WT/DS579/R/Suppl.1  
WT/DS580/R/Suppl.1  
WT/DS581/R/Suppl.1  
 
14 December  2021 
(21-8032) Page: 1/25 
  Original: English  
 
INDIA – MEASURES CONCERNING SUGAR AND SUGARCANE  
REPORTS OF THE PANELS  
Appendix  
 
This supplement  contains the Appendix to the Reports of the Panels to be found in documents 
WT/DS579/R, WT/DS580/R, and WT/DS581/R.  
 
 
_______________  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 WT/DS579/R/Suppl.1 • WT/DS580/R/Suppl.1 • WT/DS581/R/Suppl.1  
 
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APPENDIX  
 
CALCULATION OF INDIA'S MARKET PRICE SUPPORT TO  SUGARCANE PRODUCERS FOR 
THE 2014 -15 TO 2018 -19 SUGAR SEASONS  
Contents  
1   INTRODUCTION  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..........  3 
2   RELEVANT LEGAL INSTRUMENTS  ................................ ................................ .................  4 
2.1   Fair and Remunerative Price  ................................ ................................ ........................  4 
2.2   State -Advised Prices  ................................ ................................ ................................ .. 6 
2.2.1   Bihar ................................ ................................ ................................ ....................  7 
2.2.2   Haryana  ................................ ................................ ................................ ................  7 
2.2.3   Punjab  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..................  8 
2.2.4   Tamil Nadu  ................................ ................................ ................................ ............  9 
2.2.5   Uttar Pr adesh  ................................ ................................ ................................ ........  10 
2.2.6   Uttarakhand  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..........  11 
3   APPLIED ADMINISTERED PRICE  ................................ ................................ ................  11 
3.1   General  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...................  11 
3.2   Recovery rates  ................................ ................................ ................................ .........  13 
3.3   AAP based on the FRP  ................................ ................................ ...............................  14 
3.4   AAP based on the SAPs  ................................ ................................ .............................  18 
3.5   Summary  ................................ ................................ ................................ ................  19 
4   FIXED EXTERNAL R EFERENCE PRICE  ................................ ................................ .........  19 
5   QUANTITY OF ELIGIBLE PRODUCTION  ................................ ................................ ...... 22 
6   CALCULATION OF MARKET PRICE SUPPORT  ................................ ..............................  23 
 
  WT/DS579/R/Suppl.1 • WT/DS580/R/Suppl.1 • WT/DS581/R/Suppl.1  
 
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  1  INTRODUCTION  
1.1.  In the circumstances of th ese dispute s, we consider it appropriate to assess India's compliance  
with Article 7.2(b) of the Agreement on Agriculture by determining whether India's product -specific 
AMS to sugarcane producers for each sugar season from 2014 -15 to 2018 -19 was in excess of the 
amount that India is permitted to provide  pursuant to the Agre ement .1 We recall that , according to  
the complainants , India's product -specific AMS to sugarcane producers consists of : (i) market price 
support; and (ii) non -exempt direct payments or other non -exempt policies.2 This Appendix 
addresses India's alleged m arket price support to sugarcane producers.  
1.2.  Paragraph 8 of Annex 3 of the A greement on Agriculture  describes  the methodology for 
calculating the level of market price support provided by a Member. Under paragraph 8, "market 
price support shall be calculated using the gap between a fixed external reference price [FERP] and 
the applied administered price [AAP] mul tiplied by the quantity of production eligible [QEP]  to receive 
the applied administered price". This can be e xpressed mathematically  as:  
Market price support = (FERP – AAP) * (QEP)  
 
1.3.  In support of their claim under Article 7.2(b) of the Agreement on Agric ulture, the complainants 
apply the methodology set out in paragraph 8 of Annex 3 to determine India's market price support 
to sugarcane producers during each sugar season from 2014 -15 to 2018 -19. With respect to each 
component of the calculation, t he compl ainants present considerable evidence and argumentation . 
Regarding the FERP, the complainants note that, pursuant to paragraph 9 of Annex 3, the FERP may 
be adjusted for quality differences.3 On that basis, t he complainants calculate an adjusted FERP for 
different  State s and seasons , using the methodology set out  in India's Supporting Tables identified 
in its Schedule.4 As to the AAP, the complainants assert that India's Central Government, as well as 
certain State Governments, set mandatory minimum price s for sugarcane that constitute AAPs within 
the meaning of the Agreement on Agriculture.5 In order to calculate both the adjusted FERP a nd the 
amount of the AAP, the complainants provide evidence of the "recovery rate"  (i.e. the "amount of 
sugar that can be extracted from sugarcane"6) in different States.7 Regarding the QEP, the 
complainants provide evidence of the total sugarcane production in different States in India.8 Using 
these data , the complainants apply the paragraph 8 methodology to calculate the total market price 
support  that India provided to sugarcane producers for each season from 2014 -15 to 2018 -19.9 
1.4.  India argues that the mandatory minimum prices identified by the complainants do not 
constitute market  price support, within the meaning of the Agreement on Agriculture , because they 
 
1 See para. 7.11 of the Panel Report. We recall that, for the reasons explained in fn 75 to para. 7.9 of 
the Panel Report, it is unnecessary for us to address the complainants' claims under Articles 3.2 and 6.3 of the 
Agreement on Agriculture.  
2 See para. 7 .19 of the Panel Report.  
3 Brazil's first written submission, para. 146; Australia's first written submission, para. 16 1; Guatemala's 
first written submission, para. 146.  
4 Brazil's first written submission, para. 148; Brazil's Calculation of India's Domes tic Support for 
Sugarcane, (Exhibit BRA -1 (revised -3)), "FERP" spreadsheet; Australia's first written submission, 
paras. 161-162; Australia's Domestic Support Calculations, (Exhibit AUS -1 (revised 23 March 2021)), "FERP" 
spreadsheet; Guatemala's first writ ten submission, para. 147; Guatemala's Calculations of India's AMS (Exhibit 
GTM-45 (revised 12 May 2021)), "FERP details" spreadsheet.  
5 Brazil's first written submission, paras. 2 4-48, 135 -139 and 156; Australia's first written submission, 
paras. 23 -61 and 153-156; Guatemala's first written submission, paras. 37 -72 and 1 40-144. 
6 Guatemala's first written submission, para. 40. See also Brazil's first written submission, para.  32; 
Australia's first written submission, para. 28.  
7 Brazil's first written sub mission, Table C -1; Australia's first written submission, Table 16 ; Guatemala's 
first written submission,  Table 2 .  
8 Brazil's first written submission, Table C -8; Australia's first written submission, Table 17 ; Guatemala's 
first written submission,  Table 8 . 
9 See Brazil's Calculation of India's Domestic Support for Sugarcane, (Exhibit BRA -1 (revised -3)); 
Australia's Domestic Support Calculations, (Exhibit AUS -1 (revised 23 March 2021)); Guatemala's Calculations 
of India's AMS (Exhibit GTM -45 (revised 12 May 2021)).  WT/DS579/R/Suppl.1 • WT/DS580/R/Suppl.1 • WT/DS581/R/Suppl.1  
 
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  do not entail government purchase or procurement of the sugarcane .10 India does not, however,  
contest the accuracy of the evidence or calculations provided by the complainants .11 
1.5.  In paragraphs  7.37 to 7.61  of the Panel Report, we have address ed the parties' disagreement 
over whether market price support, within the meaning of the Agreement on Agriculture, can only 
exist where there is government purchase or procurement of the relevant agricultural product. We 
have concluded that there is no such  requirement, and that the existence of market price support 
depends on the existence and amount of the FERP, AAP, and QEP.12 In this Appendix , we address 
the existence and amount of the FERP, AAP, and QEP, and apply the paragraph  8 methodology to 
determin e the amount of market price support for sugarcane producers , if any,  that India maintained 
during each sugar season from 2014 -15 to 2018 -19.   
1.6.  We proceed by first describing  the relevant legal instruments through which India allegedly 
provides market price support. We then examine  the existence and amount of  the AAP , the FERP, 
and the QEP.  Finally, we apply the calculation methodology set out  in paragraph 8 in order to 
determine the amount of market price support , if any, that India provided to sugarcane producers 
during each sugar season from 2014 -15 to 2018 -19. 
2  RELEVANT LEGAL INSTRUMENTS  
2.1.  The complainants assert that India maintains mandatory  minimum prices payable by 
purchasers of sugarcane. The complainants identify two sets of such mandatory minimum prices: 
(i) the "Fair and Remunerative Price" (FRP), allegedly set by the Central Indian Government13; and 
(ii) certain State -Advised Prices (S APs) set by six individual State Governments within India.14 
According to the complainants , in States where an SAP is applied, the sugar producers are required 
to pay the SAP instead of the FRP when the former is higher than the latter.15 
2.2.  India does not co ntest, as a factual matter, the complainants' description of the FRP and SAPs.   
2.3.  Having reviewed the evidence and assertions of the parties, we find that India maintain s 
mandatory minimum prices for sugarcane , payable by sugar producer s (i.e. sugar mills and factories 
that process sugarcane into sugar) , in the form of: (i) the FRP, set on an annual basis by the Central 
Indian Government; and (ii) various SAPs , set on an annual basis  by certain State Governments in 
India. We also understa nd that, in States where an SAP is applied,  sugar producers  are required to 
pay whichever is the higher price  as between the FRP and SAPs .16 For the sake of clarity, we consider 
it useful to identify, below, the content and operation of the FRP and SAPs.  
2.1  Fair and Remunerative Price 
2.4.  The FRP is established by, and maintained through, the following legal instruments : the 
Essential Commodities Act of 195517 ("Essential Commodities Act "); the Sugarcane (Control) Order 
 
10 See paras. 7.20, 7.30, and 7.38 of the Panel Report.  
11 According to India, its silence with respect to certain aspects of the complainants' arguments should 
not be construed as assent. (India's responses to questions from the Panel at the first meeting of the Panel)  
12 See para. 7.59 of the Panel Report.  
13 Brazil's first written submission, paras. 25 -34 and 134 -155; Australia's first written submission, 
paras.  23-39 and 166 -173; Guatemala's first written submission, paras. 37 -50 and 137 -165. 
14 Brazil's first written submission, paras. 35 -48 and 156 -160; Australia's first written submission, 
paras.  41-61 and 174 -180; Guatemala's first written submission, paras. 51 -72 and 137 -165. 
15 Brazil's first written submission, para. 35; Aus tralia's first written submission, para. 41 ; Guatemala's 
first written submission, para. 140.  
16 As clarified by the Supreme Court of India, sugarcane prices fixed by State governments are "statutory 
prices" and must be complied with by the sugar mills. (Ju dgment of the Supreme Court of India, U.P. Co -operative 
Cane Unions Federations v. West U.P. Sugar Mills Association & Ors. Etc ., 5 May 2004, (Exhibit JE -49), para. 39) 
Furthermore, India confirms that "prices that may be set by State orders or enactments do not operate 
cumulatively with the FRP. If the SAP is higher than the FRP, sugar mills procure sugarcane at the SAP and not 
at the sum of the FRP and SAP." (India's response to Panel question No. 67)  
17 Essential Commodities Act, (Exhibit JE -43). WT/DS579/R/Suppl.1 • WT/DS580/R/Suppl.1 • WT/DS581/R/Suppl.1  
 
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  of 196618 ("Sugarcane Control Order "); and various notifications published in the Official Gazette by 
the Department of Food and Public Distribution.19  
2.5.  The Essential Commodities  Act empowers the Central Government to issue orders "for the 
control of the production, supply and distribution of, and trade and commerce, in certain 
commodities" .20 Section 3, titled "Powers to control production, supply, distribution, etc., of essential 
commodities", grants the power to the Central Government to regulate, inter alia , the production 
and sale of sugar  and sugarcane .21  
2.6.  The Sugarcane Control Order  cites Section 3 of the Essential Commodities  Act as its legislative 
basis.22 Clause  2 of the Sugarcane Control Order , titled "Definitions",  defines the "fair and 
remunerative price of sugarcane" as "the price f ixed by the Central Government under clause 3, 
from time to time, for sugarcane".23 Clause 3  is titled "Fair and remunerative price of sugarcane 
payable by producer [s] of sugar".24 Clause 3 (1) explains that the Central Government " may, after 
consultation with such authorities, bodies or associations as it may deem fit, by notification in the 
Official Gazette, from time to time, fix the fair and remunerative price of sugarcane to be paid by 
producers of sugar or their agents for the sugarcane p urchased by them".25 Clause 3 (2) indicates 
that "[n]o person shall sell or agree to sell sugarcane to a producer of sugar or his agent, and no 
such producer or agent shall purchase or agree to purchase sugarcane, at a price lower than that 
fixed under sub -clause (1)."26  
2.7.  As indicated, pursuant to Clause 3(1) of the Sugarcane Control Order,  the precise amount of 
the FRP is set out  in the relevant notification published in the Official Gazette , and such notifications 
may be made "from time to time" . From our review of the evidence , we understand that these 
notifications are published annually and set the FRP for  specific sugar  season s.27  
2.8.  We also note that  notifications appear to follow a particular pattern in setting the price for a 
given sugar season. Based on the evidence before us, we understand that the FRP for each sugar 
season generally consist s of: (i) a base or minimum price that is payable regardl ess of how low the 
recovery rate of the sugarcane may be , and ( ii) a premium rate that is  added  to the base price, on 
an incremental basis, depending on the margin by which the sugarcane recovery rate exceeds a 
certain threshold (or "basic") recovery  rate.28 We understand that the recovery rate of sugarcane is 
 
18 Sugarc ane (Control ) Order, (Exhibit JE -45). 
19 See e.g. Notification of 1 October 2015,  (Exhibit AUS -19); Notification of 30 September 2016,  
(Exhibit  AUS-20); and Notification of 27 September 2017, (Exhibit AUS -22). 
20 Essential Commodities Act, (Exhibit JE -43), preamble, p. 2.  
21 Essential Commodities Act, (Exhibit JE -43), Section 3, pp. 3 -7.  
22 Sugarcane (Control ) Order, (Exhibit JE -45), preamble, p. 55.  
23 Sugarcane (Control ) Order, (Exhibit JE -45), Clause 2(cc), p. 56 . 
24 Sugarcane (Control ) Order, (Exhibit JE -45), Clause 3, p. 57.  (footnote omitted)  
25 Sugarcane (Control ) Order, (Exhibit JE -45), Clause 3(1), p. 57. Clause 3(1) also elaborates on the 
factors to be taken into account by the Central Government when fixing the FRP, namely: (a) the cost of 
production of sugarcane; (b) the return to the grower from alternative crops and the general trend of prices of 
agricultural commodities; (c) the availability of sugar to the consumer at a fair price; (d) the price at which  sugar 
produced from sugarcane is sold by producers of sugar; (e) the recovery of sugar from sugarcane; (f) the 
realization made from sale of by -products such as  molasses, bagasse and press mud or their imputed value; and 
(g) reasonable margins for the gro wers of sugarcane on account of risk and profits.  
26 Sugarcane (Control Order ), (Exhibit JE -45), Clause 3(2), p. 58.  The Sugarcane Control Order defines 
"producer of sugar" as "a person carrying on the business of manufacturing sugar by vacuum pan process a nd 
at its own option, ethanol either directly from sugarcane juice or from molasses, including B -Heavy molasses, or 
both". (Ibid. Clause 2(i), p. 57)  
27 We come to this conclusion based on our review of the evidence identified in fns 31-35 to para.  2.9 
below.  
28 To use an example, we understand that for the 2012 -13 sugar season the relevan t Notification set s out 
the mandatory minimum price as follows: a base price of INR 170 per 100 kilograms, with an additional premium 
of INR 1.79 per 100 kilograms for every 0.1% increase in the recovery rate above a basic (threshold ) recovery 
rate of 9.5% . (Order of 22 October 2013, (Exhibit AUS -17), p. 22) Sugarcane farme rs therefore received a 
minimum price of INR 170 per 100 kilograms of sugarcane, regardless of the actual rate of recovery. In addition, 
if the recovery rate of a particular farme r's prod uct exceeded 9.5%, then the sugar producer was obliged to pay 
to the sugarcane farme r an additional INR 1.79 per 100 kilograms for every 0.1% increase above the ba sic 
recovery rate. Thus, if a farme r's sugarcane had a recovery rate of 10%, the farmer  would  be paid 
INR [170 + (5*1.79) = 178.95] per 100 kilograms of sugarcane.  WT/DS579/R/Suppl.1 • WT/DS580/R/Suppl.1 • WT/DS581/R/Suppl.1  
 
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  "the proportion of sugar produced by weight of cane processed, usually expressed as a 
percentage".29 
2.9.  Based on our rev iew of the evidence, we note that, for each sugar season from 2014 -15 to 
2018-19, the FRP was:  
a. For the 2014 -15 sugar season: INR 220 per 100 kilograms30, at a basic recovery rate 
of 9.5%, with an additional premium of INR 2.32 per 100 kilograms for every 0 .1% 
increase in recovery rate31; 
b. For the 2015 -16 sugar season: INR 230 per 100 kilograms, at a basic recovery rate of 
9.5%, with an additional premium of INR 2.42 per 100 kilograms for every 0.1% 
increase in recovery rate32; 
c. For the 2016 -17 sugar season: I NR 230 per 100 kilograms, with a basic recovery rate 
of 9.5% and an additional premium of INR 2.42 per 100 kilograms for every  0.1% 
increase in recovery rate33; 
d. For the 2017 -18 sugar season: INR 255 per 100 kilograms, with a basic recovery rate 
of 9.5% and  an additional premium of INR 2.68 per 100 kilograms for every 0.1% 
increase in recovery rate34; and  
e. For the 2018 -19 sugar season, the FRP was structured slightly differently: a base price 
of INR 275 per 100 kilograms was set at a threshold recovery rate of 10%, with a 
premium of INR 2.75 for each 0.1% increase in recovery rate above 10%; for sugarcane 
with a recovery rate between 9.5% and 10%, the price was reduced  by INR  2.75 for 
every 0. 1% decrease in recovery rate below 10%, down to a minimum lower threshold 
level of 9.5%; finally, for sugarcane with a recovery rate equal to or lower than 9.5%, 
a base price of INR 261.25 per 100 kilograms was set.35  
2.2  State-Advised Prices 
2.10.  The complainants  identify SAPs in six States in India: Bihar, Haryana, Punjab, Tamil Nadu, 
Uttar Pradesh , and Uttarakhand. Before describing the content and operation of these six SAPs, we 
note that five of these States (Bihar, Haryana, Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, and Uttarakh and) maintain 
 
29 Brazil's first written submission, para. 32 (referring to Exhibit JE -48). See also Australia's first written 
submission, para. 28 (referring to Exhibit JE -48); and Guatemala's first w ritten submission, para. 40 and fn 54 
thereto. India does not contest this explanation.  
30 We note that India's notifications of the FRP consistently use the unit of value of quintals . We understand 
that a quintal  is a unit of weight and one quintal signifies one hundred (100) kilograms. (See Brazil's first written 
submission, fn 3 to Table 1; Australia's first written submission, p. 27; Guatemala's first written submission, 
p. v). For our purposes, we convert all measurements of weight to kilograms a nd (where necessary) tonnes.  
31 DFPD Communication: Fixation of FRP 2014 -15 season, 14 February 2014, (Exhibit JE -2); Notification 
of 1 October 2015,  (Exhibit AUS -19). 
32 DFPD Communication: Fixation of FRP for 2015 -16 season, 2 February 2015, (Exhibit JE -4); Press 
Release, Press Information Bureau, 16 January 2015, (Exhibit JE -3); Notification of 30 September 2016,  
(Exhibit  AUS-20). 
33 Notification of 27 September 2017, (Exhibit AUS -22); CACP Price Policy for Sugarcane: 2016 -17 Sugar 
Season, (Exhibit JE -5). We are aware that the complainants also adduce a newspaper report that indicates a 
different amount with respect to the premium rate. (See "Govt keeps cane FRP unchanged at Rs 230 per qtl for 
2016-17", India Today, 6 April 2016, (Exhibit JE -47)) We agree w ith the parties that we should give greater 
weight to the official government sources than to this newspaper report. We also note India's confirmation of the 
FRP for the 2016 -17 season  through responses to questions. (See parties' responses to Panel questi on No. 68)  
34 DFPD Communication: Fixation of FRP for 2017 -18 season, 1 June 2017 , (Exhibit JE -7); Press Release, 
Press Information Bureau, 24 May 2017, (Exhibit JE -6). 
35 DFPD Communication: Fixation of FRP for 2018 -19 sugar season, 20 July 2018, (Exhibit J E-9); Press 
Release, Press Information Bureau, 18 July 2018,  (Exhibit JE -8). We are aware that the complainants also adduce 
additional evidence that do es not contain certain of the details of the FRP as set out  in Exhibits JE -8 and JE -9. 
(See Press Release , Press Information Bureau, 31 July 2018, (Exhibit AUS -15); Fair and Remunerative Price of 
Sugarcane in the Country, ISMA, (Exhibit JE -11)) We agree with the complainants, however, that these Exhibits 
do not necessarily contradict Exhibits JE -8 and JE -9 and, in any event, we consider Exhibits JE -8 and JE -9 to be 
sufficiently probative to establish the content of the FRP for the 2018 -19 sugar season. (See complainants' 
responses to Panel question No. 69) WT/DS579/R/Suppl.1 • WT/DS580/R/Suppl.1 • WT/DS581/R/Suppl.1  
 
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  SAPs that distinguish among different "varieties" of sugarcane. We understand that the term 
"variet ies" essentially refers to different types of sugarcane based on their "maturity period and 
quality".36 
2.2.1   Bihar  
2.11.  The State of Bihar enacted the Bi har Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act in 
1981 ("Bihar Sugarcane Act") .37 The Bihar Sugarcane Act contains detailed provisions regulating the 
supply and purchase of sugarcane by sugar producers. Section 42(2) of the Bihar Sugarcane Act 
stipulates that the State of Bihar may determine the minimum price to be paid by factories38 to 
sugarcane producers and that such price shall not be less than  the price set under the Sugarcane 
Control Order .39 The Act further states tha t "[t]he owner of the [sugar factory] shall make payment 
of the price of cane supplied to it immediately after the supply and on failing to do shall be liable to 
pay interest at the rate prescribed."40 Chapter VI of the Act also provides for penalties, inc luding 
imprisonment, for violations of the provisions of the Act.41 
2.12.  We note that the SAP in Bihar, for each sugar season from 2014 -15 to 2018 -19, was42:  
Bihar SAP (INR per 100 kg)  
Varieties  2014-15 2015-16 2016-17 2017-18 2018-19 
Un-recommended /lower43 varieties  250 250 260 260 265 
Central /general /normal  varieties  260 260 280 280 290 
Early/premium  varieties  270 270 300 300 310 
 
2.2.2   Haryana  
2.13.  Until 1966 , the State of Haryana was part of the State of Punjab. Pursuant to the Punjab 
Sugarcane (Regulation of Purchase and Supply) Haryana Amendment Act, 2004  ("Haryana 
Amendment Act"), Haryana continues to apply the Punjab Sugarcane  (Regulation of Purchase and 
Supply)  Act of 1953  ("Punjab Sugarcane Act") .44 Specifically, we understand that t he Haryana 
Amendment Act makes the entirety of the Punjab Sugarcane Act applicable in the State of Haryana, 
 
36 See India's response to Panel question No. 70(a). We also note Guatemala's explanation that "sugarcane 
of early and mid -varieties receives a higher SAP than sugarcane of normal varieties or unrecommended varieties 
… because the variety, or type, of sugarc ane has a major impact on sugar recovery rates." (Guatemala's first 
written submission, para. 53 (referring to Priyanka Singh, Manmohan Singh and BL Sharma, "Variation in sugar 
content between early and mid -late maturing sugarcane varieties across the crus hing period in sub -tropical 
India", Proceedings of the International Society of Sugar Cane Technologists , volume 29, 2016, 
(Exhibit  GTM-22))) Furthermore, "[s]ugarcane is considered to be mature and ready for harvest when the cane 
juice has over 16% sucrose and 85% purity. Early - and mid -varieties attain this level faster than normal or 
unrecommended varieties and, therefore, also have higher recovery rates." (Ibid.)  
37 Bihar Sugarcane Act, (Exhibit JE -50). 
38 The Bihar Sugarcane Act defines a "factory"  as: "any premises, including the precincts thereof in any 
part of which sugar is manufactured by the means of vacuum -pan process; or any other sugar or sugarcane 
based products manufactured by any other technique or process based on sugarcane which includ es sugarcane 
based Ethanol plant, Rectified Sprit plant and Co -generation plant". (Bihar Sugarcane Act, (Exhibit JE -50), 
Section 2(j), p. 1)  
39 Bihar Sugarcane Act, (Exhibit JE -50), Section 42(2), p. 19. Specifically, Section 42(2) states, inter alia , 
that "[t]he State Government may before the beginning of the crushing season, taking in to consideration the 
interest of the cane growers and the likely realisation from the sugarcane products determine by notification in 
the official gazette, the price of can e payable by the occupiers of the factories to the cane growers for cane 
supplied to them in the crushing year concerned".  
40 Bihar Sugarcane Act, (Exhibit JE -50), Section 43(4), p. 20.  
41 Bihar Sugarcane Act, (Exhibit JE -50), Chapter VI, pp. 23 -26. 
42 For 20 14-15, see CACP Price Policy for Sugarcane: 2018 -19 Sugar Season, (Exhibit JE -52), p. 57, Annex 
Table 2.2. For 2015 -16 to 2017 -18, see CACP Price Policy for Sugarcane: 2019 -20 Sugar Season, (Exhibit  JE-
53), p. 56, Annex Table 1.3. For 2016 -17, see also Not ification by the Bihar Government, 24 November 2016 
(English translation), (Exhibit JE -54-B)) For 2018 -19, see Riga Sugar Company Limited, Annual Report 2018 -19, 
(Exhibit JE -55), p. 4.  
43 We note that: for 2014 -15, the three categories of varieties are ide ntified, in ascending order of price, 
as "un -recommended", "central", and "early" varieties; for 2016 -17 and 2017 -18, "central" varieties was 
replaced with "general" varieties; and for 2018 -19, the three categories are, in ascending order of price, "lower" , 
"normal", and "premium" varieties. (See the evidence referred to in fn 42 to para. 2.12 above)  
44 See Haryana Amendment Act, (Exhibit JE -56), p. 10, Section 1(1) and (2); Punjab Sugarcane Act, 
(Exhibit JE -59). WT/DS579/R/Suppl.1 • WT/DS580/R/Suppl.1 • WT/DS581/R/Suppl.1  
 
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  except for Section 14, which it replaces, and a particular clause i n Section 20.45 Hereafter, w e use 
the term "Haryana Sugarcane Act" to refer  to the Act that currently applies in Haryana  (i.e. the 
Punjab Sugarcane Act as modified by the Haryana Amendment Act ).46 
2.14.  Under Section 14 of the Haryana Sugarcane Act, the State Government may, among other 
things, issue orders regulating the purchase, supply and price of sugarcane in an assigned area.47 
Section 20 of the Haryana Sugarcane Act authorizes the State Government to "make rules to carry 
out the provisions of this Act"48, including "the method by which the minimum price of cane is to be 
fixed under this Act" and "the payment of the price for cane".49 The Haryana Sugarcane Act also 
stipulates that " [a]s soon as the cane is supplied to a factory, the occupier of such factory shall be 
liable to pay the price of cane so supplied"50 and any violation of the Act (or any rule issued 
thereunder ) is an offence punishable by imprisonment, a fine , or both.51 
2.15.  In accordance with Section 20 of the Haryana Sugarcane Act, the Haryan a Government 
enacted the Haryana Sugarcane (Regulation of Purchase and Supply) Rules, 1992 ( "Haryana 
Sugarcane Rules "). Section 12 of the Haryana Sugarcane Rules indicates that "[a]n occupier of a 
factory or agent or purchasing agent of a factory or any pe rson employed by him shall not purchase 
cane for a factory or pay for it at a price below the minimum price."52  
2.16.  We note that the SAP in Haryana, for each sugar season from 2014 -15 to 2018 -19, was53:  
Haryana SAP (INR per 100 kg)  
Varieties  2014-15 2015-16 2016-17 2017-18 2018-19 
Normal/late54 varieties  300 300 310 320 330 / 33555 
Mid varieties  305 305 315 325 335 
Early varieties  310 310 320 330 340 
 
2.2.3   Punjab  
2.17.  As mentioned above,  Section 20 of  the Punjab Sugarcane Act provides that "[t]he Government 
may make rules to carry out the provision s of this Act", including "the method by which the minimum 
price of cane is to be fixed under this Act", and "the payment of the price for cane."56 Under 
Section  9(1) of the Punjab Sugarcane Act, " [a]ny person contravening any of the provisions of [this] 
Act or any rule made there under, for which no penalty is otherwise provided shall be punishable 
with [a] fine, which may extend to two thousand rupe es."57 
2.18.  In accordance with  Section 20 of the Pu njab Sugarcane Act, the State Government of Punjab 
adopted the  Punjab Sugarcane (Regulation of Purchase and Supply) Rules, 1958  ("Punjab Sugarcane 
 
45 Haryana Amendment Act, (Exhibit JE -56), pp. 10 -11. 
46 Haryana Sugarcane Act, (Exhibit JE -56), pp. 1 -11.  
47 Haryana Sugarcane Act, (Exhibit JE -56), Section 14, p. 5. An "assigned area " is defined as "an area 
assigned to a factory under [the Haryana Sugarcane] Act". (Haryana Sugarcane Act, (Exhibit JE -56), 
Section 2(1), p. 1)  
48 Haryana Sugarcane Act, (Exhibit JE -56), Section 20, pp. 8 -9. 
49 Haryana Sugarcane Act, (Exhibit JE -56), Section 20(i) and (l), pp. 8 -9.  
50 Haryana Sugarcane Act, (Exhibit JE -56), Section 15 -A(2), p. 6.  
51 Haryana Sugarcane Act, (Exhibit J E-56), Section 9(1), p. 4.  
52 Haryana Sugarcane Rules, (Exhibit JE -57), Section 12 , p. 57. 
53 For 2014 -15, see CACP Price Policy for Sugarcane: 2018 -19 sugar season, (Exhibit JE -52), p. 57, Annex 
Table 2.2. For 2015 -16 to 2017 -18, see CACP Price Policy for S ugarcane: 2019 -20 Sugar Season, (Exhibit  JE-53), 
p. 56, Annex Table 1.3. For 2018 -19, see Notification by the Haryana Government, 8 March 2019, (Exhibit  AUS-
63); and State of Haryana, Budget 2019 -20: Explanatory Memorandum, (Exhibit JE -58).  
54 We note that  for 2014 -15 and 2015 -16, the three categories of varieties are identified, in ascending 
order of price, as "normal", "mid", and "early", whereas for 2016 -17 to 2018 -19, "normal" varieties was replaced 
with "late" varieties. (See the evidence identified in  fn 53 to para. 2.16 above)  
55 Exhibit JE -58, an explanatory memorandum concerning the Haryana State Budget, indicates that the 
2018-19 SAP for "late" varieties was INR 330 per 100 kilograms, while Exhibit AUS -63, an official notification of 
the SAP by the Government of Haryana, indicates an SAP of INR 335 per 100 kilograms for all varieties other 
than "early" varieties. While we tend to consider an official notification to be more probative than an explanatory 
memo randum concerning the State Budget, we nevertheless do not consider it necessary to resolve this specific 
factual issue for the purposes of resolving the present disputes. (See fn 105 to para. 3.20 below)  
56 Punjab Sugarcane Act, (Exhibit JE -59), Section 20, p. 5.  
57 Punjab Sugarcane Act, (Exhibit J E-59), p. 3.  WT/DS579/R/Suppl.1 • WT/DS580/R/Suppl.1 • WT/DS581/R/Suppl.1  
 
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  Rules").58 Section 12 of the Punjab Sugarcane Rules is titled " Minimum Price" and states, inter alia  
that "[a] n Occupier or agent or purchasing agent or any person employed by him shall not purchase 
cane for a factory … at a price below  the minimum price,  if any fixed by law ."59  
2.19.  We note that the SAP in Punjab, for each sugar season from 2014 -15 to 2018 -19, was60:  
Punjab SAP (INR per 100 kg)  
Varieties  2014-15 2015-16 2016-17 2017-18 2018-19 
Normal/late /lower61 varieties  280 280 285 295 29562 
Mid/medium  varieties  285 285 290 300 300 
Early/advance  varieties  295 295 300 310 310 
 
2.2.4   Tamil Nadu  
2.20.  Section 12 of  the Tamil Nadu Sugar Factories Control Act, 194 9 ("Tamil Nadu Sugarcane Act") 
stipulate s that: 
The Government may, at any time before the commencement of a crushing season, 
after consulting the Advisory Committee, by notification, specify either generally or in 
respect of any factory, either the price which the occupier of a factory shall be bound 
to pay for any sugarcane purchased by him during the season or the method of 
calculat ing such price:  
Provided that the Government may specify different prices or different methods 
of calculating the prices of different varieties of sugarcane.63 
2.21.  Compliance with the sugarcane price is mandatory pursuant to Section 13 of the Act . 
Violations a re punishable with  a fine, imprisonment or both.64  
2.22.  We note that the SAP in Tamil Nadu for each sugar season from 2014 -15 to 201 7-18 was:  
 
58 Punjab Sugarcane Rules, (Exhibit JE -60), preamble, p. 1.  
59 Punjab Sugarcane Rules, (Exhibit JE -60), Section 12(1), p. 4.  
60 For 2014 -15, see CACP Price Policy for Sugarcane: 2018 -19 Sugar Season, (Exhibit JE -52), p. 57, Annex 
Table 2.2. For 2015-16 to 2017 -18, see CACP Price Policy for Sugarcane: 2019 -20 Sugar Season, (Exhibit JE -53), 
p. 56, Annex Table 1.3. For 2018 -19, see Notification by the Punjab Government, 28 November 2019, 
(Exhibit  JE-61); and "Punjab Govt to pay Rs 25 per quintal directly to cane farmers", The Tribune , 6 December 
2018, (Exhibit AUS -66), p. 2.  
61 We note that: for 2014 -15 and 2015 -16, the three categories of varieties are identified, in ascending 
order of price, as "nor mal", "mid", and "early"; for 2016 -17 and 2017 -18 "normal" varieties was replaced with 
"late" varieties; and for 2018 -19 the three categories are referred to as either "late", "mid" and "early" or "lower", 
"medium", and "advance/early". (See the evidence r eferred to in fn 60 to para. 2.19 above)  
62 We note that th e State Government Notification of the SAP for the 2018 -19 season indicates that 
"Sugarcane Medium and Lower varieties rates will be equal to advance/early varieties after 15th January". 
(Notification by the Punjab Government, 28 November 2019,  (Exhibit JE -61)) In response to questions seeking 
clarity regarding this aspect of the SAP, Brazil indicates that "India is in the best position to set out the meaning 
of the explanatory note".  (Brazil's response to Panel question No. 71(d), para. 82) Australia stat es that it "is not 
able to explain the meaning of the note". (Australia's response to Panel question No. 71(d), para. 68) Guatemala 
considers that the explanatory note "appears to mean that the higher 'advance and early varieties' SAPs would 
be applicable to medium and lower varieties after 15 January 2019". (Guatemala's response to Panel question 
No. 71(d), para. 65) India states that "the complainants are best placed to explain the calculations adopted by 
them". (India's response to Panel question No. 71( d)) In light of this lack of clarity regarding the meaning of the 
explanatory note, we refrain from adjusting the SAP rates on the basis of that note.  
63 Tamil Nadu Sugarcane Act, (Exhibit JE -67), Section 12(1), p. 42. A "factory" is defined as "any premises, 
including the precincts thereof, wherein ten or more workers are working or were working on any day of the 
preceding twelve months and in any part of  which any manufacturing process connected with the production 
of sugar by means of vacuum pans is being carried on or is ordinarily carried on with the aid of power". 
(Ibid.  Section 2(c), p. 36)  
64 Tamil Nadu Sugarcane Act, (Exhibit JE -67), Section 13(2)(b), pp. 42 -43. WT/DS579/R/Suppl.1 • WT/DS580/R/Suppl.1 • WT/DS581/R/Suppl.1  
 
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  a. For the 2014 -15 sugar season: INR 265 per 100 kilograms, at a basic recovery rate of 
9.5%, with an additional premium of either INR 2.21 or INR 2. 32 per 100 kilograms for 
every 0.1% increase in recovery rate65; 
b. For the 2015 -16 sugar season: INR 285 per 100  kilograms, at a basic recovery rate of 
9.5%, with an additional premium of INR 2.42 per 100 kilograms for every 0.1% 
increase in recovery rate66; 
c. For the 2016 -17 sugar season: INR 2 85 per 100 kilograms, with a basic recovery rate 
of 9.5% and an additional  premium of INR 2.42 per 100 kilograms for every  0.1% 
increase in recovery rate67; and  
d. For the 2017 -18 sugar season: INR 285 per 100 kilograms, with a basic recovery rate 
of 9.5% and an additional premium of INR 2.68 per 100 kilograms for every 0.1% 
increa se in recovery rate.68 
2.23.  In October 2018, Tamil Nadu adopted the Tamil Nadu Sugarcane (Regulation of Purchase 
Price) Act, replac ing the SAP with a system of "revenue sharing based sugarcane price".69 We 
therefore understand that Tamil Nadu did not maintain a ny SAP for the 2018 -19 sugar season.  
2.2.5   Uttar Pradesh  
2.24.  Section 16(1) of T he Uttar Pradesh Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1953  
("Uttar Pradesh Sugarcane Act") states that "[t] he State Government may, for maintaining supplies, 
by order, regulate - (a) the distribution, sale or purchase of any cane … in any reserved area or 
assigned area; and  (b) purchase of cane in any area other than a reserved or assigned area. "70 
Section 17(1) provides that "[t]he occupier of a factory shall make such p rovision for speedy 
payment of the price of cane purchased by him as may be prescribed".71 Under Section  17(2), "the 
occupier of a factory shall be liable to pay immediately the price of the cane so supplied".72 Failure 
to comply with the obligations under  the Uttar Pradesh Sugarcane Act is punishable by a fine, 
 
65 Order of 14 January 2015, (Exhibit JE -62); CACP Price Policy for Sugarcane: 2018 -19 Sugar Season, 
(Exhibit JE -52), p. 57, Annex Table 2.2. This amount includes transport costs. We n ote that , according to the 
Indian Government publication Price Policy for Sugarcane: 2018 -19 Sugar Season, the premium rate was 
INR 2.21 per 100 kilograms, whereas the official Order by the Government of Tamil Nadu indicates a premium 
rate of INR 2.32 per 100 kilograms.  We tend to consider the official Order by the Government of Tamil Nadu to 
be more probative than the Price Policy for Sugarcane  publication. We note, however, that since the average 
recovery rate in Tamil Nadu during the 2014 -15 sugar season  did not exceed the basic recovery rate  stipulated 
in the SAP , it is not necessary to resolve this issue. (See para. 3.11 below)  
66 CACP Price Policy f or Sugarcane: 2019 -20 Sugar Season, (Exhibit JE -53), p. 56, Annex Table  1.3; Order 
of 11 January 2016, (Exhibit JE -63). This amount includes transport costs.  
67 CACP Price Policy for Sugarcane: 2019 -20 Sugar Season, (Exhibit JE -53), p. 56, Annex Table 1.3;  Order 
of 5 January 2017, (Exhibit JE -64). This amount includes transport costs.  
68 CACP Price Policy for Sugarcane: 2019 -20 Sugar Season, (Exhibit JE -53), p. 56, Annex Table 1.3. This 
amount includes transport costs. We note that the complainants also add uce two Tamil Nadu Government Orders 
that refer to the SAP for the 2017 -18 sugar season, but which do not identify any premium rate. We agree with 
Australia that this is most likely because those Government Orders "relate to Tamil Nadu's production incenti ve 
payment" and "the premium was not relevant to the calculation of the production incentive payment". (Australia's 
response to Panel question No. 71(c), para. 65) We also note that the amount of the premium is not directly 
relevant to the present disputes , as the average recovery rate in Tamil Nadu during the 2017 -18 sugar season 
did not exceed the basic recovery rate. (See para. 3.11 below)  
69 Tamil N adu Sugarcane (Regulation of Purchase Price) Act, 2018, (Exhibit JE -65), p. 96 . See also  Order 
of 17 September 2018, (Exhibit JE -88). 
70 Uttar Pradesh Sugarcane Act, (Exhibit JE -68), Section 16(1), p. 104.  
71 Uttar Pradesh Sugarcane Act, (Exhibit JE -68), Section 17(1), p. 105. A "factory" is defined as "any 
premises including the precincts thereof wherein twenty or more workers are working  or [sic] on any day during 
the preceding twelve months and in any part of which any manufacturing process connected with the production 
of sugar by means of vacuum pan process or ethanol either directly from sugarcane juice or molasses, including 
B-Heavy molasses, or both as the case may be, is being carried on or is ordinarily carried on with the aid of 
mechanical power." (Ibid. para. 3(j), p. 93)  
72 Uttar Pradesh Sugarcane Act, (Exhibit JE -68), Section 17(2), p. 105 . WT/DS579/R/Suppl.1 • WT/DS580/R/Suppl.1 • WT/DS581/R/Suppl.1  
 
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  imprisonment , or both.73 The Supreme Court of India has interpreted the Uttar Pradesh Sugarcane 
Act as granting the State Government "the regulatory power … to fix the price of the sugarcane".74 
2.25.  We note that the SAP in Uttar Pradesh, for each sugar season from 2014 -15 to 2018 -19, 
was75:  
Uttar Pradesh SAP (INR per 100 kg)  
Varieties  2014-15 2015-16 2016-17 2017-18 2018-19 
Rejected /normal76 varieties  275 275 300 310 310 
Normal/mid varieties  280 280 305 315 315 
Early varieties  290 290 315 325 325 
 
2.2.6   Uttarakhand  
2.26.  We understand that t he State of Uttarakhand was previously  part of the State of Uttar 
Pradesh. The Uttarakhand Sugarcane (Regulation of Purchase and Supply) (Amendment) Act, 2013  
("Uttarakhand Amendment Act"), indicates that the Uttar Pradesh Sugarcane Act , as amended, 
applies in Uttarakhand.77 Since Sections 16 and 17 of the Uttar Pradesh Sugarcane Act were not 
amended by the Uttarakhand Amendment Act,  we understand that  these provisions are also 
applicable in Uttarakhand.  
2.27.  We note that the SAP in Uttarakhand, for each sugar season from 2014 -15 to 20 18-19, was78:  
Uttarakhand SAP (INR per 100 kg)  
Varieties  2014-15 2015-16 2016-17 2017-18 2018-19 
Rejected varieties  n/a n/a 302 306 n/a 
General /normal79 varieties  280 280 307 316 317 
Early varieties  290 290 317 326 327 
 
3  APPLIED ADMINISTERED PRICE  
3.1  General  
3.1.  Paragraph 8 of Annex 3 of the Agreement on Agriculture identifies the "applied administered 
price" (AAP) as one of the components of the methodology to calculate market price support.  
3.2.  The complainants submit that the FRP and SAPs constitute AAPs because t hey fix mandatory 
prices for sugarcane that differ from the market price and which must be paid by sugar producers .80 
Based on the operation of the measures, the complainants assert that the amount of the FRP and 
the SAP in Tamil Nadu  depend, in part, on t he recovery rate of the sugarcane being purchased.81 In 
 
73 Uttar Pradesh Sugarcane Act, (Exhibi t JE-68), Section 22, p. 110.  
74 Judgment of the Supreme Court of India, U.P. Co -operative Cane Unions Federations v. West U.P. Sugar 
Mills Association & Ors. Etc ., 5 May 2004, (Exhibit JE -49), para. 26.  
75 For 2014 -15, see CACP Price Policy for Sugarcane: 2 018-19 Sugar Season, (Exhibit JE -52), p. 57, 
Annex  Table 2.2. For 2015 -16 to 2017 -18, see CACP Price Policy for Sugarcane: 2019 -20 Sugar Season, 
(Exhibit  JE-53), p. 56, Annex Table 1.3; and Notification of 26 October 2017 (English translation), 
(Exhibit  JE-70-B). For 2018-19, see Notification of 1 December 2018 (English translation), (Exhibit JE -69-B).  
76 We note that: for 2014 -15 to 2017 -18, the CACP Price Policy for Sugarcane  publications refer to the 
three categories of varieties, in ascending order of p rice, as "rejected", "normal", and "early". For 2017 -18, the 
Notification by the Government of Uttar Pradesh refers to "mid" varieties instead of "normal" varieties. For 
2018-19, the three categories, in ascending order of price, are: "normal", "mid", and "early" varieties. (See fn  75 
to para. 2.25 above)  
77 Uttarakhand Amendment Act, (Exhibit JE -71), preamble, p. 1.  
78 For 2014 -15, see  CACP Price Policy for Sugarcane: 2018 -19 Sugar Season, (Exhibit JE -52), p. 57, Annex 
Table 2.2. For 2015 -16 to 2017 -18, see CACP Price Policy for Sugarcane: 2019 -20 Sugar Season, (Exhibit JE -53), 
p. 56, Annex Table 1.3. For 2018 -19, see Notification of 20  December 2018 (English translation), 
(Exhibit  JE-72-B). 
79 For 2014 -15, 2015 -16 and 2018 -19, the SAP distinguishes between "general" and "early" varieties. For 
2016-17 and 2017 -18, the SAP refers to, in ascending order of price, "rejected", "normal", and " early" varieties.   
80 Brazil's first written submission, paras. 137 -139 and 156; Australia's first written submission, 
paras.  153-156; Guatemala's first written submission, paras. 140 -144.  
81 Brazil's first written submission, paras. 32 -34 and 43 and Figur e 5; Australia's first written submission, 
paras. 29 -30 and 55; Guatemala's first written submission, paras. 40 and 54.   WT/DS579/R/Suppl.1 • WT/DS580/R/Suppl.1 • WT/DS581/R/Suppl.1  
 
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  order to determine the precise  amount of the average FRP applicable in different  States , as well as 
the average SAP in Tamil Nadu,  the complainants provide data regarding the average sugarcane 
recover y rates in different States  and seasons .82 With respect to  the other States that apply SAPs, 
the complainants assert that it is reasonable and appropriate to rely on the "middle" category of 
varieties in determining the amount of the AAP.83 
3.3.  India argues that the FRP and SAPs do not constitute market price support within the meaning 
of the Agreement on Agriculture because they do not entail any government purchase or 
procurement of sugarcane.84 India does not provide any additional arguments c ontesting whether 
the FRP and SAPs constitute AAPs within the meaning of paragraph 8 of Annex 3. India also does 
not contest the complainants' assertions regarding different recovery rates in India, nor does it take 
issue with the complainants' calculation s of the amount of the AAP in different States in India.85  
3.4.  We have addressed, as a matter of legal interpretation, India's arguments regarding the 
definition and scope of market price support in paragraphs 7.37 to 7.61 of the Panel Report. We 
have conclud ed that the existence of market price support does not require the government to 
purchase or procure (i.e. through government expenditure or revenue foregone ) the relevant 
agricultural product . With that threshold issue already resolved , we examine here th e specific 
question of whether the FRP and SAPs constitute AAPs within the meaning of paragraph 8 of Annex  3.  
3.5.  We recall from our discussion of the scope of  market price support that t he AAP refers to a 
price for a basic agricultural product that is determined by the administrative action of the 
government and not by market forces.86 Based on our description of the FRP and SAPs above, we 
understand that the FRP and SAPs constitute mandatory minimum purchase prices for sugarcane, 
determined by the Cent ral and State Governments respectively, and which sugar producers 
(i.e. sugar mills and factories processing sugarcane into sugar ) are statutorily obligated to pay to 
sugarcane producers  (i.e. sugarcane farmers) . In our view, such mandatory minimum purchas e 
prices constitute prices that are independent of market forces , and are set and maintained  by 
administrative action o f the Indian Central and State Governments.87 We therefore conclude that 
the FRP and SAPs do indeed constitute AAPs within the meaning of  paragraph 8 of Annex 3.  
3.6.  Turning to the amount of the AAP, we agree with the complainants that, since the amount of 
the FRP (and one SAP)  actually paid to sugarcane farmers  varies depend ing on the  sugarcane  
recovery rate88, in order to accurately reflect the amount of the AAP it is necessary to rely on data 
regarding actual recovery rates in India to calculate the average FRP (and SAP ) payable in India . 
Since  the average recovery rate in different States and seasons may diffe r, and since  the SAPs are 
specific to certain States, the amount of the AAP may be different in different  States.  We therefore 
consider it appropriate to assess individual AAP s for different States in India, for each season .  
3.7.  We proceed with our analysis i n four steps: (i) we first review the data and arguments provided 
by the parties  regarding average seasonal recovery rate s in different States in India; (ii) taking that 
data into account, we examine the complainants' assertions regarding the average  FRP a pplicable in 
different States  and seasons  (including the extent to which the average recovery rate affects the 
FRP through the incremental premium) ; (iii) we assess the complainants' assertions regarding the 
relevant AAP in the six States that applied an S AP; and (iv) we summarize our findings regarding 
the amount of the AAP  in each State during the 2014 -15 to 2018 -19 sugar seasons , for purposes of 
applying the methodology set out in paragraph 8 of Annex  3 of the Agreement on Agriculture .  
 
82 See e.g. complainants' response to Panel question No. 65.  
83 Complainants' responses to Panel question 70(b).  
84 See paras. 7.20, 7.3 0 and 7.38 of the Panel Report.  
85 India's only comment with respect to the complainants' assertions regarding the SAPs is that the 
complainants have failed to demonstrate "why the SAPs qualify as an [AAP] under paragraph 8 of Annex 3 in 
view of paragraphs 1 and 2 of Annex  3". (India's response to Panel question No. 70(c))  
86 See para. 7.52 of the Panel Report.  
87 With respect to the SAPs, paragraph 3 of Annex 3 of the Agreement on Agriculture indicates that 
"[s]upport at both the national and sub -national  level shall be included" in the calculation of a Member's AMS.  
88 We recall that the FRP , and the SAP in Tamil Nadu, stipulate  a basic threshold  recovery rate, at or below 
which a minimum price must be paid regardless of how low the actual recovery rate drops. If the sugarcane 
recovery rate exceed s that threshold rate, the amount of the AAP increase s according to t he premium rate. 
(See paras. 2.9 and 2.22 above)  WT/DS579/R/Suppl.1 • WT/DS580/R/Suppl.1 • WT/DS581/R/Suppl.1  
 
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  3.2  Recovery rates  
3.8.  In support of their assertions regarding the average recovery rates in 11 Indian States during 
the 2014 -15 to 20 18-19 sugar seasons , the complainants refer to "Price Policy for Sugarcane: 
2020-21 Sugar Season ", a publication by the Commission for Agr icultural Costs and Prices (CACP), 
which is part of the Indian Government's  Ministry of Agriculture and Farmers Welfare .89 Regarding 
the other States, for which these documents provide no data, the complainants rely on the threshold 
recovery rates set out  in the FRP for each sugar season from 2014 -15 to 20 18-19 as a proxy to 
represent the recovery rate in these States.90  
3.9.  India does not comment on the complain ants' assertions regarding recovery rates.  
3.10.  We note that the Price Policy for Sugarcane  documen t is published on an annual basis by the 
Indian Government through the CACP . In our view, these documents constitute a reliable source for 
us to determin e the average seasonal  recovery rates in different States in India. We also agree with 
the complainants tha t it is appropriate to rely on the most recent publication on the basis that it is 
likely to contain the most accurate and up -to-date information .91  
3.11.  Based on our review of the evidence, we find that the average sugarcane recovery rate s 
during  the 2014 -15 to 20 18-19 sugar seasons, for each of the 11 States for which State -specific 
data are available , were as follows92: 
Recovery rates in individual States (%)  
State  2014-15 2015-16 2016-17 2017-18 2018-19 
Andhra Pradesh  9.72 9.31 9.34 9.43 9.33 
Bihar 9.10 9.69 9.08 9.54 10.35  
Gujarat  10.48  10.37  10.56  10.51  10.65  
Haryana  9.89 9.39 10.19  10.46  10.31  
Karnataka  10.90  10.59  10.28  10.57  10.25  
Maharashtra  11.67  11.19  11.19  11.09  10.07  
Punjab  9.37 10.01  9.34 9.74 10.10  
Tamil Nadu  8.10 8.47 9.08 8.50 8.90 
Telangana  10.47  10.83  10.32 10.84  10.21  
Uttar Pradesh  9.49 10.51  10.26  10.73  10.91  
Uttarakhand  9.15 9.52 8.20 10.18  10.91  
 
3.12.  We note that t he data adduced by the complainants  is not comprehensive . Other than the 11 
individual States identified above , the Price Policy for Sugarcane documents  only provide an average 
recovery rate for "All India" ; they do not indicate the average recovery rate for other States in 
India.93 However , given that the amount of the average FRP applicable  in those other States depend s 
on the recovery rate, it is necessary to determine  the average recovery rate s in the se other Indian 
States in order to accurate ly calculat e India's market price support to sugarcane producers . 
3.13.  The complainants submit that the most reasonable approach to determining the  average  
recovery rate s for the se other States is to use , as a proxy,  the basic ( threshold ) rates set out  in the 
 
89 See complainants' responses to Panel question No. 65 (referring to CACP Price Policy for Sugarcane: 
2020-21 Sugar Season, (Exhibit JE -167), p. 81, Annex Table 2.6). The complainants also adduce the CACP Price 
Policy for Sugarcane publications for the 2018 -19 and 2019 -20 sugar seasons. The complainants submit, 
however, that the most recently published edition of the CACP Price Policy for Sugarcane  is likely to be the most 
accurate. (See complainants' responses to Panel question No. 64)  
90 Complainan ts' responses to Panel question No. 66.  
91 Complainants' responses to Panel question No. 64.  
92 See CACP Price Policy for Sugarcane: 2020 -21 Sugar Season, (Exhibit JE -167), p. 81, Annex Table 2.6. 
Our findings correspond to the average recovery rates asserted by the complainants. (See Brazil's Calculation of 
India's Domestic Support for Sugarcane, ( Exhibit BRA -1 (revised -3)), "C1 Recovery" spreadsheet; Australia's 
Domestic Support Calculations, (Exhibit AUS -1 (revised 23 March 2021)), "RecoveryRates" spreadsheet; 
Guatemala's Calculations of India's AMS (Exhibit GTM -45 (revised 12 May 2021)), "Recover y" spreadsheet)  
93 According to Guatemala, "the sugar recovery rates of all the other States … are not published". 
(Guatemala's first written submission, fn 68 to Table 2)  WT/DS579/R/Suppl.1 • WT/DS580/R/Suppl.1 • WT/DS581/R/Suppl.1  
 
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  FRP for each sugar season .94 The co mplainants note that the 11 States for which there are data 
account for the overwhelming majority of sugar production in India, such that it would be 
inappropriate to use either the "All India" average or an average of the se 11 States.95  
3.14.  We agree with the  complainants that using either the "All India" recovery rates or a simple 
average of the 11 States identified above would be inappropriate, in light of the substantial  
proportion of India's sugar production that is realized in these 11 States.96 We note that India has 
not contested the complainants' reliance on the threshold rates set out  in the FRP as a proxy for the 
recovery rate of the other States. Taking into account that the FRP is determined by the Indian 
Central Government following consultations w ith relevant authorities, bodies and associations , and 
on the basis of multiple relevant factors97, we consider it reasonable to use the basic threshold 
recovery rates set out  in the FRP as a proxy to represent the average recovery rate of those other 
States for which there is no data.  
3.15.  We therefore use a recovery rate  of 9.5% to represent the average recovery rate for "Other 
States" during the 2014 -15 to 20 17-18 seasons  and 10 % to represent the average recovery rate 
during the 2018 -19 season.98  
3.3  AAP based on the FRP  
3.16.  For the reasons explained above, we consider that the FRP and SAPs constitute relevant AAPs 
within the meaning of paragraph 8 of Annex 3 of the Agreement on Agricul ture. In order to quantify 
the AAP, and taking into account that the FRP paid to individual sugarcane producers varies 
depending on the recovery rates of their sugarcane, we consider it necessary to calculate the average 
FRP received by sugarcane producers  in different States and seasons. In States that did not apply 
an SAP, the average FRP would represent the AAP, for purposes of applying the paragraph 8 
methodology. For States that do apply an SAP, we consider it useful to calculate the average FRP in 
order to verify whether the amount of the SAP is higher than the amount of the  average  FRP.99  
3.17.  We therefore proceed to calculate the average FRP applicable in different States in India 
during each season from 2014 -15 to 20 18-19, for the purposes of determining the relevant AAP100:  
  
 
94 See complainants' responses to Panel question No. 66.  
95 See complainants' responses  to Panel question No. 66. According to Brazil's calculations, sugar 
production in these 11 States accounts for 96.6% of India's total sugar production. (Brazil's response to Panel 
question No. 66, para. 49) Australia observes that, since the States other than the 11 predominant States "are 
generally less well -suited to growing cane, it is reasonable to expect those Other States to have 
lower -than-average recovery rates." (Australia's response to Panel question No. 66, para. 43)  
96 See para 5.6 below.  
97 See fn 25 to para. 2.6 above.  
98 See para. 2.9 above. We recall that the FRP for the 2018 -19 sugar season essentially contained two 
basic recovery rates: 9.5% and 10%. The complainants consider that 10% is an appropriate recovery rate to 
use as a proxy for "Other States". (See Brazil's Calculation of India's Domestic Support for Sugarcane, 
(Exhibit  BRA-1 (revised -3)), "C1 Recovery" spreadsheet; Australia's Domestic Support Calculations, 
(Exhibit  AUS-1 (revised 23 March 2021)), "RecoveryRates" spr eadsheet; Guatemala's Calculations of India's AMS 
(Exhibit  GTM-45 (revised 12 May 2021)), "Recovery" spreadsheet) India has not contested that approach. In 
light of the structure of the FRP for 2018 -19, we agree with the complainants' approach.  
99 We recall  our understanding that sugar producers are obliged to pay whichever minimum price is higher, 
as between the FRP and the SAP. (See fn 16 to para. 2.3 above)   
100 For the base FRP, FRP basic recovery rate, and premium rate, see para. 2.9 above. For the State 
recovery rate, see paras. 3.11-3.15 above. The amount of excess, if any, is calculated by subtracting the FRP 
basic recovery rate from the State recovery rate. The actual premium paid is calculated by multiplying the amount 
of excess by the premium rate, divided by 0.1 (to account for the fact that the premium is paid on an incremental 
basis for each 0.1% that the State  recovery rate exceeds the FRP basic recovery rate). The AAP (represented by 
the average FRP) is the sum of the base FRP and the actual premium paid, represented in INR per tonne  and 
rounded to two decimal places (for the sake of precision). We note that o ur calculations accord with the 
calculations performed by the complainants. (See Brazil's Calculation of India's Domestic Support for Sugarcane, 
(Exhibit BRA -1 (revised -3)), "C2 -C6 AAPs (FRPs)" spreadsheet; Australia's Domestic Support Calculations, 
(Exhib it AUS -1 (revised 23 March 2021)), "AAP" spreadsheet; Guatemala's Calculations of India's AMS (Exhibit 
GTM-45 (revised 12 May 2021)), "AAP (FRP)" spreadsheet)    
  WT/DS579/R/Suppl.1 • WT/DS580/R/Suppl.1 • WT/DS581/R/Suppl.1  
 
- 15 -  
2014 -15 AAP based on the average FRP 
State  Base FRP 
(INR/100 
kg) State 
recovery 
rate (%)  FRP basic recovery 
rate (%)  Amount of 
excess  (%) Premium rate 
(INR/100 kg)  Actual premium 
paid (INR/100 kg)  AAP 
(INR/ t) 
Andhra Pradesh  220 9.72 9.5 0.22 2.32 5.104  2,251.04  
Bihar 220 9.10 9.5 -0.4 2.32 0 2,200.00  
Gujarat  220 10.48  9.5 0.98 2.32 22.736  2,427.36  
Haryana  220 9.89 9.5 0.39 2.32 9.048  2,290.48  
Karnataka  220 10.90  9.5 1.4 2.32 32.48  2,524.80  
Maharashtra  220 11.67  9.5 2.17 2.32 50.344  2,703.44  
Punjab  220 9.37 9.5 -0.13 2.32 0 2,200.00  
Tamil Nadu  220 8.10 9.5 -1.4 2.32 0 2,200.00  
Telangana  220 10.47  9.5 0.97 2.32 22.504  2,425.04  
Uttar Pradesh  220 9.49 9.5 -0.01 2.32 0 2,200.00  
Uttarakhand  220 9.15 9.5 -0.35 2.32 0 2,200.00  
Other States  220 9.5 9.5 0 2.32 0 2,200.00  
 
2015 -16 AAP based on the average FRP 
State  Base FRP  
(INR/100 
kg) State r ecovery 
rate (%)  FRP basic recovery 
rate (%)  Amount of 
excess  Premium rate 
(INR/100 kg)  Actual premium 
paid (INR/100 kg)  AAP (INR/ t) 
Andhra Pradesh  230 9.31 9.5 -0.19 2.42 0 2,300.00  
Bihar 230 9.69 9.5 0.19 2.42 4.598  2,345.98  
Gujarat  230 10.37  9.5 0.87 2.42 21.054  2,510.54  
Haryana  230 9.39 9.5 -0.11 2.42 0 2,300.00  
Karnataka  230 10.59  9.5 1.09 2.42 26.378  2,563.78  
Maharashtra  230 11.19  9.5 1.69 2.42 40.898  2,708.98  
Punjab  230 10.01  9.5 0.51 2.42 12.342  2,423.42  
Tamil Nadu  230 8.47 9.5 -1.03 2.42 0 2,300.00  
Telangana  230 10.83  9.5 1.33 2.42 32.186  2,621.86  
Uttar Pradesh  230 10.51  9.5 1.01 2.42 24.442  2,544.42  
Uttarakhand  230 9.52 9.5 0.02 2.42 0.484  2,304.84   
  WT/DS579/R/Suppl.1 • WT/DS580/R/Suppl.1 • WT/DS581/R/Suppl.1  
 
- 16 - 2015 -16 AAP based on the average FRP 
State  Base FRP  
(INR/100 
kg) State r ecovery 
rate (%)  FRP basic recovery 
rate (%)  Amount of 
excess  Premium rate 
(INR/100 kg)  Actual premium 
paid (INR/100 kg)  AAP (INR/ t) 
Other States  230 9.5 9.5 0 2.42 0 2,300.00  
 
 
2016 -17 AAP based on the average FRP 
State  Base FRP  
(INR/100 kg)  State r ecovery 
rate (%)  FRP basic recovery 
rate (%)  Amount 
of excess  Premium rate 
(INR/100 kg)  Actual premium 
paid (INR/100 kg)  AAP (INR/ t) 
Andhra Pradesh  230 9.34 9.5 -0.16 2.42 0 2,300.00  
Bihar 230 9.08 9.5 -0.42 2.42 0 2,300.00  
Gujarat  230 10.56  9.5 1.06 2.42 25.652  2,556.52  
Haryana  230 10.19  9.5 0.69 2.42 16.698  2,466.98  
Karnataka  230 10.28  9.5 0.78 2.42 18.876  2,488.76  
Maharashtra  230 11.19  9.5 1.69 2.42 40.898  2,708.98  
Punjab  230 9.34 9.5 -0.16 2.42 0 2,300.00  
Tamil Nadu  230 9.08 9.5 -0.42 2.42 0 2,300.00  
Telangana  230 10.32  9.5 0.82 2.42 19.844  2,498.44  
Uttar Pradesh  230 10.26  9.5 0.76 2.42 18.392  2,483.92  
Uttarakhand  230 8.20 9.5 -1.3 2.42 0 2,300.00  
Other States  230 9.5 9.5 0 2.42 0 2,300.00  
 
2017 -18 AAP based on the average FRP 
State  Base FRP  
(INR/100 kg)  State r ecovery 
rate (%)  FRP basic recovery 
rate (%)  Amount of 
excess  Premium rate 
(INR/100 kg)  Actual premium 
paid (INR/100 kg)  AAP (INR/ t) 
Andhra Pradesh  255 9.43 9.5 -0.07 2.68 0 2,550.00  
Bihar 255 9.54 9.5 0.04 2.68 1.072  2,560.72  
Gujarat  255 10.51  9.5 1.01 2.68 27.068  2,820.68  
Haryana  255 10.46  9.5 0.96 2.68 25.728  2,807.28  
Karnataka  255 10.57  9.5 1.07 2.68 28.676  2,836.76  
Maharashtra  255 11.09  9.5 1.59 2.68 42.612  2,976.12  
Punjab  255 9.74 9.5 0.24 2.68 6.432  2,614.32   
  WT/DS579/R/Suppl.1 • WT/DS580/R/Suppl.1 • WT/DS581/R/Suppl.1  
 
- 17 - 2017 -18 AAP based on the average FRP 
State  Base FRP  
(INR/100 kg)  State r ecovery 
rate (%)  FRP basic recovery 
rate (%)  Amount of 
excess  Premium rate 
(INR/100 kg)  Actual premium 
paid (INR/100 kg)  AAP (INR/ t) 
Tamil Nadu  255 8.50 9.5 -1 2.68 0 2,550.00  
Telangana  255 10.84  9.5 1.34 2.68 35.912  2,909.12  
Uttar Pradesh  255 10.73  9.5 1.23 2.68 32.964  2,879.64  
Uttarakhand  255 10.18  9.5 0.68 2.68 18.224  2,732.24  
Other States  255 9.5 9.5 0 2.68 0 2,550.00  
 
 
2018-19 AAP based on the average FRP 
State  Base FRP  
(INR/100 kg)  State r ecovery 
rate (%)  FRP basic recovery 
rate (%)  Amount of 
excess  Premium rate 
(INR/100 kg)  Actual premium 
paid (INR/100 kg)  AAP (INR/ t) 
Andhra Pradesh  261.25  9.33 9.5 -0.17 +2.75 0 2,612.50  
Bihar 275 10.35  10 0.35 +2.75 9.625  2,846.25  
Gujarat  275 10.65  10 0.65 +2.75 17.875  2,928.75  
Haryana  275 10.31  10 0.31 +2.75 8.525  2,835.25  
Karnataka  275 10.25  10 0.25 +2.75 6.875  2,818.75  
Maharashtra  275 10.07  10 0.07 +2.75 1.925  2,769.25  
Punjab  275 10.10  10 0.1 +2.75 2.75 2,777.50  
Tamil Nadu  261.25  8.90 9.5 -0.6 +2.75 0 2,612.50  
Telangana  275 10.21  10 0.21 +2.75 5.775  2,807.75  
Uttar Pradesh  275 10.91  10 0.91 +2.75 25.025  3,000.25  
Uttarakhand  275 10.91  10 0.91 +2.75 25.025  3,000.25  
Other States  275 10 10 0 +2.75 0 2,750.00  
 WT/DS579/R/Suppl.1 • WT/DS580/R/Suppl.1 • WT/DS581/R/Suppl.1  
 
- 18 - 
 
  3.4  AAP based on the  SAPs  
3.18.  The complainants submit that , as a general matter, in States where SAPs are i n force, the 
SAP is higher than the FRP and should be used as the relevant AAP.101 In those States where the 
SAP distinguishes between different "varieties"  of sugarcane , in the absence of specific data 
regarding the amounts of the different varieties produ ced in different States, the complainants assert 
that it is reasonable and appropriate to rely on the "middle" SAP (i.e. the price that is neither the 
lowest nor the highest) as the relevant AAP.102  
3.19.  India does not  contest the complainants' assertions regarding the amount s of the SAPs to be 
used as AAP s.103 
3.20.  We recall that four States, namely Bihar, Haryana, Punjab , and Uttar Pradesh, set SAPs that 
distinguished between three varieties of sugarcane for each sugar seas on from 2014 -15 to 
2018-19.104 For these four States, we agree with the complainants that it is reasonable to use the 
SAP set for the middle category  of sugarcane  varieties . We consider this appropriate for the following  
reasons . First, the parties have bee n unable to adduce data indicating the different quantities of 
production of different varieties of sugarcane , and, in such circumstances , it is not possible to 
calculate an appropriate weighted average SAP . Second, given that the SAPs contemplate three 
different varieties, and that these varieties reflect the maturity period of the sugarcane, it seems 
reasonable to us that a representative proportion of the relevant sugarcane will fall within the middle 
category . Third, alternative approaches, such as usin g a simple average, or the highest or lowest 
SAP, would , in our view,  be a less accurate approach  given that the middle SAP was presumably 
determined by the State Governments in order to reflect a meaningful proportion of production . 
Finally,  India has no t presented any reasons to doubt the appropriateness or accuracy of this 
approach.105  
3.21.  We recall  that the SAP in Uttarakhand differentiated between two categories of sugarcane 
varieties for the sugar seasons 2014 -15, 2015 -16, and 20 18-19, and differentiated between three  
categories of sugarcane varieties for the sugar seasons 2016 -17 and 2017 -18.106 For the latter two 
seasons, we consider it appropriate to use the middle category as the relevant AAP, for the reasons 
explained above.107 We note that, during these seasons, the relevant middle category was "normal" 
varieties. We further note that, during th ese two seasons, "normal" varieties were distinguished 
from "rejected" and "early" varieties. For the three sugar seasons for which the SAP only 
distinguished between two categories , we note that the categories were  "general" and "early". We 
also observe that  the SAPs for all seasons identified "early" varieties as a specific category of 
varieties. Since "early" varieties were separately identified in all five sugar seasons, we understand 
that the "general" varieties category captures both the "normal" and the "rejected" varieties of 
sugarcane. We also consider that, based on its plain meaning, the category of "general" varieties is 
likely to have been applicable to a greater proportion of sugarcane than the category of  "early"  
varieties  of sugarcane. We therefore consider it appropriate, in quantifying  the AAP in Uttarakhand 
during the 2014-15, 2015 -16, and 20 18-19 sugar seasons , to rely on the "general" varieties price.  
3.22.  Finally, we recall that Tamil Nadu, during the 2014 -15 to 2017 -18 sugar seasons, applied an 
SAP that was similar in structure to the FRP , in that the amount of the SAP  depended on the 
sugarcane recovery rate. We note, however, that under the Tamil Nadu SAP for each sugar season, 
the premium rate was only payabl e if the recovery rate exceeded 9.5%.108 We have found that the 
average recovery rate in Tamil Nadu did not exceed 9.5% in any season from 2014 -15 to 2017 -18.109 
 
101 Brazil's first written submission, para. 35; Australia's first written submission, para. 41; G uatemala's 
first written submission, para. 72.  
102 Complainants' responses to Panel question No. 70(b).  
103 See para. 3.3 above.  
104 See paras. 2.12, 2.16, 2.19, and 2.25 above.   
105 As a consequence of our decision to rely on the middle category of varieties, we note that it is not 
necessary for us to resolve ambiguities or lack of clarity in the evidence regar ding the least and most expensive 
varieties. (See in particular fn 55 to para. 2.16 above)  
106 See para. 2.27 above.  
107 See para. 3.20 above.  
108 See para. 2.22 above.  
109 See para. 3.11 above.  WT/DS579/R/Suppl.1 • WT/DS580/R/Suppl.1 • WT/DS581/R/Suppl.1  
 
- 19 - 
 
  Consequently, the appropriate AAP in Tamil Nadu is, in our view, equivalent to the basic price 
identified in the SAP , without needing to take into account the premium rate . 
3.23.  Based on the foregoing, we consider that the relevant AAPs based on the SAPs are as 
follows110: 
AAP based on the SAPs  (INR/t)  
State  2014-15 2015-16 2016-17 2017-18 2018-19 
Bihar 2,600.00  2,600.00  2,800.00  2,800.00  2,900.00  
Haryana  3,050.00  3,050.00  3,150.00  3,250.00  3,350.00  
Punjab  2,850.00  2,850.00  2,900.00  3,000.00  3,000.00  
Tamil Nadu  2,650.00  2,850.00  2,850.00  2,850.00  N/A 
Uttar Pradesh  2,800.00  2,800.00  3,050.00  3,150.00  3,150.00  
Uttarakhand  2,800.00  2,800.00  3,070.00  3,160.00  3,170.00  
 
3.5  Summary  
3.24.   We note that, for all  States that apply an SAP, the AAP based on the SAP is always higher 
than the AAP based on the FRP .111 We recall that, in States where an SAP is applied, sugar producers 
are required to pay  whichever is  the higher price as between the FRP and SAPs.112 Accordingly , in 
applying the methodology contained in paragraph 8 of Annex 3 of the Agreement on Agriculture , we 
consider that, for those States  that apply an SAP , the AAP must be based on the SAP . For all other 
States and seasons, the  average FRP  constitutes the relevant AAP .  
3.25.  To summarize, for the purposes of applying the methodology set out  in paragraph 8 of 
Annex  3, we consider it approp riate to rely on the following AAPs113:  
AAP (INR/t)  
State  2014-15 2015-16 2016-17 2017-18 2018-19 
Andhra Pradesh  2,251.04  2,300.00  2,300.00  2,550.00  2,612.50  
Bihar 2,600.00  2,600.00  2,800.00  2,800.00  2,900.00  
Gujarat  2,427.36  2,510.54  2,556.52  2,820.68  2,928.75  
Haryana  3,050.00  3,050.00  3,150.00  3,250.00  3,350.00  
Karnataka  2,524.80  2,563.78  2,488.76  2,836.76  2,818.75  
Maharashtra  2,703.44  2,708.98  2,708.98  2,976.12  2,769.25  
Punjab  2,850.00  2,850.00  2,900.00  3,000.00  3,000.00  
Tamil Nadu  2,650.00  2,850.00  2,850.00  2,850.00  2,612.50  
Telangana  2,425.04  2,621.86  2,498.44  2,909.12  2,807.75  
Uttar Pradesh  2,800.00  2,800.00  3,050.00  3,150.00  3,150.00  
Uttarakhand  2,800.00  2,800.00  3,070.00  3,160.00  3,170.00  
Other States  2,200.00  2,300.00  2,300.00  2,550.00  2,750.00  
 
4  FIXED EXTERNAL REFERENCE PRICE  
4.1.  Paragraph 8 of Annex 3 of the Agreement on Agriculture indicates that one component of the 
calculation of market price support is the "fixed external reference price" (FERP). Paragraph 9 of 
Annex 3 elaborates that the FERP is "based on the years 1986 to 19 88 and shall generally be the 
average f.o.b. unit value for the basic agricultural product concerned in a net exporting country and 
the average c.i.f. unit value for the basic agricultural product concerned in a net importing country 
 
110 See paras. 2.12, 2.16, 2.19, 2.22, 2.25, 2.27, 3.20, and 3.22 above. We convert INR per 100 
kilogrammes to INR per tonnes, to accord with our calculations of the AAP based on the FRP.  
111 Compare paras. 3.17 and 3.23 above.  
112 See para. 2.3 above.  
113 See paras. 3.17 and 3.23 above. We note that the complainants use these same AAPs in applying the 
methodology set out  in paragraph 8 of Annex 3 of the Agreement on Agriculture. (See Brazil's Calculation of 
India's Domestic Support for Sugarcane, (Exhi bit BRA -1 (revised -3)), "C14 -C20 AAPs (FRP+SAP)" spreadsheet; 
Australia's Domestic Support Calculations, (Exhibit AUS -1 (revised 23 March 2021)), "AAP" spreadsheet; 
Guatemala's Calculations of India's AMS (Exhibit GTM -45 (revised 12 May 2021)), "AAP (FRP &  SAP)" 
spreadsheet)  WT/DS579/R/Suppl.1 • WT/DS580/R/Suppl.1 • WT/DS581/R/Suppl.1  
 
- 20 - 
 
  in the base period." A dditionally, under paragraph 9, the FERP "may be adjusted for quality 
differences as necessary".  
4.2.  The complainants note that India's Supporting Tables, contained in document G/AG/AGST/IND 
and identified in India's Schedule, indicate an FERP of INR 156.16 pe r tonnes.114 The complainants 
observe that the FERP in India's Supporting Tables was calculated based on a recovery rate of 
8.5%.115 Noting that recovery rates in India today are higher than 8.5% the complainants consider 
that, in accordance with paragraph 9  of Annex  3, the FERP should be adjusted for "quality 
differences" in order to reflect the different recovery rates in different States today.116 By replacing 
the recovery rate of 8.5% (used in India's Supporting Tables) with updated average recovery rates 
for different States and seasons, the complainants calculate adjusted FERP s for different States for 
each season from 2014 -15 to 20 18-19.117 
4.3.  India does not comment on the complainants' assertions regarding the FERP, nor does India 
object to the complainants ' calculation of adjusted FERP s on a State -specific and  seasonal basis.  
4.4.  In light of Article 1 of the Agreement on Agriculture118, we consider it appropriate to take into 
account the FERP set out  in India's Supporting Tables, identified in India's Schedule119, to determine 
the amount of market price support provided to sugarcane producers for the 2014 -15 to 20 18-19 
sugar seasons. We note, in this respect, that Supporting Table A of India's Schedule indicates an 
FERP for sugarcane of INR 156.16 per ton ne.120  
4.5.  We also observe that Supporting Table A  sets out the "Calculation Details for estimating AMS 
for Sugarcane". The methodology for calculating the FERP  identified in India's Schedule entailed, 
inter alia , dividing a "Computed International price of Sugar in terms of Sugarcane"121 by 11.76 to 
determine the "Estimated External reference price of Sugarcane at 8.5% recovery". A clarifying note 
indicates that "[t]he computed international price[] of sugar, less conversion costs, is converted to 
sugarcane using a re covery rate of 8.5% for comparison with [the] domestic support price of 
sugarcane".122 This calculation was performed for all three sugar seasons from 1986 -87 to 
1988-1989, as well as the average rate over those three seasons. The average "Estimated Externa l 
reference price of Sugarcane at 8.5% recovery" is indicated as INR 156.16.123 
4.6.  It is uncontested  by the parties  that the "recovery rate" referred to in India's Supporting 
Table  A is a reference to the proportion  of sugar  that can be recovered from sugarcan e. In our view, 
a difference in the recovery rates of different sugarcane is indeed a relevant "quality difference" 
within the meaning of paragraph 9 of Annex 3. Consequently, we agree with the complainants that, 
pursuant to paragraph  9 of Annex 3, it is a ppropriate to adjust the FERP on the basis of any 
 
114 Brazil's first written submission, para. 103; Australia's first written submission, paras.  158-160; 
Guatemala's first written submission, paras. 145 and 147. (referring to G/AG/AGST/IND, p.  28, column 4)  
115 Brazil's first written subm ission, para. 1 04; Australia's first written submission, para. 160; Guatemala's 
first written submission, para s. 145 and 147. 
116 Brazil's first written submission, paras. 146 -147; Australia's first written submission, paras. 16 1-162; 
Guatemala's first written submission, paras. 146 -147. 
117 Brazil's first written submission, para. 148; Brazil's Calculation of India's Domestic Support  for 
Sugarcane, (Exhibit BRA -1 (revised -3)), "FERP" spreadsheet; Australia's first written submission, para.  162; 
Australia's Domestic Support Calculations, (Exhibit AUS -1 (revised 23 March 2021)), "FERP" spreadsheet; 
Guatemala's first written submission, para. 147; Guatemala's Calculations of India's AMS (Exhibit GTM -45 
(revised 12 May 2021)), "FERP details" spreadsheet.  
118 Pursuant to Article 1(a)(ii) of the Agreement on Agriculture, a Member's AMS during and after the 
implementation period is to be "calc ulated in accordance with the provisions of Annex 3 of this Agreement and 
taking into account the constituent data and methodology used in the tables of supporting material incorporated 
by reference in Part IV of the Member's Schedule". Similarly, Article 1(h)(ii) of the Agreement on Agriculture 
indicates that the calculation of a Member's Total AMS, for any year during or after the implementation period, 
is to be "in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement, including Article  6, and with the consti tuent data 
and methodology used in the tables of supporting material incorporated by reference in Part IV of the Member's 
Schedule".  
119 Part IV, Section I of India's Schedule states, under the heading "Relevant Supporting Tables and 
document reference": "AGST/IND: Supporting Tables refer."  
120 G/AG/AGST/IND, p. 28.  
121 The "Computed International price of Sugar in terms of Sugarcane" was calc ulated for each season 
from 1986 -87 to 1988 -89, by subtracting the "most efficient conversion cost of Sugar from Sugarcane" from the 
"International Price of Sugar". (G/AG/AGST/IND, p. 29)  
122 G/AG/AGST/IND, note 3 on p. 29.  
123 G/AG/AGST/IND, p. 29.  WT/DS579/R/Suppl.1 • WT/DS580/R/Suppl.1 • WT/DS581/R/Suppl.1  
 
- 21 - 
 
  differences in recovery rates from the 8.5% rate used to calculate the FERP in India's Supporting 
Table A. We also agree with the complainants that, in light of Article 1 of the Agreement on 
Agriculture, an y such adjustment should adhere as closely as possible to the methodology set out  
in India's Supporting Table A. Finally, since recovery rates may differ across different States in India, 
as well as over different seasons, we also agree with the complainan ts that an adjusted FERP should  
be calculated for different States and seasons.124  
4.7.  We recall our findings regarding the relevant recovery rates in different States in India during 
the sugar seasons 2014 -15 to 20 18-19.125 We also note that  India's Support ing Table A  indicates 
the average Computed International Price of Sugar for the three sugar seasons from 198 6-87 to 
1988-89 as INR 1836.38 per ton ne.126 In our view, it is consistent with the methodology set out  in 
India's Supporting Table A  for us to calculate adjusted FERPs for different States by multiplying the 
average Computed International Price of Sugar indicated in India's Supporting Table  A (i.e. 
INR 1836.38) by the average recovery rate in those  States.127  
4.8.  We therefore calculate  the relevant FERPs  for different States and seasons as follows128: 
FERP  
 2014-15 2015-16 2016-17 2017-18 2018-19 
State  Comp. 
int. 
price of 
sugar 
(INR/ 
tonne) Rec. 
Rate 
(%) FERP 
(INR/ 
tonne) Rec. 
Rate 
(%) FERP 
(INR/ 
tonne) Rec. 
Rate 
(%) FERP 
(INR/ 
tonne) Rec. 
Rate 
(%) FERP 
(INR/ 
tonne) Rec. 
Rate 
(%) FERP 
(INR/ 
tonne) 
Andhra 
Pradesh  1836.38  9.72 178.50  9.31 170.97  9.34 171.52  9.43 173.17  9.33 171.33  
Bihar 1836.38  9.10 167.11  9.69 177.95  9.08 166.74  9.54 175.19  10.35  190.07  
Gujarat  1836.38  10.48  192.45  10.37  190.43  10.56  193.92  10.51  193 10.65  195.57  
Haryana  1836.38  9.89 181.62  9.39 172.44  10.19  187.13  10.46  192.09  10.31  189.33  
Karnataka  1836.38  10.90  200.17  10.59  194.47  10.28  188.78  10.57  194.11  10.25  188.23  
Maharashtra  1836.38  11.67  214.31  11.19  205.49  11.19  205.49  11.09  203.65  10.07  184.92  
Punjab  1836.38  9.37 172.07  10.01  183.82  9.34 171.52  9.74 178.86  10.10  185.47  
Tamil Nadu  1836.38  8.10 148.75  8.47 155.54  9.08 166.74  8.50 156.09  8.90 163.44  
Telangana  1836.38  10.47  192.27  10.83  198.88  10.32 189.51 10.84  199.06  10.21  187.49  
Uttar 
Pradesh  1836.38  9.49 174.27  10.51  193.00  10.26  188.41  10.73  197.04  10.91  200.35  
Uttarakhand  1836.38  9.15 168.03  9.52 174.82  8.20 150.58  10.18  186.94  10.91  200.35  
Other States  1836.38  9.50 174.46  9.50 174.46  9.50 174.46  9.50 174.46  10 183.64  
 
124 We also consider that this is a useful and relevant approach to take in light of the data adduced by the 
complainants, which provides recovery rates for  different States, as well as the fact that the AAP in India varies 
across different States and seasons. (See  para. 3.6 above )  
125 See paras. 3.11 and 3.15 above.  
126 G/AG/AGST/IND, p. 29.  
127 We are aware that the Fixed External Reference Price for sugarcane indicated in Supporting Table A of 
India's Schedule was calculated  by dividing the Computed International Price for Sugar by 11.76, rather than 
multiplying by 0.085. The complainants submit that this difference is not relevant to the determination of an 
adjusted FERP in these disputes. Brazil also states that, in its vie w, dividing by 11.76 was reasonable, given that 
"the price of 1 kg of sugar would equal the price of approximately 11.76 kg of sugarcane, … rounded to two 
decimal places". India, for its part, submits that "dividing a figure by 11.76 is indeed equal to cal culating 8.5 per 
cent of that figure". (See parties' responses to Panel question No. 62(b)) For our purposes, we note that 
Supporting Table A clearly indicates that this calculation was intended to "convert" an international reference 
price for sugar into a reference price for sugarcane , using the average recovery rate in India of 8.5%. 
(G/AG/AGST/IND, note 3 on p. 29)  
128 For the computed international price of sugar, see India's Schedule, Supporting Table A 
(G/AG/AGST/IND, p. 29). Our findings regarding rel evant recovery rates are set out  at paras. 3.11 and 3.15 
above. The FERPs for different States and seasons are determined by calculat ing the decimal equivalent of the 
recovery rate (i.e. dividing by 100) and multiplying the result by the computed international price of sugar. We 
note that India's Schedule identifies an FERP accurate to two decimal places. (See G/AG/AGST/IND, p. 29)  In 
applying the paragraph 8 methodology,  the complainants , however, rely on precise  FERP figures.  (See Brazil's 
Calculation of India's Domestic Support for Sugarcane, (Exhibit  BRA-1 (revised -3)), "FERP" spreadsheet; 
Australia's Domestic Support Calculations, ( Exhibit AUS -1 (revised 23 March 2021)), "FERP" spreadsheet; 
Guatemala's Calculations of India's AMS (Exhibit GTM -45 (revised  12 May 2021)), "FERP details" spreadsheet) 
We recall that Article 1(a)(ii) of the Agreement on Agriculture indicates that AMS shoul d be calculated " taking 
into account the constituent data and methodology used in the tables of supporting material incorporated " in 
Members ' Schedule s. For our purposes, we consider it appropriate to rely on an FERP that is accurate to two 
decimal places,  in accordance with the constituent data and methodology contained in India's Schedule.  WT/DS579/R/Suppl.1 • WT/DS580/R/Suppl.1 • WT/DS581/R/Suppl.1  
 
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  5  QUANTITY OF ELIGIBLE PRODUCTION  
5.1.  Paragraph 8 of Annex 3 of the Agreement on Agriculture indicates that one of the components 
in the calculation of market price support is the "quantity of production eligible to receive the applied 
administered price". We ref er to this as the "quantity of eligible production" (QEP).   
5.2.  The complainants note that paragraph 8 of Annex 3 refers to the quantity of production 
"eligible" to receive the AAP and not the quantity of production that "actually " receives the AAP.129 
The complainants argue that all sugarcane produced in India is eligible to receive the FRP.130 The 
complainants also assert that, in States where an SAP applies, all sugarcane produced in that State 
is eligible for the SAP.131 Since there is no limitation in India's legal framework on the quantity of 
sugarcane that is required to be purchased at the AAP, the complainants submit that all production 
of sugarcane is eligible to be purchased at the AAP.132 The complainants provide d ata regarding the 
quantity of sugarcane production in India on a State -specific and seasonal basis .133  
5.3.  India does not contest th e complainants' assertions regarding the QEP.  
5.4.  We recall that paragraph 8 of Annex 3 refers to the "quantity of production eligible to receive 
the applied administered price".134 In our view, this shows that the QEP signifies the amount of 
production that is eligible to receive the AAP, and not the amount of production that actually received 
the AAP. We note that our approach finds support in findings made in past disputes on the same 
issue.135 We further note that India does not contest this understanding of the QEP.  
5.5.  In our view, t he evidence adduced by the parties regarding the content and operation of the 
FRP and SAPs confirms the complainants ' assertion  that there is no limitation on the quantity of 
sugarcane that is eligible to be purchased at the AAP  in India .136 We therefore turn to determine, 
based on the evidence adduced by the complainants, the total quantity  of sugarcane production in 
relevant States for each sugar season from 2014 -15 to 20 18-19.  
5.6.  Based on our review of the evidence, we find that the relevant  QEPs for different  State s and 
season s were as follows137:  
 
129 Brazil's first written submission, para. 109; Australia's first written submission, paras. 12 4-130; 
Guatemala's first written submission, paras. 123 -126.  
130 Brazil's  first written submission, paras. 150 -152; Australia's first written submission, para. 16 4; 
Guatemala's first written submission, paras. 150 -152.  
131 Brazil's first written submission, paras. 156 and 159; Australia's first written submission, para. 164; 
Guatemala's first written submission, para. 152.  
132 Brazil's first written submission, paras. 150 -152; Australia's first written submission, paras. 164 -165; 
Guatemala's first written submission, paras. 150 -152.  
133 For the seasons from 2014 -15 to 2016 -17, the c omplainants refer to Directorate of Sugarcane 
Development, Sugarcane in India: State wise Production (Exhibit JE -140). For the 2017 -18 and 2018 -19 seasons, 
the complainants refer to Department of Agriculture & Farmers Welfare: 1st advance estimates for 201 9-20, 
(Exhibit JE -141). (Brazil's first written submission, fn 376 to Table C -8; Australia's Domestic Support Calculations, 
(Exhibit AUS -1 (revised 23 March 2021)), "Production" spreadsheet; Guatemala's response to Panel question 
No. 72; Guatemala's Calcul ations of India's AMS (Exhibit GTM -45 (revised 12 May  2021)), "QEP" spreadsheet) 
(Australia also refers to First Advance Estimates of Production of Foodgrains for 2019 -20, Ministry of Agriculture 
and Farmers Welfare, 23 September 2019 (Exhibit AUS -49) (Australia's first written submission, fn 575 to 
Table  17)) 
134 Emphasis added.  
135 See Panel Reports, Korea – Various Measures on Beef , para. 831; China – Agricultural Producers , 
para. 7.296; and Appellate Body Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef , para. 120.  
136 See sections 2.1 and 2.2 above.  
137 For the sugar seasons 2014 -15 to 2016 -17, see Directorate o f Sugarcane Development, Sugarcane in 
India: State wise Production (Exhibit JE -140). For the 2017 -18 and 2018 -19 sugar seasons, see Department of 
Agriculture & Farmers Welfare: 1st advance estimates for 2019 -20, (Exhibit JE -141). Where there are 
discrepanc ies between Exhibits JE -140 and JE -141, for instance with respect to the data for the 2017 -18 sugar 
season, we have relied on the most recent data (i.e. Exhibit JE -141) on the basis that the most up -to-date 
statistics are likely to be more accurate. (See p arties' responses to Panel question No. 64) We also note that the 
data in Exhibit JE -140 is indicated in "lakh tonnes". We understand from the complainants that one lakh refers 
to one hundred thousand (i.e. 100,000). (Brazil's first written submission, fn 3 to Table 1; Australia's first written 
submission, p. 27; Guatemala's first written submission, p. v) India does not contest this understanding. We 
further note that the residual "other" States entries in Exhibits JE -140 and JE -141 refer to States differe nt from 
 WT/DS579/R/Suppl.1 • WT/DS580/R/Suppl.1 • WT/DS581/R/Suppl.1  
 
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  QEP (thousands of tonnes)  
State  2014-15 2015-16 2016-17 2017-18 2018-19 
Andhra Pradesh  9,987  9,353  7,830  7,789.6  8,091.2  
Bihar 14,034  12,649  13,036  13,824.6  11,660.9  
Gujarat  14,330  11,120  11,950  12,072.1  12,036.4  
Haryana  7,169  6,692  8,223  9,632.9  7,570.6  
Karnataka  43,776  37,834  27,378  31,135.2  42,006.3  
Maharashtra  84,699  73,680  52,262  82,984.0  92,442.6  
Punjab  7,039  6,607  7,152  8,023.7  7,773.7  
Tamil Nadu  28,093  25,494  18,988  17,154  16,207.6  
Telangana  3,343  2,405  2,061  2,604.5  2,800  
Uttar Pradesh  133,061  145,385  140,169  177,033.3  179,714.8  
Uttarakhand  6,165  5,886  6,477  6,271.4  6,329.3  
Other States  10,634  11,343  10,544  11,379.6  13,523.4  
 
6  CALCULATION OF MARKET PRICE SUPPORT  
6.1.  Having determined the individual components of the methodology set out  in paragraph 8 of 
Annex 3 of the Agreement on Agriculture, we proceed to apply that methodology to calculate  the 
amount of market price support provided  to sugarcane producers  in different States and seasons . 
We also sum up  these State totals to determine the total market price support provided to all 
sugarcane producers in India during each season.  
6.2.  For the reasons set out  in this Appendix, we conclude that India provided mark et price support 
to sugarcane producers, during each sugar season from 2014 -15 to 20 18-19, as follows138: 
Market price support (2014 -15 sugar season)  
State  FERP  
(INR per ton ne) AAP 
(INR per tonne) QEP 
(thousands m/t)  MPS 
(million s INR) 
Andhra Pradesh  178.50  2,251.04  9,987  20,698.46  
Bihar 167.11  2,600.00  14,034  34,143.18  
Gujarat  192.45  2,427.36  14,330  32,026.26  
Haryana  181.62  3,050.00  7,169  20,563.42  
Karnataka  200.17  2,524.80  43,776  101,763.00  
Maharashtra  214.31  2,703.44  84,699  210,826.82  
Punjab  172.07  2,850.00  7,039  18,849.95  
Tamil Nadu  148.75  2,650.00  28,093  70,267.62  
Telangana  192.27  2,425.04  3,343  7,464.15  
Uttar Pradesh  174.27  2,800.00  133,061  349,382.26  
Uttarakhand  168.03  2,800.00  6,165  16,226.10  
Other States  174.46  2,200.00  10,634  21,539.59  
Total – All India     903,750.80  
 
 
the "Other States" for which we require data. We therefore calculate the relevant figures for our purposes by 
subtracting the sum of production for the relevant individual States from the "Grand Total"/"All -India" figures 
indicated in Exhibits JE -140 and JE -141. In this respect, we observe that the figures indicated in Exhibits JE -140 
and JE -141 regarding the "Grand Total"/"All -India" sugar production are further substantiated by First Advance 
Estimates of Production of Foodgrains for 2019 -20, 23 Se ptember 2019, (Exhibit AUS -49). Finally, we note that 
our determination of the relevant QEP figures corresponds to the figures identified by the complainants. (See 
Brazil's Calculation of India's Domestic Support for Sugarcane, (Exhibit BRA -1 (revised -3)), "C8 Production" 
spreadsheet; Australia's Domestic Support Calculations, (Exhibit AUS -1 (revised 23 March 2021)), "Production" 
spreadsheet; Guatemala's Calculations of India's AMS (Exhibit GTM -45 (revised 12 May 2021)), "QEP" 
spreadsheet)  
138 See paras.  3.25, 4.8, and 5.6 above. We calculate market price support (i.e. MPS) by multiplying the 
difference between the FERP and the AAP by the QEP, in accordance with paragraph 8 of Annex  3 of the 
Agreement on Agriculture, and di viding the result by 1,000 to yield a figure representing millions of INR, rounded 
to two decimal places. The amount of market price support for "Total – All India" is calculated by summing the 
various amounts of market price support provided in each State  during each season. We recognize that the 
results of our calculations differ marginally from the results of the complainants' calculations. We understand 
that these differences result from our reliance on an FERP rounded to two decimal figures, in accorda nce with 
the FERP set forth in India's Schedule, rather than the precise FERP figures relied upon by the complainants. 
(See fn 128 to para. 4.8 above ) WT/DS579/R/Suppl.1 • WT/DS580/R/Suppl.1 • WT/DS581/R/Suppl.1  
 
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  Market price support (2015 -16 sugar season)  
State  FERP 
(INR per ton ne) AAP 
(INR per tonne) QEP 
(thousands m/t)  MPS 
(million s INR) 
Andhra Pradesh  170.97  2,300.00  9,353  19,912.82  
Bihar 177.95  2,600.00  12,649  30,636.51  
Gujarat  190.43  2,510.54  11,120  25,799.62  
Haryana  172.44  3,050.00  6,692  19,256.63  
Karnataka  194.47  2,563.78  37,834  89,640.47  
Maharashtra  205.49  2,708.98  73,680  184,457.14  
Punjab  183.82  2,850.00  6,607  17,615.45  
Tamil Nadu  155.54  2,850.00  25,494  68,692.56  
Telangana  198.88  2,621.86  2,405  5,827.27  
Uttar Pradesh  193.00  2,800.00  145,385  379,018.70  
Uttarakhand  174.82  2,800.00  5,886  15,451.81  
Other States  174.46  2,300.00  11,343  24,110.00  
Total – All India    880,418.99  
 
Market price support (2016 -17 sugar season)  
State  FERP 
(INR per ton ne) AAP 
(INR per tonne) QEP 
(thousands m/t)  MPS 
(million s INR) 
Andhra Pradesh  171.52  2,300.00  7,830  16,666.00  
Bihar 166.74  2,800.00  13,036  34,327.18  
Gujarat  193.92  2,556.52  11,950  28,233.07  
Haryana  187.13  3,150.00  8,223  24,363.68  
Karnataka  188.78  2,488.76  27,378  62,968.85  
Maharashtra  205.49  2,708.98  52,262  130,837.39  
Punjab  171.52  2,900.00  7,152  19,514.09  
Tamil Nadu  166.74  2,850.00  18,988  50,949.74  
Telangana  189.51  2,498.44  2,061  4,758.70  
Uttar Pradesh  188.41  3,050.00  140,169  401,106.21  
Uttarakhand  150.58  3,070.00  6,477  18,909.08  
Other States  174.46  2,300.00  10,544  22,411.69  
Total – All India     815,045.69  
 
Market price support (2017 -18 sugar season)  
State  FERP 
(INR per tonne) AAP 
(INR per tonne) QEP 
(thousands m/t)  MPS 
(million s INR) 
Andhra Pradesh  173.17  2,550.00  7,789.6  18,514.55  
Bihar 175.19  2,800.00  13,824.6  36,286.95  
Gujarat  193 2,820.68  12,072.1  31,721.62  
Haryana  192.09  3,250.00  9,632.9  29,456.54  
Karnataka  194.11  2,836.76  31,135.2  82,279.44  
Maharashtra  203.65  2,976.12  82,984.0  230,070.65  
Punjab  178.86  3,000.00  8,023.7  22,635.98  
Tamil Nadu  156.09  2,850.00  17,154  46,211.33  
Telangana  199.06  2,909.12  2,604.5  7,058.35  
Uttar Pradesh  197.04  3,150.00  177,033.3  522,772.25  
Uttarakhand  186.94  3,160.00  6,271.4  18,645.25  
Other States  174.46  2,550.00  11,379.6  27,032.69  
Total – All India     1,072,685.61  
 
Market price support (20 18-19 sugar season)  
State  FERP 
(INR per tonne) AAP 
(INR per tonne) QEP 
(thousands m/t)  MPS 
(million s INR) 
Andhra Pradesh  171.33  2,612.50  8,091.2  19,751.99  
Bihar 190.07  2,900.00  11,660.9  31,600.22  
Gujarat  195.57  2,928.75  12,036.4  32,897.65  
Haryana  189.33  3,350.00  7,570.6  23,928.17  
Karnataka  188.23  2,818.75  42,006.3  110,498.41  
Maharashtra  184.92  2,769.25  92,442.6  238,902.18  
Punjab  185.47  3,000.00  7,773.7  21,879.31  
Tamil Nadu  163.44  2,612.50  16,207.6  39,693.38  WT/DS579/R/Suppl.1 • WT/DS580/R/Suppl.1 • WT/DS581/R/Suppl.1  
 
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  Market price support (20 18-19 sugar season)  
State  FERP 
(INR per tonne) AAP 
(INR per tonne) QEP 
(thousands m/t)  MPS 
(million s INR) 
Telangana  187.49  2,807.75  2,800  7,336.73  
Uttar Pradesh  200.35  3,150.00  179,714.8  530,095.76  
Uttarakhand  200.35  3,170.00  6,329.3  18,795.81  
Other States  183.64  2,750.00  13,523.4  34,705.91  
Total – All India     1,110,085.53  
 
 
__________