WT/DS464/RPT * 
 
13 April  2017 
(17-2031) Page: 1/26 
  Original: English  
 
 UNITED  STATES – ANTI -DUMPING AND COUNTERV AILING MEASURES 
ON LARGE RESIDENTIAL  WASHERS FROM KOREA  
 
Arbitration  
under Article 21.3(c) of the  
Understanding on Rules and Procedures  
Governing the Settlement of Disputes  
Award of the Arbitrator  
Claudia Orozco  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________  
*NOTE CONCERNING DOCUMENT SYMBOL :  As of 13 April 2017, for ease of reference , awards of 
arbitrators under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU will bear the symbol WT/DS[number]/RPT.  WT/DS464/RPT  
 
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  TABLE OF CONTENTS  
1  INTRODUCTION  ................................ ................................ ................................ .. 6 
2  ARGUMENTS OF THE PAR TIES  ................................ ................................ .............  7 
3  REASONABLE PERIOD OF  TIME  ................................ ................................ ...........  7 
3.1  Introduction  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..........  7 
3.2  Mandate of the arbitrator under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU  ................................ ..........  8 
3.3  Measures to be brought into conformity  ................................ ................................ .... 9 
3.4  Factors affecting the determination of the reasonable period of time  ........................... 10 
3.4.1   Means of implementation  ................................ ................................ ....................... 12 
3.4.2   Steps in the implementation process  ................................ ................................ .......13 
3.4.2.1   Implementation of the DSB's "as such" recommendations and rulings  ......................... 13 
3.4.2.2   Implementation of the DSB's "as applied" recommendations and rulings 
concerning the Washers anti-dumping investigation  ................................ .................. 18 
3.4.2.3   Sequencing of the Section 123 and Section 129 anti -dumping proceedings  .................. 20 
3.4.2.4   Implementation of the DSB's "as applied" recommendations  and rulings 
concerning the Washers countervailing duty investigation  ................................ .......... 21 
3.4.3   Particular circumstances of this dispute  ................................ ................................ ...22 
3.4.4  Conclusion  ................................ ................................ ................................ ........... 23 
4  AWARD  ................................ ................................ ................................ .............  23 
ANNEX A E xecutive Summary of the United States' Submission  ................................ ............... 24 
ANNEX B E xecutive Summary of Korea's Submission  ................................ .............................. 25 
 
 WT/DS464/RPT  
 
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  ABBREVIATIONS USED I N THIS AWARD  
Abbreviation  Description  
Anti-Dumping Agreement  Agreement on Implementation of Article  VI of the General  Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade 1994  
Appellate Body Report  Appellate Body Report,  United States – Anti-Dumping and 
Countervailing Measures on Large Residential Washers from Korea , 
WT/DS464/AB/R   
DPM Differential Pricing Methodology  
DSB Dispute Settlement Body  
DSU Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes  
GATT  1994 General  Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994  
Panel Report  Panel Report, United  States – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing 
Measures on Large Residential Washers from Korea , WT/DS464/R  
RSTA  Korea's Restriction of Special Taxation Act  
Samsung  Samsu ng Electronics Co., Ltd  
SCM Agreement  Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures  
Section 123 proceeding  Proceeding pursuant to Section 123(g) of the Uruguay Round 
Agreements Act, Public Law No. 103 -465, 108 Stat. 483 1, codified as 
United  States C ode, Title 19, Section 3533 (g) 
Section 129 proceeding  Proceeding pursuant to Section 129(b) of the Uruguay Round 
Agreements Act, Public Law No. 103 -465, 108 Stat. 483 7, codified as 
United  States Code , Title 19, Section 3538 (b) 
T-T transaction -to-transact ion 
URAA  Uruguay Round Agreements Act  
USDOC  United  States Department of Commerce  
USTR  United States Trade Representative  
Washers anti-dumping 
investigation  USDOC [A -580-868] Antidumping Duty Investigation of Large 
Residential Washers from the Republic of Korea  
Washers  countervailing 
duty investigation  USDOC [C -580-869] Countervailing Duty Investigation of Large 
Residential Washers from the Republic of Korea  
W-T weighted average -to-transaction  
WTO World Trade Organization  
W-W weighted average -to-weighted average  
 
 WT/DS464/RPT  
 
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  CASES CITED IN THIS AWARD  
Short Title  Full Case title and citation  
Argentina – Hides and Leather 
(Article 21.3(c))  Award of the Arbitrator, Argentina – Measures Affecting the Export of Bovine 
Hides and the Import of Finished Leather – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) 
of the DSU , WT/DS155/10 , 31 August 2001, DSR 2001:XII, p. 6013  
Brazil – Retreaded Tyres 
(Article 21.3(c))  Award of the Arbitrator, Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded 
Tyres – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of  the DSU , WT/DS332/16 , 
29 August 2008, DSR 2008:XX, p. 8581  
Canada – Pharmaceutical 
Patents (Article 21.3(c))  Award of the Arbitrator, Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical 
Products – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU , WT/DS114/13 , 
18 August 2000, DSR 2002:I, p. 3  
Chile – Price Band System 
(Article 21.3(c))  Award of the Arbitrator, Chile – Price Band System and Safeguard Measures 
Relating to Certain Agricultural Products – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of 
the DSU , WT/DS207/13 , 17 Mar ch 2003, DSR 2003:III, p. 1237  
China – GOES (Article 21.3(c))  Award of the Arbitrator, China – Countervailing and Anti -Dumping Duties on 
Grain Oriented Flat -Rolled Electrical Steel from the United States – 
Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU, WT/DS414/12 , 3 May 2013, 
DSR 2013:IV, p. 1495  
Colombia – Ports of Entry 
(Article 21.3(c))  Award of the Arbitrator, Colombia – Indicative Prices and Restrictions on 
Ports of Entry – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU , WT/DS366/13 , 
2 October 2009, DS R 2009:IX, p. 3819  
Colombia – Textiles 
(Article  21.3(c)  Award of the Arbitrator, Colombia – Measures Relating to the Importation of 
Textiles, Apparel and Footwear – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the 
DSU, WT/DS461/13, 15 November 2016  
EC – Export S ubsidies on Sugar 
(Article 21.3(c))  Award of the Arbitrator, European Communities – Export Subsidies on Sugar 
– Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU , WT/DS265/33 , WT/DS266/33 , 
WT/DS283/14 , 28 October 2005, DSR 2005:XXIII, p. 11581  
EC – Tariff Pref erences 
(Article  21.3(c))  Award of the Arbitrator, European Communities – Conditions for the Granting 
of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries  – Arbitration under 
Article  21.3(c) of the DSU , WT/DS246/14 , 20 September 2004, DSR 
2004:IX, p.  4313 
Japan – DRAMs (Korea) 
(Article  21.3(c))  Award of the Arbitrator, Japan – Countervailing Duties on Dynamic Random 
Access Memories from Korea – Arbitration under Article  21.3(c) of the DSU , 
WT/DS336/16 , 5 May 2008, DSR 2008:XX, p.  8553 
US – 1916 Act (Article  21.3(c)) Award of the Arbitrator, United States – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 – 
Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU , WT/DS136/11 , WT/DS162/14 , 
28 February 2001, DSR 2001:V, p. 2017  
US – Continued Zeroing  Appellate Body Report, United States – Continued Existence and Application 
of Zeroing Methodology , WT/DS350/AB/R , adopted 19  February 2009, DSR 
2009:III, p. 1291  
US – COOL (Article 21.3(c))  Award of the Arbitrator, United States – Certain Country of Origin Labelling 
(COOL) Requirements  – Arbitration und er Article 21.3(c) of the DSU , 
WT/DS384/24 , WT/DS386/23 , 4 December 2012, DSR 2012:XIII, p. 7173  
US – Countervailing Measures 
(China) (Article  21.3(c))  Award of the Arbitrator, United States – Countervailing Duty Measures on 
Certain Products from China – Arbitration under Article  21.3(c) of the DSU , 
WT/DS437/16 , 9 October 2015  
US – Offset Act (Byrd 
Amendment) (Article  21.3(c))  Award of the Arbitrator, United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy 
Offset Act of 2000 – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of t he DSU , 
WT/DS217/14 , WT/DS234/22 , 13 June 2003, DSR 2003:III, p.  1163 
US – Shrimp II (Viet Nam) 
(Article 21.3(c))  Award of the Arbitrator, United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain 
Shrimp from Viet Nam  – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU , 
WT/DS429/12 , 15 December 2015  
US – Softwood Lumber V 
(Article 21.5 – Canada)  Appellate Body Report, United States – Final Dumping Determination on 
Softwood Lumber from Canada – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by 
Canada , WT/DS264/AB/RW , adopted 1  September 2006, DSR 2006:XII, 
p. 5087 WT/DS464/RPT  
 
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  Short Title  Full Case title and citation  
US – Stainless Steel (Mexico)  Appellate Body Report, United States – Final Anti -Dumping Measures on 
Stainless Steel from Mexico , WT/DS344/AB/R , adopted 20 May 2008, DSR 
2008:II, p. 513  
US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) 
(Article 21.3(c))  Award of the Arbitrator, United States – Final Anti -Dumping Measures on 
Stainless Steel from Mexico – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU , 
WT/DS344/15 , 31 October 2008, DSR 2008:XX, p. 8619  
US – Washing Machines  Appellate Body Repo rt, United States – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing 
Measures on Large Residential Washers from Korea , WT/DS464/AB/R  and 
Add.1, adopted 26 September 2016  
US – Washing Machines  Panel Report, United States – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Measures on 
Large Residential Washers from Korea , WT/DS464/R  and Add.1, adopted 
26 September 2016, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS464/AB/R  
US – Zeroing (Japan)  Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Relating to Zeroing and 
Sunset Reviews , WT/DS322/AB/R , adopted 23 January 2007, DSR 2007:I, 
p. 3 
 WT/DS464/RPT  
 
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  WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION  
AWARD OF THE ARBITRATOR  
 
 
United  States – Anti-Dumping and 
Countervailing Measures on  
Large Residential Washers from Korea  
 
Parties:  
 
Korea  
United  States  
 Arbitrator:  
 
Claudia Orozco  
 
 
1  INTRODUCTION  
1.1.  On 26 September 2016, the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) adopted the Appellate Body Report1 and the Panel Report2 in United  States – Anti-Dumping 
and Countervailing Measures on Large Residential Washers from Korea . This dispute concerns 
Korea's challenge of certain methodologies used by the United  States in anti -dumping 
investigations and administrative reviews, as well as certain anti -dumping and countervailing 
measures imposed by the United  States on im ports of large residential washers from Korea. The 
Panel and the Appellate Body found the measures at issue to be inconsistent with various 
provisions of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade 1994 (Anti -Dumping Agreement), the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures (SCM  Agreement), and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT 1994).  
1.2.  At the meeting of the DSB held on 26 October 2016, the United  States indicated its intention 
to im plement the DSB's recommendations and rulings in this dispute, and stated that it would 
need a reasonable period of time in which to do so.3  
1.3.  By letter dated 9 December 2016 , Korea informed the DSB that  its consultations with the 
United  States on the reaso nable period of time for implementation pursuant to Article 21.3(b) of 
the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) had not 
resulted in an agreement . Korea therefore requested that the reasonable period of time be 
determined through binding arbitration pursuant to Article  21.3(c) of the DSU.4  
1.4.  On 21 December 2016, the United  States and Korea sent a joint communication to the 
Chairman of the DSB and requested that it be circulated to WTO Members.5 In the communication,  
the United  States and Korea indicated their  agreement that , "in the event an arbitration under 
Article  21.3(c) of the DSU is requested, it shall be completed no later than 60 days after the date 
of the appointment of an arbitrator, unless the arbitrator, following consultation with the parties, 
considers that additional time is required ."6 The United States and Korea also confirmed that any 
award of the arbitrator , including an award not made within 90 days after the adoption of the 
recommendations and rul ings of the DSB, would be  deemed to be an award of the arbitrator for 
the purposes of Article 21.3(c) of the DSU.  
1.5.  By letter dated 22 December 2016, Korea informed the Director -General of the WTO that 
consultations with the United  States had not led to mutu al agreement on an arbitrator . Korea 
therefore requested the Director -General to appoint an arbitrator pursuant to footnote 12 to 
Article  21.3(c) of the DSU. After consulting with the parties, the Director -General appoi nted me as 
the Arbitrator on 12  Janua ry 2017.  
                                                
1 WT/D S464/AB/R.  
2 WT/DS464/R.  
3 WT/DSB/M/387 , para. 2.3 . 
4 WT/DS464/13.  
5 WT/DS464/14.  
6 WT/DS464/14.  WT/DS464/RPT  
 
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  1.6.  On 12 January 2017, the United  States sent a letter requesting that the due date for the 
United  States' submission be no earlier than 27 January 2017, in light of expected difficulties in 
preparing that written submission due to office closures re lating to the United  States Presidential 
Inauguration on 20 January 2017, as well as  a federal public holiday on 16  January  2017.  
1.7.  On 16 January 2017, I informed the parties of my acceptance of the appointment as 
Arbitrator, and invited Korea to comment on  the United States' letter of 12 January 2017. On 
18 January 2017, Korea indicated that it did not intend to comment on the United States' letter 
and that it thereby expressed no objection to the United States' request. On 19 January 2017, 
I transmitted to  the parties a Working Schedule identifying the dates for the filing of the parties' 
written submissions and the date for the hearing.7  
1.8.  On 20 January 2017, I received a letter from Korea requesting modification of the deadline 
for the filing of Korea's wr itten submission from Friday , 3 February 2017 to Monday, 
20 February  2017, and modification of the date of the hearing from 16 February 2017 to a few 
days later. Korea identified several reasons for its request in respect of its filing deadline. Korea 
pointed out that, in previous Article 21.3(c) arbitrations, the submissions of the implementing and 
complaining Members have been due 7 and 14 days, respectively, after the arbitrator's acceptance 
of the appointment. Korea expressed due process concerns arisin g from the fact that, under the 
Working Schedule, the United  States had been given 11 days for its submission while Korea's 
submission was due 7 days thereafter. Korea added that its ability to prepare its submission was 
also reduced by virtue of Korea's n ational holidays for the Lunar New Year from 
27-30 January  2017. Korea supported its request to postpone the date of the hearing with 
reference to its participation in expert sessions and panel meetings in the dispute  Korea – Import 
Bans, and Testing and C ertification Requirements for Radionuclides  (DS495) in 
mid-February  2017.   
1.9.  On 20 January 2017, I invited the United  States to comment on Korea's request. On 
24 January 2017, the United  States indicated that it had no objection to Korea's request to extend 
the deadline for the filing of its written submission, provided that the hearing date be extended in 
a corresponding way so as to preserve a period of at least two weeks between that deadline and 
the date of the hearing in order to allow the United  States sufficient time to consider Korea's 
submission in preparing for the hearing. Accordingly, the United  States requested that any 
extension of the date for the filing of Korea's written submission be accompanied by an extension 
of the date for the hearing unt il at least 6 March 2017.   
1.10.   On 24 January  2017, I sent the parties a revised Working Schedule , pursuant to which  the 
United  States filed its written submission on 2 February 2017, Korea filed its written submission on 
20 February 2017 , and the hearing was held on 9 March 2017. At the hearing, I indicated that, in 
light of the  parties' requests to postpone  the dates for the filing of their written submissions and 
for the hearing, the Award would be issued  by 13 April 2017.  
2  ARGUMENTS OF THE PAR TIES  
2.1.  Annexes A a nd B to this Award contain the executive summaries of the parties' submissions. 
Certain details of the parties' arguments are further described below, insofar as they are relevant 
to the analysis.  
3  REASONABLE PERIOD OF  TIME  
3.1  Introduction  
3.1.  I have been appointe d by the Director -General, at the request of Korea, to determine the 
"reasonable period of time " pursuant to Article 21.3(c) of the DSU  for the United  States to 
implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in United States – Anti-Dumping and 
Counte rvailing Measures on Large Residential Washers from Korea .  
                                                
7 The Working Schedule of 19 January 2017 indicated that the written submission of the United  States 
should be filed on 27 January 2017 , the written submission  of Korea should be filed on 3  February 2017 , and 
the hearing would be held on 16  February 2017.  WT/DS464/RPT  
 
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  3.2.  The United  States requests 21 months as the reasonable period of time for implementation of 
the DSB's recommendations and rulings in this dispute.8 
3.3.  Korea requests that the reasonable period of tim e be either 6 or 8 months, depending on the 
precise means of implementation.9  
3.4.  This section sets out the mandate of the arbitrator under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU in light of 
the text of the DSU. It then identifies the specific measures that the United  States is required to 
bring into conformity with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB. Finally, it analyses the 
factors affecting the determination of the reasonable period of time in this dispute, including the 
means of implementation, the steps in th e implementation process, and circumstances particular 
to this dispute that the parties allege should be taken into account in reaching the determination.  
3.2  Mandate of the arbitrator under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU  
3.5.  Article 21.3 of the DSU provides, in rele vant part:  
If it is impracticable to comply immediately with the recommendations and rulings 
[of the DSB], the Member concerned shall have a reasonable period of time in which 
to do so. The reasonable period of time shall be:  
... 
 (c) a period of time dete rmined through binding arbitration within 90 days after 
the date of adoption of the recommendations and rulings. In such arbitration, 
a guideline for the arbitrator should be that the reasonable period of time to 
implement panel or Appellate Body recom mend ations should not exceed 
15 months from the date of adoption of a panel or Appellate Body report. 
However, that time may be shorter or longer, depending upon the particular 
circumstances.  (fns omitted)   
3.6.  Accordingly, the mandate of the arbitrator is to dete rmine the time period within which the 
implementing Member is to comply with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB. 
Article  21.3(c) establishes as a guideline that such period should not exceed 15  months and 
recognizes that, "depending upon the partic ular circumstances " of the dispute, the period "may be 
shorter or longer".  
3.7.  In determining the period of time that is reasonable in light of the particular circumstances of 
a dispute, the arbitrator should bear in mind the provisions of the DSU that provide  context to 
Article 21.3(c), in particular Article 21.1 , which establishes that "prompt compliance" with the 
DSB's recommendations and rulings is essential "to ensure effective resolution of disputes" , and 
the introductory clause of Article 21.3 , which foresees a reasonable period of time for 
implementation when it is "impracticable to comply immediately" . Both provisions indicate the 
importance of compliance in as short a period as possible when immediate  compliance is not 
practicable.  
3.8.  Further, in determin ing the reasonable period of time, the means of implementation available 
to the Member concerned is a relevant factor. Determining this period of time thus requires 
consideration of how that Member proposes to implement under its municipal law.10 Previous 
awards have indicated that , while the Member concerned has discretion in choosing the means of 
implementation that it deems most appropriate, the means of implementation chosen must be apt 
in form, nature, and content to bring the Member into compliance wit h its WTO obligations.11 
Previous awards have also indicated that , if the action that the implementing Member proposes to 
                                                
8 United  States' submission, para. 8.  
9 Korea's submission, para. 8. 
10 Award of the Arbitrator, Japan – DRAMs (Korea) (Article  21.3(c)) , para. 26. See  also Awa rd of the 
Arbitrator, US – COOL (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 68.  
11 See Awards of the Arbitrators, Colombia – Textiles (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 3.4; US – Countervailing 
Measures (China) (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 3.3; China – GOES (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 3.2; an d Colombia – Ports 
of Entry (Article  21.3(c)) , para. 64.  WT/DS464/RPT  
 
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  take seeks to achieve objectives unrelated to the DSB's recommendations and rulings, or forms 
part of a wider reform of that Member's m unicipal law, then these considerations cannot justify a 
longer implementation period for the WTO dispute.12 At the same time, the mandate under 
Article  21.3(c) of the DSU is limited to determining the period of time within which it would be 
reasonable to e xpect implementation of the recommen dations and rulings of the DSB to occur , and 
does not involve deciding on the content of the implementation needed , nor a determination of the 
consistency with the covered agreements of the measure that the Member envisa ges to adopt in 
order to comply. The latter question, should it arise, is to be addressed in proceedings conducted 
pursuant to Article  21.5 of the DSU.13 
3.9.  Pursuant to the last sentence of Article 21.3(c), the "particular circumstances" of a dispute 
may affec t the reasonable period of time , making it "shorter or longer". Previous arbitrat ors have 
observed  that the objective of "prompt compliance" in Article 21. 1 of the DSU calls for the 
implementing Member to utilize the flexibilities available within its lega l system in implementing 
the relevant recommendations and rulings of the DSB.14 An implementing Member is not , however,  
expected to utilize "extraordinary procedures" to bring its measure into compliance.15 
3.10.   Finally, with regard to the burden of proof, it is well established that the implementing 
Memb er bears the overall burden of  proving that the time  period requested for implementation 
constitutes a "reasonable period of time".16 However, this does not "absolve" the complaining 
Member of its duty to provide e vidence supporting why it disagrees with the period of time 
proposed by the implementing Member, and to substantiat e its view that a shorter period of time 
for implementation is reasonable.17 
3.3  Measure s to be brought into conformity  
3.11.   The parties agree that the  scope of the United  States' implementation obligations in this 
dispute is defined by the recommendations and rulings of the DSB , as set forth in section 6 of the 
Appellate Body Report, together with paragraph 8.1 of the Panel Report.18 At the hearing, the 
parties agreed that the measures to be brought into conformity with the covered agreements could 
generally be summarized as follows19:  
a. In respect of certain methodologies  used by the United  States Department of Commerce 
(USDOC)  in anti -dumping investigatio ns: 
i. aspects of the Differential Pricing Methodology (DPM) used to determine whether to 
apply the weighted average -to-transaction (W -T) methodology; and  
ii. aspects of the methodologies used to calculate the margin of dumping when applying 
the W -T methodology.  
                                                
12 See Awards of the Arbitrators, Colombia – Textiles (Article 21.3(c)) , paras. 3.36 and 3.41;  
Colombia – Ports of Entry (Article 21.3(c)) , paras. 64 and 85; EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar (Article 2 1.3(c)) , 
para. 69; and EC – Tariff Preferences (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 31.  
13 See Awards of the Arbitrators, Colombia – Textiles (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 3.6; US – Shrimp II 
(Viet Nam) (Article  21.3(c)) , para. 3.3; US – Countervailing Measures (China) (Art icle 21.3(c)) , para. 3.4; and  
Japan – DRAMs (Korea) (Article 21.3(c)) , para.  27. 
14 See Awards of the Arbitrators, Colombia – Textiles (Article 21.3(c)) , paras. 3.51 -3.53; US – Shrimp II 
(Viet Nam) (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 3.5; US – Countervailing Measures  (China) (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 3.5; 
China – GOES (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 3.4; US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) (Article  21.3(c)) , para. 42;  
Brazil – Retreaded Tyres (Article  21.3(c)) , para. 48; Japan – DRAMs (Korea) (Article  21.3(c)) , para. 25; and 
US – Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) (Article  21.3(c)) , para.  64. 
15 See Awards of the Arbitrators, US – Countervailing Measures (China) (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 3.5; 
China – GOES (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 3.4; US – COOL (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 70; US – Stainless St eel (Mexico) 
(Article 21.3(c)) , para. 42; Brazil – Retreaded Tyres (Article  21.3(c)) , para. 48; Japan – DRAMs (Korea) 
(Article  21.3(c)) , para. 25; and US – Offset Act (Byrd  Amendment) (Article  21.3(c)) , para. 74.  
16 See Awards of the Arbitrators, US – Count ervailing Measures (China) (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 3.6; 
China – GOES (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 3.5; Canada – Pharmaceutical Patents (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 47;  
US – 1916 Act (Article  21.3(c)) , para. 33; and EC – Tariff Preferences (Article  21.3(c)) , para . 27. 
17 See Award of the Arbitrator, Colombia – Ports of Entry (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 67.  
18 Parties' responses to questions at the hearing.  
19 See also United  States' submission, para. 3 and Korea's submission, paras. 16 -20. WT/DS464/RPT  
 
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  b. In respect of the Washers  anti-dumping investigation20: 
i. the USDOC's determination to apply the W -T methodology on the basis of:  
 its identification of a pattern of export prices which differ significantly among 
different purchasers, regions or time periods;  and 
 its explanation as to why such differences could not be taken into account by 
the methodologies that are normally to be used; and  
 
ii. the USDOC's calculation of the margin of dumping.  
c. In respect of the Washers countervailing duty investigation21: 
i. the USD OC's determination that Article  10(1)(3) of Korea's Restriction of Special 
Taxation Act (RSTA)  is de facto specific, in particular:  
 the original and remand determinations that Samsung  Electronics Co., Ltd 
(Samsung)  received subsidies in disproportionately large amounts; and  
 the USDOC's failure to take account of the duration and economic 
diversification factors referred to in the final sentence of Article  2.1(c) of the 
SCM Agreement; and  
 
ii. the manner in which the USDOC calculated the ad valorem  subsid ization  rate for 
Samsung, in particular:  
 the test applied to ascertain whether the tax credits bestowed under 
Articles  10(1)(3) and 26 of the RSTA were tied to particular products and the 
failure to take account of certain evidence submitted by Samsung that was 
potentially relevant to the assessment of a possible tie between the tax 
credits claimed by Samsung and the products manufactured by its digital 
appliance business unit; and  
 the presumptive attribution of tax credits received by Samsung under 
Article  10(1) (3) of the RSTA to Samsung's domestic production without 
assessing all the arguments and evidence submitted by interested parties 
and other relevant facts surrounding the bestowal of such tax credits.  
 
3.12.   With respect to the measures described above, the Pane l and the Appellate Body found: 
(i) certain aspects of the USDOC's anti -dumping methodologies to be inconsistent "as such" with 
Article s 2.4.2, 2.4, and 9.3 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement, and Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994; 
(ii) certain actions by the USDOC  in the Washers anti-dumping inves tigation to be inconsistent 
"as applied" with Article s 2.4.2 and 2.4 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement; and (iii)  certain actions 
by the USDOC in the Washers countervailing duty  investigation to be inconsistent "as  applied" wi th 
Article s 2.1(c) and 19.4 of the SCM Agreement, and Article  VI:3 of the GATT  1994.22  
3.4  Factors affecting the determination of the reasonable period of time  
3.13.   The United  States indicates that a reasonable period of time to implement the DSB's 
recommendations and rulings in this dispute is 21 months.23 The United States argues that this 
period is necessary due to the "number and magnitude of modifications to the challenged 
measures, the procedural requirements under U.S. law, the complexity of the issues involve d, and 
the current resource demands and constraints on the USDOC".24 According to the United States, it 
requires a three -phase process : one in respect of each of the three sets of measures identified in 
paragraph 3.11 above . The United States explains that  it requires a proceeding pursu ant to 
                                                
20 USDOC [A -580-868] Antidumpin g Duty Investigation of Large Residential Washers from the Republic 
of Korea.  
21 USDOC [C -580-869] Countervailing Duty Investigation of Large Residential Washers from the 
Republic of Korea.  
22 See Panel Report, para. 8.1; and Appellate Body Report, paras. 6. 1-6.16. 
23 United  States' submission, para. 13.  
24 United  States' submission, para. 8.  WT/DS464/RPT  
 
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  Section  123(g) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA)25 to address the "as such" findings 
of inconsistency concerning the DPM and the use of the W -T methodology in investigations and 
assessment proceedings.26 A second  and a third proceeding , each  pursuant to Section  129(b) of 
the URAA27, are needed to address the "as applied" findings relat ing to the Washers  anti-dumping 
investigation and the Washers  countervailing duty  investigation , respectively .28 In addition, the 
United States asserts that the Section 129  proceeding concerning the Washers  anti-dumping 
investigation cannot be commenced until it has partially completed  the Section 123 proceeding 
because the Section  123 proceeding will develop the revised approaches and methodologies to be 
applied in the Section  129 proceeding.29  
3.14.   Korea questions the time requested for preparatory work and the need to undertake a 
Section 123 procedure to address  the "as such" findings. Korea contends that, taking into account 
"the number a nd complexity of the issues involved, and the administrative procedures that the 
United  States must undergo in order to implement revisions to its measures", the United  States 
should reasonably be able to implement all of the DSB's recommendations and ruli ngs through 
proceedings under Section 129 within 6 months.30 Even if a Section 123 proceeding were to be 
undertaken  to implement the "as such" recommendations and rulings , Korea maintains that all 
three proceedings could be completed within a maximum of 8 months.31  
3.15.   The parties agree that, notwithstanding that the United  States will conduct more than one 
proceeding, a single reasonable period of time should be determined. The parties  also agree that 
two Section  129 proceedings are needed  – one to implement th e recommendations and rulings 
concerning the Washers  anti-dumping investigation and one to implement the recommendations 
and rulings concerning the Washers  countervailing duty investigation  – and that they can be 
conducted separately and independently from  each other. The par ties disagree, however, on: 
(i) whether a Section 123 proceeding is necessary; and therefore whether any additional time that 
such a proceeding may entail should be taken into account in determining the reasonable period of 
time; (ii) t he extent to which a Section 123 proceeding could be conducted simultaneously with 
the Section  129 anti -dumping proceeding; and (iii) the amount of time reasonably needed to 
conduct each of the three proceedings.  
3.16.   The analysis below first addresses the part ies' disagreement with respect to the means of 
implementing the "as such" recommendations and rulings. Second, it examines the parties' 
arguments concerning the specific steps that must be taken by the United  States under the 
different proceedings, includi ng the extent to which a Section 123 proceeding could be conducted 
simultaneously with the Section  129 anti -dumping proceeding. Third, it analyses the particular 
circumstances of this dispute alleged by the parties to be relevant to the determination of th e 
reasonable period of time.  
                                                
25 Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Public  Law No. 103 -465, 108 Stat. 483 1, codified as United  States 
Code, Title 19, Section 3533(g).  
26 United  States' submission, para. 4.  
27 Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Public Law No. 103 -465, 108 Stat. 4837, codified as United States 
Code, Title 19, Section 3538(b).  
28 United  States' submission, para. 4. Although the United  States refers to these proceedings as 
"Phase  I"; "Phase II"; and "Pha se III", such categorization may be taken to imply that the phases are to be 
conducted sequentially. This, however, would be misleading, as the United  States itself envisages that there 
would be some overlap in time among them. Accordingly, this Award refe rs to: ( i) the proceeding pursuant to 
Section 123(g) of the URAA proposed to address  the "as such" findings of inco nsistency with the 
Anti-Dumping  Agreement and the GATT 1994 as the "Section 123 proceeding"; ( ii) the proceeding pursuant to 
Section  129(b) o f the URAA proposed to address  the "as applied" findings of inconsistency with the 
Anti-Dumping Agreement as the "Section  129 anti -dumping proceeding" or the "Section  129 anti -dumping 
redetermination"; and ( iii) the proceeding pursuant to Section  129(b) of  the URAA proposed to address  the "as 
applied" findings of inconsistency with the SCM  Agreement as the "Section  129 countervailing duty proceeding" 
or the "Section 129 countervailing duty redetermination".  
29 United States' submission, para. 26.  
30 Korea's s ubmission, para. 8.  
31 Korea's submission, para. 8.  WT/DS464/RPT  
 
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  3.4.1   Means of implementation  
3.17.   While the parties agree that separate proceedings are required for implementing the DSB's 
recommendations and rulings relating to the anti -dumping measures and those relating to the 
Washers  countervailin g duty investigation, they disagree on the means to implement the "as such"  
recommendations and rulings  relating  to the DPM and the application of the W -T methodology. 
Korea argues that implementation can and should be undertaken through a Section  129 
proceeding rather than a Section 123 proceeding.32 Specifically, Korea states that modification of 
the relevant anti -dumping methodologies does not require "formal rulemaking or legislation" and 
can be achieved through a Section  129 proceeding.33 Korea points ou t that the existing 
methodologies were developed within the framework of specific anti -dumping investigations.34 
Further, Korea maintains that a Section  129 proceeding is a "more efficient" means of 
implementation35, and refers to the awards of the arbitrato rs in US – Stainless Steel (Mexico)  and 
Argentina – Hides and Leather  for the proposition that, where multiple means of implementation 
are available, the reasonable period of time should be based on the shortest possible time 
period.36 In Korea's view, Sect ion 129 constitutes a flexibility available to the United  States that 
should be exercised in order for the United  States to implement its obligations in the shortest 
possible period of time.37  
3.18.   At the hearing, Korea indicated that, notwithstanding the views  expressed in its submission, 
Korea has "no problem" with the United  States pursuing a Section 123 proceeding . Korea 
nevertheless  stressed that the amount of time sought by the United  States is excessively long and 
unjustified , and that both the Section 12 3 and Section  129 anti -dumping proceedings could be 
undertaken simultaneously.  
3.19.   For its part, the United  States asserts that a Section 123 proceeding is appropriate to 
address  the "as such" findings concerning the anti -dumping measures . The United  States in dicates 
that "Section 123 is a legal instrument that generally governs changes in [the USDOC's]  practice 
when a panel or the Appellate Body finds the practice to be inconsistent with the URAA"  while 
Section 129  "sets out the procedures regarding individual  proceedings".38 The United  States 
highlights that Korea challenged the DPM as a practice and that the Panel found that the DPM is a 
rule or norm of general and prospective application . For the United States, it is therefore 
appropriate to consider the DPM a practice.39 The United  States also argues that, taking account of 
the "number and magnitude" of the "as such" findings by the Panel and the Appellate Body, it has 
determined that a Section  123 proceeding, rather than l egislative change, is the most practi cal 
way to implement these obligations.40 
3.20.   In addressing this issue, it is important to recall, from paragraph 3.8 above , that an 
implementing Member has discretion in choosing its means of implementation as long as the 
means chosen is apt in form, nature , and content to bring the Member into compliance with its 
WTO obligations.  
3.21.   In the current dispute , the Panel found the DPM and t he USDOC's methodology for apply ing 
the W -T comparison to be measures that could be challenged "as such" in WTO dispute settlement  
on the basis of a finding that they are rules or norms of general and prospective application.41 The 
Panel considered that the evidence before it demonstrated that the DPM "represents a policy 
                                                
32 Korea's submission, paras. 30 -38. 
33 Korea's submission, para. 33.  
34 Korea's submission, para. 32.  
35 Korea's submission, para. 36.  
36 Korea's submission, para. 35  (referring to Awards of the Arbitrators, US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) 
(Article 21.3(c)) , para. 53; and Argentina – Hides and Leather  (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 47).  
37 Korea's submission, paras. 34 and 38.  
38 United  States' response to questions at the hearing. Section 123 proceedings are "often used  to 
amend or modify an agency regulation or practice" while Section  129 proceedings are "used to amend or 
modify an action taken in a particular proceeding". (United  States' submission, fn 17 to para. 4)  
39 United  States' response to questions at the hearin g. 
40 United  States' response to questions at the hearing.  
41 Panel Report, paras. 7. 97-7.117 and fn 321 to para. 7.173.  WT/DS464/RPT  
 
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  choice [by the USDOC] that extends well beyond the mere repetit ion of the methodology in certain 
specific cases"  and is thus applicable in all cases.42  
3.22.   Further, the text of Section 123(g)(1) explicitly indicates that , "[i]n any case in which a 
dispute settlement panel or the Appellate Body finds in its report that a r egulation or practice of a 
department or agency of the United  States is inconsistent with any of the Uruguay Round 
Agreements, that regulation or practice may not be amended, rescinded, or otherwise modified in 
the implementation of such report unless and until" the relevant steps set forth under 
Section  123(g) have been followed.  
3.23.   On the basis of the foregoing, the United States has demonstrated that a Section  123 
proceeding is an appropriate means  to implement the DSB's "as such" recommendations and 
ruling s in this dispute.  
3.4.2   Steps in the implementation process  
3.24.   Turning to the implementation process, the subsection s below address the steps required 
for: (i) implementation of the DSB's "as such" recommendations and rulings through a Section 123 
proceeding; (ii)  implementation of the DSB's "as applied" recommendations and rulings concerning 
the Washers  anti-dumping investigation  through a Section  129 anti -dumping proceeding; (iii) the 
sequencing of the Section  123 and Section 129 proceedings concerning the anti-dumping 
measures; and (iv) implementation of the DSB's "as  applied" recommendations and rulings 
concerning the Washers  countervailing duty  investigation through a Section  129 proceeding.  
3.4.2.1   Implementation of the DSB's "as such" recommendations and rulings  
3.25.   With regard to implementation of the DSB's "as such" recommendations and rulings 
concerning the DPM and the W -T methodology, the United  States argues that it needs 5 months to 
conduct internal deliberations prior to the commencement of the Section 123 proceed ing, during 
which : the United  States would determine whether a WTO -consistent approach to applying the 
W-T methodology in anti -dumping proceedings "is possible under existing municipal law"; the 
United  States Trade Representative (USTR) and the USDOC would  conduct preliminary 
consultations; the se agencies would conduct "pre -commencement analysis preparation"; and the 
USDOC would begin devising anti -dumping methodologies in preparation for the commencement of 
Section 123 and Section 129 proceedings .43 The Uni ted States maintains  that, thereafter,  it needs  
"no less than 15 months to complete the entire section 123 proce ss".44 In considering the period of 
time required to complete both the initial deliberations and the Section 123 proceeding, the 
United  States em phasizes that implementation requires the United States to redesign, and perhaps 
replace entirely, its methodology for identifying and addressing potential masked dumping in 
original and assessment proceeding s in a way that , to date, has not been applied b y 
WTO Members.45 Overall, the United States argues that compl iance in this dispute requires a 
period of 21  months .46 
3.26.   Korea argues that the United  States' proposed time period fails to account for available 
flexibilities and incorporates steps not required un der the proposed Section 123 proceeding.47 
Korea also contends that the time periods requested for certain steps are longer than the time 
periods actually needed to complete those steps. In particular, Korea contests the amount of time 
required to: (i) cond uct initial deliberations and preparatory work; (ii) develop proposed 
methodologies for determining when to apply the W -T methodology and for calculating the margin 
of dumping; and (iii) conduct consultations with Congress and the private sector (including  time 
                                                
42 Panel Report, para. 7.115. See also para. 7.110 ; and Appellate Body Report, paras.  6.3-6.4 
and 6.7-6.11. 
43 United  States' submission, p ara. 55.  
44 United  States' submission, para. 42.  
45 United  States' submission, paras. 15 -24. 
46 In its proposed timetable, the United  States indicates that the Section 123 p roceeding will conclude in 
June 2018 (i.e. 21 months following the adoption of the Pan el and Appellate Body Reports in September 2016). 
(United  States' submission, para. 55 ) 
47 Korea's submission, paras. 42 -47. WT/DS464/RPT  
 
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  for analysis of public comments on the proposed methodologies).48 Korea also contests the extent 
to which the "novelty" of the DSB's "as such" recommendations and rulings and the technical 
compl exities of implementation are  relevant factor s in determi ning the reasonable period of time.49 
Furthermore, Korea highlights that in US – Stainless Steel (Mexico)  the United  States requested 
only 7 months to complete a Section 123 proceeding.50 Korea submits that in the present dispute 
the United  States requires no more than  8 months to complete the Section 123 proceeding.  
3.27.   Section 123(g) of the URAA provides, in relevant part :  
(g) Requirements for agency action  
(1)  Changes in agency regulations or practice  
In any case in which a dispute settlement panel or the Ap pellate Body finds in its 
report that a regulation or practice of a department or agency of the United  States is 
inconsistent with any of the Uruguay Round Agreements, that regulation or practice 
may not be amended, rescinded, or otherwise modified in the implementation of such 
report unless and until —  
(A)  the appropriate congressional committees have been consulted under 
subsection (f)51; 
(B)  the Trade Representative has sought advice regarding the modification 
from relevant private sector advisory commi ttees established under 
section 135 of the Trade Act of 1974 …;  
(C)  the head of the relevant department or agency has provided an 
opportunity for public comment by publishing in the Federal Register the 
proposed modification and the explanation for the m odification;  
(D)  the Trade Representative has submitted to the appropriate congressional 
committees a report describing the proposed modification, the reasons for 
the modification, and a summary of the advice obtained under 
subparagraph (B) with respect to the modification;  
(E)  the Trade Representative and the head of the relevant department or 
agency have consulted with the appropriate congressional committees on 
the proposed contents of the final rule or other modification; and  
(F)  the final rule or other modification has been published in the Federal 
Register.  
(2)  Effective date of modification  
A final rule or other modification to which paragraph (1) applies may not go into effect 
before the end of the 60 -day period beginning on the date on which c onsultations 
under paragraph (1)(E) begin, unless the President determines that an earlier 
effective date is in the national interest.  
                                                
48 Korea's submission, paras. 27 and 42 -48. 
49 Korea's submission, paras. 67 -71. 
50 Korea's submission, para. 48 (referring to Award of  the Arbitrator, US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) 
(Article 21.3(c)) , para. 56).  
51 Subsection (f) of Section 123 refers to "[a]ctions upon circulation of reports" and provides  that:  
Promptly after the circulation of a report of a panel or of the Appellate Bod y to WTO members …, 
the Trade Representative shall — (1) notify the appropriate congressional committees of the 
report; (2) in the case of a report of a panel, consult with the appropriate congressional 
committees concerning the nature of any appeal that ma y be taken of the report; and (3) if the 
report is adverse to the United  States, consult with the appropriate congressional committees 
concerning whether to implement the report's recommendation and, if so, the manner of such 
implementation and the period of time n eeded for such implementation.  WT/DS464/RPT  
 
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  3.28.   The parties agree that subparagraphs (A) through (F) quoted above identify the steps 
involved in a Section 123 proceeding  and that the only prescribed time period is found in 
Section  123(g)(2), which provides that the final rule or modification may not go into effect until at 
least 60 days after the USTR and the USDOC have begun consultations with the relevant 
congressional committees on the proposed modification.52 From the language of Section  123 and 
the explanations by the United  States it is clear that: (i)  the USTR begins consulting with Congress 
promptly after the circulation of a panel or Appellate Body  report  to WTO Me mbers53 and is 
"constan tly consulting from that point onwards "54; (ii) time is needed between the beginning of  
consultations and the time that the proposed modification is published in the Federal Register so 
as to enable the USDOC to elaborate its proposed modification; (iii) in practice, the USTR consults 
with relevant private sector advisory committees at the same time that the public is afforded an 
opportunity to comment on the proposal and both of these steps take place following the 
publication of the p roposed modification in the Federal Register; and (iv) because the USTR's 
report to Congress must include a summary of the advice obtained from pri vate sector advisory 
committees  and also contains  a summary of the comments from the public on the proposed r ule, 
this report can be prepared only after the period for commenting on the proposed modification has 
elapsed. Consequently, while some steps can be performed at the same time, other steps must, as 
a matter of law and by necessary implication, occur seque ntially. Korea does not disagree with the 
description and explanations provided by the United States.  
3.29.   The parties disagree as to the necessity of an initial period of internal deliberations and 
consultations by the USTR and the USDOC and as to the period of time that is required by the 
USTR and the USDOC to develop the proposed modification and publish it in the Federal Register.55 
In respect of these deliberative steps, the United  States emphasizes the "novelty" of the 
Appellate  Body's findings and highlig hts that this is the first dispute in which the DSB has made 
recommendations and rulings regarding the application of the second sentence of Article  2.4.2 of 
the Anti -Dumping  Agreement.56 The United  States further explains that there is significant 
technica l "complexity" in implementing these "as such" recommendations and rulings  because  it 
will likely need to: (i) make significant changes to or replace the DPM, including revision of the 
computer program used to perform a "quantitative" analysis of export pr ices and the development 
of a means to perform a "qualitative" analysis57; (ii) make substantial revisions to its computer 
program for determining the margin of dumping under the W -T methodology, including for 
purposes of administrative reviews58; and (iii) revise its approach to explaining why the weighted 
average -to-weighted average ( W-W) and transa ction-to-transaction ( T-T) methodologies cannot 
appropriately take into account differences in export prices, including "significant practice 
development, intern al analysis and deliberation, and decision -making" to determine how the 
USDOC would employ a T -T analysis.59 The United  States indicates that it requires 12 months from 
adoption of the Panel and Appellate Body Reports until publication of the proposed modif ication in 
the Federal Register.60 
3.30.   For its part, Korea asserts that the implementation steps that the United  States must carry 
out are neither novel nor particularly complex and "do not present significant burdens or 
complications compared to other proceedi ngs".61 Korea emphasizes that the United  States has 
already undertaken "intense studying" of the issue of how to apply the second sentence of 
Article  2.4.2 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement over the last ten years and that , just as it was not 
difficult for the USDOC to modify the Nails II methodology62 to identify differential pricing under 
the DPM, it would not be difficult to modify the DPM to implement the relevant recommendations 
and rulings of the DSB.63 Korea adds that the United  States does not need to cond uct lengthy 
                                                
52 Parties' responses to questions at the hearing.  
53 See Section 123(f) reproduced in fn 51 above.  
54 United  States' response to questions at the hearing.  
55 United  States' submission, paras. 12 and 16-24; Korea's subm ission, paras. 67 -71. 
56 United States' submission, para. 15.  
57 United States' submission, para s. 18-19. 
58 United States' submission, paras. 20 -21. 
59 United  States' submission, para. 23.  
60 United  States' submission, para. 55.  
61 Korea's submission, para. 7 1. 
62 For an explanation of the Nails II methodology previously used by the USDOC to determine the 
existence of "targeted dumping", see Panel Report, fn 54 to para. 7.10.  
63 Korea's opening statement at the hearing. See also Korea's submission, paras. 65-71. WT/DS464/RPT  
 
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  procedures in order to develop a "qualitative test", make technical revisions to its dumping margin 
calculation computer program, or make significant revisions to the USDOC's policies or regulations . 
To Korea, the DSB's recommendations and ruli ngs do not require the United  States to "redo 
everything and rethink everything and do every contingency imaginable in every single case".64 
For Korea, it follows that the reasonable period of time should not encompass time for the 
United  States to establis h if it might want to use a T -T methodology, what that methodology would 
be, and how it would apply to all the different industries to which it might be applied. Korea 
considers that the United  States could conduct its internal deliberations and consultati ons at the 
same time as it develops its methodology, all of  which could  have taken place within 9 0 days of 
the adoption of the Panel and Appellate Body Reports.65  
3.31.   The first point of disagreement between the United States and Korea relates  to the need 
and t he length of  time that would be justified  for preparatory work. The United States highlights 
that, following the finding s of the Panel and the Appellate Body, "the landscape of how 
investigating authorities can apply the second sentence of Article 2.4.2 ha s significant ly 
change d".66 Korea argues that the United States has already undertaken "intense studying" of the 
issues involved  over the past ten  years .67 Korea also emphasizes that  the United  States could have 
and should have begun taking steps towards imp lementation in this dispute earlier than it has, and 
that the United  States has not demonstrated that it has taken any concrete action in the  more 
than 5 months since adoption o f the Panel and Appellate Body R eports.68 
3.32.   Concerning p reparatory work , it is imp ortant to note that such work, including  consultations 
within government agencies , is a typical and legitimate aspect of "law -making" and is reflected 
throughout the Section 123 process. Consequently, such consultation and preparatory work should 
be taken into account in determining a reasonable period of time for implementation. The length of 
time required for such preparatory work is affected by the number and complexity of the issues 
and the number of agencies involved. The alleged novelty and complexity  involved in 
implement ation in  the current case is addressed below. At this stage, it is sufficient to highlight 
that an appropriate time for the preparatory steps as identified by the United States (reflection, 
debate, and the development, testing , and an alysis of new approaches) serves the double purpose 
of ensuring that the resulting methodology is an appropriate means of addressing targeted 
dumping consistently with the Anti -Dumping Agreement and reducing the time needed  to 
undertake subsequent steps in  the implementation process.  
3.33.   Regarding the alleged "novelty" and "complexity" of the issues involved, it is noted that this 
is the first dispute in which a panel or the Appellate Body has interpreted the second sentence of 
Article 2.4.2 of the Anti -Dumpin g Agreement.69 Moreover, according to the United States,  the 
interpretation by the Appellate Body requires an approach not yet developed by any WTO Member. 
In and of itself, the fact that a provision is interpreted for the first time in dispute settlement i s not 
necessarily relevant to the determination of the reasonable period of time to come into conformity 
with that provision. A "new" interpretation of a provision may be relatively simple to implement 
depending on the nature of the obligation that it pres cribes. Thus, the nature of the specific 
implementing obligation needs to be considered.  
3.34.   The current case relates to the second sentence of Article 2.4.2 of the 
Anti-Dumping  Agreement. The right established therein, to use an exceptional methodology to 
calculate the margin of dumping, is subject to several conditions, each requiring a number of 
analytical steps to fulfil the parameters of the provision. The scope of the DSB's recommendations 
and rulings refers to each element of the provision, namely, the manner of establish ing the 
pattern , the explanation as to why the normal methodologies are not appropriate, and  the manner 
of calculat ing the margin of dumping. Each of these elements has been interpreted for the first 
                                                
64 Korea's response to questions at the hearing.  
65 Korea's submission, paras. 44 -45 and 49.  
66 United States' response to questions at the hearing.  
67 Korea's opening statement  at the hearing.  See also Korea's submission, para. 65.  
68 Korea's submission, paras.  24-28; response to questions at the hearing.  
69 Although previous panel and Appellate Body reports have referred to Article 2.4.2, second sentence, 
of the Anti -Dumping Agreement, this is the first dispute in which a panel or the Appellate Body has made a 
finding of inconsistency in respect of this provision. (See e.g. Appellate Body Reports, US – Softwood Lumber V 
(Article 21.5 – Canada) , paras. 95 -100; US – Zeroing (Japan) , paras. 130 -136; US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) , 
paras. 122 -127; and US – Continued Z eroing , paras. 296 -298) WT/DS464/RPT  
 
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  time in this dispute . Consequently, t he nature of the obligations covered by the required 
implementation includes a number of interrelated issues with an aspect of novelty. Nevertheless, 
the novelty and complexity is limited to three elements , and for each the range of options that can 
be exp lored is limited by the parameters of what is WTO -compatible as interpreted by the Panel 
and the Appellate  Body.  
3.35.   Turning to Korea's argument that the United  States should have begun taking steps towards 
imple mentation earlier than it has,  both parties agre e that the reasonable period of time for 
implementation is measured as fr om the date of adoption of the P anel and Appellate Body 
Reports.70 According to the United  States, implementation steps in the form of internal 
deliberations and consultations were tak en as from that date. However, the United  States indicates 
that it is not in a position to provide evidence of such steps in light of the confidential nature of the 
internal deliberations and consultations  that have occur red.71 In Korea's view, absent evide nce 
showing that specific actions have been taken, an arbitrator charged with determining the 
reasonable period of time cannot accept the mere assertion by a Member that it is taking steps 
towards implementation. Otherwise, explains Korea, "the possibility  of abuse is too great" because 
that Member could make any assertion it wishe d in order to extend the reasonable period of time 
determined by an arbitrator.72  
3.36.   By the time of the hearing in this arbitration, over 5 months  had elapsed since the DSB's 
adoptio n of the Panel  and Appellate Body R eports in this dispute. It has been explained that  details 
cannot be  provided . Therefore it is not possible to assess how much has been accomplished in this 
period . Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that, in t he meantime , measures found to be 
WTO-inconsistent have remain ed in place . It is also important to keep in mind that Article  21.1 of 
the DSU identifies prompt compliance with DSB recommendations and rulings as "essential in 
order to ensure effective resolu tion of disputes to the benefit of all Members" . 
3.37.   For the reasons above, and in particular the number and complexity of the issues to be 
considered , a period of work that enables pu blication of a proposal only 12  months after adoption 
of the Panel and Appel late Body Reports  is unjustifiably long . 
3.38.   A second point of disagreement concerns Korea's claim that the timeline proposed by the 
United States does not make use of possible flexibilities . As noted in paragraph 3.28 above , the 
United States explained at the  hearing that in practice the consultations with the relevant private 
sector advisory committees foreseen in Section  123(g)(1)(B) take place simultaneously with the 
public consultation process foreseen in Section  123(g)(1)(C). The United  States also explai ned 
that, because the report to Congress foreseen in Section 123(g)(1)(D) must include "a summary of 
the advice obtained" from private sector advisory committees and also contains a summary of the 
comments from the public on the proposed rule, the report  cannot be done in parallel with those 
steps.  
3.39.   Lastly, the parties disagree on the length of time that must be afforded to the public to 
comment on the proposed methodolog y and the time to be afforded to the USDOC to complete its 
analysis of those comments. T he United  States indicates that it requires 2 months from publication 
in the Federal Register to allow the public to comment, followed by 5 months of analysis of those 
comments.73 Korea submits that the USDOC can complete both  of these  steps within 60  days.74 
3.40.   In considering this issue, previous arbitrators have noted that "there must be a balance 
between the transparency and due process rights of interested parties, on the one hand, and the 
promptness required in implementing recommendations and rulings of th e DSB, on the other 
hand."75 In the current case, while there is no statutorily  prescribed minimum period for public 
comment, it must be highlighted that a  shorter -than-normal period for public comment risks 
                                                
70 United  States' submission, para. 9; Korea's submission, para. 13.  
71 United  States' response to questions at the hearing.  
72 Korea's response to questions at the hearing.  
73 United  States' submission, para. 55.  
74 Korea's submission, para. 49.  
75 Award of the Arbitrator, US – Shrimp II (Viet Nam) (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 3.49 (referring to Award of 
the Arbitrator, Japan – DRAMS (Korea) (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 51). See also Award  of the Arbitrator,  
China – GOES (Article  21.3(c)) , para.  3.46. WT/DS464/RPT  
 
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  affecting the legitimacy of the modification. Turning to the period for consideration of the 
comments that may be received, as mentioned in paragraph 3.34 above , the number of issues 
covered and the options available within the parameters of the legal obligation are relatively 
limited. Consequently, 5 months from the end of the period for public comment  to analyse the 
response s received seems unjustifiably long.   
3.4.2.2   Implementation of the DSB's "as applied" recommendations and rulings 
concerning the Washers anti-dumping investigation  
3.41.   The United  States submits  that it requires roughly 9 months to complete the Section  129 
anti-dumping proceeding, as from the date of publication of the proposed modification developed 
in the context of the Section 123 proceeding.76 The United  States explain s that the USDOC may 
need to prepare and issue questionnaires to the two respondents in the Washers anti-dumping 
investigation, allow them time to respond, allow interested parties to comment on the responses, 
issue follow -up questionnaires, and thereafter conduct verification s in respect of the responses.77 
The United  States also indicates  that it must afford interested parties the opportunity to comment 
on a preliminary determination in the Section  129 anti -dumping proceeding and potentially hold a 
hearing with interested parties.78 
3.42.   Korea submits that any additional fact -finding step in the Section 129 anti-dumping 
proceeding should not be taken into account in determining the reasonable period of time for 
implementation because the various steps mentioned by the United States are n ot required by law 
and are not normally taken in Section 129 proceedings.79 Korea adds that it is unlikely that 
implementation of the relevant recommendations and rulings would require the USDOC to make 
new factual determinations, and that the USDOC should be able to "narrowly tailor" any 
information request it may make.80 Korea also contends that the time periods requested by the 
United States for certain steps are longer than the time periods normally taken in Section 129 
proceedings  to complete th ese steps .81 Korea submits that the United  States requires only 
6 months from the date of the adoption of the Panel and Appellate Body Reports  to complete the 
Section  129 anti-dumping proceeding .82 
3.43.   Section  129(b) of the URAA states as follows:  
(b)  Action by adminis tering authority  
(1)  Consultations with administering authority and congressional 
committees  
Promptly after a report by a dispute settlement panel or the Appellate Body is issued 
that contains findings that an action by the administering authority in a p roceeding 
under title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930  … is not in conformity with the obligations of 
the United  States under the Antidumping Agreement or the Agreement on Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures, the Trade Representative shall consult with the 
administering authority and the congressional committees on the matter.  
(2)  Determination by administering authority  
Notwithstanding any provision of the Tariff Act of 1930  …, the administering authority 
shall, within 180 days after receipt of a written  request from the Trade 
Representative, issue a determination in connection with the particular proceeding 
                                                
76 United  States' submission, para. 55.  
77 United  States' submission, paras. 2 7-29. 
78 United  States' submission, paras. 50 -52. 
79 Korea's submission, paras. 5 4-57. 
80 Korea's submission, para. 55.  
81 Korea's submission, paras. 5 6-57 (noting in particular  the time taken by the USDOC to perform 
certain steps in the Section  129 proceeding used to implement the DSB's recommendations and rulings in  
US – Countervailing Measures (China)  (DS437)) . 
82 Korea's submission, para. 58.  WT/DS464/RPT  
 
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  that would render the administering authority's action described in paragraph (1) not 
inconsistent with the findings of the panel or the Appellate Bo dy.  
(3)  Consultations before implementation  
Before the administering authority implements any determination under 
paragraph  (2), the Trade Representative shall consult with the administering authority 
and the congressional committees with respect to such  determination.  
(4)  Implementation of recommendation  
The Trade Representative may, after consulting with the administering authority and 
the congressional committees under paragraph (3), direct the administering authority 
to implement, in whole or in par t, the determination made under paragraph (2).  
3.44.   In addition, Section 129(d) of the URAA provides:  
(d) Opportunity for comment by interested parties  
Prior to issuing a determination under this section, the administering authority or the 
Commission, as the ca se may be, shall provide interested parties with an opportunity 
to submit written comments and, in appropriate cases, may hold a hearing, with 
respect to the determination.  
3.45.   The parties agree that paragraphs (1) through (4) quoted above identify the steps involved 
in a Section  129 proceeding.83 The parties' main points of disagreement, however, concern: 
(i) whether a Section  129 proceeding must be completed wit hin a maximum of 180 days; 
(ii) whether the time needed for the Section  129 anti -dumping proceeding  encompass es time for 
the USDOC to conduct additional fact -finding; and (iii) the time that the United  States requires to 
address ministerial errors in the final determination. I address these issues below.84  
3.46.   First, the parties disagree on the import of th e reference in Section  129(b)(2) to a 
maximum period of 180 days within which the USDOC is to issue its redetermination. According to 
Korea, this means that the entire Section  129 process can take no more than 180 days from the 
date of initiation.85 The Uni ted States, however, stresses that the wording of Section  129(b)(2) 
explicitly identifies the receipt of a written request from the USTR as the action that triggers the 
commencement of the 180 -day period. The United  States explains that t his action is deco upled 
from formal commencement of a Section  129 proceeding by the USDOC.86 Since this means, 
according to the United States, that a Section  129 proceeding may be commenced before the 
letter is sent from the USTR, it follows that the 180 -day period is not a maximum period within 
which to issue a Section  129 redetermination.  
3.47.   The text of Section  129(b)(2)  clearly indicates that the 180 -day time period is triggered 
following the USDOC's receipt of a written request from the USTR. From then on, the USDOC has a 
maximum of 180 days in which to issue its redetermination. Furthermore, Section 129(b)(1) 
mandates the USTR to consult with the USDOC and Congress "promptly" after circulation of a 
panel or Appellate Body report. Likewise, Section 129(b)(3) mandates the UST R to again consult 
with the USDOC and the congressional committees before the final determination is published in 
the Federal Register. Thus, the structure of Section 129 includes two consultation phases beyond 
the 180 -day period. Time for each of them  must be taken into account. It is clear, therefore, that 
the 180 -day time period does not encompass the entirety of the Section  129 proce ss. This is in 
line with the findings of previous arbitrators on this issue.87 
                                                
83 Parties' responses to questions  at the hearing.  
84 The parties also disagree over the issue of when the Section  129 anti -dumping redetermination can 
reasonably be expected to begin . This is sue is addressed in the next subsection.  
85 Korea's opening statement at the hearing.  
86 United  State s' response to questions at the hearing.  
87 See Awards of the Arbitrators, US – Shrimp II (Viet Nam) (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 3.46; and  
US – Countervailing Measures (China) (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 3.41.  WT/DS464/RPT  
 
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  3.48.   The second main difference in the positions of the parties concerns whether the reasonable 
period of time should allow time for the USDOC to conduct additional fact -finding. The 
United  States submits that, because it cannot yet "foreclose that" or "prejudge whether" it will be 
necessary to solicit a dditional factual information, conduct verifications, or hold a hearing in this 
Section  129 proceeding, time must be afforded to conduct such steps.88 Korea highlights that the 
United  States bears the burden of proving that these steps are necessary and arg ues that this 
burden cannot be met simply by making assertions that it "cannot prejudge whether [it] will need" 
further information, "potentially might need" such information, or , "depending" on the 
methodology to be developed in the Section 123 proceeding , whether further information  may be 
needed .89 Korea also points to previous Section  129 proceedings as evidence that the USDOC 
rarely engages in additional fact -finding or holds hearings during a redetermination proceeding.90 
3.49.   In light of the DSB's recommend ations and rulings, the factual  information that may be 
required by the USDOC would be information relevant for: (i)  a "qualitative" assessment of export 
price differences in order to determine the existence of a pattern of significant price differences; 
and (ii) consideration of "attendant factual circumstances" in explaining why such price differences 
could not be taken in to account through a W -W or T -T comparison.91 Whether fact -finding and 
additional steps of verification, a hearing , or even a preliminar y determination requires additional 
time seems an unnecessary question. The text of Section 129 seems to indicate that all steps 
necessary for a redetermination are to be completed within the 180 -day period foreseen in 
Section  129(b)(2).  
3.50.   Although the Unit ed States draws analogies to the time periods for certain steps to be 
conducted in original anti-dumping investigations, it acknowledges that there is no provision of 
United  States law that mandates that all steps in original investigations must also be ta ken in 
Section  129 redeterminations , or that imposes time -limits on the steps taken . Further, the text of 
Section 129 expressly refers only to an opportunity for comment s and, "if appropriate" , a hearing. 
Moreover, a s noted in Japan – DRAMs (Korea)  (Articl e 21.3(c)) , reliance on time periods used in 
original investigations seems inappropriate, because the implementing Memb er "is only required to 
conduct a re -determination to implement a limited number of DSB rulings of inconsistency."92  
3.51.   Concerning the parti es' disagreement over the time required to address any ministerial 
errors before publishing the final determination93, the United States indicated at the hearing that 
the process of addressing ministerial errors can be conducted concurrently with the proces s of 
consulting with Congress.94  
3.52.   Finally, it is noted that the overall timeframe to complete the Section 129  anti-dumping  
proceeding is affected by the date of commencement of the 180 -day period . The United States has 
indicated that this cannot be done bef ore publication in the Federal Register of the proposed 
modification to address the "as such" recommendations and rulings. This sequence is discussed in 
the subsection below.  
3.4.2.3   Sequencing of the Section 123 and Section  129 anti -dumping proceeding s 
3.53.   As describ ed above, the parties disagree over whether the Section 123 and Section  129 
proceedings in respect of the anti -dumping measures can take place simultaneously. Specifically, 
they differ on the extent to which the Section 123 proceeding can or should overlap  with the 
Section  129 ant i-dumping proceeding. For Korea,  both proceedings should be conducted 
simultaneously, starting from the date of adoption of the Panel and Appellate Body Reports.95 The 
United  States, however, maintains that it must develop new m ethodologies for identifying 
                                                
88 United  States' response to questions at the hearin g. 
89 Korea's response to questions at the hearing.  
90 Korea's response to questions at the hearing  (referring to "Past USG Implementations of WTO 
Decisions Addressing AD -CVD Issues" (Exhibit KOR -3). 
91 United  States' submission, paras. 27 -28 (referring to Ap pellate Body Report, para. 5.63; and Panel 
Report, para. 7.71).  
92 Award of the Arbitrator, Japan – DRAMs (Korea) (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 48.  
93 United  States' submission, para. 52; Korea's submission, para. 62.  
94 See also Award of the Arbitrator, US – Countervailing Measures (China) (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 3.46.  
95 Korea's submission, paras. 5 8 and 85.  WT/DS464/RPT  
 
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  so-called "targeted" dumping and for calculating the dumping margin using the W -T methodology 
before it can proceed to apply those methodologies in the Washers  Section  129 anti -dumping 
redetermination. For this reason, the United  States submits that the Section  129 anti -dumping 
redetermination could not be initiated immediately upon adoption by the DSB of the Panel and 
Appellate Body Reports.96 At the same time, the United  States does not contend that initiation of 
the Section  129 an ti-dumping proceeding must await conclusion of the Section 123 anti -dumping 
proceeding. Rather, the United  States submits that the USDOC would be in a position to 
commence the Section  129 anti -dumping redetermination once it publishes in the Federal Regist er 
the proposed modification for implementation of the DSB's "as such" recommendations and 
rulings.97  
3.54.   Paragraph s 3.21 to 3.23 above explained  that the United  States  has established that a 
Section  123 proceeding is an appropriate means of implementing the D SB's "as such" 
recommendations and rulings in this dispute. That proceeding entails  publication of a proposed 
modification after several months of deliberations. The United States has explained that it is on the 
basis of the proposed modification that the "as applied" recommendations and rulings concerning 
the anti -dumping investigation will be implemented through the Section  129 proceeding. 
Effectively, without the proposed modification, the USDOC would not have a methodology for the 
application of the sec ond sentence of Article 2.4.2 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement different from 
the ones found to be inconsistent with that provision.  
3.55.   Consequently, while there is a necessary sequence between the Section 123 and 
Section  129 anti-dumping proceedings, there is also an overlap. The United States' proposed 
timetable indicates that the Section 129 anti-dumping proceeding can commence as soon as the 
proposed methodolog y is published in the Federal Register. The postponement of the triggering of 
the 180 -day period is  explained by the link between the two proceedings described above. At the 
same time, u nder the steps of the Section  129 proceeding as described in paragraph  3.43 above , 
the USTR is obliged to conduct consultations with the USDOC and with congressional com mittees 
"promptly" after circulation  of a panel or Appellate Body report. While the initiation of the  
anti-dumping redetermination may need to be on hold until such time as the USDOC has published 
the proposed new methodology, there does not appear to be a ny reason why the USTR could not 
engage in its consultations with the USDOC and with Congress prior to that date.  
3.4.2.4   Implementation of the DSB's "as applied" recommendations and rulings 
concerning the Washers countervailing duty  investigation  
3.56.   The United  States indicates  that the Section 129 countervailing duty  proceeding can 
commence  before, or  at the same time as , the Section 123 anti -dumping proceeding, following a 
period of internal consultations and deliberations.98 The United  States indicates that 
impleme ntation of the DSB's recommendations and rulings in respect of the countervailing 
measures will take 21  months. The United States explains that this is because of the time 
requested for implementation in respect of the anti -dumping measures and that, if th e 
United  States only needed to implement the recommendations and rulings pertaining to the 
countervailing duty  investigation, it would not request a 21 -month implementation period.99 The 
United  States also notes that implementation of these recommendations and rulings may require 
the USDOC to solicit additional information from the Government of Korea or from Samsung.100 
3.57.   Korea argues that, in light of the nature of the DSB's recommendations and rulings 
concerning the Washers countervailing duty  investigation, the USDOC does not need to collect 
additional information but simply  to reconsider existing evidence.101 Korea also points out that the 
United  States has not explained why, under its proposed timetable, certain steps in the 
Section  129 countervailing duty  proceeding would take longer than the same steps in the 
Section  129 anti -dumping proceeding, given that the United  States' arguments about "complexity" 
                                                
96 United  States' submission, para. 47.  
97 See United  States' submission, para. 55; and response to questions at the hearing.  
98 United  States' submission, para s. 46 and 55 . 
99 United  States' response to questions at the hearing.  
100 United  States' submission, paras. 31 -34. 
101 Korea's submission, paras. 61 and 78-79. WT/DS464/RPT  
 
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  relate to the anti -dumping measures and not the countervailing measures.102 Additionally, Korea 
asserts that , unlike the Section 129 anti -dumping redetermination,  in the Section  129 
countervailing duty  redetermination, the United  States does not have to wait for the development 
of a methodology in a Section 123 proceeding. According to Korea, the United  States c ould and 
should have already initiated the Section  129 countervailing duty  proceeding. Instead, more than 
5 months after the adoption of the Panel and Appellate Body Reports, the United  States is unable 
to identify a single concrete step that it has taken,  even though in its written submission it stated 
that it would initiate the Section  129 countervailing duty  proceeding by February  2017.103 Korea 
submits that the United  States requires only 180 days from the adoption of the Panel and 
Appellate Body Reports to complete the Section  129 countervailing duty proceeding.104 
3.58.   The parties  agree that  the steps in a Section  129 proceeding, as described in  connection 
with the anti -dumping redetermination in paragraph  3.43 above , are the same as  those that would 
be used by  the United  States in implementing the DSB's recommendations and rulings pertaining 
to the Washers countervailing duty investigation.105 They also concur  that the Section 129 
countervailing duty redetermination will be s eparate and independent from the proce eding s 
needed to implement the DSB's recommendations and rulings pertaining to the anti -dumping 
measures. Both parties  request  determination of  a single reasonable period of time for 
implementation in this dispute .  
3.59.   As discussed in paragraphs 3.52 to 3.54 above , the period reasonably needed for  
implementation  is affected by a partial sequencing of the proceedings for implementing the DSB's 
recommendations and rulings concerning the anti -dumping measures. Consequently, the 
reasonable period of time for imple mentation in this dispute is necessarily longer than the time 
required for the Section 129 countervailing duty proceeding. A t the same time , no reason has been 
presented to explain that implementation of the recommendations and rulings relating to the 
countervailing measures could  not be completed before  the expiration of that period . In this 
context, the principle of prompt compliance contemplated in Article 21.1 of the DSU is important.  
3.4.3   Particular circumstances of this dispute  
3.60.   The United  States points to  three circumstances that weigh in favour of a longer period of 
time for implementation  in this dispute , namely: (i) the novelty and complexity of the issues 
involved; (ii) the current workload of the USDOC; and (iii) the change in the United  States' 
admin istration, including the turnover in and absence of senior officials at the USDOC.106 
3.61.   The novelty and complexity of the anti -dumping issues have been addressed in 
paragraphs  3.33 and 3.34 above .  
3.62.   Concerning the remaining two circumstances advanced by the Uni ted States, Korea disputes 
that either of these factors amount s to particular circumstances warranting a longer period of time 
for implementation.107  
3.63.   Regarding the workload of the USDOC, previous arbitrators have considered that the 
workload of the implemen ting authority is not relevant to the reasonable period of time.108 Further, 
in light of Article 21 .1 of the DSU, it would be inappropriate to prioritize new or ongoing 
investigations over corrective action vis -à-vis measures already in force  and found to be  
WTO-inconsistent . 
                                                
102 Korea's response to questions at the hearing.  
103 Korea's submission, paras. 59 -63. 
104 Korea's respons e to questions at the hearing.  
105 Parties' responses to questions at the hearing.  
106 United  States' submission, paras. 8, 10, 15 and 56-60. 
107 Korea's submission, paras. 81 -84. 
108 See e.g. Awards of the Arbitrators, US – Shrimp II (Viet Nam) (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 3.55;   
US – Countervailing Measures (China) (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 3.49; and  US – 1916 Act (Article 21.3(c)) , 
para. 38. WT/DS464/RPT  
 
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  3.64.   Concerning recent changes in the United  States' administration, the United  States clarified 
at the hearing that, although it refers to the change in administration in its submission, this is not 
a factor built into its proposed timetable .  
3.4.4   Conclusion  
3.65.   In conclusion, for the reasons explained above, the means of implementation proposed, 
including the flexibilities built into the relevant proceedings under United States  law, the 
complexity and scope of certain issues concerning the anti -dump ing measures, and the partial 
sequencing of the Section 123 and Section  129 anti -dumping proceedings , are the considerations 
to be given weight in determining the period of time reasonably needed to implement the DSB's 
recommendations and rulings in this d ispute. Having  taken account of these factors, 21 months is 
more than is reasonably needed for implementation. At the same time, 8 months would not be a 
sufficien t period of time for the United  States to bring itself into compliance with the 
recommendation s and rulings of the DSB in this dispute.  
4  AWARD  
4.1.  In light of the foregoing considerations, the "reasonable period of time" for the United  States 
to implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in this dispute is 15 months  from 
26 September  2016, tha t is, from the date on which the DSB adopted the Panel and 
Appellate  Body Reports in this dispute. The reasonable period of time will expire on  
26 December  2017.  
Signed in the original at Geneva this  28th day of March 2017 by:  
 
 
________________________  
Claudia Orozco  
Arbitrator  WT/DS464/RPT  
 
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  ANNEX A  
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF  THE UNITED STATES' S UBMISSION  
1. At its meeting on September 26, 2016, the DSB adopted recommendations and rulings in 
United States – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Measures on Large Residential Washers f rom 
Korea  (DS464). Pursuant to Article 21.3 of the DSU, the United States informed the DSB at its 
meeting on October 26, 2016, that the United States intends to comply with the 
DSB's  recommendations and rulings in a manner that respects its WTO obligations  and that it 
would need a reasonable period of time to do so.  The United States engaged in discussions with 
Korea in an effort to agree on the RPT, but the parties were unable to reach agreement.  
2. The amount of time a Member requires for implementation of D SB recommendations and 
rulings depends on the particular facts and circumstances of the dispute, including the scope of the 
recommendations and rulings and the types of procedures required under the Member's laws to 
make the necessary changes in the measur es at issue. Specific circumstances identified in 
previous awards as relevant to the Arbitrator's determination of the RPT include: (1) the legal form 
of implementation; (2) the technical complexity of the measure the Member must draft, adopt, 
and implemen t; and (3) the period of time in which the implementing Member can achieve that 
proposed legal form of implementation in accordance with its system of government.  
3. In this dispute, the United States intends to comply with DSB recommendations and rulings 
with respect to numerous matters. The most practical way under U.S. law to implement these 
matters is by conducting three proceedings, utilizing both section 123 and section 129 of the 
Uruguay Round Agreements Act. First, the United States intends to conduct a proceeding pursuant 
to section 123 to address the Appellate Body's and Panel's "as such" findings under the 
AD Agreement and the GATT 1994. Second, the United States intends to conduct two separate 
proceedings pursuant to section 129 to address the Appel late Body's and the Panel's "as applied" 
findings as they relate to the washers antidumping and countervailing duty investigations. The 
United States anticipates that it will not be possible to commence the section 129 proceeding 
relating to the antidumpin g duty investigation until the section 123 proceeding has been mostly 
completed. Many of the Panel and Appellate Body findings regarding Korea's "as applied" 
challenges to the washers antidumping investigation mirror those pertaining to Korea's "as such" 
challenges. Consequently, the United States expects that, in the section 129 proceeding, the 
USDOC will apply a number of the revised approaches and methodologies that will be developed in 
the section 123 determination.   
4. Both parties, as well as the WTO dis pute settlement system as a whole, have a strong 
interest in setting the RPT at a length that allows for an implementation process that takes account 
of all available information and uses a well -considered approach to implementing the findings in 
the Appel late Body and Panel reports. The RPT determined by the Arbitrator in this dispute thus 
should be of sufficient length to allow the United States to implement the DSB recommendations 
and rulings in a manner consistent with relevant WTO obligations. Such a r esult would preserve 
the rights of the United States to have a reasonable time for compliance and to impose 
antidumping and countervailing duties where appropriate, while at the same time would preserve 
Korea's rights to ensure that antidumping and counter vailing duties are imposed only in 
accordance with WTO rules. If the RPT is too short to allow for effective implementation, the 
likelihood of a "positive solution" to the dispute would be reduced.  
5. The United States is actively working on administrative a ctions to bring itself into compliance 
with the DSB's recommendations and rulings.  For the reasons outlined in the U.S. submission, an 
RPT of at least 21 months is a reasonable period of time for implementation in this dispute.  
 WT/DS464/RPT  
 
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  ANNEX B  
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  OF KOREA'S SUBMISSIO N 
1. Korea requests that the Arbitrator determine a reasonable period of time of 6 months 
because implementation  can be pursued exclusively through Section 129 proceedings, or 8 months 
if a Section 123 proceeding were to be  considered as part of the implementation steps. This 
constitutes the shortest period of time possible within the legal system of the United States.  
2. The United States has failed to explain why it requires "at least" 21 months for 
implementation. The requirements of the U .S. legal system, the complexities alleged by the 
United  States, and the workload of the implementing agency do not justify such an extraordinarily 
lengthy implementation period.  
3. Almost five months have passed since the Appellate Body and Panel reports we re adopted 
and yet the United States has not taken any significant steps to bring its measures into conformity 
with the WTO Agreements. The United States should have begun implementation of the Panel's 
findings on disproportionality as soon as it was aware  that these issues would not be appealed, 
and it should have begun implementation of the other findings immediately after the circulation of 
the Appellate Body report.  
4. Contrary to the United States' proposal, there is no need to pursue implementation in t hree 
phases. The United States can implement the "as such" findings through Section 129 proceedings, 
and a prior Section 123 proceeding is unnecessary. The DPM is not reflected in the USDOC's 
regulations nor was it adopted by the USDOC through a formal rul e-making process, but was 
reflected in various memoranda of the USDOC adopted in the context of specific proceedings.1 
Thus, the DPM should be capable of being modified in the context of such kind of proceeding. 
Similarly, implementation of the Appellate B ody's findings with respect to the use of zeroing would 
require a revision in the USDOC's margin calculation program, which does not require a 
Section  123 proceeding.  
5. In any case, the 16 months proposed by the United States to conduct a Section 123 
proceed ing are excessive. The time line proposed by the United States does not make use of the 
flexibilities inherent in the process, requesting several consecutive months to conduct steps that it 
could conduct concurrently. Moreover, contrary to the United State s' assertions, the "as such" 
findings do not involve any particular complexities that would warrant additional time.  
6. The time lines proposed by the United States to conduct two Section 129 proceedings to 
implement the "as applied" rulings in the anti -dump ing and countervailing duty proceedings are 
also excessive. Section 129 contains no mandatory time lines for each step, and several of these 
steps can be conducted concurrently. The United States' proposed time line also contains steps 
that are not require d under Section 129, such as collection and verification of additional factual 
data. Such non -mandatory steps should be given limited, if any, consideration.  
7. Finally, it is well established that the workload of the implementing agency is not a relevant 
factor in determining a reasonable period of time.2 Similarly, the "turnover of key decision makers 
at the USDOC or, in some cases, their absence pending completion of the nomination and 
confirmation process"3 are also factors that have been rejected as cons tituting a "particular 
circumstance" that warrants additional time.4 
8. In conclusion, Korea requests that the Arbitrator award a reasonable period of time of 
6 months, ending March 26, 2017 . This reasonable period of time reflects the following time line 
for the two Section 129 proceedings:  
                                                
1 Panel Report, US – Washing Machines , para. 7 .100. 
2 Award of the Arbitrator, US – Countervailing Measures (China) (21.3(c)) , para. 3.49.  
3 U.S. Submission, para. 59.  
4 Award of the Arbitrator, US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) (Article  21.3(c)) , para. 62.  WT/DS464/RPT  
 
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Action Under Section 129  Approx. Time 
Period  
USTR consults with administering authority and congressional 
committees  September 2016  
Prior to issuing a determination, the administering authority shall 
provide interested parties with an opportunity to submit written 
comments, and in appropriate cases, may hold a hearing.  60 days  
Before rendering a determination, USTR shall consult with 
congressional committees (to continue throughout implementation 
period)  30 months  
Within 180 days of receipt of a written request from the USTR, the 
administering authority shall issue a determination rendering the 
action consistent with WTO obligations.  60 days  
The administering authority shall publish in the Federal Register  notice 
of the implementation  30 days  
 
 
9. Finally, i f the Arbitrator were to consider a Section 123 proceeding as part of the 
implementation steps , Korea requests that the Arbitrator award a reasonable period of time of 
8 months, ending Ma y 26, 2017 . 
 
__________