RESTRICTED  
  
WT/TPR/G/382  
12 November 2018  
(18-7075) Page: 1/30 
Trade Policy Review Body   Original: English  
 
 
TRADE POLICY REVIEW  
REPORT BY  
UNITED STATES 
Pursuant to the Agreement Establishing the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (Annex 3 of the 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization), the policy statement by the 
United States  is attached.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: This report is subject to restricted circulation and press embargo until the end of the first 
session of the meeting of the Trade Policy Review Body on the United States . WT/TPR/G/ 382 • United States  
 
- 2 - 
 
  Contents  
1   THE UNITED STATE S IN THE GLOBAL TRAD ING SYSTEM  ................................ ............  4 
2   THE UN ITED STATES ECONOMIC  AND TRADE ENVIRONME NT ................................ ..... 5 
2.1   Introduction  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...............  5 
2.2   Economic Growth  ................................ ................................ ................................ ....... 5 
2.3   Federal Budget Deficit  ................................ ................................ ................................ . 6 
2.4   Nominal Savings/Investment  ................................ ................................ .......................  6 
2.5   Labor Markets  ................................ ................................ ................................ ............  6 
2.6   Productivity  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...............  7 
2.7   Exports, Imports, and the Trade Balance  ................................ ................................ ....... 7 
2.8   Challenges to the U.S. and Global Economy  ................................ ................................ ... 7 
3   OPENNESS AND ACC OUNTABILITY: BUILDIN G SUPPORT FOR TRADE  ........................  7 
3.1   Policy Coordination  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..... 8 
3.2   Public Engagement and Transparency  ................................ ................................ ...........  8 
3.3   Advisory Committee Process  ................................ ................................ ........................  9 
3.3.1    Tier I: President's Advisory Committee on Trade Policy and Negotiations  ........................  9 
3.3.2    Tier II: the Policy Advisory Committees  ................................ ................................ .... 10 
3.3.3    Tier III: the Technical and Sectoral Advisory Committee  ................................ .............  10 
3.4   State and Local Government Relations  ................................ ................................ ........  10 
3.4.1    State Point of Contact System and the In tergovernmental Policy Advisory Committee on 
Trade  ................................ ................................ ................................ .............................  10 
3.4.2    Meetings of State and Local Associations and Local Chambers of Comme rce .................  10 
3.4.3    Consultations Regarding Specific Trade Issues  ................................ ...........................  11 
4   TRADE POLICY DEV ELOPMENTS SINCE 2016  ................................ ............................  11 
4.1   WTO Agreements and Initiatives  ................................ ................................ ................  11 
4.2   Trade Enforcement Activities  ................................ ................................ ......................  12 
4.3   Free Trade Agreements and Initiatives  ................................ ................................ ........  13 
4.3.1    Central America and the Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement  ............................  13 
4.3.2    North American Free Trade Agreement  ................................ ................................ ..... 13 
4.3.3    United States –Australia Free T rade Agreement  ................................ ..........................  14 
4.3.4    United States –Bahrain Free Trade Agreement  ................................ ...........................  14 
4.3.5    United States –Chile Free Trade Agreement  ................................ ...............................  14 
4.3.6    United States –Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement  ................................ .................  14 
4.3.7    United States –Israel Free Trade Agreement  ................................ ..............................  15 
4.3.8    United States –Jordan Free Trade Agreement  ................................ .............................  15 
4.3.9    United States –Korea Free Trade Agreement  ................................ ..............................  15 
4.3.10    United States –Morocco Free Trade Agreement  ................................ .........................  16 
4.3.11    United States –Oman Free Trade Agreement  ................................ ............................  16 
4.3.12    United States –Panama Trade Promotion Agreemen t ................................ .................  16 
4.3.13    United States –Peru Trade Promotion Agreement  ................................ ......................  17 
4.3.14    United States –Singapore Free Trade Agreement  ................................ ......................  17 WT/TPR/G/ 382 • United States  
 
- 3 - 
 
  4.4   Other Negotiating Initiatives  ................................ ................................ ......................  17 
4.4.1    Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum  ................................ ................................ . 17 
4.4.2    Japan  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...................  18 
4.4.3    The U.S. -ASEAN Trade and Investment Framework Arrangement  ................................  18 
4.4.4    Engagement with the Mi ddle East and North Africa  ................................ ....................  18 
4.4.5    U.S.–EU Trade  ................................ ................................ ................................ ....... 19 
4.4.6    China  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...................  19 
4.4.7    African Growth and Opportunity Act  ................................ ................................ .........  20 
4.4.8    East African Community Trade and Investment Partnership  ................................ ........  21 
4.4.9    Nepal Trade Preference Program  ................................ ................................ ..............  21 
4.4.10    The Caribbe an Basin Initiative  ................................ ................................ ...............  21 
4.5   Other Trade Activities  ................................ ................................ ...............................  22 
4.5.1    Protecting Intellectual Property  ................................ ................................ ................  22 
4.5.2    Promoting Digital Trade  ................................ ................................ ..........................  23 
5   TRADE -RELATED CA PACITY BUILDING INIT IATIVES ................................ ................  24 
5.1   WTO-Related U.S. Trade -Related Assistance  ................................ ................................  24 
5.2   The Enhanced Integrated Framework  ................................ ................................ ..........  25 
5.3   Trade Capacity -Building Initiatives for Africa  ................................ ................................  25 
5.4   Standards Alliance  ................................ ................................ ................................ .... 26 
6   TRADE AND THE EN VIRONMENT  ................................ ................................ ...............  27 
7   TRADE AND LABOR  ................................ ................................ ................................ ... 28 
8   SMALL AND MEDIUM -SIZED BUSINESS TRAD E ................................ .........................  29 
 
  WT/TPR/G/ 382 • United States  
 
- 4 - 
 
  1  THE UNITED ST ATES IN THE GLOBAL T RADING SYSTEM  
1.1.  As the United States Government undergoes its fourteenth Trade Policy Review —more than 
any other World Trade Organization (WTO) Member —the United States  is committed to reforming 
the global trading system  in ways that lead  to fairer outcomes for U.S. workers and businesses, and 
more efficient markets for countries around  the world. U.S. trade policy is driven by a pragmatic 
determination to use the leverage available to the world's largest economy to secure these 
objectives . Our trade policy is steadfastly focused on the national interest, including retaining and 
using U.S. sovereign power to act in defense of that interest.  
1.2.  U.S. trade policy rests on five major pillars: supporting U.S. national security, strengthening 
the U .S. economy, negotiating better trade deals, aggressive enforcement of U.S. trade laws, and 
reforming the multilateral trading  system.  
Supporting U.S. National Security  
1.3.  In December 2017, the Administration issued a new National Security Strategy for the United 
States. The document states that, "A strong economy protects the American people, supports our 
way of life, and sustains American power. " It also makes clear that t he United States will not turn a 
blind eye to violations, cheating, or economic aggression. U.S. trade policy will fulfill these goals by 
using all possible tools to preserve our national sovereignty and strengthen the U.S. economy.  
Strengthening the U.S. Economy  
1.4.  In 2017, the President signed a new tax bill designed to make U.S. companies and workers 
more competitive  with the rest of the world. The Administration also began a determined effort to 
eliminate wasteful and unnecessary regulations that hamper bu siness. These and other efforts to 
strengthen the U.S. economy will make it easier for U.S. companies to succeed in global markets.  
Negotiating Better Trade Deals  
1.5.  For too long, the rules of global trade have been tilted against U.S. workers and businesses.  
The United States has demonstrated that it will alter —or terminate —old trade deals that are not in 
the U.S. national interest. In 2018, the United States completed a comprehensive renegotiation of 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and improv ed the U.S. –Korea Free Trade 
Agreement to rebalance trade and address implementation concerns. Furthermore, with roughly 
80% of the world's economy and 95% of the world's population living outside the United States, the 
United States is commi tted to openin g foreign markets and is  actively pursuing new and better trade 
deals with potential partners around the world.  
Aggressive Enforcement of U.S. Trade Laws  
1.6.  Free and fair trade benefits both the United States and the rest of the world by providing more 
afford able goods and services, raising living standards, fue lling economic growth, and supporting 
good jobs. Reducing barriers to trade offers greater product variety, enhance s product quality, 
increases innovation, and raises productivity . In addition, the Unit ed States strongly believes that 
all countries  would benefit from adopting policies that promote true market competition. 
Unfortunately, history shows that not all countries will do so voluntarily. Non -market policies and 
practices and u nfair trade practic es, including dumping, discriminatory non -tariff barriers, forced 
technology transfers, excess capacity, industrial subsidies, and other forms of support by 
governments and related entities  distort markets and damage U.S. workers and businesses . 
1.7.  The United States has an aggressive trade enforcement agenda designed to prevent countries 
from benefitting  from unfair trade practices. The United States will use all tools available —including 
unilateral action where necessary —to support this effort. More  broadly, r obust trade enforcement 
across the spectrum of goods and services remains a central pillar of U.S. trade policy. Vigorous 
work by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) and sister  U.S. agencies, including the 
Departments of Agricultu re, Commerce, Labor, State, Treasury, and others, helps ensure that trade 
agreements yield the maximum benefits in terms of ensuri ng market access for Americans,  and 
creating a fair, open, and predictable trading environment. Ensuring full implementation o f U.S. 
trade agreements r emains one of the United States'  strategic priorities.  WT/TPR/G/ 382 • United States  
 
- 5 - 
 
  Reforming the Multilateral Trading System  
1.8.  The United States wants to help build a better multilateral trading system and will remain active 
in the WTO. At the same time, the Un ited States recognizes that the WTO has not always worked as 
expected. Instead of serving as a negotiating forum where Members can develop new and better 
rules, the ability of Members to negotiate has become increasingly frustrated by an overactive 
dispute  settlement system in which activist "judges " impose their own policy preferences and 
institutional preferences on Members. Instead of constraining market distorting countries, the WTO 
has in some cases given them an unfair advantage over the United States  and other market -based 
economies. Instead of promoting more efficient markets, the WTO has been used by some Members 
as a bulwark in defense of market access barriers, dumping, subsidies, and other market distorting 
practices. The United States has been d rawing the attention of WTO Members to instances where 
the WTO Appellate Body has disregarded the explicit rules agreed by Members in the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Understanding. The United States will not allow any multilateral organization to prevent 
us fro m taking actions that are essential to the economic well -being of the American people.  
1.9.  At the same time, as the United States demonstrated at the WTO's Eleventh Ministerial 
Conference, we remain eager to work with like -minded countries to build a global ec onomic system 
that will lead to higher living standards here and around the world. The United States submitted a 
proposal in the November 2017 meeting of the General Council to improve compliance with WTO 
notification requirements and is working with other  Members to further develop the proposal. The 
United States is also interested in working with other Members on improving the functioning of the 
regular committees of the WTO. In an effort to improve the negotiating arm of the WTO, the United 
States is enc ouraging a discussion on development status in the WTO to ensure that a larger 
proportion of WTO Members will undertake substantive obligations under future WTO agreements.  
2  THE UNITED STATES EC ONOMIC AND TRADE ENV IRONMENT  
2.1  Introduction  
2.1.  The United States mai ntains one of the world's most open trade regimes, with the U.S. simple 
average MFN tariff at 3. 4% in 2017 on a bound basis under the WTO. When GSP and other tariff 
preferences are taken into account, the U.S. trade -weighted average tariff is 1. 4% on an ap plied 
basis. By comparison, simple average applied tariffs in our top five trading partners range from 4. 0% 
to 9.8% and trade -weighted average tariffs range from 2. 5% to 5. 2%. In 201 7, nearly 70% of all 
U.S. imports (including under preference programs) entered the United States duty free. The United 
States also has among the lowest non -tariff barriers of any country in the world. U.S. service 
markets are open to foreign providers with limited exceptions, and U.S. regulatory processes are 
transparent, accessible, and open to public input.  
2.2  Economic Growth  
2.2.  During the period under review, the United States ' economy  continued to grow. This marked 
the 9th consecutive year of GDP growth – this expansion will be the longest on record if it continues 
into the second half of 2019. U.S. real gross domestic product (GDP) increased by 1.6% in 201 6 and 
2.2% in 201 7. For the first half of 201 8, real GDP is up 2.7%, on an annual basis , and up 4.2% in 
the second quarter of 2018 (highest since 3rd quarter 2014 (up 4.9%)) . The increase  in growth in 
the first half of 201 8 is based on several factors: higher consumer spending (resulting from robust 
job gains, rising after -tax incomes, and greater consumer confidence), strong business investment, 
and strong growth in exports and manufacturing output (due to good economic performance in the 
rest of the world). The Administration is projecting real GDP grow th of 3.1% for 201 8, and 3.2 % 
and 3.1% for 201 9 and 20 20, respectively. Since the end of the recession in the 2nd quarter of 2009 
through the 2nd quarter of 201 8, U.S.  GDP has increased at an annual rate of 2. 3%. 
2.3.  The primary contributor to growth since 201 6 has been consumer spending. Personal 
consumption expenditures, which account for nearly 70% of U.S. GDP  (68.4% in 2017) , increased 
2.7% in 201 6, 2.5% in 201 7, and 2.5%, on an annual basis, for the first half of 201 8 (with a 4.2% 
growth in the 2nd quarter  of 2018) . Consumer spending has contributed roughly 72% of the increase 
in U.S. real GDP since the end of the recession. Business fixed investment increased 0.5% in 201 6 
and 5.3% in 201 7, and increased  6.7%, on an annual basis, for the first half of 201 8. U.S. real 
exports of goods and services decreased 0.1% in 201 6, but have grown since, up 3.0% in 2017, WT/TPR/G/ 382 • United States  
 
- 6 - 
 
  and 5.0% for the first half of 201 8). Real imports increased by 1.9% in 201 6 and 4.6% in 201 7, and 
have increased  by 4.7% so far in 201 8. U.S. governmen t expenditures increased 1.4% in 201 6, but 
decreased 0.1% in 201 7, before increasing  1.0% through the first half of 201 8. 
2.3  Federal Budget Deficit  
2.4.  The Federal budget deficit has increased  over the period under review in both absolute terms 
and relative to GDP. The budget deficit increased  from US$ 438.5  billion ( 2.4% of GDP) in fiscal year 
2013 to US$ 584.7  billion ( 3.2% of GDP) in fiscal year 201 6, and to US$ 665.4  billion ( 3.5% of GDP) 
in fiscal year 201 7. The federal deficit in fiscal year 201 7, at 3.5% of GDP, was still slightly over 
one-third of the 9.8% of GDP deficit recorded in 2009  during the depth of the recession. According 
to the  U.S. Office of Management and Budget mid -session rev iew of the FY2019 budget , the federal 
budget deficit is projected to increase to US$890 billion ( 4.4% of GDP) in FY 2018, and peak at 
US$1.1 trillion  (5.1% of GDP) in FY 2019. The deficit is estimated to decline thereafter to US$458 
billion (1.4% of GDP) in FY2028. The debt -to-GDP ratio is projected to increase from 78.5% in 2018 
to 82.7% in 2022 before declining to 73.8% in 2028.  
2.4  Nominal Savings/Investment  
2.5.  U.S. gross saving s as a percentage of gross national income  slightly declined from 19.6% 
(US$3.66 trill ion) in 2015 to 18.3% (US$3.48 trillion) in 2016 before increasing to 18.5% (US$3.68 
trillion) in 2017 and 18.7% (US$3.88 trillion) in the second quarter of 2018 (on an annual rate). 
Although there was a slight increase in gross savings of US$17 billion be tween 2015 and 2017, this 
was due to an increase in business savings of US$165 billion, being offset by an increase in 
government dissaving of US$143 billion. Household and institution savings declined slightly by 
US$5 billion, as the personal savings rate  stayed steady at 6.7 % in both 2016 and 2017 (down from 
7.6% in 2015, but up from a low of 3.2 % in 2005). U.S. gross investment increased by 
US$178 billion between 201 5 and 201 7 to US$4.0 trillion . 
2.5  Labor Markets  
2.6.  U.S. employment continued to increase during  the period under review, up 6.2 million net jobs 
between December 201 5 and August 201 8 (up 2.3 million between December 201 5 and 
December  2016, up 2. 2 million between December 201 6 and December 201 7, and up 1. 7 million 
between December 201 7 and August 201 8). The pace of net job growth for the first eight months 
of 2018 (207,000) remains higher than the average monthly pace in both 2016 (195,000) and 2017 
(182,000). U.S. employment has increased for 95 consecutive months from February 2010 through 
August 20 18 (19.6  million ), and private employment has increased for 102 consecutive months (up 
19.7 million ). Manufacturing employment has also increased, up  1.3 million  since February 2010, 
and accounted for one in 1 0.6 U.S. non -farm jobs in 201 7 and one in 10.4 jobs thus far in 2018. 
Service -providing industries (including government) employed 86% of all U.S. non -farm workers in 
2017, and services jobs are up nearly 17.0  million since February 2010.  
2.7.  With the improvement in U.S. employment during th e period  under review , the unemployment 
rate has also declined, dropping from a high of 10.0% in October 2009 to 3.9% in August 201 8 
(3.7% in September) . The unemployment rate has been at 5.0 % or below for the past 36 months 
and is well below its pre -recession average of  5.3%. August 2018 marked the fourth time this year 
that the monthly unemployment rate has been below 4.0%. Prior to this year, unemployment was 
below 4.0 % only five times since 1970. Since December 201 5, the unemployment rate has declined 
by 1.1 percentag e points.  
2.8.  The labor market continues to improve. Labor force participation has remained constant at 
62.7%, the same rate as in December 2015 , though down from the 67.3 % peak rate in April 2000. 
Labor compensation has been increasing . Nominal hourly earning s for all private sector workers are 
up 2.9% over the past 12 months ending in August 2018, the largest nominal 12 month increase in 
average hourly earnings since 2009. Real hourly earnings were up 0.2% over the past year. Real 
median household income in t he United States increased 1.8% in 201 6 to US$61,372 , the third 
consecutive annual increase , and surpassed the series high of US$58,655 in 1999 . WT/TPR/G/ 382 • United States  
 
- 7 - 
 
  2.6  Productivity  
2.9.  Labor productivity, as measured by output per hour worked, has improved in recent  years, 
picking up from the 0.6%  average pace from 2011 to 2016. Productivity grew by 1. 9% between 4th 
quarter 2015 and 4th quarter 2017 (up 1.0% in both 2016 and 2017) ). Productivity increased sharply 
in the 2nd quarter 2018 by 2.9% at an annualized rate.  With the tight labor market, firms are 
increasingly turning to capital investment to continue growth, which should support higher 
productivity growth.  
2.7  Exports, Imports, and the Trade Balance  
2.10.   Nominal U.S . exports of goods and services (on a balance of paym ents basis) de creased by 
2.2% between 201 5 and 201 6 (the 2nd consecutive annual decline) , then increased  by 6.1% in 201 7. 
Thus far in 201 8 through July, U.S. exports were up 8.6%. Similar to exports, nominal U.S. imports 
of goods and services declined  in 2016 (by 2.2%), and increased  in 201 7 (up 6.1% ) and thus far in 
2018 (up 8.3 %). The increase  in U.S. trade can be attributed, in part, to s tronger economic growth 
at home and abroad . The stronger dollar in 2018 (up 6% this year)  provided some tailwinds on 
imports and headwinds on exports.  As a share of nominal GDP, U.S. goods and services exports was 
roughly 12 % during the period under review, while imports were roughly 15 %.  
2.11.   The United States was the recipient of 1 8.7% of goods and services exports from the rest of 
the world (excluding intra -European Union (EU)  exports) in 201 7. The United States supplied 15. 1% 
of goods and services imports to the rest of the world (excluding intra -EU imports).  
2.12.   During the period of review, the U. S. goods and services trade deficit with other countries (on 
a national income and product accounts basis) increased by 10.9% from US$521 billion in 201 5 
(2.9% of U.S. GDP) to US$578 billion in 201 7 (nearly 3.0% of U.S. GDP). The U.S. deficit in 201 7 
was s ignificantly down from its all -time high of US$771 billion, or 5.6% of GDP, in 2006.  The deficit 
was even lower in the second quarter 2018 at US$552 billion (2.7% of GDP) on an annual rate.  
2.8  Challenges to the U.S. and G lobal Economy  
2.13.   The U.S. economy has bee n strong during the period under review, with accelerating growth, 
low unemployment, and inflation  at a sustainable rate. However, growth outside the United States 
has generally disappointed  in 2018: other major advanced economies have seen output growth s tep 
down from its 2017 level, while several emerging market economies have come under pressure as 
rebounding commodity prices, rising U.S. interest rates, and shifts in investor sentiment have 
interacted with pre -existing weaknesses and led to episodes of financial volatility . Though there are 
not yet signs that these financial pressures in key emerging markets are leading to broader 
contagion, a sharp tightening of financial conditions across emerging markets could be a significant 
drag on global activity and weigh on U.S. growth.  
2.14.   The global economy also remains marked by very large trade and current account imbalances, 
in part due to persistent  trade and investment barriers across  many economies . These barriers inhibit 
the efficient allocation of capital across the global economy and prevent trade from expanding in a 
way that is fair and reciprocal. Growth  across the global economy and in the United States could be 
stronger and more balanced if t hese trade and investment barriers were dismantled, and if domestic 
demand became the sustained engine of expansion for key economies that have maintained large 
trade surpluses.  
3  OPENNESS AND ACCOUNT ABILITY: BUILDING SU PPORT FOR TRADE  
3.1.  Support for the United  States' active trade agenda – including for actions under domestic trade 
law, legislation, bilateral and regional trade agreements , as well as U.S. participation in the WTO – 
has been built through constant coordination with Congress and extensive outreac h to U.S. industry 
leaders, entrepreneurs, farmers, ranch ers, small business owners, workers , state and local 
government officials, as well as advocates for labor rights, environmental protection, and public 
health, among others. The United States views co nsultation with those interested in and affected by 
trade and investment issues as an important part of any government's responsibility. Consultation 
and engagement is vital to ensuring that trade policy reflects American interests and American 
values. Adv ice from such stakeholders is both a critical and integral part of the trade policy process.  WT/TPR/G/ 382 • United States  
 
- 8 - 
 
  3.2.  Reflecting Congressional direction, and to draw advice from the widest array of stakeholders, 
including business, labor, agriculture, civil society, and the genera l public, USTR has broadened 
opportunities for public input and worked to ensure transparency of trade policy through various 
initiatives. USTR works to ensure that timely trade information is available to the public and 
disseminated widely to stakeholders , and to offer  opportunities for public comment on trade issues 
and for interaction with negotiators during trade negotiations . In addition to public outreach, USTR 
is responsible for administering the statutory Advisory Committee system, created by the U. S. 
Congress under the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, as well as facilitating formal consultations with 
State and local Governments regarding the President 's trade priorities and the status of current 
trade negotiations which may impact them or touch upon s tate and local government policies.  
3.1  Policy C oordination  
3.3.  USTR has primary responsibility, with the advice of the interagency trade policy organization, 
for developing and coordinating the implementation of U.S. trade policy, including on commodity 
matters ( for example, coffee and rubber) and, to the extent they are related to trade, direct 
investment matters. Under the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, the U.S. Congress established an 
interagency trade policy mechanism to assist with the implementation of these r esponsibilities. This 
organization, as it has evolved, consists of three tiers of committees that constitute the principal 
mechanism for developing and coordinating U.S. Government positions on international trade and 
trade -related investment issues.  
3.4.  The T rade Policy Review Group (TPRG) and the Trade Policy Staff Committee (TPSC), both 
administered and chaired by USTR, are the subcabinet interagency trade policy coordination groups 
that are central to this process. The TPSC is the first -line operating group , with representation at 
the senior civil servant level. Supporting the TPSC are more than 100 subcommittees  responsible 
for specialized issues. The TPSC regularly seeks advice from the public on its policy decisions and 
negotiations through Federal  Regist er Notices and public hearings. During the reporting period, the 
TPSC held public hearings regarding the China 301 Investigation (October 2017; May 2018), Special 
301 Review (February 2017; February 2018), the EU Beef 301 Investigation (February 2017), the 
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) product, country and out -of-cycle reviews (October 2016; 
January 2017; February 2017; July 2017; September 2017; June 2018), the African Growth and 
Opportunity Act (AGOA) country and out -of-cycle reviews (August 201 6; July 2017; August 2017), 
two Section 201 investigations (December 2017; January 2018), the negotiation of the United 
States -Mexico -Canada Agreement  (June 2017), China's compliance with its WTO Commitments 
(September 2016; October 2017), and Russia's imp lementation of its WTO Commitments (October 
2016; October  2017). 
3.5.  Through the interagency process, USTR requests input and analysis from members of the 
appropriate TPSC subcommittee or task force. This group then presents its conclusions and 
recommendations  to the full TPSC and serve s as the basis for reaching interagency consensus. On 
average, the TPSC considers over 250 policy papers and negotiating documents, and holds over 50 
TPSC meetings annually.  In cases where the TPSC does not reach agreement on a topic, or if the 
issue under consideration involves particularly significant policy questions, the TPSC refers the issue 
to the TPRG (whose membership is at the Deputy USTR/Under Secretary level) or to Cabinet 
Principals.  
3.6.  The member agencies of the TPSC an d the TPRG are the U.S. Departments of Commerce, 
Agriculture, State, Treasury, Labor, Justice, Defense, Interior, Transportation, Energy, Health and 
Human Services, and Homeland Security; the Environmental Protection Agency; the Office of 
Management and Bu dget; the Council of Economic Advisers ; the Council on Environmental Quality; 
the U.S. Agency for International Development; the Small Business Administration; the National 
Economic Council, and the National Security Council as well as USTR itself. The U.S . International 
Trade Commission is a non -voting member of the TPSC and an observer at TPRG meetings. 
Representatives of other agencies also may be invited to attend meetings depending on the specific 
issues discussed.  
3.2  Public Engagement and Transparency  
3.7.  USTR works to provide extensive opportunities for public input and works to ensure the 
transparency of trade policy.  WT/TPR/G/ 382 • United States  
 
- 9 - 
 
  3.8.  USTR 's Office of Intergovernmental Affairs and Public Engagement (IAPE) works with USTR 's 
Offices of Public and Media Affairs and Congression al Affairs, coordinating with the agency 's 13 
regional and functional offices, the Office of WTO and Multilateral Affairs, Office of General Counsel, 
and the Office of Trade Policy and Economics to ensure that timely trade information is available to 
the p ublic and disseminated widely to stakeholders. IAPE uses various tools to accomplish this 
including USTR 's interactive website; online postings of Federal Register  Notices soliciting public 
comment and input and publicizing public hearings held by the Trad e Policy Staff Committee (TPSC); 
offering opportunities for interaction with negotiators during trade negotiations; managing the 
agency 's outreach and engagement to a diverse set of all stakeholders; providing regular data 
updates to help the public unders tand and evaluate the role of trade and trade policy in the economy; 
and participating in discussions of trade policy at major domestic trade events and academic 
conferences.  
3.9.  USTR officials, including the U.S. Trade Representative, and professional staff f rom regional, 
functional, and multilateral offices as well as IAPE, conduct outreach with a broad array of 
stakeholders, including agricultural commodity groups and farm associations, labor unions, 
environmental organizations, consumer groups, large and sm all businesses, trade associations, 
consumer advocacy groups, faith groups, development and poverty relief organizations, and other 
public interest groups. USTR also engages with State and local Governments, non -governmental 
organizations, think tanks, and  academics to discuss specific trade policy issues, subject to 
negotiator availability and scheduling.  
3.10.   USTR goes to great lengths to ensure that the public is actively involved during negotiations 
and investigations. During the negotiation of the United St ates-Mexico -Canada Agreement , USTR 
officials at all levels spent well over 1,500 hours consulting with U.S. stakeholders. Likewise, during 
the KORUS amendment process, USTR met with over 120 U.S. industry groups and cleared trade 
advisors. During the revie w period, USTR has published 3 3 Federal  Register notices to solicit public 
comment on and provide notice of public hearings concerning negotiations, investigations, and a 
wide range of issues including the negotiation of the United States -Mexico -Canada Agr eement , the 
China 301 Investigation, and KORUS amendments.  
3.11.   Public comments received in response to Federal Register Notices and transcripts of the public 
hearings are available for review online .1 
3.3  Advisory Committee P rocess  
3.12.   The United States continues to r ely on its trade advisory committee system as an integral 
part of its efforts to ensure that U.S. trade policy and trade negotiating obj ectives adequately reflect 
U.S. public and private sector  interests . The trade advisory committee system , substantially 
broadened and reformed, consists of 26  advisory committees,  with a total membership of 
approximately 7 00 advisors. Advisory committee members represent the full span of interests 
including manufacturing; agriculture; digital trade; intellectual property; s ervices; small businesses; 
labor; environmental, consumer, and public health organizations; and state and local governments. 
The system is arranged in three  tiers: the President's Advisory Committee for Trade Policy  and 
Negotiations (ACTPN); five  Policy Advisory Committees dealing with environment, labor, agriculture, 
Africa, an d state and local issues; and 20  technical advisory committees in the areas of industry and 
agriculture.  
3.3.1   Tier I: President's Advisory Committee on Trade Policy and Negotiations  
3.13.   The President's Advisory Committee on Trade Policy and Negotiations ( ACTPN ) consists of not 
more than 45 members who are broadly representative of the key economic sectors affected by 
trade. The President appo ints ACTPN members to four -year terms not to exceed the duration of the 
committee 's charter. Members of ACTPN are appointed to represent a variety of interests including 
non-Federal Governments, labor, industry, agriculture, small business, service industries, retailers, 
and consumer interests.  
                                                
1 See:  http://www.regulations.gov . WT/TPR/G/ 382 • United States  
 
- 10 - 
 
  3.3.2   Tier II: the Policy Advisory Committees  
3.14.   Members of the five policy advisory committees are appointed by USTR or in conjunction with 
other Cabinet officers. The Intergovernmental Policy Advisory Committee on Trade (IGPAC), the 
Trade and Environment Policy Advisory Comm ittee (TEPAC), and the Trade Advisory Committee on 
Africa (TACA) are appointed and managed by USTR. The Agricultural Policy Advisory Committee for 
Trade (APAC) is managed jointly with the Department of Agriculture and the Labor Advisory 
Committee for Trade  Negotiations and Trade Policy (LAC) is managed jointly with the Department 
of Labor. Each committee provides advice based upon the perspective of its specific area , and its 
members are chosen to represent the diversity of interests in those areas.  
3.3.3   Tier II I: the Technical and Sectoral Advisory Committee  
3.15.   The 20  technical and sectoral advisory committees are organized into two areas: agriculture 
and industry. Representatives are appointed jointly by the U.S. Trade Representative and the 
Secretaries of Agricul ture and Commerce, respectively. Each sectoral or technical committee 
represents a specific sector, commodity group, or functional area and provides specific technical 
advice concerning the effect that trade policy decisions may have on its sector or issue . 
3.4  State and Local Government R elations  
3.16.   USTR maintains consultative procedures between Federal trade officials and state and local 
governments. USTR informs the states, on an ongoing basis, of trade -related matters that directly 
relate to, or that may have a direct effect on, them. U.S. territories may also participate in this 
process. USTR  also serves as a liaison point in the Executive Branch for state and local government 
and Federal agencies to transmit information to interested state and local governmen ts, and relay 
advice and information from the states on trade -related matters. This is accomplished through a 
number of mechanisms, detailed below.  
3.4.1   State Point of Contact System and the Intergovernmental Policy Advisory 
Committee on Trade  
3.17.   For day-to-day co mmunications, USTR operates  State Single Point of Contact (SPOC) system. 
The Governor's office in each state designates a single contact point to disseminate information 
received from USTR to relevant state and local offices and assist in relaying specific  information and 
advice from the states to USTR on trade -related matters. Th rough the SPOC network , state 
governments are promptly informed of Administration trade initiatives so th at they can provide 
companies and workers with information in order to take full advantage of increased foreign 
market  access and reduced trade barriers. It also enables USTR to consult with states and localities 
directly on trade matters which may affect them.  
3.18.   Additionally, USTR works closely with the Intergovernmental Policy Ad visory Committee on 
Trade (IGPAC) made up of various state and local officials. The IGPAC makes recommendations to 
USTR and the Administration on trade policy matters from the perspective of state and local 
governments. During the r eview period, the IGPAC was briefed and consulted on trade priorities of 
interest to states and  localities, including the negotiation of the United States –Mexico –Canada 
Agreement,  KORUS modification negotiations,  and enforcement actions at the WTO. IGPAC members 
are also invited to participate in periodic teleconference briefings, similar to teleconference calls held 
for SPOC and chairs of the advisory committees.  
3.4.2   Meetings of State and Local Associations and Local Chambers of C ommerce  
3.19.   USTR officials participate frequently in meetings of state and local government associations 
and local chambers  of commerce to apprise them of relevant trade policy issues and solicit their 
views. USTR senior officials have met with the National Governors  Association  and with other state 
and local commissions and organizations. Additionally, USTR officials have addressed gatherings of 
state and local officials around the country.  WT/TPR/G/ 382 • United States  
 
- 11 - 
 
  3.4.3   Consultations Regarding Specific Trade I ssues  
3.20.   USTR consults with particular st ates and localities on issues arising under the WTO and other 
U.S. trade agreements and frequently responds to requests for information from state and local 
governments. Topics of interest include negotiation  of the United States –Mexico –Canada Agreement , 
the Section 301 investigation, enforcement of trade agreements, and consultations with individual 
states regarding certain trade remedy investigations.  
4  TRADE POLICY DEVELOP MENTS SINCE 201 6 
4.1  WTO Agreements and Initiatives  
4.1.  The WTO is an important institution,  and the United States has a strong track record of building 
coalitions of like -minded Members to use the WTO committee system, in particular, to pressure 
noncomplying economies to bring measures into conformity with WTO rules, to advance 
transparency  and predictability in global trade rules, and to avert the need to resort to dispute 
settlement.  
4.2.  For the past two decades, the United States has been concerned that the WTO is not operating 
as the contracting parties envisioned. Multiple administrations have v oiced various concerns with 
the WTO system and the direction in which it has been headed.  
4.3.  First among those concerns is that the WTO dispute settlement system has appropriated to 
itself powers that the WTO Members never intended to give it. This includes w here panels or the 
Appellate Body have, through their findings, sought to add to or diminish WTO rights and obligations 
of Members in a broad range of substantive areas. The United States has grown increasingly 
concerned with the activist approach of the A ppellate Body on procedural issues, interpretative 
approach, and substantive interpretations. These approaches and findings do not respect WTO rules 
as written and agreed by the United States and other WTO Members. The United States has been 
drawing the at tention of WTO Members to instances where the WTO Appellate Body has disregarded 
the explicit rules agreed by Members in the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). For 
example, i n the context of meetings of the Dispute Settlement Body, the United Stat es has expressed 
concerns with respect to the Appellate Body's consistent exceeding  of the 90 -day deadline for 
appeals in contravention of DSU Article 17.5, the Appellate Body 's review of fact -finding (including 
of the meaning of a WTO Member 's domestic la w) in contravention of DSU Article 17.6, and the 
Appellate Body 's decisions pursuant to its Working Procedures for Appellate Review ( Rule 15) that 
purport to "deem"  a person whose term of appointment had expired to continue to be an Appellate 
Body member, in cont ravention of DSU Article 17.2.  
4.4.  Second, there is also longstanding concern in the United States about the WTO's inability to 
reach agreements that are of critical importance in the modern global economy. After spending close 
to 15 years attempting to  conclude the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) negotiations, Ministers at 
the WTO's Tenth Ministerial Conference in December 2015 collectively acknowledged that there was 
no consensus to reaffirm the DDA's mandates. Consequently, the United States will not ne gotiate 
off the basis of the DDA mandates or old DDA texts and considers the Doha Round to be a thing of 
the past.  
4.5.  For the WTO to be successful going forward, its membership will need to break from the failures 
of the last two decades, and base future work  on lessons learned and, importantly, current data and 
up-to-date notifications. Members' failure to comply with their notification obligations under the WTO 
Agreement undermines the negotiating function of the WTO and the credibility of the organization. 
At the November 2017 meeting of the General Council, the United States put forward a proposal 
aimed at improving Members' compliance with their notification obligations. In September 2018, the 
United States, Japan, and the EU agreed to co -sponsor an update d transparency and notification 
proposal for consideration at the next meeting of the WTO Council on Trade in Goods. The United 
States stands ready to work with Members to advance this proposal.  
4.6.  It is also vital to focus on issues that are affecting our st akeholders today and into the future. 
In this regard, the United States seeks to work with those Members who are ready and able to 
negotiate free, fair, and reciprocal agreements, with the expectation that participants to these 
agreements will contribute c ommensurate with their status in the global economy.  WT/TPR/G/ 382 • United States  
 
- 12 - 
 
  4.7.  At the WTO's Eleventh Ministerial Conference in Buenos Aires in December 2017, Members 
agreed to several important outcomes, including a Ministerial  decision on fisheries subsidies and  a 
joint declaratio n on electronic commerce. Regarding fisheries subsidies, which is an issue that 
impacts our oceans and our economies, the United States is working with other Members to finalize 
a meaningful agreement to prohibit harmful fisheries subsidies, such as those that contribute to 
overfishing and overcapacity or which support illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing. 
The United States is also advocating for enhanced transparency and reporting of fisheries support 
programs. The United States is pleased to  partner with 70 WTO Members in advancing exploratory 
work on potential negotiations on electronic commerce issues in the WTO. The digital economy 
serves as a critical  engine of domestic and global economic growth, and all countries would benefit 
from the development of strong, market -based rules in this area.  
4.8.  Third, the United States sees an acute need for the WTO to change how it approaches questions 
of development. While "least-developed countries " (LDCs) are defined in the WTO using the United 
Nations c riteria, there are no WTO criteria for what designates a "developing country. " Any country 
may "self-declare " as a developing country, thus entitling itself to all "special and differential " 
treatment afforded to developing countries under the WTO agreemen ts, as well as any new 
flexibilities afforded to developing countries under current or forthcoming negotiations. In practice, 
this means that more advanced countries receive the same flexibilities as very low -income countries, 
despite these more advanced c ountries' very significant role in the global economy. Such disparities, 
where countries  that some institutions categorize as high - or high -middle -income receive the same 
flexibilities as low - or low -middle -income, make it challenging to find balance in th e application of 
existing obligations or the development of new commitments.  
4.9.  Finally , there is significant concern that the WTO is unable to manage the rise of countries that 
pay lip service to the values of free trade but intentionally avoid, circumvent, or violate the 
commitments accompanying those values.  
4.10.   The United  States will work with other like -minded countries to address these concerns.  
4.2  Trade Enforcement Activities  
4.11.   Trade  enforcement encompasses a broad range of activities, including monitoring of trade 
agreements, direct engagement with trading partners,  use of domestic trade laws,  and engagement 
in multilateral fora such as the WTO. USTR coordinates the U.S. Government 's trade enforcement 
activities. Ensuring full implementation of U.S. trade agreements  is one of the strategic pr iorities of 
the United States.  
4.12.   The United States has been actively engaged in numerous WTO dispute settlement actions, 
including important offens ive actions related to China's discriminatory regime for technology 
licensing, agricultural market access in China, India, and Indonesia, China's excessive agricultural 
domestic support, Indian prohibited export subsidies, and the EU's subsidies benefittin g large civil 
aircraft. The United States has also initiated actions relating to additional duties imposed by certain 
Members related to the administration's actions under section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 
1962 to address the threat to national sec urity presented by imports of steel and aluminium, as well 
as participating in related defensive actions brought by certain Members.  
4.13.   Where appropriate, the United States applies the full range of its trade laws, including s ection 
301 of the Trade Act of 19 74 (Trade Act) , as amended . Section 301 of the Trade Act is designed to 
facilitate USTR's examining and addressing foreign unfair practices affecting U.S. commerce. I n 
February 2017, USTR held a public hearing in connection with the request of representati ves of the 
U.S. beef industry to reinstate action against the EU pursuant to Section 301 of the Trade Act. The 
United States is engaged in discussions with the EU on possible modifications to the operation of a 
TRQ to address U.S. industry concerns. In add ition, in August 2017, USTR initiated an investigation 
under Section 301 of the Trade Act to determine whether acts, policies, and practices of the 
Government of China related to technology transfer, intellectual property  (IP), and innovation are 
actionabl e under Section 301 . USTR held a public hearing on October 10, 2017, and two rounds of 
public written comments. In March 2018, USTR released the findings of its Section 301 investigation 
on China , determining that the acts, policies, and practices of the G overnment of China related to 
technology transfer, IP, and innovation covered in the investigation are unreasonable or 
discriminatory and burden or restrict U.S. commerce.  WT/TPR/G/ 382 • United States  
 
- 13 - 
 
  4.14.   Addressing  foreign  subsidies that affect U.S. businesses is another critical trade e nforcement 
activity. USTR and U.S. Department of Commerce Enfo rcement and Compliance staff researched 
foreign subsidies and met with representatives of U.S. industries concerned with the subsidi zation 
of foreign competitors.  
4.15.   The United States also actively  monitors, evaluates, and where appropriate, participates in 
ongoing anti-dumping ( AD) and countervailing duty (CVD)  cases conducted by foreign countries to 
safeguard the interests of U.S. industry and to ensure that Members abide by their WTO obligations 
in conducting such proceedings. To this end, the United States works closely with U.S. companies 
affected by foreign  countries ' AD and CVD investigations and provides extensive responses to 
inquiries in foreign CVD investigations . The United  States also advocates on behalf of U.S. industry 
in connection with ongoing investigations, with the goal of obtaining unbiased an d objective 
treatment as is consistent with t he WTO Agreements.  
4.16.   USTR is committed to holding foreign countries accountable and exposing the laws, practices, 
and other measures that fail to provide adequate and effective IP protection and enforcement for 
U.S. inventors, creators, brands, manufacturers, and service providers. The identification of IP -
related market access barriers and steps necessary to address those barriers are a critical component 
of the administration's aggressive efforts to defend Americ ans from harmful IP -related trade 
barriers.  
4.17.   Finally, the United States commits significant resources to identify and confront unjustified 
barriers stemming from sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures as well as from technical 
regulations, standards, and  conformity assessment procedures (standards -related measures). USTR 
uses tools, including its Annual Report and the National Trade Estimate Report, to bring greater 
attention and focus to addressing SPS and standards -related measures that may be inconsist ent 
with international trade agreements to which the United States is a party. USTR 's activities in the 
WTO SPS Committee and the WTO Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Committee are at the forefront 
of these efforts. USTR also engages on these issues with U.S. trading partners through mechanisms 
established in free trade agreements and through regional and multilateral organizations, such as 
the Asia -Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum and the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
Development (OECD).  
4.3  Free Trade Agreements and Initiatives  
4.3.1   Central America and the Dominican Republic  Free Trade Agreement  
4.18.   On 5 August 2004, the United States signed the Dominican Republic -Central 
America -United  States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA -DR) with five Central American  countries 
(Costa Rica, El  Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua) and the Dominican Republic. The 
CAFTA -DR is the first free trade agreement between the United States and a group of smaller 
developing economies. This agreement created new economic o pportunities by eliminating tariffs, 
opening markets, reducing barriers to services, and promoting transparency. It helped facilitate 
trade and investment among the seven countries, furthering regional integration.  
4.19.   CAFTA -DR countries represent the third la rgest U.S. export market in Latin America, behind 
Mexico and Brazil. U.S. goods exported to the CAFTA -DR countries were valued at US$31 billion 
in 2017. Combined total two -way trade in 2017 between the United States and Central America and 
the Dominican Re public was US$54 billion.  
4.20.   The agreement entered into force for the United States and El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, and Nicaragua during 2006, for the Dominican Republic on 1 March 2007, and for 
Costa  Rica on 1  January 2009.  
4.3.2   North American  Free Trade Ag reement  
4.21.   On 1 January 1994, the North American Free Trade Agreement between the United States, 
Canada, and Mexico (NAFTA) entered into force. Under NAFTA, the Parties progressively eliminated 
tariffs, with tariffs eliminated on all goods (except for dairy, poultry, and eggs products for Canada, 
and dairy, sugar and egg products for the United States). NAFTA created the world's largest free 
trade area, linking 494 million people producing roughly US$22.2 trillion worth of goods and services. WT/TPR/G/ 382 • United States  
 
- 14 - 
 
  U.S. goods export s to NAFTA partners increased by 270% between 1993 and 2017, from 
US$142  billion to an estimated US$526 billion.  
4.22.   In August 2017, the United States began negotiations with Canada and Mexico to address 
remaining market access barriers, and to modernize and r ebalance the obligations between the 
Parties, including by bringing the labor and environment obligations that had been included in 
supplemental agreements into the core body of the agreement. On September 30, 2018, the three 
Parties announced they had rea ched agreement on the United States –Mexico –Canada Agreement 
(USMCA).2 
4.3.3   United States –Australia Free Trade Agreement  
4.23.   The United States -Australia FTA entered into force on 1 January 2005. U.S. two -way goods 
trade with Australia totalled US$34.6 billion in 201 7, up 61% since 2004, the year before the FTA 
entered into force. U.S. two -way services trade with Australia totalled US$29.8 billion in 2017 (latest 
data available), an increase of 186% since 2004. The stock of U.S. foreign direct investment in 
Australia reached US$169 billion in 2017 (latest data available); the United States is the largest 
foreign investor in Australia, while the United States is the top destination for outbound Australian 
foreign direct investment.  
4.24.   The United States and Australia contin ue to closely monitor FTA implementation. The sixth 
Joint Committee  Meeting to review implementation of the FTA and other bilateral issues was held in 
December 2017, and covered topics including intellectual property, services, autos, and investment. 
The t wo countries work closely to further promote  trade and investment through WTO, APEC, and 
other regional initiatives.  
4.3.4   United States –Bahrain Free Trade Agreement  
4.25.   The United States -Bahrain FTA entered into force on 1 August 2006.  On the first day the 
agreemen t took effect, 100% of the two -way trade in industrial and consumer products began to 
flow without tariffs. In 201 6, two -way trade in goods was US$ 1.9 billion. U.S. exports of goods were 
US$898 million , and U.S. imports o f goods from Bahrain were US$9 96 million.  
4.26.   The U.S. -Bahrain FTA promotes the United States' policy to increase job -supporting trade  and 
investment between the United States and Middle East. The United  States -Bahrain Bilateral 
Investment Treaty (BIT) took effect in May 2001.  
4.3.5   United States –Chile Free Trade Agreement  
4.27.   The United States -Chile FTA entered into force on 1 January 2004. The United States -Chile 
FTA eliminates  tariffs and opens markets, reduces barriers to trade in services, provides protectio n 
for intellectual property, ensures reg ulatory transparency, guarantees non -discrimination in the 
trade of digital products, commits the Parties to maintain competition laws that prohibit 
anticompetitive business conduct, and requires effective labor and environmental enforcement. Two -
way goods  trade totalled US$2 7.8 billion in 201 6, with U.S. goods exports to Chile totalling 
US$1 7.2 billion. As of 1  January 2015, all products became duty free under the Agreement.  
4.3.6   United States –Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement  
4.28.   The United States -Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement (CTPA) entered into force on 
15 May 2012. Two -way goods trade totalled US$ 26.9 billion in 201 7, with U.S. goods exports to 
Colombia totalling US$ 13.3 billion. "Year 7" tariff cuts occurred on  1 January 201 8. 
4.29.   During 2016 and 2017 , the Un ited States continued regular  engagement with the Colombian 
government to support its efforts to improve the protection of worker rights  and address cases of 
violence and threats against trade unionists . The United States  will continue its engagement with 
the Government of Colombia to ensure progress on workers' rights, including through cooperative 
                                                
2 For the text of the USMCA, see:   https://ustr.gov/trade -agreements/free -trade -agreements/united -
states -mexico -canada -agreement/united -states -mexico . WT/TPR/G/ 382 • United States  
 
- 15 - 
 
  efforts and dialogue regarding the collection of fines for labor law violations, and to increase the 
number of resolved cases of violence and threats against un ionists.  
4.30.   The Agreement established an Environmental Affairs Council (EAC) under the environment 
chapter. The related U.S. -Colombia Environmental Cooperation Agreement (ECA) established an 
Environmental Cooperation Commission (ECC). In 2017 and 2018, the Un ited States and Colombia 
worked on an agreement establishing a secretariat to receive and consider submissions from the 
public on matters regarding enforcement of environmental laws pursuant to Article 18.8 of the CTPA, 
which was finalized in July 2018. Th e secretariat is housed in Colombia and is intended to promote 
public participation in the identification and resolution of issues regarding each party 's enforcement 
of its environmental laws.  
4.3.7   United States –Israel Free Trade Agreement  
4.31.   The United States -Israel Free Trade Agreement is the United States' first FTA. It entered into 
force in 1985 and continues to serve as the foundation for expanding trade and investment between 
the United States and Israel by reducing barriers and promoting  regulatory transparency. In 2017 , 
U.S. goods exports to Israel were US$15.1 billion.  
4.32.   In February  2016, the United States and Israel sought ways to engage in collaborative efforts 
to increase b ilateral trade and investment. During the meeting, the United S tates and Israel began 
discussion of a work plan to address the remaining barriers to bi lateral trade, including in agriculture 
and customs, among other areas. The two sides also made progress on a number of market access 
issues related to standards, custo ms classification, and technical regulations. In 2017, the United 
States and Israel agreed to adopt new procedures making it easier for exporters to gain approvals 
when claiming duty -free status under the FTA for individual products.  
4.33.   In 1996, the United St ates and Israel concluded an Agreement Concerning Certain Aspects of 
Trade in Agricultural Products (ATAP), which provided for duty -free or other preferential treatment 
for certain agricultural products. The 1996 agreement was extended through 2003, and a new 
agreement was concluded in 2004. While this Agreement originally ran through 2008, it has been 
extended ann ually since then. In February 2016, the United States proposed to Israel that they 
negotiate a permanent U.S. -Israel ATAP. Each side is reviewing  the proposals put forward by the 
other in preparation for ne gotiations, t entatively planned for late 2018 . 
4.3.8   United States –Jordan Free Trade Agreement  
4.34.   The United States -Jordan Free Trade Agreement entered into force on 17 December 2001, 
and all tariffs  were eliminated as of 1 January 2010. U.S. goods exports were an estimated US$2.0 
billion in 2017 , up 34.5 % from 2016.  
4.35.   At the May 2016 meeting of the Joint Committee (JC) established under the FTA, the United 
States and Jordan agreed to implement  an action pla n outlining concrete steps to boost trade and 
investment bilaterally  and between Jordan and other count ries in the Middle East region.  
4.36.   Additionally, the United States continue s to work with Jordan in the area of labor standards, 
particularly through ongoin g efforts under the Implementation Plan Related to Working and Living 
Conditions of Workers in Jordan, signed in 2013. The Plan addresses labor concerns in Jordan 's 
garment factories including anti -union discrimination against foreign workers, conditions o f 
accommodations for foreign workers, and gender discrimination and harassment.  
4.3.9   United States –Korea Free Trade Agreement  
4.37.   The United States -Korea Free Trade Agreement  (KORUS) entered into force on 
15 March  2012. Since the Agreement entered into force, the U.S.-Korea goods and services trade 
increased from US$126.5  billion in 2011 to US$154.8  billion in 2017. However, the U.S. goods deficit 
with Korea also quickly increased, topping US$23 billion in 2017, with the overall goods and services 
deficit also reaching nearly US$10 billion.  
4.38.   On July 12, 2017, the United States  requested a special session of the KORUS Joint Committee 
to review the implementation of the agreement and to discuss additional steps to address the WT/TPR/G/ 382 • United States  
 
- 16 - 
 
  significant bilateral trade imbalance, including through  possible amendment s and modification s. 
Negotiations to improve the agreement were launched in early 2018, with outcome s announced in 
March 2018 . Following the completion of domestic procedures in the United States, t he final texts 
reflect ing the outcomes from these negotiations were signed by the two countries on September 24, 
2018. The modernized provisions  will then enter into force after completion of  applicable procedures 
by both countries.  These outcomes focus on improving automobile trade, in addition to other 
provisions including on investment. Progress on implementation -related issues also was announced, 
including in the areas of pharmaceuticals and customs.  
4.39.   There  are 21 KORUS committees and working groups, which meet regularly and may also be 
convened on an ad hoc basi s to address issues of concern.  
4.3.10   United States –Morocco Free Trade Agreement  
4.40.   The United States -Morocco Free Trade Agreement (FTA) entered into force on 
1 January  2006. Since the e ntry into force of the FTA, two -way U.S.-Morocco tra de in goods has 
grown from US$927 million in 2005 (the year prior to entry into force) to US$3.5 billion in 201 6. 
U.S. goods exports to Morocco in 201 7 were US$2.2 billion, up 14.8%  from the previous year. U.S. 
imports from Morocco in 201 7 were US$1.2 billion, up nea rly 20.7%  from 201 6. 
4.41.   The United States and Morocco held the f ifth meeting of the FTA Joint Committee (JC) on 
October 18 , 201 7 in Washington, DC . U.S. and Moroccan officials noted productive bilateral 
environmental and labor -related cooperation under the Labor and Environment FTA Subcommittees,  
reviewed recent improvements to Morocco 's legislative regime for the protection of i ntellectual 
property  rights , and decided to further discuss the concerns of some U.S. pharmaceutical compa nies. 
In the area of agriculture, the JC reviewed discussions held just prior to the JC 's sessio n in combined 
meetings  of the Agriculture and SPS  FTA Subcommittees.  
4.3.11   United States –Oman Free Trade Agreement  
4.42.   The United States -Oman Free Trade Agreement, which entered into force on 1  January  2009, 
complements other  U.S. FTAs to promote economic reform and openness in the region.  In 2017, 
two-way trade in goods was US$3.1 billion. U.S. exports of goods were US$2.0 billion, and U.S. 
imports of goods from Oman were US$1.1 billion. As of 1  January 2018, all products became duty 
free under the Agreement.  
4.3.12   United States –Panama Trade Pro motion Agreement  
4.43.   The United States -Panama Trade Promotion Agreement (Panam a TPA) entered into force on 
31 October 2012. The United States' two -way goods trade with Panama  was US$ 6.7 billion in  2017, 
with U.S. goods exports to Panama totalling US$ 6.3 billion. "Year 7 " tariff cuts occurred on 
1 January  2018. T he TPA 's central oversight body is the United States -Panama Free Trade 
Commission (FTC), which held its last FTC meeting in November 2016, to review implementation of 
the Agreement.  
4.44.   The Agreement include s obligations for both countries to protect fundamental labor rights as 
well as to effectively enforce existing labor laws, which will enable workers and businesses to 
compete on a level playing field. The Agreement also established a Labor Affairs Council  (LAC) under 
the labor chapter.  
4.45.   The Agreement establishe d an Environmental Affairs Council (EAC) under the environment 
chapter. The related U.S. -Panama Environmental Cooperation Agreement (ECA) established an 
Environmental  Cooperation Commission (ECC). In August 2016, the agreement establishing the 
secretariat for environmental enforcement matters pursuant to Article 18.8 of the Panama TPA 
entered into force. The secretariat mechanism is housed in Panama and is intended to promote 
public participation in th e identification and resolution of issues regarding each party 's enforcement 
of its environmental laws.  The United States and Panama continued to make progress to fully stand 
up the secretariat throughout 2017 and 2018, including by hiring an Executive Dir ector in 2017.  WT/TPR/G/ 382 • United States  
 
- 17 - 
 
  4.3.13   United States –Peru Trade Promotion Agreement  
4.46.   The United  States -Peru Trade Promotion Agreement (PTPA) entered into force on 
1 February  2009. The PTPA eliminates tariffs and removes barriers to U.S. services, provides a 
secure, predictable leg al framework for investors, and strengthens protection for intellectual 
property, workers, and the environment. The United States' two -way goods trade with Peru was an 
estimated US$ 18.5 billion in 201 6, with U.S. goods exports to Peru totalling US$ 8.7 billion. 
4.47.   The PTPA also established the United States -Peru Forest Sector Subcommittee, the 
Environmental  Affairs Council (EAC), and the Environmental Cooperation Commission. The 
Subcommittee  serves as a forum for the Parties to exchange views and share informat ion on any 
matter arising under the PTPA's Annex on Forest Sector Governance (Forest Annex). Through the 
EAC, the United States and Peru have had robust engagement concerning the implementation of the 
environmental obligations under the PTPA Environment Ch apter and the Forest Annex. For additional 
information concerning U.S. engagement with Peru on these issues, please refer to the sectio n on 
Trade and the Environment.  
4.3.14   United States –Singapore Free Trade Agreement  
4.48.   The United States -Singapore FTA, the United States' first in Asia, has been in effect 
since 2004. Since 2003, the year before the FTA entered into force, two -way goods trade has 
increased 55%. Singapore is the 18th largest goods trading partner of the United States and reached 
US$49.2 billion in tot al goods trade and US$25.9 billion in total services trade in 2017 (latest data 
available ). The stock of U.S. foreign direct investment in Singapore reached US$274 billion in 2017  
(latest data available) . Singapore is the second -largest source of foreign i nvestment from the Asia -
Pacific in the United States , while the Singapore is the top destination for outbound U.S. foreign 
direct investment  in Asia . The United  States consults regularly with Singapore to monitor 
implementation of the FTA, address bilatera l issues, and further build and expand the bilateral 
relationship.  
4.4  Other Negotiating Initiatives  
4.4.1   Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum  
4.49.   Since it was founded in 1989, the Asia -Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum has been 
instrumental in promoting reg ional and global trade and investment. It is central to U.S. efforts to 
achieve a seamless  economy in the Asia -Pacific region that will expand opportunities for 
U.S. exporters, services providers, and workers, providing greater economic growth across the 
region.  
4.50.   The United States is a significant trader with APEC economies.  U.S. goods and services trade 
with APEC economies totalled US$2.8 trillion in 2016.  Exports totalled US$1.2 trillion, with goods 
exports to APEC economies in 2017 totalling US$972.5 bill ion, accounting for 62.9 % of overall U.S. 
exports in 2017. The United States had a US$2.6 trillion in total (two -ways) goods trade w ith APEC 
economies during 2017.  
4.51.   In 2017, during Vietnam's APEC host year, the United States worked with APEC to build on 
the commitments  of previous years, as well as to launch work on other issues of priority to the 
United States and other APEC economies that will help promote economic growth and support jobs 
for American workers and businesses. The United States joined with o ther APEC economies to 
advance capacity -building actions to help developing APEC economies improve at -the-border 
procedures, including steps that reduce the time, cost, and uncertainty of shipments. These projects 
match closely with the provisions of the W TO Agreement on Trade Facilitation. APEC's work in this 
area will make it significantly cheaper, easier, and faster for businesses to trade in the Asia -Pacific 
region. APEC is working closely with public and private sector experts in the region to advance these 
goals.  
4.52.   APEC also advanced work on promoting services trade through the implementation of 
elements of the APEC Services Competitiveness Roadmap, adopted in 2016. APEC is developing a 
region -wide index on trade restrictiveness in services based on exis ting indices. APEC continued to 
focus attention in 2017 and 2018 on the growing importance of digital trade to economic growth and WT/TPR/G/ 382 • United States  
 
- 18 - 
 
  innovation. The United States is leading the effort to adopt building blocks to facilitate digital trade, 
including principle s related to enabling cross -border data flows and preventing forced localization of 
data. APEC also showed leadership by continuing efforts to strengthen the implementation of good 
regulatory practices.  
4.4.2   Japan  
4.53.   In 2017, total U.S. -Japan trade was US$283 bill ion, and Japan was the 4th-largest goods 
trading partner of the United States (latest data available). The U.S. goods trade deficit with Japan 
was about US$69 billion in 2017, virtually unchanged from the previous year.  
4.54.   From April 2017, engagement with Japan on bilateral trade issues took place under the U.S. -
Japan Economic Dialogue, through which progress with Japan was made across issues such as 
automotive standards and the removal of restrictions on agricultural products.  In April 2018, new 
bilateral trade and investment consultations were announced, led by U.S. Trade Representative 
Lighthizer and Japan Economic Revitalization Minister Motegi, in order to intensify engagement on 
trade to strengthen the U.S. -Japan economic relationship. Meetings took pl ace in August 2018 and 
September 2018, culminating in the announcement in September 2018 that the United States and 
Japan would enter into negotiations for a U.S. -Japan Trade Agreement to cover trade in goods as 
well as other key issues including services,  to be followed by further negotiations on additional trade 
and investment issues.  
4.55.   The trade ministers of the United States, Japan, and the EU announced new trilateral 
cooperation  in December 2017 to undertake measures to combat the non -market -oriented policies 
of third countries. Following Ministerial meetings in March and May 2018, the ministers confirmed 
their shared objective to address non -market -oriented policies and practices, their shared view that 
no country should require or pressure t echnology transfer from foreign companies to domestic 
companies, and the need to deepen and accelerate discussions regarding possible new rules on 
industrial subsidies and state -owned entities. Th e Ministers further agreed  to deepen cooperation 
and exchang e of information, including with other like -minded partners, to find effective means to 
address trade -distorting policies of third countries.  
4.4.3   The U.S. -ASEAN Trade and Investment Framework Arrangement  
4.56.   The United States is pursuing several initiatives to exp and and deepen economic engagement 
with the 10 member countries of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). ASEAN 
collectively represents both the United States' fourth largest goods export market and largest trading 
partner. Under the Trade an d Investme nt Framework Arrangement signed in 2006, the United States 
is working with ASEAN countries to enhance and deepen the U.S. -ASEAN economic relationship and 
support ASEAN regional integration. In 2017 -2018, the United States supported the launch of the 
ASEAN Single Window under the U.S. Agency for International Development 's US -ASEAN 
Connectivity through Trade and Investment (US -ACTI) program. For 2018 -2019, the United States 
and ASEAN have decided  to work together on agriculture biotechnology regula tory cooperation and 
continue discussions on proposals regarding electronic payment services and automotive standards.  
4.4.4   Engagement with the Middle East and North Africa  
4.57.   The revolutions and other changes that swept through the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) beginning in 2011 prompted a comprehensive revaluation of U.S. trade and investment 
policies toward this critical part of the world. In response to these events, USTR coordinated  with 
other Federal agencies, outside experts, and stakeholders in both t he United States and MENA 
partner countries to develop trade and investment initiative s to support jobs and enhance regional 
trade. To date, the United States has focused on a number of areas, including trade facilitation, 
investment  promotion , the informa tion and communications technology (ICT) sector, and 
agricultural trade, as key priorities in developing longer -term trade and investment  ties to trading 
partners in the region.  
4.58.   Although ongoing political and in some cases military turmoil in the MENA regi on has 
hampered, to varying degrees, U.S. efforts to engage MENA partner governments, the 
U.S. Government has sought to maintain dialogue with as many partners as possible. During the  
2017-18 period , the United States continued to monitor, implement, and e nforce U.S. FTAs in the WT/TPR/G/ 382 • United States  
 
- 19 - 
 
  region (Bahrain, Isr ael, Jordan, Morocco, and Oman)  and held consultations under Trade and 
Investme nt Framework Agreements with Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and Egypt. I n these 
discussions, the United  States and partner governmen ts have explored possible new ways to address 
trade and investment issues seen as important to fostering bilateral trade and investment, including 
with respect to customs, intellectual property, control procedures for food imports, standards 
development, l egal harmonization, and WTO initiatives.  
4.4.5   U.S.–EU Trade  
4.59.   The U.S. trade and investment relationship with the EU is the largest and most complex 
economic relationship in the world, with transatlantic trade flows ( goods and services trade plus 
earnings and payments on investment) averaging over US$5.3  billion each day during 201 7. The 
total stock of transatlantic direct investment was worth US$ 5.6 trillion in 201 6. These enormous 
trade and investment flows are a key pillar of prosperi ty both in the United States and Europe, and 
countries around the world benefit from access to the markets , capital, and innovations of the 
transatlantic economy.  
4.60.   The United States interacts extensively with counterparts in the major EU  governing 
instituti ons (the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the European  Council) and EU 
member State  governments on key issues for U.S. workers, far mers, and businesses, such as long -
standing, systemic  non-tariff barriers in the EU that impede U.S. exports  of industrial and agricultural 
products , the protection of in tellectual property rights , and joint efforts on shared con cerns in third 
country markets.  
4.61.   On July 25, 2018,  President Trump and European Commission President Juncker issued a joint 
statement in  Washington announcing the formation of a bilateral Executive Working Group that 
would seek to reduce barriers to transatlantic trade.  Ambassador Lighthizer and Commissioner 
Malmstrom and their teams have discussed the scope and content of the initiative s everal times 
since the end of July, and the two sides are developing priorities both for short -term and longer -
term outcomes.  
4.62.   As noted above, the United States has been working closely with the EU and Japan at the 
ministerial level to address shared concer ns on several issues.  
4.63.   Following the United Kingdom's decision in 2016 to leave the EU, the UK and the United States 
established the U.S. -UK Trade and Investment Working Group in July 2017 and have convened five 
meetings since then. The Working Group is foc using on providing commercial continuity for UK and 
U.S. businesses, workers, and consumers as the UK leaves the EU and exploring ways to strengthen 
trade and investment ties. The Working Group is also laying the groundwork for a potential, future 
free tra de agreement once the UK has left the EU in March 2019, and exploring areas in which the 
two countries can collaborate to promote open markets and free and fair trade around the world.  
4.4.6   China  
4.64.   Since China 's accession to the WTO, the United States has repeate dly attempted to work with 
China in a cooperative and constructive manner. Using intensive, high -level bilateral dialogues, the 
United States  has sought to resolve significant trade irritants and also to encourage China to pursue 
market -oriented policies  and become a more responsible M ember of the WTO. These bilateral efforts 
have been largely  unsuccessful – not because of failures by U.S. policymakers, but because Chinese 
policymakers were not interested in moving toward a true market economy.  
4.65.   The United S tates established its first high -level trade dialogue with China in 2003, with the 
elevation of the existing U.S. -China Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT), as the U.S. 
Trade Representative  joined the Secretary of Commerce as a U.S. chair and a V ice Premier began 
leading the Chinese side. Another high -level dialogue, the U.S. -China Strategic Economic Dialogue 
(SED), was added in 2006 with a broad focus on economic matters, including some trade and 
investment issues. The SED was expanded and replac ed by the U.S. -China Strategic and Economic 
Dialogue (S&ED) in 2009. Finally, in 2017, the United States and China created the U.S. -China 
Comprehensive Economic Dialogue (CED), which supplanted the JCCT and the S&ED. Nevertheless, 
despite this constant hig h-level engagement over the years, these dialogues failed to generate 
needed shifts in the direction of Chinese policies and practices. China has shown a willingness to WT/TPR/G/ 382 • United States  
 
- 20 - 
 
  take modest steps to address isolated issues, and will sometimes make broad commitments  when 
pressed at very high levels, but it has not been prepared to follow through on significant 
commitments or to make fundamental changes to its trade and investment regime. Instead, China 
has displayed a determination to maintain the state's leading rol e in the economy and to continue 
to pursue industrial policies that promote, guide and support domestic industries while 
simultaneously and actively seeking to impede, disadvantage and harm their foreign counterparts, 
even though  this approach is incompati ble with the market -based approach expressly envisioned by 
WTO members and contrary to the fundamental principles running throughout the many WTO 
agreements.  
4.66.   In November 2017, when President Trump met with President Xi in Beijing, the U.S. side 
explained t hat it had no interest in engaging in the types of bilateral discussions pursued in the CED 
and in past dialogues like the JCCT, the SED and the S&ED. Instead, the United States made clear 
that it is seeking fundamental changes to China's trade regime, inc luding to the problematic 
industrial policies that have continued to dominate China's state -led economy. Through several 
subsequent high -level meetings in 2018, the United States reiterated its concerns, but to date China 
has not taken action to address th ose concerns.  
4.67.   Going forward, the United States will continue to hold China strictly accountable for adherence 
to its WTO obligations. Like other WTO Members, the United States will continue to use the WTO 
dispute settlement mechanism as an enforcement tool  and also raise concerns during meetings of 
WTO committees and councils in order to highlight problematic Chinese policies and practices. In 
addition, the United  States will continue to participate in other multilateral fora, such as the Global 
Forum on St eel Excess Capacity. At the same time, the United States will continue to rigorously 
enforce U.S. trade remedy laws, in accordance with WTO rules, when U.S. interests are being harmed 
by unfairly traded or surging imports from China. The United States also  will take all other steps 
necessary to rein in harmful state -led, non -market policies and practices pursued by China, even 
when they do not fall squarely within WTO disciplines, as evidenced by USTR's investigation of 
Chinese technology transfer policies and practices pursuant to Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, 
as amended.  
4.4.7   African Growth and Opportunity Act  
4.68.   AGOA has been the cornerstone of U.S. -African engagement on trade and investment since it 
was enacted  in 200 0. By providing duty -free entry into the United States for approximately 6,500 
tariff lines of products  of beneficiary countries, AGOA has helped to expand and diversify two -way 
trade between the United  States  and sub -Saharan Africa, and helped to foster an improved business 
environment in ma ny su b-Saharan African countries. AGOA was extended to 2025 by the Trade 
Preferences Extension Act of 2015. The renewed AGOA provides additional tools to support 
compliance with the AGOA eligibility criteria, including by providing greater flexibility to withdr aw, 
suspend, or limit benefits under the program if it is determined that such action would be more 
effective than termination of AGOA eligibility. The renewed AGOA was also enhanced to promote 
greater regional integration by expanding rules of origin and by encouraging beneficiary countries 
to develop AGOA utilization strategies. In 2017, U.S. total two -way (exports plus imports) goods 
trade with sub -Saharan Africa was US$39 billion. U.S. total imports under AGOA, including its 
Generalized System of Prefer ences provisions, was US$ 13.8 billion and U.S. imports of non -oil goods 
under AGOA totalled US$4. 3 billion, a more than  threefold increas e since AGOA entered into force.  
4.69.   AGOA requires the President to monitor, review, and report to Congress bi -annually on the 
progress of sub Saharan African countries in meeting the AGOA eligibility criteria set out in the 
legislation – including, among other things, making continual progress in establishing a market 
based economy, rule of law, and protection of internationa lly recognized workers' rights. The 
U.S. Trade Representative makes recommendations to the President regarding which countries 
should be eligible for benefits based on an annual country eligibility review that takes into account 
information drawn from U.S.  Government agencies, the private sector, non -governmental 
organizations, and prospective beneficiary governments. In 2018, 40 countries were eligible for 
AGOA benefits.  
4.70.   The United States -Sub-Saharan Africa Trade and Economic Cooperation Forum, informally 
known as the "AGOA Forum," is an annual ministerial -level meeting with AGOA -eligible countries. In 
July 2018, the U.S. Trade Representative led the USG delegation to the AGOA Forum held in 
Washington, DC. The U.S. Trade Representative and other U.S. partic ipants met with numerous WT/TPR/G/ 382 • United States  
 
- 21 - 
 
  African senior officials, including trade ministers, leaders of African regional economic organizations, 
and representatives of the African and American private sectors and civil society to discuss issues 
and strategies for advanci ng trade, investment, and economic development in Africa. The discussion 
topics included how to foster greater trade and investment between the United States and Africa, 
and how to expand that relationship beyond AGOA in the future.  
4.71.   In 2018, USTR published  the "2018 Biennial Report on the Implementation of the Afri can 
Growth and Opportunity Act. "3 The report provides a description of the status of trade and 
investment between the United States and sub -Saharan Africa, changes in country eligibility for 
AGOA benefits, an analysis of country compliance with the AGOA eligibility criteria, an overview of 
regional integration efforts in sub -Saharan Africa, and a summary of U.S. trade capacity -building 
efforts.  
4.4.8   East African Community Trade and Investment Partnershi p 
4.72.   The United States and East Africa Community (EAC) established a Trade and Investment 
Partnership  in 2012 to support economic integration of the EAC and enhance the U.S. -EAC trade and 
investment relationship. In 2013, the United States established Trade A frica as a partnership 
between the United States and sub -Saharan Africa to increase intra -Africa trade and investment and 
to expand trade and economic ties between Africa, the United States, and other global markets. 
From the outset, Trade Africa focus ed on the member states of the EAC – Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, 
Tanzania, and Uganda. Subsequently, South Suda n became a member of the EAC in  2016. Trade 
Africa activities included helping EAC countries implement their WTO obligations under the 
Agreement on Trade  Facilitation, the Agreement on the Application of SPS Measures, and the 
Agreement on TBT. Projects also included supporting these governments' development of export 
and AGOA strategies; strengthening the institutional capacity of trade support institution s, such as 
local export -import banks, investment promotion agencies, and standards bureaus; and working 
with port authorities and customs agencies to reduce fees, streamline customs procedures, and 
improve port and border management. In 2015, the United St ates and EAC signed the U.S. -EAC 
Cooperation Agreement on Trade Facilitation, SPS, and TBT to help support implementation of these 
WTO agreements. In 2017, t he United States had a US$1.6 billion in total (two ways) goods trade 
with EAC countries. U.S. g oods exports to the EAC totalled US$795 million  while goods imports from 
the EAC totalled US$828 million.  
4.4.9   Nepal Trade Preference Program  
4.73.   The Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 (TFTEA) entered into force on 
February 24, 2016 and directed the President to establish a country -specific preference program to 
grant Nepal duty -free treatment for a set of textile, apparel, and headgear products covered by 66 
8-digit tariff lines in the Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) with a view to assisting Nepal r ecover 
from the April 2015 earthquake and subsequent aftershocks. Due to changes in the U.S. Harmonized 
Tariff Schedule, the number  of tariff lines for which Nepal is exempt from customs duties increased 
in July 2016 to 77 8 -digit tariff lines. Following t he determination that Nepal met certain eligibility 
requirements, the NTPP program was implemented by Presidential Proc lamation on December 15, 
2016. It is effective through December 31, 2025. In addition to the tariff preferences, the TFTEA 
directs the Pr esident to provide trade -related technical assistance to help Nepal implement th e WTO 
Agreement on Trade Facilitation.  
4.74.   In 2017, U.S. -Nepal two -way trade total led US$167.8 million. U.S. imports from Nepal under 
the NTPP were US$2.4 million in 2017 and accou nted for 3 % of total U.S. imports from Nepal. The 
U.S. government has made efforts to promote the utilization of the NTPP, including through the 
U.S.–Nepal Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) Council meetings in April 2017 and 
during outreach e vents on the margins of the TIFA to explain and promote the NTPP to Nepali 
industry and government official s. 
4.4.10   The Caribbean Basin Initiative  
4.75.   The programs known collectively as the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) are a vital element 
in U.S. economic relations with its neighbo urs in the Caribbean. Initially launched in 1983 by the 
                                                
3 See:  https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2018%20AGOA%20Implementation.pdf . WT/TPR/G/ 382 • United States  
 
- 22 - 
 
  Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA) and substantially expanded in 2000 with the U.S. -
Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act  (CBTPA), the CBI was further expanded in the Trade Act of 
2002. In addition, the United States provides substantial benefits to Haiti through the Haitian 
Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement Act of 2006 ( "HOPE Act "), the Haitian 
Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership Enc ouragement Act of 2008 ( "HOPE II "), and the Haiti 
Economic Lift Program Act of 2010 ( "HELP Act"). In 2015, Congress extended this program of 
unilateral support for Haiti through  2025.  
4.76.   Since its inception, the CBERA has helped beneficiaries diversify their exports. In conjunction 
with economic reform and trade liberalization by beneficiary countries, the trade  benefits of the 
program have contributed to their economic growth. In December 2017, USTR submitted its twelfth 
biannual report to Congress on the ope ration of the CBERA. The report can be found on the USTR 
website .4 A list of current beneficiary countries can be found in the December 2017 report. On an 
annual basis, USTR is required to submit a report to Congress regarding the implementation of HOPE 
II. The latest HOPE II Report can also be found on the USTR website.5 
4.5  Other Trade Activities  
4.5.1   Protecting Intellectual Property  
4.77.   Given the importance of innovation to U.S. economic growth, employment and exports, the 
United States places a high value on the pro tection and enforcement of intellectual property (IP), in 
both domestic and foreign markets. Domestically, Congress continues to update and improve the 
U.S. IP legal regime, while the Administration stresses the importance of American leadership in the 
innovative and creative sectors. In foreign  markets, a top trade priority for the Administration is to 
use all possible sources of leverage to encourage other countries to open their markets to U.S. 
exports of goods and services, and provide adequate and effe ctive protection and enforcement of 
U.S. IP rights. Toward this end, a key objective of the Administration's trade policy is ensuring that 
U.S. owners of IP have a full and fair opportunity to use and profit from their IP around the globe. 
Through engageme nt with trading partners , the Administration advocates for strong IP  protection 
and enfo rcement in other countries for, among other things , works, phonograms, performances, 
brands, designs, trade secrets and inventions by U.S. creators, inve ntors, artists,  and businesses.  
4.78.   Top challenges for U.S. right holders abroad include copyright piracy, which threatens U.S. 
exports in media and other creative content. U.S. innovators, including pharmaceutical 
manufacturers, also face unbalanced patent systems and other  unfair market access barriers. 
Another leading concern is counterfeit products, which undermine U.S. trademark rights and can 
also pose serious threats to consumer health and safety. Additionally, inappropriate protection of 
geographical indications, incl uding the lack of transparency and due process in some systems, limit 
the scope of trademarks and other IP rights held by U.S. producers and imposes barriers on market 
access for U.S. -made goods and services that rely on the use of common names, such as "feta" 
cheese. Another longstanding concern is the theft of trade secrets, which are often among a 
company's core business assets and key to a company's competitiveness. Such theft hurts American 
businesses, including SMEs. In addition, the reach of trade secret  theft into critical commercial and 
defense technologies poses threats to U.S. national security interests.  
4.79.   The United States seeks to address these concerns through multiple avenues. One major 
effort is negotiating binding commitments with trading partner s for the strong protection and 
enforcement for IP rights, including through trade agreements, as well as through WTO and OECD 
accession negotiations. In addition, the United States engages in other ways, by pursuing 
commitments and implementation of commi tments through Trade and Investment Framework 
Agreements, Memoranda of Understanding, and Intellectual Property Protection and Enforcement 
work plans.  
4.80.   The United States actively monitors and enforces trade commitments, work that is critical to 
the success of negotiated outcomes. In one example, the United States requested consultations with 
China in March of 2018 under the WTO Dispute Resolution Understanding in DS542: China – Certain 
                                                
4 See:  https://ustr.gov/about -us/policy -offices/press -office/reports -and-publications/2017/report -
congress -operation . 
5 See:  https://ustr.gov/about -us/policy -offices/press -office/reports -and-publications/2017/hope -ii-
2017-annual -report . WT/TPR/G/ 382 • United States  
 
- 23 - 
 
  Measures  Concerning the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights . The U nited States also actively 
uses relevant enforcement provisions in its domestic law, including section 301 of the Trade Act of 
1974, border enforcement measures (including in cooperation with foreign customs authorities), and 
criminal statutes as they may apply, including as to the misappropriation of trade secrets. The United 
States promotes the protection and enforcement of IP rights through multilateral vehicles including 
the WTO Council on Trade -Related Intellectual Property Rights, the Asia Pacific Eco nomic 
Cooperation, G7, G20, and other fora. (Section 4.2 above provides additional information on U.S. 
enforcement efforts, including the investigation into China's Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to 
Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and In novation Under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 
1974.)  
4.81.   An important additional avenue for bilateral engagement is USTR's annual Special 301 Report 
and the related Out -of-Cycle Review of Notorious Markets. Pursuant to statute, USTR must identify 
those countr ies that deny adequate and effective protection for IP rights or deny fair and equitable 
market access for persons that rely on IP protection, which may lead to designation as a "Priority 
Foreign Country. " In addition, USTR has created a Special 301 "Priority Watch List " (PWL) and 
"Watch List " (WL), placement on which indicates that particular problems exist in the listed country 
with respect to IP protection, enforcement, or market access for persons relying on IP. Countries 
placed on the PWL receive incre ased attention in bilateral discussions with the United States 
concerning the identified problem areas. USTR develops an action plan for each foreign country 
identified on the PWL for at least one year. USTR also conducts an annual Out -of-Cycle Review of 
Notorious Markets focused on online and physical marketplaces that are reportedly engaged in piracy 
and counterfeiting and have been the subject of enforcement action or that may merit further 
investigation for possible IP infringements.  
4.82.   Also critical to U. S. trade policy in the arena of IP protection and enforcement is technical 
assistance and capacity building. The U.S. Government collaborates with various trading partners 
on IP-related training and capacity building around the world. Domestically and abro ad, bilaterally, 
and in regional groupings, the U.S. Government remains engaged in building stronger and more 
effective systems for the protection and enforcement of IP. Various U.S. government agencies 
provide sustained and valuable contributions, includi ng but not limited to the Department of 
Commerce's Commercial Law Development Program; the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, through 
its Office of Policy and International Affairs , which includes the Global Intellectual Property Academy ; 
the U.S. Departmen t of State 's International Visitors Leadership Program and its Global Intellectual 
Property Law Enforcement Coordinator program; as well as trainings provided by the Department of 
Justice 's Intellectual Property Law Enforcement Coordinator, U.S. Immigratio n and Customs 
Enforcement Homeland Security Investigations and the United States Copyright Office. Through 
these combined efforts, the United States is committed to ensuring that U.S. owners of IP have a 
full and fair opportunity to use and profit from the ir IP around the world.  
4.5.2   Promoting Digital Trade  
4.83.   The United States places great importance on electronic commerce (or "digital trade "), which 
plays a crucial role in strengthening and supporting firms in every sector of the economy. Since the 
last U.S. Trad e Policy Review, the United States has advanced engagement on digital trade issues 
across a range of fora, and worked to combat a rising tide of barriers to digital trade around the 
world.  
4.84.   At the WTO 's 11th Ministerial Conference in December 2017, the Unit ed States joined 70 other 
Members in announcing a commitment to initiate exploratory work on negotiations on electronic 
commerce. Since then, the United States has been actively engaged in this initiative, and worked to 
ensure that it is a productive  forum  to advance a liberal global environment for digital trade. The 
United States also joined a consensus among WTO Members to maintain a moratorium on duties on 
electronic transmissions and to continue the longstanding Work Program on Electronic Commerce.  
4.85.   On 30 September 2018, the United States, Mexico, and Canada completed a comprehensive 
renegotiation of the NAFTA. The new United States -Mexico -Canada Agreement (USMCA) contains 
the most advanced digital trade rules that will make this agreement a model moving  forward. The 
United States regularly raises digital trade issues bilaterally, including in consultations with FTA 
partners, in Trade and Investment Framework Agreement meetings, and other engagements. The 
United States also engages in conversation on digi tal trade issues in international fora such as the WT/TPR/G/ 382 • United States  
 
- 24 - 
 
  G20, APEC, and the OECD, using these platforms to bring attention to harmful barriers to digital 
trade.  
5  TRADE -RELATED CAPACI TY BUILDING INITIATI VES 
5.1.  Trade policy and development assistance are key tools tha t together can help alleviate poverty 
and improve opport unities. Through "Aid for T rade," the United States focuses on helping developing 
countries  into the global trading community. Support to countries, in the form of training and 
technical ass istance , can help them make decisions about the benefits of trade arrangements and 
reforms , implement their international and regional obligations to bring certainty to their trade 
regimes , and enhance these countries' ability to take advantage of the oppo rtunities of the 
multilateral trading system to compete in the global economy. Accordingly, U.S. assistance 
addresses a broad range of issues so that communities, rural areas, and small businesses, including 
female entrepreneurs, benefit from trade rules n egotiated in the W TO and in other trade fora . The 
United States promotes trade and economic growth in developing countrie s through a wide range of 
trade  capacity-building (TCB) activities.  
5.2.  An important element of this TCB work involves coordinating U.S. Go vernment technical 
assistance activities with those of the international institutions in order to identify and take 
advantage of donor synergies  in programming and to avoid duplication. These  institutions include 
the WTO, the World Bank, the IMF, the regio nal de velopment banks, and the United Nations. The 
United States, led by USTR at the WTO , by the Treasury Department at various  international financial 
bodies , and by the State Department at the United Nations,  works in partnership with these 
institutions and other donors to ensure that, where appropriate, trade -related assistance is an 
integral component of development programs tailored to the circumstances within each developing 
country.  
5.3.  The efforts of the United States , both through bilateral assistance and through multilateral 
institutions,  build on a longstanding commitment to help partner countries benefit from the 
opportunities provided by the global trading system. U.S. bilateral assistance includes programs 
such as targeted assistance for developing countries participating in U.S. preference progr ams and 
coordination of assistance through Trade and Investment Framework Agreements. The United States 
also provides bilateral assistance to developing countries to enable them to work with the private 
sector and non -governmental organizations to transiti on to a more open economy, to prepare for 
WTO negotiations, and to ab ide by their trade obligations.  
5.1  WTO-Related U.S. Trade -Related Assistance  
5.4.  International trade can play a major role in the promotion of economic growth and the 
alleviation of poverty, and  the United States recognizes that TCB can facilitate more effective 
integration of developing countries into the international trading system and enable them to benefit 
further from global trade. The United States has and will continue to directly support  the WTO's 
trade -related technical assistance efforts. As a major bilat eral provider of TCB  assistance, the United 
States has remained an active partner in the WTO's Aid for Trade discussion.  
5.5.  The United States supports the trade -related assistance activiti es of the WTO Secretariat 
through voluntary contributions to the D oha Development Agenda  Global Trust Fund. In Septembe r 
2017, the United  States pledged an additional US$600,000  to the trust fund . Taking into accoun t 
this contribution, total U.S.  contribut ions to the WTO have amounted to more than US$1 7 million 
since 2001.  
5.6.  The United States provides technical support to countries that are in the process of acceding 
to the WTO and for post -accession implementation. Among current accession applicants, Algeria , 
Azerbaijan , Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ethiopia, Iraq, Lebanon , Serbia , and Uzbekistan  
received U.S. technical assistance in their accession processes. In addition, Afghanistan, Georgia, 
Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, and Ukraine cont inue to receive assistance with 
implementing their membership commitments.  WT/TPR/G/ 382 • United States  
 
- 25 - 
 
  5.2  The Enhanced Integrated Framework  
5.7.  The Enhanced Integrated Framework (EIF) is a multi -organization, multi -donor program that 
operates as a coordination mechanism for trade -related as sistance to least -developed countries 
(LDCs) with the overall objective of integrating trade into national development plans. The 
United  States supports the EIF through complement ary bilateral assistance to EIF  participating 
countries. U.S. Agency for Inte rnational Development ( USAID ) bilateral assistance to LDC 
participants supports initiatives both to integrate trade into national economic and development 
strategies and to address high priority capacity building needs designed to accelerate integration 
into the global trading system.  
5.3  Trade Capacity -Building Initiatives for Africa  
5.8.  As discussed earlier, i n July 2013, the United States  launched "Trade Africa" with the five 
members of the East African Community (EAC) . The United States  subsequently expanded the Trade 
Africa initiative to Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Mozambique, Senegal, and Zambia, and it committed to 
provide technical support on trade matters to the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS). Cooperation  between the U nited States and its Trade Africa partners – including through 
technical and capacity building assistance – could  help the latter meet their WTO obligations under 
the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures, the Agreement on 
Technical Barriers to Trade ( TBT), and the Agreement on Trade Facilitation , foster an improved 
business climate, and address capacity issues that cons train trade.  
5.9.  The United St ates has boosted TCB  assistance through Trade and Investment Hubs on the 
continent, which  are expected to facilitate over US$200 million in new investments and foster the 
creation of 37,000 jobs by 2020. Under this initiative, USAID expanded its flagship Trade Hubs into 
Trade and Investment Hubs (Hubs). These Hubs, located in Accra , Ghana; Pretoria , South Africa; 
and Nairobi, Kenya, implement new and innovative initiatives to reduce bottlenecks along major 
trade corridors, as well as boost exports through the formation of sustainable business associations 
with international membersh ip. The Hubs are responsible for creating Source Africa, the continent's 
largest apparel trade show. Moreover, the Hubs support implementation of the Feed the Future 
initiative to help improve food security by integrating regional markets and reducing the time and 
cost to move goods from areas of surplus to those of deficit. Supporting such investment allows key 
value chains to scale up, reaching tens of thousands of smallholder farmers, and create stable, long -
term employment opportunities.  
5.10.   The U.S. Depart ment of Agriculture's Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) administers a number 
of agricultural  technical assistance, training, and research programs in sub -Saharan Africa. USDA's 
capacity -building program objectives are to increase agricultural trade both r egionally and with the 
United States, help develop trade policies based on sound science, support agricultural sector growth 
in partner countries, and promote regional food security. To this end, FAS administers programs to 
support SPS regulatory and polic y development and improvements that will help decrease 
international trade constraints. This capacity building creates regional frameworks for countries to 
develop equivalent SPS systems that govern regional trade, including transboundary animal disease 
and plant pest monitoring, control, and emergency response. In addition, FAS capacity building is 
helping to develop food monitoring systems that will both ensure exported foods meet international 
requirements and that will safeguard domestic food supplies f rom chemical and microbiological 
contamination.  USDA also provides support to these countries through its Food for Progress 
program, which encourages development of the agriculture sector and market development. 
USDA  further supports the West African cotto n sector through its research and exchange programs, 
specifically the Borlaug and Cochran Programs.  
5.11.   The Millennium  Challenge Corporation (MCC) works in partnership with well -governed 
developing  countries to tackle the most critical obstacles to private inv estment and economic growth  
to fulfil the agency's core mission: to reduce poverty through economic growth . While MCC's program 
with each country is different, many partner countries place a high priority on increasing their 
competi tiveness and facilitatin g domestic commerce as well as regional and international trade. 
Since MCC was created in 2004, the agency has invested more than US$7 billion in trade -related 
assistance to developing countries, and more than half of that has gone to 1 4 sub-Saharan Africa n 
countries  through 16 MCC compact grant programs . This assistance  focuses on trade -related 
infrastructure such as roads and electricity, improving the productivity of small and medium -sized 
businesses and export -oriented industries, and leveraging policy and regulatory reforms. Such WT/TPR/G/ 382 • United States  
 
- 26 - 
 
  support allows countries to expand their export -oriented sectors and better utilize AGOA. Major 
projects have included expansions to the principal sea ports of Benin and Cape Verde, upgrades to 
Mali's international airport, electricity sector investments in Benin, Ghana, Liberia, Malawi, and 
Tanzania, and roads for commerce in Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Liberia, Mozambique, 
Senegal, and Tanzania . Congress recently passed legislation giving MCC the authority to make 
regional investments through concurrent compact grant programs designed to address cross -border 
constraints to trade and economic growth.  
5.12.   The U.S. Trade and Development Agency (USTDA), the U.S. Government's project preparation 
agency , works to reduce barriers to financing infrastructure. In support of Trade Africa goals, USTDA 
increased its portfolio in Africa by two -thirds to stimulate the infrastructure development Africa 
requires to trade globally. This early -stage investment across 30 projects, including po rts, airports, 
electricity, and telecom, and has the potential to mobilize more than US$2 billion in private and 
public financing during implementation. USTDA also facilitated eight reverse trade missions, in which 
120 public and private sector delegates f rom 19 countries in sub -Saharan Africa participated, 
increasing their capacity to make informed investment decisions in their infrastructure investments.  
5.13.   Since 2005, the United States has mobilized its development agencies to help the West  African 
countries of Benin , Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, and Senegal address obstacles they face in the cotton  
sector. MCC, USAID, and USDA continue to work with these natio ns as they seek to develop a 
coherent long -term development strategy to improve prospects in the cotton sector. Elements of 
such a strategy address key challenges such as improved productivity and domestic reforms. The 
United  States will continue to coordi nate with the WTO, World Bank, the African  Development Bank, 
and others as part of the multilateral effort to address the development aspects of cotton. This 
includes the active participation of the United States in the WTO Secretariat's periodic meetings with 
donors and recipient countries to discuss the trade, development, and reform aspects of cotton.  
5.4  Standards Alliance  
5.14.   In November 2012, the United States launched a U.S. -sponsored assistance facility called the 
"Standards  Alliance" with the goal of build ing capacity among developing cou ntries to implement the 
WTO Agreement on TBT . The Standards Alliance provides resources  and expertise to enable 
developing countries t o effectively implement the Agreement  on TBT . The focus of these efforts in 
developing co untries includes efforts: to improve practices related to notification of technical 
regulations and conformity assessment procedures to the WTO; to strengthen domestic practices 
related to adopting relevant international standards; and to clarify and strea mline re gulatory 
processes for products.  
5.15.   In May 2013, USAID and the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) entered into a 
public -private partnership that coordinate s private -sector subject matter experts from ANSI member 
organizations in the delivery  of training and other technical exchange with interested Standards 
Alliance countries on international standards and best practices. During the period under review, the 
first phase of the Standards Alliance, which included activities in up to 10  markets r epresenting a 
variety of geographical regions and levels of economic development , ended . A second phase, which 
covers five countries in sub -Saharan Africa (Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Mozambique, Senegal, and 
Zambia) began. In consultation with TPSC member agenc ies and private sector experts, ANSI 
reviewed the applications received based on consideration of bilateral trade opportunities, available 
private sector expertise that may be leveraged, demonstrated commitment and readiness for 
assistance, an d potential d evelopment impact.  
5.16.   Between 201 6 and 2018, the Standards Alliance completed over 20  TBT-related trainings, 
workshops, and delegation visits for participants from 50 countries. These capacity -building activities 
have bolstered Standards Alliance countries ' understanding and application of TBT -related 
mechanisms. Highlights from the last two -year period  of Standards Alliance implementation include 
a series of programs on conformity assessment for the African Organisation for Standardization 
(ARSO), several con ferences and workshops on good regulatory practices, as well as work on 
regulatory impact assessment.  WT/TPR/G/ 382 • United States  
 
- 27 - 
 
  6  TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT  
6.1.  Since the last U.S. Trade Policy Review, the United States made significant progress on a range 
of trade and environment matters  in multiple fora, including through multilateral, regional and 
bilateral trade initiatives.  
6.2.  In August 2017, the United States, Mexico, and Canada formally launched the renegotiation of 
the NAFTA . On 30 September 2018, the United States, Mexico, and Canada completed a 
comprehensive renegotiation of the NAFTA,  including the most comprehensive set of enforceable 
environmental obligations of any previous U .S. trade agreement. These include commitments 
relating to harm ful fisheries subsidies; wildlife trafficking; illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) 
fishing; the protection of marine species; marine litter; sustainable forest management; air quality; 
and public participation and environmental cooperation.  
6.3.  The Unit ed States has also continued to prioritize implementation of the FTAs currently in force. 
For example , the United States used a unique monitoring tool under our bilateral trade agreement 
with Peru in 2016 to verify that a particular timber shipment exporte d from Peru to the United States 
complied with all Peruvian laws and regulations. Following issuance of this verification report, which 
revealed significant levels of illegally harvested timber in that shipment, Peru agreed to undertake 
various reforms to address ongoing challenges of illegal logging. In 2017, the United States 
determined that Peru had made insufficient progress in implementing these agreed upon and 
necessary reforms, and on October 10, 2017, USTR took unprecedented action by instructing th e 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to deny entry of future timber shipments from the 
Peruvian exporter subject to the 2016 verification request. In February 2018, the United States 
requested that Peru conduct a second timber verification, this time  of three separate timber 
shipments exported from Peru to the United States. Peru 's investigation could not establish that one 
of the shipments was compliant with Peru 's laws, regulations, and other measures on the harvest 
and trade of timber products. The  United States will continue to engage with Peru to address 
remaining challenges to combating illegal logging highlighted by the verification.  
6.4.  Since the last TPR, the United States kept up substantial engagement with other FTA partners. 
In particular, the United States had senior -level meetings with officials from Bahrain, Central 
America and the Dominican  Republic, Chile, Colombia, Oman, Panama, and Singapore to discuss 
implementation of and monitor progress under the environment chapters of our FTAs with those 
partners. These  engagements were also opportunities to review, and in some cases, update, the 
environmental cooperation work programs that help to support implementation of the environment 
chapters of U.S. FTAs. The United States also engaged with Tr ade and Invest ment Framework 
Agreement partners, notably Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam, and consulted on a 
wide range of issues related to trade and investment, including trade -related environmental issues 
such as wildlif e trafficking a nd IUU fishing.  
6.5.  In APEC, the United States worked with other Asia -Pacific economies through the Experts Group 
on Illegal Logging and Associated Trade to improve the capacity of APEC customs officials to combat 
illegal  logging and associated trade, includin g by hosting a customs officials workshop held in Ho Chi 
Minh City, Vietnam on August 18 -19, 2017. The United States also led the development of a Customs 
Best Practices Resource Tool designed to assist APEC customs officials in identifying illegal timber 
shipments and taking appropriate action. As part of this work, the United States strengthened 
partnerships with international and nongovernmental organizations, such as Interpol and The Nature 
Conservancy, who play an important role in combating illegal lo gging and associated trade globally. 
The United States also concluded an initiative to facilitate trade and investment in sustainable 
materials management solutions under APEC 's Regulatory Cooperation Advancement Mechanism in 
2017.  
6.6.  The United States is als o committed to combating wildlife trafficking and IUU fishing through a 
variety of means , including by using existing and future U.S. FTAs, environmental cooperation 
mechanisms , and other trade -related initiatives. For example, the United States has consis tently 
raised these areas for discussion and collaboration in meetings under the Environment Chapters of 
our FTAs and included them in recent environmental programs. In October 2016, the Eliminate, 
Neutralize, and Disrupt (END) Wildlife Trafficking Act of 2016 became law, with the objectives of 
supporting anti -poaching efforts on a global scale, strengthening the capacity of partner countries 
to combat wildlife trafficking, and designating major wildlife trafficking countries for further strategic WT/TPR/G/ 382 • United States  
 
- 28 - 
 
  collabora tion with the United States.6 The President issued an Executive Order on February 9, 2017 
that called for strengthened enforcement, including with respect to the "the illegal smuggling and 
trafficking of humans, drugs or other substances, wildlife, and wea pons…. "7 Multiple U.S. 
government agencies participate in implementing the President 's Executive Order and the END 
Wildlife Trafficking Act.  
6.7.  In regards to IUU fishing, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) 
published a final rule in Dec ember 2016 establishing a Seafood Import Monitoring Program (SIMP) 
to combat IUU fishing and seafood fraud.8 The SIMP establishes  reporting  and recordkeeping  
requirements  for imports  of 13 at-risk species  needed  to prevent  IUU-caught  or misrepresented  
seafood  from entering  U.S. commerce.  The U.S. importer of record is required to report and retain 
key data from the point of harvest to the point of entry into U.S. commerce.  The rule 's requirements 
took effect for 11 of the species on January  1, 2018:  tunas (Albacore, Bigeye, Skipjack, Yellowfin, 
and Bluefin), swordfish, sharks, Atlantic and Pacific cod, grouper, red snapper, and sea cucumber.  
The requirements  for the remaini ng two species,  shrimp  and abalone,  will take effect  on December  
31, 2018.  U.S. government  agencies  are actively  engaged  in outreach  to trading  partners  to assist  
with implementation  efforts.  
7  TRADE AND LABOR  
7.1.  Ensuring respect for workers' rights is a core v alue, and the trade policy agenda of the 
United  States includes a strong commitment to ensuring that American workers and their families 
as well as workers around the world benefit from trade. On 30 September 2018, the United States, 
Mexico, and Canada com pleted a comprehensive renegotiation of the NAFTA, including the strongest 
labor provisions of any U.S. trade agreement. The new United States -Mexico -Canada Agreement 
includes a Labor Chapter with enforceable rules that protect the rights of freedom of ass ociation and 
collective bargaining; prohibit trade in goods produced by forced labor, including forced child labor; 
address violence against workers exercising their rights; ensure that migrant workers are protected 
under labor laws; and establish mechanis ms to monitor and address labor concerns.  
7.2.  The United States has continued its efforts to enhance U.S. Government engagement with 
trade partners through formal trade agreement mechanisms to improve respect for internationally 
recognized labor rights and to increase monitoring and enforcement of trade agreement labor 
provisions.  Since the last TPR, the United States held senior -level meetings with officials from 
Bahrain, Central  America and the Dominican Republic, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and the Republic of 
Korea to discuss implementation of and monitor  progress under the labor chapters of our FTAs with 
those partners. These meetings  also provided opportunities  to discuss labor cooperation initiatives 
that support implementation of the labor chapters of U.S. F TAs. The United States also continues to 
enhance its engagement with trade partners on labor rights through trade preference programs, and 
other means. In 2017 and 2018, the United States discussed labor rights issues with several 
countries as part of meet ings held under Trade an d Investment Framework Agreements, including 
with Algeria, Indonesia, Vietnam, Malaysia, Cambodia, and the Philippines . 
7.3.  As an important component of the Administration's trade agenda, the Trade Adjustment 
Assistance (TAA) programs a ssist U.S. workers adversely affected by global competition. The TAA 
Program was renewed by the Trade Adjustment Assistance Reauthorization Act of 2015 (TAARA), 
and ensures that workers harmed by foreign trade have the best opportunity to acquire skills an d 
credentials for sustainable reemployment. The TAA Program currently offers the following services 
to eligible workers: training, out of area job search and relocation allowances, weekly income support 
(Trade Readjustment Allowances (TRA)), wage supplemen ts for older workers (RTAA), and a health 
coverage tax credit to eligible TAA recipients. In FY2017, US$ 716,364,000 was available to carry 
out the program.  
                                                
6 Eliminate, Neutralize, and Disrupt (END) Wildlife Trafficking Act of 2016, 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th -congress/house -bill/2494/text  (signed into law on Octob er 9, 2016).  
7 Presidential Executive Order on Enforcing Federal Law with Respect to Transnational Criminal 
Organizations and Preventing International Trafficking, https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential -
actions/presidential -executive -order -enforcing -federal -law-respect -transnational -criminal -organizations -
preven ting-international -trafficking/  (February 9, 2017).  
8 Magnuson Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act:  Seafood Import Monitoring Program, 
81 FR 88975 (December 9, 2016).  WT/TPR/G/ 382 • United States  
 
- 29 - 
 
  8  SMALL AND MEDIUM -SIZED BUSINESS TRADE  
8.1.  USTR has implemented a Small Business Initiative to increase e xport opportunities for U.S. 
small and medium -sized enterprises (SMEs) and expand efforts to address the specific export 
challenges and priorities of SMEs and their workers in our trade policy and enforcement activities. 
In 2017, USTR continued to engage w ith U.S. government interagency partners and foreign trading 
partners to develop and implement new and continuing initiatives that support small business 
exports.  
8.2.  U.S. small businesses are key engines for U.S. economic growth, jobs, and innovation. USTR 
is focused on making trade work to the benefit of SMEs by helping them increase their sales to 
customers abroad, access and participate in global supply chains, and support jobs in local 
communities. USTR is working to better integrate specific SME issues an d priorities into trade policy 
development, increase outreach to SMEs around the country, and expand collaboration and 
coordination on an interagency basis. USTR works closely with the U.S. Department of Commerce, 
U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA), U.S. Department of Agriculture, and other agencies to 
help provide U.S. SMEs information, assistance, and counselling on specific export opportunities. In 
2017, USTR undertook significant actions in  support of our SME objectives.  
8.3.  Tariff barriers, burdensom e customs procedures, discriminatory or arbitrary standards, lack of 
transparency relating to relevant regulations, and insufficient IPR protection in foreign markets 
present particular challenges for U.S. SMEs in selling abroad. Under the SME Initiative, USTR 's small 
business office, regional offices, and functional offices are pursuing initiatives and advancing efforts 
to address these issues. U.S. trade agreements, as well as other trade dialogues and fora, provide 
a critical opportunity to address speci fic concerns of U.S. SMEs and facilitate their participation in 
export markets . 
8.4.  Since the last TPR, the United States has worked to increase opportunities for SME exports. 
For example, for the negotiations of the United States –Mexico –Canada Agreement, one of the U.S. 
objectives  include d priorities identified by SME stakeholders, such as increased de minimis shipment 
value and the elimination of burdensome non -tariff barriers. The Agreement include s a smal l and 
medium enterprise chapter , to help ensure th at the Agreement benefits SMEs.  
8.5.  The United States and the United Kingdom launched the United States -UK Trade and 
Investment Working Group in 2017 to explore  ways to strengthen trade and investment ties between 
the U.S. and U.K. and to provide commercial conti nuity for both countries ' businesses, workers, and 
consumers. Given the significance of small businesses to both economies, the U.S. and UK launched 
an ongoing U.S. -UK Small and Medium -sized Enterprise Dialogue in 2018  to promote closer 
collaboration and t he sharing of best practices on policies and programs that support SME businesses 
and export o pportunities in each country.  
8.6.  The United States and EU continue to collaborate on small business issues in the Transatlantic 
Economic Council (TEC). In October 20 17, the United States hosted the eighth United States -EU 
Small and Medium Enterprise  Workshop in Wichita, Kansas - the first time the United States has 
hosted the US -EU SME workshop outside of Washington, DC. The SME Workshop was convened by 
USTR, the U.S.  Department of Commerce, the SBA and the EU 's Directorate General for Trade and 
Directorate General for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs (DG -GROW) and was 
hosted with the Chair of the Industry Trade Advisory Committee for Small and Mino rity Business 
(ITAC -9). Over 100 SME stakeholders on both sides of the Atlantic attended, with discussions 
focusing on manufacturing SMEs in transatlantic trade; SME startups, innovation and 
competitiveness; best practices in apprenticeships and vocational  training; and SME export 
promotion resources.  
8.7.  In 2017, USTR participated with ASEAN SME ministry and trade officials in the United States -
ASEAN Third Country Training Program to discuss potential barriers to digital trade tha t can burden 
SMEs . Such trade barriers are out of step with established best practices and impede the ability of 
SMEs to participate in digital trade and e -commerce. Best practices include tariff -free digital trade; 
promoting the free flow of information; preventing costly computer inf rastructure requirements; 
electronic signatures and online payment methods; electronic customs forms and faster customs 
procedures; high customs de minimis  to facilitate SME trade; and protection o f intellectual property 
rights.  WT/TPR/G/ 382 • United States  
 
- 30 - 
 
  8.8.  In the WTO context, USTR is  exploring the development of further work with other WTO 
Members on issues of interest to SME stakeholders, such as electronic commerce, transparency of 
regulatory processes , and implementation of trade facilitation measures.  
__________