RESTRICTED  
  
WT/DSB/M/403  
 
20 Febru ary 2018 
(18-1072) Page: 1/20 
Dispute Settlement Body  
23 October 2017    
 
MINUTES OF MEETING  
HELD IN THE CENTRE W ILLIAM RAPPARD  
ON 23  OCTOBER  2017 
Chairman: Mr. Junichi I hara (Japan ) 
Table of Contents  
1   SURVEILLANCE OF IMPL EMENTATION OF RECOMM ENDATIONS ADOPTED BY  
THE DSB ................................ ................................ ................................ ...........................  2 
A  United  States – Anti-dumping measures on certain hot -rolled steel products from 
Japan: Status Report by the United  States  ................................ ................................ .............  2 
B  United  States – Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act: Status report by the 
United  States  ................................ ................................ ................................ .....................  3 
C  European  Communities – Measures affecting the approval and marketing of biotech 
products: Status report by the European  Union ................................ ................................ ....... 3 
D  European  Union – Anti-dumping measures on biodiesel from Argentina: Status Report 
by the European  Union  ................................ ................................ ................................ ........  4 
E  Canada – Anti-dumping measures on imports of certain carbon steel welded pipe from 
the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu: Status report 
by Canada ................................ ................................ ................................ ..........................  4 
2   EUROPEAN  UNION – ANTI -DUMPING MEASURES ON IMPORTS OF CERTAIN 
FATTY ALCOHOLS FROM INDONESIA ................................ ................................ ................  5 
A  Statement by the European  Union  ................................ ................................ .....................  5 
3   UNITED  STATES – CONTINUED DUMPING AN D SUBSIDY OFFSET ACT  
OF 2000: IMPLEMENTATION  OF THE RECOMMENDATIO NS ADOPTED BY THE  DSB ...........  5 
A  Statement by the European  Union  ................................ ................................ .....................  5 
4   UNITED ARAB EMIRATES  – MEASURES RELATING TO  TRADE IN GOODS AND 
SERVICES, AND TRADE -RELATED ASPECTS OF I NTELLECTUAL PROPERTY  RIGHTS  ..........  6 
A  Request for the establishment of a panel by Qatar  ................................ ..............................  6 
5   CANADA – MEASURES CONCERNING TRADE IN COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT  ....................  9 
A  Designation by the DSB of the represent ative referred to in paragraph  4 of Annex  V of 
the SCM  Agreement  ................................ ................................ ................................ ............  9 
6   ADOPTION OF THE 2017  DRAFT ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DSB  ................................ . 11 
7   PROPOSED NOMINATIONS  FOR THE INDICATIVE L IST OF GOVERNMENTAL 
AND NON -GOVERNMENTAL PANELIS TS ................................ ................................ ..........  11 WT/DSB/M/403  
 
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  8   APPELLATE BODY MATTE RS ................................ ................................ ......................  11 
A.  Statement by the Chairman  ................................ ................................ ............................ 11 
B.  Appointment of Appellate Body members: proposal by the European  Union  .......................... 11 
C.  Proposal regarding the Appellate Body selection process  ................................ .................... 11 
9   UNITED STATES – LARGE RESIDENTIAL WA SHERS FROM KOREA  ..............................  19 
A  Statement by Korea  ................................ ................................ ................................ .......19 
 
 
1  SURVEILLANCE OF IMPL EMENTATION OF RECOMM ENDATIONS ADOPTED BY  THE DSB 
A.  United States – Anti-dumping measures on certain hot rolled  steel products from Japan: Status 
report by the United States (WT/DS184/15/Add.177)  
 
B.  United States – Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act: Status report by the United  States 
(WT/DS160/24/Add.152)  
 
C.  European Communities – Measures affecting the ap proval and marketing of biotech products: 
Status report by the European Union (WT/DS291/37/Add.115)  
 
D.  European Union – Anti-dumping measures on biodiesel from Argentina: Status report by the 
European  Union (WT/DS473/17/Add.4)  
 
E.  Canada – Anti-dumping measures on imports of certain carbon steel welded pipe from the 
Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu: Status report by Canada 
(WT/DS482/7/Add.2)  
 
1.1.  The Chairman  noted that there were five sub -items under this Agenda item concerning  status 
reports submitted by delegations pursuant to Article  21.6 of the DSU. He recalled that Article  21.6 
required that: "Unless the DSB decides otherwise, the issue of implementation of the 
recommendations or rulings shall be placed on the Agenda of the  DSB meeting after six  months 
following the date of establishment of the reasonable period of time and shall remain on the DSB's 
Agenda until the issue is resolved". He invited delegations to provide up -to-date information about 
compliance efforts and to f ocus on new developments, suggestions and ideas on progress towards 
the resolution of disputes. He also remind delegations that, as provided for in Rule  27 of the 
Rules  of Procedure for DSB meetings: "Representatives should make every effort to avoid the 
repetition of a full debate at each meeting on any issue that has already been fully debated in the 
past and on which there appears to have been no change in Members' positions already on 
record". He then turned to the first status report under this Agenda item. 
A  United  States – Anti-dumping measures on certain hot -rolled steel products from 
Japan: Status Report by the United  States (WT/D184/15/Add.177)  
1.2.  The Chairman  drew attention to document WT/DS184/15/Add.177, which contained the 
status report by the Un ited States on progress in the implementation of the DSB's 
recommendations in the case concerning US  anti-dumping measures on certain hot -rolled steel 
products from Japan.  
1.3.  The representative of the United States  said that the United States had provided a s tatus 
report in this dispute on 12  October  2017, in accordance with Article  21.6 of the DSU. The 
United  States had addressed the DSB's recommendations and rulings with respect to the 
calculation of anti -dumping margins in the hot -rolled steel anti -dumping duty investigation at 
issue. With respect to the recommendations and rulings of the DSB that had yet to be addressed, 
the US  Administration would work with the US  Congress with respect to appropriate statutory 
measures that would resolve this matter.  WT/DSB/M/403  
 
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  1.4.  The representative of Japan  thanked the United States for its status report and its statement. 
Japan, once again, called on the United States to fully implement the DSB's recommendations and 
rulings so as to resolve this matter.  
1.5.  The DSB took note  of the st atements and agreed  to revert to this matter at its next regular 
meeting.  
B  United  States – Section 110(5) of the U S Copyright Act: Status report by the 
United  States (WT/DS160/24/Add.152)  
1.6.  The Chairman  drew attention to document WT/DS160/24/Add.152, which  contained the 
status report by the United  States on progress in the implementation of the DSB's 
recommendations in the case concerning Section  110(5) of the US Copyright Act.  
1.7.  The representative of the United States  said that the United States had provided  a status 
report in this dispute on 12  October  2017, in accordance with Article  21.6 of the DSU. The 
US Administration would continue to confer with the EU, and to work closely with the US Congress, 
in order to reach a mutually satisfactory resolution of t his matter.  
1.8.  The representative of the European Union  said that his delegation thanked the United  States 
for its status report and its statement. The EU referred to its previous statements and noted that it 
wished to resolve this matter as soon as possible.  
1.9.  The representative of China  said that his country thanked the United States for submitting a 
status report in this dispute. However, China regretted to see that Members were still waiting for 
the final resolution of this dispute and full compliance with t he DSB's recommenda tions and rulings 
by the United  States. China urged the United  States to show sincere commitment to the WTO 
dispute settlement system and full respect for the rights of those copyright holders that had been 
negatively affected for more t han a decade in this dispute.  
1.10.   The DSB took note  of the statements and agreed  to revert to this matter at its next regular 
meeting.  
C  European  Communities – Measures affecting the approval and marketing of biotech 
products : Status report by the European  Union (WT/DS291/37/Add.115)  
1.11.   The Chairman  drew attention to document WT/DS291/37/Add.115, which contained the 
status report by the European  Union on progress in the implementation of the DSB's 
recommendations in the case concerning measures affecting the app roval and marketing of 
biotech products.  
1.12.   The representative of the European Union  said that, as his delegation had previously 
indicated, on 14  September  2017, the draft authorisations for one type of  genetically modified 
soybean1, one type of genetically m odified  oilseed rape2 and the renewal of one type of genetically 
modified maize3 (for food and feed use) had been submitted for a vote at the member States 
committee, with a "no opinion" result. These measures had been submitted for a vote to the 
Appeal Co mmittee on 19  October  2017, also resulting in "no opinion". It was now for the 
European  Commission to decide on these two authorisations. The EU continued to be committed to 
acting in line with its WTO obligations. But more generally, and as it had previou sly stated, the EU 
recalled that the EU's approval system was not covered by the DSB's recommendations and 
rulings.  
1.13.   The representative of the United States  said that the United  States thanked the EU for its 
status report and its statement  at the present me eting. The United States said that it would like to 
again note that the EU persisted in maintaining measures affecting the approval of biotech 
products that result in prolonged, unpredictable, and unexplained delays at every stage of the 
approvals process.  The United  States urged the EU to ensure that its measures affecting the 
                                                
1 305423 x 40 -3-2. 
2 MON88302 x Ms8 x Rf3.  
3 1507.  WT/DSB/M/403  
 
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  approval of biotech products, including measures adopted by individual EU member States, were 
based on scientific evidence, and that decisions were taken without undue delay. Further , the 
United  States noted that the EU had failed to lift all of the member State bans covered by the DSB 
findings, and that EU member States had proceeded to adopt additional bans on the same 
products as those covered by the DSB findings. These bans were u nsupported by science and 
should be removed.  
1.14.   The DSB took note  of the statements and agreed  to revert to this matter at its next regular 
meeting.  
D  European  Union – Anti-dumping measures on biodiesel from Argentina: Status Report 
by the European  Union (W T/DS473/17/Add.4)  
1.15.   The Chairman  drew attention to document WT/DS473/17/Add.4, which contained the status 
report by the European  Union on progress in the implementation of the DSB's recommendations in 
the case concerning anti -dumping measures on biodiesel fr om Argentina.  
1.16.   The representative of the European Union  said that for the present meeting, the EU had 
provided a final status report with the precise indication of the publication references of 
Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/1578. This had amended Implem enting Regulation (EU) 
No 1194/2013 by imposing a definitive anti -dumping duty and collecting definitively the 
provisional duty imposed on imports of biodiesel originating in Argentina and Indonesia. The EU 
recalled that the Implementing Regulation had been published in the Official Journal of the EU on 
19 September  2017 (OJ L 239, 19.9.2017, p. 9) and, according to Article  2 of said Regulation, had 
entered into force on 20  September  2017. The EU reiterated that the adoption of the Regulation 
ensured the  EU's full implementation of the DSB's recommendations and rulings in this dispute.  
1.17.   The representative of Argentina  said that his country welcomed the EU's status report. 
Argentina reiterated its s atisfaction with the Commission' s Implementing Regulation ( EU) 
No. 2017/1578, adopted on 18  September  2017, that had amended Regulation (EU) 
No.°1194/2013 of 19  November  2013. Argentina continued to closely monitor an appeal that had 
been brought to the European Court of Justice, by the European Commission, agains t the decision 
of the General Court, annulling the imposition of a definitive anti -dumping duty on imports of 
biodiesel in November  2013. Finally, Argentina reiterated its serious concern about a European 
Biodiesel Board press release published on 27  Septe mber 2017, announcing that it would submit a 
petition to the European Commission to initiate a subsidy investigation against Argentinean 
biodiesel imports. Argentina considered that any decision of initiation of such a procedure would be 
unwarranted, given  that Argentinean biodiesel producers received no subsidies. In any case, 
Argentina would defend its WTO rights vigorously.  
1.18.   The DSB took note  of the statements.  
E  Canada – Anti-dumping measures on imports of certain carbon steel welded pipe from 
the Separ ate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu: Status report by 
Canada (WT/DS482/7/Add.2)  
1.19.   The Chairman  drew attention to document WT/DS482/7/Add.2, which contained the status 
report by Canada on progress in the implementation of the DSB's recom mendations in the case 
concerning anti -dumping measures on imports of certain carbon steel welded pipe from the 
Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu.  
1.20.   The representative of Canada  said that, as his country had reported to the DSB o n 
22 June 2017, Canada had enacted amendments to the Special Import Measures Act in respect of 
exporters found to have de minimis margins of dumping in order to achieve compliance with the 
DSB's recommendations and rulings. Regarding the DSB's recommendati ons and rulings relating to 
measures of the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) and the Canadian International Trade 
Tribunal (CITT), on 28  July 2017, the CITT had initiated a review of its threat of injury finding, 
which would be completed by 8  December  2017. On 29  September  2017, the CBSA had amended 
the final determination of dumping of carbon steel welded pipe from Chinese Taipei in order to 
exclude two Chinese Taipei exporters that had had de minimis  margins of dumping. The CBSA had WT/DSB/M/403  
 
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  also revised the m argins of dumping for "all other exporters" from Chinese Taipei. A statement of 
reasons for this decision had been published on the CBSA's website.  
1.21.   The representative of Chinese  Taipei  said that her delegation thanked Canada for its status 
report and its statement. Chinese Taipei was still examining the legislative amendments and the 
relevant Canadian domestic review proceedings, but hoped to resolve this matter very soon.  
1.22.   The DSB took note  of the statements and agreed  to revert to this matter at its next  regular 
meeting.  
2  EUROPEAN  UNION – ANTI -DUMPING MEASURES ON IMPORTS OF CERTAIN F ATTY 
ALCOHOLS FROM INDONE SIA 
A  Statement by the European  Union  
2.1.  The Chairman  said that this item was on the Agenda of the present meeting at the request of 
the European  Union a nd invited the representative of the European  Union to speak.  
2.2.  The representative of the European  Union  said that his delegation wished to inform the DSB 
that it intended to fully comply with its WTO obligations, as had been clarified by the DSB's 
recommend ations and rulings in this dispute.  
2.3.  The representative of Indonesia  said that her country thanked the EU for its statement and 
took note of the EU's views. Indonesia considered it important for all DSB's recommendations and 
rulings to be adequately impleme nted. This was essential for the well -functioning of dispute 
settlement system. In this dispute, the Panel had found a violation of Article  6.7 of the 
Anti-Dumping Agreement, because the EU had failed to adequately disclose the results of the 
verification.  The Appellate Body had rejected the EU's appeal against this finding and had 
recommended that the EU bring itself into compliance even though the dumping measure at issue 
had expired late during the Panel's proceedings. Nevertheless, the DSB had made the 
recommendatio ns and rulings in this matter. Indonesia had a strong commercial and systemic 
interest in the EU's compliance with its obligations under Article  6.7 of the Anti -Dumping 
Agreement. Indonesia was confident that the EU would take a principled app roach and would bring 
itself into compliance with the DSB's recommendations and rulings. Indonesia would be happy to 
discuss this matter bilaterally with the EU and to keep the DSB abreast of these discussions.  
2.4.  The DSB took note  of the statements.  
3  UNITED  STATES – CONTINUED DUMPING AN D SUBSIDY OFFSET ACT  OF 2000: 
IMPLEMENTATION OF TH E RECOMMENDATIONS AD OPTED BY THE  DSB 
A  Statement by the European  Union  
3.1.  The Chairman  said that this item was on the Agenda of the present meeting at the request of 
the European  Union and he invited the representative of the EU to speak.  
3.2.  The representative of the European  Union  said that his delegation, o nce again, requested the 
United  States to stop transferring anti -dumping and countervailing duties to the US industry. Every 
disbursement that still took place was clearly an act of non -compliance with the DSB's 
recommendations and rulings. The EU renewed its call on the United States to abide by its clear 
obligation under Article  21.6 of the DSU to submit status reports regardi ng its implementation in 
this dispute. The EU would continue to place this matter on the DSB's Agenda for as long as the 
United  States had not implemented the DSB's recommendations and rulings.  
3.3.  The representative of Canada  said that his country thanked the EU for placing this item on 
the DSB's Agenda. Canada shared the EU's view that the Byrd Amendment remained under the 
DSB's surveillance until it was no longer applied.  
3.4.  The representative of Brazil  said that, once again, h er country thanked the EU for keeping 
this item on the DSB's Agenda. As one of the parties to the Byrd Amendment disputes, Brazil 
wished to refer to its previous statements made on this matter. In particular, Brazil wished to refer WT/DSB/M/403  
 
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  to its statements regard ing the continuation of illegal disbursements, which should cease 
immediately. Brazil renewed its calls on the United States to fully comply with the DSB's 
recommendations and rulings in this dispute. Until then, the United States was under an obligation 
to submit status reports, pursuant to Article  21.6 of the DSU.  
3.5.  The representative of the United  States  said that, as the United States had noted at previous 
DSB meetings, the Deficit Reduction Act – which included a provision repealing the Continued 
Dumping  and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 – had been enacted into law in February  2006. 
Accordingly, the United  States had taken all actions necessary to implement the DSB's 
recommendations and rulings in these disputes. The United States recalled, furthermore, that  the 
EU had acknowledged that the Deficit Reduction Act did not permit the distribution of duties 
collected on goods entered after 1  October  2007, some 10  years ago. With respect to the EU's 
request for status reports in this matter, as the United States h ad already explained at previous 
DSB meetings, there was no obligation under the DSU to provide further status reports once a 
Member had announced that it had implemented the DSB's recommendations and rulings, 
regardless of whether the complaining party di sagreed about compliance. As the  United  States had 
noted previously, the EU had demonstrated repeatedly that it shared this understanding, at least 
when it was the responding party in a dispute. Once again, the EU ha d provided no status report 
for the pres ent meeting for disputes in which there was a disagreement between the parties on the 
EU's compliance.  
3.6.  The representative of the European  Union  said that hi s delegation thanked the United  States 
for its response. As it had previously stated, the EU disagre ed with the last part of the statement 
made by the United States. The EU believed that it had provided status reports in all disputes that 
involved the EU. As the DSB had just heard, the EU had provided status reports in the DS291 and  
DS473 disputes, respe ctively.  
3.7.  The DSB took note  of the statements.  
4  UNITED ARAB EMIRATES  – MEASURES RELATING TO  TRADE IN GOODS AND 
SERVICES, AND TRADE -RELATED ASPECTS OF I NTELLECTUAL PROPERTY  RIGHTS  
A  Request for the establishment of a panel by Qatar (WT/DS526/2)  
4.1.  The Chairman  drew attention to the communication from Qatar contained in document 
WT/DS526/2 and invited the representative of Qatar to speak.  
4.2.  The representative of Qatar  said that his country was requesting the DSB to establish a panel 
to resolve a dispute between Qat ar and the United Arab Emirates in connection with violations of 
Qatar's rights under the GATT  1994 and the GATS Agreement, as well as to benefit from the 
protection of intellectual property rights under the TRIPS Agreement. The actions of the UAE 
constitu ted unilateral actions that grossly disregarded Qatar's WTO rights and the rights of other 
WTO Members. Qatar noted that it had attempted to seek opportunities for dialogue with a view to 
finding some reconciliation with its nearest trade partners, but the  responding parties had failed to 
engage constructively. The rights of Qatar, as well as many WTO Members, were being violated by 
the coercive attempts of the UAE to economically isolate Qatar. For example, through the denial of 
WTO-consistent transit of g oods to and from Qatar. In addition, third -country Members could no 
longer enjoy the harmonized import conditions resulting from the Gulf Cooperation Council ("GCC") 
customs union and single market.  
4.3.  Qatar regretted that the UAE had refused to even engage in consultations following a request 
by Qatar on 31  July 2017. In refusing consultations, the UAE had violated Article  3.10 of the DSU 
which provided that "all Members will engage in these procedures in good faith in an effort to 
resolve the dispute." The UAE had also violated Article  4 of the DSU, which required Members to 
engage in consultations when requested. The UAE's rejection of the agreed procedures for 
resolution of trade disputes between WTO Members should be a matter of concern to all Members. 
Qatar noted that the UAE had previously asserted an absolute unilateral right to be absolved of all 
of its substantive and procedural WTO obligations vis -à-vis Qatar, based purely on its bald 
assertion that its coercive attempts to isolate Qatar reflected a security concern. Qatar did not 
dispute the right of countries to take bona fide measures to protect their security. But this defence 
could not be self -regulating, for that would threaten the integrity of the entire rules -based system. WT/DSB/M/403  
 
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  This meant that Memb ers were not entitled to use security concerns to disguise trade measures 
that were taken in pursuit of other objectives. If Members' discretion in this regard were 
completely unregulated, then the balance of rights and obligations in the covered agreement s 
could be fundamentally altered with impunity. Qatar was confident that the panel established to 
resolve this dispute, together with the DSB, would carefully protect the balance in the covered 
agreements. Therefore, Qatar had determined to exercise its ri ghts under the DSU and the 
covered agreements and requested a panel to assist in resolving the dispute between Qatar and 
the UAE.  
4.4.  The representative of the United  Arab Emirates  said that his country regretted that Qatar had 
requested the establishment of a panel in the DS526 dispute. As Members were aware, the 
measures challenged by Qatar were measures that the UAE had been forced to take because of 
Qatar's continued support and funding of terrorist organizations. Qatar's support and funding of 
these organ izations raised serious national security issues for the UAE. The UAE had not acted 
alone. Eight other countries  – seven of which were WTO Members – had broken off relations with 
Qatar and had taken similar measures out of national security concerns. For s everal years the UAE 
and other countries had submitted their concerns to the attention of Qatar's Government and had 
asked it to desist from providing support and funding to terrorist organizations. In 2014, Qatar had 
acknowledged the concerns that had bee n raised by the UAE and other countries and had assumed 
specific commitments to cease its illegal conduct. While fully aware of its obligations and that 
non-compliance would have serious repercussions, Qatar had repeatedly violated the commitments 
it had a ssumed by continuing to support and fund these terrorist organizations. Qatar's continued 
funding and support for terrorism constituted a threat to the UAE's national security. Article  XXI of 
the GATT  1994, Article  XIVbis of the GATS, and Article  73 of the  TRIPS Agreement expressly 
allowed a Member to take any action that it considered necessary for the protection of its essential 
security interests. This was precisely what the UAE had done. The UAE's actions were not trade 
measures and were clearly disting uishable from the kind of measures that were subject to WTO 
rules. They did not protect a given industry or sector. Rather, they were intended to persuade 
Qatar to cease and desist from behavio ur that endangered the essential national security interests 
of the UAE. Accepting Qatar's request for a panel in DS526 would, in effect, transform the WTO 
from an institution intended to set rules for international trade into an institution that arbitrated 
national security issues. The WTO dispute settlement system a lready faced many serious 
challenges, including disagreements about economic measures and their consistency with WTO 
rules. The system was simply not equipped to adjudicate the national security issues raised in 
DS526, nor was there any support for the not ion that it was intended to adjudicate such issues. In 
fact, there was clear language in the GATT  1994, GATS, and TRIPS Agreement that excluded such 
national security matters from the jurisdiction of the WTO. For these reasons, the UAE could not 
agree to t he establishment of a panel. In addition, the UAE, in the strongest possible terms, urged 
every other Member of the WTO to condemn this attempt by Qatar to use the WTO for purposes it 
was not intended.   
4.5.  The representative of  the Kingdom  of Bahrain  said that his country fully endorsed the 
statement made by the UAE and supported its objection to the establishment of a panel at the 
present meeting. Like the UAE, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia had adopted national security measures 
which were directed agains t Qatar. Bahrain's measures had also been the subject of the 
consultation request issued by Qatar on 31  July 2017. For reasons that were best known to Qatar, 
it had chosen to focus on the UAE alone, notwithstanding the fact that three GCC member States 
had adopted the same stance in respect of Qatar. Against that background, Bahrain wished to 
place on record that, like the UAE, it had only decided to take measures against Qatar after it was 
satisfied, on the basis of credible evidence, that Qatar's conduct posed a serious risk to security in 
the Gulf region. As Bahrain had made clear in WTO bodies where the measures had been raised, 
the measures were necessary to protect Bahrain's essential national security interests. These 
measures were well within the rig hts granted to WTO Members under GATT  1994 Article  XXI, 
GATS Article  XIVbis and TRIPS Article  73. Those provisions made it clear that each WTO Member 
was entitled to take any action that it considered necessary for the protection of its essential 
security interests. Bahrain stressed that it was the invoking WTO Member, and it was only the 
invoking WTO Member that had the responsibility to make judgements under the national security 
exceptions. For this fundamental reason, Qatar's claims were misconceived an d could not be 
upheld. Bahrain was convinced that this matter should be resolved through the appropriate 
channel, elsewhere, and should not be considered under the WTO.  WT/DSB/M/403  
 
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  4.6.  The representative of the Kingdom  of Saudi  Arabia  said that his country regretted that  the 
establishment of a panel had been requested by Qatar. Saudi Arabia assured Members that the 
measures referenced in Qatar's panel request were being maintained pursuant to the national 
security exceptions set out in Article  XXI of the GATT  1994, Articl e XIVbis of the GATS and 
Article  73 of the TRIPS Agreement, as well as any other relevant provisions of the WTO 
Agreements. Furthermore, nothing in the WTO Agreements or security exceptions could be 
construed to compel a Member to furnish information which  it considered to be contrary to its 
essential security interests, as was the case concerning the present matter. Saudi Arabia 
associated itself with the statement made by the UAE and supported its objection to the 
establishment of a panel in this dispute.  Moreover, Saudi Arabia believed that the WTO was not 
the appropriate forum to discuss this matter. In conclusion, it emphasised that the solution to this 
matter was in Qatar's hands and this was not a matter to be dealt with by the WTO.  
4.7.  The representativ e of Egypt  said that his country associated itself with the statements made 
by the UAE, Bahrain and Saudi  Arabia. Egypt sup ported the position of the UAE to object to the 
establishment of a panel at the present meeting. It believed that these measures had been 
undertaken by the UAE in a manner that did not contradict the WTO Agreements. Egypt also 
believed that these measures had been taken in accordance with Article  XXI of the GATT  1994, 
Article  XIVbis GATS, and Article  73 of the TRIPS Agreement, which wer e important elements for 
safeguarding the rights of the UAE when it considered that issues of national security were 
involved in a dispute.  
4.8.  The representative of Qatar  said that his country had noted the statements made by the UAE 
and the other parties in volved. Qatar invited all WTO Members to contemplate the need to invoke 
the security exceptions to deny dairy products, fresh vegetables, and essential medicines to Qatari 
residents. In truth, the UAE's attempt to justify its actions was a disguise for mea sures that 
pursued a fundamentally different purpose. Furthermore, Qatar noted that certain of its 
neighbours, in particular the UAE, that were currently banning any goods from entering Qatar 
continued to willingly pay large sums to Qatar for its continuin g exports of energy -related products 
essential to the economics of its neighbours. Qatar currently provided the UAE with 30% of their 
energy needs. Such profound contradictions belied any suggestion that the coercive measures 
were based on security concern s. Qatar further rejected the UAE's contention that these measures 
did not serve a commercial purpose. With regard to the various allegations brought up by the UAE 
in their statement, Qatar wished to state that these allegations were complete fabrications and 
that the DSB was not the right f orum to deal with such matters.  It was clear that the nature of any 
defence in WTO law was subject to multilateral oversight. The legal tests agreed to by Members 
were objective and were not left to the whim of individua l decision makers in Member 
governments. The UAE was simply incorrect to the extent that it considered its measures to be 
immune from review.  
4.9.  The representative of the United  States  said that the United States noted that the UAE had 
indicated that its meas ures were justified on the basis of national security. Issues of national 
security were political and were not matters appropriate for adjudication in the WTO dispute 
settlement system. The United States therefore considered that the parties should resolve  this 
issue outside the context of WTO dispute settlement. If the parties were unable to resolve the 
issue bilaterally, the United States encouraged the parties to request assistance from the 
Director -General through his good offices or from another person  or WTO Member in which the 
parties had confidence.  
4.10.   The representative of the United  Arab Emirates  said that his country had listened to Qatar's 
statement  carefully , however, the UAE reiterated that it  objected to the establishment of a panel 
for the reaso ns it had mentioned  previously . 
4.11.   The DSB took note  of the statements and agreed  to revert to this matter.  WT/DSB/M/403  
 
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  5  CANADA – MEASURES CONCERNING TRADE IN COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT  
A  Designation by the DSB of the representative referred to in paragraph  4 of Annex  V of 
the SCM Agreement  
5.1.  The Chairman  said that this item was on the Agenda of the present meeting at the request of 
Brazil and he invited the representative of Brazil to speak.  
5.2.  The representative of Brazil  said that his country was pleased to see that Mr. Hanspeter 
Tschaeni had been put forward for designation by the DSB as a fac ilitator, pursuant to paragraph  4 
of Annex  5 of the SCM Agreement, in DS522. His designation as facilitator would contribute to the 
"timely development of information necessary to facilitate expeditious subsequent multilateral 
review of the dispute" as was required by paragraph  4 of the Annex V of the SCM Agreement.  
5.3.  The representative of Canada  said that Mr. Hanspeter Tschaeni would be designated as the 
Annex  V facilitator following an agreem ent between Brazil and Canada. However, as Canada had 
mentioned during 29  September  2017 DSB meeting, Canada had concerns with respect to Brazil' s 
panel request in this dispute. Canada considered that Brazil's serious prejudice claims were not 
properly bef ore the Panel and that, therefore, an Annex  V process was not warranted. Moreover, 
Canada noted that certain measures mentioned in the panel request were also not properly before 
the Panel. Some measures had not been subject to consultations while the desc ription of others 
was inadequate. Canada would file a preliminary request, in the coming days, asking the Panel in 
this dispute to rule on these matters.  
5.4.  The representative of the United  States  said that the United States welcomed the agreement 
of Brazil and Canada to the appoint ment of this  qualified individual to serve as the facilitator in the 
Annex  V process initiated by the decision of the DSB at its meeting on 29  September  2017. This 
agreement allowed the DSB at the present meeting to take a decision  to appoint a facilitator that 
had the parties' confidence and support. The United  States was confident that he would assist the 
parties and compile an appropriate record for the panel's work in this dispute.  
5.5.  The Chairman  recalled that a fax had been sent to delegations on 18  October  2017 regarding 
Brazil's request to designate a DSB facilitator, pursuant to paragraph  4 of Annex  V of the 
SCM Agreement. In that fax, the Chairman had informed Members that he had identified, and that 
the parties to the dispute  had agreed to, a representative whom he had proposed that the DSB 
designate to serve the function of facilitating the information -gathering process, pursuant to 
paragraph  4 of Annex  V of the SCM  Agreement. The Chairman invited any delegation that desired 
further information to contact him or the Secretariat. The Chairman proposed that the DSB 
designate Mr. Hanspeter Tschaeni as a representative to serve the function of facilitating the 
information -gathering process, pursuant to paragraph  4 of Annex  V of th e SCM  Agreement.  
5.6.  The DSB so agreed . 
5.7.  The Chairman  thanked Mr. Hanspeter Tschaeni, on behalf of the DSB, for his willingness to 
undertake this task.  
5.8.  The representative of Brazil  said that since the Annex  V procedures had been initiated and 
Mr. Hanspeter Tsch aeni had been designated as the facilitator in DS522, Brazil wished to make a 
statement of its own position, for the record. Brazil saw the Annex  V procedure as an important 
part of the multilateral dispute settlement system. This information -gathering pro cess established 
in the SCM Agreement played an important function in contributing to the Panel's obligation to 
make informed and objective findings and recommendations regarding the measures at issue and, 
consequently, helped the DSB to discharge its func tion of achieving a prompt and satisfactory 
settlement of disputes between Members. Brazil understood that, although agreement was always 
preferable and advisable, the initiation of the Annex  V procedure and the designation of its 
facilitator were simply p rocedural consequences of the DSB's decision to establish a panel.  WT/DSB/M/403  
 
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  5.9.  The representative of the United States  said that the United States did not share Brazil's view 
that the appointment of a facilitator was automatic, or that the DSB Chairman should serve as the 
facilitator in the absence of the parties' agreement. Annex  V called for the DSB to take two steps 
to commence information -gathering: under paragraph  2, "the DSB shall, upon request, initiate the 
procedure" and then, under paragraph  4, "[t]he DSB shall designate a representative to serve the 
function of facilitating the information -gathering process ". The re could not be a procedure or a 
representative unless the DSB did something to "initiate" or "designate" that procedure or 
representative. The DSB did not play the passive role of merely witnessing or commenting on 
dispute settlement. The DSU envisaged an  active role for the DSB in administering those rules and 
procedures. That role meant that a procedural step charged to the authority of the DSB could take 
place only if that body had actually taken ("executed") the relevant step. Interpreting an authority  
of the DSB as occurring without DSB action would be fundamentally inconsistent with the active 
role envisaged by the DSU. DSU Article  2.4 stated unambiguously that "[w]here the rules and 
procedures of this Understanding provide for the DSB to take a decis ion, it shall do so by 
consensus ". Article  IX:1 of the Marrakesh Agreement provided that "[d]ecisions by the 
General  Council when convened as the Dispute Settlement Body shall be taken only in accordance 
with the provisions of paragraph  4 of Article  2 of t he Dispute Settlement Understanding ". 
In contrast, where a dispute settlement provision did not require positive consensus for action by 
the DSB – such as when the DSB established a panel under Article  6.1 – this was explicit in the 
text of the relevant pr ovision. The absence of such language in Annex  V confirmed that the 
positive consensus rules applied to the initiation of the Annex  V procedures. The Annex envisaged 
a collaborative process related to, but separate from, the proceedings before the Panel. T hus, 
application of the positive consensus rule to initiation of the Annex  V procedures and designation 
of a DSB representative reflected the collaborative approach embodied in Annex  V itself. Brazil and 
Canada's agreement to initiate the Annex  V process a t the 29  September  2017 DSB meeting, as 
well as their subsequent agreement on the facilitator, was consistent with this collaborative 
process.  
5.10.   The representative of Canada  said that while his country appreciated the value of setting 
out Members' positions on the procedural aspects related to the launch of the Annex  V procedure 
and the designation of the facilitator,  Canada considered that it was unnecessary to do so at this  
point in this dispute. Therefore, Canada reserved its right to express its position on these issues.  
5.11.   The representative of Brazil  said that despite the interesting comments the DSB had just 
heard, and fortunately for the Membership, the Appellate Body ha d already given guidance on how 
to interpret this issue. In that guidance the Appellate Body had said that both the initiation of the 
procedures as well as the designation of the facilitator were procedural consequences of the DSB's 
decision to establish a  panel. To consider it otherwise would essentially make the initiation and the 
designation of the facilitator dependent on the will of one of the parties, which could lead to 
difficulties in initiating the procedures. Thus the guidance given by the Appella te Body seemed to 
be solid and it helped give Annex  V its meaning.  
5.12.   The representative of the United  States  noted that Brazil had referred to the Appellate 
Body's Report in "US – Large Civil Aircraft (Second Complaint)" (DS353). The DSB, like any other 
political body of the WTO – such as the General Council or Ministerial Conference – should resolve 
disagreements on procedural matters through their own, internal rules and processes. It was not 
for the dispute settlement system to tell the DSB or the Ministe rial Conference or any other WTO 
Body how to operate under its own rules of procedure and whether and h ow a decision was to be 
taken. Therefore, any statements relating to the DSB's procedures in the "US – Large Civil Aircraft 
(Second Complaint)" (DS353) d ispute were unwarranted, and a regrettable choice by the Appellate 
Body. To compound the concern, any such statement had not been necessary to resolve that 
appeal and would therefore be in the nature of obiter  dicta. The Appellate Body's discussion of 
whether the initiation of Annex  V was by positive consensus had clearly been unnecessary to 
resolve the dispute. The Appellate Body itself had declined to find that all of the conditions for the 
initiation of the Annex  V procedure had been fulfilled.4 And the panel considering the same issue 
had found that, in fact, the DSB had initiated no procedure and that no procedure had been 
undertaken. On that basis, the panel had declined to make findings on the legal issue, a judicious 
approach the Appellate Body had f ailed to emulate.  
                                                
4 "US – Large Civil Aircraft " (DS353) (AB), para. 549.  WT/DSB/M/403  
 
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  5.13.   The representative of Brazil  noted t he statement made by the United  States. Brazil 
understood that some Members considered the Appellate Body's guidance to be in the nature of 
obiter  dicta. However, that term did not appear in the covered  agreements. Members had been 
hearing that expression for many years even though it was not a legal concept known outside the 
common law. For all those Members from a civil law system, it was simply a matter of a judge 
writing a lot or writing less. So, fo r Brazil, the guidance given by the Appellate Bo dy in that case 
was important.  
5.14.   The DSB took note  of the statements.  
6  ADOPTION OF THE 2017  DRAFT ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DSB  (WT/DSB/W/603)  
6.1.  The Chairman  said that, under this Agenda item, he was submitting for ad option the draft 
text of the 2017  Annual Report of the DSB contained in document WT/DSB/W/603. He was doing 
so pursuant to the Procedures for an Annual Overview of WTO Activities and for Reporting under 
the WTO, contained in document WT/L/105. The Report c overed the work of the DSB since the 
previous Annual Report contained in document WT/DSB/71. In other words, it covered meetings of 
the DSB from 8  November  2016 through 29  September  2017. The Report contained a factual 
summary of DSB meetings during the pe riod under review. As in the past, following the adoption 
of the Annual Report at the present meeting, the Secretariat would update the Report under its 
own responsibility in order to include actions taken by the DSB at the present meeting. 
Subsequently, t he updated Annual Report would be submitted for consideration by the General 
Council at its meeting scheduled for 30  November  2017. Consequently, the Chairman proposed 
that the DSB adopt the draft Annual Report of the DSB contained in document WT/DSB/W/603  on 
the understanding that it would be further updated by the Secretariat.  
6.2.  The DSB took note  of the statement and agreed  to adopt the draft Annual Report contained 
in document WT/DSB/W/603 on the understanding that it would be further updated by the 
Secret ariat.5  
7  PROPOSED NOMINATIONS  FOR THE INDICATIVE L IST OF GOVERNMENTAL AND 
NON-GOVERNMENTAL PANELIS TS (WT/DSB/W/606)  
7.1.  The Chairman  drew attention to document WT/DSB/W/606, which contained additional 
names proposed by Singapore for inclusion on the Indicative  List of Governmental and 
Non-Governmental Panelists, in accordance with Article  8.4 of the DSU. He proposed that the DSB 
approve the names contained in document WT/DSB/W/606.  
7.2.  The DSB so agreed . 
8  APPELLATE BODY MATTE RS 
A.  Statement by the Chairman  
B.  Appointment of Appellate Body members: proposal by the Eu ropean  Union 
(WT/DSB/W/597/Rev.5 ) 
C.  Proposal regarding the Appellate Body selection process (WT/DSB/W/596/Rev.5)  
8.1.  The Chairman  proposed that the three sub -items under this Agenda item be taken up 
together. He said that he would first make a short statement to update delegations regarding the 
Appellate Body matters. Subsequently, he would invite the respective proponents to introdu ce 
their proposals and then he would open the floor for delegations to speak. The Chairman said that 
he would now make a short statement regarding the Appellate Body matters. As he had indicated 
at the 29  September  2017 DSB meeting, informal consultations continued on the AB matters in 
order to find a way forward regarding the current impasse. These consultations were being held at 
different levels, both political and technical. However, there had been no notable development so 
far. The Chairman urged all M embers to show more flexibility and creativity so that the DSB could 
                                                
5 Subsequently, the Annual Report was circulated in document WT/DSB/74.  WT/DSB/M/403  
 
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  launch the three selection processes as soon as possible. Subsequently, the Chairman  turned to 
the proposal submitted by the European  Union contained in document WT/DSB/W/597/Rev.5.  
8.2.  The r epresentative of the European  Union  said that his delegation thanked the Chairman for 
his statement. As the EU had repeatedly stated in previous meetings, the EU had fully supported 
the selection of new Appellate Body members without delay. The proposals o n this issue were very 
pertinent and the EU encouraged all Members to support these proposals so that all three  selection 
processes could be launched at the present meeting. In any event, the EU looked forward to the 
Chairman's continued consultations on t his issue. Regarding the details of its proposal, the EU 
noted that it had strictly followed the models of similar DSB decisions in the past. The proposal 
provided for the selection processes to be conducted and concluded as soon as possible. The EU 
had al so noted the other proposal on the table and thanked Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, 
Guatemala, Mexico and Peru for their revised proposal which corresponded, in substance, to the 
EU's proposal. There were very minor differences between the two proposa ls. Therefore, the EU 
was also ready to join a consensus on the Latin American proponents' proposal.  
8.3.  The Chairman  invited the representative of Mexico to introduce the proposal submitted by 
Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Guatemala, Mexico and Peru con tained in document 
WT/DSB/W/596/Rev.5.  
8.4.  The representative of Mexico , speaking on behalf of Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, 
Guatemala, Mexico and Peru, thanked the Chairman for his statement. Mexico regretted that the 
selection process to fill the Appel late Body vacancies had not been launched. Mexico said that it 
would be useful to hear more details from the  Chairman and the Director -General regarding the 
steps taken to move away from the impasse. Similarly, Mexico encouraged other Members who 
had engag ed in their own consultations to inform the DSB of any progress. Mexico believed that 
WTO Members had to safeguard and preserve the Appellate Body, and consequently, the 
multilateral trading system. Members could not remain passive under the present circum stances. 
It was not necessary to remind Members of the large number of disputes that continued to arrive 
at the Appellate Body, the subsequent delays or the concrete trade damages caused to the 
legitimate interests of the parties. It was for this reason th at the Latin American proponents were 
presenting, for the sixth  consecutive time, a draft proposal to launch the Appellate Body selection 
process.  
8.5.  As at the 29  September  2017 DSB meeting, Mexico's proposal sought to fill the two Appellate 
Body vacancies t hat were already open, as well as the vacancy that would beco me available in 
December  2017. This was necessary given the critical situation whereby, as of December, only 
four out of seven seats on the Appellate Body would be filled. The proposal contained 
four elements: (i) the initiation of the three selection processes: one to replace Mr. Ricardo 
Ramírez -Hernández, whose second term had expired on 30  June 2017; another to fill the vacancy 
that had resulted after the resignation of Mr. Hyun Chong Kim with effect from 1  August  2017; and 
a third to replace Mr. Peter Van den Bossche, whose second term would expire on 
11 December  2017; (ii) the establishment of a Selection Committee; (iii) setting 
29 November  2017 as the deadline for the submission of candidaci es; and (iv) requesting that the 
Selection Committee issue its recommendation no later than the regular DSB meeting in 
February  2018. Mexico was flexible regarding the deadlines for the selection process and could 
accept the deadlines proposed by the EU. M exico again urged all Members to have similar 
flexibility on this issue.  
8.6.  The representative of the United  States  said that the United States thanked the Chairman for 
his continued work on these issues. With respect to the proposals at issue, as it had men tioned at 
the 29  September  2017 DSB meeting, the  United  States was not in a position to support either of 
the proposed decisions. The United States said that, in its view, it could  not consider a decision 
launching a selection process when a person to be r eplaced continued to serve and decide appeals 
after the expiry of their term. As the United  States had noted at past meetings, the DSB had a 
responsibility under the DSU to decide whether a person whose term of appointment had expired 
should continue servi ng. The United States considered that Members needed to discuss and 
resolve that issue first before moving on to the issue of replacing such a person. As had also been 
noted previously, the United  States would welcome Mr. Ramírez's continued service on the  appeals 
to which he had been assigned prior to 30  June 2017. In fact, it did not understand  any Member to 
have objected to his service on these appeals. In that circumstance, the DSB should take up its 
responsibility to adopt an appropriate decision. The United States had been discussing this issue WT/DSB/M/403  
 
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  informally with multiple delegations recently. Those meetings had bee n productive in that the 
United  States believed that it had heard a general recognition that the DSB had the authority to 
set the term of an A ppellate Body  member under Article  17.2 of the DSU. It followed that the DSB 
had a responsibility to decide whether a person should continue serving beyond that term. The 
United  States had also heard a willingness of several delegations to work together to  find a way 
forward. It therefore would continue its efforts and its discussions with Members and with the 
Chairman to seek a solution on these important issues.  
8.7.  The representative of Australia  said that her country remained concerned at the impasse the 
DSB had reached in relation to appointments to the Appellate Body. Delays in the commencement 
of the selection and appointment processes undermined the WTO's capacity to resolve disputes, 
and had the potential to undermine the WTO itself. Australia encourage d those Members that had 
raised particular interests and concerns to discuss those openly and constructively, and to show 
flexibility with a view to finding a mutually acceptable way forward. Ultimately, however, Members 
all shared responsibility for the p roper administration and operation of the dispute settlement 
system through the DSB. Therefore all Members had to be prepared to work together to bridge 
differences and agree on a path forward. Australia stood ready to be a part of this conversation. 
Austr alia acknowledged the concerns which had been raised in the DSB regarding the current 
practices in the application of Rule  15 of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review. It remained 
open to constructive discussions about the issues raised with a view t o identifying and clarifying 
issues of systemic and legal concern and working together to consider potential solutions.  
8.8.  The representative of Pakistan  said that the current impasse being faced by the DSB 
regarding the appointment of Appellate Body members was now reaching alarming levels. Pakistan 
feared that unless this matter was resolved in earnest and at the earliest, it might eclipse other 
matters in the upcoming Ministerial at Buenos Aires. This would indeed be a travesty. The dispute 
settlement mecha nism was facing a high level of activity which underscored the great measure of 
confidence that Members continued to place in it. At the same time, these elevated levels of 
activity placed great strain on the system. To make matters worse, WTO disputes had  become 
complex and litigators had become increasingly sophisticated, thus making the job of the Appellate 
Body more challenging. This was exacerbated in situations where several appeals in different 
disputes were filed simultaneously or within a short per iod of time. In essence, the workload of the 
Appellate Body had increased significantly. While Pakistan agreed with the United  States regarding 
the seriousness and importance of the systemic issues they had pointed out, and the needed to 
iron these out. Pa kistan believed that these issues should not be linked to the appointment of the 
new Appellate Body members. Pakistan urged all WTO Members to work with the Appellate Body 
to maintain, nurture and preserve the trust and credibility that had been built up o ver the years in 
this dispute settlement system. A system which was uniquely effective, but fragile, and which 
could not be taken for granted. In that vein, Pakistan sincerely hoped that the differences between 
Members were bridged and would be overcome so on, and it urged Members to work towards that 
end, lest they create a lag whereby the sanctity of the system might be at stake. Pakistan could 
join a consensus on either of the two tabled proposals. However, it hoped that the process of 
appointment of the new Appellate Body members would be finalized by the end of 2017 and before 
MC11 to be held in Buenos Aires.  
8.9.  The representative of Singapore  said that her country wished to reiterate its serious systemic 
concerns on the lengthy delays in the launching of the Appellate Body selection process. Singapore 
regretted that a link had been drawn between the launch of the selection process and certain 
systemic issues that had been raised. It remained of the view that the systemic issues could be 
dealt with on a sep arate and parallel track and should not prevent the launch of the 
Appellate  Body selection process. Singapore urged Members to show flexibility and to work 
towards a consensus for a DSB decision to launch the Appellate Body selection process as soon as 
possible. Singapore noted that the proposal by the EU and the proposal by the group of Latin 
American countries were very similar in substance and Singapore could go along with either 
proposal. In this regard, it may be useful to work towards a single text so  that the DSB could take 
a decision on the Appellate Body selection once the impasse had been resolved. Singapore stood 
ready to engage constructively and to work with the Membership and the Chairman to help to 
resolve this impasse.  
8.10.   The representative of Thailand  said that dispute settlement was a key pillar of the WTO that 
provided predictability and security to the multilateral trading system. Thailand noted that, 
currently, there were two vacancies on the Appellate Body and another vacancy would arise a t the WT/DSB/M/403  
 
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  end of 2017. At the DSB meeting on 29  September  2017, Thailand had associated itself with the 
ASEAN statement expressing the regional group's serious concern regarding the present impasse. 
In fact, Thailand believed that most Members shared the same concern – the concern that 
vacancies had to be filled as they arose and that the selection process should have already been 
launched. Thailand also associated itself with the statements mentioned previously by other 
colleagues seeking more flexibility from  the Membership. It was willing to engage constructively 
and to work with Members and the Chairman to resolve this impasse.  
8.11.   The representative of Canada  said that his country again registered its profound 
disappointment and serious concern that the DSB ha d been unable to fulfil its legal obligation 
under Article  17.2 of the DSU to appoint Appellate Body members as vacancies arose. Order 
required law, and law required enforcement. By providing an effective enforcement mechanism, 
the WTO's system of dispute settlement had underpinned the order that had prevailed in the world 
trading system since 1995. That system had delivered predictability and prosperity for businesses 
and individuals around the world. Neither these benefits nor the institutions that were r esponsible 
for them should be neglected. Canada urged the United States to reconsider its position and to 
allow the selection process to proceed immediately.  
8.12.   The representative of New Zealand  said that her country thanked the proponents for their 
updated proposals, and the Chairman for his report on consultations.  New Zealand noted the 
United  States' intervention, and while New  Zealand stood ready to discuss the concerns the 
United  States had raised, these were distinct matters from the decision to launch the selection 
processes to find new Appellate Body members and needed to be resolved through a separate and 
parallel process. Regarding the substance of the concerns, New  Zealand again took th e opportunity 
to reiterate that any resolution of the issues raised could only be done on a prospective basis. 
It could not affect any decisions or proceedings involving divisions that had already been 
composed applying the well -established practice of Rul e 15 of the Working Procedures for 
Appellate Review. It followed that New  Zealand did not consider that a decision authorizing 
Mr. Ramírez's continued service was necessary, even though New  Zealand had no objection to that 
continued service. It  again called on Members to be flexible and pragmatic and to allow the 
launching of the selection processes for new Appellate Body members as soon as possible. 
New Zealand remained ready to work constructively with Members in this regard.  
8.13.   The representative of Switzerland  said that her country thanked the Chairman for his 
ongoing efforts on this matter. As it had noted at previous DSB meetings, Switzerland was very 
preoccupied with the situation regarding the selection process to replace Appellate Body members. 
This situation could have growing, detrimental consequences for the well -functioning dispute 
settlement mechanism, as well as for the integrity and credibility of the multilateral trading system 
as a whole. Switzerland reiterated its readiness to engage in d iscussions on issues raised and to 
explore possible solutions. At the same time, it strongly believed that the selection processes for 
all three  Appellate  Body positions should be launched and completed without further delay, in line 
with the two very simi lar proposals on the table.  
8.14.   The representative of India said that his country appreciated the efforts being made by the 
Chairman to resolve the present crisis in initiating the selection process for Appellate Body 
members. India thanked the proponents for  their revised proposals to resolve the present impasse 
in the selection process. The proposal submitted by Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Guatemala, 
Mexico and Peru, and the proposal submitted by the EU had achieved common ground to launch 
selection processes to replace the two vacancies that had arisen and a third one which would arise 
in December  2017. India was flexible with regard to the process of launching the selection 
processes and completely supported the proponents' suggestions to commence t he selection 
processes for all three vacancies as soon as possible. India believed in the rule based multilateral 
trading system of the WTO. One of the key pillars of the WTO was its dispute settlement system 
which was considered the central element in pro viding security and predictability to the 
multilateral trading system. The WTO dispute settlement system had been recognised as a reliable 
and effective system that delivered outcomes within strict time -frames. It had delivered crucial 
decisions in WTO dis putes and Members had placed their faith in it. Its independence and 
autonomy were critical to the effectiveness of the dispute settlement system. India believed that 
certainty and predictability in trade rules could be ensured with the availability of ade quate dispute 
resolution instruments and machinery. India expressed its serious systemic concerns regarding the 
significant delays in launching the Appellate Body selection process. This would paralyze the 
existing dispute settlement system and delay the r esolution of disputes. It was vital for the WT/DSB/M/403  
 
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  effective functioning of the dispute settlement system that the Appellate Body had a full 
complement of seven members to hear appeals. The continued impasse could have major 
consequences for the system. Any furth er delay in the selection of Appellate Body members would 
jeopardise Members' rights to the timely resolution of disputes. It would delay the Appellate Body 
from being able to make recommendations and rulings, which would impact the trade and industry 
affected by the measure at issue in each dispute.  
8.15.   India said that the Appellate Body was a critical element of the dispute settlement system. 
A large number of disputes ended up being appealed. There were presently two vacancies in the 
Appellate Body and anot her vacancy would arise shortly, in December  2017. There was an urgent 
need to fill the vacancies on the Appellate Body. This was not only on account of the legal 
obligation enshrined in Article  17.2 of the DSU which provided that vacancies had to be fille d as 
they arose, but also on account of the number of appeals that had already been filed or were in 
the process of being filed. Although India appreciated Members raising their concerns on any 
systemic issues which they considered should be discussed and addressed, it regretted and 
disagreed with the linkage of any such alleged systemic issues with the launch of the selection 
process to fill the Appellate Body vacancies. India shared the view of many Members that these 
were two separate, independent issues . It strongly believed that any systemic issues raised by 
Members could be dealt with on a different track, and thus, should not become a stumbling block 
for the launching of the Appellate Body selection process. India was willing to participate in any 
such discussion on the systemic issues that had been raised as an independent process and it 
urged Members to show flexibility to launch the Appellate Body selection process as soon as 
possible.  
8.16.   The representative of Chile, speaking on behalf of the GRULAC c ountries, said that the WTO 
was in a delicate situation due to the impasse that had arisen regarding the launching of the 
Appellate Body selection process. First of all, Chile acknowledged the Chairman's efforts to seek a 
solution to this problem and to en able Members to expr ess their views on this matter.  In this 
regard, Chile stated its deep concern about the present situation which affected the 
well-functioning of a central body of the WTO. If the problem continued, it would, in the short 
term, practical ly imply the paralysis of the Appellate Body, putting the entire dispute settlement 
system at risk. Chile noted that the delay in launching the selection process, with two  vacancies 
having already arisen, meant a failure of the DSB to comply with an existi ng mandate an d involved 
a flagrant breach of  legal obligations under the covered agreements. This had serious systemic 
consequences and was a bad precedent for the organization. It inflicted damage and affected the 
image and credibility of the WTO, particu larly taking into account the complex international 
environment that was having a negative impact on multilateralism. Chile had heard the concerns 
regarding the functioning of the dispute settlement system, and specific issues regarding 
decision -making, wh ich had been the cause of the impasse in launching the Appellate Body 
selection process. Chile could not accept that these concerns were linked to the launching of the 
selection process. It pointed out that the operation of the system could not be stopped because 
the concerns of some Members had not been resolved. Chile called on Members who were opposed 
to initiating the selection process to take into consideration the seriousness of a continued 
impasse, and, consequently, to not condition the initiation o f the selection process on the 
resolution of different concerns. These issues had to be addressed on their own merits and 
procedures. Members should work towards a solution that allowed the DSB to meet its legal 
obligations as soon as possible. Finally, Ch ile requested the Chairman to continue to seek a 
solution to this matter.  
8.17.   The representative of Hong Kong, China  said that her delegation thanked the Chairman for 
his on -going efforts on this matter. Hong  Kong,  China shared the systemic concerns that had b een 
expressed by other Members on the prolonged impasse regarding the launching of the Appellate 
Body selection process. It welcomed the proposals from both the EU and the group of Latin 
American Members.  Her delegation was flexible and ready to support ei ther one of the proposals. 
Again, Hong  Kong, China urged Members to exercise maximum flexibility in order to reach an 
agreement on the selection process as soon as possible. Regarding the systemic concerns that had 
been raised by the United States, her del egation was open to discussing any proposals to further 
improve the operation of the WTO, separately.  
8.18.   The representative of Norway  said that, as her country had stated on previous occasions, it 
was Norway's primary interest to ensure that the Appellate Bo dy functioned well . Norway 
reiterated its grave concern with the Membership's common failure to ensure that all vacancies on WT/DSB/M/403  
 
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  the Appellate Body were filled. Norway continued to be flexible and would be in a position to 
support any of the proposals put forw ard in order to reach a solution on launching a selection 
process without further delay. With regard to the linkage made – proposing to hold off filling the 
vacancies on the Appellate Body until the systemic issues outlined had been resolved – Norway did 
not agree that there was such a link. Norway was open and willing to discuss systemic issues 
separately. It continued to urge all Members to show flexibility in order to ensure that the DSB 
surpassed this deadlock – for the benefit of the system.  
8.19.   The repres entative of Chinese  Taipei  said that his delegation referred to its statement on 
this issue made at the 29  September  2017 DSB meeting. Chinese Taipei could support either 
proposal. On the other hand, it was willing to work with Members to discuss and clari fy the legal 
issue mentioned by the United States in a constructive manner.  
8.20.   The representative of Turkey  said that his country thanked the respective proponents for 
their revised proposals. Turkey referred to its statements delivered at the informal DSB m eeting 
held on 15  September  2017 and the regular DSB meeting held on 29  September  2017. Turkey 
reiterated its belief that the concerns raised by the United States about the working procedures of 
the Appellate Body should be dealt with separately and should  not block the immediate start of the 
Appellate Body selection process. Turkey was ready to join a consensus on either of the 
two proposals. It thanked the United States for organizing some informal consultations with 
Members to exchange views on Rule  15 of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review. During 
those consultations Members had had the chance to better understand the United States' concerns 
and to express their opinions about the legal relationship between Rule  15 of the AB Working 
Procedures an d the DSU. Turkey believed that the Members should continue such dialogue, 
nevertheless, this did not change the fact that the Members should also launch the Appellate Body 
selection process immediately.  
8.21.   The representative of Japan  thanked the Chairman fo r his report. Japan also thanked the 
respective proponents for their revised proposals. The DSB was tasked with administering the 
DSU. Appointing a member of the Appellate Body was one of the most important functions of the 
DSB under the DSU. Thus it was u nfortunate that the DSB was not in a position to launch the 
selection processes at the present meeting. All Members had to exercise flexibility and act in a 
constructive manner so that the DSB could perform its functions.  
8.22.   The representative of China  said that her country was flexible as to the modality of 
launching the selection processes. However, China was deeply concerned and shared Members' 
profound disappointment at the current situation. Out of the seven  positions on the Appellate Body 
two vacancies had arisen and one would soon arise in the coming months, yet Members were still 
not able to launch the selection processes due to the concerns expressed by the United  States. 
While the United States had expressed and explained its concerns numerous times,  it had failed to 
submit any proposals that would help resolve its concerns. China therefore queried the reasons 
behind such a blockage. As the end of Mr.  Peter Van den Bossche's term was approaching, China 
urged Members to act constructively instead of je opardizing the dispute settlement system – a 
central pillar of the multilateral trading system. China looked forward to working with other 
Members to ensure the dispute settlement system resumed its proper function without further 
delay.  
8.23.   The representativ e of Korea  said that his country appreciated the Chairman's continued 
efforts to find a way out of the impasse in launching the Appellate Body selection process. Korea 
joined the previous speakers in expressing its serious concerns about the ongoing delay in the 
launch of the Appellate Body selection process. Regarding the reasons why the DSB should 
immediately launch the selection process, Korea referred to its previous statements on this matter. 
It also shared the views expressed by other Members at the p resent meeting. As always, Korea 
stood ready to discuss the systemic issues regarding the Appellate Body. A presentation by the 
United  States of concrete ideas or proposals on how to address these systemic issues would 
facilitate the DSB's discussions. Kor ea emphasized, once again, that the selection process should 
be launched without being linked to deliberations on systemic issues relating to the Appellate 
Body. Finally, Korea expressed its flexibility on the modality of the selection process. In this 
regard, it was willing to join a consensus based on either of the two  proposals put forward by the 
EU and a group of Latin American countries respectively.  WT/DSB/M/403  
 
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  8.24.   The representative of Honduras  said that her country supported the statement made by 
Chile speaking on  behalf of the GRULAC countries. Honduras thanked the Chairman for his tireless 
efforts to seek a solution to this matter. It expressed its deep concern with the present situation. 
As an active Member of the DSB Honduras felt that the DSB needed a systemic  solution. Problems 
existed with the Appellate Body and the entire DSB and these issues had an impact on the covered 
agreements. Honduras urged Members to show flexibility and the will to find a prompt solution to 
the current impasse. This was in the inter est of the entire Membership.  
8.25.   The representative of the Russian  Federation  said that her country referred to its 
statements made on this matter at previous DSB meetings. Russia emphasised that it remained 
flexible and could join a consensus with regard to  either of the proposals that had been put 
forward at the present meeting. It remained hopeful that the disagreements would be resolved 
soon so that the vacancies on the Appellate Body could be filled as they arose.  
8.26.   The representative of Guatemala  said th at his country was disappointed that the situation 
regarding the Appellate Body selection process remained the same. Guatemala was ready to 
engage constructively in the exercise of finding a solution to this impasse.  
8.27.   The representative of Israel  said that  his country had made its views regarding the 
Appellate Body selection process known at past regular DSB meetings and at the 
14 September  2017 informal DSB meeting. The dispute settlement system, which included the 
Appellate Body, was a pillar of the WTO. By delaying the launch of the selection process for two 
existing vacancies, as well as an upcoming third, the DSB risked hindering one of the pillars upon 
which the organization stood. This would undoubtedly bring serious consequences reverberating 
across the rest of the WTO and the whole international trade environment. Israel agreed that there 
were some areas in the dispute settlement system where there was room for some improvement. 
It was committed to making such improvements. However, Israel did not se e why this should 
come in the way of launching the selection process to fill the Appellate Body vacancies. It 
encouraged Members to reach an agreement to launch the selection process es. 
8.28.   The representative of Uruguay  said that his country wished to reiterat e what it had stated at 
past DSB meetings regarding the importance of filling the vacancies in the Appellate Body. This 
was essential for the continuation of the dispute settlement system. Uruguay also supported the 
statement made by Chile on behalf of the  GRULAC countries.  
8.29.   The representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela  said that, along the same lines as 
expressed by Chile on behalf of the GRULAC  countries , her country wished to be associated with 
the previous speakers who had expressed concerns about the impasse in the launching of the 
Appellate Body selection process es.  
8.30.   The representative of the Dominican  Republic  said that her country supported the statement 
made by Chile on b ehalf of the GRULAC countries. As the Dominican Republic ha d stated at 
previous DSB meetings, it was concerned at the impasse in the launching of the Appellate Body 
selection process and hoped that a solution could soon be found.  
8.31.   The representative of El Salvador  said that her country echoed the statement made by Chile 
on behalf of the GRULAC countries. As it had pointed out at prior DSB meetings, El  Salvador 
echoed what had been stated by several delegations regarding the need for a prompt solution to 
the impasse in launching Appellate Body selection processes. Th is would enable Members to once 
again take up the work of one of the most important bodies in the WTO.  
8.32.   The representative of Peru said that his country supported the statement made by Chile on 
behalf of the GRULAC countries.  
8.33.   The representative of Mexico , speaking on behalf of Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, 
Guatemala, Mexico and Peru, said that the Latin American proponents regretted that, once again, 
Members had not achieved a consensus to start the Appellate Body selection processes. As Mexico 
had po inted out, Article  17.2 of the DSU placed an obligation on all Members by stating that 
"vacancies shall be filled as they arise ". It was therefore the Membership's duty to fill the 
vacancies on the Appellate Body. Mexico reiterated that it was not acceptab le to link the concerns 
and discussions on issues related to the dispute settlement system to the initiation of the selection WT/DSB/M/403  
 
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  process. It noted, once again, that this seemed to be a quasi -unanimous position amongst the 
DSB Members. Any substantive discussi on on appeal procedures or broader discussions on the 
Appellate Body's function should not prevent it from continuing to operate fully or complying with 
its obligations under the covered agreements. Members should not open the door to the danger 
that any M ember with a particular concern, whether justified or not, could decide to block the 
functioning of the dispute settlement system until that Member's concerns were resolved. 
Otherwise, Members would keep the Appellate Body, the dispute settlement system, a nd hence 
the rules -based multilateral trading system, the hostage of particular positions. The dispute 
settlement system relied on common efforts among all Members and the multilateral trading 
system depended on the proper functioning of the dispute settle ment system.  
8.34.   Mexico noted that for more than 20  years, the Appellate Body had provided the WTO with 
solid jurisprudence on a range of different WTO agreements. Over these years, important disputes 
had been settled, which had helped to strengthen the multi lateral trading system. There would 
always be room to improve the functioning of the DSB and the Appellate Body. However, Members 
had the responsibility to preserve what they had accomplished thus far. In this context, it was 
important not to lose sight of  the seriousness of the present situation, which only worsened as 
time passed. Currently, the DSB faced an unprecedented crisis with potential negative 
consequences. If Members failed to act now, the Appellate Body would soon become dysfunctional. 
It was M exico's firm belief that nobody gained from the present situation. Members could violate 
the covered agreements by allowing the situation to exacerbate. Mexico called on Members to be 
flexible in order to launch the Appellate Body selection process. Finall y, Mexico said that the 
November regular meeting would be the deadline for delegations to show their interest in the 
proper functioning of the Appellate Body before the matter was considered in Buenos  Aires. In this 
regard, Mexico expressed its readiness t o work with other delegations and with the Chairman in 
order to find a solution to the current situation.  
8.35.   The representative of Brazil  said that his country thanked the Chairman for his report. Brazil 
wondered about the takeaway of the present and preview s DSB meetings held in 2017. Almost one 
year had passed and the DSB had not been able to decide on this very important issue. Members 
should reflect on this matter in light of their obligations under the WTO Agreement. Brazil noted 
that Members had not mov ed closer to a common view or "met at the middle of the bridge". 
Members were losing perspective, they focused too much on the particulars and missed the bigger 
picture. It was a monument that had allowed the international trading system to stand firm desp ite 
the problems, imperfections, fiery legal skirmishes and procedural manoeuvrings. Over the past 
two decades, the Membership together  – as parties and third parties, the Secretariat, panelists 
and members of the Appellate Body – had actively contributed to breathe life to a conceptual 
inspiration that had, without a shadow of a doubt, already made a significant contribution to 
international trade law and, in fact, to public international law. But Members seemed to have lost 
the perspective. Some successes  of the Appellate Body included: around 150  appeals that had 
been filed in 20  years, similar to the number of cases in the ICJ in 70  years, important landmark 
findings that had settled disputes or had paved the way to mutually agree on solutions, the 
const ant and cautious interpretation of provisions of the Agreements, living up to the obligations 
set out in Article  3.2 of the DSU. He then referred to the following past disputes: "Gasoline, 
Alcoholic Beverages, Bananas, Salmon, Apples, Dairy, Poultry, Autos , Auto parts, Asbestos, 
Hormones, Steel, D -RAMS, Sugar, Cotton, Audiovisuals, Tyres, Raw Materials, Aircraft, Renewable 
Energy  and Solar Cells ". Brazil  asked the following questions: "Was that not the spectrum of global 
trade, of global trade rules in moti on and sometimes in trouble? Did Members not all have their 
favourite cases and preferred reasoning insights? And did Members not also have those disputes 
that they believed went off the mark or they were still trying to understand?" This was the 
formidabl e forest: a myriad of intractable legal claims and arguments that had been stripped down 
to their core and exposed to the light of the agreed common rules, in an exercise of professional 
excellence that was testimony to the capacity of solving disputes pea cefully. And all this had been 
done within the shortest time -frames of any arbitration body or tribunal in the world, with part -
time AB members and limited resources. It had been done in an environment where two thirds of 
the disputes were appealed, which demonstrated the trust that Members had placed in the dispute 
settlement system and the Appellate Body. Now Members had the perspective. The sense of 
perplexity only expanded when Brazil saw that the DSB was letting the Appellate Body slowly 
shrivel. In le ss than two  months, only four Appellate Body  members would be left and the prospect 
loomed that, for several reasons, it would not be possible to form one AB division. Members had 
pointed to the rules of procedures and, although most had never thought the rules could represent 
a problem, all Members seemed to be ready to discuss and solve the problem collectively, as the WT/DSB/M/403  
 
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  DSB had done in the past. These issues regained their proper dimension when confronted with the 
proper perspective. There was certainly ro om for improvement, but nothing that justified stalling 
the processes to fill the vacancies, which, as many had already stated, should be a routine process 
in the DSB. With regard to Rule  15 of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review, he said that 
although the DSB had not heard details about the issues or ideas on how to solve it, this was an 
issue that was intrinsically linked to the independence of the Appellate Body. Rule  15 was a 
practical solution that had been adopted in several similar adjudicato ry bodies and had been a 
constant and peaceful feature in the Appellate Body since 1996. This was a consequence of the 
decision by WTO Members to give the Appellate Body the authority to draw up its rules of 
procedure. Did any Member entertain the "slipper y-slope" idea that a Member, perhaps a party in 
a dispute, would have the right to block or to interfere with the selection of a new Member in any 
ongoing dispute. In contrast, and in perspective, the real and immediate problems facing the 
dispute settleme nt system were as follows. Article  17.1 of the DSU provided that the Appellate 
Body members had to serve in rotation. He questioned whether with fewer than seven Appellate 
Body members, such as three or four, the rotation principle would be observed and be  meaningful. 
Article  17.3 of the DSU also stipulated that the Appellate Body had to be representative of the 
Membership of the WTO (both in terms of geographical representation and of legal traditions). 
Brazil wondered how this feature was going to be main tained in the present circumstances. 
Members also know that collegiality was a central feature of the Appellate Body's collective 
decision -making. The Working Procedures provided that the Appellate Body members had to 
convene on a regular basis to discuss matters of policy, practice and procedure. The DSU also 
required the Appellate Body members to stay abreast of dispute settlement activities and other 
relevant activities of the WTO. How would the Appellate Body comply with these obligations with 
fewer and  fewer Appellate Body members? Important trade interests were being delayed and 
denied the opportunity for a decision and prompt settlement. It was not clear what type of 
consequences the Appellate Body would have to face.  
8.36.   Members collectively had to ask t hemselves: what was left of machinery, without its main 
features? What was left of an entity such as the Appellate Body, without its members, its essence? 
The answer was: a skeleton, a shadow of its former self, a truly sad figure. Members should 
consider whether they could be held accountable for that situation. In the past week, in advance of 
the present meeting, the representative of Brazil had looked at the book "A History of Law and 
Lawyers in the GATT/WTO", and had found it enlightening on the develop ment of WTO institutions 
and of its legal substrate. He then pointed out to a quotation by Claus -Dieter Ehlerman regarding 
the dispute settlement system and the Appellate Body. The quote was so accurate that it had been 
referred in two  articles in the book . It read: "The dispute settlement system that was negotiated in 
the Uruguay Round seems to me still today an extraordinary achievement that comes close to a 
miracle. It seems not wise not to take its existence for granted, and to be guaranteed forever, bu t 
to contribute to its consolidation and further development". Brazil said that t his book was a work in 
progress. New chapters were being written all the time and Members were writing one right now. 
Brazil could only hope that it would be a good chapter – with a happy ending. Brazil again noted its 
perplexity with the present situation. The good thing – the silver lining – was that the cataclysm 
had not yet occurred. Members could still change things for the better. Members could talk, listen 
and fix the pr oblem so that they could, once again, concentrate on the "formidable forest".  
8.37.   The Chairman  thanked delegations for their statements. He regretted, once again, that it 
had not been possible to reach a consensus on the proposals before the DSB. On his part, he 
would continue to consult further and, at the same time, he called upon delegations to have more 
conversations amongst themselves. Certainly, a solution to these matters required more political 
consultations. However, the Chairman believed that conversa tions in Geneva amongst Members 
would help to build the necessary confidence and create concrete ideas in order to appropriately 
address these matters. The Chairman thanked Members for their cooperation.  
8.38.   The DSB took note  of the statements.  
9  UNITED STATES – LARGE RESIDENTIAL WA SHERS FROM KOREA  
A  Statement by Korea  
9.1.  The representative of Korea , speaking under "Other Business", said that his country wished 
to express its disappointment that the DSB had failed to discuss the issue of implementation of the 
DSB's recommendations and rulings in the "US – Large Residential Washers from Korea" (DS464)  WT/DSB/M/403  
 
- 20 - 
 
  dispute as a regular Agenda item at the present meeting. Article  21.6 of the DSU stipulated that 
the issue of implementation "shall be placed on the agenda of the DSB meeting after six  months 
following the date of establishment of the reasonable period of  time" and that "the Member 
concerned shall provide the DSB with a status report" at least 10  days prior to each such DSB 
meeting. The reasonable period of time for this dispute had been established on 13  April 2017. 
Therefore, the issue of implementation of this dispute should have been placed on the Agenda of 
the present meeting and the United States should have provided a status report to the DSB for its 
consideration. Korea was aware that the deadline for inscription of items on the DSB Agenda had 
been 12 October  2017, one day prior to the expiry of the six -month period stipulated in 
Article  21.6 of the DSU. However, Korea's interpretation of Article  21.6 was that the issue of 
implementation needed to be on the Agenda of the DSB meeting that took place six months after 
the establishment of the reasonable period of time. Consequently, Korea believed that a status 
report should have been provided for the present meeting. Regarding this dispute, Korea was yet 
to learn how the United States had taken necessa ry steps, including procedures under Section  123 
and 129 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, to implement the DSB's recommendations and 
rulings. Given that the reasonable period of time would expire on 26  December  2017, Korea had 
concerns about the transp arency of the United States' implementing measures. It was Korea's 
expectation that the United States was working in good faith to fulfil its obligation to implement 
the DSB's recommendations and rulings. In this regard, Korea asked the United States to pr esent 
a status report before the next DSB meeting in November, in accordance with relevant DSU 
provisions.  
9.2.  The representative of the United  States  said that the United States thanked Korea for 
providing advance notice of its intention to make a statement under Other Business. This notice 
was called for under Rule  6 of the GC Rules of Procedure, which the DSB also applied. Under those 
Rules, in particular, Rule  25, "Discussions on substantive issues ... shall be avoided, and the [DSB] 
shall limit itself to taking note of the announcement by the sponsoring delegation" and any 
reaction by another delegation "directly concerned". The United States noted that the Agenda for 
the present meeting had closed prior to the date six month s after establishment of the re asonable 
period of time in this dispute. Further, the reasonable period of time, as had been determined by 
an arbitrator under Article  21.3(c) of the DSU, would expire on 26  December  2017. The 
United  States took note of Korea's statement and would convey i t to capital.  
9.3.  The DSB took note  of the statements.  
__________