD  duties was the es tablishment of a customs union between 
Kazakhstan, the Russia Federation, and Belarus.  Thus, Kazakhstan was of the view that extending 
the AD  duties was inconsistent with the WTO rules and relevant regulations of Indonesia. In addition, 
it referred to the sunset review of the AD  duties  imposed on HRC from, among others, Kazakhstan 
initiated in December 2017 , which was now at the final stage . According to the disclosure of essential 
facts, the Indonesian IA recommended continuing  the imposition of  AD duties  on the imports from 
Kazakhstan on the basis of facts available.  However,  Kazakhstan contended  that it  had acted to the 
best of its ability  in this investigation by providing, for instance,  written explanations concerning the 
customs mechanism of the customs union. Even though Indonesia clarified that its intention behind 
the imposition of AD  duties  on imports from Kazakhstan was  to ensure the ef fective implementation 
of the measure and to prevent circumvention , the Indonesian IA had never provided any evidence 
of the existence of circumvention. Kazakhstan pointed out that the Indonesian IA had never 
investigated whether dumped imports from other members of the EAEU circumvented the measure 
applied against imports from the Russian Federation. The report on essential facts in 2018 indicated 
that the AD  duties  imposed on  imports from Kazakhstan in 2013 were based on  the existence of 
dumping, not  circumvention . The Indonesian IA had argued that the AD Agreement and the relevant 
regulations did not regulate the extension of the imposition of the AD  duties  to include countries 
whose imports were not previously subject to the imposition of the AD  duties . Kazakhstan , however,  
contended that certificates of origin wo uld be a reasonable alternative and referred to the Appellate 
Body Report in Turkey – Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products  (DS34). It 
underlined that the absence of internal b orders within the EAEU did not change the origin of the 
goods. Therefore, the anti -circumvention concerns should be addressed through the system of 
certificates of origin, not the extension  and continued application  of the  unlawfully extended  
AD duties . 
72.  Indonesia  stated that it would convey Kazakhstan's concerns presented at this meeting to 
capital.  
73.  On the semi -annual report of Israel , Turkey  referred to  the investigations on low voltage copper 
cables and Portland cement. As regards the investigation on low  voltage copper cables, the figures 
presented in the complaint regarding, inter alia , level of sales, production  capacity , profits, prices, 
and employment were kept confidential by the complainant . Several injury factors were not 
evaluated in the complaint. The interested parties , thus, could not defend their interests.  Moreover, 
the total value of low voltage copper cables imports from Turkey to Israel underwent significant 
drops during the period o f investigation. Therefore, Turkish low voltage copper cable imports were 
not a threat to Israeli producers. Contrary to Article 3.4 of the AD Agreement, Turkey contended 
that there was an upwards trend in various economic indicators of the complainant , such as domestic 
sales, market share, and decreased loss es incurred in 2016.  Besides, there was no sufficient 
assessment about  the causality and the existence of injury caused by other factors.  With regard to 
the ongoing investigation  on Portland cement,  the Israeli IA failed to provide information in sufficient 
detail to permit a reasonable understanding of the substance of the information submitted in 
confidence. The injury parameters were neither indexed nor summarized in sufficient detail. This 
denied  the interested parties  of their right to defend their interests , contrary to Article 6.5.1 of the 
AD Agreement. Referring to Article 3.1 of the AD Agreement, Turkey was of the view that it should 
be excluded from this investigation since the report of the IA demonstrated that the actual reaso n 
for an increase in imports were  not the imports from Turkey.  Turkey requested that Israel terminate 
these two investigations without taking any measures.  
74.  In response  to Turkey , Israel  explained that the confidential ity issues were addressed directly 
to Turkey during the investigation. The IA could not disclose confidential information related to 
injury. The non -confidential report provided sufficient indices  and maintained  transparency without 
disclosing the confiden tial information.  In addition, all parties to the investigations had been provided 
with the confidential version of  the findings. Israel stated  that there was no basis for Turkey's claim 
that interested parties were not given the opportunity to defend them selves. In fact, both the Turkish 
producers and Israeli importers obtained several extensions for their submissions.  The IA conducted 
several meetings with interested parties, with the representatives of the relevant companies 
participating in the hearing.  Furthermore , Israel  was of the view that the volume of imports was only 
one out of 15 parameters that must be examined in the injury analysis , and that there was no reason 
to exclude Turkey from such investigation in accordance with Article 3. 2 of the AD Agreement.  G/ADP/M/55  
 
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  75.  On the semi -annual report of Mexico , Ukraine  expressed its concerns with the sunset review 
of the AD measures on Ferro -silico-manganese.  It contended that the AD measures imposed on 
imports from Ukraine should be allowed to lapse following the r eview procedures. The circumstances 
of the Ukrainian domestic industry had changed significantly since the last expiry review , especially 
the export capacity which decreased due to certain situations in eastern Ukraine.  Many metallurgical 
companies had shu t down their production since the beginning of 2014. Thus, the Ukrainian silico -
manganese industry was represented by only two operating mills  nowadays, resulting in a 17% 
decrease in production during 2014  and 2015.  Citing Articles 11.1 and 11.3 of the AD Agreement, 
Ukraine contended that as there was no  likelihood of continuation or recurrence of injury to the 
Mexican domestic industry caused by Ukrainian imports , there was no reason to further maintain 
the AD measu res on imports from Ukraine.  
76.  Mexico  stated  that it took note of Ukraine's concerns expressed at this meeting and asked 
Ukraine to submit them through relevant bilateral channel s. 
77.  On the semi -annual report of Peru, Brazil  raised concerns over the AD investi gation on certain 
steel bars. It pointed out that none of the requirements for dumping, injury, and causality were 
achieved. The dumping margin  of Brazil used for the initiation of the investigation was  flawed by the 
fact that the Peruvian IA did not take into account internal tax adjustment s. This indirect tax was 
imposed only on products and services used or consumed in Brazil.  Contrary to Article 2.4 of the 
AD Agreement, the initial dumping margin did not reflect necessary adjustments to the normal value  
for adequate comparison with the export price . Moreover, the questionnaire for Peruvian importers 
and Brazilian exporters required monthly figures for 45 months for the purpose of the dumping 
analysis , contrary to the recommendation adopted by the Committ ee on 5 May 2000 that the period 
for compiling data in order to prove the existence of dumping should normally be 12 months.  Such 
information request was too cumbersome for the relevant importers and exporters considering that 
there was no extension of the submission deadline. With regard to the threat of injury analysis, 
Brazil opined that the Peruvian IA should  also consider the  positive indicators  of the Pe ruvian 
domestic industry during the injury period.  Referring to Article 3.5 of the AD Agreement,  it requested  
that Peru include in the causality analysis an evaluation of other known factors enumerated by the 
parties concerned. Brazil urged Peru to abide by the WTO rules and to terminate this investigation 
without applying any measures.  
78.  Peru requeste d that Brazil submit it s concerns  in writing.   
79.  On the semi -annual report of the US, the Republic of Korea  expressed its concerns with the  use 
of adverse facts available ("AFA") and the determination of particular market situation ("PMS") by 
the US. It pointed out that the US had often  resorted to the use of AFA and drew adverse inferences 
without regard to the obligations set forth in Article 6.8 and Annex II of the AD Agreement. The US 
did not assess the facts objectively in finding that Korean exporters f ailed to provide information 
necessary for the determination of dumping margins. The US regarded AFA as a rule that rejected  
all information submitted by the company and applied instead the rate claimed by the petitioner. 
For example, in the administrative  review concerning  Oil Country Tubular Goods ("OCTG"), AFA was 
used because one line -item had been mistranslated. The Republic of Korea underlined that a legal 
proceeding under the WTO dispute settlement mechanism with regard to the use of AFA  by the US  
was underway. As for the determination of PMS by the US, despite the concerns raised by the 
Republic of Korea at the Committee meeting last year over the application of PMS in the case of 
OCTG, the US had expanded the PMS application to other cases. The R epublic of Korea was of the 
view that the US' determination of PMS was unfounded and addressed three issues concerning the 
US practice in respect of PMS . First, even though the existence of PMS allowed the use of constructed 
normal value, the IA may not ca lculate arbitrarily the cost of production without regard to the 
requirements set forth in Article 2.2.1.1 of the AD Agreement. Second, the existence of PMS had not 
been substantiated in the first place as evinced in the OCTG investigation where there was no 
analysis of how the circumstances affected the price of raw material for OCTG and prevented a 
proper comparison.  Even supposing that the raw material for OCTG was subsi dized, it did not 
automatically  mean that the sales price of such raw material or OCT G was affected by the subsidy. 
Referring to the Appellate Body Report in European Union – Antidumping Measures on Biodiesel 
from Argentina  (DS473),  the Republic of Korea highlighted the fact that a market distortion alone 
did not constitute a legally suffi cient basis for concluding that the producer's records did not 
reasonably reflect the costs associated with the production.  Third, the US failed to provide 
opportunities for the interested parties to defend their interest in the investigation  as required b y 
the AD Agreement. Although the IA was entitled to use facts available in the preliminary and final G/ADP/M/55  
 
- 12 - 
 
  determinations pursuant to Article 6.8 of the AD Agreement, ample opportunities should be given to 
the interested parties to provide information and all ev idence in accordance with  Articles 6.1 and 6.2 
of the AD  Agreement. However, due process had not been followed in the case of OCTG. The duty 
based on AFA was imposed on the OCTG producers because  the producers used input manufactured 
by POSCO. During the p rocess, the OCTG producers were not given a proper opportunity to defend 
their interest s. The Korean government was therefore asked by  the private sector to initiate  
WTO dispute settlement proceeding s. The Republic of Korea requested that the US cease to apply  
PMS and bring the measures in to conformity with the WTO rules.  
80.  Japan  referred to the suns et review of the AD measure on stainless steel bar. It was delighted  by 
the USITC review determination terminat ing the AD measure on stainless steel bar from 
Japan, which had been imposed for more than 23 years.  Neverthele ss, the US currently imposed 
18 AD measures on ot her Japanese products, of which one  measure ha s been in place for almost 
40 years and 12 of which ha ve continued over five years.  Japan continued to encourage the 
industries concerned to actively participate in the sunset review process with a view to achieving 
early termination. Japan closely monitored the practice of sunset review s by the US and requested 
for early termination of the AD measures w hich had been improperly continued for a long period  of 
time. 
81.  China  echoed the Republic of Korea 's concerns over  the AFA and PMS methodologies. It pointed 
out that AFA could only be applied when the circumstances stip ulated in Article 6.8 of the 
AD Agreement were present. With respect  to the PM S, after a PMS was found to exist, the IA would 
be allowed to  use constructed normal value which was not based on external benchmarks . Referring 
to the Appellate Body Report  in European Union – Antidumping Measures on Biodiesel from 
Argentina  (DS473), China underlined that the determination of normal value shall be based on the 
domestic  data and price . It urged the US to use AFA and PMS in a cautious and WTO -consistent 
manner. Furthermore, it shared the conce rn expressed by Japan  with regard to  sunset review s. Even 
though it was a good sign that the USITC terminated the AD measure that  had lasted for more than 
20 years, there remained many  AD measures that had been in place for a decade.  Thus, China called 
on the Members to consider its proposal on sunset review s and to avoid the abuse thereof.   
82.  The Russian Federation  also shared the concerns raised by other Members over the application 
of the PMS methodology by the US.  
83.  In response, the US explained that Sectio n 504 of the Trade Preferences Extension Act of 2015 
added the concept of PMS to the definition of the ordinary course of trade. I f a PMS existed  such 
that the cost of materials and fabrication or o ther processing of any kind did  not accurately reflect 
the cost of production in the ordinary course of trade, the administering authority may use another 
calculation methodology . After the USDOC announced its first final determination addressing this 
issue, it had received a number of additional allegations of P MS under this new statutory provision.  
To date, the USDOC has reached several final determinations pertaining to PMS allegations, some 
of which have been affirmative and some negative, and all based on the facts o n the record in the 
proceeding s. The US would continue developing the concepts and types of analysis that would be 
necessary to address ongoing and future PMS allegations.  As regards the use of AFA, the US 
reiterated that it would be inappropriate to comment on this issue, as it was currently in  litigation. 
With regard to sunset review s, the US did not see any basis for complaints by Japan and China and 
confirmed that its expiry proceedings were consistent with the AD Agreement. It disagreed with the 
implication drawn by Japan and China that an o lder measure was no longer valid solely because it 
was in place for a long time . The purpose of an expiry proceeding was to allow administering 
authorities to examine whether dumping and injury would be likely to continue or recur if the 
measures were remo ved. Pertaining to the AD measures on imports from Japan specifically, the 
US explained that the expiry process was evidence -based and that the participation by Japanese 
companies in expiry proceedings would be helpful both in terms of the relevant informa tion to be 
provided and the arguments to be made by interested parties. Furthermore, many measures 
involving Japanese exports had, in f act, been terminated. Since the  commencement of expiry 
reviews, there had been  64 measures reviewed involving Japan. Of those, 5 2 (or 81%) resulted in 
termination of the measure.  
84.  For 7 of the oldest 10 measures that remained in effect, the Japanese industry had failed to 
meaningfully participate in any sunset review proceeding. Lack of respondent participation and the 
conseq uent lack of evidence provided by respondents limited the information provided to the IA. In 
other words, Japanese producers may themselves be partly responsible for the result.  The most G/ADP/M/55  
 
- 13 - 
 
  recent termination came in August 2018, where Japanese respondents pr ovided evidence as to why 
the measures should be terminated and t he USITC subsequently made a determination that would 
terminate the measure. In contrast, in many of the expiry processes that involved imports from both 
Japan and other Members, respondents from other Members have meaningfully participated in the 
review and made relevant arguments as to why the measure should be terminated in respect of  
their specific country, and the measure was terminated. The US suggested that Japan inquire with 
its own in dustries as to why there was a lack of interest in participating in the process, particularly 
given that participation had been a vital element in the termination of measures applied with respect 
to goods from other Members as well as  goods from Japan.  
85.  No comments were made with respect to semi -annual reports that the Committee had not 
previously reviewed due to late circulation.  
86.  The Committee took note  of the semi -annual reports, the statements made, the questions posed 
and the answers provided.  
3  PRELIMINAR Y AND FINAL ANTI -DUM PING ACTIONS: NOTIFI CATIONS  
87.  The Chair referred to the notifications of preliminary and final AD actions submitted by Members 
since the Committee 's last meeting listed in documents G/ADP/N/ 313, 315, 316, 317, 318 and 319. 
During this period Argentina;  Armenia;  Australia; Brazil; Canada;  Dominican Republic;  Egypt;  
El Salvador;  India;  Indonesia; Japan; Kazakhstan; Korea, Republic of; Kyrgyz  Republic; Mexico; 
Morocco;  New Zealand;  Pakistan;  Peru; Russian Federation; South Af rica; Chinese Taipei;  Turkey; 
Ukraine;  and the US notified preliminary and/or final AD actions, which were listed in these 
documents. Since document G/ADP/N/ 319 was circulated, Argentina ; Australia;  Brazil;  Canada;  
India;  Kazakhstan;  Kyrgyz Republic;  Korea , Republic of ; Mexico;  Pakistan;  Russian Federation;  
South Africa;  Turkey;  Ukraine;  and the US had submitted such a notification, which would appear in 
the next list circulated by the Secretariat.  
88.  The Chair drew attention to the continued apparent lack of full compliance with this notification 
requirement. These reports were a key element of the required transparency concerning Members ' 
AD actions, and the Committee could not effectively carry out its monitoring and discussion functions 
if Members did not f ulfil their obligations in this regard. The Chair  strongly urged all Members taking 
AD actions to provide these notifications of preliminary and final actions, consistently and in a timely 
fashion. The minimum information format for these notifications ado pted by the Committee in 
October 2006 and revised in October 2009 (document G/ADP/2/Rev.2), contained important 
guidance as to the kinds of actions that should be notified and the information that should be 
provided.  
89.  Canada  expressed its concern regarding the preliminary dumping determination announced by 
the US on imports of large diameter welded pipe. The USDOC found that the Canadian producer was 
affiliated with one of its customers  based on the purported close  supplier  relationship between the 
two companies. Given that the customer in question was disregarded, the dumping margin calculated 
by the USDO C significantly increased. In Canada's view,  it was highly unusual for the USDOC to  
make affiliation findings  predicated on a close supplier relationship. Th e findings in this case were 
based on certain misunderstandings about the nature of t he relationship between the 
two companies, which were typical of arrangement s between  companies in the large welded pipe 
sector. Canada u rged the US to fully consider  the arguments put forward in the investigation and to 
apply reasonable standards for what constituted affiliation.  
90.  In response to Canada, the US explained that  Canada would continue to have ample opportunity 
to submit comments  and clarifications , and that the USDOC would consider those comments and 
address the relevant issues in the final determination.    
91.  Mexico  referred to  the AD investigation by Argentina  on imports of parenteral solutions.  It 
stated that there were a number of aspects of significant concern in this investigation and that it 
would continue bilateral discussions with Argentina.  
92.  In response to Mexico, Argentina  stated that it was open to consider ing the concerns raised by 
Mexico, and that  its investigation was conducted in accordance with the AD Agreement.  G/ADP/M/55  
 
- 14 - 
 
  93.  New Zealand  referred to the sunset review conducted by Brazil  of the AD measure imposed on 
milk powder products. It thanked Brazil for the details contained in the report on essential fa cts and 
for the opportunity to comment and provide submissions throughout the review process , as well as 
for those submissions taken into consideration by the Brazilian IA. It welcomed the Brazilian IA's 
conclusion that it was not probable that injury to t he domestic industry would recur if the AD duty 
was removed. Specifically, the report indicated that there had been an overall improvement in the 
productivity and profitability of the Brazilian dairy sector, and that New Zealand's  producers 
produced much l ess milk than Brazil. New Zealand's  producers were severely limited in terms of 
production growth. The technical note also indicated several times that there was no ground for 
continuation of the AD  duty on milk products from New Zealand. Therefore, New Ze aland anticipated 
that this AD  duty would be removed.  
94.  Brazil  stated that it would convey New Zealand's comments presented at this meeting to capital.  
95.  Argentina  raised concerns with the AD measure imposed by Peru on imports of biodiesel.  The 
Peruvian IA rejected all arguments put forward against the application of the AD duties  in question.  
As regards the injury and causality analysis, the Peruvian IA did not conduct an objective 
examination  based on positive evidence of other factors  that could have caused injury to the 
domestic industry . Moreover, the Peruvian IA disclosed confidential information without express 
authorization from the Argentinian producers  and thus contravened  the confidentiality rules  set forth 
in the AD Agreement. Argentina emphasized th at the AD  duties  imposed had left Argentinian 
exporters out of the Peruvian market . 
96.  In response to Argentina, Peru explained that the IA had conducted this investigation in an 
impartial and objective  manner. Dumping and increase s in imports of biodiesel from Argentina w ere 
found to exist and had negative impacts on the key economic indicators of the Peruvian domestic 
industry. There were no other known factors causing material injury to the Peruvian domestic 
industry. Besides, the IA provided a detailed analysis of relevant issues raised by the interested 
parties. Opportunities were given to various parties to defend their positions . Peru reiterated that 
the IA had acted in conformity with the AD Agreement and requested Argentina t o submit  its 
concerns  in writing.  
97.  The Chair noted that some Members were still submitting the same Ad hoc  notifications 
pertaining to certain antidumping actions via different means; i.e. electronically, by fax and post. In 
certain instances, certain Memb ers, while submitting new Ad hoc notifications, also tended to 
resubmit previously notified actions and in some cases provided electronic links that did not 
correspond to the notification the Member submits. In addition, some of these notifications were no t 
submitted to CRN directly, but to the Rules Division Secretariat which had to resend it to CRN for 
registration. The Chair  reminded all Members that a  given Ad hoc notification, as in case of all other 
notifications, should be sent electronically and onl y once to CRN with a copy to the Secretary of the 
Committee and that any previously submitted notifications should not be resubmitted. The Chair  
also requested Members, instead of providing electronic links to general website s, to attach directly 
the relev ant document containing the action they wish to notify in WORD or PDF formats. The Chair  
stressed the need to avoid any confusion , repetition or duplication as these notifications were the 
source of necessary information contained in Annex D of the Committ ee's annual report.  
98.  The Committee took note  of the statements made, questions posed and answers provided.  
4  CHAIRPERSON 'S REPORT ON THE MEET ING OF THE INFORMAL GROUP ON 
ANTI -CIRCUMVENTION  
99.  The Chair recalled that the Informal Group on Anti -Circumvention met on 24 October 2018. 
Canada provided a detailed explanation of its  new anti -circumvention regime  which came into effect 
in April this year . A very interesting and lively discussion followed, with Members posing questions 
and offering comments. Australia  offered to make a presentation on the conduct of its anti-
circumvention investigations  at the next meeting of the Group  in April 2019. 
100.  The Committee took note  of the report made.  G/ADP/M/55  
 
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  5  CHAIRPERSON 'S REPORT ON THE MEET ING OF THE WORKING G ROUP ON 
IMPLEMENTATION  
101.  The Chair indicated that the Working Group on Implementation met on 26 and 27 April 2018 
back-to-back with the April Committee meeting at which it discussed two  dumping -related issues: 
the determination of costs and profits in dumping margin calculations and  the methodologies for 
calculating the export price. Ms Carina Janse van Vuuren of South Africa, serving as discussant for 
the meeting, had circulated an outline of issues in advance of the meeting in document 
RD/ADP/WGI/11 to assist delegations in their w ork.  
102.  The Chair reminded Members that the Working  Group would hold a meeting on 
25 October  2018, continuing, as required, on 26 October 2018, at which it would discuss 
two dumping -related issues:  the methodologies to determine the likelihood of continuation or 
recurrence of dumping and injury in sunset reviews  and the institutional structures of the IA s. 
Ms Carina Janse van Vuuren  of South Africa , serving as discussant for the meeting, had circulated 
also an outline  of issues in advance of the me eting in document RD/ADP/WGI/ 12 to assist 
delegations in the ir work. The Chair encouraged all Members to attend and to participate actively in 
the discussions.  
103.  The Committee took note  of the report made.  
6  OTHER BUSINESS  
104.  The Chair encouraged Members that had issues to raise with other Members under other 
business to provide sufficient notice to the Member concerned prior to the meeting in order to 
ascertain whether or not an answer could be obtained at the meeting.  
105.  The Chair inform ed Members that f or the purpose of the dissemination of  documents to 
delegations, the fax system had been discontinued in the entire Secretariat. It was replaced by an 
e-mail system which sent documents to each Mission's main e -mail address only. The Secre tariat 
shall no longer send communications/documents to each Mission's fax machine, but to each Mission's 
e-mail inbox. The Chair encouraged all Members to check their main e -mail inbox from time to time.  
106.  The Committee took note  of the statement made.  
7  DATE OF THE NEXT REGULA R MEETING  
107.  The next Regular meeting of the Committee would be held in the week of 29 April 2019 . 
8  ANNUAL REPORT TO THE  COUNCIL FOR TRADE I N GOODS (ARTICLE 18. 6) 
108.  The Committee adopted  its 2018 Annual Report to the Council for Trade in Goods . 
 
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