G/ADP/Q1/RUS/3  
G/SCM/Q1/RUS/3  
G/SG/Q1/RUS/3  
 
22 October 2013  
(13-5819)  Page: 1/4  
Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices 
Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Committee on Safeguards
 Original: English  
 
 
NOTIFICATION OF LAWS AND REGULATIONS UNDER 
ARTICLES 18.5, 32.6 AND 12.6 OF THE AGREEMENTS  
REPLIES TO QUESTIONS POSED BY AUSTRALIA1 
REGARDING THE NOTIFICATION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION2 
The following communication, dated 18 October 2013, is being circulated at the request of the 
Delegation of the Russian Federation. 
 
_______________ 
 
 
The Russian Federation thanks Australia for the questions it raised in connection with the Notification of Laws and Regulations that Russi a submitted under Articles 18.5, 12.6 and 32.6 of 
the Agreements and is pleased to take this opportunity to clarify certain issues pertaining to the 
trade defense system of the Custom s Union of the Republic of Belarus, Republic of Kazakhstan and 
the Russian Federation.  
Question 1 
 Article 2 defines the "previous period" as three calendar years immediately preceding 
the date of filing of an application for an investigation. Please explain whether this 
means three complete calendar  years or a three year peri od prior to lodgment of an 
application. Please also explain whether this definition relates to the injury assessment. 
Article 30.4-1 notes that the period of investigation prior to the application of safeguard, 
anti-dumping or countervailing duty is establis hed by the investigatin g authority. Please 
explain the period of investigation for the purposes of determining dumping or 
subsidization. 
 
Reply 
 
The definition of "previous period" contained in Article 2 of the Agreement on the Application of 
Safeguard, Antidumping and Countervailing Measures With Regard to Third Countries of 25 January 2008 (hereinafter, the Basic Agreement) should be understood as meaning three complete calendar years prior to the lodging of an application. As regards the determination 
of serious injury in the case of safeguard proceedings, such injury, in accordance with another 
definition contained in the same Article, is " usually  determined for the previous period", that is, in 
cases when the investigating authority establishes a period of investigation in a safeguard 
proceeding pursuant to Article 30(4-1) of the Basi c Agreement, it is guided by the definition of 
serious injury contained in Article 2.  
The period of investigation for dumping established pursuant to Article 30(4-1) would, in 
accordance with Article 9(3), as a rule, be of 12 months preceding the date of lodging of the 
application, but in any case no less than 6 months. Material injury in an anti-dumping proceeding, pursuant to Article 13(3) of the Agreement, is determined for the period of investigation. At the 
same time, the investigating authority considers market trends for 3 years preceding the date of 
                                               
1 G/ADP/Q1/RUS/2-G/SCM/Q1/RUS/2-G/SG/Q1/RUS/2. 
2 G/ADP/N/1/RUS/1-G/SCM/N/1/RUS/1-G/SG/N/1/RUS/1 (dated 3 October 2012). G/ADP/Q1/RUS/3 • G/SCM/Q1/RUS/3 • G/SG/Q1/RUS/3 
 
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  lodging of the application for the purpose of establishing material injury. In accordance with 
Article 23(2-1), material injury in a countervailing proceeding is determined for the period of investigation.  
Question 2 
 Article 2 defines "threat of material injury" as one that is 'inevitable'. Please clarify 
whether this is the same standard as set down in Article 3.7 of the WTO Anti-Dumping 
Agreement, Article 15.7 of the WTO Subsid ies and Countervailing Measures Agreement 
and Article 4.1(b) of the WTO Safeguards Agreement.  
Question 3 
 Article 6.1 refers to serious injury "which wo uld be difficult to eliminate later". Please 
clarify whether this is the same standard  a s  s e t  d o w n  i n  A r t i c l e  6 . 1  o f  T h e  W T O  
Safeguards Agreement which refe rs to "damage which it would be difficult to repair". 
 
Replies to Questions 2, 3  
 
We believe that the misunderstanding of the following terms:  
 Inevitable // imminent 
 Eliminate // prevent 
is caused by translation issues. We note in this regard that many concepts enshrined in the Basic 
Agreement indeed originate and were drawn from the relevant WTO Agreements and were 
transposed into the Russian language as close to their original English meaning as was practically possible. Due to the backwards translation of these concepts into the English language that had to 
be made in order to make the present notification, some of the meanings may seem further away 
from the original. The legal standards implied in the text of the Basic Agreement in these cases, 
nevertheless, reflect the standards of the corresponding provisions of the WTO Agreements.  
Question 4 
 Article 6.4 refers to consultations that should  be initiated after adoption of the decision 
to impose a provisional safe guard measure. Please explain the timeframe for such 
consultations and whether these are held "imme diately" after the measures is taken as 
set down in the WTO Safeguards Agreement. 
 
Reply 
 Consultations under Article 6(3) would be held immediately upon receipt of a request by an 
authorized body of an exporting country, when such request is made at any point after the 
adoption of the decision to apply a provisional measure. This provision transposes the requirement of Article 12.4 of the Safeguards Agreement into the Basic Agreement. 
 
Question 5  
Article 11.1 provides for the determination of the normal value as based on "the 
ordinary course of trade for use in the customs territory of the exporting foreign country in a competitive environment". Please explai n how "competitive environment" is defined 
or assessed. 
 
Reply 
 
Certain cases when the environment is considered uncompetitive (namely, when prices are directly 
regulated by the state or there is a state monopoly on foreign trade) are defined in Article 11(11). Absent the conditions stipulated in this provision, the investigating authority would not conduct 
any additional analysis as regards the competit iveness of the environment, unless it receives, 
during the course of the investigation, indications to the contrary.  G/ADP/Q1/RUS/3 • G/SCM/Q1/RUS/3 • G/SG/Q1/RUS/3 
 
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  Question 6 
 Article 16.2 provides for recourse to the lesser duty rule. Please explain whether there are any specific circumstances where the lesser  duty rule may apply.  Please also explain 
the methodology for this assessment. Please  explain whether the lesser duty rule is 
normally applied in investigations.  
Reply 
 
The Commission has not so far made a decision to impose an anti-dumping or countervailing duty lower than the margins calculated for dumping or subsidization pursuant to Articles 16(2). 
 
Question 7  
Article 16.4 (and Article 10.11 where there is sampling) notes that an anti-dumping duty 
for all other exporters or foreign producers is based on the highest margin of dumping 
calculated during the investigation. Pl ease explain whether the margins for non-
cooperating exporters and foreign producers ar e disregarded for this purpose if there is 
sampling.  Reply 
 The investigating authority does not calculate individual margins of dumping for non-cooperating exporters and producers. In cases where sampling is  applied pursuant to Article 10(8), individual 
margins of dumping may be calculated for non-sampled but cooperating producers. 
 Question 8 
 
Article 17.3 and 17.4 outline the procedures for reviews of anti-dumping measures. Please explain whether the investigating au thority issues a public notice alerting 
interested parties to the expiry of the me asure in order to generate a request for a 
review. 
 Reply 
 Currently, the investigating authority does not practice to issue notices of impending expiry of anti-dumping measures. 
 
Question 9  Article 17.4 outlines the evidentiary requirements for a review including that an 
"existing antidumping measure is not sufficie nt to counteract dumped imports and to 
eliminate the injury to the industry of the Pa rties as a result of dumped imports". Please 
explain whether 'sufficiency' of a measure re flects the standard of Article 11.2 of the 
WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement. 
 Reply 
 Article 17(4) specifies the evidentiary requirements in which a review investigation may be carried out. At the same time, Article 17(1) establishes that an antidumping measure is to be applied to the extent and for as long as it is necessary to offset injury to the industry of the States Parties 
caused by dumped imports. In this regard, any review carried out pursuant to Article 17(4) shall 
be guided by the general standard set out in Arti cle 17(1). Hence, the standard of Article 11.2 of 
the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement is reflected in the requirements for a review. 
 
Question 10  
Article 18.1 defines circumvention as "the ch ange of the supply process to avoid paying 
antidumping duty". Article 18.3 outlines the evidentiary requirements for a circumvention review, including evidence of "neutralization of the antidumping measure 
as a result of circumvention and the influence of this factor on the production and (or) 
sale and (or) the prices of the like product". G/ADP/Q1/RUS/3 • G/SCM/Q1/RUS/3 • G/SG/Q1/RUS/3 
 
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  Please explain whether this would include evid ence of no movement in the resale prices 
of the dumped goods following the imposition of an anti-dumping measure.  Reply 
 The evidentiary basis required to make a determination of neutralization of the measure as a result of circumvention may include evidence of no movement of resale prices following the 
imposition of an antidumping measure. 
 Question 11  
Article 20 defines a subsidy as any kind of income or price support giving "an additional 
advantage" or a financial contribution that gives "additional benefits" to the recipients. 
Please explain whether a 'benefit' or 'advanta ge' is sufficient to meet the requirements 
of defining a subsidy. Please explai n the scope of "granting authority". 
 Reply 
 The apparent distinction between the concepts of "advantage" and "benefit" in the two sub-clauses 
of Article 20 is due to translation issues. The orig inal Russian-language version of the text of the 
Basic Agreement uses the word " преимущества " ("benefit") in both cases. This is in line with the 
subsidy definition contained in Article 1 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures.  
The "granting authority" is defined in Article 2 of the Basic Agreement as "a government body or 
the local authority of the exporting foreign state or an entity acting on behalf of the appropriate state authority or local authority or authorized by the appropriate government agency or a local 
authority in accordance with the legal act, or on the basis of the facts". 
 Question 12  
Please explain the scope of "other parties" in  Article 30.12 and whether this differs from 
the definition of interested parties in Article 36.  
Reply 
 
The scope of parties defined in Article 30(12) of the Basic Agreement is indeed broader than the 
exhaustive list in Article 36 (namely, it encompasses "state authorities (governments), local 
authorities, as well as other parties"). Under Article 30(12), a broad number of parties can provide the authority with information relevant to the investigation. However, if such other parties are not mentioned in the exhaustive list of Article 36, they will not be able to exercise rights pertinent to 
"interested parties" (for instance, to register as participants in the investigation pursuant to 
Article 30(5) of the Agreement). 
 
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