RESTRICTED  
  
G/C/M/133  
 
17 April 2019  
(19-2576) Page: 1/82 
Council for Trade in Goods    
 
MINUTES OF THE MEETI NG OF THE COUNCIL FO R TRADE IN GOODS  
12 AND 13  NOVEMBER  2018 
The meeting of the Council for Trade in Goods (CTG, or the Council) was convened by 
Airgram  WTO/AIR/CTG/12; the proposed agenda for the meeting was circulated in 
document  G/C/W/7 62. The meeting proceeded on the basis of the following agenda:  
 
1   NOTIFICATION OF REGIONAL TRADE AGREE MENTS  ................................ ....................  3 
2   PROPOSAL BY THE COMMITTEE ON REGIONA L TRADE AGREEMENTS T O THE  
COUNCIL FOR TRADE IN  GOODS, THE COUNCIL FOR TRADE IN SERVICE S, AND THE 
COMMITTEE ON TRADE A ND DEVELOPMENT ON A TEMPLATE FOR NOTIFYI NG CHANGE S 
TO AN EXISTING REGIO NAL TRADE AGREEMENT (WT/REG/28)  ................................ ...... 4 
3   ACCESSION OF THE  REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA  TO THE EURASIAN ECO NOMIC UNION: 
PROCEDU RES UNDER ARTICLE  XXVIII OF GATT  1994 (G /L/1110/ADD.4)  .......................  4 
4   ACCESSION OF THE  KYRGYZ REPUBLIC TO THE EURASIAN ECONOMI C UNION: 
PROCEDURES UNDER ART ICLE  XXVIII:3 OF GAT T 1994 (G/L/1137/ADD .3) ...................  5 
5   SWITZERLAND – LIECHTENSTEIN – NEGOTI ATIONS UNDER ARTICLE  XXVIII:5 OF 
GATT  1994 (G/L/1262) ................................ ................................ ................................ .... 6 
6   EUROPEAN UNION, RENEGOTIATION OF TAR IFF RATE QUOTA COMMI TMENTS IN 
RESPONSE TO BREXIT: SYSTEMIC CONCERNS – REQUEST FROM ARGENTI NA, 
AUSTRALIA, BRAZIL, C ANADA, CHINA, JAPAN,  MEXICO, NEW ZEALAND , THE UNITED 
STATES, AND URUGUAY,  PLUS CHINESE TAIPEI  AND THAILAND  ................................ ..... 7 
7   ENLARGEMENT OF T HE EUROPEAN UNION TO  INCLUDE CROATIA: NE GOTIATIONS 
UNDER ARTICLE  XXIV:6  OF THE GATT  1994 – STATEMENT BY THE RUS SIAN  
FEDERATION (G/SECRET /35/ADD.4)  ................................ ................................ ............  14 
8   TRINIDAD AND TOB AGO – REQUEST FOR AU THORITY TO ENTER INT O 
NEGOTIATIONS UNDER A RTICLE  XXVII:4 OF TH E GATT  1994 (G/SECRE T/43)  ..............  15 
9   MARKET ACCESS IS SUES  ................................ ................................ ...........................  17 
9.1   Introduc tion of Harmonized System 2002  Changes into the WTO  Schedules of Tariff 
Concessions – Draft Waiver Decision (G/C/W/756)  ................................ ................................ .17 
9.2   introd uction of Harmonized System 2007  Changes into the WTO  Schedules of Tariff 
Concessions – Draft Waiver Decision (G/C/W/757)  ................................ ................................ .17 
9.3   Introduction of Harmonized System 2012  Changes into the WTO  Schedules of Tariff 
Concessions – Draft Waiver Decision (G/C/W/758)  ................................ ................................ .17 
9.4   Introduction of Harmonized System 2017  Changes into the WTO  Schedules of Tariff 
Concessions – Draft Waiver Decision (G/C/W/759/Rev.1)  ................................ ........................ 17 
10   JORDAN – REQUES T FOR A WAIVER RELAT ING TO THE TRANSITIO NAL PERIOD  
FOR THE ELIMINATION OF THE EXPORT SUBSID Y PROGRAMME FOR JORD AN 
(G/C/W/705/REV.2)  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..... 18 
11   FACTUAL REPORT BY THE CHAIRMAN OF T HE SAFEGUARDS COMMIT TEE  
REGARDING ARTICLE  13.1(E) OF THE AGREEME NT ON SAFEGUARDS (G/ L/1276 – 
G/SG/191 AND G/L/127 6/ADD.1 – G/SG/191/A DD.1)  ................................ .................  18 G/C/M/133  
 
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  12   MEASURES TO ALL OW GRADUATED LDCS, W ITH GNP BELOW US$100 0, BENEFITS 
PURSUANT TO ANNEX  VII(B) OF THE AGREEMENT ON SUBSIDI ES AND  
COUNTERVAILING MEASU RES – COMMUNICATION FROM THE CENTRAL AFR ICAN 
REPUBLIC ON BEHALF O F THE LDC  GROUP (WT/ GC/W/742 – G/C/W/752 ) ..................  19 
13   PROPOSAL TO ENH ANCE TRANSPARENCY AN D STRENGTHEN NOTIFIC ATION 
REQUIREMENTS UNDER W TO AGREEMENTS – COMM UNICATION FROM ARGEN TINA,  
COSTA RICA, THE EURO PEAN UNION, JAPAN, T HE SEPARATE CUSTOMS TERRITORY OF 
TAIWAN, P ENGHU, KINMEN AND MA TSU, AND THE UNITED STATES (JOB/GC/204 –
JOB/CTG/14 AND JOB/G C/204/ADD.1 –JOB/CTG/ 14/ADD.1)  ................................ ....... 21 
14   BRAZIL – MEASUR ES RESTRICTING SHRIMP IM PORTS – REQUEST FROM  
ECUADOR  ................................ ................................ ................................ .......................  46 
15   KINGDOM OF SAUD I ARABIA, KINGDOM OF  BAHRAIN, AND THE UN ITED ARAB 
EMIRATES – SELECTIVE TAX ON CER TAIN IMPORTED PRODUC TS – REQUEST FROM  
THE EUROPEAN UNION, SWITZERLAND, AND THE  UNITED STATES  ...............................  47 
16   INDONESIA'S IMP ORT AND EXPORT RESTR ICTING POLICIES AND PRACTICES – 
REQUEST FROM THE EUR OPEAN UNION, JAPAN, AND NORWAY  ................................ ..... 49 
17   UNITED STATES – MEASURES RELATED TO IMPORTS O F FISH AND SEAFOOD 
PRODUCTS – REQUEST F ROM CHINA  ................................ ................................ ..............  51 
18   INDIA – CUSTOMS  DUTIES ON ICT PRODU CTS – REQUEST FROM C ANAD A, CHINA,  
THE EUROPEAN UNION, JAPAN, NORWAY, CHINE SE TAIPEI, AND THE  
UNITED STATES  ................................ ................................ ................................ .............  52 
19   PAKISTAN – MEAS URES RELATING TO SUG AR SUBSIDIES – REQUEST FROM 
AUSTRALIA AND THE EU ROPEAN UNION ................................ ................................ ........  56 
20   INDIA – MEASURE S RELATING TO SUGAR SUBSIDIES – REQUEST FROM  
AUSTRALIA  AND THE EUROPEAN UN ION................................ ................................ ........  57 
21   EUROPEAN UNION – QUALITY SCHEMES FO R AGRICULTURAL PRODU CTS AND 
FOODSTUFFS – THE REG ISTRATION OF THE TERM "DANBO" AS GEOG RAPHICAL 
INDICATION – REQUEST  FROM THE UNITED STA TES AND URUGUAY  .............................  59 
22   UNITED STATES – EXPORT RESTRICTIONS  ON CERT AIN ENTERPRISE OF CH INA – 
REQUEST FROM CHINA  ................................ ................................ ................................ ... 61 
23   EGYPT – MANUFAC TURE REGISTRATION SY STEM – REQUEST FROM THE 
EUROPEAN UNION  ................................ ................................ ................................ .........  62 
24   MONGOLIA – QUAN TITATIVE RESTRICTION S AND PROHIBITIONS O N 
IMPORTATION OF CERTA IN AGRICULTURAL PROD UCTS – REQUEST FROM THE 
RUSSIA N FEDERATION  ................................ ................................ ................................ ... 63 
25   VIET NAM – DECR EE ON THE REGULATION  AND CONDITIONS FOR AUTOMOBILE 
MANUFACTURING, ASSEM BLING, IMPORTING, AN D AUTOMOT IVE WARRANTY AND 
MAINTENANCE SERVICES  – REQUEST FROM JAPA N AND THE UNITED STA TES ..............  64 
26   CHINA – MEASURE S RESTRICTING THE IM PORT OF SCRA P MATERIALS –  
REQUEST FROM THE UNI TED STATES  ................................ ................................ .............  66 
27   INDIA – QUANTIT ATIVE RESTRICTIONS O N IMPORTS OF CERTAIN  PULSES – 
REQUEST FROM AUSTRAL IA, CANADA, THE EURO PEAN UNION, THE RUSS IAN 
FEDERATION, AND THE UNITED S TATES  ................................ ................................ ........  68 
28   CHINA – CUSTOMS  DUTIES ON CERTAIN I NTEGRATED CIRCUITS – REQUEST  
FROM THE EUROPEAN UN ION AND JAPAN, PLUS CHINESE TAIPEI  ................................ . 70 
29   EUROPEAN UNION – DRAFT IMPLEMENTING  REGULATIONS REGARDI NG 
PROTECTED DESIGNATIO NS OF ORIGIN AND GEO GRAPHICAL INDICATION S – 
TRADITI ONAL TERMS – LABELLI NG – AND PRESENTATIO N OF CERTAIN WINE  
SECTOR PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM ARGENTINA  AND THE UNITED STAT ES ...............  72 
30   CHINA – NEW EXPORT CONTROL LAW IN DRAFT – REQUE ST FROM JAPAN  .............  73 
31   UNITED STATES – PROHIBITIVE PROPOSA L ON COMMUNICATION E QUIPMENT  
OR SERVIC ES RELEASED BY THE F CC – REQUEST FROM CH INA ................................ ...... 74 G/C/M/133  
 
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  32   AUSTRALIA – DISCRIMINATORY MARKET A CCESS PROHIBITION ON  
5G EQUIPMENT – REQUE ST FROM  CHINA  ................................ ................................ ....... 74 
33   UNITED STATES – MEASURES ON AVIATIO N SECURITY EQUIPMENT  – REQUEST  
FROM CHINA  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..................  76 
34   RUSSIAN FEDERAT ION – TRADE RESTRICT ING PRACTICES – REQU EST 
FROM THE EUROPEAN UN ION ................................ ................................ ........................  76 
35   WORK PROGRAMME ON ELECTRONIC COMMER CE ................................ ...................  78 
36   CONSIDERATION O F ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE SUBSIDIARY BODIE S 
OF THE COUNCIL FOR T RADE IN GOODS  ................................ ................................ ........  81 
37   ADOPTION OF THE  ANNUAL REPO RT OF THE COUNCIL FO R TRADE IN GOODS  
TO THE GENERAL COUNC IL (G/C/W/761)  ................................ ................................ ..... 81 
38   OTHER BUSINESS  ................................ ................................ ................................ .... 82 
38.1   Annual Report on Notification Obligations and the Trade Facilitation Agreement  ................ 82 
38.2   The work of the Goods Council  ................................ ................................ ................... 82 
38.3   Date of the next meeting  ................................ ................................ ........................... 82 
 
The Chairperson  informed delegations that, under Agenda item "Other Business", he would raise 
two institutional matters , namely : (i) how to reflect Trade Facilitation Agreement ( TFA) notifications 
in the CTG 's Annual Report on Notifications  (document  G/L/223  and its revisions) ; and (ii)  how to 
make the work of the CTG more efficient. He would also raise the matter of the date of the Council 's 
next meeting . 
 
The agenda w as so agreed . 
 
1  NOTIFICATION OF REGI ONAL TRADE AGREEMENT S 
1.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that, under the working procedures agreed by the Committee on 
Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA) and following the adoption by the General Council of the 
Transparency Mechanism, the CTG was to be kept informed of Members ' notifications of new regio nal 
trade agreements (RTAs).1 He informed the CTG that four RTAs had been notified to the CRTA , as 
followed : 
– ASEAN – Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement – Entry into Force for 
Indonesia (WT/REG277/N/3) ; 
 
– Free Trade Agreement between Turkey and Singapore (WT/REG392/N/1) ; 
 
– Free Trade Agreement between Peru and Honduras (WT/REG393/N/1) ; and 
 
– Free Trade Agreement Between the EFTA States and the Philippines (WT/REG394/N/1) . 
 
1.2.  The delegate of the United State s thanked the Parties to these  RTAs for their respective 
notifications  and looked forward to learning more about these agreements  in the CRTA,  during their 
review under the RTA Transparency Mechanism.  
1.3.  The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statement made and of the 
information provided.  
1.4.  The Council so agreed . 
                                                
1 See documents  WT/REG16, WT/L/671, and G/C/M/88.  G/C/M/133  
 
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  2  PROPOSAL BY THE COMM ITTEE ON REGIONAL TR ADE AGREEMENTS TO TH E COUNCIL 
FOR TRADE IN GOODS, THE COUNCIL FOR TRAD E IN SERVICES, AND T HE COMMITTEE ON 
TRADE AND DEVELOPMEN T ON A TEMPLATE  FOR NOTIFYING CHANG ES TO AN EXISTING 
REGIONAL TRADE AGREE MENT (WT/REG/28)  
2.1.  The Chair perso n recalled that, at the Council 's meeting in July  2018, he had drawn Members ' 
attention to  the proposal set out in  document  WT/REG/28  and the template reproduced in its annex 
to be used for notifications of changes to all existing RTAs ; this proposal was of a procedural nature 
and did not entail any change in Members ' legal rights and obligations. At that meeting, he had also 
indicated that this proposal and document had been considered and adopted by the CRTA at its 
89th Session , on 19  June 2018, and recommended for adoption also to the CTG, the Council for Trade 
in Services, and the Committee on Trade and Development.  
2.2.  At that same meeting, the delegation of Brazil had indicated that it was not  yet in a position to 
approve the document at the CTG , but nevertheless looked forward to continuing the discussions in 
the context of the CTG and other fora. Therefore, the Council had agreed to r evert to the matter at 
the current  meeting.  
2.3.  The Chairperson  had then been informed that, at the September  2018 meeting of the CRTA, 
Brazil had indicated that it was now in a position to adopt the format , and invited Brazil to confirm  
that this was indeed t he case . 
2.4.  The delegate of Brazil  confirmed that his delegation was  now in a position to adopt the 
template . 
2.5.  The Chairperso n thanked Brazil for its intervention and proposed that the Council adopt the 
template annexed to document  WT/REG/28.  
2.6.  It was so agreed . 
3  ACCESSION OF THE REP UBLIC OF ARMENIA TO THE EURASIAN ECONOMI C UNION: 
PROCEDURES UNDER ART ICLE  XXVIII OF GATT  1994 (G/L/1110/ADD.4 ) 
3.1.  The Chairperson  informed Members that , in a communication dated 18  October  2018, the 
delegation of Armenia had requested the  Secretariat to circulate document  G/L/1110/Add.4 , relating 
to the extension of the time -period for the withdrawal of concessions in connection with Armenia 's 
accession to the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), until 2  January  2020. In this document, Armenia 
had indicated that it would not assert that Members that had submitted a claim of interest pursuant 
to Article  XXIV:6 of GATT  1994 were precluded from withdrawing substantially equivalent 
concessions under Article  XXVIII:3 of GATT  1994, because such withdr awal occurred later than 
six months after Armenia 's withdrawal of concessions, provided that the claiming WTO  Member 
withdrew  concessions no later than 60  months after Armenia 's modification of concessions, or until 
2 January  2020. He recalled that the Cou ncil had extended the deadline on four  occasions, namely , 
at its meetings of 26  March and 10  November  2015, 17  November  2016, and 10  November  2017.  
3.2.  The delegate of Armenia  informed Members that, during the period following the Council 's 
previous  meeting, Armenia had had a number of consultation s and exchanges  with interested 
Members ' representatives on the concern s at issue. After substantive discussion with its 
EAEU  partners, Armenia had prepared a new proposal on compensation requests with a 
comprehensiv e list of industrial goods for which Armenia was ready to consider the possibility of 
further liberalization of its bound import duties. This proposal had been approved by the board of 
the EAEU  Commission and had been submitted to the EU in April  2018. In May 2018, meetings had 
been organized in Geneva between Armenia and the EU, with the participation of EAEU  countries ' 
representatives , where the parties had had a very constructive discussion and consultation on the 
above -mentioned proposal and had agreed on further steps. Armenia hoped that the new proposal 
would lay sound ground for accelerated and substantive negotiations. Regarding a proposal for TRQ s 
on agricultur al goods, Armenia informed the Council that it had already prepared and presented a 
propos al to its EAEU  partners. Discussion s within the EAEU were advancing  and the next round of 
consultation s on the issue between EAEU  representatives was scheduled for the following day. He 
hoped that the discussion and decision -making process would soon be completed, and that Armenia 
would then be able to provide a comprehensive reply and proposal for compensation requests on G/C/M/133  
 
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  agricultur al goods, as it had already done for industrial goods. At the same time, taking into account 
that more than ten  WTO Membe rs and five  EAEU  Members  were involved in this process , and given 
also the scope of the technical work still to be carried out , Armenia believed that additional time 
would be necessary for ongoing  consultation s and negotiation s. Therefore, in document  G/L/1110, 
Armenia had indicated that, in connection with the Treaty of Accession of the Republic of Armenia 
to the EAEU , which was signed on 10  October  2014, and entry into force of the EAEU  Common 
Customs Tariff , on 2 January  2015, and in view of ensuring tha t Members reserve their rights 
pending their communication to the WTO  Secretariat of agreements reached in the context of 
GATT  Article  XXIV, Armenia believed that it was desirable to provide for an extension of 12  months, 
until 2 January  2020, to withdraw substantively equivalent concession s under Article  XXVIII of the 
GATT , and requested the Council to agree to this proposed extension.  
3.3.  The delegate of the Russian Federation  recognized the necessity for an expeditious conclusion 
to these compensatory adjustment negotiations and supported the extension of the negotiation 
deadline for the Republic of Armenia under Article  XXIV:6 of the GATT , related to its accession to 
the EAEU . 
3.4.  The delegate of the European Union  informed Members of the EU 's consultations with Armenia 
and other EAEU  members and looked forward to further discussions in that context.  
3.5.  The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made and of Armenia 's 
communication, and that it agree s on the extens ion of the deadline as set out in 
document  G/L/1110/Add.4, until 2  January  2020.  
3.6.  It was so agreed . 
4  ACCESSION OF THE KYR GYZ REPUBLIC TO THE EURASIAN ECONOMIC UN ION: 
PROCEDURES UNDER ART ICLE  XXVIII:3 OF GATT  1994 (G/L/1137/ADD.3 ) 
4.1.  The Chairperson  informed Members that , in a communication dated 25  October  2018, the 
delegation of the Kyrgyz Republic had requested the Secretariat to circulate 
document  G/L/1137/Add.3, relating to the extension of the time -period for the withdrawal of 
concessions, in connection  with the Kyrgyz Republic 's accession to the EAEU, until 12  February  2020. 
In this document, the Kyrgyz Republic had indicated that it would not assert that Members that had 
submitted a claim of interest pursuant to Article  XXIV:6 of GATT  1994 were precluded from 
withdrawing substantially equivalent concessions under Article  XXVIII:3 of GATT  1994 because such 
withdrawal occurred later than six  months after the Kyrgyz Republic 's withdrawal of concessions, 
provided that the claiming WTO  Member wit hdrew concessions no later than 54  months after the 
Kyrgyz Republic 's modification of concessions, or until 12  February  2020. He recalled that the 
Council had previously extended the deadline on three  occasions, namely at its meetings of 
10 November  2015, 14 July 2016, and 10  November  2017.  
4.2.  The delegate of the Kyrgyz Republic  thanked the Chairperson for including the issue on the 
meeting 's agenda. The Kyrgyz Republic continued the process of technical clarifications and other 
relevant data analysis based on  initial claims submitted by Members and in cooperation with the 
interested parties. He recalled that the term for withdrawing substantially equivalent concessions 
had expired on 12  February  2019. Given that additional time would be required in order to mo ve 
the negotiations forward , and with a view to ensuring that Members reserved their rights pending 
the communication to the WTO  Secretariat of the agreements reached in the context of 
Article  XXIV:6 of the GATT  1994, the Kyrgyz Republic requested a furthe r extension of Member 's 
rights to withdraw concessions pending the conclusion of Article  XXVIII:3 negotiations after 
twelve  months, until 12  February  2020, as set out  in document  G/L/1137/Add.3. Thus, the Kyrgyz 
Republic would not assert that WTO  Members that had submitted a claim were precluded from 
withdrawing substantially equivalent concessions because this withdrawal occurred  later than 
six months after the Kyrgyz Republic 's withdrawal of concessions , on 12 August  2015, provided that 
the claiming WTO  Member withdr ew concessions no later than 54  months after the Kyrgyz Republic 's 
modification of concessions. He assured the Council that the Kyrgyz Republic would be in a position 
to respond to interested Members as soon as internal matters based on consul tations with 
EAEU  partners had been addressed and settled . He expressed gratitude for the understanding of 
interested WTO  Members and for their support on the issue of the extension of rights. The Kyrgyz G/C/M/133  
 
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  Republic would exchange further communication s and i nformation with relevant partners to this 
process in due course.  
4.3.  The delegate of Ukraine  reiterated his delegation 's interest in the renegotiation process with 
Armenia and the Kyrgyz Republic under Article  XXVIII of the GATT  1994, in spite of the fact that  
trade between Ukraine and these Members was currently already governed by bilateral and 
multilateral free trade agreements. The participation of the Kyrgyz Republic and Armenia 
concurrently in the EAEU  and in free trade agreements  with Ukraine might cause  unpredictable 
consequences for Ukrainian exports in view of a possible change in the EAEU 's trade rules. Since 
Ukrainian export s could be affected by the integration process within the EAEU, Ukraine would closely 
follow the evolution of the renegotiation process.  
4.4.  The delegate of the Russian Federation  recognized the necessity for an expeditious conclusion 
to these compensatory adju stment negotiations and supported the extension of the negotiation 
deadline for the Kyrgyz Republic under Article  XXIV:6 of the GATT relating  to its accession to the 
Eurasian Economic Union.  
4.5.  The delegate of the European Union  informed Members that they had  engaged in consultations 
with the Kyrgyz Republic and other EAEU  members in this Article  XXVIII process and looked forward 
to further discussions in that context.  
4.6.  The delegate of the Kyrgyz Republic  thanked Ukraine and recalled that trade with Ukraine was 
currently carried out on a preferential treatment basis in the context of  the Commonwealth of 
Independent States  (CIS) , and the CIS Free Trade Agreement  signed in 2011 . Consequently,  and in 
line with the guidelines for negotiations set out under GATT  Article XXVIII, the Kyrgyz Republic had 
no legal ground on which to recognize Ukraine 's claim of interest in this negotiation.  
4.7.  The Chairperson  thanked the Kyrgyz Republic for its statement and other delegations for their 
interventions. He proposed that the Cou ncil take note of the statements made and, in the absence 
of any objection, agree on the extension of the deadline as set out in document  G/L/1137/Add.3, 
until 12  February  2020.  
4.8.  It was so agreed . 
5  SWITZERLAND – LIECHT ENSTEIN – NEGOTIATIO NS UNDER ARTICLE  XXVIII:5 OF 
GATT  1994 (G/L/1262)  
5.1.  The Chairperson  informed Members that , in a communication dated 29  October  2018, the 
delegation of Switzerland, on behalf also of Liechtenstein, had requested the Secretariat to circulate 
document  G/L/1262 relating to the e xtension, for an additional 12  months, of the time -period for 
the withdrawal of concessions, in connection  with the modification of tariff concession s in 
Schedule  LIX relating to "meat not further prepared than seasoned ". In this document, Switzerland 
and Liechtenstein indicated that they would not assert that Members that had submitted a claim of 
interest pursuant to Article  XXVIII of GATT  1994 were precluded from withdrawing substantially 
equivalent concessions under Article  XXVIII:3 of GATT  1994 because such withdrawal occurred later 
than six  months after Switzerland and Liechtenstein 's withdrawal of concessions, provided that the 
claiming WTO  Member withdrew concessions no later than 12  months after Switzerland and 
Liechtenstein 's modification of concess ions, or until 4  April 2019.  
5.2.  The delegate of Switzerland  stated that , in its communication of 3  October  2018, it had 
requested the Secretariat to distribute document  G/L/1262 concerning the extension of the period 
during which Members ha d the right to withdraw substantially equivalent concessions pursuant to 
the procedures under Article  XXVIII of the GATT  1994 for simply seasoned meat. He informed the 
Council that the negotiations and consultations with those Members concerned were ongoing  and 
that Switzerland hoped to conclude them quickly.  
5.3.  The delegate of Brazil  thanked Switzerland for introducing this agenda item and for proposing 
this extension. However, his  delegation had identified an apparent discrepancy between 
document  G/L/1262, wh ich indicated  that the withdrawal of concessions had occurred on 
4 April 2018, and the language found in document  G/SECRET/40, in which Switzerland, also on 
4 April, notified no more than "its intention to modify " tariff concessions. To Brazil 's knowledge,  G/C/M/133  
 
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  there had been no written notice of actual withdrawal of concessions, under the terms of paragraph  3 
of Article  XXVIII , since document  G/SECRET/40 had been circulated . He sought clarification from 
Switzerland on this issue.  
5.4.  The delegate of Switzerland  replied that he would seek clarification on this issue and inform 
Brazil and the Council accordingly.  
5.5.  The Chairperson  asked Brazil to clarify if Brazil  were oppos ed to Switzerland 's request for 
extension , or if his delegation were comfortable to approve Switz erland 's request.  
5.6.  The delegate of Brazil  replied that his delegation did not oppose the extension , but asked 
Switzerland nevertheless to clarify this issue for the Membership in writing.  
5.7.  The Chairperson  thanked Switzerland and Brazil for their interventions. He proposed that the 
Council take note of the statements made , and also of Switzerland and Liechtenstein 's 
communication. He proposed that the Council agree on the extension of the deadline as set ou t in 
document  G/L/1262, for an additional 12  months, until 4  April 2019.  
5.8.  It was so agreed . 
6  EUROPEAN UNION, RENE GOTIATION OF TARIFF RATE QUOTA COMMITMEN TS IN 
RESPONSE T O BREXIT: SYSTEMIC CO NCERNS – REQUEST FROM ARGENT INA, AUSTRALIA, 
BRAZIL, CANADA, CHIN A, JAPAN, MEXICO, NEW ZE ALAND, THE UNITED STATES,  AND 
URUGUAY, PLUS CHINESE TAIPEI  AND THAILAND  
6.1.  The Chairperson  informed Members that, in communications dated 31  October and 
1 November  2018, the delegations of Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Japan , Mexico, 
New Zealand, the United States, and Uruguay had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on 
the agenda. After the Airgram had been issued, the delegations of Chinese Taipei and Thailand had 
requested to be added to the list of co -sponsors,  and a number of  delegations had also submitted a 
room document ( document  RD/CTG/5).  
6.2.  The delegate of Paraguay  asked to be added as a co -sponsor to the room document.  
6.3.  The delegate of Brazil  thanked New Zealand for its coordination of the  room document, whic h 
Brazil was very pleased to co -sponsor. Brazil fully shared the concerns mentioned in the document 
over the manner in which the EU had sought to modify its TRQ commitments . One major concern  
for Brazil  was the lack of any indication by the EU of proper compensatory adjustments. As New 
Zealand had pointed out, the EU intended to compensate Members through recourse to concessions 
to be taken up by a distinct Member, the United Kingdom. In Brazil 's view, it was only fair to wo nder 
what the legal basis for such a heterodox methodology might be . At first sight, it challenged the 
established view that the schedule of concessions of a Member did not depend on the internal 
structure of that Member , because a  schedule could not be un derstood as the sum of partial 
concessions of a Member 's constituting members. Brazil also saw worrisome developments in the 
conduc t of the Article  XXVIII negotiations initiated by the EU on 24  July 2018. Besides the lack of 
any proposal for  compensatory a djustments, Brazil noted that the import data provided had been 
insufficient  and inadequate. Brazil had been asked to present  its claims on a  TRQ basis. 
Nevertheless, the data had been provided by tariff line, but without TRQ  usage . It had even included 
preferential trade. In his delegation 's view, Brazil 's ability to assess its negotiating rights had thus 
been undermined. Another problem was the presentation of an uncertified schedule as the basis for 
the EU's proposed modifications. He noted that the EU 's own sense of urgency in tackling this issue 
could hardly be invoked to justify a fait accompli  in prejudice of Brazil 's legitimate commercial  and 
systemic interests. A revised version of the EU 's import statistics had been circulated three  months 
after the original submission of document  G/SECRET/42, citing  unidentified "clerical errors and 
discrepancies ", and thus making it even more difficult to assess Brazil 's negotiating rights 
expeditiously in order  to be able to engage in negotiations and consultations at the earliest possible  
stage . Another important source of concern for Brazil was that no clarity had been offered about the 
future trading relationship between the EU and the UK. This situation prevented Brazil from having  
a real pictur e of the trade impact of the modifications that had been  proposed. For instance, Brazil 
did not know for sure whether or not they would be obliged to compete for access in MFN  quotas by 
the EU or the United Kingdom  with exporters from either Member. To eng age in negotiations under G/C/M/133  
 
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  such unfavourable  conditions was a challenge that few Members would be comfortable to face. Brazil 
urged the EU to listen to their concerns and to bring to the table for discussion a fair, transparent , 
and balanced renegotiation p roposal , ensuring that exporting Members would not be left worse  off 
as a result of these negotiations.  
6.4.  The delegate of New Zealand  drew Members ' attention to the fact that , in addition to a group 
of Members that had agreed to put this item on the agenda, there was also a group of Members  that 
had jointly prepared the room document outlining some of their specific systemic concerns with the 
EU's proposed modification of its agricultural TRQs. She noted that the EU was both the world 's 
largest agricultural importer  and its largest agricultural exporter. As such, the EU was  an essential 
player in terms of balancing global markets. The proposed changes outlined in the EU 's draft 
regulations and the EU 's Article  XXVIII notification put at risk the stability of many of the 
commitments underpinn ing that balance. 196  individual concessions affecting more than 365  tariff 
lines had been  proposed to be changed. In terms of the volume of affected trade, she said that this 
was probably the largest modification of commit ments ever undertaken at the WTO and was a 
modification that  could cause ripples through global markets that could affect all Members, including 
other net importers of the products  affected . Members had fought hard to achieve minimum levels 
of access throu gh WTO  tariff rate quotas. New Zealand rejected the premise that the EU was entitled 
to simply "split" its quota commitments based on a reference period using a process intended for 
renegotiating tariffs. She reported that the EU had told New Zealand that a different Member was 
supposed to provide some access to make up for their modifications. In addressing the Market Access 
Committee in October, the EU had told New Zealand that it could not make any assurances about 
the future trade policies of that Membe r. Her delegation would look first to the EU to honour  its 
obligations to Members. The flexibility currently available to Members to supply the UK or continental 
market s would be affected at exactly the time when uncertainty over future trading conditions would 
make  that flexibility more valuable than ever. The balance of UK/EU  trade in the same products 
would be affected in ways that Members could not  guess, and the same applied to respective 
currencies. In the view of her delegation , the commercial implic ations  of this were very real . In order 
to begin to assess how this might affect Members it would be vital to know more about future EU -
UK trading arrangements. However, the  EU's proposal offered no certainty regarding the treatment 
of nearly US $800 billion worth of UK -EU merchandise trade. Among other issues , she requested the 
EU to clarify to Members that MFN  quotas on each side would not be available to the EU and the 
United Kingdom respectively. That n otwithstanding, she noted that it was a basic principle that a 
Member intending to modify a concession must provide data that showed how that concession was 
actually being used. The EU had thus far not provided TRQ  usage data to Members and professed to 
be unable to do so. New Zealand had instead been provided with not just one, but two  different 
datasets , showing trade in different lines of which some corresponded to multiple quotas, or  
corresponded to trade that  may be entering the EU under preferential or non -TRQ arrangements. 
The datasets did not c larify how quotas were actually being used , and yet New Zealand was 
nevertheless being asked to make its claims based on quota usage. The second EU  dataset , tabled 
in document  G/SECRET/42/ Add.2, made some changes that appeared to correspond to Members ' 
questions on the first dataset, but there were also other changes , including the addition of 
considerable volumes  of new trade , which New Zealand could not readily explain. She concluded 
that the vast scale and scope of these proposed changes threatened the s tability of markets. 
Producers in New Zealand were already facing decisions about whether or not they could lock 
themselves at this stage into contracts to supply the EU in April  2019. New Zealand urged the EU to 
take a step back, to listen to Members ' feedback, and to reconsider their approach.  
6.5.  The delegate of the Russian Federation  expressed its concern s over the EU 's approach and 
methodology with regard to  its TRQ renegotiations. First, the Russian Federation was concerned by 
the intention of the EU to hold negotiations on the basis of the draft Schedule  CLXXV –European 
Union (document  G/MA/TAR/RS/506 , dated 17 October  2017). The Russian Federation underscored  
that the draft Schedule  CLXXV –European Union had not been certified and thus could not be use d 
as the basis for negotiations. In this context, the Russian Federation emphasized  the importance of 
finalizing the certification of the EU's draft Schedule. Second, she noted that the data provided by 
the EU had been  based on trade flows under TRQs , and that out-of-quota trade flows had apparently 
not been taken into account. The Russian Federation noted that the GATT did not provide for the 
exclusion of out -of-quota trade flows in the context of negotiations on the modification of 
concessions. The Russian Federation believed that such an approach did not reflect commercial 
realities and would lead to a substantial deterioration in market access for certain agricultural and 
manufacturing products. The Russian Federati on was of the view that these negotiations should not 
result in a de facto prohibition of market access. The Russian Federation also highlighted the fact G/C/M/133  
 
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  that for the last five  years it had been denied market access to the EU, taking into account high out -
of-quota rates and the fact that reallocation of quotas had been  made based on licen ces obtained , 
where as out-of-quota imports of third  countries were not taken into account because licen ces for 
such imports were not required . The Russian Federation insist ed that its interests should  be taken 
into account in the se negotiations.  
6.6.  The delegate of the United States  appreciated the opportunity to co -sponsor both this agenda 
item and room document  RD/CTG/5, which outlined shared concerns over the EU's approach to  the 
renegotiation of its TRQ  commitments in response to Brexit . The US believed that the room 
document was self -explanatory and so  would  not repeat the points already made there. 
Nevertheless, it was with a growing sense of urgency that the US wished to e mphasize that it could 
not accept a fait accompli  result to these negotiations that would leave US  exporters worse off. In 
addition, the  US hoped that the EU would take all Members ' concerns seriously. For its part, the US 
stood ready and willing to work diligently with the EU to ensure that the balance of concessions 
among Members went unchanged or, where changed, that Members were appropriately 
compensated.  
6.7.  The delegate of Mexico  expressed systemic concern over the notification by the EU, dated 
24 July 2018, of its intention to modify the TRQs included in its Schedule of Concessions. The EU, a 
major player in  global  trade in agricultural products, had proposed to modify its commitme nts for a 
significant portion of such trade, but such modifications  had to  be in the general interest s of 
WTO Members. Further, this  proposal represented a broad request for which there had been no 
precedent ; it would surely have commercial consequences an d at the same time impact significantly 
upon future processes in the multilateral system. Mexico also had a systemic concern with regard  to 
the suggested methodology for the apportionment  of the EU 's TRQs , as well as with the data provided 
to support such apportionment and the claim s of interests of Members. In addition, Mexico noted 
that the EU  proposal did not in any way address what the future EU obligations towards the United 
Kingdom , with whom it had a significant bilateral trade, would be. Mexico unde rstood that the state 
of negotiations between the EU and the United Kingdom did not yet allow for any  result regarding 
the terms of the commercial relationship between the two  parties after Brexit. However, according 
to Mexico, it was precisely under this situation of uncertainty that commercial and systemic concerns 
became more important and having transparent procedures and adhering to the rules likewise played 
key role s. Ther efore, Mexico urged the EU to continue its discussions and to take into account the 
commercial and systemic concerns expressed by Members in order to achieve  a mutually satisfactory 
solution.  
6.8.  The delegate of Uruguay  shared the comments made  and concerns of  other delegations. As 
detailed in the room document, the EU 's proposal to modify its TRQs  affected the flexibility of 
economic operators with established trade flows to the European market. At the same time, the 
proposal generated uncertainty and would affect trade flows on a significant number of agricultural 
products, including supply chains. He noted that there were numerous complexities associated with 
the negotiation process proposed by the EU, including a lack of clarity regarding the EU 's future 
commercial relationship with the United Kingdom,  and also how the EU intended to compensate 
Members through concessions granted by another Member. In his view, these were only some of 
the many concerns that the EU 's proposal generated. Uruguay urged the EU  to enter into 
negotiations  with Members  in good faith and with a view to maintaining the ir existing level s of rights 
and obligations , or else to ensure fair compensatory adjustment in order to  restore to Members the 
balance of rights and obligations that had been established during the Uruguay Round  negotiations . 
Therefore, i n addition to the aforementioned economic and commercial concerns, Uruguay wished 
also to set on record this systemic concern.  
6.9.  The delegate of China  noted that China had co -sponsored both the agenda item and the room 
document. Like previous speakers, China was very concerned about the changes proposed by the 
EU in document  G/SECRET/42 in the context of Brexit. Given the uncertainty over the EU 's future  
trade relations with the United Kingdom , Brexit might significantly affect the interests of Members ' 
exports to the EU  market. As stated in the room document, the stability and predictability of 
Members ' commitments were the foundation of the multilateral  trading system  (MTS) , and Brexit -
related changes in the EU 's commitments should adhere to the principle that WTO  Members should 
not be worse off as a result of any changes, and that the overall level of mutually advantage ous 
concessions that Members enjoy ed should be maintained.  As the EU 's proposed changes would 
directly affect the export interests of Members, including China, Chinese business leaders had raised 
their significant concerns over the impact on their interests in the EU  market, in particular the G/C/M/133  
 
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  proposed TRQ  apportionment on exports. China hoped that the proposed changes in the EU 's 
TRQ commitments would fully reflect current trade performance, and also meet the actual trading 
needs of China 's business communities . China hoped likewise that th e concerns of WTO  Members 
would be adequately addressed overall. To do so, the EU should provide the necessary information 
and data in an adequate and timely manner. China hoped to strengthen communication and 
coordination with the EU in order to manage th e adverse impact of Brexit on China -EU trade and 
economic cooperation, and to ensure that China 's relevant interests would not be negatively 
affected. Finally, China took the opportunity to request the United Kingdom  to ensure that Members ' 
trade interests  would be fully taken into account in their post -Brexit Schedule.  
6.10.   The delegate of Argentina  said that his delegation 's principal concerns had been reflected in 
the room document. However, he emphasized Argentina 's interest in the renegotiation of the EU 's 
TRQ concessions. He also noted that Brexit was far more than  simply  a bilateral matter; it was a  
matter of  systemic interest for the entire WTO Membership. The modality that would be adopted for 
the future relationship between the EU27 and the United Kingd om would have a  very real  impact 
upon the preservation of the currently negotiated commitments. Argentina had seen  irrefutable 
arguments that demonstrated that both the EU 's proposed methodology, as well as the statistics 
that it had used to support that m ethodology, failed by a long distance to meet the multilateral 
commitment s that the  EU had undertaken to maintain in terms both of the level and quality of 
market access. Argentina 's wide-ranging concerns and doubts had been communicated to both the 
EU and  the United Kingdom . In this regard, Argentina noted its specific  concern over the Draft 
EU Regulation COM  2018–312, which proposed a unilateral apportionment of TRQs. In Argentina 's 
view, this would lead swiftly to an unnatural result  that would run contrary to the spirit of the MTS. 
His delegation had questioned the  proposed  implementation of unilateral measures on a number of 
occasions ; nevertheless, Argentina was sure that the EU would honour its multilateral commitment s 
and not introduce any changes to  its market access commitments without having first reached 
mutually satisfactory agreements with interested Members. Argentina stood ready to continue to 
engage in  constructive dialogue to ensure that the process be conducted in compliance with the 
mechanisms of the WTO.  
6.11.   The delegate of Canada  thanked New Zealand and the other co -sponsors for contributing to 
the room document . As outlined in the room document, Canada, as well as other Members, had 
concerns regarding the approach the EU had taken to m odify its WTO  commitments on its TRQs. 
TRQs were intended to provide real access to markets of export interest. The EU's proposed 
"apportionment " of its WTO quotas reduced the quality and level of access to a significant market. 
In a number of cases , the p roposed apportionment resulted in TRQ  volumes that were not 
commercially viable , the commercial implications  of which were clear . Canada was  also concerned 
that the data provided by the EU to support its proposal was inadequate for a negotiation of this 
scale and scope. Canada argued that, given  the size of the trading relationship between the EU and 
the United Kingdom , the lack of certainty in this process with regard  to the future EU-UK bilateral 
trade relationship needed also to be taken into account. In  addition, Canada was concerned  about  
the publication of the draft EU  regulation COM  2018-312, which proposed to implement the 
reductions in the EU 's market access commitments without first completing the necessary 
negotiations with those WTO Members  affected . Canada urged  the EU to reflect upon the concerns 
outlined in the room document and to continue to engage fully  with Members  in this regard . 
6.12.   The delegate of Chinese Taipei  said that her delegation was one of the co-sponsors of both 
this agenda item and the room document , and that Chinese Taipei shared the systemic concerns 
expressed by previous speakers. As the EU was Chinese Taipei 's largest  trading partner, China Taipei 
had been paying close attention to Brexit -related issues since 2016. His del egation was of the view 
that Brexit could significantly affect WTO  Members ' trade and investment relations with the EU and 
the United Kingdom, especially  given the uncertainty still surrounding this process. Since Chinese 
Taipei 's views had been reflected in the room document, he highlighted  only the points  that followed . 
Firstly, Chinese Taipei underscored that Members should not be left worse off as a result of changes 
made to individual concessions, and that any changes introduced should maintain the general level 
of mutually advantageous concessions for all Members . Secondly, Chinese Taipei underscored the 
importance of transparency in relation to the EU's process in this regard . For example, Chinese Taipei 
would like to see how t he trade data and met hodology used by the EU would  sufficiently reflect 
Members ' concerns to ensure that their market access  remained stable.  Lastly, Chinese Taipei would 
welcome further discussion with the EU on this matter, in particular to identify ways in which the EU 
could fully meet its obligations to continue to maintain a general level of reciprocal and mutually G/C/M/133  
 
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  advantageous commitments not less favourable to trade than those that it had provided prior to this 
notification.  
6.13.   The delegate of Switzerland  thanked the co -sponsors of the  room document  and noted that  
Switzerland was among those Members holding rights as principal supplier or Member with 
substantial interests regarding a part of the commitments affected by the proposed 
TRQ apportionment . In general, Switzerland shared the concerns set out  in the room document. 
Specifically , it was difficult for Switzerland to assess its interests on the basis of the data currently 
provided by the EU. Switzerland also shared the view that allocation of appropriate TRQ  quantities 
to the EU -27 and United Kingdom  was highly relevant to many Members and therefore of systemic 
importance to the WTO as a whole. For this reason, Switzerland hoped that the necessary process 
could be completed as quickly as possible and in a consensual manner with all Members.  
6.14.   The delegate of Australia  expressed Australia 's significant interest in this important issue 
given that Australia was an exporter of agricultural TRQ  products to the EU. Austr alia also  shared 
the systemic concerns raised in the room document about the EU's proposal to modify its goods 
market access commitments in response to Brexit. Australia expected the EU to ensure that the 
value of existing market access was maintained and not just the total volume  of existing TRQs. The 
EU's proposed modifications to its TRQs would lead to year-on-year economic loss by removing 
flexibility for exporters in relation to destination market  and by making certain TRQ allocations too 
small to be c ommercially viable. Australia welcomed the EU 's addendum to its proposal  in 
document  G/SECRET/42 , circulated on 19  October  2018. However, the amended import data in 
Annex  III did not address all of the concerns previously raised over  its inadequacy for the  purposes 
of Article  XXVIII negotiations. Australia echoed the strong ly expressed  concerns of others over the 
uncertainty surrounding, and the need for clarity on, the method of accounting for UK -EU trade post -
Brexit. Australia remained concerned about  the EU 's proposed draft regulation to unilaterally 
implement the proposed TRQ  changes in the absence of agreement at the WTO. He noted that, 
based on a press release of 31  October  2018, EU Ambassadors had now agreed to the draft schedule 
of TRQs that the EU would apply after Brexit, and that the draft regulation would now be passed to 
the European Parliament. His delegation looked forward to working with the EU constructively to 
resolve its concerns and to ensure that the current quality and level of Austr alia's market access 
was maintained.  
6.15.   The delegate of Japan  said that his delegation attached great significance to this agenda item 
and for this reason had decided to co -sponsor  it. Although Japan had not subscribed to the room 
document it did understand the systemic concerns voiced by a number of Members. Japan continued 
to pay attention to the Brexit negotiations and was deeply concerned by the fact that negotiations 
on the remaining issues at the European Council had not been concluded within the so -called 
"deadline ". In his delegation 's view , it was essential to ensure transparency , predictability, and legal 
stability through the transition period in order to minimize any negative impact on Japanese 
businesses in Europe. He stated that a no -deal Brexit must be avoided and hoped that the EU and 
the United Kingdom  would maintain the current business environment or at least alleviate the impact 
of any radical changes in order for the United Kingdom  and the EU to remain attractive destinations 
for doing business. Japan also expressed its deep concern over the current situation , which left very 
little time for negotiations. Japan valued the expeditious establishment of the EU and  United 
Kingdom 's tariff schedules and the implementation of MFN applied tariff rates in a manner consistent 
with WTO  rules after Brexit. Japan urged the EU to maintain a high degree of transparency in the 
negotiations process and expressed its willingness  to continue to participate actively in those  
negotiations.  
6.16.   The delegate of Thailand  thanked New Zealand for its coordination efforts on this issue and 
joined previous speakers in expressing Thailand 's concerns regarding the EU's proposal (in 
document  G/SECRET/42), to modify its market access commitments in light of Brexit . Thailand 
believed that, in line with core WTO principles, such modification of a Member 's Schedule of 
Commitments must ensure that Members were not left worse of f as a result of changes made to 
individual concessions. Throughout its consultations with the EU, Thailand had reiterated its 
numerous concern s, including over the relevance, complete ness, and complexity of the annexed 
information provided by the EU to support their proposal. The  diminished total quality and level of 
access, as well as uncertainty with regard to  post-Brexit trade relations between the EU and the 
United Kingdom , could significantly  impair the existing rights and benefits of all WTO  Members. In 
this regard, Thailand  urged the EU to take Members ' concerns into consideration as it proceeded 
with the modification of its concessions. Thailand hoped that subsequent procedures would be carried G/C/M/133  
 
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  out in good faith and clarity  with a view to ensuring that Members ' quality and level of access to the 
EU would not be in any way impaired or diminished, and that appropriate compensation would be 
offered where current levels of market access were not maintained.  
6.17.   The delegate of the Republic of Korea  echoed the concerns raised by the co-sponsors of this 
agenda item and room document. Korea itself had not co -sponsored the room document; 
nevertheless, it shared the concerns of the co -sponsors given that the EU and the United Kingdom  
were major trading partners. For this reason, she wishe d for the compensation negotiations to be 
undertaken in a transparent and predictable manner , especially given that the initial stages of 
compensation negotiations could have a significant impact on negotiations for compensation with 
regard not only to goo ds, but also to services, in the context of bilateral and plurilateral negotiations 
and agreements in which the EU, the United Kingdom , and the Republic of Korea were partners.  
6.18.   The delegate of India thanked the sponsors and co -sponsors of this agenda item and echoed 
the concern s raised by other Members. India had submitted its concerns to the EU on 
22 October  2018; in particular,  it had cited difficulties in assessing the principle supplying interest 
or the substantial interest on specific tariff lines. In the meantime, India had received  the EU's 
revised data for its TRQ re-allocation on 19  October  2018. India appreciated the EU's efforts  but felt 
that the EU had still not adequately address ed Members ' concerns , especial ly over the  lack of clarity , 
as raised in India 's earlier communication. India hoped  for a constructive and fruitful discussion of 
these matters with the EU. 
6.19.   The delegate of Singapore  wished to thank the sponsors of this agenda item and room 
document for r aising this issue. Brexit could potentially affect all WTO  Members ' trade with the EU. 
Singapore believed that the Brexit renegotiations should not lead to substantive changes in the 
quality of market access that was currently available to the EU 's trading partners in its Schedule of 
WTO commitments. Singapore registered its interest in this matter and looked forward to continuing 
discussions with the EU.  
6.20.   The delegate of El Salvador  registered  El Salvador 's interest in the negotiations on the EU 's 
proposed modifications of its TRQs in response to Brexit and hoped to be able to engage in 
constructive dialogue with the EU on this issue. She also took note of the systemic concerns set out  
in document  RD/CTG/5, concerns which El Salvador shared. In part icular, El Salvador shared 
concerns over the uncertainty surrounding trade relations between the EU and the United Kingdom , 
and the maintenance of current levels of market access through the  appropriate  EU apportionment 
of its TRQs. She indicated that El S alvador would continue to follow this issue closely.  
6.21.   The delegate of Guatemala  thanked New Zealand and the other co -sponsors for including this 
issue on the agenda. Guatemala shared the systemic concerns on Brexit  of other Members , 
particularly with regard  to the apportionment of the EU 's WTO-bound TRQs. Guatemala emphasized  
the importance of the EU not undermining its WTO  commitments or impairing its concessions.  
6.22.   The delegate of the Dominican Republic  wished to thank the sponsors of this agenda item and 
room document and took note of the concerns that had been raised. The Dominican Republic was 
currently examining the EU and UK  lists and had recently communicated a statement of interest with 
regard to the UK  list. In general terms, the Dominican Republic was concerned by the uncertainty 
generated by Brexit and, as stated by  the Republic of  Korea, was concerned, too, by the effects of 
the process on its bilateral and plurilateral negotiations with the United Kingdom  and EU. The 
Dominican Republic would cont inue to follow this issue closely and be grateful , also,  for any 
additional information now available.  
6.23.   The delegate of Costa Rica  thanked t hose Members that had placed this issue on the Council 's 
agenda. Costa Rica was alert to  the importance of a strong a nd effective international trading system 
and of the need to maintain and promote certainty in trade relations between Members . Costa Rica 
emphasize d the importance of ensuring that Article  XXVIII negotiations were carried out in a 
transparent and inclusiv e manner so that Members could be sure that the guarantees established 
under the WTO  Agreements would  not be impaired. If there were to be changes to the EU 's and the 
United Kingdom's  Schedule, then every Member should be afforded the possibility to assess  
meaningfully the effects of such changes on their international trade flows. To this end, Costa Rica 
would remain in constructive dialogue with the EU and other interested parties at bilateral level, as 
well as in the context of the work of this Council a nd its subsidiary bodies.  G/C/M/133  
 
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  6.24.   The delegate of Chile thanked the co -sponsors of this agenda item and the room document 
for raising this issue, especially in light of its systemic and commercial implications. Chile shared the 
systemic concerns of other Members , especially with regard to the conduct of  the process itself. 
Chile had already expressed many of its concerns in bilateral meetings with the EU. Nevertheless, 
he wished to emphasize that the EU 's formula for apportionment of its TRQs was , in Chile 's view,  
not the most appropriate methodology because it unjustifiably restricted Members ' market access, 
including flexibility for exporters in relation to destination market. Further more, Chile considered 
that the proposed method did not respect  the balance of agreements established under the Uruguay 
Round, especially with regard to GATT  Article  XXVIII reciprocal concessions. In addition, Chile 
agreed with other Members concerning  the EU 's unhelpful export statistics, as presented on 
24 July 2018, which had been modified very shortly before their presentation, and which had only 
increased uncertainty with regard to the manner in which the process was being conducted. Chile 
wished cordially to invite all Members to respect the highest level s of tra nsparency. Chile itself would 
maintain an open and constructive dialogue with the EU in order to reach a satisfactory solution  to 
this issue  that would maintain the balance in market access already established under the 
WTO Agreements.  
6.25.   The delegate of Honduras thanked the co -sponsors of this agenda item  and noted that 
Honduras shared their concerns over and interest in this issue.  
6.26.   The delegate of Colombia  shared the systemic concerns of other Members and would continue 
to follow this issue  closely . 
6.27.   The dele gate of Malaysia  thanked the sponsors of this agenda item and emphasized the 
importance of ensuring that the  EU's TRQ allocation continue to afford Members  meaningful market 
access . Malaysia looked forward to engaging in a constructive dialogue on this iss ue both with the 
EU and the United Kingdom . 
6.28.   The delegate of  the Plurinational State of  Bolivia  shared other Members ' systemic concerns 
over and interest in this issue. 
6.29.   The delegate of the European Union  stated that , on 24  July 2018, the EU 's formal notification 
had been circulated to WTO  Members (document  G/SECRET/42) , in accordance with Article  XXVIII 
of the GATT  1994, with a view to apportioning the EU 's entire WTO -bound TRQs. Following bilateral 
engagement with a number of WTO  Members, as well as exchanges at the Committee on Market 
Access  (CMA) , on 9 October  2018, the EU had submitted a revised set of data on 19  October  2018. 
This new data, as contained in Annex  3 of the EU 's communication , included only trade on an 
MFN basis for the tariff lines concerned, in particular for the erga omnes TRQs. It excluded imports 
from non -WTO Members and preferential bilateral arrangements in so far as these covered the 
specific tariff lines included in these TRQs. The revised data also corrected some clerical mi stakes in 
Annex  1 and Annex  2. Procedurally, the EU understood that this revised dataset could result in a  
need for additional time for WTO  Members to submit or update their claims of interest. However, 
the EU considered that the revisions would not a have major impact on the determination of the 
negotiating rights of the relevant WTO  Members. As indicated in the explanatory note accompanying 
the new dataset, the EU was ready to engage in negotiations as soon as possible and invited 
Members to submit their claims  or revised claims without further delay. The EU took note of the 
room document that had been circulated in advance of the meeting. Again, the  EU had explained its 
approach and rational e for the apportionment and remained  willing to engage further with interested 
WTO Members  on this issue . She informed the Council that the EU had thus far received 25  claims 
from interested trading partners  and was currently assessing these claims. The EU would engage 
bilaterally with the Members concerned during the c ourse of the following  week and looked forward 
to fruitful exchanges.  
6.30.   The Chairperson  thanked all delegations for their interventions and the EU for its response 
and proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
6.31.   It was so agreed . G/C/M/133  
 
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  7  ENLARGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNIO N TO INCLUDE CROATIA : NEGOTIATIONS 
UNDER ARTICLE  XXIV:6 OF THE GATT  1994 – STATEMENT BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATI ON 
(G/SECRET/35/ADD.4)  
7.1.  The Chairperson  informed Members that, in a communication dated 31  October  2018, the 
delegation of the Ru ssian Federation had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the 
agenda.  
7.2.  The delegate of the Russian Federation  expressed deep concern over the EU's negotiations 
under Article  XXIV:6 of the GATT  1994 in the framework of its enlargement to include Croatia. She 
recalled that, in document  G/SECRET/35/Add.2 , dated 26 July 2018, the EU had notified the WTO 
and its Members of the conclusion of these negotiations. However, the  Russian Federation could not 
yet consider these negotiations to have been concluded because the EU had failed to engage in 
negotiations with Russia, which had been recognized by the EU as holding a principal supplying 
interest in respect of certain products. The Russian Federation had previously addressed this issue 
bilateral ly as well as in the CMA and in the Council for Trade in Goods. Its concerns  had also been 
directed to the EU in writing as well as circulated among WTO  Members , in 
document  G/SECRET/35/Add.4. She stated that, unfortunately, the EU had failed to respond 
adequately to these concerns . 
7.3.  First, the EU had  argued that the Russian "communication had been sent […] after the deadline 
set out in the applicable Procedures for negotiations under Article  XXVIII of the GATT [and] in 
addition, [it] did not indicate any sp ecific claim, and nor did it provide any supporting evidence ". 
She emphasized  that it was the EU itself that had determined Russia to be a WTO  Member holding 
a principal or substantial supplying interest on the basis of its import statistics in accordance with 
paragraph  4 of the Ad Note to Article  XXVIII:1 of the GATT. Considering  that Russia had not 
challenge d the data provided by the EU in its notification, it was his delegation 's view that 
paragraph  4 of the Procedures for Negotiations under Article  XXVIII of the GATT should not be 
applicable, because it spoke only  of a WTO Member that consider ed that it ha d a principal or 
substantial supplying interest ; however , neither this paragraph, nor the whole Procedures, 
establish ed rules in relation to a WTO Member that was already recognized as a principal supplier 
by the Member modifying the concession. Furthermore, as elaborated in Russia 's communication, 
the Procedures did not establish rigid obligations but merely represented soft law. By contrast, 
Article XXVIII:1 of the GATT and paragraph  4 of the Ad Note to Article  XXVIII:1 of the GATT 
established rigid obligations requiring negotiation  with a WTO Member having principal supplying 
interest. It remain ed unclear to Russia how, in the EU's view, the guidel ines could  supersede  
Members ' obligations established in the provisions of the GATT, as well as how a WTO  Member could 
be deprived of its rights under Article  XXVIII of the GATT.  
7.4.  Second, he stated that the EU's position , according to which "the indication of a WTO  Member 
as principal supplier in a GATT  Article  XXIV:6/XXVIII notification does not constitute an automatic 
recognition of a right for that WTO  Member to obtain compensation " was far from complying with 
Article  XXVIII of the GATT. Paragraph  4 of th e Ad Note to Article  XXVIII:1 of the GATT provided for 
the clear definition of the term "principal supplying interest ". The Procedures for negotiations under 
Article  XXVIII did not request the Member modifying the concession to provide information 
concerni ng principal supplying interest and substantial supplying interest in its notification. 
Article  XXVIII:1 of the GATT and paragraph  4 of the Ad Note to Article  XXVIII:1 of the GATT, 
meanwhile, obliged WTO  Member s modifying the ir concession "to ensure that a  [Member] with a 
larger share in the trade affected by the concession  … shall have an effective opportunity to protect 
the contractual right which it enjoys under [the GATT] ". 
7.5.  Third, she noted that the EU's argument that "even if the Russian Federation had  submitted its 
claims in conformity with the procedures and within the deadlines  …, it would not have been entitled 
to compensation for the tariff lines included in those claims, as the Russian Federation did not export 
the products concerned to Croatia du ring the reference period " cannot be considered as justification 
of the EU's decision not to enter into negotiations with Russia. He underlined that Article  XXVIII:2 
of the GATT stated  that, "in such negotiations  and agreement, which may include provisions for 
compensatory adjustment with respect to other products, the [Members] concerned shall endeavour  
to maintain a general level of reciprocal and mutually advantageous concessions not less favourable 
to trade th an that provided for in this Agreement prior to such negotiations ". The Russian Federation 
was of the view that the compensation request was the issue to be negotiated bilaterally. However, 
the EU had never engaged in  negotiations with Russia on this issue . G/C/M/133  
 
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  7.6.  He concluded that the EU appeared to be in violation of Article  XXVIII:1 of the GATT by not 
entering into negotiations with Russia,  and that the Russian Federation objected to the conclusion 
of the EU's negotiations under Articles  XXIV:6 and XXVIII of th e GATT . Once again , the Russian 
Federation called upon the EU to engage in compensatory adjustment negotiations with Russia on 
this issue . 
7.7.  The delegate of the European Union  replied that WTO  Members had been informed about the 
conclusion and outcome of the  negotiations following Croatia 's accession to the EU in 
document  G/SECRET/35/Add.2 , dated 26 July 2018, pursuant to paragraph  5 of the Guidelines on 
Procedures for Negotiations under Article  XXVIII. The outcome of the Article  XXIV:6 process would 
be faith fully reflected in the EU -28 schedule, which was currently in the process of certification. She 
explained that , as part of this process, a list of rectifications had been circulated to Members on 
17 October  2018 (G/MA/TAR/RS/506/Add.2). The EU had extensively and repeatedly explained its 
reasons for not having accepted the compensation claims of the Russian Federation in the context 
of the EU 's latest  enlargement. The issue had been addressed  most recently  at the  Market Access 
Committee , in October  2018. She wished  to put on record that , in the EU 's view , the indication of a 
WTO Member as principal supplier in a GATT  Article XXIV:6/XXVIII  notification did not constitute an 
automatic recognition of a right for that  WTO Member to obtain compensation. Some principal 
suppliers ma de a claim, others did not. The notifying Member then entered into negotiations  or 
consultations with those Members that had submitted a claim , in conformity with the procedures 
and within the deadlines applicable under WTO  rules, with a view to identifying if there were any 
entitlement for compensation.  
7.8.  The Chairperson  thanked delegations for their interventions and proposed that the Council take 
note of the statements made.  
7.9.  It was so agreed . 
8  TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO – REQUEST FOR AUTHORIT Y TO ENTER INTO NEGO TIATIONS 
UNDER ARTICLE  XXVII:4 OF THE GATT  1994 (G/SECRET/43)  
8.1.  The Chairperson  drew Members ' attention to document  G/SECRET/43, dated 31  October  2018, 
in which Trinidad and Tobago had requested the Council 's authorization to enter into negotiations 
under Article  XXVIII:4 of the GATT  1994 for the modification of the tariff concession on cement in 
its Schedule  LXVII. He reminded delegations that, according to the Notes and Supplementary 
Provisions to Article  XXVIII (the Ad Note), contained in Annex  I to the GATT  1994, the determination 
for the request of authorization to enter into negotiations under paragraph  4 of Article  XXVIII should 
be made within 30  days of the submission of the matter to Membe rs, or in this case, not later than 
12 December  2018.  
8.2.  The delegate of Trinidad and Tobago  explained that, at present, cement products with similar 
end-uses carried different bound rates. Notably, "Other Hydraulic Cement " of tariff heading  2523.90 
was bound  at a rate of duty of 5%, while all other cement products under tariff heading  25.23 were 
bound at 70%. He said that this had resulted in a pricing difference of US$12.2  per ton ne for similar 
cement products. The Government of Trinidad and Tobago had there fore taken the decision to 
harmonize the tariff structure for cement and its substitutable products. The objective of the 
Government 's decision to harmonize the se duties was to stabilize market variations and maintain 
production levels. Trinidad and Tobago  presented import data on "Other Hydraulic Cement " in 
Annex  II of its communication (document  G/SECRET/43). He noted that , over the period 2015 to 
2017, imports had increased by 6,532% , or from US$30,357 in 2015 to US$2,013,296 in 2017. 
Consequently, as at  December  2016, the local industry  had indicated a loss of revenue of 
US$25.8  million. The local cement manufacturing industry supplies building material to the energy 
sector and government construction projects and was a major contributor to Trinidad and Tobago 's 
non-energy economy. The current value of investment in the industry stood at US$183  million, with 
US$18.8  million  being invested over the last three  years. He explained that , neglecting the issues 
faced by the cement industry could result in the d ecline of the domestic industry , resulting in a 
negative socio -economic impact. It was estimated that the decline of the industry could result in 
direct job loss for 478 persons and indirect job loss for 686  persons. In an effort to avert the negative 
conditions currently prevailing in  the cement industry, the Government of Trinidad and Tobago 
wished to standardize all bound rates for cement products at 70%. Trinidad and Tobago stood  ready 
to enter into negotiations and consultations with the Members primar ily concerned, in accordance 
with the rules and procedures for renegotiations under Article  XXVIII of the GATT  1994, and would G/C/M/133  
 
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  endeavour to conclude such negotiations within 60  days following the conclusion of the 
90-day period for the submission of claims  of interest, but reserved its right to request an extension 
in case it deemed it necessary.  
8.3.  The delegate of the Dominican Republic  stated that her government was still reviewing this 
document and therefore could not approve Trinidad and Tobago 's request a t this meeting.  
8.4.  The delegate of Turkey  thanked Trinidad and Tobago for its notification request for 
authorization to enter into negotiations under Article  XXVIII of the GATT, for modifying its bound 
tariff commitments for the product "other hydraulic cemen ts" under tariff heading  2523.90. Turkey 
would be the main trading partner affected by the change proposed by Trinidad and Tobago and it 
had a substantial commercial  interest in this issue. He stated that , as the notification from Trinidad 
and Tobago was very recent, the relevant authorities were still evaluating the issue . Therefore, 
Turkey was not yet in a position to agree with Trinidad and Tobago 's request . He suggested that the 
Council revert to the request from Trinidad and T obago at its next meeting.  
8.5.  The Chairperson  took note that the Council was not in a position to authorize Trinidad and 
Tobago to enter into negotiations under GATT  Article  XXVIII:4 at this meeting. He reminded 
delegations that the Ad Note to Article  XXVIII: 4 mandated that the Goods Council make a 
determination on the request for authorization to enter into negotiations under paragraph  4 of 
Article  XXVIII within 30  days of the submission of the matter to Members, or in the current case, by 
12 December  2018. T herefore, he suggested that , unless Members contacted him in writing , through 
the Secretariat, with a copy to Trinidad and Tobago, by 30  November  2018, to object to this request, 
it would be considered that Trinidad and Tobago had been  authorized to enter into negotiations 
under GATT  Article  XXVIII:4 , starting from 1  December  2018. This meant that Members would have 
until 1  March  2019 to submit their claims of interest to Trinidad and Tobago  and that Trinidad and 
Tobago would endeavour to conclude negotiati ons by 30  April 2019. However, as indicated in its 
request, Trinidad and Tobago reserved its right to request an extension for this negotiation in case 
it deemed it necessary. Any further extension must be submitted to this Council. To the contrary, if 
by 30  November  2018, any Member had contacted the Chairperson in writing , through the 
Secretariat, with a copy to Trinidad and Tobago, to object to this request, then the Council would 
have to be reconvened before 12  December  2018 to cons ider this matter  further , as mandated by 
the Ad Note to Article  XXVIII:4. He therefore proposed that the Council suspend this agenda item 
until further notice.  
8.6.  The delegate of Brazil  requested  the Chairperson to circulate a letter providing Members with 
all of this information again so that they could take accurate note of the pertinent deadlines.  
8.7.  The delegate of the Dominican Republic  also requested further clarification with regard to 
procedures and deadlines. She also wished to confirm her understanding  that the Council had not 
reach ed an agreement on this issue . 
8.8.  The Chairperson  confirmed that no authorization had been granted by the Council at the 
meeting but that there was  nevertheless  a 30-day mandate to be follow ed. He repeated that , if by 
30 November  2018 no objection from Members had been received, then the authori zation to enter 
into GATT  Article  XXVIII :4 negotiations  would be considered approved , Members would then have 
until 1  March  2019 to submit their claims of interest, and Trinidad and Tobago would endeavour to 
conclude its negotiations by 30  April 2019. Nevertheless, as indicated in its request, Trinidad and 
Tobago reserved its right to request an extension for these negotiations if it deemed it necessary, 
with any further extension request being submitted to this Council. If, on the contrary, written 
objection were received by 30  November  2018, then the Council would need to reconvene before 
12 December  2018 to consider this matter again , as mandated by Article  XXVIII:4. He suggested 
that this item be suspended until further notice.  
8.9.  The delegate of Trinid ad and Tobago  said that his delegation would be guided by the 
Chairperson 's proposal.  
8.10.   It was so agreed . G/C/M/133  
 
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  9  MARKET ACCESS ISSUES  
9.1.  The Chairperson  informed Members that, as indicated in the Airgram, the Committee on Market 
Access had forwarded for the considerat ion of this Council four  collective requests for waiver 
extensions concerning the introduction of Harmonized System  (HS) Changes into WTO  Schedules of 
concessions.  
9.1  Introduction of Harmonized System 2002  Changes into the WTO  Schedules of Tariff 
Concessions – Draft Waiver Decision (G/C/W/756)  
9.2.  The Chairperson  drew Members ' attention to the collective draft waiver decision circulated in 
document  G/C/W/756, in connection with the introduction of HS2002  changes into WTO  schedules 
of tariff concessions. The curren t waiver decision was contained in document  WT/L/1026 and would 
expire on 31  December  2018. The one -year extension, as provided for in the draft waiver decision 
contained in document  G/C/W/756, had been the subject of consultations in the Market Access 
Committee meeting that had taken place on 9  October  2018.  
9.3.  The Chairperson  proposed that the Council agree to forward the draft waiver decision contained 
in document  G/C/W/756 to the General Council for adoption.  
9.4.  It was so agreed . 
9.2  introduction of Harmonized Sy stem  2007  Changes into the WTO  Schedules of Tariff 
Concessions – Draft Waiver Decision (G/C/W/ 757)  
9.5.  The Chairperson  drew Members ' attention to the collective draft waiver decision circulated in 
document  G/C/W/757, in connection with the introduction of HS2007  changes into WTO  schedules 
of tariff concessions. The current waiver decision was contained in document  WT/L/1027 and would 
expire on 31  December  2018. The one -year extension, as provided for in the draft waiver decision 
contained in document  G/C/W/ 757, had been the subject of consultations in the Market Access 
Committee meeting that had taken place on 9  October  2018.  
9.6.  The Chairperson  proposed that the Council agree to forward the draft waiver decision contained 
in document  G/C/W/757 to the General Co uncil for adoption.  
9.7.  It was so agreed . 
9.3  Introduction of Harmonized System  2012  Changes into the WTO  Schedules of Tariff 
Concessions – Draft Waiver Decision (G/C/W/ 758)  
9.8.  The Chairperson  drew Members ' attention to the collective draft waiver decision circulated in 
document  G/C/W/758, in connection with the introduction of HS2012  changes into WTO  schedules 
of tariff concessions. The current waiver decision was contained in document  WT/L/1028 and would 
expire on 31  December  2018. The one -year extension, as provided for in the draft waiver decision 
contained in document  G/C/W/758, had been the subject of consultations in the Market Access 
Committee meeting that had taken place on 9  October  2018.  
9.9.  The Chairp erson  proposed that the Council agree to forward the draft waiver decision contained 
in document  G/C/W/758 to the General Council for adoption.  
9.10.   It was so agreed . 
9.4  Introduction of Harmonized System 2017  Changes into the WTO  Schedules of Tariff 
Concessions – Draft Waiver Decision (G/C/W/ 759/ Rev.1) 
9.11.   The Chairperson  drew Members ' attention to the collective draft waiver decision circulated in 
document  G/C/W/759/Rev.1 in connection with the introduction of HS2017  changes into 
WTO schedules of tariff concessions. T he current waiver decision was contained in 
document  WT/L/1029 and Addenda 1 and 2 and would expire on 31  December  2018. The one -year 
extension , as provided for in the decision annexed to document  G/C/W/759/Rev.1 , had been the G/C/M/133  
 
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  subject of consultations in t he Market Access Committee meeting that had taken place on 
9 October  2018.  
9.12.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council agree to forward the draft waiver decision 
contained in document  G/C/W/759/Rev.1 to the General Council for adoption.  
9.13.   It was so agreed . 
10  JORDAN – REQUEST FOR A WAIVER RELATING TO T HE TRANSITIONAL PERI OD FOR 
THE ELIMINATION OF T HE EXPORT SUBSIDY PR OGRAM ME FOR JORDAN 
(G/C/W/705/REV.2)  
10.1.   The Chairperson  reminded  Members that document  G/C/W/705/Rev.2 contained both a 
waiver request and a draft waive r decision submitted by Jordan in respect of the transitional period 
for the elimination of its export subsidy programme. Also, at the July  2018 meeting of this Council, 
it had been agreed that the CTG would revert to th e matter at this meeting, where Jord an would 
update Members on any developments in this regard . 
10.2.   The delegate of Jordan  updated Members on progress made towards developing a WTO -
consistent replacement export subsidy programme in Jordan. He indicated  that, as explained  at the 
Council 's previous meeting, the new WTO -compliant programme had been agreed by the Council of 
Ministers  and was now passing through the legislative process, with the new draft income law 
currently being considered by Parliament. He once again  emphasized that the c urrent subsidy 
programme would be terminated by end -2018, according to Regulation No.  106 of 2016. Jordan 
wished again to thank Members for their cooperation and understanding of the challenges faced by 
the Jordanian economy. He requested that this item be  included in the Council 's next meeting agenda 
so that Jordan could provide Members with a further update on progress made.  
10.3.   The delegate of the United States  thanked Jordan for the update  on its reform efforts and 
congratulated Jordan on its efforts to des ign an alternate support program me that was compliant 
with Jordan 's international obligations. The US had been actively involved in providing technical 
assistance  (TA) to resolve the underlying issue. In her delegation 's view, this process had been an 
excellent example of Members working together, cooperatively and creatively. The US looked 
forward to the termination of the support program me at issue , and to the implementation of the 
new program me, in accordance with the schedule that Jordan had reviewed wi th them.  
10.4.   The delegate of New Zealand  thanked Jordan for its transparency and reform efforts; their 
regular updates to the Council were very much appreciated.  
10.5.   The Chairperson  thanked Jordan and other delegations for their interventions. He propose d 
that the  Council take note of the statements made and, as requested by Jordan, agree to revert to 
this matter at the Council 's next meeting, when Jordan would report again on the implementation 
of its new programme , as from 1  January  2019.  
10.6.   It was so agreed . 
11  FACTUAL REPORT BY TH E CHAIRMAN OF THE SA FEGUARDS COMMITTEE R EGARDING 
ARTICLE  13.1(E) OF THE AGREE MENT ON SAFEGUARDS ( G/L/1276 – G/SG/191 AND 
G/L/1276/ADD.1 – G/SG/191/ ADD.1) 
11.1.   The Chairperson  informed Members that , under this agenda item , the Council was to consider 
a factual report by the Chair person  of the Committee on Safeguards  (SG Committee)  regarding 
Article  13.1( e) of the Agreement on Safeguards , contained in document  G/L/1276 and its 
Addendum. This factual report had been  submitted under the Chair person's own responsibility. As 
was explained in the introductory part of the report itself, the SG Committee had discussed this issue 
on several occasions since its regular meeting in the spring of 2018. The Chairperson of the 
SG Committee had informed the Co mmittee at its regular meeting of 22 October  2018 that he would 
submit the factual report to the CTG under his own responsibility.  
11.2.   The delegate of Thailand  wished to express Thailand 's appreciation for the diligent work and 
efforts of the Chair of the Comm ittee on Safeguards, both in leading the process and in drafting the G/C/M/133  
 
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  factual report. As Members were aware, the factual report was the result of a request made by 
Thailand under Article  13.1(e) of the Agreement on Safeguards on Turkey 's proposed re -balanci ng 
measures. Thailand had made its request not only because of its own specific trade interests but 
also because of the broader systemic issues that could potentially have an impact upon all Members. 
Thailand thanked those Members that had expressed their views on these important issues at the 
SG Committee meetings. Thailand reserved its rights under the WTO  Agreements and would 
continue to follow the development of this issue closely.  
11.3.   The delegate of Turkey  thanked the Chairperson of the SG Committee and the Secretariat for 
preparing this factual report regarding Article  13.1(e) of the Agreement on Safeguards. His 
delegation had had the chance to make Turkey 's point of view on this issue heard several times 
during the regular Committee meetings and the Cha ir's consultations. He repeated that it was 
Turkey 's view that there was no binding rule on the methodology to calculate the level of 
substantially equivalent concessions either in the Agreement on Safeguards or  in WTO jurisprudence  
more generally . Therefo re, Members were free to use different periods in their calculations on how 
to determine their level of rebalancing measures , as indeed they did . For example, as seen in 
Annex  4 of the factual report, almost in all of the notifications made to the SG Commi ttee in 2018, 
Members had calculated their level of suspensions based on their exports in the year preceding the 
year in which the original measure had been imposed, just as Turkey had done  in calculating the 
level of suspensions against Thailand. He concl uded that the methodology employed by Turkey to 
calculate the level of substantially equivalent concessions in this case was in full conformity with 
Turkey 's obligations under the WTO  Agreements . 
11.4.   The delegate of the United States  thanked the SG Committee, along with the Committee 's 
Chair, and the Secretariat, for compiling this report and for forwarding it to the CTG. The US believed 
that this report was important  not only  for the Members directly involved but also for all Members, 
as it inform ed them of ap proaches that Members had previously taken under Article  12.5 of the 
Safeguards Agreement.  
11.5.   The Chairperson  thanked delegations for their interventions and invited the Council to take 
note of the factual report made by the Chairperson of the SG Committee , under his own 
responsibility, contained in document  G/L/1276 and its Addendum , and of the statements made.  
11.6.   It was so agreed . 
12  MEASURES TO ALLOW GR ADUATED LDC s, WITH GNP BELOW US$ 1000, BENEFITS 
PURSUANT TO ANNEX  VII(B) OF THE AGREEM ENT ON SUBSIDIES AND  COUNTERVAILING 
MEASURES – COMMUNICA TION FROM THE CENTRA L AFRICAN REPUBLIC O N BEHALF OF 
THE LDC  GROUP (WT/GC/W/742 – G/C/W/752)  
12.1.   The Chairperson  reminded delegations that, at the last meeting of this Council, the delegation 
of the Central African Republic, o n behalf of the LDC  Group, had introduced this issue. At that 
meeting, some delegations had requested further clarification and time for reflection on this issue. 
Therefore, the Council had agreed to revert to the issue at the current  meeting.  
12.2.   The delegate  of the Central African Republic , on behalf of the LDC  Group,  reiterated that this 
issue was very important in relation to the harmonious transition of LDCs towards economic 
development and integration in world trade. As already explained at the CTG on sev eral occasions, 
and also in bilateral meetings, the LDC  proposal on graduation, submitted on 19  April 2018, was 
intended, in relation to Annex  VII(b) of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
(SCM Agreement ), to enable LDCs that had graduat ed still to enjoy certain flexibilities under 
Article  27:2 of the SCM Agreement , as long as the Member 's GDP per capita was under US$1,000, 
or for a limited amount of time. He repeated that his submission was very simple and very clear , 
and it  complied wit h the request made by LDC  Ministers in their  Declaration in Buenos Aires. He 
urged Members to reach a positive agreement in favour of this proposal.  
12.3.   The delegate of Nepal  associated his delegation with the statement delivered by the Central 
African Republi c, as Coordinator of the LDC Group. He noted that graduation from LDC  status to 
developing country status was not a one -time change but  rather a continuous process of socio -
economic development , following its own rhythm and momentum . Even if, to graduate , a country 
had to fulfil two of the three  criteria indicated by the UN  system  and, specifically , the Committee on G/C/M/133  
 
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  Development Policy , under the UNDESA and ECOSOC, in practical terms , the socio -economic status 
of the general population of those countries mig ht still need to be  greatly  improved. The graduation  
itself might  be a matter of pride for the country ; nevertheless,  it was a very challenging situation 
because graduating LDCs were required to relinquish a number of international support mechanisms, 
preferences , and special treatments , including LDC -specific special and differential  (S&D)  treatment 
provisions, and A id-for-Trade. The LDC  proposal , as contained in documents  WT/GC/W/742 and 
G/C/W/752 , was intended to clarify the existing provision s of Annex  VII(b) of the SCM Agreement. 
During the consultation period, some months earlier , certain M embers had stated that the flexibilit ies 
under Annex  VII(b) provision s in the SCM  Agreement  were automatic for graduating LDCs , and that 
subsequently there was no ne ed to submit separate proposal s given that several developing country 
Members had invoked these provisions while their G DP per capita was less than the US $1,000 in 
1990 value. It was also clear that developing countries , including graduating LDC s, would only be 
using this flexibility if their GDP per capita were less than US $1,000 in 1990  value. It should be 
noted that the list of countries that had a GDP  per capita of less than US $1,000 in 1990  value was 
updated by the WTO  Secretariat. Set against  this bac kground , Nepal requested Members to support 
the LDC  proposal and thanked those Members that  had already indicated their support  for it. 
12.4.   The delegate of Brazil  recalled his delegation 's statements at the last CTG  meeting , and in the 
July meeting of the General Council , and reiterated Brazil 's support for the LDCs ' proposal.  
12.5.   The delegate of the United States  thanked the LDC  Group for its review of the proposal  
presented to the Council. In general terms , the US continued to question the need to change the 
rules in this area. It appeared to them that the UN  process already provided for a rather lengthy 
transition process out of the LDC  category, including possible extensions. The specific need for this 
proposal was also unclear to the US as there did not app ear to be any export subsidy program mes 
in place for which an extension might then be needed , and whil e the US was willing to discuss the 
issue further, it would nevertheless be helpful if the relevant Members provided a subsidy notification 
to clarify this issue. She concluded that , if technical assistance  were indeed required , the US would 
welcome the opportunity to share their experience and technical knowledge.  The US stood ready to 
continue to engage in discussions with the LDC  Group on this issue.  
12.6.   The delegate of Nigeria  thanked the delegat e of the Central African Republic for presenting, 
on behalf of the LDC  Group, th is proposal on measures to allow graduated LDCs  with GNP  below 
US$1,000 benefits pursuant to Annex  VII(b) of the SCM  Agreement. Niger ia also thanked  the other 
delegation s that had spoken on this issue. His delegation believed that the WTO should continue to  
support developing countries, and LDCs especially, in their efforts towards  economic diversification 
and sustained growth. This cou ld be achieved through review and strengthening of 
S&D treatment  provisions to further enhance the benefits for developing countries of the MTS. 
Nigeria took note of this proposal from the Central African Republic,  on behalf of the LDCs, which 
had been forwarded to Capital for its consideration , and Nigeria would communicate its position to 
the Council in due course.  
12.7.   The delegate of India welcomed the communication from the Central African Republic on 
behalf of the LDC  Group on the subject of deeming newly graduated LDCs as Annex  VII(b) Members 
until such time that they met the income criteria for graduation from Annex  VII of the 
WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. As stated at previous meetings, India 
reiterated that it agreed with the principle that the income threshold for graduation from Annex  VII 
should be extended to newly graduated LDC  Members as well. India welcomed the opportunity to 
discuss these aspects of Annex  VII interpretation with the LDC  Group and looked forward to 
extending its support in the finali zing and adoption of the proposed decision.  
12.8.   The delegate of Canada  thanked the Central African Republic, on behalf of the LDC  Group, for 
its update. Canada was mindful of the challenges faced by LDCs and  of the need for flexibilities in 
the rules, including in respect of  the S&D provisions found in Annex  VII of the SCM  Agreement . At 
the same time, Canada sought a clearer understanding of  the proposal. At the CTG 's previous 
meeting , Canada had identified a  number of questions it wished to discuss with the LDC  Group. 
Since then, Canada had met with the LDC  Group and had received certain  information ; however,  
further clarifications were still required, including on which recently -graduated LDC  countries would 
benefit from this proposal. Canada looked forward to discussing these questions  with the LDC Group.  
12.9.   The delegate of Japan  thanked the Central African Republic and the LDC  Group for the 
updates. Japan 's position on this issue remained unchanged. As st ated at the CTG's previous G/C/M/133  
 
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  meeting, Japan wished  again to highlight the importance of these issues relating to graduation from 
the LDC  category and remained open -minded about its engagement  in the discussion s. In order to 
facilitate consideration of this i ssue in Capital , as well as  discussion among Members, Japan 
reiterated , in the meantime,  its request that the proponents provide further detailed information on 
which countries would benefit from this proposal , based on the latest statistics , and what dome stic 
policies such countries currently took in this area. Japan looked forward to further discussing this 
issue with the Members  concerned . 
12.10.   The delegate of Thailand  thanked the Central African Republic, on behalf of the LDC  Group, 
for its update, and  agree d in principle to this proposal provided that  the GNP  per capita  threshold 
set out in the methodology in document  G/SCM/38 had not been reached. However, Thailand saw 
the benefit of further discussion and asked if the Secretariat could provide a list of Members that 
would benefit  from such measures . 
12.11.   The delegate of Turkey  thanked the Central African Republic,  on behalf of the LDC  Group , 
for their proposal. Turkey saw merit in discussing this proposal and believed that it was the 
responsibility of the Membership to assist  the LDCs in their efforts to integrate into the global 
economy and the MTS. Turkey also thought that graduated LDCs sh ould be granted  the same rights 
as the developing countries listed in Annex  VII(b) of the SCM Agreement. Turkey would continue to 
participate actively  in these discussions.  
12.12.   The delegate of the European Union  stated that, as indicated at the CTG's previous  meeting, 
the EU stood  ready to engage constructively on development issues, and those concerning LDCs  in 
particular , on the basis of analysis that clearly explained where  the specific problems were, which 
justified certain specific courses of action. Devel oping countries, and in particular LDCs, should have 
access to flexibilities that genuinely helped them to achieve their development objectives ; however,  
these flexibilities needed to be needs -driven and evidence -based. At present , the EU could not agree 
to any broad general automatic exemption for all developing countries from existing rules. She asked 
the proponents again if graduated LDCs would remain covered by the list of Annex  VII(b) until their 
GNP per capita reached US$1,000 in constant 1990  dollars  for three  consecutive years. Once this 
condition had been  met, she asked if the provision of Article  27.2(b) of the SCM  Agreement would 
apply to such graduated LDC s, meaning that such former LDC s would therefore  be allowed to grant 
export subsidies for eight  years after they had left the list.  
12.13.   The delegate of  the Bolivarian Republic of  Venezuela  expressed support for this proposal . 
12.14.   The delegate of the Central Africa n Republic  clarified that this was not a new sub mission, 
but rather a communication that took into account a technical error. His delegation remained 
available to M embers  wishing to discuss further the measures  proposed . 
12.15.   The Chairperson  thanked the Central African Republic for its intervention , on behal f of the 
LDC Group , as well as the other delegations for their interventions on this issue. Since certain  
delegations had indicated that they still require d further clarification of this issue, he encouraged 
the LDC  Group to continue to engage actively in discussions with Members and proposed that the 
Council take note of the statements made and revert to this issue at the Council 's next meeting , at 
the request of the LDC  Group . 
12.16.   It was so agreed . 
13  PROPOSAL TO ENHANCE TRANSPARENCY AND STR ENGTHEN NOTIFICATION  
REQUIREMENTS UNDER W TO AGREEMENTS – COMM UNICATION FROM ARGEN TINA, 
COSTA RICA, THE EURO PEAN UNION, JAPAN, T HE SEPARATE CUSTOMS TERRITORY OF 
TAIWAN, PENGHU, KINM EN AND MATSU, AND TH E UNITED STATES (JOB /GC/204 –
JOB/CTG/14 AND JOB/G C/204/ADD.1 –JOB/CTG/ 14/ADD.1)  
13.1.   The Chairperson  drew Members ' attention to document  JOB/GC/204 –JOB/CTG/14, dated 
1 November  2018, circulated at the request of the delegations of Argentina, Costa Rica, the 
European Union, Japan, and the United States, and containing a Draft Decision for the General 
Council 's consideration on procedures to enhance transparency and strengthen notification 
requirements under the WTO  Agreements. He also informed Members that, in a communication 
dated 7  November  2018, circulated as document  JOB/GC/204/Add.1 –JOB/CTG/14/Add.1, the G/C/M/133  
 
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  delegation of Chinese Taipei had also requested to be included in the list of co -sponsors of the 
proposal.  
13.2.   The representative of the United States  thanked Argentina, Costa Rica, Chinese Taipei, the 
European Union, and  Japan, for co -sponsoring this initiative and for their contribution to the proposal 
and reminded  delegations that the US had initially tabled the proposal  at the November  2017 
CTG meeting with a view  to improving Members ' compliance with the notification requirements of 
the various WTO  Agreements.  
13.3.   The proposal circulated for this meeting was the culmination of improvements, based on the 
work of all the co -sponsors, Members ' feedback received during the previous two CTG meetings, and 
countless bilateral and  small group meetings. The proposal constituted an effort to address 
deficiencies and gaps in notifications and transparency. It was an effort to reinvigorate the 20 -year-
old institution, and to put the WTO on a path towards a more successful and sustainab le future.  
13.4.   The inspiration for the proposal stemmed from the Secretariat 's Annual Report on Notifications 
provided to the CTG in document  G/L/223 and its revisions, which demonstrated Members ' 
inadequacy to comply with the notification requirements of the various WTO  Agreements. According 
to this report, fewer  than half of the WTO's Members had provided their 2017  subsidy notification s. 
A similar situation existed for Agriculture, where one  third of regular notifications were outstanding 
for the period 1995  through  2017.  
13.5.   A lack  of transparency was problematic for traders and undermined the proper functioning 
and operation of the WTO  Agreements. From a systemic perspective, it was also very difficult to 
develop, evaluate, and assess negotiating proposals to improve the operation of the various 
WTO Agreements without the information that would have been provided under existing 
WTO notification obligations. Lack of compliance with basic notification obligations also undermined 
confidence in the MTS. If Members could not comply with the ir most basic obligations, what certainty 
could there be that they were complying with the ir more substan tive ones?  
13.6.   To encourage better compliance with notification obligations , two incentives to seek improved 
performance had been considered, namely the ability to request TA, and the ability to compile 
information through the TPR  process, as well as modest ad ministrative measures that acknowledged 
that sustained problems in compliance should at least have some consequences. However, this 
proposal did not change Members ' notification obligations under the WTO  Agreements; rather, it 
merely sought to encourage  better compliance  through various incentives and administrative 
measures. In order to explain the details and particularities of the proposal he then invited  his 
colleague  to take the floor . 
13.7.   The delegate of the United States said that , in order to improve Me mbers ' compliance with 
notification obligations, the proponents had carefully reviewed the Secretariat 's reporting to the CTG 
and, given its comprehensive nature , which concerned all the Agreements under the aegis of this 
Council, the scope of the proposal  had been limited to those Agreements, as outlined in its 
first paragraph. However, the proponents were open to consider the addition of other Agreements , 
such as the TFA, which could be included in  a further revision of the proposal.  
13.8.   The proposal also rec ognized that some notification requirements were on  an annual or 
biannual basis, with a fixed date for when such notifications were due. Other notifications were 
required when a new measure was proposed, as in the case of newly proposed regulations notifie d 
under the TBT or SPS  Agreements.  
13.9.   This proposal to the General Council would apply to all notifications concerning the 
Agreements listed in its paragraph  1, as there had been delays in the submission of each type of 
notification. However, the Agreement on  Agriculture (AoA) had been treated differently in 
paragraph  1(a) given that , since 1995, when the notification timeline had been established , in 
document  G/AG/2, Members had identified significant challenges in meeting the timelines for their 
agricultural  subsidies notifications. As noted in paragraph  4 of the proposal, the work currently 
taking place at the Committee on Agriculture (CoA) was intended to modify document  G/AG/2. The 
proposal did not change Members ' notification obligations under the WTO  Agreements but , 
considering the work at the CoA , additional time had been proposed for agricultural notifications to 
be submitted before the application of administrative measures.  G/C/M/133  
 
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  13.10.   To encourage the submission of notifications, the proposal recommended elevati ng the issue 
to the General Council in order to allow Members to reaffirm their commitments to their existing 
notification commitments , in paragraph  1, and including more information on notifications in 
Members ' Trade Policy Reviews (TPRs), in paragraph  6. To maintain a focus on the issue of 
notifications, the proposal also recommended that the Working Group on Notification Obligations 
and Procedures (WGNOP) review issues relating to notifications and potential improvements, in 
paragraphs  2 and 3. It was also recommended, in paragraph  5 of the proposal, that this Working 
Group update the Technical Cooperation Handbook on Notifications.  
13.11.   Given that some WTO  Agreements encouraged the use of counter -notifications, paragraph  7 
of the proposal also suggested that this option could be employed more broadly. In the case of the 
Agreements listed in paragraph  1, the text in paragraph  8 of the proposal encouraged greater 
transparency, even when a notification had not been submitted, by asking Members to provide 
informat ion on the reason for the notification 's delay, when the notification was likely to be 
submitted, and any partial notification information already available.  
13.12.   The proposal also provided options whereby the Secretariat could assist Members in 
providing the n otification, as reflected in paragraphs  9 and 11. Her delegation believed that, in all 
probability , there were a number of notifications that were missing simply because of a lack of 
understanding of what had to be notified . The Secretariat could be of assistance in this regard . For 
example, on State Trading Enterprises (STEs), a number of Members might only need to notify that 
they did not maintain any STEs.  
13.13.   Her delegation had listened carefully to Members ' concerns about the  need to differentiate 
between those Members that were not providing notifications due to a true lack of capacity , and 
those Members that simply did not want to provide a notification. This had been included in 
paragraphs  10 and 12(c).  
13.14.   Indeed, paragraph  10 encouraged Members to identify those notifications that they had not 
submitted due to a lack of capacity. These Members were also encouraged to include information on 
the assistance and support for capacity -building that they might require in order then to submit their 
complete d notifications. This wording had been borrowed from the provisions in Section  2 of the 
TFA. In addition, if a Member provided the information identified in paragraph  10 then such Members 
would not have administrative measures applie d to them , as set out in paragraph  12(c) . 
13.15.   Some Members had indicated that they might experience difficulties in identifying those 
notifications for which they need ed assistance. Helpfully, some developing country Members had 
also indicated that the Secreta riat provided an annual accounting to each Member of those 
notifications that were currently outstanding. Thus, rather than requiring each developing country 
Member to do an independent accounting, the Secretariat provided a list for each Member to review 
and subsequently determine potential assistance needs. The US hoped that Members would find this 
flexibility useful as its ultimate goal was to achieve timely notifications from all Members.  
13.16.   Turning to the administrative measures, she noted that flexibilit y alone would not be 
sufficient to encourage notifications from Members that, for whatever reason, did not want to provide 
a notification. Therefore, according to paragraph  12 of the proposal, if after two  years a notification 
had still not been provided, administrative measures would then be applied to the Member  
concerned . 
13.17.   The Secretariat 's annual reporting on outstanding notifications and the specific efforts of the 
standing Committees to discuss the challenge of these missing notifications had done little to resolve 
the problem. Thus, the proposal looked to administrative measures currently used by the 
WTO Budget Committee. However, the US had considered Members ' comments that some of the 
administrative measures employed by the Budget Committee might  not be suitable for the current 
proposal on notifications. For example, access to the WTO  Members ' website, and access to WTO  TA, 
could be important tools in facilitating the submission of notifications. Thus, the proposal had not 
included these types of administrative measures ; instead , two new proposed administrative 
measures had been added , one outlining that Members that did not fulfil their notification 
requirements by the deadlines established in the proposal might not have the questions they ask ed 
of other Members answered  during TPRs, and the other providing for an additional monetary 
contribution to the WTO  Budget of a specific percentage, to be decided.  G/C/M/133  
 
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  13.18.   The US appreciated the opportunity to provide additional information on this notification 
proposal, newly co -sponsored by Argentina, Costa Rica, the EU, Japan, and Chinese Taipei, and 
believed that improving transparency through existing WTO  notification requirements was the kin d 
of institutional reform necessary to facilitate future negotiations across negotiating topics and would 
be a worthy and desirable outcome in the near future. To advance this work, her delegation and the 
other proponents planned to begin proponent -based d iscussions with all interested Members on 
further improving the current proposed General Council Decision on notifications.  
13.19.   The representative of the European Union  thanked the co -sponsors of the proposal for 
making it possible to continue the discussion t hat had begun with the original US proposal in 
November  2018, and for the good cooperation  overall . In addition to the remarks made by the 
US Ambassador and the US  delegate, the EU wished to place this proposal, which appeared to be 
very technical, into th e current and broader context of WTO  modernization . 
13.20.   Indeed, in September  2018, the EU had published a concept paper on WTO  modernization 
in response to the serious challenges being faced by the MTS. In that paper, the EU had outlined its 
ideas for moderniz ing the three  main functions of the WTO, which were rule -making, dispute 
settlement, and monitoring. With regard to the WTO 's monitoring function, improving transparency 
and compliance with notification obligation s was an essential part of the EU 's approach. This proposal 
therefore formed part of the EU 's effort s and was a first  step towards reinforcing the WTO as an 
institution.  
13.21.   Ambassador Shea had eloquently summarized the lack of transparency resulting from the 
serious backlog in notifications th roughout various important areas  of the WTO 's work . This created 
problems for economic operators, undermined their confidence in the MTS, and hampered the 
functioning of the Organization, including its negotiating pillar. Consequently, reinforcing 
transpar ency was in the interests of all Members, regardless of their level of development. In fact, 
the more capacity constraints a Member faced, the more important it was to have access to up -to-
date information.  
13.22.   For this reason, when the US had  tabled its origi nal proposal a year ago, the EU had 
welcomed it for triggering a long overdue conversation about an issue that had been of serious 
concern to a large number of Members for many years. The EU was pleased to develop the se ideas 
further and to co-sponsor the proposal in its current form.  
13.23.   The EU was of the view that one of the main improvements of the proposal was the 
differentiation it introduced, in paragraphs  10 and 12(c), between cases where notifications were 
not provided on time because of capacity constr aints, on the one hand, and cases where capacity 
was not the issue, on the other. Where capacity constraints were the issue, various forms of 
assistance were available to developing countries to help them to meet their notification 
requirement s. 
13.24.   Paragraph  9 of the proposal encouraged developing countries to make use of these means 
and to choose, with the help of the Secretariat, between technical assistance  and training activities 
provided through the WTO  Institute for Training and Technical Cooperation, an d more ad hoc support 
from the respective divisions of the Secretariat in preparing individual notifications.  
13.25.   The proposal also tasked the WGNOP to assess where the WTO  Trade -Related Technical 
Assistance ( TRTA) notifications were effectively contributing to improving beneficiaries ' notification 
performance, and where adjustments were still needed. The co -proponents were ready to address 
this issue.  
13.26.   Beyond capacity -building, the proposal contemplated various incentives for improving 
notification compliance;  these included updating the Handbook on Notifications and increasing the 
focus on notifications in TPRs, in full conformity with the neutrality of the Secretariat, and the key 
features of the Trade Policy Review Mechanism  (TPRM) . 
13.27.   As already stated in previous discussions, the EU believed that, in case s where a lack of 
transparency was not due to capacity constraints, there needed to be consequences. In this vein , 
the EU supported the idea of the original proposal to apply disciplinary measures for such cas es, but 
also saw the need to adapt the administrative measures used in the specific context of the Budget G/C/M/133  
 
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  Committee. The current proposal had kept those administrative measures that could usefully be 
transposed to the notification context and had also adde d some new concepts.  
13.28.   The measure that was designed to allow Members to withhold their replies to questions 
posed by a Member not fulfilling its notification obligation s during TPRs  was aimed at recalling the 
value of transparency, which should not be taken  for granted. The co -proponents were encouraged 
by the support and constructive feedback that they had received from Members during informal 
conversation s that had been taking  place since December  2017. 
13.29.   The EU looked forward to further improving the propos al with Members during the informal 
discussion process mentioned by the US and considered it important to reflect also upon the 
experience with different notification realities in the respective Committees.  
13.30.   The delegate of Chinese Taipei  thanked previous s peakers for having introduced the proposal 
and expressed satisfaction for having tabled it together with the other co -sponsors. Chinese Taipei 
believed that transparency was a critically important element of the MTS , had for this reason always 
advocate d for enhanced transparency in the WTO , and supported proposals seeking to improve 
notification  compliance . Indeed, her delegation regretted to see persistent ly low levels of notification 
compliance. The poor record on notifications was worrying as this made the work of the Committees 
ineffective, thus negatively affecting Members ' ability to monitor implementation of the 
WTO Agreements and commitments.  
13.31.   For Chinese Taipei, the key element and the essence of this proposal  was to provide 
adequate support to assist Members to complete their notification s when such support was 
necessary , but not to create new obligations.  
13.32.   The delegate of Argentina  thanked the Ambassadors of the United States and the European 
Union for having introduced this proposal on transparency on behalf of the group of co -sponsors . He 
noted that it was widely recognized that the stability of the multilateral regulatory framework , as 
well as its predictability regarding changes introduced to trade rules , were key issues for 
international trade operators. Predictability, which in essence consisted in looking forward to the 
future, was a central element for trade facilitation ; however, with predictability should also come 
transparency. Transparency allowed Me mbers to obtain information concerning not only current and 
future requirements , but also information about past regulations.  
13.33.   Members ' concerns over the low levels in fulfilment of requirements with regard to 
transparency were not an issue of systemic puri tanism. Members ' concerns on this issue referred to 
the great and real impact caused by a lack of transparency on the subtle balance of rights and 
obligations to which all Members  had voluntarily adhered.  
13.34.   Argentina believed that the status quo  was not a me ans in itself; nor did it provide the 
necessary tools to dissuade Members from ignoring their transparency obligations. Indeed, such 
status quo  resulted in other situations, which were not comparable: negligence and passivity in 
fulfilling transparency com mitments vis-a-vis real cases where Members lacked the capacity to do 
so. 
13.35.   Therefore, and without prejudice to any future developments, Argentina believed that this 
proposal represented a step forward when compared with the document initially submitted to the 
CTG in early 2018, and considered that it now adequately addressed the three  basic questions , what, 
why, and how , as followed : (i) what was the concern over the lack of transparency ; (ii) why a lack 
of transparency had a negative impact upon the functioning of the system and Members ' rights ; and 
(iii) how the introduction of incentive and administrative measures could resolve the issue. For these 
three  reasons , Argentina had decided t o co-sponsor the proposal ; in particular , Argentina believed 
that repeatedly expressing a concern was not enough to resolve it. Of course, certain adjustments 
could be introduced , and Argentina hoped to contribute to the further development of the proposal . 
13.36.   The delegate of Costa Rica  expressed deep satisfaction with the proposal , of which Costa 
Rica was now a co-sponsor. The proposal 's intention was to enhance transparency and strengthen 
notification requirements in the WTO and it contained significant elem ents that would contribute 
towards improvements in  the fulfilment of commitments by the Membership  overall . G/C/M/133  
 
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  13.37.   Transparency was both a principle and a public good of the MTS that all Members must 
protect  because  the complete fulfilment of notification obligat ions and requirements guaranteed its 
correct functioning. Without timely access to accurate information the WTO  functions of surveillance 
and negotiation would be weaken ed, and the risk of trade friction would increase . 
13.38.   Access to up -to-date information on Members ' trade policies was vital to Members ' work, 
particularly in the case of developing countries and small economies , which often lacked the means 
to maintain their own trade intelligence structures in the majority of their markets. In this regard , 
fulfilling transparency commitments in a timely manner was of great value. What would happen if 
each one of the Members were obliged to compile information from all other Members? It would be 
an impossible task , beyond the capacity of almost all Members . Ther efore, Costa Ri ca valued the 
mechanisms proposed and believed that the result could be a strengthened  WTO. 
13.39.   Costa Rica recognized that preparing notifications could be a burdensome task , which often 
involved gathering information from many different institu tions that dealt with a range of different 
policies. The efforts that some Members had made to meet their notification obligations, particularly 
in the case of developing countries like Costa Rica, might usefully be compensated by other Members 
likewise meeting their obligations  on time, to the benefit of all Members and the MTS  in general . 
13.40.   Among the various elements in the proposal , he highlighted the following: the reinvigoration 
of the WGN OP, as well as the discussion on recommendations to improve Members ' fulfilment of 
their notification requirements. These would improve Members ' understanding of those  situations 
where notifications had not been filed, and above all contribute towards trying to find solutions to 
the problem , given that not all Memb ers faced the same conditions when it came to fulfil ling these 
requirements. In this regard, technical assistance  and capacity -building received from the 
Secretariat would help to build capacity at national level. Moreover, Members could go one step 
furthe r, depend ing on their will and interest , by exploring the options within the Working Group with 
a view to improving  the role and effectiveness of TA activities, as set out in the proposal.  
13.41.   Costa Rica believed that it was important for  Members to commit to active policies when 
seeking solutions to the ir lack of notifications; perhaps on an exceptional basis, these could include 
regular reports explaining the reasons for delays, the anticipated timeline for notification, as well as 
information on any technica l assistance and support that had already been requested.  
13.42.   Costa Rica encouraged other Members to join the proposal and thanked them for their 
comments and constructive feedback . He looked forward to further develop ing this proposal so as 
to tackle the chal lenges facing  the WTO and to ensure the proper functioning of the MTS.  
13.43.   The delegate of Japan  thanked the US and the EU for their statements introducing this 
proposal. Japan had been pleased to join them, together with other co -sponsors, in strengthening 
the implementation of the current notification obligations of the WTO  Agreements.  
13.44.   Members were aware of certain deficiencies  in the functioning of the WTO, which prevented 
it from fulfilling its intended role. The rule s-based MTS was founded upon the princ iples of 
transparency and predictability, and Japan considered that it was crucial to make further efforts to 
ensure that transparency obligations were consistently fulfilled  because the  strength of the MTS 
depended on it. 
13.45.   As already stated by the US and t he EU, the intention of the proposal was not to impose new 
requirements on Members but rather to encourage them to fulfil their existing notification obligations 
as laid out in the Agreements. This proposal aimed to ensure  that Members having the capacity to 
meet their notification commitments fulfilled  their obligations within the WTO  to do so . 
13.46.   Japan sought Members ' support for the proposal and expressed it s readiness to respond to 
any questions that Members might have.  
13.47.   The representative of Australia  indicated that Australia also wanted to co -sponsor the joint 
proposal on Procedures to Enhance Transparency and Strengthen Notification Requirements. 
Referring to transparency , she noted that many WTO  bodies had ceased to operate as originally 
intended gi ven that many Members had reduced their level of engagement, ignored deadlines for 
submitting notifications, and failed to respond to the market access concerns raised by other G/C/M/133  
 
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  Members. She emphasized that not only transparency but also the monitoring of o ther Members ' 
trade policies played a central role in ensuring that WTO Members understood the policy actions 
taken by their trading partners. In this vein, effective notifications were essential to facilitating the 
identification of trade barriers and the  smooth operation of the MTS.  
13.48.   In contrast,  non-compliance or delayed compliance with notification obligations allowed 
Members to avoid unwanted investigation of their trade measures and made it difficult to compare 
trade measures between Members in a fair and timely manner. Australia believed that systematic 
and deliberate non -compliance should not be allowed to continue without consequences, particularly 
given that, for business, transparency was critical.  
13.49.   The above -mentioned processes, when functioning  properly, ensured equitable access to 
information among Members, and lower ed transaction costs between traders . Nevertheless, 
Australia recognized that there might be a need to establish the extent to which capacity and 
capability had an impact upon a Member 's level of non -compliance. Therefore , it was important to 
consider how to encourage, assist, and support Members in their efforts to improve their level s of 
compliance. In this vein, Australia found value in encouraging Members that were struggling to 
comply with their notification obligations to seek assistance from the WTO  Secretariat  to help them 
do so . 
13.50.   She clarified that the financial penalties set out in the proposal would not apply to Members 
that had sought the Secretariat 's assistance, and that the co-proponents were open to working 
further on how to minimize any adverse impact on Members that were trying to meet their 
obligations.  
13.51.   In order to reinforce Members ' commitment to transparency, the proposal suggested that 
any funds received from the budg et penalty could go towards assisting LDC  Members to meet their 
notification obligations.  
13.52.   Australia did have strong reservations regarding the differentiation in notification obligations 
between agricultural and non -agricultural notifications  because  its strong preference was for all of 
these notification obligations to be treated in the same way. Australia also favoured a sunset clause 
arrangement whereby this special leeway would cease to apply after a number of years.  
13.53.   The proposal provided both for an op portunity to review how Committees might improve 
compliance and how Members themselves might improve the completeness of their notifications.  
13.54.   Incomplete notifications raised transaction costs and the cost s of doing business. A reform 
regarding transparency  and notification practices in the WTO was critical to the continued 
effectiveness of the MTS. Therefore, Australia urged Members to co -sponsor, or simply lend their 
support to this proposal as a way of beginning a focussed dialogue on a way forward on thi s 
important issue.  
13.55.   The delegate of China  thanked the proponents for tabling the proposal. China had always 
believed that transparency was one of the most important WTO  principles, and that Members should 
abide by and make every effort to enhance transparen cy and notifications.  
13.56.   In the past, China had made various efforts to improve its notifications, both in terms of 
quantity and quality, and had submitted many new notifications. China would continue to do so.  
13.57.   As the proponents had indicated , notification co mpliance was far from being perfect. When 
talking about notification performance, some Members often cited developing Members as examples 
of a low level of compliance , and in different configurations  more or less blamed them for such . 
However, what was really important to note was that not a single Member had fully fulfilled all of its 
notification obligations as required by the WTO  Agreements. Therefore, China also echoed the 
importance of the work being done in this area and support ed the intention to find effective solutions 
that would help to address these issues. 
13.58.   However, China did not consider a punitive approach to be a good option . Punishment was 
commonly used in British -style schools in the past, and in China 's schools even in  China 's recent 
past, but nowadays schools seldom resorted to such an approach. Indeed, punitive approaches led G/C/M/133  
 
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  to more negative than positive effects and would do so also at the WTO , and that despite the fact 
that these measures had been inspired by exist ing WTO  measures that were currently used in the 
budgetary and financial context. However, Members ' financial obligations were of a different nature 
to notifications or other Members ' obligations.  
13.59.   Even though performance in the area of notification s requir ed comparable capacity, capacity 
was precisely what developing Members lacked, and it was this lack of capacity that had led to late 
or incomplete notifications. In addition, the unreliable content of the notifications of other Members 
also placed an extra  burden on developing Members with limited capacity. This point needed to be 
placed at the centre of any discussion on improvement s in the area of notification s, and if incentives 
were going to be developed, these should be positive rather than negative.  
13.60.   China asked the proponents if a similar proposal would be tabled under the Council for Trade 
in Services.  
13.61.   The delegate of Senegal  thanked the proponents for their submission, as well as for the 
bilateral exchange of views on this issue. As indicated at the  last CTG and Trade Negotiations 
Committee ( TNC) meetings, Senegal considered transparency and the implementation of current 
notification obligations to be fundamental pillars of the MTS, as well as fundamental elements in the 
WTO's negotiating role. Seneg al supported all positive proposals aimed at improving Members ' 
respect of existing notification obligations, and particularly those for Members that faced real 
constraints.  
13.62.   Senegal also considered it useful to instruct the WTO  Committees, Working Groups, and 
other relevant bodies, such as a reanimated WGNOP, to assess the difficulties faced by Members in 
respect of their notification obligations under the Agreements set out in paragraph  1 of the proposal, 
in order to formulate, as appropriate, recommendati ons on how best to encourage and to improve 
Members ' compliance with their notification obligations. In this vein, his delegation stood ready to 
look in particular at the ideas mentioned in paragraphs  4, 5, 8, 9, 10, and 11 of the proposal.  
13.63.   However, Senega l was concerned that paragraph  12 of the proposal set out punitive 
measures as a solution to the failure to notify when that failure could in fact be because of the actual 
constraints being faced by certain WTO  Members. The proponents should instead wait for the results 
and recommendations of the review process by the relevant bodies  proposed . In this regard, Senegal 
believed that certain elements of the proposal pre -judged the results of the exercise that had been 
tabled.  
13.64.   Senegal noted that  LDCs and certa in developing countries were faced by deep institutional 
and structural limitations when it came to meet ing their notification obligations. These constraints 
could not be overcome by simple capacity -building seminars and instead  required, beyond political 
will and technical capacity -building, the implementation of coordination mechanisms and processes 
at the domestic level , as well as action plans,  so that Members could collect, process, and elaborate 
the necessary notifications.  
13.65.   Senegal did not support the  proposals set out in paragraphs  6, 7, 12, 13, and 14 of the 
proposal, particularly with regard to LDCs, as these created obligations for Members and infringed 
upon their sovereignty. With regard to the proposal in paragraph  14, Senegal believed that it could 
circumvent current negotiations in the Negotiating Group on Rules (NGR), where the notification 
obligations being negotiated went beyond those set forth in Article  25.3 of the SCM  Agreement . 
13.66.   Senegal stood ready to continue its engagement in a construct ive dialogue within the 
Committees and the WG NOP to find solutions to the issue of WTO  notification  compliance . Senegal 
also associated itself with the statement to be delivered by South Africa on behalf of the African 
Group.  
13.67.   The delegate of Peru thanked t he co -sponsors for their proposal , which Peru welcomed and 
considered to be an important effort to wards  encouraging Members to comply with their notification 
obligations. In this regard, Peru noted that the current proposal contained provisions on S&D , which 
were intended  to enable developing countries to build the necessary capacity to prepare their 
notifications. However, Peru continue d to assess the issue of sanctions that could be applied to non -
notifying Members , and asked proponents for further clarification of the following  points: what was G/C/M/133  
 
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  to be understood by "full or complete notifications", and who would determine whether or not a 
notification was full and complete? When referring to the "Working Group ", were the proponents 
referring specifically to the "Working Group on Notifications ", or also to the committees  in general , 
as well as other working groups  and competent bodies? Would the Working Group be proposing  a 
schedule of meetings with other Committees or other relevant bodies in order to be come better  
acquainted with the current status quo in Members ' notifications? Peru also noted that currently 
there were certain discrepancies among Members as to under which of two  Agreements a certain 
measure should be notified , and it  had been  understood that it was up to the notifying Member itself 
to take such a decision. Did this proposal intend to address such discrepancies? With regard to 
imposing a percentage increase on WTO  Members ' contributions when they failed to notify beyond 
a certa in time, would the application of a one -off fine distinguish between a Member that had only 
one notification pending, and a Member with several pending notifications, and was there not a risk 
here of creating a disincentive to notify? How would such furthe r contributions  be used ? Given that 
the draft Decision encouraged developing Members to request technical assistance linked to their 
outstanding notifications, would the WTO  Secretariat be able to increase its TA capacity in this 
regard?  
13.68.   Peru indicated that it remained committed to contributing to discussions intended to  
strengthen the MTS , and that, in this regard, it supported the idea of seeking a more adequate 
means of incentivizing Members to comply with their notification  commitments . 
13.69.   The representative of Mexico  said that his count ry attached great importance to fully 
complying with its commitments under the covered WTO  Agreements. Thanks to the WTO's 
notification process and transparency provisions, all Members could notify the way s in which they 
honoured and respected their WTO  commitments ; this  contributed to building confidence among 
Members and to facilitating future trade negotiations.  
13.70.   For these  reasons, Mexico thanked the proponents for their submission , which would not 
only encoura ge the necessary debate but also lead Members to establish an appropriate means by 
which to encourage transparency and notification compliance . In Mexico's view, the document went 
in the right direction and proposed elements that Mexico considered positive , including the 
reactivation of the WGNOP . At the same time, it set out in detail the work that would be required by 
Members in order  to develop recommendations for an improved fulfilment of notification  
commitments , including by evaluating  the contribution of technical assistance in this regard, and to 
update the Handbook on Notifications.  
13.71.   However, in Mexico's view, there remained  two elements of concern that required further 
reflection and adjustment. One was the different treatment given to notifications in Agriculture 
compared  to notifications under other Agreements. Mexico could not understand the rationale for 
such a distinction and why in the future  it should be permanent . Mexico itself had made a special 
effort , involving all of its d omestic agencies, to ensure  that its agricultural notifications  were fully up 
to date , and it was sure that other countries, and particularly developed countries, were likewise in 
a position to do the same . In this regard, Mexico believed that there were a lternatives that should 
also be considered in the context of this proposal in order to allow those Members that were not up 
to date with their notifications a means by which to develop the capacity to become so . 
13.72.   Mexico had understood that the purpose of this exercise was to strengthen current 
notification requirements , but not to agree on new future commitments. In this regard, Mexico was 
concerned by the element in the proposal that mandated the NGR to establish  further notification 
requirements on fisheries subsidies. Mexico reiterated its understanding that the purpose of this 
proposal was to discuss how to improve Members' fulfilment of the current notification commitments , 
and which incentives were necessary to do so. Mexico was not oppose d to having a discussion on 
new notification requirements in fisheries, but on the basis of their own merits, without prejudice to 
the outcome, and in the appropriate forum, which was the NGR. 
13.73.   There were other elements in the proposal that Mexico considered important , and where 
strengthening efforts could be valuable ; at the same time,  Members had to be careful not to 
contradict current notification provisions. One such element was the proposal on  counter -
notifications , which encouraged Members to present this type of notification even in relation to 
agreements that made no reference to this concept. On TPRs , Mexico noted that the proponents 
were proposing that the TPRs include a specific section on fulfilment of notification o bligations. In 
Mexico's view, this language needed to be strengthened so as to leave in no doubt that the objective G/C/M/133  
 
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  of the current TPR mechanism was not to serve  as the basis for fulfilling specific obligations in the 
WTO Agreements . 
13.74.   Mexico stood ready to work with the proponents on these issues. 
13.75.   The delegate of Brazil  thanked the proponents for the revised version of the US  proposal. 
The current proposal had evolved in a positive direction when compared to previous versions , and 
consideration was given to the capacity constraints that for some Members were an important reason 
for their non-compliance. In this regard, the need for capacity -building and technical assistance for 
developing Members had been emphasized in the current propos al. 
13.76.   Brazil was also supportive of proposals to encourage cooperative work at Committee level, 
such as improved reporting and assessment of compliance, as well as technical workshops. Members 
should also work together to simplify their notification requirem ents and procedures. In this vein , 
Brazil wished to encourage Members to continue with the work already initiated in some areas, such 
as in the Market Access and Import Licensing Committees.  
13.77.   Brazil was concerned by the systemic consequences of a possible adoption of the 
administrative measures  proposed in the draft  and remained convinced that a more gradual 
approach would yield better results . Some of the new administrative measures being proposed, 
notably the supplementary financial assessment in paragraph  12.3(c) , could weigh heavily on 
developing Members. Brazil held similar systemic concerns over the incentive to make counter -
notifications contained in paragraph  7. 
13.78.   Brazil noted the effort s made in this proposal  to distinguish between a lack of compliance 
resulting from capacity constraints, and what the proponents called "wilful non -compliance". 
Nevertheless , certain aspects of the decision -making process on the basis of which such a distinction 
would be drawn remained unclear.  
13.79.   Brazil wa s also of the view that  the differential treatment extended to agriculture , as put 
forward in paragraph  8 of the proposal , without comparable flexibility extended also to other areas, 
was an element in the proposal that deserved Members' further attention,  especially as the outcome 
and balance of commitments in the fisheries subsidies in the NGR should not be prejudged.  
13.80.   Despite the divergent  views on several aspects of the proposal, Brazil believed this to be an 
important subject , and it was one where Brazi l stood ready to engage constructively with Members 
in a discussion of the various issues raised by the proposal's proponents.  
13.81.   The delegate  of Canada  thanked the proponents for their transparency proposal , this being  
an issue considered important by the wh ole Membership . Improving the rate of compliance was one 
of the objectives identified by Canada and twelve  other WTO  Members in Ottawa last month to 
strengthen and modernize the WTO. This proposal moved in that direction , given that a poor 
notifications record hindered the work of the Committees and Members ' monitoring ability.  
13.82.   The previous agenda item provided a good example: a number of LDCs were requesting an 
extension of special consideration s under the SCM  Agreement, but when looking at their 
SCM notifications from the previous six or seven  years, 12 of the 36  Members had not notified 
anything; therefore, it was difficult for Members to administer or understand the needs of these 
countries.  
13.83.   Notifications were a fundamental element in meeting the WTO's transparency obligations , 
and they played a central role in ensuring that WTO  Members understood in a timely manner the 
policy actions taken by each of our Governments.  
13.84.   Canada recognized that capacity issues could impede the ability of some Members to meet 
their notification obligations and that the Secretariat could indeed help in this regard. This proposal 
provided a process through which Members could meet their obligations , and consequences if they 
did not . In this regard, Canada considered it appro priate to instruct regular bodies to take the steps 
appropriate to reinforce Members' compliance with their transparency obligations, for instance , by 
conducting notification workshops. This could be a useful way to support the efforts of Committees 
to inc rease notification  compliance.  G/C/M/133  
 
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  13.85.   The proposal to instruct the TPRB to include in TPRs a focus on Members ' compliance with 
their transparency obligations was a constructive way of improving  overall performance.  
13.86.   Canada also supported involving  the Secretariat more in assisting Members to fulfil their 
notification obligations. Indeed, this was already being done  in certain specific instances: for 
example, the HS  transposition exercise , which allowed for the Secretariat to fill out and conduct the 
transposition of Members ' Schedules, and then for th ese to be verified by that Member before 
submission to the Market Access Committee. Similarly, the Integrated Database Decision from 1996 
included the possibility of  assistance from the Secretariat in helping Members to ensure that their 
obligations for supplying tariff and trade data were actually being met . 
13.87.   Canada also appreciated the improvement in the approach to potential administrative 
measures if a Member had not sought Secretariat assistance but nevertheless had concerns that 
they wished to discuss.  
13.88.   The proposal allowed for a period of two years during which Members were required to 
submit their agriculture notifications. This might be an appropriate timeline in some  cases , but this 
additional  time might not be r equired for regular agriculture notifications. Canada looked forward to 
discussions with the proponents on ways to improve the timelines of agriculture notifications , and 
looked forward , too,  to its continuing engagement with the co -sponsors, and indeed all Members, to 
identify improvements that would strengthen the WTO 's monitoring function.  
13.89.   The delegate of Paraguay  thanked the proponents for their submission , which was being 
assessed in Capital. Her delegation was of the view that enhanced transparency wa s necessary to 
help Members to face their challenges, which  had systemic consequences for the Organization. 
Indeed, a lack of notifications and transparency could cause difficulties when monitoring compliance 
and in relation to the analysis of any proposals  from Members . 
13.90.   The delegate of Nigeria  thanked the proponents for their submission and associated his 
delegation with the statement to be made by the African Group. Nigeria believed that transparency 
was an issue of critical and fundamental import ance to the work of the WTO. Nevertheless , Nigeria 
was also conscious of the fact that a number of developing countries and LDCs lacked institutional 
capacity to comply with their respective notification requirements. Given this apparent 
implementation cha llenge, Nigeria considered it unlikely that the proposal's S&D provision s would 
effectively address such challenges, but by seeking to sanction Members for not complying with their 
transparency obligations  it would rather place undue burden on developing c ountries and LDCs.  
13.91.   Nigeria was open to further consultation s on how to enhance notifications and believed that 
Members should be able to discuss this issue freely and to engage in the discussion constructively, 
without prejudice to their respective positio ns. A careful and balanced approach was necessary in 
order to ensure that all Members, especially developing country Members , were not punished unduly 
as a consequence of non -compliance with onerous notification obligations.  
13.92.   Nigeria would continue to engag e actively in  discussions with the proposal's co-sponsors , 
and considered the proposal significant in its ambition to enhance the MTS . 
13.93.   The delegate of Switzerland  welcomed this initiative , which was  intended to enhance 
transparency and, overall, the whole effectiveness of the WTO 's surveillance policies. Proper 
monitoring of Members ' trade policies was a pillar of the MTS  and enhancing  transparency and 
ensuring that notification obligations were scrupulously respected was fundamental to the smooth 
operation of the WTO  Agreements. Monitoring the agreements was the responsibility of the 
WTO bodies, such as the CTG. To ensure the proper and effective functioning of the Committees was 
a matter of collective responsibility. Therefore, Committees needed t o receive  quality notifications 
from all WTO  Members.  
13.94.   Currently , there were several gaps regarding Members ' compliance with  their notification 
obligations , and the  whole Membership needed to make up for this shortfall. To that end , Switzerland 
supported th is proposal , especially now that it s proponents had given additional consideration to the  
complexity inherent in some of its elements , as well as the additional burden that may be placed on 
those Members without the necessary resources. In general  terms , Switzerland saw this as a positive 
sign. G/C/M/133  
 
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  13.95.   The delegate of Norway  welcomed the proposal and the draft decision. Norway fully endorsed 
the aim of improving  transparency and strengthen ing Members' compliance with their notification 
requirements under the WTO Agreements. The proposal addressed the current lack of updated 
notifications, which was a major problem in various WTO  Committees.  
13.96.   To date, some Members had a n outstanding notification  backlog of ten or more years, 
without consequences , which reduced transparency and the possibility of establish ing a sound basis 
on which to negotiate new commitments. To this end, Norway supported several of the ideas 
mentioned in the proposal , including, for example, those  mentioned in paragraphs  2 to 6 regardi ng 
the WGNOP , updating of the notification requirements in the Committee on Agriculture, updating of 
the Technical Handbook on Notifications, and focusing more on lacking notifications in TPRs. In the 
previous two  meetings of the Informal Committee on Agri culture, Norway had already proposed to 
update document  G/AG/2 and welcomed the increased support for this approach . 
13.97.   Despite the se positive assessment s, Norway had some reservations  with regard  to the 
proposal's present draft. On the issue of  incentives, for example, Norway was  more in favour of 
carrots than sticks. However, it was important that Members that did not notify were named and 
required to provide their reasons; such Members could then be supported through technical 
assistance . Norway was sceptic al of using any form of stick that went beyond this.  
13.98.   Members should also be careful not to design incentives in a way that weakened 
transparency by, for example , accepting more than three  years and three  months ' delay for 
domestic support notifications in Agriculture. Monitoring and transparency were Member -driven 
processes.  
13.99.   In addition, if the Secretariat were tasked to compile Members ' notifications , the 
Secretariat 's reputation for neutrality might be jeopardized. The Secretariat should assist Members 
rather than notifying for them.  
13.100.   Norway did not support the creation of one  group of Members that submitted  their own 
notifications, possibly with the assistance of the Secretariat, and another group of Members that let 
the Secretariat simply notify on their behalf.  
13.101.   However, Norway did fully support all efforts to help all Members to comply with their 
obligations to provide timely notifications , while bearing in mind that generally it was most 
challenging to prepare the very first notification in a specific fi eld, and that the Member could then 
draw on lessons learned when preparing subsequent notifications.  
13.102.   Norway had also noted the existence of some legal uncertainty in the proposal. Who would 
judge if a Member had not cooperated with the Secretariat? And what was the relationship between 
existing penalties in the WTO and the proposed new penalties?  
13.103.   Norway considered the proposal to be a constructive contribution to the common effort to 
improve transparency , but nevertheless believed that the draft woul d benefit from further discussion 
and clarification.  
13.104.   Norway also believed that it was necessary to improve transparency and to strengthen 
compliance with notification obligations not only in the area of trade in goods , but also in other 
areas, such as trad e in services.  
13.105.   The delegate of Egypt  would support the statement that  South Africa would make on behalf 
of the African Group and thanked the proponents for their efforts in preparing and presenting the 
revised proposal, and for having invited his delegatio n to discuss its main elements  with them . 
13.106.   Egypt had some general comments to make on this proposal. First, Egypt agreed that 
improving Members ' compliance with their notification obligations and enhancing transparency in 
the WTO were important objectives. Moreover, the discussion on this issue was vital for the 
effectiveness of the MTS. Second, Egypt continued to be concerned about the proposed 
administrative measures in this revised proposal. In its view, these measures would not encourage 
Members to compl y with their WTO  notification commitments. Egypt believed that the right approach 
to enhance notification compliance in the WTO  Agreements was to focus on the needs of the G/C/M/133  
 
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  developing countries and LDCs in the areas of capacity -building and technical assist ance in order to 
help these Members to fulfil their current WTO  commitments. Third, Egypt believed that it would be 
more beneficial for the whole Membership  to focus on the elements in the revised proposals , such 
as paragraphs  2 to 5, concerning a positive role for the WGNOP , in cooperation with the respective 
Committees , and while monitoring implementation of the different WTO  Agreements, in order to 
enhance notification compliance in the WTO  overall . Fourth, it was crucial to understand that man y 
developing and least -developed Members failed to fulfil their notification obligations not necessarily 
because they did not respect transparency in their trade policies or trade -related measures but 
because of  other factors. For instance, some notificati ons require d detailed data , the collection of  
which exceeded the capabilities of some Members, which lacked central databases containing all the 
relevant legislation, statistics, and data, for the different government agencies, and where there was 
also a basic lack of sufficient, qualified, human resources trained to study and analyse any available 
data according to the requirements of each specific notification.  
13.107.   With regard to the proposal 's substance and language, Egypt commented that TPR reports 
already included a reference to the extent to which Members complied with their notification 
obligations. Therefore, Egypt sought clarification about what the proponent s mean t in paragraph  6 
by a specific and standardized focus on Members ' compliance with their no tification obligation s in 
the TPR  exercise.  
13.108.   Egypt considered that counter -notification s, to which paragraph  7 referred, could not be 
applied to all the Agreements listed in paragraph  1 of the proposal, and that such an approach would 
result in a major change in Members ' rights with regard to those  Agreements where counter -
notification s were not applicable.  
13.109.   With regard to the proposal 's paragraph  12, Egypt believed that the proposed 
administrative measures could not be successfully implemented in the WTO , where developing and 
least developed countries comprised the majority of the Membership , and where most of these 
Members had already been falling behind in their notification obligations as a consequence of  the 
various factors mentioned earlier . These proposed measures would only widen the gap between 
Members, resulting in a further marginalization of developing and least developed country Members , 
which in turn would then have a negative impact on the credibility and effectiveness of the MTS  
overall . 
13.110.   Egypt also did not support paragraph  14 of the proposal , which would change  and expand 
upon the MC11  mandate on fisheries subsidies negotiations regarding transparency and notification 
procedures. Nevertheless , Egypt stood ready to engage constructively with other Members in 
discussions to explore different gradual approaches to the issue of enhancing Members ' compliance 
with their notification obligations.  
13.111.   The delegate of Cuba thanked the co -sponsors for the proposal and made only some 
preliminary comments given that the proposal was currently being examined in Capital. Cuba 
believed that no Member could call into question its notification commitments and obligations , 
although Members might disagree with regard to the increase in the number of notifications to be 
made. Therefore, Cuba asked if the proponents had considered the extra burden that their proposal 
would represent, particularly for developing countries, which comprised the majority in the W TO, 
and which already experienced difficulty in meeting their notification obligations. Cuba did not favour 
an approach that increased the burden of notification obligations on those Members that were 
already experiencing difficulty in meeting their curren t commitments.  
13.112.   According to the proposal, a Member would be considered inactive for failing to meet its 
notification obligations , making it difficult to access  technical assistance. This would set up a chicken 
and egg situation. For this reason, Cuba did n ot feel that this proposal offered a solution to the 
question of notification capacity.  
13.113.   With regard to the WGNOP , she quoted a recommendation made in  1996, in the Working 
Group 's Report, for WTO  bodies to pay special attention to the assistance provided to  developing 
countries, particularly in the case of LDC  Members , which would require more intensive technical 
assistance in order to ensure that they would have in place the systems necessary to allow them to 
meet their notification obligations. She asked w hat had happened since that date and indicated that 
the developing and LDC  Members might still be facing the same difficulties, which was an issue not G/C/M/133  
 
- 34 - 
 
  addressed in the proposal. In short , the whole question of S&D for LDCs had not been considered , 
and Cuba could not support the proposal.  
13.114.   Cuba also indicated that , in line with the Nairobi Declaration, there was a need to establish 
a road map that would allow Members to understand what was to be done with regard to the 
Development Round  negotiations,  which as yet had not been completed . 
13.115.   Cuba also shared the concerns of previous speakers and felt that the proposal required 
careful consideration because of its implications for the governments of developing and 
LDC countries.  
13.116.   The delegate of New Zealand  thanked the co -sponsors for this proposal, which New Zealand 
considered an important initiative. New Zealand had long been supportive of improving compliance 
with the notification requirements, which it considered essential for transparency and for the 
effective functioning of the WTO  system. New Zealand welcomed the fact that this proposal now 
acknowledged where some Members might be facing capacity constraints in notifying and that it 
provided options for dealing with such situations while continuing to examine the specific implications 
for agricultural notifications, which were treated differently from non-agricultural notifications . New 
Zealand  looked forward to engaging with the proponents in further work in order to take this initiative 
forward.  
13.117.   The de legate of South Africa , on behalf of the African Group , said that the African Group 
acknowledged the revised proposal and agreed that transparency and compliance with notification 
obligations in the WTO were important. Nevertheless , this negotiating propos al contained numerous 
and serious difficulties for African countries.  
13.118.   First, it proposed a series of punitive measures and sanctions without having offered a 
proper assessment of the valid reasons why Members did not or were unable to comply with their 
notification obligations. For many African countries, the heart of the problem was a lack of 
institutional capacity to comply with notification requirements on technically complex matters. This 
should be evident from the WTO  Notification Compliance Reports , which set out the reasons for why 
some developing and least developed countries were unable to meet their notification requirements.  
13.119.   Second, this proposal placed the burden of implementation disproportionately on 
developing and least developed countries ; in other words, those countries that were least able to 
comply with the existing commitments . In short, it would penalize the very Members that most 
require d support. Additionally, some of the Members in arrears had already lost access to 
WTO resources and support.  
13.120.   Third, the S&D  treatment provisions were woefully inadequate as they did not provide any 
solution s to the real reasons why many countries were unable to comply with their notification 
obligations. The idea of a limited time extension for notificat ion, and vague offers of technical 
support , did not in themselves provide comfort. The idea to enhance the role of the Secretariat 
regarding notifications would open the way for actions that could both compromise the Secretariat 's 
impartiality and pressure  Members to comply with notification requirements in ways that impinge d 
upon national sovereignty. Further, the idea of introducing counter -notifications in certain 
WTO Agreements would simply create a new source of division and conflict between Members.  
13.121.   Fourth, this was clearly a negotiating proposal that would introduce significant changes to 
the current Agreements. However, any substantive negotiating proposal must obtain an agreed 
negotiating mandate from all Members. A nd a negotiating mandate would als o need to establish a 
negotiating body in which to hold the negotiations. Clearly, there was no negotiating mandate on 
this matter, and nor was the CTG a venue for negotiations. According to the Marrakesh Agreement, 
the function of this Council was to oversee the functioning of the multilateral trade agreements in 
Annex  IA. 
13.122.   In principle, the role of the CTG was to oversee implement ation of the  existing Agreements, 
and not to engage in discussions that would change or add to those existing obligations. For t his 
reason, the African Group was not in a position to support this proposal.  G/C/M/133  
 
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  13.123.   Nevertheless, the Group might be able to agree that the CTG engage in an assessment of 
compliance with existing notification obligations , and on the real reasons for non -complian ce. This, 
in the view of the African Group , would be a far more valuable and constructive exercise.  
13.124.   A reference had been made in the preamble to this proposal on the need for a proper ly 
functioning WTO  system. However, it was difficult to see this proposal getting the support it needed 
so long as there was no clarity on the more fundamental and urgent question of the future of the 
Appellate Body and the Dispute Settlement Mechanism, which the African Group , for its part,  viewed 
as an indispensable element in  a proper ly functioning WTO  system.  
13.125.   The delegate of Pakistan  thanked the proponents for their submission. Pakistan believed 
that Members ' notification obligations and compliances were important to the smooth functioning o f 
the WTO, but at the same time, developing Members in particular faced genuine capacity constraints 
that were sometimes preventing them from fulfilling the transparency requirement. Thus, it was 
more appropriate to provide adequate support to developing M embers to build their capacity in order 
to complete the ir notifications rather than resorting to administrative measures. In this regard, 
Pakistan noted with interest the proposals in paragraph s 2 and 3 recommending additional 
notification workshops , as we ll as the reactivation of the Working Group to recommend specific 
measures for improvement.  
13.126.   The proponents had also attempted to address Members ' capacity constraints by proposing 
additional Secretariat support.  However, Pakistan was not in favour of notifications being  compiled 
by the Secretariat on behalf of a Member . In this context, Pakistan also  asked the proponents which 
parameters for determination of non -cooperation with the Secretariat would be mentioned in 
paragraph  12 of the proposal.  
13.127.   Regarding enhanced transparency on fisheries subsidies, Pakistan believed that this issue 
should be addressed in the NGR as part of a wider possible deliverable , which responded to all 
elements of S DG target 14.6.  
13.128.   Pakistan was convinced that improvement s in Members' implementation of their notification 
obligations was imperative but did not consider punitive actions to be a good approach ; nor did it 
think that administrative measures would achieve the desired results. Members had to make efforts 
to work on simplifying the notification requirement s and, at the same time, to enhance Members ' 
capacity. Pakistan looked forward to discussing this proposal further with the proponents.  
13.129.   The delegate of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela  thanked the co -sponsors for  their 
proposal and highlighted the importance of transparency for her country , both for systemic reasons 
and from national interest.  
13.130.   Undoubtedly , those Members whose trade policy information was up to date were best 
placed to understand and to defend their trade interests. Her delegation believed that it was in 
Members ' own best interest s to ensure that they had met their notification obligations. However, 
developing countries faced technical difficulties with regard to meeting their notificatio n obligations. 
From her own country 's experience , she could affirm that developing countries were doing the best 
they could in difficult circumstances , including with regard to the technical detail and complexity 
involved in these notifications.  
13.131.   She recalled that, between 1995 and 1996 , when the WGNOP  had concluded its report, 
there had been 175 notification obligations or procedures notified in Annex  I of the Agreement. 
Clearly it was very difficult to meet such a number of commitments. She acknowled ged the 
Secretariat 's work in this regard and thanked the Secretariat, in particular, for preparing 
document  G/L/223/Rev.25, which gave an update in respect of the notifications subject to the 
Council 's oversight . This document indicated that both develope d and developing countries were 
falling behind in respect of their notification  commitments . 
13.132.   Venezuela considered that there was a need to tackle this issue but that it needed to be 
addressed in a positive spirit rather than by introducing more obligations , along with sanctions and 
punitive measures , against those countries that were falling  behind. In Venezuela's view , it would 
be better to find a way of tackling this challenge while recognizing the capacities and difficulties 
faced by Members and the type of support that they actually required. Different S&D  measures could G/C/M/133  
 
- 36 - 
 
  be considered , for example, a streamlining of notifications for LDCs , or else less frequent notifications 
for LDCs or those countries having a smaller proportion of world trade. Venezuela was prepared to 
contribute to this debate but could not accept anything beyond the already existing obligations.  
13.133.   The delegate of Ukraine  said that Ukraine recognized the cruci al role of transparency in the 
implementation of the WTO  Agreements, particularly in respect  of the notification requirements 
contained therein. He thanked the co -sponsors for their initiative to enhance transparency and to 
strengthen the notification requ irements under the WTO  Agreements.  
13.134.   The WTO  Committees were constantly making  efforts to improve Members ' compliance with 
the transparency procedures under their respective agreements, providing guidance, technical 
assistance, thematic workshops, and so on . However, Members had also understood that additional 
steps were necessary in order to further enhance transparency and to avoid delays in submitting 
notifications. The proposal was therefore a good basis for further discussion and for a consideration 
by Members of possible ways to enhance transparency in the WTO.  
13.135.   Ukraine wished to comment on  three  aspects of the proposal . First, with regard to the need 
to review and update notification requirements and formats , Ukraine noted that the current practice 
of submitting notifications , in particular under the AoA, demonstrated that some Members fail ed to 
adhere to certain deadlines established in document  G/AG/2 of 1995. Constant non -compliance with 
regard to deadlines undermined the value of transparency as a pillar of the MTS. To secure timely 
notifications, Members should discuss whether revised deadlines and notification requirements and 
formats would help to increase transparency and improve notification c ompliance. Second, 
concerning the text "[T]o instruct appropriate Committees to report annually about Members ' 
compliance with notification obligations ", Ukraine observed that some Members had limited 
resources and capacity to ensure compliance with transp arency procedures. The WTO  Committees 
could organize specific workshops addressed to such Members in order to focus on ways to 
strength en capacity, to achieve the practical benefits of transparency, and to share the relevant 
success stories . The reasons fo r non -compliance should be reviewed and included in the annual 
reports for further consideration of those  actions  considered most effective . Third, regarding the 
issue of "counter -notification on behalf of another Member , Ukraine argued that e ncouraging 
counter -notification s was a good first step , and that the WTO  committees should introduce 
appropriate amendments to their notification procedures and formats, as necessary , and in  particular 
as only some notification procedures included provisions or formats  for counter -notifications 
(namely, non-tariff measures in document  G/L/60, Balance -of-Payment (BOP) measures, Article  5.5 
of the Import Licensing Agreement, and Article  25.10 of the SCM  Agreement ). 
13.136.   The delegate of Ecuador  thanked the co -sponsors for their  proposal and wished to make 
some preliminary comments on it. Ecuador agreed with other Members that it was important to 
improve Members ' fulfilment of their notification obligations. The proposal contained several 
interesting and important ideas in  this r egard.  However, Ecuador could not support the proposal's 
administrative measures intended to put pressure on those Members that failed to meet their 
obligations. This punitive approach would not impact upon all Members in the same way and would 
therefore be counter -productive. Instead, Ecuador believed that  Members should be working 
together to design more reasonable and positive incentives.  
13.137.   The delegate of Panama  thanked the proponents for their submission , which  was being 
assessed in Capital. Panama had already submitted two  comments to the proponents during bilateral 
meetings and would continue  to hold  discussions with them.  
13.138.   The delegate of Singapore  thanked the proponents for their submission addressing an  
important area that was in urgent need of improvement. Singapore shared the proponents ' concerns 
over the continuing poor record of many Members in  terms of  meeting their notification obligations. 
For example, fewer  than 40  WTO Members had submitted notif ications on quantitative restrictions 
(QRs) since 2012.  
13.139.   Compliance with notification obligations was essential to the effective functioning of the 
WTO's rules -based system  because it provided  transparency and predictability to Members ' trade 
policies and m easures. The proposal contained concrete recommendations that were intended to 
improve  all Members ' notification records within the scope of the coverage indicated in paragraph  1. 
Singapore could support many of these recommendations , including for the rea ctivation of the G/C/M/133  
 
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  WGNOP , which last met in 1996, and the suggestion for this Working Group to work with the 
Secretariat to update the Technical Cooperation Handbook on Notifications. The suggestion to have 
a specific standardized focus on a Members ' complia nce with its notification obligations in its TPRs 
was also welcome. Indeed, Singapore had been regularly highlighting the importance of compliance 
with notification obligations in its interventions at TPRs. Singapore also supported the possibility of 
voluntary counter -notifications by Members, provided that the Secretariat would work with the 
Members concerne d in the preparation of these notifications , and that the respective Member review 
would accept these notifications prior to their submission to the WTO.  
13.140.   However, there were other areas of the proposal that require d further discussion , such as 
the proposed  administrative penalties. An issue of particular concern to Singapore was the proposal 
that a Member with more than a year of delay in fulfilling a notification would have to pay a financial 
supplement on its normal assessed contribution to the WTO  budget . Singapore appreciated that the 
proposal did acknowledge that there could be Members that were experiencing  genuine difficulty in 
meeting their notification obligations due to capacity constraints, and that the proposal had included  
concrete suggestions as to how to address such a situation , such as by involving the Secretariat in 
the preparation of notifications, and in the provision of technical assistance.  However, Singapore 
believed that , rather than imposing punitive measures on them,  further dialogue  and discussion was 
needed on how best to improve notification compliance in respect of Members facing genuine 
capacity constraints. There needed to be further  discussion of when the proposed administrative 
measures might kick in , and to whom they should a pply. 
13.141.   Singapore looked forward to further discuss ion with the proponents and all WTO  Members 
on this and any other proposals that could help Members make real and tangible improvements to 
the functioning of the WTO.  
13.142.   The delegate of Hong Kong, China  thanked the proponents for the revised proposal and for 
their efforts in addressing Members ' concerns raised prior to this meeting. The WTO  Membership 
acknowledged the importance of transparency for the MTS and all Members were committed to 
preserving the  rules-based system. Her delegation was deeply concerned over the unsatisfactory 
and, in some cases, worsening notification performance.  
13.143.   The proposal, while having made adjustments with regard to the consequences of non -
compliance, on the one hand, also proposed technical assistance as an integral part of the 
mechanism , on the other . Hong Kong, China believed that such an approach was both positive and 
practical.  
13.144.   Regarding the administrative measures proposed as a means to enhance the notification 
performan ce of a Member concerned, her delegation was of the view that some of these measures 
could have a spillover effect and subsequently affect other Members. For example, in TPRs, not to 
answer the questions posed by a Member might, in the long run, deplete th e objective of 
transparency for which the TPRs were in part created . 
13.145.   Hong Kong, China, looked forward to continuing discussion s with Members on the se 
measures with a view to finding the right balance  to them and to exploring an effective means by 
which to achieve the common goal of strengthening notification compliance.  
13.146.   The delegate of the Russian Federation  thanked the proponents for their joint 
communication on the procedures to enhance transparency and strengthen notification requirements 
under the WTO Agreements. Strengthening and enhancing the WTO  rules, including its transparency 
mechanism, was urgently required. The Russian Federation understood the concerns in respect of 
the implementation of the proposal 's provisions. However, there was scope for fl exibility concerning 
the regulatory aspects of the proposed procedures, including the time -period provided to Members 
to comply with their notification commitments under the WTO  Agreements. In Russia 's view , this 
was a timely document, and one which could serve as a useful starting point for further consideration 
by the Membership . His delegation stood ready to engage constructively in further discussions.  
13.147.   The delegate of El Salvador  thanked the co -sponsors for having presented their revised 
document , which was currently being reviewed in Capital. El Salvador considered transparency to 
be a fundamental WTO  principle  and welcomed any initiative intended to enhance  it. Her delegation G/C/M/133  
 
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  stood ready to continue its engagement in ongoing exploratory work on s ome of the constructive 
ideas that had been set out in this proposal , notably those found in paragraphs  2 to 6.  
13.148.   Nevertheless , El Salvador had several doubts and preliminary questions regarding the 
revised proposal. First, it had a doubt concerning the spec ial treatment set forth for transparency 
commitments in agriculture. El Salvador considered that any discussion should be based on equal 
treatment with regard to the notifications under all of the Agreements included in the proposal. The 
proposal might als o have specific implications for certain Members, particularly as regards the 
increased administrative burdens, not only in terms of the administrative work itself, but also as 
concerned a possible reduction in a Member 's participation in WTO  activities an d, furthermore, the 
financial implications in respect of increased contributions. This last measure would upset the current 
balance for Members, which was based on their participation in global trade. It would also set a 
further burden on those countries that were already facing constraints. El Salvador looked forward 
to continuing discussions with Members  in this regard . 
13.149.   The delegate of the Republic of Korea  appreciated the work of the proponents towards 
suggesting constructive and specific measures to enh ance transparency and strengthen notifications, 
such as revitalizing working groups and updating the Notification Handbook. Korea considered that 
it had some ideas that could also help Members in this respect . First, regarding administrative 
measures on notification failure , and as  many Members had previously pointed out, various 
considerations were to be kept in mind , such as how often a Member had failed to notify, and how 
significant was that failure. Second, the counter -notification proposal had merit  but required a 
mechanism for consultation  and verification . 
13.150.   Korea would continue to engage actively in these discussions  regarding enhancing 
transparency and strengthening notification compliance , including in working groups, and hoped that 
the discussion s would create an environment where all Members would effectively adhere to  
WTO rules and principles.  
13.151.   The delegate of India also thanked the proponents for their efforts in bringing out a detailed 
proposal on procedures to enhance transparency and strength en notification requirements. This 
revision added value to the earlier proposal by in cluding also  capacity -building aspects for developing 
countries.  
13.152.   India strongly believed that transparency was one of the main pillars of the rules -based 
MTS, and that it provided to Members the information and clarity on laws and regulations, facts and 
figures, and measures being taken by other Members that impacted upon international trade , which 
Members needed . 
13.153.   India had significantly improved upon its notification compl iance despite its difficulties in 
collecting and collating information , as per the notification requirements. However, India 
acknowledged that there was room still for improvement, both in terms of coverage and quality of 
content.  
13.154.   His delegation had the fo llowing preliminary questions on the joint paper on transparency . 
First, the CTG's mandate, as mentioned in Article  IV.5 of the Marrakesh Agreement, and Rule  33 of 
the Rules of Procedure of the CTG, was to oversee the functioning and implementation of the existing 
multilateral trade agreements, as set out in Annex  IA. However, the present proposal went beyond 
the implementation of the existing Agreements and would impact also on the existing rights and 
obligations of Members. The refore, India's  first and fo remost question was whether the CTG was in 
fact the appropriate forum for deliberating on such a proposal. The proposal sought to address the 
issue of notification compliance by bringing in two  different aspects : one  aspect with regard to 
compliance with existing notification obligations for goods, and the administrative actions for non -
compliance thereof ; and a second aspect relative  to the need for extension of the existing notification 
obligation s. As concerned  the existing notification obligation s under the WTO Agreements, 
clarification was required from the proponents as to whether or not they intended to advance similar 
proposals in relation also to other WTO  Agreements , such as GATS, and TRIPS.  
13.155.   Second , the proposal provided for several penalties and administrative actions in case of 
default. However, India found it difficult to agree to such an approach . The proponents must surely 
realize that such administrative actions should not be made burdensome or they would become G/C/M/133  
 
- 39 - 
 
  impossible to implement. What was required was rather to encourage and assist those Members that 
had not been able to update their notifications  because of  difficulties  that they faced , including 
capacity constraints  in terms of collecting, collating, and preparing a  notification, with regard to 
interpretational issues, and so on . Hence, India considered that, rather than administrative actions, 
what Members should receive is appropriate support and encouragement to help them  to improve 
upon their internal capacity to notify on time. Fu rthermore, for effective compliance  to be achieved , 
any process of improving notification compliance should be restricted to present and future 
notifications and should not be linked to notification obligations dating back to the inception of the 
WTO itself. 
13.156.   Another issue for India  was the reference in the proposal to a complete notification within 
a deadline without defining what constitute d a complete or an incomplete notification. Did an 
incomplete notification refer to a failure to notify documents pertaining to various WTO  Agreements, 
or to only one Agreement, or to only a part of a notification, and so on. Moreover, which authority, 
and under what process, would a decision be made as to a Member being "non -compliant" ? 
13.157.   The proposal further sought to  instruct the NGR with regard to enhanced fisheries subsidies 
notification s based on a discipline that was still in the process of being negotiated. India questioned 
the CTG's competence regarding the MC11  mandate  to implement the existing notification 
obligations on fisheries subsidies . In addition, unless there were convergence on the contours of the 
discipline, it was not advisable to direct the NGR for enhanced notification requirements. Such issues 
should be left to the Members to negotiate and to agree accordingly.  
13.158.   The proposal was being examined in Capital and India would revert back to the proponents 
with any further questions and comments at the appropriate time.  
13.159.   The delegate of Thailand  thanked the co -sponsors for their proposal and agreed with other 
Members that enhancing transparency was important to the work of the WTO and was a joint 
responsibility of all the Membership . Thus, Thailand supported efforts to enhance notification 
compliance . However, Thailand believed that a positive reinfo rcement approach, with strong 
incentives, as well as focused and specific technical assistance and capacity -building relating to a 
given Members ' specific needs , would be more suitable than a punitive approach. Thailand stood 
ready to continue its engageme nt on this issue in discussions with all WTO  Members.  
13.160.   The delegate of Turkey  thanked the co -sponsors for the proposal, which his delegation 
considered to be a constructive attempt to reinforce Members ' compliance with the existing 
Agreements. Turkey believed that transparency and notification requirements were fundamental 
parts of the WTO  Agreements, and was aware that compliance with notification requirements under 
the various Agreements remained inade quate and that there subsequently existed an information 
gap among Members . 
13.161.   Indeed, the current rules already addressed transparency. Nevertheless , further action was 
required to improve the functioning of the system through a concerted effort by all the Membership. 
In this regard, Turkey shared the concerns and the main idea introduced in the proposal and 
welcomed the suggestion to review the WGNOP and to update the Technical Cooperation Handbook 
on Notifications with a view to improving existing procedure s. 
13.162.   However, Turkey also believed that the proposal required further clarification concerning 
certain aspects of it, such as how the roles attributed to the Secretariat and the Working Group 
would be carried out in practice . How would the accuracy of any data provided  by a Member be 
proven  other than by the Member  itself? 
13.163.   Turkey also had a number of concerns with regard to the proposed administrative or 
punitive measures. As suggested by the proponents  themselves , Turkey was of the view that the 
proposed act ions and disciplines should contribute towards solidifying Members ' notification 
compliance, but not that those actions should push Members further out of the system by 
discouraging them from honouring their obligations.  
13.164.   At this stage, Turkey had some rema rks and specific questions on the measures proposed 
under paragraph  12. First, further clarification was needed as to whether or not the treatment on 
partial non -compliance and full non -compliance would be the same. Would the proposed response G/C/M/133  
 
- 40 - 
 
  be the same for a Member that did not submit any notifications, and another that missed only 
one notification under a specific Agreement?  
13.165.   Regarding TPRs , Turkey considered that the answers provided in TPRs had benefits for the 
system  overall  and served to clarify the trade policies of the responding parties. In this regard, 
preventing a Member 's questions from being answered during TPRs, as suggested in Article  12(a), 
would be disadvantageous to the whole Membership and not only to the Member itself that ra ised 
the question. In this way, such an approach might also diminish the benefits accruing to the entire 
Membership.  
13.166.   The proposed budgetary measures to ensure notification compliance also required further 
clarification ; similarly, on capacity -building , Turkey agreed with others that efforts in this area were 
key to address ing the challenges faced by some Members in preparing their notifications. As stated 
earlier, and even when  technical assistance was already provided, submitting timely and complete 
notifications was not an easy task for developing countries because of  their capacity constraints . In 
this regard, and by way of  positive input, Turkey considered that the updated proposal now 
incorporated special clauses for Members in need of capacity -building  in order to assist and 
encourage them to submit their complete d notifications. However, further elaboration was required 
also here, and in particular with regard to the roles defined for the Secretariat, and especially for 
the criteria set out for a Membe r to fulfil the cooperation requirement , as mentioned in Article  12. 
Who would decide when there was non-cooperation and  based on what information ? 
13.167.   Given the cross -cutting character of the issue of notification non -compliance, and its broad 
context, Turkey was of the view that sufficient time should be given for further discussion of this 
topic, and Turkey stood ready to contribute constructively in that regard . 
13.168.   The delegate of Saint Lucia  thanked the proponents for their hard w ork. Undoubtedly , 
transparency was necessary for the good functioning of any rules -based system, and the MTS was 
no exception. Nevertheless , the WTO  Membership should not lose sight of the realities facing some 
of its Members.  
13.169.   The rights and responsibiliti es assumed by Members did not emerge from an arbitrary 
exercise but resulted rather from a deliberate and delicate process that had allowed Members to 
calibrate the balance of their rights vis -à-vis their responsibilities. Therefore, any changes in the 
responsibilities or penalties assessed would upset the delicate balance already achieved  by Members.  
13.170.   Saint Lucia acknowledged that some Members had expressed genuine concern over the 
functioning of the WTO's transparency mechanisms; however, any change would require all Members 
to have an equal opportunity to weigh up and balance new obligations, including penalties, against 
existing and new benefits. For many small states , with limited administrative capacity, an inability 
to comply with notification obligati ons should not be interpreted as a  flouting or absconding from 
obligations, but rather as a situation that arose from  genuine internal administrative limitations. 
Therefore, it must be clear that reassessing penalties for breaches of notification -related o bligations 
would fundamentally redefine or undermine the balance of rights and obligations currently enjoyed 
by Members, particularly for small er countries. In this vein, it must be made clear that any change 
in penalties assessed would represent a change in Members ' obligations.  
13.171.   Several developing countries were already subject to administrative measures; hence, new 
sanctions would only lead to further questions about the efficacy of the MTS. Moreover, technical 
assistance activities would not redress the continuing capacity limitations suffered by developing 
countries, particularly small er developing  countries . 
13.172.   The capacity -building elements in the proposals were welcomed but needed nevertheless 
to be evaluated on the basis of specific situations and the needs of specific Members. His delegation 
was committed to working constructively to find solutions to this issue while preserving Members' 
agreed balance of rights and obligations.  
13.173.   The delegate of Nepal  thanked the proponents f or submitting their proposal and for 
clarifying its main elements. Transparency was a fundamental principle of the WTO  system. 
Therefore, Members ' notifications and adherence to the ir WTO commitments were important pillars 
of transparency.  G/C/M/133  
 
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  13.174.   Most LDCs, inclu ding Nepal, were strong supporters of the rules  and transparency -based 
MTS; however, the low level and lack of capacity relative to institutional, human, financial, and 
technical  constraints , meant that some LDC Members were unable to comply with the ir notification 
requirements in a full and timely  manner, even if they were doing their best  to do so . 
13.175.   The proposal was being considered in Capital ; nevertheless,  Nepal wished to share some 
preliminary comments  on it. Nepal thought it significant that the propos al included technical 
assistance provisions. However, the provision on administrative and punitive measures might result 
in a Member developing a negative attitude towards the WTO  system. For this reason , innovative 
incentive mechanisms had rather to be de veloped in such a way as to encourage Members to be 
self-motivated to submit their notifications.  
13.176.   LDCs lacked the basic capacity to fully implement the WTO Agreements and to submit their 
notifications in a timely manner. Thus, training and capacity -building programmes on the substance 
and notification processes and requirements should  be conducted by the WTO  Secretariat, addressed 
mainly to those Members not able to fulfil their notification requirement s. Besides  capacity -building, 
the WTO  Secretariat could also play a vital role in facilitating, coordinating, and information sharing  
between Members,  which could itself then become a  motivating factor that encouraged Members to 
notify. For example, the Secretariat could develop and disseminate subject -specific notification -
related brochure s and information -related documents explaining the substance and the process of 
notification s. 
13.177.   The S&D provisions were of capital importance for LDCs in the area of notif ications. Nepal 
considered that  a longer time -period, or reduced frequency to notify, could be extended to LDCs ; 
for example , where developed countries notified annually, LDCs might be required to notify only at 
an interval of every three  years.  
13.178.   The delega te of Ghana  thanked the co -sponsors for their revised proposal. Like many other 
delegations, Ghana also acknowledged that transparency and notification obligations were an 
essential part of the monitoring function of the WTO. Ghana therefore supported the preamble to 
the proposal. However, there remained a number of issues of concern , as followed : (i) several issues 
raised in the proposal were being considered under various Committees as part of their monitoring 
function and should be allowed to be discusse d as such ; (ii) the proposal acknowledged the low level 
of compliance with existing notifications but could not provide a detailed diagnosis of what were the 
causes for this . This was possibly the reason why the proposal had not addressed itself to issues 
regarding the Council for Trade in Services. How had the various technical assistance and capacity -
building provisions worked, or not worked , in the past? (iii)  WTO Members were aware of the 
challenges being faced by developing countries and LDCs, and for which they had support to build 
and improve their institutional capacities, including strengthened S&D treatment, which had received 
very little support from developed partners ; (iv) instituting punitive measures against Members as 
a way of enforcement for  measures those Members lacked the capacity to implement was something 
that Member s generally acknowledged would be unfair, and onerous ; (v) the proponents called upon 
Members to begin negotiations on the various proposals. However, Ghana wished to know if  the 
proposal had a negotiating mandate  from Members , or if it was still seeking one ; (vi) more effort 
should be given to simplifying notification procedures to encourage greater compliance. As Ghana 
had indicated a year ago when the proposal was first  introduced by the US, Ghana could only support 
the recommendation for granting incentives to compliant Members rather than punitive measures 
for non -compliance. With some developing and LDC  Members already owing their basic 
subscriptions, suggesting a supplem entary assessment for non -compliance would be additionally 
burdensome and therefore unacceptable; and (vii)  Ghana supported the view of the African Group 
that the proposal on technical assistance  was vague and , as in the past , it would fail to lift any 
developing countries or LDCs out of the ir current situation.  
13.179.   Ghana also supported the statement by South Africa on behalf of the African Group and 
remained committed to further engagement on this issue in the CTG's respective Committees.  
13.180.   The delegate of Jamaica  said that his country acknowledged the important role of 
transparency in the WTO and joined other delegations in calling for appropriate steps to be taken in 
the WTO to assist Members to improve upon  their notification compliance . Jamaica fully res pected 
Members ' rights to present proposals on any issue under the various WTO  bodies and Committees 
in the context of a discussion on  how to further strengthen the WTO's modus operandi  and working 
methods. He therefore thanked the proponents for their sub mission and hard work. However, while G/C/M/133  
 
- 42 - 
 
  the proposal was well intentioned in seeking to advance and enhance Members ' compliance with 
their transparency obligations under the various WTO  Agreements, there were elements contained 
therein which required further  clarification as they appeared to advocate for an unorthodox approach 
whose legality seemed questionable. From the proposal itself, Jamaica had understood that Members 
could find themselves subject to de facto  sanctions based on their limited capacity to submit timely 
notifications. In Jamaica's view, this approach might produce undesirable results ; it deserved further 
reflection , and also caution.  
13.181.   While Jamaica reconfirmed its commitment to initiatives aimed at improving notification 
compliance in the WTO , it was not in a position to endorse the punitive approaches outlined in the 
proposal. Jamaica was encouraged by the proponent 's intention to conduct further consultations 
with other Members in a more inclusive manner; this would add value to the current draft and would 
also provide a better balance in the proposal  with regard to  the heterogeneity of the WTO 's 
Membership.  
13.182.   In Jamaica's view, there was also room for a better understanding of the capacity 
constraints faced by developing countries and LDCs, wh ich varied from country to country, and from 
issue to issue. Therefore, Jamaica recommended that the Council, in order to begin its reflection on 
these issues , ask the Secretariat to produce a special factual and comprehensive report on how best 
to address  the notification challenges faced by WTO  Members, including, inter alia , the extent to 
which the Secretariat 's technical assistance and capacity -building facilities required further 
calibration, and whether existing notification requirements, such as coverage, details, and 
frequency, were unnecessarily onerous for developing countries and LDCs. This report should then 
be presented to the CTG in a dedicated session for Members ' analysis and discussion with a view to 
generating recommendations appropriat e to and based upon its findings.  
13.183.   The WTO belonged to all its Members. However, this sense of ownership in respect of the 
work of the Organization risked being adulterated if some Members were excluded on the basis of 
their limited capacity.  
13.184.   In order to en sure its success , Jamaica therefore urged Members to frame in a sustainable 
manner any attempt by the Organization to address notification non -compliance caused by capacity 
constraints.  
13.185.   The delegate of Israel  thanked the co -sponsors for their proposal , which built on a previous 
document submitted by the US. Israel welcomed a number of the constructive ideas in this revised 
proposal and recognized that transparency was a main WTO  function, particularly with regard to the 
rules and procedures used by WTO  Memb ers in handling their international trade flows. Israel also 
recognized the importance of the notification system as one of the fundamental tools that enabled 
transparency. In its own case, Israel's recent TPR  exercise had provided it with momentum in its 
ongoing efforts to address the gap s in its notification obligations.  
13.186.   It was also evident that developed and developing Members were not alike in terms of lack 
of resources and capacity. Therefore, Israel welcomed the efforts in the updated proposal to 
differentiate between cases in which notifications were not submitted because of a lack of capacity 
or resources, and cases in which notifications were not submitted because of  other reasons.  
13.187.   Israel was of the view that strengthening technical assistance for Members that were 
experiencing  difficulties with regard to their notification obligations, as well as counter -notifications, 
could be a useful tool in enhanc ing transparency and information -sharing  while not breaking the 
delicate balance between rights and obligations.  
13.188.   Israel considered this proposal to be an important step in the right direction and stood 
ready to participate in further consultations on this matter.  
13.189.   The delegate of the Plurinational State  of Bolivia  thanked the proponents for this proposal, 
recognized the importance of transparency in the WTO , and reiterated Bolivia 's commitment to 
predictability and transparency in line with the WTO 's policies and trade practice.  
13.190.   However, Bolivia did not believe tha t Members should take a punitive approach to dealing 
with the issue of transparency ; rather , they should try to work together using persuasive measures G/C/M/133  
 
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  instead of  threats. The transparency gap did not necessarily result from a lack of political will ; there 
were often structural reasons that had also to be taken into account. Bolivia considered that technical 
assistance should not be linked to a threat of sanctions  and that Members were required to ensure 
that all matters were dealt with in a cross -cutting m anner while recognizing the sovereignty of every 
Member.  
13.191.   The delegate of Uruguay  thanked the other co -sponsors for the ir efforts in preparing this 
revised proposal. It was an initiative whose objective was to improve  a fundamental area in terms 
of the effe ctiveness and viability of the WTO 's activities . Uruguay also believed that notifications and 
transparency  in general  was of great importance  to the smooth functioning of trade negotiations.  
13.192.   This proposal was currently under consideration in Capital and any further comments would 
be shared with the proponents  in due course . 
13.193.   The delegate of Guatemala  thanked the proponents for their submission on transparency , 
even if  Guatemala shared the concerns of other Members  with regard to sanctions. Since the 
propos al was currently being considered in Capital, Guatemala reserved its right to revert to the 
Council with further comments  in due course . 
13.194.   For Guatemala,  technical assistance , and Secretariat support in particular, was vital to 
support ing Members wishing to improve their notification compliance . After a ten -year backlog of 
notifications, Guatemala had requested the Secretariat to organize a national workshop to address 
the issue of its notification backlog . Thanks to that workshop and support, Guatemala had b oth 
addressed this  backlog and also trained a team specifically to deal with its notification obligations. 
There was still a lot of work to be done in this area and different elements to be considered before 
reaching an y agreement, but Guatemala stood ready to contribute to the ongoing discussion.  
13.195.   The delegate of Chile thanked the proponents for having submitted this proposal , which 
contained various improvements compared to the earlier submission. Chile reiterated the importance 
of the WTO to a rules -based  MTS, as well as its commitment to ensuring that the WTO could function 
in an efficient and modern way , including by enabling  Members to meet the ir notification and 
transparency  obligations.  
13.196.   The current proposal addressed problems being faced by Members in respect of 
notifications and delays in their submission. However, the WTO  Membership should recognize that 
not all Members were in a position to notify and meet their obligations in this regard . This proposal 
was an attempt to take this problem into acc ount, particularly with regard to Members facing 
technical difficulties when it came to preparing and submit ting their  notifications.  
13.197.   Chile was of the view that there were means other than sanctions available to address the 
issues of notification non -compl iance, delayed notifications, and lack of transparency. Technical 
assistance and capacity -building were indeed such adequate means , and Chile would like to obtain 
more clarity on the procedures and conditions that would govern a more effective implementati on 
of technical assistance.  
13.198.   Thanks to the current proposal , Members were now moving away from criticism and 
assessment of the problems at issue towards  proposing  solutions and problem -solving. Chile 
welcomed this approach and would revert  to the proposal itself once inputs had been received from 
Capital. In summary, Chile was committed to the strengthening and modernization of the WTO and 
believed that this proposal, with the inclusion of the pertinent improvements, constituted a 
substantial contribution  to the discussion, and was of systemic value.  
13.199.   The delegate of Colombia  thanked the proponents for their submission on transparency. 
Colombia was of the view that Members needed to address the current challenges of the MTS through 
constructive and open dialog ue to ensure the ongoing improvement of the WTO as a global good. 
Colombia would continue to contribute to the debate on how to improve and strengthen the WTO, 
including on the enhancement of transparency, which was a fundamental pillar of the MTS.  
13.200.   The rep resentative of the United States  said that he had followed and listened to 
delegations and appreciated their engagement on the proposal. He then addressed the following 
issues: (i)  the proposal did not add to current notification obligations; (ii)  if a Member sought G/C/M/133  
 
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  technical assistance, the modest administrative measures in the proposal would not apply to that 
Member; and (iii)  with regard to comments about upsetting the balance of obligations, transparency , 
and notifications were a fundamental obl igation, and a lack of fulfilment was already currently 
upsetting the balance of obligations in this institution.  
13.201.   The delegate of the European Union  thanked all delegations for their interventions; this had 
been a refreshing and substantive discussion that  did not take place very often in the WTO. Together 
with the other co -sponsors, the EU would try to react to as many questions as possible, but this was 
just the beginning of a process in which the EU looked forward to all Members be ing further engaged 
in the discussions.  
13.202.   From the present discussion it was clear that the whole Membership should collectively do 
better on notifications. In medical terms, delegations had agreed on the diagnosis, the main 
remaining difference s concerned the cure, as some believ ed that introducing what they called a 
punitive dimension might not be helpful.  
13.203.   He highlighted the following three  issues: (i)  nobody wished to punish anyone. Whatever 
would be agreed would be agreed by consensus ; (ii) a lack of notifications should have 
consequences ; and (iii)  in the WTO , Members were requested to contribute with money in the budget 
and with information. If a Member did not provide money there were consequences, but if a Member 
did not provide information there were currently no consequenc es. The fact that there were no 
consequences made it difficult for trade officials to extract the relevant information from their own 
administrations.  
13.204.   This was not a proposal addressed particularly to developed or developing Members. Not 
all developed coun tries faced the same challenges, and not all developing countries faced challenges 
in notifying. The proponents did not agree that the proposal was biased against developing countries 
and LDCs. It was intended to be  a collective effort at improving the record on transparency. The 
proponents were open to discuss with every Member how best to do this. As pointed out by the 
US Ambassador, notification obligations were in force, with or without the proposal under review. 
Nobody was proposing to create a new obl igation, but the proponents believed that technical 
assistance could be helpful. The proponents disagreed with the assertion that the proposals were 
vague and woefully inadequate; however, the  proposals  might be further improved and it was 
equally important to know what would be adequate. Guatemala brought to the Council 's attention a 
case in which technical assistance had worked. When discussing and preparing the proposal, the 
proponents had observed that technical assistance did provide good and p ositive repercussions in 
the compliance records of a Member.  
13.205.   On the specific questions that were asked , some Members reflected the fact that the GATS 
and TRIPS  Agreements were not covered. The notification requirements in the GATS were quite 
limited and al so self -judging in terms of what should be notified. Therefore, the proponents had 
concluded that reporting under the CTG was a better  starting point.  
13.206.   Another point that was made referred to compliance in the Trade Policy Review 
Body (TPRB); the proponents  were truly mindful of preserving the neutrality of the Secretariat and 
the key features of the Trade Policy Review Mechanism  (TPRM) . They were fully aware of Annex  III 
of the WTO  Agreement and that the TPRM was not intended to serve as a basis for enforce ment. 
The proposal referred to the part in TPRs where  the Secretariat referred to Members ' notification 
performance.  
13.207.   The proposal did not contain any judgment of required technical assistance and capacity -
building, nor was it intended to prejudge what kind  of technical assistance would be needed because 
only the requesting Member could judge its own needs. The proponents were open to clarify ing the 
language of the proposal as appropriate in this aspect.  
13.208.   With regard to comment s on the TP Rs and not responding  to questions from Members not 
having fulfilled their notifications, he clarified that this proposal was not intended to cure a lack of 
transparency with less transparency but was rather a continuous effort to ensure that the 
transparency of some Members s hould not be taken for granted, particularly not by those that had 
not made such efforts.  G/C/M/133  
 
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  13.209.   Finally, the administrative measures were not punitive and did not kick -in if there was a 
simple delay ; rather, they  would only apply after a serious delay without pr ogress. It was not the 
case that the day immediately after a delay a budget official would request Members to pay extra 
budgetary money.  
13.210.   The delegate of the United States , in response to some of the questions posed by 
delegations, said that, regarding the different treatment of notifications in the AoA, the proposal did 
not change the notification obligations required of any Member under the WTO  Agreements but  
rather , acknowledging the work that was currently being done in the CoA, the proposal referred only 
to some additional time for the submission of agricultural notifications before the application of the 
administrative measures  proposed . 
13.211.   With regard to counter -notifications , she said that these provided important transparency. 
While some Agreements s pecifically encouraged this practice, others did not include such a 
possibility. However, Members were aware that , where the agreements were silent on this issue, 
nothing prevented the submission of a counter -notification; and the proponents did not want t o 
preclude this opportunity for greater transparency.  
13.212.   With regard to the questions about partial and complete notifications, it was clear that 
those notifications that used a specific template would be considered a complete notification if they 
provided in formation for all of the required fields in the notification template. To the contrary, a 
partial notification would only provide information in some of the required fields, but not all.  
13.213.   The intention in paragraph  11 of the proposal concerning the Secretar iat's involvement in 
notifications was not to over -extend the Secretariat's role. Currently, any Member could consult the 
Secretariat on the challenges it was facing with a notification requirement s and could seek technical 
assistance from the Secretariat in that regard . Any Member could also prioritize the full 
implementation of its WTO  commitments to include notifications in its development assistance plans. 
For a number of developing countries, it might be that the Secretariat 's assistance would be a one -
time assistance. But the proposal was not giving the Secretariat any interpretative power. To the 
contrary, this proposal clearly stated that there must be full consultation with the relevant Member, 
and only with the approval of that Member would the Sec retariat provide a notification on its behalf. 
This type of formulation was already used under the WTO  RTA Transparency Mechanism, and like 
other Members had said , the proponents would also not agree to give the Secretariat interpretive 
powers ; however, th ey did consider that there was already a precedent for asking the Secretariat to 
undertake such work although , in all instances, Members ' consent was and would be required.  
13.214.   Regarding the proposal in paragraph  14 on fisheries subsidies, she recalled that in  Buenos 
Aires Ministers had recommit ted to implement ing the  existing notification obligations under 
Article  25.3 of the SCM with the aim to strengthen transparency on these subsidies. There was work 
ongoing in the NGR to further enhance such transparency a nd the proponents believed that there 
was a general recognition and acceptance of the need for such enhanced transparency. Their 
intention was not to prejudge those negotiations but rather to recognize that this was a critical 
element in the NGR 's work.  
13.215.   Concerning the queries about the mandate, she indicated that the proposal aimed at 
facilitating Members ' compliance with existing obligations under the WTO Agreements and was not 
intended to amend those Agreements; therefore, there was no need to tie the proposal to a specific 
mandate. As in the case of recent changes introduced by the TPRB to facilitate and improve the 
functioning of TPRs, this proposal was a means by which to improve the functioning of the system 
through the full implementation of the notification obligations under the WTO  Agreements.  
13.216.   The delegate of Japan  thanked delegations for their comments and referred to certain  of 
the questions that had been posed by Members . On the WGNOP , he recalled that it was established 
by the 1995  Ministerial Decision on Notification Procedures and that its mandate was to review all 
existing notifications and to assist developing countries to meet their notification obligations. 
Paragra ph 2 of the proposal referred to the general role of the Working Group, whereas paragraph  3 
addressed its detailed function. The Working Group was expected to play a central role, with the 
collaboration of other related bodies, in improving the domestic op erations and notification systems 
of Members, for example by sharing best practices in the Committees , by designing workshops for G/C/M/133  
 
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  Members to share information on their practices, and by coordinating between intergovernmental 
agencies.  
13.217.   With regard to the wo rding of the proposal, he indicated that an inactive Member in the 
proposal had a different meaning from the "inactive Member " defined by the Budgetary Committee. 
As mentioned in paragraph  12(b), an inactive Member would be called upon in WTO  formal meetin gs 
after all other Members had taken the floor; and when an inactive Member would take the floor in 
the General Council it would be identified as such. However, the proponents were considering 
whether it was necessary to define inactive Member more clearly  in the proposal.  
13.218.   The Chairperson  thanked all delegations for their interventions and for the interesting 
discussion that had taken place on how to enhance transparency and improve the number and 
quality of notifications under the Agreements in Annex  IA of the WTO  Agreement.  
13.219.   Considering what had been said under this agenda item, he believed that all Members were 
agreed on at least one  point, namely that transparency was indeed of great importance  to the work 
of the WTO. However, differing views existed as t o how best to address the issue of enhancing 
transparency and improving Members ' performance with their notification obligations under the 
Annex  IA Agreements . He therefore proposed that the Council take note of the statements made on 
this issue and encour aged the co -proponents and all interested delegations to continue to discuss 
this proposal and to explore how the different ideas and views expressed at this meeting could be 
incorporated  into it . 
13.220.   The Council so agreed . 
14  BRAZIL – MEASURES RE STRICTING SHRIMP  IMPORTS – REQUEST F ROM ECUADOR  
14.1.   The Chairperson  informed the Council that , in a communication dated 26  September  2018, 
the delegation of Ecuador had requested the Secretariat to include this item on the agenda.  
14.2.   The delegate of Ecuador  said that Ecuador was again compelled to draw the Council 's attention 
to the barriers that were stopping its shrimp exports to Brazil . This concern had already been raised 
on several occasions , both in this Council and at the SPS  Committee.  
14.3.   Since 1999 , and for almost 20  years, various changes in Brazil 's relevant regulation s had led 
to the suspension of shrimp imports from Ecuador. Throughout this period, Ecuador had provided 
Brazil with all the information necessary to address its phytosanitary concerns to ensure that 
Ecuador 's shrimp could again access one of the world 's most important emerging markets.  
14.4.   In 2016, following a lengthy import risk assessment analysis, Brazil had recognized that the 
relevant SPS requirements were indeed being met by Ecuadorian  shrimp . Brazil had also officially 
acknowledged the equivalence of the Ecuadorian inspection processes. However, a few months later, 
and before trade could be resumed, a judicial decision from a Federal Tribunal , which had  set up 
new SPS  equivalence requirements in response to calls from Brazilian producers , had again resulted 
in the suspension of imports of Ecuadorian shrimp to Brazil.  Furthermore, in  May 2018, Brazil 's 
General Prosecutor had requested that the Federal Supr eme Court restore the import restriction.  
Therefore, the SPS  requirements and the equivalence that had been  accepted by Brazil in 2016 to 
date remain  suspended , and the Brazilian market  remained closed to Ecuadorian shrimp . 
14.5.   The impossibility of access ing the Brazilian market was therefore a matter of deep concern to 
Ecuador, particularly as Brazil was one of the world's main shrimp importers and this was a sector 
of importance for Ecuador 's socio -economic development , accounting for hundreds of jobs in the 
country and with considerable potential for growth.  
14.6.   Brazil's  measures had not been supported by any scientific evidence; Ecuador therefore 
considered them to be  a hidden trade restriction , which was having a negative impact upon Ecuador 's 
national production , and which was inconsistent with the SPS  Agreement and the GATT  1994.  
14.7.   Ecuador 's commitment to meet all the requirements laid out by Brazil and its willingness to 
maintain a n open  dialogue  with Brazil  had to date  produced no positive results ; despite a number of 
high-level meetings between government representatives, no official solution to this question had G/C/M/133  
 
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  been reached , and Ecuador wondered how long this import ban would remain in place. Nevertheless, 
Ecuador still looked forward to this matter  being promptly resolved . 
14.8.   The delegate of Brazil  thanked Ecuador for its intervention and referred to Brazil 's statement 
made at the SPS  Committee on 1 and 2  November  2018, where it had provided its detailed 
clarification of this issue. The Brazilian Govern ment was sensitive to Ecuador's concerns and , since 
May 2017, had recognized the equivalence of Ecuador 's fisheries inspections system, when Brazilian 
restrictions on shrimp imports originating in Ecuador had been lifted. Actual imports from Ecuador 
had reached a value of US$ 400,000 in the first  quarter of 2018.  
14.9.   However, Brazil could not precisely indicate the time -frame or duration of the current 
suspension  of shrimp imports from Ecuador , which was the result of a judicial decision . Nevertheless, 
Brazil would keep Ecuador informed of any developments in the se judicial proceedings.  
14.10.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
14.11.   The Council so agreed . 
15  KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARA BIA, KINGDOM OF BAHR AIN, AND THE UNITED ARAB 
EMIRATES – SELECTIVE TAX ON CERTA IN IMPORTED PRODUCTS  – REQUEST FROM THE 
EUROPEAN UNION, SWIT ZERLAND, AND THE UNI TED STATES  
15.1.   The Chairperson  informed Members that, in a communication dated 29  October  2018, the 
delegations of the European Union, Switzerland, and the Unit ed States, respectively, had requested 
the Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda.  
15.2.   The delegate of Switzerland  regretted to be compelled once again to raise at the CTG the 
issue of this selective tax applied on energy drinks and carbonated soft dr inks. To date, 
three  GCC members, namely, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Kingdom of Bahrain, and the United 
Arab Emirates (UAE) , had implemented an excise duty selective tax on certain products. Based on 
the information  currently available , two additiona l GCC  members would implement the tax in the 
following year. 
15.3.   The current selective tax was an ad valorem  excise tax levied on the retail sales price of 
energy drinks and carbonated soft drinks. The selective tax on energy drinks was twice as high as 
that levied on carbonated soft drinks, and there was no scientific justification for such a difference.  
15.4.   At the end of September  2018, Switzerland had addressed additional questions to Saudi 
Arabia, Bahrain, and the UAE, regarding the scientific basis justifying the imposition of different tax 
rates on energy drinks and carbonated soft drinks , and Switzerland was still looking forward to 
receiving answers to these questions.  
15.5.   Since July  2018, the impact of the tax on the ground had again worsened. The consumption 
of imported energy drinks had been substantially reduced, but consumers had shifted to cheaper 
sugar -containing drinks  instead , without reducing  their consumption. This was a cle ar indication of 
the discriminatory effects of the ad valorem  selective tax.  
15.6.   Switzerland had attempted to meet with the three  Ministers of Finance before the 
GCC Finance Meeting but unfortunately this had  not been possible; however, Switzerland had 
recentl y met the UAE and had explained its concerns on this issue and presented its proposal for 
solving  the problem.  
15.7.   Switzerland appreciated the legitimate health objectives of the tax but had concerns as to 
how the tax had been designed and was being implemente d. From its discussions with the 
UAE Ministry of Finance, Switzerland had understood that a study on the discrimination issue had 
been mandated and that a GCС  Committee was studying the possible extension of additional 
products to those already list ed. 
15.8.   Switzerland considered that an appropriate solution would be  an immediate reduction of the 
level of tax on energy drinks and the application of the same tax levels to energy drinks and 
carbonated soft drinks. Switzerland proposed that enlarging the base of th e tax so that all beverages G/C/M/133  
 
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  subject to the tax face the same percentage  should also be considered, as should the introduction 
of a specific tax based on the volume or sugar content to replace the current ad valorem  selective 
tax. Switzerland believed that,  once implemented, these changes would bring an appropriate 
resolution to the matter , while still  ensuring that the health objective be achieved of reducing the 
consumption of products deemed harmful for human health, as the price of the products subject to 
the tax would likewise increase. This in turn would bring additional budget revenues that could then 
be used for information and prevention public health campaigns . 
15.9.   Switzerland looked forward regularly to receiving  information on the de velopments foreseen 
relating to the selective tax , especially  given that the Under -Secretaries of the Ministries of Finance 
would probably meet in January  2019 to discuss next steps.  
15.10.   The delegate of the European Union  recalled that her delegation had also raised this issue 
at the CTG 's previous meeting, as well as at the most recent meeting of the CMA. The EU remained 
concerned about the scientific basis for taxing carbonated drinks and echoed Switzerland 's questions  
and concerns . 
15.11.   The EU also remained concerned over the conformity of these tax measures with the non -
discrimination principle under GATT  Article  III:2. The EU urged the GCC  countries to repeal the 
current measures and to review the basis for the imposition of this tax , recalling also  that a Note 
Verbal e had been sent to each GCC  country  even if  no formal response s to these had as yet  been 
received . 
15.12.   The delegate of the United States  reiterated its concerns raised previously in this Council 
about the excise tax on carbonated soft drinks, malt beverages, and energy and sports drinks, which  
was currently being implemented by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Kingdom of Bahrain, and the 
United Arab Emirates, and that was also under consideration by other GCC  member States for future 
implementation.  
15.13.   The current implementation of the excise tax on these products had a discriminatory effect  
by singling out the particular types of beverages produced by multinational companies, while 
excluding non -carbonated sweetened beverages produced by domestic countries in the GCC.  
15.14.   The US supported all efforts to prevent and control non -communicable diseases; however, 
the report of the High-Level Commission of the WHO on such diseases did not recomm end the use 
of beverage taxes to advance public health outcomes. Indeed, the WHO had not recommend ed taxes 
on carbonated beverages because other sweetened beverages could easily be substituted for 
carbonated beverages.  
15.15.   Given that the multinational producer s of such beverages had publicly committed to working 
with GCC  member States through public/private partnerships in a voluntary effort to address health 
concerns, the US strongly encouraged GCC  member States to engage private industry stakeholders 
on how t o ensure that the excise tax were applied in a transparent and non -discriminatory manner.  
15.16.   In coordination with other WTO  Members, the US had also raised these concerns in the 
Capitals of the GCC  member States and looked forward to working with GCC  member S tates to 
address these important issues.  
15.17.   The delegate of Japan  repeated Japan 's call to GCC  member States made at the most recent 
meeting of the Market Access Committee to provide an explanation of their tariff classifications for 
carbonated drinks and ene rgy drinks.  
15.18.   The delegate of  the Kingdom of Bahrain , on behalf of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the 
United Arab Emirates, and the Kingdom of Bahrain, thanked the previous speakers for their interest 
in the GCC  Common Agreement on Excise Tax and assured them that their comments were being 
considered by officials in the respective GCC  Capitals. GCC  countries would revert to Members  once 
this issue had been fully considered  in Capitals . 
15.19.   The Chairperson  thanked delegations for their interventions and proposed tha t the Council 
take note of the statements made.  G/C/M/133  
 
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  15.20.   The Council so agreed . 
16  INDONESIA 'S IMPORT AND EXPORT RESTRICTING POLICIES  AND PRACTICES – 
REQUEST FROM THE EUR OPEAN UNION, JAPAN, AND NORWAY  
16.1.   The Chairperson  informed the Council that , in communications dated 31 October and 
1 November  2018, the delegations of the European Union, Japan, and Norway, respectively, had 
requested the Secretariat to include this item on the agenda.  
16.2.   The delegate of the European Union  said that Indonesia was well aware of the concerns that 
the EU had now regrettably to reiterate again ; she also thanked Indonesia for its efforts to address 
its cumbersome measures . Nevertheless, there remained in place in Indonesia a high number of 
trade -restrictive measures , and also an issue with regard to Indonesia's legal framework, which  had 
created significant legal uncertainty.  
16.3.   Among  the measures of particular concern to the EU were  the following : the use of local 
content requirements in a number o f sectors; complex and burdensome import requirements for a 
number of products; QRs for meat, steel, and tyres; export restrictions for certain raw materials (on 
which the EU would especially appreciate receiving further information ); burdensome and 
discri minatory conformity assessment procedures; and a growing proliferation of mandatory 
technical standards.  
16.4.   In particular, the date of implementation of Halal Law  33/2014 was approaching , although as 
yet there was no clarity as to its implementing regulations  and procedures. She urged Indonesia to 
provide precise information on the scope, object, and timing of the measures under preparation, 
and to notify them in accordance with WTO  rules. She also called upon Indonesia to keep Halal 
certification and labellin g voluntary  so as to render the measure  less trade  restrictive.  
16.5.   The EU also requested an update from Indonesia regarding the rules and standards regulating 
the production of processed milk and relevant investments.  
16.6.   As to Ministerial Decrees  82/2017 and 80/ 2018 on Maritime Transport and Insurance, these 
appeared  to mandate that the export and import of key commodities be carried out and insured by 
domestic companies  only. She sought clarification from Indonesia with regard to these laws and 
urged Indonesia to eliminate its high number of trade barriers and to refrain from issuing new trade 
barriers, in line with its G20  commitments.  
16.7.   The delegate of Japan  again registered Japan 's concerns over various Indonesian measures, 
including  export restrictions imposed  by the Mining Law, the Law on Trade, the Law on Industry, 
restrictions in the retail sector, and local content requirements for 4G  mobile phones.  
16.8.   Japan believed that these measures were or could be inconsistent with the WTO  Agreement, 
and again urged Indo nesia fully to update Members on the concrete actions being taken by Indonesia 
to ensure that these measures were brought into WTO-complian ce, with a view to creating a 
transparent and stable environment for trade and investment.  
16.9.   The delegate of Norway  brought to the Council 's attention a concern in relation to Indonesia 's 
new regulation on imports of fisheries products , adopted in June  2018 by Trade Ministry Regulation 
No. 66/2018. The Norwegian seafood exporters ' initial experience was that the new requir ements 
had proven to be complicated, time -consuming, and costly, especially the requirements for 
third party verifications of consignments to Indonesia. Norway had understood that the new 
regulation might form part of an overhaul of the Indonesian import r egime for fishery products and 
would welcome information from Indonesia in this regard.  
16.10.   The delegate of the Republic of Korea  echoed the concerns raised by previous speakers and 
noted that these concerns had been raised by many Members and had appeared  on the Council's 
agenda over the course of many years. Korea was concerned about the negative impact of  
Indonesia 's policies and practices on international trade and urged Indonesia to improve its trade 
restrictive policies and practices, including its  prepai d corporate income tax on importers, its local 
content requirements, its export law, and its industry law, and to bring these into compliance with 
the WTO's rules and principles.  G/C/M/133  
 
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  16.11.   The delegate of China  shared the concerns expressed by other Members with reg ard to 
Indonesia 's import and export restrictions. China was also concerned about the pre -paid income tax 
on imported products under Article  22 of Indonesia 's Income Tax Law and considered that this 
mechanism had placed a heavy and discriminatory tax burde n on imported products, as it required 
importer s to pay 2.5 to 10% pre -paid income tax.  
16.12.   China had also noted that , on 30  September  2018,  Indonesia had further raised the pre -
paid income tax rate for 1,174  products, thus making imports still less competitiv e. China urge d 
Indonesia to bring its measure s into conformity with the WTO 's rules.  
16.13.   The delegate of New Zealand  echoed the concerns raised by previous speakers. As noted at 
previous Council meetings, New Zealand believed that Indonesia 's restrictions on agricultural 
imports undermined core WTO  principles and were inconsistent with key obligations in the 
WTO Agreements. New Zealand welcomed Indonesia 's commitment to implement ing the 
recommendations of the Dispute Settlement Body in Indonesia – Import Licen sing Regimes  
(DS477/478) , and was hopeful that this implementation process would result in a meaningful long -
term reform of Indonesia 's restrictive import regime.  
16.14.   However, New Zealand continued to have significant concerns over several of Indonesia's 
impor t restrictions affecting trade across a range of agricultural products , notably Indonesia's recent 
introduction of measures restricting dairy imports. Restrictions also continued to be applied to New 
Zealand 's horticultural products.  
16.15.   As previously indicate d, Indonesia 's restrictions not only hurt exporters ; Indonesian 
consumers, processors, and producers had also been affected, as Indonesia 's measures had 
contributed to rises in food prices in Indonesia, including for basic foodstuffs and ingredients for th e 
domestic manufacturing sector.  
16.16.   Like other delegations, New Zealand hoped that Indonesia would implement its reform plans 
through policies  that were consistent with its WTO  obligations. New Zealand looked forward to 
working with Indonesia during this implementation process.  
16.17.   The delegate of Canada  appreciated Indonesia's stated commitment to improve its business 
investment climate; however, much needed still to be done. Canada continued to share the concerns 
outlined by other Members regarding Indonesia 's persistent import -restricting policies and practices, 
and was particularly concerned by restrictions in the mining, oil and gas sectors, increasing local 
content requirements across many sectors, including renewable energy, and the uncertainties 
surroun ding Halal Certification Requirements. Concerns also remained regarding the import licensing 
requirements for horticultural products. He encouraged Indonesia to respect its WTO  obligations.  
16.18.   The delegate of Brazil  shared the concerns of other Members . Indonesia 's trade restrictive 
measures had been particularly harmful to Brazilian exports of poultry and beef. There had been 
unjustified delays in inspection and approval procedures for meat product exporting establishments 
that had amounted to de facto  phytosanitary barriers preventing  access to the Indonesian market.  
16.19.   As delegations recall ed, Brazil had initiated two  dispute settlement proceedings over these 
issues, one of which, DS484, had resulted in  a panel report favourable to Brazil 's main requests. 
Brazil attached great importance to the full and urgent implementation by Indonesia of the panel 's 
recommendations and findings and hoped to continue working with Indonesia to that end . 
16.20.   The delegate of Chinese Taipei  shared the concerns raised by previous speakers. Her 
delegation continued to be concerned by Indonesia 's trade and investment and import and export 
restrictive policies in general , although nevertheless commended Indonesia on its efforts to improve 
its business environment. However, concerns remained over Indonesia 's restrictive policy on 
4G mobile devices. Indonesia's measure in this regard would adversely affect trade and investment, 
and Indonesia should rather ensure that its measures w ere in full compliance with its 
WTO obligations.  
16.21.   The delegate of Thailand  also shared the concerns raised by previous speakers over 
Indonesia 's import restrictive measures, particularly its import licensing and QRs on horticultural 
products, which had subs tantially impacted upon Thailand 's agriculture exports. Thailand G/C/M/133  
 
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  encouraged Indonesia to bring all of its measures into compliance with the WTO 's rules and 
obligations and looked forward to working closely with Indonesia in this regard . 
16.22.   The delegate of Indonesia  thanked the previous speakers for their interest in the Indonesian 
market . Indonesia reiterated its statements made previously in this Council , indicating that 
Indonesia had carefully considered Members ' concerns regarding several of its policy meas ures. 
Indonesia 's trade policies were always adopted in line with its WTO  commitment s favouring the 
smooth flow of trade across and within Indonesia 's borders. Indonesia had also updated Members 
on these measures in the relevant bodies and stood ready to d iscuss any of these concerns 
bilaterally.  
16.23.   The Chairperson  thanked delegations for their interventions and proposed that the Council 
take note of the statements made.  
16.24.   The Council so agreed . 
17  UNITED STATES – MEAS URES RELATED TO IMPO RTS OF FISH AND SEAF OOD 
PRODUCTS – REQUEST F ROM CHINA  
17.1.   The Chairperson  informed the Council that, in a communication dated 1  November  2018, the 
delegation of China had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda.  
17.2.   The delegate of China  reiterated China 's concerns expressed at previous meetings over the 
United States Seafood Import Monitoring Programme (SIMP). In those earlier meetings , the US had 
explained that the main goal of the programme was to avoid  illegal, unregulated, and unreported  
(IUU) products from ente ring into US commerce. However, the programme covered all imports of 
seafood, without distinction between aquaculture or fishing products.  
17.3.   China considered that the programme lacked any scientific basis and that it had overlapped 
with other existing regula tory measures , causing  increased financial cost s for Chinese enterprises; 
it also created unnecessary restrictions on international trade. China hoped to be informed of the 
SIMP updates regarding the exclusion of aquaculture  products from the proposed disc iplines on 
fisheries subsidies currently under negotiation and urged the US to exclude aquaculture products 
from the SIMP  programme , to ensure that it would not be extended , and to ensure that it would be 
WTO-consistent , without creating new trade barriers.  
17.4.   The delegate of the Russian Federation  recalled that his delegation had also raised the issue 
of the SIMP at previous CTG  meetings, and had discussed the issue bilaterally with the US , receiving 
from the US in this con text certain clarifications concerning  the programme . Nevertheless , the 
Russian Federation remained concerned about the data verification process in place to ensure that 
fish and seafood had not originated in IUU  fishing.  
17.5.   The Russian Federation considered that the verification of whether or not fish had been caught 
in IUU  fishing could not be performed without close cooperation with the competent authorities of 
third countries  competent to  prove that the fish had been legally caught. In Russia 's view, in th e 
absence of such verification, new requirements could be considered excessively burdensome for 
business entities, especially for small and medium -sized enterprises (SMEs).  
17.6.   The Russian Federation would continue to monitor the implementation of the SIMP carefully 
so as to verify its compliance with WTO  rules.  
17.7.   The delegate of the United States  thanked delegations for their continued interest in the SIMP , 
whose objective was to combat IUU  fishing and seafood fraud. The final rule required US  importers 
to repor t certain information upon entry into the US and retain other information that allowed the 
shipment to be traced back to the point of catch or harvest in order to prevent the US  market from 
being  used as a place to sell fraudulently marketed seafood or sea food products produced from 
IUU fishing.  
17.8.   The final rule was developed through a transparent process of public notice and comment, 
involving all interested stakeholders, as well as through direct outreach to exporting nations. 
Compliance with SIMP  requireme nts for 11  priority species became effective on 1  January  2018.  G/C/M/133  
 
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  17.9.   The US  National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) had recently published a 
final rule that required two  additional species, shrimp and abalone, to comply with the 
SIMP requirements  as of 31  December  2018. NOA A was committed to advising shrimp and abalone 
importers and their exporter partners on what was required by SIMP and about how importers could 
comply with the regulation.  
17.10.   The US looked forward to continuing its engagement on im plementation of these rules and 
on combatting IUU  fishing and protecting its oceans more broadly.  
17.11.   The Chairperson  thanked all delegations for their interventions and proposed that the Council 
take note of the statements made.  
17.12.   The Council so agreed . 
18  INDIA – CUSTOMS DUTIES ON I CT PRODUCTS – REQUES T FROM CANADA, CHINA , THE 
EUROPEAN UNION, JAPA N, NORWAY, CHINESE T AIPEI, AND THE UNITE D STATES  
18.1.   The Chairperson  informed the Council that, in a communication dated 1  November  2018, the 
delegations of Canada, China, th e European Union, Japan, Norway, and the United States, 
respectively, had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda, and that , in a 
communication dated 2  November  2018, the delegation of the Separate Customs Territory of 
Taiwan, Penghu,  Kinmen, and Matsu, had requested to be included in the list of co -sponsors.  
18.2.   The delegate of the European Union  said that , unfortunately , this issue was well known, as it 
had been raised in various WTO  bodies over several years now. The EU reiterated its significant  
concerns over India 's various increases of customs duties on ICT  products, the latest dating back to 
October  2018.  
18.3.   As mentioned at the Council's previous meeting, for the EU these import duties constituted 
prima facie  violations of India 's WTO  commitments, to the extent that the tariff lines in question 
were subject to duty -free commitments in India 's GATT  Schedule of Concessions. The EU therefore 
called upon India to reconsider its duty impositions and increases.  
18.4.   ICT products were also the subje ct of India 's draft rectification of its Schedule of Concessions 
communicated to WTO  Members on 25  September  2018. After careful assessment, the EU 
considered that this draft rectification did not constitute a change of a purely formal character, but 
rathe r that it altered the scope of India 's GATT  1994 commitments. The EU had already objected in 
writing , since it considered that the changes were not within the terms of paragraph  2 of the 
1980 Decision on the Procedures for Modification and Rectification of Schedules of Tariff 
Concessions.  
18.5.   The delegate of the United States  said that it was unfortunate to  have to  raise again in this 
Council the issue of India 's tariff increases on telecommunications and ICT  products ; however,  rather 
than responding to the concerns raised by the US and numerous other Members, India had 
undertaken additional concerning actions. Indeed, by the end of October  2018, India had announced 
another round of tariff increases on telecom munications equipment.  
18.6.   The US understood that tariffs had increased on base stations in tariff line  8517.61, and 
telecommunications equipment in tariff line  8517.69, from 10 % to 20 %. These increases further 
raised import tariffs, including on products for which India had a WTO  binding commitment to 
provide duty -free access. This came on top of India 's submission for a rectification and modification 
of its WTO  Schedule  XII, which proposed to unbind several concessions relating  to subheadings in 
Chapters  84 and 85.  
18.7.   After careful review, the US believed that the proposed modifications would adversely affect 
the scope of India's concessions with regard  to the goods concerned and, as such, could not be 
considered a rectification. In the view of the US, the result  of the proposed modifications was not 
within the terms of paragraph  2 of the 1980  Procedures.  
18.8.   The US had formally registered its systemic concerns over and objection to India 's proposed 
rectification in October  2018. Indeed, through the CMA, with strong support from the Secretariat, G/C/M/133  
 
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  the US undertook the necessary technical work and multilateral review to ensure that each Member 's 
tariff concessions remained unchanged with each tariff nomenclature update. However, India 's 
proposed rectificati on suggested otherwise, and it could thus have a significant impact on the very 
nature and meaning of WTO  binding tariff commitments.  
18.9.   India's proposed rectification included many of the products for which India had a 
WTO binding commitment per Schedule  XII to provide duty -free access , as discussed in previous 
CTG meetings, as well as in the CMA and the ITA  Committee. An example of this was the 
telecommunications equipment classified under tariff line  8517.62 , for which India 's commitment 
was at the HS -six-digit level, so any national tariff line or ex -out that India might propose would 
need to be bound at zero as well. However, when looking in detail at India's proposal, it suggested 
that a new ex -out, for tariff line  8517.62 , would now be unbound.  
18.10.   The US and numerous Members had discussed this matter many times in the relevant 
Committees and in this Council. There were obvious discrepancies between India 's WTO  bound 
commitments to provide duty -free access to certain products and the non -zero import duties th at 
India was actually charging on imported products at the border. The US found it deeply troubling 
that India would suggest that these discrepancies could somehow be justified through a proposed 
rectification.  
18.11.   The delegate of Japan  said that his delegatio n also remained concerned over India's customs 
duties on ICT  products. Japan had understood that , in India's WTO  bound schedule, mobile phones 
and their parts, classified at six -digit level, were bound at zero  duties. However, mobile phones were 
currently subjected to 20% customs duties, and mobile phone parts to 15%  customs duties. 
Moreover, on 12  October  2018, India had raised its tariff rates for base stations and certain 
telecommunication products, from 10% to 20%, and  had also brought certain types of printed circuit 
board assembly to a 10% tariff duty.  
18.12.   Japan had commercial and systemic concerns in this regard and believed that these duties 
violated India 's binding commitments. Japan again urged India to withdraw the tariffs on the 
ICT products at issue , and without any further delay. Despite the various bilateral meetings  that had 
been held with Indian experts, India had still not responded to the questions addressed to India  by 
Japan in April  2018.  
18.13.   On 25  September  2018, India had also circulated a rect ification and modification proposal 
of its Schedule. As this proposal would alter the scope of India 's concessions, these modifications 
could not be considered to be purely formal in nature. Consequently, Japan had submitted an 
objection to India 's propose d schedule , in accordance with paragraph  3 of the 1980  Procedures , and 
continued to discuss this issue with India bilaterally . 
18.14.   The delegate of China  recalled that her delegation had raised this issue several times in the 
CTG and in the CMA and the ITA  Comm ittee, but the situation had not improved.  
18.15.   As already mentioned by other delegation s, on 25  September  2018, India had circulated a 
communication requesting rectification of its HS2007  Schedule on some ITA  products. China 
believed that this request did not constitute a merely  formal rectification as it would alter the scope 
of India 's commitments in the ITA and the GATT  1994 and would adversely affect the existing 
concessions on the products  concerned . Therefore, paragraph  2 of the 1980  Procedures could not 
be applied.  
18.16.   China believed that India 's measures, especially the increase in applied rates on mobile 
phones and related parts , were inconsistent with its commitments in the ITA and its WTO  Schedule, 
and therefore violated WTO  rules; China called upon India promptly to redress  the duty rates on 
these products and to bring them back into conformity with India's WTO bound rates.  
18.17.   The delegate of Canada  recalled that Canada had raised this issue a number of times, at the 
CTG and, most recently, in the CMA, and t he ITA  Committee meetings , but that there had been no 
development s on the issue . Canada remained concerned that India had not only maintained its tariffs 
on ICT  products above its bound commitments, but also that it had continued to announce additional 
tariff increases on these products above its bound rates.  G/C/M/133  
 
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  18.18.   Canada had both systemic and commercial concerns with regard to India's decision to 
introduce tariffs on these products above its bound commitments, as well as with India 's 
unwillingness to respond mea ningfully to Members ' concerns in this area. India 's attempt to address 
this situation by unbinding its commitments through a notification of rectification and modification 
of schedules of tariff concessions had only exacerbate d Canada 's concerns. This was not a change 
of a purely formal nature; therefore, Canada once again called upon India immediately to rescind 
these tariff increases and to refrain from pursuing any further tariff increases above its 
WTO commitments.  
18.19.   The delegate of Norway  commented that this agenda item had not been resolved but had 
rather moved in a negative direction since the last CTG  meeting. As previously mentioned, on  
25 September  2018, the Secretariat had circulated a notification from India based on the 
1980 Procedure s for Modification and Rectification of Schedules. Norway did not consider that 
changing tariffs from bound to unbound itself necessarily went against the conditions of Article  2 of 
the 1980  Procedures . However,  India clearly was changing the scope  of its concessions and , in doing 
so, affecting other Members. Norway was considering submitting a  formal  objection to India 's 
proposed rectifications.  
18.20.   The delegate of Thailand  shared the concerns of other Members regarding India 's application 
of tariffs a bove its bound rates for various ICT  products and reiterated its commercial interest in the 
products in question. Thailand also had systemic concerns regarding the implication of the ICT  tariffs 
applied by India and urged India to bring its tariffs into li ne with its WTO  commitments . Thailand  
indicated that India 's notification on rectification and modification of schedules, dated 
25 September  2018, was still under examination in Capital.  
18.21.   The delegate of Chinese Taipei  shared the concerns expressed by other  Members . Chinese 
Taipei had also raised these concerns in the ITA and Market Access Committees on many occasions . 
However, the situation had worsened, particularly regarding India 's intention to further increase 
import duties on telecommunications equipment , such as base stations and certain 
telecommunication equipment, as indicated by the US and Japan. This violated India 's binding 
commitment for these products at zero  duties. Such an increase in customs duties was totally 
inconsistent with GATT  Article II. 
18.22.   Her delegation had strong reservation s over India's recent proposed rectification relating to 
sub-heading s in Chapters  84 and 85 of the HS , which included many of the products covered by 
ITA-1, to which India was a party. The proposed rectificati on was not within the mandate of the 
"reduplication". Rather, India should ensure duty -free access to the tariff lines in question , as indeed 
it was committed to do.  
18.23.   The delegate of Singapore  shared the concerns expressed by other Members  and urged India 
to make the amendments necessary to bring its tariffs in to line with its WTO  commitments.  
18.24.   The delegate of Switzerland  also recalled Switzerland 's concerns raised at previous 
CTG meetings. Since 2014, India had progressively increased customs duties on ICT  products, the 
latest increase dating from some two  weeks before . 
18.25.   These i mport duties applied by India constituted prima facie  violations of India's  
WTO commitments, given that the tariff lines in question were subject to duty -free duties in India's 
Schedule  of Concessions. The recent notification  submitted by India,  in September  2018, did not 
alleviate Swiss concerns ; to the contrary, the 15  tariff positions mentioned in India 's document were 
IT products for which India 's Schedule indicated a bound duty rate of zero , which  India now intended 
to change to unbound.  
18.26.   Switzerland considered that such a change altered India's balance of concessions and  could 
therefore not be of purely formal character. Switzerland had no other choice but to object to the 
proposed r ectification as it was not within the terms of paragraph  2 of the 1980  Decision on the 
Procedures for Modification and Rectification of Schedules of Tariff Concessions.  
18.27.   The delegate of the Republic of Korea  said that Korea also had systematic concerns rega rding 
India's  imposition of higher tariffs on ICT  products. Korea believed that India should give duty -free 
access to any goods belonging to HS  lines to which India had committed to provide duty -free access. G/C/M/133  
 
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  Korea requested India to reinstate a zero  duty r ate on the IT  products in question, in accordance 
with its WTO commitments.  
18.28.   The delegate of Australia  echoed the concerns of other Members  regarding India's  
modification of its tariffs beyond its bound rates. Australia had a systemic interest in ensuring that 
WTO Members upheld their tariff commitments and the basic principles of the WTO  Agreement.  
18.29.   The delegate of New Zealand  echoed the concerns raised by previous delegations, including 
those that pertained to India's more recent modifications. New Zealand would continue to register 
its systemic concerns at the CTG and other WTO  bodies.  
18.30.   The delegate of India thanked the previous speakers for their continued interest in India 's 
customs duty raising on certain telecommunication equipment and other products.  
18.31.   On the duty imposed on certain products since October  2018, which were considered by 
some Members as part of ITA -1, India had provided its responses in various WTO  bodies, including 
the CMA, the ITA Committee , and at the CTG.  
18.32.   However, in search of clarity, I ndia considered it necessary to address some of these issues 
again.  
18.33.   India was fully aware of its obligations and commitments under the ITA-1 and had been 
abiding by them. India had signed the ITA-1 in 1997 and had presented its Schedule of Concessions, 
which had been certified in document  WT/Let/181. India did not intend to make any commitment 
beyond the scope of its ITA -1 commitments. India considered that the items on which duties had 
been raised were not part of the ITA -1 that India had signed. He invite d delegations to share their 
perceptions of the coverage of those products listed under the ITA -1, as well as on the customs 
duties imposed by other Members on such products.  
18.34.   Regarding  the general concerns raised by Members over India's measure in respect of its 
ITA-1 commitments, he said that India had already provided written responses, including responses 
in various meetings of the CMA, the CTG, and the ITA  Committee. Members had the right to revisit 
any areas or mistakes when these  had occurred  in assig ning bound tariffs while transposing their 
HS Schedule, and to place the necessary rectification request before the relevant Committee. In 
fact, in document  G/MA/TAR/RS/24, dated 2  April 1997, India had made it very clear that it reserved 
the right to make  technical changes to its Schedule and to correct any errors, omissions, or 
inaccuracies  it contained . 
18.35.   Therefore, India has filed its rectification request for correcting certain errors  in its 
HS2007  Schedule in accordance with the Procedures for Modificat ion and Rectification of Schedules 
of Tariff Concessions contained in the Decision of 26  March  1980, under the category "Other 
rectifications".  
18.36.   In the explanatory note to the rectification request, India had indicated that , while 
transposing the tariff lin es and the description of the products recommended by the WCO for 
HS2002 -2007 transposition, India had inadvertently included the tariff subheading given in the 
appendix table under the zero  bound duty commitments. He therefore encouraged Members to look 
at India 's rectification request; if any Member had any other views on the technical aspects of the 
products in question, as well as regarding their classification, India was ready to discuss such views 
with the Member concerned. He also requested those  Members that had raised new issues at this 
meeting to send their statements to his delegation so that these could be forwarded to Capital for 
further  examination and consideration.  
18.37.   The Chairperson  thanked all delegations for their interventions and proposed that the Council 
take note of the statements made.  
18.38.   The Council so agreed . G/C/M/133  
 
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  19  PAKISTAN – MEASURES RELATING TO SUGAR SU BSIDIES – REQUEST FR OM 
AUSTRALIA AND THE EU ROPEAN UNION  
19.1.   The Chairperson  informed  the Council that, in communications dated 30  October and 
1 November  2018, the delegations of Australia and the European Union, respectively, had requested 
the Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda.  
19.2.   The representative of Australia  said that his a uthorities were seriously concerned about the 
global sugar glut that was hurting its sugar industry. Australia had previously raised its concerns 
over Pakistan 's domestic support and export subsidies over the previous 12  months , which Australia 
considered were contributing  to the global glut. Australia had therefore welcomed the information 
that Pakistan 's freight support to export surplus sugar in 2017 -2018 had ceased. Nevertheless, 
Pakistan 's Economic Coordination Committee of Cabinet had approved , on 2 October  2018,  the 
proposal from the Commerce Division to export one  million tonnes of surplus sugar. While no freight 
or financial support appeared to have been announced to date, Australia was concerned that Pakistan 
might  reinstitute cash freight support on a sliding scale , as had occurred in 2017 -2018, to clear the 
stockpile of surplus sugar.  
19.3.   Australia renewed its request that Pakistan reconsider its market price support at the 
provincial level and undertake reforms to ensure market price signals reached sugarcane producers 
in Pakistan and to notify its domestic support to the Committee on Agriculture.  
19.4.   Australia was committed to defending the interests of its sugar producers and was closely 
examining the WTO  consistency of the support measures provided by Pakistan to its sugar 
producers.  
19.5.   The representative of the European Union  echoed  Australia's  concerns. The EU looked forward 
to Pakistan 's explanation of how its measures had respected the letter and the spirit of the Nairobi 
Decision on Export Competition.  
19.6.   The representative of the Russian Federation  said that Pakistan had been applying export 
subsidies on sugar for the previous four  years. In late  2017, the Government of Pakistan had 
announced an increase in export subsidies and quota and the vo lume of export quota for sugar had 
grown significantly , from 500,000  tonnes to 2  million tonnes. Pakistani exporters enjoyed sugar 
subsidies of US$97 per tonne and the total amount of subsidies equalled US$194  million.  
19.7.   Russian enterprises were suffering fr om a decrease in exports to Central Asia due to Pakistan 's 
increased exports of subsidized sugar. Pakistan 's measures had created unnecessary barriers to 
trade and had undermined the level playing field on the global market.  
19.8.   The representative of Thailand  expressed her authorities ' similar concerns and they would 
continue to monitor the situation.  
19.9.   The representative of Brazil  echoed  the concerns raised by previous speakers. Pakistan 's 
measures were impacting heavily upon an already fragile market , which was  suffering from excess 
capacity and declining prices.  
19.10.   Brazil had taken note of Pakistan 's announcement , on 2 October  2018, of the discontinuation 
of its export subsidies for the 2018 -2019 harvest , and they were reviewing the details of the newly 
adopted po licy directives.  
19.11.   The representative of El Salvador  said that El Salvador shared the concerns expressed by 
other Members.  
19.12.   The representative of Canada  said that Canada 's sugar industry had concerns regarding the 
potential dampening effect on sugar prices of  Pakistan 's measures, which was detrimental to all 
sugar exporters. Canada encouraged Pakistan to move to more market -based policies and to bring 
its domestic support and export subsidy notifications up to date  so that Members could better 
understand the p rogrammes being implemented . G/C/M/133  
 
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  19.13.   The representative of Pakistan  said that the freight and marketing support measure was 
consistent with Article  9.4, read with Article  9.1(d) and (e) of the Agreement on Agriculture.  
19.14.   Pakistan had already responded to Members ' concerns, both bilaterally and at previous 
meetings of the Committee on Agriculture , and it would continue to engage constructively with all 
interested delegations.  
19.15.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
19.16.   The Council so agreed. 
20  INDIA – MEASURES REL ATING TO SUGAR SUBSI DIES – REQUEST FROM AUSTRALIA 
AND THE EUROPEAN UNI ON 
20.1.   The Chairperson  informed the Council that, in communications dated 30  October and 
1 November  2018, the delegations of Australia and the European Union, respe ctively, had requested 
the Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda.  
20.2.   The representative of Australia  reiterated Australia 's serious concerns over the global sugar 
glut that had negatively impacted global sugar prices and to which India 's domestic support and 
export subsidies had contributed.  
20.3.   Australia was disappointed by the additional sugar subsidies, in particular the freight support , 
to facilitate sugar exports, which  had been announced by the Indian Government on 
26 September  2018, and which were worth approximately US$750  million.  
20.4.   The financial assistance of 138.8  Indian Rupees  per tonne in 2018-2019, worth approximately 
US$565  million of the announced package, appeared to be contingent upon export performance 
under the minimum indicative expor t quota of 5 million tonnes of sugar. Previously, India had said 
that its domestic support arrangements did not affect global markets and the export interests of 
others, including developing countries. But this did not appear to be the case for sugar.  
20.5.   Global sugar prices had hit a decade low immediately following the Indian Government 's 
announcement. India 's sugar production forecasts and policy announcements had sent signals to 
the global market that had affected prices. India 's current 10  million tonne su rplus was 
overshadowing the world markets, as were predictions of sugar production being a further 
32 million  tonnes that season, underwritten by the additional subsidies and the market price support 
provided through the fair and remunerative price.  
20.6.   India had tried to reassure WTO  Members that it had minimal sugar exports, yet the Indian 
Government announced on 8  November  2018 that it planned to export 2  million tonnes of raw sugar 
to China beginning in 2019, and that India was in a position to become a reg ular and dependable 
exporter of high -quality sugar in significant volumes to China.  
20.7.   Australia was committed to defending the interests of its sugar producers and was closely 
examining the WTO  consistency of the myriad support measures provided to India 's sugar industry.  
20.8.   The representative of Thailand  expressed Thailand 's concerns regarding India 's measure to 
support sugar prices linked to minimum indicative export quotas and freight support. The support 
did not allow domestic producers to make commercial d ecisions based on global market signals, and 
could encourage over -production, stockpiling, and exports of surplus stocks with potential adverse 
impact on international markets. Thailand called upon India to provide detailed clarification s of all 
the measur es cited by Members  in this regard . India should also encourage domestic producers to 
take decisions based on market signals rather than trade -distorting support.  
20.9.   The representative of the European Union  said that it wished to reiterate its statement under 
the previous item with regard to India's measures in support of its sugar sector.  
20.10.   The representative of the Russian Federation  said that the Indian Government supported its 
national sugar industry through the prov ision of direct and indirect subsidies to sugar producers for 
the modernization and diversification of sugar production. The government not only guaranteed G/C/M/133  
 
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  minimum purchase prices to be paid to farmers by manufacturers, but also provided subsidies on 
sugar  cane, plus export subsidies to the sugar industry.  In these ways, India  was erecting 
unnecessary barriers to trade and destabilizing the global sugar market.  
20.11.   Sugar export duties had decreased from 20% to zero in March  2018, while at the same time, 
sugar e xport quotas had increased by up to two  million tonnes. In September  2018, the Indian 
Government had announced an increase in sugar export subsidies to US$1  billion for 5  million 
tonnes, including subsidies per tonne of sugar of US$150. It had also announc ed an increase in 
transport subsidies, from US$13.8 to US$41.3 per tonne. The se measures were having a negative 
impact on Russian companies ; in particular, there had been a decrease in exports of sugar to Central 
Asia as a result of increased subsidized su gar exports from India that were being dumped at low 
prices. Russia called upon India to withdraw its measures to avoid them creating yet further trade 
distortions.  
20.12.   The representative of Brazil  said that Brazil shared the concerns of other Members  regardin g 
the expansion of India 's support policies and the WTO consistency of its measures. Nevertheless, 
the Indian Government 's proposal to foster ethanol production  could be a step in the right direction , 
including and possibly through cooperation with Brazil itself. 
20.13.   The representative of New Zealand  said that New Zealand recognized the need for the 
condition -bound additional time -frame that was available to developing country and least developed 
country Members to allow them extra flexibility when bringing necessary regulatory changes  into 
effect . However, one of the conditions required developing country Members to have notified their 
use of export subsidies in one of the ir previous three  export subsidy notifications , whereas India had 
neither scheduled an y commitments to use export subsidies for any product , nor submitted an export 
subsidy notification since 2012 , which had been  for the marketing year 2009 -2010.  
20.14.   India's response to its use of export subsidies for skimmed milk powder at the Committee 
on Agr iculture in September  2018 gave cause for concern. Certain Members, including India, were 
using export subsidies for new markets or new products, when (a)  they had no scheduled 
commitment  to do so; and (b)  the rest of the Membership was making real progres s towards total 
elimination of this highest form of trade -distorting support , by 2023 at the latest. Therefore, New 
Zealand urged India to rethink its use of export subsidies for any agricultural product, and to do so  
immediately  as concerned sugar and ski mmed milk powder.  
20.15.   The representative of El Salvador  said that El Salvador shared the concerns expressed by 
previous speakers regarding the effect s of India 's measures on the international sugar market.  
20.16.   The representative of Guatemala  observed that Guatemal a was the fourth  largest sugar 
exporter in the world  and was therefore closely examining the WTO  consistency of India's subsidies 
and other assistance provided to the Indian sugar industry. If Guatemala considered the measures 
to be inconsistent with India 's WTO  commitments, it would use the mechanisms at its disposal to 
ensure that India abide d by its obligations. Guatemala stood  ready to hold consultations with India 
and other interested Members in order to find a rapid and mutually agreed solution  to thi s issue . 
20.17.   The representative of Canada  said that its industry was concerned by India's use of support 
mechanisms to export sugar and the resulting dampening effect on the world 's sugar market. Canada 
called upon India to reconsider its measures and to move  instead towards  more market -based 
policies.  
20.18.   The representative of India stated that cane producers in India were mostly small and 
marginal farmers with very small land holdings. The Government had taken a series of measures in 
order to get their arrears re paid and to improve their condition.  
20.19.   In this context, the Government was allowing diversion of B -Heavy molasses for production 
of ethanol for blending with petrol. It had also announced incentives for increasing ethanol 
production capacity and for upgradin g the plant stock to increase the number of working days  of 
production . It was estimated that about one  million tonnes of sugarcane stock would be utilized for 
production of ethanol, and that this figure was expected to further increase.  G/C/M/133  
 
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  20.20.   To avoid distress sales, the Government had fixed the Fair and Remunerative Price (FRP) of 
cane, which was an indicative price to be paid by sugar mills against purchase of their cane for sugar 
production. Accordingly, the Government had announced changes in the FRP relativ e to various cost 
parameters.  
20.21.   Sugarcane had not been included in India's domestic subsidy  notifications because the 
Government was not procuring sugarcane from farmers.  
20.22.   Although India was a major sugar producer and consumer, he observed that India was in 
fact only a marginal player in terms of the global sugar trade. He observed, for example, that India's 
exports of sugar in 2018 had been insignificant, at only 0.62  million tonnes compared to a total 
global export sugar trade of 63 million tonnes. As such, India's policies did not affect international 
prices and India 's sugar purchase s was thus a domestic issue.  
20.23.   India stood ready to discuss this issue bilaterally with any Members that still had specific 
concerns relative  to India's present policy.  
20.24.   The Chairp erson  propose d that the Council take note of the statements made.  
20.25.   The Council so agreed . 
21  EUROPEAN UNION – QUALITY SCHEMES FOR AGR ICULTURAL PRODUCTS A ND 
FOODSTUFFS – THE REG ISTRATION OF THE TER M "DANBO" AS GEOGRAP HICAL 
INDICATION – REQUEST  FROM THE UNITED S TATES AND URUGUAY  
21.1.   The Chairperson  informed the Council that, in communications dated 30 and 31  October  2018, 
the delegations of Uruguay and the United States, respectively, had requested the Secretariat to 
include this issue on the agenda.  
21.2.   The representati ve of the United States  said that the US remained concerned about the 
registration of the term "Danbo " as a protected geographical indication (PGI), with a complete 
disregard for the international standard in Codex.  
21.3.   The consultation process with the EU had  been unsatisfactory, as had been the EU 's responses 
to US  requests for clarity raised at the TBT  Committee. The registration of Danbo  had lacked 
sufficient transparency, such as an explanation of how the Commission had considered the existing 
Codex standa rds. 
21.4.   The application under consideration for "Havarti " also lacked transparency and the EU should 
provide a status update  for it. The US opposed the EU 's granting of a GI protection to Havarti,  since 
there was an international Codex Alimentarius standard for Havarti, which Codex Members – 
including the EU – had reconfirmed in 2007, 2008, and 2010.  
21.5.   The Council 's own decision on the EU 's accession to the Codex Alimentarius Commission had 
affirmed that "Codex standards have acquired increased legal relevance by virtue of the reference 
made to Codex in the WTO  Agreements and the presumption of conformity which is conferred on 
national measures when they are based on such standards."  
21.6.   The EU and its member States had also agreed to the Codex Committee for Milk and Milk 
Product Individual Cheese standards, which contained labelling provisions under section  7 that 
preserved the generic nature and use of the names of those cheeses.  
21.7.   Both Danbo  and Havarti h ad undergone a rigorous review to prove their use in the public 
domain and in international trade. Had the EU 's view of the legal relevance of Codex standards 
changed since the publication of the Council 's Decision?  
21.8.   Many of the EU 's proposed amendments to the underlying regulation that had been notified 
to the TBT  Committee in August  2018 were also cause for concern. The amendments appeared to 
exacerbate rather than  to alleviate the existing concerns, such as by shifting authority from the 
Commission to mem ber States , and by providing member States with greater flexibilities and control G/C/M/133  
 
- 60 - 
 
  over GI  applications. This would have an impact not only on existing applications but also in the 
context of ensuring that member States abided by their WTO  commitments.  
21.9.   The US requested  an update from the EU on the status of the proposed amendments ; it also 
requested the EU to consider withdrawing the most problematic of these and to provide confirmation 
that it would do so.  
21.10.   The representative of Uruguay  regretted that this i ssue remained on the Council's agenda, 
and lamented not yet having received any responses from the EU. Uruguay was  one of the main 
global producers and exporters of Danbo cheese and therefore  very concerned at the unnecessary 
obstacles and barriers put in the way of the trade in this type of cheese, including from constraints 
on the free use in the EU of the term  "Danbo" . Uruguay was also concerned by a possible extension 
of such protection to third  markets through free trade agreements or the use of international 
registration systems. Uruguay also had concerns regarding additional generic terms that were being 
used freely with regard to cheeses or other products.  
21.11.   In conclusion, Uruguay requested that  the record of the meeting take into account its 
detailed statement given at the Council 's meeting of 3  June 20182, and urged the EU to review its 
measure and to consider replacing it with other measures that would enable the EU to reach their 
goals withou t creating unnecessary barriers to trade.  
21.12.   The representative of Argentina  shared the concerns of other Members, noting that the 
registration of "Danbo"  as a protected geographical indication was not in keeping with Codex 
standards , and that the EU had not conducted the consultation and registration process in a 
transparent fashion.  
21.13.   According to Codex standard  264, specifically drafted for Danbo cheese, the "country of 
origin " was the country where the cheese was made and not where the appellation originated . Danbo 
was therefore recognized as a type of cheese that could be made in any country ; for this reason, 
Argentina considered that , as Danbo was a generic term, it was not possible to register it as a 
geographical indication in any restrictive  way. 
21.14.   In European Communities – Trade Description of Sardines  (DS231 ), Argentina recalled that 
the panel had decided that the Codex Standard was a relevant international standard , in keeping 
with Article  2.4 of the TBT  Agreement, and that it should therefore be used as the basis for the 
drafting of regulations. Accordingly, the term "Danbo" as a geographical indication itself indicated 
that the EU had not use d Codex Standard  264 as the basis for its Regulation (EU)  2017/1901.  
Argentina urged the EU to review t he measure.  
21.15.   The representative of New Zealand  said that his authorities were concerned that the 
European Commission had chosen to register the term "Danbo" despite having previously agreed to 
a Codex standard in which the European Commission and Denmark ha d both acknowledged that the 
country of origin statement preserved its generic nature. Such actions would negatively affect 
producers outside Denmark that had invested in their cheese production with the legitimate 
expectation that they could use the stand ard. The EU 's actions showed disregard for the integrity of 
the standards -setting system that existed to promote reliability and consistency in international 
trade rules.  
21.16.   The representative of the European Union  said that the procedure for granting protect ion to 
the term "Danbo" as a geographical indication in the EU had been finalized , and that the Commission 
Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/1901 , of 18 October  2017, had been made publicly available.  
21.17.   As stated in the TBT  Committee, the EU considered that any issue strictly concerning 
intellectual property rights should be discussed in the TRIPS  Council.  
21.18.   The United States  intervened to disagree, asserting again that for the US this was not a 
TBT issue. She noted that the EU had in fact correctly notified it s quality schemes regulation under 
the TBT  Agreement because of its TBT  implications, including the labelling issue in relation to the 
                                                
2 Document  G/C/M/132, paragraphs  6.2-6.8. G/C/M/133  
 
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  relevant international standards. She noted, too, that the Goods Council was the oversight body for 
the TBT  Committee.  
21.19.   The representative of the European Union  then reiterated her understanding that the matter 
at issue concerned the varied registration of the geographical indication and not the labelling 
provisions that went with it; for this reason, the EU's view remained t hat the right forum to discuss 
this issue was the TRIPS  Council.  
21.20.   The representative of Uruguay  also intervened for a second  time, in support of the 
US interpretation on this matter; Uruguay considered the issue to be relevant to the TBT  Agreement 
and was o pposed to it being discussed in the TRIPS  Council. Furthermore, Uruguay had had no 
choice but to raise this issue at the CTG given that to date they had received no replies from the EU 
to their questions . 
21.21.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of all the statements made on this 
issue.  
21.22.   The Council so agreed . 
22  UNITED STATES – EXPO RT RESTRICTIONS ON C ERTAIN ENTERPRISE OF  CHINA – 
REQUEST FROM CHINA  
22.1.   The Chairperson  informed the Council that , in a communication date d 1 November  2018, the 
delegation of China had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda.  
22.2.   The representative of China  noted that the US  Department of Commerce had issued an 
announcement , on 29  October  2018, adding a Chinese company , the "Fujian Jinhua Integrated 
Circuit Company" , to the Entity List of export controls, thereby prohibiting US  companies from 
exporting the products, software , and technology necessary for the Jinhua Company 's operations. 
The announcement had clearly stated th at the export control measure had been taken based on  
national security consideration s. However, in light of the products, the timing , and the reasons given 
for implementing the measure , China believed that  there was no basis for adopting the measure on 
national security  grounds . 
22.3.   The announcement had mentioned "in light of the likely US -origin technology" , and it was 
clear that the US had been thinking about the IPR  disputes between Jinhua and Micron, the 
US's biggest "Dynamic Random -Access Memory" (DRAM)  chip manufacturer. That lawsuit had lasted 
over a year amidst mutual accusations. China understood that it was usual practice in the business 
community , regarding IPR  cases, to elevate such issues to the level of national security and to 
subject them to US export control s. China considered this to be an abuse of the national security 
exception.  
22.4.   First, regarding product coverage, the measure had been targeted at DRAM  integrated 
circuits, which did not fall into any of the product categories set out in GATT  Article XXI, namely 
fissionable materials, arms, and ammunition. Second, regard ing the timing of the measure 's 
implementation , the announcement had stated that Jinhua was "nearing completion of substantial 
production capacity for DRAM  integrated circuits" wh en the measure had been taken. In other words, 
the US had deemed Jinhua a threat to its national security before the company had acquired 
production capacity. China considered this to be  an unwarranted charge and firmly opposed the 
presumption of guilt toward Chinese companies.  Third, regarding the reasons for its implementation, 
namely that "the additional production threatens the long -term economic viability of US  suppliers of 
these ess ential components of US  military systems", it was very clear that , in the vague, borderless 
sense of "long term",  the measure was being adopted for the purpose of protecting US domestic 
industry.  
22.5.   China asserted that the global DRAM  market was in fact an oligopolistic market. Register, a 
British IT  website, reported that DRAM  prices had risen by 30% in a quarter, while Micron, the largest 
DRAM  producer in the US, had increased its sales revenue by 22.3%. Therefore, Jinhua, which had 
not yet even begun produc tion, was far from threatening the long -term economic viability of 
DRAM  manufacturers in the US. Rather, the real purpose of the US  measures was to maintain the 
monopoly interests of the US  DRAM  industry.  G/C/M/133  
 
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  22.6.   China believed that the relevant trade protectionis t measures of the US  violated the non -
discrimination principle of the WTO , as well as provisions on the removal of quantity restrictions, 
thus seriously damaging China 's interests under the WTO  Agreements. Therefore, China urged the 
US to lift its export b an on the Chinese companies concerned immediately, in accordance with 
WTO rules. 
22.7.   China added that one of the objectives of the TRIPS  Agreement was to ensure that 
IPR measures and procedures did not themselves become barriers to legitimate trade , and that 
questions of trade secret s or intellectual property infringements should be decided by the courts. 
Therefore, in  China's view , it was not appropriate for the US to use export controls in their court 
rulings in this regard, let alone as an exception to a quantitative restriction.  
22.8.   The representative of the United States  stated  that the Department of Commerce 's action s 
had been taken on the basis of a certain entity in China posing a significant risk of becoming involved 
in activities that could negatively impa ct upon the national security and foreign policy interests of 
the US. 
22.9.   The measure was a law enforcement action intended to protect US national security and 
intellectual property. China and any other interested Members should refer any further enquiries to 
the US Department of Commerce.  
22.10.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements  made . 
22.11.   The Council so agreed . 
23  EGYPT – MANUFACTURE REGISTRATION SYSTEM – REQUEST FROM THE E UROPEAN 
UNION  
23.1.   The Chairperson  informed the Council that, in a communication dated 1  November  2018, the 
delegation of the European Union had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda.  
23.2.   The representative of the European Union  reiterated the EU 's concerns already expr essed in 
bilateral meetings, at the TBT  Committee, and here in this Council, over the implementation of 
two Egyptian Ministerial Decrees (No.  991/2015 , document  G/TBT/N/EGY/115 ), and No.  43/2016 , 
document  G/TBT/N/EGY/114) , and asked if the Egyptian authori ties had considered the 
improvements to the implementation of the decrees that the EU had suggested in previous 
exchanges . EU industry continued to report serious difficulties regarding the duplication of 
procedures, long delays, and lack of transparency i n the registration process of foreign 
manufacturing plants and companies.  
23.3.   The EU called upon Egypt to confirm that the need for repeated registrations by the same 
companies, and for the same products in various registries , would be repealed. A company list ed as 
a 'trusted importer ' under Decree  No. 991 should be considered as having already given enough 
assurance s of the quality and safety of its products.  
23.4.   The EU therefore urged Egypt to suspend the application of the measures at issue and to 
review them in  light of WTO  principles and obligations and then to re -notify them under the 
TBT Agreement. Members should be informed about the steps that Egypt intended to take to remove 
these unnecessary obstacles to trade.  
23.5.   The representative of Switzerland  supported the EU 's intervention  and reiterated its concerns 
already expressed at previous meetings of the TBT  Committee . Egypt 's requirements created 
unnecessary obstacles to trade, and the non -transparent application of the se measures also 
remained a concern. Switzerland encouraged Egypt to set time-limits for decisions on registration 
requests and to improve the registration process in general, since the renewal of registrations was 
contributing to the challenges faced by industry. Switzerland was concerned th at the registration 
requirements had driven Swiss companies out of the Egyptian market.  At the same time, Switzerland 
thanked Egypt for the constructive bilateral exchanges that had taken place and looked forward to 
further cooperation with Egypt in this r egard . G/C/M/133  
 
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  23.6.   The representative of the Russian Federation  shared the concerns raised by other Members  
and called upon Egypt to bring its measure s into conformity with the relevant WTO provisions. The 
manufacturer registration system created unnecessary barriers to trade and Russian enterprises had 
suffered from its negative effects. The measure had been introduced in a non -transparent way and 
was more trade -restrictive than necessary to fulfil its legitimate objectives.  
23.7.   The representative of Egypt  referred Member s to Egypt 's replies in reports from previous 
meetings of the Council and TBT  Committee meetings.3 He argued that Ministerial Decree 
No. 43/2016 did not impose further burdens on producers or companies to comply with specific 
technical regulations. Instead , it provided credible producers with a better competitive environment 
since it allowed for greater control of counterfeited products being imported into Egypt. At the same 
time, the Egyptian authorities were doing their best to accelerate the process of r egistration of 
foreign companies in order to avoid any unnecessary delay s. In addition, Egypt periodically reviewed 
and assessed measures and regulations that affected its imports , and foreign trade in general, with 
the ultimate goal of enhancing the busin ess environment and facilitating trade.  
23.8.   Egypt stood ready  to engage constructively with interested delegations and to provide 
assistance with regard to any implementation obstacles that their companies  may be facing . 
23.9.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Counc il take note of the statements made.  
23.10.   The Council so agreed . 
24  MONGOLIA – QUANTITAT IVE RESTRICTIONS AND  PROHIBITIONS ON IMP ORTATION 
OF CERTAIN AGRICULTU RAL PRODUCTS – REQUE ST FROM THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  
24.1.   The Chairperson  informed the Council that, in a communic ation dated 31  October  2018, the 
delegation of the Russian Federation had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the 
agenda.  
24.2.   The representative of the Russian Federation  said that , in 2013,  Mongolia had established a 
quota regime for importation of certain agricultural products, including wheat flour, wheat, milk, 
drinking water, and beef. According to Government Resolution No.  77, of 2  March  2013, each year 
the responsible authority determi ned the volumes of corresponding quotas. Importation outside of 
those quotas was prohibited.  
24.3.   Resolution No.  77 also set out basic criteria for determining quota volumes. The responsible 
authority calculated such volumes on the basis of the annual necessity  for importation and 
exportation of certain agricultural products. However, such a system of determining annual quota 
volumes resulted in uncertainty for Russian exporters. Moreover, in late  2016, the Ministry of Food, 
Agriculture, and Light Industry of Mo ngolia had also established an import prohibition on wheat flour.  
24.4.   In May  2018, Mongolia had established a quota on the import of wheat flour for the remainder 
of the year . However, the Ministry of Food, Agriculture, and Light Industry of Mongolia had still not, 
even then, in November, allocated the quota volume among importers of wheat flour ; at any rate, 
Mongolia had not made the decision publicly available. As a result, importers could not import within 
the quota volume and the import ban on wheat flour r emained in force. As a result, Mongolia 's 
imports of wheat flour had dropped significantly.  
24.5.   The Russian Federation considered the general elimination of QRs to be one of the core 
principles of the GATT and WTO  legal systems.  Therefore, the Russian Federati on wished in this 
context to receive clarification from Mongolia regarding its import restrictions , both quotas and 
import prohibitions and , in particular, how its measures complied with Article  XI of the GATT  1994 
and Article  4.2 of the Agreement on Agric ulture. Mongolia should also follow the transparency 
requirements set out in Article  X of the GATT  1994 and promptly publish its regulations and decisions 
in such a manner as to enable governments and traders to become acquainted with them.  
                                                
3 Document G/C/M/132, paragraphs  16.6–16.9, and document  G/TBT/M/76, paragraph  3.125.  G/C/M/133  
 
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  24.6.   The representat ive of Kazakhstan  said that his authorities shared the concern s raised by the 
Russian Federation. They requested Mongolia to clarify  how its established import prohibition on 
wheat flour and milk were in accord with the relevant WTO  Agreements.  
24.7.   The represe ntative of Canada  reiterated Canada 's systemic concerns over Mongolia 's use of 
import prohibitions and QRs. As a significant global exporter of wheat, Canada also had a commercial 
interest in the use of these measures to limit or restrict wheat imports. Ca nada encouraged Mongolia 
to reconsider the measure s and to update its notifications, including its quantitative restriction 
notifications.  
24.8.   The representative of Australia  said that Australia supported the concerns raised by the 
Russian Federation. It urged  Mongolia to fully address the se concerns and to ensure that its related 
trade policies were WTO -consistent and implemented in a transparent and predictable manner.  
24.9.   The representative of Mongolia  said that his authorities were taking step -by-step measures 
to ease market access for milk and flour imports. The call for bids for quotas had been published on 
the relevant  websites, and the Ministry of Food and Agriculture had started to allocate quotas  for 
milk, with its  decision having also been posted on the Ministry 's website. Mongolia was continuing 
with its internal consultations with a view to ensuring its measures' full compliance with the 
WTO Agreements, as well as finding a mutually beneficial solution for the Members concerned.  
24.10.   The Chairperson  propose d that the Council take note of the statements made.  
24.11.   The Council so agreed . 
25  VIET NAM – DECREE ON  THE REGULATION AND CONDITIONS FOR AUTOM OBILE 
MANUFACTURING, ASSEM BLING, IMPORTING, AN D AUTOMOTIVE WA RRANTY AND 
MAINTENANCE SERVICES  – REQUEST FROM JAPA N AND THE UNITED STA TES 
25.1.   The Chairperson  informed the Council that , in communications dated 1  November  2018, the 
delegations of Japan and the United States had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on 
the agenda.  
25.2.   The representative of Japan  acknowledged that Viet Nam's recent acceptance of the vehicle 
type approvals issued by certain Members was a positive development. Nevertheless, Decree  116 
continued to have a significant impact on the export of  automobiles to Viet Nam. Japan asked Viet 
Nam to take measures to swiftly improve the system , while taking into consideration the comments 
submitted by industry stakeholders.  
25.3.   Regarding  the import of finished automobiles, there was no international recogni tion of Viet 
Nam's requirement to submit a copy of a quality certificate for automobile types issued by foreign 
authorities.  
25.4.   Japan also insisted  that imported automobiles receive the same treatment as that applied to 
domestically produced automobiles regar ding security emissions inspections and lot-by-lot testing 
requirements.  
25.5.   Japan urged Viet Nam to review the design and implementation of its measures with a view 
to ensuring that they were consistent with WTO  principles, including non -discrimination and av oiding 
measures that were overly trade -restrictive.  
25.6.   The representative of the United States  said that they continued to have serious concerns 
over market access for motor vehicles resulting from Viet Nam 's Decree  No. 116 and Circular  No. 3. 
The measures at issue imposed burdensome certification and testing requirements, which continued 
to disrupt auto trade with Viet Nam. The Prime Minister 's announcement in October that he was 
directing the Ministry of Transport to revise the onerous lot -by-lot testing r equirements of Decree  
No. 116 and revert instead to testing only a representative sample of each imported vehicle type 
was welcome. The new regulations would enter into effect in late  2018, but it did not appear that 
the Ministry of Transport had in fact b egun yet to draft revisions to the lot -by-lot testing 
requirements. Therefore, the US requested Viet Nam to provide any available updates regarding the G/C/M/133  
 
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  development of the new regulations, including a timeline and opportunities for consultations with 
stakeholders.  
25.7.   The representative of Mexico  shared the concerns of other Members . 
25.8.   The representative of Thailand  said that the Decree 's requirement for lot -by-lot inspection 
and BTA  Certificates for imported cars unreasonably increased both time and costs a nd was 
inconsistent with international practices , while cars  produced in Viet Nam were treated more 
favourably and results and certificates from a single inspection remained valid for three  years. 
Thailand urged Viet Nam to remove the requirements for each  shipment to undergo lot -by-lot 
inspection and testing.  
25.9.   The representative of the European Union  said that the EU shared the concerns of other 
Members. Car imports in to Viet Nam had plummeted since the implementation of the Decree in early 
2018. Procedural  requirements under the TBT  Agreement should be observed and all stakeholders, 
including importers of foreign cars, should be included in current consultations on developing further 
legislation. Producers in exporting Members should also be allowed a reaso nable time -period to 
adapt their products or production methods to Vietnamese requirements.  
25.10.   Viet Nam 's written response in May  2018 to questions raised by the EU had not addressed 
the question, in particular, of the EU's concerns over the discrimination of  imported vehicles vis -à-
vis domestically produced ones.  The EU had since received a further reply from Viet Nam, which was 
currently being studied.  
25.11.   The representative of Canada  echoed the concerns of other  Members. The automotive 
industry was an important  segment of the Canadian economy and some of its stakeholders continued 
to raise concerns over Decree  No. 116. 
25.12.   The representative of the Russian Federation  joined other  Members in expressing concern 
over Decree  No. 116 of 2017 and requested Viet Nam to sus pend application of the Decree and to 
provide sufficient time for WTO Members to comment  upon it . 
25.13.   The representative of Viet Nam  said that Decree  No. 116/ND -CP had been developed and 
promulgated in accordance with the Law on the promulgation of legal normative documents ; 
furthermore, the Decree 's formulation strictly followed transparency procedures , and Viet Nam had 
consulted with stakeholders on numerous occasions during its implementation. While there had 
continued to  be some critical comments, the import situation had shown progress , as anticipated,  
as importers had become better acquainted with the necessary requirements and procedures. The 
Government had worked very hard to assist them in doing so . 
25.14.   Imports of automobiles into Viet Nam had decrease d for the first few months of 2018 
because importers had intentionally delayed orders to prepare for the revised documentation 
requirements and import clearance procedures. Imports had subsequently recovered, eventually 
reaching 11,507  units (all types of automobiles), which had surpassed the 2017 average monthly 
import volume of 8,000  units/month. Major automobile manufacturers and exporters from the 
United States , the Republic of Korea, Thailand, and Europe,  had successfully cleared import 
procedures in order to sell their vehicles in Viet Nam.  
25.15.   A key objective of Decree  No. 116 was to protect consumer safety. The Vehicle Type 
Approval was an important and necessary basis for the inspection authority to check a vehicle against 
quality, technical safety, and  environmental protection standards. Technically, each type of 
automobile had to undergo assessments of the design, samples, quality of components, emission, 
and production conditions to ensure conformity of production ; these assessments were then followed  
by verification and independent testing by a competent agency of all of the above steps before final 
issuance of the vehicle type approval certificate. The Vehicle Type Approval was mandatory for both 
imported automobiles and automobiles manufactured and assembled domestically. For legal and 
technical reasons, it was not feasible for Viet Nam to issue the Vehicle Type Approval for imported 
automobiles from the relevant Vietnamese authority. Regarding the identification of any acceptable 
documentation equiv alent to the Vehicle Type Approval, Viet Nam noted that not all exporting 
countries issued Vehicle Type Approval for exported automobiles ; nevertheless , Circular No.  3 and G/C/M/133  
 
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  subsequent guiding documents were sufficiently flexible to take the se different  circumstances into 
account and successfully to address them.  
25.16.   Viet Nam considered that lot -by-lot testing and inspection for imported automobiles was an 
appropriate measure to ensure quality uniformity  and noted that the  same requirement was applied 
to locally manufactured and assembled automobiles. Therefore, it was not correct to assert that 
imported automobiles were subject to less favourable treatment in terms of the frequency of 
inspections. The Prime Minister 's Decision No.  1254, dated 26  September  2018, m andated the 
Ministry of Transportation to review the existing lot -by-lot testing requirements with the intention 
to achieve  further trade facilitation , based on risk management , by the fourth  quarter of 2018.  
25.17.   In conclusion, Viet Nam asserted that the requirements under the Decree were not more 
trade -restrictive than necessary, and that they were in full compliance with WTO  rules. Viet Nam 
stood ready to engage constructively with any interested delegation.  
25.18.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take  note of the statements made.  
25.19.   The Council so agreed . 
26  CHINA – MEASURES RES TRICTING THE IMPORT OF SCRAP MATERIALS – REQUEST 
FROM THE UNITED STAT ES 
26.1.   The Chairperson  informed the Council that, in a communication dated 1  November  2018, the 
delegation of the Unit ed States had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda.  
26.2.   The representative of the United States  expressed the United States ' heightened concern over 
the measures that China had notified to the TBT  Committee, and subsequently implemente d, which 
banned or severely limited the import of scrap materials.  
26.3.   On 18 July 2017, China had notified CHN  1211 and CHN 1212 to the TBT  Committee, banning 
the import of scrap post -consumer plastics, mixed paper, and textiles , as well as setting new border 
inspection and identification rules for materials qualified by China as waste ; China had implemented 
these measures on 31  December  2017. On 15  November  2017, China had notified CHN  1224 
through CHN 1234, restricting the import of a variety of scrap materia ls through revised quality 
parameters. The commodities affected included industrial plastics, paper and paperboard, non -
ferrous scrap and wire, ferrous scrap and wire, and metal and electrical appliance scrap , among 
others ; these new barriers had entered i nto force on 1  March  2018. In many cases, the new quality 
parameters appeared to be excessively trade -restrictive as they were technically infeasible and acted 
as a de facto  ban on the import of many scrap materials.  
26.4.   In April  2018, China had announced an expansion of its import ban to include most plastics 
and all wood, automotive, appliance, electric motor, and vessel scrap. China had noted that it did 
not intend to notify these new measures to the TBT  Committee. Furthermore, in May  2018, the day 
after they had been announced, China had implemented new border inspection rules requiring 
100%  inspection and lab testing at the border for all scrap commodities. That same day, China had 
arbitrarily halted its pre-shipment inspection  in the US for a period of 30  days, leading to a complete 
halt in US  exports of recycled commodities to China. On 27  June 2018, China had issued a notice 
indicating that all scrap material imports would be restricted to a list of specified ports, effective  
January  2019. On 18  July 2018, China had issued the revised draft Law of the People 's Republic of 
China on the Prevention and Control of Environmental Pollution by Solid Wastes, which defined "solid 
waste" to include all recyclable materials , and which ha d expressly banned such imports. In totality, 
these measures outright banned or effectively banned imports of scrap materials that were destined 
for recycling and reuse in downstream manufacturing processes.  
26.5.   The US recognized and appreciated China 's intere st in addressing environmental concerns, 
including potentially by pursuing measures to improve its management of recovered scrap materials ; 
however, China 's approach appeared in fact to be having the opposite effect. The new barriers had 
entered into force  without  any reasonable interval for industry and recyclers to make necessary 
adjustments to their supply chains or to develop new processing capacity. As the world 's largest 
processor of scrap materials, China 's implementation of these measures had had an  immediate, 
damaging, and potentially lasting impact upon global recycling networks. Indeed, the abrupt G/C/M/133  
 
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  implementation of the measures had created a global shortfall in recycling capacity that had 
undermined the value of recycled commodities, forcing recyc lers that could not locate alternative 
processing facilities simply to dispose of otherwise valuable recycled commodities.  
26.6.   In the context of China 's national treatment obligations, for a vast number of the materials 
outlined in China 's ban and import contr ol standards, China had no mandatory commensurate 
domestic standard in place. The broadly trade -restrictive nature of the import control measures and 
the apparent ly fundamental differences between requirements for foreign and domestic commodities 
were also  causes for concern . 
26.7.   China persisted  in its refusal to notify its new technical measures in a manner consistent with 
its obligations under the TBT  Agreement  and had also arbitrar ily and abrupt ly halted pre-shipment 
inspection in the US; these developments had heightened US  concerns over the purpose of these 
actions and their consistency with China 's WTO  obligations. The US requested China immediately to 
halt implementation of these measures and to revise the m, for public comment, in a man ner 
consistent with existing international standards for trade in scrap materials, which provided a global 
framework for a transparent and environmentally sound trade in recycled commodities.  
26.8.   The representative of the European Union  said that , while the EU  agreed with the 
environmental objectives set forth, China needed to ensure that any measure in this area was 
implemented efficiently, transparently, and in the least trade distorting way possible . The EU 
requested China to notify its measures on waste und er the TBT  Agreement.  
26.9.   In the bilateral framework of the regular EU -China Dialogues, the EU had submitted written 
questions to China,  in a letter dated 25 July 2018, including questions on the recent Chinese 
measures on waste. The EU had encouraged China to  respond to these questions as quickly as 
possible , to address the issue of trade in waste in the most environmentally and economically 
efficient way , and to do so in a fully transpare nt manner . 
26.10.   The representative of Australia  said that his authorities sti ll had several  concerns over 
China 's measures on waste and scrap imports, which appeared to be more trade restrictive than 
necessary to achieve China's desired objectives. A range of materials negatively affected by China 's 
measures , rather than being 'rubbish',  in fact comprised valuable inputs to recycling supply chains. 
Trade in these products allowed for the recovery of materials that might otherwise end in landfill.  
26.11.   Australia was concerned by the broad scope and lack of clarity around a definition of 'solid 
waste ', and urged China, in this context,  to reconsider its measures in such a way as to facilitate 
global environmental outcomes by allowing for commercially meaningful trade in quality recyclable 
inputs. Australia  also urged China to engage wit h its trading partners to develop measures that met 
its policy objectives while also allowing for an ongoing trade in recyclable materials to promote the 
recovery of resources and global environmental outcomes.  
26.12.   The representative of Canada  aligned Canada w ith the concerns voiced  by previous speakers. 
Canada encouraged China to consider different and less trade -restrictive mechanisms to address 
this issue, while at the same time ensuring that the mutual ly beneficial trade in recycled products 
could continue in a predictable manner.  
26.13.   The representative of New Zealand  reiterated his authorities ' view that all WTO  Members 
enjoyed the right to regulate to protect their environments. However, New Zealand had a concern 
specifically with respect to vanadium slag, whi ch was a purposefully produced co -product of the 
manufacture of iron and steel rather than a waste product. They questioned whether all vanadium 
slag, domestic and imported, was receiving equal treatment, and whether the measure banning 
imports of vanadium  slag was more trade restrictive than necessary to meet China 's stated 
environmental objectives. China was the largest global producer of vanadium slag and hopefully it 
was now in the process of considering alternative, less trade -restrictive measures , which would apply 
equally to domestic and imported products, in order more effectively to achieve its intended 
environmental outcomes.  
26.14.   The representative of China  said that each Member had an obligation properly to handle and 
dispose of its domestically produced solid wastes. For China, as a developing country , and as the 
country with the world 's largest population , and given the need to protect environmental safety and G/C/M/133  
 
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  public health, it was imperative to improve domestic solid waste treatment and disposal while 
restricting and prohibiting imports of solid waste.  
26.15.   China had full y taken into consideration the opinions and views of domestic and international 
stakeholders and had already adjusted its Import Waste Catalogue, allowing a sufficient transit ion 
period so that the relevant industries could fulfil their notification obligations. Over the past decades, 
enterprises from many other WTO  Members had exported huge amounts of solid waste to China,  to 
their enormous economic benefit , and China hoped th at these exporting Members would now actively 
shoulder their international responsibilities by making their due contribution. Relevant adjustments 
of the catalogue would be reflected in China 's notifications , which would be submitted at the earliest 
possib le time through either the Committee on Import Licensing or the Committee on Market Access.  
26.16.   China was also un sure if the national treatment obligation really applied in this situation , 
since the Basel Convention on the Control of Trans -Boundary Movements o f Hazardous Waste and 
Their Disposal fully recognized that any State had the sovereign right to ban the entry or disposal 
of foreign hazardous wastes and other wastes in its territory. Similarly, it was not necessary to notify 
the draft of China 's Law on the Prevention and Control of Environmental Pollution by Solid Waste to 
the TBT  Committee because the law was not subject to the technical regulation s, standards, and 
conformity assessment procedures provided for under the TBT  Agreement.  
26.17.   The draft of the En vironmental Control Centres for Imports of Solid Wates as Raw Materials 
had been made available to the general public for comment on 10  August  2017. China had 
subsequently made adjustments  to it, including the deferral of entry into force of the new standa rd, 
following comments from the US, Australia, and other WTO  Members, and consequently the time 
interval  between the implementation of the new standard and the solicitation of public opinion had 
been more than six  months.  
26.18.   The questions raised regarding the  mechanism of the China -European Union catalogue would 
be discussed further in Capital.  
26.19.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
26.20.   The Council so agreed . 
27  INDIA – QUANTITATIVE  RESTRICTIONS ON IMP ORTS OF CERTAIN PULS ES – REQU EST 
FROM AUSTRALIA, CANA DA, THE EUROPEAN UNI ON, THE RUSSIAN FEDE RATION, AND THE 
UNITED STATES  
27.1.   The Chairperson  informed the Council that, in communications dated 30 and 31  October, and 
1 November  2018, the delegations of Australia, Canada, the European Unio n, the Russian 
Federation, and the United States, had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda.  
27.2.   The representative of Australia  said that the Australian Government remained concerned by 
the QRs that India had placed on a range of different pulse varieties , and which appeared to be 
inconsistent with India's WTO  obligations . India 's import licensing notification stated that these 
import restrictions were 'maintained only on grounds of protection of human health or safety; animal 
or plant life or health; security and the environment ', but without providing an explanation as to 
either their relevance or legal basis. India had continued to extend the measures and their 
application for well over 12  months , despite having stated  on multiple occasions that its QRs were 
only temporary measures. In September  2018, India had again extended its QR on peas , without 
additional volume, which meant that an effective import ban was in place for six  months , from July 
to December  2018.  
27.3.   India's measures had been implemented without warning, applied retrospectively, and were 
having a significant impact on the global pulses market. India had been Australia 's largest market 
for pulses in 2016 -2017, with exports valued at $ 1.4 billion ; however, Au stralia's exports since then 
had virtually ceased. In conclusion, Australia requested India to respond to its questions raised at 
the various WTO  Committees , and to explain to Members the WTO  basis of its QRs on pulses . 
27.4.   The representative of the European U nion expressed the EU's concerns over India's 
management of its pulse crop markets in recent months , specifically with regard to India's  QRs on G/C/M/133  
 
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  pulses, and their conformity or otherwise with WTO  rules. As a consequence of India's increased 
duties on pulses, EU  exports (mostly of peas) had come nearly to a standstill, and prices for pulses 
in the EU  market had also dropped . The EU called upon India to address these concerns.  
27.5.   The representative of the United States  said that her authorities were signifi cantly concerned 
by India's  trade -distorting policies in relation to various pulses introduced in 2017 and 2018. The se 
policies included, but were not limited to, multiple increases in tariff rates, the introduction of 
QR restrictions, and import -limiting licensing arrangements.  
27.6.   In addition to the QRs on certain pulses introduced in 2017, the Indian Ministry of Commerce 
and Industry had published Notification No.  04/2015 -2020, on 25  April 2018, which had introduced 
a QR on the import of peas to no more than  100,000  metric tonnes between 1  April 2018 and 
30 June 2018. This QR  had since been extended on two  occasions and was currently scheduled to 
last through 30  December  2019.  
27.7.   The US requested to receive from India an explanation for its introduction of the se measures 
in 2017 and 2018 , including an explanation of their compliance  with India 's WTO  commitments. The 
US asked if India plan ned to extend again its QR on peas , beyond 30  December  2018, and if it had 
additional plans to institute more QRs on imports of specific agricultural products ; if so, which?  
27.8.   The representative of Canada  said that , as the world's largest supplier of pulses to India, 
Canada had been the Member most negatively affected by India 's recent measures. During the 
June meeting  of the Committee on Agriculture, India had indicated that the notification of its QR on 
dried peas had recently been submitted to the Committee for Import Licensing and the Committee 
on Market Access ; nevertheless, India had to date provided no informatio n on the GATT or WTO  basis 
of its QR . 
27.9.   India's notification  G/MA/QR/N/IND/2 had been circulated on 21 June 2018 by the Committee 
on Market Access and was a "notification of all quantitative restrictions in force". However, the 
WTO basis for the QR on dried peas remained unclear.  
27.10.   Canada was concerned by India's  lack of transparency over its QR, and questioned the basis 
of India's justification  of it, commenting that further detail was required as to which specific 
WTO provision India intended to invoke in jus tification of its QR on peas.  
27.11.   The representative of the Russian Federation  expressed Russia's concern s over India 's policy 
on import s of yellow peas, and particular ly the increase in import tariffs on yellow peas of up to 
50%. Between April  and September  2018, India had introduced a QR on the import of yellow peas 
(100,000  tonnes) , from 1  April until 30  December  2018. The Russian Federation believed that the 
extension of the QR until December  2018 made it in effect an import prohibition because the quota 
for yellow peas appeared to have been filled already in the summer.  
27.12.   At the most recent CoA  meeting, India had stated that the purpose of QRs was to alleviate 
the distress caused to small and marginal farmers by an influx of cheap imported pulses and the 
resulting negative impact on their food and livelihood security. However, India had admitted that , 
from December  2017 to August  2018, the wholesale prices of pulses had in fact continued to 
decrease. Therefore, the import of yellow peas could not be considere d the cause of the difficulties 
faced by small farmers , and a QR measure  was not justified . Russia reminded India that QRs and 
import prohibitions could not be applied by WTO  Members without a proper justification . Russia 
therefore urged India to bring its measures into conformity with WTO  rules.  
27.13.   The representative of New Zealand  said that her authorities remained concerned by the 
apparent implementation of a QR in clear contravention of WTO  rules, and encouraged India to bring 
its measures into conformity with its WTO commitments . 
27.14.   The representative of Ukraine  said that Ukraine remained concerned over the disruptive 
nature of India 's policy  on pulses and wished to understand the policy objective and the conditions 
under which the policy  was actually being implemented . Ukraine called on India to be more 
transparent and predictable in its trade policy.  G/C/M/133  
 
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  27.15.   The representative of India said that India had notified its measures to the Committee on 
Import Licensing and the Committee on Market Acce ss (document  G/LIC/N/1/IND/14/Add.1, dated 
20 June 2018, and document  G/MA/QR/N/IND/2, dated 21  June 2018) , and that it had addressed 
the questions raised by Members in the September  meeting of the Committee on Agriculture. 
Members that had not received re sponses were requested to forward their questions in writing so 
that a response could be prepared.  
27.16.   As the largest producer and consumer of pulses, the decision to impose a quota had been 
based on domestic demand and supply and was intended to alleviate the distress caused to small 
and marginal farmers by an influx of cheap imported pulses and the consequent impact on their food 
and livelihood security.  
27.17.   The objective of India' s agricultural policy was to balance the interests of consumers and 
producers. The wholesale price index (WPI) for pulses in India had dropped significantly and reflected 
the fact that the current prices of pulses in domestic markets were lower than in the corresponding 
period of the previous year, indicating that the measures taken had been in the overall interests of 
both consumers and producers, as intended. Therefore, the Government had imposed QRs on 
different varieties of pulses and dried peas in order to protect its small and marginal farmers. Based 
on the prevailing domestic situa tion, the relevant authority in India had extended India's QRs on 
imports of peas until 31 December  2018, as per the DGFT  Notification No.  37, dated 
28 September  2018.  
27.18.   The measures were temporary and the extension or removal of the QRs was based on 
domesti c demand and supply. India was constantly reviewing the measures  in question . 
27.19.   India would revert to Members at the Council and in the relevant Committees  regarding the 
matter of under which WTO  provision India had imposed its temporary measures, as well as  India's 
notifications to the Committees on Market Access and Import Licensing. India would address any 
further query on the issue in the appropriate committee.  
27.20.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
27.21.   The Council so agreed . 
28  CHINA – CUSTOMS DUTI ES ON CERTAIN INTEGR ATED CIRCUITS – REQU EST FROM THE 
EUROPEAN UNION AND J APAN, PLUS CHINESE T AIPEI  
28.1.   The Chairperson  informed the Council that, in communications dated 1  November  2018, the 
delegations of the European Union and Jap an had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on 
the agenda. In a communication dated 2  November  2018, Chinese Taipei had requested to be 
included in the list of co -sponsors.  
28.2.   The representative of the European Union  thanked China for its engagemen t both bilaterally 
and in other contexts. However, the EU would like to receive further clarification  on how duties on 
certain MCO  semiconductors had increased in China relative to  changes to the HS  nomenclature. 
EU experts considered that  WCO guidance had not been followed , notably in relation to Insulated 
Gate Bipolar Transistors ( IGBT) (classified by China under 8504.4091). The EU would continue to 
engage with China on this issue in all appropriate fora. It would also be useful if the WT O Secretariat 
were to  prepare guidance on how the transposition should have taken place ; such  guidance would 
go beyond the case in question and be to the benefit of all ITA  Members.  
28.3.   The representative of Japan  said that Japan still had concerns following i ts bilateral 
consultation s with China. In accordance with the WCO's Classification Opinions, the IGBT -IPM 
(Intelligent Power Module ) was classified as a Power Module. However, China  treated the IGBT -IPM 
differently at import clearance and imposed on it a customs duty rate of 5% further to  the 
transposition to HS2017. Japan called upon China to provide a detailed explanation of its practice. 
Nevertheless, Japan had taken note of China 's remark at the last CTG that all of the MCO  products 
in question would be at zero duty by July 2021, and Japan would continue to monitor the issue  
accordingly . G/C/M/133  
 
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  28.4.   The representative of Chinese Taipei  said that Chinese Taipei  remained deeply concerned over 
the impact on trade of the transposition methodology chosen by China. All Me mbers should 
implement their commitments serious ly and in good faith to ensure the stability and predictability 
of the multilateral system.  
28.5.   China had imposed tariffs on MCO  products at a rate that was higher than its current 
WTO bound rate, effectively , of duty-free tariffs, thereby undermining the benefits to its industry , 
and with serious implication s for the system. He called upon China to justify its chosen method ology  
and to provide the necessary additional data to ensure that its chosen method ology  did not have 
any undesirable negative impact upon trade. He also urged China immediately to delete the tariff 
rates applied to imports of the MCO  products at issue.  
28.6.   Chinese Taipei sought Secretariat guidance on how the transposition had been undertaken . 
28.7.   The representative of the United States  supported the statements and questions raised by 
previous speakers and reiterated US concern s over change s in China 's applied duty rates for 
semiconductor products , as they had previously done not only at the Council , but also at the CMA 
and the ITA  Committee. The US continued to assert, in line with the General Council 's Decision on 
HS transpositions, that the scope of China 's concessions had changed substantially , and that their 
value had been impaired , in that semic onductor products that had been duty-free for over a decade 
were now again facing duties.  
28.8.   The representative of Switzerland  said that her authorities shared the concerns expressed by 
previous speakers. There was a clear commitment in the ITA -II schedule in  HS2007 to bind duties 
at zero for all electronic integrated circuits classified under HS  heading  8542. The HS  transposition 
was a technical process, which should not modify those  concessions already granted.  Switzerland 
invited China to remedy the current  situation as soon as possible.  
28.9.   The representative of  the Republic of  Korea  said that Korea shared previous speakers ' 
concerns. When introducing a new nomenclature , HS transposition should be neutral and fully 
respect the spirit and principles of the ITA. Korea hoped that China would provide Members with 
additional information to clarify and address their concerns.  
28.10.   The representative of China  said that they had used the fourth  method ology  set out in the 
WTO rules on HS2017  transposition , which was to apply the simple average of the previous rates of 
duty. 
28.11.   She stated that her delegation had already provided comprehensive responses to the issues 
raised at the meetings o f the CMA and the ITA  Committee ; that they  had addressed the technical 
issues raised by certain Members ; and that they would clarify related technical questions through 
bilateral consultations with the Members  concerned . China had seriously undertaken to f ulfil its tariff 
reduction commitments in the ITA  Expansion , as scheduled , and would continue to do so.  
28.12.   Furthermore, the linear reduction of the duties on MCO  products would be implemented over 
a five -year period and , in accordance with China 's tariff redu ction commitments in the 
ITA Expansion, all duties on MCO  products would be eliminated by July  2021.  
28.13.   She concluded by noting that her delegation supported the EU 's suggestion regarding 
guidance to be provided by the WTO  Secretariat in respect of HS  transpo sition.  
28.14.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
28.15.   The Council so agreed . G/C/M/133  
 
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  29  EUROPEAN UNION – DRAFT IMPLEMENTING REGU LATIONS REGARDING PR OTECTED 
DESIGNATIONS OF ORIG IN AND GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS – TRADIT IONAL TERMS – 
LABELLI NG – AND PRESENTATIO N OF CERTAIN WINE SE CTOR PRODUCTS – REQU EST 
FROM ARGENTINA AND T HE UNITED STATES  
29.1.   The Chairperson  informed the Council that, in communications dated 31  October and 
1 November  2018, the delegations of Argentina and the United States had r equested the Secretariat 
to include this issue on the agenda.  
29.2.   The representative of Argentina  considered the EU's legal regime to be inconsistent with the 
TBT Agreement and expressed concern regarding the unjustified EU delay in approving  the use of 
the traditional terms "Reserva" and "Gran Reserva" on Argentine wine exported to and traded on 
the EU  market. The substantive procedure for the approval of the se terms had been concluded in 
March  2012, and there was no legal justification for any delay in approval. 
29.3.   Argentina had been raising for more than ten years its concern s regarding certain 
EU regulations, namely Regulations CE No. 607-2009 and No.  479-2008, but was still waiting  for 
final approval of the terms "Reserva" and "Gran Reserva".  
29.4.   In 2018, the EU had notified its draft regulation, including for the registration of traditional 
terms. However, the draft regulation had  not address ed Argentina 's concern , which was not only 
about the trade impact , but also about the EU 's basic unwillingness to solve a routine trade concern , 
such that it was subsequently turning into a trade and legal problem. In conclusion, Argentina urged 
the EU to complete the formal proceedings for the registration of the terms "Reserva" and "Gran 
Reserva" as soon as possible.  
29.5.   The re presentative of the United States  reiterated her authorities ' concerns over the EU 's lack 
of transparency and action concerning applications made by US  producers to use certain traditional 
terms on their wine labels in the EU  market. Despite having raised this issue repeatedly in the 
WTO TBT Committee, the EU had neither provided any satisfactory explanation for its eight-year 
delay, nor any information about when the applications would at last be processed.  
29.6.   The EU had recently issued draft revised regulati ons relating to traditional terms, yet they 
appeared to contain no timelines or transparency that could explain or justify the egregious delays. 
Nor did they indicate any timelines or transparency in the revised draft regulations to ensure that 
such delays  would not recur . The US called upon the EU to process the US  applications expeditiously 
and to provide full transparency on both their status and the rules that applied to them.  
29.7.   The representative of Australia  requested clarity on how the proposed EU  regulation 
amendments would affect the existing quality and coverage of objections processes in relation to 
prior rights or the common names of goods or vine variety names, recognizing that some of these 
matters would now be determined by member States. He als o enquired if, during consultations on 
the amendments, any concerns had been raised on the effect of the changes on the quality or 
coverage of the objections process.  
29.8.   The representative of the European Union  said that the EU had undertaken an internal 
assessment of traditional terms with stakeholders and experts from EU  member States , in 
accordance with Article  114(3) of EU Regulation No.  1308/2013 establishing a common organization 
of markets in agricultural products. This now formed part of the EU Draft C ommission Implementing 
Regulation laying down rules for the application of that Regulation. The Draft Implementing 
Regulation had recently been notified to the TBT  Committee ( document  G/TBT/N/EU/571). The EU 
had received TBT  comments on the notification fr om the US and Argentina, the EU's  replies to which 
were currently being prepared . 
29.9.   The pending applications for traditional terms were still under consideration in the EU and it 
was not yet possible to provide any precise timeline for them . 
29.10.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
29.11.   The Council so agreed . G/C/M/133  
 
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  30  CHINA – NEW EXPORT C ONTROL LAW IN DRAFT – REQUEST FROM JAPAN  
30.1.   The Chairperson  informed the Council that, in a communication dated 1  November  2018, the 
delegation of Japan had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda.  
30.2.   The representative of Japan  said that his authorities were concerned that the scope of the 
products subject to restrictions under the new law could be widened, including to the protection of 
important strategic raw materials. They had additional concerns over the requirement for dis closure 
of technological information at export be ing unnecessarily stringent. Finally, they were also 
concerned over the way in which the draft law provided for responsive measures against 
discriminatory control measures taken by other countries, which wou ld be regarded as unilateral 
measures that were not subject to national security.  
30.3.   Japan called upon China to give due consideration to its concerns and to keep them fully 
updated on how China intended to reflect the public comments and the comments made at  this 
Council in its draft law. The draft law would be passed in China's Parliament before end-2018 and 
Japan sought information on the future timeline for the draft law 's review . China was encouraged to 
provide the draft law's implementation schedule  in a transparent manner , including its detailed 
enforcement regulations. Japan also requested China to provide a sufficient ly long  transitional period 
before implementation . 
30.4.   The representative of the European Union  said that it had submitted the EU's comments in 
writing during the consultation period in July  2017. The EU welcomed China 's efforts to consolidate 
various existing export control provisions into a single draft export control law , given that strategic  
export controls derived from international obliga tions and commitments and pursued related 
objectives in terms of international security and non -proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 
Therefore, the EU called for additional clarity on a number of elements of the draft law, including : 
development i nterests; discriminatory export control measures; protection of important strategic 
raw material; and its testing report.  
30.5.   The EU also asked for further information from China about  any changes that may have been 
introduced to the draft , and what was its ti metable for finalization . The EU looked forward to further 
discussions with China with a view to ensuring a mutually beneficial convergence of export controls 
in line with international rules and standards.  
30.6.   The representative of  the Republic of  Korea  stated that China 's new Export Control Law 's 
objective and implementation must follow international rules regarding export restrictions. Korea 
questioned whether development interest s could be considered a reasonable objective and was 
concerned that the Law 's coverage was too wide and vague. Export restrictions on security grounds 
should only be taken based on  strict requirement s to prevent any possibility of their misuse. Korea 
hoped that China would reflect Members ' concerns in the ongoing and future drafti ng process so that 
they could make improvements to the draft law in compliance with international rules.  
30.7.   The representative of China  said that 252  comments had been received from government 
agencies, companies, associations, and law firms , both at home and  from abroad , following the 
online publication of the Draft Export Control Law by the Ministry of Commerce and , as a result, the 
Ministry of Commerce had made further modifications and improvements  to it. China would address 
the issue of providing more det ails on the provisions during the process of amending its supporting 
regulations and rules.  
30.8.   The draft law had been submitted to the State Council in February  2018, while the Ministry of 
Justice had been conducting its legislative review ; this  would be foll owed by the legislative work of 
the State Council and the National People 's Congress. However, China could not provide a precise 
timeline for this process . At the same time, China commented that the scope of the covered products 
was very narrow and less th an half of that provided for international practice , while the requirements 
for disclosure of technological information at export were lower than the requirements set by other  
Members.  
30.9.   While some Members were currently inclined to use national security in an abusive way, China 
resolutely defended the MTS while at the same time ensuring China's  ability to safeguard its 
legitimate rights and interests , in accordance with the law.  G/C/M/133  
 
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  30.10.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
30.11.   The Council so agreed . 
31  UNITED STATES – PROH IBITIVE PROPOSAL ON COMMUNICATION EQUIPM ENT OR 
SERVICES RELEASED BY  THE FCC – REQUEST F ROM CHINA  
31.1.   The Chairperson  informed the Council that, in a communication dated 1  November  2018, the 
delegation of China had request ed the Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda . 
31.2.   The representative of China  referred to the US  Federal Communications Commission 's (FCC) 
announcement on the Federal Register of 2  May 2018, which was intended to prohibit the use of 
Universal Service  Funds to purchase equipment or services from any communications equipment or 
service providers identified as posing a national security risk to the communications network or the 
communications supply chain. The FCC  proposal would restrict the commercial p urchases of 
telephones, broadband service s, and healthcare providers.  
31.3.   The comment period for the proposed rule had closed on 2  July 2018 and some Chinese 
companies had submitted their comments proving , in China's view,  that the proposed national 
security b enefits were speculative. Moreover, a number of organizations, including but not limited 
to the American Cable Association, the Rural Wireless Broadband Coalition, and the Voice of 
America 's Broadband Providers, had all also strongly objected to the propos ed rule. The US was 
urged seriously to reconsider its comments. China hoped that the US would  adhere to WTO  rules 
during the legislation process  for these measures  because any  measures that caused nationality -
based discrimination treatment in law or in pra ctice would violate the WTO's MFN principle  
31.4.   The representative of the United States  said that the proposed rule dealt exclusively with 
matters of national security. It would ensure that Universal Service Funds would not be spent on 
telecommunications equip ment or services from suppliers that posed a national security threat to 
the integrity of communications networks or the communications supply chain. Such a rule fell 
squarely within the WTO  exception for essential security interests. No Member would be ex pected 
to procure goods or services that they determined would pose a national security threat to that 
Member.  
31.5.   The proposed rule -making had been conducted through a typically transparent and open 
process. The FCC had released a lengthy description of the p roposed rule on its website and had 
welcomed comments from the public at any point up until the close of the comment period. 
Interested Members should visit the FCC  website at FCC.gov which would contain any further 
updates on the matter.  
31.6.   The representativ e of China  urged the US to honour  the commitment reached by the Chinese 
and US  leaders on generally applicable information and communication technology (ICT) security -
related measures in the commercial sector , during the 2016  G20 summit , which would ensure  the 
compliance of FCC  measures with relevant WTO  rules, and that national security would not be used 
in abusive ways.  
31.7.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
31.8.   The Council so agreed . 
32  AUSTRALIA – DISCRIMI NATORY MARKET ACCE SS PROHIBITION ON 5G  EQUIPMENT – 
REQUEST FROM CHINA  
32.1.   The Chairperson  informed the Council that, in a communication dated 1  November  2018, the 
delegation of China had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda.  
32.2.   The representative of China  said that the Secretary of the Department of Communication and 
Arts of Australia had notified Huawei, ZTE , and Australian local telecommunication operators by 
telephone , on 22  August  2018, that Huawei and ZTE would be banned from participating in 
5G projects in Australia. That meant that local carriers would be prohibited from purchasing 
5G products from those Chinese companies. The relevant prohibitions had not been found in G/C/M/133  
 
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  Australian official documents and China was seriously concerned about the legal s tatus of the 
decisions since these  had been relayed by telephone.  
32.3.   The prohibition was not consistent with the MFN  principle because of its discrimination against 
Chinese communication products. Moreover, it did not comply with the provisions on the "Public ation 
and Administration of Trade Regulations" set out in Article  X of the GATT  1994, which states that 
laws, regulations, or administrative rulings affecting the sales of imported products shall be 
published promptly.  
32.4.   Australia 's written response to quest ions previously raised by China had covered only 
Australia 's legal framework and had not provided any essential information on the prohibition. 
Australia was requested to provide the content of the prohibition as well as its legal basis  in writing . 
32.5.   Austral ia should not interfere with and restrict the normal business activities of Chinese 
enterprises on the grounds of national security, bearing in mind their bilateral economic and trade 
cooperation. Instead, it should cultivate a sound business environment f or Chinese companies in a 
fair, impartial, and transparent manner.  Above all, China opposed protectionism under the guise of 
national security.  
32.6.   The representative of Australia  said that additional information had been provided to China in 
response to the questions it had raised in the CMA. 5G networks would enable a new wave of 
innovation across the economy. Like other countries, the Australian Government was committed to 
safeguarding its critical national infrastructure, including in the telecommunicatio ns sector.  
32.7.   In 2016, following extensive public consultations, the Government had introduced in 
Parliament a Bill called the Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment Bill  2016, which 
introduced a regulatory framework to strengthen the security of Australia 's telecommunications 
networks.  
32.8.   The explanatory memorandum accompanying the Bill had highlighted that the security and 
resilience of the telecommunications infrastructure significantly affected the social and economic 
well-being of the nation. The  key element in Australia 's telecommunications security framework was 
a new security obligation for carriers, carriage service providers, and carriage service intermediaries, 
to do their utmost to protect networks and facilities from unauthorized access an d interference.  
32.9.   To ensure predictability and stability for investors and suppliers, and before the new laws 
came into effect, the Australian Government had provided security guidance regarding 
5G technology and the requirements of the legislative framework  to the companies that would build 
the next generation of networks. The security guidance had been provided based on  careful, 
objective, and extensive review. The guidance related exclusively to public 5G  networks ; other 
networks and uses were unaffected. Nor had Australia  proposed any restriction on the importation 
of equipment.  
32.10.   The Government 's statement on security guidance had provided clear information to affected 
mobile network operators about how their new legal obligations under the telecommunicatio ns 
security legislation could be expected to apply as 5G  networks were developed. Australia 's approach 
was non -discriminatory as the obligations were not targeted at a particular country or at suppliers 
from any particular country; they applied equally to domestic -owned and foreign -owned carriers. 
Australia continued to welcome foreign business involvement in this market, which was essential for 
the efficient and effective operation of Australia 's telecommunications sector . Australia  would also 
continue to engage bilaterally with China on this issue.  
32.11.   The representative of China  said that it was groundless to believe that 5G  technology posed 
greater risks  than previous generation s of communication technology ; to the contrary, 
5G technology had bee n developed to solve the problems of previous generation communication 
technologies, including with regard to security issues.  
32.12.   The 5G  standards had been jointly formulated by all parties in the communication industry, 
including equipment providers like Nok ia and Eriksson, chipmakers like Inter , and companies like 
Apple and Samsung, with a view to ensuring the security of 5G. China had consulted technical 
experts and had learned that, in the 5G  solution, a security interface was already incorporated into G/C/M/133  
 
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  the core network, which in fact made it more secure than previous generation  technology . Besides, 
the 5G  solution offered by the relevant Chinese companies fully met the security standards for next 
generation communications as certified by the international s tandards organizations for 5G.  
32.13.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
32.14.   The Council so agreed . 
33  UNITED STATES – MEAS URES ON AVIATION SEC URITY EQUIPMENT – REQUEST FROM 
CHINA  
33.1.   The Chairperson  informed the Council that , in a c ommunication dated 1  November  2018, the 
delegation of China had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda.  
33.2.   The representative of China  said that the US  Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 
was the authority for the US  certificat ion of civil aviation security equipment (TSA  certification) , as 
well as for the procurement of airport security equipment. One of the conditions for procurement of 
certain security equipment was that it must pass the TSA  certification. However, Chinese en terprises 
that had applied for TSA  certification had been informed by e -mail that the ir applications had not 
been accepted , but without having been provided with any explanation or specific reasons  as to 
why; and nor would the TSA respond to further enquir ies. 
33.3.   As a result, exports of aviation security equipment from Chinese companies to the US , and to 
other countries that had transportation cooperation with the US , were blocked. Furthermore, as the 
TSA certification would be adopted by most countries, the C hinese aviation security equipment would 
face difficulties in exporting to the global market. China considered that the TSA  certification was 
inconsistent with the relevant rules of the TBT  Agreement, such as its rules  relating to the  conformity 
assessment  procedures of central government agencies, and its transparency principles ; in addition, 
it erected unnecessary obstacles to trade. In conclusion, China called upon the US to respect  the 
relevant provisions and principles of the TBT  Agreement and to treat  Chinese companies and 
products in an equal manner, including by granting them national and MFN  treatment, and by 
eliminating these technical barriers to trade.  
33.4.   The representative of the United States  said that the measures that had been raised by China 
at the most recent TBT  Committee meeting, and here at this Council, dealt with matters of national 
security, and specifically aviation security. The US TSA had competency over the measures and, 
because it was a security -specific issue, it was not one that would be productively addressed in this 
Council. China and any other Members should discuss their concerns directly with the TSA.  
33.5.   The representative of China  reiterated that this was not a security issue. Indeed, other 
Members, including China,  faced similar security concerns; nevertheless, China did not prevent the 
certification or procurement of US  aviation security equipment on security grounds. Furthermore, 
Chinese aviation security equipment reached worldwide markets and was used by many countries, 
including the EU. All Chinese aviation security equipment met the strictest  and most stringent safety 
technical standards  and requirements  and was acknowledged as such in the market. China asserted 
again that security issues should not be used as an excuse to  restrict normal bilateral trade.  
33.6.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
33.7.   The Council so agreed . 
34  RUSSIAN FEDERATION – TRADE RESTRICTING P RACTICES – REQUEST F ROM THE 
EUROPEAN UNION  
34.1.   The Chairperson  informed the Council tha t, in a communication dated 1  November  2018, the 
delegation of the European Union had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda.  
34.2.   The representative of the European Union  said that they had requested Russia to modify the 
GOST  standard on  cement certification, namely GOST  R 56836 -2016, to correct its discriminatory 
dimension while also respecting WTO  rules on notification. They also called upon Russia and the G/C/M/133  
 
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  other four EEU  members not to replicate the discriminatory character of the measu re in the Technical 
Regulation that was currently under preparation at EEU  level.  
34.3.   The requirement of "good manufacturing practice" (GMP) certificates for pharmaceuticals had 
not yet been notified to the WTO and had a discriminatory dimension. Amendments to  Federal 
Law 61 had been approved at the Duma on 17  May 2018. The EU sought an update on the schedule 
for the entry into force of these amendments. The EU also requested Russia to provide sufficient and 
timely information to allow for a smooth transition.  
34.4.   The EU also remained concerned by the embargo on fishery products from Estonia that had 
been in place since June  2015, allegedly for SPS reasons.  
34.5.   Regarding the Russian Federation 's wine taxation regime, which was heavier on imported 
than on domestic wines,  the EU welcomed the proposals from the Ministry of Finance on the 
modification of excise taxes on wine, as submitted to the Duma  for discussion . The EU requested an 
update on the state of play of this discussion, including when the new rules would enter i nto force.  
34.6.   Turning to the issue of the increasing difficulty faced by importing companies (for goods) and 
foreign companies (for services) to participate in Russian SOEs ' purchases, the EU noted that it had 
already raised this issue several times in the TR IMS Committee ; Law 44/2013 -FZ on Government 
Procurement had since been amended, but apparently in a way that had further limited national 
treatment for foreign products. The EU sought an explanation of whether or not the amendment 
implied that Law  44, whic h did not provide for the application of national treatment, now covered 
investments made by SOEs where fixed capital investments using state subsidies  had been made . 
34.7.   The regime to be applied to the automotive sector as of 1  July 2018 was also cause for 
concern. Russia 's exemption from several WTO  measures as part of its WTO accession , in 2012, was 
due to end on 30 June 2018. The EU asked  Russia if it could confirm that a decision of the EAEU 
from 14  September  2018 removed preferential duties for Russia, bu t not for other members of the 
EAEU . The EU also requested to receive information on planned subsidies (if any) for car  
manufacturers , which had previously benefited from preferential duties , to offset the ir "lost 
incentive". The EU also requested an updat e on the policy of Special Investment Contracts and of 
any other measures under consideration to promote localization of car production in Russia.  
34.8.   Regarding Russia 's renewal in July  2018 of the 2014 so-called temporary export ban on raw 
hides and skins , until December  2018, and with end-2018 fast approaching, the EU asked if Russia 
intended once again  to extend this ban . 
34.9.   Decree No.  836 of 17  July 2018 introduced a temporary quota on the export of birch logs 
from Russia outside of the EEU for the period from 1 January  2019 to 30 June 2019. In view of the 
precedent of the four -year ban on exports of raw hides and skins, the EU wished also to receive 
Russia's confirmation that the measure would not be extended beyond June  2019.  
34.10.   The representative of Ukraine  said that Ukraine shared the EU's concerns and urged Russia 
to comply fully with its WTO  commitments.  
34.11.   The representative of the Russian Federation  stated that exports of processed fishery 
products from Estonian and Latvian plants had resumed their export to the Russian Federation and 
had supplied 500  tonnes of fishery products in total in 2018, despite mutually imposed economic 
sanctions. Russia continually monitor ed these supplies to facilitate the process of export resumption.  
34.12.   Based on the agreements rea ched between the two countries, Russian inspectors would visit 
the Estonian fish processing establishments, as proposed by the Estonian competent authorities , in 
compliance with Russian and EAEU  requirements. Both sides still needed to agree on certain 
technical details about  the forthcoming visit , but Russia nevertheless confirmed its readiness to 
settle the issue.  
34.13.   Regarding the rules for cement certification, the application practice of the relevant 
GOST -R 56836 -2016 had revealed the need to introduce changes to it. Draft amendments No.  2 to 
the GOST -R had been developed and published on the website of the Federal Agency for Technical 
Regulation and Metrology. Public discussion of the draft had ended on 1  March  2018 and the draft G/C/M/133  
 
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  was currently being finali zed, taking into account the comments received. The draft provided for the 
elimination of additional inspection control s, among other issues.  
34.14.   The Russian Federation 's procedures to obtain a GMP  certificate for pharmaceutical products 
fully complied with international standards and recommendations. In addition, the procedures were 
similar for domestic and foreign manufacturers. The number of inspections of foreign manufacturers 
was growing annually , with statistics showing that the number of inspections of  foreign 
manufacturers were almost six  times those  of domestic manufacturers . The amendments to the 
Federal Law "On the Circulation of Medicines", that had come into force on 15  June 2018, allowed 
for the submission of a copy of the GMP  certificate or a co py of the Decision of the Ministry of 
Industry and Trade of the Russian Federation in order to initiate the medicine registration process. 
The changes were designed to simplify and speed up the registration of new medicines on the 
Russian market.  
34.15.   The tempo rary export ban on tanned leather, which was required to assure the 
implementation of state defence procurement, would end on 10  December  2018. The Government 
of the Russian Federation was not considering reintroducing the measure at this time. 
34.16.   Regarding  excise taxes on wine, and in consideration of Members ' concerns , the Ministry of 
Finance had been tasked with developing amendments to the Tax Code in order to align excise rates 
for domestic and imported wines and champagne with protected geographical indi cations and 
appellation s of origin. Members would be provided with the relevant information once the legislation 
had been passed.  
34.17.   Addressing the issue of temporary QRs on export s of birch, he informed the Council that 
Resolution No.  836, of 17 July 2018, w ould apply from 1  January  2019 to 30  June 2019, to prevent 
any critical shortage s of a product that was essential to the Russian Federation.  
34.18.   Finally, concerning preferential duties for car manufacturers, the preferential duties had been 
removed for Russia but Russia could not  comment on other Members of the EEU  in this regard . 
34.19.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
34.20.   The Council so agreed . 
35  WORK PROGRAMME ON EL ECTRONIC COMMERCE  
35.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that a Ministerial De cision was adopted at MC11 in Buenos Aires in 
which Ministers had agreed to maintain the existing Work Programme on E -Commerce, and to 
endeavour to reinvigorate the WTO 's work on E -Commerce. The Ministerial Decision had also 
instructed the General Council to hold periodic reviews in its sessions of July and December  2018, 
and July  2019, based on the reports submitted by the relevant bodies, among them the Goods 
Council; and to maintain the current practice of not imposing customs duties on electronic 
transm issions. Therefore, this Council was again tasked to discuss the E -Commerce aspects relating 
to trade in goods. In order to fulfil its mandate, the E -Commerce issue was a standalone agenda 
item. 
35.2.   For this reason, he invited delegations to make suggestions a s to how to work on the 
preparation of the periodic review to be held in the General Council at its session of December  2018. 
He also inform ed delegations that, once again, to fulfil this mandate, and as his predecessors had 
done, it was his intention to s ubmit to the General Council a factual report under his own 
responsibility.  
35.3.   However, before opening the floor , he wished first to report on the informal consultations that 
he had held on 2  November  2018 on a possible workshop on "Cross -Border E -Commerce and Trade 
in Goods".  
35.4.   He recalled that , at the CTG 's previous  meeting, on 3 and 4  July 2018, under this agenda 
item, regarding the possible organization of a "Workshop on Cross -Border E -Commerce and Trade 
in Goods", the Council had agreed that he should hold informal open -ended consultations with 
delegations to explore Members ' interests and suggestions with regard to such a workshop. To this G/C/M/133  
 
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  end, in communications dated 6  July and 14  September  2018, he had  invited delegations to submit 
in advance , and in writing , their views, ideas, and suggestions concerning their interest in this 
matter , and the possible themes, speakers , and International Organizations that could participate if 
the workshop were to take place. In a communication dated 25  October  2018, he had sent to all 
delegations a compilation prepared by the Secretariat of all the comments and ideas received from 
Members to facilitate discussions at an open -ended informal session of the Council that to ok place 
on 2 November  2018.  
35.5.   In light of the limited number of interventions made at that meeting, he had concluded that , 
at present, there was no consensus to hold such a workshop, and that , consequently, he would 
cease holding consultations on this issue . He had also indicated that , even if there were currently 
no consensus to continue consultations , Members were at liberty to propose their own concrete ideas 
in this regard.  
35.6.   Finally, he informed delegations that , following this general discussion on E -Commerce , he 
would submit a factual report to the General Council on the informal open -ended consultations , and 
on that day's session.  
35.7.   The delegate of China  registered his delegation 's appreciation for the Chairperson 's 
endeavours and efforts in respect of th e proposed joint workshop on E -Commerce under the CTG. 
First, he wished to emphasize the importance of the proposed workshop in enhancing experience -
sharing among Members, and in maintaining the momentum of multilateral E -Commerce 
discussions. Second, he b elieved that discussions held under the CTG should be conducted within 
the Council's terms of reference, with a focus on internet -enabled trade in goods . In this regard , he 
called upon Members to be flexible in respect of the workshop's organization. Third, his delegation 
would continue to communicate with the Secretariat and reach out to Members to seek appropriate 
solutions regarding the workshop. China valued and supported the discussions on E -Commerce 
under the 1998  Work Programme on E -Commerce.  
35.8.   At this meeting, his delegation wished  to shed light on the Electronic Commerce Law passed 
by China 's National People 's Congress on 31  August  2018,  to enable a better understanding of 
China 's latest legislative achievements and regulatory concepts in the fie ld of electronic commerce.  
35.9.   The legislative work on the E -Commerce Law had been ongoing for five  years since it was 
formally launched at end-2013. Throughout the process , a very cautious attitude had been taken 
regarding  legislation on this emerging industr y. Extensive consultations had been conducted with 
various stakeholders and multiple workshops had been held to solicit opinions from both home and 
abroad. The drafting process had proven to be scientific, democratic, and normative, aiming at 
protecting th e legitimate rights and interests of all parties to E -Commerce, regulating E -Commerce 
activities, maintaining market order, and promoting the healthy development of the industry.  
35.10.   Specifically, the Electronic Commerce Law was composed of 7  chapters or 89  articles, 
dealing with the adjusted object by the law, the parties to E -Commerce (including E -Commerce 
operators and platform operators), E -Commerce activities (including E -contract, E -payment, express 
logistics , and delivery), data and information, the prot ection of consumer rights and interests , a 
dispute resolution mechanism, market order and fair competition, cross -border electronic 
commerce, supervision and administration, and legal liability.  
35.11.   At this meeting, China would focus on the clauses relating to  internet -enabled cross-border 
trade in goods, as well as related services.  
35.12.   First, the Law highlighted the importance of integrated regulatory system s for cross -border 
E-Commerce. It stipulated that the State shall support and promote the development of cr oss-border 
E-Commerce, and establish integrated service and regulatory system s for customs declaration, tax 
payment, inspection and quarantine, payment settlement s, and other phases in cross-border 
E-Commerce transactions, which corresponded to the charact eristics of cross -border E -Commerce. 
The State shall support cross -border E -Commerce platform operators and other operators to provide 
warehouse and logistics, Customs declaration, and inspection declaration services for cross -border 
E-Commerce transaction s. G/C/M/133  
 
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  35.13.   Second, the Law emphasized the importance of international regulatory cooperation on 
cross-border E -Commerce. It required that the State shall promote information -sharing, mutual 
regulatory recognition, and international law enforcement cooperation, to improve regulatory 
efficiency for cross -border E -Commerce transactions. The law also allowed cross -border 
E-Commerce business operators to use electronic documents during customs procedures.  
35.14.   Third, the Law also touched upon the issue of international rule -making on E -Commerce. It 
required the State to participate in international rule -making on E -Commerce and promoted 
international mutual recognition of electronic signatures and electronic IDs. It also required the State 
to promote the establishment of disp ute resolution mechanism s for cross -border E -Commerce with 
other countries and regions.  
35.15.   The Electronic Commerce Law was a basic and comprehensive law in the field of E -Commerce 
in China. As China had learnt from the discussions under various WTO  bodies, as  a cross -cutting 
issue, E -Commerce involved trade in goods, trade in services, and many other aspects. China was 
ready and willing to share more information on the law in greater detail at the coming sessions of 
the relevant WTO  bodies, and looked forward to in-depth exchanges and discussions with other 
Members on these  occasions.  
35.16.   The delegate of Nigeria  thanked the Chairperson for his factual report, and for his frank 
assessment of the state of play. Nigeria had taken note of the report and , in particular , of the current 
stalemate in relation to the organization of the workshop. Nevertheless, his delegation still wished 
to reiterate the importance of this subject in light of the MC11  Decision and the CTG 's responsibility 
for it. He was also mindful of the p arameters and scope of any discussion , and the fact that 
E-Commerce was a cross -cutting issue that affected both goods and services.  
35.17.   His delegation wished to highlight the following: first, Nigeria was a strong supporter of 
multilateral discussion s on E-Commerce and would share its perspective in the context both of the 
Joint Initiatives and the Work Programme. Members also needed to ensure the continuing relevance 
of the WTO for all its Members. In other words, Members should be able freely to disc uss issues of 
importance to them. Second, it was also clear that E -Commerce had the potential to bring significant 
development benefits to Members, even if not necessarily automatically. Nevertheless, Nigeria was 
mindful of the significant gaps in capacity  and skills that could affect the equitable distribution of 
E-Commerce in terms of its potential benefits. Third, Nigeria would favour the organization of a 
workshop, subject to consensus, that would examine the relationship between E -Commerce and 
developm ent, including addressing questions around the nature of S&D treatment. Finally, in terms 
of next steps, Nigeria believed that the objective now should be to improve and deepen an 
understanding of the current state of play, to identify concerns and challen ges and how to address 
them, and to take advantage of the opportunity of such a workshop . 
35.18.   In this regard, Nigeria thought that the workshop would be very important to facilitate 
substantive engagement ; nevertheless, in the absence of a workshop, information -sharing could 
also be a way to deepen discussions on this important topic. While it was difficult to affirm that the 
Chairperson should continue with consultations given a lack of appetite  for them , Nigeria wished to 
encourage Members to be flexible in their approach and to take advantage of this window of 
opportunity to raise specific concerns in the context of the Work Programme and the scope and 
responsibility of discussions under the CTG.  
35.19.   The delegate of Brazil  wished to express Brazil's support for the Work Programme and for 
the multilateral discussions on E -Commerce. At the same time, he wished to convey an initial 
assessment that the lack of consensus concerning the workshop  probably reflected the convenience 
of having a more horizontal process in this area , which could encompass the interests of various 
Members. Brazil also wished to highlight the Joint Initiative on E -Commerce resulting from MC11 , 
and the fact that a debate had taken place in that context abo ut legal texts and disciplines that could 
improve regulations of various aspects of E -Commerce. In Brazil 's view, the discussions there would 
be more fruitful if Members that had not yet engaged in that process could follow or participate in 
that context a s well.  
35.20.   The Chairperson  concluded by confirming that there was some interest among Members in 
E-Commerce issues. He proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  G/C/M/133  
 
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  35.21.   The Council so agreed . 
35.22.   In addition, he further proposed that , to fulfil the Buenos Aires mandate, he would make , 
under his own responsibility, a purely factual report to the General Council, in December  2018, on 
the discussions held in this Council at this meeting.  
35.23.   The Council so agreed . 
36  CONSIDERATION OF ANN UAL REPO RTS OF THE SUBSIDIAR Y BODIES OF THE COUN CIL 
FOR TRADE IN GOODS  
36.1.   The Chairperson  noted that , pursuant to the "Procedures for an Annual Overview of 
WTO Activities and for Reporting under the WTO" (WT/L/105), which were adopted by the General 
Council on 15  November  1995, all bodies constituted under Agreements in Annex  1A of the 
WTO Agreement were required to submit a factual report to the Council for Trade in Goods annually, 
and the Council was to take note of these reports.  
36.2.   Such factual reports were adopted a t the last meeting of each subsidiary body and submitted 
to the CTG for its consideration. In the case of the Committees on Agriculture, Technical Barriers to 
Trade, and Customs Valuation, the corresponding factual reports would be submitted directly to th e 
General Council.  
36.3.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the following factual annual reports: 
TRIMs (G/L/1273 and G/TRIMS/8); Subsidies and Countervailing Measures  (G/L/1272 and 
G/SCM/152); Anti -dumping (G/L/1270 and G/ADP/25); Safeguards  (G/L/1275 and G/SG/190); 
Market Access (G/L/1271); Import Licensing (G/L/1269); Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
(G/L/1280); ITA  (G/L/1278); Pre -shipment Inspection and Independent Entity (G/L/1274); Rules of 
Origin (G/L/1266); Trade Facilitation (G/L/ 1267); and Working Party on State Trading Enterprises 
(G/L/1268 and G/STR/21).  
36.4.   The Council so agreed . 
37  ADOPTION OF THE ANNU AL REPORT OF THE COU NCIL FOR TRADE IN GO ODS TO THE 
GENERAL COUNCIL (G/C /W/761)  
37.1.   The Chairperson  drew Members ' attention to the Draft Re port of this Council to the General 
Council, circulated in document  G/C/W/761. In accordance with the "Procedures for an Annual 
Overview of WTO  Activities and for Reporting under the WTO" (WT/L/105), which was adopted by 
the General Council on 15  November  1995, it was agreed that " [T]he respective sectoral Councils 
should report in November each year to the General Council on the activities in the Council as well 
as in the subsidiary bodies" and that the reports of the sectoral Councils should be "factual i n nature, 
containing an indication of actions and decisions taken, with cross -references to reports of 
subordinate bodies and could follow the model of the GATT  1947 Council reports to the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES".  
37.2.   The draft report before Members would be upda ted in light of today 's meeting.  
37.3.   The delegate of Norway  noted that , at the CTG 's meeting of 3  July, Norway had made a 
statement that still needed to be reflected in paragraph  20.2 of the draft report.  
37.4.   The delegate of Hong Kong, China  noted that , on page 8, paragraph  13, references to 
Article  13.1(b) should be Article  13.1(e). Corresponding changes needed to be made to the heading 
and table of contents.  
37.5.   The delegate of Colombia  noted that , in footnote  20, the reference should be to 
document  G/L/1269 and not to document  G/LIC/W/1269.  
37.6.   The Chairperson  noted that the United States would need to be added to the list of Members 
that had intervened under the agenda item in Section  31 of the draft report (page  14, 
paragraph  31.2 of the draft report).  G/C/M/133  
 
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  37.7.   He proposed that  the Council take note of the statements made, and that the Council adopt 
the report subject to its update and revision to take into account the work of the Council at this 
meeting and the interventions that had just been made.  
37.8.   The Council so agreed . 
38  OTHER  BUSINESS  
38.1  Annual Report on Notification Obligations and the Trade Facilitation Agreement  
38.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that , at the March  2018 meeting of the CTG , it was agreed that this 
Council would hold consultations with interested Members on how best to in clude the 
TFA notifications in the Annual Report on the Status of Notifications. It was his intention to convene, 
if possible before the end of the current year, or in February  2019, informal open -ended 
consultations on this issue. He therefore invited del egations to be prepared to discuss how best to 
reflect the TFA  notifications in the Annual Report, particularly in light of the TFA's series of 
notification requirements of different kinds , and with different ranges of coverage.  
38.2  The work of the Goods Counc il 
38.2.   The Chairperson  noted that , since he had taken over the Chairpersonship of this Council, he 
had had the opportunity closely to observe the number and diversity of issues that were being 
brought to the Council 's attention at each meeting. He had been sur prised by the increasing number 
of specific trade concerns (STCs) that were brought to the Council 's attention. During these two  days 
of intensive work , Members had considered 38  agenda items. He found this to be positive in that it 
demonstrated Members ' confidence in the MTS and the functioning of the WTO  bodies in general. 
However, he had also noticed that many of these issues had already been considered at previous 
meetings. In fact, some issues were such regular fixtures on the CTG 's agenda that they se emed 
almost to be standalone agenda items. He had been reflecting on this and wished to invite 
delegations to consider how best to deal with the CTG 's STCs, how to improve the functioning of the 
CTG in general , and above all how to make its work more effic ient. 
38.3  Date of the next meeting  
38.3.   The Chairperson  noted that the next meeting of the Council was scheduled to take place on 
Thursday, 11  April, and Friday, 12  April 2019. The agenda would close at 16:30 on Friday, 
29 March  2019.  
38.4.   Regarding  the closing of the a genda, he reminded delegations that, according to the Rules of 
Procedure, meetings of WTO  bodies were convened by a meeting notice issued not less than 
ten calendar days prior to the date set for the meeting. The agenda itself therefore closed 
one WTO working day prior to the circulation of the meeting notice; that is, 11  calendar days before 
the date set for the meeting (or, if the date fell on a weekend, the previous Friday).  
38.5.   The meeting was closed . 
__________