RESTRICTED  
  
G/STR/M/42  
 
26 May 2023 
(23-3635) Page: 1/10 
Working Party on State Trading Enterprises    
 
MINUTES  OF THE REGULAR MEETING  
HELD ON 28 APRIL  2023  
CHAIR: AGUST ÍN NAVARRO DE VICENTE -GELLA ( SPAIN ) 
1.  The Working Party on State Trading Enterprises (the "Working Party") held a regular meeting on 
28 April  2023, in person as well as virtually via Interprefy.  
2.  The Working Party adopted  the following agenda (the proposed agenda had been circulated in 
WTO/AIR/STR/18  on 18 April  2023). 
1   REVIEW OF NEW AND FULL NOTIFICATIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS  .....................  1 
2   REVIEW OF NOTIFICATIONS PREVIOUSLY REVIEWED BY THE WORKING PARTY  ........  3 
3   CONTINUED NON -NOTIFICATION OF STATE TRADING ENTERPRISES BY THE 
RUSSIAN  FEDERATION  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..... 5 
4   REPORTING BY THE CHAIRPERSON TO THE WORKING PARTY ON THE REPORTS 
SUBMITTED TO THE COUNCIL FOR TRADE IN GOODS (CTG) ON THE FUNCTIONING OF 
THE WORKING PARTY AND THE RESPONSE TO THE PANDEMIC  
(DOCUMENTS G/L/1455 - G/STR/31 AND G/L/1456 - G/STR/32) AND THE 
CONSULTATIONS HELD BY THE CHAIR OF THE CTG IN THIS REGARD  ..............................  7 
5   OTHER BUSINESS  ................................ ................................ ................................ ........  9 
6   DATE OF THE FOLLOWING MEETING  ................................ ................................ .........  10 
 
1  REVIEW OF NEW AND FULL NOTIFICATIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS  
3.  The Chair recalled that, according to paragraph 5 of the Understanding on the Interpretation of 
Article XVII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (the Understanding), the 
Working  Party was tasked with reviewing the notifications and counter -notificati ons submitted by 
Members on their state trading enterprises (STEs).  
4.  For the review of the new and full notifications of STEs submitted by Members, the Chair 
suggested that the Working Party conduct the review in the same way as at previous meetings, 
focusi ng on: (i) whether the notification responded adequately to the information requested in the 
Questionnaire on STEs ( G/STR/3/Rev.1 ); and (ii) whet her more information was required in order 
to permit a clear appreciation of the manner of operation of the enterprises notified and the effect 
of their operations on international trade.  
5.  The Chair recalled that new and full notifications were now presente d every two years. The most 
recent call for new and full notifications was contained in document G/STR/N/19 , and called for 
Members to submit notifications for the years 2020 and 2021 by 30  June 2022. The  Working  Party 
would take up notifications from nine Members circulated since the previo us meeting on 
21 October  2022.  
6.  The Chair recalled that, as provided in the Working Party's 1995 Report ( G/L/35 ), Members 
wishing to raise questions on a notification under review were to present them in writing to the 
notifying delegation and to the Secretariat at the latest three weeks before th e meeting. The Chair 
also reminded Members asking questions not already sent in writing that, if they wished to receive G/STR/M/42  
 
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  a written response, they would have to follow up by submitting their questions in writing to the 
Member concerned, with a copy to the Se cretariat for circulation.  
7.  No questions were posed and no comments were made regarding the notifications of Albania  
(G/STR/N/19/ALB ), Chile  (G/STR/N/19/CHL ), Indonesia  (G/STR/N/19/IDN ), Korea  
(G/STR/N/19/KOR ), Switzerland  (G/STR/N/19/CHE ), and Chinese Taipei  
(G/STR/N/19/TPKM/ADD.1 ). 
8.  Regarding the notification of Costa Rica  (G/STR/N/19/CRI ), the Europe an Union  thanked 
Costa  Rica for its detailed description of the functioning of the Agro-Industrial Sugar Cane League  
(LAICA) as an STE. The European Union requested Costa Rica to confirm whether  LAICA's Board of 
Directors act s in a non -discriminatory manne r when it adopts decisions concerning imports and 
exports . The European Union further asked for confirmation  whether LAICA's Marketing Board as 
oversee ing the Marketing Division takes part in decisions or functions affecting imports and exports 
of sugar  and, if so,  whether the Marketing Board acts independently or whether it accepts and 
implements instructions from the Board of Directors ? The European Union indicated that it would 
provide its questions in writing  after the meeting.  
9.  Costa Rica  indicated that  it would consult bilaterally with the European Union  to understand its 
concern s, as Costa Rica had done with the European Union on previous occasions.  
10.  Regarding the notifications of Haiti  (G/STR/N/16/HTI - G/STR/N/17/HTI - G/STR/N/18/HTI - 
G/STR/N/19/HTI ), the United States thanked Haiti for  its notification and expresse d appreciat ion 
that Haiti  used the opportunity  to cover periods of time since its last notif ication, thereby providing 
an example for others to follow.  
11.  Regarding the notification of Panama  (G/STR/N/19/PAN ), the European Union  noted the recent 
launch of Panama's State Agri -Food Policy and the ratification of the State Agri -Food Policy Act. 
According to that Policy, the European Union noted that agriculture is given priority and is designated 
as the key instrument for ensuring b oth development of the agri -food production sector and the food 
security of Panama. The European Union asked Panama to confirm whether the State Agri -Food 
Policy and the State Agri -Food Policy Act are in conformity with Article XVII of the GATT 1994 and 
its related instruments . In addition, the European Union sought clarification as to whether the 
involvement of the Ministry of Agricultural Development and the Ministry of Economy and Finance, 
and the National Agricultural and Rural Sector Development Plan : (i) involve elements that could 
lead to discrimination of imported foreign -originating agricultural products ; or (ii) involve elements 
that could lead to application of non -commercial considerations in decisions affecting imports and 
exports. The European Union indicated that it would provide its questions in writing . 
12.  Panama  thanked the European Union and indicated that  it would consult bilaterally after 
receiving the questions in writing.  
13.  The Chair drew the attention of delegations to the document contain ing the Status of 
Notifications ( G/STR/30 ). The Chair noted that the Status of Notifications showed that many 
Members were not fulfilling their notification obligations and that this prevented Members from 
enjoying the full benefit of transparency. The Chair, therefore, urged Members that had not yet  
notified to do so, and to consult the Secretariat if they had any questions. The Chair also thanked 
Members that had notified.  
14.  Australia , Canada , Costa Rica , the European Union , Japan , the United Kingdom  and the 
United  States  jointly expressed appreciation for the Chair's statement encouraging Members to make 
the required notifications, noting that a number of Members had either failed to make any notification 
or have not made any for some time. Referring to data circulated by  the Secretariat, they noted that 
59 Members had not made a notification in the last 10 years, and only  38 out of 136  Members had 
made the requisite notification for the most recent notification cycle. That was the lowest level of 
compliance the Working  Party had ever seen, the previous being 45  notifications in 1996 and 2020. 
Australia, Canada,  Costa Rica,  the European Union, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United  States 
stressed that transparency was an important requirement for all WTO Members and noti fications 
and counter -notifications were sometimes the only way in which other Members could be properly 
informed of a Member's activities in a given area. Low levels of compliance undermined the 
transparency function of the Working Party. They also noted that much of the information to be G/STR/M/42  
 
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  provided in STE notifications had been provided and discussed in the Trade Policy Review process, 
in the WTO  Committee on Agriculture, in particular the yearly Export Competition Questionnaire, or 
had otherwise been provi ded to the WTO . Thus, Members could benefit from synergies in respect of 
information submitted through STE  notifications and the Committee on Agriculture reporting, which 
could contribute to greater transparency and reduce burdens for Members. Australia, C anada, 
Costa  Rica, the European Union, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United  States called on other 
Members to submit their regular STE notifications within the deadlines and to respond to other 
Members' questions in a substantive and timely manner. Moreover, Australia, Canada, Costa Rica, 
the European Union, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United  States also indicated that they fully 
support any initiative that the Chair or the Secretariat might take regarding compliance with 
notification requirements . 
15.  The United States  separately took the floor to inform Members that the United States ha d placed 
an agenda item to the Council for Trade in Goods (CTG) with the purpose of identifying certain 
Members' non -notification of items, including in the context of  STEs. The United States explained 
that, by bringing this item to the CTG, its intent is to raise awareness of this issue beyond the 
Working Party, with a call to work with the listed Members on their notifications. As stated to the 
CTG, the United States noted that many Members' notifications have been outstanding for over 
25 years and urged Members with questions about their notification obligations to approach the 
Secretariat for guidance about how to meet the requirements under the applicable WTO agreem ents. 
Alternatively, if for some reason a Member is unable to reach out to the Secretariat, the United 
States suggested that Members can reach out to other Members for guidance and/or assistance. The 
United States also called on Members to be sympathetic t o the challenge, as all Members at some 
point in time have been in a position of having to prepare a WTO notification for the first time.  
Finally, the United States stressed that it stands ready to help Members with their applicable 
notifications , as it ha s done so in the past, particularly LDC Members.  
16.  The Working Party took note  of the notifications, questions and answers and statements made.  
2  REVIEW OF NOTIFICATIONS PREVIOUSLY REVIEWED BY THE WORKING PARTY  
17.  The Chair recalled that delegations had requested that the Working Party revert to notifications 
from five Members. First, regarding the notification of China  contained in document 
G/STR/N/18/CHN , the Chair recalled that the United States had requested that the Working Party 
revert to it.  
18.  The United States  indicated that it continued to find China's notification to be insufficient. The 
United States stated that throughout the notification, China had failed to provide any of the required 
information on import quantity, average import price, average representative domestic sales price, 
mark-up, average procurement price, average export price, and – in some instances – national 
production, instead describing the information as "not available". The United States  questioned 
whether that informati on could not be available to China, noting that several entities in the 
notification were listed companies that had periodic reporting requirements and that some of the 
missing information was publicly available through other sources. The United States fur ther 
emphasized that, given the role the State plays in many of the products reported in the notification, 
China would likely have knowledge of information regarding national production. The United States 
requested that China review its notification and pr ovide the information to the Working Party for 
review. The United States added that China's notification was troublesome for systemic reasons, 
given the vital role of the transparency function of the Working Party and the WTO broadly. The 
United States ask ed Members to seriously consider whether the Working Party should consider 
China’s notification as a proper notification, point ing out that notifications sometimes offered the 
only means to learn about other Members' activity in a given a rea, and that all Members had 
committed to fulfilling their transparency obligations. Finally, the United States recalled China's 
statement at the 21 October 2022 meeting that China would consult with capital before providing a 
reply to the United States and noted that it h ad not heard from China.  
19.  The European Union  thanked the United States for drawing attention to China's notification, 
sharing the concern that the China's most recent notification  appeared incomplete and did not 
provide the required information regarding im port and export quantities, price and other elements. 
The European Union looked forward to China providing additional information in line with the 
notification requirements. In addition, the European Union asked China to provide further 
information on the  China Mineral Resources Group, which the European Union stated  was established G/STR/M/42  
 
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  last year with the purpose to buy raw materials, in particular iron ore for China's steel industry. The 
European Union requested China to provide further information on the func tion of this entity, 
whether it operates as a state agency or otherwise has any link to the Chinese government, and 
whether its trading activities constitute state trading within the meaning of Article XVII of the 
GATT  1994.  
20.  China  thanked the United States and the European Union for their continued concerns about 
China's notification as well as the European Union's questions regarding China Mineral Resources 
Group. China stressed the relatively heavy burden it faced in preparing it s notification given the 
involvement of STEs in a wide array of products and sectors of the Chinese economy. 
Notwithstanding  this, China reiterated that it took seriously its commitments on notifications and 
transparency and emphasised that it was doing it s utmost to comply with its obligations, in particular 
with respect to its notification for the 2018 -2020 period. China indicated that it had taken note of 
the concerns expressed since the last meeting and made sincere efforts and studied the possibility 
to provid e more information on the legal basis, operation s, import and export volumes , and domestic 
product ion of the STEs identified i n its most recent notification. China also noted that the 
United  States' recent notifications, G/STR/N/18/USA  and G/STR/N/19/USA , lack complete 
information on export volume s, average domestic selling prices and domestic production. China 
concluded by proposing that Members consider exchanging information and sharing their 
experiences to improve the quality of notifications and to assist Members in their efforts going 
forward . China also indicated it would continue to consult with the European Union and the United 
States to further see how to improve its notifications . 
21.  Regarding the notifications of India  contained in documents G/STR/N/15/IND  and 
G/STR/N/16/IND  – G/STR/N/17/IND , the Chair recalled that on 28  October  2019 the United  States 
had posed written questions to India on these notifications, which had been circulated as document 
G/STR/Q1/IND/21 . On 9 June 2021, India submitted written responses to the United States' 
questions, which were circulated as document G/STR/Q1/IND/22 .  
22.  The United States  thanked India for its responses provided to date but also noted that responses 
to several questions  concerning the 2016 -2018 period  remained substantively outstanding, as India 
had previously stated that reviews and responses were still being pr epared at the time of its 
June 2021 reply and that a full reply would be provided once th at review process was completed. 
The United States requested an update as to when finalized responses and an updated notification 
were expected , noting that the India' s non -response has also been placed as an agenda item before 
the CTG.  
23.  The European Union  also expressed concerns with India's notification, noting that at the meeting 
of the Working Party on 15 October 20211, the European Union had requested information r egarding 
the state -owned enterprise Vijaya Dairy located in the Indian state of Telangana. The 
European  Union noted that it had subsequently submitted those questions in writing in document 
G/STR/Q1/IND/24  on 6 April 2022, and had also requested an update from India  as to when t o a 
response could be expected at both the 13 May 20222 and 21 October 20223 meetings of the 
Working  Party. The European Union reiterated its request for a written response to its questions 
regarding whether Vijaya Dairy engaged in exports of agricultura l products and related measures .  
24.  India thanked  the United States and the European for their questions and interest in India's 
notifications , indicating that it was working on preparing a response. India noted that extensive 
consultations were being conduc ted to ensure that a complete response would be made, and 
reassured Members that it would share a response as soon as one was available . 
25.  Regarding the notification of New Zealand  contained in document, G/STR/N/19/NZL , the Chair 
recalled that at  the previous meeting  of the Working Party  on 21 October 2022, the European Union 
posed questions to New Zealand and received answers during the meeting. The questions were then 
submitted in writing on the same day and circulated as G/STR/Q1/NZL/23 . On 31 October 2022, 
New Zealand provided written responses to the European Union's questions, which were circulated 
as G/STR/Q1/NZL/24 . 
 
1 G/STR/M/39 , para.22.  
2 G/STR/M/40 , para. 30.  
3 G/STR/M/41 , para. 35. G/STR/M/42  
 
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  26.  The European Union  did not raise any further questions regarding New Zealand's response.  
27.  Regarding the notification of Thailand  contained in document, G/STR/N/19/THA , the Chair 
recalled that  at the previous meeting  of the Working Party  on 21 October 2022, the European Union  
raised questions in rela tion to th is notification. These questions were submitted in writing on the 
same day and circulated as G/STR/Q1/THA/6 . 
28.  The European Union  thanked Thailand for its notification, recalling that Thailand had indicated 
at the previous meeting of the Working Party that it would respond  to the European Union's questions  
regarding Public Warehouse Organization (PWO) after consulting with relevant agencies . The 
European Union reiterated its request for a response, also indicating that it was available to consult 
bilaterally.  
29.  Thailand  thanked the European Union for its interest in Thailand's notification. After consulting 
with the relevant agencies, Thailand explained that the PWO has been assigned as the sole importer 
of palm oil, palm kernel oil products, garlic, and maize. Thailand indicated that the PWO request s an 
import certificate from the department of Foreign Trade Ministry of Commerce to allocate in -quota 
shares of these products upon the request from any importer, after which importation of the good 
concerned will be  authoriz ed. Thailand explained that the PWO thus operates as an intermediary 
between exporters and importers and, in Thailand's view, this function does not amount to an 
exclusive or special privilege within the meaning of Article XVII of the GATT 1994. Neverthele ss, 
Thailand emphasized that it attaches great importance to the role of transparency, and thus notified 
the requisite information concerning the PWO and its activities. Thailand indicated that it would 
submit its answers in writing following the meeting a nd is open to discuss the matter further with 
the European Union as necessary.  
30.  The United States  requested clarification, based on Thailand's explanation that the PWO acts as 
an intermediary between exporters and importers, whether any party, either forei gn or domestic, 
can work with the PWO in terms of imports and exports.  
31.  Thailand  responded that both foreign and domestic  parties can engage in activities with the 
PWO, indicating that it would consult with relevant agencies to confirm its response while al so 
offering to consult bilaterally.  
32.  Regarding the notifications of Viet Nam  (G/STR/N/15/VNM – G/STR/N/16/VNM ), the Chair 
recalled that the United  States had made a counter -notification, G/STR/Q1/VNM/4 , and that 
Viet Nam had responded in documents G/STR/Q1/VNM/5  and G/STR/Q1/VNM/5/Corr.1 . 
The United  States had asked follow -up questions to Viet Nam i n document G/STR/Q1/VNM/6 , and 
Viet Nam had responded to those questions in document G/STR/Q1/VNM/7 . In November 2020 the 
United States had posed further follow -up questions to Viet Nam in documents G/STR/Q1/VNM/8  
and G/STR/Q1/VNM/8/Corr.1 . Viet Nam had responded to these questions in document 
G/STR/Q1/VNM/9  received on 7 October 2021, and G/STR/Q1/VNM/10,  received on 
20 October  2022.  
33.  The United  States  thanked Viet Nam for its responses  and indicated that it had no follow -up 
questions at this time.  
34.  The Working Party took note  of the questions an d answers and statements made.  
3  CONTINUED NON -NOTIFICATION OF STATE TRADING ENTERPRISES BY THE 
RUSSIAN  FEDERATION  
35.  The United  States  expressed regret that this was the sixteenth consecutive meeting at which 
the continued non -notification of STEs by the  Russi an Federation was on the agenda  and the 
eleventh year that the issue has been raised . However, the United States stated that as a result of 
the Russian Federation's premeditated and unprovoked war of aggression in Ukraine and the 
unspeakable horrors being inflicted on the people of Ukraine by the Russian Federation's military, 
the United States would not engage in "business as usual" for matters concerning the 
Russian  Federation. The United States stated that the actions of the Russian  Federation were 
incom patible with the rules -based system that Members had built in the WTO and had worked to 
improve. Therefore, the United States indicated that it would not make a fuller intervention and G/STR/M/42  
 
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  instead referred Members to its prior statements at the 20154, 20165, 20176, 20187, 20198, 20209, 
202110, and 202211 meetings of the Working Party.  
36.  The European Union  referred to its  previous  statements condemn ing in the strongest terms the 
Russian Federation's unprovoked and unjustified military aggression in Ukraine . The European Union 
called  on the Russian Federation immediately to end its acts of aggression, to withdraw its troops 
and to fully respect Ukraine's  territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence within its 
internationally recognized borders.  The European Union indicated that it stood firmly by Ukraine and 
its people, and remained firmly committed to supporting Ukraine in political, financial, mi litary and 
humanitarian terms . Regarding the specific agenda item, the European Union referred to its 
statement made at previous meeting s of the Working Party, including its statement on 
5 October  2021.12 
37.   Australia  expressed support for the comments made by the United States and European Union , 
condemn ing the Russia n Federation 's illegal and immoral, full -scale invasion of Ukraine, as a gross 
violation of international law. Australia expressed strong support  for Ukraine's sovereignty and 
territorial integr ity and  indicated that  is working closely with partners to support Ukraine to resolve 
this conflict on its own terms . Australia additionally noted that, a side from the terrible damage and 
loss of life in Ukraine, the Russian Federation's  war is propelling a global crisis in food security and 
inflatin g already high prices of food and agricultural inputs . 
38.  Canada  also supported  the statements made by the United States, European Union  and 
Australia, indicating that it would not engage in business -as-usual activities with the 
Russian  Federation because of their continuing illegal and unprovoked war of aggression against 
Ukraine. Canada urged  the Russian Federation  to contribute to alleviating the global food crisis and 
energy crisis caused by its actio ns, by immediately withdrawing its troops from Ukraine.  
39.  Japan  also voiced support for the statements  by other Members, strongly condemn ing the 
Russian Federation's aggression against Ukraine. Japan urged the Russian Federation to stop the 
aggression and im mediately withdraw its forces from the internationally recognized borders of 
Ukraine . Japan further indicated that it would  continue to work firmly on imposing strong sanctions 
against Russia while also  providing robust support to Ukrain e in cooperation wi th the international 
community . 
40.  The United Kingdom  joined in condemning in the strongest possible terms  what it considered  
the Russian Federation's unprovoked and unjustified attack on Ukraine  over the course of the 
previous  year. The United Kingdom indica ted that it  could not  sit by and ignore the continued 
large-scale aggression and egregious violations of international law and the UN Charter , committed 
by one WTO member against another. T he United Kingdom also joined other Members in observing 
that the R ussian Federation's  illegal invasion continues to impact global trade and security, including 
severely aggravating the global food crisis . The UK promised to  continue to work with its allies and 
partners across the multi lateral system to condemn these appa lling actions and to isolate the 
Russian  Federation  internationally . 
41.  Switzerland  condemned the Russian Federation's military aggression against Ukraine as 
constituting a flagrant violation of international law, especially that pertaining to the use of force 
and the territorial integrity of states. Switzerland called upon the Russian F ederation to take 
measures to deescalate the military situation, cease hostilities and withdraw its troops from 
Ukraine's territory, and called upon all actors to respect international law, especially international 
humanitarian law.  
 
4 G/STR/M/27 , para. 27 and G/STR/M/28 , para. 37. 
5 G/STR/M/29 , paras. 73 and 74 and G/STR/M/30 , paras. 64 and 65.  
6 G/STR/M/31 , para. 36 and G/STR/M/32 , para. 28.  
7 G/STR/M/33 , para. 36 and G/STR/M/34 , para. 29. 
8 G/STR/M/35 , para. 35 and G/STR/M/36 , para. 27. 
9 G/STR/M/37 , para. 44.  
10 G/STR/M/38 , para. 31 and G/STR/M/39 , para. 28.  
11 G/STR/M/40 , para. 39 and G/STR/M/41 , para. 41.  
12 G/STR/M/39 , paras. 28 and 30.  G/STR/M/42  
 
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  42.  The Russian Federation  reiterated its position that WTO is not the right platform to raise issues 
such as the Ukrainian crisis, which in its view falls outside the scope and mandate of the 
Working  Party. The Russian Federation noted that the global economy is already suffering f rom 
commodity shortages, accelerated inflation and faces the threat of a global economic crisis, 
attributing this to the economic and financial policies of major developed economies and the 
restrictive and discriminatory actions imposed by certain members against the Russian Federation. 
Regarding its STE notification process, the Russian Federation thanked the United States and the 
European Union for their interest and informed the Working Party that the Russian Federation 
remains committed to its WTO oblig ations. However, the Russian Federation indicated that it would 
not provide a response or update on the status of its notifications due to statements that were made, 
which demonstrated Members' intentions to misuse the platform of the Working Party to furt her 
their political interests, instead of discussing the actual process of notification by the 
Russian  Federation that was mentioned in the agenda item. The Russian Federation believed that, 
by doing so, Members were not only showing a lack of respect for WTO principles and rules of 
procedure, but also to the other Members of the Working Party. While the Russian Federation noted 
that it was always  willing to discuss the status of its STE notification with all interested delegations 
and provide answers to an y questions about the current state of process, the United States and the 
European Union had today showed neither interest nor readiness to interact with the 
Russian  Federation on any issues.  
43.  The Russian Federation took the position that demonstrations of a lack of respect for 
fundamental WTO principles was not limited to the Working Party. In this respect , the 
Russian  Federation observed that the United States did not provide a response to the  
Russian  Federation's written questions submitted to the Committee on Agriculture in October 202213 
and March 202314, regarding import duties in excess of the bound rates and restrictions on 
agricultural and agricultural related services. Similarly, the Ru ssian Federation observed that the 
United States failed to provide a response to Russian Federation's questions raised in the Committee 
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures in October 202215, regarding the semi -annual report of 
the United States as wel l as regarding recent subsidies policies and measures of the United States. 
The Russian Federation submitted  that the United States  also did not respond 330 times to questions 
submitted in the context of its TPR held in December 2022 .16 The Russian Federat ion similarly 
observed that the European Union had not provided responses to questions that had been submitted  
on various occasions , including written questions regarding the Carbon Border Adjustment 
Mechanism submitted on 8 October 202117; questions on th e same topic submitted during 
the March  202218 and October 202219 meetings of the Committee on Market Access ; and questions  
regarding elements of the European Union Green Deal  that were  submitted at the November 2022 
meeting of the Committee on T echnical Barriers to Trade .20 
44.  The Russian Federation concluded by stating  that it respected all the WTO notification 
procedures, strongly believes that transparency is of utmost importance and would gladly continue 
the dialogue on the matter with all those  delegations, once they were in a position to cooperate.  
45.  The Working Party took note  of the statements made.  
4  REPORTING BY THE CHAIRPERSON TO THE WORKING PARTY ON THE REPORTS 
SUBMITTED TO THE COUNCIL FOR TRADE IN GOODS (CTG) ON THE FUNCTIONING OF THE 
WORKI NG PARTY AND THE RESPONSE TO THE PANDEMIC (DOCUMENTS G/L/1455  - 
G/STR/31  AND G/L/1456  - G/STR/32 ) AND THE CONSULTATIONS HELD BY THE CHAIR 
OF THE CTG IN THIS REGARD  
46.  The Chair indicated that this item was place on the agenda of the meeting to report  to the 
Working Party on the process of consultations on WTO reform conducted by the Chair of Council for 
 
13 G/AG/W/226 , pp. 7 and 8 ( AG-IMS ID nos. 103085 and 103065) . 
14 G/AG/W/231 , pp 14 and 15. ( AG-IMS ID nos. 104123 and 104128).  
15 G/SCM/M/121 , paras. 59 -62 and 132.  
16 WT/T PR/M/434/Add.1 . 
17 G/MA/M/75 , para. 12.3 , referring to G/MA/W/172  and G/C/W/800 . 
18 G/MA/M/76 , para. 12.6 referring to G/MA/W/172  and G/C/W/800 . 
19 G/MA/M/77 , para. 20.9 referring to G/MA/W/172  and G/C/W/800 . 
20 G/TBT/M/88 , para. 2.143 and 2.148.  G/STR/M/42  
 
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  Trade in Goods (CTG), as well as on his own reports to the CTG on the functioning of the 
Working  Party21 and on the response to the pandemic .22 
47.  The Chair noted that the first report on the functioning of the Working Party focused on the 
concrete actions that the Working Party had adopted over time to improve its work. Since the report 
was intended as a stock taking and information gathering exercise to allow for a fact -based discussion 
among Members, the Chair had refrained from including recommendations or an assessment of what 
needed to be improved. The second report indicated that the Working Party did not undertake 
concrete activities or discussions dedicated to the pandemic. The Chair recalled that that on 
21 November 2022, both factual reports were sent to the Membership in a draft form, to provide 
Members with the opportunity to make comments. On 28 Nove mber 2022, both documents were 
submitted to the CTG.  
48.  The Chair also reported on the subsequent events related to the factual reports of the 
Working  Party as well as all other subsidiary bodies ' Chair reports  that had been submitted to the 
CTG. Based on wha t is contained in those reports, the CTG Secretariat circulated on 11 January  2023 
a "Comparison Matrix" providing a general overview of the main elements that seem ed to be 
comparable across the reports.23 The CTG Chair noted that, as explained in the intr oductory part of 
the that Matrix, this matrix would  not replace the reports submitted by the Chairs and did not reflect 
all the information contained in those reports.  
49.  On 31 January 2023, the CTG held an informal meeting to which all 14 Chairs were invited  along 
with all CTG Members. At that meeting, the Chair provided a brief overview of both reports of the 
Working Party and listened to Members' comments. Although there were no specific comments 
directed to the Working Party's report on its functioning, Me mbers made suggestions based on their 
reading of the different reports and the Matrix. The Chair viewed Members' suggestions as a 
reflection of what they considered to be good practices, but explained that it would be up to the 
Members of each body to disc uss and decide whether any procedures, practices, or means of 
conducting business need ed improvement or change s. 
50.  On 9 March 2023, the CTG Chair sent the Chairs of the 14 subsidiary bodies a communication 
requesting the different bodies to start discussions , in the context of formal or informal meetings, 
concerning the functioning of their respective bodies. The CTG Chair also emphasized that at a later 
stage, all subsidiary bodies would  be requested to submit a written report to the CTG describing the 
discussions held and  any proposed improvements. Such written reports are intended to  be submitted 
to the CTG for consideration at the last formal meeting of the CTG, which is tentatively scheduled to 
take place on 30 November 2023. On 22 March 2023, the  CTG Chair invited the Chairs of the 
subsidiary bodies to an informal brief meeting to exchange views and provide updates on where 
each body stood.  
51.  At its formal meeting of  3-4 April  2023, the CTG Chair  provided a status report on his 
consultations under the agen da item "MC12 Implementation Matters: Functioning of the CTG and its  
Subsidiary Bodies and WTO Response to the Pandemic". Members requested the Chair of the CTG 
to share with the 14 Chairs of the subsidiary bodies the status of work at the CTG, as reflected in 
document JOB/CTG/28 . Some Members underlined that there was broad convergence on several 
issues that had been discussed at the CTG which should also be taken up for discussion under the 
subsidiary bodies, and in particular those related to assistance to capital based and Geneva based 
delegates, planning and organization of meetings, and working procedures.  In addition, there were 
approximately 11  other issues that the Council would  not discuss again, at least for the time being , 
because the Council ha d instructed either the CTG  Chair or the CTG Secretariat to take some action 
towards addressing the issues, or because they were cross-cutting issues that may need to be 
addressed at a horizontal level , or had budgetary implications . 
52.  In a subsequent communication sent to all 14 Chairs, the  CTG Chair highlighted that the Council 
has thus far been able to reach forma l agreement on four issues, namely: adopting the use of the 
e-Agenda in the work of the CTG on a trial basis; extending the deadline for the inclusion of agenda 
items to 15 calendar days before the formal meeting to allow Members to better prepare for the high 
number of trade concerns raised at the CTG; instructing the Secretariat to separate newly raised 
 
21 G/L/1456  - G/STR/32 . 
22 G/L/1455  - G/STR/31 . 
23 G/C/W/824/Rev.1 . G/STR/M/42  
 
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  trade concerns and place them in the agenda before previously raised concerns; and instructing the 
Secretariat to integrate the CTG data concerning trade concerns into the Trade Concerns Database, 
subject to budgetary constraints. The CTG Chair indicated in his communication that the subsidiary 
bodies may find inspiration in some of the actions that have been taken by the Council, while 
emphasizing that it remained up to each subsidiary body to decide what kind of action to take to 
improve its functioning.  
53.  With this update , the Chair then opened the floor to Members for them to indicate how they 
wished to see the functioning of the Working Party improved, a nd proposed doing so in informal 
mode, which Members agreed to.  
54.  When the meeting returned to formal mode, the Chair noted that there appeared to be potential 
consensus around taking the following five steps to improve the functioning of the Working Party:  
a. instructing  the Secretariat to shorten the time taken to produce minutes;  
b. instructing the Secretariat to circulate the Status of Notifications twice a year, before 
each formal meeting, after the closing of the airgram;  
c. agreeing  on the dates of both formal meetings of the year at the autumn meeting of the 
previous year;  
d. for each formal meeting of the Working Party, issue the final airgram 15 days before the 
meeting  (or if that is a WTO non -working day, the previous WTO working day) ; and 
e. instructing the Secretariat to organize relevant hybrid training in the fall/winter 2023, 
with a focus on how to comply with  notification requirements . 
55.  The Chair asked whether Members were ready to agree to these steps at the meeting. Some 
Members ind icated that they needed more time  to consider them . The Chair therefore suggested 
initiating a written process for Members to be able to finalize their agreement on these five steps , 
of which there was no objection . 
56.  In addition, the Chair noted that some M embers had suggest ed the following three further steps  
to improve the functioning of the Working Party:  
a. setting deadlines for written responses to written questions, and for each formal meeting 
of the Working Party, circulating a document listing all the deadlines relating to the 
meeting;  
b. using e -Agenda for the Working Party; and  
c. preparing verbatim minutes.  
57.  The Chair noted that Members had not reached consensus on these steps during the discussion 
and therefore proposed that the Working Party take up t hese items again during a dedicated informal 
meeting , of which there was no objection .  
58.  The Chair lastly noted that Members did not wish to continue discussions on issues related to 
the pandemic.  
59.  The Working Party took note  of the statements made and the p roposed course of action 
concerning improvements to the functioning of the Working Party . 
5  OTHER BUSINESS  
60.  No issue was raised under other business.  G/STR/M/42  
 
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  6  DATE OF THE FOLLOWING MEETING  
61.  The Chair recalled the Working Party's practice of holding its regular meetings  either 
immediately before or immediately after the week during which the Committees on 
Anti-Dumping  Practices, on Safeguards and on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures hold their 
regular meetings. Given that, the Chair proposed to schedule the following  meeting of the 
Working  Party for 20 October  2023. 
62.  No objections were raised.  
63.  The meeting was adjourned . 
 
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