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S/WPDR/M/73  
 
9 March  2018 
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Working  Party  on Domestic  Regulation    
 
REPORT  OF THE MEETING  HELD  ON 7 AND 8 NOVEMBER  2017  
NOTE  BY THE SECRETARIAT  
1. The Working  Party on Domestic  Regulation  (WPDR)  held a meeting  on 7 and 8 November  
chaired  by Ms. Katarzyna  Stecz  from Poland.  The agenda  for the meeting  was contained  in 
document  WTO/AIR/WPDR/11  dated  27 October  2017.  No item was raised  under  other  business.  
2. The representative  of Rwanda , speaking  on behalf  of the African  Group,  intervened  before  
the adoption  of the agenda,  asking  for clarity  on how the WPDR  process  was managed.  In 
particular,  he enquired  as to who was in charge  of this process , about  the role of the Chair, and 
why the Chair was undermining  her own conclusions  and was presiding  over a process  that 
Members  consider ed highly  questionable  and possibly  even illegitimate . The African  Group  had 
stated  at the WPDR  meeting  on 4 October  2017 that it still had to consult  on the convening  of 
WPDR  meetings  outside  of the scheduled  services  clusters  of meetings.  He reminded  Members  that 
the Chairperson  herself  had acknowledged  in her concluding  remarks  at the October  meeting  the 
time and resource  constraints  that many  delegations  faced . It was regrettable , in his view, that 
this was not an isolated  incident  under  her Chairpersonship.  He recall ed the serious  misgivi ngs 
that many  Members  had expressed  when  the Chairperson  had decided  to convene  an informal  
meeting  of the WPDR  on 9 May 2017. This had happened  despite  Members  of the African  Group  
expressing  to the Chairperson  during  informal  consultations  that they did not deem  it necessary , 
or timely , to have an informal  meeting.  The Group  had explained  that it would  be more 
appropriate  for the proponents ' clarificatory  responses  to be placed  on the formal  record  of the 
June cluster  of meetings.  Yet the Chairperson  had gone ahead  and convened  the meeting . Many 
Members,  including  two large groups  consisting  of 36 and 44 Members  respectively,  had expressed  
concerns  on the manner  and timing  in which  the Chairperson  had chose n to convene  the meetings  
outside  of the normal  structures  of the scheduled  cluster.  The Chairperson 's response  at the May 9 
informal  WPDR  had been that she would,  going  forward,  consult  on the convening  of meetings  
outside  ordinary  business.  This was the comfort  the Members  had taken  away from those  
proceedings  to ensure  that the process  was predictable  and transparent , and that Members  had 
enough  time to consult  internally  with capitals,  and within  Members ' respective  configurations.   
3. Regarding  the schedul ing of the current  WPDR  meeting , he noted  that following  the October  
meeting,  the African  Group  had expected  that the Chairperson  would  consult  on the convening  of 
the next meeting.  Indeed,  there  had been a number  of delegations  who had expressed  very clearly 
that unless  a significant  change  had been brought  about  in the consolidated  text by the 
proponents,  and until Members  had had an opportunity  to assess  those  changes,  they could  not 
agree  to holding  another  meeting.  On 27 October,  the coordinator  and focal point of the African  
Group  had received  an email  from the Secretariat  informing  him of the convening  of a WPDR  
meeting  on 7 November  and enquiring  whether  the African  Group  would  like to have its submission  
with questions  (JOB/SERV/269)  listed  on the Airgram.  In consultations  the African  Group  had 
undert aken with the Chairperson , it had understood  that the Chairperson  was to follow  the process  
previously  agreed  in the WPDR,  i.e. to consult  with Members  and upon conclusion  of the 
consultations  during  the week of 30 October  decide  whether  a meeting  could be envisaged.  
However,  shortly  thereafter  the African  Group  received  an Airgram.  It was therefore  not clear how 
the process  was being  managed.  The African  Group  did not agree  to the convening  of the current 
meeting  and had been very clear on how it viewed the work advancing  in the WTO. He stated  that 
under normal  circumstances,  the African  Group  would  block the agenda  but, as it wanted to 
continue  engaging  in good faith, the Group  would  not do so. However,  he stressed  that the voice 
of Africa  had to be duly recorded.   S/WPDR/M/73  
 
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  4. When  the Chairperson  had been entrusted  with the responsibility  to chair a negotiating  
body,  the African  Group  had the expectation  that the Chairperson  would  be objective,  transparent,  
and cognizant  of all Members ' views.  For that reason  the Group  was disappointed  with the report  
that the Chair had made  under  her own responsibility  at the CTS Special  Session  meeting  on 
23 October.  Notwithstanding  the fact that she had not been mandated  by Members  to develop  the 
report  in question,  the report  had not addressed  any of the concerns  raised  by the African  Group  
over the last nine months.  The only accommodation  that the African  Group  had been given  in the 
report  was a reference  to the concerns  that some  Members  had with respect  to the right to 
regulate  and having  a development  chapter.  He expressed  the view that even the Chair of the CTS 
Special  Session  had overturned  the WPDR  Chair's assessment  and presented  a balanced  report  at 
the informal  TNC meeting the following  day. He underlined  that since March  2017,  the Chairperson  
had presided  over four WPDR  meetings . By the count  of the African  Group , she had presided  over 
at least 40 hours  of meetings,  and yet she did not think it appropriate  to reflect  in her report  the 
views,  concerns,  conceptual  differences  and substantive  divergences  expressed  by the African  
Group.  To date, the African  Group  remain ed the biggest  group engaged  in the domestic  regulation  
discussi ons in the WTO.  He wondered  how the Chair expect ed Members  to have any faith in the 
process  she was leading  if she could  not be fair to some  Members  and represent  their perspectives  
as much  as she did for the proponents . The African  Group  had explained  in great  detail  why it 
consider ed the proposed  rules as being  incompatible  with "Agenda  2063:  The Africa  We Want" and 
had demonstrated  how the proposed  rules did not adhere  to the GATS  Article  VI:4 mandate.  The 
Group  had also expressed  in detail  its concerns  with the inclusion  of the necessity  test, and the 
fact that transparency  and gender  had no mandate . The Group  did not agree  that the formulation  
of the development -of-measures  proposals  was within  the meaning  of GATS  VI:4. Nor did it agree  
with the scope  of the proposed  rules,  and the necessity  of developing  these  rules. The group  had 
also expressed  concerns  over interpretative  issues,  regulatory  capture,  preservation  of policy  
space,  regulatory  models,  regulatory  autonomy  and the intrusion  into Members ' domestic  policy -
making  processes.  Even if the proponents  continuously  chose  not to acknowledge  the African  
Group 's concerns,  the Group  still expect ed, as a bare minimum , that the Chair would  acknowledge  
them.   
5. He also expressed  the Group 's wish to place on record  the inability  of African  Members  to 
prepare  for these  meetings  without  early circulation  of the WPDR  reports  in English  and French,  
and requested  clarity  on how these  reports  were developed.  The Group  had observed  that its 
written  statements  were not reflected  verbatim  in the reports.  Further,  he expressed  the view that 
the interventions  of African  Group  Members  and those  of others  on contentious  issues  were 
engineered  by the report  writer.  Members  had heard  references  in the WPDR  Chair's report  at the 
CTS Special  Session  to the growing  number  of proponents.  Yet the proponents  were supporting  a 
text that had brackets.  He noted  that perhaps  the Chair should  also be reporting  on that fact. He 
caution ed the Chair against  playing  a numbers  game  and noted  that the African  Group  could  also 
play this game  and use numbers  to seek development -centered  conclusions  on DDA issues , 
including  on agriculture  domestic  support  and cotton,  as well as on the permanent  solution  for 
public stockholding  for food security  purposes,  the special  safeguard  mechanism  and on special  
and differential  treatment . He was of the view that the Chair's duty was to build bridges  and not 
burn them.  The African  Group  took the implications  of an illegitimate  process  very seriously.  He 
underlined  that the issues  under  consideration  in the WPDR  were very important  for the Group  and 
remind ed the Chair and the proponents  that the WTO operate d on the basis of consensus.  If the 
Chair was committed  to fulfilling  her role as a competent,  objective  and transparent  Chair who was 
seen not as a proponent  but as a voice carrying  the interests  of all Members,  she needed  to reflect  
whether  she had the capacity  to undertake  the responsibili ties required  of such posts  in the WTO 
system.  He also recommend ed the Chair to read the African  Group  statements.  The African  Group  
recall ed and reaffirm ed every  statement  it had made  in the WTO since March  2017,  including  at 
the TNC on 24 October  2017.  
6. The representative  of Kenya  associate d himself with the statement  made  by Rwanda  on 
behalf  of the African  Group.  He recall ed that during  the meeting  of 9 May, Kenya  was one of the 
delegations  that raised  the issue of scheduling  of meetings  outside  of clusters.  Kenya  had made  a 
request  to the Chair that in view of the challenges  that small  delegations  faced  to prepare  and 
attend  such meetings , it was important  that she hold consultations  before  schedul ing meetings  
outside  the cluster  schedule.  He remember ed that following  this request,  the Chair committed  
herself  to consult  before  scheduling  meetings  outside  the cluster . The delegation  of Kenya  was not 
aware  of any consult ations  that had been undertaken  and perhaps  the Chair might wish to let S/WPDR/M/73  
 
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  Members  know  why she had decided  to do so without  consulting . He thought  that without  proper  
explanation  this was going  to erode  Members ' confidence.  As stated  before,  some  delegations  were 
handling  many  issues  and faced challenges  to prepare  and participate  in meetings , particularly  in 
formal  ones that were held outside  the cluster , without  consultations  and on short notice.  
7. The representative  of Cuba share d the concern s expressed  by the preceding  speakers . At 
previous  meetings  a number  of delegations  on an individual  basis, as well as two groups  that 
represent ed developing  countries , had indicated  reservations  with regard  to holding  another  
meeting.  In the absence  of a qualitative  step forward  that would  allow for a change  in the 
dynamics  of the deliberations , Members  were just going  to be listening  to a rerun  of previous  
meetings.  Proponents  had not taken  into account  all of Members ' concerns  in their revised  
consolidated  text. She enquired why the Chair had determined  that it would  not be necessary  to 
hold consultations  on the scheduling  of a meeting  with at least the most active  delegations  that 
had raised  serious  concerns  at the October  meeting.  The current  situation  was of great concern  to 
Cuba because  the Chairperson  should  address  all Members ' concerns  especially  when  these  did not 
respond  to the criteria  upheld  by the delegation  of Cuba. Although  she recogni zed the efforts  made  
by the Chair,  she believe d that the Chair should  be more careful  in trying  to preserve  neutrality.  
The situation  was very complex , especially  considering  that green  room meetings  or reduced  
format  consultations  were being  held on this topic with the exclusive  presence  of the proponents  
when  an important group  of developing  countries  had demonstrated  that the conditions  were not 
ripe for this topic to be part of a concrete  outcome  at the 11th Ministerial  Conference.  
8. The representative  of the Plurinational  State  of Bolivia  echoed the concerns  raised  by 
Rwanda  on behalf  of the African  Group , Kenya  and Cuba,  especially  with regard  to convening  
meetings,  given  that small er delegations  had to manage  their time appropriately  and make  sure to 
participate  in every  meeting.  For that reaso n he thought  that the concerns  raised  by the African  
Group  were very pertinent . He also express ed concerns  with regard  to the minutes.  The minutes  
were a reference  point for capitals  in terms  of what had happened  in meetings  in Geneva  and on 
some  occasions  the minutes  had not reflected  what had actually  been said at the meeting.  For 
example , on one occasion  a reaction  by the delegation  of Bolivia  to a statement  made  by the 
Secretariat  on the Article  VI:4 mandate  had not been recorded.  By the same  token,  the summary  
of the last Special  Session  of the CTS did not reflect  what had actually  happened  in the room,  and 
that was a concern  to Members.  He recogni zed the Chair's efforts  in leading  this process,  but in 
some  situations  the process  seem ed to be undermined  by the promotion  of the position  of one 
group  of countries.  That position  did not reflect  the position  of the whole  membership , and he 
urged the Chair to continue  this process  in a fair and balanced  way.  
9. The representative  of Uganda  associated his delegation  with the views  expressed  by Rwanda  
on behalf  of the African  Group  and the other delegations  that had spoken.  Uganda  had consistently  
stressed  since the Nairobi  Ministerial  Meeting  that the process  had to be transparent,  bottom  up, 
predictable  and Member -driven.  His delegation  took these concepts  seriously  and had tried to the 
greatest  extent  possible  to seek operationalization  of these  concepts.  He regret ted that the Chair 
did not follow  her own guidance  in the last WPDR  meeting.  His recollection  was that the Chair had 
indicated  that she would  undertake  consultations  before  convening  the current  meeting , as the 
delegation  of Uganda  had informed  her that it would  not be useful  to just meet for the purpose  of 
meeting  if areas  of interest  and concern  to certain  Members  had not been addressed  in a new text. 
In fact Uganda  had also suggested  that it would  be important  to look at the text before  even 
agree ing to the next meeting.  At a later stage  the Secretariat  had sent a message  enquiring  
whether  or not Uganda  wanted an item to be included  on the agenda,  as the date for the meeting  
had been picked.  He claimed  that during  the consult ations,  the Chair herself  had expressed  
surprise  at the time of the event , which  suggested  that she was not in charge  of the process  and 
the Secretariat  had taken  over, without  consulting  the Chair or consulting  other  actors , as opposed  
to the Chair who was supposed  to be the leader  of the process.  As far as Uganda  was concerned , 
he considered  the Chairperson  to be the rightful  Chair of the Working  Party. Uganda  had 
participated  in the Chair's re-election,  and the basic expectation  was for the Chair to perform  her 
function s. He encourage d the Chair to uphold  this principle  and express ed understand ing of the 
difficulties  she was in. The most important  part of this work was to come  up with regulatory  
measures  developed  in an objective  and transparent  manner.  These  principles  should  be 
operationaliz ed just for the purpose s of the process,  even if Members  had diverging  views  on the 
definitions  of those  terms.  He asked  the Chair to pay more attention  to the way the minutes  were 
prepared.  Uganda  had been one of those  delegations  that had engaged  extensively  in the WPDR . 
There  were areas  that had provoked  a lot of tension  which  had not been reflected  in the way they S/WPDR/M/73  
 
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  ought  to have been reflected . He referred  to the debate  on interpretation  of the negotiating  
mandate  as it related  to the issue of transparency  where  his delegation  had expressed  certain  
views  on the role of the Secretariat.  Those  views  had been watered  down  in such a way that the 
delegation  of Uganda  could  not even recogni ze them. He was of the view that if Members  could not 
have the process  right,  they needed  at least to have their statements  correctly  reflected  in the 
minutes . He had observed  a distinction  in the way the reports  of the CTS and the WPDR  had been 
prepared.  He provided  an example  of when  in 2014 he participate d in a process  under  the 
preparatory  committee  for the Trade Facilitation  Agreement  (TFA). During  that time, a number  of 
delegations  had expressed  strong  views  on the adoption  of the protocol  of amendment  and created  
a linkage  between  the protocol  and anoth er item. Under the agenda  item on "next steps ", one 
delegation  had stated  that they could not agree  to holding another  meeting  if the situation  
continue d to prevail.  The Chair had promised  to undertake  consultations  and never  called  a 
meeting  without  having  exhaustive  consultations , which was contrary  to what the WPDR  Chair had 
done. In his opinion  the Chair had abrogated  her own conclusions  and the Airgram  was sent out 
instead  of the Chair seeking  meetings  with Members.  Following  the issuing  of the Airgram,  he had 
not seen a reason  for a meeting with the Chair,  as there  was no good faith and the spirit of that 
meeting  had been destroyed.  He expressed  hopes  for good process  and predictability  in the future  
and underlined  that in the WTO all Members  were equal , as they were protected  by the same  
covenant.   
10. The representative  of Ecuador  expressed  regret  that the meeting  had started  off in the way 
it had. In the report  that he had sent to his capital  from the previous  meeting  he had indicated  
that the item relating  to the convening  of another  meeting  had remained  open and that this item 
would  be submitted  to consultations  to determine  whether  or not the current  meeting  would  in fact 
be convened.  He noted  that not being  aware  of any such consultations,  he had not been able to 
inform  his capital . He asked  why the decision  had been taken  to convene  the current  meeting,  
without  prior consultations . 
11. The representative  of Colombia  thank ed the Chair and welcome d her proposal  to conven e 
the current  meeting.  He believe d that this was the correct  process  and that a sufficient  number  of 
Members  had expressed  interest  in continuing  discussions.  He also believe d that there  had been 
substantive  changes  to the document  which  merit ed an in-depth  discussion . 
12. The representative  of South  Africa  fully support ed the statement s delivered  by Rwanda  on 
behalf  of the African  Group,  Kenya,  Cuba,  Bolivia,  Uganda  and Ecuador.  There  had been a number  
of inconsistencies  in this Chair-led process  that had confused  the preparation  by delegations  in 
ways that could  prejudice  South  Africa 's position  and interest.  Members  had also been hearing  that 
the Chair had been comment ing on the fact that it was not the African  Group  who was opposing  
domestic  regulation  disciplines , but only a few Members  of the African  Group  who had concerns.  
She encourage d the Chair to remain  objective  and transparent  and to pay attention  to the needs,  
views,  and position s of all Members.  She stated  that South  Africa  did not question  the coordination  
mechanisms  in the Chair's own delegation  and, therefore  as a bare minimum,  South  Africa  
expected  the same  mutual  respect.  
13. The representative  of Australia  expressed  serious  concerns  about  the way the meeting  had 
started . She was very concerned  that Members  were having  a process  discussion  which  called into 
question  actions  she considered  to be very balan ced and very transparent,  and at times,  not in line 
with what the co-sponsors  would  have liked to see in terms  of how the discus sions had 
progressed . She noted  that if a process  did not perfectly  please  Members  on either  side of the 
discussion  that was a good indication  that the process  was balanced  and took into account  the 
views  of all Members.  She noted that interest  had been expressed  by a large group  of Members  at 
the October  WPDR  meeting  to have further  discussion  at the end of October,  but the proponents  
had also heard  concerns  from some  Members  that they would  not be ready  to engage  and that 
there  were certain  steps  that they felt needed  to be taken,  before  such a meeting  could  be held. 
The proponents  had listened  carefully  to the Chair's summary  of those  discussions  and had tried to 
respond  to what was requested.  Following  the October  WPDR  meeting , the co-sponsors  had 
circulated  written  responses  to the questions  that had been raised  and undertook  broad  
consultations  with a wide range  of Members  in developing  a draft revised  text. Proponents  had 
consulted  a number  of the most active  Members  on the revised  text, includi ng a number  of 
Members  who expressed  surprise  at how quickly  the revised  text had come forward , even though  
they had seen the draft well in advance.  The proponents  had worked  hard to consult  with a broad  S/WPDR/M/73  
 
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  range  of Members  in developing  a revised  draft text that responded  to questions  and comments  
that had been raised,  and then had circulated  the revised  text. On the basis of that revised  text, 
the proponents  had requested  that a meeting  be scheduled.  Unfortunately , it had not been 
possible  to schedule  the meeting as early as the proponents  would  have liked it to be scheduled,  
but they recogni zed that there  was a broad  range  of views  that needed to be taken  into account  in 
scheduling  such a meeting,  and so proponents  were willing  to take the Chair's guidance  on what 
was the best timing  based  on her wide consultations  with a broad  range  of Members  throughout  
the process.  She thank ed the Chair for the continued  efforts  to balance  what Members  knew were 
very divergent  views  on a number  of issues.  The delegation  of Australia  was a bit concerned  with 
some  of the suggestions  heard  that there  should  be some  kind of right for certain  Members  to 
have an advance  look at the proposals  put forward  by other  Members  in order  to determ ine 
whether  it would  be satisfactory  to call a meeting  on that basis.  Surely  there  was no pre-approval  
right of certain  Members  to decide  whether  certain  proposals  were a basis for having  a discussion.  
She recogni zed that convening  meetings  was the sole right of the Chair and looked forward  to 
continuing  to work constructively  with the Chair through  the regular  processes  of the Working  
Party.  
14. The representative  of the European  Union  believe d that the process  had so far allowed  for all 
the views  and sensitivitie s to be expressed.  He believe d that the WPDR  had played  its role as a 
platform  for exchanges  and discussions , so his delegation  felt comfortable  where  Members  were at 
this stage . Second,  it had been a common  practice  for the WPDR  to meet as needed,  and this had 
happened  on multiple  occasions  in the past and the conditions  were clearly  met for the current  
meeting  to happen.  He also noted that all the formal  requirements  had been respected.  
15. The representative  of the Republic  of Korea  register ed Korea 's support  of the statement s 
made  by Colombia,  Australia  and the EU. 
16. The representative  of Chile offered full support  to the statements  made  by the delegations  of 
Colombia,  Australia  and the EU and fully endorse d the work the Chair had been undertaking  for 
the Working  Party. Regarding  the document  under  discussion , he stated  that since the last 
meeting  of the WPDR , substantive  changes  had been made  and hence  it was worth  holding  a new 
meeting  to discuss  those.  He believe d that the current  meeting  was complet ely in accordance  with 
the Chair's prerogative  to call meetings  of the WPDR . Furthermore , this was a formal  meeting,  as 
many  Members  had requested,  and it had been organized  with enough  advance  notice . He 
believe d that this was the right body for the various  delegations  to bring up their points  of view. It 
was perfectly  legitimate  that there  were delegations  who might  have diverging  views  and those  
divergences  should  be examined  within  the substantive  discussion  itself.  
17. The representative  of Uruguay  thank ed the Chair for having  convened  this meeting  and 
support ed the process  that she believe d had been transparent  and well-balanced.  Furthermore , 
she support ed the statements  made  by Colombia,  Australia,  the EU, Korea  and Chile. She 
highlight ed the fact that Members  had been working  very hard to make  the significant  changes  
some  delegations  had requested  and had tried to integrate  these  into the revised  text so as to 
address  all concerns  raised  by Members.  
18. The representative  of the Kingdom  of Saudi  Arabia  thank ed the Chair for the hard work and 
the energy  she had been spending  to help advancing  the work on DR disciplines.  She expressed  
special  thanks  to the proponents  of the DR proposals  who had spent  much  time consulting  with 
Members,  answering  questions  and trying  to take into account  Members ' remarks  and concerns  to 
produce  the text currently  on the table.  She remind ed Members  that at the beginning  of the 
process  when  Members  had the first proposals  before  them, they had talked about  a puzzle.  The 
elements  of the text, i.e. the pieces  of the puzzle , had progressively  come  forward.  Some  Members  
had accepted  the option  to work on this basis and study  and discuss  element s in turn. Other  
Members  had stated  that they preferred  to have the whole  picture  in front of them to determine  
their position.  From the beginning  Members  had expressed  divergences , but at this point almost  all 
pieces  of the puzzle  had been presented.  The picture  was getting  clearer , and the questions  and 
remarks  from Members  and responses  from the proponents  signified  a strong  will to have an open 
and constructive  dialogue  that might  lead to concrete  results  at MC11.  Having  a development  
provision  in the text was a very encouraging  sign of engagement  and willingness  to have a 
dialogue  and to find balanced  results.  Saudi  Arabia  believe d that domestic  regulation  was crucial  
for sound  development  policy  objectives  and was keen to have a DR outcome  at MC11.  She S/WPDR/M/73  
 
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  strongly  believe d that this time Members could not afford  to lose the occasion  to deliver  a 
meaningful  outcome  for services . To achieve  this goal, the process  of convening  several  meetings  
before  MC11  was necessary  to bridge  gaps and to move  forward  with the work.  She noted  that her 
delegati on remain ed cooperative  with the Chair and all Members  to move  things  forward  in an 
open and constructive  manner . 
19. The representative  of Zimbabwe  endorse d the statement  made  by Rwanda  on behalf  of the 
African  Group  and support ed the views  expressed  by Kenya , Cuba,  Bolivia,  Uganda,  Ecuador  and 
South  Africa.  She urged  the Chair to be impartial  and to respect  the principles  of transparency  and 
inclusiveness , as well as the Member -driven , bottom  up principles  of the WTO.  The limited  capacity  
of small  delegations  should  also be taken  into account  when  convening  meetings , and 
consultations  should  be held before  convening  meetings  that were outside  the normal  cluster  of 
meetings.  In her view, there  should  be no compromises  in respecting  these  principles.  
20. The represe ntative  of Canada  associate d himself  with the interventions  made  by Colombia,  
Australia,  the EU, Korea,  Chile and Uruguay  and reiterate d that the Chair and the Secretariat  
continue d to have Canada 's trust and respect.  Members  had substantive  work ahead  of them with 
a new text which  had been widely  consulted.  It include d substantial  revisions  which  sought  to 
address  interests  raised  by Members  in previous  meetings  of the WPDR.  
21. The representative  of Cameroon  stated  that he had closely  followed  the statement  of the 
African  Group.  He expressed  the view that the Chair, when  when  she had given the report  to the 
CTS SS, had herself  stated  that her report  was biased. In the current  meeting  Members  had heard  
that the Chair's procedure s had gone down  the torturous  road of inviting  certain  delegations  for 
consultations  which  should  have no impact  on the content  of the negotiations.  He remind ed Chile 
that Members  were not yet discussing  the conte nts of the text, but the adoption  of the agenda.  
The African  Group  had said that it was not blocking  the meeting,  despite  all of the reasons  that 
spoke  for doing  so. He thought,  however,  that this fact should  be highlighted  and taken  note of. 
He expressed  uncertainty  as to whether  the Secretar iat was taking  proper  note of what was being  
said, as, in his view, it was often choosing  a particular ly selective  approach  to minutes . He asked  
what Members  could  expect  when  they could  not recogni ze their own statements  in report s. He 
pointed  out that the proponents , who, in his view,  were misguidedly  trying  to support  the Chair, 
had stated that they had spoken  to the Chair and that the meeting  had been convened  
subsequently.  He was of the view that this was not how Members  worked and underlined  that a 
Chair must be neutral  and must consult  all Members  who had put forward  divergent  viewpoints  
before  convening  a meeting,  where  holding  such a meeting  would  be problematic.  In his opinion,  
the Chair's credibility  was diminishing  as discussion s went on because  of the way she was leading  
the work.  He noted  that the proponents  were trying  to convince  Members  to support  the Chair and 
to show that when  they wanted something,  the Chair was under  their influence . He asked  the 
Chair if that was how she wanted to come  across , or whether  her work should  be transparent  and 
legitimate.  In Cameroon 's view, the Secretariat  was not putting  across  a correct  rendition  of the 
discussion  in the minutes,  the French  language  versions  were not available  within  the timeframes  
and the Chair's version  of events  was biased. He asked  the Chair what she would  do in Cameroon 's 
place and if she was under  the influence  of the proponents.  The delegation  of Cameroon  sought  a 
clarification  in this regard . He underlined  that certain  Members ' interests  could  not set aside the 
rules, as the WTO was a rules-based  organization  and his delegation  had a systemic  concern  with 
regard  to the rules.  He concluded  by saying  that many of the different  storms  in the modern  world  
had come  because  the rules no longer  held up the interest s of certain  parties.  It was problematic  
when the force of certain  waves  was stronger  than the rules and these  waves  needed  to be 
resisted.  
22. The representative  of Japan  expressed  his full support  for the interventions  of Colombia,  
Australia,  the EU, Korea , Chile and Uruguay  and others.  He also supported  the intervention  by 
Saudi  Arabia  to thank  the Chair for her leadership  and efforts  to take forward  the DR discussions.  
He testified  that the Chair had held numerous  consu ltations  with many  Members  since the 
summer.  In this meeting  Japan  wanted to discuss  the contents  of the proposals  and the next 
steps.  
23. The representative  of Chinese  Taipei  appreciate d the Chair's decision  to conven e the 
meeting  and thank ed her for her hard work for the WPDR.  His delegation  fully support ed the 
statement s made  by Colombia,  Australia,  the EU, Korea , Chile,  Uruguay,  Japan  and especially  S/WPDR/M/73  
 
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  Saudi  Arabia , as well as other  Members  who had shared  positive  and constructive  ideas. Chinese  
Taipei  would continue  to work with other  Members  on the text. He recogni zed that the Chair had 
been providing  excellent  leadership  and thoughtful  contribution  over the last fifteen  months.  He 
also looked forward  to listening  to other  Members ' ideas on how to define objectiv ity and 
transparency  to move  the discussion  forward.  
24. The representative  of Costa  Rica supported  the statements  by Colombia,  Australia,  the EU, 
Korea , Chile,  Japan  and others  who had spoken  of the need to hold the present  meeting.  He 
believe d that, as had been previously  stated , the proponent 's document  had under gone 
substantive  changes  and merit ed discussion.  He also believe d it was the Chair's prerogative  to 
convene  the current  meeting  and noted  that all formal  requirements  had been respected . This was 
a formal  meeting  at the request  of many  Members  and all positions  would be reflected  in the 
minutes . 
25. The representative  of New Zealand  added her voice to those  of Colombia,  Australia,  the EU, 
Korea,  Chile,  Uruguay,  Canada,  Saudi  Arabia,  Japan,  Chinese  Taipei  and Costa  Rica. She put on 
record  New Zealand 's support  for the Chair,  the Secretaria t, the agenda  and the process.  Co-
sponsors  had been working  hard to make  significant  changes  to the text, as had been requested  
by other  Members  and in particular,  to draft a development  chapter.  The proponents  were also 
working  hard to consult  with others.  She welcome d the opportunity  to discuss  the new 
development  chapter,  as well as other  inputs  received  from delegations  since the last meeting.  
New Zealand  looked forward  to getting  to work.   
26. The representative  of Switzerland  thank ed the Chair for the important  work that had been 
carried  out under  her stewardship  of the WPDR . He believe d that the Chair had followed  the 
procedures  by convening  this meeting  given  that there  were new elements  to discuss.  In addition , 
as certain  delegations  had mentioned , it was common  practice  of the WPDR  to meet as necessary.  
He acknowledged  that certain  delegations  had limited  resources  and had to choose  where  to invest  
those  resources.  He noted  that at least the time-frame  between  announcing  and holding  this 
meeting  had allowed  the delegations  to prepare.  He highlight ed that in addition  to the new 
elements  of the text, there  was added  value  in being  able to discuss  different  viewpoints  among  
Members  just a few weeks  before  a Ministerial  Conference.  
27. The representative  of Norway  added her voice to the statements  made  by Colombia,  
Australia,  the EU, Korea,  Chile,  Uruguay,  Canada,  Saudi  Arabia,  Japan, Chinese  Taipei,  Costa  Rica, 
New Zealand  and Switzerland.  She also reiterate d that the Chair and the Secretariat  continue d to 
have Norway 's full support  and trust and that all formal  procedures  had been followed  for the 
convening  of the present  meeting.  As stated  by New Zealand,  Norway  was looking  forward  to 
getting  to work.  
28. The representative  of Hong Kong,  China  support ed the statements  made  by Colombia,  
Australia,  the EU and others.  In his eyes the process  so far had been open,  transparent,  inclusive  
and well-balanced.  He believe d that in discussing  the proposals  made  by the proponents  in the 
WPDR  starting  from last year, due process  had been followed.  His delegation  fully respect ed and 
support ed the process  and the leadership  of the Chair.  
29. The represent ative of Argentina  added his voice to that of other  Members  in that he agree d 
with the way the process  was being  led. He also believe d that it was the Chair 's prerogative  to 
convene  meetings,  in particular  where  there  were new elements  to be discussed  by the Members.  
30. The representative  of the Bolivarian  Republic  of Venezuela  support ed the delegations  who 
had stated  their concern s with the current  negotiating  process.  He recalled  that the Director -
General  had suggested  that Members  focus on those  areas  where  there was the greatest  
possibility  of achieving  an outcome  at the upcoming  Ministerial  Conference.  
31. The representative  of Turkey  echoed the co-sponsors , as well as Saudi Arabia,  and stated 
that her delegation  highly  appreciate d the hard work and efforts  of the co-sponsors  to establish  a 
new proposal,  as well as the efforts  of all WTO Members  to contribute  to this process . She also 
emphasi zed her appreciat ion for the impartiality  of the Chair in this process.  In this regard,  she 
support ed Canada 's statement  that Members  should  use their precious  time in the WPDR  and start 
working  on the text as soon as possible.  S/WPDR/M/73  
 
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  32. The representative  of Swaziland  associate d himself  with the statement  delivered  by the 
African  Group , as well as with those  delivered  by like-minded  delegations.  His personal  observation  
was that the proponents  were not willing  to listen  to Members ' concerns.  The African  Group , as 
well as other  like-minde d delegations , had voiced  specific  concerns . He thought  that the 
proponents  would  come  to the Chair's rescue  and address  those  concerns  but they had just made  
a general  statement  instead.  He found  that the proponents  were delaying  the process  and not the 
African  Group.  He had expected  the proponents  to address  the concerns , so that Members  could 
move  forward , since the African  Group  was not willing  to block the adoption  of the agenda.  He 
noted  that Australia  mentioned  that it perceive d the process  as being  balanced.  He was concerned  
by such a statement  and asked  how one delegation  could  water down  the feelings  of other 
Members.  While  he agree d that Members  had equal  rights  to voice their views,  his expectation  was 
for the proponents  to address  the concerns  raised  by the African  Group  and other  like-minded  
countries,  even though  these  concerns  had been directed  at the Chair.  The Australian  delegation  
had also stated that the pre-approval  right to convene  meeting s rested solely  with the Chair, which  
mean t that it did not rest with Members , which  explain ed why the Chair had not consult ed with the 
African  Group and like-minded  delegations.  He considered  that with such a statement  it would be 
very difficult  to move  forward  and even adopt  the agenda , as Members  were shown  right from the 
outset  by one of the proponents  that the process  would not be transparent.  He enquired  what the 
use of proceeding  with this meeting  was if Members ' concerns  were watered  down  by the very 
same  proponent s that Members  were expected  to listen  to. 
33. The representative  of the Russian  Federation  added her voice of support  to the efforts  of the 
Chair with a view to achieving  a meaningful  result.  
34. The representative  of the Republic  of Moldova  support ed the statements  made  in support  of 
the process  and expressed  her gratitude  for convening  the meeting.  She believe d that the process  
of convening  the meeting  had been transparent  and had respected  the rules.  The role of the Chair 
was to facilitate  an open discussion  and to do so transparently , inclusively  and fairly.  Members  
should  also take into account  the fact that they were just weeks  away from MC11  and hence  it was 
only fair that the work would intensify  if Members  really  wanted to achieve  concrete  results. 
Therefore  she support ed New Zealand 's statement  and expressed  readiness to work on the 
substance  without  delay.  
35. The representative  of Israel  thanked the Chair for convening  the meeting  and register ed his 
support  for the Chair and for the process . He believe d that the Chair had been fair all along.  He 
also associate d his delegation  with the constructive  views  concerning  the process  expressed  by 
several  delegations . He looked forward  to being  able to arrive at a substantive  discussion  of the 
text at this meeting . He stated  that, as pointed  out by other  Members,  time was running  out. 
36. The representative  of the Plurinational  State  of Bolivia  stated  that it was clear that there  had 
been consultations  with the proponents  on the content  and the process,  and not with the rest of 
the membership , and was of the view that this presented  a problem  that needed  to be resolve d. 
No one was opposed  to having  the meeting  but there  were clear problems  with the substance  of 
the process  which  had to be corrected  and taken  into account  when  convening  future  meetings.  
37. The representative  of Egypt  expressed  his regret  regarding  the start of the meeting,  as 
stated  previously  by Ecuador  and others . In his opinion,  Members  were passing  through  critical  
timing  and it was clear that there were divergences.  The concerns  of develop ing countries,  
including  the African  Group  and the LDCs, needed to be addressed.  Therefore,  Members  needed to 
have a discussion  on the process , the strategy  and the experience  of the Chairpersonship  and not 
only on the substance , as proposed  by the proponents.  As raised  before,  the issue of the timing  
was crucial , and Members  needed to think about  the way forward  towards  MC11 , as well as about  
post-MC11.  The delegation  of Egypt  stood  ready  to work and engage.  
38. The representative  of Kenya  expressed  surprise  to hear the proponents  saying  that the 
WPDR  should  meet whenever  the proponents  needed  it to meet. The question  was who determine d 
if there was a need for a meeting  and whether  it was the proponents . He stated that Kenya  was 
not opposed  to WPDR  meetings , or to having  a substantive  outcome  at MC11  on domestic  
regulation , if there  was consensus . His only concern  related  to having some  assurance  that 
consultations  would  be carried  out regarding  the timing  of the meeting.  This was important  in 
order  to ensure  that Members  could  at least prepare  so that there  was effective  participation  by S/WPDR/M/73  
 
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  all. Members  were seeking  an opportunity  to engage  in discussions.  It was concern ing to hear a 
Member  say that those  who had inadequate  resources  should  allocate  them where  they were most 
needed.  This was the kind of attitude  Members  were consistently  getting from the proponents.  He 
thought  that this was not right and not in good spirit.  Members  were only seeking  to have an 
opportunity  to participate  in the discussions.  
39. The representative  of Peru expressed  his support  to the Chair of the Working  Party, as other  
Members  had done.  He specified  that Members  had a mandate  under  the GATS  and as there  was a 
proposal  on the table,  Memb ers had to work on it. 
40. The representative  of Cameroon  enquired  upon which basis or which  criteria  his delegation  
had not been consulted  while other  delegations  had been. He asked  the Chair to clarify  the reasons  
for the above  to clear things  up. 
41. The representative  of Mozambique  support ed the statement  made  by Rwanda  on behalf  of 
the African  Group  and other  like-minded  delegations , in particular  with regard  to the need for a 
bottom -up approach , inclusion  and openness  to full participation  of all Members,  following  the 
principles  of this organization.  
42. The Chairperson  expressed  her regret  that some  delegations  attempt ed to undermine  her as 
a Chair of the Working  Party.  She, however,  took note of the statements.  As Members  had a lot of 
work in front of them, she would  not rebut  the details  of the personal  attacks  that had been made  
against  her. She invited  any delegation  felt that its statement  had not been reflected  accurately  in 
the report  of the meeting  to contact  the Secretariat  which  would find a solution  with the delegation  
concerned.  As regards  the convening  of the present  meeting,  she recall ed that at the last meeting  
there  had been a broad  agreement  that meeting s should  not be held for meeting s' sake,  especially  
in light of the resource  constraints  of many  delegations  and the busy calendar  in the run up to the 
Ministerial  Conference . She also recall ed that the proponents  had been asked  to provide  written  
replies  to questions  and take into account  concerns  expressed  by other  delegations.  After 
proponents  had circulated  a document  containing  replies  to questions , and after their latest  
submission  of a revised  text, they had requested  the Chair to convene  a formal  meeting  as soon as 
possible,  so that the proposal  could be discussed  among  the Membership.  She had decided  to 
convene  this meeting  following  the practice  of the WTO where  every  delegation  had the right to 
bring proposals  before  Committees  and to get them discussed  in the appropriate  form.  It was not 
for other  delegations  to impose  preconditions  for such meetings  and it was not the role of the 
Chair to judge  whether  certain  proposals  merit ed discussion  or not. To clear the 
misunderstandings,  she underline d that she had not consult ed with any delegation  on the 
convening  the meeting.  Her consultations  with Members  had been related  to the way forward  and 
the state of play in the discussions.  She noted  that she had accommodated  the request  of the 
African  Group  of not having  informal  meetings  after reflecti ng upon the May informal  meeting,  and 
that was the reason  why all subsequent  meetings  were conven ed in formal  mode . She was trying  
her best to consult  with delegations  that were involved  in the process.  Sometimes  she could not 
reach  out to everybody  but she assure d Members  that she always  made an effort  to hear 
everybody  and ask everybody  about  their position , their view on the state of play and the issues  
on the table.  She asked  whether  Members  agreed  to adopt  the agenda.  
43. The agenda  was adopted . 
1  ITEM  A. DEVELOPMENT  OF REGULATORY  DISCIPLINES  UNDER  GATS  ARTICLE  VI:4 
1.1.  The Chairperson  recalled  that under the item "Development  of Regulatory  Disciplines  under  
GATS  Article  VI:4", Members  had held discussions  on the proposal  by the co-sponsors  in early 
October.  The delegation  of India had provided  written  comments  and several  other  delegations  
had made  textual and other  suggestions  on how to improve  the text. While  there  had been 
significant  engagement  by delegations,  some  Members  had remained  unconvinced  that the 
proposals  on the table presented  a viable  path forward  and pointed  to fundamental  conceptual  
differences  concerning  the need for domestic  regulation  disciplines,  and the benefits  that they 
might bring to these  Members.  The African  Group  had submitted  questions  to proponents  before  
the October  meeting  (JOB/SERV/269),  to which  the proponents , in addition  to providing  replies  at 
the meeting  itself,  circulated  written  replies  thereafter  (JOB/SERV/270).  At the end of the October  
meeting,  proponents  had announced  that they would  continue  to engage  with other  Members  on S/WPDR/M/73  
 
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  the new proposals.  Some  Members  had stressed  the need for a negotiating  text, while others  had 
believed  that the time was not ripe for such a text. She recalled  that she had undertaken  to 
explore  if and how convergence  could  be brought  about.  Her initial  consultations  with individual  
Members  had led her to the conclusion  that it would  not be productive  for her to seek to facilitate  
substantiv e convergence  among  delegations  while the proponents  were continuing  to reach  out to 
delegations  with a view to producing  a revised  text. 
1.2.  As a result  of their outreach,  the proponents  had circulated  a new proposal  for discipli nes on 
domestic  regulation,  contained  in JOB/SERV/272.  In the morning  of the current  meeting,  a revision  
had been distributed  under  JOB/SERV/272/ Rev.1 adding  Ukraine  as a co-sponsor.  In addition,  
Members  had received  a communication  from the Russian  Federation,  contained  in JOB/SERV/27 3, 
suggesting  amendments  and modifications  to the proposal  by co-sponsors.  She recall ed that at the 
last meeting,  Members  had received  written  comments  by India (RD/SERV/145)  on an earlier  
version  of the proposal  by co-sponsors,  contained  in JOB/SERV/268.  Her suggestion  was to use 
the time at the present  meeting  to focus on the new suggestions  that had been put before  the 
membership . Delegations  should  not feel a need to repeat comments  they had on portions  of the 
text that had not changed.  All those  commen ts were already  on the record,  and unless  any 
delegation  wishe d to indicate  otherwise,  those comments  would  remain  valid.  
1.3.  The representative  of Uruguay  speaking  on behalf  of the co-sponsors  of the proposal  for 
"Disciplines  on Domestic  Regulation ", contained  in JOB/SERV/272/Rev.1,  noted  that the 51 co-
sponsors  welcome d the high level of engagement  on the proposed  disciplines1. Following  the 
direction  given  by the Director -General  at the mini-Ministerial  meeting  in Marrakesh  on the need to 
intensify  work on domestic  regulation  as a prospective  deliverable  for MC11,  and in particular  the 
need for proponents  to address  questions  and concerns,  the co-sponsors  had intensified  outreach  
across  the Membership.  The revised  text contained  in JOB/SERV/272/Rev.1  was a response  to 
requests  at the last meeting  of the WPDR  on 2-4 October  2017,  for co-sponsors  to bring forward  a 
revised  text that respond ed to questions  and proposals  from other  Members  as a basis for moving  
forward.  She noted  that "development " was recognize d as an element  of high interest  to many  
Members  in the revised  text. The proponents  had listened  carefully  to many  Members ' views  on 
the need for domestic  regulation  disciplines  to include  a section  on development.  They welcome d 
the input received  from many  Members  on how the text could  address  the needs  of developing  and 
least-developed  country  Members,  which  had helped  to shape  the new section  7 in the revised  
text. In particular,  the co-sponsors  had taken  note of comments  from Members  that there  should  
be no one-size-fits-all approach  to development  and had instead  proposed  text that would  allow 
for a high level of flexibility  and specificity  to take into account  the different  needs,  situations  and 
capacities  of individual  developing  and least-developed  Members.  To achieve  this objective,  the 
proponents  had sought  inspiration  notably  from the Trade  Facilitation  Agreement  (TFA) , previous  
WPDR  Chair  texts, from the recent  proposal  from India, as well as from oral remarks  by Member s 
in WPDR  meetings  and during  many  bilateral  and small  group  meetings.  
1.4.  The starting  point in paragraph  7.1 was to make  transition  periods  available  for developing  
countries  up to a maximum  number  of [X] years.  However,  recognizing  that not all developing  
Members  would need transition  periods,  and that different  Members  might  need flexibility  to delay  
implementation  of different  provisions,  the proponents  had proposed  a text that would  allow for 
developing  Members  to register  different  transition  periods  on a Member -by-Member  basis,  
according  to their individual  needs.  Those  transition  periods  would  be registered  in a separate  
Annex  or Attachment  to the disciplines  and would  list each Member  requesting  transition  periods  
and the period  requested  for each provision,  providing  for different  implementation  time frames  for 
different  obligations.  This mean t that not necessarily  all provisions  would  be subject  to the same  
transition  period,  or to any transition  period  at all. Transition  periods  would vary on a provision-
by-provision  and Member -by-Member  basis.  The proponents  believe d that this flexible  approach  
would  allow developing  country  Members  to best reflect  their own specific  situation.  In terms  of 
implement ation of the provision,  the proponents  envisage d two steps  in the negotiations.  It would 
be important  for Members  to have clarity  about  the nature  of the obligations  before  they could 
identify  what transition  periods  would  be necessary.  The first step would  be to reach  agreement  on 
the disciplines  thems elves.  The next step, once agreement  was reached  on the text, would  be for 
developing  countries  to advise  what transition  periods  they wanted to list in the Annex.  The Annex  
would  need to be finalized  before  the disciplines  enter ed into force for any Membe r. The 
                                                 
1 The full statement  is contained  in document  RD/SERV/148,  dated  7 November  2017. S/WPDR/M/73  
 
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  proponents  had also included  language  from the WPDR  Chair text, as picked  up in India's proposal,  
that provide d the possibility  for the CTS to extend  those  transition  periods.   
1.5.  Paragraph  7.2 dealt with the specific  interests  of LDCs.  The language  was based  on the 
earlier  Australian  proposal  on "Development  - LDCs" contained  in JOB/SERV/261  and existing  
WPDR  Chair texts.  It specifie d that LDCs shall not be required  to apply  the disciplines . It 
recognised , however,  that some  LDCs had indicated  an interest  in imple menting  some  of the 
disciplines  and encourage d them to apply  the disciplines  to the extent  consistent  with their 
individual  development  needs.  In addition,  in response  to concerns  from LDC Members  about  what 
would happen  upon graduation  from LDC status,  the proponents  had included  language  that would  
allow graduating  LDCs to nominate  transition  periods  by notifying  the Council  for Trade  in Services  
of the transition  periods  they require d upon graduatio n, in accordance  with paragraph  7.1. The 
proponents  had also proposed  that the CTS should  take special  account  of any request  from a 
graduated  LDC Member  for extension  of the transition  periods.   
1.6.  Paragraph  7.3 provide d for technical  assistance  and capacity  building  as an integral  part of 
the proposal.  Members  would have recognized  the well-known  language  in this respect.  The 
proponents  believe d that this was an important  encouragement  for developed  and developing  
Member s, who were in a position  to do so, to deliver  on both technical  assistance  and capacity  
building  for developing  and LDC Members  with a view to facilitating  the implementation  of the 
disciplines  on domestic  regulation.   
1.7.  Moving  to the issue of scope  of application , she noted  that the proponents  had clarified the 
scope  in the revised  text and respond ed to questions  about  the relationship  between  the 
disciplines  and the GATS.  At the last WPDR  meeting  in October,  a number  of Members  had raised  
concerns  and questions about  the use of the term "authori zation". Some  Members  had enquired  
about  the scope  and definition  of authori zation,  while some  other  Members  were concerned  that 
this term would  go beyond  GATS  Article  VI:4. The proponents  had included  a precise  definition  of 
the term in the revised  text to address  these concerns  and questions.  As Members  could see from 
the text, "authori zation" mean t "the granting  of permission  to a person  to supply  a service,  as a 
result  of a procedure  a person  must adhere  to in order  to demonstrate  compliance  with licensing  
requirements,  qualification  requirements  or technical  standards ". The first part of this definition  
("the granting  of permission  to a person  to supply  a service ") was the ordinary  meaning  of 
"authori zation", which  could  also be found  in many  FTAs.  In the second  part, the proponents  had 
clarified that the scope  was limited  to those  authori zations  that result ed from a procedure,  linking  
back the definition  of "authori zation" to the well-known  elements  of the work on domestic  
regulation.  Finally,  the last part of the text ("in order  to demonstrate  compliance  with licensing  
requirements,  qualification  requirements  or technical  standards ") was inspired  by the existing  
definitions  in the WPDR  Chair text. It clarifie d that "authori zation" only cover ed those  processes  
that services  suppliers  were required  to go through  in order  to show that they compl ied with 
licensing  requirements,  qualification  requirements  or technical  standards.  In this way the revised  
text made very clear that "authori zation" for the purposes  of these  disciplines  did not go beyond  
the five elements  of GATS  Article  VI:4. In light of the certainty  provided  by this definition,  co-
sponsors  thought  that corresponding  changes  could be introduced  to paragr aphs 3.1 and 6.1, by 
using  "measures  relating  to authori zation" rather  than specifically  listing  the elements.  
1.8.  To respond  to broader  questions  and comments  on the link between  these  disciplines  and the 
GATS,  she explained  that in the revised  text the co-sponsors  had included  a new paragraph  1.1. 
The language  drew on the proposal  from India to include  the WPDR  Chair text paragraph  4, which  
had two elements:  a sentence  relating  to the difficulties  which  might be faced  by developing  and 
LDC Members  in implemen ting disciplines  on domestic  regulation,  which  the proponents  had 
included  as the first sentence  in the revised  text 7.1; and a sentence  relating  to the difficulties  
faced  by services  suppliers,  particularly  from developing  and LDC Members,  in complying  with 
domestic  regulatory  requirements , which  the proponents  had included  at the start of paragraph  
1.1. Therefore,  the proponents  had included  the full text proposed  by India from paragraph  4 of 
the WPDR  Chair text in both paragraph s 7.1 and 1.1 of the revised  text.  
1.9.  In paragraph  1.1 the proponents  had added  language  drawn  from the beginning  of the Annex  
on Telecommunications , where  Members  had agreed  on disciplines  with the objective  of 
elaborating  upon the provisions  of the GATS  and demonstrat ing the link back to the GATS,  as well 
as language  from paragraph  1 of the WPDR  Chair text referencing  the mandate  for these  S/WPDR/M/73  
 
- 12 - 
 
  disciplines.  The proponents  had also added  language  in paragraph  1.3 in response  to concerns  and 
questions  that the disciplines  on domestic  regulation  could  undermine  existing  GATS  obligations . 
They had clarified that nothing  in these  disciplines  would  diminish  the rights  and obligations  of any 
Member  under  the GATS,  which  was language  that had also been used in the Trade  Facilitation  
Agreement  in relation  to rights  and obligations  under  the TBT Agreement.  Following  a request  from 
some  Members  to specify  that all GATS  exemptions  and exceptions  applied , the proponents  had 
included  a sentence  stipulating  that all provisions  of the GATS,  including  Article  XIV on "General  
Exceptions " and Article  XIVbis on "Security  Exceptions " applied. 
1.10.   Another  section  that had received  a lot of questions  and concerns  was "Transparency ". With 
respect  to paragraph  4.2 on enquiry  points,  the propon ents had suggest ed to complement  the text 
by a proposal  from India.  A second  sentence  could  be introduced  with the objective  of clarify ing 
that enquiries  could be addressed  through  enquiry  and contact  points  already  established  under  
the GATS.  As a consequ ence,  footnote  5 which  revolved  around  a similar  notion  could  be 
eliminated.  The proponents  recognize d that many  questions  had been raised  in relation  to the 
opportunity  to comment.  As a first step, in order  to facilitate  the discussion  moving  forward,  in the 
revised  text the proponents  had deconstructed  the previous  paragraph  4.3 and clarified that the 
chapeau  ("[t]o the extent  practicable  and in a manner  consistent  with its legal system ") applie d to 
each item of the discipline.  Further  to this, the proponents  had added  the footnote  proposed  by 
Peru relating  to the consideration  of comments.  This footnote  explain ed in plain language  that this 
provision  did not place any obligation  on the final decisi on of a Member.  The proponents  believe d 
that those  two changes  added clarity,  notably  with respect  to the strength  of the discipline,  and 
would  provide  for a better  point of departure  for continuing  the discussions.  
1.11.   Co-sponsors  welcome d continued  engagemen t on the proposed  disciplines  and in particular  
acknowledge d the specific  textual  suggestions  that had been brought  forward  by a number  of 
Members.  In the revised  text, the proponents  had tried to accommodate  the positions  of Members  
as much  as possible,  without  introducing  changes  that might  create  difficulties  for other  Members.  
The proponents  looked forward  to further  substantive  discussion  on the revised  text. However,  the 
proponents  also recognize d that there  was a limit to how far they could take forward discussions  
based  on a co-sponsors ' text. It was clear that a number  of Members  would  like to see their 
positions  reflected,  but not in a co-sponsors ' text. She noted  that in order  to better  reflect  the 
positions  of all, Members  might  need to move  to a negotiating  text as the next step for taking  the 
work forward.  
1.12.   The representative  of the Russia n Federation  welcome d the contribution  of the co-sponsors  
to the development  of a working  text for negotiations  on disciplines  on domestic  regulation.  She 
appreciate d the significant  work carried  out by the co-sponsors  to accommodate  text proposals  
with a view to addressing  questions  and concerns  of certain  Members.  At the same  time, she 
believe d that there  was a potential  to make  the text more ambitious.  Her delegation's  
communication  JOB/SERV/273  circulated  on 3 November  contain ed some  amendments  and 
modifications  to the communication  of co-sponsors  which  her delegation  considered  to be 
improvements  to the text. 
1.13.   Paragraph  2.4(f)  referred to the situation  where  a competent  authority  was required  to 
disclose  details  on the reasons  for rejection  of an application.  In this case such details  could 
contain  information  related  to specificities  of activities  of certain  applicants.  She suggest ed making  
clear that paragraph  2.4(f)  would  not be construed  to require  a competent  authority  to disclose  
information,  where  that disclosure  would  impede  law enforcement  or otherwise  be contrary  to the 
public  interest  or essential  security  interests.  
1.14.   Furth ermore,  the current  draft disciplines  did not contain  a provision  allowing  an applicant  
to re-submit  an application  in case it had been rejected.  She believe d that the applicant  should  
have a clear understanding  that he or she had such a possibility  and suggest ed to include  the 
respective  provision  as an additional  subparagraph  (g) to paragraph  2.4. 
1.15.   Regarding  paragraph  2.7 on "Examinations ", she noted  that due to the specificity  of areas  
that were under  the purview  of financial  services regulators  or self-regulatory  bodies  or 
organizations , issues  related  to the process  of examinations  were defined  by such regulators  and 
bodies  individ ually.  Therefore,  paragraph  2.7 should  not be applied  to examinations  administered  
or offered  by financial  service  regulators  or self-regulatory  bodies  or organizations.  S/WPDR/M/73  
 
- 13 - 
 
  1.16.   She also suggest ed making  it clear that no law or regulation  referred  to in paragraph  4.3 
shall enter  into force prior to publication.  She suggest ed supplementing  paragraph  6.1. with a 
provision  stipulating  that a Member  shall ensure  that licensing  requirements  directly  related  to 
eligibility  to supply  a service  were not in themselves  an unjustified  barrier  to the supply  of a 
service.  She believe d that the disciplines  would significantly  benefit  from such a provision.  
Licensing  requirements  should  be subject  to the specificity  of the service  supplied  and must not 
create  hurdles  for supply  of a service.  
1.17.   She also proposed  to supplement  paragraph  7.1. with a provision  specifying  that transit ion 
periods  mentioned  in this paragraph  should  not be undertaken  in respect  of compliance  with 
provisio ns already  provided  for by WTO agreement s. If a Member  had already  made  commitments  
in respect  of certain  provisions  provided  for by these disciplines , e.g. in its specific  commitments  
or its Working  Party Report , such a Member  should  not take exemptions  in respect  of those  
commitments  within  the disciplines.   
1.18.   The Russia n Federation  support ed a multilateral  outcome  on domestic  regulation  at MC 11. 
She believed that Members  would  certainly  have to continue  their work after MC 11 in order  to 
raise the level of ambition  on this track.  Now however,  Members  needed to keep up the 
momentum  in their preparations  for the upcoming  Ministerial.  In this regard,  she support ed the 
idea of devel oping  a Chair text to accommodate  all concerns  and interests,  and to consolidate  all 
proposals.  Members  needed to have a text that could  facilitate  the negotiations  of a balanced  
outcome  for MC-11.  
1.19.   The representative  of India thank ed Uruguay  for its statement  on behalf  of the proponents  
and the Russian  Federation  for the revisions  and proposals.  She provided  comments  covering  the 
various  sections  covered  in the revised  text contained  in JOB/SERV/272 . The delegation  of India 
had engaged  constructively  with the proponents  on the development  of the DR disciplines  in 
accordance  with the letter  and spirit of the GATS  during  the recently  concluded  WPDR  meeting  in 
October  2017.  The Indian  capital  representative  had also been present  during the last meeting.  
She requested  Members  to recall  India's detailed  opening  remarks  delivered  during  the last 
meeting,  as contained  in document  RD/SERV/146;  India's textual  proposals,  together  with the 
rationale  for the proposed  changes  on the propone nts' consolidated  text, as contained  in document  
RD/SERV/145 , and India's detailed  oral interventions  on several  key issues  made  over the course  
of the three  days of the last meeting.  Since  then, the delegation  of India had also met with the 
proponents  bilaterally  on two separate  occasions  and further  clarified  their position.  
1.20.   The delegation  of India had carefully  examined  the revisions  introduced  by proponents  in 
the latest  revised  text (JOB/SERV/272).  She expressed  disappo intment  that the concerns , as well 
as the areas  of interest  to India had not been addressed.  The present  format  and structure  of the 
proponents ' draft text did not comply  with the mandate  provided  by GATS  VI:4. The mandate  
extended  to disciplines  on five specific  areas,  namely  licensing  requirements,  licensing  procedures,  
qualification  requirements,  qualification  procedures  and technical  standards,  and not to 
authori zation,  or various  other  themes  developed  by the proponents.  It appear ed that the 
proponents  were trying  to develop  theme -based  disciplines  on "authori zation", a term actually  
included  in GATS  Article  VI:3. The mandate  for negotiations  was contained  in Article  VI:4 and 
not VI:3. Article  VI:3 had a rather  clear obligations  to inform  the applicant  of the decision  
concerning  the application,  and at the request  of the applicant  provide,  without  undue  delay,  
information  concerning  the status  of the application.  Other  than these  two obligations,  there  were 
neither  other  disciplines , nor a mandate  for disciplines  on authorization.  Providing  a definition  for 
the term authori zation did not resolve  the problem.  India could not agree  to the present  approach  
of the proponents  which  was not aligned  with the GATS  VI:4 mandate.   
1.21.   It was also unfortunate  that the proponents  had not found  it worthwhile  to include  
definitions  of the five mandated  areas  of licensing  requirements,  licensing  procedures,  qualification  
requirements,  qualification  procedures  and technical  standards , four of which  had previously  been 
agreed  on an ad referendum  basis.  In addition,  she referred  to India's detailed  intervention  on 
"authori zation" delivered  on 3 October  for other  specific  observations.  She was of the view that 
Members  needed to go back to the significant  work that had been done in developing  the DR Chair 
Report s of 2009 and 2011.  S/WPDR/M/73  
 
- 14 - 
 
  1.22.   As mentioned  during  the October  meeting , the delegation  of India was unable  to appreciate  
the implication  of the section  on "administration  of measures " in the absence  of clarity  on the 
meaning  of the term "authori zation". She was convinced  that the scope  of disciplines  around  
authori zation could be much  broader  and even different  than the mandate  provided  by Article  VI:4 
of the GATS.  It was also unfortunate  that the proponents  had not incorporated  any of India's 
suggestions  on recognition,  which  were based  on the Chair texts of 2009 and 2011.  Disciplines  on 
qualification  requirements  were critical  to ensure  commercially  meaningful  access  for foreign  
professionals.  Without  commercia lly meaningful  disciplines  on qualification  requirements,  DR 
disciplines  would have negligible  value  for service  suppliers.  She recalled  that WTO Members  had 
negotiated  the "Disciplines  on Domestic  Regulation  in the Accountancy  Sector " contained  in 
document  S/L/64  in 1998. In fact the WPDR  had earlier  been called  the Working  Party on 
Professional  Services  (WPPS).  In her view,  it was regrettable  how far Members  had moved  away 
from the desired  and intended  mandate.  
1.23.   Regarding  the section  on independence,  the delegation  of India was unable  to comprehend  
the difference  between  the current  proposal  and GATS  VI:1 obligations  of "impartiality " on the one 
hand and the concept  of "operational  independence " of paragraph  18 of the Chair text, on the 
other.  These  issues  require d further  brainstorming  both within  the Group  and outside.   
1.24.   Regarding  the section  on transparency,  she request ed the proponents  to once again  refer to 
the textual  proposals  contained  in document  RD/SERV/145.  She reiterate d that publication  in one 
of the official  languages  of the WTO would  be an important  value  addition.  She appreciated  the 
reservations  and concerns  expressed  by some  Members  and noted  that implementation  of this 
obligation  would  also be difficult  for India given  that many  states and local level governments  in 
India used their own local languages  and dialects.  Yet, India saw great  merit  in this proposal.  As 
part of the Trade  Facilitation  Agreem ent, all Members  had undertaken  an analogous  obligation.  On 
the issue of mechanisms  to respond  to queries  from service  suppliers,  she repeat ed that India 
could not accept  the dilution  of the GATS  obligation  on contact  points  for developed  countries  
through  DR disciplines  in the name  of resource  constraints.  The new paragraph  1.3 was not 
particularly  helpful  when  footnote  6 clearly  dilute d obligations  on developed  countries  arising  from 
GATS  Article  IV:2. Regarding  the "opportunity  to comment  and information  before  entry into 
force", she request ed proponents  to once again  reflect  on the textual  proposals  and suggestions  
made  by India via document  RD/SERV/145.   
1.25.   As concerned  the section  on "technical  standards ", India had made  a specific  proposal  on 
technical  standards  based  on the DR Chair text that the proponents  had not found  worthy  enough  
for inclusion  in their revised  text. She reiterate d that the delegation  of India was unable  to 
understand  why out of the five mandated  areas  of GATS  Article  VI:4, the proponents  had included  
a separate  section  only for technical  standards.  She enquired  whether  other  mandated  areas  were 
not important  enough  for dedicated  disciplines .  
1.26.   Concerning  the section  on "development  of measures ", she was of the view that the current  
text, as it stood, namely  each of the sub-paragraph s (a), (b) and (c) of paragraph  6.1, constituted  
a complete  distortion  of the GATS  VI:4 mandate  and were completely  unacceptable.  In 
paragraph  6.1 (a), "competence  and ability  to supply  a service " should  be the main consideration  
for the objective  and transparent  criterion,  as clearly  mandated  by the GATS . India could  not agree  
to the inclusion  of irrelevant  and extraneous  conditions  related  to health  and environment,  as 
proposed . She was of the view that the implications  of sub-paragraph s (b) and (c) of 
paragraph  6.1 vis-a-vis the GATS  VI:4 mandate  were not clear. She agree d that there  was a 
mandate  on necessity,  and the Indian  suggestion  in this regard  was clearly  captured  in document  
RD/SERV/145.   
1.27.   Regarding  the section  on gender , she reiterated  her delegation 's earlier  comments,  namely  
that India did not agree  with the proponents  that gender  issues  could meaningfully  be addressed  
through  DR disciplines.  
1.28.   Regarding  the development  chapter,  she considered  it unfortunate  that the proponents  had 
completely  distorted  the import  of India's textual  proposal  on development . In paragraph  7.1 India 
could not agree  to a "best endeavour " language  on special  and differential  treatment  for 
developing  countri es. While  it had been proposed  that developing  countries  shall not be required  to 
apply  these  disciplines  for a period  of [X] years,  the propo nents ' text stated that developing  S/WPDR/M/73  
 
- 15 - 
 
  countries  "may" delay  entry into force of specified  provisions  for some  years.  This approach  to 
special  and differential  treatment  was not acceptable  to India.  She also noted that the Indian  
suggestions  on reduced  administrative  fees for service s suppliers  from developing  country  
Members  and the gradual  introduction  of new licensing  requirements,  licensing  procedures,  
qualification  requirements,  qualification  procedures  and technical  standards  in service  sectors  and 
modes  of supply  of export  interest  to developing  country  Members  had not been included.  The 
representative  of India saw merit  in those suggestions  and request ed proponents  to reconsider  
India's suggestions  based  on the DR Chair texts. It was also unfortunate  that developed  countries  
did not appear  to be sincere  on provision  of technical  assistance  to developing  countries  and LDCs,  
as evident  from language  of paragraph  7.3. 
1.29.   The representative  of Peru thank ed the representative  of the Russian  Federation  for their 
submission  and noted  that his delegation  had only co-sponsored  one section  of the proposal,  but 
would  like to become  a full co-sponsor  of the consolidated  proposal . He provided  a textual  
suggestion  to the language  in paragraph  2.5 of the discipline s that concern ed the entry into effect  
of authorizations  without  undue  delay . In the view of Peruvian  authorit ies, the language  could  be 
improved.  In this regard,  the authorities  needed to better  appreciate  the intended  distinction  
between,  on the one hand, the grant  of an authorization , and on the other  hand,  the entry into 
effect  of an authorization,  taking  into consideration  the scope  of the mandate  and thus of the 
disciplines . In his view, there  were two possibilities : the first one was that the term "enter  into 
effect " mean t the real use of an authorizat ion under  particular  conditions  in a particular  time and 
place.  The second  possibility  was that the term "enter  into effect " mean t the expiry  of a deadline  
set at the moment  of the granting  of authorization , i.e. the deadline  from which  on the service  
provider  would  be capable  of using  his or her authorization  without  legal impediment.  In other  
words,  the first possibility  was about  the real application  and the second  possibility  was about  the 
entry  into effect  without  legal impediment , in which  case it would  be better  to specify  the exact  
moment . If the first possibility  was the actual  application  of the authorization  under  specific  
circumstances,  unforeseen  events  might prevent  or impair  this sort of entry into effect  in particular  
contexts.  He provided  an example  of an authorization  to provide  transportation  services  for a 
determined  journey  which,  once granted , could  be prevented  from entering into effect  because  of 
a natural  disaster . Even if the authorization  had been granted  and thus all legal requirements  and 
procedures  had been fulfilled  and the service  provider  request ed for the authorization  to be treated  
expeditiously  by competent  authorities,  the repair  of a particular  road, for instance,  might  be 
something  that would  preven t the entry  into effect  of the authorization , i.e. the actual  use or 
implementation  of the authorization.  In this situation,  he did not see how the authorities  that 
issued the authorization  should  be held responsible  for ensuring  that the road be repaired  without  
undue  delay,  as they might  not be comp etent in that respect.  Since  Members  were working  under  
time constraints  and Peru abode willingly  and diligently  by the mandate  under  GATS  VI:4, he 
propose d alternative  language  as a footnote  to paragraph  2.5, namely  "for greater  certainty,  once 
an authori zation  enters  into effect , Members  are not responsible  for ensuring  its implementation ". 
If this formulation  was not acceptable , Peru remain ed open to consider ing other  suggestions  
Members  might  have to tackle  this concern.  He also flagged that Peru was still considering  the 
discipline  on enquiry  points  in paragraph  4.2. Regarding  the above  suggestion  to paragraph  2.5, 
he noted that this suggestion  could  be better  reflected  in a negotiating  text, as mentioned  by 
Uruguay . In his view,  a negotiating  text was a constructive  idea to consider  in the next steps  
discussion . 
1.30.   The representative  of the European  Union  thank ed the Russian  Federation  for circulating  the 
document  JOB/SERV/273,  the constructive  engagement  by Russia  and, in particular  the concrete  
textual suggestions.  Concerning  a new sentence  the Russian  Federation  propose d to add to 
paragraph  2.4(f), he underlined  the need to better  understand  the rationale  behind  this 
suggestion.  The sentence  seem ed to combine  some  elements  of Article IIIbis of the GATS dealing  
with disclosure  of confidential  information,  with some  elements  of paragraph  1 of GATS  Article  
XIVbis on Securit y Exceptions,  notably  the reference  to essential  security  interests.  While  the EU 
could certainly  subscribe  to the principles  of Article IIIbis and XIVbis, he wanted  to understand  the 
need to include  this sentence  in paragraph  2.4, especially  in light of paragraph  1.3 of the 
consolidated  text. The latter  provision  already  confirm ed that nothing  in DR disciplines  diminishe d 
the rights  and obligations  under  the GATS  and that all provisions  of the GATS  applied to these  
disciplines.  It even listed specifically  Article XIVbis as one of the provisions.  He was therefore  
wondering  whether  the General  Provisions  paragraph  1.3 was sufficient  to cater to the concerns  
that the Russian  Federation  was trying  to address  in paragraph  2.4(f). Russia  had also proposed  to 
add a new obligation , in paragraph  2.4 (g), to allow an applicant  to resubmit  an application  within  S/WPDR/M/73  
 
- 16 - 
 
  a reasonable  time limit in case of a rejected  application.  He noted that this was framed  as a hard 
obligation,  as the text referred to "shall allow". The current  drafting  of paragraph  (f) already  
contained  a reference  to procedures  for the resubmission  of an application  in the case of a rejected  
application,  in the form of a soft obligation , i.e. "to the extent  possible  inform  the applicant , where  
applicable , of the procedures  for resubmis sion of an application ". He enquired  if the Russian  
Federation  could  clarify  whether  it was indeed  of the opinion  that there  could never  be a situation  
where  an applicant  could not be allowed  to resubmit  an application  after the rejection  of an 
application . He also asked  how the Russian  Federation  saw the interplay  between  its suggestion  to 
add the sentence  "no law or regulation  referred  to in paragraph  4.3 shall enter into force prior to 
publication " in paragraph  4.5 with Article  III:1 of the GATS  which  allowed in exceptional  
emergency  circumstances  the publication  of measures  of general  application  after the time of their 
entry  into force.  Finally , he enquired  what exactly  was covered  by the term "eligibility  to supply a 
service " in the newly  proposed  subparagraph  6.1(d). He asked  if there  was any difference  with the 
term "ability  to supply  a service " used in footnote  9 or in GATS  Article  VI:4(a). 
1.31.   The representative  of Hong Kong,  China  welcome d the suggestions  made  by the Russian  
Federation . He reiterated  the question  asked  by the EU in respect  of paragraph  2.4(f). Secondly , 
he noted  that in paragraph  4.8 the Russian  Federation  propose d that no law or regulation  referred  
to in paragraph  4.3 shall enter  into force prior to publication.  Nonethel ess, paragraph  4.3 only 
used soft language , such as "to the extent  practicable  and in a manner  consistent  with the legal 
system " for the prior publication  of laws and regulations.  As para 4.3 only used soft language , he 
was not sure how the propos ed additi on using  "shall" language  would  operate.  Regarding  
paragraph  6.1(d), he stated  that his delegation  had similar  questions  as the EU, and asked if the 
Russian  Federation  could  provide  any examples  on what the licensing  requirements  directly  related  
to eligib ility to apply  a service  were. 
1.32.   The representative  of Canada  provided  Members  with an update  regarding  paragraph  6.2 on 
gender  equality.  He noted  that Pakistan  and the Former  Yugoslav  Republic  of Macedonia  had 
indicated  their interest  to be added  as co-sponsors  of that provision  and that a subsequent  revision  
would be issued  to that end. 
1.33.   The representative  of the Russian  Federation  thank ed the EU and Hong Kong,  China  for 
their questions  and noted  that she would  arrange  bilaterals  with interested  Membe rs to respond  to 
the questions.  
1.34.   The representative  of Australia  joined other  Members  in welcoming  the latest  textual 
suggestions  that had been circulated  by the Russian  Federation  in JOB/SERV/273.  She welcome d 
the continued  level of engagement  and apprecia ted the enthusiasm  with which  Russia  had 
approached  the text with a view of raising  the level of ambition  in some  of the disciplines . She 
looked  forward  to hearing  comments  from Members  about  whether  some  of these  additional  
proposals  might  be acceptable  to raise the level of ambition.  In relation  to some  of the additional  
language  that had been put forward  in Article  2.4 on administration  of measures,  she shared  the 
same  question  on sub-paragraph  2.4(f), as raised  by the EU and referenced  by Hong Kong, China. 
She was not sure if the proposed  language  was necessary  and what the implications  might  be if 
this language  was included  in that location  and not in every  other  provisions  where  the GATS  
obligations,  for example  on General  Exceptions  and Security  Exceptions  applied as well. She 
enquired  if the new language  that had been put forward  in Article  1.3 of the latest  revised  
consolidated  text might  provide  additional  comfort  in this respect  and might make  the extra 
language  that Russia  had put forward  in paragraph  2.4(f)  redundant.  Regarding  the value  added of 
sub-paragraph  (g), which  referred to the case of a rejected  application  and the fact that a new 
application  might  be submitted , she noted that the possibility  for the resubmission  of an 
application  was already  covered  in Article  2.4(f) of the revised  consolidated  text and asked  what 
gap the Russian  Federation  saw that this new language  might  fill. 
1.35.   The representative  of the Kingdom  of Saudi  Arabia  noted  that with regard  to the issue of 
gender  equality,  Saudi  Arabia  support ed the economic  empowerment  of women  which   would allow 
women  in general  to have better  access  to finance  to be able to integrate  into international  
markets  and solve the problem  of poverty.  
1.36.   The representative  of Swaziland  suggest ed deleting the words "gender  equality " and 
replac ing them with "marginalized  groups ". He stated  that his country  had different  priorities  and S/WPDR/M/73  
 
- 17 - 
 
  those  might  not be the priorit ies of some  other  countries . He suggested  adding  some  other  criteria  
as a basis for non-discrimination  in measures  relating  to authorization  for the supply  of the 
service , namely  physical  disability,  gender,  race, social  status,  nationality,  and others.  
1.37.   The representative  of Panama  thank ed the proponents  for the written  responses  to 
questions  and for the revised  text. She also thank ed Australia  and others  for the bilaterals  that 
had helped  her delegation  to better  understand  some  of the provisions,  particularly  those  related  
to technical  standards.  In general  the delegation  of Panama  saw the document  in a positive  way. 
She mentioned  the importance  of the development  aspect  that had been incorporated  in the 
revised version  of the text. However,  she believe d that the approach  used was not the most 
effective  way to address  or take into account  the needs  of developing  and least-developed  
countries  in services.  She noted that the proposal  adopted  an approach  simila r to that of the TFA, 
but she did not believe  that this specific  framework  should  be used in all negotiations.  She 
confirmed  that Panama  would be active  in negotiat ions on this text, which  was seen by the 
proponents  as the next step. In this regard  Panama  would  present  specific  language  for the 
provisions  related  to technical  standards,  as Panamanian  authorities  were not prepared  to accept  
obligations  on technical  standards  developed  nationall y. Therefore , the delegation  of Panama  was 
seeking  specific  langu age that clearly  reflect ed that the proposal  did not impose  technical  
standards  on countries.  
1.38.   The representative  of Thailand  thank ed the co-sponsors  for their great efforts  in producing  
the current  revision  of the draft consolidated  text, as well as the provision  of the written  response s 
addressing  the concerns  relating  to DR disciplines.  She also appreciate d the active  engagement  of 
other  Members  that had been providing  useful  comments  and drafting  suggestions.  She briefly  
noted that Thailand's position  remain ed the same  as in previous  WPDR  meeting.  She believe d that 
the provisions  on necessity  test and gender  equality  would  further  complicate  the negotiations.  As 
a result,  the delegation  of Thailand  might not be able to render  support  to the rule-making  
discussions  on these  specific  issues.  She reiterate d Thailand 's commitment  to developing  DR 
disciplines  as mandated  by GATS  Article  VI:4 and stood ready  to work together  with Members  to 
achieve  a DR outcome  at MC11  or further  down  the road. 
1.39.   The representative  of Australia  took note of India's comments  regarding  concerns  about  the 
structure  of the current  proposal . She regret ted that for many  years  it had not been possible  in the 
WPDR  to reach  agreement  and move  negotiations  forward.  She noted that Members  had spent  
many  years  debating  whether  they could  move  forward  on the basis of the 2009 or 2011 WPDR  
Chair texts. Neither  of the two texts had been able to secure  agreement  from Members.  The 
delegation  of Australia  had heard  very clear calls throughout  2015 and 2016 that if Members  
wanted  to move  negotiations  forward , there  needed  to be a new proposal  with a new approach  
and that was what had been proposed  by the co-sponsors  in their text. She hoped to focus on the 
substance  of the discussions  and not get caught  up in a structural  debate,  mainly  to see whether  
in substance  the co-sponsors  could  come  up with a proposal  that was shared  by Members  and 
address ed the interests  of many  Members  in the room.  The proponents  were certainly  interested  in 
going  beyond  their own interests , and had been looking  very carefully  at the various  comments  
and proposals  they had received  from other  Members  at the October  WPDR  meeting  through  
formal  written  submissions  and oral comments  by delegations.   
1.40.   She expressed  willingness  to provide  extra explanations  on the Australian  position  on some  
of the textual suggestions  that had been put forward  by India.  First, in relation  to paragraph  1.2, 
she noted that India had suggested  the inclusion  of additional  language  on the right to regulate  
that came from the GATS  preamble , as well as paragraph  3 of the WPDR  Chair text from 2011. 
From the proponents ' consultations  with other  Members , she recogni zed that the inclusion  of this 
language  might raise or exacerbate  additional  concerns  from Members  about  the extent  of their 
right to regulate.  From Australia 's perspective , she was open to considering  alternative  ways to 
reflect  the needs  of developing  and least-developed  countries,  particularly  in respect  of the degree  
of development  of services  regulations  in different  countries . Proponents  would  need to have a 
more detailed  discussion  on the right to regulate , which  was a critical  issue for many  Members , but 
she did not consider  that including  India's proposed  language  in the revised  text would  help to 
respond  to the concerns  that had been raised  by a broad  range  of Members  on the right to 
regulate.   S/WPDR/M/73  
 
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  1.41.   On India's suggestion  to add a new paragraph  1.3, namely  to include  language  from 
paragraph  4 of the WPDR  Chair text, she noted that this entire  paragraph  had been included  in the 
revised  text. She noted that the paragraph  had two separate  sentences  – one referring  to the 
particular  difficulties  that might be faced by developing  and least-developed  country  Members  in 
implementing  domestic  regulation  disciplines,  and she noted  that that language  was now the new 
introduction  for paragraph  7.1 of the revised  text. Secondly , the paragraph  put forward  by India 
recogni zed the difficulties  that might  be faced  by service  suppliers  particularly  from developing  
countries  and LDCs,  in complying  with domestic  regulatory  regimes,  and this element  had been 
included  as the first sentence  in the new paragraph  1.1 in the revised  text.  
1.42.   In relation  to definition s, the proponents  had taken  careful  note of the comments  by many  
Members  at the last WPDR  meeting  that the term "authorization " needed  to be clarified  and in 
particular  that authorization  should  not go beyond  the scope  of GATS Article  VI:4, i.e. the five 
elements  in GATS  Article  VI:4. The proponents  had included  a very specific  discipline  in this regard  
which  made it very clear that "authorization " for the purposes  of the domestic  regulation  
disciplines  was limited  to those  five elements,  i.e. licensing  requirements,  qualification  
requirements,  technical  standards  and the procedures  related  to those  requirements.  Therefore,  
the proponents  disagree d that authorization , as used in the revised  text, would  go beyond  the 
scope  of GATS  Article  VI:4 or would  only relate  to GATS  Article  VI:3. As stated  previously , the 
delegation  of Australia  was open to the inclusion  of other  definitions  if these  were important  for 
other  Members , but she encourage d Members  that were seeking  definition s to consider  whether  
the language  could  be streamlined  given  that the language  used in paragraphs  6-9 of the DR Chair 
text was quite complicated . She thought  there  would  be scope  for streamlining  the definitions.   
1.43.   In relation  to India's  suggestions  on "recognition ", which  came from paragraph s 27 and 28 
of the WPDR  Chair text from 2011, she noted that many  of those concepts  had already  been 
covered  in the revised  text. In particular,  paragraph  6.1(b) of the text require d Members  to have 
adequate  procedures  for applicants  to demonstrate  whether  they met the requirements , which  
cover ed the concept  in the first sentence  of India's proposed  text drawn  from paragraph  27 of the 
WPDR  Chair text. She noted that India had put forward  the whole  of paragraph  27 and enquired  as 
to the rationale  for including  the second  sentence  from paragraph  27 of the 2011 WPDR  Chair text. 
She asked  what value  India saw in that additional  sentence  and whether  there  might be scope  for 
redrafting  of that sentence  in a way that might  make that value -added  clearer. 
1.44.   Similarly , in relation  to the proposal  to include  paragraph  28 of the Chair text, she noted 
that para 2.4(e) of the proponents ' text addresse d incomplete  applications , including  on informing  
the applicant  and allowing  him or her, the opportunity  to provide  the additional  information  
required  to complete  the application.  She enquired  about  the rationale  for India's proposal  to 
include  a non-exhaustive  list of requirements . She also stated  that many  Members  throughout  the 
WPDR  discussions  had expressed  strong  concern  about  the viability  of any provisions  to allow 
applicants  to fulfil such requirements  in the home  country,  host country  or any third country.  And 
therefore  the proponents  did not consider  it likely that Member s would be able to agree  to text on 
this issue.  
1.45.   In relation  to India's proposal  in paragraph  2.7 on "examinations ", she noted that many  
Members  in previous  WPDR  discussions  had expressed  concerns  about  the viability  of any 
provisions  to encourage  competent  author ities to use electronic  measures  for conducting  
examinations,  or to provide  opportunities  to conduct  examinations  from the home  country  of the 
applicant.  The proponents  did not consider  it likely that Members  would be able to agree  on this 
issue.  
1.46.   Regarding  India's proposal  on publication  in one of the official  WTO languages , she recalled  
that many  Members  had indicated  at the October  WPDR  meetin g that they could  not agree  to any 
commitments  to publish  information  in one of the official  languages  of the WTO.  This provision  
would  of course  not provide  any problems  for Australia,  as domestic  laws and regulations  were 
published  in English  which  was one of the official  languages  of the WTO.  However,  as stated  
before,  the motivation  and objective  of the proponents  in developing  the text had been to only 
include  language  which  was pragmatic  and had real chances  of getting  agreement  from the whole  
membership.  She did not consider  it likely that Members  would be able to agree  on the publication  
of measures  in one of the official  languages  of the WTO.   S/WPDR/M/73  
 
- 19 - 
 
  1.47.   In relation  to India's comments  on transparency , she noted that the proponents  had 
adopted  India's proposal  to include  language  from the WPDR  Chair text in paragraph  4.2 that 
enquiries  could be addressed  through  contact  points  established  under  GATS  Articles  III and IV 
and had therefore  removed  the footnote  that was contained  in the previous  version  of the text. 
1.48.   In relation  to technical  standards  and in particular  India's proposal  to include  a paragraph  
on international  standards  from paragraph  41 of the WPDR Chair text, the delegation  of Australia  
remained  interested  to see if it was possible  to reach  agreement  amongst  Members  on the 
inclusion  of an additional  paragraph  providing  encouragemen t to adopt  international  standards  in 
areas  in which  Members  were using  standards.  However,  she noted that in previous  WPDR 
discussions  on this issue Members  had failed  to reach  agreement  and that the WPDR  Chair text 
contained  several  alternatives.  She enquired if Members  could  consider  the language  which  was 
more closely  based  on paragraph  2.4 of the TBT Agreement  as an alternat ive to paragraph  41 of 
the WPDR  Chair text. The text of the TBT Agreement  might  be more familiar  to Members  and 
might assist  consu ltations  in determining  whether  there  were prospects  for securing  agreement  to 
include  provisions  on the use of international  standards.  However,  she noted that paragraph  2.4 of 
the TBT Agreement  was a hard, "shall"-type obligation  and recogni zed that, given  the rate of 
development  of international  standards  for services , it was very unlikely  that Members  would  
agree  on any kind of "shall" provision  in relation  to the use of international  standards  for services . 
Therefore,  she suggest ed that any languag e that was considered  in relation  to international  
standards  should  be framed  in best-endeavour  or encouragement  manner.  
1.49.   In relation  to the development  provisions  and India's proposal  drawn  from the WPDR  Chair 
text, she referred  to the explanation  provided  by Uruguay  on behalf  of the co-sponsors  on the 
basis of paragraphs  7.1 to 7.3 of the revised  consolidated  text and to the approach  the proponents  
had taken  to development.  The proponents  had heard  from a broad range  of Members  that a one-
size-fits-all approach  to development  would not work.  They had heard  from many  developing  
countries  that they either  did not need transition  periods  at all, given  the flexibility  that was 
inherent  in the disciplines , or that they only needed transition  periods  for specific elements  of the 
text. Based on these  comments  and the previous  history  of discussions  in the WPDR , the 
proponents  did not think that it would be possible  to get agreement  on an approach  to special  and 
differential  treatment  that would  dictate  a one-size-fits-all transition  period  that applied  to all 
developing  countries.  As a result,  the proponents  had tried to be more responsive  to the widely  
divergent  views  of Members  in previous  WPDR  discussions  in coming  forward  with something  that 
they thought  could work for all Members.   
1.50.   She also took note of the suggestion  by Peru in relation  to paragraph  2.5 of the revised  
consolidated  text. It was not Australia 's intention  or understanding  that the provision  would  in any 
way require  competent  authorities  to be responsible  for ensuring  that service  suppliers  could 
provide  a service.  That was not how she read the provision  but if this was not clear to Members,  
her delegation  was very interested  in looking  at ways to clarify  that.  
1.51.   In response  to the comments  from Panama  in relation  to technical  standards,  she clarified  
that it was not Australia 's intention  that disciplines  on domestic  regulation  should  create  
obligations  on any Member  to develop  or adopt  technical  standards  for services, just as the 
disciplines  on domestic  regulation  did not create  any obligation  on any Member  to maintain  
qualification  requirements , or licensing  requirements , or procedures.  It was up to each Member  to 
determine  whether  or not they decide d to regulate  by using  technical  standards . Where technical  
standards  were adopted  by a Member  as a form of regulation  of services,  those standards  should  
be developed  using  an open and transparent  process.  She concluded  by saying  that if it was 
necessary  to clarify  this language , she looked forward  to working  with Panama  on how that might  
be achieved . 
1.52.   The representative  of Pakistan  expressed  appreciation  and recogni zed the Chair's efforts  in 
balancing  the many  views  which  was not an enviable  task. He welcome d the revised  proposal  of 
the co-sponsor s in the document  JOB/SERV/272 , which , in his view, was a much  improved  version  
of the earlier  document . In relation  to the revised  text, he had sought  some  clarifications , 
particular ly regarding  the development  provision in paragraph  7; he enquired  how the co-sponsors  
saw the implementation  of transition  periods  that was expressed  as "X" within  square  brackets.  He 
asked  whether  the X parameter  would  be identified  through  negotiation  or whether  it was a self-
designated  number  for any country  in question.  Second ly, he asked  whether  it was intended  that S/WPDR/M/73  
 
- 20 - 
 
  encouragement  provisions  would  become  hard obligation  after the determination  of the transition  
period . Thirdly,  regarding  the extension  of transition  periods  that could be made  depending  on 
levels  of development  and size of the economy , he asked  the co-sponsors  to clarify  the reason  for 
adding  the size of the economy  in this provision , as it could be unrelated  to the levels  of 
development.  He also requested  a clarification  from the Russian  Federation  on what the intention  
and value  added  of the additional  language  in paragraph  7.1 was. If the special  and differential  
treatment  provisions  were already  in the GATS,  the repetition  in the new disciplines  would  already  
be redund ant. In paragraph  4.8 the new language  proposed  by Russia  seem ed to negate  the 
flexibility  language  that was part of paragraph  4.3. Therefore , he did not see the need for this 
additional  language.  Finally  he thank ed Canada  for adding  Pakistan  to the proponent s of paragraph  
6.2 and expressed  willingness  to work on resolv ing the bracketed  footnote  and any other  
suggestions  in this regard.  
1.53.   The representative  of Canada  acknowledge d the constructive  interventions  of Saudi  Arabia  
and Swaziland  with respect  to the gender  equality  proposal.  The welcome  comments  also 
demonstrate d the challenge  Members  were facing in trying  to come  up with a provision  on gender  
that balance d interests  across  a large number  of Members . The delegation  of Canada  would  
certainly subscribe  to Swaziland 's view that Members  could  use trade  disciplines  to address  
inclusivity  more broadly  than simply  on the basis of gender . He welcome d the opportunity  to have 
a look at the text proposed  by Swaziland  to that end. Canada  was interes ted in working  with 
Members , including  Saudi  Arabia , on language  that might  enjoy  multilateral  consensus  and was 
encouraged  by the flexibility  that Members  had shown .He also thank ed India and Russia  for their 
specific  textual suggestions  which  pointed  to a very constructive  approach  to the negotiations . In 
his opinion,  those  proposals  should  have full airing  and an opportunity  to be negotiated  alongside  
the proponents ' text. With respect  to India's textual suggestions , Canada  could  subscribe  largely  to 
the Australian  intervention  with possibly  a couple  of exceptions.  Regarding  official  languages  of the 
WTO,  two of them - English  and French  - were Canada 's official  languages.  Regarding  technical  
standards , the delegation  of Canada  was not willing  to have a paragraph  dealing  with international  
standards  in the text. He stressed,  however,  that Members  needed  to find a way to consider  all 
proposals  currently  on the table and not only the proponents ' text in some  kind of consolidated  
negotiation.  
1.54.   The representat ive of China  reiterated  that his delegation  was committed  to fulfilling  the 
mandate  of Article  VI:4 of the GATS  and thanked  the proponents  for preparing  the consolidated  
text which  had incorporated  additional  elements  and some  suggestions  from other  Member s. The 
delegation  of China  had provided  their comments  and suggestions  on the proposal  at the last 
WPDR  meeting  in October.  His preliminary  observation  was that the revised  text could  become  a 
good basis for future  discussions.  He also thanked  India and Russia for their detailed  comments  
and suggestions.  
1.55.   The representative  of South  Africa  speaking  on behalf  of the African  Group,  stated  that the 
African  Group  had engaged  meaningfully  in the WPDR.  Without  seeking  to repeat  the well-known  
concerns,  she stated  that the revised  text had not addressed  most of the Group 's concerns.  At the 
outset,  she recalled  and reaffirmed  every  statement  the African  Group  had made  in the WPDR  
since March  2017,  and at the TNC on 24 October.  She also fully endorsed  and re-committed  
herself  to the African  Group 's submission  in the document  "Questions  on domestic  regulation  - 
Submission  by the African  Group " (JOB/SERV/269).  She was encouraged  by the many  voices  that 
had joined  the conversation  since the October  meeting  and expressed  similar  views  and concerns,  
as the African  Group  had been doing  for the past eight months. These  views  and concerns  were 
systemic  and pointed  to the need for a deeper,  more conceptual  discussion  of GATS  Article  VI:4. 
She enquired  how Members  could  reasonably  be expected  to resolve  these  divergences  in one 
month  when  the entire  genesis  of the consolidated  text was problematic  and there  was no 
common  understanding  and agreement  on the GATS  Article  VI:4 mandate.  Even within  the African  
Group,  Members  had different  perspectives  on what they considered  GATS  Article  VI to mean.  
However,  all Membe rs of the African  Group  agreed  that the GATS  Article  VI:4 mandate  had been 
misinterpreted  and imprecisely  operationalized  in the consolidated  text and other  proposals  
Members  had on the table.  
1.56.   For the African  Group,  one of the most fundamental  concerns  was how the proposals  
created  a framework  to facilitate  foreign  governments ' and service  providers ' ability  to intervene  in 
domestic  policy  making  processes  more directly  in the future.  It was the concept  of and S/WPDR/M/73  
 
- 21 - 
 
  implications  for the governments  on the soverei gn right to regulate,  as reflected  in the 
consolidated  text. Paragraph  1.2 of the text did not cure these  concerns  because  the provisions  on 
transparency  and development  of measures  consequently  diminished  this right.  For example,  this 
meant  that the gover nment  had the right to regulate  but before  it introduced  a new regulation,  the 
government  had to provide  sufficient  details  about  that possible  new law or regulation  and allow 
interested  persons  and other  Members  to assess  how their interests  might  be significantly  affected.  
The government  also had to allow these  interested  persons  and other  Members  to comment  and to 
the extent  practicable  consider  those  comments.  The right to regulate  was then limited  even 
further  because  any new introduced  measure  had to be based  on objective  and transparent  criteria  
and the procedures  had to be impartial.  These  were only some  of the ways in which  a 
government 's sovereign  right to regulate  became  conditional  through  the proposed  disciplines,  all 
the while subjecting  the framework  to multilateral  oversight  and enforcement.   
1.57.   It was regrettable  that the African  Group  had heard  proponents  qualify  their views  as 
ideological.  She believed  that it was important  for Members  to understand  where  the Group  was 
coming  from.  All Members  were familiar  with the internationalization  of decision  making  and 2017 
should  not become  a new 1884-1885,  when  at the Berlin  Conference  fourteen  states  met with an 
agenda  to divide  Africa  between  colonial  powers  into fifty irregular  countries.  This had been 
superimposed  over one thousand  indigenous  cultures  and regions  of Africa.  As a result,  Africa  was 
economically  divided,  which  prevented  it from being  as prosperous  as it should  have been.  By the 
time independence  had returned  to Africa  in the 1950s  and 1960s,  the legacy  of political  and 
economic  fragmentation  had been entrenched.  When  the econom ic crisis hit Africa  in the 1970s,  
the structural  adjustment  programs  of the IMF were forced  on African  countries  and inserted  in 
setting  an African  macroeconomi c development  and policy  agenda.  The World  Bank decimated  
African  economies  and societies  through  structural  adjustment  lending.  Africa  had never  fully 
recovered  and the structural  adjustment  programs  in more cases  than not could  not achieve  any of 
its claimed objectives  and had been promoting  unemployment,  poverty  and deindustrialization.  
What Africa  had learnt  from this battle  and struggle  was how little attention  was given  to the social  
dimension  of development  and to the institutional  weaknesses  of developing  countries.  A one-size-
fits-all approach  did not work.  The African  Group  had said this before  and would  continue  to say it. 
Too much  emphasis  was being  placed  on the institutional  and procedural  approach  to domestic  
regulation.  There  was an underlyin g assumption  that there  was a one-size-fits-all approach  or 
model  to regulation.  Hence  what Members  were seeing  now was a third struggle,  i.e. in the form of 
regulatory  colonialism.  The proposed  domestic  regulation  rules and the so-called  best practice  
models under  the guise  of good governance  seemed  to be creating  a regulatory  profession  to close 
off any space  and methodology  inside  governments  to think outside  of the proposed  criteria,  as if 
Members  were regulating  for proponents  to be able to lock in all future  market  access  for services  
exporters  and Memb ers with first mover  advantage.  
1.58.   In the short time that was left until MC11  it was not possible  to bridge  these  historically  
sensitive  matters  because  no amount  of best endeavor  language  or transitional  periods  being  
characterized  as special  and differential  treatment  could  make  up for taking  away African  
governments ' sovereign  right to regulate.  The use of flexibility  language  and references  in the text 
such as "shall to the extent  practicable ", "shall endeavor ", "to the extent  possible ", "to the extent  
practicable  endeavor ", "shall encourage " did not provide  comfort  to Members.  According  to WTO 
jurisprudence,  a "shall" obligation  required  a positive  action.  There  was also jurisprudence  on the 
terms  "practicable ", "whenever  practicable ", and "where  practicable ". She stated  that a 2010 WTO 
Secretariat  paper  on "Treatment  of flexibility  language  in dispute  settlement " (JOB/SERV/8)  
provided  a broader  explanation  and she encouraged  Members  to read it. The proposed  rules would  
result  in binding  obligations;  hence  it could  not be argued  that best endeavor  language  was non-
committal  language.  She also noted  that the so-called  flexible  best endeavor  language  was being  
used very specifically  and applied  only to some  provisions.  The chapter  on development  of 
measures  in particular  locked  in this prescriptive  regulatory  approach.  
1.59.   The WPDR  had its origins  in the Working  Party on Professional  Services  (WPPS)  which  had 
been established  with the purpose  of carrying  out GATS  Article  VI:4 mandate.  Historically  DR was 
about  addressing  barriers  facing  professional  services,  so that GATS  Article  XVI and XVII 
commitments  were not being  undermined  by domestic  regulatory  measures.  In other  words,  the 
intent  of GATS  Article  VI:4 had been to address  mode  4 issues,  but because  of political  sensitivities  
by some  Members  there had been no agreement  that GATS  Article  VI:4 disciplines  would  address  
barriers  in the form of visa requirements  and procedures.  Due to the broad  scope  of the text, the 
African  Group  was of the view that those  procedures  and requirements  were covered  by the S/WPDR/M/73  
 
- 22 - 
 
  proposed  rules.  Yet what had become  very clear was the diminished  value  of mode  4 in the 
proposed  text, with provisions  for residency  requirements  being  removed. Members  could  not start 
this discussion  by excluding  a priori  issues  that mattered  the most for developing  countries.  
Another  important  issue was the increased  trade  taking  place through  mode  1. It was inevitable  
that the proposed  rules would  apply  to all modes  where  specific  commitments  had been 
undertaken.  If Members  were to agree  to the rules as they were being  framed  currently,  they 
would  also be agreeing  to constrain  their development  imperatives  in the context  of an emerging  
digital  economy  and in building  the Africa  they wanted  through  industrialization,  economic  
diversification  and structural  transformation  of the economy.  
1.60.   All discussions  on the development  of domestic  regulatory  disciplines  always  came  back to 
one very important  question,  namel y which  disciplines  were necessary  and why. To date Members  
had still not obtained  any satisfactory  responses  on the necessity  of these  disciplines.  A very good 
example  to demonstrate  to the proponents  how well the system  was working  in the absence  of 
GATS  Article  VI:4 disciplines  related  to the recent  discussion  at the CTS on 6 October.  Some  
Members,  most of whom  were proponents,  had brought  to the attention  of the membership  new 
measures  on cyber security  which  were being  implemented  or being  adopted  in two Members ' 
jurisdictions.  Given  the growing  threat  posed  by cybercrime,  its increasing  sophistication  and 
frequency,  she was of the view that the measures  taken  by Members  could  certainly  be 
appreciated.  Yet many  of the proponents  were criticizing  these  measures,  their scope  and alleged  
vagueness.  If the DR disciplines  had already  been adopted,  proponents  could  have used the 
disciplines  to challenge them in the DSB for being  based  on non-transparent  or non-objective  
criteria,  or being  too burdensome  or not independent  in the case of licensing  requirements.  Yet in 
that same  CTS meeting  in discussions  on the digital  economy,  proponents  had themselv es 
acknowledged  that the nature  of the digital  economy  would  require  governments  to regulate  in 
novel  ways,  as opposed  to how they had regulated  before.  Indeed,  digitalized  delivery  of services  
could  also make  GATS  Article  XVI and XVII limitations  that Members had put in their schedules  
ineffective.  She enquired  how Members  could  implement  their limitations  if services  were directly  
accessed  by the consumers  abroad.  Until Members  better  understood  the changing  business  
models,  how digitalized  services  would  be delivered  differently,  how Members  could  operationalize  
Article  XVI and XVII limitations  in the digital  environment  and address  all unresolved  issues,  such 
as the technological  neutrality  of the GATS,  adopting  binding  domestic  regulation  rules would  
simply tie governments ' hands  to regulate  for legitimate  objectives,  such as implementing  GATS 
scheduled  limitations,  cyber security  concerns  and digital  industrialization.  The African  Group  had 
already  explained  in great detail  how net services  importers  would not suddenly  become  net 
services  exporters  and why these  rules were bad for African  countries.  Hence  it was time for 
Members  to move  away from texts that had been cherry -picked  over others  and to start 
address ing the African  Group 's concerns  and discuss  the starting  point for discussions  after MC11.  
1.61.   The representative  of Uganda , speaking  on behalf  of the LDC Group , stated  that he did not 
understand  why the Chair  had called  the meeting.  Most issues  of concern  that had been raised  
previously  had not been taken into account  by the proponents.  It had been the understanding  of 
the Group  that the Chair would  undertake  consultations  prior to convening  the meeting  with the 
view to assessing  whether  any progress  had been made.  He regretted  that the Chair had not 
either followed  her own conclusions,  or seemed  to not have heard  what many  Members  had raised  
in the WPDR.  As a result,  Members  were left to simply  reiterate  their points  and to suggest  that all 
Members  had to respond  to the call by the Director -General  to only focus on areas  where  there  
was a possibility  of convergence  of views.  At this point,  the LDC Group  agreed  with the views  of 
the African  Group  and the ACP Group  that there was no chance  of convergence  on this text. It was 
therefore  important  to move  to the discussion  of next steps.  
1.62.   He stated  that LDCs needed  a definition  of concepts  and clarity  on the scope  of application.  
Members  should  demonstrate,  with concrete  examples,  how the GATS  had not been sufficient.  
They also needed  to demonstrate  to the LDCs, the economies  of which  could  only support  low 
standards  of living  and were in the early stages  of development,  what was in it for them in 
exchange  for undertaking  stringent  and onerous  multilateral  rules that would  erode  their policy  
space.  He asked  why Members  continued  to push proposals  that had no mandate  in the WPDR.  
1.63.   Regarding  the new development  provisions,  he noted  that the language  in paragraph  1.1 
seemed  to suggest  that developing  countries  and LDCs were the demandeurs  of these  domestic  
regulatio n disciplines,  yet many  of LDCs were net services  importers.  As indicated  during  the S/WPDR/M/73  
 
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  previous  session  of the WPDR,  the LDC Group  had highlighted  areas  that it considered  to be non-
tariff barriers  for services  trade  in its collective  request.  These  problems  had continued  to make  it 
difficult  for the LDCs to take advantage  of the preferential  treatment  under  the LDC services  
waiver  mechanism.  These  were contained  in the sections  B and C of the LDC collective  request.  
The LDC Group  requested  the proponents  to consider  including  these  elements  as part of the 
development  package.  The elements  included  reduction  of fees, paper  work and onerous  
procedures  and requirements  for visas,  work permits  and residence  permits  and facilitation  or 
creation  of a better  enablin g environment  for recognition  of LDC institutions  and awards  (degrees  
and qualification).  
1.64.   Regarding  the issue of technical  assistance  and capacity  building  reflected  in paragraph  7.3, 
the major  concern  of LDCs was about  building  their supply -side capacity  with a view to exporting  
products  of export  interest  to LDCs in order  to be able to take advantage  of the regulatory  
framework  being  suggested.  The best endeavor  language  in this regard  was not helpful.  This was 
the same  kind of langu age Members  had been seeking  to make  precise,  effective  and operational  
in line with paragraph  44 of the Doha Ministerial  Declaration  in the CTD SS. The problem  had 
always  been that no Member  wanted  to be held responsible.  No one wanted  to take binding  rules 
on technical  assistance  and capacity  building,  yet Members  were required  to take on binding  
multilateral  disciplines  in accordance  with their regulatory  practices.  It was important  to recall  that 
this request  was consistent  with the Uruguay  Round  Decisi on on "Measures  in Favour  of Least -
Developed  Countries ", paragraph  2(v) of which  stated  that "Least -developed  countries  shall be 
accorded  substantially  increased  technical  assistance  in the development,  strengthening  and 
diversification  of their production  and export  bases  including  those  of services,  as well as in trade 
promotion,  to enable  them to maximize  the benefits  from liberalized  access  to markets ". What was 
important  for LDCs was not just the issue of transition  periods.  Their experiences  in the Uruguay  
Round  showed  that transition  periods  did not work or at best were not an end in and of 
themselves.  LDCs had come  back to Members  to seek various  extensions  e.g., in the TRIPS  
Council  under  Article  66:1;  and in the CTD SS for the TRIMS  Agreement  and the ASCM,  etc. under  
the mandate  in paragraph  44 of the Doha Ministerial  Declaration.  Further,  he agreed  with Panama  
and others  that it was still too early to qualify  the TFA as a model  template.  It had not yet been 
adequately  tested  and audited.  It therefo re could  not be used as best practice.  In effect  the major  
preoccupation  of the LDCs was the development  of their respective  services  industries,  so as to be 
able to build supply -side capacity  with a view to develop ing their competitiveness  and export  
capacity, to be able to create  jobs, improve  household  incomes,  and promote  social  welfare.  This 
ability  to grow the local industry  should  not be constrained  through  unnecessary  multilateral  
disciplines.  
1.65.   Regarding  the scope  of application,  domestic  regulation  disciplines  targeted  the ways in 
which  a country  was permitted  to regulate  three  activities  that served  multiple  functions:  licensing,  
qualifications , and the far reaching  technical  standards.  The regulations  that resulted  from these  
disciplines  applied  across the board  to all domestic  activities.  Whilst  the measures  would  cover  
every  service  sector  where  specific  commitments  had been undertaken,  the proposal  applied  to 
measures  "affecting " trade  in services.  This meant  that the DR disciplines  might  actuall y spill over 
to other  sectors  that simply  affected  trade  in services.  The EC-Bananas  case in the WTO had given  
a wide interpretation  to the scope  of the GATS,  and almost  any type of state intervention,  to the 
extent  that it affected  trade  in services.  In assessing  the cost and benefit  of DR rules,  it would  
depend  on whether  or not a Member  was a services  exporter  and faced  various  sorts of barriers  
entering  others ' markets,  or a net services  importer.  LDCs were net services  importers  with a 
services  trade  deficit of 33bn USD. It would  therefore  mean  that if they were required  to 
undertake  these  disciplines,  they would  be granting  unfettered  market  access  to the proponents,  
which  was contrary  to the object,  purpose  and spirit of the LDC Waiver  Decision.  The waiver 
mechanism  was meant  to provide  LDCs with a competitive  edge over and above  non-LDCs,  so as 
to facilitate  their integration  into the multilateral  trading  system.   
1.66.   Trade  rules were primarily  designed  to ensure  market  access  and were not directly  design ed 
to promote  efficiency  or social  welfare.  There  was a growing  preoccupation  concerning  the 
potential  adoption  of disciplines  that were highly  intrusive  in the domestic  domain,  requiring  trade 
considerations  to prevail  over other  legitimate  policy  objecti ves of domestic  regulation  such as 
people 's access  to services,  employment  considerations,  macro -economic  reasons,  security,  social  
and cultural  considerations,  etc. If for these  reasons  regulations  had been put in place that might  
be considered  not "the least burdensome ", or not "objective ", or not "transparent ", governments  S/WPDR/M/73  
 
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  would  most likely be challenged  under  these  disciplines.  This in effect  could  seriously  constrain  the 
capacity  of states  to effectively  regulate  services.  
1.67.   Concerning  the right to regulate, he noted  that in its current  framing,  the proposal  tended  
to be too prescriptive  because  it assumed  that trade  was an end in and of itself in domestic  
regulation.  Developing  countries,  and in particular  LDCs,  were still grappling  with a multitude  of 
social,  economic  and political  challenges  that demanded  regulatory  autonomy  to regulate  services  
in the national  interest.  Too much  emphasis  was being  placed  on the domestic  processes  involved  
in developing  domestic  measures.  The proposal  intended  to restrict the actual  policy -making  
processes  of governments,  i.e. not just the rules and policies  governments  could develop,  but also 
how they developed  those  processes,  who could  participate  in those  processes,  such as 
corporations  and foreign  states,  and the terms by which  governments  were going  about  the 
decision -making  processes  before  the introduction  of a domestic  measure  and during  the 
development  of that measure.  Further,  the introduction  of new measures  would  be permissible  
only if they were "necessary " to achieve  a Member 's policy  objective.  This was the so-called  
necessity  test. Not only did this test shift the burden  of proof on governments  to demonstrate  that 
a measure  was necessary  to achieve  a domestic  public  policy  objective,  but the government  also 
had to show that it was the "least burdensome " measure  that could  have been taken.  This 
significantly  diminished  a Member 's right to regulate,  which  was a key function of democratic  
governance.  
1.68.   Regarding  the applicable  WTO jurisprudence,  with respect  to paragraph  1.2, he stated  that 
previous  WTO cases  addressing  similar  wording  on the right to regulate  had shown that this kind 
of language  provided  Members  no protection  at all from the substantive  rules and commitments.  
The language  in paragraph  1.2 was contradicted  by the substantive  provisions  that followed  
thereafter.  It also did not override  the substantive  DR rules.  As noted  in the US-Gambling  case 
(WT/DS285/R),  the right to regulate  was not unlimited.  The Panel  in that case had held that 
Members ' regulatory  sovereignty  was an essential  pillar of the progressive  liberalization  of trade in 
services,  but ended  whenever  rights  of other  Members under  the GATS  were impaired  (Panel  
report,  paragraph  6.316).  In China -Raw Materials  and Argentina  – Measures  Relating  to Trade  in 
Goods  and Services , the right to regulate  had been turned  on its head by suggesting  that the 
commitments  taken  by Member s were the expression  of their right to regulate.  Effectively  
Members  would  have expressed  their right to regulate  through  agreeing  or negotiating  these  
disciplines.  Hence  the disciplines  had to be adhered  to as the express ion of their right to 
regulate.  It was, however , the view of the LDC Group  that governments  had a duty to regulate  and 
the goals of such regulation  might  not necessarily  be about  furthering  trade.  Other  priorities  were 
also important,  inter alia: people 's access  to services,  employment  considerations,  macroeconomic  
and security  reasons.  Most services  sectors  were intrinsically  related  to performing  social,  cultural  
and economic  functions,  for which  regulation  in the national  interest  would  be the biggest  priority.  
However,  what these  propo sals attempted  to do was to grab the only tool that governments  had to 
intervene  and seek corrective  measures,  and consequently  erode  the minimal  policy  space  that 
was left to develop  a particular  sector.  He enquired  whether  there  was a right to regulate  in this 
case. He asked  if the "right to regulate " was just the recognition  of such a right and whether  
"recognition " of the right was the same  as "holding " and "exercising " the right.  This provision  
should  therefore  not only be a stand -alone  paragraph,  but a substantive  provision.  It should  be 
written  in a way that would  override  all relevant  rules.  The word "recognition " should  be replaced  
with the words  "shall have". 
1.69.   Regar ding the issue of best endeavor  language,  Members  had heard  so far that the 
language  was soft and they did not have to do anything.  This view seemed  to be contested  by the 
WTO jurisprudence.  The words  "shall,  to the extent  practicable " pointed  to a hard obligation  and 
non-compliance  could  be challenged.  According  to WTO jurisprudence,  such a "shall" obligation  
required  "a positive  action ". Whilst  it was not an obligation  of "results ", it was nevertheless  still an 
obligation  of "means ", i.e. Members  were obliged to undertake  the obligation,  regardless  of 
whether  the specific  result  had been attained.  Panels  would  also evaluate  if the decision  taken  by a 
Member  that fulfilling  the commitment  was not practicable,  was in fact a valid judgement.  There  
was jurispr udence  on the terms  "practicable ", "whenever  practicable " and "where  practicable ". This 
was cited in the Secretariat  Note on the "Treatment  of flexibility  language  in dispute  settlement " 
(JOB/SERV/8).  When  such language  was used,  Panels  would  investigate  what authorities  had done 
to try to put in place the obligation.  They would  judge  if the decision  taken  by authorities  that a 
commitment  had not been practicable  was a valid conclusion.  In the EC-Bananas  III case, the 
arbitrators  had noted  that the margin  of review  by the arbitrators  implied  the authority  to broadly  S/WPDR/M/73  
 
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  judge  whether  the party  in question  had considered  the necessary  facts objectively  and whether  
on the basis of those  facts it could  plausibly  arrive at the conclusion  that it was not practicable  or 
effective  to carry out the obligation  (EC-Bananas  III, paragraph  52). The note then cited two cases  
where  Panels  had judged  that the Member  had not done what was necessary  to carry out their 
"whenever  practicable " and "where  practicable"  obligations.  In the case of US – Oil Country  
Tubular  Goods  Sunset  Reviews  (Article  21.5 – Argentina),  where  the expression  "whenever  
practicable"  had been dealt with, the Panel  and Appellate  Body reports  had found  that various 
aspects  of the sunset  reviews  by the United  States,  as well as parts of the US statutes  and 
regulations  that underlay  the reviews,  had violated  the Anti-Dumping  Agreement  (ADA).  An 
arbitrator  had given  the US twelve  months  to implement  the findings  (17 December  2004 – 16 
December  2005).  The major  part of this period  had been used by the US to amend  its regulations.  
The amendments  had become  effective  from 31 October  2005.  The US had then started  a new 
determination  and concluded  that the anti-dumping  duty had to remain  in place.  Argentina  
claimed,  inter alia, a violation  of Article  6.4 of the ADA because  no access  had been provided  to 
certain  information  that was used in this determination.  The United  States  argued  that the limited  
time that was availa ble after the amendment  of the regulations  meant  that it was not "practicable"  
to provide  access.  Nonetheless,  the Panel  concluded  that the limited  amount  of time that was 
available  was not a justification  for not providing  access  to the information.  The expression  "where  
practicable"  was also used in paragraph  7 of Annex  II of the ADA, and was referred  to by the Panel  
in Mexico  – Anti-Dumping  Measures  on Rice. In this case, when  calculating  dumping  margins  for 
US rice exporters,  the Mexican  authority  had based itself only on the information  with regard  to 
two US rice exporters  identified  in the applications  for an anti-dumping  investigation  and on 
information  provided  by two other  US rice exporters  on their own initiative.  The authority  had not 
made  attempt s to check  the information  from other  independent  sources.  While  paragraph  7 of 
Annex  II indicated  that this should  only be done "where  practicable",  the Panel  found  a violation  
because  no attempt  had been made  at all. The Panel  stated  that in examining  the record,  they 
found  no basis to consider  that the authority  had made  any attempt  to check  the applicant's  
information  against  information  obtained  from other  interested  parties  or had undertaken  the 
evaluative,  comparative  assessment  that would  have enabl ed the authority  to assess  whether  the 
information  provided  by the applicant  had indeed  been the best information  available.  For all the 
above  reasons,  the Panel  found  that the Mexican  investigating  authority  had calculated  a margin  of 
dumping  on the basis of the facts available  for rice producers  in a manner  which  had not been 
consistent  with Article  6.8 of the ADA, read in light of paragraph  7 of Annex  II of the ADA. It was, 
therefore,  important  for proponents  to find other  language  that would  be the reverse of what was 
being  sought  at the moment  because  this language  did not protect  or guarantee  LDCs'  policy  space  
and the right to regulate.  
1.70.   On the subject  of transparency,  he requested  to reflect  the statement  made  at the previous  
session  of the WPDR  in June and July on the record  of this meeting .2 However,  he observed  that 
there  was no mandate  to negotia te disciplines  on transparency.  
1.71.   Regarding  the issue of development  of measures,  he requested  that the statement  made  at 
the previous  session  of the WPDR  in July be reflected  on the record  of the current  meeting .3  
1.72.   The scope  of the proposed  disciplines  was very wide.  The proposal  referred  to measures  
adopted  or maintained  by Members.  This would  suggest  that those  measures  Members  would  
adopt  in the future  and those  that they currently  maintained  as part of their regulatory  regime  
would  both be covered  by the disciplines.  The GATS  had defined  the term "measure " in Article  
XXVIII  very broadly.  The concerns  of LDCs were two-fold: first, on the retrospec tive application  of 
the disciplines  and, second,  they had found  the scope  extremely  intrusive,  expensive,  unnecessary  
and onerous.  The LDC Group  had requested  Members  to share  with the Working  Party,  with 
concrete  examples,  why they had found  that GATS  Article VI, as it stood,  was not sufficient  to 
address  the perceived  concerns,  especially  in light of Article s VI:1, VI:2 and VI:5. The proponents  
had not indicated  whether  they had attempted  to use these  provisions  and failed.  It was not clear 
whether  the challenge  was with the way the provisions  had been crafted,  or with their 
implementation.  Members  had not indicated  whether  they had undertaken  a necessity  test on the 
                                                 
2 See Uganda's  statement  in paragraph  2.142  of the Report  of the WPDR  meeting  held on 15, 16, 22 
June and 5 July 2017 (S/WPDR/M/71),  delivered  on behalf  of the LDC Group.  
3 See Uganda's  statement  in paragraph  2.204  of the Report  of the WPDR  meeting  held on 15, 16, 22 
June and 5 July 2017 (S/WPDR/M/71),  delivered  on behalf  of the LDC Group.  S/WPDR/M/73  
 
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  necessity  of the disciplines.  They had not yet explained  what the inherent  problem  with the GATS  
was that they were seeking  to resolve.  
1.73.   In addition  to all of the definitional  issues  raised  in the previous  session,  it was still not clear 
to the LDCs who determined  what was "objective,  or "reasonable ", or "impartial ", and which  
procedures  did not "unduly  prevent  fulfilment  of requirements ". He asked  what the standard  
measurement  or criteria  for these  concepts  were,  what range  of competing  factors  was to be 
considered  and in the context  of whose  legal and administrative  traditions.  This was an area where  
a lot of work remained  to be done to arrive  at a common  understanding.  In the previous  sessions  
the LDC Group  had suggested  that one of the best ways forward  was to adopt  a common  definition  
by all Members  which  could  be reflected  as a footnote.  He asked  how this proposal  promoted  the 
right to regulate.  From his perspective,  it was an exception  to the right to regulate.  In other 
words,  it would  render  any attempt  at regulation  redundant,  as the LDC Group  had highlighted  
before.  
1.74.   The representative  of Colombia  thanked  countries  that had submitted  responses  in writing,  
as well as those  who provided  constructive  opinions,  such as Russia,  India,  Peru, Pakistan,  Panama  
and others.  He echoed  the statements  made  by Australia  relating  to the textual  suggestion s, inter 
alia by India.  On the proposal  by Russia , he aligned  himself  with the comment  made  by Australia  
in relation  to paragraph  2.4 on rejected  applications.  He added  that Colombian  legislation  
distinguished  between  different  forms  of incomplete  applicat ions, such as gaps,  errors,  procedural  
errors,  or substantive  errors . An application  could  only be revised  if the incompleteness  resulted  
from an error in form.  If there  were substantive  errors,  the applicant  had to submit  a new 
application  and not a revised application.  
1.75.   Turning  to the text presented  by India,  he reaffirmed  the viewpoint  of the co-sponsors  that 
the definition  of "authorization " already  included  the five elements  Members  were discussing  under  
GATS  Article  VI:4. He noted  that including  this definition  helped  the scope,  and defined  many  of 
the obligations.  It also made  it easier  for the proponents  to deal with the five elements  together,  
as could  be seen in the articles  on independence  and development  of measures.  With regard  to 
other  proposed  definitions,  Colombia  was not sure that it was necessary  to include  definitions  of all 
the different  elements  from Article  VI:4. Historically  every  country  was defining  licensing  
requirements  in their own individual  way and it was not going  to be easy to go forward  with 
common  definitions.  
1.76.   Regarding  the issue of fees, he appreciated  the approach  that had been put forward  in 
India's text. In some  cases  in Colombia  there was also another  fee, which  went to the employer 's 
fund or to other  specific  funds.  In his view,  the creation  of an obligation  and the aim thereof  must 
be to avoid  the trade barriers  but not to be too stringent  in the way those  obligations  were 
created.  As regards  technical  standards,  he welcomed  the drafting put forward  by India,  insofar  as 
it required  a government  to create  technical  standards  in certain  cases.  In his opinion,  this was a 
situation  that was going  to vary from system  to system.  The reference  to relevant  international  
standards  was require d. Colombian  standards,  however,  sometimes  deviated  from international  
standards  to meet local needs  and requirements,  and therefore  Members  would  need to have 
some  flexibility  in this provision.  
1.77.   Turning  to development,  he explained  that Colombia  was a developing  country  that had yet 
to complete  its regulatory  process es. However,  Colombia  was a proponent  and demandeur  of DR 
disciplines  in the WTO.  He strongly  believed  that the proponents ' text improved  the way the needs  
and interests  of Colombia  were being met and respected,  as it was creating  sufficiently  broad  
obligations  that would  allow countries  that saw the need to create  different  stages  for applications,  
to do so. The language  had already  set out explicitly  all the sensitivities  that Colombia  had and he 
did not see the need to add any more prerogatives.  However,  he acknowledged  that many  other  
Members  required  such flexibilities,  as was mentioned  by Pakistan  and others.  He saw great  value  
in the text put forward  by Peru and welcomed  the suggestion  to include  this in the proponents'  
text so as to bring Members  closer  to the adoption  of a negotiating  text that was open to 
suggestions  by all. He concluded  by stating  that as a developing  country  which  had yet to finish  its 
regulatory  development  process , Colombia  did not see domestic  regulation  obligations  as an 
obstacle  for its export  of services.  At this stage  Colombia  had a services  trade  deficit  but the 
government  was creating  programs  that would  strengthen  Colombia 's export  supply  and the WTO 
discip lines presented  a good opportunity  to do so. S/WPDR/M/73  
 
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  1.78.   The representative  of Hong Kong,  China  took the opportunity  to comment  and seek 
clarification  on India's textual  proposal.  He considered  that India's constructive  engagement  had 
injected  new impetus  into the discussion.  He acknowledged  that the right to regulate  was 
important  for many  Members  and expressed  willingness  to further  discuss  any improvements  that 
were needed  in terms  of the language.  Regarding  definitions,  India had expressed  the need to 
have definiti ons on the five elements  mentioned  under  the GATS  Article  VI:4 mandate.  While  
having  a clear definition  on the five elements  would  probably  be the best arrangement,  he could  
understand  the difficulties  in coming  up with commonly  agreed  definition s. The idea of defining  
"authorization " might  be a compromise  solution  to address  the concerns  of some  delegations,  
while at the same  time providing  more clarity  on the scope  of application.  He was open to 
discussing  definitions.  He echoed  the response  Australia  had provided  with respect  to recognition.  
1.79.   Regarding  the question  by India on the scope  and need for the article  on independence  of 
authorities , he said that the intention  was clear,  i.e. this requirement  was applicable  to licensing  
requirements  and procedures,  qualification  requirements  and procedures,  and technical  standards  
adopted  or maintained  by Members  as a condition  for the supply  of a service . The purpose  was to 
ensure  that the competent  authorities  operated  in an independent  manner  when  they reached  and 
administered  their decisions.  This was designed  to remove  the possible  influence  of any service  
supplier  on the competent  authorities,  and to ensure that the competent  authorities  would  operate  
in an unbiased  manner.  He saw great  value  in this provision  to ensure  that the service  suppliers  
were treated  equally.  
1.80.   Regarding  paragraph  4.3(ii),  he took note of India's observation  that administrative  rulings 
in some  jurisdictions  could  belong  to quasi -judicial  or administrative  fora. As such,  the proposal  
only used soft language,  i.e. "encouraged  to", which  was not a hard obligation.  Regarding  
paragraph  4.4, India considered  that explaining  the purpose  of a law might  result  in questioning  of 
a sovereign  authority 's right to determine  what was best for them.  He was of the view that 
explain ing t the purpose  of the law could  hardly  be interpreted  as inviting questions  on what was 
best for that Member.  In any case, the proposal  adopted  a soft language,  i.e. "encouraged  to". As 
concern ed paragraph  6.3, he encouraged  India to consider  this provision  together  with the new 
development  chapter,  which  provided  for transitional  periods  for developing  Members  and LDCs.  
He welcomed  further  discussion s and noted  that other  Members  had made  or promised  to make  
text suggestions,  e.g. Peru had made  a suggestion  earlier  and Panama  promised  to submit  its 
suggestions  as well. All of this pointed  towards  a negotiating  text that would  incorporate  all 
suggestions  and proposals.  
1.81.   The representative  of Cameroon  took note of the new documents  that had been submitted  
by Members.  He looked  forward  to discovering  the other  proposals  which  had been announced  and 
which  confirmed  that those  proposals  currently  on the table were not satisfactory.  Cameroon  had 
repeatedly  expressed  its concerns  with regard  to the proposals  on domestic  regulation.  At this 
stage  he did not see how Members  could  work on this issue to move  it in the right direction.  The 
proposed  rules which  limited  the policy  space  were promising  Members  more development  and 
more potential  for development.  Perhaps  Members  should  be looking  at certain  aspects  in greater  
detail.  It had yet to be established  that the proposed  discipline s were absolutely  necessary.  
Therefore,  the delegation  of Cameroon  was not yet convinced  by the responses  that had been 
submitted  so far. The delegation  of Cameroon  and the African  Group  had clearly  insisted  on the 
right to regulate.  The proposal,  as it stood,  did not guarantee  such a right,  as at this stage  it was 
just a declaration.  However,  the entire  process  of a declaration  in any forum  or body in the world  
was something  of a political,  and not a legal nature.  For it to have real legal value  it neede d to be 
framed  and formalized.  There  was no guarantee  other  than evoking  the right to regulate  that 
would  guarantee  the effectiveness  of such a right.  And this was precisely  where  the problem  lay as 
regards  the proponents'  text, which  seemed  to be difficul t to accept.  He enquired  how the 
proponents  interpreted  the provision  contained  in paragraph  1.2 on the right to regulate,  where  
the text imposed  regulatory  approaches  on gender  equality.  The explanations  provided  by the 
proponents  so far amounted  to statements  to the effect  that no particular  way of interpreting  or 
regulating  was imposed  upon Members;  yet, the very same  text submitted  by the proponents  gave 
the opposite  impression.  In other  words,  the right to regulate  was guaranteed  because  it was 
mention ed, and at the same  time Members  were being  reassured  that they would  remain  free to 
interpret  and to regulate  as they deem ed appropriate.  Yet, the proposal  contained  specific  articles  
that stipulated  exactly  how Members  had to regulate  on specific  issues.  The text was asking  for 
economic  operators  to have the possibility  to request  justifications  from the state,  which  meant  
that governments  could  be held hostage  by people  who were looking  for justifications.  This S/WPDR/M/73  
 
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  formulation  showed  that a gap in the text needed  to be filled with something  that reflected  the 
right to regulate,  as well as the jurisprudence.  He referred  to the statement  made  by Uganda  in 
this respect.  He expressed  hope that the Secretariat  would  concisely  put all of the above  into the 
minutes  of the meeting.  If Members  were going  to rely on the mentioning  of the right to regulate  
in the text, they should  remember  that this was not therefore  a legal text. He doubted  if Canada  
had put enough  effort  into their proposal  on gender  equality.  He asked  how the proponents  were 
trying  to integrate  immigrants,  people  of differing  religions  and races,  all social  groups  on the 
margins  of society  and economy,  people  with disabilities,  etc. He recalled  the point made  by 
Swaziland  in this regard.  
1.82.   He enquired  as to whether  there  was a problem  with the current  situation.  He further  asked  
if Members  had a problem  with Cameroon 's domestic  regulation.  He noted  that he had yet to hear 
a single  delegation  argue  that domestic  regulation  in Cameroon  was such a problem  that it needed  
to be changed.  He stood  ready  to discuss  in case any delegation  brought  forward  some  proof that 
regulatory  practices  in Cameroon  were a cause  for concern.  That had not been the case thus far, 
therefore  nothing  should  be changed.   
1.83.   Regarding  the issue of development,  he noted  that from his TFA negotiating  experience,  the 
proponents  were just repeating  that process  but without  changing  anything  on the substance.  He 
asked  why Members  were being  presented  with proposals  as they were and how it moved  in any 
new directions  from those  taken  by the TFA. He enquired  whether  the proponents  thought  that the 
TFA was precisely  the same  thing as domestic  regulation  just because  there  was one common  
aspect  that involved  domestic  rules.  He recalled  that everythi ng in the TFA was in full respect  of 
national  laws. In other  words,  the states  could  keep their regulations  and had the freedom  to only 
accept  what was necessary.  In the TFA economic  operators  might  be consulted  but there  was no 
requirement  for justificati on. The TFA provided  for transition  period s for different  categories  
determined  by the Members.  However,  a group  of Members  had tried to impose  upon a single  
delegation  a maximum  duration  allowed  for the implementation  of the obligations.  Furthermore  in 
the TFA implementation  meetings  Members  were under  control  and there  was a police  force 
following  them and telling  them how many  years  they had and asking  them if that was enough,  
whereas  the agreement  itself provided  for each delegation  setting  the implemen tation  timeframe  
as a function  of its own sovereignty,  capacity  or development  program.  So the section  on 
development  in the consolidated  text was a step back compared  to the TFA; in other  words,  it did 
not even meet the needs  addressed  by the TFA. He recalled  the statement  by Uganda  on the 
practices  for implementation  and technical  assistance.  He gave an example  of where  a country  had 
announced  that it was financing  the implementation  of the TFA and the money  was earmarked  for 
lobbies  or consultants . His delegation  could  not support  the same  approach  in domestic  regulation.  
In his view,  as stated  before,  there  was no need to have this negotiation  as such.  The updates  had 
not really  evolved  and if the proponents  wanted  a real discussion  or at least safeguard  the right to 
regulate,  they should  take into account  what the delegation  of Cameroon  had said earlier.  He 
expressed  the view that this was the time to ask for Members'  sensitivities  to be taken  into 
account.  In his opinion,  the time had come  to recognize  that some  countries  were unable  to 
implement  the proposed  disciplines.  He suggested  that the text could  be applied  by developed  
countries  and advanced  developing  countries,  whereas  for LDCs and other  developing  countries  it 
would  be applied  on a voluntary  basis,  namely  by those  who wanted  to could  commit , whereas  
those  who were not interested  would  not have to, as the disciplines  would  impose  limits  on their 
ability  to work on their development.  He hoped  that this proposal  could  assist  the co-sponsor s in 
reviewing  what they wanted  to do. As far as the delegation  of Cameroon  was concerned,  the co-
sponsors  needed  to convince  them of the fact that the regulatory  practices  in Cameroon  were 
problematic.  
1.84.   The representative  of Cuba expressed  disappointment  that at this stage  the text did not 
meet Members ' expectations.  The changes  that had been made  to the text and many  remaining  
elements  confirmed  Cuba's concerns  about  the departure  from the 2009 Chair text. Members  had 
been told by proponents  that progress  was not possible  on the basis of that Chair text, and had 
instead  submitted  an even more complex  text, in particular  as it related  to developing  countries.  
As pointed  out previously,  she noted  that there  was still an issue with the mandate  of GATS  
Article  VI:4, and the text still impacted  on the right to regulate,  and contained  intrusive  measures.  
She reiterated  her previous  point that the co-sponsors  had not justified  the need for the 
establishment  of the disciplines.  It was not just a matter  of having  a mandate  - the proponents  
had to provide  concrete  examples  of the reasons  why the disciplines  were necessary  and what 
issues  needed  to be resolved.  Throughout  the year this had not happened.  On the basis of the few S/WPDR/M/73  
 
- 29 - 
 
  changes  made  to the text since October  and the many  elements  that had been maintained  in it, 
she wondered  whether  there  was any genuine  desire  to listen  to the requests  of other  delegations.   
1.85.   She did not understand  the purpose  of including  paragraph  1.1 in the text. The paragraph  
used terms  and phrases  that did not match  reality,  as a lot of developing  countries  were net 
services  importers  and not significant  providers  of services.  In her view, paragraph  1.2 on the 
right to regulate  did not provide  any added  value  and did not have any content.  In reality,  specific  
disciplines,  e.g. paragraph  1.3, actually  diminished  the right to regulate.  Regarding  the scope  
provision  in paragraph  1bis.1,  she wondered  why the co-sponsors  wanted  such a wide-ranging  
scope  provision.  First of all, they needed  to explain in detail  what the issues  were that they faced,  
and those  explanations  needed  to be based  on actual  facts.  Regarding  paragraph  1bis.2,  she noted  
that authorization  was not part of the mandate  in Article  VI:4, and the proposal  went beyond  the 
mandate  by including  this term.  She also enquired  how the co-sponsors  interpreted  the frequently  
used expression  "shall to the extent  practicable ". In other  debates  in the WTO it had been 
explained  that a discipline  would  not lose its flexible  nature  and yet it seem ed that it could  be 
challenged  by any Member.  It seemed  that a Member  could  challenge  another  Member 's efforts  in 
the regulatory  field. She asked  how the proponents  could  guarantee  the right to regulate  and the 
limitations  of Members ' administrations.  
1.86.   She further  noted  that several  delegations,  including  Cuba,  had repeatedly  stated  
throughout  the year that the transparency  chapter  was not in accordance  with the Article  VI:4 
mandate  and should  be deleted.  Concerning  development,  Cuba had pointed  out that the issue of 
development  could  not be limited  to a simplistic  view of transition  periods.  Such an approach  had 
been used in the past, but it did not recognize  the structural  issues  that developing  countries  were 
facing , which  were all the more complex  and challenging  in the services  sector.  The proposal  was 
not acceptable  to Cuba as an alternative  to special  and differential  treatment.  Regarding  technical  
assistance  and capacity  building,  she noted  that in the TFA context  Cuba had not yet received  any 
assistan ce for specific  measures  it wanted  to implement.  Similar  issues  had also come  up in the 
past when  Cuba had not been able to receive  the required  assistance.  She noted  that this type of 
sentence  was only a promise  and not a guarantee.  It was quite clear for her that at this stage  
there  were still major  divergences  on the revised  text. Often  there  was more political  rather  than 
technical  content  to the text. She did not feel that the revised  text was an appropriate  foundation  
for future  discussions,  as the delegation  of Cuba had different  opinions  on the scope,  the mandate  
and other  parts of the text. 
1.87.   The representative  of Bangladesh  associated  himself  with the statement  made  by Uganda  
on behalf  of the LDC Group.  He thanked  the Chair for her hard work in order  to bridge  the gaps in 
this important  discussion.  He also thanked  Australia  and the co-sponsors  for submitting  a revised  
text that tried to capture  some  of the concerns  expressed  by Members,  and expressed  appreciation  
for the oral statement  by Uruguay  that elaborated  on the rationale  behind  the revision.  He noted  
that his delegation 's question  about  the relevance  of authorization  in the context  of the Article  VI:4 
mandate  had remained  unaddressed.  He supported  the views  of India in this regard.  Article  VI:4 
mandated  Members  to develop  disciplines  for measures  relating  to qualification  requirements  and 
procedures,  technical  standards  and licensing  requirements.  In order  to develop  the disciplines,  
Members  needed  to bring clarity  to the definitions  of these  terms. 
1.88.   He referred  to a 1996 WTO Secretariat  Note (S/WPPS/W/9)  that had elaborated  on the 
definitions  of these  terms.  Therein,  qualification  requirements  had been defined  as comprising  
substantive  requirements  which  a professional  service  supplier  was required  to fulfil in order  to 
obtain  certificatio n or a license.  Such requirements  normally  related  to matters  such as education,  
examinations,  practical  training,  and experience  or language  ability.  Qualification  procedures  had 
been characterized  as administrative  or procedural  rules relating  to the administration  of 
qualification  requirements.  They included  procedures  to be followed  by candidates  to acquire  a 
qualification,  including  the administrative  requirements  to be met. This covered  inter alia the place 
to register  for education  progr ams, conditio ns to be respected,  documents  to be filed, fees, 
mandatory  physical  presence  conditions,  alternative  ways to follow  an educational  program  (e.g. 
distance  learning)  to obtain  qualification,  and organizing  of qualifying  examinations,  etc. Licensing  
requireme nts had been spelled  out as substantive  requirements,  other  than qualification  
requirements,  with which  a service  supplier  was required  to comply  in order  to obtain  formal  
permission  to supply  a service.  They included  measures  such as residency  requirement s, fees, 
establishment  requirements,  registration  requirements,  etc. Licensing  procedures  had been S/WPDR/M/73  
 
- 30 - 
 
  defined  as administrative  procedures  relating  to the submission  and processing  of an application  
for a license,  covering  such matters  as time frames  for the processing  of a license,  or the number  
of documents  and the amount  of information  required  in the application  for a license.  Technical  
standards  had been defined  as requirements  which  might  apply  both to the characteristics  or 
definition  of the service  itself and to the manner  in which  it was performed.  For example,  a 
standard  might  stipulate  the content  of an audit,  which  was akin to the definition  of the service,  
another  standard  might  lay down  rules of ethics  or conduct  to be observed  by the auditor.  
1.89.   Similar definitions  might  be found  in documents  "Working  Party on Domestic  Regulation  - 
Disciplines  on Domestic  Regulation  Pursuant  to GATS  Article  VI:4 - Consolidated  Working  Paper  - 
Note by the Chairman " (JOB(06)/225)  and "Working  Party on Domestic  Regulati on - Unofficial  
room document  - Disciplines  on Domestic  Regulation  pursuant  to GATS  Article  VI:4 - Annotated  
Text - Informal  Note by the Chairperson " (RD/SERV/10).  He noted  that the above  definitions  had 
not been agreed  by Members.  In his view,  definitions  of requirements  and procedures  did not 
consider  authorization  as requirements  or procedures.  As seen from the note, no Member  had 
demanded  to include  authorization  as a requirement  or a procedure.  Authorization  only came  after 
a service  supplier  had fulfilled any requirements  and procedures.  It was his understanding  that 
authorization  was applicable  across  all sectors  regardless  of whether  there  was any qualification,  
licensing  and standard  requirement.  Perhaps  for this reason  the drafters  of the GATS  had inserted  
Article  VI:3 that referred  to authorization.  Moreover,  Article  VI:1 referred  to measures  of general  
application  affecting  trade  in services.  Therefore,  it was his conviction  that reference  to 
authorization  was misplaced  and did not match  the manda te. 
1.90.   He recalled  that on 15 November  2005 the Chair had circulated  an "Illustrative  List of 
Possible  Elements  for Article  VI:4 Disciplines " (JOB(05)/280),  which  had been referred  to by some  
proponents  in their submission  of 22 May 2015 (RD/SERV/124).  Contra ry to his expectation,  the 
elements  referred  to in the Chair's note had not been reflected  in the disciplines  proposed  by the 
proponents.  It seemed  to him that these  elements  should  be the core of any disciplines  that 
Members  would  develop  under  Article  VI:4, and wondered  how proponents  could  consider  that 
their present  text was within  the mandate  of Article  VI:4 without  addressing  these  issues.  
Document  RD/SERV/124  also referred  to the priorities  identified  in the Collective  Request  of LDCs.  
He asked  if there  was any reflection  of LDCs' priorities  in the present  text. Bangladesh  also had 
concerns  about  the gender  issue.  He enquired  if the proponents  thought  that qualification  
requirements,  licensing  requirements  or standards  had any relevance  to gender.  He had expected  
that by inserting  paragraph  1.1 the proponents  would  make  an effort  to address  the difficulties  
faced  by developing  countries ' service  suppliers  in meeting  the qualification,  licensing  and standard  
requirements  in importing  countries.  Howeve r, the paragraph  only addressed  the difficulties  faced  
by the governments  in fulfilling  the obligations  by proposing  a carve -out. He enquired  if the 
proponents  thought  that this was development  and whether  that development  should  be directed  
towards  increa sed participation  of developing  countries,  in particular  LDCs,  through  developing  
disciplines  which  addressed  difficulties  faced  by service  suppliers  in LDC countries  in supplying  
their services  in the importing  countries.  
1.91.   The representative  of the Republi c of Korea  aligned  herself  with the statement  made  by 
Uruguay  on behalf  of the co-sponsors.  Korea  was willing  to join efforts  to make  progress  on 
developing  disciplines  on domestic  regulation.  In this regard,  she also welcomed  Russia 's textual  
suggestions.  She expressed  deep appreciation  to all Members  who had come  forward  with 
suggestions  and engaged  constructively.  She echoed  the representative  of Pakistan  who had noted  
the improvement s that the new proposal  had brought  about.  Thanks  to the contributions  from 
Members,  the text had become  more complete,  particularly  with the inclusion  of the definition  of 
authorization  and the provision  on development.  
1.92.   Regarding  the structure  of the text, she shared  the observations  of Australia.  She believed  
that Members  needed  to consider  alternative  approaches  to move  forward  and fulfil the Article  
VI:4 mandate  instead  of revisiting  the same  issues  that had proved  very difficult  to reach  an 
agreement  on. She believed  that the structure  of the revised  consolidated  text worked better  for 
this purpose.  Regarding  definitions,  she appreciated  Bangladesh  reminding  Members  of the past 
work relating  to definitions.  Members  had actually  engaged  in rich discussions  on definitions,  but it 
had proved  very difficult  to reach  an agreeme nt thereon.  The definition  of authorization  in the 
revised  text was based  on Members ' past work and captured  earlier  discussions  with regard  to the 
five elements  very well. Nevertheless,  the delegation  of Korea  was open to discussing  the inclusion  S/WPDR/M/73  
 
- 31 - 
 
  of definitions  of licensing  requirements  and procedures,  qualification  requirements  and procedures  
and technical  standards.  She was not sure that the Chair text definitions  were the best option,  and 
believed  that there  could  be more refined  and streamlined  wording  than what was contained  in the 
Chair text. 
1.93.   With respect  to India's  suggestions  on "administration  of measures " and "recognition " 
specifically,  she associated  herself  with Australia 's observation  that part of India's suggestions  had 
been covered  by paragraphs  2.4(e)  and 6.1(b)  of the revised  text. She explained  that Korea  dealt 
with the recognition  issue primarily  on a bilateral  and reciprocal  basis.  In this respect,  she sought  
a clarification  as to what kind of obligations  the proposed  language  would  imply,  in particular  the 
words  "shall give due consideration " in the first subparagraph.  Regarding  transparency,  she 
reiterated  her reservation  on India's suggestion  to oblige  Members  to publish  information  in one of 
the official  languages  of the WTO, which  was impracticable  for Korea.  While  Korea  published  key 
laws and regulations,  such as the Constitution  and its important  legislation  in English,  the 
information  Korea  would  be required  to publish  in one of the official  languages  of the WTO under  
the proposed  transparency  provision  was not usually  found  in the type of legislation  that Korea  
could  provide  in English.  Secondly,  as for the suggestion  of India to delete  some  provisions  on 
transparency  in relation  to advance  announcement  of laws and regulations  and opportunity  to 
comment,  she supported  the transparency  provision,  as set out in the proponents ' text.  
1.94.   It was Korea 's experience  that transparency  mechanisms  actually  made  domestic  laws and 
regulations  more effective  and accountable.  Korea  had an Administrative  Procedure  Act that 
governed  the general  administrative  processes,  including  measures  falling  under  the scope  of 
GATS  Article  VI:4. Article  41 of the Act required  the administrative  authority  to pre-announce  the 
enacting,  amending,  or abolishing  of legislation,  unless  for reasons  of public  safety  or welfare,  
simple  modification  of expressions  or wording.  Article  42 stipulated  that administrative  authorities  
had to widely  notify  the purposes  of draft legislation  and the major  points  or full texts thereof  
through  the official  gazette,  official  bulletins,  the internet,  newspapers,  broadcasting,  etc. Finally,  
Article  44 stated  that any person  might  present  his or her opinions  about  pre-announced  draft 
legislation.  Administrative  authorities  had to notify  the presenters  of the opinions  of the processing  
results  of such opinions.  She believed  that the transparent  process  Korea  was undertaking  during  
the legislative  process  contributed  to enhancing  the public 's confidence  and trust in the Korean  
legal system.  Therefore,  government  policies  could  be implemented  more effectively  through  
broader  support  from the public.   
1.95.   Regarding  the proposal  by Russia,  Korea  shared  the same  questions,  as asked  by the EU, 
Hong Kong,  China,  Australia  and others  and asked  for clarifications.  
1.96.   The representative  of Egypt  thanked  the proponents  for the updated  text that continued  to 
address  Members ' concerns , and noted  the need to continue  discussions,  as Members  still had 
many  concerns.  The way forward  on the current  proposal  on the table was still unclear.  It was 
essential  to have more clarity  on the term authorization  and to refer to measures  relating  to 
licensing  requirements  and procedures  and qualification  requirements  and procedures.  The 
delegation  of Egypt  still had concerns  relating  to the current  proposal  on special  and differential  
treatment.  As stated  before,  the necessity  test was not a starting  point for Egypt.  He reaffirmed  
his delegation 's position  with regard  to gender.  All governm ents were working  to support  gender  
equality  or women  empowerment,  but Members  needed  to be cautious  when  it came  to the WTO.  
WTO agreements  did not cover  issues  of gender  equality  and it was unclear  how the issue was 
relevant  to the trade  liberalization  purpose  of the WTO, as stated  in the Preamble  to the GATS  and 
Article  XIX. Yet, many  areas  of concerns  remained.  He asked  to have his statements  from the June 
meeting  to be incorporated  in this report , as Egypt  had raised  many  issues  relating to the 
technic ality of gender  and its inclusion  in the agenda  of the WTO4. Regarding  paragraph  1.2 of the 
general  provisions,  he highlighted  the need to better  understand  the inclusion  of the word "their", 
which  might  lead to misinterpretation.  It could  be argued  that the reference  to "their policy  
objectives " might  mean  that Members  were entitled  to set objectives  they saw fit without  
interference  from other  Members,  but other  interpretations  might  also be conceivable.  He asked  
for more reaffirmation  guaranteeing  the right of each Member  to regulate.  
                                                 
4 See Egypt's  statements  contained  in paragraphs  2.36, 2.57, 2.87, 2.126,  2.154  and 2.208  of the 
Report  of the WPDR  meeting  held on 15, 16, 22 June and 5 July 2017 (S/WPDR/M/71) . 
 S/WPDR/M/73  
 
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  1.97.   Regarding  paragraph  2.7 on the issue of examinations,  he sought  clarification  in respect  of 
the Russian  suggestion  to carve  out examinations  administered  or offered  by financial  services  
regulators  or self-regulatory  bodies  or organizations.  In his view, the term "financial  services  
regulators " was not clear,  as it could  be argued  that it referred  to any regulatory  bodies , whose  
activities  had any impact  on the supply  of financial  services.  Alternatively , it could  be argued  that 
it referred  to a very specif ic regulatory  body, whose  only task was to regulate  financial  services.  
He noted  that those  bodies  differed  from country  to country.  The same  applied  to the term "self-
regulatory  bodies ". It was still unclear  whether  the term referred  to public  bodies,  or private  
bodies  with certain  autonomy.  He noted  that in either  case it would  be important  to have much  
more clarity  on this point.   
1.98.   On the subject  of independence,  he recalled  his statement  made  during  the October  WPDR.  
With regard  to the opportunity  to comment before  entry  in force,  he explained  that when  he had 
compared  the previous  text and the revised  text, he noted  that paragraph  4.3 of the previous  
version  of the draft disciplines  started  with the expression  "to the extent  practicable  and in a 
manner  consistent  with its legal system  for adopting  measures  each Member  (…)". The current  
draft disciplines  removed  the flexibility  provided  in the paragraph  with respect  to publishing  laws 
and regulation  of general  application,  and his delegation  would  like to see that flexibility  
maintained.  He asked  for clarity  on the newly  added  paragraph  4.8, as he thought  that no law or 
regulation  referred  to in paragraph  4.3 should  enter  into force prior to publication.   
1.99.   He understood  paragraph  7.1 to mean  that developing  countries  were entitled  to determine  
by themselves  what obligations  they could  assume  upon entry  into force of the disciplines  and 
what obligations  they could  implement  at a later stage.  The draft provisions  further  allowed  for the 
extension  of the impleme ntation  period,  but the extension  did not seem  to be automatic  upon 
request,  but would  depend  on a Member 's level of development  and size of economy.  He shared  
the concerns  of other  Members  as to the relationship  between  the size of an economy  and levels  of 
development  and regulatory  capacity.  It remained  unclear  who would  determine  whether  a 
Member 's condition  would  warrant  the extension  of the implementation  period . He also requested  
a clarification  of the point raised  by the Russian  Federation  that transition periods  should  not apply  
in respect  of provisions , compliance  with which  had already  been provided  for by WTO Agreement.  
Regarding  paragraph  7.3, he was of the view that the way in which  the technical  assistance  
provision  was drafted , i.e. using  the hortatory  term "encouraged ", meant  that there  was no 
obligation  to provide  that assistance.  Moreover,  as assistance  was to be provided  on mutually  
agreed  terms , developed  countries  and developing  countries  in a position  to do so were in control  
of the technical  assistance  activities.  In his view,  Members  needed  to have much  more discussion  
and to engage  more in this regard.  He recall ed Egypt 's earlier  suggestion  on development.  
1.100.   The representative  of Zimbabwe  supported  the statement  delivered  by South  Africa on 
behalf  of the African  Group  and the views  expressed  by like-minded  Members  and groups.  She 
highlighted  that the proponents ' attempt  to address  the concerns  fell far short of bridging  the 
current  divergences.  There  were still substantive  divergences  on systemic  matters  of interpretation  
of the mandate  of GATS  Article  VI:4, relating  to the scope  and necessity  of the proposed  
disciplines.  In her delegation 's view, the scope  of the proposed  disciplines  went beyond  the scope  
of the mandate,  e.g. through  the introduction  of ambiguous  and new terms  or disciplines,  such as 
"authorization " which  was not prescribed  in the mandate,  or the establishment  of enquiry  points  
and other  proposed  burdensome  and onerous  transparency  obligations.  Members  had not yet 
agreed  which  disciplines  were necessary,  in line with the mandate  of Article  VI:4 and this should  
have been the first stage  of work.  Additionally,  as the African  Group  had comprehensively  
elaborated,  the resubmissions  had not addressed  the concerns  regarding  preservation  of Members ' 
right to regulate,  erosion  of their policy  space,  burdensome  transparency  obligations,  and intrusive  
discip lines.  
1.101.   The best endeavor  measures  proposed  were beyond  some  Members ' implementation  
capacity  because  they would  still have the obligation  to demonstrate  commitment  or attempt  to 
implement.  In this case governments  would  still have the burden  of proof,  as had been articulated  
by Uganda.  Regarding  the development  proposal,  namely  transition  periods  and technical  
assistance,  her view was that this fell far short of addressing  the concerns  stated.  The right to 
regulate  and policy  space  were issues  Members  could  not exchange  for technical  assistance  and 
transitional  periods.  In her view, gender  issues  did not belong  in the disciplines.  She asked  which  
mandate  gender  fell under,  what the problem  was, what such gender -related  measures  would  S/WPDR/M/73  
 
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  achieve  and who would  benefit  from the proposed  obligation.  In her view, African  Members  would 
not benefit  from such a provision.  In spite of the recent  submission  by the proponents,  Members  
had not been able to narrow  the differences  and this was why her delegation  could  not agree  to a 
text-based  discussion  at this stage.  There  was clearly  no consensus  and there was not likely to be 
a miracle  for Members  to achieve  consensus  in time for MC11.  In this respect,  she recalled  the 
DG's advice  that Members  should  focus only on likely deliverables  for MC11.  Domestic  regulation  
was not one of the element s that was mature  enough  for MC11.  Work on domestic  regulation  
should  therefore  continue  post-MC11  in line with the mandate  of Article  VI:4 of the GATS.  Given  
their differences,  Members  should  start discussing  the next steps  regarding  their work post-MC11.  
1.102.   The representative  of Nigeria  noted  that Members  could  not improve  the process,  but 
nevertheless  he still had confidence  in the Chair's neutrality.  He expressed  hope that Members  
could  still deliver  an outcome  on the basis of consensus  and intensified  work. He noted  the level of 
engagement  and the intensification  of work in the WPDR.  He recalled  the message  of the Director -
General  for the proponents  to consider  seriously  what the priority  issues  were on the way to 
Buenos  Aires.  Nigeria  was neither  a propon ent, nor a demandeur  in the WPDR,  but was very 
supportive  of domestic  regulation.  He reaffirmed  his delegation 's previous  statements  on the 
subject.  Conceptual  differences  could  be overcome  with pragmatism.  He underlined  that 
transparency  provisions  should  not be in conflict  with domestic  laws and the domestic  legal system  
should  have primacy  over the obligations.  He mentioned  that Nigeria  achieved  an ambitious  goal 
of becoming  one of the top 10 most improved  business  destinations  globally  and in doing  so had 
moved  twenty  places  up in the ranking.  
1.103.   As regards  the revised  proponents ' text, he underscored  the clarity  of the scope  of the 
disciplines,  in particular  the fact that their application  would  be limited  to sectors  where  specific  
commitments  had been undertaken,  and that the disciplines  would  not be applicable  to any terms,  
limitations  and conditions,  as stated  in the proposal . The proposed  obligations  on electronic  
applications  and acceptance  of copies  should  be subject  to domestic  laws. Regarding  fees, 
Members  needed  clarification  as to what was "reasonable " in terms  of fees not restricting  the 
supply  of the relevant  service.  He urged  Members  to be cautious  when  it came  to gender  equality  
and stated  that Nigeria  was gender -friendly.  He echoed  the point made  by Egypt  on the flexibi lity 
Members  needed  with regard  to the opportunity  to comment  on draft regulation  before entry  into 
force.  He stressed  the need to examine  the consistency  between  paragraphs  4.3 and 4.6. 
Regarding  development  and special  and differential  treatment,  he enquired  how Members  could  
determine  the regulatory  and institutional  capacity  and decid e whether  special support  was 
needed.  He saw similarities  between  the proposed  text and the Trade Facilitation  Agreement  and 
stated  that his delegation  was comfortable  with that approach.  He encouraged  the Chair to consult  
as frequently  as possible.  
1.104.   The representative  of Ecuador  noted  that proponents  had retained  paragraph  1.2 in the 
general  provisions  sections,  and recalled  that Members  had already  raised  concerns  about  the 
need for this paragraph.  Members  had the right to preserve  their policy  space  and to regulate  as 
necessary  for their own development.  He requested  the proponents  to explain  the intention  behind  
paragraph  1.3 and stressed  that the rights  and obligations  of Members  under  the GATS  had to be 
maintained.  Regarding  the administration  of measures  and particularly  the issue of reasonable  and 
transparent  fees in paragraph  2.6, he enquired  how the criteria  of reasonability  were established.  
Regarding  transparency  in section  4, his concern  was that the provisions  had gone beyond  the 
mandate  of GATS  Article  VI:4. As concerned  development  of measures,  he reiterated  that 
Members  needed  to set out parameters  that qualified  objectivity,  transparency  and impartiality.  
Regarding  development,  he stated  that there  had to be a text that provided  flexibil ity to 
developing  countries.  He welcomed  the proposal  but thought  that the topic needed  more debate  
before  being  settled.  A more adequate  focus was needed  to ensure  that its application  was 
efficient  and took into account  the needs  of developing  countries  and LDCs without  being  
additionally  burdensome.  He considered  that the revised  text did not meet a large share  of the 
concerns  that had been expressed  and therefore  could  not be used as a basis for further  
negotiations.  He urged  Members  not to believe  that domestic  regulation  fell into the group  of 
issues  on which  there  was convergence  and that therefore  a possibility  for an outcome  in Buenos  
Aires existed . 
1.105.   The representative  of New Zealand  considered  the revised  proponents ' text a significant  
step forward,  and was glad to welcome  Ukraine  to the co-sponsors ' group.  She reiterated  some  of S/WPDR/M/73  
 
- 34 - 
 
  the responses  she had provided  previously  on the subject  of the right to regulate  that had been a 
concern  for many  Members.  It was very important  to understand  the scope  of what was being  
proposed:  the proponents  were not talking  about  disciplines  that would  apply  to every  regulatory  
measure  that a Member  might  undertake,  but rather  only to those  that fell within  the scope  of the 
disciplines  in paragraph  1bis, which  also applied to authorization.  Paragraph  1bis set the limits  to 
the disciplines.  It was also important  to remember  that the right to regulate  existed  regardless  of 
whether  the proponents  included  it in the text. That is why it was framed  as "recognizing " the right 
to regulate.  It was not because  the proponents  had some  ulterior  motive  but because  if they had 
made  it a proactive  obligation,  as a number  of delegations  had suggested  and had phrased  it as 
"shall have the right to regulate " or alike,  this would call into question  other  instruments,  including  
other  trade  agreements  where  the right to regulate  had either  been phrased  in terms  such as 
"recognize  the right to regulate ", which  was the case in the GATS,  or had not been mentioned  at 
all. Therefore,  turning the right to regulate  provision  into a proactive  obligation  could  have 
unintended  consequences  in other  contexts  and could  actually  diminish  the right to regulate.  She 
thanked  Members  who had made  specific  language  suggestions  in advance  of the meeti ng, in 
particular  India and Russia  who had circulated  them in writing,  as well as Peru, Saudi  Arabia,  
Swaziland  and others.  This sort of engagement  with specific  text proposals  was exactly  what the 
process  needed . She was looking  forward  to moving  to a negotiating  text that could  better  reflect  
all inputs.  She hoped  to see further  written  text proposals,  but nonetheless  still placed  great  value  
on the comments  provided,  especially  on the development  text which  was being  considered  for the 
first time. New Zealand  was interested  in answers  to questions  put forward  by the EU and Hong 
Kong,  China  to the Russian  Federation.  As for India's textual  suggestions,  she referred  to the 
questions  asked  by the representative  of Australia.  It was important  to note the different  ways in 
which  the co-sponsors  had tried to respond  to India's suggestions : some  of them had been 
incorporated  into the revised  consolidated  text, such as the language  in the general  provisions  
paragraph  1.1 and in the contact  points  provisions.  By the same  token,  the language  coming  
originally  from Peru had been included  in the transparency  footnote . The proponents  had also tried 
to respond  to India's concerns  regarding  the scope  of the disciplines  by providing  a definition  of 
"authorization ". She agreed with Korea  that this drew from the previous  discussions  in the WPDR.  
However,  given  the most recent  comments  from India,  Bangladesh,  Egypt  and others,  she was 
looking  forward  to further  discussions . Members  needed  to continue  this conversation  and perhaps 
also discuss  the proposal  for more definitions.  New Zealand  had mixed  FTA practice  in this 
regard . Sometimes  FTA language  included  definitions  and sometimes  not, so while she did not see 
that a broader  set of definitions  was necessary,  it was something  she was prepared  to consider  in 
the ongoing  discussions  if a workable  solution  could be found.  The representative  of New Zealand  
was also willing  to elaborate  further  on the technical  standards  provisions,  but given  the comments  
by Panama  and some  other  Members  so far, she was of the view that further  discussion  was 
necessary.  She agree d with the statement  by Australia  in relation  to the concerns  raised  by 
Panama  in this regard  and was of the view that the text did not contain  any obligation  to engage  in 
international  standard -making  processes.  She stressed  that India's proposal  on development  had 
provided  inspiration  for the co-sponsors  even if the proposal's  specific  language  had not been 
used.  This approach  was similar  to that taken  with regard  to Egypt 's comments  seeking  
clarification  on the application  of GATS  exceptions , which  inspired  paragraph  1.3, even if the exact  
language  had not been used.  Other suggestions  had not been reflected  in revisions,  as in some  
cases  the proponents  felt that the underl ying concept  was already  covered  in the existing  text. 
Some of the new language  proposed  by India on recognition  had already  been to some  extent  
covered  by paragraphs  6.1(b),  and there  were already  provisions  on treatment  of incomplete  
applications.  This also applie d in respect  of some  of Russia 's suggestions.  Finally,  there  were other  
elements , which  were put forward  but had not been included , for example  on publication  in WTO 
languages  and electronic  means  for examinations . The proponents  looked very carefully  at the 
proposals  that had been made  and it had been difficult  to gain broad  consensus  on those  proposals  
even amongst  the co-sponsor s. New Zealand  was already  publish ing measures  in English,  but the 
challenges  such an obligation  could  prese nt for others  were understandable . She acknowledged  
that the revised  text had not satisfied  everyone,  despite  the proponents ' sincere  efforts.  The 
proponents  were willing  to continue  the conversation.  She agree d with Canada  that Members  
needed to find a way to move  forward  with a process  that could accommodate  different  textual 
proposals  in one place and support ed the idea of moving  to a negotiating  text.  
1.106.   The representative  of the European  Union  echoed the intervention  made  earlier  by 
Australia , as regards  the comments  provided  by India. In the October  meeting,  India had asked  for 
clarification  of the term "authorization ", as it was used frequently  in the proponents ' text. In 
response,  the proponents  had added  a definition  in para 1.bis2. However,  the deleg ation of India S/WPDR/M/73  
 
- 35 - 
 
  consider ed that the proponents  were not respecting  the mandate  of GATS  Article  VI:4 by 
introducing  this concept  in the text. India,  Cuba and others  were of the view that the reference  to 
"authorization " would  broaden  the scope  beyond  the five elements  of domestic  regulation,  i.e. 
licensing  requirements  and procedures,  qualification  requirements  and procedures  and technical  
standards.  He did not share  this view and noted  that the intention  of introducing  the current  
definition  of the concept  of "authorization " in paragraph  1.bis2 was precise ly to build a bridge  to 
the five elements  of GATS  Article  VI:4. "Authorization " was defined  as the result  of a procedure , 
thus making  the link to licensing  and qualification  procedures  that were put in place so that an 
applicant  could  demonstrate  compliance  with licensing  and qualification  requirements  and technical  
standards.  This mean t that all five elements  of GATS  Article  VI:4 were covered  by the term 
"authorization ", but also that nothing  else was cover ed by the term. 
1.107.   The representative  of Barbados  delivered  a statement  on behalf  of the African,  Caribbean  
and Pacific  (ACP)  Group  of States . Trade  in services  continued  to be an important  issue for the ACP 
Group,  although  this file could  not be properly  assessed  outside  of the wider  context  of 
negotiations.  Barriers  to entry for services  professionals  limited  access  of all services  and servic e 
suppliers  to markets  of export  interest  to the ACP Group.  However,  it had to be emphasized  and 
understood  clearly  that ACP countries  faced  numerous  supply -side constraints , which  limited  their 
capacity  to, for example,  develop  adequate  legislative and development -oriented  regulatory  
regimes.  Many  ACP economies  remain ed net importers  of services  and their domestic  services  
providers  faced intense  competition  from foreign  providers.  Any outcome  on mandated  domestic  
regulation  negotiations  should  ensure  that there  was a reduction  of barriers  to qualifications  of ACP 
services  suppliers.  While  divergent  views  existed  even amongst  proponents  of the disciplines , any 
necessary  disciplines  that all Members  would  agree  to had to preserve  the right to regulate  and 
not hinder  the regulatory  capacity  and policy  space  for development -driven  regulations  by ACP 
States . In her view, a pragmatic  assessment  of the discussions  to date reveal ed the following:  at 
the beginning  of October  2016 the proponents  had started  to subm it blocks  of text on services  
domestic  regulation . These  were a departure  from the more familiar  form of process  and 
substance  that negotiations  on domestic  regulation  had taken  until 2011.  Many  delegations , 
particularly  a large number  of developing  countr ies, had raised their preliminary,  but substantial  
concerns  regarding  the new texts and indicated  that they were awaiting  comments  from their 
capitals . In September,  the proponents  submitted  what appeared  to be an amalgamated  text 
instead  of a consolidated  text, which  included  some  minimal  amendments  to the earlier  text 
proposals.  It was evident  that not all proponents  submitting  the text supported  all elements  of the 
text. The African  Group  had then submitted  a list of questions  in writing  to the proponents,  and 
India had submitted  comments  in writing  indicating  its conditional  engagement  in the proponents ' 
text. India's contribution  comprised  both questions  and a development  chapter  stemming  from the 
2009 and 2011 Chair texts. Other  delegations  had posed  questions  at the meeting.  After a brief 
review  of the revised  text the ACP Group  had observed  the divergences  among  proponents.  
Amongst  both proponents  and non-proponents  convergence  was still remote  with regard  to the 
scope,  nature  and substance  of the discussions.  Many  of the difficulties  went straight  to the core of 
the basis upon which  Members  engage d on domestic  regulation . The concerns  of many  developing  
countries  had included  the limitations  to their right to regulate,  shrinking  policy  space,  limited  
capacity,  and legal and regulatory  framework , and remain ed valid despite  the inclusion  of the 
development  chapter  in the new text. Bearing  all of the above  in mind and with the very little time 
before  Buenos  Aires,  she did not believe  that Members  could reach  an agreement  on domestic  
regulation  by MC11.  It was therefore  critical  that Members  focused  their limited  resources  
effectively , and on priority  areas  which  could  be delivered  in Buenos  Aires.  She recall ed that 
Members  had stressed  that texts should  not be presented  to Ministers  where  there  was no 
convergence.  At this stage  it would  therefore  be more prudent  to focus the efforts  on developing  a 
textual  proposal  that facilitate d continued  work on domestic  regulation  post-MC11  in fulfilling  the 
mandate  of GATS  Article  VI:4. 
1.108.   The representative  of Senegal  expressed  support  for the statements  made  by South  Africa  
on behalf  of the African  Group , Barbados  on behalf  of the ACP Group  and Uganda  on behalf  of the 
LDCs.  He reiterate d his initial  concern  expressed  at the last meeting  of the WPDR , as well as 
during  a bilateral  meeting  with the proponents.  The introduction  of the text in paragraph  1.1 
indicating  that the proposal  was designed  to deal with the issues  of licensing  and qualification  
requirements  and technical  standards  relating  specifically  to developing  countries  and LDCs was 
problematic.  Indeed , as indicated  by Bangladesh  and Uganda,  LDCs faced  difficulties  that had been 
indicated  in the LDC Collective  Request  and that pertained  to mode  4. This proposal  could not be 
presented  as only benefitting  LDCs and developing  countries.  His delegation  had already  indicated  S/WPDR/M/73  
 
- 36 - 
 
  the systemic  concerns  the disciplines  could create  for the administrat ive, legislative  and regulatory  
system , as well as for the institutional  capacity  in terms  of development  of qualifications,  technical  
standards  and licensing  requirements.  With regard  to the terms  under  paragraphs  4.4 to 4.6 "to 
the extent  practicable  and in a manner  consistent  with its legal system  for adopting  measures ", he 
questioned  the scope  of this provision  and noted  that it was a matter  of knowing  whether  the 
obligations  would  still be the same  if the domestic  legal system  did not provide  for this. He 
supported  India's concerns  regarding  the non-binding  language  in the development  section.  In 
case of difficulties,  developing  countries  should  be able to decide  whether  to apply  the obligations  
or not, and apply  them only when  they had the capacity  to do so. He asked the proponents  to 
explain  how the elements  under  the development  provision  with regard  to the size of the 
econom y, for example , would  be measured . He reiterate d his concerns  about  having  issues  related  
to gender  equality  dealt with in the proposed  text. He did not believe  that the WPDR  was the right 
place to have the gender  discussion.   
1.109.   The representative  of Kenya  associated  himself  with the statement  delivered  by South  
Africa  on behalf  of the African  Group.  In his view, the format  and the structure  of the text were not 
in line with the mandate  contained  in GATS  Article  VI:4. The text was not balanced,  since many  of 
the issues  of interest  to developing  countries  had been left out. For instance,  in the 2009 Chair 
text it was clearly  stated  that residency  requirements,  other  than those  subject  to scheduling  
under  Article  XVII of the GATS,  could  not be a prerequisite  for assessing  and verifying  the 
competence  of a service  supplier  of another  Member,  which  was a very important  issue for Kenya  
and many  developing  countries.  Regarding  the right to regulate,  he was concerned  that the 
language  suggested  in the text did not provide  substantive  content  or any mechanism  to 
operationalize  the right to regulate  in relation  to the proposed  disciplines.  In fact some  of the 
provisions  in the text, inter alia paragraph  1.3, diluted  the importance  of the right to regulate.  On 
the use of the word "authorization ", he was still not clear about  the scope.  He enquired  what the 
scope  was in relation  to domestic  processes  associated  with the license  granting  procedures.  His 
concern  was that authorization  could  encompass  additional  domestic  processes  of granting  licenses  
that might  go beyond  what had been envisaged  by Article  VI:4. 
1.110.   On the issue of submission  of applications,  as proposed  in paragraph  2.1, he stated  that 
the laws and regulations  governing  business  varied  and therefore  licensing  requirements  and 
procedures  depended  on the particular  circumstances  of a business.  Secondly,  many  types  of 
business es required  additional  certification  or a permit  beyond  the basic business  license.  Third,  
the provision  of a service  might  involve  different  kinds of activities.  One might  therefore  need 
permits  or licenses  for different  activities  even if they were all carried  out by the same  business.  
He was therefore  of the view that the proposed  provisions  on the submission  of applications  did 
not take into account  the realities  of granting  of licenses  in different  services  sectors.  On the issue 
of fees, as reflected  in paragraph  2.6, he stated  that licensing  fees were not commensurate  with 
the administrative  cost of providing  a service  in all cases.  There  were a number  of situations  where  
fees were used to raise revenue,  which  in turn was used to build capacity  of the regulatory  agency.  
This was the case in Kenya,  where  there  were many  competing  priorities  and national  resources  
were always  limited.  His concern was that fees that were not commensurate  with administrative  
costs of providing  a service  might  be challenged  as unreasonable  even if they had been agreed  
upon by relevant  stakeholders  through  a national  consultative  process.  
1.111.   With regard  to the issue of transparency,  particularly  paragraph  4.6, where  Members  were 
mandated  to consider  comments  received  from interested  parties , it was important  to note that 
consultations  on laws and regulations  normally  attracted  comments  reflecting  the interests  of 
various groups,  some  of which  were conflicting.  Furthermore,  some  of the comments  might  not be 
in line with the national  policy  objectives  that the published  laws and regulations  were expected  to 
address.  It was therefore  not possible  or feasible  that all comme nts from interested  persons  would  
be taken  into account  in the final laws and regulations.  In his view, the use of soft language,  such 
as "to the extent  practicable ", did not help much,  because  if a Member  was challenged,  it would  
have to demonstrate  that there  had been an attempt  to consider  those  comments,  even if those  
comments  were not in line with the specific  objectives  of the laws and regulations  being  put in 
place.  Concerning  development,  he highlighted  that the acquisition  of capacity  was critical  in terms  
of effective  implementation  of disciplines.  As far as developing  countries,  especially  those  with 
capacity  constraints,  were concerned,  their experience  with the Uruguay  Round  had revealed  that 
transitional  periods  as an element  of special  and differential  treatment  did not guarantee  the 
acquisition  of capacity  to implement  the disciplines.  S/WPDR/M/73  
 
- 37 - 
 
  1.112.   The representative  of El Salvador  indicated  that her delegation  was neither  a proponent,  
nor a demandeur  of domestic  regulation  disciplines.  El Salvador  was a net importer  of services  
with a share  of 0,5%  of global  services  trade,  and hence  her position  on the issue was somew hat 
defensive.  Nevertheless,  her delegation  would  like to be constructive,  and contribute  to the work 
of the WTO and bring positive  messa ges to its trading  partners.  Regarding  the development  
provisions,  she indicated  that El Salvador  considered  that DR disciplines  could  use a similar  model , 
as the TFA. In other  words,  under  such a model  Members  could  introduce  flexibilities  for 
developing  countries  in areas  where  they deemed  it necessary.  Article  7 of the text was not 
sufficiently  clear,  which  was concerning  given  the short time that remained  before  MC11.  Members  
currently  did not even have a copy of the proposal  in Spanish.  What was propos ed with regard  to 
transition  periods  appeared  not to be self-determination,  and she asked  the proponents  to clarify  
this point.  She also asked  for clarity  as to whether  Article  7 covered  all provisions  of the text. She 
stated  that the criterion  of the size of economy  should  be removed  given  that only Members  
themselves  knew their own limitations.  Despite  many  disciplines  containing  best endeavor  
language,  at any given  time there  could  be an obligation  to apply  the disciplines.  El Salvador  took 
the potential  consequences  of the application  of the proposed  provisions  very seriously.  She 
suggested  that Articles  2, 3 and 6 should  include  language  that related  to the implementation  or 
application  of these  disciplines  where  practicable  and in accordance  with the legal systems  of 
Members.  
1.113.   The representative  of the Plurinational  State  of Bolivia  took note of the proponents ' 
statements  and thanked  Russia  for its suggestions.  He pointed  out that his delegation  continued  to 
have concerns  with regard  to a number  of elements . Following  several  meetings,  the proponents  
had yet to identify  the issues  that needed  to be resolved  and explain  why Articles  III and VI:2 of 
the GATS  were not sufficient  for resolving  some  of the situations  proponents  would  like to see 
disciplin ed by the proposed  text. A number  of disciplines  had yet to meet the necessity  test. 
Members  had different  regulatory  processes  and were all confronted  by different  realities.  The 
transparency  provisions  were not based  on a mandate  and were more burdensome  than those  
contained  in the GATS.  One group  of Members  should  not presume  that it could  resolve  the 
problems  of other  Members.   
1.114.   The definition  of "authorization ", and the text on administration  of measures  went further  
than the GATS  mandate.  Provisions  relating  to prior publication  also raised  concerns  and went 
beyond  the scope  of the rules Members  were mandated  to create.  The establishment  of new rules 
in the multilateral  trading  system  generated  a number  of social  concerns  that were just as 
important  as trade  concerns.  Furthermore,  he noted  that in line with the WTO jurisprudence,  also 
flexible  language  invoked  positive  obligations  on the part of Members  and was of the view that the 
margin  of flexibility  was very small.  The ambiguity  of certain  provisions , like those  on impartiality,  
transparency,  objectivity  and on reasonable  process es negatively  impacted  on the right to regulate  
in favor of vulnerable  groups  and the right to correct  historical  injustices.  Regarding  development,  
he noted  that transition  periods  were not necessarily  long enough  and flexibilities  had to be set off 
against  the ability  of developing  Members  to meet their needs  and not just the transition  periods.  
Furthermore,  the question  of how to address  the right to regulate  continued  to present  difficulties,  
given  that the right had limits,  according  to the WTO jurisprudence  set out in cases  such as US-
Gambling , China -Raw Materials  and many  others.  Bolivia  was not in a position  to consider  
restricting  its policy  space  and regulate  against  its national  interests.  Experience  with the WTO 
showed  that when  Members  negotiated  a bad agreement,  it was very difficult  to change  it 
afterwards.  The proponents ' text had changed  after many  debates  but convergence  was yet to be 
achieved,  meaning  that there was no consensus  on presenting  a proposal  to Ministers  at MC11.  
Some  Members  had put forward  proposals  on agriculture,  where  the outlook  was not very 
optimistic  either  and he asked  Members  to take this into account.  On the process,  Bolivia  was 
currently  undertaking  informal  consultations  on the way forward  with as many  Members  as 
possible.  
1.115.   The representative  of Kazakhstan  thanked  India,  Russia  and Peru for their textual  
suggestions  to the consolidated  text by the co-sponsors.  This demonstrated  the constr uctive  
attitude  of these  Members  in the development  of domestic  regulation  disciplines.  In relation  to 
India's proposal,  she associated  herself  with the statements  and comments  made  by Uruguay  and 
Australia.  She supported  the amendments  and modifications  proposed  by the Russian  Federation,  
most of which  were acceptable  to Kazakhstan,  and were in line with its WTO commitments.  Finally,  
she expressed  support  for moving  towards  a negotiating  text, as called  for by several  Members  
and expressed  her readiness  for further  constructive  engagement.  S/WPDR/M/73  
 
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  1.116.   The representative  of Switzerland  thanked  Uruguay  for the introductory  statement  and the 
co-sponsors  that had taken  the floor,  as well as the Russian  Federation,  Peru, India and others  for 
their contributions.  He echoed  the statement  made  by New Zealand  concerning  the scope  and the 
right to regulate.  The Swiss  Confederation  was a strong  advocate  of domestic  regulation  
disciplines.  Switzerland  had originally  supported  the WPDR  Chair text, as many  other  Members  had 
done, and still supported  it. With the aim to stimulate  the debate  in the WPDR  the proponents  had 
adapted  their positions  and co-sponsored  a revised  text. Switzerland  was eager  to see further  
work and would  continue  to show flexibility  and an open mind.  Since  the DR negotiation  had been 
interrupted,  Switzerland  had constantly  supported  the idea of returning  to text-based  negotiations.  
With the revised  proposal  currently  on the table,  it was his firm wish to make  the WPDR  work 
more concrete.  He was equally  willing  to consider  the proposals  tabled  by other  Members,  
especially  those  who had expressed  their concerns  about  existing  proposals,  and to take steps  to 
move  collectively  towards  common  ground.  Some  of the proposals  on the table corresponded  to 
Switzerland 's positions and he supported  them.  Switzerland  was supportive  of definitions  of 
licensing  and qualification  requirements  and the respective  procedures.  Finally,  he stated  that the 
negotiation  process  should  be comprehensive , inclusive  and based  on all existing  WPDR materials,  
new proposals  by Members  and WPDR  discussions.  
1.117.   The representative  of the Bolivarian  Republic  of Venezuela  acknowledged  the efforts  from 
the proponents  of the revised  document  and thanked  in particular  Uruguay  for having  made  the 
introduction  of the revised  proposal  and Russia  for having  presented  their remarks.  He reiterated  
that many  Members  had actively  committed  to showing  that they did not agree  with either  the 
proposed  text, or the very premise  of negotiations.  In other  words,  as things  stood  today,  the 
disciplines  were not necessary.  Many  delegations,  such as South  Africa  on behalf  of the African  
Group,  Uganda,  Cameroon,  Cuba,  Zimbabwe,  Egypt,  Barbados  on behalf  of the ACP Group,  
Senegal,  Kenya  and Bolivia , among  many  others  had already  referred  to the intrusiveness  of some  
of the proposed  provisions.  For example,  the proposed  disciplines  would  impinge  on the right to 
regulate  given  that they effectively  contained  obligations  on how to regulate,  as had been clearly  
expressed  by the delega tion of Cameroon.  Article  1.1 was an example  of very problematic  drafting.  
Many  developing  countries  were net importers  of services,  but the disciplines  would  be beneficial  
to service  exporters.  In a number  of places  in the text Members  saw the expression  "shall to the 
extent  possible ", which  was language  that required  a positive  action  by Members.  Although  it was 
not an obligation  to produce  results,  the burden  of proof fell on Members  to demonstrate  that they 
were not able to meet the obligation.  Regardin g transparency,  he noted  that Article  VI:4 did not 
provide  a mandate  in this respect.  Nor did the mandate  provide  for obligations  on independence.  
He sought  a clarification  as to how the proponents  defined  "independence " and why they 
considered  independence  to be the best regulatory  model.  He was concerned  about  the provisions  
on technical standards  under  paragraph  5.1 and noted  that given  that there  was little clarity  on 
the term "open and transparent  processes ", it could be interpreted  to mean  that some  of the 
practices  employed  by certain  Members  could  become  a prescription  or imposition  of a regulatory  
approach.  With regard  to development,  he did not consider  it useful  to follow  the TFA approach.  He 
continued  to have the same  concerns,  as shared  by a number  of Members,  on special  and 
differential  treatment  that was limited  to transitional  periods  and technical  assistance , which  was 
currently  being  proposed  on a best endeavor  basis.  He did not see the proponents ' text as a basis 
for negotiations  and thought  that domestic  regulation  must be part of the post-Buenos  Aires work,  
given  the short amount  of time before  MC11  and the guidance  of the DG to focus on topics  that 
had the best possibility  of getting  results  in Buenos  Aires. 
1.118.   The representative  of Turkey  stated  that as a developing  country  and one of the latest  
supporters  of the text, Turkey  had completed  a long and effective  evaluation  process  to verify  the 
benefits  of domestic  regulation  disciplines  in services.  As a result of that evaluation,  the 
government  came  to the conclusion  that it could  only ensure  predictability,  legal certainty  and 
efficiency  of the authorization  processes  through  these  disciplines.  Licensing  costs and procedural  
delays  affected  developing  and least-developed  services  suppliers ' participation  in trade  in services  
much  more than multinational  corporations,  as the latter  had the resources  to avoid  domestic  
regulation  obstacles.  In this regard,  she believed  that disciplines  on domestic  regulation  could only 
bring a positive  contribution  to the economic  development  of developing  country  Members  of the 
WTO.  The current  proposal  reflected  the recent  suggestions  by various  WTO Members  to better  
highlight  the needs  of all WTO Members  in the text. New amendments  to the text, especially  in the 
development  section,  had been added  with the aim of addressing  the concerns  of all developing  
WTO Members,  as well as LDCs by providing  flexible  transition  periods.  In this regard,  she 
reiterated  her appreciation  for the hard work and efforts  of all co-sponsors  to develop  the new S/WPDR/M/73  
 
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  proposal  on the disciplines  on domestic  regulation,  as well as the efforts  of all WTO Members,  such 
as India,  Peru and the Russian  Federation  who had contributed  to the text through  their 
suggestions.  In her opinion,  suggestions  from Members  were the best way to proceed  further.  She 
hoped  that this work would  be vital for the progress  towards  establishing  a common  understanding  
for MC11.  In this regard,  she hoped  that Members  would  use their remaining  time before  MC11  
efficiently  and start negotiations  on the basis of a negotiating  text. 
1.119.   The representative  of the United  States  expressed  his appreciation  to the Chair and to the 
Secretariat.  He acknowledged  that the Chair was facilitating  work on a very controversial  issue and 
under  very difficult  circumstances,  and urged  other  Members  to aim their errors  at other  Members  
and not at the podium.  In his view, the proposed  disciplines  focused  on the correct  issues.  
Although  other  Members  might  have more suggestions  to make  at an appropriate  time, this was a 
good start.  During  the course  of this meeting,  which  echoed  prior meetings,  he had heard  a clear 
message  from Members,  including  the African  Group  and the LDCs,  that they were not comfortable  
with the process  and the application  of the disciplines.  Members  would  not reach  the finishing  line 
until they addressed  the concerns  of all. From his perspective,  although  the core of the proposed  
disciplines  was solid,  they faltered  on the balance  of their application  across  Members  and their 
insufficient  flexibility  in application  to each Member.  The problem  of balance  across  Members  was 
caused  first by the scope,  which  tied the application  of the disciplines  to GATS  schedules.  This 
meant  that Members  who had taken  weak market  access  commitments  had far greater  rights  to 
challenge  the regulatory  practices  of Members  who had scheduled  strong  market  access  
commitments.  Balance  was also a problem  because  the development  provisions  that had been 
included  in the text could  allow large emerging  economies  to neglect  their leadership  obligations.  
The US would  not accept  outcomes  that were not balanced  from its perspective  and that did not 
reflect  US interests.  The problem  of inflexibility  was made  clear in particular  by the interventions  of 
the LDCs.  The approach  the text took to scope  and development  did not meet the needs  of many  
Members.  As Members  had heard  from the LDCs,  simply  creating  a loophole  in otherwise  inflexible  
disciplines  did not give them confidence.  He added  that this was an approach  that reinforced  
negative  stereotypes  about  LDC service  suppliers  and regulators  which  had contributed  to their 
poor integration  in world  services  trade.  Conversations  about  what Members  could  not do were 
important  but ultima tely, they did not move  the membership  forward.  Members  needed  to begin  
the very difficult  work of discussing  with all WTO Members  what they could  do. What was needed  
was an honest  appraisal  by each Member  of where  these  disciplines  were appropriate  and in which  
sectors,  or under  which  circumstances  they might  cause  problems.  Members  needed  a 
methodology  that allowed  for flexible  tailoring  of commitments.  This might  be an area in which  the 
Chair could  provide  assistance  when  Members  came  back to work after MC11.  While  the WPDR  had 
given  Members  a possible  starting  point with the text, it was clear that Members  would  not be in a 
position  to present  a final consensus  text to Ministers  at MC11.  It was far too late for that and 
everyone  should  put the possibilit y out of their minds.  Members  did not present  issues  to Ministers  
because  a Ministerial  Conference  was taking  place.  Rather,  they presented  issues  to Ministers  
when  the issues  were ripe for Ministerial  involvement.  In the case of domestic  regulation,  given  
that the mandate  to work came  from the GATS  and not from Ministers,  he was not convinced  at 
this time of the need for Ministerial  involvement  with this issue at MC11  in order  to allow Members  
to continue  their work in 2018.  
1.120.   The representative  of Uruguay  thanked  Russia,  Peru, India and Australia  for their positive  
contribution  to the discussion  in the form of comments  and questions.  She considered  that 
Members  needed  to move  towards  a negotiating  text and on a constructive  basis.  She took note of 
the concerns put forward  by Members  at previous  meetings.  
1.121.   The representative  of Chile echoed  the presentation  delivered  by the representative  of 
Uruguay  on the new elements  introduced  in the consolidated  text. The revised  version  of the text 
was the product  of an important  effort  that the proponents  were making  to incorporate  various  
elements  that were not in the proponents ' interests  but were necessary  to take into account  
comments  and requests  made  by non-co-sponsors.  He thanked  the delegations  of the Russian  
Federation,  Peru and Swaziland  for the textual  suggestions  they had made.  He believed  that this 
was a constructive  way to participate  in the discussions  and was committed  to evaluating  the 
suggestions.  Regarding  the proposal  by the Russian  Federation,  in particular,  he looked  forward  to 
receiving  the clarifications  requested.  Regarding  the relationship  between  the proposal  and the 
mandate  of Article  VI:4, he referred  to the arguments  that his delegation  had given  in past 
meetings,  i.e. noted  that the consolida ted text responded  perfectly  to the mandate  contained  in 
Article  VI:4. Indeed,  paragraph  1.1 of the proposal  expressly  stated  that it had been developed  on S/WPDR/M/73  
 
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  the basis of the GATS  and, in particular,  in accordance  with its Article  VI:4. Furthermore,  the 
paragraph  on the scope  of application  expressly  stated  that the proposal  applied  to measures  of 
Members  related  to the five elements  contained  in Article  VI:4 and to nothing  more than that. For 
its part, the definition  of "authorization " made  direct  reference  to licenses,  qualifications  and 
technical  standards;  hence  all provisions  contained  in the consolidated  text fitted perfectly  into the 
mandate  of Article  VI:4. While  he did not consider  it necessary  to introduce  definitions  for the five 
elements  of Article  VI:4, he was open to exploring  alternatives.  The proposed  publication  of 
information  in one of the official  languages  of the WTO would  not be a problem  for Chile as a 
Spanish -speaking  country,  but he was aware  that the suggestion  represented  a very import ant 
difficulty  for many  Members,  which  was the reason  why Chile did not support  it. 
1.122.   Regarding  development,  he believed  that it was not appropriate  to introduce  rules that 
applied  to all developing  Members,  without  distinction.  Chile was a developing  countr y. These  
countries  represented  a very large and heterogeneous  group  that included  small,  medium  and 
large economies  with different  levels  of economic,  institutional  and regulatory  development.  In 
fact, many  developing  Members  were co-sponsors  and demandeur s in domestic  regulation.  
Therefore,  he considered  that the approach  proposed  in Article  7 on development  was appropriate,  
as it would  allow transition  periods  with respect  to specific  obligations  if Members  needed  to 
postpone  implementation  due to their particular  situation.  He also highlighted  the transition  period  
disciplines  for LDCs upon graduation  and disciplines  on technical  assistance  and capacity  building.  
With regard  to the concern  expressed  by Panama  on technical  standards,  he confirmed  that the 
text did not contain  an obligation  to develop  technical  standards  at the national  level.  He was open 
to consider  language  to make  this absolutely  clear.  
1.123.   Regarding  the criticism  by some  delegations  of the relevance  of the flexibility  language  in 
the proposa l, he pointed  out that it was precisely  the language  that sought  to generate  greater  
flexibility,  while maintaini ng in the majority  of the cases  a certain  degree  of obligation,  which  had 
to be evaluated  in the full context , i.e. the limited  scope  of the proposal  and the GATS,  the 
application  of the exceptions  contained  in the GATS  and Article  7 on development.  Although  he 
considered  it necessary  to introduce  flexibilities  that allowed  Members  to achieve  a balanced  
instrument,  he believed  that it would  not make sense  to introduce  elements  that would  empty  
obligations  of all form of abidingness.  Regarding  the change  in the structure  of paragraph  4.3 on 
transparency,  his reading  of the text was that the level of the obligation  was not increasing  as 
compared  to the earlier  proposal,  but Chile was nevertheless  open to considering  any necessary  
language  changes.  In relation  to the fact that the disciplines  on domestic  regulation  applied  only to 
specific  commitments  that each Member  had undertaken  in its schedule,  he clarified  that this was 
intended  to grant  Members  greater  flexibility.  If a Member  had been able to make  a specific  
commitment  on market  access  or national  treatment,  one could  assume  that this Member  could 
also make  a commitment  on domestic  regulation.  Chile and some  other  Members  could  accept  
horizontally  applicable  disciplines  but he was aware  that this would  not be acceptable  to all 
Members.  He supported  the suggestion  to move  to a negotiating  text. 
1.124.   The representative  of Swaziland  clarified  his previous  point on gender  equality.  His 
comments  were meant  to demonstrate  how easy it would  be to include  in the text everything  
under  the sun that was best suited  to be dealt with in a forum  like the United  Nations.  As for 
gender  equality,  he believed  that the UN was doing  a wonderful  job in his regard . He emphasized  
that the proposed  disciplines  were limiting  Members ' policy  space  to regulate  and their 
sovereignty.  He was of the view that Article  VI:4 could  not be read in isolation  from other Articles  
of the Agreement.  He stated  that Members  also had to consider  Articles  VI:1, VI:5(a)(i),  I:1 
and XVIII of the GATS.  Members  had to get a clear understanding  of what implications  these  had, 
as well as their linkages  to the current  discussion.  
1.125.   He noted  that Article  VI:1 of the GATS  already  dealt with the administration  of measures,  
and he asked  what more the proponents  wanted  to achieve.  Moreover,  he considered  that the 
objective  behind  the consolidated  proposal  was to have the WTO play an oversigh t role in the 
administration  of almost  all measures  of general  application.  Measures  of general  applications  were 
measures  that cut across  sectors  and were not specific  in design  or nature.  This meant  that by 
increasing  the scope  through  Article  VI:4, Memb ers would  subject  their schedules  and non-
scheduled  specific  commitments  to WTO law oversight  and DSB interpretation.  Simply  put, if 
Members  were to sign up to the proposal,  they would  be required  to always  consider  WTO 
interests  above  domestic  interests  whenever  developing  their respective  domestic  regulation.  It S/WPDR/M/73  
 
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  was without  doubt  that domestic  regulation  evolved  over time from generation  to generation  and it 
was necessary  to strike  a balance  between  economic,  political  and social  interests  of a particular  
society  or generation.  Domestic  regulation  served  as a tool for each state to intervene  in striking  
the right balance.  More often than not there  was a time lag in the development  of domestic  
regulation  to correct  any failures  that had been identified.  This was because  most often states  
were reactive  rather  than proactive.  He stated  that Swaziland  would never  subject  the process  of 
developing  domestic  regulation  to WTO oversight.  Regarding  Article  VI:5(a)(ii),  he noted  that it 
was a widely  known  fact that developing  countries  had poor regulatory  frameworks.  In his view,  
the proposed  disciplines  were aimed  at capturing  the limited  policy  space  developing  countries  and 
LDCs had. The language  of Article  VI:5(a)(ii)  in his view gave flexibility  not to apply  the proposed  
disciplines  to the countries  that had already  developed  a regulato ry framework.  Regarding  
Article  VI:5(b),  he asked  who participated  in developing  standards.  Developing  countries  did not 
have the capacity  to develop  standards  and were mere standard  takers  from their developed  
counterparts.  This in turn meant  that the disciplines  on standards  were indirectly  targeted  at 
developing  countries.  Regarding  the scope  of the proposal,  he noted  that the devil lay in the 
details  and challenge d Members  to scrutinize  GATS  Articles  VI:1, VI:5(a)(i)  and I:1 on the scope,  
as well as Article  XVIII.  
1.126.   The representative  of the Republic  of Moldova  associated  herself  with the statements  made  
by the co-sponsors.  Transparent,  predictable  and non-discrimina tory regulatory  frameworks  were 
vital to ensure  a stable  environment  in order  for trade  in services  to thrive.  Furthermore,  because  
of the importance  of the domestic  regulatory  environment  as a context  for trade,  WTO Members  
had been given  a negotiating  mandate  through  Article  VI:4 of the GATS  to develop  disciplines  that 
would  ensure  that unnecessary  barriers  to trade were not created.  She thanked  India and the 
Russian  Federation  for their constructive  suggestions.  She invited  Members  to further  examine  the 
proposal  in the broader  context,  taking  into account  the importance  of trade  in services  and the 
need to ensure  that such trade  was conducted  in a transparent  and reliable  environment.  Moldova  
supported  a multilateral  outcome  on domestic  regulation.  The proponents  had engaged  
constructively  to present  a balanced  consolidated  text. It was important  to move now towards  a 
negotiating  text, and to start a process  where  each Member  could work on a common  text, open to 
the whole  membership  in order  to achieve  a balanced  outcome  for the next Ministerial  Conference.  
1.127.   The representative  of Costa  Rica supported  the statement  made  by Uruguay  on behalf  of 
the co-sponsors  who had dedicated  a great  amount  of effort  and work in order  to come  forward  
with a proposal  incorpo rating  all the elements.  Some  elements  in the text did not reflect  the co-
sponsors ' preferred  option.  He thanked  Russia,  India and others  for their constructive  suggestions  
seeking  to improve  the text. He referred  to some  of the suggestions  from India,  particularly  with 
regard  to definitions  and recognition.  Including  definitions  in the text could  give rise to difficulties  
for national  implementation  and could  be incompatible  with some  provisions  in national  laws. 
However,  he was nevertheless  ready  to discuss language  that was compatible  with the national  
legislation.  With regard  to recognition,  he noted  that the language  proposed  by India posed  some  
difficulties  in terms  of consistency  with the national  legislation,  so his preference  was to leave  it 
out. With regard  to the comments  on the development  section,  Costa  Rica believed  that there 
were a lot of differences  among  the many  developing  countries  and that a one-size-fits-all 
approach  was therefore  not appropriate,  as countries  had different  levels  of maturity and 
development  of their national  institutions  and regulations.  He suggested  allowing  for some  
flexibility  and taking  into account  different  needs  of each country  with regard  to its level of 
regulatory  development.  He believed  the time had come  to move to a negotiating  text as a next 
step, to which  all Members  could  contribute  and take ownership  of. 
1.128.   The Chairperson  requested  Members  to take note of the statements  made.  
1.129.   It was so agreed . 
2  ITEM  B. FUTURE  WORK  AND TIMING  OF THE NEXT  MEETING  
2.1.  The Chairperson  noted  that the question  at this stage  was what Members  wanted to do after 
the current  discussion . In their interventions  many  delegations  had already  alluded  to what they 
consider ed to be the appropriate  next steps . There were different  perspec tives on the viability  of 
taking  the work forward  on the basis of the proposals  on the table.  There  were a number  of 
Members  who had, repeatedly  and consistently,  stated  that they did not think that what was S/WPDR/M/73  
 
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  proposed  was a basis for negotiations  on discipl ines on domestic  regulation.  There  were also 
delegations  who had said that while they believe d that the texts on the table were a basis for 
work,  there  were too many  differences  at this stage  that in their assessment  could not be bridged  
before  the Ministe rial Conference.  Those delegations  suggest ed to continue  work on the basis of 
what was on the table after Buenos  Aires.  The proponents  and some  other  delegations  had 
expressed  at this and at previous  meetings  that their intention  was to engage  further  in the 
coming  weeks  and to explore  how gaps could be bridged.  Several  of those  delegations  who saw 
the possibility  for an outcome  at MC11  had called  for the development  of a negotiating  text, so as 
to facilitate  further  work before  the Ministerial.  Against  this backdrop,  she sought  clarification  from 
Members  as to what work they would  like to carry out in the WPDR  in the remaining  time before  
the last General  Council  meeting  on 30 November  2017.  
2.2.  The representative  of South  Africa  delivered  a statement  on behal f of the African  Group.  In 
considering  the next steps  she recall ed two of her earlier  statements . She had explained  in great 
detail  why her delegation  consider ed the proposed  rules as being  incompatible  with the "Agenda  
2063 - The Africa  We Want". In her interventions  she had demonstrated  how the proposed  rules 
did not adhere  to the GATS  Article  VI:4 mandate.  She had also expressed  in elaborate  detail  the 
Group 's concerns  on the inclusion  of the necessity  test, on the fact that transparency  and gender  
had no mandate,  and that it did not agree  that the formulation  of the development  of measures  
proposals  was within  the meaning  of GATS Article  VI:4. Her concerns  also included  the scope  of 
the proposed  rules,  the necessity  of developing  these  rules,  issues  of interpretation,  regulatory  
capture,  preservation  of policy  space,  regulatory  models,  regulatory  economy  and the overarching  
concerns  of intrusion  into the domestic  policy  processes.   
2.3.  The African  Group  had engaged  meaningfully  in the WPDR.  Without  seeking  to repeat  the 
well-known  concerns  of the African  Group , she stated upfront  that the revised  proponents ' text 
had not addressed  most of the concerns,  which  were systemic.  They pointed to the need for a 
deeper , more fulsome  and more conceptual  discussion  on GATS Article  VI:4. She asked  how 
Members  could reasonably  be expected  to resolve  the divergences  in one month  when  the entire  
genesis  of the proposals  and the consolidated  text were problematic  and there  was no common  
understanding  and agreement  on the GATS  Article  VI:4 mandate.  In the short time left until MC11,  
it was not possible  to bridge  these  historically  sensitive  matters,  as no amount  of best endeavour  
language  or transition  periods  being  characteriz ed as special  and differential  treatment  could  make  
up for taking  away African  governments ' sovereign  right to regulate.  To date Members  still had not 
obtained  any satisfactory  response s on the necessity  of the proposed  disciplines , nor had they 
been convinced of the value  addition  it sought  to create.  It was time to move  away from texts that 
had cherry  picked  some  issues  over others  and start assessing  how the proponents  intend ed to 
address  the African  Group 's concerns  and what the starting  point for discussions  would be after 
Buenos  Aires.  She further  noted  that it might be useful  to start thinking  about  the post-MC11  work 
plan for the WPDR.  
2.4.  The representative  of Ecuador  noted  that the existing  positions , as reflected  by the Chair,  
were very far apart . He consider ed that this was not the time to continue  working  on the topic of 
domestic  regulation . The Director -General  had been very clear in stating  that countries  should  
make  every  possible  effort  to work in areas  where  there  could  be room for agreement  and 
consensus . In his view,  the revised  text could  not serve  as basis for a negotiating  text. He echoed  
the point made  by South Africa in that it was necessary  to pursue  dialogue  and reflection  on the 
mandate  established  under  Article  VI:4. He reiterate d that his delegation  would  have to think more 
about  the future  work to be done on this subject  and urged  Members  not to continue  to insist on 
being  able to achieve  a result  in Buenos  Aires. 
2.5.  The representative  of the Plurinational  State  of Bolivia  recalled  that the African  Group,  the 
ACP Group,  the LDC Group,  and many  developing  countries  consider ed that there  was no text on 
domestic  regulation.  There was a proposal  from the proponents  who only formed  one group  of 
Members.  The few weeks  left until the MC11  would not allow Members  to resolve  divergent  
positions . In his view,  it was reasonable  to leave  this work for after Buenos  Aires. He reminded  
Members  of the long-standing  Doha agenda  that also had a mandate  of close to twenty  years . He 
noted  that it was time to look back and assess  the relevance  of the WPDR  mandate , reflect  on 
changes  that occurred  globally  and use scientific  evidence  to see whether  services  domestic  
regulation  was a relevant  topic for the multilateral  trading  system. He suggested  looking  at the S/WPDR/M/73  
 
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  issue of domestic  regulation  post-MC11  and stressed  that his delegation  could  not support  the 
process  for the upcoming  Ministerial . 
2.6.  The representative  of Cuba requested  her statement  made  at the WPDR  meeting  in October  
be put on the minutes  of this meeting .5 Her delegation  shared  and supported  the positions  of 
South  Africa  on behalf  of the African  Group,  Ecuador  and Bolivia.  In her view, it was not necessary  
for the Working  Party to meet again  to continue  cyclically  reiteratin g the same  debates.  It was 
more useful  to begin  reflection  on how Members  were going  to work post-Buenos  Aires and in 
particular  what the starting  point would  be. She noted  that it was important  to reflect  on the 
mandate  of Article  VI:4. The delegation  of Cuba was open to including  this issue in the post-
Buenos  Aires work program  based  on the existing  mandate.  
2.7.  The representative  of Brazil  was of the view that it was time to move  to a negotiating  text or 
a Chair's text, where  views  and proposals  of all Members  could  be better  reflected.  The text could 
be presented  at the Chair's own responsibility,  so that Members  were not bound  to accept  it. Even 
though  he was aware  of the time constraints,  there  was still a chance  to make  an attempt  at 
convergence  due to a lot of interest  in the debate.  
2.8.  The representative  of Nigeria  acknowledged  that Members  were facing  a very difficult  
moment.  He based  his comments  on the document  "General  Council  - Informal  TNC and Heads  of 
Delegation  meeting  - Tuesday  24 October  2017 - Chairman 's statement  and oral reports  by the 
Chairs  of the Bodies established  by the TNC" (JOB/GC/145).  He stated  that Members  should  
ensure  that MC11  was more manageable  for Ministers.  It was important  to be mindful  of the fact 
that at some  point it would  be necessary  for Members  to make  a very honest  assessment  as to 
what was doable.  It was likewise  important  to emphasize  that the WTO was a Member -driven  
organization,  so Members  had a collective  responsibility  and had to take a collective  decision.  They 
could  not pretend  that the decision  was in the hands  of the Chair. Regardless  of perspectives  and 
approaches,  it was important  for Members  not to leave  Buenos  Aires empty -handed.  The same  
message  had been reinforced  before  the Bali Ministerial  conference  in 2013 and the Bali Ministerial  
had delivered.  Another  key issue was the call for flexibility  and pragmatism,  which  needed  to be 
translated  on the basis of different  perspectives  as to what Members  could  deliver.  Buenos  Aires 
was not the end of the road and Members  had two options:  either  to deliver  at MC11  with a 
reduced level of ambition  to give comfort  to Members ' and accommodate  their concerns,  including  
on development,  or to continue  working  after MC11  on the basis of a work program.  He 
encouraged  the Chair to consult  with Members  as quickly  as possible  to see if Members  could 
deliver  at MC11.  He stressed  that all Members  should  be prepared  to make  contributions,  but 
noted  that domestic  regulation  was not the only issue on the negotiating  table,  and that other 
issues  also needed  to be given  prominence,  in particular  special  and differential  treatment  and 
developing  countries ' capacity  constraints.  The representative  of Nigeria  was still optimistic  and 
noted  that even though  MC11  was not the end, Members  needed  to come  back with something  
they could  be proud  of, no matter how small.  
2.9.  The representative  of the Bolivarian  Republic  of Venezuela  supported  the viewpoint  that due 
to substantial  differences,  the proposed  text could  not be a basis for negotiations.  Considering  the 
little time left until the MC11,  he recalled  the guidance  by the Director -General  to focus on areas  
where  there  was the best chance  of achieving  something.  Domestic  regulation  was a topic for 
post-Buenos  Aires work, which  should  be guided  by the proposal  by South  Africa  to sincerely  
reflect  on the negotiating  mandate.  
2.10.   The representative  of Australia  welcome d the continued  interest  from a growing  number  of 
Members  in negotiating  disciplines  on domestic  regulation  and acknowledge d the substanti ve 
engagement  across  the Membership  on the revised  text. Even where  Members  had expressed  
doubt s about  the prospects  for reaching  agreement  at MC11,  she appreciate d their efforts  to 
engage  with the substance  of the provisions  to identify  outstanding  questi ons and concerns.  She 
welcome d textual proposals  from a growing  number  of Members  with very concrete  ideas on how 
the text could  be further  improved  and was encouraged  by the comments  from at least one 
Member  who had not taken  the floor in recent  WPDR  discussions  but stated  that even though  the 
core disciplines  were solid,  further  work was required . She looked forward  to continuing  
                                                 
5 See Cuba's  statement  contained  in paragraph  2.16 of the Report  of the WPDR  meeting held on 2,3 and 
4 October  2017 (S/WPDR/M/72) . S/WPDR/M/73  
 
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  discussions  with Members  to move  the work ahead.  It was clear that Members  were at a point in 
the discussions  where  they needed to move  from discussing  the co-sponsors ' text to a process  
where  the positions  of all Members  could be reflected  in a common  text. She support ed and 
promised  to engage  constructively  in a Chair text process.  She was concerned,  however,  with the 
tone of the discussions  in the WPDR  and was particularly  disappointed  to hear some  Members  go 
as far as questioning  the veracity  of the WPDR  Chairperson.  In her view,  this was not constructive.  
In an environment  where  question s of substance  were increasingly  entangled  with political  issues , 
she recogni zed that Members  might  need to elevate  the discussions  to find a process  where by they 
could  take forward  the substantive  work on a negotiating  text, but also look to address  the higher-
level questions  that would  influence  what was possible  at MC11  and post-MC11.  
2.11.   The representative  of the Kingdom  of Saudi  Arabia  echoed  the statement  made  by Brazil.  
She compared  the situation  in the WPDR  to the situation  of two people  riding  the same  vehicle  
going  to the same  destination  in the middle  of the highway.  These  people  might  not agree  on the 
itinerary  but they were in the middle  of the highway.  They had two options:  either  to continue  
persevering  on the highway  and reach  the destination,  or take the first exit. She believed  that it 
was about  time to move  forward  to a negotiating  text that could  be presented  under  the Chair's 
responsibility.  She also agreed  with Nigeria  that Members  should  not leave  MC11  empty -handed  
and should  at least try to produce  an outcome .  
2.12.   The representative  of Swaziland  supported  the statement  by South  Africa  on behalf  of the 
African  Group,  as well as the statements  of other  like-minded  delegations.  According  to the 
Director -General  and the General  Council  Chair,  Members  needed  to be pragmatic  and realistic  in 
going  forward.  He recall ed that the representative  of the US had emphasized  this point as well, 
namely  that Members  should  only take issues  to Ministers  that were ripe. He stated  that it would  
be a great  surpri se for his delegation  if this proposal  was to proceed  to the Ministerial  without  the 
required  consensus.  It would  also be a great  surprise  if the Chair were to plan another  meeting  of 
the WPDR  notwithstanding  the current  impasse.  There  was no way Members  could reach  
consensus  in the next four weeks  before  MC11.  If Members  were to do so, it would  be a 
disrespectful  slap in Ministers ' faces.  As regards  the proponents ' comments  on the discussion  being  
politicized  by the delegations  trying  to get clarity  from them, he considered  it not worthwhile  to 
take the issue of domestic  regulation  to Ministers,  as Members  already  had the GATS  agreement  
and the Article  VI:4 mandate.  It was debatable  whether  the mandate  had been fully fulfilled  and 
whether  there  had been consensus  on the disciplines.  As there  had not been any consensus,  the 
issue of domestic  regulation  should be dealt with post-MC11.  
2.13.   The representative  of the European  Union  recognized  and acknowledged  the diverging  
voices  in the room.  His intention  was to continue  addressing  Members ' concerns  when  moving  
forward.  In response  to the calls for a more conceptual  discussion,  he believed  that only more 
debate  and text-based  discussion would  allow Members  to solve the difficulties . The revised  
consolidated  text had already  made  some  important  steps  in this direction.  At the same  time, he 
recognized  that there  was a limit to how far co-sponsors  could  take discussions  forward  based  on 
their own text. A number  of Members  wanted  to see their position  reflected  but not in the co-
sponsors ' text. In order  to better  reflect  the positions  of all Members,  it was necessary  to move  to 
a negotiating  text as the next step in taking  the work forwa rd. In view of what Members  heard,  it 
was time to elevate  the discussion  to a higher  level in the WTO.  He saw domestic  regulation  as a 
necessary  component  of a balanced  outcome  at MC11.  
2.14.   The representative  of Costa  Rica supported  the statements  delivered  by Australia  and the 
EU, which  reflect ed the position  of Costa  Rica on this process.  As had been pointed  out before,  he 
stated  that it was important  to move  the process  to the next level and find a way to continue  with 
the substa ntive work towards  a negotiat ing text, to which  everyone  could make  their 
contributions . He believe d that it was important  to move  to a process  that would  allow Members  to 
discuss  the issues  at a higher level and achieve  results  in Buenos  Aires, as well as in the work after 
Buenos  Aires.  
2.15.   The representative  of India noted  that services  suppliers,  particularly  from developing  
countries , faced  numerous  difficulties  in complying  with complex  domestic  regulations,  in particular  
those  brought  about  by developed  country  Members.  In this regard, she particularly  emphasized  
the hurdles  faced  by natural  persons  supplying  services  in foreign  jurisdictions  and recalled  the 
Accountancy  Disciplines  developed  by the Working  Party on Professional  Services  (WPPS).  The S/WPDR/M/73  
 
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  delegation  of India had construc tively  and in good faith engaged  with the proponents  in the 
process  in accordance  with the letter  and spirit of the GATS.  India had tabled  textual  suggestions  
based  on earlier  Chair texts that should  have been acceptable  to the proponents.  However,  the 
new revised  consolidated  text neither  provided  clarity  in most key areas  where  it had been 
requested,  nor did it include  provisions  that were essential  for India.  As a result,  the delegation  of 
India had no option  but to revisit  its approach  to the discussion . She had been repeatedly  pointing  
out that while it was important  to address  behind -the-border  barriers,  it was perhaps  more critical  
to address  border,  or entry -related  measures  impeding  trade  in services.  This was crucial  for 
developing  countries  and LDCs, which  had a specific  interest  in mode  4, and that was why India 
wanted  to address  challenges  confronting  trade  in services  in a more comprehensive  manner.  The 
African  Group,  the ACP Group,  the LDC Group  and many  other  Members  were not satisfied  by the 
approach  taken  by proponents  and the responses  provided.  She was of the firm view that due to 
the wide divergences  in positions,  the current  text did not seem  to be an acceptable  basis for 
further  discussions.  The Chair  reports  of 2009 and 2011 continued  to have relevance.  In view of 
the above  and the very limited  time available  before  MC11,  she believed  that domestic  regulation  
disciplines  were not ripe for an outcome  at MC11.  Instead,  she suggested  a comprehensive  post-
MC11  work program  on trade  in servic es based  on the Chair reports  of 2009 and 2011,  along  with 
some  of the elements  of the Indian  proposal  on Trade  Facilitation  in Services,  including  those  
related  to mode  4. 
2.16.   The representative  of Chile believed  that in line with the statements  made  by Brazil, 
Australia,  Saudi  Arabia,  the European  Union  and Costa  Rica, Members  had reached  a point in the 
discussions,  in which  they needed  to take a new step. Members  could  not make  substantive  
progress  on the basis of the co-sponsors ' text and had to move  forward  to a negotiating  text, 
which  would  allow all Members  to contribute  and express  their positions  and thereby  try and meet 
the mandate  that had been on hold for the past twenty  years.  
2.17.   The representative  of Hong Kong,  China  welcomed  and supported  the proposal  to produce  a 
negotiating  text. In his view,  there  was a lot of support  for further  discussion  of text-based  
proposals  in the WPDR.  It was important  that all proposals  were taken  into account  in an open,  
transparent  and inclusive  process.  It was therefore  time to move  to a negotiating  text that was 
inclusive  of all proposals  on the table to facilitate  further  discussion.   
2.18.   The representative  of the Republic  of Korea  believed  that all Members  wanted  to fulfil the 
GATS  Article  VI:4 mandate.  She consider ed that intensifying  text-based  substantive  discussions  
was the best way to move  towards  that goal. Co-sponsors  had worked  very hard in this direction  
for the last one and a half years.  They had carried  out extensive  outreach  and responded  to many  
question s orally  and in writing.  They had circulated  a consolidated  text which  they had 
subsequently  revised.  She noted  that it was time to move  to a negotiating  text that could  take into 
account  the views  and contributions  of more Members.  At the same  time, she shared  the view of 
the EU and Australia  that some  issues  could  be addressed  at a higher  level.  
2.19.   The representative  of Uruguay  joined  the statements  made  by the delegations  of the EU, 
Australia,  Costa  Rica, Chile,  Hong Kong,  China  and Korea.  She also believed  that it was time to 
move  to a substantive  discussion  of a negotiating  text that would  reflect  all positions  in an 
inclusive  and transparent  process.  She also believed  that domestic  regulation  was an important  
topic of interest  to the Ministerial  Conferenc e in Buenos  Aires.  
2.20.   The representative  of New Zealand  considered  that the exchange  on the revised  
consolidated  text had been useful  and the inputs  from delegations,  in particular  on the 
development  chapter,  had been a helpful  opportunity  to consider  for the first time what was 
included  in this chapter.  It was clear from the reactions  from the floor that Members  needed  to 
move  to a new basis for discussions  that did not belong  to the co-sponsors  and which  could  
incorporate  a wider  set of inputs  in an inclusiv e and transparent  manner.  She supported  the 
suggestion  for a negotiating  text made  by Brazil  and Saudi  Arabia  and a range  of co-sponsors.  
Members  might  also need to consider  other  modifications  to their methods  of working,  as 
suggested  by Australia,  the EU and Korea.  In her view,  it was still possible  to get an outcome  on 
domestic  regulation  at MC11.  
2.21.   The representative  of Canada  added  his voice to those  willing  to continue  work on domestic  
regulation  towards  MC11.  He acknowledged  the frustration  Members  heard  from the delegation  of S/WPDR/M/73  
 
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  India and others  that the proponents ' text did not reflect  their interests.  In his view, the co-
sponsors  could  not be expected  to champion  issues  that were not in their own interest.  Taking  
negotiations  back eight years  where  they had been at an impasse  was not a solution.  Rather,  
Members  should  move  to a process  where  each Member 's proposal  could  be considered  alongside  
others  and negotiated  in a consolidated  text. He joined  those  who had called  for moving  to a 
proper  negotiating  process  where  Members  could  consider  everybody 's interest s.  
2.22.   The representative  of Israel  welcomed  the work being  done on domestic regulation  and was 
hopeful  for an outcome  at MC11.  She recognized  the divergences  in the ongoing  vigorous  debate  
and noted  that Members  needed  to continue  this valuable  engagement  and present  concrete  ideas 
and concerns.  It would  therefore  be useful  to have a text that reflected  this engagement.  She 
supported  the suggestion  to elevate  the process  from discussing  the co-sponsors ' text to a Chair 
text. The delegation  of Israel  was still hopeful  not to leave  MC11  empty -handed.  
2.23.   The representative  of Colom bia reiterated  his support  for the process.  He regretted  the way 
in which  the discussion  had been conducted  and that the work of the Chair had been called  into 
question.  Colombia  was a developing  country  that also had challenges  and goals in terms  of social 
equality  and development  but it believed  that domestic  regulation  disciplines  would  support  
Colombia 's development  efforts.  He reiterated  his delegation 's interest  to continue  the discussion  
and to move  to a negotiating  text that would  not be under  the control  of the co-sponsors  and 
which  would  include  comments  of all Members  who wished  to achieve  a concrete  result  at MC11.  
The discussion  was complex  but he stressed  that Colombia  would  support  unconditionally  any 
decision  made  by the Chair.   
2.24.   The represent ative of Turkey  thanked  all the delegations  that had showed  positive  
engagement  in the discussion  of the proposed  text. She hoped  to use the remaining  time before  
MC11  efficiently  and to start the negotiations  on the basis of a negotiating  text that was inclusive  
of all the comments  and proposals  on the table.  Members  had reached  momentum  through  hard 
work in the last months  and were encouraged  by the level of engagement.  The proponents  did not 
want to end up at another  impasse.  She believed  that Members  should keep up the hard work to 
seek convergence.  The current  point was the closest  Members  had come  to realizing  the mandate  
in a long period  of time. Members  should  start working  on a negotiating  text and carry out 
discussions  at a higher  level.  MC11  was not the end of the road, as some  delegations  had 
emphasized,  but she hoped  that Members  could  keep up the good work achieved  until now and not 
lose this opportunity.  
2.25.   The representative  of Switzerland  echoed  the statements  made  by Hong Kong,  China  and 
others . In his view,  Members  were at a juncture  where this important  discussion  should be moved  
from abstract  to concrete.  A negotiating  text was the right tool to reflect  Members ' positions  in 
substance.  He urged  Members  to move  forward  and fulfil the long-standing mandate  in an open,  
transparent  and inclusive  process.   
2.26.   The representative  of Argentina  believed  that Members  were at the stage  where  they 
needed  to move  from a co-sponsors ' text to a negotiating  text in which  the positions  of all 
Members  could  be reflected.  This would  be the most adequate  means  of making  progress  in the 
area of domestic  regulation.   
2.27.   The representative  of the Russian  Federation  reiterated  her delegation 's support  for a 
multilateral  outcome  at MC11  and supported  the idea of a negotiating  text that consolidated  all 
proposals  and accommodated  all concerns  and interests.  Members  needed  to have a text that 
could  facilitate  the negotiation  of a balanced  outcome  at MC11.   
2.28.   The representative  of Singapore  concurred  that moving  to a negotiating  or a Chair text 
would  provide  a better  sense  of MC11  prospects  for domestic  regulation.  He believed  that such a 
text would  be helpful  to better  reflect  the varying  positions  and text contributions  in an inclusive  
process  and also facilitate  constructive  engagement  on the substance.   
2.29.   The representative  of Swaziland  enquired  what issues  in the view of the proponents  should  
be elevated  to a higher  level.  Considering  the number  of days left until MC11,  it was important  to 
know  what those  issues  were.  Geneva -based  delegations  also needed  to take those  comments  
back to capitals  for reflection.  S/WPDR/M/73  
 
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  2.30.   The representative  of Japan  expressed  his strong  support  for having  a negotiating  text or a 
Chair text that would  reflect  the previous  discussions  as much  as possible.   
2.31.   The representative  of China  was of the view that Members  should  try their best to lock in 
the progress  they had achieved  in the previous  two years  at the Ministerial  Conference.  Therefore,  
he echoed  previous  speakers  who had stated  that Members  should  still strive  to achieve  something  
at MC11.  He recalled  the suggestion  he had made  more than one month  ago that Members  needed  
to move  to a Chair text. One precious  month  had passed  since the last meeting  and Members  were 
still at the same  point.  This time more Members  agreed  that a Chair text was the only way 
forward.  He agreed  with India that the 2009 and 2011 Chair texts were still very relevant,  as well 
as Members ' written  submissi ons and textual  suggestions.  All of the above  should  form part of the 
Chair text, including  those  suggestions  that had been recorded  in the minutes,  and should  be 
reflected  in brackets  or in any other  way. Looking  back at the long and difficult  discussions  of the 
past two years,  he stated  that one of the major  reasons  why proponents  were faced  with so many  
doubts,  suspicions  and questions  in the process  was the fact that the form of the current  text was 
quite different  from that of the previous  Chair  texts.  On substance,  Members  were facing  the same  
arguments  on the same  controversial  issues  that they had had during  the discussions  of the 
previous  two Chair texts.  In his view, a new Chair text should  take this into consideration  and 
should  be balanced  and complete  to help bring about  more legitimacy.  He expressed  hope that 
Members  could  make  more progress  on the basis of a Chair text. He was not sure Members  could 
arrive  at an outcome  by MC11,  but a Chair text was the best hope.  Members  still needed  a work 
program  on domestic  regulation  post-MC11  no matter  the outcome.   
2.32.   The representative  of Peru supported  the idea of going  forward  with a negotiating  text in 
which  all Members  could  see their expectations,  concerns  and ideas reflected.  At the same  time, 
he felt that it was necessary  to recognize  the work and momentum  these  negotiations  had gained.  
To do the contrary  would  be risking  deconstructing  the path Members  had been following  and 
having  nothing  to take to the attention  of Ministers  at MC11.  He acknowledge d many  Members ' 
concerns  and divisions  of views.  At the same  time, he noted  that only a part of the membership  
had expressed  fundamental  opposition  to the negotiations,  whereas  the majority  was looking  at 
modifications  of scope  with the objective  of addres sing barriers  to trade  in services.   
2.33.   The representative  of Zimbabwe  supported  the statement  delivered  by South  Africa  on 
behalf  of the African  Group.  There  were still substantive  divergences  on systemic  issues  of 
mandate  and scope,  as well as on the issue of necessity.  In her view, the concerns  had not been 
effectively  addressed.  Moreover,  there was no time left to bridge  the above  differences  in the 
coming  month.  In this regard,  the revised  consolidated  text could  not form a basis for a 
negotiating  text. Members  were still far from having  a text-based  discussion.  She therefore  did not 
support  the idea of having  either  a negotiating  text or a Chair text. The only option  was to be 
pragmatic,  face the moment  of truth and take the Director -General 's advice  that immature  work 
should  continue  post-MC11.  She highlighted  that services  were not the only element  negotiated  at 
the WTO and Members  were working  on other  DDA issues  outside  of domestic  regulation.  
Therefore,  the concern  of leaving  Buenos  Aires empty -handed  was a fallacy.  Lastly,  she 
highlighted  that the majority  of developing  countries,  including  the LDC Group,  the African  Group  
and the ACP Group,  had registered  systemic  concerns.  WTO decision  making  was consensus -
based.  She urged  Members  to start working  on what the WPDR  would  do post-MC11.   
2.34.   The representative  of Chinese  Taipei  welcomed  the suggestion  to move  from the current  co-
sponsors ' text to a negotiating  text. He urged  the Chair to energetically  continue  to meet with 
Members  to move  the discussion  forward.  There  were never  any guarantees  of success,  but 
Members ' best chance  lay in continuing  the current  WPDR  work.  He strongly  believe d that the 
forthcoming  MC11  was a crucial  opportunity  for Members  to regain  credibility  in the eyes of their 
stakeholders.  MC11  could  be a watershed  moment  for domestic  regulation.  It was time to elevate  
this discussion  to a higher  level in the WTO.  He saw domestic  regulation  as a necessary  
component  of a balanced  outcome  at MC11.  He urged  the Chair and other  Members  to redouble  
their efforts  to move  forward  the negotiations.  
2.35.   The representative  of Cameroon  stated  that domestic  regulation  was the least impor tant 
area for MC11  because  it was the most divisive  in terms  of WTO rules.  This area was distanced  the 
furthest  from the WTO rules,  hence  the less Members  did in this area, the better  the WTO would  
function.  Members  had been looking  at this issue for a long time. The majority  of Members  had S/WPDR/M/73  
 
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  expressed  clear positions  that the proponents  had not been able to take into account.  The 
Chairperson  had not been able to be objective  and neutral  and now Members  were hearing  that 
the Chair should  take initiative  to submit a text. In his view, this made  no sense.  The Secretariat  
had shown  that it was not even able to note down  what Members  had been saying.  The delegation  
of Cameroon  could  not participate  in any discussions  in the WPDR.  So far it had participated  not to 
negotiate  a text but to show that the submission  of a text had no grounds.  His position  had been 
the same  from the very beginning  where  every  subject  had been brought  up from the issue of the 
mandate  to the rejection  of the right to regulate.  The GATS  was a different  agreement  than the 
GATT,  and domestic  regulation  was an aspect  that left space  for national  governments  to regulate  
domestically,  taking  into account  principles  to which  they had signed  up. The issue of breaking  
through  that ceiling  had come  up causing  issues  that the African  Group  had explained  in light of 
the historical  background,  putting  forward  relevant  legal analysis  and arriving  at the conclusion  
that this text would  be not only useless,  but also harmful.  Hence,  no negotiations  were possible. 
Members  could  discuss  how to go forward  after the Ministerial.  The proponents  had shown  their 
inability  to take into account  what Members  had been saying.  In response  to New Zealand 's 
attempt  to explain  the issue of the right to regulate,  he noted  that it was not a favor Members  
were asking.  It was the right that Members  had and that the GATS  had recognized  and that 
proponents  had tried to limit. The delegation  of Cameroon  would  oppose  this until the very end. He 
asked  the proponents  what more they could explain  and whether  Members  had to bind themselves  
to be free. Members  had to be clear as to why they had to go to that extent.  The proposed  text 
was intrusive,  it had gone through  many  revisions  where  it was not possible  to incorporate  
everything  Membe rs had said during  these  discussions.  He stated  that perhaps  the proponents  had 
some  influence  over the Chair  and wanted  to benefit  from their position.  Members  might  discuss  
this again  with another  Chair and consider  other  proposals  that would  take into account  Members ' 
positions  and aspirations.  What was proposed  on development  was worse  than what had existed  in 
the TFA. It was no use to resubmit  proposals  that had no value.  It served  no one to not be able to 
strengthen  the special  and differential  treatm ent. Since  2001,  Members  had not been able to move  
forward  on this issue.  In the area of domestic  regulation,  the text was not necessary.  It was not 
only insufficient,  but it was not moving  in the right direction.  He believed  that Members  could  work 
on this but the proponents  had to submit  a text on something  that was acceptable  to all. The 
delegation  of Cameroon  did not want a result  on domestic  regulation  and was in favor of looking  
into this after Buenos  Aires.   
2.36.   The representative  of Uganda  stated  that his delegation  had extensively  engaged  in the 
WPDR  and had attempted  to understand  what the proposed  rules would  mean  if and when  Uganda  
graduated  from the LDC status.  He had spoken  at length  about  the right to regulate  and the 
jurisprudence  related  thereto . He had explained  the issue of the use of flexibility  language  in the 
text and demonstrated  its shortfalls,  including  in respect  to WTO jurisprudence.  Members  still had 
challenges  on basic definitions  of concepts  that had been used in the text. Members  had no clarity  
on the scope  of application.  The proponents  had not demonstrated  with concrete  examples  how 
the GATS  had not been sufficient  in light of Article  VI, as it stood,  especially  Articles  VI:1, VI:2 and 
VI:5. The proponents  had not indicated  whether  they had attempted  to use those  provisions  and 
failed.  It was not clear whether  the challenge  was with the way the provisions  had been crafted  or 
with their implementation,  in which  case a conceptual  discussion  of the monitoring  mechanism  had 
been suggest ed in the CTD Dedicated  Session.  The co-sponsors  had not indicated  whether  they 
had undertaken  the necessity  test on the necessity  of the proposals  and had not explained  what 
inherent  problem  with the GATS  they sought  to resolve.  They had not demonstrated  to the LDCs,  
the economies  of which  could  only support  low standards  of living  and were in the early stages  of 
development,  what was in it for them in exchange  for undertaking  stringent  and onerous  
multilateral  rules that would  erode  their policy  space.  While Members  were pressured  to accept  the 
development  chapter,  developing  countries  had demonstrated  the challenges  they had with the 
chapter,  as the concerns  related  not only to time to implement  obligations  but also about  
developing  the supply -side capaci ty and addressing  the elements  of sections  B and C of the LDC 
Collective  Request.  Members  had, however , been told in bilaterals  that those  elements  could  not 
and would  not fly. Members  had indicated  that the proposals  on transparency  and gender  had no 
mand ate in the WPDR.  Proponents  had continued  to push these  issues  in the hope that this would  
change.  He believed  and suggested  that the proponents  should  use relevant  intellectual  persuasion  
to push these  rules into law. He stated  that Members  had spoken  passionately  about  the necessity  
to fulfil the Article  VI:4 mandate , but that mandate  was not the only one in the WTO that required  
to be fulfilled.  He reminded  Members  that there  were specific  mandates  in paragraph  13 of the 
Doha Ministerial  Declaration  on how to deal with domestic  support,  in paragraph  44 with respect  to 
special  and differential  treatment.  Members  had unfulfilled  promises  on duty-free and quota -free S/WPDR/M/73  
 
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  market  access.  It was important  to recall  that domestic  regulation  was not a self-balancing  act and 
developing  countries  and LDCs had other  interests  of priority,  such as in agriculture  and the 
Special  Session  of the CTD. It was not a secret  that no areas  were moving.  He noted  that in the 
CTD SS one hundred  Members  supported  a proposal  for an outcome but the momentum  had been 
killed  by none other  than the WPDR  proponents.  Members  had heard  from the African  Group,  the 
LDC Group  and the ACP Group  which  would  collectively  form the G90 on how to deal with WTO 
work.  There  was very limited  time to bridge  existing  gaps,  and therefore  he did not think that 
Members  should  spend  time going  through  the same  questions  and getting  the same  responses.  
He agreed  with Nigeria  and others  that Members  should  ensure  that MC11  was more manageable  
for Ministers.  The proponents ' text was not sufficient  for being  used as a basis for negotiations.  
Member s needed  to follow  the Director -General 's advice  on two things:  first, proponents  had to 
lead the process  and build convergence  around  their issues  of interest.  That could  not be 
outsourced.  He did not support  any Chair text. The WPDR  was the only body mandated  to 
undertake  negotiations  on domestic  regulation.  Second,  the Director -General  had recommended  
the Members  needed  to quickly  make  an assessment  on what would  and would not fly. However,  
in order  not to leave  MC11  empty -handed,  Members  could  consider  developing  a post-MC11  work 
program  in line with the mandate  of Article  VI:4 of the GATS.  Buenos  Aires was not the end of the 
road and Members  had come  back empty -handed  from many  Ministerials  before.  The Ministerial  
could  not spell the end of the road for LDCs in terms  of regulatory  autonomy  and independence.  
LDCs needed  to protect  their right to regulate  and policy  space.  Many  delegations  had stated  that 
many  Members  in the WPDR  wanted  an outcome.  In the SPS Committee , Uganda,  Kenya  and the 
US had made  a submission  on how to deal with pesticide  maximum  residue  levels  on a voluntary  
basis.  All Members  of the Committee  had supported  an outcome  in the SPS Committee  itself,  but 
also supported  a decision  that was to be adopted  at MC11.  One Members  who was a WPDR  
proponent  had objected  to this decision.   
2.37.   The representative  of Norway  echoed  the statements  made  by Australia,  the EU and other  
like-minded  Members.  She thought  that it was important  to move  the process  to a higher  level and 
to a negotiating  text. 
2.38.   The representative  of Senegal  supported  the statements  made  by South  Africa  on behalf  of 
the African  Group  and Uganda  on behalf  of the LDCs.  He noted  and regretted  that the process 
being  followed  posed  difficulties  for many  delegations.  He did not believe  that a text prepared  
under  the Chair's own responsibility  would  be an acceptable  alternative  for all Members.  Nor did he 
believe  that the revised  consolidated  proposal  could  serve as a basis for negotiations,  given  the 
substantial  and conceptual  differences  he had noted  over the recent  months  and particularly  in 
view of the short time remaining  before  Buenos  Aires.  Committing  to negotiations  in this context  
was certainly  committi ng to failure  and losing  time for delegations  with limited  resources.  
Therefore,  he was of the opinion  that domestic  regulation  had to form part of the post-Buenos  
Aires work program  with discussions  based  on the existing  mandate.   
2.39.   The representative  of Kenya acknowledged  that significant  divergences  existed  among  
Members  on many  issues.  This was expected,  considering  that Members  were trying  to develop  
horizontal  disciplines  that would  be applicable  to very diverse  sectors.  Members  had to be realistic  
on what was doable  within  the short time left until MC11.  He was willing  to continue  discussions  
post-MC11  on the basis of the existing  mandate.  He had not detected  sufficient  convergence  for 
Members  to be able to move  to the next step. There  were a number  of issues  and concerns  which  
had not been addressed  by the proponents,  and Members  had a lot of difficulty  accepting  the 
current  consolidated  text, as proposed  by the proponents,  as the basis for further  work.  The 
structure  and the format  of the text remained  questionable  and several  issues  in the text remained  
to be clarified.  In a negotiating  process  where  everyone  had been stressing  the need for a bottom -
up approach,  he had serious  doubts  as to the validity  of the Chair text and was not sure whether  
the WTO was still in the era of Chair texts.  He only heard  calls for a Chair text in the WPDR.  
Members  could  only support  a text that was balanced  and took into account  the interests  of all 
Members.  
2.40.   The representative  of Tanzania  did not believe  that it would  be possible  to reach  consensus  
to have a Chair  text that could  form the basis for the way forward  for MC11.  As clearly  mentioned  
by the African  Group,  there  were still some  conceptual  differences  on the scope  of the mandate  
itself.  It would  be disastrous  to present  a text to Ministers  in Buenos  Aires that contained  
controversial  concepts.  Such an approach  would  contravene  the possibility  of even going  forward  S/WPDR/M/73  
 
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  after MC11,  as the process  would  be viewed  to lack good faith. As the Director  General  had said, 
Membe rs needed  to face the moment  of truth and focus only on few issues  that had attained  
convergence.  Members  needed  to keep the same  momentum  of discussion  after MC11  
concurrently  with the other  areas  of interest  to all Members.  Domestic  regulation  was not the only 
area, in which  there  would  be no outcome  at MC11.  In his view any process  to reach  an outcome  
should  be Member -driven,  i.e. it should  come  from Members  and not from the Chair.  He supported  
the statements  made  by South  Africa  on behalf  of the African  Group  and Uganda on behalf  of the 
LDC Group.  
2.41.   The representative  of Pakistan  took note of the views  expressed  by various  delegations  on 
the present  situation  in the WPDR.  Like China  and others,  he agreed  that the Ministerial  was a 
time to take stock of and recognize  the progress  made  in every  aspect.  He supported  the idea of 
taking  positive  steps  in an inclusive  and balanced  manner  and to secure  whatever  was possible  at 
MC11  and beyond.   
2.42.   The representative  of Nigeria  urged  Members  to be courageous  and did not see any fallacy  
in his previous  remark  that Members  should  not come  back from Buenos  Aires empty -handed.  He 
asked  if Members  were saying that they had embarked  on a journey  that was fruitless  and on an 
exercise  that could  not attain  any results.  Nigeria  was not a proponent  and was not satisfied  with 
some  of the propos ed elements  either,  and had provided  comments  to that end. He urged  
Members  to be open-minded  and engage  in a process  that was inclusive,  transparent  and 
comfortable  for everyone.  He urged  Members  to strive  to ensure  that they did not come  back 
empty -handed  in every  aspect  of the WTO work.  He recalled  that Members  had had over one 
thousand  square  brackets  in the TFA, but noted  that in the end Members  had achieved  an 
outcome.  He asked  Members  if they actually  wanted  the outcome  in the WPDR  or not, because  if 
the answer  to this question  was no, this was a waste  of time and a journey  with no destination.  
Members  could  recalibrate  the ambition  and should  contribute  what they could  to ensure  the 
exercise  was not a waste  of time and resources.  He stressed  that Nigeria  wanted  a result  on 
domestic  regulation  as a means  of supporting  the ongoing  reforms.  His delegation  was committed  
to continu ing work and achieving  an outcome  that would  be a win-win for all Members.   
2.43.   The representative  of South  Africa  noted  that domestic  regulation  by the very nature  of the 
proposed  text on transparency  and development  of measures  was political.  The proposed  
disciplines  could  not be seen with only a trade lens. Regulator y goals and legitimate  policy  
objectives  could  not be limited  to trade and included  prevention  of market  failures,  important  
domestic  objectives  in key sectors,  or prioritization  of social,  community,  health,  safety  or even 
political  objectives  over trade  objectives.  Regulation  was a function  of democratic  governance  and 
a tool by which  a state created  for itself policy  space  to achieve  certain  objectives.  South  Africa  
had only recently  overcome  apartheid  and racial  oppression  and regulation  had been used to 
address  historical  injustices.  She enquired  if Australia  was suggesting  that South  Africa 's past 
history  could  not inform  what new rules the government  of South  Africa  could choose  to develop.  
She had been concerned  with the tone of the discussions  and the approach  of the proponents  over 
the entire  year. There  were a seventy - and a fifty-page report  of recent  WPDR  meetings  proving  
how constructive  Members  had been.  Members  were perhaps  legitimizing  the process  too much  by 
being  so substantive  and construc tive because  even until this meeting,  there  had been very little 
accommodation  offered.  Members  did not understand  what the rush was. Proponents  kept on 
mentioning  the twenty -year old mandate  and she asked  if Members  now had to operate  on the 
proponents ' schedule  and rush to a Chair text. The nature  of the discussions  was very different  
from those  on domestic  support  in agriculture  and cotton,  public  stockholding  for food security  
purposes  and fisheries  subsidies  where  there  was a general  acceptance  and commitment  to have 
an outcome.  In domestic  regulation,  this kind of general  acceptance  to have an outcome  was 
lacking.  There  had been no foundation  on trust and substance.  She reminded  Members  that 
domestic  regulation  had always  been pursued  as part of the broader  context  of a range  of issues  
under  the DDA package.  She saw absolutely  no basis for the view that there  could  be a deliverable  
in Buenos  Aires on domestic  regulation.  To suggest  otherwise  was to ignore  the harsh  reality  that 
fundamental  divergences  remained.  In his report  to the TNC meeting  on 24 October  2017,  the 
Chairman  of the CTS SS had observed  that delegations  had expressed  concerns  of a more 
fundamental  nature.  He mentioned  the differences  around  the need for the proposed  disciplines  
and the benefits  they might  bring to developing  countries  and LDCs and that a group  of Members  
believed  that the proposed  text would  be incompatible  with their development  aspirations  and limit 
their policy  space.  The limited  time left before  Buenos  Aires only compo unded  the situation.  There  
was no common  starting  place for a discussion.  There  could  not be a constructive  engagement  S/WPDR/M/73  
 
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  unless  Members  knew what they were talking  about  and agreed  on what they wanted  to discipline  
in accordance  with GATS  Article  VI:4. She did not support  the development  of a Chair text. She 
was prepared  to take up Australia 's suggestion  to have a detailed  discussion  about  the right to 
regulate  but this was a discussion  Members  could  only have after MC11.  This discussion  would  go 
hand in hand with determining  whether  there  were any necessary  disciplines  to be developed.  In 
view of the little time left Members  needed  to agree  that there  was no possibility  to have an 
outcome  at MC11  on domestic  regulation  and to address  the issue of how fulfilling  the GATS  
Article  VI:4 mandate  could  be addressed  in a post-MC11  work program.  
2.44.   The representative  of Rwanda  supported  the statements  delivered  by South  Africa  on behalf  
of the African  Group  and Uganda  on behalf  of the LDC Group.  He considered  that Members  were in 
a very difficult  situation.  There  were too many  diverging  views  and hence  he did not see a 
possibility  of moving  to a negotiating  text or elevating  the discussion  to a higher  level.  He 
discouraged  the Chair from undertaking  any work on a Chair text or any other  work that would  
surprise  Members.  In his opinion,  the human  aspect  and friendship  in negotiations  was extremely  
important  but the defense  of the national  and regional  interests  was more important.  A strong  
statement  could  be legitim ate without  targeting  the Chair personally.  He considered  that the 
skeptical  Members  had been very flexible.  The proposals  on the table,  in particular  on issues , such 
as transparency  and development  of measures,  were very political  and ideological  and were driven  
by the neo-liberal  approach  that developing  Members  could  not accept  at their level of 
development.  He was of the view that even a paragraph  on post-MC11  work could  not be easily  
achieved,  let alone  the conversation  about  a negotiating  text being  lifted to a higher  level.  Moving  
into that level was problematic.  There  was no linkage  between  domestic  regulation  and other  
issues,  but services  outcomes  were meant  to be on balance  with what was to be achieved  in 
agriculture  and other  negotiating  areas.  Looking  at services  as a stand -alone  issue was not 
acceptable.  The endeavor  of TiSA participants  to liberalize  trade  in services  among  themselves  and 
bring it back to the WTO was unacceptable  and could  not even be considered  post-MC11.  
2.45.   The representative  of Barbados  enquired  what exactly  was envisaged  by the proponents ' 
suggestion  to elevate  the discussion  to a higher  level,  so as to be able to report  back to the capital  
and to the ACP Group.  She had a sense  that the suggestion  went beyond  just moving  to a 
negotiating  text.  
2.46.   The representative  of Nigeria  urged  the Chairperson  to give Members  the summary  of the 
interventions  that had taken  place.  The Chair's question  should  be what the next step should  be in 
the light of the suggestions  to move  the discussion  to a higher  level or developing  a Chair text. 
Calling  it a day would  be unacceptable  to the delegation  of Nigeria.  He wanted  to see how far 
Members  could  go when  the time came  to make  that call. The basis should  be the call for 
continuation  of work and trying to bridge  the differences  at hand.  Members  should  be able to make  
an assessment  as to what they could  live with. Members  were not looking  for a bad deal. He could  
not agree  with the view point that this discussion  was the end of the exercise.  Members  had to put 
a lot of sensitivities  on the table and needed  to decide  what could  be done to address  those  
sensitivities.   
2.47.   The representative  of Kazakhstan  added  her voice to the statements  of Brazil,  Saudi  Arabia,  
Australia,  the EU, China,  Russia,  Singapore,  Pakistan  and other  Members  and supported  moving  to 
a negotiating  text by MC11.  
2.48.   The representative  of Brazil  addressed  a systemic  concern  of his delegation,  namely  the 
idea voiced  by some  Members  that the preparation  of a Chair text would  be inconsistent  with the 
Member -driven  process.  He could  not endorse  the view that this was inconsistent  with the practice  
of the WTO.  Many  Members  had asked  the Chair in the past to prepare  a text, and the Chair had 
delivered  such texts previously  in 2009 and 2011.   
2.49.   The representative  of Ecuador  explained  that his delegation  was not against  the proponents ' 
text, but that effort  and dedication  were required  with regard  to the mandate  of GATS  Article  VI:4. 
Regarding  the image  of a vehicle  mentioned  by Saudi  Arabia,  he noted  that in his view there  were 
two cars: one that wanted  to knock  everyone  out of the way and go straight  for the objective  and 
the other  that preferred  to go a little bit slower,  reflect  on certain  topics  and work on what 
Members  would  be submitting  to Minist ers. With regard  to the proposal  made  by Brazil  and other  
Members  asking  the Chair to submit  a text, he recalled  that in the previous  meeting  the Chair had S/WPDR/M/73  
 
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  mentioned  that she could  submit  a text as a contribution  but that she would  not do it if she did not 
believe  that there  would  be any convergence  possible.  He asked  the Chair if convergence  was 
possible  in her view.  
2.50.   The representative  of Uganda  asked  if Brazil  was suggesting  that the Chair could  put 
forward  a Chair text without  Members ' consensus.   
2.51.   The representative  of Brazil  was of the view that a Chair text was presented  under  the 
Chair's own responsibility  and it did not imply  that there  was consensus  on the text. There  could  
be an argument  of convenience  but some  Members,  even non-proponents,  had asked for it, so the 
Chair could  consider  producing  a text and did not need Members ' consensus.  The Chair would  be 
trying  to do her job which  was to search  for convergence.   
2.52.   The representative  of Thailand  remained  committed  to developing  domestic  regulation  
disciplines,  as mandated  by GATS  Article  VI:4. She also supported  text-based  negotiations  in 
which  all Members  could  engage  constructively.  She noted  however,  that even if Members  had a 
negotiating  text or a Chair text, in light of the short time left before  MC11,  it was very difficult,  if 
not impossible,  for Members  to bridge  all the divergences,  let alone  start the negotiating  process.  
MC11  was not the end of the road. Members  should  not leave  the Ministerial  empty -handed,  but 
an outcome  could  come  in several  forms.  From Thailand 's perspective,  if the discussion  was not 
ripe, a Ministerial  declaration  could  at least acknowledge  the progress,  urge Members  to keep the 
momentum  and continue  discussions  with a view to commencing  text-based  negotiations  as 
mandated.  
2.53.   The representative  of the Kingdom  of Saudi  Arabia  picked  up on Ecuador 's comments  on her 
allegory  and stated  that all Members  were in the same  vehicle  and wanted  to have a safe trip. All 
Members  cared about  the credibility  of the WTO,  wanted  to ensure  the strong  multilateral  trading  
system  and had the same  objective.  Members  having  divergences  was in itself enriching.  The 
question  was how to stick together,  have a frank dialogue,  have the roadmap  and reach  the 
objective  with safety,  transparency  and inclusivity.  She noted  that she by no means  spoke  of 
crushing  or getting  rid of people  on board.  The WPDR  work was a journey  and she was sure that 
nobody  would  be opposed  to success  either  in regular  work, or in general  Council  meeting,  or in 
Ministerial  conferences.   
2.54.   The representative  of Barbados  reiterated  her earlier  question  on behalf  of the ACP Group.  
Considering  very little time left before  Buenos  Aires,  she did not believe  that Members  could  reach  
an agreement  on domestic  regulation  between  the current  meeting  and MC11.  Members  needed  to 
focus on utilizing  their limited  resources  efficiently  and on the priority  areas  which  could  be 
delivered  in the short run. She recalled  that Members  had stressed  that texts should  not be 
presented  to Ministers  where  there  was no convergence.  At this stage  in the work,  it would  
therefore  be more prudent  to focus the efforts  on developing  a textual  proposal  that would  
facilitate  continued  work on domestic  regulation  post-MC11  in fulfilling  the mandate  specified  in 
GATS  Article  VI:4. 
2.55.   The representative  of Swaziland  noted  that the revised  proposal  still had not addressed  the 
concerns  that had been flagged  to the proponents.  He was of the view that the proposed  
disciplin es would  curtail  the remaining  policy  space  developing  countries  and LDCs had, thus 
threatening  and limiting  the right to regulate.  Not only were disciplines  onerous  in crafting,  but 
also prescriptive  in model.  He was not satisfied  with invoking  GATS  Article VI:4, the reason  being  
that doing  so was incumbent  upon the consensus  of the entire  membership  for the necessity  to 
develop  disciplines.  If Members  continued  in this footing,  they would  be abrogating  the GATS.  He 
continued  to see the consolidated  text on a piece-meal basis which  was something  that had been 
raised  in previous  meetings.  There  were still diverging  views  among  the proponents.  It was 
unfortunate  that instead  of addressing  concerns,  proponents  were talking  about  a negotiating  text. 
He asked  what there  was to discuss  or negotiate.  In his opinion,  the proponents  were not bringing  
the proposal  to the table in good spirit.  The fact that they brought  up the negotiating  text before  
consensus  had been reached  attested  to that. There  was no way he could join a consensus  on 
domestic  regulation,  on grounds  of sovereignty.  
2.56.   The Chairperson  concluded  that, first, some  Members  did not see any prospect  for any 
outcome  in the short term on the basis of what was on the table.  Consequently,  these  Members  S/WPDR/M/73  
 
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  did not believe  that the production  of a negotiating  text would  serve  any purpose.  Second,  some  
Members  wished  to continue  with the process  in the coming  weeks  despite  the skepticism  
expressed  by others.  Many  of these  Members  had called  for a negotiating  text to be produced  to 
provide  an input to the discussion.  Some  Members  calling  for a negotiating  text had expressed  the 
view that a discussion  should  take place at a higher  level.  Third,  several  delegations  had suggested  
reflecting  on post-MC11  work,  but it was not her sense  that these  delegations  had suggested  that 
this reflection  should  take place in the WPDR  in the coming  two weeks.  At this stage  and on this 
basis,  she did not see agreement  on what to do in the coming  weeks.  Moreover,  she did not see 
scope  for preparing  a negotiating  text under  her own responsibility  on the basis of the views  heard  
if such a text was meant  to lead towards  a consensus  outcome  in the short term.  She therefore  
decided  to report  before  the next General  Council  to the Chair of the CTS SS on the state of play 
along  the lines of what she had set out. Nevertheless,  she promised  to continue  to consult  and did 
not preclude  that delegations  might  wish to bring any issue before  the WPDR  before  the 
Ministerial.   
2.57.   The Chairperson  invited  delegat ions to take note of the statements  made.  
2.58.   It was so agreed . 
3  ITEM  C. OTHER  BUSINESS  
3.1.  No item was raised  under  this agenda  item. 
3.2.  The meeting  was adjourned . 
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