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Trade Policy Review Body    
 
* In Original language only/ En langue originale seulement /En el idioma original solamente . 
  RUSSIAN FEDERATION  
DRAFT MINUTES  OF THE MEETING* HELD ON 28 AND 30 SEPTEMBER 2016 
Delegations are invited to submit factual corrections, if any, on their own statement to the 
Secretariat ( Mrs Barbara Blanquart: barbara.blanquart@wto.org , or to  tprd@wto.org ) no later 
than 21 November 2016 . 
 
Organe d'examen des politiques commerciales  
 
FÉDÉRATION DE RUSSIE 
PROJET DE COMPTE REN DU DE LA RÉUNION* TENUE LES 28 ET 30 SEPTEMBRE 2 016 
Les délégations sont invitées à soumettre  leurs éventuelles corrections factuelles concernant leurs 
propres déclarations au Secrétariat ( Mme Barbara Blanquart: barbara.blanquart@wto.org , ou 
tprd@wto.org ) le 21 novembre 2016  au plus tard.  
 
Órgano de Examen de las Políticas Comerciales  
 
FEDERACIÓN DE RUSIA 
PROYECTO DE ACTA DE LA REUNIÓN* CELEBRADA LOS DÍAS 28 Y 30 DE SEPTIEMBRE D E 2016  
Las delegaciones pueden enviar a la Se cretaría (Sr a. Barbara Blanquart: 
barbara.blanquart@wto.org , o tprd@wto.org ) a más tardar el 21 de noviembre de 2016  las 
correcciones fácticas que deseen introducir en sus  propias declaraciones.  
 
 
_______________  
 WT/TPR /W/115  • Russian Federation  
 
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  TRADE POLICY REVIEW  
RUSSIAN FEDERATION  
DRAFT MINUTES OF THE MEETI NG 
Chairperson: Ms Irene Young (Hong Kong, China)  
CONTENTS  
 
1  INTRODUCTORY REMARKS  BY TH E CHAIRPERSON  ................................ .......................  3 
2  OPENING STATEMENT BY  THE REPRESENTATIVE O F THE RUSSIAN 
FEDERATION  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...................  5 
3  STATEMENT BY THE DIS CUSSANT  ................................ ................................ ................  9 
4  STATEMENTS BY MEMBER S ................................ ................................ ........................  15 
5  REPLIES BY THE REPRE SENTATIVE OF THE RUS SIAN FEDERATION AND 
ADDITIONAL COMMENTS  ................................ ................................ ...............................  61 
6  CONCLUDING REMARKS B Y THE CHAIRPERSON  ................................ .........................  76 
 
 
Note: Advance written questions and additional questions by WTO Members, and the replies 
provided by the Russian Fe deration are reproduced in document WT/TPR/M/345/Add.1 and will be 
available online at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp_rep_e.htm.  WT/TPR/W/115  • Russian Federation  
 
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  1  INTRODUCTORY REMARKS  BY THE CHAIRPERSON  
1.1.  The first Trade Policy Review of the Russian Federation was held on 28 a nd 
30 September  2016. The Chairperson, Ms. Irene Young (Hong Kong, China), welcomed the 
delegation of the Russian Federation headed by Mr. Maksim Medvedkov, Head of the Department 
for Trade Negotiations of the Ministry of Economic Development of the Russia n Federation; the 
delegation from Moscow; and the discussant, Ambassador Vangelis Vitalis (New Zealand).  
1.2.  The Chairperson recalled the purpose of the Trade Policy Reviews and the main elements of 
the procedures for the meeting. The report by the Russian Fe deration was contained in document 
WT/TPR/G/345 and that of the WTO Secretariat in WT/TPR/S/345.  
1.3.  Questions by the following delegations had been submitted in writing before the deadline: 
Malaysia; Oman; Canada; Australia; Switzerland; Singapore; Mexico; Ch ina; European Union; 
Norway; Japan; United States; Argentina; Ukraine; Chinese Taipei; Costa Rica; India; Chile; Peru; 
Indonesia and Korea. The following delegations submitted written questions after the deadline: 
Benin; Brunei Darussalam; Colombia; Saudi Arabia; Hong Kong, China; New Zealand; Paraguay; 
Thailand; Republic of Moldova; El Salvador; Ecuador and Turkey.  
1.4.  The economic environment in the Russian Federation had been challenging over the last few 
years. Real GDP had decreased by 3.7% in 2015, and wa s expected to dip further this year. The 
main cause for this contraction had been the fall in oil prices, coupled with insufficient 
diversification in the exports. Economic sanctions imposed by some countries and the 
countermeasures by the Russian Federati on had also played a role. The Government had 
responded with an anti -crisis plan, but GDP growth was slow to pick up. There was clearly a need 
to accelerate economic reforms. But were there factors undermining their success? What further 
steps the authorit ies were taking, or planned to take, to spur the country's development? Members 
wished to know more about the broader economic context in which Russia's trade policies 
operated.  
1.5.  Focussing on trade policies, Russia's accession to the WTO in 2012 had been a  historic 
moment; a landmark in the country's integration into the multilateral trading system. It had come 
with wide -ranging commitments in goods and services, which required fundamental changes to 
Russia's domestic legislation and trade regime. Four year s on, Members had witnessed 
tremendous liberalization efforts and remarkable improvements, but this was still very much an 
ongoing process. Tariff reductions, for instance, will not be completed until 2020, and accession 
negotiations for the Government Pro curement Agreement had yet to begin. While Members could 
expect elimination of WTO -inconsistent measures applied under the Auto Investment Programme 
in 2 years' time, in other areas such as customs control and import restrictions, Members had 
raised new co ncerns. Some of these issues were addressed in other WTO bodies, and could only be 
resolved in those contexts. As far as this TPR was concerned, what Members might expect of this 
TPR was greater transparency of the policies involved.  
1.6.  At the regional level,  economic integration of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) Member 
states was a key priority of the Russian Federation. The authority over many aspects of Russia's 
foreign trade regime now rested with the EAEU institutions, and there was coordinated policy  for 
sectors such as agriculture. As the Secretariat remarked, to a certain extent, the EAEU guided the 
trade policy reform agenda of the Russian Federation. The policies and legal competence of the 
Eurasian Economic Commission were therefore matters of co nsiderable interest to WTO Members. 
Many questions had been asked about these, as well as EAEU's first comprehensive FTA with 
Vietnam. Members looked forward to the delegation's elaboration.  
1.7.  In two crucial trade areas, namely services and investment, the c ompetence for negotiations 
were retained by individual EAEU members. From the advance questions, the Chairperson had 
seen a lot of interest in Russia's investment regime, in particular regarding market access 
limitations, approval procedures and the reform  'roadmaps'. In view of the predominance of 
state-owned enterprises in many sectors including banking, transport and energy, and the huge 
untapped potential for private investment, questions had also been raised regarding the much 
delayed privatization pro gramme.  WT/TPR /W/115  • Russian Federation  
 
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  1.8.  Regarding sectoral trade policies, the Chairperson expected interesting discussion on Energy 
from both market access and environmental perspectives, given Russia's influence as the world's 
second -largest oil and gas producer. Agriculture was also t he focus of many questions, mainly in 
relation to import bans, TRQs, domestic support and export assistance.  
1.9.  The more than 700 questions of course covered much more than what the Chairperson 
highlighted above. She left it to Members to discuss in greater d etail trade issues of interest to 
them and of systemic importance to the multilateral trading system.  WT/TPR/W/115  • Russian Federation  
 
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  2  OPENING STATEMENT BY  THE REPRESENTATIVE O F THE RUSSIAN FEDERA TION 
(MR.  MAKSIM MEDVEDKOV)  
2.1.  I am very pleased to head the Russian delegation to attend the f irst WTO Trade Policy Review 
of Russia. On behalf of the delegation, I would like to thank you, Madam Chair, for your warm and 
substantive opening remarks.  
2.2.  Many thanks also go to Ambassador Vitalis for assuming the role of discussant.  
2.3.  I would like also to express my sincere gratitude to the Secretariat for outstanding hard work 
in preparing comprehensive report – the first one for Russia – as well as for organizing this 
meeting. We deeply appreciate the excellent cooperation we have had with Mr. Willy Alfaro  and his 
team of experts.  
2.4.  Last but not least, let me extend our deep appreciation for the Members' visible interest in 
Russia's trade policies and practices. We have received 753 questions from 33 Members (including 
ASEAN and LDC group) by yesterday. For t he past few week,s we have been working on them 
around the clock together with our colleagues from two dozen government agencies. By now, 
written responses for 617 of questions have been circulated. Please be assured that the remaining 
responses will be pr ovided in line with the established practices.   
2.5.  We hope that our answers as well as the discussion today will enable Members to better 
understand Russia's and Eurasian Economic Union's trade policies. We also hope that through this 
process we can get a cl earer picture of how Members assess specific elements of Russia's trade 
regime and gather valuable ideas aimed at improving its efficiency.  
Challenges  
2.6.  Saying that, I come down to business. Four years have passed since Russia acceded to the 
WTO. Now we ca n conclude that both the process and the implementation of the terms of the 
accession gave an extra impetus to increasing competitiveness of Russia's economy. It helped to 
boost demand in foreign markets for some commodities produced in our country and mai ntained 
stability of the domestic regulatory system.  
2.7.  In the years following the accession, Russia has faced numerous economic challenges. Our 
economy was hit by the global economic and financial crisis. It witnessed volatility of the 
post-crisis recovery p rocess, depressed global business environment, and decline in world prices 
on main export products.  
2.8.  The key process in our economy these days can be described as steady structural adjustment 
of the Russian economy to both external shocks and internal chal lenges.  
2.9.  The major external shock was a three -fold drop in hydrocarbon prices, which substantially 
reduced the role of the export revenues in economic growth. Now, almost 60% of budgetary 
revenues come from sectors other than energy, 3 years ago the pictur e was opposite. Effects of 
the oil price shock for the Russian economy were also strengthened by restrictive measures 
imposed against our country by some WTO Members.  
2.10.   A negative impact of external factors was balanced by the need to stimulate internal sou rces 
of economic growth. Our economic policy is to resolve this challenge by implementing a number of 
comprehensive measures. They include increasing public demand (through the regulation of 
money supply and implementation of national projects), developing  sector -specific incentives in 
the industry and agriculture and optimizing the regulatory functions of the Government.   
2.11.   Doing this, we keep in mind obligations in the WTO and give priority to market based 
regulatory instruments. The Bank of Russia practic es the same approach in its monetary and 
exchange rate policies.  
2.12.   Timely and comprehensive series of anti -crisis measures taken by the Russian Government 
allowed to minimize negative effects from external economic shocks. It maintained social stability WT/TPR /W/115  • Russian Federation  
 
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  and employment level, attenuated risks of inflation and financial instability, helped to restore 
confidence and protect interests of investors.  
2.13.   Government activities aimed at sustainable economic development are gradually yielding 
results. Despite the remaini ng challenges, we see positive signs in Russia's economy. The pace of 
GDP decline is expected to slow down to 0.2% this year. By the end of this year, we expect the 
economy to restore moderate growth. GDP growth rate of 0.8% in 2017, 1.8% in 2018, and 2.2%  
in 2019 is expected. Industrial and agricultural production is expected to expand by annual 
average growth rates of 1.6% up to 2.3% in the next three years accordingly to effect positively 
on GDP dynamics. In addition, we foresee gradual growth of non -energy exports, controlled 
unemployment (with the rate of 5.8% at the beginning of the current year), and declining inflation 
(less than 6.5% on annual basis by the end of this year). There are also some positive investment 
trends as capital flight pace is re duced and major investors are gradually returning to Russia.  
2.14.   At the same time, the challenges that Russia had faced triggered an accelerated search and 
implementation of solutions for the systematic trade and economic problems, such as export 
diversificat ion, development of domestic high -tech industries, and of small and medium -sized 
enterprises, exploring new opportunities on foreign markets for trade and investment.  
2.15.   Russian foreign trade strategy is reflected in the Government programme for the 
developm ent of foreign economic activity (FEA) until 2018, approved two years ago.  
2.16.   Goals set by this Programme include improving export specialization of Russia; increasing 
the number of companies - exporters of goods by 1.5 times; reaching higher ranking in the World 
Bank's Ease of Doing Business Index by the "International Trade" indicator. We also aim at 
reaching a qualitatively higher level of economic and trade cooperation with the EAEU Members, 
other CIS countries, as well as APEC, ASEAN, BRICS. In order to achieve these goals, the Russian 
Government is preparing a series of practical tools (including roadmaps and priority projects), 
designed to create business environment of a “new quality”, improve corporate governance and 
streamline export and import proce dures.  
2.17.   The Russian Federation extends its range of export products. We explore new directions. 
This year, Russia became the largest supplier of wheat worldwide, strengthening its position in the 
world grain market. In the next five years, we plan to substa ntially increase our agricultural 
products export, which explains why we are very much interested in maintaining the talks in the 
WTO.  
2.18.   Russia maintains its role as a reliable global supplier of raw materials and energy resources 
that provides world market stability. We also attach great importance to deeper integration into 
global value chains, moving up the value chains in prospective industries and increasing domestic 
added value. Russia takes same steps as many other countries do – reforming economy in 
accordance with needs shaped by external and internal factors and challenges.  
Russia in the Multilateral Trading System  
2.19.   With regard to the multilateral trading system, Russia takes a responsible and proactive 
approach as a dedicated supporter of and contrib utor to the WTO.  
2.20.   Russia strongly adheres to the rules of the multilateral trading system. Our key priority is to 
maintain the centrality of the WTO as the global forum for trade and to strengthen its negotiating 
function. It is for these aims that we acti vely participate in the multilateral trade negotiations in 
full cooperation with other Members.  
2.21.   Russia largely supported the multilateral efforts to reach agreements on Bali package in 
2013 and Nairobi package last year. We continue to emphasize the need for an expeditious and 
efficient implementation of the outcomes we achieved during these ministerials. Russia ratified the 
TFA Agreement and presented its instruments of ratification to the Director General in April 2016. 
We also eliminated agricultural ex port subsidies well before WTO accession.  
2.22.   In our minds, the WTO is a unique platform for establishing universal trade rules. We 
strongly believe that it is time for a membership to launch the negotiation process on the issues WT/TPR/W/115  • Russian Federation  
 
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  that might be delivered by the  next Ministerial. We are still confident that it is possible to reach 
consensus with regards to the formation of the new direction if we start working towards this goal 
now.  
2.23.   We believe that the new agenda should include the outstanding Doha issues that h ave a 
high potential of reaching agreement by the Membership. As we see it, such issues could be: 
domestic support, remaining elements of export competition and agricultural market access, as 
well as parts of rules agenda. Consequently, the new agenda coul d also include other issues in the 
list of negotiating tracks, such as: rules in antidumping and subsidies, domestic regulation in 
services, transparency in RTAs, as well as evaluation of their impact on the multilateral trading 
system, investment regulati on, e-commerce and environmental aspects of trade.  
2.24.   We are ready to work vigorously with other Members in order to reach tangible results by 
the next Ministerial conference. We made some textual proposals before and intend to make new 
soon.  
2.25.   We have been in vesting efforts into the improvement of global trading rules, not only in 
Geneva, but also in other international fora. As the Chair of APEC in 2012 and within the "G20" in 
2016, we worked hard together with others to deliver a strong message in support of  the central 
role of the WTO in the multilateral trading system.  
2.26.   As of June 2016, Russia has made 73 regular notifications to the WTO and has 
systematically submitted tariff data to the WTO Integrated Data Base.  
2.27.   As a new Member, Russia is actively partici pating also in the work of the WTO, its 
committees, working groups and councils.  
2.28.   Since 2012, we participated in 32 TPRs.  
2.29.   Against the backdrop of increased efforts in developing domestic regulation disciplines in 
accordance with a built -in agenda under GATS  Article VI:4, in June, Russia co -sponsored the 
initiative of Friends of Domestic regulation group aimed at launching substantive discussion on this 
issue within the relevant working group.  
2.30.   We also fully support revived discussions on electronic commerce i n the WTO. We support 
an “evolutionary” approach in dealing with e -commerce challenges: first, revealing issues in the 
field of e -commerce development, including barriers and gaps in the institutional framework 
regulating e -commerce, and then trying to ide ntify optimal ways to address the abovementioned 
issues. This is why in July Russia co -sponsored the document proposed by Japan that exemplified 
such approach.  
2.31.   Russia is of the view that the WTO can and should be one of the platforms for observing a 
reformation of the respective investment regulation, as it already has the basis for furthering the 
discussions on this issue. We are currently working on the relevant investments -related initiatives, 
and Russia is committed to work closely with all WTO partner s in a constructive manner that will 
help this institution move forward into a new successful decade.  
Bilateral and Regional Developments  
2.32.   While strengthening the multilateral trading system remains our key priority, we also 
continue to expand bilateral an d regional trade and economic cooperation.  
2.33.   We are actively involved in regional integration. Therefore, we place high value on 
enhancing transparency of the regional economic agreements. We continue to call for the 
transformation of the current provisional  Transparency Mechanism into a permanent one. We are 
convinced that regional trade agreements cannot serve as an alternative to global trading rules 
and should complement rather than substitute coherent multilateral rules.   
2.34.   We carry our work on deepening economic integration with our partners on the principles of 
openness, inclusiveness and compatibility with the multilateral trading rules.  WT/TPR /W/115  • Russian Federation  
 
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  2.35.   On this basis, we are promoting integration within the Eurasian Economic Union (the EAEU). 
Now The EAEU is a common m arket with a population of over 180 million people, with a total GDP 
of US$1582.1 billion and foreign trade turnover of more than US$500 billion (in 2015).  
2.36.   Further, in an effort to deepen international partnerships, Russia places a great emphasis on 
develo ping trade and investment ties to foster closer cooperation between the EAEU, the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
(SCO).  
2.37.   Last year, the EAEU signed the first Free Trade Agreement with Vietnam, which  will enter 
into force on 5 October 2016.  
2.38.   Together with the EAEU Member States, we consider several proposals to launch 
negotiations on free trade agreements.  
2.39.   We firmly believe in the paramount importance of our joint work in strengthening and 
improving a n open, rules based and balanced multilateral trading system. We will combine these 
efforts with further integrating Russia's economy into the global economic architecture and 
creating business - and investment -friendly environment.  
2.40.   We approach Russia's fi rst TPR as a valuable opportunity to listen and to learn. We look 
forward to participating in this exchange of opinions and ideas. Our delegation is ready to receive 
comments and questions. Thank you.  WT/TPR/W/115  • Russian Federation  
 
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  3  STATEMENT BY THE DIS CUSSANT  
3.1.  Let me at the outset warml y welcome the Head of the Department for Trade Negotiations of 
the Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation, Mr. Medvedkov, and his 
high-level team from Moscow.  
3.2.  For my own part, it is a particular pleasure and privilege – in equal measure  - for me to be 
the discussant for this the first WTO Trade Policy Review of the Russian Federation.  
3.3.  I have some experience in working on Russia -related trade policy since the WTO accession 
process commenced and which I covered as a junior officer attache d to the New Zealand Embassy 
in Moscow.  
3.4.  Subsequently, I worked for a time at the Russian Ministry of Agriculture as part of the EU's 
TACIS programme. In particular, I was part of a team which developed a partial equilibrium model 
of the Russian agricultur al sector. The objective was to help the Russian Ministry of Agriculture 
assess the likely effects of WTO accession on the agricultural sector.  
3.5.  In preparing my remarks for this process today, I could not help recalling the words of 
Hermann from Pushkin's great novella "The Queen of Spades". Hermann says "I am not in the 
position to sacrifice the necessary in the hope of winning the superfluous”. That quote has a 
particular meaning and relevance for me as I read the Secretariat's thorough report, as well as  the 
range of questions Members have posed.  
Introduction  
3.6.  This - the First Trade Policy Review (TPR) of the Russian Federation - is an important 
milestone. It is the first such scheduled review since Russia joined the WTO four years ago. Its 
significance, t herefore, cannot be understated. In this regard, it is worth reflecting briefly on the 
situation for Russia's trading partners before its accession was concluded, not least in terms of 
some of the core WTO principles such as transparency and non -discrimina tion. Put simply, prior to 
WTO accession there were very low levels of transparency, numerous instances of discrimination 
and a distinct lack of certainty about the overall direction of travel of Russia's trading system.  
3.7.  The same is not true today. Taken together, it is clear that on a comparative basis with the 
situation prior to 2012, the process of accession has substantively improved matters for WTO 
Members. That is a positive development, though further effort is needed if the full benefits of 
WTO mem bership are to be realised both by Russia and the wider multilateral trading system. It is 
in this context that the following three inter -related trade policy issues are considered with a view 
to informing Members' engagement on this TPR:  
 Structural trade  policy issues;  
 Sectoral trade policy issues, with a particular emphasis on agriculture; and  
 Systemic trade policy issues with a focus on preferential trade agreements and fossil fuel 
subsidies.  
Structural Trade Policy Issues  
3.8.  The objectives of Russia's int ernational trade policies are clearly laid out in a range of Russian 
Federal Laws dating from 1999 to 2003. It is useful to benchmark the findings of this TPR against 
those objectives which include: to modernize and diversify the Russian economy; accelerat e 
Russia's integration into the global economy and to create favourable conditions for traders - 
exporters and importers - as well as consumers.1 These objectives should be kept in mind and 
should inform this Trade Policy Review.  
3.9.  After WTO accession, Russ ia's trade policies were demonstrably heading in the right 
direction, including in terms of its overall trade policy objectives. The final bound rate for all 
                                                
1 Federal Law No. 164 -FZ of 8 December 2003  on the Fun damentals of the State Regulation of Foreign 
Trade Activity  in the Russian Federation; and Federal Law No. 160 -FZ of 9 July 1999 o n Foreign Invest ment in 
the Russian Federation.  WT/TPR /W/115  • Russian Federation  
 
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  products is moving to 7.8% in keeping with the agreed implementation process.2 This represents a 
significant improvement over the terms and conditions that governed trade with Russia prior to its 
accession. Moreover, the commitments made by Russia in goods, services and elsewhere, while 
commensurate to those of other recently acceded Members, compare f avourably with many 
so-called 'older' WTO Members who have been long standing members of the GATT.  
3.10.   As with any WTO Member, there remain areas for improvement. To state the obvious, 
ensuring that its tariff bindings are not breached for whatever reason is an important principle and 
Russia's assurances to this end will be appreciated. Similarly, greater transparency and efficiency 
would also be achieved through the exclusive use of ad valorem  tariff rates, rather than the mixed 
rates which feature in its exi sting schedule of commitments.  
3.11.   In terms of more specific structural trade issues, this assessment has necessarily narrowed 
its focus in the interest of time on three areas: the expanding role of the Eurasian Economic Union 
(EAEU); the "ease of doing busin ess" in Russia; and the increased emphasis on import substitution 
and the role of State -Owned Enterprises.  
The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU)  
3.12.   The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) is a significant new structural development in Russia's 
trade policy. On the o ne hand, the EAEU has been developing rapidly, including on trade policy 
where the Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC) increasingly has competency. The initial 
assessment of the EAEU appears on balance to be broadly positive,3 including in terms of the 
potential future direction it may take.4  
3.13.   On the other hand, the role of the Eurasian Economic Commission in managing the EAEU 
members' Customs Union may have created certain misunderstandings in some Members' minds 
about the management of the EAEU's external tariff and trade remedies' regimes. It would be 
useful to clarify these matters and the broader competencies of the EEC during this review. It 
appears, for instance, that the EEC has an increasingly important role to play on technical barriers 
to trade, as  well as competition policy – all of which touch on trade policy.  
3.14.   The experience of Members trading with Russia and the EAEU also suggests that further 
work is needed to improve trade facilitation procedures in Russia and the EAEU itself. Such 
improvement s will deliver obvious economic benefits to Russia, the EAEU and their trading 
partners. Ratification of the Trade Facilitation Agreement is a positive development not least for 
the helpful signal this sends about Russia's commitment to the multilateral tr ading system. The 
implementation of the commitments contained in that Agreement will be useful for Russia and its 
EAEU partners in terms of their own focus in this area.  
3.15.   More directly, it is encouraging to note that a "single window" clearance process is already 
being tested within the EAEU through a pilot programme under  way in several maritime ports. A 
high priority should be accorded to the accelerated roll -out of this "single window" for improved 
customs procedures. These procedures also need to be bet ter aligned across all members of the 
EAEU, not just Russia. Intensified effort will also be needed by Russia and other members of the 
EAEU to reduce and eliminate the significant number of non -tariff measures and regulatory 
requirements that continue to c hill trade flows, including within the EAEU itself.  
The Ease of Doing Business  
3.16.   There are a series of indices that are used to rank and rate the ease of doing business in 
Russia. These include, for instance, indices which assess customs procedures or tradi ng across 
borders – aspects where there is some work still to be done by Russia in this area.  
                                                
2 https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news11_e/acc_rus_10nov11_e.htm  accessed on 
17 September  2016.  
3 See for instance: F. G Carneiro (2013) What Promise does the Eurasian Customs Union Hold for the 
Future? The Economic Premise, World Bank, Washington, February, Number 108.  
4 See for instance: Bertelsmann Stiftung (2016) Free Trade from Lisbon to Vladivostok , Guetersloh.  WT/TPR/W/115  • Russian Federation  
 
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  3.17.   One particular index usefully draws together a set of variables that arguably provides the 
most complete picture of the 'ease of doing business' in a particular country. This is the World 
Bank's eponymous index of 'the Ease of Doing Business'.  
3.18.   Immediately after WTO accession in 2013, Russia was ranked 112th on the World Bank's 
Ease of Doing Business index. Currently, it is ranked 51st. This is a rapid and marked 
improvement over three years.5 Nevertheless, for a G20 Member of Russia's standing it cannot be 
satisfied with a ranking outside of the top twenty. It is encouraging therefore that Russia has a 
long-standing programme in place that has an explicit target t o move its ranking to 20th in the 
World Bank Index by 2018 “and maintain that position by 2020”.6 In fact, securing a place in the 
upper portion of the top twenty should be the level of ambition that drives the next phase of 
Russian reforms in this area.   
Import Substitution and Trade Policy  
3.19.   Perhaps most significantly in structural terms, including the long term trajectory of Russia's 
trade policy has been the recent re -invigoration of a policy of import substitution. As a supplement 
to this, if not direct ly related there is a matter worth reflecting on regarding the increasing role of 
state-owned enterprises in the domestic economy and trade. Import substitution as a formal policy 
mechanism was enacted through the establishment in August 2015 of the Govern mental 
Commission on Import Substitution.7 In fact, import substitution was already an active policy since 
2014 for the agriculture sector.  
3.20.   In terms of the functioning and structure of this instrument and indeed the role of state 
owned enterprises therein , there is a considerable amount of written material available about this 
Commission on Russian Government websites. This is to be commended, though one does need to 
be able to read Russian to access the relevant material in this specific instance.  
3.21.   Severa l Members have asked about the role which the Commission on Import Substitution 
has in domestic policy setting. It is somewhat unclear, for instance, how this mechanism facilitates 
the role that trade and competition – i.e. including exports and imports of  goods and services - 
plays in driving domestic innovation and growth. There is also a risk that this policy of import 
substitution will create a number of rent seekers domestically who will have a vested interest in 
sustaining a mechanism over time that, according to the relevant legislation (Number 758), is 
intended only to be a temporary measure. Moreover, the role of state -owned enterprises in this 
process is an area of some interest to Members. It would be useful for Members to understand 
how products and projects are identified as suitable for import substitution. What review 
mechanism is utilised to keep the indicative list of such products and projects updated to reflect 
both external and internal developments? Is there scope for foreign suppliers an d domestic 
importers to engage on the list of import substitutable projects and products? Further information 
on these matters will be appreciated by Members.  
Sectoral Issues: Trade and Agriculture  
3.22.   Prior to 2014, Russia's agriculture sector was an increas ingly competitive and outward 
looking one. Its overall output growth had expanded considerably between 2003 and 2013 and this 
had been driven by very sharp increases in Total Factor Productivity (TFP). In fact, Russia's TFP in 
agriculture is well above the  global average.8  
3.23.   In the meantime, the ongoing transition to fully implement Russia's accession commitments 
in agriculture is still under  way. By way of example, the average tariff for all agricultural products 
in 2011, i.e. before accession, was 13.2%. I n accordance with the Protocol of Accession, the 
transitional phase since then has in fact led to an overall increase in tariffs to 17.6% in 2012. This 
has been be followed by a gradual decline to 14.6% this year. By the end of the transition period 
                                                
5 http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/russia/  accessed on 10 September 2016  
6 See in particular: Government of the Russian Federation Number 467 -r of 29 March 2013 which 
included a specific objective of moving from its then 120th ranking to 20th by 2018.  
7 Government of the Russian Federation Resol ution Number 758 of 4 August 2015.  
8 OECD (2016) Agricultural Polic y Monitoring and Evaluation 2016 , OECD, Paris.  WT/TPR /W/115  • Russian Federation  
 
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  the av erage tariff for agricultural goods will be 10.8%.9 As noted earlier, this average rate is 
comparable to other recently acceded Members but it compares favourably with the tariff regimes 
of certain "older" WTO Members. As with the wider tariff regime, Russ ia is again to be encouraged 
for transparency and efficiency reasons to move to ad valorem  tariffs rather than the mixed rates 
which remain a feature of certain parts of the agriculture -related section of Russia's schedule of 
commitments.  
3.24.   Since 2014, the Government's agricultural policies appear to have shifted. In particular, 
there has been an intensification of focus on self -sufficiency in agriculture. This was detailed in the 
Russian Federation's Doctrine of Food Security launched in 2010, though substa ntive 
implementation only commenced in 2014. The results have been mixed. The importation of 
agricultural products, for instance, remains significantly greater than exports. In fact, despite 
stated commitments to diversify agricultural exports, the country 's dependence on wheat exports 
remains, with this product alone accounting for nearly a third of all exports in 2015.10 In the 
meantime, some imports have increased while the declines in other sectors are marginal. While 
the bi -directional sanctions between  Russia and some of its partners have been a factor in the 
changing fortunes of the sector, as well as the issue of transit arrangements, they are not the only 
reason for the sector's difficulties. The challenges the sector faces are structural. It is clea r that 
import substitution policies risk having the reverse intended effect, creating an uncompetitive and 
inefficient system over time. A reinvigorated reform process would address many of these in an 
efficient and effective manner.  
3.25.   In terms of domestic s upport to the agricultural sector, Russia has a longstanding tradition 
of intervention in this area. Its accession to the WTO took this historical commitment to the sector 
into account and Russia is transitioning the reduction of its total trade distorting  support to the 
agriculture sector to US$4.4 billion by 2018. It is also positive that part of the accession process 
includes an agreement to avoid excessive concentration of support on individual products11 and, 
like other recently acceded Members, Russia has also eliminated all of its agricultural export 
subsidies. Again, with regard to export subsidies, this is something which other 'older' WTO 
Members with such entitlements have only recently agreed to do at the end of last year through 
the Nairobi WTO M inisterial.  
3.26.   It should be noted too that Russia's notifications in several areas are not up to date. This 
needs to be urgently rectified. It is also important as a factual matter, however, also to 
acknowledge that in terms of its compliance with notificati on commitments for both agricultural 
domestic support and export subsidies for agricultural products. Russia is one of only twenty -nine 
WTO Members that is fully compliant with its notifications to 2014. Indeed, of these 29 Members, 
Russia is one of only f our developed WTO Members that is up to date.12  
3.27.   This review has already highlighted the potential role of the Eurasian Economic Union 
(EAEU) in catalyzing improvements for the bloc's trading partners. In this context, it would be 
interesting to understand how the EAEU is engaged in the Russian agriculture sector. The 
Russian -language website for the EAEU, for instance, notes that agricultural policy coordination is 
an area of expanding interest and engagement for the Eurasian Economic Commission.13 There is 
an existing agreement on, for instance, Unified Rules for State Support for Agriculture.14 More 
information on what this involves would be welcomed.   
                                                
9 https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news11_e/acc_rus_10nov1 1_e.htm  accessed on  
18 September  2016.   
10 WTO (2016) Trade Policy Review: Russian Federation , Geneva, WT/TPR/S/345, Table 4.2  
11 https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news11_e/ac c_rus_10nov11_e.htm  accessed on 
18 September  2016.  
12 The others are Australia, New  Zealand and Norway ( JOB/AG/80 of 20 July 2016 refers)  
13 See for instance the range of material on: 
http://www.eurasiancommission.org/ru/act/prom_i_agroprom/Pages/default.aspx  accessed on 18 and 
19 September 2016.  
14 http://www. eurasiancommission.org/ru/act/prom_i_agroprom/dep_prom/projects/Pages/default.aspx  
accessed on 17 September 2016.  WT/TPR/W/115  • Russian Federation  
 
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  Systemic Issues: Preferential Trade Agreements and the WTO: Trade and Fossil Fuel 
Subsidies  
3.28.   There are a ra nge of systemic issues that Members have identified for consideration through 
their questions and engagement in past Trade Policy Reviews. Indeed, given the focus of the TPR 
process on how policies may affect the multilateral trading system, the inter -action between 
preferential trade agreements and the multilateral trading system is of particular interest. 
Specifically, there is the question of how the former can be "building blocks" rather than 
"stumbling blocks" to the latter.  
3.29.   This is not an academic po int. Paragraph 28 of the WTO Ministerial Declaration in Nairobi 
reaffirms Members' wish to ensure that preferential arrangements “remain complementary to, not 
a substitute for” the multilateral trading system. Further, Ministers have instructed additional work 
in this area, including enhancing the transparency of these arrangements.15 This is important 
work, particularly if we are to manage the risk of what Professor Bhagwatti called “the termites in 
the system.”  
3.30.   In this regard therefore, it is interesting to note that Russia through the EAEU is seeking to 
expand its network of preferential trade arrangements, including to the Asia -Pacific in which of 
course two -thirds of Russia's territory lies. Given the accelerating level of economic integration 
underway across the region already, not least through the range of ASEAN+ agreements, as well 
as the non -trivial development of two mega -regionals - the recently concluded Trans -Pacific 
Partnership Agreement and the Regional Comprehensive Partnership Agreement (or the ASEAN+6 
FTA)16 – Russia and the EAEU will want to move swiftly to engage on processes that can catalyse 
integration.  
3.31.   At this point, however, neither Russia, nor the EAEU is involved in any of these processes. 
There is considerable interest therefore in  the approach Russia is likely to take to deepen its 
integration with this dynamic region. In the meantime, it will be important for Russia and the EAEU 
in their areas of trade competence to negotiate high quality and comprehensive outcomes as they 
conclud e their first suite of preferential trade agreements in the region. This will reassure the 
region and WTO Members more generally about the contribution that Russia can make to economic 
integration and supporting the multilateral trading system. The opposit e signal, i.e. for low quality 
and less than comprehensive outcomes from its FTA agenda will not be helpful, neither to the 
region nor indeed to efforts by the EAEU or Russia to deepen their integration and to be actively 
invited to and included in the dyn amic integration processes already well under  way in the region.  
3.32.   In this regard, the level of ambition being displayed by Russia and the EAEU at least in 
terms of the number of negotiating partners suggests a busy forward agenda of FTA negotiations. 
This will be of ongoing systemic interest to many Members. As noted above, the early signals 
Russia sends about levels of ambition and commitment to high quality and comprehensive 
outcomes will be carefully monitored. In this context, the recently concluded pre ferential 
agreement with Viet Nam will be a litmus test. Once this agreement comes into force, Russia and 
its fellow WTO Members of the EAEU will be expected to notify this outcome consistent with the 
relevant WTO obligations. Further information as to how  this agreement therefore meets the test 
of comprehensivity and quality as well as its role as a 'building block' to multilateralism will be 
appreciated.  
Fossil Fuel Subsidies and Trade  
3.33.   Another area that has become of increasing systemic interest to Member s through the Trade 
Policy Review process is the issue of fossil fuel subsidies. Such incentives have both trade 
distorting and environment -related effects.17 Moreover, the link between reform in this area, the 
multilateral trading system, policy coherence and achieving UN Sustainable Development Goal 12 
is obvious.  
                                                
15 The Nairobi Declaration is available at: 
https://www .wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/mc10_e/mindecision_e.htm  Accessed on 19 September 2016.  
16 RCEP includes the ten ASEAN Members, Australia, China, India, Japan, Korea and New Zealand.  
17 On the trade effects of fossil fuel subsidy reform see in particula r J Burniaux, J Chateau and 
J Sauvage (2011) The Trade Effects of Phasing out Fossil Fuel Consumption Subsidies, OECD Trade and 
Environment Working Papers , 2011/05, OECD, Paris.  WT/TPR /W/115  • Russian Federation  
 
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  3.34.   Russia's subsidies to fossil fuels are focused on producer measures and involve tax 
concessions or targeted reductions in export duties for oil and gas. The International Energy 
Agency has also identified subsidies through dual or under -pricing of electricity and natural gas.18 
Reform of such incentives will deliver both trade and environmental benefits both domestically and 
globally.  
3.35.   In this context, the recent reduction of some export duties fo r oil and gas by Russia is, on 
the face of it, an example of sound trade policy. That said, it is worth noting that the measures 
that appear to have replaced these duties have had perverse effects, including the selective 
increase of production from partic ular fields or in particular regions (e.g. East Siberia or the 
Caspian Sea). This may be an issue worth focusing on as Russia considers the next phase of its 
reforms. Russia is also to be commended for the fact that refined petroleum products in Russia are  
not under -priced at the retail stage.19  
3.36.   In terms of specific policy suggestions through this Trade Policy Review, Russia is 
encouraged to actively consider joining other WTO Members in participating in a peer review of its 
policies in support of fossil fu els.20 In addition, Members may be interested to discuss how trade 
policy reform in this area can contribute to enhanced welfare effects at the domestic economy 
level as well multilaterally not least as a way to achieve the objective set out by Leaders thro ugh 
UNSDG 12.  
Conclusion  
3.37.   Taken together, the reforms codified in Russia's Accession Protocol are significant and 
far-reaching. The Secretariat's report combined with Members' questions underlines two things. 
First, the progress that the Russian Federation has made since accession has been considerable. 
Second, the period after 2014 remains a work in progress and in some areas more work and an 
intensified process of reform will be needed. It is to be hoped that this TPR can assist in the 
forward process.  
3.38.   More generally, and in order to leverage the full benefits of Membership and its participation 
in a rules -based international trading system, Russia is encouraged to utilise the WTO as a whole. 
This means not only being active in its negotiating processes, t hough this is important, but also 
through Russia's active engagement in regular committee work across the institution. In this way, 
trade policy in Russia can be a reinforcing instrument that complements and supplements its 
domestic reform agenda.  
3.39.   Finally , it is to be hoped that a focus through this set of remarks as part of the TPR – 
structural; sectoral; and systemic - can assist Russia's ongoing reflection of both the direction and 
pace of its post -accession reform agenda. In this way, the constructive engagement by all 
Members on technical and substantive trade policy issues during the TPR process over the coming 
two days will matter. If this is achieved, the TPR will have made a measurable contribution to 
helping the Russian Federation achieve its ambi tious trade policy objectives and helped us 
collectively to sustain and reinforce the multilateral trading system over time.  
                                                
 18 Respectively US$22.1 billion and US$17.5 billion last year. The full IEA d ataset is available here: 
http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/media/weowebsite/2015/Subsidies20122014.xlsx  accessed on 
20 September.  
19 The exception, however, is o f diesel fuel used in the agricultural sector.  
20 The US and China recently concluded their peer reviews through the G20 which is available here: 
http://www.g20.org/English/Documents/Cur rent/index.html  accessed on 20 September 2016. New  Zealand 
and Peru have undertaken peer reviews through the APEC process. New  Zealand's review is available here: 
http://www.mbie.govt.nz/info -services/sectors -industries/energy/international -relationships/apec -fossil-fuel-
subsidy -reform -peer-review   accessed on 20 September 2016.  WT/TPR/W/115  • Russian Federation  
 
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  4  STATEMENTS BY MEMBER S 
MALAYSIA  ON BEHALF  OF ASEAN  
4.1.  I am making this statement on behalf of ASEAN.  
4.2.  The Russian Federation was ASEAN' s eighth largest trading partner in 2014. After a decade of 
consistent trade growth from a modest US$4.2 billion up to 2014, where total trade peaked at 
US$23 billion, trade contracted significantly in 2015 to just over US$13 billion. Despite challenging 
economic conditions, Russia remains to be one of ASEAN's major trade trading partners.  
4.3.  Recognizing the potential for enhanced economic and trade cooperation, both sides have 
agreed to enhance ASEAN -Russia trade and economic relations. This includes encourag ing our 
private sector and SMEs to explore business opportunities with each other. Recent examples of 
such exchanges were the ASEAN -Russia Business Forum held in May 2016 in Sochi, Russia, 
followed by Russian Business Missions to ASEAN including in Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia and 
Viet Nam.  
4.4.  At the Fourth ASEAN Economic Ministers and Russia Consultations held in August 2015 in 
Kuala Lumpur, Ministers endorsed the Post -2015 ASEAN -Russia Trade and Investment Cooperation 
Work Program which is expected to deepen  economic ties and enhance trade and investment 
relationship. Russia also submitted a list of 57 new projects to be annexed to the ASEAN -Russia 
Trade and Investment Roadmap which include areas such as technology, agriculture products, 
energy, and tourism a s key areas for growth.  
4.5.  We share the view of Ambassador Vitalis of the importance of stepping up engagement with 
ASEAN, one of the fastest growing regional groupings.  
4.6.  We very much welcome the Federation of Russia's active engagement in the WTO since its 
membership. In this, we welcome her ratification of the Trade Facilitation Agreement which we 
hope can be fully implemented soon.  
4.7.  We also express our thanks to Ambassador Gennady Ovechko and the colleagues in the 
Russian Mission for their constructive engag ement with the ASEAN delegations here in Geneva.  
MALAYSIA   
4.8.  We commend the Russian Federation for its commitment to liberalize a trade regime at 
acceding the WTO. This includes improvement of access for goods and services, and help 
participation in the Plur ilateral Information Technology Agreement. We encourage the Russian 
Federation to join the expanded ITA, currently with 24 participants including Malaysia. We look 
forward to Russia's continuous integration and reforms under these rules based multilateral trading 
system.  
4.9.  We noted that the Russian economy was hit hard in 2015, as most of us, particularly by the 
weakening crude oil prices and the depreciation of the Ruble. We therefore welcome the steps 
taken by the Russian Federation in stabilizing the situ ation and setting the foundations for 
recovery.  
4.10.   Although bilateral trade in 2015 saw a decline of up to 40%, for the first part of this year we 
saw that trade has picked up by some 3%, which is encouraging, which is up to US$2.9 billion. 
There is certainly  a big room for improvement for our bilateral trade.  
4.11.   It was noted too that Russia is a favorite destination for students looking for affordable 
medical education. We have over 2 000 students currently studying in universities in Russia.  
4.12.   There are addition al written questions from our capital. While we welcome the reforms 
undertaken over the review period, we are interested to learn more about the Auto Investment 
Programme and the progress of eliminating WTO inconsistent measures under the said 
programme. W e also seek further elaboration of changes to the existing tax regime on crude oil 
given that this may affect the foreign establishments in Russia.  WT/TPR /W/115  • Russian Federation  
 
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  4.13.   We also note that Russia imposes customs clearances and charges for customs escort of 
goods and storage. We would like to know the take -up rate in terms of quantity and data and the 
movements of goods transported into and towards the Russian Federation.  
4.14.   We wish to highlight that there is great interest among our business community in exploring 
opportunities in t he Russian Federation. It would certainly be helpful to our businesses to have 
comprehensive trade technical information readily available in English on the Russian customs 
website.  
OMAN  
4.15.   The Sultanate of Oman and the Russian Federation enjoy excellent poli tical as well as 
economic relations. Oman anticipates that these relations will further expand and strengthen in the 
coming years to the mutual benefit of both countries.  
4.16.   The Russian Federation is a strong supporter of the multilateral trading system. It i s a firm 
believer in the role the WTO has played and will continue to play in providing a rules -based system 
for the conduct of world trade and the liberalization of international trade. The Russian Federation 
is of the view that there exists an imbalance between the rights and obligations of the original 
WTO Members and Article XII Members. It calls for the elimination of such imbalances, a 
sentiment which the Sultanate of Oman fully shares.  
4.17.   Oman is pleased to note that the Russian Federation's efforts to diversify its economy from 
mineral resources are meeting with success. According to the Secretariat Report, in 2015 services 
accounted for 62.3% of GDP followed by manufacturing at 13.6%, mining and quarrying at 9.5%, 
construction at 7.0%, and agriculture and related activities at 4.0%.  
4.18.   It is encouraging to note that since accession the Russian Federation has been able to 
reduce the MFN applied tariffs from a simple average of 11% to 8.3%.  
4.19.   Since 1 January 2015, the Russian Federation as a member of the Eura sian Economic Union 
has been applying the common external tariff.  
4.20.   The Russian Federation has taken various steps to simplify customs procedures and thus 
improve efficiency for both importers and exporters. It has made significant commitments in trade 
in services and as part of its WTO commitments has liberalized important services sectors 
including the telecom sector.  
4.21.   Oman commends the Russian Federation for adhering to the rules and disciplines of the 
WTO. It has been abiding by its commitments under the multilateral trade agreements. Its policies 
and practices have no doubt a positive impact on the functioning of the multilateral trading 
system. We would like to thank the Russian Federation for their active engagement and positive 
role in the Group of Art icle XII Members.  
CANADA  
4.22.   Russia's accession to the WTO in August 2012 was an important and welcome step. Canada 
acknowledges the efforts of the Russian Federation in completing its first Trade Policy Review and 
welcomes the work Russia has undertaken to me et its WTO obligations.  
4.23.   Russia's economic picture has changed markedly since its accession. The strong growth of 
the Russian economy in 2010 -12 was followed by slowed growth in 2013 and 2014 and a 
significant contraction in 2015. While the Russian economy  has, to a great extent, been able to 
cope with the global challenge of weak commodity prices, it has also been negatively affected by 
the risk and uncertainty arising from its own actions on the international stage and by continued 
structural challenges w hich impede the progress of its private sector. The Russian Federation has 
within its power to take the actions necessary to alleviate these challenges. Canada would 
welcome such developments.  
4.24.   Looking first to the structural challenges that impair the per formance of the Russian 
economy, I would point to two areas where sustained efforts would support economic growth - WT/TPR/W/115  • Russian Federation  
 
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  continued work to reduce the involvement of the State in the economy, and efforts to both address 
corruption and improve the business environ ment. The State continues to be heavily involved in 
the Russian economy, by virtue of direct ownership and its administrative and regulatory 
presence. State -owned enterprises comprise roughly half of Russia's GDP, and have a dominant 
position in key sector s including banking, transport, and energy. This diminishes overall efficiency, 
productivity, and competition. The Government's over -involvement in these sectors also 
exacerbates the harmful effects that low global commodity prices and slow economic growth  have 
had on Russia's economy. We welcome efforts already made by the Russian Federation to reduce 
the number of State owned enterprises and call for additional work in order to achieve a  more 
efficient capital allocation and a more competitive private se ctor. 
4.25.   Regulation can promote strong governance practice, deal effectively with a range of 
externalities and encourage the growth of a healthy private sector. However, burdensome 
administrative and regulatory regimes discourage growth, both in Russia's priv ate sector and in its 
investment climate. In this regard, I echo the recommendations of the IMF's most recent World 
Economic Outlook when I say that boosting potential economic growth in Russia will involve a 
concerted effort to address the disproportionat e effect of the State in its economy, including 
through greater competition, lower administrative barriers and regulation, and stronger 
governance.  
4.26.   The Russian economy also continues to be adversely affected by corruption. Despite efforts 
including ratific ation of the OECD's Anti -Bribery Convention, investors still point to corruption as a 
major concern for their operations in Russia. More specifically, foreign investors report that they 
face worryingly high levels of corruption from law enforcement officia ls. According to the OECD's 
Phase 2 Follow -Up Report on Corruption and Bribery this year, Russia has only partially 
implemented 21 out of 50 anti -corruption recommendations and failed to implement 19. Canada 
encourages Russia to continue to make efforts in  addressing this important concern.  
4.27.   Turning to the international stage, and underlining that this is not a political forum, it bears 
observing that some of Russia's actions in the non -trade sphere have contributed to an uncertain 
business climate, includin g sanctions and some issues that are now before the WTO's dispute 
settlement mechanism.  
4.28.   At the same time, Russia's concurrent engagement of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), 
beginning in 2015, appears to have sometimes strengthened and sometimes weakened  its pursuit 
of fulfilling its WTO obligations. Canada notes Russia's sometimes competing objectives in these 
two bodies. On the one hand, Russia has sought to implement some of its WTO commitments 
through EAEU measures including, for example, the broader enforcement of IPRs. On the other 
hand, Russia has been found to be applying tariffs on goods under the Common Customs Tariff of 
the Eurasian Economic Union in excess of its Schedule of Concessions including, for example, on 
paper and refrigerators. It is our view that when international trade objectives are pursued 
inconsistently across competing organizations, these may further risk damaging Russia's economy 
and undermine the multilateral trade system which benefits Russia. Therefore, while Canada 
welcome s Russia's efforts to work multilaterally and plurilaterally to strengthen the international 
trade framework, but cautions against efforts that detract from the pursuit of a global, transparent 
and coherent trading system.  
4.29.   Within the WTO, Canada notes Rus sia's active participation in dispute settlement both as 
complainant and respondent. We also note with interest Russia's plan to begin negotiations to 
accede to the GPA in the second half of this year, and continue to welcome and support Russia's 
pursuit o f its international trade objectives in the WTO.  
4.30.   Canada hopes that these recommendations will support Russia's efforts at the WTO. We 
have also prepared a set of questions touching on some of themes previously mentioned, including 
coherence between EAEU r egulations and WTO rules, particularly in the spheres of SPS and TBT, 
as well as other issues such as government procurement and government support for the 
agriculture section. Canada looks forward to receiving responses from the Russian Federation.  WT/TPR /W/115  • Russian Federation  
 
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  AUSTR ALIA 
4.31.   Australia welcomes the opportunity to participate in the Russian Federation's first Trade 
Policy Review. The review process is an important step in Russia's further integration in the global 
economy.  
4.32.   The Reports of the Secretariat and of Russia, as we ll as the issues raised by Member States 
in their advance written questions, reveal a range of areas where further reform is either required 
or where there are concerns about increased protectionist sentiment and practices. Clearly, current 
political tensi ons are affecting policy settings and constraining trade. We must be realistic about 
this. But even as we counsel Russia against encouraging protectionist policies we also acknowledge 
and commend the progress that has also been made in liberalising trade a nd investment, largely 
as a result of Russia's WTO Accession.  
4.33.   We encourage Russia to take further steps on the road to economic reform. We believe this 
will require addressing issues such as excessive regulation, weak governance, inadequate 
competition in goods and services markets and significant government interventions in the 
economy that have discouraged trade and investment. It will also require efforts to resist and 
reverse, as I said previously, the self -damaging effects of protectionist policies and  practices.  
4.34.   Australia has a modest trade relationship with Russia, with two -way merchandise trade 
worth AUD 874 million in 2015, making Russia Australia's 44th largest trading partner. Growing 
bilateral trade, particularly in the mining equipment, technolo gy and services (METS) sector and in 
the education sector, is supporting modernization and enhancing productivity in Russia. Australia 
looks forward to future growth in bilateral trade in these, and other, sectors.  
4.35.   Australia commends the Russian Federation  on having ratified the WTO Trade Facilitation 
Agreement (TFA) in April 2016. Australia would welcome any new efforts by Russia to facilitate and 
streamline procedures related to quarantine and customs clearance. In particular, harmonizing - 
and clarifying  - regulatory requirements for imported foods and coordinating border inspection and 
clearance systems for imports to Russia would lower costs for importers and, in turn, domestic 
consumers. Accordingly, Australia welcomes advice that the Eurasian Economic  Commission (EEC) 
is developing a single -window for customs procedures, which is, of course, a component of the 
WTO TFA.  
4.36.   Currently, Russia represents less than 1% of Australia's agricultural exports, with Russian 
policy settings currently preventing growt h in trade in many sectors. In addition, technical barriers 
to trade in agricultural products create additional challenges for Australian exporters. We 
encourage Russia to ensure its measures are consistent with international standards and 
guidelines.  
4.37.   The challenges currently faced by the Russian economy, including the global decline in oil 
(and other commodity) prices, highlight the importance of pursuing growth strategies that support 
a flexible, versatile and resilient economy. Although there are some po sitive signs for the Russian 
economy, with the latest IMF figures predicting Russian GDP to grow by 0.8% in 2017, the delay in 
structural reforms, weak investment, and more recently, moves to restrict trade liberalization, are 
affecting the potential for f urther economic growth.  
4.38.   Australia's own experience of trade liberalization and economic reform has demonstrated 
that while the process can be painful in the short -term, the long -term benefits are clear. This year 
Australia has realized 25 years of continuo us economic growth – an achievement that is a clear 
indicator of the value of open markets and international trade in creating a sustainable and 
resilient economy. We encourage Russia to reduce barriers to trade and to deepen its integration 
into the globa l economy.  
4.39.   Finally, we would like to thank the Russian Federation for its responses to Australia's written 
questions.  WT/TPR/W/115  • Russian Federation  
 
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  SWITZERLAND  
4.40.   Accession to the multilateral trading system four years ago was a landmark for both the 
Russian Federation and the WTO. On th e part of the Russian Federation, it implied wide -ranging 
reform efforts and the establishment of a generally liberal trade regime. For WTO, it represented a 
big step towards universality.  
4.41.   As reflected in the reports by the Russian Federation and the Secre tariat, reforms have 
continued in various fields since 2012, implementing commitments undertaken at accession as well 
as pursuing a broader agenda of modernization and internationalization.  
4.42.   We welcome these advances made over the past four years in various  fields, such as 
customs and IPR, which have contributed to lifting the Russian Federation to position 51 in the 
World Bank's latest Doing Business Report.  
4.43.   Since 2013, economic and political shocks have strongly impacted the Russian Federation's 
economy an d its terms of trade, facing the Government and the Central Bank with a number of 
major challenges. Switzerland welcomes the recent signs of stabilization and recovery, including 
with respect to the Rouble and to inflation.  
4.44.   At the same time, we note that a bout half of the Russian GDP is still generated by 
state-owned or state -controlled enterprises and that the privatization programme for the period 
2014-16 has come to a halt. We encourage the Russian Federation to resume that programme as 
soon as possible,  enhance corporate governance of remaining state -owned enterprises and inform 
the WTO membership about relevant developments in line with notification commitments made 
upon accession.  
4.45.   Another area of concern for Switzerland are recent policy and regulatory  developments 
pertaining to import substitution and accompanying localization requirements, including for 
pharmaceutical products and in government procurement. Such measures can undermine 
competitive markets and the participation of Russian producers in i nternational value chains.  
4.46.   Switzerland welcomes the Russian Federation's recent communication to initiate accession 
to the GPA, as well as regulatory and institutional progress made during the reporting period on 
government procurement. We believe that fur ther strengthening transparency, the rule of law and 
the fight against corruption holds great potential for efficiency gains, in government procurement 
and the economy at large, and look forward to engaging with the Russian Federation in the GPA.  
4.47.   We note t he Russian Federation's objective to massively reduce the country's high energy 
intensity over the coming years, as part of efforts to diversify and upgrade the economy away 
from mineral resources. In this context, Switzerland encourages the Russian Federa tion also to 
address fossil fuel subsidies in line with its G20 commitment and the goals set by COP21.  
4.48.   Switzerland ranks among Russia's top ten partners for foreign direct investments, with 
sizeable two -way flows and FDI holdings. Our enterprises investing  in the Russian Federation 
acknowledge steady improvements of the business environment in recent years. At the same time, 
they still see significant room for further strengthening of various aspects, notably with respect to 
implementation of regulations an d to legal certainty.  
4.49.   Before concluding, I would like to express Switzerland's appreciation for the Russian 
Federation's active and constructive role played in the WTO and in support of the Multilateral 
Trading System since accession. We look forward to fu rther engagement in view of MC11 and 
beyond.  
SINGAPORE  
4.50.   Singapore appreciates the Russian Federation's efforts to integrate with the multilateral 
trading system, further regional economic integration, and liberalize its trading regime. Russia's 
undertaking of commitments in its accession to the WTO, as well as the entry into force of the 
Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) Treaty on 1 January 2015 have been major milestones in this 
process.  WT/TPR /W/115  • Russian Federation  
 
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  4.51.   Russia has made extensive economic restructuring efforts since its WTO a ccession. In the 
area of intellectual property rights (IPR) protection, Russia has passed long -awaited legislation, as 
well as established its Intellectual Property Rights Court in July 2013. The revisions made to 
Russia's Civil Code are considered one of the major legislative initiatives since the first Part of the 
Civil Code was adopted in 1995. We note that Russia's ranking in the World Bank's Ease of Doing 
Business Report has improved tremendously since its WTO accession. Russia ranked 51 in the 
2016 Re port compared to 120 in the 2012.  
4.52.   These positive developments have also been reflected in our bilateral trade relationship, 
which has grown significantly since Russia's WTO accession. Total bilateral trade in goods between 
Singapore and Russia grew at a co mpound annual growth rate of 13.11%, from S$4.68 billion in 
2011 to S$7.66 billion in 2015, making Russia our 21st largest trading partner worldwide. 
Singapore companies have found that with Russia's integration into the rule -based multilateral 
trading sys tem, they have had greater and more predictable access to Russia's market.  
4.53.   At the WTO, Russia has been consistent in advocating the strengthening of the WTO as the 
main platform for multilateral trade negotiations, as well as the development and enforceme nt of 
the multilateral trade rules. We note Russia's good track record of making regular notifications to 
the WTO and that there were only few outstanding notifications at the end of 2015. We hope that 
Russia would deal with the outstanding notifications a s soon as possible. We welcome Russia's 
deposit of its instrument of acceptance of the Trade Facilitation Agreement in April 2016, as well as 
Russia's intentions to proceed with the Government Procurement Agreement accession 
negotiations. We encourage Russ ia to also accept the Protocol Amending the TRIPS Agreement. 
We further encourage Russia to address the issue of applied tariffs exceeding its bound tariff 
commitments for some tariff lines which was highlighted in the Secretariat's report.  
4.54.   Singapore looks  forward to continuing our close cooperation with the Russian Federation in 
the WTO, and the EAEU, to further our common goal towards deeper and more progressive trade 
liberalisation at all levels. We commend the commitment of Russia to the multilateral tr ading 
system and the constructive contributions of Russia's Permanent Representative Ambassador 
Gennady Ovechko and his able team. Finally we thank the Russian Federation for their timely 
responses to our questions and wish them every success in their firs t Trade Policy Review.  
MÉXICO  
4.55.   Permítame comenzar mi intervención sustantiva, uniéndome a otras delegaciones que me 
han precedido para aplaudir los esfuerzos de Rusia en sus esfuerzos de integración al Sistema 
Multilateral del Comercio. El año pasado, Méxic o y Rusia celebramos 125 años de relaciones 
diplomáticas. Nuestras relaciones comerciales se han estrechado sustancialmente a partir del 
ingreso de Rusia a la OMC. Las importaciones de productos rusos en México se incrementaron 
desde 2008 a 2015 en un 88%,  mientras que las exportaciones de productos mexicanos a la 
Federación Rusa aumentaron un 73% en el mismo periodo. México quiere aplaudir estos 
resultados e instar a que nuestra relación siga creciendo.  
4.56.   Rusia es el país más extenso del mundo y la décima ec onomía mundial. Además, cuenta con 
abundantes recursos naturales que abarcan desde la madera hasta el gas natural y el petróleo.  
4.57.   Notamos en los informes que la economía rusa sigue caracterizada por la gran importancia 
de sus empresas públicas en numerosas  actividades, que van desde la extracción y exportación de 
recursos naturales, hasta el suministro de servicios financieros. Estas empresas representan 
prácticamente la mitad del PIB. Notamos también que siete décimas partes de las exportaciones 
rusas cons isten en aceites crudos, aceites de petróleo, gas natural y productos mineros. Este perfil 
exportador ha determinado que la economía rusa dependa en gran parte de los precios 
internacionales del petróleo.  
4.58.   De aquí que, mientras que del periodo de 1999 a 20 08, el PIB creció en un promedio de 7% 
anual. De 2010 a 2012 lo hizo en sólo 4,1%; a partir de la caída de los precios del petróleo. La 
economía rusa se contrajo un 3.7% en el 2015. Esto indica la necesidad que como lo han señalado 
otras delegaciones de co ntar con una estrategia que profundice en la diversificación productiva y 
exportadora de Rusia.  WT/TPR/W/115  • Russian Federation  
 
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  Aranceles  
4.59.   Rusia aplica aranceles con un promedio aritmético NMF del 8,3%. En el caso de los 
productos agrícolas, el porcentaje es del 14,6%, mientras que para los bienes no agrícolas es del 
6,5%. A pesar de que este promedio de aranceles aplicados se mantiene cerca del promedio de los 
aranceles consolidados, notamos que más de dos mil líneas arancelarias siguen todavía sujetas a 
compromisos de reducción, lo cual  esperaríamos que ocurra en el futuro.  
Facilitación de Comercio  
4.60.    Con referencia al tema de Facilitación de Comercio, mi delegación quisiera felicitar a Rusia 
por haber depositado su instrumento de ratificación en abril de este año. Esto, en buena medida, 
es posible gracias a los importantes avances que Rusia ha implementado:  
 El proyecto de Código de Aduanas de la Unión Económica Euroasiática; y  
 El plan de acción de la Comisión Económica Euroasiática para la aplicación de un sistema de 
ventanilla única con  varias etapas, entre otras medidas.  
Facilidad de hacer negocios  
4.61.   Mi delegación quisiera hacer notar los logros obtenidos por Rusia y descritos en el Informe 
Doing Business 2016 del Banco Mundial, a los que otras delegaciones han hecho referencia, en el 
que Rusia mantuvo un envidiable quinto lugar en cumplimiento de contratos; alcanzó el octavo 
lugar en el rubro de registro de la propiedad, el 29 en obtención de electricidad y el 41 en el rubro 
de apertura de negocios.  
4.62.   A pesar de lo anterior, vemos con pre ocupación que Rusia ocupó el lugar 170 de 189 en 
comercio transfronterizo, debido principalmente al número de horas para cumplir con los requisitos 
en la frontera y al número de documentos exigidos. Aunque las autoridades rusas ya han aclarado 
esta situaci ón, quisiéramos alentar a Rusia a continuar simplificando estos trámites, para lo que 
seguramente ayudará la efectiva y pronta implementación del Acuerdo sobre Facilitación del 
Comercio.  
4.63.   De la misma manera, quisiéramos alentar a la Federación Rusa a conti nuar con la 
simplificación regulatoria, a fin de evitar que las empresas del estado distorsionen el mercado, y 
continuar su lucha contra la corrupción.  
Obstáculos en Materia de Tránsito de Mercancías  
4.64.   Por último, quisiera expresar la preocupación sistémica  de mi delegación por las medidas 
que Rusia aplica y que restringen el tránsito de mercancías de productos originarios de otro 
Miembro de la OMC, así como por otras represalias económicas impuestas por Rusia a otros 
Miembros, lo mismo que por las sanciones  aplicadas por determinados Miembros a Rusia, sin 
haber seguido los procedimientos previstos en el Entendimiento sobre Solución de Diferencias de 
esta Organización. En ese sentido, quisiéramos alentar a los Miembros implicados a negociar una 
solución y a n o permitir que conflictos políticos escalen al punto de afectar a otros Miembros de la 
OMC y al sistema multilateral de comercio en su conjunto.  
Cierre  
4.65.   Concluyo mi intervención alentando a Rusia a continuar con su proceso de transición a una 
economía de me rcado y agradeciendo las respuestas a las preguntas que ya fueron formuladas por 
mi delegación.  
CHINA  
4.66.   The Russian Federation became the 156th WTO Member in August 2012. As a fellow 
article  12 Member, China deeply understands the difficulties and challenges  in implementing the 
accession commitments. Therefore, we highly appreciate the tremendous efforts and achievements 
made by Russia to live up to their binding commitments on trade and investment liberalization.  WT/TPR /W/115  • Russian Federation  
 
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  4.67.   Since its accession to the WTO, the Russian Federation has been engaged in creating a 
business friendly environment both for trade and investment. It has established high -tech parks, 
industrial clusters and special economic zones (SEZs) and offered preferential treatments to 
foreign - and domesticall y-funded enterprises therein; it created a market environment for fair 
competition by enabling the Federal Antimonopoly Service of Russia (FAS) to focus on serious 
violations of the Law On the Protection of Competition; and strengthened intellectual proper ty 
enforcement by amending the IP chapters of the Civil Code in 2014 and establishing the 
Intellectual Property Rights Court.  
4.68.   China firmly believes that a rules -based, transparent, non -discriminatory, open and 
inclusive multilateral trading system serves the interests of all. It is important that all the trade 
and investment related measures, including those adopted by some members on Russia should be 
WTO-consistent.  
4.69.   Russia has also actively participated in the negotiations to expand the Information 
Techno logy Agreement, ratified the Trade Facilitation Agreement in April 2016, and started 
negotiations to accede to the Government Procurement Agreement accession. In addition, Russia 
has duly performed its transparency obligations and regularly notified the im plementation of its 
relevant domestic trade policies to the WTO. We also hope that, in the future, Russia may further 
open its market, optimize the investment climate and improve the level of trade facilitation. We 
highly commend all these positive develop ments which have taken place since Russia's Accession 
in 2012.  
4.70.   The Russian Federation and China have a long history of friendly relations. The two 
countries are important trade and investment partners. China is Russia's biggest trading partner 
and the four th biggest source of investment. The bilateral trade between China and Russia has 
generally maintained rapid growth in recent years. In 2014, the bilateral trade volume reached a 
record level of US$95.28 billion. From January to August 2016, the bilateral trade volume was 
USD$44.3 billion, expanded 1% compared with the same period of last year. In terms of 
investment, by the end of 2015, China's cumulative non -financial direct investment in Russia 
reached US$10.03 billion and these investments were mainly d istributed in energy, agriculture, 
forestry, building materials, communications and services, etc.  
4.71.   In recent years, the bilateral economic and trade structure has been further optimized, the 
trade volume of agricultural products has increased, the implemen tation of strategic major 
projects in energy, high -speed rail and cross -border infrastructures has been accelerated, financial 
cooperation has been constantly expanded, and cross -border e -commerce and other new trading 
patterns are also doing well. The Sin o-Russian economic and trade cooperation, with its solid 
foundation, has huge potential and broad prospects.  
4.72.   With the deepening of bilateral economic and trade development between China and Russia, 
Chinese enterprises wish to learn more details of Russian economic and trade policies and 
regulations. We would hereby thank the Russian delegation for their reply to China's questions, 
which we will go through carefully.  
EUROPEAN  UNION  
4.73.   It has escaped nobody's attention that no specific mechanism was created to m onitor the 
Russian Federation's implementation of its commitments (contrary to when the People's Republic 
of China and Vietnam entered this Organization). Today is, therefore, an extremely important 
moment for the life of our Organization.  
4.74.   As many of you will recall, high expectations surrounded the accession of the Russian 
Federation. This review allows us to collectively confront these expectations with reality. It is with 
great regret that we must admit today that in the EU's view, the Russian Federatio n has so far not 
made the best use of the opportunities afforded by its membership, including transforming its 
economy and advancing on its objectives of modernization and innovation. We are concerned that 
instead of continuing the reforms introduced in vi ew of its accession, the Russian Federation has 
moved down the path of import substitution that started the day after the Russian Federation 
joined this Organization.  WT/TPR/W/115  • Russian Federation  
 
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  4.75.   The EU is of the view that this policy, is neither in line with the objectives and princi ples of 
the WTO, nor does it bring any of the benefits claimed. The Russian Federation's economy has not 
been strengthened, it has not acquired new pro -growth impulses, and its exporters have not 
increased their share of international markets. At the same time Russian consumers have not 
received higher quality products and their choices have been narrowed.  
4.76.   The best illustration of this overall situation is the fact that the Russian Federation's trade 
with many of its partners, and not just with the EU, has  shrunk since its WTO accession. Even 
though this reduction has to be examined in a broader context which takes into consideration the 
overall economic situation, including the fall of oil prices and the devaluation of rouble, it is telling 
that compared t o 2014, its trade with China decreased by 30%, with the United States by 29% 
with Japan by 32% in 2015 according to calculations based on Federal Customs Service of Russia 
statistics.  
4.77.   The same trend holds true for trade with the EU. At the time of accessio n, the Russian 
Federation was the EU's third trading partner, now it is its fourth. Its trade with the EU decreased 
by 40% since 2012 and has now reached its lowest level since 2010.  
4.78.   This being said, the Russian Federation remains a key partner for the EU  representing 6% of 
our total trade. For some of our Member States it is even the first external trading partner.  
4.79.   The EU continues to be most important source of FDIs in Russia, despite the fact, that it is 
getting increasingly difficult for the Russian F ederation to attract investment. A dramatic drop in 
FDI flows was recorded between 2013 and 2015, falling from US$69 billion to US$6 billion.  
4.80.   Multiple explanations can be put forward for this phenomenon. There is of course the 
restriction of the sectors w here FDI is allowed. However, more generally, the main factor seems to 
be the lack of predictability of the conditions for doing business, as well as the opaque, ever 
changing legal environment. EU operators complain that this is a real obstacle: legislati on changes 
too often and there is insufficient time for business to be consulted, nor is the legislation 
systematically notified to the relevant WTO committees in a timely manner for consultation. Once 
legislation is adopted, the entry into force does not leave time for operators to adjust (in order to 
implement the changes). The recent requirements regarding cement certification or the good 
manufacturing practices in the area of pharmaceuticals are just two examples among the many 
obstacles and lack of tra nsparency that impede our trade.  
4.81.   There are unfortunately many more. These include the food ban imposed on the EU and a 
large number of restrictive sanitary and phytosanitary measures that the Russian Federation has 
introduced, often without proper risk as sessment and in breach of international standards. Such 
measures have a strong distortive effect on trade in agricultural products.  
4.82.   Then there are the unilateral restrictions on road and railway transit from Ukraine to 
Kazakhstan and to Kyrgyzstan, both WT O Members. Compliance of these measures with WTO rules 
and principles is highly questionable.  
4.83.   All in all, the EU has raised about 110 questions to the Russian Federation, which, taking 
into account that this is the first review since the Federation acceded  the WTO, should be viewed 
as a rather modest figure. We could have raised many more. Apart from the issues already 
mentioned, we raised concerns and clarification questions regarding the role of the State in the 
economy, the modalities of price controls, custom procedures that are not in compliance with 
commitments made during accession, alignment to international standards, IPR enforcement, local 
content requirements and subsidization among many other issues.  
4.84.   The EU very much welcomes this important oppo rtunity for Members to express their views 
regarding the Russian Federation's overall implementation of its WTO commitments, even if in the 
different Committees and in the relevant working groups we have regularly expressed our specific 
trade concerns.  
4.85.   Differences are, of course, a normal occurrence in the WTO but the rapid increase in the 
numbers of formal disputes launched against the Russian Federation provides evidence of the 
problems just highlighted and suggests a worrying trajectory.  WT/TPR /W/115  • Russian Federation  
 
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  4.86.   This being said , the EU hopes that the ratification of the Trade Facilitation Agreement and 
its future entry into force will lead the Russian Federation to adopt more business friendly and 
WTO compliant custom procedures; that the full implementation of the SPS Agreement  will be 
actively promoted and implemented without delays, because it would help to boost agricultural 
trade; and that the Russian Federation's recent notification of its intention to accede to the GPA 
will lead to a fundamental review of its legal framewo rk for government contracting, in particular 
the abolition of the existing discriminations as the current system would not allow for accession.  
4.87.   Before concluding, the EU would like to recall that many of the competences of the Russian 
Federation have now b een transferred to the bodies of the Eurasian Economic Union (e.g. tariffs, 
customs, trade defence measures, SPS and TBT). While this is a fundamental change, it remains 
that the Eurasian Economic Union is bound by the Russian Federation's commitments. In this 
context, it would be useful if the Russian Federation would use this meeting to report (preferably 
in writing) on the implementation of its commitments since its accession taking due account of the 
transfer of competences to the Eurasian Economic Unio n. 
4.88.   The EU strongly supported and actively contributed to the Russian Federation's accession. 
We hope that the Russian Federation now opts for maximizing the benefits of its membership to 
diversify its economy, use fully its comparative advantages and rich endowments and modernize 
its economy in compliance with WTO rules and in full transparency.  
NORWAY  
4.89.   The Russian economy has great potential. The Russian Federation has extensive access to 
arable land, vast oil and gas reserves, a highly educated population and, in several areas, an 
advanced industry.  
4.90.   Since 2013, the Russian economy has experienced slowdown and contraction in real GDP 
growth rates, primarily due to the oil price slump amid insufficient diversification of exports. 
Restrictive measures and sub sequent retaliatory import restrictions imposed by the Russian 
Federation have also played a role. The TPR report from the WTO secretariat points out that the 
economic uncertainty caused by these developments have contributed to capital outflows, a sharp 
decline in the value of the Rouble, and an increase in inflation.  
4.91.   However, the Russian Government's measures to deal with the economic challenges appear 
to contribute to stabilization of the economy. These measures include switching to a floating 
exchange rate regime, fiscal stimulus and an anti -crisis plan aimed at stabilising the banking 
sector. According to the IMF, there will be a 1.8% GDP contraction in 2016, but an expansion in 
2017. In 2015, Russia was Norway's 15th largest source of imports and 20th  largest export 
destination.  
4.92.   Challenges related to corruption, inadequate transparency, uncertainty in the area of rule of 
law, complexity of tax regulations, difficult access to financing, and inadequate respect for 
property rights nevertheless continue to be issues for investors in Russia. To secure continued 
development of the Russian economy, it will be important to build a predictable framework in the 
Russian market for traders and foreign investors, including the independence of the judiciary.  
4.93.   Both R ussia and Norway attach great importance to the multilateral trading system. 
Working to demonstrate the credibility of the WTO and delivering on the outcomes from the 
Ministerial Conference in Nairobi is crucial. We urge Russia to consider membership in IT A II and 
other initiatives like the EGA.  
4.94.   As regards fossil fuels subsidies reform, we would encourage Russia to join other G20 
members in utilizing the G20 peer review process to assist with reform of fossil fuel subsidies as a 
mechanism for reviewing foss il fuel policies.  
4.95.   Russia and Norway are both world leading maritime nations. Our maritime cooperation is 
significant, and we have a shared interest in working for open markets and fair competition in the 
international maritime transport services sector.  WT/TPR/W/115  • Russian Federation  
 
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  4.96.   According to media reports, as well as reports by the International Chamber of Shipping, we 
understand that Russia is debating possible changes to its so -called "Subsoil Law", whereby the 
carriage of Russian "shelf hydrocarbons" might be restricted to Russia n-flagged ships from 2020. 
It is unclear to what extent these changes might apply to international trades in addition to 
cabotage. We believe that such a bill would be contrary to Russian GATS -commitments for 
maritime services, and urge Russia to reconside r.  
4.97.   Russia is one of the largest fishing nations in the world. As neighbours, Norway and Russia 
work together constructively on resource management. We note that Russia has a support 
programme in place, including for construction and reconstruction of fish ing vessels. How is this 
support tempered to not contribute to detrimental overcapacity? We urge the Russian Federation 
to join actively in the WTO negotiations on fisheries subsidies. Already at this TPR, it would be 
beneficial for the membership to hear Russia's general views on this.  
4.98.   Finally, some concerns about seafood. Norway fully recognizes each WTO Member's right to 
set their own appropriate level of protection. From the experiences with inspections of seafood 
enterprises performed in Norway by the  Russian Federation after its accession to the WTO, it is 
Norway's understanding that these inspections do not constitute a system audit of our competent 
authority, but instead target the individual enterprises. This is contrary to the Russian “Regulation 
on common system of joint inspections of objects and sampling goods (products), subject to 
veterinary control (supervision)” that confirms that system audits is the basic approach. We urge 
Russia to apply its own regulation and use systems audits.  
4.99.   The Eur asian Economic Union represents a large market and is an important vehicle for 
economic integration. We appreciate the written answer from the Russian Federation to our 
question on this. However, we would appreciate further clarifications as to whether the  EAEU has 
one common list of enterprises that authorises access to this market or if each member of EAEU 
has its own individual list. If the latter is the case, what are the consequences of discrepancies in 
the individual member countries lists for the cir culation of products in the EAEU?  
4.100.   Finally, we acknowledge Russia's progress, in the current challenging economic 
environment and we look forward to seeing the Russian economy achieve its full potential.  
JAPAN  
4.101.   According to the Secretariat's report, because  of the country's unstable political situation, 
the actual rate of Russia's GDP growth slowed from 2013 to 2014. Then in 2015 as a result of the 
drop in the price of crude oil, Russia's GDP went down again as far as -3.7%.  
4.102.   On top of that, financial sancti ons and countermeasures adopted by Russia led to a rapid 
fall in the value of the rouble, and a rise in the rate of inflation.  
4.103.   Having said that, Japan highly evaluates Russia's measures to liberalize trade, including 
simplification and streamlining of cus toms inspections as well as tax -reduction measures in special 
economic zones.  
4.104.   Since Russia's accession to the WTO in 2012, the country has been steadily reducing its 
rate of customs tariffs. According to the Secretariat's report, in 2016 the average MFN t ariff rate 
on agricultural produce was 14.6%, which represented a reduction in the rate to just slightly 
higher than the final tariff concession rate of 13.6%. Furthermore, the average MFN tariff rate on 
non-agricultural produce was 7.1%, which was below t he final tariff concession rate of 13.6% and 
is helping to promote trade liberalization.  
4.105.   In addition, Japan commends Russia's measures towards greater liberalization of trade, 
including the country's participation in the Information Technology Agreement (I TA) as well as its 
participation as an observer in the Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA).  
4.106.   According to the Secretariat's report, Russia has already concluded RTAs with 10 countries 
and Japan welcomes this active promotion of trade liberalization o n its part. We expect the RTAs 
that Russia has concluded to supplement and contribute to strengthening the multilateral trading 
system.  WT/TPR /W/115  • Russian Federation  
 
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  4.107.   While Japan positively commends Russia on the contributions it has made since joining the 
WTO, we continue to hold some concerns.  
4.108.   To avail of the subsidies that were introduced by Russia this May, namely subsidies for 
after-sales, salary and energy, it is necessary to fulfil strict localization requirements. This has 
made it difficult for some foreign companies to avail of the subsidies. As such, Japan expects 
Russia to provide further information about those requirements, and to also consider relaxing the 
requirements for these subsidies. We believe that this will help to ensure that foreign corporations, 
which are contribu ting to Russia's economy with their high levels of technological expertise, can 
smoothly conduct their business operations.  
4.109.   Reports have been brought to our attention of the following situation in the case of 
corporations based in Turkey. When such corpora tions export produce and production parts to 
Russia, strict customs inspections are being carried out, including inspections of the entire freight. 
Japan expects Russia to ease these kinds of strict inspections, to enable stable production in the 
country.  
4.110.   Japan is also aware of reports that as part of Russia's import substitution policies, 
restrictions have been imposed on government procurement of foreign manufactured goods. We 
understand that Russia plans to engage in negotiations towards joining the Agr eement on 
Government Procurement (GPA). As such, Japan expects Russia to ensure that its government 
procurement related measures are compatible with the GPA.  
4.111.   Lastly, I would like to make some comments on the collection of compensation for the 
proposed mea sures for audiovisual recordings for private use as well as the free reproduction of 
audiovisual works based on Russia's system of collective management of copyright. We are aware 
of a case where, even though imported items consisted of goods for business consumption that are 
not subject to the aforementioned system, a judicial decision was made to impose compensation 
based on the HS codes at time of import. Japan expects Russia to create an appropriate 
competitive environment.  
4.112.   To conclude, Japan stands re ady to work with the Russian Federation, and appreciates the 
opportunity to participate in this review of Russia's trade policy.  
UNITED  STATES  
4.113.   Russia became a Member in 2012 after the longest accession negotiation in WTO history. 
During those 18 years, Ru ssia made numerous changes to its legal regime to be in a position to 
comply with its WTO obligations. It introduced significant market -liberalizing reforms, and spurred 
its evolution from a centrally -planned, extractive -industry -based economy toward a div ersified 
market -driven economy. The United States was enthusiastic about Russia joining the WTO and 
integrating into the global trading system, and anticipated the many benefits to the global trading 
order that would accrue as a result of Russia's WTO memb ership.  
4.114.   During the years since Russia's accession, we have appreciated the efforts of Ambassador 
Ovechko and his team to contribute constructively to our work here in Geneva, including through 
Russia's participation in, and subsequent ratification of, the  Trade Facilitation Agreement. Russia 
has rapidly become a well -established and collaborative member of our community here at the 
WTO.  
4.115.   We have, however, been disappointed to see Russia turning away from the core tenets of 
the WTO, liberal trade, transparen cy, predictability, in favour of inward -looking, 
import -substitution, economic policies. Russia, like most of the world economy, suffered as a result 
of the global recession, and even more acutely by the more recent decline in energy prices. 
However, much of Russia's economic pain is a result of its economic policies. As reflected in the 
written questions submitted by the United States in the context of this TPR, we are greatly 
concerned about the increased reliance on local content and import substitution policies adopted 
by Russia. Moreover, Russia has expanded these import substitution policies to cover its numerous 
state-owned enterprises, which, as the Secretariat's Report notes, remain “significant” in Russia's 
economy. In addition, Russia fails to bas e its sanitary/phytosanitary measures in international 
guidelines, but rather appears to base them on political motivations. While we continue to monitor WT/TPR/W/115  • Russian Federation  
 
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  these policies and call on Russia to ensure they are applied consistent with its obligations, it is 
important to note that these policies undermine the trade liberalizing intent of the WTO.  
4.116.   Another core tenet of the WTO which Russia seems to have moved away from is 
transparency. The Secretariat's report notes that Russia has not met certain notification 
obligations, such as those governing state -trading enterprises and industrial support programmes. 
The United States has asked numerous questions seeking to understand various aspects of 
Russia's trade regime, including its export control regime, industrial development policies, and gas 
exports.  
4.117.   The United States also seeks greater clarity regarding the working of the Eurasian 
Economic Union. As a general matter, the United States does not oppose regional trade 
agreements as such, but we are concerned when su ch arrangements do more to protect certain 
industries than to create incentives to increase trade. The Secretariat's report prompted the United 
States to ask various questions regarding the mechanics of the Eurasian Economic Union – for 
example, the breadt h of its competence, how it develops its trade policies, how it applies different 
tariff levels, and the degree to which the regulatory regimes of the member States are 
harmonized.   
4.118.   Russia's adherence to international standards and its enforcement and pro tection of 
intellectual property rights have also been long -standing concerns for the United States. The 
Secretariat's report notes that Russia is a member of various international organizations in the 
area of food safety but, in the view of the United Sta tes, Russia has often ignored the rules and 
guidelines of those organizations. Concerning intellectual property rights, Russia continues to 
inadequately enforce its own laws, particularly with regard to piracy on the internet.  
4.119.   Being a Member of the WTO bri ngs numerous benefits which, when boiled down to their 
core, are: transparency, predictability and rule of law. However, just as WTO Members receive 
these benefits from other Members, so they must accord those benefits to others. As Russia 
continues to tur n inwards, it misses the opportunities for economic growth and global engagement 
that WTO Membership brings. Furthermore, by ignoring the rules of the international organizations 
to which it is a member, Russia is denying these benefits to others. It's a s ignificant lost 
opportunity.  
4.120.   A TPR, particularly a first one, is, no doubt, a difficult and challenging process, and we 
thank Russia for the seriousness with which it has approached this process. TPRs are a critical 
element in the WTO's transparency missi on. We hope that the Russian representative and his team 
will see today's discussion as an opportunity, not unlike the accession process, to learn from 
others' questions and comments with the goal of improving Russia's trade regime to the mutual 
benefit of  all WTO Members.  
ARGENTINA  
4.121.   La Federación de Rusia reviste mucha importancia para la economía global ocupando, 
efectivamente, el lugar número 10 en el ranking económico mundial. A pesar de las proyecciones 
que indicarían una contracción de la tasa de creci miento de su PBI para 2016, nos contentamos 
con las expectativas de estabilización económica y de crecimiento para 2017.  
4.122.   Asimismo, vemos con agrado los esfuerzos del Gobierno de la Federación que se proponen 
garantizar el desarrollo socio -económico estable  para su país, a partir de, entre otras, acciones 
tendientes a fortalecer el clima de negocios, a promover las inversiones, modernizar la economía, 
fortalecer la competitividad global, creando, de ese modo, condiciones favorables para alcanzar el 
crecimien to económico continuo y el desarrollo sostenible.  
4.123.   En el plano bilateral, no quisiéramos dejar de mencionar que existe un relevante 
intercambio comercial entre ambos países. En el año 2015, el comercio bilateral alcanzó los 
1.151  millones de dólares EE.UU. Las exportaciones argentinas alcanzaron los 472 millones de 
dólares EE.UU. y las importaciones registraron un total de 679 millones de dólares EE.UU.  WT/TPR /W/115  • Russian Federation  
 
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  4.124.   Durante el primer semestre de 2016, el comercio bilateral alcanzó los 454,1 millones de 
dólares EE.UU (sie ndo las exportaciones de 235,7 millones de dólares EE.UU. y las importaciones 
de 218,4 millones de dólares EE.UU.), registrando un saldo comercial favorable para nuestro país.  
4.125.   Al respecto, cabe mencionar que las exportaciones argentinas hacia el mercado ru so están 
concentradas en productos agrícolas, mayormente frutas (peras, manzanas, mandarinas, limones), 
carne bovina congelada, aviar, caballar y lácteos. Las importaciones están constituidas por gasoil 
y, en menor medida, por abonos (fosfatos, urea) y bie nes de capital. En particular, durante el año 
2015, se destacan laminados planos, azufre, papel y cartón, y también papel prensa.  
4.126.   Son dignas de mención, además, varias iniciativas de cooperación en materia de energía 
hidroeléctrica (la Federación Rusa tien e una importante participación al proyecto de la central 
hidroeléctrica Chihuido en la provincia argentina del Neuquén), agricultura, pesca, acuicultura, 
minería, entre otros sectores. También se encuentran vigentes, entre otros, un Convenio para 
evitar la  Doble Imposición en materia de Impuestos sobre la Renta y sobre el Capital.  
4.127.   Creemos, en virtud de ello, que existe potencial para el crecimiento y la diversificación de 
la relación comercial bilateral, fortaleciendo lazos económicos y de cooperación para beneficio 
mutuo.  
4.128.   Finalizando, y al tiempo de reiterar nuestro reconocimiento por esta nueva oportunidad de 
intercambiar elementos de juicio y consideraciones sobre las políticas y prácticas comerciales de la 
Federación de Rusia, permítanos señalar, una vez  más, la relevancia de este ejercicio de 
transparencia en todos sus aspectos y desear a las autoridades rusas la exitosa conclusión de este 
primer examen de su política comercial.  
UKRAINE  
4.129.   The Ukrainian delegation welcomes the first Trade Policy Review of t he Russian Federation. 
Ukraine believes this multilateral review is vitally needed as policies and practices adopted by the 
Russian Federation in recent years raised concerns of the WTO Members.  
4.130.   The Russian Federation was once Ukraine's largest trade partn er. In 2012, its share in 
Ukraine's overall trade in goods amounted to about 30%. It accounted for over 25% of Ukraine's 
total exports.  
4.131.   Ukraine welcomed the Russian Federation's accession to the WTO because we expected 
adherence to international trade rul es and principles and transparent application of the WTO 
Agreements. We also expected the Russian Federation's WTO membership would further 
contribute to the development of a rules -based multilateral trading system.  
4.132.   Ukraine always believed that rules must be respected.  
4.133.   Unfortunately, numerous policies and practices adopted by the Russian Federation in 
recent years do not exemplify the predictability, transparency, and consistency with the WTO 
Agreement that is expected of WTO Members.  
4.134.   Although previously U krainian products encountered occasional trade barriers to enter the 
Russian market, access to this market has considerably deteriorated since 2014. The Russian 
Federation has de facto introduced an intensive economic pressure in its aggression towards 
Ukraine. 
4.135.   Initially, during 2014 -2015, the Russian Federation's restrictive trade measures targeted 
certain Ukrainian goods (confectionery, dairy produce, juices, beer, wallpaper, railway equipment, 
etc.). The Russian Federation banned imports of these goods o n the pretext of the alleged non -
compliance with labelling, hygiene or safety requirements.  
4.136.   After the initial wave of trade restrictive measures, dozens more products that had been 
exported to the Russian market for years and decades – and that are curren tly being supplied 
without any problems to a wide range of international partners – have allegedly also been found to 
be in violation of Russian TBT and/or SPS requirements.  WT/TPR/W/115  • Russian Federation  
 
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  4.137.   Transparency simply has not existed. Despite repeated requests, the Russian Feder ation 
has not provided, either our traders or our Government, any information (such as the results of 
tests, findings of examinations that were allegedly conducted by Russian authorities), which could 
justify the imposition of these discriminatory measures . It is quite disappointing that the Russian 
Federation constantly disregards these critical transparency provisions of the WTO agreements.  
4.138.   As a result of these trade restrictive measures, the Russian Federation's share in Ukraine's 
overall trade in goods dropped to about 16% in 2015. Ukrainian -Russian trade decreased from 
US$45 billion in 2012 to US$12.3 billion in 2015. The Russian Federation's share in Ukrainian 
exports decreased to 12% in 2015 and amounted to about 9% in the first half of 2016. Exports of 
juices dropped from US$72.7 million in 2013 to US$0.8 million in 2015 ( -98.8%). Exports of 
railway locomotives, wagons and parts thereof decreased from US$1.7 billion in 2013 to 
US$110  million in 2015 ( -93.7%).  
4.139.   1 January 2016 marked the beginning of ano ther phase of the economic pressure. From 
that date, the Russian  Federation : 
 unilaterally suspended the CIS Free Trade Agreement with respect to Ukraine;  
 banned imports of agricultural products, raw materials and foodstuffs originating in Ukraine 
(the food  embargo); and  
 imposed restrictions on traffic in transit from Ukraine to the Republic of Kazakhstan via the 
territory of Russia until 1 July 2016.  
4.140.   Further escalation of the economic pressure took place on 3 July 2016. The Russian 
Federation extended the restrictions on traffic in transit until 31 December 2017 and:  
 expanded restrictions to transit of goods from Ukraine to the Kyrgyz Republic via the 
territory of the Russian Federation;  
 banned the transit of goods via the territory of the Russian Federatio n, which are subject to 
the food embargo; and  
 prohibited the transit of goods subject to the tariff rates higher than zero under the Eurasian 
Economic Union's Customs Tariff (about 85% of tariff lines are subject to the rates 
exceeding 0%).  
4.141.   Collectively, these measures impose a practical prohibition on transit of the majority of 
goods from Ukraine via the territory of the Russian Federation to countries of Central and Eastern 
Asia and the Caucasus. Ukraine believes that these measures represent a flagrant violation of WTO 
rules, in particular, Article V of the GATT 1994. As a result of these restrictions, Ukrainian exports 
to countries of Central and Eastern Asia and the Caucasus decreased by 35% in 
January -June 2016. Exports to Kazakhstan fell 45.5% in the  first half of this year.  
4.142.   It is worth highlighting on the transit measures, that in April 2016, the Russian Federation 
presented its instrument of acceptance of the WTO Agreement on Trade Facilitation aiming, inter 
alia, at clarifying and improving releva nt transit (Article V) and transparency (Article X) provisions 
of the GATT 1994 “with a view to further expediting the movement, release and clearance of 
goods, including goods in transit”. We expect to see this implemented in practice as well as spirit 
for all WTO Members.  
4.143.   To illustrate the unpredictability of trading conditions and the non -transparency of Russian 
trade measures we draw attention to one particular example. Ukraine was one of the largest 
suppliers of edible salt to Russia. In early 2015, t he Russian Federation banned the import of this 
product supplied by a major Ukrainian producer due to alleged non -compliance with requirements 
concerning purity, iodine content, and organoleptic parameters. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian producer 
held valid cert ificates issued by accredited conformity assessment bodies in the Russian 
Federation. Despite repeated requests, Russian authorities have not provided any findings 
regarding the alleged tests conducted on this product. As a result of the prohibition, Ukrai nian 
exports of edible salt to Russia decreased from US$22.2 million (390.7 thousand tonnes) in 2014 WT/TPR /W/115  • Russian Federation  
 
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  to US$1.7 million (33.5 thousand tonnes) in 2015. After a short respite in this policy, on 
10 September 2016, the Russian Federation included salt in the l ist of products subject to the food 
embargo. That policy will enter into force on 1 November 2016. Multiple, ever -changing measures, 
all absent the necessary transparent underpinnings, have and continue to dislocate and disrupt 
trade.  
4.144.   Taking this opportuni ty, the Ukrainian delegation would like to call on the Russian 
Federation again to take the necessary actions to eliminate the restrictions on traffic in transit 
from the territory of Ukraine through the territory of the Russian Federation to third countri es.  
4.145.   In addition to the aforementioned issues, Ukraine has also posed a number of questions 
concerning technical regulations, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, customs requirements, 
domestic support, and anti -dumping measures, among other policy areas. Unfortunately, the 
non-responsive answers provided by the Russian Federation can hardly be considered adequate, 
especially given the wide effect on Ukraine and other Members' trade.  
4.146.   We urge the Russian Federation to respect WTO rules. Pacta sunt servanda.  
THE SEPARATE  CUSTOMS  TERRITORY  OF TAIWAN,  PENGHU,  KINMEN  AND  MATSU  
4.147.   The Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu recognizes many 
external challenges that Russian Federation's economy has to face. The reforms implemented by 
the Russian Federation in the past few years, however, are encouraging, and will hopefully lead to 
further integration into the global economy, more trade policy liberalization and diversification of 
trade relations, as well as greater transparency in the policy -makin g process.  
4.148.   Russian Federation's efforts at streamlining regulations are very welcome, especially in the 
areas of customs procedure, establishing single -window and etc. They should produce a more 
favourable business environment, which in turn will attract a  greater amount of foreign 
investment.  
4.149.   We were pleased to see, as well, that the Russian Federation submitted its letter of 
acceptance of the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement on 22 April 2016, contributing to our joint 
efforts to accelerate the entry into force of the Agreement. We commend the Russian Federation 
for undertaking the steps necessary to ratify this important agreement. We also encourage the 
Russian Federation to move forward on important WTO initiatives and commitments, including 
continuing it s accession to the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement.  
4.150.   Since acceding to the WTO membership in 2012, the delegation of the Russian Federation 
under the excellent leadership of H.E. Mr. Ambassador Gennady Ovechko, has played an active 
role in the DDA n egotiations and, as a fellow -member of the Article XII Group, we expect to 
engage closely together in the negotiations that lie ahead.  
4.151.   On trade policy, in advance, we submitted several questions to the Russian Federation 
covering, among other areas, mining  and energy, and intellectual property rights. We thank the 
Russian Federation for its response and we shall study it with great interest. There are just a few 
specific points, though, that I wish to mention here, if I may.  
4.152.   Needless to say, the Russian Fed eration's most important trade policy initiative is probably 
the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). We hope that such process contributes to the Russian 
Federation's development, without creating trade barriers or trade diversion to other Members.  
4.153.   Nevertheles s, while the Russian Federation has clearly demonstrated its commitment to 
open trade, some concerns do remain in the context of this TPR. We note, for example, from the 
Secretariat's report, that, in the area of state -owned enterprises (SOEs), "some of th e large SOEs 
occupy a dominant position in key sectors…". We note that the Russian Government is taking steps 
to improve corporate governance and privatize SOEs to increase productivity, competition and 
efficiency. We would therefor encourage the Russian F ederation to adopt the necessary reforms in 
order to guarantee the transparency of the related procedures and promote competition, which 
would not only open up more opportunities for foreign investment, but could also help promote 
diversity.  WT/TPR/W/115  • Russian Federation  
 
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  4.154.   On the bilater al front, I am pleased to say that trade between the Russian Federation and 
us has steadily increased since 2007. Bilateral two -way goods trade between the Russian 
Federation and us rose steadily from just over US$2.7 billion in 2007 to around US$5 billion  in 
2015, covering products such as steel products, machinery, coal and natural gas. But, potential 
certainly exists to increase and diversify our bilateral trade, not only in goods, but also in services 
and investments if we can identify the greater compl ementarity of our trading sectors.  
4.155.   In closing, I would like to express the hope that the Russian Federation continues to 
benefit from the foundations it is building through its own efforts, and that it finds constructive 
support and feedback from fellow WT O Members in this, its first Trade Policy Review. We strongly 
encourage the Russian Federation to hold firm to its strategy of economic and trade policy 
reforms.  
COSTA  RICA 
4.156.   La Federación de Rusia es un actor importante dentro del comercio mundial.  
Conside ramos, por ende, que su adhesión a la OMC en el 2012 ha sido valiosa y que influirá 
positivamente en las reformas que la Federación Rusa ha comenzado a implementar como parte 
de este proceso de integración económica global.   
4.157.   Las reformas introducidas a su s regímenes de competencia y de contratación pública así 
como las mejoras introducidas a su legislación sobre observancia de los derechos de propiedad 
intelectual son sólo algunos de los cambios que le permitirán a la Federación Rusa una mayor 
adaptación y  modernización de su economía.   
4.158.   Las mejoras en su régimen de administración aduanera, incluyendo la reciente ratificación 
del Acuerdo sobre Facilitación de Comercio representan también avances importantes.  
4.159.   Coincidimos con la Federación de Rusia en que la inversión extranjera, la transferencia de 
tecnología y la innovación son esenciales en este proceso.  En consecuencia, esperamos con 
interés los avances que sobre estos temas pueda presentar en los próximos años la “Estrategia 
para un Desarrollo Innovador de la Federación de Rusia 2020”  
4.160.   A pesar de que la adhesión de la Federación de Rusia a la OMC es todavía reciente, ya se 
comienzan a percibir los efectos positivos de su incorporación al sistema multilateral del comercio. 
Esto se ve reflejado en las mejora s en rankings como el Doing Business del Banco Mundial (2016) 
y el Índice de Competitividad Global del Foro Económico Mundial (2015 -2016), en los cuáles la 
Federación Rusa ha venido escalando posiciones desde el año 2012.   
4.161.   No obstante, todavía hay retos i mportantes que se deben afrontar.   
4.162.   El ingreso de la Federación Rusa a la OMC ha coincidido con un período de fuerte 
inestabilidad económica causada por una variedad de factores, entre los que destacan el desplome 
de los precios del petróleo, la insuficien te diversificación de las exportaciones y las sanciones 
económicas que ha enfrentado por parte de algunos países.   
4.163.   Esta situación ha provocado problemas tales como una fuerte devaluación del rublo, 
salidas de capital y un incremento en la inflación.   
4.164.   Las perspectivas de crecimiento son más positivas para los próximos años según las 
proyecciones del Fondo Monetario Internacional, pero podrían ser mejores si la Federación Rusa 
alienta una mejor gobernanza, acelera las reformas estructurales requeridas para atacar las 
distorsiones de su economía y genera un mejor clima de inversión.  
4.165.   La diversificación de la economía ha sido señalada como una de las prioridades 
fundamentales de la Federación de Rusia para afrontar estos retos. Nos complace observar como 
la Fed eración rusa se ha propuesto disminuir su dependencia energética a través de una serie de 
medidas, entre las cuales destacamos el fomento de energías renovables. Sería interesante 
conocer si dentro de sus políticas energéticas, la Federación de Rusia está considerando reformas 
a los programas de subsidios a los combustibles fósiles.  WT/TPR /W/115  • Russian Federation  
 
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  4.166.   En el marco de este examen de políticas comerciales, Costa Rica presentó un conjunto de 
preguntas relacionadas con su régimen de servicios, inversiones y propiedad intelectual. Quisiera 
agradecer la atención brindada a estas preguntas y concluir mi intervención deseándole a la 
Federación de Rusia muchos éxitos en su primer examen de políticas comerciales.  
INDIA  
4.167.   According to the Secretariat's report, the global economic crisis of 2008-09 caused a 
contraction of 7.8% in the real GDP of the Russian Federation in 2009, but it rebounded with 
annual growth rates of 4.1% on average over the period 2010 -12. Since then, real GDP growth 
rates slowed to 1.3% and 0.7% in 2013 and 2014, respec tively, while it contracted by 3.7% in 
2015. The main cause for this significant fall in GDP growth was the oil price slump amid slow 
structural reforms, weak investment, and adverse population dynamics which are affecting 
potential growth. We have noted t hat according to the IMF, the Russian Federation is on a 
stabilization course; it expects GDP growth to contract by 1.8% in 2016 and to grow by 0.8% in 
2017.  
4.168.   We would like to commend the Russian Federation for moving several places, 51st place 
(out of 189)  in 2016 from being ranked 120th (out of 183) in 2012 in the World Bank's ease of 
Doing Business rating. We also appreciate the Russian Federation for taking steps for facilitating 
trade in Goods.  
4.169.   We have noted that the establishment of the Eurasian Econo mic Union aims at creation of 
a single market for goods services, capital and labour within the union. It would also spur growth, 
enhance modernisation and competitiveness of the economies.  
4.170.   India and Russian Federation share multifaceted and long -standing ties rooted in history. 
Since the signing of “Declaration on the India -Russia Strategic Partnership” in October 2000, 
India-Russia ties have acquired a qualitatively new character with enhanced levels of cooperation 
in almost all areas of the bilateral rel ationship including economic, trade and investment areas. 
There has been a regular exchange of visits at the highest levels, including Annual Summit 
meeting between the Prime Minister of India and the President of the Russian Federation. India 
and Russian Federation are also partners under the BRICS framework and are working together on 
a variety of issues such as global governance and sustainable development.  
4.171.   In 2015, bilateral trade amounted to US$6.83 billion, with Russian exports to India 
amounting US$4 .17 billion and Indian exports to Russia amounting US$2.66 billion. The 
cumulative Indian investment between the years 2000 to 2014 in Russia are estimated to be about 
US$8 billion, while Russian investments in India are about US$3 billion. During the annu al summit 
held in December 2015, both sides have highlighted the importance of further enhancing trade and 
economic cooperation and have reiterated the commitment to increase the bilateral trade to 
US$30 billion by 2025 and the bilateral investment each wa y to US$15 billion by 2025. India is 
keen to engage more closely with Russia and the CIS countries to further intensify trade and 
economic cooperation with this region.  
4.172.   Both sides have enhanced cooperation to promote trade in the area of dairy products an d 
Bovine meat. India has submitted a number of questions and we thank the Russian delegation for 
the replies provided. The prices of the essential drugs exported to Russia is capped at the rate of 
first supply from India (fixed in year 2010). Subsequent pr ice revision of these products have been 
allowed to local companies on proven justification on account of increase in cost of manufacturing, 
transportation and other incidentals. However the same is not applicable to products imported into 
Russia from Indi a in spite of proven justification in increase of cost of production. We would like to 
seek a clarification from the Russian Federation regarding this.  
4.173.   To conclude, we look forward to working with the authorities of the Russian Federation in 
further expand ing our trade and investment ties for mutual benefit. We wish the delegation of the 
Russian Federation a productive and successful TPR.  WT/TPR/W/115  • Russian Federation  
 
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  CHILE  
4.174.   Para este ejercicio hemos formulado nueve consultas, y agradecemos las respuestas 
recibidas sobre los diversos te mas que consultamos, entre ellos: la formulación de su política 
comercial, los Acuerdos Comerciales que ha firmado la Unión Económica Euroasiática, inversión 
extranjera, medidas antidumping y empresas comerciales del estado.  
4.175.   Desde el restablecimiento de la s relaciones diplomáticas con la Federación de Rusia, a 
inicios de los años 90, tres presidentes de la República de Chile han visitado dicho país. Por su 
parte, el Presidente de la Federación de Rusia visitó Santiago en el año 2004, con motivo de la 
Cumbre  de APEC, Foro donde ambos somos economías miembros.  
4.176.   Rusia es un socio relevante para Chile. Nuestra relación bilateral se va consolidando 
progresivamente mediante diversos convenios, consultas políticas regulares, cooperación en 
materias de defensa, cienc ia y tecnología, así como nuestra común pertenencia a distintas 
instancias multilaterales del sistema comercial.  
4.177.   Nuestro intercambio comercial ha tenido un crecimiento del 13% durante los últimos seis 
años, alcanzando en 2015 los 664 millones de dólares EE .UU., con una balanza favorable para 
nuestro país. No obstante, nuestras exportaciones a la Federación han disminuido en el último 
tiempo, y el volumen del intercambio no refleja todavía la magnitud del mercado de la Federación 
y por lo tanto existe un amp lio espacio para el crecimiento de nuestros envíos y en general del 
comercio recíproco.  
4.178.   Rusia es un mercado importante para los envíos chilenos de pescado congelado, carne de 
cerdo congelada, uvas frescas, frutos secos, vino y productos procesados derivado s de la fruta, 
como las pastas y purés de fruta y mermeladas, productos para los cuales Chile espera recuperar 
el nivel de crecimiento de los envíos.  
4.179.   En un contexto de promoción de nuestras relaciones económicas, valoramos fuertemente 
la conformación de lo s Consejos Empresariales entre nuestros países.  
4.180.   Hace algunos años, Rusia puso en marcha un Consejo Empresarial Ruso -Chileno, pero 
faltaba constituir un Consejo Empresarial Chileno -Ruso como su contraparte en Santiago, lo que se 
logró en 2013, el que ha ent rado en contacto con su homólogo en Moscú, estimulando las 
actividades económico -comerciales. Ambos Consejos se encuentran en funciones, sumándose al 
trabajo que realiza en Rusia el Comité Nacional para la Colaboración Económica con los Países de 
América L atina (CN -CEPLA).  
4.181.   En un contexto más amplio, Chile ha manifestado su interés por avanzar en una agenda 
comercial con la Unión Económica Euroasiática (UEE). Una expresión concreta de esta voluntad, es 
la misión público -privada que, encabezada por nuestro Vi ceministro de Relaciones Económicas 
Internacionales, se encuentra actualmente realizando una visita de trabajo en Rusia, Kazajstán y 
Bielorrusia.  
4.182.   En el marco de esa visita se firmará un memorándum de colaboración científica y 
tecnológica entre el Instituto  de Investigaciones Agropecuarias de Chile y el Instituto de 
Investigaciones Científicas de Horticultura y Viticultura del Cáucaso del Norte, orientado 
especialmente a fortalecer la horticultura y viticultura de ambos países.  
4.183.   Con respecto al informe presen tado, observamos que Rusia ha avanzado hacia una 
economía orientada al exterior. La liberalización del comercio y la inversión, impulsada por los 
compromisos contraídos en el marco de la adhesión a la OMC, y la entrada en vigor el 1° de enero 
de 2015 del T ratado por el que se establece la Unión Económica Euroasiática (UEEA), han sido 
hitos importantes en este proceso.  
4.184.   Sin embargo, también se observa que el Estado sigue desempeñando un papel 
fundamental para la economía rusa y, pese a que el número de empres as públicas ha disminuido 
recientemente, estas siguen representando alrededor de la mitad del PIB.  WT/TPR /W/115  • Russian Federation  
 
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  4.185.   Entendemos que las autoridades rusas están tomando medidas para mejorar la gestión 
empresarial, a fin de aumentar la productividad, la competencia y la efici encia; sin embargo, tal 
como se menciona en el informe, la mayor parte del programa de privatización de empresas 
públicas del período 2014 -2016 se ha pospuesto.  
4.186.   Nos parece muy relevante y una muestra de compromiso con el sistema, que Rusia haya 
ratificado el Tratado de Facilitación de Comercio en abril del presente año.  
4.187.   Vemos con interés que Rusia ha estado tomando medidas para mejorar las operaciones 
aduaneras y la eficiencia en el proceso de importación y exportación. Asimismo, la Comisión 
Económica Euroa siática está desarrollando las bases de un mecanismo de ventanilla única para 
avanzar en estas materias, entre otras medidas.  
4.188.   Del informe concluimos que la adhesión de Rusia a la OMC ha significado un avance en 
reformas de política comercial y que, en el l argo plazo, la aplicación coherente y decidida de éstas 
contribuirá a que la economía rusa materialice su verdadero potencial, tal como lo expresa la 
Secretaría.  
PERÚ  
4.189.   El Perú saluda los esfuerzos desplegados por el Gobierno de Rusia en el ámbito económico 
para hacer frente al contexto adverso e incierto de los últimos años. En ese sentido, cabe resaltar 
la creación de la Unión Económica Euroasiática como un espacio que promueve el comercio 
regional y el desarrollo económico de los países que la componen; as í como las medidas para 
mejorar las operaciones aduaneras que viene llevando a cabo la Comisión Económica Euroasiática, 
que han llevado al diseño de un mecanismos de ventanilla única para simplificar los trámites 
aduaneros. De igual modo, el Perú hace voto s por que la economía de Rusia retome la senda del 
crecimiento, objetivo para el cual el Perú es un socio de gran potencial.  
4.190.   El alto grado de cooperación entre el Perú y la Federación de Rusia ha quedado elevado a 
un nivel de asociación estratégica median te la firma en noviembre  2015 de un acuerdo para este 
propósito. Dicho acuerdo ha abierto las puertas para ampliar la cooperación a niveles aún 
mayores, específicamente en los campos de la energía y la ingeniería. De igual manera, como 
parte de las excele ntes relaciones políticas entre el Perú y Rusia, ambos Estados cuentan ya con 
una serie de acuerdos para fomentar el intercambio en materia de protección del medio ambiente, 
la defensa, la energía nuclear, la cultura y el deporte, etc. En lo que se refiere  a la relación 
comercial entre ambos países, se ha desarrollado activamente y presenta buenas perspectivas. El 
intercambio comercial entre Rusia y Perú ha aumentado 7 veces en los últimos 10 años, superando 
los 500 millones de dólares EE.UU. en 2013. No ob stante, existe actualmente un desbalance 
comercial importante en favor de la Federación de Rusia, situación para la cual el Perú está 
dispuesto a trabajar para diversificar y equilibrar las exportaciones en ambos sentidos.  
4.191.   El Perú ha formulado algunas inte rrogantes sobre la base del contenido de los informes 
preparados para el presente examen. En este sentido, hemos planteado preguntas sobre los 
alcances del Fondo de Intervención para estabilizar los precios de algunos productos en el mercado 
interno de Rus ia. Asimismo, el Perú ha solicitado mayor detalle con respecto a las funciones, 
autoridades y procedimientos dentro de la Unión Económica Euroasiática, en particular, con 
relación a la toma de decisiones en materia de antidumping y salvaguardias. De igual manera, 
hemos expresado nuestra inquietud por conocer el grado de implementación de Rusia con respecto 
a sus compromisos comerciales relativos a los productos pesqueros. Entre ellos, el Perú ha 
expresado su preocupación por la política de la Federación de Rusia de entregar subsidios a las 
organizaciones pesqueras, subsidios que los Objetivos de Desarrollo Sostenible buscan prohibir en 
tanto pueden afectar la sostenibilidad del ecosistema marino.  
4.192.   El Perú agradece a la Federación de Rusia por sus respuestas,  las cuales serán analizadas 
con detenimiento. Asimismo,  les deseamos muchos éxitos en este su primer Examen de Políticas 
Comerciales.  
INDONESIA  
4.193.   Indonesia associates itself with the ASEAN statement made by the Malaysian Ambassador.  WT/TPR/W/115  • Russian Federation  
 
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  4.194.   In light of the trade p olicy review which we are commencing today, Indonesia notes with 
positivity that Russia has coped well with economic turbulence during the period under review 
(2012 -2016) – characterized by strong capital outflows, a sharp decline in the value of the Roubl e, 
and an increased inflation. Indonesia commends the steady exit of Russia's economy from a state 
of recession to an expected GDP growth of 0.8% in 2017 – according to the IMF.  
4.195.   This positive growth forecast is a tribute to Russia's economic reform commitm ent, to 
continuously transform its, then, centrally -planned economy to a market -oriented one; which 
entices liberalizing its trade and investment regimes, consistent with Russia's commitments taken 
during its accession to the WTO just over four years ago i n August of 2012.  
4.196.   Indonesia shares Russia's experience in the need to diversify exports. Indonesia 
commends the strong role of Russia in promoting trade and investment liberalization through 
regional, sub -regional, and bilateral co -operations.  
4.197.   Some similar ities in our trade strategies and experiences – as they relate to our respective 
national development plans – are the basis to some of the questions that Indonesia has posed to 
Russia. These questions merit transparent answers, especially for its imbedded experience -sharing 
values.   
4.198.   As such, Indonesia sees Russia not only as one of the largest economies and trading 
entities in the world, but also as one of Indonesia's few strategic partners. Through Russia's 
development experiences, Russia plays a critical  role in the multilateral trading system, including 
in negotiations on the remaining DDA issues.  
4.199.   A strategic partnership between Indonesia and Russia entails a mutually -beneficial bilateral 
trade relationship, mutually beneficial independent of the prevail ing macro -economic conditions of 
the Russian Federation. And such describes Indonesia's ties with the Russian Federation.  
4.200.   Although the average growth of bilateral trade value in goods and commodities has shown 
a decrease of 3.2% between 2011 to 2015, the Russian people and industry still enjoy, among 
others, palm oil, electrical machineries, coffee beans, rubber, cocoa, and coconut oil. In return, 
Indonesia remains customer, among others, to Russian oil and gas, iron and aluminium alloys, 
potassium chlorid e, aeronautic products, asbestos, and diesel fuel.  
4.201.   Aside from the strong and positive economic ties between Indonesia and Russia, we do 
find some trade and trade -related barriers that have become Indonesia's concerns, such as import 
measures related to pal m oil and fishery products. We believe that through this Trade Policy 
Review, those issues can be addressed. We have submitted a number of questions related to our 
concerns on Russia's trade policies and practices, and we thank the Russian Federation for s ome 
written responses. We will look into them and conduct a further study on them. In the meantime, 
we look forward to receiving the remaining answers to our questions, which was submitted as 
additional questions.  
4.202.   Indonesia believes that Russia will respec t the wide -ranging commitments on market 
access for goods, services, and elsewhere made during its accession to the WTO.  
4.203.   Finally, I would like to conclude my remarks by expressing once again my profound 
appreciation to Russia's delegation – and Ambassador Gennady Ovechko, Permanent 
Representative of the Russian Federation to the WTO – for their hard work, and wish Russia every 
success in its first Trade Policy Review. I look forward to working further with you Ambassador 
Ovechko.  
COLOMBIA  
4.204.   Felicitamos a Rusi a por la realización hoy de su primer examen de las políticas 
comerciales, luego de que en el 2012 se convirtiera en el Miembro 156 de esta Organización. A 
partir del momento de su ingreso a la OMC, este Miembro ha logrado un gran proceso de reforma 
para c onvertirse en una economía orientada hacia el exterior, mediante la liberalización del 
comercio y las inversiones.  WT/TPR /W/115  • Russian Federation  
 
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  4.205.   La relevancia de la economía rusa para el mundo se refleja en su posición como la décima 
de mayor tamaño, el 7a exportador mundial y el 11o importador, el segundo productor mundial de 
petróleo y gas, y el cuarto productor de electricidad, entre otros. Lo que lo hace un jugador muy 
importante en el contexto multilateral y merece un estudio cuidadoso el impacto del desarrollo de 
su política comer cial. 
4.206.   Según el reporte de la Secretaría, la insuficiente diversificación de las exportaciones rusas, 
la fuerte disminución de las reservas internacionales, el aumento de la inflación y la depreciación 
del tipo de cambio, hicieron esta economía dependiente y vulnerable ante el contexto 
internacional.  
4.207.   El crecimiento económico ha sido moderado a partir del 2013 y según el Foro Económico 
Mundial, se espera que esta situación mejore y se estabilice, una vez se vean los resultados del 
plan anti -crisis. La estabil ización del sector bancario, el tipo de cambio flotante, los estímulos 
fiscales y la reducción de la intervención estatal, son los componentes del plan de reactivación 
económica, que se espera mejore el clima de inversión y permita diversificar su oferta e xportable.  
4.208.   En relación con los temas del ámbito multilateral objeto de este examen, abonamos los 
esfuerzos que ha venido realizando Rusia para facilitar las operaciones comerciales mediante la 
automatización de trámites aduaneros e implementación de la ven tanilla única, la adecuación de 
sus normas de propiedad intelectual, la privatización de las empresas comerciales del estado y las 
mejoras en el sistema de contratación pública.  
4.209.   Destacamos el activo compromiso con las negociaciones, el cumplimiento de sus 
compromisos en materia de transparencia a través de las notificaciones, la ratificación del Acuerdo 
de Facilitación del Comercio, la participación en el Acuerdo ITA, así como la condición de 
observador del Acuerdo de Contratación Pública de la OMC.  
4.210.   No obst ante, notamos que el uso recurrente de medidas antidumping, salvaguardias, 
sanitarias y fitosanitarias, de tránsito y limitaciones para las importaciones de productos agrícolas 
y alimenticios, han sido objeto de preocupación en la OMC. Esperamos la pronta notificación de 
sus empresas comerciales del estado.  
4.211.   Finalmente, en cuanto a la relación bilateral, destacamos que el flujo comercial alcanzó, en 
el 2015, 464 millones de dólares EE.UU. predominado por las exportaciones colombianas de rosas 
y carne bovina y la importación de cloruro de potasio y nitrato de amonio. Al ser un importante 
jugador mundial, resaltamos nuestro interés por continuar profundizando y diversificando esta 
relación comercial, así como los flujos de inversión.  
4.212.   Esperamos que las reformas emprendidas por el Gobierno ruso, a través de un régimen 
comercial liberal, la modernización y diversificación de su economía, la reducción de la 
participación estatal y la mejora del entorno empresarial, permitan que retome la senda de 
crecimiento.  
4.213.   Deseam os a la distinguida delegación rusa muchos éxitos en el desarrollo de éste su 
primer examen de política comercial y agradecemos la respuesta a las preguntas formuladas por 
nuestro país.  
HONG  KONG,  CHINA  
4.214.   Hong Kong, China and the Russian Federation have enjo yed steady and mutually beneficial 
trade relations. We value the Russian Federation as an important trading partner. Our total 
bilateral merchandise trade amounted to US$2.4 billion last year, and in 2014, our total bilateral 
services trade amounted to US$ 479 million.  
Trade facilitation  
4.215.   Since its accession to the WTO, the Russian Federation has made commendable efforts in 
improving its customs operations. This is done through an action plan, with a series of measures to 
simplify customs procedures and impro ve efficiency. These measures have significantly reduced 
the average time for import clearance. We also welcome the unified information platform, Seaport WT/TPR/W/115  • Russian Federation  
 
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  Portal, which is being implemented as an electronic single window for handling and processing 
cargo at  Russian seaports.  
4.216.   We are pleased to note that the Russian Federation has deposited the instrument of 
acceptance of the Agreement on Trade Facilitation, contributing to our joint efforts to accelerate 
the entry into force of the Agreement.  
State Trading an d Services  
4.217.   State -owned enterprises (SOEs) continue to play a significant role in the Russian economy. 
Despite a decline in the number of SOEs over the last few years, they still account for about half of 
Russia's GDP. In particular, we note that SOEs are h eavily involved in key service sectors such as 
banking, transport and energy. As a services -oriented economy, Hong Kong, China, firmly believes 
that services liberalisation would induce economic growth. We therefore encourage the Russian 
Federation to furt her liberalise its trade regime for foreign investment.  
4.218.   Some SOEs also face governance issues that undermine productivity, and while 
privatisations have taken place, the overall programme was delayed because of unfavourable 
market situation. We encourage t he Russian Federation to expedite reforms in these areas.  
4.219.   At the same time, we note that the Russian Federation had not made any notification to 
the WTO on state -trading enterprises and we encourage the Russian Federation to ensure 
compliance of WTO notifi cation requirements.  
Tariffs  
4.220.   Turning to tariffs, we note that the Russian Federation has a complex tariff structure 
comprising ad valorem duty and non -ad valorem  duty. Upon its accession to the WTO in 2012, the 
Russian Federation has bound all of its tarif f lines and committed to phase in its tariff reductions 
within eight years by 2020. It is commendable that the simple average rate of its applied MFN 
tariff has been reduced from 11.0% in 2012 to 8.3% in 2016, which is lower than the simple 
average final b ound tariff of 8.4%.  
4.221.   However, more than 1,700 tariff lines at the 10 -digit level still carry non -ad valorem  
duties. For some tariff lines, applied MFN tariffs may exceed their bound tariffs because the applied 
tariffs are ad valorem but not less than thei r specific duties, while bound tariffs are ad valorem  
only. Moreover, Russia's tariff shows tariff escalation with the simple average of 6.1% on products 
at the first stage of processing, 6.7% for semi -processed products, and 9.5% for fully processed 
produ cts. We encourage the Russian Federation to improve these aspects with a view to 
simplifying its tariff regime, observing its bound tariff rates, reducing escalations, and enhancing 
predictability.  
Anti-Dumping  
4.222.   We note that the Russian Federation has been active in using anti -dumping measures. To 
avoid creating unnecessary restrictions to trade, we encourage the Russian Federation to exercise 
cautions and restraints in using such measures, and to conduct thorough reviews to ensure that 
any measures in force  are fully justified.  
Government Procurement  
4.223.   We appreciate Russian Federation's effort in reforming its government procurement 
system. We are delighted to note its recent application for accession to the WTO GPA and look 
forward to reviewing its accession offers when they are available.  
Concluding Remarks  
4.224.   This is the first Trade Policy Review for Russian Federation since its accession to the WTO. 
We appreciate its efforts in integrating into the multilateral trading system and liberalizing its 
trading regim e in the past few years. We certainly recognize the challenges involved, but the 
benefits from such reforms will pay off in the long run.  WT/TPR /W/115  • Russian Federation  
 
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  NEW  ZEALAND  
4.225.   New Zealand and Russia have a lengthy trading relationship, although our current trade 
levels are below hi storical levels. We welcome the opportunity to engage with Russia in this forum 
and hope this exercise will be useful to Russia for the further development of its trade policies and 
practices.  
4.226.   As the WTO Secretariat report notes, the Russian Federation is  on an economic 
stabilisation path, following the severe impact of the global economic crisis of 2008 -09. The report 
however illustrates that this stabilization faces a number of challenges. These include the slump in 
the oil price which has significantly impacted Russia's economy which is highly dependent on 
energy exports; slow structural reforms; factors inhibiting investment; and low population growth.  
4.227.   As a more specific example, the Secretariat report notes that import substitution has 
become a key fac tor in Russia's agricultural policy. Our own past experience with import 
substitution policies strongly suggests that openness to trade rather than efforts to promote 
import substitution is the best way to generate economic growth therefore we encourage gr eater 
structural reform efforts in this area.  
4.228.   Another point of concern flagged in the Secretariat report is Russia's imposition of bans on 
the imports of agricultural and food products from certain countries. This is an issue of systemic 
concern that New Z ealand and others have raised in the WTO in the past and which we reiterate 
here. 
4.229.   Paragraph 2.22 of the Secretariat report notes that Russia has ten outstanding WTO 
notifications. New Zealand encourages Russia to fulfil its reporting obligations, in line w ith the 
requirement for transparency, which is fundamental to the operation of the WTO. We look forward 
to an update from Russia on progress on these outstanding notifications. That said, we should also 
record that we welcome the fact that Russia is one of  only four developed Members to be fully up 
to date with their notification requirements on agricultural domestic support and export subsidies 
for agriculture.  
4.230.   New Zealand also commends the ongoing and broadly positive developments on market 
access for goo ds and services, and on the improvement and simplification of customs procedures. 
We encourage further progress, including in the context of Russia's ongoing implementation of its 
Accession Protocol. And as we do other Members, we encourage Russia to conve rt its mixed tariff 
rates to ad valorem rates as a measure to enhance transparency and facilitate access. We also 
appreciate the information provided in the reports of the Secretariat and the Russian Federation on 
the operations of the Eurasian Economic Un ion.   
4.231.   In our written questions we have sought more information on the application of SPS 
standards in the Russian Federation. In particular, and as required by the WTO SPS Agreement, 
we seek more information from Russia about the scientific basis for thos e instances where it 
applies more stringent requirements than international standards and norms. Similarly, we have 
also asked for clarification as to whether the audit of the system of supervision in third countries is 
carried out against measures equival ent to that of the Eurasian Economic Union, even where these 
are more stringent than the relevant international standards.   
4.232.   We welcome the advice in the Secretariat report that the Russian Federation may officially 
initiate GPA accession negotiations in t he second half of 2016. We ask when Russia expects to be 
in a position to submit its first GPA offer and pose questions on the application of GPA principles, 
including on the compatibility of Russia's preference schemes with the GPA's principle of non -
discrimination.  
4.233.   We would also appreciate clarification concerning the use of public funds for Russian 
agricultural businesses seeking to increase export sales to confirm that this is not an export 
subsidy.  
4.234.   Like other Members, we consider subsidy issues to be a  horizontal and systemic matter. 
Given Russia's significant fishing industry we have some questions concerning the support 
provided to the sector and look forward to Russia's responses on these. With regard to fossil fuel WT/TPR/W/115  • Russian Federation  
 
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  subsidies, given their impact on t rade, we would also be interested to know when Russia will join 
other G20 members, most recently China and the US, in utilising the G20 peer review process to 
assist with Russia's ongoing reform of fossil fuel subsidies.  
4.235.   We acknowledge Russia's progress, in the current challenging economic environment and 
we look forward to seeing the Russian economy achieve its full potential.  
REPUBLIC  OF KOREA  
4.236.   Korea highly appreciates Russia's hard work and significant achievements in turning into a 
market -oriented econo my during the last two decades and half. Since its accession to the WTO, 
Russia has continued liberalizing its market and reforming its trade regime to meet the WTO 
commitments. In this regard, Korea welcomes Russia's acceptance of the TFA this spring and its 
recent decision to initiate negotiations for its accession to the GPA.  
4.237.   However, Korea also notes that for the last couple of years, the Russian economy was hit 
by various factors, political and economic, and internal and external, which inevitably have  had a 
negative impact on its trade with other countries, and to some degree, on its efforts for structural 
reforms. Despite these difficulties, Korea hopes that Russia will continue working toward for 
deeper integration into the multilateral trading syste m. 
4.238.   Turning to the bilateral side, Korea and Russia share many economic interests, in 
particular, regarding the development of Russia's Far Eastern region.  
4.239.   Around 40% of Russia's bilateral trade involves this region, in which Korea was the largest 
export de stination in 2014. We would like to highlight that early this month President Park 
Geun-hye reaffirmed Korea's willingness to contribute to Russia's efforts for the development of 
this region when she participated in the second Eastern Economic Forum in Vl adivostok.  
4.240.   I very much appreciate Russia's response to Korea's advanced written questions and 
requests. In this regard, please allow me to take this opportunity to emphasize our main concerns 
about some of its trade measures and encourage Russia to address  them.  
4.241.   First, many Korean companies face difficulties when they enter the Russian market due to 
customs administration and procedures. The difficulties include the arbitrary classification and 
application of HS codes to electronic goods, notably smartwatch es, as well as burdensome 
document requirements. As Russia accepted the TFA in April, Korea looks forward to seeing 
greater improvements in its customs administration and procedures in the near future.  
4.242.   We also hope to see more transparency in SPS measures , especially when relevant laws 
are amended or revised, so that Korean companies do not have difficulties in finding required 
documents.  
4.243.   Second, as many of the previous speakers pointed out today, Korea is also concerned 
about import substitution measures  in Russia's government procurement system. Many Korean 
companies experience difficulties with government procurement, especially regarding construction 
equipment, automobiles and medical products. In this context, Korea welcomes Russia's decision 
to initi ate negotiations for the GPA and hopes for an early conclusion of the negotiations.  
BÉNIN  AU NOM  DU GROUPE  DES  PMA 
4.244.   La délégation du Bénin, au nom du Groupe des Pays les Moins Avancés (PMA), félicite la 
Fédération de Russie pour son premier examen des Polit iques commerciales depuis son accession 
à l'OMC en 2012, et la remercie pour les informations importantes qui nous ont été fournies sur les 
réalisations de la Russie dans les domaines économique et commercial. Le Groupe des PMA se 
félicite des réformes lég islatives et réglementaires menées par la Russie, contribuant ainsi à 
renforcer son intégration dans le système commercial multilatéral.  
4.245.   Le Groupe des PMA salue la signature de 81 Accords bilatéraux d'investissement, dont l'un 
avec le Cambodge, pays membre  du Groupe des PMA. Le Groupe encourage la Russie à poursuivre 
l'effort d'établissement d'Accords avec les autres PMA.  WT/TPR /W/115  • Russian Federation  
 
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  4.246.   Les PMA sont en situation de déficit commercial vis -à-vis de la Fédération de Russie, le 
niveau élevé ayant été atteint en 2011. Ceci s'e xplique dans une large mesure par les prix élevés 
des importations de pétrole et de blé. Certains PMA de la région asiatique sont parvenus à réduire 
leur déséquilibre commercial vis -à-vis de la Russie, à l'inverse des PMA Africains qui connaissent 
une haus se notable de ce déficit.  
4.247.   Les principaux exportateurs PMA vers la Fédération de Russie sont le Bangladesh, le 
Cambodge, le Malawi, la Tanzanie, le Mozambique, le Myanmar et l'Éthiopie. Ces PMA réunis, 
représentent environ 90% des exportations totales du Gr oupe PMA vers la Fédération de Russie.  
4.248.   Les principaux produits d'exportation sont, entre autres, le textile et l'habillement (60% 
des exportations des PMA), les produits agricoles, notamment le tabac, le café, le riz et les 
crevettes, et les métaux, tels que l'aluminium et l'uranium. En termes d'importations, le Groupe 
PMA dans son ensemble achète à la Fédération de Russie essentiellement du blé, du pétrole, des 
engrais, du bois, des avions et armements.  
4.249.   Dans le domaine des Services, certains PMA ont impo rté des services d'éducation et 
d'infrastructures en provenance de la Fédération de Russie. Selon le Rapport 2012 du Secrétariat, 
la Russie a quant à elle importé des services en provenance des PMA pour une valeur de 38,5 
millions de dollars EU. Ces import ations concernaient, en particulier, les autres services aux 
entreprises, les services de transport, de construction et de télécommunications, en provenance du 
Sénégal, du Libéria et d'Afghanistan. Ces données démontrent que le commerce des services entre 
la Russie et les PMA est actif et qu'il est possible d'aller plus loin.  
4.250.   Nous encourageons la Russie, qui a manifesté son intérêt pour l'octroi d'un traitement 
préférentiel aux PMA dans le domaine des biens, à compléter ces dispositions par la notification  de 
préférences spécifiques bénéficiant aux prestataires de services issus des PMA, en réponse à notre 
demande collective. Nous exhortons la Russie, en particulier, à supprimer les restrictions 
administratives et droits applicables aux PMA associés aux dem andes de visa, permis de travail, 
licences et permis de séjour. Nous sollicitons également la suppression des obstacles à l'accès aux 
marchés pour l'entrée et l'établissement de prestataires de services contractuels et de 
professionnels indépendants issus des PMA, de façon différenciée par rapport à ceux non 
originaires des PMA. Si la Russie applique des contingents dans le domaine des services, nous 
recommandons l'instauration de contingents spécifiques pour les PMA.  
4.251.   Le Groupe remercie par avance la Russie  pour les réponses qu'elle apportera à ses 
questions, conformément aux règles de l'OMC. Le Groupe des PMA apprécierait vivement 
d'approfondir ses consultations avec la Russie autour des priorités du Groupe au sein de l'OMC, et 
sur le territoire de nos memb res, autour de notre objectif d'industrialisation, d'intégration au 
système commercial multilatéral, de l'intégration dans les chaînes de valeur mondiales, et de lutte 
contre la pauvreté.   
4.252.   La délégation du Bénin voudrait, au nom du Groupe des PMA, saisir la présente occasion, 
quelques jours après la première édition du Dialogue Sud -Sud sur les PMA et le Développement, 
tenu à Annecy, en France, pour exhorter les autres partenaires techniques et financiers à 
poursuivre, leur assistance aux PMA dans leurs eff orts de promotion du développement 
économique et social.  
4.253.   Par ailleurs, le Groupe des PMA apprécie le soutien de la Russie à la poursuite du 
Programme de Doha pour le Développement, et à la conclusion des questions restantes du PDD, et 
salue particulièreme nt sa contribution à ce processus.  
KINGDOM  OF SAUDI  ARABIA  
4.254.   Despite the impact of the financial crisis, the crash of oil prices and the severe 
International economic sanctions over the period of review, the Russian Federation's economy 
remained open and res ilient. The Russian Government has been implementing a range of policies 
and measures to adapt to its new economic reality and even managed to stabilize its economy and 
further open its market as part of its extensive WTO accession commitments.  WT/TPR/W/115  • Russian Federation  
 
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  4.255.   While reco very will be long and painful, the Russian Government made a clear point up 
front about the importance of trade and investment liberalization for the country's economic 
recovery. GDP growth is projected to return to a positive 1.1% in 2017 due to improving  
investment dynamics, led by expected rising oil prices and declining credit cost.  
4.256.   The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia commends the reform programme undertaken by the 
Russian Federation which aimed at transforming a centrally -planned economy to a market -oriented 
and fostering its global competitiveness.  
4.257.   The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia trusts that the efforts undertaken by the Russian authorities 
to accelerate economic reforms and aim at enhancing competition in goods and services markets, 
improving property rights, an d revamping transport and telecommunications infrastructure to 
improve the business climate and boost investment will create favourable conditions for its 
continuous growth and sustainable development.  
4.258.   The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Russian Federatio n enjoy friendly and substantive 
economic and trade relationship underpinned by commercial ties and supported by shared 
membership in the G20. The value of two -way trade between the two countries exceeded 
US$1.2  billion in 2015.  
4.259.   The high -level exchange of  visits between the two countries and the establishment of the 
Saudi -Russian Joint Economic Commission contributed to enhancing the bilateral business ties and 
help expand and diversify trade between the two countries.  
4.260.   In November 2015, during the Saudi R ussian Investment Forum in Moscow, a number of 
agreements and memorandums of understanding were signed between the two countries 
especially in the field of distributing products of Russian companies in the Saudi market, expanding 
the provision of Russian p orts services in the Kingdom, marketing the Russian oil products, 
cooperating in the training of Saudi cadres in operation and maintenance of the 
telecommunication, information technology, maintenance and operation of water and electricity 
stations.  
4.261.   The im portance of trade to the Russian Federation is reflected in its commitment to the 
WTO and the multilateral trading system.  
PARAGUAY  
4.262.   La crisis financiera mundial de 2008 -2009, la inestabilidad política en la región y las 
sanciones impuestas por importantes socios comerciales castigaron con especial dureza a la 
economía rusa. Es por ello que el repunte económico de los años 2010 al 2012 ha sido opacado 
por una posterior desaceleración del crecimiento del PIB real en el 2013, 2014, y 2015. Por otra 
parte, la c aída de los precios del petróleo ha influido de manera importante en el ingreso de 
divisas al país, lo cual también se tradujo en una fuerte devaluación del rublo y un incremento de 
la inflación.  
4.263.   Ante este escenario, vale destacar que el Gobierno respondió  con un interesante paquete 
de medidas anticrisis, destinados principalmente a estabilizar el sistema bancario, y a dar 
estímulos fiscales a la economía, e introducir un programa de sustitución de las importaciones. Las 
autoridades rusas reconocen la neces idad de acelerar las reformas económicas, y se han 
propuesto a reforzar la competencia en los mercados de bienes y servicios, mejorar los derechos 
de propiedad y renovar la infraestructura de transporte y de telecomunicaciones para mejorar el 
clima empresa rial e impulsar las inversiones. Como hemos visto en informes de organismos 
financieros multilaterales, la economía rusa está en proceso de estabilización; en ese sentido, el 
FMI prevé una reducción del crecimiento del PIB del 1,8% en 2016 y un aumento del  0,8% en 
2017.  
4.264.   En ese sentido, confiamos que Rusia podrá, más temprano que tarde, completar su 
transición hacia una economía de mercado.  
4.265.   Con referencia a la política comercial, es importante destacar que la adhesión de la 
Federación de Rusia a la OMC en el año 2012 fue un paso fundamental en la integración del país WT/TPR /W/115  • Russian Federation  
 
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  en el sistema multilateral de comercio, lo cual vino acompañada de cambios estructurales en la 
normativa comercial, convirtiendo al país en un socio más previsible con quien realizar negocios. 
Desde su adhesión a la OMC, Rusia ha reducido gradualmente su nivel de protección por medio de 
los aranceles aplicados, situándose en 6,09%.  
4.266.   De igual manera, Rusia ha participado activamente para la conclusión del Acuerdo sobre 
Facilitación del Comercio, y en consecuencia ha adoptado medidas para acelerar las formalidades 
aduaneras y reducir el tiempo necesario para el levante de las mercancías, entre otras cosas 
mediante la eliminación de los obstáculos innecesarios impuestos por los reglamentos de aduana , 
la simplificación de los procedimientos aduaneros y la reducción del tiempo necesario para las 
formalidades aduaneras  
4.267.   No obstante, quedan varios desafíos en el horizonte; los cuales han sido reflejados en la 
gran cantidad de consultas realizadas por los Miembros para este ejercicio; entre ellas podemos 
destacar las preguntas sobre las notificaciones, los mecanismos de defensa comercial, y 
programas de incentivos a la producción. Por su parte, mi delegación ha realizado varias consultas 
puntuales, referent e al programa de sustitución de las importaciones, políticas de tránsito, y 
comercio de servicios. Agradecemos mucho las respuestas parte de las preguntas que hemos 
realizado, las cuales las estudiaremos con mucha atención.  
4.268.   Igualmente, como país sin litora l marítimo, quisiéramos expresar una preocupación 
sistémica que tenemos por algunas medidas adoptadas por Rusia que restringen al tránsito 
internacional de mercaderías por su territorio y con destino a terceros mercados. Esperamos que 
estás cuestiones pued an ser resueltas en la brevedad, en línea con lo dispuesto en el Artículo V del 
GATT y el Acuerdo sobre Facilitación del Comercio.  
4.269.   Por otro lado, quiero destacar la excelente relación bilateral que tiene mi país con Rusia, 
no solo a nivel económico, sino t ambién a nivel político, social y cultural. En el periodo en estudio, 
los flujos de comercio en ambas direcciones se han incrementado considerablemente, tanto así 
que Rusia es uno de los principales destinos de exportación para el Paraguay, especialmente p ara 
la carne vacuna y los pellets de soja; juntos alcanzan la cifra de 750 millones de dólares EE.UU. 
Por su parte, Paraguay importa de Rusia: gasoil, fertilizantes y otros productos derivados de la 
industria química. No obstante, creemos que aún existe un  gran potencial en esta área, y al cual 
ambos Gobiernos están determinados a trabajar juntos.   
4.270.   Vale mencionar también que en los últimos años se han registrado importantes inversiones 
rusas en el Paraguay, especialmente en el sector ganadero e industrial.   
4.271.   Para concluir, vale la pena destacar que Paraguay y Rusia comparten la misma visión 
sobre la necesidad de fortalecer el sistema multilateral comercio, ambos queremos una pronta 
implementación del Acuerdo sobre Facilitación de Comercio, y una OMC orientad a hacia el 
desarrollo.   
THAILAND  
4.272.   Thailand associates itself with ASEAN's statement previously delivered by Ambassador 
Mariam.   
4.273.   Russia and Thailand have a cordial and long -standing trade relation. In 2015, Russia was 
Thailand's 31st trading partner in the  world, with trade value of US$2.3 billion. Russia ranked as 
our 37th export destination, although we note that there was a sharp decline from an average 
total export value of approximately 1.1 billion between 2011 and 2014 to 700 million in 2015, this 
is due in large part to the sharp drop in our top exports to Russia in the past five years, especially 
automobiles and electric machinery. In terms of Imports Russia ranked as Thailand's 24th largest 
source of import, having declined from 14th in 2010 as Thai land's importation of fuel, fertilizers, 
and iron and steel fell sharply in the past five years. As we look forward, we hope that our 
fundamentally strong relationship will help our bilateral trade to rejuvenate and induce further 
growth in the near future .  
4.274.   The report by the Secretariat indicate that Russia's economy has contracted by 3.7% in 
2015 owing to various factors including the political instability in the Crimea region, the fall in oil WT/TPR/W/115  • Russian Federation  
 
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  prices, and the two -way economic sanctions between some wester n countries and Russia. We 
hope that Russia will continue to strengthen its efforts in transforming and liberalizing its economy 
to a market -oriented one, and in doing so, achieve a sustainable and positive growth in the near 
future.   
4.275.   We would like to com mend Russia's strong efforts to further liberalize trade and 
investment since its accession to the WTO.  
4.276.   Thailand is also pleased with Russia's efforts in regard to investment facilitation and 
promotion through special tax and infrastructure incentives, and  we look forward to improvements 
in transparency, tax rates and complexity of tax regulations, access to financing, and improvement 
in intellectual property protection to further enhance Russia's investment environment.  
4.277.   Thailand also believes Russia to be  an active contributor to the WTO, with its ratification of 
the Trade Facilitation Agreement as well as its participation in the ITA expansion.  
4.278.   In this review, Thailand submitted quite a number of questions to Russia, covering the 
policies and measures of  our interests regarding Investment policies and Competition policies. We 
look forward to Russia's responses, for which we will study carefully with great interest.  
4.279.   In conclusion, Thailand would like to express its appreciation to the Russian delegation fo r 
today's presentation. We are thankful for the cooperation with Russia in every level and wish 
Russia every success in its first trade policy review.  
REPUBLIC  OF MOLDOVA  
4.280.   Becoming a Member of the WTO in august 2012, Russia has committed to abide by its 
rules and principles in accordance with the WTO rules undertaken by the Protocol of Accession, in 
order to improve the competitiveness of the Russian economy and to successfully integrate into 
the global marketplace.  
4.281.   We would like to congratulate the Russian Federation on its ratification of the Trade 
Facilitation Agreement on 22 April 2016, further encouraging the Russian authorities to move 
forward with the negotiation process on the ratification of the GPA Agreement.  
4.282.   It is important to note and commend tha t upon accession, the Russian Federation joined 
the Information Technology Agreement, aiming to liberalize trade and growing sector of the global 
economy.  
4.283.   Since 2012, Russia has been annually moving upwards in the Doing Business rating 
compiled by the Worl d Bank Group. From being ranked 120th in 2012, Russia moved to the 51st 
place in 2016. Despite this achievement, some of the macro -economic indicators remain unstable. 
Since joining the WTO, the real GDP of Russia's economic growth rates slowed to 1.3% and  0.7% 
in 2013 and 2014, respectively, while a contraction of 3.7% occurred in 2015 due to the external 
and internal challenges, certain geopolitical challenges, currency devaluations in trading partner 
countries, trade sanctions, the oil price slump below US$50 per barrel, coupled with the insufficient 
diversification of Russian exports. Merchandise exports decreased from US$524.8 billion in 2012 to 
US$343.9 billion in 2015.  
4.284.   Among the factors that have a negative impact on the volume of bilateral trade are:  loss of 
economic ties with Ukraine and some of the other CIS countries and access to their market, 
including some of the main line tariffs from Moldova, depreciation of the national currency, the 
reduced financial capacity of the local population and fina ncial challenges of enterprises.  
4.285.   The Russian Federation has been one of the most important trading partners of Moldova. 
Even if the trade volume has declined significantly from a deficit of US$156 million in 2013 to a 
double one of US$300 million in 2015, Russia still remains among top 5 trade partners of the 
Republic of Moldova, descending from the first export partner of Moldova to the third one in 2016. 
The value of exported Moldovan fruits has decreased from US$90 million in 2013 to only US$13.6 
in 2015 , which is a decrease of approximately 85%. Customs duties imposed on fruits vary 
between 5 -10%.  WT/TPR /W/115  • Russian Federation  
 
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  4.286.   The Moldovan delegation looks forward to receiving responses to the recently submitted 
questions to the Government of the Russian Federation regarding addition al transparency 
measures planned to be introduced by the Russian Federation on dumping investigations and 
procedures, as well as regarding to the ban imposed on all international transit of cargo by road 
and rail from Ukraine to Kazakhstan through the terr itory of the Russian Federation and its 
compatibility with GATT Article V, which requires WTO Members to apply a free transit regime.  
4.287.   Regarding the RTAs, the Republic of Moldova notes that starting with 2014, and in spite of 
agreed free trade preferences under the CIS FTA, the Russian Federation has imposed trade 
restrictions on certain Moldovan products. As a result, this has greatly reduced the volumes of 
Moldovan exports to Russia in 19 agricultural products, which represent Moldova's main exports. 
The trade restrictive measures have taken the form of increased import duties on these products 
from a previous level of 0 –5% to a current level of 15% (under Govermental Decision No. 736 
from 31 July 2014).  
4.288.   The exports of certain agricultural products have b een generally banned. These include 
fresh fruit and vegetables, wines and other alcoholic drinks, canned fruit and canned vegetables, 
and processed meat. Currently, only certain producers placed on a special list can export some of 
these products to Russia . Thus, only 123 exporters are eligible to export fruits falling under 
HS 0808 and 0809. The exports of other agri -vegetal products are permitted only to 248 Moldovan 
exporters. As a result, during 2013 -2016, the value of Moldovan exports to the Russian Fe deration 
has decreased by 61.8%, having a highly disruptive impact on the economy and the regional trade 
system.  
4.289.   While we are fully aware of the economic difficulties in Russia, in view of proper 
implementation of the legally binding CIS Free Trade Agreem ent, and giving full effect to 
Article  XXIV of GATT, the Republic of Moldova requests the Russian Federation to lift the applicable 
restrictions allowing to restore the traditional volumes of trade between the two countries.  
4.290.   In spite of the economic diffi culties caused by these measures to the Moldovan economic 
agents, the Republic of Moldova has not taken steps to litigate the issue neither under the CIS FTA 
nor under the WTO rules. This reflects our willingness and good faith in a process where amicable 
and mutually acceptable solutions are explored. The Government of the Republic of Moldova looks 
forward to revisiting and solving this issue under the auspices of our bilateral governmental 
commission meetings and further discussions among diplomats in Gen eva, in order to find 
mutually agreeable solutions, with respect to the WTO commitments and principles. In this regard, 
we appreciate the consultations held in Moscow and Chisinau by high level officials and we hope 
that the recent meeting at the highest l evel between our leaders will bring positive results soon.  
4.291.   The Republic of Moldova is confident that the first exercise of the trade policy review will 
help Russia to attain its economic objectives and fully honour its international commitments.  
4.292.   We look forward to continuing strengthening our bilateral relations with Russia and on 
behalf of the delegation of the Republic of Moldova I wish the Russian delegation the utmost 
success during the first WTO Trade Policy Review Cycle.  
EL SALVADOR  
4.293.   Este ejercicio t al cual es un claro ejemplo de las bondades que se extraen de la adhesión 
rusa a esta casa.  
4.294.   Claramente, el entorno económico de la Federación Rusa está pasando por una 
desaceleración de su crecimiento, debido principalmente a factores externos como la cri sis 
financiera mundial, entre otros de naturaleza política. Asimismo, tal como se señala en el informe 
de Gobierno, durante el 2012 y 2015 también se vio afectado el volumen de comercio exterior, 
disminuyendo en un 37,5%, debido principalmente a la devalua ción del rublo que disminuyó la 
demanda por importaciones, y la caída de los precios mundiales que afectó las exportaciones.  
4.295.   Por otro lado, es importante destacar los importantes esfuerzos que realizó la Federación 
de Rusia en virtud de su adhesión a la OM C, principalmente en materia arancelaria, a través de la 
consolidación de la totalidad de sus líneas arancelarias, y el compromiso de reducir sus aranceles WT/TPR/W/115  • Russian Federation  
 
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  consolidados hasta un promedio de 8,4% en el año 2020, según el informe de la Secretaría. Este 
prome dio es relevante contrastarlo con el promedio de sus aplicados, que actualmente se 
encuentran en 8,3% ad valorem , incluidos los EAV (equivalente ad valorem ) de los derechos no ad 
valorem , es decir, casi al mismo nivel que sus aranceles promedio consolidado s.  
4.296.   Felicitamos a Rusia por su depósito del Acuerdo de Facilitación del Comercio. A su vez 
observamos que Rusia es parte de algunas iniciativas plurilaterales, tales como el Acuerdo sobre 
Tecnologías de la Información, y tiene condición de observador del A cuerdo plurilateral sobre 
Contratación Pública. Asimismo, se destaca desde su adhesión en el año 2012, la activa 
participación en el órgano de solución de diferencias, tanto como Parte como Tercero Interesado. 
Alentamos a la Federación de Rusia a notificar  el protocolo de enmienda del TRIPS.  
4.297.   Queremos destacar además, las medidas que la Federación de Rusia está tomando para 
facilitar el comercio, tales como, la ratificación del Acuerdo de Facilitación del Comercio de la OMC, 
la eliminación de reglamentación  excesiva, la simplificación de los trámites aduaneros, la ventanilla 
única electrónica, entre otros, y de ahí que damos la bienvenida de sus esfuerzos de 
implementación de la ventanilla única.  
4.298.   En el plano bilateral, los vínculos diplomáticos entre ambos países fueron establecidos en 
el año 1992 y a partir de esa fecha se han venido fortaleciendo cada vez más, como resultado, 
entre otros, de la cooperación que dicho país ha brindado a El Salvador en áreas como ciencia, 
tecnología, turismo y seguridad. Esta mos seguros que la firma de este Acuerdo de supresión de 
visas en todo tipo de pasaporte ayudará a potenciar el intercambio de negocios.  
4.299.   En cuanto al comercio, a pesar de que actualmente no es muy significativo, consideramos 
que es bastante complementario , ya que del periodo 2013 a 2015, El Salvador exportó azúcar, 
café oro, esquejes sin enraizar, cacao en grano, y prendas de vestir, mientras que las 
importaciones se concentraron principalmente de abonos minerales, productos de hierro y acero, 
alambres de aluminio y productos de papel y carbón.  
4.300.   Esperamos continuar fortaleciendo los lazos bilaterales con la Federación de Rusia en el 
futuro, a fin de promover, entre otros, el incremento en el intercambio comercial actual.  
4.301.   Aprovecho también para agradecer al  Embajador Gennady Ovechko y a su equipo por su 
firme compromiso y activa participación en los trabajos ordinarios y extraordinarios de la OMC.  
ECUADOR  
4.302.   Durante los últimos años, la Federación de Rusia ha continuado impulsando las reformas 
encaminadas a mod ernizar su economía, fomentar la competitividad y crear condiciones favorables 
para su crecimiento y desarrollo sostenible. Sin embargo, un sector externo adverso, marcado por 
la crisis financiera mundial de los años 2008 -2009 y la caída de los precios de los productos 
básicos, así como otros factores, han impedido obtener los resultados esperados. Ante este 
escenario, la Federación de Rusia ha promovido una nueva política industrial fundamentada en el 
apoyo a los exportadores, los incentivos fiscales y la sustitución de importaciones. Confiamos que 
esta nueva política industrial, acompañada de iniciativas orientadas a la diversificación de su 
economía y la reducción de la dependencia de los recursos minerales y energéticos, permitirá 
recuperar el crecimient o económico.  
4.303.   La adhesión a la OMC en agosto de 2012 constituye uno de los ejes en los que la 
Federación de Rusia ha sustentado sus esfuerzos para pasar de una economía de planificación 
centralizada a una economía de mercado. Medidas como la consolidación d e la totalidad de sus 
líneas arancelarias y su reducción gradual para el año 2020, la apertura de sus sectores de 
servicios y, las limitaciones a los derechos de exportación, supusieron modificaciones substanciales 
en su política comercial. Tomando en cons ideración los antecedentes históricos de la Federación de 
Rusia, los retos derivados de la implementación de tales medidas no deben ser subestimados.  
4.304.   Además de su activa participación en el ámbito multilateral, la Federación de Rusia ha 
optado por suscribi r acuerdos regionales dentro de los cuales ocupa un lugar privilegiado la Unión 
Económica Euroasiática, unión aduanera que aplicó un arancel externo común a partir del 1° de 
enero de 2015 y a la cual se han transferido importantes competencias en ámbito co mercial como WT/TPR /W/115  • Russian Federation  
 
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  el establecimiento de una política agrícola coordinada. La consolidación del mercado interno de la 
Unión Económica Euroasiática así como su posicionamiento en los mercados internaciones 
constituye uno de los principales desafíos de la Federaci ón de Rusia en el ámbito de política 
comercial.  
4.305.   Ecuador y la Federación de Rusia mantienen un importante intercambio comercial, que 
superó en el año 2015 los 900 millones de dólares EE.UU. Para Ecuador la Federación de Rusia es 
uno de los principales merc ados para productos agrícolas como banano, flores, camarón y café, 
motivo por el cual sigue con particular atención la normativa aplicable a su sector agropecuario, 
incluido el esquema sanitario y fitosanitario. En lo que respecta a las importaciones, Ecua dor 
importa de la Federación de Rusia insumos agrícolas y maquinaria. Adicionalmente, la 
complementariedad de sus economías sugiere la existencia de un mayor espacio para la 
profundización de las relaciones comerciales entre los dos países.  
4.306.   Hemos presenta do preguntas por escrito acerca de ciertos aspectos de su política 
comercial y a la vez que agradecemos por las respuestas que sabrán dar a las mismas, les 
deseamos una exitosa conclusión de su primer examen de política comercial en la OMC.  
TURKEY  
4.307.   Russian Federation's accession to the WTO marked a significant development for its 
integration into the rules based multilateral trading system. With a nominal GDP of 
US$1,326  billion in 2015, the Russian Federation, a G -20 member, ranked tenth in the world 
econom y. Moreover, it is the largest country covering more than one eighth of the world's 
inhabited area, also the world's second -largest oil and gas producer and one of the most 
energy -intensive economies.  
4.308.   With regard to the economic environment of the Russian Federation, as has been pointed 
out in the Secretariat report, the economy had averaged 7% annual growth during the period 
1998-2008, driven largely by rapidly increasing oil and gas revenues and mining investments. 
However, the global economic crisis of 2 008-2009 and the sharp decline in the global oil prices 
since 2014, have adversely and deeply affected the economy and financial situation of Russia. 
Geopolitical uncertainty as well as international sanctions and counter -sanctions, mostly during the 
period under review, further aggravated the situation. Due to these developments, real GDP 
growth rates slowed down to 1.3% and 0.7% respectively in 2013 and 2014, and a contraction of 
3.7% occurred in 2015.  
4.309.   Having said that, Turkey is pleased to observe that the Russian Government has adopted 
an anti -crisis plan comprising: stabilizing the banking system, implementing a fiscal stimulus and 
accelerating the move to a floating exchange rate regime to restore confidence and stabilize the 
financial system. Taking into account that the Russian Federation derives about 50% of its federal 
government revenues from oil and gas related activities, I believe that developing plans and 
policies aiming at economic diversification and promoting a non -oil economy would further  
increase the resilience of the economy. Moreover, accelerating the implementation of consistent 
and determined economic reforms would help lift the Russian economy towards its true potential.  
4.310.   As referred to in the Government report, Russia's accession to  the WTO was accompanied 
by fundamental legislative changes that has improved predictability of the Russian market for all 
stakeholders, including foreign trade operators. As a result, the incorporation of the WTO rules in 
the national legislation has cont ributed to an improvement in Russia's international ratings. In this 
context, the upward move of Russia in the World Bank's “Ease of Doing Business Report” from 
120th in 2012 to 51st place in 2016 is commendable.   
4.311.   From a trade policy perspective, Turkey w elcomes the steps taken by the Russian 
Federation to expedite customs formalities and reduce the release time for goods through an 
action plan that sets out a series of measures to simplify customs procedures and improve 
efficiency for both imports and exp orts since mid -2012.   
4.312.   Sharing the same geography and having strong historical ties, bilateral relations between 
Turkey and Russian Federation had its periods of competition and cooperation over the course of 
history. Following a rapid development of econo mic relations in the 90s, our bilateral relations WT/TPR/W/115  • Russian Federation  
 
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  entered a new positive phase in the early 2000's and then attained an institutional character with 
the establishment of the High Level Cooperation Council between the two countries in 2010.  
4.313.   On the other ha nd, our relations faced a serious test which affected both economies as a 
result of military activities in connection with the ongoing Syrian crisis. However, in line with the 
mutual desire of the Turkish and the Russian peoples and with the common sense o f the 
Presidents of the two countries, a political dialogue has been re -established and subsequently a 
normalization process was launched recently. However, these positive steps have not yielded 
desired results yet in the areas of bilateral trade and econo mic relations. At this stage, we 
especially expect that Russia will take measures to solve the current problems regarding the 
export of Turkish -origin fresh fruits and vegetables to Russia, as immediately as possible.  
4.314.   Economic and trade relations constitu te the driving force behind the Turkish -Russian 
relations. Russia is one of our most important trade partners. Bilateral trade volume, which 
reached US$38 billion in 2008, before the global economic crisis, decreased to US$24 billion in 
2015. However, we a re confident that the normalization process that was launched by the 
Presidents of the two countries would serve to attain the previous trade volume levels and further.  
4.315.   On the other hand, just before our foreign ministers meeting scheduled for 9 October, 
negotiations of a free trade agreement between the two countries, covering services and 
investment, will be held. Our aim is to conclude, as soon as possible, this FTA which we believe 
would serve to increase bilateral trade volume to US$100 USD.  
4.316.   Turkey s ubmitted a number of written questions in advance and we are looking forward to 
receiving responses in due course.  
4.317.   To conclude, I commend Russian Delegation's active participation in, and contributions to, 
the WTO negotiations under the leadership of my fr iend Ambassador Gennady Ovechko.  
ICELAND  
4.318.   Iceland strongly supported the accession of the Russian Federation to the WTO and was 
even directly involved for a while. With this in mind, I noted in particular with pleasure the clear 
commitment of the Russian de legation to the WTO system made in the opening statement this 
morning.   
4.319.   Iceland and Russia have enjoyed a long and strong bilateral relationship, although these 
days we are unfortunately experiencing some challenges. Despite that we continue close and 
regular dialogue on various issues, including trade.  
4.320.   We have for decades enjoyed mutually beneficial trade relations, which hopefully can be 
restored soon, but our trade has contracted tremendously over the past couple of years.  
4.321.   Let me in the context of thi s review highlight two particular issues.  
4.322.   Firstly, the application of SPS rules which has caused major difficulties for some of our 
exporters of fish and now meat producers.  
4.323.   More concretely, for close to two years, three of the biggest exporters of lamb m eat in 
Iceland have been blocked from the Russian market based on SPS rules. This is causing 
considerable damage to the exporters who have invested a lot of time, effort and money in 
establishing themselves on the Russian market.  
4.324.   During this period, Icela ndic authorities and the companies in question have worked 
extensively on meeting all requirements put forward by Russian authorities only to be repeatedly 
faced with rejections from the Russian side to recognize official documents, information and facts 
submitted.  
4.325.   Despite all the measures that have been taken to meet the requirements indicated the 
situation remains.  WT/TPR /W/115  • Russian Federation  
 
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  4.326.   Thus, let me echo what a number of delegations have mentioned regarding what we see as 
a lack of predictability and transparency in applicat ion of SPS rules.  
4.327.   We urge the Russian authorities to concretely clarify as soon as possible all the 
requirements that still need to be fulfilled in order for all stakeholders to be able to take the 
necessary measures to meet such requirements. Icelandic au thorities continue to be fully 
committed to work directly and concretely with Russian authorities in this regard.  
4.328.   In this context, Iceland has noted with interest the recent outcome of the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Body in Case DS475.   
4.329.   Secondly, allow me to echo concerns of a number of delegations when it comes to 
application of subsidies in Russia, in particular fisheries subsidies. For a country as rich in 
resources as Russia, embarking on a course of sustainable resource management is essential to 
securing  sustainable growth. Iceland strongly encourages Russia to join a growing and diverse 
group of members committed to negotiating real disciplines to abolish harmful fisheries subsidies 
in the WTO instead of embarking on comprehensive state supported project s of increasing the 
capacity of its fishing fleet.   
4.330.   Finally, allow me to complement the whole Russian delegation for the enormous work you 
have put into your first TPR and my delegation wishes you all the success.  
KAZAKHSTAN  
4.331.   Russia is the second trading p artner of Kazakhstan after the European Union and our 
major investment partner. In 2015, annual trade turnover with Russia amounted to US$14.5 
billion.  
4.332.   I would like to note positive influence of Russia's accession to the WTO in terms of the 
country's recen t fundamental legislative changes that led to the creation of a solid and predictable 
business environment for market participants. Since 2012, Russia moved up 69 places in the 
World Bank's Doing Business ranking (Russia #51, Kazakhstan #41).  
4.333.   Kazakhstan pa ys a great deal of attention to this review.  
4.334.   We commend Russia's efforts in developing trade policy regime that is coherent with the 
requirements of the Multilateral Trading System and the Government's adherence to the 
transparency obligations.  
4.335.   Let me als o highlight Russia's growing share of non -trade distorting support for agricultural 
producers.  
4.336.   We welcome the recent ratification of the Trade Facilitation Agreement by Russia.  
4.337.   Let me note our joint efforts within the EAEU to improved customs administrati on and 
developed a new EAEU Customs Code that will simplify customs operations.   
4.338.   We are confident that there is still a lot of potential to further improve our mutually 
beneficial trade and economic cooperation as EAEU evolves.  
4.339.   I thank the Government of Russia and personally Mr. Medvedkov and his team for their 
support to the accession of Kazakhstan to the WTO. Both our countries experienced quite a 
lengthy and complex accession exercises that helped to find solutions to some longstanding 
systemic issues of the WTO.  
BRAZIL  
4.340.   It is a matter of great satisfaction for Brazil to take part in this first Trade Policy Review of 
the Russian Federation, a valuable partner of Brazil, bilaterally, here at the WTO, in the BRICS and 
many other fora. The accession of Russ ia to the WTO represented a landmark event not only for 
Russia, as highlighted in its Government report, but also for the multilateral trading system, WT/TPR/W/115  • Russian Federation  
 
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  consolidating the integration and commitment of Russia, with its substantial economic weight, to 
our comm on set of rules and principles.  
4.341.   Brazil commends the significant reforms undertaken by the Government of the Russian 
Federation, following the wide -ranging commitments on market access in goods and services 
which resulted from its accession process to the W TO. As highlighted in the reports, legislative or 
regulatory action has taken place in a number of areas, such as simplification of customs 
procedures, competition, government procurement, investment, intellectual property, TBT and 
trade remedies, among ot hers, in order to enhance and consolidate Russia's openness to trade and 
investment flows. Brazil is particularly encouraged by Russia's efforts to bring its agricultural 
policies in line with its WTO obligations. Let me also highlight our good dialogue wi th Russia on 
SPS measures applicable to Brazilian products which are crucial in our bilateral trade relations.  
4.342.   We also would like to praise Russia's record in the notification of trade measures, one of 
the pillars of the multilateral trading system, as rem arked by the Secretariat, covering virtually all 
the WTO set of disciplines.  
4.343.   Russia's economic performance was affected by the international economic crisis of 
2008-2009 and its aftermath, and later by the widespread fall in commodity prices, especially, i n 
its case, oil and gas prices. While not being able to avoid weaker growth or event negative growth 
rates in some years between 2012 and 2015, the Russian Federation's economy has avoided the 
kind of crisis that occurred in the late nineties. A number of policies were crucial in this area. Some 
point in the direction of a more liberal economic policy, such as the adoption of a floating exchange 
rate; others possibly translate as a choice for more regulation and government intervention, 
including an import substitution programme. Although we do acknowledge Russia's right to use all 
WTO-consistent policy options, we hope that it will always choose the least trade alternatives to 
promote economic recovery.  
4.344.   On the bilateral Brazil -Russia agenda, exchanges have decreased from US$7.1 billion in 
2011 to US$4.6 billion in 2015, after a brief recovery in 2014. Brazil and Russia are still grappling 
with adverse economic conditions, which, by depressing imports in both economies, can easily 
explain the trajectory of bi lateral trade flows. This trend requires careful attention on the part of 
our Governments, bearing in mind that, in 2004, on the occasion of the first state visit by a 
Russian Head of State to Brazil, a technological partnership was established with the go al of 
increasing bilateral trade to US$10 billion. Brazil is also interested in continuing to work together 
with Russia to increase the complementary of our economies and diversify our bilateral trade, 
which already comprises a range of agricultural and in dustrial products, towards higher 
value -added goods.  
4.345.   One way to foster our economic ties would be to identify and explore investment 
opportunities, with positive side effects on bilateral trade. In this context, we noted with interest 
Russia's decision, hi ghlighted in the Secretariat report, to promote foreign investment and 
innovation through the establishment of high -tech parks, industrial clusters and special economic 
Zones (SEZs).  
MONTENEGRO  
4.346.   Montenegro wishes to congratulate the Government of the Russia n Federation on 
becoming the 156th member of the World Trade Organization in 2012, and to congratulate the 
Government on its first trade policy review cycle. We are convinced that Russia's active 
membership will continue to contribute to the strengthening of its responsibilities and compliance 
with WTO rules and principles, and enable it to enjoy the benefits that the Organization brings to 
all of its Members. To this end, Montenegro notes with appreciation the Russian Federation's 
ratification of the Trade  Facilitation Agreement and welcomes the intended application to join the 
Government Procurement Agreement that will support the necessary improvements in its domestic 
governmental procurement system.  
4.347.   In addition, Montenegro notes from the report of the G overnment of the Russian 
Federation that between 2012 and 2015, the regional integration process within Eurasian 
Economic Union and beyond, was actively developing. Montenegro firmly believes in the WT/TPR /W/115  • Russian Federation  
 
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  importance of strong regional trading partnership and the  benefits that deep economic integration 
and cooperation bring to States and their populations.  
4.348.   As the Secretariat notes, in 1991, the Russian Federation embarked on a reform 
programme aimed at transforming a centrally planned economy to a market orientat ed one. In this 
regard, Montenegro is pleased to read the finding of the Secretariat that Russia has “largely met” 
its objective of creating an outward -orientated economy. In agreement with the Secretariat, 
Montenegro considers that liberalization of trade  and investment (driven by commitments taken 
during Russia's accession to the WTO) has been a major milestone in the reform project.  
4.349.   Notwithstanding the clear benefits marked by Russian accession to the WTO, Montenegro 
notes the findings of the Secretaria t that Russia was hit exceptionally hard by the global financial 
crisis. Montenegro hopes that the future economic growth of Russia will become more stable and 
return to higher levels that had previously been experienced.  
4.350.   Montenegro has economic and trade  relations with the Russian Federation, guided by the 
Joint Committee for trade, economic and technical cooperation between our two Governments. 
Montenegro would like to use this opportunity to express its strong interest to continue 
consultations on the P rotocol concerning current trading framework and to expand cooperation, 
particularly in the sector of tourism.  
4.351.   Finally, Montenegro is looking forward to continuing its constructive engagement with the 
delegation of the Russian Federation in Geneva and my d istinguished colleague Ambassador 
Gennady Ovechko.  
ROYAUME  DU MAROC   
4.352.   Le Maroc s'associe à la déclaration faite par le Bénin au nom des PMA.  
4.353.   C'est pour mon pays un immense plaisir de participer aujourd'hui au premier Examen des 
politiques commerciales de l a Russie qui, j'en suis convaincu, sera l'occasion de permettre aux 
pays Membres de cette Organisation de prendre connaissance des grands progrès réalisés par 
Russie pour son intégration dans le système commercial multilatéral.  
4.354.   Au niveau international, la Russie est membre permanent du Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU, 
de notre Organisation l'OMC, et du groupe des G20 qu'il a présidé en 2013.  
4.355.   Sur le plan économique, la Russie fait partie des pays émergents, les BRICS, mais il 
constitue une puissance économique qui s'impose de plus en plus. Aujourd'hui, la Russie figure 
parmi les partenaires privilégiés et les marchés prioritaires du Maroc.  
4.356.   Les multiples visites de haut niveau du secteur privé et public, l'organisation de premiers 
forums économiques maroco -russes  témoignent de la volonté du Royaume du Maroc de consolider 
davantage ses acquis en préservant ses parts de marché et en renforçant son positionnement à 
travers la diversification de son offre exportable.  
4.357.   Cet intérêt grandissant pour le marché russe s'ill ustre également par l'ouverture il y a 
quatre années d'une ligne maritime reliant la ville marocaine d'Agadir à St Pétersbourg, port de 
liaison stratégique entre l'Europe et l'Afrique.  
4.358.   Une des principales étapes dans les relations bilatérales a été la vis ite officielle de Sa 
Majesté le Roi Mohammed VI en Fédération russe en octobre 2002 ponctuée par la signature de la 
déclaration sur le partenariat stratégique englobant le commerce, les technologies de l'information 
et les pêches maritimes. La visite offic ielle de Sa Majesté le Roi Mohammed VI en Russie a encore 
permis aux relations entre nos deux pays de passer à la vitesse supérieure dans le cadre d'un 
partenariat stratégique approfondi qui constitue une véritable feuille de route pour les divers 
interven ants publics et privés pour augmenter le niveau de leur coopération pratique en matière 
d'économie, de commerce et d'investissements. En marge de cette visite il y a quelques mois, les 
opérateurs des deux pays ont lancé le Conseil économique.  WT/TPR/W/115  • Russian Federation  
 
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  4.359.   Sur le volet de la pêche, le Royaume, conscient de la nécessité de donner un nouveau 
souffle à la coopération Maroc -Russie dans ce secteur porteur, a conclu avec la Russie un nouvel 
accord de coopération d'une durée de quatre ans, le sixième du genre depuis 1992.  
4.360.   Les relations économiques entre le Maroc et la Russie sont promises à un avenir florissant 
à l'image des liens solides qui se serreront par une volonté partagée de les consolider dans tous 
les domaines d'intérêt commun. Désormais, les échanges ne se limiteront plus aux produits 
agricoles, aux hydrocarbures et à la pêche.  
URUGUAY  
4.361.   Para Uruguay esta es una ocasión de gran interés para analizar y comprender como la 
pertenencia a la OMC de un país tan importante como la Federación de Rusia, fortalece y 
contribuye a l a Organización por un lado, y como ha contribuido a dotar a la Federación de Rusia 
de instrumentos para enfrentar enormes desafíos económicos y comerciales. Y consideramos que 
el saldo y el resultado hasta ahora es positivo para la Federación de Rusia y pa ra la Organización 
como seguramente surgirá del intercambio que tendrá lugar en este ejercicio.  
4.362.   Uruguay mantiene desde hace más de 150 años amistosas y constructivas relaciones con 
Rusia. Las relaciones económicas con Rusia se han desarrollado de forma mu y dinámica en los 
últimos años. Actualmente, el comercio de mercancías representa la forma principal de nuestras 
relaciones: Uruguay importa principalmente petróleo, abonos y productos químicos, mientras que 
exporta productos alimenticios como lácteos, car ne, frutas y pescado.  
4.363.   Uruguay le otorga una especial importancia a Rusia como destino de nuestras 
exportaciones y posee fuertes expectativas en doblar o triplicar las mismas, en especial en el 
sector cárnico, lácteo y frutícola y hortícola. Las exportacion es de carne experimentaron una caída 
generalizada por lo cual nuestros países aprobaron un Protocolo entre las autoridades sanitarias.  
4.364.   El diálogo bilateral a distintos niveles, es muy fluido y con numerosas misiones técnicas en 
ambos países. En los último s meses, hemos avanzado en cuestiones relacionadas a la obtención 
del permiso de suministro de carne de alta calidad, con lo cual se accede al mercado Premium sin 
límite cuantitativo y con un arancel del 15%, con lo cual esperamos incrementar las ventas en  
cortes de alta calidad.  
4.365.   Los vínculos con Rusia se consideran como prioritarios y nuestra intención es reforzarlos y 
generar nuevos espacios de trabajo en áreas tales como formación de empresas mixtas en el 
sector agroindustrial, utilización de zonas franc as, colaboración en esferas de alta tecnología como 
biotecnología, telecomunicaciones, electrónica, agricultura, energías renovables, entre otros.    
4.366.   Como comentario final, quisiéramos señalar el interés de ambos países por aunar 
esfuerzos para la pronta y  exitosa finalización de las negociaciones comerciales con un alto nivel 
de ambición así como el fortalecimiento del sistema multilateral de comercio basado en normas 
previsibles, transparentes y equilibradas como una herramienta para el desarrollo.  
ARMENI A 
4.367.   As we know, observation and monitoring of national trade policies are one of the 
fundamental WTO activities. We strongly support the TPR mechanism aimed at enhancing of 
transparency and building of confidence in the multilateral trading system.  
4.368.   As it was  mentioned today, this is the first review after Russian accession to the WTO in 
2012. Armenia having strong trade and economic links with the Russian Federation was among 
those WTO Members who were the most interested into its full membership to the WTO.  
4.369.   Historically, Armenia and the Russian Federation have very close links in various sectors of 
the economy. Russia is an important strategic partner for Armenia both in trade and investment. 
Currently, we have more than 1,000 companies with the Russian capit al successfully operating in 
Armenia. Russia is one of the main destinations for Armenian exports and also is the main source 
of Armenian imports. Almost 30% of all Armenian exports go to the Russian Federation. Trade 
between our two countries has grown su bstantially over the past 15 years.  WT/TPR /W/115  • Russian Federation  
 
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  4.370.   As you know, Armenia became a full member of the EAEU in 2015 and, since then, 
together with the other EAEU members, has been enjoying benefits from being part of the big, 
almost 200 -million market. In view of this, we a re very much interested in the further 
development and expanding of our economic and trade cooperation with all EAEU members.  
4.371.   We believe that Russian accession to the WTO provides the country with grounds for 
formation of an open, liberal, predictable, and  transparent trade policy. Thanks to the Trade Policy 
Review, we have an excellent opportunity to better understand the Russian trade and investment 
policies and assess their compliance with the WTO rules and practices.  
4.372.   In the years following its accession , Russia has made a significant progress in adopting 
economic reforms and increased the openness of its economy for trade and investment.  
4.373.   Despite all well -known challenges, Russia has shown its commitment to further integration 
into the global trading syst em by undertaking a number of reforms targeted at foreign trade 
liberalization, infrastructure development and business environment improvement.  
4.374.   We do hope that the efforts undertaken by the Russian Federation to modernize and 
diversify its economy will fu rther promote the country on the path of sustainable and inclusive 
growth.  
SRI LANKA  
4.375.   We believe that the accession of the Russian Federation to the World Trade Organization 
on 22 August 2012 was a very important landmark in the country's economy. We highly  appreciate 
the dedication and the efforts taken by the Russian Government in the accession process to 
integrate the Russian economy with the multilateral trading system. We are pleased to note the 
progress made by Russia in this direction. We are optimist ic that Russia would be able to 
overcome its negative growth experienced in the recent past in the years to come with the 
developments in its trade policy orientation.  
4.376.   Going through the comprehensive reports by the Russian Government and the WTO 
Secretaria t, we have noted the significant contribution from the services sector of the economy 
which accounts for around 62% to the Russian GDP. With regard to the tariff, Russia maintains the 
average applied MFN rate of 14.6% for the agricultural products while ma intain 6.5% for the 
non-agricultural products. The Russian authorities have identified the need of accelerating 
economic reforms, and enhancing market through transparent policies for the goods and services 
with the objective of boosting the investment in the country. A good indicator towards this 
achievement is the higher ranking position Russia maintains in the Global Doing Business Index.  
4.377.   Let me also briefly reflect on the historical close bilateral relations between Russia and 
Sri Lanka. The history sho ws that the formal relations between the two countries started in 1892 
with an establishment of Russian Consulate in Galle, Sri Lanka. The diplomatic relations between 
the two countries stared in 1957. Russia is a very important trading partner for Sri Lan ka and the 
strong relationship between the two countries has grown steadily over the time. The value of total 
trade turnover between the two countries has increased from US$212 million in 2007 to 
US$436  million in 2015, registering an increase of around 10 6% compared to 2007. Russia has 
been the single largest buyer of Ceylon Tea for several years.  
4.378.   The two countries have signed bilateral agreements in many areas. The first agreement of 
Economic and Technical Cooperation was signed in 1958, supporting establ ishment of Sri Lanka's 
steel cooperation, a flour mill and tyre cooperation. The same year, both countries signed the first 
trade agreement which permitted the exchange of goods between the two countries. This 
agreement was subsequently updated in 1964, 19 75 and 1977. In 1977, another agreement was 
signed by both countries enabling the currency system to be convertible. In the front of the 
cooperation in education, Sri Lanka has many students who have graduated from Universities in 
the Russian Federation in  different fields. In order to further strengthening the close bilateral 
relations between the two countries, an intergovernmental Commission on Trade -Economic and 
Scientific -Technical Cooperation has been established and the first meeting of the Commissio n was 
held in February this year in Moscow.  WT/TPR/W/115  • Russian Federation  
 
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  4.379.   My delegation highly appreciates Russia's continued commitment to the multilateral 
trading system and its active engagement in the negotiations in the WTO. We welcome Russia's 
joining the Trade Facilitation Agree ment on 22 April 2016, becoming the 77th Member to deposit its 
instrument of acceptance of the TFA. The dynamic role played by Ambassador Gennady Ovechko 
and his team in proactively engaging in ongoing activities of the WTO is highly commendable.  
CUBA  
4.380.   El Gobierno de Cuba acoge con satisfacción la presentación por parte de Rusia del informe 
para su primer examen de las políticas comerciales en el marco de la OMC y resaltamos el 
compromiso de transparencia de ese país en lo que concierne a su régimen de polít ica comercial.  
4.381.   Como se plantea en el informe, la adhesión de Rusia a la OMC en agosto de 2012 y cito 
"vino acompañada de cambios legislativos fundamentales que dieron unos fundamentos sólidos y 
previsibles al mercado ruso para todos los participantes, incl uidos los operadores extranjeros", fin 
de la cita. Como resultado, la incorporación de las normas de la OMC a la legislación nacional ha 
contribuido a mejorar la calificación internacional de Rusia por su facilidad para hacer negocios. De 
estar clasificada  en el 2012 en el puesto 120, Rusia ha ascendido al puesto 51 en el 2016.  
4.382.   En los últimos 4 años, la política comercial de este Miembro se ha centrado sobre todo en 
conseguir una mayor integración en el sistema multilateral de comercio y una mayor liberaliz ación 
del régimen de comercio, tanto en el marco de los compromisos asumidos en la OMC, como a 
través de la integración económica regional.  
4.383.   Aún con estos logros, la economía rusa ha experimentado una desaceleración desde finales 
de 2012. Particularmente en  el 2015 y durante los primeros meses de 2016, el desarrollo de la 
economía rusa resultó afectado negativamente por factores externos. El deterioro del entorno 
económico exterior sumado a las sanciones comerciales contra ese país, se tradujo en graves 
consecuencias para su economía, lo que incluyó la depreciación del rublo, una reducción del saldo 
positivo de la balanza comercial, una mayor incertidumbre económica y un endurecimiento de las 
condiciones de los préstamos no relacionadas con el precio. Cuba si empre ha denunciado los 
efectos adversos que las medidas coercitivas unilaterales acarrean para los Estados y sus pueblos 
y reitera la necesidad de su pronta eliminación.   
4.384.   Durante el primer semestre de 2016, la recesión económica se ha mitigado, lo que 
muestra que la economía rusa se ha adaptado a los recientes choques externos. De hecho, en el 
2017 se prevé una recuperación del crecimiento del PIB.  
4.385.   El Gobierno cubano reconoce los esfuerzos realizados por Rusia para integrarse cada día 
más al contexto mult ilateral y regional y su apego a las normas y principios de la OMC. Además, 
queremos resaltar el excelente estado de nuestras relaciones bilaterales que se extienden a 
diversos órdenes, no solo el económico -comercial.  
4.386.   Felicitamos a Rusia por su dinamismo d entro de este y otros foros internacionales y le 
deseamos éxitos en su examen de política comercial.  
BURUNDI  
4.387.   Ma délégation s'associe à la déclaration faite par le Bénin au nom des PMA.  
4.388.   Elle fél icite la Russie pour son premier examen des Politiques commerci ales depuis son 
accession à l'OMC en 2012, sa ratification de l'Accord sur la facilitation des Échanges et la remercie 
pour les informations importantes qu'elle a fournies sur les réalisations du pays dans les domaines 
économique et commercial afin d'améli orer le climat de la libéralisation du commerce et des 
investissements.  
4.389.   Ma délégation se félicite des réformes législatives et réglementaires menées par la Russie, 
contribuant ainsi à renforcer son intégration dans le système commercial multilatéral et qui  visent 
à libéraliser le régime commercial.  WT/TPR /W/115  • Russian Federation  
 
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  4.390.   Le Burundi se réjouit des excellentes relations d'amitié et de coopération qui ont toujours 
existé entre le Burundi et la Fédération de Russie depuis l'établissement des relations 
diplomatiques en 1962 et que, pa r là, un grand nombre d'accords intergouvernementaux ont été 
signés notamment dans le domaine du transport aérien, la communication, la science et la culture 
ainsi que dans le domaine militaire.  
4.391.   Ces relations viennent d'être particulièrement renforcées par  la visite en mai dernier au 
Burundi de S.E. M. M.L Bogdanov, Vice -ministre des Affaires Étrangères de la Fédération de Russie 
et Représentant spécial du Président pour le Moyen Orient où il a été convenu, avec son 
homologue burundais, de conclure un accor d sur la promotion et la protection réciproque des 
investissements.  
4.392.   Dans la même logique, un accord de partenariat entre la Banque de la République du 
Burundi (BRB) et Gazprombank (Une Banque Russe) a été signé à Moscou en juin 2016, lors de la 
visite de S.E. M. Joseph Butore, Deuxième Vice -Président de la République du Burundi et ma 
délégation exprime de cela sa volonté et la nécessité de renouveler la coopération dans d'autres 
domaines économiques du pays.   
4.393.   Ma délégation salue l'initiative de la Fédérat ion de Russie quand elle a décidé de 
développer la politique de stabiliser les prix à la consommation pour le bien être de la population.  
4.394.   Ma délégation salue également la volonté du Gouvernement russe de prendre des mesures 
d'amélioration du climat des inv estissements sans oublier la création des conditions pour la 
croissance des investissements nationaux et étrangers afin d'augmenter l'expansion du commerce 
international dans la transparence et le renforcement de la compétitivité économique pour tous.  
4.395.   Le Burundi prend note du développement en Russie des services et infrastructures 
soutenant l'universalisation des télécommunications, en particulier dans les régions rurales, y 
compris par la construction de réseaux haut débit en fibre optique.  
4.396.   Ma délégation e ncourage la Russie dans son intérêt d'octroyer un traitement préférentiel 
aux Pays les Moins Avancés en complétant ses dispositions par la notification de préférences 
spécifiques bénéficiant aux prestataires de services issus des PMA.  
KYRGHYZ  REPUBLIC  
4.397.   On 12 August 2015, the Kyrgyz Republic became a full member of the EAEU joining the 
Russian Federation, Armenia, Belarus and Kazakhstan in further regional economic integration. 
Accession to Customs Union has opened wide spectrum of opportunities to the Kyrgyz  Republic for 
promotion of Kyrgyz goods and services on markets of Russian Federation and other member 
States of the EAEU.  
4.398.   The Russian Federation is the strategic partner of the Kyrgyz Republic. More than 
200 agreements have been concluded between the Kyrg yz Republic and the Russian Federation. In 
2015, the share of the Russian Federation in the Kyrgyz Republic's trade turnover was 25%, i.e. 
9.4% of export and 31.2% of import. Russian business sector and enterprises are widely 
represented on the market of t he Kyrgyz Republic.  
4.399.   Russian investments into the Kyrgyz Republic's economy demonstrate rising tendency, the 
total volume which, for 2015, comprised US$1573.2 million. In order to finance entrepreneurship 
projects, the Kyrgyz -Russian Development Fund was es tablished and is functioning with an equity 
capital of US$500 million.  
4.400.   The Kyrgyz Republic supports the efforts undertaken by the Russian Federation on trade 
regime liberalization in accordance with the obligations and WTO rules.  
MYANMAR  
4.401.   First of all, I w ould like to extend a warm welcome to the delegation of the Russian 
Federation and appreciate their comprehensive information on Trade Policy to enhance cooperation 
with international partners.  WT/TPR/W/115  • Russian Federation  
 
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  4.402.   The Russian Federation became the 156th WTO Member in August 2 012. This Trade Policy 
Review is first of its kinds for Russian Federation and has provided an opportunity for member 
states to better understand the economic and trade policies of the Russian Federation.  
4.403.   We welcome this Review and have optimistic on polit ical and economic reforms of the 
Russian Federation.  
4.404.   Myanmar and Russia have established diplomatic relations since 18 February 1948.  
4.405.   According to our record, the bilateral trade between Myanmar and Russia were gradually 
increased. In the 2015 -2016 Fiscal  Year, the two -way trade reached over US$28 million. We would 
like to see the continuation of this positive trend to meet the target of bilateral trade between our 
two countries.  
4.406.   In terms of the Foreign Direct Investment in Myanmar, the current volume of i nvestment 
from the Russian Federation is US$94 million according to the FDI statistics published in 
June 2016.  
4.407.   In 2014, Myanmar -Russia Trade and Economic Cooperation Commission was held in 
Myanmar and adopted a trade cooperation roadmap. We are looking for ward to hold the Second 
Trade and Economic Cooperation Commission meeting in the near future.  
4.408.   The Russian Federation is an important player of both the regional and multilateral trading 
systems. We are glad to note that the Russian Federation has been supp ortive of the need to bring 
the current trade negotiations forward, including the DDA negotiations.  
4.409.   The delegation of Myanmar is pleased to convey our sincere thanks and appreciation to 
Mr. Maksim Medvedkov and his delegation for their constructive engagem ent throughout this first 
TPR. 
PHILIPPINES  
4.410.   The Philippines would like to associate itself with the ASEAN statement in recognizing 
Russia as one of ASEAN's major trading partners.  
4.411.   This year marks the 40th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relat ions between 
the Philippines and the Russian Federation. In June 1976, the Philippines established its diplomatic 
relations with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Subsequently, robust bilateral 
relations continued, with the Philippines formal ly recognizing the Russian Federation in 
December  1991.  
4.412.   Since 1991, the Philippines and the Russian Federation have been sharing cordial and 
expanding relations. This was manifested through the exchange of high -level officials and 
recognition of initiative s in the field of politics, economics, culture and tourism.  
4.413.   Russia has been an important trading partner of the Philippines. Among the top commodity 
exports of the Philippine to Russia include carrageenan, parts of air conditioning machines, ignition 
wiring sets, and desiccated coconuts. While among the top imports of the Philippines from Russia 
include petroleum oils, semi -finished products of iron or non -alloy steel, and coal.  
4.414.   In November 2015, the Philippines and the Russian Federation have signed an Agr eement 
creating the Philippines -Russia Joint Commission on Trade and Economic Cooperation (JCTEC) at 
the sidelines of the APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting in Manila. The JCTEC will serve as an 
overarching framework to facilitate and promote trade and economi c cooperation between the 
Philippines and Russia. The Philippines is in the process of completing the executive ratification of 
the Agreement and is in coordination with Russia in identifying possible topics for the agenda of 
the inaugural JCTEC meeting.  
4.415.   Russia is one of the largest markets in Europe with a population of over 150 million people. 
Its accession to the WTO in August 2012 marked a landmark in its integration into the multilateral 
trading system. This resulted in the implementation of the WTO ru les into its national legislation, WT/TPR /W/115  • Russian Federation  
 
- 56 - 
 
  which contributed to improvements in its international ratings. The Philippines notes that Russia 
has been annually moving upward in the World Bank's Doing Business rating since 2012. From 
being ranked 120th (out of 183) in 2012, Russia has moved up to 51st place (out of 189) in 2016.  
MAURITIUS  
4.416.   Since its accession to the WTO, the Russian Federation has been an active participant in 
the deliberations that shaped the outcomes at various levels at the WTO. This is also visibl e in the 
progress made by the Russian Federation in its wide ranging commitments including tariff 
reductions it made when acceding to the WTO.  
4.417.   Russia is a member of the Information Technology Agreement (ITA), in which Mauritius 
has been an active particip ant.   
4.418.   We are encouraged by the Russian Government's efforts for improving the doing business 
climate and environment and to efforts for macro -economic stability in the face of international 
constraints.  
4.419.   Mauritius and Russia are exploring ways to improve o ur bilateral trade and economic 
relations. Tourist arrivals into Mauritius from Russia have been increasing, thanks to a carefully 
crafted strategy aimed at diversifying our tourism source markets. We look forward to an 
expansion of trade possibilities wit h the Russian Federation. Mauritius has submitted a proposal for 
a Mauritius -Russian Free Trade Agreement. We have also proposed a Double Taxation Avoidance 
Agreement and an Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement. We hope that the Russian 
authoritie s would extend a favourable consideration to our proposals.  
4.420.   We look to prospect opportunities in the field of industry, given the wide industrial base of 
the Russian Federation, seafood exports, training and capacity building in high technology 
industries,  assaying and metrology, mutual recognition of educational qualifications.  
VIET  NAM 
4.421.   It is our pleasure to associate ourselves with the ASEAN statement presented by 
Ambassador Mariam Salleh of Malaysia.   
4.422.   It is highlighted in the Secretariat's report that t he Russian Federation ranks tenth in the 
world economy, with a nominal GDP of around US$1,326 billion in 2015. The ratio of merchandise 
trade (exports and imports) to GDP averaged about 40% during the period 2012 -15. In 2014, the 
Russian Federation ranked 7th among world merchandise exporters and 11th among importers. It 
is one of the world's largest manufacturers. The main industries include oil and gas, mining, 
processing precious stones and metals, aircraft building, aerospace production, weapons and 
military machinery manufacture, transport, and agricultural machinery production.  
4.423.   The WTO multilateral trade system has been beneficial to the economic development of all 
members including Russian Federation and Viet Nam. In return, the Russian Federation ha s also 
contributed to the system by its active and constructive engagement. Viet Nam also commends 
the Russian Federation for ratifying the Trade Facilitation Agreement earlier this year.  
4.424.   In recent years, the bilateral economic relationship between Viet Na m and Russian 
Federation has a significant increase. The two countries have achieved a number of satisfied 
results in trade, investment and economic cooperation. We appreciate the development of the 
bilateral ties between our two countries which have gone from strength to strength.  
4.425.   The Russian Federation is a traditional partner and becomes (one of the most) important 
trade partners of Viet Nam in trade and investment. In the first seven months of 2016, The 
amount of two -way trade between Viet Nam -Russia r eaches US$1,56 billion, increased more than 
30% in comparison to which of the same time of last year.  
4.426.   The Russian Federation has 113 existing investment projects in Viet Nam with the total 
registered capital of up to US$2 billion, ranking the 17th out of 114 investment partners in 
Viet Nam. The Russian Federation directly invests in most of the economic fields from oil and gas WT/TPR/W/115  • Russian Federation  
 
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  exploitation to telecommunication, agricultural and fishery processing, infrastructure construction, 
etc. In return, Viet Nam has 2 0 existing investment projects in Russia with the total capital of 
around US$3 billion.  
4.427.   Viet Nam appreciates the outcome of the 19th meeting of the Inter -Governmental 
Committee between Viet Nam and Russia that has been recently conducted this September 201 6. 
At the 19th meeting, two sides agree to promote importation of agricultural products, especially to 
accelerate negotiation of a bilateral agreement on food safety for these imported products. The 
remaining issues of differences between two sides will be  continued to discuss in a bilateral and 
cooperative manner.  
4.428.   Viet Nam would like to appreciate efforts of Russia in development of the Viet Nam -Eurasia 
Economic Union Free Trade Agreement (VN -EAEU FTA) which features Viet Nam, Russia 
Federation, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia, and Kyrgyzstan. This FTA was initiated from 
March,  2013 and after eight official rounds of negotiations and many mid -term meetings, the 
Agreement was signed on 29 May 2015 and will come into force in some days, i.e. from 
5 October  2016. The Agreement includes contents of trade in goods, trade in services, investment, 
customs cooperation, sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS), technical barriers to trade (TBT) 
and legal and institutional issues in accordance with regulations of the W orld Trade Organisation 
(WTO). The signing of the FTA is regarded as a crucial move to promote the cooperative and boost 
trade and investment for the sake of both sides. When the FTA is implemented, the two -way trade 
turnover will make a new record. Viet N am also believes that the FTA would contribute 
considerably to the development of cooperation between the Eurasia Economic Union and other 
nations in ASEAN.  
4.429.   Last but not least, we acknowledge the important role that the Russian Federation plays in 
the mult ilateral trading system. We look forward to enhance the Viet Nam –Russian Federation 
connectivity even further in the year to come.  
4.430.   I would like to conclude this statement by putting on record our high appreciation for the 
contribution to the system by wish ing Russian Federation every success in its economic and social 
development and the Russian delegation a fruitful trade policy review.  
GUATEMALA  
4.431.   Las relaciones diplomáticas entre Guatemala y la Federación Rusa iniciaron en 1945 y se 
retomaron en la década de 1990. Desde entonces, los intercambios y la cooperación entre 
nuestros países se han intensificado. Prueba de ello, es la suscripción del Acuerdo de Promoción y 
Protección Recíproca de Inversiones (APRI) a finales de 2013. Este instrumento está únicamen te 
pendiente de ser aprobado por nuestro Organismo Legislativo para su entrada en vigor, y en él se 
contempla el establecimiento de reglas y estándares que permitirán la promoción y protección 
legal de las inversiones e inversionistas guatemaltecos y rusos , en cada uno de nuestros 
territorios. Luego de la firma del APRI, una delegación de empresarios guatemaltecos realizó una 
exitosa misión comercial a Moscú durante el primer trimestre de 2014, en la que se exploraron 
diferentes oportunidades de negocios, i nversión y cooperación.  
4.432.   La Federación Rusa ha estrechado también sus relaciones en el ámbito regional, a través 
del acercamiento que se ha realizado en el marco del Sistema de Integración Centroamericana 
(SICA). En este sentido, el año pasado, la Federaci ón Rusa formalizó su solicitud para convertirse 
en Observador Extrarregional del Sistema. Adicionalmente, nuestros países mantienen un diálogo 
sobre las diferentes vías para el establecimiento de mecanismos que permitan profundizar la 
cooperación mutua en áreas tales como la seguridad, la lucha contra el narcotráfico, asuntos 
culturales, económicos y comerciales.  
4.433.   Las relaciones comerciales entre nuestros países han mantenido un ritmo creciente en la 
última década. El flujo comercial de bienes superó a fina les de 2015, los 51 millones de dólares 
EE.UU., es decir un incremento de más del 400% respecto de 2005. Éste se concentró en el 
intercambio de café,  abonos y fertilizantes, tabaco y productos plásticos.  
4.434.   La Inversión Extranjera Directa proveniente de Rusi a ha tenido también un importante 
incremento en los últimos años. Entre 2012 y 2016, Guatemala recibió más de 460 millones de WT/TPR /W/115  • Russian Federation  
 
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  dólares EE.UU. provenientes de la Federación Rusa, invertidos particularmente en el área de 
agricultura, petróleo, minas y cantera s. Cabe destacar que, con base en el acercamiento 
mencionado anteriormente, existe un importante potencial de crecimiento en el flujo comercial y 
de inversiones a nivel bilateral.  
4.435.   En relación con el examen que hoy nos concierne, destacamos los esfuerzos e mprendidos 
por las autoridades rusas para generar mayor eficiencia en las operaciones aduaneras, a través de 
la simplificación de los procesos para las importaciones y exportaciones. La puesta en marcha de 
una ventanilla única y la unificación de la inform ación en una sola plataforma electrónica serán 
elementos que darán gran impulso a estos importantes pasos. De igual manera, consideramos 
tendrán un impacto muy positivo las reformas fiscales y administrativas internas tendientes a 
facilitar la comprensión de la reglamentación en estas áreas, así como el fortalecimiento del 
sistema de compras públicas, destinado a generar mayor transparencia durante todas las fases del 
proceso.   
4.436.   Como retos a corto plazo, consideramos será de gran importancia continuar los e sfuerzos 
de privatización de las empresas comerciales del Estado, así como el aceleramiento de reformas 
estructurales, debido al gran aporte que podrían brindar para impulsar un rápido crecimiento de la 
economía.  
PAKISTAN  
4.437.   Prior to the joining of the WTO, t he Russian Federation had already embarked on a long 
journey of reforms towards achieving the objective of a market oriented -economy. And since its 
accession in 2012 to the WTO membership, the Russian Federation has started to trade and 
compete at an inter national level within the multilateral trade systems of the WTO.  
4.438.   During the period under review, the Russian federation was faced with several challenges, 
and therefore a modest economic growth was achieved during the first three years of period under 
review, and a contraction of 3.5% were registered in 2015.  
4.439.   Within this context, we would like to praise the swift and effective response of the Russian 
Government to overcome the situation by taking appropriate measures such as the introduction of 
fiscal ince ntives and a substitution programme. These well targeted strategies were implemented 
during 2015 and 2016, and today, forecast for the Russian federation predicts a positive growth by 
2017.  
4.440.   During the period under review, we would like to also commend the different reforms 
undertaken by the Government to facilitate trade and investment and to boost competition as well 
as improving its Intellectual Property Rights regime in way of its legislation, administration and 
enforcement. Particularly, we noted with a ppreciation the ratification of the Trade Facilitation 
Agreement by the Russian Federation in April this year.   
4.441.   From the period of 2015 -2016, the Global Competitiveness Index, ranked the Russian 
Federation at 45th place, an improvement of eight places as compared to its previous ranking. 
This demonstrates the important efforts undertaken by the Government to achieve a highly 
competitive economy.    
4.442.   A few words on the bilateral trade between Pakistan and the Russian Federation, the two 
countries have starte d to actively engage through different initiatives in order to boost bilateral 
trade, given that the current trade volume of US$350 -400 million does not reflect the real trade 
potential of both countries.  
4.443.   During the year 2014 -2015, the two countries held s everal sessions of Pakistan -Russia 
Inter-Governmental Commission on Trade, Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation and the 
fourth session was held in Islamabad in November 2015. At these sessions, there was a clear 
willingness of the business commun ities of both countries to increase trade and investment 
opportunities in energy, oil/gas explorations, leather products, pharmaceutics, vegetables and 
fruits.  WT/TPR/W/115  • Russian Federation  
 
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  4.444.   It is worthwhile to mention that North -South Gas pipeline, which will be a major energy 
artery f or our country, is being built by foreign investment from Russia. This is very important for 
meeting our energy security needs. We appreciate this investment and that the Russian federation 
for their assistance and cooperation in that regard. The Project i s estimated to cost around 
US$2.5  billion. It will be capable of transporting 1.2 BCFD of gas from Karachi to Lahore via 42” 
dia 1100 Km pipeline system.  
4.445.   At WTO, we appreciate the active role and engagement of Russian Federation led by 
H.E. Ambassador Mr.  Gennady Ovechko and his team in Geneva.  
TAJIKISTAN  
4.446.   Tajikistan and Russia are strategic partners and historically linked by centuries -old 
tradition, close interaction and deep interpenetration of cultures. We have also shared the 
moments of sadness and hap piness under one roof of the Soviet Union. Today, Tajikistan and 
Russia have common positions on the majority of conceptual questions of the international and 
regional policy as well as economic integrations.  
4.447.   It should be noted that being a major trading p artner Russia over the past few years made 
direct investments in Tajikistan close to US$1 in industries such as energy, manufacturing, metals 
and mining, construction industry, aviation, rail transportation, high technology and agriculture.  
4.448.   We welcome Russ ia's efforts and measures to keep its economic stability despite the 
challenges faced like the financial crisis and decrease of oil prices during the review years which 
has also an impact on economy of Tajikistan.  
4.449.   We compliment the increase in ranking of t he doing business and wish Russia to become 
top 20 in this ranking.  
4.450.   We are in a view that the mechanism of TPR is a unique platform to revise the obligations 
and take homework from the members to further improve the national trade regime.  
4.451.   We welcome Russia 's commitment to Multilateralism as well as the ratification of the Trade 
Facilitation agreement.  
LAO PDR 
4.452.   Allow me first to commend the Russian Federation for its efforts in conducting their first 
TPR exercise. We appreciate the efforts put in conducting o f such comprehensive trade review. 
Your report underlines well that how over the recent years, the business environment and balance 
of payments improved despite the economic downturn.  
4.453.   Regarding trade between the Russian Federation and Lao PDR, total mercha ndise trade 
between the two countries was valued at US$16.5 million in 2015 with a largely positive trade 
balance for Russia. Laotian exports to Russia consist essentially of articles of apparel, wood and 
footwear, whilst leading imports from Russia are mo tor vehicles for the transport of goods, unused 
postage and articles of goldsmiths' or silversmiths' wares. In sum, trade in goods between 
Lao PDR and the Russian Federation increased by 35.3% in 5 years (from 2011 to 2015) at an 
annual average growth of 6 .2%. 
4.454.   With respect to tariffs, we are glad to see that the applied tariff rates are being 
continuously reduced since 2012. Lao PDR benefits from Russia's Generalised System of 
Preferences, although we believe that it would be highly beneficial for LDCs to e xtend the coverage 
of DFQF unilateral preferences, both in terms of covered tariff lines and reduction of rates to zero.  
4.455.   Concerning customs formalities, Lao PDR would like to signal Russia's effort in simplifying 
substantially its customs procedures, which  includes a welcomed draft Customs Code, a Single 
Window approach to formalities, a drastic reduction in the number of required documents to 
provide and a system for automatic goods declaration. Furthermore, we very much appreciate the 
fact that the Russia n Federation has deposited on 22 April 2016 the instrument of acceptance of WT/TPR /W/115  • Russian Federation  
 
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  the Agreement on Trade Facilitation. Indeed, a prompt entry into force of this Agreement is of the 
utmost importance for landlocked developed countries like Lao PDR.  
BELARUS  (OBSER VER) 
4.456.   This TPR is of particular interest to the Republic of Belarus since the Russian Federation is 
our key economic partner in the framework of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU).  
4.457.   The accession of the Russian Federation to the WTO in 2012 was a milestone e vent 
streamlining international trade in our region in compliance with the world's best practices. The 
Russian membership also had an important WTO -consistency impact on the integration process 
within the EAEU.  
4.458.   It should be recognized that Russia has achie ved progress over the last four years in the 
implementation of its WTO commitments. As a result, the average weighted customs tariff was 
decreased to the level of roughly 6%. Belarus supported fulfilment of the Russian Federation's 
WTO commitments by adopt ing the necessary changes to the Single Customs Tariff of the EAEU.  
4.459.   Russia rendered its support to the trade liberalization initiatives, like Trade Facilitation 
Agreement, and consistently promoted the central role of the WTO in various international fora.  
These developments confirm Russia's commitment to the multilateral trading system.  WT/TPR/W/115  • Russian Federation  
 
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  5  REPLIES BY THE REPRE SENTATIVE OF THE RUS SIAN FEDERATION AND ADDITIONAL 
COMMENTS  
5.1.  Please allow me to start with my words of appreciation for interventions of those developed  
and developing Members, who gave their positive assessment of Russia's fulfilment of its WTO 
commitments.  
5.2.  In your statements we felt sincere support of the Membership for Russia's efforts to stabilize 
and improve economic situation and we are thankful for  your positive reactions to the anti -crisis 
measures carried out by our Government and the Central Bank.  
5.3.  We were also very pleased to receive high evaluation of Russia's role as a devoted supporter 
of the rules -based multilateral trading system and an acti ve participant in most WTO processes. 
Please be assured that Russia will do its best to continue playing an active and constructive role in 
all areas of the WTO activity.  
5.4.  It was also a pleasure for us to hear warm and well deserved words in respect of Russ ia's 
notification discipline, in particular, in agricultural sector. We feel it is especially important because 
this positive assessment that comes from the Members who are well -known for their role as the 
guardians of the WTO principles and rules.  
5.5.  Our spe cial thanks go to our EAEU neighbours: Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan 
who expressed their firm stance and commitment to continue to engage in our joint efforts on 
building and maintaining fully WTO -compatible trade regime of our Eurasian Econo mic Union.  
5.6.  We thank Members for their detailed and insightful questions on Russia's trade regime. 
Indeed, you brought our attention to some elements of our WTO commitments which were beyond 
the main focus of our implementation work within the TPR period. Y our fair (even sometimes 
negative) assessment of some trade -policy measures helped us to get a fuller picture of the 
priorities of the Members regarding Russia's implementation of the WTO commitments. This will 
enable us to structure and streamline our pol icies to make our work more effective.  
5.7.  This is the first TPR of the Russian Federation. It is held in the course of the transitional 
period of implementation of our commitments in the WTO amidst accommodation of Russia's trade 
regime and trade policy to th e WTO environment.  
5.8.  Thus, it is no surprise that some Members point at (and in our view sometimes exaggerate) 
the issues which, as they believe, show certain deficiencies in Russia fulfilling its commitments. 
They claim lack of predictability in doing busin ess in Russia ignoring the fact that Russia's ranking 
in the World bank's Doing Business index moved from 112th to 51st during 4 years upon 
accession. They claim that import substitution policies are not in line with the objectives and 
principles of the WT O, ignoring the fact that these policies are currently implemented only within 
the framework of governmental procurement system, which is outside Russia WTO commitments.  
5.9.  At the same time, a great number of delegations estimate that the implementation proce ss is 
on the right path, and, with due attention and engagement of the Russian authorities, the issues 
which are on the agenda of this TPR will be successfully solved. The argument of those Members – 
that maintaining open and transparent trade regime will contribute to the prompt recovery of the 
Russian economy – is an important message for us.  
5.10.   We also took note of an argument put forward by the delegation of Mexico in its statement: 
that politics should not interfere with trade. Interestingly enough though : the statements of those 
Members who most actively resort to politics in their trade relations with Russia were the most 
critical ones.  
5.11.   For the sake of accuracy, let me remind you that those Members initiated economic and 
financial restrictions, directly proclaiming economic isolation of Russia and weakening of its 
economy as their primary goal. Those measures added to economic recession. The imports 
slumped (as well as exports from Russia, by the way). And now it's Russia who gets all the blame 
for that. This is just not fair.  WT/TPR /W/115  • Russian Federation  
 
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  5.12.   And it's our feeling that we are not alone in that estimate. Most other Members share our 
view and, as we heard here on Wednesday, are looking forward to develop mutually beneficial 
trade and investment relations with Russia. I woul d like to underline that Russia is open for 
cooperation with all interested economies.  
5.13.   Now let me move to answering some of the major trade -related concerns expressed by the 
Members on the first day of our TPR.  
Areas of competence of the EAEU  
5.14.   The competen ce of the Eurasian Economic Union is established by the Treaty on the 
Eurasian Economic Union signed 29 May 2014 and international treaties in the framework of the 
Union. Supranational competence of the Union covers the following main areas: import tariff rates, 
tariff preferences, tariff -rate quotas, non -tariff measures (e.g. import or export restrictions, import 
licensing), trade remedy investigations and imposition of trade remedy measures, customs 
regulation, technical regulation and SPS measures, compe tition and antitrust regulation on 
cross-border markets. In these areas, the Eurasian Economic Commission is empowered to take 
decisions that have direct effect on the Member States of the Union.  
Transparency of the EAEU  
5.15.   Both draft and adopted decisions ar e published on the Internet portal of the Union within 
the time limits that ensure legal certainty and meet reasonable expectations of persons whose 
rights and/or obligations may be affected by these regulatory legal acts, but in any case before 
their effe ctive dates (entry into force). Draft regulatory acts shall be generally published within 
30 calendar days before the date of their adoption. Publications of draft decisions include 
explanation of the purpose of their adoption. Moreover, the decisions that  might affect 
environment or business activity in the Union are subject to prior regulatory impact assessment.  
Transparency in trade remedy investigations  
5.16.   The trade remedy practice of the Union is fully transparent. Notices regarding trade remedy 
investig ations are published on the official website of the Eurasian Economic Commission. Each 
participant of the investigation may also apply for access to full electronic non -confidential record 
of the investigation through the website.  
5.17.   Public notices are also forwarded by an investigating authority (i.e. Department for Internal 
Market Defence, or DIMD) to the competent authority of the exporting third country and other 
interested parties known to the investigating authority.  
EAEU Compliance with WTO Commitment s 
5.18.   Given the competence of the EAEU in some trade policy issues certain commitments taken 
by the Russian Federation, as well as by other EAEU members during their WTO accessions are 
being implemented through the decisions taken by the EAEU bodies.  
5.19.   Conformit y of the Union's legal framework and the decisions taken by the Union with the 
relevant WTO Agreements is ensured by the Treaty on the Functioning of the Customs Union in the 
Framework of the Multilateral Trading System, which was signed on 19 May 2011.  
5.20.   The Treaty on the Functioning of the Customs Union in the Framework of the Multilateral 
Trading System ensures conformity of the law and practice of the Eurasian Economic Union 
("EAEU") with regard to application of trade measures, including trade defense m easures with the 
relevant WTO Agreements. This treaty imposes an obligation on Unions' bodies to effectively 
implement WTO commitments of its Members.  
Import substitution  
5.21.   One of our big trading partners believes that Russia started import substitution imme diately 
after its WTO accession.  WT/TPR/W/115  • Russian Federation  
 
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  5.22.   In fact, we started seriously considering this policy two years later, after this big trading 
partner introduced restrictive measures on trade and economic cooperation with Russia. It was a 
response to external threats, whi ch limited our access to money and technologies, and threatened 
to spread into other imports and even exports.  
5.23.   Import substitution in Russia means creation of competitive domestic production rather than 
elimination of foreign products from domestic market . For instance, with respect to industrial 
policy, the key objectives are the development of innovative, high technology, environmentally 
friendly industrial production, stimulation of scientific research, efficient use of financial, labour 
and environment al resource.  
5.24.   It is based not on administrative preferences but on creation of favourable institutional and 
macroeconomic conditions for the development of domestic enterprises – our future world market 
champions. In this sense, this policy is very much di fferent from usual import substitution policies 
applied widely 10 -20 years ago by many WTO Members.  
5.25.   Only in the area of government procurement, where Russia has no WTO commitment in this 
area, we restricted procurement of some goods from abroad.   
5.26.   In Augus t 2016, we informed Members about our intention to join GPA, and we will proceed 
with submitting an offer. Naturally, successful completion of these negotiations may influence 
current restrictions in respect of foreign products on government procurement.  
5.27.   In agriculture, import substitution is also considered to be within the framework of food 
security concept. Respective strategies never aim at achieving a 100% share of domestic products 
in internal consumption and allow for substantial share for imports. All this is in line with our WTO 
commitments.  
5.28.   In addition, the Russian legislation does not provide for any preferences to domestic 
agriculture producers.  
5.29.   It is also worth mentioning that we take appropriate measures to secure consistency of all 
our import  substitution policies with WTO rules. In case of deviations, like preferences for investors 
in automotive sector, such deviations are justified by our negotiated accession obligations.  
Fossil fuel subsidies  
5.30.   This is a new trade issue for us, and I fear we may have different understandings in respect 
of our policies in the energy sector. We have not registered any internal subsidies in respect of 
fossil fuels, as they are defined in the WTO Agreement. Duties for oil export decreased in parallel 
with an incre ase of natural resources extraction tax. In respect of gas, current export duty is in 
line with our WTO commitments, and we consider it not as a subsidy but as a fiscal instrument.  
5.31.   In this context, on Wednesday, some Members brought up our dual pricing for  gas. Like 
many other Members, we do consider dual pricing fully WTO consistent. Nevertheless, our 
Government decided to gradually approximate incomes from domestic and export sales of gas for 
industrial users. It's not a secret that energy consumption in Russia per 1 GDP unit is higher than 
for instance, in France by 4.8 times and Italy by 5.6 times. We acknowledge this problem and will 
continue to work on its solutions.  
Customs  
5.32.   On Wednesday, many WTO Members appreciated recent developments in simplificati on of 
Russian customs formalities revealing common positive attitude to our Customs' performance in 
this area. The Russian Customs works in close cooperation with international experts assessing 
cross border operations and procedures according to the indic es of doing business ranking. It is 
highly welcomed that the approach and the methods applied by these experts are being more and 
more refined with consideration to implementation of stringent indicators set to Customs by the 
Government and various logisti cal and infrastructure aspects.  WT/TPR /W/115  • Russian Federation  
 
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  5.33.   I would like to note that Russia and its EAEU Partners efficiently coordinate common 
customs policy through the Union legislation in order to harmonize and simplify customs 
procedures, including in the areas of customs valua tion, rules of origin, classification and customs 
tariff.  
5.34.   The new revised Customs Code of the EAEU is expected to come into force in 2017. It will 
focus among other areas on simplified customs operations and procedures, namely  
 implementation of a Single W indow concept;  
 priority of electronic declaration;  
 further reduction of goods release time; and  
 submission of declarations without supporting documents.  
5.35.   Our Federal Customs Service has already de facto implemented a number of many 
important decisions bas ed on international standards to facilitate foreign trade at the national 
level. To mention some of them, a single electronic environment for EDI purposes between 
Customs and other Agencies is established, 99% of all customs declarations are filed electron ically, 
and the number of documents required for customs control and goods release time is significantly 
reduced in accordance with target indicators set and monitored by the Government.  
SPS 
5.36.   We share the interest to the issues raised by the Members and ar e aware of the effect of 
SPS measures on trade.  
5.37.   As a WTO Member, in applying its SPS measures, the Russian Federation adheres to the 
standards, guidelines and recommendations of the Codex Alimentarius Commision, World 
Organization for Animal Health and th e International Plant Protection Convention.  
5.38.   We are ensuring harmonization of the SPS legislation with the relevant international 
standards both on the EAEU level and at the national level. Harmonization is still an on -going 
process. To give you some exam ples: pesticides, veterinary drugs, antibiotics and MRLs are 
harmonized at the EAEU level. At the national level, we adopted amendments to the Federal Law 
on veterinary concerning regionalization and introduced electronic certification and traceability.  
5.39.   The Russian Federation treats with due diligence all concerns raised by the WTO Members 
within the Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. We aim at resolving them on 
bilateral basis using different instruments. Together with our trading partners we are open to hold 
bilateral meetings and consultations. Sometimes they end positively removing a Member's 
concern. Some issues may need further attention as the risk for human, animals' and plants' lives 
and health underlying a particular measure still p ersists.  
5.40.   I reiterate that our SPS measures are justified and applied to protect human, animal and 
plant life or health in accordance with transparency principle. In response to specific SPS issues 
raised during the TPR and repeated at the meeting, we have provided detailed answers in writing.  
Lack of predictability of doing business  
5.41.   I would like to make exemption from the rule not to react to Members' specific comments 
because of a rather critical nature of the statements made by two particular Members.  
5.42.   One Member raised some points concerning negative trends in bilateral economic relations. 
Let us all be clear, all measures by Russia affecting the trade with that Member were taken in 
response to that Member's own actions and are of a reciprocal and defensiv e nature.  
5.43.   As we explicitly laid out in our responses to advance questions, the beginning of decline in 
bilateral trade with that Member is related to the measures implemented by the Member as a 
result of its alignment with restrictions introduced by some o ther WTO Members.  WT/TPR/W/115  • Russian Federation  
 
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  5.44.   It is worth mentioning that following this course of trade restrictive action, the Member went 
much further than those other WTO Members, thus causing great harm to us. The fact is that the 
Russian economy is also affected by this undesi rable decrease of bilateral trade.  
5.45.   Another aggravating factor was the Member's decision to suspend implementation of the 
trade -related arrangements within the CIS in the course of the implementation of its FTA with the 
European Union.  
5.46.   This is a “lose -lose” situation and we tried our utmost to address it through various channels 
and formats, including trilateral consultation mechanism. Up to now, all our efforts turned out to 
be in vain.  
Non-implementation of tariff commitments  
5.47.   This issue was highlighted b y many Members and deserves immediate reaction. Indeed, we 
really had a few problems with implementation of bound rates upon our accession. We achieved 
compliance well before panel proceedings on request of the complaining Member. We still need to 
adjust a pplied tariffs in respect of five tariff lines of paper products. Please note also that the panel 
decided that the complaining Member – and I quote – "failed to establish its claims of 
inconsistency with GATT Article 2.1.a) and b) because it did not demons trate the existence of the 
systematic duty variation by Russia".  
State -owned and state trading enterprises  
5.48.   We certainly recognize the importance of this issue. In fact, SOEs may be less effective and 
less commercially successful compared to private compan ies. That is why it is important to secure 
proper legal framework, establishing same rules for all companies irrespective of their ownership. 
That was done in Russia 10 years ago, and state -owned and private companies compete in Russia 
on equal footing in almost all sectors including banking and energy.  
5.49.   What is also important, we allow foreign investors to participate in capital of all major SOEs, 
including Gazprom in the energy sector and Sberbank in the banking sector. As such, according to 
our data, non -residents own in total 45.6% (as of 01.07.2016) of the charter capital of PJSC 
Sberbank which indicates the openness of this credit institution to foreign investors.  
5.50.   Like other countries, we plan to gradually privatize some of our SOEs, including in the 
energy sector. The Government is interested to get a fair price, which can be a bit of a challenge 
these days, taking into account the drastic depreciation of the national currency.  
5.51.   And I very much doubt that our situation in respect of SOEs role in economy  is specific to 
Russia. In a number of developed WTO Members in Europe SOEs control 100% of the energy 
sector. As for Russia, this figure is much lower, depending on the type of energy produced. In 
top-2000 Forbes list of major world enterprises, about 20%  are state owned. This means that the 
problem is not in the ownership but in the terms of the operation. This is a different issue, and we 
would certainly be ready to deal with it.   
5.52.   The time limit for my statement does not allow me to give detailed respon ses to all the 
issues raised by the Members within this TPR. Nevertheless, I would like to underline that our 
delegation will address the rest of them in our written responses and stands ready to discuss them 
further in any appropriate format.  
5.53.   In conclusio n, I would like to thank Honourable Ms. Irene Young for her brilliant conduct of 
this meeting, Ambassador Vitalis for his fair and extremely competent contribution, Mr. Alfaro, 
Mr. Milthorp, Mr. Finn, Mr. Barba, Mr. Marinov and all Secretariat's team for t heir hard and highly 
professional work on this TPR, and again all Members for their valuable engagement and 
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  DISCUSSANT  
Introduction  
5.54.   On the day that the Russian Federation became the 157th member of the World Trade 
Organization, then WTO Direc tor-General Pascal Lamy observed that WTO membership was a 
priority for Russia and the wider membership because “trade can bring a predictable and stable 
basis for economic growth”. He added that “joining the WTO is a sign of confidence in the 
organization  and in what it can deliver for its members.”21 It is worth recalling those words as we 
reflect back on this, the first Trade Policy Review of the Russian Federation, since its accession four 
years ago.  
5.55.   A key signal of the spirit in which this process woul d be undertaken was included in Russia's 
opening statement on 28 September. This emphasised its express commitment to use the TPR to 
“listen and to learn.” In short, there is a shared understanding about the value of this Trade Policy 
Review process – it is to inform and help shape trade policy thinking.  
5.56.   This is an important point. After all, the purpose of the Trade Policy Review Mechanism 
(TPRM) is not to assess whether a particular trade policy is WTO compatible, i.e. whether it is 
'legal' or not. As th e Chair reminded the Membership on 28 September in her opening remarks and 
as Annex 3 to the Marrakesh Agreement makes similarly clear, the TPRM is explicitly not intended 
to serve as a basis for the enforcement of obligations under WTO Agreements, nor is it to be used 
for dispute -settlement purposes.22 Rather, the objective of the TPRM is “to enable a multilateral 
assessment of the effects of policies on the world trading system.”23 This is an important 
distinction and has informed my approach – as an econom ist - to the role of Discussant in this 
review process.  
5.57.   It is against this background that I have drawn three specific conclusions from this TPR. 
These are based on listening closely to the exchanges during the review process itself as well as 
reviewing t he written answers Russia has submitted to date:  
1. Membership matters : Russia's membership of the WTO has been a benefit to it and the 
wider membership, not least when one considers the alternative;  
2. Progress positive since 2012, but more is needed : Taken tog ether, progress since 
2012 in terms of Russia's Protocol of Accession has been, on balance, positive but there 
remains a considerable amount of work to be done; and  
3. Being WTO consistent is not necessarily the same as having a good trade policy: 
Some measur es that Russia is currently using may not necessarily contravene its WTO 
obligations. The more pertinent question in terms of the WTO's Trade Policy Review 
Mechanism is, however, whether those measures are in fact (a) good trade policy; and (b) 
how they im pact on the multilateral trading system.  
5.58.   As a factual matter, I want to make clear that this last point is not unique to Russia's TPR. It 
has featured in other recent TPRs and that has not been conducive to the kind of exchange we 
should be having in this  format. This is a matter that Members may wish to reflect on, including in 
the context of the actual purpose of this important mechanism for WTO transparency.  
5.59.   With the above three conclusions in mind, the following clusters a number of particular 
observa tions as follows:  
 General Comments;  
 Structural issues;  
 Sectoral issues; and  
 Systemic issues.  
                                                
 21 https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres12_e/pr671_e.htm  accessed on 28  September 2016.  
22 See the full text at: https://www.wto.org/englis h/docs_e/legal_e/29 -tprm_e.htm  accessed on 
29 September 2016.  
23 https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm11_e.htm  accessed on 
29 September  2016.  WT/TPR/W/115  • Russian Federation  
 
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  5.60.   Please note that in the interests of time I have not covered every issue raised by Members 
through this review. Rather, I have sought to identify those matters whe re there appeared to be 
particular insights to be gained in policy terms which Russia might find most useful in terms of its 
own consideration of further reforms.  
General Observations  
5.61.   This TPR has reaffirmed that the Russian Federation remains a significa nt actor in both trade 
and economic terms. Many Members in their own assessments underlined the value of WTO 
accession both to the Russian Federation, but also to themselves and to the "health" of the 
multilateral trading system. The unhappy period prior t o accession was recalled by many Members, 
noting – and in some cases enumerating - the substantive improvements since then. Others 
underlined the need for more effort by Russia to fully realise the benefits of WTO membership.  
Trade and Structural Issues  
5.62.   It is noteworthy that Russia and many Members in their interventions during the TPR 
process highlighted the structural challenges that Russia has faced following its recovery from the 
Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2008 -09. Many of you also highlighted tha t by 2013 those initial 
improvements that Russia made were and remained at risk.   
5.63.   Many Members suggested that this emerging risk was a consequence in part  of two factors - 
the declining oil price and the imposition of bi -directional sanctions. I do not ne cessarily concur 
with the implication that these are the only reason for the challenges that Russia is facing.  
5.64.   The contraction rates in GDP since 2012 which many Members explicitly noted reflect in my 
view a rather different set of structural difficulties . Comparing the movement underway in Russia's 
exports and imports since 2012 is instructive. By way of a concrete example, in 2012 Russia's 
exports (fob) were worth nearly US$535 billion. By 2015, these had declined to US$344 billion. 
Compounding this shif t has been the decline in imports, from US$316.2 billion in 2012 to 
US$182.8 billion last year.  
5.65.   These contractions are structural. They cannot be adequately explained only by the 
combination of collapsing oil prices and bi -directional sanctions. Rather, t he impact of both has 
been compounded by slow -moving structural reforms, declines in trade flows; diminishing levels of 
investment across the economy, regulation that is hampering business growth and innovation, 
alongside increased state intervention. It i s these factors, rather more than falling oil prices and 
bi-directional sanctions which are hampering Russia's ability to achieve its own stated trade policy 
objectives.  
5.66.   More directly, Members appeared to broadly concur that immediately post -accession, 
Russia's trade policies were heading in the right direction.24 Many contrasted, for instance, the 
situation at the Russian border before accession with the post -accession period, noting the decline 
in tariffs and uncertainty, even if several of you also ident ified ongoing difficulties, in some cases 
serious ones.  
5.67.   In terms of specific structural recommendations, many Members encouraged Russia to 
transition to ad valorem tariff rates exclusively, rather than the mixed approach which is utilised in 
some parts of  Russia's Schedule of Commitments. It is clear that such a transition would deliver 
both transparency and efficiency, while providing benefits to domestic producers and consumers.   
5.68.   The following three broad elements – the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU); t he World 
Bank's 'ease of doing business' index; and Russia's shift to import substitution policies  - emerged 
as particular areas of interest in structural terms from the exchanges on 28 September.  
                                                
24 https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news11_e/acc_rus_10nov11_e.htm  accessed on 
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  The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU)  
5.69.   The Eurasian Economic U nion was of particular interest to Members. Almost all Members 
referred to this evolving body and I expect therefore that this will be a particular focus for the next 
review when the EAEU will be much more firmly embedded as a core element in Russia's trad e 
policy -making process.  
5.70.   It was interesting to note too that all of the members of the EAEU, including Belarus which 
of course is not yet a WTO Member, underlined their expectation during this TPR that the EAEU 
would be an important catalyst for trade gro wth over time – a perspective that is more widely 
shared as well.25 That said, many Members underlined the need for the EAEU and Russia to make 
more progress more quickly in clarifying where specific competencies lie, as well as to enhance 
trade facilitatio n procedures within the bloc and for third partners. Russia's written responses to 
questions in this regard are worth reading very carefully in this context. It is clear too that Belarus' 
membership of the WTO would further intensify integration of this bo dy into the multilateral 
trading system.  
Ease of Doing Business  
5.71.   Almost every Member who took the floor referred in positive terms to Russia's rapid move 
through the rankings in the World Bank's Ease of Doing Business index. Russia was encouraged to 
work o n further improvements to ensure that its own formal policy objective of reaching and 
staying in the top twenty can be achieved.26 To state the obvious, in trade policy terms, improving 
the way companies can do business in Russia will have positive structur al effects including to drive 
trade and investment flows.  
Import Substitution and Trade Policy  
5.72.   Arguably the policy measure which attracted the greatest interest from Members was 
Russia's establishment in August 2015 of a Governmental Commission on Import Substitution.27  
5.73.   The written question and answer process and the statements delivered on 28 September 
are worth reading on this particular policy measure. Several questions queried the WTO 
compatibility of the measure. As several Members made clear during t he exchanges on 28 
September, while Russia is of course entitled to use all WTO -consistent policy options, it should be 
seeking the least trade distortive ones, not least to promote its own economic recovery. Moreover, 
while Members may be reassured by ass ertions that the measure is WTO -consistent, the actual 
questions for this TPR must be, as I noted in my introduction: (a) is it good trade policy? and (b) 
what is its impact on the multilateral trading system?  
5.74.   The response to both questions in terms of imp ort substitution is, in my view, 
straightforward. I have not heard in the exchanges during this TPR, nor read in the written 
responses a persuasive economic, let alone trade policy rationale for this measure.  
5.75.   Import substitution is a policy that was a sta ple of the 1960 -1980s, including in my own 
country. Such policies retard trade and competition, thereby having a chilling effect on domestic 
innovation. In New  Zealand's case one cannot even say that the results of import substitution were 
mixed. They set back by a decade the development of New  Zealand's manufacturing and 
agricultural sectors. If the history of such measures in other Members is any guide – and several 
other Members referred to their own negative experiences - there is also a serious politic al 
economy risk. This is that such import substitution will create its own domestic constituency who 
will have a vested interest in retaining the mechanism to preserve their 'rents'. This risks 
subverting the stated purpose of Russia's tade policy which is  to provide “temporary” relief given 
the challenging economic circumstances it finds itself in.  
                                                
25 See for instance: F. G Carneiro (2013) What Promise does the Eurasian Customs Union Hol d for the 
Future? The Economic Premise, World Bank, Washington, February, Number 108  
26 See in particular: Government of the Russian Federation Number 467 -r of 29 March 2013 which 
included a specific objective of moving from its then 120th ranking to 20th by 2018.  
27 Government of the Russian Federation Resolution Number 758 of 4 August 2015.  WT/TPR/W/115  • Russian Federation  
 
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  5.76.   As to the impact of Russia's import substitution policy on the multilateral trading system, 
many Members have observed that their working assumption remains th at this will be negative, 
not least given the economic influence Russia exerts in its immediate region and beyond. Russia is 
encouraged therefore to reflect on these assessments and the international experience of others as 
it considers the way forward wit h this policy.  
5.77.   In the meantime, formal confirmation from Russia that this policy instrument is indeed a 
temporary measure will be a welcome signal for Members. It will also be important for the next 
TPR to "check -in" on the evolution or abolition of this n ewly established instrument of trade policy.  
Sectoral Issues  
5.78.   Many Members raised questions about a range of sectoral policies such as those in place in 
the automotive, manufacturing, fisheries and agricultural sector, including in terms of their impact 
on the multilateral trading system. Concerns were expressed, for instance, by many Members 
about the apparent absence of science -based risk assessment for SPS -related measures.  
5.79.   In some cases, it may be too early to fully assess the impact of particular polic ies both on 
Russia and on the wider multilateral trading system. That said, several Members indicated concern 
about the direction of travel for policies in particular sectors. Others have outlined in some detail 
the immediate and negative effect of some me asures and these will need to be urgently addressed 
by Russia.  
5.80.   In fact, the initial indications in a number of sectors appear to be discouraging, both from 
the perspective of Russia's own stated trade policy priorities, as well as the likely impact on the  
multilateral trading system. I note in this regard particularly the comments by Members regarding, 
for instance, the impact of subsidies to vessel construction in the fisheries sector, as well as 
questions about the potential for policies aimed at support ing manufacturing in general and the 
automotive sector in particular. There is a perception that some of these may have trade distorting 
impacts beyond Russia's borders.  
5.81.   Taken together, it will be important for the next Trade Policy Review to reflect – with the 
benefit of a more meaningful time series data set - on what progress has been made and what 
needs to be done to ensure that the full competitiveness of specific sectors can be realised.  
5.82.   In terms of notifications, many Members encouraged Russia to e nsure that it complies with 
its transparency obligations. Ten such notifications in specific sectors of the WTO's work are now 
overdue. Russia's assurances that it intends to meet its obligations in this regard are welcomed 
and Members will no doubt look f orward to considering these in the appropriate regular bodies.  
5.83.   In the meantime, and from the perspective of notifications for both agricultural domestic 
support and export subsidies, several Members commended Russia for being one of only four 
Developed Me mbers that is up to date in these areas.28  
Systemic Issues: Preferential Trade Agreements; Fossil Fuel Subsidies; and the Ongoing 
Post-Nairobi Negotiations  
5.84.   As in previous TPRs, Members have identified a number of systemic issues of ongoing 
interest and in this respect, this TPR was no different.  
Preferential Trade Agreements  
5.85.   In their statements on 28 September, many Members expressed considerable interest in 
Russia and the EAEU's approach to preferential trade agreements. A particular avenue of inquiry 
was how specifically such agreements will support the multilateral trading system. Several 
Members also encouraged Russia to ensure quality and comprehensivity in any negotiated 
outcomes, noting that this would send an important signal about Russia's long ter m trade policy 
perspective. Russia's reassurances in this regard were welcomed, as indeed were Viet Nam's which 
is the first WTO Member to conclude an agreement with Russia and the EAEU. Advice about the 
                                                
28 The others are Australia, New  Zealand and Norway ( JOB/AG/80 refers).  WT/TPR /W/115  • Russian Federation  
 
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  ratification and implementation of this new agreemen t was also appreciated and Members will look 
forward to hearing more details about this in line with the existing transparency requirements.  
Trade and Fossil Fuel Subsidies  
5.86.   Given  that Russia has the second largest reserve base of coal and is the second lar gest 
producer of fossil fuels more generally, it was not surprising that several Members referenced the 
need for Russia to consider reforms of its subsidies for fossil fuels. In terms of specific policy 
suggestions, Russia was encouraged to join other G20 and WTO Members in participating in a peer 
review of its policies in support of fossil fuels with a view to further reform. The contribution this 
would make to achieving UNSDG 12 was also highlighted.  
Post-Nairobi Negotiations  
5.87.   Russia's strong commitment to  the ongoing negotiations post -Nairobi was referenced in its 
opening statement, as well as in a number of its written responses to questions. This was warmly 
welcomed.  
5.88.   Members will also have taken careful note of Russia's comment about the role of Article  XII 
Members. Russia observed that the contributions made by those (Article XII) Members to 
“advancing trade liberalisation” should be taken into account in any negotiation. Russia also made 
clear that “Article XII membership should not by itself mean endl ess shelter from further 
liberalization commitments. We, thus expect of other Article XII partners to continue to be 
responsible WTO Members making their further contribution to reaching the goals of the 
Organization”.29 
Conclusion  
5.89.   Taken together, the refor ms codified in the Russian Federation's Protocol of Accession were 
significant and far -reaching. The Secretariat's report combined with Members' written questions 
and Russia's answers as well as the exchanges on 28 September during the formal TPR chart the  
progress that the Russian Federation has made, both in the immediate aftermath of its accession 
to 2014 and – if rather more slowly - thereafter. It is also clear from this TPR that more needs to 
be done and, in some cases, in an intensified manner if the  full benefit of WTO membership is to 
be realized, both by Russia and by the multilateral trading system.  
5.90.   As Members are well aware, however, securing the benefits of WTO membership and 
ongoing economic and trade -related reform is far from automatic. The g reatest positive welfare 
effects accrue to Members that demonstrate a sustained commitment to domestic economic policy 
reform which is well organized and implemented coherently. The period ahead in Russia therefore 
needs to be viewed as an opportunity to u se the WTO accession to help transform its domestic 
economy into a genuinely competitive and innovative one.  
5.91.   In my introductory comments, I observed that I had drawn three conclusions from this 
Trade Policy Review. These were that:  
1. WTO membership matters ;  
2. Russia's progress since 2012 has been, on balance, positive, but there are some risks 
emerging and certain serious issues have been identified since 2014 that require urgent 
attention.  
3. Being WTO consistent is not necessarily the same as having a sound trade policy. In the 
context of the TPR process, the test of a policy should not be its legality – that should be a 
given. Instead it should be whether it is sound economic or trade policy; and how the 
measure may impact on the multilateral trading system.    
5.92.   Finally, it is to be hoped that addressing many of the constructive questions Members have 
posed through this Trade Policy Review process, including the focus on structural, sectoral and 
systemic issues can help shape and inform domestic economic reform  in Russia over the coming 
                                                
29 See for instance, Russia's Written Response to a Written Question from Oman. A similar point wa s 
included in Russia's Opening Statement to the TPR on 28 September, 2016.  WT/TPR/W/115  • Russian Federation  
 
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  period. In this way, the TPR will have measurably assisted in delivering on the promise enunciated 
by then Director -General Pascal Lamy when he welcomed Russia's accession to the WTO 
suggesting that it would deliver “a predictabl e and stable basis for economic growth”.30 In this 
context, therefore, the next and second TPR of the Russian Federation will be a crucially important 
check -point for progress both for Russia and for the multilateral trading system.  
UKRAINE  
5.93.   Ukraine is high ly affected by the Russian Federation's trade policy. As Members know well, 
our traders and our economy have been very negatively impacted by a series of restrictive trade 
measures implemented by the Russian Federation during the past several years.  
5.94.   Ukraine has posed a number of questions concerning trade and transit restrictions, technical 
regulations, SPS measures, customs requirements, domestic support, and anti -dumping measures, 
among other policy areas.  
5.95.   The TPR provides an opportunity to exchange info rmation to improve the functioning of the 
multilateral trading system.  
5.96.   Unfortunately, the Russian Federation's inadequate and often dismissive responses have 
disappointed again. In this context, we would like to make five reflections based on its answers or 
lack thereof.   
5.97.   First, the Russian Federation conducts a highly politicized trade policy. It uses trade as a 
punishment tool.  
5.98.   Second, WTO Members should not refuse to be responsive to partners' concerns and 
requests as the Russian Federation has repeate dly done.  
5.99.   For example, we refer Members to the Russian Federation's non -answer to our questions 
regarding import prohibitions. As we have noted over the past several months and years, an 
increasingly long list of Ukrainian goods are simply blocked from en try into the Russian Federation 
without adequate justification.  
5.100.    Or, there is the longstanding trend of the Russian Federation's use of SPS measures to 
block or slow many Members' trade. Unfortunately, the same approach is increasingly applied in 
terms of TBT measures as well.   
5.101.   Third, there is also a very worrisome subtext about the Russian Federation's unilateral 
interpretation of WTO rules to suit its needs.  
5.102.   There is not one set of rules for the Russian Federation and one set of rules for the rest of 
us. We refer Members to the Russian Federation's views on FTAs as justification for imposing 
retaliatory trade measures as just one example.  
5.103.   Fourth, the imposition of transit measures blocking our trade to third countries is a new 
dimension to the Russian Fe deration's trade policy. While the rest of the WTO is hailing the utility 
of the Trade Facilitation Agreement, the Russian Federation is actively moving in the entirely 
opposite direction, by systematically blocking trade and trade in transit. This should be a concern 
to all.  
5.104.   Finally, our fifth systemic concern relates to the Russian Federation and the Eurasian 
Economic Union (EAEU).  
5.105.   WTO Members have been trying to pin down how EAEU authorities and law overlap and 
interplay with Russian authorities and nati onal law since Russia's WTO accession. Unfortunately, 
the Russian Federation's answers continue to fog this critical issue.  
                                                
 30 https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres12_e/pr671_e.htm  accessed on 28 September 2016.  WT/TPR /W/115  • Russian Federation  
 
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  5.106.   The Russian Federation failed to answer several basic questions about how the EAEU 
formulates, decides, and implements specific tra de policies. This is basic transparency that would 
be required of any other WTO Member.  
5.107.   Customs Unions are not meant to establish an impermeable trade wall within which Russia 
can control international trade for its own purposes. Indeed, WTO rules allow cu stoms unions only 
when they are overall trade liberalizing.  
5.108.   Increasingly, it seems that the Russian Federation uses Customs Union structures and 
rules to exercise Russia's political trade policy and to keep the markets of other EAEU countries 
captive for Russian suppliers.   
5.109.   We truly appreciate the work that the Secretariat, other WTO Members and you Chair do 
to work through and analyse these critical issues. It is a rare moment when the wider trading 
community focuses on the details that we, unfortunately , face as a normal matter of business on a 
daily basis.  
UNITED  STATES  
5.110.   We wish to speak briefly today, first to thank Mr. Medvedkov and the Russian Federation 
delegation for their constructive participation in this first TPR. It has been good to see many 
familiar faces back in Geneva - congratulations to you all on accomplishing this important "rite of 
passage" for WTO Members.   
5.111.   For all of the hard work and coordination required by a TPR, the United States consistently 
finds this exercise to be helpful for us during our biennial reviews. As we've heard just now from 
Ambassador Vitalis, it's good to hear the views of other Members, to learn of their interests and 
concerns, and to be reminded of the value of transparency and constructive scrutiny. We hope that  
our Russian colleagues will leave this process with similar impressions.  
5.112.   We thank Max and his team for the thought that went into preparing the statement we 
have heard this morning. The Russian delegation has clearly listened carefully during this review,  
and we appreciate the reflections offered in response, even if we may not agree with all of them, 
such as import substitution. We welcome the reflections by Ambassador Vitalis as to consideration 
of what is good trade policy.   
5.113.   Again, we thank the Russian  Federation for providing written answers to our questions. 
Most of the answers were helpful, although some were rather perfunctory. In any case, these 
written exchanges will give us a basis for ongoing discussion in the context of our relationship here 
at the WTO. We have submitted a few follow -up questions, and will appreciate replies within the 
established timelines.  
5.114.   It has been particularly interesting for us to participate in this TPR and to observe some 
common themes, both from Member statements and t he views of our very able Discussant.  
5.115.   Clearly, the large number of Members who participated actively in this TPR reflects the 
widespread interest in Russia and its trade policies. This is to be expected, especially for an 
economy of Russia's significance. It has struck us that this interest is also very much connected to 
some common threads of concern with regard to Russia's trade policies and how some of those 
policies relate to the commitments Russia undertook in becoming a Member.  
5.116.   As I've mentioned, we'v e taken particular note of apparent broad concern with respect to 
policies that appear to be driven by motivations of import substitution. We expect to follow up on 
some of these concerns through the activity of other WTO committees.  
5.117.   We also have noticed c ommon themes of concern in this room regarding fossil fuel 
subsidies, questionable imposition of additional sanitary/phytosanitary measures, restrictions on 
transit, inadequate protection of intellectual property rights, and an unpredictable investment 
climate. We've heard from Director Medvedkov this morning on all of these issues, which is 
helpful. Clearly, we need to look for ways to maintain an ongoing dialogue on these and other 
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  5.118.   In closing, let me again say thanks to our Russian colleagues fo r their serious approach to 
this important process, and to wish safe travels to those returning to Moscow.  
EUROPEAN  UNION  
5.119.   We welcome the Russian delegation, led by Mr. Maxim Medvedkov, back to the second day 
of the 1st Trade Policy Review of the Russian Fe deration.  
5.120.   As you have noted, the EU pays very close attention to the trade related policies of the 
Russian Federation. And this should be of no surprise: the EU is the most important trading 
partner of the Russian Federation and a source of significant flo ws and stocks of foreign direct 
investments.  
5.121.   This is a trade policy review - not trade "politics" review; so I will abstain from 
commenting on the Russian delegation's remarks about sanctions.  
5.122.   We fully share the remarks by the Discussant that we are here  not to assess the legality of 
Russia's trade measures, but rather whether these measures make good trade policy. We invite 
Russia to respect the letter and spirit of the WTO agreements. We should all make efforts to devise 
good trade policies, rather than  to construct legally viable bad trade policies.  
5.123.   We have expressed our assessment of the first four years of Russia's WTO membership 
already quite clearly on the first day of this review. In doing so, we are convinced that a relevant 
and straightforward f eedback from both sides on how we see the trading policies of the Russian 
Federation can substantially contribute to a positive development of our mutual trading relations. 
That was also the reason why we highlighted some very real problems to our Russian partners 
from our perspective.  
5.124.   It is worth noting that a number of issues raised in the EU statement were mentioned by 
several other WTO Members as well, indicating that the EU perception of Russia's trade related 
policies is in line with those of other im portant trading partners. Therefore, we sincerely hope that 
these messages can help improving Russia's trade and economic policies back in the capital.  
5.125.   The Russian Federation is an important player in the WTO system; it has demonstrated a 
good record of ag riculture related notifications and constructive participation in the Trade 
Facilitation Agreement negotiations. EU is of the opinion that a policy of economic opening and 
trade liberalization, together with consistent implementation of WTO rules, are the most effective 
tools to achieve a full and sustained economic recovery, after an uneasy period of recession.  
5.126.   We would like to thank the Russian Federation for its efforts in answering our 114 advance 
questions and their contribution to this exercise. Howe ver, after an analysis conducted quickly by 
the EU, we regret to note that some Russia's replies are still missing the point. On some occasions 
we have even noticed considerable divergences between the information provided in the replies 
and the actual sit uation occurred.  
5.127.   Therefore the EU would strongly urge the Russian Federation to provide more detailed 
information in number of areas, notably on subjects such as:  
 Import substitution policies – for example in the car sector where you can have subsidies if  
you have an agreement with the ministry that imports are related to an "industrial assembly 
mode". However, there is no definition of what that is and the outcome is that smaller 
foreign operators who do not buy parts in the local market are discriminated  against. 
Furthermore, we would like to recall - in reaction to the statement of Russian Federation just 
now – that the import substitution policy was already there before the accession to the 
WTO. In this context, we once again the share the remarks of th e Discussant that import 
substitution policies remain bad in the short and long term;  
 
 The actions and role of some STEs – while we can agree that state ownership is not 
necessarily a negative factor, the state behaviour and regulatory environment certainl y are;  
 WT/TPR /W/115  • Russian Federation  
 
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   EAEU – the EU fully supports regional integration that is outward looking and aimed at 
increasing and liberalizing trade, however, this has not been the case recently;  
 
 Customs documentation and procedures – we note with interest that Russia will  adopt a new 
Customs Code next year that will include some important TFA provisions and look forward to 
its implementation;  
 
 Compliance of some measures to the SPS Agreement – the interpretation of the spirit and 
letter of the rules governing SPS measures  clearly differs among some Members. For 
example, in relation with the export ban on fishery products of some EU Member States 
Russia stated that – and I quote – "the EU competent authorities were duly informed, 
preliminary consultations were held on the i dentified violations, and the competent 
authorities were alerted on possible temporary restrictions if these violations would not be 
eliminated. So the exporting countries had possibility to take corrective measures, but they 
did not use a chance ". However , this was hardly the case. The Russian Federation audit to 
relevant enterprises took place 17 -23 May 2015; on 25th of May Rosselhoznadzor published 
information about the audit. On 3rd of June, the relevant office in the EU was informed by 
phone that all i mports of fisheries products from that particular EU Member were suspended. 
We would invite the Russian Federation to address SPS related issues in a much less trade 
disruptive matter.  
 
 Business environment – Russian Federation should feature much higher in the Ease of Doing 
Business ranking. The fact that it has lost trade with most of major trading partners, clearly 
indicates that there remains more to be done. Legal certainty and predictability is of utmost 
importance as demonstrated also by the issue o f tariffs on paper products that was a 
negotiation issue before the accession, became an implementation issue immediately after 
it, and still continues to be a problem;  
 
 Regulatory practices and standards.  
 
5.128.   To that effect we have submitted several follow -up questions on those and other issues 
and we would expect the Russian Federation to deliver satisfactory replies and provide necessary 
details within the established timeframe after this meeting.  
5.129.   To conclude, the EU wishes to thank the Russian Federation for its committed and helpful 
participation in this important transparency exercise. We look forward to the next TPR and hope to 
see improvements and more positive developments on the ground.  
IRAN  (OBSERVER)  
5.130.   The Russian Federation became the 156th WTO Mem ber in August 2012 after a long 
process of negotiation on accession during which it could make an impressive reform in its legal 
regime to be able to comply with the WTO obligations. It could also make significant economic 
reforms particularly in liberaliz ing market and creating diversified market -driven economy.  
5.131.   The Russian Federation has become the 77th WTO Member to ratify the new Trade 
Facilitation Agreement (TFA). The Russian Federation’s Minister of Economic Development, 
H.E Mr. Alexey Ulyukaev, met with Director -General H.E Mr. Roberto Azevêdo on 22 April and 
presented his country’s TFA instrument of acceptance.  
5.132.   The Islamic Republic of Iran commends Russia's establishing a single window as a pivotal 
part of TFA and believes that such an important mov e opens up a new horizon for the country's 
trade policy sound and adopted with WTO rules.  
5.133.   The volume of Tehran -Moscow trade transactions has increased considerably since 
20 March this year, and the number of visas issued for tourists and businessmen have also 
increased by 100%. Iran and Russia have also boosted their trade transactions by 70% over the 
past six months in the current year.  
5.134.   Signing different documents between the two countries, especially in the trade and 
economic fields, and also setting up Russia’s 5 -billion -dollar credit line that has also been approved WT/TPR/W/115  • Russian Federation  
 
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  by the Iranian Parliament shows the two countries’ serious determination to develop their 
relations. Referring to the agreements, reached between Iran and Russia in the 12th Iran -Russia 
Joint Economic Cooperation Commission session, the two sides expressed their readiness for 
development of all -out ties. Therefore, the Russian Federation remains a key partner in our total 
trade.  
5.135.   In spite of adversely affecting developments in recent years, ca using hurdles and leading 
into oil price slump and devaluation of the Ruble and decrease in trade with some countries, the 
Russian Government responded appropriately utilizing an anti -crises plan aimed at stabilizing the 
banking sector, a fiscal stimulus, switching to a floating exchange rate regime, and introducing an 
import substitution programme. As per to the IMF report, the Russian Federation is on a 
stabilization course.   
5.136.   Finally, it is believed that Russia, with great potentials in its economy, enjo ying highly 
educated population, vast resources of oil and gas among others, can deal with economic 
challenges and meet WTO rules and regulations specially through the acceleration of economic 
reforms aiming at enhancing competition in goods and services m arkets, improving property 
rights, and revamping transport and telecommunications infrastructure to improve the business 
climate and boost investment.  WT/TPR /W/115  • Russian Federation  
 
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  6  CONCLUDING REMARKS B Y THE CHAIRPERSON  
6.1.  This is the first Trade Policy Review of the Russian Federation si nce its accession in 2012. 
Therefore, as some delegations have pointed out, it is the first opportunity for Members to learn 
about developments in the Russian Federation's economic and trade policies since then, and to 
review the country's participation in  the multilateral trading system as a Member of the WTO.  
6.2.  During this 2 -day meeting, we have had a useful discussion, thanks to the contributions from 
the head of the Russian delegation, Mr. Maxim Medvedkov, Head of the Department for Trade 
Negotiations of the Ministry of Economic Development; our discussant, Ambassador Vangelis 
Vitalis from New Zealand; and also the 53 delegations that have taken the floor.  
6.3.  This Review took place at a time when the Russian Federation faced a challenging economic 
environment . While the sharp decrease in GDP might had stabilized and growth was expected to 
resume next year, the recovery seemed slow and modest. During the discussion, Members noted 
that the fall in oil prices, the sanctions imposed on the Russian Federation by so me countries, and 
the counter measures taken by the Russian Federation were among the main reasons for the 
contraction in the economy. There were ongoing structural reforms to diversify the economy and 
reduce reliance on hydrocarbons. However, several dele gations stated that more could be done, 
given the high level of education, excellence in technology, and the wide range of resources 
available in the Russian Federation.  
6.4.  Members had a frank exchange on how Russia's trade policies could best be oriented to make 
a difference. More specifically, several Members noted that the Government's response to the 
economic crisis had focused on three principal measures, namely: a fiscal stimulus; the floating of 
the Rouble by the Central Bank; and import substitution. W hile the first two were viewed generally 
favourably in general, some delegations questioned how the third could align with the basic 
principles of the WTO. They pointed out that policies based on this objective would undermine 
trade liberalization efforts and discourage competition, which would be detrimental to sustainable 
economic growth.  
6.5.  From the trade policy perspective, this is also an interesting time for a review, because the 
expanding roles of the Eurasian Economic Union and the Eurasian Economic Co mmission mean 
that many policies and practices are now decided and applied at a regional rather than national 
level. Examples include the common external tariff, the development of a new customs code, 
negotiation of free trade agreements, and the investiga tions and application of contingency 
measures. During this Review, many Members sought further information on the policies of the 
Union and the legal competence of the Commission.  
6.6.  Commenting on Russia's participation in the WTO, most delegations acknowled ged that 
Russia was an active Member, and had made significant contribution to multilateral negotiations. 
Many highlighted the considerable progress that Russia had made in liberalizing its trade regime 
both before and after accession to the WTO. The Russi an Federation was commended in particular 
for its ratification of the Trade Facilitation Agreement, tariff reductions, simplification of customs 
procedures, participation in the Information Technology Agreement, as well as improvement to its 
intellectual p roperty legislation.  
6.7.  As noted by many delegations, these reforms had helped the Russian Federation move up 
quickly in the World Bank's Ease of Doing Business index. In addition, the Russian Federation was 
recognized for having met many of its notification  requirements, and indeed for being one of the 
only four developed country Members that had updated its notifications on domestic support and 
export subsidies for agriculture. However, several notifications were still outstanding, including 
those on state -trading enterprises.  
6.8.  Some Members expressed concern about the local content requirements that Russia applied 
to its government procurement and state -owned enterprises. These requirements could be 
particularly trade distorting, given that the state was hea vily involved in the economy through the 
companies that it owned and controlled, which altogether represented over half of the country's 
GDP and dominated key sectors such as banking, transport and energy. Many Members suggested 
that better governance of t hese companies, restarting the stalled privatization programme, along WT/TPR/W/115  • Russian Federation  
 
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  with accession to the WTO Government Procurement Agreement could help improve transparency, 
reduce distortions and stimulate growth.  
6.9.  Several delegations were particularly concerned about  the Russian Federation's use of SPS 
and TBT measures that were apparently not based on international standards, as doing so had 
created considerable trade barriers for them. Furthermore, they were concerned about restrictions 
on import to the Russian Fede ration and on the transit of goods through the Russian Federation to 
other countries, which had greatly reduced trade. They were of the view that the lack of 
transparency and predictability in the administration of these measures had posed additional 
difficulties for their traders.  
6.10.   Many other issues were raised during our discussion, including fossil fuel subsidies, fisheries 
subsidies, use of contingency measures, efforts in fighting corruption, the use of non -ad valorem  
tariffs, and incentives conditional  on strict localization requirements.  
6.11.   The Russian delegation has taken this opportunity to explain its economic strategies and 
foreign trade policies. It had also responded in detail to Members' comments in the key areas. It 
acknowledged the systemic trade  and economic challenges that the country was facing, and found 
solutions in export diversification, development of domestic high -tech industries and of small and 
medium -sized enterprises, as well as exploring new opportunities in foreign markets for trade  and 
investment.  
6.12.   The delegation affirmed the Russian Federation's strong support for the multilateral trading 
system and its adherence to WTO rules. It also underlined the country's determination to continue 
playing an active and constructive role in all a reas of WTO activity, and the Russian Federation 
looked forward to developing mutually beneficial trade and investment relations with other WTO 
Members.  
6.13.   Overall, the active participation of Members during these two sessions and the large number 
of advance written questions are testimony to the importance of this exercise and of Members' 
interest in Russia's trade policies. This Trade Policy Review will be completed within the next 
month when the Russian Federation has replied to all outstanding questions.  
6.14.   Although the Russian Federation is facing a challenging economic environment, it also has 
many advantages in minerals, hydrocarbons, agriculture, forestry, fishing, and, most importantly, 
human resources. I very much hope that an open and transparent trade and investment regime, 
reinforced by good policies based on WTO principles, commitments and rules, would help the 
Russian Federation diversify its economy and maximize its growth potentials.  
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