RESTRICTED  
  
WT/GC/M/149  
 
28 February 2014  
(14-1247)  Page: 1/49  
General Council 
26 November 2013   
 
 MINUTES OF MEETING 
HELD IN THE CENTRE WILLIAM RAPPARD ON 26 NOVEMBER 2013  
Chairperson:  Mr. Shahid Bashir (Pakistan) 
Subjects discussed1: 
1  REPORT BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE TRADE NEGOTIATIONS COMMITTEE ..................... 3  
2  WORK PROGRAMME ON SMALL ECONOMIES – REPORT BY THE CHAIR OF THE 
DEDICATED SESSION OF THE COMMITTE E ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT .................... 29  
3  THE DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE ASPECT  OF COTTON – PERIODIC REPORT BY 
THE DIRECTOR-G ENERAL ............................................................................................... 30  
4  NINTH SESSION OF THE MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE ................................................. 31  
4.1  Statement by  the Chairman ........................................................................................ 31 
4.1.1  TRIPS non-violation and situation complaints .............................................................. 31 
4.1.2  E-Commerce .......................................................................................................... 31 
4.2   Attendance of Observers from Inte rnational Intergovernm ental Organizations ................... 34 
4.2.1  Request by the League of Arab States ........................................................................ 34 
5  REVIEW OF THE EXEMPTION PROVIDED  UNDER PARAGRAPH 3 OF GATT 1994 .......... 34  
6  IMPROVING THE GUIDELINES FOR GRANTING INTERGOVERNMENTAL 
ORGANIZATIONS PERMANENT OBSERVER STATUS IN THE WTO – STATEMENT BY 
THE CHAIR .....................................................................................................................  36 
7  TRIPS COUNCI L MATTERS .......................................................................................... 37  
7.1  Review under Paragraph 8 of the Decision  on the Implementation of Paragraph 6 of 
the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health – Report of the Council 
for TRIPS ........................................................................................................................ 37 
7.2  Proposal for a Decision on an Extension of the Period for the Acceptance by Members 
of the Protocol amending the TRIPS Agreement (IP/C/65) ...................................................... 37 
8  WTO ACCESSIONS: 2013 ANNUAL REPORT BY THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL – 
STATEMENT BY THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL ...................................................................... 39  
9  WAIVERS UNDER ARTICLE IX  OF THE WTO AGREEMENT ............................................ 42  
9.1  Introduction of harmonized system 2002 changes into WTO schedules of tariff 
concessions – Dr aft deci sion .............................................................................................. 43 
9.2  Introduction of harmonized system 2007 changes into WTO schedules of tariff 
concessions – Dr aft deci sion .............................................................................................. 43 
                                               
1 The proposed agenda was circulated in WT/GC/W/677. WT/GC/M/149 
 
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  9.3  Introduction of harmonized system 2012 changes into WTO schedules of tariff 
concessions – Dr aft deci sion .............................................................................................. 43 
9.4  European Union – Application of autono mous preferential treatment to Moldova – 
Extension of the waiver  – Draft decision .............................................................................. 43 
9.5  Review of waivers pursuant to Article IX:4 of the WTO Agreement .................................... 43 
9.5.1  Preferential treatment to services and service suppliers of least-developed 
countries, granted on 17 December  2011 until 17 December 2026 .......................................... 43 
9.5.2  Kimberley process certification scheme for rough diamonds, granted on 
12 December 2012 until 31  December  2018  ........................................................................ 43 
9.5.3  Canada – CARIBCAN, granted on 30 November 2011 until 31 December 2018 ................. 43 
9.5.4  European Union – Application of autonomous preferential treatment to the West 
Balkans, granted on 30 November 2011 until 31 December 2016 ............................................ 43 
9.5.5  Cuba – Article XV:6 of GATT 1994, extension of waiver, granted on 
14 February 2012 until 31 December 2016 .......................................................................... 43 
10  COMMITTEE ON BUDGET, FINANCE AND ADMINISTRATION – REPORT ON 
MEETINGS OF OCTOBER AND NOVEMB ER 2013 .............................................................. 44  
11  WTO PENSION PLAN MANAGEMENT BO ARD – ELECTION OF AN ALTERNATE – 
PROPOSAL BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE GENERA L COUNCI L ............................................ 45  
12  REVIEW OF WT O ACTIVITI ES ................................................................................... 45  
12.1  General Council, Dispute Settlemen t Body, and Trade Policy Review Body ........................ 45 
12.2  Sectoral Councils and Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, Committee on 
Antidumping Practices, Committee on Safeguards, Committee on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures ................................................................................................... 45 
12.3  Committees on Trade and Development, Trade and Environment, Balance-of-
Payments Restrictions, Budget, Finance and Administration and Regional Trade 
Agreements ....................................................................................................................  45 
12.4  Working Groups on Trade, Debt and Finance and Trade and Transfer of Technology .......... 45 
12.5  Committees under the Plur ilateral Trade Agreements .................................................... 45 
13  APPOINTMENT OF OFFICERS TO WT O BODIES – ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE 
CHAIRMAN PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 7.1 (A) OF THE GUIDELINES ............................ 46  
14  RESPONSIBILITIES OF CHAIRPERSONS OF WTO BODIES – STATEMENT BY 
DOMINICAN RE PUBLIC .................................................................................................. 47  
15  CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE TRIPS COUNCIL IN SPECIAL SESSION - STATEMENT 
BY THE CHAIRMAN ......................................................................................................... 48  
16  ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES FOR MEMBERS IN ARREARS – STATEMENT BY THE CHAIR .....................................................................................................................  49
 
 WT/GC/M/149 
 
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  1  REPORT BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE TRADE NEGOTI ATIONS COMMITTEE 
1.1.  The Chairman invited the Director-General, as  Chairman of the TNC, to report on the TNC's 
activities since his last report to the Council. 
1.2.  The Director-General2, Chairman of the TNC, recalled that since the last meeting of the 
General Council in October, the TNC had held three informal meetings on 14 and 25 October and 
12 November.3  In conjunction with the General Council Chairman, the TNC had also held an 
informal HODs meeting on 1 November. He thanked the Chairs and the Secretariat for their work 
over recent weeks.  
1.3.  He said that when he had accepted the position of Director-General he had told Members that 
one of his priorities would be transparency and inclusiveness. He had often heard that truly productive meetings could only happen with a small number of delegations, behind closed doors. 
He had never accepted that. He had always felt that all delegations had to take part in the 
decision-making process. Of course meetings in smaller configurations were needed to speed up 
the process, but the results of these meetings had to feed into a more open, transparent and 
inclusive process. He had put these ideas into practice as the list of meetings for October and 
November showed.  
1.4.  He recalled that, in recent weeks, over 150 hours of negotiations had been completed in 
room W, D and E meetings alone. The last meetings had been open-ended in Room W. He said 
that perhaps this was not the most efficient way of doing things and he apologised for that. The last meeting had started on Sunday at 10am and had finished at 7am the previous day. He thanked everyone for the tremendous effort carried out over the previous couple of months. He 
hoped Members would forgive him for having pushed so hard and for trying to get efficiency 
through unorthodox procedures like the 60-second rule. He wished to think that these often unpleasant procedures were necessary to help cove r so much ground over such a short period of 
time. He believed Members had achieved a lot and had done so hearing all voices and allowing for 
a process where everyone knew what was happening and where the trade-offs were accessible to all. More than that, each Member had had a chance to defend their national interests to the fullest 
extent. He was proud of that particularly becaus e this inclusive process had not prevented them 
from making progress. In fact, more progress had been made in just the past few weeks than over the past five years. The ship had almost sunk a few times, but everyone had managed to keep it afloat and on course. 
1.5.  He stressed that, over the last few weeks he had seen the WTO the way it should be. 
Members had been negotiating. Members had been dynamic. Members had worked hard to get an agreement: engaging capitals, seeking common ground, making compromises. Members had 
worked through weekends, around the clock, and ha d lost sleep. He had not seen such effort and 
engagement since July 2008. And in contrast, back then, just a few delegations had been active actors throughout. As a result of these efforts and engagement negotiations had been concluded in 
a large number of difficult and sensitive areas. The texts before Members at the present meeting 
showed this quite clearly. He noted that the set of documents included the following: 
a. Four draft decisions on Agriculture: 
i. The Draft Decision on Agriculture General Services – JOB/TNC/28 
ii. The Draft Decision on Public Stockholding for Food Security Purposes – JOB/TNC/29 
iii. The Draft Decision on Export Competition – JOB/TNC/31 
iv. The Draft Decision on Tariff Rate Quota Administration – JOB/TNC/30 
b. The Draft Trade Facilitation Agreement – JOB/TNC/35.  
                                               
2 The Director-General's statement was circulated in JOB/GC/59. 
3 The Director-General's statements at these meetin gs are contained in documents JOB/TNC/23, 26 and 
27, respectively. WT/GC/M/149 
 
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  c. Five documents in the Development/LDC pillar: 
i. The Draft Decision on the Monitoring Mechanism on Special and Differential 
Treatment – JOB/TNC/34  
ii. The Draft Decision on Duty-Free and Quota-Free Market Access for LDCs – 
JOB/TNC/33 
iii. The Draft Decision on Preferential Ru les of Origin for LDCs – JOB/TNC/24 
iv. The Draft Decision on Cotton – JOB/TNC/32 
v. And the Draft Decision on the Operationalization of the Waiver Concerning 
Preferential Treatment to Services and Service Suppliers of LDCs – JOB/TNC/25 
1.6.  He recalled that these ten texts had been negotiated as a Package. Members had made 
compromises and showed flexibility with the understanding that their contributions would be 
reciprocated in other areas of the negotiation. The work had not been finished in all negotiating 
areas and, therefore, none of these texts could be understood to be fully agreed. Each one of them had a square bracket at the beginning of the text  and another at the end. These documents were 
simply a snapshot of where the negotiations were at that point in time. They consolidated the 
progress made so far and did not incorporate anything that happened after 7 a.m. the previous day. They were the documents negotiated in the open-ended meetings in room W. Many had 
asked for adjustments of the texts where they felt further progress could be made, or where there 
were specific difficulties in some areas. He did not make the requested adjustments, because other 
Members had not had time to comment on them. He had therefore kept the texts intact as they were at 7 a.m. the previous day.  
1.7.  He noted that there was one slight change made to the export competition text in order to 
take on-board some of the language proposed by  Cuba as the last meeting on that issue was 
finishing. As Members did not have the opportunity to come back to that text in the negotiating 
process, he had taken the risk of including some elements of the Cuban proposal to the text even 
though he had not had the chance to test it with other Members. As Members had not discussed the proposal in that meeting he had not applied the full scope of the proposal, but he thought 
some elements were useful and appropriate as they referred to S&D treatment for LDCs and 
NFIDCs. He hoped he had not upset the balance Me mbers were seeking. Nonetheless, none of the 
texts were fully agreed so Members could revisit these adjustments in due course. Since there would no longer be further open-ended meetings between then and Bali, the documents would not 
be revised. He nonetheless encouraged Members to continue seeking convergence wherever this 
was possible. Any further results would be taken to Bali and could be incorporated in the consolidated texts at the appropriate time. 
1.8.  In his assessment, after the hard effort put into the negotiations, there was good news and 
bad news. 
1.9.  The good news was that Members had come very close to fully agreed texts. As far as the 
Geneva process was concerned, Members had managed to get convergence in almost all areas. 
Except for the Trade Facilitation text, the other documents were either entirely or mostly clean of square brackets. They were not agreed texts but they were “stable”. Delegations might want to 
revisit them, but in the process in Geneva, Members had managed to conclude negotiations. Even 
Section II of the Trade Facilitation text – the largest iceberg until a couple of days earlier – was 
now virtually “clean”. Members still needed to conclude work on some of the provisions for LDCs, but otherwise there was a stable and finalised text. He was afraid the same could not be said of 
Section I. Members had cleaned much of the text but some issues remained unresolved. He did 
not think the challenges in those issues were insurmountable. On the contrary, he believed the landing zones were discernible to Members.  
1.10.  The bad news, however, was that over the last few days, Members had stopped making the 
tough political calls and this had prevented them from getting to the finish line. They were indeed close, but not quite there. What remained to be negotiated was not something that could be easily WT/GC/M/149 
 
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  managed by the Ministers in Bali. Although Member s could discern the landing zones in most – if 
not all – of the pending issues, the bracketed areas were too many and too technical in nature.  
1.11.  He said that holding negotiations in the short time in Bali would be simply impractical with 
over 100 Ministers around the table. He did not believe that small negotiating meetings behind 
locked doors would do the trick either. Anyway, th ey were not an option. Even at this critical 
juncture, he did not believe Members would be ready to abandon the transparent and inclusive nature of the negotiations. Moreover, many Members had expressly stated that Bali should not be 
a negotiating Ministerial Conference and he agreed with them. It would not be feasible and would 
not be successful. Members were not going to Bali with a set of finalised documents that could allow the Ministers to announce to the world a set of multilaterally agreed outcomes – the first since the WTO was created. 
1.12.  He said that, at that point in time, one could not tell the world that the Organization had 
delivered and he would inform the Ministers that  Members had failed to find convergence. He 
would tell them that Members had come truly close to a successful outcome, but that, once more, 
the finish line had eluded them. Failure in Bali would have grave consequences for the Multilateral 
Trading System. Most of the Members knew this. Members would fail not only the WTO and multilateralism but also the constituencies at la rge, the business community and, above all, the 
most vulnerable. Members would fail the poor worldwide. Not a single human being living in 
poverty anywhere in the world would be better off if there was failure in Bali. 
1.13.  What Members had on the table for Trade Facilitation would deliver jobs and opportunities in 
times of unemployment and slow growth. It would also deliver technical assistance and capacity 
building for the better integration of developing and least-developed countries into global trade 
flows. What Members had on the table would deliver for the least-developed countries in several areas: 
a. Improvement in market access schemes of duty-free quota-free; 
b. Simplified and more accessible rules of origin for their exports; 
c. Improved market access for the services sector; and 
d. A renewed push for the cotton negotiations. 
1.14.  What was on the table would also deliver a mechanism for the review and strengthening of 
S&D provisions in all WTO Agreements. And what was on the table would deliver on very significant agricultural issues. In this pillar, the results would:  
a. Set a track for a reform of export subs idies and measures of similar effect; 
b. Provide for a better implementation of tariff rate quota commitments; and 
c. Provide a temporary shelter for food security programmes and put in place negotiations 
that would address concerns regarding the sust ainability of legitimate food security and 
food aid programmes. 
1.15.  The worst of all was that if this failed, ever ything would be lost, for no justifiable reason. He 
believed that nothing that was on the table requir ed any Member to go beyond what was doable. 
One might not get all that they sought, but no unmanageable contribution was required from anyone. Above all, one should not accept the inevit able simplistic assessments that would show up 
over the next few days about why Members were  at an impasse. This was not about developed 
versus developing countries. This was not a North – South divide. Members had all tried. He had 
seen the developing and least-developed fully engaged and showing the impetus and flexibility required for a successful conclusion of the negotiations. Only those that truly wanted an outcome 
would show such a disposition. He had also seen developed Members trying hard to get to the 
finish line.  
1.16.  The negotiations on Section II of the Trad e Facilitation text had made it abundantly clear 
that both sides wanted a successful outcome. Sure; it had been a rough, tough and bloody WT/GC/M/149 
 
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  endeavour. That’s how negotiations were. But he was proud of the effort and of the engagement. 
Both North and South wanted this to end successfully.  
1.17.  He further said that this was also not abou t lack of time. If Members had a few more weeks, 
they would still not make it. Over the last few da ys he had begun to see signs of backtracking and 
inflexibility and time would not remedy this situation. 
1.18.  This was about specific, localised difficulties . All of them perfectly workable if the will was 
there. The landing zones were reachable. But it ha d been proven that the final yard could not be 
crossed with normal negotiating practices. Members were in a new stage now and the final few 
steps had to be taken together by Members. They would need to talk to each other over the next 
few days, to figure out a way forward. He would be consulting with them and would do everything he could to facilitate discussions. But it was up to Members to find the solution that everyone 
wanted to see. If they were to get this deal over the line it would need political engagement – and 
political will. Ministers would need to decide what future they wanted to see – both for the issues 
on the table – and for the WTO. 
1.19.  It aggrieved him to have to say this again and he was sure it was difficult for Members to be 
in this position. So close, but not quite there. Members had been in this situation before, had let 
the opportunity go by, and had sorely regretted it. If they missed the opportunity given this time 
around, they would regret it a lot more, for the costs would be even greater. Members had 
reached the end of the process in Geneva and had come as far as they could and would brief their authorities on the situation faced. Ministers would have an opportunity in Bali to address it. 
1.20.  Therefore his recommendation in light of the nature and shape of the documents was that 
he would recommend that the General Council take note of the documents which he would simply 
use to brief Ministers on the state of play as of now – but not as agreed texts for adoption.  
1.21.  All delegations which spoke thanked th e Director-General, Chairman of the Trade 
Negotiations Committee, for his report and for his tireless efforts. 
1.22.  The representative of Indonesia said that MC9 was right in front of Members, that he could 
see the finish line and that Members were almost there. Everyone had already worked hard during 
the last 11 months. With engagement, lowering the ambitions, and increasing the flexibility, 
Members could get to convergence. He asked why, at that point, delegations still looked back at the starting line and still kept back some flexibilities. He noted that Members had their own national interests and problems, and that they had to  show more trust in each other. The future of 
the Organization was at stake. He asked the DG, together with his team, the GC Chair, and all 
delegations to make the final acceleration and to bring the complete Bali Package.  Efforts had to be memorable, so as to make th e Organization exist forever.  
1.23.  The representative of Morocco, on behalf of the African Group, said that the DG had led the 
negotiations with a great deal of skill, sensitivity, openness and patience. There were very deep 
divergences but thanks to his efforts, Members ha d been able to narrow the gaps, particularly in 
Trade Facilitation. The question was whether Members could have done better but that was 
difficult to answer.  In the past, the WTO had never worked in total transparency, nor on an inclusive basis where each and every Member, big an d small, were able to be present in the room, 
listen, speak, contribute, defend their positions. The WTO had never had so many meetings on the 
eve of a Ministerial:  the number of hours and da ys, the amount of time spent on the negotiation 
of the Bali Package was a record.  That meant that Members were all committed to reach a balanced Package on Agriculture, Trade Facilita tion and development issues. Much progress had 
been made. He noted that many things had seemed taboo or impossible and recalled several 
discussions in which delegations had spoken of red-lines.  However, in the past few days no one had been speaking of red lines: delegations had been seeking landing zones. For this he wished to 
thank the representatives of the US, of the EU as well as his fellow Group Coordinators. 
1.24.   Members had been open, ready to listen and to understand the concerns.  It was that 
flexibility which had enabled delegations to tidy up almost the entire text on Trade Facilitation. The debate had been lively, delegations had had tough discussions over words, but it had been fully 
legitimate and Members had understood and respected one another, which had enabled them to 
achieve what had been achieved on Trade Facilitation. He was pleased with respect to the positive WT/GC/M/149 
 
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  results reported by the Director-General on deve lopment issues, cotton and the operationalization 
of the Services waiver for LDCs. These were posi tive facts for the Organization; they showed how 
good the method was that had enabled Members to reach this result. On Agriculture, he recalled that there were a lot of developing countries involved in the negotiation and there as well there 
was major progress.  The hope was that Agriculture was included in the Package.  
1.25.  He recognized that there were still some outstanding difficulties but he believed that the 
remaining issues were not insurmountable. There were issues of national position, there was a 
political dimension, and that meant that Members had other stakeholders involved other than 
those actually sitting in the room. But would Members allow themselves to go to Bali and announce to the world that they had failed? He stressed that delegations had not failed, because negotiators had done what they had been given the responsibility to do.  They had negotiated and 
had undertaken a collective effort with a great sens e of responsibility which had enabled them to 
have all the texts on the table. However, in any negotiation, there was a political side and negotiators were not responsible for the political side. That was up to the Ministers.  Members in 
Geneva had not failed, and he did not believe that they could imagine a failure in Bali.  
1.26.  Negotiations were then moving to a higher level – to the political level. It was up to the 
Ministers to say whether they were committed to the WTO and whether they wanted to save the 
Multilateral System. It was up to them as well to say whether they were willing to sacrifice all the 
work, the negotiations and the concessions that they had made thus far. It was up to the Ministers to say that Members had failed: he did not believe that any Minister, in any Capital, developed or developing, could say that their negotiators had failed.  
1.27.  The Conference could not be closed before it had begun. Negotiations had to continue to 
deal with the tiny amount, the 10% that remain ed. That 10% should not kill the 90% that had 
been negotiated, reinforced and strengthened. De legations had to be able to convince their 
Capitals that this balanced Package was a Packag e for history. Members could either save the WTO 
or use national positions to kill it. It was easier to kill than to preserve, but he believed that Members had go to Bali with the commitment to continue their discussions.  
1.28.  He stressed that the Director-General should continue his consultations to find solutions. He 
did not agree that Members could not continue negotiations in this format. The format was probably not viable in Bali, but there could be a format involving those countries with direct problems.  The DG could then come back to the plenary format and inform Members of the results 
of the discussions. He recalled that, the previous days, while in an open plenary meeting, the G-77 
had discussed directly with the US and the EU, and these bilateral discussions had allowed them to 
come back and report on the results. This approach could be used in Bali and political alchemy 
could offer the solution.  
1.29.  Members should be proud of what had been done thus far and they should not be 
discouraged. It was only on 6 December at midnight, if there was no agreement, that one could 
say that they had failed and the Bali Package had not been concluded. He reiterated the appeal 
made by Indonesia to those countries that had direct, firm positions, who wished to have further concessions and who wanted to find solutions.  He appealed to those countries to face up to their responsibilities so that delegations could try to find solutions to the problems. Each Member should 
go to Bali with the commitment, determination and resolution to solve the problems. If Members 
had these ingredients, then they would succeed, so that Bali would not be a black spot on WTO's history, but be a rock which would strengthen the foundations of the WTO and multilateral 
negotiations.  
1.30.  The representative of the Solomon Islands, on behalf of the LDC Group, said that the DG's 
assessment was balanced and that the LDC Group appreciated his leadership. It was now critical 
that Members should hear the DG's call. The work had to be accomplished, and failure would not 
be in the interest of any Member. For LDCs, the success of Bali was not an option. LDCs were marginal participants in world trade, and Bali provided an opportunity to Members to further assist LDCs in their beneficial integration in world trade. Bali should not fail to deliver on promises made 
to LDCs. A solid LDC Package could not only boost the morale of LDCs but also reinvigorate the 
Multilateral Trading System. WT/GC/M/149 
 
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  1.31.  A lot of work had been undertaken to prepare the LDC Package. Members had worked out 
multilateral guidelines for preferential rules of or igin. In the area of Services, a process was being 
initiated to operationalize the LDC Services waiver which he hoped would result in meaningful outcomes for LDC Services and service suppliers. Outcomes had also been worked out both for 
DFQF market access as well as for addressing trade and development assistance aspects of cotton. 
All these elements – though not fully to the aspirati ons of LDCs – could assist them in their efforts 
to accelerate economic growth and development.  They could not afford to throw this away. 
1.32.  As regards other deliverables in Bali – Agriculture and Trade Facilitation – Members had 
come a long way. The LDCs had approached these negotiations with necessary flexibility. They had made considerable progress and they firmly believed that the outstanding issues could be resolved. The LDCs were ready to play their part in  this process to secure a meaningful outcome in 
both areas. As Members prepared to finalize at Bali the Package, he wished to emphasize that Bali 
was not the end of the road. 
1.33.  With respect to LDC specific language in se ction II of the draft text on Trade Facilitation, his 
understanding was that it would capture additional flexibilities for LDCs. He underlined that any TF 
text should be sent to Ministers only after LDC specific language had been fully incorporated in the text. He recalled that, at the last Ministerial, Members had committed to explore different 
negotiating approaches as Members made progress on the Doha Round. They had embraced the 
principle that whatever progress they could make should not be halted. The LDC Package was almost ready for Ministers’ approval. Substantial progress had already been made in other areas of the Bali deal. At this juncture, LDCs requested all Members not to give up. LDCs fully agreed with 
the DG that Members were almost there: abandoning now would only undermine their own ability 
and credibility.   
1.34.  He recalled how difficult it had been to achieve results in the WTO and that for 20 years it 
had not delivered. Many times Members had reached a mark of near-delivery, but they had failed. 
This time there was an opportunity, especially in view of an objective assessment of progress Members had made so far. Results, however minimum and modest, could only ensure the 
Organization’s credibility – the Organization that Members collectively had instituted and 
collectively needed. 
1.35.  The representative of Australia shared the message from previous interventions that 
Members were not ready to give up, that the i ssues were not insurmountable and that Members 
could still deliver a Package at Bali. He agreed that Members had made more progress in the past 
few weeks than he had seen for a very long time an d it had been very clear, including in the last 
few days, that the vast majority of Members was ready to complete a realistic Package of 
outcomes in Bali. Members were not there yet, but he was not ready to give up and urged the 
Director-General to continue working with Members. It was the Membership's responsibility but they needed the DG's help to find a way forward to deliver an outcome in Bali. It was clear that a 
Package was the only way to get a result.  He be lieved that, given the small areas of fundamental 
problems, there had to be a way to move past th ose differences that divided Members and to unite 
on a whole balanced Package. Members knew what the expectations in all the areas of the Package 
were; it was now time to find a way to deliver.  He urged the Director-General to help Members to 
find that way and all other Members to commit to that outcome as well. 
1.36.  The representative of Jamaica, on behalf of  the ACP Group, said that in Jamaica, sprinters 
were taught to run through the line, not to the lin e.  This had been famously disregarded by their 
most famous sprinter in Beijing where he had not run through the line.  The good thing was that 
he was already so far ahead of the field that he was in no danger.  He would not recommend the same approach for the process in which they were now engaged. 
1.37.  He noted that the Director-General had placed the issue before Members in their hands and 
had explicitly said that they had come as far as they could in Geneva, but not how far they could now go. He commended him for the extraordinary efforts that he had made to invigorate and 
guide the negotiating process to help Members secure the significant progress that had been 
made.  He also commended him for the transparent and inclusive manner in which he had carried 
forward the negotiations through the Room W proc ess. Delegations, especially the smaller ones, 
had valued the ability to engage in this way and also in many of the consultations in smaller 
configurations.  WT/GC/M/149 
 
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  1.38.  He said that the ACP Group had sought to advance the interests of its members in the 
negotiations, in line with clearly enunciated principles, while at the same time endeavouring to help forge convergence across the membership. The ACP Group had worked closely with the 
African Group and the LDC Group in the G-90 format to secure mutual objectives. It had also 
worked to forge wider convergence with other developing countries in particular, and all Members 
in general, in pursuit of their shared goals. At their Ministerial gathering in October, in preparation for MC9, ACP Ministers had declared their commi tment to the efforts to achieve a successful 
outcome in Bali. That commitment remained - especially bearing in mind the importance attached 
by the ACP to the rule-based Multilateral Trading System and the recognition of the important contribution that a successful Bali outcome would make to the agenda of the WTO and the MTS. 
1 . 3 9 .   W h i l e  h e  w o u l d  h a v e  l i k e d  t o  h a v e  m a d e  s o m e  m o r e  p r o g r e s s  t h a n  w a s  r e f l e c t e d  i n  t h e  
texts that were before them, he felt that an outcome remained within reach although it was clear 
that Members had to do more to achieve it. The AC P Group was pleased that in Section II of Trade 
Facilitation text, Members had secured an outcome that was substantially stabilized around the 
principles set forth in the Annex D and Hong Kong mandates, and on the basis of a process to 
which Members had attached great importance. Members had been able to benefit from a shared vision in the negotiations on Section II. The flexibilities shown by key partners were a welcome 
feature of their efforts in the final stages to build convergence, especially around key elements of 
paragraphs 1, 4 and 6 of the consolidated Section II text.  
1.40.  The Group also welcomed the significant progress in Section I, but shared the DG's 
assessment that there remained a number of substantive matters still to be resolved. The Group 
was heartened that the issues underlying these unresolved matters were well known and the 
options for addressing them were laid out. Of course, knowing more precisely what the problem was did not in itself lead to a solution - but it helped. With Section II more or less stabilized and to 
be complemented by the finalisation of further LD C specific flexibilities, the Group hoped that if 
there were any outstanding Section I provisions for which time or resources were a key factor, these could now be more clearly addressed. Members would be able to signal a way forward for 
dealing with the outstanding matters, one way or another. 
1.41.  On Development, there was no question that the ambition level was low. The agreement 
reached on the Monitoring Mechanism proposal by the African Group cleared the way for an acceptable outcome on this issue but Members sti ll had to address the Group’s proposal that there 
be a meaningful decision on post Bali work on S&D. This was a condition linked to the outcome on 
the Cancun 28. The ACP Group would give its full support to the efforts to secure this, recognizing that a meaningful conversation on post-Bali had not yet taken place. 
1.42.  On LDC issues, the levels of ambition on key proposals of the Group had been lowered in 
the final outcomes. The Group recognized and su pported the approach taken by the LDC Group, 
which was to find compromise outcomes that could enjoy consensus while remaining committed to 
pursuing solutions that could adequately and effectively address the concerns of Members and 
promote their integration into the MTS.  
1.43.  On Agriculture, the Group was encouraged by the progress made in reaching agreement or 
understanding on the key proposals of the G-20 and G-33.  The Group was pleased that in certain 
areas in which the interests and concerns of the ACP Group arose, the measures advanced had 
taken these into consideration. He was hopeful that the proposals in this pillar would secure and retain the support of all Members. 
1.44.  On the matter of the horizontal assessments, logic dictated that their benchmark be the 
acceptance of the outcomes agreed by the key proponents in each of the three pillars. The 
perspectives for example of the G-20, the G-33 an d the African Group in the areas of Agriculture 
and development and those of proponents of key elements in TF remain key factors for 
consideration by anyone making the assessment. 
1.45.  On post-Bali, the Group had already fla gged the importance of work on S&D, and the 
commitment to completion of the DDA in a development focused programme of work, were of the 
highest priority for the Members. On the issue of the Bali Package itself, he was sure that Members 
remained committed to ensuring that Bali pr ovided a landing zone for the Package.  WT/GC/M/149 
 
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  1.46.  He looked forward to the DG's thoughts on how Members could proceed to complete the 
Package as a whole, even in the face of a punishing timeline. The ACP Group would support any final effort that was realistic and retained the commitment to the FIT principles. He shared the view that Bali should not be a negotiating Ministerial while recognizing that as the highest body of 
the Organisation it ultimately had to play the deciding role.  
1.47.  The representative of Chile recalled that the Director-General had warned Members several 
times. Errors in political calculation, lack of time or other matters meant there was no concrete 
agreement for Bali. He said that experience had shown that it was not possible to take a document 
to Ministers for them to settle it, when it had ab out 40 themes still open in Trade Facilitation and 
disagreements in the Agriculture pillar. He believed th at there were only two options: to give up or 
to commit. If Members decided to gi ve up on the Bali Package, not only would they lose what they 
had managed to achieve with so many efforts, but this would lead to harmful consequences for the 
institution, both in the short and long term. Consequently, the realistic option was to continue.  This would mean sending the Ministers the set of what Members had negotiated up to date in the 
three pillars as a Package. Ministers could then take note of these important advances and could 
instruct negotiator to finalize the Package so that this could be adopted in a new Ministerial Conference. A reasonable deadline for this purpose would be two months for effective negotiations, 
which would imply a new final meeting in the spring of the northern hemisphere.  
1.48.  But this would only be possible if all Members were ready to make concessions. Without this 
attitude, there would be no success. He believed that this was a credible and realistic alternative.  It was credible, because Members were indeed very close to the goal and it was realistic because 
the work done in the last few weeks had showed th at it was possible to make progress. Certainly, 
it was more complex than in the past, more difficult, perhaps even painful. But the documents that were before Members show that it could be done . If Members opted for this path, they would be 
showing the world that the WTO was able to make  progress in negotiations on the basis of 
consensus and cooperation. He acknowledged the work of the Director-General and the 
Secretariat, who had been able to maintain the pace of negotiations in accordance with the 
circumstances. His participation and leadership in each of the stages in the process were of 
fundamental importance. As Winston Churchill had said, " it's not about doing the best but doing 
what it takes ". 
1.49.  The representative of United States joined others in appreciating the Director-General's 
efforts at attempting to facilitate a deal for MC9. Like others, on the previous Sunday night, he had 
been hopeful that eight weeks of around the clock toil by Members could lead to the first multilateral trade deal in two decades, the first multilateral trade deal in the history of the WTO. 
But by 7 am on the Monday morning, it had appeared that the deal was no more. Today he was 
worried, alongside so many in the room, that a once in a generation opportunity might have slipped the grasp of Members.  
1.50.  He recalled that he had been in Geneva for three and half years and many times the 
previous week, it had been striking to him how alive the institution felt. Bustling hallways, excited clusters of conversations swapping rumours between meetings, empty vending machines, Room W with text up on the big screen and negotiators filling every seat. It had felt like a place where 
things happened and it had been the first time that he had felt that way during his tenure. Equally 
striking had been the interest of global stakehol ders in what Members were doing. They had been 
calling and e-mailing, sceptically at first wonderin g if a deal was really possible. And later with 
cautious hope, often after learning about particulars of the deal they would say: "Good luck. This 
would be good for the Multilateral Trading System". 
1.51.  The United States was among the vast majority of Members who had worked hard to have a 
deal for Bali. It cared about the institution and had seized this chance to keep the negotiating 
rooms busy, to earn the respect and attention of st akeholders from around the world. It had been 
a privilege to work with so many distinguished colleagues over the last several weeks and months. By now delegations knew each other very well. He had particularly appreciated the efforts of the 
many in the waning moments who had worked together to bridge the gaps, to consider creative 
options for resolving issues, to bring Members closer together rather than finding new ways to drive Members apart.  
1.52.  Yet despite all of these efforts and good faith, Members were not there yet and in an 
Organization that operated by consensus, a small handful of Members could keep the majority WT/GC/M/149 
 
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  from achieving success. The lowest common denominator could become, de facto , the highest 
common denominator. He was worried that this mi ght be happening. He was sceptical that those 
who appeared to be refusing to reach agreemen t could now be convinced by just another long 
night of negotiation. Indeed, he agreed with the assessment of the Director-General that the 
Geneva process had run its course. Further work in Geneva, even if there were time, would run 
the risk of yet more hostage-taking. Nor did he agree with those who expected magic solutions to emerge through negotiations by Ministers in Bali and he wondered how that would work. He asked 
if Members were proposing to put text up on the screen and ask a plenary session of the one 
hundred and fifty nine Minsters to find words where they in Geneva could not. Would the 
Membership accept a green room where thirty Ministers cut a deal, while one hundred and twenty nine waited outside in the hallway? Having learned the hard way from previous Ministerial 
Conferences, Members had said for months that Bali could not be a negotiating session. Nor should 
this body contemplate rewarding the intransigent few with new concessions.  
1.53.  The United States had taken the Director-General seriously when he had said that Members 
had been in the end game and it had left its best  offer on the table. In pursuit of an agreement 
with its trading partners, the United States had demonstrated its flexibility on tough issues such as Section II and in that case, with willing partners, they had found agreement together. The United 
States had negotiated hard, but it had done so in the spirit of problem solving, making principled 
compromises when necessary, to help solve a puzzle that had blocked negotiating progress for a decade. Having made those tough compromises, th e United States stood by the deals that had 
been reached. He had heard someone suggest taki ng a couple of months after Bali to tie up 
negotiations. He was afraid that would not work. Members had all known for two years that Bali 
would be a moment of reckoning. What Members co uld not decide by then, would not fall suddenly 
into place in the weeks thereafter. Like others, he was not sure about the path forward and would 
use the next few days to consider carefully the next steps. After having had a taste of the potential 
of the institution, when Members had worked toge ther, after the actual texts had been in their 
hands, it seemed hard to contemplate going back to the quiet, dark hallways of the old WTO, but 
that was a prospect that was present again and Members knew it all too well. The United States 
would look for answers with those who were working to keep the lights switched on.  
1.54.  The representative of Korea thanked the Director-General for his hard work, together with 
the three Chairs, Friends of Chair, the LDC facilitator, the Secretariat and all Members towards 
finalizing the Bali deal. However, Members knew that they were not there yet.  The current 
situation was quite critical to the success of MC9 and the prospects for the MTS and the global economy. Since early September, Korea had been pleased about the substantial progress in the 
preparation for MC9, although it was slow. Members had managed to produce agreed papers ad 
referendum on Agriculture, development and LDCs . On TF, Members had also eliminated hundreds 
of brackets in a short period of time, although some still remained. 
1.55.  He said that Members were faced with serious challenges: first, there were still some 
icebergs in the text, although not insurmountable. Second, Members had too little time to finalize the pending problems before Bali. Third, it was regrettable to see some Members still posturing and even back-tracking. But, in his view, there was some good news too. He had noticed a solid 
trust among some key players, and he had also no ticed that Members trusted the Director-General 
as TNC Chair. Members had achieved a lot so far and the landing zone was within reach.  It was necessary now to figure out a pathway. Failure in Bail was not an option, and deferment was also 
not an option. He urged Members, and particular ly key players, to show their leadership by 
cooperating and compromising with each other. Until Bali, Members should make a bold decision to drop and to trim down some outstanding issues which could not enjoy consensus in order to 
deliver in Bali. The Package that could be harveste d in Bali would serve as a strong momentum for 
further strengthening the MTS and the revitalization of the DDA negotiations. Korea would continue to engage and contribute in the final stage toward the success of MC9. 
1.56.  The representative of Brazil said that hi s delegation had been working with determination 
and a constructive spirit for the achievement of a significant Package of results in the Bali 
Ministerial Conference. The Brazilian delegation had demonstrated this both with its words and with its moments of silence, and even more so with its concrete moves. Brazil had received with a 
favourable disposition the product of the intense negotiations, even if it was less than what his 
delegation had wanted, because this had been a complex effort towards a consensus he believed was possible. It was with that spirit that he had submitted the progress that had been made until 
now to the consideration of the highest authorities and Members could be certain that this very WT/GC/M/149 
 
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  positive determination would guide Brazil's enga gement in the important and challenging work 
ahead. Brazil was ready to continue negotiations before Bali and in Bali.  
1.57.  The representative of Japan agreed with the DG's assessment on the state of play and 
commended his leadership and strenuous efforts.  Regarding the way forward, as the DG had 
stated, with some few remaining issues on Section I, most of them of a technical nature, Members 
could not bring the draft text Package as it was to  Bali. Negotiating among Ministers would be just 
impossible and chaos should be avoided. At Bali, Ministers could instruct negotiators to continue 
and finish the negotiation by a certain point in 2014, based on the understanding not to reopen 
the discussion regarding the issues where convergences had emerged. However, he wondered if Members could deliver that. He highlighted that, with these factors in mind, the fate of the Package depended on those Members who still continued to play risky games at the end game 
stage. If Members were to solve the remainin g bracketed issues, they had to show needed 
flexibility. Beautiful words alone could not work. 
1.58.  The representative of South Africa expre ssed disappointment that the Bali Package had not 
been concluded. He said that his delegation had not been part of the narrative that failure to 
conclude such a Package would be fatal to the Or ganization and the Multilateral Trading System, 
and was not part of the all or nothing approach ad opted by some. He believed that the reasons for 
this were simple: the WTO was and continued to be in crisis due to the prolonged impasse in the 
Doha Round. The main reason for this was, in his view, the high and unrealistic demands of some Members. The crisis was then exacerbated by a sh ift of the resources and energy of the largest 
and richest Members, towards transcontinental and mega-bilaterals. An all or nothing approach 
was another attempt to shift the focus of attentio n, from the needs and interests of the poorest 
Members towards that of major business interests.  Nevertheless, the majority of Members were 
willing to do what it took to rebuild support in the rich countries for multilateralism and the Doha 
Round. This was reflected in their active participation in the Bali Package negotiations. Members 
had worked hard during the past few months, spendi ng long nights and several weekends trying to 
conclude an agreement on Trade Facilitation. Ho wever, despite several hundred hours of overtime 
on these proposals of the proponents, Members could not meet the deadline for Bali.  
1.59.  He pointed out that there were some lesso ns to be learned. First, a proponent-driven 
process had limits and should be converted to a multilateral process owned by the Membership. 
Many of these proponent-driven proposals should  have been withdrawn months before, or their 
high ambition reduced. However, several of thes e proponents maintained these proposals that had 
little chance of gaining convergence, holding up progress and resulting in the collapse of the negotiations, under the sheer weight of some much resolved technical and political issues. 
However, there was no doubt that Members had made some real progress, even in Section II of 
the text, reflecting their willingness to find solution s. This flexibility should have come much earlier 
in the negotiations. An approach of brinkmanship had always suffered the danger of coming too 
late to save the day. He paid tribute to the extr aordinary resilience and tenacity of the Director-
General: his mastery of the technical issues under discussion, an ability to craft balanced solutions to intractable problems, was indispensable to getting Members that far. He had succeeded in building an inclusive approach to the negotiations. However, he wished to caution against the all 
night pressure cooker technique from being used again: a negotiation by exhaustion approach 
would only favour those who had the technical expertise and capacity.  
1.60.  He also said that the failure of the Bali Package had to also lie in its construction. In the 
wake of the prolonged impasse in the Doha Round, an "LDC plus" approach to an early harvest 
favoured by the majority of the Members had been substituted by a "Trade Facilitation plus" approach. Whilst Members had agreed at several Ministerial and TNC meetings to have a balance 
between the three pillars of the Bali Package, development and LDC issues, Agriculture, and Trade 
Facilitation, the final texts were clearly imbalanced. The LDC pillar remained weak, postponing the legitimate demands of the poorest countries into promises of delivery in the future. The Agriculture pillar contained temporal solutions that would expire in a few years and created an opt-out clause 
for the largest economy. And the monitoring mechanism, meant to provide creative solutions for 
developing country concerns, might be more rest rictive than the existing Committee on Trade and 
Development. On the other hand, the proposed Trade Facilitation text had become expansive and 
extensive, containing many new obligations for developing countries and with uncertainties on the 
delivery of assistance remaining in the text. There were some underlying questions which cast a huge shadow over the negotiations for Bali. He wo ndered about the fate of the Doha Development 
Agenda and whether the major developed countries would insist on new pathways that shifted the WT/GC/M/149 
 
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  focus of the WTO to the issues and interests of  the developed countries and to plurilateral 
approaches that excluded the majority of developing countries. Unfortunately, that had been no discussions on those issues in preparation for Ba li, nor had Members even placed these questions 
on the agenda for Bali.  
1.61.  In terms of what should be done at Bali, his Minister had clearly instructed him not to bring 
those texts, especially the highly technically comp lex and heavily bracketed Trade Facilitation text, 
to Bali for Ministers to negotiate. Past experience had clearly indicated that Ministerial meetings 
had not offered a conducive environment for negotiations. They were highly politicized forums 
under the full glare of global attention. It was not the place where Members showed flexibilities, 
but positions tended to harden under the pressure of stakeholders and NGOs. Members should use Bali to gain insights of Ministers and the many stakeholders and NGOs gathered on how they could 
regain support to strengthen the multilateral, rules-based system, that had served humanity well 
since the Second World War, to reignite multilateral negotiations in the WTO, by a return of Members from mega-regionals and bilateral and plurilateral negotiations, and to rebuild the WTO's 
legitimacy by addressing the concerns of develo ping countries. The Multilateral Trading System 
needed to be reformed. It needed to shift decisive ly from its tendency to be driven by the narrow 
mercantilist interests of its largest members, to wards a more balanced approach that prioritized 
development, employment and equity for all.   
1.62.  The representative of Sierra Leone suppor ted the statements of the LDC Group, the African 
Group and the ACP. Sierra Leone was a least-developed country: she said that if anybody believed 
that least-developed countries did not want to move out of the situation, they were making a 
mistake. What she asked for as an LDC was not that  LDCs stayed in that status forever, but that 
LDCs could get the bus that would move them out of that status, and play a role, both in communities and in society. As for Sierra Leone's specific situation, Members knew that it had 
come out of a civil war and had then come up with the Agenda for Prosperity. Sierra Leone's goal 
was to reach medium-income status by 2035, and the new Agenda for Prosperity launched by the President gave trade prominence. She noted th at her country had a lot by way of natural 
resources, every mineral in the world, marine  resources, but still remained very poor.  
1.63.  Sierra Leone had looked at trade issues an d had seen that the improvements that could be 
made, through the WTO process, would be beneficial so that it could benefit from the resources it 
had. This was why Sierra Leone had high expectations from MC9. She commended the Director-
General since he had made it possible for more countries like Sierra Leone to take part actively in 
the negotiations, something she had not seen in other negotiating processes before.  Sierra Leone wished to plead to all Members to put all efforts in to the conclusion of a successful Package, be it 
in Bali or post-Bali. The contents of the Package that related to LDCs were extremely important for 
future development. She appealed to all Members that when they looked at Bali, they should consider the least advantaged sectors of the international community and make efforts to ensure 
that the process be used to boost their development. 
1.64.  The representative of Uruguay said that the Director-General's report provided a good 
picture of where Members were, and showed that the results for the Ministerial Conference would 
be scant, particularly in Agriculture, where Urug uay had not only shown great patience but also a 
constructive attitude. Uruguay joined those who ha d expressed frustration in the face of lack of 
progress in this field of such great importance, both internationally and as an engine of development for several countries. Uruguay had come into the negotiations in a flexible and 
constructive way. Far from accepting a vision that the Organization was dead, Uruguay had tried 
with others to strike a proper balance which was of  benefit to everyone's development, particularly 
the development of the LDCs. Uruguay had hoped that the Ministerial Conference offered an 
opportunity to reassume a serious and political commitment to the Multilateral Trading System.  
1.65.  Uruguay believed that global problems should be solved with global solutions, and that 
Members should take the proper responsibility in seeking solutions. The reality demanded solutions and dynamiting the Organization was not the proper way out. It was true that the negotiations 
should be balanced and until Members understood th at everyone should benefit from the results, 
unfortunately, there would be no way out. Uruguay joined those delegations that repeated the call for responsibility and that continued to put efforts in order to ensure that results would be to the 
benefit of all. The WTO was in a very delicate situation and Uruguay wished to appeal to all 
Members to be cautious and find a wa y out in order to revive the WTO. WT/GC/M/149 
 
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  1.66.  The representative of Mexico said that his delegation deeply regretted the fact that the Bali 
Package had not yet been achieved. He recalled that all Members had stressed the need of making 
Bali a success and the importance of substantive re sults to contribute to the development of trade, 
of countries, of the Least-Developed Countries and the creation of jobs at a time when the world 
economy was still weak. He said that political will and the necessary flexibility had not been 
reached in time to bridge the remaining gaps and to enable an agreement on the Package. As the 
Director-General had said, the points of disagr eement were noted and there was no doubt that 
they could be resolved. The preparatory stage of MC9 was coming to an end, and it did not seem 
suitable to have a further negotiating meeting. He believed that the progress made over the previous weeks was of such great importance that it should be given an additional opportunity to 
be turned into a WTO agreement, which could be adopted as an unofficial agreement. He was 
certain that the Director-General would continue his intensive consultations to explore new ways of 
moving forward and seeking possible solutions to issues that still needed to be solved. These issues were not many, and they could be solved.  He believed that a Package was still possible and 
therefore he urged the Director-General to contin ue his consultations and to endeavour to bridge 
the remaining gaps.  To paraphrase a concept in Jean-Paul Sartre's "Being and Nothingness", if 
Members cooperated, they would succeed, but egoism would lead to collective destruction. 
1.67.  The representative of Cuba, on behalf of  the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our 
America (ALBA)4, underscored that the content of the Bali Package should be fair and balanced, 
and should take into account the interests and ne eds of developing and least-developed countries. 
Development, as the core premise of the Doha Round, should be honoured in the Bali Ministerial 
meeting. The necessary balance of the Package had not been achieved, and Cuba was concerned 
by this imbalance, which continued to exist between and amongst the various themes where 
Members could have hoped to reach agreement at MC9. Thus far, what Members had on the table 
was a possible legally binding agreement on Trade Facilitation, a theme where the countries for 
which she spoke were not demandeurs  and which was of particular interest to developed Members. 
Whereas on the themes of Agriculture and deve lopment, which were of great interest to 
developing countries, who formed the majority in the Organization, the results that might be 
achieved were modest and in some cases were solely political statements which were not binding. Cuba and the other members of ALBA were concerned that binding commitments had not been established for developed countries on all issues in the Bali Package and more particularly for 
Agriculture. She believed that after MC9, the negotiating process for the working programme of 
the Doha Development Agenda should be continued to its final conclusion, putting development at the core of the work.  
1.68.  She said that Members could not take up ne w challenges or new agendas if they had not yet 
managed to deal with the still outstanding challenges which were part of the current Round. Maximising the efforts to  finalize the Doha Development Work Programme should be the only post-
Bali work programme and therefore new issues shou ld not be introduced.  They would overburden 
the agenda and become a distraction on the way to a successful conclusion of the Doha negotiations, which should remain the sole priority. She also stressed that Members should not move towards new negotiation approaches such as plurilaterals either. MC9 should take a formal 
decision that the reactivation and conclusion of the Doha Round should be the priority of work in 
the WTO in moving forward. 
1.69.  On behalf of Cuba, regarding the proposed text on the monitoring mechanism, she recalled 
that Cuba, together with Bolivia, Nicaragua and Venezuela, had told the Secretariat that they 
would not accept it for the following reasons: first, it did not correspond to the original intention of the African Group, i.e. to create a monitoring mechanism to strengthen the provisions of S&D 
treatment. Secondly, the language proposed had li mited the functions and scope of the monitoring 
mechanism solely to reviewing aspects of implementation of provisions relating to S&D treatment and not to strengthen them. Thirdly, it did no t provide any added value, as the functions of 
analysis and review of the S&D provisions were usually carried out by the CTD in special session 
according to the mandate it was given from its very creation. Fourthly, it should provide or 
propose specific actions, including in the General Council, with a view to strengthening the provisions on S&D and providing a mandate to regularly review their operation, use and 
effectiveness. She believed that the text presented did not meet those objectives and said that 
either those elements should be included or that Members should continue the analysis post-Bali. She supported those who had said that Bali could not be considered as the end of the road but 
                                               
4 Plurinational State of Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. WT/GC/M/149 
 
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  rather an opportunity to continue and to renew political commitment to a Multilateral Trading 
System which was fair, balanced and focused on development. 
1.70.  The representative of Hong Kong, China said that some Members had not shown the 
political willingness to allow final compromises to happen. He had found this inexplicable given the 
limited ambition of the Package. He believed th e Director-General had left the door open for 
Members to close the existing gaps, particularly in Trade Facilitation. This was for Members to do, but they could not do it without the Director-General's impartial, but highly perceptive, calls. He 
said it would be impossible to achieve that in Bali,  so he urged delegations to give another twenty-
four hours to cross the finish line with the Director-General at the helm. With respect to Trade Facilitation, he urged Members to table their calls on the outstanding issues: if they could not be 
agreed in Geneva, it would not happen in Bali. With  respect to Agriculture, if texts were not stable, 
then he would endorse the Director-General's view that Members had failed. He had been 
saddened by some comments who had mentioned the Bali Package in the past tense. This would mean that the WTO negotiating arm would be meaningless. 
1.71.   Regarding Trade Facilitation, as Friend of the Chair on Section II, and referring to the LDC 
elements, he said that this issue simply had not been discussed in Room W. That was a process issue and nothing to do with the substance or LDCs unwillingness to discuss it. Members could not 
allow Section II to go forward with an "LDC placeholder" in the text, where there should be 
concrete text. He had been working with LDC stakeholders on concrete provisions for the areas of the text which remained unfinished. He asked Members to agree to allow the fruits of their labour to be included in the texts that were sent to Ministers.  
1.72.  The representative of the Bolivarian Repub lic of Venezuela supported the statement by Cuba 
on behalf of ALBA. He expressed his delegation's gratitude to the DG for his report and for his 
admirable efforts to achieve a balanced result at MC9, and recognized the balanced and fair way 
the DG had guided the WTO during this historic time. Venezuela had participated in the 
negotiations on the understanding that developing countries not only required a gradual process for adaptation, which to date had been unfair, unequitable and that had systematically led to 
inequalities, but also that financial and technical cooperation was required as well as a readiness to 
apply special and differential treatment. Unfortunately, however, the Bali Package as it was on the table did not provide balanced results. For countries  that needed to preserve the available political 
space, a binding agreement, such as Trade Facilitation, would accentuate the inequalities that 
already characterized the Multilateral Trading System.  
1.73.  As for Agriculture, it had been suggested that Members enter into onerous commitments, 
such as those stipulated in the draft understanding concerning tariffs and tariff quotas, but at the 
same time there was an attempt to set up special and differential treatment, yet once more in 
favour of developed countries. The peace clause, something under which developing countries had hoped to obtain some flexibility, contained so many conditions that it would be difficult for 
Members to invoke it.  Furthermore, Members still had a long standing issue pertaining to cotton. 
He reiterated his delegation's reservation about the draft decision in connection with the monitoring mechanism. Still on Agriculture, there was one issue of major interest to the developing countries regarding trade distorting subsidies. Developed countries would continue to 
apply their trade distorting measures through export subsidies and there was an attempt to put in 
a new proposal without binding effect. Venezuela was concerned about the systemic future repercussions which would run counter to the growth interests of developing countries.  
1.74.  He agreed that the Ministerial Conference should not be a negotiating conference. He 
believed that Members should have a Ministerial Conference which focused on how to solve the 
problems of developing countries, which should remain the priority for the Organization. His 
delegation did not wish to have surprises in Bali: it was his delegation's hope that the negotiations 
on issues in the Bali Package would be renewed afte r the Ministerial Conference so that they could 
be finalised. Members had not yet met the pending challenges which were part and parcel of the current Doha Round and they needed a new focus in the negotiations. 
1.75.  The representative of Kenya supported the African Group and ACP statements. Kenya had 
also taken note of the considerable amount of energy and effort that had brought the Package that 
far. Members knew that, since its inception in 2001, the Doha Development Agenda had walked a 
long walk and endured very challenging and hostile conditions to be where it was. Among the 
options that Members had, the key was to ensure that the DDA was safeguarded and navigated WT/GC/M/149 
 
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  against any further global turbulences to enable it to deliver on development, the premise on 
which the round had been launched. He stressed that MC9 should remain a non-negotiating Ministerial. It was on this understanding that Me mbers had prepared their Ministers both mentally 
and psychologically for MC9 and therefore they expe cted no surprises in Bali. Regarding the Bali 
Package, the overall balance and ambition sti ll remained skewed and therefore some serious 
rebalancing remained to be done. This was the only way of ensuring that development continued to remain central in any outcome on the DDA. On Trade Facilitation, it was important that 
Members continued to work for the right balance and ambition between Sections I and II of the 
draft text. To this end, it was critical that Members who lacked implementation capacity be 
accorded reasonable flexibility of self-designating  the three categories of Section I and also be 
enabled to acquire appropriate and effective implem entation capacity that would empower them to 
undertake obligations and commitments, particularly those related to Category C measures. On 
the Monitoring Mechanism, its role and function should be seen to be complimentary and supportive to those of the Committee of Trade an d Development, rather than conflicting them. 
Duty-Free Quota-Free should be addressed in a balanced manner for purposes of mutual gain. The 
Kenyan delegation fully recognized the time and energy the Director-General had invested in the 
negotiation since he had taken office. Kenya co mmended his transparency and inclusiveness and 
stood ready to continue to engage constructively in moving the process forward.  
1.76.  The representative of Argentina agreed wi th the DG's evaluation and that the process had 
concluded in Geneva and also that it was impractical to negotiate in Bali. His delegation had a 
feeling of deep dissatisfaction over what had ha ppened in the course of the previous days. His 
Government was convinced the playing field was not level in WTO, because while recognition of its 
historic demands in Agriculture were denied, acceptance of binding commitments were being 
imposed on it, such as in Trade Facilitation, which were difficult, if not impossible for it to comply 
with. Nothing which had occurred in recent days had charged that conviction, which was why 
Argentina could not join the consensus on what had been achieved thus far. 
1.77.  However, Argentina's commitment to multilaterism was very deep, and it believed WTO was 
the only place where the trade concerns of developing countries could be met, which was why his 
delegation had continued to participate constructively in the process.  In Bali, Ministers should take note of what had been achieved, and give delegations a mandate to continue the negotiations and resolve the outstanding issues in all areas, in Agriculture, Trade Facilitation and Development. His 
delegation agreed with Cuba's concerns in this la tter area. These negotiations could take place in 
the second half of the following year, and lead to a special Ministerial Conference to endorse the work aimed at turning the DDA into a truly fair and balanced trade negotiation. 
1.78.  The representative of Botswana said that the smaller and weaker developing countries as 
well as the least-developed countries needed the WTO to deliver on the Doha Development 
Agenda. For that to happen, they depended on  the Members who had the wherewithal, both 
developed and developing, to midwife the delivery. Botswana was very encouraged by the 
progress made on some of the issues under nego tiation, especially Trade Facilitation. Everyone 
would be worse off with a failure, especially as there was so much on the table. Botswana remained hopeful that the remaining hurdles might be overcome. He also said that the Director-
General should find a way of keeping alive what ha d been achieved so far, so that when Members 
next discussed these matters, they would not start from the beginning. 
1.79.  The representative of China regretted that Members had not yet succeeded, when there 
were only a few brackets to be removed and a few hard-core issues to crack. China would never 
accept that that was the end of the journey. On the contrary, China believed that the draft texts 
for a small but meaningful Package which had been tabled were all in good shape. He was 
confident that if Members made the political call, they would be able to have a deliverable at the 
MC9 and to demonstrate to the public community th at the WTO negotiating function was still alive. 
Therefore, he appealed to every Member to seize the historic opportunity to make the last stretch 
and secure an outcome in Bali. China would continue to work in that spirit with all other Members 
in the run up to Bali, and during Bali, until the last minute.  
1.80.  The representative of Tanzania supported  the statements by the LDC Group, the ACP and 
the African Group. He believed that no one had underestimated the Director-General's efforts in 
the previous weeks. Members had managed to cr oss highly contentious grounds and haul back 
some positions, particularly on Trade Facilitation. All was based on honest positions. It had been simply too hard to cross some hurdles. Members had tried the best that they could. The remaining WT/GC/M/149 
 
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  obstacles in the text appeared to require additional contemplation and active consultation among 
Members. He supported the process and believed that the expected positive results were too dear to relinquish at that time. His delegation was ready to engage in the negotiation right after the meeting. He looked forward to seeing positive fl exibilities on the few left bracketed areas in the 
Trade Facilitation text. He stated that LDCs should not seem to be those who had destroyed the 
negotiation. 
1.81.  The representative of Canada said he wa s particularly struck by three aspects of the 
Director-General's assessment. The first was the importance of the agenda to poverty reduction 
and to growth. It was apparent to everyone around the world that Members were witnessing a very sluggish recovery. All the data, all the studies, whether from the WTO or independently pointed out the contribution that liberalized trade could lead to creating jobs and to helping to 
restore growth and thus not bringing that to a speedy conclusion was damaging prospects for 
recovery. It was against that backdrop that he was struck by a second aspect of the remarks and that was that the agenda was neither north nor south but rather something that contributed 
mightily to growth throughout the world. Mostly all independent studies pointed out that the 
biggest economic gains from Trade Facilitation would be in developing countries, the biggest creation of jobs would be in the developing countries and thus what Members had managed to put 
together was a Package that had to be viewed not on ly as balanced, but as being in the interest of 
all. He was, as a result, saddened not only by dele gations not bringing it to a conclusion, but also 
by listening to colleagues and the danger of some rhetoric returning to the table that failed to 
acknowledge the common interests of Members on behalf of their people, their workers, in 
pursuing the agenda. Members had admitted long before that it was a modest Package. This was 
no longer an early harvest after many years, but it was a harvest, a foundation for looking forward to bigger gains for their economies and their peoples. The third aspect that had struck him was the 
observation that time would not remedy the situation and thus he was concerned at the notion 
offered by some delegations that Members should just roll over and find a more propitious time in the future to piece together an agenda. What he had taken from the DG's assessment was that 
time was of the essence; it was therefore imperative that Members did everything possible at the 
present, during the following day, at Bali and potentially beyond, to build on what had been done to date, to nail that down and to move forward from there.  
1.82.  The DG had asked for Members' views as to what should be done; it seemed to him that the 
answer was somewhat pointed and somewhat obvi ous. Members should continue working on the 
basis of the text distributed. First, Members sh ould simply agree that whatever had been done 
could not be re-opened or moved backwards from the agreements reached to date. Members 
would do so on the basis of the principles th at the DG had respected of fully inclusive and 
transparent work. Second, Members should take ad vantage of time remaining in Geneva to see 
whether there was any prospect of reducing brackets further and of making some practical 
progress at a technical and senior official's level. At Bali itself, he accepted what sounded like a 
collective assessment that it might not be possible to have a Ministerial meeting serve as negotiating forum. On the other hand, in most democratic societies, it was Ministers who decided: officials proposed and Ministers disposed and thus it could not be merely a ceremonial occasion. It 
seemed to him that Ministers should be invited to endorse the work done to date and to help lock 
it in as the basis for further work. Ministers should give a direction to complete this work as soon as possible. He endorsed the earlier observations  from Chile and others that the deadline should 
be very short for any further work. And third, it seemed to him Ministers should invite delegations, 
whilst completing the text, to look forward. Mi nisters should invite delegations to help them 
endorse, at that early meeting, not only the results of the Package but future directions. He felt 
that Members were not responding to the needs of people. It was with sadness that he had 
listened to some rhetoric that sought to ascribe narrower interests, and he admitted that there was more to be done beyond Bali, which he had hoped could have been achieved beforehand. His 
delegation stood ready to continue working intensively. 
1.83.  The representative of the Plurinational Stat e of Bolivia endorsed th e statement by Cuba on 
behalf of ALBA and also supported the statements  by Sierra Leone and South Africa. She thanked 
the DG for his hard work, patience, technical capacity and his efforts to find constructive solutions 
at every step preceding the present meeting. Th e progress report presented by him showed where 
Members stood. She commended the DG for his efforts in attempting to achieve results and particularly for the open and participative way in which the negotiations had been run. It was the 
first time since she had been in Geneva that she had witnessed a true multilateral negotiation in 
the WTO. It was not a small group of countries taking decisions for all Members, as had been the WT/GC/M/149 
 
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  case in the past. Her delegation was proud of the process that had been adopted and for being 
able to participate, since it was a very small one. The process was a long and difficult one, but it was more open, transparent and democratic. Multilateralism had finally returned to where it should always have been. Although the documents were not finalized, one had to recognize that much 
progress had been made with the new process, much  more than in past years. The responsibility 
for results lay with all Members and reflected the state of the situation in the Organization. Members had always known that the DG had a very difficult task in front of him, having inherited 
imbalances from the past. Members were aware that he had tried to do the best for all. However, 
going to Bali and exposing the Ministers to the dangers of such a complex negotiation had more disadvantages than advantages and the results would be uncertain at that level of decision-making. It could even further endanger the credib ility of the Organization. She believed that the 
DG had taken the right decision; a difficult one but a necessary one. Her delegation would 
therefore continue to work together with other Members in a process still to be defined but which had development and the interests of developing countries at its centre and not swept under the 
rug or on the margins as if it was an undocumented alien with no place in the Organization. On the 
contrary, Development had its full place in the Organization. That was what her delegation felt should guide Members in the future. She expressed her delegation's confidence in the DG in these 
difficult times and hoped that Members would in the next few years achieve positive results for all, 
not just for the minority as had been the case in previous years. 
1.84.  The representative of European Union expr essed his appreciation for the DG's efforts and 
said that the work that had been done using new ways and processes was really ground-breaking 
in many ways for the Organization. A tremendous amount of work had been achieved collectively 
and a lot of distance had been covered in the negotiation of the Bali Package. Most texts were stabilized, except Section I of the Trade Facilitati on Agreement. Section I was a core part of the 
Bali Package, both for developing and developed countries as well as traders all around the world. 
It was a very striking aspect that this was not a North-South negotiation, nor a negotiation between developing and developed countries. Reaching a result on the Bali Package was an 
opportunity for all in the Organization. Important steps had also been achieved in Agriculture and 
Development. Regarding Section II of Trade Facilitation and LDCs, his delegation was open to the LDCs' requests, both in substance and in process. He agreed that Members had reached the end of the road in Geneva and also stressed that this sh ould not be seen as failu re. However, he was very 
concerned with the state of play. He had taken note of the fact that the DG would take these texts 
to Bali to be used as a briefing for the Ministers and believed it was the right way forward.  
1.85.  He noted that the DG had placed the responsibility was where it belonged: it was up to the 
Members to find solutions and to move forward. At the same time, the DG had given Members a 
direction; he had encouraged them to seek convergence on substance for the remaining issues and to talk to each other. He agreed that Members were almost there and believed, as others had 
said, that Members were simply too close to do anything else than strongly persevere. In the 
coming days, the EU would continue to intervene to seek further convergence, particularly on unfinished parts of the text and create the best possible conditions for Ministers in Bali; first, to take the Bali Package forward and second, to en gage to an open and forward looking discussion. 
He looked forward to Bali and reiterated his support  for the DG and confidence in his guidance for 
the next steps. 
1.86.  The representative of Ecuador supported the statement made by Cuba on behalf of ALBA. 
With respect to Agriculture, Ecuador believed that Members would not achieve the promise of 
getting rid of export subsidies, and the main dist ortions in agricultural markets would continue and 
even worsen. Members had not even seen the op ening of markets for the main products of 
developing countries as important enough. This shou ld be dealt with in the context of post-Bali, 
and Agriculture should be treated together with the other elements of the Doha Work Programme 
and should be a priority for WTO's work. With respect to Trade Facilitation, self-designation had been confirmed and reconfirmed as the basic prin ciple of the negotiations. However, there were 
still attempts to limit this prerogative of develo ping countries. For example, in paragraph 4.5 of 
the current text, it should be stated clearly that the Committee would take note of notifications without deadlines or procedures to be carri ed out. The capacity to implement as a sine qua non  
condition for the enforceability of commitments had been flagged as a basic principle of these 
negotiations. This principle had been confirmed in  the HODs meeting the previous week, in which 
it had been agreed to include in paragraph 1.2 a final sentence along those lines. Full operability 
needed to be ensured. In the early morning of 25 November, a few Members had proposed a WT/GC/M/149 
 
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  cross-cutting paragraph and Ecuador had expressed its concern in that respect since it had the 
potential to bring even greater imbalance to the process.  
1.87.  He believed that Bali should not be a negotiating conference. No-one could justify 
disagreement on specific issues at the technical level being taken to the Ministerial level. In 
concluding, he congratulated the DG for his efforts and leadership. Ecuador recognized the high 
level of transparency that had been promoted by  him and transparency could not be undermined, 
but should be even more deep. 
1.88.  The representative of Barbados, on behalf of the SVEs, recognized the DG's tireless efforts 
to have a Bali Package that included elements of Agriculture, Development and Trade Facilitation. 
She trusted that the Bali Ministerial would also serve to reiterate the importance of development 
and a continuing commitment to existing and future flexibilities for small economies. She stressed 
that it was important that all elements of the Pack age were known before delegates left for Bali, to 
ensure that Members continued to operate in a no-surprises manner. The SVEs had expressed a preference for conclusion of the Package in Ge neva, rather than in Bali. She was sure that, 
following the DG's address, the SVEs would support attempts to conclude the outstanding matters 
in the remaining areas. Whatever happened in Bali, a post-Bali agenda was important for many SVEs, as they still required that attention be paid and solutions be found to some of the critical 
areas facing the group. The Organization had to re focus on the outstanding issues and the existing 
mandates, including concrete measures to ensure the fuller integration of small economies into the Multilateral Trading System. Whatever the outcom e, the SVEs reiterated their support for the WTO 
and to the Multilateral Trading System.  
1.89.  On behalf of Barbados, she said she never shared the view that Bali would determine the 
future or the credibility of the Organization or the Multilateral Trading System. The world needed a 
Multilateral Trading System and she believed that  there was hope for a properly managed WTO in 
the future.  
1.90.  The representative of Paraguay said that  post-Bali was of the essence. Members needed a 
renewed mandate from Ministers based on the prog ress which had been made, especially over the 
previous few weeks. The progress had to be co nsolidated and the Ministers had to pronounce 
themselves on this. The mandate had to be base d on the present texts. Delegations needed a 
mandate to complete what they had been doing ov er the previous weeks. Bali would be a great 
moment for all Members to say that they had only just begun. Members were indeed going to Bali 
with a renewed hope that nothing was impossible, especially because there was a new momentum 
at WTO and it should not go to waste. Members owed this to themselves and Bali should become the new launching pad. In this regard, Paraguay joined Chile and Argentina in proposing that an 
extraordinary Ministerial meeting be held over the next few months. 
1.91.  The representative of Switzerland appreciated the inclusive way in which the DG had 
handled the negotiations and his tireless efforts to bring convergence on the different aspects of a 
potential Bali Package. Members had made enormous  progress but had not reached the goal to go 
to Bali with a negotiated Package, with nothing left to be decided by Ministers, at least not yet. He 
noted that some had said Members had not failed, and said that this was the optimistic view. For the time being Members were back on the losers tr ack. They had seemed to confirm to the outside 
world that in the WTO they could not conclude trad e agreements. It looked as if Bali would not be 
a stepping stone for the conclusion of the Doha negotiations and even that Members might never finish of the Doha Development Agenda. Many issu es would probably not be on the table for many 
years ahead. This also seemed to confirm the widespread opinion that it was advisable to search 
for trade solutions outside WTO – at least for the Members who had this possibility. This was very regrettable, in particular for the more vulnerable Members who had fewer possibilities to join 
regional trade agreements.  
1.92.  That being said, Switzerland remained committed to WTO and the Multilateral Trading 
System. He hoped this commitment was shared by the membership of the Organization as a whole and that Members could get back on the right trac k, and he would prefer this to happen in the 
very short remaining time before Bali. He did not believe in extending deadlines for concluding the 
Package. He agreed with the DG, that the TF te xt, as it was, could not be submitted to the 
Ministers. In TF there were still several brackets. The key to unlocking them needed political will in 
particular, from some - rather a very small number - Members. He knew that this was difficult for 
them, but he urged all colleagues to still check with  their capitals to see if giving a hand to find WT/GC/M/149 
 
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  solutions on the open issues would not be worth it, for the Multilateral Trading System on which all 
Members depended. It was the hour of truth. He asked if Members really attached importance to 
the Multilateral Trading System and if they were ready to support it. If the answer was yes, then Members should show this in the following 24 hours and Switzerland was ready to go for a further 
night session. 
1.93.  The representative of Norway said the DG had presented a sobering report. It was now up 
to Members to face up to the responsibility. Norw ay was not ready to give up and did not like to 
talk about the Bali Package in the past tense. He  thought Members should listen to the calls of 
countries such as Sierra Leone and others. As the DG had said, this was not a North-South issue. Members should take careful note of  the fact that they had not succeeded at that point in time, but 
they should use the time available to do whatever was necessary to agree on a Bali Package. He 
also believed that Members needed the DG's facili tation and urged all to use the time available in 
cooperation with the DG to try to go forward, because all knew that if they did not succeed, they would not restart in January as if nothing had happened. Hard lessons had shown that this was not 
the case. Members had failed in 2008, and they had not really got back up to scratch yet. All 
Members needed to be responsible and this would open up the possibility to continue after Bali with the core areas of the Doha Development Agenda - Development, NAMA, Agriculture and 
Services.  Members could not afford to let go of the opportunity to get back on track in the 
Organization.  
1.94.  He agreed that the LDC text needed to be brought into the TF document to be taken to Bali. 
He hoped that the texts that Members had put on the table would be used. He also hoped that 
there would be no more backtracking or tactical manoeuvres. He encouraged Members to make 
every effort to find convergence in the few remaining hours. Norway stood ready to continue until it was over.  
1.95.  The representative of Colombia said that the consultations had been very inclusive and that 
the endeavour to reach landing zones had seemed almost impossible to achieve a few months 
before. Members now had stabilized texts, or advanced texts, in all of the areas that had been 
agreed to be included in the Bali Package. However, as some had said, Members were near but not 
there yet. The only way of coming up to the leve l of the tasks and the expectations held by the 
world was to reach a conclusion. Members could not let this ship go down. He believed that most of the largest icebergs had been avoided. There were still a couple but these needed another 
dosage of political will and flexibility which woul d enable taking these texts to a safe harbour. 
Delegations needed to consolidate the success that  had been achieved and convince Ministers to 
take decisions and give them the necessary instructions, as Chile had said inter alia,  for a 
reasonable period of just a couple of months after the Ministerial. A clear mandate could be 
enough to conclude on the outstanding issues. The post-Bali work would depend on this and it was 
an important step in defining the future of the WTO. Colombia remained as committed as ever to 
the Organization and would continue to be prepared to work actively and positively in the 
negotiations. He was convinced that the outstanding issues could be solved.  
1.96.  The representative of New Zealand commended the DG for the tremendous energy and 
dedication that he had shown since his arrival in September and for having pushed all Members to 
do things that they had gotten out of the habit of doing in the Organization; to agree, and to find 
consensus. It was clear that since 2008, Members had completely lost their way and there were signs that Members were now at least starting to regain some of this capacity. This was reflected 
in the very significant progress that the texts he had brought forward comprised. But Members did 
not have final agreement and in particular on a TF text which still included many bracketed areas. The DG's assessment of the situation and the pr ospects for securing consensus, in the time 
available, were therefore an important wake up ca ll to all. New Zealand was certainly not giving up 
on the goal of having a Package of decisions agreed in Bali but time was now very limited.  
1.97.  It was very clear that the only way to bridge the gap was if Members who knew that their 
positions might be among those standing in the way of a final agreement, were prepared to leave 
the room after the meeting and immediately seek th e necessary political flexibility to compromise, 
to communicate that clearly to the DG and to engage urgently with others who were key to a solution. In that regard, he trusted the DG's judgement in briefing Ministers in Bali on where 
things stood. That would obviously need to take into account the information that the DG had 
brought forward and any further information, re garding any flexibilities that could unlock the 
Package. It seemed to him that within the Organization, Members were often looking to someone WT/GC/M/149 
 
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  else to fix the problems for them. The reality was that Members needed to face up to their 
responsibilities and some, both developed and developing, had a much more important stake, 
influence and consequential responsibility to help fix them.  
1.98.  He was fully aware that any outcomes n eeded to be the subject of consensus among the 
whole Membership. However, Members would never get there if the differences among some of 
the key players on any given issue meant that there was no scope for wider agreement. The message that all Members needed to take away wa s to face up to their responsibilities. Members 
knew that the DG would do everything he could to help fix it but he could not do it alone and if 
Members were seeking his assistance in resolving their difficulties, they needed to give him the permission space to assist, by coming up with solutions that they could accept but could not propose themselves. Members had seen how this could work in recent weeks but they had also 
seen instances where it had not been so clear that  they were prepared to provide that permission 
space. For his part, he would support any realistic effort to resolve remaining differences in the very limited time available, but if there was to be an effort, it could only succeed if it was a 
genuine and honest one, initiated without delay. Members should avoid anything that was simply a 
process of going through the motions as this would only make things worse. 
1.99.  The representative of Egypt, on behalf of  the Arab Group, said that Members had worked 
very hard and had acquired several things: that should not be wasted. The Group was very much 
supporting the DG's efforts. It found it regrettable that Members could not go to Bali with a balanced Package with which all were satisfied to the extent that they could present it to the Ministers, who could endorse it and guide Members with regard to the way forward, and keep the 
multilateral trade negotiations on the right course. The subjects of the document that were 
distributed were very important. All of them were a plus for all countries and had to be there. The 
Arab Group would continue to be supportive of the DG was ready to exert all efforts in order to still 
make Bali an important milestone in the work. A lot of road had been covered and the Group did 
not want to restart from square one. Many delegations, if not all, had acquired something, which might not have been one hundred per cent satisfactory, but with some issues still remaining, all 
had gotten things. If Members looked back to Ma y or June, they would see that they had done a 
lot, in TF, in Agriculture, in Development, even though development had had the least focus, which was not satisfactory.  
1.100.  There was always room for more work. Work was in fact in progress, and what Members 
had agreed on was open to more improvements  in the future. This was a dynamic process. 
Therefore, this was not the end and Members should not forget what they had already acquired.  Members should consider objectively what they  had in these documents, look at the most 
important issues that were still lacking convergence, and try to get to some convergence on these. 
Issues that were of less importance could dispos ed of for the time being, without harming the 
whole construction and looked at again in the future.  There were lessons to draw from this 
experience, at all levels. Members had entered into negotiations with too much ambition, without 
being realistic enough to see what they could ge t, and what they could not. Sometimes there was 
also lack of mutual understanding of the concerns  of different parties. Members had to overcome 
this state of mind and see where ambitions could reach and stick to that without over-
exaggerating, taking into account the whole context. An understanding of the concerns and the 
needs of the others had to be there, and this applied to both developing and developed countries.  
1.101.  The Arab Group did not want to see the Doha mandate disappearing or becoming a dead 
letter. Members had to work together to achieve mu tual benefits as much as possible, taking into 
account the problems of the least advanced, of th e developing countries and of the less privileged 
positions in the world. The Group agreed that this  should not be regarded as a failure. A lot had 
been achieved, and now the question was was how to invest the remaining time, even if it was 
very little until Bali. It agreed that Ministers should not negotiate in Bali because it would make things much more difficult. Ministers in Bali co uld acknowledge the progress achieved, and that 
there were still some difficult areas.  They should mandate delegations to continue work on the 
difficult areas without overlooking what had been  achieved. Members needed to know now what 
was expected in Bali and what would be post-Bali.   This was very important because one could not 
start from the very beginning, or all stood to lose what had been achieved so far, even if in the 
view of some delegations it was not the maximum that they could have wished for. All would have 
liked to have achieved all of what they wanted, but this was not possible as far as negotiations were concerned. The Arab Group have a thorough and deep analysis of what had been achieved, 
what was remaining, to prioritize and try to invest the remaining time.  WT/GC/M/149 
 
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  1.102.  The representative of Brunei Darussalam, on behalf of ASEAN, said that from the 
beginning ASEAN had been supportive of a successful  Bali Ministerial and of the process conducted 
by the Director-General. ASEAN wished to see the Director-General continue to take the lead as Members approached the Bali Ministerial. This task could not be left to Ministers in Bali. 
Delegations in Geneva had to recommend the way forward now. They were almost at the finish 
line with just a few more yards towards success. Members could not throw away those parts of the 
Bali Package that could be finalized in Geneva. Members should continue with the positive 
momentum they had had consider the options they had.  
1.103.  He invited the DG to continue his intensive consultations with the key players and to report 
to Members on the result as soon as possible. He acknowledged that this was going to be tough and difficult. The other option was for the DG to conduct another HODs process within 24 hours as 
proposed by Hong Kong, China, as another attempt to find consensus on the Trade Facilitation 
draft text. He said that Members had to accomplish their work on the Bali Package for the credibility of the Multilateral Trading System. As a region of developing and least-developed 
countries, ASEAN had continued confidence in the Multilateral Trading System. 
1.104.  The representative of Trinidad and Tobago commended the Director-General for his 
tenacity and strong leadership, as Members worked arduously to achieve a balanced Bali Package. 
He recalled that the DG had warned at the last informal TNC meeting that "in the next few days, I 
will push you to the limit", and indeed he had done so. Many had questioned the commitment of some Members to the Multilateral Trading System, however, for his delegation, the one hundred and fifty hours of negotiations invested over the last few weeks were an indication that all 
remained committed to the Organization and to the System. Even if Members had not achieved 
exactly what they had hoped, he believed that the WTO could still deliver for the weakest and most vulnerable Members of the institution, in Bali, and more importantly, post Bali. Members 
therefore should use the energy of the last few weeks to build on what had been achieved in each 
of the pillars of the Bali Package and more importantly, to reinvigorate the DDA negotiations. The Development Agenda had to remain at the core, to ensure that the WTO addressed the concerns 
and met the needs of its poorest and more vulnerable Members. MC9 was an important 
opportunity to say to the myriad of stakeholders that the negotiation function of the WTO Multilateral Trading System was alive and functi oning; that the WTO could deliver trade deals. 
Members should therefore explore all the options available to ensure that MC9 was a resounding 
success. The light at the end of the tunnel had become brighter. He urged all colleagues and 
trusted that all Members would retain that momentum to secure a successful MC9. The DG had led Members like a fearless military general and everyone knew that military generals would never 
give up until the objective had been overcome. In  Trinidad and Tobago, there was a mentorship 
programme for young people that carried the motto, "if it is to be, it is up to me". For Bali and MC9: "if it is to be, it is up to us". 
1.105.  The representative of the Dominican Re public, on behalf of the Informal Group of 
Developing Countries (IGDC), commended the DG for his unceasing efforts, his caution, his 
transparency, and his respect for inclusiveness. He had almost managed to make the Bali Package 
magic, as he had managed in the agricultural proposal on TRQ administration. 
1.106.  On behalf of the Dominican Republic, he said it was now up to Members to complete this 
magic and ensure in the time left to them in Geneva that they cleaned up what remained to be 
done. Most of the key points had now been covered and dealt with, and the rest were issues where 
technical flexibility was lacking. He said that so me of the fundamental parts of what Members had 
achieved in some of the proposals had been the result of a magic atmosphere that had been present as they looked towards Bali. He was afraid that this atmosphere might be lost after Bali 
and that the very delicate balance that had been struck in some texts would not be recoverable. 
Members had already witnessed partial negotiations where results had been achieved, commitments that had never been fulfilled, even those contained in Ministerial Declarations. The present was a time where Members were not allowed to fail, could not be cowardly, could not 
throw in the towel and hand over to Ministers in Bali. He therefore urged his colleagues to 
complete the magic that was to be found in the Bali Package. Members should not complain but should act. It was not the time to be defeatist but optimistic, not the time to talk about half empty 
glasses, but half-full. He hoped that Members co uld be worthy representatives of the commitments 
they had to their own peoples and that they would be able to work towards further human progress. WT/GC/M/149 
 
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  1.107.  The representative of India commended the DG's leadership, his inexhaustible reserves of 
patience and stamina and his efforts. Despite taking over the reins of the WTO at a fairly late 
stage in the negotiations, he had added tremendous dynamism and focus in the collective effort to achieve a Package. This process had been tota lly inclusive and transparent, a remarkable 
achievement considering the past history. But this had raised the stakes for all to be jointly 
responsible for ensuring a successful outcome in Bali. He was saddened that, despite the DG's strenuous efforts and the deepest commitment sh own by all the delegations in Geneva, Members 
had not collectively been able to go past the finish line. He shared the DG's sombre assessment of 
the situation and the implications of the failure to deliver a Bali Package. He agreed fully with his statement that none of the texts, quite apart from the incomplete Trade Facilitation final draft, had been fully agreed upon and that each of these texts had one square bracket at the beginning and 
one at the end. He had taken note of the DG's statement that many delegations had asked for 
adjustments to these texts and that, due to lack of  time to engage with the rest of the Members 
on these adjustments, with the exception of the pr oposal made by Cuba to the export competition 
text, these adjustments could not be discussed or incorporated in the draft texts. These 
adjustments to the draft texts would have to be ta ken up before they could be in final shape.  
1.108.  Against this backdrop, Members needed to  take a pragmatic look at the various options 
before them.  Most Members had stated that Bali should not be a negotiating Ministerial. At the 
same time, Members had to be realistic also about what could be achieved in the days before Ministers congregated at Bali. Work still remained to be done and some divergences continued on important issues. Members had to make a call on  whether they wished to place the unresolved 
issues before Ministers in Bali. Many delegations had stated more time was needed to arrive at a 
consensus on the whole Package, but the enormous  effort and achievement of the negotiators in 
Geneva should not be thrown away and some parts should be laid out to enable a successful 
harvest, if possible at Bali itself, or if not, within a reasonably short period thereafter. India had 
not given up hope and would be willing to join in efforts to harvest at least those outcomes which benefited the poorest countries. India would also be willing to join in any effort before Bali to close 
the remaining gaps in the Trade Facilitation text. An equally important issue which had been 
neglected in the work so far was that of the po st-Bali agenda and work programme. The unfinished 
Doha Development Agenda should continue to be the main focus in the post-Bali phase and getting the Ministers to exchange views on ho w to make that possible would be extremely 
valuable. He said that India remained ready to engage constructively with the membership to find 
solutions and to ensure a successful MC9. 
1.109.  The representative of Singapore commended the DG for his dynamism and determination 
which had taken Members farther than they had ever come before, despite the icebergs 
encountered. He recalled that Members had already taken a collective decision that Bali would not be a negotiating Ministerial: it would not be successful if Ministers were pressed into a negotiation 
they did not ask for. There were technical solutions to many of the problems which, if 
Ambassadors had not found, should not be raised to Ministers. Having any form of Ministerial 
negotiation in Bali would not lead to a productive outcome. He stressed that Members were truly close, and that they should not do anything that would erode that position, nor anything which 
would block their view of the finish line which they could all see.   
1.110.  Members had appointed the DG, had put their trust in him, and then had imposed on him 
to do the impossible.  Members had wanted to drive the Organisation to say one thing, but had 
done another. They had said they were support ing him and upholding the Multilateral Trading 
System, and then had proceeded to block progress by being inflexible and unaccommodating.  Members had agreed with him that no unmanageable commitment was asked of anyone, but they 
were plainly and simply unwilling, despite his best efforts, to commit. 
1.111.  He agreed with the DG's observation that in the last, most critical parts of the past 
weekends, some delegations had stopped making the tough political calls. He recalled that, throughout the process, he had negotiated more with his capital than with his counterparts.  He 
did not see this same dynamic happening evenly amongst his counterparts.  He said that where 
"localised specificities" needed accommodating, they used capitals as an excuse not to resolve problems, rather than persuade them of the value in agreeing.  This was not across the board, but 
had happened selectively.  In the area of work wh ich he had the privilege to chair, he had seen 
that commitment and constructiveness.  All sides had given, and then when the crunch time came, had given again, and the outcome was balanced. WT/GC/M/149 
 
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  1.112.  In his view, there was nothing in substance which could not have been completed already. 
Many of the differences left were ideological and tactical positions, not substantive ones.  Unfortunately, it had led to the conclusion that those tactical positions were to push the rest who had been flexible and accommodating to give up the broader interests of the collective and meet 
the demands of a minority. Regarding the Monitoring Mechanism, and speaking as the Ambassador 
of Singapore and not the CTD SS Chair, he found it disappointing that, even after Members had 
collectively agreed on something meaningful wh ich was worth 200% more than the words of the 
mandate that initiated that work, there were still ideological statements being made which 
suggested an ignorance of the real signif icance of the very text adopted.    
1.113.  The good faith of the silent majority should not be taken for granted, nor should it be 
abused. Many had kept constructively silent, but not disengaged, over the past weeks.  So it did 
not go unnoticed that early in the morning on Monday, one delegation had actually stated that if 
the Room W gave that delegate "everything I want", there would be no problem.  As stated by the DG, there was no delegation which would get everything they wanted. Members all gave, and then 
gave again.  That these words were even uttered required Members to wonder whether all parties 
truly valued the Multilateral Trading System, or indeed whether all wanted a success to protect the WTO.  He agreed with Morocco who had noted that some were using their national positions to kill 
this Organisation. If the Organisation meant less to some than the rest, then their willingness to 
jeopardise the Organisation should also fo rm part of the balance being contemplated. 
1.114.  He strongly associated himself with those Members that wanted the Package before them.  
But he did not associate himself with those who had said that they would not give up because they 
wanted to reopen matters to get everything th ey wanted. As far as Singapore was concerned, 
there was only one deal on the table, and it was the one contained in the document RD/TNC/1 which had been circulated that day. He kept an open mind to ideas from Members, and from the 
DG, on what next steps could be taken to the fina l landing of that deal.  Members were close, but 
success was prevented.  He thought it should be clear that Members were not in the business of 
reopening RD/TNC/1.  On the contrary, they should be firmly committed to finishing the business 
started with the DG on 1 September 2013.  There were no new elements to be added, although 
there was always the option to drop items if the collective belligerence prevented a balanced solution.   
1.115.  He said that what Members would do in the succeeding days was also their decision. While 
the DG had respectfully asked for Members' views, Members had not given the DG enough 
specifics to work with.  Some of the key stakeholders had expressed the need to pause and reflect.  That was fair, as the stakes were higher for them, and he took comfort that they were committed 
to keeping the lights on in the building. He just  hoped they were not again asking him to do the 
impossible.  If Members pressed on to negotiate over the next two days in Geneva, they would create a sense of anxiety. Others were saying that negotiating in Bali was not an option.  While he 
s t o o d  r e a d y  t o  u n d e r t a k e  A m b a s s a d o r - l e v e l  w o r k  a t  a n y  t i m e  o r  f o r m a t  t h e  D G  d e c i d e d ,  h e  
wondered if there would be any point unless Members saw a change to the tactical positions witnessed over the weekend which so many speakers had recalled.   
1.116.  If there was no market to negotiate with changed positions, then the logical thing was to 
consider work after Bali. He stressed that he ha d spoken of Bali and the Package in the present 
tense. He supported those who had suggested that the DG send the Package to the Ministers in Bali and seek their political decision to commit to that Package, with no variations.  The difference 
was that in Bali, the DG would have the chance to have the exact same conversation with 
Ministers, especially in private. Ministers could th en instruct the DG and delegations to resolve the 
remaining issues on the following basis: either compromise and resolve, or drop and delete. 
Nothing else. No new texts, no new additionalities. 
1.117.  The representative of Cameroon joined others in commending the Director-General. His 
assessment of the situation was correct that Members had not been able to reach a final 
agreement. The work that remained was not to be overestimated nor underestimated. At this 
stage, Members needed to focus on the arrival point and not on where they had started from. 
Members had to focus on solutions, not on problems. As to the way to reach an outcome, Cameroon believed that the Geneva texts had to be preserved and presented to Ministers in Bali. 
Bali was not the last stage, although it was a crucial one. Members should not try to have a Bali 
Package at all costs, at a very high cost. Ministers should be invited to take into account what was presented to them and they would certainly not ag ree to backslide nor to un-do what had already WT/GC/M/149 
 
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  been sufficiently stabilized. As Ministers, they would then instruct their negotiators. Without 
overlooking the post-Bali agenda and the streng thening of the Multilateral Trading System, 
seeking a balance in the Package should be Member s' priority and they should reach a conclusion 
by the spring, as Chile had outlined. In concluding, he supported the comments made by the 
African Group, the ACP Group and South Africa.  
1.118.  The representative of Costa Rica said that the DG's contribution had been decisive in 
achieving progress in the negotiations and extended his recognition to the valuable work 
accomplished by the Chairs and the friends of th e Chair. Members had achieved convergence on 
the broad majority of the issues within the three areas of the Bali Package. There was very little 
that remained to be resolved and solutions had been identified so that those few countries that were not yet on board would be able to board the vessel, so that Members could all complete the 
crossing, which was so important for them and the Organization. The progress that Members saw 
reflected in the ten texts had real value in substa nce and, if agreed, would contribute to promoting 
trade, job creation and towards the fight against poverty. An agreement on the package in Bali 
would furthermore send a signal that the WTO multilateral negotiations were able to produce 
agreements. If agreement was not possible in Ba li, the opposite message would instead be sent 
and this would be very serious for the system.  
1.119.  However, trade negotiations would not stop, as efforts to promote growth could not be put 
aside. But the negotiations would not happen in the WTO and Members would not all be there to participate. It would be difficult to avoid trade liberalization efforts outside if Members confirmed 
their inability and capacity to negotiate such agreements in the WTO. He was confident that 
Members would able to do so in respect of agreements where they could all gain, such as in Trade 
Facilitation. Costa Rica reaffirmed its determination to achieve agreements on the basis of the ten texts and its commitment to the Multilateral Trading System. Costa Rica's silence in previous days 
was a sign of flexibility and not a sign of a lack of interest. He agreed that Members should use the 
remaining hours in Geneva to attempt to resolve differences to enable Ministers to approve the results in Bali. That should be a genuine effort - this was the safest way to attempt to preserve 
what Members had achieved in terms of progress. 
1.120.  The representative of Uganda supported the statements by the Solomon Islands for the 
LDCs, Morocco for the African Group and Jamaica for the ACP Group. He said that his optimism 
about the Bali Package had almost eroded completely in the seventy-two hours that had gone by 
since Monday morning. He thought that there woul d probably not be a possibility of the Director-
General coming up with anything in the form of a report or if he could come with one, it would not b e  a b l e  t o  e f f e c t i v e l y  m e e t  m o s t  o f  t h e  e x p e c t a t i o n s  o f  t h e  m a j o r i t y  o f  d e l e g a t e s .  T r u e  t o  h i s  
leadership qualities of self-confidence, vitality, spirit of inclusiveness, resilience and functional 
versatility, the Director-General had indeed managed to present the fruit of his tireless efforts. Of course, many delegations were not comfortable with the report, the landing zones seemed to be 
rough and turbulent. Uganda and the LDCs felt greatly let down; some very important language 
had to be incorporated in the Director-General's document for the Bali Package. He joined others who believed that Bali should not be a negotiating Ministerial. He therefore recommended a post-Bali process that would look at these documents wi th a view to including them in the framework of 
the DDA. 
1.121.  The representative of Chinese Taipei, on behalf of the RAMs Group, commended the 
Director-General for his outstanding leadership, ex pertise, ability and tremendous hard work in 
guiding Members towards achieving a balanced deal before Bali. It was sad that Members had not 
reached the final deal, although they had ironed many differences after more than 150 hours of work in rooms D, E and W, since the Director-General had taken office in September. She said that 
the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu,  Kinmen and Matsu, like other Members of the 
RAMs Group, believed that Members could and should enjoy the benefits of further trade 
liberalization through the Multilateral Trading System. It was disappointing that the Organization had not been able to deliver very meaningful negotiation outcomes for almost the past two 
decades. In particular, her delegation felt frus trated that after many months of hard work, 
Members had almost reached the final point of having a balanced and successful Bali Package. But, Members were just not there yet. Nevertheless, she still had full confidence in the Multilateral 
Trading System, and in Members' ability and willingness to reach a balanced deal. A successful Bali 
Package was an indispensable cornerstone for the fulfillment of the Doha round negotiations in the future. Members should not give up any hope even when it was dim. Her delegation stood ready to 
fully engage in continuous negotiations whenever they took place. WT/GC/M/149 
 
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  1.122.  The representative of Honduras said that the Organization had more hope than ever with 
the Director-General at its head. Honduras would follow his guidance with respect to the document 
that he had given Members that morning. Hondur as believed that Members should not feed hope 
but rather exert best efforts to achieve a significant success in Bali, in the interests of the 
credibility of the Multilateral Trading System. If Members did not achieve their objective, after the 
Bali Ministerial Members should take up once again the challenge given to Members by the Ministers in 2001, following the process that the Director-General had established. 
1.123.  The representati ve of Philippines said that Members st ill had the initiative and the 
momentum; and, should not allow this precious commodity to slip away. The usual refrain “so near 
yet so far away" was not good enough anymore.  Members should finish the Bali Package in 
Geneva and return to the negotiation table right away. 
1.124.  The representative of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia commended the DG's efforts to find 
landing zones for many difficult issues and to finalize a Package for Bali. He agreed with his 
assessment and thought there was no time for more negotiations in Geneva before MC9. Likewise, 
he did not think it would be practical to expect Ministers to negotiate and solve very technical 
issues during the Conference, it was just not do able. Even though Members had not achieved an 
agreement on a complete Package for Bali, it would be unjust to call it failure.  Progress had been 
made and with more political commitments, the Package could be finalised in the near future. 
1.125.  The representative of Panama said that th e efforts of the Director-General had been titanic 
and he had managed to inspire delegations to make equally titanic efforts. He believed that it was 
important to continue this work to achieve as complete as possible a Package in Bali. This was not 
a magic process; it was a working process, one of persistence. As some had said, the Geneva 
process was over but only insofar as there was a "Geneva Process", a procedural stage, which had various objectives. One was to complete a full Package of agreed texts so that the Ministerial 
would not be a negotiating session and Members should continue on this path. Members needed to 
d o  w h a t  t h e y  c o u l d .  W h a t  t h e y  h a d  i n  t h e  d o c u m e n t s  b e f o r e  t h e m  w a s  t h e  r e s u l t  o f  h a r d  negotiations, countless meetings and efforts. The possible "plan B" for the Geneva Process was to 
transmit the Package of documents in a state of advanced stabilization. Members had managed to 
achieve the "plan B", but as many had said, that was not enough for a final Bali outcome. Thus the G e n e v a  P r o c e s s  o f  t h e  n e g o t i a t i o n s  s h o u l d  g o  w i t h  " p l a n  A "  o r  a  m u c h  m o r e  a d v a n c e d  s e t  o f  documents, and it should continue working to achieve that.  
1.126.  Members could focus on an experience that many had had together with the Director-
General; the process of achieving results in the last UNCTAD Ministerial. He recalled that in that process, in Geneva, they had negotiated what they  could on a very intensive basis, to get through 
the procedural stage of being able to send a set of documents to Ministers in Doha. Once that 
procedural stage had been completed they ha d had a set of documents with many square 
brackets, but they had then continued negotiations in Geneva at the same intensity in order to get 
rid of even more square brackets and reach greate r convergence. This had resulted in the set of 
revised documents which had been handed out in Doha and distributed as revised documents. Negotiations had continued there, with texts th at had fewer square brackets, fewer points of 
discord. The Director-General had been through th at process himself and the controversial points 
were very important. Therefore, Members should continue the intensive discussions and 
negotiations in Geneva, in multiple formats as had been done and just as intensively. It was a question of persistence and work, not magic. Members needed to continue during available time in 
the same way, in the same intensity as in the past weeks and should be working intelligently and 
with flexibility. If they did not continue, they wo uld believe in magic and not in work, and it would 
be like giving up. Members would not be doing their job of being persistent. His delegation would 
be in any meeting that could be organized jointly with other delegations in order to be able to 
present documents to Ministers in Bali.  
1.127.  The representative of Benin, on behalf of the C-4, and also on behalf of the Minister of 
Burkina Faso, endorsed the statements by the Af rican Group, the LDC Group and the ACP Group. 
The intensive work undertaken by Members, in various formats including the Room W broad 
plenary meetings, had enabled them to take negotiations closer to Bali, not only physically and geographically, but also in terms of the outcome of this work.  That is why Members should not 
have doubts about the possibility of having a final Package for Bali. On the issue of cotton, the C-4 
urged Members to make the necessary responses in order to find solutions, both from the trade 
and development perspectives, bearing in mind the vital character of cotton for the economy in WT/GC/M/149 
 
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  African and LDC cotton-producing countries. The C- 4 recommended that the request by the LDCs 
included in the Package should be looked at carefully and dealt with usefully, taking into account their specific needs. The results for Bali were standing before Members. He said that the C-4 
believed that there was hope and possibili ty for achieving success in the future. 
1.128.  The representative of Guatemala noted that, in just a few weeks, Members had reached 
the point of being very close to an agreement, which some were calling modest, others necessary, 
and others insufficient. His delegation had not he ard anyone say that they did not recognise the 
importance of reaching an agreement. For Guatem ala, the only option available was to conclude 
what Members had started. The Ministerial Confer ence would give the opportunity to Members to 
approve the texts as they currently stood so that they could serve as a basis for further negotiations. Secondly, Members should exchange opinions and take the political decisions which 
would enable them to conclude on the outstanding items. Thirdly, Members should establish a 
Work Programme with a view to concluding the Pa ckage successfully. That was for the short term. 
Members had picked up momentum and the world would not wait. If Members could not achieve 
an agreement in Bali, it would increase pressure  on the Organization and the need for a rapid 
agreement. 
1.129.  The representative of El Salvador said that, regarding Trade Facilitation, the decision 
needed to be political. Taking the Package to Ministers was a risk. It was not the same to talk 
about defeat or failure in Geneva as it was to speak of a Ministerial failure in Bali. Members should carefully ponder the situation. He said that with the little time available, however hard it sounded, 
Members needed to continue working intensely. Bali could not be a forum for negotiations, and 
Members needed to be aware of the great risk th at that would pose. The solution of having an 
extraordinary session of the Ministerial Conference , as proposed by Chile, was a very reasonable 
alternative. The decision taken needed to be one that maintained the integrity of the WTO. 
Members had made much progress and they should not miss that opportunity, so necessary for 
the protection of the institutionality of the Organization, and for the Organization to make its contribution to a very complex world. He thought one last effort was something that Members 
owed to future generations and to their citizens. This was not the final Package. It was a Package 
which would enable Members to continue after Bali on the basis of the Doha agenda and the rest of the pillars that had to be concluded. El Salvador would continue to make every effort to achieve the goal. He thanked the Director-General again because what he had promised in his campaign, 
he had done; inclusivity was there. He asked that Members continue in this way and stressed that 
they should not be discouraged.  
1.130.  The representative of Pakistan said that the DG had been able to energise negotiations by 
leading from the front. She knew, with regret, that the number of brackets did not allow Members 
to conclude things before Bali, but the signs of  engagement that had been shown by Members in 
the preceding three months were a reflection of th e energy and vitality which negotiations brought 
to the institution. Members needed to preserve the progress made and remain constructive to take 
the process forward. She joined those who believe d in continuing the march for the strengthening 
of the Multilateral Trading System, which needed to deliver in increasing jobs and alleviating poverty through shared prosperity.  
1.131.  The representative of Bangladesh support ed the statement by the LDC Group. There was 
no doubt that, with regard to the non-completion of DDA, the LDCs would suffer most. If no 
outcome could be achieved in Bali, it would make the conditions of the LDCs worse. Therefore, his 
delegation urged all Members to make a last effort to have the Bali Package cleared in Geneva. 
That would set the tone to conclude the DDA in the near future.  
1.132.  The representative of Dominica, on behalf  of the OECS, supported the statements by the 
ACP Group and by the SVEs. He stressed that it had been a very long and arduous process in the 
past few days, but also the most transparent and inclusive process that Dominica had seen. The assessment of the Director-General of the state of play and the way forward was very sobering 
and also disappointing. The OECS were among th ose who had wanted and continued to want a 
success at Bali, based on delivering on all elements of the Bali Package as well as a roadmap for 
reinvigorating the negotiations on the rest of the DDA in a post-Bali work programme. The OECS had been part of the consensus when Members had agreed to pursue an early harvest in the run 
up to MC8 and then in the run up to MC9. They  had and continued to support an outcome on the 
LDC issues, which were the most in need of a development outcome from the DDA negotiations. As part of the G-33, they also supported an outcome on the G-33 proposal. Dominica attached WT/GC/M/149 
 
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  critical, substantive and systemic importance to an outcome on development, particularly the 
monitoring mechanism. However, it was on Trade Facilitation that they had the most intensive 
interest. In this regard, their Capitals had communicated quite clearly that the Trade Facilitation text, particularly on Section I, offered very little  additional impetus over existing policy goals and 
objectives. They could have lived with a far more ambitious set of Section I disciplines, backed by 
a Section II which provided the mechanism for obtaining assistance and support. In that regard, the OECS was heartened that progress had been made on Section II to arrive at a text that was 
almost free of internal brackets, based on the ACP proposal. It was now up to Members to see 
what could be done. Having serious negotiations in Bali with Ministers could be difficult, but the OECS had heard the call that morning for not giving up and the need to make a last effort moving forward and supported that stance to the extent that it was possible. 
1.133.  The representative of Niger supported the statements by the African Group, the ACP Group 
and the LDCs and called for sustained consideration for LDCs that needed further efforts to enable 
them to move forward in their development. Furt her flexibility was needed. Members needed to be 
open-minded and show that the accomplishments as consigned in the documents on the table 
would be able to be strengthened, if possible in Bali. 
1.134.  The General Council took note of the Director-General's report and of the statements. 
1.135.  The Director-General thanked all delega tions who had spoken words of encouragement 
and support, which meant a lot to him. For him, the toughest part was being at the table, 
sympathizing with the two sides and being unable to help, having tried to find common ground. Even more difficult was trying to get Members to move and push without overstepping each 
other's red lines. The overall message that he had heard, from the overwhelming majority of 
delegations that had spoken, was that Members were indeed close, and that they should not give up, but they should keep trying instead. He would reflect on that. He would be talking to Members 
in the following days and in Bali to see how they could seize that opportunity to the best of their 
ability.  
1.136.  He needed however, to give Members his honest assessment about what they could do, 
realistically, over the following days, or months. He believed that Members were very, very close 
and he had heard delegations saying "so near and yet so far" but he thought they were so near, 
and yet so near. He did not see the outcomes as something too far away. But, Members had to be 
realistic about the political realities that they faced. He believed that Bali was not amenable to a 
negotiating exercise. Ministers could not be put arou nd a table, in a large or small format, with the 
text before everyone. He had also heard some suggestions that Members should push the work further, over the subsequent days or hours before even getting to Bali in the hope that they could 
get a bit closer and then be in a position to make the final effort in Bali. His assessment was as 
good as any one of the Members' assessments, and having had the benefit of some private consultations, his assessment was that pursuing negotiations in Geneva any further would only 
lead to backtracking. It was not going to lead Members closer; it might even take them further 
apart. He was not saying that the subsequent fe w days in Geneva would be wasted. He would be 
consulting, talking to Members, working and prep aring for every scenario that he could imagine 
developing at Bali. He did not know what those sce narios were but Members had to be ready for all 
of them. If Members had scenarios that they wanted to add to his list, they should tell him in the 
coming hours, but he thought that the scenarios were probably the same.  
1.137.  With regard to Bali, he did not envisage that a typical negotiation around a text, trying to 
close the last gaps of a technical nature, was something that the Ministers should be doing. 
Ministers needed to talk, engage and figure out what they wanted. Ministers would therefore be 
sovereign, would be playing their hands and he would be there to help, to facilitate and to 
implement whatever Ministers decided. They had to explore all options; they would have to decide 
what they wanted, not only for the deliverables, but also for the Multilateral Trading System as a negotiating forum. He had said it several times; there would be a very significant blow to the Organization if Members did not conclude the Package. He had not been saying this only after he 
took the office; he had been saying that for a long time. He had been saying that since 2008, 
when Members could not close the deal. 
1.138.   He had heard many delegations saying that bilaterals and plurilaterals should not be 
happening. However, one could not have control ov er that. They were going to happen. Members 
had two options: they could deliver and therefore k eep the negotiating forum in Geneva alive, or it WT/GC/M/149 
 
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  would be going away. The Multilateral Trading System was not going to disappear, but the 
negotiations would not be there. For him was quite clear, and Ministers would have to make that call too. He had also heard many delegations mentioning the possibility of continuing negotiations after Bali; however, he did not believe that any process after Bali was going to approximate 
positions, particularly if there were no very significant change in terms of political environment. 
Members could not simply come back to Geneva and continue negotiations, and hope that it was going to change. It would only change if ther e was a political decision that the Ministers, 
particularly the Ministers of the delegations which were more active, all made a collective decision.  
If there was that decision, in his view, it would ha ppen, even in Bali. But that political engagement 
had to be there. If it was not, Members were not going to do it. He remained in the hands of the Members and of the Ministers. He would be doing everything he could to help Members get there.  
1.139.  He would speak to some Members. He was not going to have any more open-ended 
meetings, they were not necessary. He would be consulting with Members, probably with group 
coordinators and others over the subsequent days to get some more views and see how they 
should prepare their Ministers to get ready for Bali. He would also be talking to Ministers, including 
the Chairman of the Conference, Minister Gita Wirj awan, as it was important that he was briefed. 
He would be doing his utmost to help Members get the Bali Package done. But that would not be 
enough. He needed Members' efforts. In concludi ng, he thanked the Secretariat, the Chairs, and 
all Members.  
1.140.  The General Council took note of the Director-General's statement. 
2  WORK PROGRAMME ON SMALL ECONOMIES – REPORT BY THE CHAIR OF THE 
DEDICATED SESSION OF THE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT 
2.1.  The Chairman recalled that in line with the framework and procedures agreed by the General 
Council in 2002, the Work Programme on Small Economies was a standing item on the General 
Council's agenda and the Committee on Trade and Development regularly reported to the Council 
on the progress of work in its Dedicated Sessions on  this subject. He drew attention to the Report 
submitted by the Committee on Trade and Development in Dedicated Session to the General 
Council in document WT/COMTD/SE/8 and invited Ms Williams (Barbados), Chair of the CTD, to 
report on developments in this area. 
2.2.  Ms Williams (Barbados), Chairperson of the Dedicated Session of the CTD, recalled that since 
the most recent report to the General Council on the Small Economies Work Programme, there had 
been one formal and several informal meetings of the CTD in Dedicated Session. These meetings 
concerned first, a Workshop held on 23 October on  the Effects of Non-Tariff Measures (NTMs) on 
the Exports of Small Economies, and second, several consultations on the Dedicated Session's 
report to the General Council. 
2.3.  The Workshop on 23 October had featured three sessions: the first had included recent 
research by international organizations on NTMs in general and how they affected the exports of 
small economies; the second had focused on nati onal experiences with meeting NTM challenges 
and had featured presentations by delegations fr om Jamaica, Sri Lanka and Trinidad and Tobago. 
Finally, a third session had featured efforts by developed countries and international organizations to build capacity in order to help small econom ies meet NTM challenges. A Secretariat background 
paper (WT/COMTD/SE/W/28) had been prepared for the workshop and was accessible on the 
WTO's website as were all presentations and audio recordings of the various statements made. The record of the workshop would appear in the official minutes of the 26
th Dedicated Session in 
due course. 
2.4.   Concerning the several informal consultations held since October, she was pleased to report 
that document WT/COMTD/SE/8 had been adopte d by Members on 7 November and had been 
forwarded by the Dedicated Session to the General Council with recommendations for future work. 
In this report, Members had proposed that th e General Council make a recommendation to the 
9th Ministerial Conference requiring Ministers to reaffirm their commitment to the Work Programme 
on Small Economies and to take note of all work conducted to date, especially the work 
undertaken since MC8 on the effects of Non-Tariff Measures on Small Economies.  WT/GC/M/149 
 
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  2.5.  Members had also proposed to the General Council that it instruct the Secretariat to provide 
relevant information and factual analysis for a discussion to take place in the course of next year in the CTD Dedicated Session, in the areas identi fied in item k of paragraph 2 of the Work 
Programme and, in particular, on the challe nges and opportunities experienced by Small 
Economies when linking into global value chains in trade in goods and services. She said that the 
Dedicated Session was looking forward to having the General Council forward these 
recommendations to Ministers. 
2.6.  The representative of Barbados, on behalf of SVEs, said that the Chair's report outlined the 
positive work that had been done within the Committee on Trade and Development under the 
Work Programme on Small Economies. The Workshop on NTM's coupled with the WTO Secretariat's background note (WT/COMTD/SC/W/28) had provided for an informative and 
instructive debate which had not only revealed that NTM's presented real challenges to the exports 
of small economies but had also highlighted some of the work that was being done by countries, 
agencies, and international organizations to assist with building capacity to deal with NTMs. In that 
regard, SVEs were pleased that Members could report positively to Ministers at the Ninth 
Ministerial Conference on the work that had been done in accordance with their Mandate two years 
prior. SVEs looked forward to reviewing the main conclusions of the workshops in 2014. She 
thanked WTO Members for their spirit of en gagement and their commitment to the Small 
Economies Work Programme, as demonstrated in their recommendation to Ministers to reaffirm the Work Programme and the adoption of the areas for future work as set out in WT/COMTD/SC/8. 
SVEs looked forward to working with Members in the post-Bali stage on the Small Economies Work 
Programme in the CTD Dedicated Sessions as well as in the regular work of the WTO on the DDA 
Negotiations. 
2.7.  The Chairman noted that the Council woul d take action on the report by the Dedicated 
Session on Small Economies in WT/COMTD/SE/8 under item 4(a) of the agenda. 
2.8.  The General Council took note of the repo rt of the Chair of the Dedicated Session of the 
Committee on Trade and Development and of the statement. 
3  THE DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE ASPECT OF COTTON – PERIODIC REPORT BY THE 
DIRECTOR-GENERAL (WT/GC/154 – WT/CFMC/DG/6 – WT/MIN (13)/3) 
3.1.  The Chairman recalled that, in Paragraph 1.b of its July 2004 Decision on the Doha Work 
Programme, the General Council, inter alia , had taken note of the bilateral, multilateral, and 
regional efforts to make progress on the development assistance aspects of the Cotton Initiative, 
and had instructed the Secretariat to continue to work with the development community and to provide the Council with periodic reports on relevant developments. 
3.2.  The Council had also instructed the Director-General to consult with the relevant international 
organizations, including the Bretton Woods Institutions, the Food and Agriculture Organization and the International Trade Centre, to direct effe ctively existing programmes and any additional 
resources towards development of the economies where cotton had vital importance. 
3.3.  He invited Deputy Director-General David Shark to introduce the Report in document 
WT/GC/154 – WT/CFMC/DG/6 – WT/MIN(13)/3 on behalf of the Director-General. 
3.4.  Deputy Director-General Shark, on behalf of the Director-General, said he was pleased to 
introduce the Periodic Report on the Development Assistance aspects of Cotton on behalf of the 
DG. Progress had been made since the last Periodic Report was circulated in 2012. This progress had been reflected in the sixteenth version of the Evolving Table on Cotton Development 
Assistance, which had been recently issued. The Evolving Table was considered to be the 
centrepiece of the work of the Consultative Framework Mechanism on Cotton in the implementation of its mandate on cotton development assistance.    
3.5.  The numbers in the Report indicated that  concrete results had been achieved. There had 
been an increase in the total value of commitmen ts and disbursements, and, importantly, the gap 
between them had narrowed. And, perhaps just as  significant, was that the results pointed to 
progress in the enhanced dialogue between prov iders and recipients of development assistance, 
which the Mechanism aimed to foster. He commended the traditional members of the development WT/GC/M/149 
 
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  community for their engagement in the consultative process, in particular Australia, Canada, the 
European Union and several of its Member States , Japan, Switzerland and the United States. In 
addition, he welcomed the greater involvement of , and contributions from, a number of developing 
countries, in particular Brazil, China, India and Pakistan. Contributions had been received from 
several multilateral institutions. As a result of this engagement there was now a strong partnership 
between the providers of development assist ance for cotton and its beneficiaries.  
3.6.  The discussions in the consultations had been  enriched by improvements in the presentation 
of the quantitative information and by greater qu alitative assessment of the implementation of the 
different projects and programmes. The C-4 conti nued to regularly submit information on their 
work, as reflected in the "Table on Domestic  Cotton Sector Reforms". Members more broadly 
remained engaged in the Consultative Framework Mechanism on Cotton. But, it was necessary for 
all the actors to continue to work towards achieving complementarity between the two aspects of 
the cotton dossier, i.e. both the trade and the development components.   
3.7.  Finally, he wished to say he was pleased to be taking this work forward on behalf of the DG 
as Chairman of the Consultative Framework Mechanism. On that note, he wished to thank the 
outgoing Chair, former DDG Harsha Singh, for th e pivotal role he had played in taking this 
important work forward. 
3.8.  The Chairman noted that the report by the Director-General had already been circulated as a 
MC9 document.  
3.9.  The representative of Benin, on behalf of  the C-4, thanked the Deputy Director-General for 
the periodic report on recent activities in the framework of the DG Consultative Mechanism on the 
development aspects of Cotton. The C-4 also wished to thank the Members of the donor 
community, both developed and developing, as well  the international and regional bodies which 
helped them with the activities within the fram ework of the development aspects of Cotton. The 
C-4 recommended that the ways and means identified during meetings held recently by the WTO 
and its Members in the follow up to identified activities be implemented in a coherent way in order to achieve the expected results in terms of the de velopment aspects of cotton, thus contributing to 
improve the cotton situation in the interested countries and regions. 
3.10.  The General Council took note of the Director-General's report and of the statement. 
4  NINTH SESSION OF THE MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE 4.1.  The Chairman pointed out that, as indicate d in the agenda, there were two sub-items under 
this item:  (a) a statement he would be making as Chairman; and (b) Attendance of Observers 
from International Intergovernmental Organizations, including a request from the League of Arab States to attend MC9. He suggested taking up these two sub-items separately. 
4.1  Statement by the Chairman 
4.1.1  TRIPS non-violation and situation complaints (IP/C/67) 
4.1.2  E-Commerce (WT/GC/W/676) 
4.2.  The Chairman said that he would first take  up the two sub-sub-items on the agenda, namely 
TRIPS non-violation and situation complaints and e-commerce.  He would then turn to the other 
three recommendations for action by Ministers stemming from the reports of subsidiary bodies under Item 2 and Item 12. Finally, he would turn to some organizational and administrative 
matters for the Conference. 
4.3.  He recalled that the Conference would undertake an Overview of WTO activities under item 1 
of its Agenda, on the basis of Annual Reports from the General Council and its subsidiary bodies.  
The annual reports, which Members would take up  under item 12 of the agenda of the present 
meeting, constituted the main vehicle through which WTO bodies reported to Ministers on progress of work in their respective areas, and might include points or recommendations for action by 
Ministers.  In his statement at the Opening Session  of the Ministerial Conference, he would report WT/GC/M/149 
 
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  to Ministers that the General Council and its subsidiary bodies had fulfilled their mandates, in 
particular with respect to the mandates that Ministers had given at MC8.   
4.4.  As he had noted before, work under the relevant MC8 mandates had already been concluded 
in the areas of LDC Accession Guidelines, which had been adopted by the General Council in 
July 2012, and of the extension of the transition period for LDCs under the TRIPS Agreement, 
which had been agreed by the TRIPS Council in June. On small economies, Members had heard from Ms Williams that the Dedicated Session had agreed to a text concerning future work in its 
report to the General Council. The annual reports of the Committee on Trade and Development – 
with respect to Aid for Trade - and the annual report of the Working Group on Trade and Transfer of Technology also contained recommendations for Ministerial action. 
4.5.  He turned to the Decisions to be forwarde d to the Ministerial Conference, starting with the 
two sub-sub-items on TRIPS non-violation and situation complaints and E-Commerce.  The texts of 
the draft decisions could be found in the resp ective reports in IP/C/67 and WT/GC/W/676.  
4.6.   Unless any delegation wished to take the floor, he proposed that, in accordance with 
practice, the General Council take note of his statement and agree to forward those reports and 
the draft texts for decision by Ministers which they contained to the Ministerial Conference. 
4.7.  The representative of Barbados brought to the attention of Members a development which 
she thought was important. On 24 October 2013, a group of developing countries had sought in 
document WT/L/202 to have the CTD report to the General Council on development work in WTO 
in accordance with its mandate as a focal point of development work as set out in WT/L/46 and in compliance with the request of Ministers at MC8 that the CTD operationalize that mandate as set 
out in WT/MIN/11/11. Unfortunately, the proposal had not achieved consensus even though it was 
only seeking to implement the decision of Minist ers. Insofar as Members were seeking to take 
other matters to the upcoming Ministerial in Bali, she thought that it would be important to bring 
the fate of the decision of Ministers to the attention of the full membership as it could have 
implications for the future approaches of the Organization to Ministerial Decisions. 
4.8.  The representative of the United States sa id that MC8 had called for focused work in the CTD 
and on Members to fully operationalize the mandate of the CTD as a focal point for development 
work in the WTO. Since then, Members had actively engaged to fulfil the mandate. For example, Members had intensified efforts on a nearly reached agreement on the creation of a Monitoring Mechanism. Such a Mechanism could have very positive impact on CTD's work and would provide 
value to Members to a regular review of the ut ilization and implementation of existing WTO S&D 
provisions and related to paragraph 3 of the CTD' s mandate. Further, several proposals had been 
received and actively discussed in the CTD, each aimed at implementing the MC8 guidance. One 
such proposal had directed the Secretariat to upda te the report on S&D provisions which obtained 
full support in the CTD. As such, the Secretaria t had issued an updated report that provided a 
useful review on the implementation of S&D provisions in WTO provisions and decisions. But 
failure to adopt one specific proposal, that was the CTD Report on the Activities of other WTO 
Bodies, did not imply that Members had failed to fulfil the MC8 mandate or that they had ignored 
Ministers' instructions. He said that it was simply fallacious to argue that the MC8 mandate could be fulfilled only by directing the CTD to report on all development work taking place in the WTO, 
including in other bodies. The United States had been very clear in its views that such a proposal 
was not only inappropriate, but also unnecessary. The US failed to understand what such reporting would add considering that the CTD had already reported annually to the General Council on its 
activities as did the other WTO Bodies whose work had often been development related. The 
United States had remained supportive of focused discussions in the CTD on specific issues of concern to developing countries and on the link between trade and development. One such 
proposal which had sought to promote such discussions had not received consensus in the CTD but 
that did not mean that Members had failed. The United States remained committed to continuing work pursuant to the mandate especially that which had supported the positive link between trade and development to focus work in the CTD. 
4.9.  The representative of the European Union said that, on TRIPS non-violation and situation 
complaints, his delegation was not convinced that the GATT non-violation complaints concept 
applied to TRIPS. The TRIPS Agreement required Members to put in place clearly the described 
legislation and to enforce it. Any failure to comply with that obligation could be directly addressed WT/GC/M/149 
 
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  as a violation of the TRIPS Agreement. He said that the EU had supported further extension of the 
moratorium. 
4.10.  On E-Commerce, the EU was very pleased with the reinvigoration of the Work Programme. 
Members had been able to focus on specific  issues through the two workshops and other 
workshops. The outcome of the last two years was a valuable input in improving the 
understanding of the trade-related aspects of E-Commerce. The EU was ready to continue engaging on those topics in the next two years and would welcome further technical discussion on 
the topics identified on the Ministerial Declaration. He had also invited Members to consider 
discussion on the permanent character of the moratorium. 
4.11.  The General Council took note of the stat ements and agreed to the Chairman's suggested 
course of action. 
4.12.  The Chairman then turned to the Work Pr ogramme on Small Economies. As the Council had 
heard under Item 2, the report of the Committee on Trade and Development in Dedicated Session 
and the recommendation to Ministers that it contained could be found in document 
WT/COMTD/SE/8, in para. 3.2.  
4.13.  On Aid for Trade, the recommendation for Ministers' action could be found in the annual 
report adopted by the CTD, which was document WT/COMTD/83, in para. 5.9.   
4.14.  Similarly, on Trade and Transfer of Tec hnology, the recommendation for Ministers' action 
was contained in the Annual Report adopted by the Working Group, which was document 
WT/WGTTT/15, in para. 4.1.   
4.15.  Unless any delegation wished to take the floor, he proposed that, in accordance with the 
practice, the General Council agree to forward the recommendations which he had mentioned to 
the Ministerial Conference for decision by Ministers. 
4.16.  The General Council so agreed. 
4.17.  The Chairman noted that the Trade Polic y Review Mechanism Fifth Appraisal had been 
completed and the relevant report contained in document WT/MIN(13)/5 had been submitted 
directly to the Ministerial Conference in accordance with the mandate of the TPRB. 
4.18.  Turning to organizational matters, he no ted that the programme of the Conference had 
been circulated to delegations in document WT/M IN(13)/INF/13.  As indicated in that document, 
the Conference would be opened on 3 December at  3 p.m. by the President of the Republic of 
Indonesia.  The first Plenary Session would be held on Wednesday 4 December starting at 9.30 am 
and would continue over the following days.  As in the past, the Plenary Session would provide 
Ministers with the opportunity to make prepared statements in accordance with the List of Speakers.  He reminded delegations that statements in the Plenary Session would be limited to 
three minutes. 
4.19.  As a matter of course, and in line with its Rules of Procedure, MC9 would take up two issues 
related to the organization of the Tenth Minister ial Conference.  Those issues were the date and 
venue of MC10 and the election of officers for th at Conference, and they appeared as items 3 and 
4 on the MC9 Provisional Agenda in document WT/M IN(13)/W/1.  He proposed that, as in the past, 
Ministers refer those issues to the General Council for it to hold consultations on them when appropriate. He trusted that this was acceptable to delegations. 
4.20.  Further, he said that Members had to also consider the question of the appointments of the 
Chairs of Negotiating Bodies.  In line with the agreement reached at the first meeting of the TNC, 
those appointments were to be reviewed at each Se ssion of the Ministerial Conference.  As for past 
Ministerial Conferences, he proposed that Minist ers request the General Council to take the matter 
up in the February 2014 slate of names exercise for appointment of officers to regular bodies.  He 
trusted that this was also acceptable to delegations. 
4.21.  The General Council took note of the statement and so agreed. WT/GC/M/149 
 
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  4.2  Attendance of Observers from Inte rnational Intergovernmental Organizations 
4.2.1  Request by the League of Arab States 4.22.  The Chairman recalled that, in line with th e discussions at the October meeting, the General 
Council had agreed to revert to the matter of atte ndance of IGOs at MC9 at that meeting.  In 
October, he had urged all delegations to work together with a truly constructive spirit to find a 
solution to this issue. Since that meeting, he had continued to conduct consultations in several different configurations.  Despite those efforts, it appeared from his consultations that there was 
no consensus on that matter and that therefore no IGOs would be able to attend MC9.  In his 
view, this was a regrettable situation, and one that had systemic implications on the work of the WTO as a whole.   
4.23.  With respect to the sub-item concerning the request from the League of Arab States to 
attend MC9, which was related to the broader issu e of IGO's attendance at MC9, his consultations 
had continued to show that there were Members who were not in a position to agree to the request.  
4.24.  The representative of Egypt, on behalf of the Arab Group, referred to his delegation's 
statement at the last General Council Meeting on behalf of the Arab Group. For more than a 
decade, some Members had continued to undermine the Guidelines to ensure the participation of 
IGOs and their contribution to the work of WTO, to  ensure the coherence needed in the Multilateral 
Trading System. Divergence over the interpretati on of the Guidelines granting IGOs Observer 
Status had continued to grow with no clear indication as how some IGOs had been granted permanent observer status while others had continued to be barred from receiving the same 
status. The Group invited Members to refrain from politicizing the work of the WTO and warranted 
that requests for Observer Status were granted to all IGOs. 
4.25.  The General Council took note of the statements. 
5  REVIEW OF THE EXEMPTION PROVIDED UNDER PARAGRAPH 3 OF GATT 1994 
(WT/L/880) 
5.1.  The Chairman recalled that Paragraph 3(a) of  GATT 1994 provided an exemption from Part II 
of GATT 1994 for measures under specific mandatory legislation – enacted by a Member before it 
became a contracting party to GATT 1947 – which prohibited the use, sale or lease of foreign-built or foreign-reconstructed vessels in commercial applications between points in national waters or waters of an exclusive economic zone.   
5.2.  In 1994, the United States had invoked that provision with respect to specific legislation that 
met the requirements of that paragraph. Paragrap h 3(b) of GATT 1994 called for a review of that 
exemption five years after the date of entry in to force of the WTO Agreement – and thereafter 
every two years for as long as the exemption was in force – to examine whether the conditions for 
the exemption still prevailed. 
5.3.  The General Council had last considered that matter at its meeting in February that year, and 
his predecessor had invited interested delegations to speak with regard to the review under the 
current cycle.  She had also invited interested delegations to submit comments and questions to 
the United States regarding the operation of the legislation under the exemption, to which the US was to be invited to respond. Those statements , questions and responses, together with the 
annual report provided by the US under Paragrap h 3(c) of GATT 1994 – circulated in WT/L/880 – 
would form the basis for that year's review.   
5.4.  The General Council had also agreed that it would consider that matter again at its last 
meeting of the year, at which it would take note of the discussions held in the course of the 
review, take any other action it might agree on, and would also take note that the subsequent review would be held in 2015. The exemption was without prejudice to solutions concerning 
specific aspects of the legislation covered by the exemption negotiated in sectoral agreements or 
in other fora. WT/GC/M/149 
 
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  5.5.  The representative of the European Union said that his delegation supported the review 
process.  However, he wished to underline once again the EU's strong concerns with the unjustified 
exemption. The EU continued to view the Jones Act as a piece of legislation that restricted competition in the ship building and shipping mark ets and no longer served a legitimate purpose in 
today's global economy. The prevailing situation had negative economic consequences for the EU's 
and other countries' ship-building industries and also for the US Maritime Industry, faced with higher costs due to the closure of the US market  for foreign-built ships. The EU sincerely hoped 
that the 2013 review would deliver results and not be again a simple recurring point in the agenda. 
The EU encouraged the US to engage in a more ob jective approach in that area with the view to 
seriously reviewing the exemption in the near future. 
5.6.  The representative of Japan said that since this exemption was a deviation from the 
fundamental principles of the WTO, Japan at tached great importance to the review. The 
explanation given by the US so far had merely mentioned the continued existence of the Jones Act. Japan believed that fell short of demonstrating the necessary explanation of the substantial 
need of such an exemption. Japan was concerned that the continuation of this exemption without 
proper reasoning could undermine the credibility of the WTO rules as a whole. Japan hoped that pursuant to Paragraph 3 of the GATT 1994, more substantial and effective examination would be 
conducted for the future with the cooperation of the United States. 
5.7.  The representative of Hong Kong, China po inted out that it was the eighth review of the 
Jones Act exemption. Hong Kong, China had been  disappointed by the outcome of the previous 
seven reviews. Its objective and systemic interests remained unchanged. The Jones Act 
represented a major derogation from a fundamenta l principle of the WTO – national treatment. 
Further, as a strong proponent of the liberalization of the maritime transport, which was a crucial part of the logistics supply chain, his delegation was concerned that the exemption represented 
one of the major impediments to the Member concerned in making any market access 
commitments in maritime transport services. He  therefore urged the US to seriously review 
whether the legislation covered was still serving the objectives originally intended and whether the 
conditions for retention of the measures indeed still prevailed. As in the past, Hong Kong, China 
stood ready to discuss with the US as with other Me mbers with an open mind and in a constructive 
manner. 
5.8.  The representative of Norway thanked the US for organizing consultations on the continued 
application of the GATT Paragraph 3 Exemption for the purposes of the Jones Act. He noted that a 
number of questions had been posed by Members to the United States throughout the years, both concerning previous notifications and the effects of legislation. He believed that it was fair to say 
that the answers had not been satisfactory, in particular, as regards the continued need for the 
exemption in the WTO context - a somewhat peculiar  exemption. He still believed that the review 
should focus on the salient point of Paragraph 3(b) which was the examination of whether the 
conditions which had created the need for the exemption still prevailed. There was a need to move 
beyond the point of discussing only statistical information submitted under Paragraph 3(c) and address also the conditions for the exemption and the continued need for it. 
5.9.  The representative of China joined the other Members in expressing its commercial and 
systemic concern at the unjustified exemption. 5.10.  The representative of Australia appreciated the information provided by the United States as 
part of the review and the opportunity to discuss the issue informally with US experts. Australia 
had a particular interest in the issue because of Australia's capacity to provide certain transport 
and related services and Australian expertise in building a range of maritime vessels including light-weight fast ferries. Australia recognized the particular sensitivities of the US in relation to 
cabotage and coastal shipping. Australia and many other Members shared those sensitivities. 
However, Australia believed there was scope for the US to make some commitments on maritime 
transport and related services that would not contravene the Jones Act. Australia noted that in the context of the Services negotiations, the US had not been asked to make commitments on coastal 
and cabotage shipping. Even after informal consultations with US officials as part of this review, 
Australia had not understood which aspects of the Jones Act had prevented the US from making commitments on maritime transport and related services that were not related to cabotage or to 
coastal shipping. Australia would welcome further information from the US on the issue. WT/GC/M/149 
 
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  5.11.  The representative of Korea also joined  other Members in airing their systemic and 
commercial concerns on the matter. Korea would al so like to engage in any future process. 
5.12.  The representative of the United States said that, as the United States had explained 
before, the provisions of Paragraph 3 of the GATT 1994 were an integral part of the GATT 1994. 
Paragraph 3 of the GATT 1994 was drafted and included in the Uruguay Round Package to deal 
with non-conforming provisions of domestic legislation of a non-discretionary character in the specific area addressed by the exemption. Under Paragraph 3(a), as long as the legislation that 
the United States had notified remained in force and had not been modified to reduce its 
conformity with Part II of the GATT 1994, the US legislation remained exempt and Part II of the 
GATT did not apply to it. And that was the situation wi th respect to the US legislation at present. It 
remained in force and its conformity with Pa rt II of the GATT 1994 had not decreased. This 
provision had been agreed to by all Members as a central part of the Uruguay Round results. It 
was critical for US ship-builders to build commercial ships for this trade if a viable industrial base to be maintained to meet future navy requirements. Moreover, the navy had relied upon shipyards 
to perform commercial work for the Jones Act trades for day to day maintenance of naval and 
surge fleet vessels such as the ready reserve fleet. It was the strongly held position of United States that the only purpose of the review provided for in Paragraph 3(b) was to "examine 
whether the conditions which created the need for the exemption still prevail." The conditions that 
had created the need for the use of the exemption by  the United States still existed. Since United 
States had invoked the exemption in 1994, there had been no amendments or measures adopted 
by the United States that would alter the US position in conforming to coverage by the exemption. 
And US had very much the same need as it did in 1994 to maintain its shipyards' readiness to 
build and maintain naval vessels. 
5.13.  The General Council took note of the statements made in the course of the review that year, 
and also took note that the subsequent review under the two-yearly cycle provided in 
paragraph 3(b) of GATT 1994 would normally be held in 2015. 6  IMPROVING THE GUIDELINES FO R GRANTING INTERGOVERNMENTAL 
ORGANIZATIONS PERMANENT OBSERVER STAT US IN THE WTO – STATEMENT BY THE 
CHAIR 
6.1.  The Chairman recalled that the matter was on the agenda following a communication by the 
Arab Group entitled "Improving the Guidelines fo r Granting Observer Status to Intergovernmental 
Organizations in the WTO" (WT/GC/W/643), wh ich had then been supplemented by a further 
communication in document WT/GC/W/654. 
6.2.  At the October Meeting, he had stressed again the importance of the issue, and its 
implications for the efficient functioning of the WTO. Since then, he had continued his 
consultations in parallel with the consultations he had conducted on the attendance of IGOs at MC9, given the relationship between the two matters . From his consultations, it had appeared that 
there was no convergence on how to take the process forward at that stage.  
6.3.  The representative of Egypt, on behalf of the Arab Group, pointed out that, in the previous 
General Council meeting, Egypt had presented a proposal on behalf of the Arab Group regarding 
the participation of the IGOs at MC9. That had be en a proposal that had included a constructive 
basis for improving the Guidelines for Granting IGOs Observer Status in WTO. Unfortunately, no 
consensus had been reached on the proposal which had resulted in not inviting IGOs to participate in MC9, which was very regrettable. He requested that the item should remain on the agenda of 
the General Council for the future meetings and called upon Members to put the issue as a priority 
for consultations in the coming period in the aim of reaching a conclusive set of guidelines for granting IGOs observer status in WTO. 
6.4.  The representative of Oman fully associated  herself with the statement made by Egypt. As 
already stated, the matter had already been on the agenda for quite some time. She thought it 
was time for the Chairman to conduct more consultations and to have more technical discussions on the Arab Group proposal. 
6.5.  The representative of the Dominican Repub lic, on behalf of the IGDC, thanked the Chairman 
for his effort in trying to reach a solution to improve rules in ensuring participation of inter-WT/GC/M/149 
 
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  governmental organizations as permanent observer s in the WTO. He urged him to continue his 
efforts to find a positive outcome to the consultations. 
6.6.  The representative of United States said th at the issue of Observer Status for IGOs had been 
a difficult one for the Organization and that it was unfortunate and unnecessary that so many 
requests remained outstanding. The situation at the present and during the previous Ministerial 
Conference was an aberration from past practice when the vast majority of IGOs had been able to participate. Members had tried in the past to resolve those issues by building on the rules 
Members adopted in 1996. Those efforts had failed over a number of difficult issues. As much as 
he might wish it were otherwise, the situation had not changed since then. He appreciated the Arab Group's efforts in putting some more concre te ideas in front of Members. He had studied 
them carefully and could not see a basis on wh ich agreement might be achieved. Regretfully, 
history had not indicated that it was a constructive area for future discussion. 
6.7.  The representative of Jordan thanked the Chairman for his efforts. He associated himself with 
the statement by Egypt and hoped a solution could be reached in the near future to improve the 
guidelines for granting IGOs permanent observer status in the WTO. 
6.8.  The General Council took note of the statements. 
7  TRIPS COUNCIL MATTERS 
7.1  Review under Paragraph 8 of the Decision  on the Implementation of Paragraph 6 of 
the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (WT/L/540 and WT/L/540/CORR.1) – Report of the Council for TRIPS (IP/C/66) 
7.2  Proposal for a Decision on an Extens ion of the Period for the Acceptance by 
Members of the Protocol amending the TRIPS Agreement (IP/C/65) 
7.1.  The Chairman proposed to take up the two sub-items together. 
7.2.  He recalled that, in August 2003, the General Council had adopted a Decision on the 
Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha De claration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health.  Paragraph 8 of that Decision provided that the TRIPS Council should review annually the functioning of the System set out in the Decision with a view to ensuring its effective operation, 
and should annually report on its operation to the General Council.   
7.3.  In addition, in keeping with the August 2003 Decision, the General Council had adopted, in 
December 2005, a Protocol Amending the TRIPS Agreement, which had been submitted to Members for acceptance and which, in accordance with Article X:3 of the WTO Agreement, would 
enter into force upon acceptance by two thirds of the Members.   
7.4.  In view of the status of acceptances, however, the TRIPS Council at its meeting in October 
that year had agreed to submit to the General Council a proposal for a decision on a fourth 
extension of the period for the acce ptance by Members of the Protocol. 
7.5.  Mr Suescum (Panama), Chairman of the TRIPS Council, recalled that at its meeting on 10-11 
October 2013, the TRIPS Council had taken up the annual review pursuant to Paragraph 8 of the 
Decision on the Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement 
and Public Health. The TRIPS Council's report on the review to the General Council had been circulated in document IP/C/66. 
7.6.  The cover note to that document had set out factual information regarding the 
implementation and use of the Decision, as well as the status of acceptances of the Protocol 
Amending the TRIPS Agreement. The TRIPS Council's report also contained, in Annex 1, the record 
of the discussion that had taken place during the Council's review of the waiver decision; the 
statements made by delegations were reproduced  in Appendix 1. In addition, Annex 2 to the 
report contained a recommendation for a General Council decision on an extension of the period for the acceptance by Members of the Protocol, which he would like to address. WT/GC/M/149 
 
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  7.7.  As Members were aware, the Protocol Amen ding the TRIPS Agreement that had been done in 
Geneva on 6 December 2005 provided that the "Pro tocol shall be open for acceptance by Members 
until 1 December 2007 or such later date as may be decided by the Ministerial Conference". Given the status of acceptances at the end of the initial period, the General Council, at its meeting in 
December 2007, had decided for the first time to  extend the period for the acceptance of the 
Protocol until 31 December 2009.  Since then, further extensions of the period had been agreed upon by the General Council through decisions ta ken at its meetings in December 2009 and in 
November 2011.  Currently, the period for the acceptance of the Protocol was due to expire on 
31 December 2013. 
7.8.  He said that at present, 48 instruments of  acceptance, including by the European Union, had 
been notified by Members. The complete list of th ose Members could be found in the report to the 
General Council on the annual review of the functioning of the Paragraph 6 System (IP/C/66), 
which he had mentioned at the beginning of his inte rvention. The list could also be consulted on a 
dedicated webpage which was regularly updated by the WTO Secretariat.  In accordance with 
paragraph 3 of Article X of the WTO Agreement, the Protocol should enter into force upon 
acceptance of the Protocol by two thirds of the Members, which currently amounted to 106 Members. 
7.9.  Given the present status of acceptances, the Council for TRIPS, at its meeting in 
October 2013, had agreed to forward to the Genera l Council a proposal for a decision to extend 
once more the period for the acceptance by Member s of the Protocol by a further two years, until 
31 December 2015. The proposal was before Members in document IP/C/65, for consideration and 
adoption by the General Council.  
7.10.  Before concluding his report, he once more called upon those Members who had not yet 
accepted the Protocol to carry out promptly the necessary internal procedures that would permit 
them to deposit their instruments of acceptance. In this regard, he emphasized that accepting the 
Protocol Amending the TRIPS Agreement was distinct from implementing the system in the domestic legal framework. Those were two separate acts, but many WTO Members, including his 
country in the past, had believed mistakenly that acceptance could not occur without 
implementation. In other words, the Protocol coul d be accepted independently from the adoption 
of domestic measures to implement the system . By accepting the Protocol, a Member agreed 
simply that WTO Members, including itself, were entitled to use the additional flexibility that the 
System provided. Should a WTO Member wish to take advantage itself of those additional 
flexibilities it might need to domestically implement appropriate legislative measures. But since those two processes were entirely separate, a Member might choose to deposit an instrument of 
acceptance of the Protocol without the need  to wait for any domestic implementation.
 At its 
meeting on 10-11 October 2013, the TRIPS Council had taken up the annual review pursuant to Paragraph 8 of the Decision on the Implementation  of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the 
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health. The TRIPS Co uncil's report on the review to the General 
Council had been circulated in document IP/C/66. 
7.11.  The representative of the European Union said that, regarding the first point, there had 
been some positive aspects in the work of th e TRIPS Council that year. Access to essential 
medicines for developing countries was of outmost importance for the EU. The EU encouraged 
Members to accept the amendment to the TRIPS Agr eement so that it could come into force. The 
EU supported further extension of the deadline for acceptance of the Paragraph 6 System by 
Members. It was EU's conviction that the TRIPS Agreement, including this amendment but also the 
broader system of obligations and flexibilities, achieved the necessary balance to ensure that 
Intellectual Property might not unduly constitute an obstacle for access to medicines by low-
income and least developed countries. The EU welcomed the continuation of a focused debate in 
the TRIPS Council of the Paragraph 6 system even  if in the last two years no evidence or 
argumentation had been brought to the table abou t the deficiencies in the system. The EU was 
pleased that the discussion under the topics of IP and innovation and the interventions from 
Members of the TRIPS Council had given ample evidence of the very positive effect of IPR towards 
useful innovation and economic and public welfare, which was true in countries in all stages of development. The EU looked forward to further disc ussions of this kind. On the second point, the 
EU supported the extension. 
7.12.  The representative of the United States recalled that the US had strongly supported the 
Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health and the General Council's Decision of WT/GC/M/149 
 
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  August 2003 to implement the Doha Declaration, including Paragraph 6 to allow drugs to be 
exported under compulsory licence on the terms set out in that Decision and the accompanying Chairman's statement. The US had also provided strong support for the General Council's Decision 
of 6 December 2005 to amend the TRIPS Agre ement and make permanent the system and 
appropriately preserve reference to the Chair's Statement. In October, the TRIPS Council had held 
a productive review of the Implementation of  Paragraph 6 and any further review of the 
Implementation of Paragraph 6 should be within the TRIPS Council. On Item B, the United States 
had strongly supported the 2005 Decision to amen d the TRIPS Agreement and had been the first 
Member to notify its acceptance to the amendmen t. The US respected the trading partners' right 
to protect Public Health and in particular, to promote access to medicines for all. The US supported the vital role of the patent system in prom oting the development and creation of new and 
innovative life-saving medicines. The US welcomed the nearly 50 Members that had accepted the 
amendment so far. The United States hoped to see at least 2/3 of the WTO Membership accept this amendment by 31 December 2015, at which point the amendment would go into effect for 
those Members that had accepted it. 
7.13.  The representative of Canada took note of  the fact that if Members looked at the 2005 
waiver and the subsequent decision to transform it into a permanent amendment, that really was 
an important signal that trade and intellectual pr operty rights actually could support access to 
medicines. He strongly supported the initiative. He welcomed the extension of the deadline to allow the Protocol Amending the TRIPS Agreement to come into force because there were not enough Members to bring it into force yet.  He encouraged Members to brief their Ministers to at 
least move this matter up the priority list, whether or not Members were in the position to more 
expeditiously consider favourably acceptance of th e Protocol. He appreciated the work of the Chair, 
and it was up to the Members themselves to take advantage. 
7.14.  The Chairman proposed that the General Council took note of the report of the TRIPS 
Council in document IP/C/66, and adopted the draft decision in document IP/C/65 extending the 
time period for acceptance by Members of th e Protocol amending the TRIPS Agreement to 
31 December 2015. 
7.15.  The General Council took note of the statements and so agreed. 
8  WTO ACCESSIONS: 2013 ANNUAL REPORT BY THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL (WT/ACC/21 
– WT/GC/155 – WT/MIN(13)/6) – STATEMENT BY THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL 
8.1.  The Chairman drew attention to the Direct or General's annual report on accessions, which 
was circulated in a triple symbol document, WT/ACC/21- WT/GC/155 - WT/MIN(13)/6. He invited 
Deputy Director-General David Shark to introduce the report on behalf of the Director-General. 
8.2.  Deputy Director-General Shark, on behalf of the Director-General, said he was pleased to 
present the Fifth Annual Report on Accessions.  He  said that, as in previous years, the Report 
provided detailed information on: (a) the operational work on accessions; (b) the benefits of 
membership; (c) policy issues and challenges; and (d) transparency obligations and notifications. 
Work on accessions played an important role in strengthening the WTO.  He recalled that, in 2013, 
two new Members had been welcomed to the WTO, as Lao PDR and Tajikistan had deposited their instruments of accession, therefore increasing the membership to 159. Each new accession 
expanded the rule of law in trade and in 2013 Members had also concluded the accession of 
Yemen. He thanked the membership for its direct engagement to achieve this LDC accession, under the guidance of Mr. Hartmut Röben, Chairperson of the Working Party on the Accession of 
Yemen and with the support of his co-facilitators,  Mr Steffen Smidt, the Chairperson of the LDC 
Sub-Committee, and DDG Yi, in his former role as the Ambassador of China. He congratulated the Government of Yemen for its hard work in under taking the reforms necessary to complete its 
accession negotiations. Elsewhere, there had been substantial technical progress, including on LDC 
accessions and this would set the stage for further progress in 2014. In closing, he thanked Members for their engagement and pragmatism in assisting those acceding governments that were ready to cross the finishing line and those Members who had provided technical assistance in 
2013, including Australia, Brazil, China, India,  the US, and the EU and its Member States, 
particularly Sweden. He commended acceding governments for their sustained commitment to undertaking the relevant domestic reforms and the team in the Secretariat for its work in 
managing the complexities and sensitivities of accessions to the WTO.  He said comments from 
Members on how to improve this wo rk in future were welcome.   WT/GC/M/149 
 
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  8.3.  The Chairman noted that the Director-Gener al's Annual Report had been circulated as an 
official MC9 document.  
8.4.  The representative of the Dominican Republic , on behalf of the IGDC, appreciated the efforts 
of the Director-General and his team. He was pl eased to see the many initiatives and decisions 
taken on the issue of accessions and to soon see some new countries join the WTO. In particular, 
he was pleased with the efforts to implement the Decision to strengthen the guidelines on accession of LDCs. He was also pleased with the initiative taken by the Secretariat such as the 
Accession Toolbox and seminar on WTO Accessions.  Accessions were important in broadening and 
strengthening the WTO as an institution and for the Multilateral Trading System. Accessions allowed the WTO to fulfil this goal of universality of membership and inclusion of the majority of global commerce under its multilateral rules-based system. WTO membership provided acceding 
governments with good instruments to cement their domestic policy, as well as legal and 
institutional reforms. However, the process of accession entailed great efforts on the part of the acceding developing countries and the necessary reforms were not always easy to implement. 
Problems emerged too when future Members we re faced with very ambitious request and 
expectation by existing Members. This was why he also reiterated that all accession processes should follow the principles of special and differential treatment for developing countries, non-
reciprocity, and should be based only on technical, trade, and economic considerations. There 
were several accession processes that were very close to completion and Members should accelerate in the bilateral market access negotiations that were holding up some accessions. 
8.5.  The representative of the European Union welcomed Yemen's accession as evidence that the 
system worked and that the strengthened LDC guide lines delivered results. He wished to thank the 
Director-General for the report, which was always useful. However, he noted that this year, the report was neither complete nor accurate. As regards accessions where significant technical work 
was advanced, Serbia's accession deserved to be  mentioned. Also, there was a difference between 
those advanced accessions mentioned in the introd uction and overview and those mentioned in the 
conclusions outlook 2014, which listed Azerbaijan. Taking into account that no Working Party 
meeting had been held on this accession in 2013, he did not understand why this accession was 
added in the conclusions and why Algeria's accession which was examined in a Working Party meeting in 2013 was not. He also failed to see any reason for singling out Kazakhstan's accession in a specific paragraph when other accession processes were more advanced. The pragmatism to 
solve outstanding issues applied to all accessions.  He therefore encouraged Members and acceding 
governments to be pragmatic as regards the completion as soon as possible of the accession process identified as priorities for 2013 and which were well advanced: Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Afghanistan, Serbia, and Kazakhstan. In this re gard, while more efforts may be needed from 
acceding governments, Members also had to show the necessary flexibilities in the market access 
negotiations to ensure that the Multilateral Trading System could welcome soon these developing 
countries and LDCs as new Members. 
8.6.  The representative of Mexico said that the results of work carried out over the year were well 
reflected in the Director-General's report. 2013 had been an intensive year in the areas of 
negotiations and technical assistance related to accessions. He paid tribute to the progress made 
on several accession procedures under way, particularly the successful finalization of the work of 
the Working Party on the Accession of Yemen. He welcomed Yemen and hoped that the conditions of its membership in the WTO would be made official in the Ninth Ministerial Conference. 
8.7.  The representative of the United States sa id that, after 18 years of experience, all Members 
knew that the WTO Accession process was a prov en method of structuring and implementing 
domestic reform as well as trade policy implementation. The report described and demonstrated 
how accessions strengthen the WTO in addition to a wealth of technical information on the results 
of 32 accession negotiations completed to date in the WTO. The report contained strong evidence for the support of the system provided by the newly-acceded Members. His delegation looked forward to future accessions. 
8.8.  The representative of Barbados recalled th at the process of accession entailed very onerous 
commitments and could require substantial adjustment by acceding countries. Members should 
show increased flexibilities with respect to developing countries when they sought accession to the 
WTO. She was pleased with the decisions taken in recent years to improve the process of 
accessions for LDCs and was also of the view that all accession processes should be based on special and differential treatment for all developing countries, including SVEs. More lenient WT/GC/M/149 
 
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  approaches to accessions for developing countries, particularly SVEs, would assist them as they 
proceeded to join the WTO family. 
8.9.  The representative of Algeria, speaking as an Observer, thanked the Director-General for his 
report on Accessions and the Secretariat for a toolbox to help acceding countries to better manage 
their accession process and to better understand the commitments. 2013 had been a particularly 
active year for Algeria. After 5 years of break,  the accession process of Algeria to the WTO had 
been re-launched at the 11th meeting of the Working Party. Algeria had held four series of bilateral 
meetings with some 15 Members of the WTO. Algeria had also held a plurilateral meeting on 
Agriculture upon the request of Members and had also answered the questions put by Members. 
Algeria had submitted new offers on Goods and Services in August 2013. All these efforts had been made with the prospect of holding the 12
th meeting of the Working Party during the last 
three months of 2013. It was regrettable to note that the report on accessions did not reflect this 
race against the clock that her country had underta ken so as to speed up its accession process. 
For years, her country had called for greater transparency in the accession process. She 
considered that this need for transparency had to relate also to the selection criteria as far as 
treatment was concerned, to the translation of accession documents, as well as to the conditions preceding the convening of the different Working Parties. 
8.10.  The representative of the Bahamas, speaking as an Observer, said that her country 
remained committed to the accession process and it intended with finest efforts to undertake the 
necessary steps particularly to advance this process. The Bahamas looked forward to being present in the WTO as a Member one day. The Baha mas looked to all Members of the Organization 
for their continued support during this process and wished to place on record its gratitude to the 
Accessions Division for their support and guidance throughout this period. 
8.11.  The representative of Yemen, speaking as an Observer, appreciated the comprehensive 
report which not only presented the state of play of the 24 accessions to WTO, including Yemen's, 
but highlighted several other key issues, including transparency, as a crucial ingredient of the accession process. Technical assistance and outr each exercises had been quite successful in 2013 
as well as building on earlier year's work. Accession tools were equally useful to all, particularly to 
acceding LDCs. The latter countries had been always  one of the key areas of focus of the Director-
General and Members of WTO for very obvious reasons. LDCs represented the biggest group of countries outside WTO. He was pleased that one LDC, Yemen, would become soon a full-fledged 
Member of the WTO. On this note, he reiterated his delegation's sincere gratitude to Members for 
the future adoption of the Yemen Accession Package at MC9, in Bali. This was one deliverable on 
which Members had reached consensus. Yemen appealed to the wisdom of Members to reach 
similar consensus on other MC9 issues. Yemen was very keen to become a Member. He recalled 
that Yemen had not been part of Room W process nor other negotiating meetings. He stressed that one important privilege of being a WTO Member was to be able to participate in shaping WTO 
rules. His delegation wished MC9 all the success it deserved but clearly that was dependent on 
Members' will and consensus. Yemen sincerely hoped that it would be the case before MC9 began. 
8.12.  The representative of Iran, speaking as an Observer, associated his delegation with the 
statement made by the Dominican Republic, on behalf  of the IGDC. Iran also wished to express its 
appreciation to the Director-General and Secret ariat for providing a transparent, comprehensive 
and well elaborated Accession Report for 2013. Iran was delighted with the thought and viewpoint regarding accession which had been highlighted as "a strategic priority for the Organization”. Iran 
was confident that the Director-General would try his best to bring this into practice. 
8.13.  Statistically, there were now 24 countries, with approximately 8% of world population that 
were in the process of negotiating their terms of  accession to the WTO. They were at different 
levels of progress on the way towards the WTO membership. However, they all had one common 
concern, i.e. further endeavours as well as more cooperation were needed to facilitate and speed up their accession to the WTO. This desire came  from the gradual pace for the accession process 
since the establishment of the Organization in 1995 . During this period and out of the 55 requests 
for accession submitted, 31 countries and custom territories had joined the Organization, with few 
more soon on the verge of it. From a public opin ion standpoint, the reputation of the Organization 
would be improved if the remaining countries were not left outside the door of accession. This 
would also help convince those who might have another opinion according to which the general 
trend for accession seemed to contradict with the pledge made in the Ministerial Declaration at Singapore to “work to bring [the] applicants [of countries wishing to accede to the Organization] WT/GC/M/149 
 
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  expeditiously into the WTO System.” This commit ment of Members to proceed in the accession 
process "as rapidly as possible” was renewed in the 1998 Geneva Ministerial Declaration and other similar events as well. 
8.14.  Iran welcomed the positive progress made in the accession process of some countries, 
including developing and least-developed countries. Such advancement had a significant role in 
the universalization and inclusiveness of the WTO and in strengthening the Multilateral Trading 
System. Iran hoped that the WTO could genuinely ma tch up to its well-deserved name, i.e. “World 
Trade Organization”. As had been elaborated again in the 2013 Accession Report, the Islamic 
Republic of Iran had taken all necessary technical steps in its accession process. It had submitted its Trade Regime Memorandum in 2009 and had responded to almost 700 questions put forward by interested Members and submitted them to the Secretariat in November 2011, all of which had 
been formally distributed in December 2011. At the same time, consultations on setting up Iran's 
Working Party and appointing its Chairperson, based on the accession procedure, had been 
initiated prior to the aforesaid submission of Trade Regime.  
8.15.  After the completion of all tasks, sh owing the Iranian Government’s seriousness and 
readiness in the accession process, it was Iran's high and reasonable expectation to see that the WTO and its Members reinforce the consultations leading to a tangible result in the near future. As 
a case in point, Iran hoped that the designation of the Working Party Chair and convening its first 
Working Party session at the earliest convenient time would be realized. In this context, Iran counted on the cooperation and support of all Members and the personal capacity of the new DG as a bridge-builder in the lengthy and complicated process, in a way that non-economic factors 
would not adversely affect the accession of countries. 
8.16.  The General Council took note of the report  by the Director-General and of the statements. 
9  WAIVERS UNDER ARTICLE IX OF THE WTO AGREEMENT 
9.1.  The Chairman said that there were a numbe r of sub-items under this agenda item, and he 
suggested that these be taken up separately. He noted that the draft waiver decisions for the 
matters listed in sub-items 9(a) to (d) had been taken up for consideration by the Council for 
Trade in Goods at its meeting on 18 October.  For these items, the Chairman of the Goods Council 
was required to report to the General Council. He th erefore invited Mr Castillo (Honduras) to report 
on the Council's consideration of these matters in a single intervention.   
9.2.  Mr Castillo (Honduras), Chairman of the Go ods Council, reported that the Council for Trade in 
Goods, at its meeting of 18 October 2013, had approved the collective request for waiver 
extension contained in G/C/W/682, which had been made in connection with the introduction of HS2002 changes into WTO Schedules of Tariff Concessions. The Goods Council had also 
recommended that the draft waiver decision contai ned therein be forwarded to the General Council 
for adoption. Also at its meeting of 18 October 2013, the Goods Council had approved the collective request for waiver extension contained in document G/C/W/683, which had been made 
in connection with the introduction of HS2007 changes into WTO Schedules of Tariff Concessions.  
The CTG had therefore agreed that the draft waiver  decision contained therein be forwarded to the 
General Council for adoption. 
9.3.  With regard to the Introduction of Harm onized System 2012 changes into WTO Schedules of 
Tariff Concessions, he reported that the Goods Council at its October meeting, had approved the 
collective request for waiver extension contained in document G/C/W/684/Rev.1.  The CTG had therefore agreed that the draft waiver decision contained therein be forwarded to the General 
Council for adoption. 
9.4.  Concerning the request by the European Unio n for an extension of its current waiver for the 
application of autonomous preferential treatment to Moldova, he reported that the Goods Council, 
at its October meeting, had considered document G/C/W/688 containing the EU's request to 
extend the currently existing waiver until 31 December 2015. At that meeting the Goods Council had approved the waiver request and recommended that the draft decision annexed to G/C/W/688 be forwarded to the Gene ral Council for adoption. WT/GC/M/149 
 
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  9.5.  The Chairman noted that there were four  waivers on the agenda for adoption. Given the 
similar nature of the first three waivers listed in sub-items (a) to (c), he suggested to take them 
up together. 
9.1  Introduction of harmonized system 2002 changes into WTO schedules of tariff 
concessions – Draft decision (G/C/W/682) 
9.2  Introduction of harmonized system 2007 changes into WTO schedules of tariff 
concessions – Draft decision (G/C/W/683) 
9.3  Introduction of harmonized system 2012 changes into WTO schedules of tariff 
concessions – Draft decision (G/C/W/684/Rev.1) 
9.6.  He therefore drew attention to the draft decisions in documents G/C/W/682, G/C/W/683 and 
G/C/W/684/REV.1, which concerned the Introducti on of Harmonized System 2002, 2007 and 2012 
changes into WTO Schedules of Tariff Concessions, respectively. 
9.7.  Unless delegations wished to comment on  the draft decisions, he proposed that, in 
accordance with the Decision-Making Procedures under Articles IX and XII of the WTO Agreement 
agreed in November 1995 (WT/L/93), the Gene ral Council adopt the three draft Decisions. 
9.8.  The General Council so agreed. 
9.4  European Union – Application of autono mous preferential treatment to Moldova – 
Extension of the waiver – Draft decision (G/C/W/688) 
9.9.  The Chairman then turned to the Draft Decision in document G/C/W/688. Unless delegations 
wished to comment on the draft decision, he proposed that, in accordance with the Decision-Making Procedures mentioned before, the Ge neral Council adopt this draft Decision. 
9.10.  The General Council so agreed. 
9.5  Review of waivers pursuant to  Article IX:4 of the WTO Agreement 
9.5.1  Preferential treatment to services  and service suppliers of least-developed 
countries, granted on 17 December 2011 until 17 December 2026 (WT/L/847) 
9.5.2  Kimberley process ce rtification scheme for rough diamonds, granted on 
12 December 2012 until 31 December 2018 (WT/L/876) 
9.5.3  Canada – CARIBCAN, granted on 30 November 2011 until 31 December 2018 
(WT/L/835, WT/L/898) 
9.5.4  European Union – Application of auto nomous preferential treatment to the West 
Balkans, granted on 30 November 2011 until 31 December 2016 (WT/L/836, 
WT/L/896) 
9.5.5  Cuba – Article XV:6 of GATT 199 4, extension of waiver, granted on 
14 February 2012 until 31 December 2016 (WT/L/850, WT/L/895) 
9.11.  The Chairman recalled that, in accordance  with paragraph 4 of Article IX of the WTO 
Agreement, "any waiver granted for a period of more than one year shall be reviewed by the 
Ministerial Conference not later than one year after it is granted, and thereafter annually until the 
waiver terminates."  Three of the waivers under review provided that an annual report should be 
submitted by the Members concerned regarding the operation or implementation of those waivers 
with a view to facilitating their annual review by the General Council.  The reports from these Members had been circulated in documents WT/L/895 (Cuba), WT/L/896 (European Union), and 
WT/L/898 (Canada). WT/GC/M/149 
 
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  9.12.  The representative of Trinidad and Tobago, on behalf of CARICOM, recalled that CARICOM 
and Canada shared a long and eventful trading history spanning several hundred years. That 
relationship had endured to this day as Canada  continued to be one of the largest and most 
important trading partners. CARIBCAN had theref ore been of great importance in growing and 
deepening that relationship since the mid-1980s. Fr om the onset, his country had recognized the 
tremendous opportunities on offer by CARIBCAN and had worked closely with the Government of Canada to ensure that every effort was made to take full advantage of its benefits. Today's report 
indicated that the efforts had resulted in an increase in CARICOM exports from $698,535 in 2002 
to $966,652 in 2012. While more could have been done and the results had been mixed for some within CARICOM, he was encouraged by the overall positive trend over the last three decades.  
9.13.  In the not too distant future, CARICOM and Canada would be opening a new chapter in their 
its trading history with a conclusion of a CARICOM-Canada Free Trade Agreement. Negotiations 
were aiming for an early 2014 end of negotiations. He was hopeful and optimistic for a good deal, one that was favourable to both sides and faithful  and true to the trading history. CARICOM wished 
to express appreciation to the Government and pe ople of Canada for their continued support and 
friendship. He thanked all Members for their favourable disposition towards the CARIBCAN waiver in recent years. 
9.14.  The representative of Jamaica fully endorsed the statement made by Trinidad and Tobago 
on behalf of the countries of CARICOM. He expressed his deep appreciation to the Government of 
Canada for the sustained partnership they formed in maintaining the CARIBCAN agreement. Jamaica certainly had benefitted tremendously from this agreement and even as they now 
embarked on a new dimension in their trade relations, there was a solid foundation that had been 
laid by CARIBCAN. Jamaica looked forward to its continued existence. 
9.15.  The representative of Barbados endorsed th e statements by Trinidad and Tobago on behalf 
of CARICOM and by Jamaica. 
9.16.  The representative of St. Lucia, on behalf  of the OECS, subscribed to the statement made 
by Trinidad and Tobago on behalf of CARICOM. 
9.17.  The representative of Canada expressed gratitude for the kind words of the CARICOM 
countries, which he would convey to his authorities in Ottawa. 
9.18.  The General Council took note of the reports contained in documents WT/L/895, 896, and 
898, and of the statements. 
10  COMMITTEE ON BUDGET, FINANCE AND ADMINISTRATION – REPORT ON MEETINGS 
OF OCTOBER AND NOVEMBER 2013 (WT/BFA/139)5 
10.1.  The Chairman drew attention to the reports of the Budget Committee in document 
WT/BFA/139 and invited Mr Stone (Hong Kong, Ch ina), Chairman of the Committee, to introduce 
them. 
10.2.  Mr Stone (Hong Kong, China), Chairman  of the Committee on Budget, Finance, and 
Administration, said that, at its meetings in  October and November 2013, the Committee on 
Budget Finance and Administration had dealt with a number of items and was making four 
recommendations to the General Council. First, the Committee had reviewed the budget proposal for the ITC for the biennium 2014-15. As advocated by the UN Secretariat, the ITC budget was 
reduced by 2.3% compared to 2013. The Committee was recommending the General Council to 
approve the ITC budget as proposed in paragraphs 2.6 and 2.7 of the report. 
10.3.  Second, the Committee had examined the WTO budget proposals for the next biennium. 
Listening to the Committee's budgetary concerns, the Director-General had presented a zero 
nominal growth budget for 2014 and 2015. The Co mmittee had warmly welcomed the Director-
General's overall approach to the serious issues that needed to be addressed regarding the budget 
and human resources. The Committee was recommending the General Council to approve the WTO 
                                               
5 This item of the agenda was taken up after item 3. WT/GC/M/149 
 
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  budget and to endorse its strategic priorities as  proposed from paragraphs 3.14 to 3.26 of the 
report. 
10.4.  Third, the Committee had examined the Bienni al Technical Assistance and Training Plan for 
2014-15. The Committee was recommending to the General Council that secure and predicable 
financing be provided for the implementation of the Plan as proposed in paragraph 4.4 of the 
report. He acknowledged the Members who had contributed extra-budgetary resources to support the WTO's technical assistance and training activities since the 3
rd quarter report on trust funds 
was reviewed by the Committee.  These recent contributors were Australia, France, Germany, 
Japan, Korea, Lichtenstein, Norway and Sweden. 
10.5.  Finally, the Committee had established a Working Group to review the offers received 
regarding the selection of the WTO External Audi tor. Following the Working Group's report, the 
Committee was recommending the General Council to appoint the German Bundesrechnungshof as 
the WTO External Auditor as from the audit of th e accounts for 2014 and for a period of 6 years as 
presented in paragraph 5.3 of the report. 
10.6.  The General Council took note of the statement; approved the Budget Committee's specific 
recommendations contained in paragraphs 2.6, 2.7, 3.14, 3.18, 3.24, 4.4 and 5.3 of its report – 
including the draft Resolutions referred to in paragraphs 3.14 and 3.18; adopted the draft 
Resolutions on the Expenditure of the WTO in 2014 and 2015 and the Ways and Means to Meet 
Such Expenditure, in paragraphs 3.14 and 3.18 of its report; and adopted the Committee's report 
in document WT/BFA/139 as a whole. 
11  WTO PENSION PLAN MANAGEMENT BO ARD – ELECTION OF AN ALTERNATE – 
PROPOSAL BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE GENERAL COUNCIL (WT/GC/W/674) 
11.1.  The Chairman recalled that Article 4(a)  of the Regulations of the WTO Pension Plan 
provides, inter alia , for the election by the General Council of a Chairman, four members and four 
alternates to the Management Board of the Pension Plan. 
11.2.  In a communication circulated to delegations in document WT/GC/W/674, he had indicated 
that an alternate, Ms Klimes (Germany), was no longer available to serve on the Board, and he 
proposed Mr Rühl (Switzerland) who had kindly agreed to have his name put forward for election 
as alternate.  He had also invited delegations to submit any comments they might have by close-of-business on 15 November 2013. 
11.3.  Since he had not received any comments re garding the proposed nomination, he proposed 
that the General Council elect Mr Rühl (Switzerland) to serve as alternate on the Management 
Board of the Pension Plan for the remainder of the Board's term, i.e. until May 2014. 
11.4.  The General Council so agreed. 
12  REVIEW OF WTO ACTIVITIES 12.1  General Council (WT/GC/W/675), Di spute Settlement Body (WT/DSB/61 and 
WT/DSB/61/Add.1), and Trade Policy Review Body (WT/TPR/321) 
12.2  Sectoral Councils (G/L/1057, S/C/42, and IP/C/67) and Committee on Technical 
Barriers to Trade (G/L/1056), Committee on Antidumping Practices (G/L/1053), Committee on Safeguards (G/L/1054), Co mmittee on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures (G/L/1052) and (G/L/1052/Corr.1) 
12.3  Committees on Trade and Developmen t (WT/COMTD/83), Trade and Environment 
(WT/CTE/20), Balance-of-Payments Restri ctions (WT/BOP/R/107), Budget, Finance 
and Administration (WT/BFA/140) and Re gional Trade Agreements (WT/REG/23) 
12.4  Working Groups on Trade, Debt and Finance (WT/WGTDF/12) and Trade and 
Transfer of Technology (WT/WGTTT/15) 
12.5  Committees under the Plurilateral Trade Agreements (GPA/121, WT/L/897) WT/GC/M/149 
 
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  12.1.  The Chairman recalled that the reports ha d been drawn up in line with the Decision 
concerning procedures for an annual overview of WTO activities and for reporting under the WTO 
in document WT/L/105. He noted that the Committees on Technical Barriers to Trade, on Anti-Dumping Practices, on Safeguards, and on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures had met after 
the Council for Trade in Goods.  For this reason, the Annual Reports of these Committees had been 
forwarded directly to the General Council. Delegations had already had a substantive discussion on these reports in the respective bodies where they had been adopted and he suggested that 
Members would not repeat those discussions in the General Council.   
12.2.  All reports from the respective bodies woul d be forwarded to the Ministerial Conference for 
the consideration of Ministers. He proposed that the Chairs of the various bodies not introduce their respective reports, unless they wished to dr aw particular attention to some aspect of the 
work carried out in their bodies. He also proposed that, in accordance with the practice, the 
General Council take action on these reports. 
12.3.  First, he invited the General Council to adopt the report of the Committee on Trade and 
Development in document WT/COMTD/83, and take note of the reports of the other WTO bodies, 
including the reports of the Committees under the Plurilateral Trade Agreements, listed in the Proposed Agenda.  
12.4.  The General Council so agreed. 
12.5.  He then proposed that the General Council adopt the draft Report of the General Council 
contained in document WT/GC/W/675 and Corr.1, on the understanding that the Secretariat would make the necessary adjustments to that Report to include matters that had been considered at 
this meeting. The Council's Report would then be circulated and also forwarded to the Ministerial 
Conference. 
12.6.  The General Council so agreed.  
12.7.  He noted again that two of the reports th at had just been forwarded to the Ministerial 
Conference, namely the report of the Committee on  Trade and Development and the report of the 
Working Group for Trade and Transfer of Techno logy contained recommendations for Ministers' 
action, which had been taken up under Item 4(a) of the Agenda of the present meeting. 
13  APPOINTMENT OF OFFICERS TO WTO BO DIES – ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN 
PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 7.1 (A) OF THE GUIDELINES (WT/L/510) 
13.1.  The Chairman drew attention to document WT/L/510, which contained the Guidelines for the 
Appointment of Officers to WTO bodies.  These Guid elines provided that the outgoing Chair of the 
General Council would conduct consultations on the appointment of chairpersons to the WTO bodies in Groups 1, 2, 4 and 5 of the Annex to the Guidelines.  The Guidelines also provided that in 
order to promote transparency, the selection process should start with an announcement by the 
Chair at the General Council meeting held in December each year.  Accordingly, he informed the General Council that he was now starting the selection process. 
13.2.  In accordance with Paragraph 7.1(b) of the Guidelines, he would be assisted in the selection 
process by the serving Chairman of the Disput e Settlement Body, Mr Fried (Canada), and by 
Mr Matus (Chile), former Chairman of the General Council. 
13.3.  The consultations for the appointment of of ficers would start in mid-January.  Messrs Fried, 
Matus and he would communicate, as early as possible, a specified time-period in which they 
would be available to hear the views and suggestion s of Members, individually and/or in groups.   
13.4.  Furthermore, as provided for in the Guidel ines, a list of past Chairs of major bodies was 
available to delegations at the present meeting in order to provide some structure for Members' 
subsequent deliberations on the possible distribution  of chairs based on past practice and the need 
for balance.  He noted that, in accordance with the Guidelines, representatives of Members in 
financial arrears for over one full year could not be considered for appointment. WT/GC/M/149 
 
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  13.5.  He also recalled that, in July 2012, the General Council had taken note of a number of 
practical steps to improve the implementation  of the Guidelines, contained in document 
JOB/GC/22. The practical steps provided that mo re comprehensive information about the process 
should be provided to delegations at an early stag e, and in particular to group coordinators.  The 
practical steps specified that these groups were developed countries, Latin America and the 
Caribbean, Asia and Africa.   
13.6.  The General Council took note of this statement and so agreed. 
14  RESPONSIBILITIES OF CHAIRPERSONS OF WTO BODIES – STATEMENT BY 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 
14.1.  The representative of the Dominican Republic, speaking under "Other Business", said he 
wished to raise certain questions concerning the responsibilities of the Chairpersons of the various 
WTO bodies. Despite the importance of this matt er, to date there was no body of rules that 
governed issues of the proper conduct expected from the Chairpersons of the WTO bodies in the discharge of their responsibilities in the respective Committees, Councils and other bodies within 
the Organization. He believed that a thorough evaluation should be requested on this topic and 
t h a t  i t  s h o u l d  r e m a i n  o n  t h e  a g e n d a  o f  t h e  G e n e r a l  C o u n c i l .  H e  s a i d  t h a t  t h e  G e n e r a l  C o u n c i l  should ask the Secretariat for research on the specific situations that might affect the rights and 
responsibilities of the Chairperson in the conduc t of the meeting of their respective Councils and 
Committees.  
14.2.  This research should take into account th e current disciplines established in paragraph 2.2 
of the "Guidelines for the Appointment of Officers to WTO Bodies" (WT/L/510), according to which 
"[c]hairpersons should continue the tradition of being impartial and objective; ensuring 
transparency and inclusiveness in decision-makin g and consultative processes; and aiming to 
facilitate consensus"; the basic principles concerning the procedures governing the settlement of 
disputes, as contained in the "Rules of Conduct for the Understanding on Rules and Procedures 
Governing the Settlement of Disputes" (WT/DSB/RC/1); and in specific provisions of various covered Agreements regarding the rights and responsibilities of the committees established in 
those agreements. 
14.3.  This work should eventually lead to a set of rules or guidelines that would provide clarity to 
the Chairpersons of the various bodies on the scope of their responsibilities. He wished to ask the Secretariat to take note of this concern and to initiate a technical evaluation of this matter. 
14.4.  The representative of Honduras said it would be interesting to look at the request from the 
Dominican Republic in this respect. He thought, if Members were comfortable, that it would be 
good to see what research work could be done by the Secretariat. 
14.5.  The representative of Panama said he ha d listened to the statement from the Dominican 
Republic with great interest. As Honduras had said, it could be not just important but also 
interesting for the Organization to carry out research into the possibility of this type of action. 
14.6.  The representative of Oman thanked the Dominican Republic for bringing this issue to 
Members' attention. She supported the request to evaluate and to clarify the role of the 
Chairpersons, their rights and responsibilities, as part of institutional reform of this Organization. Members needed to review, clarify, and also to u pdate the work of this Organization in a number 
of areas, including this one. 
14.7.  The representative of the United States said that this was certainly an interesting proposal. 
This was the first time he had heard that this was actually an issue. He thought that before 
Members could task the Secretariat to do research on  this topic, his delegation preferred to review 
what the Dominican Republic was actually proposing and outlining what the specific issues were, so that Members could take a more considerate view of this and revert back to it. 
14.8.  The representative of Canada thought Members had a common ground of not wishing to 
pursue substantive items on which delegations might not be best prepared in advance by taking 
them under "Other Business" without notice. Members had a Committee on Budget, Finance and Administration, whose mandate also included the ma nagement of the Organization. Issues of role, WT/GC/M/149 
 
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  responsibility, potential conflicts of interest, code s of conduct, were subjects that went beyond 
Chairs. There was a Staff Code which had not been looked at for quite some time, and that applied up to the Director-General. Representatives in other International Organizations at all levels, whether Chairs or not, were certainly expected to act in accordance with certain standards of 
probity. So, ultimately, the question he had heard was not just about Chairs. It was about various 
dimensions of the Organization: Secretariat, Representatives, and so on. That was a mighty task to take on, especially if Members had an intensive post-Bali Work Programme. He believed that it 
would be probably useful to see a proposal in writing, within the appropriate mandate for the 
Committee on Budget, Finance and Administration, since its mandate was management modernization. He said it was a little surprising to have this raised without warning and without a chance for other delegations to digest the idea under "Other Business". 
14.9.  The representative of Japan agreed with what had been said by the US and Canada. Japan 
also wished to know this issue a little bit better before taking any course of action. Japan also 
agreed that it was not appropriate to take a decision or any action under "Other Business". 
14.10.  The representative of Cuba stressed that any Member was entitled to raise issues under 
"Other Business". She did not understand why ther e was a problem with what had been described 
by the Dominican Republic. Members were allowed to do this. The Dominican Republic was not 
asking for a decision, but was simply sharing a concern that had arisen in other delegations as 
well. 
14.11.  The representative of the Dominican Republic  wished to clarify that he had referred only to 
the role of Chairpersons, not to the entire staff of the Organization, nor to those in any other 
International Organizations. This was a concern on the part of other delegations as well, and if 
others had different problems it was within their rights as well to raise those issues. He was not asking for a decision right now. Instead, he was wondering if there could be a set of rules 
clarifying the role of a Chairperson. He was not adding new rules to the Organization. The 
Secretariat could simply look at what procedures existed, and at the standards and rules, so that when a Chairperson was appointed, he could be given those rules. He did not think that this 
situation was complicated nor did it create a revolution within the Organization. On the contrary, 
this was an element that facilitated transparency  and that would inform Chairpersons about their 
rights and duties. 
14.12.  The General Council took note of the statements. 
15  CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE TRIPS COUNCIL IN SPECIAL SESSION - STATEMENT BY THE 
CHAIRMAN 
15.1.  The Chairman, speaking under "Other Business", recalled that at the previous General 
Council meeting, he had announced that he would be conducting consultations on the replacement 
of Mr Agah to the Chair of the TRIPS Council in Special Session – assisted by Mr Fried (Canada), 
Chairman of the DSB, and Mr Matus (Chile),  former Chairman of the General Council. 
15.2.  He drew attention to the faxes he had sent on the 6 and 7 of November, which he had sent 
further to his consultations and in which he had proposed the appointment on an ad interim  basis 
of Mr Suescum (Panama), Chairman of the TRIPS Co uncil.  He also drew attention to subsequent 
fax he had sent on 18 November.  In this fax, he had confirmed that, following additional 
consultations he had been conducting, it was hi s understanding that Members had agreed to the 
appointment of Mr Suescum as Chairman on an ad interim  basis, in particular to ensure that this 
position was not vacant during MC9. It had be en understood that consultations and a separate 
decision on a permanent appointment to this position were to take place early in the New Year. 
The TRIPS Council in Special Session had met the previous week and had proceeded with the formal appointment of Mr Suescum as Chairman on an ad interim  basis.  
15.3.  The General Council took note of the statement. WT/GC/M/149 
 
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  16  ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES FOR MEMBERS IN ARREARS – STATEMENT BY THE 
CHAIR 
16.1.  The Chairman, speaking under "Other Business", recalled that at its meeting in 
October 2012, the General Council had approved a recommendation from the Committee on 
Budget, Finance and Administration regarding revised Administrative Measures for Members in 
arrears, as contained in WT/BFA/132, Annex I.  These new revised measures had entered into 
force on 1 January this year. 
16.2.  Among these Administrative Measures was a requirement that, at the end of each meeting 
of the General Council, the Chairman of the Committee on Budget, Finance and Administration would provide information with regard to which Members and Observers were under Administrative 
Measures.   
16.3.  He invited the Chairman of the Budget Co mmittee, Mr Michael Stone (Hong Kong, China), to 
provide the Council with this information.  
16.4.  Mr Stone (Hong Kong, China), Chairman  of the Committee on Budget, Finance, and 
Administration, said that as required by the decision of the General Council, he would list the 
Members and Observers under Categories I through III of the Administrative Measures as of 
25 November 2013. He said that there were 5 Members in Category I: Benin, Saint Vincent and 
the Grenadines, Senegal, The Former Yugoslav Re public of Macedonia, and Vanuatu. There were 
3 Members in Category II: Antigua & Barbuda, Dominica, and Grenada. There were 2 Members in Category III: Guinea-Bissau and Mauritania. There was 1 Observer in Category I: Syrian Arab Republic. There was 1 Observer in Category III: Sao Tome and Principe. 
16.5.  The General Council took note of the statement. 
__________