RESTRICTED  
  
TN/C/M/35  
 
1 December 2014  
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Trade Negotiations Committee 
16 October 2014    
 
 MINUTES OF MEETING 
HELD IN THE CENTRE WILLIAM RAPPARD ON 16 OCTOBER 2014 
Chairperson: Mr. Roberto Azevêdo (Director-General) 
Contents 
 
1   INTRODUCTORY REMARKS BY CHAIRMAN AND STATEMENT BY THE 
CHAIRMAN OF THE GE NERAL COUNCIL ............................................................................ 1  
2   REPORTS BY CHAIRPERSONS OF  BODIES ESTABLISHED BY THE TNC .......................... 3  
3   STATEMENT BY  CHAIRMAN ......................................................................................... 7  
4   STATEMENTS BY  PARTICIPANTS ................................................................................. 9  
ANNEX I - STATEMENT BY THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA AT THE INFORMAL 
HEADS OF DELEGATION MEET ING ON 15 SEPT EMBER 2014 ........................................... 30 
 
 
1  INTRODUCTORY REMARKS BY CHAIRMAN AND STATEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE 
GENERAL COUNCIL 
1.1.  At the outset, the Chairman recalled that the 35th formal meeting of the Trade Negotiations 
Committee (TNC) had originally been scheduled for 6 October. However, this date had caused 
difficulty for a number of delegations as it fell during the Eid holiday. The meeting had therefore 
been rescheduled for 16 October. 
1.2.  The Chairman said that this meeting came at a very important moment. These were difficult 
days for the Organization. As delegations were aware, a major impasse had been reached in July 
related to the interplay between two Bali decisions: public stockholding on one hand, and the adoption of the Protocol of Amendment on the Tr ade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) on the other. 
While there was no formal or legal linkage, an important political linkage had been made bringing 
the two decisions together. Every effort had been made to resolve the problem in July, but in the end those efforts had come to naught. As a result, Members had missed the deadline for the adoption of the Protocol of Amendment on th e TFA, which had been the first deadline that 
Ministers had set in Bali. In July, he had feared that there would be serious consequences. He had 
asked Members to reflect over the summer and talk to each other about potential ways forward. He had also carried on his own consultations. To address the situation, he had convened an 
informal Heads of Delegation meeting on 15 Sept ember. That meeting had marked the beginning 
of a period of intense and comprehensive consul tations to break the impasse and move forward. 
1.3.  Since then, the Chairs of the relevant nego tiating and regular bodies had been working hard. 
They had been taking stock of Members' posi tions and discussing how to move forward to 
implement all of the Bali decisions and develop a post-Bali work programme. Meetings had been 
held in a range of different formats and configurations. Members had been engaging with each other, both in Geneva and in capitals. He had spoken to a wide range of delegations and groups of 
delegations, as had the Chair of the General Council, Ambassador Fried. He had also met with 
Ministers wherever possible. Everything had been tried to resolve the problem. The end of that TN/C/M/35 
 
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  period of intensive consultations had arrived. As he had promised, at this stage he would give 
Members a clear assessment of the situation based on their views. However, first, he thought 
Members should hear from the other Chairs who had also been conducting consultations over the previous weeks. 
1.4.  Ambassador Jonathan Fried (Canada), Chairman of the General Council, made a statement 
on the Bali implementation issues which came unde r the regular bodies of the WTO. He said that 
as stated at the Heads of Delegation meeting on 15 September, the TNC and the General Council 
had been acting in concert in an effort to assess the situation with respect to the implementation 
of all the Decisions and Declarations agreed by Ministers in Bali. Meetings of all the regular bodies in charge of implementing the Bali mandates ha d taken place following the Heads of Delegation 
meeting of 15 September. In those meetings, the Chairs had – as encouraged by Members and the 
TNC Chairman – tried to assess the level of engagement and ability to move forward in each area 
of the Bali Package. He had maintained regular di alogue with all the Chairs before and after their 
respective meetings and had systematically and regularly reviewed the situation with the TNC 
Chairman.  
1.5.  The picture that had emerged from thos e consultations – albeit with some nuances 
depending on the Committee involved – was rather homogeneous. All Chairs had reported that 
varying degrees of concerns had been raised in ea ch of their bodies on the possibility of moving 
forward with the work in their respective areas, given the current impasse involving the implementation of the TFA and the Decision on Public Stockholding for Food Security Purposes. In some bodies, linkages with the need to solve th e situation before work could proceed had been 
made more explicitly. However, sensitivity had been expressed by several delegations about the 
implementation of the LDC-related Bali decisions. 
1.6.  With regard to agriculture, he said that the Chair of the Committee on Agriculture (CoA) had 
held an informal open-ended consultation on 16 September to take stock of Members' positions on 
the implementation of the Bali outcomes and to exchange views on the way ahead in light of the 
reflection that had been undertaken after 31 July. The CoA Chair had recalled the Committee's 
essential role in the monitoring and transparency functions of the WTO and in providing a forum 
for Members to discuss policies in the context of  the implementation of commitments under the 
Agreement on Agriculture. She had noted the progress made in the area of notifications, highlighting a notification from India wh ich had been circulated on 10 September. 
1.7.  Many Members had stressed the importance  of continuing the regular Committee work on 
agriculture relating to monitoring, transparency, and notifications. But at the same time, some Members had made clear that, unless trade facilitation was resolved, work on the remaining Bali 
implementation mandates would not be taken up. Other Members had noted that, given the 
timetables for Committee work on export competition and tariff-rate quota (TRQ) administration, Members could postpone the decision on the status of these issues. Members had discussed the 
question of which committee – regular CoA or CoA in Special Session – should address the public 
stockholding issue and the Chair had concluded th a t  s h e  w o u l d  o n l y  b e  a b l e  t o  t a k e  u p  t h e  
question regarding the proper forum for discussion s on public stockholding when the fundamental 
issue concerning Bali implementation had been settled. 
1.8.  On trade facilitation, a meeting of the Preparatory Committee had taken place on 
29 September. The session had had two main agenda it ems. First, in line with the requirements of 
the Bali mandate, the Preparatory Committee ha d received the notifications of Category A 
commitments submitted by delegations since th e Committee had last addressed the matter on 
2 July. This had been followed by an informal working session in which Members had been asked to exchange views on the road ahead. The feedback received from Ambassador Conejos on the 
developments regarding the first agenda item had been that the Committee had received an 
impressive number of new notifications – almost 40 since July. That was a positive sign of Members' continued commitment to the TFA and its expeditious entry into force. It had been especially heartening to see so many notifications being tabled over the summer break, despite 
the existing situation. The overall number of su bmissions now approached 50 – there had been 48 
as of 1 October. 
1.9.  Exchanges on the second agenda item, on the other hand, had revealed that there was no 
movement on the circumstances that had preven ted Members from adopting the Protocol of 
Amendment at the end of July. It had clearly emerged that the Preparatory Committee was not in TN/C/M/35 
 
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  a position to draw up such a Protocol to insert the TFA into Annex 1A of the WTO Agreement. 
Members had also been unable to come to a common understanding on what should be given priority in terms of the next steps, and in which framework. Ambassador Conejos would be consulting delegations further on the way forward. 
1.10.  Regarding development and least-develope d country (LDC) issues, the Chairman of the 
Committee on Trade and Development (CTD) had co nvened an informal open-ended meeting on 
23 September to take stock of Members' position s and exchange views on the way ahead on the 
Bali decisions relating to the Monitoring Mechanism on Special and Differential Treatment (S&D) 
and Duty-free Quota-free (DFQF) market access for LDCs. At that meeting, some delegations had expressed concern that a standstill on further implementation of the TFA could have an adverse effect on other areas of work and that this hiatus was not good for the multilateral trading system. 
Members had also said they were willing to carry on further work on both the Monitoring 
Mechanism and DFQF market access, in accordance with the mandates given in the Bali decisions. The subsequent meeting of the Monitoring Mechan ism would take place in November. With regard 
to the CTD's annual review on DFQF market access – also scheduled for November – the 
Secretariat had already begun, based on the go -ahead given by Members at the 23 September 
meeting, the preparation of its report on Members' DFQF schemes which, as mandated by the Bali 
Decision, would be prepared in close coordination with Members.  
1.11.  With regard to the Council for Trade in Serv ices (CTS), which was in charge of implementing 
the Decision on the LDC services waiver, the LD C Group had submitted its collective request on 
21 July. At the September meeting of the CTS, the Group had provided a detailed overview of the 
submission, giving additional background info rmation and context to its various elements. 
Delegations had welcomed the request as a stepping stone in the process of the operationalization of the LDC waiver; had indicated that they were still reviewing the document and would revert to 
it; and had stressed willingness to engage in discussions with LDCs to further clarify specific 
elements of the request and make progress towards operationalizing the waiver. However, a handful of delegations had alluded to a potential linkage of progress on the LDC waiver with other 
Bali outcomes, in general terms. 
1.12.  Regarding the high-level meeting that the CTS was mandated to convene six months after 
the circulation of the collective request, the LDCs had stated their expectation that this meeting would take place in the second half of January 2015. They were currently reflecting on the 
procedural aspects and would present their views on  the organization of the event to the CTS. As 
the next CTS meeting was scheduled for the last week of November, the Chairman of the CTS had encouraged LDCs to share their ideas with Members, so that planning for the high-level meeting 
could proceed.  
1.13.  Finally, concerning the Decision on Preferen tial Rules of Origin for LDCs, the Chairman of 
the Committee on Rules of Origin (CRO) had conven ed an informal meeting on 17 September. At 
that meeting, Members had expressed their commi tment to implementing the Decision and had 
reaffirmed the importance of the Decision for th e LDCs and for the work of the CRO. However, a 
number of Members thought that the Decision could not be implemented as if the situation had remained business-as-usual. They believed that greater clarity was required regarding Members' 
commitment to implement other parts of the Bali outcomes, particularly the TFA, before full 
implementation of the Decision could proceed. 
1.14.  The Chairman of the General Council consider ed it clear from the reports of the Chairs that 
the implementation of the Bali mandates in all areas was not unfolding in a business-as-usual 
scenario. The existing impasse was having a freezing effect on the Bali implementation work in a number of bodies and its impact might further deepen and affect other areas of work.  
1.15.  The Trade Negotiations Committee took note of the Chairman's introductory remarks and of 
the statement by the Chairman of the General Council. 
2  REPORTS BY CHAIRPERSONS OF BODIES ESTABLISHED BY THE TNC 2.1.  Ambassador John Adank (New Zealand), Chai rman of the Special Session of the Committee 
on Agriculture (CoA SS), said that since the last informal TNC on 31 July and following the 
communication of 2 September highlighting the need to re-engage quickly to find solutions to the TN/C/M/35 
 
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  implementation of the Bali outcomes, he had been consulting with a range of delegations. He had 
a l s o  h e l d  a n  i n f o r m a l  o p e n - e n d e d  C o A  S S  o n  2 3  S e p t e m b e r  a s  p a r t  o f  t h e  f o l l o w - u p  t o  t h e  15 September Heads of Delegation meeting. The pu rpose of that meeting had been to review the 
situation just before the summer break as well as  developments thereafter. The meeting was also 
intended to provide a further opportunity to Members to take stock of their positions concerning 
the way ahead for the negotiations and the work programme mandated at Bali. 
2.2.  In terms of where Members' positions be fore the summer break, at the CoA SS meeting on 
23 July, he had reported on his informal consulta tions aimed at clarifying Members' perspectives 
on the way forward for the Bali work programme in agriculture. At that point, it had been clear 
that more focussed and in-depth discussions would be required in a range of areas if Members were to take their work forward. He had circulated prior to that meeting a set of questions aimed 
at encouraging greater engagement. At the same meeting, the G-33 had introduced three 
proposals – on Public Stockholding (JOB/AG/27), Special Products (SP) (JOB/AG/28), and Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM) (JOB/AG/29) – that had been circulated to Members a week earlier. 
But as he had been repeatedly reminded by delegations at successive meetings, the CoA SS did 
not exist in isolation from the broader work on Doha and Bali follow-up. Even at the 23 July 
meeting, it had been clear that in the event a solution was not found to the impasse on the 
protocol on the TFA, this was likely to have a broader impact on the work within all bodies tasked 
with Bali and Doha follow-up, including the CoA SS.  
2.3.  The CoA SS on 23 September had confirmed wh at he had already heard in his consultations. 
It had been evident from the various views expre ssed that this unresolved situation regarding the 
implementation of the Bali TFA Protocol had been of significant concern to Members. He had heard 
a range of different perspectives on what this meant for the work of the CoA SS. A number of Members had underlined that unless the TFA Protocol was adopted and opened for signature, it 
would not be possible to advance further work in the CoA SS or in any other Committee mandated 
to pursue follow-up negotiations to Bali. These delegations had pointed to the fact that Bali had been a carefully negotiated package and that in or der for work to be advanced across the board, it 
had to be advanced as a whole, as envisaged in  the Bali decisions and in accordance with the 
sequential milestones outlined there.  
2.4.  Some other Members, in contrast, had suggested that, notwithstanding the current situation 
affecting implementation of Bali decisions, work should continue within the CoA SS as envisaged 
prior to the summer break. These Members had suggested that all issues in the Bali decisions 
should be the subject of independent fo llow-up without linkages between them.  
2.5.  Another set of Members had highlighted more  generally the importance they placed on work 
within the CoA SS given the importance of agricultural reform more broadly and the unique role 
that the WTO had to play in this regard. While these Members had underlined that they wanted to 
see progress, they had also acknowledged that th is would be extremely difficult in the current 
context given that advancing issues required willingness for genuine engagement among Members 
on the range of substantive issues that would necessarily feature in any post-Bali work programme. It had been evident to them that this  kind of engagement was doubtful in the event 
that the impasse in respect of Bali implementation was not resolved.  
2.6.  In terms of more specific issues, at that meeting the G-33 had clarified that it would see the 
CoA SS, rather than the regular CoA, as the plac e for taking forward negotiations regarding the 
public stockholding permanent solution issue. At the same time, it had also been clear that the 
willingness of many Members to move this work  forward was dependent on progress made on 
adoption and opening for signature of the TFA Protocol. A number of Members had also noted the importance of finding ways to address issues of concern to LDCs. 
2.7.  Against this background, his general conclusion from the last informal CoA SS on 
23 September unfortunately still held – in the ab sence of a solution to the current impasse in 
respect of trade facilitation and broader Bali implementation, there was no consensus on how work could be taken forward in the CoA SS. TN/C/M/35 
 
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  2.8.  Ambassador Remigi Winzap (Switzerland), Chairman of the Negotiating Group on Market 
Access, said that following the General Council and informal TNC meetings of July, he had 
convened an open-ended meeting of the Negotiat ing Group on Market Access on 22 September to 
take stock of Members' positions and to exchange views on the way ahead. 
2.9.  In the two earlier open-ended meetings of the Negotiating Group which had taken place on 
31 March and 9 July, he had been able to report  fruitful exchanges with Members and a good 
engagement of the Membership. Unfortunately, he had not been in a position to do so at the 
22 September meeting because he had not sensed a comparable level of interest to engage in 
non-agricultural market access (NAMA). He had understood this to be a consequence of the deadlocked situation in the WTO since early July, and in particular after the 31 July deadline had passed without a General Council decision on the adoption of a TFA Protocol. 
2.10.  The views expressed by Members in the 22 September meeting could broadly be divided 
into three groups. For some, work on NAMA should continue. For others, business-as-usual had not been possible because trust had been undermine d as a result of the non-adoption of the TFA 
Protocol. These Members had also said that they would be ready to move forward on NAMA once 
the current impasse had been resolved. The view of  the third group had been that Members should 
remain positive and wait for the eventual results of on-going consultations. 
2.11.  Although some Members had expressed su pport for further work on NAMA in the open-
ended meeting of 22 September, his assessment, ba sed also on bilateral contacts over previous 
weeks, was that there was no appetite – and ther efore no consensus – in the Membership at large 
to work on NAMA and to engage on this aspect of the work programme at present. 
2.12.  Ambassador Gabriel Duque (Colombia), Chairm an of the Special Session of the Council for 
Trade in Services (CTS SS), said that over the previous months, he had continued to consult in 
different configurations with Members on the way forward in trade in services. Most recently, in 
mid-September, a CTS SS meeting had provided him with the opportunity to hear how Members 
envisaged the possibilities for future work in this area. His consultations had shown that Members acknowledged the existence of an impasse in the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) and that this 
was having a serious effect on the services component of the negotiations. Reactions varied, 
however, as to the effect of this crisis. Some Members were nonetheless committed to continue work in services on the basis of previous milestones in the negotiations. They were not prepared to "lose the dream". Some had added that the operatio nalization of the LDC services waiver should 
not be jeopardized by the overall impasse in the DDA negotiations.  
2.13.  However, a significant number of other Members took the view that the services 
negotiations could not progress without full implem entation of the Bali Package, including the TFA. 
In their view, further negotiations were presently impossible due to a climate of distrust arising 
from the failure to agree to the TFA Protocol. Seve ral Members argued that in any case there could 
be no progress in services without any advanc es in the agriculture component of the DDA. 
2.14.  Before July, he had observed a willingness to  make progress in the services negotiations, in 
particular through the examination of a number of constructive proposals made by several Members. However, he had to reluctantly report that at present there was no consensus within the CTS SS to move forward with the servic es negotiations within its mandate. 
2.15.  Ambassador Harald Neple (Norway), Chairman of the Special Session of the Committee on 
Trade and Development (CTD SS), said that an in formal open-ended meeting of the CTD SS had 
been held on 19 September to ascertain Members' views on the way forward given the impasse. At 
that meeting, some Members had strongly regrette d the non-implementation of the Bali Package, 
in particular the TFA-related deadlines, which had undermined the prospect of any productive engagement in the CTD SS. These Members had felt that without the full and faithful 
implementation of the Bali Package, any attempts to stimulate work in the CTD SS at this stage 
would be unrealistic. 
2.16.  Other Members, however, had expressed the hope that the consultative process led by the 
TNC Chairman would lead to finding a resolution to the current conundrum. They had also felt that 
given the centrality of development issues, the work programme on S&D should continue in spite TN/C/M/35 
 
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  of the current stalemate. They had hoped that this would have a positive trickle-down effect in 
other areas. 
2.17.  There was, therefore, no consensus amongst Members on how to proceed with the work in 
the CTD SS given the impasse. There appeared to be somewhat greater convergence, but still no 
consensus, on the possibility of carrying on the work on LDC-specific issues. 
2.18.  Ambassador Dacio Castillo (Honduras), Chairman of the Special Session of the Council for 
TRIPS, said that responding to the Chairman's call for negotiating group Chairs to restart their 
process of consulting with Members, he had held informal consultations with the most active 
Members on 2 October to see whether there had been any new thinking on how to advance the work of the TRIPS Council Special Session and on how to reflect it in a post-Bali work programme. 
2.19.  It was his sense from these consultations that the situation in the TRIPS Council Special 
Session had not improved since his last report to the TNC in June. Members' substantive positions 
had not changed and delegations' appetite to engage in constructive work on the geographical indications (GI) register negotiations remained  limited within the current overall negotiation 
framework, although several had highlighted the continuing importance of this issue for them 
substantively. The majority of delegations in his consultations had emphasized that they saw no possibility of engaging in work on any aspect o f  t h e  p o s t - B a l i  w o r k  p r o g r a m m e  a s  l o n g  a s  t h e  
implementation of the Bali decisions remained st alled. Those few delegations that had signalled 
readiness to continue working on the post-Bali agenda had offered no novel ideas on how to advance the process or the substance of the TRIPS Council Special Session negotiations. 
2.20.  In light of this, it seemed clear that any resumption of substantive work in this negotiating 
group remained dependent on resolving Members' concerns that lay squarely outside the mandate 
of the TRIPS Council Special Session. He said that as Members worked through these issues, he would continue to be available for delegations to  share any new idea they might have on how to 
advance the process or the substance of the GI register negotiations in the TRIPS Council Special 
Session. 
2.21.  Ambassador Wiboonlasana Ruamraksa (Thailand), Chairperson of the Special Session of the 
Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE SS), said that as indicated in her previous report to 
the TNC in June, she had held a series of bilateral consultations with about 25 delegations to 
discuss ways to contribute to the post-Bali work. Following the summer break, she had renewed her invitation to delegations to discuss bilaterally or in small groups how they envisaged the 
contribution of the CTE SS to the collective efforts to define the post-Bali work programme. Since 
then, she had met with a few delegations and all of them had reiterated their interest in environment issues. At the same time, the attention of delegations was now focused on obtaining 
greater clarity on the overall Bali implementation . In the current situation, she stood ready to 
continue any informal exchange and to discuss, as Members saw fit, ways to move forward the 
CTE SS agenda. 
2.22.  Ambassador Wayne McCook (Jamaica), Chairm an of the Negotiating Group on Rules, said 
that in his consultations last Spring the prevailing view had been that the general approach and 
level of ambition on the so-called "core" issues of agriculture, NAMA and services needed to be 
defined before a serious discussion on the role of Rules could be engaged. To date, he saw no 
indication that this had changed, nor had any delegation advised him otherwise. Thus, apart from 
a continuing active discussion of anti-dumping prac tices in the Technical Group, there had been no 
new Rules activity to report.  
2.23.  Ambassador Ronald Saborío Soto (Costa Ri ca), Chairman of the Special Session of the 
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB SS), said that since his last report in June, meetings had been held 
at the end of July, including an informal open-ended meeting. Since then, he had also consulted 
informally with a number of participants on the state-of-play arising from the discussions of 
proposed elements on all 12 issues over the past  year with the goal of building convergence 
around approaches that would have the broadest possible base of support, in all areas. In particular, these meetings and consultations had taken stock of the elements of a possible 
outcome. He intended to consult further with participants as to the next steps towards obtaining 
elements of a possible outcome on all issues, with the aim that these elements could be a basis of 
future work. TN/C/M/35 
 
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  2.24.  The Trade Negotiations Committee took note of the reports by the Chairpersons of the 
bodies established by it. 
3  STATEMENT BY CHAIRMAN 3.1.  The Chairman said that, having listened to the reports of the Chairs and the statement by the 
General Council Chairman and on the basis of his own consultations, he wished to provide 
Members with his own sense of the situation. It was his duty to give them his honest and straight-forward perspective, based primarily on what he had heard from Members. 
3.2.  In his view, the situation was clear. First, no solution had been found to the impasse. The 
deadline on the TFA had passed more than two mo nths earlier. Members were on borrowed time. 
Second, this situation had had a major impact on several areas of the negotiations. There appeared to be a growing distrust which was having a paralysing effect on the Organization's work 
across the board. He was not in a position to tell Members that a solution was in the making. 
However, he encouraged them to keep working an d keep looking for a solution. He said that he 
would keep trying as well. However, it was his sense that a continuation of the current paralysis 
would serve only to degrade the Organization, pa rticularly its negotiating function. He believed 
that Members had a responsibility to be realistic ab out the situation and, therefore, to find ways to 
continue to work and to keep moving forward, while still looking for a way out of the impasse. In 
his view, this was the only option. 
3.3.  The Chairs' reports had not been encour aging. Work on substance seemed unlikely to 
advance. Therefore, the first step needed to be to start a broader discussion about the basis on which the current scenario of disengagement could be overcome. It was time to start a discussion 
about the future; a future which honoured the aims of the Marrakesh Agreement, which was 
worthy of the WTO's role in international relations, trade and development, and which delivered for the people it served, particularly the poorest. It wa s time to face up to the undeniable problems of 
the Organization and have an open and honest discussion about how to move forward.  
3.4.  There were a number of layers to the discussi on, each of which had to be addressed. In his 
view, the issues at stake fell into four concentric circles. The first circle covered trade facilitation 
and public stockholding. Progress on the TFA was stalled, as Members waited for progress on the 
adoption of the Protocol of Amendment. Public st ockholding was stalled too, as the conversations 
had ground to a halt. He asked how Members should respond. He asked whether these two Bali decisions should be simply put on the shelf, or whether there was a way to move them forward. 
3.5.  Trade facilitation also affected the TFA Facility, which would become operational once the 
provisions of the TFA were being implemented. Desp ite the current situation – or rather because of 
it – Members needed to work to keep the Facility alive and keep donors interested in the initiative. 
Donors had budgetary and time constraints and, therefore, needed clarity about what was 
happening. Despite the state of affairs in Geneva, he had seen a lot of support. On Friday, he had 
been in Washington to enhance the WTO's cooperation with the World Bank on this issue. He and 
the World Bank President Jim Kim had announced a strengthened partnership, under which the 
WTO and the World Bank would work together to ensure that support was available for all who 
needed it under the terms of the TFA.  
3.6.  On public stockholding, it was his sense th at there was a widespread positive disposition to 
negotiate a permanent solution. Nonetheless, there also seemed to be an overarching reluctance 
to put other issues on hold while that permanent solution was sought. This begged the question of 
whether there was any way for Members to move forward on those two issues in the context of 
the current paralysis and distrust. 
3.7.  In the second circle were the other eight Ba li decisions, including agriculture, the Monitoring 
Mechanism and the package of measures for LDCs. Members had to consider what was going to 
happen with those issues. The LDCs, for example, ha d made it clear that they were not preventing 
any other issues from progressing, so they asked why they should be punished and their issues be held back. On the reverse side of this debate were those that said that Bali was a package, and that Members could not easily separate off certain elements to take forward. This camp saw 
linkages amongst the Bali decisions and was not ready to ignore them. Despite these conflicting 
views, there was a clear appreciation from most Me mbers of the logic that had led to the different TN/C/M/35 
 
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  timeframes agreed in Bali for each specific issue. It was clear that what happened in the second 
circle was intertwined with what happened in the first. The ability to implement the other Bali decisions affected the ability to move forward on trade facilitation and public stockholding, and vice versa. 
3.8.  The issue in the third circle was the post-B ali work programme. This task had been mandated 
by Ministers with a deadline of 31 December 2014.  However, realistically there was time only until 
the December meeting of the General Council – eight weeks. He said that on the basis of 
conversations held before July, he had been aiming at a very detailed and specific work 
programme, which came very close to setting out modalities. As he had said at the TNC meeting in June, if the ground was prepared properly, he quoted, "we will be able to construct the clearly defined work programme that we were tasked to de liver by the Bali Declaration." If that could be 
achieved, it would mean that Members would be in a position to conclude negotiations on the DDA 
fairly rapidly. However, in his view, it was very unlikely that such a detailed and precise modalities-like work programme would be ready by the end of the year. What happened was up to 
the Members, but he struggled to see how this could be achieved in the current circumstances. 
Too much time had been lost due to the current impasse and, as the Chairs had reported, the needed engagement was not there.  
3.9.  In saying this, he was not prejudging what could be achieved on the work programme when 
the time was right. He was not commenting on its ambition, coverage and substance. All of this would be determined by Members. He was only commenting on the timing and said that in the eight weeks remaining until the December General Co uncil meeting, it seemed very unlikely that a 
detailed, precise, modalities-like work programme  was possible. Therefore, Members had to ask 
themselves how to deliver on the mandate that had been given in Bali. If they were to deliver by 
December, as instructed, what shape would this work programme take? That was another 
conversation that Members needed to have. What happened in this third circle would also affect 
the first and second, and vice-versa. 
3.10.  The issue in the fourth and final circle, which encompassed all of the others, was what all 
this meant for the Organization itself. Once again the negotiating track was stuck. This was not 
new. Deadlock had unfortunately become a familiar  position, but this did not make it any more 
acceptable. It was not often that Members had been able to overcome similar situations. They had done so in Bali and that had given hope for a new WTO. Yet, now, they again in a similar situation. 
The lack of ability to find full convergence quickl y led to deadlock, and deadlock led to paralysis. 
Members had seen this situation too many times. They could not continue in such an inefficient and ineffective way that was prone to paralysis.  
3.11.  Members had been talking about the other non-multilateral options that were open to them. 
These Members might disengage, pursue other avenues and explore other tracks, inside or outside the WTO. Therefore, it was time to think about the consequences of this situation and consider 
how the Organization could work. This was something Members had to talk about. He would 
facilitate this conversation and hold meetings with delegations. The Chairs would convene meetings. He urged Members to talk to each other. There would be a need, as always, to engage in different formats and different config urations, including open-ended meetings. 
3.12.  He said that this could be the most seriou s situation that the Organization had ever faced. 
He had warned of potentially dangerous situatio ns before and had urged Members to take the 
necessary steps to avoid them. But now, he was not warning them about a potentially dangerous 
situation; he was saying that Members were in it. Therefore, they had to move on and keep 
working for a solution to the current impasse. But they also needed to think about the next steps. He would be starting the discussion on what to do immediately after the General Council meeting 
on 21 October. All Members would have an opportuni ty to put their views forward on all of these 
issues.  
3.13.  As to the content of the discussion, he suggested that Members try to answer some 
questions, specifically: What should be done with  the decisions on trade facilitation and public 
stockholding? What should be done with the other Bali decisions, including the LDC package? How 
should Members respond to the Ministerial mandate to develop a work programme on the post-Bali agenda? How did Members see the future of the ne gotiating pillar of the WTO? He hoped that 
these questions would help to structure the conversation. He wanted to hear from Members what 
they wished to do, what their priorities were, an d where the linkages lay, both legal and political. TN/C/M/35 
 
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  It was often said that the WTO was a Member-d riven Organization. It was the Members who had 
to now take control and find a way forward. Members were the only ones who could answer these questions. In short, he was extending to Members an invitation for reflection and hoped they would accept it.  
3.14.  The Trade Negotiations Committee took note of the Chairman's statement. 
4  STATEMENTS BY PARTICIPANTS 
4.1.  The representative of Kenya, on behalf of the ACP Group, stressed the urgency to prepare 
the post-Bali work programme to conclude the remaining issues in the DDA. The Group also looked 
forward to the expeditious resolu tion of the current impasse on implementation of the two Bali 
decisions in order to enable all Members to reap the benefits of their achievements this year. In 
that regard, the ACP Group counted on the Chairman's leadership to find the right nexus to resolve 
the impasse. It recognized that efforts to break the impasse were underway and it would not stand 
in the way of moving forward on all the decisions as taken at Bali, especially on trade facilitation. The Group had worked hard to achieve, not on ly the Bali package, but also what had been 
achieved after Bali, particularly the TFA Facility  which would be indispensable for the successful 
implementation of the TFA once the deadlock was resolved.  
4.2.  On the post-Bali work programme, the Group had circulated a document (JOB/TNC/41) on 
principles that had been pronounced upon since the beginning of the year. The document reflected 
the Group's priorities, in particular on flexibilities , whatever the solution to conclude the DDA was. 
The document addressed the priorities set in paragraph 1.11 of the Bali Ministerial Declaration to define the post-Bali work programme with emphas is on development, agriculture and LDC issues, 
and not decisions already taken at Bali. Ministers had charged the TNC with defining the work 
programme for the remaining DDA issues and substantial work had to be done in order to meet the deadline of 7 December which was consistent with the timeframe agreed by Ministers at Bali. 
Little time would be left after the impasse was broken, and the Group did not want a situation 
where it might be forced into a top-down process. The Group believed in the multilateral trading system and wished to capitalize on the years of DDA negotiations to ensure inclusiveness, 
transparency and balance. Therefore, paragraph 47  of the Doha Ministerial Declaration had to be 
observed. All Members had relied on that provision to arrive at successful decisions in Bali. 
4.3.  Along with the market access areas that th e Chairman had highlighted earlier this year as 
important to concluding the Round, members of the Group were participating in work to take a 
practical approach to the S&D issues which were also central to realizing the development 
component of the Doha Round. On market access, the Group's document emphasized the need to 
maintain the essence of the flexibilities that it had gained in the last decade of work. New ideas 
were welcome but had to adapt to their flexibilities or be built-in to any solutions. The Group had 
also been working on its own ideas for possible approaches to adopting the flexibilities once the impasse was resolved. Some members of the Group had also expressed offensive and defensive 
interests in fisheries subsidies disciplines that would foster a level playing field in favour of 
development objectives and S&D. Members of the Group were also expecting more from the services pillar, so as to enable them to diversify their economies and participate effectively in the multilateral trading system, including taking better advantage of global value chains that 
supported their development goals.  
4.4.  The Group looked forward to the Chairman 's leadership to advance the post-Bali work 
programme as instructed by Ministers. The ACP Group supported the statements by the African 
and LDC groups. 
4.5.  The representative of Jordan, on behalf of the Arab Group, extended the Group's deep 
appreciation and gratitude to the Chairman for his understanding and positive response to many 
Islamic countries' request to postpone the TNC me eting, which had previously been scheduled for 
6 October. This had coincided with the Eid al-Adha holiday, the most important religious occasion on the Islamic calendar.  
4.6.  The Arab Group expressed disappointment that  work within the negotiating bodies continued 
to be at a standstill. As Members had already crossed the first half line of the first month of the 
last quarter of the year, the Group had great conc erns about whether the mandated post-Bali work TN/C/M/35 
 
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  programme was still doable within the limited time remaining. The linkage between the adoption of 
the TFA Protocol of Amendment and finding a permanent solution on public stockholding continued to represent the main issue on the table. For the ti me being, it felt like moving within a vicious 
circle, or a chicken and egg metaphor. Unexpected issues had been raised when things could have 
moved closer to a conclusion.  
4.7.  The message from the Bali deliverables ha d been clear enough: show more flexibility to 
ensure equity among all Members. Therefore, the Group still believed that more efforts were 
needed to finish the work by the end of the ye ar, as decided in Bali. Members could choose to 
collectively cooperate with the overall direction, ra ther than insisting on personal preferences. The 
Arab Group's view was to have satisfactory progre ss on all areas of the Bali Package. Hence, there 
was a need for accommodating the concerns of different Members, including building stocks for 
food security purposes to prevent volatility in f ood price. At the same time, the Group did not want 
to miss the opportunity to implement the TFA, which could lead to substantial reduction of the cost 
of conducting international trade.  
4.8.  The Arab Group encouraged all Members to work constructively to solve the current impasse, 
to share multiple concerns and information, and put more ideas and solutions on the table with a view to moving forward to accomplish what had been agreed in Bali. The Group stood ready to 
engage constructively, as it had always done, and to build the future work programme for a 
successful and balanced DDA conclusion. The Group urged the Chairman to continue his efforts and consultations to overcome the current standoff.  
4.9.  The representative of Uganda, on behalf  of the LDC Group, said that the Group was 
interested in preserving the multilateral trading system as an important stabilizing factor in global 
economic affairs. For this reason, it called upon all Members to remain constructively engaged and ensure that a work programme was established by 7 December, as mandated by Ministers in Bali. 
The Chairman had kept them seized of developments on the consultations that were currently 
underway within his office and in the respective capitals to try and resolve the current issues with regard to the TFA and food security. The Group urge d all parties to remain engaged with a view to 
an expeditious resolution of the same, taking into account the interests of all the parties 
concerned.  
4.10.  The LDC Group was committed to the full im plementation of all Bali decisions, including – 
but not limited to – the TFA. Of specific importance  to the Group were the LDC-specific issues such 
as the LDC services waiver, DFQF market access, rules of origin and cotton. Bali had had many 
decisions. Therefore, disagreement on one should  not be allowed to stop movement on other 
issues, especially the work programme. The LD C Group did not understand why, for instance, 
Members should create linkages with LDC-specific issues. The LDC issues were not the ones 
causing the current impasse. Deadlines had been missed before, including on LDC-specific issues such as on cotton, but it had never stopped movement on other areas of work in this Organization. 
The Group called for continuity of work. Members should not use this as yet another opportunity to 
deny LDCs the right to development. The Group ha d painful memories of 2011, a year where there 
had almost been an LDC package, but it had been a still birth. The LDC Group welcomed the comments of those delegations that had indicated that the LDC issues would be shielded from this 
current situation.  
4.11.  The Group took note of the statement by the Chairman of the General Council. On 21 July, 
the LDCs had submitted their collective request, pursuant to the Bali Decision, to operationalize 
the LDC services waiver. It was important to recall  the convening of the hi gh-level meeting in mid-
January, where non-LDC Members in a position to do so would have to indicate sectors and modes of supply where they intended to provide prefer ential treatment to LDC services and service 
suppliers. The LDCs would work wi th Members on the choreography for the high-level meeting. It 
ought to be acknowledged, however, that the waiver decision had been adopted at the Eighth Ministerial Conference (MC8). There had been three years of inaction. In the Group's view, 
Members had had ample time to reflect on what they could do. The waiver had a life span of 
15 years and the clock was not standing still. Ministers in Doha had recognised the need for LDCs 
to benefit from the increased opportunities and we lfare gains that the multilateral trading system 
generated. Therefore, the Group looked forwar d to the timely convening of this meeting. TN/C/M/35 
 
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  4.12.  On the implementation of the TFA, it was no secret that the LDCs attached a great deal of 
importance to the question of assistance and supp ort for capacity building. In this regard, they 
took note of the Chairman's report on the proact ive engagement of the World Bank. However, they 
had heard suggestions that Annex D organizations were undertaking yet again another debate in 
light of the July events. This was not only amazing but it was also disappointing. It asked if anyone 
expected LDCs to undertake the much needed refo rms, despite their paltry share of world trade, 
without the requisite assistance and support for capacity building. It said that not only would such 
organizations drive themselves out of relevance, bu t they would also be seen for what they really 
were. To that end, therefore, the Group's recommendation would be for the continued flow of resources with a view to enabling the impl ementation of the requisite reforms.  
4.13.  On the new approaches, the Group believed that patience and caution ought to be 
exercised. The WTO had been fashioned in such a way that the interests of developed, developing 
and least-developed countries were taken into account. The Marrakesh Agreement had been constructed on the premise of accommodation, es pecially in decision-making. For that reason, 
despite its many imperfections, many Members, especi ally the LDCs, still considered it to be a field 
they could play on. However, some Members had taken exception and had suggested that perhaps the WTO was not the place to do business. They had taken steps in that direction in the past, 
unaided and uninhibited, and they continued to do so with the various plurilateral arrangements 
that were taking shape today. The Group was of th e view that plurilaterals were isolationist in 
nature and undermined multilateralism.  
4.14.  On the post-Bali work programme, the Group wondered what had gone wrong. It was sad to 
imagine that less than two months from the end of the year Members had not even drafted an 
identifiable paragraph on the post-Bali work pr ogramme. Therefore, it should not come as a 
surprise when some of the Members who had been covered under paragraph 1.11 of the Bali 
Ministerial Declaration regarding non-binding outcomes were not as enthused. There needed to be 
guidance on how to take forward this part of th e mandate. Perhaps, Members needed first to get 
into a discussion on the basics: what the structure of the work programme would look like, and 
whether or not a work programme was required on the reaming DDA issues when there already 
was a Doha Declaration with a clear work programme. Development should be the centre of all negotiations. In conclusion, the Group urged Me mbers to remain fully committed and engaged. 
LDC issues should not be sacrificed. Posterity would judge them harshly if Members failed to 
deliver the bare minimum of commitments made in favour of LDCs. 
4.15.  The representative of Dominican Republic, on behalf of the Informal Group of Developing 
Countries (IGDC), expressed the Group's wholehearted support for the Chairman's efforts to find a 
solution to the current impasse that had paralyzed the negotiating pillar of the WTO, and urged the 
Membership to engage constructively towards the same goal. He also reiterated the Group's strong commitment to collectively find a way out of the current situation and develop a post-Bali work 
programme as mandated by Ministers in Bali. 
4.16.  The representative of Lesotho, on behalf  of the African Group, said that the Group had 
participated in the negotiating groups' meetings and consultations with the Chairs, where it had 
conveyed a clear message that singing a eulogy  over the consultations underway would be pre-
emptive of the outcome thereto. This was not to say that the African Group did not recognize the 
gridlock Members had lent themselves into. The matter of fact was that those Members who were 
intimately involved in consultations with an aim to diffuse the gridlock had not yet reported having 
thrown in the towel. This was a significant variable that had to inform the next phase of the 
consultations. Understandably, the consultations had to come to an end at some point. For this reason, the Group appealed to Members' sense of forbearance to give the consultations a fair 
chance.  
4.17.  The African Group was acutely concerned by  the turn of events since July. In the first 
instance, the political linkages that had been drawn between the current gridlock and the other Bali decisions did not enjoy the Group's support, particularly because no element of the Bali 
outcomes had created such a hierarchy or legal linkage regarding their implementation. It was 
therefore paradoxical that the other Bali decisions that would undoubtedly be of benefit to African countries and LDCs were being engaged as a lever to diffuse the gridlock between the TFA and the 
public stockholding decision. In the second instance, it was regrettable that some Members had 
gone to the extent of blocking the convening of  one Committee meeting in an outright disregard 
for the rules of procedure of the concerned Committee. This act set a procedural precedence TN/C/M/35 
 
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  whereby Members could veto the convening of m eetings. The Group hoped that this situation 
would be rectified. In the third instance, the Group had been extremely disappointed and alarmed 
by disrespectful comments which had been used by some Members during the last meeting of the Preparatory Committee on Trade Facilitation. It wished to place on record that such comments 
addressed to representatives of States were highly unacceptable and would not be tolerated. 
4.18.  There was a new narrative emerging, which seemed to be pointing towards the 
plurilateralisation of subsequent WTO Agreements. Members might recall declarations of various 
African Ministerial Conferences which had patently taken a stand against plurilateral approaches to 
trade negotiations. These remained valid. The African Group believed in a strong multilateral trading system; a system that gave a voice to the marginalized Members of the global community and a system anchored on the principle of mult ilateral consensus in reaching agreement on 
negotiated outcomes. Devoid of this, the alternatives were well-known. Going back to the pre-
Uruguay Round negotiating environment or the GA TT days would be unacceptable. Over the years 
the Group had lamented the imbalances inherent in the Agreement on Agriculture and it was 
known how the Agreement had been brought to be ar in the WTO's architecture. The WTO could 
not simply be reduced to the past.  
4.19.  At this critical juncture, Members should be careful not to get locked in procedural 
discussion about how the Organization's work ing methods should be changed, while the 
substantive areas of interest to African countries remained unaddressed. The current meeting almost sounded like Members were gearing themselves towards the discussion of a new agenda. However, the Group wished to recall that the issue of new approaches to negotiations predated the 
current gridlock. Today, Members retained full options at their disposal to have exclusive 
arrangements as foreseen in the WTO Agreement, whether through plurilateral agreements, regional agreements or mechanisms such as preferential trade arrangements (PTAs). These 
arrangements continued to be on an upward trend. It therefore remained unthinkable that with 
these legal options available, the Organization should be reeling itself towards a procedural agenda-setting discussions. On the contrary, every effort had to be invested in ensuring full 
participation of developing countries and ensuring that negotiated outcomes were carried out in a 
transparent fashion and with the buy-in of all Members.  
4.20.  For the African Group, it would be logical to  afford the consultations on the current gridlock 
an opportunity to complete its lifecycle. For this reason, pre-empting these consultations should 
not be the way forward. For the Group, it would seem premature for Members to turn away 
negotiations from the substantive elements of the DDA to a new agenda in the form of a procedural question as to whether consensus-based approach to negotiating outcomes still held 
relevant. Therefore, Members could not allow the system that had been carefully constructed with 
safeguards that ensured full participation of we ak Members to collapse. The Group looked forward 
to hearing the views of other Members and st ood ready to engage. The Group supported the 
statement delivered by the ACP and the LDC groups. 
4.21.  The representative of Chinese Taipei, on behalf of the Group of Recently Acceded Members 
(RAMs), expressed serious concern about the current impasse that the Organization was 
experiencing and the threat that this represente d for the multilateral trading system. The RAMs 
had joined the WTO in the belief that they would benefit from participating in the multilateral 
trading system. Therefore, they had made exceptionally deep and extensive commitments in the 
course of their accession processes; much more extensive than those made by Members that had 
joined in previous rounds. Most of the commitments undertaken by the RAMs were even lower in 
terms of tariffs in agriculture and NAMA or were hi gher in terms of quality in services than those 
made by the majority of developing and develo ped Members. There was no doubt that the RAMs 
would be among the worst-affected Members out of the whole WTO family, if Members failed to 
complete the DDA and its mandates.  
4.22.  It was their hope that the work on the po st-Bali agenda could resume as soon as possible. 
The RAMs always kept the development dimension at the heart of the post-Bali work programme. 
The Group also held the view that the three co re issues in the post-Bali agenda – that is 
agriculture, NAMA and services, should be tack led together, and that the 2008 modalities should 
be the basis for future work in agriculture and NAMA.  TN/C/M/35 
 
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  4.23.  The RAMs thanked and supported the Chairm an and others for their efforts over the past 
few months in trying to resolve the challenge that had been ever-present since the establishment of the WTO. The Group was ready to engage constr uctively with all Members to resolve the current 
impasse and to work together to move forward. 
4.24.  The representative of Benin, on behalf of  the Cotton Four (C-4), supported the statements 
made by Uganda for the LDC Group, Lesotho for the African Group and Kenya for the ACP Group. 
The C-4 reiterated its steadfast commitment to a multilateral trading system based on equitable 
rules and mutually advantageous benefits for all Me mbers. It also reiterated its belief that, as 
stated in the Doha Ministerial Declaration, trade could be an instrument for development and for fighting poverty. For the C-4, more than ever be fore, implementation of the results of the Ninth 
Ministerial Conference (MC9) and respect of the previous Ministerial decisions had to remain a 
priority for the WTO, in the context of the DDA. Fo r this reason, all necessary efforts needed to be 
made to ensure respect of the decisions taken by  Ministers. The Group recalled that amongst the 
outstanding issues were those relating to the LDCs, including the vital issue of cotton. In this 
regard, the C-4 supported the consultation process undertaken by the Chairman, the Chairman of 
the General Council and the Chairs of the negotiat ing bodies to resolve the current impasse, which 
jeopardized all relevant work of the Organization. The C-4 also believed that the negotiations on 
the other issues in the Bali Package and the di scussion on the post-Bali work programme had to 
continue.  
4.25.  The representative of Singapore, on behalf of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), said that ASEAN was a strong supporter of the multilateral trading system under the 
WTO. It had worked closely with the rest of the Membership to advance the negotiating agenda, 
culminating in the successful MC9 held in Bali. ASEAN was strongly committed to the implementation of all MC9 decisions, in accordance  with the agreed timelines for agriculture, trade 
facilitation, and development as well as LDC-related issues. However, it was deeply concerned 
about the current state of play and dismayed by the fact that the difficulty Members were facing 
had affected all areas of work in the WTO. Failing to implement the Bali decisions as agreed by 
Ministers at MC9 would have grave consequences for the credibility of the WTO as a body for 
negotiating multilateral trade agreements. Adhering to the deadlines mandated by Ministers at MC9 would demonstrate that Members were serious about implementing the Bali Package towards the conclusion of the whole DDA. 
4.26.  All Bali decisions had been political decisions and each Member, without any condition, 
should respect the decisions made by the high est body of the Organization. The WTO had not 
achieved any tangible outcomes on the DDA in the past 13 years, and unless Members could move 
ahead with the implementation of each Bali decisi on in their respective agreed timelines and with 
the drafting of a work programme for the completi on of DDA, they should be asking themselves 
what would be the future of the WTO and the multilateral trading system.  
4.27.  ASEAN stood ready to contribute positively  and constructively to all discussions to resolve 
the current impasse. It was imperative that trust be rebuilt among Members as the basis for future discussions. Confidence-building measures should be strengthened to bridge the current gap and to find a common landing zone which was balanced, inclusive, transparent and beneficial to all. In 
this regard, ASEAN welcomed the announcement on 10 October of a strengthened partnership 
between the WTO and the World Bank to assist developing and LDC Members on trade facilitation. ASEAN called on all Members to work together expeditiously in good faith, if they were to resume 
the work on the implementation of the Bali Pa ckage and the formulation of a post-Bali work 
programme. Members could not afford to let all work in the WTO come to a standstill.  
4.28.  Speaking on behalf of Singapore, she said that the TFA was the first multilateral trade 
agreement concluded in the WTO's history. It was clear from the respective Chairs' reports that 
the failure to adopt the protocol of amendment for the TFA, contrary to what Ministers had agreed 
at MC9, was causing harm to the WTO. Undermined  trust was making it difficult to conduct work. 
All Members were in a lose-lose situation. The potential consequences on the functioning of the 
multilateral trading system were grave.  
4.29.  From the statements made at the last informal Heads of Delegation meeting and at the 
present TNC meeting, it was clear that Members continued to want the TFA to come into force. 
Singapore welcomed the continued submission of Category A notifications and encouraged other 
developing Members to do so as early as possible. Two and a half months had lapsed since TN/C/M/35 
 
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  31 July. If Members adopted the TFA protocol now, they would be back on track. If they worked 
really hard, they might be able to make up for lost time or at least not let the deadline lapse by too much. Ministers' instructions at MC9 needed to be carried out in a balanced and comprehensive manner and in good faith. Singapore was ready to participate in any work or 
discussion. 
4.30.  The representative of Paraguay, on behalf  of the Land-Locked Developing Country Group, 
LLDCs), said that a fair, balanced, rules-based an d respected multilateral trading system was of 
outmost importance for developing countries, especially the most vulnerable. Members should 
commit all their efforts to preserve the work of this Organization and to deliver outcomes for the benefit of all. In this sense, the LLDCs wanted  to express their full support to the ongoing 
consultation process led by the Chairman to solve the current impasse that was putting all the 
relevant work of the Organization at stake.  
4.31.  This was a significant year for the LLDCs. The Group was revising the Almaty Programme of 
Action established in 2003. In the first Programme, one of the five priorities had been international 
trade and trade facilitation. This priority, toge ther with the development of efficient transit 
transport systems, key infrastructure and mainte nance, as well as international measures, had 
been part of the efforts to reach the Almaty goal s. Ten years later, after months of preparations 
and consultations, in the newly revised Plan of Action, transit and trade facilitation were again core 
elements of the document to be approved in Vienna in November.  
4.32.  For LLDCs, trade facilitation was an essential component of a toolbox oriented towards the 
improvement of their participation in global trade taken as a means of promoting their 
development. The implementation of trade facilita tion measures was one of their demands in Aid 
for Trade. In a number of landlocked countries support for implementation had already started with development partners. The LLDCs hoped to have a substantial reduction in the cost and time 
of doing business. If this became a reality, then it  would soon be translated into job creation as a 
result of trade facilitation reforms, with possible spill-over effects in trade development itself. It 
was with this conviction that the Group encouraged and reiterated its support for any effort to 
bring the TFA to a satisfactory conclusion, especially because it had become a matter of trust and 
credibility in Members themselves and in the Organization.  
4.33.  The representative of Egypt expressed his delegation's appreciation for the Chairman's 
positive response to the Arab Group's demand regarding the postponement of the TNC in 
observance of the Muslim holiday.  
4.34.  Egypt associated itself with the statements made by Jordan on behalf of the Arab Group and 
Lesotho on behalf of the African Group. It ex pressed willingness and readiness to work towards 
breaking the current stalemate regarding the implementation of the TFA and the public 
stockholding issues. There was a need to envisage a multilateral solution that satisfied the legitimate concerns of all Members, within the framework of the rules and decision-making 
mechanisms of the WTO. He emphasized that pluril ateral approaches had to be avoided in order to 
ensure the reliability and trustworthine ss of the multilateral trading system. 
4.35.  Egypt was concerned by the deliberate linkage between the current stalemate and the 
resumption of negotiations within various negotiating groups established by the TNC. Freezing 
negotiations in all areas was not a solution to the current impasse. On the contrary, it would 
increase the divergence and undermine the mutual trust and confidence needed to break the deadlock. Continuous dialogue and constructive engagement was the only feasible way to 
overcome the existing stumbling blocks. In this context, the finalization of the TFA text itself was a 
lesson that Members could learn from. Whereas all the negotiating tracks in the WTO had been deactivated due to polarized negotiating positions, the Negotiating Group on Trade Facilitation had 
continued its work, eventually leading to a successful conclusion of the negotiations and 
subsequently to the adoption of the text in Ba li. Therefore, he urged all Members to engage 
constructively on all the negotiating tracks as soon as possible taking into consideration that the negotiations were a process, not an outcome.  
4.36.  In the upcoming phase, Members should establish the parameters of work on the basis of 
the current experience and the reality they face d, and avoid the vicious circle of blame. The 
current stalemate indicated that the piece-meal approach and small-packages methodology was TN/C/M/35 
 
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  not working. The holistic approach to negotiations, as reflected in the single undertaking principle, 
was the best methodology to be employed to  conclude the DDA. Egypt was committed to the 
multilateral trading system and to the successful conclusion of the Doha Round with development as its major component, which would ensure the integrity and credibility of the WTO. It looked 
forward to constructive engagement in formulating a comprehensive and development-oriented 
post-Bali work programme as instructed by Ministers in Bali.  
4.37.  The representative of Indonesia, on be half of the G-33, acknowledged and appreciated 
efforts to move forward on the implementation of Ministers' decisions in Bali, including on a post-
Bali work programme. As a Group that continued to pursue its common interest in agriculture, the G-33 had made its contribution to follow up to th e Bali decision on a post-Bali work programme by 
submitting its proposals on SP and SSM in July 2014. At the same time, in following up to the Bali 
decisions, the Group had also resubmitted its proposal on Public Stockholding for Food Security 
Purposes. The G-33 urged an early, constructive and substantive engagement of other Members to discuss the proposals aimed at advancing the SP an d SSM issues as part of the post-Bali work 
programme and finding a permanent solution for pub lic stockholding by no later than the Eleventh 
Ministerial Conference (MC11). The G-33 emphas ized that the Rev.4 draft modalities text in 
agriculture (TN/AG/W/4/Rev.4) had to be the basis fo r the negotiations as they were the result of 
collective undertakings and reflected an enormous amount of negotiations since the launch of the 
DDA negotiations. The Group remained committed to engage constructively with other Members to follow up to the Bali deci sions in a timely manner. 
4.38.  The representative of Switzerland said that at the Heads of Delegation meeting in 
September, more clarity had been sought from Me mbers on their positions and deep concerns had 
been expressed by many, includin g Switzerland. Some clarification had been provided, but this 
had not yet allowed Members to move towards solutions. Rather, as had been reported by the 
various Chairs, all Bali and Doha-related activities had remained on hold and the credibility of the 
Organization had continued to suffer. Switzerland shared the Chairman's view that the WTO was in a very precarious situation. Given the WTO's unique role in global trade, cooperation and 
development, it was urgent to move beyond this point, quickly. What was needed was, if it was 
still possible, a solution in line with Bali. Switzerland recognized that there was an ambiguity on the duration of the peace clause on public stockh olding for food security purposes, an issue which 
could be resolved. However, it was not realistic to expect the Bali Package to be renegotiated. 
Multilateral engagement would not be at the same level again if Ministerial decisions could no 
longer be trusted to be followed.  
4.39.  Adoption of the TFA Protocol was what Ministers had asked Members to do, and they had to 
follow suit. The Protocol would clear the way for implementing the first new multilateral agreement 
in the WTO in almost two decades; an agreement addressing the real needs of the world economy 
and one which, when agreed by Ministers last December, had reasserted the WTO's key role in 
creating rules for world trade. At the same time, accepting a straight and clean TFA Protocol would 
enable Members to get down to work again on all other Bali decisions and on the very important post-Bali agenda, including LDC issues and food security. However, Switzerland agreed with the Chairman that Members would realistically have to scale down on what could be done until the end 
of the year, as several months of work had already been lost. Conversely, a failure to resolve the 
current stalemate would call for complex questions, including about alternatives to the multilateral approach, with very uncertain answers. It would expose the Organization to a high risk of gradual 
drifting from purpose, relevance and support. Th erefore, Switzerland called on all Members, and 
particularly those that had been withholding their consent, to take the necessary steps to allow the TFA Protocol to be adopted in the following days.  
4.40.  While in doubt on whether Members would be able to get back on the Bali track, serious 
discussions between Members had to start on what the Chairman had described as the four concentric circles: the TFA and public stockholding  decisions, the rest of the Bali decisions, the 
post-Bali work programme, and the WTO. Switze rland also agreed with the Chairman that 
Members had to face reality and they could not afford to let the WTO drift. 
4.41.  The representative of Dominica, on behalf of the Member States of the Caribbean 
Community (CARICOM), thanked the Chairman for his efforts at transparency and inclusiveness in 
the consultations which he had been undertaking towards finding a resolution to the current 
impasse. In light of this impasse which had paralyzed the post-Bali implementation work, CARICOM hoped that a resolution would be found soon through the ongoing consultative process. TN/C/M/35 
 
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  The Group further hoped that whatever emerged from a resolution and the work that had to 
necessarily follow would be brought back to the Member-driven processes in the appropriate 
bodies in line with the principles of transparency  and inclusiveness. The multilateral trading system 
continued to be of importance to the small economies of CARICOM an d the Group therefore 
remained fully committed to it once it recognized the challenges faced by the smallest, weakest 
and most vulnerable of its Members and provided  the necessary flexibilities, S&D treatment and 
policy space for their full integration into the system. 
4.42.  Speaking on behalf of the WTO Members of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States 
(OECS), he said that for the small states of the OECS, which were amongst the most open 
globally, it was enormously important that the po st-Bali implementation agenda provided a basis 
for all WTO Members to advance their growth, development and poverty alleviation agenda. There 
was a school of thought among small countries that the Geneva process from the outside might 
appear to be more of an end in itself, rather than a means to an end. More needed to be done to debunk such sentiments.  
4.43.  The OECS members had begun this demarche convinced that a successful Doha 
Development Round would bolster their national, sub-regional, regional and global integration by providing ancillary accommodation for the expansion of their services trade; an SSM as a redress 
to import surges; an SP regime for critical food security concerns; and a gentler phase-out of 
agricultural and industrial tariffs through differential modalities for small economies. They had come to this House at the beginning of this process convinced that they needed to secure 
flexibilities in de minimis  levels for agricultural support and disciplines on fisheries subsidies. At 
Bali, they had been encouraged by what had appeared to be immutable commitments on trade 
facilitation. The OECS members continued to hold a clear strong commitment to the preservation of the small vulnerable economies (SVEs) modalities which had evolved leading up to Bali. As 
small states and as members of the SVEs, G-33 an d ACP groups, they held real convictions on 
these issues. Their negotiating style might be different – being a polite though not docile civilization – but their convictions were equal to those that had pursued their issues with more 
vigour. They therefore remained fully committed to having a multilateral trading system that was 
fair and equitable and that addressed the needs and concerns of all Members. 
4.44.  The members of the OECS Economic Union openly admitted to a growing sense of anxiety 
born out of the promise of this Round so far re moved from what they had been able to achieve 
thus far, and fuelled by the reality that Member s did not appear capable of closing the gap. The 
post-Bali debacle in which Members were presently engaged and which was supposed to advance and reaffirm the relevance of the WTO negotiations, was not only a stumbling block in this 
process, it marked a further retreat of public co nfidence from multilateralism. The consequential 
grinding to a halt of the work programme had opened even further the yawning gap between the 
development promise of the DDA and the developmen t dividend anticipated by the small states of 
the OECS. While the DDA negotiations had been touted as the round to address the needs and 
concerns of developing countries with development at the heart of the negotiations, this promise remained largely unfulfilled after almost 15 years. 
4.45.  Members needed to be frank with one anothe r in admitting that the situation in which they 
found themselves was rather unfortunate. The OECS members were not a party to the current 
impasse. However, they were committed to doing whatever they could to assist with a resolution. They did not hold the keys to the resolution of the current impasse. But as Members recommitted 
to redouble their efforts towards resolving this impasse, the OECS wanted to remind them that 
there were small states for which this process was a means to an end, not an end in itself, and that the members of the OECS had real developm ent issues which remained largely unaddressed. 
In this regard, they urged the parties that held the key to unlocking the potential of this Round to 
reach a speedy resolution, so that the Bali de cisions could be implemented, and work towards 
completing the DDA might be resumed in a manner which accommodated the development interest of the OECS. 
4.46.  The OECS members also had an anxiety that time was running out for the finalization of the 
work programme in line with the MC9 deadline. Accordingly, the OECS countries would be seeking some guarantees around the preservation of the flexibilities so far negotiated for SVEs in 
agriculture and NAMA. The OECS members looked fo rward to the resolution of the impasse and the 
resumption of work so that the priorities and ot her interests of all Members, including the OECS, 
could be pursued and accommodated. If Members were not able to find a way out of the current TN/C/M/35 
 
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  situation, then the opportunity for advancing de velopment and making the multilateral trading 
system beneficial to all might be lost for a long time. 
4.47.  While there was concern with the credibilit y of the negotiating function of the WTO, the 
OECS members were also concerned with other func tions of the Organization. In that regard, the 
United States' non-compliance with the rulings and recommendations of the Dispute Settlement 
Body (DSB) had visited considerable damage on the fairness and credibility of that Body, not only within CARICOM, but further afield. The OECS had repeatedly stated that this was not solely an 
OECS matter and they were grateful for all the non-CARICOM States that had stood with them in 
solidarity on this issue. This also constituted a test of the multilateral trading system. The OECS Member States viewed the United Sates as an important and valuable trading partner. It was the country where most of its diaspora lived and wo rked. They were joined not solely by their 
maritime and geographic space, but by culture, in stitutions and a healthy regard for the rule of 
law. They were therefore troubled by what appeared  to be the reluctance of the United States on 
this matter. They had looked with cautious optimi sm as disputes by trading partners, distinguished 
only by their size, had been resolved by the United  States. This entrenched the view that the work 
of this Organization principally served the needs of the mighty and powerful, not those of the small 
and vulnerable. However, in an inter-connected world, they doubted this could properly represent 
a tenable philosophy of the new world trading order. The OECS called on the United States to work 
with them in redeeming the reputation of the WTO by complying with the DSB ruling thereby 
bringing this decade-long dispute to an end. Wh ile their shared bounds of culture demanded more, 
customary international law and respect for the rule of law, particularly at this time, should see 
nothing less. 
4.48.  The representative of Guatemala, on be half of Small and Vulnerable Economies (SVEs), 
expressed the Group's concern about the impact that the current impasse was having on their 
interests. In that regard, the SVEs wished to offer their full support to the efforts that the 
Chairman was undertaking to reach an agreement among Members so that the Bali decisions could be implemented. The Group also highlighted the gr eat importance that it placed in the post-Bali 
work programme formulation and adoption within the timeframe agreed at MC9.  
4.49.  The representative of Uruguay said that, Members were confronted with a new crisis or a 
worrying impasse, which was already having negative impacts on the functioning of the different 
negotiating bodies of the Organization. As firm supporters of multilateralism, his delegation 
believed that this was not a situation Members should be in, because this would set aside the WTO 
as an Organization that regulated existing Agreements while foregoing one its main roles as a forum for world trade negotiations. With this new paralysis, Members were driving the system 
towards a greater fragmentation which was not in Uruguay's interest and certainly not in the 
interest of any WTO Member.  
4.50.  For Uruguay, it was absolutely essential that the multilateral trading system be in good 
health and be a fruitful forum for negotiations that helped solve the challenges facing international 
trade. This was not only because it was a cornerstone of Uruguay's international trade integration, but also because it provided a general framework – which Uruguay aimed at making even more predictable, equitable, balanced and transparent – one that had a positive impact on the 
development of all its Members. But without doubt, there would be none of this without strong and 
serious political leadership – leadership with a vision and sovereign decision-making powers by all Members, so as not to miss opportunities that would allow Members to continue the process of 
reform of the current functioning of  the multilateral trading system.  
4.51.  Like all human creations, the system had its imperfections that all Members had a 
responsibility to improve, but they should not wi tness its destruction. To adopt such an attitude 
would be seen in the future as a historical error. Uruguay had taken and would take its share of 
responsibility. For this reason, it had negotiated in good faith and in the conviction that the steps taken should inevitably lead to achieving critical results in areas of interest to Uruguay and to the vast majority of Members, such as in agricultur e where the Rev.4 draft modalities text had to be 
an important basis for negotiation. Uruguay believed that from a technical point of view, although 
there was still some work to be done, Members were not far from a comprehensive package in agriculture, with concrete results in export subsidies, substantive results in market access and 
improved disciplines on domestic support. These achievements in agriculture were essential for the 
health of the multilateral trading system and would not be resolved in regional, bilateral or mega-TN/C/M/35 
 
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  regional agreements. Undoubtedly, it was in everybody's interest that these issues be solved 
through multilateral disciplines.  
4.52.  Members had the opportunity to take a si gnificant step towards a greater integration of 
LDCs in world trade. This, as in the case of agriculture, was an important objective of the 
Organization and an important result for development, poverty reduction and the creation of new 
opportunities for all. As a Member that believed in multilateralism as a system based on predictable rules and balanced negotiations, not to solve this critical impasse as soon as possible 
would mean a terrible blow. Hence, the urgent call to all parties involved to find a dignified 
solution that would allow Members not only to move forward with the difficult work ahead, but also to rebuild trust among all Members of the WTO – an organization that was instrumental to improve the living conditions of their people. 
4.53.  Finally, Uruguay reiterated its support to the consultation that the Chairman was carrying 
out to find a solution that addressed the interests of all Members, and expressed its readiness to contribute to efforts that would generate confidence and valid results that would enable positive 
developments. 
4.54.  The representative of the Kingdom of Sa udi Arabia requested that its statement at the 
Heads of Delegation meeting of 15 September be  included in the minutes of this meeting.1 He 
wished to stress in particular that the present juncture was of serious concern. Members had a 
collective responsibility to protect the multilateral trading system and the credibility of the WTO during this challenging time. His delegation shared the prevailing sense of urgency, and recognized a responsibility to demonstrate its commitments in a timely manner. He associated his delegation 
with the statements delivered by Jordan on behalf  of the Arab Group and Chinese Taipei on behalf 
of the RAMs. 
4.55.  The representative of the United States recalled that the Chairman had urged all Members 
to reflect on the path forward over the month of August. In September, the Chairman had asked 
the Chairs to assess the prospects for constructive  work going forward. Today, Members had heard 
from the Chairs. The time had come to begin conne cting the dots. To engage in this process, it 
was important that there was clarity about the situation. For the good of the Organization, 
Members agreed that they had to begin to ask themselves difficult questions, no matter how uncomfortable the answers might be. 
4.56.  So far, there was no indication that the handful of Members blocking implementation of the 
TFA had altered their position of 31 July in any way. The United States, in response to the specific 
concerns of one Member, had made a specific offer of new flexibility to clarify that the duration of the Bali due-restraint mechanism would last until Members had reached agreement on a 
permanent solution for food security. Implicit in this offer was the expectation that the TFA would 
be implemented in the straight-forward manner envisioned by Ministers at Bali. For the time being, the offer stood as a way out of the current morass, but it had not been accepted. 
4.57.  This episode was worrisome from a number of perspectives, including the breach of an 
international agreement and the lack of regard fo r the impact of this action on others less 
fortunate. In this context, he had been pleased th at one of the countries blocking implementation 
of the TFA had recently announced that it was moving ahead with its own efforts to implement the 
TFA. But many poorer developing Members were counting on the joint effort that was so integral 
to the concept of a multilateral agreement. Many of these countries had also looked hopefully to the promised creation of the TFA Facility, belie ving that working together with other Members 
would be important to their domestic efforts. 
4.58.  If there was one sliver of brightness over  the past two months, it was the large number of 
developing countries that had moved forward to submit their Category A notifications under the 
TFA. At the present date, 48 developing countries had demonstrated the seriousness with which 
they took their obligations, even in the face of  uncertainty created by others. These Members had 
sent a strong signal to donors and to investors. The United States hoped that more such actions would follow, as notifications stood as one sign that something of the hard work of so many 
Members might be salvaged. 
                                               
1 The statement is included in Annex I. TN/C/M/35 
 
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  4.59.  At the same time, the terrain that was being crossed since 31 July was uncertain ground. 
Trust had been shattered and business-as-usual in such circumstances was impossible. The Bali Package had been significantly undermined, and it was axiomatic that the post-Bali work had been 
impacted. The reports from the Chairs had made it clear that the actions of a few had placed 
Members in a situation of deadlock across a wide range of issues. This had been wholly 
foreseeable. 
4.60.  Members were asking themselves how they might move forward in this environment. The 
United States wished to offer its initial thoughts. As a starting point, the United States was 
committed to attempting to keep the actions of  a few from hurting LDCs. Work was already 
underway on rules of origin for LDC preferences and implementation of the LDC services waiver. 
Goodwill was important for this work to be fully successful. But, the United States wished to find 
ways to move forward. 
4.61.  The elements of the Bali Package that faced immediately damaging consequences were 
those that required collective WTO Member follow- up. With implementation of the TFA blocked, 
there were obvious consequences for issues including work on food security and the post-Bali work 
programme. It was worth recalling that these issues were unfinished at Bali because Members had been nowhere near a consensus on how to move forward. Lacking consensus, they had agreed to 
timelines for future work with the hope that they could build on the goodwill of Bali to invigorate 
their efforts. Sadly, instead of implementing the TFA in the manner directed by Ministers, many valuable months of what might have been productive post-Bali work had been squandered due to an unnecessary and counterproductive crisis. The goodwill from Bali had largely dissipated, 
replaced by questions about whether any multilateral agreement was possible.  
4.62.  As for trade facilitation, Members had to confront the reality that a fully multilateral 
agreement might not be possible. The immediate question was obvious: could something be 
salvaged from the work done by so many Member s? The United States had been considering how 
best to keep such an effort inside the WTO. All Members had experience in negotiating outside the WTO, but this was a moment in which the prefe rred options, at least from the United States' 
perspective, would involve keeping trade facilitation inside this Organization and not being forced 
into the position of considering an agreement outs ide of it. The United States would not pretend to 
have answers to the questions that the Chairman had posed. There were many more questions left 
un-posed about the work of this Organization and its future relevance. But the moment for those 
questions – and the answers to them – was approach ing rapidly. The United States looked forward 
to working with all those seeking a constructive outcome to find a way forward. 
4.63.  The representative of Japan said Members were not in a position to indulge themselves into 
repeating their position or discussing the way forward based on an unrealistic scenario and in a 
business-as-usual manner. As reported by the Chairs, there was no consensus on future work. It was a surrealistic situation, because Ministers had reached a detailed consensus at Bali. Everybody 
knew who had brought about this crisis. Japan stil l hoped that Members could get back to the Bali 
Package as agreed so that they could resume  tackling the unfinished important agenda, in 
particular the LDC-related issues. But the window of opportunity would not be open forever. Very 
narrow windows would already be shut in the following days. Unless Members could rebuild the 
mutual trust which was prerequisite for any ne gotiation by abiding by the already reached 
agreement, each Member might or would have to opt for going its own way. 
4.64.  The representative of Mexico said that the Chairs' messages signalled the gravity of a 
situation that the Chairman himself had qualified as the most serious situation that the 
Organization had ever faced. It was a situation that had no quick solution. Mexico fully agreed with the four circles mentioned by the Chairman, which evoked Dante's nine circles of hell. This was a 
"Dantesque" situation. The first circle mentioned by the Chairman was about the trade facilitation 
and the public stockholding decisions. He recalled that Dante's first circle was limbo; and Members were in limbo on these issues. The problem was that without solving the first circle, Members could not proceed to solve the remaining three circles.  Therefore, the question was how to save the 
situation.  
4.65.  In the Middle Ages, there had been a practice of placing a bell in cemeteries to help unbury 
those who had been buried alive by mistake. This  was where the expression "saved by the bell" 
originated. The problem here was that there were 160 Members and only one who could ring the 
bell to save them all. If this did not happen, they would all be in serious difficulties and would have TN/C/M/35 
 
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  to start to think about how to solve this problem. With regard to the third circle, as the Chairman 
had said, there was no way of having a post-Bali work programme for December. There might be a few general lines, but this would require ringing the bell, otherwise Members would end up in the 
fourth circle, the discussion on the future of the negotiating pillar of the WTO.  
4.66.  There were things that could be done irrespective of any scenario or any circles that 
Members might be in. One of them concerned the LDCs. Another one was trade facilitation, specifically how to salvage the work that Members had done and how to do it within this 
Organization. This needed to be discussed. Ho wever, without solving the first circle, Members 
would not be able to solve the second nor the th ird circle. Therefore, he asked that the bell be 
rang as soon as possible, hopefully before  the following General Council meeting.  
4.67.  The representative of Korea said that the situation had not changed in any significant 
manner since the September informal Heads of Delegation meeting. Moreover, there seemed to be 
no reasonable prospect on when – or even whether – a solution could be found. The implications were far from trivial. The inability to implement what had been agreed was seriously undermining 
the credibility of the WTO as a system. Its key functions of rulemaking remained elusive and in a 
deep freeze. Due to the current impasse, Members could not engage in any discussions on the post-Bali work programme while the December deadline was fast-approaching. Korea was even 
doubtful of whether there was sufficient trust and confidence among Members to resume and 
conclude the DDA negotiations, even if Members were able to overcome the current stalemate at this stage.  
4.68.  A solution should be found at the earliest date possible. Members had to redouble their 
efforts to find a breakthrough, while keeping any potential side-effects of this long stalemate at 
bay. In doing so, the core of the agreements reac hed in Bali should be respected. If the current 
paralysis continued, Members might need to start serious reflections and frank discussions on the 
implications of the current impasse on the multilateral trading system, especially its negotiating 
function. Members might also need to respond to the raising question of what could be done next about the Chairman's four concentric circles.  
4.69.  The representative of the European Union (EU) agreed with the Chairman's core assessment 
that Members were in the midst of a very serious situation for the future of the Organization. The 
EU deeply regretted the current impasse and agreed that, as the impasse persisted, Members needed to prepare for a broader discussion that could take place along the lines of the four 
concentric circles mentioned by the Chairman, including on the future role of the WTO and 
specifically of its negotiating function. Such a deep reflection would require that all Members devoted the necessary time and energy to prepare for what would unavoidably be a complex 
debate. 
4.70.  A number of very important points had been raised and most of them could not be 
answered directly and within the time available. Ho wever, he wished to comment briefly on five of 
them. First, Members should not deceive themselves into thinking that just another deadline had 
been missed and that the pieces could be easily picked up. Throughout the DDA's long history, there had been deadlines that had not been met. However, what was being challenged since 31 July was not a mere deadline, but rather the im plementation of a Ministerial decision taken by 
consensus as part of a broad compromise a few months earlier in Bali. This impasse was 
particularly damaging for the credibility of the WTO and its ability to move forward. What was at stake was not only the ability to reach agreements, but also to implement what had been agreed. 
There should be no mistake that the current stalemate would have consequences on the WTO and 
the multilateral trading system.  
4.71.  Second, concerning the decisions taken in Bali, the EU would abide by its legal 
commitments and urged all other WTO Members to do the same. Nevertheless, and this was his 
third point, a certain number of decisions taken in Bali required further negotiations, the post-Bali work programme being the most prominent. In view  of the current stalemate, the EU did not see 
the necessary conditions and trust for WTO Members to engage in the difficult discussions which 
were needed to prepare the work programme. The effects of the current blockage were already 
being felt. The trust needed to address such diffic ult issues as agriculture, NAMA and services was 
not present. Many precious months had been lost, which could have been used to prepare a work 
programme which would put Members on a path towards the conclusion of the DDA. TN/C/M/35 
 
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  4.72.  Fourth, under those circumstances, pretendi ng to negotiate by continuing with business-as-
usual, while it was known that the current conditions did not allow any real progress to take place, was not an option. This also applied to the discussion on a permanent solution on public stockholding. Members needed to face reality, assu me their responsibility and not give up on their 
efforts for a WTO that could deliver again, as it had proved it could in Bali. Finally, a consequence 
of the current impasse was that many issues of concern to developing countries and particularly LDCs were not getting the attention they dese rved. With regard to LDC issues, the EU was 
prepared to continue efforts to make progress. 
4.73.  On the way forward, what was needed was to get out of the vicious circle. However, the 
solution had to be found through upholding the Bali decisions, not undermining them. This was the only way forward that could allow Members to recover the spirit of cooperation and trust that had 
made Bali possible. The EU had a long history of  consistently supporting the multilateral trading 
system, which remained a core element of its trade policy. It had repeatedly expressed its interest and readiness to engage in discussions with a view to advancing and concluding the DDA. While it 
remained fully committed to these objectives, it was aware that these could only be attained if the 
commitments made in Bali were adhered to. 
4.74.  The EU had already expressed its readiness to find a compromise regarding trade facilitation 
and public stockholding as long as the substance of the Bali decisions did not change. It had 
already shown its readiness to find a compromise in July and in September. It remained ready to re-confirm the open-ended nature of the peace clause on public stockholding and was ready to engage in further discussions to find a permanent solution. In order to do this however, there 
needed to be clarity regarding the willingness of all WTO Members to make good on their 
commitments. In concrete terms, this meant that th e TFA Protocol had to be adopted, if the post-
Bali process was to be put back on track. Getting a multilateral agreement on trade facilitation 
remained the EU's first priority. Time was howe ver running out quickly. The EU remained ready 
and open to engage in the process and discussions suggested by the Chairman to explore feasible 
options to allow the TFA to move forward and to discuss solutions which strengthened the 
multilateral trading system and which would allow Members to collectively make progress. The EU 
would support the Chairman's effort s to facilitate such a process. 
4.75.  The representative of Argentina joined other delegations in offering his delegation's support 
and encouragement to the Chairman's efforts to solve the current impasse. While many 
delegations considered that the question was about when and how the TFA would be implemented, 
from Argentina's point of view the deeper ques tion was to define when and how the WTO would 
finally focus on attending the interests and expectations of developing and least-developed 
countries which had been put off for so long. If this Organization did not place developing 
countries' needs first, no progress would be possible, as evidenced by the current situation.  
4.76.  On how to address each of the areas that  the Chairman had mentioned, Argentina believed 
it was necessary to conduct consultations until Me mbers found a way out of the crisis. Likewise, for 
Argentina, any work programme which included an outcome in agriculture had to simultaneously provide for a legally-binding decision for the elimination of all forms of export subsidies. A work programme that did not eliminate export subsidies in agriculture would be impracticable. This was 
necessary not only because of the long delay in complying with the 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial 
Declaration and with what had been agreed in the Bali Declaration on Export Competition, but also in light of the substantial changes in the international situation of trade in agriculture due to the 
drop in prices of agricultural products. The situat ion was now different to the one in Bali at the end 
of 2013 and therefore, it was much more pressing. With the increase in subsidies, the drop in 
prices could deepened and cause an increase in protectionism, which would not be limited to 
agricultural products.  
4.77.  Argentina was confident in the Chairman's ab ility to achieve this goal. A result as the one 
Argentina was seeking would definitely show whether the WTO supported poorest countries' development or it legitimized distorting practice s of certain Members and promoted their agenda. 
4.78.  The representative of China said that in recent weeks it had been very quiet on the Geneva 
lakeside, in stark contrast with those busy days ten months earlier, in Bali, when the Chairman 
had proudly declared that there had been an ag reement and that the WTO had truly delivered. 
Now, the WTO was at a crossroad. The stakes were high. If Members failed to resolve the 
stalemate immediately and move forward, the damage to the Organization would be difficult to TN/C/M/35 
 
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  repair. It would be a grave loss that no Member could afford. The Bali Package was a balanced 
result achieved through concerted effort by all Members. Members had an obligation to implement all the decisions reached in Bali, including the TFA. The multilateral implementation of the TFA was in the interest of all, including developing Members. For this purpose, all the avenues and patience 
had to be exhausted. China appreciated the Chai rman's suggestion to keep working and looking 
for solutions.  
4.79.  In the meantime, certain ambiguity in the language on food security should be legally 
clarified. As a Member of the G-33, China had particular concerns on this issue and would join 
efforts for a rapid resolution. China was deeply concerned with the current situation, where the delayed implementation of the TFA and the inacti vity of various negotiating bodies had made 
Members unable to keep up the discussions on the post-Bali work programme as mandated in Bali. 
Time was not on Members' side. China hoped that with joint and great efforts, workable solutions 
could be found both for the TFA and food security through a transparent and inclusive process before the General Council meeting on 21 October. China remained committed to working to 
address the four concentric circles mentioned by the Chairman with the paramount interest of the 
multilateral trading system as the centre of those circles.  
4.80.  The representative of Barbados said that while it was true that the 31 July deadline for 
reaching agreement on the Protocol of Amendment for the TFA had been missed, there was 
another approaching deadline, 31 December, for th e completion of the DDA work programme. It 
would be most appropriate if a concentrated effort could be seen as the 31 December deadline approached. She said that it had been brought to her attention by one expert that the time might 
be even shorter, since the Bali Ministerial Declarat ion spoke of twelve months from the date of the 
agreement. That would make 8 December the date for completion of the work programme, and not 31 December.  
4.81.  Members were guilty of holding the LDC package hostage, even though most of that 
package had been promised to the LDCs for seve ral years. This was quite regrettable as each 
section of the package agreed in Bali should be advanced without waiting on the other. Members 
had to pay special attention to matters such as the length of time countries had been waiting to 
obtain relief, in these as well as in other matters, particularly where pressing humanitarian issues were involved. 
4.82.  On another note, Barbados urged caution in proclaiming that multilateralism was in the best 
interests of small economies. This statement wa s incomplete and small economies themselves had 
been guilty of repeating it in its incomplete form. This was only true if small economies were given special consideration in such agreements. Where this did not occur, they had to seriously reflect on 
their situation. In an important recent decision  of the WTO, no special arrangements had been 
made for small economies. It was therefore important to qualify the assertion that multilateralism was best for small economies with the caveat: provided that those who needed it were given 
special consideration. In this regard, Barbados looked forward to seeing the flexibilities for SVEs 
being given due consideration in the resumed negotiations, particularly with respect to the SSM and SP. 
4.83.  Barbados was also concerned that, given th at the TFA commitments were subject to dispute 
settlement, in some cases there seemed to be no  recourse for small economies with respect to 
non-implementation of DSB decisions. Her delegation was hopeful that despite these apprehensions, positive outcomes would be achiev ed. With this hope, Barbados pledged its full 
support to multilateralism and to the continued efforts of the WTO. 
4.84.  The representative of India associated her delegation with the statement made by Indonesia 
on behalf of the G-33. Her delegation agreed that the negotiating pillar of the WTO was important 
and that it had to yield results. But equally important was to ensure that the results that were 
being sought collectively responded to the needs and interests of all WTO Members, particularly 
developing country Members. It was in this cont ext that Members had termed the Doha Round of 
negotiations as a "development" round.  
4.85.  She reiterated India's commitment to the implementation of all Bali decisions. Her 
delegation had been emphasizing the need for balanced progress on all Bali outcomes, including the Bali Ministerial Decision on Public Stockholding for Food Security Purposes, which was an issue TN/C/M/35 
 
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  of utmost importance to India and several developing country Members. In this regard, the G-33 
had submitted concrete proposals. She noted that whenever the Membership had engaged 
seriously and with commitment, they had been able to quickly resolve the most challenging issues. India had engaged with Members in different form ats and remained optimistic that Members would 
be able to show flexibility and understanding on the public stockholding issue. On its part, India 
was also prepared to take a step forward towards an acceptable resolution of the issue which met the aspirations of the Membership.  
4.86.  India was disappointed with the position  o f  s o m e  M e m b e r s  t h a t  n o  e n g a g e m e n t  w a s  
possible on the development of a post-Bali work programme until the issue of TFA implementation 
was addressed. Her delegation saw the work programme as being on a separate track. The submission by the ACP Group was a useful contri bution to guide the development of a post-Bali 
work programme. Most importantly, the submission  highlighted the centrality of the development 
dimension in the work of the Organization, which needed to be kept in clear focus. Her delegation believed that the multilateral trading system was in the best interest of developing countries, 
especially the poorest and most marginalized. However, if the system failed to function in a just 
and fair manner, then the most vulnerable sections  of the world's population would be left behind. 
It was Members' collective responsibility to ensure that the multilateral trading system worked for 
all. 
4.87.  In India's view, the Marrakesh Agreem ent establishing the WTO enshrined cardinal 
principles delineating the scope and functions of the WTO as well as the decision-making procedures. She reminded Members that the text had been the outcome of extremely careful and 
prolonged deliberations and captured the values of  inclusiveness and transparency with effective 
decision-making. Her delegation believed that one should abjure the temptation of seeking 
alternative approaches without assessing carefully the systemic implications of rearranging the 
founding values of the system.  
4.88.  The representative of Colombia highlighted three main messages. First, from the Chairs' 
reports, it was clear that work had virtually stopped in all areas and thus far the consultations had 
shown no solution to the impasse. Members could not pretend that the impasse only involved a 
few. It involved all of them because they would all lose if work became paralysed. Second, the Organization relied on a rule-based system, which for its proper functioning depended on Members' respecting their commitments. Without that basis, the future was sombre. Third, 
Colombia reiterated that it was willing to work with the intensity necessary to recover lost time. 
His delegation would reflect carefully on the questions that the Chairman had posed.  
4.89.  The representative of New Zealand shared the concerns about the impasse that persisted 
within the Organisation. Since 2011, when Ministers had first recognised that the Doha Round 
could not be concluded because of significant divergences within the Membership, Members had 
been struggling to find an agreed basis for the further conversations that were necessary to make 
progress. That had been New Zealand's main preoccupation in the lead-up to MC9, which had seen 
the adoption of the Bali Declaration. The Declaration had set out a roadmap of sequential milestones to guide future work. The first of these had envisaged the adoption and opening for 
signature of the TFA by the end of July. Accordin gly, if Members were unable to take forward the 
consensus reached in Bali, there would be grave co nsequences for the WTO and, in particular, for 
its ability to make further progress towards the conclusion of the DDA. New Zealand was extremely concerned about this. It wished to see this Organisation make progress on further 
much-needed reform of global trade rules and conditions. It was concerned that if the impasse 
persisted, it would not be possible to deliver, in any effective way, on the development dimension of the Round.  
4.90.  He said that sometimes there was a tenden cy to compartmentalise development issues as 
though they were completely standalone. Yet, in many cases, the development dimension could 
only be effectively delivered through agreements in such areas as meaningful agricultural reform – which included the complete elimination of all forms of export subsidies – through the introduction 
of effective disciplines for fisheries subsidies, and through real improvements in market access for 
goods and services, including in areas of particular priority for developing countries. Development issues and issues of importance to LDCs were embedded within these core areas of the Round. 
That was New Zealand's assessment of the political reality.  TN/C/M/35 
 
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  4.91.  For this reason, his delegation thought that a solution to the current impasse – one that was 
consistent with the Bali Ministerial consensus rather than one that sought to rewrite it – was still the only effective way to get back on track and to move the multilateral trading system forward. If such a solution was not possible then Members would have to think very deeply and honestly 
about what they were realistically able to ac hieve within this Organisation in the rather 
inauspicious environment that the current impasse had brought about. While New Zealand hoped it would not come to that, it was clear that more than hope would be needed to avoid it.  
4.92.  The representative of the Bolivarian Repub lic of Venezuela associated his delegation with 
the statements made on behalf of the IGDC and on behalf of the G-33. His country appreciated 
and supported the Chairman's efforts to resolve the situation that had arisen in July. His delegation believed that decisions taken should be  consistent with the interests of all Members and 
stressed the importance of development as the linchpin of the DDA negotiations.  
4.93.  As for the Preparatory Committee on Trade Faci litation, he recalled that it had been created 
by Ministerial mandate with the functions, inter alia , of receiving notifications of Category A 
commitments and drafting the Protocol of Amendm ent. These tasks had not yet been completed. 
For his delegation, the Preparatory Committee had to, once work resumed, keep performing the functions entrusted to it by the Ministerial ma ndate. The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela 
reaffirmed its belief that the multilateral trading system represented the best framework to find 
solutions that allowed balanced results for the benefit of all WTO Members. 
4.94.  The representative of Norway said that th e Bali Ministerial Conference had been a milestone 
for the WTO and the multilateral trading system when Members, for the first time since 1995, had 
demonstrated to the world that they could agree on and – as they had thought at that time – 
implement the results of their negotiations. The decisions in the Bali Package had reflected the consensus between all Members of this Organisation . The Package itself had been finely balanced, 
carefully taking into account the inter-linkage s between the different issues and Members' 
interests. All this was now at risk. If Members st epped away from any element of the Bali Package, 
they risked losing what they had achieved.  
4.95.  The TFA, which would contribute to econom ic growth and jobs, would likely be lost. This 
would affect all Members, but developing countries, which had the most to gain from this agreement and the new arrangements therein, st ood to lose the most. The Bali Package and the 
post-Bali work programme were also at stake. Without the Bali Package there could be no 
consensus or common understanding on the way forward. The current crisis undermined any 
prospects for progress on the work programme or on  any other decision from Bali. Norway agreed 
with the Chairman that this was the most serious situation for the WTO since its creation. This was 
not merely another missed deadline. This impasse seriously undermined the WTO and its ability to 
deliver for the future. It could derail the WTO's important function of negotiating new rules. Norway agreed with the Chairman on the need to  start discussing the four concentric circles. 
Members had to avoid the Organization's drifting or being in limbo. Such uncertainty would 
undermine the credibility of the WTO. Members had to  take this situation seriously and face up to 
reality. 
4.96.  The representative of Australia said that it was clear that the overwhelming preference of 
WTO Members was to move forward on all issues as agreed in Bali. The impasse regarding the TFA 
and public stockholding was having a broader impact on work in Geneva. Australia supported efforts to help find an acceptable solution but the time available to do so was rapidly disappearing 
and nothing he had heard gave grounds for optimism. His delegation did not see this as merely 
another missed deadline. Members were approach ing a watershed moment for the future of the 
negotiations. Members needed to know whether this was a WTO where they could talk endlessly, 
or one where they could negotiate outcomes an d implement them. Australia strongly supported 
the need for a WTO that could produce and implem ent outcomes. If that was not possible, then 
Members would need to face up to that reality soon and ask themselves some difficult questions about the future of the WTO's negotiating function, as well as the practical issue of what they 
would do in this Organization over the coming years. 
4.97.  The representative of Costa Rica agreed with the Chairman's assessment about the 
seriousness of the situation and the risks that Members were already facing. This situation was 
hard to believe, even for him who had witnessed many difficult moments in this Organization, both 
during the Doha and the Uruguay Rounds. This was not a missed deadline in the negotiations. TN/C/M/35 
 
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  Only a few months earlier, Ministers had reached agreement on several issues in Bali, after many 
years of trying and as a result of a delicate balance between each of the components of the final result. Today Members were faced with the impossibility of implementing these results because of the attempt at changing that delicate balance.  
4.98.  First, it was unrealistic to attempt to reopen what had been agreed in order to modify in a 
definitive manner and at once the rules concerning  domestic agriculture subsidies. Second, it was 
not correct to attempt to do so by holding back  the implementation of the TFA. Third, Members 
could not expect that this would not affect the im plementation of the other Bali elements and the 
post-Bali work programme. If a good-faith solution that respected the balance achieved in Bali was not found soon, how could Members negotiate with confidence in other areas? The only thing that could help rebuild this destroyed trust was the adoption of the TFA Protocol in full respect of the 
balance struck in Bali.  
4.99.  Costa Rica agreed with the Chairman's explanation of the four concentric circles and 
believed that the questions he had put on the table were relevant. His delegation would contribute 
to finding solutions that would satisfy the will of  the many Members that wished to benefit from 
the TFA. Costa Rica saw this agreement as a valuable instrument for the enhanced participation of developing countries' small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in international trade. It 
believed that the development dimension of the Doha Round was contained in the TFA, in both 
Section I and Section II. This Agreement would be nefit developing countries and the multilateral 
trading system.  
4.100.  Today, they were not only deprived of th e opportunity to discuss relevant trade issues, but 
also to benefit from the implementation of what had been agreed on the only Singapore issue that 
had survived in Cancun: trade facilitation. All this put the WTO on the verge of a serious risk: irrelevance. This was serious for developing countries, particularly for the smallest and most 
vulnerable. He agreed with the Chairman that th is was the WTO's biggest crisis and that Members 
had to start a broad and deep discussion on th e functioning and future of the Organization. 
4.101.  The representative of Brazil said that her delegation hoped and believed that a solution 
could be found for the deadlock with which Member s had been confronted since 31 July. Brazil had 
not thrown in the towel yet. Despite the impasse, her country remained convinced that the efforts to build consensus through a trade-off that accommodated the diversity of interests in the Organization conferred to the WTO a degree of le gitimacy that would be impossible to replicate 
elsewhere. There were still some days to go until the 21 October General Council meeting and 
Brazil appealed to those more directly involved in the current impasse to mobilize their highest political will to rescue the Bali process. If a co mpromise could not take shape, Members would be 
entering into uncharted and dangerous waters. In this scenario, Brazil would pause for reflection 
for as long a period as necessary to assess the path ahead. It would not rush to conclusion, certainly not to the wrong conclusions. What was at stake was the commitment to trade as a tool 
for development, to a balanced and sustainable multilateral trading system and to Brazil's 
permanent interest in this Organization and beyond. 
4.102.  The representative of Canada expressed deep disappointment that despite the hard work 
and engagement, a way forward remained elusive. Members were at a cross-road in the 
Organization's history and were confronted with the most serious situation that the Organization 
had ever faced. Business-as-usual did not appear  possible and it was incumbent upon Members to 
find a way to do business in this changed environment. All Members needed to reflect on the 
questions that the Chairman had posed. It was un likely that they would be comfortable or happy 
with what they would find, but this reflection was necessary. Members needed to find a way to strengthen and improve the negotiating pillar of the WTO so that it could be an effective means to 
achieve the real results that Members sought. Th e Chairman, the Chair of the General Council and 
Members could count on Canada's continued support and engagement in addressing these questions and finding a way forward for this very important Organization. 
4.103.  The representative of Hong Kong, China sa id that there was no solution in sight for the 
impasse that had started three months earlier. More Members now believed that, given the current 
situation, it was not realistic to have negotiations on other Doha issues. But, with each day's inaction, one more blow was being dealt to the WTO's negotiating arm, with the risk that one day 
the arm would paralyse beyond rehabilitation.  TN/C/M/35 
 
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  4.104.  Hong Kong, China was fully committed to im plementing the Bali decisions as agreed, but it 
alone could not break the impasse. There were Members in a position to make a difference, and she would urge them to do so without further delay. The only General Council meeting scheduled before December was the one on 21 October. This was an opportunity for Members to come round 
and make the right decision, so as to agree to the TFA Protocol quickly and catch up with the rest 
of the Bali Package. Meanwhile, based on deve lopments to date, the Chairman had helpfully 
offered his assessment and outlined a possible structure for a broader discussion. She hoped that, 
if a solution came soon enough, Members might be able to eliminate at least some of the four 
concentric circles, thus making the way forward a lot easier. But Hong Kong, China was also prepared, if circumstances so required, to engage constructively in discussions on options and other long-term issues. 
4.105.  The representative of South Africa supported the statements made by Lesotho on behalf of 
the African Group, and Uganda on behalf of the LD C Group. He said that Members continued to be 
confronted by the challenges that had arisen as a direct result of a lack of balance in the progress 
across all the decisions taken in Bali. In the Bali Declaration, Ministers had committed to prioritise 
the issues where no legally-binding outcomes had been achieved. To date, there had been little or 
no evidence that such prioritisation had been given effect.  
4.106.  Some Members were convinced that the cause of this situation was trade facilitation or the 
food security issue. In South Africa's view, the cu rrent state of affairs went beyond and was due to 
Members' inability to ensure the delivery of legally-binding outcomes that were balanced and that reflected the interests of all Members. In partic ular, Members had not been able to put down a 
development dividend on issues of interest to LDCs and had yet to register meaningful and 
significant results in agriculture, where many developing countries had an interest. South Africa shared the concern expressed by LDCs that an im passe which was not of their doing was yet again 
delaying the resolution of their long-standing legitimate demands. Regarding the issue at hand, his 
delegation supported efforts to find a permanent solution to the food security needs of poor people in Africa and in many other developing countries.  
4.107.  After the summer, a rather unfortunate tr end had arisen across the Committees. A handful 
of Members had adopted the posture that until the broader horizontal issue had been resolved, no work would continue in any of the Committees – despite the fact that the majority of Members 
participating in these meetings had expressed willin gness and a desire to continue working. South 
Africa strongly cautioned against this step. To wilfully impede progress in the work of the 
Committees set a negative precedent for the proper functioning of the system and did not facilitate a spirit of constructive dialogue.  
4.108.  On what had been characterised as "alternative approaches" of undertaking what had 
always been known to be difficult and complicated negotiations. He said that decision-making by consensus – no matter how difficult the issue was – had been a fundamental legal principle of the 
WTO since its establishment. In South Africa's view, consensus could only be reached by 
negotiation. Consensus guaranteed inclusivity in decision-making and strengthened the multilateral trading system. By their very nature and construct, so-called alternative approaches did not serve the interests of the multilateral trading system as envisaged in its founding 
documents. Members would be well-advised to uphold multilateralism, inclusivity and transparency 
– the key values of the WTO. South Africa would not support any effort undermining the multilateral nature of the WTO.  
4.109.  In concluding, he underscored the point ma de by the Coordinator of the African Group that 
consultations to resolve the current situation had to continue and be given the requisite time to provide results. The most constructive and responsibl e course of action to take was to remain in a 
problem-solving mode and that could only be achieved through continued dialogue. 
4.110.  The representative of Peru regretted that despite all efforts, only two and a half months 
before the end of the year, it was clear that Members were not where they should be. It should not 
be surprising that negotiations generated both progress and setbacks. However, the negotiating 
phase had come to an end and Members were at the implementation stage. Peru was concerned 
by the lack of compliance with commitments adopted in good faith by Ministers in Bali almost a year ago. While Peru understood that some Members had a different understanding of the 
circumstances that would allow the entry into force of the TFA, it was concerned that uncertainty TN/C/M/35 
 
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  on this specific issue had stopped Members from implementing what they had committed to – to 
prepare by December a clearly defined work programme on the remaining DDA issues.  
4.111.  For Peru, there was no causal link to justify this paralysis. The apparent non-compliance by 
one Member of what had been agreed in Bali should not penalize developing countries. The real 
effect of the disagreement on the entry into force of the TFA had been the blocking of development 
on all other DDA issues. From the perspective of a developing country such as Peru, it was incomprehensible and unjustifiable. The principle of good faith did not mean that the lack of 
compliance by one of the parties in a multilateral  agreement released the other parties from their 
obligations. All agreements reached in Bali were equal and had to be complied with equally. Non-compliance with one could not be linked to the fate of the other agreements. The opposite could have serious systemic implications, as it implied that failure to comply by one Member justified 
failure to comply by the others. For example, what would happen to the DSB if Members decided 
not to comply with its recommendations because one given Member systematically refused to do so in a particular case?  
4.112.  This situation sent a very negative politi cal message. It showed that the idea by some 
Members of an early harvest in Bali was not supported by a genuine desire to save the Doha Round, but rather of obtaining an agreement on trade facilitation. This perception meant that 
developing countries such as Peru had to seriously rethink whether the flexibility shown to achieve 
an early harvest in Bali had been worth it. It seemed that many Members were not willing to discuss the future of the Doha Round without the en try into force of the TFA; but they should be 
aware that many others were not willing to have a TFA without assurances about the future of the 
Doha Round.  
4.113.  In Peru's view, there were three different issues – rather than concentric circles – that had 
been confused and that could – and should – be  dealt with separately. These issues had been 
clearly identified by the Chairman: (i) entry into force of the TFA; (ii) compliance with the other 
Bali decisions, and (iii) the establishment of a post-Bali work programme. It was vitally important that in any consultation on the future work of this Organization, both with regard to the 
implementation of the Bali decisions and the design of a post-Bali work programme, these 
elements were kept in mind. He recalled that if Bali was a package, so was the Doha Round. If by adopting a package in Bali, Members had accepted  that the Doha Round could be completed at 
various speeds, he did not see why the Bali Package would escape this rule. Without the political 
will to stop the impasse on trade facilitation from contaminating the other commitments, then it 
might be time to consider what the Chairman had referred to as the "fourth circle" – to start thinking about the very future of the WTO. 
4.114.  The representative of Pakistan said that  the reinvigoration of the Doha Round had been 
one of the landmark achievements of the Bali Mini sterial. The afterglow of Bali had hardly been 
behind, when Members had landed in this vortex . The Bali negotiations had been conducted in 
good faith in order to focus on issues of higher levels of difficulty at a later stage. At Bali, not 
every Member had been entirely comfortable with the outcomes, but they had all agreed with the 
Package because they could sense a spirit of a ccommodation from all sides to reinvigorate the 
negotiating function of the WTO. There had been extreme flexibility on all issues, including on 
stockholding, and the language had been carefully drafted to balance the interests of all Members.  
4.115.  Pakistan urged a win-win solution on all decisions including food security and hoped that 
further work as agreed in Bali would provide an opportunity to work in that direction. Pakistan 
expected all Members to stand by the commitments made in Bali. The success in Bali should not 
be only a confidence-building measure but a positive signal for inclusive growth leading to new opportunities. Therefore, his delegation called for an early re-initiation of engagement on all Bali 
deliverables, especially those for the LDCs. In spite of grim prospects, the determination to move 
forward was nevertheless a recurrent theme and he was optimistic that good progress could be made in the following days. 
4.116.  The representative of Nepal aligned his statement with the statement made by Uganda on 
behalf of LDC Group, and appreciated those dele gations who had spoken in support of the LDC 
issue. Like others, Nepal was very much concerned with the current impasse in the WTO and wished to underline the importance of an early reso lution of this stalemate. In this regard, Nepal 
commended the efforts by the Chairman, both in his capacity as TNC Chair and as Director-TN/C/M/35 
 
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  General of the WTO, to draw an amicable solution which would not only provide a way out of the 
current impasse but also help put the WTO regular business back on track.  
4.117.  The LDCs were the most vulnerable and unprotected group in the world. Sluggish socio-
economic development coupled with geographical and other constraints had crippled many LDCs 
and prevented them from meaningf ully integrating into the world trading system and taking due 
economic advantage of it. Despite two decades sinc e the establishment of the WTO, LDCs' share in 
global trade still remained at around one per cent. This indicated that LDCs' issues and concerns 
needed to be addressed with utmost urgency and priority. If Members were committed to 
developing an inclusive multilateral trading system, if they wished the LDCs to remain meaningfully engaged in the global trading sy stems and to draw adequate benefits for the 
upliftment of their poor, marginalized and vulnerable people, they needed to pay due attention to 
resolving the problems and challenges faced by LDCs in the global trading system. In this regard, 
the conclusion of the DDA was a must. 
4.118.  In view of the looming uncertainty and lo nger-than-anticipated time taken to conclude the 
DDA, full and faithful implementation of the LDC-specific decisions related to DFQF, services 
waiver, cotton and preferential rules of origin in line with the Bali Ministerial outcomes were of 
utmost importance. However, at this juncture, it  was a pity to note that some Members showed 
apathy in advancing the LDC-related decisions by lin king them to the current stalemate. In Nepal's 
view, the LDC agenda needed not be impacted by the current impasse, but rather be addressed with utmost priority since it covered issues related to the livelihoods of the poor and had often been deemed to be the best candidate for early harvest. 
4.119.  LDCs were committed to implementing all Ba li outcomes, but not limited to the TFA. LDCs 
had already submitted to their partners their joint request on the operationalization of the services waiver in July, and were engaged in bilateral talks with interested Members. The responses so far 
were encouraging and the LDCs hoped that by the time of the high-level meeting to be convened 
during the last week of January 2015, Members woul d come up with offers that were economically 
viable and meaningful to LDC services and service suppliers and that could ultimately help increase 
their share in global trade in services. Nepal urged all non-LDC Members to positively respond to 
their joint request and help implement the LDC-rela ted decisions faithfully and expeditiously. Nepal 
extended its full support to the Chairman in resolving the current impasse quickly and taking the WTO ahead as a vibrant organization, not only for making global trade rules but also for ensuring 
effective execution and oversight of said rules.  
4.120.  The Chairman said that what he had he ard had confirmed his earlier assessment: Members 
were stuck and needed to find a way out. He addressed a few of the misapprehensions that had 
been raised during the discussions. First, he had heard concerns that a new agenda was being 
created. He clarified that this was not the case. On the contrary, his message was that Members had to think about how to deliver on the present agenda. Second, with regard to the bottom-up 
approach, he assured delegations that the approach would remain bottom-up. He wished to dispel 
any ideas – or any hopes – that there could be a top-down approach and reiterated that the bottom-up, Member-driven approach was the only option. Third, he had also heard some concerns with regard to changing the consensus rule. He made it clear that this was not a possibility. The 
consensus rule was never going away. Everything  Members did would be done by consensus. 
Fourth, on the issue of plurilaterals, he reiterated  his preference for the multilateral approach. He 
said that what Members did had to be consistent with the multilateral approach and open to 
everyone. However, he could not stop plurilateral s from happening. If a group of Members decided 
to engage in these initiatives, particularly outside the WTO, it was beyond the Organization to stop them. This was a reality Members had to live with. The best way to avoid this trend was to fix 
things in the WTO. Therefore, he urged Members to  find solutions that would allow them to solve 
the current impasse, put things back on track and get things done in the Organization. He assured 
Members that there was no hidden agenda to push for any kind of engagement that undermined the work of the WTO.  
4.121.  Finally, he clarified why he was inviting Members to engage in a new conversation on the 
way forward. He recalled that during the negotiations on the Bali package, "icebergs" had often been mentioned. Members were trying to manoeuvre and go around them to avoid sinking the 
ship. Fortunately, they had managed to navigate thos e icebergs. It had been difficult, but they had 
made it into port. In the current situation, Me mbers faced an asteroid heading for Earth. There 
was no guarantee that the Earth would survive. He said that if the asteroid hit, there would be life-TN/C/M/35 
 
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  altering consequences. The preferred option would be to send a missile and pulverize the asteroid. 
But Members did not have a missile at this point. They needed to talk about this asteroid. There was no other option. An asteroid heading to Earth was an unwelcome circumstance that Members would rather not talk about. However, it was his responsibility as Chairman to ensure that 
Members talked about it. It was up to Members how to carry out this conversation and decide what 
would be the outcome. This did not mean giving up on everything else during this conversation and stop working on the missile. But in the me antime, Members needed to think about how to 
manage the impact, what things would look like  afterwards, and how they could keep moving 
forward in this scenario.  
4.122.  He urged Members to be ready for that conversation. Everything that each Member wished 
to get out of any future negotiation was at stake. Everyone knew that the LDC agenda and the 
DDA were extremely important for many Members.  However, before talking about those things, 
Members needed to first talk about what would ha ppen once the asteroid hit. This conversation 
would commence immediately in the period after the General Council meeting on 21 October. All 
Members would be involved at one point or another.  
4.123.  In conclusion, he said that it was not his original intention to have this TNC meeting and 
the 21 October General Council meeting so close together. He and the Chairman of the General 
Council did not envisage a long discussion on these issues at the General Council meeting – unless 
something happened in the meantime. He did not intend to make a long statement. He would make reference to his statement at the present meeting. Members would be welcome to take the floor. But the Secretariat would ensure that delegation's statements at the present TNC meeting 
would also be reflected in the minutes of General Council of 21 October.  
4.124.  He said that he did not expect delegations to answer the questions he had raised at this 
meeting at the General Council meeting. Those answers should come during the period of 
discussion and consultation that would begin after the General Council meeting. This would allow 
for a more full, frank and substantive exchange. 
4.125.  The Trade Negotiations Committee took note of the statements. 
 
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  ANNEX I  
STATEMENT BY THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA  AT THE INFORMAL HEADS OF DELEGATION 
MEETING ON 15 SEPTEMBER 2014 
Thank you Mr. Chairman. Looking back on Bali, we cannot be overtaken by today’s state of affairs. 
We should not lose sight of the fact that the Package delivered in Bali was a significant 
achievement – we proved that the WTO can deliver agreement and that Members can at once show leadership and flexibility for the good of the system. 
Today, however, we all see that the implementation  of the results we thought we had obtained in 
Bali has not been as smooth as we and our Ministers expected. 
More effort, goodwill and trust are necessary to ov ercome the present situation. Most of all, we 
need to find common ground. 
On this score, let me point out two important facts:  
- First, all Members have expressed their desire  to move forward on the basis of the Bali 
Ministerial; this is our common ground. 
- Second, no Member has disowned or underestima ted the very positive results of Bali, which 
further demonstrates the common foundation of our work. 
Therefore, Saudi Arabia urges Members to continue building trust and goodwill by demonstrating 
our collective commitment to building on common ground. For example, many Members including 
Saudi Arabia have manifested their desire to implement the Bali Package and progress toward a conclusion of the DDA by notifying "Category A" commitments under the Agreement on Trade Facilitation. Members can expand these notifications, and find other ways to accentuate our 
collective commitment to moving ahead, based on our individual capacities. 
We turn to you, Mr. Chairman, and encourage you to seek out the best format to hold 
consultations; to try new formats; to invent new configurations, and to test alternative 
constellations for making progress while respecting the principles of transparency and 
inclusiveness. 
The present juncture is of serious concern, and we  have a collective responsibility to protect the 
multilateral trading system during this challengin g time. We share the prevailing sense of urgency, 
and recognize a responsibility to demonstrate ou r commitments in a timely manner. In order to 
reach our goal in 2014, a more intensive meeting schedule may be required to assess the situation 
in Geneva, to elicit the necessary support from capitals, and ultimately to resolve the situation.  
I would like to say that although it is natural that our respective positions are shaped by the 
economic, political and social realities of our countries, as I and others have emphasized in previous discussions, the WTO negotiating forum shou ld not be exploited to address political issues 
that cannot be resolved through our trade negotiations. The cost of such political infiltration is too 
great, as it would drive the Organization into paralysis. 
I would like to conclude with the observation that in Bali our Ministers mandated that we should 
agree upon a way forward by the end of this year. But the reality is that without greater clarity 
about the Work Program, it will be difficult to make progress in a balanced and ambitious manner. 
Our Ministers left this clarification in our hands.  
Bali was always meant to be a foundation, one step to be followed by many others. So the fact 
that we must come to an agreement on the impl ementation of the Bali package does not detract 
from the necessity to maintain intensive efforts to deliver the Work Program, and sooner rather than later. 
I am confident that we can find the common ground necessary to implement our collective will, 
and to serve our common interest. 
__________