G/ADP/Q1/RUS/4  
G/SCM/Q1/RUS/4  
G/SG/Q1/RUS/4  
 
22 October 2013  
(13-5847)  Page: 1/15  
Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices 
Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Committee on Safeguards
 Original: English  
 
NOTIFICATION OF LAWS AND REGULATIONS UNDER 
ARTICLES 18.5, 32.6 AND 12.6 OF THE AGREEMENTS  
REPLIES TO QUESTIONS POSED BY THE UNITED STATES1 
REGARDING THE NOTIFICATION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION2 
The following communication, dated 18 October 2013, is being circulated at the request of the 
Delegation of the Russian Federation.  
 
_______________ 
 
General Statement 
The Russian Federation thanks the United States  for their questions regarding the legislative 
notification outlining the specific aspects of the legal norms applicable in the Customs Union of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation in connection with the 
application of trade remedies. This provides th e Russian Federation with an opportunity to 
comment in greater detail on the particularities of the trade defense system of the Customs Union 
and ensure greater transparency in the conduct of investigations. Moreover, this is an occasion for 
the Russian Federation to shed light on the deve lopments that have taken place in the framework 
of the integration within the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) since the relevant parts of the Report of the Working Party on the Accession  of the Russian Federation to the World Trade 
Organization were completed. 
 For all the U.S. questions two comments are of particular necessity.  
First, based on the nature of questions, the Russian  Federation would like to note that a number of 
them clearly demonstrate that some misunderstanding s are due primarily to issues of translation.  
 
Second, a number of questions specifically refer to  the ways in which consistency of the relevant 
provisions of the legislation adopted in the framework of the CU – in forms of international agreements and/or decisions of the CU bodi es – with the relevant provisions of the 
WTO Agreements is to be ensured. In this regard  we highlight Article 2(1) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the Customs Union in the Framewor k of the Multilateral Trading System, signed on 
19 May 2011. This article provides that the Parties shall take measures in order to bring the legal system of the Customs Union and the decision s of its bodies in conformity with the 
WTO Agreement, insofar as it is stipulated in the Protocol on Accession of each of the Parties, 
including the obligations of each Party taken as one of the conditions of its accession to the WTO. Until such measures are taken, the provisions of the WTO Agreement, including the obligations 
taken by the Parties as conditions of their accession to the WTO, have priority over the 
corresponding provisions of international agreements concluded within the framework of the Customs Union, and the decisions adopted by its bodies. 
 
                                               
1 G/ADP/Q1/RUS/1-G/SCM/Q1/RUS/1-G/SG/Q1/RUS/1.   
2 G/ADP/N/1/RUS/1-G/SCM/N/1/RUS/1-G/SG/N/1/RUS/1 (dated 3 October 2012). G/ADP/Q1/RUS/4 • G/SCM/Q1/RUS/4 • G/SG/Q1/RUS/4 
 
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  Question 1 
 With regard to the 2008 Agreemen t, please clarify the relati onship between the Eurasian 
Economic Commission (EEC) and the Customs Union Commission (Commission). Please 
identify the differences in structure, re sponsibility and decision-making capability 
between the two entities.  
Reply 
 
The Commission of the Customs Union was established pursuant to the Treaty on the Commission of the Customs Union of 6 October 2007 (the CC U Treaty) as the single permanent regulatory 
body of the Customs Union. The Commission consis ted of three Members who represented each of 
the Member-States and were deputy heads of go vernment of the respective Member-States. 
According to Article 7 of the CCU Treaty, decisions of the CCU were to be adopted by a two-thirds 
majority vote, whereby the Russian Federation ha d 57 votes, and the Republic of Belarus and the 
Republic of Kazakhstan had 21,5 votes each.  
The Eurasian Economic Commission (hereinafter, the Commission, the EEC) is a permanent 
regulatory body of the Customs Union and the Sing le Economic Space, established pursuant to the 
Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Commission (signed on 18 November 2011, took effect on 2 February 2012, hereinafter – the EEC Treaty),  comprised by the Board of the Commission and 
the Council of the Commission. 
 Pursuant to Article 39, on the day the EEC Treaty entered into force, the CCU ceased to exist. The 
competences that had been conveyed to the CCU in accordance with international agreements 
forming the legal basis of the Customs Union (her einafter – CU) and the Single Economic Space 
(hereinafter – SES) and the Decisions of the Eu rAsEC Interstate Council, were transferred to 
the EEC. On the same day, the CCU Treaty was terminated. Nevertheless, Article 38 of the EEC 
Treaty established that Decisions of the CCU th at were in force as of 1 January 2012 preserved 
their legal force.  
In accordance with Article 14 of the EEC Treaty, the Board of the Commission is made up of nine 
Members, whereby each of the Member-States of the Customs Union nominates three officials to serve on the Board. The Board officials are inde pendent of the governments of the CU Member-
States by virtue of Article 15 of the Treaty. The Bo ard exercises its functions within the limits of its 
competence as specified in Article 18 of the Tr eaty. The Council of the Commission consists of 
three Members who represent each of the Member-S tates and are deputy heads of government of 
the respective Member-States. The Council exer cises its functions within the limits of its 
competence as circumscribed in Article 9 of the Treaty.  Under Article 6 of the EEC Treaty, the Commission is empowered to execute the international 
agreements forming the legal basis of the CU and the SES. 
 The Agreement on the Application of Safeguard, Antidumping and Countervailing Measures With 
Regard to Third Countries of 25 January 2008 (hereinafter, the Basic Agreement) and the 
Agreement on the Application of Safeguard, Antidumping and Countervailing Measures in Transitional Period of 19 November 2010 (hereinaft er, the Transitional Agreement) both pertain to 
the agreements forming the legal basis of the CU , and hence, they define, together with the 
EEC Treaty, the competence of the Commission in the area of trade remedies.  In this regard, the Commission adopts decisions which are binding on the Member-States, form 
part of the legal basis of the CU and are to be directly applied in the territories of the Member-
States. Decisions on the application of anti-dumping, countervailing and safeguard measures are taken by a two-third majority vote whereby, in accordance with Article 7.2 of the Treaty, each 
Member of the Council and the Board of the Commission has one vote. 
 Under Article 3.4 of the Basic Agreement, the inve stigating authority is designated by the CCU. On 
23 September 2011, the CCU adopted Decision N 802 "On Certain Issues Pertinent to the 
Application of Safeguard, Antidumping and Countervailing Measures in the Single Customs Territory of the Customs Union" that defined the Department for Trade Defense Measures in External Trade of the CCU as the investigating authority in accordance with the provisions of the 
Basic Agreement. As noted above, the competence s of the CCU were transferred to the EEC by G/ADP/Q1/RUS/4 • G/SCM/Q1/RUS/4 • G/SG/Q1/RUS/4 
 
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  virtue of Article 39 of the EEC Treaty. It is in th is regard that the Board of the Commission adopted 
Decision N 1 "On Certain Issues Pertinent to Internal Market Defense" of 7 March 2012, which entrusted the Department for Internal Market Defense (hereinafter, the DIMD) with the powers of the investigating authority, previously vested in the Department for Trade Defense Measures in 
External Trade of the CCU. 
 Question 2 
 
Article 2 of the 2008 Agreement contains a defi nition of the term "material injury to an 
industry of the States Parties." Articles  13(1), 13(2), 23(1), and 23(2) of the 2008 
Agreement also purport to define material injury in the context of antidumping and 
countervailing duty proceedings. The general de finition in Article 2, on the one hand, 
and the more specific definitions in Articles  13 and 23, on the other hand, do not fully 
correspond to each other. Please clarif y which definition(s) are controlling in 
antidumping and countervailing duty investigat ions and what the significance is of the 
definition in Article 2.  
Reply 
 
Articles 13 and 23 define the steps the investigating authority follows in its determination of injury to the industry of the States Parties in th e context of antidumping and countervailing 
investigations. Article 13 and 23 set out the re quirements to be followed in any injury 
investigation, as well as certain specific requirements for threat of injury investigations. However, the word "injury" in these two provisions is used as a vehicle to encompass "material injury", 
"threat of material injury" and "material retardation". In this regard, the Russian Federation 
considers that the translation may need rectification to reflect this understanding, whereby Article 13(2) and 23(2) should read as follows: "For the purposes of this section, injury to the 
industry of the States Parties is understood to mean material injury to the industry of 
States Parties, threat of such injury or material retardation of the creation of an industry of the 
States Parties".  
Question 3 
 Article 2 of the 2008 Agreement contains a defini tion of the term "industry of the States 
Parties. Article 2 defines "industry" to  include, for the purposes of safeguard 
investigations, as all the producers of the li ke or directly competitive product "in the 
States Parties." Please explai n how the Commission would conduct an investigation that 
involves producers in multiple states, in cluding whether the Commission would have 
authority to compel producers in the variou s states to submit information and whether 
the Commission would seek to verify or ot herwise confirm the information submitted. 
 
Article 2 further defines the term "industry" to mean all producers in the States Parties 
of the like or directly competitive product or those whose share of total production 
"constitutes a significant part, but not less than 25 per cent." Please explain how the 
term "significant part" is consistent with  the definition of domestic industry in 
Article 4.1(c) of the WTO Agreement on Safe guards, which states that, "in determining 
injury or threat thereof, a 'domestic indust ry' shall be understood to mean the producers 
as a whole of the like or directly competitiv e products... or those whose collective output 
of the like or directly competitive products constitutes a major portion of the total domestic production of those products" (emp hasis added). Please also explain the basis 
for concluding that producers accounting fo r as little as 25% of production might 
constitute a "major proportion" of production of the like or directly competitive products 
and how the Commission would consider producers accounting for the remaining 75% of domestic production. Finally, please explain whether this 25% rule would apply in the 
case of producers in each of the States Parties, and whether a petition would be 
considered properly filed if it accounted fo r less than 25% of the production of certain 
States Parties. 
 
Reply 
 The investigating authority collects information from producers in the States Parties regardless of 
their location. At the complaint stage, in accordance with Article 29(12) the investigating authority G/ADP/Q1/RUS/4 • G/SCM/Q1/RUS/4 • G/SG/Q1/RUS/4 
 
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  examines the accuracy and adequacy of the eviden ce and information contained therein. In this 
regard, the investigating authority may request additional information from the complainant (in accordance with Article 29(12) or seek information from the States Parties (in accordance with the "Protocol on the provision of information, including, inter alia, confidential information, to the 
investigating authority for the purposes of investigations prior to the introduction of safeguard, 
antidumping and countervailing measures in relation to third countries" of 19 November 2010, hereinafter – the Protocol on the provision of information). In case the evidence or information 
contained in the complaint is deemed inaccurate, the investigating authority declines the complaint 
under Article 29(10) of the Basic Agreement. At the investigation stage, the investigating authority, in accordance with Article 35(4) of the Basic Agreement, ascertains that the information provided by interested parties in the course of the investigation is adequate and accurate. 
Article 35(4) empowers the investigating authority to conduct verifications for the purpose of 
confirming such information.  
As regards the definition of the industry of the States Parties contained in Article 2, we would like 
to note that this provision of the Basic Agreement is not concerned with the industry in each of the 
States Parties. Instead, the definition speaks of the producers of the like (like or directly 
competitive) product in the CU as a whole . In this regard, applications that are filed by the 
industry will be required to pass the 25% threshold measured in relation to the total volume of production of the product in the territory of the CU, regardless of the volumes of production or 
shares in particular States Parties. 
 
In cases where industry is defined as those pr oducers whose share in total production of the 
product in the States Parties constitutes a major proportion (in the sense of Article 2), and 
information is available about other producers not included in the domestic industry, such 
information will be used in the analysis of market trends in the Customs Union.  
The Russian Federation would like to note further that the Agreement on Safeguards does not 
contain quantitative indications as to what is to be considered a minimal threshold to determine "a major proportion of the total domestic production".  The Russian Federation is of the view that the 
definition contained in Article 2 satisfies th e pertinent requirements of the Agreements 
 
Question 4  
Article 2 of the 2008 Agreement defines the threat of serious injury to mean "the 
inevitability" of serious injury  to the domestic industry, wh ile Article 4.1(b) of the WTO 
Agreement on Safeguards states that the te rm should be understood to mean "serious 
injury that is clearly imminent." The term "inevitability" is defi ned to mean an event 
that is "impossible to evade or prevent" (Merriam-Webster Dictionary, accessed at 
http://www.merriam-webster.com /dictionary/inevitability on14 February 2013), but 
does not convey the sense of when that event will occur. Th e term "clearly imminent," 
coupled with the requirement in Article 4. 1(b) of the WTO Agreement on Safeguards 
that the finding of threat be based "on facts and not merely on allegation, conjecture or 
remote possibility," suggests an event "rea dy to take place" as in "hanging 
threateningly over one's head" (Merri am-Webster Dictionary, accessed at 
http://www.merriam-webster.c om/dictionary/imminent on 14 February 2013). Please 
explain how the use of the term "inevitability"  is consistent with "clearly imminent" in 
Article 4.1(b) of the Safeguards Agreement.  
 Question 5  
Article 3.1 of the 2008 Agreement states th at an investigation "should be conducted" 
before the introduction of a safeguard meas ure. The use of the word "should" suggests 
that an investigation would be optional. Th is is in contrast to Article 4.1 of the 
2008 Agreement which indicates that such an investigation would be a prerequisite to 
introduction of a safeguard measure. Please explain how Article 3.1 of the 
2008 Agreement is consistent with Article 3. 1 of the WTO Safeguards Agreement, which 
states: "A Member may apply a safeguard me asure only following an investigation by 
the competent authorities of that Member pu rsuant to procedures previous established 
and made public in consonance with Arti cle X of GATT 1994". Pl ease explain whether 
any law notified by the Russian Federation  would allow the Commission, in specific 
instances, to apply a safeguard measure with out conducting an investigation (such as a G/ADP/Q1/RUS/4 • G/SCM/Q1/RUS/4 • G/SG/Q1/RUS/4 
 
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  provisional safeguard measure that meets the requirements of Article 6 of the 
WTO Safeguards Agreement).  Question 9 
 
Article 7.1 of the 2008 Agreement states th at the safeguard measure applied would be 
in the amount and "within" the time required  for "elimination" of the serious injury or 
threat of serious injury. Please explain ho w this provision is consistent with the 
requirement in Article 5.1 of the WTO Agreem ent on Safeguards, which requires that the 
measure applied be "only to the extent nece ssary to prevent or remedy serious injury 
and to facilitate adjustment" and similar wo rding in Article 7.1 of the WTO Safeguards 
Agreement. In particular, please explain ho w the word "elimination" (or "eliminate") is 
consistent with the WTO Safeguard Agreement term "prevent or remedy" serious injury. Please also explain how Russia would "elim inate" a threat of serious injury. 
 
Question 14  
Article 17.3 and Article 27.3 of the 2008 Agreemen t indicate that in conducting an expiry 
review, the investigating authority will co nsider "the possibility of renewal of 
continuation of [dumped or subsidized] import s and injury" to the industry of the States 
Parties at the termination of the measure. Please explain how the "possibility" standard 
is consistent with the standards of Articl e 11.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and 
Article 21.3 of the Subsidies and Countervailin g Measures Agreement that "expiry of the 
duty would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence" of dumping or subsidization, 
on the one hand, and injury, on the other. 
 Question 20 
 
Article 30 of the 2008 Agreement states that during the course of an investigation, 
interested parties may "familiarize them selves with" non-confidential written 
submissions of other interested partie s and "get acquainted with" other non-
confidential information relevant to the inve stigation. Please explain the meaning of the 
terms "familiarize themselves with" and "get acquainted with" in the context that they 
are used in Article 30. Please also explai n whether Article 30.9 is consistent with 
Article 6.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement,  which requires authorities to provide 
opportunities to interested parties to "see" all relevant non-confidential information and 
"to prepare presentations on the basis of this information." 
 
Replies to Questions 4, 5, 9, 14, 20 
 We believe that the misunderstandings of the following terms: 
 
 Familiarize themselves with, get acquainted with // see 
 Inevitable // imminent 
 Should // shall 
 Eliminate // prevent 
 Possibility // likelihood 
is caused by translation issues. We note in this regard that many concepts enshrined in the Basic 
Agreement indeed originate and were drawn from the relevant WTO Agreements and were transposed into the Russian language as close to their original English meaning as was practically possible. Due to the backwards translation of these concepts into the English language that had to 
be made in order to make the present notification, some of the meanings may seem further away 
from the original. Nevertheless, we confirm that for some of the concepts the Russian language simply does not allow a possibility to distinguish between meanings (for instance, inevitable-
imminent-neizbezhnyi).   
 G/ADP/Q1/RUS/4 • G/SCM/Q1/RUS/4 • G/SG/Q1/RUS/4 
 
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  Question 6 
 Article 3.6 and Article 40 of the 2008 Agreement state that in arriving at a final 
determination the investigating authority provides the Commission with a report 
suggesting the appropriateness of the imp osition and application of a safeguard, 
antidumping or countervailing measure. The Commission then considers these recommendations in light of other factors including public interest, the state of 
competition and state of the domestic in dustry, all of which raise the following 
questions:   How are the recommendations of the inve stigating authority taken into account 
when formulating the ultimate decision  in the investigation issued by the 
Commission? 
 Are the decisions of the Commission final or  are they subject to approval by the 
individual States Parties? 
 Do the States Parties need to vote or otherwise signal their approval of the 
decision of the Commission before a tr ade remedy measure can be imposed? 
 What role do the States Parties and interested parties play once the technical 
recommendations of the investigating au thority have been submitted to the 
Commission? 
 What opportunities are provided for interested parties to comment and otherwise 
express their views about the report to  the Commission prior to its final 
determination? 
Please also explain the process and timeline by which decisions of the Commission are 
passed to individual States Parties. Does each  States Party issue its own notification of 
an antidumping, countervailing duty or safe guard measure? If so, through what means 
does each States Party issue its notification? 
 
Reply 
 In accordance with Article 40(2) of the Basic Agreement, the conclusions that are submitted to the 
Commission in order to take a decision pursuant to Article 40(1) by the investigating authority 
shall be based on a cumulative assessment of the interests of the industry of the States-Parties, 
the industrial users of the product under investigation and their associations in the States-Parties, 
public associations of consumers and importers of  the product. In preparing the conclusions, the 
investigating authority devotes particular attention to the distorting influence of the increased, dumped or subsidized imports on the normal cour se of trade and the state of competition on the 
relevant product market of the States-Parties. 
 The report (in other words, the conclusions) of the investigating authority contains an analysis of all the relevant factors, including, where appropriate, the public interest and the state of 
competition (in accordance with Article 40(2) of the Basic Agreement). 
  As one of the Departments of the Commission, the DIMD is defined as the investigating 
authority authorized to conduct investigations and take all procedural actions within the 
limits of the Basic Agreement – both in relation to the import side (increased imports, dumping, subsidization) and the injury side. In accordance with Article 3(3) of the Basic 
Agreement, the decisions to apply safeguard, antidumping or countervailing measures are 
taken by the Commission. By virtue of Article 3(6) of the Basic Agreement, the investigating 
authority, as a result of its investigation, provides the Commission with a report suggesting the appropriateness of the introduction and application of a measure, or a review or 
termination of a measure, and attaches a draft decision of the Commission. In this way, the 
recommendations of the investigating authority are directly embedded into the draft decision of the Commission. After the Commission adopts a decision, such decision would be final 
and binding on the States-Parties without a need for them to signal approval. G/ADP/Q1/RUS/4 • G/SCM/Q1/RUS/4 • G/SG/Q1/RUS/4 
 
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   In accordance with Clauses 2.4 and 2.6 of  the Regulation on Decision-Making and 
Preparation of Draft Decisions of the Eurasian Economic Commission on Safeguard, Antidumping and Countervailing Measures (item 6.  of the list of laws and regulations in the 
initial notification), the draft decisions of the Commission are prepared by the investigating 
authority, then sent to the authorized bodies of the States-Parties and are considered at a 
meeting of an advisory body on trade issues be fore such draft decisions are submitted to the 
decision-making bodies of the Commission. Un der the current practice, the draft decisions 
are sent out to the States-Parties for consideration at the meeting of the advisory body 
together with the report containing the findings of the investigating authority. The States-Parties can make their views known at this stage of the process, and such views are 
submitted to the Commission together with the conclusions of the investigating authority. 
The States do not need to vote or signal their approval in any other way before a trade 
remedy measure can be imposed. 
 According to Articles 31(3) and 32(3) the investigating authority sends out the non-
confidential version of its final conclusions (report) to the participants in the investigation 
and provides them with an opportunity to give their comments. The participants may 
comment on the findings of the investigating authority at this stage. Such comments are 
taken into account and are incorporated into the final report of the investigating authority 
that is then submitted to the decision-making bodies of the Commission  along with the draft 
decision. In accordance with Article 30(15) the investigation is completed on the day the Commission considers the report of the investigating authority and the draft decision.  
In accordance with Article 5(6) of the EEC Treaty, the decisions of the Commission are published 
on the official website of the Commission and are sent to the States-Parties no later than three days after their adoption. The entry into force of the decisions of the Commission is independent of 
whether such decisions are published by any of the States-Parties, and in accordance with 
Article 5(3) of the EEC Treaty, occurs no sooner th an after 30 days from the date of the publication 
of the decision on the official website of the Commission. The notifications on the conclusion of 
investigations are issued by the investigating authority in accordance with Articles 39(4) and 39(5) 
of the Basic Agreement.  Question 7 
 
Article 6.1 of the 2008 Agreement refers to a preliminary dete rmination regarding 
imports of a product "under investigation" and to continuation of the "investigation" 
after the preliminary determination. Please explain the kind and duration of the 
investigation that would be undertaken in or der to make a preliminary determination, 
and the procedures that would be followed, including the extent to which such 
procedures would be of the type describe d in Article 3.1 of the WTO Agreement on 
Safeguards (e.g. publication of a notice, a pu blic hearing, and opportunity for interested 
parties, including importers and exporters,  to present evidence and their views). 
 
Reply 
 
The investigation referred to in Article 6(1) is a single uninterrupted process of collecting and 
analyzing evidence. The mechanism for the application of provisional measures enshrined in 
Article 6 is used only where in the early stage of the investigation there is clear evidence that increased imports have caused or are threatening to cause serious injury, and there are critical 
circumstances where delay would cause serious injury  which it would be difficult to repair. Any 
decision to apply a provisional safeguard measure sh all be preceded by a formal initiation of the 
investigation and the publication of the relevant notice in accordance with Article 39(2) of the Basic Agreement. However, the Agreement does not establish a particular timeframe for making a 
preliminary determination leading to the imposition of a provisional safeguard measure, other than 
stipulating that such a decision may be taken "before the conclusion of the investigation". As the investigation process is not interrupted even in case a decision to apply a provisional measure is 
taken, the rights of the interested parties to re quest a public hearing and/or present evidence and 
their views are not prejudiced. In case a decision to apply a provisional safeguard measure is taken, the investigating authority is under an obligation, pursuant to Article 39(3), to publish a 
notice thereof, containing an explanation of its preliminary determination and stating the facts that 
form the basis for such a decision. Interested parties may comment and present their views based on such notice and their submissions in this regard, duly filed to the investigating authority, will be G/ADP/Q1/RUS/4 • G/SCM/Q1/RUS/4 • G/SG/Q1/RUS/4 
 
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  taken into consideration in the investigation process. During the period of application of the 
provisional safeguard measures all pertinent re quirements of Articles 2 through 7 of the 
Agreement on Safeguards shall be met.  
Question 8  
 Article 6.1 of the 2008 Agreement also refers to " serious injury ... which would be 
difficult to eliminate later." Please explain ho w this wording is consistent with Article 6 
of the WTO Agreement on Safeguards, which refers to " damage which it would be 
difficult to repair"?  
Reply 
 
With regard to the consistency of the wording of Article 6(1) with Article 6 of the Agreement on 
Safeguards, we note that "damage" is not elsewhere defined in the Agreement, and it appears 
indeed to be a concept directly linked to the one of serious injury. We thus believe that the wording of the Basic Agreement that establishes a very high standard and refers "damage" to a 
specific concept is not inconsistent with the provisions of Article 6.  
 Question 10  
Article 7.2 of the 2008 Agreement states that when the safeguard measure is in the form 
of an import quota, the quota will not be lowe r than the average annual level of imports 
of the product under investigation "during a previous period" except when "necessary" 
to "eliminate" serious injury or the threat of serious injury. Please explain how this 
wording is consistent with Article 5.1 of th e WTO Safeguards Agreement, which requires 
that the measure "not reduce the quantity of  imports below the level of a recent period 
which shall be the average of imports in the last three representative years for which 
statistics are available , unless clear justification is given...." (emphasis added). 
 Reply 
 In answering this question, we would like to refer to the definition contained in Article 2 of the Basic Agreement, which defines "previous period" as  "3 calendar years, immediately preceding the 
date of the filing of application for the initiation of an investigation, for which necessary statistics 
are available". As regards the second element of this provision, we note that it should correctly read "except in cases where a lower level is nece ssary to prevent or remedy serious injury or 
threat thereof to the industry of the States-Parties".  In this context, we believe that the wording of 
Article 7(2) of the Basic Agreement is not inconsis tent with the requirement of Article 5.1 of the 
Agreement on Safeguards.  
Question 11 
 Article 10.6 of the 2008 Agreement states that  in the comparison of export price with 
normal value any required conversion from one currency to another is made using the 
official exchange rate on the date of the sa le of the product. Please identify the source 
of the exchange rate data and whether that data is available to the public. 
 
Reply 
 Required conversions are usually made by using the exchange rate data provided by the interested 
parties in their responses to questionnaires, verified against information on exchange rates that 
would be available in official sources (such as web-sites of central banks of the countries of origin). In cases where official information is not available, the investigating authority would use other 
open sources. 
 Question 12 
 
Article 16.2 of the 2008 Agreement states that  the Commission may decide to impose an 
antidumping duty at a rate le sser than the rate of the calculated margin of dumping if 
such rate is sufficient to repair the injury  to the industry of the Parties. Likewise, 
Article 26.4 of the 2008 Agreement states th at the Commission may decide to impose a G/ADP/Q1/RUS/4 • G/SCM/Q1/RUS/4 • G/SG/Q1/RUS/4 
 
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  lower CVD rate than the calculated per unit rate  of subsidization, if the rate is sufficient 
to repair the injury to the industry of  the Parties. Please explain whether the 
Commission examines whether the application of such lesser duty is appropriate in 
every antidumping and countervailing duty inve stigation. If lesser duty is applied, 
please describe the steps by which the amount  of the lesser duty is calculated in each 
type of investigation. Please also explain the opportunities provided to interested 
parties to evaluate the calculation of th e lesser duty and provide comments to the 
Commission. 
 Reply 
 
The Commission has not so far made a decision to impose an anti-dumping or countervailing duty 
lower than the margins calculated for dumping or subsidization pursuant to Articles 16(2) or 26(4) of the Basic Agreement. Should the investigating authority deem it appropriate to calculate such 
"lesser duty" in an anti-dumping or countervailing investigation, the interested parties shall have 
all procedural rights as specified in the relevant provisions of the Basic Agreement.  
Question 13 
 Article 17.2 of the 2008 Agreement states that  the duration of the antidumping measure 
shall not exceed 5 years from the date of in itiation or conclusion of review. Likewise, 
Article 27.2 of the 2008 Agreement states that the duration of the countervailing 
measure shall not exceed 5 years from the date  of initiation or conclusion of review. 
Please clarify: 
 
 In expiry reviews, does any extension of the measure for an additional five year 
period begin on the date the review is co mpleted or the date the prior five year 
period expired? 
 In expiry reviews, in the event the Commission determines to extend a measure, 
does the extension apply for a five-yea r period or does the Commission have 
discretion to determine the duration  of the extension in its review? 
Reply 
 
In accordance with Articles 17(2) and 27(2) of the Basic Agreement, the duration of an anti-
dumping or countervailing measure shall not exceed 5 years from the date of the conclusion of the 
expiry review investigation. This means the following:  
 The duration of the extended measure shall be ca lculated from the date of the conclusion of 
the expiry review investigation. 
 In expiry reviews, the investigating authority may propose to extend the application of an 
anti-dumping duty for a period  not exceeding five years. 
Question 15 
 Article 18.3 of the 2008 Agreement states th at an application for a circumvention 
investigation must contain, among other thin gs, evidence of dumped imports. Please 
clarify whether the application for a circ umvention investigation must contain new 
evidence of dumped imports for products cu rrently subject to an anti-dumping duty 
measure. In addition, please  explain the relevance of the requirement that there be 
dumped imports to the circumvention investigation.  Reply 
 In accordance with Article 18(3) of the Basic Agreement, the application for a circumvention investigation must contain, inter alia, evidence of the existence of dumping of a 
product (parts or derivatives thereof) as a result of circumvention of an anti-dumping measure. 
The normal value used to determine the existence of dumping in this case shall be the normal 
value established in the original investigation that led to the imposition of the anti-
dumping measure. In our view, evidence of the existence of dumping is relevant in proving that G/ADP/Q1/RUS/4 • G/SCM/Q1/RUS/4 • G/SG/Q1/RUS/4 
 
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  there is circumvention, since such a determination would be contingent on the fact that dumping is 
not being offset (e.g. by trading via a third territory).  Question 16 
 
Article 28-1.3 of the 2008 Agreement discusse s how States Parties will collect special 
antidumping, countervailing duty and safeguard duties. It is not clear from the 
description provided whether States Parties have the ability to change or modify the 
antidumping, countervailing duty and safeguar d measures that are put in place, and 
their subsequent collection, refund or dist ribution. Can the Russian Federation please 
clarify whether or not States Parties will have  the ability to modify or alter the measure 
imposed by the Commission and, if so, will interested parties have an opportunity to 
comment?  
Reply 
 
Article 28-1 of the Basic Agreement provides te chnical guidance to the national authorities 
responsible for the collection, refund and distributi on of the duties collected as a result of the 
application of trade remedies measures (e.g. Customs, Treasury), whereby the competence remains at the national level. This, however, does not imply that States Parties and/or their authorities that are responsible for enforcing th e measure adopted by the Commission would have 
the ability to modify or alter such a measure. 
 Question 17 
 
With regard to Article 29.5 of the 2008 Agreem ent, could the Russian Federation confirm 
whether the investigating authority consid ers employment when determining whether 
there is evidence of serious injury or threat  of serious injury caused by imports in the 
course of a safeguard investigation?  Reply 
 In analyzing applications filed under Article 29 of  the Basic Agreement and evaluating the accuracy 
and adequacy of the evidence contained therein,  the investigating authority is guided by the 
definitions and requirements contained in other re levant provisions of the Basic Agreement. In 
accordance with Article 5(1)(5) of the Basic Agreement, in determining serious injury to the industry of the States-Parties, the investigating authority in the course of a safeguard investigation 
evaluates factors of an objective and quantifiable nature having a bearing on the situation of the 
industry of the States-Parties, including the change  in the level of employment in the industry of 
the States-Parties. Accordingly, evidence of serious injury contained in the application is considered in light of the other provisions of th e Basic Agreement relating to the determination of 
serious injury. This implies that employment is analyzed by the investigating authority when 
determining whether there is evidence of serious injury.  
Question 18 
 Article 29.5(3) of the 2008 Agreement desc ribes the information necessary to be 
included in an application to initiate a CVD investigation. The list includes "the 
availability and nature of specific subsidie s or a particular foreign country and, if 
possible, its volume, evidence of material in jury, threat of such injury…" among other 
things. Please explain whether, for each su bsidy alleged, an application must contain 
evidence regarding each element of a counter vail able subsidy – financial contribution, 
benefit and specificity and that the investig ating authority will review the accuracy and 
adequacy of this evidence to determine whether the evidence is sufficient to justify the 
initiation of an investigation. 
 Reply 
 The requirements for the content of an applicatio n contained in Article 29 of the Basic Agreement 
should be read in conjunction with the other relevant provisions that the Agreement contains. In this regard, the definition of subsidy contained in Article 20 of the Basic Agreement is relevant. 
The information about the existence and nature of a specific subsidy  of a particular exporting G/ADP/Q1/RUS/4 • G/SCM/Q1/RUS/4 • G/SG/Q1/RUS/4 
 
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  country must include both information on the elements of an alleged subsidy listed in Article 20, 
and its specificity in the sense of Article 21 of the Basic Agreement. The investigating authority 
reviews all evidence and information contained in applications filed under Article 29, including applications for countervailing investigations, in accordance with Article 29(12) of the Basic 
Agreement. 
 Question 19 
 
Article 29.14 of the 2008 Agreement states th at the information in the application "is 
not subject to public disclosure" before the deci sion is made to initiate an investigation. 
However, Article 29.9 requires the applicant to file a non-confidential version of the 
application if the application contains conf idential information. Article 3.2 of the 
WTO Agreement on safeguards generally requires that non- confidential information (or 
non-confidential summaries of confidential information) be disclosed. Please explain 
why the non-confidential version of the app lication, once formally filed, would be 
withheld from disclosure until the decision to initiate is made. We note in this regard 
that prompt disclosure of the formally filed application would provide interested parties, 
including interested importers and export ers and foreign governments, with the 
opportunity to examine the application and to advise the investigating authority of 
possible errors in the application. Any such errors so identified might prove helpful to 
the investigating authority in de ciding whether to initiate an  investigation, including the 
appropriate scope of the investigation. 
 Reply 
 The specified provisions of Article 29(14) of the Basic Agreement draw from the meaning of 
Article 5.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and 11 .5 of the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
Agreement, which establish that the authorities shall avoid, unless a decision has been made to 
initiate an investigation, any publicizing of the application for the initiation of an investigation. Neither the Basic Agreement, nor the Agreement on Safeguards provide for a formal public action on behalf of the investigating authority upon receipt of an application. Moreover, upon receiving 
the application, the investigating authority is ob liged, under Article 29(12) of the Basic Agreement, 
to examine the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence submitted, and also whether the non-
confidential summaries of the information submitted are in sufficient detail to permit a reasonable 
understanding of the substance of the information submitted in confidence. We note here that the 
period for such screening is limited by the provisio ns of Article 29, and the decision whether or not 
to initiate an investigation is made as soon as this examination is completed. As soon as the 
decision to initiate an investigation is made, a public notice is given, and interested parties are 
invited to register as participants in the investigation, which allows them to access the non-confidential file of the case, including the application, and provide their comments.  
Question 21 
 Article 30.9, 37, and other provisions of the 2008 Agreement authorize the investigating 
authority to withhold "confidential informatio n" from participants in the investigation. 
Please explain how the Commission woul d define confidential information. 
 
Reply 
 
The investigating authority defines "confidential information" in accordance with the provisions of Article 37 of the Basic Agreement. Article 37(1) establishes that information is to be regarded 
confidential if it is submitted by an interested party in confidence together with justifications, 
demonstrating, inter alia, that the disclosure of such information would accord a competitive advantage to a third party or would lead to advers e consequences for the party that provided such 
information or for the party that such information was received from. 
 Question 22 
 
Article 30.11 of the 2008 Agreement states that  during the course of the investigation 
all interested parties will have the opportunit y to defend their interests, including the 
opportunity to meet in order to be able to provide opposing points of view and to offer 
rebuttal. Please describe the procedures that will be followed, including whether G/ADP/Q1/RUS/4 • G/SCM/Q1/RUS/4 • G/SG/Q1/RUS/4 
 
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  interested parties will have the opportuni ty to file briefs and other documents 
containing information and arguments.  Question 24 
 
With regard to Article 34.2 of the 2008 Agreement, please confirm that the 
Russian Federation will inform all interested parties, not only those participating in the 
investigation, of the time and agenda of th e hearing. Could the Russian Federation also 
confirm that a record of the hearing, as  well as any non-confidential submissions 
submitted subsequent to the hearing, will be accessible in the public case file? 
 
Please also indicate whether this article appl ies to safeguard investigations. If it does, 
please indicate whether interested foreign pr oducers, importers, ex porters, and foreign 
governments may "petition" for public hearin gs and whether such petitions for hearings 
are automatically granted. 
 Replies to Questions 22 and 24 
 The purpose of meetings under Article 30.11 has so far successfully been served by the practice of 
organizing public hearings conducted under Article 34. The investigating authority, in accordance with Article 34(2) is under an obligation to send out a notice to all participants in the investigation 
containing information on the time and place of the public hearing and a list of issues to be 
considered at the hearing. To ensure transparency and universal access to such information, the investigating authority publishes the notice of public hearing on the official website of the 
Commission. In accordance with Article 34(2), a hearing cannot be scheduled for a date earlier 
than fifteen days after sending out the notice to the participants in the investigation. Information 
delivered at the public hearing is taken into account in the investigation if it is presented in written 
form to the investigating authority no later than fi fteen days after the date of the public hearing. 
In accordance with Article 30(9) during the investigation the investigating authority, subject to the requirement to protect confidential information, allows the participants in an investigation, at their request, to see any information presented in written form by any interested party as evidence 
pertinent to the subject of investigation. This practice applies to the submissions received after the 
public hearings, insofar as they are "information presented by interested parties in written form". 
 
The pertinent requirements of Article 34 are identical for antidumping, countervailing and 
safeguard proceedings.  
In accordance with Article 39(2)(10) and Article 34(1) public hearings are conducted at the 
request of a participant in an investigation filed within the time limit specified in the notice of initiation of an investigation. Any interested party, as defined in Article 36, can, in accordance with Article 30(5), express their wish to participate in an investigation. Article 36 covers, inter alia, 
exporters, foreign producers, importers of the product under consideration [36(4)] and authorized 
bodies of an exporting country or country of origin  of the product [36(5)]. In other words, in case 
interested exporters, importers or the government  of the exporting country or country of origin 
duly applied for participant status, their requests to hold public hearings are automatically granted 
by virtue of Article 34(1).  
Question 23 
 Article 31.3 of the 2008 Agreement states that , before making a decision on the results 
of an antidumping or a countervailing duty investigation, the investigating authority 
shall send interested parties a non-confiden tial version of the final conclusions and 
provide an opportunity to comment. How ma ny days, on average, before the final 
determination, will this statem ent of essential facts be issu ed? Please identify how much 
time will be made available to parties to submit comments on this report and explain 
how these comments will be a ddressed by the investigating authority in the final 
determination. 
 
Reply 
 
The investigating authority sends out the non-confidential version of its final determination to 
allow participants in an investigation on average two weeks to provide their comments. Comments G/ADP/Q1/RUS/4 • G/SCM/Q1/RUS/4 • G/SG/Q1/RUS/4 
 
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  received by the investigating authority within this timeframe are analyzed and included, where 
appropriate, in the final report of the investigating authority that it submits to the Commission in accordance with Article 3(6) and (7) of the Basic Agreement.  
Question 25 
 With regard to Article 35.4 of the 2008 Agreem ent, could the Russian Federation explain 
how experts who are not part of the inve stigating authority will be chosen and the 
typical circumstances when such expertise would be necessary? Additionally, please 
clarify whether such experts would be requir ed to submit a non-disclosure form and 
describe the sanctions for violation of confidentiality. 
 
Reply 
 
The investigating authority may engage external ex perts in the process of verification when the 
necessary competence is not present internally (e.g. translation/interpretation from/into a foreign 
language). In choosing the experts, the investigating authority will apply a competence-based approach and evaluate whether the competence of the candidates is sufficient to successfully 
support the verification process. External experts will be required to submit a non-disclosure form. 
In accordance with Article 35.4, such expert s cannot be engaged unless there is a practical 
opportunity to sanction them for potential breaches of confidentiality. 
 
Question 26 
 
Articles 39.2 – 39.5 of the 2008 Agreement desc ribe the content of reports published by 
the investigating authority concerning the initiation, preliminary and final 
determinations of trade reme dy investigations. Please explain at what point in the 
investigation each of these reports are ty pically issued. Please also describe all 
documentation that is provided to interested  parties at the time of the preliminary and 
final determinations. Such items could includ e, but not be limited to the text of the 
official published notice, detailed calculations, and the underlying analysis and 
supporting evidence for the Commission's decisions. 
 
Reply 
 
Article 39 contains requirements for the public notices given of decisions concerning investigations. All such notices are, in accordance with Article 39(1), published on the official website of the 
Commission. The publication of the notice of initiation described in Article 39(2) marks the day on 
which the investigation starts by virtue of Article 30(3-1). Thus, the notice of initiation is available to the public from the first day of the investigation. The notice of conclusion of an investigation, in 
case a measure is applied, is published in accordance with Article 39(4) for safeguards and 39(5) 
for anti-dumping and countervailing measures in the three days following the conclusion of investigation. In accordance with Article 30(15) the investigation is concluded on the day the Commission considers the report and the draft decision submitted by the investigating authority. A 
similar practice is used for the notice of imposition of provisional measures – it is published in the 
three days following the date of the decisi on of the Commission. Moreover, for safeguard 
measures, the investigating authority is under the obligation, pursuant to Article 6(2), to notify the 
authorized body of the exporting country and othe r interested parties known to it, of the possible 
introduction of a provisional safeguard duty.  
In accordance with Article 39(1) the notices described in the Article, in addition to their publication 
on the official website, are sent to the auth orized body of the exporting country and other 
interested parties known to the investigating authority. The conclusions of the investigating authority, including underlying analysis, calculations, consideration of the arguments made during 
the investigation etc. are set out in the report it submits to the Commission in accordance with 
Article 3(6) and (7). The notice of imposition of provisional measures described in Article 39(3) is 
in practice published on the official website of the Commission together with the non-confidential 
version of the report submitted to the Commission under Article 3(7). Similarly, the notice of 
conclusion of the investigation is published on the official website of the Commission together with the non-confidential version of the report submitted to the Commission under Article 3(6). 
 G/ADP/Q1/RUS/4 • G/SCM/Q1/RUS/4 • G/SG/Q1/RUS/4 
 
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  Question 27 
 Article 40.1 of the 2008 Agreement states th at a decision of non-application of a 
safeguard, antidumping or countervailing meas ure may be taken "if such measure could 
harm the interests of States Parties, and revi sed if the causes that led to its application 
have changed." Please clarify whether th is provision allows the Commission the 
authority to revisit a previously determ ined anti-dumping or countervailing duty 
measure and to revise it. If so, under what  circumstances would the Commission revisit 
a previously-determined measure, and where does the Agreement outline a formal process for doing so?  
Reply 
 
We note that in the text of Article 40(1) the wo rds "revised" should be read as relating to the 
words "this decision". In this sense, the only decisions that the Commission would have the 
authority to revisit based on this Article would be the decisions it has previously taken in accordance with the same article , i.e. decisions of non-application. Article 40(1) does not establish 
a formal process for the revision of previously-determined measures.  
Question 28 
 With respect to the 2010 Transitional Agreement:  
 Have all antidumping, countervailing du ty and safeguard measures initially 
imposed by individual States Parties been  reviewed and determined either to be 
applicable to the entire Customs Union or on ly to a specific States Party? It is our 
understanding that measures found to be applicable only to a particular States 
Party will expire at the end of the initial five year period. Is this understanding 
correct? 
 If a measure initially imp osed by an individual States Party is found to be 
applicable to the entire Customs Union, please confirm that, absent a review, the 
measure would also expire five years fr om the original date of imposition. 
 Does the Commission have the ability to change or modify the original terms, rates 
or duties of measures orig inally imposed by the States  Parties? If so, please 
describe the process by which such changes would be made. 
Reply 
 
Antidumping, countervailing and safeguard measures initially imposed by individual States Parties have been reviewed in accordance with the Transitional Agreement. As 22 April 2013, only 
two measures that have undergone the review and were found to be applicable in a particular 
State Party remain in force in accordance with its national legislation (by virtue of Article 5 of the Transitional Agreement) – the safeguard measures  applied by the Republic of Kazakhstan. These 
measures are set to expire in September 2014. The list of the measures applied by individual 
Member-States that remain in force is available on the official website of the Commission 
(http://www.eurasiancommission.org/ru/act/tr ade/podm/mery/Pages/zaschitaStran.aspx ). 
 
In accordance with Article 2 of the Transition al Agreement, measures that have been found 
applicable in the Single Customs Territory of the CU are applied pursuant to decisions of the Commission until the date of expiry of the initial measure introduced by the State-Party. The 
understanding of the United States is correct in as much as those measures will expire on the 
dates stipulated in the relevant decisions of the Commission, if no review is conducted.  Changes of the original terms, rates of duties of measures originally imposed by the States Parties 
may be made by the Commission only pursuant to  a review conducted in accordance with the 
provisions of the Basic Agreement. The review process provided by the Transitional Agreement 
does not foresee such changes. 
 G/ADP/Q1/RUS/4 • G/SCM/Q1/RUS/4 • G/SG/Q1/RUS/4 
 
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  Question 29 
 With regard to Decision, 16 May 2012, No. 44, Moscow, On  some issues of protection of 
the domestic market , could the Russian Federation clar ify that for measures imposed by 
individual States Parties prior to July 2012,  whether any future reviews of the measures 
will be conducted by the relevant State Party or the EEC instead?  
Reply 
 
For all national trade remedy measures that have passed the review under the Transitional Agreement and have been found to be applicable in the Single Customs Territory of the CU, all 
future reviews are to be conducted by the EEC. 
  
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