RESTRICTED  
  
WT/CTE/M/60  
 
16 March 2016  
(16-1527)  Page: 1/20  
Committee on Trade and Environment   
 
REPORT OF THE MEETING HELD ON 6 OCTOBER 2015 
NOTE BY THE SECRETARIAT1 
The Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE Regu lar) met on 6 October 2015, chaired by the 
Permanent Representative of Hong Kong, China, Ms. Irene Young. The Committee adopted the 
Airgram, WTO/AIR/CTE/2, issued on 17 July 2015. The latest list of documents of the 
Committee was circulated on 29 February 2016 in document WT/CTE/INF/5/Rev.12 . The 
Report of the last CTE meeting, held  on 22 June 2015, is contained in WT/CTE/M/59 .  
 
_______________ 
   
1   PARAGRAPH 32(I) OF THE DO HA MINISTERIAL DECLARATION .................................. 3
 
1.1   Hydropower ..............................................................................................................  3 
1.1.1   Canada's experience and the Hydrop ower Sustainability A ssessment Prot ocol .................. 3  
1.1.2   Norway's  experience ............................................................................................... 6  
1.2   Organic Agriculture .................................................................................................... 7 
1.2.1   Chinese Taipei's experience ...................................................................................... 7  
1.2.2   Briefing by the United Nations Co nference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) ............. 7  
1.2.3   Briefing by the International Trade Centre (ITC) .......................................................... 8  
1.2.4   Briefing by the United Nati ons Environment Prog ramme (UNEP) .................................... 8  
1.3   Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing .......................................................... 9  
1.3.1   Ecuador's experience ............................................................................................... 9  
1.3.2   The United States' experience .................................................................................. 10 
1.3.3   Mexico's experience ............................................................................................... 11 
1.3.4   European Un ion's experience ................................................................................... 11 
1.3.5   Sri Lanka's experience ............................................................................................ 12 
1.3.6   Republic of Korea's experience ................................................................................. 12 
1.3.7   Norway's  experience .............................................................................................. 13 
1.3.8   Chinese Taipei's experience ..................................................................................... 13 
1.3.9   New Zealan d's experience ....................................................................................... 13 
1.3.10   Question s and An swers ......................................................................................... 14 
2   OTHER ITEMS ON THE CTE'S WORK PROGRA MME (ITEMS 1, 2, 3(A), 4, 5, 7, 9, 
AND 10) ....................................................................................................................... .. 16 
2.1   Item 1 .................................................................................................................. .. 16 
                                               
1 This document has been prepared under the Secret ariat's own responsibility and is without prejudice 
to the positions of Members or to thei r rights and obligations under the WTO. WT/CTE/M/60 
 
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  2.1.1   The Multilateral Environmental Agreements Matrix ...................................................... 16 
2.1.2   State-of-play of the climate change negotiations ........................................................ 16 
3   OTHER BU SINESS ...................................................................................................... 18  
3.1   Presentation on the Environm ental Goods Agreemen t Negotiations .................................. 18 
3.2   Briefing on developments in  other internationa l organiza tions ......................................... 18 
3.3   WTO Secretariat's information session  on various trade an d environmen t topics ................ 20 
4   DATE OF NE XT MEETING ........................................................................................... 20  
 
_______________ WT/CTE/M/60 
 
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1  PARAGRAPH 32(I) OF THE DOHA MINISTERIAL DECLARATION 
"The effect of environmental measures on market access, especially in relation to 
developing countries, in particular the least-developed among them, and those 
situations in which the elimination or reduction of trade restrictions and distortions 
would benefit trade, the environment and development."  
1.1.  The representative of Argentina made the point that topics on the agenda for the meeting, 
such as energy efficiency, needed to be discu ssed in line with the mandate of the CTE under 
paragraphs 32(i), (ii), (iii), 33 and 51 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration, in particular the effect of measures on market access of developing countries.  
1.1  Hydropower 
1.1.1  Canada's experience and the Hydrop ower Sustainability Assessment Protocol 
1.2.  The representative of Canada introduced  the topic of hydropower and the Hydropower 
Sustainability Assessment Protocol, a leading tool for the assessment of sustainability in 
hydropower. Hydropower had enormous potential to contribute to the greening of global electricity 
production, and could be combined with intermittent  sources of energy like solar or wind, even if 
located across international borders, to ensure constant supply of low-carbon electricity. 
Hydropower accounted for 16 per cent of global electricity generation and was by far the most 
used form of renewable energy in the world. Its production was expected to increase at a rate of about 3.1 per cent per year for the next 25 years, particularly in developing countries where a potential of 91 per cent of unexploited and economically feasible hydropower existed. Canada was 
the world’s third largest hydropower generator after China and Brazil, and more than 60 per cent 
of its electricity production came from hydropower.  
1.3.  International trade could play an important role in supporting the deployment of hydropower 
and the transition to a low carbon economy. Trade related to hydropower could be in goods – for 
example turbines – or services related to the constr uction or operation, or in power itself, through 
integrated grids. But the development of hydropower resources required careful attention to 
environmental considerations to ensure sustainability. In Canada, all hydropower projects were 
subject to a comprehensive environmental as sessment at each stage of a project. The 
representative from Canada explained that the Hydropower Sustainability Assessment Protocol 
provided a rigorous and practical set of tools an d guidance to help ensure that hydropower was 
developed in an environmentally sustainable manner. 
1.4.  On behalf of Canada, a representative
2 of the International Hydropower Association (IHA), 
presented on the Hydropower Sustainability Asse ssment Protocol (HSAP). The presenter explained 
that hydropower capacity globally was projected to double in the coming decades, from around 
1000 gigawatts (GW) to 2000 GW by 2050, the vast majority of which would be built in developing countries. In Latin America, for example, there we re over 800 hydropower projects approved and 
under development.  
1.5.  Large hydropower projects had created si gnificant environmental, social, technical and 
financial issues, which led to the development of the HSAP by the International Hydropower Association and other organizations. HSAP was a framework to assess the sustainability of a 
hydropower project at all stages of development,  using a methodology applicable to any project 
worldwide. It was based on 23 clearly defined sustainability topics, governed by a multi-stakeholder council and benefitted from a broad-based multi-stakeholders support. For instance 
the World Bank, following a recent review of the Protocol, concluded that the protocol was the 
most powerful existing tool to improve the sustainability performance of hydropower schemes.  
1.6.  The Protocol methodology consisted of four sections, namely tools, topics, criteria, and 
scoring. The tools were divided into four methodologies fo r different stages of development of a 
project: (i) an early stage tool used as a screening tool for potential projects; (ii) a preparation 
                                               
2 Mr. Douglas Smit, Senior Sustainability Specialist  with the International Hydropower Association. WT/CTE/M/60 
 
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  tool used for planning and design; (iii) an implementation tool for the construction phase; and 
(iv) an operation tool used on working projects. The Protocol methodology included 21 topics , 
ranging from social, environmental, technical to financial topics. For example, they included infrastructure safety, financial viability, resettlement, indigenous peoples and water quality. There 
were also cross-cutting issues in the Protocol that covered several topics, such as climate change, 
gender, livelihoods and transboundary issues. Th e third section of the methodology covered the 
criteria  used for the assessment, namely management, stakeholder engagement, conformity, 
compliance, and likely outcomes. Finally, the protocol provided  scoring  statements between 1 and 
5 where 5 was for proven best practice and 3 for basic good practice.  
1.7.  The presenter explained that the Protocol  also delivered an evidence-based objective 
assessment of a project performance, prepared by  a team of accredited assessors. The assessors 
delivered an assessment report according to a standard format and that report synthesized the 
information on the project performance. This included a sustainability profile with a score for each topic in order to observe the performance of a hydropower project according to the methodology. 
The public disclosure of the assessment was optional.  
1.8.  The Protocol was governed by the Hydrop ower Sustainability Assessment Council, which was 
made up of seven chambers representing different segments of stakeholders such as 
environmental organizations or hydropower operat ors. The chambers elected Chairs to form a 
governance committee that oversaw the implementa tion and promotion of the Protocol. In cases 
where the protocol was not applied objectively, the Council could take corrective steps.  
1.9.  Given the increasing use of the protocol around the world by developing and developed 
countries, the objective was to have an open market where accredited assessors could sell their 
services to provide assessments for both small and large projects. There were 22 assessments carried out to date, and so far, all of these asse ssments were contracted via the IHA. The size of 
projects also varied, with one being the largest project being assessed in Brazil (Itaipu Dam).  
1.10.  The Protocol was considered as a leading tool to assess sustainability in both large and 
s m a l l  h y d r o p o w e r  p r o j e c t s .  S o  f a r ,  i t  a s s e s s e d  m o r e  t h a n  2 0  m e g a w a t t  ( M W )  o f  p o w e r ,  w i t h  
9 projects in developed countries and 13 in developing countries. The speaker noted that there 
was a general assumption that small hydropower was more beneficial as compared to large hydropower. However, according to IHA, as long as large hydropower projects were sustainable 
they could provide greater benefits for sustainable development than small hydro. Having a large 
number of small projects carried out in a fragmented manner could have bigger ecological impacts 
than having fewer but larger projects. Also, larger  projects made up 5 per cent of the number of 
projects but they provided as much as 95 per ce nt of the generation. There were a lot of large 
hydro projects in developing countries that required renovation, and such renovation could 
generate more additional hydropower that severa l new small hydropower projects. Large projects 
were also capable of storing energy to re spond to periods of peak demand, and were 
complementary to other renewable sources such as solar and wind, which did not have the 
capacity to store energy. Such storage could also be useful to provide irrigation and flood control.  
1.11.  So far, hydropower projects had been assessed mainly in developed countries as there was 
more hydropower developed in the past. In Spai n for example, there were 164 projects in the 
Duero Basin in North West Spain and 142 of these projects were less than 10 MW providing  
only 9 per cent of the generation. The rest of th e generation was provided by larger projects. In 
Austria, hydropower provided about 65 per cent of  the electricity generation, 86 per cent of which 
was provided by projects that were greater th an 10 MW in size. Projects smaller than 1 MW 
represented almost 85 per cent of the number of facilities, but provided only 4.6 per cent of generation. France was increasing the total capacity from 82 MW to 94 MW by replacing small 
projects with newer projects with a more sustainable design.  
1.12.  The representative of Canada concluded th at there was a significant amount of hydropower 
that would be developed in developing countries over the coming decades, and the Protocol was emerging as a leading tool for the assessment of su stainability in hydropower globally. As long as 
they were sustainable, large hydro projects coul d provide greater benefits than small hydro and a 
greater contribution to climate change mitigation and adaptation. WT/CTE/M/60 
 
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  1.13.  Egypt raised the question of shared waterc ourses in the evaluation of sustainability, which 
for many countries was a core issue. The representative also questioned Canada's position that 
favoured large hydropower projects. In his view, large projects were not useful unless there was a 
well-functioning grid and infrastructure in place to distribute the energy generated. For small 
communities in developing countries, which did not have access to the grid, he asked whether 
smaller sized projects would be preferable. 
1.14.  Costa Rica considered the Protocol was an interesting tool in a context where countries were 
moving towards clean energy generation. The representative enquired whether Canada had 
envisaged a cost/benefit analysis. Costa Rica's concern related to ways to balance between achieving environmental and social sustainability of a project on the one hand, and ensuring that 
the related additional costs would not become unsustainable economically, on the other. As a 
result, it was necessary to strive for an appropriate balance between benefits and potential 
impacts, and the Protocol was a tool to optimize the cost/benefit of future hydroelectric projects.  
1.15.  New Zealand explained that hydro-electricit y was the backbone of the country's electricity 
system and could be a reliable and economical way to generate electricity. Already in 2014, 
around 80 per cent of New Zealand's electricity generation came from renewable energy sources, on track towards achieving 90 per cent of rene wable energy by 2025. The delegate confirmed 
Canada's assertion that large hydro systems provided greater benefits and were more sustainable 
than small hydro systems. Large projects cont ributed to 80 per cent of hydro-electricity 
generation. When a hydropower project was construc ted and maintained correctly, using tools like 
the HSAP, maximum energy outputs and minimum en vironmental impacts could be ensured. As a 
reliable and economic energy source, hydro-el ectricity was key for trade and development. 
1.16.  The European Union (EU) mentioned that it supported the implementation of this Protocol in 
the European Union through a €1.2 million programme called Hydro for Life. This programme 
aimed to raise awareness and build capacity primar ily via electronic outreach campaigns about the 
Protocol and hydropower sustainability performanc e in the European Union, involving all relevant 
stakeholders, including member States, EU regulators, and policy makers. The representative 
asked two questions: (i) what were the actions of other governments to promote the Protocol, and 
(ii) in which cases small hydropower was working better.  
1.17.  Switzerland noted that hydropower played an  important role in the production of sustainable 
energy and it was a key part of the Swiss energy policy strategy. A dam had to be accompanied by 
a sustainability analysis that took into account social and environmental aspects. For Switzerland, 
the sustainability of a dam depended on its desi gn and position and not on its size. Switzerland 
acknowledged the important added value of the protocol's sustainability analysis and would 
continue to contribute actively to its work in the future. 
1.18.  India requested more information on several aspects of the Protocol: who was the target 
group of the training module; whether there were projects that failed the sustainability test; 
whether the cost related to the environmental impact of the project was taken into account in the 
context of the examination of its financial viability; and if there was a process of review of the Protocol and how participative that was.  
1.19.  The representative of the IHA, on behalf of Canada, agreed with Egypt that transboundary 
issues were extremely important, and they were covered by a number of topics of the Protocol's 
methodology, particularly governance, environmental and social issues management, and also hydrological resource and downstream flow regimes. An assessment would look carefully at the 
involvement and opinions of stakeholders in neighbouring countries. The delegate also stated that 
if small communities could have access to the grid, then large hydro projects were more sustainable. When there was no grid access, then off-grid solutions could be developed. 
1.20.  Concerning Costa Rica's question relative to the additional cost of achieving environmental 
sustainability, the IHA representative noted that th is needed to be looked into. In his view, the 
cost incurred with a greater sustainability had a significant positive payback. The IHA was also working with other international bodies, and had recently published a paper on green bonds and 
how the Protocol could be used to guide the allocation of green bonds in hydropower.   WT/CTE/M/60 
 
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  1.21.  In response to the European Union, the IHA representative cited the examples of Norway 
and Switzerland who were supporting the developm ent and implementation of the Protocol, in 
various countries and at various stages of the Protocol. On the question on small hydropower, it reiterated that it was the actual situation and sustainability of each individual project that 
mattered. In certain circumstances, small hydro projects were considered more sustainable.  
1.22.  Concerning India's questions, the representative explained that trainings were provided to 
developers, often with the participation of civil society and government organizations. The Protocol 
did not use a "fail or pass" system but instead identified areas where the situation could be 
improved and incentives created. On the inclusio n of the environmental co st, he explained that 
this was covered by the topic on financial viability. Finally, he indicated that the Protocol was reviewed every three years through the Council.  
1.23.  Venezuela reiterated that his delegation supported the statement made by Argentina at the 
outset of the meeting that the Committee's discussio n should be in line with the mandate of the 
CTE under the Doha Ministerial Declaration. Venezuela asked Canada for clarification on how the 
presentation on hydropower related to Paragr aph 32(i) of the Doha Ministerial Declaration 
regarding the effect of environment measures on market access, especially in relation to developing countries. For instance, no reference had been made to the elimination or reduction of 
trade restrictions for the hydropower sector.  
1.24.  Canada responded that the deployment  of hydropower had knock-on effects on 
environmental and sustainable economic developmen t, and it was important to ensure that trade 
barriers did not prevent the deployment of hydrop ower technologies. In the hydropower sector, 
despite being a major player, Canada was still dependent on trade for many of the inputs. For 
example, it did not produce all the turbines that were necessary.  
1.1.2  Norway's experience 
1.25.  Norway explained that electricity production in Norway was close to 100 per cent renewable, 
and approximately 98 per cent derived from hydr opower. Renewable energy's share of the total 
energy consumption today was about 65 per cent. The EU target was, by comparison, 20 per cent 
by 2020. Norway's topography and climate were  well suited to develop hydropower, and the 
country was making use of the hydropower  potential since the beginning of the 20th century.  
Hydropower had been key to industrialize and electrify Norway. Today, Norway was the sixth 
largest producer of hydropower in the world. 
1.26.  Norway considered all types of hydropower as renewable energy, regardless of size, as this 
was recognized in the Statute of the Internatio nal Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA). The key 
factors in determining the sustainability of a hy dropower system did not include the size, but 
rather how the system was planned, executed, and operated. Good planning and assessment 
procedures had received increased attention by the industry as well as by host countries. Norway operated a licensing system, which included a high  degree of transparency and public involvement 
at all stages in the process, securing and safegu arding various interests, balancing impacts, and 
ensuring that the benefits were shared. 
1.27.  Norway's delegate noted that hydropower was by far the largest source of renewable energy 
globally (about 16 per cent of the world's electricity generation) and an important tool both for 
climate change mitigation and adaptation. Given the increasing challenges of climate change, 
developing countries could further utilize their untapped hydropower potential to support their 
socio-economic development efforts. Norway had shared its experience with other countries and 
contributed to advance the sustainable hydropower projects in developing countries. It also 
supported the development and implementation of the HSAP both financially and through 
knowledge sharing. The protocol was tested in on e of the hydropower plants of the state-owned 
power company Statkraft, which was Europe's  leading producer of renewable energy. WT/CTE/M/60 
 
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  1.2  Organic Agriculture 
1.2.1  Chinese Taipei's experience 1.28.  The representative of Chinese Taipei explained that organic agriculture was about combining 
tradition, innovation and science to benefit the environment and promote a good quality of life for 
all. In Chinese Taipei, related policies aimed at supporting: the establishment of an organic 
farmers' market, organic products e-shops and franchised retail counters; the organization of exhibitions and sales activities for organic products; and the promotion of an organic lifestyle in 
schools. The “Agricultural Production and Certification Act” in 2007 allowed for a sound organic 
agriculture products certification and accreditation management system. Inspections were conducted on a yearly basis at organic agricultural products certification bodies. In case of major non-compliance, the accreditation would be revoked. Finally, in order to protect consumers' rights 
and strengthen their confidence, there was also an annual quality inspection and certification label 
verification plan that would enhance product labelling and quality inspection and testing.   
1.2.2  Briefing by the United Nations Conf erence on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
1.29.  The representative of the United Nation s Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
provided an overview of their work on promoting organic agriculture in developing countries, with 
a particular focus on East Africa and Southeast Asia. The first part of the presentation focused on 
the importance of organic agriculture, which wa s a key commodity produced by rural communities 
in many developing countries. Organic agriculture produced higher-price premium products both in 
developing and developed countries. UNCTAD explai ned that it was important to link farmers and 
producers in rural areas to the local market, and then to international markets to facilitate access 
to these premium products through international trade.   
1.30.  UNCTAD had a work programme on organic agriculture as part of its overall work on 
commodities. It was currently engaged in Uganda and in Lao People’s Democratic Republic (PDR), 
and it was starting a new project in Tanzania. UNCTAD's support focused on facilitating the link 
between small rural farmers and both domestic and international markets. The representative 
explained that the domestic market was the main market for farmers to sell their goods. Once 
farmers were able to achieve some level of penetration in the domestic market, UNCTAD would 
provide some help for them to access international markets, which required additional certifications. UNCTAD was assisting them with agriculture certifications, harmonization of standards, and recognition of equivalence. UNCTAD also supported countries to develop organic 
agriculture policies. It encouraged national dial ogues on organic agriculture among farmers, the 
government and the private sector. These dialogues enabled the farmers to inform the government of their needs. 
1.31.  In Lao PDR and Tanzania for example, UNCTAD's work was looking at linkages between 
tourism and organic agriculture. Tourism was an important factor for local production and supply of organic food and other organic-based products. UNCTAD had also been instrumental in 
launching in 2007 the East African Organic Product Standard (EAOPS) by the East African 
Community. The leading adopter of this standard was Uganda, which saw its organic agriculture exports grow by 40 per cent in 2013. There were 250'000 organic farmers in Uganda, 305'000 ha of organic agriculture certified land, and 44 organic agriculture export companies. The country had 
also set up a national certification company, the National Organic Agriculture Movement of 
Uganda, which was working with the government and private sector to set up a national organic agriculture policy for the development of organic agriculture in Uganda.   
1.32.  In Lao PDR, UNCTAD also provided support to the organic farming sector to meet the needs 
of the domestic market and its growing tourism industry. The local supply capacity and product 
quality was not yet able to reach international markets. UNCTAD organized the annual Lao Organic 
Forum to facilitate discussions among local organic agriculture farmers, the government and 
development agencies to support organic agriculture development. In this way, local farmers were able to express their needs and have discussions wi th the government on the kind of support they 
needed, including in terms of farming techniques and financing. UNCTAD also started similar work 
in Tanzania. WT/CTE/M/60 
 
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  1.33.  UNCTAD was also coordina ting with other intergovernmental agencies, including through the 
United Nations Inter-Agency Cluster on Trade an d Productive Capacity. UNCTAD would continue 
with advocacy on organic agriculture as it was not only an important component of sustainable development and climate mitigation, but also im portant to small farmers in developing and 
developed countries as a source of livelihood and food nutrition.  
1.34.  Speaking on behalf of least developed co untries (LDCs), the representative of Haiti asked 
several questions: what was the procedure for an LDC to benefit from UNCTAD support in the area 
of agriculture; how UNCTAD supported small farmers and exporters to adapt to international 
standards; and whether the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) was also part of the UN Inter-Agency Cluster on Trade and Productive Capacity, as this could provide important synergies for field work in developing countries. 
1.35.  UNCTAD responded that it was mobilizing support to undertake similar work in other LDCs, 
and any least developed country could request individual support. UNCTAD also helped small scale 
farmers to adopt international standards. Other consultative bodies and forums such as the 
UN Forum on Sustainability Standards explored additional avenues to address issues regarding 
standards and how they could be formulated to meet the needs of LDCs. UNCTAD confirmed that FAO was part of the UN Inter-Agency Cluster on Trade and Productive Capacity and noted that the 
cluster was open to any other relevant UN agencies.  
1.2.3  Briefing by the Intern ational Trade Centre (ITC)  
1.36.  The representative of the International Tr ade Centre (ITC) explained that there were two 
l i n e s  o f  w o r k  i n  I T C ' s  T r a d e  a n d  E n v i r o n m e n t  P r o g r a m m e  t h a t  w e r e  b o t h  r e l e v a n t  t o  t r a d e ,  
standards, market requirements, and market access. The first focused on biodiversity, particularly 
on trade and native biodiversity.  ITC was working with countries such as Peru, Madagascar and w i t h  t h e  S o u t h  E a s t  A s i a  r e g i o n ,  a s  w e l l  a s  w i t h  t h e  C o n v e n t i o n  o n  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  T r a d e  i n  
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) Secretariat on trade in species that could be 
legally traded.   
1.37.  The second line of work was on climate change and climate smart agriculture with a focus 
on private voluntary standards. The representative introduced a pilot project in the tea sector in 
East Africa with ITC looking to expand the project to countries where the agricultural export sector 
was facing changes relating to market access and climate change. He added that ITC was working closely with other agencies such as UNCTAD and UNEP, and also at the national level with trade 
promotion agencies.  
1.38.  ITC's support focused on market information and analysis for exporters and policy makers, 
capacity building, and strengthenin g market linkages. ITC was also helping SMEs deal with carbon 
standards. The representative provided examples of the cut flower sector in Uganda and the tea 
sector in Kenya, where ITC's work had benefitted principally exporters and small farmers. ITC had 
also carried out surveys on exporters' climate change mitigation and adaptation strategies, and 
their needs. The surveys in Peru and Uganda , for example, underlined the challenges to 
competitiveness faced by the agricultural sector due to climate change, in addition to high price volatility and poor infrastructure.   
1.39.  The representative of Norway noted that th e topic of climate resilient export agriculture was 
relevant to the work of the CTE. Norway, as a donor, supported ITC's Trade and Environment 
Programme because climate change was entwined with the challenges of development. Norway 
would continue to use soft earmarking for programs that, in line with their priorities, were related 
to trade and environment, women and trade, an d poor communities and trade. International 
donors had a critical role to play in supportin g developing countries' efforts in climate change 
mitigation and adaptation. 
1.2.4  Briefing by the United Nati ons Environment Programme (UNEP)  
1.40.  The representative of the United Nation s Environment Programme (UNEP) presented UNEP's 
work on organic agriculture through the Green Economy and Trade Opportunities Project (GE-TOP) 
in South Africa.  This project, financed by the European Commission, aimed to identify, assess, 
and inform beneficiaries in Chile, Ghana, Peru, South Africa and Viet Nam about the trade WT/CTE/M/60 
 
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  opportunities that arose from a green economy transition, and of steps to tackle related risks and 
challenges. In South Africa, the national project on the organic agriculture sector in 2015 included 
a national study, two national stakeholder worksh ops, and representation at key trade fairs such 
as Biofach in Nuremberg. The national study identified trends, challenges and regulatory 
developments in the organic segment, including th ose related to the export of organic products, 
with focus on harmonization, equivalence, and organic certification as a technical barrier to trade.  Furthermore, the study provided a cost-benefit analysis for organic production and export, using 
environmental, social and economic indicators and offered some recommendations for the 
development of trade opportunities and exports from the organic sector.   
1.41.  Key benefits from organic production and export in South Africa included (i) increased sales 
revenue from price premiums; (ii) reversal of trends of mechanisation of farm activities and labour 
drain from rural areas; (iii) enhanced value addi tion and employment oppo rtunities from on-farm 
processing, marketing and retailing; (iv) improved health for workers and consumers; (v) increased food production; and (vi) the preser vation of natural ecosystems. In order to reap 
these benefits, producers had to mitigate the costs associated with conversion to organic practices, 
including the reallocation of resources and the n eed for market intelligence.  He added that the 
organic agriculture sector in South Africa faced various challenges, including a lack of effective 
institutional representation and organic legislation; a discord between production, certification and 
markets; and the need for critical mass to justify capital investment and processes. 
1.42.  In order to overcome these challenges, the study provided recommendations, including 
(i) to establish a national organic standard, ideally combined with a national communication 
strategy; (ii) to facilitate a conversion of non-organic farming systems, through financial incentives 
like subsidies, tax exemptions, or reduced certification fees; (iii) to promote integration and development of organic markets, through coop eration with international donor and support 
agencies, and visits to organic trade fairs; and (iv) to establish Organic Development Zones in 
regions where organic agriculture would benefit the most to help address social, environmental or economic challenges. 
1.43.  He said that UNEP was looking for adequate funding to support the next phase of activities 
in the South African organic sector. Besides South Africa, UNEP contributed to develop export markets for organic agriculture in Kenya, Tanzan ia, Uganda, and was engaged in the development 
of the organic segment in Eastern Europe, throug h project activities in Armenia, Moldova and 
Ukraine. Further information and materials of UN EP's market studies, matchmaking events with 
potential buyers, and sponsored trade fair visits to assist organic producers access export markets 
was available on demand. As 2015 was the "International Year of Soils", he noted that it took 
between 450 to 1000 years to naturally develop one centimetre of topsoil. Organic agriculture was 
a low to no-input farming concept that maintained the soil, and this should provide a strong additional impetus for a shift in practice. 
1.3  Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing 
1.3.1  Ecuador's experience 1.44.  The representative of Ecuador provided an overview of its national action plan  
against Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU)  fishing, which was first developed in 2001 and 
adopted in July 2015. The objective of Ecuador's national action plan was to prevent, deter,  
and eliminate IUU fishing in its territorial waters and in adjacent high seas. Fishing in Ecuador provided 90 per cent of the income to coastal co mmunities and to the island of Galapagos. In 
2014, Ecuador produced some 235,000 tons of tuna and 230,000 tons of small pelagic species. 
Ecuador's processing capacity for tuna was between 450 and 500 thousand tons per year, and it was one of the five leading countries in terms of canned tuna and pre-cooked filet. It was a 
member of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Comm ission (IATTC), the Western and Central Pacific 
Fisheries Commission (WCPFC), and had taken steps to join the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR).  
1.45.  The national action plan against IUU fishing of 2015 was the result of various efforts and 
activities since 1995. This included the adoption of the 2009 FAO Port State Measures Agreement 
(PSMA) and a national regulation for the certification of catch in compliance with the EU Directive of 2012. He considered Ecuador's legislation on IUU fishing to be consistent with regional and WT/CTE/M/60 
 
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  international regulations. To implement the action plan, the government's strategy was to boost 
monitoring, supervision and traceability, to enhance current capacities, and to develop institutions. Since 2008, Ecuador had developed certification of catches, and started automating information for better supervision of its fisheries. To develop institutions and enhance institutional capacity, 
Ecuador had carried out in-house and inter-institutional assessments to address any weakness 
within the system. Ecuador had also joined strategic alliances to develop finances and share accountability, participated in multilateral technical and inter-institutional cooperation, and was in 
the process of reforming legislation for fisheries that dated back to 1974. A new special track for 
fisheries' regulations was being considered, which would speed up the adoption of new legislation 
and allow Ecuador to address vulnerabilities in the sector, including sanctions.  
1.46.  Ecuador was also analysing the competent government bodies and steps involved to join 
different agreements on fisheries. For instance, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea would 
require approval by the National Assembly, sign ature by the President and publication in the 
official bulletin to become part of domestic law;  the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would then deposit 
the appropriate instruments. Finally, Ecuador pointed to several national plans: one on sharks 
(2007); one for the gilt-head sea bream (2011); and one for the pomada shrimp (2014).  UNCTAD was supporting Ecuador with a green fisheries project.   
1.3.2  The United States' experience 
1.47.  The representative of the United States (U S) presented the US Presidential Initiative on 
Combating IUU Fishing and Seafood Fraud with the Action Plan developed in 2014-2015 by a 
Presidential Task Force co-chaired by the Department of Commerce and the Department of State 
with 12 other federal agencies Members, including the Office of the US Trade Representative.3 The 
action plan included 15 recommendations with concrete and specific actions to combat IUU fishing and seafood fraud. These recommendations covered four general themes, namely (i) combating 
IUU fishing and seafood fraud at the international level, including at Regional Fishery Management 
Organizations (RFMOs); (ii) strengthening enforcement and enhancing enforcement tools;  (iii) creating and expanding partnerships with non-federal entities to identify and eliminate seafood 
fraud and the sale of IUU seafood products in US commerce; and (iv) increasing the information 
available on seafood products through additional traceability requirements. All these components were inter-related and complementary. 
1.48.  The United States drew attention to Recommendations 4 and 5, which called on the 
United States to use existing and future free trade agreements to combat IUU fishing and to 
pursue international commitments to eliminate fisheries subsidies which contributed to excess fishing capacity, overfishing and IUU fishing by 2020. In particular, Recommendation 4 directed 
the US to pursue commitments in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Trans-Atlantic Trade 
and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations to combat IUU fishing and seafood fraud. Recommendation 5 similarly directed the United States to pursue commitments to discipline 
harmful fisheries subsidies and to promote greater transparency of fisheries subsidies in the TPP 
and the TTIP negotiations as well as at the WTO rules negotiations. The United States was working to implement Recommendations 4 and 5 under existing RTAs, such as the cooperation programmes with Chile and Peru, and would includ e combating IUU fishing as one element. She 
added that the recently concluded TPP negotiations included provisions to combat IUU fishing 
through implementation of port state measures.  It also included commitments on fishery subsidies. 
1.49.  In addition, the United States said that Recommendations 14 and 15 called for a traceability 
programme for species at risk that would initially be applied to seafood products of particular concern because these species were subject to significant seafood fraud or because they were at 
significant risk of being caught via IUU fishing. The United States had received public comments on 
the types of information that should be collected as well as a draft list of principles for determining 
species at significant risk of IUU fishing and seafood  fraud and a draft list of at-risk species. These 
draft lists were published in March and a finalized list of species at risk would be the basis of the 
initial phase of the seafood traceability programme to be published in December 2015 with an 
opportunity for public comment. A final rule was expected by August 2016.  
                                               
3 Information on the task force and action plan is  available at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration's website: http://www.nmfs.noaa.go v/ia/iuu/taskforce.html  WT/CTE/M/60 
 
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  1.3.3  Mexico's experience 
1.50.  The representative of Mexico presented some of the steps taken at the national and 
international level to prevent, deter, and eliminate IUU fishing. At the national level, Mexico was 
boosting its domestic legislation and establishing a regulatory framework to safeguard fish and 
aquaculture resources. Effective fisheries management measures had also been set up over the 
years to ensure sustainability in Mexican waters and in the high seas.  Some of the measures included legal procedures for vessel registration, standards for flag state responsibilities, 
provisions to regulate access to ports, to carry out landings and transfer the product by water or 
land, and regulation of high-seas fishing and compliance with conditions and requirements established by foreign governments for catching ce rtain species. Harsh sanctions were imposed for 
those who did not comply with the regulations. Si nce 2004, a 24/7 real time satellite monitoring 
system was in place which required all Mexican vessels engaged in commercial fishing and with a 
vessel length of over 10.5 meters, to use a location and monitoring device. In addition to the satellite tracking system, Mexico had also developed for some fisheries a programme that required 
fishing vessels to have observers on board as monitors for the entire duration of the fishing trip. 
Better fishing techniques had also been developed allowing for a reduction in incidental bycatch. These programmes allowed for easier supervision and ensured compliance not only with current 
domestic regulation but also with standards and international agreements that regulated fisheries  
and combated IUU fishing such as the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC) and the International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna (ICCAT). 
1.51.  He said that Mexican regulations were considered among the strictest in the Eastern Pacific 
because it was compulsory to have observers on board for 100 per cent of the tuna fleet trips, 
there was a ban on night time sets and on the us e of explosives as well as limits on dolphin 
mortality. Such measures had been implemented since the provisions of the Agreement on the 
International Dolphin Conservation Program (AIDCP) became compulsory for the Mexican fleet and 
thereby enabling traceability. Multilateral and regional cooperation was considered to be the best way to boost and re-enforce all other mechanisms Mexico used to combat IUU fishing. IUU had to 
be combated via different approaches and measures depending on the region by implementing 
national, regional, or multilateral approaches. Mexico would also continue to foster its work both bilaterally and multilaterally. 
1.3.4  European Union's experience 
1.52.  The representative of the European Union pr ovided an overview of the policies it applied for 
IUU fishing, its cooperation with third countries, the main objectives, principles and tools used, 
and the EU's strategic view for future challenges. The European Union considered IUU fishing to be 
a global challenge as it had an environmental, social and economic impact on fisheries resources, 
especially for developing countries and for legitima te trade. Studies by the European Union before 
2010 estimated IUU fishing to amount to more than €10 billion, while a report by the United 
States projected ille gal trade to be more than USD 20 bill ion in 2015. He stressed the importance 
of a level playing field as the European Union was the largest net importer of fish with imports accounting for two-thirds of the EU's consumption. In value terms, EU's imports of fishery products 
exceeded €20 billion per year. It was therefore es sential to ensure traceability in the whole supply 
chain from net to plate for all fishery products traded with the European Union.   
1.53.  The European Union highlighted progress in international law including the UN Convention 
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the UN Fish Stocks Agreement (UNFSA), and the work of the 
FAO on IUU fishing such as FAO's International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate 
Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (IPOA), FAO Compliance Agreement, and FAO's PSMA. There were also a plethora of measures at the regional level with the RFMOs. At the EU level, the 
policies on IUU fishing focused on three pillars, namely control regulation, fisheries authorization 
regulation, and IUU fishing regulation. In its internal waters, the European Union, through control regulation, was monitoring the actions of all the vessels of EU member States. For the EU fishing fleets outside EU waters, a fisheries authorization regulation was needed. The EU's IUU fishing 
regulation intended to prevent and eliminate fish products derived from IUU fishing activities 
coming into or going out of the European Union.  
1.54.  The European Union considered its IUU fishing regulation to be a non-discriminatory 
instrument to prevent, deter and eliminate fisher y products derived from IUU fishing activities 
from being traded in or out of the European Union. The European Union had sought to create a WT/CTE/M/60 
 
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  culture of compliance, level the playing field, ensu re fish traceability from net to plate, and to 
promote international cooperation in the fight against IUU fishing. The IUU fishing regulation tools implemented over the past five years included: (i) a catch certification scheme for traceability of fish; (ii) a mutual assistance system for cooperation and exchange of information between 
EU member States to address cases of risk; (iii) bilateral dialogue and administrative cooperation 
to help third countries develop their fisheries policy in line with international standards; and (iv) strong sanctions against EU nationals engaged in IUU fishing. 
1.55.  As a result of dialogue and cooperation wi th third countries, the European Union had helped 
improve governance, strengthen monitoring and control systems, and improve traceability through the supply chain. It was important that third countries revised their legislation to comply with international laws such as the UNFSA or UN CLOS, strengthened fisheries management and 
surveillance, and improve traceabi l i t y  o f  t h e  f i s h  s u p p l y  c h a i n .  A t  t h e  E U  n a t i o n a l  l e v e l ,  t h e  
Commission over the last 5 years, in cooperation with member States, had received more than 180 alert messages on cases of risk. The European Union had taken more than 200 decisions to 
refuse imports into the European Union because of breach of applicable international standards.  
1.56.  Looking forward, the European Union stresse d the importance of full implementation of the 
FAO's IPOA and ratification of the FAO's PSMA as it would help landings and deter IUU fishing 
activities.  It also supported the introduction of a global catch certificate, the full traceability of 
fisheries products, and international cooperation on IUU fishing issues at forums such as RFMOs, FAO, and INTERPOL. Finally, the advancement of tec hnology facilitated possibilities to spot, deter, 
and eliminate IUU fishing activities. The European Union, with other countries, was supporting 
vessel monitoring systems, the work of the Intern ational Maritime Organization and the FAO on a 
global record of vessels. The European Union would continue to work on these issues to fight IUU fishing.   
1.3.5  Sri Lanka's experience 
1.57.  The representative of Sri Lanka said that the country was an island, and fishing was an 
economic activity important to the livelihoods of its over four million people, because it was a 
source of food and export revenue. Over 3000 small vessels below 15 meters were involved in 
fishing activities. Sri Lanka was making every effort to comply with its international obligations to control IUU fishing activities. For instance, Sri Lanka recently amended its fisheries legislation in line with international obligations, made the installation of a Vessel Monitoring System compulsory, 
and improved its Catch Certificate and Harbour Management. The representative also expressed 
appreciation for the assistance received from the European Union to improve the management measures of its fisheries sector in compliance with international standards.  Such constructive 
dialogue would continue to take place as the European Union was Sri Lanka's single largest market 
for its fisheries products.  
1.3.6  Republic of Korea's experience 
1.58.  The representative of the Republic of Korea pointed out that IUU fishing was one of the 
greatest threats to the already vulnerable marine  eco-system and to over 3.5 billion people who 
depended on the oceans for food, employment or income. The Korean government had put in place an array of measures to prevent, deter, an d eliminate IUU fishing. First, Korea improved its 
legislation in order to strengthen the level of sanctions against IUU fishing: it introduced two 
amendments of relevant laws and regula tions in 2014 and 2015 and proceeded with the 
ratification of the PSMA that was expected during 2015. The revised law included new penalties, 
such as imprisonment of up to five years or a criminal fine of up to five times the potential gain 
from illegal catches. Korea also updated its National Plan of Action to combat IUU fishing according to the FAO International Plan of Action.  
1.59.  Second, Korea enhanced the Monitoring, Cont rol and Surveillance system on Korean fishing 
vessels with the installation of a Vessel Monitoring System on all Korean distant water fishing vessels, and the monitoring of all Korean vessels in distant waters 24/7 through the Fisheries Monitoring Centre. Third, Korea strengthened its compliance verification system: the National 
Fishery Products Quality Management Service was checking the Vessel Monitoring System record 
and the validity of pertinent fishing authorizations before the issuance of a catch certificate. Fourth, Korea made significant efforts to enhance the awareness of the adverse effects of WT/CTE/M/60 
 
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  IUU fishing on marine systems and trade through various education programs, and had been 
working closely with coastal countries, NGOs and other stakeholders. The representative concluded that Korea would continue to share its experiences with other countries in order to end illegal fishing and to contribute to the implementation of  SDGs Goal 14, which called on the conservation 
and sustainable use of oceans, seas and marine resources.  
1.3.7  Norway's experience 1.60.  The representative of Norway shared his delega tion's concerns regarding IUU fishing, which 
undermined the biological and economic sustainabi lity of fisheries. Seafood fraud threatened 
consumers' confidence and the market competitiven ess of the legal seafood industry. In order to 
combat IUU fishing, it was vital to address all relevant issues along the value chain, and primary instruments included effective monitoring, surveill ance, and control at sea and upon landing. He 
indicated however, that it was also important to look beyond the illegal catching of fish in order to 
tackle the whole array of fisheries crimes. Financially motivated crimes such as tax and customs fraud, occurring along the value-chain were threats to the competitiveness of the law-abiding 
industries.  
1.61.  In order to combat fisheries crimes throughout the value chain, it was important to assess 
the whole picture, from sea to shop, and a cross agency approach was required. Norway had 
experience with such cooperation through a dedica ted Inter-Agency Task Force on Fisheries Crime 
and IUU-Fishing. In this task force, Norway had gathered the most relevant control agencies, such 
as coast guard, police, tax and customs authorities, labour inspectors, coastal administration and fisheries authorities. As IUU fishing was a truly trans-national issue, international cooperation was 
key. The representative indicated that Norway was one of the driving forces behind establishing 
FAO's PSMA. As a result of regional implementa tion of the PSMA, most of the problems with 
IUU fishing in the North-East Atlantic had been e liminated and fish quotas had increased. Norway 
also combatted IUU fishing and fisheries crimes through FAO, regional fisheries management 
organizations, INTERPOL and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).  
1.62.  At the WTO, Norway had called for a prohibition on subsidies provided to any vessel 
engaged in IUU fishing as they distorted trade, depleted the resources basis of other Members and 
also affected negatively the Members providing such subsidies, resulting in a lose-lose-lose situation for all. While combating IUU fishing was vital for trade, measures to address it could also affect trade, and thus it was essential that they  were simple, clear and transparent, risk-based, 
proportionate, and would not constitute unnecessary barriers to trade. Measures also had to be 
even-handed in the treatment of imports and domestic production, and fully compliant with international obligations.  
1.3.8  Chinese Taipei's experience 
1.63.  The  representative from Chinese Taipei briefed the CTE about its efforts to establish a legal 
framework to fight IUU fishing and pursue a su stainable fishing policy. Chinese Taipei had 
developed a Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter, and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated 
Fishing in line with FAO's IPOA. It provided a legislative framework and monitoring, control and surveillance measures in fisheries management. The management of rules of Chinese Taipei's marine fisheries included the Fisheries Act and other related regulations. Their objective was to 
promote conservation and optimal utilization of aquatic resources, maintenance of orderly fishing 
operation, improvement of the livelihood of fisher men and sustainable development of fisheries. As 
IUU fishing was a global problem that threatened ocean ecosystems and sustainable fisheries, 
Chinese Taipei would continue to further action s to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing 
activities including through cooperation with other Members. 
1.3.9  New Zealand's experience 
1.64.  The  representative of New Zealand  noted that there was a significant trade angle to 
IUU fishing, both in terms of the trade impacts an d the potential for trade policy responses. Trade 
in IUU fishing was a significant problem globally and it was therefore important to put in place market state measures that were a deterrent to IUU fishing while at the same time not creating 
unnecessary barriers to trade. Trade instruments were one of a number of policy tools in the fight 
against IUU fishing, and it was important to ensure they were in line with WTO rules, in particular WT/CTE/M/60 
 
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  the principle of national treatment. New Zealan d placed particular emphasis on the need to 
recognise the equivalence of other States' fisheries management regimes and to focus on risk. 
1.65.  New Zealand welcomed the United States' presentation on the Presidential Taskforce on 
IUU fishing and encouraged all countries to be  guided by FAO's agreed principles for the 
development of catch documentation schemes when  determining the seafood species at risk of 
IUU fishing and seafood fraud. Such schemes should be consistent with WTO obligations (including national treatment) and adhered to the principl es agreed by the FAO Committee on Fisheries, 
namely: (i) conformity with relevant international law; (ii) not create unnecessary barriers to 
trade; (iii) equivalence; (iv) risk-based approach; (v) reliable, simple, clear and transparent; and if possible (vi) use of electronic means.  
1.66.  The representative explained that New Ze aland had an active work programme to combat 
IUU fishing, particularly in the Southern Ocean. Working closely with international partners and 
INTERPOL, New Zealand had pursued a strategy of disr uption at all levels of IUU fishing operations 
including the support, distribution and ownership ch ain, with a number of key successes. Globally, 
New Zealand also worked on broader initiatives aimed at deterring IUU fishing. In May 2014, 
New Zealand had become a party to the FAO Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulate d Fishing (PSMA), and was working with a number 
of developing countries to identify capacity-building needs for them to join the PSMA. Once the 
PSMA had sufficient ratifications to enter into force it could have a significant impact on the control 
of the provision of services to IUU fishing operators.  
1.67.  Another important angle to IUU fishing was su bsidies, as they contributed to overfishing and 
overcapacity, which in turn contributed to IUU fishing. According to the representative, there were 
documented instances of subsidies provided to operators that were, or recently had been, engaged in IUU fishing, as noted in a recent report by Oceana. The proposals from the African, Caribbean 
and Pacific (ACP) countries, the European Union, New Zealand and others in the Negotiating Group 
on Rules for a prohibition of subsidies to IUU fishing presented an immediate opportunity for the WTO to make a tangible contribution in this area at MC10. Finally, international cooperation and 
information sharing was key as no single country could succeed in combatting IUU fishing alone 
and it was important to continue to work together in the Committee to succeed in putting IUU fishing operators out of business. 
1.3.10  Questions and Answers 
1.68.  The representative of the Philippines no ted that striking a balance among environment, 
trade and development was a very critical component of his country's policy and it was within the 
mandate of the CTE. While the Philippines shared the global objective to address IUU fishing and 
commended the efforts of the United States on th e subject, it was concerned about the US risk-
based seafood traceability programme since it wo uld impact not only the environment but also 
trade of developing countries like the Philippines.  
1.69.  He said that the Philippines was improving their own mechanism to combat IUU fishing, 
aligned with international and regional initiatives, and had adopted a national action plan to combat, deter and eliminate IUU fishing. He fu rther noted that identifying species at risk, 
regardless of past history of IUU fishing or fraud violation by the countries involved, could create 
complexity and barriers. The Philippines therefore ur ged the United States to look at the listing of 
species at risk, which included species for which the Philippines was an important exporter, including tuna and blue swimming crabs, and also to look at the less stringent EU model which 
focused rather on countries that were engaged in IUU fishing.  
1.70.  The representative also argued that the US measure seemed to be discriminating between 
domestic and imported sea food as regards the principles for identifying at risk fisheries, since the 
information required for domestic products was less complicated as compared to imported 
products. While the Philippines looked forward to continuing its bilateral dialogue with the United States, it requested that they engage with the countries that would be affected by the measure to find a balance between the very legitimate objective of promoting sustainability and 
combatting IUU fishing, and the interest of developing countries and their exports.  WT/CTE/M/60 
 
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  1.71.  The United States representative responded that she would relay Philippine's comments to 
capital, noted that there were opportunities to pr ovide comments after each step of the action plan 
and encouraged the Philippines to provide comments as well.  
1.72.  Speaking on behalf of the LDC group, the representative of Haiti noted the particular 
importance of this topic for the group as fish ing was important for jobs, food security, the 
promotion of rural livelihoods and poverty reduction as well as a source of foreign income. Putting an end to IUU fishing could only happen throug h binding multilateral disciplines on fishing 
subsidies rather than through isolated domestic initiatives, which, in some cases, could create 
obstacles to market access. The LDC group urge d Members to engage constructively against 
IUU fishing in the Committee on Trade and Environment and in other relevant WTO bodies. International cooperation to combat IUU fishing was more necessary than ever to further 
countries' development, and LDCs could also make an  effective contribution to combat IUU fishing.  
1.73.  The representative of Australia noted that the discussion on IUU fishing was very relevant to 
the work of the CTE given the direct impact that some of the related measures could have on 
trade. From Australia's perspective, IUU fishing was a very important matter that required global, 
regional and national actions. He highlighted FAO's PSMA, which addressed a range of issues relevant to the fight against IUU fishing and prevented IUU fishermen from selling and trading 
their illegal catch. According to the representative , the PSMA was directly relevant to international 
fisheries trade and was already having a positive impact in terms of illegal fishing. Australia had recently ratified the PSMA and encouraged other WTO Members to do so as well.   
1.74.  The representative of Argentina highlighted that IUU fishing issues were also related to the 
current discussions on fisheries in the Negotiating Group on Rules pursuant to the Doha Ministerial 
Declaration and Hong Kong Ministerial Conference mandates. It was important therefore to further negotiations in that group so as to limit ov erfishing and overexploitation of resources. 
1.75.  The representative of Switzerland noted the impo rtance of the sustainable exploitation of 
fishery resources for Swiss consumers and the government. Switzerland was in the process of 
adopting legislation on IUU fishing along the lines of the EU legislation. Switzerland enquired 
whether more information was available on the EU plans to create a global catch certificate and 
who would be involved in such a process.  
1.76.  The representative of Papua New Guinea thanked the European Union for lifting the yellow 
card imposed in June 2014 on his country's fisheries products entering the EU market due to 
IUU fishing issues. The fisheries, especially the tuna industry, were one of the most important 
exports for Papua New Guinea, and the European Union was its major market. In response to concerns expressed by the sector, Papua New Guinea's government worked directly in reforming 
its fisheries governance system towards meeting the required conditions on IUU fishing. The 
government had amended its legal framework to ad dress IUU fishing, improved control of fleets 
and other corrective actions. This resulted in th e removal of the yellow card on 1 October 2015.  
1.77.  The representative of the European Union explained that yellow cards were a form of 
enhanced cooperation with third countries in order to address issues relating to fisheries 
management and IUU fishing. The intention was to help developing countries improve their governance in line with international law, including, inter alia , FAO, RFMOs regulations or UNCLOS. 
The European Union was open to enhanced cooperation, including through the financing of 
development programmes, in order to fight IUU fishing and its impacts on sustainability and the future of fish stocks. The European Union was also one of the front runners in promoting the idea 
of a global catch certificate, which would allow for a common standard for all countries on what to 
expect from producers and processors and how th e information should be presented to ensure 
traceability from net to plate. Some RFMOs had already developed some small catch certification 
schemes and the UN General Assembly had also underlined the importance of having a global 
catch certificate. According to the representative, the FAO had initiated a small working group bringing together small and large, developed and developing countries to start the process of drafting the basic principles of such a system. He believed that this process was promising in 
terms of actual traceability and full chain custody of the products, as it was the best way to trace 
and deter any kind of illegal activity. The represen tative hoped that the drafting process would be 
concluded in the near future.  WT/CTE/M/60 
 
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  1.78.  The representative of Ecuador provided some additional elements concerning Ecuador's 
experience. He explained that Ecuador had started investigating work contracts and social security 
contracts for those working in the fisheries extraction and processing industries. Ecuador was developing a satellite monitoring and supervision system for about ten thousand small vessels. 
Looking beyond the efforts it could make as a single country, it was also important to support the 
implementation of new technologies to improve the collection of information and systematization of an optimal fishery and aquaculture system for the management of fisheries resources. 
2  OTHER ITEMS ON THE CTE'S WORK PROGRA MME (ITEMS 1, 2, 3(A), 4, 5, 7, 9, 
AND 10)
4 
2.1  Item 1 
"The relationship between the provisions of  the multilateral trading system and trade 
measures for environmental purposes, including those pursuant to multilateral 
environmental agreements."  
2.1.1  The Multilateral Environmental Agreements Matrix  
2.1.  The WTO secretariat provided the biennial update of the Matrix on Trade-related Measures 
Pursuant to Selected Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEA Matrix). Currently, 17 MEAs, 
including Conventions and Protocols, were covered by the MEA Matrix. The information in the 
MEA Matrix had been reorganized to enable Members to better navigate and access data for each MEA. Information for each MEA was detailed in six sub-sections providing: (i) a brief description of the MEA; (ii) information on trade-related measures; (iii) information on supportive measures; 
(iv) information on non-compliance mechanisms; (v) information on dispute settlement 
mechanism; and (vi) information on the provisions relating to non-parties to the MEA. Finally, the MEAs were ordered in clusters (e.g. Chemical Conventions were kept together as were protocols 
with their parent conventions). 
2.2.  Some key new developments were reported . The Minamata Convention on Mercury had been 
signed by 128 signatories since 10 October 2013. The Convention would enter into force after 
50 parties deposited their instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, and 
12 parties had already done so. The Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits from their Utilization had entered into force on 12 October 2014. The Gaborone Amendment to CITES had entered into force on 29 November 2013 and opened the 
CITES membership to regional economic integration organizations.  
2.1.2  State-of-play of the climate change negotiations 2.3.  A representative of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
briefed the CTE on the status of the climate change negotiations. At the 21st session of the 
conference of the parties in Paris, governments would reach a new climate agreement that should put all nations on track towards a sustainable future. The outcome in Paris should underwrite in 
concrete terms the goal of keeping average global  temperatures from rising above 2°C compared 
with pre-industrial levels. The Sustainable Development Goals adopted in New York in September 2015 were a similarly important part of the effort towards a sustainable future. Action on climate change would enhance development, st able and sustainable business growth and public 
well-being. Although the world economy had grown by 3.3 per cent in 2014, CO
2 emissions from 
fossil fuels had remained constant. This showed that it was possible to decouple economic growth from emissions. 
2.4.  The expected outcome in Paris would cons ist of four pillars: (i) the agreement and the 
accompanying decisions; (ii) a robust set of nati onal climate plans, known as intended nationally-
determined contributions (INDCs); (iii) a strong confirmation by developed countries of their 
determination to mobilize at least USD100 billion per year by 2020 to support climate action in 
developing countries; and (iv) the recognition of the enormous groundswell of non-state action and pledges, and a call for additional action. Th e agreement and decisions would have to provide: 
(i) a balance between mitigation and adaptation; (i i) a globally transparent accounting system that 
                                               
4  See Annex 1, the original CTE work programme which includes these items.  WT/CTE/M/60 
 
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  includes measurement, reporting, and verification (MRV) arrangements; (iii) a commitment to 
deliver adequate finance; and (iv) some clarity on the long-term direction of keeping within the 
2°C limit. The number of parties that had su bmitted INDCs to the UNFCCC Secretariat by 
1 October 2015 totaled 146. The Secretariat would prepare a synthesis report on the aggregate 
effect of those INDCs. In addition, UNFCCC wo uld launch a public website for countries to 
showcase their INDCs. 
2.5.  Several negotiating sessions had taken place in 2015, including one in Geneva in February 
that produced a negotiating text. This text served as a basis for negotiations in Bonn in June 2015, 
where parties tasked the co-chairs with developing a streamlined, consolidated, and clear version of the Geneva negotiating text. The text by the co-chairs, published on 24 July 2015, had been used as a tool in the latest round of negotiations in Bonn from 30 August to 4 September 2015. At 
the end of that round, the co-chairs had once again been tasked with preparing a concise and 
coherent version of the draft agreement and the decisions. This version had been published on 
5 October 2015. In addition, the so-called "pre-2020 action" would be a key outcome of the 
Paris conference; it addressed the need to increase  state and non-state action in the period before 
2020, when the new agreement would enter into force. 
2.6.  The representative from the European Union stated that the contribution of the 
European Union to the global agreement would be a binding target to reduce greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions by at least 40 per cent by 2030 compared with 1990 levels. The European Union and its member States had been the first major economy to communicate their INDC to the UNFCCC (on 6 March 2015). Several conditions had to be met for the Paris agreement to help 
reach the goal of keeping global temperature rise below 2°C. First, the agreement would have to 
be legally binding and applicable to all. Second, a long term goal would be needed to guide the process of strengthening commitments over time. The agreement should reaffirm the objective of 
limiting global temperature rise to below 2°C and call on all parties to reduce collectively global 
GHG emissions by at least 60 per cent by 2050 comp ared with 2010, and to near zero or below by 
2100. Third, the agreement would have to include a five-year review mechanism to take stock 
periodically of whether commitments were being achieved, and to strengthen countries' targets 
over time in line with science. Fourth, countries would have to intensify collaboration before 2020 on reducing emissions by taking advantage of existing opportunities, for example in renewable 
energy and energy efficiency. Fifth, the nationally  determined targets would have to be backed by 
multilaterally agreed and robust rules on transparency and accountability. 
2.7.  The representative from Venezuela stated that the Paris agreement should lead to better 
implementation of the UNFCCC in order to meet the Convention's goal on the basis of equity and in 
accordance with common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. The 
principle of common but differentiated responsibilities would have to be reflected in operational terms in all elements of the Paris agreement. Mean s of implementation were critically important. 
Clear commitments by developed countries on financing and technology transfer at the necessary 
scale for the post-2020 period would be needed. Th e Paris agreement should not focus exclusively 
on mitigation but should also contain commitments on means of implementation for developing countries. Similarly, INDCS were a key element of the Paris outcome and should not be limited to 
mitigation; they should cover adaptation, loss and damage and means of implementation too. 
Adaptation was a global responsibility in light of the historical emissions of developed countries. Means of implementation were necessary for developing countries to meet their adaptation needs. 
The Paris outcome on pre-2020 commitments would be equally important. 
2.8.  The representative from Egypt supported the statement from Venezuela. It was important to 
view the Paris agreement, not as the start of a ne w process, but rather as a continuation of the 
process started in 1992, with its principles and provisions, including common but differentiated 
responsibilities and historical responsibility. Fi nance and technology transfer were of paramount 
importance. Paris would trigger another phase of action against climate change. It was important to ensure the success not only of the Paris conference  but also of the post-Paris period by creating 
the necessary enabling environment. Several deve loping countries had underlined the importance 
of Article 3.5 of the UNFCCC, which stated th at measures taken to combat climate change, 
including unilateral measures, should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade. This issue, which would be part of 
the Paris negotiations, was related to the work of the WTO. WT/CTE/M/60 
 
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  3  OTHER BUSINESS 
3.1  Presentation on the Environmental Goods Agreement Negotiations 3.1.  The representative from Australia provided an update of the negotiations towards an 
Environmental Goods Agreement (EGA) in his ca pacity as Chair of the negotiations. The 
EGA negotiations were formally launched on 8 July 2014. Nine negotiating rounds had been 
concluded, with two more planned for the remainde r of 2015. A full list of product nominations had 
been completed in April and covered around 650 tariff lines at HS6 level. The focus of the 
negotiations had shifted since May 2015 to consider the nominations that could be included in a 
final EGA list. Environmental credibility remained at the centre of these discussions. All nominations remained on the table, but partic ipants were developing a better sense of the 
contours of an agreed EGA list. 
3.2.  No fixed timetable for the conclusion of the EGA negotiations had been defined. Nonetheless, 
EGA negotiations were working to determine what might be possible within the short time-frame 
until MC10 and the Paris climate change conference . The focus of the negotiations was to build a 
list of products that would be covered by the EGA, but participants were also considering ways to 
make the EGA a living agreement, including how to add new products and technologies to the EGA list, and how to consider important related issues such as services and non-tariff barriers. The 
EGA remained open to other WTO Members committe d to liberalization. The EGA, once completed, 
would show the important contribution that trade could make to tackling some of the world's environmental and climate-related challenges. 
3.3.  The representative from Venezuela stated that the EGA was not taking place under the 
auspices of the WTO. Therefore, its outcome sh ould not be imposed on other WTO Members or 
construed as the result of CTESS negotiations under paragraph 31 (iii) of the Doha Declaration. The results of an EGA outcome in goods could be easily extended to other WTO Members on an 
MFN basis through unilateral amendments to schedul es of concessions. Nonetheless, it was not 
clear how additional agreements among EGA participants in areas such as services and non-tariff barriers would be incorporated, and how those agreements would fit into the legal acquis. His 
delegation was concerned about the proliferation of plurilateral agreements such as the EGA, 
which would undermine multilateral efforts and would create a multi-speed multilateral trading system. 
3.4.  The representative from Argentina echoed the statement made by Venezuela that any work 
carried out in a plurilateral setting should not prejudge multilateral negotiations under 
paragraph 31(iii) of the Doha Declaration. 
3.5.  The representative from Cuba supported th e statements made by Venezuela and Argentina. 
Her delegation supported multilateral negotiations under the WTO and considered that the 
mandate contained in paragraph 31(iii) of the Doha Declaration was still valid. Plurilateral negotiations such as the EGA were being conducted within a framework that was outside of the 
WTO. The presentation made by Australia under this agenda item was for information only. 
3.6.  The representative from India noted that the EGA negotiations were taking place outside of 
the WTO and would have no implications for Members' WTO obligations. His delegation was 
concerned about the proliferation of plurilateral  agreements, which would undermine multilateral 
efforts. 
3.2  Briefing on developments in  other international organizations 
3.7.  A representative of the United Nations Depa rtment of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA) 
provided an overview of Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development, which was adopted at the 
UN Summit held from 25 to 27 September 2015 in New York. The 2030 Agenda consisted of four parts: (i) a declaration, including the guiding pr inciples and overarching vision of the Agenda; 
(ii) 17 goals and 169 targets, which were at the core of the Agenda; (iii) so-called means of 
implementation, which encompass issues such as te chnology, finance, capacity building and trade; 
and (iv) the mechanism for follow-up and revi ew of progress in implementing the Agenda. WT/CTE/M/60 
 
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  3.8.  Compared with the MDGs, which would expire at the end of 2015, the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) contained in Agenda 2030 were more numerous and ambitious. The MDGs could be characterized as a socially-focused, aid-driven agenda that sought to deal with the symptoms of poverty. They addressed issues su ch as health, primary education, and gender 
equality. The SDGs took a step forward in how to overcome poverty and tackle inequality by 
broadening the agenda to encompass more fu lly the social, economic and environmental 
dimensions of sustainable development. SDGs 1 through 6 were a continuation of the MDGs, but 
were also more ambitious. The remaining SDGs contain the new agenda, with targets on energy, 
climate change, oceans, biodiversity, industrializ ation, infrastructure, and decent jobs, among 
others. SDG 16 covers peaceful societies, effective institutions and the rule of law. This had been a breakthrough and had filled a perceived void in the MDGs. It completed the picture of what was 
needed to strengthen sustainable development: tackling the social side, making available the 
means of sustainable economic growth, protecting  the environment, and paying attention to the 
institutions that were critical in making this happen. Goal 17 covered the means of implementation 
and global partnership and contained several targets related to trade and the WTO. Each of the 
goals in the SDGs had so-called implementation s targets of their own. This reflected the 
importance attached by developing countries in particular to matching goals with specific means of 
implementation. 
3.9.  The SDGs were a political document resulting from deliberations among UN member States. 
By contrast, the MDGs were a summary prepared by UN technical experts on the basis of the 
Millennium Development Declaration. The SDGs had been prepared by a political body. The 
2030 Agenda highlighted the need for policy space to allow countries to adapt and work on the 
Agenda. It was recognized that starting positions differed, and that national circumstances would have to be taken into account when implementing the goals. The SDGs were universal in nature 
and the UN system was ready to support their implementation. 
3.10.  The High Level Political Forum (HLPF) sat at the apex of the follow-up and review 
architecture for Agenda 2030. The HLPF would meet annually under the auspices of the 
UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and every four years at a higher level under the 
General Assembly. Besides reviews at the HLPF, the 2030 Agenda set out proposals for national and regional reviews. HLPF reviews had two stream s. The first stream covered national voluntary 
reviews consisting of detailed country presenta tions on progress made and obstacles encountered 
in the implementation of the 2030 Agenda. The se cond stream encompassed thematic reviews of 
the 2030 Agenda. The launch of voluntary country reviews and thematic reviews was scheduled for mid-2016. The Technology Facilitation Mechanism would meet under the direction of the President 
of ECOSOC, and its reports would be channelled to the HLPF. 
3.11.  The Addis Ababa Action Agenda adopted in July 2014 was an integral part of the 
2030 Agenda. It reaffirmed the 0.7 target for offi cial development assistance and highlighted the 
importance of domestic resource mobilization for sustainable development. It covered illicit 
financial flows and tax evasion, and strengthened a UN committee of experts on taxation. Furthermore, the Agenda called for the creation of  a Technology Facilitation Mechanism, which was 
launched at the Summit in September and would consist of a forum, an online platform, and a 
UN interagency taskforce that would seek to facilitate technology discussions within the 
United Nations. 
3.12.  The representative from the European Union welcomed the adoption of the 2030 Agenda 
and the recognition that trade policy served as a means to implement SDGs. The Agenda had 
established a clear link between trade policy and sustainable development. The European Union had advocated for a strong push on the link between trade and sustainable development during 
the process to define Agenda 2030. It had already developed a number of trade measures that 
incorporated sustainable development. Sustainabl e development was an overarching principle in 
the EU domestic and external relations contexts, as reflected in the inclusion of sustainable development provisions in the EU's trade agre ements, the Generalized System of Preferences 
(GSP) Plus, sustainability impact assessments, and the EGA negotiations. The European Union was 
looking forward to other partners implementing their commitments under the 2030 Agenda in an ambitious manner. 
3.13.  The representative from Venezuela noted that 2015 was an important year that would put 
multilateralism – including the SDGs, financing for development, climate change, and trade – to 
the test. Each of these processes should be seen as complementary parts of a single system that WT/CTE/M/60 
 
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  should move in the same direction. Implementation was critically important, as was the availability 
of means of implementation, in particular financ e. Regarding the SDGs, Director-General Azevêdo 
had noted that Agenda 2030 placed significant em phasis on the role that trade could play in 
achieving sustainable development. One of the ta rgets under goal 17 called for the promotion of a 
universal, rules-based, open, non-discriminatory and equitable multilateral trading system under 
the WTO, including through the conclusion of negotiations under the Doha Development Agenda. This high level commitment should guide the WTO's work and provide the necessary push for a 
successful conclusion of the Doha Round. Nairobi would provide an opportunity for ministers to 
reflect on how to make progress in the negotiations and reach a development-oriented outcome. The refusal of some Members to continue negotiations under the Doha umbrella after MC10 was a cause for concern. In particular, the Doha Round contained several specific mandates in 
agriculture, fisheries, intellectual property, trade and environment and special and differential 
treatment, all of which could contribute significantly to the achievement of the SDGs, notably goals 2, 3, 8, 14 and 17. There was no need for a new WTO agenda to comply with the 
commitments undertaken in New York. 
3.14.  The representative of UNDESA recalled the clear understanding that trade was a key means 
of implementation and the need to establish clos er links between the agendas in New York and at 
the WTO in a mutually beneficial way. Agenda 2030 identified ways for trade to play a positive role 
in making the SDGs a reality. There were provisions relating to the need to maintain and strengthen the multilateral trading system, as well as special provisions relating to fisheries subsidies and special and differential treatment for LDCs. It would be important to ensure that the 
high level of political commitment demonstrated in New York worked its way into the trade agenda 
to inform and strengthen trade discussions. 
3.3  WTO Secretariat's information session on various trade and environment topics 
3.15.  Following requests by several delegations, the CTE received an informal presentation by the 
WTO Secretariat on "Selected GATT Article XX (b) and (g) Cases". 
4  DATE OF NEXT MEETING 
4.1.  The next meeting of the Committee would take place sometime in the early summer 2016. 
The precise date would be communicated to Members in due course. 
 
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