RESTRICTED  
  
WT/DSB/M/367  
 
30 October 2015  
(15-5747)  Page: 1/29  
Dispute Settlement Body 
31 August 2015    
 
 MINUTES OF MEETING 
HELD IN THE CENTRE WILLIAM RAPPARD 
ON 31 AUGUST 2015 
Acting Chairman: Mr. Jonathan T. Fried (Canada) 
Prior to the adoption of the Agenda, the Director of the Legal Affairs Division, Ms. Valerie Hughes 
stated that, in the absence of the Chairman of  the DSB, Ambassador Harald Neple, she had the 
pleasure to open the present DSB meeting. She further stated that as Members were aware, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure for meetin gs of WTO bodies, if the Chairperson of the DSB 
was absent from any meeting or part thereof, th e Chairperson of the General Council or in the 
latter's absence, the Chairperson of the Trade Poli cy Review Body, shall perform the functions of 
the DSB Chairperson. If the Chairpersons of th e General Council and the Trade Policy Review Body 
were also not present, the DSB shall elect an interim Chairperson for that meeting or that part of 
the meeting. She, therefore, proposed that Amb. Jonathan Fried of Canada be elected as interim 
Chairman to preside over the proceedings of the meeting. 
 
The DSB so agreed. 
Table of Contents 
1   SURVEILLANCE OF IMPLEMENTATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS ADOPTED BY 
THE DSB ....................................................................................................................... .... 2 
A.  United States – Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998: Status report by 
the United States .............................................................................................................. 3  
B.  United States – Anti-dumping measures on certain hot-rolled steel products from 
Japan: Status report by  the United States ............................................................................ 6  
C.  United States – Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act: Status report by 
the United States .............................................................................................................. 7  
D.  European Communities – Measures affect ing the approval and marketing of biotech 
products: Status report by  the European  Union ..................................................................... 7  
E.  United States – Anti-dumping measures on certain shrimp from Viet Nam: Status 
report by the Un ited States ................................................................................................ 8  
F.  European Communities – Measures prohib iting the importation and marketing of seal 
products: Status report by  the European  Union ..................................................................... 9  
2   IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RE COMMENDATIONS OF  THE DSB ................................... 10  
A.  Ukraine – Definitive safeguard measures on certain passenger cars .................................... 10 
B.  Peru – Additional duty on imports of certain agricultural products ....................................... 11 
3   UNITED STATES – CONTINUED DUMPING AND SUBSIDY OFFSET ACT 
OF 2000: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RECO MMENDATIONS ADOPTE D BY THE DSB ......... 11  
A.  Statements by the Eu ropean Union and Japan ................................................................. 11 WT/DSB/M/367 
 
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  4   CHINA – CERTAIN MEASURES AFFECT ING ELECTRONIC PAYMENT SERVICES ........... 12  
A.  Statement by th e United States .................................................................................... 12 
5   THAILAND – CUSTOMS AND FISCAL MEASURES ON CIGARETTES FROM 
THE PHILIP PINES .......................................................................................................... 13  
A.  Statement by the Philippines ........................................................................................ 13 
6   UNITED STATES – COUNTERVAILING AND ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES ON 
CERTAIN PRODUCTS FROM CHINA ................................................................................. 14  
A.  Statement by the United States on implementation of the recommendations adopted 
by the DSB .................................................................................................................... . 14 
7   EUROPEAN UNION – ANTI-DUMPI NG MEASURES ON BIODIESEL FROM 
INDONESIA .................................................................................................................... 15 
A.  Request for the establishm ent of a panel by Indonesia ..................................................... 15 
8   UNITED STATES – ANTI-DUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING MEASURES ON 
CERTAIN COATED PAPER FROM INDO NESIA .................................................................. 15  
A.  Request for the establishm ent of a panel by Indonesia ..................................................... 15 
9   KOREA – IMPORT BANS, AND TEST ING AND CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS 
FOR RADIONUC LIDES .................................................................................................... 16  
A.  Request for the establis hment of a pane l by Japan ........................................................... 16 
10   INDONESIA – SAFEGUARD ON CERT AIN IRON OR STEEL PRODUCTS ...................... 17  
A.  Request for the establishment of a panel by the Separate Customs Territory of 
Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu ................................................................................... 17 
11   UNITED STATES – MEASURES AFFECTING THE IMPORTATION OF ANIMALS, 
MEAT AND OTHER ANIMAL PROD UCTS FROM AR GENTINA ............................................. 18  
A.  Report of  the Panel...................................................................................................... 18 
12   CHINA – COUNTERVAILING AND ANTI-DUMPING DUTIES ON GRAIN 
ORIENTED FLAT-ROLLED ELECTRICAL STEEL FROM THE UNITED STATES: RECOURSE TO ARTICLE 21.5 OF THE DSU BY THE UNITED STATES ................................ 20
 
A.  Report of  the Panel...................................................................................................... 20 
13   DELAYS IN THE DISP UTE SETTLEMENT PROCESS .................................................... 22  
A.  Statemen t by Ko rea .................................................................................................... 22 
 
 
1  SURVEILLANCE OF IMPLEMENTATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS ADOPTED BY THE DSB 
A.  United States – Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998: Status report by the 
United States (WT/DS176/11/Add.152) 
 B.  United States – Anti-dumping measures on cert ain hot-rolled steel products from Japan: Status 
report by the United States (WT/DS184/15/Add.152) 
 C.  United States – Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act: Status report by the United States (WT/DS160/24/Add.127) 
 
D.  European Communities – Measures affecting the approval and marketing of biotech products: Status report by the European Union (WT/DS291/37/Add.90) 
 
E.  United States – Anti-dumping measures on cert ain shrimp from Viet Nam: Status report by the 
United States (WT/DS404/11/Add.38) 
 
F.  European Communities – Measures prohibiting the importation and marketing of seal products: 
Status report by the European Union (WT/DS400/16/Add.5 – WT/DS401/17/Add.5) WT/DSB/M/367 
 
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 1.1.  The Chairman noted that there were six sub- items under this Agenda item concerning status 
reports submitted by delegations pursuant to Article 21.6 of the DSU. He recalled in this context 
that early in his role as Chair of the DSB in 2013, he had made some general observations about 
this regular item on the Agenda. He had drawn attention to the fact that Members had become accustomed to and complacent about submitting and receiving status reports that generally 
provided limited information about real and curre nt efforts undertaken to achieve compliance. 
Having reviewed the records of several DSB meetings, he had observed that Members did little more each month than repeat what they had said the previous month. He had pointed out that this stood in marked contrast to the importance in the WTO dispute settlement mechanism of the 
surveillance function of the DSB, and had hi ghlighted that it was one of the unique and 
distinguishing features of the mechanism. The complete record of his remarks was reflected in the minutes of the DSB meeting held on 26 March 2013, contained in document WT/DSB/M/330. He 
recalled that Article 21.6 of the DSU required that: "Unless the DSB decides otherwise, the issue of 
implementation of the recommendations or ruling s shall be placed on the Agenda of the DSB 
meeting after six months following the date of esta blishment of the reasonable period of time and 
shall remain on the DSB's Agenda until the issue is resolved". In that light, and as he had done 
throughout his tenure as Chairman of the DSB in 2013, he invited delegations to provide up-to-date information about compliance efforts and to focus on new developments, suggestions and ideas on progress towards the resolution of disputes. Furthermore, he reminded delegations 
that, as provided for in Rule 27 of the Rules of Procedure for DSB meetings: "Representatives 
should make every effort to avoid the repetition of  a full debate at each meeting on any issue that 
has already been fully debated in the past and on which there appears to have been no change in 
Members' positions already on record". 
1.2.  The DSB took note of the statement. 
A.  United States – Section 211 Omnibus Appr opriations Act of 1998: Status report by 
the United States (WT/DS176/11/Add.152) 
1.3.  The Chairman drew attention to docu ment WT/DS176/11/Add.152, which contained the 
status report by the United States on progress in the implementation of the DSB's 
recommendations in the case concerning US Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998. 
1.4.  The representative of the United States said that his country had provided a status report in 
this dispute on 20 August 2015, in accordance with Article 21.6 of the DSU. Several bills 
introduced in the current US Congress would repeal Section 211. Other previously introduced 
legislation would modify Section 211. The US Administration would continue to work on solutions 
to implement the DSB's recommendations and rulings and resolve this matter with the European Union. 
1.5.  The representative of the European Union sa id that the EU thanked the United States for its 
most recent status report and the statement made  at the present meeting. The EU hoped that the 
US authorities would resolve this matter very soon. 
1.6.  The representative of Cuba said that her dele gation wished to refer to an article in a recent 
newspaper, which described the Havana Club rum factory and distillery in Santa Cruz del Norte 
in Cuba. As stated in that newspaper, the rum was aged naturally in soft oak barrels. Cuba's climate and island soils provided sugar cane and molasses, which together with the expertise of 
Cuban master rum makers, gave a unique flavour to this popular Cuban product. As explained in 
the Cuban encyclopedia EcuRed, "Havana Club" was th e most traditional of all rum brands in Cuba. 
It had existed since 1878 and its name was rooted in Cuban tradition, the city of Havana and its 
worldwide reputation. Hence the choice of the name "Havana Club", because it represented the 
heritage of Cuban rum production and evoked the atmosphere of those days in Havana, whose symbol "La Giraldilla" appeared on the logo of th is Cuban brand. One should also reflect on the 
cultural and traditional aspects of the product at issue in this dispute. This was a Cuban rum and 
brand, whose origin could be none other than Cuba. However, u nder Section 211, the Bacardi 
Company had used the "Havana Club" trademark on  US territory since 1997 in order to market 
rum that was not produced in Cuba and did not contain any products of Cuban origin. Moreover, 
this was an infringement of the registration of this Cuban rum trademark, which had been renewed 
in 1996 in the United States for a period of 10 years. In its 152nd status report, the United States WT/DSB/M/367 
 
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  still did not provide new information, nor did it give any indication of its intention to implement the 
DSB's recommendations and rulings of 2002. Therefore,  Cuba wished to reiterate its request that 
the United States provide a status report, which would contain information on actions that could lead to the settlement of this dispute. In Cuba's view, t he US administration had the institutional 
capacity and the authority to urge the US Congress to repeal Section 211 and to end this 
non-compliance, which affected and undermined the credibility of the WTO dispute settlement system with regard to its efficient operation. Cuba, o nce again, urged the United States to repeal 
Section 211 by eliminating all its adverse effects. Cuba called on the United States to definitively 
and unconditionally end the policy of economic, commercial and financial blockade imposed on 
Cuba. 
1.7.  The representative of Mexico said that since the circumstances of this dispute had not 
changed and the US non-compliance continued, Mexico wished to refer to its statements made 
under this Agenda item at previous DSB meetings. 
1.8.  The representative of Jamaica said that her country thanked Cuba, the United States and the 
EU for their statements, updates and the status report under this Agenda item. Jamaica noted that 
the circumstances of this dispute had not changed and that no progress had been reported since the previous DSB meeting. As at previous DSB m eetings, Jamaica wished to join other speakers 
with concerns about the continued US failure to implement the DSB's recommendations adopted 
in 2002 regarding Section 211. The protracted failure by the United States to take the necessary steps to comply with its obligations under the DSU provisions was incompatible with the requirement for prompt implementation of the DSB decisions. This was of particular concern in 
cases such as this where the failure to meet an obligation had a negative impact on the economic 
interests of a developing-country Member. Jamaica reiterated its deep concern about the systemic implications of any disregard for DSB decision s. Such disregard could undermine the overall 
integrity of the dispute settlement system, whic h remained a key pillar of the WTO. Jamaica 
believed that after 13 years since the adoption of the DSB's recommendations, it was more than 
reasonable for Members to expect that this matte r would be resolved and removed from the DSB's 
Agenda. 
1.9.  The representative of the Plurinational St ate of Bolivia said that, for the past 13 years, 
Members had heard the same status report submitted by the United States, which did not contain 
any information on progress in this dispute. Bolivia, once again, expressed its concern about the 
systemic effects of non-compliance with the DSB's recommendations. The US failure to comply in 
this dispute undermined the credibility and functioning of the multilateral trading system and affected the interests of a developing-country Member. Bolivia urged the United States to comply 
with the DSB's recommendations and rulings and to remove the restrictions imposed under 
Section 211. Bolivia supported the concerns ex pressed by Cuba at the present meeting. 
1.10.  The representative of Ecuador said that his country supported the statement made by Cuba. 
Ecuador, once again, recalled that Article 21 of the DSU referred specifically to prompt compliance 
with the DSB's recommendations and rulings, in particular since the interests of a developing-country Member were concerned. Ecuador urged the United States to step up its efforts 
and promptly comply with the DSB's recommendations and rulings regarding Section 211. Ecuador 
said that this dispute demonstrated that the WTO dispute settlement system had some 
shortcomings. 
1.11.  The representative of India said that his country noted the US status report and its 
statement made at the present meeting. India also thanked Cuba for its statement. Like other 
delegations, India wished to highlight that the Un ited States had not reported any progress. India, 
once again, was compelled to stress that the principle of prompt compliance was missing in this 
dispute. India joined the previous speakers in renewing its systemic concerns about the 
continuation of non-compliance. In India's view, such non-compliance undermined the confidence that Members reposed in a predictable, rules-based multilateral trading system, especially in the context of a developing-country Member seek ing compliance. Continued non-compliance by 
Members eroded the credibility of the WTO dispute settlement system. India urged the 
United States to report compliance in this dispute without further delay. 
1.12.  The representative of Nicaragua said that her country supported the statement made by 
Cuba. Nicaragua reiterated its concern about the continued US lack of compliance with the DSB's 
recommendations and rulings in this dispute. Nicaragua noted that the 152nd US status report did WT/DSB/M/367 
 
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  not contain any information on progress towards resolving this 13-year-old dispute. As many 
delegations had pointed out in previous DSB meetings, the US failure to comply with the recommendations undermined the economic intere sts of a developing-country Member with a 
small economy. The failure to comply also undermined the DSB. Nicaragua joined other Members 
in urging the United States to take the nece ssary measures to promptly implement the DSB's 
recommendations and rulings. 
1.13.  The representative of El Salvador said that her country thanked the United States for its 
status report and Cuba for its statement made at the present meeting. El Salvador wished to 
highlight that the failure to comply with the DSB's recommendations and rulings in this dispute affected the economic interests of a small deve loping-country Member. El Salvador urged the 
United States to promptly comply with the DSB's recommendations and rulings so as to resolve 
this dispute. 
1.14.  The representative of Viet Nam said that her country thanked the United States for its 
status report in this dispute. Viet Nam noted that this matter had not been resolved for more than 
a decade. Viet Nam shared the concerns expresse d by Cuba and the previous speakers about the 
US lack of compliance in this dispute. Viet Nam ur ged the United States to step up its efforts and 
to fully comply with the DSB's rulings and recommendations. 
1.15.  The representative of Argentina said that his country thanked the United States for its 
status report. Argentina, once again, regretted that the US status report did not contain any new 
information on progress in this dispute. In that regard, Argentina reiterated its view that this lack of progress was inconsistent with the princi ple of prompt implementation of the DSB's 
recommendations and rulings, in particular since the interests of a developing-country Member 
were affected. Argentina, therefore, supported Cuba as well as the previous speakers and urged the United States to adopt the necessary measures to resolve this dispute. 
1.16.  The representative of Peru said that his country thanked the United States for its status 
report and Cuba for its statement. Peru urged the parties to this dispute to take all the necessary 
measures, within a reasonable period of time, in order to comply with the DSB's rulings and 
recommendations, in particular since the interests of a developing-country Member were affected. 
Peru supported the previous speakers who had expressed concern that no progress had been 
made in implementing the DSB's recommendations in this dispute. 
1.17.  The representative of Angola said that his country thanked the United States for its status 
report regarding Section 211. Angola supported the statement made by Cuba and the previous 
speakers regarding the lack of progress in this dispute. However, Angola welcomed the fact that, after 54 years, on 20 July 2015, there had been a formal re-establishment of relations between 
Cuba and the United States. Angola considered that the re-established bilateral relationship 
between Cuba and the United States could prov ide a new foundation and a new opportunity to 
resolve this 13-year-old dispute. Angola hoped that the steps that the United States had taken 
would promptly lead to a solution to this dispute, which affected Cuba, a small and vulnerable 
developing-country Member. In that regard, Angola considered it important for all Members to implement and respect the DSB's recommendations and rulings so as to ensure the effective functioning of the dispute settlement system. Angola  called upon the Unites States to promptly 
comply with the DSB's recommendation and to resolve this dispute. 
1.18.  The representative of the Russian Federation  said that his country regretted that it had to, 
once again, express its concern about the lack of progress in this long-standing dispute. The lack 
of compliance in this dispute attracted the attention of Members as it was an example of disregard 
of the DSB's recommendations and rulings. Russia be lieved that due and timely implementation of 
the DSB's decisions and recommendations by all Members was essential for maintaining mutual 
trust and credibility of the WTO system. As it had previously stated, Russia urged the parties to 
this dispute to address the outstanding issues and to resolve this dispute as soon as possible. 
1.19.  The representative of Brazil said that he r country thanked the United States for its status 
report. Brazil regretted that the US status report did not contain any information on progress in 
this dispute. Brazil shared the concerns ex pressed by the EU, Cuba and other delegations 
regarding the lack of compliance in this dispute. In that regard, Brazil urged the parties to the WT/DSB/M/367 
 
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  dispute, as well as the United States and Cuba, in light of their new bilateral relations, to 
cooperate in finding a solution to this dispute. 
1.20.  The representative of China said that his country thanked the United States for its status 
report and its statement made at the present me eting. The prolonged situation of non-compliance 
in this dispute was highly inconsistent with th e principle of prompt compliance under the DSU 
provisions, in particular since the interests of a developing-country Member were affected. China urged the United States to implement the DSB's rulings and recommendations without any further 
delay. 
1.21.  The representative of the Bolivarian Repub lic of Venezuela said that her country supported 
the statement made by Cuba. Venezuela noted wi th concern that the 152nd US status report, 
which was repetitive, did not contain any information on progress towards implementation of the 
DSB's recommendations and rulings in this dispute. Unfortunately, Section 211 remained in force. 
In Venezuela's view, the US status report did not meet the obligation under Article 21.6 of the DSU, which required Members to provide information on progress in this dispute. Rather, it simply 
repeated that no progress had been made. Venezuela recalled that Members had called for an end 
to this prolonged situation of non-compliance in this dispute and had urged the United States to 
comply with the DSB's recommendations and rulings. Venezuela joined the previous speakers who 
had expressed concerns about the systemic implications of this prolonged situation of 
non-compliance. Such non-compliance set a negative precedent for the credibility of the DSB and undermined the confidence Members placed in th e dispute settlement system. It also showed 
disregard for the dispute settlement system. It also  undermined the multilateral trading system as 
a whole and its ability to resolve disputes. Venezuela urged the United States to comply with the 
DSB's recommendations and rulings and to repeal Section 211. 
1.22.  The representative of Uruguay said that her country thanked the United States for its status 
report regarding Section 211. Uruguay reiterated its concern about the lack of compliance with the 
DSB's recommendations and rulings in this dispute, in particular since the interests of a developing-country Me mber were affected. 
1.23.  The representative of Zimbabwe said that his country thanked the United States for its 
status report. Zimbabwe, once again, regretted that there was no information on progress in this 
dispute since the previous DSB meeting. In that regard, Zimbabwe joined the previous speakers in supporting Cuba and urged the United States to comply with the DSB's rulings and 
recommendations in this dispute. 
1.24.  The Chairman noted the exchange of view s under this Agenda item regarding a status 
report that, as many delegations had observed, may not have reported on much progress. He 
noted that many concerns had been expressed, including the impact of non-compliance on the 
dispute settlement system and developing-country Members. Some delegations had noted that the current environment could provide an opportunity to  resolve this matter. He hoped that a mutually 
agreeable solution to this dispute would be found soon. 
1.25.  The DSB took note of the statements and agreed to revert to this matter at its next regular 
meeting. B.  United States – Anti-dumping measures  on certain hot-rolled steel products from 
Japan: Status report by the Un ited States (WT/DS184/15/Add.152) 
1.26.  The Chairman drew attention to document WT/DS184/15/Add.152, which contained the 
status report by the United States on progress in the implementation of the DSB's 
recommendations in the case concerning US anti-dumping measures on certain hot-rolled steel 
products from Japan. 
1.27.  The representative of the United States said that his country had provided a status report in 
this dispute on 20 August 2015, in accordance with Article 21.6 of the DSU. The United States had 
addressed the DSB's recommendations and rulings with respect to the calculation of anti-dumping margins in the hot-rolled steel anti-dumping duty investigation at issue. With respect to the recommendations and rulings of the DSB that had yet to be addressed, the US Administration WT/DSB/M/367 
 
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  would work with the US Congress with respect to appropriate statutory measures that would 
resolve this matter. 
1.28.  The representative of Japan said that his country thanked the United States for its 
statement and status report submitted on 20 August 2015. Japan referred to its previous 
statements that this issue should be resolved as soon as possible. 
1.29.  The DSB took note of the statements and agreed to revert to this matter at its next regular 
meeting. 
C.  United States – Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act: Status report by the 
United States (WT/DS160/24/Add.127) 
1.30.  The Chairman drew attention to document WT/DS160/24/Add.127, which contained the 
status report by the United States on progress in the implementation of the DSB's 
recommendations in the case concerning Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act. 
1.31.  The representative of the United States said that his country had provided a status report in 
this dispute on 20 August 2015, in accordance with Article 21.6 of the DSU. The US Administration 
would continue to confer with the European Union, and to work closely with the US Congress, in 
order to reach a mutually satisfactory resolution of this matter. 
1.32.  The representative of the European Union said that the EU thanked the United States for the 
status report and its statement made at the present meeting. The EU referred to its statements 
made under this Agenda item at previous DSB meet ings. The EU wished to resolve this dispute as 
soon as possible. 
1.33.  The DSB took note of the statements and agreed to revert to this matter at its next regular 
meeting. D.  European Communities – Measures affect ing the approval and marketing of biotech 
products: Status report by the Eu ropean Union (WT/DS291/37/Add.90) 
1.34.  The Chairman drew attention to document WT/DS291/37/Add.90, which contained the 
status report by the European Union on pr ogress in the implementation of the DSB's 
recommendations in the case concerning measures affecting the approval and marketing of 
biotech products. 
1.35.  The representative of the European Union said that, in recent meetings, the EU had already 
reported on authorization decisions and other actions towards approval decisions taken up to 
May 2015. One draft decision for the authorization of GM food and feed was scheduled for possible 
vote in the Standing committee on 14 September 2015.1 More generally, and as stated many 
times before, the EU recalled that the EU a pproval system was not covered by the DSB's 
recommendations and rulings. 
1.36.  The representative of the United States said that his country thanked the EU for its status 
report and its statement made at the present meeting. The United States noted that dozens of 
biotech applications remained pending in the EU approval system. One of these applications had 
been pending for well over a decade. The ongo ing backlog and delays remained a serious 
impediment to trade in biotech products. The United States remained concerned about an EU proposal for major change in the EU approval meas ures. If adopted, that measure would result in 
even greater disruptions in trade in agricultural products. As the United States had previously 
stated, the EU Commission had proposed to adopt an amendment to EU biotech approval 
measures that would allow individual EU member States to ban the use of biotech products within their territory, even where the EU had approved th e product based on a scientific risk assessment. 
This was in addition to a cultivation opt-out already in effect. The United States was concerned 
about the relationship of such a proposal to the EU's obligations under the SPS Agreement. Additionally, the United States noted that one or more EU member State bans on use would serve 
as a major impediment to the movement and use of biotech products throughout the entirety of 
                                               
1 MON 87427 maize. WT/DSB/M/367 
 
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  the EU. The United States urged the EU to ensure that its biotech approval measures operated in 
accordance with the EU's own laws and regulations and its obligations under the SPS Agreement. To the extent that the EU considered revisions to its biotech approval measures, the EU should 
ensure that these revisions were consistent with the EU's WTO obligations and should notify these 
revisions to the SPS Committee pursuant to Article 7 of the SPS Agreement. 
1.37.  The representative of the European Union said that the proposal that the United States had 
just referred to was not related to the implementation of the DSB's recommendations and rulings 
and it therefore fell outside the responsibilities  of the DSB under Article 21.6 DSU. There was no 
basis for a discussion in the DSB on this issue. 
1.38.  The DSB took note of the statements and agreed to revert to this matter at its next regular 
meeting. 
E.  United States – Anti-dumping measures on certain shrimp from Viet Nam: Status 
report by the United States (WT/DS404/11/Add.38) 
1.39.  The Chairman drew attention to document WT/DS404/11/Add.38, which contained the 
status report by the United States on progress in the implementation of the DSB's 
recommendations in the case concerning US an ti-dumping measures on certain shrimp from 
Viet Nam. 
1.40.  The representative of the United States said that his country had provided a status report in 
this dispute on 20 August 2015, in accordance with Article 21.6 of the DSU. As the United States 
had noted at previous DSB meetings, in February 2012, the US Department of Commerce had modified its procedures in a manner that addressed certain findings in this dispute. The 
United States would continue to consult with interested parties as it worked to address the other 
recommendations and rulings of the DSB. 
1.41.  The representative of Viet Nam said that her country thanked the United States for its 
statement and the status report on this dispute. As Members would recall from the previous DSB 
meetings, Viet Nam considered that, those actions which the Panel in this dispute had found to be WTO-inconsistent should be addressed in the cont ext of US implementation of the DS429 dispute. 
Specifically, the WTO-inconsistent margins of dumping found in each of the reviews at issue in this 
dispute must be revised based on a WTO-consistent methodology in order for the United States to take the WTO-consistent remedial action required by the DS429 dispute, specifically to conduct a redetermination of the sunset review on frozen warm water shrimp from Viet Nam and to 
re-examine individual company requests for revocations based on the sustained absence of 
dumping. Viet Nam believed that the United States was prepared to fully implement the recommendations and, in that context, looked fo rward to being able to address the DSB after the 
expiry of the reasonable period of time for implementation in the DS429 dispute and announce 
that this dispute had been fully implemented. 
1.42.  The representative of the Bolivarian Repub lic of Venezuela said that her country supported 
the statement made by Viet Nam and took note of the US status report. Venezuela noted the 
importance of prompt implementation of the DSB' s rulings and recommendations. Failure to do so 
undermined the rules-based multilateral trading system and its ability to resolve disputes. Venezuela urged the United States to take the necessary measures to resolve this dispute and to 
report at the next DSB meeting on th e measures it intended to adopt. 
1.43.  The representative of Cuba said that  her country was concerned about the continued 
non-compliance with the DSB's recommendations and rulings and its impact on the affected 
Members. Cuba noted that the US status report di d not contain any information on progress in this 
dispute which affected Viet Nam, a developing-c ountry Member. Cuba, once again, supported the 
statement made by Viet Nam and urged the United States to take the necessary measures to 
comply with the DSB's recommendations and rulings. 
1.44.  The DSB took note of the statements and agreed to revert to this matter at its next regular 
meeting. WT/DSB/M/367 
 
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  F.  European Communities – Measures prohib iting the importation and marketing of seal 
products: Status report by the Eu ropean Union (WT/DS400/16/Add.5 – 
WT/DS401/17/Add.5) 
1.45.  The Chairman drew attention to document WT/DS400/16/Add.5 – WT/DS401/17/Add.5, 
which contained the status report by the European Union on progress in the implementation of the 
DSB's recommendations in the case concerning EU measures prohibiting the importation and marketing of seal products. 
1.46.  The representative of the European Union said that the EU continued to work on the 
implementation of the DSB's recommendations and rulings in this dispute and was making its best 
efforts to complete the implementation before the expiry of the agreed reasonable period of time 
on 18 October 2015. As already reported during the previous DSB meetings, the European 
Commission had submitted a proposal to the Council and the European Parliament for amending 
those aspects of EC Regulation No. 1007/2009 on trade in seal products that had been found to be discriminatory. In particular, it proposed to remove the exception for maritime resource 
management hunts and provided for certain modifications to the exception of indigenous 
communities. The EU was expecting the proposal to be adopted by the legislators in the course of 
September 2015 and was working in parallel on re placing the current EU Commission regulation 
No. 737/2010 with a new one. In addition and as already foreshadowed in previous meetings, on 
30 July 2015, the attestation system for Canadian Inuit was put in place through a decision by the European Commission. This was the result of constructive cooperation with Canadian authorities and provided the basis for Canadian Inuit to start using the IC exception. 
1.47.  The representative of Canada said that his country thanked the EU for its sixth status report 
regarding the implementation of the DSB's recommend ations and rulings in this dispute. Since the 
conclusion of the agreement between Canada and th e EU, on a joint statement on access to the EU 
of seal products from indigenous communities of Canada, Canada continued to engage with the EU 
to operationalize the indigenous communities exempt ion, with the objective of ensuring practical 
market access for Canadian Aboriginal seal products. Canada was pleased that the Commission 
had adopted, on 30 July 2015, a decision recognizing the Government of Nunavut as an attestation 
body under the EU seal regime. Canada under stood that Nunavut would need to renew its 
recognised certifying body status upon the entry into force of the proposed amended seal regime. 
Canada expected that this process would be managed in such a way as to ensure a smooth 
transition between the existing seal regime and the amended one. Canada had also been following 
closely the debate concerning amendments to the EU Seal Regime. Canada expected that any such amendments would be implemented consistently with the DSB's recommendations and rulings, 
and in a manner that did not adversely affect Inuit and other indigenous communities, particularly 
regarding the renewal of Nunavut's recognized certifying body status, in light of the ongoing Nunavut application. Canada reiterated that Canada's seal harvests were humane, sustainable and 
well-regulated activities that provided an important source of food and income for coastal and Inuit 
communities. 
1.48.  The representative of Norway said that her country thanked the EU for its sixth status 
report concerning the implementation of the DSB's recommendations and rulings in this dispute. 
Norway continued to follow with interest the legislative process in the EU, including the proposal 
for an amendment of the Basic Seal Regulation. Norway noted that the EU had informed the DSB 
that a new implementing regulation would need to be adopted to reflect the amendment. In that 
regard, Norway wished to reiterate its position that Norway's seal hunt was well-regulated, 
conducted in a humane manner and contributed to th e sustainable management of Norway's living 
marine resources. The fact that this had not been taken into account by the EU thus far in the 
legislative process was disappointing. Norway would continue to monitor the legislative process, 
and expected that the EU would fully implement the DSB's recommendations and rulings within the agreed reasonable period of time. 
1.49.  The DSB took note of the statements and agreed to revert to this matter at its next regular 
meeting. WT/DSB/M/367 
 
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  2  IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE DSB 
A.  Ukraine – Definitive safeguard measures on certain passenger cars 
 B.  Peru – Additional duty on imports of certain agricultural products 
 
2.1.  The Chairman recalled that in accordance with the DSU provisions, the DSB was required to 
keep under surveillance the implementation of reco mmendations and rulings of the DSB in order to 
ensure effective resolution of disp utes to the benefit of all Members. In that respect, Article 21.3 of 
the DSU provided that the Member concerned shall inform the DSB, within 30 days after the date 
of adoption of the panel or Appellate Body report, of its intentions in respect of implementation of the recommendations and rulings of the DSB. He pr oposed that the two sub-items to which he had 
just referred be considered separately. 
A.  Ukraine – Definitive safeguard measures on certain passenger cars 
2.2.  The Chairman recalled that at its meet ing on 20 July2015, the DSB had adopted the Panel 
Report in the dispute on: "Ukraine – Definitive Safeguard Measures on Certain Passenger Cars". As 
Members were aware, the 30-day time-period in this dispute had expired on 19 August 2015, and on 17 August 2015, Ukraine had informed the DSB in writing of its intentions with respect to 
implementation of the recommendations and rulings  of the DSB. The relevant communication was 
contained in document WT/DS468/9. He then invi ted the representative of Ukraine to speak. 
2.3.  The representative of Ukraine said that at its meeting on 20 July 2015, the DSB had adopted 
the Panel Report on the dispute: "Ukraine – Definitive Safeguard Measures on Certain Passenger 
Cars" (WT/DS468/R and Add.1). Pursuant to Article 21.3 of the DSU, Ukraine in its communication 
of 17 August 2015 (WT/DS468/9), had notified its intention to implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in this dispute in a mann er that respected its WTO obligations. Ukraine 
would need a reasonable period of time for implementation and stood ready to discuss this matter 
with Japan, in accordance with Article 21.3 of the DSU. In line with the legislation of Ukraine, the 
Interdepartmental Commission on International Trade ("the Commission") would meet in 
September 2015 to take a decision required to implement the DSB's recommendations and rulings. 
The Ministry of Economic Development and Trade of Ukraine would recommend that the Commission revoke the measure at stake in order to move forward with prompt implementation of the Panel's Report. 
2.4.  The representative of Japan said that his country took note of, and appreciated, Ukraine's 
intention to implement the DSB's recommendations and rulings promptly as expressed in its 
statement made at the present meeting as well as in its written communication dated 
17 August 2015 (WT/DS468/9). Japan recalled that Article 21.1 of the DSU provided that "prompt 
compliance with recommendations or rulings of the DSB is essential in order to ensure effective 
resolution of the disputes to the benefit of all Members" and that the Panel suggested that Ukraine 
revoke its safeguard measure on passenger cars "[i]n the light of the nature and number of 
inconsistencies with the Agreement on Safeguar ds and the GATT 1994". Article 21.3 of the DSU 
provided that the Member concerned shall have a re asonable period of time, if it was impracticable 
to comply immediately with the recommendations and rulings. However, Japan believed that it was 
not necessary for Ukraine to have a longer reasonable period of time for complying with the DSB's 
recommendations and rulings in this dispute. In any case, the deadline provided by Article 21.3(b) of the DSU, which was 3 September 2015 in this case, was approaching. Japan thus urged Ukraine 
to be ready for consultations immediately in order to reach an agreement on the reasonable period 
of time by the deadline, in accordance with Arti cle 21.3 of the DSU as stated in Ukraine's written 
communication. 
2.5.  The DSB took note of the statements, and of the information provided by Ukraine regarding 
its intentions in respect of implementation of the DSB's recommendations and rulings. WT/DSB/M/367 
 
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  B.  Peru – Additional duty on impo rts of certain agricultural products 
2.6.  The Chairman recalled that at its m eeting on 31 July 2015, the DSB had adopted the 
Appellate Body Report in the dispute on: "Peru – A dditional Duty on Imports of Certain Agricultural 
Products" and the Panel Report on the same matter, as modified by the Appellate Body Report. As 
Members were aware, the 30-day time-period in this dispute had expired on 30 August 2015. He 
invited the representative of Peru to inform the DSB of its intentions with respect to implementation of the recommendations and rulings of the DSB. 
2.7.  The representative of Peru said that, on 31 July 20 15, the DSB had adopted the Panel and 
Appellate Body Reports in the dispute: "Peru – Additional Duty on Imports of Certain Agricultural 
Products" (DS457) . As required by Article 21.3 of the DSU, Peru informed the DSB that it would 
implement the DSB's recommendations and rulings within a reasonable period of time , in 
accordance with its WTO obligations. To this effect, the relevant branches of the Peruvian 
Government were working in a coordinated manner to determine the appropriate steps to ensure 
the implementation of the DSB's recommendations. 
2.8.  The representative of Guatemala said th at his country thanked Peru for the statement 
regarding its intentions in respect of the implementation of the DSB's recommendations and 
rulings. Given the nature of the measure in question, Guatemala believed that it would be 
practicable for Peru to comply immediately with the DSB's recommendations and rulings. It was, 
therefore, not necessary for Peru to seek a reasonable period of time in which to comply. Nevertheless, Guatemala remained open to any proposal under Article 21.3 of the DSU from Peru to be submitted within the period of time provided for in Article 21.3(b), i.e. within 45 days after 
the date of adoption of the DSB's recommendat ions and rulings. That deadline expired on 
14 September 2015. Guatemala noted, however, that within the period from the adoption of the Reports until the present meeting no special DSB meeting was scheduled; i.e., within the required 
30-day period provided for in Article 21.3 of the DSU. Guatemala was also aware that Peru had not 
requested a meeting within that period to inform the DSB of its intentions in respect of the implementation of the DSB recommendations and ru lings. The period of 30 days under Article 21.3 
of the DSU had expired on 30 August 2015. Guatemala had decided to accept, exceptionally and in 
this case only, a pragmatic solution not to convene a special DSB meeting for the purposes of Article 21.3 of the DSU to prevent the misuse of  WTO resources. In Guatemala's view, it would 
have made no sense to convene a special DSB meeting to discuss this matter simply because the 
deadline had expired the day before the date scheduled for a regular DSB meeting in August. In 
Guatemala's view, it would, however, have been desirable for Peru to inform the DSB of its intentions towards implementation in writing before the expiry of 30 days. 
2.9.  The DSB took note of the statements, and of  the information provided by Peru regarding its 
intentions in respect of implementation of the DSB's recommendations and rulings. 
3  UNITED STATES – CONTINUED DUMPIN G AND SUBSIDY OFFSET ACT OF 2000: 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RECOMME NDATIONS ADOPTE D BY THE DSB 
A.  Statements by the European Union and Japan 3.1.  The Chairman said that this item was on th e Agenda of the present meeting at the request of 
the European Union and Japan. He then invited the respective representatives to speak. 
3.2.  The representative of the European Unio n said that the EU, once again, requested the 
United States to stop transferring anti-dumping and countervailing duties to the US industry. Every 
disbursement that still took place was clearly an act of non-compliance with the DSB's 
recommendations and rulings. The EU renewed its call on the United States to abide by its clear 
obligation under Article 21.6 of the DSU to submit status reports in this dispute. 
3.3.  The representative of Japan said that, since the distributions under the CDSOA had been 
continuing, Japan, once again, urged the United Stat es to stop the illegal distributions in order to 
resolve this long-standing dispute. As it had stated in previous meetings, Japan was of the view that the United States was under obligation to provide the DSB with a status report in this dispute in accordance with Article 21.6 of the DSU. WT/DSB/M/367 
 
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  3.4.  The representative of Brazil said that hi s country thanked the EU and Japan for keeping this 
item on the DSB's Agenda. Brazil, as one of the pa rties to these disputes, was of the view that the 
United States was under an obligation to discontinue any disbursements made pursuant to the Byrd Amendment. What was important in this dispute was that disbursements continued to be 
made. The fact that the disbursements may be related to investigations initiated before the repeal 
of the Act in February 2006 did not mean that they were excluded from compliance obligations. Since the DSB had confirmed the illegal nature of the disbursements under the Byrd Amendment 
more than 10 years ago, any disbursement to petitioners must be discontinued. Only then would 
compliance be achieved in this dispute. 
3.5.  The representative of India said that his country shared the concerns expressed by the EU 
and Japan. The WTO-inconsistent disbursements continued unabated to the US domestic industry. 
The latest data available2 for the fiscal year 2014 indicated that about US$70 million were 
disbursed to the US domestic industry. India was of  the view that this item should continue to 
remain on the Agenda of the DSB until such time th at full compliance was achieved in this dispute. 
3.6.  The representative of Canada said that he r country thanked the EU and Japan for putting this 
item on the Agenda of the present meeting. Ca nada shared the view that the Byrd Amendment 
was subject to the surveillance of the DSB until the United States ceased to apply it. 
3.7.  The representative of the United States said that as the United States had noted at previous 
DSB meetings, the Deficit Reduction Act, which included a provision repealing the Continued 
Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, was enacted into law in February 2006. Accordingly, the United States had taken all actions necessary to implement the DSB's recommendations and 
rulings in these disputes. Furthermore, the United States recalled that the EU, Japan, and other 
Members had acknowledged that the Deficit Reduction Act did not permit the distribution of duties 
collected on goods entered after 1 October 2007, over seven and a half years ago. The 
United States therefore did not understand the pu rpose for which the EU and Japan had inscribed 
this item on the Agenda of the present meetin g. With respect to comments regarding further 
status reports in this matter, as it had already explained at previous DSB meetings, the 
United States failed to see what purpose would be served by further submission of status reports 
which would repeat, again, that the United States had taken all actions necessary to implement the DSB's recommendations and rulings in these disputes. Indeed, as these very WTO Members had demonstrated repeatedly when they had been a responding party in a dispute, there was no 
obligation under the DSU to provide further status reports once a Member announced that it had 
implemented those DSB recommendations and rulings, regardless of whether the complaining party disagreed about compliance. 
3.8.  The DSB took note of the statements. 
4  CHINA – CERTAIN MEASURES AFFECTING ELECTRONIC PAYMENT SERVICES 
A.  Statement by the United States 
4.1.  The Chairman said that this item was on th e Agenda of the present meeting at the request of 
the United States. He invited the represen tative of the United States to speak. 
4.2.  The representative of the United States said that his country reiterates its serious concerns 
regarding China's failure to bring its measures into conformity with its WTO obligations, despite 
numerous interactions between the United States  and China in the DSB and elsewhere. China 
continued to impose its ban on foreign suppliers of electronic payment services ("EPS") by requiring a license, while at the same time failing to issue all specific measures or procedures for 
obtaining that license. The United States previously had taken note of an April 2015 State Council 
decision, which indicated China's intent to open up its EPS market following issuance of implementing regulations by the People's Bank  of China and the China Banking Regulatory 
Commission. The United States noted that the People's Bank of China had issued draft regulations 
the previous month setting forth some procedures for EPS suppliers to follow when seeking a license. To date, the China Banking Regulatory Commission had not issued any draft or final regulations implementing the State Council's April 2015 decision. As a result, one Chinese 
                                               
2 http://www.cbp.gov/ sites/default/files/ documents/FY2014%20Annual%20Report%20wHolds.pdf WT/DSB/M/367 
 
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  enterprise continued to be the only EPS supplier able to operate in the domestic market. As 
required under its WTO obligations, China must still adopt the implementing regulations necessary for allowing the operation of foreign EPS suppliers in China. The United States continued to look forward to the prompt issuance of all measures necessary to permit foreign EPS suppliers to do 
business in China. The United States was mindful that any regulations must be consistent with 
WTO obligations and treat foreign EPS suppliers in a consistent and fair way. 
4.3.  The representative of China said that his country regretted that the United States had, once 
again, brought this matter before the DSB. China referred to its statements made under this 
Agenda item at previous DSB meetings and reiterated that it had taken all necessary actions and had fully implemented the DSB's recommendations and rulings in this dispute. 
4.4.  The DSB took note of the statements. 
5  THAILAND – CUSTOMS AND FISCAL MEASURES ON CIGARETTES FROM 
THE PHILIPPINES 
A.  Statement by the Philippines 
5.1.  The Chairman said that this item was on th e Agenda of the present meeting at the request of 
the Philippines. He invited the representative of the Philippines to speak. 
5.2.  The representative of the Philippines said that her country remained concerned about a series 
of outstanding compliance issues that remained despite Thailand's repeated statements that it had 
done all it was required to do to secure full compliance with the DSB's recommendations and rulings in this dispute. As at previous DSB meet ings, the Philippines wished to highlight two issues 
due to their particular systemic impact for the DSB's rulings and the Customs Valuation Agreement 
overall. First, the Philippines remained deeply  concerned about the Thai Attorney General's 
decision to prosecute an importer of Philippine cigarettes for alleged under-declaration of customs value. The WTO panel had ruled that Thailand enjo yed no legitimate grounds to reject the customs 
values that Thailand now sought to criminalize. In addition, Thai Customs Board of Appeals 
(or "BoA") had explicitly accepted those customs values, in a ruling heralded by Thailand itself as a measure taken to comply. Thailand's actions with the criminal prosecution directly undermined the 
implementation obligation placed on it by the DSB's recommendations and rulings. In systemic 
terms, there could be no doubt that the discipl ines of the Customs Valuation Agreement applied 
whenever a WTO Member engaged in the customs valuation of goods, including in the enforcement of domestic Customs provisions. Despite this evident WTO-inconsistency, Thailand had explained 
in its statements made at previous DSB meetings that it "will take steps to ensure" the 
WTO-consistency of the criminal prosecution. While it appreciated the sentiment behind these repeated statements, the Philippines still had not received an explanation about precisely what 
steps Thailand would take to ensure the WTO-consistency of the criminal prosecution. The 
Philippines requested Thailand to deliver expeditiousl y on its assurance, particularly in light of what 
the Philippines understood to be a meeting to wh ich the Thai public prosecutor had summoned the 
importer. That meeting was now scheduled for mid-September 2015. 
5.3.  Second, the Philippines was also deeply conc erned about a separate Thai BoA ruling rejecting 
transaction value for 210 entries from Indonesia that were covered by the DSB's rulings and recommendations in the original proceedings in this dispute. Thailand had submitted the BoA 
ruling as a declared measure taken to comply. However, as the Philippines had previously noted, 
the ruling was riddled with WTO-inconsistencie s, and set out a methodology that perpetuated 
Thailand's application of WTO-inconsistent conduct with respect to customs valuation of related 
party transactions. In addition, as it had been explained at previous DSB meetings, the position 
that Thai Customs had taken in pending domestic judicial proceedings concerning the BoA ruling was disturbing. Thai Customs had explicitly advised the Thai court that they did not need to follow 
the WTO ruling because it supposedly bound only the Philippines, as the party that had brought 
the dispute, and did not bind Thailand. The Philippine s reiterated its appeal to Thailand to rise to 
its role as a responsible and important WTO Member, and to prove that its commitment to full compliance was real. If this was not possible, the Philippines reserved its right to return to dispute 
settlement. WT/DSB/M/367 
 
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  5.4.  The representative of Thailand said th at his country noted the Philippines' continued 
concerns. Thailand, once again, wished to inform the DSB that it had taken all actions necessary to 
implement the DSB's recommendations and rulings. Thailand wished to refer to its previous statements made under this Agenda item.  
5.5.  The DSB took note of the statements. 
6  UNITED STATES – COUNTERVAILING AND ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES ON CERTAIN 
PRODUCTS FROM CHINA 
A.  Statement by the United States on im plementation of the recommendations adopted 
by the DSB 
6.1.  The Chairman said that this was on the Ag enda of the present meeting at the request of the 
United States. He invited the representative of the United States to speak. 
6.2.  The representative of the United States said that his country was pleased to inform the DSB 
that it had implemented the DSB's recommendations and rulings in the dispute: "United States – 
Countervailing and Anti-dumping Measures on Certain Products from China". The United States 
and China had agreed to a reasonable period of time of 12 months from the adoption by the DSB 
of its recommendations. The original reasonable period of time had expired on 22 July 2015. The 
United States and China had agreed to extend the reasonable period of time, so as to expire on 
5 August 2015. In light of the DSB's recommendations, the US Department of Commerce had 
investigated the existence of overlapping remedies in the 25 original investigations and administrative reviews covered by this dispute.  The Department of Commerce had issued new 
determinations with respect to these 25 proceedings pursuant to section 129 of the Uruguay 
Round Agreements Act. On 20 July 2015, and 4 August 2015, the US Trade Representative had 
directed the Department of Commerce to implement these determinations. Therefore, the United States had implemented the DSB's recommendations and rulings in this dispute prior to the 
expiry of the reasonable period of time. Desp ite US disagreement with the legal basis for the 
underlying finding that there was an obligation to investigate the existence of overlapping remedies, this implementation action by the Unit ed States strengthened the multilateral trading 
system, as all those Members speaking under Agenda item 1 would undoubtedly agree. 
6.3.  The representative of China said that his country thanked the United States for its statement 
made at the present meeting. China wished to express its concerns about the US implementation 
of the DSB's rulings and recommendations in this dispute. The United States claimed that it had 
completed the process under the US law for implementing the DSB's recommendations and 
rulings, and that the United States had now brought the measures at issue in this dispute into full compliance with the DSB's recommendations and ru lings. China, however, could not agree with 
the US claim. China was concerned about whether the United States had implemented the DSB's 
substantive rulings and recommendations in good faith. As could be seen from the final determinations, the USDOC's compliance proceedings yielded virtually no changes in the 
anti-dumping duty margins applied to the Chinese companies, which had evinced a systematic 
approach that the United States had undertaken to get around the implementation of the DSB's rulings and recommendations in this dispute. Chin a regretted to see that the United States had 
interpreted and applied those rulings and recommendations in a worrisome manner. The US 
implementation action set a bad example for other Members and would have a negative impact on 
the dispute settlement system. China recalled that  the sequencing agreement between China and 
the United States had been circulated to Members on 25 August 2015 in document WT/DS449/15. 
China was carefully evaluating the Department of Commerce's determinations and reserved its 
right to take any necessary actions to address its concerns about the US implementation in this dispute in due course. 
6.4.  The DSB took note of the statements. WT/DSB/M/367 
 
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  7  EUROPEAN UNION – ANTI-DUMPING ME ASURES ON BIODIESEL FROM INDONESIA 
A.  Request for the establishment of a pa nel by Indonesia (WT/DS480/2 and Corr.1) 
7.1.  The Chairman recalled that the DSB had considered this matter at its meeting on 
20 July 2015 and had agreed to revert to it. He drew attention to the communication from 
Indonesia contained in document WT/DS480/2 and Corr.1, and invited the representative of 
Indonesia to speak. 
7.2.  The representative of Indonesia said that at its meeting held on 20 July 2015, the DSB had 
considered, for the first time, Indonesia's request for the establishment of a panel in this dispute. 
However, as the establishment of the panel was deferred pursuant to the position taken by the EU, Indonesia had tabled its request for the establishment of a panel for the second time. Indonesia had noted the statement made by the EU at the DSB meeting on 20 July 2015. In that regard, 
Indonesia wished to make two brief points. First, while the detailed claims of Indonesia would be 
elaborated in the written submissions in the co urse of the Panel proceeding, the matter in the 
dispute "European Union - Anti-dumping Measures on Biodiesel from Argentina" (DS473) only 
partly overlapped with that in Indonesia's panel request. Second, as each dispute needed to be 
treated individually on its merits and based on the claims and legal arguments forwarded, 
Indonesia counted on the engagement of the panel in this dispute and considered that the panel's 
assessment of the methodological issues raised would contribute significantly towards the 
clarification and proper application of the discipl ines of the Anti-Dumping  Agreement. In that 
regard, Indonesia respectfully reiterated its request that the DSB establish a panel in order to examine the measures referred to in Indonesia's panel request. 
7.3.  The representative of the European Union said that the EU noted Indonesia's decision to 
request a WTO panel on the anti-dumping measures imposed by the EU on imports of biodiesel 
from Indonesia. The EU wished to also point out that the measures challenged by Indonesia were 
also subject to a dispute with Argentina (DS473) wh ere the Panel would issue its final report to the 
parties by the end of 2015. Like in the dispute with Argentina, the EU was convinced that the 
measures identified in the panel request were in  conformity with the WTO Agreements and the EU 
would defend them vigorously before a panel. 
7.4.  The DSB took note of the statements and agreed to establish a panel in accordance with the 
provisions of Article 6 of the DSU with standard terms of reference. 7.5.  The representatives of Argentina, Australia, Canada, China, India, Japan, Norway, the 
Russian Federation, Singapore, Turk ey and the United States reserved their third-party rights to 
participate in the Panel's proceedings. 
8  UNITED STATES – ANTI-DUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING MEASURES ON CERTAIN 
COATED PAPER FROM INDONESIA 
A.  Request for the establishment of  a panel by Indonesia (WT/DS491/3) 
8.1.  The Chairman drew attention to the communication from Indonesia contained in document 
WT/DS491/3, and invited the representative of Indonesia to speak. 8.2.  The representative of Indonesia said that, on 13 March 2015, her country had requested 
consultations with the United States regarding the US imposition of anti-dumping and 
countervailing duties on certain coated paper from Indonesia. As noted in Indonesia's request for 
consultations, the US dumping, subsidy and thre at of injury determinations appeared to be 
inconsistent with the US obligations under the GATT 1994, the Anti-Dumping Agreement, and the 
SCM Agreement. Indonesia and the United States had held consultations on 25 June 2015. 
Unfortunately, the consultations had not resolved this  dispute. Indonesia, therefore, requested, for 
the first time, that the DSB establish a panel to examine this dispute. As set out in Indonesia's request for the establishment of a panel, a number of procedural and substantive deficiencies 
existed in the coated paper investigation and the US dumping, subsidy, and threat of injury 
determinations which appeared to be inconsistent with its obligations under the GATT 1994, the Anti-Dumping Agreement, and the SCM Agreement. Indonesia also viewed a provision of US law 
relating to threat of injury determinations as inconsistent with its obligations under the WT/DSB/M/367 
 
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  GATT 1994, the Anti-Dumping Agreement, and the SCM Agreement. Indonesia requested that the 
DSB establish a panel to examine the matter set out in its panel request, with the standard terms of reference. 
8.3.  The representative of the United States said that his country was disappointed that Indonesia 
continued to seek the establishment of a panel on this matter. The United States maintained that 
the measures identified in Indonesia's new request for the establishment of a panel were fully WTO-consistent. Indonesia had even brought a claim under a US legal provisions that had no 
bearings on the investigations and orders mentioned in its new panel request. As noted previously, 
at a time when WTO dispute settlement resources were stretched thin, the United States did not think that a panel proceeding would be a productive use of those resources. The United States noted that Indonesia had submitted a new panel requ est and that this was the first occasion that 
the DSB was considering the request. For all these reasons, the United States was not in a position 
to agree to the establishment of a panel at the present meeting. 
8.4.  The DSB took note of the statements and agreed to revert to this matter. 
9  KOREA – IMPORT BANS, AND TESTING AND CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS FOR 
RADIONUCLIDES 
A.  Request for the establishment of a panel by Japan (WT/DS495/3) 
9.1.  The Chairman drew attention to the communication from Japan contained in document 
WT/DS495/3, and invited the representative of Japan to speak. 
9.2.  The representative of Japan said that his country had made this request for the 
establishment of a panel on 20 August 2015. As explained in the panel request, this case 
concerned two groups of Korean measures. First, following the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi 
nuclear power plant that had occurred after the Great East Japan Earthquake of 11 March 2011, Korea had adopted a series of measures in the form of: (i) import bans on certain foods from 
particular regions in Japan; and (ii) additional testing and additional certification requirements 
regarding the presence of other radionuclides in foods from Japan where trace amounts of cesium 134, 137 or iodine 131 were detected in them. Second, Korea had further failed to publish 
these SPS measures, had failed to adequately respond to Japan's requests under Articles 4 and 5.8 
of the SPS Agreement, and had provided very lim ited and insufficient responses to a series of 
questions posed by Japan to Korea's SPS enquiry po int. As explained in the panel request, Japan 
considered that Korea's import bans and additional testing and additional certification 
requirements were discriminatory against food pr oducts from Japan. Furthermore, they were 
disguised restrictions on international trade and more trade-restrictive than necessary. Japan considered that these measures were therefore inconsistent with several provisions of the 
SPS Agreement, in particular, its Articles 2.3, 5.5, 5.6 and 8, and Annex C. Japan also considered 
that Korea's omissions relating to its transpar ency obligations under the SPS Agreement were 
inconsistent with Articles 4, 5.8, 7 and Annex B of the SPS Agreement. 
9.3.  It was well recognized in the WTO Agreemen t that the protection of human life and health 
was a legitimate policy objective Members may pursue, and the ultimate responsibility of ensuring food safety was with the government of each Me mber. The first sentence of the preamble of the 
SPS Agreement affirmed that "no Member should be prevented from adopting or enforcing 
measures necessary to protect human, animal or plan t life or health". Similarly, Article 2.1 of the 
SPS Agreement recognized that "Members have the right to take sanitary and phytosanitary measures necessary for the protection of human, an imal or plant life or health". However, this 
right of WTO Members was not without bound and in  exercising this right, Members ensured that 
their "measures are not inconsistent with the provisions of [the SPS] Agreement". In Japan's view, Korea's SPS measures at issue were not consistent with the disciplines of the SPS Agreement. 
9.4.  On its part, Japan had been and was taking very seriously its responsibility to protect human 
life and health and to ensure food safety. Japan had been taking all necessary measures to this end. As it had explained in detail in its panel request, for months and years Japan had made intense efforts to address and satisfy Korea's concerns and had provided to Korea volumes of 
detailed data and information obtained from the monitoring and testing activities and their 
comprehensive evaluations. Despite these effort s, Korea had yet to offer any indication of WT/DSB/M/367 
 
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  appreciable or meaningful progress toward review and lifting of the measures in question. Under 
these circumstances, on 21 May 2015, Japan had requested consultations with Korea. Japan had 
held these consultations in good faith with Korea on 24 and 25 June 2015 with a view to reaching a mutually agreed solution. While the consultations provided useful opportunities for the parties to 
better understand their respective positions on this matter, the parties were unable to resolve 
their differences. Japan, therefore, requested, purs uant to Articles 6 of the DSU, that a panel be 
established to examine this matter, as set out in its panel request, with standard terms of 
reference in accordance with Article 7.1 of the DSU. 
9.5.  The representative of Korea said that his country regretted that Japan had chosen to request 
the establishment of a panel to examine this ma tter. It had only been four years since the 
Fukushima nuclear power plant accident of March 2011, and this catastrophic event continued to 
affect Korea. The accident had caused large amounts of radioactive material to be released into 
the atmosphere and marine environment, resulting in significant contamination of the ground and ocean. Radionuclides, which were atoms that emitted radiation, poured into the ocean from the 
fallout, runoff, leakage, and the release of water from the nuclear power plant. Unfortunately, such 
leakage continued even after the accident had occu rred. For example, in June 2013, officials from 
the nuclear power plant had publicly acknowledged that water contaminated with radioactive 
material was still seeping into the Pacific Ocean. There were similar reports of continuing leakage 
of contaminated water into the ocean as recently as February 2015. Thus, to date, significant questions remained with respect to the status of the Fukushima nuclear power plant and the ability of its operators to put an end to the contam ination of the marine environment. The SPS 
Agreement provided that Members had the right to take SPS measures necessary for the 
protection of human, animal or plant life or health. Korea had done so in response to the Fukushima nuclear accident. Korea had notified its emergency measures to the SPS Committee 
and was surprised by Japan's allegations of lack of  transparency when, in its panel request, Japan 
referred to no fewer than 45 publicly available documents. Moreover, Korea continued to base all of its SPS measures on sound science. Indeed, Japan appeared to agree with the science as it was 
not challenging this aspect of Korea's measures. Korea had also engaged constructively with Japan 
on this matter, and had diligently responded to Japan's requests for information in detail. In short, Korea had adopted and implemented its measures in a transparent and non-discriminatory manner, and in full compliance with its WTO obligations. Korea, therefore, was not in a position to 
agree to the establishment of a panel at the present meeting. 
9.6.  The DSB took note of the statements and agreed to revert to this matter. 
10  INDONESIA – SAFEGUARD ON CERTAIN IRON OR STEEL PRODUCTS 
A.  Request for the establishment of a pa nel by the Separate Customs Territory of 
Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu (WT/DS490/2) 
10.1.  The Chairman drew attention to the communi cation from the Separate Customs Territory of 
Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu (Chinese Ta ipei) contained in document WT/DS490/2. He 
invited the representative of that delegation to speak. 
10.2.  The representative of Chinese Taipei said that his delegation wished to request that the DSB 
to establish a panel to examine the safeguard meas ure imposed by Indonesia on imports of certain 
flat-rolled product of iron or non-alloy steel, the investigation and determinations leading thereto, 
and other aspects related to the notification requirements and consultations required under Article XIX:2 of the GATT 1994 and Article 12 of th e Agreement on Safeguards. In Chinese Taipei's 
view, these were not consistent with the WTO laws. Chinese Taipei and Indonesia had previously 
held consultations on 16 April 2015 with a view to reaching a mutually agreed solution. While these consultations had resulted in clarifications of certain aspects of the measures and the laws 
concerned, regrettably they had failed to produce a positive outcome. With respect to the specific 
duty imposed as a safeguard measure, there were no reasoned and adequate findings regarding the alleged unforeseen development and the effect  of GATT 1994 obligations. Other than that, no 
reasoned and adequate explanations of increased im ports, serious injury, threat of serious injury 
and the causation were provided either. Indonesia had also failed to provide a notification with 
sufficient information and an opportunity for consultations prior to the imposition of the safeguard measure. In those circumstances, and with the co ntinuation of the said measures, Chinese Taipei 
was left with no choice, but to request the establishment of a panel to examine this matter. WT/DSB/M/367 
 
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  10.3.  The representative of Indonesia said that Chinese Taipei and Indonesia had held 
consultations concerning this dispute on 16 April 2015 in Geneva. During these consultations, 
Indonesia had provided comprehensive responses to all technical questions raised by Chinese Taipei. Indonesia believed that it had de livered a clear explanation concerning the legal 
and factual aspects of the safeguard measure imposed by Indonesia on imports of certain iron and 
steel products in order to resolve any misunderstanding on the safeguard measure. Despite Indonesia's efforts during the consultations to clarify that the safeguard measure was consistent 
not only with the Safeguard Agreement but also with its domestic safeguard regulation, Indonesia 
was disappointed that Chinese Taipei was requesting the DSB to establish a panel to examine this dispute. As provided by the DSU, Indonesia was no t in a position to agree to the establishment of 
a panel at the present meeting. 
10.4.  The DSB took note of the statements and agreed to revert to this matter. 
11  UNITED STATES – MEASURES AFFECTING THE IMPORTATION OF ANIMALS, MEAT 
AND OTHER ANIMAL PRODUCTS FROM ARGENTINA 
A.  Report of the Panel (WT/DS447/R and Add.1) 
11.1.  The Chairman recalled that at its meeting on 28 January 2013, the DSB had established a 
Panel to examine the complaint by Argentina pertaini ng to this dispute. The Report of the Panel, 
contained in document WT/DS447/R and Add.1 had been circulated on 24 July 2015 as an 
unrestricted document. The Panel Report was before the DSB for adoption at the request of Argentina. This adoption procedure was without pr ejudice to the right of Members to express their 
views on the Panel Report. 
11.2.  The representative of Argentina said that his country was pleased to request the DSB to 
adopt the Panel Report in the DS447 dispute. Argentina thanked the members of the Panel and the 
Secretariat for their time and effort devoted to this dispute. This dispute concerned sanitary 
measures maintained by the United States for more than 11 years. The measures had been 
designed to prohibit imports of animals, meat and other products of animal origin from Patagonia since that region was not recognized as an FMD-free zone, and to prohibit imports of fresh meat 
(chilled or frozen) from the rest of the territory of Argentina. Argentina referred to the prohibitions 
set forth in Title 9 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 94.1(b) and in the 2001 Regulations, and to those contained in Part 94, respectively. The United States had also been responsible for undue delays in applying the approval procedures contained in Title 9 of the CFR, 
Part 92.2, in respect of Argentina's requests both for authorization of imports of fresh meat and for 
recognition of Patagonia as an FMD-free zone. The Panel had made it very clear that the US measures were inconsistent with Articles 1.1, 2.2, 2.3, 3.1, 3.3, 5.1, 5.6, 6.1 and 8 and with 
Annex C(1)(a) and (b) of the SPS Agreement. E ssentially, the Panel had found that the US 
sanitary measures challenged by Argentina were not based on the provisions of the World O r g a n i z a t i o n  f o r  A n i m a l  H e a l t h  ( O I E )  T e r r e s t r i a l  A n i m a l  H e a l t h  C o d e .  T h e y  h a d  n o  s c i e n t i f i c  
justification and had not been based on a risk assessment. They arbitrarily and unjustifiably 
discriminated between countries where identical or similar conditions prevailed; and that they were more restrictive than necessary to achieve the a ppropriate level of sanitary protection of the 
United States. Although Argentina had repeatedly expressed its concern to the United States, both 
at the bilateral and multilateral levels, the disp ute had not been resolved. Argentina, therefore, 
had decided to have recourse to the dispute settlement mechanism. The Panel's review, as had been reflected in its rulings and recommendat ions, conclusively and unequivocally upheld 
Argentina's complaints regarding the inconsistency of the US measures with the SPS Agreement. 
This was why Argentina welcomed the Panel Report and had asked that it be placed on the Agenda of the present meeting for adoption. Argentina also  valued the systemic contribution of the Panel 
Report regarding the application of sanitary me asures. Argentina hoped that the DSB would adopt 
the Panel's rulings and recommendations and hoped that the United States would comply promptly with the DSB's rulings and recommendations to ensu re that this dispute was settled efficiently. 
11.3.  The representative of the United States said that, since the time Argentina had requested 
the DSB to establish a panel, the view of the United States had been clear. The United States was 
moving forward with its evaluation of Argentina's requests for access for beef imports, and action on those requests would address Argentina's concer ns about the length of the regulatory process. 
In fact, those evaluations did move forward, and the United States Department of Agriculture was 
able to propose and complete regulatory actions several months ago. These US administrative WT/DSB/M/367 
 
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  actions, taken following the rigorous, science-based review that the United States applied to any 
application, now permitted the import of Argentine beef under conditions that met the high level of protection of the United States, in particular to ensure that foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) would not be introduced into the United States through beef imported from Argentina. Based on these 
actions, taken well in advance of the Panel Report, the United States considered that it had 
addressed the matters raised in this dispute. The United States would like to emphasize that neither the disease at issue nor the review process were trivial. The US cattle herd consisted of 
nearly 90 million head of cattle, with a value of  some US$60 billion. The United States had been 
free of FMD since 1929. In light of the complex natu re of FMD, and the fact that it was highly 
contagious and had serious biological and economic impact, the United States had conducted a thorough and scientifically rigorous review of the sanitary situation in Argentina's two designated 
regions, Patagonia and Northern Argentina. The United States Department of Agriculture had 
conducted several intensive field visits and had collected significant amounts of veterinary and 
other data. Throughout this regulatory proce ss, which had overlapped with the dispute, the 
United States had openly communicated with Argentina. Argentina had agreed to permit US 
experts to conduct a veterinary site visit after the first written submissions had been submitted in this dispute. Before the first panel meeting, in relation to Argentina's request on beef from 
Patagonia, the United States had issued an up dated 87-page risk analysis and had proposed 
administrative action that would find the Patago nia region to be free of FMD. Following public 
comments, the United States had taken final action more than one year ago, in August 2014, with the result that beef from Patagonia was no longer restricted on account of FMD. Before the second 
panel meeting, in relation to Argentina's request on beef from Northern Argentina, the 
United States had also issued, in August 2014, an updated 103-page risk analysis and had proposed administrative action that would permit fresh beef from Northern Argentina to enter into 
the United States with certain risk mitigations. Following public comments, the United States had 
taken final action in July 2015, co nsistent with its risk analysis and proposal that beef from 
Northern Argentina may, with scientifically justified conditions, be safely imported into the 
United States. Both of these administrative acti ons, then, had been proposed one to two years 
ago, and had become final from 1 to 12 months ag o, before the issuance of the Panel's Report in 
this dispute. In that regard, the United States continued to consider that this dispute was not necessary, or the most efficient use of resources. The Panel Report made no findings that were 
inconsistent with the actions now taken by the United States on Argentina's applications – to the 
contrary, the Panel's findings supported them. 
11.4.  First, the Panel Report recognized that the initial action taken by the United States to 
prohibit the importation of fresh beef after Argentina suffered severe outbreaks of FMD had been 
appropriate and fully consistent with science. The Panel Report had stated that "the undisputed science supports the conclusion in the June 2001 Interim Rule that Argentine products posed a 
significant risk for introduction of FMD into the United States"
3 Second, the Panel Report also 
recognized that FMD was a substantial and harmful animal disease. The Panel Report had referred to the statement by the World Organization of Animal Health, the international standard-setting body in this area, that FMD "is a high impact disease, a trans-boundary animal disease, highly 
contagious and has serious impact".
4 Third, the Panel Report recognized that the United States 
maintained a level of sanitary protection with respect to FMD that was "higher than that achieved" by the World Organization of Animal Health's standard, the Terrestrial Code.
5 Fourth, the Panel 
had made certain findings on the basis that the United States had previously evaluated the 
scientific evidence and had applied conditions for the importation of beef from certain other regions that purportedly had the same FMD-status as Argentina. Now that the United States had 
completed its evaluation of the scientific evid ence concerning imports from Argentina, US 
authorities had, as explained, determined that in fact those same conditions that the Panel had noted the United States had already applied successfully in other cases could also ensure that beef from Argentina did not transmit FMD and met the US level of protection. Although the 
United States was disappointed that this dispute had moved forward, despite the fact that the 
United States had continued to work diligently and had applied consistently its high standards of scientific review to determine Argentina's FMD disease status, the United States also considered 
that the Panel Report, coming many months after the United States had taken action to approve 
Argentina's applications, was no longer especially relevant. The United States was also cognizant 
                                               
3 Panel Report "United States – Me asures Affecting the Importation of  Animals, Meat and Other Animal 
Products from Argentina", at paragraph 7.334. 
4 Idem, at paragraph 7.331. 
5 Idem, at paragraph 7.387. WT/DSB/M/367 
 
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  of the need for Members to consider the ma ny demands on the dispute settlement system. 
Therefore, the United States had decided not to appeal the Panel Report. The adoption of the Panel Report provided a renewed opportunity for Argentin a and the United States to work together, and 
in fact the parties to the dispute were collaborating on separate technical matters. The 
United States looked forward to working constructively, and was available to confer further with 
Argentina in relation to the actions taken by the United States on its beef approval applications. 
11.5.  The representative of Argentina said that his country noted the US statement to the effect 
that the measures to comply with the DSB's recommendations and rulings had been adopted. 
Regarding the importation of fresh meat (chilled or  frozen) from the territory of Argentina situated 
in northern Patagonia, Argentina acknowledged the efforts made by the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) to publish the final rule authorizing, under certain conditions, the importation 
of fresh meat (chilled or frozen) from that region  (9CFR 94.29), which would enter into force at the 
beginning of September. However, Argentina was concerned about the draft House
6 and Senate7 
legislation currently in Congress, entitled: "Bill Making Appropriations for Agriculture, Rural 
Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies programs for the fiscal year 
ending 30 September 2016, and for other purposes", which had already been approved by the Appropriations Committees of both chambers. Section 749 of House Bill 3049 and Section 743 of 
Senate Bill 1800 were intended to restrict the av ailability of funds to "implement, administer, or 
enforce" the final rule authorizing the importation of Argentine fresh meat from the region of northern Patagonia. They imposed a series of ne w requirements that blocked the implementation 
of the final rule, thereby maintaining the same effects on trade as the measures that had been 
recognized by the final Panel Report, which was before the DSB at the present meeting for 
adoption, as being inconsistent with the provisions of the SPS Agreement. Argentina's concern was evidenced in a communication from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), which was 
within the Executive Office of the US Presiden t to the Chair of the Senate Appropriations 
Committee, which stated that: "the Administration opposes the bill's provisions blocking implementation of two final rules for the importat ion of beef from Brazil and Argentina published 
on 2 July 2015, that acknowledge the efforts of trading partners and our own efforts to provide for 
safe and mutually-beneficial trade. These rules were based on objective analyses of risk and  the 
identification of appropriate mitigation measures and reflected diligent work including site visits and economic analysis finding that the rules would have a net benefit to the US economy. 
Completing the requirements listed in the bill before these rules can be effective would, at a 
minimum, delay the implementation of the rules, potentially by years".
8 Argentina concluded that, 
if any of the provisions in the mentioned bills were to be adopted, it would not be possible to 
implement the DSB's rulings and recommendations, with the result that the obligations of the 
United States under the DSU would be violated . Consequently, Argentina could not accept the 
statement by the United States that it had complied with the DSB's rulings and recommendations. 
Argentina would continue to examine the US measures currently being adopted and would 
consider the best way to address its concerns. 
11.6.  The representative of the United States said that in relation to certain proposals in the 
Congress, to which Argentina had referred, the United States wished to clarify that these were 
proposals only and had not been enacted. As such, these proposals did not have any effect on the 
administrative action that USDA had taken. 
11.7.  The DSB took note of the statements and adopted the Panel Report contained in 
WT/DS447/R and Add.1. 12  CHINA – COUNTERVAILING AND ANTI-DUMPING DUTIES ON GRAIN ORIENTED FLAT-
ROLLED ELECTRICAL STEEL FROM THE UNITED STATES: RECOURSE TO ARTICLE 21.5 OF 
THE DSU BY THE UNITED STATES 
A.  Report of the Panel (WT/DS414/RW and Add.1) 12.1.  The Chairman recalled that at its meeting on 26 February 2014, the DSB had agreed, 
pursuant to Article 21.5 of the DSU, to refer to the original Panel the matter raised by the 
                                               
6 Available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/3049/text  
7 Available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-bill/1800/text  
8 Letter from the Director of the Office of Manageme nt and Budget to the Chair of the Senate Committee 
on Appropriations, page 3. Available at http://www.whitehouse.gov /omb/legislative_letters  WT/DSB/M/367 
 
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  United States concerning the implementation by China of the recommendations and rulings of the 
D S B  p e r t a i n i n g  t o  t h i s  d i s p u t e .  H e  a l s o  r e c a l l e d  t h a t  t h e  R e p o r t  o f  t h e  P a n e l ,  c o n t a i n e d  i n  document WT/DS414/RW and Add.1 had been circulated on 31 July 2015 as an unrestricted document. The Panel Report was before the DSB for adoption at the request of the United States. 
This adoption was without prejudice to the right of Members to express their views on the Panel 
Report. 
12.2.  The representative of the United States said that his country was pleased to request the 
DSB to adopt the Report of the compliance Panel in  this dispute. The Report was important and of 
a high quality, and the United States thanked the compliance panelists, and the WTO Secretariat assisting them, for their work in producing the Report. Grain-oriented flat-rolled electrical steel (GOES) was a high-tech, high-value magnetic specialty steel. Prior to China's imposition of 
anti-dumping and countervailing duties, US steel producers had been able to export over 
US$250 million of this specialty product to Chinese purchasers. The countervailing duties and anti-dumping duties that China had imposed on US exports of GOES had unfairly restricted US 
exports to this increasingly important market. In  fact, since China had imposed duties, US exports 
of GOES to China had fallen to virtually nothing. The DSB would recall that the United States had challenged China's duties, and the DSB had adop ted recommendations that China should bring 
those duties into conformity with WTO rules. China had chosen to continue those duties and simply 
provide further elaboration to, allegedly, suppo rt them. But there had been no change in 
substance. The compliance Panel had found that China had failed to address the findings of the original Panel and the Appellate Body in this disp ute. China had repeated many of the same errors 
identified in the original proceedings, rather than come to grips with the recommendations and 
rulings of the DSB. In particular, the United States wished to draw attention to two points. First, the compliance Panel had found that China's price effects analysis in its injury re-determination 
was fundamentally flawed. The compliance Panel Repo rt underscored that China's analysis of price 
effects was not based on positive evidence and did not involve an objective examination. The Report found that China's determination that imports caused injury to the domestic industry was 
not supported by facts and evidence on the administrative record. The Report also found that 
China did not disclose the essential facts supporting this analysis. Second, the United States also noted that other Members were pursuing simila r claims involving other AD and CVD measures 
adopted by China. The United States continued to  hope that China would respond to these series 
of disputes by making the systemic changes nece ssary to begin operating its AD and CVD regimes 
in accordance with WTO rules. The United States noted that China had announced, in the penultimate stages of this proceeding, that it would terminate the anti-dumping and countervailing 
duties on GOES from the United States. The United States obviously welcomed that action by 
China. Nonetheless, the United States regretted that this action had only been taken following original Panel and appellate proceedings and towards the very end of a compliance Panel 
proceeding when the conclusion of  all of these WTO reports was that China never had a legal basis 
to impose those duties on US exports. In sum, the United States was pleased to propose that the 
DSB adopt this important Report. As noted, the United States hoped that China would begin to address these systemic deficiencies so as to ensure that all of its AD and CVD investigations 
comported with its WTO obligations. 
12.3.  The representative of China said that his country welcomed the compliance Panel's decision 
in terms of the adverse impact on domestic industry and disclosure of essential facts of domestic 
industry conditions. China, however, maintained a reservation on the compliance Panel's decision 
on price effect, causality and disclosure of essential facts. China regretted that the compliance Panel had found that China's compliance measure was not in conformity with its obligations under 
the Anti-Dumping and SCM Agreements. China, th erefore informed the DSB that the AD and CVD 
measures on imports of GOES originating from the United States had already been terminated upon their expiration on 10 April 2015. In that re gard, there was no need for China to take any 
further action to implement the DSB's recommendations and rulings. 
12.4.  The DSB took note of the statements and adopted the Panel Report contained in 
WT/DS414/RW and Add.1. WT/DSB/M/367 
 
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  13  DELAYS IN THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCESS 
A.  Statement by Korea 13.1.  The Chairman said that this matter was on the Agenda of the present meeting at the 
request of Korea and invited the representative of Korea to speak. 
13.2.  The representative of Korea said that his country wished to express its concerns about the 
growing delays in the WTO dispute settlement process. As Members were aware, on 
25 March 2015, the DSB had established a panel in the dispute: "United States – Anti-Dumping 
Measures on Certain Oil Country Tubular Goods from Korea" (DS488). The Panel had subsequently 
been composed and, in accordance with the DSU, the adjudication process should have proceeded without delay. Instead, the Secretariat had informed Korea that the Panel would not begin its work until the end of 2016, at the earliest, a date some 15 months from the time that Korea had been 
notified of the delay. This remarkable and extr aordinary delay was not because the panelists were 
unavailable. Rather, Korea had been informed that it was due to the constraints affecting the Secretariat. Korea understood the challenges posed to the Secretariat by the current caseload. 
However, a delay of that magnitude between the panel composition and the initiation of panel 
proceedings was simply unreasonable, in light of both the DSU provisions and the economic reality. In fact, it undermined the very purpose of the dispute settlement system. The drafters of 
the DSU had recognized that the effectiveness and legitimacy of the new dispute settlement 
system depended on its ability to provide for the prompt settlement of disp utes. This principle was 
expressly reflected in Article 3.3 of the DSU and embedded throughout the DSU in the form of strict deadlines for each stage of the process and mechanisms that ensured that the process could 
not be blocked by one of the parties to the disput e. Article 12.9 of the DSU provided that "[i]n no 
case should the period from the establishment of the panel to the circulation of the report to the 
Members exceed nine months". In spite of this  unambiguous language, Korea had been asked to 
wait 15 months just for the case to get started. To put it into perspective, this delay was almost 
twice as long as the period foreseen in Articl e 12.9 of the DSU between the establishment of a 
panel and the circulation of its report. Korea was aware that in some instances the deadlines laid 
out in the DSU provisions could be surpassed by practical realities. However, the delay proposed in 
the DS488 dispute was so excessive and so far removed from the deadlines set forth by the drafters that it was impossible to reconcile with the principle of prompt settlement of disputes that 
was at the core of the DSU. Unless the problem was urgently addressed, the dispute settlement 
mechanism risked becoming "toothless", as a delay of  this kind was effectively a denial of remedy. 
Moreover, Korea was concerned that Members were getting used to the idea of slipping deadlines, even as they were becoming longer and longer. A delay of, for example, six months no longer 
raised alarm. Timelines, regardless of how unequivocally they were stipulated in the DSU, were 
becoming easier to brush aside with each passing dispute. 
13.3.  However, WTO disputes were not about abstract disagreements. Real world economic 
interests underlay every single dispute. There were  people who suffered real losses while a dispute 
was pending. The DS488 dispute illustrated this  vividly. The dispute involved anti-dumping 
measures applied by the United States against imports of certain Korean steel products. As a result of these punitive measures, the affected  Korean companies were sustaining losses of 
US$10 million a month. A delay of fifteen months  meant losses of US$150 million. These were just 
the losses from the delay in getting the panel pr oceedings operational. By the time the panel 
report was actually received, the damage would likely be double that figure. These companies 
could very well have gone out of business by then  and thousands of people could have lost their 
jobs. At that point, any ruling, however favo urable, would have become an afterthought. 
13.4.  The problem would only get worse if left unaddressed. Long delays created perverse 
incentives by lowering the cost of adopting and maintaining WTO-inconsistent measures. Interest 
groups seeking protection would pressure Member s to adopt those measures, insisting, rightly, 
that they would not be subject to review by th e WTO for years. Members could therefore expect 
more protectionist measures and more, not less, disputes being brought to the WTO. These, in 
turn, would cause further delays, prompting a vicious, never-ending cycle. It was in the interest of 
everyone, the parties, the wider Membership and the Secretariat, not to let this happen. Korea 
fully appreciated the efforts being made by the Se cretariat to improve the system under significant 
resource constraints. Notably, in September 2014, the Director-General had provided a helpful 
assessment of the current situation and ways to address the challenges. Korea was ready to engage with the Secretariat and other Members to address such challenges. One possible path WT/DSB/M/367 
 
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  forward would be to boldly redistribute and more effectively utilize existing resources of the WTO 
system as a whole. In that regard, Korea would welcome constructive ideas from the Secretariat. In order to discuss prescriptions, however, there was a need for an accurate diagnosis. Thus, it was critical that the Secretariat provide more information to Members on the specific constraints 
that it was facing. The information, updated regularly, should include hard numbers on staff 
members available to assist panels, and the allocation of staff among the various dispute settlement divisions of the Secretariat in relation to each division's evolving workload. Additionally, 
the Secretariat needed to provide case-specific information to the parties that could help them 
better understand how the Secretariat's across-the-board workload problems affected their disputes. This information needed to be deta iled and tailored enough so that parties could 
appreciate in non-conceptual terms why, for instance, the Secretariat could not commit its staff to 
a case before a certain date. Information on the assignment of staff to each panel and each 
panel's place in the queue would also be appreciated. Korea had previously asked the Secretariat for such information, but the Secretariat, unfortunately, had been less than forthcoming. 
13.5.  In Korea's view, the general, one-size-fits-all letters that the Secretariat currently sent out 
under circumstances of delay were neither sufficient ly detailed nor specific to the case at hand. 
Something more individualized would be required to help parties understand where they stood. 
Korea believed that this case-specific information, as well as the more general assessments that 
Korea hoped the Secretariat would continue to provide Members, would allow the dispute settlement community to better focus on the problem and formulate necessary responses. Korea wished to make it clear that seeking such information was distinct from attempting to intrude on 
the Secretariat's internal management. Far from it, Korea respected the Secretariat's decisions 
regarding management. Nor was Korea suggesting that the Secretariat should work harder than it already did. The standout professionalism and dedication of the entire WTO staff were deeply 
appreciated and had never been in question. Korea respectfully requested the Secretariat to 
provide, preferably by the next DSB meeting or  at the earliest possible date the following: 
(i) specific information regarding the state of the dispute settlement workload; and (ii) an 
explanation of how that general information translat ed into the "end of 20 16" timeline that Korea 
had been notified of in the DS488 dispute. Kore a hoped that this information would serve as a 
platform for further constructive efforts. 
13.6.  The representative of the United States said that Korea had raised an important systemic 
issue at the present meeting. Unfortunately, Korea had also raised a bilateral dispute in this 
context and the United States said it would like to make it clear that the United States did not agree with Korea's statement about harm to its companies since the United States considered that 
US duties had been imposed consistently with WT O rules. That said, for some time the dispute 
settlement system had been facing significant dela ys, first at the appellate stage, and now at the 
panel stage. This raised some significant concerns, particularly in light of the fact that the WTO 
dispute settlement system had, for many year s, operated with admirable efficiency. The 
United States shared the view that Members needed a better understanding of the causes behind delays so that they could develop and consider appropriate solutions. The United States looked 
forward to further discussion and analysis of this issue. 
13.7.  The representative of Guatemala said that his country thanked Korea for placing this item 
on the Agenda of the present meeting. Growing delays in the WTO dispute settlement process was 
an issue of extreme importance that concerned all Members. Guatemala shared Korea's concerns 
in this regard. A delay of almost 15 months to begin a panel's work due to the constraints faced by 
the WTO Secretariat was alarming. It was extremely difficult to reconcile this situation with the very purpose of the WTO dispute settlement system . As Korea rightly pointed out, Article 12.9 of 
the DSU provided that "[i]n no case should the period from the establishment of the panel to the 
circulation of the report to the Members exceed nine months". Members were aware and had accepted that in some instances the DSU deadlines could be surpassed by practical realities including, but not limited to, resource constraints. However, this could not change the meaning of 
Article 12.9 of the DSU, far from it. Guatemala believed that the success of the dispute settlement 
mechanism rested on three key aspects, one of wh ich was the ability to settle disputes promptly. 
The other two were the quality of the panel and the Appellate Body reports, and the stability and 
predictability of its rules and procedures. The WTO dispute settlement system was recognized for 
these features as well as for the professionalis m and hard work of panelists, Appellate Body 
members and the WTO staff servicing panels and appeals. The WTO dispute settlement system 
was one of the most effective and prompt internat ional systems of adjudication. Victim of its own 
success, the system faced the risk of becoming slow er. If no effective action were taken to address WT/DSB/M/367 
 
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  this unfortunate situation, the principle of "promp t settlement of disputes" in Article 3.3 of the DSU 
would become a mere "best endeavour" provisio n, not more than an illusionary aspiration. 
Guatemala also agreed with Korea that long delays in the dispute settlement mechanism may create perverse incentives for adopting politically motivated WTO-inconsistent measures. Since the 
current system did not provide for interim relief or retroactive measures, like full reparation, the 
lack of prompt justice would mean that WTO-inconsistent measures could be maintained longer without any consequences. This would be the equivalent of obtaining "unilateral waivers" or 
adopting "safeguard measures" without obligat ion to provide compensation. If WTO Members 
allowed this situation, the result would be an even more significant increase in the caseload. This would, in turn, only contribute to the collapse of the system. Guatemala believed that this problem 
deserved urgent and dedicated attention. More impo rtantly, it needed effective action by Members. 
Guatemala wished to make it clear that this was not the Secretariat's problem, nor a problem that 
only the Secretariat could or had to resolve. This situation required collective understanding and effort from the dispute settlement community, Members, practitioners, Secretariat, academics, 
etc. For these reasons, Guatemala agreed with Korea that the Secretariat should provide Members 
with more details on its current resources and the specific constraints it was facing. More importantly, the Secretariat should provide its own assessment on its specific needs to address 
those constraints. Equally critical was for Members to start taking action in the framework of the 
DSB. While Members continued their discussions of the never-ending DSU review to address issues 
that they had identified more than 17 years ag o, the dispute settlement system urgently needed 
action that could not wait another 20 years. Members had to act fast. In conclusion, Guatemala 
was ready to participate constructively and proact ively in any effort that may be undertaken to 
address this issue. 
13.8.  The representative of Chile said that her country shared the view that it was essential for 
the WTO to have a system that was instrumental in defusing and settling trade disputes brought 
by Members. Chile was concerned about these long delays, which were unprecedented in the history of the system. Chile believed that it was important to improve transparency and to deal 
with the problems that could give rise to a sign ificant build-up of cases. Therefore, measures 
should be taken to ensure efficiency at each stage of dispute settlement proceedings. It was 
important that the dispute settlement system oper ated expeditiously so that trade barriers were 
removed promptly. 
13.9.  The representative of China said that his country recognized that the Secretariat was 
currently facing a heavy workload and that the disputes involved more and more complex factual 
and legal issues. At the same time, China shared the serious concerns raised by Korea. In several 
recent disputes, the panel proceedings were signif icantly delayed due to resource restraints. China 
had been told that such delays were expected to continue indefinitely. China believed that if there were no prompt solution, this unprecedented situ ation would seriously undermine the effectiveness 
and credibility of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. To remedy the problem, China wished 
to urge the Director-General to take all appropriate steps as soon as possible to address the serious delays and, at the same time, to maintain the high quality of the Secretariat's work. To solve the problem, China was open to discuss any proposals with other Members. China supported 
the Secretariat's efforts to allocate more resources to the area of dispute settlement and to recruit 
more dispute settlement lawyers. 
13.10.  The representative of Australia said that his country recognized the significant resource 
constraint currently placed on the Secretariat, as a result of the growing number of disputes, and 
the increasing complexity of those disputes. The consequent delays at both the panel and Appellate Body stage, while understandable, were problematic for the system and, in Australia's 
view, needed to be addressed. This issue should be of concern for the entire WTO Membership, not 
only for those affected by the current delays. The dispute settlement system was the cornerstone of the multilateral trading system and was a widely respected and effective international legal system. It was essential for the WTO that its effectiveness and efficiency be maintained. Australia 
was, therefore, willing to work with other Members and the Secretariat to consider any option that 
might help alleviate the current situation and improve the system over the long-term. This 
included ensuring that the Secretariat had the resources needed to service disputes in a timely 
manner, and also exploring ways for the Membership  to reduce the burden on the system in terms 
of the length and complexity of disputes. This may need to involve re-allocation of resources within the Secretariat. Australia would also be prepared to consider proposals from the Secretariat or 
Members for streamlining dispute settlement processes, whilst fully respecting the requirements of 
the DSU and maintaining the high-quality of reports. Australia also considered it important to, WT/DSB/M/367 
 
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  once again, thank the WTO Secretariat staff from the Rules Division, the Legal Affairs Division and 
the Appellate Body Secretariat for their hard wo rk and dedication. The dispute settlement system 
could not function without them and their efforts were greatly appreciated. 
13.11.  The representative of the Russian Federation said that her country thanked Korea for 
raising this important systemic issue at the pres ent meeting. The delays in the dispute settlement 
process seriously jeopardized the multilateral trading system. They undermined the effective functioning of the WTO and weakened a proper balance between the rights and obligations of 
Members. The dispute settlement mechanism was correctly labelled "the jewel in the crown" of the 
WTO. Yet, as Members were aware, even the most  precious and beautiful jewels needed to be 
polished from time to time. The WTO was a Member-driven organization, and the fate of the dispute settlement system was in Members' hands.  As an active user of the dispute settlement 
mechanism, both as a complainant and a respondent, Russia stood ready to actively participate in 
multilateral efforts to address this issue. 
13.12.  The representative of Mexico noted that his country had expressed its views on the issue 
of delays at the September 2014 DSB meeting9. Mexico had two concerns with regard to the issue 
of delays. First, Mexico had a direct interest in two recent disputes that had been initiated at the end of 2008 in which Mexico was a complainant (DS381 and DS386). These disputes had not yet 
been concluded and this had implications for the respective national industries. Second, Mexico 
had a systemic interest in this matter since longer periods to settle a dispute increased both the disincentive to file complaints and the incentive to adopt protectionist measures. While a Member may suspend concessions in the case of non-compliance, this would not eliminate the impact of 
such non-compliance. Delays only added to already long periods for protectionist measures to 
remain in place. Members should ask themselves whether they, and indeed the Secretariat, had been adhering to the principles of the "prompt settlement" of disputes and "prompt compliance", 
as provided in Articles 3.3 and 21.1 of the DSU.  As Mexico had stated at the September 2014 
DSB meeting, it would be a shame if one of the be st-functioning pillars of the WTO – "the jewel in 
the crown" – became a source of criticism because of its increasingly tarnished performance. This 
criticism had been expressed by the private sector, which was affected by proceedings of 
uncertain, but certainly longer, duration. Mexico regretted that almost a year had lapsed since the DSB meeting when the issue of delays had been considered. Yet, these delays continued with no information as how to remedy the situation. Finally, Mexico reiterated its commitment to finding a 
solution to the issue of delays. 
13.13.  The representative of Pakistan said that hi s country welcomed Korea's initiative to bring to 
the attention of Members one of the most pressing issues, namely, delays in solving trade disputes 
under the dispute settlement mechanism. Pakistan attached great significance and firmly believed 
that the dispute settlement system was the bedrock of the entire multilateral trading system and 
the most crucial pillar of the WTO. The functi oning of the dispute settlement system had been 
excellent since the birth of the WTO and, to date, had delivered quite efficiently and effectively 
towards the settlement of trade disputes among Members. Certainly, the dispute settlement system ranked much higher in performance when compared with other international systems. While Pakistan acknowledged the significant role of the dispute settlement system leading to the 
ever increasing growth in global trade over the last 50 years, at the same time, it shared the 
issues and concerns raised by Korea, which deserved positive consideration by all Members and the Secretariat. What was needed was a proposal  that would bring greater transparency and 
efficiency in the dispute settlement mechanism, in line with the relevant DSU provisions that 
stipulated a well laid out procedure based on specific timelines for each and every stage.  On the 
other hand, Pakistan did recognize the resource constraints that the Secretariat was faced with. 
Pakistan, however, urged Members to engage construc tively with a view to addressing the critical 
challenges that hampered the smooth functioning of the dispute settlement mechanism, not only 
from a systemic viewpoint but also for the timely resolution of Members' disputes. On its part, Pakistan was ready to undertake constructive engagement with Members and the Secretariat to 
find an efficient way forward. 
13.14.  The representative of Japan said that his country shared the concerns expressed by some 
Members regarding backlogs and substantial delays in many dispute settlement proceedings, 
including months of delay in commencing proceedings after composition of panels. Article 3.3 of 
the DSU provided that "[t]he prompt settlement of [WTO disputes] is essential to the effective 
                                               
9 WT/DSB/M/350, paragraphs 1.8 to 1.11 WT/DSB/M/367 
 
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  functioning of the WTO and the maintenance of  a proper balance between the rights and 
obligations of Members". This principle of "prompt settlement" was specifically expressed in various DSU provisions including those which imposed strict time-limits on the parties, as well as Article 12.2 of the DSU which provided that "[p]anel  procedures should provide sufficient flexibility 
so as to ensure high-quality panel reports, while not unduly delaying the panel process". The 
growing trend of substantive delays in the disp ute settlement process was particularly alarming 
because it may potentially undermine "the effective functioning" of the WTO dispute settlement 
system, which had proven to work so successfully. It was well recognized that a mounting number 
of disputes and their increasing complexity had certainly placed an enormous strain on the ability of WTO adjudicators and the Secretariat supporting them to strictly follow the principle of "prompt settlement" of WTO disputes and observe time-limits imposed by the DSU. The substantial delay in 
the dispute settlement process was also due, in part , to resource constraints. Japan noted that this 
was a difficult issue, which should be addressed by Members urgently. Japan, on its part, had been working with other Members through informal discussions related to this issue and cooperating 
with WTO adjudicators in their efforts to meet the deadlines in disputes involving Japan. That said, 
as the Appellate Body Report in the "Thailand-Cigarettes" dispute had observed, WTO Members had "legitimate" interests, "such as an adjudicative process in which it can seek redress in a timely 
manner" and "[t]hese interests find reflection in the provisions of the DSU" such as Articles 3.3 
and 12.2 in which the principle of "prompt settlement" was enshrined.
10 By virtue of these 
legitimate interests of Members, and as a matte r of transparency and due process as well, the 
current practice of extending the time period se t out in the DSU regularl y without even providing 
sufficient explanation to the parties caused serious concerns. 
13.15.  Japan considered that in a case where WTO adjudicators found that scheduling beyond 
prescribed deadlines was necessary, consultations should be held to ensure that all parties to the 
dispute had an opportunity to express their views an d to be fully informed of the reasons for such 
delays. Japan attached the utmost importance to the effective functioning of the dispute settlement system and believed that the value and the credibility of the system should not be 
undermined. Japan continued to work with other Members to find ways to cope with the challenges 
which the WTO was currently facing. 
13.16.  The representative of Brazil said that th e issue raised by Korea at the present meeting was 
of interest to all Members and not only to active participants in the dispute settlement system. 
Brazil shared many of the general concerns expressed by Korea and considered that more 
transparency in the administration of the pa nel proceedings and an open dialogue between 
Members and the Secretariat could only contribute to a more efficient mechanism. In particular, 
Members would only be able to search for, and of fer, practical solutions to the current workload 
problem at the panel level if they had accurate and sufficient information about the ongoing difficulties in handling the disputes. It would be natural to expect that longer delays would require 
more specific information to be provided by the Secretariat. Both the parties to a dispute and the 
Secretariat had a stake in keeping the system as e fficient as in the past. If the system started to 
show signs of strain, more collaboration, reflection and action would be needed. Brazil believed that the dialogue that already existed between Members and the Secretariat could be improved 
and should strike an appropriate balance regarding: (i) the legitimate expectations of parties to a 
dispute under the DSU; (ii) the information provided by the Secretariat about time-tables and reasons for delays; and (iii) a realistic and thorough appraisal of the available resources available 
in the Secretariat. In search for this balance, preserving mutual trust was paramount. Therefore, 
while the Secretariat was responsible for explaining the delays, it was also important that Members' justified concerns did not result in micromanagement or undue interference in the 
administration of disputes, so as not to affect the ability of the dispute settlement mechanism to 
provide for the prompt settlement of disputes in an independent and impartial manner. 
13.17.  The representative of Canada said that his country thanked Korea for placing this item on 
the Agenda of the present meeting and bringing it to the attention of the DSB. Canada had 
received similar information from the Secretariat in two new disputes in which it was involved. 
Canada, therefore, shared many of the concerns ra ised by Korea, including the concern that these 
delays, if left unchecked, risked undermining the credibility of the WTO dispute settlement system. 
But these delays should not just concern Members that currently had disputes underway or 
pending. These delays should concern all Members, which seemed to be the case given the interest expressed in this item at the present meeting. This was not a new issue. In fact, during 
                                               
10 Appellate Body Report, "Thailand – Cigarettes" (Philippines), paragraph 150. WT/DSB/M/367 
 
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  his tenure as the DSB Chair in 2013, the interim Chairman of the present meeting, 
Amb. Jonathan Fried (Canada), had conducted a series of consultations with Members to identify possible solutions to what at that time was already a worrying trend of increasing delays. These consultations had revealed that the causes of the increasingly burdened dispute settlement system 
were multi-faceted, and had suggested, therefore,  that multi-faceted solutions would be required. 
Some initial steps were taken, in particular related to the reallocation of Secretariat resources to dispute settlement activities. But as the Director-General himself had acknowledged when he had 
presented his progress to the DSB in September 2 014, the issues could not be resolved only by 
increasing resources to the Secretariat and adjudicators. The Director-General himself had called upon Members to act to identify a range of solutions, including action on limiting inputs and outputs and demand for, and supply of, disput e settlement outcomes. While the issue was not 
new, what was perhaps new at th e present time was just how long these delays had become, and 
how little the resource allocation steps taken in the previous year seemed yet to have accomplished much in terms of avoiding further delays. Canada understood though that the 
resource constraints could not be fixed overnight and that it would take some time for the new 
resources to be fully functional such that delays could be reduced. The good news was that because Members had been considering the issues of workload and delays for several years now, a 
lot of ideas had already been developed to address them. The membership, which was ultimately 
and collectively responsible for ensuring the capacity of the system, had not failed in coming up with ideas. The Membership had, however, faile d in its efforts to agree and implement any of 
them. For example, Korea had at the present m eeting requested to receive more information 
about the status of all disputes to allow parties and Members more generally to evaluate better the 
demand on the system. These ideas for more information sharing, among others, had in fact been extensively discussed in a small group of frequent users, who had come close to putting together a 
proposal for DSB action in this area. Unfortunately , for a variety of reasons, the Members involved 
in these discussions had been unable to arrive at an agreed proposal and the efforts had faded away. Korea's statement of concern at the present meeting, echoed as it had been by other 
Members, was a reminder that Members could not just sit back and wait for resource reallocation 
alone to solve all the problems. Members needed to persist in their efforts to find multi-faceted solutions. Members needed to take the responsi bility as a governing body seriously and work 
together to find sustainable solutions that pres erved the credibility and legitimacy of the WTO 
dispute settlement system for the next 20 years. Canada stood ready to re-engage in discussions, 
in whatever form they might take, to develop, and finally implement, such solutions. 
13.18.  The representative of India said that his country thanked Korea for raising the issue of 
delays in dispute settlement proceedings. India understood Korea's disappointment with the 
inordinate delay in the initiation of panel proceedings. A well-functioning dispute settlement system was a critical component of the multilater al trading system. There were many elements to 
a well-functioning, rules-based dispute settlement system. Prompt resolution of disputes was chief 
amongst them. Delays in the dispute settlement sy stem severely affected the credibility of the 
system, a point that Korea had raised at the pres ent meeting. India viewed the issue holistically 
and in a balanced manner. India recognized the fact that the dispute settlement system was 
currently faced with an unprecedented workload burden. The number of cases filed was a 
testimony to the success of the system. Delays in dispute settlement, especially between panel composition and the initiation of panel proceedings, severely impacted on the economic interests 
of the parties to the dispute as well as on the sy stemic interests of the Membership. The credibility 
of the process was at stake and it was under standable that a Member affected would be 
disappointed and agitated. However, it was equally important to recognize that there were genuine 
reasons for the delay and a severe resource crunch was one of them. The Rules Division, in 
particular, may be facing increased pressure due to the nature of WTO cases that had arisen in the past few years, mainly trade remedy disputes. It was important to underscore and recognize the work of the Secretariat to expeditiously handle disputes and put teams in place. India believed 
that the functions of the Secretariat must not be interfered with in terms of the internal 
management of the process to ensure total inde pendence and integrity of the process. India 
believed that this was performed by the Secretariat in a non-arbitrary manner. Furthermore, the 
quality of reports was also of pivotal importan ce and could have a bearing on time-frames. 
Members, therefore, must engage in a discussion to have a pragmatic, balanced and practical solution to the issues at hand. Information on the stages of the various disputes as well as 
time-frames for their completion with reasons for the same could serve as a useful input for 
Members to assess the gravity of the problem as we ll as the reasons for the delay. On the other 
hand, Members must guard against interference in the internal management of the panel process. 
It was a delicate balance and must be deliberated upon. India looked forward to other suggestions WT/DSB/M/367 
 
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  that Members may have on this issue and was ready to work with other Members and the 
Secretariat to address the root causes as well as to find practical solutions on making the dispute settlement process more prompt and effective. In India's view, any solution would have to address 
the parties' concerns for prompt settlement and the need to maintain the independence of the 
Secretariat to manage its resources as well as effectively schedule cases. 
13.19.  The representative of the European Union said that the EU thanked Korea for raising this 
important matter. The EU noted that it was one, if not the most, affected Member by the current 
situation, with many cases in the queue. The EU  acknowledged that the situation was difficult, 
both in terms of adverse impact on the interests of WTO Members who needed to wait for the cases to start in earnest, and also in terms of finding a solution to the underlying problems of which all Members were aware. In the EU's view, there was a need to have two objectives in mind. 
The first was to manage the situation at hand. In this regard, the EU had confidence in the 
Secretariat's management of the situation and that this was handled in a proper way. Korea had provided additional ideas on how this could be fu rther improved, and the EU would be interested in 
continuing this discussion. In that respect the EU would emphasize that the approach needed to be 
workable and pragmatic, as much as transparent and even-handed. The second objective would be to find solutions to the mid and long-term situat ion against the background of ever increasing 
pressures in the WTO dispute settlement system. In  that respect, the EU had already had good 
discussions in the past in various fora. There was no miracle solution, but rather many individual steps and measures would be needed to cope with the problem that Korea had raised at the present meeting. 
13.20.  The representative of Argentina said that  his country shared the concerns expressed by 
Korea and other Members. Argentina thanked Korea for placing this item on the Agenda of the 
present meeting. Argentina was also affected by current delays, in particular with respect to 
disputes relating to anti-dumping. Argentina, therefore, shared Korea's concerns about the 
economic damage irrespective of whether or not the measure was eventually ruled to be consistent with WTO Agreements. In particular the predictability of the multilateral trading system 
was affected. Argentina was aware and appreciate d that the WTO Secretariat and the Appellate 
Body Secretariat were considering certain measures that would reduce current delays and resolve the problem and to find a prompt solution to this matter. Argentina was prepared to continue to discuss this issue with Members and with the Se cretariat and was open to suggestions. In 
Argentina's view, this issue would continue to have serious implications, as pointed out by other 
delegations. Therefore, the necessary measures to resolve this situation must be taken as quickly as possible. 
13.21.  The representative of Chinese Taipei said that his delegation thanked Korea for raising this 
issue at the present DSB meeting. Chinese Taipei  shared Korea's concerns about delays in the 
proceedings under the DSU. As Chinese Taipei understood and as mentioned by several Members, 
such delays may be caused by the increasing workload and the shortage of human resources in 
the Secretariat. Chinese Taipei noted that the situation was going from bad to worse, in particular with the disputes under the mandate of the Rules Division. For example, two rules-related dispute panels, which had been composed in June 2014 (DS464
11 and DS47312), had announced that the 
final reports were expected to be issued by the end of 2015. In other words, the panel proceedings 
would last for approximately one year and six mo nths. However, another two rules-related dispute 
panels, which had been composed in December 2014 (DS44213 and DS47914), had announced that 
the final reports were expected to be issued by the end of 2016. In other words, the prospective 
duration of proceedings was extended to approximately two years. Thus far, Chinese Taipei had not seen any panel composed in 2015 announcing the expected final report issuance date, 
                                               
11 https://www.wto.org/english/trat op_e/dispu_e/cas es_e/ds464_e.htm  ("On 20 June 2014, the 
Director-General composed the panel…. The panel expects to issue its final report to the parties by the end 
of 2015.") 
12 https://www.wto.org/english/trat op_e/dispu_e/cas es_e/ds473_e.htm  ("On 23 June 2014, the 
Director-General composed the panel…. The panel expects to issue its final report to the parties by the end 
of 2015.") 
13  https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds442_e.htm  ("On 18 December 2014, the 
Director-General composed the panel…. The panel expects to begin its substantive work shortly and to issue its 
final report to the parties in the second half of 2016.") 
14  https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds479_e.htm  ("On 18 December 2014, the 
Director-General composed the panel…. the Chair of the pa nel…does not expect to issue its final report to the 
parties before the end of 2016.") WT/DSB/M/367 
 
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  including the DS482 Panel before which Chinese Taipei was the complaining party. Chinese Taipei 
could reasonably expect that those proceedings would be delayed even longer. Chinese Taipei was of the view that Members did not need to be reminded again about the negative effects the 
worsening delay problem may have on the dispute settlement system. In that regard, 
Chinese Taipei agreed with Korea that action should be taken as soon as possible to address this 
problem. Having more detailed and exact information about the Secretariat's workload and human resources situation would be the first step to an effective solution. In addition to Korea's proposal, 
Chinese Taipei proposed that the Secretariat publish a list of the panels awaiting the allocation of 
Secretariat staff. That information should specify each panel's place in the queue, the availability 
of supporting staff, and the estimated time when the supporting staff would be available. The publication of that information should be maintained on a regular basis and updated. For short-
term purposes, publication of that information would allow the parties to those pending disputes 
and the third-parties to better arrange their preparatory work. In the long-term, that information may be used as an index to measure the severity of the delay problem, allowing the Secretariat, 
the DSB and all Members to keep observing the is sue and communicating on the most appropriate 
solution. Chinese Taipei, once again, thanked Kore a for raising this issue at the present meeting 
and for the constructive and practical proposal. Chinese Taipei appreciated the views of Members 
and hoped that more engagement in this matter would soon resolve the matter. 
13.22.  The representative of Norway said th at her country noted with interest the views 
expressed by Korea and other Members under this Agenda item. Norway understood that an 
increased level of activity in dispute settlement ha d resulted in resource challenges in the dispute 
settlement pillar of the Secretariat, leading to serious delays in panel proceedings. Norway agreed 
with Korea and the previous speakers that tran sparency was of great importance when longer 
delays in panel proceedings were foreseen. Providing case-specific information to the disputing 
parties would give them a better understanding of the situation and the necessary consequences 
for the dispute at hand. The delays gave rise to concerns about the well-functioning and efficient dispute settlement system. It was crucial that the Secretariat was set up in a way that enabled it 
to adapt to fluctuations in the number of disput es, their scope and their complexity. In Norway's 
view, this should be a core objective of the ongoing organizational review of the Secretariat. Like previous speakers, Norway stood ready to engage in further discussions on this important issue raised by Korea at the present meeting. 
13.23.  The Chairman thanked Korea for placing th is matter on the Agenda of the present meeting 
and Members for their thoughtful statements. He said that many Members were aware that this 
was an issue that had long concerned him personally as well as institutionally. In summing up, he 
wished to suggest some next steps. First, he said that Members had the benefit of having, at the 
present meeting, the Directors of the Legal Affair s Division, the Rules Division, and the Appellate 
Body Secretariat to hear the views expressed by Members. He assured Members that their views 
would be conveyed to the Director-General. He was certain that there would be further discussions 
in the Secretariat on some of the issues raised. Second, a number of delegations had referred to the fact that there were other dimensions to th e problem of delays. To some extent, when more 
Members burdened the Secretariat and the panelis ts with bigger briefs, covering more issues, 
requiring more time and attention, there was an inevitable domino effect that led to the 
unavailability of resources for later cases in the line-up. That had triggered some discussion, as was mentioned among the major users, regarding whether Members themselves could do 
something to help to contribute to a more streamlined process. This could be either voluntarily 
between the parties or by agreement on best prac tices or potentially procedurally, and ultimately, 
referred to the DSU negotiations for consideration.  He noted that some Members had stated that 
they were willing to continue discussions and that  this issue might be further explored in the 
Special Session of the DSB. Third, he recalled th at DDG Brauner had been given the responsibility 
to continue with the "Jara process" named after Alejandro Jara, the former DDG, who had led a series of consultations on practical ideas that might contribute to streamlining the dispute 
settlement system. That process was now called the "Dispute Settlement Efficiency Exercise". He 
was certain that DDG Brauner would soon undertake his consultations on this matter. He assured Members that he would report back to the Chair of the DSB on the discussions held at the present 
meeting regarding the issue of delays  in the dispute settlement system. 
13.24.  The DSB took note of the statements. 
__________