RESTRICTED  
  
JOB/AG/203  
 
12 July 2021  
(21-5453) Page: 1/5 
Committee on Agriculture  
Special Session  Original: English  
 
 
DOMESTIC SUPPORT:  DISCIPLINES ON FINAL BOUND AMS ENTITLEMENTS  
COMMUNICATION FROM  THE AFRICAN GROUP  
The following communication , dated 8 July 2021, is being circulated at the request of the  delegation 
of Mauritius on behalf of the African  Group , for consideration by Members.  
 
_______________  
 
 
1. Under the provisions of Article 6.3 of the Agreement on Agriculture and as specified in Part IV 
of a Member's Schedule, 32 (counting the EU as 1) Members enjoy Final  Bound Aggregate 
Measurement of Support (hereafter referred to as AMS) above the de minimis  levels. About half 
of these are developed country Members accounting for 96 % of total Final Bound AMS 
entitlements1 while the developing country Members account fo r the residual 3.9 %. The 
remaining 104 developing2 country Members have zero Final Bound AMS entitlements.3 The EU 
has Final Bound AMS entitlements of USD 81 billion; Japan has USD 36 billion and the US has 
USD 19.1 billion.  
2. The distribution of Final Bound AMS  entitlements is highly skewed even among these additional 
entitlement holders as six WTO Members account for 92% of total Final Bound  AMS 
entitlements. The European Union accounts for 51.4%, Japan 23.1%, US 12.1%, Russian 
Federation 2.8%, S witzerland 2.7% and Canada 2.1% of such Final Bound AMS entitlements.  
3. These additional entitlements add two types of bias  to product -specific AMS;  
(a) First, any product may receive AMS far above the de minimis  level that other countries are 
restricted to. As an illustrative example, the EU 's AMS on skimmed milk powder (SMP) has 
been high and increasing from 49.1% of value of production (VOP) in 2008 -09 to 88.6% of 
VOP in 2017 -18.4 As a percentage of VOP, US 's AMS was 57% on sesame, 59% on sugar, 
16% on cotton, 14% on millet and 16% on peanuts in 2014. It was 27% on mohair in 2009 
and ranged between 23 to 12% in dairy between 1995 and 2009 .5 But the de minimis  limit 
is 10% of VOP for developing countries and 5%  for developed countries. So , these countries 
are exceeding both their own and even developing country limits. This allows them much 
higher flexibility and market power to be focused in products of choice compared to other 
developing countries.  
 
(b) Second, th ese additional entitlements allow for any amount and proportion of the total 
entitlement to be focused on any product, therefore leading to large concentration in single 
products. For example , in 2013, the US focused 23% of its product -specific AMS on dair y, 
 
1 JOB/AG/190 , Update to Canada 's Analytical Tool on Domestic Supports, 7 December  2020.  
2 For greater certainty for the purposes of this Decision, "developing Member " includes least -developed 
Member s. 
3 JOB/AG/190 , Update to Canada 's Analytical Tool on Domestic Supports, 7 December  2020. 
4 EU DS:1 notifications and EU Milk Market Observatory, "EU historical prices " (butter and SMP) and "EU 
historical productions " ("D6100  - Butter " and "D113  - skimmed milk powder ", queried at 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/food -farming -fisheries/farming/facts -and-figures/markets/overviews/market -
observatories/milk_en . 
5 JOB/AG/102 , "Elimination of AMS to Reduce Distortions in Global Agricultural Trade ", Submission by 
China and India,  18 July  2017. JOB/AG/203  
 
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  22% on corn and 12% on livestock; the EU focused 39% of its product -specific AMS on 
butter, 16% on SMP and 29% on common wheat; and Canada focused 65% of its total 
product -specific AMS on milk alone .6 
Therefore , the Final Bound AMS entitlements not onl y allow higher absolute amounts of 
domestic support to be given by the Members enjoying such entitlements compared to other 
Members but also allow much higher flexibility and policy space in assigning the support to 
specific products.  
4. Several developed co untries, most notably the US7 and the EU8, have given very high levels of 
domestic support to their farmers as pandemic support above the de minimis  levels accounted 
through their Final Bound AMS entitlements but these subsidies may have even exceeded th e 
entitlement levels in some cases. Such subsidies can create a further exacerbation of inequities 
in global trade and agricultural markets with regard to non -entitled developing countries who 
are not entitled to grant such subsidies, and may create advers e impacts on the livelihood and 
production capacity in the latter. This is another important reason for additional support 
entitlements to be eliminated.  
5. Therefore, the African Group is tabling this draft Ministerial Decision for delivering on disciplines  
of Final Bound AMS entitlements above de minimis  levels.  
_______________  
 
6 JOB/AG/102 , 18 July 2017, ibid. 
7 Congressional Research Service 2020 U.S. Farm Support: Outlook for Compliance with WTO 
Commitments, 2018 to 2020 (congress.gov) . 
8 European Commission, Supporting the agriculture and food sectors amid Coronavirus | European 
Commission (europa.eu) . JOB/AG/203  
 
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  DOMESTIC SUPPORT:  DISCIPLINES ON FINAL BOUND AMS ENTITLEMENTS  
DRAFT MINISTERIAL DECISION OF THE 12TH MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE OF  
THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (WTO), GENEVA, SWITZERLAND  
The Ministerial Conference,  
 
Having regard  to paragraph 1 of Article IX of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization;  
 
Acknowledging  that under the provisions of Article 6.3 of the Agreement on Agriculture and as 
specified in Part IV of a Member's Schedule, 32 (counting the EU as 1) Members enjoy Final Bound 
Aggregate Measurement of Support (hereafter referr ed to as AMS) entitlements about half of whom 
are developed country Members accounting for 96 % of total Final Bound AMS entitlements1 while 
the developing country Members account for the residual 3.9 %. The remaining 104 developing2 
country Members have z ero Final Bound AMS entitlements3; 
 
Noting  also that the distribution of Final Bound AMS is highly skewed even among the additional 
entitlement holders as six WTO Members account for 92 % of Total Final Bound AMS entitlements4;  
 
Recognizing  that the 2008 Draft Modalities text (TN/AG/W/4/Rev.4) includes a directive to cut Final 
Bound AMS entitlements;  
 
Taking into the account  that current Final Bound AMS entitlements allow for large concentration and 
higher policy flexibility in specific prod ucts as there is no limit on amount per product and can exceed 
the product -specific de minimis  limits that other Members are required to adhere to ; 
 
Noting with concern  that the pandemic has created major challenges for production and livelihoods 
in the agriculture sector  especially in developing and least -developed countries and that the Food 
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations  (FAO)  has specifically reco gnized the challenges 
to smallholder farmers and their families whose numbers include more than two billion of the world 's 
poorest and most vulnerable people, and food workers in all sectors5;  
 
Noting also  several developed countries gave pandemic suppor t to their farmers in 2020 accounted 
under their Final Bound AMS entitlements and in possible excess of the entitlement levels in some 
cases .6 Such subsidies can create a further exacerbation of inequities in global trade and agricultural 
markets with reg ard to developing country Members who have 0 Final Bound AMS, and may create 
adverse impacts on the livelihood and production capacity of farmers in the latter;  
 
Decides as follows:  
 
[ALT 1  
 
1. All Members with Final Bound AMS entitlements exceeding applicabl e de minimis  levels and 
accounting for a share of 10% or above in all Members ' total Final Bound AMS entitlements  shall 
cap their total product -specific AMS at the de minimis  level for each agricultural product within 
a period of three calendar  years from the date of this Decision.  
 
 
1 JOB/AG/190 , Update to Canada 's Analytical Tool on Domestic Supports, 7 December  2020. 
2 For greater certainty for the purposes of this Decision, "developing Member " includes least -developed 
Member s. 
3 JOB /AG/190 , 7 December  2020, ibid. 
4 JOB /AG/190 , 7 December  2020, ibid. 
5 FAO, Policy brief: The Impact of COVID -19 on Food Security and Nutrition, June 2020, page 3, 
https://www.un.org/sites)/un2.un.org/files/sg_polic y_brief_on_covid_impact_on_food_security.pdf . 
6 Congressional Research Service 2020 U.S. Farm Support: Outlook for Compliance with WTO 
Commitments, 2018 to 2020 (congress.gov) ; European Commission, Supporting the agriculture and food 
sectors amid Coronavirus | European Commission (europa.eu) . JOB/AG/203  
 
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  2. All other Members with Final Bound AMS entitlements exceeding applicable de minimis  levels  
shall cap their total product -specific AMS for each agr icultural product at the de minimis  level 
within a period of six calendar years from the date of this Decision.  
 
3. In addition, all Members with Final Bound AMS entitlements exceeding applicable de minimis  
levels  shall cap their total non product -specific AM S at the de minimis  level within a period of 
five calendar years from the date of this Decision.  
 
4. {Alt 1:  Developing country Members7 with Final Bound AMS entitlements exceeding applicable 
de minimis  levels  covered under paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 above shall have double the time period 
specified in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 to cap their relevant AMS at the de minimis  level.}  
 
{Alt 2: Developing country Members with Final Bound AMS entitlements exceeding applicable 
de minimis  levels  covered under paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 above shall have double the time period 
specified in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 to cap their relevant AMS at [50]% of  its average value in 
the last five  calendar years as notified to the WTO.} ] 
 
[ALT 2  
 
1. All Members with Final Bound AMS entitlements exceeding applicable de minimis  levels; (i) 
either accounting for a share of 10% or above in all Members ' total Final Bound AMS 
entitlements, or  (ii) accounting for x% of global exports of WTO Members  over the last [3] years 
in that product shall cap their total product -specific AMS for each agricultural product at the de 
minimis  level within a period of thre e calendar years  from the date of this Decision.  
 
2. All other Members with Final Bound AMS entitlements exceeding applicable de minimis  levels  
shall cap their total product -specific AMS for each agricultural product at the de minimis  level 
within a period of  six calendar years  from the date of this Decision.  
 
3. In addition, all Members with Final Bound AMS entitlements exceeding applied de minimis  levels  
shall cap their total non product -specific AMS at the de minimis  level within a period of five  
calendar year s from the date of this Decision.  
 
4. {Alt 1:  Developing country Members8 with Final Bound AMS entitlements exceeding applicable 
de minimis  levels covered under paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 above shall have double the time period 
specified in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 to cap their relevant AMS at the de minimis  level.}  
 
{Alt 2: Developing country Members with Final Bound AMS entitlements exceeding applicable 
de minimis  levels  covered under paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 above shall have double the time period 
specified in paragr aphs 1, 2 and 3 to cap their relevant AMS at [50]% of its average value in 
the last five  calendar years as notified to the WTO.} ] 
 
[ALT 3  
 
1. All Members with Final Bound AMS entitlements exceeding applicable de minimis  levels  shall 
cap their total product -specific AMS at the de minimis  level in respect of each agricultural 
product where the total product -specific support has exceeded  15%-20% of  the value of 
production as notified to the WTO any time within the last five calendar years , within a period 
of three calendar years  from the date of this Decision.  
 
2. All other Members with Final Bound AMS entitlements exceeding applicable de minimis  levels 
shall cap their total product -specific AMS at the de minimis  level in respect of all other 
agricultural products within a period of six calendar years  from the date of this Decision.  
 
3. In addition, all Members with Final Bound AMS entitlements exceeding a pplicable de minimis  
levels  shall cap their total non product -specific AMS at the de minimis  level within a period of 
five calendar years from the date of this Decision.  
 
7 For greater certainty fo r the purposes of this Decision, "developing country Member " includes least -
developed country Members.  
8 For greater certainty for the purposes of this Decision, "developing country Member " includes least -
developed country Members.  JOB/AG/203  
 
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  4. {Alt 1:  Developing country Members9 with Final Bound AMS entitlements exceeding applicable 
de minimis  levels covered under paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 above shall have double the time period 
specified in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 to cap their relevant AMS at the de minimis  level.}  
 
{Alt 2: Developing  country Members with Final Bound AMS entitlements exceeding applicable 
de minimis  levels  covered under paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 above shall have double the time period 
specified in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 to cap their relevant AMS at [50]% of its average value  in 
the last five  calendar years as notified to the WTO.} ] 
 
 
__________  
 
9 For greater certainty for the purposes of this Decision, "developing country Member " includes least -
developed country Members.