WT/DS475/1  
G/L/1065  
G/SPS/GEN/1325  
 
14 April 2014  
(14-2314)  Page: 1/6  
  Original: English  
 
 RUSSIAN FEDERATION – MEASURES ON THE IMPORTATION OF LIVE PIGS, PORK  
AND OTHER PIG PRODUCTS FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION 
REQUEST FOR CONSULTATIONS BY THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 The following communication, dated 8 April 2014, from the delegation of the European Union 
to the delegation of the Russian Federation and to the Chairperson of the Dispute Settlement Body, is circulated in accordance with Article 4.4 of the DSU. 
 
_______________ 
 
 
My authorities have instructed me to request consultations with the Government of the Russian 
Federation (Russia) pursuant to Articles 1 and 4 of the WTO Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disput es, Article XXIII of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT 1994), and Article 11 of the Agreement on the Application of 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures  (SPS Agreement), concerning certain measures adopted by 
Russia affecting the importation of live pigs and their genetic material, pork, pork products and certain other commodities (the products at issue) from the European Union (the EU), purportedly 
because of concerns related to isolated  cases of African Swine Fever (ASF). 
 Background to the dispute and the SPS measures at issue 
 Following two cases of ASF in wild boar in the south-eastern part of Lithuania on 24 January 2014, 
Russia ceased accepting certain of the products at issue from the entire EU as of 27 January 2014. 
Two more cases in wild boar were reported in the eastern region of Poland on 17 and 19 February 
2014. The Russian measures, amounting to the adoption, maintenance and/or application of an import ban or import restrictions, are evidenced, inter alia , by the following. 
 
On 29 January 2014, two administrative notices from the Russian Federal Service for Veterinary 
and Phytosanitary Surveillance were issued (FS-SA-7/1275 and FS-SA-8/1277).   
According to Russia's notification to the WTO,  G/SPS/N/RUS/48 of 10 February 2014, Russia 
imposed, on 25 January 2014, emergency measures with regard to Lithuania, comprising a temporary restriction on imports of "live pigs an d their genetic material, pork products (which 
were not heat treated to at least 72ºC for at least 30 minutes), including products from slaughter 
of wild boar, horn-hoofed and leather, intestinal materials, bristles, feed for pigs, hunting trophies, previously used equipment for maintenance, transp ortation, slaughter and cutting of pigs" (FS-EN-
8/1023). The EU reacted to the measures imposed by Russia with a communication to all WTO 
Members of 19 February 2014 on Lithuania (G/SPS/GEN/1305). 
 According to Russia's second notification to the WTO G/SPS/N/RUS/49 of 4 March 2014, Russia 
imposed on 27 February 2014 similar emergency measures with regard to Poland (FS-NV-8/2972). 
The EU also reacted to the measures imposed by  Russia with a second communication to all WTO 
Members of 11 March 2014 on Poland (G/SPS/GEN/1313).  
 
On 14 March 2014, Russia followed its WTO notifi cations and the two EU communications to all 
members, by a communication of its own to all WTO members (G/SPS/GEN/1315).   
Immediately after the occurrence of the four ASF cases, the EU introduced measures, which were 
complemented by national measures by Lithuania and Poland, establishing affected areas to WT/DS475/1 • G/L/1065 • G/SPS/GEN/1325 
 
- 2 - 
 
  prevent any spread of ASF from those areas, in line with EU law and international standards laid 
down by the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE). Russia was informed about all measures taken and participated in expert meetings.  
The competent Russian authorities have attempted to justify the refusal of imports from the EU 
territory, inter alia , based on the assertion that the wording of the veterinary export certificates for 
the export of the products at issue from the EU to  Russia no longer allows for correct certification 
of exports from the non-affected areas of the EU, given the four ASF cases in Lithuania and 
Poland. The EU authorities had promptly provided the Russian authorities with all requested relevant information. Additional information was also provided on the EU's own initiative. Furthermore, a series of bilateral meetings were  held between the EU authorities and the Russian 
authorities during February and March 2014, at which further information and explanations were 
provided. Notwithstanding the information and explanations provided, Russia has refused to recognise the steps the EU has taken to separate  the affected areas (regionalisation) and has 
maintained its measures preventing the resumption  of exports to Russia from non-affected areas 
in the EU, and from Lithuania and Poland. 
On 8 January 2014, Ukraine notified cases of ASF in wild boar in the Forester-hunting ground 
"Pischane", Stanychno-Luganskyi, in the Luhansk Region, close to the Russian border. Russia 
restricted imports of live pigs and pork prod ucts from this region only, according to the 
administrative notice from the Russian Federal Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Surveillance of 15 January 2014 (FS-NW-8/528). This decision – detailed in Russia's notification to 
the WTO G/SPS/N/RUS/46 – was issued merely days be fore the isolated cases of ASF in Lithuania.  
In the same vein, Russia accepted lifting certain im port restrictions against Belarus despite the fact 
that ASF has been identified and no tified in two regions of Belarus  since June 2013. The movement 
of live pigs and pork products from pig farm s and meat processing companies of the Mogilev 
Oblast, Belarus, was allowed by virtue of the administrative notice from the Russian Federal 
Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Surveillance of 27 January 2014 (FS-EN-8/1093). 
Following steps by the EU to initiate consultations in the WTO, on 2 April 2014, the Russian 
authorities announced that, as from 7 April 2014, temporary restrictions will be introduced, and that the ban will be extended to include proce ssed products containing pork excluding ready-to-
use feed for cats and dogs which underwent thermal treatment (temperature not lower than 70ºC, 
duration of treatment not less than 20 minutes), from Lithuania and Poland (FS-EN-8/5084). This 
announcement was followed closely by updates to the original Russian notifications (G/SPS/N/RUS/48/Add.2 and G/SPS/N/RUS/49/Add.1) to demonstrate the extension of the ban 
already in force. They include an administrative notice from the Russian Federal Service for 
Veterinary and Phytosanitary Surveillance (ref. FS-EN-8/5081). 
The measures at issue include the adoption, maintenance and application by Russia, through its 
actions or omissions, in law and in fact, of import bans or import restrictions on live pigs and their 
genetic material, pork, pork products and certain other commodities, including those referred to above (the products at issue
1), as such and as applied, from the EU or any part thereof (with the 
exception of the areas2 where protective measures against ASF apply in accordance with EU 
legislation). The measures at issue also include di scriminatory treatment afforded to the EU and its 
Member States by comparison with Ukraine and Belarus. Furthermore, the measures at issue 
include those as of 7 April 2014 with respect to Lithuania and Poland, and eventually the EU.  
The measures at issue appear to be inconsistent with Russia's obligations under the SPS 
Agreement and the GATT 1994. 
 
Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement 
 
It appears that Russia has not ensured, and does not ensure, that the measures at issue are applied only to the extent necessary to protect human  or animal life or health. It does not appear 
necessary for Russia to restrict imports from non-affected areas of the EU; or with respect to all 
the products at issue.  
                                               
1 The products at issue are the products to which the Russian measures apply. 
2 Sardinia and certain areas in south-eastern Lit huania and north-eastern Poland, bordering Belarus. WT/DS475/1 • G/L/1065 • G/SPS/GEN/1325 
 
- 3 - 
 
  It appears that Russia has not ensured, and does not ensure, that the measures at issue are based 
on scientific principles. It appears that there is no scientific basis, whether specific or general, for restricting imports from non-affected areas of the EU; or with respect to all the products at issue.  
It appears that Russia has not ensured, and does not ensure, that the measures at issue are not 
maintained without sufficient scientific evidence.  
Articles 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 of the SPS Agreement 
 
The measures appear neither to be "based on" nor "to conform" to the relevant international standards, guidelines or recommendations, as provided for in Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the SPS 
Agreement. Furthermore, they do not appear to  be consistent with Article 3.3 of the SPS 
Agreement as there does not appear to be any scientific justification for departing from the 
relevant standards, guidelines or recommendations , nor would the measures at issue appear to be 
a consequence of the level of sanitary protection sought by Russia. 
 Articles 5.1 and 5.2 of the SPS Agreement 
 It appears that Russia does not ensure that the measures at issue are based on an assessment, as appropriate to the circumstances, of the risks to  human or animal life or health, taking into 
account risk assessment techniques developed by the relevant international organizations, as 
required by Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement. Russia has neither provided, nor referred to, any 
such risk assessment.  
It appears that, in adopting, maintaining and/or applying the measures at issue, Russia did not 
and does not take into account available scientific evidence; relevant processes and production methods; relevant inspection, sampling and testing methods; the prevalence of specific diseases 
or pests; the existence of pest- or disease-free areas; the relevant ecological and environmental 
conditions; and quarantine or other treatment. Ru ssia has provided no evidence that it has taken 
these matters into account, as required by Articl e 5.2 of the SPS Agreement. Had Russia properly 
taken these matters into account, it would have concluded that the measures at issue are 
unnecessary and unjustified. 
 Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement 
 As regards the measures at issue relating to Lithuania and Poland only, Russia appears to rely on Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement for the justification of its measures, as indicated in its 
communication to all WTO members of 14 March 2014 (G/SPS/GEN/1315).  
 With respect to the measures at issue, it appears that Russia has failed to comply with any of the requirements of Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement. In this case, it appears incorrect to proceed on 
the basis that relevant scientific evidence is insufficient. The measures at issue do not appear to be 
provisional. Russia does not appear to have proceeded on the basis of available pertinent information, including that from the relevant international organizations, as well as from sanitary 
measures applied by other Members. Although, Ru ssia has obtained the information necessary for 
a more objective assessment of risk, it has not, and shows no sign of, reviewing the sanitary measure accordingly within a reasonable period of time.  
 
Articles 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 of the SPS Agreement 
 It appears that Russia has not ensured, and does not ensure, that the measures at issue are 
adapted to the sanitary characteristics of the area from which the products at issue originate and 
to which they are destined, as required by Article 6.1 of the SPS Agreement. It appears that, in assessing the sanitary characteristics of the affected area, Russia fails to take into account, inter 
alia, the level of prevalence of ASF (four incidences in feral pigs (wild boar) in geographically 
limited areas close to the eastern external border  of the EU), the existence of eradication and 
control programs (immediately implemented in accordance with international standards laid down 
by the OIE), and appropriate criteria or guidel ines developed by the relevant international 
organizations.  It appears that, with respect to the measures at issue, Russia does not recognise the concepts of 
pest- or disease-free areas and areas of low pest or disease prevalence, as required by Article 6.2 WT/DS475/1 • G/L/1065 • G/SPS/GEN/1325 
 
- 4 - 
 
  of the SPS Agreement. It further appears that, in the measures at issue, Russia does not make 
determinations with respect to such areas based on factors such as geography, ecosystems, epidemiological surveillance, and the effectiveness of sanitary controls. Russia fails to recognise the EU territory, excluding the restricted areas, as a non-affected area, despite the implementation 
of appropriate regionalisation measures. 
 With respect to Article 6.3 of the SPS Agreemen t, the EU considers that it has provided the 
necessary evidence to objectively demonstrate to Russia that the EU (excluding Sardinia and parts 
of Lithuania and Poland which have been restricted due to the presence of ASF) is a disease-free area or area of low ASF prevalence. For this pu rpose, access has been given, upon request, to 
Russia for inspection, testing and other relevant procedures.  
 
Articles 5.3, 5.4 and 5.6 of the SPS Agreement 
 
It appears that, in assessing the risk to animal health and determining the measure to be applied 
for achieving the appropriate level of sanitary protection, Russia has failed to take into account all relevant economic factors referred to in Article 5.3 of the SPS Agreement, including the relative 
cost-effectiveness of alternative approaches to limiting risks. 
 It appears that, when determining the appropriate level of sanitary protection, Russia has failed to take into account, or properly take into account, th e objective of minimizing negative trade effects, 
as required by Article 5.4 of the SPS Agreement. 
 It appears that, when establishing and maintaining the measures at issue, Russia fails to ensure 
that they are not more trade-restrictive than required to achieve their appropriate level of sanitary 
protection, taking into account technical and economic feasibility, as required by Article 5.6 of the SPS Agreement. Russia fails to take into account that there are other measures, which are 
reasonably available taking into account technical and economic feasibility, that achieve Russia's 
appropriate level of sanitary protection and that are significantly less restrictive to trade.   The alternative measures would be those that take into account the principles of regionalisation, as 
determined in the OIE Terrestrial Code on Zoning and Compartmentalisation (Chapter 4.3) and set 
out in Article 6 of the SPS Agreement. Russia sh ould recognise the EU territory (excluding the 
restricted areas due to the presence of ASF), as  a non-affected area. The alternative measures 
would also involve a narrower definition of the products at issue. 
 Article 2.3 and Article 5.5 of the SPS Agreement 
 It appears that Russia does not ensure that the measures at issue do not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between Members where identical or similar conditions prevail, including between their own territory and that of other Members, as required by Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement. It 
further appears that Russia is applying the measures at issue in a manner that constitutes a 
disguised restriction on international trade. In addition, it appears that Russia has failed to avoid arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions in the levels it considers to be appropriate in different 
situations, and that such distinctions result in discrimination or a disguised restriction on 
international trade, contrary to the requirem ents of Article 5.5 of the SPS Agreement.  
 
By refusing to accept regionalisation with regard to the territory of the EU and its Member States 
(including the non-affected areas in Lithuania and Poland), but accepting, at the same time, regionalisation in respect of Ukraine and Belarus, it appears that Russia fails to comply with its obligations under Articles 2.3 and 5.5 of the SPS Agreement.  
 
Furthermore, Russia has responded to isolated cases of ASF in two Member States of the EU by closing the Russian market to all imports of the products at issue from the EU. By comparison, in 
the event of outbreaks of ASF in Russia, Russia do es not close the entire Russian market to all 
domestic products at issue. For this reason also, Russia appears to act inconsistently with Articles 2.3 and 5.5 of the SPS Agreement.  
 
In this context, it is noted that Russia does not appear to effectively control the spread of ASF in 
its own territory: since its introduction in the Russian territory from the Caucasus region in 2007, ASF has spread westwards and northwards, infecting the feral and domestic pig population. 
According to the notifications of Russia to the OIE, there were around 600 reported cases in feral WT/DS475/1 • G/L/1065 • G/SPS/GEN/1325 
 
- 5 - 
 
  pigs (wild boar) and close to 400 reported outbreaks in domestic holdings since 2007, involving 
the infection of a significant number of domestic pigs. The virus strain found in the four wild boar in Lithuania and Poland appears to closely match the ASF virus strain found in the Russian territory. The cases found in the EU are also located on the border with Belarus where the disease 
is also present, due to the spread of the disease from Russia. 
 Finally, it appears that Russia has failed to avoid arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions in the levels 
it considers to be appropriate in different situations, including with respect to different products. 
Such distinctions result in discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade, which is, once again, inconsistent with Articles 2.3 and 5.5 of the SPS Agreement.  
Article 8 and Annex C.1(a), (b) and (c) of the SPS Agreement  
 
The EU has repeatedly approached Russia since early February 2014 in order to discuss adaptation 
of the measures at issue to the regional conditions in the EU. The EU authorities have promptly 
provided to the Russian authorities all requested information, in addition to further information, provided at the EU's own initiative. Furthermore, a series of bilateral meetings were held between 
the EU authorities and the Russian authorities during February and March 2014, at which further 
information and explanations were provided. Notwithstanding the information and explanations provided, Russia has failed to modify the measures at issue in order to permit the resumption of 
imports to Russia of the products at issue from non-affected areas in the EU and/or with respect to 
appropriately treated or processed products. 
 The resulting undue delay is reflected, inter alia , in: 
 
 the administrative notice from the Russian Federal Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary 
Surveillance of 12 March 2014 (FS-SD-4/3620); 
 the failure to reply to invitations by EU author ities of 31 January and 14 February 2014 for 
urgent meetings; 
 requesting answers to questions irrelevant to the case (e.g. information on establishments 
in unaffected areas graded by production vo lume and biosecurity; number and origin of 
foreign hunters in all Member States); and 
 the belated provisions of invitations for visas for a technical meeting agreed on 21 February 
to take place 24-25 February 2014, which finally only took place on 7 March 
2014.Accordingly, it appears that Russia has failed to observe the provisions of Annex C of 
the SPS Agreement on the operation of contro l, inspection and approval procedures and 
otherwise failed to ensure that its procedures are not inconsistent with the provisions of the 
SPS Agreement, as required by Article 8 of the SPS Agreement. 
Furthermore, it appears that Russia has failed to ensure, with respect to its procedures for 
checking and ensuring the fulfilment of sanitary measures, that such procedures have been undertaken and completed without undue delay and in no less favourable manner for imported 
products than for like domestic products, as re quired by Annex C.1(a) to the SPS Agreement. 
 Furthermore, with respect to Annex C.1(b) to the SPS Agreement, it appears that Russia has failed 
to ensure that the standard processing period  of each procedure is published or that the 
anticipated processing period is communicated to the applicant upon request; that when receiving 
an application, the competent body promptly examines the completeness of the documentation 
and informs the applicant in a precise and complete manner of all deficiencies; that the competent 
body transmits, as soon as possible, the resu lts of the procedure in a precise and complete 
manner to the applicant, so that corrective action  may be taken if necessary; that even when the 
application has deficiencies, the competent body proceeds, as far as practicable, with the 
procedure if the applicant so requests; and that upon request, the applicant is informed of the 
stage of the procedure, with any delay being explained.   
Furthermore, with respect to Annex C.1(c) to the SPS Agreement, it appears that Russia has failed 
to ensure that information requirements are limited to what is necessary for appropriate control, inspection and approval procedures. 
 WT/DS475/1 • G/L/1065 • G/SPS/GEN/1325 
 
- 6 - 
 
  Article 7 and Annex B, paragraphs 1, 5 and 6 of the SPS Agreement 
 
Certain measures at issue were taken by Russia against Lithuania on 25 January 2014 (ref. FS-EN-8/1032). Russia only notified the so-called “emergency measures” with respect to Lithuania on 10 
February 2014, that is, 16 days after their impositi on. Other measures at issue relating to the EU 
have never been notified to the WTO. This appears to be inconsistent with the rules of the SPS Agreement concerning transparency.  
 
Specifically, it appears that Russia has failed to notify changes in its sanitary measures and to provide information on such sanitary measures in accordance with the provisions of Annex B of the SPS Agreement, as required by Article 7 of the SPS Agreement. Furthermore, Russia has failed to 
ensure that all sanitary regulations which have been adopted are published promptly in such a 
manner as to enable the EU and its Member States to become acquainted with them.  
It also appears that Russia has failed to notify other Members, through the WTO Secretariat, of the 
products to be covered by the measures at issue and the products covered, together with a brief 
indication of the objective and rationale of the proposed measures, including the nature of the 
urgent problem, at an early stage, when amendments can still be introduced and comments taken 
into account. It also appears that Russia failed to provide copies of the proposed measures at issue and to identify the parts which in substance deviate from international standards, guidelines or recommendations. It also appears that Russia has failed, without discrimination, to allow 
reasonable time for other Members to make comments in writing, discuss these comments upon 
request, and to take the comments and the results of such discussions into account.  
Articles I:1, III:4 and XI:1 of the GATT 1994 
 
For the reasons stated above, the measures at issue also appear to be inconsistent with Russia's 
obligations under the GATT 1994, and specifically: Article I:1 (most favoured nation treatment); 
Article III:4 (national treatment with respect to internal regulations); and Article XI:1 (general elimination of quantitative restrictions).  
*  *  * 
 Russia’s measures appear to adversely affect exports to Russia of live pigs, fresh pork and the 
other products at issue originating in the EU and its Member States, and also appear to nullify or 
impair the benefits accruing to the EU and its Member States directly or indirectly under the cited agreements.  
 
This consultation request relates to the measures at issue and to any amendments, supplements, extensions, replacement measures, renewal measur es and implementing measures, including but 
not limited to any such measures referred to by either party during the course of the discussions 
referenced to in this consultation request. 
 The EU reserves the right to address additional me asures and claims under other provisions of the 
covered agreements regarding the above matters during the course of the consultations. 
 The EU looks forward to receiving Russia's reply to this request and expresses its readiness to 
consider a mutually convenient date and place for the consultations. 
  
__________