RESTRICTED  
  
WT/TPR/G/434  
9 November 2022  
(22-8373) Page: 1/39 
Trade Policy Review Body   Original: English  
 
TRADE POLICY REVIEW  
REPORT BY  
UNITED STATES 
Pursuant to the Agreement Establishing the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (Annex 3 of the 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization), the policy statement by the 
United  States  is attached.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: This report is subject to restricted circulation and press embargo until the end of the first 
session of the meeting of the Trade Policy Review Body on the United States . WT/TPR/G/434 • United States  
 
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  Contents  
1   THE UNITED STATES IN THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM  ................................ .............  4 
2   THE UNITED STATES ECONOMIC AND TRADE ENVIRONMENT  ................................ ...... 5 
2.1   Introduction  ................................ ................................ ................................ ................  5 
2.2   Economic Growth  ................................ ................................ ................................ ........  5 
2.3   Federal Budget Deficit  ................................ ................................ ................................ .. 5 
2.4   Nominal Savings/Investment  ................................ ................................ ........................  6 
2.5   Labor Markets  ................................ ................................ ................................ .............  6 
2.6   Productivity  ................................ ................................ ................................ ................  6 
2.7   Exports, Imports, and the Trade Balance  ................................ ................................ ........  7 
2.8   Challenges to the U.S. and Global Economy  ................................ ................................ .... 8 
3   ADVANCING A WORKER -CENTERED TR ADE POLICY  ................................ ....................  8 
3.1   Standing up for Worker Rights  ................................ ................................ ......................  8 
3.2   Accelerating Decarbonization and Promoting Sustainable Environmental Practices  ...............  9 
3.3   Supporting U.S. Agriculture  ................................ ................................ ......................... 10 
3.4   Bolstering Supply Chain Resiliency  ................................ ................................ ................ 10 
3.5   Combatting the COVID ‑19 Pandemic  ................................ ................................ ............. 11 
4   OPENNESS AND ACCOUNTABILITY: BUILDING SUPPORT FOR TRADE  .......................  12 
4.1   Promoting Equitable, Inclusive, and Durable Trade Policy  ................................ ................ 12 
4.2   Engagement and Consultation with Partners and Stakeholders  ................................ ......... 12 
4.3   Policy Coordination  ................................ ................................ ................................ .....12 
4.4   Public Input and Transparency  ................................ ................................ ..................... 13 
4.5   The Trade Advisory Committee System  ................................ ................................ ......... 13 
4.5.1    Tier I: President's Advisory Committee on Trade Policy and Negotiations  ........................ 14 
4.5.2    Tier II: Policy Advisory Committees ................................ ................................ ............ 14 
4.5.3    Tier III: Technical and Sectoral Committees  ................................ ................................ 14 
4.6   State and Local Government Relations  ................................ ................................ .......... 14 
4.6.1    State Single Point of Contact System and IGPAC  ................................ ......................... 15 
4.6.2    Meetings of State and Local Associations and Local Chambers of Commerce  ................... 15 
4.6.3    Consultations Regarding Specific Trade Issues  ................................ ............................. 15 
5   TRADE POLICY DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 2018  ................................ .............................  15 
5.1   WTO Agreements and Initiatives  ................................ ................................ .................. 15 
5.2   Trade Enforcement Activities  ................................ ................................ ........................ 16 
5.3   Other Monitoring and Enforcement Activities  ................................ ................................ ..17 
5.3.1    Addressing Non -market Policies and Practices  ................................ ............................. 18 
5.3.2    Ensuring Compliance with Labor Obligations  ................................ ................................ 19 
5.3.3    Addressing Forced Labor  ................................ ................................ ........................... 19 
5.4   Free Trade Agreements and Initiatives  ................................ ................................ .......... 20 
5.4.1    The Dominican  Republic -Central America – United  States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA -
DR) ................................ ................................ ................................ ................................ ..20 
5.4.2    United  States -Australia Free Trade Agreement  ................................ ............................ 21 WT/TPR/G/434 • United States  
 
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  5.4.3    United  States -Bahrain Free Trade Agreement  ................................ .............................. 21 
5.4.4    United  States -Chile Free Trade Agreement  ................................ ................................ ..21 
5.4.5    United  States -Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement  ................................ .................... 21 
5.4.6    United  States -Israel Free Trade Agreement  ................................ ................................ .22 
5.4.7    The United  States -Jordan Free Trade Agreement  ................................ ......................... 22 
5.4.8    United  States —Korea Free Trade Agreement  ................................ ............................... 22 
5.4.9    United  States -Mexico -Canada Agreement  ................................ ................................ ...23 
5.4.10    United  States -Morocco Free Trade Agreement  ................................ ........................... 24 
5.4.11    United  States -Oman Free Trade Agreement ................................ ............................... 24 
5.4.12    United  States – Panama Trade Promotion Agreement  ................................ ................. 24 
5.4.13    United  States –Peru Trade Promotion Agreement  ................................ ........................ 24 
5.4.14    United  States -Singapore Free Trad e Agreement  ................................ ......................... 25 
5.5   Other Initiatives  ................................ ................................ ................................ ......... 25 
5.5.1    Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum  ................................ ................................ ...25 
5.5.2    Japan  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..................... 25 
5.5.3    United  States –ASEAN Trade and Investment Framework Arrangement  ........................... 26 
5.5.4    Engagement with the Middle East and North Africa  ................................ ...................... 26 
5.5.5    Economic and Trade Agreement Between the Government of The United  States  
of America And the Government of The People's Republic of China (Phase One A greement)  ........ 26 
5.5.6    United  States -African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Engagement  ....................... 27 
5.5.7    United  States -Brazil Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation  ............................. 27 
5.5.8    United  States -Ecuador Protocol on Trade Rules and Transparency  ................................ ..27 
5.5.9    United  States/United Kingdom Dialogues on the Future of Atlantic Trade  ........................ 27 
5.5.10    Indo-Pacific Economic Framework  ................................ ................................ ............ 27 
5.5.11    U.S.-EU Trade and Technolog y Council  ................................ ................................ .....28 
5.6   Other Trade Activities  ................................ ................................ ................................ .29 
5.6.1    Protecting Intellectual Property (Including China -Related 301)  ................................ ......29 
5.6.2    Promoting Digital Trade  ................................ ................................ ............................ 30 
6   TRADE -RELATED CAPACITY BUILDING INITIATIVES ................................ .................  31 
6.1   WTO-Related U.S. Trade -Related Assistance  ................................ ................................ ..31 
6.1.1    The Enhanced Integrated Framework  ................................ ................................ ......... 32 
6.1.2    Trade -related Capacity Building Initiatives for Africa  ................................ .................... 32 
6.1.3    Standards Alliance  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...33 
7   UNITED  STATES PREFERENCE PROGRAMS  ................................ ................................ . 34 
7.1   Generalized System of Preferences (GSP)  ................................ ................................ ......34 
7.2   African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA)  ................................ ................................ ..34 
7.3   The Caribbean Basin Initiative  ................................ ................................ ...................... 35 
7.4   Nepal Preference Program  ................................ ................................ ........................... 35 
7.5   Haiti Hope  ................................ ................................ ................................ ................. 36 
8   TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT  ................................ ................................ .......................  36 
9   SMALL AND MEDIUM -SIZED BUSINESS TRADE  ................................ ..........................  38 WT/TPR/G/434 • United States  
 
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  1  THE UNITED STATES IN THE GLOBAL TRAD ING SYSTEM  
1.1.  As we undergo our fifteenth trade policy review, the United  States  affirms that our priorities at 
the WTO and in the global trading system are more important than ever . We are leveraging our core 
values of fairness, inclusivity, growth, and sustainability to navigate the myriad complex challenges 
we find ourselves in tod ay: a pandemic response, violent conflict initiated by one WTO Member 
against another, supply chain shortages, and environmental concerns.  
1.2.  The United  States  recognizes that trade can – and should – be a force for good. Done right, 
and in coordination with other policy disciplines, it can grow the middle class, redress inequality,  and 
level the playing field by promoting fair competition. We remain committed to upholding a fair and 
open global trading system – one that follows through on our partners ' longst anding commitment 
to conduct economic relations with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full employment, 
and promoting sustainable development.  
1.3.  To realize these goals, we must take stock of what has worked and what has not. This requires 
us to identify and rethink aspects of the existing trading system that incentivize or enable unfair 
competition. Competition in a global market provides Americans access to a wider variety of goods 
and services at competitive prices. But, too often our existing  global trade rules have rewarded 
advantages that are not based on fair competition. Consumers in the global marketplace are wage 
earners , producers, and members of broader communities that feel the effects of our trade policies. 
A trade model that promote s exploitation, whether of workers or the environment, is not efficient – 
it is a form of unfair competition. And it is not sustainable.  
1.4.  For these reasons, the Administration continues to advance its worker -centered trade policy. 
We are standing up for wor kers' rights – but it is more than that. We are promoting a broader agenda 
of fair competition to ensure that workers are competing on the basis of skills and creativity, not 
exploitative cost advantages. We are  focused on working with fellow WTO Members to chart new 
trade rules that do more to advance decarbonization and other critical environmental standards, 
support U.S. farmers, promote sustainable and resilient supply chains, and combat the COVID ‑19 
pandemic.  
1.5.  We know we cannot effectively advance our worker -centered trade policy alone. Many of our 
fellow WTO Members  share our goal of a fairer, more sustainable international economic regime, 
and we are steadily forging the partnerships necessary to update and enforce the rules governing 
the global econo my and trade. One example  is the deal we reached with the European  Union  (EU) 
to combat global oversupply in the steel and aluminum industry and negotiate a first -of-its-kind 
trade arrangement predicating market access on the greenhouse gas emissions of im ported steel 
and aluminum. Another  is the agreements we reached with the EU and the UK to resolve the 
longstanding aircraft disputes involving Boeing and Airbus, which allowed us to move past a 
perennial irritant and focus on shared interests, including fi nancing on market terms and the 
challenges posed by non -market economies. We are building on this momentum to advance broader 
goals of fair competition through all available avenues, whether bilateral, regional, or multilateral 
discussions; existing trade agreements and frameworks; or new initiatives. Where the scope of the 
challenge requires new tools, we will pursue them as well.  
1.6.  A vital element of our effort to build an inclusive trade policy agenda is understanding the 
effects of our policies on underr epresented and underserved workers and communities, and ensuring 
that they have a say in how our policies are designed going forward. A more inclusive framework 
will lead to more durable trade policy. Approaches to trade that rest on a narrow base of suppo rt 
are unsustainable, and could ultimately undermine U.S. leadership at a critical juncture. While our 
ambition is high, we are rising to the challenge.  
1.7.  Precisely because it is focused on workers as the engine of the global economy, the 
United  States ' trade policy will be a force for good – and will lead to a more durable, stable, and 
resilient trading system.  WT/TPR/G/434 • United States  
 
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  2  THE UNITED STATES ECONOMIC AND TRADE ENVIRONMENT  
2.1  Introduction  
2.1.  The period under review , October 2018 to June 2022, was marked by the onset of the 
COVID-19 pandemic that was accompanied by historic drops in output in both the United  States  and 
the world. The U.S. recovery has been strong, outpacing many of our trading partners, due primarily 
to an early and rapid vaccine rollout as well as significant f iscal and monetary policy support. Inflation 
emerged as a challenge for the United  States  and nearly all our major trading partners as strong 
demand, skewed toward goods and away from services, interacted with supply chain issues.  
2.2.  The United  States  mainta ins one of the world's most open trade regimes, with the WTO 
reporting the U.S. simple average MFN tariff at 3.34% in  2021 on a bound basis and 2. 34% in 2020 
on a trade weighted average basis. On an applied basis (considering GSP and other tariff 
preferenc es, as well as increased duties from section 232 and section 301 actions), the 
U.S. trade -weighted average tariff was 3.0 % in 2021. By comparison, simple average final bound 
tariffs in our top five trading partners (EU, Canada, Mexico, China, and Japan) ra nged from 4.6 % to 
36.5%, simple average applied tariffs ranged from 4.0%  to 7.5 %, and trade -weighted average tariffs 
ranged from 2. 4% to 4.1%. In 2021, 66 % of all U.S. imports (including under preference programs) 
entered the United  States  duty free. The United  States  also has among the lowest non -tariff barriers 
of any country in the world. U.S. service markets are open to foreign providers with limited 
exceptions, and U.S. regulatory processes are transparent, accessible, and open to public input.  
2.3.  The United  States  was the recipient of 17.6 % of goods and services exports from the rest of 
the world (excluding intra -European  Union  (EU) exports) in 2020 (lates t data available). The 
United  States  supplied 13.6 % of goods and services imports to the rest of the world (excluding 
intra-EU imports). Trade (exports and imports of goods and services) made up between 24 % and 
28% of U.S. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) between 2018 and 2021.  
2.2  Economic Growth  
2.4.  During the period under review, the U.S. economy had three distinct periods: continued 
expansion that started from June 2009 through February 2020 (a record 128 months , or more than 
10 consecutive years of growth), a sho rt but extreme recession brought upon by pandemic 
lockdowns and production shutdowns associated with the COVID ‑19 pandemic in March and April  of 
2020, and the current period of recovery that started after the recession's trough in April 2020. 
During the pe riod under review, U.S. real GDP increased 2.9 % (year/year) in 2018 and 2.3 % in 
2019. It declined 3.4 % in the pandemic year of 2020 (down 5.1 % at an annual rate in the first 
quarter and down a record 31.2 % in the second quarter, before increasing by a reco rd 33.8 % in the 
third quarter and 4.5 % in the fourth quarter). Real GDP increased 5.7 % in 2021, surpassing the 
pre-recession (2019:Q4) real GDP level in the second quarter. For the first  two quarter s of 2022, 
real GDP declined at an annualized rate of 1.6  and 0.6% , respectively, reflecting a slower increase 
in inventories, a surge in goods imports, and declines in government spending at all levels. However, 
the outlook for full year 2022 remains  positive despite headwinds such as the illegal Russian invasio n 
of Ukraine, continued (though easing) supply chain disruptions due to COVID ‑19 lockdowns in Asia, 
and rising interest rates. According to the Office of Management and Budget, U.S. real GDP growth 
is forecasted to be 1.4% , 1.8% , and 2.0 % for 2022, 2023, and 2024, respectively.  
2.5.  The strong economic recovery to date has been primarily driven  by increases in consumption 
and investment. However, pandemic -induced changes in behavior led to relatively more demand for 
goods than services, both d omestically produced and import ed. The increase in domestic demand 
along with production disruptions reduced the available supply for exports, while increasing demand 
for imports, adversely affecting  the overall U.S. trade balance. U.S. trade in  services h as taken 
longer to recover, and the pandemic has affected U.S. services exports to a greater extent than 
U.S. services imports.  
2.3  Federal Budget Deficit  
2.6.  U.S. fiscal support measures (including additional spending  and discretionary tax cuts), which 
ultimately  exceeded 25 % of U.S. GDP through  the third quarter of 2021, w ere a key factor in the 
quick recovery of the U.S. economy that was faster than that of most of our trading partners. WT/TPR/G/434 • United States  
 
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  U.S. federal government spending , which  directly support ed firms and workers  as well as state and 
local governments, was substantially larger than comparable efforts in other major economies. The 
UK response was under 20 % of GDP and average spending in the euro area was 12 % of GDP.  
2.7.  The U.S. Federal budget deficit increased from USD 779 billion (3.8% of GDP) in fiscal year 
(FY) 2018 and USD  984 billion (4.7% of GDP) in FY2019 to USD  3.1 trillion (15.0% of GDP) in 
FY2020 before decreasing  to USD  2.8 trillion (12.4 % of GDP) in FY2021. F or FY2022, the deficit is 
estimated to be USD  1.0 trillion ( 4.2%  of GDP). Notably, the deficit will be more than USD  1.7 trillion 
lower than FY2021, making it the largest ever one -year decline in U.S. history  to less than a third 
of the FY2020 deficit.  
2.8.  According to the U.S. Office of Management and Budget Mid-Session R eview of the FY2023 
Budget, the federal budget deficit is projected to be USD 1.3 trillion (4. 9% of GDP) in FY2023 and 
then to stabilize in the 4.2 -to-4.5%  of GDP range during the final years of the Budget window (2028 -
32). The gross Federal debt-to-GDP ratio is projected at 125.4%  in FY2022 before declining to 
116.4%  in FY2032.   
2.4  Nominal Savings/Investment  
2.9.  U.S. gross savings as a percentage of gross national income fluctuated during the period under 
review. They were  19.2% (USD 4.03 trillion)  in 2018 , 19.1 % (USD 4.16 trillion) in 2019, and then 
fell to 18.8 % (USD 4.00 trillion) in 2020 before increasing to 19.5 % (USD 4.63 trillion) in 2021. The 
personal saving rate was steady at 7.6 % in both 2018 and 2019 (prior to the recession), peaked at 
16.6% in 2020, declined to 12.3 % in 2021 and was 5.6 % in the first quarter of 2022. Overall, 
U.S. gross investment increased by USD 582 billion between 2018 and 2021 to USD 4.9 trillion.  
2.5  Labor Mark ets 
2.10.   The onset of the pandemic in the United  States  resulted in a decline in U.S. employment of 
1.5 million in March 2020 and 20.5 million in April 2020 (down 14.4 % between February 2020 and 
April 2020). As of Ju ly 2022, U.S. employment was 32,000 higher than the pre -pandemic peak of 
February 2020. Private employment declined 21.0 million (16.2 %) from February through 
April 2020, and as of Ju ly 2022, it was 629,000 higher than the pre -pandemic peak. Manufacturing 
employment payrolls declined by nearly 1.4 mi llion (10.7 %) between February and April 2020, but 
was 41,000 above the February 2020 level, as of Ju ly 2022. Employment in the service -providing 
sector (including government), accounting for 86 % of total employment  in July 2022 , was 40,000 
lower than the pre-pandemic peak of February 2020.  
2.11.   The unemployment rate also spiked in early 2020, from 3.5 % in February 2020 to 14.7 % in 
April 2020. It has systematically declined since then reaching 3.6 % over the March to June 2022 
period  and 3.5% in July 2022 . Prior  to the recession, the unemployment rate averaged  3.9% in 2018 
and 3.7 % in 2019.  
2.12.   The labor force participation rate rose from calendar year averages of 62.9% in 2018 to 63.1 % 
in 2019, but declined to averages of 61.8% in 2020 and 61.7 % in 2021. Though an improvement 
from the April 2020 low of 60.2 %, as of July 2022, it was 62. 1%, 1.3 percentage point below the 
February 2020 level.  
2.13.   Despite the pandemic, labor compensation has been increasing. Nominal average hourly 
earnings for all priv ate sector workers rose every year during the period under review, and as of 
July 2022 w ere 18.2%  higher than in September 2018  (the month prior to the start of the period 
under review) . After accounting for inflation, average hourly earnings were up only 0.5%  through 
July 2022. (Real earnings in April 2020 were 9 % higher than the level in December 2017; they have  
declined 7.2%  between April 2020 and July 2022. ) Real median household income in the 
United  States  was USD 67,521 in 2020 (latest available data) , down 2.9 % from 2019 (a record 
USD 69,560), but up 3.7 % from 2018 ( USD 65,127).  
2.6  Productivity  
2.14.   Labor productivity  growth , as measured by output per hour worked, ranged from 1.5% to 
2.4% annually between 2018 and 2021. Labor productivity declined by 7. 4% in the first quarter of WT/TPR/G/434 • United States  
 
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  2022, at an annual rate, the sharpest decline in 75 years  and then contracted again by 4.6% in the 
second quarter of 2022.  It is now up 4.9%  since the fourth quarter of 2017, an annualized pace of 
1.14%. Labor productivity is estimate d to grow at an average 1.8 % annual rate, above the 1.4 % 
average annual rate during the preceding business cycle but below the average 2 % annual rate over 
the 66 years through 2019.  
2.7  Exports, Imports, and the Trade Balance  
2.15.   U.S. exports and imports were bot h strongly affected by the COVID ‑19 pandemic, significantly 
declining in 2020 before recovering in 2021. Nominal U.S. exports of goods and services (on a 
balance of payments basis) were relatively steady at USD 2.5 trillion in both 2018 and 2019, before 
plummeting 15 % to USD 2.2 trillion in 2020 due to the pandemic. They increased 18 % to a record 
USD 2.56 trillion in 2021, and are up 20% so far in 2022 (year -to-date through June, as compared 
to the same period in 2021). Nominal U.S. imports of goods and services were also relatively steady 
at USD 3.1 trillion in 2018 and 2019, before declining 9 % in 2020. They increased 21 % in 2021 to 
a record USD 3.4 trillion (up 9.0 % over their pre-pandemic peak in 2018). Imports are up 23%, 
thus far in 2022 (year -to-date through June, as compared to the same period in 2021).  
2.16.   The COVID ‑19 pandemic affected services exports and imports significantly more than goods 
exports and imports, largely d ue to disruptions in travel and transport as people stayed at home. 
U.S. services exports and imports declined by 18.5 % and 21.4 %, respectively, in 2020, while goods 
exports and imports declined by 13.5 % and 6.6 %, respectively. Although goods exports and i mports 
have surpassed their pre -pandemic peaks by  5.0% and 11.6 % between 2018 and 2021, services 
exports and imports in 2021 were still 10.8 % and 7.3 % below their respective pre-pandemic peak s 
set in 2019. On a monthly basis, however, U.S. services imports  exceeded their pre-pandemic high 
in October 2021, while U.S. services exports surpassed their pre-pandemic high in April 2022. 
Nonetheless, U.S. travel services exports, the category most affected by the pandemic remained 
22% below its pre -pandemic peak a s of June 2022   
2.17.   In part due to the speed of the U.S. recovery relative to the rest of the world and amidst 
strong U.S. domestic demand, the U.S. trade deficit has widened. Goods imports have been 
particularly strong, as working and staying at home led to a  surge in demand for things like computer 
equipment, games, and cooking supplies. Although exports have hit record nominal highs, they 
increased at a slower pace than imports because many of the economies of countries that buy 
U.S. goods have not recovered  as fast. At the same time, new waves of COVID‑19 infection s 
depressed international travel and weighed on the recovery of some services that are important for 
U.S. exports such as tourism.  
2.18.   During the period of review, the U.S. goods and services trade de ficit with the world, 
decreased slightly from USD 579 billion in 2018 (2.8 % of GDP) to USD 560 billion in 2019 (2.6 % of 
GDP), before increasing in 2020 to USD 654 billion (3.1 % of GDP) and 2021 to a record  level of 
USD 845 billion (3.7 % of GDP). Through May 2022, the goods and services trade deficit  was 33% 
larger  than the same period in 2021.  
2.19.   Though trade in goods broadly recovered in 2021, supply bottlenecks slowed the recovery of 
both imports and exports of such products as automotiv e and capital goods that are at the heart of 
global value chains that were disrupted by pandemic -related challenges. Meanwhile, waves of 
COVID‑19 infections weighed down the recovery of cross -border trade in services. Although trade in 
services that are le ss reliant on personal contact followed a recovery pattern similar to goods, others, 
particularly travel and transportation services, continue to be impaired by the persistence of the 
virus. The sharp contraction of trade in travel services was a notable d rag on the U.S. trade balance 
in 2021. Exports of these services in the form of foreign tourists, students, and business travelers 
are typically a significant contributor to the surplus in the U.S. trade balance in services.  
2.20.   It is important to note that in flation has also played a role in these trade figures, as rising 
costs have contributed to larger nominal trade values. Into 2022, consumption patterns have shifted 
back toward services from goods as consumers begin to return to purchases in areas includin g leisure 
and dining , but the share of consumer expenditure on goods remains elevated relative to the 
pre-pandemic period . WT/TPR/G/434 • United States  
 
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  2.8  Challenges to the U.S. and Global Economy  
2.21.   Inflation remains a global challenge. Many factors contributed to higher prices, including a 
slow recovery in global energy production, supply -chain disruptions and related shortages of specific 
inputs, persistently strong demand for durable goods, rising food costs in part due to supply chain 
issues , brisk growth in house prices, and increased demand for services (such as travel, leisure, and 
hospitality) as the economy reopened.  
2.22.   The Russian Federation' s unprovoked and unjustifiable war with Ukraine has further 
challenged the global outlook. It has exacerbated supply disruptions , driven up ener gy costs  and 
increas ed food insecurity. The IMF projects global growth to slow from an estimated 6.1 % in 2021 
to 3.2% in 2022 and 2.9% in 2023, which is 1.2 and 0. 9 percentage points lower for 2022 and 2023 
than the IMF 's projections in January 2022.  
2.23.   Globa l current account imbalances have also widened due to the trade distortions associated 
with the pandemic. In general, and especially at a time of recovering global growth, adjustments to 
reduce excessive imbalances should occur thorough a symmetric rebalan cing process that sustains 
global growth momentum rather than through asymmetric compression of demand in deficit 
economies – the channel which too often has dominated in the past.  
3  ADVANCING A WORKER -CENTERED TRADE POLICY  
3.1  Standing up for Worker Rights  
3.1.  Labor issues  have been an important part of U.S. trade policy throughout the reporting period. 
In 2021, the United  States made it a priority to  bring labor issues and topics important to working 
people to the forefront of trade policy. USTR engaged with govern ments around the world to 
recalibrate trade policy to ensure that real people can realize the benefits of international trade. In 
addition, the United  States  increased stakeholder consultations to ensure workers ' voices are heard 
and considered throughout the policy -making process. Under this new policy approach, the 
United  States  promoted respect for labor rights as part of engagement with trade partners in 2021 
through the formal mechanisms of trade agreements and trade preference programs, as well as 
through country -specific initiatives, capacity building, and technical assistance.  
3.2.  One of the United  States'  top priorities is effective implementation and enforcement of existing 
trade commitments, including the United  States –Mexico –Canada Agreement (USMCA).  The 
United  States  reported on the USMCA negotiations in our 2018 report. The Agreement, which 
entered into force in July 2020, includes the strongest labor provisions in any trade agreement, as 
well as a ground -breaking labor enforcement tool, the rapid r esponse labor mechanism (RRM). The 
RRM allows the United  States  to quickly take action and target specific facilities in Mexico where 
workers are being denied their rights to freedom of association and collective bargaining. The 
United  States  has triggered  the mechanism five times  and has  secur ed concrete wins for workers. 
For more information on how the United  States  is promoting compliance with the labor commitments 
included in our trade instruments, see 5.2 Trade Enforcement Activities . For more information on 
the USMCA, see section 5.4.9 United  States -Mexico -Canada Agreement.  
3.3.  In addition, the United  States  has promoted the creation of innovative trade tools to address 
topics important to working people. We are prioritizing labor issues in the United  States -
European  Union  Trade and Technology Council (TTC), in the Indo -Pacific Economic Framework 
(IPEF), in t he United  States – United Kingdom Dialogues on the Future of Atlantic Trade, the 
U.S.-Taiwan Initiative  on 21st Century Trade, and in the United  States -Kenya Strategic Trade and 
Investment Partnership .  
3.4.  The United  States  has elevated the problem of forced labor in supply chains with our trading 
partners. On 25 January  2022, the United  States  announced that it will develop its first -ever focused 
trade strategy to combat forced labor. It will include a thorough interagency review of USTR 's 
existing trade poli cies and tools to combat forced labor, to determine areas that may need 
strengthening, and to identify gaps that need to be filled. For more information on USTR 's work to 
combat forced labor, see section 5.3.3 Addressing Forced Labor .  WT/TPR/G/434 • United States  
 
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  3.5.  The United  States  is also bringing its worker -centered trade policy and commitment to fair 
competition to multilateral and bilateral  engagements . In 2021, the United  States  chaired the trade 
session on "Making Trade Work for All " at the 60th Organization for Economic Cooperat ion and 
Development (OECD) Ministerial Council Meeting, focusing the discussion on labor issues. The 
United  States  is calling upon other regional and multilateral organizations, such as Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Asia -Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and the WTO and its 
Members to consider how to more effectively respond to  the needs of workers . The United  States  
has and will continue to press WTO members to address the use of forced labor on fishing vessels.  
3.2  Accelerating Decarboniz ation and Promoting Sustainable Environmental Practices  
3.6.  Combating the climate crisis and promoting sustainable environmental practices are top 
priorities for the United  States . In this regard, the United  States  considers trade an indispensable 
tool in add ressing the climate crisis.  
3.7.  The traditional approach to climate and environmental issues within trade has primarily focused 
on advancing levels of environmental protection for our trading partners. The United  States  will 
continue this work to strengthen an d expand those commitments, but we also recognize that this 
singular approach will not fully achieve our climate goals. To this end, the United  States  is pursuing 
a new generation of trade policies that will more affirmatively promote the decarbonization n ecessary 
to limit global temperature increase to 1.5 degrees Celsius.  
3.8.  Launched during the U.S. -EU Summit in June 2021 to deepen transatlantic trade and economic 
relations, the Trade and Technology Council (TTC) held its inaugural meeting in September 2021.  
During this meeting, the co -chairs reaffirmed the TTC 's commitment to grow the transatlantic trade 
and investment relationship, fight the climate crisis, and protect the environment. Under the U.S. -EU 
TTC Climate and Clean Tech and Global Trade Challenges  working groups, the United  States  will 
work with the EU to collaboratively advance trans -Atlantic priorities to address climate and 
environmental issues.  
3.9.  In October 2021, the United  States  and the EU further announced their commitment to 
negotiate the wor ld's first emissions -based sectoral arrangement on steel and aluminum trade. 
Together, the United  States  and EU are working to address the carbon intensity of steel and 
aluminum traded into their market , as well as countries that adopt non -market practices  that 
contribut e to worldwide over -supply. The arrangement will drive investment in green steel and 
aluminum production in the United  States , Europe, and around the world, reducing emissions in two 
of the most carbon -intensive industrial sectors .  
3.10.   The agre ement is proof that trade policy is an important part of our climate agenda, and that 
effective climate action can —and must —support good -paying, quality jobs. It is also a first in the 
fight against climate change: never before have two global partners aligned their trade policies to 
confront the joint threats of climate change and global market distortions, ensuring that trade works 
to solve the challenges of the 21st century.  
3.11.   The United  States  continues to encourage like -minde d trading partners to work with us to 
address the emissions intensity of steel and aluminum production and non -market excess capacity 
in the steel and aluminum sectors. For example, through regional engagements, the United  States  
plans to pursue opportunit ies to maintain and improve environmental protection of our trading 
partners and increase climate ambition, including decarboniz ation of  our respective economies. We 
will seek to enable and mobilize the technologies, public and private investment, and tech nical 
resources needed to scale up clean energy infrastructure and facilitate trade in climate -friendly 
goods, services, and technologies, while generating high -quality jobs that power economic growth 
and advance our Paris Agreement commitments.  
3.12.   In additi on, in June 2022, the United  States  joined other WTO Members to reach agreement 
on the first multilateral trade agreement with environment at its core – the WTO  Agreement  on 
Fisheries Subsidies. The Agreement prohibits subsidies to those engaged in illegal , unreported, and 
unregulated ( IUU) fishing or fishing related activities in support of IUU fishing, subsidies for fishing 
on overfished stocks, and subsidies for fishing on the unregulated high seas. It also includes 
enhanced transparency provisions, whic h will provide important additional information regarding 
Members ' fisheries and subsidies programs. Negotiations will continue in order to reach agreement WT/TPR/G/434 • United States  
 
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  on additional disciplines on subsidies that contribute to overfishing and overcapacity. The 
United  States is committed to working with all WTO members to ensure this agreement promptly 
enters into force, and to further enhance the disciplines, to improve the sustainability of our fisheries 
resources and the lives of fishers.  
3.13.   The United  States  also seeks  to protect our oceans and marine resources, and those whose 
livelihoods depend on them, from the harm caused by plastic pollution. In 2022, the United  States  
supported the launch of multilateral negotiations on an international agreement on plastic pollut ion. 
The United  States  recognizes the key role that trade plays as both a contributor to the problem of 
plastic pollution in the environment, including the marine environment, and its potential to serve as 
an important part of the solution.  
3.14.   Finally, the U nited States  will continue to support and promote more circular and 
resource -efficient approaches in other international fora, including the WTO 's Committee on Trade 
and Environment and the Trade and Environmental Sustainability Structured Discussions, and  at the 
OECD. In the APEC forum, we are leading a Recyclable Materials Policy Program under the Committee 
on Trade and Investment. We will continue to support and expand this work, to help develop the 
capacity of APEC economies to identify and frame domest ic policies that promote solid waste 
management and recycling infrastructure.  
3.3  Supporting U.S. Agriculture  
3.15.   U.S. farmers, ranchers, food manufacturers, and fishers compete in global markets, and 
expanded market access raises incomes, expands employment, and  enables farms, ranches, 
manufacturing plants, and fishing operations to thrive. The United  States  is committed to standing 
up for American farmers, ranchers, food manufacturers, and fishers by pursuing trade policies that 
are inclusive and work for all pr oducers, and, by enforcing global agricultural trade rules.  
3.16.   For example, in May 2021, the United  States  requested and established the first dispute 
settlement panel under the USMCA to review whether Canada violated its dairy commitments under 
the USMCA. Sp ecifically, we challenged Canada 's dairy TRQ allocation measures that undermine the 
value of the TRQs by setting aside and reserving access to in -quota quantities exclusively for 
Canadian processors, thereby undermining the ability of American dairy export ers to sell a wide 
range of products  to Canadian consumers. In December 2021, the United  States  prevailed in this 
proceeding, with the panel agreeing that Canada had breached its USMCA commitments. This 
demonstrates the United  States'  commitment to ensurin g that our trade agreements benefit 
American workers, including farmers, and it will ensure that the U.S. dairy industry receives the full 
benefits of the USMCA to market and sell U.S. products to Canadian consumers.  
3.17.   On 16  May 2022, Canada published polic y changes to implement the panel's finding. The 
United  States rejected these changes as a basis to resolve the dispute because Canada remains out 
of compliance with its USMCA obligations. USTR initiated a second USMCA dispute on Canada's 
allocation measure s on 25  May. 
3.18.   The United  States  will continue using our enforcement tools to ensure that our trading 
partners deliver on their commitments and that U.S. agricultural producers receive the benefits 
negotiated in existing FTAs. The United  States  support s U.S. farmers by insisting that trading 
partners implement fair and science -based policies for U.S. agriculture products, including those 
grown and developed through innovative technologies, in order  to ensure that U.S. farmers can 
continue supplying safe, nutr itious and cost -competitive food and agricultural products around the 
world.  
3.4  Bolstering Supply Chain Resiliency  
3.19.   The COVID ‑19 pandemic  and the Russian Federation' s further  invasion of Ukraine have 
created significant disruptions to global supply chains and trade. These stresses put a spotlight on 
pre-existing vulnerabilities in many supply chains, including in the United  States , and the disruptions 
have led to higher costs for manufacturers, farmers, businesses, and families. The United  States  is 
focused on addressing these bottlenecks, securing our critical supply chains, lowering prices, and 
revitalizing American manufacturing.  WT/TPR/G/434 • United States  
 
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  3.20.   President Biden signed Executive Order 14017,  "Securing America 's Supply Chains ", in 
February 2021, directing a whole -of-government approach to assess vulnerabilities in, and 
strengthen the resilience of, critical U.S. supply chains. Pursuant to the Executive Order, the 
United  States  conducted a 100 -day review for four priority product areas: semiconductors, large 
capacity batteries, critical minerals and materials, and pharmaceuticals and active pharmaceutical 
ingredients.  
3.21.   Further, in February 2022, the United  States  released the results of year -long reviews of 
six industrial base supply chains: defense, transportation, energy, information and communications 
technology, public health, and agriculture and food. As part of these reviews, agencies looked at 
new policies and investments across a number of  sectors to address the supply chain vulnerabilities 
that come from geographically concentrated sourcing and to spur the transition to a low carbon 
economy.  
3.22.   As part of the recommendations that emerged from the 100 -day reports, prepared pursuant 
to Executi ve Order 14017 the United  States  established an interagency Supply Chain Trade Task 
Force (Task Force) led by USTR. Through this Task Force, USTR brings together a broad range of 
U.S. government agencies to identify unfair foreign trade practices that have  eroded U.S. critical 
supply chains, as well as opportunities to use U.S. trade agreements and trade tools to strengthen 
the collective supply chain resilience of the United  States  and our trad ing partners.  
3.23.   The United  States  is engaging bilaterally and mul tilaterally with its trading partners and 
stakeholders  to, inter alia , identify supply chain bottlenecks and chokepoints; ensure supply chains 
embody strong environmental and labor standards; and facilitate trade in the context of  supply chain 
shocks . 
3.5  Comb atting the COVID ‑19 Pandemic  
3.24.   Consistent with our trade policy agenda that recognizes that people are the core of our 
economy, USTR is working closely with a number of agencies to ensure that trade rules support, and 
do not impede, the global response to th e COVID ‑19 pandemic. The Biden Administration is taking 
a whole -of-government approach to address the pandemic, at home and abroad. These efforts 
include COVID ‑19 vaccine donations through COVAX and other fora, investment in vaccine 
production and delivery  infrastructure in underserved regions, and working with trading partners to 
facilitate the flow of goods. USTR also recognizes the critical role of digital trade and digitally 
supported services in meeting the challenges of the pandemic and supporting eco nomic resilience, 
and will continue to work to ensure that these flows are not obstructed.  
3.25.   The pandemic has placed tremendous strain on peoples ' health and livelihoods around the 
world. During the WTO 's 12th Ministerial Conference in June 2022, Members ag reed to a Ministerial 
Declaration on the WTO Response to the COVID ‑19 Pandemic and Preparedness for Future 
Pandemics. The Declaration positions Members to undertake relevant and meaningful work in 
WTO bodies to build resilience through the sharing of infor mation and experiences and the analysis 
of lessons learned from COVID ‑19 responses. The Declaration reflects core values of the 
United  States'  approach to international trade and the multilateral framework: transparency, 
cooperation, and respect for a rule s-based system.  
3.26.   WTO Members also agreed at the 12th Ministerial Conference on a Ministerial Decision on the 
WTO Agreement  on Trade -Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) that provides 
accommodations to the intellectual property rules for COVID ‑19 vaccines that can facilitate a global 
health recovery. For over a year, the United  States , as part of its compreh ensive effort to end the 
pandemic, worked constructively with other Members to facilitate discussions and bridge differences 
that led to an outcome on intellectual property that achieved consensus across the 164 Members of 
the WTO.  
3.27.   It is important that ou r work on trade and health does not end at the 12th Ministerial 
Conference. This pandemic will not be the last public health crisis we encounter. The United  States  
will continue to work with other WTO Members to strengthen the resolve of the international 
community to protect people and maintain the free flow of goods and services.  WT/TPR/G/434 • United States  
 
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  4  OPENNESS AND ACCOUNTABILITY: BUILDING SUPPORT FOR TRADE  
4.1  Promoting Equitable, Inclusive, and Durable Trade Policy  
4.1.  In coordination with other economic policies, trade policy can h ave positive and equitable 
impact on marginalized, underserved, and disadvantaged communities, including and especially 
workers in the United  States  and abroad, grow the middle class, redress inequality, and level the 
playing field by promoting fair competition.  The United  States  recognizes that an intersectional, 
interconnected framework in trade and investment policy advances the United  States'  economic 
competitiveness and resiliency while expanding the benefits of trade. Thus,  equity is critical when 
designing inclusive and durable trade policy . Consistent with USTR 's Fiscal Year 2022 -2026 Strategic 
Plan, whole -of-government Presidential policy dire ctives, and the United  States'  National Strategy 
on Gender Equity and Equality, advancing racial and gender equity is mainstreamed in U.S. trade 
policy.  
4.2.  Accurate and accessible disaggregated economic data to assess the impact of trade on different 
types o f U.S. workers is critical to informing trade policy actions. USTR requested that the 
U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) conduct an independent investigation of the potential 
distributional effects of goods and services trade and trade policy on U .S. workers, by level of skill, 
wage and salary level, gender, race/ethnicity, and age, especially the effects on underrepresented 
and underserved communities. This investigation will explore gaps in existing data and economic 
literature, and propose follo w-up analyses that could be done with restricted data (i.e.  data that is 
not publicly available or otherwise available to relevant USG analysts). USTR will make the 
investigation report publicly available. The United  States  will take into account the poten tial 
distributional effects of trade and trade policy, including goods and services imports and exports, on 
U.S. workers in all future trade initiatives.  
4.2  Engagement and Consultation with Partners and Stakeholders  
4.3.  Close collaboration between the U.S. Execu tive and Legislative  branches of government is 
critical to developing successful U.S. trade policy. USTR welcomes and seeks guidance and feedback 
from Members of Congress to share their views and constituents ' priorities regarding trade 
policy.  USTR regula rly briefs Congress on initiatives.  For example, in 2022, USTR has briefed 
Congress extensively on initiatives including: responses to the COVID ‑19 pandemic, the Indo -Pacific 
Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF), the U.S -Taiwan  Initiative on 21st Centu ry Trade, the 
United  States -Kenya Strategic Trade and Investment Partnership,  the WTO 's MC12, the U.S./UK 
Dialogue on the Future of Atlantic Trade, and the United  States -Mexico -Canada Agreement (USMCA) 
enforcement actions on dairy and labor rights.  
4.4.  The Un ited States  understands that in order to ensure durable robust outcomes, USTR must 
proactively seek input from stakeholders, including those from underserved, underrepresented, and 
marginalized communities, to ensure that their concerns are considered in d esigning trade policy. 
USTR officials meet virtually and travel extensively across the country to listen, learn, and build 
trusted relationships and lines of communication with Members of Congress and their constituents, 
Tribal Nations, State and local ele cted officials, labor and civil society leaders, academia, 
communities, and entrepreneurs to inform the development of inclusive policy that delivers equitable 
results.  
4.3  Policy Coordination  
4.5.  USTR has primary responsibility, with the advice of the interagenc y trade policy organization, 
for developing and coordinating the implementation of U.S. trade policy, including on commodity 
matters, and, to the extent they are related to trade, direct investment matters. Under the Trade 
Expansion Act of 1962, the U.S. C ongress established an interagency trade policy mechanism to 
assist with the implementation of these responsibilities. This organization, as it has evolved, consists 
of tiers of committees that constitute the principal mechanism for developing and coordina ting 
U.S. Government positions on international trade and trade -related investment issues.  
4.6.  USTR chairs and administers both the Trade Policy Review Group (TPRG) and the Trade Policy 
Staff Committee (TPSC). The TPRG 's membership is at the Deputy/Under Secre tary level. The TPSC 's 
membership is at the senior civil servant level. The 21 voting member agencies of the TPRG and WT/TPR/G/434 • United States  
 
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  TPSC are: USTR, the U.S. Departments of Commerce, Agriculture, State, Treasury, Labor, Justice, 
Defense, Interior, Transportation, Energy,  Health and Human Services, and Homeland Security; the 
Environmental Protection Agency; the Office of Management and Budget; the Council of Economic 
Advisers; the Council on Environmental Quality; the U.S. Agency for International Development; the 
Small Bu siness Administration; the National Economic Council, and the National Security Council. 
The U.S. International Trade Commission is a non -voting member of the TPSC and an observer at 
TPRG meetings. USTR may invite representatives of other agencies to atten d meetings depending 
on the specific issues discussed.  
4.7.  Supporting the TPSC are subcommittees responsible for specialized issues. Through the 
interagency process, USTR requests input and analysis from the subject matter experts of the 
appropriate TPSC subco mmittee or task force. The conclusions and recommendations of the 
subcommittee or task force are presented to the TPSC and serve as the basis for reaching 
interagency consensus. In cases where the TPSC does not reach agreement on a topic, or if the 
issue u nder consideration involves particularly significant policy questions, the issue may be referred 
to the TPRG or to Cabinet Principals.  
4.4  Public Input and Transparency  
4.8.  The United  States  has broadened opportunities for public input and worked to ensure the 
transparency of trade policy through various initiatives. This is accomplished in part via USTR 's 
interactive website; online postings of Federal Register notices soliciting public comment and input 
and publicizing public hearings held by the TPSC; opportunit ies for public comment and interaction 
with negotiators during trade negotiations; agency outreach to and engagement of all stakeholder 
sectors including State and local governments, labor unions, business and trade associations, small 
and medium -sized bus inesses, agriculture groups, environmental organizations, industry groups, 
consumer advocacy groups, non -governmental organizations, academia, think tanks, and the public 
generally; regular data updates to help the public understand and evaluate the role o f trade; and 
participation in discussions of trade policy at major domestic trade events and academic conferences.  
4.9.  For example, in 2021 and 2022, the TPSC held public hearings or fostered public participation 
by inviting written submissions and responses to questions from the TPSC on a range of topics, 
including: the Special 301 Review (January to March 2021); the WTO Dispute Settlement Proceeding 
Regarding United  States –Origin Marking Requirement (Hong Kong, China) (March to April 2021); 
Proposed Actions on Digital Services Taxes (June 2021); the annual African Growth and Opportunity 
Act country eligibility review (May to June 2021); the USTR report to Congress regarding the 
operation of the Caribbean Basin Initiative (July to August 2021); Certain Product s Exclusions 
Related to COVID ‑19: China 's Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, 
Intellectual Property, and Innovation (August to December 2021); the 2021 Review of Notorious 
Markets for Counterfeiting and Piracy (August to October 2 021); the National Trade Estimate Report 
on Foreign Trade Barriers (September and October 2021); China 's Compliance with its WTO 
Commitments (September and October 2021); the Russian Federation' s Implementation of its WTO 
Commitments (September and October 2021); the Extension Review of the Safeguard Action on 
Imports of Certain Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Cells (September to December 2021); the Fair 
and Resilient Trade Pillar of an Indo -Pacific Economic Framework (March and April 2022); and the  
U.S.–Taiwan Initiative  on 21st -Century Trade (June and July 2022).  
4.5  The Trade Advisory Committee System  
4.10.   The trade advisory committee system, established by the U.S. Congress by statute in 1974, 
was created to ensure that U.S. trade policy and trade negotia ting objectives adequately reflect 
U.S. public and private sector interests. Substantially broadened and reformed over the subsequent 
four decades, the system remains a central means of ensuring that USTR 's senior officers and line 
negotiators receive idea s, input, and critiques from a wide range of public interests. The system now 
consists of 26 advisory committees, with a total membership of up to approximately 700 advisors. 
Advisory committee members represent the full span of interests, including manufa cturing; 
agriculture; digital trade; intellectual property; services; small businesses; labor; environment, 
consumer and public health organizations; and State and local governments. USTR manages the 
advisory committee system in collaboration with the U.S.  Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, 
and Labor. The advisory committee system is organized into three tiers: the President 's Advisory 
Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiations (ACTPN); five policy advisory committees, dealing with WT/TPR/G/434 • United States  
 
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  environment, labor, a griculture, Africa, and State and local governments; and 20 technical advisory 
committees in the areas of industry and agriculture.  
4.5.1   Tier I: President 's Advisory Committee on Trade Policy and Negotiations  
4.11.   As the highest -level committee in the system, the Pr esident 's ACTPN examines U.S. trade 
policy and agreements from the broad context of the overall national interest. The ACTPN consists 
of no more than 45 members, who are broadly representative of the key economic sectors of the 
economy affected by trade, i ncluding non -federal government, labor, industry, agriculture, small 
business, service industries, retailers, and consumer interests. The President appoints ACTPN 
members to four -year terms not to exceed the duration of the charter. A list of all the ACTPN  
members and the diverse interests they represent is available on the USTR website at : 
https://ustr.gov/about -us/advisory -committees/adviso ry-committee -trade -policy -and-
negotiations -actpn .  
4.5.2   Tier II: Policy Advisory Committees  
4.12.   Members of the five policy advisory committees are appointed by USTR or in conjunction with 
other Cabinet officers. USTR manages the Agricultural Policy Advisory Committ ee jointly with the 
U.S. Department of Agriculture and the Labor Advisory Committee for Trade Negotiations and Trade 
Policy jointly with the U.S. Department of Labor. The Intergovernmental Policy Advisory Committee 
on Trade, the Trade and Environment Polic y Advisory Committee (TEPAC), and the Trade Advisory 
Committee on Africa are appointed and managed solely by USTR. Each committee provides advice 
based on the perspective of its specific area, and their members are chosen to represent the diversity 
of inte rests in each area.  
4.13.   Beginning with the October 2021 TEPAC Federal Register nomination notice, USTR is exploring 
how the re -chartering of USTR -managed advisory committees can further the objectives of Executive 
Order (EO) 13985, Advancing Racial Equity and Support for Underserved Communities Through the 
Federal Government, and EO 14035, Diversity, Equity, Inclusion, and Accessibility in the Federal 
Workforce . 
4.14.   A list of all the members of the policy advisory committees and the diverse interests they 
represent  is available on the USTR website at : https://ustr.gov/about -us/advisory -
committees/advisory -committee -trade-policy -and-negotiations -actpn . 
4.5.3   Tier III: Technical and Sectoral Committees  
4.15.   The 20 technical and sectoral advisory committees are organized into two areas: agriculture 
and industry. Representatives are appointed jointly by the U.S. Trade Representative and the 
U.S. Secretaries of Agriculture or Commerce, respectively. Each sectoral or technical committee 
represents a specific sector, commodity group, or functional area and provides specific technical 
advice concerning the effect that trade policy decisions may have o n its sector or issue.  
4.16.   A list of all members of the agriculture committees and the diverse interests they represent 
is available on the U.S. Department of Agriculture website at : 
https://www.fas.usda.gov/topics/trade -advisory -committees . A list of all members of the industry 
committees and the diverse interests they represent is available on the U.S. Department of 
Commerce website at : https://www.trade.gov/industry -trade -advisory -center . 
4.6  State and Local Government Relations  
4.17.   USTR maintains consultative procedures between Federal trade officials and State and local 
governments. USTR informs each State on an ongoing basi s of trade -related matters that directly 
relate to, or that may have a direct effect on, it. U.S. territories may also participate in this process. 
USTR also serves as a liaison point in the Executive Branch for State and local government and 
Federal agenc ies to transmit information to interested State and local governments and relay advice 
and information from the states on trade -related matters. This is accomplished through a number 
of mechanisms, detailed below.  WT/TPR/G/434 • United States  
 
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  4.6.1   State Single Point of Contact System and I GPAC  
4.18.   For day -to-day communications, USTR operates a State Single Point of Contact (SPOC) 
system. Under the SPOC system, each State Governor 's office designates a single contact point to 
disseminate information received from USTR to relevant State and local  offices. Through the SPOC 
system, State governments are promptly informed of U.S. Executive Branch trade initiatives so that 
they can provide companies and workers with information that will allow them to take full advantage 
of increased foreign market ac cess and reduced trade barriers. In turn, the SPOC system assists in 
relaying specific information and advice from the states to USTR on trade -related matters, thereby 
enabling USTR to consult with states and localities directly on trade matters that may a ffect them.  
4.19.   USTR also works closely with the Intergovernmental Policy Advisory Committee on Trade 
(IGPAC) made up of various State and local officials. The IGPAC makes recommendations to USTR 
and the Executive Branch generally on trade policy matters from the perspective of State and local 
governments. IGPAC members are also invited to participate in periodic teleconference briefings, 
similar to teleconference calls held for SPOC and chairs of the advisory committees.  
4.6.2   Meetings of State and Local Association s and Local Chambers of Commerce  
4.20.   USTR officials participate frequently in meetings of State and local government associations 
and local chambers of commerce to apprise them of relevant trade policy issues and solicit their 
views. USTR senior officials have  met with the National Governors ' Association and other State and 
local commissions and organizations.  
4.6.3   Consultations Regarding Specific Trade Issues  
4.21.   USTR consults with particular states and localities on issues arising under the WTO and other 
U.S. trade ag reements and frequently responds to requests for information from State and local 
governments.  
5  TRADE POLICY DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 2018  
5.1  WTO  Agreement s and Initiatives  
5.1.  The United  States  is committed to the WTO  and believes we must work within the WTO to 
encourage a race to the top and  confront global challenges as they arise. There is a strong precedent 
for this approach: the Marrakesh Declaration and Agreement, on which the WTO is founded, begins 
with the reco gnition that the purpose of trade should be to raise living standards and ensure full 
employment, bearing in mind the objective of sustainable development, and the need to protect and 
preserve the environment.   
5.2.  Unfortunately, the WTO has fallen short with respect to these ambitions, and its relevance and 
credibility have accordingly come under fire. In recent years, the WTO 's inadequacy in responding 
to the needs of everyday people and the inability of current rules to effectively constrain unfair trade 
and economic practices have only become clearer. At MC12, Members demonstrated that the 
organization can remain relevant in today 's international trading system by agreeing to a package 
of outcomes, including the first multilateral agreement produced by the W TO in nearly a decade. 
While these achievements are welcome, there is still much work to be done.  
5.3.  That is why the United  States  supports a WTO reform agenda that reflects the priorities of a 
worker -centered approach – one that protects our planet, supports  improved labor conditions and 
living standards , and contributes to shared prosperity. This reform agenda includes restoring efficacy 
to the negotiating arm and promoting transparency; improving compliance with and enforcement of 
Members ' WTO commitments; and equipping the organization to effectively address the unfair 
practices of non -market economies ––such as economic coercion ––and global market distortions.  
5.4.  Another aspect of reform is to the WTO 's dispute settlement function. For many years, 
WTO dispute settlement has not met the needs of WTO Members, including the United  States , for 
example, due to its complexity, delays, lack of transparency, and interpretive overreach. Many 
Members share U.S. concerns with the functioning of the system and its negative  impact on the 
WTO's negotiating and monitoring functions. This fact underscores the importance of understanding WT/TPR/G/434 • United States  
 
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  better the interests of all Members in dispute settlement. The United  States  supports a reform 
discussion that aims to ensure that WTO dispute settlement reflects the real interests of Members. 
The United  States  has been, and will continue to be, engaging with Members with an aim to achieving 
durable, lasting reform.  
5.5.  These reform conversations will take time. The United  States  recognizes the impo rtance of 
holding open and inclusive reform conversations that promote equity and fairness among all WTO 
Members. Meanwhile, the United  States  will continue to work constructively with other Members to 
deliver results on achievable outcomes at the WTO.  
5.2  Trade Enforcement Activities  
5.6.  Trade enforcement encompasses a broad range of activities, including monitoring of trade 
agreements, direct engagement with trading partners, use of domestic trade laws, and engagement 
in multilateral fora such as the WTO. USTR c oordinates the U.S. Government's trade enforcement 
activities. Ensuring full implementation of U.S. trade agreements is one of the strategic priorities of 
the United  States .  
5.7.  The United  States  has been actively engaged in numerous WTO dispute settlement ac tions, 
including important offensive actions related to agricultural market access in China, India, and 
Indonesia, China's excessive agricultural domestic support, and Indian prohibited export subsidies. 
The United  States  has also initiated actions relatin g to additional duties imposed by certain Members 
related to the administration's actions under section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 to 
address the threat to national security presented by imports of steel and aluminum, as well as 
participating i n related defensive actions brought by certain Members.  
5.8.  Where appropriate, the United  States  applies the full range of its trade laws, including section 
301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (Trade Act), as amended. Section 301 of the Trade Act is designed to 
facilitate USTR's examining and addressing foreign unfair practices affecting U.S. commerce. For 
example, on 2  October  2020, USTR initiated an investigation regarding whether Viet  Nam's acts, 
policies and practices related to the import and use of illegally ha rvested or traded timber  are 
actionable under section 301. USTR held a public hearing on 28 December  2020, and two rounds of 
public written comments. On 1 October  2021, the United  States  and Viet  Nam signed an agreement 
that addresses U.S. concerns in the investigation. USTR will monitor Viet  Nam's implementation of 
the Agreement. On 2 October  2020, USTR also initiated an investigation regarding whether 
Viet Nam's acts, policies and practices related to the valuation of its currency are actionable under 
section 301. USTR held a public hearing on 29 December  2020 and solicited two rounds of public 
written comments. On 15 January  2021, the U.S. Trade Representative determined that Viet  Nam's 
acts, policies, and practices related to currency valuation, includin g excessive foreign exchange 
market interventions and other related actions, taken in their totality, are unreasonable and burden 
or restrict U.S. commerce, and thus actionable under section 301. On 23 July 2021, based on an 
agreement reached between the D epartment of the Treasury (Treasury) and the State Bank of 
Viet Nam regarding Viet  Nam's currency practices, USTR determined that no action under section 
301 was warranted at that time because Viet  Nam's agreement with Treasury provided a satisfactory 
resolution of the matter subject of the investigation. USTR, in coordination with Treasury, is 
monitor ing Viet Nam's implementation of its commitments under the agreement and associated 
measures.  
5.9.  USTR is committed to holding foreign countries accountable and exposing the laws, practices, 
and other measures that fail to provide adequate and effective intellectual property ( IP) protection 
and enforcement for U.S. inventors, creators, brands, manufacturers, and service providers. The 
identification of IP -related market access barriers and steps necessary to address those barriers are 
a critical component of the administration's aggressive efforts to defend Americans from harmful 
IP-related trade barriers.  
5.10.   One of our top priorities is effective implementation and enforcement of the United  States –
Mexico –Canada Agreement (USMCA). The Agreement includes the strongest labor provisions in any 
trade agreement ever, as well as a ground -breaking enforcement tool, the Rapid Response Labor 
Mechanism (RRM). The RRM allows the  United  States  to quickly take action and target specific 
facilities in Mexico where workers are being denied their rights to freedom of association and 
collective bargaining.  For more information on the USMCA, see section 5.4.9.  WT/TPR/G/434 • United States  
 
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  5.11.   The United  States  successfully used the mechanism to secure concrete wins for workers in 
three  different instances and has two actions pending. The United  States  self-initiated the first -ever 
request for review under the RRM in May 2021, concerning a General Motors facilit y in Silao, Mexico. 
On 3 February  2022, workers at the plant overwhelmingly voted in favor of a new union to represent 
their interests and to negotiate a new collective bargaining agreement with the company, and in 
May 2022 the workers approved the new col lective bargaining agreement. This outcome shows that 
new tools can help us work with allies and trading partners ––such as Mexico ––to reverse the race 
to the bottom.  
5.12.   The United  States  also requested a review under the RRM  in June 2021, pursuant to a petition 
filed by the AFL -CIO, Service Employees International Union ( SEIU), Public Citizen, and SNITIS (a 
Mexican union) alleging a denial of workers ' rights at a Tridonex automotive parts facility in 
Matamoros, Mexico. In thi s instance,  USTR negotiated an extensive set of commitments with 
Tridonex, including severance and backpay for a large number of former Tridonex workers, as well 
as a commitment that the company will remain neutral in future union representation elections.  
5.13.   The United  States  again requested review under the RRM on 18 May 2022, regarding the 
Panasonic Automotive Systems de Mexico facility in Reynosa, Tamaulipas. On 14 July 2022, USTR 
announced that the matter had been successfully resolved. Actions taken by t he facility to resolve 
the matter included: renouncing a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) signed with a union that 
lacked lawful bargaining authority; reimbursing workers for dues withheld for that union; remaining 
neutral in a representational vote t hat resulted in a landslide victory for an independent union; 
negotiating a new CBA with that independent union; and offering reinstatement and backpay to 
26 workers who were allegedly terminated for participating in union activity.  
5.14.   On 6 June 2022, the Uni ted States requested review regarding the Teksid Hierro de M éxico 
facility in Frontera, Coahuila. Mexico accepted the request for review.  On 16  August  2022, USTR 
announced the matter had been successfully resolved. Actions taken to date by the facility to resolve 
the matter included: providing the independent union with access to the facility and designated office 
space within the company for the purpose of carrying out worker representation; payment of union 
dues withheld from workers and owed to the indep endent union; reinstating and offering back pay 
to 36 workers, as well as offering compensation to an additional worker, each of whom was allegedly 
terminated for participating in a protest against the company, and issuing a statement of their 
neutrality i n union affairs and recognizing the valid CBA. The Government of Mexico committed to 
continuing to monitor the situation at the facility.  
5.15.   On 21 July 2022, the United  States  requested review under the RRM in response to a petition 
that alleged a denial of workers ' rights at Manufacturas VU, an automotive components facility in 
Piedras Negras, Coahuila. Mexico agreed to review the situation and  has until 4 September  2022, to 
complete their review.  
5.16.   Finally, the United  States  commits significant resources to i dentify and confront unjustified  
non-tariff barriers including disciplines on rules of origin, customs and trade facilitation, import 
licensing, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, technical barriers to trade measures (technical 
regulations, standards and  conformity assessment procedures), government procurement, trade -
related investment measures, and services . USTR uses tools, including its Annual Report and the 
National Trade Estimate Report, to bring greater attention and focus to addressing non-tariff 
measures that may be inconsistent with international trade agreements to which the United  States  
is a party. USTR's activities in the WTO technical committees  are at the forefront of these efforts. 
USTR also engages on these issues with U.S. trading partne rs through mechanisms established in 
free trade agreements and through regional and multilateral organizations, such as the Asia -Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum and the Organization for Economic Cooperation Development 
(OECD).  
5.3  Other Monitoring an d Enforcement Activities  
5.17.   Addressing foreign subsidies that affect U.S. businesses is another critical trade enforcement 
activity. USTR and U.S. Department of Commerce Enforcement and Compliance staff researched 
foreign subsidies and met with representative s of U.S. industries concerned with the subsidization 
of foreign competitors. The United  States  examines the complaints and concerns raised by 
U.S. exporting companies and monitors the foreign subsidy practices in question to determine if WT/TPR/G/434 • United States  
 
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  there is reason t o believe they are impeding U.S. exports and are inconsistent with the 
SCM Agreement . 
5.18.   The United  States  actively monitors, evaluates, and where appropriate, participates in 
ongoing anti -dumping (AD) and countervailing duty (CVD) cases conducted by foreign countries to 
safeguard the interests of U.S. industry and to ensure that Members abide by their WTO obligations 
in conducting such proceedings. To this end, the United  States  works closely with U.S. companies 
affected by foreign countries' AD and CVD inves tigations and provides extensive responses to 
inquiries in foreign CVD investigations. The United  States  also advocates on behalf of U.S. industry 
in connection with ongoing investigations, with the goal of obtaining unbiased and objective 
treatment consis tent with the WTO agreements. In addition, in CVD cases, the United  States  
provides extensive information in response to questions from foreign governments regarding the 
subsidy allegations at issue.  
5.3.1   Addressing Non -market Policies and Practices  
5.19.   Free and fa ir trade benefits both the United  States  and the rest of the world by providing 
more affordable goods and services, raising living standards, fueling economic growth, and 
supporting good jobs. Reducing barriers to trade offers greater product variety, enha nces product 
quality, increases innovation, and raises productivity. In addition, the United  States  strongly believes 
that all countries would benefit from adopting policies that promote true market competition. 
Unfortunately, history shows that not all co untries will do so voluntarily. Non -market policies and 
practices including discriminatory non -tariff barriers, forced technology transfers, excess capacity, 
economic coercion, forced labor, industrial subsidies, and other forms of support by governments 
and related entities, distort markets and harm workers and businesses in the United  States  and in 
other countries. Non -market policies and practices also undermine supply chain resilience and harm 
consumers who, in the long run, are deprived of the innovati on and choice that fair competition 
would produce.  
5.20.   To address these concerns, the United  States is considering all existing tools ––and will 
potentially seek new ones as needed ––to combat the harms of non -market policies and practices . 
Critically, we are bringing renewed focus to engagement with our partners and allies, who also suffer 
harm from non -market policies and practices. We share values and an essential interest in fair, 
market -based competition. The ability to defend against no n-market policies and practices requires 
that market economies act in concert to confront policies and practices that are fundamentally at 
odds with a global trading system based on market competition. The United  States  promotes 
cooperation to tackle harmf ul non -market policies and practices through bilateral, plurilateral, and 
multilateral vehicles including relevant WTO committees, G7, G20, and other fora; existing trade 
agreements and frameworks; and new initiatives.  
5.21.   For example, in 2021 the United  States and the EU launched the Trade and Technology 
Council to promote U.S. and EU competitiveness and prosperity and the spread of democratic, 
market -oriented values by improving transatlantic trade and investment in products and services of 
emerging technolo gy,  
5.22.   strengthening our technological and industrial leadership, boosting innovation, and protecting 
and promoting critical and emerging technologies and infrastructure. The United  States  and the EU 
stand together in continuing to protect our businesses, co nsumers, and workers from unfair trade 
practices, in particular those posed by non -market economies that are undermining the world trading 
system. In addition, the United  States , the EU, and Japan will continue discussions under the 
Trilateral partnership to address the global challenges posed by the non -market policies and 
practices of third countries.  
5.23.   As another example, in June 2021, the United  States  reached agreements with the EU and 
the UK to resolve the longstanding aircraft disputes involving Boein g and Airbus, which allowed us 
to move past a perennial irritant and focus on shared interests, including financing on market terms 
and the challenges posed by non -market economies. A working group under each Cooperative 
Framework collaborates on jointly a nalyzing and addressing non -market practices of third parties 
that may harm their respective large civil aircraft industries.  WT/TPR/G/434 • United States  
 
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  5.3.2   Ensuring Compliance with Labor Obligations  
5.24.   The United  States  is committed to ensuring compliance with the labor requirements  of ou r 
trade tools. Trade agreements negotiated since 2007 have included enforceable obligations to ensure 
the consistency of each party 's labor laws with fundamental labor rights as stated in the 1998 ILO 
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Wor k. These agreements also include the 
obligations that each party not fail to effectively enforce its labor laws and not waive or derogate 
from those laws, in a manner affecting trade or investment. As part of the ongoing effort to monitor 
and implement exi sting U.S. trade agreements, the United  States  has worked with trading partners 
to advance respect for labor rights through technical cooperation and enforcement efforts, including 
in Bahrain, Chile, Colombia, Jordan, Korea , Mexico (USMCA), Peru, and the D ominican  Republic –
Central America –United  States  Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA –DR) countries.  
5.25.   Of note, the United  States  has worked closely with Mexico to collaborate on compliance with 
the labor obligations of the USMCA. The United  States  has allocated unpre cedented technical 
assistance funding to support Mexico 's implementation of its commitments. The United  States  has 
also invoked the new RRM five times since the agreement entered into force in July 2020; two 
matters are pending and in three  the United  States was able to successfully secure concrete wins 
for workers trying to exercise their labor rights . For more information, see section 5.2 Enforcement 
Priorities.  
5.26.   The United  States  has also undertaken dialogues under several Trade and Investment 
Framework A greements (TIFAs) and related bilateral mechanisms. In each, the United  States 
brought worker issues to the forefront, including forming labor working groups under the TIFA with 
Chinese  Taipei and  the Trade and Investment Cooperation Agreement (TICA) with Ukraine; 
discussing the importance of high labor standards under the TIFA with Uruguay, the Trade and 
Investment Council Agreement (TIC) with Ecuador, the Joint Commercial Commission (JCC) with 
Moldova, and the Central Asian TIFA; and emphasizing the worke r-centered trade policy during the 
Trade Policy Forum with India and TIFA discussions with Algeria. The USG and the Government of 
Bangladesh agreed to establish a labor working group as part of broader bilateral trade, labor and 
economic engagements.  
5.27.   Finally, the United  States  has also worked to promote compliance with the labor obligations 
of U.S. trade preference programs, including the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), the 
African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), and trade preferences for Haiti and Nepal. Each requires 
beneficiaries to meet statutory eligibility criteria pertaining to internationally recognized worker 
rights and child labor , including the worst forms of child labor .  
5.3.3   Addressing Forced Labor  
5.28.   Since 2018, the United  States  has incre asingly used trade policy to address forced labor 
worldwide, including in global supply chains. Many trade agreements to which the United  States  is 
a party include provisions that require parties to adopt, maintain, and enforce legal provisions on 
the elim ination of all forms of forced or compulsory labor. In addition, the USMCA, which entered 
into force in July 2020, includes a ground -breaking provision requiring all three countries to prohibit 
the importation of goods produced wholly or in part with force d labor.  
5.29.   U.S. trade preference programs continue to be powerful tools in strengthening labor standards 
around the world, including against the use of forced labor. The GSP  (prior to its legislative 
expiration)  and AGOA trade preference programs require th at countries receiving these preferential 
benefits meet all the eligibility criteria, including with respect to forced labor. In January 2019, the 
United  States  terminated AGOA eligibility for Mauritania after a review determined the Government 
of Mauritan ia had made insufficient progress toward combating forced labor. In 2020, following years 
of intensive engagement and significant progress on the part of the Government of Uzbekistan 
toward eliminating systemic forced adult and forced child labor during it s annual cotton harvest, the 
United  States  closed the GSP eligibility review of Uzbekistan, leaving Uzbekistan's GSP eligibility 
intact.  
5.30.   In 2020, the United  States  also established an interagency Forced Labor Enforcement Task 
Force (FLET F) to monitor U.S. enforcement of the prohibition under s ection 307 of the Tariff Act of 
1930, as amended, which prohibits importing into the United  States "all goods , wares, articles, and WT/TPR/G/434 • United States  
 
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  merchandise, mined,  produced , or manufactured, wholly or in part, in any foreign coun try by convict 
labor or/and forced or/and indentured labor". In June 2022, DHS, as Chair of the the FLETF , issued 
the FLETF's  strategy to support the enforcement of the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, which 
establishes a rebuttable presumption that the importation of any goods, wares, articles, and 
merchandise mined, produced, or manufactured wholly or in part with forced labor in the Xinjiang 
Uyghur Autonomous Region of the People 's Republic of China, or pro duced by certain entities 
appearing on a list maintained by the United  States, is prohibited under section 307 of the Tariff Act 
of 1930, as amended . 
5.31.   In January 2022, the United  States  announced that it will develop its first -ever focused trade 
strategy to  combat forced labor.  The development of this strategy includes a thorough, interagency 
review of existing trade policies and tools used to combat forced labor, including forced child labor, 
to determine areas that may need strengthening and gaps that need  to be filled.  The United  States  
will use this analysis to establish objectives, priorities, new tools, and key action items to advance 
its goals to combat forced labor.   
5.32.   The United  States  has also engaged and worked with allies and trad ing partners to pro mote 
a fair, rules -based international trading system that respects workers ' rights and affirms that there 
is no place for forced labor in such a system, including state -sponsored forced labor. For example, 
in June 2021, President Biden pushed for the incl usion of forced labor in the G7 Leaders ' Statement, 
which paved the way for U.S. Trade Representative Tai to negotiate the October 2021 Trade 
Ministers ' Forced Labor Statement that recognized the importance of  working together to protect 
individuals from f orced labor and  to ensure that global supply chains are free from the use of forced 
labor.  
5.4  Free Trade Agreements and Initiatives  
5.4.1   The Dominican  Republic -Central America  – United  States Free Trade Agreement 
(CAFTA -DR)  
5.33.   On 5 August  2004, the United  States  signed the Dominican  Republic –Central America –
United  States  Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA –DR) with five Central American countries (Costa Rica, 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua) and the Dominican  Republic . The Agreement has 
been in for ce since 1 January  2009 for all seven countries that signed the CAFTA –DR. It entered into 
force for the United  States , El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua in 2006, for the 
Dominican  Republic  on 1 March  2007, and for Costa Rica on 1 January  2009. Two -way goods trade 
with our CAFTA -DR partner countries totaled US D 68.4 billion in 2021, with U.S. goods exports to 
the region totaling US D 38.5 billion.  
5.34.   Nearly all U.S. textile and apparel goods meeting the Agreement 's rules of origin may enter 
the oth er CAFTA –DR countries ' markets duty -free and quota free. Under the CAFTA –DR, tariff -rate 
quotas (TRQs) for sensitive agricultural products will increase annually through 2025, after which 
the TRQs will be eliminated and the affected products will enter oth er CAFTA –DR countries duty -free. 
5.35.   From 2019 to 2021, the United  States  continued regular engagement with the CAFTA -DR 
countries on matters related to implementation and administration of the Agreement. The CAFTA -DR 
Free Trade Commission (FTC) is the central  oversight body for the CAFTA –DR. The FTC is responsible 
for monitoring the implementation and administration of the Agreement, including strengthening 
implementation and facilitating trade, enhancing opportunities for small and medium -sized 
enterprises (S MEs), and addressing trade related aspects of labor and environment. The CAFTA –DR 
Coordinators, who are technical level staff of the Parties, maintain ongoing communication to 
advance technical and administrative implementation matters, follow up on agreem ents reached by 
the FTC, and to define the agenda for meetings of the FTC.  
5.36.   The USG continues to monitor labor rights compliance under CAFTA -DR and regularly engage 
governments —particularly in the Dominican  Republic, Guatemala, and Honduras —to support effor ts 
to improve the protection of worker rights . WT/TPR/G/434 • United States  
 
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  5.4.2   United  States -Australia Free Trade Agreement  
5.37.   The United  States –Australia Free Trade Agreement (FTA) entered into force on 
1 January  2005. Under this agreement, as of 1 January  2015, Australia provides duty-free access to 
all U.S. exports. The United  States  provides duty -free access to nearly all Australian products. In 
2021, two -way trade in goods totaled US D 38.9 billion, with U.S. goods exports totaling 
USD 26.5 billion. U.S. total exports of agricult ural products to Australia totaled US D 1.4 billion in 
2021,  while imports of agricultural products from Australia totaled US D 3.5 billion   
5.38.   The U.S. –Australia Joint Committee is the central oversight body for the FTA. The 
United  States  and Australia convene d a meeting of the Joint Committee in March 2022. The purpose 
of this meeting was to monitor implementation of the FTA and review concerns about market access. 
The United  States  continues to work closely with Australia to deepen the bilateral trade relatio nship 
and coordinate on issues of regional and international importance.  
5.4.3   United  States -Bahrain Free Trade Agreement  
5.39.   The United  States -Bahrain FTA entered into force on 1 August  2006. Under the FTA, all 
two-way trade in industrial and consumer products is duty-free. In 2021, two -way trade in goods 
was USD 2.1 billion . U.S. exports of goods was USD 934 million and U.S. imports of goods from 
Bahrain was USD 1.2 billion. U.S. total exports of agricultural products to Bahrain totaled USD 83 
million in 2021. U.S.  total imports of agricultural products from Bahrain totaled USD 2 million in 
2021.  The United  States -Bahrain Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) took effect in May 2001.  
5.4.4   United  States -Chile Free Trade Agreement  
5.40.   The United  States -Chile FTA entered into force on 1  January  2004. As of 1 January  2015, all 
products became duty -free under the Agreement. The United  States -Chile FTA eliminates tariffs and 
opens markets, reduces barriers to trade in services, provides protection for intellectual property, 
ensure s regulatory transparency, guarantees non -discrimination in the trade of digital products, 
commits the Parties to maintain competition laws that prohibit anticompetitive business conduct, 
and requires effective labor and environmental enforcement. Two -way goods trade totaled 
USD 32.4 billion in 2021, with U.S. goods exports to Chile totaling USD 17.3 billion.  
5.4.5   United  States -Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement  
5.41.   The United  States –Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement (CTPA) entered into force on 
15 May 2012. Under  the CTPA, the two countries extend provides duty -free access to all consumer 
and industrial products. More than half of agricultural trade  became duty -free immediately upon 
entry into force, with virtually all remaining tariffs on U.S. agricultural goods to be eliminated by 
2026 (reflecting a 15 -year phase -out period). Tariffs on a few most sensitive agricultural products 
will be phased out in 17 to 19 years. Two -way goods trade totaled US D 41.3 billion in 2021, with 
U.S. goods exports to Colombia totaling  USD 16.7 billion.  
5.42.   From 2019 to 2021, the United  States  continued regular engagement with the Colombian 
government to support its efforts to improve the protection of worker rights and address cases of 
violence and threats against trade unionists. The Uni ted States  will continue its engagement with 
the Government of Colombia to ensure progress on workers' rights, including through cooperative 
efforts and dialogue regarding the collection of fines for labor law violations, combatting abusive 
subcontracting,  and to increase the number of resolved cases of violence and threats against 
unionists.  
5.43.   The CTPA established an Environmental Affairs Council (EAC) under the environment chapter. 
The related U.S. -Colombia Environmental Cooperation Agreement (ECA) establis hed an 
Environmental Cooperation Commission (ECC). In July 2018, t he United  States  and Colombia 
finalized  an agreement establishing a secretariat to receive and consider submissions from the public 
on matters regarding enforcement of environmental laws pur suant to Article  18.8 of the CTPA. The 
secretariat is housed in Colombia and is intended to promote public participation in the identification 
and resolution of issues regarding each party's enforcement of its environmental laws.  WT/TPR/G/434 • United States  
 
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  5.4.6   United  States -Israel Free Trade Agreement  
5.44.   The United  States -Israel Free Trade Agreement is the United  States'  first free trade 
agreement. It entered into force in 1985 and continues to serve as the foundation for expanding 
trade and investment between the United  States  and Israel b y reducing barriers and promoting 
regulatory transparency. In 2021, U.S. goods exports to Israel were US D 12.8 billion, up 25.8 % 
from 2020.  
5.45.   In December 2020 at a virtual Joint Committee (JC) meeting of the US -Israel FTA, the 
United  States  and Israel sought  ways to engaged in collaborative efforts to increase bilateral trade 
and investment. During the meeting, the United  States  and Israel sought ways to promote greater 
reciprocal market access for agricultural and industrial goods, and explored further coope ration in 
the area of digital services and investment.  
5.46.   In 1996, the United  States  and Israel concluded an Agreement Concerning Certain Aspects of 
Trade in Agricultural Products (ATAP), which provided for duty -free or other preferential treatment 
for certa in agricultural products. The 1996 Agreement was extended through 2003, and a new 
agreement was concluded in 2004. While this Agreement originally ran through 2008, it has been 
extended annually since then. In June 2018, the United  States  and Israel opened  negotiations on a 
permanent ATAP and held a second round of talks in March 2019. At the December 2020 JC meeting, 
the United  States  and Israel reaffirmed their commitment to the negotiation of a permanent ATAP.  
5.4.7   The United  States -Jordan Free Trade Agreeme nt 
5.47.   The United  States -Jordan Free Trade Agreement entered into force on 17  December  2001, 
and all tariffs were eliminated as of 1  January  2010. U.S. goods exports to Jordan in 2021 were an 
estimated US D 1.2 billion, down 6.4 % from 2020.  
5.48.   At the July 2019 me eting of the Joint Committee established under the FTA, the United  States  
and Jordan discussed a range of bilateral trade and investment issues, noting positively the increase 
in bilateral trade. Officials focused on ways to promote greater reciprocal mark et access for 
agricultural and industrial goods, including with respect to technical standards and regulations and 
food safety measures, as well as Jordanian labor reforms, improved IP protection and 
implementation of the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement.  
5.49.   Additionally, the United  States  continues to work with Jordan in the area of labor standards, 
particularly through ongoing efforts under the Implementation Plan Related to Working and Living 
Conditions of Workers in Jordan, signed in 2013. The Plan addres ses labor concerns in Jordan 's 
garment factories including anti -union discrimination against forced work, conditions of 
accommodations for foreign workers, and gender discrimination and harassment.  
5.4.8   United  States—Korea Free Trade Agreement  
5.50.   The United  State s–Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS) entered into force on 
15 March  2012. Duties on virtually all goods have been eliminated as of 1 January  2022, with only 
some Korean seafood tariff lines and the U.S. tariff line on trucks to be eliminated in future years. 
The United  States  and Korea  reached agreement in 2018 on modifications and amendments to 
KORUS and a related letter exchange. These modifications and amendments, which entered into 
force on 1 January  2019, doubled from 25,000 to 50,000 the nu mber of U.S. -origin vehicles per 
manufacturer per year that may be imported and sold in the Republic of Korea  that meet U.S. safety 
standards in lieu of Korean safety standards, and delayed the elimination of U.S.  tariffs on trucks 
until 2041. The Parties also agreed to establish a working group to address issues related to origin 
verification.  
5.51.   In 2019, the United  States  requested and held formal consultations with Korea under the 
Competition Chapter of KORUS to discuss concerns that the Korea Fair Trade Co mmission (KFTC) 
had taken disproportionate enforcement efforts (e.g.  remedies with geographic scope that go beyond 
the harm to competition in Korea) with regard to international companies, as well as concerns under 
KORUS due process provisions about KFTC p rocedures and practices that inhibit the ability of 
companies to adequately defend themselves during investigatory proceedings and hearings. These 
consultations led to reforms of certain KFTC procedures and amendments to Korea 's Monopoly WT/TPR/G/434 • United States  
 
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  Regulation and Fai r Trade Act. Also in 2019, the United  States  requested environment consultations 
with Korea under the KORUS Environment Chapter to discuss concerns regarding Korea 's response 
to actions of Korean vessels that contravened measures adopted by the Commission for the 
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR). Following these consultations, Korea 
adopted amendments to Korea 's Distant Water Fisheries Development Act to enable the Minister of 
Oceans and Fisheries to administer administrative sanct ions for violations of conservation and 
management measures of regional fisheries management organizations, including CCAMLR.  
5.52.   There are 22 KORUS committees and working groups, which meet regularly and may also be 
convened on an ad hoc  basis to address issues of concern.  
5.53.   The United  States  met with Korean counterparts in April 2022 for a meeting of the Labor 
Affairs Council under  the KORUS  Labor Chapter  to discuss labor rights and worker protections . 
5.4.9   United  States -Mexico -Canada Agreement  
5.54.   The United  States –Mexico –Canada Agreement ( "USMCA " or "Agreement ") entered into force 
on 1 July 2020. The USMCA maintains the zero tariffs among th e three countries that were in place 
under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), while also modernizing the Agreement 
to include provisions covering digital trade and small and medium -sized enterprises (SMEs). Since 
the original NAFTA did not el iminate all tariffs on agricultural trade between the United  States  and 
Canada, the USMCA creates new market access opportunities for United  States  exports to Canada 
of dairy, poultry, and eggs, and in exchange the United  States  provides new access to Cana da for 
dairy, peanuts, processed peanut products, and a limited amount of sugar and sugar containing 
products. The USMCA features strong, enforceable labor and environmental obligations in the core 
text of the Agreement. In 2020 (latest available data), U. S. goods and services trade with Mexico 
and Canada totaled an estimated USD 1.2 trillion.  
5.55.   The USMCA contains new rules of origin for motor vehicles, which require a specific amount 
of North American content in the final vehicle. The USMCA raises regional v alue content requirements 
to 75 % for automobiles, compared to 62.5 % under the NAFTA. The USMCA also requires that at 
least 70 % of a producer 's steel and aluminum purchases originate in North America. The USMCA 
also introduced a new labor value content rule  that requires that a certain percentage of qualifying 
vehicles be produced by employees making an average of at least USD 16 per hour.  
5.56.   The USMCA Environment Chapter obligations are fully enforceable under the USMCA 's dispute 
settlement mechanism and addr ess key environmental challenges such as illegal, unreported, and 
unregulated (IUU) fishing and for disciplining harmful fisheries subsidies. The USMCA commits the 
United  States , Mexico, and Canada to take actions to combat and prevent trafficking in timbe r, fish, 
and other wildlife, and includes provisions to address other environmental issues such as air quality 
and marine litter.  
5.57.   The USMCA 's robust and comprehensive labor provisions are fully incorporated into the text 
of the Agreement and fully enforce able under the Agreement 's dispute settlement mechanism. 
Among other obligations, the USMCA  includes new provisions requiring Parties to take measures to 
prohibit the importation of goods produced by forced labor and to address violence against workers 
exercising their labor rights. The USMCA also includes an innovative Rapid Response Mechanism 
(RRM) in the dispute settlement chapter to address protection of association and collective 
bargaining rights at the facility level. The new mechanism provides for the suspension of USMCA 
tariff benefits or the imposition of other penalties, such as blocki ng imports from businesses that are 
repeat offenders, in cases of non -compliance with key labor obligations.  
5.58.   The USMCA contains  strong commitments on digital trade, financial services, and intellectual 
property rights. It also addresses non -tariff barrier s that can hinder U.S. exports through new 
provisions on transparency and regulatory matters, including in chapters covering technical barriers 
to trade, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, and a new chapter on good regulatory practices. 
Finally, the Agre ement contains provisions to combat subsidies and non -market practices that have 
the potential to disadvantage American workers and businesses, including a chapter to address 
unfair currency practices, rules on trade distortions caused by state -owned enter prises (SOEs), and 
transparency obligations with respect to any USMCA Party 's future trade negotiations with 
non-market economies.  WT/TPR/G/434 • United States  
 
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  5.4.10   United  States -Morocco Free Trade Agreement  
5.59.   The United  States -Morocco Free Trade Agreement (FTA) entered into force on 
1 January 2006. By the final phase out of US tariffs in 2023, the United  States will provide duty -free 
access to the majority of Moroccan products. Since entry into force, two -way trade in goods has 
increased by 331.5%,  and totaled  USD 4.0 billion in 2021. U.S. goods exports to Morocco in 2021 
were US D 2.8 billion , and U.S. goods imports from Morocco in 2021 were US D 1.3 billion.  
5.60.   The United  States  and Morocco held the sixth meeting of the FTA Joint Committee (JC) on 
16 July 2019 in Rabat. U.S. and Moroccan offici als noted productive discussions of customs, 
intellectual property protection, and standards issues. In the area of agriculture, the JC reviewed 
progress in discussions held just prior to the JC's session in combined meetings of the FTA Agriculture 
and SPS  Subcommittees.  
5.4.11   United  States -Oman Free Trade Agreement  
5.61.   The United  States -Oman Free Trade Agreement, which entered into force on 1 January  2009, 
complements other U.S. FTAs to promote economic reform and openness in the region. As of 
1 January 2018, all pr oducts became duty free under the Agreement.  In 2021, two -way trade in 
goods was US D 3.3 billion. U.S. exports of goods was USD 1.4 billion, and U.S. imports of goods 
from Oman was USD 1.9 billion.  
5.4.12   United  States  – Panama Trade Promotion Agreement  
5.62.   The Unit ed States –Panama Trade Promotion Agreement entered into force on 
31 October  2012. Nearly half of U.S. agricultural exports immediately became duty free immediately 
after entry into force, with most remaining tariffs on U.S. agricultural goods to be elimina ted by 
1 January  2026 (after a 15 -year phase -out period). Tariffs on most sensitive agricultural products 
will be phased out in 18 to 20 years. The Agreement also provides access to Panama 's estimated 
USD 37.8 billion services market in 2020 (latest data a vailable).  The United  States  provides duty -
free access to nearly all Panamanian products. As of 1 January  2021, Panama provides duty -free 
access to all U.S. consumer and industrial products.  
5.63.   The United  States –Panama Free Trade Commission (FTC) is the centr al oversight body for the 
Agreement. The United  States  and Panama continued to work cooperatively in 2021 to address a 
few remaining implementation issues, resulting in new opportunities for traders and investors.  
5.64.   In conjunction with the Cooperative Labor Dialogue under the Agreement, in 2021 the 
U.S. Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service continued to provide trainings to Panama 's 
Inter-American School for Social Dialogue, Tripartism and Conflict Resolution.  
5.4.13   United  States–Peru Trade Promotion Agreement  
5.65.   The United  States -Peru Trade Promotion Agreement (PTPA) entered into force on 
1 February  2009. The PTPA eliminates tariffs and removes barriers to U.S. services, provides a 
secure, predictable legal framework for investors, and strengthens protections for  intellectual 
property, workers, and the environment. The United  States  provides duty -free access to nearly all 
Peruvian products.  The United  States'  two-way goods trade with Peru was an estimated 
USD 17.1 billion in 2021, with U.S. goods exports to Peru totaling US D 10.2 billion.  
5.66.   The PTPA also established the United  States -Peru Forest Sector Subcommittee, the 
Environmental Affairs Council (EAC), and the Environmental Cooperation Commission. The 
Subcommitte e serves as a forum for the Parties to exchange views and share information on any 
matter arising under the PTPA's Annex on Forest Sector Governance (Forest Annex). Through the 
EAC, the United  States  and Peru have had robust engagement concerning the imple mentation of the 
environmental obligations under the PTPA Environment Chapter and the Forest Annex. For additional 
information concerning U.S. engagement with Peru on these issues, please refer to the section on 
Trade and the Environment.  
5.67.   The U.S. continue s to monitor labor rights compliance under the US -Peru TPA and engage 
with the Government of Peru.  WT/TPR/G/434 • United States  
 
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  5.4.14   United  States -Singapore Free Trade Agreement  
5.68.   The United  States -Singapore Free Trade Agreement entered into force on 1 January  2004. 
The United  States –Singapo re Joint Committee is the central oversight body for the FTA. The Joint 
Committee met in October 2021. During the meeting, the United  States  and Singapore agreed to 
work together on shared areas of interest through the FTA framework, including on areas suc h as 
environment, labor, digital trade, supply chains, and intellectual property. The United  States  
continues to work closely with Singapore to deepen the bilateral trade relationship and coordinate 
on issues of regional and international importance.  
5.5  Other  Initiatives  
5.5.1   Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum  
5.69.   Since it was founded in 1989, the Asia -Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum has been 
instrumental in promoting regional and global trade and investment. APEC 's new vision, agreed to 
in 2020, calls f or an "open, dynamic, resilient and peaceful Asia -Pacific community by 2040, for the 
prosperity of all our people and future generations ".  
5.70.   The United  States  is a significant trader with APEC economies. U.S. goods and services trade 
with APEC economies totaled US D 2.8 trillion in 2016. Exports totaled US D 1.2 trillion, with goods 
exports to APEC economies in 2021 totaling US D 1.1 trillion, accounting for 62.7%  of overall 
U.S. exports in 2021. The United  States  had a US D 3.0 trillion in total (two -ways) goods trade with 
APEC economies during 2021.  
5.71.   During New  Zealand 's APEC host year (2021) and Thailand's APEC host year (2022), the 
United  States  worked with APEC to build on the new vision, as well as to launch work on issues of 
priority for the United  States  and other APEC economies that will help promote economic growth and 
support jobs for American workers. The United  States  joined with other APEC economies to a dvance 
capacity -building actions to help developing APEC economies improve at -the-border procedures, 
including through border agency cooperation. These projects match closely with the provisions of 
the WTO  Agreement  on Trade Facilitation. During this time,  the United  States  also advanced work 
on inclusion, sustainability/environment, digital trade, trade in services, multi -stakeholder 
engagement, good regulatory practices, and supply chain resilience.  
5.72.   The United  States  is looking forward to host ing APEC in  2023, underscoring our commitment 
to advance fair and open trade and investment, bolster American competitiveness, and ensure a 
free and open Indo -Pacific.  
5.5.2   Japan  
5.73.   In 2021, total U.S. -Japan trade was USD 278.4 billion, and Japan was the 4th -largest goods 
trading partner of the United  States  (latest data available). The U.S. goods trade deficit with Japan 
was USD 60.2 billion in 2021, a 7.9 % increase over 2020. The U.S. services trade surplus was an 
estimated USD 4.9 billion with Japan in 2021, down 29.1 % from 2020.  
5.74.   On 16 October  2018, USTR notified Congress that the United  States  intended to enter into 
negotiations on a trade agreement with Japan. The United  States  and Japan began negotiations for 
a phase -one agreement in April 2019, reached agreement in principle on early achievements in the 
areas of market access and digital trade in August 2019, and announced that the final agreements 
in these two areas had been reached in September 2019. On 7 October  2019, the United  States  and 
Japan signed the United  States -Japan Trade Agreement and the United  States –Japan Digital Trade 
Agreement, reflecting those early achievements. Following the completion of respective domest ic 
procedures, both agreements went into effect on 1 January  2020.  
5.75.   In November 2021, the United  States  and Japan announced the launch of the U.S. -Japan 
Partnership on Trade, an initiative to advance a shared agenda of cooperation across a broad range 
of issue areas as well as to address bilateral trade issues of concern to either side. The first round 
of meetings took place in February 2022. The trade ministers of the United  States , Japan, and the 
EU also announced the renewal of trilateral cooperation in November 2021 to undertake measures WT/TPR/G/434 • United States  
 
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  to combat the non -market -oriented policies of third countries. In May 2022, Japan joined the 
Indo-Pacific Economic Framework as one of the 13 initial partner countries.  
5.5.3   United  States–ASEAN Trade and Investment Framework Arrangement  
5.76.   The United  States  continued to work under the auspices of the United  States –ASEAN TIFA to 
further enhance economic ties between the United  States  and ASEAN, which collectively represents 
the United  States'  fourth largest trading partner. At th e annual ASEAN Economic Ministers –USTR 
Consultations in September 2021, the United  States  and ASEAN agreed to enhance cooperation on 
labor, environment, and SMEs. The United  States  is also continuing cooperation with ASEAN on 
digital trade, intellectual pr operty, standards, competition, trade facilitation, and agriculture 
biotechnology.  
5.5.4   Engagement with the Middle East and North Africa  
5.77.   Rapid changes and political instability in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA)  region over 
the past decade have posed on going challenges with respect to U.S. trade and investment relations 
with MENA countries. The region continues to see uneven progress on economic and trade reforms, 
and many of the underlying economic drivers of political and social instability in various countries 
have yet to be addressed. However, changing regional dynamics have led to some possible new 
opportunities for U.S. trade and investment. During the 2018 – 22 period, USTR continued exploring 
with other U.S. Government agencies, as well as with ou tside experts and stakeholders in the 
United  States  and MENA countries, prospective areas for cooperation that could yield the results in 
terms of increased trade and investment.  
5.78.   Throughout the 2018 -22 period, the United  States  continued to monitor, imple ment, and 
enforce existing U.S. FTAs in the region (Bahrain, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, and Oman) and sought 
to engage other MENA countries through existing TIFA mechanisms and preference program review 
processes. Due to the COVID ‑19 pandemic, it remained di fficult through 2020 and 2021 to engage 
directly with partner governments. Nonetheless, the United  States  held virtual meetings under the 
United  States –Tunisia TIFA in May 2021 and under the United  States  – United Arab Emirates TIFA 
in June 2021.  
5.79.   The Unit ed States  also sought further contact with additional partners in the region, including 
among Member States of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, 
the Kingdom of Saudi  Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates). U.S. dialogue with all MENA countries 
remains aimed at ensuring that U.S. interests, including the realization of a worker -centered trade 
policy  and women's economic empowerment , are fully represented as they pursue the modernization 
and diversification of their economies. T he United  States  will enhance its efforts to engage 
meaningfully with its regional partners as travel restrictions ease; U.S. officials visited Algiers in 
June 2022 for the first post -pandemic in -person meeting under the United  States  – Algeria TIFA.  
5.5.5   Econo mic and Trade Agreement Between the Government of The United  States  of 
America And the Government of The People 's Republic of China (Phase One Agreement)  
5.80.   In 2017, the United  States  launched an investigation into China 's acts, policies and practices 
relatin g to technology transfer, intellectual property and innovation under Section 301 of the Trade 
Act of 1974. The findings made in this investigation led to substantial U.S. tariffs on imports from 
China as well as corresponding retaliation by China. Against this backdrop, in January 2020, the two 
sides signed the U.S. -China Economic and Trade Agreement, commonly referred to as the "Phase 
One Agreement ". This Agreement included commitments from China to improve market access for 
the agriculture and financial s ervices sectors, along with commitments relating to intellectual 
property and technology transfer and a commitment by China to increase its purchases of U.S. goods 
and services.  
5.81.   China has not yet implemented some of the more significant commitments that i t made in the 
Phase One Agreement, such as commitments in the area of agricultural biotechnology and the 
required risk assessment that China is to conduct relating to the use of ractopamine in cattle and 
swine. China has also fallen far  short of implementi ng its commitments to purchase U.S. goods and 
services in 2020 and 2021. Meanwhile, other commitments that China made, such as in the area of 
technology transfer, are difficult to verify given the tactics that China uses to obscure its activities. WT/TPR/G/434 • United States  
 
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  Importan tly, this Agreement did not meaningfully address the more fundamental concerns that the 
United  States  has with China 's state -directed, non -market policies and practices and their harmful 
impact on the U.S. economy and U.S. workers and businesses. The Unite d States  is exploring 
appropriate next steps.  
5.5.6   United  States -African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Engagement  
5.82.   In December 2021, U.S. Trade Representative Tai met with the Secretary General of the 
African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Secretariat to discuss their vision for further 
engagement and ways to support regional value chains across Africa, attract positive investment on 
the continent, and improve African workers ' livelihoods and opportunities. Numerous 
U.S. government agencies are offering technical assistance for the AfCFTA and USTR is collaborating 
with the Department of Commerce's Commercial Law Development Program, in a USAID - and 
Prosper Africa -funded activity, to support the AfCFTA Protocol on Women and Youth.  
5.5.7   United  States-Brazil Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation  
5.83.   In 2020, the United  States  and Brazil updated their 2011 Agreement on Trade and Economic 
Cooperation by adding a Protocol Trade Rules and Transparency, comprising annexes on Trade 
Facilitation and Custo ms Administration, Good Regulatory Practices, and Anti -Corruption. This trade 
agreement entered into force 2 February  2022, following approval by the Brazilian Congress in 
November 2021.  
5.5.8   United  States -Ecuador Protocol on Trade Rules and Transparency  
5.84.   In 20 20, the United  States  and Ecuador updated their 1990 Agreement on a Trade and 
Investment Council by adding a Protocol on Trade Rules and Transparency, comprising annexes on 
Trade Facilitation, Good Regulatory Practices, Anti -Corruption, and Small - and Medi um-sized 
Enterprises. This trade agreement entered into force August 2021, following approval by the 
Ecuadorian Congress.  
5.5.9   United  States /United Kingdom Dialogues on the Future of Atlantic Trade  
5.85.   United  States  Trade Representative Katherine Tai and United Ki ngdom Secretary of State for 
International Trade Anne -Marie Trevelyan hosted two U.S. – UK Dialogues on the Future of Atlantic 
Trade in 2022. The first was held in Baltimore, Maryland, in March 2022 and the second was held in 
Aberdeen, Scotland, in April 2 022. 
5.86.   The Dialogues followed President Biden and Prime Minister Boris Johnson's announcement last 
year of a new 'Atlantic Charter. ' The purpose of the Dialogues was to explore how the United  States  
and United Kingdom can collaborate to advance mutual intern ational trade priorities rooted in our 
shared values, while promoting innovation and inclusive economic growth for workers and 
businesses on both sides of the Atlantic. The trade ministers held a series of roundtable discussions 
in both locations with a di verse group of stakeholders from the U.S. and UK business community, 
trade unions, and civil society, and held government -to-government bilateral discussions between 
U.S. and UK officials.  
5.87.   As a result of the discussions, the United  States  and the United K ingdom agreed to collaborate 
further on: delivering practical support for SMEs, digitizing U.S. -UK trade in the modern economy, 
building resilience in critical supply chains, addressing the global trade impacts of the 
Russian  Federation' s invasion of Ukrai ne, promoting environmental protection and the transition to 
net zero, supporting high labor and environmental standards, and promoting innovation and 
inclusive economic growth for workers and businesses on both sides of the Atlantic. Both 
governments are now considering internally the next steps following these Dialogues.  
5.5.10   Indo -Pacific Economic Framework  
5.88.   The United  States  is committed to engaging economically with partners in the Indo -Pacific 
region. In the coming decades, we believe that competitiveness will be defined largely by how well 
countries are able to harness technology and digital sectors of our economies and on  our ability to WT/TPR/G/434 • United States  
 
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  adapt to the coming energy and climate transition. The U nited States  is also committed to promoting 
inclusive growth.  
5.89.   The Indo -Pacific is one of the most dynamic regions in the world, and it is one of strategic 
importance to the United  States. Additionally, the region is home to some of our closest allies and 
trading partners, including some with which we have longstanding trade agreements. By working 
closely with allies and partners to bolster our economic engagement in the Indo -Pacific, w e can 
establish a new path forward that supports the global competitiveness of American workers and 
businesses and further s the shared interests of our allies in the years to come.  
5.90.   In October 2021, President Biden announced that the United  States  would de velop an Indo -
Pacific Economic Framework to deepen economic relationships with allies and partners in the region. 
This framework will promote resilient, sustainable, and inclusive growth for workers and businesses, 
including by advancing strong labor stand ards and addressing climate change. The framework is 
central to the United  States'  economic strategy in the Indo -Pacific and complements our national 
security goals in the region.  
5.91.   On 23 May the United  States  launched the Indo -Pacific Economic Framework fo r Prosperity 
(IPEF). In addition to the United  States , IPEF includes 13 partners: Australia, Brunei  Darussalam , 
Fiji, India, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, New  Zealand , Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand, and Viet  Nam.  
5.92.   The United  States  will use this framework to address a range of important areas of economic 
cooperation, including: trade; supply chains; clean energy, decarbonization, and infrastructure; and 
tax and anti -corruption. USTR will lead efforts to craft a trade arrangement that inc ludes 
high-standard commitments in the following areas: labor; environment; digital and emerging 
technology; agriculture; transparency and good regulatory practices; competition policy; and trade 
facilitation. The U.S. Department of Commerce will lead U.S.  efforts to expand cooperation on supply 
chains; clean energy, decarbonization, and infrastructure; and tax and anti -corruption.  
5.5.11   U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council  
5.93.   At the United  States -European  Union  (EU) Summit in June 2021, President Biden, European 
Commission President von der Leyen, and European Council President Charles Michel announced the 
formation of the U.S. -EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC). The TTC 's overall objective is to 
promote U.S. and EU competitiveness and prosperity and the spread  of democratic, market -oriented 
values by increasing transatlantic trade and investment in products and services of emerging 
technology, strengthening our technological and industrial leadership, boosting innovation, and 
protecting and promoting critical a nd emerging technologies and infrastructure. The United  States 
and the EU have initiated cooperation in the TTC  on the development and deployment of new 
technologies that are based on our shared democratic values, including respect for human rights, 
and that encourage compatible standards and regulations.  
5.94.   For the United  States , the TTC is co -chaired by U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai, 
Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo, and Secretary of State Anthony Blinken. For the EU, the 
TTC is co -chaired by Eu ropean Commission Executive Vice Presidents Valdis Dombrovskis and 
Margrethe Vestager.  
5.95.   The United  States  and the EU have established 10 TTC Working Groups, which are chaired by 
relevant U.S. agencies and European Commission services. USTR leads the Global Trade Challenges 
working group (Working Group 10) along with the European Commission 's Directorate -General for 
Trade. Working Group 10 is focused on a range of issues including challenges from non -market 
economic policies and practices, avoiding new and un necessary technical barriers in products and 
services of emerging technology, and promoting and protecting labor rights.  
5.96.   USTR is also one of the U.S. co -leads for the Climate and Clean Tech working group , along 
with the Department of State and the Departme nt of Energy. On the EU side, t he group is co-led by 
the Directorate s-General for Climate Action, for Research and Innovation, and for Communication 
Networks, Content and Technology. The Climate and Clean Tech working group is seeking  to identify 
opportunities, measures , and incentives to support technology development, tra nsatlantic trade , and 
investment in climate neutral technologies, products , and services, including collaboration in third WT/TPR/G/434 • United States  
 
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  countries  and on  research and innovation . The working group is also explor ing methodologies, tools, 
and technologies for calculating embedded greenhouse gas emissions in global trade.  
5.6  Other Trade Activities  
5.6.1   Protecting Intellectual Property (Including China -Related 301)  
5.97.   Fostering innovation and creativity is essential to U.S. economic growth, competitiveness, and 
the estimated 63 million  American jobs that directly or indirectly rely on intellectual property 
(IP)-intensive industries. To this end, a trade priority for the Administration is to protect American 
innovation and creativity in foreign markets employing all the tools of U.S. tra de policy. 
IP infringement, including patent infringement, trademark counterfeiting, copyright piracy, and 
trade secret theft, causes significant financial losses for right holders and legitimate businesses, 
undermines U.S. competitive advantages in innova tion and creativity, and can also harm American 
workers whose livelihoods are tied to America's innovation and creativity driven sectors. Through 
engagement with trading partners, the Administration advocates for strong IP protection and 
enforcement in oth er countries for, among other things, works, phonograms, performances, brands, 
designs, trade secrets, and inventions by U.S.  authors,  creators, inventors, artists, and businesses.  
5.98.   Top challenges for U.S. right holders abroad include copyright piracy, whi ch particularly 
threatens U.S. exports in media and other creative content. Trade in counterfeit and pirated products 
often fuels cross -border organized criminal networks, increases the vulnerability of workers to 
exploitative labor practices, and hinders sustainable economic development in many countries. The 
theft of trade secrets, often among a company 's core business assets and key to a company 's 
competitiveness, hurts U.S. businesses, including small and medium -sized businesses. The reach of 
trade secr et theft into critical commercial and defense technologies poses threats to U.S. national 
security interests as well. Additionally, inappropriate protection of geographical indications, including 
the lack of transparency and due process in some systems, li mits the scope of trademarks and other 
IP rights held by U.S. producers and imposes barriers on market access for U.S. -made goods and 
services that rely on the use of common names, such as "feta" cheese. Furthermore, while 
recognizing that certain extraord inary circumstances such as pandemics call for extraordinary 
measures, the Administration continues to seek adequate and effective protection for pharmaceutical 
and other health -related IP around the world to ensure robust American innovation in these crit ical 
industries to fight not only the current, but also future pandemics. In addition, the Administration 
has sought to level the playing field abroad by reducing market access barriers, including those that 
discriminate against U.S. companies, are not ade quately transparent, or do not offer sufficient 
opportunity for meaningful stakeholder engagement.  
5.99.   The United  States  seeks to address these concerns through multiple avenues. The 
United  States  works with many trading partners to strengthen IP protection a nd enforcement 
through the provisions of bilateral instruments, including trade agreements and memoranda of 
understanding. This also includes engagement under Trade and Investment Framework Agreements 
and through bilateral intellectual property work plans.  In addition, the United  States  works with 
trading partners within regional or other initiatives, including the Asia -Pacific Economic Cooperation, 
the Group of 7, the World Intellectual Property Organization, the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development, the World Customs Organization, and other fora.  
5.100.   The United  States  actively monitors and enforces trade commitments, which is critical to the 
success of negotiated outcomes. In one example, the United  States  requested consultations with 
China in March of 2018 under the WTO dispute settlement process in DS542: China – Certain 
Measures Concerning the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights. In March 2019, China revised 
the measures that the United  States  had challenged by deleting certain prov isions in three measures, 
including the Administration of Technology Import/Export Regulations. The United  States  considered 
that China 's actions had sufficiently addressed U.S. concerns, and after 12 months, the authority of 
the panel expired on 8 June 2021. The United  States  also actively relies upon  relevant enforcement 
provisions in its domestic law, including section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, border enforcement 
measures (including in cooperation with foreign customs authorities), and criminal statu tes as they 
may apply, including as to the misappropriation of trade secrets. (Section 5.2 above provides 
additional information on U.S. enforcement efforts, including the investigation into China's Acts, 
Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Trans fer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation Under 
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.)  WT/TPR/G/434 • United States  
 
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  5.101.   An important additional avenue for bilateral engagement is USTR's annual Special 301 
Report and the related Review of Notorious Markets for Counterfeiting and Piracy. Pursuant to 
statute, USTR must identify those countries that deny adequate and effective protection for IP rights 
or deny fair and equitable market access for persons that rely on IP protection, which may lead to 
designation as a "Priority Foreign Country ". In addition, USTR created a Special 301 "Priority Watch 
List" (PWL) and "Watch List" (WL), placement on which indicates that particular problems exist in 
the listed country with respect to IP protection, enforcement, or market access for persons relying 
on IP. Countries placed on the PWL receive increased attention in bilateral discussions with the 
United  States  concerning the identified problem areas. USTR develops an action plan for each foreign 
country identified on the PWL for at least one year. USTR also conducts an annual Review of 
Notorious Markets for Counterfeiting and Piracy focused on online and physical marketplaces that 
reportedly engage in or facilitate substantial piracy or counterfeiting.  
5.102.   Also critical to U.S. trade policy in the arena of IP protection and enforcement is the provision 
of technical assistance and capacity building. The U.S. Government collaborates with various trading 
partners on IP -related training and capacity building around the world. Domestically and abroad, 
bilaterally , and in regional groupings, the U.S. Government remains engaged in building stronger 
and more effective systems for the protection and enforcement of IP. Various U.S. government 
agencies provide sustained and valuable contributions, such as the Department  of Commerce's 
Commercial Law Development Program; the STOPfakes program managed by the International 
Trade Administration; the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, through its Office of Policy and 
International Affairs, which includes the Global Intellectual  Property Academy and the Intellectual 
Property Attaché Program; the U.S. Department of State's Office of Intellectual Property 
Enforcement, International Visitors Leadership Program , and its Global Intellectual Property Law 
Enforcement Coordinator program ; as well as trainings provided by the joint Department of Justice 
and State 's International Computer Hacking and Intellectual Property (ICHIP) program, 
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) through the 
HSI-led Nat ional Intellectual Property Rights Coordination Center, and the United  States  Copyright 
Office. Through these combined efforts, the United  States  is committed to ensuring that American 
innovation and creativity is protected in foreign markets.  
5.6.2   Promoting Di gital Trade  
5.103.   The United  States  places great importance on electronic commerce (or "digital trade"), which 
plays a crucial role in strengthening and supporting firms in every sector of the economy. Since the 
last U.S. Trade Policy Review, the United  States  has advanced engagement on digital trade issues 
across a range of fora to ensuring that digital trade benefits people as both workers and consumers, 
and worked to combat a rising tide of barriers to digital trade around the world.  
5.104.   Following the announcemen t in December 2017 to initiate exploratory work on negotiations 
on electronic commerce, the United  States  and 75 other WTO Members issued a Joint Statement on 
Electronic Commerce on the margins of the World Economic Forum in January 2019 confirming their 
intent to commence negotiations and committing to seek a high -standard outcome with the 
participation of as many Members as possible . Since the initiation of the WTO Joint Statement 
Initiative on Electronic Commerce, the United  States  has participated activ ely in the negotiations, 
including submission of a text proposal in 2019. At the WTO 's 12th Ministerial Conference in June 
2022, the United  States  also joined a consensus among WTO Members to maintain a moratorium on 
duties on electronic transmissions and to reinvigorate  the Work Program on Electronic Commerce.  
5.105.   The United  States  -Japan Digital Trade Agreement, which entered into force in January 20 20, 
and United  States -Mexico -Canada Agreement, which entered into force in July 2020, established 
high-standard digital trade rules that will support digitally -enabled suppliers from every sector to 
innovate and prosper. In May 2022, the United  States  and 13 other countries launched the 
Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF). For more information, see section 5.5.10. Through the 
IPEF, the United  States  will work with our partners to ensure we take full advantage of the 
opportunities presented by digital tra de. The United  States  regularly raises digital trade issues 
bilaterally, including in consultations with FTA partners, in Trade and Investment Framework 
Agreement meetings, and other engagements. The United  States  also engages in conversation on 
digital tr ade issues in international fora such as the G20, G7, APEC, and the OECD, using these 
platforms to address and bring attention to barriers to digital trade.  WT/TPR/G/434 • United States  
 
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  6  TRADE -RELATED CAPACITY BUILDING INITIATIVES  
6.1.  The United  States  supports effective, targeted, and dem and-driven technical assistance by 
leveraging available resources; designing programs that aim at the widest participation among 
developing and least developed countries; and, ultimately, ensuring that the benefits of open and 
transparent trade regimes are  realized by all our traders.  
6.2.  An important element of this TCB trade -related capacity building work involves coordinating 
U.S. Government technical assistance activities with those of the international institutions in order 
to identify and leverage donor s ynergies in programming and to avoid duplication. These institutions 
include the WTO, the World Bank, the IMF, the regional development banks, and the United Nations. 
The United  States , led by USTR at the WTO, led by the Treasury Department at various inte rnational 
financial bodies, and led by the State Department at the United Nations, works in partnership with 
these institutions and other donors to ensure that, where appropriate, trade -related assistance is an 
integral component of development programs ta ilored to the circumstances within each developing 
country. The capacity building efforts of the United  States , both through bilateral assistance and 
through multilateral institutions, build on a longstanding commitment to help partner countries 
benefit fr om the opportunities provided by the global trading system. U.S. bilateral assistance 
includes programs such as targeted assistance for developing countries participating in 
U.S. preference programs and coordination of assistance through Trade and Investme nt Framework 
Agreements. The United  States  also provides bilateral assistance to developing countries to enable 
them to work with the private sector and non -governmental organizations to transition to a more 
open economy; to prepare for WTO negotiations; a nd to abide by their trade obligations.  
6.3.  The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has historically been the primary 
implementer of U.S. trade capacity building programs. In 2020, together with the U.S. Department 
of Agriculture (USDA), and Depa rtment of State, these three USG Agencies invested USD 352 million 
in trade technical assistance delivering more than 500 projects across 118 countries and geographic 
regions with a focus on lower -middle income groups in Sub -Saharan Africa.  
6.4.  Total U.S. government investments in TCB decreased by 67% from FY2019 to FY2020 primarily 
due to a decrease in funding from the M illennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), and a decrease in 
funding  obligations from other  the USG  programs , likely as a result of  disruptions in programming 
arising from the COVID ‑19 pandemic and global response.  
6.1  WTO -Related U.S. Trade -Related Assistance  
6.5.  The United  States  has long supported the trade -related assistance activities of the WTO 
Secretariat through voluntary contribution s to the Doha Development Agenda Global Trust Fund. 
Overall, the United  States  has contributed more than USD 21 million since 2001.  
6.6.  The United  States  is an active participant in the Aid for Trade program at the WTO. The Aid for 
Trade program was establishe d at the Sixth Ministerial Declaration in 2005 in Hong Kong, China, as 
a framework to operationalize technical assistance and trade capacity building efforts among 
WTO Members and other international organizations. Through the Aid for Trade program, the 
United States  fosters the establishment of open markets and rules -based trading systems worldwide, 
particularly in less developed countries.  
6.7.  The United  States  provides technical support to countries that are in the process of acceding 
to the WTO and for post -accession implementation. Among current accession applicants, Algeria, 
Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Comoros, Iraq, Lebanon, Serbia, Timor Leste, and Uzbekistan 
received U.S. technical assistance in their accession processes. In addition, Afghanista n1, Georgia, 
Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz  Republic , Tajikistan, and Ukraine continue to receive assistance with 
implementing their membership commitments.  
 
1 The implementation of trade capacity building programs by USAID Mission in Afghanistan ceased at 
the end of Fiscal Year 2021.  WT/TPR/G/434 • United States  
 
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  6.1.1   The Enhanced Integrated Framework  
6.8.  The Enhanced Integrated Framework (EIF) is a technical assistance, multi -donor trust fund 
that operates as a coordination mechanism for trade -related assistance exclusively to least -
developed countries (LDCs), with the overall objective of integrating trade into national development 
plans and integrating LDCs into the multilat eral trading system. The United  States  has supported 
the EIF primarily through complementary bilateral assistance to LDC countries by USAID. Bilateral 
assistance includes initiatives both to integrate trade into national economic and development 
strategies  and to address high priority capacity building needs designed to accelerate integration 
into the global trading system.  
6.1.2   Trade -related Capacity Building Initiatives for Africa  
6.9.  U.S. trade -related capacity building programs have primarily focused on inclusiv e economic 
growth through increased trade, investment, and competitiveness that creates greater opportunity 
for all citizens. In Africa in particular, this translates into significant assistance to help recipient 
countries expand exports under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and other U.S. tariff 
preference programs. From 2001 to 2020 (latest year of available data), the United  States  has 
invested or obligated more than USD 8.5 billion in trade -related projects in sub -Saharan Africa to 
promote  economic growth and alleviate poverty.  
Prosper Africa  
6.10.   Since mid -2019, the United  States  has been implementing a continent -wide program called 
Prosper Africa that invests in opportunities to do business in, and with, Africa, for the  benefit of 
companies, investors, and workers both in Africa and the United  States . To date, the 
U.S. Government has helped close 800 transactions across 45 countries for an estimated value of 
USD 50 billion in exports and investments. The Prosper Africa program inclu des support for the 
implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), while Prosper Africa funding 
for the West and Southern Africa Trade and Investment Hubs has enabled African businesses to take 
better advantage of AGOA trade preference s. Most recently, USAID and the American National 
Standards Institute (ANSI) sponsored a technical advisor who supported the African Union 
Commission until September 2021 in its preparations to implement the Technical Barriers to Trade 
(TBT) Annex of the A fCFTA Goods Protocol. Additionally, USAID 's Promoting American Approaches 
to ICT Regulatory Policy (ProICT) program will be offering the services of a technical consultant 
through Trademark East Africa (TMEA) to support the upcoming digital trade negotiati ons in the 
AfCFTA.  
USAID Trade and Investment Hubs  
6.11.   The United  States  has boosted trade capacity building assistance through Trade and 
Investment Hubs (Hubs) on the continent, which are expected to facilitate over US D 500 million in 
new investments and fost er the creation of 40,000 jobs by 2024. These Hubs, located in Accra, 
Ghana; Pretoria, South Africa; and Nairobi, Kenya, implement new and innovative initiatives to 
reduce bottlenecks along major trade corridors; promote trade with the United  States  under AGOA; 
and attract investment that drives commercial expansion of African companies into global markets. 
The Hubs are responsible for creating Source Africa, the continent's largest apparel trade show. In 
addition, the Hubs support implementation of the Fee d the Future initiative to help improve food 
security by integrating regional markets and reducing the time and cost to move goods from areas 
of surplus to those of deficit. Supporting such investment allows key value chains to scale up, 
reaching tens of t housands of smallholder farmers, and create stable, long -term employment 
opportunities.  
U.S. Department of Agriculture  
6.12.   The U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA 's) Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) administers 
a number of agricultural technical assistan ce, training, research and exchange programs in 
sub-Saharan Africa such as Food for Progress; the Borlaug  Fellowship Program ; and Cochran 
Programs to help develop sound science in trade policies, and promote regional food security. To 
this end, FAS capacit y building is helping to develop harmonized  SPS systems  that align with the 
WTO SPS Committee and International Standard Setting Bodies  to monitor and control WT/TPR/G/434 • United States  
 
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  transboundary animal disease s and plant pest s, and respond to emergencies. In addition, FAS 
techn ical assistance supports the development of food monitoring systems that will both ensure 
exported foods meet international requirements and that will safeguard domestic food supplies from 
chemical and microbiological contamination. In 2021, USDA confirmed  support  to hire an embedded 
SPS advisor at the African Union Commission to guide the African Union 's efforts to implement the 
SPS Policy Framework, a document intended to guide Member States on the SPS Annex of AfCFTA; 
reduce barriers to cross border trad e; and better coordinate capacity building and policy 
harmonization under the AfCFTA.  
Millennium Challenge Corporation  
6.13.   The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) works in partnership with well -governed 
developing countries to reduce obstacles to private in vestment and promote economic growth. Since 
MCC was created in 2004, the agency has invested more than US D 8.1 billion in trade -related 
assistance to developing countries, with over USD 4.8 billion of that amount invested in AGOA -
eligible countries. MCC 's partnerships with AGOA -eligible countries span the continent and have 
included expansions to critical seaports in Benin and Cabo Verde and roads used for commerce in 
Ghana, Mozambique, Niger, Côte  d'Ivoire , and Senegal. MCC 's innovative approach —from viabi lity 
gap financing for infrastructure projects to support of regulatory reforms —unlocks capital, improves 
investment environments, and helps create opportunities for firms in emerging markets.  
U.S. Trade and Development Agency  
6.14.   The U.S. Trade and Developmen t Agency (USTDA) works to reduce barriers to financing 
infrastructure, and links U.S. businesses to export opportunities by funding feasibility studies, 
technical assistance and pilot projects that integrate U.S. private sector innovation into infrastructu re 
projects and foster economic growth in partner countries. The Agency also connects overseas project 
sponsors with U.S. partners through its reverse trade missions, industry conferences, and expert 
workshops. Over the last 30 years, USTDA has been workin g in sub -Saharan Africa connecting 
African project sponsors and U.S. companies through project preparation and export promotion 
activities in collaboration with the U.S. Government 's Prosper Africa and Power Africa initiatives, as 
well as USTDA 's Access Af rica initiative. The Power Africa initiative works to improve the legal and 
regulatory environment for power projects in the African market. USTDA 's Access Africa initiative is 
a partnership with U.S. industry to advance the development of high -quality inf ormation and 
communications technology infrastructure and services across Sub -Saharan Africa. In addition, 
USTDA advances Prosper Africa through its Global Procurement Initiative , which provides education 
to public officials in emerging markets on how to e stablish procurement practices and policies that 
integrate life -cycle cost analysis and best value determination in a fair, transparent manner. The 
GPI helps partner countries acquire high -quality, long -lasting technologies, while building smart, 
sustainab le infrastructure with overall savings to their government.  
6.1.3   Standards Alliance  
6.15.   The Standards Alliance is a public -private partnership between USAID and ANSI, the official 
U.S. representative to the International Organization for Standardization (ISO). The  goal of this 
partnership is to build capacity among developing countries to implement the WTO  Agreement  on 
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT  Agreement ). This program aims to reduce the costs and 
bureaucratic hurdles U.S. exporters face in foreign markets a nd increase the competitiveness of 
U.S. products, particularly in developing markets, through the delivery of training on, among others, 
international standards, and best practices supporting implementation of the TBT  Agreement . The 
Standards Alliance impl ements projects in Africa, the Indo -Pacific, Central and South America.  
6.16.   The Standards Alliance  has worked with a number of AGOA -eligible countries, including 
Senegal, Côte  d'Ivoire , Ghana, Mozambique, Zambia, South Africa, and Kenya.  In 2019, USAID and 
ANSI announced the launch of Standards Alliance: Phase 2 (2019 –2024). Building on the success of 
Phase 1, Phase 2 commits funds to promote regulatory convergence in the context of the COVID ‑19 
pandemic, good regulatory practice (GRP), and the adoption of int ernational standards for medical 
devices while enhancing the critical role of standards and conformity assessment in supporting public 
health and safety. Ultimately, the goal is to establish an efficient medical device regulatory 
environment and framework that will facilitate the response to the COVID ‑19 pandemic and diminish 
technical barriers to trade, thus promoting the export of quality U.S. medical devices. In addition, WT/TPR/G/434 • United States  
 
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  the Standards Alliance provides private sector technical assistance in the region o n the biofuels, and 
water and sanitation sectors. The initiative is also exploring opportunities in the construction related 
standards. All projects are co -financed by the U.S. private sector and USAID.  
7  UNITED  STATES  PREFERENCE PROGRAMS  
7.1  Generalized System of Preferences (GSP)  
7.1.  The U.S. Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program was authorized by the Trade Act 
of 1974 (19 U.S.C. §§ 2461 et seq.) and has subsequently been renewed 14 times, most recently 
in March 2018. Authorization for the program lapsed on 31 December  2020. The GSP  program is a 
non-reciprocal trade preference program that allows eligible exports from designated developing 
countries to enter the United  States  duty-free. It was designed to support the creation of trade 
opportunities for developing countries and encour age broad -based economic development.  As of 
31 December  2020, there were 119 designated GSP beneficiary developing countries (BDCs) and 
territories. Forty -four countries and territories were designated least -developed beneficiary 
developing countries (LDBD Cs) under the GSP program and, as such, were eligible for a broader 
range of duty -free benefits. Approximately 3,500 non -import sensitive products were eligible for 
duty-free treatment for BDCs, with an additional approximately 1,500 products reserved for 
eligibility from LDBDCs only.  
7.2.  USTR makes recommendations to the President regarding which countries are eligible for 
benefits  based on beneficiary countries ' compliance with the 15 GSP eligibility criteria established by 
Congress. These criteria include, b ut are not limited to: taking steps to respect internationally 
recognized worker rights, providing the United  States  with equitable and reasonable market access, 
reducing trade -distorting investment practices, providing adequate and effective protection of  
intellectual property (IP) rights to U.S. rights holders, and enforcing arbitral awards in favor of 
U.S. citizens or corporations. In 2018, USTR implemented a new monitoring process that assesses 
all GSP beneficiaries ' compliance with all eligibility crit eria on a triennial basis.  During t he reporting 
period, USTR and the GSP Subcommittee assessed GSP beneficiary countries in the Western 
Hemisphere, Europe, the Middle East, North Africa, and Sub -Saharan Africa.   
7.3.  In May 2019, the United  States  terminated In dia's GSP designation after India had 
implemented a variety of trade barriers that negatively impacted United  States  commerce, and failed 
to provide the United  States  with reasonable access to its markets. In May 2019, the United  States  
also terminated Tur key's GSP designation after finding that Turkey had attained a sustainable level 
of economic development and global competitiveness without the need for preferential access to the 
United  States  market. In April 2020, the United  States  suspended US D 1.3 bil lion of Thailand 's GSP 
benefits for failure to comply with GSP worker rights criteria; in December 2020, the U.S. suspended 
an additional US D 817 million for failure to provide equitable and reasonable market access for 
U.S. pork products. More information  may be found on the USTR website2 and in USTR 's GSP 
Guidebook.   
7.2  African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA)  
7.4.  AGOA, which was extended to 2025 by the Trade Preferences Extension Act of 2015, has been 
a core element of U.S. -African engagement on trade and inv estment since it was enacted in 2000. 
By providing duty -free entry into the United  States  for approximately 6,000 tariff lines of products 
to beneficiary countries, AGOA has helped to expand and diversify two -way trade between the 
United  States  and sub -Saharan Africa. In 2021, U.S. total two -way goods trade with sub -Saharan 
Africa was US D 44.8 billion. U.S. total imports under AGOA, including its Generalized System of 
Preferences provisions, was US D 6.7 billion and U.S. imports of non -oil goods under AGOA t otaled 
USD 4.8 billion. AGOA has also created hundreds of thousands of new jobs in eligible countries and 
sectors, and helped to alleviate poverty on the continent.  
7.5.  Every year, AGOA requires the President to monitor and review the progress of sub -Saharan 
African countries in meeting the AGOA eligibility criteria set out in the legislation – including, among 
other requirements, making continual progress in establishing a market -based economy, rule of law, 
and protection of internationally recognized workers ' rights. USTR makes recommendations to the 
 
2 Viewed at:  https://ustr.gov/issue -areas/trade -development/preference -programs/generalized -system -
preference -gsp. WT/TPR/G/434 • United States  
 
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  President regarding which countries meet eligibility criteria for benefits based on an annual country 
eligibility review that takes into account information drawn from U.S. Government agencies, the 
private sector , non -governmental organizations, and prospective beneficiary governments. As of 
January 2022, 36 countries were eligible for AGOA benefits.  
7.6.  The United  States -Sub-Saharan Africa Trade and Economic Cooperation Forum, informally 
known as the "AGOA Forum ", is an annual ministerial -level meeting with AGOA -eligible countries. In 
October 2021, the United  States  convened a two -day high -level Virtual AGOA Ministerial with African 
counterparts that took place in lieu of an in -person annual AGOA Forum due to the COV ID‑19 
pandemic. The theme of the Ministerial was "Building Back a Better U.S. -Africa Trade and Investment 
Relationship ". The 2020 AGOA Forum did not take place due to the COVID -19 pandemic and the 
most recent in -person AGOA Forum took place in August 2019 in Abidjan, Côte  d'Ivoire . Ambassador 
Tai hosted a Virtual AGOA Ministerial meeting in October 2021 and will host an in person Ministerial 
meeting in December 2022.  The next AGOA Forum is slated to take place in South Africa  in 
August  2023. 
7.7.  In June 202 2, USTR released the "202 2 Biennial Report on the Implementation of the African 
Growth and Opportunity Act " to Congress. The report provides Congress a description of the status 
of trade and investment between the United  States  and sub -Saharan Africa, changes in country 
eligibility for AGOA benefits, an analysis of country compliance with the AGOA eligibility criteria, an 
overview of regional integration efforts in sub -Saharan Africa, and a summary of U.S. trade 
capacity -building efforts.  
7.3  The Caribbean Basin Initiative  
7.8.  The programs known collectively as the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) are a vital element in 
U.S. economic relations with its neighbors in the Caribbean. Initially laun ched in 1983 by the 
Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA) and substantially expanded in 2000 with the 
U.S.-Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA), the CBI was further expanded in the Trade Act 
of 2002. The HOPE Act, the HOPE II Act of 2008, and the HELP Act provide additional benefits for 
textile and apparel products from Haiti, as part of CBI. As of 2021, the CBI provides 17 countries 
and dependent territories with duty -free access to the U.S. market for most goods.  
7.9.  The trade benefits of CB I have helped beneficiary countries and dependent territories in the 
region diversify their exports. In conjunction with economic reform and trade liberalization by 
beneficiary countries, the trade benefits of the program have contributed to their economic  growth. 
In December 2021, USTR submitted its fourteenth biannual report to Congress on the operation of 
the CBERA including compliance of each country with CBI eligibility criteria. The report can be found 
on the USTR website.3 A list of current benefici ary countries can be found in the December 2021 
report.  
7.4  Nepal Preference Program  
7.10.   The Nepal Trade Preference Program (NTPP) provides non -reciprocal preferential trade 
benefits on specified products through 31 December  2025 to assist Nepal in its recovery fr om the 
April 2015 earthquake and subsequent aftershocks. The Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement 
Act of 2015 (TFTEA) entered into force on 24 February  2016 and directed the President to establish 
a new country -specific preference program to grant Nepa l duty -free treatment for a set of textile, 
apparel, and headgear products covered by 66 8 -digit tariff lines in the Harmonized Tariff Schedule 
(HTS). Due to changes in the U.S. Harmonized Tariff Schedule, the number of tariff lines for which 
Nepal is exem pt from customs duties increased in July 2016 to 77 8 -digit tariff lines. Following the 
determination that Nepal met certain eligibility requirements, the NTPP program was implemented 
by Presidential Proclamation on 15 December  2016. In addition to the tar iff preferences, the TFTEA 
directs the President to provide trade -related technical assistance to help Nepal implement the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) Trade Facilitation Agreement.  
7.11.   In 2021, U.S. -Nepal two -way trade totaled USD 304.5 million. U.S. impor ts from Nepal under 
the NTPP were USD 4.0 million in 2021 and accounted for 3.7 % of total U.S. imports from Nepal. 
The U.S.  government has made efforts to promote the utilization of the NTPP, including through the 
 
3 Viewed at: https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/reports/2021/2021CBIReport.pdf . WT/TPR/G/434 • United States  
 
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  last U.S. –Nepal Trade and Investment Frame work Agreement (TIFA) Council meetings in 
December  2020. The TFTEA also requires the President to annually report to Congress on the 
implementation of the NTPP4 as well as whether Nepal is meeting the eligibility criteria, which 
includes, among other thin gs, making continual progress in establishing a market -based economy, 
rule of law, and protection of internationally recognized workers' rights.  
7.5  Haiti Hope  
7.12.   The United  States  provides substantial benefits to Haiti through the Haitian Hemispheric 
Opportunity  through Partnership Encouragement Act of 2006 ("HOPE Act"), the Haitian Hemispheric 
Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement Act of 2008 ("HOPE II"), and the Haiti Economic 
Lift Program Act of 2010 ("HELP Act"). In 2015, Congress extended this progra m of unilateral support 
for Haiti through 30 September  2025.  
7.13.   On an annual basis, USTR is required to submit a report to Congress regarding the 
implementation of HOPE II. The latest HOPE II Report can also be found on the USTR website.5 
8  TRADE AND ENVIRONM ENT 
8.1.  Since the last U.S. Trade Policy Review, the United  States  made significant progress on a range 
of trade and environment matters in multiple fora, including through multilateral, regional and 
bilateral trade initiatives.  
8.2.  The USMCA Environment chapter (Chapter 24) includes the most comprehensive set of 
enforceable environmental obligations of any previous U.S. free trade agreement. These include 
commitments relating to harmful fisheries subsidies; wildlife trafficking; illegal, unreported, and 
unregulat ed (IUU) fishing; the protection of marine species; marine litter; sustainable forest 
management; air quality; and public participation and environmental cooperation. Full 
implementation, monitoring , and enforcement of the USMCA Chapter 24 continues to be a key 
priority. In June 2021, the United  States , with its Mexican and Canadian counterparts, organized the 
inaugural meeting of the trilateral Environment Committee during which the Parties provided 
updates on respective efforts to implement Chapter 24 com mitments , including  an in -depth 
discussion of cooperative law enforcement  efforts to stem wildlife trafficking and trade in illegally 
harvested timber . The meeting also included a public session, which provided public stakeholders 
the opportunity to  raise questions and comments to the Parties . In February 2022, the United  States  
launched consultations with Mexico under the Environment Chapter Article  24.29.2 regarding 
Mexico 's obligations to effectively enforce its fisheries -related laws, regulations, and other measures 
designed to prevent illegal fishing in the Upper Gulf of California, to prevent trafficking of protected 
species such as the totoaba fish, and to protect and conserve the critically endangered vaquita 
porpoise. T hrough these consultations  United States  is working closely with the Government of 
Mexico to strengthen Mexico 's fisheries enforcement and ensure effective enforcement of USMCA 
environment commitments.  
8.3.  The United  States  has also continued to prioritize implementation of the FTAs curr ently in force. 
In particular, the United  States  continued to actively monitor and enforce the United  States –Peru 
Trade Promotion Agreement (PTPA) and its landmark Forest Annex. Following a 2018 verification 
exercise, the United  States  took action in July 2019, and again in October 2020, to block future 
timber imports from a Peruvian exporter based on illegally harvested timber found in its supply 
chain. In addition, the United  States  and Peru held regular bilateral discussions on the 
implementation of obli gations under the Agreement 's Environment Chapter and Forest Annex, 
including discussions related to the Secretariat for Submissions on Environmental Enforcement 
Matters (Secretariat) established in Article  18.8 of the Agreement. In September 2021, the 
United States  and Peru undertook a process to select a new Executive Director of the Secretariat. 
The new Executive Director was selected in December 2021 and will serve a term of two years 
beginning in early 2022. The United  States  continued to engage closel y with Peru to combat illegal 
logging and work toward improving forest sector governance. Keeping illegal timber out of the supply 
 
4 Viewed at: https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/assets/reports/2022/ntpp/2022 -nepal -tpp-report -to-
congress -final.pdf . 
5 Viewed at: 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/reports/2022/2022USTRAnnualHaitiHOPEIIReportCongress.pdf . WT/TPR/G/434 • United States  
 
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  chain is a high priority as illegal logging damages the global environment and the natural resources 
we all depend on and is unfair to our workers and businesses.  
8.4.  On 1 October  2021, the United  States  and Viet  Nam signed an agreement that addresses 
U.S. concerns in the Viet  Nam Timber Section 301 investigation, which was initiated in October 2020. 
This was the first Section 301 investigation to address environmental concerns. The Agreement 
secured commitments that will help keep illegally harvested or traded timber out of the su pply chain 
and protect the environment and natural resources. USTR determined that the Agreement provided 
a satisfactory resolution of the matter subject to investigation and that no trade action was 
warranted at that time. USTR is monitoring Viet  Nam's implementation of the Agreement. Pursuant 
to the Agreement, bilateral engagement on this issue continues through the Timber Working Group 
under the United  States -Viet Nam Trade and Investment Framework Agreement. The Timber 
Working Group was established to f acilitate coordination between the parties and to oversee the 
implementation of the Agreement. The first meeting of the Timber Working Group was convened  in 
April 2022 .  
8.5.  Since the last TPR, the United  States  kept up substantial engagement with other FTA pa rtners. 
In particular, the United  States  had senior -level meetings with officials from Central America and 
the Dominican  Republic , Colombia, Israel, Republic of Korea, and Singapore to discuss 
implementation of , and monitor progress under , the environment chapters of the relevant  FTAs, and 
to engage in discussions about  global environmental challenges such as climate change adaptation 
and mitigation and use of trade tools to address such challenges. These engagements were also 
opportunities to review, and i n some cases, update, the environmental cooperation work programs 
that help to support implementation of the environment chapters of U.S. FTAs. The United  States  
also engaged with Trade and Investment Framework Agreement partners, notably Ecuador, Laos, 
Maldives, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Chinese  Taipei , and Uruguay to consult  on a wide range of issues 
related to trade and investment, including trade -related environmental issues such as wildlife 
trafficking and IUU fishing.  
8.6.  In APEC, the United  States  continued to work with other Asia -Pacific economies through the 
Experts Group on Illegal Logging and Associated Trade to improve the capacity of APEC customs 
officials to combat illegal logging and associated trade and promote the trade in legally harvested 
forest p roducts within the APEC region. Within the Oceans and Fisheries Working Group, the 
United  States  supported implementation of the Port State Measures Agreement, and worked to 
identify areas of convergence and best practices to combat IUU fishing, including through APEC 's 
Roadmap on Combating IUU Fishing. In addition, work continued on the U.S. -led Recyclable 
Materials Policy Program, which aims to develop the capacity of APEC economies to identify and 
frame domestic policies that promote solid waste manageme nt and recycling infrastructure. Through 
multilateral fora such as APEC and OECD, the United  States  is promoting circular economy 
approaches and discussing opportunities to decarbonize economies through trade tools. At the WTO, 
the United  States  is collabo rating with trading partners to forge new partnerships to promote an 
environmentally sustainable trade agenda, and is working collaboratively through such initiatives as 
the WTO Trade and Environmental Sustainability Structured Discussions (TESSD), which t he 
United  States  formally joined in November 2021. The United  States  submitted a discussion paper to 
the CTE and TESSD in May 2022 on the issues of climate change and circular economy.  
8.7.  The United  States  is also committed to combating wildlife trafficking and IUU fishing through a 
variety of means, including through U.S. FTAs, environmental cooperation mechanisms, and other 
trade -related initiatives. For example, the United  States  has consistently raised these areas for 
discussion and collaboration in meeti ngs under the Environment Chapters of our FTAs and included 
them in recent environmental programs. Multiple U.S. government agencies continue to participate 
in implementing the Eliminate, Neutralize, and Disrupt (END) Wildlife Trafficking Act of 2016, with  
the objectives of supporting anti -poaching efforts on a global scale, strengthening the capacity of 
partner countries to combat wildlife trafficking, and designating major wildlife trafficking countries 
for further strategic collaboration with the United  States.6 The United  States  also continues to be an 
active Party to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 
(CITES), including through participation in meetings of the CITES Animals, Plants, and Standing 
Committees, and the Conference of t he Parties.  
 
6 Eliminate, Neutralize, and Disrupt (END) Wildlife Trafficking Act of 2016. Viewed at: 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th -congress/house -bill/2494/text  (signed into law on 9 October 2016).  WT/TPR/G/434 • United States  
 
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  8.8.  IUU fishing continues to be an important U.S. international policy priority in the areas of oceans 
governance and economic security. The Maritime Security and Fisheries Enforcement (SAFE) Act, 
which became law in December 2019, supports a "whole-of-government approach across the Federal 
Government to counter IUU fishing and related threats to maritime security " through a number of 
means including, inter alia : improving data sharing that enhances surveillance; advancing effective 
enforcement and  prosecution against IUU fishing; increasing and improving global transparency and 
traceability across the seafood supply chain; responding to poor working conditions and labor abuses 
in the fishing industry; and preventing the use of IUU fishing as a fina ncing source for transnational 
organized groups. To further interagency collaboration in this area, Part II of the Maritime SAFE Act 
called for the establishment of the Interagency Working Group on IUU Fishing. The Working Group, 
which is comprised of 21 f ederal agencies, aims to employ a coordinated, cohesive, and 
regionally -appropriate approach to combating IUU fishing and related threats to maritime security 
in "priority regions " and "priority flag states ". On 27 June 2022, President Biden signed a Natio nal 
Security Memorandum (NSM) to address IUU fishing and related harmful practices. The NSM will 
increase coordination with diverse stakeholders – public and private, foreign and domestic. The 
United  States  will use the full range of existing conservation,  labor, trade, economic, diplomatic, law 
enforcement, and national security authorities to address these challenges.  
9  SMALL AND MEDIUM -SIZED BUSINESS TRADE  
9.1.  USTR has implemented a Small and Medium -Sized Business Initiative to increase export 
opportunities f or U.S. small and medium -sized businesses (SMEs) and has expanded efforts to 
address the specific export challenges and priorities of SMEs and their workers in U.S. trade policy 
and enforcement activities. During the period under review, USTR continued to engage with its 
interagency partners and with trading partners to develop and implement new and ongoing initiatives 
that support small business exports.  
9.2.  U.S. small businesses are key engines for U.S. economic growth, jobs, and innovation. USTR 
focused on making trade work for the benefit of U.S. SMEs, helping them take advantage of new 
markets abroad, access and participate in global supply chains, and support jobs at home.  
9.3.  USTR worked closely with the U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA), the U.S. De partment 
of Agriculture, the U.S. Department of Commerce (Commerce), and other agencies that help provide 
U.S. SMEs with information, assistance, and counselling on specific export opportunities.  
9.4.  Tariff barriers, burdensome customs procedures, discriminat ory or arbitrary standards, lack of 
transparency relating to relevant regulations, restrictions on digital trade, and insufficient intellectual 
property rights protection in foreign markets present particular challenges for U.S. SMEs exporting 
abroad. Unde r the SME Initiative, USTR 's small business office, regional offices, and functional offices 
pursued initiatives and advanced efforts to address these issues. U.S. trade agreements, as well as 
other trade dialogues and fora, provided a critical opportunity  to address specific concerns of 
U.S. SMEs and facilitate their participation in export markets. Since the last TPR, the United  States  
has worked to increase opportunities for SME exports.  
9.5.  For the first time in a U.S. trade agreement, the United  States  included a dedicated chapter on 
SMEs in the United  States –Mexico –Canada Agreement (USMCA), in recognition of the fundamental 
role of SMEs as engines of the North American economy. The USMCA also contains key provisions 
supporting SMEs throughout the Agreemen t. The SME chapter promotes ongoing cooperation among 
the Parties to increase SME trade and investment opportunities. It establishes information -sharing 
tools that help SMEs better understand the benefits of the Agreement and provides other information 
useful for SMEs doing business in the region. The chapter also established a committee on SME 
issues comprised of government officials from each country. The committee cooperated on webinars 
for small businesses and small business counselors, including foster ing on underserved communities, 
in 2021 and 2022. Furthermore, the chapter launched a new framework for an ongoing SME 
Dialogue, which is open to participation by SMEs, including those owned by diverse and 
underrepresented groups. The Dialogue will enable participants to provide views and information to 
government officials on the implementation of the Agreement to help ensure that SMEs continue to 
benefit. The first USMCA SME Dialogue was convened in San Antonio, Texas in April 2022.  
9.6.  SMEs also benefit from  other  obligations  throughout the USMCA , including: (1) cutting costs 
and red tape for customs and border procedures , (2) supporting Internet enabled small businesses WT/TPR/G/434 • United States  
 
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  and electronic commerce exports; ( 3) protecting the intellectual property of innovators; 
(4) supporting cross -border trade in services for small business; and, ( 5) supporting small 
businesses through good regulatory practices to promote transparency and accountability when 
developing and implementing regulations.  
9.7.  The United  States –European  Union (EU) Trade and Technology Council, launched in 2021, 
includes a  Commerce Department -led W orking Group on Promoting SME Access to and Use of Digital 
Tools. It has hosted a series of online webinars for European and U.S. SMEs throughout 2022. The 
United  States  and the EU  also continued their exchanges on SME objectives and planning for the 
11th U.S. – EU SME Workshop in September 2022, to be hosted by the EU in  Germany.  
9.8.  The United  States  and the United Kingdom (UK) continued their exchanges on SME objectives 
and planning and held the 5th U.S. –UK SME Dialogue in June 2022 in Boston, Massachusetts, with 
the U.S. Export Assistance Center in New England, the Massac husetts Small Business Development 
Center Network, and the UK Embassy.  
9.9.  In the Asia -Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, APEC economies continued to advance 
initiatives to facilitate SME access to global markets, including by enhancing policy makers ' 
understanding of the role of data flows in building a more inclusive digital economy. The 
United  States , through the APEC Alliance for Supply Chain Connectivity and other mechanisms, 
continued capacity building activities closely linked to the World Trade  Organization (WTO) Trade 
Facilitation Agreement. These activities included assistance for economies to further simplify 
customs procedures and document requirements and to foster border agency cooperation, which 
will benefit SMEs that often lack the resou rces necessary to navigate overly complex requirements 
to deliver their goods to overseas markets in the region. Economies also continued to update the 
APEC Trade Repository to help SMEs seeking information on tariff rates, customs procedures, and 
other in formation for doing business in the APEC region.  
9.10.   USTR worked with USAID, Commerce, SBA, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) on the development of topics and participants for a United  States –ASEAN SME Best 
Practices Exchange  held in Marc h 2022 .  
9.11.   In the WTO context, USTR pursued work with other Members on issues of interest to SME 
stakeholders, such as electronic commerce, transparency of regulatory processes, and 
implementation of trade facilitation measures.  
 
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