RESTRICTED   
  
TN/MA/M/26  
 
13 August  2018 
(18-5105) Page: 1/23 
Negotiating Group on Market Access   
 
 
MINUTES OF THE MEETI NG 
HELD IN THE CENTRE W ILLIAM RAPPARD ON 2 1 JULY 2017  
Chairman: Ambassador D. Chambovey (Switzerland)  
The agenda of the meeting was circulated in WTO/AIR/TN/MA/2 and WTO/AIR/TN/MA/2/ Rev.1.  
The Negotiating Group adopted the agenda with the inclusion of "MC11 initiative on the temporary 
admission of palettes, containers and packings" under other business at the request of Australia.  
The Negotiating Group also agreed  to conduct the meeting in formal mode.  
Table of content s             Page 
1   MINISTERIAL DECISION  ON FACILITATING SME TRADE TRANSPARENCY O F 
REGULATORY MEASURES FOR TRADE IN GOODS – COMMUNICATION FROM T HE 
EUROPEAN UNION; HONG  KONG, CHINA; THE S EPARATE CUSTOMS TERR ITORY 
OF TAIWAN PENGHU, KI NMEN AND MATSU (CHIN ESE TAIPEI); AND SIN GAPORE  ...........  1 
2   OTHER BUSINESS  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 23 
2.1   MC11 initiative on the temporary admission of palettes, containers and packings  ............... 23 
 
_______________  
 
1  MINISTERIAL DECISION  ON FACILITATING SME TRADE  TRANSPARENCY OF 
REGULATORY MEASURES FOR TRADE IN GOODS – COMMUNICATION FROM T HE 
EUROPEAN UNION; HONG KONG, CHINA;  THE SEPARATE CUST OMS TERRITORY OF 
TAIWAN PENGHU, KINME N AND MATSU (CHINESE  TAIPEI) ; AND SINGAPORE  
1.1.  The Chairman  drew attention to the communication from European Union; Hong Kong, China;  
the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu (Chinese Taipei) ; and 
Singapore entitled the Ministerial Decision on Facilitating SME TRADE: Transparency of Regulatory 
Measures for Trade in Goods  (TN/MA/W/144/Rev.1).  
1.2.  The representative of the European Union  thanked the co -sponsors for their active support, 
for their inpu t and help in developing this proposal.   
1.3.  In today's world of global trade and global supply chains, the most important hurdles that 
business faced were not tariffs, but rather non -tariff measures  (NTMs) .  Least developed countries 
(LDCs)  only faced on ave rage an ad valorem  tariff of 0.15%, developing countries an average of 
0.63%.  Despite  these low tariffs, small businesses around the world, but especially in  LDCs, still 
struggled to reap the benefits of global trade and found it difficult to integrate in to global value 
chains, also because of non -tariff measures.   
1.4.  Small and medium -sized enterprises (SMEs) played an important role in the global economy, 
as well as national economies, both in terms of growth and employment.  However, there was still 
much t o be done to improve their access to export markets.  In his delegation's view, f ostering 
transparency and good regulatory practices would facilitate that market access.  TN/MA/M/26  
 
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  1.5.  There seemed to be a wide consensus on this as transparency and good regulatory practi ce 
provisions had become an integral part of bilateral and regional trade agreements around the 
world.  However, it was a subject that should be further developed here in the multilateral context.  
This joint proposal for the Ministerial Decision built on work previously done on transparency, 
notably in this Negotiating Group, but also in several WTO Committees, particularly in the 
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) and Sanitary and Phytosan itary (SPS) Committees.  The 
co-sponsors believed that increasing tr ansparency to facilitate trade for SMEs  was an area where 
a concrete and comprehensive result could be reached in Buenos Aires in the remit of trade in 
goods.  Colleagues in the services area were also working on facilitating trade by looking at the 
domes tic regulation disciplines.   
1.6.  There had been questions about lodging this proposal in this Negotiating Group and about the 
revival of this Group.  He confirmed that the EU did not look to re -litigate one way or another the 
Nairobi Ministerial Declaration.  His delegation therefore encouraged Members to look at the 
substance of the proposal rather than the procedure.  
1.7.  The joint proposal covered regulatory measures that fell under the scope of the TBT and the 
SPS Agreements and he recalled the key elements of the proposal.  
1.8.  The first area where new rules were proposed was in domestic publication.  With the advance 
of internet, implementation of disciplines relating to publication measures enshrined in the TBT 
and SPS Agreements had to be modernised.  The proposa l aimed to ensure the availability of all 
relevant regulatory measures and useful information on them over the internet, directly from 
national websites.  This was often a small step for an administration, but it would enable SMEs to 
evaluate the regulator y environment for future export markets.  Having a place where interested 
persons could get information for free would expand the possible space for entrepreneurship.   
1.9.  The second area of action concerned the notification of measures to the WTO under Artic le 4.  
The TBT and SPS Agreements already required the notification of draft measures, however, not the 
final texts.  The WTO notification system did not have a comprehensive overview of the adopted 
final measures.  The proposal targeted closing this gap b y requiring that Members notify also the 
final measure as adopted.  
1.10.   Regarding Article 5, he noted that this Article would facilitate the building of a repository or 
a web portal that was user -friendly and easily -searchable by an SME or any other enterprise,  even 
individuals.  In a one -stop shop fashion, a company could compare the regulatory conditions for its 
products for all possible export markets that it might be interested in.  The WTO Secretariat could 
be entrusted with the task of coordinating the eff ort to build such a global repository, in 
coordination with UNCTAD and the ITC.  Further discussions would be required regarding the 
practical modalities of how to organize this repository.  He wished to make clear that this would be 
the responsibility of the international organizations, and not Members, to put together based on 
information published on the internet by Members.  
1.11.   Article 6, the third dimension of the proposal aimed to improve public consultation during 
the development of domestic regulatory m easures.  SMEs found it difficult to have their views 
heard in regulatory processes potentially affecting them both at home and in third countries.  The 
proposal aimed to improve the conduct of public consultation, reaching out to all stakeholders, 
includi ng SMEs.  They should be allowed to present their views and the proposal encouraged WTO 
Members to make this consultation as transparent as possible.   
1.12.   Finally, in Article 10, the proposal put forward an ambitious work programme to continue to 
discuss disciplines in the area of transparency and good regulatory practices beyond the horizon of 
the Ministerial Conference scheduled to take place Buenos Aires in December.  Ways to improve 
the transparency, inclusiveness and coherence of regulatory processes included publication of 
regulatory agendas, early information on upcoming measures, impact assessment and 
retrospective evaluation.   
1.13.   The list of these good  regulatory practices indicated the areas that the EU believed were 
important to discuss, however, future disciplines were not prescribed or prejudged in any way.  
These ideas had been developed in an inclusive process involving the co -sponsors and many 
Members who  had discussed and supported the ideas that had been put forward.  The EU believed TN/MA/M/26  
 
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  that this proposal represented a feasible and positive outcome which would benefit concretely 
SMEs and would give a new impetus to the work on NTBs and transparency  in the WTO.  
1.14.   It was feasible because the cost to an administration to implement these measures would 
be marginal and it was positive because it would be concretely benefitting traders around the 
world, rendering the greatest benefits to the smallest busin esses and operators in LDCs.   
1.15.   The EU encouraged Members to engage in discussing this proposal constructively. The EU 
looked forward to their suggestions and of course, stood ready to look into them and take them 
into account.  
1.16.   The representative of Hong K ong, China  thanked the EU for initiating this proposal. Hong 
Kong, China was very happy to co -sponsor the proposal because they saw great value in 
enhancing the transparency of regulatory measures in particular in relation to the SPS and TBT 
Agreements.   
1.17.   The current proposal would significantly enhance the disciplines on the publication and 
notification of regulatory measures as well as the public consultation process.  It facilitated life for 
traders in general but was particularly useful for SMEs and Mic ro, Small and Medium -Size 
Enterprise (MSMEs).  The one -stop shop web portal, for example, would be of great help for these 
small enterprises as they navigated the complex local rules in their export markets.  If endorsed 
by Members, this proposal would be a concrete deliverable for MC11. It would send a strong signal 
to the world that the WTO responded to practical business needs.  Hong Kong, China therefore 
hoped that Members could work together to this end and looked forward to hearing Members' 
views on t he proposal.   
1.18.   The representative of Chinese Taipei  thanked the EU for bringing forward this proposal.  His 
delegation appreciated the contributions of the co -sponsors and other Members who had been 
actively participating in the discussions over the past f ew months.   
1.19.   As the EU had stated, enhancing regulatory transparency was certainly one of the most 
important steps towards addressing the issue of non -tariff measures.  Transparency not only 
benefitted trade in general, but it was especially beneficial to the SMEs, who were short of the 
resources required to access the regulatory information in the different foreign markets. Chinese 
Taipei believed that this proposal was a move in the right direction to improve the multilateral 
trading system, and as the EU  had said, it would also give impetus to the existing negotiatin g 
work.  
1.20.   He thought that it might be useful to share with other Members how his delegation had 
come to the decision to co -sponsor this proposal.  After receiving the first draft of this propos al, 
Chinese  Taipei had conducted a preliminary self -assessment. This  had revealed the existence of 
certain gaps between Chinese Taipei's existing regulatory system, as far as transparency was 
concerned, and the elements suggested in the proposal. Various r egulatory agencies had 
expressed some reservations.  
1.21.   However, Chinese Taipei's negotiation policy arm had seen great value in this proposal.  
Most of the elements suggested in the proposal were consistent with Chinese Taipei's long -term 
government reform g oal.  Chinese Taipei had understood the fact that while joining a multilateral 
framework would to some extent limit the government's regulatory authority, it would also provide 
the momentum to reform.  In other words, the current degree of non -conformity s hould not 
prevent Members from committing to improving their own system and to achieving a higher 
standard.  
1.22.   So, after long discussions, Chinese Taipei was able to move forward and become the first 
Member to co -sponsor the proposal.  He hoped that Chinese Taipei's experience might encourage 
other Members to look at the positive aspects of this proposal, instead of just focusing on its very 
minor limiting effect on regulatory authority.  He also echoed the words of the EU by noting that 
discussion should foc us on the substance of the proposal.  
1.23.   The representative of Singapore  said that it was good to have the NAMA Negotiating Group 
meet again.  The Group had last met in November 2016 and during the intervening period there TN/MA/M/26  
 
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  had been informal conversations cond ucted in small groups on what was doable in the Negotiating 
Group from the perspective of what could impact businesses materially and at the same time what 
would be reasonable in terms of substance and approach for the membership.  
1.24.   Good things took time and  the result of such small -group informal conversations was the 
proposal before Members today, of which Singapore was a co -sponsor.  The EU had presented the 
proposal in detail, and she hoped to complement that with the following remarks.  
1.25.   This proposal addr essed TBT and SPS non -tariff barriers which were amongst the top five 
NTBs that affected international trade.  This proposal focused on MSMEs and addressed the issue 
of getting access to information, which was a key challenge for MSMEs seeking to participa te in 
international trade.  This proposal sought to enhance transparency through a number of ways, 
including the establishment of an internet portal of regulatory measures and through the 
notification of Members' final TBT and SPS measures.  Finally, this proposal took into account 
resource constraints of Members and international organizations by respectively providing 
appropriate transition time and ensuring that there was no duplication of work through closer 
collaboration among international organizatio ns. 
1.26.   Was Singapore presently fulfilling all that was being proposed in the proposal?  No, 
Singapore was not.  For  example, Singapore currently did not notify final measures to the WTO. 
There was still some work to do domestically to be in full conformity wi th all aspects of the 
proposal.  However, Singapore's view was that this was a proposal which sent a strong and 
positive signal of the direction that the WTO should be heading towards.  
1.27.   Enhancing transparency and access to TBT and SPS related information w as a practical step 
forward that would materially benefit businesses and the system as a whole.  Singapore looked 
forward to hearing Members' thoughts on the proposal and to engage with Members in a 
constructive exchange.  
1.28.   The representative of Egypt , on be half of the Afric an Group, thanked the EU and 
co-sponsors for submitting this proposal.  He wished to share the African Group's views, generally 
and specifically on the draft Ministerial Decision on Facilitating SME Trade: Transparency of 
Regulatory Measur es for Trade in Goods.  
1.29.   The African Group fully agreed with the proponents that the implementation of the Doha 
Ministerial Declaration of 20 November 2001 was extremely important for all Members, as 
mentioned in the Preamble.   Having said this and upon fu rther examination of the proposal, the 
African Group was contemplating what these rules meant for the African Group in a Development 
Round, and to what extent this proposal would truly benefit SMEs.  The proposal involved heavy 
obligations for the fifty -four Members of the African Group, the result of which would subject their 
domestic rule -making to WTO oversight covering every goods sector at every level of government. 
These were a seriously complex set of obligations for central governments and it was si mply not 
feasible.  
1.30.   In this regard , the Group had a number of concerns  and they were all on substance .  
1) There was too much emphasis being placed on the domestic processes involved in 
developing countries . This was not the intention of the TBT and SPS Agreements, and the 
African Group urged Members to resist the temptation to recreate the legislative history of 
these Agreements.   
2) These proposals infringed on existing rules, and created a duplication of  work, in particular 
for developing and LDCs.   
3) There was no clarity on the definition of "regulatory measures", and no agreement in the 
WTO on the definition of SMEs.  
4) The scope of application of this proposal was unclear and extremely broad. This p roposal 
would create huge burdensome obligations and result in high compliance costs for 
developing  countries and LDCs because of the enhanced transparency obligations.  
5) The Group was particularly interested in understanding how these rules would be ben eficial 
to SMEs, in particular SMEs from developing and LDCs which we re confronted with multiple 
challenges namely access to finance , entrepreneurial and technological capabilities, supply 
capacity constraints and with limited capacity to participate in ru le-making of partner states.   TN/MA/M/26  
 
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  6) The proposal was intrusive because it require d that every Member grant all interested 
persons, "in view of outreaching to the widest possible public, including SMEs " unrestricted 
access to the domestic policy -making proces ses of governments. The proposal restrict ed the 
actual policy -making processes of governments, not just the rules and policies that Members 
could develop, but in terms of how Members develop ed them, who could participate in this 
process, and set the terms by which governments  went about these decision -making 
processes, before the introduction of a domestic measure and during the development of 
that measure.  
7) The proposal significantly diminished a Member's right to regulate, which was a key function 
of democratic governance.  It also constrained a Member from regulating to achieve 
legitimate  policy objectives. From this perspective, it was very clear to the African Group, 
that this attempt at "regulatory capture " would not be exercised by SME s but rather  by 
other actors in a bid to maximize their benefits at the expense of Members' right to regulate 
to achieving their economic imperatives and policy choices.  
 
1.31.   Based on all the African Group 's concerns, Members of the African Group did not accept this 
proposal and the envisaged Work Programme under Article 10.   Finally, the narrative on SMEs and 
Transparency had been seized upon by some to advance a set of policy prescriptions alongside a 
specific agenda for international trade negotiat ions, with a view to undermining the development 
objectives of other Members. In this respect, such a proposal could undermine the Africa industrial 
development priorities as encapsulated in Agenda 2063: the  Africa We Want.   
1.32.   The representative of New Zeal and thanked the EU and co -sponsors Chinese Taipei; 
Singapore and Hong Kong, China for this most useful initiative.  Advancing the WTO's multilateral 
work in the area of transparency had the potential to reap benefits for regulators and traders alike 
and it  was something that New Zealand was highly supportive of and looked to see if they could 
join.   
1.33.   SMEs played a large role in all their economies, and this was true also of New Zealand.  In 
his previous role of overseeing trade policy in New Zealand, they h ad gone through a process of 
updating New Zealand's longstanding trade strategy which the Government had now published in 
what they called Trade Agenda 2030.  One of the priorities that had emerged strongly from 
business and particularly from New Zealand's  SMEs was the need to focus on addressing NTBs.  
That was particularly true because large companies had ways and means of working around these 
barriers, but for small companies, it stopped them before they had even started.  So, SMEs were 
disproportionatel y affected by NTBs and one of the first steps to start coming to grips with such 
barriers was to increase transparency and access to information.   
1.34.   The proposal did well to build on existing obligations around the TBT and SPS Agreements 
and to strengthen t hese in a way that New Zealand considered would be most beneficial to SMEs, 
including the obligation for Members to notify their final implemented regulations, making those 
more readily accessible for exporters, particularly small ones.  
1.35.   Another point that New Zealand thought was highly relevant was that one of the main 
themes Members had heard in the recent Aid -for-Trade week was the indispensable importance of 
SMEs to the development potential of economies of LDCs and developing Members.  Increased 
transpa rency was a key way to make sure that these SMEs were able to benefit from the 
processes set up at the WTO.   
1.36.   New Zealand looked very much forward to an ongoing dialogue on this proposal, which was 
a broad ranging initiative, not directed at any particular  angle and New Zealand thanked again the 
co-sponsors for this work in this regard.  He thought that the representative of Hong Kong, China 
had summed it up well.  Members delivering on this would show that working through the WTO, 
outcomes of practical ben efits to businesses could be delivered.   
1.37.   The representative of El Salvador , speaking on behalf of the Small, Vulnerable Economies 
(SVEs), thanked the proponents for the document submitted in the Negotiating Group on Market 
Access. This document was still under consideration in their capitals, but they wished to ask some 
questions to the proponents for more clarity on their proposal and also to provide some 
preliminary comments.  TN/MA/M/26  
 
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  1.38.   First of all, they had questions about whether these issues should be discusse d in the 
competent bodies, and how these provisions related to the mandate of this Negotiating Group.  
The SVEs were also interested in getting additional information on how this proposal would help 
the integration of SMEs in particular. Another important point was how this proposal took into 
account the needs and constraints of developing countries, and whether it did not impose 
additional administrative burdens on these countries. On the other hand, what specific provisions 
of technical assistance were en visaged in the proposal?  The SVEs wished to have more clarity on 
whether these provisions were intended to be applied to both agriculture and non -agricultural 
products. Lastly, given the little time available before the Ministerial, they wished to indicat e the 
need to focus on the priority issues that had been identified as possible outcomes at MC11. They 
were interested in continue participating in this process and would possibly come back with more 
specific questions.  
1.39.   The representative of Japan  noted th at Japan shared the view with the European Union; 
Hong Kong, China; Singapore and Chinese Taipei that it was very important to enhance 
transparency and to include MSMEs in global trade.  Japan believed that this proposal was 
beneficial in terms of developm ent by encouraging MSMEs to join international trade by enhancing 
transparency.  Japan wished to continue to participate in discussions regarding this proposal in a 
constructive manner.  
1.40.   The representative of Australia  was pleased to announce its co -sponsor ship of this initiative, 
which focused on transparency and overcoming NTBs to trade.  Transparency was key to providing 
businesses with the clarity they needed to succeed.  In particular, transparency assisted in putting 
MSMEs on the same footing as large businesses.  Australia believed that all Members' economies 
would benefit through the implementation of this proposal.  
1.41.   The representative of  the Plurinational State of Bolivia  supported the statement of the SVEs 
which had been read out by El  Salvador.  He had been in touch with his capital and hoped to have 
more specific comments by the next meeting. Bolivia did in the meantime have a few preliminary 
questions and comments.  First of all, Bolivia noted that the proposal was fairly broad.  It covered 
two Com mittees, SPS and TBT.  It was very ambitious because it went further than the current 
provisions of the TBT and SPS Agreements and Bolivia was of the view that it affected their rights.  
Bolivia had a few additional questions. As far as Bolivia was concern ed, mandates were extremely 
important and Bolivia wished that the proponents would explain where the remit came from to 
deal with this in the NAMA Negotiating Group.  Additionally, transparency was already an 
obligation in the TBT and the SPS Agreement s and these requirements were already quite 
cumbersome for developing countries.  There seemed to be an objective to replace binding rights 
in these agreements and to include them in the proposal. Also, his delegation had many doubts as 
to whether this proposa l really would benefit SMEs. Some SMEs had shared their views with his 
delegation.  Additionally, there was the issue of timing, which was problematic for Bolivia as there 
were four months until MC11.  Bolivia wondered whether it was realistic and pragmati c to think 
that there could be a result on this issue at MC11.  In addition, Bolivia agreed with many of the 
concerns expressed by the African  Group  as conveyed by Egypt.  Bolivia reserved the right to 
come back with more specific comments later on.   
1.42.   The representative of  the Republic of Moldova  thanked the European Union; Hong Kong, 
China, Singapore; and Chinese Taipei for their proposal.  Her delegation acknowledged the 
importance of regulatory measures for international trade as they determined the comp atibility of 
inputs along the value chain and ensured that final products were safe for consumers.   Moldova 
further recognised that transparency was the key to ensuring that regulatory measures 
contributed to sustainable trade; fulfilled the objective wit hout becoming burdensome for those 
who had to implement them.  MSMEs were affected often by what was known as "regulatory 
turbulence".  On the one hand, regulatory distance made it difficult for a firm to comply with a new 
set of regulatory measures, on th e other hand regulatory fluctuations were challenging as the firm 
had to adjust rapidly to a new environment.  As a country where 96% of the companies entered 
the category of SMEs, Moldova deeply understood the importance of supporting SMEs, not only at 
the national, but also at the international level.  Moldova had recently joined the group of friends 
of MSMEs and had been engaging in fruitful discussions and encouraged Members to further 
explore ways of facilitating the internationalisation of MSMEs and t heir access to third markets.  
1.43.   In her delegation's view, information was crucial, access to information about regulatory 
measures was vital if one wanted to make them work for SMEs.  In this regard, Moldova welcomed TN/MA/M/26  
 
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  the initiative contained in the proposal to create a public internet portal of regulatory measures 
which would facilitate greater access to information for SMEs.  Moldova also appreciated the fact 
that the proposal encouraged Members to provide easier access to adopted regulatory measures, a 
practice that had been adopted in the WTO for the notifications mechanism.  Moldova saw great 
value in the proposal and the creation of the dedicated WTO internet portal for SMEs.  Her 
delegation strongly supported this initiative.  Following the adoption of t he national strategy 
"digital Moldova 2020", the Moldovan Government was also working on facilitating access to 
information to important EU reforms and her delegation stood ready to share its experience and to 
engage in fruitful discussions on this subject .   
1.44.   The representative of Mexico  thanked the European Union; Hong Kong, China; Singapore; 
and Chinese Taipei for their proposal and added that Mexico was glad that this Negotiating Group 
had been re -activated.  Mexico was one of the main proponents of tran sparency and had argued 
for this in all fora.  The proposal contained important elements that Members should consider 
including: 1) making use of new technologies through building an internet portal which would 
mean better access for users, both importers and exporters; and 2) publishing the final regulatory 
measures.  Members had to notify measures but very often Members did not know the latest 
measures.  Mexico viewed this proposal very positively in terms of implementation and good 
regulatory practice an d also the work programme which included early information of regulatory 
measures and the evaluation of existing regulatory measures.  Mexico considered the WTO as a 
framework for detailed information and for a more robust agenda for promoting good practic e. 
Mexico looked forward to continuing with this discussion.   
1.45.   The representative of Canada  joined others in thanking the co -sponsors for this concrete 
proposal.  Canada welcomed constructive and positive contributions to the Negotiating Group.  
Canada sup ported the broader objective of improving transparency of regulatory measures at the 
WTO, particularly in a way that would help MSMEs integrate into international trade in an inclusive 
manner.  So Canada saw value and merit in several aspects of the propos al and was certainly 
prepared to engage constructively toward an outcome in this area as part of a successful MC11 in 
Buenos Aires later this year.  At the same time as Canada supported discussions on this proposal, 
Canada also wished to ensure that Member s did not lose sight of the fact that there was significant 
room for improvement on performance related to existing WTO notifications requirements.  So, 
Canada saw multiple paths towards greater overall regulatory transparency. Improving Members' 
notificat ion performance was one and this proposal was another very valuable contribution to that 
effort.   
1.46.   The representative of the Republic of  Korea  thanked the European Union; Hong Kong, 
China; Singapore; and Chinese Taipei for proposing the Ministerial Decisi on on Facilitating SMEs 
trade.  Korea supported delivering meaningful and substantive outcomes in market access at MC11 
and Korea's view was that NTBs needed to be addressed properly to improve market access. In 
this regard, Korea welcomed this proposal an d generally supported the initiative.  Korea believed 
that the initiative could contribute to promoting inclusive growth as well as to ensuring the 
multilateral trading system by increasing the transparency of regulatory measures for SMEs who 
were facing N TBs in relation to their trade.  Korea was open to further discuss this proposal and 
looked forward to working closely with other Members to develop this initiative.   
1.47.   The representative of China  appreciate d the efforts made by European Union and other co -
sponsors  in this regard and support ed facilitating SME trade  in principle .  However, it  would be 
appreciated if EU could further clarify some related issues. Firstly, regarding the scope of this 
Ministerial Decision , would it  only appl y to regulatory measures within  the scope of the SPS and 
TBT Agreement s, which mean t that other WTO Agreements were not covered ?  Secondly, 
regarding the relations between this Ministerial Decision and other WTO Agreements on trade in 
goods, especially the SPS and TBT Agreement s, as China understood, some of the articles in this 
proposal had been derived from the discussion on Good Regulatory Practices in the TBT 
Committee.  However, those articles had not been agreed upon in the TBT Committee.  Thirdly, 
regarding the relations between this Ministerial Decision and facilitating SME trade ,  improving 
transparency of regulatory measures would benef it all enterprises  not only SMEs . China looked 
forward to the EU's further clarification s.   
1.48.   The representative of the Russian Federation  was grate ful to the European Union; 
Hong Kong, China; Singapore; and Chinese Taipei for their tabled proposal on transparency of 
regulatory measures for trade in goods. As  a participant of the group of "Friends of MSMEs", the TN/MA/M/26  
 
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  Russian  delegation generally supported efforts to advance a business friendly regulatory 
environment for MSMEs.  His delegation thanked the proponents for the numerous opportunities 
which were provided to comment on the previous versions of this initiative throug hout its 
development since October last year.  Since the present version had gone through substantial 
transformation during the last months, his delegation wished to provide several updated 
comments and questions.  
1.49.   Articles 1 and 2: The Decision applied to "regulatory measures".  His delegation noted that 
throughout the WTO Agreements this notion was determined differently or in many cases not 
defined at all. The  elaboration of a new universal definition for the purposes of the Ministerial 
Decision would be very complicated.  Therefore, his delegation proposed to use for the Decision, 
the definitions provided by the SPS and TBT Agreements.  
1.50.   Article 3: In his delegation's view, provisions on publication of information should reflect at 
least the burden of trans lation of measures into official WTO languages.  His delegation suggested 
using some kind of "best endeavour" language such as "whenever it was practicable".  
1.51.   Article 4:  While his delegation generally supported the idea of improving notifications of 
TBT an d SPS measures, they favoured incremental changes, where at the first stage the playing 
field would be levelled between recently acceded and old Members.  
1.52.   Article 5: The idea of creating an electronic repository of regulatory measures was welcome, 
especiall y if it was made under the auspices of the international organisations – WTO, ITC and 
UNCTAD.  
1.53.   Article 6: Public consultation of interested persons when preparing regulatory measures 
could be useful in order to improve regulatory practice of WTO Members. In  this regard, his 
delegation would welcome any comments from the proponents regarding their understanding of 
the terms "major regulatory measures" and "interested persons".  
1.54.   Article 7: The need for a provision on measures in urgent situations was clear. How ever, his 
delegation sought comments on how to establish the measure's "consisten[cy] with the WTO 
Agreement".  Some improved language might be needed here.  
1.55.   Article 10: It was not entirely clear what was understood by the term "regulatory agendas". 
Did it mean that the proponents anticipated negotiations over the publication of legislative plans?  
1.56.   The Russian delegation hoped that its intervention would help others understand their 
position and make necessary adjustments to the current draft decision. His delegation looked 
forward to having a constructive engagement with proponents on this topic.  
1.57.   The representative of Switzerland  expressed appreciation to the European Union and other 
co-sponsors for their work on this topic and for this proposal.  Switzerla nd saw increasing 
transparency and promoting good practices in the area of NTBs as an important objective.  TBT 
and SPS measures, in particular, not only affected MSMEs in a disproportionate manner, but 
MSMEs typically were also the least informed of such measures.  Today, too many TBT and SPS 
measures were not yet accessible online on a cost -free basis. And  when they were, information 
was often scattered and difficult to find among a range of sources and websites. Information 
contained in WTO notifications  today usually was not very helpful either, as these seldom included 
the final versions of applied measures. As a result, for many SMEs, access to relevant information 
easily became too high a hurdle, impairing their participation in international value ch ains.  
Switzerland therefore thought that this was a timely proposal – particularly its Articles 3, 4 and 5, 
which seemed to address the challenges just mentioned.  In summary, Switzerland was of the 
view that this proposal addressed significant shortcomin gs in the TBT and SPS Agreements, and 
they looked forward to participating in further dialogue with the aim of achieving a meaningful 
outcome at MC11.  
1.58.   The representative of Norway  thanked the European Union; Hong Kong, China; Singapore; 
and Chinese Taipei for putting forward this proposal.  Norway supported the overall objective and 
purpose of the proposal which was related to transparency and the accessibility of information on 
regulatory processes for  MSMEs .  With the proposal the proponents brought into focus good TN/MA/M/26  
 
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  regulatory practices and underlined the relevant obligations that already flowed from the SPS and 
TBT Agreements.  Norway also found the concept of a web portal where all relevant information on 
institutional, procedural and regulatory matters w as aggregated, interesting.  Norway would 
therefore continue to follow this process with interest.  When it came to the specificities of the 
proposal, it was currently being a ssessed by her capital, so her delegation might therefore revert 
with more detail ed comments at a later stage.   
1.59.   The representative of  the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela  was grateful to the European 
Union; Hong Kong, China; Chinese  Taipei; and Singapore for submitting the proposal.  His capital 
was still evaluating it, but he wished to make a few preliminary comments.   Venezuela agreed 
with the concerns expressed by several Members that had taken the floor.  In  particular, 
Venezuela considered that this proposal went beyond the Agreement on Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary measures and the  Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade. It also contained very 
broad and burdensome transparency provisions.  It was important to highlight that with these 
transparency obligations Members might find that the regulations applied for industrialisation 
policies would b e subject to extreme scrutiny. Finally, like other Members, Venezuela considered 
that there was not enough time to achieve an outcome on this issue for the 11th Ministerial 
Conference.   
1.60.   The representative of Brazil  thanked the European Union; Hong Kong, C hina; Singapore; 
and Chinese  Taipei for co -sponsoring and circulating this proposal.  Brazil also wished to thank the 
co-sponsors for the flexibility shown in the consultations held before the circulation of this 
document.  
1.61.   Brazil particularly praised the p roponents of this draft Ministerial Decision for the inclusion of 
SPS in the scope of this decision.  Brazil thought that there was no reason to have different 
treatment between SPS and TBT where current disciplines in both areas were essentially identical  
on the issues covered by the draft Ministerial Decision.  Capital was still looking at the specific 
details of this proposal. However, he could say at this point that Brazil would engage constructively 
in the discussions and supported the continuation of the discussions o n this draft Ministerial 
Decision.  Finally, he stated that Brazil had some points that they wished to clarify regarding the 
proposal and would be presenting textual suggestions as well.  Some of the points raised here and 
under considerat ion in capital could be solved through negotiations and discussions in the context 
of this Negotiating Group.  
1.62.   The representative of Senegal  thanked the sponsors for this proposal on transparency of 
regulatory measures for trade in goods.  His delegation w ished to align itself with the statement 
made by Egypt on behalf of the African Group.   
1.63.   Senegal, like many developing countries, placed great importance on the development of 
SMEs and MSMEs, which made up more than 80% of their production, a great part of  which was in 
the informal sector, to create value, employment, increased economic growth and ensure 
economic and social development.  To this end, improving the business environment and lifting 
non-tariff barriers for SMEs, was one of the priorities of hi s government. Having said that, his 
delegation had some preliminary comments on the proposal.  Some elements within this proposal 
required clarification.  The first thing was what was covered by the notion of regulatory measures 
of general application fall ing within the scope of the SPS and TBT Agreements. Were they SPTS or 
TBT measures, or were they all laws, decrees, acts and administrative decisions relating to the TBT 
and SPS Agreements?  
1.64.   Next, what was specific to SMEs in this proposal?  It seemed to ap ply to all public/private 
partnerships, all stake -holders and civil society and as a consequence would extend beyond SMEs.  
1.65.   Senegal further wished to note that beyond the regulatory measures developed by 
Members, this proposal also targeted other measures a s well.  This meant that Members would be 
obliged to make an inventory of all regulatory measures, explain them, translate them as required, 
publish them, modify them if required taking into account comments made by interested parties.  
All this, in Senega l's view was too burdensome for some developing countries and LDCs who were 
already experiencing internal difficulties to satisfy certain needs of transparency and good 
regulatory practices of their own companies.  TN/MA/M/26  
 
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  1.66.   Senegal also feared that this proposal so ught to completely modify legislative, regulatory 
and administrative procedures of LDC Members. To conclude Senegal believed that the situation of 
developing countries and LDCs had not been properly taken into account in this proposal and 
Senegal would be grateful to the proponents if they could provide clarifications with regard to the 
concerns expressed.   
1.67.   The representative of Colombia  thanked the EU and co -sponsors for th e proposal .  
Undoubtedly, this would motivate more Members to actively participate in this Negotiating Group 
which had been inactive. It would also push Members to seek concrete results for MC11, especially 
on NTBs. 
1.68.   For Colombia, transparency was a very relevant topic.  Individuals and enterprises 
participating in trade had to be well in formed about the conditions in which they intended to 
conduct business. As was already known, lack of information greatly affected access capacity to 
markets, especially for SMEs.  Therefore it was fundamental that regulations and policies be 
transparent.  
1.69.   Taking into account that this was the first formal presentation of the document, Colombia 
had some preliminary comments, which were positive.  Colombia viewed the moderate wording of 
the proposal as positive.  Access to information in Article 5, which went  hand in hand with the 
work of the ITC on single -window, would be of benefit principally to SMEs because it allowed them 
to access a wide variety of information and data which in turn would assist them to promote their 
competitive agenda, as well as their participation in global trade.  The provisions on S&D 
treatment and technical assistance and finally the work programme allowed space for discussions 
on more complex topics to be examined in the future.   
1.70.   Colombia was willing to constructively participate in this and in other proposals that might 
be submitted to this Negotiating Group.  Colombia trusted that this kind of initiative, which could 
have a positive impact on SMEs, would encourage Members to boost their discussions.   
1.71.   The representative of Bangla desh thanked the European Union and other co -sponsors for 
the proposal.  He had sent the proposal to his capital and was awaiting their response.  At this 
meeting, he wished to express preliminary views on the proposal.  
1.72.   Access to information on NTBs was v ery important for LDC exports and in this context 
Bangladesh fully appreciated the proposal made for the establishment of the public internet portal 
on NTBs and wished to participate in the discussion on developing such a portal.  
1.73.   Regarding the proposal ma de in Articles 3, 4 and 6, Bangladesh wished to have some 
clarification on how the obligations contained therein were different from the obligations stemming 
from the Trade Facilitation Agreement and other Agreements under the WTO. His delegation was 
open to holding discussions on the issues and was willing to fully participate in those discussions.  
1.74.   The representative of Malaysia  thanked the European Union and co -sponsors for the 
proposal.  Transparency and availability of information was particularly impor tant for SMEs which 
had limited resources.  Thus Malaysia would continue to engage constructively to ensure that SMEs 
obtained the needed information that could help them integrate into regional and international 
trade.   
1.75.   The representative of Swaziland  thanked the co -sponsors for their proposal.  His delegation 
wished to support the statement made by Egypt on behalf of the African Group as well as other 
concerned delegates.  His delegation was astonished at the growing propensity in this organization 
to disregard the rules that defined the very existence of this institution.  His delegation was 
worried in the same way as China who had raised the concern as to why issues pertaining to SMEs 
were confined to SPS and TBT alone.  Why not all the other Agreements ?  Could this issue not be 
dealt within the appropriate fora, i.e. the SPS and TBT Committees, respectively?  
1.76.   His delegation was in agreement that this proposal had no room in the NAMA Negotiating 
Group.  This subject could be dealt within the SPS and TBT C ommittees.  To further compound 
matters, there was no definition of SMEs, which accommodated all the membership.  The scope 
was also questionable. Moreover there was no way that this proposal would benefit developing TN/MA/M/26  
 
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  countries.  Why?  Because it was an ope n secret that SMEs in developing countries relied mostly 
on agriculture. So before outstanding issues in agriculture were addressed, there was no way that 
these disciplines, as proposed, would benefit developing countries.  
1.77.   His delegation was of the view th at in this institution, seemingly, there was this elephant 
which was growing at a very high rate.  The elephant aimed at disregarding the interests and 
concerns of developing countries.  
1.78.   The representative of Fiji thanked the proponents for the proposal.  Her capital was 
currently examining this proposal. However, Fiji wished to associate itself with the comments from 
the SVEs and the important points raised by the African Group.  At this stage, she wished to make 
only preliminary comments on the proposal.   
1.79.   SMEs were without doubt important for the development of developing Members and LDCs.  
However, from an economic point of view, the magnitude and size of developing and developed, 
including the LDCs' SMEs varied in size and operation.  For example, an SM E in a developed 
country was defined as one having a turnover of €50 million, whereas for an LDC Member the SME 
turnover barely reached a few thousand euros.  A question to ask was whose SMEs would this 
proposal benefit more.  Obviously the SME s of develop ed and developing countries which had a 
higher turnover than €50 million would have a competitive and comparative advantage.  
1.80.   She further noted that there were a number of variables contributing to the success of 
SMEs, such as  access to finance  and technolo gy transfer .  The issue of supply constraint s was a 
major issue for SMEs.  Whilst at a first glance, Fiji saw a parallel between this proposal and that of 
the proposal on domestic regulation s, this case relat ed to goods.  So, the question of mandate as 
raised by some  Members  was also being examined by Fiji as well as the impact this proposal might 
have on Fiji's right to regulate.   
1.81.   Another question to reflect on was how this proposal would assist in addressing NTBs. 
Would an SME from an LDC or a small econ omy, even if it were able to receive information on the 
regulatory measures of a developed country .  For SMEs, technical and financial assistance in 
achieving equivalence, mutual recognition and conformity assessment for products of export 
interest, seemed  to be more meaningful than this transparency proposal.  Nevertheless, as 
mentioned, Fiji reserved its right to revert to this proposal . 
1.82.   The representative of Ecuador  endorsed the statement made by the delegation of 
El Salvador on behalf of the SVEs and Ec uador wished to align itself with what was expressed by 
the African Group.  Her capital was still reviewing the proposal but her delegation wished to 
convey some preliminary comments.  
1.83.   Her country believed that the TBT and the SPS Agreements clearly provide d for the relevant 
transparency obligations and in this regard these obligations were still in progress in terms of their 
implementation. The proposal was therefore of concern to Ecuador because of its level of ambition 
with regard to those disciplines fou nd in the aforementioned agreements.  
1.84.   Finally, Ecuador note d that the proposals should not reduce the policy space for Members 
and create further obligations for LDCs who d id not benefit from such proposals.  
1.85.   The representative of South Africa  associated her delegation with the statement delivered 
by Egypt on behalf of the African Group. She recalled that the mandate on NTB negotiations in 
NAMA was derived from Annex B of the July 2004 Framework - it focused on the reduction or 
elimination of N TBs in particular on products of export interest to developing countries.  It further 
required Members to identify, examine, categorize, and ultimately negotiate on NTBs. It took note 
that the modalities for addressing NTBs in these negotiations could incl ude request/offer, 
horizontal, or vertical approaches; and  should fully take into account the principle of S&D 
treatment for developing and LDC participants.  
1.86.   The proposed Decision fell outside the work of the NAMA Negotiating Group as established 
in the D oha Declaration. That mandate did not provide for a re -negotiation of the TBT Agreement 
nor was there any reference to MSMEs or SMEs.  For obvious reasons, issues related to SPS did 
not form part of the work of the NAMA Negotiating Group.  TN/MA/M/26  
 
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  1.87.   Members should a lso recall that according to paragraph 34 of the Nairobi Ministerial 
Declaration, any decision to discuss or launch negotiations multilaterally on issues without a 
mandate needed to be agreed by all Members. This minimum threshold had not been met.  
1.88.   The pro posed Ministerial Decision did not provide a basis to move forward. While its 
implications for MSMEs trade were at best uncertain, particularly for SMEs in many developing 
countries, its real effect would be to impose new constraints and limits on governme nts' national 
policy and regulation with regard to the provision of information and due process.  The proposal 
offered no definition of SMEs and was therefore unable to distinguish between the very different 
challenges faced by small businesses in developi ng countries as compared to those in developed 
countries.   
1.89.   The proposed decision would narrow Members' policy regulation -making space as well as 
subject it to multilateral oversight and adjudication. The proposal was presented as a first step, 
with furthe r elements to be negotiated in future. In totality, the proposal was intrusive, onerous 
and far -reaching. The very weak S&D provision did nothing to mitigate these concerns.  
1.90.   All Members pursued policies to support SMEs, and recognized the important contri bution 
that SMEs made to their national economies. However, the challenges SMEs confronted would not 
be addressed by multilateral rules that limited the space that governments had to address 
development imperatives, including to provide support to SMEs.  
1.91.   In conclusion, South Africa saw no need to duplicate the ongoing work on transparency 
already taking place under the review of the SPS Agreement. There was also no reason to 
duplicate the discussions on Good Regulatory Practice currently underway in the TBT  Committee. 
Any proposals on transparency could be taken up in future TBT triennial reviews.  
1.92.   So, South Africa did not agree with the content of the proposed Decision and could not 
agree to place it before Ministers at MC11.   
1.93.   The representative of India thanked the proponents for introducing their proposal which was 
a draft Ministerial Decision on Facilitating SME Trade: Transparency of Regulatory Measures for 
Trade in Goods.  
1.94.   India supported the statements made by the African Group, South Africa and other like-
minded countries. The proposal was still under the consideration of his capital and his comments 
were very preliminary. His delegation reserved the right to come back at a later stage with further 
comments.  
1.95.   WTO disciplines and flexibilities were not a menable to being used to target sub -national 
entities exclusively, such as SMEs.  India believed that WTO provisions were neutral to the size or 
type of business entities.   
1.96.   It was important to understand the basic concept of SMEs before Members considered  this 
proposal.  India acknowledged that the concept of Small and Medium Enterprises did exist in most 
economies. However, the definition varied widely. What was "small" in a developed Member might 
not be so in developing countries. Therefore, before initi ating discussions on what Members could 
do to benefit SMEs in a rule -based organization, it was essential to have a common understanding 
on the basic concept of SME. It was to be emphasized that the rule -based nature of the WTO 
placed it on a different pla ne compared to other organizations in which discussions on various 
subjects could take place in generalities.  
1.97.   India also wished to seek clarification from the proponents on how the proposal was linked 
with the mandate of this Negotiating Group. Moreover, the scope of application of this proposal 
was very broad. This proposal would create huge burdensome obligations and result in high 
compliance costs for developing countries and LDCs.  As in many countries, there was a three -tier 
governance structure in In dia: Federal; provinces; and local. Although there were efforts by 
governments at all these three levels in India to provide inf ormation online through their 
e-governance initiatives, there were a lot of differences in providing e -governance between 
different provinces and between areas in one province. This  proposal would be extremely onerous 
for provincial and local bodies to comply with.  TN/MA/M/26  
 
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  1.98.   The proposed Decision would also narrow regulation -making policy space of developing 
countries and LDCs.  The proposal  was intrusive, onerous and far -reaching.  The very weak S&D 
provision with only an extra three years of transition period did nothing to mitigate these 
concerns. There was no component of technical assistance and capacity -building given the digital 
divide  between developed and developing countries, especially LDCs.  
1.99.   In the Negotiating Group on Rules, the European Union had submitted a proposal for 
improving disciplines on subsidies notification. The proposal contained some statistics on 
compliance of exist ing notification obligations under the SCM Agreement: "the level of compliance 
by WTO Members with this requirement has deteriorated significantly since 1995 as the share of 
Members that notified subsidies decreased from 50% to 38%." The situation could be  similar with 
regard to notifications under SPS and TBT agreements. Maybe the Secretariat could inform 
Members on the compliance of existing notification requirements in these two bodies. Efforts 
should be made to understand the low compliance of existing notification obligations, including the 
administrative and other constraints faced by developing countries and LDCs to submit 
notifications on time. Asking developing countries and LDCs to take additional transparency 
obligations would be more onerous give n the above background.  
1.100.   In view of all of this, India would not accept this proposal and the envisaged Work 
Programme under Article 10.  However, India was ready to engage constructively in these 
discussions.  
1.101.   The representative of Zimbabwe  stated that he r delegation associated itself with the 
statement made by Egypt on behalf of the African Group.  She thanked the European Union and 
the co -sponsors for their proposal, and wished to make the following observations and raise the 
following concerns.  
1.102.   The prop osal was SPS and TBT -plus and had burdensome transparency provisions which 
Zimbabwe could not implement.  Her delegation did not understand where the mandate for such 
negotiations came from.  There was current work in the TBT and SPS Committees on transpar ency 
issues and this included work under the TBT/SPS Agreements' Review processes, Good Regulatory 
Practice and regular notifications, So Zimbabwe wished to know why the sponsors of the proposal 
would want to duplicate the work of the TBT/ISPS Committees.    
1.103.   Zimbabwe was concerned that the proposal resulted in an intrusion into Zimbabwe's 
domestic processes, had burdensome transparency obligations and impinged on Zimbabwe's right 
to regulate.   
1.104.   Zimbabwe also wanted to understand the definition of MSMEs in t he WTO context.  As was 
already highlighted by the African Group, the proposed transparency measures would not address 
the current challenges of MSMEs in developing countries such as Zimbabwe.  
1.105.   Zimbabwe had serious concerns with the single window concept wh ich Zimbabwe viewed 
to be impractical in their system, in view of the lack of connectivity in some areas at provincial and 
district levels.  This was also very costly and defeated Zimbabwe's national objectives of 
decentralisation and rural development.  
1.106.   The proposed single -window concept was not practical in Zimbabwe's system where some 
levels of administration were not yet online; this would be very costly for Zimbabwe, and also 
defeated the spirit of Zimbabwe's national decentralization in rural developm ent strategies.   
1.107.   Lastly, there was no consensus to negotiate the proposed measures which was required as 
they were new issues.  Further, the proposal did not assist MSMEs but undermined her country's 
efforts to industrialise.  
1.108.   The representative of the United States  thanked the proponents for presenting their 
proposal. Her authorities were still reviewing the proposal and therefore she would only have a few 
preliminary views to offer based on an initial review.  
1.109.   First, the United States remained deeply scept ical that Members would be able to come to 
an agreement on substantial negotiated outcomes in time for MC11. Her delegation would consider TN/MA/M/26  
 
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  this proposal falling into that basket particularly after listening to the discussions so far this 
morning.   
1.110.   The pro posal presented complex legal issues including, in effect, amending or interpreting 
key WTO agreements.  Anything of this nature required methodical deliberations by experts and 
not the kind of fast -track consideration offered by the present circumstances.  
1.111.   On substance, in most respects this proposal did not appear to provide added value to the 
discussions that were already well developed in the SPS and TBT Committees.  Some of the 
provisions in this proposal, moreover, could set Members backward.   
1.112.   Based o n today's discussion, the United States believed that the need for realism was 
necessary, even if proponents chose to continue their discussions.  However, proponents should 
not undermine the good work on transparency issues that was taking place among exp erts in the 
technical committees.  The United States invited the proponents to introduce their ideas for further 
consideration in those committees, whether in the context of the TBT tri -annual review or the SPS 
under its fifth review.   
1.113.   The representative of Turkey  thanked the European Union; Hong Kong, China; Chinese 
Taipei; and Singapore for their proposal. Turkey agreed with the importance of transparency and 
effective access to information on regulatory measures especially for SMEs. His capital was stil l 
examining the proposal and might come up with some questions and comments especially related 
to Article 6 of the proposal on public consultation of interested persons and the proposed 
obligation of an official website in one of the official languages of the WTO in Article 3.   
1.114.   The representative of Argentina  thanked the European Union; Hong Kong, China; Chinese 
Taipei; and Singapore for the proposal  on transparency and regulatory measures in trade in 
goods.  Argentina saw a number of merits in the proposal, more particularly in connection with 
improved trans parency and more particularly in connection with the creation of a web  portal which 
would facilitate the access to information on the part of SMEs.  As Brazil had said, they should be 
submitting proposals concerning MSMEs with the objective of achieving sp ecific results in this area 
at the Ministerial  Conference in Buenos Aires.  Argentina attached top priority to the participation 
of MSMEs in international trade and for this reason Argentina would participate constructively in 
the discussion of all proposa ls which had as objective to benefit MSME trade.   
1.115.   The representative of Kenya  thanked the European Union and the co -sponsors for their 
proposal.  This proposal was currently being examined in the capital and his delegation would 
revert with substantive co mments in subsequent discussions.  Kenya also wanted to associate 
itself with the statement that was made by Egypt on behalf of the African Group.  
1.116.   He wished to start by seeking clarification from the EU: was this proposal aimed at 
Members having two sets o f laws and regulations - those that applied to SMEs and those that 
applied to enterprises which were not SMEs?  if this were the case, then it would pose huge 
administrative challenges to regulatory bodies, particularly in developing countries, which were 
normally faced with capacity constraints.  
1.117.   His delegation had doubts that this proposal would benefit the SMEs in developing 
countries. This was because lack of transparency was not the main challenge faced by SMEs in 
developing countries and LDCs as far as  getting into regional and global value chains. Egypt had 
highlighted clearly the main challenges that were faced by SMEs in developing countries. This 
proposal therefore, did not serve the interest of SMEs in developing countries and LDCs.  Kenya's 
view w as that this proposal was aimed at advancing the interest of multinationals which had the 
capacity to participate in public consultations during the process of preparing the regulatory 
measures in developing countries.  SMEs in developing and LDCs did not have the necessary 
capacity to participate in such consultations.   
1.118.   Therefore, Kenya could not accept a situation where regulatory measures were shaped by 
special interest and not national interests.  Government regulation and oversight were an essential 
part of a functioning market economy and therefore, Kenya was concerned that most successful 
multinationals would engage in regulatory capture in developing and LDCs, thereby creating 
barriers to competition behind which they would continue to earn huge pro fits. TN/MA/M/26  
 
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  1.119.   Kenya was also not sure about the added value of some of the provisions contained in this 
proposal.  For example a lot had been done by the WTO Secretariat in collaboration with other 
organizations in the development of the public internet portals on  SPS and TBT measures, 
particularly under the E-ping programme.  Kenya noted that this was accomplished without a 
Ministerial Decision. Kenya therefore saw a lot of duplication between this proposal and the work 
being done in the TBT and the SPS Committees.  
1.120.   Kenya also had doubts as to whether this proposal was in line with the NAMA mandate. 
This had already been alluded to by many previous speakers.   
1.121.   The representative of Uganda  associated his delegation with the statement made by Egypt 
on behalf  of the African Group.   His delegation had submitted this proposal to capital however he 
wished to make some preliminary comments today.   
1.122.   Uganda wished to express sincere appreciation to the proponents on recognising the 
importance of concluding the Doha  Round.  Uganda encouraged all to act studiously towards this 
endeavour.  That said, like other Members, Uganda had difficulty understanding where the 
proponents and their co -sponsors got the mandate to bring this issue up for negotiation in this 
Negotiati ng Group.  Would the proponents clarify where the mandate for transparency had been 
generated in paragraph 16 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration?  Uganda was not convinced that 
there was a mandate for such a discussion in this body.   
1.123.   Like Zimbabwe had sa id, there were already ongoing processes within the SPS and TBT 
Committees that included addressing transparency issues.  The SPS Committee was in the process 
of putting in place the fourth review of the SPS Agreement and there were transparency elements 
in that package.  In the TBT Committee the work on good regulatory practices had begun.  
Transparency was already a part of that work.  Why did the proponents want to have a new 
agreement in this area when transparency was already being taken up there?  
1.124.   On the issue of the NTBs and NTMs that had been referred to in the presentation by the 
proponents and co -sponsors, in Uganda's reading, there was a half -hearted attempt to address 
these elements without actually dealing with them.  If it was the issue of NTBs that Members 
wanted to deal with, then there should be a comprehensive proposal to deal with issues of NTBs 
and NTMs that made DFQF redundant to many LDCs.  However, what was being proposed was like 
getting a comprehensive medical examination and then being denied the curative remedy.  
1.125.   The question then was what did the proponents really want?  If the proponents were 
interested in dealing with NTBs, then deal with them directly. If it was indeed about SMEs and 
their current plight, then there were very many remedies that Uganda had suggested, including in 
the CTDSS and in the COASS.  All Members needed to do was to master the courage to promote 
the structural transformation and industrialisation of Africa in line with the agenda 2063 in building 
the Africa we  want.  Members should also discipline domestic support in line with paragraph 13 of 
the Doha Ministerial Declaration.  
1.126.   If Members really wanted to help SMEs, then infrastructure should be built, trade finance 
provided and supply -side capacity built with a view to enabling SMEs to engage in trade.  Th ose 
who sold basic stuff with a turnover of about €2,000 as Fiji had said, were looking for basic 
survival within their domestic regimes.  The last thing they needed was intrusive multilateral 
disciplines.   
1.127.   When one read this proposal carefully, the ultimate objective was to remote control 
countries under the guise of transparency.  Uganda had seen this under the discussions on 
domestic regulations in services, under Investment Facilitation and under MSMEs.  All  of this was 
intended to promote regulatory capture by the corporate interests of major corporations rendering 
Governments redundant.  
1.128.   This could have strong implications on the nature of domestic regulation, on the extent to 
which it would effectively res pond to legitimate national concerns.  The proponents suggested that 
before countries adopted any regulatory measure and regulation, they must be first published in 
advance with sufficient detail to allow not only Members, but also non -state actors to dete rmine 
whether and how their interests would be affected.  In so doing, explanations needed to be TN/MA/M/26  
 
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  provided on the purpose and the rationale for such measures or regulation.  In the event that 
those interests were affected, governments should allow them not only to comment, but should 
also consider their comments. So for whom were governments regulating?   It was as if these 
countries became little protectorates and that before any conclusive actions were taken, 
permission had to be sought and granted by the higher powers.  On some of the specific 
provisions, for instance Article 6, what did it mean to consider the inputs that had been received? 
Did it mean taking a look at the comments on the e -mail?  Did it require putting in place a focus 
group, for instanc e?  What was the scope of "considering"? Should "considering" necessarily result 
in a positive outcome?  What if the comments ran counter to the object and purpose of the 
regulation, to what extent would a Member be said to have complied with the requireme nts if 
comments were considered but rejected in the end?  Who benefitted from these provisions?  Was 
governance being relegated to supranational entities that might not have the best interests of the 
Members?  Supposing they rejected the rationale and the purpose of the regulation, then what did 
a Member do?  Do  you take such a Member to DSB because they have not convinced a major 
enterprise in your territory?  Should parliaments be asked to tiptoe around their legislative 
function mandated by the supreme l aw of the land just because they had taken into account the 
view of foreign agents against?  
1.129.    This proposal effectively opened a country's domestic legislative and administrative 
procedures to foreign interventions including and not limited to non -state act ors; besides the 
administrative burden that would be imposed.   
1.130.   Also before initiating discussions on SMEs in future, it would be important to first have a 
precise definition of an SME and then begin to scope the issues to be discussed.  Members would 
also then have to agree a precise mandate and decide on an appropriate negotiating body.  As it 
stood now, Members had no mandate, there was no negotiating body, there was no Chair for such 
a body, there was no agreement on the scope and breadth of issues to d iscuss, nor was there a 
precise definition of the notion of SMEs.   
1.131.   The representative of Jordan  thanked the sponsors for putting this proposal forward.  The 
proposal was still under consideration in the capital. A clarification was needed on the legal 
relationship between this draft decision and the TBT and SPS Agreements as it seemed that this 
decision was clarifying the provisions of these agreements.  The example Members had was the 
Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) which had clarified the GATT.  Anoth er clarification that was 
required was did Article 5 on the public internet portal cover existing measures or only future 
measures?  
1.132.   The representative of Cameroon  associated itself with the statement made by Egypt 
speaking on behalf of the African Group.  Several Members had asked fundamental questions. The 
questions inter alia  concerned the mandate which was not specified, overambitious content, the 
chosen definition which was imprecise, beneficiaries real or presumed that could be located in 
developing c ountries or relocated.  Members having taken the floor in this regard included South 
Africa, India, Swaziland, the United States, Zimbabwe, Venezuela, Bolivia, Uganda, and China. 
Given that this proposal did raise new issues, he had a question for the EU a nd the other 
proponents. In conformity with the Nairobi Ministerial Declaration, new issues should be subject to 
explicit consensus - did the co -sponsors intend to ask for approval by consensus?   
1.133.   The representative of the European Union  thanked Members fo r their detailed comments. 
His delegation would try to address all the questions, comments, criticisms and concerns raised. 
His delegation would also be very keen to engage bilaterally and in other groups with the 
assistance of the Chairman.  
1.134.   Some Members h ad indicated that time was limited before MC11 and it would be difficult to 
reach a negotiated outcome, but he was not so pessimistic.  He thought that the Negotiating 
Group had the time, the expertise, the energy and with due willingness would be able to find an 
agreement on a text that was three pages long.  He thought tha t in five months Members could 
agree upon such a document.  In this regard, his delegation hoped that Members would engage.  
1.135.   Many delegations had referred to the negotiating mandate and i t would not be a surprise 
that the EU and he personally were not fans of spending a long time discussing detailed legal 
aspects of the mandate. So he wished to encourage a discussion on the substance rather than the TN/MA/M/26  
 
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  procedures.  As far as the mandate was c oncerned, this proposal did not aim at certain sectors 
specifically and covered measures under the TBT and SPS Agreements. The NAMA Negotiating 
Group was the appropriate platform to discuss this proposal because in this forum Members could 
discuss TBT and SPS measures which had also been discussed in the past in this Negotiating 
Group.   
1.136.   The SPS Agreement was concerned with regulatory measures relating to a variety of goods 
including non -agricultural goods such as forestry  products  and fish.  In addition he  recalled that 
there was an NTB proposal on the Horizontal Mechanism which was discussed in 2008.  It was 
intended to be a constructive element in the negotiation on NTBs.  This proposal before Members, 
which was a subsector of the Horizontal Mechanism to a certain extent, was supported at that time 
by many delegations, even those who today claimed that the proposal was outside the negotiating 
mandate of this group.  So, his delegation regretted to see that instead of looking at the substance 
and the conten t of the proposal, attention had been focused on procedural elements. Agricultural 
products subject to SPS and TBT measures might not be under the remit of this group, but it was 
important to have them in the proposal because, in particular, SPS measures o n agricultural 
products had a strong developmental interest.  
1.137.   Another important element that was referred to was capacity constraints. The proponents 
were fully sensitive to this and wanted to take this into account as much as possible.  What was 
being prop osed was feasible and the kind of ideas that were in the paper could be put into practice 
without excessive constraints.  The proponents were open to look into what these constraints were 
in detail and to think of an imaginative way to sort them out.  Memb ers had already in this 
organization addressed the link between commitments and capacity in the Trade Facilitation 
Agreement and there was no reason why Members should not be able to do it twice especially on 
what were surely less important obligations.  
1.138.   There was a question on what was a regulatory measure and Russia had proposed to use a 
TBT and SPS definition. That was the objective.  What proponents would wish to have would be to 
limit the Ministerial Decision to cover exclusively the regulations that we re covered by the TBT and 
SPS Agreements.  If the text was not good enough to capture that aspect at this stage, the 
proponents were open to discuss further with Members in order to improve it.   
1.139.   Regarding the comment by the Russian delegation on translati on, of course, the 
proponents had not proposed to have the full measure translated into a WTO official language, 
only a short description of what was already notified to the WTO.  He had not entirely caught 
Russia's comment about a new and old Member but w ould be happy to clarify this bilaterally.  
1.140.   On the question on what was a "major regulatory measure", the proponents wanted to 
make clear that the kind of procedures that were being proposed were not applicable to every 
single regulatory measure that a Memb er put forward; just the most important ones.  The 
proponents had wanted to leave such a definition to the discretion of Members.  
1.141.   As well, for "interested persons", the proponents had left a pretty broad scope of 
interpretation. They could be traders, in fact anyone that could have an interest. But the 
proponents were open to discuss further in case the language that was used appeared to be not 
entirely clear.  As well, they were ready to look into some suggestions on "urgent measures".  
1.142.   Another definitiona l question was "what was a regulatory agenda?"  This was in the work 
programme. It was a concept that existed in the EU to try to anticipate in advance the main 
regulatory reforms that were being planned for the future.  It was a broad concept which they 
would be happy to discuss when  the work programme began.   
1.143.   He had heard that S&D treatment in the traditional form of a transitional period was not 
considered sufficient by some delegations.  As well, he had heard that there would be need for 
technical assistance in order to implement some of the ideas.  It went without saying that the EU 
was supportive of this idea. First of all, the EU already provided technical assistance in this field 
and again they were ready to explore with those Members that had i ndicated problems in this 
regard to see how S&D treatment and technical assistance could be combined.  TN/MA/M/26  
 
- 18 - 
 
  1.144.   Another question was whether the proposal covered agriculture or just industrial products.  
It covered agriculture as well.  The proponents had wanted to cover these products in order to be 
in line with the Doha Declaration which specified that NTBs on products of export interest to 
developing countries should be addressed. Addressing transparency for SPS measures relating to 
the export of developing countr ies and LDCs was an additional point.  
1.145.   There was an important point that he wished to make which had also been made by 
several other delegations, notably from the African Group, that this proposal was an attempt to 
limit regulatory policy and the right of M embers to regulate.  This proposal did not in any way 
impinge on the right of Members to regulate any regulation or the content of any regulation.  This 
proposal simply spoke of prior consultations with interested persons and publication of the 
regulation.   Members had adopted this kind of proposal in the TFA. At that time nobody had said 
that multinationals would destroy the regulatory powers of customs authorities.  His delegation did 
not believe that multinationals would destroy the regulatory power of S PS or TBT authorities. On 
the contrary, his delegation thought that multinationals had already found a way or sometimes 
paid their way through the regulatory processes of some Members and that further transparency 
and increased consultations would be a str ong deterrent for such problems.  In particular, giving a 
voice to the stakeholders on NTM measures was something that his delegation saw emerging in 
many developing countries.   
1.146.   While listening with interest to the various interventions, he had googled th e website of the 
Ugandan Ministry of Trade Industry and Cooperatives.  The site showed a picture of a guy with a 
truck shouting in front of a person, asking him whether he was experiencing non -tariff barriers and 
if so to dial 201 to order to report it.  S o, at least in Uganda, one saw that NTBs were a problem 
and that the Ugandan Government was making an effort to make sure that people informed the 
relevant Ministry.   There was even an NTB reporting tool on that site, which was great.  He was 
sure that th e Ugandan government did not think that big multinationals would make use of the 
201 number to limit the regulatory powers of the government.  
1.147.   There were a lot of questions about the SMEs versus development.  He appreciated what 
Senegal had said about SMEs being important for development and NTMs affecting them.  His 
delegation did not think that SMEs and development were contradictory concepts .  
1.148.   They had not wanted to give a definition of SMEs because the proposal did not need a 
definition.  The proponents thought that their proposal would be particularly beneficial to SMEs, 
because if the company was big, it would have a sales department in various countries that would 
be able to go around, read the websites, discuss with the governments of the countries to  which 
they wanted to export and obtain all the necessary information in order to export to a particular 
country.  An SME in developing countries in particular  and in developed  countries as well  did not 
necessarily have the possibility to do this in all ma rkets that they would, in theory, be able to 
access.  So,  while the proposal was neutral in terms of business entity, to respond to Kenya, they 
were not in the business of creating categories or provisions for SMEs or non -SMEs.  They had 
wanted to give add itional instruments to the SMEs just as the EU did with web -portal known as the 
Export Helpdesk. It was a way for companies which did not have a sales department in the EU to 
get all the necessary information on non -tariff measures, quotas, tariffs and in the future hopefully 
on rules of origin as well relating to the country of export and on the products they wanted to 
export.  
1.149.   A lot of work was already ongoing in Geneva on this subject.  UNCTAD and WTO were 
doing great work.  ITC was doing excellent work i n putting this information together in an interface 
that was user friendly.  With this Ministerial Decision, they aimed to give a strong political mandate 
to those organizations and to show that WTO Members were fully on board for these organizations 
to continue this work, like in the case of e -ping.   
1.150.   He had noted the view which had been expressed that this proposal was not about NTBs.   
As he had mentioned, there were Members whose site addressed this issue, but it was not the 
main or only problem that SM Es had and he referred to trade finance in this regard. The EU was 
fully aware of that and their policy towards Africa was not limited to a web portal on NTMs for 
SMEs.  This proposal could not solve all the problems of Africa which did not mean that it wa s a 
bad proposal.  There was a need to start with something and the EU thought that this was a good 
idea.  There were of course different levels of ambition and some of the objectives that the G90 
had tried to achieve with their SPS and TBT proposals were the same as what the proponents TN/MA/M/26  
 
- 19 - 
 
  wanted to achieve here. The proponents wanted to limit the impact of SPS and TBT measures in 
trade by enhancing the transparency of these measures.  
1.151.   Someone had asked what does considering mean.  "Considering" for the propone nts meant 
"not to ignore". He had asked the expert who had told him that it is even less than "taking note" 
or "take into account".  Usually "considering" meant that there was a site where you could register 
your problem and this site is, for example, a go vernment site.  For the purpose of "considering" it 
would be enough as far as the EU was concerned.  
1.152.   An important legal point was this decision did not amend the TBT and SPS Agreements. It 
did not clarify in the sense that the TFA clarified the GATT and di d not replace any TBT and SPS 
provisions.  The proponents had been clear in the proposal when they said in Article 9 that in 
relation to other Agreements, nothing in this decision shall affect what was in the TBT and SPS 
Agreements.  This was a copy/paste language from the TF A.  So, the proponents were sure that no 
rights or obligations emerging from the TBT or SPS Agreements were affected by this.  Moreover, 
this was a Ministerial Decision. So as Members knew such a decision was not under Annex I of the 
Dispute Settlement Understanding.  So as it stood, it was not a decision that would be subject to 
the dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO.   
1.153.   Several delegations had referred to the Decision's links with the TFA.  Members had 
already collectively adopted provisions in term of transparency and consultations as a binding 
agreement subject to the WTO DSU when they agreed to the TFA.  Basically, the proponents were 
looking at extending some transparency and minimal regulatory practice not only to customs 
regulation and procedures but as well to SPS and TBT measures as defined in the TBT and SPS 
Agreements by means of a Ministerial Decision; again it was not an amendment.   
1.154.   Did this portal already exist?  What they would wish to ask the ITC, WTO and UNCTAD was 
to have a full picture of all the measures that were in force at a particular given time in a particular 
country.   
1.155.   He had heard with interest that several delegations had not yet consulted their capital s but 
had preliminary observations and in some cases h ad already rejected the proposal. The 
proponents were keen to engage, discuss and understand further, both the more general and 
systemic points that had been expressed as well as the specific and the technical aspects of the 
decision.  A view had been expr essed that Members should let the TBT and SPS experts dealing 
with the Committees work on these issues, but at the end of the day he believed that they were 
the same people sitting in different chairs and if their minds and maybe their hearts, were put int o 
it Members could emerge with something positive for Buenos Aires, which was going to be good 
for development and for SMEs.  
1.156.   The representative of Uganda  thanked the representative of the European Union for having 
taken a look at Uganda's website.  Indeed  Trademark East Africa was a project in Uganda funded 
by Trademark East Africa to deal with non -tariff barriers.  But this project emanated from a 
decision that was adopted at a summit level in the East African Community.  So at the summit 
level, the heads  of states agreed on a road map to eliminate all non -tariff barriers.  So Uganda's 
process went beyond transparency.   So, in order to eliminate all NTBs, a specific law was adopted 
at the East African legislative assembly to this effect.  In addition ever y Member, including 
Uganda, had put in place an NTB national rapid response mechanism.  So the portal that the EU 
representative was referring to was meant to facilitate such an endeavour.  Uganda's point was 
not to deny the importance of dealing with NTBs , it was that there was no cause and effect 
between transparency and the elimination of NTBs.  
1.157.   The representative of Brazil  wished to address one point that had also been part of the EU 
response which had contained useful clarifications.  Specifically, he wished to address the question 
of SPS which was mentioned by the EU and others.  One delegation had stated that it was obvious 
that SPS issues fell outside the mandate of this Negotiating Group.  Well, in Brazil's opinion it was 
not obvious at all.  The EU  had rightly said that SPS had an important development component 
due to its connection to mostly agricultural issues.  There were other elements that Brazil could 
add to the discussion favouring the inclusion of SPS issues in the discussion of this propos al and 
other proposals that might emerge under the NTBs segment of this Negotiating Group.  TN/MA/M/26  
 
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  1.158.   First of all, TBT measures could apply to agricultural products and SPS measures could 
apply to products which were not considered to be agricultural products, inclu ding, if one read the 
explicit language of Annex 1 of the Agreement on Agriculture, fishery products. Fishery products 
were subject to SPS measures and if subject to a tariff negotiation would fall under the scope of 
this Negotiating Group.  So, Brazil did  not think that the boundaries between the SPS and TBT 
were exactly the same as the boundaries between agricultural and non -agricultural products as 
was implied by some interventions.  
1.159.   Further to that argument, if one were  to simplify the discussion and say  that TBT covered 
industrial products and SPS covered agricultural products, Brazil thought that it would be 
unacceptable to create a new gap between the treatment in the disciplines that covered industrial 
products and the disciplines that covered agricul tural products.  This was the gap that Brazil had 
been trying to bridge in the WTO for the last 20 years and prior to that in the Uruguay Round, 
before the creation of the WTO.   So, for this reason Brazil thought that the inclusion of SPS in the 
discussio n was essential and reiterated its intention to engage constructively in the discussion of 
this proposal and would contribute with specific amendments to this text.  He thanked Argentina 
for mentioning their work to come forward with a concrete proposal in  favour of MSMEs in the 
parallel track of the informal dialogue on MSMEs.   
1.160.   The representative of Chinese Taipei  said that he had heard some Members mention that 
transparency was not the most urgent need of SMEs in developing and LDC Members.  It was his 
delegation's view that, it may not be easy to have a one -stop shop SME assistance package, so his 
delegation believed that an incremental approach was the appropriate one.  Also his delegation 
understood that there were several proposals about the SME devel opment issues that were 
discussed in other for a, so this proposal was aimed at addressing the transparency issue only.  
1.161.   In reaction to the statement by Uganda in which he had said that enhancing transparency 
had nothing to do with eliminating NTBs, Chinese Taipei, on the contrary, believed that enhancing 
transparency could reduce the compliance costs for the SMEs.  SMEs would be better able to 
identify the NTBs they faced in their foreign market and bring them to the attention of their 
governments who in tur n could address those NTBs in a bilateral or multilateral forum. So, his 
delegation echoed what the EU just said.  This proposal addressed transparency issues; not 
everything that SMEs in developing or LDC Members faced. But that did not mean that the 
proposal was a bad one. His delegation hoped to have more discussions on this topic.   
1.162.   The representative of Cameroon  noted that his earlier statement remained valid 
particularly as his question had as yet not been answered.  Secondly, Chinese Taipei had just said 
that the proposal was a good one but he disagreed.  It was bad, because in fact it was illegal, and 
the process to legitimize this illegal situation should not be part of this organization.  Among the 
elements that had appeared in the Doha mandate, th ere was transparency in the functioning of 
the institution but that had not been made a priority.  That was the kind of proposal that was of 
interest to his delegation - transparency at the heart of the institution.   
1.163.   Now, his delegation considered legal q uestions important.  If some delegations believed 
that the mandate could be left aside, they were mistaken.  This was the starting point of a 
process.  Otherwise it meant starting from an illegal situation to reach a legal one, which his 
delegation found t o be a curious way of functioning.  This was an institution that had functioned on 
the basis of so called provisional laws, but Members realized that that the functioning was 
sometimes not effective and that the law needed to be reinforced.   The WTO was c riticised from 
inside and from out, but when one was looking to re -legitimise it, it was most important to be in 
conformity with the rules.  When one was in conformity with the rules, then a clear message of 
credibility was conveyed. So, Members were not g oing to be convinced by an apparent solution 
when it was a trap.  That was the issue at stake.  If an organization was based on rules, then 
those rules had to play a central role.  
1.164.   The representative of South Africa  observed that the proposal under Article 2 on "Scope" 
said the following: "Without prejudice to paragraph 2, this Ministerial Decision applies to all 
regulatory measures falling within the scope of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures and the Agreement on Techni cal Barriers to Trade".  It did not indicate 
that it would cover fisheries because fisheries fell under the scope of NAMA goods and was 
therefore affected by SPS  measures .  So, it was for those reasons that South Africa had said that 
issues related to SPS  measures  did not form part of the work of the NAMA negotiating group.  Her TN/MA/M/26  
 
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  point was that the proposal did not indicate which products affected by SPS measures, it was 
proposing to deal with in the NAMA Negotiating Group.   
1.165.   The representative of Swaziland  said that in regard to the EU's response to the effect that 
the delegation felt that they wouldn't want to dwell much on issues of legality, the mandate and 
process issues. His delegation believed that the WTO was a rule -based organization whose 
foundation  was the legal framework which in turn informed process issues.  While on the other 
hand process issues determined and defined substantive issues.  What this meant was that one 
could not leap  frog process issues for the sake of substantive issues.  
1.166.   The repr esentative of  the European Union  said that in relation to the point made by  
South  Africa, it was true that this Negotiating Group was meant to deal with Non -Agricultural 
Market Access. So, in theory this proposal should not cover agricultural goods.  At th e same time, 
the distinction between SPS and TBT had nothing to do with it.  As long as one talked about 
market access for fishery products to which SPS and TBT measures applied, the proposal was 
within the mandate.  Brazil had explained this very well.  T he only criticism that he could accept 
was that this was a non -agricultural setting and Members were discussing a proposal that in theory 
could be applicable to an agricultural setting.  The conclusion could then be to exclude agricultural 
products. Howeve r, he had said no because he considered that this was important for 
developmental reasons.   
1.167.   On the point raised by Cameroon, in the Ministerial Conference there would be a need for a 
consensus.  However, he did not agree with the view that the Negotiating  Group was discussing 
new issues.  In fact, the entire discussion between new questions, old questions, Doha issues was 
rather tiring.  The EU was ready to work on the Doha files. His delegation had important proposals 
on fishery subsidies, agricultural su bsidies, food security, and stood ready to discuss these issues 
as well as others.  So his emphasis on the substance and not the process was obviously not 
because he considered procedural questions unimportant.  But if Members were to discuss only 
this iss ue, then there might be a risk of limiting Members' effectiveness and increasing the 
criticisms that the WTO would face.   
1.168.   The representative of Cameroon  thanked the representa tive of the European Union for 
replying in French.  That way there was no misund erstanding about a certain number of key 
concepts.  The European Union considered a discussion on the distinction between new issues and 
old issues, Doha questions somewhat tiring.  That was the point of view of Cameroon. Now when a 
discussion was tiring o r tiresome, one had to settle it. And if one did not want to get tired of it, 
then one had to submit a proposal to procedure.   On this question, he wished to remind Members 
that the EU was very careful about details.  Consensus was prior to the negotiatio ns; the 
consensus did not take place after the negotiations. It was not after one had finished negotiating 
that one asked whether there was a consensus. A driver for example had to get a driving permit 
before driving not the other way round.  So  a consensu s was needed prior to negotiations. The EU 
was suggesting a completely different approach from the legal one and this had awakened his 
curiosity.   Since his time as a diplomat, he had been working with the EU and he knew that the 
EU was careful about thes e legal issues. He knew that the WTO Secretariat was also careful about 
this.   
1.169.   The issue of consensus was a fundamental decision because negotiations were structured 
on the basis of this consensus.  Once a choice was made to deliberately violate a rule, t hen it was 
a problem, it became tiresome.  That was why in the United Nations, voting took  place.    At the 
WTO, the rule was consensus and it was a very effective system.  Many proposals had been 
tabled, but nothing was moving forward because people were focussed on details which did not 
allow for efficiency.  So, his delegation insisted on respecting the procedures.  Otherwise it would 
discredit the organization.  This organization had a mode of functioning that was very effective; 
the rules simply had to  be respected.  
1.170.   For instance, if Members did not want to conclude the Doha negotiations, then Members 
had to so evaluate.  The mandate was clear. If Members did not want to make progress in the 
negotiations, then conclude them, make an assessment and move o n.  But, trying to circumvent 
the system was tiring and it prevented Members from moving forward effectively.  So his 
delegation insisted on this question and, like the EU, his delegation did not want to receive more 
criticisms on this.  TN/MA/M/26  
 
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  1.171.   His country had an economy which was based on the work of  SMEs , even in the informal 
sector , to the tune of more than 96%. So his delegation was very interested in this question. In 
fact, Cameroon's Minister for Small and Medium Sized Enterprises had attended MC10 in Nairobi , 
and had even been recognized for the work he had done in this area.  Nevertheless, his delegation 
did have a problem. They could not work in an illegal situation. This insistence was not a puerile 
and was not to be taken lightly, because when one was tal king about law, one was talking about 
serious questions.  
1.172.   His delegation was very keen that the EU's proposal followed the rules.  Why should the EU 
proposal not respect the rules?  Why should people who did not have any legitimacy or any 
political mandate,  control the actions of his government.  The Cameroonians had elected the 
government who elaborated the rules.  Why should there be disorder in the law. Members had to 
keep to the legal standards, and had to respect the procedure.  That was how things coul d get 
done. Previously the EU had pushed Uganda to reply, and Uganda had replied. Uganda had said 
that there was an issue of legitimacy and credibility involved here.  If one followed this logic of 
credibility and legitimacy, the discussion would not be ti ring or tiresome.  
1.173.   The representative of Brazil  stated , also in response to South Africa's question that 
paragraph 2 of Annex 1 of the Agreement on Agriculture explicitly stated that "The foregoing" and 
they refer red to the list of covered HS codes "shall n ot limit the product coverage of the 
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures".  So one example was 
fisher ies, but it was not the only one.  This was what he had wanted to bring as an additional 
element to the Negotiating Group.  
1.174.   The representative of Singapore  wanted to complement what was said about SPS, and to 
respond to South Africa's question on the scope of application of measures of the SPS Agreement.  
The definition in footnote 4 of Annex A of the SPS Agreement explicitly stated that "For the 
purpose of these definitions, "animal" includes fish and wild fauna; "plant" includes forests and 
wild flora; "pests" include weeds; and "contaminants" include pesticide and veterinary drug 
residues and extraneous matter".  So from thi s text, one got a sense that fish and other types of 
products were included within the scope of application of the SPS Agreement.   
1.175.   The representative of South Africa  stated that the EU had provided a satisfactory answer to 
say that fish might fall under t he scope of NAMA goods, but the proposal covered the SPS 
Agreement and not just those that affected fish but also those that affect agriculture.  Therefore 
the scope of the proposal did not cover only fish products in the NAMA negotiations and fisheries 
products affected by SPS but covered SPS regulations that affected all agricultural products. In 
short, she had sought clarification that the proposal was not only focused on fish but covered all 
agricultural products and the EU had said "yes".  She was not disputing the scope of application 
under any agreement; it was just a clarification and she had obtained her answer.   
1.176.   The Chairman  noted that there had been an intense debate with a variety of arguments 
brought up. The Negotiating Group had heard argument s in favour of and against the proposal. A 
number of questions and requests for clarification had also been made.  The EU and other 
co-sponsors had already provided a number of explanations and the EU had also indicated 
willingness to further engage, expla in and discuss their ideas with Members.  So, he proposed that 
the Negotiating Group take note of the statements; that the proponents continue to consult and to 
explain their proposals, and in particular to clarify and answer any remaining questions.  He s tood 
ready to hold consultations should further developments take place.  
1.177.   The representative of Cameroon  thanked the Chairman for his summary. There was one 
element which had been left out in the summary which was that some Members had indicated that 
there were prior legal requirements which needed to be addressed first.  This point needed to be 
made at the beginning so that it was clear to everyone, and he hoped to hear this element in the 
Chairman's summary.  
1.178.   The Chairman  noted that he would be providing a  summary of the deliberations that took 
place this morning at the meeting of Heads of Delegations tha t was scheduled for Tuesday, 
25 July. In his summary, he had observed that there were arguments for and against the proposal. 
He presumed that the argument s concerning legal matters, procedures and principles would be 
categorised in the context of today's debate among the elements which went against the proposal.   TN/MA/M/26  
 
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  1.179.   The Negotiating Group took note  of the statements made.  
2  OTHER BUSINESS  
2.1  MC11 initiative on the  temporary admission of palettes, containers and packings  
2.1.  The representative of Australia  appreciated the opportunity to inform Members about an 
initiative which reduced trade costs, assisted MSMEs, was environmental and was of benefit to all.  
Australia h ad previously  informed Members of this initiative in the Council for Trade in Goods.  
2.2.  Packed goods were travelling faster, more frequently and to a greater spread of destinations 
than ever before.  This included stackable containers for food, customised con tainers for car parts 
and containers used to dispatch garments.  With so many goods criss -crossing the globe, palettes, 
containers and packings costs had a significant impact on world trade and on the environment.  
2.3.  The aim of this initiative was to establi sh binding international rules ensuring the duty -free 
temporary admission of containers, palettes and packings.  The concept behind this initiative was 
quite simple: containers, palettes and packings should be provided duty -free temporary admission 
at the border.   
2.4.  This initiative reduced trade costs and bureaucracy at the border, the cost of which should 
not be passed on to businesses, consumers and Members' economies.   
2.5.  This initiative assisted MSMEs. MSMEs were disproportionately affected by bureaucratic  
measures.  The reduction of bureaucratic, costly and inefficient measures was at the heart of this 
initiative.  Businesses would also benefit from a clear universal approach.  Currently the disparate 
customs procedures between countries meant that busines ses could not be certain of what 
measures they would face.   
2.6.  This initiative was environmental. It was about the use of reusable containers, palettes and 
packing.  Further, it reduced post -harvest loses and food waste by facilitating the use of containers 
designed to protect their contents.  Currently some customs authorities imposed duties on the 
return of empty containers, effectively penalising this more sustainable transport method.  It built 
on achievements reached on the Agreement on Trade Facilitatio n, which provided for temporary 
admission of goods, but did not particularly address containers, palettes and packings.  It also 
built on a number of conventions in this area, to which many Members were already a party, the 
revised Kyoto Convention, for ex ample, had 103 parties and provided recommended practice for 
temporary admission for containers, palettes and packings.  The relevant annex of the Istanbul 
Convention on Temporary Admission concerning containers, palettes and packings had 50 parties. 
In recognition of the volume of goods shipped globally nowadays and the significance of this issue, 
Australia had noted the need for progress in this area had been called for by the International 
Chamber of Commerce.   
2.7.  All Members were welcome to attend an info rmation session to be held after the summer 
break on this issue, which was currently being arranged.  Australia further welcomed the 
engagement of Members  in developing a formal proposal with the aim of securing an outcome at 
MC11.  
2.8.  The Negotiating Group took note  of the statement.  
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