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TN/C/M/31  
 
18 February 2013  
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Trade Negotiations Committee 
7 December 2012    
 
   
MINUTES OF MEETING 
Held in the Centre William Rappard 
On 7 December 2012 
CHAIRMAN: MR PASCAL LAMY (DIRECTOR-GENERAL) 
 
CONTENTS 
Page 
1   STATEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN AND REPORTS BY THE CHAIRPERSONS OF 
THE BODIES ESTABLIS HED BY TH E TNC ........................................................................... 1  
2   STATEMENTS BY  PARTICIP ANTS ............................................................................... 11  
 
1  STATEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN AND REPORTS BY THE CHAIRPERSONS OF THE BODIES ESTABLISHED BY THE TNC 
1.1.  The Chairman
1 recalled that the last informal TNC had taken place over one year before, in 
October 2011, and more than two years had passed since the last formal session in March 2010. 
Over this period of time, he had continued to  provide the membership with updates at each 
regular session of the General Council and comprehensive discussions on the Doha Development 
Agenda (DDA) had been held both at that level an d, indeed, at the Ministerial Conference in 2011. 
Nevertheless, he believed that a formal TNC wa s long overdue in terms of transparency and 
inclusiveness for all Members, but equally in view of the important work that lay ahead in 2013. He 
hoped that the meeting would be able to take stock of progress in the negotiating front with a view 
to prepare the year ahead. The meeting was also timely because it was the half-way mark of the 
period between the Eighth Ministerial Conference (MC8) and the Ninth Ministerial Conference 
(MC9). The guidance provided by Ministers at the 2011 Conference remained the road-map which 
would guide the membership to Bali and all Members had a collective responsibility to ensure that work was done towards clearly id entifying where Members' interests lay, and recognizing which 
areas could be realistically considered short-term deliverables and which areas required further 
work to ensure a successful and balanced outcome.  
1.2.  At the Annual Meeting of the IMF and World Bank in Tokyo, he had cautioned that the global 
economic picture remained marked by turbulence , with sluggish growth rates, high global 
unemployment and downwards predictions for world trade growth. The WTO had recently revised 
its forecasts for 2012, putting trade growth in volume at 2.5% – a substantially lower rate than the earlier forecast of 3.7%. This gloomy economic backdrop made it even more urgent for the 
WTO to strive to identify solid deliverables for 2013. At the World Export Development Forum in 
Indonesia, he had discussed the importance of  trade capacity building and had met with the 
authorities in Jakarta to discuss preparations for MC9. He had also participated in the ASEAN Global Dialogue on the sidelines of the East Asia Summit in Cambodia, where he had had the 
opportunity to exchange views and consult with AS EAN+6. Finally, he had recently returned from a 
visit to the most recent Least-Developed Country (LDC) Members, Samoa and Vanuatu, where he had met with government officials and business leaders. In Samoa, he had also met with the 
                                               
1 The Chairman's statement was subsequently circulated in JOB/TNC/16. TN/C/M/31 
 
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 Secretary-General of the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (PIFS) and had signed a five-year 
Memorandum of Understanding that strengthened  the long-standing cooperation between the WTO 
and the PIFS and ensured joint efforts to provide trade-related technical assistance to Pacific island countries. 
1.3.  The message he had taken away from all of those high-level meetings had been a continuing 
strong support for the multilateral trading system and an overwhelming recognition of the importance of strengthening multilateral trade rules to limit protectionism and restore sustained 
levels of global trade growth. From what he had heard, Members remained committed to re-
energising the WTO talks in a pragmatic and practical manner and to ensuring that 2013 was a productive year for the Organization. 
1.4.   The Chairman gave the floor to the Ch airs of the bodies established by the TNC. 
1.5.  Ambassador Adank (New Zealand), Chairman  of the Special Session of the Committee on 
Agriculture, said that since his last update to  the TNC, he had been meeting with Members in 
various formats including convening meetings of the Committee on Agriculture in Special Session 
(CoA SS) in late September and on 16 November. He had also had several consultations with 
individual delegations and smaller groups. Discussi ons had focused on three recent proposals: two 
non-papers submitted by Brazil on behalf of Agriculture G-20 countries, i.e. "Understanding on 
Tariff Rate Quota Administration Provisions of Agricultural Products as Defined in Article 2 of the 
Agreement on Agriculture" (JOB/AG/20) and "Request of Studies on Tariff Rate Quota Administration and on Export Competition" (JOB/AG/21) both dated 5 October 2012; and a G-33 proposal, "G-33 Proposal on Some Elements of TN/AG/W/4/Rev.4 for Early Agreement to Address 
Food Security Issues" (JOB/AG/22) of 13 November 2012.  
1.6.  The tabling of these proposals had prov ided a basis for more focussed and engaged 
discussion and he had been encouraged by Members' willingness to engage. In his view, this 
reflected the fact that Members across the spectrum recognised that an agricultural component to 
the Doha-related work remained crucial to the success of any broader effort, even if the consultations had predictably revealed a range of sensitivities about the extent to which a selective 
approach might be able to achieve the overall balance necessary in Agriculture. Some Members 
had also indicated, including in the context of the discussions in the DG's Consultative Framework 
on Cotton, that they were considering other Agriculture issues as candidates for early agreement. He wished to encourage any Member with other proposals to come forward as early as possible, so 
as to ensure sufficient time for discussion.  
1.7.  On the specific proposals, the tone of the discussions to date had been constructive and 
pragmatic. Turning to the TRQ administration paper (JOB/AG/20), as he had indicated during the 
Special Session meeting on 16 November, "It's fair to say that I have not heard 'no' from any 
Member on the idea that TRQ administration might form part of a broader range of Doha-related decisions taken forward next year, even if it's not possible to say that there has been an 
unreserved 'yes' to the specific proposal of the G-20". In short, while no Member had rejected the 
idea that TRQ administration could form part of a broader range of Doha-related decisions taken forward in 2013, some Members had expressed concerns regarding certain aspects of that proposal. Members of the G-20 and Cairns Group had supported the proposal, even though they 
had said the proposed disciplines would not be as ambitious as they had wanted. While a number 
of Members were supportive of taking the proposal  forward for endorsement on the basis that it 
effectively replicated the supposedly "stabilised" text of TN/AG/W/4/Rev.4, other Members had 
indicated reluctance to move too quickly in this same direction and some other Members had 
cautioned that even if the provision was "stable" within the 2008 modalities, on its own it might not reflect the broader balance in the wider modalities document that had been negotiated at that 
time. 
1.8.  Some aspects of the underfill mechanism outlined in the Annex to the proposal continued to 
raise questions for some Members. In particular, there were mixed views regarding the S&D provisions. Some Members had noted the importance of maintaining this aspect of the paper as 
formulated in JOB/AG/20, while others had considered that this aspect would need to be the 
subject of further consideration, making the poin t that the broader contours of decisions beyond 
agriculture that might evolve in coming months would also need to be taken into account before 
arriving at any final position or decisions. However, he felt that, overall, in this area Members had 
made a very good start and, as a result of th e consultations, there was more awareness about TN/C/M/31 
 
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 where Members stood on the TRQ text submitted by the G-20. He had encouraged Members to 
continue to engage in bilateral discussions to deve lop a better understanding of the nature of their 
respective sensitivities. 
1.9.  In parallel to the proposal on TRQ administration, the G-20 had made a proposal that the 
Secretariat circulate updated information on TRQ administration and export competition 
(JOB/AG/21). Some Members had also requested th e Secretariat to provide updates on export 
restriction notifications. He had asked the Secretar iat to proceed with this transparency exercise, 
preparing studies that presented updated factual in formation on the basis of information notified 
by Members. The goal would be to produce some of the requested information by the end of 2012, 
but some information would also be produced in early 2013.  
1.10.  The G-33's food security proposal was introduced by Indonesia in the Special Session of the 
Committee on Agriculture on 16 November. In the proposal, the G-33 sought early approval for 
new provisions allowing government stockholding and purchases from low-income and resource-poor farmers at supported prices to be excluded from AMS calculations. Preliminary reactions had 
been varied. Supporters of the proposal included G-33 members and some members of the 
Agriculture G-20. While all Members had accepted th e importance of food security, particularly in 
the current climate, many had also recommended  proceeding with caution and had emphasized 
the need to examine the proposal closely to better understand the current practices of the 
Members supporting it and the broader implications of the new rules proposed for the Agreement on Agriculture. Some Members had noted that isolating the proposal from the rest of the modalities package would also raise questions of overall balance in regard to the wider package of 
reforms, new disciplines and flexibilities to be achieved in Agriculture as a whole. Others had said 
that the provisions had not yet been discussed multilaterally in enough depth and should not be considered stabilised even though they had been  included in the Rev.4 text. Additionally, some 
Members had suggested that reforming agricultural trade by concluding the Doha Round, including 
the adoption of the full modalities text, would give food security the biggest boost. So in short, 
there had been a range of different perspectives ai red at the time the proposal was introduced and 
he was aware that since then, delegations had been having informative and constructive 
exchanges to deepen their understanding on the objectives behind the proposal and how this fit in with their own priorities and concerns in relation to the negotiations. He wished to encourage delegations to continue that process. In th e meantime, he remained available for further 
discussions with any delegations or groups wishin g to outline their views and hoped to pursue 
further individual or smaller group discussions on the proposal before the end of the year or early 
in 2013. 
1.11.  In conclusion, he said he was not planning any further meetings of the Agriculture Special 
Session for the remainder of 2012. In the first part of 2013, he would consult with Members to try and advance a common understanding on the way forward and to determine an appropriate time 
for the Special Session to next convene. 
1.12.  Ambassador Sperisen-Yurt (Guatemala), Chairman of the Negotiating Group on Trade 
Facilitation, said the latest meeting of the Ne gotiating Group had been concluded the previous 
afternoon with a stocktaking of the work that ye ar and a discussion on the way ahead. He was 
happy to report that there had been a general f eeling that the Group had made progress on the 
Consolidated Draft Text of the Agreement and that delegations were committed to continue negotiating constructively on the Text in 2013. Inevitably, there were still many points of 
disagreement among delegations on the details of  the Draft Text, both the new disciplines on 
Trade Facilitation in Part I and the S&D provisions on flexibility and assistance for developing countries and LDCs in Part II. He recognized that there was a temptation for those not close to the 
negotiations to count the remaining brackets and cautioned against putting too much faith in that 
as a measure of the progress being made. In many cases, a single area of disagreement was reflected in the Draft Text by many brackets. As Members succeeded in resolving issues and got closer to a final draft, he expected to see the bracket count diminish quickly. 
1.13.  Much of the work still involved technical issu es that could only be solved at the expert level. 
For that, reliance should continue to be made on the facilitator process to make progress on cleaning up the Draft Text in between formal meet ings of the Negotiating Group. As regards Part II 
of the Draft Text on S&D, that week had seen a successful start to a valuable discussion of a more 
holistic nature about how the S&D provisions should work in practice when it came to the implementation of a Trade Facilitation agreement.  The Negotiating Group would continue with that TN/C/M/31 
 
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 theme in the facilitator process in 2013. Those negotiations had benefitted a great deal from being 
carried out in a fully inclusive and transparent, member-driven manner and he was committed to ensuring that those principles continued to apply to the work of the Negotiating Group.  
1.14.  As the technical work advanced and allowe d key sticking points in the Draft Text to be 
brought into clearer focus, he would review th e negotiating process and discuss with delegations 
how to best introduce a broader, more horizontal approach that would allow the Negotiating Group to address key choices that would have to be made across-the-board in the Draft Text in order to 
turn it into a final product. He intended for that discussion to take place at the Group's next 
meeting, which was scheduled for the week of 11 March. In the meantime, he would intensify his own consultations with delegations in order to prepare for a smooth transition from the more technical to the more political aspects of the negotiations.  
1.15.  Reflecting the continuing interest of many  developing countries and LDCs to be more fully 
involved in the Trade Facilitation negotiations, in 2013 capital-based officials would continue to be sponsored as often as possible to participate in meetings of the Negotiating Group, thanks to 
generous financial support from Norway, Sweden and the EU. Finally, the Secretariat had recently 
launched a new needs assessment programme to assist developing countries and LDCs, upon request, in conducting their own analysis of their individual trade facilitati on needs and priorities, 
including the resource costs that would be involved in implementing a new Trade Facilitation 
agreement, and in preparing their approach to donors and other development partners for assistance in this area. Almost 50 Members had already requested assistance under this new programme. 
1.16.  Ambassador Kwok Fook Seng (Singapore ), Chairman of the Special Session of the 
Committee on Trade and Development, said his oral report built on the transparency report he had 
made at the 47th Special Session of the Committee on Trade and Development (CTD SS) on 13 
July 2012 (TN/CTD/M/47). At that meeting, he had outlined the consensus among Members to 
work, in parallel, on three clusters: (i) the 28 Agreement-specific proposals agreed, in-principle, at Cancún, (ii) the Monitoring Mechanism, and (iii) the six Agreement-specific proposals relating to 
the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures and the Agreement on Import Licensing 
Procedures. On a fourth cluster of the Category II issues which were referred to other WTO Bodies 
and Negotiating Groups, it had been agreed that he, in his capacity as Chair, would undertake informal consultations with those respective Bodies, to determine if some form of housekeeping 
could be done for each of these proposals. From  that July meeting onwards, all CTD SS informal 
consultations had been held on an open-ended ba sis, with a published schedule. Participation by 
delegations in the CTD SS continued to grow steadily. After the summer, the schedule of meetings 
had been adjusted from weekly to fortnightly meet ings at the request of some Members, allowing 
them more time to prepare and coordinate with capitals and/or within their respective groups. As a practice, he had also met regularly with Members in  variable geometry, with a view to keeping all 
key stakeholders, particularly those who missed meetings, in step with the work of the Committee 
in Special Session. 
1.17.  With regard the Cancún 28 Agreement-specific proposals, Members had consulted using a 
Matrix prepared by the Secretariat at Members' request. The aim of the Matrix had been to 
facilitate the mandated stocktake exercise by helping Members to consider whether any of those 
proposals had been impacted by the passage of ti me and/or developments elsewhere in the WTO. 
Members had completed a first reading of the Matrix, during which a frank exchange of views had 
taken place in a positive and constructive manner. It had been expressed, at the outset of the 
discussions, that Members did not want the stocktak e exercise to lead to any re-negotiation of 
these previously stabilised proposals, and that the objective of the stocktake was to adopt as 
many of the 28 proposals as possible. Neverthele ss, some Members had articulated the need to 
seek clarifications on the intended effects of so me of the 28 proposals, given that much time had 
passed since the Cancún Ministerial. This had been no t to object to these proposals, but to better 
facilitate considerations in capital, with a view to securing support for their adoption. Following an 
exchange of views, Members had agreed that such clarifications could take place at the informal 
level, through bilateral or plurilateral interactions between delegates. In parallel, the Committee would focus its work on the six proposals identified  by the Secretariat as having been impacted by 
the passage of time. Consultations on these six proposals had begun on 23 November, and 
Members would revisit the remaining 22 proposals after completion of that work.  TN/C/M/31 
 
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 1.18.  On the six Agreement-specific proposals, work had primarily focused on the two proposals 
forming one text which related to Article 10.3 of the SPS Agreement. While there had been 
conceptual discussions on the other four Agreement-specific proposals, further clarification was needed before text-based work could begin on those. Discussions on the SPS Article 10.3 proposal 
were progressing in a positive and constructive manner, with a shared aim of producing a precise 
decision which would be effective and implementable in the SPS Committee. Members had found it more important to discuss and converge conceptually on what this proposal sought to achieve in 
terms of Special and Differential Treatment (S &D) exceptions from the SPS Committee, rather 
than negotiating the language in isolation. The Committee had also benefited from valuable input provided by the Secretary of the SPS Committee, which had given sufficient clarity for a further 
revision of the text which had been discussed on 9 November 2012. Work on this text would 
continue and the proposals would be further refined for a positive outcome. 
1.19.  With regard the Monitoring Mechanism,  text-based work had begun in June, with a 
compilation Chair's text produced under his personal responsibility. The text had built on the 
previous Chair's non-paper. On the preambular section, there remained a spectrum of views 
among delegations on the mandate for the Mechanism. His own assessment was that once Members had developed a shared view on what the desired operational objectives were for the 
Mechanism and had translated this into the body of the working text, the question of the mandate 
and progress on other elements in the preambular section would follow automatically. Text-based work had since progressed, accompanied by an engaged conceptual discussion among Members, 
who had offered useful ideas and textual proposals. This had enabled the Committee to improve 
and stabilise the text in some parts. At the meeting held on 9 November 2012, Members had 
agreed to continue work on the basis of a compilation text which captured the progress made, and also incorporated the clarity achieved hitherto in the useful conceptual discussions. An updated 
compilation Chair's text had been circulated on 12 November 2012. The Committee would return 
to text-based work in this cluster in January 201 3, and he intended to continue his practice of 
parallel bilateral, plurilateral and open-ended informal consultations in order to build convergence 
and move forward. 
1.20.  On the Category II proposals, during th e month of October, he had held one-to-one 
meetings with the Secretaries of the WTO Bodies  to which these 38 proposals had been referred. 
While he was preparing a detailed report on these proposals to be shared with Members at a later 
stage, his initial sense was that there was mixed progress in this broad spectrum of proposals. At 
one end of the spectrum, the issues raised in some proposals formed an integral part of the ongoing negotiations under the Doha Round. As a result it had been difficult to make progress on 
them in isolation of the ongoing negotiations. In  the case of some regular bodies, the proposals 
referred to them had been addressed by actions taken within those committees, or had evolved through follow-up action of the original proponents. His sense was that not all 38 proposals were 
without progress, and he was in the midst of producing a detailed report to update Members in 
early 2013.  
1.21.  With regard to future work, in line with  the Ministerial directions given at the MC8, he 
intended to continue text-based discussions on the three clusters of work. A schedule of CTD SS 
meetings for the first half of 2013 had already been circulated to Members. His intention was to 
continue consultations in the open-ended format which enabled full participation, inclusiveness and transparency, with the objective of achieving positive results as soon as practicable. 
1.22.  Ambassador Winzap (Switzerland), Chairman  of the Negotiating Group on Market Access, 
recalled that the Negotiating Group had met in formal session on 29 November and had elected 
him as Chairman. It had been a short meeting wh ere he had spoken of the continued importance 
of NAMA trade. He had further noted that the e ffort expended by Members over the past decade 
and the technical know-how acquired by them over that period of time should not be 
underestimated. He had indicated that he saw his Chairmanship role to be that of a facilitator and at times a mediator, and had put the onus on Members to offer him guidance keeping in mind the 
mandate and to be pragmatic and creative.  
1.23.  In terms of a work plan, he had proposed holding consultations in different configurations. 
Some of the meetings he intended to schedule would be bilaterals, others would be meetings with 
groups of Members. During these consultations, he would be seeking responses to essentially two 
questions: whether the situation in NAMA looked different today than one year ago; and what could be done in NAMA and under what circumstances would success be possible in the short-term TN/C/M/31 
 
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 and in a broader time perspective. He would also welcome suggestions on process. He had 
circulated those questions to Members after the meeting. Consultations would start the following week and would continue through January and ea rly February 2013. His main objective was to 
sense when and under what conditions Members would be ready to re-engage on NAMA. He 
intended to hold a transparency meeting towards the end of February to report on the results of 
his consultations. 
1.24.  Ambassador de Mateo (Mexico), Chairman of the Special Session of the Council for Trade in 
Services, said that over the past year, he had continued to consult Members on market access 
issues, mindful of Ministers' MC8 guidance to ex plore more fully different negotiating approaches, 
and to advance negotiations where progress could be achieved. Nevertheless, during that period 
there had been very little movement on these issues and the Special Session had not held any 
formal meetings. Looking to the following six mo nths, he could see no signs that the situation 
would change. Of course, he would continue to foll ow up with Members, and be responsive to any 
request to take up these issues in the Special Se ssion. He would also be attentive to any different 
negotiating approaches developed by Members to advance the services agenda. 
1.25.  Ambassador McCook (Jamaica), Chairman of the Negotiating Group on Rules, said the 
Negotiating Group on Rules had confirmed him as Chairman at a formal meeting in February 2012. 
Since that time he had twice invited delegations to consult with him and share their views 
regarding the work of the Group, an invitation which had been taken up by a number of delegations, both bilaterally and plurilaterally. He had also held an open-ended informal meeting of the Group in October, in order to allow an ex change of views among delegations regarding the 
Group's future work. On the basis of this meeting and consultations, he believed he was in a good 
position to assess the current expectations and ambitions of the membership regarding the Rules negotiations. The news was both good and less good. 
1.26.  On the positive side, his perception was that Members continued to believe that Rules 
remained an important, and indeed essential, component of the DDA, and to hope that active 
negotiations would be resumed in the future. On a less positive note, although a few delegations 
had indicated their interest in renewing substantive work – for example, on S&D in regard to anti-
dumping – the prevailing view seemed to be that , in the absence of a shift in the underlying 
dynamics of the DDA, for the time being the resumpti on of active negotiations in any area of the 
mandate would not be fruitful. Indeed, some delegations had cautioned that in the present 
circumstances, any such activity could harm prospects for longer-term progress on these issues. 
That said, some Members had suggested that some form of technical work, whether within or outside the context of the Group itself, might be useful. 
1.27.  One area where there was convergence on this score was the Technical Group, a non-
negotiating subsidiary body of the Negotiating Group that allowed the exchange of views among 
Members on their respective anti-dumping practices. That body had continued to meet in 
conjunction with regular Rules Committee meetings and was doing useful work; some Members 
had suggested changes to make the Technical Grou p ' s  w o r k  m o r e  i n c l u s i v e .  I t  h a d  a l s o  b e e n  
suggested that some form of activity on fisherie s subsidies might be helpful, perhaps focusing on 
increasing transparency, although the advocates seemed to be envisioning that any such activity 
be organized by delegations and not be an activi ty of the Negotiating Group itself. Finally, some 
delegations had recognized that there might be value in undertaking some further technical work on RTAs, especially review of the transparency mechanism.  
1.28.  He remained conscious of the clear message from the membership that at this point any 
activities for engagement should be Member-dri ven and bottom-up. Thus, he had told Members at 
the end of their October informal meeting that if they had ideas for technical or other activities in 
that Group, they should bring them to him, but more importantly they should engage with other 
delegations and seek to develop support for those ideas. He did not believe that it would be helpful for him to seek to impose activities that did not benefit from the broad support of the membership. 
1.29.  The Director-General read out a report on  behalf of Ambassador Agah (Nigeria), Chairman 
of the Special Session of the Council for TRIPS, as follows: 
"This report on the negotiations on the establishment of a multilateral system of 
notification and registration of geographical indications for wines and spirits TN/C/M/31 
 
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 undertaken under the aegis of the Special Session of the Council for TRIPS is 
submitted on my own responsibility and is without prejudice to the positions of delegations and to the outcome of the negotiations. 
Following the formal meeting of the Special Session convened on 23 March 2012, I 
initiated a long process of informal consultations with the delegations, both 
individually and in groups, in order to determine how we might best operationalize those elements of the outcome of the MC8 that related to our work. The essence of 
the bilateral consultations was to hear what delegations had to say with respect to: 
first, the status of work in the Special Session; and second, how Members would like to operationalize the elements of political guidance by Ministers at MC8, namely, to 
advance negotiations where progress can be achieved, and to seek early harvest on 
those elements of the Doha Declaration th at allow Members to reach provisional or 
definitive agreements based on consensus ear lier than the full conclusion of the Single 
Undertaking. 
Based on what delegations told me on these two elements of our work, my sense of 
the outcome of the consultations was the following:  
(i) The positions of delegations remain entrenched, in particular on the question of the 
mandate, and more specifically the question of coverage of the Register as currently 
considered in the Draft Composite Text, contained in JOB/IP/3/Rev.1 and annexed to the Chair's report to the TNC of 21 April 2011 (TN/IP/21). 
(ii) Some delegations stressed that the register must be limited to geographical 
indications for wines and spirits, and saw no merit in restarting work as long as this 
mandate was not firmly anchored in the Draft Composite Text.  
(iii) Some other delegations, however, could not accept to work on the Draft 
Composite Text if discussing the mandate was the only motivation to do so. 
(iv) Some Members have drawn linkages between the register negotiations and the 
Doha implementation issues of GI extension and TRIPS-CBD. Nevertheless, in order to 
permit some technical work to take place in the TRIPS Special Session, some other 
delegations commented that there might be some value in unbundling these three TRIPS issues and to deal with the issue of  linkages later. Overall, apart from one 
delegation, most Members were prepared to work on the basis of a temporary de-
linking of the issues, as long as work on the three issues would continue in parallel 
and at the same pace.  
For the purposes of transparency and inclusiv eness, I reported on these results at the 
open-ended informal meeting of the Specia l Session on 23 November 2012. At that 
meeting I said that, while the current situation seemed deadlocked in many ways, I wished, nonetheless, to encourage delegations to use these coming months to prepare 
for a time when progress would be possible, by pursuing technical work and 
exchanging information and expe riences on existing national practices. In that regard, 
I recalled that valuable work had already been done in this area in the TRIPS Special Session, and that further clarity on national practices regarding, for instance, 
genericness and scope of protection could be achieved by continuing this approach. I 
believe that such purely technical work on existing practices does not require delegations to make strategic choices in the negotiations now, but can considerably 
broaden the factual basis for negotiations in the future. Another consideration was 
whether to increase the involvement of stakeholders through holding seminars or workshops. I further asked Members to consider what our future work should be, 
particularly during the first Quarter of 2013.  
In view of the sparse and hesitant responses that I have received from Members, it is 
my intention at this stage to resume informal consultations in various formats shortly after the Davos meeting, and consider conv ening a formal session of the Negotiating 
Group, at which views and ideas could be pu t on record. Such a formal meeting could TN/C/M/31 
 
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 be held back-to-back with the regular session, tentatively scheduled for 6-7 March 
2013.  
While I am aware that the TRIPS Special Session is not a priority for many 
delegations, I am concerned about the need to keep up the momentum, and to ensure 
that the Special Session will not lag behind on account of insufficient technical work 
and one day become a stumbling block for a wider set of outcomes.  
I encourage Members to consider those elemen ts of our work which are really within 
each other's comfort zone. I am aware that this is Members' work; and it is only the 
Members that can determine how best we can proceed. But as your facilitator, I urge delegations to accept to cooperate in any exercise that can move our work forward." 
1.30.  Ambassador Kuneralp (Turkey), Chairman of the Special Session of the Committee on Trade 
and Environment, recalled that at the end of Octobe r, he had been given the task of chairing the 
negotiations on Trade and Environment for which he  was grateful to all delegations. He looked 
forward to working with all of them to help fulfil the objectives set for those negotiations. Since 
being given this task, he had held a number of bilateral, but not exhaustive, consultations with a 
number of delegations. Naturally, he remained open to meeting any delegation that had not hitherto taken part in these consultations and wished to do so.  
1.31.  In his consultations, no delegation had de nied that the topic of environmental protection 
was a very special one in the overall Doha mandate and that sustainable development was a core element in the wider governmental agenda of Memb ers. However, he had also observed a paradox 
between the efforts governments were making to reduce the environmental impact of economic 
activity on the one hand and the apparent relu ctance to proceed with the mandate to remove 
barriers to trade on environmental goods on the ot her. In the face of the pressing environmental 
challenges that the world was confronted with, it was clearly in everyone's interest to make sure 
the environmental chapter of the Doha negotiations was successfully concluded. 
1.32.  Since the April 2011 TNC report, he had gathered that not much work had been carried out 
by that Committee despite his predecessor's earnest attempts to reach out to delegations. During 
his consultations, the focus had been mainly on the environmental goods part of the negotiations. 
Indeed, from his reading of the April 2011 TNC report, and as confirmed by several delegations, it seemed that good progress had already been made on the two negotiating items on the relationship between multilateral environmenta l agreements (MEAs) and the WTO. In the 
interactions with delegations, he had noted that, on the whole, they were not opposed to resuming 
some work on environmental goods. They had ge nerally expressed their readiness to help him 
explore ways to do so. For instance, there had been general support for some technical work 
drawing on experts' knowledge in order to furt her the understanding of the complex nature of 
rapidly evolving technologies. Technical work, whic h should preferably be driven by delegations, 
was also needed so as to begin to come to grip s with the challenges related to the mandate on 
non-trade barriers (NTBs) and the development aspe cts, including meaningful capacity building. 
This would allow Members to move the discussion beyond what some perceived purely as tariff 
reduction and have a structured debate on these other important aspects. 
1.33.  He intended to continue discussions with interested delegations – and there appeared to be 
a large number of them – in small groups as well as bilaterally. In fact, he had been given to 
understand that a number of delegations were alre ady spending time on this area, including by 
meeting informally in various small groups. He wish ed to encourage those delegations to pool their 
resources and come forward with ideas, to the extent possible. Delegations would be given the 
opportunity to clarify their positions. He was looking for pragmatic and concrete ways to move forward based on specific ideas that may emerge in  the course of these consultations. Therefore, 
his job in the following weeks and months as facilitator would be to allow delegations to bring up 
specific suggestions that could contribute to moving the process forward towards a positive outcome. It was important to avoid a re-run of past discussions of well-known positions and approaches and that delegations make every effort to focus on the elements in these positions that 
could be used to move the work forward.  
1.34.  Additionally, a significant number of WTO Members had recently been involved in an 
important initiative outside the WTO in opening markets in environmental goods. That again TN/C/M/31 
 
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 underlined the importance of this area. It also showed that sitting back and not doing at least 
some substantive work in the WTO on environmen tal goods was not an option. All these different 
elements showed that Members needed to actively and collectively look into ways to move the work forward. Once he had a good overview in January of what the Group was ready to do, he 
would meet with delegations in a larger group and report back to them. 
1.35.  Ambassador Saborío Soto (Costa Rica), Ch airman of the Special Session of the Dispute 
Settlement Body, said that in the DSU negotiations, Members had continued to meet throughout 
the year, in line with the instructions provided by Ministers at MC8 and the mandate for these 
negotiations in support of a conclusion of the negotiation. The level of engagement had remained solid throughout the year, and this had allowed th em to conclude in November the discussion of 
the universe of 12 issues identified in his report of July 2008. Intense discussions had taken place 
in small groups as well as in larger groupings.  This had been a very useful process. Discussions 
had developed initially on the basis of the draft text contained in the 2008 report, and more recently based also on revised papers presented by participants. These revisions had often been 
the result of intense efforts among participants themselves, including efforts to take on board the 
views provided by other participants. It had been  encouraging to see that, despite the constraints 
faced in a number of negotiating areas, 2012 had b een an intense and constructive year. He was 
very grateful to delegations for their continued engagement. As a result, significant progress had 
been achieved in a number of areas, and, wher e gaps remained, these had been identified and 
narrowed down as much as it had been feasible at that stage.  
1.36.  Members needed to move from this to a more horizontal, negotiation-oriented exercise to 
facilitate the closing of gaps, finalize the work and fulfil the mandate to improve and clarify the 
DSU. With this goal in mind, the objective over the coming months would be to move towards a revised Chairman's text. The objective of this text  would be to take stock of the progress made, 
consolidate it, and pave the way for a final outcome. In order to facilitate this process, he intended 
first to hold consultations in different formats during the first weeks of 2013. He hoped that such consultations would allow Members to explore and cl arify further, in a more horizontal process, 
how remaining gaps could be bridged. In this exercise, he would be counting on the continued 
engagement of participants. In particular, at this stage it would be important for participants to consider the specific improvements and clarifications as well as the overall balance that they wished to see achieved through such improvements. 
1.37.  The Chairman thanked the Chairs for their comprehensive reports as well as for their efforts 
to keep the multilateral process running, whether at the formal level or through consultations in 
various formats. There was still a long road ahead, but before looking ahead, he wished to quickly 
look back and give his own across-the-board overview of progress since the beginning of the year. 
Work since January had been guided by the course  of action set out at MC8, where Ministers had 
acknowledged that the DDA could not be delivered  as expected in the near future and that 
Members needed to more fully explore different negotiating approaches and advance negotiations 
where progress could be achieved. MC8 had left Members with a long to-do list. Work in 2012 had been devoted to preparing the ground for the fo llow-up to the Ministerial guidance. Early on, 
Members had engaged – both formally and informally  – in trying to advance areas of interest to 
them. Despite a slow start, negotiating activities had picked up in the second half of the year. At 
the General Council meeting on 3 October, encouraging signs of re-engagement had been noted with the emergence of a basket of issues on whic h consensus could be achieved in the short-term, 
and it had been agreed that it was time to seri ously engage in bridging the gaps on these.  
1.38.  Reports on the work in each negotiating group showed a diverse picture. Some areas 
showed little activity, but there was progress on Trade Facilitation, on some Agriculture items, on 
S&D, including LDC matters, as well as on Dispute Settlement. There was also work on services 
opening, although the shape of an agreement rema ined, as he understood it, open, which was why 
this had not been part of Ambassador de Mateo's report. He was firmly convinced that such engagement, along with some creativity, was the key to further progress in early 2013. In moving 
forward, Members needed to make sure that, duri ng the first quarter of 2013, that momentum and 
renewed sense of engagement was translated into concrete proposals. WTO's credibility – Members' credibility – in the next phase would depend on the WTO's ability – Members' ability – to 
make tangible progress on specific issues as they matured. 
1.39.  He then offered his own views about the immediate next steps that could be taken to 
develop a collective vision for the 2013 deliverables. The activities of 2012 had contributed to build TN/C/M/31 
 
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 some momentum. Members had put on their negotiating caps again. The WTO could not afford to 
lose this momentum; it had to build on it. This required stepping up Members' engagement and act in a timely and responsible manner to ensure that all proposals were given the right level of attention. For this to take place, Members needed  to make sure that proposals were put on the 
table in good time to allow for discussions and for the regular process to take place. In other 
words, Members had to avoid introducing last-minute proposals that had not been discussed in the appropriate bodies first. There was a need to go ba ck to the well-known principle of "no surprises". 
Any kind of Christmas-tree syndrome as MC9 approached would have destabilizing effects on the 
entire process, probably jeopardizing the Ministerial Conference itself and, hence, denting the credibility of the WTO. He wished to make clear th at the negotiating bodies were the starting point 
for any proposal to be considered by the membership. 
1.40.  To ensure that the process run as smoothl y as possible and to avoid any surprises, Members 
needed to stick to a few simple guidelines. First, they needed to work towards what was reasonably doable. Members should be realistic in their demands, take into account other 
Members' red lines and stay clear of what were  known to be unattainable objectives. Second, 
when advancing a proposal, it was the proponents ' responsibility to build consensus around it. 
Members needed to work towards convincing the other Members, not themselves. Third, Members 
needed to avoid being confrontational. Any proposal should not be framed as a kind of take-it-or-
leave-it position. The negotiating process entaile d a trade-off between concessions and demands. 
He urged Members to be flexible and work together with other Members and around their sensitivities to achieve a common understanding. Certainly, he recognized that none of these 
points were new. They had guided past Ministerial Conference preparatory processes. They were 
mainly dictated by common sense, but they were fundamental if Members wished to act 
responsibly and with collective determination in the run-up to Bali. 
1.41.  Without setting new and unworkable deadlin es, MC9 provided the WTO with an opportunity 
to show that its Members could advance the negoti ating front of the WTO agenda. Of course, there 
should be no illusion about the breadth of what could be achieved in the short timeframe between 
now and MC9. Nor should there be unrealistic expe ctations. The main stumbling blocks of the DDA 
were still standing and many of the toughest nuts would likely not be cracked by the time Ministers met in Bali. Although Members had to manage expe ctations and keep ambitions in check for Bali, 
they could not fall short of delivering on a cred ible basket of issues that would signal their 
confidence that the rest of the Doha agenda could be addressed in due course.  
1.42.  Positive developments could also be found outside the framework of the DDA. For example, 
under the ITA, progress had been made on techni cal discussions to expand the product coverage 
of the Agreement. Also, following the adoption of the revised Government Procurement Agreement 
in March, work had resumed to bring it into effect, while, at the same time, an increasing number of WTO Members had signed up to become observer s, showing that there was growing interest in 
Government Procurement issues. In addition, th e agreement reached amongst APEC countries in 
the summer on a list of environmental goods migh t provide momentum for further multilateral 
market opening in this area of the negotiations , provided the value of bindings commitments was 
duly recognised.  
1.43.  Before concluding, he wished to say a few words regarding the two TRIPS implementation 
issues of GI extension and TRIPS-CBD, to which Ambassador Agah had made reference in his report and on which he was required to report in his capacity as Director-General. Since his last 
written report contained in document WT/GC/W/633 - TN/C/W/61, dated 21 April 2011, there had 
not been any consultations. He would continue to  keep the membership informed of developments 
on these issues. 
1.44.  In conclusion, he said that there were encouraging signs showing that there was overall 
interest and willingness to engage on preparing negotiating deliverables for 2013. The needed impetus to push the talks forward and translate them into action could come from any front. No stone should be left unturned, but Members should also not wait for the last minute to engage. 
Recent engagement had to be switched to a higher gear. One more housekeeping Ministerial 
Conference in Bali would not suffice to keep the Doha house alive.  
1.45.  The Trade Negotiations Committee took no te of the Chairman's statement and of the 
reports by the Chairpersons. TN/C/M/31 
 
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 2  STATEMENTS BY PARTICIPANTS 
2.1.  All delegations that spoke thanked the Ch air of the TNC and the Chairs of the various 
negotiating bodies for their reports. 
2.2.  The representative of Mauritius, on behalf of the African Group and the ACP Group, said that 
there was a sign of new and regained dynamism in the negotiating groups. The progress and the 
intensity of the activity were uneven, but at least in some areas proposals were being discussed. Members were operating under the guidelines give n by Ministers at MC8 to try and deliver where 
progress could be harvested, also in line with pa ragraph 47 of the Doha mandate. If the starting 
point was the MC8 guidelines, the next step was to identify what to deliver at MC9 without building 
undue or too big expectations. In order to be credible, Members had to make progress and deliver some positive results in Bali. The work that was being done in the negotiating groups needed to 
dovetail sometime in the course of 2013 into the expectations for MC9.  
2.3.  There should be two approaches as Memb ers moved from the implementation of the MC8 
guidelines towards trying to meet the MC9 deliverables. First, Members would have to continue to 
work on whatever was doable in terms of DDA de liverables. Good faith had to prevail and Members 
had to avoid setting undue or unachievable conditionalities or trying to work an impossible balance. However, the progress that the Negotiating Group Chairs had reviewed in Trade 
Facilitation, Agriculture, CTD SS would not be enou gh for the ACP and African Groups. In order to 
be really meaningful and to make a difference, the results in the DDA had to be complemented by other initiatives to be inspired by the MC8 outcome. At MC9, Members had to show real implementation of some of the decisions taken at  MC8 that had deep and meaningful development 
implications: E-Commerce, the LDC Services Waiver, the TRIPS extension and some others. 
Additionally, Members should not discard any new initiative aiming at consolidating the regular work, because that had been one of the guidelin es of MC8. The WTO Secretariat had produced a 
number of interesting reports, for example on glob al value chains and on NTBs. The NTBs report 
had a lot of implications for development and, in the context of the changing circumstances of the 
global trading system, NTBs were becoming very important in trade enhancement and trade 
promotion. Therefore, one thing to be promot ed at MC9 was a Work Programme on NTBs and 
Development, a field where a lot could be done, no t only in terms of transparency and capacity 
building, but also in terms of a dialogue on priv ate standards, the link between NTBs and global 
value chains and a link with Aid for Trade to promote development. In conclusion, the set of 
deliverables for MC9 needed to include a little bit more than just what was in the DDA.  
2.4.  The second approach would be to have a more coherent process in place to allow Members to 
horizontally join the dots in all these elements and try to push all these moving parts together in 
order to arrive at something for December 2013. In all this, for Mauritius, the ACP Group and the 
African Group, as well as for the LDCs, development remained central. The major concern was how to make development visible in anything that Members would deliver at MC9. 
2.5.  The representative of Indonesia, on behalf  of the G-33, recalled that at MC8, Members had 
expressed the willingness to continue their work to advance the negotiations. Members had also 
declared that they would look into ways to ov ercome critical stalemates and move the Doha 
negotiations forwards. In this regard, the G-33 welcomed the positive developments in terms of 
Members' concrete contribution and reinvigorated engagement, which reflected the unified stand 
and tireless commitment to breathe new life into the DDA. That momentum should be capitalized to bring positive and meaningful results at MC9.  
2.6.  The G-33 wished to emphasize that Agricu lture was at the heart of the Doha Development 
Round. Hence, it was critical that some, if not all, elements of Agriculture were harvested at MC9. Without prejudice to the overall conclusion of the Doha negotiations based on the Single 
Undertaking and in line with MC8 recognition to advance negotiations, at the last CoA SS on 
16 November 2012, the G-33 had introduced its negotiating proposal on "Some Elements of TN/AG/W/Rev.4 for Early Agreement to Address Food Security Issues". Food security and livelihood security were pressing issues for developing countries. It was therefore more critical 
than ever that Members concretely delivered the Doha and Hong Kong mandate on Agriculture, in 
particular on food security, livelihood security and rural development for developing countries and hundreds of millions of poor farmers. Since the la st CoA SS, the G-33 had engaged with the rest of 
the membership to explain the technical as well as the economic merit of the Group's proposal. 
This process would be continued as appropriat e. The G-33 would also remain constructively TN/C/M/31 
 
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 engaged in the discussions of other submissions.  The ingredient of success would include the 
readiness of all WTO Members to be constructive, flexible and realistic. 
2.7.  Speaking on behalf of Indonesia, he said  that the WTO Ministerial Conference in Bali was 
expected to be an important landmark for enhancing the credibility of the WTO and the multilateral 
trading system. Therefore, the Bali Ministerial sh ould not be a house-keeping exercise. Indonesia 
fervently hoped that a breakthrough could be achieved by Ministers during that important 
gathering. Indonesia welcomed the good momentum in the negotiations and urged Members to 
build on and capitalize on the momentum in the negotiating process ahead. In this context, 
political support from Ministers and leaders was crucial for the Geneva-based process to continue working constructively and for engaging in real negotiations. Indonesia, for its part, would be flexible in accepting any ideas capable of bringing Members closer to the end-goal. It stood ready 
to engage constructively in the negotiating process and wished to encourage key players, as well 
as other Members, to assume their leadership role to bring meaningful deliverables for all Members at MC9. 
2.8.  The representative of Brazil, on behalf of  the G-20, said that the Group was reassured that 
the proposals tabled on 28 September 2012 had been understood by the membership to be an 
honest effort to help negotiations move forward, given that outcomes in Agriculture were essential 
for facilitating progress in other DDA issues. Despite some specific concerns, all delegations had 
expressed their readiness to further analyse and debate the G-20 non-papers.  
2.9.  On the update of the studies on export competition and on TRQ administration, the Group 
hoped that they would be concluded expeditiously,  given the short time available to advance the 
technical work, so as to allow for careful and balanced contributions by Members. On the proposal 
regarding new disciplines on TRQ administration, the G-20 took comfort in the fact that, for completely different reasons, both exporters and importers of agricultural products seemed to be 
equally dissatisfied with the proposal, which was a clear indication of balance. The Group had 
taken note of the concern of some Members that th ey would have to change internal procedures if 
the proposed provisions on TRQ administration were adopted. This was indeed the main objective 
of the proposal. Likewise most developing countries – if not all – would have to change internal 
procedures if negotiations in other non-agricultural areas were successful. The G-20 underscored, however, that the Group was not seeking changes in current market access commitments. The proposal solely aimed at improving administrative procedures so that TRQ administration did not 
become an undue hindrance to international trade.  
2.10.  As highlighted to the membership in diffe rent occasions, the non-papers presented by the 
G-20 in September had been just the first outcom e of an exercise among the Group to suggest 
viable development issues in Agriculture. A frank and open debate on export competition could not 
be avoided in the present context. There was the 2013 deadline established at the Hong Kong 
Ministerial Declaration for the elimination of all forms of export subsidies. Members needed to take 
stock of possible reforms that took place from  2005 onwards and evaluate the path ahead. The 
studies requested to the Secretariat would help shed light on where Members were and where they should go from there.  
2.11.  On Cotton, there were indications that the C-4 was considering tabling new contributions. 
Cotton was one of the most important developmenta l issues of the DDA and outcomes related to 
its dossier should be delivered as a priority. There was a shared perception that the time ahead was short. However, more important than tablin g contributions expeditiously was that Members 
assessed the feasibility of their proposals to ensu re that they helped, rather than hindered, the 
process ahead. The G-20 would take all necessary steps to guarantee that any proposal that would emerge from the Group would represent a real cont ribution to the process, in keeping with the 
final document of MC8 and paragraph 47 of the Doha  Declaration. The G-20's overriding objective 
was to move the Round forward by suggesting viable development issues in Agriculture that would have a positive impact on the DDA negotiations. 
2.12.  Speaking on behalf of Brazil, he said that while discussing how to facilitate deliverables that 
could blow some fresh air into the Doha Round, Members should keep in mind the big picture of 
the endeavour that had been agreed upon eleven  years before. The Doha Round had not become 
the "development round" without a reason, and Me mbers had a responsibility to deliver on the 
pledges made at that time. The key issue was that only what was somewhat ripe could be 
harvested. However, fruits did not become ripe because a deadline was set for them. Therefore, TN/C/M/31 
 
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 Members had to be careful not to create unreasonable expectations about what could be delivered 
in a year's time. Sometimes expectations got out of hand and that was a palpable risk whenever Members put on their negotiating hats. So, there was a widespread notion that the Damocles' sword was again over Members' heads, and they had to work with it, because it was the credibility 
of the WTO that was at stake.  
2.13.  Regarding the discussions on creating feasib le short-term deliverables, it was important to 
firmly set the principles that must guide the work ahead. First, on the search for a healthy balance 
of issues, all Members had to listen to the proposals with open minds and a constructive 
disposition. It did not mean that all of the proposals had to lead to deliverables. It meant, however, that none would be shot down before being carefully examined. In the initial phase of submissions, surely some ideas would seem more difficult than others, but Members needed to be 
sensible enough to separate what was difficult – but doable – from what was impossible. On the 
other hand, it should also be expected that the Member or Members behind each proposal tabled 
in the negotiating groups would exercise good judgement and limit their demands to what was 
strictly doable. Members had a very good idea of where most of the red lines were. This was not 
the time for tactical manoeuvres based on mutually assured destruction. This was the time for careful and precise engineering, where the select ion and positioning of the building blocks were 
critical.  
2.14.  In this first phase of putting proposals on the table, some ideas had a head-start. Trade 
Facilitation was certainly one of them. It had become rapidly clear, however, that proposals in other areas had to advance as well to bring balance to this undertaking. Agriculture was one such 
area. It cannot be ignored that Agriculture had been the engine behind the launching of the Round 
and the main reason why the DDA had been associ ated with positive connotations worldwide, 
particularly in developing countries. Brazil attached a high value to the opportunity of a 
preliminary agreement on certain topics, as long as it included development issues. However, it 
should be no more than a preliminary deal. Life would go on after MC9, and Members had to keep pursuing the full conclusion of the Round after Bali. Any harvest in the near future would only be 
possible if Members truly believed that efforts to wards further DDA deliveries would continue in 
good faith and with firm determination. 
2.15.  The representative of Switzerland, on be half of the G-10, said that the Group remained 
committed to a successful conclusion of the multilateral negotiations and was open to alternative 
approaches in order to move forward. The G-10 had consistently been demonstrating its 
constructive and proactive role in trying to achieve a reasonable balance between liberalizing agricultural markets across the board and the need to accommodate Members' specific domestic 
situations and concerns. It was true that the G-10 members – like others – had sensitivities in 
certain areas in Agriculture, especially on market access issues. However, they continued to look openly and with goodwill into contributions submitted by Members in recent months as well as any 
other genuine agricultural proposals Members could realistically agree on. The G-10 stood ready to 
engage constructively in discussions and, where necessary, clarification exercises on the agricultural proposals currently on the table. 
2.16.  Speaking on behalf of Switzerland, he wished to recall that the WTO was a success story in 
levelling the playing field for international trade and, in particular, for keeping markets open. 
However, countries were fa cing difficulties in taki ng advantage of this extraordinary forum to strike 
trade deals. A stronger re-engagement in the WTO was needed. This, however, was only possible 
if all Members moved – and in order to be able to move, Members needed to create trust between 
them. Trust between Members was not simply given,  but had to be earned step by step, little 
success by little success. MC9 should be considered  as a stepping stone for full re-engagement. 
Bali would not be the end of the road, but an o pportunity to enhance the credibility and the work 
of the WTO. Switzerland urged Members to make g ood use of MC9. A slow approach to the tasks 
on the road to Bali would not succeed. Those Members who were still considering putting new proposals on the table should ask themselves whether these new proposals were really doable in 
the following few months. If they came to the conclusion that they were, they should submit them 
as soon as possible in order to give the membership the chance and the time to meaningfully engage. When submitting new proposals, the proponents should highlight the real problems they 
wanted to address as this would facilitate the search for common ground. In the end, a balance on 
the overall bundle of proposals needed to be found. This meant for instance also that possible deliveries in 2013 could not be predominantly composed of agricultural issues; a balance with 
other issues was necessary. The goals for Bali should be to deliver something meaningful for the TN/C/M/31 
 
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 entire membership and thus strengthen the credibility of the multilateral trading system. A 
possible Bali result would leave Members still far away from concluding the Doha Round as a whole. However, it would provide much needed so lid ground for future work. Without a meaningful 
result in Bali, the task to deliver the whole Do ha Round would be much more difficult – maybe 
even impossible. Therefore, Switzerland urged Me mbers to be realistic and pragmatic and do all 
they could in order to seize the opportunity of the Bali Ministerial. 
2.17.  The representative of Australia, on behalf of the Cairns Group, welcomed the more positive 
mood in the overall negotiating environment in re cent months. There was an easy explanation for 
this: for the first time since December 2011, Agriculture had re-established itself as a key part of the negotiations. Members were seriously engaged in finding solutions on Agriculture which would improve the prospects for taking forward negotiations in other areas. This should be kept in mind 
as Members considered their work in 2013, including on the preparations for MC9. Of course, the 
ultimate objective for the Cairns Group remained a comprehensive outcome and the fulfilment of the Doha mandate on Agriculture. Looking to the work programme for 2013, Members needed to 
keep the maxim of finding solutions which were pragmatic, practical and doable. For this reason, 
the Cairns Group had welcomed the G-20 proposals on TRQ administration and the studies on TRQs and export competition as positive contribu tions and was in the process of considering the 
more recent G-33 proposal.  
2.18.  Members could not afford to be complacent as time before the 2013 Ministerial meeting was 
short and it was a priority to deliver results on Agriculture. For those contemplating putting forward proposals, the Group would therefore encourage them to consult broadly and bring 
proposals forward as soon as possible. The reform process in Agriculture was unfinished business 
and the objective of attaining the types of market conditions which would provide greater transparency and predictability in the international market was still far away. For this reason, the 
Group was also watching closely developments in domestic policies settings in some larger 
agriculture producers and major economies to ensure that any new policies were consistent with efforts to continue the reform process. With world trade growth slowing, never had there been a 
more urgent time to ensure that efforts within Members' domestic systems were directed at 
revitalising international trade and the global ec onomy. Agriculture was the right place to start. 
2.19.  Speaking on behalf of Australia, he said that Australia was certainly encouraged by the 
current mood and by the current discussion. Ther e had been a significant shift in the dynamic 
since the summer break and the key challenge was how to capitalize on that to ensure that 
progress could be built in 2013. It was Australia's view that the G-20 proposals on agriculture issues had been the key drivers for the change in atmosphere because they were pitched at a 
realistic and doable level, therefore they were  capable of achieving consensus. These were 
certainly important benchmarks that should guide all Members in the proposals that they put forward. Australia, together with Brazil and New Zealand, had put forward a proposal on perishable 
products in the Trade Facilitation negotiations. Australia would continue to reach out to others' 
proposals, hear views and make refinements with a view to having it incorporated in the Trade 
Facilitation text for consideration at upcoming Negotiating Group meetings. In Australia's view, the proposal on perishable goods was doable and addressed important issues which were directly 
relevant to the interests of developing countries. In advancing work across the board, including in 
Trade Facilitation, focus on practical proposals – such as the one Australia had put forward – and a focus on the text was what was needed to move things forward. Of course, the other key element 
in Trade Facilitation was to seek advances on Section II issues. Australia recognized and would 
respond to the issues being raised by small developing countries, including LDCs, to ensure that their interests were taken into account as the discussion moved forward. In addition to Trade 
Facilitation and Agriculture, which were seen as delivering important development outcomes, 
Australia was aware that developing countries wanted  results in other areas. For this reason, it had 
been actively engaged in other discussions, especially in the CTD and in the CTD SS, and had been reaching out to developing country groups, particularly the LDCs, to help advance issues of priority 
to them.  
2.20.  On timing and the danger of complacency setting in, Australia recognized that MC9 was one 
year away, but the reality was that there were only about eight working months left before 
December 2013. Australia hoped that Members could come forward with proposals as quickly as 
possible so that they could be given the attention they deserved in the respective negotiating groups. Before too long – and certainly before Easter – Members needed to form a better picture 
of what issues could be advanced and what the prospects were for MC9. This was not an easy TN/C/M/31 
 
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 task. Certainly the objective for MC9 would be to de liver an outcome of substance that built on the 
guidance received at MC8 and that would help restore confidence in the multilateral trading system and confirm Members' common endeavour – and Aust ralia's number one priority – of completing 
the Doha negotiations.  
2.21.  The representative of Haiti, on behalf of the LDC Group, wished to express overall 
satisfaction for the intense work that had taken place in 2012. The LDCs remained hopeful that 
progress on the various negotiations would be achi eved and that the Ministerial Conference in Bali 
would mark a turning point for the DDA. On LDC issues, the Group planned to play its part and 
participate actively in the various negotiations taking place at the WTO. The Group's positions during these negotiations were and would continue to be based on the particular circumstances of LDCs and on the system-wide recognition of due S&D. The Group remained firmly committed to 
the full implementation of all LDC-related de cisions taken at MC8 and previous Ministerial 
Conferences. More specifically, LDCs were putting  due emphasis on the Services Waiver for LDCs, 
the new extension of the transition period for LDCs under Art. 66.1 of the TRIPS Agreement, 
market access for LDCs within the framework of Annex F of the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference 
with a view to ensure commercially meaningful market access for products originating from LDCs, and also ensuring that appropriate facilities and/or arrangements were developed to support LDCs' 
diversification efforts. 
2.22.  On Agriculture and Cotton, the Group atta ched special importance to the issue of food 
security – taking into account country-specific concerns. It also wished to ensure that LDCs' production capacities were enhanced and diversified and continued pursuing Cotton issues and 
assuring that C-4 issues were taken into consideration. On Trade Facilitation, the LDCs paid 
particular attention to the crafting of language und er Section I of the consolidated text and wished 
to ensure that the outcome document contained adequate flexibilities for countries' specific needs, 
including the particular needs of landlocked LDCs. The Group also wished to ensure a balance in 
the provisions of Section I in relation to commitments for technical assistance, financial support and capacity building, including support towards addressing infrastructure constraints as well as 
provisions on S&D of concern under Section II. Finally, the Group remained steadfast in its resolve 
to continue its efforts on behalf of the close to a billion people of the LDCs that they represented, 
and to integrate fully into the multilateral trad ing system within the framework of agreed LDCs' 
S&D needs and specificities. 
2.23.  The representative of Cambodia, on behalf of the ASEAN Group, said that the current TNC 
meeting provided Members with an opportunity to assess where they were and what steps should 
be taken to move the DDA forward in the lead up to MC9 in Bali, Indonesia. ASEAN expressed its 
great concern that despite enormous efforts made  by the Director-General and the Chairs of 
various negotiating groups, as well as the continued engagement by Members, progress on the DDA remained slow and 2012 had proven to be less productive than anticipated at MC8. In this 
regard, collective action was needed to revive the spirit of cooperation as Members worked on 
incremental deliverables for MC9. ASEAN supported Indonesia's wish to contribute to the multilateral trading system by hosting a successful Ministerial Conference which could lead to a new and incremental approach towards an eventual conclusion of the DDA.  
2.24.  In line with the guidance from MC8 to advance negotiations where progress could be 
achieved, ASEAN was confident that with exerted efforts, Members could bring to Ministers in Bali a possible early harvest package containing a range of meaningful elements, based on 
p a r a g r a p h  4 7  o f  t h e  D o h a  M i n i s t e r i a l  D e c l a r a t i o n ,  t h a t  w e r e  b e n e f i c i a l  t o  M e m b e r s .  I n  t h i s  
connection, ASEAN recognized the momentum in the areas of Trade Facilitation, Agriculture as well 
as the good work of the CTD SS on the Monito ring Mechanism, the 28 Cancún proposals and the 
six Agreement-specific proposals, which ASEAN supported. Other issues that could be possible 
candidates for deliverables included the proposals on TRQ administration, export competition, and food security that were before the CoA SS. ASEA N was also mindful that other proposals could be 
tabled in due course. ASEAN wished to emphasise that the LDC issues contained in the MC8 
political guidance should be revisited. ASEAN had supported the granting of DFQF market access to 
products from LDCs. This was an area that some ASEAN members had already accorded, and 
would continue to improve, in accordance with the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration. ASEAN had 
a strong regional focus on helping its three LDC members – Cambodia, Lao PDR and Myanmar – 
improve their capacity to trade. TN/C/M/31 
 
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 2.25.  In order to ensure a smooth preparat ion and a successful outcome for MC9, it was 
important for Members and the Chairs of the negoti ating groups to work expeditiously taking into 
consideration the tight timeline before Bali. Proposals on possible convergent areas for MC9 should be tabled as soon as possible, thus allowing sufficient time for discussion and the building of 
consensus. This had to be done in good faith by tabling realistic and pragmatic proposals which 
matched the prevailing appetite for meaningful ou tcomes at MC9. This did not mean that other 
elements of the DDA would be abandoned afte r MC9. On the contrary, Members should be 
prepared, in the spirit of the Single Undertaking, to work on the remaining issues for delivery at 
subsequent Ministerial Conferences. In this way, MC9 would truly live up to the commitment of MC8 to advance negotiations where progress could be achieved and not repeat what had been unsuccessful in the past. Given the complex nature of the issues on the table, ASEAN was of the 
view that the decisions to be taken at MC9 should be negotiated and agreed by all Members in 
Geneva, prior to the conference. To leave the nego tiations to MC9 run a big risk of failure. In 
conclusion, ASEAN reiterated its strong commitment to actively engage in the preparatory process 
and contribute to a successful MC9 in Bali, Indonesia. 
2.26.  The representative of Chinese Taipei, on behalf of the Group of Recently Acceded Members 
(RAMs Group), said the Group was pleased to see momentum building among Members towards 
re-engagement on certain DDA issues since the beginning of 2012. While Members began to re-
engage in discussions following the guidance give n by Ministers at the MC8, the Group had to 
emphasize that one of their key instructions had been to aim for a comprehensive final package of 
the DDA under the mandate of a Single Undertakin g. The RAMs Group had noticed that technical 
discussions in three areas, namely Trade Facilitation, the DSU review and development-related 
issues, had been proceeding positively. The work in the CoA SS had also re-started in formal mode on the G-20 TRQ administration and G-33 food security proposals. The newly-confirmed NAMA 
Chair had convened an informal meeting the pr evious Thursday to explore the way forward. 
However, the rest of the issues, including many stabilized ones under the DDA, generally remained untouched, or barely touched, without any substantive movement since the Easter Package 
released on the 21 April 2011. Therefore, the RAMs Group called on Members to re-engage 
actively and constructively on these important, but still dormant, issues. 
2.27.  With MC9 approaching fast, the Group wished  to see Members re-double their efforts, under 
Ministers' guidance at the MC8 to work collectively to develop appropriate approaches in areas 
where progress could be made, and use that outcome as the basis for further formulating a more 
comprehensive conclusion at a later stage. It was also the view of the RAMs Group that Members had to respond to the needs and interests of developing country Members in a precise, effective 
and operational fashion. In addition, the principle of FIT, namely full participation, inclusiveness 
and transparency, should be respected throughout the process. Finally, the RAMs wished to take 
this opportunity to remind WTO Members of their unique position. It was widely recognized that 
the work of the WTO was of vital importance to the future development of international trade 
worldwide. For this reason, all the RAMs on their accessions had made extensive commitments to the WTO trusting that they were contributing to promote global trade and to reinforce and strengthen the multilateral trading system. Th e RAMs Group, therefore, urged Members to 
recognize and give full and proper consideration to RAMs' special situation as the DDA negotiation 
work proceeded in the coming years. The RAMs Group remained committed to the DDA negotiations and stood ready to re-engage. 
2.28.  Speaking on behalf of Chinese Taipei, he said that his delegation wished to associate itself 
with the remarks made by Switzerland on behalf of the G-10. Chinese Taipei agreed that Members 
were following Ministers' guidance at MC8 to advance in areas where progress could be made. 
However, it also believed that any package had to  be doable, pragmatic and that there should be a 
balance amongst all issues in the interest of th e broad membership. Bali provided Members with 
an opportunity to move ahead; Members should make sure they did not miss it and work very hard towards deliverables at MC9. He assured Members of Chinese Taipei's commitment to engage 
positively and contribute in the process.  
2.29.  The representative of Mexico recalled that on 1 December 2012 Mr Enrique Peña Nieto took 
office as President of Mexico. The new Minister of the Economy, Mr Ildefonso Guajardo, had 
instructed him to inform the Chair of the TNC and Members that, as part of the measures to be 
implemented with a view to achieving the object ive of promoting the country's competitiveness 
and development, the Mexican Government was committed to free trade, to strengthening the 
multilateral trading system, to ensuring the successful outcome of the Doha Round, and to TN/C/M/31 
 
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 combating protectionism as a response to the problems facing the global economy. Mexico was 
fully prepared to step up the pace, together with  the rest of the membership, in order to achieve 
the objectives set forth in the Elements of Political Guidance provided at MC8, and to move the Round forward in such areas where progress could be made as a contribution to the conclusion of 
the negotiations under the Single Undertaking. Mexico urged all Members to make every possible 
effort so that a substantial initial outcome could be delivered at the Bali Ministerial Conference in December 2013. 
2.30.  The representative of China said that the TNC meeting was a valuable opportunity for 
Members to collectively take stock of the Doha Round and to think about their work in the future. 
Despite the disappointingly slow progress during the first half of the year, recently China felt encouraged to witness some tangible movements and most-needed political will that seemed to 
surface for the MC9 deliverables. Members had b een working hard, at both ambassadorial and 
technical level, to identify the scope of a small package of deliverables. As several Members had mentioned, it seemed that Trade Facilitation, S&D and some Agricultural issues were potential 
candidates. As always, China firmly stood behind the initiative to achieve credible deliverables at 
MC9 and the full conclusion of the DDA in the long run. Thus far, China had not tabled its own requests. On the contrary, it had demonstrated maximum flexibility to engage with other Members 
and to facilitate the negotiating process, including on the sensitive issue of Agriculture. China was 
of the view that mutual understanding and trust remained the key to the work ahead, and Members had to respect each other's sensitivities in that process. On the long-term perspective, China firmly believed that a small package of deliverables was only the first stop of the entire 
journey. In any case, it should neither be the only harvest nor the end of the Doha Round. China 
hoped that all Members shared this spirit and exerted equal efforts towards the same direction. Therefore, it was of paramount importance for Mi nisters to make a collective commitment at MC9 
that negotiations on the remaining issues would continue and that the full conclusion of the Single 
Undertaking would be achieved when the political and economic atmosphere was ripe.  
2.31.  In concluding, he wished to share with the Members an old Chinese story dated more than 
2,200 years, which in his view might help inspire some thoughts on how to work in the future. 
There had been a 90-year old man called Yu Gong (in Chinese, it meant 'stubborn man'), whose house had been surrounded by two high moun tains and whose family had been virtually 
handicapped to travel around. Therefore, Yu Go ng had decided to move the two mountains away 
by digging inch by inch, pit-a-pat. When asked ho w he could accomplish this task during the rest 
of his life, he had simply answered: "Well, when I die, my sons will continue. And when they die, 
my grandchildren will continue." Finally, God ha d been touched and had helped Yu Gong move the 
two mountains away. With relation to Members' work under the DDA negotiations, they could not 
spend as much time as Yu Gong, they could not rely on future generations to do their job, and they could not pray for God to help move their mountains away. But they had to manifest the 
same determination, the same perseverance, and th e same confidence as Yu Gong. Only with that, 
could they accomplish their work and get out of this difficult situation. After all, as compared to the mountains handicapping Yu Gong and his family, the challenges facing Members were more surmountable. So, he urged Members to follow the slogan of Nike: "Just do it". 
2.32.  The representative of Argentina endorsed Br azil's statement on behalf of the G-20. One year 
after MC8, it could hardly be said that progre ss along the lines drawn out by the Ministers had 
been satisfactory. Thus far, the Trade Facilitati on Negotiating Group was the only group to have 
met on any regular basis, and that was the only area in which there had been concrete progress. 
It had been said repeatedly that an agreement on Trade Facilitation was not self-balancing. As Ministers had affirmed at MC8, "any agreements reached, at any time, have to respect fully the 
development component of the mandate". There wa s a long way to go before reaching this 
balance within the draft agreement, and judging from the latest developments, the imbalance was 
growing. There was considerable disparity in the progress being made in the different areas: while Section I, which reflected initiatives by developed country Members and represented gains for their 
export sectors, had progressed significantly; Section II on S&D had met with the refusal by 
developed country Members to move forward on the issue of definitions as called for unanimously by developing country Members. 
2.33.  There was lack of overall balance between progress in the Trade Facilitation area and in 
other areas of negotiation of interest to developing countries. In the case of Agriculture, which was central to development, the G-20 had submitted proposals that represented a genuine effort to 
find new approaches that would enable Members to overcome the current deadlock and include TN/C/M/31 
 
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 Agriculture in the discussions on an early harv est package for the next Ministerial Conference. 
However, three months later, Members had yet to begin discussions or to work out a schedule of meetings of the Negotiating Group. It would be difficult to achieve an early harvest on Trade 
Facilitation unless there were substantially equivalent results in the negotiating areas that were 
important to developing countries. Members had to focus on achieving a genuine balance in the 
early harvest that was being sought by December 2013. In this connection, Argentina hoped that the TNC would play a monitoring role to ensure that work progressed harmoniously. 
2.34.  It was still essential to correct the imbalances that were making it difficult for developing 
countries to become fully integrated into the international trading system. Today's problems were the same as those that had led to the initiation  of the Doha Development Round in 2001. Thus, 
Argentina could not accept any early harvest that would aggravate the imbalances in the 
multilateral trading system to the detriment of developing countries. To reach an agreement on 
Trade Facilitation would not be acceptable unless substantial agreements were reached, particularly in agriculture, in conformity with the Doha mandate. As Brazil had pointed out, the 
deadline of December 2013 for the elimination of su bsidies of all kind could not be disregarded. 
Commitments under the export competition pillar were essential to be able to progress towards provisional or definitive agreements in other areas of the negotiations. Finally, in view of the next 
Ministerial Conference, Argentina reiterated its commitment to work hard to find approaches that 
would enable the WTO to progress towards the conclusion of the DDA in accordance with its mandate.  
2.35.  The representative of the European Union said that it was a particularly appropriate moment 
for a common reflection concerning the negotiating agenda. The meeting was exactly the halfway 
point between MC8 and MC9 and it was time to th ink about what Members wished to be doing at 
MC9. The EU believed that all WTO Members shared a strong interest and had a profound 
responsibility to deliver concrete outcomes at MC 9, working in the directions that had been given 
by Ministers at MC8. Those outcomes needed to be  meaningful, so as to demonstrate that results 
that mattered could be achieved multilaterally. Th is was an important challenge for the prospects 
of the DDA and for the overall credibility of the multilateral trading system. In some ways, 2012 
had come out to be more positive than expected. It was encouraging to see that 2012 had not been a wasted year and that Members were engaged in meaningful negotiations in several areas. There was, on the part of the vast majority of Me mbers, a prevailing feeling of responsibility and 
commitment to move forward. It had all started out slowly. The bottom-up, step-by-step approach 
had proven appropriate in many ways and Members had managed collectively, at some stage of the process, to inject a positive approach to their work, which had allowed modest but real 
progress to take place and had led to the current negotiating environment. More of this positive 
approach would be needed in the coming months. The progress achieved was fragile, the road ahead was long and the time to MC9 was very short.  
2.36.  The objectives seemed clear. Members wanted – and indeed needed – to reach an 
agreement on a number of DDA areas, while not losi ng sight of the overall DDA. These areas, at 
least at a general level, were becoming clear to everyone. Trade Facilitation, the Monitoring 
Mechanism, the Agreement-specific proposals, some LDC-oriented issues, the DSU review and 
certain Agriculture elements were certainly doable, and would entail gains for all Members, 
particularly developing ones. These areas could be complemented by the ITA review. As always, however, the devil lay in the details. On Trade Facilitation, negotiations were moving forward, 
albeit not always as fast as it was hoped for. Members had just finished a productive round of 
discussions in the Negotiating Group which had clar ified a number of questions. Nevertheless, this 
work needed to accelerate. The agreement itself was highly complex and necessitated a real effort 
in order to arrive at an advanced text. If Members did not invest time and energy now into 
resolving their differences, they might find themselves in a situation where not enough time was left before MC9 to complete a satisfactory text. In particular, some key political aspects of the agreement needed to be addressed shortly – an d notably the section related to S&D. On the 
practical side, the EU wished to underline its readiness to continue providing technical assistance 
on trade facilitation. However, in order to ad vance, efforts were needed regarding the needs 
assessments. In this regard, the EU reiterated the need for further cooperation with the 
Secretariat. TN/C/M/31 
 
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 2.37.  On the Monitoring Mechanism and the Agr eement-specific proposals, over the last few 
months the Chair had spared no effort to better delineate what Members' objectives and to bring positions closer together. The EU was ready to continue to constructively engage in these negotiations and called on others to do the same. On Agriculture, there were new proposals on the 
table that would need to be discussed in deta il in the coming months. The EU welcomed the 
constructive views and attitudes being expressed and the openness to sit down and engage in negotiations. However, Members should not be fooled  into thinking that – concerning proposals on 
the table or others eventually to come – there were  no limits to what could be done or that the 
context and complexity of certain compromises could simply be ignored. The EU would remain constructive, on par with others, and would work to find solutions that satisfied everyone. Addressing LDC issues was high on the EU's ag enda. Members had proven their dedication to 
these issues, which had been exemplified in July with the agreement on the revision of the LDC 
accession guidelines. This positive spirit had spilled over into the actual accession process of LDCs. It now needed to continue with a view to preparing further meaningful deliverables acceptable to 
all. Finally, on the DSU review, negotiations were continuing at a good pace. The Chair and 
delegations were engaging in a new phase of discussions which, it was hoped, would lead towards an agreement on the review. The EU would engage  also in these discussions in a constructive 
manner. 
2.38.  Overall, the EU recognised that even tual MC9 outcomes would need to meet some 
expectations for everyone so that each Member could go home as a winner. Members were facing two interrelated challenges. First, they needed to  keep expectations and demands at reasonable, 
realistic and doable levels and accept a limited bu t relevant and significant outcome. At the same 
time, it needed to be clear that a successful outcome at MC9 was only a stepping stone towards the remaining DDA issues. The entire agenda rema ined the objective of the EU. A successful MC9 
appeared today as a necessary precondition for the conclusion, at a later stage, of the whole 
Round. The EU was ready to work for this and believed this was in the shared interest of all Members. 
2.39.  The representative of Pakistan said that although the impact of the 2007-08 global financial 
crisis was still being felt and total trade volume growth in 2012 would be slower than earlier 
estimates, Members were still of the view that the rules-based mult ilateral trading system had no 
substitute and by strengthening this system, economic conditions could be improved, including 
addressing the impact of the crisis on employment and job creation. After the summer recess, 
there had been a renewed vigour in negotiations and the identification of doable initiatives which could be delivered at MC9. Members had tabled new proposals in Agriculture and there was 
tangible progress in crafting the Monitoring Mechanism along with the strengthening of S&D 
provisions in various covered Agreements. Besides, square brackets in Trade Facilitation had been reduced. However, further engagement was required to address systemic and real concerns of 
some developing and least-developed countries with an open mind to bridge the gaps. At some 
point in time, Members would engage in a horizo ntal analysis of the deliverables, for which a 
process might be developed to secure the progress made this year. The next important step would be to deliberate and develop convergence on a work programme following the next Ministerial. 
This effort was likely to generate confidence in Members and help them objectively assess balance 
in the initiatives for completion in December 2013.  
2.40.  Some trade analysts had calculated that trade in intermediate goods was expanding and 
constituted about 40% of the imported content of  the goods manufactured in the global chain of 
production. In the coming decade, this percenta ge might rise considerably. New trade statistics 
indicating balance of trade amongst countries involv ed in this scheme were likely to be discussed 
in the WTO and would indicate the level of interdependence in economic and trade development. 
The new trade analysis might help Members to th ink afresh on the future course of action. A 
number of areas including tariffs, non-tariff barriers and application of trade defence laws and so on might be addressed. Besides, the focus of the Fourth Global Review of Aid for Trade in July 
2013 would be on connecting to value chains. This would be an occasion to raise and address the 
concerns of developing countries as well as LDCs . There might be a possibility that some initial 
proposals be developed and placed before Ministers for future guidance.  
2.41.  Shrinking of spendable income by fami lies, primarily due to low rate of growth, 
unemployment or underemployment and lesser opport unities to trade heightened food security 
concerns, especially for landless rural population and poor in the urban areas. The only way to 
address these concerns was to keep a focus on the development aspect of the Round. Besides, for TN/C/M/31 
 
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 countries that relied more on the imports of food, trade facilitation in the international movement 
of agricultural commodities remained an important initiative for access to food at reasonable prices. Members were also waiting for the outcome of the panel of experts constituted in April to analyse the state of affairs and propose the future course of action. That analysis might be helpful 
to further the cause of multilateralism in international trade. Members were aware that damage to 
the multilateral rules-based system would not be in the interest of any Member, big or small, and there were collective responsibilities to keep the WTO safe and relevant. Pakistan endorsed the 
statements delivered by Brazil, Indonesia and Aust ralia on behalf of the G-20, G-33 and Cairns 
Group, respectively. 
2.42.  The representative of Jamaica associated his delegation with the statements made by 
Mauritius and Indonesia on behalf of the ACP and the G-33, respectively. Jamaica joined others in 
acknowledging the renewed focus on Trade Facilitati on and the thrust to have an agreement in the 
short term. The contributions that Trade Facilita tion could make to development, especially 
through improved efficiencies and enhanced capacity in key trade-related functions, were well 
recognized. However, it was Jamaica's view th at any agreement reached should reflect the 
required balance between binding commitments an d support for development in Trade Facilitation 
specific areas. Ultimately, the linkage between the acquisition of capacity to implement the 
measures required for each trade facilitation obligation, the implementation on a sustainable basis 
of those measures and the triggering/assumption of the related binding commitments had to be 
satisfactorily addressed. Due attention also needed to be paid to reasonable concerns expressed about the impact of obligations on Members' economic situation. Efforts on Trade Facilitation had 
to be complemented by positive action on the development-related issues being addressed in the 
CTD SS and other proposals being advanced in keep ing with commitments made at MC8. Equally, 
Members had to continue their constructive engagement with a view to securing attainable 
objectives in proposals made in areas other than Trade Facilitation, in particular those proposals in 
Agriculture. Finally, Jamaica reiterated its continued commitment to the collective search for solutions. 
2.43.  The representative of Japan said that in a global economic environment where recovery was 
on a fragile track with considerable downside risks, trade had a major role in fostering growth and 
employment. Indeed, there were many dynamic mo vements on the bilateral and regional fronts, 
including on both sides of the Atlantic, within the Asia-Pacific region, as well as between Japan and 
the EU. Against this backdrop, in 2013 the WTO woul d face a real challenge to its strength as a 
relevant organization within the multilateral co ntext. Japan, regardless of the outcome of its 
general elections, would continue to work to further strengthen the multilateral trading system 
under the WTO.  
2.44.  With regard to the way forward, at some early stage of 2013, Members would have to 
proceed with a review of the overall situation. That review would have to be conducted under the 
strong assumption that the Trade Facilitation negotiation, which was a critical pillar of the current 
process, had advanced enough in the lead-up to MC9. In this regard, Japan welcomed that the win-win nature of Trade Facilitation had gradually been understood by many of the developing countries. For example, the African Union's "B oosting Intra-African Trade" emphasized the 
importance of "eliminating trade barriers through improved trade facilitation". Under the changing 
economic circumstances and the development of various value chains, it was not only the developed countries which would benefit, but possibilities would be expanded to developing 
countries as well. It was a complex negotiation, so Members had to address it with energy to 
accelerate it. On Agriculture, Japan echoed the statement by Switzerland on behalf of the G-10. 
On trade and development, Japan appreciated the enhanced and structuralized consultations being 
carried out by the CTD SS Chair. However, there still remained a lot of issues to tackle. Japan was 
ready to engage in the consultations with flex ibilities vis-à-vis LDCs and invited developing 
countries to fulfil their roles as proponents in order to advance the process. 
2.45.  The representative of Colombia said hi s delegation endorsed the statement made by 
Australia on behalf of the Cairns Group. The conversations Colombia had had with many Members 
and the statements made today shared one common denominator: the wish to seek agreement on a series of topics on which it should be possible to achieve results for the Bali Ministerial 
Conference. Colombia welcomed this positive spirit and wished to see it grow. Colombia noted with 
satisfaction the G-20 proposals on Agriculture, a central issue in the Doha Negotiations. These proposals should be discussed as soon as possible so that they could reach full maturity. There had 
also been progress on Trade Facilitation. However, Members needed to step up their work, TN/C/M/31 
 
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 particularly on Section II on S&D, a prerequisite for any sound and balanced agreement. Colombia 
did not share the view of certain Members that only the developed countries stood to gain from a Trade Facilitation agreement: there was clear evidence that in this area, all Members were beneficiaries.  
2.46.  On development – in particular the Monitoring Mechanism, the 28 Cancún proposals and the 
six Agreement-specific proposals – developing coun tries needed to be more coherent. For years, 
they had been clamouring for progress in these areas, and now that there was finally some 
movement, they were the ones holding back progress, either by acting indifferently or by failing to 
contribute to the efforts. Slowing down progress for tactical reasons had to be avoided. The proposals of the LDCs for the Bali meeting were much anticipated. The LDCs were counting on the 
other Members to support them in their aspirations, but Colombia urged them to make those 
aspirations clear as soon as possible, and above all to be realistic and concrete. 
2.47.  Finally, Colombia emphasised that any propos al had to be realistic, and had to be submitted 
to Members as rapidly as possible so as to be thoroughly examined and discussed. The Chairs of 
the committees and negotiating groups had to guide these discussions and the other Members had 
to participate in them objectively. Each initiative had to be judged on its merits and viability. At the same time, Colombia agreed that a horizo ntal process might be required to assess the 
progress in different areas and determine where to go next. However, it would be meaningless at 
this stage, when not all of the proposals were on the table yet and those that were had not yet been properly examined. To attempt a horizontal review at this stage would encourage tactical moves to favour certain proposals over others. Members would simply be sabotaging their own 
efforts, and worse still, undermining the credibility of the Organization.  
2.48.  The representative of India said it was he artening to note that significant, albeit slow, 
progress, had been reported by three of the Nego tiating Group Chairs, namely Trade Facilitation, 
Development and Agriculture. India wished to full y associate itself with the statements made by 
Indonesia and Brazil on behalf of the G-33 and the G-20, respectively. There was less than a year until the next Ministerial meeting. Subtracting the holidays, there were actually just about 30 
weeks of effective negotiating time left to achi eve a meaningful outcome for MC9. This was not a 
lot of time, but if there was a genuine desire among Members to have a balanced and inclusive outcome at MC9, it was still possible. Members had to utilize the time available in the best possible manner. On the substance of the possible outcom e at MC9, India felt that a large number of 
Members were of the view that a broad outline of a road map to the conclusion of the Doha Round, 
in which MC9 would be an important intermediate stage, had to be a part of the MC9 outcome. The membership had to be assured, if possible in concrete and credible terms, that MC9 did not 
represent the de facto  end of the Doha Round but would just be the next step forward in moving 
towards the final goal. There was not a clear idea as to how to do it but he wished to exchange views with other delegations on this issue so as to be able to come up with something by MC9. 
2.49.  Considering the impasse in the DDA negotiat ions in the recent past, it would be extremely 
valuable to have some negotiated outcomes in different DDA areas by MC9. This would help reaffirm the faith of the membership in multilateralism and in the future of the WTO as a viable negotiating forum. At the moment, there were different proposals in Trade Facilitation, Agriculture 
and perhaps on the 28 Agreement-specific propos als and the S&D Monitoring Mechanism. It was 
India's understanding that other delegations were working hard to put together their concerns and 
aspirations in the form of concrete proposals, an d would be tabling them in the near future. In 
working out a set of deliverables, it was important to remember that issues related to the LDCs 
and the poorer countries had to receive top most priority, whether they related to TRIPS extension, which had already been tabled, or other proposals on which the LDCs and SVEs might 
be working. The broader membership owed it to th e proponents of any proposal, whether it was in 
Trade Facilitation or Agriculture or any other area, to give it the most serious consideration and try to seek solutions to the problems. Ideally, there could be an attempt at having final outcomes in some areas, but if that posed too difficult a hurdle, there could be intermediate outcomes or 
provisional outcomes, linked to the conclusion of the DDA. The outcomes could range from new 
agreements to understandings and interpretations of different provisions on either a binding or best endeavour basis, depending on how much traction each proposal received. If a delegation did 
not receive complete satisfaction on any of its proposals, it should not be viewed as a failure either 
for the delegation or the collective process, because the objective was to attempt to craft together a package that was as inclusive as possible and prov ided benefits or addressed the concerns of as 
many of the Members as possible. TN/C/M/31 
 
- 22 - 
 
 2.50.  The representative of Paraguay endorsed th e statement delivered by Australia on behalf of 
the Cairns Group. Paraguay welcomed the constructive spirit in which Members had been working 
so as to move forward the MC8 mandate. Efforts had been made to revive the agenda for the agriculture negotiations with pragmatic and realistic proposals. Paraguay urged Members to 
continue working in order to analyse the possible elements for the next Ministerial Conference, 
especially in Agriculture. It called for an increase in the number of meetings so as to proceed with these tasks and emphasized the need to resume discussions on the export competition pillar. 
2.51.  The representative of the United States said that TNC meetings offered an important 
opportunity for Members to share their view of the broad context in which negotiations took place, 
their reaction to specific initiatives, and their thoughts for moving forward. This was, in part, a transparency exercise, but, even more fundamen tally, Members owed each other an honest and 
straightforward assessment of where they stood. L ooking at MC9 to be held in Bali, one year 
seemed like a long time, yet there were far fewe r than twelve months available. Bali was not a 
deadline, but it had already emerged as a milestone. One way or the other, Bali would mark a 
moment when not only the WTO Members but the world outside of Geneva would take stock of the 
work and the health of the trading system.  
2.52.  One year earlier, at MC8, Ministers had frankly acknowledged that the Doha negotiations 
were at an impasse. Yet they had directed Members to explore different negotiating approaches 
with particular focus on areas where progress  could be achieved. 2012 and 2013 were about the 
collective effort to determine whether, despit e the broad impasse, there remained some areas 
where the WTO could make progress. If Members entered Bali with nothing to show for the two 
years since MC8, they should not delude themselves about how the world would perceive the Doha 
negotiations. Members had repeatedly expressed concern that if something short of the full Doha package was harvested, the rest might then be left behind. The US wished to make clear that it 
did not view the possible earlier achievement of so me results as the end of the line. Like others, 
many of the United States' most important DDA priorities were not on the table in the short-term context. Therefore, the United States needed and expected the multilateral work to continue. 
However, the real risk was that if Members could not produce something now, they would lose 
hope of accomplishing anything later.  
2.53.  There was already a growing perception that  the WTO may no longer be an effective forum 
for trade negotiations. It was vitally important to the health of the institution that this perception 
not become a reality. But the test was deeds ra ther than words. So the question of whether 
Members would have something to show for their efforts in the two years since MC8 took on increasing urgency. For this reason, work on Trade Facilitation, Agriculture, and Development was 
so important. Many Members – developed and developing – had identified Trade Facilitation as one 
issue that should be pursued vigorously as part  of the short-term agenda. The United States 
believed that trade facilitation promoted the trade equivalent of a healthy circulatory system; it 
cleared blockages that were the economic equivalent of arterial sclerosis. Ultimately, all Members 
would make their own assessments about trade facilitation and any other issue. The United States had listened very carefully to all developing country Members and understood that S&D was a vital part of the trade facilitation discussion. For this reason, three years before, the United States had 
put forward a proposal for state-of-the-art S&D that actually allowed every individual Member to 
categorize every individual obligation as it saw fi t, and then to pick individual implementation 
deadlines for each obligation. This would be unprecedented in a WTO agreement, and the US 
looked forward to discussing this issu e with Members in the weeks ahead.  
2.54.  At the last report by the TNC Chair, two months earlier, there had been a marked 
atmosphere of optimism. A broad diversity of Memb ers had expressed hope that, even in the post-
MC8 context of reduced short-term ambition, WT O Members might be able to achieve something 
meaningful. Certainly the United States shared this hope. That optimism was based, in significant part, on the constructive work by some Members to identify initiatives that might be paired with Trade Facilitation in crafting a broader package. At that point, the G-20 had put forward a TRQ 
administration proposal which, while not perfec t, had obviously been calibrated. For example, 
while the proposal sought to solve an important problem, it did not have significant implications for the broad balance of benefits and obligations in the Round. Its scale fit the current, short-term 
negotiating context. TRQ administration was also a relatively easy problem to describe, and the fix 
too was straightforward, so that potential negotiations were feasible in the timeframe available. In short, without prejudice to what the ultimate ne gotiated outcome might be and to the questions 
that had been raised about applicability limited to developed countries, TRQ administration seemed TN/C/M/31 
 
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 to pass the abstract test of "do-ability." So the tone had reflected, in significant part, the 
sentiment that Members has still been operating within the bounds.  
2.55.  On the other hand, there were real question s about both the scale and the do-ability of the 
more recent stock-piling proposal by India and others and these questions were creating new 
concerns about what could be collectively put together by Bali. The United States remained open-
minded and hopeful that the stock-piling proposal might be rescaled into something appropriate for today's negotiating context. However, it had many questions. The United States could not go 
down the path of opening a brand new, WTO-auth orized, open-ended carve out of agricultural 
subsidy programs. In this connection, the US would also want to be sure that in taking an action in the name of food security for some, food security  for others was not being undermined. Efforts to 
understand the problem and its solution were im peded significantly by the lack of required 
agricultural notifications from some prominent proponents. Such information was an essential first 
step to the collective ability to understand the is sues and their context. The United States had 
appreciated efforts by India to begin providing more information along these lines and was ready 
to continue the discussion on an intensive basis.  
2.56.  The work ahead presented significant cha llenges and the nature of the WTO institution 
made it easier to hold up progress than to make it happen. But there was still time for the hard 
work that could make MC9 successful, and prove to the world that the WTO was still a place where 
Members could negotiate solutions to the world's problems. But the clock was ticking and there was no time to waste. 
2.57.  The representative of Nepal said his delega tion associated with the statement made by Haiti 
on behalf of the LDC Group. It was encouraging that Members had intensified engagement and 
that there were indication of progress in some  areas. The underlining message of MC8 had been 
that the DDA should not fail. Ministers had committed in unequivocal terms to the Doha mandate 
and had reaffirmed that the WTO had a vital role to play in promoting economic growth and 
development and that development was a core element of the WTO's work. The possible MC9 
package should, therefore, have adequate deve lopmental balance. Ministers had given clear 
instructions to devise the work programme giving priority to LDCs' interests, including the effective 
implementation of Decision 36 of Annex F of the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration, the 
operationalization of the decision on Services Waiver, addressing the issue of Cotton, taking 
decision on the extension period under TRIPS Article 66.1, addressing accession issues and taking 
other decisions on other measures in favour of LDCs, including simplified and facilitative rules of 
origin. Nepal was concerned over the lack of pr ogress on core LDCs issues. Members had agreed 
on streamlining LDCs' accession process, but th ey had to bear in mind that accession was a 
systemic issue and could not be used as a quid pro quo  for compromise on other areas. 
2.58.  On Trade Facilitation, Nepal was ready to engage constructively. Nonetheless, it was its 
view that balance should be ensured between the commitments in Section I and technical 
assistance, financial support and capacity building as well as special and differential provisions in 
Section II. Due consideration had to be given to the difficulties faced by LDCs that were also LLDCs. It was equally important to understand that progress on Trade Facilitation could not be achieved in isolation. Adequate progress was needed on Agriculture to ensure development 
balance. The lack of progress on LDC issues undermined the commitment made in the 2005 Hong 
Kong Ministerial Declaration to "effectively and meaningfully integrate LDCs into the multilateral trading system". Without special support and treatment, LDCs' integration into the multilateral 
trading system could not be achieved. Unless Member s took up LDCs' issues, they run the risk of 
being further marginalized. Nearly a billion people in those countries should not be further subjected to grappling with hunger and poverty.  While working for the possible deliverables for 
MC9, Members had to bear in mind that the MC9 package could only be balanced by adequately 
accommodating the LDCs' agenda, which for years had been termed as a 'low hanging' one. A 
decision on implementation of LDC-related issues should not be made conditional on the progress 
or lack of progress in other areas. 
2.59.  The representative of Korea said that with regard to Trade Facilitation, Korea viewed Trade 
Facilitation as one of the most feasible candidates for early harvest. It fully recognized the value of 
facilitating trade in a world where the global value chain had been connected across different 
countries. Korea noted that substantive progress had been made at the technical level and 
appreciated the efforts made by the proponen ts to further promote and fine-tune common 
understandings of various proposals. Nonetheless, the challenges were enormous. Korea TN/C/M/31 
 
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 suggested two points for further advancing work in this area. First, commensurate with the 
ongoing facilitator-led process, Members needed more  inputs and attention from high-level officers 
in order to better address sensitive and politically charged issues and expedite the process. Second, discussions needed to focus on exploring viable and realistic ways to address Section II 
questions, while streamlining Section I issues. In a bid to help contribute to the Trade Facilitation 
negotiations, Korea had hosted a trade facilitation symposium on 27 November in Seoul. The symposium had focused on two specific issues: single windows and risk management. Possible 
ways to move forward the overall DDA negotiations were also discussed.  
2.60.  Turning to Agriculture, there were several proposals from different groups. Regarding the 
G–20 proposal on TRQ administration, Korea was wo rried about the cherry-picking from a text that 
had been delicately balanced after long years of intensive negotiations. It was also concerned 
about attempts to re-open already stabilized issues  in the existing text. As a Member of the G-33 
and G-10, Korea echoed the proposals by those Groups and was ready to engage in future negotiations on all proposals in a constructive manner.  
2.61.  Looking at the way forward, the challenges were overall daunting. There were time 
constraints towards MC9, but the contour of the harvest that was being pursued were not there 
yet. In addition, the current state of play was fluid and fragile for many exogenous and 
endogenous reasons. Against this backdrop, Members first needed to move step by step to restore 
trust in each other, while trying to harvest a modest outcome. The following 2-3 months were crucial to build up the contour of the possible harves t for MC9. To this end, all proposals needed to 
be put on the table as soon as possible to avoid any surprise and ensure timely consideration. In 
the meantime, the proposals already on the table needed to be tackled at the working level and 
even at a higher level, as necessary. Further work  should be guided by the MC8 mandate and past 
experiences with the negotiations. Members needed to focus on the elements that were 
realistically eligible for a balanced outcome at MC9. This did not mean abandoning the principle of 
the Single Undertaking.  
2.62.  The representative of the Plurinational State of Bolivia said that with regard to Trade 
Facilitation, Bolivia was unclear as to what this issue's contribution to development would be. 
While this issue reflected the interest of some countries on the basis of their export economies, it was also clear that it presented a serious challenge and was a matter of concern for a number of developing countries given its implications for their economies. With regard to how negotiations 
were conducted, Bolivia favoured participat ory and transparent methodology. However, 
methodological proposals on a conceptual or integral approach raised concern as they could potentially be much less transparent or participatory and create a situation where small 
delegations were side-lined. Furthermore, as rega rds these negotiations, it was better to reach a 
safe harbour where all Members were satisfied than to try to aim too high only to reach a dead end as a result of undue haste, incorrect methodol ogy or inappropriate objectives, forgetting once 
again the main objective, which was development. 
2.63.  In short, it would be quite unreasonable at this stage of the process to consider Trade 
Facilitation as a stand-alone issue for the outc ome of the MC9. The impetus being received by 
Trade Facilitation should also be reflected in other areas of interest, since what had been on the 
table up until then was not satisfactory in terms of a possible balanced result for MC9 that 
reflected the interests of developing countries. Nor could it be said that there was a balance between the aspects that were being negotiated in the area of Trade Facilitation. Issues of great 
importance such as Agriculture and, in particular the elimination of subsidies in 2013, the 
proposals by the G-20 and the G-33 and other proposals that might be submitted by developing countries should be reconsidered if a result was to be achieved during the Ministerial. In particular, 
the emblematic case of Cotton should be used as a benchmark to gauge whether any progress was 
made in the run up to MC9. Lastly, Bolivia hoped that a possible early harvest was not just another attempt to bury the development component of the Round. 
2.64.  The representative of Bangladesh agreed that the reference point for moving ahead in the 
run-up to MC9 was Ministers' political guidance and the decisions taken at MC8. His delegation 
associated itself with the statement by Haiti on  behalf of the LDC Group. One year had elapsed 
since MC8 and there was virtually no tangible pr ogress. Bangladesh was dismayed by observing 
the disproportionate and selective focus on some issues disregarding the LDC priority issues, which 
had broad convergence. At the Hong Kong Minister ial and at MC8, there had been clear decisions 
on the issues of LDCs, such as DFQF, Services Waiver, Cotton and political guidance on the TN/C/M/31 
 
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 extension of TRIPS flexibility. On DFQF, Bangla desh failed to understand how much time was 
needed for a developed country to implement the Hong Kong Ministerial Decision. With the new political dispensation, countries should make the gesture of announcing a date of implementation of the Hong Kong Decision at the very beginning of 2013. This would be a genuine New Year's gift 
for the 800 million people of the LDCs. This was not an additional commitment. They would simply 
join the others Members who had already offered preferential market access to LDCs, even on an autonomous basis. Some developing countries had also announced their offer for LDCs. This was 
crucial for the socio-economic development of countries like Bangladesh. Preference schemes on 
market access created jobs for women and the poor, reduced poverty and empowered them. They also helped governments curb terrorism. Bangladesh wished to see the full engagement by developed and developing countries to operationalize the MC8 decision on Services Waiver before 
MC9 and looked forward to the TRIPS Council meet ing, when the extension on TRIPS flexibility 
would be fully considered. 
2.65.  Members could not afford to waste time to conclude the DDA. There was one more year 
before the MC9 in Bali. Bangladesh wished for the whole membership to consider LDC issues as a 
special package, and not linked to progress in othe r areas, and was willing to be fully engaged in 
any other issues. LDCs, as a special group, deserved special consideration. Like other LDCs, 
Bangladesh strongly believed in a multilateral trading system with development at its core. It 
believed that the whole membership would demonstrate the political will and wisdom to conclude the DDA and thus make the Bali Ministerial a success. For that, there needed to be wholehearted engagement with an inclusive, transparent and do able work plan for the run-up to MC9, with a 
special focus on the LDC priority issues. 
2.66.  The representative of Barbados said her delegation associated itself with the statements 
delivered by Mauritius on behalf of the ACP and Indonesia on behalf of the G-33. The TNC meeting 
was an opportunity to discuss the way forward. So far, it seemed that matters relating to Trade 
Facilitation, S&D and some aspects of Agriculture were likely to be on the table in Bali. It was very important to emphasize the development focus of the Round. While achieving a positive outcome 
in Bali was highly desirable, it was also important that the outcome was balanced, had a 
development focus and dealt with the urgent concerns of developing countries, especially of LDCs. It was important to use all fora to build consensus.  
2.67.  On Trade Facilitation, she thanked the US for its suggestion made at the opening session of 
the Trade Facilitation meetings earlier that week relating to safeguards. Barbados had since added 
a paragraph to the proposed text that it wished to submit to the Negotiating Group. Barbados had linked the safeguards to the deterioration in the balance of trade of significant net-importing 
developing countries – and not to deterioration of  the balance of payments – lest other non-trade 
sectors were asked to take up the resulting deterioration in the trade balance following implementation of trade facilitation measures. 
2.68.   Barbados recognized the value of the efficiencies and improved speed of transactions as a 
result of trade facilitation. However, all studies had shown that trade would increase and it was important to accept that trade could not increase on one side only. Exports could not increase unless imports increased. It was a statistical impossi bility. Therefore, the impact on significant net-
importing developing countries needed to be addressed, since it was their net imports that were 
likely to increase in a situation where, because of their WTO commitments, they were prevented from taking necessary self-preservation responses.  Over the short to medium term, it would be 
those countries, some of whom already had import/export ratios ranging from 19:1 to 2:1, who 
would be worst affected. In addition, it was important to focus on what was meant by 'capacity'. In the trade facilitation text, 'capacity' meant administrative and institutional capacity. 
Macroeconomic capacity needed to be added to that definition. There was an assumption that 
more technical assistance would solve all problems. If the right problem was not identified, Members would be offered the wrong solution. It was not that technical assistance was not needed, but it did not solve the problem of macroeconomic capacity. Only recently, one Member 
had queried how it was possible that revenues from trade could increase when costs declined. The 
answer was because imports would increase. This had not been made explicit; it had to be inferred.  TN/C/M/31 
 
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 2.69.   Members did not have to come away from Bali having damaged the prospects of net-
importing developing countries. This would not honour the commitment to emphasize the development focus of the Round. There were about 35 countries in that situation, mostly LDCs and SVEs. The position advanced by Barbados was not solely for Barbados. There were many others, 
some of which were in an even more vulnerable situation based on their import/export ratios. 
Some of these countries did not even have missions in Geneva so it took some time to get them on board and to get feedback from their capitals. It was Barbados' hope however, to be able to 
make this case through the Trade Facilitation Negotiating Group shortly, not just for Barbados 
itself, but for those of the 35 countries who were interested in having these safeguards and enhanced S&D treatment apply to them. Barbados remained committed to these negotiations and to the WTO process.  
2.70.  The representative of Singapore recalled that MC8 had mandated a confidence building 
exercise, and the step-by-step building of trust in 2012 had been necessary. Members had been 
productive in modest ways. Pressing on, they should  not be so afraid that they did not to reach out 
to strike a final deal. There was collective clarity that the aim was not a comprehensive deal, but 
one which suited the prevailing appetite. Singapore fully endorse the negotiating 'code of conduct' outlined by the Director-General: Members should do things in a non-confrontational way and 
make efforts to address each other's concerns.  
2.71.   Singapore agreed with those Members who said that MC9 should be treated as an 
opportunity, and not an end-point in itself. It was an opportunity once every two years for Ministers to take decisions on the normative agenda which could improve the WTO's functioning, 
both on the DDA and in its regular work. The journey was long, but there was commitment to 
move any mountains blocking the path. MC9 was a significant milestone in that journey, because it would test Members' ability to do what was agreed at MC8, which was not to pursue approaches 
and proposals which had not worked in the past. There was an understandable anxiety about 
proposals which would come over and above what  Members were already working on. Singapore 
echoed what Brazil had stated, namely that "Members should assess the feasibility of their 
proposals to ensure that they help rather than hinder the process ahead". If there were proposals 
which could not be completed at MC9, Members should also be prepared to keep these for later, as they would continue to press on to deliver more and more of the DDA in small, doable parts.  
2.72.  Singapore welcomed the G-33 statemen t by Indonesia explaining the views on the 
relevance of food security to the WTO and how this related to the DDA work ahead. Singapore was 
glad that Members were willing to move away from the old thinking that the WTO could not begin to deal with any pressing matters which challenged the real world until the Doha Round was 
completed. This was a step towards improving credibility. Singapore was open to this proposal 
and, as for all the other proposals on the table, it encouraged all stakeholders to engage and refine them to make them both meaningful and acceptab le to all Members. The key was for Members to 
act responsibly in tabling pragmatic proposals and for the proponents to be flexible and 
cooperative both in terms of substance and process.  
2.73.  Finally, on process, Singapore said that when things were straightforward and any 
agreement was clearly beneficial to the system, Members should not hold back from finalising it 
because they were waiting for a 'horizontal treatm ent'. This had been part of the old approach 
which Members had agreed to avoid. Time was shor t, so when Members could agree, they should 
do so and bank in these credits to start building up a healthy bottom-line. This would improve the 
WTO's own credit rating, which would, in turn, improve the market sentiment to achieve good 
deliverables at Bali. 
2.74.  The representative of Norway said that her delegation was encouraged by the fact that 
there were proposals on the table, or in the pipeline, to help focus the discussions in 2013. That 
was a sign that Members wanted to see the WTO achieve tangible progress. It also suggested that they had learnt valuable lessons from the experien ces of the last Ministerial meeting, namely that 
the path from proposal to agreement required a significant amount of time, effort, realism and 
transparency. Norway took the willingness to present proposals for discussion as an 
acknowledgement that any proposal would need to be evaluated against the time, context, and political reality that Members faced today. Since the Doha Ministerial Conference, much progress 
had been made that captured expressions of willingness to solve problems – representing 
offensive as well as defensive interests. Norway wished to caution against discussions on whether there was still willingness to solve these problems, but at the same time Members should avoid TN/C/M/31 
 
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 coming to the table with dogmatic views on how or when to solve them. They had to be realistic in 
how they selected, presented and treated topics. Norway accepted that there was only so much 
that could be expected from a first step. Realism and restraint would be a necessity if Members were to achieve results in Bali. As such, the courage not to place unrealistic proposals on the table 
was as necessary as the ability to identify proposals that were doable and that brought the 
Organization in the right direction.  
2.75.  Finally, Norway believed it necessary to deliver in Bali. Ministers at MC8 had mandated 
negotiators to advance negotiations where progress could be achieved and look into ways to 
overcome stalemates in the areas where converge nce had proven to be especially challenging. 
After two years, Members could not go back and ask Ministers for two more years. Consequently, 
the focus should be on delivering some positive elements and give direction on how to deal with 
the rest. There would be many important elements  that could not possibly be delivered at MC9, 
but that nonetheless remained central to Members' expectations for the multilateral negotiations. Failure to address these issues would undoubtedly undermine the system in the long run. Members 
needed to provide the comfort that the direction set out at the Doha Ministerial remained a shared 
commitment after 2013. 
2.76.  The representative of Kenya said his delegation associated itself with the statement by 
Mauritius and Indonesia on behalf of the ACP Gr oup and G-33, respectively. One year had passed 
since the conclusion of MC8, where Ministers ha d advised to consider concentrating on those 
elements of the Doha Declaration that would allow Members to advance negotiations where progress could be achieved, including focusing on the elements of the Doha Declaration that 
allowed Members to reach provisional or definitive agreements based on consensus earlier than 
the full conclusion of the Single Undertaking. At  the heels of the MC8 statement, came the image 
of MC9. Against this backdrop, one of the fund amental questions was: after twelve months of 
engagement in Geneva, what kind of menu were Members preparing for Ministers at Bali? He did 
not have an answer to this question, but one thing was clear – honest dialogue and practical 
engagement could yield some positive results, however small they might be. In light of this, the 
urgency with which Members should start examining their work with a view to wrapping up a small 
package for consideration by Ministers at MC9 could not be overemphasized. 
2.77.  It was with this understanding that Keny a wished to examine a few areas of the DDA that 
had seen some engagement. Regarding Trade Facilitation, Kenya noted that the work of removing 
brackets in Rev.13 was ongoing, although at a slow pace. The imbalance between Section I and 
Section II of the text continued to persist. Furthermore, an evaluation of Section II against the mandate as contained in the July Framework and some fundamental issues of the Section still 
remained unaddressed. In this regard, it was critical to address these issues in tandem with the 
mandate so that Trade Facilitation could join ot her issues that were being prepared for early 
harvest. On S&D, the fortnightly meetings conv ened by the Chairman of  the Negotiating Group 
were progressing well in as far as the Cancún 28 and the six Agreement-specific proposals were 
concerned. Kenya welcomed this development and underscored the fact that this was an area that harboured a lot of development potential. It was therefore important that the progress being made 
was reflective of the mandate and that all concerns embedded in this area were being addressed 
as adequately as possible. In the area of Agri culture, Kenya welcomed the two proposals already 
on the table – the TRQ administration proposal by the G-20 and the food security proposal by the 
G-33 – and called for constructive engagement. It was Kenya's hope and earnest belief that a 
similar approach should be extended to cover the other remaining issues under the export 
competition pillar.  
2.78.  The ongoing work in those three areas seem ed to set a good trend on how to advance the 
DDA. Members should sustain this trend and endeavour to initiate engagement in other areas 
lagging behind. Besides, the LDCs issues, such as  DFQF, the Services Waiver and indeed all other 
issues contained in the DDA where decisions had been reached, should be candidates for early harvest. This selective approach had to respect th e principle of Single Undertaking and the process 
embracing the tenets of transparency and inclusiveness. Furthermore, any package for early 
harvest should truly reflect an appropriate balance and adequate development content. In conclusion, Kenya requested that its statement be  reflected in the minutes of the General Council 
of 11 December 2012. The Delegation of Kenya woul d continue to remain constructively engaged.  TN/C/M/31 
 
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 2.79.  The Chairman thanked delegations for their statements and said that his overall impression 
what that the meeting had been encouraging. 
2.80.  The Trade Negotiations Committee took note of the statements.  
 
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