RESTRICTED  
  
G/C/M/125  
 
8 July 2016  
(16-3704)  Page: 1/32  
Council for Trade in Goods    
 
MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF TH E COUNCIL FOR TRADE IN GOODS 
15 APRIL 2016 
CHAIRPERSON: H.E. MR. HÉ CTOR CASANUEVA (CHILE) 
The meeting of the Council for Trade in Goods (CTG, or the Council) was convened by 
Airgram WTO/AIR/CTG/4; the proposed agenda for the meeting was circulated in document G/C/W/723. The meeting proceeded on the basis of the following agenda. 
 
1   NOTIFICATION OF RE GIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS .................................................... 2
 
2   STATUS OF NOTIFICATIONS UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENTS 
IN ANNEX IA OF THE WTO AGREEMENT (G/L/223/REV.23) ............................................. 2  
3   APPOINTMENT OF OFFICERS TO TH E SUBSIDIARY BODIES OF THE COUNCIL 
FOR TRADE IN GOODS ...................................................................................................... 4  
4   ENLARGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: PROCEDURES UNDER 
ARTICLE XXVIII:3 OF GATT 1994 (G/L/1051/A DD.5) ..................................................... 4  
5   JORDAN – REQUEST FOR A WAIVER  RELATING TO THE TRANSITIONAL 
PERIOD FOR THE ELIMINATION OF THE EXPORT SUBSIDY PROGRAM FOR 
JORDAN (G/C/W/705; G/C/W/705/CORR.1; G/C/W/705/REV.1; AND 
G/C/W/705/REV.2) ......................................................................................................... 5  
6   UNITED STATES OF AMERICA – REQUEST FOR A WAIVER EXTENSION – 
FORMER TRUST TERRITORY  OF THE PACIFIC ISLA NDS (G/C/W/721) ............................. 8  
7   RUSSIAN FEDERATION – TRADE RESTRICTING MEASURES – REQUEST FROM 
UKRAINE (G/C/W/720) ................................................................................................... 9  
8   INDONESIA'S IMPORT AND EXPORT RESTRICTING POLICIES AND PRACTICES 
– REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION, JAPAN, AND THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA ........................................................................................................................ 13  
9   CHINA - ISSUES RELATED TO TRADE IN SEAFOOD - REQUEST FROM NORWAY ......... 16  
10   NIGERIA – IMPORT RESTRICTING MEASURES – REQUEST FROM CHILE, THE 
EUROPEAN UNION, ICELAND, NORWAY, THAILAND, THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, AND URUGUAY ............................................................................................... 17
 
11   ECUADOR – IMPORT RESTRICTING MEASURES – REQUEST FROM JAPAN 
AND THE UNITED STATES OF  AMERICA (G/C /W/722) ................................................... 21  
12   UKRAINE – ISSUES RELATED TO CUSTOMS VALUATION – REQUEST FROM 
NORWAY ........................................................................................................................  24 
13   INDIA – IMPORT RESTRICTING MEASURES – REQUEST FROM JAPAN AND 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA .................................................................................. 25  
14   PAKISTAN – DISCRIMINATORY TAXES – REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN 
UNION ......................................................................................................................... .. 28 
15   WORK PROGRAM ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE ........................................................ 30  
16   OTHER BU SINESS .................................................................................................... 30  G/C/M/125 
 
- 2 - 
 
  16.1   Information about the expiry date of Section 15(a)(ii) of the Protocol on the 
Accession of  China ........................................................................................................... 30 
16.2   United States' Seafood Import Monitoring Programme .................................................. 31 
16.3   Date of next meeting............................................................................................... 32 
17   ELECTION OF CHAIRPERSON OF THE COUNCIL FOR TRADE IN GOODS .................... 32  
 
At the start of the meeting, the delegate of Tha iland requested to add the name of his delegation 
to the list of supporters of agenda item 10, "Nigeria's Import Restrictions". The delegate of the 
Russian Federation informed the Council that her delegation, under agenda item "Other Business", 
would raise an issue regarding the seafood import monitoring programme of the United States of 
America, and the delegate of China informed the Council that, under the same agenda item, her 
delegation intended to inform the Council of the expiry date of Section 15(a)(ii) of the Protocol on the Accession of the People's Republic of China.  
The Chairperson announced that he would refer to the date of the next CTG meeting. 
 
The agenda was so agreed. 
 1  NOTIFICATION OF REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 
1.1.  The Chairperson recalled that, under the wo rking procedures agreed by the Committee on 
Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA), and follow ing adoption by the General Council of the 
Transparency Mechanism, the CTG was to be kept  informed of Members' notifications of new 
regional trade agreements.1 He informed the CTG that the following trade agreements had been 
notified to the CRTA: 
a. Free Trade Agreement between the Republic of Korea and New Zealand  
(WT/REG367/N/1); 
b. Accession of Seychelles to the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Free 
Trade Area (WT/REG368/N/1); 
c. Free Trade Agreement between Australia and China (WT/REG369/N/1); 
d. Free Trade Agreement between China and the Republic of Korea (WT/REG370/N/1); and 
e. Free Trade Agreement between the Republic of Korea and Viet Nam (WT/REG371/N/1). 
1.2.  The delegate of the United States of Amer ica thanked the parties to the previous Agreements 
for their notifications, and encouraged those Members that had not yet notified Free Trade 
Agreements (FTAs) they had signed to do so as  quickly as possible so that Members could all 
benefit from the transparency mandated under the WTO Transparency Mechanism for Regional 
Trade Agreements. 
1.3.  The Chairperson proposed that the Council take note of the statement made and of 
information provided. 1.4.  The Council so agreed. 
2  STATUS OF NOTIFICATIONS UNDER TH E PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENTS IN 
ANNEX IA OF THE WTO AGREEMENT (G/L/223/REV.23) 
2.1.  The Chairperson drew Members' attention to document G/L/223/Rev.23, containing the 
status of notifications under the provisions of the Agreements in Annex 1A of the WTO Agreement. 
2.2.  The delegate of the United States of America thanked the Secretariat for the updated 
document on notifications, and appreciated the efforts made by various committee Chairs to get 
                                               
1 See documents WT/REG16, WT/L/671, and G/C/M/88. G/C/M/125 
 
- 3 - 
 
  Members to make the required notifications under the relevant agreements. The United States had 
noticed that an increasing number of Members had done so, at least in some areas. However, there continued to be a number of countries that either: (1) did not make their notifications at all; or (2) did not do so in a timely fashion; or (3) submitted notifications that appeared significantly 
incomplete. 
2.3.  The United States had also noticed that, during the Trade Policy Review (TPR) Process, some 
of these Members had informed the WTO of whethe r or not the requisite notification had been 
made, or if there had been situations that had or had not had an impact upon their notification 
obligation. In other words, the respective Members had made an effort to inform the WTO of their 
situation with regard to a specific subject matter, albeit in another forum. As other Members had demonstrated, the notification itself did not ne ed to be cumbersome and, for many Members, 
would often result in a nil notification. Consequently, the United States continued to encourage all 
Members that had not yet submitted their respecti ve notifications to review their individual 
situations and to submit full notifications in a timely manner. 
2.4.  Concerns existed particularly with regard to agriculture given that the track record was poor 
in the case of many notifications under the Agreement on Agriculture, particularly those relating to domestic support and export subsidies. If Memb ers were serious about future negotiations on 
domestic support they needed to demonstrate a commitment to transparency regarding existing 
domestic support obligations. Transparency was also more critical than ever for the current implementation process for commitments made in the Nairobi Decision on Export Competition. Some Members were more than 10 years overdue on their export subsidy notifications and, if the 
WTO was to move forward, Members needed to bring these notifications up to date. 
2.5.  The situation of notifications regarding fisheries subsidies was troubling, particularly as 
several of the largest fishing nations had not provided a full notification of their programmes. In 
light of the dire straits of the ocean's fisheries,  the United States called upon Members fully to 
disclose all of their fisheries subsidies so as to comply with their obligations under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. In the case of customs valuation, her delegation had 
noticed that out of 134 Members, only 39 Member s had met all their notification commitments, 
while 57 Members had made partial notifications, and 38 Members had not notified at all. In other words, over 70% of Members had either made no notifications or provided only partial notifications. The Customs Valuation Agreement (C VA) had been in effect since the establishment 
of the WTO, with the last transition period en ding over 14 years ago. Thus, the facts suggested 
that Members were not taking seriously the CVA's intention to ensure that the opportunities provided as a result of negotiated tariff reductions were realized. The United States hoped that this 
would mark a turning point for Members, and for the Customs Valuation Committee. 
2.6.  The delegate of the European Union highlight ed the importance of the notification obligations 
for the European Union and other Members, and thanked the Secretariat for the Report. However, 
he noted that the report had been circulated some what late, and called on the Secretariat in future 
to submit such reports as early as possible. 
2.7.  The Secretariat thanked the delegation of the European Union for its important comment, 
and explained how this document, which contained the annual notification obligations concerning 
all the WTO agreements contained in Annex 1A of the Marrakesh Agreement, was drawn up. The 
Annual Report (AR) which seemed a simple and mechanical document in its preparation as it consisted mostly of tables, was, in practice, one of the more complex documents as it contained a 
recompilation that went back to 1996 and, in th is case, up until 31 December 2015. Therefore, this 
document compiled the notifications from 1 January until 31 December. This itself presented one significant difficulty given that the Secretariat unfortunately could not start compiling this 
information in advance. Furthermore, since 1996, the number of years had increased, as had the 
number of WTO Members. And each time a new Member acceded to the WTO the tables corresponding to this document had to be reworked and reformatted in order to reflect the situation of this new Member not only since its accession to the WTO, but also with regard to past 
years when it was not yet a Member. This also occurred with regard to the new members of the 
European Union, as the tables needed to reflect their situation before and after their EU accession. 
A recent example was the case of the accession of Croatia to the European Union in 2013, where 
Croatia no longer notified individually but was ra ther grouped together with all EU notifications. 
These situations had also to be reflected in the tables and on each occasion required these tables to be carefully reformatted. Moreover, in a document of such length and complexity, the inclusion G/C/M/125 
 
- 4 - 
 
  of every footnote and explanation would render  the footnotes shambolic. Furthermore, the 
information contained in this document, which relates to all of the agreements in Annex I of the Marrakesh Agreement, is compiled by Divisions othe r than Market Access, the division that rather, 
in this case, puts together and revises all the information, tables, footnotes, and numbering. 
2.8.  In addition, three years ago, the Secretariat, further to concerns raised by several 
delegations about the difficulty of tracing the information on every Member, year after year, since 1996, suggested that the length of the document be reduced so as to make it more user-friendly, 
less complex, and without actually tampering with the current overall format as adopted by this 
Council in 1996 so as to avoid discussions on the mandate and content. The proposal was simply to limit the document to the previous five years. However, two and only two delegations at the time opposed this although the changes proposed would have greatly facilitated the Secretariat's 
work. After discussion between the two interested delegations and the Secretariat it was agreed 
that, in the case of agriculture, where the notifications were often more complex and the tables of greater length, there would be a reference to the document prepared by the Committee on 
Agriculture separately at the beginning of each year. In this way, the document was shortened 
from 96 to 55 pages. Thus, the call made today by the European Union could be taken as an expression by Members that it may be time for them to reflect again upon the structure and 
content of this document, given its importance. The Secretariat would be ready to engage in 
discussions with Members on this issue, and specific ally to explore ways to improve this document 
and to accelerate its circulation to Members. 
2.9.  The Chairperson proposed that the Council  take note of the statements made and of 
document G/L/223/Rev.23. 
2.10.  The Council so agreed. 
3  APPOINTMENT OF OFFICERS TO THE SU BSIDIARY BODIES OF  THE COUNCIL FOR 
TRADE IN GOODS 
3.1.  The Chairperson recalled that the Guidelines  for the Appointment of Officers to WTO bodies 
contained in document WT/L/510, adopted by the General Council on 10 December 2002, provided 
that the Chairperson of the Council for Trade in Goods would conduct consultations on the 
appointment of the Chairpersons of the subsidiary  bodies of the Council for Trade in Goods. He 
informed the Council that he had carried out consultations with the Group Coordinators on 29 February, 23 March, and 4 April 2016, and on 29 February, 3, 4, 21, 22, 23, and 
24 March 2016, with interested Members. During this period he had held a total of 69 interviews, 
while Ambassador Hamish McCormick from Australia, incoming Chair of the CTG, had carried out 15 consultations on 29 and 30 March 2016 regarding the Committee on Agriculture. All these 
consultations were carried out in a highly tr ansparent and open manner, whereby all Members 
were informed that the CTG Chair would be accept ing proposals for candidates for these positions. 
3.2.  As a result of these consultations, and based on the proposals and suggestions made by 
Members who responded to his invitation, he prepar ed a slate of names of those to be nominated 
to chair the CTG's subsidiary bodies. This slate of names was circulated by fax to all Members on 5 April 2016. However, despite his consultations, time, and best efforts, he was not in a position to present at this meeting a slate of names. He therefore proposed that the Council suspend this 
agenda item while he carried out further consultations, and that his successor would reconvene a 
meeting to deal solely with this agenda item, once an agreed slate of names was ready. 
3.3.  The Council so agreed. 
4  ENLARGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: PROCEDURES UNDER ARTICLE XXVIII:3 OF 
GATT 1994 (G/L/1051/ADD.5) 
4.1.  The Chairperson drew Members' attention to document G/L/1051/Add.5 concerning the 
accession to the European Union on 1 July 2013 of the Republic of Croatia. In this document, the 
European Union indicated that it would not assert that Members who had submitted a claim pursuant to Article XXIV:6 of GATT 1994 were precluded from withdrawing substantially equivalent concessions under Article XXVIII:3 of GATT 1994 be cause such withdrawal occurred later than 
six months after the European Union's withdrawal  of concessions, provided that the claiming G/C/M/125 
 
- 5 - 
 
  WTO Member withdrew concessions no later than 42 months after the European Union's 
modification of concessions. He recalled that the CTG had extended the deadlines on five occasions, namely at its meetings of 27 November 2013, 9 April and 17 November 2014, and 26 March and 10 November 2015. 
4.2.  The delegate of the European Union informed  the CTG that the EU Council had authorized the 
signature of the agreement with the People's Republic of China, the Member most affected by the 
modification of Croatia's commitments, and that the negotiations with Uruguay had also been 
concluded. Negotiations with other countries we re well advanced; the European Union hoped to 
announce at the next CTG meeting the conclusion of other agreements. Nevertheless, the EU requested the extension of the period in which Members' rights were preserved until all relevant agreements entered into force. 
4.3.  The Chairperson proposed that the Council take note of the statement made and agreed to 
extend the deadline mentioned by the European Union in document G/L/1051/Add.5 until 1 January 2017. 
4.4.  The Council so agreed. 
5  JORDAN – REQUEST FOR A WAIVER RELA TING TO THE TRANSI TIONAL PERIOD FOR 
THE ELIMINATION OF THE EXPORT SUBS IDY PROGRAM FOR JORDAN (G/C/W/705; 
G/C/W/705/CORR.1; G/C/W/705/REV.1; AND G/C/W/705/REV.2) 
5.1.  The Chairperson reminded delegations that, at the meeting of 17 November 2014, the 
delegation of Jordan had submitted for the Council's consideration document G/C/W/705 
containing a request for a waiver relating to the transitional period for the elimination of the export 
subsidy programme for Jordan and that it had later submitted a corrigendum clarifying the exact 
date of the extension of the transitional period  (document G/C/W/705/Corr.1). He also reminded 
delegations that, according to Article IX:3(b) of the Marrakesh Agreement, on 20 February 2015 
his predecessor had made a factual report to the General Council informing it that this issue had 
been under the CTG's consideration for more than the 90 days, and that this Council would continue considering this request. He also recalled that during the last meeting the delegation of 
Jordan had introduced document G/C/W/705/REV.2, where it limited its request for the waiver of 
this programme to only three (3) years so as to undertake and establish, meanwhile, a replacement programme that would be compatible with WTO rules and principles on this matter. An action plan had been annexed to this document containing the different steps that Jordan 
would undertake to this end. Finally, he indicated that, at the CTG meeting on 10 November 2015, 
it had been agreed that the Council would revert to this issue at this meeting. 
5.2.  The delegate of Jordan thanked Members for their support and for the interest they had 
shown during the last meeting of this Council, and for their understanding and consideration of the 
challenges the Jordanian economy was facing due to the current unrest in the Middle East with regard, specifically, to the closure of borders with Syria and Iraq, which significantly affected 
Jordanian exports. 
5.3.  He informed delegations that, since December 2015, and following the approval by Jordan's 
Council of Ministers of the action plan in all of its stages, intensive work had taken place aimed at replacing the current export subsidy programme with a new and WTO-compliant programme. In 
this regard, a national committee chaired by the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Industry, 
Trade, and Supply, had been established that includ ed senior officials from both public and private 
sectors. Its main role was to monitor the implementation of the action plan within the estimated 
time-frame, and to develop the necessary technical and legal frameworks for an alternative 
subsidy programme in cooperation with a broad group of stakeholders. 
5.4.  The national committee became operational on 1 January 2016, the same date that the data 
collection process began, with technical assistance provided by USAID's Jordan Competitiveness 
Programme. This process would be followed by the exploration of potential alternative programmes, with rigorous analysis of different replacement schemes. Additionally, Jordan's competent authorities would begin the process of designing a new and WTO-compliant programme 
in coordination with the Secretariat of the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. 
Considering Jordan's budgetary constraints and the need for fast execution, the new programme G/C/M/125 
 
- 6 - 
 
  would be carefully designed to generate maximu m impact from limited resources. Following the 
design and the new draft legislation, a consultati on process would take place with stakeholders 
and interested Members. The final step would be the legislative process, and once fulfilled the 
export subsidy programme would be terminated. The work at the national level would take place in 
cooperation with USAID, the WTO Secretariat, and any interested Member. 
5.5.  Jordan was committed to terminate its current programme as soon as it had designed and 
approved the new programme but, in any case, the current export subsidy programme would be 
automatically terminated by end-2018. Jordan wo uld share information about the progress of the 
work on the new programme with any interested Member, and requested that this item be included on the agenda of the November meeting of this Council so as to provide Members with an update on progress. 
5.6.  The delegate of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia , on behalf both of his delegation and the Arab 
Group, thanked Jordan for its update and for the efforts it had undertaken to design a new 
alternative subsidy programme to support small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) with a clear 
time-frame, including a detailed action plan that illustrated Jordan's level of engagement with and 
respect for its commitments in the WTO. 
5.7.  The regional instability and the global financial and economic slowdown had had serious 
implications for Jordan's economy, and the spill overs from conflicts in neighbouring countries 
continued to subdue Jordan's economic activities. Therefore, Jordan's request for a waiver was essential to helping Jordan overcome many daunting challenges. The exceptional circumstances and difficulties faced by Jordan clearly justified extending to it the necessary time to design and 
implement the new WTO-consistent subsidy programme. 
5.8.  The delegate of Qatar associated his delega tion with the statement made by the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia on behalf of the Arab Group, an d thanked Jordan for its update on the work 
undertaken towards implementation of a WTO-consistent programme. He also requested that the 
statement delivered by his delegation at the November 2015 meeting be reflected in these minutes.
2 
5.9.  The delegate of the United States of America thanked Jordan for its comprehensive report on 
its efforts to make the necessary changes to the programme at issue. The United States had been 
actively involved in providing technical assistance to Jordan in the context of its reform efforts. This included sending a private sector lawyer to Jordan for several days to provide face-to-face 
assistance and advice. The United States hoped that Jordan could complete and implement the 
necessary programmatic changes as soon as possible and stood ready to continue to assist Jordan in any manner needed. 
5.10.  The delegate of Japan thanked Jordan for the update and commended the vital role played 
by Jordan in the region. Japan acknowledged the challenges faced by Jordan, and appreciated the 
further efforts it had made to reform its subsidy programme so as to make it WTO-consistent, and 
Japan expected that Jordan would eliminate this programme soon. Japan would continue to follow 
this issue closely. 
5.11.  The delegate of Egypt associated his delegation with the statement made by Saudi Arabia 
on behalf of the Arab Group, and urged WTO Members to accept Jordan's request. 
5.12.  The delegate of Australia welcomed Jord an's update on the work it had undertaken to 
develop a replacement subsidy programme to meet WTO requirements; bringing this to the 
Council's attention was a positive, transparent, and constructive step. Australia was also conscious 
of the fact that Jordan was working under a difficult set of circumstances. This demonstrated its 
strong commitment to WTO rules and to the multilateral trading system. Australia called upon Members to be understanding of these circumstances as Jordan continued to take further steps in 
this positive direction, and looked forward to hearing further updates on Jordan's efforts. 
5.13.  The delegate of Oman associated his delegation with the statement made by Saudi Arabia 
on behalf of the Arab Group, and thanked Jordan for its update on its efforts to make the subsidy 
                                               
2 See document G/C/M/124, paragraphs 4.7–4.9. G/C/M/125 
 
- 7 - 
 
  programme WTO-consistent. Consideration of this issue had taken a lot of time, and Oman 
believed that Jordan had sufficiently demonstrated the considerable challenges that it was currently facing. Thus, Oman urged Members to consider Jordan's request favourably. 
5.14.  The delegate of Turkey thanked Jordan for its update on this issue and referred to Turkey's 
statements on this agenda item made at previous  meetings. He reiterated Turkey's support for the 
waiver request and urged Members to do the same, and especially given that Jordan had shown its goodwill by reducing the requested period of exte nsion from 4  to 3 years, and by working on a 
new replacement programme. 
5.15.  The delegate of New Zealand also thanke d Jordan for its update on this issue, and 
welcomed Jordan's transparency in providing de tailed information about the progress undertaken 
internally. New Zealand appreciated Jordan's commitment to remove its WTO-inconsistent export 
subsidy programme, particularly in spite of its unique situation, and with the acute challenges it 
was facing in the region. Bilateral discussions had also been helpful, and New Zealand remained ready to work with Jordan in bringing these reforms to a conclusion as soon as possible, and in 
any case before end-2018. 
5.16.  The delegate of Chinese Taipei joined othe rs in thanking Jordan for the update and for its 
efforts to develop a new and WTO-consistent replacement programme. His delegation also 
recognized the important role that Jordan had pl ayed and continued to play in the context of 
peace-building and stabilization in the Middle East, and the challenges it was currently facing, including the massive influx of refugees from neighbouring countries. Chinese Taipei supported Jordan's request for a waiver and called upon the Council to do the same. 
5.17.  The representative of Pakistan echoed the statement made by Saudi Arabia on behalf of the 
Arab Group, and welcomed Jordan's update. Paki stan appreciated Jordan's transparency and its 
efforts to reform its subsidy programme, particularly in light of the challenges it was facing, 
including hosting a huge population of refugees. Pakistan supported Jordan's waiver request and 
urged the WTO membership to agree to the same. 
5.18.  The delegate of China thanked Jordan for it s update and welcomed the reform efforts it was 
making in the direction of a WTO-consistent reform. Given the exceptional circumstances Jordan 
was facing, China reaffirmed its support for Jordan's request for a waiver to extend the transitional period for the elimination of its export subsidy programme until end-2018. China expected all WTO Members also to endorse Jordan's request. 
5.19.  The delegate of Guatemala joined others in thanking Jordan for its update and expressed 
Guatemala's support for Jordan's request. Guatemala emphasized that any request for a waiver in 
this Council had to be made on an individual basi s and without prejudice to any future request that 
may be made on this matter. 
5.20.  The delegate of Jordan thanked delega tions for their interventions and appreciated 
Members' acknowledgment of the exceptional challe nges being faced by Jordan's economy due to 
the current regional unrest. He reiterated Jordan's  commitment to fulfil all of its obligations under 
the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCVM), and assured Members that Jordan would continue to work constructively and in a transparent manner on the implementation of the action plan aimed at replacing the current export subsidy programme with a new and 
WTO-compliant programme. Jordan requested that this issue be placed again on the Council's 
agenda for its November 2016 meeting, at which point Jordan would submit a revised update on further developments. 
5.21.  The Chairperson thanked delegations for their statements, and Jordan for its update about 
the work undertaken internally to replace the current programme with a new and WTO-consistent 
programme. He proposed that the Council take note of the statements made and, as requested by 
Jordan, that this item be included in the agen da for the November 2016 Council meeting, when 
Jordan would inform the Council about the development of its new programme. 
5.22.  The Council so agreed. G/C/M/125 
 
- 8 - 
 
  6  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA – REQUEST FOR A WAIVER EXTENSION – FORMER 
TRUST TERRITORY OF THE PA CIFIC ISLANDS (G/C/W/721) 
6.1.  The Chairperson informed the Council that, in a communication dated 2 March 2016, the 
delegation of the United States of America had requested the Secretariat to circulate 
document G/C/W/721, containing a request to extend the waiver concerning the Former Trust 
Territory of the Pacific Islands. 
6.2.  The delegate of the United States of Am erica introduced the US request concerning the 
duty-free treatment to eligible products from the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Federation 
States of Micronesia, the Republic of Palau,  and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana 
Islands, all formerly part of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. This request was circulated by the United States in advance of this meetin g, and on 15 July 2015 the United States also 
submitted its annual report to the General Council (document WT/L/954) on the operation of the 
programme. In 1986, the entry into force of the Covenant establishing the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, the Compacts of Free Association with the United States for the Republic 
of the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, and, in 1994, the entry into force of 
the Compact of Free Association with the United States for the Republic of Palau, terminated the Trusteeship of the Pacific Islands, established on 2 April 1947. United States law provided for the 
extension of the preferential trad e treatment to these entities that were granted under the TTPI. 
These preferences were similar to historical pr eferences the United States provided to the 
US Virgin Islands, Guam, and American Samoa, which were US possessions on 1 July 1939, and which were included in Annex D of Article I of the GATT 1994. 
6.3.  The primary purpose of this preference sy stem had been to promote the expansion of trade 
and the economic development of the beneficiaries in a manner consistent with the objectives of the GATT and with the trade, financial, and deve lopment needs of the beneficiary countries. The 
close trade relations between the United States and those territories were one component of an 
exceptionally deep, multi-faceted partnership betw een the United States and the constituent parts 
of the former Trust Territory of the Pacific Isla nds. The Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana 
Islands had been a US territory since 1975. As for the three Freely Associated States (or FAS) – 
the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Federate d States of Micronesia, and the Republic of Palau 
– even after independence, the United States continued to maintain very close relationships with them under the three Compacts of Free Association and related amended Compacts. Most citizens 
of the FAS may live, study, and work in the United States without a visa. The three FAS received 
combined US assistance of over $200 million annually – among the highest per capita assistance levels in the world – including direct assistance in the form of grants and annual deposits into 
national trust funds intended to promote their long-term sustainable development. Moreover, in 
contrast to US assistance to other foreign states, the US Department of Interior, not USAID, was the leading agency administering US assistance to the FAS. A very small volume of production and 
trade was involved in this programme. Considered together, US imports from the Republic of the 
Marshall Islands, the Republic of Palau, the Federated States of Micronesia, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in 2015 represented about US$32.1 million. 
6.4.  The United States was committed to working in partnership with its friends in these areas to 
enhance the common interest of increasing trade and investment. These preferences were a key 
element in US efforts to help the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of Palau, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands 
participate more fully in the global economy, and complemented other Members' initiatives to 
promote their growth and development. 
6.5.  The delegate of the European Union stated that his delegation did not have any problem with 
the request as such. However, the European Union was not in a position formally to join the 
consensus on this issue since it needed to go through internal procedures that took time. The European Union hoped to be in a position to join the consensus at the CTG's next meeting. 
6.6.  The Chairperson proposed that the Council take note of the statements made and revert to 
this issue at the next meeting. 
6.7.  The Council so agreed. G/C/M/125 
 
- 9 - 
 
  7  RUSSIAN FEDERATION – TRADE RESTRICTING MEASURES – REQUEST FROM UKRAINE 
(G/C/W/720) 
7.1.  The Chairperson informed the Council th at, in a communication dated 30 March 2016, the 
delegation of Ukraine had requested the Secretaria t to include this item in the agenda of this 
meeting and also to consider document G/C/W/720, circulated to delegations on 6 January 2016. 
7.2.  The delegate of Ukraine drew Members' a ttention to burdensome trade restrictions being 
applied by the Russian Federation, which unduly restricted and complicated international traffic in 
transit from the territory of Ukraine to third country destinations via the territory of the Russian 
Federation. Ukraine had referred to these transit barriers, which it considered onerous, in a communication dated 13 January 2016, and subsequently it had raised its concerns at the General Council meeting on 24 February 2016, as well as at the March meeting of the Committee on 
Agriculture. Unfortunately, the non-transparent, no n-justified, and overly burdensome restrictions 
applied by the Russian Federation continued unabated. 
7.3.  Moreover, there were signs that linked other unrelated technical barriers to these already 
overly restrictive transit restrictions and which resulted in a substantial expansion of Members' 
products potentially facing even more dubious and unnecessary requirements while in transit through the Russian Federation. Ukraine's systemic  concerns arose from: (i) the abrupt manner in 
which the Russian Federation imposed these measures; (ii) the continued lack of public 
information detailing operational guidance; (iii) the absence of convincing and supporting rationale to justify any identifiable transit risk posed; and (iv) the unjust and non-uniform application and imposition of these onerous and costly burdens. 
7.4.  The significant reduction in trade via this corridor was tangible and further increased 
Ukraine's trade concern. Indeed, the disruptive transit restrictions were affecting trade to other destinations, eliminating altogether the export of  some products, and having a serious impact on 
the competitiveness of other export goods given the unnecessary additional costs. From a wider 
perspective one could notice that other Russian measures were further hindering or preventing 
trade. Thus, the broad and systemic nature of these trade restrictions surpassed a simple bilateral 
Ukrainian concern and deserved rather the attention of all WTO Members. 
7.5.  As Ukraine noted in document G/C/W/720, the Russian Federation's Presidential Decree 
No. 1, and Government Resolution No. 1, both of  1 January 2016, banned all international transit 
of cargo by automotive and railway transportation from the territory of Ukraine to Kazakhstan via 
the territory of the Russian Federation, and in particular at the border with the Russian Federation. 
Goods currently being exported to Kazakhstan must pass through the Republic of Belarus, where there are only two checkpoints, and may only exit  at the Russian–Kazakhstani border at one of 
three checkpoints. The new routing results in up to  900 kilometres of additional transit distance. 
Compared with earlier routes, used prior to 1 January 2016, transit costs from Ukraine to Kazakhstan via the Russian Federation were now up to 30% higher. 
7.6.  Additionally, all international cargo in transi t from the territory of Ukraine to Kazakhstan via 
the Russian Federation must be sealed and then electronically tracked via a Russian satellite system called GLONASS, and all transiting personnel, such as drivers, faced additional registration 
requirements. In practice, attempts to conform to the new transit restrictions revealed only more 
constraints; for example, cargo in transit shou ld use a police convoy where each convoy was 
limited to only ten vehicles, with a fee of 350 US dollars per vehicle. Such restrictions had no documentary basis and produced a negative impact upon Ukraine's economy as a whole, and upon 
Ukraine's exports in particular. 
7.7.  The above-mentioned costs and greater tran sit distances did not even account for the most 
important factor for business, namely the conditions under which cargo in transit from Ukraine was 
subject, which were unpredictable, limited business activity, and disrupted trade links between 
Ukraine and a number of Ukraine's trading partners . The Russian Federation's sudden imposition of 
these restrictions, through the Russian Federation's Presidential Decree No. 1 and Government Resolution No. 1, both enacted on 1 January 2016, resulted in a de facto  short-term total ban on 
Ukrainian goods transiting to the Caucasus, Central Asia, China, and Mongolia. Export activities to 
Kazakhstan gradually revealed that the operational guidance for Ukrainian goods in transit to G/C/M/125 
 
- 10 - 
 
  third countries was vague, and that in the Russian Federation such goods continued to face 
non-transparent and non-viable transit restrictions. 
7.8.  Like a Rubik's Cube, further twists and turns revealed still more trade protectionist 
developments. Ukrainian goods were subject to bein g challenged on health, safety, or conformity 
grounds, allegations often unsubstantiated und er the TBT or the SPS Agreements, and were 
subsequently denied access to the Russian Federation's market and appeared to be banned even for simple transit through the Russian Federation's territory. Unfortunately, details of transit 
operations were not provided in a transparent ma nner. Moreover, goods that had been allowed by 
the Russian Federation's authorities to embark on the long and costly transit across Russian 
territory had subsequently been stopped at exit checkpoints in the Russian Federation and forced 
to retrace their long journey back to Ukraine. 
7.9.  Ukrainian exports to Kazakhstan in the first quarter of 2016, when compared to the same 
period in 2015, had decreased on average by 49%. Exports to other destinations in the region, such as Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kyrgyzst an, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, had 
decreased by 48%. Ukrainian exports of peri shable agricultural goods faced enormous 
transportation risks and had fallen to zero under the new transit conditions applied by the Russian Federation. 
7.10.  Ukrainian customs officials had also noticed that other WTO Members had been and were 
being adversely affected by the Russian Federation's non-transparent and burdensome transit restrictions. Shipments from EU member States such as Romania, the Slovak Republic, Poland, Italy, and Hungary, as well as goods from Turk ey and the Republic of Moldova, had apparently 
been refused permission to transit across the Russian Federation at the Ukraine–Russian 
Federation border. Some shipments had apparently been re-routed for transit via Belarus. Sadly this represented a further unfortunate twist in this unravelling trade protectionist story. 
7.11.  In light of the above, Ukraine had serious concerns regarding the compatibility and 
compliance of the Russian Federation's measures wi th GATT  Article V, on "Freedom of Transit", 
and had raised these concerns at the General Council  and in other WTO fora, requesting on each of 
those occasions that the Russian Federation imme diately lift these unreasonable and restrictive 
transit barriers. Regrettably, the Russian Federation had remained silent, giving no indication of its willingness to modify, remove, or relax the transit measures. All WTO Members seeking 
international transit of goods across the territory of the Russian Federation should be accorded the 
same basic treatment: namely, the most convenient routes, no discrimination as to origin of 
goods, or entry or exit point, or destination, or  ownership of goods, or means of transport. This 
had not been and was still not the case as concerned the application of the Russian Federation's 
measures. 
7.12.  Ukraine drew the attention of Members to the negative impact upon trade of the Russian 
Federation's transit measures described above. Although much of the trade impact of these 
measures was carried by Ukrainian businesses, Ukraine believed that the nature and 
characteristics of these measures required that th ey be given broad and systemic consideration by 
the entire WTO membership. In conclusion, Ukraine called upon the Russian Federation to cease application of the transit measures in question and instead to re-establish a non-discriminatory 
and open treatment of goods in transit for all WTO Members. Ukraine requested that the following 
questions and requests to the Russian Federation for information be included in these minutes as follows: 
1. Explain in detail the requirement that traffic in transit from the territory of Ukraine 
through the territory of the Russian Federation must comply with since 1 January 2016; 
2. Provide information about the policy rationale behind the introduction of the 
measures; 
3. Explain why the Russian Federation decided to restrict carrying out traffic in transit 
from the territory of Ukraine to the territory of Kazakhstan through two checkpoints in 
the Russian–Belarus border; 
4. Explain why the Russian Federation decided to restrict the exit of traffic in transit from 
the territory of Ukraine to the territory of Kazakhstan through three checkpoints in the 
Russian Federation–Kazakhstan border; G/C/M/125 
 
- 11 - 
 
  5. Provide WTO Members with all operational details, including subsidiary legislation or 
enforcement orders for customs authoritie s regarding the implementation of this 
measure; 
6. Explain how Russian authorities enforce these measures, and in particular, if the 
country of origin of a good is the basis for applying the measure; 
7. Clarify whether: 
(a) The measure is applied, whether in law or in fact, only to goods in transit from 
the territory of Ukraine to the territory of Kazakhstan; or 
(b) the measure is also applied, whether in law or in fact, to goods in transit from 
the territory of Ukraine to the territories of other countries. List these countries, if applicable; 
8. State whether the Russian Federation has any other similar trade restrictions on traffic 
in transit. If so, please provide details; 
9. Explain what regime was applicable to traffic in transit from the territory of Ukraine 
through the territory of the Russian Federation prior to the entry into force of 
Presidential Decree No. 1 and the related Reso lution of the Government of the Russian 
Federation; 
10. Explain in detail the requirements for traffic in transit of the Ukrainian goods subject 
to the SPS and TBT restrictions under the Russian Federation acts through the territory of the Russian Federation; 
11. Provide WTO Members with all operational details, including subsidiary legislation or 
enforcement orders for customs authorities regarding this issue; 
12. Describe what normative acts of the Eurasian Economic Union or the Russian 
Federation regulate traffic in transit from, or to, countries other than Ukraine; 
13. Provide statistics of traffic in transit from  the territory of Ukraine through the territory 
of the Russian Federation, by country of destination, for 2013, 2014, 2015, and January 2016; 
14. Explain how the measure complies with the WTO Agreement, including GATT Article V; 
15. Explain how the Russian Federation will ensure that the measure is consistent with its 
WTO obligations. 
 
7.13.  The delegate of the European Union reiterat ed the European Union's concerns, as previously 
raised at the General Council meeting of Februa ry 2016, and regretted that the trade-restrictive 
measures introduced by the Russian Federation in its Presidential Decree No. 1 remained in force. 
These measures appeared to violate not only key WTO provisions, such as GATT Article V on the 
freedom of transit, but also had a direct econom ic impact on other WTO Members, including the 
European Union, as the measures in question made the transit of EU goods to Kazakhstan more 
complicated. The European Union then called upon all WTO Members to abide by the existing 
provisions of the multilateral legal framework by ensuring a non-discriminatory treatment of goods in transit, which allowed the transit of goods via the traditional and most convenient routes, and without unnecessary delays, costs, and restrictions, as provided for in GATT Article V. The 
European Union would continue to follow this situation closely and reserved its rights to address 
these measures again in other WTO fora. 
7.14.  The delegate of Turkey expressed concern about the Russian Federation's restrictions with 
regard to goods originating in a number of WTO Members; these restrictions appeared to be 
arbitrary and unjustified and covered many areas, including restrictions on transit and complete 
import bans on various products from different  Members. Turkey had been among those Members 
affected by the Russian Federation's measures in troduced since early 2016. Indeed, on the basis of 
a number of administrative instruments, the Russian Federation had banned imports of about 20 categories of agricultural products of Turkish or igin, and fresh fruit and vegetables in particular. 
Industrial products had also been affected by th e Russian Federation's import restrictions and by 
the generally unfavourable treatment extended to  them by the Russian Federation's customs 
authorities. Turkey requested that the Russian Federation provide clear explanations of these 
practices to the CTG, particularly with regard to the pertinent WTO Agreements, and to abide by 
its WTO obligations, and to lift all trade restrictions and arbitrary practices that were in violation of 
the WTO Agreements and the Russian Federation's specific WTO commitments. 
7.15.  The delegate of the Russian Federation indi cated that her delegation had listened carefully 
to these statements and reaffirmed the seriousn ess of the Russian Federation's commitment to 
implement its WTO obligations, including in its trade relations with Ukraine. G/C/M/125 
 
- 12 - 
 
  7.16.  The delegate of Canada thanked Ukraine fo r having raised this issue and indicated that, 
based on Ukraine's communication and statement at this meeting, as well as that given at the 
General Council meeting in February 2016, it appeared that the Russian Federation's measures would have a negative impact on several WTO Members in addition to Ukraine. Indeed, there could 
be systemic implications for all WTO Members, and a core issue in this case was therefore 
Members' respect of all their WTO obligations such  that their rights, too, were also respected. 
Canada encouraged Ukraine and the Russian Federation to resolve these issues promptly. 
7.17.  The delegate of Australia joined other Members in expressing its concern with regard to this 
issue. Australia embraced the principle of free tran sit as a fundamental element of trade facilitation 
and was concerned about actions taken by any Member that could compromise this key principle. Australia called upon Ukraine and the Russian Federati on to address this issue so as to resolve it 
promptly and to restore the integrity of the principle of free transit. 
7.18.  The delegate of Japan joined previous speakers in expressing systemic concern with regard 
to the Russian Federation's measures as adopted in January 2016. Japan expected these measures 
to be repealed soon. 
7.19.  The delegate of the United States of Amer ica thanked Ukraine for the additional information 
it had provided and joined Ukraine in expressing concern about the Russian Federation's restrictive 
trade measures on the transit of goods through its territory. It was clear that Ukraine's trade 
interests were especially and directly hit by these restrictions although other Members' shipments had also been hit. Consequently, the United States also believed that the CTG should also consider 
these measures from a broader perspective. Considering the fundamental importance for all 
Members of the GATT/WTO provisions governing the freedom of transit, the United States believed 
that these measures raised a systemic issue th at touched upon many aspects of the WTO rules 
and obligations. The Russian Federation's measures interfered primarily with the freedom of transit 
of Ukrainian goods through Russia, and specifically goods in transit from Ukraine to Kazakhstan, 
although other trade was also impacted, and the measures introduced significant uncertainty due 
to their vagueness, as well as imposing unreasonable costs. 
7.20.  The United States also echoed Ukraine's concern about a lack of information. Indeed, these 
measures did not explain the rationale for the restrictions: they did not identify a threat from the transit of goods from only one WTO Member; th ey did not describe how diverting such transit 
through another country would eliminate any such threat; they did not present a rationale for 
limiting border crossings to the specified transit points; and they did not justify the technological 
or administrative requirements imposed on the mode  of transit; in short, they did not provide a 
legal or rational justification for the significant restrictions imposed by the measure. The absence 
of these explanations lent credence to the characte rization of the measures as punitive action, and 
action of therefore questionable validity under WT O rules. In the view of the United States, the 
CTG required a fulsome explanation from the Russian Federation as to why these measures were 
necessary and justified under WTO rules. As indicated at the February meeting of the General 
Council, the United States urged all Members with an interest in this matter to adhere faithfully to their WTO obligations. 
7.21.  The delegate of Switzerland noted that a number of measures implemented by the Russian 
Federation were directly affecting the transit of  goods through its territory for some WTO Members 
and recalled that all Members must ensure that their respective trade practices were in compliance with WTO rules and obligations. 
7.22.  The delegate of Jamaica appealed to the Russian Federation and to Ukraine to pursue 
bilateral discussions in order to identify a way of addressing Ukraine's concerns. She called upon 
both Members to engage in bilateral consultations to find an amicable and prompt solution to this 
problem. 
7.23.  The delegate of the Republic of Korea thanked Ukraine for having raised this issue and 
shared the concerns expressed by previous speakers. Korea wished to see a prompt and 
WTO-compliant solution to this issue. 
7.24.  The Chairperson thanked delegations for their statements and proposed that the Council 
take note of the statements made. G/C/M/125 
 
- 13 - 
 
  7.25.  The Council so agreed. 
8  INDONESIA'S IMPORT AND EXPORT RE STRICTING POLICIES AND PRACTICES – 
REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION, JAPAN, AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
8.1.  The Chairperson informed the Council that, in communications dated 1 and 4 March 2016, 
the delegations of the European Union, Japan, an d the United States of America, requested the 
Secretariat to include in the agenda of this m eeting an item entitled: "Indonesia's Import and 
Export Restricting Policies". 
8.2.  The delegate of the United States of Amer ica reminded delegations that the United States 
held a number of long-standing concerns about In donesia's trade and investment regime. Over the 
last five years, Indonesia had adopted a host of trade and investment restrictions, including import licensing requirements, unique technical regulations, pre-shipment inspection requirements, export 
restrictions, local content, and domestic manufacturing requirements. Nevertheless, the 
statements made by President Widodo and his Trade Minister Lembong indicating that these 
policies did not enhance the natural potential of the Indonesian market, and that it was their 
intention to reform and liberalize the Indonesian market, were encouraging. In this vein, the 
Indonesian Government had announced 11 economic policy packages, some of which appeared to contain positive developments, such as a revision to the Negative Investment List and changes to 
labelling requirements. But the United States beli eved that the actual implementation of such a 
reform package was more important than the announcement itself. For instance, only the issuance of the revised Negative Investment List would allow for a review of the document and an evaluation of the overall impact of such a revision. 
8.3.  Despite some positive changes, the fund amental direction of Indonesia's policies did not 
seem to have changed. The United States considered that certain regulations restricting the market and imposing new localization requirements  appeared to be the continuation of policies 
first advanced under the previous government. For example, the Circular Letter issued in 
March 2016 appeared to impose local presence requirements on over-the-top (or over-the-internet) companies. The trend in Indonesia continued to be to impose localization 
requirements of various kinds, such as the loca l content requirements imposed on 4G LTE-enabled 
products, as had happened in July 2015, and the recourse to import licences that required license holders to commit to developing local industry within three years. The United States understood that the Ministry of Trade was amending its import licensing requirement so as to align it with the 
LCR requirement. 
8.4.  The United States had also seen revisions to other import licensing requirements, including 
those for agricultural goods, which appeared to continue many of the earlier trade-restrictive 
policies, and to impose quotas and domestic purchasing requirements. Concerns also remained 
about the regime's lack of transparency, and only some small steps had been taken in the right direction at the Ministry of Trade that, for exampl e, had established a website of draft regulations, 
and that had issued a few regulations for public comment. The United States again called upon 
Indonesia to notify its pre-shipment inspection requirements and to update its subsidies notification, neither of which had been updated for more than 20 years. 
8.5.  The United States understood that the economic reform and trade liberalization announced 
by the Indonesian President and Minister of Trade would not take place overnight. However, each 
revision of a regulation provided an opportunity to  take a step in the right direction. The United 
States hoped that future economic policy pack ages would begin to dismantle the previous 
protectionist measures, and believed that the senior leadership in Indonesia had understood that, 
in the Southeast Asia region, Indonesia had to position itself so as to be competitive. This meant to take the necessary steps to ensure that Indonesia was as attractive a place for business and 
investment as were its neighbours. The United States acknowledged that the reform process was 
challenging but remained optimistic that Indo nesia would succeed. The United States looked 
forward to working with Indonesia in support of its reform agenda and to address these 
long-standing concerns. 
8.6.  The delegate of Japan shared the concerns expressed by the United States with regard to 
Indonesia's trade-restrictive policies, which violated such WTO rules as local content requirement 
and restrictions on imports and exports. However, Japan recognized that Indonesia had been G/C/M/125 
 
- 14 - 
 
  improving its trade and investment environment thro ugh measures that included the relaxation of 
regulations and import procedures, and the amendmen t of Presidential decrees to relax investment 
regulations under its economic policy packages . At the previous CTG meeting, and at the 
TRIMS Committee meeting, Indonesia had explaine d that 143 economic regulations would be 
repealed, of which 32  related directly to trade. Japan requested Indonesia to provide Members 
with detailed information on these revisions and their relationship to the economic policy packages. 
8.7.  Turning back to the main issue, he recalled that at previous meetings of this Council, and 
other committees, Japan, together with other Members, had repeatedly raised their concerns about a long series of Indonesia's laws and regula tions, namely the Mining Law, the Law on Trade, 
the Law on Industry, restrictions in the retail sector and specifically sales restrictions on 4G mobile 
phones, and local content requirements for investment in the telecommunications sector. It was 
regrettable that these measures had not yet been rectified despite most of them going clearly against WTO rules. These trade policies also went against the above-mentioned pro-trade efforts 
of Indonesia to improve its business environment. Japan urged Indonesia to consider the concerns 
raised by WTO Members and to make a real effort to amend its trade policies accordingly. 
8.8.  The delegate of the European Union recalle d that the European Union had also been raising 
this issue for a long time although no progress had been made, and that the moves that Indonesia 
had made appeared to be both inadequate an d lacking in transparency. The European Union 
welcomed the reform package that had been adopted by the Indonesian Government in February 2016. However, the high number of rest rictive and protectionist trade and investment 
measures still in place, together with a general lack of transparency, continued to be a cause for 
concern. The European Union's operators continued to face multiple layers of general and specific import licensing and local content requirements in various sectors and the status of which 
remained unclear. 
8.9.  The European Union was also concerned abou t the imposition of a pre-paid corporate income 
tax on importers, which worsened already restrictive import measures besides being also 
discriminatory. Other concerns were in reference to the entry port restrictions applied in the main 
port of Jakarta, which hampered the possibility for EU operators to export food, in particular. 
Additionally, the European Union was worried about export restrictions applied to certain raw materials. These particular measures disrupted international markets, increased input costs for 
producers, and led to uncertainty in terms of  supply. The European Union would appreciate 
confirmation from Indonesia concerning the measures that it had already taken to eliminate the above-mentioned trade barriers, and also an indication as to when it would remove the barriers 
that the European Union and other Members had repeatedly mentioned in this Council, in 
particular but not only relating to the Law on Trade and Industry. 
8.10.  The delegate of Canada joined previous speakers in expressing optimism that recent 
developments in Indonesia might lead to greater progress being made in addressing a number of 
the concerns that had been raised in this Council on numerous occasions. However, Canada remained concerned that Indonesia's numerous measures, especially those that related to agricultural products, might negatively affect Canada's ability to compete on the Indonesian 
market. Canada also shared the concern that Indo nesia persisted in applying import restricting 
policies and practices, and for this reason Canada had participated in the discussions and consultations that had taken place to date. Canada encouraged Indonesia to respect its 
WTO obligations, and with a particular emphasis on import licensing procedures. 
8.11.  The delegate of Australia shared the concerns expressed by other delegations about 
Indonesia's import and export-restricting policies in recent years, and particularly as they affected 
agricultural trade. Particular concerns remained with regard to Indonesia's import licensing 
regimes, which included outright prohibitions on imports of certain animals and animal products, including ready-to-slaughter cattle and certain types of bovine offal and secondary cuts. Other types of bovine secondary cuts and carcasses coul d only be imported by State-owned enterprises 
in limited circumstances. And imported meat products could not be sold in traditional markets or 
supermarkets. 
8.12.  Indonesia's import permit system for agricultural products, including live cattle, boxed beef, 
and horticultural goods, effectively imposed a quot a on imports. Furthermore, imports of certain 
horticultural products had been banned for periods of time to coincide with domestic production G/C/M/125 
 
- 15 - 
 
  cycles; for example, imports of citrus fruits fo r the first half of 2016 had only been permitted 
between February and April. 
8.13.  Indonesia had continued to amend its regulations in a way that imposed further restrictions, 
such as an explicit quota-setting process for horticultural imports, and limits on how long meat 
products could be stored before they entered Indonesia. Australia remained concerned about the 
effect that these and other measures by Indonesia had had on trade between the two countries, and would welcome further information about the co nsistency of these regulations with Indonesia's 
WTO obligations. 
8.14.  The delegate of Brazil shared the previous concerns about Indonesia's import-restricting 
practices given that these had systemic implications and a significant impact on trade. Since 2009, 
Brazil had tried to gain access to the Indonesian market for chicken products and bovine meat. 
However, all Brazil's efforts had proven fruitless given that Indonesia did not provide appropriate 
answers concerning the possibility of exporting such products from Brazil. This flagrantly violated a 
number of WTO rules and adversely affected Brazil's trade interests. 
8.15.  The Brazilian private sector estimated that, without these barriers, bilateral trade could 
improve considerably, thereby contributing to the economic development of both countries, in line with WTO objectives. With this in mind, the Brazilian Government had had no option but to initiate 
two cases in the context of the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism. The first complaint concerned 
chicken meat and chicken products (DS484). It was presently in its panel phase, with Brazil's first written submission to be submitted on 22 April. The second complaint, about bovine meat (DS506), was still in the consultations phase as requested on 4 April 2016. Brazil hoped to work 
together with Indonesia towards achieving a prompt solution to its concerns that would be in the 
interests of both countries, including in light of  the positive policy developments mentioned by 
other Members today. 
8.16.  The delegate of New Zealand echoed previo us concerns given that Indonesia's restrictions 
undermined core WTO principles and were inconsistent with key obligations in the 
WTO Agreements. New Zealand continued to be concerned about the numerous import restrictions 
in Indonesia's laws and regulations as these affected trade across a range of agricultural products, 
including horticultural and animal products. Indonesia's recent introduction of new import regulations for horticultural and animal products had not remedied this situation, and the new regulations continued to impose severe restrictions on the importation of a wide range of 
agricultural products. 
8.17.  These restrictions hurt not only exporters but also Indonesian consumers, processors, and 
producers, given the inflationary effect of the meas ures on food prices in Indonesia, including for 
basic foodstuffs. The measures could have a negative impact on supply chains and so also 
undermined the positive efforts made by the Indonesian Government to increase local capacity and jobs. New Zealand hoped that Indonesia's reform plans would steer its policies back in a more 
positive and WTO-consistent direction. 
8.18.  The delegate of Switzerland reiterated the systemic concerns expressed at previous 
CTG meetings with regard to Indonesia's trade-rest ricting practices. Nonetheless, he welcomed the 
recent progress made and called on Indonesia to continue in its efforts to comply with WTO rules, 
and also to be transparent in its reform process. 
8.19.  The delegate of Chinese Taipei reiterated Chinese Taipei's concerns with regard to 
Indonesia's trade policies and practices, and especially with regard to the requirements for 
imported fish and fish products and the restrictio ns of entry port. He welcomed Indonesia's recent 
reform plan, and urged it to continue with its reform process and to bring its trade policies into conformity with its WTO commitments. Considering Indonesia's statement at the previous 
CTG meeting, that the deregulation programme was still in progress, Chinese Taipei sought from 
Indonesia an updated overview of developments . Chinese Taipei would continue monitoring 
Indonesia's import and export regimes closely. 
8.20.  The delegate of the Republic of Korea indicated that his authorities had similar systemic 
concerns and reserved its right to come back to these issues. G/C/M/125 
 
- 16 - 
 
  8.21.  The representative of Indonesia thanked Members for their continued interest in Indonesia's 
export and import policy, and acknowledged that this issue had been a long-standing agenda item 
at the CTG. Since Indonesia had already addressed these concerns at the last CTG meeting he requested to incorporate Indonesia's earlier responses into the minutes of this meeting.
3 Indonesia 
also acknowledged that the issue had been raised in the meetings of the related committees. He 
highlighted that Indonesia had applied its import and export policies on the basis of justifiable 
reasons, such as safety, health, environmental, social, cultural, and also moral hazard reasons. 
8.22.  Such policies were designed to be in conformity with Indonesia's WTO commitments and 
were not intended to create barriers to trade.  Under the current administration, Indonesia had 
issued 11 economic deregulation packages, which covered around 180 regulations concerning trade deregulation policies and simplified bureau cracy processes, and which aimed to expand and 
support the improvement of economic activities in Indonesia. The measures adopted included, 
among others, harmonization of various regulations, streamlining requirements, simplification of licence and/or business permits, and eliminatio n of some inspection processes. Indonesia 
reiterated its support of transparency as a key prin ciple, and throughout the drafting process of its 
trade regulations had welcomed comments and recommendations from all relevant stakeholders, both domestic and international. 
8.23.  Indonesia reiterated its statements on its "living policies", which evolved and were 
reconciled with new challenges as these emerged in trends in the global trade into which Indonesia was integrated. Therefore, Indonesia, as a developing country, needed policy space in order to pursue and achieve development and could not be considered as being restrictive given that, 
during the last five years, its imports grew steadily, and by rather more than many other 
countries, such as Japan and the United States. In donesia had repeatedly conveyed this response, 
not only at this Council, but also in other subsidiary bodies. Indonesia remained committed to 
working with interested Members in the WTO and other fora to address Members' concerns while 
at the same time taking into account Indonesia's need to address its own development challenges. 
8.24.  The Chairperson thanked delegations for th eir interventions and proposed that the Council 
take note of the statements made. 
8.25.  The Council so agreed. 
9  CHINA - ISSUES RELATED TO TRADE IN SEAFOOD - REQUEST FROM NORWAY 9.1.  The Chairperson informed the Council th at, in a communication dated 31 March 2016, the 
delegation of Norway requested the Secretariat to include in the agenda of this meeting an item 
entitled: "China – Issues Related to Trade in Seafood". 
9.2.  The delegate of Norway stated that, at  the last CTG meeting, in November 2015, and 
repeatedly in the SPS Committee, her delega tion had raised concerns about measures 
implemented by China since December 2010 that  affected Norwegian exports of seafood. The 
measures included quarantine and testing proced ures, and allocation of "import licences" for 
salmon. Furthermore, the list of Norwegian enterprises approved for exports to China had not been 
updated, an issue on which Norway had repeated ly requested China to provide a justification. 
9.3.  The market share for Norwegian salmon in  China had been reduced from about 95% in 2010 
to close to zero by March 2016. Exports of non-salmon species had also been reduced. The scope 
of these issues called for in-depth bilateral consultations between the Norwegian and Chinese 
authorities. Norway had repeatedly, and through different channels, requested technical consultations with China in order to look into the whole range of food safety issues. Nevertheless, 
Norway's requests had not been addressed by Ch ina and there had been no further developments 
since Norway had raised its concerns in this Council last autumn. 
9.4.  Norway had welcomed confirmation from th e Chinese representative, in November 2015, that 
the Chinese authorities had indeed received the relevant information to allow for the seafood 
enterprises registration to be updated. However, no progress had been made with regard to such 
updates. 
                                               
3 See document G/C/M/124, paragraphs 10.22-10.23. G/C/M/125 
 
- 17 - 
 
  9.5.  In the past China had explained that its me asures affecting Norwegian seafood were justified 
for food safety reasons. However, Norway highligh ted that its food safety regulations were fully 
harmonized with the EU regulations that applied throughout the European Economic Area, and reflected the relevant requirements of the Codex Alimentarius, the OIE, and the IPPC. Therefore, 
seafood produced anywhere in the European Economic Area, which included the EU and the 
EFTA states, had to comply with the same food safety requirements. 
9.6.  Norway had met bilaterally with the Chinese mission in Geneva and hoped that, on the basis 
of the last meeting (that took place immediately before this Council), a positive solution would be 
found. 
9.7.  The delegate of the European Union underlined that all import procedures applied by 
WTO Members must be transparent, predictable, and in line with international standards and 
WTO requirements. Moreover, such procedures should not be more restrictive than necessary. 
9.8.  The delegate of the People's Republic of China indicated that her delegation had taken note of 
the previous statements and, since it was the se cond time that Norway had raised this issue, 
China wished to reiterate its position and make further clarifications. In this regard, she said that 
in recent years AQSIQ had constantly detected parasites, pathogenic micro-organisms, and other diseases from Norwegian salmon, including frozen salmon and cod fish. According to reports from 
the website of the OIE, the ISA virus had been detected repeatedly in Norwegian salmon in recent 
years. Moreover, international and Norwegian media had also reported that toxic substances such 
as dioxins and dioxin-like PCBs were detected in the livers of Norwegian cod fish at levels that exceeded the maximum limits. 
9.9.  In order to ensure the safety of imported  aquatic products, China was monitoring imported 
aquatic products based on the different risk levels of products, and had strengthened the inspection and quarantine of products that represented a high risk. China asserted that its 
measures served to strengthen the inspection and quarantine of salmon exported to China, and 
that the measures applied to like products from all WTO Members and were not targeting only Norwegian seafood products. All the relevant measur es served only for risk management purposes 
and were not intended completely to ban the regular importation of Norwegian sea products. 
These measures were based on existing Chinese laws and regulations, which were consistent with the WTO SPS Agreement. China was in contact with Norway and had sent its written responses to Norway through bilateral channels on several occasions. 
9.10.  The delegate of Norway commented, in resp onse to China's intervention, that, despite its 
numerous requests, Norway had not yet received written information from China regarding its 
regulations on imports. 
9.11.  The delegate of China clarified that te chnical communication between the two sides had 
taken place and had never been interrupted, and that the issue had been raised recently and that 
Chinese capital-based officials had replied in writing to questions and concerns raised by Norway 
on several occasions. Moreover, upon the request of Norway, the SPS delegates of China had held 
several bilateral consultations with the SPS delegates from Norway on the margins of meetings of the SPS Committee, and at the Committee meeting the Chinese SPS delegates had replied in a detailed manner to Norway's concerns. Therefore, China could not understand why Norway, which 
repeatedly highlighted the importance of technical discussions, had chosen the CTG meeting to 
raise its concerns rather than the SPS Committee meeting, which was by nature more technical. 
9.12.  The Chairperson thanked delegations for th eir interventions and proposed that the Council 
take note of the statements made. 
9.13.  The Council so agreed. 
10  NIGERIA – IMPORT RESTRICTING MEASURES – REQUEST FROM CHILE, THE 
EUROPEAN UNION, ICELAND, NORWAY, THAILAND, THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
AND URUGUAY 
10.1.  The Chairperson informed the Council that, in communications dated 31 March and 
4 April 2016, the delegations of Chile, the European  Union, Iceland, Norway, the United States of G/C/M/125 
 
- 18 - 
 
  America, and Uruguay requested the Secretariat to include the following item on the agenda of 
this meeting: "Nigeria – Import Restricting Measures". He also reminded delegations that, at the outset of the meeting, Thailand had requested to be added to the list of the co-sponsors of this 
issue. 
10.2.  The delegate of Norway stated that, in July 2015, the Central Bank of Nigeria had imposed 
currency restrictions limiting access to foreign exchange on the Nigerian exchange market for a 
number of products. This measure in effect repres ented a restriction on trade between Nigeria and 
several of its trading partners, including Norway . Trade in fish and seafood between Norway and 
Nigeria had decreased, and this affected the sector in both countries. This issue had been duly addressed by Norway and several other Members in the WTO and on other occasions since July 2015. 
10.3.  The effect of the currency restrictions was to limit imports of certain specific goods and to 
force importers to operate outside the official exchange market. Norway questioned whether the 
restrictions were in conformity with Nigeria's WTO obligations, in particular GATT Article XI. 
Norway had also been informed of a possible new "quota import regime" under Nigeria's fishing 
policy, and invited Nigeria to clarify whether a new policy had indeed been introduced. If this were 
the case, Nigeria should also indicate how import quotas remained in conformity with Nigeria's 
obligations under the GATT, especially given that WTO regulations prohibited the use of import 
restrictions. Nigeria needed to update Members on these import restrictions, both in terms of currency restrictions and the fish importation policy and quota regime. 
10.4.  The delegate of Chile indicated that th e problems encountered by the Chilean exporting 
sector had obliged Chile again to request the inclusion of this agenda item. Exports of frozen 
mackerel to Nigeria were faced with a situation where the Nigerian authorities denied access to foreign currency for trading operations; the situation regarding new import licences was also 
unclear. 
10.5.  Chile had been expressing these concerns since 2013, both in this Council and in various 
subsidiary bodies, and had also carried out bilateral talks in Kenya, concurrent with Nigeria, where 
all these issues had been raised. However, Nigeria had not provided any clarification or information 
that would allow Chile to understand Nigeria's market conditions in any predictable manner. Chile hoped that Nigeria would address this matter and again allow entry to Chilean exports, as before the adoption of the aforementioned restrictions. 
10.6.  The delegate of Iceland recalled that, like other Members, Iceland had repeatedly raised this 
matter in this Council and in other appropriate fora, and had also repeatedly made calls to Nigeria 
to refrain from imposing restrictive measures on th e importation of fish. Iceland had also urged full 
transparency on any changes made to Nigeria's import regime for fish products. At the last 
CTG meeting, Iceland drew the Council's attention to the currency restrictions being faced by any importer of fisheries to Nigeria. Despite repeated calls, to date these measures had still not been 
appropriately notified. 
10.7.  Several months after Nigeria's introduction of its import licensing regime, it was still unclear 
as to precisely which requirements had to be fulfilled in order to obtain an import licence. Nigeria had also increased its tariffs for a number of fish products, from 5% to 20%. All these restrictions 
and the general lack of transparency had had a stro ng negative impact on exports of fish products 
to Nigeria. Nigeria had traditionally been Iceland's most important export market in Africa. Icelandic fish products had provided Nigerian consumers with a healthy, high-quality, and 
affordable source of food. Exports to Nigeria were an important economic activity in many 
vulnerable coastal communities in Iceland. Unfortunately, the measures that Nigeria had introduced posed a serious threat to this long-standing trade relationship, to the detriment of 
Icelandic producers and Nigerian consumers alike.  Once again, Iceland insisted that Nigeria 
provide more detailed information as to the precise content of its import regime as applied to fisheries products, including any currency restrictions, and also called upon Nigeria to respect its WTO obligations, including its notification obligations. 
10.8.  The delegate of Uruguay echoed previous speakers with regard to the various measures 
taken by Nigeria to prevent access to its market. Uruguay's trade concerns focused on Uruguayan 
exports of fish and fish products to the Nigerian  market that were disadvantaged by the Central G/C/M/125 
 
- 19 - 
 
  Bank note, which prevented local operators from accessing the foreign currency necessary to pay 
for imports. She recalled that, in 2015, the delegati on of Nigeria in Geneva had explained that the 
main reason for not having addressed these issues, and for not having provided a response, was the changes of respective authority in the ministries  involved in these areas in light of the election 
of a new Government. However, this situation had now been rectified thanks to the appointment of 
the Cabinet of President Buhari on 11 November  2015. Consequently, communication between the 
delegation in Geneva and the new Government of Nigeria should be re-established. She therefore 
urged the delegation of Nigeria in Geneva to convey to the capital Uruguay's trade concerns with 
regard to access to the Nigerian market, and also urged Nigeria to notify the appropriate committees concerning all of the relevant measures in an opportune manner since these measures were affecting international trade. In the case of Uruguay, its fishing industry and cooperatives 
had been making great efforts to export to Nigeri a's market, which was a traditional destination for 
Uruguayan exports. Uruguay remained ready to engage with Nigeria on these issues, either bilaterally or multilaterally. 
10.9.  The delegate of Thailand regretted having  to voice again Thailand's concerns regarding 
Nigeria's restrictions on importers accessing foreign exchange currencies for numerous imported 
products. These measures had been implemented since mid-2015 and had included agricultural 
products and construction materials. The items affected represented considerable restrictions to 
trade for Thailand and its exporters. Thailand doubted if the measure was consistent with GATT Article XI. 
10.10.  Furthermore, and although Thai exporters continued to be affected, to date no substantial 
response had been received to Thailand's formal letter, sent to Nigeria in August 2015, in which 
Thailand registered its interest in this issue and requested clarification of the aforementioned measure. Thailand urged Nigeria to provide interested Members with detailed and adequate 
information and to endeavour to terminate such trade-restrictive measures promptly. 
10.11.  The delegate of the European Union indi cated that the two issues of concern for the 
European Union were already well known to Members, namely: import restrictions relating to 
access to foreign exchange, and local content requirements on oil and gas activities. With regard 
to the import restrictions, the Central Bank of Nigeria had restricted access, since June 2015, to foreign exchange to importers of about 40 items covering a wide range of economic activity, 
restrictions that went beyond the import restrict ions of fish products that had already been in 
place for more than a year. This measure restricted trade on more than 800 tariff lines and had 
significant consequences on the national econom y, on people's standards of living, and on 
Nigeria's trade partners. Interestingly, the Lagos Chamber of Commerce and Industry (LCCI), in its 
third quarter business environment survey, had indicated that the Central Bank's forex restriction 
policy was one of the costliest policies in Nigeria in recent years. Nevertheless, the impact of these restrictions could be felt by the poorest segments of the Nigerian population as prices of products 
of first necessity had increased as a consequence of insufficient supply. The European Union asked 
Nigeria to explain the justification for the foreign exchange restrictions, which had not been notified to the WTO, and that therefore ran co ntrary to Nigeria's WTO commitments. She asked 
Nigeria when it would notify these import restriction measures and to which WTO body, if the 
Committee on Import Licensing or another WTO committee, such as the Balance-of-Payments 
Committee. In this context, the European Union also noted that Nigeria had received a visit from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in January 2016. 
10.12.  With regard to the oil and gas local cont ent requirements, an item that had been several 
times on the CTG's agenda and that had also been addressed over the course of a number of years in the TRIMS Committee, the European Union was still waiting for answers to its questions. The 
European Union would appreciate receiving info rmation on the position adopted by the new 
Nigerian Government regarding the expected date of entry into force and implementation of the 
Amendment Bill to the Local Content Act as it  had understood that this amendment had been 
passed by the National Assembly but was sti ll awaiting the agreement of the President. 
10.13.  The delegate of United States of America recalled that at the last CTG meeting a number of 
delegations had expressed concern regarding trade barriers imposed by Nigeria, including 
restrictions on the use of foreign exchange for imports of a wide range of products and local 
content requirements. The Central Bank of Nigeria had indicated that the rationale for the foreign 
exchange restriction measure was to stimulate local production of the targeted products although G/C/M/125 
 
- 20 - 
 
  the United States was not aware of Nigeria's notification or provision of a WTO justification for the 
measure. 
10.14.  Concerns also existed with regard to Nigeria's local content requirements and product 
bans. The United States believed that the local co ntent requirements were arbitrary and onerous, 
and would drive away potential investors rather th an promoting the generation of employment and 
transfer of skills and capacity sought by the Nigerian government. The WTO Secretariat's report for Nigeria's last TPR in 2011 stated that the government's import prohibition list, mostly used to 
protect domestic industry, was being steadily reduced. However, the United States believed that 
the next report would show that the list had in fact grown in recent years, even while it would at the same time acknowledge the various economic challenges being faced by Nigeria, and also applaud Nigeria for undertaking a number of diffic ult but necessary structural reforms. However, 
the United States was concerned that these import restrictions were harming Nigeria's economy as 
well as those of its neighbours and other tradin g partners. She encouraged Nigeria to identify 
other policy tools by which to address its objectives. The United States believed that measures 
that would foster greater competitiveness for Nigerian producers through an open trade regime 
and attractive investment climate would be more effective in helping the Nigerian government to achieve transformative growth and job creation. 
10.15.  The delegate of Switzerland reiterated the systemic concerns of his delegation with regard 
to Nigeria's currency restrictions as applied to imports of a wide range of products. These 
measures affected the trade of importers but also damaged the local economy. Switzerland asked Nigeria to provide an update on the impact of these measures so as to improve Members' 
understanding of the situation. 
10.16.  The delegate of Japan echoed the previous concerns. Japan considered that the measures 
put in place by the Central Bank of Nigeria were de facto  import restrictions that had an adverse 
impact on the exports of WTO Members to Nigeria, including those from Japan. He urged Nigeria to 
provide detailed information on this measure, and also to provide information on the consultations that were currently taking place with the IMF, in  accordance with Article 14 of the IMF Agreement. 
Japan also requested Nigeria to reform its measure so as to end the adverse impact it was having 
on Members' exports. 
10.17.  The delegate of Australia joined previous speakers over concerns with Nigeria's measure. 
Like the European Union, Australia sought an explanation from Nigeria as to how the preferential 
treatment accorded to local goods and services in the Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry Content 
Development Act of 2010 was consistent with Nigeria's National Treatment WTO obligations. Australia also requested a follow-up to Nigeria's comments at the last CTG meeting indicating that 
its new government was prepared to address the concerns raised by Members of this Council, and 
specifically to know what steps had been taken by  Nigeria with regard to local content measures 
for oil and gas. 
10.18.  The delegate of Chinese Taipei joined previous speakers given that his delegation shared 
the systemic concerns of other Members about the Nigerian measures on importation and 
investment. He encouraged Nigeria to increase the transparency of its measure and to provide 
explanations as to its WTO consistency. 
10.19.  The delegate of Nigeria thanked delegati ons for their interventions and indicated that, 
despite the enormous challenges being faced by he r country, Nigeria could assure Members that it 
would abide by its WTO commitments, and that it would continue cooperating with interested 
Members. She indicated that, as previously report ed to this Council, the Government of Nigeria 
was currently engaged with critical stakeholders of its economy in addressing the measures and policies in question with a view to reviewing them as appropriate. In this exercise, due 
consideration would be given to Members' concerns, including the rapid diversification of the 
Nigerian economy, with an emphasis on agricultural and solid minerals development. Her authorities required more time to conclude the ongoing consultation process and looked forward to engaging in constructive dialogue with interested delegations. Nigeria also hoped that interested 
Members would understand the difficult and challenging situation it was facing. Nevertheless, 
Nigeria would continue to uphold and respect the fundamental principles of the multilateral trading system. G/C/M/125 
 
- 21 - 
 
  10.20.  The Chairperson thanked delegations for their interventions and proposed that the Council 
take note of the statements made. 
10.21.  The Council so agreed. 
11  ECUADOR – IMPORT RESTRICTING MEASURES – REQUEST FROM JAPAN AND THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (G/C/W/722) 
11.1.  The Chairperson informed the Council that, in communications dated 1 and 4 April 2016, the 
delegations of Japan and the United States of Am erica, respectively, requested the Secretariat to 
include in the agenda of today's meeting an item entitled: "Ecuador – Import Restricting 
Measures". The delegation of the United States  also requested the Secretariat to circulate 
document G/C/W/722 containing questions to Ecuador. 
11.2.  The delegate of Japan indicated that his delegation would raise two issues: first, import 
restricting measures on automobiles; and second, Ecuadorian balance-of-payments 
(BOP) measures. On the first issue, he regretted that, despite the calls made by Japan and other Members to remove the restrictions, Ecuador had not only extended the implementation of these 
measures for a further year but had also strength ened the level of restriction. Japan considered 
that Ecuador's measures were inconsistent with GATT Article XI and had not found convincing the explanations of these measures provided by Ecuado r at the last meeting of this Council, where it 
indicated that they were justified under GATT Article XX. Japan believed that these measures 
constituted an arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination, and that there were other policy options available that would enable Ecuador to achieve the same environmental policy objectives but in a less trade restrictive and distortive manner. Japan again urged Ecuador to remove the measures 
as soon as possible, or at least to confirm that the measures would expire and would be 
completely removed no later than December 2015, as initially planned, and that no new measures would then be introduced. 
11.3.  On Ecuador's BOP measures, Japan's position was that such measures were inconsistent 
with GATT Article XVIII and must be completely e liminated at the latest by June 2016. Japan 
appreciated Ecuador's efforts to phase-out the surcharge early in January 2016; nevertheless, 
Japan highlighted that the existing measure had been creating a significant adverse effect and 
having a significant impact on WTO Member's exports, including from Japan. Last but not least, Japan understood that Ecuador was considering the introduction of a new or alternate programme in the form of a "timbre cambiario". This was further cause for concern and should be clarified in 
detail by Ecuador, including with regard to its conformity with WTO rules. 
11.4.  The delegate of the United States of America expressed her hope to hear at this meeting 
Ecuador's responses to the questions posed to it by the United States in document G/C/W/722. 
These questions referred to the following aspects of the situation at issue: (i) Following the issue 
of Presidential Decree 943 on 22 March 2016, what were the next steps and timing in instituting a system of alternate means of payment for tariff duties on imports? (ii) How would the proposed 
system work, particularly as it seemed to subs idize Ecuadorian exporters by allowing them or 
other favoured entities sole initial access to the new electronic currency? Did Ecuador consider this system a subsidy to exporters? (iii) What was Ecuador's understanding of the effect the new system would have on import levels, particularly as it might limit the level of imports by restricting 
the supply of new electronic currency available to importers? (iv) What was Ecuador's response to 
the US description of the price effects of scarc ity? How would the high price of the proposed 
electronic currency relative to the dollar re late to Ecuador's WTO bound tariff rate? In 
document G/C/W/722 the United States had outlined a number of concerns regarding the 
operations of the Central Bank Board in this new system. Could Ecuador address those concerns, which fall under the overall concern for transparency? (v) Finally, how would the new system apply 
to Members with which Ecuador had a free trade agreement and those to which it did not so as to 
avoid discriminatory treatment? 
11.5.  The delegate of the Republic of Korea stated that Korea welcomed the steps being taken by 
Ecuador with a view to eliminating its BOP safeguard measure; however, Korea would wish 
Ecuador to abolish its measure before the original schedule, as Ecuador had indicated. He asked 
Ecuador to ensure that a new and further import-restricting measure would not be taken in the future, even though the import surcharge would be eliminated. G/C/M/125 
 
- 22 - 
 
  11.6.  Korea also shared the concerns expressed by previous speakers with regard to the import 
quota system. The Ecuadorean government had maintained its import quotas on automobiles and mobile phones since these were imposed in 2012; these measures were supposed to be discontinued last year although they had actually been extended now until end-2016. Korea 
doubted the consistency of these measures with the GATT and believed that they could undermine 
the multilateral trading system given that the measures had a significant negative impact on the commercial interests of Korean industry. For instance, the export of automobiles to Ecuador had 
decreased by more than 50% in 2015 due to the import quota. Korea requested Ecuador to abolish 
the import quota as soon as possible and looked forward to closely working together with Ecuador to address these issues, including in the Korea-Ecuador SECA negotiation. 
11.7.  The delegate of Canada stated that Canada continued to have systemic concerns with 
regard to Ecuador's import restrictions in the automotive sector, and in particular the application of 
a tariff regime that appeared to favour local co ntent. In addition, Ecuador's refusal to accept 
US motor vehicle safety and emissions standards continued to be a matter of concern for Canada. 
As most of the motor vehicles manufactured in Canada were built to US Federal Motor Vehicle 
Safety Standards (or FMVSS), Ecuador's decision no longer to accept vehicles certified to these standards was troubling. US vehicle safety standards and, by extension, Canadian safety 
standards provided the most stringent performance and outcomes with respect to vehicle safety. 
Ecuador had failed to provide the necessary scientific evidence with respect to its conclusion that vehicles built to US FMVSS, with their long histor y of acceptance in Ecuador, no longer met its 
objectives. Canada requested Ecuador to reconsider its final regulation, and to continue to allow 
for the use of US FMVSS and Environmental Prot ection Agency (or EPA) standards and their 
Canadian equivalents. 
11.8.  Canada also joined previous speakers in expressing its concern with regard to the 
inconsistency of Ecuador's application of its BOP measures with GATT Article XVIII, citing, by way 
of example, the targeted nature of the tariff me asures, which covered only 31% of total imports, 
and the large variation in the surcharges app lied, which ranged between 5% and 45%. Canada 
welcomed the phase-out schedule undertaken by Ecua dor, with an initial reduction from 45% to 
40% of the highest tariff level in February 2016, and encouraged Ecuador to lift all its BOP measures by June 2016, or earlier, as it had promised to do. Like other Members, Canada also had concerns with regard to possible replacement measures to follow the phase-out of those 
currently in place. Ecuador should in any case assure Members that any future measures would be 
non-discriminatory and consistent with its WTO obligations. 
11.9.  The delegate of the European Union stat ed that the European Union considered that 
monetary measures and measures related to BOP difficulties in general should first and foremost 
be discussed in the BOP Committee and in the Gene ral Council, where the EU position had been 
expressed several times when it had asked Ecuador to dismantle the current import surcharges in 
place, which the European Union did not consider  to be WTO-compatible. At the meeting of the 
BOP Committee in February 2016 the majority of Memb ers were of this view and had called upon 
Ecuador to ensure that any new measure adopted be WTO-compliant, as should also be the case 
with regard to the monetary instrument being designed by the Ecuadorian authorities, as 
mentioned by the United States in its communication and by several delegations in their previous 
statements. Ecuador should confirm whether a final decision had already been taken and also ensure that any new scheme be fully WTO-compatible. 
11.10.  The delegate of Switzerland acknowledged the challenging situation being faced by 
Ecuador, in particular with regard to its BOP, as well as Ecuador's efforts to consider its economic 
situation in light of its international commitments. Nevertheless, Switzerland shared the concerns 
of other delegations and with regard in particular  to the Presidential Decree issued in March that 
accepted a new instrument as an alternate means of payment; in case this were a stepping stone to introducing a trade-restricting measure, Ecuador should carefully review the measure's compatibility with WTO rules. 
11.11.  The delegate of Chile recalled that in various WTO fora her delegation had expressed its 
concerns about the implementation and effect of the trade restricting measures imposed by 
Ecuador. In 2015, Chile followed carefully the commitment announced by Ecuador concerning its 
BOP measures, as outlined in document WT/BOP/G/23, dated 26 October 2015, and which 
established that the tariff surcharge would end by June 2016. Chile thanked Ecuador for the information and the cooperation provided at the last session of consultations of the G/C/M/125 
 
- 23 - 
 
  BOPs Committee held on 17 February 2016, and for the different bilateral meetings which had also 
been held. 
11.12.  Given the news in the media about new restrictive measures in Ecuador, the Government 
of Chile shared the concerns expressed by the United States and other delegations at this meeting, 
and seconded some of the questions posed by the United States in document G/C/W/722. Chile 
recognized and expressed its solidarity with Ecua dor's complex economic situation but at the same 
time Chile requested that, if considering new measures, Ecuador should take into account its 
international commitments so as to maintain maximum certainty and predictability in international 
trade. 
11.13.  She also reminded Ecuador that its responses to Chile regarding how the safeguard 
measure had improved the negative situation of Ecuador's BOP situation were still pending. Chile 
hoped that any new measure adopted by Ecuador would be consistent with its commitments and 
avoid any kind of discrimination. 
11.14.  The representative of Ecuador thanked delegations for their statements and responded 
firstly to Japan and Korea's concerns about automobiles. Ecuador considered that the quantitative 
restrictions on imports on vehicles fell under the general exceptions contained in GATT Article XX and that the quota distribution had been applied in compliance with GATT Article XIII:2(a) on the 
non-discriminatory application of quantitative restrictions. Imports of vehicles for 2016 had been 
established with a similar amount to those of 2015 , when 94% of the total amount was reached in 
ad valorem  terms, and 82% in unit terms. Given the current economic situation in Ecuador, the 
prospects for 2017 should be similar to 2015 and 2016. This meant that the current quantitative 
restriction was adequate to satisfy the demand for imports and to address the Ecuadorian market. 
Therefore, there was no real market access limitation in Ecuador. To the contrary, Ecuador had tried to render access to its market more flexible, in accordance with GATT Article XIII:2, which 
indicated how quantitative restrictions on imports were to be applied so as to ensure, in other 
words, that trade distribution be approximate to  the greatest extent possible to that which 
Members could have expected had there been no restrictions. The global quota principle was one 
of free demand, based on the principle of first co me first served, was administered automatically 
via the customs IT system, and did not constitute an import licensing procedure given that imports were open to any importer, and noting also that  the previous situation, whereby only a reduced 
group of companies had access to quotas, had now been abolished. 
11.15.  With regard to the BOP safeguard measure, he indicated that this issue must be dealt with 
in the competent body, which was exclusively the BOP Committee, whose next meeting would take place in June 2016. Ecuador assured Members that in the BOP Committee it would comply with 
what it had previously offered, and that all the measures it had adopted or that could eventually 
be adopted were and would be in line with its commitments. Ecuador noted that some of the information in the media was based on  nothing more than speculation. 
11.16.  Regarding the US submission containing qu estions on the possible adoption of a monetary 
policy instrument, he indicated that these referred to an inexistent and non-adopted legal instrument, and were based on speculative and unjustified national and international press reports. Indeed, Article 3 of Ecuador's " Código Orgánico de la Producción, Comercio e Inversiones " 
established the means of payment for tax obligations, and Executive Order 43 of 2 March 2016 
only provided that such means of payment would be determined in accordance with Articles 94 
and 99 of the " Código Orgánico Monetario y Fiananciero " adopted in September 2014. Thus, it was 
a previously established legal body that coordinate d internal monetary policy, and this previously 
established legal body was far from being an inte rnational commercial instrument. In other words, 
Executive Order 943, which had caught the attention of the United States, as well as that of other 
Members, only complemented and gave coherence to the means of payment of customs 
obligations so that these could be appropriately adjusted to the existing monetary system of Ecuador. Consequently, the Ecuadorian authorities had not adopted any legal instrument such as the one mentioned by the United States in its communication. For these reasons he was not in a 
position to respond to questions that referred to a document that did not exist. 
11.17.  Given that the current BOP situation had been caused by a drop in oil prices as well as the 
well-known and unfavourable movements in the currencies of Ecuador's main trading partners, the 
Ecuadorian Government had been implementing a macroeconomic programme to re-establish a 
fundamental balance for its economy and to protect the current dollar-based system. This G/C/M/125 
 
- 24 - 
 
  programme had been designed in compliance with Ecuador's international commitments, 
particularly those commitments made in multilateral organizations of which Ecuador was a member. Ecuador constantly evaluated the results of the measures it had adopted with a view to assessing different macroeconomic policy options that, within the context of its international 
commitments, could allow it to stabilize its economy. 
11.18.  The delegate of Japan thanked Ecuador for the information it had provided; however, 
Japan did not share Ecuador's position that the restriction on vehicles fell under GATT Article XX. 
Therefore, he invited Ecuador to continue a discussi on of this issue so as to seek a satisfactory 
outcome. He welcomed Ecuador's indication that it was not exploring a new measure to substitute its current safeguard measure for BOP. 
11.19.  The representative of Ecuador reiterated Ecuador's readiness to discuss this matter with 
Japan and other interested Members either bilaterally or multilaterally. 11.20.  The Chairperson thanked delegations for their interventions and proposed that the Council 
take note of the statements made. 
11.21.  The Council so agreed. 
12  UKRAINE – ISSUES RELATED TO CUSTOMS VALUATION – REQUEST FROM NORWAY 
12.1.  The Chairperson informed the Council that, in a communication dated 31 March 2016, the 
delegation of Norway had requested the Secretaria t to include this item on the agenda of this 
meeting. 
12.2.  The delegate of Norway stated that th is was an issue that since 2011 had been raised 
repeatedly by her delegation, not only in this Council but also in other WTO bodies. On those 
occasions Norway had discussed this issue with the Ukrainian customs at various different levels. 
The issue had been raised again multilaterally at  the CTG's meeting in November 2015. However, 
Norway's industry still reported that the Ukrainian customs authorities continued to use indicative 
prices to determine the customs value of fish imported into Ukraine; moreover, in various cases, 
the indicative price was higher than the price on the invoice. This represented additional duties 
and value added payments on imports. 
12.3.  The Ukrainian authorities had explained that Resolution No. 724 was intended to ensure 
equal conditions for foreign economic activity, as well as a common approach to risk management systems as used for customs valuation purposes. But stakeholders had nevertheless reported that the actual price varied at different border offices and that in some cases indicative prices were still 
used by the Customs Service as a basis for their calculations. 
12.4.  Norway called upon Ukraine to find a solution to the problems faced by economic operators 
to ensure that the determination of the customs value be in all cases in accordance with 
WTO methodology, and to ensure that a transpar ent and predictable trading system be the basis 
for bilateral trade. 
12.5.  Her delegation had held a constructive bilateral meeting with Ukraine prior to the 
CTG meeting, and at that meeting Ukraine had given assurances to Norway that its authorities 
would continue working on these issues in order to ensure the implementation of their customs 
practices in ways that were in conformity with WTO rules. 
12.6.  The delegate of the United States of Amer ica stated that US exporters had also expressed 
concern about the valuation practices of Ukraine's customs service. The United States also shared 
Norway's concern about Resolution No. 724, which appeared to set out a process for creating and using indicative or reference prices, which could then be used to supplant invoice prices at the 
time of import. Such a process might raise questions, especially in light of the specific prohibitions 
on the use of reference prices in the Customs Valuation Agreement (CVA). The Ukrainian customs 
valuation legislation and practices thereunder should be discussed substantively in the Committee 
on Customs Valuation. G/C/M/125 
 
- 25 - 
 
  12.7.  The delegate of Switzerland echoed the previous concerns about Resolution No. 724 and 
recalled that at the last CTG meeting his delegation had indicated that Swiss companies continued 
to face similar problems in Ukraine in the area of customs valuation. Despite calls made by Switzerland and other Members, the situation had worsened. Switzerland remained ready to work 
constructively with Ukraine to find a satisfactory solution. 
12.8.  The delegate of Japan expressed Japan's intere st in this issue from a systemic point of view 
and noted that Japan would continue to monitor this issue closely. 
12.9.  The delegate of Ukraine, in response to previous speakers, stated that Ukraine's customs 
legislation was in conformity with GATT Article VII, and that Ukraine had already indicated this 
when responding to the questions posed by Norway on its notification contained in 
document G/VAL/W/248. The main method used by Ukraine's customs authorities, throughout all 
its territory, was the first indicated in the CVA.  Moreover, Ukraine had implemented a number of 
comprehensive reforms to the administration of its customs clearance procedures with a view to ensuring trade facilitation and a smooth flow of exports and imports. Such reforms had 
significantly improved customs procedures in her country. Ukraine would give its consideration to 
the particular concerns expressed by Norway and the United States at this meeting. 
12.10.  The Chairperson thanked delegations for their interventions and proposed that the Council 
take note of the statements made. 12.11.  The Council so agreed. 
13  INDIA – IMPORT RESTRICTING MEASURES – REQUEST FROM JAPAN AND THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
13.1.  The Chairperson informed the Council that, in communications dated 1 and 4 April 2016, 
respectively, the delegations of Japan and the United States of America had requested the 
Secretariat to include this item on the agenda of this meeting. 
13.2.  The delegate of Japan indicated that, on 5 February 2016, the Directorate-General of 
Foreign Trade of India, attached to the Minist ry of Commerce and Industry, had introduced a 
minimum import price (MIP) measure for 173 iron and steel products. According to India's 
notification, dated 5 February 2016, the MIP measure did not allow the products to be imported at 
prices below the specific prices set out in the notification; these prices would be valid for six months from the date of notification. This measure had a significant adverse impact on the exports of iron and steel products from Japan and was clearly inconsistent with GATT Article XI. 
Therefore, Japan requested India to remove the measure immediately. Japan also had serious 
concerns with regard to India's determination on safeguard measures for hot-rolled flat products and would like to further discuss this issue in the upcoming meeting of the Committee on 
Safeguards. 
13.3.  The delegate from New Zealand stated that, in addition to the concerns raised by Japan, 
New Zealand had specific concerns about India's port closures to apple imports, an issue that his 
delegation and other Members had raised before in  this Council, and elsewhere, given India's lack 
of satisfactory response to Members' enquiries. He welcomed the news that four of the six ports 
that had been closed without consultation in September 2015 had now been reopened; however, the remaining ports continued to be closed to apple imports. Port closures gave rise to concerns 
under Article 4 of the Agreement on Agriculture and under GATT Article XI. New Zealand looked 
forward to receiving India's responses to the questions posed to it at the November 2015 CTG meeting and in other WTO committees, and in particular with regard to India's rationale and 
justification for the ongoing closure of certain ports, and how long these port closures would 
continue? 
13.4.  The delegate of the United States of Am erica acknowledged India's improvements in terms 
of market openness in the past few months, such as the inclusion of a tariff reduction on wind 
turbine equipment, improved customs processing procedures, and revisions to its product approvals scheme for food products. However, the Un ited States had also noticed a trend in tariff 
increases, localized conformity assessment requirements, and continued confusion over new 
requirements in India. G/C/M/125 
 
- 26 - 
 
  13.5.  In terms of tariff increases, the most recent Indian budget announced tariff increases on 
96 tariff lines falling under capital goods. Furthe r, the budget included tariff increases on 
manufacturing inputs, to include preform of silic a, driving up the cost of fibre optic cable 
production in India. There were also tariff increases across the ICT sector. Given India's desire to 
increase manufacturing as well as promote digital connectivity under its "Make in India" and 
"Digital India" campaigns, the United States urged India to remove these tariffs. 
13.6.  In the area of renewable energy, India ha d increased its tariffs on industrial solar water 
heaters and solar tempered glass. Given India's goal of reducing the cost of clean energy, and 
specifically India's goal of increasing solar pr oduction, the United States encouraged India to 
eliminate or at least reduce these tariffs. 
13.7.  The United States had also noted that Indi a imported over 70% of its medical devices, and 
that India had recently increased the basic cust oms duty on medical devices. The press release 
announcing the duty increase had expressly noted that the change was to promote domestic manufacturing in India. India had also recently withdrawn a duty exemption for approximately 
70 lifesaving drugs. Ultimately, duty increases on  medical devices and on pharmaceuticals were 
passed on to consumers, meaning that those most in need of lifesaving devices and drugs would 
be the ones that also suffered the most. 
13.8.  India also maintained a "Compulsory Regi stration Order" (CRO) for certain electronic 
products that required that foreign products should be re-tested according to an Indian standard that was identical to an international standard, and that this testing was to be performed in laboratories located in India. This requirement was especially burdensome for imported products, 
particularly when the products had already been te sted according to international standards. India 
had also expanded the list of products on which the CRO applied, and continued to issue updates 
to the policy via its website, rather than through a formal regulatory process involving stakeholder 
notice and comment. The United States believed that coming into accordance with international 
best practices for testing and certification of IT and electronics equipment would help to jumpstart Digital India's efforts. The United States encouraged India to continue its collaborative 
consultations with stakeholders so as to bring its safety testing regime into alignment with 
international best practice. 
13.9.  The United States acknowledged that some Indian Ministries engaged regularly with 
stakeholders, such as the Ministry of Law and Justice, whose February 2014 guidance set out 
stakeholders' engagement on draft legislation, pr oviding a 30-day comment period to the public. 
The United States encouraged India to expand this notice and comment period to proposed regulations, and to apply such procedures uniform ly across all of its Ministries and Departments. 
13.10.  She voiced the same concerns as those rais ed by the delegate of New Zealand with regard 
to the confusion that remained as to how apple imports were currently being treated at different ports. A similar confusion existed with regard to other policy actions that did not undergo a notice 
and comment period with stakeholders, such as a proposed ban on animal testing, new guidelines 
on insurance and re-insurance, and re-issued guidance on computer and related inventions. Transparency and predictability in the advancemen t of new rules helped in the development of the 
best possible rules, which then required fewer amendments. Advance notice was also important for 
traders, as well as for domestic and small businesses, which might have more difficulty in 
adjusting to new rules, while the absence of such rules served as an impediment to importers, as 
the issues were equally important to both Indian and foreign companies. 
13.11.  To conclude, she urged India to reduce or eliminate its recent tariff increases, to follow 
international best practices in conformity assessment procedures, and to adopt transparent, predictable, and uniform notice and comment procedures. 
13.12.  The delegate of Chinese Taipei echoed Japan's systemic concerns with regard to India's 
introduction of the MIP measures on certain iron  and steel products, and invited India to provide 
more detail on its MIP measure, especially with regard to whether or not the importation of a product below the minimum price would be allowed,  and if the importation of a product could be 
allowed if the price was raised equal to or more than the minimum price. Explanation of the 
compliance of India's MIP measure with GATT Article XI, which provided that no prohibitions or G/C/M/125 
 
- 27 - 
 
  restrictions other than duties, taxes, or other char ges, should be instituted or maintained, was also 
necessary. 
13.13.  The delegate of Canada shared the previous concerns regarding India's MIP measures on 
173 iron and steel tariff lines, which created an unnecessary trade barrier and also had a negative 
impact on the price of iron and steel products fo r users of such products in India. Thus, Canada 
encouraged India to respect its obligations under GATT Article XI. 
13.14.  Like New Zealand, Canada was concerned about India's decision to maintain restrictions on 
apple imports at certain ports, as well as by a lack of justification of such measures given that they 
had been raised in various committees, such as Agriculture, Import Licensing, SPS and TBT. Canada looked forward to receiving from India so me indication as to the rationale behind these 
measures, and to responses to the questions posed to it by New Zealand. 
13.15.  The delegate of Australia echoed prev ious speakers on this issue given that the 
MIP measure appeared to be WTO-inconsistent. This measure was also in addition to other 
measures in place against steel imports, which had been introduced by India to curb competition 
from imports on its market. He also shared the concerns expressed regarding the current global 
excess capacity and oversupply in the steel sector. Ongoing significant challenges were also being 
faced by the Australian steel industry; however,  WTO Members were required to ensure open, 
well-functioning, transparent, and competitive ma rkets. Therefore, governmental measures that 
resulted in further disruption to global trade should be avoided. 
13.16.  The delegate of Chile recalled that, at the last CTG meeting, Chile had voiced its concerns 
with regard to Indian port closures to apple imports. However, these closures had been lifted and 
the ports were now operating normally. Chilean importers had indicated that the ports that had 
been re-opened were those where the goods had typically arrived in the past. Chile believed that Members should address any concern raised by another Member in light of the importance of 
transparency, a cornerstone of the multilateral trading system. 
13.17.  The delegate of the European Union fo cused his statement on the European Union's 
concerns about the safeguard instrument put in place by India to address overcapacity in the world 
steel market. The European Union considered that safeguards were the most trade-restrictive tool 
because they were applied erga omnes  and affected all countries of origin and not just the 
exporting entities that were really the cause of the problem. The European Union regretted that the Indian authorities were inclined to use the safeguard instrument in cases where 
anti-dumping/anti-subsidy investigations would and should normally have been more appropriate. 
Regarding the MIP set for imports, the European Un ion shared the concerns expressed by previous 
speakers. These measures would have a negative impact upon EU exports to India and could be 
considered to be restrictions. India should provide further clarification of these measures. 
13.18.  The delegate of the Republic of Korea echoed the concerns about MIP measures on iron 
and steel products, and also reiterated its concer ns on the safeguard measures adopted by India. 
He requested India to address these issues in a transparent and WTO-consistent manner. 
13.19.  The delegate of China recalled China's comments on India's port measures with regard to 
apple imports at the CTG's previous meeting. China appreciated India's efforts to re-open several 
ports and asked India to provide Members with mo re information on the administration of its 
system for apple imports, indicating whether or not India would maintain these port measures on 
a longer term basis, for example, and explaining at  the same time India's justification for doing so. 
13.20.  The delegate of India thanked delegations for their interest and comments regarding 
various of its measures, such as MIP, safeguards, port restrictions, imposition of tariffs, 
compulsory registration orders, and conformity assessment procedures. He insisted that India took its WTO commitments very seriously and was of the view that it had not breached any of its 
multilateral obligations. 
13.21.  Regarding the concerns raised by some delegations on measures relating to certain 
products of iron and steel, he said that it was premature to raise these issues in this Council, when discussion of them had either not yet been initia ted or else had not yet been exhausted in the 
relevant WTO Committee. Indeed, the two issues mentioned during this meeting, which were G/C/M/125 
 
- 28 - 
 
  "minimum import price or MIP" and "safeguards", had not yet been raised or fully discussed in the 
Committee on Market Access and in the Commi ttee on Safeguards. India recognized that 
safeguards were an instrument available to WT O Members under the well-defined Agreement on 
the subject matter; however, his delegation had noted the concerns raised at this meeting and 
would convey those concerns to the authorities in capital for their consideration. 
13.22.  With regard to the concerns raised specifically by Chile and New Zealand on port 
restrictions for imports of apples into India, he noted that the issue had already been raised in 
some WTO Committees, as well as in this Council,  and added that the measure in question was 
made effective in September 2015, namely, the import of apples into India channelled only through the sea port of Nhava Sheva. However, based on the requests of several stakeholders, 
including WTO Members, the Indian government had subsequently decided to lift the restriction on 
apple imports from many customs ports. Members may have noticed that India had subsequently 
withdrawn the port restriction from the sea ports and airports in Kolkata, Chennai, Mumbai, and Cochin, and from the land port and airport in Delhi. Imports had also been opened through India's 
land borders. 
13.23.  Concerning the comments made on increases in tariffs, conformity assessment procedures, 
compulsory registration orders, and other issues, he noted that it was the first time that these 
issues had been raised in the CTG, although in the case of conformity assessment and compulsory 
registration orders, India had replied to Members'  queries to the fullest extent possible in the 
Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade. However, he had taken note of the concerns raised at this meeting and would consult his authorities in capital. 
13.24.  The Chairperson thanked delegations for their interventions and proposed that the Council 
take note of the statements made. 
13.25.  It was so agreed. 
14  PAKISTAN – DISCRIMINATORY TAXES – REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION 14.1.  The Chairperson informed the Council that, in a communication dated 4 April 2016, the 
delegation of the European Union had requested the Secretariat to include this item on the agenda 
of this meeting. 
14.2.  The delegate of the European Union regretted to be compelled to raise once again the 
so-called "Statutory Regulatory Order (SRO) 1125", which was a taxation instrument that 
appeared to establish discriminatory taxation between products imported into Pakistan and like 
products manufactured locally. Under the SRO 1125, which applied to domestic sales taxes and 
covered a large number of products destined for both industrial use and retail sale, imported 
finished goods ready for use by the general public  were charged a sales tax of 17%. Contrary to 
this, like locally manufactured goods in retail sale were instead charged a tax of only 5%. This 
measure had negatively affected EU exports to Pakistan and, in particular, EU exports of leather, leather articles, and leather footwear. Exports of these products had decreased between 2013 and 
2015 in contrast with the overall positive trend in EU exports of goods not covered by this 
measure. The European Union had welcomed Pakistan's invitation to seek a solution on a bilateral basis. Unfortunately, this had not yet achieved results. The European Union found this especially regrettable given that it had raised this matter on several occasions in different WTO bodies 
(including in the Committee on Market Access) and during the recent Trade Policy Review (TPR) of 
Pakistan. Moreover, Pakistan had not yet given any indication as to how and when it intended to 
remove the discriminatory measure. The European Union hoped to receive replies from Pakistan at 
this meeting. Further to the seminar on this i ssue held in March 2016 in Islamabad, immediately 
after Pakistan's TPR, the European Union was also interested to learn of the follow-up Pakistan's authorities had given or intended to give to this issue. 
14.3.  The delegate of the United States of Amer ica said that at the last meeting of the CTG the 
United States had co-sponsored this agenda item but that it was not in a position to do so at this 
meeting. However, the United States did wish to register its concerns about the SRO of Pakistan, G/C/M/125 
 
- 29 - 
 
  and therefore requested that its statement delivered  at the last meeting be registered again in 
these minutes.4 
14.4.  The delegate of Switzerland reiterated his delegation's systemic concerns on this issue and 
encouraged Pakistan to provide an update of the situation on its SRO and on how it intended to 
follow-up. 
14.5.  The delegate of Canada expressed Canada's commercial and systemic concerns with 
Pakistan's SRO measures. Like others, Canada sought an explanation from Pakistan as to the 
consistency of its measures with Article III of th e GATT, and likewise an explanation as to how and 
when Pakistan planned to address this issue in order to ensure that similar conditions applied to all traders. 
14.6.  The delegate of Chinese Taipei stated that he recognized the principle of national treatment 
in GATT Article III to be a cornerstone of the multil ateral trading system. Therefore, Chinese Taipei 
associated itself with previous speakers in expressing its systemic concerns with regard to this issue, and invited Pakistan to provide explanations  as to the WTO-consistency of the measures in 
question. 
14.7.  The delegate of Japan indicated the interest  of his delegation in this issue for systemic 
reasons. Japan would follow-up on any further developments with regard to these measures. 
14.8.  The representative of Pakistan thanked previous speakers for their interventions and 
assured them that his delegation had taken note of the concerns raised about SROs in general and 
about SRO 1125 in particular. He reaffirmed the commitment of the Government of Pakistan to reforming its SRO regime, and indicated that Pakistan's authorities were following a well-defined 
road map with a view to bringing transparency, pr edictability, and certainty to Pakistan's taxation 
system, in line with Pakistan's WTO commitments. 
14.9.  Pakistan could understand and agreed that SROs could complicate trade. With that in mind, 
during the Fourth TPR of Pakistan in March 2015, Members had been informed of Pakistan's firm 
commitment to eliminate all discriminatory SROs by the end of the second half of 2016-2017. 
Pakistan was strictly adhering to this target. 
14.10.  As a follow-up to Pakistan's TPR, some  national seminars were organized with the 
assistance of the WTO Secretariat, where reform of SROs was particularly emphasized. The SRO issue was an important component of Pakist an's trade reform agenda and a high-level 
committee, headed by the Minister of Finance, had taken full cognizance of the issue. He reported 
that progress had been made on this issue and that Pakistan had initiated a robust staged 
programme for elimination of its concessionary SRO regime. 
14.11.  With regard to numbers, he reported that  SROs having a cumulative concessionary impact 
of approximately 103 billion Rupees had been el iminated in the budgetary measures for the 
financial year 2014-2015, and that for 2016, the Finance Act of 2015 had withdrawn SROs providing concessions amounting to 120 billion Rupees . In line with Pakistan's resolve, this Act had 
also curtailed the powers of the Federal Board of Revenue to deal with issues concerning 
exemptions and concessions through SROs, and th e forthcoming Finance Act of 2016 proposed to 
withdraw concessions with a financial impact of around 100 billion Rupees. 
14.12.  The reform of discriminatory SROs was one key performance criteria under the 
IMF's ongoing Extended Fund Facility Programme, whose 10
th Review had just been concluded. 
This was clear evidence of the Government's resolve for the first time to reform Pakistan's economy under an IMF reform programme. 
14.13.  Pakistan acknowledged that discriminatory SROs were not only an impediment to a 
predictable trade regime, but also narrowed Pakistan's tax base, complicating the tax 
administration and weakening tax compliances. However, given the current decisive phase of the 
war on terror, which required unprecedented reso urces channelled to security and anti-terrorist 
operations in Pakistan, he called upon Members to understand the complicated period that his 
                                               
4 See document G/C/M/124, paragraphs 17.7-17.9. G/C/M/125 
 
- 30 - 
 
  country was living through, as well as the efforts it was making to bring SRO 1125 into conformity 
with Pakistan's WTO commitments. He reiterated Pakistan's firm commitment to strengthening the multilateral rules-based system, and to improving its trade and fiscal policies so as to facilitate fair and open trade undertaken to the benefit of all. He invited Members to remain bilaterally engaged 
with Pakistan. 
14.14.  The Chairperson thanked delegations for their interventions and proposed that the Council 
take not of the statements made. 
14.15.  The Council so agreed. 
15  WORK PROGRAM ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 
15.1.  The Chairperson recalled that, at the last Ministerial Conference, held in Nairobi in 
December 2015, Ministers had adopted the decision contained in document WT/L/977 on the 
"Work Programme on Electronic Commerce". In this decision Ministers reaffirmed not only the 
mandate of the "Work Programme on Electronic Commerce" adopted on 25 September 1998 and contained in document WT/L/274, but also reaffirmed subsequent Ministerial Declarations and 
Decisions on the Work Programme. 
15.2.  Therefore, Ministers decided to continue the work under the Work Programme on Electronic 
Commerce since the last session, based on the existing mandate and guidelines and on the basis 
of proposals submitted by Members in the relevant WTO bodies as set out in paragraphs 2 to 5 of 
the Work Programme. To this end, they instructed the General Council to hold periodic reviews in 
its sessions of July and December 2016 and July 2017, based on the reports that might be submitted by those WTO bodies entrusted with th e implementation of the Work Programme, and 
to report to the next session of the Ministerial Conference. 
15.3.  With a view to informing the General Co uncil, at its July 2016 session, about the discussions 
that had taken place on E-commerce in this Council, he invited delegations to make their 
statements on this matter. 
15.4.  Given that there were no interventions from Members, he proposed that the Council take 
note of the information he had provided and to revert to this issue at the next CTG meeting. 
15.5.  The Council so agreed. 
16  OTHER BUSINESS 
16.1  Information about the expiry date of Section 15(a)(ii) of the Protocol on the 
Accession of China 
16.1.  The Chairperson reminded delegations that, at the start of the meeting, the delegation of 
China had requested inclusion under the agenda item "Other Business" a report on the expiry date 
of Section 15(a)(ii) of China's Protocol of Accession. 
16.2.  The delegate of China recalled the statem ent made at the November 2015 meeting of this 
Council on the expiration of Section 15(a)(ii) of its Protocol of Accession on 11 December 2016. 
China had raised this issue in different WTO fora, indicating that this provision was out-dated, 
discriminatory, and unfair by nature. Since it was now the month of April 2016, China again 
reminded those Members still using the surrogate or analogue country methodology based on Section 15 that there remained only eight months for them to undertake the necessary steps to amend or adjust their laws, regulations, or practices, and to terminate the use of this methodology 
against China in their anti-dumping investigations and in their reviews, and to do so before the 
deadline so as not only to implement their WTO obligations but also to avoid any unnecessary disputes. 
16.3.  The Chairperson thanked China for the information it had presented and proposed that the 
Council take note of the statement made. 
16.4.  The Council so agreed. G/C/M/125 
 
- 31 - 
 
  16.2  United States' Seafood Import Monitoring Programme 
16.5.  The Chairperson reminded delegations that, at the start of the meeting, the delegation of 
the Russian Federation had requested inclusion, under the agenda item "Other Business", of an 
issue concerning the United States' seafood import monitoring programme. 
16.6.  The delegate of the Russian Federation stated that the Department of Commerce of the 
United States had published, in the Federal Re gistry of 5 February 2016, a proposed rule 
concerning the import monitoring programme on seafood. The programme was aimed at 
combatting illegal unreported and unregulated fi shing sea food fraud by means of filing and 
report-keeping procedures relating to the importation of certain fish and fish products. According to the proposed rule, importers would be required to report the following information at the point 
of entry: information on fish, time and place of ha rvest, and information on entities harvesting or 
processing the fish. Most of this information was already contained in declarations, bills of lading, 
or other common commercial documents. Moreover, importers were also required to keep, for five years, additional information on each point in the chain of custody. However, the text of the 
proposed rule did not provide specific clarification as to what kinds of documents were relevant to 
this additional information. This led to uncertainty in bilateral and international trade as many fish products might be caught in one country and processed in another. 
16.7.  This requirement, combined with a lack  of transparency, constituted a challenge for 
exporters, producers, and fishermen, as they woul d also have to collect and keep such information 
for five years. The Russian Federation believed that there should be specific provisions to protect the confidential information and documents contained in contracts and other documents that might 
be required on all points of the chain of custody, but no provisions in this regard were contained in 
the proposed rule. 
16.8.  Another issue of concern referred to mino r errors in data submission in an automated 
commercial environment as accidental and involuntary mistakes could constitute an excuse to be 
suspicious of highly virtuous producers, or fish ermen in third countries, in illegal, unreported, and 
unregulated fishing or seafood fraud. The Russi an Federation acknowledged that programmes 
intended to combat IEUU fishing were important elements of an environmental policy and should 
be developed in all countries, but such measures should not be more trade-restrictive than necessary. 
16.9.  She therefore sought further clarifications form the United States with regard to this issue, 
and invited the United States to engage in bilateral consultations with the Russian Federation 
concerning these provisions and the implementa tion of the US Seafood Import Monitoring 
Program. 
16.10.  The delegate of the United States of America thanked the Russian Federation for its 
comments and indicated that the Russian Federation should have taken advantage of the public 
comment period when the United States had issued  the notice for this programme. Her delegation 
would convey Russia's comments to the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration for 
consideration as to when they would prepare a final rule. 
16.11.  The delegate of Norway confirmed Norw ay's commitment to combatting IEU fishing and 
shared US concerns about IEU fish entering international markets. Both nations were working in 
close cooperation on this issue. However, Norway had understood that the measures on imports of 
fish under consideration by the United States would only apply to imports and not to domestic products. This raised some issues about the conformity of these measures with international law, 
including WTO rules, as all of these measures should be based on risk analysis, be even-handed 
and non-discriminatory, and aim to avoid unnecessary barriers to trade. Since both countries had a joint interest in ensuring that trade in legal seafood be safeguarded, Norway looked forward to 
working closely with the United States on this issue in the coming months. 
16.12.  The Chairperson thanked delegations for their interventions and proposed that the Council 
take note of the statements made. 16.13.  The Council so agreed. G/C/M/125 
 
- 32 - 
 
  16.3  Date of next meeting 
16.14.  The Chairperson informed the Council that the next meeting of this Council was scheduled 
to take place on Thursday, 14 July 2016. The agenda would close on Friday, 1 July 2016. 16.15.  He also reminded delegations that, as announced under Agenda item 3, "Appointment of 
Officers to the Subsidiary Bodies of the Council for Trade in Goods", he would continue 
consultations on this issue, and his successor would reconvene a meeting to deal solely with this agenda item once an agreed slate of names was ready. 
16.16.  He therefore proposed that the Council to take note of the information provided. 
16.17.  The Council so agreed. 
17  ELECTION OF CHAIRPERSON OF THE COUNCIL FOR TRADE IN GOODS 17.1.  The Chairperson recalled that the Chairperson of the General Council had carried out 
consultations on a slate of names for Chairpersons to the different WTO standing bodies in 
accordance with the established Guidelines for the Appointment of Officers. These proposed nominations had been approved by the General Council at its meeting of 24 February 2016. In line 
with the nominations, he proposed that the Council for Trade in Goods elect Ambassador Hamish 
McCormick from Australia as Chairperso n of this Council, by acclamation. 
17.2.  The Council so agreed. 
17.3.  The outgoing Chairperson thanked all delegations, and the Secretariat, for their untiring 
efforts and dedication in carrying out the work of the Goods Council in 2015. He also congratulated 
Ambassador McCormick on his appointment and wished him all success in fulfilling his mandate as Chair of this Council. 
17.4.  The incoming Chairperson thanked delegations for the opportunity they had given him to 
contribute to the work of the WTO by chairing the Council for Trade in Goods; he also thanked 
Ambassador Casanueva for his contribution during 2015. 
17.5.  The meeting was closed. 
__________