RESTRICTED  
  
WT/GC/M/159  
 
9 December 2015  
(15-6521)  Page: 1/35  
General Council 
8 October 2015    
 
MINUTES OF THE MEETING 
HELD IN THE CENTRE WILLIAM RAPPARD ON 8 OCTOBER 2015 
Chairperson: H.E. Mr Fern ando de Mateo (Mexico) 
Subjects discussed:1 
1   REPORT BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE TRADE NEGOTIATIONS COMMITTEE .................... 1  
2   IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BALI  OUTCOMES — STATEMENT BY THE 
CHAIRMAN ..................................................................................................................... 26 
3   WORK PROGRAMME ON SMALL ECONOM IES — REPORT BY THE CHAIRMAN OF 
THE DEDICATED SESSION OF THE COMMI TTEE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT ............. 29  
4   TENTH SESSION OF THE MINISTERIAL CO NFERENCE ................................................ 30  
4.1   ATTENDANCE OF OBSERVERS FROM INTERNATIONAL INTERGOVERNMENTAL 
ORGANIZA TIONS ............................................................................................................. 30 
5   FOSTERING PARTICIPATION OF MICRO, SMALL AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISES 
(MSMES) IN REGIONAL AND GLOBAL MARKETS — COMMUNICATION FROM THE 
PHILIPPINES AND MALAYSIA  ........................................................................................ 30  
6   COMMITTEE ON BUDGET, FINANCE AND ADMINISTRATION — REPORT ON 
MEETING OF SE PTEMBER 2015 ...................................................................................... 34 
7   WTO PENSION PLAN — ELECTION OF  AN ALTERNATE — PROPOSAL BY THE 
CHAIRMAN OF THE GE NERAL COUN CIL  ......................................................................... 34  
8   CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE COMMITTE E ON TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT IN 
SPECIAL SESSION – STATEMEN T BY THE CHAIRMAN ..................................................... 35  
9   ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES FOR MEMBERS IN ARREARS – STATEMENT BY 
THE CHAIRMAN .............................................................................................................. 35  
 
1  REPORT BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE TRADE NEGOTI ATIONS COMMITTEE 
1.1.  The Chairman invited the Director-General, as  Chairman of the TNC, to report on the TNC's 
activities since his last report to the Council. 
1.2.  The Director-General, Chairman of the TNC2, said that at the last General Council meeting, 
on 28 July, he had reported that limited progress had been made on developing a work program 
by the July deadline. He had convened a TNC meetin g on 31 July to take stock of progress and to 
discuss the way forward. That meeting had ended with an unequivocal and united message from 
Members that they should focus their efforts towards delivering outcomes in Nairobi. With that in 
mind, Members had restarted their work in September with renewed impetus. He had held a Room W meeting with heads of delegations on 17 September to report in detail on his 
consultations and to give his assessment of the situation. Progress on some key issues, like 
                                               
1 The proposed agenda was circulated in WT/GC/W/704. 
2 The Director-General's statement was subsequently circulated in JOB/GC/83. WT/GC/M/159 
 
- 2 - 
 
  domestic support, and market access in agricultur e, NAMA and services had been looking very 
difficult.  
1.3.  While continuing their work on those effort s, it had been time for Members to start working 
more intensely on issues where there appeared to be more convergence and which could be 
potential deliverables for MC10. Those included — but not necessarily limited to: development 
issues with a particular focus on LDCs, export competition in agriculture, and a set of possible outcomes to improve transparency in a number of areas. A range of consultations had taken place 
since the Room W meeting which had further pointed things in that direction even though it was 
not the preferred outcome for many. He had continued his consultations in a variety of configurations. He had held numerous bilateral meetings with Ministers where possible including in the margins of the Public Forum, the G20 and the UN Sustainable Development Summit in New 
York. On 29 September, he had convened a meeting focused on advancing LDC issues. On 
1 October, he had held a meeting to start discussing how Members approached their work after Nairobi. He had also taken part, by invitation, in a number of meetings convened by Members, 
including meetings in Istanbul with a small group of Ministers, and then with G20 Trade Ministers 
at the invitation of the Government of Turkey. 
1.4.  On the meeting on LDC issues which had been held on 29 September, given the emerging 
view in favour of delivering an LDC package in Nairobi, he had asked Ambassador Shameem Ahsan 
of Bangladesh (LDC Coordinator) to give an indication of what their forthcoming proposals could contain. He had given a helpful overview of the potential issues which had included: some elements of S&D treatment; all issues of intere st to LDCs in agriculture, including domestic 
support; action on non-tariff barriers, including a horizontal mechanism; binding DFQF market 
access through scheduling; reflection of flexibility that had already been agreed upon in various decisions, guidelines and ministerial declarations in trade in services; adoption of simplified 
procedures for taking anti-dumping action for use by LDCs and increasing the threshold on non-
application of anti-dumping duties for LDCs; and strengthening of technical assistance. There had not been a detailed discussion of the issues in th e meeting. Rather, reflecting the proximity of 
MC10, there had been a desire to move to discussi ng textual proposals as soon as possible. They 
had also briefly reviewed progress on implementati on of the Bali issues. On Rules of Origin and the 
submission from the LDC Group, he had appointe d Steffen Smidt, the LDC Facilitator, to take 
forward the proposal on his behalf. He thanked Mr Smidt for his continued commitment to LDC 
issues and wished him luck in the important role where he would have his full support.  
1.5.  He was delighted that the terms of Liberia's WTO Membership had been agreed. He 
congratulated the Government of Liberia on the achievement — and all those in Geneva who had 
been involved in the process. He looked forward to formally agreeing the accession in Nairobi. He 
reminded Members that an LDC event would be held on 12 October in Room W, looking at the twenty years of supporting the integration of LDCs  into the multilateral trading system. That would 
be an important opportunity to discuss what had been achieved on that front since the WTO had 
been created and what they could aim to deliver in the future. Preparations were underway for the Pledging Conference to support Phase Two of the EI F. He would be chairing the event in Nairobi on 
14 December. A successful pledging conference would be a significant MC10 outcome and he 
strongly urged all existing and potential donors to be ready to lend their support. 
1.6.  On 1 October, he had convened another m eeting. His preference would have been to call 
another Room W meeting, but with the Public Fo rum still ongoing most rooms were occupied. The 
Forum was an important outreach event and a symbol of the WTO's openness as an organization 
and he had not wanted to disrupt proceedings. He had instead convened a session in his own meeting room with 48 delegations. The meeting had been a chance to update Members on the 
state of play. They had also discussed how they coul d intensify their work, including on the specific 
outcome documents for Nairobi, and how they would continue their work after Nairobi. A range of views had been expressed. He had floated an idea  on a possible way forward. He had promised to 
bring that idea to the General Council. Indeed, the post-Nairobi issue had become a feature of 
many of his consultations over recent weeks. 
1.7.  On 28 September and 1 October, he had been invited to participate in a meeting hosted by 
Australia. The meeting included representatives fr om Brazil, China, the EU, India, Japan and the 
US. The Chairpersons of the General Council, CoA-SS and the NAMA Negotiating Group had also 
joined the meeting. In both meetings, discussi ons had revolved around possible outcomes for 
Nairobi. In particular, participants had discussed the possibility of agreeing on a subset of DDA WT/GC/M/159 
 
- 3 - 
 
  issues in Nairobi combined with a statement on post-Nairobi work. On the Nairobi package itself, 
participants had mentioned export competition, a development and LDC package, and some transparency provisions. They had all agreed that there would be challenges in negotiating those issues. Those had been promising issues, but not "sure outcomes". Participants had not discussed 
the details of the difficulties that they had thought they could face. 
1.8.  A key issue that had been discussed was the post-Nairobi work. Views had been quite 
divergent. Some wanted to continue their work and reaffirm the Doha architecture and constructs. 
Others would be prepared to engage on issues they had been negotiating under Doha but would 
not be willing to pursue them under the curr ent DDA framework. Participants had also 
acknowledged that it would be difficult to find common language on the post-Nairobi work, but no-one had disagreed with the importance of trying  to work out a common message on the future 
which would form part of the overall Nairob i outcome. Participants had explored their 
commonalities on guidance for future work. If Members delivered the package that had been outlined for Nairobi, centred on development, transparency, and export competition, no-one had 
disagreed that it would be a meaningful outcome.  Such a package would not mean that it would 
successfully address the DDA single undertaking. After Nairobi, participants would be willing to think about how to make progress on issues that would have not been fully addressed by MC10. 
The conversation had been preliminary. Some part icipants had noted they had no instructions on 
those issues. It had been clear that, even if th ere were some commonalities about their future 
work, important differences still existed. Participants had also gone through the different possibilities in terms of the nature of the outcome document.  
1.9.  The same participants had accepted Australia’s invitation and had met at the Ministerial level 
in the margins of the G20 Trade Ministers meeting in Istanbul. Ambassador Amina Mohamed, as MC10 Chairperson, had joined the meeting. Th e conversation had focused on what issues 
participants thought could be dealt with in Nair obi and what the approach should be on post-
Nairobi work. It was a repetition of the familiar conversation – focusing the two points. Participants had been asked to say whether they were prepared to proceed on a package of issues which would 
be DDA minus, along the lines of what he had already outlined. They had been asked if they were 
willing to evaluate whether and how they should start working on a final Nairobi document. The participants were willing to work on both fronts. 
1.10.  In addition to the arguments made in previous meetings, some other elements had 
emerged more clearly. Some participants had said that reassurance regarding post-Nairobi was 
needed for a successful outcome in Nairobi. No-o ne seemed to fundamentally disagree. Some had 
stressed the importance of a balanced outcome even  in the context of a package containing some 
issues only. Some had noted that the post-Nairobi  a g e n d a  s h o u l d  b e  o p e n  t o  i s s u e s  t h a t  w e r e  
relevant to all Members and some had made the point that the DDA issues should remain the primary focus and could not be forgotten. No-one had disagreed that development should stay 
central to their conversations after Nairobi and that  principles like S&D treatment and less than full 
reciprocity should be kept in their post-Nairobi work. 
1.11.  Differences remained on the role of the DDA framework in the post-Nairobi agenda. There 
had been no apparent disagreement on the desirabi lity of a consensual document – a Ministerial 
Declaration – as part of the outcomes for MC10. He had told participants that he would bring the 
discussions to the General Council. He had stressed the importance of not leaving the discussion about future work to the last minute to avoid the risk of having a chaotic process in Nairobi. He 
had been reassured by the participants. All of  them had expressed willingness to engage in 
negotiations in Geneva along the lines of what he had described, and they had underscored the need of discussing those issues with the wider Membership. 
1.12.  On 6 October, he had attended the G20 Trade Ministers meeting in Istanbul. Cabinet 
Secretary Amina Mohamed had also joined the meeting. He had set out the shape of the potential deliverables that had been discussed in Geneva and had posed two key questions: First, "was there a willingness to proceed on the basis of a package of specific issues which is DDA-minus – 
and therefore should we intensify our work on the more promising issues that I outlined earlier, 
without prejudice to the other items we were alre ady negotiating?" Second, "should we start work 
on a final Nairobi document immediately, without pr ejudice to the outcome of this exercise, either 
in terms of substance or format?" He had been pleased with the response. There had been strong 
support to begin working – in the negotiating groups – more intensively on a package of specific substantive outcomes for Nairobi, with a focus on areas where outcomes seemed more likely to be WT/GC/M/159 
 
- 4 - 
 
  successfully concluded. It had been however clear that work on the issues should not preclude 
work on other areas where some Members felt consensus could still be achievable.  
1.13.  He had cautioned Ministers that there was still a great deal of intensive work ahead if they 
were to narrow the gaps between positions and reach outcomes, even on the specific issues 
identified as part of the potential package. Mi nisters had also given their backing to a parallel 
discussion on the path of future work on unresolved Doha issues after Nairobi. No-one disagreed with the continuing central importance of development to the work – nor that core DDA issues 
which remained unresolved, such as agriculture, industrial goods and services, would continue to 
be an important part of the post-Nairobi discussion . Overall he thought a clear, high-level political 
message had emerged from the meeting – political  will existed among the important players to 
make Nairobi a success.  
1.14.  Drawing on all of the meetings and consultations, he said that while there was a potential 
package on the table it seemed that whatever Memb ers delivered in Nairobi, it would not be viable 
or credible to announce it as an agreed conclusion of the DDA single undertaking – this seemed to 
be a consensual view. In that scenario, the unavoidable question was: "what to do with the DDA 
issues that are not properly addressed in the Nairobi package?" There were divergent views on 
what would happen after Nairobi. Many said that if there was no consensus to end the Doha Round 
then it would simply continue – consensus would be needed to end it – and that it should be stated 
clearly. Others said that if they did not deliver  D o h a  b y  N a i r o b i  t h e n  t h a t  w o u l d  b e  i t  –  e v e n  
without a formal statement affirming the demise of the DDA. 
1.15.  Clearly the views were extremely difficult to reconcile. However, he thought Members could 
not disregard important commonalities when thin king about the way ahead. For example, he 
thought they all agreed that they wanted to deliver something in Nairobi and that it should be meaningful. Whatever they delivered would not be agreed to be the end of negotiations on the 
DDA issues. They were still ready to keep pursuing the core issues of the DDA and their 
development dimension after Nairobi – although there was no agreement on how to do it: whether under the DDA framework or a reformulated architecture. 
1.16.  The question was whether Members could – or whether they wanted – to capture those and 
other possible commonalities in a consensual text in Nairobi. They had a number of options in terms of the type of document that could result from MC10. It could be: a Ministerial Declaration, 
which was the usual type of document from such meetings; a non-consensual Chairperson’s 
statement, which was something they had done befo re; or a hybrid of some sort – it could be 
partly consensual text and partly non-consensual text.  
1.17.  Members arrived again at the question of how such a document could be produced. It was 
not a small challenge and it was important that they needed to think about the process that would 
allow them to find convergence on a satisfactory solution. He suggested that they started working 
on the basis that they would have a Ministerial Declaration that would take stock of the decisions 
taken at MC10 and that provided guidance on thei r future work. That would be without prejudice 
to what outcomes they would have in Nairobi, but it was important to start somewhere and to aim for the highest possible result.  
1.18.  He proposed to start a process that would lead Members to text-based negotiations on a 
Ministerial Declaration. There were still different views on what the process would look like and he 
would be informally consulting with Members on the matter. Whatever the process was they 
should bear some things in mind: the process should be progressive; it should be a bottom-up, 
transparent and inclusive process; it would not deal with substance – that would happen in the 
negotiating groups; and his instinct was that it should probably start with a focus on the post-Nairobi elements of the Declaration. Those were just his preliminary views. He would be holding 
consultations to hear Members' own views. 
1.19.  Through the various consultations over rece nt weeks, he thought Members had identified a 
road to success in Nairobi. There were many obstacles along the way but none were insurmountable. They had very little time remainin g. He thought they had a general sense of what 
could be on the table in terms of substantive deliv erables (though it was not a closed package, or 
a sure package) – Members should recognize that  agreement on the elements they were talking 
about would represent real progress. They would have a major economic and developmental WT/GC/M/159 
 
- 5 - 
 
  impact even though they should strive to do much more in the future. They needed to firm the 
process up with textual proposals that could be advanced through the negotiating groups.  
1.20.  The post-Nairobi conversation should take place at the same time. The two elements should 
move in parallel. Otherwise the differences they  already saw could compromise any chance of 
success on the substantive issues. 
1.21.  The representative of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, on behalf of the Arab Group, said that 
Members were at a critical stage in their work towards agreeing on MC10 outcomes. They should 
take responsibility of overcoming the difficulties in arriving at a common ground to ensure 
balanced and satisfactory results and make MC10 a success. The Arab Group would spare no efforts to make the goal achievable and was su pportive of any efforts that would expedite and 
accelerate the work and the preparations for MC10. In principle, if no convergence would be 
reached on the core DDA issues and the only possible option was to have a mini-package, then all 
the areas where convergence was at reach should be included and all the remaining DDA issues should be tackled post-Nairobi. As a rules-based organization, Members should respect all 
ministerial mandates especially the Doha Declaration – with the Doha negotiations remaining a 
Development Round. Whatever the outcome document would be, it should give Members a clear guidance on post-Nairobi work on all the remain ing DDA issues and ensure the completion of the 
Doha Round. The development dimension should remain the overarching principle of any future 
work program. The Arab Group reiterated its comm itment to the multilateral trading system and 
remained ready to engage constructively in the work ahead. 
1.22.  The representative of Kenya associated with  the statements to be made on behalf of the 
ACP, the G-33 and the African Group. Despite hard  work, the report by the Director-General had 
revealed that it could not be possible to agree on a comprehensive package on outstanding DDA issues before MC10. Notwithstanding the current situation, Kenya was hopeful that something 
would be delivered in Nairobi. Not having an outcome in Nairobi would be damaging to the 
credibility of the WTO, particularly its negotiating function. There was little time left considering that the details of the issues should be di scussed and agreed upon by the Members. Kenya 
therefore supported having a drafting group to immediately start working on the issues that the 
Director-General had identified as promising outcomes in Nairobi. 
1.23.  Kenya was looking forward to having a process that was transparent and inclusive, 
progressive and interactive and which allowed Members to monitor the progress in the drafting 
group and provided the opportunity to seek comp romises whenever required. Members needed to 
add more deliverables for MC10 and should strive to achieve credible, balanced and development-oriented outcomes for Nairobi. Work of the drafting group should proceed in parallel with 
discussions and consultations on other issues in the respective Negotiating Groups. The 
Chairpersons' consultations should also be complimented with the DG-led process as in the past – providing the opportunity of adding other issues on which consensus could be reached. What 
would happen after Nairobi on the rest of the issues should also form part of the package. 
Members should continue to work on core DDA issues. A forward-looking declaration that would give them hope and would ensure that the WTO pl ayed its central role in realizing the goals of 
development was expected. Core principles of S&DT and less than full reciprocity should remain 
fundamental and should be reaffirmed in the post-Nairobi agenda. 
1.24.  The type of document for MC10 should be a ministerial declaration on both the deliverables 
and the post–Nairobi agenda. Members could not celebrate the WTO's twentieth anniversary with a 
Chairperson's statement. A ministerial declaration would send out a clear message that the WTO 
was committed to the tenets of a multilateral trading system and that development was a central element of its future work. Kenya assured the Dire ctor-General of its support – confident in his 
leadership to advance work towards a successful and meaningful conclusion of MC10 in Nairobi. 
1.25.  The Director-General clarified that he had not proposed a drafting group but rather a 
drafting process. He would further consult with Members on the matter. 1.26.  The representative of Bangladesh, on behalf  of the LDCs, appreciated the proposal made by 
the Director-General to move the process forward with a view to having an outcome at Nairobi. 
Members were at a critical juncture. They only had two months left to come up with an outcome in Nairobi, but they could not yet make visible progress on substantive issues. It was important to WT/GC/M/159 
 
- 6 - 
 
  succeed in Nairobi since it would be the first WTO Ministerial Conference in Africa – the continent 
where majority of LDCs belonged to. They should therefore help each other out and redouble their efforts to reach consensus on a package with development as the centrepiece. 
1.27.  As emphasized in Paragraph 1.11 of the Bali Ministerial Declaration and reiterated in the 
General Council Decision of 27 November 2014, issues in the Bali Package where legally binding 
outcomes could not be achieved, including LDC is sues, would be prioritized. Building on them, 
Members could deliver a meaningful package for LDCs, comprising credible and legally binding 
outcomes on rules of origin, DFQF market access, LDC service waiver and cotton as well as S&DT 
and issues related to food security of LDCs, SPS and antidumping measures. The LDCs had noted 
with interest the Director-General's assessment on work towards a Nairobi outcome including a post-Nairobi track. They were keen to engage in  consultations on the matter in any forum. They 
valued the WTO's contribution in establishing a multilateral trading system based on balanced 
rules and trade liberalization. They had benefitted and would continue to benefit from the WTO through various rules and measures taken in their favour. They had high expectations from the 
DDA and hoped that it would significantly benefi t their Group. All DDA areas should thus have 
substantial and meaningful movement in their core elements focusing on development. 
1.28.  The LDCs welcomed the decision by the EIF Board and EIF Steering Committee for the 
adoption of the EIF Phase 2 from 2016 to 2022 and the launch of the EIF Phase 2 on 1 July, along 
with the EIF Pledging Conference to be held on th e margins of MC10. The EIF should be tailored to 
the developmental and needs context of LDCs. The EIF had demonstrated solid results so far, but 
there was more work to be done. The LDCs urge d donors to provide funding for phase 2 which 
would enable the momentum to continue and to timely move from commitments to the actual 
replenishment to avoid any disruption of the program scheduled to start on 1 January 2016. 
1.29.  The LDCs also welcomed the Director-General's decision to initiate discussions on the LDC 
submission on rules of origin led by Ambassador Steffen Smidt, whose role had been instrumental 
in resolving the LDC issues before the Bali Conf erence. They hoped that the process would give 
Members the opportunity to engage in construc tive discussion on the issue and to find a 
meaningful outcome for LDCs on rules of origin. The LDCs assured their fellow Members that they 
would be available to effectively and constructive ly engage in upcoming discussions to ensure an 
outcome at Nairobi under the Director-General's leadership and guidance. 
1.30.  The representative of Lesotho, on behalf of  the African Group, noted the African Ministers of 
Trade would meet on 19-20 October to consider issues under the TNC agenda item. The African 
Group had been party to numerous consultations on technical aspects of the DDA both within various structures of the WTO and with individual Members. An apparent stalemate with regard to 
making requisite breakthroughs in agriculture, NAMA and services needed no mention. A credible 
outcome would nonetheless be one that delivered in the three core DDA issues. 
1.31.  Agriculture remained important in addressing the developmental needs of the African 
Members. WTO should have an outcome in all three pillars of agriculture: domestic support, 
market access and export competition. Contrary  to views of other Members, the draft Rev.4 
modalities should form the basis of work in agriculture negotiations. To address the developmental objectives in agriculture, Members should aim for a substantial reduction in OTDS, flexible 
treatment of special products and SSM, flexibilities for LDCs, SVEs and NFIDCs and a timely 
solution on cotton. As mandated, they should also aim to reach a permanent solution for public stockholding for food security purposes by the end of 2015. 
1.32.  On NAMA, the principle of less than full reciprocity should be preserved. NAMA flexibilities 
contained in Rev.3 of the draft 2008 modalities for developing countries, LDCs and SVEs should be maintained. Some of the African Group Members fe ll under the category of the formula-applying 
countries. The Group would be prepared to consider the option of average tariff cuts, with a spread 
of differentiated targets for developed and developing countries. The African Group insisted that special circumstances of members in customs unions made up of developing countries, LDCs and SVEs should be effectively taken into account.  
1.33.  On Services, the flexibilities for developing countries and LDCs in the GATS should be 
preserved. The principles of S&DT and flexibilities contained in the GATS and the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration should be maintained in the negotiations.  WT/GC/M/159 
 
- 7 - 
 
  1.34.  Development issues were of key importance to the African Group. It would be unacceptable 
for the negotiations not to deliver a credible development outcome. The African Group and its G-90 partners had tabled agreement-specific proposals which, similar to the pursuits of the Group in the area of agriculture, sought among others to redress unjustifiable imbalance codified in various 
Uruguay Round agreements. For the African Group, development remained an important issue. 
The means to realize it had been embodied in th e Doha Declaration, the 2004 July Framework and 
the Bali Declaration. There should be no question on what would be the basis of post-Nairobi work.  
1.35.  It remained fundamental to ensure th at work was well-organized. The African Group 
expected a ministerial declaration anchored on Doha mandates in the Nairobi outcome document. Members should be particularly cautious on how they treated ongoing consultations as against the drafting of a declaration. They should avoid pr e-empting negotiations on technical issues under 
negotiations by virtue of turning their attention and energies on the declaration. That had not been 
the case in Bali and it should not be the case in Nairobi. They still had the S&DT proposals submitted by the G-90 under discussion, and other elements that had not yet been finalized. 
Whatever would be agreed in Nairobi should be completed in Geneva to avoid turning Nairobi into 
a negotiating ministerial. The issues of transparency, inclusiveness and bottom-up approach in the formulation of such a declaration could not be overemphasized. They should ensure that any 
drafting process involved all Members and wa s representative of everyone's concerns. 
1.36.  The African Group would engage constructively to ensure that Members achieved credible 
and commercially and economically meaningful development outcomes in Nairobi. The common good and their sense of responsibility would be indispensable ingredients to help them come up 
with such outcomes. There were huge aspirations among the African People that the WTO would 
prove itself to be an organization that served no t only the needs of the affluent Members but also 
those of the developing and LDC Members. Nairobi should count for development. 
1.37.  The representative of Australia, on behalf of the Cairns Group, was disappointed with the 
point that had been reached in the Doha Round agriculture negotiations. The fact that Members 
w e r e  b e i n g  t o l d  t h a t  n o  o u t c o m e s  o n  d o m e s t i c  s u p p o r t  o r  m a r k e t  a c c e s s  w e r e  d o a b l e  r a i s e d  
serious questions on the level of political will on the part of some Members to pursue reforms to 
agricultural trade from which all would benefit. Outcomes on agriculture should form part of a Nairobi package even if there was little time to deliv er outcomes in all three pillars of agriculture at 
MC10. The Cairns Group was committed to engaging in discussions aimed at delivering an 
outcome on export competition for Nairobi. Having regard to the Ministerial Declarations in Hong 
Kong and Bali, the Cairns Group hoped others would work with them in formulating disciplines for the pillar on the basis of and as close as possib le to the 2008 modalities (Rev.4). Achieving an 
ambitious outcome on export competition in Nair obi would be an important step forward but it 
would only be one step of many that needed to be taken in the reform of global agricultural trade. 
The Cairns Group therefore insisted that, whatever  outcomes Members achieved in Nairobi, they 
would continue their efforts to reform global agricultural trade in 2016 and beyond. That would 
require committing in Nairobi to ongoing discussions about all outstanding issues in the agriculture negotiations. 
1.38.  On behalf of Australia, he supported the approach proposed by the Director-General.  Time 
was too short to do anything else. Members should focus their efforts in Geneva over the short 
time left until MC10 on defining in detail a package of meaningful Nairobi outcomes – without prejudice to the ongoing concerns in many othe r areas of the Doha Round. The Director-General 
had often repeated the likely parameters of such a package for Nairobi. 
1.39.  Australia shared a number of the views expr essed by Members: there was no prospect of a 
comprehensive package of outcomes which would allow for a consensus decision to finish the Doha 
Round at MC10. The only package of outcomes for Nairobi which appeared to have any prospect of 
agreement was a narrower one, around export competition, LDC and development outcomes, and perhaps some additional transparency outcomes in areas such as rules, fisheries subsidies and domestic regulation. In addition to those area s, Members should be working to define other 
positive outcomes for Nairobi, including implementation of the trade facilitation agreement, 
accepting new Members of the WTO, finalizing the expansion of the Information Technology 
Agreement (ITA) and delivering on the enviro nmental goods agreement (EGA) negotiations. 
1.40.  All Members wanted to see a WTO negotiating function post-Nairobi that could produce 
outcomes for the benefit of all Members – including those DDA issues which they would not resolve WT/GC/M/159 
 
- 8 - 
 
  by Nairobi. Australia supported beginning a process as soon as possible which would lead to the 
drafting of a narrative for post-Nairobi work. Th e process would not be easy given some of the 
different views on post-Nairobi but Australia wanted to start early and see how far Members could go for the good of the broader WTO system. 
1.41.  The representative of Barbados, on behalf of  the ACP Group, said that it was imperative that 
Members avoided a simple Chairman's summary, which alone was typically associated with a low 
outcome at WTO Ministerial Conferences. There was ample material available that would make it 
doable to achieve a development-focused and successful outcome in Nairobi and to warrant 
ministerial texts as had been done in Bali. On a drafting group, the ACP welcomed the emerging 
view of not wanting to be in the situation faced in Bali where the clearly defined work on core areas to conclude the DDA had been handled in th e eleventh hour at the Ministerial Conference 
itself. However, the establishment of any drafting  group should be prefaced by consensus of the 
Membership on the elements for inclusion in the De claration. Its terms of reference should be clear 
and simple. The criteria for participation should be representational and inclusive. The Group was 
concerned about a process that would not result in the full representation of their Members and 
required clarification from the Director-General on any past practice of setting up a drafting group and how well the approach had fared.  
1.42.  The ACP reiterated that Members should maintain the commitment to a transparent, 
inclusive, consensus-based and Member-driven proc ess. The Group had been actively contributing 
to the WTO process and negotiations, delivering on  proposals that had aided convergence in the 
Membership at critical times since the lead up to Bali. In 2015, the ACP had continued to do so by 
signalling its constructive engagement and interests in advancing bridging ideas, in agriculture, 
NAMA and services, not only because the ACP members were trying to be good citizens of the WTO to aid their major players in their efforts to sort out their differences, but also because they should 
play a part to respond to their export interests in all pillars of the core negotiating areas.    
1.43.  However, the ACP Group was greatly concerned about the principle approaches for Nairobi, 
which had yielded pronouncements about a "mini-pa ckage" that was not based on proposals from 
all developing countries – approaches that were cherry picking among developing countries 
including LDCs. A core element of the ACP's Bridging Gaps paper, introduced to the TNC at the end of July, was a development package for Nairobi ca refully enunciated in the document. Yet, there 
had been no talk of a development component of  the DDA that included the ACP's offensive and 
defensive interests. The ACP submission in document JOB/TNC/50 outlined the Group's precise 
views about a package in Nairobi, which was not about a "mini-package" designed by only a few Members but a "development package" for all developi ng countries in keeping with the spirit of the 
development dimension of the Doha Development Round. 
1.44.  As a minimum, the ACP had listed its ideas where other developing countries could add 
theirs. First, the Group had asked for Ministerial agreement that the flexibilities found in the 2008 
draft negotiating texts were locked in together with the principle that should the formula be 
changed, the flexibilities would be adjusted in a manner that would not create a disproportionate result to undermine the flexibilities. Second, there should be affirmation of all of the flexibilities in the GATS and services modalities, including those found in all ministerial declarations and 
Annex C. Third, the ACP included concrete decisi ons on the G-90 S&DT Proposals that had been 
lingering in the DDA for almost two decades – that work was underway in the good leadership of Ambassador Yee Woan in the CTD-SS. Fourth, the ACP included agreement on binding decisions 
for LDCs, which the LDC Group was preparing to roll out in the end of October. Fifth, there should 
be a binding and concrete agreement on cotton, with the C-4's proposal being forwarded soon. Sixth, there should be a minimum developmental and food security decision on fisheries subsidies. 
Seventh, there should be the establishment of a new working group on Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs) 
under the auspices of the Council for Trade in G oods (CTG) that would enable the WTO to examine 
all crosscutting NTBs that had plagued developing countries beyond the narrow mandates found in 
the NAMA negotiations so far. In addition, the ACP required clear recognition at Nairobi that 
Members would continue their commitment to address all core areas of the DDA and to complete 
the Round with the fullest result commensurate with their expectations in agriculture, NAMA and services, as well as other remaining areas in the DDA not yet addressed. 
1.45.  The ACP insisted that any drafting, if agreed by all Members, should include the ACP's full 
participation and inputs. The ACP was concerned that the proposals it had advanced in its July paper on a practical and doable development package were not being considered. It was the first WT/GC/M/159 
 
- 9 - 
 
  proposal from a large group of Members repres enting nearly two-thirds of the Membership. 
Members should not lose sight of what their Ministers had had envisaged at the DDA's launch, "to ensure that developing countries, and especially  the least-developed among them, secure a share 
in the growth of world trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development". The 
ACP urged the Director-General and all Members to examine the ACP proposals in JOB/TNC/50, 
include the ACP in the drafting process, and full y engage with the ACP on the texts that would 
form part of a successful development package in Nairobi – one that would lend credibility to the 
pronouncements that Nairobi would deliver on development for all developing countries. 
1.46.  The representative of Indonesia, on behalf  of the G-33, said that it was important that 
Members ensured balanced and credible outcomes in Nairobi that delivered development for all 
developing Members to comply with the mandate Ministers had given in Doha. He said that critical 
development issues such as SP, SSM, and Public Stockholding, which gained support from a large 
number of developing Members, were the most suitable balancing elements for the outcomes. The reluctance of some developed Member subsidizers to make meaningful reforms even further 
justified the need to have an operable and effective trade-remedy tool through SSM. The G-33 
urged Members to re-intensify engagement on SSM. Members should remain committed to having a comprehensive conclusion of the Doha Round  and ensure a commitment to continuing the 
discussion on the remaining DDA issues after Nairob i following the ministerial decisions, mandates 
and framework established since Doha in 2001. In finding a permanent solution for public 
stockholding for food security purposes in sepa rate Dedicated Sessions, the G-33 remained open 
to discussing options to address the likelihood of unintended consequences under the permanent 
s o l u t i o n  a s  p r o p o s e d  b y  G - 3 3  i n  d o c u m e n t  J O B / A G / 2 7 .  T o  d r a w  M e m b e r s '  a t t e n t i o n  o n  t h o s e  
crucial elements, on 5 October 2015 the G-33 had circulated a submission in document TN/AG/GEN/37 which accentuated the need to reaffirm development perspectives at MC10 and 
post-Nairobi. The Group looked forward to frui tful discussions on agriculture DDA issues as 
Members geared up for meaningful, balanced, and development-oriented outcomes in Nairobi. 
1.47.  The representative of Chinese Taipei, on behalf of the RAMs Group, continued to believe 
that Members could and should deliver a meaningful outcome in Nairobi, without prejudice to the 
single undertaking principle. Despite the absence of visible signs of any convergence among the main pillars in the Doha negotiations, the RAMs Group accepted that it would be prudent to get started on all the necessary preparations given th e current time constraints. The Group wished to 
see a small group of Members soon to start drafting a ministerial document, setting out possible 
outcomes for MC10 and a post-Nairobi Agenda. As to the composition of the drafting group, the 
RAMs Group suspected it would be quite a challenge for Members to reach consensus within a 
short period of time and probably be even more ch allenging to agree on the terms of reference. In 
an attempt to be realistic, the General Council Chairman, together with the Director-General, as the head of the Secretariat, should play a leading role in preparing a draft ministerial document, 
with assistance from the Secretariat, and in consultation with the proposed small group. Given the 
high stakes associated with the outcome of the wo rk, the RAMs should be represented in the small 
group. The three key principles of full participation, inclusiveness and transparency should be followed in the process at all times. 
1.48.  The ministerial document should provide clear guidance on how to continue future work on 
all pending DDA issues after Nairobi. All mandates from the DDA negotiations should also be recognized and reaffirmed in such a document. The RAMs had made exceptionally deep and 
extensive commitments in the course of their accession processes making them differently 
situated from the Original Members of the organi zation. The RAMs Group expected that the gap in 
commitment levels between them and the original WTO Members should be significantly narrowed 
after the conclusion of the current Round. It was totally unreasonable for the RAMs to accept the 
scenario that they had not gained some reward from the DDA for the high price all RAMs had paid in the form of exceptionally deep concessions upon accession.  
1.49.  The representative of Honduras, on behalf of the IGDC, supported the Director-General's 
proposal for a small group to begin work on a declaration for MC10 in Nairobi. The drafting process 
should be conducted in a transparent and inclusive manner and the declaration should comprise a post-Nairobi component. The declaration should also focus on achievable outcomes, without 
prejudice to the Single Undertaking principle in paragraph 47 of the Doha Declaration, even if 
those would result in the finalization of a smalle r package of outcomes than initially envisaged. WT/GC/M/159 
 
- 10 - 
 
  1.50.  The representative of Mali, on behalf of  the C-4, aligned with the statements made on 
behalf of the African, ACP and LDC Groups and fully subscribed to the declarations made by Kenya 
on what to expect in Nairobi. In the few weeks before the commencement of MC10 in Nairobi, the 
C-4 said that no notable new facts had been recorded. Nevertheless, the Group could still 
recognize that there was some political will. The proposal that had been made concerning the 
implementation of a working group was a proposal that could be accepted by the C-4 as long as 
that process would bring Members to having a draft ministerial declaration in Nairobi. The C-4 
reiterated its will to make progress and announced that the C-4 proposal would be available soon.3 
1.51.  The representative of Guatemala, on behalf of the SVEs, reiterated the SVEs' commitment 
on having a successful MC10 in Nairobi. On a possible ministerial declaration, the SVEs would 
support a successful conclusion of the Conference with an agreed ministerial declaration as long as 
the declaration contained a clear commitment to continue the negotiations on the pending issues 
of the DDA. Any future work on DDA issues should consider the special flexibilities that had been widely recognized for the SVEs – in particular, the ones contained in Rev.4 for Agriculture, Rev.3 
for NAMA, and the flexibilities afforded to developi ng countries in GATS Article XIX:2 for services, 
where the process of liberalization should ta ke place with due respect for national policy 
objectives, the level of development and the size of economies of individual Members. 
1.52.  The SVEs would support the creation of a small group for drafting the Nairobi Ministerial 
Declaration as long as it had clear parameters and a defined mandate that the small group would follow while drafting the declaration. The comp osition of the small group was important and it 
should be representative and balanced and ensure  transparency and inclusiveness. The SVEs were 
also ready to consider a small package of deliverable as an ultimate option provided that it was 
tied to a commitment to continue the negotiation on the pending DDA issues based on the mandate and principles agreed to launch the Doha Round, the July 2004 Framework and the Hong 
Kong Ministerial Declaration. However, the Group wished to have clarity on the content of such 
small package - in particular, the three elements  that were proposed for the package including 
what the element of "transparency" would constitute. The SVEs reiterated that they considered 
development to be in a broader perspective and that a minimum package would not be sufficient 
to fulfil the development focus of the round. They stood ready to engage in further discussions in order to have an acceptable outcome at the Ministerial Conference in Nairobi. 
1.53.  The representative of Egypt endorsed the statements made on behalf of the Arab and the 
African Groups. The multilateral trading system was the main vehicle for reaching and securing an 
inclusive and effective global trading regime – a regime that had become more relevant and important in light of endorsing the Post 2015 Agen da that had defined trade as one of the main 
enablers for achieving sustainable development and the SDGs. Members had succeeded just a 
couple of years ago in reaching an agreement within the multilateral trading system on trade facilitation which represented an important milest one in ensuring that the system worked and in 
giving hope to moving forward. Development was the second pillar in the multilateral trading 
system as reflected in the Doha outcome and in  the preamble of the Marrakech Agreement. The 
collective re-affirmation and acknowledgment of the importance of a development-oriented global approach to trade was an important factor for formulating the approach to the MC10 outcome. 
1.54.  Egypt shared the belief that MC10 in Nairobi – the first to be held in Africa – should be 
successful. Development should remain at the core of the MC10 outcomes to ensure a meaningful 
integration of all Members into the global economy. Nairobi represented a critical juncture for the 
WTO and the rules-based system it represented to  multilateral trade. The WTO could only be 
relevant in the future if Members were capable of honouring their past commitments by reaching a successful conclusion of the Doha Round and its mandate. The only way Members could converge 
on their differences was through sitting down and working seriously on a text that through 
negotiations would be acceptable to all. Egypt fully supported the proposal made by the Director-General to initiate a drafting exercise of elemen ts of an outcome document for Nairobi. Such an 
exercise should be representative of all groupi ngs in the organization whether geographic or 
thematic. It could draw some elements encompa ssing what Members could agree upon by Nairobi 
and what would need more time – constituting a po st-Nairobi work program. As for the timeframe, 
the drafting exercise should deliver as soon as possible for Members to start deliberating on such 
elements as a basis for the Ministerial Declaration given the eight weeks left before MC10. 
                                               
3 The proposal was subsequently circulated in document TN/AG/GEN/38 – TN/AG/SCC/GEN/14 and 
TN/AG/GEN/38/Add.1 – TN/AG/SCC/GEN/14/Add.1. WT/GC/M/159 
 
- 11 - 
 
  1.55.  To materialize the development dimension, Members should fulfil the Doha mandate that 
"…all special and differential treatment provisions shall be reviewed with a view to strengthening them and making them more precise, effective and operational." The G-90 had put on the table a 
modest proposal comprising only 25 provisions. Egypt urged Members to engage constructively on 
the negotiations in the CTD-SS with the aim of de livering on the subject. Agriculture remained the 
most trade-distorted sector in the context of WT O rules, thus requiring serious reform. The draft 
modalities of 2008 represented the only basis achieved among Members for further work in this 
area. Any possible deliverable on export competitio n should outline future work on the domestic 
support pillar without prejudging the outcome of such negotiations. It should entail substantial reduction of trade-distorting domestic support incl uding strict disciplines on "box-shifting" towards 
Green Box measures to ensure that the measures were truly minimally or non-trade distorting. 
The scope of work on the two other pillars should  be clarified before embarking on the market 
access pillar. Market Access was not only about tariff reduction. It also dealt with other sensitive areas to developing countries especially to NFI DCs and LDCs. MC10 should provide an outcome to 
boost negotiations on the unfinished business under the Doha Agenda and not to be seen as an 
attempt to remove the life support it had been enjoying since 2008 or probably since mid-2003. Egypt remained committed to work constructively  in achieving progress that safeguarded the 
integrity of the multilateral trading system and strengthened the agreed principles particularly 
those aiming at achieving an inclusive and sustainable development and prosperity for all. 
1.56.  The representative of Brazil regretted that that was how poorly Members had lived up to the 
commitments made by all of them at the turn of th e century. Brazil was especially frustrated – like 
many others – with the fact that Members had not yet begun to concretely address the crux of the 
immense distortions in agricultural trade: domestic support, which they could only deal with at the WTO, and the multiple and still growing barriers to market access for agriculture products. 
Entrenched protectionism in agriculture continue d to hamper progress in the organization and 
Members continued to have a multilateral tradin g system heavily skewed to the detriment of 
agriculture, and therefore to the detriment of development. In Bali, Members had accepted to 
harvest a limited package of results but had also agreed to come back to Geneva and deal with the 
remaining core issues of the Round: agricultur e, NAMA, services and development. One more 
mutual promise apparently would be broken, one more in a series: with agriculture always as the main victim of recurrent hit-and-run. That was what really compromised the credibility of the 
organization's work and undermined trust among each other. 
1.57.  Despite all the broken promises made to each other and to the world, Members would have 
to renew their commitment to keep working on the crucial core issues they could be unable to 
tackle by MC10 – a sine qua non  condition. In order to consider joining a consensus for an 
eventual limited outcome in Nairobi, there should be a collective commitment to carry on with their work beginning in January in the areas where real negotiation and agreement could be 
postponed. As Brazil had made clear in Istanb ul, the commitment and the substantive agreements 
Members could reach in Nairobi were two inseparable parts of the same package. Commitment at MC10 should take the form of a Ministerial Declar ation. In the absence of a credible way ahead, 
Brazil could not assure that it would be able to accept a limited result in Nairobi. That was Brazil's 
position, following consultations within its government and with broader interested constituencies. 
Brazil, its stakeholders and public opinion could definitely not accept the notion that the most 
important objectives of Members' work could simply be abandoned. 
1.58.  Since Brazil needed absolute clarity in that regard to consider joining a possible consensus 
i n  N a i r o b i ,  i t  s t r o n g l y  a g r e e d  t h a t  M e m b e r s  s h o u l d  b e g i n  t o  w o r k  o n  b o t h  t r a c k s  a s  s o o n  a s  possible: on the areas of attempted substantive ag reement, as well as on discussing and drafting 
the basis for a Ministerial Declaration. In the past, Members had been asked to accept dealing with 
"new issues" in order for them to easily move ahead with agriculture and the other core areas. 
Trade Facilitation had been one of them. They ha d delivered on that but not on agriculture – the 
core area. Members should not be asked again to "pay" in advance in the form of including new 
issues for negotiation before they could even begi n to deal with the old ones. Those who had been 
there before would not accept that storyline one more time. They could continue to reflect on such issues on a forward-looking exploratory basis – as was done with e-commerce – but not as an 
added part to the negotiating agenda that they had been chronically unable to deal with. They 
should not overload their cart and push its cranky wheels further into the mud. 
1.59.  Some restraint should be exercised in using the argument of how urgent and essential the 
new issues were for the WTO's good and its relevance. Those who were convinced they were WT/GC/M/159 
 
- 12 - 
 
  urgent and important should be prepared first to  assume the same sense of urgency and relevance 
regarding the older themes, particularly agricultur e. Brazil was prepared to immediately get down 
to work, on the possible substantive agreements an d on a ministerial declaration with a clear and 
credible post-Nairobi commitment. Given Members'  track record of unfulfilled promises, such 
credibility would require political commitment of a kind that their societies could begin to believe in 
– that part of the package would be the indispensable condition for the other one. 
1.60.  The representative of South Africa supported  the statements made on behalf of the African, 
Cairns, G-90 and ACP Groups. The Director-General's report had clearly identified the key issues 
that all Members would need to take up in the coming weeks. With the limited time left to MC10, it was clear that Members needed to quicken the pace of their work if they were to make Nairobi the success that they all sought. They should conver ge soon and reach agreement on what outcomes 
would be delivered in Nairobi. They needed clarit y on how they would pick up negotiations on the 
remaining issues after MC10. They should see if they could capture all of those in a ministerial 
declaration that should be completed in Geneva – before leaving for Nairobi. As part of the 
outcomes for Nairobi, there was clearly a consen sus that they should deliver on a package of 
measures in favour of LDCs. South Africa supported such an outcome but that package should be acceptable to LDCs themselves. South Africa would be looking for a signal from the LDCs that the 
Package would meet their expectations. South Africa could also accept an outcome on export 
competition provided it would not go beyond Rev.4 and it would contain disciplines that ensured that food aid would not undermine domestic and regional production. On transparency, the South 
African Minister signalled at the G20 Trade Ministers meeting in Istanbul that South Africa would 
not accept any transparency provisions that imposed new and unduly onerous administrative 
burdens and that intruded further on its domestic policy-making processes. 
1.61.  What Members would be able to deliver at MC10 in Nairobi remained an open question. With 
the apparent inevitability of a small package of  outcomes at MC10, no one would be able to 
credibly claim that the Doha Round negotiations had been concluded. There was no legal basis for any Member or group of Members to declare th e Doha Round over. In Members' most recent 
exchanges, they all recognized that negotiations  would need to continue after Nairobi but there 
were also differences on how they would proceed. They should consider when and how to begin the process of drafting the ministerial declaratio n to capture the state of affairs in a text. An 
agreed Ministerial Declaration would signal a successful Conference. They should aim to finalize 
the Ministerial Declaration in Geneva ahead of MC 10. Work on the Ministerial Declaration should 
start soon. In delivering an agreed text, they should construct a transparent, participatory and inclusive drafting process with full multilateral oversight. That would be essential to give all 
Members the confidence that would be needed to advance the process. In the short time they had 
left before Nairobi, their work on al l those matters should be accelerated. 
1.62.  The representative of Jamaica, on behalf of the CARICOM, associated with the statements 
made on behalf of the ACP and SVE Groups. CARICOM acknowledged with regret the current 
circumstances that rendered the possibility of atta ining significant outcomes on the DDA in Nairobi 
unlikely. CARICOM underlined the importance of re-doubling efforts to ensure that nevertheless, meaningful outcomes were secured in developm ent and LDC issues, areas of agriculture where 
progress could be made and other areas that were of significant interest to Members. Regardless 
of what would happen in the Nairobi process, it was vitally important for CARICOM that the approach reflected in the modalities which had been developed regarding SVE flexibilities remained 
part of the acquis in the House. With that in mind and recognizing that the unfinished business of 
the DDA had to be spoken to, CARICOM expected appropriate recognition of the important understanding on addressing SVE issues in the WTO to be reflected in any agreed outcome 
document. Members should have a clear understanding of the way forward post-Nairobi, reflected 
appropriately in an outcome document for MC10. CARICOM was open to suggestions made for a transparent, focused and efficient mechanism for developing a possible Nairobi Declaration. 
1.63.  The representative of the European Union said that given that a comprehensive Doha deal 
was unattainable in view of the lack of readiness of some to contribute to an outcome on domestic 
support, Members needed to tackle two fundamen tal questions. Firstly, what could Members 
deliver in Nairobi. The European Union was growing uncertain whether much could be done, 
though the G20 had urged them to deliver. The EU  could agree with the ideas presented by the 
TNC Chairman and pursue an outcome centred on ex port competition, transparency disciplines and 
development subject to Members arriving at a balanced outcome. The EU was willing and ready to WT/GC/M/159 
 
- 13 - 
 
  engage fully and immediately through the channels  of the negotiating groups to forge a solid 
Nairobi package. 
1.64.  On export competition, all four components needed to be addressed in a balanced way. The 
EU believed that Rev.4 was the right starting po int for Members' discussion. On transparency, the 
EU believed that they should seek transparen cy outcomes in as many areas as possible. 
Transparency in rules, domestic regulation, agriculture (Annex M) and NTBs had all been mentioned recently. The EU was ready to work in that direction. Members all agreed on the need 
to achieve a meaningful outcome on development. They  should focus, first of all, on the issues of 
greatest interest for LDCs: cotton, DFQF, rules of origin and the services waiver were all areas where meaningful outcomes could be achieved. The EU remained concerned by current proposals on S&DT. Only if they focused on proposals (1) ai med at addressing real problems encountered by 
the most vulnerable economies, primarily LDCs, in their integration in global trade, and (2) which 
would not open loopholes in the basic WTO rules, would they be able to make progress. The EU 
reiterated its call for realism to proponents and its availability to engage constructively. 
1.65.  Secondly, Members should prepare and agree on a clear vision for post-Nairobi work. The 
EU called upon Members to be realistic. If they  could not reach agreement on the core DDA issues 
in the last fourteen years and over the last tw o years when they had considered significantly 
recalibrated approaches – that did not inspire confidence in their ability to advance on the same 
basis in the future. Hence, while the EU agreed that negotiations should continue post-Nairobi on certain key DDA issues, Members needed to consider new approaches which allowed them to advance. In the absence of openness to consider such new approaches, no one would consider the 
DDA as a negotiating process able to deliver any longer and the WTO's negotiating function as 
such would remain paralyzed in its entirety. The post-Nairobi vision should remain open regarding the parallel exploration of possible negotiations on other issues which were of interest to traders 
worldwide. That would herald a new era for the WTO and would help put the organization back into 
the centre of trade rule-making. Otherwise, those issues could simply be taken forward elsewhere. 
The EU welcomed the Director-General's initiative to start the process that led to a text-based 
negotiation on the future Ministerial Declaration which should focus as a first priority on the text 
on post-Nairobi. The process was indispensable but it should be parallel to and not hold hostage 
the negotiations of the Nairobi package itself. Sequencing of the post-Nairobi and the Nairobi package was a sure recipe for failure given that Members had less than ten weeks before them. 
1.66.  The representative of Morocco associated with the statement made on behalf of the African 
and the Arab Groups. Morocco expressed its grave concern and its frustration regarding the 
current state of the WTO negotiations given the few weeks left before MC10. Since the Bali 
Conference, Morocco had engaged constructively with all Members on the implementation of all the 
Bali Ministerial Decisions including on the prepar ation of a clearly defined work program on the 
remaining DDA issues as mandated in paragraph 1.11 of the Bali Declaration. It had also shown its 
commitment to devising the contours of a concrete, credible, fair and consensual outcome for the 
Nairobi Ministerial. Unfortunately, Members had not yet been able to meet those objectives. 
1.67.  Despite the rather bleak outlook, there was still some hope. Members shared a common 
objective: the Ministerial Conference in Kenya should deliver a result. The cost of failure was too 
high to contemplate as it would compromise not only the Doha Round but also the WTO itself as a 
key rule-making institution for the multilateral trading system. Morocco did not think anyone was prepared to take responsibility for such a failure.  They had no choice but to persevere and step up 
their efforts. As the WTO celebrated its twentieth anniversary, Morocco refused to be a simple 
spectator – standing by as the system disintegrated into exclusive subsystems that altered its original nature and priorities. Morocco urged them to be more reasonable to preserve a system 
that was useful to the international community.  
1.68.  Given the work done over the past few months and delegations' expectations and red lines 
being well-known, it could be possible to reach consensus in the remaining period provided that all the parties commit to a negotiating process aimed at achieving convergence. Members did not 
need a miracle. Real political will to succeed would be enough. At the 18 September meeting, the 
Director-General had told Members that the potential emerging deliverables for the Nairobi Conference could include an LDC package and development outcomes, outcomes on export 
competition in agriculture, and a number of provisions to improve transparency in several issues 
being negotiated. That should form their work agenda in the lead up to Nairobi. In the long run, the WTO negotiations should aim to eliminate remaining distortions in areas of interest – WT/GC/M/159 
 
- 14 - 
 
  agriculture and the manufacturing industry, which had a large labour force and continued to be 
crucial areas for developing countries like Morocco. To properly overcome the remaining obstacles, the new dynamic should be encouraged in the nego tiations and rhetoric should be abandoned in 
favour of dealing with specific issues whic h was what had disappeared from the WTO.  
1.69.  In facing the new deadlock, Morocco maintained a consensual and solution-finding position. 
It was ready to join Members to ensure success in Nairobi and assert the primacy of the multilateral trading system and the WTO as a pre-eminent forum for trade negotiations. Members 
should therefore renew their efforts to show solidarity and avoid any division that could jeopardize 
WTO's cohesiveness. Morocco welcomed the Director-General's proposal and was ready to contribute to the process. If, in the absence of convergence between the Members on key DDA 
issues, the only option was a mini-package covering LDC and development issues, Morocco would 
not oppose the package provided that all the outstanding DDA issues were addressed after 
Nairobi. As a rules-based organization, mandates and ministerial decisions governed the WTO. Members should thus respect all the ministerial mandates – in particular the Doha mandate and 
the whole of the Doha Round as a development round. The MC10 outcome document should be a 
Ministerial Declaration giving clear direction on post-Nairobi work including all outstanding DDA issues and ensuring the conclusion of the Doha Round. Any solution should be negotiated in 
Geneva in a transparent manner by all Members before being presented to the Ministers in Nairobi. 
The process should be guided by the key principles of transparency, inclusiveness and predictability. 
1.70.  The multilateral trading system in general and the WTO in particular were at the crossroads. 
Members could either ensure they progressed in a spirit of shared values and enhanced 
cooperation or they would run the risk of seeing their decline. Without close cooperation and collaboration among all Members, the impasse would remain a dangerous reality. They could not 
afford to wait for better days to come. Agreeing to do nothing would make matters worse. 
Together, they should be bolder and rise to the challenge. The success of the system agreed on in 
Marrakesh in 1994 would depend on the wisdom with which it was implemented and taken 
forward. It would only be possible if they had the wisdom, determination, courage and clarity of 
those who had shown them the way twenty years ago. 
1.71.  The representative of China associated with  the statements made on behalf of the G-33 and 
the RAMs Group. Members should work hard to  achieve a credible, balanced and development-
oriented outcome and issue a ministerial declaration that was conducive to strengthening the 
multilateral trading system at MC10. It was advisabl e to initiate the drafting work of a Ministerial 
Declaration. Work should not however draw from groundless thoughts or subjective orientation but 
should be based on the progress and consensus of  negotiations on substance among Members.  
1.72.  The drafting of the declaration should in no circumstances deny or change the Doha 
Mandate. The Doha Round had been going on for fourteen years and remarkable progress had 
been achieved. Unless there was an explicit consensus among all Members to end the Doha 
Round, the Doha Round should continue after Nairobi not only with the remaining issues but also together with its architecture. When Members looked forward beyond Nairobi, they should allow themselves to discuss some new issues such as investment and e-commerce on an exploratory 
basis, not on the same mode as or a tr ade-off with the remaining DDA issues.  
1.73.  Given the short period of time, China did not think it would be possible to reach any 
consensus on composition of the drafting process independent of the existing architecture. As the 
TNC Chairman, with the neutrality and Members' full trust, the Director-General was responsible to 
lead the drafting process and hold confessionals with Members in the preparations for the ministerial declaration. 
1.74.  The representative of Uganda aligned with  the statement made by the LDCs and the G-33. 
Uganda was in favour of an LDC package. The on ly question was on its content. Going forward, 
Members should engage in the actual drafting of  potential outcomes for Nairobi so that they 
avoided repeating themselves at every occasion. Ug anda cautioned that LDC issues as adopted in 
Bali could not be harvested in their current form . There had to be value addition. Those issues 
were well-known as had been well articulated by the LDCs. On the issue of what to do with the rest of the DDA, some had said Nairobi was the end of the DDA. Some had whispered the 
possibility of Nairobi being the launch of a new roun d. Others had questioned the utility of a small 
package. A small but critical group of the Membersh ip had proposed that some form of discussions WT/GC/M/159 
 
- 15 - 
 
  would continue on some elements such as domestic supports in agriculture and preserve a limited 
number of some widely held principles.  
1.75.  Uganda had been at the forefront at urging the Director-General and the Members to 
consider a two-track approach. Uganda apprec iated and welcomed the Director-General's 
leadership on the matter. The proposal he had laid before Members would give all of them – the 
developed, developing and least-developed – the o pportunity to participate in shaping the future 
they wanted. The process would give them clarity and predictability. It would not be the way it had 
been in Bali where a declaration had been impose d on them. Uganda supported the idea of a small 
working group but would wish to be consulted on the "Friends of the Chair" who would lead the 
process. The "Friends" should also include a representative from the LDCs. The idea was to go beyond mere geographical station to the strength  of ideas that the "Friends" represented in the 
House. A Ministerial Declaration more than anything else would afford all Members an opportunity 
to marshal support for the package to the extent that they had faith that issues of critical importance to them would be handled post-Nairobi.  
1.76.  Uganda had heard some messages of re-assurance that discussions would continue in some 
shape or form on issues of interest to developing countries such as on development, domestic support in agriculture and others. Uganda had also heard that principles such as S&DT and less 
than full reciprocity should be preserved. Members had even pledged declarations of public 
commitment and Uganda welcomed those messages. However, no amount of reassurance could be substantive enough to replace the mandates. Was it realistic or doable to ask poor countries to set aside mandates agreed upon by Ministers starting from Doha, Hong Kong, July Framework, and 
Bali and to simply depend on hope? If major powers could turn against the mandates which had 
been codified through painstaking and nail-biting negotiations, how about mere voluntary and non-binding "commitments"? Uganda was reluctant to go along the perilous path.  
1.77.  The unfairness of suggesting that times ha d changed and that the mandates were outdated 
was worth acknowledging. At the UN Security Council, a 1945 construct still operated on the same principles with the same actors as it had been back in 1945 despite the persistent calls for reform. 
It was therefore not accurate to posit that 2001 was such a long time ago. That argument would 
have merited serious attention if LDCs had had secured a share in the growth in international trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development. Had Members put the needs and interests of developing countries and LDCs at the heart of the work program? Had they undertaken 
that fundamental reform promised in Paragraph 13 of the Doha Declaration? Had they ensured 
that LDCs secured a share in international trade? Uganda answered on the negative. 
1.78.  LDCs' share of world merchandise trade was only 1.24% with a trade deficit of 60.6bn USD. 
252 million people lived in hunger. Only 31% of the rural populations had access to improved 
sanitation facilities. 58% had access to improved  drinking water sources. 79% lacked access to 
electricity. 91% lacked access to modern fuels. In 2014, the GNI per capita for LDCs had been 
US$915 compared to US$44,290 for high-income countries. 400 million lived on less than one USD 
a day. The LDCs suffered enormous health burdens both of communicable and non-communicable diseases. Despite the above, the organization s eemed unresponsive to the needs of the poorest 
and weakest Members of the system. They were sti ll grappling with what could be done on the so-
called LDC specific issues promised since 2001, reaf firmed in Hong Kong and watered down in Bali. 
How could Members then consider it to be mission accomplished? 
1.79.  It was important that as Members tried to  fashion an outcome that they could sell as a 
development outcome to Africa, it had to be one with concrete deliverables. It should be one that 
spoke to addressing issues of poverty and unemployment. History would judge them too harshly if the DDA got buried in Africa – a place it had been meant to help develop. The organization should 
play its part in responding to the theme of tr ansforming the world in the post-2015 Development 
Agenda by contributing to a world free of poverty, hunger, disease and want – where all life could thrive. If they wanted to provide a package, however modest, it should be one that would pass the real test of it being a development package. Uganda however did not see how it would meet that 
test without an outcome in agriculture consistent with Paragraph 13 of the Doha Ministerial 
Declaration or without a promise of dealing with such issues post-Nairobi. 
1.80.  The representative of India aligned with th e statement made by Indonesia on behalf of the 
G-33. The WTO would be holding its Ministerial Conference for the first time in Africa. It should be 
Members' collective effort to make it a success and to fulfil the DDA's development promise. WT/GC/M/159 
 
- 16 - 
 
  Members were in a critical phase of the negotiations and the countdown to Nairobi had begun. 
India had consistently held that a comprehensive and balanced outcome in all the three core negotiating areas – agriculture, NAMA and services, and internally in all three pillars of agriculture, even if it was a downward recalibration of ambition, was a necessary condition for fulfilling the 
development mandate of the Round. They should continue their efforts to reach as close as 
possible to that result at Nairobi. There were however indications that, currently, convergence could be feasible only on a small set of issues. Nevertheless, there should be no presumption on 
what the small set would constitute. That there was convergence on a certain set of issues should 
not be taken for granted. Credibility and balance of the package would be essential for the success in Nairobi.  
1.81.  Another critical success factor for Nairobi would be the terms on which Members decided to 
advance the remaining DDA issues should it be difficult to achieve consensus on a comprehensive 
set of outcomes. Nairobi in such a situation could not be either the conclusion or the end of the DDA. India believed that multilateral negotiations such as those envisaged under the DDA were an 
ongoing process especially when they were aimed at addressing existing inequities in the trading 
system. The framework provided by the DDA was a valuable component for attaining that goal and should continue to anchor the deliberations on the remaining DDA issues. S&D treatment was an 
integral component of all pillars of the negotiations. Any calls for changing the existing WTO legal 
paradigm and seeking further stratification among developing countries would not be conducive for 
advancing work and could complicate the negotiating process immensely.  
1.82.  WTO stood for a rule-based multilateral trading system. The rules derived their legitimacy 
from Ministerial mandates – WTO's highest legal governing structures. Any attempt to undermine 
the mandate and the rules in totality or selectively would not be in the interest of the system nor would it be helpful in the journey to Nairobi. The time remaining for MC10 was short. As Members 
moved towards Nairobi, India was ready to engage constructively. They should not be collectively 
found wanting in their quest for a meaningful  and balanced package on the DDA issues. 
1.83.  The suggestion for a drafting group on wh atever form the drafting process stuck on the 
Nairobi outcome document needed further deliberation. At the current stage, there was no 
convergence on the substantives. Complete clarity and agreement would be necessary on the precise task of the said group. Divergences in Me mbers' positions persisted not only on the post-
Nairobi narrative but even on the shape and form of the issues that would constitute the package 
of deliverables at Nairobi. Those differences were substantive and did not stem from the mere 
failure to find a commonly acceptable language to re flect the decisions. It was only in the fitness of 
things that they were resolved in the respecti ve negotiating bodies. A drafting group process 
however well-intentioned would lack the required institutional memory and bandwidth to forge 
consensus on substantives. 
1.84.  On the substantive areas, consensus-build ing should be based on proponents' proposals. 
India had heard time and again that any progress on  an issue could only be proponent-led. That 
principle should be observed in all cases. Tran sparency and inclusiveness in the run up to MC10 
was crucial. It was important that Members followed a Member-driven, bottom-up approach and ensured that the required work was completed at Geneva itself prior to the Ministerial Conference. 
1.85.  The representative of Japan thanked the Director-General for his efforts in Istanbul 
particularly on briefing Ministers on the state of progress or non-progress of negotiations in 
Geneva. To support the Director-General's appe al and his encouragement to Members, Japan 
highlighted three points: first, without prejudic e to discussions on other issues, they should 
intensify their efforts to implement the results of the negotiations on promising themes to prepare 
a document for Nairobi. Second, on post-Nairobi, Japan would not repeat its position on the 
question of whether the Doha Round would be dead or alive after Nairobi. They should find ways 
to ensure innovation and flexibility in the organization to maintain its leadership in the multilateral trading system. Third, to achieve the second object ive, they should set up and start a process of 
preparing the document. They often highlighte d the importance of having a Member-driven 
process while relying on the Director-General's leadership. The collaboration of two or three 
facilitators who would be in contact with Members seemed a formality on which they could come to an agreement without wasting time as had been too often the case vis-à-vis  other organizations. 
1.86.  The representative of Dominica, on behalf of the OECS, associated with the statements 
made on behalf of the ACP, the CARICOM, the SVE s, and the G-33. The OECS emphasized that the WT/GC/M/159 
 
- 17 - 
 
  OECS members were small islands, small economies and small States with limited resources, small 
markets and inherent structural disadvantages. Th ey were also highly vulnerable to external 
shocks and natural disasters. Only recently, Dominica had suffered unprecedented damage and loss from the effects of the passage of tropical storm Erika. That framed the OECS' engagement 
and participation in the WTO and in the DDA negotiations and shaped their expectations for MC10.  
1.87.  The OECS was not at that stage willing to  contemplate any option other than a successful 
MC10 in Nairobi. An important ingredient for such a success was having some positive outcomes 
on the DDA – outcomes with a strong and me aningful development component. The OECS 
acknowledged that given the lack of convergence Members would not have a comprehensive DDA package at MC10. The OECS was willing to work  with a small package of DDA deliverables. 
1.88.  The OECS emphasized that it was import ant that the group's delegations were able to 
clearly identify specific outcomes in that small pa ckage that were of benefit to them and addressed 
their unique challenges and could contribute to their development. The OECS referred to the ACP 
July submission which contained specific proposals for a development package for agreement in 
Nairobi. The OECS delegations attached significant importance to those proposals. Specifically, 
they were seeking agreement that the SVE tariff modalities in agriculture and NAMA were stabilized and that any agreement on new approaches should not result in a disproportionate or 
prejudicial position compared to those Members that applied the formula. As had been stated by 
the CARICOM, it was vitally important for the OECS  delegations that the approach reflected in the 
modalities for SVE flexibilities remained part of th e acquis in the House moving forward. Members 
should have a reaffirmation of the flexibilities and S&DT principles contained in the GATS and the 
negotiating guidelines and procedures for developing countries – specifically SVEs and LDCs. The 
development and food security aspects of fisherie s subsidies were important for the small island 
States with small scale and artisanal fishing sectors. 
1.89.  On the unresolved issues, the OECS concurred that there had to be a clear commitment at 
Nairobi that Members would be working to addres s all core unresolved areas of the DDA after 
MC10. The package at Nairobi, the commitment on continuing work and other matters related to 
the regular work of the WTO should be captured in a ministerial declaration. The OECS agreed that 
work should start soon on drafting the declar ation. The OECS would support any process that 
would not undermine the Member-driven process or the fundamental principles of transparency and inclusiveness in the multilateral organization. 
1.90.  The representative of Qatar, on behalf of the GCC, associated with the statement made on 
behalf of the Arab Group. Fundamental principles of the multilateral system should not be 
overlooked. The GCC believed in an all-inclusive DDA as the only way forward for the WTO. There 
was a growing recognition within the GCC that certain aspects of the WTO's negotiating function 
had been impeded by liberalization efforts pursued by subsets of Members outside the organization 
and that those efforts had indirectly impacted the work of the WTO. Ambiguity remained towards 
what outcome Members were looking to achieve in Nairobi. Whatever the outcomes would be, they 
should be in line with the DDA mandate and without prejudice to the single-undertaking principle. 
1.91.  Looking towards Nairobi, the GCC encouraged Members to reassert political will into WTO's 
negotiating function. The DDA mandate had the built- in flexibilities, contained in Paragraph 47, on 
the application of any packaged development outcomes they could reach in Nairobi within the 
broader framework of the DDA taking into account  the overall balance of the negotiations. They 
should focus on areas in which consensus could be achieved and in outlining areas to address on 
the key negotiating pillars of agriculture, NAMA and services. It was important to emphasize the 
peculiar situation of the RAMs Group – who had joined the WTO in accordance with Article 12 of the Agreement Establishing the WTO – and who had taken on deep and extensive commitments on 
the assumption that the full DDA package would be realized. The GCC also emphasized the 
importance of the core development dimension of the DDA including flexibilities for LDCs, NFIDCs and SVEs in any feasible outcome in Nairobi. The GCC subscribed to the ACP's view that MC10, being held in Africa, should contain clear outcomes in favour of developing countries.  
1.92.  Nairobi presented a chance to reaffirm Members' commitments going forward with the Doha 
Round while preserving the credibility of the WTO. The GCC was ready to intensify efforts to reach an outcome that allowed its delegation to regain traction towards the fulfilment of the DDA 
mandate and to preserve a functioning and inclusive multilateral trading system.  WT/GC/M/159 
 
- 18 - 
 
  1.93.  The representative of Costa Rica associat ed with the statement made on behalf of the 
Cairns Group. Costa Rica had always sought an ambitious result in the Doha Round negotiations – 
particularly in agriculture, NAMA, services, rules and trade and environment. Costa Rica was disappointed by the current situation which pr evented Members from making progress on key 
issues in the Round. Costa Rica welcomed the interest shown by the G20 Ministers in Istanbul and 
the idea of establishing a drafting group to prepare a ministerial declaration for Nairobi. The principles of inclusivity and transparency should be observed throughout the process. Costa Rica 
hoped to participate and be consulted on issues of interest. 
1.94.  Costa Rica supported a Nairobi package th at was feasible and supportive of the reform 
process. A package including LDC issues, export co mpetition and transparency was the first step in 
the right direction. Members should not forget however that the reform process was broader than 
that. In particular, agriculture remained a key issue on which progress should be made especially 
in the areas of domestic support and market acce ss. The Doha Round negotiations should provide 
results that strengthened the multilateral trading system. Costa Rica was willing to assess all 
possibilities and alternatives that would enable Members to reach consensus that favoured global 
trade, inclusive growth and economic development. 
1.95.  Members should look beyond Nairobi and set a work program that would give back to the 
WTO the tools that would enable it to remain relevant in the current economic climate. Recent 
years had shown that trade and investment flows were closely linked and had a clear impact on the global economic climate. The phenomenon of global value chains had already gone beyond the 
traditional concepts of imports and exports, transcending the vision of trade as a zero sum game. 
The difference between goods and services was increasingly small. Technological progress only 
accelerated the changes. It was time to bring to the table issues such as competition and to discuss the effects that climate change could and would have on patterns of production, 
consumption and trade at the international level. A technically and politically feasible, meaningful 
outcome in Nairobi could still be achieved. A frank discussion should however be had on how to address the outstanding issues in 2016. Costa Ri ca reiterated its commitment to the multilateral 
trading system and reaffirmed its readiness to reach a successful agreement in Nairobi. 
1.96.  The representative of Pakistan shared the sense of urgency expressed by many other 
Members. The Nairobi package required technical wo rk so that they had clarity over deliverables 
before going to Nairobi. Due to shortage of ti me, they could not address all DDA issues in the 
Nairobi package. Pakistan therefore fully endorsed  the Director-General's suggestion of developing 
a draft declaration for Nairobi, through an inclusiv e process. The Nairobi package, irrespective of 
its size, would be a symbol of WTO relevance and significance as a multilateral institution despite 
an increasing number of RTAs. It was important to demonstrate that the negotiating function of 
the WTO was alive and Members had the capacity to negotiate balanced outcomes. 
1.97.  The DDA was important for developing countries. The DDA issues and principles of 
development should remain the focus of post-Nai robi work. SDGs adopted by the world leaders 
had several targets that demanded effectiveness of the institution and reverberated to the DDA by focusing on eradicating poverty, income generation and food security. Pakistan re-emphasized the importance of balanced and development-oriented outcomes in the Nairobi package and in post-
Nairobi by focusing on liberalizing trade in the sectors and products important for the developing 
countries. The WTO had a key role in the integration of poor developing countries into the global trading system through an enabling environment, effective S&DT and demand-led growth, 
generated through enhanced market access. The WTO also played a key role in enhancing 
production capacity and one's ability to compete in the knowledge economy – which were both extremely important for Pakistan. MC10 would therefore provide an opportunity for the Members 
to reaffirm the central role the WTO played in the global trading system. 
1.98.  The representative of Colombia said Member s' work in the following days would involve two 
main tasks. The first was to define a package of deliverables that could be presented for Minister's 
consideration in Nairobi. The consultations that Members and the negotiating group Chairpersons 
had held made it clear that some iss ues were more viable than others as part of the package. 
Securing outcomes on export competition would enable Members to meet objectives agreed in the past but not yet fulfilled – which would require a certain amount of effort. On the development 
objective, the core pillar of the negotiations, Colombia was pleased to see that the deliverables 
included achieving a set of outcomes on that area and on issues of importance for LDCs – which would also require effort and creativity from everyone. Improving transparency provisions in WT/GC/M/159 
 
- 19 - 
 
  various areas was vital for the organization and should be an objective shared by all. Colombia 
likewise recognized the needs and limitations of many developing countries in that area. Achieving the deliverables would require a lot of work but would also be necessary to help strengthen the WTO. If the package could expand in the remainin g time, the better the outcome would be for all. 
Colombia stood ready to continue exploring potential deliverables. It was, however, necessary to 
make the most of the time left and quickly move forward in establishing the package's specific content. Colombia intended to participate actively in the process. 
1.99.  The second task was to define the future  of the WTO's negotiating pillar after Nairobi. 
During the first half of the year, Members had spoken extensively about the so-called "core issues" – those issues central to the negotiations. As things currently stood, it seemed unlikely that they would achieve outcomes on all the negotiating areas. They should not ignore the situation. In 
Nairobi, Members should send a clear message about what they intended to do, both with the 
"core issues" and with the other issues that formed  part of the Round's negotiations and on which 
results were yet to be achieved – as they continued to be relevant and of interest to many. They 
could not afford to ignore that message as it would significantly affect both the negotiating pillar 
and their ability to continue making progress po st-Nairobi. Colombia agreed with the Director-
General's proposal to begin drafting that message clearly and expressed its preference that the 
final outcome should lead them to a consensual ministerial declaration. 
1.100.  It had been a week of good news for international trade. Colombia hoped that it would be 
the start of the period that would extend up to the Ministerial Conference. Results such as the conclusion of the TPP negotiations showed Members that the solution was not to set aside the 
main issues but to continue to seek creative solutions even if it would take time to find them. 
1.101.  The representative of Uruguay supported the statement made on behalf of the Cairns 
Group. A result in Nairobi was essential for the health of the organization. An ambitious outcome 
on export competition would be one achievement wh ich would contribute to renewing the appetite 
for negotiations on the key pillars. All Members would benefit from an agreement on export competition avoiding issues in the 80s and 90s which had negatively affected exporting and 
importing countries particularly developing countries. Uruguay had first-hand experience of the 
situation. Together with a package for LDCs, Members should apply all efforts in order to achieve that as soon as possible. Uruguay wished to have a Ministerial Declaration in Nairobi and supported the proposal for establishing that document in an inclusive and transparent manner. 
1.102.  The representative of the Russian Federati on said that the G20 Ministers had had fruitful 
discussions recently in Istanbul. The Russian Federation would have preferred to successfully 
conclude the Doha Round in its entirety in Nairobi. Unfortunately, there were no doubts left that 
the mission was impossible. Members were at a critical juncture in defining whether or not they 
could achieve positive outcomes. They were at the point where they had to decide what they could 
do to deliver a successful outcome at the Nairobi Conference and what their plans were going to be 
after. There was a proposal to deliver in Nairobi a small but meaningful "DDA minus" package, 
which would include export competition, LDC pa ckage, development elements and transparency. 
Russia was ready to consider the modest package if it included export competition.  
1.103.  No Member wanted to witness a total failure of the Doha Round though they did not have 
consensus on the post-Nairobi agenda. For Russia, the conclusion of the Round with the modest 
package was not feasible. A clear commitment on continuing their work on the DDA was needed 
for their multi-year efforts not to go in vain. It was clear that many substantial trade issues could 
and should be addressed on a multilateral basis only. It was also valid for substantial differences in 
the level of obligations between founding Members and RAMs. Russia supported the Director-General's initiative to start a drafting process on an outcome document for Nairobi in the proposed 
format with the aim to reach Member s' goal of making MC10 a success. 
1.104.  The representative of the Bolivarian Re public of Venezuela, on behalf of the ALBA, 
supported the statement made by the G-33 and also those made on behalf of the groups to which 
they respectively belonged. The ALBA had heard the various issues raised by the Director-General 
on the possible types of outcomes for Nairobi. Starting to think about the preparation of an 
outcome document for Nairobi was a positive step to avoid a repetition of the situation Members experienced in Bali.  WT/GC/M/159 
 
- 20 - 
 
  1.105.  The drafting process would be launched  in a situation where there was still no full 
agreement on the possible issues that could be taken for consideration for Ministers at the Ministerial Conference including the way forward.  The process should therefore have a precise 
framework, should be open, transparent and incl usive with a bottom-up approach in order to 
clearly define what Members wanted to harvest in Nairobi. They should recognize the key role that 
the Chairs of the General Council and the TNC wo uld play in the exercise. The main groups and 
coalitions should be represented in any drafting process and in any negotiation of the document to 
be put to the Ministers. Such a document should be drawn up in an open way. Success in Nairobi 
should be ensured. Essential factors needed to be agreed and should therefore be concluded in 
Geneva. A successful Ministerial Conference in Nairobi would be linked to its outcome document. In defining the document's content, Members should prioritize development, and should take into 
account the asymmetry in Members' different leve ls of development. The document should be 
based on consensus.  
1.106.  Venezuela was analysing the options carefully, in particular the implications of each path in 
the lead up to Nairobi. Venezuela was concerned that at the current stage of the process, there 
was still no clarity on what would be in the package of outcomes. Proposals of some Members were known. Proponents should therefore act given the urgency of the situation. The nature of the 
package was intrinsically linked to and went hand in hand with the future of the Doha Round. 
1.107.  Post-Nairobi, Members should have a renewed sense of urgency in addressing the DDA 
issues and in fulfilling the Ministerial Declaratio ns which had been issued ever since, and work 
should continue within the same framework. The ALBA would not support any narrative which 
would imply that the Round as designed and set up in Doha and subsequent Ministerial 
Declarations should end in Nairobi. It would be unfortunate that MC10, the first one to be held in Africa, would be remembered as that in which the DDA would be buried. In the post-Nairobi 
agenda, the remaining DDA issues should be brou ght forward including agriculture and S&DT. The 
ALBA reiterated its commitment to working constructively to hold a successful MC10. 
1.108.  The representative of Korea associated with  the statement made on behalf of the G-33. To 
maintain the credibility of the WTO and to safeguard the basis for continuing its future work, 
Members should not allow MC10 to fail. They should agree on a set of deliverables in Nairobi. Korea supported the elements of a potential pack age such as export competition, development 
and LDC issues and transparency. To be successful , balance within the package that would give a 
certain level of comfort to all Members should be had. In particular, requiring overly burdensome 
contributions from certain Members should be avoided. Korea was ready to constructively participate in the discussions to build a Nairobi Package. 
1.109.  On post-Nairobi work, it was clear but an unfortunate reality that a business-as-usual 
approach would lead Members nowhere. At the same time, all of the negotiating matters under the DDA were important and work on those issues should continue. That should be the starting point 
of their deliberation on their post-Nairobi work. They should also do their work to come up with 
some compromise language for the MC10 outcom e document. On how Members would proceed on 
the MC10 documents, Korea supported the Director-General's proposal to start the text-based drafting process immediately and in a way that was both transparent and inclusive. 
1.110.  The representative of Tanzania associat ed with the statement made on behalf of the 
African, the LDC, and the ACP Groups. On the drafti ng process, Tanzania agreed with the Director-
General that it would be practical to allow Members of different configurations to consult to uphold 
the principles of transparency and inclusiveness.  T a n z a n i a  a l s o  s u p p o r t e d  t h e  i d e a  o f  h a v i n g  a  
Ministerial Declaration rather than a Chair's text as an outcome document at MC10. 
1.111.  With the short time remaining before MC10, Members needed to be responsible. It was 
unfortunate that statements were being heard that fell short of that expectation forgetting their 
history of under-development and the principles and reasons thereof for establishing the WTO. Members should redouble their efforts through more constructive engagements and start thinking about the post-Nairobi work program as an assurance to continue with DDA negotiations for those 
issues which would not be achieved in Nairobi. Tanzania took note of ongoing negotiations in 
various Committees and Members' configurations in preparing for Nairobi. Tanzania urged Members to adhere to the past Ministerial decisions during the ongoing negotiations and 
preparations for the MC10 as a basis of their consultations. WT/GC/M/159 
 
- 21 - 
 
  1.112.  Tanzania appreciated the work done specific ally on the first reading of the S&DT proposals 
submitted by G-90. It was imperative that Members followed the criteria provided in the Doha Declaration Paragraph 44 as they proceeded to engage on the proposals. Paragraph 44 of the 
Doha mandate called for the review of S&DT provisio ns with the aim of making them more precise, 
effective and operational and that was what Memb ers needed to adhere to as they continued 
engaging on the submitted S&DT proposals. 
1.113.  Members were aware that development was the central issue in the DDA. They should 
continue negotiating DDA beyond Nairobi until all the development objectives enshrined in the 
DDA would be fully achieved including all issues of interest to LDCs. Tanzania would not support emerging ideas of closing the round in Nairobi – a pillar that connected African Members to the 
WTO. Tanzania was confident that they could ma ke MC10 successful if they would agree on two 
aspects: on all achievable development outcomes including LDC issues and to continue with 
negotiations for the remaining DDA issues under the same DDA modality and not in any other framework. Tanzania believed proposals for another framework could compromise the DDA. 
1.114.  MC10 should not be the end of DDA. Member s should ensure that the Ministers in Nairobi 
would issue a clear message reaffirming the outcome of MC9 and declaring that the DDA 
negotiations should continue post-Nairobi. The expected broad-based contribution of trade to 
various sustainable development goals would necessitate to reach an agreement on DDA as it 
would provide an enabling environment internationally, assuring a fair and open trading environment and providing space for developing countries to implement policies that would enable trade to flourish and development dividends to be shared among Members. Tanzania was 
committed to remain engaged in a constructive manner for a successful MC10 and in post-Nairobi. 
1.115.  The representative of Hong Kong, China agreed with the Director-General's assessment 
that Members would not be able to deliver outcomes at Nairobi which could credibly conclude the 
Doha Round. With barely two months left, they should be realistic about what they could 
collectively achieve. Negotiations after the summer break had not gained visible momentum. Hong Kong, China feared that attention could drift if that went on and concrete outcomes would remain 
elusive unless there was a clear sense of direction and a common purpose. 
1.116.  Hong Kong, China appreciated that the suggestions to intensify work on a manageable 
package of deliverables and to start drafting an outcome document for Nairobi were meant to help Members move more speedily towards greater clarity and convergence. Clarity was needed for 
Members to better know how and what they wanted to negotiate in the coming weeks and 
thereafter. To strike a deal, they needed conv ergence quickly. Such a development would be a 
useful step forward. Hong Kong, China was pleased to see many Members welcoming the idea. For 
those who cared not only about Nairobi but also the future of the multilateral trading system, it 
was important that they worked together as one organization at that critical juncture. 
1.117.  As a constructive middle-grounder and an honest broker, Hong Kong, China stood ready to 
contribute to processes which could help Members build consensus and attain their common goals. 
They had one aim at the moment: to deliver positive outcomes in Nairobi and ascertain the way forward after Nairobi. Hong Kong, China felt encouraged by the Director-General's observation that 
the political will existed to make Nairobi a success.  As Members worked together to that end, they 
could count on Hong Kong, China's continuous support and active engagement. 
1.118.  The representative of Nigeria associated wi th the statements made on behalf of the African 
Group, the C-4, the ACP, the G-33 and the IGDC. On preparing an outcome document for Nairobi, 
Members should avoid the mistakes of the past. Ni geria preferred having a Ministerial Declaration 
based on consensus both in terms of format and substance. In keeping with past practices, the 
Nairobi declaration should also reaffirm the Bali Declaration with a strong commitment to the 
successful conclusion of the DDA negotiations in view of the fact that the Doha Round would not 
be concluded in Nairobi. They should aim at finalizing the texts as part of the Geneva process ahead of MC10. Any future work in the DDA post-Nairobi should recognize and preserve the existing flexibilities for developing countries particularly the LDCs and SVEs.  
1.119.  With respect to the Director-General's init iative on the drafting process, Tanzania agreed 
on the need to begin the process of text-based negotiations as soon as practicable. The drafting exercise should be guided by the agreed principles of full participation, inclusiveness, and WT/GC/M/159 
 
- 22 - 
 
  transparency, progressively building on the elem ents where consensus had emerged, in parallel 
with the negotiations, without encroaching on the substance of the negotiations. 
1.120.  As the clock was ticking fast, Members should focus on how to achieve convergence on the 
elements for the Nairobi package which should incl ude LDC issues and cotton as a priority, export 
competition, domestic support, SPs and SSM, public  stockholding for food security purposes and 
development based on the G-90 proposals on S&DT. Outcomes in agriculture, as the centrepiece of the Doha round were essential especially to correct the existing imbalances, consistent with the 
objectives of the agriculture negotiations. Regardless of the Nairobi outcomes, it was important 
that they continued their efforts to reform global agricultural trade, including their commitment to continue discussions on all outstanding core issues in agriculture, NAMA and services. 
1.121.  Although Members needed to make cont ributions consistent with the Doha mandate, 
Nigeria reiterated its call particularly to the majo r players to exercise the required flexibilities and 
political will critical for a successful MC10. Ni geria remained willing and committed to working 
closely with all Members towards achieving a meaningful and credible package in Nairobi. The 
success of MC10 was Members' collective responsibility – a task that should be accomplished.  
1.122.  The representative of Argentina endors ed the statement made by the Cairns Group. 
Argentina expressed its concern on the lack of progress made in the negotiations on domestic 
support and market access in the agricultural pillar. Members should not forget that their 
commitment to agricultural sector reform went beyond the Doha Round as it was enshrined in Article 20 of the Agreement on Agriculture. The issu e should therefore be prioritized in any future 
agenda to be agreed in Nairobi. The same should be taken into special account during the process 
proposed by the Director-General for the preparation of a draft ministerial declaration for 
December – a process supported by Argentina. 
1.123.  Despite the lack of progress in the ar eas of domestic support and market access in 
agriculture, Members should not underestimate what it would mean to reach an agreement on 
export competition at the Tenth Ministerial Conferen ce. For many years, they had insisted on "the 
parallel elimination of all forms of export subsidies and disciplines on all export measures with 
equivalent effect" as yet to no avail. Achieving a result in that area would in itself be a triumph for 
the organization and Nairobi would always be remembered for it. 
1.124.  Argentina was concerned on the lack of details on the "adjustments" that would be 
required in that area to satisfy everyone given the limited time before Nairobi. Argentina's position 
had always been to achieve a result as close as possible to the 2008 modalities (Rev. 4). Members 
should therefore know as soon as possible whethe r work should be done on the "adjustments". 
1.125.  At the first WTO Ministerial Conference on  African soil, there should be an outcome on 
agriculture – a sector vital to the economies of most developing and least-developed Members. 
Export competition was the ripest area in that resp ect. In the little time le ft before MC10, Members 
should therefore do their utmost to remove that longstanding issue from the negotiating table and 
turn Nairobi into a milestone for the organization. 
1.126.  The representative of Singapore wanted a meaningful package at Nairobi for all the 
reasons that others had earlier expressed. Member s should not waste the opportunity of Nairobi as 
a step towards the path of reform. A meaningful package of deliverables could only be agreed to if 
there was an acceptable agreement on what woul d happen with the remaining issues post-Nairobi. 
In the interest of time, work should begin as soon as possible to draft a ministerial declaration. Singapore wondered whether there were any useful inspirations to be gleaned from the drafting 
process for the 2011 MC8 guiding principles. 
1.127.  Work in the respective negotiating groups should intensify. At least for the two months in 
the run-up to Nairobi, Singapore urged Members not to insist on sequencing. If substantive 
discussion was refused on the grounds of lack of clarity in other core issues, Members would end 
up with no outcome in Nairobi. Real discussions on substance should instead be allowed to resume in the negotiating groups. Progress made in any area in the run-up to Nairobi would be without prejudice to delegations' eventual positions on whether or not there would be consensus on the 
potential Nairobi package, including on what would happen post-Nairobi.  WT/GC/M/159 
 
- 23 - 
 
  1.128.  The representative of Thailand associated with the statement made on behalf of the Cairns 
Group. Delivering any outcome in Nairobi should  not mean the end of the DDA. Thailand was 
prepared to support initiatives proposed by the Di rector-General on the process of determining the 
Nairobi package and the drafting of the Nairobi declaration noting that the process should be 
conducted in a transparent and inclusive manner.  Thailand concurred with most Members that 
they should start the process as soon as possibl e to ensure a meaningful package for Nairobi and 
conveying a strong message for the continuation of DDA negotiations under all areas. 
1.129.  The representative of Switzerland said Members were facing two challenges: coming up 
with the content of a meaningful Nairobi outcome and framing post-Nairobi. Both issues had to be 
tackled in parallel and with great urgency and ha d questions of process and of substance. On a 
Nairobi outcome, Members should engage in the negotiating groups without sequencing and in a 
proponent-led process. They should work on a non-prejudicial basis where outcomes were still 
possible. Although it had proven impossible to put the DDA on a final track for Nairobi, they would still have to deliver meaningful results at MC10 which all Members would be able to sell at home. 
1.130.  On framing post-Nairobi, the Director-General suggested to set up a drafting process to 
support work on an outcome document – a Ministerial Declaration if possible. Switzerland supported such an approach under the Director-General's leadership. Time was short. Members 
needed to identify commonalities in their positions to allow them to progress collectively towards 
an outcome document in a transparent and inclus ive process. On the content of post-Nairobi, 
Members had different perspectives and offensive and defensive interests that they would like to see reflected. They should not focus on divergences but on commonalities in view of strengthening 
the negotiating arm of the WTO in the future. 
1.131.  Against the backdrop of broad-based trade negotiations successfully concluded recently 
among diverse partners, serious reflection was needed in the WTO on how to overcome paralysis 
and credibly craft a way forward on important issu es – issues which had been negotiated without 
success over many years but which would stay with them in the future as well as new issues that mattered for producers and consumers around the world. 
1.132.  The representative of the United States said Members were faced with the question of 
what package would be possible for Nairobi. It wa s important to emphasize the nature of what the 
Director-General had identified. What he had laid out was not a proposal by any particular Member of the institution or any group but the finite number of issues where there was some possibility 
based on the evidence over the course of a le ngthy discussion that Members could still find 
consensus. All Members agreed to the list. Those issues represented places where they could still find consensus before Nairobi. The United States hoped that that could be a focusing principle for 
them to work on the areas of export competitio n, LDCs, development and transparency. Questions 
had been posed on some of the items that should be on the list. Perhaps they should not be part 
of it. It would be helpful to the process for those who had concerns to clearly and quickly articulate 
their positions because they needed to be as focused as possible given the limited amount of time. 
1.133.  Related to the list of issues where some consensus could be possible was the flipside of the 
coin. After fourteen years of negotiations and afte r eight months of intensive negotiations in 2015, 
issues with zero evidence of finding consensus had also become clear. The United States was 
unhappy to hear about that because there were a lot of issues on the shortlist that it cared about 
just like everybody else. Members continuing to read their long wish-list as if there had been no discussions taking place over the past fourteen years was frustrating. When it came to issues like 
SSM, there was zero evidence that there would be consensus on that issue by Nairobi. If 
somebody had a new idea in that regard, it would be interesting to hear but to simply restate the issue and say it was a must-have would not contribute to coming together on a package to 
Nairobi. The same could be seen in many other issues such as domestic support. Before the 
summer break, it was obvious that that issue had been deadlocked. The Director-General had asked all Members to go back and think creatively. They had done that. The United States had come back with a new proposal and it had been shot-down before sun-down the same day. 
Perhaps somebody else had a good idea for domestic support. The United States would be 
interested in hearing it but with the facts as they currently stood there would be no consensus on domestic support before Nairobi. That was just a factual assessment of the discussion that they 
had all been engaged in. Members should work on that list of issues urgently. The Director-General 
had clarified that that was a list without prejudic e. If somebody had something new and creative WT/GC/M/159 
 
- 24 - 
 
  to suggest such as a way forward on an issue that  was not on the list, it could be added. Members 
should use the debate that they had to focus their work. 
1.134.  Another question Members faced was what they would do after Nairobi. The United States 
was open-minded about process and agreed that it should be transparent and inclusive – which 
could be achieved in several ways. On the substance of post-Nairobi discussions, several delegates 
were right when they had indicated that there wo uld be no consensus in Nairobi at a statement 
that the Doha Round was dead. Based on the consensus rule, it would only take one person to say 
that for it to be right. But there would also be no statement in Nairobi stating that the Doha Round 
would continue because there were many Members that did not agree with that. At the end of the day, it was a stalemated debate and there was a more useful discussion that they could be having about the post-Nairobi agenda.  
1.135.  The United States was open-minded to ha ving a conversation about a post-Nairobi work 
plan dealing with any issue that anybody thought should be on the list. For anybody who was looking for comfort that the issue that they cared about the most would have a discussion 
continuing after Nairobi, the United States was willing to give that assurance because the WTO 
should be a forum where delegations could bring is sues that they wanted to discuss which included 
the issues in the Doha Round. Others said that there were other issues that they would like to 
discuss as well. China had mentioned e-commerce and investment. Lots of delegations had 
mentioned lots of other issues that would be useful to have discussions about in Geneva. The United States remained open-minded on all of them.  
1.136.  Not talking about an issue in Geneva would not mean that the issue would not be talked 
about. It just meant it would not be talked about in Geneva. The United States was not sure why 
any Member would want to disenfranchise itself of the ability to contributing to conversations about significant issues on a global trade agenda. The United States would like those conversations 
to be done multilaterally but it would also respect the wishes of those who would not want to 
participate in a particular conversation. The United States would thus be ready to talk about any issue. What it would not restate or reaffirm in any way nor pledge loyalty to would be to an 
architecture which had demonstrably failed for fourteen years. It would be irresponsible to restate 
fidelity to an architecture that had failed. 
1.137.  Members should ask themselves what they could do better. They should ask whether Doha 
at present was generating benefits for any of th em. If not, they should  dig deeper. At MC8, 
Ministers had acknowledged that they had been deadlocked and called for new approaches. They 
could do a lot better. Members should be working on something meaningful, and not having a negotiation about a negotiation which was what they had been doing for the past fourteen years. 
Nairobi could be successful on the basis of a package that was modest but meaningful. Members 
should come back to Geneva in January 2016, do  something meaningful and make the institution 
vibrant and relevant. 
1.138.  The representative of Sri Lanka supported the statements made on behalf of the G-33 and 
the SVEs. Members should develop a credible, acceptable and balanced outcome in Nairobi – the 
first WTO Ministerial Conference in Africa. Many  were concerned on the post-Bali arrangements 
that could be made to address remaining DDA issues. Small countries such as Sri Lanka placed its 
confidence in the multilateral trading system. It was important for them that the results in Nairobi 
and post-Nairobi work would be parallel to their expectations. There should be a clear and credible way forward in their work in Nairobi and post-Nairobi to strengthen the multilateral trading 
system. Sri Lanka continued to remain engaged for such an outcome. 
1.139.  The representative of Norway said that wide divergence on what should be achieved in 
Nairobi remained. Norway would have liked to have a comprehensive, balanced package of results 
for Nairobi – ideally finalizing the DDA. The past weeks had however demonstrated that that would 
not be possible. Members were then faced between agreeing on a package that seemed doable in Nairobi and having no outcome – something was be tter than nothing. But even if Members wanted 
to achieve a package containing export competitio n, LDC issues and transparency, there would still 
b e  a n  e n o r m o u s  a m o u n t  o f  w o r k  t o  b e  d o n e .  They therefore need to begin quickly. Norway 
supported the Director-General on the need to mo ve towards a Nairobi Ministerial Declaration in a 
transparent manner. If Members wanted to get a successful outcome in Nairobi, they should 
urgently start parallel work on a Nairobi pack age and on the post-Nairobi narrative without 
sequencing. While maintaining the development dimension with special emphasis on the LDCs, WT/GC/M/159 
 
- 25 - 
 
  they needed to find convergence on how to tack le agriculture, NAMA, services and rules after 
MC10. The main goal going forward should be to strengthen the WTO and its negotiating function. 
1.140.  The representative of Montenegro associ ated with the statement made by the European 
Union. Montenegro expressed its support to the Di rector-General's proposal on a drafting process 
that should be progressive, transparent and inclusive, taking into account meaningful and realistic 
deliverables in Nairobi and indicating the post-Nairobi roadmap. It should not be the last negotiation. Members should be open-minded in defining the way forward. Montenegro would 
continue to support the Director-General and his team in his efforts to help strengthen the Bali 
decisions and the multilateral trading system and to keep the WTO relevant and vibrant. 
1.141.  The representative of Mexico had hoped for a successful conclusion of the Doha Round at 
MC10. However, it was clear that a complete Doha deliverable, even a "recalibrated" version, was 
not going to be possible before Nairobi. It looked like Members would be compelled, in the best of 
cases, to opt for a small package containing commitments in the export competition pillar and on transparency on rules and regulations in the area of domestic regulation in services, together with 
a package of benefits for LDCs and other development-related elements. The G20 Ministers had 
expressed their support for the small package. Members should prioritize ensuring success in 
Nairobi. However, the most critical and key Doha Agenda issues, such as domestic support for 
agriculture, agricultural market access, NAMA and services, would remain unresolved. 
1.142.  Mexico supported the idea of the proce ss proposed by the Director-General: first, the 
negotiating groups would begin working intensively in the coming weeks to produce the necessary texts, since Nairobi should not be a negotiating conference. Second, a group would be established 
to draft a Ministerial Declaration – a text which could reflect the decisions reached and to which 
such decisions could be annexed, while reflecting also the understanding that would be reached on how they should conclude the negotiations on outstanding issues particularly domestic support and 
market access in agriculture, NAMA and services . They should establish a methodology for the 
post-Nairobi and do everything within their power to ratify the TFA as soon as possible. 
1.143.  The Director-General said there were two areas he had wanted to hear from the Members 
and he thought he had heard both of them at th e meeting. The first one related to substance – 
what Members could do by Nairobi and how they wo uld get there. He had heard everyone say that 
they were ready to begin to intensify the work in the negotiating groups trying to figure out what 
was it that they could get consensus on in the lead up to Nairobi. In his report, he had underlined 
the areas of the negotiations that based on his consultations had more likelihood of attracting 
consensus in time for MC10. But that did not prejudge other areas where consensus could be 
achieved and that remained important to Members – those still remained on the table and they 
should continue to work on them. It did not also prejudge that the issues that he had mentioned 
would be delivered. He had only said that it was more likely that Members could reach consensus on those because even though there were differences, they were not as big as in other areas. The 
negotiating group process should therefore intensif y and continue working on all issues. He asked 
Members to pay more attention to areas that looked more promising. Members should begin to engage, look at the language and do whatever it was that they should do to deliver a package in 
Nairobi. 
1.144.  The second area related to the outcome do cument. Nobody had said that they should not 
try to have a consensual Ministerial Declaration. It did not likewise mean that Members would get there. He was concerned that they were not of the same view on how to begin to work on the 
drafting. Some Members had mentioned a negotiating group, a more open process and 
confessionals. Some were ready to begin to work on the two elements – substance and process together. Others said they should do the post-Nairobi part first. The process would take time 
because of the differences of what Members wished to see the declaration, particularly on the 
post-Nairobi scenario, were big. There were some commonalities but that did not mean that the differences were non-existent. They should therefore not waste time. 
1.145.  He did not want to delay the commencement of that conversation. He would not be in 
Geneva during the following days. He would be in Riyadh for the Arab League Ministerial Meeting, 
then in Beijing right and then in Brussels for the African Union and the ACP Ministerial Meetings. He would use that time to talk to the Ministers and see how much impetus and momentum he 
could muster from them for the processes in Ge neva. To prevent the conversation from getting 
stuck, he would ask for some Ambassadors to facilitate the consultations with Members on that WT/GC/M/159 
 
- 26 - 
 
  area. The facilitators would consult with Members on what they would like to see in terms of the 
declaration: what would be doable, what the declaration should contain and how to reflect their inputs. He asked Members to limit themselves to only the key elements they thought should be in the declaration. The facilitators would also consult on how they would advance the drafting 
process.  
1.146.  Upon his return, the facilitators would brief him on the consultations. He would then hold a 
Room W meeting to inform Members of the consultations both in terms of the process and the 
content of the declaration. Depending on what he would hear in the Room W meeting, they could 
begin to shape the elements that would be in the declaration and be in a position to offer Members something. They could then begin to transition into  text-based negotiations from that point on. He 
stressed that this was only his suggestion and it would not prejudge anything Members would do 
afterwards. 
1.147.  The representative of Barbados asked for a clarification on whether the facilitators that the 
Director-General had mentioned would be the same who would draft the declaration.  
1.148.  The representative of Singapore suggested that the Deputy Directors-General could also 
help facilitate the process. 
1.149.  The representative of Jamaica wondered whether such a process should begin with an 
interactive exchange probably in the Green Room. He was not sure whether the Director-General's 
schedule would permit for there to be at least one meeting before the confessionals for Members to know what to expect in the consultations. He had no difficulty with the TNC Chair designating Friends to undertake the consultations, but he was wondering if it would also be helpful for those 
who would be asked to facilitate the consultations to benefit from an exchange with the TNC Chair 
and the Members on the matter. 
1.150.  The Director-General said that the facilitators would only consult with Members while he 
was away. After that, he would report to Members on what the facilitators would hear during their 
consultations. From that point on, it would be a completely new phase. His suggestion would not prejudge anything that would happen afterwards. The facilitators would not be appointed for any 
position. They would only be there to help him hear Members while he was away. He also noted 
that he could convene a Green Room or a Room W before the consultations where he would tell Members who were the facilitators he had selected to conduct the outreach on his behalf. He noted 
the Facilitators could also consult groups. Confessionals could be part of the process but the 
Facilitators could also decide to hear whole groups and listen to the groups themselves. He did not 
want to prejudge anything. Members should not be too structured about the consultations in the early stages. If they tried to over-engineer the process too much it would not happen.  
1.151.  He asked Members to allow the interim process to commence because that was as 
legitimate a place to have that kind of conversation as any other. He hoped that after the outreach, what they would have would be a structured set of issues that could be part of the 
conversation and then see how they would go from there. He urged Members to reach out, come 
to him and talk about their issues on the interim process and other areas that concerned them. He stressed that the consultations would only be an interim process and would not prejudge anything. He did not know whether the elements that would emerge from the consultations would be only 
TNC elements or whether in the declaration Members wished to see a mix of both TNC and General 
Council issues. He could not prejudge that. That was precisely what they were going to discuss. His intention was to be in close contact with the Chairman of the General Council after the 
consultations and consult on the best way to proceed on both sides.  
1.152.  The General Council took note of the Director-General's report and of the statements. 
2  IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BALI OUTCOMES — STATEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN 
2.1.  The Chairman recalled that this item on implementation of the Bali outcomes had been on 
the agenda since July 2014,  to provide an opportunity to be up-to-date with the work taking place 
in the regular bodies which were directly involv ed in the implementation of the various Bali 
Decisions. Since the July meeting, not all the regular bodies had met and a number of meetings WT/GC/M/159 
 
- 27 - 
 
  were scheduled in October. His statement would therefore focus on relevant updates where those 
were available.  
2.2.  Regarding TRIPS non-violation and situatio n complaints, the Council for TRIPS had discussed 
the matter at each of its formal meetings. The TRIPS Council Chair was currently continuing his 
informal consultations with Members with a view to enabling the Council to agree, at its next 
meeting in mid-October, on its recommendations to MC10. 
2.3.  On e-commerce, he recalled that at the July General Council meeting, Ambassador Suescum 
(friend of the GC Chair) had reported on the Work Programme on Electronic Commerce and his 
report had been circulated in document WT/GC/W/701. The Chairs of the Council for Services and the Council for Goods had also submitted reports on their respective areas (S/C/47 and G/C/56). The Friend of the Chair had continued his contacts and encouragement with delegations, and 
different groups of delegations had been discussing the way forward. However, he did not have 
much to add but he urged Members to engage further in the area following the Bali mandate. He recalled that Ministers had instructed them to consider any recommendations on possible 
measures related to e-commerce at MC10. He reminded them that the current moratorium on 
electronic transmissions would expire at MC10. He hoped that they would be able to come up with 
some consensual language on the matter under the able leadership of Ambassador Suescum. 
2.4.  Concerning Aid-for-Trade, the Fifth Global Review held in the summer had provided an 
opportunity for participants from the trade an d development community to discuss the economic 
and development impact of high trade costs – no tably on the poorest countries and citizens, and 
on achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals. Discussions during the three days had 
focused on how to address high trade costs. An important conclusion that had emerged had been 
that the expeditious implementation of the TFA woul d help in lowering trade costs. The Review had 
also provided a platform for the launch of Ph ase 2 of the EIF for LDCs — an event that had 
prepared the ground for the pledging conference  t o  b e  h e l d  i n  a d v a n c e  o f  M C 1 0 .  A  S u m m a r y  
Report of the Fifth Global Review would be circul ated in the following days. The CTD's next formal 
session on Aid for Trade was expected to take place at the end of October — that would be 
preceded by a Workshop on Aid for Trade and th e Sustainable Development Goals. A new biennial 
Aid-for-Trade work programme would be developed after MC10. 
2.5.  Regarding Trade and Transfer of Technolo gy, the next meeting of the Working Group would 
be in October. Discussion would continue on possible recommendations on the basis of a non-
paper titled "Facilitating Access to Information on Appropriate Technology Sourcing — Steps to 
Increase Flows of Technology to Developing Countries", tabled by a group of developing countries. 
2.6.  On Agriculture, he recalled that the Committee on Agriculture was responsible for 
implementation of Bali outcomes in two areas: th e dedicated discussion on export competition and 
the Decision on TRQ administration. There were no updates with respect to the report he had provided in July on the two issues. 
2.7.  Regarding Development and LDCs matters, on Preferential Rules of Origin for LDCs, he 
recalled that the Bali Ministerial Decision required the Committee on Rules of Origin to "annually review the developments in preferential rules of origin applicable to imports from LDCs, in accordance with these guidelines"; "report to  the General Council", and "provide the Sub-
Committee on LDCs with a report on the outcome of  such review." The Committee had been taking 
note and discussing new preferential rules of origin applicable to LDCs or modifications to existing rules. The first report had been prepared and sent to the General Council in 2014 and a second 
report would be prepared after the CRO meeting of 15 October. At that meeting, the Committee 
would examine new or modified rules of orig in notified by China, Japan and Thailand. 
2.8.  Regarding the Operationalization of the LDC Services Waiver, the Council for Trade in 
Services had received a total of 15 notification s of preferences for LDC services and service 
suppliers. Those had been submitted by: Canada; Australia; Norway; China; Korea; Hong Kong, China; Chinese Taipei; Singapore; New Zealand; Switzerland; Japan; Mexico; Turkey; the United States; and India. In addition, two Members, th e European Union and Chile, had communicated to 
the Council their intention to notify preferences as soon as their domestic procedures were 
completed. The LDC Group had recently circulated a communication requesting that a Dedicated WT/GC/M/159 
 
- 28 - 
 
  Session be convened to assess the state of play on  the notifications of preferences and to consider 
next steps. The Dedicated Session was tentatively scheduled for late October. 
2.9.  On Duty-Free Quota-Free (DFQF), a dedi cated meeting of the CTD had been held in 
September to discuss DFQF market access for LDCs following from the request for such a meeting 
made by Bangladesh, the LDC Coordinator and the subsequent informal consultations held by the 
CTD Chairperson. The dedicated meeting had allowe d a frank and open exchange of views on the 
DFQF issue. On the way forward, several Members had expressed support for the idea of a "clinical 
examination" to allow a better appreciation of the issues involved and possible impact arising from 
implementation of DFQF. It had been proposed that the Secretariat would prepare a study to help in the examination. Some Members had also suggested possible elements that could be included in the study. While most Members had indicated that they had been open to the idea of a Secretariat 
study, it had also been suggested that the "parameters" or "scope" of such a study should be 
defined before the Secretariat could begin work. Accordingly, the CTD Chairperson had invited the proponents to submit a proposed outline of the st udy as soon as possible, after which he intended 
to hold informal consultations. The CTD's annual DFQF review would take place at the Committee's 
November meeting, for which a Secretariat's report on Members' DFQF market access for LDCs would be prepared in accordance with the Bali Decision. 
2.10.  Regarding the Monitoring Mechanism on Special and Differential Treatment, the Bali 
Decision stipulated that the Mechanism, which operated in a Dedicated Session of the CTD, was to serve as a focal point within the WTO to analyse and review the implementation of S&D provisions. 
Although three meetings of the Dedicated Session had been held since Bali, no written submissions 
from Members had yet been received. The next meeting of the Monitoring Mechanism was 
scheduled for November. 
2.11.  Work on Trade Facilitation had continued to progress since his last report. Members had 
submitted additional category A notifications, bringing their current overall number to 72. The 
notifications would be formally received by th e Preparatory Committee on 13 October. Delegations 
had also deposited a series of ratification instruments — and the increase had been especially 
noticeable during the current period. He under stood that since July the WTO had received 
instruments of acceptance from a number of Members, each bringing them one step closer to what would be necessary to allow the Agreement to enter into force. It was an encouraging development that he hoped to see followed by addi tional ratifications so that the Trade Facilitation 
Agreement could take effect in the near future. 
2.12.  The representative of Thailand said  that Thailand was committed to support the 
implementation of all Bali decisions. Thailand ha d deposited its instrument of acceptance for the 
TFA on 5 October and hoped that other Members would join n due course so that the entry into 
force of the TFA would become an achievement for MC10. 
2.13.  The representative of India conveyed that  India had recently notified its preferential 
treatment to services and service suppliers of LDCs  in accordance with the decision taken by the 
Ministers at MC8 and MC9. Through the notifica tion, it had made available substantial and 
commercially meaningful preferences in response to the LDC collective request. Similar to an 
effective DFQF scheme for goods with duty-free ma rket access on 96% tariff lines and preferential 
duties on another 2.2%, making the total 98.2%. In Services, India had notified substantive 
preferential access to LDCs. India's Services Waiver notification was comprehensive as it covered substantive preferences under Mode 4 wherein it had included new Mode 4 categories of 
contractual service suppliers and independent profe ssionals in about eight sectors and sub-sectors. 
In accordance to the LDC request, it had gran ted preferences in the new Mode 4 Category of 
Installers or Servicers. In addition, it had granted preferences in about fifteen new sub-sectors and 
significantly improved its existing GATS commitments. Under technical assistance and capacity 
building, in addition to several ongoing schemes, it had designed new schemes and programs for LDC services and service suppliers in several sectors to effectively utilize the preferences that had been granted. Being a Mode 4 demandeur , India fully realized the importance of entry regulations 
which were critical for converting scheduled market access to real market access. It was for that 
reason that it had decided to waive visa fee for natural persons of LDCs applying for Indian business and employment visas. Given its economic reality and capacity, India had made its 
outmost efforts to deliver on the LDC cause both in goods and services. India hoped that the 
preferences would be fully utilized by the LDCs to further integrate with the global economy. WT/GC/M/159 
 
- 29 - 
 
  2.14.  The representative of Montenegro informed Members on the progress her country had made 
since the July meeting. The prompt consideratio n and approval of Montenegro's request for the 
TFA implementation in May and July had contributed significantly to the fact that its TFA Protocol was already in the final phase of ratification in the Montenegrin Parliament. Montenegro was 
committed to present the instrument of acceptance on time before MC10. Montenegro had also 
moved towards its preparation and adoption of the DFQF in goods for the LDCs, which had also been an important pledge at the Bali Ministeria l Conference. Montenegro was firmly committed to 
continuing its engagement on the implementation of the Bali package. 
2.15.  The General Council took note of the Chairman's statement and of the other statements. 
3  WORK PROGRAMME ON SMALL ECONOMIES — REPORT BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE 
DEDICATED SESSION OF THE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT 
3.1.  The Chairman recalled that in line with the framework and procedures agreed by the General 
Council in 2002, the Work Programme on Small Economies was a standing item on the General 
Council's agenda and the Committee on Trade and Development reported regularly to the Council 
on the progress of work in its Dedicated Sessions on the subject. At Bali, Ministers had also 
adopted a Decision re-confirming their commitment to the work programme and instructing the CTD to continue its work in Dedicated Sessions under the overall responsibility of the General 
Council. He invited Ambassador Juan Esteban Agui rre (Paraguay), Chairperson of the Dedicated 
Session of the CTD, to report on that matter. 
3.2.  Ambassador Juan Esteban Aguirre (Paraguay), Chairperson of the Dedicated Session of the 
CTD, recalled that at the last meeting of the General Council in July, it had been reported that the 
proponents of Small Economies had been following up on the Decision taken at the WTO's Ninth 
Ministerial Conference in Bali. That decision instructed the WTO Secretariat to provide relevant information and factual analysis for discussion among Members concerning the Small Economies' 
Work Programme and, in particular, the challe nges and opportunities experienced by small 
economies when linking into global value chains in trade in goods and services. The Secretariat 
had prepared a background analysis on the subject in document WT/COMTD/SE/W/31. Members 
had discussed the report and its findings at the previous meeting of the Dedicated Session on 
Small Economies on 5 June. Discussion on the topic would continue to explore the report in further detail. Another formal meeting of the Dedicated Session had been scheduled for the end of October to discuss, among others, its annual report to the CTD and its biennial report to the 
General Council including a section on future activities of the Work Programme on Small 
Economies. 
3.3.  The representative of Guatemala, on beha lf of the SVEs, said that Members had discussed 
during the meeting of the Dedicated Session on Small Economies on 5 June a study on challenges 
and opportunities experienced by small economies when linking into global value chains in trade in goods and services contained in document  WT/COMTD/SE/W/31. The SVEs supported the 
continuation of the discussions on the paper and was ready to start the discussions in the next 
CTD dedicated session. The SVEs welcomed the discussions on the dedicated session annual reports to the CTD and the biennial report to the General Council especially to the section of future activities of the Work Programme on Small Economies in preparation for MC10. 
3.4.  The representative of Dominica, on behalf of the OECS, associated with the statement made 
on behalf of the SVEs. The Work Programme remained an essential and critical part of WTO's 
work. The work programme was agreed to examin e trade-related issues of SVEs aimed to frame 
responses to the issues identified for the SVEs' full  integration into the multilateral trading system. 
The mandate continued to be relevant. The OECS looked forward to the reaffirmation of Ministers at MC10 to their commitment to the work programme and to continuing giving instructions to the 
General Council to examine the trade-related i ssues for the fuller integration of the SVEs. 
3.5.  The General Council took note of the CTD Chairperson's report and of the statements. WT/GC/M/159 
 
- 30 - 
 
  4  TENTH SESSION OF THE MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE 
4.1  ATTENDANCE OF OBSERVERS FROM  INTERNATIONAL INTERGOVERNMENTAL 
ORGANIZATIONS 
4.1.  The Chairman recalled that past practice up  to MC7 had been to invite the IGOs which had 
had observer status in the previous Ministerial Conference to attend the next one. For MC8 and 
MC9, consensus on repeating past practice with respect to IGOs attendance could not be reached.  Therefore no IGOs had been invited to attend bo th sessions of the Ministerial Conference. At the 
General Council meeting in July, he had reported on his consultations and he had noted that there 
had still been a divergence of opinions as to how to address the matter. Since then, he had consulted with key delegations and noted that the positions expressed previously had not changed. 
Some delegations believed that going back to the past practice that Members had used until MC7 
would be a good option to unblock the matter, while others stressed that that would not be the 
opportune way to address it. Therefore, he regretted that they still had no clarity on attendance of IGO Observers. He would continue his consultations on the matter and report, as appropriate.   
4.2.   He stressed that his consultations had also covered the broader issue which related to the 
Guidelines for granting observer status to IGOs in WTO bodies – contained in Annex 3 to the Rules 
of Procedure in WT/L/161. He recalled that the matter had been discussed by the General Council 
since the beginning of 2012, following two communi cations from the Arab Group on Improving the 
Guidelines to grant IGOs permanent observer stat us in the WTO. It was undeniable that the two 
matters were connected. Participation of IGOs, both at the upcoming Ministerial Conference and more in general in WTO's work, was essential. He urged Members to remain engaged in trying to 
find pragmatic ways to address the issue and encouraged any Member who wished to put forward 
any suggestion as to how to unblock the situation to do so. 
4.3.  He drew attention to the request for Observer status at MC10 by Palestine circulated in 
document WT/L/960. In accordance with customary practice, he would undertake consultations on 
the request and would revert to it at the next General Council meeting. 
4.4.  The representative of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, on behalf of the Arab Group, thanked the 
Chairman for his continued efforts and consultations on the important issue. The participation of all 
qualified IGOs at MC10 was crucial and every effort should be made to facilitate it. All IGOs should be treated on an equal footing. The process of considering their participation in MC10 should remain technical, transparent and objective. The screening process should be undertaken on the 
basis of Annex 3 of the Rules of Procedures of the Ministerial Conference. The Arab Group 
remained committed to supporting the WTO Member consensus to welcome each qualified IGO as an observer at MC10 – with all requests receiving equal treatment from the WTO. 
4.5.  The representative of Honduras, on behalf  of the IGDC, welcomed the consultations which 
the Chairman was holding on the issue of IGOs observership at MC10. The IGDC supported the 
Chairman's efforts to find a speedy resolution to the issue. 
4.6.  The General Council took note of the Chairman's report and of the statements. 
5  FOSTERING PARTICIPATION OF MICRO, SMALL AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISES (MSMES) 
IN REGIONAL AND GLOBAL MARKETS — COMMUNICATION FROM THE PHILIPPINES AND MALAYSIA (WT/GC/W/702 AND WT/GC/W/702/ADD.1) 
5.1.  The Chairman said that the item was on th e agenda at the request of the delegation of the 
Philippines. He drew attention to the relevant communication by Malaysia and the Philippines titled 
"Fostering Participation of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) in Regional and Global 
Markets" circulated in document WT/GC/W/702.  He also drew attention to the Addendum 
circulated on 6 October indicating that Brunei Darussalam and Lao PDR also co-sponsored the communication. He invited the representative of the Philippines to introduce the item. 
5.2.  The representative of the Philippines recalle d that at the July meeting of the General Council, 
the Philippines had circulated a paper in JOB/GC/80 entitled "Fostering the Participation of Micro, 
Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) in Regional and Global Markets". The paper which was co-sponsored by Malaysia, Brunei Darussalam and Lao PDR was being tabled as a formal proposal in WT/GC/M/159 
 
- 31 - 
 
  WT/GC/W/702. The proposal called for the inclusion in the outcome documents of MC10 in Nairobi 
of a statement on fostering the participation of MS MEs in regional and global markets by: firstly, 
recognizing the important role played by MSMEs in the performance of national economies of all WTO Members; secondly, encouraging the continuation of the discussions and explorations on 
SMEs in WTO and strengthening its linkages with parallel work being undertaken by international 
organizations, such as the ITC, UNCTAD and th e World Bank; and thirdly, directing the General 
Council to undertake a stock-take, through the WTO Secretariat, of the discussions on MSMEs 
taking place in the various councils and committees in the WTO and thereafter, consider the most 
appropriate arrangements for a better understanding and coherence in the discussions.  
5.3.  The Philippines explained the reasons for pu shing for a ministerial declaration calling for the 
integration of MSMEs in the regional and global ma rkets. Globally, SMEs made up over 95 percent 
of all firms, accounted for approximately 50 pe rcent of value added and 60 percent of total 
employment, and were important sources of innovation and job creation, in particular for women and the youth. SMEs therefore constituted the ba ckbone of Members' economies especially for 
developing and LDC Members, and the lynchpin for inclusive growth. However, their share in world 
trade was infinitesimal when compared to their size and importance. Furthermore, micro enterprises, a significant component of the SME sector, were left out in the current discourse on 
SMEs. 90 percent of the SME sector was co mprised of micro and small enterprises. 
5.4.  It was not the proponents' intention to start negotiations on any specific discipline on MSMEs. 
The aim was to start a conversation that would lead to a better, more focused and sustained discussion of MSMEs. Outside the organization, there was some misconception that the WTO 
worked only for the big companies. It was Members' duty to debunk the misconception. A 
statement from their Ministers in Nairobi placing MSMEs squarely in the global trade agenda would 
send a powerful political message that the WTO worked to level the playing field for the benefit of 
all – big and small alike. 
5.5.  The representative of Singapore, on be half of the ASEAN, expressed its support for the 
proposal on MSMEs co-sponsored by Brunei, Lao PDR, Malaysia and the Philippines. MSMEs had a 
key role to play in fostering innovation, job creation and boosting economic growth. The time was 
ripe to kick-start a more robust conversation on MSMEs at the WTO. That would enable the WTO to maintain its relevance as the pre-eminent institution shaping global trade policy. 
5.6.  The representative of Malaysia associated with the statement made by the Philippines as a 
co-sponsor and by ASEAN. Such endorsement by Ministers was important to realize Members' 
commitment in strengthening WTO's work on the participation of MSMEs. SMEs, representing more than 98% of Malaysia's business community, were taking a more prominent role in shaping the 
future of its national economy. In 2004, Malaysia had taken a more realistic and structured 
approach to SME development which had been made a national agenda. SMEs, including micro enterprises, had progressed through the years an d currently contributed to 36% of GDP, 65% of 
employment and 18% of exports. Malaysia was curre ntly focusing on productivity and innovation-
led growth of the SMEs which were no longer just an enabler of growth as in the past but also a key driver of growth and a significant contributor in achieving inclusive growth. What it was doing 
nationally fit into the regional ASEAN economic community which would be realized at the end of 
2015 under Malaysia's ASEAN Chairmanship. The coordinated SME development featured highly in 
ASEAN's regional economic integration. The joint report on inclusive global value chains by the OECD and the World Bank Group to the G20 had sh own that Southeast Asia was the region where 
the most comprehensive and deepest regional integration agreement could be found and had the 
highest average share of inter-regional global value chain participation. That was a testimony of the work being done by ASEAN. ASEAN would roll out further development action plans for micro 
enterprises. It was timely for Members to pu rsue discussions on MSMEs in the WTO and its 
subsidiary bodies post-Nairobi. 
5.7.  The representative of Guatemala, on beha lf of the SVEs, said that MSMEs were extremely 
important and required specific attention for them to develop and integrate better into the global 
trading system and in global value chains. The SVEs hoped that the WTO and other international 
organizations would provide special attention on the matter. 
5.8.  The representative of South Africa ackn owledged the work done by the Philippines and 
Malaysia in putting together the proposal. It should be clear to everyone that Members faced 
serious difficulties and challenges in putting together an agreed Package for Nairobi. The WT/GC/M/159 
 
- 32 - 
 
  challenges were even more profound in forging a common approach to the work in the WTO after 
MC10. South Africa was thus not prepared to ac cept adding that new issue to the Ministers' 
agenda in Nairobi that would furt her compound their difficulties. 
5.9.  The representative of El Salvador welcomed the initiative given that MSMEs represented a 
significant share of the enterprise structure of a majority of the Membership according to statistics. 
In El Salvador's case, its government considered that the promotion and integration of MSMEs was a priority issue on the trade agenda. El Salvador hoped to continue the dialogue with the 
proponents and other interested Members on the basis of the proposal currently tabled. 
5.10.  The representative of Chile supported the initiative presented by the Philippines and the co-
sponsors which went along the same lines as the priorities of its government. The development of 
MSMEs as set out in the proposal would help the most vulnerable sectors of the population – the 
youth and women. Initiatives such as that would allow Members to examine challenges facing 
MSMEs in global value chains and would provide a guide for discussions encouraging innovative proposals. Chile would share some of the comments from the proponents to its capital. 
5.11.  The representative of India said that MSME s played an important role in India. Not all of 
their role was documented, as a large proportion of India's MSMEs were in the unorganized sector. 
In organized manufacturing, they accounted for ab out 45% of the output and 40% of exports. The 
organized sector MSMEs provided the largest sh are of employment after agriculture and other 
nurseries for entrepreneurship and innovation. Given the role and strong contribution of MSMEs in boosting overall economic growth, India had rece ived the joint proposal of the Philippines, 
Malaysia and other co-sponsors with great interest. However, India had questions and clarifications 
to seek from the proponents before they could discuss the substantive proposal. The submission 
raised extensive horizontal and cross-sectoral issues. A systemic question that India would like to raise was whether WTO disciplines and flexibilities were at all capable of being used to target 
specific constituencies within a Member such as  MSMEs. The WTO disciplines were not predicated 
upon the size and type of entities. As such, India would hesitate to support the proposed 
ministerial statement or declaration in document WT/GC/W/702. An exploratory study could be 
done without such a declaration provided there was consensus among Members. 
5.12.  The representative of the Dominican Repub lic, on behalf of the IGDC, said that MSMEs, 
particularly micro and small enterprises, were a fundamental part of the economic fabric of 
developing and LDC Members. They played a cruc ial role in furthering growth, innovation and 
prosperity. The topic had been tackled during th e discussions at the WTO public forum under the 
theme "Trade Works". The discussions had highlighted the need for collaboration to make trade more inclusive. The IGDC welcomed the proposal presented by Brunei Darussalam, Lao PDR, 
Malaysia and the Philippines. Without prejudice to the final positions of the members of the IGDC 
who were currently undertaking consultations with their respective capitals, the IGDC would participate in the discussions of the MSMEs proposal.  
5.13.  The representative of Dominica, on be half of the OECS, recognized the economic 
contribution of MSMEs to the growth and develo pment of the OECS economies. The OECS thanked 
the Philippines, Malaysia and the other co-sponsor s for the proposal and expressed its support to 
the general thrust of it. The issue of integrat ing MSMEs into regional and global markets was 
particularly relevant to the OECS and was a pr iority for the OECS governments. MSMEs were 
predominant, if not the total features, within OECS economies. The many challenges which they grappled with could not be overstated as they re lated to integrating into the global and regional 
markets – a result obtained from the inability to define their positions in regional and global supply 
value chains due to their inability to contend with larger competitors and incapacity to infuse innovations into their business models. Any initiative that sought to advance the interest and 
concerns of MSMEs would have the full support of the OECS delegations. In any engagement of the 
topic, there should be a clear understanding of wh at MSMEs constituted, on what they were trying 
to do and on what role the WTO could and should  play. The focus and priority in any engagement 
on the issue would be through the prism of deve lopment and therefore to address the challenges 
of MSMEs in developing countries. The OECS no ted with immense interest the tenets of the 
solution and recorded its support for the proposal. The OECS looked forward to jointly working with the proponents and other Members who we re confronted with similar challenges and 
recognize the importance of MSMEs to the development of small economies. WT/GC/M/159 
 
- 33 - 
 
  5.14.  The representative of the United States welcomed the paper submitted by the Philippines. 
The United States was actively engaged in a variety of public initiatives to promote the increased 
integration of SMEs into US and global trade. The Philippines was making a useful contribution in the area by attracting Members' attention to th e particular circumstances of MSMEs. The timely 
implementation of the TFA was especially releva nt to the topic as its implementation would 
significantly benefit SMEs by cutting costs an d red-tape that could otherwise prevent their 
participation in global trade. The benefits of SM Es of expanding their global customer base by 
taking advantage of e-commerce could be another area for discussion in a WTO work programme 
on e-commerce. The United States was interested in further exploration of the ways in which WTO 
agreements could promote SME interests. It was in that positive spirit that the United States would be considering the specific proposal of the Phili ppines for placing the issue in the context of MC10. 
The United States hoped that it could be a place where they could apply creative thinking. 
5.15.  The representative of Nigeria associated with the statement made on behalf of the IGDC. 
Nigeria generally supported the thrust of the proposal. The challenges facing the MSMEs 
particularly in developing countries should be taken into consideration. The proposal was currently 
being reviewed in its capital and it would come back with a more definitive position in terms of how it would take the particular initiative forward.  
5.16.  The representative of the European Unio n supported the proposal. The European Union was 
a frontrunner on SME policy and SME internationalizat ion and recognized that SMEs were the main 
contributor for economic growth and jobs in th e EU and in other countries. Among SMEs, micro 
enterprises were dominating in numbers. A study providing an overview of SME opportunities and 
challenges could help understand how the WTO was delivering for SMEs. SMEs in all countries had, 
compared with large companies, similar needs because of their available resources and their smaller trade volumes which increased trade-related cost per product. The study should therefore 
include not only developing and LDC Members but also the SMEs of developed countries. 
5.17.  The representative of Kenya supported th e proposal put forward by the Philippines and 
Malaysia and co-sponsored by Brunei Darussalam and Lao PDR on working towards the inclusion of 
MSMEs in regional and global trade, as proposed in document WT/GC/W/702 for consideration and 
adoption at MC10 in Nairobi. There was no doubt that MSMEs played an important role in economic development through employment and income generation in both developed and developing countries. For developing and LDC Members, the role  of MSMEs became more critical as they had 
the potential to help improve income distribution, employment creation, poverty reduction and 
export growth. In Kenya's case, MSMEs created cl ose to 80% of employment and contributed to 
about 20% of the GDP which implied that there was significant scope for realizing the full potential 
of MSMEs in contributing to Kenya's economic gr owth and development. Regional and global value 
chains created enormous trade opportunities. WTO work could contribute in promoting international cooperation to foster the participation of MSMEs in regional and global value chains 
as powerful drivers of economic growth and deve lopment. Kenya supported for a decision to be 
taken by Ministers at MC10 aimed at strengthening the role of the WTO in promoting the participation of MSMEs in regional and global mark ets. Kenya was ready to work with the rest of 
the Membership in ensuring that MSMEs were part of the WTO Agenda. 
5.18.  The representative of the Philippines, on behalf of the co-sponsors, thanked the delegations 
who had made a statement on the proposal. The Philippines hoped it was able to discern the 
statements that had been made. Majority of th e statements had emphasized the importance of 
MSMEs and had welcomed the submission of the pr oposal. The Philippines had also taken note of 
the reservations made by some Members who had expressed their views on why they thought it 
would not be appropriate at that time. The Phili ppines and the co-sponsors would continue to do 
outreach initiatives and reach out to more Members specifically to those who had expressed 
reservations and hoped they would be able to respond to their concerns adequately and sufficiently. The Philippines proposed that Member s would continue to reach out and get back on 
the item at the next meeting of the General Council before Nairobi. 
5.19.  The representative of the Bolivarian Re public of Venezuela thanked the Philippines for 
presenting the proposal. Venezuela was interested in holding a dialogue with the proponents and 
had sent the proposal to its capital. It valued the work on the participation of MSMEs and the role 
they played in its economy but had certain concer ns given the quantity of work in the following 
days as South Africa had pointed out. It also supported India's comments on the matter. The short 
period remaining would not allow Members to conclude a substantial discussion on the proposal.  WT/GC/M/159 
 
- 34 - 
 
  5.20.  The Chairman said it seemed clear from the discussion that the proposal from the 
Philippines and the co-sponsors had generated a lo t of interest among delegations, and that the 
matter was considered important for MC10. The General Council would revert to the matter at the next meeting. He hoped that delegations would then be in a position to formally decide that an 
outcome document of MC10 would include a reference to MSMEs. 
5.21.  The General Council took note of the communication and of the statements. 
6  COMMITTEE ON BUDGET, FINANCE AND ADMI NISTRATION — REPORT ON MEETING OF 
SEPTEMBER 2015 (WT/BFA/150) 
6.1.  The Chairman drew attention to the report of the Budget Committee in document 
WT/BFA/150 and invited Ambassador Daniel Blockert (Sweden), Chairperson of the Committee, to 
introduce the report. 
6.2.  Ambassador Daniel Blockert (Sweden), Chairperson of the Committee on Budget, Finance 
and Administration, said that at its meeting in  September, the CBFA had been updated on the 
administrative progress reports on the budgeta ry and financial situation and to the extra-
budgetary funds.  
6.3.  The Chairperson of the Working Group on Af ter Service Health Insurance had introduced the 
Working Group's final report. He had drawn the Committee's attention to the recommendations 
and guidance that would assist the Director-General to develop a strategy. The Committee had 
agreed on establishing a new Working Group to monitor the strategy development process. The 
CBFA Chairperson would consult with Members to identify a Chairperson of the new monitoring group. The Committee had endorsed the report of the Working Group on ASHI. 
6.4.  The CBFA had reviewed and refined a revised proposal on Terms of Reference for a Working 
Group concerning an Audit Committee. The Committee had agreed to establish a Working Group that would work to determine whether or not there was a need for an audit committee at the WTO. 
A consultation among Members to nominate a Chair of the Working Group was in process. 
6.5.  On a proposal for allocation of the curre nt accumulated budgetary surplus, the document 
released by the Secretariat had contained three recommendations. Members had expressed 
support for the two recommendations concerning the establishment of a building renovation fund. 
For the third recommendation related to set asid e funds for ASHI, some Members had requested 
more time for analysis and discussion. The Committee would follow up on the issues at an informal meeting on 16 October to further clarify some of the more technical details.   
6.6.  The Senior Management had updated the Committee on the progress on the Organizational 
Review taking place within the Secretariat. Two administrative memos had been issued on mobility and mediation policies, respectively. The memos had been sent to him. The Senior Management 
had emphasized that the Committee would continue to be kept informed on the matter. 
6.7.  The General Council took note of the statement and adopted the report in WT/BFA/150. 
7  WTO PENSION PLAN — ELECTION OF AN ALTERNATE — PROPOSAL BY THE CHAIRMAN 
OF THE GENERAL COUNCIL (WT/GC/W/703) 
7.1.  The Chairman recalled that Article 4(a) of the Regulations of the WTO Pension Plan provided, 
inter alia , for the election by the General Council of a Chairperson, four members and four 
alternates to the Management Board of the Pension Plan. In a communication circulated to 
delegations in document WT/GC/W/703, he had indicated that a position for an alternate was 
currently vacant, and that it had been necessary for the Council to decide on the matter. He proposed the name of a representative who had ki ndly agreed to have her name put forward for 
election as an alternate. He had also invited delegations to submit any comments they could have 
by close-of-business on 2 October. He had no t received any comments regarding the proposed 
nominations and proposed that the General Council elected Ms Eunice Huang (Singapore) to serve 
as an alternate on the Management Board for the remainder of the term of her predecessor. WT/GC/M/159 
 
- 35 - 
 
  7.2.  The General Council so agreed.4 
8  CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT IN SPECIAL 
SESSION – STATEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN 
8.1.  The Chairman said that as had been announced by a fax to all delegations on 16 September, 
he had conducted consultations to appoint a new Chairperson for the Committee on Trade and 
Environment in Special Session, following the departure of Ambassador Wiboonlasana Ruamraksa (Thailand). In line with the Guidelines for the Appointment of Officers, he had conducted the 
consultations with the assistance of Ambassado r Neple (Norway) – DSB Chairperson, and of 
Ambassador Fried (Canada) – former Chairman of the General Council. In undertaking the process 
set out in the Guidelines, Members had also put in to effect the practical steps to improve their 
implementation agreed by the General Council in July 2012, and contained in JOB/GC/22. They 
had therefore consulted group coordinators first, and had also invited any other interested 
delegations to come and consult with them. As a result of the consultations, he had sent a fax on 2 October to all Members informing them that it had been his understanding that there had been 
consensus among delegations on the appointment of  Ambassador Syed Tauqir Shah (Pakistan) as 
CTE-SS Chairperson, and had invited them to subm it comments, if any, by 6 October. Since he 
had received no objections, he proposed that the CTE-SS formally appointed Ambassador Shah as 
the new Chairperson at its next formal meeting. 
8.2.  The General Council took note of the Chairman's statement. 
9  ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES FOR MEMB ERS IN ARREARS – STATEMENT BY THE 
CHAIRMAN 
9.1.  The Chairman, speaking under "Other Business", recalled that the new revised Administrative 
Measures for Members in arrears, contained in WT/BFA/132, Annex I, had entered into force on 
1 January 2013. 
9.2.  Those measures included a requirement th at, at the end of each meeting of the General 
Council, the Chairperson of the Committee on Budget, Finance and Administration should provide information with regard to which Members and Ob servers were under Administrative Measures. He 
invited the Chairperson of the Budget Committee, Ambassador Daniel Blockert (Sweden), to 
provide the Council with the information. 
9.3.  Ambassador Daniel Blockert (Sweden), Chairperson of the Committee on Budget, Finance 
and Administration, recalled that in line with the Administrative Measures he should list all 
Members and Observers under all categories of Administrative Measures as of 7 October 2015. 
There were nine Members and three Observers in Category 1: Benin; Grenada; Malawi; Rwanda; St Vincent & the Grenadines; Suriname; The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; Vanuatu; 
The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela; Equatorial Guinea (Observer); Libya (Observer); and Sudan 
(Observer). There were no Members and Observers in Category 2. There were six Members and one Observer in Category 3
5: Central African Republic; Djibouti; Dominica; The Gambia; Guinea-
Bissau; Mauritania; and Sao Tomé and Principe (Observer). 
9.4.  The Chairman said that he was also required at each Council meeting to request Members 
and Observers in Categories II and III of the Measures to inform the Secretariat as to when their 
payment of arrears could be expected. 
9.5.  The General Council took note of the stat ements of the Chairperson of the Budget Committee 
and of the Chairman. 
 
__________  
                                               
4 The decision was subsequently circulated in document WT/L/961. 
5 Members who have not complied with their Paymen t Plan Terms: Central African Republic; Djibouti; 
and The Gambia.