RESTRICTED  
  
TN/AG/37  
 
27 November 2017  
(17-6465) Page: 1/16 
Committee on Agriculture  
Special Session    
 
COMMITTEE ON AGRICUL TURE IN SPECIAL SESS ION 
REPORT BY THE CHAIRM AN, H.E. MR STEPHEN NDŨN'GŨ KARA U, 
TO THE TRADE NEGOTIA TIONS COMMITTEE  
28 Nove mber 2017  
 
Contents  
1   EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  ................................ ................................ ................................ . 3 
2   STATE OF PLAY  ................................ ................................ ................................ ............  3 
2.1   PUBLIC STOCKOLDING FOR FOOD SECURITY PURPOSES  ................................ ..................  3 
General  ................................ ................................ ................................ .....................  3 
Core Provision ................................ ................................ ................................ ............  4 
Country and Programm e Coverage  ................................ ................................ ...............  4 
Product Coverage  ................................ ................................ ................................ ....... 4 
Safeguards and Anti -Circumvention Provisions  ................................ ...............................  5 
Transparency Provisions  ................................ ................................ ..............................  5 
2.2   DOMESTIC SUPPORT  ................................ ................................ ................................ .... 6 
General  ................................ ................................ ................................ .....................  6 
Overall Limit on Trade -Distorting Domestic Support  ................................ ........................  6 
Aggregate Measurement of Support  ................................ ................................ ..............  6 
De minimis  ................................ ................................ ................................ ................  7 
Blue Box  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...................  7 
Product -Specific Disciplines  ................................ ................................ .........................  7 
Article 6.2  ................................ ................................ ................................ .................  7 
Green Box  ................................ ................................ ................................ .................  8 
Transparency Provisions  ................................ ................................ ..............................  8 
Special and Differential Treatment  ................................ ................................ ................  8 
2.3   COTTON  ................................ ................................ ................................ .....................  8 
General  ................................ ................................ ................................ .....................  8 
Domestic Support  ................................ ................................ ................................ ....... 8 
Other elements  ................................ ................................ ................................ ......... 10 
2.4   MARKET ACCESS  ................................ ................................ ................................ ........ 10 
General  ................................ ................................ ................................ .................... 10 TN/AG/37  
 
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  Work Programme  ................................ ................................ ................................ ......11 
Special Agricultural Safeguard  ................................ ................................ .................... 11 
2.5   SPECIAL SAFEGUARD ME CHANISM  ................................ ................................ ............... 11 
General  ................................ ................................ ................................ .................... 11 
Major Outstanding Issues  ................................ ................................ ........................... 12 
Recent Discussions  ................................ ................................ ................................ ....12 
2.6   EXPORT PROHIBITIONS AND RESTRICTIONS  ................................ ................................ .12 
General  ................................ ................................ ................................ .................... 12 
Advance notification  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..13 
Content of notification, consultation, reporting and monitoring  ................................ ........ 13 
Exemptions for Foodstuffs Purchased for Non -Commercial Humanitarian Purposes  ............ 13 
Special and Differential Treatment  ................................ ................................ ............... 13 
Other issues  ................................ ................................ ................................ ............. 13 
Post-MC11 work programme  ................................ ................................ ....................... 14 
2.7   EXPORT COMPETITION  ................................ ................................ ................................ 14 
2.8   SANITARY AND PHYTOSA NITARY MEASURES  ................................ ................................ .14 
3   RECOMMENDATIONS  ................................ ................................ ................................ . 14 
3.1   PUBLIC STOCKHOLDING FOR FOOD SECURITY PURPOSES  ................................ ............... 14 
3.2   DOMESTIC SUPPORT  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...14 
3.3   COTTON  ................................ ................................ ................................ .................... 14 
3.4   MARKET ACCESS  ................................ ................................ ................................ ........ 15 
3.5   SPECIAL SAFEGUARD ME CHANISM  ................................ ................................ ............... 15 
3.6   EXPORT PROHIBITIONS AND RESTRICTIONS  ................................ ................................ .15 
3.7   EXPORT COMPETITION  ................................ ................................ ................................ 15 
3.8   SANITARY AND PHYTOSA NITARY MEASURES  ................................ ................................ .15 
4   CONCLUSION ................................ ................................ ................................ .............  15 
 
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  1  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
1.1.  This report to the Trade Negotiations Committee has been produced under my own 
responsibility. It does not purport to be a consensus document or exhaustively reflect t he positions 
advocated by Members on the various issues under negotiation. It is intended, from my 
perspective as Chair, to inform the Membership of where we are  in the agriculture negotiation s, so 
as to enable Ministers to make the necessary decisions and  provide the necessary guidance at the 
Eleventh Session of the Ministerial Conference  (MC11) , which is scheduled to take place in Buenos 
Aires, Argentina on 10 -13 December 2017.  
1.2.  In preparing this report, I took into account the written submissions and ora l interventions 
made by Members at formal and informal meetings of the Special Session of the Committee on 
Agriculture (CoA -SS) and the Dedicated Sessions of the CoA -SS on Public Stockholding for Food 
Security Purposes  (PSH)  and the Special Safeguard Mecha nism for Developing Countries (SSM) as 
well as in bilateral/plurilateral meetings with different Members in various configurations. To 
ensure transparency, I also periodically convened open -ended meetings of the entire Membership 
to report on my consultations. In that regard, since my appointment as Chair of the CoA -SS on 
26 April 2017, I have held more than 100  meetings . I wish to underscore  that I observed  the 
principles of transparency, inclusiveness, balance and objectivity  in the consultation  process .   
1.3.  This report builds on the state of play document (JOB/AG/109) whic h was circulated to 
Members on 5  September 2017. It covers the eight topics under negotiation s, namely (i) P SH; 
(ii) Domestic Support; (iii) Cotton; (iv) Market Access, including  the Special Agricultural Safeguard  
(SSG) ; (v) S SM; (vi) Export Prohibitions or Restrictions; (vii) Export Competition , and 
(viii) Sanitary and Phytosanitary Mea sures  (SPS) . This report only summariz es the salient 
elements or ideas expressed by Members on the various negotiating issues and does not purport 
to be a substitute for the written submissions or oral interventions of Members. Nevertheless, it is 
my considered view that it gives an accurate picture of the current status of the negotiations in the 
various areas.  
1.4.   The report contains recommendations for the consideration of M embers . These 
recommendations are without prejudice to the positions of Members on the negotiating issues  and 
may be  refined , as appropriate .  
2  STATE OF PLAY  
2.1  PUBLIC STOCKOLDING FOR  FOOD SECURITY PURPOSES  
General  
2.1.   Public Stockholding for Food Security Purposes remains a priority issue for MC11. All 
Members recognize that unlike other issues, there are clear Ministerial mandates, both from Bali 
and Nairobi  Ministerial Conferences  and a firm deadline , for a permanent solution to be found by 
the end of the year. Currently, there are four proposals on the table: one by Brazil, the 
European  Union (E U), Colombia, Peru and Uruguay in JOB/AG/99 (17 July 2017), a second one by 
the G33 in JOB/A G/105 (19 July 2017) , a third one by Russia n Federation  and Paraguay in 
JOB/AG/118 ( 30 October  2017)  and a fourth one by Norway and Singapore in JOB/AG/125 
(20 November 2017) .   
2.2.  This section summarizes the ideas espoused in the four most recent proposals, as well as 
other ideas put forward during different meetings and consultations  I convened in my capacity as 
Chairman  of the agriculture negotiation s. Whereas the first two proposals suggest exempting the 
support provided under public stockholding programmes from the Aggregate Measurement of 
Support (AMS) calculation  with differing conditions that have to be fulfilled by developing  country  
Members, the other two proposal s build on the Bali Ministerial Decision (BMD)1, which seeks to 
provid e a legal shield against challenges  under the Agreement on Agriculture  (AoA). Of the two 
approaches, the Bali approach has gain ed broad support  among the Membership , owing to the 
                                                
1 Public Stockholding for Food Security Purposes, Ministerial Decision of  7 December 2013 
(WT/MIN(13)/38 –WT/L/913).  TN/AG/37  
 
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  opposition of many Members to the idea of an unlimited exemption  of market price suppor t from 
AMS calculation and the fact that Members are familiar with  it having adopted the BMD in 
December 2013 .  
2.3.  In general, apart from the core provision, there is convergence of views on some key 
elements to be included in the permanent solution such as s afeguards and transparency 
requirements. However, Members ' views on the scope and content of these elements continue to 
differ. Different views have also been expressed on other issues such as country coverage, 
programme coverage and product coverage.  The issue of linkage between PSH and Domestic 
Support has also been discussed extensively in meetings of the CoA -SS and also in my 
consultations. The view of most developing Members is that PSH was on a separate track and 
there was a specific Ministerial mandate for a permanent solution to be found by December 2017. 
As such, there was no basis for a linkage to be made between PSH and the negotiations  on 
Domestic Support . The opposing view is that there is a strong link between PSH and Domestic 
Support and that considering them together , or at least in parallel , would actually facilitate a 
permanent decision on the former.  
Core Provision  
2.4.  As mentioned above, there are two approaches under consideration . Under the first 
approach, one proposal suggests the exem ption of support provided under PSH programmes for 
food security purposes from AMS calculation , while another also advocates the same treatment in 
addition to the exemption from a proposed new overall li mit to t rade-distorting Domestic Support . 
By contrast, t he second approach advocates that the permanent solution should be built on the 
Bali interim solution, which provides that Members shall not challenge through the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Mechanism compliance of PSH programmes  with the obligations  under Articles 6.3 and 
7.2(b) of the AoA when they satisfy a number of conditions and the developing country Member 
fulfils  the terms of the Decision. Proponents believe that it would be easier to build convergence 
around the Bali approach given the familiarity of Members with it having adopted the BMD in 
December 2013 and the fact that  it does not require an amendment to the A oA, to which many 
Members are strongly opposed . In my consultations, s ome Members highlighted the need for legal 
certainty of the p ermanent solution. In response, other Members  stated unequivocally that they 
regarded a Ministerial Decision as legally binding .  
Country and Programme Coverage  
2.5.   Regarding the country coverage, there are divergences in the proposals on the table. Three  
of the proposals suggest that apart from programmes of developing countries existing as of the 
date of the Bali Ministerial Declaration, the Decision should be extend ed to cover:  (i) programmes 
of least developed countries (LDCs); and ( ii) small programmes  of any developing country Member  
in the sense of them not exceeding a certain percentage of the VoP or total quantity of a product 
produced by a developing country Member . The other proposal advocates a wider coverage that 
would include all programmes of developing Members and LDCs. There is also the suggestion to 
limit the coverage to net importers of relevant products with a volume of production that does not 
exceed a certain level or that significant exporters should be excluded. The view has also been 
proffered  that the eligibility of a Member should be forfeited should exports from stocks take place.  
Additionally, some Members have suggested that the permanent solution should apply only to non -
commercial activities, including ensuring that stocks are c onstituted for a bona fide food assistance 
programme only; or only to support rural development and for the benefits of resource poor 
farmers.  
2.6.   In my consultations, broad support was expressed for the extension of the Decision to 
programmes  of LDCs and small programmes of developing countries. Only one Member registered 
its concerns with such an extension.   
Product Coverage  
2.7.  Regarding product coverage,  two contrasting views have been expressed by Members. On 
the one hand, several Members hav e argued for maintaining the current phrase "traditional staple 
food crops " as used in the BMD . They noted that this issue was the subject of intensive 
consultations among Members before the Bali Ministerial Conference and as such there was no TN/AG/37  
 
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  basis for re -visiting the agreed language. On the other hand, the G33 believes that there is a need 
for consistency in the terms used in the Decision and the A oA. They noted that the term used in 
footnotes 5 and 5&6  of Annex 2 and Article 12 of the AoA was "foodstuffs ", and as such the same 
term should be used in the Decision.  
2.8.   In my consultations, there was broad support for maintaining the agreed language in the 
BMD.    
Safeguards and Anti -Circumvention Provisions  
2.9.  Many Members are of the view that safeguards are needed to ensure that the procured 
stocks do not distort trade or adversely affect the food security of other Members. However, views 
differ on how these safeguards should be formulated. On the one hand, s ome Members see the 
safeguards in the BMD as a necessary minimum , with others expressing the view that they should 
be strengthened through, inter alia , having an explicit prohibition of direct and indirect exports  in 
the text.  On the other hand, some Members  have requested "more functional" safeguards than 
those contained in the BMD , while others believe that the current language in the BMD is adequate 
and should not be changed.  
2.10.   In my consultations, there was broad support for the view that the current langu age should 
be supplemented with language prohibiting direct and indirect exports from procured stocks. It 
was also suggested that should exports of a product increase by a  certain percentage [X]%, the 
product should no longer benefit from the permanent solution. Inclusion of a provision not allowing 
the applied tariffs for the products procured to exceed [X]% of the average applied tariffs in the 
period of 2013 -2017 has also been suggested.   
Transparency Provisions  
2.11.   There are two opposing views on this iss ue. On the one hand, some Members, including 
those belonging to the G33 are of the view that the ex-ante conditions, such as those requiring a 
developing Member to be up -to-date with its Domestic Support notifications and to notify in 
advance a breach or a  potential breach , are too onerous for a developing Member to comply with. 
As such, they have called for a relaxation of the transparency provisions in the BMD. It was 
pointed out that most Members – developed and developing – were several years behind with their 
Domestic Support notifications and that it was unrealistic for developing countries to be up -to-date 
with their notifications for five years immediately preceding their recourse to the BMD. On the 
other hand, some Members are of the view that the t ransparency provisions in the BMD are a 
necessary minimum  and should be complemented . They disagree with the view that the ex-ante 
transparency requirements in the BMD were onerous. The point was also made that there should 
be proportionality between the t ransparency requirements and the size of the PSH programme. 
The bigger the programme the more onerous the transparency provisions should be.  
2.12.   Some Members have also suggested including a mandatory notification of the targets, and 
data demonstrating that PS H programmes are not distorting trade or commercial markets . Two 
proposal s, for example, advocate for additional data requirements such as notification of the VoP 
and the value of acquired stock prior to the implementation of the PSH programme as well as o n 
an annual basis. Another proposal suggests a narrower set of transparency requirements that 
include information on the programme and description of its functioning and statistical information 
on domestic activities2, and on exports and imports.3 
2.13.   In addition, it has also been suggested to hold annual dedicated discussions based on 
available data and with the assistance of the Secretariat; to examine the programmes in the 
dedicated discussions on an annual basis; and to review or assess the situatio n by the Committee 
on Agriculture (CoA).  
                                                
2 This includes, for example, annual purchases, annual releases, administered prices, released prices, 
total production, eligible population benefiting from the release of this crop, estimated quantities released to 
the beneficiaries.  
3 This refers,  inter alia, to total imports (quantity and value) and total exports (quantity and value).  TN/AG/37  
 
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  2.14.   In my consultations, some Members signalled their preparedness to consider relaxing the 
transparency requirements. It was suggested , for example , that developing Members should be 
granted a grace period of not more than two years to submit their notifications and that the DS1 
template and its supporting tables should be used to notify a breach or potential breach.  One 
proposal built on this idea and suggest ed that notifications should be made not later than 
18 months  from the end of the reporting period.  
2.2  DOMESTIC SUPPORT  
General  
2.15.   Many Members have consistently indicated that they would like to see an outcome on 
Domestic Support at MC11. A number of submissions have been tabled since last year.4  
Overall Limit on Trade -Distorting Domestic Support  
2.16.   An overall limit on trade -distorting Domestic Support has been suggested in several 
submissions and has been a focus of our discussions for a while. While there is broad support for 
the introduction of such a limit, some M embers have expressed their opposition to such a limit. A 
key question among those supporting the introduction of an overall limit is whether such a limit 
should be fixed or floating.  
2.17.   In the proposal JOB/AG/99, proponents put forward the idea of a floatin g limit, expressed as 
a percentage of the VoP. However, several Members expressed a strong preference for a fixed 
limit.5 More recently , the idea of  a hybrid limit has been advanced; it combin es elements of both 
fixed and floating limits. It has been sugge sted that an overall limit should be based on existing 
entitlements ( i.e. AMS and de minimis ) – an idea that was picked up in one of the recent 
proposals, or that the current de minimis  limit could be used as an overall limit (thereby 
constraining  also Blu e Box spending).   
2.18.   The other issue which has been discussed is what type of support such a limit should apply 
to. It is suggested in several proposals that it should apply to the sum of AMS and de minimis  
support, at least initially. Many Members, however,  prefer a wider coverage that would also include 
the Blue Box and/or Article 6.2 support. Some Members have expressed strong reservations 
against the potential inclusion of Blue Box, de minimis  and/or Article 6.2  support . 
2.19.   Special treatment in the form of a  longer implementation period has also been suggested 
for Members with trade -distorting Domestic Support above a certain level.  
Aggregate Measurement of Support  (AMS)  
2.20.   A number of Members are of the view that priority should be given to further reducing AMS 
entitlements. Some even go further by calling for the complete elimination of AMS for all Members 
or limited only to developed Members. T aking into account the Doha m andate, some of t hese 
Members have reviewed  their position by demanding  that a first step towards the elimination of 
AMS could be taken at MC11. One proposal builds on this idea and suggests that a cut could be 
                                                
4 Submission by Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay in JOB/AG/72/Add.1  
(11 November 2016 ); Submission by Rwanda on behalf of the ACP Group in JOB/AG/87  (15 November 2016 ); 
Communicat ion by Benin on behalf of the LDC Group in JOB/AG/90 (13 January 2017); Proposal by Brazil, the 
EU, Colombia, Peru and Uruguay in JOB/AG/99  (17 July 2017 ); Submission by New Zealand, Australia, Canada 
and Paraguay in JOB/AG/100  (17 July 2017 ); Submission b y China and India in JOB/AG/102 (18 July 2017 ); 
Communication by Switzerland on behalf of the G10 in JOB/AG/103  (18 July 2017 ); Communication by Japan 
in JOB/AG/104  (19 July 2017 ); Submission by Guyana on Behalf of the ACP Group  in JOB/AG/112 
(6 October  2017); Proposal by New Zealand, Australia, Canada, Chile and Paraguay in JOB/AG/114 
(17 October 2017) ; Proposal by Argentina in JOB/AG/1 20 (2 No vember 2017), and P roposal by Mexico in 
JOB/AG/124 (17  November 2017). However, s tatistical  papers are not covered as they were submitted 
primarily in support of views  and ideas put forward elsewhere.  
5 Relevant proposals include a Submission  by New Zealand, Australia, Canada and Paraguay in 
JOB/AG/100 (17 July 2017); Communication by Switzerlan d on behalf of the G10 in JOB/AG/103  
(18 July 2017) and C ommunication by Japan in JOB/AG/104  (19 July 2017 ); Proposal by Argentina in 
JOB/AG/1 20 (2 No vember 2017); and P roposal by Mexico in JOB/AG/124 (17 November 2017).  TN/AG/37  
 
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  taken at MC11. For many Members, however, the  elimination of current AMS entitlements is 
unrealistic.  
De minimis  
2.21.   Some Members have argued that in view of the increasing VoP of several developing 
countries, particularly the large r ones, any reform to level the playing field should include de 
minimis  support . However, many Members, particularly developing country Members have 
indicated that de minimis is a very sensitive issue for them  and could not accept any proposals 
calling for their current level to be reduced. Members seeking  reduction in trade -distorting 
Domestic Support have been considering the idea of an overall limit that would further discipline 
the use of trade -distorting Domestic Support in general, rather than seeking a reduction in de 
minimis  entitlement per se . The views and ideas put forward also include exclusion of de minimis  
entitlement from any additional limitation; exclusion of LDCs, Net Food Importing Developing 
Countries (NFIDCs), and developing country Members in general from any additional commitment; 
and curtailing the de minimis  entitlement notably for the world's largest producers and exporters.  
Blue Box  
2.22.   A number of Members have expressed the view that disciplines governing the Blue Box 
should be re -evaluated considering its potential to distort trade. A mong the disciplines suggested 
are a fixed overall limit; product -specific limits; and its inclusion in an overall trade-distorting 
Domestic Support coverage – immediately or at a later stage.  
2.23.   However, a number of Members consider the Blue box as a sensiti ve issue for them. They 
argue that the Blue Box is less trade distorting than the Amber Box  and facilitates reforms which 
would level the playing field and introduce more competition in the agricultural sector.  
Product -Specific Disciplines  
2.24.   Many Members consider product -specific limits or disciplines as a necessary element to limit 
trade -distorting Domestic Support. However, doubts have been cast by several Members about the 
feasibility of an outcome at MC11. The views and ideas put forward since a year include product -
specific numerical limits; limits expressed as a percentage of the overall trade -distorting Domestic 
Support, as a percentage of the VoP of the products in question, or in per capita terms. Others 
have suggested product -specific  AMS limits; overall limit on product -specific AMS, particularly for 
products of interest to the LDCs; product -specific Blue Box limits; product -specific limits to trade -
distorting D omestic Support; and linking trade -distorting support and exports .  
2.25.   There is also a suggestion to focus on those products which benefit most from Article 6 o f 
the AoA  and which are of specific interest to developing country Members, including LDCs, NFIDCs 
and Small and Vulnerable Economies (SVEs). However, many Members have expr essed their 
opposition to product -specific disciplines, whether in general or for developing country Members.  
2.26.   One recent proposal suggests putting the product -specific disciplines in the work 
programme, given the very divergent views of the Members on this  issue.   
Article 6.2  
2.27.   Some Members are of the view that the disciplines governing Article 6.2 should be re -visited 
considering the vast sums of money being spent by some developing Members. They argue that at 
least certain types of support under Article 6. 2 (such as input subsidies) need to be disciplined 
and/or its use be constrained by an overall limit to trade -distorting Domestic Support. One 
proposal advocates the establishment of a work program me to explore additional reductions and 
discipline s for all  elements of Article 6, including Article 6.2 . However, a lmost all developing 
country Members consider support under Article 6.2 as a sensitive issue; several of them have 
indicated that they do not have flexibility to accommodate the demands of other Memb ers.   TN/AG/37  
 
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  Green Box  
2.28.   While there is the recognition that Green Box support is non - or minimally trade distorting, 
several Members would like it to be disciplined at some point owing to its increasing size and 
doubts about whether certain programmes meet the pr escribed criteria.6 In addition, many 
developing country Members have expressed the view that Green Box disciplines should be better 
adapted to their needs. However, many Members remain opposed to any change in the current 
disciplines.  
Transparency Provisi ons 
2.29.   The importance of transparency in the WTO is widely acknowledged by Members. Many 
Members would like to see an enhancement of the relevant disciplines and/or stricter enforcement. 
Many developing country Members have, however, cautioned against onerous  requirements, 
especially considering the difficulties that have been encountered by some of them in fulfilling the 
current requirements. The ideas put forward to enhance the transparency provisions include 
additional data to be provided annually based on a questionnaire; annual dedicated discussions in 
the CoA; and punitive penalties for Members not fulfilling their transparency obligations, 
particularly large producers or large exporters of particular products.  
Special and Differential Treatment  
2.30.   The impor tance of special and differential treatment (SDT) for developing country Members 
is recognised by all Members. There appears to be a general understanding that no further 
commitment would be required from LDCs. However, while there is a recognition that SD T should 
be provided to all developing country Members, there are divergences as to the nature of 
flexibilities to be granted. The views and ideas put forward include higher overall limit (expressed 
as higher percentage or higher numerical limit) for devel oping country Members and longer 
implementation periods or same limit as developed Members but longer implementation period for 
them; exemption of developing country Members or SVEs and NFIDCs from binding reduction 
commitments; and technical assistance an d capacity building to help the implementation of 
disciplines.  
2.3  COTTON  
General  
2.31.   All Members recognize the mandate , agreed  more than 13 years ago , that Cotton  be 
addressed "ambitiously, expeditiously and specifically within the agriculture negotiations " and m ost 
Members have continued during all my consultations to express their support to a meaningful and 
specific outcome on Cotton.  
2.32.   This being said, a couple of delegations have consistently cast doubts about the possibility 
of achieving a  substantive outcome  at MC11, taking into account the overall negotiating 
environment.  
Domestic Support  
2.33.   Cotton Domestic Support remains the central and most controversial issue in the 
negotiations on Cotton  and the views remain far apart on what could constitute a possible ou tcome 
in this area.  
2.34.   As indicated in the Compilation Document JOB/AG/128, in addition to the C4 proposal 
contained in document TN/AG/GEN/46, several other submissions on Domestic Support also 
include specific suggestions on Cotton Domestic Support.  
                                                
6 See, for example, the communication by Benin on behalf of the LDC Group in JOB/AG/90  
(13 January  2017). 
 TN/AG/37  
 
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  2.35.   More gen erally, several Members continue to highlight the existence of a de facto  link 
between the overall negotiation on Domestic Support and the negotiation on Cotton Domestic 
Support.  
 Trade -Distorting Support  
2.36.   The positions remain divided between three main poss ible general approaches on how to 
address Cotton trade-distorting support:  
a) The C4 proposal suggests a combination of disciplines addressing trade -distorting support 
(AMS, Blue Box and de minimis ) including differentiated level of reductions for developed 
Members with final Bound Total AMS Commitments and reduction in AMS support for 
developing country Members with final Bound Total AMS Commitments based on the level 
of support notified during a reference period. The C4 proposal also includes a cap for all 
Members applicable on AMS and Blue Box  support  based on Members de minimis  
entitlements.  
The C4 proposal raised various questions from Members, as well as some specific concerns 
related to the idea of a differentiation between developing country Members on  the basis of 
whether or not they have AMS commitments. Several Members considered that the C4 
proposal was too ambitious in the current overall negotiation context.  
b) Several Members favour a limit o n Cotton trade -distorting support  expressed as a 
percentag e of Cotton  VoP as detailed , for example , in the proposals JOB/AG/99 and 
JOB/AG /120. In these proposals, trade-distorting support would be composed initially of de 
minimis  and AMS only. By contrast, t he C4 considered that a floating limit would not be 
sufficiently constraining.  
c) Another group of Members insist on the need to first address the AMS granted to Cotton  
beyond the de minimis  level and oppose any new disciplines on de minimis  for developing 
country Members without an AMS commitment.  
2.37.   It seems gener ally accepted from the proposals and the discussions that LDCs should be 
exempted from any new commitments . 
2.38.   The C4  also called for a figures -based negotiation in order to compare the various levels of 
support and cuts in Cotton  subsidies in the different b oxes that would result from the different 
proposals currently on the table.  
2.39.    Recalling  its strong scepticism about any possible substantive outcome on Cotton Domestic 
Support in the current  negotiating environment, one delegation  invited participants to turn their 
attention to a possible post -MC11 work programme in which Cotton  could be included.  
2.40.   Several Members have expressed the view that the negotiations should ultimately a im at 
eliminating all types of D omestic Support that ha ve distorting effects on the Cotton  market, while 
others have suggested a review clause following a certain period of time after MC11 with a view to 
agreeing on the next steps to be taken in phasing out trade -distorting Domestic Support provided 
for Cotton .  
 Green Box  
2.41.   While all Members recognize the Ministerial mandate to treat Cotton  ambitiously, 
expeditiously and specifically, many Members considered that further disciplines on Green Box 
direct payments granted to Cotton  producers as suggested by the C4 i n its proposal could not be 
achieved at MC11. Some Members are of the view that it is not a realistic option for the time 
being , while some others have opposed t he proposal on more fundamental grounds . TN/AG/37  
 
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  Other elements  
2.42.   As regards the other components of Cott on – Market Access, Export Competition, 
implementation and follow up as well as development assistance  – Members  have reaffirmed the 
continued relevance of the Nairobi Decision.  
2.43.   Most delegations agreed that this fact could be recognized in a Cotton  outcome at MC11 as 
suggested by the C4 in paragraphs 10 to 13 of TN/AG/GEN/46, subject to possible minor edits 
aimed at updating references to various timelines contained in the Nairobi Decision.  
2.44.   It also appears to me, following the 8th Dedicated Discussi on of the relevant trade -related 
developments for Cotton  held on 17  November 2017 that the upcoming launch of a joint WTO/ITC  
Cotton Portal could be recognized in a Ministerial text on Cotton.  
2.4  MARKET ACCESS  
General  
2.45.   The discussions on Market Access have be nefitted from some technical work by Members on 
topics such as tropical products, tariff overhang, tariff peaks, tariff escalation and the S SG. The 
need for enhanced transparency and updated Market Access information has been highlighted by 
some Members in  order to make progress in the Market Access negotiations.  
2.46.   In May 2017, Paraguay and Peru in their submission7, sought to pursue agricultural  Market 
Access negotiations in an incremental manner.8 The two Members also proposed to focus, as a first 
step, on the following specific issues so as to arrive at sp ecific outcomes on them by the T welfth 
Session of the Ministerial Conference (MC12): tariff simplification, tariff peaks, tariff escalation and 
bound in -quota tariffs. The proponents sought Members' engagement in Market Access 
negotiations post -MC11 towards establishing parameters for meaningful Market Access through 
tariff reduction and the revision of tariff rate quotas.  
2.47.   Specifically on the them e of tariff simplification, one more submission9 was presented by 
Tunisia to Members. A few Members support ed tariff simplification as a potential outcome at MC11. 
Some of these Members , however, suggested focussing only on highly complex forms of tariffs,  
rather than seeking an outright conversion of all non -ad valorem  tariffs into ad valorem  
equivalents.  
2.48.   Generally, Members  have not engaged in detailed technic al discussions on the specific 
Market Access elements included in the various proposals. It becam e clear subsequently that with 
the limited time available before  MC11, it would not be possible to address complex and technical 
issues such as tariff simplification , and achieve appropriate outcomes. The proponents have since 
redirected their negotiating efforts towards achieving an agreement on a detaile d post -MC11 work 
programme for M arket Access negotiations.   
2.49.   Some other Members have also  supported the idea of negotiations on a post -MC11 work 
programme to guide the M arket Access negotiations. However , a number of Members have 
cautioned against a selective picking and choosing among the various Market Access issues in any 
work programme that may be agreed.  
2.50.   A number of developing country Members (including LDCs and SVEs) have underlined the 
importance of incorporating SDT in any negotiating framework that is agreed in the area of Market 
Access. Some developing country Members have expressed the view that a lower priority should 
be accorded to Market Access negotiations considering their defensive concer ns about preference 
erosion. The point about parallel progress in non -agriculture Market Access and services Market 
Access negotiations has also come  up in the discussions.  
                                                
7 Submission by  Paraguay and Peru in JOB/AG/93 ( 29 May 2017 ). 
8 A similar idea of pursuing market access reforms in an incremental manner was also con tained in the 
submission from the Cai rns Group in document JOB/AG/91 ( 19 May 2017 ). 
9 JOB/AG/119  (30 October 2017 ). TN/AG/37  
 
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  2.51.   Article XII Members have underscored the need for their special situation to be ta ken into 
account in the negotiations in view of the extensive Market Access commitments assumed by them 
at the time of accession.  
Work Programme  
2.52.   Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Thailand and Uruguay have recently presented a 
submission10 containing a wo rk pro gramme for the continuation of M arket Access reform in 
agriculture. The proposed work programme has been discussed both in open -ended CoA -SS 
meeting s and in a limited group format  and generally received broad support .  
2.53.   Several developing Members have echoed their concerns on the lack of SDT in the proposed 
text. A specific request has also been made by a group of developing country Members to suitably 
acknowledge the issue of preference erosion. Some importing Members ha ve expressed concerns 
about a few aspects of the proposed work programme , including on paragraph 2 that these 
importing Members consider seeks to prejudge an outcome. The proposal to conduct negotiations 
in dedicated sessions and have yearly transparency a nd monitoring exercise s on Market Access 
has also been questioned by some Members.  
2.54.   The proponents have since circulated a revised submission11 taking into account some of the 
comments that the Members made on the original submission.      
Spec ial Agricultur al Safeguard (SSG)  
2.55.   Several Members have proposed a decision at MC11 on the elimination of SSG rights 
(Article  5 of the AoA) of WTO Members.12 This position has been endorsed by some other 
Members.  
2.56.   Simultaneously, some other Members have expressed their oppo sition to the elimination of  
the SSG. Some of them consider the SSG as forming part of the delicate balance that was reached 
during the Uruguay Round . A number of Members also doubt that SSG elimination would be 
feasible in isolation of broader Market Access reforms.  
2.57.   Some of these proposals13 have also included a possibility for Members to negotiate access 
to or an improve ment of  the SSG until its elimination b y all.  A few Members have expressed 
support for such a negotiating window; simultaneously a number of other Members have 
expressed opposition to any idea of extension of the SSG to Members which are not currently 
eligible , or a relaxation of the existing SSG con ditions in Article 5 of the A oA. One proponent has 
identified SSG "improvement " to be a possible approach to address its concerns related to price 
volatility and market distortions and has considered a successful outcome addressing these 
concerns to be ind ispensable for the success of  MC11.  
2.5  SPECIAL SAFEGUARD MEC HANISM  (SSM)  
General  
2.58.   The discussions on SSM continue to reveal the contrasting readings of the negotiating 
mandate among Members . Relying on various mandates, including the Nairobi Ministerial 
Declar ation, the G33, supported by some other developing country Members, have sought an 
outcome on SSM at MC11 without accepting any linkage with other negotiating issues . However, 
several Members are strongly opposed to an outcome on SSM in isolation and, espe cially, in the 
absence of a Market Access outcome.  
                                                
10 JOB/AG/122 and Corr.1  (9 November 2017 ). 
11 JOB/AG/122/Rev.1  (20 November 2017 ). 
12 Submission by Paraguay, Argentina, Australia, Chile, Col ombia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Peru and 
Uruguay and Viet Nam in JOB/AG/85, C orr.1, Corr.2 ( 15 November 2016 ); Submission s by the Russian 
Federation in JOB/AG/95 (29 May 2017 ), and JOB/AG/116  (19 October 2017 ) and Submission from the 
Philippines in JOB/AG/121 (8 November 2017) . 
13 JOB/AG/116 (19 October 2017 ), JOB/AG/121 (8 November 2017 ), and JOB/AG/123 
(10 November  2017). TN/AG/37  
 
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  2.59.   The G33 contends that an SSM for developing country Members is needed so as to enable 
them to effectively address the negative impacts of international price volatility on resource -poor 
small -scale farmers.14 Other developing country Members have also supported an agreement on 
SSM to counter price volatility and remedy the existing distortions in international agricultural 
trade.  
2.60.   A number of other Members do not consider the SSM to be the appropriate  remedy to 
address price volatility. One Member also stressed that Members that  were not responsible for 
causing distortions in international trade should be exempted from the application of the SSM. 
2.61.   A number of developing country Members with SSG rights a lso support an outcome on SSM, 
as they consider the existing SSG provisions to be complex and not attuned to addressing the 
needs of developing country Members facing import surges and/or price depressions . 
Major Outstanding Issues  
2.62.   The G33 has elaborated o n the following major outstanding issues in connection with the 
SSM with a view to reaching agreement on the technical aspects and leaving the bigger political 
decisions to be made later by Ministers: product coverage, capping of remedies , and treatment of  
trade under Free Trade Agreements (FTA).15 To facilitate those technical discussions, the G33 
submitted a set of specific questions on certain outstanding issues.16 
2.63.   The level of engagement on these issues has been limited . Some Members did emphasize a 
few a spects related to these issues, especially concerning the capping of remedies and treatment 
of FTA trade. These were, however, a re -statement of their well -known positions. Some Members 
have indicated their willingness to discuss technical aspects related to product coverage.  
Recent Discussions  
2.64.   The G33 has suggested focussing on a partial concrete outcome on SSM at MC11 in the 
form of either a volume -based or a price -based SSM.17 Not all G33 Members have expressed their 
support for this proposal. Some state d that they were in the process of examining the proposal 
and reserved their right to present their views later. The incremental approach included in the 
proposal has not led to any discernible change in the negotiating position of other Members. The 
recen t discussions have rather remained one -sided with only the proponents participating in the 
discussions.   
2.65.   A few Members believe that the only feasible outcome on SSM at MC11 would be a decision 
on the continuation of the SSM negotiations post -MC11. One Mem ber has underlined the 
difficulties it would have in accepting an outcome at MC11 in the form of a continuing work 
programme on SSM. It would rather prefer a concrete outcome, albeit , a partial one on SSM at 
MC11 . 
2.6  EXPORT PROHIBITIONS AND RESTRICTIONS  
General  
2.66.   The discussions on this  subjec t have been facilitated by a submission  from Singapore  in 
JOB/AG/101  (17 July 2017 ) and its revised version circulated as JOB/AG/101/Rev.1 on 
9 November  2017 as well as a submission  from Israel, Japan, Korea, Switzerland  and 
Chinese  Taipei circulated as JOB/AG/115 on 18 October  2017.  
2.67.   My consultations have confirmed that many Members consider that there could be an 
outcome in t he area of Export Prohibitions and  Restrictions at MC11 , and that Singapore' s proposal 
could be a basis for a decision by Ministers at MC11.  
                                                
14 Submission by the G33 in TN/AG/GEN/45  (29 May 2017 ). 
15 Submission by the G33 in JOB/AG/96 ( 29 May 2017 ). 
16 Submission by the G3 3 in JOB/AG/106  (19 July 2017 ). 
17 JOB/AG/11 1 and Corr.1, 2  and 3 (15 September 2017 ). TN/AG/37  
 
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  2.68.   However, some Members still have concerns  about some elements in the proposal . Others 
have expressed the view that an outcome on Export Prohibitions and  Restrictions at MC11 could 
not be envisaged in the absence of a broader agricultural package . 
Advance notification  
2.69.   The latest proposal by Singapore suggests that the advance notice for an export prohibition 
or restriction , to be made in accordance with subparagraph 1(b) of Arti cle 12 of the AoA, should be 
submitted at least 30 days prior to the coming into force of the measure . However, this time frame 
may be dispensed with when there is a  critical shortage of foodstuffs caused by an event 
constituting force majeure . 
2.70.   Many Members expressed their support for the new language proposed by Singapore . 
However, s ome Members , particularly net -food importing developing countries , favoured an 
advance notice period longer than 30 days, so as to enable them to make alternative 
arrangements.  The issue of shipments " en route " was also raised .  
2.71.   Some Members cautioned , however , against the risk of making the notification requirements 
too burdensome for developing country Members. The view was expressed that the proposed time 
frame of 30 days would limit the policy space of developing countries. It was also noted that it was 
not always possible to anticipate sudden demand/supply mismatches and that advance notification 
might lead to market ma nipulation . It was further noted that the "force majeure " was an 
ambivalent term and that it should be avoided in the text.  The possibility of not making the time 
limit mandatory was also canvassed by some Members.  
Content of notification, consultation , reporting and monitoring  
2.72.   The revised proposal by Singapore also includes  provisions related to the content of notice 
as well as on consultation, reporting, and monitoring.  
2.73.   These provisions did not generate lengthy debates amongst the Membership . At least o ne 
Member , however , noted  that the su ggested provisions might be too onerous , including the one 
requiring that reasons be provided for the instituti on of measures. It was also noted that the 
proposed text was redundant considering the existing language in the A oA.      
Exemptions for Foodstuf fs Purchased for Non -Commercial Humanitarian Purposes  
2.74.   Singapore's  proposal specifies that foodstuffs purchased for non -commercial humanitarian 
purposes by the World Food programme shall be exempted from the application of Export 
Prohibitions and  Restrictions.  
2.75.   While many Members supported this proposal, the view  was expressed that this provision 
would limit  Members' flexibility in applying such measures and that WFP purchases were made on 
commercial terms.  
Special and Differential Treatment  
2.76.   The SDT provisions contained in Singapore's revised proposal and applicable to the 
suggested provisions on advance notification, content of notification, consultation and reporting 
replicate the S DT provisions contained in p aragraph 2 of Article 12 of the AoA and also exempts  
LDCs.  
2.77.   In my consultations, there was broad support for Singapore' s approach , but a few  Members 
questioned the relation ship between the proposed language and the text of Article 12.2 of the AoA. 
The need to  permit NFIDCs  to benefit  from t hese SDT provisions  was also mentioned.  
Other issues  
2.78.   Israel, Japan, Korea, Swi tzerland and Chinese Taipei  suggested addressing complementary 
elements in relation to Export Prohibitions and Restrictions in their submission JOB/AG/115 
namely: Duration of m easures, status of net -food importers , and clarification of foodstuffs.  TN/AG/37  
 
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  2.79.   While s ome Members  expressed an  interest in these issues, there was broad agreement that 
an outcome on these issues cannot be envisaged at MC11 and that they should be addressed post-
MC11 . 
Post-MC11 work programme  
2.80.   Several Members supported the inclusion of a reference to the  continuation of the work on 
Export Prohibitions and Restrictions after MC11 as suggested in p aragraph 10 of Singapore's 
revised propo sal. However, a few Members qu estioned the need for such a reference.  
2.7  EXPORT COMPETITION  
2.81.   Canada, Chile and Switzerland  circulated on 10 November  2017 a proposal containing 
possible language on a post -MC11 work programme on Export Competition in document 
RD/AG/61 . I detected broad support for this proposal.  
2.82.   A couple of concerns were expressed, including on how the proposal relate d to the review 
process foreseen to be undertaken by the Co A in the December 2015 Ministerial Decision . Some 
Members indicated that they were still asses sing the proposal by Canada, Chile an d Switzerland . 
2.8  SANITARY AND PHYTOSA NITARY MEASURES  
2.83.   Following the  submission of a discussion paper  by Brazil and Argentina on 30 May 2017  in 
RD/AG/57 , Brazil  circulated on 10 November  2017 a proposal containing possible language on a 
post-MC11 work programme on SPS in document RD/AG/62.  
2.84.   Several Members , while acknowledging the ir interest in the SPS proposal,  considered that 
these issues could be addressed by the SPS Committee , which already had a mandate and did not 
need a Ministerial Decision to continue its work.  Some Members indicated that they were still 
assessing the proposal by Brazil.  
3  RECOMMENDATIONS  
3.1  PUBLIC STOCK HOLDING FOR FOOD SECURITY PURPOSES  
3.1.  Taking into account the proposals on the table and what I have heard in different meetings 
and the strong opposition by many Members to the unlimited exemption of market price support 
provided under the public stockholding programmes, my assessment is that in the absence of 
parallel progress on Domestic S upport, a Permanent Solution  based on the Bali Decision  is most 
likely to attract convergence among the Membership . Many Members feel that the transparency 
provisions should be made more operable , while others believe that the safeguard provisions 
should be  strengthened, especially if the country and programme coverage were to be expanded.  I 
invite Members to redouble their efforts in their search for a permanent solution to this important 
issue at MC11, taking into account the submissions circulated thus fa r and in particular the most 
recent one by Norway and Singapore.  
3.2  DOMESTIC SUPPORT  
3.2.  There have been many submissions and proposals on Domestic Support. However, Members' 
negotiating positions on the key issues still remain far apart despite the attempts by s everal 
Members to bridge the gaps through recent proposals. Consequently, my recommendation to 
Members is to work towards a limited outcome potentially comprising a decision on some core 
principles and a work programme to guide the negotiations post -MC11 . I am in the hands of 
Members and stand ready to assist them to progress on this issue.  
3.3  COTTON  
3.3.  Based on my consultations, I believe that the Nairobi Decision pertaining to Cotton  in the 
areas of Market Access, Export Competition, Implementation and Developm ent assistance can be 
reaffirmed and the work undertaken since then acknowledged. It is my considered view that a 
consensus could potentially be reached on textual elements based on the C4 proposal in this TN/AG/37  
 
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  regard. As regards Cotton Domestic Support, the di vergences remain wide and I invite Members to 
reflect on what can be envisaged in this area at MC11.  
3.4  MARKET ACCESS  
3.4.  Based on my consultations thus far, it appears to me that the joint revised submission from 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Thailand and Uruguay in JOB/AG/122/Rev.1, which incorporates 
some of the comments received following the initial proposal , could form the basis of a possible 
work programme to guide negotiations on this issue post -MC11.  I therefore invite Members to 
work together and m ake all efforts to achieve convergence based on this proposal, taking into 
account the specific concerns and issues raised by Members . 
3.5  SPECIAL SAFEGUARD ME CHANISM (SSM)  
3.5.  I would encourage Members to  reflect on the collective mandate that the Ministers gave us at 
Nairobi to negotiate an SSM for developing country Members in dedicated sessions of the CoA -SS. 
As we all are aware, SSM has a number of challenging issues  which need to be addressed in order 
to make progress on this issue. Despite a number of submissions from the G33 on this topic, the 
positions of Members remain far apart and recent discussions did not manage to bridge to close 
the gaps in negotiating positions. I will continue my consultations on this issue in order to be able 
to propose  a way forward on SSM at MC11 for the consideration of Members.  
3.6  EXPORT PROHIBITIONS AND RESTRICTIONS  
3.6 Notwithstanding the concerns expressed by some Members, I remain convinced  that an 
outcome on Export Prohibitions and Restrictions coul d be envisaged at MC11. Given the relatively 
high degree of convergence on Singapore's revised proposal in JOB/AG/101/Rev.1, I consider that 
it offers Members a platform to further engage and reach an agreement on this issue. I suggest 
that Members explore  language which could accommodate the concerns expressed , notably  as 
regards the timing of the notification to be made pursuant to Article 12 of the AoA.   
3.7  EXPORT COMPETITION  
3.7 There was broad support for the proposal by Canada, Chile and Switzerland in document 
RD/AG/61, which contains elements that could be included in a work programme post -MC11  and I 
consider this proposal constitutes a potential basis for a post -MC11 work programme in this area .  
3.8  SANITARY AND PHYTOSA NITARY MEASURES  (SPS)  
3.8 In this a rea, several Members doubted whether an outcome on SPS was relevant  in the 
context of the agriculture negotiations  but the text suggested by Brazil in document RD/AG/62 
nevertheless remains on the table . 
4  CONCLUSION  
4.1.  This report is an honest effort on my part to accurately capture the state of play of the 
agriculture negotiation at this point in time.  
4.2.  My responsibility as Chair also requires me to clearly identify at this stage  what I see as 
potential deliver ables at MC11 based on the proposals as well as the meetings, consultations and 
informal contacts I have had thus far with Members. By doing so, I hope I can effectively help the 
Membership to prioriti ze and focus on issues in respect of which outcomes are within r each and 
provide the necessary directions to guide negotiations in respect of issues where significant 
outcomes could not be achieved at MC11.  
4.3.  As you will have seen from my recommendations, I consider that there is basis for 
agreements to be reached at MC1 1 on PSH and Export Prohibitions and Restrictions. A Decision 
could also be envisage d on Cotton at MC11. Regarding D omestic Support, I have recommended 
that Members pursue a limited outcome potentially comprising a decision and a work programme 
to guide th e negotiations post -MC11 owing to persistent differences in the negotiating positions of 
Members. With regard to SSM, I am still reflecting on the possible way forward.  Regarding other TN/AG/37  
 
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  negotiating issues, my assessment is that the best possible outcome wil l be a post -MC11 work 
programme. I suggest considering the work programme for all these outstanding negotiating 
issues together in order to ensure a consistency and coherence . 
4.4.  It is my expectation that this report and the recommendations will stimulate fur ther 
discussions among Members paving the way for agreements to be reached on the draft texts as 
well as on the draft work programmes contributing to a successful Ministerial outcome on 
agriculture at MC11.  
4.5.  On my part,  I remain fully committed to facilitat ing convergence on the outstanding issues in 
the limited time remaining before MC11 . In that regard, I  will be continuing my consultations and 
will take fully into account the views and comments that Members will provide on my report. I 
intend , based on Me mbers submissions, to include dr aft texts  in my final recommendations, where 
appropriate , in the coming days  for the consideration of Members.   
4.6.   Last but not least, let me conclude by noting that Members have undertaken significant work 
in the negotiation s through the attendance of numerous meetings and the submission of 
proposals, which are reflected in the Compilation Document JOB/AG/128. It is my sincere hope 
this important body of work will not be lost and will constitute a solid basis for Members ' work 
post-MC11.  
 
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