RESTRICTED  
  
G/C/M/141  
 
28 February  2022 
(22-1901) Page: 1/85 
Council for Trade in Goods    
 
 
MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF THE COUNCIL FOR TRADE IN GOODS  
1 AND 2  NOVEMBER  2021 
CHAIRPERSON: HE  MR LUNDEG PUREVSUREN  
The meeting of the Council for Trade in Goods (CTG, or the Council) was convened by 
Airgram  WTO/AIR/CTG/20  and WTO/AIR/CTG/20/Rev.1 ; the proposed agenda for the meeting was 
circulated in document  G/C/W/ 805. The meeting proceeded on the basis of the following modified 
agenda , as detailed below : 
 
1   NOTIFICATION OF REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS  ................................ ....................  4 
2   MARKET ACCESS ISSUES  ................................ ................................ .............................  4 
2.1   Draft Decision on the Procedure for the Introduction of HS  2022 Changes to Schedules of 
Concessions Using the Consolidated Tariff Schedules (CTS) Database (G/C/W/802)  ....................  4 
2.2   Introduction of Harmonized System Changes into the WTO  Schedules of Concessions – 
Collective Requests for Waiver  Extensions  ................................ ................................ ..............  5 
3   ACCESSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA TO THE EURASIAN ECONOMIC UNION: 
PROCEDURES UNDER ARTICLE  XXVIII:3 OF GATT  1994 – COMMUNICATION FROM 
ARMENIA (G/L/1110/ADD.7)  ................................ ................................ ..........................  5 
4   ACCESSION OF THE KYRGYZ REPUBLIC TO THE EURASIAN ECONOMIC UNION: 
PROCEDURES UN DER ARTICLE  XXVIII:3 OF GATT  1994 – COMMUNICATION FROM  
THE KYRGYZ REPUBLIC (G/L/1137/ADD.6) ................................ ................................ ..... 6 
5   CUBA – REQUEST FOR AN EXTENSION OF THE WAIVER CONCERNING ARTICLE  XV:6  
OF THE GATT  1994 CONTAINED IN THE DECISION OF 7  DECEMBER  2016 (WT/L/1003)  
– (G/C/W/8 03) ................................ ................................ ................................ ...............  7 
6   MEASURES TO ALLOW GRADUATED LDCS, WITH GNP BELOW USD  1,000, BENEFITS 
PURSUANT TO ANNEX  VII(B) OF THE AGREEMENT ON SUBSIDIES AND  
COUNTERVAILING MEASURES – REQUEST FROM CHAD ON BEHALF OF  
THE LDC  GROUP (WT/GC/W/742 -G/C/W/752)  ................................ ...............................  8 
7   WITHDRAWAL OF THE UNITED KINGDOM FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION:  
PROCEDURES UNDER ARTICLE  XXVIII:3 OF GATT  1994 – COMMUNICATION FROM  
THE EUROPEAN UNION (G/L/13 85/ADD.1)  ................................ ................................ ... 10 
8   UNITED KINGDOM'S WITHDRAWAL FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION: PROCEDURES  
UNDER ARTICLE  XXVIII:3 OF GATT  1994 – COMMUNICATION FROM  
THE UNITED KINGDOM (G/L/1386/ADD.1)  ................................ ................................ ... 11 
9   EUROPEAN UNION – RECTIFICATION AND MODIFICATION OF SCHEDULES – 
SCHEDULE  CLXXV – REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION  ................................ ..........  11 
10   EUROPEAN UNION – IMPLEMENTATION OF NON -TARIFF BARRIERS ON 
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM ARGENTINA, AUSTRALIA, BRAZIL,  
CANADA, COLOMBIA, COSTA RICA, ECUADOR, JAMAICA, PANAMA, PARAGUAY, THE 
UNITED STATES, AND URUGUAY (G/C/W/7 67/REV.1)  ................................ ..................  12 
11   INDIA – IMPORT POLICY ON TYRES – REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION, 
INDONESIA, AND THE SEPARATE CUSTOMS TERRITORY OF TAIWAN, PENGHU,  
KINMEN AND MATSU  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 21 G/C/M/141  
 
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  12   EUROPEAN UNION – QUALITY SCHEMES FOR AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS AND 
FOODSTUFFS – THE REGISTRATION OF CERTAIN TERMS OF CHEESE AS  
GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS – REQU EST FROM URUGUAY  ................................ ..........  24 
13   EUROPEAN UNION – PROPOSED MODIFICATION OF TRQ  COMMITMENTS:  
SYSTEMIC CONCERNS – REQUEST FROM BRAZIL, CHINA,  AND URUGUAY  ......................  25 
14   UNITED KINGDOM – DRAFT GOODS SCHEDULE AND PROPOSED 
UK TRQ COMMITMENTS: SYSTEMIC CONCERNS – REQUEST FROM BRAZIL,  CHINA,  
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, AND URUGUAY  ................................ ................................ .. 28 
15   CHINA – IMPLEMENTATION OF TRADE DISRUPTIVE AND RESTRICTIVE  
MEASURES – REQUEST FROM AUSTRALIA  ................................ ................................ ...... 29 
16   CHINA – SUBSIDY TRANSPARENCY AND CHINA'S PUBLICATION AND INQUIRY  
POINT OBLIGATIONS UNDER CHINA'S PROTOCOL OF ACCESSION – REQUEST FROM 
AUSTRALIA, EUROPEAN UNION, UNITED KINGDOM, AND THE UNITED STATES  .............  32 
17   CHINA – COSMETICS SUPERVISION AND ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS (CSAR)  
– REQUEST FROM AUSTRALIA, THE EUROPEAN UNION, JAPAN, AND  
THE UNITED STATES  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 35 
18   INDIA – RESTRICTIONS ON IMPORTS OF CERTAIN PULSES – REQUEST  FROM 
AUSTRALIA, CANADA, THE EUROPEAN UNION, THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, AND  
THE UNITED STATES (G/C/W/791)  ................................ ................................ ...............  39 
19   SRI LANKA – IMPORT BAN ON VARIOUS PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM  
AUSTRALIA AND THE EUROPEAN UNION ................................ ................................ ........  41 
20   EGYPT – MANUFACTURER REGIST RATION SYSTEM – REQUEST FROM  
THE EUROPEAN UNION  ................................ ................................ ................................ .. 43 
21   INDONESIA – IMPORT AND EXPORT RESTRICTING POLICIES AND PRACTICES – 
REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION, JAPAN, NEW ZEALAND, AND  
THE UNITED STATES  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 44 
22   INDONESIA – IMPORT SUBSTITUTION PROGRAMME – REQUEST FROM  
THE EUROPEAN UNION  ................................ ................................ ................................ .. 47 
23   KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA, KINGDOM OF BAHRAIN,  
THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES, THE STATE OF KUWAIT, OMAN, AND QATAR –  
SELECTIVE TAX ON CERTAIN IMPORTED PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM  
THE EUROPEAN UNION, SWITZERLAND, AND THE UNITED STATES (G/C/W/792)  ........  49 
24   UNITED STATES – IMPORT RESTRICTIONS ON APPLES AND PEARS – REQUEST  
FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION  ................................ ................................ ........................  50 
25   SRI LANKA - IMPORT BAN ON PALM OIL - REQUEST FROM INDONESIA  ..................  51 
26   INDIA – INDIAN STANDARDS AND IM PORT RESTRICTION IN THE AUTOMOTIVE 
SECTOR (QUALITY CONTROL ORDERS): WHEEL RIMS, SAFETY GLASS, HELMETS –  
REQUEST FROM INDONESIA ................................ ................................ ...........................  53 
27   INDIA – PLAIN COPIER PAPER QUALITY ORDER  2020 –  
REQUEST FROM INDONESIA ................................ ................................ ...........................  54 
28   CHINA – EXPORT CO NTROL LAW – REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION  
AND JAPAN  ................................ ................................ ................................ ....................  54 
29   RUSSIAN FEDERATION – TRADE RESTRICTING PRACTICES – REQUEST FROM  
THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE UNITED STATES  ................................ ..........................  57 
30   MEXICO – CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT PROCEDURE FOR CHEESE UNDER MEXICAN 
OFFICIAL STANDARD NOM -223-SCFI/SAGARPA -2018 – REQUEST FROM THE UNITED 
STATES ................................ ................................ ................................ ...........................  60 
31   CHINA – ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES FOR REGISTRATION OF OVERSEAS 
PRODUCERS OF IMPORTED FOODS – REQUEST FROM THE UNITED STATES  ...................  61 G/C/M/141  
 
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  32   INDIA – ORDER RELATED TO REQUIREMENT OF NON -GM CUM GM FREE  
CERTIFICATE ACCOMPANIED WITH IMPORTED FOOD CONSIGNMENT – REQUEST  
FROM THE UNITED STATES  ................................ ................................ ............................  65 
33   KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA – SABER CONFORM ITY ASSESSMENT ONLINE 
PLATFORM/SALEEM PRODUCT SAFETY PROGRAM – REQUEST FROM  
THE UNITED STATES  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 66 
34   PANAMA - ONIONS AND POTATOES HARVEST LIFE AND SPROUTING  
REQUIREMENTS – REQUEST FROM THE UNITED STATES  ................................ ................  67 
35   UNITED STATES – MEASURES REGARDING MARKET ACCESS PROHIBITION FOR 
ICT PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM CHINA  ................................ ................................ ....... 68 
36   UNITED STATES – EXPORT CONTROL MEASURES FOR ICT  PRODUCTS –  
REQUEST FROM CHINA  ................................ ................................ ................................ ... 68 
37   AUSTRALIA – DISCRIMINATORY MARKET ACCESS PROHIBITION ON  
5G EQUIPMENT – REQUEST FROM CHINA  ................................ ................................ ....... 69 
38   EUROPEAN UNION – SWEDEN'S DISCRIMINATORY MARKET ACCESS  
PROHIBITION ON 5G  EQUIPMENT – REQUEST FROM CHINA  ................................ ..........  69 
39   EUROPEAN UNION – CARBON BORDER ADJUSTMENT MECHANISM  
(THE EUROPEAN GREEN DEAL OF DECEMBER  2019) – REQUEST FROM CHINA  
AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  ................................ ................................ ....................  69 
40   EUROPEAN UNION – THE EUROPEAN GREEN DEAL – REQUEST FROM  
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ................................ ................................ ............................  75 
41   EUROPEAN UNION – REGULATION EC  NO. 1272/2008 (CLP  REGULATION) –  
REQUEST FROM THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  ................................ ................................ .. 77 
42   EUROPEAN UNION – REGULATION (EU)  2017/2321 AND  
REGULATION (EU)  2018/825 – REQUEST FROM CHINA AND  
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ................................ ................................ ............................  78 
43   ANGOLA – IMPORT RESTRICTING PRACTICES – REQUEST FROM THE RUSSIAN 
FEDERATION  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..................  79 
44   MONGOLIA – MEASURES APPLIED WITH RESPEC T TO CERTAIN AGRICULTURAL 
PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  ................................ .............  80 
45   INDIA - MANDATORY CERTIFICATION FOR STEEL PRODUCTS –  
REQUEST FROM JAPAN  ................................ ................................ ................................ ... 81 
46   INDIA – IMPORT RESTRICTION ON AIR CONDITIONERS –  
REQUEST FROM JAPAN  ................................ ................................ ................................ ... 82 
REPORTS TO T HE GENERAL COUNCIL  ................................ ................................ .............  83 
47   WORK PROGRAMME ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE  ................................ ...................  83 
48   CONSIDERATION OF ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE SUBSIDIARY BODIES  
OF THE COUNCIL FOR TRADE IN GOODS  ................................ ................................ ........  84 
49   ADOPTION OF THE ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL FOR TRADE IN GOODS  
TO THE GENERAL COUNCIL (G/C/W/804)  ................................ ................................ ..... 84 
50   OTHER BUSINESS  ................................ ................................ ................................ .... 85 
50.1   Functioning of the CTG and its Subsidiary Bodies –  
Information from the Chair (RD/CTG/14)  ................................ ................................ .............. 85 
50.2   Date of Next Meeting  ................................ ................................ ................................ 85 
 
 
The Chairperson  observed that, given the long agenda, it would be preferable for Members to keep  
their interventions short , if possible . He invited those Members  that were planning to submit longer 
written statements for incorporation into the meeting's minutes to expressly indicate their intention to 
do so when taking the floor . To ensure transparency in the preparation of the minutes, the Secretariat G/C/M/141  
 
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  would only reflect what had been  said at the meeting , except in those cases where a Member had 
explicitly indicated that it was their intention to submit a longer statement in writing.  
 
The delegate of the United States  requested to be included, along with Australia and the European 
Union, as a co -sponsor of Agenda Item 16, "China – Subsidy Transparency and China's Publication and 
Inquiry Point Obligations under China's Protocol of Accession ". 
 
The delegate of the United Kingdom  likewise requested to be incl uded as a co -sponsor of Agenda 
Item 16, "China – Subsidy Transparency and China's Publication and Inquiry Point Obligations under 
China's Protocol of Accession ". 
 
Finally , the Chairperson  informed delegations that, under agenda item "Other Business", he wo uld 
report briefly on the Annual Plan of Meetings. In addition, he would raise the matter of the date of the 
Council's next meeting . 
 
The agenda was so agreed . 
 
1  NOTIFICATION OF REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS  
1.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that, under the working procedures agreed by the Committee on 
Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA) and following the adoption by the General Council of the 
Transparency Mechanism1, the CTG was to be kept informed of Members' notifications of new 
regional trade agreements (RTAs). He informed the CTG that four RTAs had been notified to the 
CRTA , as followed:  
• ASEAN  Trade in Goods Agreement (ATIGA), Goods (WT/REG457/N/1);  
• ASEAN  Trade in Goods Agreement (ATIGA), Goods (WT/REG457/N/1/Add.1);  
• Trade Co ntinuity Agreement between the United Kingdom and Mexico, Goods and 
Services (WT/REG456/N/1 -S/C/N/1060); and  
• Agreement on Trade Continuity between the United Kingdom and Canada, Goods and 
Services (WT/REG419/N/1/Add.1 -S/C/N/1061).  
 
1.2.  The Council  took note  of the information provided.  
2  MARKET ACCESS ISSUES  
2.1.  The Chairperson  informed Members that, as indicated in the Agenda, the Committee on Market 
Access (CMA) had forwarded five  items for the Council's consideration.  
2.1  Draft Decision on the Procedure for the Introduction of HS 2022 Changes to Schedules 
of Concessions Using the Consolidated Tariff Schedules ( CTS) Database ( G/C/W/802)  
2.2.  The Chairperson  drew Members' attention to document  G/C/W/802 , containing  a draft decision 
on the " Procedure for the Introduction of Harmonized System 2022  Changes to Schedules o f 
Concessions Using the Consolidated  Tariff Schedules (CTS) Database ". 
2.3.  He noted that this  draft decision follow ed the same approach that had been used in previous 
transposition exercises. Furthermore, t he CMA had agreed that a final draft text, now contained in  
document  G/C/W/ 802, be forwarded to the General Council for its adoption through the Goods 
Council.  
2.4.  Accordingly, he proposed that the Council agree to forward the draft decision contained in 
document  G/C/W/802 to the General Council for adopti on. 
2.5.  The Council so agreed . 
 
1 Documents  WT/REG/16, WT/L/671, and G/C/M/88.  G/C/M/141  
 
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  2.2  Introduction of Harmonized System Changes into the WTO  Schedules of Concessions 
– Collective Requests for Waiver Extensions  
2.6.  The Chairperson  informed Members that, as indicated in the Agenda, the CMA had forwarded 
four draft collective requests for waiver extensions concerning the introduction of Harmonized 
System (HS) changes into WTO  Schedules of Concessions for the consideration of th e Council. These 
collective requests had been the subject of consultations in the CMA  meeting th at had taken place 
on 11 October  2021. 
2.7.  He drew Members ' attention to the collective draft waiver decisions circulated in 
documents  G/C/W/ 796, G/C/W/ 797, G/C/W/ 798, and G/C/W/ 799, which concerned 
one-year extensions of draft collective waiver decisions to the HS for the years 2002, 2007, 2012 , 
and 2017, respectively, that would all expire on 31  December  2021. 
2.8.  Finally, he proposed that the Council agree to forward the draft waiver decisions contained in 
these documents to the General  Council for  adoption.  
2.9.  The Council so agreed . 
3  ACCESSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA TO THE EURASIAN ECONOMIC UNION: 
PROCEDURES UNDER ARTICLE  XXVIII:3 OF GATT  1994 – COMMUNICATION FROM 
ARMENIA (G/L/1110/ADD.7)  
3.1.  The Chairperson  informed Members that, in a communication da ted 11 October  2021, the  
delegation of Armenia had requested the Secretariat to circulate document  G/L/1110/Add. 7 relating 
to the extension of the time -period for the withdrawal of concessions, in connection with Armenia's 
accession to the Eurasian Economi c Union (EAEU), until 2  January  2023.  
3.2.  The delegate of Armenia  indicated the following:  
3.3.  After the last extension, Armenia has continued consultations and communications with the 
interested delegations. However, for understandable reasons, with less intensit y than in the year in 
which it was initially considered. Armenia has made positive developments and real progress on the 
non-agricultural  market access  (NAMA) package and is finalizing the negotiations on the 
NAMA  substance. At the same time, Armenia has intensified its efforts and concentrated more 
resources to come up with the formulation of a mutually acceptable position for a compensation 
package on agriculture.  
3.4.  However, considering the number of interested Members that are involved in the process, as 
well as the technical and logistical obstacles in relation to the COVID -19 pandemic to be overcome, 
Armenia believes that additional time will be required to complete the compensation negotiations. 
Therefore, with the purpose of properly organi zing the process pursuant to 
document  G/L/1110/Add. 7, Armenia has indicated the following: "In connection with the Treaty of 
Accession of the Republic of Armenia to the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU)  […]; and in view of 
ensuring that Members reserve their rights pending the communication to the WTO  Secretariat of 
the agreements reached in the context of Article  XXIV:6 (GATT), Armenia believes that it is desirable 
to provide for an extension of 12  months (that is, until 2  January  2023)."  
3.5.  In consequence, Arme nia expresses its readiness to provide to Members an extension of an 
additional 12 -month period, until 2  January  2023, for the withdrawal of substantially equivalent 
concessions under Article  XXVIII:3 of the GATT  1994. Armenia asks the Council to agree to this 
proposed extension.  
3.6.  The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
3.7.  The European Union welcomes the progress achieved in its negotiations with Armenia on tariffs 
for non -agricultural products, where an agreement of principle has been reach ed. On agriculture, 
recent progress indicates that an agreement of principle could  also be reached soon, potentially by 
MC12.  The EU therefore looks forward to completing these compensation negotiations in the near 
future.  G/C/M/141  
 
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  3.8.  The delegate of the Russian Feder ation indicated the following:  
3.9.  The Russian Federation will continue to support the negotiation process of Armenia in order to 
conclude it successfully.  The Russian Federation support s the extension of the deadline.  
3.10.   The delegate of Armenia  indicated the following:  
3.11.   Armenia takes note of the statements made by the representative s of the respective 
delegations , which  will be relayed to capital  in due course . Meanwhile, Armenia will continue its 
communication s with interested WTO  Members in a p ragmatic and constructive way . In this regard, 
Armenia confirm s its readiness to organize the next round of bilateral negotiations with a view to 
finally bring ing them to their completion.  At the same time , Armenia will continue to inform the 
Council, as w ell as all interested Members, concerning the  ongoing compensatory adjustment 
negotiations . 
3.12.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made  and of Armenia' s 
communication, and that it agree to extend the deadline to withdraw subs tantially equivalent 
concessions under Article  XXVIII of the GATT for 12  months, until 2 January  2023, as set out in 
document  G/L/1110/Add. 7. 
3.13.   The Council  so agreed . 
4  ACCESSION OF THE KYRGYZ REPUBLIC TO THE EURASIAN ECONOMIC UNION: 
PROCEDURES UNDER ARTICLE  XXVIII:3 OF GATT  1994 – COMMUNICATION FROM THE 
KYRGYZ REPUBLIC (G/L/1137/ADD.6)  
4.1.  The Chairperson  informed Members that, in a communication dated 18  October  2021, the 
delegation of the Kyrgyz Republic had requested the Secretariat to circulate 
document  G/L/1137/Add.6, relating to the extension of the time -period for the withdrawal of 
concessions, in c onnection with the Kyrgyz Republic's accession to the EAEU, until 12  February  2023.  
4.2.  The delegate of the Kyrgyz Republic  indicated the following:  
4.3.  After substantive discussions with Eurasian Economic Union partners, the Kyrgyz Republic has 
submitted a compen sation proposal concerning non -agricultural products to one of the interested 
Members. T he Kyrgyz Republic has received positive feedback from that Member concerning a 
NAMA  goods package . This gives rise to the hope that a mutually agreeable outcome has be en 
reached, and that the NAMA  negotiations near their completion. On agricultural goods, the Kyrgyz 
Republic notes that the consultations at the technical level and an information exchange on 
agricultural products are under way; in addition, internal consu ltations are being held within the 
Eurasian Economic Union platform.  Like Armenia, the Kyrgyz Republic also considered it necessary 
to extend the time -period for the  withdrawal of substantially equivalent concessions , which expires  
on 12  February  2022. Con sidering that additional time would be required in order to move these 
negotiations  forward, and in view of ensuring that Members reserve their rights pending the 
communication to the WTO  Secretariat of the agreement, the Kyrgyz Republic requests for a fur ther 
extension of Members' rights to withdraw concessions pending the conclusion of 
Article  XXVIII:3  negotiations after 12  months, until 12  February  2023, as reflected in 
document  G/L/1137/Add. 6. The Kyrgyz Republic will not assert that WTO  Members that have 
submitted a claim pursuant to Article  XXIV:6 of the GATT  1994 are precluded from withdrawing 
substantially equivalent concessions because this withdrawal occurs later than six  months after the 
Kyrgyz Republic 's withdrawal of concessions.  
4.4.  On the basis of  the above -mentioned, the Kyrgyz Republic expresses its gratitude for the 
understanding of interested WTO  Members, and for their support in demonstrating no objections on 
the issue of the extension of rights. The Kyrgyz Republic will continue communicating  and 
exchanging information with the relevant partners to this process in due course  and thanked the 
European Union and the Russian Federation for their comments . G/C/M/141  
 
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  4.5.  The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
4.6.  The European Union welcomes the progress achieved in its negotiations with the Kyrgyz 
Republic on tariffs for non -agricultural products, where an agreement of principle has been reached.  
On agriculture, recent progress indicates that an agreement of princi ple could also be reached soon, 
potentially by MC12.  The EU therefore looks forward to completing these compensation negotiations 
in the near future.  
4.7.  The delegate of the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
4.8.  The Russian Federation will continue to su pport the negotiation process of the Kyrgyz Republic 
in order to conclude it successfully. The Russian Federation supports the extension of the deadline.  
4.9.  The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made  and of the 
Kyrgyz  Republic' s communication, and that it agree to extend the deadline to withdraw substantially 
equivalent concessions under GATT  Article  XXVIII for 12  months, until 12 February  2023, as set out 
in document  G/L/1137/Add.6 . 
4.10.   The Council  so agreed . 
5  CUBA – REQUEST FOR AN EXTENSION OF THE WAIVER CONCERNING ARTICLE  XV:6 OF 
THE GATT  1994 CONTAINED IN THE DECISION OF 7  DECEMBER  2016 (WT/L/1003) – 
(G/C/W/803)  
5.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
Cuba, which had also requested the Secretariat to circulate document  G/C/W/803 ,dated 
14 October  2021, contain ing a request for an extension of the waiver from its obligations under 
Article  XV:6 of the GATT  1994 because it was not a member of the International Monetary Fund  
(IMF). 
5.2.  The delegate of Cuba indicated the following:  
5.3.  Cuba once again brings to the Council a request for a waiver extension under paragraph  6 of 
Article  XV of the GATT , as it has done every five  years since October  1986.  It does so in light of the 
fact that C uba is not a member of the IMF , and the current waiver extension will expire on 
31 December  2021. Beyond the reasons that had justified previous extensions of the waiver, they 
had become more acute  as described in the document . 
5.4.  Indeed, Cuba wishes to highl ight the measures under  the financial and commercial embargo 
that the United States maintains against Cuba. The administration of former President Trump 
introduced 243  measures , tightening  the embargo , that are still in  force, and that, particularly 
following the pandemic, have combined to make it still more severe . Cuba could advance 
considerably if , as the international community has called for , the embargo were lifted. For example,  
recently , in the context of the 76th UN General Asse mbly, a number  of Heads of State referred to 
Cuba's embargo.  
5.5.  Cuba has complied rigorously with the decisions taken  by the General Council , including  
reporting on an annual basis the various measures required under  the waiver exemption . 
Furthermore,  this remains the focus of Cuba's activities , including compliance . 
5.6.  In addition, Cuba  would like to reiterate that the approval of this extension will have no 
negative consequences for the WTO Membership . To the contrary , Cuba reaffirms its commitment 
not to cause any injury or prejudice to Members' rights . The extension of the waiver exemption 
seeks to  continue promoting trade and investment for WTO Members , as can be seen in the 
documents that have been circulated . 
5.7.  The Council took note  of Cuba's  statement , approved  the request for an extension of the waiver 
contained in document  G/C/W/803 , and agree d to forward the draft  waiver decision to the General 
Council for adoption.  G/C/M/141  
 
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  6  MEASURES TO ALLOW GRADUATED LDCS, WITH GNP BELOW USD  1,000, BENEFITS 
PURSUANT TO ANNEX  VII(B) OF THE AGREEMENT ON SUBSIDIES AND COUNTERVAILING 
MEASURES – REQUEST FROM CHAD ON BEHALF OF THE LDC  GROUP (WT/GC/W/742 -
G/C/W/752)  
6.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of 
Chad, on behalf of the LDC  Group.  
6.2.  The delegate of Bangladesh , speaking on behalf of the LDC  Group, indicated the following:  
6.3.  The LDC  Group has pointed out several times t hat the specific objective of this proposal is to 
correct a technical oversight. According to Article  27.2(a) of the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures  (SCM Agreement ), some  Members are eligible to enjoy flexibilities under 
this agreement. Eligible  Members are specified under Annex  VII of the Agreement under  
two separate categories: (a)  the least developed countries ( LDCs); and (b)  certain developing 
countries , as long  as their GNI  per capita remains below USD  1,000 in constant 1990  US dollar 
terms.  
6.4.  It is possible that some  LDCs, that is, countries listed under  Annex  VII(a)  of the 
SCM Agreement , may graduate from the LDC  category even with a GNI per capita that remains 
below USD  1,000 in constant 1990  US dollar s (as, for example, Nepal).  However, it  is not clear 
whether or not these LDCs , after graduation, and having a GNI threshold comparable to the 
Annex  VII(b) countries, can still benefit from the flexibility foreseen in Article  27.2 of the 
SCM Agreement . This is a technical oversight that should be corrected.  
6.5.  Therefore, the submission proposes that an LDC  Member , after graduation, as long as it 
remains below the USD 1,000 GNI  threshold, should be allowed to have recourse to the flexibility 
foreseen under  Article  27.2 of the SCM Agreement . The LDC  Group 's proposal is focused on a 
clarification issue only ; it is not proposing to change any rule. Th e submission has already received 
wide support and the LDC Group is grateful to all Members.  
6.6.  At the same time, the LDC Group is engaging with the European Union  and the United States 
on the concerns that they have raised . The LDC  Group is grateful for the opportunity to do so . 
Furthermore, the LDC  Group trusts that it can continue  with its informal meetings  with the EU and 
the US in order to get a positive result on the LDC  Group submission. In conclusion, Bangladesh, 
along with the LDC  Group, stands ready to engage constructively with Members.  
6.7.  The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
6.8.  As the United States  mentioned at the  Council's  previous meeting, due to some data -related 
issues, the U nited States will be working with the Secretariat to provide a table for Members showing 
the GNI  per capita for all WTO  Members, in accordance with the metho dology set out in 
document  G/SCM/38.  
6.9.  The table should appear as it does in document  G/SCM/110/Add.18, the annual Secretariat  
Note that updates GNI  per capita for Members listed in Annex  VII(b) , and it should provide GNI  per 
capita at constant 1990  US dollars  for each Member for the most recent three  years for which data 
is available.  
6.10.   The United States will ask that the SCM  Secretariat circulate the table to Members when it 
has been prepared , and the U nited States looks forward to reviewing it.  
6.11.   The dele gate of Turkey  indicated the following:  
6.12.   As stated at previous meetings of the Council, Turkey  continues to  support this proposal.  
6.13.   The delegate of India indicated the following:  
6.14.   India has already supported this proposal in earlier meetings of the Council,  and its position 
remains the same.  G/C/M/141  
 
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  6.15.   The delegate of Brazil  indicated the following:  
6.16.   Brazil reiterates its support for the LDC proposal to amend Annex  VII of the SCM Agreement , 
to allow graduated LDCs , whose GDP  per capita remains below USD  1,000, to continue to be covered 
by Article  27.2(a). Brazil recalls that it has already supported this proposal, both within the scope of 
the SCM Committee and in the CTG itself.  
6.17.   The delegate of Nigeria  indicated the following:  
6.18.   Nigeria thank s the LDC  Group for the proposal and reiterate s its support for it. 
6.19.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
6.20.   As there have been no new developments, the European Union's views remain the same as 
those expressed at the Council's previous meetings.  
6.21.   To recall, t he European Union supports constructive initiatives meant to better integrate LDCs 
into the multilateral trading system . To this end, the EU encourage s discussing this proposal , as any 
Special and Differential (SDT)  proposal , on the basis of ana lysis that shows where specific problems 
lie. 
6.22.   The European Union is mindful of the challenges that graduating LDCs face.  However, the EU 
would still need to assess the actual use of export subsidies by LDCs in order to establish whether a 
transition period  is needed that would allow graduated LDCs to continue using export subsidies. In 
this regard, the EU would also welcome the submission of any additional data , as suggested by the 
United States  and discussed at the Council's previous meeting.  
6.23.   The European Union stands ready to engage in informal consultations with the LDC  Group on 
this proposal.  
6.24.   The delegate of Angola  indicated the following:  
6.25.   Angola support s the proposal.  
6.26.   The delegate of Nepal  indicated the following:  
6.27.   Nepal wishes to  associate itself with the statement delivered by Chad on behalf of the 
LDC Group , and add some additional points . The eligibility criteria set out for graduation allows for 
countries to be come  eligible for graduation even by meeting only two of the relevant criteria , thus 
making it possible for a  country to graduat e without meeting the threshold of per capita income.  
6.28.   In this situation, the graduated Members may have a low level of GNP per capita and still 
meet and respect the spirit of the eligibility criteria set out in  Annex  VII(b) of the SCM Agreement . 
However, such a count ry, once graduated,  cannot benefit from flexibilit ies in export incentives , as 
per the relevant provision laid down in the Agreement , even if it still has a low GNP per capita and 
meets  the other relevant criteria set out in Annex  VII(b) of the SCM Agreement.  
6.29.   Nepal, for example, is graduating without meeting the GNI  per capita criteria , although  it is 
currently still eligible to benefit from this provision of Annex  VII(b). In consequence, Nepal will lose 
this benefit upon graduation , even if it is still being enjoyed by other developing countries in a similar 
situation.  This is unfair, and a lapse in WTO law requiring that Members make the necessary positive 
adjustment s. 
6.30.   LDC graduation is a global agenda and target ; therefore, enabling and encouraging 
LDC graduation by extending maximum possible support to graduating LDC  Members both before 
and after their graduation , and in a just manner , becomes urgent in order to meet this global target 
in a timely and sustainable manner.  
6.31.   Furthermore, LDC  Member s have been devastated by the COVID -19 pandemic , with  health 
and economic systems unable to respond appropriately to its challenges.  In addition,  LDC Member s 
have been suffering from huge gap s in many areas , especially infrastructure (including G/C/M/141  
 
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  ICT infrastructure ), institutional and human capacity, resources, and technology , among others . The 
COVID -19 pandemic has further exacerbated the challenges  for LDCs in their socio -economic 
transformation and their exports have been  severely affected.  Furthermore,  the fact that LDCs only 
have a 1% share in world export s is a matter of disappointment considering that LDCs represent 
approximately 13% of the world's population.  
6.32.   In this context, graduated  LDCs,  or LDCs that are in the process of graduation , which still 
meet the criteria allowing recourse to export incentives , as per the provision s and spirit of the 
Agreement , should be permitted to enjoy the same level of flexibility  as others.  
6.33.   This provision of the SCM Agreement  seems to be very much focused on the level of an 
LDC Member's economic development , particularly in terms of GNP per capita ; for this reason , this 
provision needs to be applied in a fair manner by extending the  same level of  flexibility  to 
LDC Members even after graduation if they are eligible in terms of the provision s and spirit of the 
Agreement.  
6.34.   In conclusion, the LDC  Group is not demanding any thing new but only requesting that minor 
adjustment s be made  in accordance with the spirit of the law.  
6.35.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
7  WITHDRAWAL OF THE UNITED KINGDOM FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION: PROCEDURES 
UNDER ARTICLE  XXVIII:3 OF GATT  1994 – COMMUNICATION FROM THE EUROPEAN 
UNION (G/L/1385/ADD.1)  
7.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  the 
European Union.  
7.2.  The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
7.3.  The European Union  recall s that , on 22  December  2020, it submitted 
document  G/SECRET/42/Add.3 in connection to the ongoing negotiations under Article  XXVIII of  the 
GATT  1994 on the apportionment of the European Union's tariff rate quota  (TRQ) concessions 
following the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union.  That communication 
highlighted that the European Union strives for the rapid and successful conclusion of these ongoing 
negotiations and consultations.  
7.4.  The European Union is pleased to report that good progress has been achieved. Agreements 
have been formally signed with six  partners. Negotiations were finalized and are going through 
domestic validation procedures with a further five  partners. In addition, there are several  negotiating 
and consultation partners with whom there are very good prospects of closing negotiations and 
advancing towards initialling  a draft agreement.  
7.5.  Thus, in line with established practice in the framework of Article  XXVIII negotiations , and also 
under Article  XXIV:6, the European Union  believes it is desirable to extend the timelines of 
Article  XXVIII:3 of GATT  1994 by six  months, namely until 1  July 2022, without prejudice to the 
question of whether there are any rights to withdraw concessions purs uant to Article  XXVIII:3(a) 
and (b).  On this basis, the EU and other Members currently engaged in these Article  XXVIII 
procedures can continue to concentrate on bringing these negotiations and consultations to a 
successful conclusion in the coming months.  The EU remains fully committed to successfully 
conduct ing these negotiations and consultations within this extended deadline.  Therefore, the 
European Union proposes that the Council take note of this communication  and that it agree on the 
extension of the deadline until 1  July 2022, as indicated in document  G/L/1385/Add.1.  
7.6.  The Chair person  propose d that the Council take note of the European  Union's communication  
and the statement made . He also propose d that the Council agree on the extension of the deadline 
as set out in the European Union's communication  G/L/1385/Add.1, until 1  July 2022.  
7.7.  The Council  so agreed . G/C/M/141  
 
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  8  UNITED KINGDOM'S WITHDRAWAL FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION: PROCEDURES UNDER 
ARTICLE  XXVIII:3 OF GATT  1994 – COMMUNICATION FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM 
(G/L/1386/ADD.1)  
8.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  the 
United Kingdom.  
8.2.  The delegate of the United Kingdom  indicated the following:  
8.3.  The United Kingdom refers Members to document  G/L/1386/A dd.1, circulated on  
22 October  2021. Members will be aware that the United Kingdom  has been in ongoing negotiations 
and consultations with trading partners with respect to it s obligations concerning TRQs contained 
within the United Kingdom 's Schedule  of concessions and commitments on goods in a process under 
Article  XXVIII of the GATT.  
8.4.  Document  G/L/1386/A dd.1 sets out that the United Kingdom will now provide for the extension 
of timelines under Article  XXVIII:3 of the GATT by six months , until 1  July 2022.  
8.5.  The United Kingdom  has been consistently clear that it is strongly committed to working closely 
with WTO  Members in discussions on the U nited Kingdom 's Schedule , including th e process under 
Article  XXVIII, with the aim to conclude these discussions with all partners successfully. The U nited 
Kingdom  thus see s an extension to these timelines as the best course of action to facilitate this 
outcome.  
8.6.  The United Kingdom  continues to have productive discussion s with relevant Members, and is 
pleased with the positive and sustained progress that it has been making in these negotiations 
towards resolving Members ' concerns.  The U nited Kingdom  therefore believe s that this 
six-month  extension will be sufficient for those discussions to reach their conclusion.  
8.7.  The United Kingdom  would like to thank those Members that have e ngaged constructively on 
matters relating to its Goods Schedule  so far. The U nited Kingdom  will further update Members 
following the conclusion of Article  XXVIII  negotiations, in line with past WTO  practice.  
8.8.  The Chair person  propose d that the Council take note of the United Kingdom's communication  
and the statement made . He also propose d that the Council agree on the extension of the deadline , 
as set out in the United Kingdom 's communication  G/L/1386/Add.1, until 1  July 2022.  
8.9.  The Coun cil so agreed . 
9  EUROPEAN UNION – RECTIFICATION AND MODIFICATION OF SCHEDULES – 
SCHEDULE  CLXXV – REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION  
9.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  the 
European Union.  
9.2.  The delegate of the  European Union  indicated the following : 
9.3.  The Russia n Federation  is the only WTO  Member maintaining a reservation on the EU -28 draft 
Schedule  CLXXV, which notably impedes the certification of the European Union's  Nairobi 
commitments on export subsidies, a matter which is of systemic importance.  
9.4.  The European Union has engaged with the Russia n Federation  and replied to all its technical 
questions. In the EU's view, there are no more reasons to maintain the reservati on. Therefore, t he 
European Union urges Russia to lift the reservation as soon as possible.  
9.5.  The European Union  underlines that schedule certification is not a process that is suitable for, 
and capable of, supporting requests formulated in the context of WT O tariff negotiations , or 
challenging the outcome of such negotiations.  G/C/M/141  
 
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  9.6.  The delegate of the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
9.7.  The Russian Federation notes that neither its comments related to the increase of Aggregate 
Measurement of Support (AMS)  and non -completion of negotiations under Article  XXIV:6 of the GATT 
between the Russian Federation and the European Union following Croatia' s accession to the 
European Union, nor other comments provided for in Note s Verbales submitted by the Russian  
Federation,  have been taken into account by the European Union. For this reason, the Russian 
Federation continues to be concerned with the modification of the schedule  proposed by the 
European Union. 
9.8.  The Council took note  of the st atements made.  
10  EUROPEAN UNION – IMPLEMENTATION OF NON -TARIFF BARRIERS ON 
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM ARGENTINA, AUSTRALIA, BRAZIL, CANADA, 
COLOMBIA, COSTA RICA, ECUADOR, JAMAICA, PANAMA, PARAGUAY, THE UNITED STATES, 
AND URUGUAY (G/C/W/767/REV.1)  
10.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of 
Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Jamaica, Panama, Paraguay, 
the United States, and Uruguay.  
10.2.   The delegate of Brazil  indicated the f ollowing:  
10.3.   The Brazilian co -sponsorship of this agenda item stems from the understanding that the 
European Union's position in relation to the definition of maximum residue limits (MRLs) puts at risk 
the balance established in the Agreement on the Applicati on of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
(SPS Agreement ) between the principle of protection of life and human and animal health and the  
guarantee that market access conditions negotiated multilaterally are not undermined by unjustified 
non-tariff measures. This balance rests upon the scientific principles enshrined in the 
SPS Agreement, and materialized through risk analysis, which must g uide the adoption of sanitary 
and phytosanitary measures. However, when prohibitions based on the hazard approach and/or 
recourse to Article  5.7 of the SPS  Agreement become the norm, despite technical advice from 
renowned institutions, the balance tilts to wards protectionism. And this condition of imbalance 
cannot last.  
10.4.   Brazil considers that this issue is not merely technical or legal, as European policy implies 
concrete risks to the maintenance of safe and efficient production systems in various regions of  the 
world. It prevents access to pest control instruments that threaten the viability of food production, 
and discourages scientific research, which would allow access to new chemical and biological 
technologies to combat these pests.  
10.5.   Currently, it is fas hionable to draw attention to the risk that climate change may lead to the 
introduction of new pests, especially in areas of temperate agriculture. Without underestimating this 
risk, it is imperative to remember that such tropical countries as Brazil have always faced these 
SPS risks. Furthermore, the success or failure of agricultural activity depends on access to the new 
technologies. In the case of Brazil, for example, the sustainability of several crops is at risk, such as 
soybeans, citrus fruits, coffe e, wheat, bananas, and papayas, which are a source of income and 
nutrients for a very important portion of the Brazilian and world population. In contrast, the 
introduction of new technologies has also led to more sustainable agricultural production; it ha s 
made it possible to use new practices in several countries, such as the no -till system, for example.  
10.6.   It is indisputable that production has become more sustainable, since no -tillage prevents soil 
erosion, reduces water loss through evaporation, increases  the level of organic matter in the soil, 
reduces the use of fossil fuels with machinery and equipment, and provides a better balance of 
microbiological properties in soils. Indeed, it is an essential mechanism for increases in production 
based on increase d productivity, and not the expansion of the planted area or deforestation.  
10.7.   It is worrying that, 25  years after its adoption, the interpretation given to the SPS  Agreement 
differs from the purposes that guided the negotiations during the Uruguay Round. It is also worrying 
that Brazil and other Members have to bring debates of this nature to the CTG in a context in which G/C/M/141  
 
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  Brazil itself has been following with concern certain legislation projects that try to create non -tariff 
trade barriers under the guise of environmental protection measures.  
10.8.   In addition, Brazil is extremely concerned about the publication by the European Union of 
more than 2,600  emergency authorizations by its member States of substances under review since 
2017. Many of these requests present  the same arguments as delegations from other Members in 
the SPS and the Technical Barriers to Trade ( TBT) Committees, while others simply do not offer any  
justification and yet were approved.  
10.9.   In this context, Brazil believes that the European Union's trea tment of countries requesting 
longer transition periods or exceptions to pesticide MRL  decreases (or "import tolerances") is clearly 
discriminatory and incompatible with WTO  rules.  
10.10.   The delegate of Paraguay  indicated the following:  
10.11.   Paraguay regrets having t o place this item on the agenda once again, in view of the lack of 
progress in resolving this concern that it still has with the European Union. Paraguay also regrets 
that, despite the fact that the EU received a comprehensive list of questions, the EU has decided not 
to reply to the written queries contained in document  G/SPS/GEN/1926, which was circulated on 
25 June 2021.  
10.12.   Paraguay wishes to avoid repeating its previous statements; nevertheless, it is difficult to 
avoid referring to the same points when it  is not possible to move forward in the absence of a 
response, both in relation to this concern overall, and specifically in relation to the last set of detailed 
questions. At the same time, the four  Members that worked on the preparation of 
document  G/SPS /GEN/1926, including Paraguay, are developing countries, with small teams both in 
capitals and in Geneva. These four  Members spent time and effort in producing their document and, 
for this reason, it is their hope that the delegation of one of the larger W TO Members will also be 
able to invest time and work in order to respond in writing to the question raised in 
document  G/SPS/GEN/1926.  
10.13.   Paraguay recalls that the European Union announces in its proposal for reforming the 
functioning of the committees that, for better functioning, Members should submit their questions 
in writing with a view to moving forward on trade concerns, and that Members receiving questions 
should try to respond to them within 30  days of receiving them. This is considered by the EU as 
"good practice" , which should be adopted in accordance with its proposal. However, the issue with 
which we are dealing today seems to be an exception.  
10.14.   Paraguay wishes to briefly recall the following points: (i)  the European Union is applying the 
precautiona ry principle with respect to the elimination of active substances, which are routinely 
reviewed and whose maximum residue levels (MRLs) are reduced to the limit of detection, without 
conclusive scientific evidence, even where international Codex Alimentari us standards exist; (ii)  the 
import tolerance procedure considers issues outside the scientific field, such as the so -called "other 
legitimate factors", which are not defined in the European legislation; (iii)  in addition, the import 
tolerance procedure ta kes at least two  years, and there is no guarantee that it will ultimately be  
successful; (iv)  despite the EU's claim that these measures are adopted because  consumer health 
cannot be compromised, even though there is no scientific evidence supporting these  decisions, it 
also admits that these measures are being taken to "level the playing field"; that is to say, to benefit 
its producers and protect them from what they consider to be unfair competition; (v)  the EU is 
seeking extraterritorial application of i ts policies, without regard to climatic, geographical and other 
differences in production systems, which make it impracticable to replicate its models in developing 
countries with tropical and subtropical climates; (vi)  European producers benefit from bill ions of 
euros in subsidies that distort agricultural trade and, according to reports of the FAO, OECD, UNDP, 
and UNEP, are at the same time most damaging to the environment; and (vii)  European producers 
also benefit from thousands of emergency authorizatio ns allowing them to continue using these 
"prohibited" products, with a simplified procedure that merely involves sending a form to the 
member State, which is approved despite being practically blank on a number of occasions. This can 
be confirmed in the pu blicly available database that is maintained by the EU. Furthermore, in order 
to obtain these exceptions, European producers put forward many of the same grounds that 
Paraguayan producers claim are problematic in the policies implemented by the EU. However , 
Paraguayan producers are not beneficiaries of this type of special treatment, which is exclusively G/C/M/141  
 
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  reserved for European producers. Paraguay notes, above all, a proliferation of emergency 
authorizations in France, for beet producers, with respect to subs tances that are considered 
neonicotinoids and regarding which the EU recently announced that it was not granting import 
tolerances because the protection of bees is a global environmental concern. However, the EU has 
failed to provide a response as to whet her it would no longer be granting emergency authorizations 
while no longer granting import tolerances.  
10.15.   In light of the above, Paraguay considers that the EU  measures are not only discriminatory 
but also provide more favourable treatment to EU  domestic pro ducers than to their competitors. 
Furthermore, Paraguay also considers that the EU  measures are inconsistent with the European 
Union's  obligations under the TBT and SPS  Agreements in being more restrictive than necessary and 
in not being based on scientifi c evidence.  
10.16.   The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
10.17.   Australia, as a co -sponsor of this item, again highlights its ongoing concerns in relation to 
the European Union's non -tariff barriers on agricultural products, including agricultural chemical 
regulations and policy and the potential negative effect on farmers and trade. This includes concerns 
about elements of the EU's Farm to Fork Strategy and its implementation. Australia has also 
previously raised its concerns about the EU's risk assessment and import tolerance setting policies 
in this Council, as well as at the TBT and SPS  Committees.  
10.18.   Australia raised or supported a number of specific trade concerns against the European 
Union, including at the most recent SPS and TBT  Committee meetings. Many  other Members also 
joined in expressing these concerns, highlighting a strong level of concern from a broad cross -section 
of Members regarding the EU's measures. It is clear that these concerns are largely based on the 
EU's lack of transparency and predic tability for exporters.  
10.19.   While Australia recognizes the right of WTO  Members to regulate agricultural and other 
chemicals in a manner that protects animal, plant and human health and the environment, Members 
are also bound by WTO  obligations, particularly i n relation to undertaking science -based risk 
assessments and ensuring that measures are no more trade  restrictive than necessary. Australia is 
a strong supporter of robust, risk and science -based regulations of agricultural chemicals.  
10.20.   Australia questions t he European Union's approach to the approval and renewal of plant 
protection product authorizations and import tolerance limits that relies primarily on hazard -based 
assessment. In doing so, it is unclear how the EU hazard -based assessment is consistent wi th 
internationally agreed risk assessment standards for import tolerances.  
10.21.   Australia continues to seek clarification on how the European Union determines threats to 
consumers of treated produce and would welcome discussion on the risk assessments that unde rpin 
EU decisions on import tolerances. Australia also seeks greater clarity from the EU on how hazards 
of a substance are differentiated in terms of the substance used in a production system compared 
with presence in consumed produce.  
10.22.   In the last decade, the EU  ban of many active constituents on the basis of their hazardous 
properties, and the subsequent reduced availability of plant protection products (PPPs), has 
significantly contributed to the increasing number of emergency authorizations granted under  
Article  53 of Regulation (EC) No.  1107/2009. Australia notes that, since 2011, there has been a 
considerable increase in the number of these authorizations, many of which are for non -approved 
PPPs.  
10.23.   The use of emergency authorizations and setting of relate d temporary MRLs to allow the 
supply and consumption of treated produce can lead to trade imbalances that are not in line with 
WTO standards and obligations. Australia is concerned that the establishment of MRLs under 
emergency authorization does not apply  equally to imported and EU  produce. Australia would 
welcome more details on the European Union's process of emergency authorization and 
establishment of temporary MRLs.  
10.24.   Australia is looking for the European Union to substantially engage on these long -running 
issues with Australia and other Members.  G/C/M/141  
 
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  10.25.   The delegate of Colombia  indicated the following:  
10.26.   Colombia regrets that, since the item was first raised, insufficient progress has been made  
on the substance of this item for it to be removed from the agenda. C olombia also regrets that it 
has not received a reply from the European Union to its latest set of questions, prepared with several 
countries six  months ago.  
10.27.   On this occasion, Colombia intends to summarize its position and address more explicitly the 
Europ ean policy's implementation, rather than considering its nature or political decision. It must be 
stressed that the European Union's MRL policy, beyond its guiding principles, its justifications, and  
its public policy objectives, is simply discriminatory i n its implementation. Indeed, regardless of 
whether one agrees or disagrees with its purported objectives, the way in which the policy works in 
practice is very different for local and foreign producers. The differences are as follows.  
10.28.   First, Colombia has stated that the European Union's process to determine MRLs is 
discriminatory in terms of selecting the substances to be reviewed. When it comes to choosing which 
substances will be evaluated every year, a natural prioritization and selection exercise is co nducted 
by the EU. Obviously, certain substances are chosen for evaluation over others, taking into 
consideration the impact on its own constituencies, not on foreign ones. Thus, This selection exercise 
can therefore lead to setting aside certain substance s that would burden its own agricultural 
producers, or more easily selecting substances that have already lost their intellectual property 
protection, in which case the laboratories producing said substances protect themselves by closing 
the door to potent ial generic competitors abroad. In this first  selection process, carried out behind 
closed doors and with room for arbitrariness, there is a lot of leeway for domestic trade protection.  
10.29.   Second, it is also discriminatory to establish different MRLs for the same substance, but used 
in a primarily European product versus a foreign one. For example, banana peel treated with a 
pesticide called imazalil is considered hazardous, whereas orange peel treated with imazalil is 
considered non -hazardous. One does no t have to be an expert to know that orange peel can be 
consumed , while banana peel cannot. There is also unequal treatment in the selection of products 
to be reviewed, which should be equal.  
10.30.   Third, in terms of allowing the involvement of stakeholders, the European procedure allows 
its member States and their stakeholders to intervene at various stages, while other Members have 
to wait until the decision reaches the WTO to have a say; that is, after an intra -European consensus 
has already b een negotiated and achieved. Hence, despite notifications and comments being 
submitted, they have never changed a single measure pertaining to MRLs. Comments from European 
producers and countries are made at a point in the process when they are effective, while comments 
from foreign producers and countries are made after the decision has already been taken. There is 
no equal treatment.  
10.31.   Fourth, the implementation of the European policy has powerful exceptions, waivers and 
carve -outs, which take into account the different geographical and climatic conditions of countries, 
as well as the localized prevalence of pests. For these situations, there exists a simple waiver 
procedure, a carve -out, that allows European farmers to continue using the substance, to sell it 
throughout the European market, and to export it without adequate controls. None of these 
geographical or climatic circumstances is duly recognized as valid for foreign products. Especially in 
tropical areas, pests are prevalent and distinctive. Again, one does not have to be an expert to see 
that higher temperatures lead to a higher prevalence of pests than in temperate zones. That said, 
these simple and convenient waivers, which are poorly controlled and known as "emergency 
authorizations", do not exis t for foreign products. For foreigners, there is a difficult procedure, which 
is often impossible to carry out and increasingly strict. An exception mechanism should be 
equivalent, and equally strict or flexible, which is one of Colombia's reasonable reque sts. 
10.32.   Therefore, the policy on MRLs, with its laudable green objectives, human health protection, 
and biodiversity conservation (which Colombia fully shares), clashes with a severely unfair 
implementation plan, in which some must comply with very onerous ru les, with no possibility of 
discussing them, while others can influence, decide, and even exempt themselves from measures 
that they themselves have discussed. This is not a matter of health or the environment, but simply 
of protectionism in the implementat ion of a policy.  G/C/M/141  
 
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  10.33.   To this rather bleak picture must be added, lastly, the huge subsidy capacity that the 
European Union has to ensure that its producers are able to adapt to any standard, which other 
Members lack. Not only are the standards uneven, but so a re the financial means to support the 
producers.  
10.34.   To be very clear, all of the above occurs without the basis for the policy itself being called 
into question. Colombia has also questioned the scientific basis for such determinations and, in 
particular, the  precautionary application of new MRLs in the absence of any negative information on 
their effects. However, here at this meeting, Colombia is still focusing on the uneven and 
discriminatory implementation of these standards.  
10.35.   For this reason, Colombia agai n stresses the need for the establishment of a structured and 
comprehensive mechanism for plurilateral dialogue, in parallel with bilateral discussions, in order to 
seek constructive and substantive solutions to this uneven playing field. Colombia proposes  the 
following options, which it considers reasonable and acceptable for the European Union, and which 
do not require the EU to change its policy or regulations, without prejudice to the fact that Colombia 
reserves its rights in connection with the latter aspect. Constructive spirit could be shown through 
the adoption of the following measures: (a)  creating a mirror  mechanism for import authorizations, 
strictly equivalent to the existence of emergency authorizations within the EU, allowing producers 
to cont inue using products containing non -authorized substances, or granting emergency 
authorizations under the same terms as those that apply to European producers; (b)  allowing longer 
transition periods, especially in cases where there are no viable alternative s for substances not 
renewed on the market; (c)  carrying out a joint review of the marketing authorization procedure for 
substances, to ensure the effective participation of the countries affected, in terms of good 
regulatory practices, well before the not ifications reach the WTO; and (d)  maintaining the MRLs 
defined by the Codex Alimentarius in cases in which scientific evidence is inconclusive, until the 
scientific data are complete. In cases in which there are no Codex MRLs, the EU could establish a 
fixed MRL, by default different from the 0.01%, which meets its objective, but is not more trade 
restrictive than necessary.  
10.36.   These are simply a few ideas that Colombia believes are constructive and plausible for all. 
Reaching an agreement requires political wi ll and a lot of dialogue, for which Colombia is fully 
prepared.  
10.37.   The delegate of Uruguay  indicated the following:  
10.38.   As Members all know, trade in agricultural products continues to be the most protected and 
distorted at the global level, and this is due to di fferent tariff and non -tariff measures and policies. 
In particular, the European Union's non -tariff policies and measures affecting trade in agricultural 
products have led to the accumulation, on the agenda of various WTO  bodies, of a large and growing 
number of specific trade concerns by various Members.  
10.39.   In this regard, Uruguay wishes to reiterate its trade and systemic concern regarding the 
European Union's use of a hazard -based approach, rather than full risk assessments, in its regulatory 
decisions link ed to SPS matters.  
10.40.   Uruguay would like to make it clear that any determination of MRLs, particularly when it  
deviates from internationally accepted standards and harmonization efforts in multilateral forums 
such as the Codex, must be based on a full scienti fic risk assessment and conclusive scientific 
evidence. This is essential to maintain the effective balance that must exist between the right of 
Members to pursue their legitimate objectives and the need to avoid creating unnecessary barriers 
to trade.  
10.41.   Uruguay agrees with other Members that the issue of emergency authorizations to use 
non-approved active substances in general, or for certain specific uses, which are granted by 
EU member States to their domestic producers, should be discussed in more depth. Specifically, 
Uruguay notes that this element could lead to tensions regarding the consistency of the policies 
adopted at domestic level by the member States of the European Union with the aim of protecting 
health at Community level, as well as to trade -related situations that could be discriminatory 
vis-à-vis third parties.  G/C/M/141  
 
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  10.42.   Furthermore, Uruguay wishes to underline its concern about persisting uncertainties over 
the approach, definition, and implementation of the new EU  regulations on veterinary drugs, 
particularly regarding the requirements that would be imposed on exporting third  countries as of 
January  2022. In this regard, Uruguay would like to stress that any measure should be based on 
international standards, or on conclusive scientific evidence; that the specific circumstances of 
different countries, including the prevalence of diseases and regulations in force to address 
antimicrobial resistance, should be taken into account; and that transition periods should be provided 
for that are appropriate to t he individual situations in productive sectors and the marketing 
conditions of the products concerned.  
10.43.   Thus, we once again urge the European Union, as one of the largest markets for agricultural 
products, to reconsider its regulatory approach in order to a void the unjustified proliferation of 
barriers to international trade in agricultural products. Consideration must be given to the serious 
social and economic consequences that these policies may have on other Members, especially 
developing and LDCs, whose  economies rely on the production and trade of agricultural and  
agro-industrial products, and for which the EU market is of key importance.  
10.44.   The delegate of Ecuador  indicated the following:  
10.45.   Ecuador also regrets to include once again this item on the CTG's agenda. Although Ecuador  
has called upon the European Union multiple times to act in accordance with its multilateral 
commitments, Ecuador notes with concern that there is no response to its requests. Indeed, 
Ecuador's concern grows even more since, given t he current circumstances, the post -pandemic 
economic recovery requires a global and coordinated effort.  
10.46.   Ecuador refers to its previous interventions in this Council and once again urges the 
European Union not to adopt restrictive trade measures without con clusive scientific evidence. 
Rather, Ecuador urges the European Union (i)  to observe international standards recognized as 
binding on human, plant and animal health protection and not to apply unilaterally determined 
standards; (ii)  to comply with the requ irements established in the SPS  Agreement, which take a risk  
assessment approach to any measure; and (iii)  to consider suspending the ongoing implementation 
of measures to reduce MRLs and maintain the levels recommended by the Codex Alimentarius,  
granting the necessary adjustment period, of at least 36  months, in cases where the reduction of 
MRLs is shown to be essential. On this last point, Ecuador notes that, together with the delegations 
of Colombia, Guatemala, and Paraguay, it has submitted written foll ow-up questions to the EU in 
the framework of the Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, which are contained in 
document  G/SPS/GEN/1926. The co -sponsors submitted the document in a constructive spirit, 
seeking to obtain additional information on  the modification of MRLs. However, to date, no reply has 
been received.  
10.47.   Ecuador urges the European Union to be proactive regarding the exchange of information, 
and to engage in a dialogue that would allow Members to move forward in addressing their 
longst anding trade concerns. It is  Ecuador's understanding that this interest is shared by all the 
parties.  
10.48.   The delegate of Panama  indicated the following:  
10.49.   Panama wishes to echo the statements made by previous speakers. As co -sponsor of this 
trade concern and jo int communication, Panama reiterates the importance it attaches to this issue. 
The reduction of MRLs without sufficient scientific evidence restricts access to essential substances  
for agricultural production, particularly in countries with a tropical climate, such as Panama.  
10.50.   Panama believes that the European Union's set of policies and practices carries  the risk of 
nullifying and impairing the legitimate rights of the WTO  Members that have signed the Agreement 
on Agriculture and the SPS  Agreement.  
10.51.   While Panama agrees with the European Union's goal of supporting the global transition to 
more sustainable w orld agri -food systems, this goal must be based on building solutions designed 
and implemented through dialogue mechanisms, and multilateral cooperation frameworks. Panama 
once again urges the EU to listen to the legitimate concerns of dozens of WTO  Member s. Panama G/C/M/141  
 
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  believes that a constructive, serious, and ongoing dialogue, in conjunction with mutually agreed 
technical assistance, will allow us to reach mutually beneficial solutions.  
10.52.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
10.53.   The United Sta tes continues to be concerned about the European Union's implementation of 
non-tariff barriers on agricultural products. Increasingly, the EU is developing rigid polices with 
extraterritorial implications that force third  countries to adopt European produc tion practices or to 
abandon trade.  
10.54.   The European Union continues to lower many M RLs to trade -restrictive levels without clear  
scientific justification or measurable benefit to human health. The EU's hazard -based approach to 
pesticide regulation may lead to  trade barriers that threaten the security of global food systems.  
10.55.   Further, the European Union enforces new reduced MRLs at the point of production for 
domestic goods, and at point of importation for imported goods. This causes trade inefficiencies and 
disruptions for products destined for the EU  market, depending on when a new reduced MRL is 
enforced, and results in both an inconsistent application of the SPS  measure and an unfair advantage 
for EU  producers, especially for products with long shelf lives.  
10.56.   The United States remains concerned that it appears as though the European Union is 
following a similar approach through its new veterinary drug legislation that could prohibit producers 
from using antimicrobials that are not considered medically important.  The United States recalls its 
concerns, as raised in the SPS  Committee, that these prescriptive restrictions, which do not appear 
to be based on completed risk assessments, will apply to foreign producers shipping animals and 
animal products to the EU.  
10.57.   The United States urges the European Union to consider the needs of agricultural producers 
and both recognize and respect the level of protection provided by other countries' national 
regulatory systems as it works to implement its own system. The internat ional community should 
be working together to support science -based measures that promote a safe and sustainable food 
supply, and the United States  calls upon the European Union to join with its trading partners in 
identifying such mutually beneficial solu tions.  
10.58.   The delegate of Argentina  indicated the following:  
10.59.   Despite the length of time that has elapsed, all of the concerns, proposals, and requests 
contained in document  G/C/W/767/Rev.1 remain valid. Far from improving, the situation regarding 
the implemen tation of non -tariff barriers on agricultural products by the European Union continues 
to worsen, with a growing number of Members from all regions expressing their concerns in this 
Council and some of its subsidiary bodies.  
10.60.   Despite this, Argentina has sti ll not received satisfactory replies to questions about the 
measures implemented by the European Union that effectively prohibit the use of a number of 
substances required for safe and sustainable agricultural production. These measures 
disproportionately affect trade in agricultural products and undermine harmonization and 
standard -setting efforts at the multilateral level.  
10.61.   Compounding what was stated on previous occasions is the concern that, as part of the 
objectives of the Farm to Fork, Biodiversity and  Green Deal strategies, the European Union has 
announced that, when setting import tolerances, it will take into account, on top of public health 
risks, the substances' environmental aspects for which MRLs are established in third  countries. The  
EU is ther efore extrapolating its policies to other countries.  
10.62.   Therefore, Argentina once again strongly encourages the European Union to cease 
implementing these measures that unnecessarily and inappropriately restrict international trade. 
Argentina also asks that t he EU establishes a transparent, predictable, and commercially viable 
import tolerance process for PPPs that have not been re -approved, and which  includes a risk 
assessment, taking into account the risk assessment techniques developed by the relevant 
international organizations. Lastly, Argentina believes that the proposals that were introduced today G/C/M/141  
 
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  by Colombia are constructive and very specific. Argentina urges the European Union to consider 
them with the attention they deserve.  
10.63.   The delegate of Costa Rica  indicated the following:  
10.64.   Costa Rica shares the concerns of other Members and continues to co -sponsor and support 
this item and document  G/C/W/767/Rev.1. Costa Rica considers that all of the different elements in 
this discussion remain very relevant. In th e interest of time, Costa Rica wishes to refer Members to 
its previous statement to the Council, and calls upon the European Union to continue its dialogue 
with the interested parties in order to overcome Members' concerns as expressed in the relevant 
comm ittees.2 
10.65.   The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
10.66.   As noted in its previous interventions on this subject, Canada emphasizes the need for 
transparency and predictability in international trade.  
10.67.   In accordance with WTO  Agreements, Canada continues to recognize Members' right to 
adopt measures to achieve legitimate objectives and to apply the food safety measures deemed 
necessary to protect human health. However, such measures must be implemented in a transparent 
manner that does not unjustifiably restr ict international trade.  
10.68.   The communication highlights Members' shared need for greater transparency and 
predictability around the European Union's approach to approving and renewing plant protection 
product authorizations, as well as Members' shared concer ns about the impacts this approach is 
having on trade in food.  
10.69.   Canada shares the European Union's ambitions related to health, safety, and environmental 
protection, with a view to making the agriculture sector more sustainable and adaptable. That said, 
for this to work in practice, related measures must be predictable and based on thorough scientific 
analysis and risk assessments that reflect the specific realities at the national and regional levels.  
10.70.   Canada acknowledges the European Union's recent efforts to clarify the process for 
establishing import tolerances. In particular, Canada thanks the EU for hosting seminars with 
third countries and stakeholders in January  2021; Canada appreciated the information shared and 
the opportunity to participate and ask questions.  
10.71.   Canada is pleased that the European Union intends to conduct risk assessments for all import 
tolerance requests and that such requests will be impartially reviewed in accordance with 
internationally accepted risk assessment principles and EU  legislation. However, Canada is not 
reassured and has yet to be convinced by the real -world feasibility, commercial viability, and 
compliance with the SPS  obligations of the EU's approach for setting import tolerances when a plant 
protection product has met t he hazard -based "cut -off" criteria.  
10.72.   In the meantime, Canada requests that the European Union consider maintaining MRLs for 
substances that do not pose unacceptable dietary risks. Along with minimizing disruptions to trade, 
this would eliminate the need for  import tolerance requests for some substances.  
10.73.   In addition, Canada understands that environmental considerations with a global reach will 
be included as a factor in future assessment of import tolerances. Canada would appreciate details 
on the timelines f or when environmental considerations will be included in the import tolerance 
process. Canada would note that including environmental considerations as part of the import 
tolerance assessment does not align with relevant international guidance.  
10.74.   Consequentl y, Canada looks forward to receiving further information from the European 
Union as to the scientific justification for including environmental considerations in the import 
tolerance assessment process for pesticides, as they are established for the protec tion of human 
health from food safety risk.  
 
2 Document  G/C/M/140, paragraphs  6.6-6.10. G/C/M/141  
 
- 20 - 
 
  10.75.   Canada also notes that EU  member States have authorized numerous emergency 
derogations to allow PPPs to be placed on the EU  market. There are many examples of emergency 
derogations being granted for individual me mber States for multiple years, and often with a lack of 
justification for their authorization. This would seemingly contradict the EU's approach to renewing 
PPPs as their approval periods expire, as well as allowing domestic producers an unjustified 
advan tage through the repeated approval of these derogations without affording importers the same 
approvals. There is also uncertainty regarding how numerous emergency derogations align with the 
high level of health protection chosen by the EU and its low risk tolerance for these substances.  
10.76.   Canada also urges the European Union to take into account the timelines necessary for 
practical decision -making by farmers and producers, as well as the time and effort required to bring 
products to market, particularly in t he global trade context. Sufficiently long transition periods should 
therefore be factored in.  
10.77.   In conclusion, Canada hopes that reiterating its concerns to the Council serves as a clear  
indication of the importance that Canada, and many WTO  Members, attrib ute to seeking enhanced 
transparency and predictability for trade.  
10.78.   The delegate of India indicated the following:  
10.79.   India thanks the proponents of this communication and shares the concerns raised regarding 
the European Union's application of SPS  standards o n agriculture products.  
10.80.   In implementing its SPS  measures, the European Union seems to impose its own domestic 
regulatory approach onto its trading partners. India believes that the EU has not accounted for the 
feedback provided by the Members on its propos ed regulations. The hazard -based approach being 
used by the EU does not adequately balance the twin objectives of protecting human health and 
facilitating trade.  
10.81.   On the one hand, Members see that the objectives of transparency are talked about vocally 
in forums like the Committee on Agriculture, and so much so that transparency has become an 
additional eighth  pillar of the Agreement on Agriculture; but when it comes to applying the same 
principles to their own trade practices, the votaries of transparency f ail to be consistent. And the 
process of implementation of these regulations by the European Union puts the interests of farmers 
in developing countries and LDCs at grave risk.  
10.82.   The delegate of Guatemala  indicated the following:  
10.83.   Guatemala reiterates its con cern over the measures by the European Union and the lack of 
dialogue to date. The use of the precautionary principle by the EU is extremely concerning, especially 
when one compares production in the EU to production in other countries. It is important to recall 
that there are important geographical differences between the different continents, and that tropical 
countries lack the European cold weather that helps to contain the spread of certain pests. 
Additionally, it seems to ignore the different conditio ns prevailing across countries around the world 
and seeks to impose its measures on third  countries.  
10.84.   Guatemala is concerned by the European Union's attitude regarding the treatment of 
emergency authorizations in a way that disadvantages developing countries. Guatemala wishes to 
reiterate the points made by Colombia concerning the treatment of certain gene ric substances and 
other issues. Guatemala recalls the transparency proposals by the EU and calls upon the European 
Union to reply to the written questions submitted in document  G/SPS/GEN/1926.  
10.85.   The delegate of Nigeria  indicated the following:  
10.86.   Nigeria suppo rts the paper tabled by the proponents and shares their same concerns. Nigeria 
believes that the EU  measure has disproportionately affected farmers from developing countries and 
LDCs. While Nigeria believes that protection of human health is key, such SPS  measures should not 
be designed in a manner that restricts trade. Therefore, Nigeria supports Members' calls for greater 
transparency. And Nigeria also calls upon the European Union to review its measure and consider 
replacing it with options that are less  trade restrictive.  G/C/M/141  
 
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  10.87.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
10.88.   The European Union takes note of, and continues to pay due attention to, the concerns 
expressed. The EU provided detailed replies to these concerns in previous CTG  meetings and  wishes 
to refer to these earlier statements, which remain valid in their entirety.  
10.89.   The European Union is the biggest importer of agri -food products in the world. The EU has 
developed a highly trusted, transparent, and predictable system based on a high le vel of consumer 
health protection, to which some other countries defer in the absence of their national MRLs. 
10.90.   The European Union has an open market, and its high level of consumer protection has never 
been an impediment to the import of agricultural commodities, including from the Members raising 
these concerns, whose large exports of agricultural products to the EU during these five  years have 
remained stable.  
10.91.   The European Union provides technical assistance to developing countries and LDCs, directly 
or through other international organizations, such as the FAO, to support a smooth transition towards 
new products or production systems.  
10.92.   The European Union wishes to emphasize again its commitment to continuing an open 
dialogue on its policies and measures. Therefore, the EU stands ready to further engage with its 
trading partners on this issue, including by providing  clarifications of its policies to its trading 
partners. Finally, based on the outcome of the UN  Food Systems Summit convened in 
September  2021, the EU believes that Members have a shared interest in making food systems 
sustainable and protecting citizens'  health by tackling the issue of toxic active substances with 
appropriate measures.  
10.93.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
11  INDIA – IMPORT POLICY ON TYRES – REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION, 
INDONESIA, AND THE SEPARATE CUSTOMS TERRITORY OF TAIWAN, PEN GHU, KINMEN 
AND MATSU  
11.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of 
the European Union, Indonesia, and the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and 
Matsu.  
11.2.   The delegate of Indonesia  indicated the f ollowing:  
11.3.   Indonesia appreciates India's discussion of this issue at the Working Group on Trade and 
Investment's virtual meeting that took place on 5  August  2021. However, Indonesia has also sent 
an enquiry to India's enquiry point, requesting further clari fication of this matter, but has yet to 
receive a response.  
11.4.   An Indonesian tyre exporter complained about the hindering of Indonesian tyre imports into 
India since 2020, resulting from India's unilateral suspension of imports from Indonesian exporters. 
This policy has been in effect since India issued a new import policy in Notice No.  12/2015 -2020 
"Amendment in Import Policy of Tyres", dated 12  June 2020, concerning changes in tyre import 
policy, namely that the trye import criteria had changed from "free" t o "limited".  
11.5.   Indonesia thanks India for issuing an import permit for tyre products in early 2021. However, 
India applies another restriction, which is that only tyres that meet certain criteria, and which are 
not manufactured in India, can be exported to I ndia. As a result of the new provisions, several import 
licences were revoked.  
11.6.   On this occasion, Indonesia requests India to explain in detail its policy on prohibiting or 
restricting tyre imports, including the requirements for obtaining import approvals and, if any, import 
recommendations.  
11.7.   Indonesia also requests that India immediately review its policy to ensure its adherence to 
WTO principles. Indonesia would likewise be grateful if the regulation in question could be forwarded G/C/M/141  
 
- 22 - 
 
  to the TBT  Committee. And  finally, Indonesia hopes to follow -up on bilateral meetings virtually at 
the TBT  meeting, the previous meeting, in July, of the C TG, and the meeting of the C MA that took 
place in October  2021.  
11.8.   The delegate of Chinese Taipei  indicated the following:  
11.9.   Chines e Taipei joins the European Union and Indonesia in expressing its concerns on this 
agenda item. The situation has been ongoing for more than one  year since India announced its 
restrictive import measure on new pneumatic tyres in June  2020. Chinese Taipei h as flagged its 
concerns in the previous CTG  meeting as well as numerous times in the Committees on Market 
Access and Import Licensing. It is regrettable that the concern has remained unchanged.  
11.10.   The Directorate General of Foreign Trade (DGFT) of the Indian Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry announced on 12  June 2020 that a restrictive import measure had been imposed on new 
pneumatic tyres (Notification No.  12/2015 -2020). As a result, importers must apply to the DGFT for 
a licence or special approval before im porting those items.  
11.11.   Since then, Chinese Taipei has noticed that only about 40% of its applications have been 
approved by the Indian Authority, compared to average figures over the past three  years. The delay 
in issuing import licences has severely affecte d Chinese Taipei's exports to India, resulting in a sharp 
decrease of 70% of trade in 2020 compared to the same period in 2019.  
11.12.   To Chinese Taipei's understanding, India appears to issue import licences only for those 
kinds of pneumatic tyres that are not p roduced domestically, and sets a limit on those imported 
tyres. This clearly constitutes a ban on tyre imports. Chinese Taipei questions how the measure 
could be compatible with the GATT  1994 and the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures 
(ILP Agreement ). 
11.13.   Chinese Taipei urges India to comply with Article  XI:1 of the GATT, which prohibits Members 
from instituting any import restriction made effective through import licensing, and the 
ILP Agreement , which requires non -automatic licensing procedures to be im plemented in a 
transparent and predictable manner, and without having trade -restrictive or trade -distortive effects 
on imports additional to those caused by the imposition of the restrictions. Chinese Taipei would also 
like to ask India to provide the rati onale that led it to implement this new measure, which by its 
nature is restrictive and discriminatory.  
11.14.   In conclusion, Chinese Taipei kindly urges India to share the reasoning behind its 
licence -granting practice and to take immediate measures to ensure that import licences can be 
issued in a timely, transparent, non -discriminatory and predictable manner.  
11.15.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
11.16.   The European Union would like to reiterate the concerns, which were already raised in  this 
Council in July  2021, regarding the licensing regime for importation of pneumatic tyres introduced 
by India under Notification No.  12/2015 -2020 of 12  June 2020. Despite having raised the issue on 
multiple occasions at WTO  level (three  times in both t he Import Licen sing and Market Access 
Committees) there has been little progress towards a positive resolution.  
11.17.   The European Union welcomes the belated WTO  notification of India related to this measure. 
However, the EU remains highly concerned by the restr ictive and discriminatory nature of this 
measure, which has had a considerable negative impact on EU  replacement tyres manufacturers.  
11.18.   Only a limited number of licences have been granted to EU  tyre manufacturers. In addition, 
these licences are limited in duration, quantities, and types of tyres. In particular, no licences have 
yet been granted to bus and truck tyres.  
11.19.   The European Union therefore urges India: (i)  to increase transparency with respect to the 
applicable requirements and procedural steps for tyre importers to follow; and (ii)  to eliminate any 
implicit or explicit quantitative or other restrictions on the import of replacement tyres that could 
run contrary to WTO  requirements.  G/C/M/141  
 
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  11.20.   The delegate of the Republic of Korea  indicated the follow ing: 
11.21.   The Republic of Korea wishes to reiterate its concern, expressed also in previous meetings, 
about India's import policy on tyres adopted in June  2020. This policy continues to restrict trade by 
substantially banning the import of tyres, which is not c onsistent with WTO  rules, including 
Article  3.2 of the ILP Agreement . Therefore, Korea urges India to improve its policy in accordance 
with the relevant WTO  rules to prevent it from constituting a barrier to free trade.  
11.22.   The delegate of Thailand  indicated t he following:  
11.23.   Thailand shares the same concerns as those of the co -sponsors of this item about India's 
import policy on tyres, which has been changed from free to restricted. This change has caused 
adverse effects on Thailand's exports of tyres to India. F or this reason, Thailand continues to closely 
monitor the developments on this matter and encourages India to provide further clarifications and 
its rationale behind its restrictive import policy on tyres.  
11.24.   The delegate of India indicated the following:  
11.25.   India would like to thank the delegations of Indonesia, the European Union, the Separate 
Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu, the Republic of Korea, and Thailand, for 
their interest in this issue. This issue was also discussed earlier, in Oc tober  2021, in the C MA, and 
India believes that it had clarified the questions on that occasion.  
11.26.   However, to reiterate, the non -automatic licensing requirements are administered in a 
manner consistent with the rules of the ILP Agreement , including with res pect to the time -frames 
for the granting of import licences. This process is being administered in a fair and equitable manner 
and a number of licences have been granted after approval by the Exim Facilitation Committee 
(EFC).  
11.27.   The import policy measure has  been taken keeping in view the quality issues for the product. 
For granting licences under this non -automatic licensing procedure, India has laid down specific 
criteria to evaluate the applications received. The comments of the concerned administrative 
ministries are also taken into account as part of this non -automatic licensing procedure. For import 
of tyres, the EFC has granted licences in almost all cases after due examination of the applications.  
11.28.   Specifically on Indonesia's points, the fee being charg ed is a marking fee and not termed as 
"royalty fee on tyres". The Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS) operates a product certification scheme 
as per the scheme -1 of the BIS (conformity assessment) regulation 2018, under the BIS  Act 2016. 
Under this scheme, th e BIS  grants product certification licence to the domestic or foreign 
manufacturers as per the regulation.  
11.29.   The manufacturer is required to pay to the BIS the necessary fee, as notified in the 
above -mentioned scheme for each product. The marking fee for a p roduct is specified on two  criteria: 
(a) minimum marking fee per annum; and (b)  unit and unit rate.  
11.30.   The manufacturer is required to pay the minimum marking fee in advance for the validity 
period of the licence. The actual marking fee for each year is calcu lated by multiplying the unit rate 
with the quantity (units) marked with ISI  mark during the year by the manufacturer. The higher of 
the actual marking fee thus arrived at, or the minimum marking fee for the year, is payable by the 
manufacturer.  
11.31.   To reitera te, the marking fee calculation as per the process described above is the same for 
domestic and foreign manufacturers and does not discriminate between them. The marking fee is 
chargeable on all production of tyres carrying the ISI  mark.  
11.32.   The Council took note of the statements made.  G/C/M/141  
 
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  12  EUROPEAN UNION – QUALITY SCHEMES FOR AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS AND 
FOODSTUFFS – THE REGISTRATION OF CERTAIN TERMS OF CHEESE AS GEOGRAPHICAL 
INDICATIONS – REQUEST FROM URUGUAY  
12.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  include d on the agenda at the request of 
Uruguay.  
12.2.   The delegate of Uruguay  indicated the following:  
12.3.   Uruguay regrets having to include this item on the Council's agenda again and would like to 
make reference to its previous statements, reaffirming Uruguay's concern  around the European 
Union's decision to include the term "Danbo" as a protected geographical indication of origin.  
12.4.   As explained at the previous meeting, Uruguay considers that Danbo is a cheese production 
technique that, although it was created by a Danis h national, it goes not correspond to any 
geographical place in Denmark or anywhere in the world. In contrast, Codex Alimentarius 
Standard  264 establishes the characteristics, production method, and labelling for this kind of 
cheese. This standard has been  changed a number of times, most recently in 2007, with the 
participation and approval of the European Union and its member States. For this reason, Uruguay 
considers that the term "Danbo" is a generic term that refers to a generic production method 
establ ished in the Codex Standard independently of where the cheese is manufactured.  
12.5.   The actions taken by the European Union in its trade agreements, including Danbo as a 
geographical indication, mean that third  party producers that are not Danish can no longer fully 
export this product, thereby restricting market access. This is why Uruguay considers that the 
registration of the term Danbo by the European Union creates a de facto  monopoly on a generic 
term, in contravention of international rules that the Europe an Union approved. And regardless of 
how much time has lapsed, Uruguay will continue to maintain this trade concern.  
12.6.   The delegate of Argentina  indicated the following:  
12.7.   As stated on previous occasions, Argentina's concern refers specifically to the use of t he term 
"Danbo" as a protected geographical indication, but it also has broader, systemic implications. The 
EU measure has a negative impact on harmonization and standardization efforts within the Codex 
framework, undermining the predictability and consist ency that international trade rules should have 
as a key factor in guiding the decision -making processes of producers.  
12.8.   Indeed, the recognition and registration of the term Danbo as a protected geographical 
indication in favour of Denmark in the European Un ion did not give due consideration to the Codex 
Alimentarius international reference standard for Danbo cheese, standard "CODEX  STAN  264-1966", 
which was last revised by that international body in 2008.  
12.9.   Under this standard, Danbo is established as the gene ric name for the product in question 
and, for labelling purposes, the name of the product is Danbo and the product's country of origin 
must be indicated. In other words, the Codex Alimentarius clearly did not regulate a geographical 
indication, but rather regulated the generic name of a product that is produced globally, not only in 
Denmark.  
12.10.   The protection of the name in any place other than Denmark constitutes an undue restriction 
on international trade in Danbo cheese, when it is produced in any other pla ce, as it does not take 
into account that the international reference standard specifies it as the common name of the 
product, which is why no country should appropriate that name.  
12.11.   Therefore, no country that bases its technical regulation on the Codex Alim entarius standard 
should encounter constraints to trade due to a misappropriation of the term.  
12.12.   The delegate of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
12.13.   As stated at previous CTG  meetings, in relation to this issue New Zealand remains interested 
and concerned. Specifically, New Zealand is concerned that the European Commission has chosen 
to register the terms "Danbo" and "Havarti", despite having previousl y agreed to a Codex standard G/C/M/141  
 
- 25 - 
 
  in which the European Commission and Denmark both acknowledged that "the country -of-origin 
statement preserves its generic nature".  
12.14.   Registering cheese names for which there are existing Codex standards shows disregard for 
the i ntegrity of the standards -setting system, which promotes reliability and consistency in 
international trade rules, and which New Zealand would expect the European Union to support. 
Furthermore, such actions will negatively affect producers outside Denmark who have invested with 
the legitimate expectations that they could use the standard.  
12.15.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
12.16.   The European Union has consistently provided its views on this issue in past CTG  meetings. 
The EU's views remai n unchanged, and the EU notes that its statements from the Council's previous 
meetings, and in particular the last meeting, remain valid.  
12.17.   The European Union has notably explained how the generic status of a name is assessed in 
the European Union. To recall , the European Union has consistently said that the fact that a GI  name 
is subject to a specific Codex Alimentarius standard, or that it is listed in Annex  B to the Stresa 
Convention, does not imply that the name should be considered as a common or generic  term.  
12.18.   Generic status in the European Union can only be assessed with regard to the perception of 
the consumers in the EU  territory. In the European Union, the relevant public is comprised mainly 
of the reasonably well -informed members of the public and/or  customers who may purchase the 
product or a like product.  
12.19.   The European Union has also explained that Regulation (EU) No.  1151/2012 on quality 
schemes for agricultural products and foodstuffs, as well as subsequent delegated and implementing 
acts, were not ified to the WTO under the TBT  Agreement as they contain provisions relevant to the 
TBT Agreement. Nevertheless, even if intellectual property rights (in particular, elements related to 
the substantive protection of geographical indications) are part of th e notified measures, these are 
not relevant for TBT  purposes.  
12.20.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
13  EUROPEAN UNION – PROPOSED MODIFICATION OF TRQ  COMMITMENTS: SYSTEMIC 
CONCERNS – REQUEST FROM BRAZIL, CHINA, AND URUGUAY  
13.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that  this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of 
Brazil, China, and Uruguay.  
13.2.   The delegate of Uruguay  indicated the following:  
13.3.   Uruguay wishes to reaffirm its position and concerns, which are both trade -related and 
systemic, on the European Union's modification of TRQ concessions under Article  XXVIII of the  
GATT  1994.  
13.4.   In Uruguay's view, there was no need for the European Union to modify, the concessions set 
out in its WTO  schedule, as applied to third  parties as a co nsequence of an internal matter such as 
Brexit. And in addition to being unnecessary, there are also no legal grounds under the 
WTO Agreements for the apportionment of these tariff rate quotas between the European Union and 
the United Kingdom.  
13.5.   Despite the complaints lodged by many trading partners, which saw how their conditions of 
access would be undermined as a result of the apportionment, the European Union decided to go 
ahead with the project.  
13.6.   Without prejudice to existing these fundamental differences,  Uruguay was a committed and 
constructive participant in the process under Article  XXVIII from the outset. And it did so taking into 
account the relevance and sensitivity of WTO  bound market access conditions and concessions by 
important trading partners, such as the European Union, in key products for a small developing 
country whose economy is largely dependent on its agricultural exports. It is for this reason that G/C/M/141  
 
- 26 - 
 
  Uruguay prepared and presented impact assessment studies that showed the injury that its 
agricultural sector, as well as its economy as whole, would suffer as a result of the apportionment. 
In line with these studies and the provisions of Article  XXVIII, Uruguay requested the EU to provide 
a fair compensation. However, the EU rejected those req uests.  
13.7.   As a sign of flexibility, and in a spirit of compromise, Uruguay adjusted its claims downwards. 
It did so with a view to achieving the balance needed to ensure moderate but tangible results, taking 
into account the context and scope of this process launched under Article  XXVIII. However, even 
these more modest requests were met with nothing more than another refusal from the European 
Union.  
13.8.   Unfortunately, it must be said that refusals from the European Union in this kind of process 
are not new to Uru guay. In fact, Uruguay has systematically reserved its rights in open -ended 
negotiations throughout the successive enlargements of the European Union in the past. However, 
on only two  occasions – in the last decade, upon the accession of Croatia, and 40  years ago, upon 
the accession of Greece – did the EU consider that a small country like Uruguay was entitled to 
specific compensation. This same European Union, when faced with the withdrawal of one  of its 
former member States, now seeks to reduce the volume  of most of its tariff rate quotas, including 
eight of the ten that it recognized as duties for Uruguay , while refusing to offer compensatory 
adjustments – as provided for under Article  XXVIII – as part of a process that leaves third  parties 
worse off.  
13.9.   This is why Uruguay wishes to reiterate its profound deception and dissatisfaction with this 
situation, while reaffirming its willingness to find a mutually agreed solution, insofar as the European 
Union recognizes Uruguay's specific conditions and needs, and  demonstrates the necessary political 
will to reach an agreement. This has been clearly absent during this process.  
13.10.   Lastly, without prejudice to the bilaterally agreed commitments between them, Uruguay 
once again requests that the European Union remove the  United Kingdom from the potential users 
of its tariff rate quotas in its WTO  Schedule of concessions. At the same time, given that it has been 
almost a year since the completion of the United Kingdom's withdrawal from the European Union, 
Uruguay reiterate s its query about when and how the European Union intends to adjust downwards 
its final bound AMS entitlements in its schedule of concessions, in line with the announcements  
made.  
13.11.   The delegate of Brazil , addressing agenda items  13 and 14, indicated the fol lowing:  
13.12.   Initially, Brazil would like to register that it expects that the decreasing number of Members 
sponsoring these agenda items is in consequence of a review on the part of the European Union and 
the United Kingdom of their negotiating stance.  
13.13.   Althoug h the EU -UK trade agreement has resolved the concern relating to the risk of bilateral 
trade occupying the quotas object of the "apportionment", Brazil considers that little has been done 
to remedy the fact that all Members will be worse off in terms of ac cess to the EU -27 and the 
UK markets due to the unilateral reduction of quota volumes.  
13.14.   Other than that, many of Brazil's country -specific quotas were made international law by 
virtue of past Article  XXIV and XXVIII negotiations, and of dispute settlement p rocedures under the 
GATT and the WTO. Therefore, they cannot be subject to reductions simply due to Brexit.  
13.15.   British quotas, established in order to maintain the previously established total volume of 
EU-28 quotas, cannot be considered as a compensation by the EU -27, nor are they enough by 
themselves to guarantee access to the British market.  
13.16.   As a new WTO  Member, if one that traces the origin of its participation in the multilateral 
trading system through the fact that it was an original contracting party of  the GATT  1947, the 
UK quotas should at least respect the Uruguay Round minimum access criteria. And the reference 
to the Uruguay Round is relevant to this case, as it is on such basis that the United Kingdom seeks 
to establish its right to consolidate a l arge final bound Total Aggregate Measure of Support (FBTAMS).  G/C/M/141  
 
- 27 - 
 
  13.17.   However, it is contradictory that the United Kingdom seeks to move away from the Uruguay 
Round with regard to the volume of its TRQs. The United Kingdom also seems to ignore the Uruguay 
Round wh en it chooses the most favourable quinquennium in terms of exchange rate to convert 
euros to pounds sterling, both in relation to the FBTAMS that it claims, and to the tariffs that it seeks 
to consolidate. And regarding only its FBTAMS, the choice of the p eriod 2015 -2019, instead of 
1986-1988, will yield additional rights to grant distortive and environmentally harmful domestic 
support of nearly GBP  1 billion.  
13.18.   Brazil would also like to register its systemic concern regarding the decision of the United 
Kingd om and the European Union to conclude negotiations that possibly involve Brazilian negotiating 
rights, despite following the negotiations with Brazil on these TRQs.  
13.19.   The delegate of China , addressing agenda items  13 and 14, indicated the following:  
13.20.   China appreciates the consultations and negotiations with the European Union that took 
place in June  2021, and those that took place with the United Kingdom in September  2021, 
respectively. China provided its updated requests at those meetings and looks fo rward to receiving 
feedback from the EU and the United Kingdom as soon as possible. In this regard, China will continue 
its negotiations with the EU and the United Kingdom, and hopes to reach mutually satisfactory 
outcomes as soon as possible.  
13.21.   The delegate  of Paraguay , addressing items  13 and 14 together, indicated the following:  
13.22.   Paraguay wishes to recall its earlier interventions making reference to its systemic concerns 
regarding these agenda items. Especially regarding the downward adjustment of the tota l aggregate 
measure of support by the European Union, which does  not allow Paraguay to arrive at the necessary 
level of certainty and clarity that it needs to be able to put forward objections to the schedule of the 
United Kingdom on this particular matte r. 
13.23.   The delegate of India indicated the following:  
13.24.   India has already expressed its concerns, both in writing and during the formal consultations 
with the European Union under Article  XVIII of the GATT  1994 negotiations. India has also made it 
clear to the EU how the present methodology and threshold years taken into account for the 
apportionment of TRQs adversely affects Members' rights. India expresses its concerns that the EU 
had not taken on board the issues raised by India for the early resolution for an  amicable solution. 
India expects that the EU will provide reasonable opportunities to all WTO  Members, including India 
itself, to exercise their rights under the WTO  Agreements and take into account the concerns raised. 
India looks forward to further fruitful negotiations with the European Union.  
13.25.   The delegate of New Zealand , addressing agenda items  13 and 14, indicated the following:  
13.26.   New Zealand shares the concerns that have been raised by other Members regarding the 
TRQ commitments following the United Kingdom's departure from the European Union. Ne w Zealand 
is, however, working now to finalize satisfactory outcomes to address these concerns and hopes to 
have these processes completed soon.  
13.27.   The delegate of Canada , addressing agenda items  13 and 14, indicated the following:  
13.28.   Negotiations with both the European Union and the United Kingdom, on their respective 
negotiations for the modification of TRQ  commitments as a result of Brexit, are still ongoing. In this 
regard, Canada notes the two  extensions, one for the European Union, and the second for the Un ited 
Kingdom, in terms of the extensions of these negotiations to 1  July 2022. Finally, Canada looks 
forward to continuing these separate discussions with the European Union  and the United Kingdom 
to bring them to a successful conclusion.  
13.29.   The delegate of Mexico, addressing agenda items  13 and 14, indicated the following:  
13.30.   Mexico wishes to reiterate its systemic concern over the modification of the TRQs in the 
schedules of concessions of the European Union and the United Kingdom, as well as the proposed G/C/M/141  
 
- 28 - 
 
  metho dology for doing so, which could result in a reduction, and even an elimination, of market 
access opportunities.  
13.31.   Mexico also reiterates the need to heed the calls to modify the AMS commitment in the  
European Union's schedule to reflect the changes that it intends to make due to the United Kingdom's 
withdrawal.  
13.32.   In the light of the foregoing, Mexico urges both the European Union and the United Kingdom 
to continue their discussions with WTO  Members as agreed today, with the extensions granted, and 
to take into  consideration the trade and systemic concerns raised with a view to finding a mutually 
satisfactory solution through procedures that comply with the rules of this Organization.  
13.33.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
13.34.   The European Union  is pleased to report on the good progress achieved so far, including with 
agreements formally signed with six  partners, and negotiations with five  other partners for which 
draft texts are being finalized and will be shortly initialled.  
13.35.   The European Union welcomes the increased engagement of many WTO  Members. For its 
part, the EU remains fully committed to continuing these negotiations and consultations and to 
bringing them to a successful close in the coming months.  
13.36.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
14  UNITED KINGDOM – DRAFT GOODS SCHEDULE AND PROPOSED 
UK TRQ COMMITMENTS: SYSTEMIC CONCERNS – REQUEST FROM BRAZIL, CHINA, THE 
RUSSIAN FEDERATION, AND URUGUAY  
14.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of 
Brazil, China, the Russian Federation, and Uruguay.  
14.2.   The delegate of Uruguay  indicated the following:  
14.3.   In addition to the various elements raised under the previous agenda item, which are fully 
applicable to the current agenda item, Uruguay wishes to reaffirm the  following three  specific points: 
(i) the claim of the United Kingdom to have a bound total AMS  warrants analysis and discussion on 
the part of the Members. It is especially problematic since, almost a year after the completion of 
said Member's exit from t he European Union, the EU has still not lowered its bound AMS  levels; (ii)  it 
does not seem appropriate for the United Kingdom to attempt to replicate the rights to invoke the 
Special Agricultural Safeguard, under Article  5 of the Agreement on Agriculture,  for all products and 
under the same criteria and conditions as set out in the European Union's Schedule. In this regard, 
Uruguay wishes to know whether the United Kingdom intends to waive the rights to apply special 
agricultural safeguards for certain pro ducts, including those not produced in its territory; (iii)  the 
proposal to introduce a  currency conversion in the draft schedule of concessions based on the 
average daily exchange rate in the 2015 -2019 period also raises concerns. Firstly, given its abili ty 
to generate bound tariffs and particularly high levels of AMS  entitlements which are higher than 
those that would result from considering other representative periods (in particular 1986 -1988, used 
as a basis in the Uruguay Round negotiations). And seco ndly, given its factual linkage with the 
ongoing Article  XXVIII process.  
14.4.   Regarding this process, Uruguay also regrets the United Kingdom's lack of openness, thus 
far, to considering Uruguay's proposals in a positive light. In this context, Uruguay reiterat es its 
willingness to enter into substantive bilateral negotiations, based on meaningful proposals, to arrive 
at a mutually advantageous agreement. This agreement should enable the United Kingdom to have 
an independent schedule of concessions formally esta blished in the WTO, while at the same time 
safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of the other Members concerned, such as Uruguay.  
14.5.   The delegate of the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
14.6.   The Russian Federation continues to have a significant concern regarding the United 
Kingdom's approach to the renegotiations of its TRQs, and stresses the impossibility of concluding G/C/M/141  
 
- 29 - 
 
  negotiations without an agreement on compensation. To this end, the Russi an Federation urges the 
United Kingdom to provide its compensatory proposal.  
14.7.   The delegate of India indicated the following:  
14.8.   India is engaged with the United Kingdom in bilateral discussions under Article  XXVIII of the 
GATT  1994 to resolve similar issues. I ndia remains interested in the resolution of issues pertaining 
to TRQs, with an approach that recognizes the rights of the UK's trading partners. India also urges 
the United Kingdom to use consistent methodologies across all aspects of the negotiations, su ch as 
the calculation of the AMS, and the special safeguard measures for agricultural products.  
14.9.   The delegate of the United Kingdom  indicated the following:  
14.10.   The United Kingdom reiterates the commitments it set out under Agenda Item 8 of the 
Council's curren t meeting, and in previous WTO  meetings. The United Kingdom is committed to 
resolving all discussions on  its schedule successfully, working closely with partners to do so. The 
extension of timelines under Article  XXVIII, set out in that item, will offer sp ace for conclusion of 
discussions.  
14.11.   On statements relating to AMS, SSGs, and currency conversion, the United Kingdom refers 
Members to its previous statements from this Council and the C MA, which set out its position on  
those issues, which still stand.  
14.12.   The United Kingdom is committed to continuing constructive bilateral dialogue towards 
resolution of the concerns voiced by WTO  Members.  
14.13.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
15  CHINA – IMPLEMENTATION OF TRADE DISRUPTI VE AND RESTRICTIVE MEASURES – 
REQUEST FROM AUSTRALIA  
15.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of 
Australia.  
15.2.   The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
15.3.   It has been one  year since Australia first  raised i n this Council its concerns with China's 
disruptive and restrictive trade measures targeting Australian products. These measures include the 
following: de facto  import bans or quantitative restrictions  (QRs) ; the imposition of unjustified 
anti-dumping and countervailing duties; increased and arbitrary border testing and inspections 
applied without prior notification; and unwarranted delays in listing and re -listing export 
establishments, and issuing import licences.  
15.4.   As Members are now well familiar, these m easures have severely limited Australia's trade 
with China in a range of products over the past 18  months, including barley, coal, copper ores and 
concentrates, cotton, logs, rock lobsters, and bottled wine. China's measures have also delayed 
Australia's t echnical market access for dairy, infant formula, hay, and meat, among other 
commodities.  
15.5.   In the normal course of trade, it is not unusual for occasional technical issues to arise. But 
the concurrent and sustained imposition of such a breadth of trade rest rictions by one  Member on 
another Member appears highly unusual.  
15.6.   Australia continues to raise these issues here and in other WTO  bodies because these 
problems persist and because China's actions have implications beyond their impact on Australian 
exporters. Indeed, they raise the risk and uncertainty of China's market for the global business 
community.  
15.7.   Australia is deeply concerned by China's failure to observe due process and its lack of 
engagement on the technical merits for each measure, includi ng in response to Australian 
submissions. Australia is also particularly concerned with credible reports that Chinese authorities G/C/M/141  
 
- 30 - 
 
  have instructed importers to not purchase certain Australian products. Any such instruction by 
Chinese authorities, whether fo rmal or informal, is inconsistent with China's WTO  obligations.  
15.8.   These actions undermine the transparency and predictability of trade and the effective 
operation of the rules -based trading system on which all Members rely. Furthermore, statements by 
Chinese  officials have directly linked China's actions to unrelated issues in China and Australia's 
bilateral relationship. WTO  rules do not permit any Member to impose such conditions on another 
for political reasons.  
15.9.   Australia has taken careful note of China's previous responses to its concerns, in this and 
other WTO  bodies, and feels that China has still not provided satisfactory answers on how its actions 
are consistent with its WTO  commitments.  
15.10.   During its recent Trade Policy Review  (TPR) , China reiterated its  commitment to safeguarding 
a rules -based multilateral system that is transparent, non -discriminatory, open, and inclusive. 
Australia urges China to give full effect to this vision by ceasing immediately any discriminatory 
measures being applied to Austral ian products.  
15.11.   Australia and China have enjoyed a strong trading relationship, built over many decades, 
which has delivered benefits to both sides. Australia has welcomed China's growth for the better 
economic outcomes and standard of living it delivers to the people of China. Australia stands ready 
to engage with China bilaterally on these matters at any time.  
15.12.   The delegate of the United Kingdom  indicated the following:  
15.13.   The United Kingdom would again like to express its support for Australia's concern about 
trade restrictive measures taken by China against Australian products.  
15.14.   China must ensure that its trade measures are applied in a non -discriminatory, predictable 
manner, and with the necessary transparency around decision -making and administrative 
procedur es as required by the relevant WTO  Agreements. It is vital that, as Members, we adhere to 
the fundamental principles and objectives of free and fair trade underpinning the rules -based 
multilateral trading system.  
15.15.   Unfair and market -distorting trade practice s risk undermining the integrity of, and trust in, 
the multilateral trading system, and lead to direct consequences for business and citizens worldwide. 
This is a point that the United Kingdom, and other Members, made clear during China's latest TPR. 
15.16.   The U nited Kingdom encourages China to engage in good faith and in a timely and responsive 
manner, providing clarifications to the points raised by Australia.  
15.17.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
15.18.   The United States shares Australia's concer ns, and notes that China appears to have 
implemented a broad range of restrictive measures against certain Australian goods. Official Chinese 
statements have linked these actions to unrelated bilateral matters. The United States is also 
concerned that Chin a's actions are not isolated to Australia.  
15.19.   As noted during China's TPR, the United States is concerned with a wide range of Chinese 
trade and economic practices, including the Chinese practice that has come to be known as 
"economic coercion". If another WT O Member speaks out against or otherwise offends China, China's 
response increasingly has been to use its economic clout to pressure the offending country to 
"correct its mistakes". A number of WTO  Members in this room have experienced China's "economic 
coercion", in apparent retaliation for unconnected bilateral issues.  
15.20.   China asserts that it upholds the "rules -based multilateral trading system" and is complying 
with its international trade commitments, but this claim seems inconsistent with China's actions . 
15.21.   China's failure to adhere to global trade norms and WTO  principles challenges the prosperity, 
security, and values not just of the United States, but also of many other Members of this institution.  G/C/M/141  
 
- 31 - 
 
  15.22.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the followi ng: 
15.23.   As stated in previous meetings, the European Union is not directly involved in the issues that 
Australia is currently raising with China. Rather, the EU's statement is related to questions of 
principle, and not to the facts of the measures that Austral ia has brought to the Council's attention. 
However, the European Union does note with concern the long list of measures adopted by China 
that have a negative impact on Australian exports.  
15.24.   The European Union notes and respects Australia's preference to trea t these issues on their 
individual technical merits, including raising them in the various forums that the WTO offers for that 
purpose, including technical committees and dispute settlement. This being said, the already noted 
length of the list of issues r aised by Australia, as well as the current discussion of this agenda item, 
suggests that there is an additional dimension to this matter.  
15.25.   Taking a step back and looking at the world more generally, the European Union of course 
agrees that Members' compliance with WTO  obligations is key for the security and predictability of 
the international trading system. It is key for the reliability of trading opportunities in the interests 
of growth, efficiency, and welfare. And compliance is key for a Member's  reputation in this 
Organization and beyond. The European Union trusts that all Members share the same commitment 
to safeguard and nurture this Organization, which is currently facing major challenges.  
15.26.   However, there is a further problem about which the Eu ropean Union is concerned, namely 
an appearance that the underlying true reason for the resort to these measures, be they formal or 
informal, is an intention to put pressure on, or sanction, the other country involved for a policy 
choice that lies within t he rights of that country.  
15.27.   Within the European Union, the European Parliament, member States, and the European 
Commission, have all expressed their concerns as to such practices of certain countries seeking to 
coerce other countries, and also the EU, to ta ke or withdraw particular policy measures. Such 
coercion raises questions of international legality beyond WTO -consistency.  
15.28.   In conclusion, the European Union is grateful for this opportunity to share its concerns about 
this increasing trend towards coercio n. 
15.29.   The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
15.30.   Canada shares the systemic concerns raised by Australia. Canada has also raised a number 
of specific trade concerns regarding China's application of SPS measures that are restricting trade  
in food, plants and animals, and their products. Canadian agri -food exporters continue to experience 
a lack of transparency and predictability with respect to China's application of SPS  measures, and 
significant undue delays in China's approval procedures.  
15.31.   Canada has note d a recent pattern regarding China's growing willingness to use unjustified 
SPS and TBT  measures to block or otherwise hinder trade. The use of these trade -disruptive and 
coercive measures challenges and destabilizes the rules -based international trading s ystem, from 
which China, Canada, and all WTO  Members have benefited. For example, Canadian canola seed 
exports to China continue to be arbitrarily and unjustifiably restricted, which is why Canada has 
requested the establishment of a WTO  panel on this matt er. 
15.32.   In addition, Canada remains concerned that measures adopted by China in 2020 to 
temporarily suspend exports from meat and fish establishments due to China's alleged concerns 
regarding COVID -19 transmission remain in place despite recent findings from t he FAO and the WHO 
that point to the contrary. With no scientific evidence to support these measures, the continued 
suspension can only be viewed now as a tool to block trade. Canada urges China to base its 
SPS measures on sound science and to take into ac count the updated FAO/WHO  guidance that 
confirms that food and food packaging is not a pathway for the spread of COVID -19. 
15.33.   Canada also remains concerned that other new regulations in China, notably Decrees  248 
and 249, create unjustified disruptions and delays for Canadian food exporters. For this reason, 
Canada requests China to provide, at the very least, more clarity on these two  decrees, and to delay 
their implementation for eighteen  months to allow trading partners time to comply with  them.  G/C/M/141  
 
- 32 - 
 
  15.34.   Canada encourages all WTO  Members, including China, to abide by their WTO  commitments.  
15.35.   The delegate of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
15.36.   New Zealand shares the systemic interest in the concerns expressed by other Members on 
this topic. As New Zea land has repeatedly noted in a number of for ums, the multilateral rules -based 
trading system provides that all Members, regardless of their size or trading capacity, are subject to 
the same rights and obligations. This provides the predictability and certa inty necessary to ensure 
that trade can take place efficiently and with the least friction possible.  
15.37.   Given the challenges that all Members are facing as a result of the COVID -19 pandemic, the 
certainty provided by the multilateral trading system is more im portant than ever. And if Members 
step away from their commitments, or adopt remedies provided for under the WTO  Agreements for 
other purposes, this will undermine the predictability and certainty on which the system rests.  
15.38.   Trade measures by WTO  Members th at cause widespread disruption to trade and lack 
transparency cause concern to New Zealand, including actions undertaken against a range of 
Australian exports. New Zealand encourages Members to fully comply with their WTO  obligations, 
including in the appl ication of trade remedies.  
15.39.   The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
15.40.   Japan shares the concerns expressed by Australia that China's trade measures, including 
trade remedy measures, should be implemented within the framework of the WTO  Agreements, and 
should comply with the relevant WTO  Agreements in the procedures and fact -finding.  
15.41.   As Members pointed out during China's TPR, government measures by China conducted in 
an informal or undisclosed manner are problematic in terms of China's WTO  Accession Proto col, as 
well as the transparency principle in the WTO. Japan believes that it is important that China ensures 
transparency for its relevant measures.  
15.42.   If China operates trade measures in an arbitrary manner, as reported, then its approach 
conflicts with the  international trade system, which is based on free and fair rules. Japan hopes that 
China will respond to Australia's concerns in good faith and in a timely manner.  
15.43.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
15.44.   China has already provided explanations on this issue several times in this Council and other 
relevant WTO  bodies, and China also provided very detailed responses in its recent TPR. For these 
reasons, China will not repeat its detailed past explanations, but only reiterate that the measures 
taken b y China against certain Australian exports to China are aimed at protecting the legitimate 
rights and interests of China's domestic industries, and the safety of consumers, and are measures 
that are consistent with Chinese laws, regulations, and the WTO. I n addition, China has notified 
these measures to Australia and the communication between the Chinese authorities and the 
Australian authorities has been open and smooth.  
15.45.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
16  CHINA – SUBSIDY TRANSPARENCY AND CHINA'S  PUBLICATION AND INQUIRY POINT 
OBLIGATIONS UNDER CHINA'S PROTOCOL OF ACCESSION – REQUEST FROM AUSTRALIA, 
EUROPEAN UNION, UNITED KINGDOM, AND THE UNITED STATES  
16.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of 
Austral ia and the European Union, later joined by the United Kingdom and the United States as 
additional co -sponsors.  
16.2.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
16.3.   As this Council is aware, over the years, the United States and other Members have had  
numerous serious concerns with respect to the transparency of China's industrial subsidy regime.  G/C/M/141  
 
- 33 - 
 
  16.4.   In China's Protocol of Accession, China agreed to publish all trade -related measures in a single 
journal, which China has designated as the MOFCOM  Gazette. Of ten, if not normally, however, 
subsidy measures, especially normative measures and sub -central measures, are not published in 
the MOFCOM  Gazette. And sometimes these measures are nowhere to be found anywhere else.  
16.5.   In its Protocol of Accession, China also a greed to "establish or designate an enquiry point 
where, upon request of any individual, enterprise or WTO  Member all information relating to the 
measures required to be published … may be obtained."  
16.6.   Several years ago, the United States came across referen ces to five  legal measures, 
two relating to fuel subsidies for fishers, one  relating to the development of China's distant water 
fishing fleet, and two  relating to the semiconductor industry. Unable to find these measures in the 
MOFCOM  Gazette, or anywhere  else, the United States submitted a request to China's WTO  enquiry 
point in April  2020, roughly eighteen  months ago.  
16.7.   Under its Protocol of Accession, China agreed with respect to its enquiry point that "Replies 
to requests for information shall generally be provided within 30  days after receipt of a request. In 
exceptional cases, replies may be provided within 45  days after receipt of a request. Notice of the 
delay and the reasons therefor shall be provided in writing to the interested party."  
16.8.   Despite the United States having submitted its initial request in April  2020, it has yet to 
receive a written formal response to its request. In September  2020, months beyond the deadline 
for a written response, a Ministry of Commerce representative did spea k with the US  Embassy, as 
China referenced at the Council's previous meeting. In that telephone call, the United States was 
informed that China would not be providing copies of any of the requested measures because they 
were either soon to be replaced by n ew measures or because they were not relevant to China's 
WTO commitments. The United States views China's handling of its request as inadequate and 
contrary to China's WTO  commitments.  
16.9.   First, China plainly should have provided copies of the requested measu res that it claims were 
soon to be replaced. Paragraph  2(c) of China's Protocol of Accession to the WTO contains no 
provision for China to withhold measures that may be superseded at some point in the future. When 
new measures eventually did come out, it w as nearly a year after the United States' initial request 
and well beyond the 45 -day response time mandated in China's Protocol of Accession to the WTO.  
16.10.   Second, the United States disagrees with China's refusal to provide copies of the requested 
measures th at China claims are not relevant to its WTO  commitments. The requested measures 
clearly appear to address policies and guidelines relating to the development of China's fisheries and 
semiconductor sectors, and therefore clearly would appear to satisfy the standard of "pertaining to 
or affecting trade in goods" in paragraph  2(c) of China's Protocol of Accession to the WTO.  
16.11.   While it perhaps could be debated whether the requested measures provide "subsidies" 
within the meaning of the SCM Agreement , China's obligation under paragraph  2(c) of China's 
Protocol of Accession to the WTO is not limited to a requirement to provide copies of requested 
subsidies measures. Rather, China is to provide copies of any measures pertaining to or affecting 
trade in go ods, which should include the requested measures.  
16.12.   The United States also notes that none of the requested measures appear to have been 
published in China's designated official journal, the MOFCOM  Gazette, as required by paragraph  2(c) 
of China's Protocol o f Accession to the WTO. Moreover, the two  new fishery support measures have 
also not been published in the MOFCOM  Gazette.  
16.13.   The transparency obligations of China's Protocol of Accession to the WTO are there because 
Members were concerned, in part, with the lack of transparency of China's industrial subsidy regime. 
After twenty  years, unfortunately, those very same concerns remain.  
16.14.   But more fundamentally, beyond the legal technicalities, why is China refusing to publish or 
simply make public a legal measure, for example, about a fuel subsidy programme for fishers that 
was being ended? It is difficult to understand the need to conceal and suppress these measures.  G/C/M/141  
 
- 34 - 
 
  16.15.   Often the first response that Members hear from China on these transparency issues is that 
China ta kes its WTO  transparency obligations very seriously. But to be frank, the experience of the 
United States in making a simple request to China's enquiry point seems to demonstrate otherwise.  
16.16.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
16.17.   The co mmitment by China under its Protocol of Accession to publish all trade -related 
measures, as well as providing information through the enquiry point, is designed to improve 
transparency.  
16.18.   However, in order for such a commitment to be meaningful, China must p ublish all its 
trade -related measures in the MOFCOM  Gazette, and actually respond to requests for information 
under the enquiry point. This is not only in the interest of transparency, but also required under 
China's obligations in its Protocol of Accessio n. 
16.19.   Therefore, the  European Union urges China to comply fully with its commitments under the 
Protocol of Accession to the WTO by publishing all trade -related measures, as it agreed to do, and 
by responding to requests for information under the enquiry point  without undue delay.  
16.20.   The delegate of the United Kingdom  indicated the following:  
16.21.   The United Kingdom believes that it is important to continue to co -sponsor this item both at 
this Council and at the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures  (SCM  Committee) . 
Accordingly, the United Kingdom would like to reiterate its belief that transparency is central to the 
proper functioning of the WTO.  The United Kingdom urges  all Members, including  China,  to take all 
steps necessary to fulfil their obligations,  including by comply ing with their transparency 
commitments in accordance with their WTO obligations.  
16.22.   The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
16.23.   Australia attaches considerable importance to the WTO  notification and transparency 
obligations, and is  particularly concerned about transparency in relation to subsidy programmes.  
16.24.   Australia notes the transparency commitments made as part of China's Protocol of Accession. 
Paragraph  2(c) of the Protocol require s the designation of an official journal to publ ish all laws, 
regulations, and other measures affecting trade in goods.  
16.25.   It also requires China to establish or designate an enquiry point where, upon request, all 
information relating to the measures required to be published under paragraph  2(c) may be 
obtained. In this regard, Australia raised its concerns at last week's Subsidies Committee and 
specifically asked China for the details of how this enquiry point mechanism was functioning. 
Furthermore, Australia understands that to date no satisfactory respon se has been received to a 
request made by a Member under this mechanism.  
16.26.   Australia considers that transparency is the thread that is woven through all the 
WTO Agreements. Accordingly, notification obligations remain critical to the proper functioning of 
the WTO; they are obligations, and not aspirational in nature. Similarly, transparency is what 
underpins the SCM  Agreement, whereas a lack of transparency increases the uncertainty for all our 
exporters in being able to compete fairly in international market s. 
16.27.   In conclusion, Australia requests China to provide further information on how the enquiry 
point mechanism functions, and to assure Members that it is fully adhering to its transparency 
obligations, including those under its Accession Protocol.  
16.28.   The deleg ate of Canada  indicated the following:  
16.29.   Canada shares the concerns of other Members with respect to the transparency of China's 
subsidies. When it acceded to the WTO in 2001, China accepted comprehensive transparency 
obligations. Among other things, China a greed to publish all laws, regulations, or other measures 
affecting trade in goods in a single official journal. It also agreed to respond to enquiries by 
individuals, enterprises, and WTO  Members relating to these measures.  G/C/M/141  
 
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  16.30.   Canada considers that complianc e with notification requirements and responses to enquiries 
in accordance with the SCM Agreement  and China's Protocol of Accession to the WTO is critical to 
the successful functioning of the rules -based international trading system. Canada urges China to 
fulfil its WTO  transparency obligations.  
16.31.   The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
16.32.   Notification obligations and transparency are the most important foundations of the 
WTO system, and compliance with them is in the interests of all Members. If the transparency of 
subsidy expenditure is not ensured, there is concern that distorted subsidies will be increased, which 
may lead to problems such as oversupply. This issue was discussed at the SCM  Committee's meeting 
of 26 October, but it is difficult to sa y that China is taking sufficient measures.  
16.33.   Regarding China's subsidies, various WTO  Members have expressed concerns about 
transparency and the possibility of non -notification of China's subsidy measures at the relevant 
committees. At the same time,  China is the world's largest trader, and is required to be transparent 
and to comply with the WTO's notification obligations, especially regarding subsidies.  
16.34.   Like other Members, Japan urges China to fulfil its transparency obligations agreed upon in 
the context of its WTO  Accession Protocol, and to ensure the effectiveness of the mechanisms that 
contribute to increasing transparency.  
16.35.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
16.36.   As stated in previous meetings, China attaches great importance to compliance with 
WTO rules; accordingly, China responds to the formal requests of WTO  Members for its trade 
policies, as defined in China's Protocol of Accession to the WTO.  
16.37.   Regarding the enquiry made by the United States, and as China stated at the Council 's 
previous meeting, China already provided its replies in September, in accordance with the 
commitments specified in China's Protocol of Accession to the WTO. Regarding subsidy transparency, 
China has made great efforts to enhance its transparency in rela tion to its subsidy policies; indeed, 
China has already submitted its notifications of subsidies at the central and local government levels. 
Specifically, China's latest notifications on subsidies for 2019/2020 includes 71  subsidy policies at 
central level , and 374  subsidies at local level. In addition, China has also submitted its latest 
notifications on state trading enterprises and quantity limitations; and China will also soon submit a 
notification on its domestic support to the agricultural sector.  
16.38.   The delegate of the United States  intervened a second  time to indicate the following:  
16.39.   The United States wishes to take this opportunity to reiterate its questions to China. Will 
China provide the United States the five  requested measures? If not, what is Chin a's justification for 
denying the request? And if China is not going to provide the requested measures, will China provide 
a written explanation as to why it is denying the US  request?  
16.40.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
16.41.   As stated earlier in its  intervention, China wishes to reiterate that it has already provided its 
replies regarding the enquiry made by the United States in September, in accordance with the 
commitments specified in China's Protocol of Accession to the WTO.  
16.42.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
17  CHINA – COSMETICS SUPERVISION AND ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS (CSAR) – 
REQUEST FROM AUSTRALIA, THE EUROPEAN UNION, JAPAN, AND THE UNITED STATES  
17.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
Australia, the European Union, Japan, and the United States.  G/C/M/141  
 
- 36 - 
 
  17.2.   The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
17.3.   Australia respects the right of Members to implement technical measures for legitimate policy 
purposes and in accordance with their obligations  under the TBT  Agreement. However, Australia is 
still concerned that measures under China's Cosmetics Supervision and Administration Regulations 
(CSAR), and various implementing regulations, which entered into force on 1  May 2021, are more  
stringent than necessary. Australia would ask that China pursue its objective of ensuring the safety 
and quality of imported cosmetics using less trade -restrictive measures.  
17.4.   Australia requests more information from China on its reasons for requiring eithe r 
GMP certification or animal testing for managing either safety risks or quality of low -risk cosmetics 
products formulated using approved ingredients. China's responses on this in July  2021, and in the 
TBT Committee, have not sufficiently answered these q uestions.  
17.5.   Australia would also like to know why China has maintained its requirement for mandatory 
animal testing of cosmetics products to be used on children, regardless of the level of risk presented 
by those products. Australian exporters are also conce rned about stringent and inflexible measures 
under the CSAR  framework, particularly regarding testing and registration requirements and 
requirements to provide detailed information on production processes and other aspects of their 
intellectual property.  
17.6.   Australia is a consistent supplier of high quality and safe cosmetics products domestically, 
and to the world. As Australia has said on previous occasions, the Australian Government stands 
ready to work with China and discuss the CSAR and  their respective s ystems for cosmetics 
regulation.  
17.7.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
17.8.   It is unfortunate that the United States must again reiterate its serious concerns. The United 
States brings this issue to the Council on this occasion because it i s imperative to find a resolution 
to US  concerns with China's development of the C SAR, and its implementing measures. Despite  
extensive multilateral and bilateral engagement from the United States, US  industry, and other 
WTO Members and stakeholders, signi ficant trade concerns remain.  
17.9.   First, the United States has significant concerns that the only means China provides importers 
to establish conformity with good manufacturing practices, if their respective governments do not 
issue GMP  export certificates, in volves animal testing. The United States questions China's rebuttal 
to the comments of several WTO  Members that its requirements for imports and domestic products 
are equivalent. The United States asks that China consider less trade -disruptive means for it s 
importers to meet China's animal testing exemption requirements, such as second and third -party 
certificates to the ISO  GMP cosmetics standard. The United States also again asks that China be 
flexible and transparent with respect to which government or o ther GMP  certificates or production 
licences it will accept as demonstrating conformity.  
17.10.   Second, the United States acknowledges that China notified an updated draft of the Good 
Manufacturing Practices for Cosmetics (GMP) to the WTO ( G/TBT/N/ CHN/1626) for c omment in 
September  2021, given the substantive updates. The United States asks China to confirm that, for 
the purposes of overseas inspections, foreign manufacturers will be considered in conformity with 
the Chinese GMP  standard if, as provided in Article  17 of the Provisions for the Management of 
Cosmetics Registration and Notification Dossiers (a draft of which was notified as 
G/TBT/N/ CHN/1524), they are in conformity with their national or international GMP  standards.  
17.11.   Third, the United States remains co ncerned that CSAR and its implementing measures 
require overly extensive information to assess conformity and fulfil China's regulatory objectives. 
The United States is disappointed that China has not pared back these highly burdensome 
requirements. The Un ited States asks China's National Medical Products Administration to 
re-consider the extent of the information requirements.  
17.12.   Fourth, the United States considers that China has failed to address concerns that exceptions 
to the provisions protecting confiden tial business information (CBI) and reference to China's 
Regulation on the Disclosure of Government Information may undermine protections for trade G/C/M/141  
 
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  secrets and CBI. The United States asks that China clarify whether it will develop an explicit 
mechanism for  companies to indicate to NMPA when information provided should be treated as trade 
secrets and CBI, to protect from unauthorized disclosure. The United States requests that NMPA 
provide a mechanism to ensure that the treatment of CBI is monitored and lega lly enforceable within 
China.  
17.13.   Fifth, the United States requests that China not require duplicative testing at laboratories 
that have Chinese Metrological Accreditation, if companies provide test results from other 
laboratories that are in conformity with C hina's requirements. The United States requests that China 
consider accepting test results from laboratories certified to Good Laboratory Practices or Good 
Clinical Practices, as per the International Council for Harmonization of Technical Requirements for  
Pharmaceuticals for Human Use (ICH) Guidelines.  
17.14.   Sixth, the United States continues to have concern that new cosmetics labelling 
requirements potentially create unnecessary obstacles to trade. As explained previously, the United 
States requests that China not require companies to disclose the product manufacturer on the 
product label. The United States also asks that China not require that foreign product safety and 
claims labelling be a direct translation of the Chinese label, as this may require companies  to develop 
new packaging to enter China. The United States asks that China allow for foreign labelling, so long 
as the foreign product safety and claims information does not conflict with this information on the 
Chinese label.  
17.15.   Seventh, the United States i s concerned, given the magnitude of some of the new 
CSAR  requirements, that China has not consistently notified its transition periods for the new 
CSAR  requirements so as to allow for public comment. The United States asks that China allow 
importers and ma nufacturers at least two to three  years to update existing registrations and to sell 
through existing inventory for products already on the market. The United States requests that China 
delay finalization of additional measures until these trade concerns e xpressed by the United States 
and many other WTO  Members are addressed.  
17.16.   The delegate of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
17.17.   New Zealand welcomes China's endeavours to modernize its regulatory system for cosmetics 
and appreciates the opportunity to comment  on specific elements of China's Regulations. While 
New Zealand welcomes the intention to improve safety and quality assurance, it would like to 
encourage China to ensure that facilitation of trade is considered in the implementation of the 
regulations.  
17.18.   New Zealand notes that, under the measures, non -animal tested cosmetics are able to enter 
China's market only if regulator -issued GMP  certification is provided. Yet non -special use cosmetics 
are considered to be low -risk products in many countries, includi ng New Zealand, and for this reason 
are not subject to regulator -issued GMP  certification.  
17.19.   New Zealand warmly welcomes the introduction of alternatives to mandatory animal testing 
for imported cosmetics. Yet New Zealand, like others, is disappointed that t he measures do not 
provide for non -regulator issued GMP  certification or other trade facilitative mechanisms for 
providing product assurances, meaning that significant and unnecessary barriers to trade for 
imported cosmetics products still apply for Member s that cannot offer regulator -issued 
GMP certification.  
17.20.   New Zealand encourages China to engage directly with affected Members, including New 
Zealand itself, to identify a trade -facilitative mechanism to demonstrate GMP  conformity, without 
imposing animal -testing requirements. Specifically, and following China's response to New Zealand's 
question submitted during its recent TPR, New Zealand seeks clarification of whether the 
requirement for a regulator -issued GMP  certificate as an alternative to animal testi ng requirements 
can be exempted on the basis that: (i)  the product fully complies with the relevant ISO  22716 
standard, or higher, confirming the safety of the product; or (ii)  a product safety risk assessment 
result is provided from a laboratory accredite d by a National Accreditation Body that confirms the 
safety of the product. Additionally, New Zealand requests that China also provide flexibility in respect 
of product testing requirements. In particular, New Zealand encourages China to accept test report s 
from accredited laboratories situated outside of China. Otherwise, this is a burdensome and G/C/M/141  
 
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  unnecessary trade barrier for exporters that send products to China as well as multiple other 
markets. Building in such flexibility would be trade facilitative an d in accordance with international 
best practice.  
17.21.   New Zealand also holds concerns, which it notes are shared by a number of Members, that 
China requires more detailed disclosure of product formulas than is required in other markets, 
including specific sour ces of each ingredient. New Zealand encourages China to limit such disclosure 
requirements, particularly in relation to sensitive information, to only cover the information that is 
required to assure product safety in China's domestic market, so as not to compromise intellectual 
property.  
17.22.   New Zealand appreciates its recent constructive bilateral engagement on cosmetics issues 
and looks forward to engaging further with China on its CSAR  measures to address these issues. 
New Zealand would welcome China's resp onse to the concerns raised by it and other Members in 
this and other for ums. 
17.23.   The delegate of the Republic of Korea  indicated the following:  
17.24.   The Republic of Korea wishes to reiterate its concern about China's C SAR. The requirements  
under the Regulation are creating a trade barrier to Korea's exports to China by restricting trade 
more than necessary. The Regulation requires exporters to specify, in the application form, the 
sources and quality data of all ingredients. Such informatio n contains a number of trade secrets and 
is more than is required in other countries. In addition, the labelling requirement is excessive 
compared to internationally recognized practice. Korea requests China to improve its Regulation so 
that it does not co nstitute an unnecessary obstacle to international trade.  
17.25.   The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
17.26.   Japan notes that China enforced the revised C SAR in January  2021. In addition, Japan also  
noted that China had conducted TBT  notifications on many relat ed implementing regulations. Japan 
has been expressing its concerns regarding the above -mentioned regulations, as well as the related 
implementing regulations, in the TBT  Committee since March  2019.  
17.27.   Although China explained at the Council's previous meetin g that it was properly protecting 
sensitive commercial information, the regulations, as well as related implementing regulations, are 
still requesting the disclosure of such information as production processes or purchase information 
for the materials. In addition, Japan considers it a problem that China only approves the results 
verified by Chinese domestic agencies, while it does not approve international methods of 
investigation, such as ISO. Japan requests China to ensure that the C SAR is formulated and  
implemented in accordance with Article  2.2 of the TBT  Agreement, without deviating from the 
international standard.  
17.28.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
17.29.   The CSAR has introduced new definitions and classifications of cosmetics, new c osmetic 
ingredient application, and safety assessment and requirements. The European Union understands 
that the aim of the CSAR is to ensure consumer safety. However, the EU has concerns linked to the 
obligation to transmit confidential information for new  products to the Chinese authorities. The EU 
would also like to recall its concerns as expressed at the CTG's previous meeting, held in July  2021, 
namely: (i)  the mandatory disclosure in the registration process of commercially sensitive 
information, touch ing on the intellectual property rights of companies involved; (ii)  the amount of 
information required for the notification of new ingredients, as well as potential issues over the 
disclosure of such information after a certain period of time; and (iii)  the need to publish a detailed 
summary of efficacy evaluation, which may damage business secrets.  
17.30.   The European Union believes that these requirements go beyond what is necessary to ensure 
consumer safety and traceability of the ingredients used in cosmetics,  diverging from international 
practice. This extensive level of information is not required elsewhere in the world for notification 
and registration purposes. Finally, the European Union reiterates its comment that a differentiated 
approach is needed betwe en new products and products on the market. Such a differentiated G/C/M/141  
 
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  approach would avoid a situation where product supply could be interrupted for an extended period 
of time due to insufficient preparation time for both industry and supervision authorities.  
17.31.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
17.32.   China takes note that many technical questions have been raised at today's meeting, such 
as animal testing, intellectual property rights protection, trade secrets protection, GMP  licences, 
extensive informatio n requirements, labelling and packaging issues. However, as similar questions 
were also raised in China's most recent TPR, which took place just one  week prior to this meeting, 
and as China has also provided detailed answers to technical questions, in writ ten form, in the 
context of that review, for the sake of time, China does not intend to repeat, on this occasion, its 
detailed technical replies. Accordingly, China encourages relevant Members to refer to its written 
replies provided in the context of its TPR. At the same time, Members' additional questions will be 
forwarded to capital for further consideration and appropriate action.  
17.33.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
18  INDIA – RESTRICTIONS ON IMPORTS OF CERTAIN PULSES – REQUEST FROM 
AUSTRALIA, CA NADA, THE EUROPEAN UNION, THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, AND THE 
UNITED STATES (G/C/W/791)  
18.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of 
Australia, Canada, the European Union, the Russian Federation, and the United Stat es. 
18.2.   The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
18.3.   Australia's concerns with India's restrictive measures on pulses imports, particularly India's 
QRs, are well known to all Members. While Australia has previously welcomed India's temporary 
suspension o f the renewed QRs for mung beans (Moong), pigeon peas (Tur), and black gram (Urad), 
until 31  October  2021, this does not address Australia's underlying concerns and its continued 
request that the QRs be permanently removed.  
18.4.   Australia has previously said, i n this Council and in other relevant WTO  bodies, that it believes 
that India is using these WTO -inconsistent measures as an ongoing means to flexibly manage 
imports in response to changing domestic circumstances. Australia understands that the temporary 
suspension of the QRs and the imposition of domestic stock limits for all pulses until 31  October  2021 
was to address concerns about inflation in pulse prices, which reinforces  Australia's concerns about 
how India is using the QRs. Australia also notes that,  at the same time, India recently continued to 
increase the minimum support prices for a range of pulses.  
18.5.   Pulses are not a "small" commodity for India, neither by tonnage, nor the value produced and 
consumed, nor with respect to trade. Therefore, India's m easures matter in the global pulses market. 
India's current suite of measures on pulses, including significant and increasing levels of market 
price support, high tariffs, and QRs, continue to negatively impact the stability and predictability of 
the globa l pulses market, to the detriment of all producers and consumers, including those in India.  
18.6.   Australia and the co -sponsors of this agenda item have submitted numerous formal questions 
to India in various WTO  forums, including in this Council. Unfortunately, India has not answered all 
of the co -sponsors' questions or addressed all of their concerns. It is important that India provides 
detailed answers to explain the market and other conditions behind its decisions, including the 
temporary suspen sion, and explain how they are WTO -consistent. While the WTO  Agreements 
contain exceptions, the onus is on the Member implementing the measure to explain how such 
exceptions may apply.  
18.7.   Australia asks India to clearly explain the status of all the QRs on pu lses, in particular whether 
the temporary suspensions have continued beyond 31  October, or whether the QRs were reinstated 
on 1 November, and the status of the QR on yellow peas for the fiscal year 2021 -2022. Australia 
also requests India to explain the po licy rationale for the minimum import price requirement and 
port restrictions for yellow peas.  G/C/M/141  
 
- 40 - 
 
  18.8.   India needs to provide certainty and stability to exporters, traders, and the global pulses 
market, which will not be achieved by continuing to implement potenti al "temporary suspensions" 
to what were claimed to be "temporary measures" that have now been in place since August  2017. 
Australia requests that India respond to its questions and permanently remove the QRs.  
18.9.   The delegate of the Russian Federation  indicate d the following:  
18.10.   The Russian Federation once again raises its long -standing concern over India's pulses 
import policy, and calls upon India to stop applying restrictive measures on imports of yellow peas 
that are inconsistent with WTO  rules. Since the star t of the application of restrictive measures, in 
2018, India has not provided sound reasoning for its introduction of measures that hinder the import 
of pulses into India. Import quotas, an import ban, minimum import price requirements, and port of 
entry r estrictions have led to a situation in which import volumes of yellow peas from the Russian 
Federation have plunged almost to zero in the first half of 2021.  
18.11.   India repeatedly declares justification for its measures on imported pulses by recourse to 
Article  XX(a) and (b) of the GATT. The Russian Federation once again urges India to explain the 
causal link between the protection of public morals, human, plant or animal life or health, and import 
restrictions on yellow peas. Thus far, India has failed t o provide such a link.  
18.12.   One more point is the lack of transparency on the details of India's import policy on yellow 
peas for the 2021 -2022 fiscal year. As of the date of this meeting, 1  November  2021, the information 
about the import conditions on yellow p eas on the website of the D GFT of India is still absent,  
meaning that India has delayed the publication of this information by half a year already.  
18.13.   The Russian Federation urges India to fully respond to the questions and requests it has 
raised on these iss ues in multilateral and bilateral for ums. The absence of information, and India's 
unwillingness to respond, run contrary to the basic principles of this Organization.  
18.14.   The Russian Federation urges India to eliminate its minimum import price requirement, to 
lift its ports of entry restriction, and to allow import of yellow peas into India's market, as required 
by India's obligations in the WTO. The Russian Federation also calls upon India to publish timely 
information about its import conditions.  
18.15.   The delegate  of Canada  indicated the following:  
18.16.   Canada and other Members have raised India's restrictions on the imports of pulses in this 
Council and in other WTO  Committees. Canada continues to question the legal interpretation 
provided by India to justify its trade  restrictive measures on dried peas. It is increasingly difficult for 
Canada to understand why India continues to claim that these measures are "temporary" when the 
QRs on imports of dried yellow peas were established over three and a half years ago. For d ried 
peas, no quota volume has been announced by India for the fiscal year 2021. Canada therefore 
understands that the import of dried peas is banned.  
18.17.   Canada asks India to promptly clarify the situation as to why dried peas are still restricted 
from import , why no quota on dried peas has been available since 31  March  2021, and when imports 
of Canadian dried peas can resume. To conclude, Canada calls for India to immediately and 
expeditiously remove its trade restrictive measures put in place on dried peas a nd other pulses, and 
to implement alternative, WTO -consistent policy options that promote a predictable and transparent 
import regime for pulses.  
18.18.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
18.19.   As has been previously stated in this and other WTO  committee meetings, the United States 
remains concerned with India's application of import restrictions for pulses, including pigeon peas, 
mung beans, black gram lentils, and peas. The United States repeats its previous requests for 
information on how the  measures reflect India's WTO  commitments, and when and how the allegedly 
temporary measures will be ended. Furthermore, the United States notes that India still has not 
responded to its written questions submitted on 19  March  2021. When can the United Sta tes expect 
to receive a response from India?  G/C/M/141  
 
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  18.20.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
18.21.   This issue has been raised on multiple occasions. To refer only to the latest discussions, the 
European Union has taken note of India's reply in the Oc tober  2021 meeting of the C MA. In the EU's  
view, India's reply on that occasion unfortunately fell short in addressing the requests for 
clarifications raised by the many Members concerned about India's quantitative import restrictions 
on pulses. In this re gard, the EU's concerns remain over the application of import restrictions for 
pulses, and the EU echoes the interventions made by other Members. This supposedly temporary 
measure has been in place about four  years, and thus cannot be considered temporary.  Finally, the 
European Union requests that India provide clarifications as to how its measures are WTO -compliant, 
as well as more clarity as to when and how the measures will be ended.  
18.22.   The delegate of Argentina  indicated the following:  
18.23.   Despite the concerns  expressed on this matter in various forums, India's explanations have 
not yet led to a better understanding of the scope and duration of this measure. Therefore, Argentina 
does not know whether it is a temporary measure, or whether it will be maintained o ver time. 
According to the information available, in May  2021, the Indian Ministry of Commerce and Industry 
published new import conditions for certain pulses. Even though the quota restriction was lifted for 
mung beans, providing greater flexibility for e xport, the regulation will be in force until 
30 November  2021 (with shipping date prior to 31  October  2021), without guarantees or information 
about the conditions thereafter. Finally, Argentina wishes to point out that India did not open any 
quotas in 202 0, nor in 2021, for the import of yellow peas.  
18.24.   The delegate of India indicated the following:  
18.25.   India wishes to reiterate that the objective of this measure is to cater to the food and 
livelihood security of small and marginal farmers. India has been regularly reviewing this measure 
based on the market situation of pulses. Owing to such reviews, the import quota on pulses has 
been increased from time to time.  
18.26.   The characterization of these measures as anything but temporary is not correct. Apart from 
the increase in import quotas from time to time, the Government of India has relaxed its import 
measures through the draft Notification S.O.  1858(e), dated 15  May 2021. Through this order, the 
restrictions on the import of tur / pigeon peas ( cajanus cajan ), moong, and urad have been 
withdrawn by revising their import policy from "restricted" to "free", with effect from 15  May 2021, 
and which were in effect until 31  October  2021.  
18.27.   Further, on 13  September  2021, through Notification S.O.  3707(e), the Government of India 
notified that the import of tur / pigeon peas ( cajanus cajan ) will remain free. This order was published 
in the Gazette, which has the necessary details.  
18.28.   India continues to review these measures.  
18.29.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
19  SRI L ANKA – IMPORT BAN ON VARIOUS PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM AUSTRALIA AND 
THE EUROPEAN UNION  
19.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of 
Australia and the European Union.  
19.2.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated t he following:  
19.3.   The European Union regrets to repeat its concerns over the import restrictions imposed by 
Sri Lanka, in various forms, since April  2020. In this context, the EU does not dispute that Members 
can take import restrictions in the case of a criti cal balance -of-payments (BOP)  situation. However, 
the measures have been in place for over a year and a half. To the EU's  knowledge, Sri Lanka has 
still not complied with its obligation to notify the import restriction and enter into consultations with 
other WTO  Members.  G/C/M/141  
 
- 42 - 
 
  19.4.   At the October meeting of the C MA, Sri Lanka repeated that it was preparing a notification to  
the Council for Trade in Services. However, the European Union believes that this is not a services 
issue, or at least not solely a services issue . 
19.5.   Since the introduction of the initial measure, in April  2020, Sri Lanka has repeatedly modified 
the corresponding regulations. However, the European Union cannot conclude that the measures are 
temporary or close to being phased out. To the contrary, in S eptember  2021, the EU was informed 
of a newly announced 100% cash margin deposit requirement on various import lines, relating in 
particular to agri -food products, which risks making imports more difficult or unprofitable, especially 
for smaller companies.  
19.6.   In addition, the European Union notes that the suddenly banned imports of fertilizers are, 
since July  2021, made subject to opaque import licences. Again, this measure has not been notified, 
and imports remain unpredictable. As a result, this could affect  the production and ultimately also 
the export of agricultural products.  
19.7.   Contrary to what Sri Lanka implied at the most recent CMA  meeting, these measures, and 
the continued pressure exercised on the banks to reduce currency outflow, are hurting EU  interes ts 
and significantly affecting EU  exports. Moreover, despite all these measures, the trade deficit has 
continued to increase, and the macro -economic situation is deteriorating. In addition, the European 
Union is concerned to read in official presentations of the Central Bank that the authorities aim for 
a continued reduction of imports, whereas the import restrictions should have been temporary.  
19.8.   The European Union does not believe that this situation is sustainable in the absence of 
international macro -economic assistance. Furthermore, this is the fourth  time that the EU is raising 
this import ban at this Council, if, thus far, to no avail. Therefore, the European Union reserves its 
right to take further steps if Sri Lanka fails to notify and initiate consul tations.  
19.9.   The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
19.10.   Australia welcomed the update provided by Sri Lanka on its series of import restrictions at 
the CTG and C MA meetings earlier this year, most recently its update at the October CMA meeting.  
Despite these updates, Australia wishes to reiterate its concerns with respect to the range of import 
measures currently being implemented and their cumulative impact. These measures appear to be 
overly trade  restrictive and do not have a clear end -date. Australia appreciates the difficult 
circumstances that Sri Lanka is under as a result of the impact of COVID -19 on its economy and 
trade. Nevertheless, a well -functioning, transparent, predictable, and stable global trading system 
remains f undamental to global economic stability.  
19.11.   Australia welcomes Sri Lanka working with the Secretariat to ensure these measures are 
adequately notified to the WTO. In addition, Australia reiterates its request for this notification to be 
submitted as soon as p ossible, particularly to provide the WTO  basis of these measures, and to 
indicate when they will be lifted. The continuing lack of certainty has been trade -disruptive and has 
impacted upon Australian exporters' ability to provide staple food stuffs to Sri Lankan consumers. 
Furthermore, Australia requests Sri Lanka to reassure Members that the measures are being 
implemented in a manner consistent with its WTO  obligations. Finally, Australia remains open to 
engaging with Sri Lanka further on this issue, inclu ding through the suggested briefing with 
interested Geneva delegations.  
19.12.   The delegate of Thailand  indicated the following:  
19.13.   Thailand shares the views of Australia and the European Union regarding Sri Lanka's import 
measures that came into effect on numerous products in 2020, including automotive products, about 
which Thailand has been particularly concerned. Thailand takes note of Sri Lanka's updates and 
explanations at the most recent meeting of the C MA. Nevertheless, Thailand wishes to encourage  
Sri Lanka t o review and implement less restrictive alternative import measures and to notify the 
amendments of its import policies to the WTO at the earliest opportunity. Thailand continues to 
closely monitor Sri Lanka's responses to this matter and stands ready to e ngage with Sri Lanka to 
discuss this issue bilaterally.  
19.14.   The delegate of Argentina  indicated the following:  G/C/M/141  
 
- 43 - 
 
  19.15.   Argentina wishes to support the concern raised by the European Union and Australia, since 
Sri Lanka's Notification No.  2184/21 affects Argentine expo rts of mung beans.  
19.16.   The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
19.17.   Japan shares the concerns expressed by Australia and the European Union, and believes that 
Sri Lanka's import restrictions, especially its automobile import restrictions, may amount to an 
import ban, which would not be in compliance with Article  XI:1 of the GATT.  
19.18.   Japan understands that Sri Lanka advocates the need for this measure because of the 
difficulties it is experiencing with its Balance of Payments (BOP). At the same time, such an impo rt 
restriction, due to the BOP, should not be introduced easily. Rather, it should be carried out with the 
utmost caution and due consideration for the substantive and procedural requirements in the 
WTO Agreements.  
19.19.   Japan requests Sri Lanka to explain how t his measure meets those requirements, and to 
indicate its reasons for considering the measure to be justified. In addition, considering Sri Lanka's 
explanation, since March  2020, that this measure is to be applied temporarily Japan calls upon 
Sri Lanka to proceed with its early withdrawal.  
19.20.   At the Council's meeting of July  2021, Sri Lanka explained that, not only transactions by 
letter of credit, but also transactions by two  types of payment methods, such as prepaid and open 
account payment, had been introdu ced for certain items. Japan wishes to clarify whether this applies 
to automobiles, such as passenger cars, commercial vehicles, two -wheeled vehicles, or repair parts, 
and also in which laws and regulations the two  types of payment methods are stipulated.  
19.21.   The delegate of Sri Lanka  indicated the following:  
19.22.   Sri Lanka wishes to thank delegations for their continued interest in Sri Lanka's trade policy 
measures introduced to curb the economic impact of the COVID -19 pandemic. Sri Lanka has already 
made several s tatements on this matter at previous meetings of various WTO  bodies, including the 
CTG. Sri Lanka also made a detailed statement at the October meeting of the C MA, where an account  
was provided on the most recent developments regarding Sri Lanka's trade po licy measures under 
reference.  
19.23.   Therefore, Sri Lanka does not wish to make a detailed statement on this occasion. However, 
Sri Lanka does wish to share key aspects of the developments that have taken place since June  2021. 
Accordingly, the previous Import a nd Export Control Regulations, issued since April  2020, which 
imposed measures on imports, have been repealed as follows: (i)  the requirement to obtain import 
licences has been removed, and for those products, no prior approval is required as the temporary  
suspension is no longer applied; (ii)  those items that were subject to importation only on a 90 or 
180 days credit basis are no longer subjected to such requirements; (iii)  those goods that were 
subjected to temporary suspension are now allowed to be impo rted, except automotive vehicles and 
plastic goods. In addition, certain fertilizer varieties have been brought under Special Import 
Licences. These measures on imports, which still continue to exist on plastic goods and certain kinds 
of fertilizer, are ju stified under Article  XI of the GATT  1994, as they have been introduced on a 
non-discriminatory basis to limit the use of certain plastic and chemical fertilizer domestically for 
environmental reasons.  
19.24.   Sri Lanka has taken note of the additional concerns ex pressed by Australia and the European 
Union and will coordinate with its capital -based officials accordingly. At the same time, Sri Lanka will  
continue to engage on this matter with all of the Members concerned.  
19.25.   The Council took note  of the statements made . 
20  EGYPT – MANUFACTURER REGISTRATION SYSTEM – REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN 
UNION  
20.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of 
the European Union.  G/C/M/141  
 
- 44 - 
 
  20.2.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
20.3.   The Europ ean Union wishes to reiterate its concerns with regard to the registration of 
companies exporting to Egypt under Decrees No.  991/2015, No.  43/2016, and No.  44/2019. This 
registration procedure constitutes a considerable obstacle to trade. It imposes an unn ecessary 
administrative burden and blocks or substantially delays EU  exports. The European Union continues 
to question the measure and Egypt's justification for this mandatory registration of EU  companies.  
20.4.   The European Union notes with concern that the pen ding registration cases known to the EU 
have still not been successfully processed, and that some sectors (like ceramic tiles) continue being 
disproportionately affected by the discretionary application of Decree No.  43. Moreover, the EU 
would like to highlight the structural problems relating to Decree No.  43/2016, like the lack of 
transparency of the registration process, the lack of clear deadlines for processing the requests, the 
lack of a clear appeal procedure, and the high level of  discretion in granting registrations. The 
European Union stands ready to work with Egypt in order to terminate the measure.  
20.5.   The delegate of Turkey  indicated the following:  
20.6.   Turkey would like to share its continuing concerns regarding Egypt's Manufacturer 
Registration System, which still constitutes a significant trade barrier. Although certain 
improvements are being reported in comparison with the early days of the system's implementation, 
its lack of transparency and resulting unpredictability continues to  be a burden on exporters. Turkey 
now has additional concerns with the recent regulatory change. Decree No.  273, of the Ministry of 
Trade and Industry foresees to prohibit the dismantled parts of the articles prescribed by the 
two Ministerial Decrees that relate to the Manufacturer Registration System. That is, Decree No.  43 
of 2016 and Decree No.  44 of 2019. Turkey will closely follow the implementation process of this 
new Decree. In conclusion, while remaining ready to engage bilaterally with Egypt with a  view to 
addressing all trade -related matters, Turkey wishes once again to ask Egypt to review this measure 
considering its obligations under the WTO  Agreements, and to ensure its implementation in full 
transparency.  
20.7.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
20.8.   The United States remains concerned about the lack of transparency concerning Egypt's 
measure, as well as its application, which appears to be unnecessarily burdensome for US  exporters.  
20.9.   The delegate of Egypt  indicated the following:  
20.10.   Egypt wishes to thank the European Union, Turkey, and the United States, for the issues 
that they have raised concerning Decree No.  43 of 2016, and notes that Egypt and the EU have been 
engaged in discussions of this issue on nume rous occasions at various forums. In the context of 
those meetings and exchanges, Egypt has explained its understanding of the issues raised by the 
EU and its trading partners, and has exchanged information regarding the status of the registration 
of EU  companies. Egypt is committed to working towards the resolution of the remaining issues.  
20.11.   On the systemic issues relating to the implementation of the registration system, Egypt has 
indeed taken a number of positive steps in the right direction, and will cont inue to work on the 
improvement of the system, including transparency. On the issue raised by Turkey concerning 
Decree No.  273 on the registration of dismantled parts of the goods provided for in Decrees No.  43 
and No.  44, Egypt wishes to note that this De cree has been suspended. Finally, Egypt emphasizes 
its commitment towards working with its trading partners towards the resolution of any pending 
issues in this matter.  
20.12.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
21  INDONESIA – IMPORT AND EXPORT RESTRICTING  POLICIES AND PRACTICES – 
REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION, JAPAN, NEW ZEALAND, AND THE UNITED STATES  
21.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of 
the European Union, Japan, New Zealand, and the United States.  G/C/M/141  
 
- 45 - 
 
  21.2.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
21.3.   The European Union once again wishes to express its concerns over import and export 
restrictive policies and practices by Indonesia. The EU is deeply concerned that no real progress 
could be registe red in this respect as yet. Rather, the number and scope of Indonesian restrictions 
seem to have further expanded over time, with negative impacts on trade flows, and with a bigger 
impact at a time when growth and economic integration are under major stres s due to the pandemic. 
Integration in global value chains will be key for economic recovery. A country cannot rely only on 
promoting exports, but also needs to be open to increasing imports and to creating a trade and 
investment -friendly climate.  
21.4.   The Europ ean Union had welcomed the adoption by Indonesia of the Omnibus Law on Job 
Creation, which could be a game -changer for facilitating investment. However, the EU notes with 
concern that several burdensome and opaque requirements remain in place, preventing t he trade 
and investment facilitation impacts of the Omnibus Law from materializing. In particular, the EU 
reiterates its serious preoccupation with a number of Indonesia's policies and practices, including 
burdensome and lengthy SPS  import authorization pr ocedures; complex rules on halal labelling; 
mandatory use of, and limited possibilities for audits on, domestic SNI  (Indonesia National Standard) 
standards; and restrictive import licensing requirements for an increasingly broad range of goods.  
21.5.   These polic ies and practices de facto  hinder access to the Indonesian market for a variety of 
EU products, and hamper bilateral trade and investment relations. The European Union, therefore, 
urges Indonesia to reduce its high number of trade barriers, which have been  affecting EU  trade 
flows for too long. The European Union also calls upon Indonesia to refrain from creating new trade 
barriers. Finally, the European Union also reiterates its call to Indonesia to ensure that all relevant 
measures are notified to the WTO , thereby affording Members an opportunity to provide their 
comments on them.  
21.6.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
21.7.   The United States takes this opportunity to underscore its deep concern with a number of 
worrying developments in Indon esia's trade and investment regime. First, the United States remains 
deeply dismayed by the lack of substantive response to the concerns that the United States has 
raised regarding Indonesia's use of local content requirements. As Members know, Indonesia h as 
imposed such requirements across a wide range of sectors, including telecommunications, mobile 
technology, energy, textiles, retail, and franchising. Despite the United States and other Members 
repeatedly raising concerns in the WTO  TRIMs  Committee, Ind onesia has expanded its use of such 
requirements. Most notably, the Indonesian government recently announced plans to suppress 
imports, including through the use of local content requirements, with the goal of "substitut[ing] 
35 percent of imported product s" by 2022. And in line with this goal, in October  2021, the 
ICT Ministry issued a regulation that will increase local content requirements for all 4G and 
5G devices to 35%. It is difficult to envision how Indonesia could implement its plan to suppress 
imports in a WTO -consistent manner, and the US strongly urges Indonesia to clarify these reported 
plans and reconsider its use of local content requirements generally.  
21.8.   Second, the United States remains concerned by what it sees as a pattern of Indonesia 
finalizing trade -related measures without sufficient opportunities for stakeholder input. For example, 
in the WTO  TBT Committee, the United States recently learned that Indonesia had signed into effect 
several measures connected to its halal product assurance l aw, without sufficient notification or 
opportunities for input. US  concerns with Indonesia's regulatory transparency are not hypothetical; 
indeed, the halal measures that Indonesia finalized have the potential to impact a significant 
proportion of global g oods trade with Indonesia, including US  exports. Going forward, the United 
States encourages Indonesia to notify draft measures of its halal law to the TBT  Committee and to 
consider the adoption of a more consultative policymaking process overall. The Unit ed States 
believes that this will be to Indonesia's benefit, including by providing greater certainty to domestic 
businesses and foreign investors.  
21.9.   Third, the United States strongly encourages Indonesia to respond to the concerns that it has 
raised with re spect to applying tariffs at the border on a category of ICT  products that appear to 
exceed its WTO  bound tariff commitments. The United States has raised this issue several times 
with Indonesia over the past two  years, including in the Market Access and I TA Committees, as well G/C/M/141  
 
- 46 - 
 
  as bilaterally. Unfortunately, Indonesia has yet to provide a substantive response to US  concerns. 
The United States has been patient and constructive, providing concrete examples that clearly 
illustrate US  concerns multiple times, a s well as preparing several specific questions, which were 
circulated to the ITA  Committee on 14  April 2021; unfortunately, Indonesia has yet to provide a 
substantive response to repeated US  attempts at engagement. In addition to calling into question 
Indonesia's bound commitments, the United States believes that these policies are to Indonesia's 
own detriment as they limit access for Indonesian consumers and firms to important high -tech 
products that form the backbone of the digital economy. US  traders hav e also been actively noting 
the disincentives to investment that result from these tariffs.  
21.10.   The United States is hopeful that, in raising these important issues again on this occasion, 
it can help to pave the path for greater engagement. To this end, the U S stands ready to work in 
partnership with Indonesia to address these concerns.  
21.11.   The delegate of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
21.12.   New Zealand echoes the concerns raised by the European Union and Japan. New Zealand 
notes again that it believes that Indon esia's restrictions on agricultural imports undermine core 
WTO principles. New Zealand remains particularly concerned about the inconsistent issuance of 
import licences. Delays in import licences last year prevented commercially meaningful access for 
New Z ealand horticultural products to the Indonesian market for a significant proportion of New 
Zealand's export season. And delays in the processing of applications in 2021 reduced the 
commercial certainty exporters have in this market.  
21.13.   Despite outlining these concerns at the Council's previous meeting, and Indonesia 
undertaking to follow up on the issues raised by Members, New Zealand notes that timely issuance 
of commercially meaningful import licences remains a significant concern, continuing to impact trade 
throughout the season.  
21.14.   In the week before the Council's current meeting, for example, Indonesia's Ministry of Trade 
released a number of new regulations, including Regulations No.  18/2021 and No.  20/2021 relating 
to Indonesia's import regim e. Whil e importers were previously able to apply for licences in November 
for the following year's import season, these regulations take effect very quickly, from 15  November. 
Furthermore, the regulations appear to be dated 1  April 2021. New Zealand is con cerned that the 
regulatory environment continues to be unpredictable for importers and exporters to operate in, 
leading to unnecessary disruptions to trading practices.  
21.15.   New Zealand encourages Indonesia to provide an update on how the issues outlined by 
Members will be addressed, and how Regulations No.  18/2021 and No.  20/2021 relate to, and will 
address, the concerns previously raised.  
21.16.   The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
21.17.   In past meetings of the CTG and TRIMs  Committees, Japan has been continuing to express 
its concerns about the WTO  consistency of various local content requirement measures 
(LCR measures) by Indonesia relating to 4GLTE  equipment, TV  equipment, retail industry products, 
and so on. In this regard, it is regrettable that Indonesia has  declared that it has no plans to review 
its LCR  measures in the near future. Indonesia has repeatedly explained that LCR  measures in 
general are related to the following three  things: (i)  government procurement; (ii)  policies that 
involve fulfilling the n eed to maintain the welfare and life necessities of the entire Indonesian 
population; or (iii)  national management of strategic supplies. However, not all LCR  measures fall 
under these categories, nor are they justified by these reasons.  
21.18.   Japan is also conc erned about the increase in import restricting measures to the import 
registration or approval system for textile products and air conditioners, raising concerns about their 
consistency under Article  XI:1 of the GATT. Japan appreciates that there is an imp rovement in the 
level of permitted quantities, but hopes that the criteria will be clarified, and the operational 
transparency improved.  
21.19.   Moreover, when import licences for steel products were issued in accordance with the 
Minister of Trade Regulation No.  3 of 2020, the Minister of Industry Regulation No.  4 of 2021 G/C/M/141  
 
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  stipulated that the authority would take into account national supply and demand balance when 
deciding whether or not to issue a Technical Consideration for API -U. Since then, the actual  number  
of approved quantities of both API -U and API -P for manufacturers decreased, so Japan considers 
that de facto  import restrictive measures have been implemented.  
21.20.   Furthermore, on textile products, it was truly regrettable that the safeguard measure on 
carpets w as introduced on 17  February  2021, even though Japan called upon Indonesia to reconsider 
its introduction in the context of the Safeguards Committee and bilateral consultations. There are 
two main problems with the safeguard measure, one being that the tar iff is as high as 150 -200% in 
terms of ad valorem  tax conversion, and the other being that it was introduced in a situation where 
carpet exports have dropped sharply.  
21.21.   Japan is concerned about the increase in Indonesia's trade restricting measures, which it  
suspects are inconsistent with WTO  Agreements, and requests from Indonesia a concrete 
explanation regarding the background to the introduction of these systems, and their 
WTO consistency.  
21.22.   Finally, regarding Indonesia's import regulation on air conditioner s, its import licence for 
steel, and its import regulation for textiles, Japan recalls the questionnaire that it submitted to the 
Import Licensing and TRIMs  Committees earlier in the year. Japan expects a prompt response from 
Indonesia. In addition, Japan hopes that the import regulations on air conditioners will be operated 
in such a way that they do not become import restrictions, that future permit standards and 
procedures will be stipulated more transparently, and that the other measures at issue will b e 
corrected or abolished as soon as possible.  
21.23.   The delegate of Norway  indicated the following:  
21.24.   Norway has an ongoing concern in this matter and looks forward to a change in Indonesia's 
practice in this regard.  
21.25.   The delegate of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
21.26.   Indonesia thanks the United States, the European Union, Japan, and New Zealand for 
returning to Indonesia as an investment and trade destination. Indonesia is well aware of Members' 
concerns over its import policies, including the  following: the US  concern about the Domestic 
Component Level (TKDN), halal certification, and information and communication technology; the 
EU's concern about the underlay process of animal and plant products, as well as information on 
halal certification ; Japan's concern about TKDN on 4GLTE  products, import restrictions on textile 
products, and high import duties on safeguard measures for carpet products; and New Zealand's 
concern about Indonesia's inconsistency in issuing import approvals for horticultur al products.  
21.27.   Indonesia reiterates that there are no restrictions, such as import policies and actions related 
to government procurement, that concern the fulfilment of the Indonesian population's living needs 
and welfare, and policies involving strategic r esources managed by the Indonesian State. 
Furthermore, based on import data from 2016 to 2020, the products in question do not generally 
show or experience a decline but rather a comparatively positive trend.  
21.28.   Indonesia will always support simplification, t ransparency, and efficiency to make exports 
and imports easier to take place. With the current implementation of export and import licensing 
procedures, Indonesia has managed to create an automatic and digital export and import licensing 
system, allowing a pplications to be processed in a relatively short time if all the required documents 
are completed correctly before their submission.  
21.29.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
22  INDONESIA – IMPORT SUBSTITUTION PROGRAMME – REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN 
UNION  
22.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this new item had been  included on the agenda at the request 
of the European Union.  G/C/M/141  
 
- 48 - 
 
  22.2.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
22.3.   As reflected under the previous agenda item, the European Union holds deep concern s about 
the ever -increasing trend in Indonesia towards applying import restrictive measures. In particular, 
the EU wishes to bring to the attention of this Council some worrisome recent developments 
regarding Indonesia's strengthened focus on import substitution. Notably, the EU has serious 
concerns about reported plans by the Indonesian Ministry of Industry to achiev e, by 2022, a 
reduction in imports equivalent to 35% of the value of its 2019  import potential. This would be 
achieved through a range of measures, including expanding local content requirements and the 
mandatory use of national "SNI"  standards, as well as  the further promulgation of cumbersome 
import licensing procedures.  
22.4.   The European Union understands that the implementation of this approach is already under 
way. For example, with the adoption of import restrictions on medical devices, through the "freezi ng" 
of several foreign devices in the Indonesian e -catalogue for public procurement, preventing 
government health institutions from purchasing them.  
22.5.   EU industry (including, for example, the toy and tyre sectors) is also facing increasing 
challenges linked to the requirements on use of SNI  standards for a growing range of products. 
Notably, the renewal or granting of new SNI  certificates remains extremely difficult, since virtual 
audits or certification by foreign bodies are not allowed, and options for phys ical inspections remain 
significantly limited due to COVID -19-related restrictions.  
22.6.   Therefore, the European Union wishes to ask Indonesia for clarification of the following: the 
reported plans for an import substitution programme, including its underlying rationale; the 
implementing measures that Indonesia intends to take; and how Indonesia intends to ensure that 
such policies and practices will be compliant with its WTO  obligations.  
22.7.   The delegate of Switzerland  indicated the following:  
22.8.   Switzerland wishes to  express its concerns regarding Indonesia's Import Substitution 
Programme. And while Switzerland recognizes the challenges that Indonesia has had to face due to 
the pandemic, indeed like many other countries, Switzerland firmly believes that, in an 
interco nnected world, restricting imports can only jeopardize Indonesia's economic recovery. In this 
context, Switzerland recalls the importance of ensuring that trade policies and practices are 
compliant with WTO  rules. Switzerland looks forward to hearing Indon esia's responses to questions 
posed by other delegations.  
22.9.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
22.10.   The United States shares the European Union's concerns regarding the Indonesian 
government's recent statements that it will suppress import s with the goal of "substituting 35% of 
imported products" by 2022. The United States urges Indonesia to share further information on 
these statements, including the government's objectives. In particular, the United States would like 
to better understand which 35% of imports Indonesia wishes to suppress, and why. Finally, the 
United States urges Indonesia to rethink this trade -distortive goal, which seems to run counter to 
the foundational WTO  principle of fair competition.  
22.11.   The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
22.12.   Japan noted that Indonesia implemented the P3DN  (Use of Domestic Products) programme 
in 2018, which stipulates that the purchase and use of domestic products should be prioritized, and 
that the Minister of Industry wanted to accelerate this programme as of February of this year. Japan 
shares the European Union's concerns regarding such import substitution programmes.  
22.13.   Japan has expressed a series of concerns about a situation in which Indonesia has introduced 
and maintained LCR  measures in var ious fields. Japan has also expressed its concern that import  
licence -related measures have been effectively restricted in terms of import quantity. Japan is 
concerned that this programme will exacerbate this situation.  G/C/M/141  
 
- 49 - 
 
  22.14.   Japan wishes to ask for a clarificat ion of how Indonesia intends to implement the 
P3DN  programme. Japan also requests Indonesia to explain how it aims to ensure WTO  consistency 
with the measures that it is trying to implement to realize the plan.  
22.15.   The delegate of Indonesia  indicated the follo wing:  
22.16.   Regarding the questions on the alleged Indonesia's Import Substitution Programme, 
Indonesia took note of the concerns and will transmit them back to capital.  
22.17.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
23  KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA, KINGDOM OF BAHRAIN, T HE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES, 
THE STATE OF KUWAIT, OMAN, AND QATAR – SELECTIVE TAX ON CERTAIN IMPORTED 
PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION, SWITZERLAND, AND THE UNITED 
STATES (G/C/W/792)  
23.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the ag enda at the request of 
the European Union, Switzerland, and the United States.  
23.2.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
23.3.   The United States, the European Union, Japan, and Switzerland circulated questions on 
17 March  2021 to each of the mem ber State governments of the Cooperation Council for the Arab 
States of the Gulf (GCC) regarding their implementation of the selective tax on carbonated soft 
drinks, malt beverages, energy drinks, sports drinks, and other sweetened beverages. However, we 
have not yet received written responses to those questions and ask these Members to indicate today 
when those responses will be provided.  
23.4.   Nevertheless, the United States wishes to acknowledge a recent telephone call with the 
GCC members, Switzerland, and the European Union, to discuss this issue. The United States and 
co-sponsors look forward to the written responses from the GCC  members, and request a fulsome 
update on revisions to the GCC  excise tax model and its implementation plan unde r the GCC  Unified 
Excise Tax Agreement, and in particular those steps that members see being taken by the end of 
2021. In this regard, the timely engagement with interested trading partner governments and 
private sector stakeholders on the concerns noted i s critical.  
23.5.   The delegate of Switzerland  indicated the following:  
23.6.   Switzerland would like to thank the delegations of the GCC member States for the discussions 
that took place in the week prior to the Council's current meeting and, like the United States, is  
looking forward to receiving written answers to the questions. Although Switzerland appreciated the 
opportunity to discuss the state of play of the current reform process, its concerns with regard to 
the current discriminatory design and impact of the sel ective tax remain unresolved. In particular, 
Switzerland reiterates and underlines its request to harmonize at 50% the tax rate for energy drinks 
and other sugar -containing beverages. Switzerland makes this request again because, from a health 
perspective,  energy drinks and carbonated soft drinks contain similar amounts of sugar. A recent 
review of the available studies concerning the safety of caffeine performed by the competent 
authorities in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia also came to the conclusion that the normal consumption 
of caffeine does not present a risk for human health. In addition, the share of energy drinks in the 
GCC markets is very small. Finally, the GCC  member States have expanded the scope of the 
selective tax to include fr uit juices and milk drinks containing added sugar. This expansion generates 
additional revenues and compensates for the harmonization of the tax. For all these reasons, an 
equalization of the rates at 50% would neither have a detrimental effect on the reve nues nor on the 
legitimate health objectives of GCC  member States.  
23.7.   As the reform process advances within the GCC  member States, Switzerland would again ask 
to be regularly informed about the evolution of this process. Switzerland will certainly contribute 
constructively in the consultation process and make comments once a draft is publicly available. 
Finally, Switzerland will continue to follow this issue closely and looks forward to the next opportunity 
for further exchanges with the GCC  member States, as previously discussed.  G/C/M/141  
 
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  23.8.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
23.9.   The European Union thanks the GCC  countries for the meeting that took place in the week 
prior to the Council's current meeting, and looks forward to continuing such engagemen t. Of 
particular importance to the EU is the harmonization of the implementation of the Excise Tax Law, 
as well as the need for a close engagement with private industry stakeholders on the process for 
revising the tax.  
23.10.   The European Union would also seek GC C confirmation that, in the revised tax system, 
energy drinks will fall within the scope of a sweetened beverage tax, and be taxed according to the 
same criteria as other sweetened beverages, namely solely on the basis of their sugar content. The 
EU would also welcome information on the envisaged timeline for the change to the volumetric tax 
and an acceleration of the implementation of the new tax regime.  
23.11.   The European Union also calls for providing immediate relief for industry until the ongoing 
GCC excise taxation revision takes effect, by exempting all zero  sugar beverages from the tax and 
harmonizing the tax rate at 50% for energy drinks and all other categories of sugar -sweetened 
beverages subject to the tax.  
23.12.   The European Union will continue engaging wit h GCC  countries on this issue in order to have 
this trade barrier lifted in the near future.  
23.13.   The delegate of the Kingdom of Bahrain  indicated the following:  
23.14.   On behalf of the United Arab Emirates, the Kingdom of Bahrain, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 
the Sul tanate of Oman, the State of Qatar, and the State of Kuwait, Bahrain wishes to thank the 
delegations of the European Union, Japan, Switzerland, and the United States for their interest in 
the GCC  excise tax regime, and for their communication on the applic ation of the excise tax on 
carbonated soft drinks, malt beverages, energy drinks, sport drinks, and other sweetened 
beverages, contained in document  G/C/W/792, dated 19  March  2021.  
23.15.   In this regard, the Kingdom of Bahrain recalls the GCC  statement before the  CMA during its  
meeting of 11  October  2021, in which some of the concerns expressed by interested delegations 
were answered. As for the timeline of the ongoing process on the new GCC  excise tax model, and 
its implementation, Bahrain recalls, once again, th at the revision of the excise tax on beverages is 
a complex exercise that needs significant effort, extensive coordination, and comprehensive studies. 
The GCC  Working Group on Tax Issues is sparing no effort to complete this exercise in order to 
submit to the GCC  member States the appropriate results and high standards excise tax model. The 
complexity, time, and resource -consuming nature of this process was emphasized during the 
consultations held on 28  October  2021, via video conference, with certain of th e GCC  member 
States' Geneva -based delegations, in which representatives from the GCC  capitals participated. In 
this respect, the GCC  member States were satisfied with the discussions and the exchange of ideas 
held during the said consultations on the GCC  excise tax regime.  
23.16.   The Kingdom of Bahrain can confirm that the concerns expressed by interested 
WTO Members will be taken into account and treated with consideration in the framework of the 
GCC revision of the excise tax regime. As mentioned during the 28  October consultations, 
appropriate procedures, and timelines, will be adopted by the GCC  member States for the revision 
of their excise tax regimes. Once the process has been completed, the relevant information will be 
immediately shared with WTO  Members.  
23.17.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
24  UNITED STATES – IMPORT RESTRICTIONS ON APPLES AND PEARS – REQUEST FROM 
THE EUROPEAN UNION  
24.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of 
the European Union.  G/C/M/141  
 
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  24.2.   The delegat e of the European Union  indicated the following:  
24.3.   The European Union has raised this issue on multiple occasions in the SPS  Committee and 
under this Council, and the EU's concerns remain. The current so -called pre -clearance system put in 
place by the United  States is too costly and in practice the US  market is closed for imports of apples 
from the EU. 
24.4.   The United States carried out a scientific risk assessment on allowing imports of apples and 
pears from several EU  member States under a systems approach. This  assessment was finalized 
several years ago and demonstrated that safe imports of apples and pears from the European Union 
could take place under a systems approach.  
24.5.   Since 2014, the United States continues to block the publication of its Federal Notice, wh ich 
is the last remaining step to allow imports of apples and pears from the European Union under this 
systems approach, and this without any scientific grounds. The United States is thereby going 
against the SPS  Agreement, as it maintains an approval proc edure with undue delays and without 
providing a scientific justification explaining those delays.  
24.6.   The European Union urges the United States to base its import policy on science, in line with 
its WTO  commitments. The European Union calls upon the United St ates to finalize the last purely 
administrative step to allow market access of apples and pears from the EU without any further 
delay. The European Union looks forward to continuing to cooperate with the United States with a 
view to finding a swift solutio n on this overly long outstanding matter.  
24.7.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
24.8.   The United States thanks the European Union for its continued interest in the status of the 
request from eight  EU member States to export apples and pears under a systems approach to the 
United States. The US  Department of Agriculture continues to work through its administrative 
procedures on this request. The United States would again note that the EU is able to export apples 
and pears to the United States under the existing pre -clearance program.  
24.9.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
25  SRI LANKA - IMPORT BAN ON PALM OIL - REQUEST FROM INDONESIA  
25.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of 
Indonesia.  
25.2.   The delegate of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
25.3.   Indonesia requests further clarification from Sri Lanka regarding its policy of prohibiting palm 
oil imports, as contained in the Operating Instruction of the Sri Lanka Export and Import Supervision 
Department No.  8/2021, which has been updated with Operating Instruction No.  9/2021, dated 
12 April 2021. In this policy, crude palm oil products are categorized into a list of products that are 
prohibited from being  imported because Sri Lanka does not know how to deal with the issue of 
micro -toxin contamination. Indonesia understands that such contamination has occurred as a result 
of the actions of certain importers, who are deemed to have acted unethically by bring ing crude 
palm oil onto the Sri Lankan market while claiming it as refined palm oil and mixing it with coconut 
oil. 
25.4.   Sri Lanka is a major producer of coconut oil products, and in recent years there has been an 
increase in imports and consumption of palm oil , which is seen as detrimental to domestic producers 
and smallholders. Thus, Sri Lanka has issued a prohibition policy to make Sri Lanka free from oil 
palm plantations and free from palm oil consumption. The implementation of the prohibition policy 
has had  a direct impact on exports of palm oil products to Sri Lanka, especially from Indonesia, and 
this affects the livelihoods of small palm oil farmers in Indonesia, and has a systemic impact on the 
global palm oil trade. Indonesia considers that Sri Lanka's prohibition policy is a form of 
discrimination, and is not permitted under WTO  provisions; it also has the potential to create 
unnecessary barriers to international trade.  G/C/M/141  
 
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  25.5.   Indonesia appreciates Sri Lanka's step in notifying the policy in question to the 
TBT Committee, in document  G/TBT/N/LKA/36. Nevertheless, Indonesia had submitted a request 
for clarification to Sri Lanka's enquiry point, to date without response or answer. In this regard, 
Indonesia hopes that Sri Lanka can immediately provide its response s and answers regarding this 
clarification request, and if Sri Lanka's policy is renewed, it should immediately be notified to the 
TBT Committee, including further explanation of its rationality, administration, objectives, and 
duration, as well as the sci entific basis for its justification.  
25.6.   Indonesia hopes that Sri Lanka will review the implementation of its palm oil import ban policy 
and instead use other, alternative, policy instruments, which are permitted and in line with the 
applicable provisions in t he WTO, such as through implementation of technical standards/regulations 
to ensure the quality of imported palm oil products.  
25.7.   The delegate of Colombia  indicated the following:  
25.8.   Colombia is also interested in this topic and concerned about the measures adop ted by 
Sri Lanka, that is, the restrictions and bans on the importation of palm oils, derivatives. Colombia 
produces and exports palm oil derivatives and biofuels that are created using palm oil. In this vein, 
market dynamics and restrictions or bans impos ed on the trade of these goods in various jurisdictions 
have a direct impact on Colombian exports. On this particular matter, Colombia is especially 
concerned about the operating instructions issued by the Sri Lankan Government that have 
suspended or restr icted imports of palm oil. Yet again, as it has done in other WTO  Committees, 
Colombia requests that Sri Lanka provide greater information about these measures, so that 
Members can get acquainted with Sri Lanka's policy objectives, the period of implementa tion, the 
procedures to commercialize palm oil and derivatives, and the time -frame during which these 
restrictions will apply.  
25.9.   The delegate of Sri Lanka  indicated the following:  
25.10.   Sri Lanka notes that this issue had also been raised at the meetings of the Co mmittee on 
Import Licensing, and the C MA, held on 8 and 11  October, respectively, where Sri Lanka had  
responded to those queries substantially.  
25.11.   In this context, Sri Lanka would like to reiterate that it has not changed its import policy in 
respect of the i mportation of palm oil. In addition, the process of implementation of import 
authorizations through import licences by Sri Lanka is fully transparent and predictable. As Members 
have previously been informed, Sri Lanka has complied with due procedures with  regard to 
provisions under the ILP Agreement , as well as the TBT and SPS  Agreements. For the record, 
Sri Lanka wishes to repeat the following key points:  
25.12.   First, through its Notification to the TBT  Committee, in document  G/TBT/N/LKA/36, dated 
28 May 2018, Sri Lanka has notified its Imports Standardization and Quality Control Regulations of 
2017, which were introduced through the Extraordinary Gazette of Sri Lanka No.  2064/34, dated 
29 March  2018. This regulation governs the Compulsory Import Inspection Sche me of Sri Lanka, 
operated by the Sri Lanka Standards Institution. Under the Compulsory Import Inspection Scheme, 
importers are not permitted to import to Sri Lanka the specified 122  items listed in Schedule -I of 
this regulation, including palm oil, unless they conform to the relevant Sri Lanka Standards.  
25.13.   At the meetings of various committees, Sri Lanka has already explained its reasons for 
including all palm oil, palm olein, and palm stearin varieties under its Compulsory Import Inspection 
Scheme, namely th at it is purely due to the SPS  measures relating to aflatoxins and mycotoxins, 
which are carcinogenic materials. As stated above, the two TBT and SPS  focal points in Sri Lanka, 
namely, Sri Lanka Standard Institute (SLSI), and the Ministry of Health, respec tively, had already 
notified to the WTO the standards adopted for 122  items, including palm oil products. As notified, 
there are three  SLSI Standards, one in relation to palm oil, which is SLS  720, one in relation to palm 
olein, which is SLS  961, and one i n relation to palm stearin, which is SLS  960. Of all palm oil, palm 
olein, and palm stearin varieties, the specific products falling under HS  codes 1511.10.00, 
1511.90.20, and 1511.90.90, appeared to have been more contaminated with aflatoxins and 
mycotoxi ns, prompting Sri Lanka to impose much stricter measures on their importation.  G/C/M/141  
 
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  25.14.   Second, the principal set of procedures that relate to automatic and non -automatic licences 
are stipulated in the Regulation published in Extraordinary Gazette No.  1739/03, date d 
2 January  2012. Sri Lanka has already notified this Regulation to the WTO, in 2014. Accordingly, 
palm oil products falling under HS  codes 1511.90.10, HS  1511.90.30, and HS  1511.90.90, can be 
imported to Sri Lanka by obtaining an import licence from the D epartment of Import and Export 
Control, with a fee of 0.4% of c.i.f.  value.  
25.15.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
26  INDIA – INDIAN STANDARDS AND IMPORT RESTRICTION IN THE AUTOMOTIVE 
SECTOR (QUALITY CONTROL ORDERS): WHEEL RIMS, SAFETY GLASS, HELMETS – 
REQUEST FROM INDONESIA  
26.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of 
Indonesia.  
26.2.   The delegate of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
26.3.   Indonesia expresses gratitude to India for notifying to the TBT  Committee, on 25  May 2020, 
in document  G/TBT/N/IND/147, the draft Automobile Wheel Rims (Quality Control) Order  2020. 
Wheel rim products must meet IS  16192 and bear the Indian Standard Mark, w hich is licensed by 
the B IS, based on these criteria.  
26.4.   Indonesia pays close attention to this policy and requests that India postpone or provide 
adequate transition time for Indonesian industry to comply with the regulation. Indonesia also needs 
clarificati on of the status of the regulation's implementation at this time. Although the regulation 
went into effect on 1  October  2020, India has made no additional notification regarding the 
establishment of the arrangement. As there is no clarity regarding the reg ulatory mechanism, 
Indonesia believes that the regulation will have an adverse impact and become a trade barrier to 
Indonesian trade. In addition, Indonesia requests India's clarification of several policy issues, 
including the status of implementing regul ations, factory visits, the implementation of the 
International Center for Automotive Technology (ICAT) standards, and the scope of the 
arrangement.  
26.5.   Indonesia also hopes for a follow -up bilateral meeting further to the discussions that took 
place at the TB T and CTG  meetings that took place in July, the Working Group on Trade and 
Investment meeting that took place in August, and the CMA  meeting that took place in October. 
Indonesia has also sent an enquiry to India's enquiry point to request further clarific ation of this 
matter; however, it has yet to receive any feedback from India in this regard.  
26.6.   The delegate of India indicated the following:  
26.7.   India notes that it is not a mandatory obligation under the TBT  Agreement to notify a final 
measure to the WTO. Howe ver, the same is published in the gazette and publicly available. As also 
mentioned on the B IS website3, the implementation date for the regulation has been postponed to 
21 March  2022. This same clarification has already been provided in the October meeti ng of the 
CMA. 
26.8.   The quality control order has listed the mandated standard and the conformity assessment 
procedures (CAPs) required. There is no provision in BIS (conformity assessment) regulations 2018 
for remote assessment or any other means for inspectio n. However, India is considering alternatives 
to in-person inspections, with this discussion currently in its initial stages. India requests Indonesia 
to share the specific challenges being faced on account of this measure.  
26.9.   The Council took note  of the sta tements made.  
 
3 https://www.bis.gov.in/wp -content/uploads/2021/06/automobile -wheel -rim-component -quality -
control -amendment -order -2021.pdf  G/C/M/141  
 
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  27  INDIA – PLAIN COPIER PAPER QUALITY ORDER  2020 – REQUEST FROM INDONESIA  
27.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of 
Indonesia.  
27.2.   The delegate of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
27.3.   Indonesia seeks clarification from India regarding the provisions outlined in the Plain Copier 
Paper (Quality Control) Order  2020. Only the Indian Standards Bureau (BIS) performs certifications 
based on the Conformity Assessment Regulation 2018 via Scheme  1 of Sched ule-II, which requires 
factory visits, sampling, product testing, and licensing procedures.  
27.4.   Indonesia regrets India's failure to address the current COVID -19 pandemic, which prevents 
factory visits, and includes travel bans, and social distancing policies.  In this regard, Indonesia 
requests India to consider using remote assessment in conducting factory visits, and relaxing its 
policies, as a means of facilitating trade and minimizing technical trade barriers, particularly in the 
context of this pandemic.  
27.5.   Indonesia requests that India postpone the measures or provide for a reasonable transition 
time to grant Indonesia's pulp and paper industry sufficient time to comply with the regulation, and 
also that India immediately adopts the available international s tandards as the basis for its testing 
methods, namely remote assessment during factory visits.  
27.6.   In addition, Indonesia requests India to notify the TBT  Committee of this technical regulation. 
Indonesia also hopes for a follow -up virtual bilateral meeting fu rther to the discussions that took 
place at the July meetings of the TBT   Committee and the CTG, the August meeting of the Working 
Group on Trade and Investment, and the October meeting of the C MA. 
27.7.   The delegate of India indicated the following:  
27.8.   There is no  provision in the B IS conformity assessment regulations 2018 for remote  
assessment or any other means for inspection. India is considering alternatives to in -person 
inspections, with this discussion currently in its initial stages. The quality control orde r refenced in 
this discussion has listed the mandated standard, as well as the CAPs required. On standards, India 
wishes to clarify that international standards are indeed adopted unless specified otherwise.  
27.9.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
28  CHINA – EXPORT CONTROL LAW – REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION AND JAPAN  
28.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of 
the European Union and Japan.  
28.2.   The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
28.3.   Japan continues to h ave concerns over China's Export Control Law, which entered into force 
in December  2020. In particular, the details of the export -controlled items, and the details regarding 
regulations and operations, are still unclear to Japan.  
28.4.   As stated in previous Coun cil meetings, and taking into consideration the objective of the law 
to safeguard national interests, Japan especially wishes to reiterate the following three  points: (i)  the 
possibility to set out the scope of the products excessively broadly; (ii)  cases that may require 
unnecessary disclosure of technological information during classification and end -user or usage 
investigations; and (iii)  the provisions on countermeasures for discriminatory export regulation by 
other countries, which are maintained in th e law.  
28.5.   Japan believes that the aforementioned export restrictions stipulated in this law may 
constitute an overly stringent export regulation or be unnecessary restrictions in light of the 
international export control regime. Therefore, they may equate to export restrictions prohibited 
under Article  XI of the GATT, and consequently be inconsistent with the WTO  Agreement.  G/C/M/141  
 
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  28.6.   In this regard, Japan wishes to reiterate the following two  points, as raised already in previous 
meetings of the Council: (i)  the draft r egulations on rare earths, published in January  2021, 
mentioned a plan to set out strategic reserves, which Japan believes could mean the possibility that 
China may introduce controls on exports of rare earths and related products, in accordance with the 
aforementioned Export Control Law; and (ii)  regarding the "Unreliable Entities List", and the export 
prohibition list based on the External Trade Law, Japan is concerned that the relationship between 
the entities list in the Export Control Law, the items co vered in the law, and the technology list, is 
also unclear.  
28.7.   Japan understands that China explained at the Council's previous meeting that it is still 
drafting the Export Control Law's supporting regulations and the control lists, and that it will 
communica te with the Members concerned and provide updates in due course. For its part, Japan 
will continue to observe the details of the regulations on implementing the law and hopes that its 
concerns will be resolved accordingly in their final draft. In addition,  Japan is of the view that the 
countermeasure provisions should be removed from the law.  
28.8.   In conclusion, Japan requests China to provide information on the detailed regulations, and 
their timeline, in full transparency, while also providing ample time for t heir consideration.  
28.9.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
28.10.   The European Union is closely following developments regarding China's new Export Control 
Law, which took effect on 1  December  2020. While recognizing that China's Export Contr ol Law 
consolidates its non -proliferation commitments and export controls, the EU still has concerns relating 
to the following five  main issues.  
28.11.   First, the extra -territorial application of the law. The law contains a new provision with 
extraterritorial app lication determining consequences to foreign individuals and organizations 
outside of China violating the law and endangering the national security and interests of China 
(Article  44), which is not in line with internationally agreed export control standar ds. 
28.12.   Second, rules on deemed exports and re -exports. The law appears to provide for controls to 
apply to transactions within China ("deemed exports", as per Article  2.3). In this regard, the 
European Union places great importance on the non -discriminatory t reatment of EU  companies in 
China (for example, their Chinese subsidiaries). The EU is concerned that the concept of "deemed 
exports", which goes beyond the internationally agreed standards on export controls, might lead to 
an unequal treatment and have ad verse effects on the activities of EU  companies in China (for 
example, research and development). Furthermore, the law foresees controls on re -transfer or 
re-exports (Articles  16 and 45), but it is unclear whether the obligation not to re -export items 
without the prior consent of the Chinese authorities also applies to foreign products that contain 
controlled items obtained from China as components. The previous draft included an explicit 
provision in this regard in case the controlled items exceeded a cert ain threshold. It would be useful 
to confirm that this is not the case under the current re -export provision.  
28.13.   Third, objectives and scope of controls. The law names "national security and interests" as 
a prime objective, next to "non -proliferation and othe r international obligations". Even though the 
law does not reference "development interests", "industrial competence", or "technological 
development" anymore as control principles (as previous drafts did), the European Union is 
concerned that Article  1 ("national security and interests") as well as Article  3 ("national security" 
and coordination of "security and development") contain vague language still reflecting objectives 
other than international security obligations and commitments. The EU recalls that the objectives 
and scope of export controls should be in line with a Member's international obligations and 
multilateral commitments. In the context of its TPR, China replied that "[n]ational interests are  
inseparable from the concept of nati onal security. The legislative purposes of major international 
countries' export controls all mention safeguarding national security and safeguarding national 
interests". However, the EU would welcome further clarification in this regard, as well as on the  
intended application and specification of other related provisions that could lead to legal uncertainty 
for economic operators, for example, on the application of control parameters ("national security" 
and "development", Articles  1, 3, and 13); "terroris t purposes" (Article  12); the scope of controls 
("temporary controls", Article  9) and related control lists; understanding of exporters' obligations in 
this regard ("is or should be aware", Article  12); scope of investigations by the authorities (in case G/C/M/141  
 
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  of "suspected violations", Article  28); and information restrictions ("prohibited for reasons of national 
security", Article  32). 
28.14.   Fourth, the retaliation clause. Article  48 provides for "reciprocal measures by the Chinese 
Governments where the abuse of expo rt control measures by any country or region endangers its 
national security and interests". In the context of its TPR, China replied that this would be "in line 
with the basic norms of international relations, WTO  rules and internationally accepted practi ces". 
The European Union is of the view that this provision is not in line with international export control 
standards and requests China to provide additional clarifications. The EU will place great importance 
on any secondary legislation and would welcom e clarifications and specifications on the application 
of such provisions.  
28.15.   Fifth, the European Union requests China to explain the relationship between the 
technologies that are subject to the restrictions under the Export Control Law (for example, the lis ts 
formulated under the implementing administrative laws and regulations) and the list of technologies 
that are prohibited/restricted to be exported under the Catalogue of Technologies Restricted or 
Forbidden for Export. In the context of its TPR, China re plied that "the Catalogue of Technologies 
Restricted or Forbidden for Export does not lie in the applicable scope of the Export Control Law. […] 
The former was made according to the Export Control Law, while the latter was under the Regulations 
on Unreliab le Entity List". However, the Export Control Law explicitly stipulates that the purpose of 
the legislation is to safeguard the national security and interests, while the Catalogue of Technologies 
Restricted or Forbidden for Export also aims to regulate man agement over technological exports and 
maintain national economic security. The European Union would like to ask China to further clarify 
the difference, in particular in terms of the consequences for EU  companies and operators in China.  
28.16.   The European Union  requests China to clarify whether the lists originate from multilateral 
non-proliferation efforts or whether it is based on national considerations, and if so, which? The 
European Union requests China to clarify whether corresponding references to the lis ts of multilateral 
export control regimes will be published in order to provide legal clarity. The European Union thanks 
China for the explanations provided as part of its recent T PR. Nevertheless, the European Union  
would appreciate receiving China's furt her clarification of the various issues just outlined.  
28.17.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
28.18.   The United States has been closely following this issue, including how China implements its 
new Export Control Law, which went into effect lat e last year. The United States is concerned that 
the law gives the Chinese government new rationales to impose terms on transactions among firms 
and within various partnerships in China, as well as on exports and offshore transactions. It also 
allows Chine se authorities to temporarily impose export controls on goods not on a control list. This 
is in the context of China's history of controlling the export of commodities, such as coke, fluorspar, 
and rare earth elements, and using ad hoc  restrictions to crea te commercial and political pressures 
on its major trading partners. The United States will continue to watch this closely.  
28.19.   The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
28.20.   Australia notes the statements delivered by Japan, the European Union, and the Un ited 
States in relation to China's Export Control Law. Australia was pleased to make a submission to the 
Government of China in relation to this law in August  2020 as part of a public consultation process. 
In this regard, Australia appreciated China's cons ultation with interested parties ahead of the law's 
adoption in December  2020. As set out in Australia's submission, Australia also welcomed China's 
efforts to codify the regulatory framework for defence export controls.  
28.21.   However, Australia still has concerns, which relate primarily to the broad scope of the law. 
Australia encourages China to provide greater clarity in relation to key elements of the law, including 
jurisdiction, the scope of administrator powers, and confirmation that the law is consis tent with 
China's international commitments, including WTO  rules and the China -Australia Free Trade 
Agreement (ChAFTA). Australia continues to urge China to take account of the concerns of foreign 
businesses and Members in the implementation of this law an d the development of future measures, 
and looks forward to continuing to work closely with China.  G/C/M/141  
 
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  28.22.   The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
28.23.   Canada would welcome further clarity from China with regard to the scope and application 
of its Export Control  Law (ECL). For example, Canada understands that the ECL includes a broader 
concept of "national interests" that is well beyond the scope of international export control regimes, 
which are based on national security and international non -proliferation cons iderations. Canada 
requests more information on how China defines "national interests" in this context, and how it could 
affect the scope of export controls that could be considered under the ECL. For example, does it 
provide scope for China to adopt any e xport controls intended solely to promote economic 
development and industrial policy objectives?  
28.24.   Canada also understands that the ECL includes a provision stipulating that China could take 
reciprocal measures against foreign countries or regions that "abus e" their export control measures. 
Canada requests clarity on how "abuse" of export control measures by foreign countries is defined, 
including, but not limited to, "abuse" deemed to be endangering China's "national interests".  
28.25.   Canada notes the importance o f transparency in the application of the ECL, to ensure that 
legitimate commercial activities are not impeded, and would welcome any clarifications that China 
could provide in this regard.  
28.26.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
28.27.   China is still in th e process of drafting the legislation of the supporting rules and regulations 
for its Export Control Law . These supporting laws and regulations will provide clear and more specific 
guidance for all parties, including foreign enterprises, to implement and a bide by China's ECL. China 
welcomes any suggestions provided by Members during the drafting process and China is willing to 
continue to engage with relevant Members on this issue. For the specific questions raised by 
Members, China encourages the relevant Members to refer to China's detailed written replies 
provided in its recent T PR. 
28.28.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
29  RUSSIAN FEDERATION – TRADE RESTRICTING PRACTICES – REQUEST FROM THE 
EUROPEAN UNION AND THE UNITED STATES  
29.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of 
the European Union and the United States.  
29.2.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
29.3.   The Russian Federation continues to openly develop and apply a polic y of import substitution 
and forced localization of production that is contrary to the spirit, and often the letter, of the Russian 
Federation's WTO  commitments, and which, consequently, is the origin of numerous trade irritants 
affecting EU  products.  
29.4.   At the Council's previous meeting, the European Union referred to six  specific measures. 
However, on this occasion the EU will not raise the issue of quotas for foreign products, as this issue 
is now subject to dispute settlement (DS604). Nevertheless, the EU will comment again on the other 
five issues previously raised.  
29.5.   First, the European Union referred in some detail in past meetings to the planned increase in 
the so -called "recycling fee" for certain categories of vehicles. In this context, the EU requests the 
Russian Federation to kindly inform Members about the state of play of those planned increases. 
The EU also renews its request to the Russian Federation to conduct a fact -based evaluation of the 
recycling market for vehicles before any future decision is taken, and to ensure that measures 
supporting demand provide the same advantages to domestic and imported products.  
29.6.   Second, on cement, the European Union takes note of Russian Government Decree No.  1265, 
of 24  July 2021. The EU wishes to know how this Decree will affect the certification  requirements 
that have blocked EU  exports of cement to Russia, effectively since 2016. The EU would also like to G/C/M/141  
 
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  understand whether it will lead to the partial remedy announced by the Russian Federation in 2019 
in the fo rm an amendment to the standard.  
29.7.   Third, on the Federal Law "on protecting consumer rights", which mandates the 
pre-installation of Russian software in a number of consumer electronic devices, the European Union 
reiterates its previously stated view that th e amendment to that Law is a potentially discriminatory 
measure, for which reason the EU requests its notification, in accordance with the TBT  Agreement. 
The measure could contravene WTO  national treatment provisions concerning goods, as well as the 
Russia n Federation's WTO  commitments for certain services.  
29.8.   Fourth, on Federal Law No.  468, "on Viticulture and Winemaking", the European Union notes 
that, since the Council's previous meeting, the Russian Federation has adopted a new law (Law 
No. 345, of 2  July 2021), which alters Federal Law No.  468. This law introduced additional new 
requirements for placing wine products on the Russian Federation's market. The European Union 
urges the Russian Federation to notify this new law to the WTO, in accordance with the  
TBT Agreement. This law has already had negative effects on exports of EU  wine and spirits to 
Russia. The European Union also reiterates its request to notify Federal Law No.  468. Furthermore, 
these laws, including the newest, affect the use of European g eographical indications on the Russian 
Federation's market. The European Union expects that the Russian Federation will refrain from 
further pursuing its stated goals to reduce imports of foreign wines and spirits into the Russian 
Federation.  
29.9.   Fifth, the Eu ropean Union reiterates its concerns about the announced introduction of an 
export ban on unprocessed wood, starting from 1  January  2022. It is of high importance to the EU 
that the Russian Federation explains how such an export ban and related measures ma y be 
compatible with WTO  rules and its own Schedule of concessions, which includes tariff -rate quotas 
for the export of wood, some of which are EU -specific. The European Union also urges the Russian 
Federation to notify any corresponding draft legislation.  
29.10.   The European Union continues to call upon the Russian Federation to ensure that its 
measures fully conform to WTO  rules and to abandon its policy of import substitution and 
localization.  
29.11.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
29.12.   The Unite d States again raises its flag to add its voice to the European Union's to express 
concerns about the Russian Federation's trade restrictive practices. However, the US  intervention 
will be short because the Members of this Council are, by now, quite famili ar with its concerns.  
29.13.   The United States has identified, and described in this Council, numerous measures adopted 
by the Russian Federation that impose local content requirements, exclude imports from certain 
sectors of the economy, mandate the use of domes tic products, establish quotas for the use of 
domestic products, and provide preferential pricing for domestic products, to name but a few. In 
short, the Russian Federation is turning inward, imposing import substitution strategies and building 
walls to ke ep out global trade. And such a posture is hardly consistent with the goals of this 
Organization.  
29.14.   The Russian Federation assures this Council and other WTO  bodies that its measures "should 
be applied in accordance with the international obligations of the Russian Federation". However, laws 
and regulations adopted by the Russian Federation appear to explicitly mandate behaviour that is 
not in accordance with the Russian Federation's international obligations. Those international 
obligations include the guidi ng principles of the WTO: to foster global trade through the guarantee 
of most -favoured -nation principle and non -discriminatory treatment by and among Members, and a 
commitment to transparency. The Russian Federation seems to be moving its economy away fro m 
those principles.  
29.15.   The United States will continue to carefully examine the Russian Federation's actions and 
raise its concerns with the Russian Federation's restrictive measures in the hope that the Russian 
Federation will reverse these trends, and parti cipate in an open and fair multilateral trading system.  G/C/M/141  
 
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  29.16.   The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
29.17.   Australia thanks the Russian Federation for its recent engagement on this issue. However, 
Australia wishes to reiterate its concerns over the Russian  Federation's Federal Law No.  468, of 
27 December  2019, on wine making and wine growing in the Russian Federation, which Australia 
has outlined at previous meetings of this Council and the TBT Committee.  
29.18.   The Federal Law poses several barriers to the importation of wine into the Russian 
Federation, imposing a more onerous compliance burden, which coupled with the short timelines for 
the law's implementation and subsequent amendments, are of concern to the Australian wine 
industry. Furthermore, the Russ ian Federation has not yet notified the WTO of the Federal Law, 
despite it being in force for over a year, having entered into force on 26  June 2020. Australia 
requests that the Russian Federation notifies the Federal Law to the WTO accordingly, and as soo n 
as possible.  
29.19.   Australia also notes several obligations within the Federal Law that are inconsistent with the 
Eurasian Economic Union Technical Regulation No.  047/2018, "On safety of alcohol products". 
Australia understands that the entry into force of the  Technical Regulation has been postponed to 
1 January  2022 to allow harmonization work with the Russian Federation's Law. Australia requests 
that the Russian Federation provide an update on this harmonization work and confirm whether the 
Technical Regulati on is expected to enter into force on 1  January  2022.  
29.20.   Finally, Australia requests that the revised Technical Regulation is notified to the WTO 
accordingly, and that an adequate transition time be put in place to provide businesses with sufficient 
time to a djust to the new requirements.  
29.21.   The delegate of the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
29.22.   In past meetings of the CTG, in other WTO  working bodies, and in the context of the Russian 
Federation's most recent T PR, the Russian Federation has previously c ommented extensively on 
many of the issues raised on this occasion. The Russian Federation wishes to highlight the following 
points. On its import substitution policy, the Russian Federation refers to the remarks made by the 
head of its delegation in its p ast TPRs, as well as to the Russian Federation's replies to the relevant 
questions within those TPRs.  
29.23.   In respect of the increase in the recycling fee for vehicles, the Russian Federation notes that 
this fee is applied to both domestic and imported products . The rate of the fee is the same 
irrespective of the product source. WTO  rules do not prohibit charging fees at any rate as long as 
they comply with the national treatment and non -discrimination principles.  
29.24.   As for cement, the GOST -R on rules of certificat ion of cement was developed in order to 
ensure the safety and quality of products, both imported and domestic, circulated in the market of 
the Russian Federation. The Russian Federation notes that certain provisions of this standard are 
being reconsidered.  
29.25.   Regarding developments at the EAEU  level, the Russian Federation notes that the member 
States of the EAEU have made a decision to develop a technical regulation on the safety of building 
materials, which includes cement. It is currently planned that the d raft regulation should be 
developed by the fourth  quarter of 2022.  
29.26.   On the Federal Law on Viticulture and Winemaking, the Russian Federation notes that the 
law is aimed at settling specific issues concerning the manufacturing of wine raw materials and wine 
products in the Russian Federation. Besides, the objectives of the law are to set a mandate for the 
government and for the self -managing of organizations, as well as to set the legal status of economic 
operators in the field of viticulture and winemaking, in order to eliminate counterfeiting and 
unnecessary administrative barriers.  
29.27.   The Russian Federation notes that the value of wine imports, including from the European 
Union, the United States, and Australia, remained stable or else increased after the Law had entered 
into force, as the customs statistics indicate. Bearing this in mind, one can only conclude that the 
Law did not result in any negative impact on the traditional trade in wine products.  G/C/M/141  
 
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  29.28.   In respect of geographical indications, the Russian Federa tion notes that GIs are protected 
by its Civil Code. "Cognac" and "Shampanskoe" are terms not protected in the Russian Federation 
as they are generic names and associated by Russian consumers with categories of products. 
According to Article  24.6 of the TR IPS Agreement, nothing shall require a WTO  Member to apply 
protection in respect of geographical indications of any other WTO  Member with respect to goods or 
services for which the relevant indication is identical with the term customary in common language  
as the common name for such goods. Besides, neither the TRIPS  Agreement, nor any 
WIPO  Convention, set out a list of automatically recognized GIs.  
29.29.   As for the export ban on timber, the Russian Federation notes that there is no export 
prohibition in force fo r the export of timber products from the Russian Federation. Rather, all the 
measures that the Russian Federation introduces in the sphere of the regulation of export of timber 
products, including the reduction of railway border crossing points, are measur es aimed to combat 
criminal activities in the field of illegal logging and illegal export of these products.  
29.30.   The Russian Federation's Track and Trace System aims to combat counterfeiting and 
smuggling, as well as to ensure that all taxes are paid for each item. 
29.31.   As for additional obstacles to trade, the Russian Federation notes that, before the System 
enters into force in respect of each category of products, the Government carries out the relevant 
pilot projects in collaboration with the private sector (man ufacturers, importers, representatives of 
foreign companies). These pilots are usually carried out more than a year in advance of their 
implementation in order to ensure the smooth operation of the System and to avoid any technical 
issues and challenges be fore its implementation. Besides, the statistics on the issued codes and 
imports show that the measure does not have any impact on trade.  
29.32.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
30  MEXICO – CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT PROCEDURE FOR CHEESE UNDER MEXICAN 
OFFICI AL STANDARD NOM -223-SCFI/SAGARPA -2018 – REQUEST FROM THE UNITED 
STATES  
30.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of 
the United States.  
30.2.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
30.3.   The United States  must raise its concerns over Mexico's NOM -223 – Cheese Conformity 
Assessment Procedures (CAP s), a measure that may be finalized by December  2021, and 
implemented in 2022. The US  concern is fourfold.  
30.4.   First, and foremost, NOM -223 contains a conformity asses sment scheme that is overly trade 
restrictive, as the United States has detailed before. Providing information to consumers about 
cheese quality is typically a low -risk undertaking. The United States and industry are concerned that 
Mexico's scheme is not p roportional to those risks, and that Mexico does not appear to have seriously 
considered available alternatives to meet the needs of the consumer. For these reasons, the United 
States requests Mexico to halt the finalization of the regulation and consider the alternatives 
previously proposed by the US  Government and industry stakeholders, including the use of 
standards of identity, labelling, or supplier's declaration of conformity to demonstrate the completion 
of third -party test procedures. The United Sta tes has also requested that Mexico notify this revised 
draft measure to the WTO  Secretariat under the terms of the TBT  Agreement, with a corresponding 
comment period of at least 60  days.  
30.5.   Second, cheese made from animal fat will have to undergo these burden some testing and 
certification requirements, while cheese produced from vegetable fat will not. The United States 
requests Mexico to explain the reasoning for the difference in treatment of these products.  
30.6.   The third US  concern relates to whether Mexico has  seriously taken into account the 
comments from WTO  Members and stakeholders. In 2020, stakeholders provided input into a draft, 
and participated in good faith in the working group that concluded in September  2020, and the final 
draft is significantly diff erent from the draft agreed to by that working group.  G/C/M/141  
 
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  30.7.   The fourth US  concern relates to confusing and potentially conflicting processes for revising 
NOM-223. In this regard, the United States wishes to know how Mexico will harmonize the final 
cheese CAP in NOM-223 with the resulting cheese standard in NOM -223 still being formulated in 
2021.  
30.8.   Again, the United States asks Mexico to suspend the cheese CAP (in its mandatory form) and 
to reconsider the less trade -restrictive alternatives presented by other WTO  Members, and dairy 
industry stakeholders.  
30.9.   The delegate of Mexico  indicated the following:  
30.10.   As already stated, the measure in question is to address issues and problems relating to the 
authenticity of products called "cheese" that are offered in Mexican territ ory, to inform consumers 
about them, and to prevent practices that could be misleading. Mexican authorities are still analysing 
the CAP comprehensively in light of international procedures, in order to ensure a proper regulation  
and compliance with interna tional procedures, and to reach the legitimate objectives sought by the 
CAP. In addition, any change will be notified to the TBT  Committee in due course, after consulting 
with WTO  Members.  
30.11.   Mexico is available, through transparent and open communication channels to clarify any 
doubts that Members might have on the CAP and to inform them of any progress made through 
Mexico's relevant contact points.  
30.12.   Finally, Mexico believes that this agenda i tem is a good example of the need to have better 
coordination on the dates of the meeting of this Council and its subsidiary bodies. Mexico encourages 
the Chairperson to continue his consultations to improve the sequencing of meetings because these 
technic al issues would be better discussed in the context of those technical bodies , before they are 
discussed in the Council. Indeed, Mexico believes that Members could resolve these issues in the 
Council's subsidiary bodies without having to overload the Counci l's already very heavy agenda.  
30.13.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
31  CHINA – ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES FOR REGISTRATION OF OVERSEAS 
PRODUCERS OF IMPORTED FOODS – REQUEST FROM THE UNITED STATES  
31.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of 
the United States.  
31.2.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
31.3.   The United States notes that China published the final version of this measure as Decree 
No. 248, on 12  April 2021, with an implementati on date of 1  January  2022. This measure, when 
implemented, will create major trade disruptions for the United States and every country that 
exports food and agricultural products to China. The United States is very concerned that China has 
not provided det ailed guidance regarding implementation of this measure, yet plans to implement it 
on 1 January  2022. Any measure of this magnitude requires far more time for industry to be able to 
implement. Thus, the United States requests China immediately to suspend o r delay implementation 
of these measures for at least 18  months until sufficient guidance has been provided and exporting 
countries' questions have been answered.  
31.4.   The delegate of Norway  indicated the following:  
31.5.   Norway underlines its concern regarding these  measures, as stated in China's most recent 
TPR, as they affect Norwegian food exports to China. Norway will return to this issue at the meeting  
of the SPS  Committee later that week.  
31.6.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
31.7.   The European Union would like to echo the concerns raised by the United States on the 
implementation of Decree No.  248 of the Chinese Customs Administration. The EU does not question 
China's objective of ensuring that imported food products come from legitimate sources . However, G/C/M/141  
 
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  the EU is deeply concerned about the manner in which China is implementing the planned 
registration of exporting businesses.  
31.8.   China and the European Union trade high volumes of food products and beverages through 
tens of thousands of enterprises;  some are big, many are small. For an effective registration of 
businesses, clear guidance, registration template forms, and realistic transition periods, are 
indispensable in order to avoid disruptions to economic relationships between enterprises on both  
sides. However, instead of offering such information, through the holding of seminars or briefing 
sessions, for example, China sent a letter to EU  member States and other trading partners with the 
request to identify and register exporting businesses for 14 unclearly defined product categories 
within five  weeks.  
31.9.   This deadline is impossible to meet given that it covers tens of thousands of businesses. 
Considering that products due to be imported into China early next year have already been produced, 
if exis ting time -frames are maintained, Decrees No.  248 and No.  249 risk disrupting global food 
supply chains and delaying food supply into China.  
31.10.   The European Union urges China: (i)  to postpone the implementation of Decree No.  248 until 
detailed guidelines, temp late forms, and functioning websites are available; (ii)  to clearly define 
those product categories by their HS  numbers that must register under the "registration with 
recommendation" procedure under Article  8 of Decree No.  248, and to clarify the specific  actions 
requested from foreign competent authorities, in particular in the "Declaration of Conformity"; and 
(iii) to provide for realistic and practicable transition periods of at least 18  months for the 
self-registration of businesses under Article  9 of Decree No.  248. Trade with businesses not yet 
registered should continue without disruption.  
31.11.   Once registrations are approved and registration numbers are allocated, provisions relating 
to labelling under Article  15 must be implemented with adequate transit ion periods. In particular, 
products with a long shelf life, such as spirits, may be in retail stocks for many months and must be 
protected by transition periods of at least 36  months. The European Union urges China to organize 
information sessions both fo r trading partners and industry to foster a better understanding of the 
new registration requirements.  
31.12.   The delegate of the United Kingdom  indicated the following:  
31.13.   The United Kingdom is concerned that the application of such measures to all food products, 
regardless of risk, would create unnecessary barriers and negatively impact food trade. The United 
Kingdom reiterates its request for China to share risk assessments and scientific evidence supporting 
its intended application of the measures. Without clarit y on the food items in scope, and how 
measures will be applied, it is not possible for food manufacturers or national authorities to adapt to 
any new requirements. Therefore, the United Kingdom requests that China postpone the 
implementation of these measu res and, in the meantime, provide full clarity on their scope and 
application.  
31.14.   The delegate of Switzerland  indicated the following:  
31.15.   Switzerland shares the concerns expressed by other Members regarding the two  decrees, 
Decrees No.  248 and No.  249, published by the General Administration of Customs of the People's 
Republic of China (GACC). Switzerland understands and supports China's objective of ensuring that 
only safe food is imported. However, Switzerland regrets that the measures still include al l food 
categories, irrespective of their risk profile, and seem to be more trade restrictive than necessary to 
ensure the safety of imported food products. Switzerland has also expressed its concerns in this 
regard in previous SPS and TBT  Committee meeting s. 
31.16.   Switzerland notes that there are still many open questions for which it, as well as its industry, 
does not have sufficient information. Examples of incomplete information include product categories 
(by their HS  codes), the types of operations that will need to be registered, or questions regarding 
labelling. Switzerland strongly encourages China to brief all interested WTO  Members on the detailed 
guidelines, implementing rules, and template forms, and to do so at the earliest possible date. It is 
importa nt that all Members have access to the same necessary information, which we can then share 
with our competent authorities and industries. Furthermore, Switzerland invites China to foresee G/C/M/141  
 
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  realistic and practicable implementation and transition periods and asks for an extension of at least 
18 months.  
31.17.   The delegate of the Republic of Korea  indicated the following:  
31.18.   The Republic of Korea wishes to join others in raising its concern regarding China's 
administrative measures for the registration of overseas produc ers of imported foods. The measures, 
such as the expansion of the product scope, and requirements related to hazards found in food 
products, may impose an excessive burden on the authorities of the exporting country, creating an 
unnecessary barrier to trad e. Therefore, Korea urges China to clarify the relevant guidelines on the 
registration process, and to provide a reasonable time -period for foreign governments and 
companies to prepare for the application of these measures.  
31.19.   The delegate of Brazil  indicated  the following:  
31.20.   Brazil has been following the Chinese regulatory process regarding the registration of 
producers of imported food both bilaterally and at the TBT  Committee. In these instances, the 
Chinese government has not yet provided clarification on th e risk analysis that supported its 
disproportionate requirements for food products of different categories. In Brazil's assessment, the 
new requirements constitute unnecessary obstacles not only for Brazil's private sector, but also for 
Brazilian regulator s, who should operate as the Competent National Authority for a much more 
extensive list of products than usual, several of which are of low or no health risk, and without an 
adequate adaptation period.  
31.21.   The delegate of Mexico  indicated the following:  
31.22.   Mexic o wishes to note that it will make a statement at the TBT  Committee requesting more 
clarity on the scope and application of this measure.  
31.23.   The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
31.24.   Canada shares the concerns raised by the United States and other Membe rs. Canada and 
other Members continue to raise significant concerns and challenges with China's administrative 
measures for the registration of overseas manufacturers of imported food. Canada is concerned that 
the Decrees will negatively impact trade. Inde ed, these measures are broad, over -arching in scope, 
and will have a significant impact on exports to China. Canada remains concerned that the 
administrative measures being implemented by China are overly burdensome and unjustified as they 
do not appear to  be based on an assessment of risks using the risk assessment techniques developed 
by international organizations and go beyond the extent necessary to protect against food safety 
risks. Canada urges China to provide Members with additional information and  clarification on the 
implementation of Decrees No.  248 and No.  249, and delay their implementation for 18  months, to 
allow both foreign governments and industry to fully understand and comply with the new 
requirements contained in the Decrees.  
31.25.   The delegat e of Australia  indicated the following:  
31.26.   Australia is concerned that China's Regulation on Registration and Administration of 
Overseas Manufacturers of Imported Food, promulgated as Decree No.  248, will unnecessarily 
disrupt and restrict trade. Furthermore,  Members have not been given sufficient time and 
information to register, adjust, and prepare, before these measures enter into force on 
1 January  2022.  
31.27.   Australia has previously raised its concerns in both the SPS and TBT  Committee s, but China's  
responses in these committees have not been reassuring. In fact, in early October  2021, China 
advised the Australian Government that it had issued a deadline for t he submission of information 
to support Article  7's registration by 31  October  2021, giving only days to gather and provide the 
relevant information to China.  
31.28.   Furthermore, businesses whose exports would come under Article  9 of Decree No.  248 are 
not yet ab le to register and, two  months out from implementation, the specific requirements these 
businesses will need to meet are yet to be clarified. Similarly, Australia is also lacking clarity on G/C/M/141  
 
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  labelling requirements for products for export in 2022, and proces ses for businesses looking to 
export to China for the first time. Many businesses are already producing and labelling products for 
export in 2022 and would need time to adjust their settings and sell -through existing products. 
China's delays in clarifying how these products will be treated raises the potential risk of trade 
disruptions when the measures enter into force.  
31.29.   Australian food exporters are ready and willing to comply with China's food safety 
requirements, but businesses and governments need clari ty and a reasonable time to make changes 
to comply with new measures. In the circumstances, Australia requests that China delay 
implementation by at least 18  months and provide more detailed guidance to allow WTO  Members 
and businesses to prepare and regis ter, and for administrative processes to be properly implemented 
and tested. Australia would also welcome the opportunity to engage bilaterally with China to discuss 
how it can meet China's food safety objectives, while ensuring that trade is not unnecessa rily 
disrupted.  
31.30.   The delegate of Chinese Taipei  indicated the following:  
31.31.   Chinese Taipei thanks the United States for bringing this agenda item to the CTG for the 
first time. Chinese Taipei notes that the issue concerns China's proposed "Administrative Measu res 
for Registration of Overseas Producers of Imported Foods (Decree No.  248)", which was published 
on 12  April 2021, with an implementation date on 1  January  2022.  
31.32.   In fact, quite a number of Members, including Chinese Taipei, have already expressed the 
same concern numerous times in the TBT and SPS  Committees since February  2020. Furthermore, 
at China's most recent T PR meeting, Chinese Taipei also heard many Members specifically  
expressing their serious concerns over this new regulation, including the nega tive impact of 
immediate trade disruptions, delays, and extra administrative burdens. It clearly shows that even 
up to the present time, when China has introduced its measure, many uncertainties about the 
interpretation and implementation of the measure st ill remain, and Members are still puzzling over 
related details, including the scope of products and facilities that are subject to this measure, 
registration requirements and guidelines on how to fill out application documents, procedures and 
timelines fo r audits, and re -evaluation and renewal of registration.  
31.33.   In addition to the measure's possible inconsistency with the SPS and TBT  Agreements, 
Chinese Taipei also questions how the measure could be compatible with the GATT, including 
Article  XI:1 of the GAT T, which prohibits Members from instituting any import restriction made 
effective through any other measures, and how the measure could be justified under Article  XX of 
the GATT due to its discriminatory and excessive nature. Given the measure's potential 
incompatibility with the GATT and other WTO  Agreements, its high level of uncertainty, as well as 
its lack of sufficient transition time, it has caused great concern among foreign administrative 
authorities and business operators. Therefore, Chinese Taipei  echoes others in urging China to 
substantially postpone, at the very least, its implementation date, in order to allow sufficient time 
for foreign administrative authorities and business operators to be in a better position to prepare for 
the new administ rative requirement.  
31.34.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
31.35.   In order to ensure its population's health and safety, China has revised its previous 
regulations on the safety management of imported and exported food, and the registration 
management of overseas producers of imported food. On 12  April 2021, China's General 
Administration of Customs announced two  orders: Order No.  248 and Order No.  249, which will take 
effect on 1  January  2022. Before the announcement, in accordance with the relevant WTO  rules, 
China had issued a circular requesting comments and suggestions from the relevant WTO  Members. 
China welcomes the feedback and notes that some of the reasonable opinions and suggestions from 
Members have already been incorporated. China will soon pro vide additional information regarding 
the above -mentioned two  orders. In addition, China notes that Order No.  248 will not affect the 
implementation of China's bilateral protocols with other WTO  Members.  
31.36.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  G/C/M/141  
 
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  32  INDIA – ORDER RELATED TO REQUIREMENT OF NON -GM CUM GM FREE CERTIFICATE  
ACCOMPANIED WITH IMPORTED FOOD CONSIGNMENT – REQUEST FROM THE UNITED 
STATES  
32.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of 
the United States.  
32.2.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
32.3.   The United States must raise its serious concerns with India's measure mandating that 
competent authorities of exporting countries provide a "non -GM origin and GM  free certificate" on a 
per consignment basis. The Order has created significant barriers for US  exports to India, and trade 
stoppages risk future product shortages that could lead to price increases for Indian consumers and 
further disruptio ns to Indian supply chains. Furthermore, the United States is concerned with India's 
lack of consistency and clarity on the certification requirements of the measures.  
32.4.   India's issuance of "Clarification" documents on the scope and timing of the Order have not 
responded to the United States' concerns, nor do they in fact clarify the scientific basis for the 
measure. While the Order is intended to apply only to food crops, and not to processed products or 
products intended for animal consumption, India has no t identified criteria for a product to be 
deemed "processed", and nor has it established a process for determining a product's end -use. The 
Order states that it is intended to be temporary, "pending framing of regulations" for GM and 
GM-derived food, howev er India has not notified a termination date.  
32.5.   Therefore, the United States encourages India to provide the consistency and clarity needed 
to facilitate the safe trade of these 24  listed food crops. Considering the above -mentioned concerns, 
the United State s requests India to withdraw this measure immediately. If India is unable to 
withdraw this measure, the United States requests that India quickly engage in dialogue with the 
United States and other WTO  Members and explore less trade  disruptive and science -based 
alternative approaches that can be implemented in a non -discriminatory manner.  
32.6.   The delegate of Uruguay  indicated the following:  
32.7.   There is international consensus that genetically modified products, approved by exporting 
countries on the basis of Codex  recommendations in relation to the risk assessment methodology, 
are equivalent to their conventional counterparts. Therefore, in Uruguay's view, there would not 
appear to be any technical justification for the implementation of the certification measure p roposed 
by India, taking into account the legitimate objective cited in the Order in question, of ensuring the 
safety and wholesomeness of imported food. In light of this objective, Uruguay therefore wishes to 
reiterate that, in its view, this measure shou ld be notified to the S PS Committee.  
32.8.   Uruguay wishes to stress the importance of Members establishing measures based on 
scientific principles, and particularly of applying such measures with the objective of minimizing 
negative trade effects, in line with t he provisions of the SPS  Agreement. Uruguay remains attentive 
to any comments or questions that the delegation of India may have in response to Members' 
concerns expressed in both Geneva and New Delhi, including in a joint note submitted in 
January  2021 by  a number of countries, including Uruguay.  
32.9.   The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
32.10.   Canada shares the concerns raised by the United States. Canada has also raised specific 
trade concerns in the TBT and SPS  Committees relating to India's non -GM Order , which mandates 
that a non -genetically modified or GM  free certificate accompany imported consignments of imported 
food products. Canada encourages India to consider the scientific and technical information in its 
approach to support a transparent, predic table, risk - and science -based trading environment, in line 
with India's WTO  commitments. Canada requests that India suspend the implementation of this 
measure and allow trade to continue without a certificate requirement until a viable solution is found. 
This would provide an opportunity for India to further engage with Members to discuss and consider 
an alternative, less trade -restrictive approach that would meet India's objectives and minimize the 
impact on trade. Canada would be pleased to contribute to  these discussions and share its extensive 
experience in this area.  G/C/M/141  
 
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  32.11.   The delegate of India indicated the following:  
32.12.   India wishes to inform Members that the requirement to regulate the import of GM  food is 
based on already existing provisions of the Environm ent Protection Act (1986) and is not a new 
requirement. The Food Safety and Standards Authority of India (FSSAI) Order, dated 
21 August  2020, requiring non -GM certificate for import of 24  food crops, is only an assurance 
provided by competent authorities o f the exporting countries that the food crops that are not 
approved by the Genetic Engineering Appraisal Committee (GEAC) for genetic modification, are not 
imported into India.  
32.13.   It may also be noted that this requirement has already been notified to the WTO . It is not 
trade restrictive as it is uniformly applicable to imports from all countries. In addition, India wishes 
to clarify that the requirement of non -GM certificate is not applicable for import of processed food 
and animal feed. Moreover, the non -GM attestation on phytosanitary certificates, which is already 
issued for every consignment, is also acceptable. Members may also please note that several major 
trading partners are complying with this requirement and furnishing a copy of non -GM certificates 
in the prescribed format for their export consignments. Nevertheless, India is open to discuss this 
matter further with the United States, Uruguay, and Canada, for any additional clarification.  
32.14.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
33  KINGDOM OF SAUDI  ARABIA – SABER CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT ONLINE 
PLATFORM/SALEEM PRODUCT SAFETY PROGRAM – REQUEST FROM THE UNITED STATES  
33.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of 
the United States.  
33.2.   The delegate of the United Sta tes indicated the following:  
33.3.   The United States brings its concerns for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's SABER  Conformity 
Assessment Online Platform/SALEEM Product Safety Program to the Council on this occasion to find 
a resolution regarding the lack of clarity in Saudi Arabia's conformity assessment program covering 
40 technical regulations for a wide range of goods, including construction materials, electrical 
products, saws, textiles, and toys. Despite the United States, along with the European Union a nd 
Switzerland, having raised concerns over this program in the last five  TBT Committee meetings, 
these concerns have gone unresolved.  
33.4.   SABER is an online system that was introduced by the Saudi Arabia Standards, Metrology, 
and Quality Organization (SASO), to operate the SALEEM  program. SABER enables exporters, 
importers, and local manufacturers to electronically obtain the required Product Certificate of 
Conformity (PCoC) and Shipment Certificate of Conformity (SCoC) for their products. The PCoC is 
type-approval for medium - and high -risk products that are governed by mandatory technical 
regulations, and the SCoC is required for other products not needing type approval, whether they 
are regulated or not.  
33.5.   First, this mandatory conformity assessment program has never been notified to the WTO for 
a notice and comment period, despite repeated requests for notification, including the most recent 
US request for information on 1  February  2021. The United States asks that Saudi Arabia notify this 
program fo r WTO  Member comment.  
33.6.   Second, the registration and certification process remains unnecessarily complex and 
time-consuming for US  exporters. The United States requests Saudi Arabia to simplify the 
registration and certification process and to implement clea r and transparent guidelines.  
33.7.   Third, industries report that the HS  codes on the SABER  system, including those listed on 
SABER's website, often do not match international HS  codes. The United States requests SASO to 
provide the list of products, using compl ete HS  Codes having 10  digits, for which SASO will require 
third-party certification, and new certificates of conformity instead of self -declarations.  
33.8.   Fourth, the United States notes that the question of how to obtain the Gulf Conformity 
Tracking Symbols ( GCTS) remains confusing. The United States requests Saudi Arabia to clarify the G/C/M/141  
 
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  documentation requirements for manufacturers when they apply to Notified Bodies to obtain the 
GCTS  mark and registration number required under SABER.  
33.9.   Finally, the United States  notes that manufacturers report that the CAPs required in the 
technical regulations implemented by Notified Bodies are not consistent, and asks how SASO is 
working to ensure that all Notified Bodies implement the CAPs in the same manner. The United 
States  looks forward to the response from Saudi Arabia.  
33.10.   The delegate of Switzerland  indicated the following:  
33.11.   Switzerland is concerned over the potential negative impact of the SABER  Conformity 
Assessment Online Platform on bilateral trade with the Kingdom of Sau di Arabia across a range of 
products. Like other WTO  Members, Switzerland is also following this matter in the TBT  Committee.  
33.12.   The registration and certification process remains costly, complex, and time -consuming for 
Switzerland's exporters. Manufacturers continue to report that recognized bodies require 
disproportionate fees when carrying out CAPs. Depending on the sector, strict CAPs apply for 
products considered in their majority to be low -risk products. Furthermore, additional third -party 
certification and registration is required for the same low -risk products that already have been 
certified and registered in the system. For companies exporting quality products in small quantities 
in particular, the registration and certification process leads to dispr oportionate costs and 
documentation requirements, making it prohibitive to enter the market.  
33.13.   Switzerland would appreciate it if the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia could ensure that the 
registration and certification process is not more strict than necessary to gi ve adequate confidence 
that products fulfil the applicable requirements. Furthermore, Switzerland encourages the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia to base the documentation and certification requirements on international standards, 
to implement clear and transparent  guidelines, and to ensure that the requirements are applied in 
an equal and uniform manner.  
33.14.   The delegate of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia  indicated the following:  
33.15.   The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia thanks the United States and Switzerland for raising this matter 
of the SABER  Platform and the SALEEM  Program. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia takes note of the 
interventions made by previous speakers and wishes to refer to its intervention delivered at the 
TBT meeting in June  2021, where it responded to this concern. In add ition, Saudi Arabia requests 
to receive the statements in writing so they can be transmitted back to capital.  
33.16.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
34  PANAMA - ONIONS AND POTATOES HARVEST LIFE AND SPROUTING REQUIREMENTS 
– REQUEST FROM THE UNITED STATE S 
34.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of 
the United States.  
34.2.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
34.3.   The United States thanks Panama for continuing bilateral discussions regarding the 
implementation of Panama's technical regulations for potatoes and onions. The United States also 
thanks Panama for delaying implementation of the potato regulation for another six  months. While 
the United States appreciates Panama's flexibility on the potato regulation, it would provide greater 
economic certainty for exporters if Panama would suspend the measure until technical discussions 
have concluded.  
34.4.   During bilateral discussions, the United States indicated that Panama's technical regulations 
for potatoes  and onions appear to be inconsistent with relevant international standards, and further 
indicated that Panama's requirements appear to be unjustified and unnecessarily trade restrictive. 
Given these considerations, the United States reiterates its request  that Panama provide the 
scientific justification for its measures or suspend implementation of both the potato and onion 
regulations until technical discussions have concluded.  G/C/M/141  
 
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  34.5.   The delegate of Panama  indicated the following:  
34.6.   Panama thanks the United States for its comments and has taken note of US  concerns. 
Panama is taking into account the comments of trading partners affected by the measure, as 
evidenced by the additional six -month delay granted in the entry into force of the amendment to 
potato req uirements. Panama is working bilaterally to address the concerns of its trading partners 
and looks forward to working together towards finding mutually satisfactory solutions. Nevertheless, 
Panama's previous comments regarding this trade concern remain val id. Panama will share with the 
Committee any information that it receives from capital as a result of these conversations.  
34.7.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
35  UNITED STATES – MEASURES REGARDING MARKET ACCESS PROHIBITION FOR 
ICT PRODUCTS – REQUEST  FROM CHINA  
35.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of 
China.  
35.2.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
35.3.   China regrets to have to raise this issue again as its concerns have not been addressed. China 
reiterates its serious concerns on the relevant measures taken by the United States restricting 
China's companies from providing communication products in the US  market. In this regard, China 
considers that national security should not serve as a defence for tr ade protectionism. Therefore, 
China urges the United States to abide by WTO  rules, and to refrain from its unilateral practice of 
abusing the national security exception.  
35.4.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
35.5.   As stated previously, the United States does not believe that the Council for Trade in Goods 
is the appropriate forum to discuss issues related to national security.  
35.6.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
36  UNITED STATES – EXPORT CONTROL MEASURES FOR ICT  PRODUC TS – REQUEST FROM 
CHINA  
36.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of 
China.  
36.2.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
36.3.   The United States continues to impose export control measures against Chinese companies,  
abusing its state power to oppress Chinese companies without any evidence. The United States has 
included more than 900  Chinese companies, entities, and individuals in its export control list, and 
other various unilateral measures, which have seriously di srupted normal bilateral exchanges 
between the two  countries. China firmly opposes this practice, which disregards basic WTO  rules, 
including by undermining the market principle and the principle of fair competition. China urges the 
United States immediate ly to stop this unjust and unfair practice in order to create favourable 
conditions for bilateral normal trade and investment cooperation.  
36.4.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
36.5.   As stated previously, the United States does not believe t hat the Council for Trade in Goods 
is the appropriate forum to discuss issues related to national security.  
36.6.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  G/C/M/141  
 
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  37  AUSTRALIA – DISCRIMINATORY MARKET ACCESS PROHIBITION ON 5G  EQUIPMENT – 
REQUEST FROM CHINA  
37.1.   The Chairper son recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of 
China.  
37.2.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
37.3.   China regrets to raise this issue again, but it considers that the key questions that it addressed 
to Australia have still not been directly answered as yet. China also has key serious concerns about 
the prohibition having been extended to existing 4G  networks. Australia believes that the issue of 
telecommunications network security should be addressed based on scientifi c and verifiable facts 
and data, rather than upon the origin of the suppliers. China urges Australia to review its regulatory 
policies in the telecommunications sector, to provide fair market access to Chinese companies, and 
to align its actions with WTO  rules. 
37.4.   The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
37.5.   Australia notes China's statement. China first raised this issue in the WTO in late  2018. Since 
then, Australia has engaged constructively with China to explain the rationale for its position on 
5G networks. As Australia has previously stated, its position on 5G  networks is country -agnostic, 
transparent, risk -based, non -discriminatory, and fully WTO -consistent.  
37.6.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
38  EUROPEAN UNION – SWEDEN'S DISCRIMINATORY MARK ET ACCESS PROHIBITION ON 
5G EQUIPMENT – REQUEST FROM CHINA  
38.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of 
China.  
38.2.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
38.3.   China continues to raise its concern about Sweden's m easure prohibiting Chinese companies 
from participating in the construction of Sweden's 5G  network. Until now, China has still not seen 
any evidence provided by the Swedish host and the telecom authority showing that the Chinese 
companies' products show se curity risks to Sweden. Therefore, China is of the view that Sweden's 
non-transparent measure is groundless, discriminatory, and inconsistent with WTO  rules. For these 
reasons, China requests Sweden to immediately withdraw its discriminatory measure, and t o provide 
a fair, transparent, and non -discriminatory environment for Chinese companies operating in Sweden.  
38.4.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
38.5.   The European Union notes that the matter raised by China in relation to the recent Swed ish 
5G spectrum auction is still under legal proceedings in Sweden. In light of these ongoing 
proceedings, the European Union will not enter into the details of this issue on this occasion.  
38.6.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
39  EUROPEAN UNION – CARBON BORDER ADJUSTMENT MECHANISM (THE EUROPEAN 
GREEN DEAL OF DECEMBER  2019) – REQUEST FROM CHINA AND THE RUSSIAN 
FEDERATION  
39.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of 
China and the Russian Federation.  
39.2.   The deleg ate of the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
39.3.   On 14  July, the European Union published a draft proposal concerning its Carbon Border 
Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM). It is a mechanism that will be applied in respect of imports of iron G/C/M/141  
 
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  and steel, cemen t, fertilizers and chemical products, aluminium, and electricity. The Russian 
Federation continues to analyse the proposal, although many of its elements have not yet been 
developed and will be presented in separate acts.  
39.4.   The Russian Federation already has many questions, including in relation both to some 
elements of the proposed mechanism, and to its relationship with international agreements, 
including the WTO  Agreement. For example, according to the proposal, starting from 2023, the 
products concerned shall only be imported into the customs territory of the European Union by a 
declarant that is authorized by the competent authority. The Russian Federation wonders about the 
reasons for revoking the authorization for a declarant. The Russian Fed eration also has certain 
questions regarding the methods for calculating embedded emissions, and the price of the 
CBAM  certificates, including, in particular, their relationship and consistency with the relevant 
methods applied under the EU  ETS. Furthermor e, the Russian Federation cannot avoid questioning 
the exclusions and exemptions of goods originating in certain WTO  Members from the CBAM, as well 
as the adaptations of default value based on various factors, including natural resources and specific 
marke t conditions. These and other questions were circulated by the Russian Federation in 
document  G/MA/W/172 –G/C/W/800. In conclusion, the Russian Federation urges the European 
Union to consider these questions and to provide its responses in accordance with W TO procedures.  
39.5.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
39.6.   China believes that, in order to effectively address climate change and promote sustainable 
development, Members need to actively implement the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Cha nge (UNFCCC) and the Paris Agreement, and to promote trade and investment 
liberalization in green sectors. However, the CBAM does not conform to the basic principles of the 
UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement of common but differentiated responsibilities. It is  also inconsistent 
with the WTO  principles that underpin a free and open multilateral trading system. In China's view, 
the CBAM will not increase mutual trust and promote economic growth after the pandemic. 
Therefore, China requests the European Union to c larify how its CBAM will comply with the 
WTO principles of MFN  treatment and national treatment, as well as with the EU's concession 
schedule obligations. The CBAM is a unilateral measure, and it would also be hugely controversial if 
its compliance with WT O rules were based on invoking exception clauses. China stands ready to 
continue working, together with the European Union and other parties, to promote trade 
liberalization, facilitation, and investment in green sectors, and to address climate change 
collectively.  
39.7.   The delegate of India, addressing agenda items 39 and 40, indicated the following:  
39.8.   India believes that a thorough legal examination will be required of various elements of the 
European Green Deal, including the CBAM, to ascertain its conformity w ith the relevant WTO  rules. 
India advocates handling the environment -related issues within the multilateral environment 
agreements (MEAs). Members have proposed Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) 
in the relevant MEAs. These INDCs are base d on the respective capacity of Members, honouring the 
principle of common but differentiated responsibilities.  
39.9.   Mechanisms such as the CBAM seek, on the one hand, to burden the global trade structure 
with new commitments, but on the other, developed Members are not adhering to the commitments 
that they have made in MEAs. In particular, India finds the following elem ents to be conspicuous by 
their absence: technology transfer; grant funding; low interest financing; and long tenure financing.  
39.10.   India notes with great disappointment that additional commitments are being sought from 
the very same Members that are already d oing more than their respective capacity to fight the 
urgent climate change issues, and this is being done without the support of those Members that 
continue to generate the highest per capita emissions, and without fulfilling their commitments to 
create t echnology and financing resources.  
39.11.   The delegate of Kazakhstan  indicated the following:  
39.12.   Kazakhstan reiterates its position as expressed at the CTG's previous meeting, and continues 
to follow developments around the EU's CBAM. Kazakhstan again urges the Euro pean Union to fully G/C/M/141  
 
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  consider the CBAM's compatibility with WTO  rules and regulations, and to ensure that any such 
mechanism does not create obstacles to trade.  
39.13.   The delegate of Uruguay  indicated the following:  
39.14.   Uruguay recognizes the policy objectives identi fied by the European Union and reaffirms its 
strong commitment to climate matters, reflected in the commitments Uruguay has made under the 
multilateral agreements on the matter, including the Paris Agreement, and the policies adopted to 
comply with those a greements.  
39.15.   Uruguay takes note of the proposal for a Regulation establishing a CBAM, introduced by the 
European Commission on 14  July 2021, as part of the "European Green Deal". Uruguay will closely 
follow the process of development, adoption, and implement ation of this mechanism.  
39.16.   Uruguay wishes once again to stress the importance of ensuring the measure's compatibility 
with the European Union's commitments under the WTO  Agreements. Preliminarily, it seems 
important to monitor the measure and ensure that it does not violate Articles  I, II, and III of the 
GATT. In this respect, Uruguay wishes to know, for example, how eventual inconsistencies, resulting 
from the possible simultaneous application of the CBAM  for imported products , and the "free 
allowances" for domestic products, will be avoided. Likewise, Uruguay wishes to know how, in the 
respective calculations, carbon reduction policies will be taken into account separately from the 
carbon pricing applied by different countries. Lastly, Uruguay wishes to know  how the European 
Commission addressed the principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities", enshrined in the 
Paris Agreement, when preparing the proposal.  
39.17.   The delegate of Brazil , addressing agenda items  39 and 40, indicated the following:  
39.18.   Brazil supports the adoption of policies with legitimate environmental objectives, but is 
concerned about the adoption of unilateral measures that result in unnecessary negative impacts on 
international trade, contrary to commitments made by Members in other for ums. As countries 
discuss the interdependence between trade, climate change, and environmental sustainability, it is 
important that they do so based on the terms, commitments, and principles that are enshrined in 
the Agenda  2030 for Sustainable Development,  the UNFCCC, and in international environmental law 
more broadly. Most importantly, Brazil recalls the principle of "common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capacities", which stems from the different historical responsibilities 
for the g lobal problem of climate change, and that was agreed to by all countries in Rio de Janeiro 
in 1992.  
39.19.   Against this backdrop, Brazil believes that the EU  Green Deal, and the CBAM in particular, 
must necessarily comply not only with core WTO  rules, but also wi th the fundamental principles 
established in international environmental law, many of them enshrined in Agenda  21, signed in Rio 
de Janeiro in 1992, such as common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capacities, and 
international cooperation . And in both the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement, the European Union 
has agreed to take into account historical responsibilities and respective capabilities, thus committing 
itself not to seek to impose its standards on other countries. Therefore, Brazil b elieves that the EU's 
claim that its Green Deal, and the CBAM in particular, is ambitious, should be taken with several 
grains of salt.  
39.20.   First, historical responsibilities mean that countries that industrialized first, benefiting from 
cheap and more polluti ng energy sources, should bear a larger brunt of the costs of emission 
reduction. In this context, Members should take not only direct emissions on European soil into 
account, but also how European companies have benefit ed from polluting activities all ove r the world 
for over two  centuries.  
39.21.   Second, access to finance is a fundamental aspect. A country with a debt to GDP  ratio of 
more than 100%, and that can borrow at very low cost, is not necessarily more ambitious in its 
investments or policies than a count ry with a much lower debt to GDP  ratio, but which faces the 
challenge of a new "taper tantrum" to finance its investments in sustainability.  
39.22.   Third, if each Member were to use criteria that were more advantageous to itself, Brazil 
could, for its part, impos e taxes on countries that did not match Brazil's "ambition" of having a grid G/C/M/141  
 
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  based on 80% of renewables; other countries could similarly choose other criteria, and this could 
wreak havoc on the multilateral trading system.  
39.23.   Therefore, in order to avoid a po tential protectionist bias or the adoption of discriminatory 
measures, Brazil urges the European Union to take into due consideration the comments made by 
Brazil in the process of drafting and implementing the measures under the EU  Green Deal, and hopes 
that a channel of dialogue will be established between the competent authorities on these topics.  
39.24.   Finally, Brazil observes that many stakeholders have called for trade negotiators to work 
closely with environmental experts, as these topics cannot be addresse d in silos. In this context, 
Brazil believes that the best way to move forward in discussions on sustainable development at the 
WTO is through fully respecting not only the WTO  rules, but also those concepts, principles, and 
commitments that have been agre ed in other for ums, and which reflect the balanced outcomes 
achieved there.  
39.25.   The delegate of Turkey  indicated the following:  
39.26.   As a country committed to respond to the challenges of climate change, Turkey is closely 
following the developments regarding the Eu ropean Green Deal since its announcement by the 
European Commission in December  2020. Within the context of the Green Deal, Turkey, together 
with many other Members, is paying particular attention to the details of the European Union's 
CBAM. While Turkey i s currently analysing the CBAM  proposal with a view to sharing with the EU its 
comprehensive comments on the draft, it nevertheless wishes to reiterate certain points of 
significance to Turkey.  
39.27.   Turkey considers that it is important to note, in the scope of  Members' discussions, that the 
CBAM, as a response measure aimed at mitigating climate change, will have certain adverse 
transboundary impacts. In this context, the most visible negative transboundary effect of the CBAM 
will be on international trade.  
39.28.   It is thus imperative to ensure that any CBAM is applied in the least trade -restrictive manner, 
without constituting a disguised restriction on international trade, and in line with WTO  rules and 
principles. Any CBAM should also respect the principles of inte rnational environmental law, including 
the principle of cooperation and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capabilities, as indicated in the scope of the UNFCCC. In other words, WTO  Members, in crafting 
their responses aimed at mitig ating climate change, should keep in mind the rights and obligations 
conferred both by multilateral environmental agreements and by WTO  Agreements, since only a 
reading of these together can provide a clear picture of the tools available to respond to clim ate 
challenges in a balanced way. And omitting any of these element s may risk foregoing the objectives 
and methods that were once intended and agreed upon by our negotiators in order to meet those 
challenges.  
39.29.   In conclusion, Turkey requests the European Uni on to keep WTO  Members informed of 
details and developments concerning its CBAM, as transparency and cooperation remain invaluable 
in this process.  
39.30.   The delegate of the Republic of Korea  indicated the following:  
39.31.   The Republic of Korea appreciates the Europea n Union's efforts to tackle ongoing climate 
change and takes note of the framework of the CBAM, which was revealed in July  2021, to address 
the issue of possible carbon leakage.  
39.32.   As it has stated at previous meetings, Korea wishes to stress that trade -related measures, 
including the CBAM, should be consistent with WTO  rules and not constitute trade barriers. In 
addition, it is necessary that companies affected by the CBAM be more fully informed and engaged. 
To this end, it is necessary that sufficient i nformation about the scheme be available to them, and 
that they are also given opportunities to submit their comments.  
39.33.   The Republic of Korea hopes that the CBAM will be implemented in a way that fulfils the 
WTO's objectives of achieving sustainable development and facilitating free trade. Korea will G/C/M/141  
 
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  continue to follow the process of introduction of the EU's CBAM, and also suggests that further 
WTO discussions be held on the use of trade measures for environmental purposes.  
39.34.   The delegate of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia  indicated the following:  
39.35.   From the perspective of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, while the European Union has st ated 
that the proposed mechanism would be in conformity with WTO  rules and other international 
obligations, the EU has yet to provide explanations as to how it aims to do so. While the European 
Union may intend to address the risk of investment leakage fro m the EU into other countries, its 
main objective is in fact to maintain the competitiveness of EU  industries. And Saudi Arabia's very 
preliminary review indicates that the proposed mechanism raises very serious concerns due to its 
potential long -term nega tive implications on global trade, which will distort the full value chain of 
trade, including goods, services, and jobs.  
39.36.   The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia urges the European Union to further engage in consultations 
with Members in order to ensure the CBAM's ful l compliance with WTO  rules and Agreements, that 
it will not create any unnecessary barriers to trade, and that it will not be used as a means of 
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination, or a disguised restriction on international trade, or be 
applied in  a manner that constitutes protection to EU  domestic industries. Finally, the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia stands ready to engage with the European Union and other interested Members, and 
looks forward to receiving further details and reflections from the EU co ncerning this proposed  
mechanism.  
39.37.   The delegate of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
39.38.   New Zealand is a strong advocate for coherent and mutually supportive trade and climate 
policy responses. New Zealand is forward leaning when it comes to the opportunity  to contribute to 
meaningful and positive climate mitigation efforts through trade policy. In this regard, New Zealand 
cites what it is trying to achieve in the context of the Agreement on Climate Change, Trade and 
Sustainability (ACCTS), a plurilateral ef fort that aims to bring together some of the inter -related 
elements of the climate change, trade and sustainable development agendas. Indeed, New Zealand 
has long been a leading proponent of phasing out and eliminating environmentally harmful subsidies, 
including the reform of agricultural, fisheries, and fossil fuel subsidies.  
39.39.   New Zealand recognizes the potential value of CBAMs as a tool to contribute to climate 
change mitigation goals, while also acknowledging challenges in their implementation. In this r egard, 
New Zealand believes that, for such a mechanism to be effective, it must be environmentally 
effective, WTO -compatible, and scientifically robust. Furthermore, its design should include 
meaningful consultation with trading partners. New Zealand invit es the EU to continue sharing with  
Members the ongoing developments.  
39.40.   The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
39.41.   Australia has made a number of statements in various WTO  committees in recent months, 
highlighting some of its concerns over the Europea n Union's CBAM draft regulation. These include 
the issues of WTO  consistency, possible protectionist impact, and the need for the policy to consider 
alternative, implicit measures, such as higher standards, or Australia's technology -led approach, 
which can  be equally if not more effective in reducing emissions. Australia looks forward to any 
updates the European Union can provide on its deliberations, including any potential changes to the 
CBAM  policy since the draft regulation's release on 14  July 2021.  
39.42.   The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
39.43.   Japan is aware that the CBAM may have a significant impact on trade, and therefore that 
the interest in it is increasing on the part of all WTO  Members, including Japan. As Japan has pointed 
out in previous meet ings of the Trade and Environmental Sustainability Structured Discussions 
(TESSD) and the CTE, it is a prerequisite that the CBAM be designed to be consistent with WTO  rules. 
In addition, Japan estimates that there will be certain challenges to address. Fo r example, Members 
have been working towards reducing carbon emissions by implementing various policies; bearing 
these efforts in mind, the CBAM should be designed to achieve its objective of preventing carbon 
leakage with the least effect on trade.  G/C/M/141  
 
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  39.44.   Japan believes that it is important to consider internationally reliable measurement or 
evaluation methods for carbon emissions per product unit. It is also important to consider the actual 
verification of carbon costs, including any costs that, in effect, are b orne by the product in proportion 
to its carbon emissions. Finally, Japan considers that it will be necessary to continue conducting 
sufficient discussions internationally on this issue.  
39.45.   The delegate of Paraguay  indicated the following:  
39.46.   Paraguay has made a  significant commitment to the protection of the environment, with a 
100% clean energy matrix; more than 40% of its surface area covered by forests; good agricultural 
practices which contribute to the conservation and preservation of the environment, inclu ding 
through direct planting, crop rotation, and use of biotechnology. We will likely hear again today that 
the European Union will justify this measure to offset carbon leakage. However, Paraguay notes that 
they have not heard how the compensation mechani sm would function to take into account the 
impact of these measures on third  parties. In this context, Paraguay notes that it accounts for less 
than 0.02% of the world's CO 2 generation, whereas the EU overall accounts for close to 10%.  
39.47.   Therefore, we have c ommon but differentiated responsibilities, who pollutes more should do 
more, and not require from others to pay the same. And what concerns Paraguay in regard to this 
measure is that, rather than levelling the playing field, it would in fact favour some ov er others, not 
only by ignoring historical but also current responsibilities, accompanied by generous subsidies which 
represent a fiscal advantage to which most developing countries do not have access.  
39.48.   In this regard, Paraguay echoes the questions and conc erns posed by Uruguay and the 
comments made by Brazil on the danger to world trade from introducing unilateral measures and 
their possible proliferation. And without a compensation measure, such measures begin to look more 
like commercial protectionism tha n the protection of the environment. For this reason, Paraguay 
wishes to urge the European Union to inform its trading partners as soon as possible as to how its 
compensation measure for third  parties would function.  
39.49.   Turning to the European Green Deal, in the next agenda item, Paraguay notes that it appears 
not only to contain a number of measures that do not seem based on scientific evidence, but also 
promotes subsidies in ways that could prove detrimental to the environment. For example, a subsidy 
paid ou t or granted for the mechanisms of mechanical dredging, without looking at the issue of 
release of carbon that had been naturally captured in the ground. Paraguay therefore asks if the 
EU's Green Deal is really seeking to protect the environment, or if it is rather seeking to protect 
certain policies that are being subsidized by Members seeking to defend, in a very artificial fashion, 
the competitiveness of their agriculture.  
39.50.   The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
39.51.   Canada is carefully reviewing the European Commission's draft legislation, and will continue 
its discussions with the European Union to ensure that the design of the CBAM takes Canada's carbon 
pricing policies fully into account. In addition, Canada expects that the CBAM and its administra tion 
will respect the EU's international trade obligations. More broadly, Canada looks forward to 
collaborating with the EU, as well as other WTO  Members, on how CBAM can fit into a broader 
strategy to meet climate targets while addressing potential carbon  leakage risks.  
39.52.   The delegate of Mozambique  indicated the following:  
39.53.   The European Union's CBAM (EU  Green Deal of December  2019), is an issue that has been 
drawing the attention of Mozambique, it being one of the producers and exporters of certain of the 
products targeted. For various reasons, Mozambique shares the concerns raised by other Members. 
Mozambique is also convinced that the matter concerns a sensitive and global issue. For this reason, 
Mozambique would highly encourage a deeper analysis, data -sharing, and also the sharing of 
scientific evidence, to avoid considering unilateral measures for a global problem.  
39.54.   In any case, any measures introduced by the European Union to address such areas of global 
concern must take into consideration the guiding pri nciple of common but differentiated 
responsibility, a principle that must be observed to enable Members the necessary policy space and, 
in the case of LDC and developing Members, the necessary differentiated treatment.  G/C/M/141  
 
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  39.55.   Mozambique sees the need for a contin uous dialogue with the European Union in order to 
ensure that all aspects of the concerns raised are taken into consideration, and that a solution for 
one Member does not imply a position prejudicial to the interests of others, which, in the particular 
case of Mozambique, is embedded in government efforts to reduce poverty and advance economic 
development.  
39.56.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
39.57.   The European Union appreciates the interest of its partners in this important issue. The EU 
has stepped up its climate ambition, fully translating the implementation of the Paris Agreement into 
legislation, and invites its partners to share a comparable le vel of ambition.  
39.58.   The introduction of a CBAM to address the risk of carbon leakage is an integral part of that 
implementation and ambition, as reflected in the European Green Deal, to avoid EU  climate action 
being undermined. The CBAM is a purely climate -oriented environmental policy tool. It will be applied 
in a non -discriminatory and even -handed manner, in full compliance with WTO  rules and other 
international obligations.  
39.59.   The aim of the CBAM  proposal is to ensure that imported goods are subject to an equi valent 
carbon price as goods produced in the European Union. The CBAM does not target third  countries; 
rather, it applies to goods of certain carbon -intensive sectors at high risk of carbon leakage. It will 
take into consideration the application of carbon  pricing systems by third  countries, as well as 
indirectly taking account of effective climate policies that lead to lower emissions. Actual carbon 
emissions embedded in a product will also be taken into account.  
39.60.   The mechanism will initially apply only to a selected number of goods at high risk of carbon 
leakage. A monitoring and reporting system will be put in place from 2023 until the end of 2025 for 
those goods, the objective being to facilitate a smooth roll -out and dialogue with third  countries. 
This gradual phasing -in of the mechanism will provide businesses and trading partners with legal 
certainty, stability, and the necessary time to prepare.  
39.61.   As of 2026, the CBAM will gradually begin to be applied, with revenue collection, to the 
products covered , and in direct proportion to the reduction of free allowances allocated under the 
EU Emission Trading Scheme for those sectors. Over time, the CBAM will replace the free allocation 
of allowances.  
39.62.   The European Union has been transparent throughout the proc ess and remains ready to 
engage with trade partners and international organizations to inform and, where possible, assist 
with the implementation of the measure. In addition, the EU believes that international collaboration 
is essential to fighting climate  change effectively. Trade policy has an important supporting role to 
play in this fight. For this reason, climate action is an EU  priority in WTO  discussions.  
39.63.   The environmental sustainability statement for MC12, which is being advanced in the TESSD, 
is establishing discussions on how trade -related climate measures and policies can best contribute 
to climate and environmental goals. All Members will have the opportunity to share their views on 
carbon leakage in the context of those discussions.  
39.64.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
40  EUROPEAN UNION – THE EUROPEAN GREEN DEAL – REQUEST FROM THE RUSSIAN 
FEDERATION  
40.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of 
the Russian Federation.  
40.2.   The delegate of the Russian F ederation  indicated the following:  
40.3.   In December  2019, the European Commission announced its political vision for sustainability, 
and published the European Green Deal, which aims to reduce Green House Gas (GHG) emissions 
by at least 55% by 2030, and to reac h climate neutrality by 2050. The Russian Federation shares 
the EU's view of the importance of fighting climate change.  G/C/M/141  
 
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  40.4.   However, the Russian Federation notes that whatever activities Members plan within the 
framework of the environment and climate change, these activities should be carried out in 
accordance with fundamental WTO  principles and rules, and should not result in any kind of 
discrimination or disguised restrictions on trade; in particular, none of the "green" measures should 
impede trade and be u sed as a means of "green protectionism", as implied by paragraph  32 of the 
Doha Ministerial Declaration. Nevertheless, WTO  Members are currently raising specific trade 
concerns over certain elements of the European Union's Green Deal.  
40.5.   The first measure is the CBAM, as discussed under the previous agenda item. The European 
Union's targets, laid down in the European Green Deal, are not limited to the establishment of this 
mechanism. It also provides for the reduction of the use of chemical and more hazardous pesticides, 
the reduction of fertilizer use, the promotion of EU  energy standards and technologies at the global 
level, the diversification of energy sources of supply, the adoption of new technical regulations, and 
the revision of competition rules, and s o on. Most of these projects are, or will be, heavily subsidized; 
furthermore, their implementation would lead to the elimination of traditional foreign supplies from 
the EU  market. From a trade point of view, this equates to classical forced import substi tution. The 
Russian Federation expects the European Union to explain in detail how wrong Russia is in making 
such a serious claim.  
40.6.   At the same time, the Russian Federation is already concerned about the implementation of 
certain elements of the Green Deal;  for example, the draft EU  regulation on batteries, notified in 
document  G/TBT/N/EU/775. This measure sets out product requirements for new batteries as a 
condition for access to the EU  market, as well as material recovery targets for waste batteries. This  
regulation specifically sets requirements on the maximum level of carbon footprint over the life cycle 
of batteries, and the minimum level of recycled materials that they should contain, such as cobalt, 
lithium, copper, lead, and nickel.  
40.7.   Apparently, the r equirements for the minimum level of recycled materials in batteries is aimed 
at reducing the use of primary metals in the European Union, given that the EU does not have 
sufficient capacity in primary non -ferrous metals in its territory to meet internal d emand. By 
introducing a provision that discriminates against imported primary materials vis -à-vis domestically 
remanufactured materials, the draft regulation aims to substitute imported primary metals by the 
like domestically recycled metals. Indeed, this draft regulation is not based on science, nor on 
international standards or guidelines that specify the content of recycled materials in batteries, 
material recovery targets, and the levels and methodologies for the calculation of a carbon footprint 
over t he life cycle of a battery.  
40.8.   Another issue under the EU's Green Deal is the Chemicals Strategy for Sustainability, which 
involves plans to further tighten current regulation of chemical substances and mixtures under the 
CLP/Reach Regulations and other produ ct-specific regulations. These plans include the ban of 
hazardous materials classified as such by the CLP  Regulation. Russia hereby notes that this 
Regulation employs the precautionary principle, which implies strict classification decisions without 
availa ble laboratory or epidemiological data. One recent example is cobalt classification under the 
14th Adaptation to Technical and Scientific Progress (ATP) of the CLP  Regulation. Expanding this 
practice will entail restrictions and prohibitions of safe substa nces classified unjustifiably strictly 
using the precautionary principle. The EU sticks to the position that, once relevant scientific data is 
available, the classification decision can be revised. However, such a revision would have little 
practical impli cations, since the manufacturers of prohibited products would already have stopped 
their production, revised their technological processes, or even gone out of business.  
40.9.   In conclusion, the Russian Federation draws Members' attention to the fact that enviro nmental 
policies should not result in the imposition of unnecessary restrictions on international trade. For 
this reason, the Russian Federation expects that current trade rules will be fully respected.  
40.10.   The delegate of Qatar , addressing agenda items  39 and  40, indicated the following:  
40.11.   Qatar takes note of the European Union's ambitious Green Deal and, in particular, of its 
ambition to become the first  climate -neutral continent by 2050. Qatar compliments the EU for its 
political courage in setting these objec tives. Like the EU, Qatar has also signed and ratified the Paris 
Agreement, and is equally ambitious in its climate change objectives. However, considering the 
EU Green Deal, Qatar wishes to express certain additional trade -related concerns over the G/C/M/141  
 
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  introd uction of the CBAM to tackle so -called carbon leakage. In particular, Qatar seeks further 
clarification from the EU on how it intends to apply the CBAM in such a way as to ensure its 
compatibility with such fundamental WTO  principles as the MFN  principle a nd the principle of national 
treatment. In this context, Qatar considers that treating like products differently based on the carbon 
content of the production process goes against decades of well -considered WTO  jurisprudence.  
40.12.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
40.13.   Climate change and biodiversity loss are existential threats. Science tells us that this decade 
is a make -or-break moment for delivering on Members'  commitments under the Paris Agreement, 
and that  the cost of non -action is clearly higher than the cost of fulfilling our climate ambitions. For 
this reason, the European Union committed, in 2019, to becoming the world's first  climate -neutral 
continent by 2050. With the European Climate Law now in force , the EU's ambitious 2030  climate 
target, of a reduction of at least 55% in greenhouse gas emissions compared to 1990  levels, is now 
a legal obligation, which must be implemented through binding legislation applicable across the 
European Union.  
40.14.   The Europea n Green Deal was unveiled as a comprehensive plan to make the EU  economy 
and EU  society ready to meet its Paris Agreement goals, facilitating the resetting of its economic 
policy to better correspond to the challenges of the global climate crisis. On 14  July 2021, the 
European Union presented a package of proposals intended to deliver on the ambition of the Green 
Deal, the "Fit for 55"  package. This package comprises a mix of existing legislation upgraded to 
deliver on the EU's new level of ambition, plus a  number of new initiatives, covering a range of policy 
areas and sectors of the economy, including the following: climate, energy, transport, fuels, 
buildings, taxation, land use, agriculture, and forestry. It is based on a comprehensive set of impact 
assessments and has been carefully designed to be fully aligned with WTO  rules and the EU's other 
international commitments.  
40.15.   It is clear that trade policy alone cannot solve the global climate crisis, but it can certainly 
contribute to advancing climate action . International trade is an engine of growth that creates new 
green jobs, reduces poverty, and increases economic opportunity across the globe. Indeed, trade 
policy already contributes quite significantly to sustainable development, even if more can still be 
done. To this end, the new trade strategy communication presented by the European Commission 
in February  2021 outlines how trade policy and environmental and climate policies are, and must 
be, mutually supportive. And the European Union views green tran sition as an opportunity; global 
climate change mitigation efforts are a necessary part of the solution. Cooperation at multilateral 
and bilateral levels is therefore needed to shape the rules for fair and sustainable globalization.  
40.16.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
41  EUROPEAN UNION – REGULATION EC  NO. 1272/2008 (CLP  REGULATION) – REQUEST 
FROM THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  
41.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of 
the Russian Federation.  
41.2.   The delegate of the  Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
41.3.   The Russian Federation reiterates its statements made during previous regular meetings of 
the TBT  Committee and the CTG on the cobalt classification adopted by the European Union under 
the 14th Adaptation to Tec hnical Progress to the CLP  Regulation, and notified to the WTO in 
document  G/TBT/N/EU/629. The EU approved this classification in the absence of comprehensive 
laboratory and epidemiological data. Based on this classification, it is clear that the European 
Commission will go further and develop industrial, product -specific, and technical regulations, which 
will set unjustified restrictions or prohibit cobalt use in a wide range of products. The Russian 
Federation welcomes the European Commission's efforts to  approve gastric bioelution, but notes 
that, although it was supposed to have been approved at EU  level in September  2021, this 
methodology has not yet been approved. The Russian Federation requests the European Union to 
inform the Council of the state of work on bioelution approval.  G/C/M/141  
 
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  41.4.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
41.5.   As explained at previous Council meetings, titanium dioxide and cobalt were included in the 
14th ATP amending the CLP  Regulation. Several discussions on the classification of cobalt, TiO2, and  
the classification of mixtures containing TiO2, took place in t he expert group on the Registration, 
Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH) and the  Classification, Labelling and 
Packaging Regulation (CLP  Regulation) (CARACAL), and in the regulatory committee (the 
REACH  Committee).  
41.6.   After its adop tion by the Commission on 4  October  2019, the Commission Delegated 
Regulation was sent to the Council and the European Parliament for the two -month objection period. 
As no objection was raised, the Commission Delegated Regulation (EU)  No. 2020/217 was publ ished 
in the EU's Official Journal on 18  February  2020, and the classification of cobalt as a carcinogen 
became applicable as of 1  October  2021.  
41.7.   The classification of cobalt as a carcinogen for all routes of exposure is based on the scientific 
opinion of the Risk Assessment Committee (RAC) of the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA), as well 
as on the comments received and concerns expressed by EU  member States and stakeholders. This 
opinion is in line with the CLP  Regulation, as well as the UN  Globally Harmonized System of 
Classification and Labelling of Chemicals (UN  GHS). The opinion and the background document 
containing all the relevant scientific information on which the opinion is based are available to all 
WTO Members and stakeholders at the ECHA  website.4 In its scientific assessment, the ECHA's 
RAC Committee took all available data into account, including the information submitted during the 
public consultation period. However, review of an RAC  opinion is only possible if new and relevant 
scientific information becomes available. In this regard, the European Union notes that all comments 
submitted by WTO  Members in the context of the EU  notification in accordance with the 
TBT Agreement were duly taken into account by the Commission and membe r States in the 
decision -making process. Furthermore, the Commission has also sent written replies to the 
comments from WTO  Members on the TBT  notification of the measure.  
41.8.   The European Union has also proposed to harmonize at OECD  level its method on bioelu tion. 
This method could be useful to ensure that if a metal contained in an alloy is not bioavailable (that 
is, if it remains in the matrix), then the alloys (for example, stainless steel) do not need to be 
classified. An agreement at the OECD has been rea ched in May  2020 to develop and validate this 
method. The EU would welcome any support from third  countries to actively participate in the 
development of the OECD  test method on bioelution.  
41.9.   As a new development, the European Union notes that the special ex pert sub -group that has 
been recently established by the Commission in order to provide advice and exchange views on 
technical, legal, and policy issues relating to the use of the relative in vitro bioaccessibility of a 
hazardous metal in metal compounds o r alloys, for the refinement of their classification under CLP, 
has already met twice. A third  meeting, to conclude its discussions, is planned for mid -November.  
41.10.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
42  EUROPEAN UNION – REGULATION (EU)  2017/2321 AND R EGULATION (EU)  2018/825 
– REQUEST FROM CHINA AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  
42.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of 
China and the Russian Federation.  
42.2.   The delegate of the Russian Federation  indicated the followi ng: 
42.3.   The Russian Federation remains concerned about the amendments to the EU  basic regulation 
on protection against dumped imports introduced by Regulation (EU)  No. 2017/2321 and Regulation 
(EU) No. 2018/825. The Russian Federation wishes on this occasion t o reiterate its systemic views 
about the discriminatory nature of the aforementioned amendments. Taken together, these 
amendments seem to be designed to selectively squeeze the imports of certain WTO  Members out 
of the EU  market. The presence of only two  reports of so -called "significant distortions" in the 
 
4 https://echa.europa.eu/registry -of-clh-intentions -until-outcome/ -/dislist/details/0b0236e1806bd156  G/C/M/141  
 
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  exporting countries in question speaks in favour of this understanding. The Russian Federation 
reiterates its view that such treatment of exporters is WTO -inconsistent; accordingly, it calls upon 
the Eur opean Union to abstain from its application. In addition, the Russian Federation requests the 
European Union to provide it with any update that may dispel the Russian Federation's worries 
regarding the amendments in question.  
42.4.   The delegate of China  indicate d the following:  
42.5.   China's concern over this issue remains. China believes that the European Union's 
anti-dumping regulation and relevant practices are inconsistent with WTO  anti-dumping rules. China 
is particularly concerned about the so -called significant market distortion concept and relevant 
standards in the regulation, the working document on significant distortion in China, as well as the 
way of using third  party data for normal value calculation. China urges the EU to bring its practices 
into line with  the WTO  Anti-Dumping  Agreement and relevant rulings.  
42.6.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
42.7.   The European Union notes the points raised by both China and the Russian Federation. 
However, the EU also notes that its position on these poi nts is well known, and remains unchanged. 
Therefore, to avoid repetition, the EU refers to its previous statements on this issue as delivered 
both at this Council and at meetings of the Anti -Dumping Committee.5 
42.8.   The Council took note  of the statements made . 
43  ANGOLA – IMPORT RESTRICTING PRACTICES – REQUEST FROM THE RUSSIAN 
FEDERATION  
43.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of 
the Russian Federation.  
43.2.   The delegate of the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
43.3.   The Russian Federation remains concerned over Angola's import restrictions under 
Presidential Decree No.  23/19, intended to protect Angola's domestic industries, the conformity of 
which with WTO  rules on certain agricultural and i ndustrial products is doubtful. Russia's concern in 
this regard has been raised multiple times in this Council and the C MA. The Russian Federation  
wishes to thank Angola for their fruitful consultations during the course of the year. Nevertheless, 
Russia s ees no developments relating to the elimination of Angola's trade restricting measures. The 
Russian Federation urges Angola to bring its measures into conformity with WTO  rules. To this end, 
Russia remains open to further bilateral discussion with Angola.  
43.4.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
43.5.   As the United States has expressed in this Council and in the C MA, it is committed to 
strengthening trade and investment ties with Angola. However, the United States remains concerned 
that Presiden tial Decree No.  23/19 appears to be aimed at restricting Angola's imports, which could 
negatively impact the US  relationship with Angola. The United States continues to hear reports of 
confusion over how the Decree is being enforced, and of delays facing g oods at the border. In 
particular, US  agricultural exporters remain concerned over delays that perishable goods face amidst 
all this uncertainty. The United States hopes that Angola will take steps to revise the Decree in 
question to address US  concerns an d ensure that its measures with respect to imports are in 
compliance with WTO  rules.  
43.6.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
43.7.   The European Union maintains its long -held concern over Angola's Decree No.  23/19, which 
seems to protect domestic industries in a manner that is incompatible with WTO  rules, and which 
could also be detrimental to foreign investments in Angola. Since 2019, the EU has not received any 
substanti ve explanations from Angola as to how it intends to make Decree No.  23/19 
 
5 See, for example, document  G/C/M/140, para graphs  30.9-30.10.  G/C/M/141  
 
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  WTO-compliant. Irrespective of the issue of compatibility with WTO  rules, the European Union urges 
Angola to provide clarity as to the process under way in Angola as concerns this Decree, and whether  
or not Angola intends to introduce any changes to it and, if so, in which areas. The European Union 
remains supportive of Angola's intention to diversify its economy and to develop its domestic 
industry. Nevertheless, the European Union o nce again urges Angola to review the relevant 
measures in order to ensure their compliance with WTO  rules.  
43.8.   The delegate of Angola  indicated the following:  
43.9.   Angola takes note of the statements made by the delegations of the Russian Federation, the 
European U nion, and the United States, regarding their concerns around Angolan imports. Angola 
considers its previous statements delivered in this Council, and at other committees, to remain valid; 
however, since Angola has received excellent contributions from the aforementioned Members, 
Angola has begun to adjust the Decree in question in order to make it more comprehensive. To this  
end, Angola will certainly be counting upon the technical assistance of interested Members.  
43.10.   Despite the trade concerns raised around t he Decree, Angola wishes to ensure Members that 
the level of its imports has remained unchanged, as can be verified from the available statistics, and 
especially for those Members that have expressed concerns. For this reason, Angola suggests that 
the Memb ers in question consult their exporters in order to be provided with the real information 
concerning the current status of their exports to Angola, which continue to develop normally. In 
conclusion, Angola reiterates that the Decree in question is under re view. 
43.11.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
44  MONGOLIA – MEASURES APPLIED WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN AGRICULTURAL 
PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  
44.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of 
the Russian Federation.  
44.2.   The delegate of the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
44.3.   The Russian Federation wishes to raise the issue of Mongolia's quantitative measures applied 
to the importation of certain agricultural products. Russia appreciates the f act that Mongolia did not 
open quotas for imports of bottled water, liquid milk, and wheat flour for 2021. However, Russia 
reiterates that these products were not excluded from the list of agricultural products subject to 
annual QRs. Rather, according to the Mongolian Food Law, such quotas may be imposed in the 
future.  
44.4.   In the context of its T PR, Mongolia stated that "the Law on Food has been included in the  
guidelines for improving the Mongolian legislation until 2024 and shall be amended in a ccordance 
with the WTO  rules and principles by 2021". During the Committee on Agriculture meeting in 
June 2021, Mongolia indicated that the Food Law would be improved, in compliance with the 
WTO Agreements, during the autumn session of the Parliament. In S eptember  2021, Mongolia 
stated that the required amendments were under development.  
44.5.   Mongolia's quota regime continues to be inconsistent with its obligations under the 
WTO Agreements, in particular, Article  XI of the GATT  1994 and Article  4.2 of the Agreem ent on 
Agriculture, as well as Mongolia's accession commitments under paragraph  20 of the Working Party 
Report. The Russian Federation would appreciate Mongolia sharing information regarding the 
progress of bringing its legislation into compliance with WTO  rules.  
44.6.   The Russian Federation also wishes to raise a concern relating to Mongolia's Enrichment Law, 
which sets out the mandatory requirement for wheat flour to be fortified with vitamins and mineral 
compounds. In the context of its T PR in March  2021, Mong olia stated that the procedure for enriched  
flour examination had not yet been worked out. In this regard, the Russian Federation asks why 
Mongolia imposes a measure while its procedure has not yet been elaborated. For this reason, 
Mongolia's application o f a mandatory fortification requirement in practice raises issues with regard 
to its consistency with the relevant provisions of the TBT  Agreement.  G/C/M/141  
 
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  44.7.   The Russian Federation expects Mongolia to take all further necessary steps to bring its 
legislation and mea sures into compliance with the relevant WTO  rules. The Russian Federation also 
urges Mongolia to terminate the implementation of its Enrichment Law. Finally, the Russian 
Federation will continue to carefully monitor the review of Mongolia's quota policy an d food nutrition 
measures.  
44.8.   The delegate of Mongolia  indicated the following:  
44.9.   Mongolia thanks the Russian Federation for its continued interest in Mongolia's trade policy 
on agricultural products. Mongolia reiterates that the Food Law of Mongolia is in forc e, and it is not 
possible to exclude wheat flour and liquid milk from the list of agricultural products. At the same 
time, Mongolia notes that no import quotas have been imposed on wheat flour and liquid milk since 
2019, and nor will any such quotas be rei mposed. Mongolia wishes to inform the Council that the 
necessary amendments to the Food Law, which are intended to ensure its compliance with the 
WTO Agreements, are under development. Mongolia also takes note of the comments on the 
Enrichment Law and othe r issues raised by the Russian Federation. These comments will be 
forwarded to capital and Mongolia will respond to them at the Council's next meeting.  
44.10.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
45  INDIA - MANDATORY CERTIFICATION FOR STEEL PRODUCTS – REQUE ST FROM JAPAN  
45.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of 
Japan.  
45.2.   The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
45.3.   Regarding India's mandatory certification for steel products, Japan has repeatedly requested 
that India ensure its proper implementation through discussions in both the TBT  Committee and the 
CTG. Japan wishes to touch on four  points in this regard.  
45.4.   First, Japan requests India to approve expeditiously the applications, since it is still taking a 
long ti me to receive approval for a conformity assessment, especially for new projects.  
45.5.   Second, Japan understands that due to the COVID -19 pandemic the Government of India has 
been unable to proceed with on -site inspections. For this reason, Japan requested India  to implement 
appropriate alternative measures. In response to Japan's request, India mentioned, at the most 
recent meeting of the TBT  Committee, the possibility of introducing remote inspections. Japan 
requests India to provide an update on its progress i n introducing such alternatives.  
45.6.   Third, if appropriate alternative measures are not to be introduced, Japan requests that India 
postpone the introduction and enforcement of new compulsory standards.  
45.7.   Finally, in obtaining a certification of conformity, some  products are not subject to the original 
application procedure, and some companies need to switch procurement to Indian companies, even 
though such a switch has no relation to the process of the acquisition of the certification of conformity 
with the stan dards set. An additional submission of future plans for local production is also required. 
Japan requests India to improve upon this situation by addressing such problems.  
45.8.   The delegate of the Republic of Korea  indicated the following:  
45.9.   The Republic of Korea  wishes to raise a concern regarding India's Steel and Steel Products 
(Quality Control) Order. The Order requires compulsory certification for imported steel products for 
which Korean companies have applied. However, there has been a delay in the process o f assessing 
the applications since December  2020, as the "factory visit" was deferred because of the 
COVID -19 pandemic. The "factory visit" is one of the requirements for obtaining the certification. To 
avoid any additional delay and to accelerate the proc ess, the Republic of Korea urges India to be 
more flexible by temporarily replacing the "factory visit" requirement by a document -based 
examination until the COVID -19 situation improves. If this is not possible, an alternative would be 
a provision that all ows virtual or remote inspection, in place of an on -site visit.  G/C/M/141  
 
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  45.10.   The delegate of India indicated the following:  
45.11.   The mandatory BIS  certification for steel products is enforced through the notification of 
quality control orders to ensure that the quality of steel being manufactured by domestic producers 
or imported into the country is as per Indian standards. The WTO recognizes a Member's right to 
implement measures to achieve legitimate policy objectives, such as the protection of human health 
and safety, protection of the environment, prevention of unfair trade practices, or national security. 
The technical regulations and QCOs on steel and steel products have been issued based on the same 
policy objectives. The QCOs notified by the government are  not trade -restrictive, but rather a 
necessity to meet the legitimate objective of ensuring a level playing field for domestic as well as 
foreign suppliers.  
45.12.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
46  INDIA – IMPORT RESTRICTION ON AIR CONDITIONERS – REQUEST FROM JAPAN  
46.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of 
Japan.  
46.2.   The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
46.3.   Japan reiterates its concern that India's import ban on air conditioners, incl uding refrigerants, 
introduced last year through Notification No.  41/2015 -2020, is a measure that unreasonably 
imposes a restructuring of corporate supply chains. Japan is significantly concerned that this 
measure may be an import ban that is inconsistent with Article  XI:1 of the GATT, as well as 
Article  2.1 of the TRIMs  Agreement.  
46.4.   India responded in its T PR, and at the CTG, that its measure was consistent with its obligations  
under the Montreal Protocol. However, this import ban is still considered by Japa n to be superfluous 
and irrational in that it covers a wide range of air conditioners that use refrigerants. Furthermore, 
these air conditioners are subject neither to India's reduction and elimination obligation under the 
Montreal Protocol, nor to the reg ulation for freon gas causing ozone layer depletion under India's 
domestic regulation. In this respect, after considering India's previous answers, Japan submitted 
written questions to the TRIMs  Committee meeting in September  2021; in this regard, Japan ex pects 
India to provide prompt and more detailed answers to its questions.  
46.5.   In addition, as Japan mentioned at the recent TRIMs  Committee meeting, regarding air 
conditioners, India's ISI  Mark certification system is scheduled to come into effect in January  2022 
based on the quality control order for air conditioners and their parts. However, while it is necessary 
to obtain a BIS  licence for these products through the conformity procedure, the BIS has stopped 
conducting overseas factory inspections, and the ce rtification procedure for imported products has 
not progressed. Japan is concerned that imports may be restricted if nothing is done. Japan requests 
India to consider (i)  an extension of the measure's enforcement date; and (ii)  alternative procedures 
for certification other than overseas factory inspection.  
46.6.   The delegate of Thailand  indicated the following:  
46.7.   Thailand shares Japan's concerns over India's import restriction on air conditioners, which has 
had an adverse impact on Thailand's exports of air condit ioners to India. Thailand also wishes to 
reiterate its concerns regarding India's restrictive import policies on television sets, as raised in 
previous meetings of the CMA. Thailand continues to closely monitor developments in this regard, 
and encourages I ndia to find and implement less restrictive import measures on these products. 
Thailand also welcomes bilateral discussion with India on this issue.  
46.8.   The delegate of India indicated the following:  
46.9.   This is an issue that was raised at the Council's meetings o f March and April  2021, wherein 
India explained the rationale for the measure undertaken. India wishes to inform Members again 
that the measure was necessary for the application of standards and regulations. Besides reducing 
risks to human, animal and plan t life and health, it is also consistent with India's commitment to the 
Montreal Protocol. Furthermore, as per the Ozone -Depleting Substances (Regulation and Control) G/C/M/141  
 
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  Amendment Rules 2014, the import of air conditioners containing Group  VI substances 
(hydr ochlorofluorocarbons) is prohibited since 1  July 2015.  
46.10.   In August  2021, India provided its approval for the ratification of the Kigali Amendment to 
the Montreal Protocol, on substances that deplete the ozone layer. This amendment was adopted by 
the parties to the Montreal Protocol in October  2016 at the 28th meeting of the parties held at Kigali, 
Rwanda. India will complete its phasedown of hydrofluorocarbons in four  steps, from 2032  onwards, 
with cumulative reduction of 10% in 2032, 20% in 2037, 30% in 2042 , and 85% in 2047. India has 
a consistent policy in this regard and remains open to discussing this issue with Japan bilaterally.  
46.11.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
REPORTS TO THE GENERAL COUNCIL  
47  WORK PROGRAMME ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE  
47.1.   The Chairpe rson recalled that, at the General Council's meeting of March  2021, the 
Chairperson of the General Council had indicated that the General Council would continue holding 
periodic reviews of the Work Programme on Electronic Commerce in its future sessions, b ased on 
the reports submitted by the WTO  bodies entrusted with the implementation of the Work 
Programme. For that purpose, the General Council had instructed these bodies, including the CTG, 
to continue placing the issue of the Work Programme on the agenda  of their meetings and to send 
updates to the General Council in order to assist it in its preparations for MC12. Therefore, in order 
to fulfil the renewed mandate of this Council to update the General Council about the discussions 
that have taken place on  this issue, he invited delegations to continue expressing their opinions and 
to make suggestions as to how to work on the preparation of the periodic review to be held in the 
General Council in preparation for MC12.  
47.2.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
47.3.   The United States notes that this agenda item should be requested by a Member and driven 
by proposals from Members for consideration. It is not a standing agenda item.  
47.4.   The delegate of Pakistan  indicated the following:  
47.5.   All Members are we ll aware that, in this era of digitization, the digital divide is a reality, and 
one that has been further aggravated by the COVID -19 pandemic. At its onset, countries with low 
digital penetration faced insurmountable problems in dealing with the natural o utcome of the global 
pandemic in different forms. These challenges have not yet subsided, and developing countries are  
making concerted efforts, within their available fiscal space, to improve upon their situation. 
However, the digital divide can only be b ridged if efforts are made by all Members, in line with the 
original negotiating mandate, as agreed at the Second  WTO Ministerial Conference.  
47.6.   Any attempts at rule -making in this area without first addressing the concerns of developing 
countries will furthe r widen the existing digital divide, including by creating additional imbalances 
that may have a detrimental impact on the prospects for developing countries to address their 
structural issues.  
47.7.   Therefore, Pakistan wishes once again to stress and support en gagement at the correct 
mandated forum in which multilateral discussions on e -commerce should take place, and in this  
regard supports the reinvigoration of the Work Programme. Pakistan considers that to do so is also 
indispensable for the digital development and industrialization of developing countries.  
47.8.   The delegate of Norway  indicated the following:  
47.9.   Norway sees e -commerce as an important part of coping with the pandemic. E -Commerce  
and trade facilitation have proven themselves to be extremely important in the toolbox that Members 
and consumers have used to cope with this pandemic. For this reason, Norway, together w ith nearly 
twenty  other Members, has proposed a prolongation of the Work Programme, including the 
moratorium on electronic transmissions.  G/C/M/141  
 
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  47.10.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
48  CONSIDERATION OF ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE SUBSIDIARY BODIES OF THE COUNCIL 
FOR TRADE IN GOODS  
48.1.   The Chairperson  noted that, pursuant to the "Procedures for an Annual Overview of 
WTO Activities and for Reporting under the WTO" (WT/L/105), which were adopted by the General 
Council on 15  November  1995, all bodies constituted under Agr eements in Annex  1A of the 
WTO Agreement were required to submit a factual report to the Council for Trade in Goods annually, 
and the Council was to take note of these reports.  
48.2.   Such factual reports were adopted at the last meeting of each subsidiary body a nd submitted 
to the CTG for its consideration. In the case of the SPS Committee (G/L/1413/Rev.1), and the 
TBT Committee (G/L/1420), the corresponding factual reports would be submitted to the General  
Council directly.  
48.3.   The Chairperson proposed that the Coun cil take note of the following factual annual reports: 
Committee on Anti -Dumping Practices (G/L/1415); Committee on Customs Valuation (G/L/1410); 
Committee on Import Licensing (G/L/1406); Committee on Market Access (G/L/1407); Committee 
on Rules of Origin (G/L/1405); Committee on Safeguards (G/L/1417); Committee on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (G/L/1414); Committee on Trade Facilitation (G/L/1416); Committee on 
TRIMs (G/L/1404); Committee of Participants on the Expansion of Trade in Information Tec hnology 
Products, ITA (G/L/1412); Working Party on State Trading Enterprises (G/L/1403); Preshipment 
Inspection (G/L/1411); and the Independent Entity (G/L/1409).  
48.4.   The Council so agreed . 
49  ADOPTION OF THE ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL FOR TRADE IN GOODS TO THE  
GENERAL COUNCIL (G/C/W/804)  
49.1.   The Chairperson  drew Members' attention to the Draft Report of this Council to the General 
Council, circulated in document  G/C/W/804. In accordance with the "Procedures for an Annual 
Overview of WTO  Activities and for Reporting  under the WTO" (WT/L/105), it was agreed that "[T]he 
respective sectoral Councils should report in November each year to the General Council on the 
activities in the Council as well as in the subsidiary bodies" and that the reports of the sectoral 
Council s should be "factual in nature, containing an indication of actions and decisions taken, with 
cross-references to reports of subordinate bodies and could follow the model of the GATT  1947 
Council reports to the CONTRACTING PARTIES".  
49.2.   He reminded delegations  that all sections of the Draft Report currently before Members would 
be updated in light of the present meeting, and would also be circulated to Members for comments . 
In addition, he noted that the Secretariat had adjusted the way in which the information  on trade 
concerns was presented, which would now be summarized in table format in the annexes.  
49.3.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
49.4.   The United States thanks the Secretariat for the Draft Report in document  G/C/W/804 and  
welcomes the introduction of the annex tables, which is a sensible way of presenting this information. 
However, the United States would not be in a position to adopt the report today as it would first like 
to see a complete version. For this reason, it requests the Cha irperson to follow a written procedure 
for its adoption.  
49.5.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Secretariat circulate by email a revised version of the 
Annual Report, in tracked changes, by close of business on 3  November. If no objection was received  
by the Se cretariat by Monday, 8  November, this revised draft would be considered to be approved 
and the Annual Report would subsequently be circulated under the G/L  document series for 
presentation to the General Council.6 
 
6 The Annual Report of the Council for Trade in Goods was adopted by written procedures on 
8 November  2021 and circulated as document  G/L/1418, dated 10  November  2021.  G/C/M/141  
 
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  49.6.   The Council so agreed . 
50  OTHER BUSINESS  
50.1  Functioning of the CTG and its Subsidiary Bodies – Information from the Chair 
(RD/CTG/14)  
50.1.   The Chairperson  drew Members' attention to documents  RD/CTG/14 and RD/CTG/14/Corr.1, 
containing the most recent version of the Annual Plan of Meetings for the CTG and it s subsidiary 
bodies  for the year 2022 . This document had been prepared in close coordination between the 
Secretary of the Goods Council and the Secretaries of the CTG's subsidiary bodies with the aim of 
ensuring an optimal scheduling of meetings, and in particular, avoiding overlaps. In this regard, he 
noted that certain meetings had already been rescheduled in light of Members' comments on this 
issue made at the Council's previous meeting. As previously noted, he had requested the Secretariat 
to prepare an update of this Annual Plan for each CTG meeting, which should facilitate an early 
identification of any potential issues and allow Members to plan accordingly. He had also continued 
to engage with the Chairpersons and Secretaries of the CTG's  subsidiary bodies with a view to 
continuing to im prove the coordination between the Council and the Committees, thus ensuring that 
Members' concerns were addressed in a satisfactory manner.  
50.2.   The delegate of Paraguay  indicated the following:  
50.3.   Just as Paraguay had done in the past, when it took the floor to complain when there were 
problems, it now felt compelled to take the floor to thank and congratulate the Secretariat for this 
excellent annual plan of meetings. Paraguay sees that not only has the Secretariat tried to avoid 
overlaps in meetings, but also t hat they have tried to maintain the sequence of first having the 
meetings of the subsidiary bodies, then the meeting of the CTG, so that issues can then be raised 
to the General Council. The only overlap that seems to remain is between the Committee on 
Agriculture and the TBT  Committee meetings in June  2022, but Paraguay imagines that this was 
unavoidable. Nevertheless, this calendar represents a significant improvement over past years and 
will allow all delegations to organize their work more efficiently, which is something that delegations 
had been requesting for a long time. Thanks again to the Secretariat and to the Chairperson for his 
leadership on this issue.  
50.4.   The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
50.5.   Canada takes the floor to echo the comments ma de by Paraguay, and to thank the 
Chairperson and the Secretariat for steering the preparation of this calendar of meetings. It is a 
great contribution to organizing the work of the CTG  subsidiary bodies, and for laying down this 
calendar and allowing for s ome planning. Canada would urge the Secretariat to continue with this 
effort, including advance planning so that these dates can be included in the WTO  website's calendar 
of meetings, and doing so as far in advance as possible as many delegates used this a s their main 
tool for planning and accessing meetings. Finally, Canada encourages delegates to use the 
e-Registration system to indicate the committees that they are covering, which is a simple procedure  
and assists all delegates and the Secretariat in ide ntifying who their counterparts are in each of the 
bodies.  
50.2  Date of Next Meeting  
50.6.   The Chairperson  announced that the next CTG  meeting had been tentatively scheduled for 
21-22 April 2022. These dates would be confirmed in due course.  
__________