Risk Management Proposal  
Poultry Hatching Eggs & Specific -Pathogen -Free 
Chicken Eggs  
 
 
 
 
 
 
24 July 2015   
 
 
Disclaimer  
 
This risk management proposal does  not constitute, and should not be regarded as, legal advice. While 
every effort has been made to ensure the information in this document is accurate, the Ministry for 
Primary Industries does not accept any responsibility or liability whatsoever for any er ror of fact, 
omission, interpretation or opinion that may be present, however it may have occurred.  
 
Requests for further copies should be directed to:  
 
Ministry for Primary Industries  (MPI)  
Regulation & Assurance  
Animal Imports  
PO Box 2526  
WELLINGTON 6140  
 
Email:   animalimports@mpi.govt.nz  
Telephone:         04 890 0134  
Facsimile:           04 894 0733  
 
© Crown Copyright - Ministry for Primary Industries   
i Contents  Page 
 
Purpose  1 
Background  1 
Objective  1 
Commodity Definition  1 
Recommendations for Identified Risk Organisms  2 
Avian influenza viruses  3 
Avian paramyxovirus 1 (APVM -1/Newcastle d isease)  5 
Salmonella  6 
Salmonella arizonae  [turkeys only]  7 
Ornithobacterium rhinotracheale  7 
Hepesvirus (big liver & spleen disease)  8 
Turkey Specific Diseases  8 
Mycoplasma  8 
Turkey rhinotrachietis virus (TRTV)  9 
Lymphoproliferative disease  10 
Duck Specific Diseases  10 
Duck virus enteritis (DVE)  10 
Duck virus hepatitis  11 
Goose parvovirus and Muscovy duck parvovirus  11 
Reoviruses of Muscovy ducks (DRV)  12 
Chlamydia psittaci  13 
Post Arrival Quarantine Requirements  15 
  
Risk Management Proposal for Poultry Hatching Eggs & Specific -Pathogen -Free Chicken Eggs  24 July 2015  
COMEGIC.GEN  Purpose  
The purpose of this document is to:  
 
 Show how options for the management of risk organisms have been assessed; and  
 Provide recommendations for import requirements for the generic import health standard (IHS) for 
poultry hatching eggs and specific -pathogen -free (SPF) chicken eggs.  
 
The IHS for poultry hatching eggs and SPF eggs from chickens has been developed under Sec tion 24A of the 
Biosecurity Act 1993.  
 
For a detailed analysis of potential hazards and management options  refer to the following Import Risk Analyses  
(IRA)  (available on the MPI website http://mpi.govt.nz/importing/overview/import -health -standards/risk -analysis/ ): 
 
 Import Risk Analysis: Hatching Eggs from Chickens (Gallus gallus) from the European U nion, Canada, 
the United States of America, and Australia, 28 January 2009 (IRA 2009)   
 Import Risk Analysis: Hatching Eggs of Domestic Ducks (Anas platyrhynchos domesticus and Cairina 
moshata) from the European Union, Canada, the United States of America, and Australia. February 
2012  (IRA 2012)  
 Import Risk Analysis: Turkey Meat, May 2010 (IRA 2010)  
 Import Risk Analysis: Turkey Rhinotracheitis Virus in Turkey Hatching Eggs from the United Kingdom 
Sourced from TRT - Vaccinated Flocks, February 2004 (IRA 2004)  
 Import Risk Analysis: Avian Paramyxovirus Type 1 in Hens’ Hatching Eggs 2001 (IRA 2001)  
 Rapid Risk Assessment: Mycoplasma in Turkeys , March 2014  (RRA 2014)  
Background  
The IHS for poultry hatching eggs and SPF chicken eggs came into force in January 2013. This IHS will replace 
the individual IHSs for chicken and turkey hatching eggs and SPF chicken eggs from specified countries  as new 
veterinary certificates are negotiated , these negotiations are still underway . 
 
The generic IHS serve s as the basis for country -to-country (bilateral) negotiations with countries  considered in the 
current risk analyses . MPI and the Competent Authority of the exporting country will negotiate the content of  the 
veterinary c ertificate to determine how the requirements of the IHS will be met. Negotiations will take into account 
the disease status in the exporting country, the national systems, legislation and standards in the exporting 
country for re gulation of the poultry industry, and the capabilities and preferences of the Competent  Authority.  
 
A guidance d ocument provide s additional guidance material  and contains  a model veterinary certificate for trade 
in hatching eggs  and SPF eggs  and links to country -specific  negotiated veterinary cert ificates .  
Objective  
The objective is to manage all biosecurity risks posed by the import of poultry hatching eggs and SPF eggs, 
consistent with New Zealand’s domestic legislation and international o bligations.  
Commodity Definition  
The commodities are:  
 
 Hatching eggs of chickens ( Gallus gallus ), ducks ( Anas platyrhynchos domesticus  and Cairina 
moschata ) and turkeys ( Meleagr is gallopavo ), sourced from poultry breeding flocks compliant with the 
standards described in Chapter 6.4 of the World Organisation for Animal Heath (OIE) Terrestrial Animal 
Health Code 2011  (the Code ) or equivalent; and  
 SPF eggs of chickens ( Gallus gallus ) produced b y flocks free of specific pathogens. The flocks supplying 
SPF eggs must be kept under secure biosecurity controls at least equivalent to those required for 
breeders in the Code  Chapter on Biosecurity in Poultry . 
  
 2 The eggs will be clean when collected, unwa shed and have intact (uncracked) shells. They will be collected 
separately from dirty and broken or cracked eggs. Hatching eggs should be cleaned and sanitised as soon as 
possible after collection using an approved sanitising agent, in accordance with the manufacturer’s instructions.  
Recommendations for Identified Risk Organisms  
(The requirements for risk organisms are located in Part 2 of the IHS)  
The biosecurity risks associated with the importation of poultry hatching eggs have been examine d in the 
docum ents IRA 2009, IRA 2012  and the RRA 2014 . 
Risk management measures were justified for the following four risk organisms associated with imported chicken 
hatching eggs:  
 
 Avian influenza viruses  
 Type 1 avian paramyxoviruses  
 Salmonellae  
 
Risk management measures were justified for the following four risk organisms associated with duck hatching 
eggs (in addition to those identified for chicken hatching eggs):  
 
 Duck virus enteritis  
 Goose and Muscovy duck parvoviruses (Muscovy ducks and their hybrid breeds o nly) 
 Reoviruses of Muscovy ducks (Muscovy ducks and their hybrid breeds only)  
 Chlamydia psittaci  
 
Risk management measures were carried over from the previous IHSs for the following risk organisms from 
imported turkey hatching eggs:  
 
 Avian influenza viruse s 
 Type 1 avian paramyxoviruses  
 Salmonella  Gallinarum -Pullorum  
 Mycoplasma iowae  
 Mycoplasma meleagridis  
 Turkey rhinotracheitis virus (TRT V) 
 Lymphoproliferative disease of turkeys  
 
(Note: the r emoval of measures for TRT and l ymphoproliferative disease are exp lored in this document)  
Additionally risk management measures are proposed for the following risk organisms from turkey 
hatching eggs:  
 
 Salmonella arizonae  
 Salmonella Enteritidis and Salmonella  Typhimurium  
 
The IHS requires  all diagnostic tests to be approved by MPI and listed in the document, Approved Diagnostic 
Tests, Vaccines, Treatments and Post -Arrival Testing Laboratories Testing for Animal Import Health Standards 
(MPI -STD-TVTL) . This is because MPI understands that th e OIE Manual  will be moving away from prescribing 
diagnostic testing in the future. MPI approved diagnostic tests must be either described in the OIE Manual  or will 
only be approved after consultation with MPI Investigation and Diagnostic Centre (IDC) labo ratory experts. Tests 
must be considered by IDC as valid for diagnostic purposes in the appropriate class of poultry  and must be 
appropriate for surveillance for the identified risk organism.  
 
In some instances the IHS requires flock testing to demonstrate freedom from disease. The IHS makes  reference 
to testing a randomly selected, statistically valid sample to demonstrate flock freedom from disease. A specific 
sample size is not specified as t his will depend on the sensitivity and specificity of the tests used and the 
expected prevalence of disease in the flock. This information should be provided when the tests are considered 
for approval by MPI. The IHS requires a sample size to be sufficient ly large to give 95% confidence of detecting  
Risk Management Proposal for Poultry Hatching Eggs & Specific -Pathogen -Free Chicken Eggs  24 July 2015  
COMEGIC.GEN  infection where there is at least a 5% prevalence in the flock, unless otherwise stated. Where a test’s sensitivity is 
99%, 60 samples will be sufficient to provide 95% confidence of detecting infection where th ere is a prevalence of 
at least 5% in a population of 500 or more.  
  
It should be noted that for each risk organism, risk management requirements are specified in the IHS as one or 
more of the following:  
 
 Country , zone  or compartment freedom and residency requirements;  
 Flock freedom and residency requirements;  
 Specified measures to verify individual flock/batch freed om; 
 Pre-export isolation (PEI) and post -arrival quarantine (PAQ).  
  
Recommendation   
Diagnostic testing and vaccination:  
(1) Where diagnostic testing is required it must be conducted at a laboratory approved by the Competent 
Authority of the exporting country to conduct the required pre -export and/or surveillance testing.  
(2) Where flock testing options are used to satisfy specified requirements for  identified risk organisms (Part 2), 
sampling of birds for diagnostic testing must be randomised, and representative of the flock from which the 
product is derived and samples must be collected under the supervision of the Official Veterinarian. T he 
sample  size selected must be sufficiently large to give 95% confidence of detecting infection where there 
is at least 5% prevalence in the flock, unless otherwise stated.  
(3) Laboratory samples from birds must be collected, processed, and stored in accordance with t he 
recommendations in the Code  and/or Manual , and/or approved by MPI.  
(4) Diagnostic test(s) and vaccines used must be approved by MPI and listed in MPI -STD-TVTL.  
 
 
 
 
Analysis  
 
The Code  terminology for avian influenza was changed in the 2013 version of the Code . This resulted in the term 
“notifiable avian influenza” being replaced with “avian influenza”. Low pathogenicity influenzas that were not 
previously classified as notifiable, are now referred to as influenza A viruses. Accordingly the IHS was amended  
in September 2014  to refer to avian influenza, instead of notifiable avian influenza.  
 
Exposure to a vian influenza ( AI) refers to infection of poultry with any influenza A virus of H5 and H7 subt ypes or 
any avian influenza  virus with pathogenicity above limits set in Chapter 10.4 (Infection with viruses of notifiable 
avian influenza) of the Code .  
 
AI has not been detected through serological screening in New Zealand caged/barn layers, broilers or pullet -
rearer farms. There has been detection of antibodies to H5 viruses on three free range layer farms but no 
evidence of ongoing virus circulation. Influenza A viruses and some  low pathogenicity viruses  that would be 
considered avian influe nza virus in poultry  have been isolated from wild New Zealand waterfowl.  
 
The definition of AI in the Code  is limited to infection in poultry. As there is no evidence of highly p athogenic avian 
influenza  in birds in New Zealand or AI circulating in New Ze aland poultry measures for all  AI can be justified.  
 
AI was not specifically examined in the duck hatching egg IRA as it is deemed appropriate to apply the same 
measures recommended for chicken hatching eggs. The pre -export recommendations are consistent w ith the 
Code, with the addition of post -arrival quarantine and testing.  
 
The measures in the previous IHSs for chicken hatching eggs include d sanitising eggs, serological sampling of 
parent birds, parent flocks being resident in the country of export for at least 60 days and being at least 25 km 
from any premise where AI has been reported within the last 6 months. Birds must not have been vaccinated.  Avian influenza viruses   
 4  
The Code  recommendations were  adopted  in 2013  where possible. An alternative flock testing option , included in 
the IHS as an amendment in  September 2014 , was added  due to prescriptive requirements in the Code  for 
surveillance for avian influenza being difficult to meet, particularly for ducks. The amendment to include a flock 
testing option is based on  one of the recommendations in the IRA 2009, and is considered to manage the risk 
effectively in this commodity. The previous IHSs for hatching eggs also had a flock testing option for avian 
influenza.  
 
The re commended amendment  is for an outcome based cla use to be included that will not prescribe the tests to 
be used or the flock sample sizes required to demonstrate freedom. These will be considered during the country 
approval process, in accordance with the recommendations in the Code  chapter 10.4.29 Surveillance Strategies , 
with recommended tests being included MPI-STD-TVTL . 
 
Reflecting considerat ion of the potential impact of AI on the domestic poultry industry, particularly the export trade 
in hatching eggs and day -old chicks, retention of post -arrival quarantine of imported poultry hatching eggs has 
been required to meet New Zealand's appropriate level of protection against t his avian disease.  
 
Virus isolation or direct ribonucleic acid ( RNA) detection such as reverse transcriptase polymerase chain reaction 
(RT-PCR) allows earlier testing of birds  in post -arrival quarantine , without maternal antibody interference (as is 
seen w ith serological testing).  Virus isolation or RNA detection methods could be used on representative samples 
of hatch debris , culled and dead -in-shell chicks  with release of hatched chicks on receipt of negative results. Virus 
isolation or RNA detection meth ods for sampling live birds involves taking swabs rather than blood sampling, so 
sampling is easier in younger birds and less invasive.  Twenty -one days would be sufficient time to allow the virus 
to have disseminated amongst chicks  and clinical signs to de velop. The Code  lists the incubation period to be 21 
days, although the onset of disease is usually sooner. Chicks  could be tested at 21 days and then released on 
receipt of negative test results. If serological methods are used, maternal antibodies can be  detected for up to 
four weeks so testing could not take place until after this time.  Serological testing could be undertaken after 4 
weeks of age, with release on receipt of negative results.  
 
The Manual lists virus isolation as the prescribed test for international trade, however for surveillance purposes 
(unless birds are vaccinated) serology (listed in the Manual  as an alternative test) is more likely to be used and is 
a more practical and less expensiv e option . For post -arrival quarantine, the testing options could include an MPI 
approved RT -PCR, which will allow earlier testing of birds post hatch. PCR is not an OIE prescribed or alternative 
test, but is widely used for AI testing and is a faster and l ess expensive option than viral culture and isolation. 
Pooled samples for PCR can be used to reduce the number of tests required.  
 
Recommendation   
 
Avian influenza (AI) [all poultry]  
(1) The eggs for export must be derived from parent flocks:  
a) With a vaccinati on status of:  
i) Not vaccinated for avian influenza; or  
ii) Vaccinated for avian influenza in accordance with the provisions of the Manual  and the nature 
of the vaccine used and the date of vaccination have been attached to the certificate; and 
either  b) or c) mu st apply.  
b) That have been resident for at least the 21 days before, and during, egg collection in a country, zone 
or compartment that was free from AI, with current Code  surveillance requirements being met for 
avian influenza; or  
 
c) Demonstrated to be free from infection with AI by carrying out testing on a statistically valid sample, 
selected in accordance with the Code’s  Surveillance Strategies, with a test for AI listed in MPI -STD-
TVTL, within the 21 days prior to commencement of e gg collection and at a maximum of 21 day 
intervals during the egg collection period.  
  
Risk Management Proposal for Poultry Hatching Eggs & Specific -Pathogen -Free Chicken Eggs  24 July 2015  
COMEGIC.GEN   
 
 
Analysis  
 
APMV -1 is classified in the IRA 2009 as a risk in chicken hatching eggs and risk management measures are 
justified. The IRA for duck hatching eggs did not specifically examine Newcastle disease (ND) as it is assumed 
that risk mitigation measures proposed for chicken eggs would also be appropriate. How ever, it should be noted 
waterfowl are highly resistant to clinical manifestations of Newcastle disease. Ducks may shed APVM -1 for 
months after exposure and may not have a detectable antibody titre. The use of virus isolation or direct RNA 
detection method s (e.g. RT -PCR), rather than serology, is therefore the preferred test method for ducks.1 
 
The current measures for hatching eggs from chickens include sanitising eggs, serological sampling of parent 
birds, parent flocks being resident in the country of export for at least 60 days and being at least 25 km from any 
premise where ND has been reported within the last 6 months. Birds must not have been vaccinated with a live 
vaccine during the 3 months prior to egg collection.  
 
The Code  recommendations should  be adopted where possible. An alternative flock testing option has been 
included in the IHS in September 2014 . This amendment has been made due to the requirements in the Code  for 
surveillance for ND being difficult to meet, particularly for ducks or when  vaccination is carried out. The 
amendment to include a flock testing option is based on one of the recommendations in the IRA 2009, and is 
considered to manage the risk effectively in this commodity. The previous IHSs for hatching eggs also had a flock 
testing option for ND. 
 
The recommendation is for an outcome based clause to be included that will not prescribe the tests to be used or 
the flock sample sizes required to demonstrate freedom. These will be considered during the country approval 
process, in accordance with the recommendations in the Code  chapter 10.9.29 Surveillance Strategies , with 
recommended tests being included in MPI-STD-TVTL . 
 
MPI also received a request to amend the vaccination requirements to  include the option of both inactivated and  
live vaccines to have been used. This is considered acceptable, so the clause contains the additional option.  
 
Live vaccines used must be lentogenic and have an intracerebral pathogenicity index (ICPI) of <0.7, which is 
below the Code definition of ND. In order to account for interassay and interlaboratory variability, a safety margin 
should be allowed so that vaccine master seed virus strains should not have an ICPI exceeding 0.4. This is 
discussed in the Manual . 
 
Cleavage site sequencing alone cannot be used to specify the characteristics of allowable vaccines. 
Demonstration of multiple basic amino acids at the F0 cleavage site confirms the presence of virulent or 
potentially virulent virus however the OIE (Article 10.9.1 of the Code ) notes that failure to detect multiple basic 
amino acids at the F0 cleavage site does not confirm the absence of virulent virus. Failure to demonstrate the 
characteristic pattern of amino acid residues still requires characterisation of the isolated virus  by an ICPI test.  
 
Reflecting consideration of the potential impact of ND on the domestic poultry industry, particularly the export 
trade in hatching eggs and day -old chicks, it was decided that retention of post -arrival quarantine of imported 
poultry hat ching eggs was desirable . 
 
The use of virus isolation or direct RNA detection methods (e.g. RT -PCR) allows earlier testing, either on hatch 
debris or live chicks without risk of maternal antibody interference (as is seen with serological testing). The Code  
lists the incubation period to be 21 days although the onset of disease is usually sooner . 21 days from hatch is 
considered sufficient time to allow any potential dissemination of ND amongst hatchlings and for clinical signs to 
develop. Post -hatch debris could be tested by virus isolation or direct RNA detection methods immediately after 
the chicks have hatched or live birds could be sampled at 21 days post -hatch and released when negative results 
are received.  
                                                
1 N. H. Christensen, Review of Risk Analysis: Hatching eggs of domestic ducks  Avian paramyxovirus 1 (APVM -1/Newcastle disease)   
 6  
Alternatively birds can be sampled by serol ogy after maternal antibodies have waned at around 4 weeks of age, 
with release on receipt of negative results.  The timing of this testing if further discussed later under post -arrival 
quarantine, due to some detection of low levels of maternal antibodies when testing was carried out at 28 days.  
 
Recommendation   
 
Avian paramyxoviruses type 1 (APMV -1), Newcastle disease (ND) [all poultry]  
(1) The eggs for export must be derived from p arent flocks:  
a) With a vaccination status of either:  
i) Not vaccinated for APMV -1; or 
ii) Vaccinated for APMV -1 using an inactivated vaccine; and/or  
iii) Vaccinated with a live, lentogenic, APMV -1 vaccine strain, in accordance with the provisions 
of the Manual , and the nature of the vaccine used and the date of vaccination have been 
attached to t he veterinary certificate. The master seed virus for the vaccine used must have 
an intracerebral pathogenicity index (ICPI)  <0.4; and either  b) or c) must apply.  
b) The eggs must be derived from parent flocks that have been resident for at least the 21 days b efore, 
and during, egg collection in a country, zone or compartment that was free from Newcastle disease 
(as defined in the Code ) with current ND Code  surveillance requirements being met; or  
 
c) The eggs must be derived from parent flocks demonstrated to be free from infection with APMV -1 by 
carrying out testing on a statistically valid sample, selected in accordance with the Code’s  
Surveillance Strategies, with a test listed in MPI -STD-TVTL, within the 21 days prior to 
commencement of egg collection and at a  maximum of 21 day intervals during the egg collection 
period.  
Salmonella  
 
Analysis  
 
Risk management measures for  Salmonella enterica subsp . enterica serovar Gallinarum -Pullorum  in chicken 
hatching eggs are justified in the IRA 2009. It is deemed appropriate to apply the same risk management 
measures for the importation of duck hatching eggs.  
 
Paratyphoid infections of poultry are not OIE listed diseases; however the Code contai ns sections on the 
prevention, detection, and control of Salmonella in poultry (Chapter 6.5). Chapter 6.5.9 has recommendations for 
importation of hatching eggs, with requirements th at parent flocks participate in a Salmonella  surveillance 
programme in acc ordance with the Code , and have no evidence of S. Enteritidis or S. Typhimurium.  
 
The IRA 2009 justifies risk management measures for Salmonella Typhimurium  DT 104 and Salmonella 
Enteritidis  phage type 4. More recent analysis (IRA 2010) concluded that par atyphoid Salmonellae  should not be 
identified as a  potential hazard in imported poultry meat as exotic serotypes associated with poultry overseas are 
likely to be no more pathogenic than serotypes recognised to be present in New Zealand.  However h atching e ggs 
provide a direct pathway for risk organisms to the New Zealand poultry sector, which is recognised free of S. 
Enteritidis. Risk management measures are justified for egg transmitted Salmonella  serotypes. The IHS will adopt 
the international standard, a s set out in the OIE Code . 
 
Although S. arizonae  is not assessed  to be a risk in chicken hatching eggs, the IRA 2010 describes evidence that 
this organism is recognised to be vertically transmitted in turkey eggs so should be considered a risk in hatching 
eggs of this species.  
 
The current IHSs for hatching eggs from c hickens have the following requirements:  
 
 All flocks from which eggs were obtained are certified free of Salmonella Pullorum .  
Risk Management Proposal for Poultry Hatching Eggs & Specific -Pathogen -Free Chicken Eggs  24 July 2015  
COMEGIC.GEN   Non-specific measures included the requirement that during the 28 days prior to collection of eggs, the 
birds in the flock of origin were inspected and found to be free from clinical evidence of infectious 
diseases including, amongst others, fowl plague (highly pathogenic avian influenza) and salmonellosis; 
and that none of these diseases had existed in the flock of origin during  the previous 6 months.  
 
The IRA 2009 recommends:  
 
 Testing birds in the parent flock to ensure that they do not carry infection and importing eggs only from 
flocks recognised as free of infection.  
 
Importing from flocks monitoring for Salmonella  as per Cha pter 6.5 of the Code , with an assurance this testing 
has not identified S. Gallinarum -Pullorum , S. Typhimurium DT 104  and S. Enteritidis .  
 
For S. Arizonae  instead of specifying the sample size and type of testing required where the option of flock testing 
to demonstrate freedom is selected, it is proposed to amend the wording to require a statistically valid, randomly 
selected sample to be tested with a tes t listed in MPI -STD-TVTL. This means alternative testing options can be 
considered, and the sample size will need to be supported to demonstrate a 95% of detecting infection where 
there is a 5% prevalence of in the flock.  
 
Recommendation   
 
(1) The eggs for exp ort must be derived from parent flocks in a country, zone or compartment free from 
Salmonella  Gallinarum -Pullorum, Salmonella  Enteritidis and Salmonella  Typhimurium as demonstrated by 
surveillance, conducted in accordance with the Code  requirements for mon itoring poultry breeding flocks 
for Salmonella , and approved by an MPI  CTO; or  
(2) The eggs for export must be derived from a parent flock certified as free from Salmonella  Gallinarum -
Pullorum, Salmonella  Enteritidis and Salmonella  Typhimurium. Flock monitorin g must have been carried 
out in accordance with the Code  requirements for monitoring poultry breeding flocks for Salmonella .  
 
 
 
(1) The turkey hatching eggs must be:  
a) Derived from parent flocks in a country, zone or compartment free from Salmonella  arizonae  as 
demonstrated by surveillance, conducted in accordance with the Code  requirements for monitoring 
poultry breeding flocks for Salmonella , and approved by an MPI  CTO ; or 
b) Derived from a parent flock certified free from Salmonella  arizonae . Flock monitoring must have 
been carried out in accordance with the Code  requirements for monitoring poultry breeding flocks for 
Salmonella ; or 
c) Derived from parent flocks demonstrated  to be free from Salmonella  arizonae  by testing a 
statistically valid, randomly selected sample of turkeys within the 7 day period prior to 
commencement of egg collection  with an approved diagnostic test listed in the MPI document MPI -
STD-TVTL.  
 
 
 
 
Analysis  
 
In 2015 MPIs IDC isolated Ornithobacterium rhinotracheale  (ORT)  with a new RT -PCR test . Testing of further 
samples dating back as far as 2011 indicate that ORT is widespread in New Zealand with isolates  identified  from 
both commercial and backyard flocks and both the  North and South Island. These findings indicate that ORT can 
be considered endemic and the measures for ORT in the IHS  should be removed.  
 Salmonella arizonae  [turkeys only]  
Ornithobac terium rhinotracheale   
 8 Recommendation  (Amended  June 2015 ) 
 
No measures are recommended for ORT.  
 
 
 
Analysis  
 
There were  measures in the previous  IHS for chicken hatching eggs from Australia and the United Kingdom for 
big liver and spleen diseas e. This was  testing 240 birds in the parent flock by agar immunodiffusion test within 30 
days of egg collection.  
 
The IRA 2009 lists the hepesvirus causing big liver and spleen disease in the hazard list as not infecting eggs. It 
is concluded the organism is not ver tically transmitted so no measures are justified in the updated IHS.  
 
Recommendation  
 
No risk mitigation measures are justified .  
 
Turkey Specific Diseases  
 
 
 
Analysis  
 
There were  measures in the previous  IHS for chicken hatching eggs for Mycoplasma gallisepticum  and M. 
synoviae .  As these organisms have b een described in New Zealand the measures for chickens were not 
included in the 2013 IHS, however the measures in place for turkey hatching eggs were carried over as there was 
not a new ri sk assessment available  at that time . 
 
The IRA 2009 states Mycoplasma iowae  is a hazard in chicken hatching eggs from countries other than Australia, 
however no measures are recommended as the requirement for chickens to come from flocks managed as per 
Chapter 6.4, biosecurity procedures in poultry production, in the Code  would m ake the entry assessment 
negligible.  
 
In September 2014, f ollowing a number of requests from trading partners the prescriptive recommendation for 
Mycoplasma  in turkeys were replaced with an outcome based requirement. The RRA 2014  was undertaken to 
examine the risk of Mycoplasma  in turkey hatching eggs.  
 
The RRA 2014  concluded that Mycoplasma iowae  is a risk in the commodity and the following risk management 
options were presented that were considered to effectively manage the risk:  
 
Option 1: Hatching eggs could be imported from flocks in countries, zones, or compartments free from M. 
iowae.  
Option 2: Hatching eggs could be imported from turkey flocks that have been shown to be free from M. 
iowae by culture of cloacal swabs.  The curr ent requirement that 10% of the birds in the supply flock have 
been subjected with negative results in each case to cloacal swab culture for M. iowae could be 
maintained.  
Option 3: Hatching eggs could be hatched under secure quarantine conditions in New Ze aland and 
material from embryos, dead -in-shell chicks, or hatchlings could be tested for M. iowae by culture or PCR.  
Option 4: Hatching eggs could be subject to antibiotic treatment with enrofloxacin . 
 Hepesvirus (big liver & spleen disease)  
Mycoplasma   
Risk Management Proposal for Poultry Hatching Eggs & Specific -Pathogen -Free Chicken Eggs  24 July 2015  
COMEGIC.GEN  Additionally the RRA 2014  concluded that Mycoplasma meleagridis  is a risk in the commodity and the following 
risk management options were presented that were considered to effectively manage the risk:  
Option 1: Hatching eggs could be imported from flocks in countries, zones, or compartments free from M. 
meleagridis.  
Option 2: Hatching eggs could be imported from flocks able to demonstrate freedom from M. meleagridis.  
Based on the United States National Poultry Improvement Plan, initially 100 birds from each breeder flock 
should be serologically tested and shown to be negative for antibodies to M. meleagridis at more than 12 
weeks of age.  Subsequently a minimum of 60 samples from the flock should be retested (and shown to 
be seronegative) at 28 -30 weeks of age and at 4 -6 week intervals thereafter.  
Option 3:  Hatching eggs could be hatched under secure quarantine conditions in New Zealand and 
material from embryos, dead -in-shell chicks, or hatchlings could be tested for M. melegridis by culture or 
PCR.  
Option 4: Hatching eggs could be treated with antibiotics,  based on recent antimicrobial sensitivity data.  
 
Considering the RRA 2014  risk mitigation measures for  Mycoplasma spp. in turkeys  were changed to outcome 
based in September 2014 . The requirement in the IHS released in 2013 for M. meleagridis  to test 100% of the 
supply flock with specified tests was replaced with an option  to test a statistically valid sample of the flock with an 
MPI approved test within 28 days of collection of the eggs for export. This is in line with the recommendation in 
Option 2 of the RRA 2014 above, given that in  the US scheme mentioned above the flocks tested every 4 -6 
weeks retain their negative status.  
 
Recommendation  
 
For Mycoplasma  iowae:  
(1) The eggs for export must be derived from parent flocks in a country where Mycoplasma iowae is not 
recognised to be present; or  
(2) Ten percent (10%) of the birds in the parent flock must be subjected , with negative results * in each case , 
to cloacal swab culture for Mycoplasma iowae  within the 28 days prior to  commencement of  collection of 
eggs for export and the flock must have a negative test history; or  
(3) The turkey hatching eggs must be derived from a parent flock demonstrated to be free from Mycoplasma 
iowae  by testing a statistically valid sample of the flock with a test l isted in MPI -STD-TVTL within the 28 
days prior to commencement of collection of eggs for export.  
For Mycoplasma meleagridis : 
(1) The eggs for export must be derived from parent flocks in a country where Mycoplasma meleagridis is not 
recognised to be present; o r 
(2) The turkey hatching eggs must be derived from a parent flock demonstrated to be free from Mycoplasma 
meleagridis  by testing a statistically valid sample of the flock with a test listed in MPI -STD-TVTL within the 
28 days prior to commencement of collectio n of eggs for export; or  
(3) The turkey hatching eggs must be derived from a parent flock demonstrated to be free from Mycoplasma 
meleagridis with testing undertaken in accordance with a Competent Authority supervised poultry health 
scheme with consistently negative results for the past 12 months . Testing must be carried out  on a 
statistically valid sample  of the flock , with a test listed in MPI -STD-TVTL.  
*In the case of positive or inconclusive results, a further sample must be taken and retested by a test l isted 
in MPI -STD-TVTL at a Competent Authority approved laboratory. Any bird positive to this test must be 
subject to post mortem and bacteriological examination and show no evidence of Mycoplasma  infection.  
 Turkey rhinotrachietis virus (TRTV)  
 
  
 10 Analysis  
 
There were  measures in previous  IHSs for turkey hatching eggs for TRTV. From the United Kingdom, birds must 
either come from vaccinated parent flocks, or the parent flock must test negative for TRTV within 30 days of egg 
collection to confirm with 99% con fidence of detecting a prevalence of 5% that the flock is sero -negative. From 
other countries the requirement is 10% of the parent flock must be tested as sero -negative.  Additionally any 
respiratory disease in hatchlings during the post -arrival quarantine  period must be tested for TRTV. The 
certification requires no clinical signs of TRTV, including drop in egg production in the parent flock.  
 
The IRA 2004 acknowledges the likelihood of TRTV being present in turkey hatching eggs to be very low, 
particularl y from vaccinated birds. The measures in the previous IHSs  require d the parent flock to show no clinical 
signs of TRT in the immediate period prior to, or during egg collection. In case of any outbreak of respiratory 
disease in quarantine, affected birds m ust be tested for TRTV isolation using tracheal organ culture and/or PCR.  
 
The IRA 2009 concludes the risk estimate is negligible for pneumoviruses and no risk management measures are 
necessary in the commodity chicken hatching eggs. The discussion also ex amines turkey hatching eggs;  with the 
conclusion drawn that there is no conclusive evidence for vertical transmission. The risk estimate was concluded 
to be negligible.  
 
Recommendation  
 
No specific risk management measures are required for poultry hatching  eggs as there is no conclusive evidence 
that TRTV is vertically transmitted. The parent poultry flock must be healthy as described in the commodity 
definition.  
 
 
 
Analysis  
 
There were  measures in previous  IHSs for lymphoprolife rative disease of turkeys. The measures were  limited to 
an owner’s declaration that there has been no evidence of this disease during the rearing period. 
Lymphoproliferative disease is a rare neoplastic syndrome of turkeys reported in Israel and Europe.  
 
Recommendation  
 
Given the very rare reports of this disease, the high health status required of parent flocks and the non -specific 
nature of the previous  measure, no risk mitigation measures are required .  
 
Duck Specific Diseases  
 
 
 
Analysis  
 
DVE has not been reported in New Zealand. Vertical transmission of DVE has been recognised, although more 
recent reports suggest DVE virus may be excreted only on the surface of the egg from infected carriers. Risk 
management measures are justified.  
 
The risk management options presented in the IRA 2012 includes : 
(1) Importing eggs from flocks in countries where DVE has not been  recognised without restriction.  
(2) Vaccination against DVE could be prohibited in f locks supplying eggs for export.  Lymphoproliferative disease  
Duck virus enteritis (DVE)   
Risk Management Proposal for Poultry Hatching Eggs & Specific -Pathogen -Free Chicken Eggs  24 July 2015  
COMEGIC.GEN  (3) Eggs derived from flocks where virus isolation or PCR has demonstrated freedom from DVE could be 
considered eligible for import.  
(4) Imported eggs could be hatched under secure post -arrival quarantine conditions in New Zealand and 
material from embryos, dead -in sh ell chicks, or hatchlings could be tested for DVE by virus isolation or 
PCR.  
 
Diagnosis of DVE is based on a combination of clinical signs, gross pathology, and histopathology together with 
identification of the agent either by virus isolation or by PCR. I mmunological tests have limited value, although 
detection of neutralizing antibodies to DVE virus is possible. A number of diagnostic tests have been described to 
detect sero -conversion.  
 
The wording of the flock testing option  (IHS option (1) (a)(b)) was been amended in September 2014  to provide 
additional guidance on the number of samples required for testing and the timing of testing prior to export of eggs. 
In order to be consistent with the testing requirements throughout this IHS the recommendation i s for testing to be 
undertaken within the 21 days prior to collection of eggs, rather than 28 days as previously listed.  
 
Recommendation (Amended  September  2014)  
 
(1) The duck hatching eggs for export must be derived from a parent flock not vaccinated for DVE;  and either  
a) The duck hatching eggs must be derived from a parent flock in a country where DVE is not 
recognised; or  
b) The duck hatching eggs must be derived from parent flocks demonstrated free from DVE by testing 
a statistically valid sample of the flock wi th a test for DVE listed in MPI -STD-TVTL within the 21 days 
prior to the commencement of collection of eggs for export.   
 
 
 
 
Analysis  
 
Duck virus hepatitis (DVH) has not been reported in New Zealand. Vertical transmission of DVH has not been 
recognised. Eggs will be disinfected and sourced from flocks kept in accordance with the standards described in 
Article  6.4, biosecurity procedures i n poultry production, of the Code . Surface contamination or contamination of 
the egg containers will be avoided by following the measures described in the Code . 
 
The IRA 2012 concludes that DVH is not a hazard in the commodity.  
 
The Code has the following recommended measures for DVH. Hatching eggs for export:  
 Have been disinfected in conformity with the standards referred to in Chapter  6.4, biosecurity 
procedures in poultry production ; 
 Come from establishments  and/or hatcheries which are recognised as being free from DVH and from 
hatcheries which comply w ith the standards referred to in Chapter  6.4, biosecurity procedures in poultry 
production;  
 Were shipped in clean and unused packages.  
 
Recommendation  
 
DVH is not assessed as a risk  in the commodity. Sufficient risk mitigation is provided by the requirement to 
comply with Chapter 6.4 of the Code , biosecurity in poultry production.  
 
 
 
 Duck virus hepatitis  
Goose parvovirus and Muscovy duck parvovirus   
 12 Analysis  
 
Goose parvovirus (GPV) and Muscovy duck parvovirus (MDPV or Derzsy’s disease) has not been reported in 
New Zealand. The disease only affects geese and Muscovy ducks (including some hybrids). The disease is 
known to be vertically transmitted. Risk managemen t measures are justified.  
 
Options presented in the IRA 2012 are:  
(1) Eggs from duck species that are neither Muscovy nor their hybrids could be imported without sanitary 
measures.  
(2) Muscovy duck eggs could be imported without restrictions from countries known to be free from GPV or 
MDPV.  
(3) Eggs could be imported from duck flocks that are maintained as closed flocks and in which the disease 
has not occurred for several years (3 -5 years is suggested).  
(4) Donor ducks could be kept separate from other ducks for at least  3 weeks, while eggs are being collected 
and the donors could be tested serologically before going into isolation and again 3 weeks after the end of 
the isolation period, with negative results.  
(5) Imported eggs could be hatched in isolation in New Zealand and  the hatchlings mixed with sentinel sero -
negative New Zealand Muscovy ducklings. A representative sample of imported and sentinel birds could 
be tested serologically with negative results at the end of the quarantine period of at least 3 weeks.  
 
Option 3 d escribes the establishment of a compartment for disease freedom. This would require the exporting 
country’s veterinary authority and MPI to approve a biosecurity plan.  
 
Option 4 would require certification that the pre -export isolation facility had an appr opriate biosecurity plan in 
place and that the facilities were acceptable for isolation. Additionally the consignment would be delayed, or 
would likely have been imported and incubating while results of the second testing were collected.  
 
The wording of the flock testing option (IHS option 3) was amended  in September 2014,  to provide additional 
guidance on the number of samples required for testing and the timing of testing prior to export of eggs.  
 
Recommendation   
 
(1) The duck hatching eggs must be from breeds other than Muscovy duck ( Cairina moshata ) and their 
hybrids; or  
(2) The Muscovy duck hatching eggs (or hybrid Muscovy duck hatching eggs) must be derived from a parent 
flock in a country where Muscovy duck parvovirus and goose parvovirus is not recognis ed; or   
(3) The Muscovy duck hatching eggs (or hybrid Muscovy duck hatching eggs) must be derived from an 
establishment that has maintained a closed flock with a negative surveillance history for goose parvovirus 
and Muscovy duck parvovirus for the past 3 year s. The parent flock must be demonstrated free from 
goose parvovirus and Muscovy duck parvovirus by testing a statistically valid sample of the flock with a 
test for goose parvovirus and Muscovy duck parvovirus listed in MPI -STD-TVTL within the 21 days prio r to 
the commencement of collection of eggs for export.  
 
 
 
 
Analysis  
 
Duck reovirus of Muscovy ducks (DRV) has been recognised in South Africa, France, Israel, and China. It has not 
been recognised  in New Zealand and is considered to be a risk in imported hatching eggs from Muscovy ducks or 
their hybrids.  
 Reovirus es of Muscovy ducks (DRV)   
Risk Management Proposal for Poultry Hatching Eggs & Specific -Pathogen -Free Chicken Eggs  24 July 2015  
COMEGIC.GEN  Options presented in the IRA are:  
(1) Eggs from duck species that are neither Muscovy nor their hybrids could be imported without sanitary 
measures.  
(2) Muscovy duck eggs could be imported without restrictions from countries known to be free from DRV.  
(3) Eggs could be imported from duck parent flocks that are maintained as closed flocks and in which the 
disease has not occurred for several years (3 -5 years i s suggested).  
(4) Donor ducks could be kept isolated from other ducks for at least 3 weeks, while eggs are being collected 
and the donors could be tested serologically before going into isolation and again 3 weeks after the end of 
the isolation period, with ne gative results.  
(5) Imported eggs could be hatched in isolation in New Zealand and the hatchlings mixed with sentinel sero -
negative New Zealand Muscovy ducklings. A representative sample of imported and sentinel birds could 
be tested serologically with negati ve results at the end of the quarantine period of at least 3 weeks.  
 
Option 3 describes the establishment of a compartment for disease freedom. This would require the exporting 
country’s veterinary authority and MPI to approve a biosecurity plan.  
 
Option 4  would require certification that the facility and procedures had an appropriate biosecurity plan in place 
and that the facilities were acceptable for isolation. Additionally the consignment would be delayed, or would likely 
have been imported and incubati ng while results of the second testing were collected.  
 
Risk management measures should only apply to Muscovy ducks and their hybrids. Muscovy duck eggs could be 
imported without restriction from countries free of DRV.  
 
In order to manage the risk prior to importation, where the country of origin cannot be deemed as free of DRV, 
imported hatching eggs of Muscovy ducks (and their hybrids) may be imported from closed parent flocks with a 
negative surveillance history for the past 3 years and which were test ed negative within the 28 days prior to 
commencement of collecting eggs for export.  
 
The wording of option 3 in the IHS has been amended to provide additional guidance on the number of samples 
required for testing and the timing of testing prior to export of eggs.  
 
Recommendation  
 
(1) The duck hatching eggs must be from breeds other than Muscovy duck ( Cairina moshata ) and their 
hybrids; or  
(2) The Muscovy duck hatching eggs (or hybrid Muscovy duck hatching eggs) must be derived from a parent 
flock in a country where duck reovirus (DRV) has not been recognised; or  
(3) The Muscovy duck hatching eggs (or hybrid Muscovy duck hatching eggs) must be imported from an 
establishment that has maintained a closed flock with a negative surveillance history for reovirus of 
Musco vy ducks for the past 3 years. The parent flock must be demonstrated free from reovirus of Muscovy 
ducks by testing a statistically valid sample of the flock with a test for DRV listed in MPI -STD-TVTL within 
the 21 days prior to the commencement of collect ion of eggs for export.  
 
 
 
 
Analysis  
 
The available evidence indicates that serovars C and E of are not present in New Zealand and are assessed to 
be a risk in duck hatching eggs.  There are no measures in the Code  for chlamydiosis  in poultry.  
 
Options presented in the IRA 2012 are:  Chlamydia  psittaci    
 14 (1) Duck eggs could be imported without restrictions from countries where chlamydiosis has not been 
reported in commercial ducks.  
(2) Eggs could be imported from flocks that are maintained as closed flocks and i n which ongoing surveillance 
has demonstrated freedom from C. psittaci .  
(3) Donor ducks could be kept isolated from other ducks for at least three weeks before eggs are collected, 
and the donors tested  serologically for exposure to C. psittaci  before going into isolation and again three 
weeks after the end of the collection  period, with negative results.  
(4) Imported eggs could be hatched in isolation in New Zealand and a representative sample of chicks could 
be tested serologically with negative r esults.  Any dead hatchlings or dead -in-shell chicks could be 
examined to detect the presence of C. psittaci  using histochemical staining of liver and spleen impression 
smears.  
(5) A combination of point 2 and 3 would allow the parent flock to be tested prior to egg collection and the 
eggs to be tested post -hatch in quarantine in New Zealand, without the complication of requiring some 
ducks to be isolated, or for testing ducks after egg collection, when the eggs would either be incubating in 
quarantine, or woul d be so aged hatchability would be low.  
 
The wording of option 2  of the IHS  has been amended to provide additional guidance on the number of samples 
required for testing and the timing of testing prior to export of eggs.  
 
Recommendation  
 
(1) The duck hatching eggs must be derived from parent flocks in a country where Chlamydia psittaci (serovar 
C and E)  in ducks is not recognised; or  
(2) The duck hatching eggs must be derived from parent flocks which are kept as closed flocks with a 
negative surve illance history for Chlamydia psittaci . The parent flock must be demonstrated free from 
Chlamydia psittaci  by testing a statistically valid sample of the flock with a test for Chlamydia psittaci  listed 
in MPI -STD-TVTL within the 21 days prior to the commen cement of collection of eggs for export. The 
sample size must be sufficient  to detect 10% prevalence with 99% confidence. Post -arrival quarantine 
testing is required as per Schedule 3.  
  
   
Risk Management Proposal for Poultry Hatching Eggs & Specific -Pathogen -Free Chicken Eggs  24 July 2015  
COMEGIC.GEN  Post -Arrival Quarantine Requirements  
 
Analysis  
 
Previous  IHSs for h atching eggs require post -arrival quarantine in a facility approved to the MPI Standard for 
Avian Transitional Facilities  (154.02.05). The quarantine period is required to mitigate risk of AI and ND incursion 
from hatching eggs. The air filtration requirement was based on potential for ND to be spread via the airborne 
route. This includes a requirement for filtration of exha ust air. The current air filtration requirements are consistent 
with the 2001 IRA, with filtration requirements being classified as semi -HEPA filtration. MPI is not proposing to 
review the transitional facility standard at this time, although the filtratio n requirements may be revisited if the 
standard is to be reviewed. Any changes would take into account the findings of the IRA 2001(and its 
appendices) and would be consulted on.  
 
SPF eggs must be used within a transitional approved to MPI Standard for Avian Transitional Facilities 
(154.02.05)  or MPI Standard for Transitional Facilities for Biological Products (154.02.17) . SPF eggs, any egg 
products and any resultant chicks used in a transitional facility for biological products must be destroyed, triple 
bagged and incinerated at the conclusion of all work.  
 
In September 2014 the post -arrival quarantine test sample size requirements for AI and ND were amended to 
match that of the pre -import requirements which is testing a sufficiently large sample to give 95% confidence of 
detecting infection at 5% prevalence. This replaced the previous  recommendation of testing with 99% confidence 
of detecting infection where there is at least a 5% prevalence , and  reduce d the sample size required from 90 
birds to 58 birds.  See the following website to see the calculation used:  
http://epitools.ausvet.com.au/content.php?page=FreedomSS&Prevalenc e=0.05&dpaType=0&Sens=0.99&seh=0.
95&Population=500   
 
It also bec ame apparent  that in some circumstances maternal antibodies may be detected when serological 
testing is carried out as early as 28 days. Because of the flexibility provided to the facility operators by allowing 
early testing it was not proposed to change this date, but to allow the date of testing to be optional once 28 d ays 
has been reached. If maternal antibodies are suspected, then the birds must be retested at a timing agreed with 
MPI and the authorised facility supervisor . Timing of retesting takes  into account the level of antibody identified, 
the clinical history of  the birds and the vaccination history of the parent flock the eggs were derived from.  
 
Recommendation   
 
Schedule 3  - Post-Arrival Quarantine amendment  to reduce the post -arrival testing sample size for AI and ND to 
match that of the pre -export requirements, requiring a sample size sufficient to detect with 95% confidence a 
prevalence of 5%. In most circumstances this will require a sample size of at lea st 60 birds to be selected.  
 
Additional requirements were  added in September 2014 in the case maternal antibodies are detected when 
serological sampling is carried out earlier than 42 days of age. Schedule 3, Newcastle disease (1) c) changes are 
as follows : 
 
Serological testing of chicks for APMV at or after 28 days of hatching. The sample size must be sufficient to 
confirm that the flock is free from infection with at least 95% confiden ce of detecting 5% prevalence. Testing must 
be conducted after 28 days to avoid interference of maternal antibodies. If maternal antibodies are suspected in 
samples collected at or after 28 days, the Authorised Supervisor must be notified immediately and repeat testing 
must be carried out on or before 42 days of age or as agr eed with MPI. Rising serum titres  or any clinical 
evidence of disease must be reported immediately in accordance with the requirements in the avian transitional 
facility standard).