RESTRICTED  
  
G/C/M/139  
 
16 June 2021 
(21-4927) Page: 1/85 
Council for Trade in Goods    
 
MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF THE COUNCIL FOR TRADE IN GOODS  
31 MARCH  AND 1 APRIL  2021 
CHAIRPERSON: HE  MR MIKAEL ANZÉN  (SWEDEN ) 
The meeting of the Council for Trade in Goods (CTG , or the Council) was convened by  
Airgram  WTO/AIR/CTG/18 and WTO/AIR/CTG/1 8/Rev.1 ; the proposed agenda for the meeting was 
circulated in document  G/C/W/ 793. The meeting proceeded on the basis of the following agenda:  
 
1  NOTIFICATIO N OF REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS  ................................ .....................  3 
2  STATUS OF NOTIFICATIONS UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENTS IN 
ANNEX  1A OF THE WTO  AGREEMENT (G/L/223/REV.28)  ................................ .................  5 
3  APPOINTMENT O F OFFICERS TO THE SUBSIDIARY BODIES OF THE COUNCIL FOR 
TRADE IN GOODS  ................................ ................................ ................................ .............  5 
4  WITHDRAWAL OF THE UNITED KINGDOM FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION:   
PROCEDURES UNDER ARTICLE  XXVIII:3 OF THE GATT  1994 – COMMUNICATION FROM  
THE EUROPEAN UNION (G/L/1385)  ................................ ................................ .................  6 
5  UNITED KINGDOM'S WITHDRAWAL FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION: PROCEDURES 
UNDER ARTICLE  XXVIII:3 OF GATT  1994 – COMMUNICATION FROM THE UNITED 
KINGDOM (G/L/1386)  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..... 6 
6  ACCESSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA AND THE KYRGYZ REPUBLIC TO THE 
EURASIAN ECONOMIC UNION: PROCEDURES UNDER ARTICLE  XXVIII:3 OF GATT  1994 – 
REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION  ................................ ................................ ...........  7 
7  UPDATE ON PROCEDURES TO ENHANCE TRANSPARENCY AND STRENGTHEN 
NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS UNDER WTO AGREEMENTS – ARGENTINA, AUSTRALIA, 
CANADA, COSTA RICA, TH E EUROPEAN UNION, ISRAEL, JAPAN, NEW ZEALAND, THE 
SEPARATE CUSTOMS TERRITORY OF TAIWAN, PENGHU, KINMEN AND MATSU, THE 
UNITED KINGDOM, AND THE UNITED STATES  ................................ ................................ .. 8 
8  MEASURES TO ALLOW GRADUATED LDCS, WITH GNP BELOW USD  1,000, BENEFITS 
PURSUANT TO ANNEX  VII(B) OF THE AGREEMENT ON SUBSIDIES AND  
COUNTERVAILING MEASURES – REQUEST FROM CHAD ON BEHALF OF THE LDC  GROUP 
(WT/GC/W/742 -G/C/W/752)  ................................ ................................ .......................  12 
9  EUROPEAN UNION – COVID -19 VACCINE EXPORT TRANSPARENCY AND 
AUTHORIZATION MEASURE – REQUEST FROM AUSTRALI A ................................ ............  16 
10  INDIA – MANDATORY CERTIFICATION FOR STEEL PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM 
JAPAN  ................................ ................................ ................................ ............................  24 
11  INDIA – IMPORT RESTRICTION ON AIR CONDITIONERS – REQUEST  
FROM JAPAN  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..................  25 
12  MEXICO – CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT PROCEDURE FOR CHEESE UNDER MEXICAN 
OFFICIAL STANDARD NOM -223-SCFI/SAGARPA -2018 – REQUEST FROM THE UNITED 
STATES ................................ ................................ ................................ ...........................  26 
13  EUROPEAN UNION – SWEDEN'S DISCRIMINATORY MARKET ACCESS  
PROHIBITION ON 5G  EQUIPMENT – REQUEST FROM CHINA  ................................ ..........  27 G/C/M/139  
 
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  14  EUROPEAN UNION – QUALITY SCHEMES FOR AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS AND 
FOODSTUFFS – THE REGISTRATION OF CERTAIN TERMS OF CHEESE AS  
GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS – REQUEST FROM URUGUAY  ................................ ..........  27 
15  CHINA – MEASURES RESTRICTING THE IMPORT OF SCRAP MATERIALS –  
REQUEST FROM THE UNITED STATES (G/C/W/790)  ................................ ......................  29 
16  EUROPEAN UNION – IMPLEMENTATION OF NON -TARIFF BARRIERS ON 
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM AUSTRALIA, BRAZIL, CANADA,  
COLOMBIA, COSTA RICA, CÔTE D'IVOI RE, ECUADOR, GUATEMALA, HONDURAS,  
JAMAICA, PANAMA, PARAGUAY, PERU, THE UNITED STATES, AND URUGUAY 
(G/C/W/767/REV.1)  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..... 30 
17  INDIA – RESTRICTIONS ON IMPORTS OF CERTAIN PULSES – REQUEST FROM 
AUSTRALIA, CANADA, THE EUROPEAN UNION, THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, UKRAINE, 
AND THE UNITED STATES (G/C/W/791)  ................................ ................................ ....... 39 
18  EUROPEAN UNION – PROPOSED MODIFICATION OF TRQ  COMMITMENTS:  
SYSTEMIC CONCERNS – REQUEST FROM AUSTRALIA, BRAZIL, CHINA, NEW ZEALAND, 
AND URUGUAY  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...............  41 
19  UNITED KINGDOM – DRAFT GOODS SCHEDULE AND PROPOSED 
UK TRQ COMMITMENTS: SYSTEMIC CONCERNS – REQUEST FROM AUSTRALIA,  
BRAZIL, CHINA, NEW ZEALAND, THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, AND URUGUAY  ................  44 
20  EUROPEAN UNION – CARBON BORDER ADJUSTMENT MECHANISM  
(THE EUROPEAN GREEN DEAL OF DECEMBER  2019) – REQU EST FROM ARMENIA,  
CHINA, KAZAKHSTAN, KYRGYZ REPUBLIC, QATAR, THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION,  
AND THE KINGDOM OF  
SAUDI ARABIA  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...............  46 
21  KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA, KINGDOM OF BAHRAIN, THE UNITED ARAB  
EMIRATES, THE STATE OF KUWAIT, OMAN, AND QATAR – SELECTIVE TAX ON CERTAIN 
IMPORTED PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION, JAPAN,  
SWITZERLAND, AND THE UNITED STATES (G/C/W/792)  ................................ ..............  54 
22  EGYPT – IMPORT RESTRICTIONS FOR SUGAR – REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN 
UNION  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...........................  57 
23  SRI LANKA – IMPORT BAN ON VARIOUS PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM  
AUSTRALIA AND THE EUROPEAN UNION ................................ ................................ ........  58 
24  UNITED STATES – IMPORT RESTRICTIONS ON APPLES AND PEARS – REQUEST  
FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION  ................................ ................................ ........................  60 
25  INDONESIA – IMPORT AND EXPORT RESTRICTING POLICIES AND PRACTICES – 
REQUEST FROM AUSTRALIA, THE EUROPEAN UNION, JAPAN, NEW ZEALAND, AND  
THE UNITED STATES  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 60 
26  EGYPT – MANUFACTURER REGISTRATION SYSTEM – REQUEST FROM THE  
EUROPEAN UNION AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  ................................ ......................  63 
27  CHINA – CUSTOMS DUTIES ON CERTAIN INTEGRATED CIRCUITS – REQUEST  
FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION AND JAPAN  ................................ ................................ ..... 65 
28  CHINA – EXPORT CONTROL LAW – REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION AND 
JAPAN  ................................ ................................ ................................ ............................  65 
29  RUSSIAN FEDERATION – TRADE RESTRICTING PRACTICES – REQUEST FROM  
THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE UNITED STATES  ................................ ..........................  67 
30  CHINA – IMPLEMENTATION OF TRADE DISRUPTIVE AND RESTRICTIVE  
MEASURES – REQUEST FROM AUSTRALIA  ................................ ................................ ...... 70 
31  EUROPEAN UNION – REGULATION (EU)  2017/2321 AND REGULATION 
(EU)  2018/825 – REQUEST FROM CHINA AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  ...................  73 
32  EURO PEAN UNION – REGULATION EC NO.  1272/2008 (CLP  REGULATION) –  
REQUEST FROM THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  ................................ ................................ .. 74 G/C/M/139  
 
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  33  ANGOLA – IMPORT RESTRICTING PRACTICES – REQUEST FROM THE RUSSIAN 
FEDERATION  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..................  75 
34  MONGOLIA – MEASURES APPLIED WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN AGRICULTURAL 
PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  ................................ .............  76 
35  KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA – TRADE RESTRICTIVE POLICIES AND PRACTICES 
CONCERNING TURKEY - REQUEST FROM TURKEY  ................................ ...........................  77 
36  EUROPEAN UNION – DRAFT IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS REGARDING  
PROTECTED DESIGNATIONS OF ORIGIN AND GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS, 
TRADITIONAL TERMS, LABELLING AND PRESENTATION OF CERTAIN WINE SECTOR 
PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM THE UNITED STATES  ................................ ........................  78 
37  UNITED STATES – MEASURES REGARDING MARKET ACCESS PROHIBITION FOR 
ICT PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM CHINA  ................................ ................................ ....... 79 
38  UNITED STATES – EXPORT CONTROL MEASURES FOR ICT  PRODUCTS – REQUEST 
FROM CHINA  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..................  80 
39  UNITED STATES – EXECUTIVE ORDER ON SECURING THE BULK -POWER SYSTEM - 
REQUEST FROM CHINA  ................................ ................................ ................................ ... 80 
40  AUSTRALIA – DISCRIMINATORY MARKET ACCE SS PROHIBITION ON  
5G EQUIPMENT – REQUEST FROM CHINA  ................................ ................................ ....... 81 
41  FUNCTIONING OF THE COUNCIL FOR TRADE IN GOODS AND SUBSIDIARY 
COMMITTEES:  INFORMATION FROM THE CHAIR  ................................ ............................  81 
42  WORK PROGRAMME ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE  ................................ ....................  83 
43  OTHER BUSINESS  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..... 85 
43.1  Date of Next Meeting  ................................ ................................ ................................ .85 
43.2  Secretariat Staff Changes in Connection with the Council for Trade in Goods  ..................... 85 
44  ELECTION OF CHAIRPERSON OF THE COUNCIL FOR TRADE  IN GOODS  .....................  85 
 
The Chairperson  recalled that , given the virtual format of the meeting  and the long agenda,  it would 
be desirable for Members to keep their interventions brief and to the point ; to facilitate delegates' 
time-keeping, he proposed that an on -screen timer be used. In any case , delegations were invited to  
send their full written statements to the Sec retariat, either during the meeting itself or during the 
subsequent five working days, for their incorporation into the meeting 's minutes.  
 
The delegate of Paraguay  requested that an  on-screen timer  not be used to keep track of  delegates'  
interventions . 
 
The Chairperson  informed delegations that, under agenda item  "Other Business" , he would raise the 
matter of the date of the Council 's next meeting  and make an announcement regarding Secretariat 
changes in relation to this Council.  
 
The agenda was so agreed . 
 
1  NOTIFICATION OF REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS  
1.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that, under the working procedures agreed by the Committee on 
Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA) and following the adoption by the General Council of the 
Transparency Mechanism1, the CTG was to be kept informed of Members ' notifications of new 
regional trade agreements (RTAs). He informed the CTG that 42 RTAs had been notified to the CRTA , 
among them 32  trade agreements concluded by the United Kingdom and its partners , as followed:  
(i) United Kingdom – Ghana, Goods (WT/REG449/N/1);  
 
(ii) ASEAN – Hong Kong, China, Goods and Services (WT/REG448/N/1 -S/C/N/1043) ; 
 
1 Documents  WT/REG/16, WT/L/671, and G/C/M/88.  G/C/M/139  
 
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(iii) European Union – United Kingdom, Goods and Services (WT/REG447/N/1 -S/C/N/1041) ; 
 
(iv) Indonesia – Australia, Goods and Services (WT/REG446/N/1 -S/C/N/1040) : 
 
(v) European Union – ESA – Accession of Comoros, Goods (WT/REG445/N/1) ; 
 
(vi) Ukraine – Israel, Goods (WT/REG444/N/1) ; 
 
(vii) United Kingdom – SACU and Mozambique, Goods (WT/REG443/N/1) ; 
 
(viii) China – Mauritius, Goods and Services (WT/REG442/N/1 -S/C/N/1037) ; 
 
(ix) Trade Agreements notified by the United Kingdom2: 
 
- UK – Colombia , Goods and Services  (WT/REG410/N/1 ); 
- UK – Kosovo , Goods  (WT/REG411/N/1 ); 
- UK – Lebanon , Goods  (WT/REG412/N/1 ); 
- UK – Pacific States , Goods  (WT/REG413/N/1 ); 
- UK – Pacific States (Samoa) , Goods  (WT/REG414/N/1 ); 
- UK – Pacific States (Solomon Islands) , Goods  (WT/REG415/N/1 ); 
- UK – Palestine , Goods  (WT/REG416/N/1 ); 
- UK – Kenya , Goods  (WT/REG417/N/1 ); 
- UK – Cameroon , Goods  (WT/REG418/N/1 ); 
- UK – Canada , Goods  (WT/REG419/N/1 ); 
- UK – CARIFORUM , Goods and Services  (WT/REG420/N/1 ); 
- UK – Côte d'Ivoire , Goods  (WT/REG421/N/1 ); 
- UK – Central America , Goods and Services  (WT/REG422/N/1 ); 
- UK – Chile, Goods and Se rvices  (WT/REG423/N/1 ); 
- UK – Faroe Islands (Denmark) , Goods  (WT/REG424/N/1 ); 
- UK – Ecuador and Peru , Goods and Services  (WT/REG425/N/1 ); 
- UK – Egypt , Goods  (WT/REG426/N/1 ); 
- UK – ESA, Goods  (WT/REG427/N/1 ); 
- UK – Israel , Goods  (WT/REG428/N/1 ); 
- UK – Morocco , Goods  (WT/REG429/N/1 ); 
- UK – Norway and Iceland , Goods  (WT/REG430/N/1 ); 
- UK – Republic of Korea , Goods and Services  (WT/REG431/N/1 ); 
- UK – Singapore , Goods and Services  (WT/REG432/N/1 ); 
- UK – Tunisia , Goods  (WT/REG433/ N/1); 
- UK – Turkey , Goods  (WT/REG434/N/1 ); 
- UK – Ukraine, Goods and Services (WT/REG435/N/1);  
- UK – Viet Nam, Goods and Services (WT/REG436/N/1);  
- UK – Switzerland and Liechtenstein, Goods (WT/REG437/N/1);  
- UK – North Macedonia, Goods and Services (WT /REG438/N/1);  
- UK – Republic of Moldova, Goods and Services (WT/REG439/N/1);  
- UK – Georgia, Goods and Services (WT/REG440/N/1);  
- UK – Japan, Goods and Services (WT/REG441/N/1);  
 
(x) Communication by the European Union and the United Kingdom (WT/REG/GEN/N/10) 
– Notification of inactive agreements ; and 
 
(xi) EU Treaty (WT/REG39/N/1 -S/C/N/6/A dd.1) – Notification of changes . 
 
1.2.  The Council  took note of the information provided.  
 
2 Reference to Kosovo shall be understood to be in the context of the United Nations Security Council 
Resolution  1244 (1999).  G/C/M/139  
 
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  2  STATUS OF NOTIFICATIONS UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENTS IN 
ANNEX  1A OF THE WTO  AGREEMENT (G/L/223/REV.28)  
2.1.  The Chairperson  drew Members' attention to document  G/L/223/Rev.28, containing the status 
of notifications under the provisions of the Agreements in Annex  1A of the WTO  Agreemen t. 
2.2.  The Council took note  of the report.  
3  APPOINTMENT OF OFFICERS TO THE SUBSIDIARY BODIES OF THE COUNCIL FOR TRADE 
IN GOODS  
3.1.  The Chairperson  reminded delegations that the Guidelines for Appointment of Officers to the 
WTO (WT/L/510) adopted by the General Cou ncil on 11  December  2002, provided that the 
Chairperson of the CTG would conduct consultations on the appointment of the Chairpersons of the 
subsidiary bodies of this Council, including consultations with the Group Coordinators in line with the 
practical s teps to be taken to improve the process of appointment of officers contained in JOB/GC/22, 
dated 27  July 2012.  
3.2.  In this vein, and as he had announced at the March meeting of the General Council, and as he 
had also reiterated in his communication to WTO  Memb ers of 4  March  2021, in his capacity as 
Chairperson of the CTG, he had begun his consultations by meeting on four  separate occasions  with 
the Group Coordinators of the four  Regional Groups, namely Asia and the Pacific, Latin America and 
the Caribbean, Afri ca, and the Developed Countries , on 8, 11, 24, and 26  March  2021.  Specifically, 
during the first  two meetings, he had indicated that, once he had received all of the lists from the 
different Groups, and in order to ensure full transparency and equal opport unities to the entire 
Membership, he would contact those delegations that did not belong to any of the Regional Groups.  
3.3.  During the first  meeting, the Group of Developed Countries had submitted the names of their 
candidates. He had  received the final lists of candidates from the other three  Regional Groups on 
Thursday, 18  March, and he had immediately conveyed the lists to the other Group Coordinators, 
requesting them, in turn, to conve y them to their constituencies.  Based on the lists of candidates 
that he had  received from Group Coordinators within the established deadline, he had prepared a 
slate of names , which had then been circulated to the Group Coordinators on 24  March  2021. 
3.4.  In his preparations, he had not only taken into consideration where more than one  candidate 
had been proposed to chair the same committee, but had also respected, to the greatest extent 
possible, the principles of impartiality, objectivity, and, in particular,  rotation and balanced regional 
representation.  This ha d not been an easy task due to overlapping interests, and the many 
candidates that had been presented by two  Regional Groups, while the other two  Groups had 
presented, within the agreed deadline, only one or two  candidates respectively.  Even so , he thanked 
the Regional Group Coordinators for their engagement in the process and for all their efforts to reach 
a consensus on the list.  
3.5.  Nevertheless, he  regretted to inform Members that , even though he had pr epared a slate of 
names based on the candidates submitted to him by the Group Coordinators, and even though this 
slate had represented to the extent possible a balanced regional representation, and had respected 
the principle of rotation, he was not yet in  a position to submit a slate of names to the Council for 
its approval.  
3.6.  Therefore, in his capacity as outgoing Chairperson, responsible for this process, he would 
continue further consultations with a view to seeing the approval of the list that he had cir culated. 
He recalled  that this was a routine housekeeping exercise, so he invited Members to do their utmost 
to reach consensus on a slate of names as soon as possible, and particularly  as the absence of 
officers to chair the CTG's subsidiary bodies would block the work of those bodies.  Therefore, he 
proposed to suspend this item on the agenda and to request the Council's new Chairperson, upon 
completion of the exercise, to reconvene the  CTG meeting in order to deal specifically with this 
one agenda item . 
3.7.  The Council so agreed . G/C/M/139  
 
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  4  WITHDRAWAL OF THE UNITED KINGDOM FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION: PROCEDURES 
UNDER ARTICLE  XXVIII:3 OF THE GATT  1994 – COMMUNICATION FROM THE EUROPEAN 
UNION (G/L/1385)  
4.1.  The Chairperson  informed Members that, in a communication dated 18 March  2021, the 
delegation of the European Union had submitted document  G/L/1385 relating to the ongoing 
negotiations under Article  XXVIII of the GATT  1994 on the apportionment o f the European Union's 
tariff rate quota concessions following the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European 
Union.  In this document, the European Union had indicated  that it would not assert that Members 
that had submitted a claim pursuant to Art icle XXIV:6 of GATT  1994 were precluded from 
withdrawing substantially equivalent concessions under Article  XXVIII:3 of GATT  1994 because such 
withdrawal had occurred later than six  months after the European Union's withdrawal of concessions, 
provided that  the claiming WTO  Member withdrew concessions no later than 12  months after the 
European  Union's modification of concessions.  
4.2.  The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
4.3.  The European Union recall ed that, on 22  December  2020, the EU submitted a document 
(G/SECRET/Add.3) in connection to the ongoing negotiations under Article  XXVIII of GATT  1994 on 
the apportionment of the European Union's tariff  rate quota concessions following the withdrawal of 
the United Kingdom from the European Union.  That communication highlighted, inter alia, that the 
European Union strives for the rapid and successful conclusion of these ongoing negotiations and 
consultations . 
4.4.  The EU is pleased to report that good progress has been achieved so far , with agreements 
formally signed with two  partners and negotiations finalized and undergoing domestic validation 
procedures with a further six  partners.  In addition, there are several negotiating and consultation 
partners with whom the re are very good prospects of closing negotiations or consultations 
successfully and advancing towards the initialling of draft agreements.  Thus, in line with established 
practice in the framework of Article  XXVIII  negotiations (also under Article  XXIV:6),  the EU believes 
it is desirable to extend the timelines of Article  XXVIII:3 of GATT  1994 by six  months . That is, until 
1 January  2022, without prejudice to the question of whether there are any rights to withdraw 
concessions pursuant to Article  XXVIII:3(a ) and (b).  
4.5.  On this basis, the EU and other Members currently engaged in these Article  XXVIII procedures 
can continue to concentrate on bringing these negotiations and consultations to a successful 
conclusion in the coming months.  The EU remains fully commi tted to successfully conducting these 
negotiations and consultations within this extended deadline.  Therefore, the EU requests  that the 
CTG takes note of this communication and that it agrees on the extension of the deadline as indicated 
in the above -menti oned communication (G/L/1385), until 1  January  2022.  
4.6.  The Council took note  of the sta tement made and agreed  to extend the deadline to withdraw 
substantially equivalent concessions under GATT  Article  XXVIII by six  months, until 1  January  2022, 
as set out in  document  G/L/1385.  
5  UNITED KINGDOM'S WITHDRAWAL FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION: PROCEDURES UNDER 
ARTICLE  XXVIII:3 OF GATT  1994 – COMMUNICATION FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM 
(G/L/1386)  
5.1.  The Chairperson  informed Members that, in a communication dated 18 March  2021, the 
United  Kingdom had submitted  document  G/L/1386 relating to the ongoing negotiations under 
Article  XXVIII of the GATT  1994 on the establishment of the United  Kingdom's Schedule of 
concessio ns and commitments on goods following its withdrawal from the European Union.  In this 
document, the United Kingdom had indicated that it would not assert that Members that had 
submitted a claim pursuant to Article  XXIV:6 of GATT  1994 were precluded from wi thdrawing 
substantially equivalent concessions under Article  XXVIII:3 of GATT  1994 because such withdrawal 
had occurred later than six  months after the United Kingdom's withdrawal of concessions, provided 
that the claiming WTO  Member withdrew concessions n o later than 12  months after the United 
Kingdom's modification of concessions.  
5.2.  The delegate of the United Kingdom  indicated the following:  G/C/M/139  
 
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  5.3.  The United Kingdom refers Members to the statement contained in document  G/L/1386, which 
was circulated by the Secret ariat prior to this meeting.  As Members are aware, the UK has been in 
ongoing negotiations and consultations with trading partners with respect to its obligations 
concerning tariff rate quotas within our Schedule of concessions and commitments on goods in a 
process under Article  XXVIII of the GATT. This is on account of the UK's withdrawal from the 
European  Union.  The United Kingdom's priority remains to engage in good faith with Members in 
discussions relating to tariff rate quotas ( TRQs), and to reassure Members that we are committed to 
maintaining the existing balance of rights and obligations within our Schedule.  
5.4.  Negotiations with Members in this process under Article  XXVIII have been progressing well and 
the UK would like to thank the relevant Members f or their continued and constructive engagement 
in resolving specific concerns. Whilst the UK is  optimistic that it will be able to make swift progress 
in reaching agreement with remaining Members, the UK believes that an extension of the timelines 
under Ar ticle XXVIII:3 of the GATT, by six  months, until 1  January  2022, is the most appropriate 
course of action towards concluding these discussions and the process under Article  XXVIII  of the 
GATT . 
5.5.  An extension will allow the UK  to provide trading partners with  more certainty on their 
outstanding concerns, and to ensure sufficient time to complete obligatory internal processes.  The 
UK thanks Members for their participation in this process so far and will further update Members 
following the conclusion of Article  XXVIII negotiations, in line with past WTO  practice.  
5.6.  The Council took note  of the sta tement made and agreed  to extend the deadline to withdraw 
substantially equivalent concessions under GATT  Article  XXVIII by six  months, until 1  January  2022, 
as set out i n document  G/L/138 6. 
6  ACCESSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA AND THE KYRGYZ REPUBLIC TO THE 
EURASIAN ECONOMIC UNION: PROCEDURES UNDER ARTICLE  XXVIII:3 OF GATT  1994 – 
REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION  
6.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been included in the agenda at the request of the  
European Union.  
6.2.  The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
6.3.  In April  2019, the European Union welcomed the progress achieved in our negotiations on 
tariffs for non -agricultural products, where an  agreement of principle has been reached. When it 
comes to agriculture, however, that is not yet the case.  Talks continued in 2020, but understandably, 
progress has been impacted by the COVID -19 pandemic. Nevertheless, these negotiations remain 
important f or the EU. The EU  hopes that we will be able to engage with both countries to pursue 
talks with a view to concluding negotiations as soon as possible.  
6.4.  The delegate of Armenia  indicated the following:  
6.5.  Armenia wishes  to inform Members that it is continuing its consultation s and communication s 
with interested delegations on this issue. However , for understandable reasons, with less intensity 
than was initially anticipated. Armenia has made  positive development s and real progress on the 
non-agricultural market access ( NAMA ) package and is very close to the finalization of negotiation s 
on NAMA  substance. At the same time, Armenia has intensified its efforts and concentrated  more 
resources to come up with the formulation of a mutual ly accept able position for a compensation 
package on agriculture. However, considering the number of interested Members that are involved 
in the process , as well as the technical and logistic al obstacles created mainly by the COVID -
19 pandemic , Armenia  will require  additional time to conclude these negotiation s. Armenia has  taken 
note of the statement made by the representative of the European Union and will forward it to 
Capital. Armenia  will continue its communication with all interested WTO  Members in a pragmatic 
and constructive way and confirm s its readiness to organize the next round of negotiation s in 
anticipation of finally completing  them.  
6.6.  The delegate of Switzerland  indicated the following:  G/C/M/139  
 
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  6.7.  Switzerland wishes  to note that bilateral discussions on t his matter with the Kyrgyz Republic 
have not been advancing in a satisfactory manner over the last few years. Switzerland invites the 
Kyrgyz delegation to re-engage  in the bilateral process in order to make progress.  
6.8.  The delegate of the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
6.9.  The Russian Federation recognizes its crucial role in the successful conclusion of these 
negotiations and will continue to support the negotiation process.  
6.10.   The delegate of the Kyrgyz Republic  indicated the following:  
6.11.   The Kyrgyz Republic wishes to express its gratitude to the delegation of the European Union 
for its comprehensive cooperation on the matter of the negotiation process under GATT  Article  XXIV.  
The Kyrgyz Republic also thanks Switzer land and the Russian Federation for their comments.  
6.12.   Back in 2019, after substantive discussions with its Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU ) partners, 
the Kyrgyz Republic had formally submitted a set of NAMA and agricultural tariff lines by way of a 
compensatio n proposal, based on which the Kyrgyz Republic stands  ready to further liberalize its 
tariff lines , including on TRQs for agriculture.  As a result of NAMA  goods negotiations , the Kyrgyz 
Republic has heard positive feedback from the EU  side, which gives it reason to hope that they have 
reached mutually agreeable outcomes in NAMA  goods , and that the NAMA  negotiations now near 
their completion.  
6.13.   As for agriculture , the Kyrgyz Republic wishes to state that the consultations at technical level 
are under  way with colleagues from the European Union on agricultural products, along with the 
holding of internal consultations at the EAEU -level. Upon the EU's request, the necessary statistical 
and technical information was sent to the EU in October  2020, and the Kyrgy z Republic,  as well as 
its EAEU  partners , are expecting to receive feedback from EU at this consultation track in order to 
swiftly move forward, because the Kyrgyz Republic is also interested in completing the negotiation 
process in the very near future.  
6.14.   The Kyrgyz Republic assures the EU, Switzerland, and other interested Members, that it is 
making all possible effort s to intensify the consultation process with its EAEU  partners. However, the 
negotiation process also involves a number of players among its EAEU  partners. The Kyrgyz Republic 
also reiterates that it is currently waiting for the necessary feedback from the EU  side as concerns 
its technical calculations.  Finally, the Kyrgyz Republic reiterates that the ongoing work has been 
seriously affected by  the unforeseen circumstances presented by the COVID -19 pandemic.  
6.15.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
7  UPDATE ON PROCEDURES TO ENHANCE TRANSPARENCY AND STRENGTHEN 
NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS UNDER WTO AGREEMENTS – ARGENTINA, AUSTRALIA, 
CANADA, COSTA  RICA, THE EUROPEAN UNION, ISRAEL, JAPAN, NEW ZEALAND, THE 
SEPARATE CUSTOMS TERRITORY OF TAIWAN, PENGHU, KINMEN AND MATSU, THE UNITED 
KINGDOM, AND THE UNITED STATES  
7.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included in the agenda at the request of  
Argentina, Australia, Canada, Costa Rica, the European Union, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, 
Chinese  Taipei, the  United Kingdom, and the United States.  
7.2.  The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
7.3.  On beh alf of the co -sponsors, the United States appreciate s the opportunity to return to the 
joint notification proposal, "Procedures to Enhance Transparency and Strengthen Notification 
Requirements Under WTO  Agreements ", document  JOB/CTG/14/R ev.4. For this meet ing, the 
co-sponsors wish to inform Members that they remain committed to advancing this proposal in 2021.  
The central focus of the proposal is about transparency, which is essential for the continued 
functioning and relevance of the WTO as an institution.  Improvement of notification practices must 
be a necessary element of WTO  reform efforts.  As the pandemic made clear, transparency with 
regard to Members ' trade measures is critically important.  G/C/M/139  
 
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  7.4.  Members were able to act in spite of challenging circumstance s. A recent count showed that 
WTO Members had submitted more than 300  notifications related to COVID -19. These notifications 
enabled other Members to make policy decisions based on accurate and timely information.  
Similarly, Members must continue to improve baseline WTO  transparency practices as we work to 
build back better.  Earlier in the meeting , Members  considered document  G/L/223/Rev.28, "Updating 
of the Listing of Notification Obligations and the Compliance Therewith as Set Out in Annex  III of 
the Report of the Working Group on Notification Obligations and Procedures ". While the update 
indicates there have been some improvements in notification reporting by some Members, efforts to 
date to encourage timely reporting have yielded limited and insuff icient results. This underscores 
the importance of the recommended reforms set forth in this proposal.  
7.5.  Since the last CTG  meeting, the co -sponsors have been meeting and considering ways to evolve 
the proposal, taking into account the feedback received from  Members.  The purpose of this 
intervention is to remind Members about the notification proposal and to advise that co -sponsors 
will be reaching out in the coming weeks to seek Members ' input on what improvements can be 
made to address outstanding concerns and garner their support.  The co -sponsors welcome 
understanding concerning what the core impediments are that prevent Members from meeting their 
notification requirements . What is necessary to ensure the timely submission of notifications? How 
can the noti fication proposal better balance benefits and obligations?  
7.6.  The co -sponsors continue to welcome all comments and are ready to listen to how we may 
address outstanding concerns.  More importantly, the co -sponsors would welcome Members'  support 
as they continu e to find ways to reinforce the fundamental principle of transparency that is at the 
core of the WTO and is critical to helping restore the negotiating function of the WTO.  
7.7.  The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
7.8.  The European Union appr eciates the opportunity to relaunch discussions on this proposal. As 
the US has highlighted, the proposal aims at improv ing a basic tenet of WTO  work: transparency.  
Looking at the Secretariat 's annual listing of compliance with notification obligations 
(document  G/L/223/Rev.28 , under agenda item 4), we can certainly learn from Members ' 
experience. Some Members have made efforts to catch up on their notification performance. It would 
be interesting to hear from them about what has made this possible.  By cont rast, there are still 
many blanks in areas such as  import licensing, state trading enterprises , and quantitative 
restrictions.  
7.9.  Some of these blanks are very likely due to genuine capacity constraints. The co -sponsors 
would like to understand how these cons traints can be better addressed, or why available assistance 
has not been used.  In case of blanks where capacity constraints are not the reason behind the delay 
or lack of notification, we would like to understand what impedes Members from notifying and 
explore possible avenues to address the issue.  
7.10.   The proposal has undergone a series of revisions since it was tabled initially. The co -sponsors 
are not at the end of the journey yet , but would like to get there soon. The co -sponsors look forward 
to stepping up engagement with Members to address outstanding concerns.  
7.11.   The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
7.12.   Japan thanks the United States for delivering the statement on behalf of the co -sponsors and 
thanks the EU for its intervention. Japan would  like to echo the points made by the United  States 
and stress that it is fundamental for the functioning of the WTO, as a Member -driven organization, 
to receive notifications from Members  in the proper way . As a co -sponsor of the proposal, Japan 
believes t hat a reformed WTO will only be achieved by strengthened and enhanced transparency.  
The proposal includes procedures to improve the operation and effectiveness of notification 
requirements, through future work done by the Working Group on Notification Obli gations and 
Procedures. Furthermore, the proposal recognizes a need for technical assistance to improve 
notification compliance.  Japan hopes to see a consensus on this proposal as the first  step in the 
WTO reform efforts, and to achieve mutually satisfacto ry improvements in transparency and 
notification requirements, through the future activities of the Working Group.  
7.13.   The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  G/C/M/139  
 
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  7.14.   Australia is committed to working collectively towards more effective transparency as a ke y 
part of WTO  reform. Increasing transparency and meeting notification obligations would enhance 
confidence in the WTO  and its rules. Australia  acknowledge s the particular difficulties faced by 
developing countries, particularly least developed countries, and the importance of work ing to assist 
these Members . Australia looks forward to working towards raising compliance rates for notifications, 
including by lifting unreasonable impediments, in order to make transparency a practical reality. 
Australia  also l ooks forward to working with other co -sponsors on outreach and further refinement 
of this notification proposal.  
7.15.   The delegate of Costa Rica  indicated the following:  
7.16.   Costa Rica wishes to reaffirm the importance of transparency in the process of reforming and 
strengthening the WTO.  Improving transparency and notification obligations would enhance 
confidence in the work of this Organization.  In this regard, Costa Rica looks forward to continuing to 
work together with the other co -sponsors to improve and refine the proposal.  
7.17.   The delegate of the United Kingdom  indicated the following:  
7.18.   As a strong supporter of the rules -based Multilateral Trading System, the United Kingdom 
reiterate s its commitment to this proposal to improve compliance around tr ansparency and 
notifications.  The United Kingdom is  conscious of the certainty and predictability which transparency 
can bring to the trading system. This proposal continues to represent a logical and practical step 
forward in advancing improvement in thes e areas, as well as part of the wider WTO  reform debate.  
The United Kingdom continue s to welcome feedback from Members, particularly from developing 
Members , on how to enhance aspects of the current proposal and attend to their present concerns.  
7.19.   The UK would like to take this opportunity to re -emphasize that both technical assistance and 
capacity -building are integral to the proposal. The UK is  committed to ensuring that this proposal 
does not disadvantage LDCs who face capacity constraints when trying to m eet their notification 
requirements.  The UK looks forward to strengthening support for this proposal and hopes that its 
inclusion on the agenda has allowed Members to re -focus on it. 
7.20.   The delegate of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
7.21.   New Zealand continue s to support efforts to enhance transparency and notification obligations 
under all WTO  Committees. These are fundamental to the functioning of the WTO  system, and allow 
Members to understand each other 's implementation of commitments made under the respec tive 
WTO Agreements.  This proposal seeks to identify areas where further guidance and assistance may 
be required to assist Members with meeting their existing notification requirements.  In this regard, 
New Zealand continues to support and co -sponsor the pr oposal and ongoing efforts to enhance 
transparency and notifications , including in the context of MC12  outcomes.  
7.22.   The delegate of Ukraine  indicated the following:  
7.23.   Ukraine supports the essential role of transparency in the implementation of the 
WTO Agreements and considers notifications to be an important and indispensable tool to facilitate 
the implementation of fundamental obligations under the WTO. Ukraine also see s transparency and 
notification as a tool that builds or is able to rebuild trust be tween WTO  Members.  Ukraine would 
like to thank all of the co-sponsors of the document for their valuable contributions in updating the 
previously submitted proposal.  Ukraine remains a supporter of WTO  activities aimed at ensuring 
transparency in Members' trade policies and supports WTO  Members' efforts to improve compliance 
with the transparency requirements set forth in specific agreements . Ukraine expresses its readiness 
to further discuss the initiative, which will meet the challenges and needs of develo ping countries 
with regard to the timely submission of comprehensive notifications.  
7.24.   The delegate of Israel  indicated the following:  
7.25.   Israel thank s the co -sponsors of this proposal for their continued interest in enhancing 
transparency and strengthening the notification requirements across all WTO  Agreements. 
Transparency is of critical importance to the overall functioning of the system. Although this proposal 
did not address ad hoc notifications of temporary measures imposed under the COVID -19 pandemic, G/C/M/139  
 
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  the general goal remains the same: increased transparency. Israel echoes other  Members in 
emphasizing the need to make policy decisions based on accurate and timely information and 
believe s that this proposal accurately addresses this overarching objective. I srael stands ready to 
continue its close collaboration with the co -sponsors and any interested delegation interested in 
learning more about the proposal and those interested in joining as co -sponsors.  
7.26.   The delegate of the Republic of Korea  indicated the fol lowing:  
7.27.   Korea recognizes the co-sponsors ' efforts in developing this item and providing updates to 
WTO Members . Korea would like to reiterate the importance of notifications in the Multilateral 
Trading System as the first  step to securing transparency.  Korea is ready to engage in further 
discussions to this end. Furthermore, Korea hopes that this item will gather greater support by 
addressing relevant concerns in an adequate manner.  
7.28.   The delegate of India indicated the following:  
7.29.   India thank s the proponents of document  JOB/CTG/14/Rev.4.  India strongly believes in 
transparency, as it is one of the main pillars of the rules -based Multilateral Trading System and 
provides Members with information and clarity on the laws and regulations, facts and  figures , and 
measures taken by other Members impacting international trade.  India had earlier expressed its 
concerns on certain specific issues in the proposal and the decision being sought by the proponents. 
Most of those concerns still remain.  In a nuts hell, India finds it difficult to agree to any proposal  that 
provides for administrative actions and penalties in case of default in submitting notifications, rather 
than making an effort to understand the capacity constraints and other legitimate difficul ties faced 
by a large number of developing country Members in meeting their notification obligations under the 
WTO Agreements. In India's view, what is required is not to assume wilful default, but to encourage 
those Members that are able to update their n otifications despite difficulties faced, and to assist 
those Members that have not been able to do so because of various reasons, including capacity 
constraints.  Therefore, India reiterate s that, instead of administrative actions and penalties , 
appropriate  support to notify would encourage Members in improving their internal capacity to fulfil 
their notification obligations.  
7.30.   The delegate of Paraguay  indicated the following:  
7.31.   Paraguay  would like to thank the proponent s for the statements that they delivered t oday. 
However, Paraguay  notes that they have not provided any updates, despite the title of the agenda 
item. Paraguay  continue s to note with concern that, despite its repeated calls to review the 
differentiated treatment of agricultural notifications in th is proposal, this treatment persists. 
Paraguay  agree s with the need to improve transparency but is convinced that this differentiated 
treatment has precisely the opposite effect.  Agricultural notifications, specifically DS:1  notifications, 
have a significant impact on trade and should not be considered less important for the purpose of 
enhancing transparency in this Organization. The timely submission of these notifications is much 
more important than other notifications of which the delayed submis sion would result in penalties 
from the first  year of delay, but in which the notified disbursements represent zero  cost for Members. 
However, the disbursements for agricultural notifications represent around USD  525 billion. 
Members  must put an end to the  double standards for agricultural trade in this Organization, rather 
than continuing to promote further unequal treatment of agriculture. Paraguay  maintain s its 
systemic concern in this regard, as it seems that bad practices are bad in all areas of this 
Organization except agriculture.  Paraguay  finds no valid justification for this differentiated treatment 
and cannot help but wonder whether the prevailing reluctance to provide equal treatment could be 
related to the agriculture notification practices of so me of the proponents who are several years 
behind with the submission of their notifications.  
7.32.   The delegate of Uruguay  indicated the following:  
7.33.   Uruguay thanks the co -sponsors for the update on this proposal, whose latest version , 
document  JOB/CTG/14/Rev.4 , which included  the United Kingdom, was submitted on 
24 November  2020.  In the absence of any substantive modifications with respect to previous 
versions, Uruguay  would like to refer to its detailed statements on this matter delivered at previous G/C/M/139  
 
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  meetings.3 Without prejudice to the other issues that Uruguay has  raised in these statements, which 
remain valid, Uruguay request s the co -sponsors to provide a clear answer to the following  question . 
What specific contribution to the objective of enhancing transpare ncy in the WTO is the proposal to 
implement the administrative measures in paragraph  12 supposed to make, specifically in the case 
of non -compliance regarding DS:1  notifications of domestic support in agriculture, two  years later 
than would apply to the re mainder of the notifications covered by the document?  Uruguay hopes to 
continue constructive exchanges on this issue with the proponents and the rest of the Members hip 
in order to achieve concrete and balanced results aimed at improving transparency in the  WTO, 
ensuring compliance by all Members with their respective notification requirements . 
7.34.   The delegate of Chile indicated the following:  
7.35.   Chile wishes  to echo previous speakers in emphasizing that this is a very important issue , 
particularly with regard to the future of the WTO . Transparency is of paramount importance and 
Chile hopes that it can be improved across the board. With a view to moving forward, Chile wishes  
to ask the co-sponsors  if they are in a position to change the punitive framework  on which it  is based  
in some way , as well as the difference s in the treatment of notifications in agriculture and other 
categories of notification s, as was just highlighted in the comments from Paraguay and Uruguay.  If 
we want to be eff icient, Chile believes that it is necessary to have a dialogue in an environment that 
promotes solutions.  
7.36.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
7.37.   The United States thanks all delegations that spoke today. The co -sponsors were interested 
in raising this issue again and providing an update indicating that they would be initiating 
consultations. The United States considers it heartening to hear that there is an interest in advancing 
transparency as a goal that we all share. Regarding the spe cific questions from Uruguay and Chile, 
the United States will work with co -sponsors to agree an answer on behalf of all co -sponsors 
together. Nevertheless, the co -sponsors have obviously raised this issue with a time -frame and goal 
in mind of working towa rds a successful conclusion of this proposal. Therefore, the co -sponsors will 
be reaching out and will respond collectively to address the questions that were raised specifically 
about the disparity in agriculture notifications.  
7.38.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
8  MEASURES TO ALLOW GRADUATED LDCS, WITH GNP BELOW USD  1,000, BENEFITS 
PURSUANT TO ANNEX  VII(B) OF THE AGREEMENT ON SUBSIDIES AND COUNTERVAILING 
MEASURES – REQUEST FROM CHAD ON BEHALF OF THE LDC  GROUP (WT/GC/W/742 -
G/C/W/752)  
8.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included in the agenda at the request of  Chad, 
on behalf of the LDC  Group . 
8.2.  The delegate of Bangladesh , on behalf of the LDC  Group,  indicated the following:  
8.3.  The submission in document  WT/GC/W/742 -G/C/W/752 aims to correct a technical omission 
regarding the use of export subsidies under the WTO  Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures (ASCM). It is widely accepted that export subsidy is a policy tool that can potentially help 
Members in transition. The submission has already received wide support , and the LDC  Group  is 
grateful to all Members. The LDC  Group also thank s those delegations that earlier raised some 
concerns and later provided opportunities to engage bilaterally.  During previous CTG  meetings, 
Bangladesh cited the historic example of Honduras,  which was accidentally excluded from the 
original list of 20 developing country Members in the Annex  VII(b) in 1995 , although its Gross 
National Income (GNI) per capita was below USD  1,000. The General Council judiciously allowed the 
inclusion of Honduras in the year 2000 by correcting the omission. It means that technical correction 
is possible.  
8.4.  Time and again , the LDC  Group has  said that , in the early 1990s,  when the ASCM was 
negotiated, probably no one could visualize that , in future , the LDCs, namely those  countries listed 
 
3 Document  G/C/M/137, paragraphs  7.35 to 7.40.  G/C/M/139  
 
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  in Annex  VII(a), would be graduated from the LDC  category , and that some of them might still 
remain with GN I per capita below USD  1,000. This gap is nothing but a technical omission which can 
be corrected without adding any new flexibility in the original agreement. An omission cannot be 
interpreted as a deliberate intent by the Members to prevent graduating LDCs from benefit ing from 
Article 27.2(a) flexibilities.  Members also know that paragraph  10.4 of the Doha Ministerial Decision 
on Implementation -Related Issues and Concerns (WT/MIN(01)/17) further confirms that , if a 
Member has been excluded from the Annex  VII(b) list, it shall be re -included in it when its GN I per 
capita falls back below USD  1,000. This is evidence of the flexibility that Ministers decided to extend 
to the eligible Members. Now, if a least developed country , after graduation , still falls back below 
this threshold of USD  1,000 in constant 1990  US dollar terms, why should it not be considered 
eligible to use the flexibility? The LDC  Group asked this question previously , but has never received 
any answer from our friends , who are  not yet convinced to approve this proposal.  
8.5.  The LDCs have provided reasons justifying why this correction is necessary. The LDC  Group 
has always been open to engaging  constructively  with Members . Some Members asked questions on 
this issue, and the LDC  Group has answered. The LDC  Group has also answered all the queries raised 
during the last CTG  meeting , in November  2020. Very recently , the LDC  Group had an opportunity 
to sit with the EU  delegation to answer their questions. Since April  2018, after the intr oduction of 
this document in the CTG, the LDC  Group has  never received any counter -arguments against the 
explanations.  The LDC  Group reaffirm s that the specific need for this proposal is very clear, namely,  
to correct a technical omission and nothing else.  And there is no need to change any rule. If the 
technical omission is corrected, the LDCs , after graduation , can equally well benefit from the ASCM, 
like the Annex  VII(b)  countries, as long as their per capita GN I does not reach the threshold of 
USD 1,000 in constant 1990  US dollar terms for three  consecutive years.  In conclusion, the 
LDC Group  requests the Council to accept the current submission. The delegation of Bangladesh, 
along with the LDC  Group , stands ready to engage constructively with Members . 
8.6.  The delegate of Nepal  indicated the following:  
8.7.  Nepal wishes  to associate itself with the statement delivered by Bangladesh  on behalf of the 
LDC Group. In addition, Nepal notes that the  criteria set for graduation eligibility cover human 
development, econ omic development, and economic risk factor s. However, the provision allows 
countries to be eligible for graduation even by meeting only two  of these criteria , making it possible 
for a country to graduate without it meeting the per capita income  threshold . In this situation, the 
graduating Members may have a low level of GNP  per capita , and they may meet the eligibility of 
Annex  VII(b) of the ASCM . However, such a graduating Member may not benefit from the flexibility 
of export incentives as per the provisio n laid down in the Agreement just because of their graduation. 
This is a completely unfair situation arising from a lacuna  in WTO law that requires adjustment.  
Members should therefore view this request positively.  
8.8.  Nepal believes that LDC graduation is an issue not only for LDC Members ; it is also a global 
issue. Therefore, enabling and encouraging LDC graduation by extending the maximum possible 
support  to LDCs  before and after graduation , and in a just manner , has become an urgent task to 
enable Members to meet the global target of LDC  graduation in a timely manner.  Furthermore, LDCs 
are heavily devastated by the COVID -19 pandemic . The health and economic syste ms of LDCs have 
not been able to respond adequately  to the challenges posed by the pandemic.  Additionally, LDCs 
have been suffering from huge gap s in many areas , especially in infrastructure , and including 
ICT infrastructure, institutional and human capaci ty, resources, and technology.  
8.9.  Nepal also notes that it is disappointing that LDCs account for only an approximately 
0.96%  share in global merchandise export s, and a 0.71%  share in global commercial service 
export s, especially when one considers that LDCs represent approximately 13% of the global 
population.  The COVID -19 pandemic has further exacerbated the challenges for LDCs in their 
socio-economic transformation , and LDC exports are severely affected.  In this co ntext, graduated 
LDCs, or LDCs that are in the process of graduation , and which still meet the criteria of allowing 
export incentives as per the provision and spirit of the Agreement , should be permitted to enjoy the 
same level of facilitation  as others.  
8.10.   The provision of the Agreement seems focused on the level of economic development , 
particularly in GNP per capita , and therefore, this provision needs to be applied in a fair manner by 
extending support  to Members, even after their graduation , if they are e ligible as per the provision 
and spirit of the Agreement.  G/C/M/139  
 
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  8.11.   The delegate of India indicated the following:  
8.12.   India's delegation thank s the delegation of Chad for inclusion of this agenda item , as well as 
Bangladesh and Nepal for their comprehensive interventio ns. India has already supported this 
proposal in earlier meetings of the CTG  and its position remains the same.  
8.13.   The delegate of Turkey  indicated the following:  
8.14.   Turkey thank s Chad for bringing this proposal to the agenda of this meeting. Turkey' s support 
for this proposal continues as stated in previous CTG  meetings.  Turkey believe s that this carve -out, 
which is currently available to developing countries with GNP  per capita below USD 1,000, should 
also be extended to LDCs that meet the same condition so that Members can continue to assist them 
in overcoming their remaining developmental challenges.  
8.15.   The delegate of Brazil  indicated the following:  
8.16.   Brazil reiterates its support for the LDC proposal to amend Annex  VII of the ASCM , to allow 
graduated LDCs whose GDP  per capita remains below USD  1,000 to continue to benefit from  the 
rules of Article  27.2(a). Brazil has already supported this proposal, both within the scope of the 
Committee on Subsid ies and Countervailing Measures and in the CTG  itself.  
8.17.   The delegate of Nigeria  indicated the following:  
8.18.   Nigeria wishes to register its support for the proposal as presented by the delegation of 
Bangladesh.  
8.19.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the fo llowing:  
8.20.   The United States thank s Bangladesh for its comments today and at previous CTG  meetings. 
The United States would like to provide more detailed reaction and to raise a question about data.  
8.21.   First, it is important to understand that the proposal woul d not correct a "technical omission ", 
as has been suggested.  It is important to recognize that Members chose somewhat different criteria 
for Annex  VII(a) and Annex  VII(b). The UN  criteria for graduation from LDC  status is not fixed. The 
criteria changes over time. The per capita income criteria, for example, has increased in current 
value over the years – similar to the manner in which the current value of USD 1,000 measured in 
constant 1990  dollars has increased. In addition, the UN  graduation pr ocess contains many 
flexibilities. A Member that recently graduated from LDC  status had first met the criteria 26  years 
before graduating and was recommended by UN  members for "immediate graduation " 23 years prior 
to graduating.  In addition, the United Sta tes does not see the relevance of the case of Honduras. 
The record shows that instance was a mistake by Members, not a deliberated choice.  Second, 
Members need to acknowledge that the proposal would clearly provide a new special and differential 
(S&D) benefit to LDCs who graduate from LDC  status with a GNI  per capita below USD 1,000 in 
1990 dollars. This S&D  benefit does not exist today.  Third, Members have been told several times 
that their request that LDCs provide subsidy notifications is not relevant to  our consideration of this 
proposal. The United States wishes to explain why this stance will not help this proposal to advance. 
A fundamental aspect of this proposal is trust – trust that Members asking to receive a certain benefit 
would be transparent in  how they take advantage of that benefit. Bangladesh has cited capacity 
constraints and challenges as the reason why some LDCs have never submitted a subsidy notification 
for over twenty -five years at this point. Are these LDCs working with the WTO  Secreta riat to 
overcome these challenges and provide their notifications?  
8.22.   In reviewing the proposal, the United States has noted that per capita income data, in 
constant 1990  dollars, does not exist for certain LDC  Members. What do the proponents suggest be 
done about this?  In addition, the United States notes that the proposal provides for re -inclusion if a 
Member graduates and then later falls below the USD 1,000 per capita constant 1990  threshold. 
This aspect is not a part of the current provision governin g graduation from Annex  VII(b). What is 
the rationale for including this aspect in the current proposal?  
8.23.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  G/C/M/139  
 
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  8.24.   The EU is mindful of the challenges that graduating LDCs face. The EU supports constructive  
initiatives to better integrate LDCs into the Multilateral Trading System and encourage s discussing 
this proposal – as any S&D treatment  proposal – on the basis of analysis that shows where specific 
problems lie.  In previous discussions in this Council, t he EU had the opportunity to set out its 
comments and requests for further information. These are still valid and aim to inform the 
consideration of the proposal.  The EU would like to thank Bangladesh for the recent bilateral 
discussions on this proposal.  The EU remains ready to continue engaging in informal consultations 
with the LDC  Group on this matter.  
8.25.   The delegate of Vanuatu  indicated the following:  
8.26.   Vanuatu is one of the countries that is in the process of graduation , in the transition period , 
so Vanua tu is very mindful of the issues that have been raised by Bangladesh. Vanuatu wishes to  
express its support for the proposal that is before the Council.  
8.27.   The delegate of Bangladesh , on behalf of the LDC  Group,  indicated the following:  
8.28.   The LDC  Group thanks the delegations that have spoken today to support the submission.  
The LDC  Group is also grateful to those Members  that actively participated through their 
thought -provoking questions. The LDC  Group has  observe d that a few delegations are just repeating 
the same questions, despite the fact that the LDC  Group has  already responded to those questions. 
On the contrary, there is a reluctance from their side to give responses to our queries and to offer 
any observati ons on the rationale and arguments provided by us to address the technical omission 
in this Annex. The LDC  Group is ready to welcome any such responses and observations in order to 
have a constructive discussion on this long-pending issue.  
8.29.   Today, the US  delegation has raised some interesting points , including by stating that the 
issue is not about a technical correction. The LDC  Group has already provided explanations in support 
of the textual proposal. The LDC Group also mentioned the example of Honduras a nd explained the 
issue of threshold level of inclusion into the Annex  VII(b) list. The LDC  Group would certainly look 
forward to hearing the detailed views of the US  delegation for its not considering the issue as a 
technical omission.  
8.30.   Indeed, the LDC  Group fully agree s with the US  delegation that the LDC  graduation criteria 
under the UN  system are different from the eligibility criteria for inclusion in the ASCM  Annex  VII(b) 
list. In the UN, the LDC  graduation criteria are based on GNI  per capita, economic vulnerability , and 
the human assets index. To reach eligibility for graduation, a country must reach threshold levels 
for graduation in two  consecutive triennial reviews for at least two of the three  criteria, or its GNI  per 
capita must exceed at least twice the threshold level. In short, the UN has its own process to 
recommend an eligible LDC out of the LDC  category.  
8.31.   On the other hand, Article  27.2 of the ASCM clearly set s the basis of the eligibility criterion 
for inclusion into the Annex  VII(b) list and GNI  per capita below USD  1,000 is the only threshold, 
and except this, there are no other criteria. This should be the focus of our discussion here. Can the 
US delegation deny this?  
8.32.   The US has also brought a concern that per capita data for many L DCs do not exist. In this 
context, it is to be clarified that the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs 
(UNDESA ) regularly estimates the GNI  per capita for all developing countries , including LDCs.4 The 
World Bank also regularly updates  GNI per capita data for all LDCs5, which is used by the 
WTO Secretariat . Since the only qualification to belong to the Annex  VII(a) list is whether they are 
LDCs or not, the GNI  per capita for LDCs were not required in this context. When an LDC is gradua ted 
from the LDC  category, the WTO  Secretariat can easily access the World Bank data from graduating 
LDCs in order to estimate the GNI  per capita in constant 1990  US dollars, as per the current practice.  
8.33.   The US has also asked a pertinent question: why is the technical support from the Secretariat 
not effectively improving the capacity constraints of LDCs in terms of providing their notification s? 
The LDC  Group welcomes such a question. And why the existing technical assistance program mes 
 
4 https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/least -developed -country -category/ldc -data-retrieval.html  
5 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD?locations=XL  G/C/M/139  
 
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  on notification enhancement cannot meet our expectation s must be investigated . But this is not the 
case only for the ASCM, the constraints and challenges are regular phenomena for LDCs. It is perhaps 
true also for many other developing countries. Therefore, t he issue of the inability of LDCs to submit 
notification s should not be placed as a pre -condition block ing our discussion that aims to address a 
technical oversight.  
8.34.   The LDC  Group thanks the EU for their demand for additional information. The Group would 
certainly invite the EU to detail their proposal on additional information in relation to the current 
proposal and the text of Annex  VII of the ASCM . The LDCs consider that Annex  VII provides a policy 
space for the LDCs and the countries with a GNI per capi ta below USD  1,000. The volume of export 
subsidy is not a criterion here. In this context, the LDC  Group asks the EU the following questions: 
When the ASCM was negotiated, and the Annex  VII list was created, was it considered which country 
had provided wha t quantity of export subsidy to determine the inclusion criteria into Annex  VII? In 
this context, does the EU  delegation provide its rationale behind the inclusion of Article  27.1 in the 
ASCM , which maintains  that "Members recognize that subsidies may play  an important role in 
economic development programmes of developing country Members "? 
8.35.    The LDC  Group will be happy to engage further with the delegations of the US and the EU.  
In conclusion, the LDC  Group thanks the Chairperson for facilitating the discuss ion and requests 
that, until the issue is resolved, the Council please keep this item on the agenda of the Council's 
next meetings. The LDC  Group also requests the Chair person  to facilitate informal group 
consultations on this issue. The LDCs stand ready to engage constructively in this regard . 
8.36.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
8.37.   The United States wishes to reiterate that the rules and procedures require that agenda items 
be added in writing . In order to avoid confusion at the General Council and elsewhere, the US 
reiterate s that the normal procedure is not to create standing items , but rather that proponents may 
request an item, in writing, before the nex t meeting.  
8.38.   The delegate of Chad indicated the following:  
8.39.   Chad supports the statement made by Bangladesh, the focal point for the LDC  Group. The 
LDC Group's proposal on graduation simply seeks to correct a technical issue with regard to the 
SCM Agreement, i n order to make sure that LDCs that have graduated from that status can benefit 
from the same condition as countries which are not listed as LDCs in Annex  VII in terms of the 
flexibilities which appear in Article  27.2 of the SCM  Agreement. This is a questi on of equality, equity, 
and inclusivity, and Chad thinks that Members are ready to lend an attentive ear to this LDC  concern 
and to correct an item that until now has been neglected.  
8.40.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
9  EUROPEAN UNION – COVID -19 VACCINE EXPORT TRANSPARENCY AND 
AUTHORIZATION MEASURE – REQUEST FROM AUSTRALIA  
9.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included in the agenda at the request of 
Australia.  
9.2.  The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
9.3.  Australia is disappointed and concerned by the European Union' s decision to extend the scope 
and duration of its transparency and authorization mechanism for exports of COVID -19 vaccines.  
Australia acknowledges the concerning epidemiological situation in t he EU and offers its sincere 
condolences for the ongoing loss of life. Australia also recognizes the important role the EU has 
played in the global response to COVID -19 as a significant exporter of vaccines. At the same time, 
Australia has called on the EU  to ensure this measure is no more trade restrictive than necessary to 
achieve the objective of vaccine export transparency, and that it is consistent with existing 
WTO obligations. Australia is disappointed that, instead of exercising restraint, the EU ha s recently 
expanded the grounds on which exports may be refused.  Australia is particularly concerned that the 
measure could now be used to prevent exports based on the epidemiological situation, vaccination 
rate, and availability of vaccines in the country  of destination – even when the EU's own contracts G/C/M/139  
 
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  have been fulfilled. Australia views the scheme and its expansion as an inappropriate method of 
dealing with commercial contractual disputes. Australia also believes that it is inconsistent with the 
EU's W TO obligations.  
9.4.  The EU is a global leader in the fight against COVID -19 and its decisions are closely watched. 
As such, the continued imposition of this measure sends a disturbing signal. Widespread adoption 
of export restrictions on vaccines would have di sastrous consequences for our collective efforts to 
combat the virus.  Australia's long -standing position is that COVID -19 vaccines should not be subject  
to restrictive trade measures, and that there is a global and moral responsibility on all countries to 
share COVID -19 vaccines far and wide.  Vaccines produced in the EU are an important component of 
many Members' vaccine rollouts. This includes the vaccin e rollout in Australia, and Australia's ability 
to support the rollout to developing countries and least developed countries in our region.  Australia 
has already gifted doses of our domestic COVID -19 vaccine stocks to support the vaccination of 
front-line health workers in Papua New Guinea. It is essential that the EU's measure not restrict 
exports of Australia's contracted vaccine supplies and our ability to support developing countries and 
least developed countries most in need of vaccines.  
9.5.  Australia urge s the EU to remove this measure as soon as possible.  More broadly, Australia is 
troubled by recent reports that other large vaccine manufacturers have ceased exports of 
COVID -19 vaccines, including exports for use by COVAX. Australia  encourage s all Members  to 
exercise restraint in the imposition of measures, whether formal or informal, that affect the export 
of vaccines and other essential medical goods. These measures have significant adverse flow -on 
effects for global supply chains and production.  
9.6.  The del egate of Switzerland  indicated the following:  
9.7.  Switzerland takes note of the EU  export authorization mechanism that was introduced in 
January  2021, which in the previous week has been made more restrictive.  Switzerland regrets this 
decision, particularly be cause of the highly integrated production chains across national borders for 
the manufacture of vaccine active ingredients and preparations, which makes a smooth flow of 
supply chains essential, especially during the fight against this pandemic.  Switzerlan d underlines the 
importance of open and barrier -free supply chains for these essential products , as well as the need 
for cooperation and solidarity in addressing this global challenge. Being itself a contributor in the 
production of vaccines, Switzerland a ims for a frictionless production chain and will continue its 
efforts in this regard.  
9.8.  Switzerland also notes that other countries have either taken restrictive export measures on 
inputs needed for the manufacturing of COVID -19 vaccines, or on COVID -19 vaccines themselves, 
with a view to prioritizing progress in the vaccination of their own populations.  All these restrictive 
measures have a chilling effect on the global supply value chain and run the risk of triggering a 
domino effect, which is in no one's i nterest. As this pandemic affects every country in the world, 
cooperation and solidarity are needed more now than ever.  Switzerland calls upon all WTO  Members 
to remove their trade -restrictive measures as soon as possible, to ramp up their production 
capac ities, and to contribute to the sharing of vaccines, because it is only by working together, in a 
collective effort, that Members will we be able to put an end to this pandemic.  
9.9.  The delegate of the United Kingdom  indicated the following:  
9.10.   The United Kingdom  shares the concerns of other Members regarding the trade -restrictive 
nature of the European Union's Implementing Regulation, and the UK regrets the EU's decision to 
extend this measure beyond its original expiry date of 31  March  2021. The UK  notes the rec ent 
changes to the EU's regulation and ask s that the EU  reviews this measure to ensure that it does not 
constitute an unnecessary barrier to coordinated global COVID -19 efforts, and that it is duly 
adherent to WTO  obligations, including the non -discriminat ory application of export restrictions. The 
UK has also been raising these points bilaterally with the EU.  Trade restrictive measures on medical 
goods, including vaccines – such as these – are damaging and costly, and must be avoided. Not only 
do they impe de immediate global efforts to resolve the COVID -19 crisis, but they are also 
counterproductive to efforts to achieve equitable access to COVID -19 vaccines. They also risk 
damaging the Multilateral Trading System in the long term.  G/C/M/139  
 
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  9.11.   The pandemic has highligh ted just how dependant we all are on complex global supply chains. 
Vaccine production is often reliant on key inputs from various countries, and each batch must be 
tested – sometimes abroad – before it can be deployed anywhere else in the world.  Such compl exity 
and interdependence mean that it is in all Members' interests to support these supply chains by 
avoiding restrictions. This has particular resonance at a time when an international collaborative 
effort has never been more necessary.  
9.12.   The delivery and creation of the vaccine has been a multinational effort. These are 
international projects which require international cooperation because this virus knows no borders.  
The United Kingdom would like to conclude by recognizing the shared challenges of the pan demic 
and by noting that it looks forward to continuing to support the global recovery from COVID -19, 
working closely with partners to do so.  
9.13.   The delegate of Colombia  indicated the following:  
9.14.   Colombia is concerned that the regulatory measures and restricti ons on the export of vaccines 
and other medical technologies related to COVID -19, far from improving, are worsening. Since the 
call that was made by Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Panama, and Paraguay, at the last General 
Council, to avoid or limit export restrictions, Members have gone rather in the opposite direction. 
Now, Members are learning of new measures, identifying new Members that are restricting exports, 
seeing extensions of previous measures, and witnessing export processes that are becoming mor e 
demanding in several places.  Like many countries, Colombia continues to call for the strengthening 
of global trade and global value chains as the correct response to the global health crisis. The basic 
principles of free trade that have been so strongly defended in this Organization must continue to 
guide us. The export restrictions on inputs and vaccines, and the ensuing retaliation by injured 
countries, may lead to unpredictable risks.  The growing vaccine nationalism is creating incentives 
for the force d localization of domestic production, thus affecting the synergies arising from 
international trade and the advantages that each country can offer. This vaccine nationalism is 
inefficient and does not help to achieve the global goals of fighting the pande mic. However, it is, 
above all, contrary to what the WTO has always pursued.  
9.15.   The contractual legal grounds provided by the Members that have adopted these measures, 
contrary to the rules of the WTO, are not sound arguments either. We all have contracts and  we all 
face challenges in implementing them, and potential non -compliance. The prevalence of some 
contracts over others is not a valid argument, but rather another example of vaccine nationalism.  
Such vaccine nationalism weakens neighbouring countries and  trading partners, yet this is an 
advantage from an electoral point of view. It is , therefore , not a good solution, either in economic, 
legal, or public health terms, or from an ethical perspective. However, international disciplines are 
designed precisely  to ensure that such electoral and political arguments, in the short term, do not 
prevail over the benefits of free trade.  
9.16.   As Colombia has been saying since the beginning of the pandemic, the global health crisis 
requires a coordinated and multi -level solu tion. Colombia has participated constructively in all the 
different forums permitted by the WTO to improve trade in protective equipment, medical devices, 
medicines, and vaccines. For example, Colombia is participating actively in the discussions on the 
waiver in the TRIPS  Council. Together with four  Latin American partners, it spearheaded the 
statement on export restrictions. For several months, under the leadership of Hong Kong, China, 
Colombia has been promoting open and transparent discussions, in the C TG and the Committee on 
Market Access  (CMA) , on the measures taken by Members in response to the COVID -19 pandemic. 
Colombia endorsed the communication to enhance the Organization's role in the global effort toward 
the production and distribution of COVID -19 vaccines and other medical products, led by Canada, in 
support of the ideas shared by the Director -General. Colombia also supported the Trade and Health 
Initiative of the Ottawa Group.  
9.17.   From Colombia's perspective, this is a series of complementary and c onsistent measures that 
seek to influence the different points in the vaccine development, production, and distribution chain. 
And Colombia is participating in all of these initiatives because Colombia is concerned , because 
Colombia is affected, and becaus e vaccination and treatment must be globalized much faster than 
at the current pace. And time is against us all. Colombia believes that these are crucial and 
complementary discussions that cover the different aspects of the issue.  Colombia urges all Member s 
to continue working together to avoid vaccine nationalism and  begin cooperating.  G/C/M/139  
 
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  9.18.   The delegate of Paraguay  indicated the following:  
9.19.   Paraguay reiterate s its concern, as reflected in document  WT/GC/W/818, regarding the 
mechanism implemented by the European Union for prior export licensing for COVID -19 vaccines, 
notified in document  G/MA/QR/N/EU/5/Add.1.  The extension and deepening of export restrictions 
imposed by some Members increases our concerns about equitable access to vaccines. However, the 
current issue goes beyond the specific measures adopted by the European  Union.  As mentioned in 
Paraguay's statement at yesterday's informal meeting of the General Council, the extreme inequality 
in vaccine access is undermining the global fight against the pandemic. In the three  months since 
vaccination procedures were initiated internationally, only ten  Members have managed to administer 
three  quarters of all the vaccines available. COVAX has received only 6% of all vaccines administered 
globally.  
9.20.   The Membe rs that have committed to multilateralism through mechanisms such as COVAX 
have been adversely affected with regard to the distribution of and timely access to 
COVID -19 vaccines. In the specific case of Paraguay, it should be noted that Paraguay purchased 
four million doses but has received only 36,000  doses. The COVAX  mechanism claims that this is 
due to lack of supply and logistical problems, which have resulted in a delay in distribution.  While 
Paraguay does acknowledge the generosity of some Members in contributing financially to the 
COVAX  initiative, such funding is of little use if COVAX cannot access or distribute the vaccines. If 
no quick solution to this inequality is found, several Member s will find themselves having to reassess 
their position on t he adoption of the waiver requested under the Agreement on Trade -Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).  
9.21.   The pandemic is a global issue and Paraguay considers that access to vaccines is a universal 
public health good for preventing, contai ning, and halting the spread of the virus. The circumstances 
call for a response that allows for joint and united action to be carried out to avoid segmenting or 
restricting access to vaccines for a certain group of countries or requesting additional requi rements 
that impede the timely distribution of vaccines. The fight against the pandemic is global and requires 
global and inclusive solutions. Therefore, no one will be safe until all are safe. The WTO cannot be 
indifferent to this global priority and must  promote multilateralism to seek concrete solutions and 
thereby ensure social justice in vaccine access and provide peace of mind to each and every one of 
our citizens.  Paraguay reiterates its call for all Members to refrain from imposing such measures tha t 
undermine global health. Measures must include an equity component, take into account the real 
health situation, and promote international cooperation and solidarity.  
9.22.   The delegate of Turkey  indicated the following:  
9.23.   As mentioned by other Members, this mea sure was discussed at the General Council's most 
recent meeting, where Members voiced their concerns over the possible negative repercussions that 
it could have on global trade and health.  As also stated at that meeting, Turkey is concerned about 
the possi ble domino effects that this measure could have in terms of what many call "vaccine 
nationalism". Turkey also wants to underline certain vague aspects of the measure, which could lead 
to arbitrariness in its implementation, and again asks the EU to act in line with the principles put 
forward in the Trade and Health Initiative that they pioneer and not to extend this measure to ensure 
global solidarity.  However, Turkey regrets to learn that not only was this measure extended, but 
also that several new criter ia were added to it, which could lead to the rejection of more applications 
for authorization.  Given these recent developments, Turkey wishes to once again call upon the EU 
to act in line with its commitments to "fair and equitable access to critical suppl ies", and to exercise 
restraint in imposing export restrictions on essential medical goods and vaccines.  
9.24.   The delegate of Mexico  indicated the following:  
9.25.   Mexico considers that controlling the pandemic is the most important challenge faced by each 
Member . The coronavirus has wreaked havoc around the world, with the regrettable loss of 
thousands of lives, and difficult economic conditions to be overcome in the short, medium, and long 
term. Our region has been particularly affected. To date, Mexico has confirme d thus far a total of 
2,224,767  cases of COVID -19, and a total of 201,429  deaths from the virus. Although  Mexico has 
had access to vaccines, uncertainty remains about the speed at which these will reach Mexico so 
they can be administered extensively to the  population.  In light of the above, Mexico wishes to 
express its systemic concern regarding the European Union's decision to extend the scope and G/C/M/139  
 
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  duration of its transparency and authorization mechanism for exports of COVID -19 vaccines, as well 
as measures  with a similar objective that other Members are considering or have already 
implemented.  Like previous delegations , Mexico urges the EU to ensure that this measure is not 
more trade restrictive than necessary to fulfil the objective of transparency in the  export of vaccines, 
and that it is consistent with its WTO obligations.  
9.26.   Mexico supports the call for all WTO  Members to exercise restraint in the imposition of both 
formal and informal measures that affect the export of vaccines and other essential medica l 
products. If Members  are to overcome this crisis, it is vital that we all support the smooth functioning 
of global supply chains and production , and avoid measures that could have negative and restrictive 
effects on trade flows.  
9.27.   The delegate of the Repub lic of Korea  indicated the following:  
9.28.   Korea shares the concerns raised by Australia and other Members that any trade -restrictive 
measure may disrupt the global distribution of COVID -19 vaccines.  As a co -sponsor of the Trade and 
Health Initiative, Korea would like to highlight why it is important to support it. The initiative includes 
actions that are intended to facilitate trade in those essential medical goods that are necessary for 
responding to the current COVID -19 pandemic. Concerni ng the " export restrictions", Members are 
to review and promptly eliminate unnecessary existing restrictions on exports of essential medical 
goods. Members should bear in mind that the actions laid out in the initiative will help ensure 
equitable distribut ion of scarce essential medical goods and vaccines.  In this regard, Korea would 
like to urge all WTO  Members, as well as the EU, to participate in the Trade and Health Initiative and 
to carry out actions pursuant to that initiative.  
9.29.   The delegate of Panama  indicated the following:  
9.30.   Panama recognizes that the impact of the COVID -19 pandemic has led Members to take 
dramatic measures to contain its spread. The suspension of trade activities has affected the 
economies and development of all countries, revealing v ulnerabilities and unexpected challenges.  
The European Union, like many WTO  Members, has expressed its commitment to international 
solidarity to fight the COVID -19 pandemic. It has, on several occasions, supported the principle that 
any measure considered necessary to address the pandemic must be transparent, proportionate, 
temporary, clearly related to addressing the pandemic, and consistent with WTO  obligations.  This is 
why Panama is surprised and concerned by the various reports in the last few weeks, wh ich point to 
a systematic practice of "vaccine nationalism" that the European Union had been conducting, 
contrary to the principles of cooperation and multilateralism upon which the WTO was founded.  
9.31.   Panama is particularly concerned about the implementation  of measures that restrict exports 
of vaccines and their ingredients, which are necessary for the global concerted efforts against 
COVID -19. Panama calls on Members to refrain from implementing this type of policy. COVID -19 
does not recognize levels of dev elopment or borders. The problem is global,  and Members  will 
continue to suffer globally because of it.  Panama believes that the efforts of the Director -General, 
Dr Ngozi Okonjo -Iweala, to identify places with manufacturing capacity, especially in developi ng 
countries, are necessary to expand vaccine production and reduce the access gap. However, her 
efforts will only be successful if Members all work together to avoid interruptions in supply chains. 
Otherwise, we risk seeing an even slower economic and soc ial recovery for all. The solution to the 
pandemic lies in ensuring that the means to control COVID -19 are distributed equally across the 
world.  
9.32.   The delegate of Ecuador  indicated the following:  
9.33.   Ecuador thanks Australia for placing this item on the agenda. During the General Council 
meeting on 1  March, together with Colombia, Costa Rica, Panama, and Paraguay, Ecuador called for 
the avoidance of administrative restrictions on the export of vaccines against COVID -19. Ecuador is 
in favour of consolidati ng universal access to vaccines and, by this means, removing any obstacles 
that limit it. Ecuador is sure that this approach, aligned with the rules governing international trade, 
is the most reasonable and humanitarian in the midst of the pandemic.  It is the same spirit that has 
prompted Ecuador also to endorse communication  WT/GC/230/Rev.1, to enhance the role of the 
WTO in the global effort to produce and distribute vaccines and other medical products. While G/C/M/139  
 
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  addressing different aspects of the production  and distribution chain for vaccines and other 
technologies, these are two  important and complementary topics with a single interest.  
9.34.   For global challenges , the world needs global solutions. What could be more global than a 
pandemic whose effects have cut short millions of human lives and affected the economies of nations 
worldwide ? Ecuador considers that only the cooperation of all countries can help us to find a solution 
that will benefit us all: the control of the pandemic at the global level. All States  and all international 
organizations must play their part in promoting and protecting global vaccine distribution.  Ecuador 
has not lost sight of the fact that the EU's measures for the authorization of vaccine exports 
correspond to very specific motivation s. As stated previously, Ecuador recognizes the EU's 
contributions to COVAX and GAVI, as well as the exclusion of export restrictions as concerns a 
significant number of developing countries. However, the impact that such action s may have gives 
grounds for  special concern, particularly because it may set an unfavourable precedent.  
9.35.   At this point, Ecuador is dismayed to note the uneven distribution of vaccines globally. The 
concentration of the provision of vaccines in a few States and the delay in their arri val to the vast 
majority of countries is a challenge for the whole international community. The prospect of some 
countries being unable to complete their vaccination programmes before 2023 is bad news for 
everyone. As long as the pandemic is not under cont rol throughout the world, nobody will be safe. 
In the first place, there are humanitarian considerations; but there are scientific considerations, too, 
since areas where the virus is not under control are areas from where new and resistant strains of 
the v irus are most likely to emerge.  Therefore, Ecuador encourages a spirit of transparency, 
cooperation, and international solidarity to be promoted from the WTO, not only on the part of 
Members , but also among pharmaceutical companies and vaccine distributors . This would lead to an 
access to vaccines that is universal and guaranteed by collective action, and so that there is not the 
slightest possibility of a sustained global immunization process being blocked, especially if some 
experts predict that control o f the pandemic will require efforts for years to come.  
9.36.   The delegate of Saint Lucia  indicated the following:  
9.37.   Saint Lucia delivers this statement on behalf of the WTO  Members that are part of the 
Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS).  The OECS cons iders the matter of access to 
vaccines a moral issue, and fully endorses any and all efforts geared towards ensuring that all 
countries have equitable access to COVID -19 vaccines in a timely manner. As Small Island 
Developing States (SIDS), the COVID -19 pandemic has stretched our public health and fiscal 
capacities to their very limits.  The OECS is very concerned about growing vaccine nationalism and 
export restrictions on vaccines. While we understand that certain supply chain and manufacturing 
issues are diminishing access to vaccines, these problems are certainly compounded by vaccine 
nationalism and export restrictions. The impact of this on SIDS like ours is particularly severe.  
9.38.   Prospects for a safe and sustainable economic recovery in the short to medi um term appear 
quite dim, given that the supply gap and the inequitable access to vaccines continue to plague us.  
It is in this context that the OECS urges all WTO  Members to exercise due restraint with respect to 
the trade restrictions being imposed on va ccines. The OECS is also very concerned that many of the 
restrictions currently in place lack transparency. Members should recall that transparency is one of 
the fundamental and enduring principles of the WTO.  
9.39.   At a more systemic level, none of the rulemaki ng or reforms that this Membership is targeting 
will yield value unless we address the pandemic. Therefore, the OECS welcomes the initiative 
announced by the Director -General to bring manufacturers and Members together for a purposeful 
exchange with a view  to unlocking vaccine production and supply.  Members must also seek to gain 
a better understanding of how WTO  rules can be used to remove frictions in the supply of vaccines.  
Finally, the OECS stands ready to work with all WTO  Members to ensure that all co untries, especially 
the most vulnerable, have equitable access to vaccines. The world is watching us, and we must avert 
a moral failure.  
9.40.   The delegate of India indicated the following:  
9.41.   India believes that export restriction is a legitimate policy tool. If u sed in the right manner, it 
could lead to equitable delivery of scarce commodities and prevent countries with deep pockets from 
cornering such supplies. India has demonstrated  this during last year 's first  wave of the G/C/M/139  
 
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  COVID  pandemic, where India used this tool for ensuring equitable distribution of critical medicines, 
diagnostic kits, ventilators , and personal protective equipment , to more than 150  countries , based 
on mutually assessed needs . And this year , India has  provided more than 60  million vaccine do sages 
to more than 80  countries, ensuring their equitable distribution . However, some Members have 
chosen to do the opposite , and have used export restrictions as a tool to prevent cross -border 
shipment of vaccines from their territory. Therefore, export restrictions will continue to play their 
role as a policy tool, although it depends on how a Member chooses to use them.  
9.42.   The delegate of Pakistan  indicated the following:  
9.43.   Pakistan is a staunch supporter of equitable, easy, aff ordable, and swift access to 
COVID -19 vaccines for the entire global population. Pakistan understands that no one is safe until 
everyone is safe. Pakistan's Prime Minister, in his letter to the UN  Health Assembly  last year , has 
openly called for making the  COVID -19 vaccine a global public good.  In this regard, any steps that 
restrict vaccine availability are unwelcome in our collective fight against the pandemic. Members 
well understand that vaccine supply shortages are indeed a reality and can lead countri es to take 
certain steps in the interest of only their own populations.  This issue is evidence d and the reason 
that the current approach to vaccine sharing and equitable supply across the globe is not working. 
We clearly need a new approach.  It is for this  reason that Pakistan, along with almost 60  other 
WTO Members, has been calling for the open availability of technology, and the technical know -how 
of vaccine manufacturing, to allow for large -scale production of vaccines in all relevant countries. 
While m anufacturing capacity in developing countries remains idle, the shortages in vaccine 
production in developed countries is leading to a global shortage, thereby giving rise to phenomena 
such as vaccine hoarding and nationalism. The only way to avoid this ev entuality is to support the 
proposal on a temporary waiver from certain TRIPS  obligations.  Pakistan will continue to follow 
developments on this issue and will remain committed to finding ways to allow vaccine availability 
to all across the globe in an equ itable, affordable, and swift manner.  
9.44.   The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
9.45.   Rather than commenting on the specifics of this situation, Canada would like to take a step 
back and to make some general observations on the situation vis-à-vis export r estrictions.  The rules 
governing the use of export restrictions were drafted in an era when free resort to such policies 
would have most certainly slowed, if not set back, domestic and international efforts to recover from 
the destructive effects of World War II. As such, GATT  negotiators agreed that such restrictions must 
be prohibited, hence the resulting Article  XI:1 provision.  However, in deference to national 
sovereignty, the negotiators included a series of carve -outs from the scope of the prohibition , one 
of which allows the imposition of a temporary measure on exports by a Member "to prevent or 
relieve critical shortages of foodstuffs or other products essential" to that Member – Article  XI:2(a)  
of the GATT . 
9.46.   In the context of world trade in the late 1940s, such a self -determining exception might have 
made sense.  It is unlikely, however, that those same negotiators could have imagined the level of 
integration of today's international trade, nor the rapid advancement of technologies and 
communications t o facilitate that trade, nor forecast the formation of the supply chains that support 
production in the current global economy.  Moreover, even if restricting exports may make sense in 
the context of a local crisis, such an action may not be appropriate or helpful in the context of a 
global effort to address a global crisis.  This discussion , and this situation , reminds me again of the 
words of a Canadian astronaut, Chris Hadfield, whose messages to Planet Earth from the 
International Space Station inspired m any, when he said "There is no problem so bad that you can't 
make it worse."  In a time of real or anticipated crisis, undisciplined resort to export restrictions can 
have ripple effects that negatively affect all of us.  Therefore, we need to be careful and  considered 
in how we use this legitimate tool in our trade policy toolbox.  Just as we have improved the rules 
around the use of Article  XI restrictions in the past, Canada believes that we should take stock of 
the lessons learned throughout this pandemic.  We should consider how WTO  Members can improve 
our use of this provision in a way that mitigates the potential cascading negative effects that export 
restrictions can cause to our citizens and to our collective efforts to address future crises.  As a start , 
Canada highlights the export restriction principles outlined in the Ottawa Group's Trade and Health 
Initiative.  These important principles are a starting point for Canada, and we look forward to 
engaging with all Members on them in the lead -up to MC12.  
9.47.   The delegate of New Zealand  indicated the following:  G/C/M/139  
 
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  9.48.   The COVID -19 pandemic imposes risks to public health and human security on a scale 
unprecedented in living memory. This means that no country is safe until the pandemic is brought 
under control globally.  We therefore have a responsibility as a global community to ensure that 
COVID -19 vaccines, therapeutics, and diagnostics reach all populations in a timely manner, and 
particularly the vulnerable, and to ensure the smooth functioning of global supply chains  for 
COVID -19 medical supplies.  Export restrictions on these products will only introduce inefficiencies 
to supply chains and slow global pandemic recovery.  It is paramount that the global trade in essential 
goods, particularly vaccines, be conducted in a manner that provides long -term consistent and 
predictable trading conditions for all WTO  Members. In that context, New Zealand affirms its view 
that any trade measures applied by WTO  Members in respect of the export of vaccines should be 
trade facilitative and implemented strictly in accordance with WTO  obligations.  
9.49.   A small group of WTO  Members produces the bulk of the world 's supply of COVID -19 vaccines 
and relevant inputs. These Members have a particular responsibility to actively facilitat e the flow of 
COVID -19 vaccines and vaccine -related goods in line with international trade obligations.  The EU is 
one of these Members and has been a leader in the WTO in pushing the trade and public health 
initiative, which New Zealand supports. The EU ha s played a very important role in producing 
vaccines for supply internationally, even while experiencing the devastating impacts of the pandemic 
at home. However, New Zealand is deeply troubled by the implications of restrictions on 
COVID -19 vaccines for g lobal supply chains and equitable access.  We need to maximize efficiency 
at all points of the supply chain. To this end, New Zealand encourages governments to work together 
with pharmaceutical companies to optimize supply chains to ensure the uninterrupted  availability of 
vaccines to all and to make full use of existing global manufacturing capacity.  New Zealand is grateful 
for the leadership that the W orld Health Organization (W HO) has shown in establishing the 
COVAX  Facility, which has been instrumental t o date in increasing supply and equitably distributing 
COVID -19 vaccines. New Zealand hopes that through this initiative, and with the continued support 
of the global community, we will together bring the pandemic to an end.  
9.50.   The delegate of Vanuatu  indicat ed the following:  
9.51.   Vanuatu supports the concerns and views that were expressed by Australia. The measures by 
the EU are risking global value chains and this must not be allowed to become the norm for future 
pandemic responses . As a graduating LDC and a Smal l Island State, Vanuatu  is very concerned 
about this type of action. What does this action by the EU signal for countries like ours? Vanuatu 
cannot condone this vaccine nationali zation that we are seeing today.  The unequal and inequitable 
access by Austral ia, other Developing Countries, LDCs, and SIDS must not continue.  Not only does 
Vanuatu regret the reality of the imposition of the new EU  measures, it also calls upon and urges 
the EU to review its own position and accept its global responsibilities.  
9.52.   The delegate of Egypt  indicated the following:  
9.53.   Egypt shares the concerns raised by Australia and many Members today , and believes that 
these concerns underline the challenges we are all facing to achieve equitable access to 
COVID -19 vaccines. For this reason, Egypt urges all Members to reach consensus on the waiver 
proposal in the TRIPS  Council in order to help in the r amping up of production and supply of 
COVID -19 vaccines.  It is clear that time is not on our side, so Egypt would like to encourage all those 
Members that have not yet supported the waiver proposal to reconsider their position in order to put 
an end to thi s unprecedented global crisis.  
9.54.   The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
9.55.   Japan would like to echo other Members' views and reiterate its position that any export 
restrictions, if they are taken, should be implemented in a manner that is targeted, tran sparent, 
proportionate, temporary, and consistent with WTO  obligations. The Ottawa Group has proposed in 
the draft General Council Declaration, document  JOB/GC/ 251, to take stock of the effectiveness of 
the actions, including on export restrictions, with a  view to adopting possible commitments regarding 
trade in essential medical goods at MC12. As a member of the Ottawa Group, Japan would like to 
realize this initiative with support from the wider Membership.  
9.56.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the  following:  G/C/M/139  
 
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  9.57.   The European Union thanks Australia and other WTO  Members for expressing their views on 
the EU's transparency and authorization mechanism for exports of COVID -19 vaccines.  As Members 
are undoubtedly aware, the third  wave of the pandemic is curr ently unfolding with force in many 
EU member States, with all its dire consequences for our citizens and the economy. Three  months 
after the first  vaccine was authorized in the EU by the European Medicines Agency, we are all 
struggling to deliver the long -awaited vaccines to our citizens. There are simply not enough vaccines 
on the market yet , and not all producers are meeting the agreed delivery schedules.  As a result, not 
enough EU  residents could be vaccinated to date, including in the most vulnerable pa rts of the 
population. Lives were lost that could have been saved through faster vaccination.  As explained at 
the General Council on 2  March  2021, the EU introduced a mechanism to ensure the transparent 
distribution of vaccines and to avoid a situation whe re the much -awaited vaccine goes to the highest 
bidder, or where distribution is left to the arbitrary decision of vaccine producers.  As persistent 
delays in vaccine deliveries continue, the EU needed to extend the measure until the end of June 
and is hope ful that by that time the bottlenecks in the production and distribution of vaccines will 
have been reduced.  
9.58.   Yet Members must not lose sight of the fact that the EU continues to be the largest exporter 
of COVID -19 vaccines globally. Since the scheme entere d into force, EU member States have 
approved 493  requests for export authorizations and rejected only one. As announced by President 
Ursula von der Leyen last week, the total number of exported doses amounts to 77 million. To repeat 
and be precise: all exp ort requests have so far been authorized except for one.  Amid continuing and 
unevenly distributed shortfalls in production globally, the EU is the only major OECD  producer that 
continues to significantly export vaccines.  On 25  March  2021, the scheme was re vised to include 
two additional criteria that member States should consider when granting an export authorization in 
order to preserve the security of supply chains.  This means that (i)  the EU will carefully assess 
whether the destination country restricts exports of its own vaccine production or their raw materials, 
either by law or other means; and (ii)  whether conditions prevailing in the destination country, in 
particular the epidemiological situation, its vaccination rate, and the vaccine stoc ks justify a request 
for exports.  The European Union would like to underline that this is not an export ban. Rather, it is 
about making sure that Europe gets its fair share of vaccines. European citizens do not understand 
why vaccines manufactured in the E U are going to other countries, but close to nothing is coming 
our way, including from other countries having significant production of COVID  vaccines.  
9.59.   Vulnerable, low, and middle -income countries will continue to be exempt from the scope of 
the mechanism,  as are any exports to the COVAX  facility. The EU calls upon all vaccine producers to 
exercise similar solidarity and to avoid restrictions on inputs necessary for vaccine production.  The 
EU underlines that, not only does it request transparency, it is als o committed to ensuring it. The 
EU has promptly and diligently reported all versions of the mechanism to the WTO's monitoring of 
trade measures related to COVID -19 and notified them in conformity with the relevant requirements, 
such as the CTG  Decision on notification procedures for quantitative restrictions. The EU is more 
than willing to explain its approach in detail, and it would normally expect the same from other 
Members that restrict their exports but have so far not notified anything.  The EU is work ing towards 
the overall common objective of ensuring broad and equitable access to COVID  treatments and 
vaccines. As stated at the General Council's meeting in March, the underlying problem is insufficient 
global production, which cannot meet the unprecede nted demand. Members must all make every 
effort to help manufacturers find reliable partners globally with whom they could share their 
know -how and technology.  
9.60.   The European Union has started to explore avenues for scaling up local domestic 
manufacturing. T he EU is also accelerating its programmes to support the development of 
pharmaceutical production capacity in Africa, where it is particularly scarce.  The Europea n Union 
strongly supports Director -General Ngozi Okonjo -Iweala in her efforts to improve globa l cooperation 
in this matter.  
9.61.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
10  INDIA – MANDATORY CERTIFICATION FOR STEEL PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM JAPAN  
10.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been included in the agenda at the request of 
Japan.  G/C/M/139  
 
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  10.2.   The delegat e of Japan  indicated the following:  
10.3.   Regarding the application of certification for steel products, Japan has repeatedly been 
requesting that India ensure proper implementation through discussions in the TBT  Committee. 
However, it is still taking a long tim e to get approval for a conformity assessment, and it has become 
normal that no response is provided to Japanese steel companies even after a year has passed, 
especially for new projects. Due to the COVID -19 pandemic, the Government of India has not been 
able to proceed with the on -site inspection that is required as part of the approval process for 
certification. Japan has therefore requested the Ministry of Steel and the Bureau of Indian Standards 
(BIS) to implement appropriate alternative measures and po stpone the enforcement of new 
standards. If nothing is done, this measure may lead to substantial import restrictions. For this 
reason, Japan would like to request India to implement appropriate alternative measures and to 
postpone the introduction of new compulsory standards.  
10.4.   In addition, Japan expresses its concern over the Government of India's request that Japanese 
companies switch to local procurement from Indian companies not related to the process of applying 
for certifications. Japan is also concern ed by the Government of India's request that Japanese 
companies submit future plans for domestic production in India. These requirements were not 
included in the original procedure. When Japan also expressed its concerns at the TBT  Committee's 
meeting in F ebruary, India only explained the reason for the introduction of its current trade 
restrictive measures, but did not explain the details of how it expects to find a way forward to resolve 
the issues surrounding those measures. Finally, Japan would like to request that India implement 
alternative measures in an appropriate manner or extend the period of enforcement of these 
mandatory standards, which should be no more trade  restrictive than necessary to achieve India's 
legitimate objectives.  
10.5.   The delegate of India indicated the following:  
10.6.   Steel imports in India are governed by the Steel Import Monitoring System (SIMS), instituted 
by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (DGFT  Notification No.  17, dated 5  September  2019), to 
provide statistical data on steel im ports entering India prior to their arrival. The SIMS requires 
importers to submit advance information in an online system. On submission of online 
data/information, the system generates an automatic and unique registration number. No manual 
documents are to be submitted to any public authority for this purpose. Importers can apply for 
online registration not earlier than the 60th day and not later than the 15th day before the expected 
date of arrival of an import consignment. The automatic registration num ber thus granted shall 
remain valid for a period of 75 days. A registration fee of INR 1 per thousand, subject to a minimum 
of INR 500/- and a maximum of INR 1 Lakh on the aggregate c.i.f. value of imports, is required to 
be paid  electronic ally in the onli ne system for each registration number. Importers must enter the 
registration number and the registration expiry date in the Bill of Entry to enable customs clearance 
of the consignment. SIMS is effective from 1  November  2019, that is, any Bill of Entry re ceived on 
or after 1  November  2019 for listed items is governed by SIMS. Since every importer that applies 
for this document receives it, this system can be classified as an automatic registration system, 
where the objective is to collect statistics.  
10.7.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
11  INDIA – IMPORT RESTRICTION ON AIR CONDITIONERS – REQUEST FROM JAPAN  
11.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been included in the agenda at the request of 
Japan.  
11.2.   The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
11.3.   As already mentioned in the latest TRIMs  Committee meeting, Japan considers that India's 
import ban on air conditioners including refrigerants, introduced on 15  October  2020, is a measure 
that unreasonably imposes a restructuring of corporate supply chains.  Japan is strongly concerned 
that this measure is likely to be an import ban that is inconsistent with Article  XI:1 of the GATT  1994. 
In this regard, India responded at its Trade Policy Review (TPR) that the measure was consistent 
with India's obligations under the Montreal Protocol and was consistent with regulations on 
hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs), which are ozone -depleting substances. However, this import ban G/C/M/139  
 
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  is unnecessary and irrational in that it covers a wide range of air conditioners that use re frigerants, 
which are not subject to India's reduction and elimination obligation under the Montreal Protocol and 
the regulation of the ozone -depleting substance, freon gas, under Indian domestic law. Japan calls 
upon India to proceed with the early withdr awal of this measure. If India considers the measure to 
be justified, Japan would like India to explain its reasons  more specifically . 
11.4.   The delegate of India indicated the following:  
11.5.   The measure in question was necessary for the application of standards and  regulations for 
marketing of the item. Besides reducing risks to human, animal and plant life and health, it is 
consistent with India's commitment to the Montreal Protocol. Further, as per the Ozone -Depleting 
Substances (Regulation and Control) Amendment Rules  2014, the import of air conditioners 
containing Group  VI substances (HCFCs) is prohibited since 1  July 2015.  
11.6.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
12  MEXICO – CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT PROCEDURE FOR CHEESE UNDER MEXICAN 
OFFICIAL STANDARD NOM -223-SCFI/SAGARPA -2018 – REQUEST FROM THE UNITED 
STATES  
12.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been included in the agenda at the request of the 
United States.  
12.2.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
12.3.   The United States raise s its concerns over Mexico's NOM -223 – Cheese conformity assessment 
procedures, a measure that may very soon be finalized. The US  concern is three -fold. First and 
foremost, NOM -223 contains a conformity assessment scheme that includes the following: 
(i) third-party testing of cheese with an annual production facility inspection, traceability, and 
post-market surveillance performed by a third -party certification body; or (ii)  batch -by-batch testing 
at the border to determine the quality of cheese products wit h the objective of providing better 
information to consumers. Such a scheme may be overly trade restrictive. Providing information to 
consumers about cheese quality is a low -risk undertaking, and the United States and industry are 
concerned that Mexico's s cheme may not be proportional to those risks, and that Mexico does not 
appear to have fully considered available alternatives to meet consumer needs. The United States 
requests Mexico to halt the finalization of the regulation and to consider the alternati ves previously 
proposed by government and industry stakeholders, including the use of standards of identity, 
labelling, or suppliers' declarations of conformity, to demonstrate the completion of third -party test 
procedures.  Second, cheese made from animal fat will have to undergo these burdensome testing 
and certification requirements, while cheese produced from vegetable fat will not. Please explain the 
reasoning for the difference in treatment of these products. The third US  concern relates to whether 
Mexico has taken comments from WTO  Members and stakeholders into account. Stakeholders had 
provided input into a draft in the working group, which concluded in September  2020, and the final 
draft is significantly different from the draft agreed to by that wor king group. The US asks Mexico 
to suspend the draft and reconsider the less trade restrictive alternatives presented by industry and 
other WTO  stakeholders.  
12.4.   The delegate of Mexico  indicated the following:  
12.5.   The delegation of Mexico welcomes the comments shar ed by the delegation of the United  
States on the conformity assessment procedure applicable to Mexican Official Standard  223 on 
cheese, which, as Mexico has mentioned on previous occasions, seeks to address issues that have 
been identified in the verificat ion processes carried out at points of sale to the final consumer in the 
Mexican market with regard to consumer information. In order to prevent deceptive practices, and 
on the basis of cases of non -compliance detected in products of both domestic and fore ign 
manufacture, it is of utmost importance to demonstrate the compliance of any product bearing the 
name "cheese" with the applicable technical regulation. The Mexican authorities are currently 
analysing this procedure in a comprehensive manner, so that t he requirements envisaged, including 
compliance with international commitments, ensure that products bearing the name "cheese" 
marketed in national territory comply fully with the applicable technical regulation, and that Mexican 
consumers are not offered any misleading products. Given the above, the delegation of Mexico G/C/M/139  
 
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  reiterates its willingness to clarify any doubts that Members may have on this procedure and 
undertakes to report on any progress made through the TBT  Committee and the relevant contact 
points. 
12.6.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
13  EUROPEAN UNION – SWEDEN'S DISCRIMINATORY MARKET ACCESS PROHIBITION ON 
5G EQUIPMENT – REQUEST FROM CHINA  
13.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been included in the agenda at the request of 
China.  
13.2.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
13.3.   China would like to raise its concerns over Sweden's measure prohibiting China's companies 
from participating in Sweden's 5G  construction. On 20  October  2020, the Swedish Post and Telecom 
Authority (PTS) set the l icence conditions regarding the process of its 5G  frequency auction, which 
clearly stipulate that new installations and new implementation of central functions for radio use in 
frequency bands must not be carried out with products from the suppliers H uawei  and ZTE. In 
addition, the products of H uawei  and ZTE in the existing infrastructure must be removed by 2025. 
China also takes note that the decision made by PTS has already been implemented, in 
January  2021, despite the relevant legal cases still ongoing in Sweden. China is deeply concerned 
about th is measure, which China thinks is groundless, discriminatory, and inconsistent with 
WTO rules.  
13.4.   China noted that the decision of the PTS is based on the assessments made by the Swedish 
Armed Forces and the Swedish Security Service. However, PTS has neither disclosed the content of 
the assessment and relevant evidence, nor consulted or informed H uawei , ZTE, and other 
stakeholders before taking the decision. China is of the view that this non -transparent decision 
violates both WTO  rules and the domestic laws a nd regulations of Sweden. In fact, H uawei  and ZTE 
have been operating in Sweden for more than 20  years, and no security concerns regarding their 
products have ever been raised before. It is also worth noting that Ericsson's CEO has criticized 
Sweden's deci sion to ban H uawei  and ZTE. He said that, "[F]or Ericsson and Sweden, we are built 
on free trade, [and] it is important that we have open markets and free competition".  
13.5.   In contrast to Sweden's discriminatory treatment towards H uawei  and ZTE, China's market  
has always been open to Sweden's telecommunications companies, such as Ericsson. Recently, the 
company's CEO also said that, "[I]n China we have a larger share of 5G than we had of 4G, so that 
is also driving our growth". China requests Sweden to stop its  erroneous practice  immediately, and 
instead to provide a fair, transparent, and non -discriminatory environment for Chinese companies 
operating in Sweden.  
13.6.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
13.7.   This item is on the agenda of a WTO  body for the first  time. The EU would like to thank China 
for the bilateral discussions that have taken place in Geneva prior to this meeting. The EU notes that 
the matter raised by China in relation to the recent Swedish 5G  spectrum auction is currently subjec t 
to legal proceedings in Sweden. In light of these ongoing proceedings, the EU will not enter into 
details on this issue in the Council today.  
13.8.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
14  EUROPEAN UNION – QUALITY SCHEMES FOR AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS AND 
FOODSTUFFS – THE REGISTRATION OF CERTAIN TERMS OF CHEESE AS GEOGRAPHICAL 
INDICATIONS – REQUEST FROM URUGUAY  
14.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been included in the agenda at the request of 
Uruguay.  
14.2.   The delegate of Uruguay  indicated the following:  G/C/M/139  
 
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  14.3.   Uruguay regrets to include this item again in the agenda and wishes to refer to previous 
statements6, reaffirming its concern over the decision of the European Union to register the term  
"Danbo" as a protected geographical indication despite the objections t o this decision raised by many 
Members. From a systemic point of view, it is a source of concern that recognized international 
regulations and standards are disregarded, as is the potential impact on the value of standardization 
and harmonization efforts w ithin the framework of Codex. Also, from the point of view of trade, 
Uruguay is concerned about the creation of restrictions and uncertainty, as well as the potential 
frustration of legitimate expectations of producers operating under internationally agree d standards. 
Uruguay would like to recall the questions it raised at previous meetings of this Council regarding 
the practical implementation of EU  legislation on quality schemes for agricultural products and 
foodstuffs, to which Uruguay has not yet receiv ed a response. Lastly, Uruguay would like to urge 
the EU to respect the provisions and international standards of the Codex Alimentarius,  and to 
reconsider its regulatory approach in order to avoid the creation and proliferation of unnecessary 
restrictions  on international trade in cheese.  
14.4.   The delegate of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
14.5.   New Zealand is raising this item in the Goods Council because it sees a conflict in the positions 
that the EU has taken in standard -setting bodies and the actions that they have taken ex post facto  
to restrict the labelling within the EU of products produced using those standards by producers 
outside of Denmark. This does not relate solely to grounds for granting or denying IP  protection, but 
relates also to the importan ce of legal consistency, upholding internationally agreed standards, and 
not frustrating the legitimate expectations of businesses operating within those standards. New 
Zealand remains concerned that the European Commission has chosen to register the terms  "Danbo" 
and "Havarti", despite having previously agreed to a Codex standard in which the European 
Commission and Denmark both acknowledged that "the country of origin statement preserves its 
generic nature". Such actions will negatively affect producers o utside Denmark who have invested 
with the legitimate expectations that they could use the standard. The EU's approach to registering 
cheese names for which there are existing Codex  standards shows disregard for the integrity of the 
standards -setting system  that promotes reliability and consistency in international trade rules, which 
New Zealand would expect the EU to support.  
14.6.   The delegate of Argentina  indicated the following:  
14.7.   Argentina would like to register its support on this trade concern and thanks Urug uay for 
having kept it on the Council's agenda. Argentina also wishes to reiterate that the Codex standard 
for Danbo cheese is the international standard of reference regarding the identity and quality of this 
product in relation to the TBT  Agreement. Bein g the international standard of reference regarding 
the identity and quality of "Danbo" cheese, no country that bases its technical regulations on the 
said standard should encounter trade restrictions due to a misappropriation of this term. Argentina 
believes that this misappropriation of the internationally regulated name of a product has analogies 
to the panel report that concluded against the EU, in EC – Sardines . Even when the elements are 
different, both cases have an international reference standard o f identity and quality of the Codex 
Alimentarius that establish the generic name of the product. As it mentioned at the Council's previous 
meeting, Argentina does not understand the point of dedicating efforts to multilaterally agree on a 
Codex standard on  "Danbo" cheese if the use of this term will then be the exclusive privilege of 
Danish producers. In essence, registering the term "Danbo" as a geographical indication constitutes 
an undue restriction on the international trade in such cheese. In any case,  as Argentina has stated 
on previous occasions, Argentina's concerns are not purely commercial but also encompass systemic 
aspects, in particular the impact on international harmonization efforts.  
14.8.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
14.9.   The EU has had the opportunity to explain its approach on many occasions, which remain 
relevant.7 The EU has consistently said that the fact that a GI name is subject to a specific Codex 
Alimentarius standard, or that it is listed in Annex  B to the Stresa Convention, does not imply that 
the name should be considered as a common or generic term. Generi c status in the EU can only be 
assessed with regard to the perception of the consumers in the EU  territory. In the EU, the relevant 
public is comprised mainly of the reasonably well -informed members of the public and/or customers 
 
6 See, for example, document  G/C/M/138, paragraphs  23.2-23.5. 
7 See, for example, document  G/C/M/138, paragraphs  23.15 -23.17.  G/C/M/139  
 
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  who may purchase the produ ct or a like product. Regulation (EU) No.  1151/2012 on quality schemes 
for agricultural products and foodstuffs, as well as subsequent delegated and implementing acts, 
were notified to the WTO under the TBT  Agreement as they contain provisions relevant to the 
TBT Agreement (for example, provisions relating to technical standards, definitions, and labelling 
issues). Nevertheless, even if intellectual property rights (in particular, elements relating to the 
substantive protection of geographical indications) are part of the notified measures, these are not 
relevant for TBT  purposes.  
14.10.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
15  CHINA – MEASURES RESTRICTING THE IMPORT OF SCRAP MATERIALS – REQUEST 
FROM THE UNITED STATES (G/C/W/790)  
15.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been included in the agenda at the request of the 
United States.  
15.2.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
15.3.   It is unfortunate that the United States must again reiterate its concerns, as expressed 
previously in t his and many other WTO  bodies, regarding the negative trade and environmental 
impacts resulting from China's import ban, and accompanying measures, on certain recovered 
materials. The United States has circulated a set of written questions and requests tha t China provide 
written responses. As the United States has noted previously, in April  2020, China approved a 
revised Law on Prevention and Control of Environmental Pollution by Solid Wastes. As the United  
States has indicated before in the CTG and in othe r bodies, these policy measures seem to contradict 
China's own pro -circular economy narrative that it is promoting in the WTO and internationally. 
China is the world's largest processor of scrap materials, and these measures hinder China's 
aspirations to t ransition to a more resource -efficient, global, circular economy by directly affecting 
global recycling networks.  
15.4.   The United States is very concerned with the overly broad scope of "solid waste", as it appears 
in the revised Law, which has resulted in an i mport ban on certain plastic and paper scrap, which 
are recyclable materials. The United States understands that certain recyclable scrap materials such 
as bundled newspaper have been banned, whereas other more processed "recycled raw materials", 
such as c opper, aluminium, and brass, are allowed as long as those materials meet strict purity 
standards. The United States would like to reiterate its request that China explain the scientific bases 
that it has used to determine which categories of scrap material s it will allow to be imported. These 
abrupt restrictions and bans have left recyclers without viable alternative processing capacity, and 
the global shortfall in processing capacity has also caused the decline, and in some cases, collapse, 
in prices for s ome recyclable materials.  
15.5.   Further, the United States is concerned that these policies are detrimental to our shared 
environment and have resulted in an increased volume of scrap materials going into landfills, or 
other less desirable waste channels, and be coming marine litter. The United States reiterates its 
request that China immediately revise the relevant measures in a manner consistent with existing 
international standards for trade in scrap materials, which provide a global framework for 
transparent a nd environmentally sound trade in recyclable commodities.  
15.6.   The delegate of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
15.7.   New Zealand acknowledges and supports the right of all WTO  Members to regulate to achieve 
legitimate domestic health and environmental objectives . New Zealand applauds China's stated 
proactive policy objectives in relation to sustainable development and encourages valid actions to 
limit harmful environmental impacts from contaminated waste inside its borders. New Zealand in no 
way seeks to question  China's right to regulate to protect its environment. However, New Zealand 
remains concerned that vanadium slag is included in China's catalogue of banned imports under this 
measure. New Zealand reiterates its view that vanadium slag is a purposefully pro duced co -product 
with a purposeful end -use in the production of specific forms of steel. It is not a waste product and 
so should not fall under measures for solid waste. New Zealand understands that China itself is the 
largest global producer of vanadium s lag, and that its production has reportedly increased over 30% 
since 2018.  G/C/M/139  
 
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  15.8.   New Zealand would appreciate clarification on how China has ensured that the rules that apply 
to foreign products are no less favourable than those accorded to domestic products. Ne w Zealand 
would also be interested to hear a further explanation from China on how it has ensured that the 
import ban on vanadium slag is not more trade restrictive than necessary to achieve China's 
environmental and health protection objectives. New Zeala nd thanks China for its recent 
engagement on this issue, including bilaterally and at the TBT  Committee, and looks forward to 
further constructive engagement on this topic to better understand China's approach to 
distinguishing between waste and non -waste materials.  
15.9.   The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
15.10.   Canada continues to share the concerns of the United States and would like to reiterate its 
comments on China's restrictions with respect to solid waste from past CTG  meetings.8 Canada does 
not wi sh to dispute China's goal of limiting harmful environmental impacts resulting from 
contaminated waste material. However, Canada notes that high -quality scrap products are a 
valuable raw material for Chinese customers involved in various manufacturing sect ors and a key 
component of a strong circular economy that ultimately helps to reduce waste.  
15.11.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
15.12.   China is still working on the questions that were submitted by the United States. China would 
like to provide its pre liminary responses at this meeting. Since 1  January  2021, China has 
implemented its import prohibition on solid waste according to China's law on the prevention and 
control of environmental pollution by solid waste and relevant regulations, with the aim of  effectively 
protecting people's health, ensuring ecosystem safety, and enhancing the treatment of domestic 
solid waste. As there is no internationally agreed definition and standard on what constitutes solid 
waste, the definition and the coverage China us es in the law and regulations on solid waste is based 
on the Basel Convention. China's relevant laws and regulations also stipulate that, if the solid waste, 
after being properly treated, is not hazardous to people's health and the environment, and complie s 
with the national mandatory quality standards of the relevant products, it will not be considered as 
solid waste, and can be managed and traded as normal goods. The relevant rules equally apply to 
domestic and international trade. China has published the  national quality standards for recycling 
materials for brass, copper, cast aluminium alloys, and iron and steel materials, and is working on 
the relevant standards for recycling paper pulp. WTO  Members may export the recycling materials 
to China in the no rmal way after ensuring that the solid waste is not hazardous and that it meets 
China's quality standards for the relevant products.  
15.13.   China would like to reiterate that the relevant measures taken by China are fully in line with 
its circular economy policy.  The measures not only support environmental protection in developing 
the circular economy, they also promote the utilization of domestic and international recycling 
materials. China urges the major solid waste exporting Members to reduce the solid waste a t the 
source and to shoulder their international responsibilities to handle and dispose of their own solid 
waste rather than exporting millions of tonnes of solid wastes to other Members, in particular 
developing Members, which already lack capacity to mee t environmental challenges.  
15.14.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
16  EUROPEAN UNION – IMPLEMENTATION OF NON -TARIFF BARRIERS ON 
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM AUSTRALIA, BRAZIL, CANADA, COLOMBIA, 
COSTA RICA, CÔTE D'IVOIRE, ECUADOR, GUATEMALA, HON DURAS, JAMAICA, PANAMA, 
PARAGUAY, PERU, THE UNITED STATES, AND URUGUAY (G/C/W/767/REV.1)  
16.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been included in the agenda at the request of 
Australia, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Ecuador, Guat emala, Honduras, 
Jamaica, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the United States, and Uruguay . 
16.2.   The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
 
8 See, for example, document  G/C/M/138, paragraphs  12.6-12.7. G/C/M/139  
 
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  16.3.   Australia, as a co -sponsor of this paper, again highlights its ongoing concerns in relation to 
the EU's non -tariff barriers  on agricultural products, including agricultural chemical regulations and 
policy, and the potential negative effect on farmers and trade. Australia has also previously raised 
its concerns about the EU's risk assessment and import tolerance setting policie s in this Council, as 
well as in the TBT and SPS  Committees. Australia welcomes the unofficial room document, 
document  RD/CTG/12, which highlights the range of SPS and TBT  specific trade concerns raised 
against the EU. Australia raised or supported a numbe r of these specific trade concerns, including at 
the most recent SPS and TBT  Committee meetings. This shows the strong level of interest in the 
EU measures and the concerns of a broad cross -section of Members. While Australia recognizes the 
right of WTO  Members to regulate agricultural and other chemicals in a manner that protects animal, 
plant and human health, and the environment, Members are also bound by their WTO  obligations, 
in particular in relation to undertaking science -based risk assessments and e nsuring that measures 
are not more trade -restrictive than necessary.  
16.4.   Australia questions the EU's approach to the approval and renewal of plant protection product 
authorizations and import tolerance limits that relies primarily on hazard -based assessment. In doing 
so, it is unclear how the EU  hazard -based assessment is consistent with internationally agreed risk 
assessment standards for import tolerances. Australia continues to seek clarification on how the EU 
determines hazards to consumers of treated prod uce and would welcome discussion on the risk 
assessments that underpin EU  decisions on import tolerances. Australia also seeks greater clarity 
from the EU on how hazards of a substance are differentiated in terms of the substance's use in a 
production syst em compared with presence in consumed produce. Australia is looking for the EU to 
substantially engage on these long -running issues with Australia and other Members.  
16.5.   The delegate of Peru indicated the following:  
16.6.   The delegation of Peru thanks Paraguay and t he other delegations that requested this item to 
be placed on the Council's agenda. Peru shares the concerns raised in document  G/C/W/767/Rev.1 
relating to the policies implemented by the European Union over the past few years, which deviate 
from the provi sions of the SPS  Agreement, especially Article  5 thereof. This is because some of the 
EU measures are not based on a risk analysis but instead reflect a hazard -based approach, which in 
practice translates into more restrictive measures than necessary. Peru  wishes to emphasize that it 
has submitted its trade concerns on these issues within the framework of the SPS  Committee, 
without obtaining a satisfactory response from the EU to date. In this regard, Peru would like to 
emphasize the need to work together, so that the concerns are addressed in a specific way and take 
account of the needs that countries may have. Lastly, Peru reiterates the importance of complying 
with the provisions of the SPS  Agreement, especially those relating to risk assessment, in order  to 
avoid further barriers to trade.  
16.7.   The delegate of Colombia  indicated the following:  
16.8.   For more than three  years, Colombia, like other Members, has been raising this trade concern 
in many WTO  Committees and forums. It has also done so in various spaces for  bilateral dialogue. 
Colombia would have preferred no t to have to repeat its earlier statements but, unfortunately, the 
concern is not only persisting but also aggravating. Colombia fully shares the European Union's 
environmental objectives. However, there are increasing drawbacks and barriers in the EU's set  of 
policies and practices which have made it difficult, and which will make it increasingly difficult, for 
agricultural products to enter into the common market. Colombia has raised, on previous occasions, 
several points of concern, to which new concerns have now been added. Colombia will now provide 
a summary and brief explanation of these concerns and respond to the arguments heard earlier.  
16.9.   First, the health measures that are of concern are not based on a "risk assessment" that takes 
into account both th e harm caused by, and the result of exposure to, the active substance. It has 
been said on previous occasions that the establishment of a maximum residue level (MRL) in the 
European Union does involve a risk analysis. The main problem, however, is that the  risk analysis is 
absent at a much earlier stage, from the beginning of the process, when the renewal of the marketing 
authorization for a substance is requested. It is at this point that things diverge, as this is precisely 
where the European Union appear s not to carry out a risk analysis of the substance. From this point 
onwards, the other steps are merely natural consequences of the first  decision taken.  G/C/M/139  
 
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  16.10.   Second, the SPS  Agreement requires Members to base their specific MRLs on those agreed 
under the Code x, and to carry out individual risk assessments only exceptionally. The figures 
submitted by the European Union itself show that its MRLs deviate 30% from those of Codex 
Standards. This is exacerbated by the fact that the 30% includes many of the plant pro tection 
products that are used particularly for tropical agricultural products.  
16.11.   Third, these measures involve discriminatory practices on several levels. For example, the 
same substance when applied to products produced in the EU, such as oranges, is given different 
treatment from when it is applied to products produced in the tropics, such as bananas, and the 
arguments that are provided are anything but convincing. Furthermore, emergency mechanisms to 
combat pests for which there are no available alte rnatives are considered only for EU  member 
countries, and there is no parallel mechanism for other Members. The consequence of this differential 
treatment is that European citizens can consume those substances that the EU considers to be 
dangerous, as a pr ecaution, only when they are used on EU  soil (for oranges and beets), but not 
when the substances come from abroad.  
16.12.   Fourth, these problems are linked to a subsidy issue. The European Union has a Just 
Transition Mechanism (JTM) to offset the costs of the pr oposed transition. According to the EU's 
figures, the JTM will provide specific support to the amount of at least EUR  100 billion to mitigate 
the socio -economic impact of the transition. Moreover, the Union has calculated the cost for each 
farmer, per hect are, of the transformation required to implement only some of these measures, and, 
based on that amount, has calculated the necessary subsidies. Countries like Colombia simply do 
not have the financial capacity to provide this type of support. The EU's eno rmous capacity to 
subsidize its producers, coupled with the above -mentioned non -tariff restrictions, skews the playing 
field, to the detriment of Colombia's farmers.  
16.13.   Fifth, Colombia is also faced with an issue of good regulatory practices. Colombia regrets  the 
EU's lack of transparency during the internal process for the renewal of substances, during which 
spaces for intervention by stakeholders are non -existent or are simply considered as a formality to 
be completed. The measures are notified to the WTO wh en they are already fully defined, following 
an internal process carried out in the EU with no consultation with any interested external 
stakeholder. The natural consequence of this is that the resulting measures are neither proportionate 
nor transparent.  
16.14.   Sixth, the relationship between policy objectives and measures is far from direct or simple: 
environmental objectives are not a direct cause of the elimination of pesticides, as the European 
policy suggests. In fact, the disappearance of pesticides could e asily lead to a need for larger areas 
of cultivation. The data for the EU indicate that reductions in the use of phytosanitary substances 
lead to a decrease in production and harvests of 7% to 12% for European farmers. This probable 
reduction in harvests i s likely to encourage land conversion in Europe and other latitudes, and 
therefore it cannot be ruled out that the overall effect of the entire policy may erase the alleged 
environmental gains that justify it.  
16.15.   Seventh, Colombia is concerned about the growi ng wall that it is facing. Although these  
concerns are serious, legitimate, and shared by countries on all continents, the response has only 
been "this is the way forward, end of story". Despite the goodwill of some EU  officials in Geneva and 
Brussels, the  political wall is insurmountable: "this is the way forward, end of story". Evidence of 
this, as demonstrated by the room document submitted, is the ever -increasing and already 
disproportionate space that these specific trade concerns are taking up on the agendas of the 
technical committees, and the inability to resolve them and remove them from the agendas of those 
committees. Unfortunately, the European Union does not seem to have any legitimate interest in 
addressing these concerns. There is a very power ful electoral benefit that outweighs and negates 
any discussion of the health, environmental , and trade benefits of these measures.  
16.16.   In conclusion, Colombia believes that the European Union's set of policies and practices 
carries the risk of nullifying and undermining the legitimate rights of WTO  Members that have signed 
the Agreement on Agriculture and the SPS  Agreement. Members should be more concerned about 
the current good level of trade. For these reasons, Colombia will continue to call for a dialogue t hat 
allows Colombia to raise its concerns candidly and constructively and explore alternative solutions. 
Colombia believes that a constructive, serious, and ongoing dialogue, in conjunction with mutually 
agreed technical assistance, will allow us to reach mutually beneficial solutions, within the general 
spirit of partnership that characterizes Colombia's relationship with the EU. The most important thing G/C/M/139  
 
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  now, beyond specific requests, is to break through the wall and find a willingness to really sit down 
and address these concerns.  
16.17.   The delegate of Uruguay  indicated the following:  
16.18.   The non -tariff policies and measures of the European Union affecting trade in agricultural 
products have created a large and growing number of specific trade concerns on the part o f various 
Members in the SPS and TBT  Committees, which occupy a large part of the agenda of those bodies, 
as reflected in room document  RD/CTG/12. In this regard, Uruguay wishes to reiterate its trade and 
systemic concerns, particularly regarding the use b y the EU of a hazard -based approach rather than 
complete risk assessments, in its regulatory decisions linked to SPS  matters. Uruguay would like to 
make it clear that any determination in this area, particularly when it deviates from internationally 
accept ed standards and harmonization efforts in multilateral forums such as Codex Alimentarius, 
must be based on a complete scientific assessment of the risks using validated methodologies, in 
line with the provisions of the relevant agreements, and on conclusiv e scientific evidence. This is 
essential to maintain the effective balance that must exist between the right of Members to pursue 
their legitimate objectives and the need to avoid creating unnecessary obstacles to trade. Special 
responsibility lies with th e largest importers of agricultural products to consider the effects that their 
approaches and regulatory determinations, particularly when they are not based on sufficient 
scientific evidence, may have on developing and least developed countries, whose ec onomies rely 
to a large extent on the production and trade of agricultural and agro -industrial products, through 
which they make an invaluable contribution to global food security. In light of the above, Uruguay 
urges the EU to reconsider its regulatory ap proach with a view to avoiding the unjustified 
proliferation of barriers to international trade in agricultural products and the severe socio -economic 
consequences that it may have for other Members, in particular developing and least developed 
countries, for which the European market is of key importance.  
16.19.   The delegate of Paraguay  indicated the following:  
16.20.   Paraguay regrets having to return to this item, but unfortunately, in the absence of 
satisfactory replies from the European Union, Paraguay has no choice.  Since 2020, Paraguay has 
been submitting questions to the European Union on the policies proposed or implemented by the 
EU or its member States, which affect or have the potential to affect trade in agricultural goods. 
During this period, 72  questions wer e submitted to the EU in the context of the SPS  Committee, the 
Committee on Agriculture, and the EU's T PR, which were directly or indirectly related to the creation 
of non -tariff barriers in trade in agricultural goods by the EU. Furthermore, questions hav e been 
posed orally to the EU in the Committees on Market Access, Technical Barriers to Trade, and Trade 
and Environment. This is no small task for a small developing country with resource constraints, 
such as Paraguay. Despite Paraguay's efforts, several of the answers provided by the EU are 
incomplete or do not address the issue in a concrete manner, which is unusual for a delegation that 
is known for promoting transparency in the WTO. These include a request for a single list indicating 
all substances th at are, or that have been, subject to assessment, and their current status, which 
the EU has failed to provide, thus forcing Paraguay to compile the list itself. This list was recently 
circulated in document  RD/SPS/131/Rev.1, the information contained in w hich Paraguay expects at 
least to be confirmed by EU  colleagues. Paraguay has yet to receive a reply to the latest questions 
submitted in writing to the EU before the closing of the SPS  Committee's agenda. In addition to the 
questions raised in Geneva, Par aguay would like to point out that its Mission in Brussels also formally 
submitted questions in writing to the European Commission's Directorate -General for Health and 
Food Safety  (DG SANTE ) on 21  January  2021, to which it has  still not received replies.  
16.21.   The proliferation of non -tariff barriers to trade in agricultural products in the EU is illustrated 
in document  RD/CTG/12, which is co -sponsored by Paraguay, together with other Members. 
Paraguay notes that more than 20% of the trade concerns of the TBT and  SPS Committees are about 
EU policies. In addition, Paraguay would like to point out that, according to 
document  G/SPS/GEN/804/Rev.1, which was prepared by the  Secretariat, the EU is the Member 
with the highest number of trade concerns raised against it in  the SPS  Committee in the history of 
this Organization. The concerns raised generally remain on the agenda for years with no possible 
resolution, due to the lack of political will or flexibility to resolve them. In particular, the inflexibility 
shown by ou r European colleagues with regard to alternatives that take into account the climate and 
geographical conditions and the level of development of their trading partners, or the fact that there 
are sometimes no alternatives on the market, the continued refus als to provide longer transition 
periods, and the uncertainty surrounding the lengthy and costly import tolerance process in the G/C/M/139  
 
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  review of MRLs for plant protection products, has grown in prominence over the past few years in 
both Committees. This inflexib ility is not applied to European producers, who are routinely granted 
emergency authorizations to continue using unauthorized products in the EU, in the absence of 
alternatives on the market, despite the fact that the EU's argument, when denying the reques ts of 
its trading partners, even regarding simpler issues such as higher transitional periods, is that greater 
flexibility would jeopardize the health of its consumers.  
16.22.   It is highly concerning that the European Commissioner for Agriculture publicly stated in 
2020 that he does not believe that the importation of goods produced with plant protection products 
not permitted in the EU should be allowed, which would appear to indicate that the EU does not 
intend to grant import tolerances. These statements are li nked to preserving the competitiveness of 
European products and were delivered in this context. This protection of competitiveness is explicitly 
stated as one of the objectives of the Farm -to-Fork strategy. Both producers and European 
representatives indic ate that such protection would be necessary to level the playing field and 
balance competition, but what they seem to overlook is the fact that agriculture is extremely 
unbalanced because of the high levels of subsidies maintained by some Members, includin g the 
European Union, with total subsidies of over EUR 351 billion per year, according to the amounts 
approved for the latest common agricultural policy (CAP).  Not only is there a notification backlog of 
several years for these subsidies, but their notific ation format and classification are also the subject 
of constant questions and comments in the Committee on Agriculture. Moreover, the EU's clear 
intention to export its standards to third  countries, as expressed in the Farm -to-Fork and Biodiversity 
Strate gies published in May  2020, is also concerning, as these standards are to be applied 
extraterritorially, diverge from international standards, and have no conclusive scientific basis. 
Paraguay has heard pledges of specific cooperation and training for deve loping countries to help 
them adapt and comply with European standards, but to date, all the cooperation programmes 
published by the EU or mentioned in its seminars target some specific regions, but none appear to 
be applicable to Latin American countries.  
16.23.   Before concluding, Paraguay wishes to indicate that the US  Department of Agriculture 
recently published a report on the consequences of the implementation of these strategies within 
the EU, and if implemented by other Members, as indicated in the design o f the strategies. The 
report concludes that such implementation will lead to increased food insecurity in the world as 
production will decline and food prices will rise, with the erosion of the competitiveness of agricultural 
producers, and a decrease in t he GDP of developing countries. The EU has contested these 
assertions, but has so far failed to provide its own impact assessment, which Paraguay also 
requested, without receiving any response. Paraguay reiterates its call to European colleagues for a 
comp rehensive and constructive dialogue, among all interested parties, to seek a joint solution 
together, to find alternatives with which compliance is feasible and which will still allow the European 
Union to pursue legitimate protection objectives in a manne r that is not more trade restrictive than 
necessary, and that takes into account the fact there are different methods of pursuing such 
objectives, rather than a single universally applicable formula for all Members.  
16.24.   The delegate of Brazil  indicated the fol lowing:  
16.25.   The Brazilian co -sponsorship of this agenda item stems from the understanding that the EU's 
position in relation to the definition of MRLs puts at risk the balance established in the 
SPS Agreement between the principle of protection of life and hum an and animal health and the 
guarantee that the market access conditions negotiated multilaterally are not undermined by 
unjustified non -tariff measures. This balance rests on the scientific principle, enshrined in the 
SPS Agreement and materialized throug h risk analysis, which must guide the adoption of 
SPS measures. When prohibitions based on the hazard approach and/or recourse to Article  5.7 of 
the SPS  Agreement become the norm, despite technical advice from renowned institutions, the 
balance tilts towar ds protectionism. This condition of imbalance cannot last.  
16.26.   The document that Brazil co -sponsors shows that this issue is not merely technical or legal. 
European policy implies concrete risks to the maintenance of safe and efficient production systems 
in various regions of the globe. It prevents access to pest control instruments that threaten the 
viability of food production, and discourages scientific research, which would allow access to new 
chemical and biological technologies to combat these pests. Curr ently, it is fashionable to draw 
attention to the risk that climate change may lead to the introduction of new pests, especially in 
areas of temperate agriculture. Without underestimating this risk, it is imperative to remember that 
tropical countries such  as Brazil have always faced these SPS  risks and the success or failure of G/C/M/139  
 
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  agricultural activity depends on access to these technologies. In the case of Brazil, the sustainability 
of several crops is at risk, such as soybeans, citrus fruits, coffee, wheat,  bananas, and papayas, 
which are a source of income and nutrients for a very important portion of the Brazilian and world 
population.  
16.27.   The introduction of these technologies has also led to more sustainable agricultural 
production, as it has made it possibl e to use new practices, such as the no -till system, in several 
countries. It is undisputable that production has become more sustainable, since no -tillage prevents 
soil erosion, reduces water loss through evaporation, increases the level of organic matter in the 
soil, reduces the use of fossil fuels with machinery and equipment, and provides a better balance of 
microbiological properties in soils. It is an essential mechanism for the increase in production from 
increased productivity, and not from the expan sion of the planted area, or deforestation. It is 
worrying that, 25  years after its adoption, the interpretation given to the SPS  Agreement differs 
from the purposes that guided the negotiations during the Uruguay Round. It is also worrying that 
Members ha ve to bring debates of this nature to the CTG in a context in which Brazil has been 
following with concern legislation projects that try to create new non -tariff trade barriers under the 
guise of environmental protection measures.  
16.28.   The delegate of Ecuador  indicated the following:  
16.29.   Ecuador continues to support raising this trade concern because the European Union has not 
taken into account the specific production features of the different regions of the world. The EU 
proposes banning the use of critical tools for pest control, without considering that agricultural 
production conditions vary across regions and what works in Europe may not be appropriate in other 
climates and regions. In addition, the implementation of the proposed measures includes inadequate 
transition periods. Furthermore, the EU's suggestion to seek alternative tools is difficult to implement 
because of limited access to information on replacement substances and on the implementation of 
alternative treatments. Plant protection is essential to ensuring the absence of pests in many 
regions, which in turn increases food quality. Taking unilateral measures that restrict such protection 
without conclusive scientific evidence and at short notice amounts in practice to creating non -tariff 
barriers to trade in agricultural products. As indicated in the trade concern, such measures can 
seriously obstruct the entry of many products into the markets of trading partners.  
16.30.   Room document  RD/CTG/12 further describes this concern. Over the past five  years, 
36 trade concerns have been raised in the SPS  Committee and 27 in the TBT  Committee, all related 
to the adoption of such measures by the EU. This is not an isolated subject. The ongoing presence 
of these concerns on the agendas of the meetings of this Council a nd its subsidiary bodies reflects 
the lack of a real commitment to finding a viable solution for all concerned. Meanwhile, the pandemic 
continues to affect the economies of the world and presents ever growing challenges for small -scale 
agricultural produce rs. Members should make an effort to put themselves in their position and 
imagine how this kind of measure seriously affects their livelihoods and those of the people who 
depend on them. Based on the foregoing, Ecuador refers to its previous statements on the subject9 
and once again urges the EU: (i)  not to adopt restrictive measures without conclusive scientific 
evidence, without an actual increase in the level of health protection , and without taking into account 
the economic and social impact on its tra ding partners in the short, medium, and long term; (ii)  to 
observe the globally recognized international standards on human, plant and animal health 
protection; (iii)  to comply with the requirements established in the WTO  SPS Agreement to take a 
risk asses sment approach to any measure, to minimize the adverse effects of its trade -related 
measures, and to prevent such measures from becoming unjustified barriers to trade; (iv)  to 
consider suspending the ongoing implementation of measures to reduce MRLs and ma intain the 
levels recommended by the Codex Alimentarius; (v)  to grant the necessary adjustment period – of 
at least 36  months – in cases where the reduction of MRLs is shown to be essential; and (vi)  to 
provide additional information on alternatives to the  contested substances.  
16.31.   The delegate of India indicated the following:  
16.32.   India also thanks the proponents of this agenda item. India echoes the concerns raised by 
other Members relating to the implementation of non -tariff barriers on agricultural products by the 
European Union. These measures effectively  prohibit the use of a n umber of substances that are 
required for safe and sustainable agricultural production, and which have been assessed and 
 
9 See, for example, document  G/C/M/138, paragraphs  18.14 -18.16.  G/C/M/139  
 
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  authorized for use by many WTO  Members. In this context, India would like to reiterate its trade as 
well as systemic concerns. This haz ard-based measure by the EU is significantly impacting the trade 
from developing countries, including India. It also lacks transparency, hindering predictability for 
exporters. India would urge the EU to avoid such unnecessary barriers to trade and to find  a mutually 
acceptable solution to this issue, through dialogue with Members, as early as possible.  
16.33.   The delegate of Jamaica  indicated the following:  
16.34.   Jamaica joins other co -sponsors in expressing its concerns over an approach in which certain 
non-tariff mea sures are adopted. While Jamaica believes that WTO  Members are within their rights 
to adopt measures to protect the environment, as well as their population's health, safety, and 
welfare, those rights should be balanced by Members' responsibilities in rela tion to WTO  rules and 
the Multilateral Trading System. Jamaica is of the view that measures adopted should be in 
accordance with WTO  rules and practices, should be proportionate to the objectives sought, should 
stand up to independent scientific scrutiny, should accommodate the capacity constraints of 
developing countries and their vulnerable exporters, and, importantly, should not be a disguised 
restriction on trade. For Jamaica, the issue at hand is a systemic one. Jamaica already faces capacity 
constrain ts in its bid to take advantage of the opportunities to be derived from the export of 
agricultural products. These measures are yet another layer of restrictions faced by Jamaica's 
producers who export the relevant products to the EU  market. Small and vuln erable economies, 
such as that of Jamaica, with less resourced treasuries, do not have the resources to offset exporters ' 
losses induced by these measures. Furthermore, Jamaica's farmers are disadvantaged by the lack 
of an adequate transition period for im plementation. The measures have negative implications for 
the development of Jamaica's agricultural sector, rural development objectives, and job creation and 
foreign exchange -earning targets. Jamaica urges Members adopting certain measures to bear in 
mind their implications and the unbearable compliance burden they present for small, resource -poor 
farmers and small businesses, who are already at a competitive disadvantage in global markets.  
16.35.   The delegate of Costa Rica  indicated the following:  
16.36.   As a co -sponso r of this agenda item and joint communication  G/C/W/767, and the  revision 
thereof, G/C/W/767/Rev.1, previously submitted in this Council, Costa Rica wishes to reaffirm the 
importance of this topic. As Costa Rica has highlighted on previous occasions, this concern is shared 
by a large number of Members of this Organization, mostly developing and least developed countries. 
Costa Rica's technical concerns are well  known, having been put forward in the SPS  Committee, in 
the TBT  Committee, and, since June last y ear, in this Council. Costa Rica continues to have multiple 
concerns regarding the scientific soundness of the EU's MRL  assessments and what, in Costa Rica's 
view, is a hazard -based approach, rather than one based on risk. The reduction of MRLs without 
sufficient scientific evidence restricts access to critical substances for agricultural production, 
particularly in countries with a tropical climate, such as Costa Rica. Moreover, it generates additional 
costs and increases the risk of pests emerging and hav ing an impact on production and export 
capacity. While Costa Rica agrees with the EU's goal of supporting the global transition to more 
sustainable world agri -food systems, Costa Rica is of the view that the fulfilment of this goal must 
be based on buildin g solutions designed and implemented through dialogue mechanisms and 
multilateral cooperation frameworks. Costa Rica urges the EU once again to listen to the legitimate 
concerns of dozens of WTO  Members and establish a mechanism for dialogue and evaluation  of its 
policies on MRLs that takes into consideration and effectively addresses Members' systemic and 
trade -related concerns. Costa Rica is sure that, through increased and better -quality  multilateral 
dialogue, Members can find solutions together that wil l enable them to progress towards mutually 
beneficial trade.  
16.37.   The delegate of Argentina  indicated the following:  
16.38.   Argentina would like to thank those Members that again raised this concern regarding the 
proliferation of non -tariff barriers to trade in agricultural products by the European Union. Argentina 
is particularly concerned that the EU applies measures that effectively prohibit the use of a number 
of substances that are required for safe and sustainable agricultural pr oduction, a use that has been 
tested and authorized by many WTO  Members. As other Members have already highlighted, this 
claim has been repeatedly expressed in the SPS and TBT  Committees, emphasizing the 
disproportionate impact of these measures in the tra de in agricultural products. Argentina fully 
supports and reiterates the arguments, concerns, and requests made to the European Union in 
document  G/C/W/767/Rev.1, and those that several Members have expressed today, and urges the G/C/M/139  
 
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  EU to take them into accou nt. Argentina asks the EU to provide additional information on the process 
and timelines for establishing import tolerances for active substances whose authorization is not 
renewed by the EU, as well as on the applicable transition periods for MRLs. In add ition, Argentina 
requests that the EU establish a transparent, predictable, and commercially viable import tolerance 
process for plant protection products whose authorization has not been renewed, including a risk 
assessment taking into account the risk as sessment techniques developed by the competent 
international organizations.  
16.39.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
16.40.   The United States continues to be concerned about the European Union's implementation of 
non-tariff barriers on agricultu ral products. Increasingly the EU is developing rigid polices with 
extraterritorial implications that force third  countries to adopt European production practices or to 
abandon trade. The EU continues to lower many MRLs to trade -restrictive levels without clear 
scientific justification or measurable benefit to human health. The EU's hazard -based approach to 
pesticide regulation may lead to trade barriers that threaten the security of global food systems. The 
United States recalls its concerns on these matte rs as set out in documents  G/SPS/GEN/1858, 
G/SPS/GEN/1802, G/SPS/GEN/1750 , and G/SPS/GEN/1749, as presented to the SPS  Committee.  
Further, the EU enforces new reduced MRLs at the point of production for domestic goods, but at 
the point of importation for i mported goods. This causes trade inefficiencies and disruptions for 
products destined for the EU  market depending on when a new reduced MRL is enforced and results 
in both an inconsistent application of the SPS  measure and an unfair advantage for EU  produc ers, 
especially for products with long shelf lives.  
16.41.   The United States is also increasingly concerned with the politicization of EU  pesticides 
polices, particularly as evidenced in the EU's Farm -to-Fork Strategy, Biodiversity Strategy, and the 
Pesticide Regulatory Fitness and Performance Programme (REFIT) . Further, it appears as though the 
EU is following a similar approach through its new veterinary drug legislation that could prohibit 
producers from using for growth promotion antimicrobials that are not co nsidered medically 
important. The United States recalls its concerns, as raised in document  G/SPS/GEN/1811, that 
these prescriptive restrictions will apply  to foreign producers shipping animals and animal products 
to the EU. The EU has also not clarified h ow risk assessment will be used to inform its import polices. 
The United States urges the EU to consider the needs of agricultural producers and both recognize 
and respect the level of protection provided by national regulatory systems as the EU works to 
implement its own system. The international community should be working together to support 
science -based measures that promote a safe and sustainable food supply. The United States calls 
on the EU to join with its trading partners in identifying such mutua lly beneficial solutions.  
16.42.   The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
16.43.   As noted in previous interventions on this subject, most recently at the June and 
November  2020 Council meetings, Canada emphasizes the need for transparency and predictability 
in international trade. In accordance with the WTO  Agreements, Canada continues to recognize 
Members' rights to adopt measures to achieve legitimate objectives and to apply the food safety 
measures deemed necessary to protect human health. However, such measure s must be 
implemented in a transparent manner that does not unjustifiably restrict international trade. This 
Communication highlights Members' shared need for greater transparency and predictability around 
the EU's approach to approving and renewing plant protection product authorizations, as well as 
Members' shared concerns about the impact this approach is having on trade in food. Canada 
acknowledges the EU's recent efforts to clarify the process for establishing import tolerances. In 
particular, Canada t hanks the EU for hosting seminars with third  countries and stakeholders in 
January. Canada appreciated the information shared and the opportunity to participate and ask 
questions.  
16.44.   Canada shares the EU's ambitions relating to health, safety, and environment al protection 
with a view to making the agriculture sector more sustainable and adaptable. That said, for this to 
work in practice, such frameworks must be predictable and based on thorough scientific analysis 
and risk assessments that reflect the specific  realities at the national and regional levels. Canada is 
pleased that the EU intends to conduct risk assessments for all import tolerance requests and that 
such requests will be impartially reviewed in accordance with internationally -accepted risk 
assessm ent principles and EU  legislation. While Canada recognizes that the EU has a process for 
import tolerances, Canada also requests that the EU consider maintaining MRLs for substances that G/C/M/139  
 
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  do not pose unacceptable dietary risks. Along with minimizing disrupt ions to trade, this would 
eliminate the need for import tolerance requests for some substances. Canada also urges the EU to 
take into account the timelines necessary for practical decision -making by farmers and producers, 
as well as the time and effort req uired to bring products to market, particularly in the global trade 
context.  
16.45.   Canada understands that environmental considerations with a global reach will be included 
as a factor in future assessment of import tolerances. Canada would note that including 
environmental considerations as part of the import tolerance assessment does not align with relevant 
international guidance. Consequently, Canada looks forward to receiving further information from 
the EU as to the scientific justification for including env ironmental considerations in the import 
tolerance assessment process for pesticides, as they are established for the protection of human 
health from food safety risk. In closing, Canada hopes that reiterating its concerns here in the CTG 
serves as a clear indication of the importance that Canada, and many WTO  Members, attribute to 
seeking enhanced transparency and predictability for trade.  
16.46.   The delegate of Côte d'Ivoire  indicated the following:  
16.47.   The delegation of Côte d'Ivoire supports document  G/C/W/767/Rev. 1 because the European  
Union's SPS  measures are disproportionately affecting its producers and exporters of fruits and 
vegetables. This is why the Exporters' Association of Côte d'Ivoire, as well as those of other countries 
in the region, has been trying t o get in touch with the authorities in Brussels for a dialogue, as yet 
unsuccessfully. Côte d'Ivoire has also written a letter directly to the WTO in order to try to find a 
solution to the problems faced by producers given the European Union's policies in determining MRLs 
in relation to certain pesticides. This is why Côte d'Ivoire encourages the EU to review its 
hazard -based approach for the authorization of these types of products. Côte d'Ivoire sincerely 
encourages the EU to adopt a risk -based approach i n accordance with international practices. 
Côte d'Ivoire is very concerned by this issue because it is a largely agricultural country, the economic 
policy of which is based on agri -food production. Since the EU is its major trade partner, Côte  d'Ivoire 
believes that the EU should be in a position to help developing countries such as Côte  d'Ivoire in this 
area. Setting these barriers prevents our countries from getting access to the EU's markets.  
16.48.   The delegate of Panama  indicated the following:  
16.49.   Given the time  constraints, Panama just wishes to express its support for the concern s raised 
by the co -sponsors under this agenda item. Panama considers that these concerns have been made 
very clear in this and other forums.  
16.50.   The delegate of Chile indicated the followin g: 
16.51.   Chile congratulate s the Colombian and Paraguayan delegates for explaining well the problem 
at issue , as well as the long list of other Members that have taken the floor. Although this is not the 
first time that the issue is being raised in the CTG, clearly it is an important one and discussing these 
trade concerns is the essence of multilateralism. The issue is not about impeding the EU to meet its 
objectives, but it is for the EU to respect the rules of the game in doing so. Chile urges the EU to 
pay attention to all the comments and concerns that have been raised. Chile supports the concerns 
expressed by a number of delegations regarding the measures taken by the EU and requests further 
information on the scientific risk analysis on the basis of which these measures were adopted.  
16.52.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
16.53.   The European U nion takes note of the concerns expressed. The European Union provided a 
detailed reply to these concerns at the CTG  meeting in November  2020.10 The European Union has 
also provided detailed explanations to all specific trade concerns raised against the Eu ropean Union 
and listed in unofficial room document  RD/CTG/12. Without repeating its statement from 
November  2020 in full, the European  Union would like to highlight that that statement remains 
unchanged and valid in its entirety. The European Union is the  biggest importer of agri -food products 
in the world. The European Union has developed a highly trusted, transparent, and predictable 
system based on the high level of consumer health protection, to which some other countries defer 
 
10 Document  G/C/M/138, paragraphs  18.54 -18.18.60.  G/C/M/139  
 
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  in the absence of their national MRLs. The European Union has an open market. Its high level of 
consumer protection has never been an impediment to the import of agricultural commodities, 
including from the Members raising this concern, whose large exports of agricultural product s to the 
European Union during these five  years have remained stable. The European Union provides 
technical assistance to developing countries and LDCs, directly or through other international 
organizations, such as the Food and Agriculture Organization (F AO), to support a smooth transition 
towards new products or production systems. The European Union again emphasizes its commitment 
to continuing an open dialogue on its policies and measures. The European Union stands ready to 
further engage and explain ou r policies to our trading partners. The EU believes that Members have 
a shared interest in tackling the issue of toxic active substances and protecting their citizens' health 
with appropriate measures.  
16.54.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
17  INDIA – RESTRICTIONS ON IMPORTS OF CERTAIN PULSES – REQUEST FROM 
AUSTRALIA, CANADA, THE EUROPEAN UNION, THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, UKRAINE, AND 
THE UNITED STATES (G/C/W/791)  
17.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been included in the agenda at the request of 
Australia, Canada, the European Union, the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and the United States . 
17.2.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
17.3.   The United States has repeatedly stated its concerns with India's use of domestic support 
policies, multi ple increases in tariff rates, and the application of quantitative import restrictions for 
pulses including pigeon peas, mung beans, black gram lentils, and peas. The United States' concerns 
remain unchanged. On 17  March  2021, in concert with the delegatio ns of Australia, Canada, the 
European  Union, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine, the United States circulated questions for 
India (G/C/W/791) regarding these measures, which are due to expire today, 31  March  2021. The 
United States requests India to confi rm that these allegedly "temporary" measures will not be 
renewed for a fourth  consecutive year, and to respond in writing to the questions circulated on 
17 March  2021. 
17.4.   The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
17.5.   Australia's concerns with India's res trictive measures on pulses imports are well  known to all 
Members, particularly India's quantitative restrictions (QRs). Australia was extremely disappointed 
with India's decision to renew the QRs for mung beans (Moong), pigeon peas (Tur), and black gram 
(Urad), for the 2021 -2022 marketing year. The renewal of the QRs means that India will have in 
place these WTO -inconsistent measures over five  marketing years, noting the QRs were 
first introduced in August  2017. Australia would request India to clarify the  status of peas, which 
were also the subject of a QR in 2020 -2021. These QRs are clearly no longer temporary and must 
be removed. Despite Australia's regular requests, India has failed to provide a sufficient explanation 
of the WTO -basis for the QRs. Austr alia, along with Canada, the EU, the Russian Federation, Ukraine, 
and the United States, submitted formal questions to India prior to this Council's current meeting. 
The recent Indian Government announcement has effectively answered one of these questions,  but 
this announcement has only increased the importance of the other questions asked. It is imperative 
that India provide detailed answers to explain the market and other conditions behind the decision 
and how they are WTO -consistent. While the WTO  Agreem ents contain exceptions, the onus is on 
the Member implementing the measure to explain how such exceptions may apply.  
17.6.   Pulses are not a "small" commodity for India, neither by tonnage, nor value produced and 
consumed, nor with respect to trade. Therefore, I ndia's measures matter in the global pulses market. 
India's current suite of measures on pulses, including significant levels of market price support, high 
tariffs, and QRs, continue to negatively impact upon the stability and predictability of the global 
pulses market and are demonstrably ineffective. In addition to the formal questions that Australia 
co-sponsored for this Council meeting, Australia has previously posed a series of questions to India 
in this Council, in June and November  2020, and in late  2019, including providing them to India in 
writing. Australia has still not received a response. Australia will avoid repeating its questions, but 
notes that it was requesting India provide a detailed explanation of how India's QRs satisfied the 
requiremen ts of Article  XI:2(c)(ii) and Article  XX(a) and (b)  of the GATT , which Australia does not G/C/M/139  
 
- 40 - 
 
  believe are appropriate or legally available in respect of India's import restrictions on pulses. 
Australia requests India to remove the measures immediately.  
17.7.   The delegate of the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
17.8.   The Russian Federation recalls its long -standing concern over India's pulses import policy and 
urges India to stop applying restrictive measures on imports of yellow peas inconsis tent with its 
WTO commitments. During the period from 2018 to 2021, India has been progressively restricting 
the access of pulses to its market through measures which India has been calling "temporary" for 
the past three  consecutive years. The negative res ult of India's policy of import restrictions became 
obvious in 2020, as exports of yellow peas from Russia into India declined by a factor of 145 in that 
year compared to the values exported in 2017. The most dramatic decrease in export volumes was 
demonst rated after the introduction of India's import ban on yellow peas in early 2020. At the same 
time, India fell short of providing sound reasoning to justify its introduction of measures that hinder 
the import of pulses into India to such extent. Import quot as, import bans, minimum import price 
requirements, and ports of entry restrictions, have led to a situation where import volumes of yellow 
peas have plunged down almost to zero.  
17.9.   These restrictive measures contravene Articles  VII and XI of the GATT  1994, a nd Article  4.2 
of the Agreement on Agriculture. India claims that the measures are justified under Article  XX(a) 
and (b)  of the GATT . However, India failed to provide the causal link between the protection of public 
morals, and human, plant or animal life or health, and its import restrictions and prohibition on 
yellow peas. As the current financial year has almost come to an end, the Russian Federation would 
like to clarify whether India is going to introduce an import quota on pulses and an import prohibi tion 
on yellow peas in the upcoming 2021 -2022 financial year and beyond. The Russian  Federation urges 
India to remove its unjustified import restrictions on yellow peas and to bring its policy into 
compliance with its WTO  obligations.  
17.10.   The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
17.11.   As the largest supplier of pulses to India, Canada has been the WTO Member most negatively 
affected by India's measures to limit the import of pulses. Pulses are an important source of protein 
for many Indian  consumers and Canada is a high quality and reliable supplier. Canada is disappointed 
that India continues to use QRs on the import of dried peas and other pulses. For dried peas, Canada 
will be marking the third  consecutive year of QRs this April. Other QRs on other types of pulses have 
been in place for more than three  years. It is difficult for Canada to see how India can still be claiming 
these measures to be temporary. Market access for yellow dried peas in India continues to be unfairly 
affected by In dia's import measures. For yellow peas, the combination of a prohibitive minimum 
import price, import quota at zero, and restrictions on the port of entry, constitute a perfect storm 
of measures that is blocking all access in India. As expressed in previou s committees, these 
measures violate both Article  XI:1 of the GATT and Article  4 of the Agreement on Agriculture and 
cannot be defended on the basis of Article  XI:2(c) or Article  XX. Canada would also like to reiterate 
its request for India to clarify how these stated objectives are advanced through India's QRs on dried 
peas and other pulses and why less trade -distorting approaches have not been considered. To 
conclude, Canada reiterates its call for India to immediately and expeditiously review its trade 
restrictive measures put in place on pulses, and to implement alternative, WTO -consistent policy 
options that promote a predictable and transparent import regime for pulses.  
17.12.   The delegate of Ukraine  indicated the following:  
17.13.   Ukraine stands for predictable mar ket conditions. Therefore, Ukraine would like to reiterate 
its concerns over India's pulses policy. India has continued to impose QRs on imports, along with 
other trade -distorting policies, in relation to various pulses, for more than three  years. During t his 
period, India did not provide substantial explanations as to the nature and duration of such restrictive 
measures despite the systemic concerns expressed by Members at almost all meetings of the 
Committee on Agriculture, the CMA, and the C TG. As such, India's QRs are not temporary and 
non-transparent and appear to violate the requirements of Article  XI of the GATT  1994 and Articles  4 
and 12 of the Agreement on Agriculture. India's policy has a destructive effect on the international 
pulse crop markets a nd cannot guarantee predictable trade opportunities for exporters. For example, 
Ukraine's exports of pulses to India have been negatively affected and decreased dramatically – by G/C/M/139  
 
- 41 - 
 
  almost a hundred  times (from 157.4  thousand to 1.9  thousand tonnes). Ukraine hopes that India 
will comply with its WTO  commitments and eliminate the above -referenced export restrictions.  
17.14.   The delegate of Argentina  indicated the following:  
17.15.   Argentina would like to register its support for the concern raised by several Members, 
regardi ng the measure ordered by India that restricts the importation of certain pulses for more 
than three  years. As other Members have said today, despite the concerns that have been expressed 
on this issue in different bodies, India has not provided explanatio ns regarding the justification and 
duration of this measure, so Argentina does not know if it is or is not a temporary measure as 
established by the WTO.  
17.16.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
17.17.   The European Union has been raising concer ns on this issue for a long time in various 
WTO bodies; the EU once again echoes the concerns raised here today. The EU is one of the 
co-sponsors of the questions circulated to India earlier this month in document  G/C/W/791. The EU 
would welcome clarificat ions from India on these various questions at today's meeting, and also in 
writing. The EU would welcome clarity as to whether the import ban will be prolonged after today's 
date, 31  March  2021. For over three  years, India has been telling Members that the  measure was 
temporary, but after three  years this was clearly not the case. The EU urges India to rapidly eliminate 
this trade -distorting measure. The EU would also welcome clarifications as to how this Indian policy 
complies with WTO  rules.  
17.18.   The delegate of India indicated the following:  
17.19.   India would like to thank the delegations of Australia, Canada, the European Union, the 
Russian Federation, Ukraine, and the United States for their continued interest in this matter. India 
notes that most of the issues ra ised today have also been raised in the earlier meetings of this 
Council, including at its last meeting, as well as in Committees, such as this week's Committee on 
Agriculture. In this context, India would like to reiterate that the objective of this measu re is to cater 
to the food and livelihood security of small and marginal farmers. India submits that a mere increase 
in tariffs on pulses has not been sufficient to handle the prevailing domestic demand and supply 
situation of pulses in India. The Governme nt of India has been regularly reviewing this measure 
based on the market situation of pulses, owing to which the quota of pulses has been increased from 
time to time. A few Members have sought to know relevant specific WTO  provisions under which 
India has  imposed these measures. On this, India has replied earlier that the QRs on pulses are 
necessary for the enforcement of governmental measures to remove any surplus of pulses, as 
permitted under Article  XI:2(c)(ii) of the GATT  1994, and the protection of pu blic morals and human, 
animal, or plant life or health in India, as recognized under Article  XX(a) and (b) of the GATT  1994. 
India believes that the General Exceptions under Article  XX allow a Member to impose measures 
necessary to protect its small and ma rginal farmers' food and livelihood security.  
17.20.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
18  EUROPEAN UNION – PROPOSED MODIFICATION OF TRQ  COMMITMENTS: SYSTEMIC 
CONCERNS – REQUEST FROM AUSTRALIA, BRAZIL, CHINA, NEW ZEALAND, AND URUGUAY  
18.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been included in the agenda at the request of 
Australia, Brazil, China, New Zealand, and Uruguay . 
18.2.   The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
18.3.   Australia has consistently raised concerns with the EU and UK's approach to splittin g the 
previous EU -28 tariff rate quotas (TRQs) as a result of Brexit since it was first proposed in 2017. It 
is clear the proposed modifications to TRQs will diminish the commercial value of Australia's existing 
market access, by not only removing flexibil ity in where a product is sent year -to-year, but by also 
rendering some TRQ  allocations too small to be commercially viable. That said, Australia appreciates 
the constructive and pragmatic engagement from the EU in late 2020, which resulted in Australia 
reaching agreement with the EU on revised TRQ  splits before the end of the transition period. 
Australia is now seeking to ensure that implementation of the agreed arrangements occurs in a G/C/M/139  
 
- 42 - 
 
  timely manner. This will provide certainty to Australian exporters wit h the new post -Brexit trading 
environment. Australia would appreciate if the EU could provide an update to the Council on the 
overall timing of the implementation of the agreements resulting from the GATT  Article  XXVIII 
negotiations, as well as when the EU  will table an amended EU -27 Goods Schedule reflecting the 
revised TRQs and the reduced Final Bound Total Aggregate Measurement of Support (FBTAMS) 
entitlement.  
18.4.   The delegate of Brazil  indicated the following:  
18.5.   Brazil's statement will cover both items  18 and 19. Brazil would like to refer to its statements 
presented in November 202011, and state that, in addition to the elements that Brazil has been 
raising, Brazil would like to highlight that the end of the transition period and the agreement between 
the European Union and the United Kingdom have not substantially changed Brazil's concerns over 
the consequences of Brexit on WTO  Members. Brazil would like to reiterate that the methodology of 
"apportionment", unilaterally proposed by the United  Kingdom and t he European Union, makes the 
general level of concessions on reciprocal access to markets agreed during the Uruguay Round less 
advantageous for other WTO  Members. For this reason, Brazil understands that compensatory 
adjustments are essential and expects c onstructive engagement from both Members. With regard 
to systemic issues, there are still doubts about how the UK and the European Union will ensure that 
the most -favoured -nation clause be respected. Brazil has been following the uncertainties on the 
manag ement of trade across the Irish border and successive relaxations of the border control of the 
bilateral trade, which are not justified in the light of the current relationship between the UK and the 
EU. 
18.6.   As expressed on other occasions, apprehension persis ts about the way in which the UK and 
the EU are dealing with the FBTAMS of the EU -28. On the one hand, the United  Kingdom claims a 
formally non -existent right to establish its Aggregate Measure of Support ( AMS) itself, using 
exchange rate conversion that o verestimates that value; on the other hand, the EU has not yet 
communicated to the WTO the equivalent reduction of its FBTAMS, which seems to indicate a 
selective application of the apportionment method. The reasons why Brazil – and other delegations 
– considers that its conditions of access to the EU and UK  markets will worsen, as raised in previous 
meetings, remain; this is in view of the remaining uncertainties and the lack of a recognition that a 
successful conclusion of the negotiations under Article  XXVIII will require flexibility from the EU and 
the UK regarding their negotiating position.  
18.7.   The delegate of Uruguay  indicated the following:  
18.8.   Uruguay wishes to reiterate its position and concerns expressed previously here and in other 
forums on the specific  issue of modifications of concessions in the form of European  Union TRQs 
under Article  XXVIII of the GATT  1994. Uruguay's delegation reaffirms its willingness to work 
constructively with the EU to find appropriate solutions in this context and recalls the  importance for 
the Multilateral Trading System of this matter being resolved within the framework of substantive 
bilateral negotiations between the parties concerned, in accordance with WTO  rules. Secondly, 
Uruguay takes note of the completion of the nego tiations on the EU -UK Trade and Cooperation 
Agreement and its provisional application, which provides greater clarity regarding the form that the 
trade relationship between the two  partners will take, including with respect to the reciprocal use of 
WTO-bound erga omnes  TRQs. While the commitment not to make reciprocal use of such tariff 
quotas included in the above Agreement, and the clarifications provided in the relevant 
MA:1 notifications of the EU and the UK this year, are all positive, Uruguay would li ke to see this 
commitment reflected in the Schedules of concessions of both Members in the WTO for greater legal 
certainty.  
18.9.   Lastly, Uruguay wishes to raise the issue linked to domestic support. In this regard, the EU 
and the UK indicated in their joint let ter of 11  October  2017 that the committed AMS  levels for the 
EU-28 would be shared on the basis of an objective methodology. In its communication 
G/SECRET/42/Add.3 of 22  December  2020, the EU stated that it would revert to Members in due  
course on this top ic, in accordance with the appropriate procedures to this end. Uruguay would like 
to know when and how the EU intends to adjust downwards its Final Bound AMS  entitlements in its 
Schedule of concessions, in line with the announcements made.  
 
11 Document  G/C/M/138, paragraphs  18.30 -18.33.  G/C/M/139  
 
- 43 - 
 
  18.10.   The delegate of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
18.11.   New Zealand has been consistent in raising its concerns about this issue for the past 
three  years. Though New Zealand does not accept the EU's rationale for, or approach to, the 
modifications it has sought to make to it s WTO  tariff rate quota commitments, New Zealand does 
appreciate the fact that the EU has engaged actively with concerned WTO  Members, including 
New Zealand, to find practical solutions to address these concerns. New Zealand is pleased that 
progress is bei ng made in this regard and is committed to continue working with the EU to arrive at 
practical solutions that can work for all concerned. New Zealand is pleased to see that 
"Article  GOODS  18: Use of Existing WTO  Tariff Rate Quotas" of the EU -UK Trade and C ooperation 
Agreement makes clear that each Party is precluded from using the other's WTO  MFN TRQs. It will 
be important to see this reflected in the respective Member's WTO  Goods Schedules in due course. 
New Zealand would appreciate an indication from the EU (and the UK) as to when they plan to 
submit the necessary notification of modification to this effect.  
18.12.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
18.13.   China's statement will address both agenda items  18 and 19. China's consistent concerns on 
the issues r emain unchanged. China is of the view that the EU and UK's approach to simply split the 
EU existing TRQs will diminish the commercial value of China's existing market access and does not 
reflect the reality of their bilateral trade. Meanwhile , China takes note that the EU and UK already 
proceeded with their draft Schedules from January  2021 according to Article  XXVIII:3(a) of the 
GATT  1994. This causes immediate negative commercial impact to China's exporters. In this 
situation, China urges the EU and UK to  redouble their efforts to speed up the negotiations and to 
reach agreements soon with the Members concerned . 
18.14.   The delegate of Switzerland  indicated the following:  
18.15.   Switzerland will likewise address agenda items  18 and 19 together. Switzerland welcomes 
the progress in the negotiations that the EU and UK have made with other Members. Switzerland is 
of the view that legal uncertainties regarding the reallocation of TRQ  quantities to the EU -27 and UK 
must be avoided and that , in this respect , the Article  XXVIII  negotiations with other Members also 
need to be concluded as soon as possible. In particular, Switzerland is asking for legal certainty that 
existing tariff quotas are not filled by bilateral trade between the EU and UK.  
18.16.   The delegate of Mexico  indicated the following:  
18.17.   Mexico would also like to make reference to both agenda items  18 and 19. Mexico would 
echo the concerns expressed by the preceding delegations in taking the floor and would stress 
Mexico's systemic concern, which Mexico has also r aised on previous occasions12, over the 
methodology put forward by the parties regard ing the relationship between the EU and the UK and 
how this is presented in their Schedules, as well as the issue of domestic support.  
18.18.   The delegate of Canada  indicated the  following:  
18.19.   Negotiations with the EU on its modification of its TRQ  commitments as the result of Brexit 
are still ongoing. Canada looks forward to continuing a positive discussion with the EU.  
18.20.   The delegate of Paraguay  indicated the following:  
18.21.   In the intere sts of time, Paraguay will address both agenda items  18 and 19 together. While 
Paraguay welcomes the fact that the EU and the UK have reached an agreement and that they have 
mutually excluded each other from erga omnes  quotas according to their MA:1  notifications, 
Paraguay agrees with other colleagues that this should be reflected in their Schedules of concessions. 
Paraguay also reiterates its concerns as expressed on previous occasions.13  
18.22.   The delegate of India indicated the following:  
 
12 Document  G/C/M/138, paragraphs  21.29 -21.31.  
13 Document  G/C/M/138, paragraphs  21.37 -21.38.  G/C/M/139  
 
- 44 - 
 
  18.23.   This is India's resp onse to both agenda items  18 and 19. India had already expressed its 
concerns, both in writing and during formal consultations with the EU under Article  XXVII. India has 
also made it clear to the EU how the present methodology and threshold years taken int o account 
for the apportionment of TRQs adversely affects Members' rights. India expects that the EU will 
provide reasonable opportunities to all WTO  Members, including India itself, to exercise their rights 
under the WTO  Agreements and take into account t he concerns raised. India looks forward to further 
fruitful negotiations with the EU.  
18.24.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
18.25.   With reference to the European Union's statement under agenda item  4, also related to these 
negotiations, the EU is pleased to report good progress achieved so far with agreements formally 
signed with two  partners and negotiations fully finalized and going through domestic validation 
procedures with a further six  partners. The EU welcomes the increased engagement of many 
WTO Members and remains fully committed to continuing these negotiations and consultations and 
to bringing them to a successful close in the coming months.  
18.26.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
19  UNITED KINGDOM – DRAFT GOODS SCHEDULE AND PROPOSED 
UK TRQ COMMITMENTS: SYSTEMIC CONCERNS – REQUEST FROM AUSTRALIA, BRAZIL, 
CHINA, NEW ZEALAND, THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, AND URUGUAY  
19.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been included in the agenda at the request of 
Australia, Brazil, China, New  Zealand, the Russian Federation, and Uruguay . 
19.2.   The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
19.3.   Australia has consistently raised concerns with the EU and UK's approach to splitting the 
previous EU -28 TRQs as a result of Brexit since it was first propose d in 2017. It is clear the proposed 
modifications to TRQs will diminish the commercial value of Australia's existing market access, by 
not only removing flexibility in where a product is sent year -to-year, but by also rendering some 
TRQ allocations too sma ll to be commercially viable. That said, Australia appreciates the constructive 
and pragmatic engagement from the UK on these issues before the end of the transition period in 
late 2020. Australia has reached an in -principle agreement with the UK on its re vised TRQ  splits and 
is working with the UK to finalize the overall agreement. Australia is seeking to ensure 
implementation of the agreed arrangements in a timely manner. This will provide certainty to 
Australian exporters in the new post -Brexit trading e nvironment.  
19.4.   Beyond the TRQ  splits, Australia continues to be concerned that the issues it has raised over 
the UK's initial rectification remain unaddressed. Australia considers that the UK's draft Goods 
Schedule, circulated on 24  July 2018, contains substa ntive changes to the UK's current 
WTO concessions, including the UK's F BTAMS  entitlement, and Special Safeguard (SSG) 
entitlements. Australia does not believe the UK should have automatic rights to an AMS  entitlement 
without some scrutiny from the Membersh ip and potential changes. Australia is concerned with the 
UK's inclusion of an AMS  entitlement of GBP  4.95 billion, and it is worth noting that the EU has still 
not formally proposed any corresponding reductions to its AMS  entitlement.  
19.5.   The UK needs to find  a multilateral solution to this issue and demonstrate to other Members 
that its expected future domestic support programmes will not unduly distort global agricultural 
trade. Australia calls on the UK to reassure Members that the UK is a strong advocate f or domestic 
support reform, to help show that it will be part of the solution, even if it has such a large initial 
AMS entitlement. Finally, Australia also does not think that the UK should be able to simply "copy 
and paste" SSG  rights from the EU's WTO  Goods Schedule, which have a distinct history and basis 
from the Uruguay Round and could result in the perverse outcome of providing the UK with 
SSG rights for products that the UK does not produce. Australia stands ready to have constructive 
discussions wit h the UK to help resolve these matters and move towards certification of the UK's 
Goods Schedule.  
19.6.   The delegate of Uruguay  indicated the following:  G/C/M/139  
 
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  19.7.   Uruguay wishes to reiterate its position on the following points: (i)  the claim of the 
United  Kingdom to have  a bound total AMS warrants analysis and discussion on the part of the 
Members; (ii)  it would not seem appropriate for the UK to attempt to replicate the rights to invoke 
the Special Safeguard, under Article  5 of the Agreement on Agriculture, for all produ cts and under 
the same criteria and conditions as set out in the Schedule of the European Union; and (iii)  the 
proposal to introduce one  currency conversion in the draft Schedule of concessions based on the 
average daily exchange rate in the 2015 -2019 period also raises concerns, given its ability to 
generate bound tariffs and particularly high levels of AMS  entitlements, higher than those that would 
result from considering other representative periods (in particular, 1986 -1988), and from its factual 
linkag e with the ongoing Article  XXVIII  process. Uruguay hopes that the open procedure under 
Article  XXVIII of the GATT on TRQs will be settled through substantive bilateral negotiations between 
the Members concerned and the UK, enabling the latter to have an in dependent Schedule of 
concessions formally established in the WTO, while at the same time safeguarding the rights of the 
other Members concerned. In this regard, Uruguay looks forward to continuing its discussions with 
the UK with a view to ensuring market  access commitments that are adapted to the reality of bilateral 
trade and the specific interests of the parties involved, and which do not detract from current access 
opportunities, fully complying with the relevant multilateral rules.  
19.8.   The delegate of the  Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
19.9.   The Russian Federation would like to reiterate its concern in respect of the UK's approach to 
establishing its Schedule of concessions. In spite of its bilateral consultations with the UK, the 
Russian Federation  is still worried about the methodology of apportionment of Aggregate Measure 
of Support and the proposed currency conversion. The Russian Federation notes that Article  XXVIII 
of the GATT, as well as the Agreement on Agriculture, do not provide the possibi lity to amend 
Members' AMS  commitments. As for the currency conversions, the Russian Federation is troubled 
by their potential impact on the general level of concessions, which may result in substantive 
changes to the UK's current WTO  concessions. The Russ ian Federation also continues to have a 
significant concern regarding the UK's approach to the TRQ  renegotiations. The Russian  Federation 
stresses the impossibility of concluding negotiations without an agreement on compensation to be 
provided by the UK. T he Russian Federation urges the UK to provide its compensatory proposal. The 
Russian Federation looks forward to further consultations with the UK to resolve these issues.  
19.10.   The delegate of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
19.11.   As noted under the previous ite m, New Zealand has been consistent in raising its concerns 
about this issue for the past three  years. Just because the item has become a regular feature on the 
Goods Council agenda over this period, though, it should not be misconstrued as suggesting that 
this a routine matter. Far from it, the nature and scale of the changes the UK has proposed to its 
bound commitments makes this a major matter of concern. These proposed changes include doing 
away completely with access to the UK  market (that is, zero  quotas) for 55 of the 142  existing 
WTO quotas, and offering such small volumes for a number of other quotas as to render them not 
commercially meaningful. Unfortunately, despite the ongoing efforts that concerned WTO  Members, 
like New Zealand, have made to see k practical solutions, there has been little discernible progress 
in discussions with the UK aimed at resolving this serious issue. Rather, New Zealand is now 
experiencing direct, negative, commercial impacts, with exporters being denied access to even the  
reduced quotas the UK has unilaterally implemented from January this year. New Zealand food 
exporters are now being denied the ability to utilize valid UK  quota access for exports into 
Northern  Ireland, due to complications arising from the implementation  of the 
UK-EU Northern  Ireland Protocol. Other WTO  Members may be experiencing similar difficulties. This 
is a clear and present example of the kind of disadvantages that the UK's actions to modify its 
WTO quota commitments in this way have caused for othe r WTO  Members.  
19.12.   As has been indicated previously, New Zealand also continues to have concerns about 
several other aspects of the UK's draft WTO  goods Schedule. These include the UK's very substantial 
claim to trade distorting AMS  entitlement; a similarly su bstantial claim (on 685  products) to use of 
the Special Safeguard; and the proposed application of "minimum entry price" and "Meursing Table" 
market management systems not reflected in the UK's global tariff regime. New Zealand, for its 
part, remains commi tted to pursuing its engagement with the UK in order to arrive at practical 
solutions to address its concerns. Given the time that has now elapsed since the UK left the EU, New 
Zealand urges the UK to redouble its efforts to this end – and to do so urgentl y, given the damaging 
commercial effects that New Zealand's exporters are already experiencing.  G/C/M/139  
 
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  19.13.   The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
19.14.   Negotiations with the UK on its draft WTO  Goods Schedule and proposed TRQ  commitments 
are still ongoing. Canada looks forward to continuing a positive discussion with the UK.  
19.15.   The delegate of the United Kingdom  indicated the following:  
19.16.   Firstly, the United Kingdom would like to thank Members for their statements under this 
item. Across all of the issues relatin g to the United Kingdom's withdrawal from the European Union 
at the WTO, the United Kingdom has endeavoured to ensure that Members are not left worse off by 
the UK's departure from the European Union. The United Kingdom remains strongly committed to 
contin uing to work closely with WTO  Members in discussions on its Schedule, including through the 
process under Article  XXVIII on TRQs. Furthermore, the United Kingdom would like to refer Members 
to document  WT/GC/226, which was circulated to the General Council  at the beginning of this year. 
In that communication, the United Kingdom confirmed that, from 1  January  2021, the UK fully 
respects the concessions and commitments laid out in its Goods Schedule.  
19.17.   As mentioned in agenda item  5 of this meeting, whilst negot iations in the process under 
Article  XXVIII have been positive and productive, discussions are still progressing with some 
Members. The United Kingdom's position on the extended time -frame for these discussions was set 
out in more detail under that agenda item. The United  Kingdom believes that this extension will 
allow it to continue constructive engagement with Members towards resolution of any outstanding 
concerns. On Special Safeguards, the United Kingdom would note to Members that the UK's Schedule 
replicates the concessions and commitments applicable to the UK as expressed in the 
EU-28 Schedule. On the statements relating to Northern Ireland made by New Zealand, the United 
Kingdom has made numerous efforts to support traders following the end of the tra nsition period 
with respect to moving goods into Northern Ireland. The UK  Trader Scheme was established to 
enable authorized businesses to undertake that the goods they are bringing into Northern Ireland 
are "not at risk" of onward movement to the EU and t herefore not liable to EU  tariffs. The United 
Kingdom has been clear that it wants to address the specific TRQ  issue raised today by working 
constructively with traders and international partners, including particularly with the European 
Union,  as part of ongoing dialogues on the implementation of the UK -EU Withdrawal Agreement. 
The UK will continue to engage bilaterally with WTO  Members on this.  
19.18.   Regarding the United Kingdom's AMS  entitlement, the United Kingdom set out its intention 
to divide the pre -existing EU -28 level of commitment on domestic support between the UK and EU 
in October  2017, using an objective methodology based on previous cases at the WTO, and the UK 
has continued dialogue with Members on this issue ever since. This is not a new AMS  entitlement 
and the United Kingdom's view has not changed on this issue. On the question of currency, the 
United Kingdom redenominated all currency components in the Schedule, including both tariffs and 
AMS, with a single, consistent exchange rate into pound st erling using a methodologically sound 
formula built on previous examples at the WTO, as explained in document  G/MA/TAR/RS/570/Add.1. 
The United Kingdom is continuing its dialogue with Members to address their relevant questions and 
concerns.  
19.19.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
20  EUROPEAN UNION – CARBON BORDER ADJUSTMENT MECHANISM (THE EUROPEAN 
GREEN DEAL OF DECEMBER  2019) – REQUEST FROM ARMENIA, CHINA, KAZAKHSTAN, 
KYRGYZ REPUBLIC, QATAR, THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, AND THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI 
ARABIA  
20.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included in the agenda at the request of 
Armenia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Qatar, the Russian Federation, and the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia . 
20.2.   The delegate of the Russian Federation  indicated the foll owing:  
20.3.   The Russian Federation reiterates the statements made during previous meetings of the CMA 
and the C TG on the plans of the European Union to introduce the Carbon Border Adjustment 
Mechanism in accordance with the European Union's Green Deal Strategy,  published in G/C/M/139  
 
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  December  2019. First, Russia appreciates the intentions of the European Union to protect the 
environment. However, it does not seem fully evident why the focus on climate change efforts is 
placed on a unilateral trade -measures mechanism rathe r than the mechanisms stipulated in specific 
climate agreements, including the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC), the Paris Agreement, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), and 
others. Currently, the implementat ion mechanism of Article  6 of the Paris Agreement, aimed at 
cooperation among the parties to this Agreement, has been under development and will be 
established within the framework of the UN  Climate Change Conference of the Parties (COP26) this 
year. The R ussian Federation believes that the instruments provided in the specific climate fora have 
not yet been exhausted. The Russian Federation is convinced that the introduction of trade -related 
climate measures is premature and unjustifiable.  
20.4.   Second, one of th e purposes of the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), as 
announced by the EU, is the reduction of so -called "carbon leakage". The Russian Federation 
questions "carbon leakage" as an environmental goal, as well as the WTO -consistent reasons to set 
the restrictions implied under the CBAM. The protection of the European industry from the risk of 
delocalization of capacities to other territories with policies different to the EU  climate and 
environmental policies obviously relates to economic reasons and  cannot be justified under the 
WTO Agreement. Third, the EU  proposal on the CBAM does not take into account the fundamental 
principles reflected, for example, in Article  2.2 of the Paris Agreement , which  states that the 
"Agreement will be implemented to re flect equity and the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances". However, 
the concept of the CBAM and, by the way, many other measures under the EU  Green Deal, impl y 
prioritization of the EU  approaches as the only credible way to protect the environment.  
20.5.   As a final note, the Russian Federation would like to stress its belief that all WTO  Members 
are united by the objective of creating a more climate -friendly world. A ny Member should be free to 
choose its own methods on the path towards the achievement of global climate objectives, as long 
as those methods represent a proportionate contribution and do not nullify or impair any of the 
benefits accruing to other WTO  Memb ers. Hence, the Russian Federation would like to urge Members 
to stick to the ultimate goal of the WTO, namely, ensuring sustainable global development by means 
of trade. This is why all Members should avoid imposing unnecessary restrictions on internation al 
trade, as no true development can be achieved if trade is being undermined by "green 
protectionism".  
20.6.   The delegate of Qatar  indicated the following:  
20.7.   Qatar would like to thank the Russian Federation for making this statement on behalf of the 
co-sponsors. Qatar has taken note of the European Union's Green Deal climate ambition to become 
the first  climate -neutral continent by 2050. Qatar takes note that the European Union has made a 
presentation on this initiative during the last meeting of the Committee on Trade and Environment 
(CTE). Qatar compliments the European Union for its political courage in setting these objectives. 
Like the EU, Qatar has also signed and ratified the Paris Agreement and is equally ambitious in its 
climate change objectives. However,  concerning the EU  Green Deal, Qatar would like to express 
some trade -related concerns over the introduction of a C BAM to address the so -called "carbon 
leakage". Qatar would like to seek further clarification from the European Union on how its CBAM 
will be  compatible with fundamental WTO  principles, including most -favoured -nation and national 
treatment. Qatar is of the view that treating like products differently based on the carbon content of 
the production process would go against decades of well -consider ed jurisprudence. Qatar takes this 
opportunity to thank the EU and looks forward to continuing this discussion in a fruitful and 
cooperative manner.  
20.8.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
20.9.   China notes that the EU is considering a carbon border adjustment mechanism. The 
discussions on the EU's CBAM in various events and relevant reports indicate that the introduction 
of the CBAM is likely to serve multiple purposes, such as tackling climate change, protecting the EU's 
industries from competition, and increasing the EU's financial budget. China is of the view that the 
UNFCC C is the most important international treaty tackling global climate change. The UNFCCC has 
confirmed "common but differentiated responsibilities" as one of its core principles to car ry out 
international cooperation on climate change. This principle should be fully respected. China cannot 
go along with any measure, either in the form of carbon border adjustment or carbon tax, if they G/C/M/139  
 
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  are discriminatory and inconsistent with WTO  rules. The issue of the environment should not be used 
as a disguise to implement trade protectionist measures. China encourages the EU to enhance 
transparency and the dialogue with Members and relevant stakeholders in the process of drafting 
the CBAM, and to ens ure its WTO -compatibility. China will closely follow this issue.  
20.10.   The delegate of Argentina  indicated the following:  
20.11.   Argentina thanks the Members that included this agenda item, which generates a growing 
concern among the Membership, with serious doubts abo ut the consistency of a mechanism of this 
nature with the WTO  rules and, in particular, with the provisions of the GATT  1994. The fight against 
climate change is a commitment of all Members and the actions they undertake, as well as the 
instruments they us e, must be respectful of international commitments, and must not restrict 
international trade more than necessary to achieve legitimate objectives, nor constitute a disguised 
restriction to international trade. In this context, Argentina views with concern  the intention of the 
EU to impose the same level of ambition at a global level, without taking into account the principle 
of "common but differentiated responsibilities". Argentina wishes to draw the attention of the EU to 
the importance of avoiding unila teral actions without due legal support. Argentina will follow the 
evolution of this initiative and hopes to receive detailed information on the design that will be 
adopted, the system to calculate the carbon footprint, as well as the scope that the mechan ism will 
have, all in due time, to be able to have a productive exchange. Argentina also raised the issue in 
the CMA and looks forward to its notification to the WTO.  
20.12.   The delegate of the Philippines  indicated the following:  
20.13.   The Philippines supports the hol istic efforts by the EU in the area of sustainable trade and 
development. The Philippines makes the following intervention to contribute to and enrich the EU's 
assessment processes in relation to the proposal on CBAM in the context of the Green Deal.  
20.14.   First, the Philippines would like to seek clarification from the EU as to whether the CBAM will 
take into account the limitations in the capacity of some trading partners, like the Philippines, which 
can affect compliance in respect of, for example, measuring a nd assessing carbon footprint per 
commodity. The Philippines is in the process of building its own institutional capacity, consistent with 
the Enhanced Transparency Framework (ETF) of the Paris Agreement. However, much will depend 
on the methodology or app roach that the EU will eventually decide in implementing the CBAM. This 
emphasizes the importance of trade -related technical support and assistance to enable compliance 
by developing country Members and their domestic industries. Second, the Philippines wo uld like to 
ask the EU if, and how, the CBAM could affect the EU's Generalized Scheme of Preferences Plus 
(GSP+) and the tariff rates on the products benefiting from the EU  GSP+.  Third, the Philippines 
would like to ask the EU if it has considered the possibility of double counting with respect to the 
accounting of carbon leakage from emissions associated with imported goods. The Philippines notes 
that the CBAM could potentially co nflict with Article  4 of the Paris Agreement, which states that 
"when recognizing and implementing mitigation actions with respect to anthropogenic emissions and 
removals, Parties should take into account, as appropriate, existing methods and guidance unde r 
the Convention, in light of the provisions of Paragraph  13 of the Article", which in turn refers to 
ensuring the "avoidance of double counting". There is the likelihood that said emissions are already 
accounted for and reported by the exporting country a s part of its domestic emissions reduction 
measures. Fourth, the Philippines is concerned that the implementation of the CBAM could have a 
significant impact on its main exports to the EU, which are electronic products, machinery and 
transport equipment, a nd other manufactured goods. These are likely to be covered by the CBAM 
based on the EU  Parliament's proposal. Fifth, the target implementation date of the CBAM (that is, 
by 2023) may be ill -timed since the Philippines anticipates that, by that time, the m ajority of the 
world's economies, especially developing economies, will still be recovering from the impact of the 
COVID -19 pandemic. The CBAM may only amplify negative socio -economic impacts resulting from 
disruptions to international trade, especially in  terms of unemployment and poverty. This will only 
exacerbate the post -COVID -19 challenges faced by many countries.  
20.15.   The delegate of Pakistan  indicated the following:  
20.16.   Pakistan  thank s the Russia n Federation , China,  and other Members for their statements on 
this issue. This is an issue of extreme importance for Pakistan , as the EU is a large export market 
for Pakistan. The issue is currently being studied in greater detail in Capital. The issue is also being G/C/M/139  
 
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  discussed with the EU at Capital -level. Pakistan is concerned about the various technicalities and 
operations of this programme and its wider impact on trade flow s and the potential negative 
implications for Pakistan 's exports to the EU. Pakistan is also concerned that it will affect, in a very 
short time, its industry and employment structures without immediate adjustment mechanisms in 
place. Pakistan  will continue to follow developments in this issue.  
20.17.   The delegate of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia  indicated the following:  
20.18.   Saudi Arabia thanks the proponents fo r including this agenda item. From the perspective of 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, while the EU stated that the proposed mechanism will be in conformity 
with WTO  rules and other international obligations, the EU is yet to provide explanations on how it 
aims to achieve this. While the EU's stated intention is to address the risk of investment leakage 
from the EU to other countries, in fact its main objective is to maintain the competitiveness of 
EU industries. Saudi Arabia's very preliminary review indicates  that the proposed mechanism raises 
very serious concerns due to its potential long -term negative implications on global trade, which will 
distort the full value chain of trade, including goods, services, and jobs. Saudi Arabia urges the EU 
to further enga ge in consultations with Members in order to ensure the full compliance of the CBAM 
with WTO  rules and Agreements, and to ensure that the proposed mechanism would not create 
unnecessary barriers to trade, or be applied in a manner that constitutes protecti on to EU  domestic 
industries. Finally, Saudi Arabia looks forward to receiving further details and reflections from the 
EU on this proposed mechanism, and the Kingdom stands ready to engage with the EU and interested 
Members on this issue.  
20.19.   The delegate of Turkey  indicated the following:  
20.20.   Turkey continues to follow closely the developments around the European Green Deal, which 
includes the goal of enshrining the objective of climate neutrality and increasing the EU's climate 
ambition to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Turkey believes that combating climate change at 
international community level plays a vital role and that all members of the international community 
should take the necessary steps to combat climate change. This should be done, however, taking 
into account the historical responsibilities for greenhouse gases and common but differentiated 
responsibilities, as indicated in the scope of the UNFCCC. Turkey would also like to note that the 
international climate change regime acknowledges that mitigat ion measures can affect the social 
and economic development of countries. In fact, the UNFCCC affirms that responses to climate 
change should be coordinated with social and economic development in an integrated manner with 
a view to avoiding any adverse im pact or response measures. Turkey, as a developing country, 
believes that international trade is one of the major driving forces for sustainable development and 
economic diversification efforts. Therefore, any restrictive measure on trade can affect the 
development goals of developing countries. In this sense, Turkey believes that, while designing its 
CBAM, the EU must take into account the possible negative effects of mitigation measures and the 
fact that not all members of the international community can have the same level of ambition 
because of their different levels of capacity and industrialization. Turkey also believes that the 
EU Commission must give all interested parties sufficient time to make the necessary adjustments 
once it declares details of its methodology on how the carbon contents of imported goods will be 
measured, calculated, and verified by the EU. Turkey thinks that all countries will need time and 
detailed information in order to analyse and adjust to the EU's proposal. Turkey also bel ieves that 
the EU's future carbon border adjustment must be fully aligned with GATT  rules and principles, and 
that it must not be applied in an arbitrary manner or constitute unjustifiable discrimination or a 
disguised restriction on international trade.  
20.21.   The delegate of Paraguay  indicated the following:  
20.22.   Paraguay thanks the proponent delegations for placing this item on the agenda. Paraguay 
has been closely monitoring the development of this mechanism in Brussels and notes the recent 
publication, on 10  March, of a resolution by the European Parliament on the CBAM and its 
compatibility with the rules of this Organization. Paraguay is pleased to note that the initiative 
recognizes the need to be consistent with WTO  rules, and that it cannot create new protecti onist 
barriers or be applied in a discriminatory manner. However, the resolution raises some questions 
regarding, first, special and differential treatment, which, in accordance with paragraph  7 of the 
resolution, would appear to apply only to LDCs and sma ll island states, and not to all developing 
countries. Paraguay notes in this regard that landlocked developing countries are also in a special 
category of developing countries and should receive the same treatment as small island states.  G/C/M/139  
 
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  20.23.   Second, regarding  coverage, the resolution calls for all products and commodities under the 
EU emissions trading system (ETS) to be subject to this mechanism. In this regard, Paraguay notes 
that the EU had indicated that agricultural products would not be affected. However , products such 
as powdered milk, casein, lactose, frozen potatoes and peas, dehydrated potatoes, tomato purée 
and concentrate, yeast, manufactured malt, sugar, fats and oils, are part of the ETS, on the list for 
2020. Paraguay requests the EU to confirm w hether the CBAM will include agricultural products.  
20.24.   Third, regarding calculation of the carbon footprint, the country of origin of the imports is 
expected to be able to present its own data and demonstrate that the carbon footprint of the products 
is lower  than that indicated by the EU. In this regard, Paraguay would highly appreciate an update 
on how the procedure would work, and Paraguay asks for it not to create a disproportionate burden 
on exporters. Paraguay also reiterates its request for information on whether the EU plans to 
introduce positive incentives, such as a tariff reduction for products with a lower footprint than 
European products. Paraguay notes that if the objective is to incentivize carbon reductions, Members 
that are already contributing  in a positive manner, in line with the principle of common but 
differentiated responsibilities of the Paris Agreement, should be rewarded.  
20.25.   Fourth, regarding "export discounts", paragraph  29 of the communication refers to this 
alternative as an option for consideration. In principle, this seems to be the same as export subsidies 
for European producers, which would provide them with an additional competitive advantage. 
Paraguay requests the EU to provide an explanation of how this alternative would work and how it 
is consistent with WTO  rules.  
20.26.   Paraguay would also like to note once again that, while Paraguay shares the EU's objectives 
of environmental protection and reduction of greenhouse gases, and an ambitious emissions 
reduction agenda, the implementation of such an agenda should take into account the specific 
conditions of the different Members and their levels of development, and respect the principle of 
shared but differentiated capabilities. To this end, such issues must be taken into account in the 
design of the tools, as imposing the same rules and standards on those that have much smaller 
carbon footprints, despite having different production systems, would not level the playing field and 
would create even greater inequalities and negatively affect de veloping countries. Lastly, Paraguay 
urges the EU to publish its impact assessment for its trading partners once completed.  
20.27.   The delegate of the Republic of Korea  indicated the following:  
20.28.   Korea appreciates the EU's leading role in the global efforts to tack le ongoing climate change. 
In this context, the EU is considering introducing a CBAM to address the issue of possible carbon 
leakage in the process of reinforcing environmental policies that aim to achieve carbon neutrality by 
2050. However, individual cou ntries should be considerate in introducing proactive measures for 
environmental protection, such as the CBAM. They must ensure that such actions comply with 
WTO rules and will not impede the free flow of trade by creating additional barriers. Korea also 
suggests having sufficient discussions among the WTO  Members to ensure transparency and 
predictability in the process of introducing the CBAM, from the submission of the bill by the European  
Commission in June to the deliberation by the European Parliament and the Council of Europe. Korea 
looks forward to having active multilateral discussions on the CBAM at the C TE. 
20.29.   The delegate of Kazakhstan  indicated the following:  
20.30.   Kazakhstan is closely monitoring the development of the proposed EU  CBAM. Kazakhstan 
urges the EU to fully consider the compatibility of the CBAM  with WTO  rules and regulations so that 
any such measure does not create obstacles to trade. Kazakhstan looks forward to learning more 
about this initiative, including its current state of development, the specific form of the measure, 
and its coverage at the sectoral and product level.  
20.31.   The delegate of the Kyrgyz Republic  indicated the following:  
20.32.   The issue of the CBAM of the European Union has been raised more than once in the different 
bodies of the WTO . A number of Members expressed their views and positions on this issue during 
the meetings of the WTO  bodies at the end of 2020. The Kyrgyz Republic commends the efforts of 
WTO Members towards establishing and achieving the aim of a sustainable ecological  environment. 
The issues relating to ecology and the environment are important for all Members of the WTO. At G/C/M/139  
 
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  the same time, the Kyrgyz Republic believes that all actions taken, and all measures introduced, 
with a view to achieving the above -mentioned obje ctives should not impact negatively upon the 
interests of other Members and should be implemented and maintained in full compliance with 
WTO rules and norms.  
20.33.   The delegate of Chinese Taipei  indicated the following:  
20.34.   Chinese Taipei thanks the proponents for placing this item on the agenda and wishes to 
register its interest in this subject. The EU is to be commended on its ambitious proposals and 
international leadership towards the goal of climate neutrality by 2050. The various measures 
propo sed to ensure a just and inclusive economic transition under the European Green Deal 
programme are also greatly appreciated. However, it appears that the CBAM is part of a broader 
EU industrial strategy that could, in the future, include all imports of pro ducts and commodities listed 
under the EU's current E TS and hence have wide implications on international trade. Chinese Taipei 
notes that the EU is currently undertaking an impact assessment relating to those sectors with a 
high risk of carbon leakage. Ch inese Taipei welcomes any update on this matter.  
20.35.   Chinese Taipei is especially interested in learning more about the possible implications of 
the mechanism for those trading partners outside the EU. Here, Chinese Taipei would urge the EU 
to engage further w ith international stakeholders and WTO  Members in a more transparent and 
comprehensive manner, taking into account the relevant WTO  rules and the undesirable trade 
barriers arising from the mechanism. Furthermore, the issue of environmental sustainability is 
already a much more important factor in the crafting of Members' trade policies as of today. At the 
multilateral level, the collective effort of all Members is required to shape a common policy objective, 
which involves a fully coordinated trade approac h overall, as well as the harmonization of all 
regulatory requirements. Chinese Taipei would therefore strongly encourage the EU, and other 
Members intending to carry out carbon border measures, to come forward and initiate discussions 
at meetings of all t he relevant WTO  committees. In addition, the newly established Trade and 
Environmental Sustainability Structured Discussions (TESSD) is another forum available now for a 
meaningful engagement and experience -sharing on this highly critical subject.  
20.36.   The dele gate of Egypt  indicated the following:  
20.37.   Egypt  would like to refer to its statement from the CTG  meeting in November  202014, and 
thank s the EU for its presentation made in the CTE  meeting  the day before . Egypt would like to 
reiterate the need to ensure the f ull compliance of the proposed CBAM with WTO  rules and principles , 
and to ensure that the proposed mechanism would not create unnecessary barriers to international 
trade.  
20.38.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
20.39.   The United States has been  following with interest the EU  progress to develop a carbon 
border adjustment mechanism, particularly given our bilateral trading relationship. The United  
States is committed to appropriately utilizing trade channels as another tool for tackling the 
poten tially catastrophic impact of climate change, including through market and regulatory 
approaches to address greenhouse gas emissions and to achieve net -zero global emissions by 2050 
or before. Regarding the EU's carbon border adjustment under current devel opment, the United  
States looks forward to additional, detailed information and engagement as the EU has promised it 
will do, at the ir earliest possible convenience, so that it may better understand how the CBAM is 
being developed and how it would be imple mented. The United States further encourages the EU to 
fully consider the compatibility of any such measure it develops with applicable WTO  rules to ensure 
that there is an open system of trade and that any such measure will not constitute a barrier to 
trade. It will be important to ensure that Members' respective approaches to climate change 
mitigation are complementary, achieve the desired climate and environmental benefit, and minimize 
interruptions to our transatlantic trade relationship.  
20.40.   The delegate o f Uruguay  indicated the following:  
 
14 Document  G/C/M/138, paragraphs  16.35 -16.36.  G/C/M/139  
 
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  20.41.   Uruguay would like to thank the proponents for placing this item on the agenda. Uruguay 
recognizes the policy objectives identified by the EU and reaffirms its strong commitment to climate 
matters. Uruguay would like to r eiterate its interest in following up on the process of adoption of a 
CBAM by the European Commission, within the "European Green Deal". Uruguay looks forward to 
continuing to receive updated and detailed information on the initiative, including its curren t state 
of development and the time -frame for the measure's adoption, how the measure will be designed, 
and its coverage at the sector and product level. Lastly, Uruguay wishes to highlight the importance 
of ensuring the measure's compatibility with the co mmitments made by the EU in the WTO.  
20.42.   The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
20.43.   Canada and the European Union have a long -standing history of fruitful cooperation on the  
environment and climate change. Like the EU, Canada is committed to ambitious act ion and global 
leadership on climate change. Canada is following the EU's work on a new Carbon Border Adjustment 
Mechanism with great interest. Canada anticipates that the design of a CBAM will account for the 
carbon pricing policies and climate measures o f partner countries. Canada also anticipates that the 
EU will ensure that any mechanism it puts in place will respect its trade obligations. Canada would 
welcome continued opportunities for meaningful engagement with EU  officials throughout the 
CBAM  develo pment process.  
20.44.   The delegate of India indicated the following:  
20.45.   India would also like to thank the delegations of Armenia, China, Kazakhstan, the 
Kyrgyz  Republic, and the Russian Federation, for raising this important issue in this Council. India 
also thanks  the mission of Canada and the WTO for organizing the Carbon Border Adjustment 
Workshop. India believes that a thorough legal examination will be required of any such mechanism 
to ascertain its conformity with the relevant WTO  rules. India would reiterate that any such 
mechanism must take into consideration the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities 
and respective capabilities of different countries, in the light of different national circumstances, 
fiscal, and development levels. India bel ieves that there may be possible WTO  non-compliance issues 
relating to any such mechanism that will require further deliberation once the details of the EU  CBAM 
are made available by the EU.  
20.46.   The delegate of the Kingdom of Bahrain  indicated the following:  
20.47.   The Kingdom of Bahrain shares similar concerns to those raised by the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia and other delegations regarding the European Union's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism 
and looks forward to further clarification from the European Union on its a pplication.  
20.48.   The delegate of Brazil  indicated the following:  
20.49.   Brazil would like to thank the sponsors for raising this issue. Brazil reiterates that it is 
carefully monitoring the proposal for the establishment of a CBAM. The proposal mentions some 
possible alternatives for its implementation , noting  that the calculation of the carbon content could 
be based on different methods , and that there are several methodologies to quantify the carbon 
footprint of products. There is thus a high degree of uncer tainty and the exact contours of the 
European Union's CBAM are still unclear. Brazil expects that, once specific elements of the CBAM 
have been defined, an opportunity for more direct dialogue between the competent authorities will 
be provided, in order to  ensure that the measure is not discriminatory in character and that it is fully 
compatible with WTO  rules. It should be remembered that, since 2013, the EU  Commission has 
introduced specific regulations to deal with the risks of carbon leakage under its E TS, and industrial 
facilities considered by the bloc as threatened with the transfer of operations to other countries 
("leakage") receive privileged treatment to maintain their competitiveness, production, and jobs in 
Europe. In May  2019, the Commission pu blished a new list for ETS, effective until 2030, which 
includes, among other sectors, mining, paper and cellulose production, sugar production, and 
textiles and leather manufactures, among others. In the absence of clarity about the methodology 
to be used , there are risks related to the establishment of carbon quantification based on industry 
performance benchmarks from the European bloc, which may constitute undue privileges, 
disregarding the reality of production from other countries. Finally, as highlig hted by other 
delegations, Brazil must also stress that the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, 
enshrined in the UNFCCC since it was agreed in Rio in 1992, cannot be ignored.  G/C/M/139  
 
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  20.50.   The delegate of Mexico  indicated the following:  
20.51.   Mexico thanks Russia and the other proponents and Members who have taken the floor on 
this issue. Mexico would like to record its interest in this issue. Colleagues in Capital are currently 
analysing the development and implications of these measures and their im plications regarding 
future policies relating to the European Green Deal. Mexico thanks the European Union for 
information updates on this point.  
20.52.   The delegate of Armenia  indicated the following:  
20.53.   Armenia  would also like to share the concerns expressed by th e Russian Federation and 
other s regarding the EU CBAM initiative. This is an important and sensitive issue for many  Members 
and Armenia  will be carefully monitoring further developments.  
20.54.   The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
20.55.   Australia is stron gly committed to addressing climate change and believes that international 
trade can contribute to this objective. In particular, Australia believes that policies that facilitate 
increased trade in environmental goods and services, and related investment, can make a strong 
contribution in support of international climate policy. Australia welcomes the consultative approach 
that the EU has taken so far in respect to its CBAM. Australia encourages the EU to share to the 
maximum extent possible, in the WTO and  other relevant international bodies, details of its policy 
deliberations and the likely form a CBAM might take, consistent with the central WTO  principle of 
transparency. Australia also notes the EU's commitment to ensuring the consistency of its eventual  
measure with its WTO  obligations. Further details addressing the issue of WTO  consistency would be 
helpful for the many Members – including Australia – that have questions and concerns about border 
carbon adjustment policies, including their possible prot ectionist impacts.  
20.56.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
20.57.   The EU appreciates the continued interest of Members in this important issue. The EU is 
determined to ensure that its declared greenhouse gas reduction targets, required to keep  the 
temperature goals of the Paris Agreement within reach, are implemented in practice. This is why the 
EU is fully translating the necessary steps into legislation. But the climate challenge is inherently 
global. This is why the European Union wants – and needs – its international partners to share a 
comparable level of ambition. As long as climate action is not equally taken at a global level, there 
is a risk of "carbon leakage": put simply, companies transferring production to places where 
decarbonizati on requirements are less strict and, as a result, increasing their emissions there, thus 
leading to a global increase in emissions. This would end  up undermining global climate action 
efforts.  
20.58.   In the European Green Deal, the European Commission announced t hat, should differences 
in levels of climate action and ambition worldwide persist as the EU upgrades its own commitments, 
it would need to propose a CBAM, for selected sectors, to tackle the risk of carbon leakage. The 
decarbonization objectives of EU  action would be sharply curtailed if EU  businesses in certain 
emission -intensive sectors were to transfer production to other countries with less stringent 
emissions constraints. This could lead to an increase in total emissions globally, thus undermining 
the effectiveness of the EU's emissions mitigation policies. However, the CBAM would take into 
account efforts by the EU's international partners to adopt policies and measures to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions from industrial production, including through c arbon pricing mechanisms. 
Importers will be treated in an even -handed manner and will not be subject to an adjustment that 
is higher than that applied domestically.  
20.59.   The EU wishes to work with its partners to promote effective methods of decarbonization, 
from technological innovation to market -based approaches, and much in between. The EU is 
committed to stepping up its bilateral engagement in this regard. The European Union is also 
committed to working with EU  trading partners to make sure that adjustment m easures work in an 
open and fair manner – and are in full compliance with WTO  rules. In doing so, the EU shall take 
into account all relevant provisions, such as existing carbon pricing mechanisms applied to the 
proven actual carbon emissions of given prod ucts. G/C/M/139  
 
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  20.60.   The Council  took note  of the statements made.  
21  KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA, KINGDOM OF BAHRAIN, THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES, 
THE STATE OF KUWAIT, OMAN, AND QATAR – SELECTIVE TAX ON CERTAIN IMPORTED 
PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION, JAPAN, SWITZERLA ND, AND THE 
UNITED STATES (G/C/W/792)  
21.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included in the agenda at the request of  the 
European Union, Japan, Switzerland, and the United States . 
21.2.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
21.3.   The Un ited States, the EU, Japan, and Switzerland, circulated questions on 17  March 
regarding the GCC  Selective Tax on Certain Imported Products. The United States looks forward to 
written responses to these questions from each of the member State governments of  the 
Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC) regarding their implementation of the 
selective tax on carbonated soft drinks, malt beverages, energy drinks, sports drinks and other 
sweetened beverages. As noted in the questions, the co -sponsors have raised concerns with 
GCC member States regarding the transparency and application of this tax since it was introduced 
in 2016, including in this Council and in other WTO and bilateral fora.  
21.4.   These concerns relate to the need for GCC  member State g overnments to: (i)  switch from an 
ad valorem  tax on energy drinks and carbonated beverages to a graduated tax based on sugar 
content in beverages in line with international best practice models; (ii)  ensure that tax will be 
applied to all beverages in whic h the total sugar content – from either naturally occurring and/or 
added sugars – exceeds a minimum threshold, including fruit juices and milk -based products; 
(iii) exempt from the selective tax those beverages with no added sugar and low caloric beverages ; 
(iv) harmonize and apply the same tax rate to all beverages subject to the tax for energy drinks and 
other beverages currently covered that have similar amounts of sugar; and (v)  ensure consultation 
with private industry, trading partner governments, and  other interested parties regarding the 
selective tax. Given the study currently being conducted by GCC  member State governments on 
alternative excise tax implementation models and possible revisions of the current excise tax model, 
timely engagement on th ese concerns with interested trading partner governments and private 
industry stakeholders is critical.  
21.5.   The delegate of Switzerland  indicated the following:  
21.6.   Switzerland refers to its past statements in this Council, as well as in the CMA, where it has 
repeatedly raised its concerns with regard to the selective tax, and notably  addressed issues relating 
to the reform of the tax and the harmonization of the tax rate for energy drinks and other 
sugar -containing beverages.15 Last November in this Council, Members were provided with the 
information that the study on the tax reform would be completed soon. However, if Switzerland's 
information is correct, this date h as again been postponed, currently until the end of 2021. This 
delay perpetuates discrimination between beverages that contain a similar amount of sugar, but 
which are taxed differently on the basis of non -scientific criteria. Together with the EU, Japan, and 
the US, Switzerland has raised a series of questions in document  G/C/W/792 regarding specific 
issues about the tax reform. The aim of these written questions was to have a sense about the 
direction of the foreseen reform of the tax, as well as when it would take place. Will it be at the 
beginning, the middle, or at the end of 2021? Switzerland expects to get detailed answers from the 
GCC member States as it is they that together take the decisions and implement the changes. By 
contrast, the GCC  Secretar iat is not able to provide the requested answers as it does not have the 
power to decide. Switzerland reiterates its expectation to be informed sufficiently in advance about 
the results and recommendations of the study, that is, before a final decision is taken at the 
GCC level. Switzerland encourages the GCC  member States to continue to engage and work closely 
with Switzerland and other interested Members, as well as the private sector, in order to modify the 
selective tax and related measures, so that the y are applied in a transparent and non -discriminatory 
manner while meeting the legitimate health policy objectives.  
 
15 See, for example, document  G/C/M/138, paragraphs  33.2-33.3, and document  G/MA/M/73, 
paragraph  25.2 G/C/M/139  
 
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  21.7.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
21.8.   The EU maintains its serious concerns, which have already been voiced in the C TG, the CMA, 
and in bilateral contacts with the GCC  countries, in relation to the GCC  "Treaty on Excise Tax" of 
December  2016. The EU would like to reiterate the importance of harmonizing the implementation 
of the Excise Tax law and the need for a close enga gement with private industry stakeholders on 
the process for revising the tax. The EU would also like to underline the call for providing immediate 
relief for industry until the ongoing GCC  excise taxation revision takes effect, by exempting all 
zero sugar  beverages from the tax and harmonizing the tax rate at 50% for energy drinks and all 
other categories of sugar -sweetened beverages subject to the tax. The EU also looks forward to 
receiving the results of the study concerning the revision of the Excise Ta x as soon as it is available. 
The EU looks forward to receiving written replies from the GCC  countries to the written questions 
which the EU submitted earlier this month, together with Japan, the United States, and Switzerland, 
in document  G/C/W/792. The E U is ready to continue engaging with the GCC  countries on this issue 
in order to ensure positive adjustments to the excise taxes in all GCC  countries.  
21.9.   The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
21.10.   Japan has been expressing its concerns over this issue of the selective tax on carbonated 
soft drinks introduced by certain GCC  member States since 2019. Especially in the United Arab 
Emirates, a high tax rate is imposed on some Japanese carbonated soft drinks due to their 
classification as energy drinks based no t only on the drinks' ingredients but also on the marketing 
and merchandizing methods used for them. Japan does not have any intention to raise an objection 
to impose certain excise taxes in order to improve human health. However, if the objective of the 
excise tax is improvement of human health, the tax must be a specific tax in line with the quantity 
of ingredients, such as stimulants, that are harmful to human health. If the UAE does not take the 
above approach, the tax would not act as an incentive to r efrain from consumption of the stimulants 
concerned. Japan therefore requests that the selective tax be modified based on objective reasoning 
in a transparent and constructive manner.  
21.11.   Japan noted that, at the CTG's November  2020 meeting, the Kingdom of Bahrain had stated , 
on behalf of the GCC  members , that they were now undertaking a review. However, Japan has not 
yet received detailed information regarding the future plan for the review from the GCC  members, 
even when communicating with them regarding rela ted meetings. Information on the review has not 
been shared with the business sector or the countries concerned. As such, Japan would appreciate 
an update on the current situation of the review. Also, immediately after the review, a notification 
should be made on the actual implementation of the new measures in order for the business sector 
and countries concerned to address it in an appropriate manner. Finally, Japan requested written 
answers to the questions that had been put forward in document  G/C/W/792 . 
21.12.   The delegate of the Kingdom of Bahrain , on behalf of the GCC  member States,  indicated the 
following:  
21.13.   The European Union, Japan, Switzerland, and the United States have circulated a 
communication, in document  G/C/W/792, dated 17  March  2021, through which they have submitted 
some questions on the excise tax implemented in the GCC  member States pursuant to the 
GCC Unified Excise Tax Agreement. In reaction to this communication, the Kingdom of Bahrain would 
like to share with the Council the following informa tion on behalf of the GCC  member States, as 
Bahrain is the GCC  Coordinator for the year 2021. First of all, the Kingdom of Bahrain would like to 
emphasize that the compliance of the GCC  member States with international obligations has always 
been, and will  continue to be, a priority. Indeed, they take into consideration all their international 
commitments during the process of enacting new legislation to ensure their continued compliance. 
Specifically, the GCC  member States were cognizant of the need to mai ntain conformity with their 
WTO commitments when ratifying the GCC  Unified Excise Agreement domestically, and when 
enacting their respective domestic excise tax legislation.  
21.14.   As for the questions raised in the communication circulated by the GCC's  trading partners, 
the Kingdom of Bahrain will try to respond to them without necessarily following the order in which 
they were posed. With regard to the GCC  timeline to inform the concerned WTO  Members, the GCC 
will do so as soon as the GCC  member States undertake the completion of all the aspects of the new 
excise tax model and its implementation plan. Once a decision is taken on these matters at G/C/M/139  
 
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  GCC level, there will be a formal communication to inform WTO  Members of the new model and its 
implementation timeline. It is worth noting that the change in the current tax regime is a standing 
process of the "GCC  Tax Working Group" to regularly review different aspects and issues with respect 
to taxation, including excise tax on beverages. Such regular review wi ll take into consideration new 
developments, international best practices, and the optimal methods of the tax under consideration. 
In conducting such reviews, it is essential for the Group to make recommendations in an objective, 
efficient, and non -discrim inatory manner. In fact, the objective is to switch to a graduated tax based 
on sugar content as soon as the GCC  member States complete their review. The project, when 
completed and commonly adopted, will effectively amend the GCC  Unified Excise Tax Treaty . Then 
it is expected that the GCC  member States will announce their respective timeline for domestic 
implementation within a few months of the common work being completed at GCC  level.  
21.15.   The GCC  member States do not consider that their excise tax practices are, or at any point 
were, discriminatory, as the tax is neutral and the same and like products are not subject to different 
tax treatments. Furthermore, the excise tax is applied to achieve the GCC  common health objectives 
and is implemented on all produc ts that fall within the definitions agreed upon by the GCC  member 
States, regardless of their origin. The GCC  member States emphasize that the excise tax regime is 
not, and was not, discriminatory in any way. The difference in the tax rate between some dri nks is 
based on the inherent difference between the type and content of the beverages. Thus, the 
appropriate tax rate is applicable to a drink depending on how it is categorized on the basis of the 
legal definition for each type of beverage. In this regard , the GCC  member States have common 
definitions and are in process of the amendment of such definitions at GCC  level. In fact, the 
GCC member States are of the opinion that the current excise tax model is a good practice as it 
balances both public health c oncerns and private sector interests. On the other hand, the tiered 
volumetric model may be applied in the future and would be implemented after numerous 
discussions with all the relevant stakeholders in the public and private sectors in order to ensure 
that its implementation is practical, reflecting both policy objectives and industry interests, as well 
as being easy to enforce.  
21.16.   As for the question of fruit juices and dairy products, the GCC  member States have already 
taken steps to expand the application  of the excise tax on sweetened fruit juices and dairy products. 
It should be noted that the expansion was approved by the GCC  member States on 
6 November  2018 for implementation on 1  July 2019. With regard to low calorie beverages, studies 
are being under taken, as mentioned before, on the move towards a tiered volumetric excise tax 
model based on sugar content that would consider the option of imposing low or no tax on beverages 
with low calorie -added sweeteners. The outcomes of the said studies will help the GCC  member 
States to take decisions in this regard. Until now, there is no exemption based on the calorie count 
of the beverages subject to the excise tax. The current beverages definition for excise tax purposes 
does not recognize such a category of d rinks. In fact, the GCC  member States are considering the 
inclusion of this category and making a distinction based on caloric intake in the revised excise tax 
scheme. Such consideration was initially based on the recommendations of the GCC  Tax Working 
Group. The requests from the concerned WTO  Members came to strengthen the thinking of the 
working group.  
21.17.   The GCC  member States have looked at the practices of most countries that implement an 
excise tax on beverages as part of the comprehensive study conducte d to transition to a tiered 
volumetric excise model. The Egyptian experience has been taken into consideration, along with 
other country models, to inspire decision -makers to reach a final decision. As far as the GCC  member 
State governments' formal mechan isms for consultations with private industry are concerned, all 
GCC member States have their own public consultation process in place to obtain feedback and 
commentary from the private sector and any interested party on draft legislations prior to their 
enactment. In this regard, the GCC  member States remain committed to working closely with 
industry stakeholders and welcome their comments and suggestions on regulatory and legislative 
issues that affect the industry, taking these into consideration as they develop and improve 
legislative frameworks. As for the mechanism for consultations with trading partner governments, 
the GCC  member States are open to all commonly known mechanisms and use all of them at both 
bilateral and WTO  levels.  
21.18.   The Kingdom of Bahrai n would like to assure GCC  trading partners that all comments and 
suggestions from the relevant stakeholders, including the private sector, as well as from officials 
from WTO  Members, are taken into consideration. For this purpose, the GCC  member States ha ve G/C/M/139  
 
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  maintained open and transparent dialogue with private stakeholders, as well as with GCC  trading 
partners, to ensure transparency and effectiveness.  
21.19.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
22  EGYPT – IMPORT RESTRICTIONS FOR SUGAR – REQUEST FROM THE EU ROPEAN UNION  
22.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included in the agenda at the request of  the 
European Union . 
22.2.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
22.3.   Since 4  June 2020, Egypt implemented a series of three -month restrictions on imports of 
sugar that have been prolonged three  times. The most recent prolongation took place on 
4 March  2021, again for a period of three  months. In the Committee on Agriculture meeting of 
28 July 2020, the EU asked Egypt to explain how i t sees this measure respecting the requirements 
of Article  XI:2(c)  of the GATT . To date, Egypt has not provided a reply. Moreover, in the Committee 
on Import Licensing's meeting of 9  October  2020, the EU asked Egypt to submit all the relevant 
information w hich could justify the import prohibitions applied to raw and white sugar. Again, to 
date, no information has been received. Following the most recent prolongation of the measure, the 
EU asked Egypt, in the Committee on Agriculture's meeting of 30  March  2021, how the import 
restrictions on sugar fitted with its commitments under Article  XI of the GATT (General Elimination 
of Quantitative Restrictions). Furthermore, the EU enquired about the current market situation in 
Egypt, the modalities of obtaining an i mport approval for sugar, and recent import statistics. The EU 
continues to seek Egypt's replies to these questions concerning its restrictions on the import of raw 
and white sugar. The EU considers that these import restrictions are not in line with Egypt 's 
WTO obligations and urges Egypt to rapidly eliminate these trade -distorting measures.  
22.4.   The delegate of Brazil  indicated the following:  
22.5.   The decision of the Egyptian government to impose restrictions on sugar imports is of concern 
to Brazil both from an ec onomic and commercial point of view, given the importance of sugar exports 
in Brazil's export basket, and from a systemic point of view, given the prohibition by Article  4 of the 
Agreement on Agriculture on QRs on imports of agricultural products. It is of  paramount importance, 
and as a way of ensuring the stability of the agricultural trading system, including by strengthening 
its resilience and robustness, that WTO  Members, as set out in the aforementioned provision of the 
Agreement on Agriculture, limit themselves to applying customs duties on trade in agricultural 
products. In this sense, Brazil  asks Egypt to eliminate its import ban on sugar.  
22.6.   The delegate of Egypt  indicated the following:  
22.7.   Egypt thanks the delegations of the EU and Brazil for their conti nued interest in this matter 
and wishes to clarify the following points. Currently, there is no ban on the import of sugar into the 
Egyptian market. The recent Ministerial Decree No.  606, issued on 3  December  2020, allows for the 
importation of white sugar , as is the case for imports of raw sugar, through obtaining an import 
approval from the Minister of Trade and Industry and the Ministry of Supply and Internal Trade, and 
this Ministerial Decree was renewed on 4  March  2021. Egypt reiterates that the measur es it has 
taken in relation to sugar imports are of a temporary nature and in order to address the inventory 
surplus of sugar due to the impact of the current pandemic on different economic activities and on 
local consumption. These measures will be review ed on a regular basis.  
22.8.   It is also important to point out that, in order to ensure the continuity of trade, since the 
issuance of the first  decree in June  2020, a number of trade -facilitating measures have been taken 
by the Egyptian authorities, including: (i) excluding products that have been shipped or have arrived 
before the entry into force of the decree; (ii)  excluding shipments for which credit lines were opened 
before the entry into force of the decree; (iii)  excluding contracts concluded, legalized, and 
accredited, from Egyptian consulates abroad, in case of transfer of at least 10% of its value before 
the date of entry into force of the decree, provided that they are implemented in a time -period of 
no longer than a year; and (iv)  excluding contracts concluded, legalized, and accredited, from 
Egyptian consulates abroad, in case of transfer of the total value before the date of entry into force 
of the decree.  G/C/M/139  
 
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  22.9.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
23  SRI LANKA – IMPORT BAN ON VARIOUS PRODUCTS – REQU EST FROM AUSTRALIA AND 
THE EUROPEAN UNION  
23.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included in the agenda at the request of  
Australia and the European Union . 
23.2.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
23.3.   The European Union continues t o have serious concerns over the broad import restrictions 
imposed by Sri Lanka, in various forms, since April of last year. The European Union repeats its 
position that it has serious doubts concerning whether Sri Lanka is accomplishing its commitments 
under the GATT , specifically the Understanding on the Balance -of-Payments Provisions of the 
GATT  1994, and also the GATS. The European Union does not dispute that Members can take import 
restrictions in the case of a critical Balance -of-Payments (BOP) situat ion. However, when doing so, 
a WTO  Member must comply with its relevant WTO  obligations. Such measures must be consistent 
with WTO  rules (GATT  Article  XII, GATT  Article  XVIII(b), and the Understanding on the Balance -of-
Payments Provisions of the GATT  1994) . These measures have already been in place for over 
10 months, and Sri Lanka has still not complied with the following: (i)  the obligation to notify the 
import restriction to the General Council and to enter into consultations with other WTO  Members; 
(ii) the need for the measures to be temporary in nature – as the measures have no expiration date 
and apply "until further notice"; (iii)  the obligation to present timetables for progressive relaxation 
and phasing out until final elimination of the measures; and (iv)  the need to administer the import 
restrictions in a transparent manner.  
23.4.   The European Union notes that, since its initial measure of April  2020, Sri Lanka has 
repeatedly modified its regulations, and has gradually moved products from the banned cat egory 
into the category where imports are subject to a 90 or 180 -day credit facility. However, the measures 
still remain heavy, complex, and non -transparent. And on a select number of tariff lines, such as 
cars and tyres, or the import of certain textiles,  a full import ban remains in place. This seems clearly 
targeted to protect a particular domestic industry. The European Union wishes to recall that open 
trade remains an essential element in supporting the recovery from the COVID -19 pandemic. It is 
in Mem bers' common interest to maintain conducive trade policies and to promote trade and 
investment as key factors for development. Protectionist or short -term approaches risk causing 
structural and systemic constraints, which will have a long -lasting impact on  the economy. It is 
worrying that, in 2020, EU  exports to Sri Lanka decreased by 27% – way beyond the average decline 
in EU exports of 9%. The European Union, therefore, reiterates its concerns over the measures taken 
by the Government of Sri Lanka affecti ng EU  exports, including the lack of notification and 
justification of the measures. In the absence of any justification of these measures, the EU calls for 
their full withdrawal.  
23.5.   The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
23.6.   Australia appreciates the  recent engagement by Sri Lanka on this issue. Australia appreciates 
the difficult circumstances that Sri Lanka is under as a result of the impact of COVID -19 on its 
economy and trade. Nevertheless, a well -functioning, transparent, predictable, and stable global 
trading system remains fundamental to global economic stability. Australia would like to reiterate 
the concerns it raised at the November  2020 C TG, and shares the concerns of the European Union 
with respect to these measures implemented by Sri Lanka , including import restrictions and 
limitations on commercial banks relating to payment arrangements for imports. These measures 
appear to be overly trade -restrictive, do not appear to have a clear end -date – noting that they are 
in place "until further no tice", and have not been notified to the WTO.  
23.7.   Australia reiterates its request for Sri Lanka to notify the WTO of these measures as soon as 
possible and to provide an explanation of the WTO  basis for the measures. Australia also request s 
Sri Lanka to update Members on when these measures will be lifted. The lack of certainty has been 
trade -disruptive and has impacted Australia's exporters' ability to provide staple foodstuffs to 
Sri Lankan consumers. Australia requests Sri Lanka to reassu re Members that the measures have 
only been implemented to address the immediate impacts of COVID -19, and that they will not be G/C/M/139  
 
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  maintained longer than necessary. Finally, Australia requests Sri Lanka to ensure that these 
measures are being implemented in a  manner consistent with Sri Lanka's WTO  obligations.  
23.8.   The delegate of Argentina  indicated the following:  
23.9.   Argentina wishes to join the EU and Australia in raising this concern as Notification 
No. 2184/21 of the Government of Sri Lanka affects Argentine expor ts of mung beans. Argentina 
refers to its previous  Council  statements in this regard .16 
23.10.   The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
23.11.   Japan shares the views expressed by the EU and is likewise concerned that the measure is 
inconsistent with Article  XI:1 of the GATT. Sri Lanka explained that the rationale behind the measure 
derives from the difficulties it is facing in terms of its balance of payments. However, taking into 
account the practical and procedural requirements provided in the Agree ment on Balance of 
Payments (BOP), due caution must be taken when implementing import restrictive measures. Japan 
would like to know the reason why Sri  Lanka considers its measure to be legitimate and also urges 
Sri Lanka to revoke the measure as soon as p ossible , in line with its explanation that the measure 
is temporary.  
23.12.   The delegate of Sri Lanka  indicated the following:  
23.13.   Sri Lanka takes this opportunity to appreciate the interest shown by the delegations of the 
European Union, the United States, Australia , Argentina,  and Japan, on Sri Lanka's trade policies in 
general and for directing their specific concerns on the current trade measures taken by Sri Lanka 
to curb the COVID -19 pandemic in the island. Sri Lanka made very detailed statements at the CTG 
and the CMA  sessions when this matter was raised. The texts of its interventions were also shared 
with interested delegations and the contents of these statements are still relevant in addressing the 
concerns raised by the interested delegations.17 The emphasi s of these Members has been on the 
compliance with provisions in the GATT and the BOP. However, Sri Lanka already explained why it 
considers that these measures are covered by the GATS rather than the GATT and is, therefore, 
within its legal limits in rela tion to the justification of these measures.  
23.14.   From the statements which interested delegations made at the CMA and the CTG  meetings, 
it is evident that the major concerns raised by these delegations evolve around Sri Lanka's 
transparency obligations and the  duration of the temporary measures. Having considered their 
concerns in a pragmatic manner, Sri Lanka has already taken the initial steps towards ensuring Sri 
Lanka's transparency obligations. In this regard, Sri Lanka is pleased to inform Members that it  has 
already contacted the WTO  Secretariat and shared an overview of the measures currently in force 
for the purposes of seeking the Secretariat's guidance, further information on notification formats, 
and technical assistance enabling Sri Lanka to notify the existing measures to the appropriate 
Council/Committee in the very near future, which Sri Lanka considers to be the Council for Trade in 
Services, in order to fulfil its transparency obligations. With respect to the second  matter, on the 
duration of th e temporary measures, which were targeted and for a specific purpose, Sri Lanka is 
ready to engage constructively with the interested delegations with a view to presenting a clear 
picture of the measures currently in force. As the EU noted, some of the mea sures have already 
been removed. This will supplement the information that Sri  Lanka had already shared with the 
interested delegations recently. The intention of this interaction is to apprise them of the remaining 
measures, as most of the measures have e ither been removed or eased by Sri Lanka over the past 
few months, as Sri  Lanka believes in the gradual liberalization of its measures.  
23.15.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
 
16 Document  G/C/M /138, paragraphs  34.6-34.7. 
17 Document  G/C/M/138, paragraphs  34.10 -34.16.  G/C/M/139  
 
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  24  UNITED STATES – IMPORT RESTRICTIONS ON APPLES AND PEARS – REQUEST FROM 
THE EUROPEAN UNION  
24.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included in the agenda at the request of  the 
European Union . 
24.2.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
24.3.   The European  Union regrets that the United States has so far failed to  solve this matter, 
despite the EU raising this issue on multiple occasions in the SPS  Committee and this Council. The 
scientific risk assessment carried out by the United States has been finalized already years ago and 
demonstrated that safe imports of ap ples and pears can take place from the EU under a systems 
approach. The United States continues to block the publication of its Federal Notice, which is the last 
remaining step to allowing imports of apples and pears from the EU under this systems approach , 
and this without any scientific ground. The United States is herewith going against the 
SPS Agreement: it maintains an approval procedure with undue delays and without providing a 
scientific justification explaining these delays. The EU urges the United States to base its import 
policy on science, in line with its WTO  commitments. In this regard, the EU urges the US to finalize 
the last purely administrative step to allow market access of apples and pears from the EU without 
any further delay. The EU look s forward to continuing to cooperate with the United States with the 
aim of finding a swift solution to this matter.  
24.4.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
24.5.   The United States thanks the EU for its continued interest in the status of the request from 
eight EU member States to export apples and pears under a systems approach to the United States. 
The US  Department of Agriculture continues to work through its administrative procedures on this 
request. The United States would again note that the EU is able to export apples and pears to the 
United States under the existing preclearance programme.  
24.6.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
25  INDONESIA – IMPORT AND EXPORT RESTRICTING POLICIES AND PRACTICES – 
REQUEST FROM AUSTRALIA, THE EUROPEAN UNION, JAPAN, NEW ZEALAND, AND THE 
UNITED STATES  
25.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included in the agenda at the request of  
Australia, the European Union, Japan, New Zealand, and the United States . 
25.2.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
25.3.   Under this long -standing agenda item, the European Union has repeatedly stressed that an 
announced shift towards more trade openness and a deeper integration of Indonesia in world trade, 
which the EU welcomes, cannot result solely  in measures to improve the country's trade balance 
and an exclusive focus on promoting exports and attracting investments. To truly integrate into 
global value chains, a country also needs to be open to increasing its imports. Creating a trade and 
investm ent-friendly climate is necessary to achieve this result. The European Union is therefore 
encouraged by the recent Omnibus Law on Job Creation. The bill is designed to stimulate domestic 
and foreign investment by removing bureaucratic inefficiencies and ex cessive licensing requirements 
as well as opaque, overlapping, and contradictory regulations. The European Union is looking forward 
to seeing the trade and investment facilitation effects of these measures. The European Union is 
also relieved that the impo rt ban on EU  alcoholic beverages in place since April  2019 has been lifted 
and that trade flows have resumed. The EU  trade and investment relations with Indonesia continue 
nevertheless to be hampered by a long list of pervasive non -tariff barriers. The EU will only elaborate 
on recent developments.  
25.4.   On the export restrictions side, the EU has initiated a dispute settlement case to address the 
ban on nickel exports. Imports of food and agricultural products in Indonesia continue to be 
hampered by the lack of transparency and undue delays in SPS  import approval procedures. The EU 
is particularly concerned by the lack of progress on its export applications on beef, dairy, poultry, 
pork, and plant products, which in some instances were submitted more than seven  years ago, and G/C/M/139  
 
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  on most of which Indonesia has failed to provide any feedback for many years. Moreover, Indonesia 
has only concluded the approval procedure and opened its market in a very few cases. The long 
period needed for risk assessment is also not just ified from a scientific point of view. Regulation 
No. 77 of 2019, regarding the "Second Amendment on the Ministry of Trade Regulation No.  85/M-
DAG/PER/10/2015 Regarding the Provisions on the Imports of Textiles and Textile Products" aims 
at preventing impo rtation of a significant number of textiles and textile products by means of an 
extremely complex import licensing scheme. Since January  2020, these products can only be 
imported to meet the processing needs of domestic producers and small or mid -sized ind ustries. 
This legislation has not been notified in accordance with WTO  terms and affects EU  operators in the 
sector  very negatively. Moreover, Ministry of Trade Regulation No.  68/2020 of 28  August  2020, 
concerning Provisions for the Imports of Footwear, El ectronics, and Two -Wheeled and Tricycle 
Bicycles aims at suppressing the imports of the targeted consumer goods. Finally, the 
implementation of Law No.  33/2014 – also known as the Halal Law – has been creating uncertainty. 
Government Regulation No.  31 of 2 019 on the Implementation of Law No.  33 of 2014 entered into 
force in May  2019. Not one of these measures has been notified to the TBT  Committee.  
25.5.   The European Union would request Indonesia to provide clarification on the specific products 
covered within th e defined categories (Halal and Haram). The European Union further considers that 
Indonesia's requirement for a bilateral government -to-government Mutual Recognition Agreement 
as a pre -condition for the Indonesian Halal Product Assurance Agency (BPJPH) to start recognizing 
Halal-certifying agencies in a foreign country is complicated in practice and unnecessarily 
burdensome. The additional registration requirement for Halal certifications issued by foreign bodies 
appears to be duplicative and time -consuming . The European Union therefore reiterates its invitation 
to Indonesia to consider less cumbersome practical solutions to continue recognizing Halal -certifying 
institutions and to provide further information on the technical implementation of the cooperatio n 
between BPJPH and foreign Halal agencies. The EU also calls upon Indonesia to keep Halal 
certification and Halal labelling voluntary as a less trade restrictive measure, and not to impose 
non-Halal labelling for products or services not claimed by the pr oducer as being Halal. The EU 
considers that "non -Halal" labelling is unnecessary and creates an excessive burden for operators. 
For additional detail, the EU refers to the EU's comments and questions raised in the TBT  Committee. 
The EU is currently analys ing the Implementing Regulation of the Omnibus Law on Halal, which 
Indonesia has just notified. The EU is hopeful that this will address its concerns. To sum up, the 
European Union looks forward to soon seeing the positive effects of the Omnibus Law. Since  the 
CTG's previous meeting, market access for EU  alcoholic beverages has been restored; nevertheless, 
there is a persisting and urgent need to reduce the high number of trade barriers that have been 
affecting EU  trade flows for too long, and to refrain fr om issuing new ones, in line with Indonesia's 
commitments in the G -20. 
25.6.   The delegate of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
25.7.   New Zealand echoes the concerns raised by the European Union. New Zealand believes that 
Indonesia's restrictions on agricultural imp orts undermine core WTO  principles. New Zealand is 
particularly concerned about the inconsistent issuance of import licences. Delays in import licences 
last year prevented commercially meaningful access for New Zealand horticultural products to the 
Indones ian market for a significant proportion of New Zealand's export season. Delays in the 
processing of applications this year reduce the commercial certainty exporters have in this market. 
New Zealand looks forward to the timely issuance of commercially meani ngful import licences to 
allow trade to flow freely for the remainder of this season. New Zealand requests an update from 
Indonesia on how the issues previously experienced will be addressed.  
25.8.   The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
25.9.   Australia wel comes the opportunity to co -sponsor this agenda item. Australia shares 
Members' concerns regarding Indonesia's import restricting measures, in particular regarding import 
licensing. Australia notes that a number of Indonesia's import policies continue to u nnecessarily 
restrict and impact imports. Australia thanks Indonesia for its engagement with Australia to date on 
this issue — including under the Indonesia -Australia Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
(IA-CEPA) — and requests that it continues to ensure t hat any delays are resolved and trade in the 
affected products can resume as soon as possible. Australia is encouraged by Indonesia's efforts to 
improve its import licen sing regime through implementation of its Omnibus Law on Job Creation 
(Law No.  11 of 20 20), including by simplifying permit processes for agricultural products. Australia 
encourages Indonesia to promptly notify WTO  Members about regulations to implement the Omnibus G/C/M/139  
 
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  Law, including in relation to the operation of the Commodity Balance, which A ustralia understands 
will inform decisions about import and export permits. Australia would like to better understand how 
the proposed usage of the Commodity Balance will affect the issuing of import permits. Australia 
also requests Indonesia to explain wh ether there was any consideration of the adoption of automatic 
import licensing procedures as part of the Omnibus Law, and why this was not adopted. Australia 
requests that Indonesia ensures that all its measures, including the latest proposed changes 
resulting from the Omnibus Law, are consistent with its WTO  obligations, and in particular those 
under the WTO  Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures.  
25.10.   The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
25.11.   As Japan has stated in the General Council, as well as in th e TRIMs  Committee, Japan 
continues to have concerns over Indonesia's local content requirement measures in various areas, 
as over their consistency with WTO  Agreements. These include a measure for 4G  LTE mobile devices 
and measures in the retail sector. Ja pan continues to raise the issue, taking into consideration the 
situation that Indonesia has not made any improvements, even though Indonesia explained that it 
was working on a comprehensive review of various local content requirement measures, and that it  
was proceeding with harmonizing a set of regulations. Japan would like Indonesia to implement 
these measures in accordance with the WTO  Agreements and also to explain the process and content 
of the reviews in a transparent manner.  
25.12.   Indonesia has been intro ducing increasing numbers of trade restrictive measures, which 
appear to be inconsistent with Article  XI:1 of the GATT. For example, since import licensing measures 
for textiles products and air conditioner products were introduced in October  2019 and Augu st 2020, 
respectively, imports have dramatically decreased. Moreover, on textile products, it was truly 
regrettable that the safeguard measure on carpets was introduced on 17  February  2021, even 
though Japan called upon Indonesia to reconsider this measure  during the meeting of the Safeguards 
Committee, as well as in the consultations on Article  XIX:2 of the GATT. Japan questions Indonesia's 
action of imposing a high duty, amounting to 150 to 200%, without considering the negative impact 
of the introduction  of the aforementioned import licensing measures. Japan is not convinced that 
this falls within the scope of "to the extent and for such time as may be necessary to prevent or 
remedy such injury", as stipulated in Article  XIX of the GATT. Japan is concerne d by Indonesia's 
introduction of increased trade restrictive measures that are questionable in terms of their 
WTO consistency. Japan has therefore prepared some written questions for Indonesia after receiving 
its request in the TRIMs  Committee. Japan urges  Indonesia to explain the background to the 
introduction of the measures, as well as their legitimacy in terms of WTO  consistency. Japan also 
urges Indonesia to withdraw the measures immediately.  
25.13.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
25.14.   This Council is well aware of the breadth of concerns that the United States has with 
Indonesia's trade and investment regime. In previous interventions in this body, the United States 
has reviewed in some detail the broad range of its concerns, including o ver import licensing 
requirements, standards requirements, pre -shipment inspection requirements, and export 
restrictions, including taxes and prohibitions, among others. These types of restrictions affect a 
broad range of sectors. The United States would l ike to focus its remarks today, however, on several 
emerging issues in the ICT and digital trade space in Indonesia that the United States considers 
deeply worrisome.  
25.15.   First, the United States continues to note concerns that Indonesia is applying tariffs at the 
border on a category of ICT  products that appear to exceed its WTO  bound tariff commitments. For 
example, Indonesia has a duty -free tariff commitment for all products that are classified under tariff 
subheading  8517.62. However, US and Indon esian traders report that a 10%  duty is being levied 
for certain products in this tariff category. The United States has been raising this issue repeatedly 
with Indonesia over the past year, including in the Market Access and ITA  Committees, as well as 
bilaterally. Unfortunately, Indonesia has yet to provide a substantive response to the US  concerns. 
The United States understands that US  companies have also engaged the Indonesian government 
directly on this issue, seeking clarification of Indonesia's applic ation of these tariffs. Despite their 
efforts, they too have yet to receive a satisfactory response from Indonesia. In addition to calling 
into question Indonesia's bound commitments, the costs of Indonesia's policies in this space are not 
insignificant, p ractically speaking. Indonesia's tariffs not only impose an unfair financial burden on G/C/M/139  
 
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  foreign firms, but they also limit access for Indonesian consumers and firms to important high -tech 
products.  
25.16.   Second, the United States continues to have significant con cerns with Indonesia's use of 
local content requirements, including their expanding use in the ICT  sector. For example, Indonesia 
requires 30%  local content for 4G  LTE subscriber stations (cell phones, laptops, and tablets) and 
40% local content for 4G  LTE base stations. And for over a decade now, Indonesia has imposed local 
content requirements on wireless broadband equipment. Unfortunately, Indonesia now appears to 
be expanding these local content requirements, with the ICT  Ministry issuing regulations in  late 2019 
that establish a legal basis for the application of local content requirements to telecommunication 
tools and devices. In response to Members' concerns, Indonesia agreed to undertake a 
"comprehensive" review of its local content policies. Howeve r, it has now been over two  years since 
the launch of this review and Indonesia has yet to provide any updates or further information.  
25.17.   Third, the United States is concerned by recent reporting that Indonesia may move forward 
with plans to apply import duti es on electronically transmitted software and digital goods. The United  
States first raised this issue before the Council in 2018 when Indonesia issued a regulation 
establishing five  8-digit tariff lines for such products. The United States is raising its concerns again 
today because of recent public statements by the Indonesian Finance Minister indicating that 
Indonesia may move forward with such duties. Such a move would contravene the  customs duties 
Moratorium, through which Members, including Indonesia, agreed not to impose tariffs on digital 
content transmitted electronically. The United States is hopeful that, by raising these issues today, 
it can help to pave the way for greater en gagement on these issues and move towards their 
expeditious resolution. The United States thanks the Indonesian delegation in advance for its 
engagement.  
25.18.   The delegate of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
25.19.   Indonesia thanks Australia, the European Union, Jap an, New Zealand, and the United States, 
for their interest in Indonesia's import and export policies. Before responding to the concerns, 
Indonesia is of the view that this agenda title is too general, and one where new issues may be 
raised by Members witho ut prior notice being given, making it difficult for Indonesia to identify the 
concerns before the meeting. In general, Indonesia's export and import policies are inter alia  aiming 
to provide a better business environment and climate. This is reflected thr ough a series of continuous 
efforts made to deregulate and improve Indonesia's trade -related regulations and policies, of which 
the most recent is the Law on Job Creation, which entered into force on 2  November  2020. Under 
the Law, business licensing, incl uding export, import, and investment licensing, will be further 
simplified to make it more streamlined and effective. Indonesia's government is now preparing the 
implementing regulations that it believes and expects will address the issues raised by Member s 
under this agenda item. To conclude, Indonesia took note of Members' concerns to this date and is 
committed to discuss the issues further with the WTO  Members concerned.  
25.20.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
26  EGYPT – MANUFACTURER REGISTRATION SYST EM – REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN 
UNION AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  
26.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included in the agenda at the request of  the 
European Union and the Russian Federation . 
26.2.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the follow ing: 
26.3.   The European Union would like to reiterate its concerns with regard to the registration of 
companies exporting to Egypt under Decrees No.  991/2015, No.  43/2016, and No.  44/2019. This 
registration procedure constitutes a considerable obstacle to trade,  imposes an unnecessary 
administrative burden, and blocks or substantially delays EU  exports. The EU therefore continues to 
question Egypt's justification for this mandatory registration of EU  companies. The EU notes with 
concern that most of the pending r egistration cases known to the EU have still not been successfully 
processed and that some sectors (like ceramic tiles) continue being disproportionately affected by 
the discretionary application of Decree No.  43. Moreover, the EU would like to highlight t he structural 
problems relating to Decree No.  43/2016, like the lack of transparency in the registration process, G/C/M/139  
 
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  the lack of clear deadlines for processing requests, the lack of a clear appeals procedure, and a high 
level of discretion in granting registr ations. Therefore, the EU considers that this measure should be 
either terminated or substantially improved. The EU is ready to work with Egypt in order to finalize 
the registrations of pending applications and to work on solutions that would prevent delay s in future 
registrations.  
26.4.   The delegate of the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
26.5.   Russia regrets to raise this concern on the Egyptian registration procedures of foreign 
companies under Decree No.  43/2016 once again, and reiterates its statements made during the 
previous meetings of the TBT  Committee and the CTG.18 Unfortunately, the reasons for this concern 
still remain, and the conditions still hold. A Russian steel manufacturer has been trying to get 
registered since 2016, but without any progre ss. Over this period the company has not received any 
substantive feedback on its application apart from one  time when it was requested by the General 
Organization for Export and Import Control (GOEIC) to update some submitted documents that had 
expired. T his request was swiftly satisfied. Russia takes note that the purpose of the decree is to 
ensure the reliability and credibility of exporters. It is surprising that the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry is questioning the company's reliability and credibility  in the case of traditional exporters 
that have been shipping their products to Egypt for decades. The company in question currently 
supplies Egypt with other products and does not raise questions of reliability in other sectors. Such 
a denial of market ac cess to certain sectors of the Egyptian market suggests that the reasons behind 
those decisions are different from those stated publicly. Russia has witnessed that the list of Russian 
companies that are facing registration problems is widening and, therefo re, requests the delegation 
of Egypt to provide the Russian companies with market access in accordance with the WTO  rules, 
and to bring its measures into conformity with those rules.  
26.6.   The delegate of Turkey  indicated the following:  
26.7.   Turkey will refrain from repeating the points raised previously in this Council and the 
TBT Committee and limit itself to stating that its concerns are still ongoing with regard to Egypt's 
manufacturer registration system. Rather than problems faced only by individual companies, t here 
are structural problems in relation to this Decree and its implementation that lead to unpredictability 
and arbitrariness. In this sense, it is still unclear how the applications to the  GOEIC are evaluated, 
whether the completion of the process is sub ject to any time -limits, and which steps should be 
followed to complete a registration process. In addition, companies are not informed of the status 
of their application on a regular basis. Predictably, they face long delays and bear additional costs 
in the registration process. As a result, Turkey would like to ask Egypt to review its measures, taking 
into consideration its obligations under the WTO  Agreements, and ensuring their implementation in 
full transparency. Turkey believes that this hindrance wil l be overcome given the continued dialogue 
with Egypt, and Turkey stands ready to engage with Egypt on all trade -related measures.  
26.8.   The delegate of the Republic of Korea  indicated the following:  
26.9.   Korea has expressed its concerns on this issue over several ye ars and would like to reiterate 
its previous position. The registration procedures carried out by Egypt are causing serious delays for 
foreign manufacturers of specific products, which includes requiring the issuance of certificates of 
conformity and certi fications of inspection. These measures constitute a non -tariff barrier and 
undermine the free trade system. Korea urges Egypt to take appropriate measures by improving its 
trade restrictive policies and practices.  
26.10.   The delegate of Egypt  indicated the follo wing:  
26.11.   Egypt thanks the delegations of the European Union and the Russian Federation for their 
continued interest in this issue; as well as the delegations of Turkey and the Republic of Korea for 
their interventions today. Since the CTG's previous meeting, last November, bilateral meetings 
between Capitals with some of Egypt's trading partners have taken place in order to discuss 
Members' concerns regarding the delay in the registration process under Ministerial Decree 
No. 43/2016. Egypt would like to assure  its trading partners of its understanding for their concerns, 
 
18 Document  G/C/M/138, paragraphs  15.2-15.4, and document  G/TBT/M/83, paragraph  2.288.  G/C/M/139  
 
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  and Egypt will continue to follow -up with its Capital in order to resolve the issue of pending 
registration requests.  
26.12.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
27  CHINA – CUSTOMS DUTIES ON CER TAIN INTEGRATED CIRCUITS – REQUEST FROM THE 
EUROPEAN UNION AND JAPAN  
27.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included in the agenda at the request of  the 
European Union and Japan . 
27.2.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
27.3.   The European Union continues to have concerns about Chinese duties on 
MCO semiconductors, raised on numerous occasions in the past. The EU continues to urge China to 
reconsider its classification of certain MCO  products, where dut ies should not apply even if such 
duties are being gradually lowered as the implementation of the staged cuts progresses.  
27.4.   The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
27.5.   Japan will carefully observe whether all of the relevant tariffs on goods are eventuall y 
eliminated by July  2021, in accordance with China's ITA concession schedule.  
27.6.   The delegate of Chinese Taipei  indicated the following:  
27.7.   Chinese Taipei supports the statements made by the EU and Japan, and echoes the concerns 
that they have just raised. Chinese Taipei's views on this agenda item have already been expressed 
on numerous occasions since 2018. Chinese Taipei takes note of the fact that all of the duties on 
multi-component semiconductors (MCOs) will be eliminated by this July.  Neverthe less, Chinese  
Taipei must reiterate the fundamental principle that the scope of Members' tariff concessions under 
their WTO  commitments should not be altered during their tariff transpositions. Chinese Taipei will 
continue to closely monitor developments o n this subject until the duties on the products concerned 
have been completely eliminated.  
27.8.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
27.9.   China thank s the delegations for their continued interest in this  issue. As the same question 
has been raised many tim es and China has  repeated its response in various bodies, China has  no 
intention of repeat ing its detailed statement again  on this occasion . What China  would like to do is 
to reiterate that its methodology is consistent with WTO  rules, and that the duties on the 
MCO products concerned will be eliminated in July  2021.  
27.10.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
28  CHINA – EXPORT CONTROL LAW – REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION AND JAPAN  
28.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included in the agenda at the request of  the 
European Union and Japan . 
28.2.   The delegation of the European Union  indicated the following:  
28.3.   The EU is closely following the developments in China's new Export Control Law, which passed 
the Standing Committee of China's National Peo ple's Congress on 17  October  2020 and took effect 
on 1 December  2020. While recognizing that it consolidates China's non -proliferation commitments 
and export controls, the EU has four  major concerns regarding China's Export Control Law.  
28.4.   First, on extra -territorial application, because the law contains a new provision with 
extraterritorial application determining the consequences for foreign individuals and organizations 
outside of China violating the law and endangering the national security and interests o f China 
(Article  44), which is not in line with internationally agreed export control standards.  G/C/M/139  
 
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  28.5.   Second, on rules on deemed exports and re -exports, because the law appears to provide for 
controls that apply to transactions within China (referred to as deem ed exports, Article  2.3). In this 
regard, the EU places great importance on the non -discriminatory treatment of EU  companies in 
China (for example, of their Chinese subsidiaries). The EU is concerned that the concept of deemed 
exports, which goes beyond th e internationally agreed export control standards, might lead to 
unequal treatment and have adverse effects on the activities of EU  companies in China (including 
their research and development activities, for example). Furthermore, the law foresees control s on 
re-transfer or re -exports (Article  16 and Article  45), while it is unclear whether the obligation not to 
re-export items without the prior consent of the Chinese authorities also applies to foreign products 
that contain controlled items obtained from China as components. The previous draft included an 
explicit provision in this regard in case the controlled items exceeded a certain threshold. It would 
be useful if China could confirm that such obligation is not included in the current re -export provisi on. 
28.6.   Third, on the objectives and scope of controls, because the law names "national security and 
interests" as a prime objective, next to "non -proliferation and other international obligations". Even 
though the law does not any longer reference "developmen t interests", "industrial competence", or 
"technological development" as control principles (as previous drafts did), the EU is nevertheless 
concerned that Article  1 ("national security and interests") as well as Article  3 ("national security" 
and coordina tion of "security and development") contain vague language still reflecting objectives 
other than China's international security obligations and commitments. The EU recalls that the 
objectives and scope of export controls should be in line with internation al obligations and 
multilateral commitments. The EU would therefore welcome clarification in this regard, as well as on 
the intended application and specification of other related provisions that could lead to legal 
uncertainty for economic operators, as, for example, on the application of control parameters 
("national security" and "development", Article  1, Article  3, and Article  13; and "terrorist purposes", 
Article  12), the scope of controls ("temporary controls", Article  9) and related control lists, th e 
understanding of exporters' obligations in this regard ("is or should be aware", Article  12), the scope 
of investigations by the authorities (in case of "suspected violations", Article  28), and the information 
restrictions (prohibited for reasons of nati onal security, Article  32). 
28.7.   Fourth, on the retaliation clause, because Article  48 provides for "reciprocal measures by the 
Chinese Government where the abuse of export control measures by any country or region 
endangers its national security and interests" . This provision is not in line with international export 
control standards. The EU will place great importance on any secondary legislation and would 
welcome clarifications and specifications on the application of such provisions.  
28.8.   The delegation of Japan  indicated the following:  
28.9.   Japan continues to have concerns over China's Export Control Law, which entered into force 
last December. Japan believes that this law may constitute an overly stringent export regulation that 
goes beyond the scope of the internati onal export control regime and may be inconsistent with 
Article  XI of the GATT. As Japan has stated in past Council meetings, and taking into consideration 
the objective of the law to safeguard national security and interests, Japan is concerned that the 
scope of products subject to restrictions appears to be quite diverse, and that there may be cases 
that require unnecessary disclosure of technological information during classification and 
end-user/usage investigations. Japan is also concerned that the pro visions on countermeasures for 
discriminatory export regulation by other countries are maintained in the law.  
28.10.   As for the scope of the targeted items, the draft regulations concerning rare earths, which 
were published in January  2021, provide that the expor t of rare earth products shall comply with 
said Export Control Law. Japan is concerned that, in complying with the law, the export controls on 
rare earth products will be carried out in an inappropriate manner due to Japan's aforementioned 
concerns. When J apan looks at the draft regulations, which provide a certain amount of control over 
reserves of resources, prioritizing already exploited minerals as strategic reserves in order to offset 
domestic demand might be regarded as de facto  export controls, and t here might be a possibility 
that they are inconsistent with Article  XI:1 of the GATT. Japan urges China not to include rare earth 
products among the items to be covered in the law and to treat domestic demand and export demand 
equally and in a non -discrimi natory manner when it buys and sells reserves on the basis of the rare 
earth regulation. Japan remains concerned that the "Unreliable Entities List" contains a wide range 
of possible measures that may be used as countermeasures, in the same way as the 
countermeasures stipulated in the Export Control Law. In addition, Japan is concerned by the lack G/C/M/139  
 
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  of clarity on the relationship between the entities list in the Export Control Law and this "Unreliable 
Entities List".  
28.11.   Japan is further concerned by the catalogu e of technologies subject to export bans and 
restrictions based on the Foreign Trade Law. The list's objective and scope lack a clear definition and 
could be widely defined as reasons for restrictions for listed technologies and may contain measures 
that a re inconsistent with the Agreement. The relationship between the items covered in the law 
and the technology list in the Export Control Law is also unclear. Japan understands that the details 
of the procedure for implementing the law will be provided in du e course and expects that the scope 
of the items, as well as the technologies list and entities list under the Export Control Law, will be 
provided within the appropriate scope. Japan also expects that a procedure that does not require 
excessive disclosure  of technologies will be prescribed in due course. In addition, Japan is of the 
view that the countermeasure provisions should be removed from the law. Finally, Japan will 
continue to observe the actual practice in the implementation of the law. In this co nnection, Japan 
would like to request China to provide information on the detailed regulations and the timeline for 
them, with sufficient leeway and in full transparency.  
28.12.   The delegation of China  indicated the following:  
28.13.   China requests the European Union to  provide them with  its technical questions. At present, 
China is  still drafting the supporting regulations and control lists of the "Export Control Law". China 
will keep in communication with the relevant Members and will provide updates in due course.  
28.14.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
29  RUSSIAN FEDERATION – TRADE RESTRICTING PRACTICES – REQUEST FROM THE 
EUROPEAN UNION AND THE UNITED STATES  
29.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included in the agenda at the request of  the 
European Union and the United States . 
29.2.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
29.3.   The Russian Federation continues to develop and apply a policy of import substitution and of 
forced localization of production that is contrary to the spirit, and often to the letter, of its 
WTO commitments. Moreover, this policy is bei ng expanded in its scope and made more stringent 
in its requirements. A case in point is the recent proposal to increase the "recycling fee" for certain 
categories of vehicles. Revenue collected from this fee is presumably used to recycle end -of-life 
vehicles, and the measure applies to both domestic and imported goods. Russia is proposing up to 
a six-fold increase for certain categories of vehicles (semi -trailers), and up to 2 -3 times for road 
construction equipment and some agricultural machinery. Has an evaluation of the recycling market 
in Russia concluded that the cost of recycling certain categories of vehicles requires an increase in 
the corresponding fee? The EU has not found evidence of the existence of such an evaluation, which 
the Russian Federati on is invited to provide. Instead, the preamble of the draft Governmental 
Resolution "On amendments to the list of types and categories of wheeled vehicles (chassis) and 
trailers to them, in respect of which the recycling fee is paid, as well as the size o f the recycling fee" 
reads: "It is expected that the increase of the recycling fee will not cause an increase in prices for 
Russian -made cars, as this increase will be offset by a proportional increase in government support 
for sectoral demand stimulation program mes … Additional receipts to the federal budget will allow, 
among other things, to continue the implementation in 2021 of programmes to stimulate demand 
for automotive equipment … The programmes … apply to highly localized cars of a mass, affordable  
price segment."  
29.4.   Similarly, in the course of the public consultation on the measure, the Ministry of Industry 
and Trade said that "the additional revenues received from adjusting the rates of recycling fees will 
be used to finance government support measur es demand." It is thus apparent that, behind the veil 
of an environmental purpose, the Russian Federation's measure actually intends to raise the price 
of foreign products and use the increased revenue to stimulate demand for domestic products, which 
would  not be compatible with Article  III of the GATT (National Treatment). A number of business 
associations in Russia, including those bringing together local companies, expressed well -reasoned 
disagreements with the planned measure. Therefore, the European Un ion calls upon Russia: (i)  to G/C/M/139  
 
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  suspend the planned increase in the recycling fee; (ii)  to conduct a fact -based evaluation of the 
recycling market for vehicles so as to inform future decisions on the level of the recycling fee; and 
(iii) to ensure that measu res supporting demand provide the same advantages to domestic and 
imported products.  
29.5.   At the previous meeting of this Council, the EU voiced its concern over the draft decree 
establishing quotas for foreign products in procurement by State -Owned Enterprises  (SOEs) and by 
some unspecified private entities. This decree, No.  2013, was adopted on 3  December  2020. It lists 
250 lines of customs nomenclature, on which quotas for Russian products were established. These 
quotas reach a prohibitive 90%  level. This is a manifest practice of trade restriction and its 
compatibility with WTO  rules is highly questionable. The EU regrets that it continues to be necessary 
to refer to the blockage of EU  exports of cement to Russia, effective since 2016, and to the absence 
to this date of the remedy announced by the Russian Federation in 2019 in the form an amendment 
to the standard. As previously stated, the European Union considers the amendment to the Federal 
law "on protecting consumer rights", which mandates the pre -install ation of Russian software 
mandatory in a number of consumer electronic devices, to be a potentially discriminatory measure, 
and requests its notification in accordance with the TBT  Agreement.  
29.6.   The European Union repeats its request to notify Federal Law No.  468, "On Viticulture and 
Winemaking", and regrets that Russia refuses to do so. To remind this Council, the law introduced 
many new requirements for the placing of wine products on the Russian market, hence it has to be 
notified to the WTO in accordance w ith the TBT  Agreement. Furthermore, this law uses European 
geographical indications as definitions for certain categories of wine, like Champagne, Cahors, or 
Cognac, and the implementation of this law is not clear. The European Union expects that the 
amend ments to the law, currently in preparation, will be proposed to eliminate the EU's concerns. 
The EU would welcome clarifications as to when these amendments would be adopted.  
29.7.   Finally, the European Union reiterates its concern about the announced introducti on of an 
export ban on timber, starting from 1  January  2022. It would seem that Russia also plans to reduce, 
from four to one, the number of railway border crossing points with the EU for the export of round 
wood. Moreover, the chosen crossing point has pr actically no infrastructure to handle wood trade, 
which would make exports of wood to the EU all but impossible. The European Union would welcome 
explanations from Russia about how such an export ban and related measures may be compatible 
with WTO  rules, a nd urges Russia to notify any corresponding draft legislation. The EU continues to 
call upon Russia to ensure that its measures fully conform to WTO  rules and to abandon its policy of 
import substitution and localization.  
29.8.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
29.9.   The United States joins the EU to raise again its concerns about Russia's trade restrictive 
practices, most notable in its increasing reliance on localization requirements and import substitution 
policies. As the United States has raised before , and as the  EU has noted, Russia's  expanding 
adoption of local content requirements and import substitution policies flies directly in the face of 
the goals of this Organization – to open trade for the benefit of all. The United States certainly does 
not have time to day to review all the measures that have been put in place since Russia adopted 
Law No.  223-FZ "On the Purchasing of Goods, Works, and Services by Certain Types of Legal 
Entities" in 2011, which gave the government the authority to establish priority for R ussian goods, 
works, and services. However, a sampling of government measures reveals an economy that: 
(i) requires SOEs to provide a 15%  price preference to Russian -made products in many sectors; 
(ii) requires SOEs to provide a 30%  price preference to Rus sian-made radio -electronic products; 
(iii) requires SOEs to consult with the Commission on Import Substitution to purchase certain 
imported products for use in large investment projects; and (iv)  requires SOEs to purchase a 
minimum quota (sometimes as high as 90%) of over 150  domestically -produced products.  
29.10.   And such measures continue to grow. For example, as the United States mentioned at the 
Council's last meeting, the US understands that the Duma is considering a draft measure requiring 
that companies considered to be "critical information infrastructure" purchase only Russian software. 
The United States has specific questions on this draft that will be provided to the Russian Federation 
in writing. Although the United States and other Me mbers have raised these concerns in the past, 
Russia has yet to explain how these measures comport with its WTO  obligations. Likewise, the United  
States has yet to hear any assurances from the Russian delegate that Russia will ensure that 
purchases made by  commercial enterprises that are state -owned or state -controlled are governed G/C/M/139  
 
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  by commercial considerations, as provided for in its Working Party Report. Will the delegate from 
the Russian Federation provide such an assurance to this Council?  
29.11.   With regard to  the track and trace labelling regime, Russia continues to expand the list of 
goods to which these labels must be applied. While the United States supports efforts to combat 
counterfeit goods, the US is concerned about the proportionality of this measure – whether such a 
costly and burdensome labelling regime is really needed for all products. The United States is also 
concerned about the potential for significant supply chain disruptions at the border and about 
unequal access to the machinery and the techn ological systems of the regime. The United States 
will continue to monitor Russia's implementation of this regime  carefully. The United States has 
mentioned previously its concerns about the software pre -installation requirement established in 
Federal Law No. 425-FZ, "Law on Protection of Consumer Rights." The United States appreciates the 
efforts of the Ministry of Digital Development, Communications and Mass Media to work with industry 
in the implementation of this law. Nevertheless, the United States con tinues to question the 
consistency of what is, in fact, another localization requirement, with Russia's WTO  obligation on 
national treatment.  
29.12.   The United States also joins the EU in raising concerns about the proposed dramatic increase 
in the recycling fee on construction and agricultural equipment and will be raising questions in the 
CMA. Finally, the United States echoes the EU's call for transparency with regard to Russia's wine 
law. The United States hopes that Russia will respect its transparency obliga tions and notify the 
Russian measures as well as the EAEU  measure.  
29.13.   The delegate of Ukraine  indicated the following:  
29.14.   Ukraine thanks the EU for keeping this issue on the agenda and echoes the concerns raised 
with regard to the Russian Federation's certificat ion requirements for cement. Ukraine also continues 
to have significant concerns about the Russian Federation's certification requirements for alcohol 
drinks. Ukraine would like to refer to its statements made in the course of the previous 
TBT Committee me etings on these issues for further detail.19 
29.15.   The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
29.16.   Australia understands that Russia has adopted "Federal Law No.  468 of 27.12.2019 on wine 
making and wine growing in the Russian Federation", which entered into force on 26  June 2020. 
Australia thanks the Russian government and industry for its recent engagement on this issue. 
However, despite Australia raising its concerns in previous CTG and TBT  Committee meetings, its 
concerns remain. The Federal law poses seve ral barriers to the importation of wine into Russia, 
which, coupled with the short timelines for the law's implementation, are of concern to the Australian 
wine industry. Further to the technical issues that Australia raised at the recent TBT  Committee, a 
key concern is the mandatory declaration of vintage and variety required under the new law. This 
does not reflect the International Organisation of Vine and Wine (OIV) practices, of which Russia is 
a member. Additionally, Australia notes that several oblig ations within the Federal wine law are 
inconsistent with the Eurasian Economic Union Technical Regulation No.  047/2018, "On safety of 
alcohol products". Australia understands that the implementation of the technical regulation has 
been postponed in order t o allow for harmonization work with the Russian Law to be undertaken. 
Australia encourages Russia to take into account concerns raised by Members during the 
harmonization phase, including ensuring that the technical regulation aligns with international 
production standards. Australia looks forward to Russia notifying the WTO accordingly, and as soon 
as possible.  
29.17.   The delegate of the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
29.18.   The Russian Federation takes note of the concerns raised and previously the Russian  
Federation commented extensively on many of the issues raised today, in this Council as well as in 
the TBT  Committee and CMA. On this occasion, the Russian  Federation would like to highlight the 
points that follow. Regarding SOEs procurement, the Russian Federation would like to point out that 
this regulation is the development of the previous acts under the Federal Laws No.  223-FZ, "On the 
Procurement of Goods, Works, Services by Certain Types of Legal Entities", and No.  488-FZ, "On 
 
19 See document  G/TBT/M/82, paragraph  2.340.  G/C/M/139  
 
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  the Industrial Policy of the Russian Federation", which clearly stipulate that this regulation should 
be applied in accordance with the international obligations of the Russian Federation. The 
Russian  Federation would also like to note that this regulation does not cover privat e entities. As for 
cement certification, the Russian Federation states that the relevant amendments are still being 
discussed among the responsible authorities and the Russian delegation will inform the 
WTO Members when they are prepared, adopted, and publ icly available.  
29.19.   Regarding pre -installation of software on technically complex goods, the Russian Federation 
refers to its previous statements regarding the conformity of this measure with Russia's 
WTO commitments.20 The Russian Federation would also like t o inform WTO  Members that the date 
of entry into force of the measure was postponed based on the consultations with the interested 
companies, including foreign companies . Throughout the process of developing the draft Law, the 
comments submitted by the sta keholders were taken into due account. The current version of the 
Law provides for a number of flexibilities. In particular, there are several options for the 
pre-installation of software and the product manufacturers are free to choose those most convenie nt 
for them. If the programme is not compatible with the operation system, the Law does not require 
pre-installation. The software in question is already available in manufacturers' digital stores, so the 
Law does not require the installation of applicatio ns incompatible with the company's rules and 
policies.  
29.20.   Concerning the Wine Law, the Russian Federation notes that this Law was developed in order 
to improve the quality of viticulture products circulated in the Russian market, and to bring about a 
reductio n in smuggled and counterfeit products. The Russian Federation is happy to inform 
WTO Members that the requirements of the Law did not have a negative impact on international 
trade in viticulture products, which remained stable and, in some cases, even inc reased, according 
to trade statistics data. Considering this fact, one comes to the conclusion that credible exporters 
and manufacturers not only retained their positions but also expanded their presence in the Russian 
wine market. Regarding the timber exp ort regulation, the Russian Federation carefully studies the 
practice of WTO  Members in this area. The Russian Federation notes that a number of 
WTO Members, including certain member States of the European Union, apply different restrictions 
relating to th e export of timber for different reasons. The final design of the future  measure is still 
under development. Taking into account the current practices in the WTO, the Russian Federation 
believes that it will be able to ensure the compliance of the measure with WTO  rules.  
29.21.   In respect of the increase in recycling fee for vehicles, the Russian Federation notes that this 
fee is applied to both domestic and imported products, and that the size of the fee is the same for 
domestic and imported products. The WTO  rules do not prevent the establishment of fees, at any 
rate, not as long as they comply with the national  treatment and non -discrimination principles. As 
for the track and trace system, the Russian Federation reiterates its statements made during the 
previous  meetings of the TBT  Committee, the C TG, and the CMA. This measure was developed for 
fighting counterfeited and smuggled products on the Russian market as well as ensuring that all 
taxes have been paid. This measure is implemented, in respect of each categ ory of products, in close 
cooperation with importers and manufacturers, with sufficient transition periods, and in full 
compliance with WTO  rules.  
29.22.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
30  CHINA – IMPLEMENTATION OF TRADE DISRUPTIVE AND RESTRICTIVE MEAS URES – 
REQUEST FROM AUSTRALIA  
30.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included in the agenda at the request of  
Australia . 
30.2.   The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
30.3.   Australia and China have enjoyed a strong bilateral partnership and trading relationship, built 
over many decades, that has delivered benefits to both sides. Members will recall that Australia 
raised China's implementation of trade disruptive and restrictive measures at the November  2020 
CTG meeting. Since that time, Austr alia has followed up on its concerns about these measures with 
 
20 Document  G/C/M/138, paragraph  31.15.  G/C/M/139  
 
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  China bilaterally and through the relevant WTO  committees. Australia has not received from China 
a satisfactory response to the issues it raised. Australia remains concerned by the sudden incre ase 
of measures China has taken against Australia, particularly in the second  half of 2020, and official 
Chinese statements linking their trade actions to unrelated issues in our bilateral relationship.  
30.4.   China has concluded anti -dumping and countervailing d uty investigations into imports from 
Australia of barley and wine. Australia has concerns with the procedures, analysis, and findings of 
these investigations. The anti -dumping and countervailing duty (AD/CVD)  investigations and duties 
have effectively ceas ed Australian exports of these commodities to China. Australia initiated 
WTO dispute proceedings into China's AD/CVD  duties on barley. Australian exporters fully cooperate 
where they find themselves respondents in anti -dumping and countervailing duty inves tigations. 
Australia fully respects the right of all WTO  Members to take trade remedy action within the 
framework of existing international trade rules that govern such action and on the expectation that 
those rules will be upheld. Trade remedy actions sho uld not be used as retaliatory measures. Trade 
remedy actions necessarily stem from properly constituted requests from a Member's domestic 
industry, not directed by governments.  
30.5.   Australia also has serious concerns regarding China's lack of transparency, du e process, and 
engagement across a range of measures implemented on imports of Australian goods. China's 
approach to many of these measures appears to be inconsistent with China's WTO  obligations, and 
is significantly impacting the overall bilateral trade relationship. At the November  2020 
CTG meeting, Australia outlined its concerns about measures China had placed on a range of 
Australian agricultural exports. In summary, these were as follows: (i)  undue delays in obtaining 
Chinese government  approval for export establishments (meat, dairy, and seafood), brand approvals 
of infant formula, and new approvals of Australian seafood species; (ii)  the lack of reinstatement of 
three  Australian establishments that voluntarily suspended exports to China following th e detection 
of SARS -CoV-2 in on -site workers long after the COVID  incidents were resolved; (iii)  increased 
testing of Australian live rock lobster consignments; (iv)  suspension of timber log imports from 
particular Australian states; (v)  suspension of some  Australian barley and wheat exporters; and 
(vi) increased inspection and laboratory testing of imports of Australian wine.  
30.6.   Since the last CTG  meeting, Australia has seen no improvement to these measures and 
Australian agricultural exports continue to be u nnecessarily impacted. Worryingly, the situation has 
deteriorated further, with new or additional measures being placed on more Australian agricultural 
commodities. These include the following: (i)  the suspension of timber log imports from all Australian 
states; (ii)  the suspension of another meat export establishment; (iii)  increased testing and delays 
to the clearance of bulk and sparkling wine not covered by the AD/CVD  duties ; and (iv)  a number 
of Chinese importers of Australian hay and lobsters being un able to secure import licences prior to 
the expiry of existing licences, despite the Australian Government providing well in advance the 
necessary information for the re -registration of the Australian exporters. Concerningly, the increased 
inspection and t esting on barley and wine and the suspension of barley exporters, in addition to the 
AD/CVD  investigations and duties, raises questions about whether these products are being 
indiscriminately targeted by China to ensure all trade in these commodities cease s from Australia.  
30.7.   Regardless, Australia continues to treat these issues on their technical merits. Australia has 
sought to address them bilaterally with the relevant Chinese authorities. Australia takes detections 
of non -compliant consignments seriously an d initiates investigations into the cause of the 
non-compliance. Australia has made a number of technical submissions to China seeking to address 
China's concerns about non -compliance. However, Australia has been disappointed with China's lack 
of timely re sponses to Australia's efforts to reinstate trade. To progress and resolve these issues 
there needs to be a willingness by both sides to engage in a timely and responsive manner. At the 
November CTG  meeting, China said that it always honours its commitment s and actively fulfils its 
obligations under the WTO and the China -Australia Free Trade Agreement. Australia once again asks 
China: (i)  to respond to the submission of non -compliance investigation reports; (ii)  to take action 
on requests for new and revise d listings and reinstatement of establishments; and (iii)  to implement 
changes to inspection and testing requirements in a timely, transparent, non -discriminatory, and 
predictable manner.  
30.8.   In addition to trying to address these issues bilaterally, Australia  raised its concerns with 
China's undue delays in China's approval procedures, disproportionate actions taken by China in 
response to minor or technical breaches, and lack of transparency in its approval procedures, at the 
SPS Committee meeting on 25 -26 March 2021. Australia was not the only Member to raise concerns G/C/M/139  
 
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  with China's approval procedures, highlighting that this is not just an issue for us to resolve 
bilaterally and not simply a reflection on Australia's regulatory systems as China has asserted.  
30.9.   In November  2020, Australia received credible reports, including from Chinese industry, that 
Chinese authorities had informally instructed importers not to purchase Australian barley, coal, 
copper ores and concentrates, lobster, logs, sugar, and wine. At th e time, Australia welcomed 
China's denials that any such instructions were in place. However, Australia has in this Council 
outlined the formal actions that China has taken against Australian barley, lobster, logs, and wine, 
which have rendered trade in th ese items prohibitive. For the other items, Australia notes that 
Chinese trade data shows zero Chinese imports of Australian coal and copper ores and concentrates 
since December  2020. China continues to import these items from countries other than Australi a. 
Australia therefore urges China to immediately cease any discriminatory measures being applied 
formally or informally to Australian products.  
30.10.   Australia understands that no Australian coal has cleared Chinese customs since early 
November  2020. Associated  delays saw the number of vessels carrying coal from Australia waiting 
at Chinese ports to discharge cargo peak at 79 in December  2020. The delays have impacted the 
welfare of crew aboard these vessels and imposed significant costs on the commercial partie s 
involved. When asked by a journalist at a State Council Information Office press conference on 
24 February  2021 what needs to be done by Australia before China will stop banning the import of 
Australian coal, China's Vice -Minister of Commerce and Deputy China International Trade 
Representative Wang Shouwen, said: "we hope that Australia can do more things that are conducive 
to increasing trust and cooperation". Australia does not consider that such a sentiment reflects an 
understanding of China's obligati ons under the WTO  Agreement. On cotton, there have been 
widespread and consistent reports, including a statement from the Australian cotton industry that, 
on 16  October  2020, the Chinese National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) told 
Chinese miller s to stop or limit purchases and imports of Australian cotton. It is claimed that Chinese 
businesses that do not stop purchases and imports from Australia risk losing access to imports of 
cotton under existing or future cotton TRQs. Australia understands f rom its cotton  exporters that 
this situation remains the same. Australia continues to consider that such directives, if issued 
formally or informally, appear to be inconsistent with China's WTO  obligations.  
30.11.   In conclusion, China has implemented a range of t rade disruptive and restrictive measures 
against Australian goods that have been outlined. Australia has engaged on the technical merits of 
each measure, but its engagement has not been reciprocated on the Chinese side. The recent 
developments have created  uncertainty and increased risk for all exporters and created a 
trade -chilling effect on imports from Australia, regardless of whether the measures are formal or 
informal. Moreover, the cumulative impact of these measures, their sudden increase in intensit y 
over 2020, the disproportionate impact of these measures on Australia, and China's public 
statements linking trade with political issues in our relationship, takes China's actions beyond the 
realm of the technical. They give rise to concerns about China' s adherence to the letter and spirit of 
its international trade obligations.  
30.12.   China has consistently stated it is committed to open trade and the Multilateral Trading 
System. Australia expects all WTO  Members to conduct their trading relationship with Australia in a 
manner consistent with their WTO  obligations, and the market -oriented policies that underpin 
WTO membership. Allowing enterprises to make their own purchasing decisions is an important 
policy that should be observed by all WTO Members. Accordingly, Australia again seeks assurances 
from China that Australian exports are not subject now, and will not be subject in the future, to 
instructions to stop or limit purchases and imports of Australian goods. Similarly, Australia would  
like China to provide reassurance that relevant import licences will be issued, including under 
existing and future TRQs, and consignments will be cleared by relevant Chinese customs officials in 
a timely, transparent, non -discriminatory, and predictable manner, consistent with China's 
WTO obligations. Australia has actively sought meetings to discuss these issues and remains open 
and willing to progress constructively with regard to any technical issues in its trade with China 
bilaterally, at all levels, in Geneva, in Beijing, and in Canberra, at the earliest opportunity.  
30.13.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
30.14.   China has already made its statement on this issue in previous CTG  meeting s and has no 
intention of repeat ing its  statement. However, China would like to reiterate that the measures taken 
by China to address the problems of Australian products in the process of inspection and quarantine G/C/M/139  
 
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  are to protect the health of its people. The trade remedy measures imposed on certain Australian 
products by  China are to counter unfair trade practices and protect the legitimate interests of the 
relevant Chinese domestic industries. Regarding transparency, a ll the measures, already published 
on the relevant Chinese  government websites, are consistent with China 's laws, regulations , and 
international practices, as well as the provisions of the China -Australia Free Trade Agreement.  
30.15.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
31  EUROPEAN UNION – REGULATION (EU)  2017/232 1 AND REGULATION (EU)  2018/825 
– REQUEST FROM CHINA AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  
31.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included in the agenda at the request of 
China and the Russian Federation . 
31.2.   The delegate of the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
31.3.   The Russian Federation has raised at previous CTG  meetings, and on numerous occasions, its 
concerns regarding the amendments to the EU  basic regulation on protection against dumped 
imports introduced by Regulation (EU)  2017/2321 and Regulation ( EU) 2018/825. Unfortunately, 
the reasons for the Russian Federation's concerns remain and appear to become more pronounced. 
At previous CTG  meetings we have heard, inter alia , the following from EU  delegates: (i)  that the 
anti-dumping calculation rules for eseen under the 2017/2321  amendment are "country -neutral"; 
(ii) that China and Russia were selected for the first  two country -reports in view of their "relative 
importance" in the EU's trade defence activity; and (iii)  that the legislative changes introduc ed in 
2017 and 2018 are distinct, which applies also to the definition of "significant distortions" under 
amendment  2017/2321, as opposed to "distortions on raw materials" under amendment  2018/825.  
31.4.   Today the Russian Federation would welcome further clarifi cations from the EU on the 
following. First, what further steps, if any, has the EU made or planned to ensure the alleged 
country -neutrality of the 2017/2321  amendment? It should be noted that, at the time of the previous 
CTG meeting, the EU had two  report s on so -called "significant distortions" published – on the Russian 
Federation and on China. Four  months have now passed since the preceding CTG  meeting. Has the 
EU started, or at least planned, and is ready to announce, the preparation of a similar report  on any 
other country? Second, how does the EU assess the so -called "relative importance" of Russia and 
China in its trade defence activity? The impression that the Russian Federation has so far is that the 
countries of such "relative importance" are those  to which the EU  investigators can afford applying 
WTO-inconsistent methodologies. The Russian Federation's views on WTO -incompliance of the 
methodologies are well known to Members, and the Russian Federation will not repeat them. 
However, should the Russi an Federation's impression be wrong, and there is any other reason to 
label Russia and China as of "relative importance", the Russian Federation would welcome such 
clarification from the EU. Third, what exactly is the distinction the EU sees between the de finition of 
"significant distortions" under amendment  2017/2321 and "distortions on raw materials" under 
amendment  2018/825? The only distinction that the Russian Federation can see now is the rationale 
for the punishment of exporters. It seems that the EU  would call the same thing either a "significant 
distortion" or "distortion on raw materials" depending on its aim – either to calculate the normal 
value based on out -of-country data or to deny lesser duties to the exporters. Should the EU have 
any other e xplanation, the Russian Federation is most curious to hear it.  
31.5.   The Russian Federation would welcome clarifications from the EU. The Russian Federation 
also urges the EU to abstain from WTO -inconsistent methodologies and discriminative treatment of 
Russian exporters in its trade defence proceedings.  
31.6.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
31.7.   China is of the view that the EU's anti-dumping regulation and relevant practice is inconsistent 
with WTO  anti-dumping rules. First, the EU's anti -dumping regulation  creates a so -called "significant 
market distortion" concept and sets up six  standards to assess whether the market is seriously 
distorted. However, WTO  anti-dumping rules neither have such a concept and standards, nor 
authorize Members to assess the marke t situation of exporting Members in an anti -dumping 
investigation. In addition, the EU currently only issues the documents on so -called significant 
distortions for a very small number of countries, which raises concerns over whether its approach is G/C/M/139  
 
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  consist ent with the principle of MFN  treatment. Second, China cannot go along with the EU's 
anti-dumping practice of using the so -called working document on significant distortions of China as 
important evidence to carry out its anti -dumping investigations. This is not in line with WTO  rules, 
which require Members to carry out anti -dumping investigations based on the specific evidence and 
facts of an individual case. Third, in the EU's anti -dumping practice, if there is so -called significant 
market distortion, the  EU will directly use the third -party data as the normal value, without carrying 
out a proper assessment of whether the third -party data is distorted. This is inconsistent with 
WTO anti-dumping rules.  
31.8.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the follow ing: 
31.9.   The EU notes the points raised by both China and Russia. The EU's replies are on the record 
of both this Council and numerous meetings of the WTO  Anti-Dumping Committee. In order not to 
repeat the EU's position on the points raised, the EU invites the  Council to refer to the EU's previous 
statements.21 
31.10.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
32  EUROPEAN UNION – REGULATION EC NO.  1272/2008 (CLP  REGULATION) – REQUEST 
FROM THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  
32.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included in the agenda at the request of the 
Russian Federation . 
32.2.   The delegate of the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
32.3.   The Russian Federation is still concerned about the cobalt classification as a carcinogen 
category  1(b) for all routes of expo sure adopted under the 14th Adaptation to Technological and 
Scientific Progress to the CLP  regulation. First, the Russian Federation considers this classification 
as unjustifiable because currently there are no scientific studies allowing the classificatio n of cobalt 
as a carcinogen for any route of exposure other than inhalation. Second, the classification was 
adopted in accordance with a precautionary principle laid down in the CLP  Regulation, as well as 
other regulations of the EU. The Russian Federation  questions the consistency of this principle with 
Article  2.2 of the TBT  Agreement, which requires scientific information when developing technical 
regulations. At the same time, the Russian Federation is also convinced that classification of 
chemicals und er the CLP should be justified, if not by laboratory testing, then at least 
epidemiologically. However, in spite of the Russian Federation's requests, the EU has not yet 
provided any data. Third, the Global Cobalt Association (Cobalt Institute) initiated a  scientific study 
on the carcinogenicity of cobalt for oral route of exposure, about which the Russian Federation 
several times informed the EU, both bilaterally and during the meetings of the working bodies of the 
WTO. In spite of this information, the Co mmission adopted the cobalt classification without any 
laboratory and epidemiological data that would confirm cobalt hazard for any route of exposure other 
than inhalation.  
32.4.   The Russian Federation welcomes the efforts of the EU to adopt the gastric bioeluti on protocol 
at the levels of the OECD and the EU. However, this classification enters into force in October  2021 
and if the methodology of bioelution is not adopted, cobalt -containing products, including compounds 
and alloys, will be subjected to restricti ons in a form of registration and authorization under the 
REACH  regulation, as well as further restrictions of cobalt content in product -specific and sectoral 
legislation of the EU. As a final note, the EU proposed the new chemical strategy in the framewor k 
of implementation of the EU  Green Deal, which implies amendments to the REACH/CLP  legislation 
and further restrictions in respect of chemicals strictly classified, such as cobalt. Thus, the 
Commission is considering further restrictions and the classific ation decisions are not limited to 
labelling and packaging requirements.  
32.5.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
32.6.   The clarifications provided in previous meetings are still relevant. Titanium dioxide and cobalt 
were included in the 14th Adaptation to Technical and Scientific Progress (ATP) amending the 
 
21 See, for ex ample, document  G/C/M/138, paragraphs  17.8-17.10.  G/C/M/139  
 
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  CLP Regulation. Several discussions on the classification of cobalt and TiO2 and the classification of 
mixtures containing TiO2 took place in the expert group for REACH and CLP (CARACAL) an d in the 
regulatory committee (the REACH  Committee).  After its adoption by the Commission, on 
4 October  2019, the Commission Delegated Regulation was sent to the Council and the European 
Parliament for the two -month objection period. As no objection was ra ised, the Commission 
Delegated Regulation (EU)  2020/217 was published in the Official Journal of the EU on 
18 February  2020, and the classification of cobalt as a carcinogen will become applicable as of 
1 October  2021.  The classification of cobalt as a car cinogen for all routes of exposure is based on 
the scientific opinion of the Risk Assessment Committee (RAC) of the European Chemicals Agency 
(ECHA), as well as on the comments received and concerns expressed by the member States and 
stakeholders. This opi nion is in line with the CLP  Regulation as well as the UN  Globally Harmonized 
System of Classification and Labelling of Chemicals (UN -GHS). The opinion and the background 
document containing all the relevant scientific information on which the opinion is b ased are available 
to all WTO  Members and stakeholders at the ECHA  website.  In its scientific assessment, the ECHA's 
RAC took all available data into account, including the information submitted during the public 
consultation period. Review of an RAC  opinion is only possible if new and relevant scientific 
information becomes available.  The EU would like to reassure WTO  Members in the CTG that all 
comments that WTO  Members submitted in the context of the EU  notification, in accordance with 
the TBT  Agreement,  were shared with EU  member States and duly taken into account by the 
Commission and member States in the decision -making process. The Commission has also sent 
written replies to the comments from WTO  Members on the TBT  notification of the measure.  
32.7.   The EU also proposed to harmonize at OECD  level the method on bioelution. This method 
could be useful to ensure that, if a metal contained in an alloy is not bioavailable (that is, it remains 
in the matrix), then the alloys (for example, stainless steel) do not n eed to be classified. An 
agreement at the OECD has been reached in May  2020 to develop and validate this method. The EU 
would welcome any support from third  countries to actively participate in the development of the 
OECD  test method on bioelution. A speci al expert sub -group has also been recently established by 
the Commission in order to provide advice and exchange views on technical, legal, and policy issues 
relating to the use of the relative in vitro  bioaccessibility of a hazardous metal in metal compou nds 
or alloys, for the refinement of their classification under CLP. The discussions are expected to focus 
on the applicability of the data generated with a validated test method.  The European Union also 
referred to its statement delivered under this agenda item at the Council's previous meeting.22 
32.8.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
33  ANGOLA – IMPORT RESTRICTING PRACTICES – REQUEST FROM THE RUSSIAN 
FEDERATION  
33.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included in the agenda at the request of the 
Russian Federation . 
33.2.   The delegate of the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
33.3.   The Russian Federation remains concerned about Angola's import restrictions on certain 
agricultural and industrial products un der the Presidential Decree No.  23/19, and reiterates its 
statements made during the previous meetings of the CMA and the C TG.23 The Russian Federation 
would like to thank Angola for the fruitful consultations that took place last year. Nevertheless, since  
then, the Russian Federation does not see any positive developments in respect of an elimination of 
Angola's QRs. The Russian Federation urges Angola to bring its measures into conformity with the 
WTO Agreement and to lift its import bans on agricultural products.  
33.4.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
33.5.   As the United States has expressed in this Council and in the CMA, the United States remains 
concerned that this decree appears aimed at restricting Angola's imports. The United States 
appreciates Angola's engagement on this issue with the US  Embassy in Luanda. However, as the US 
seeks to resolve its concerns, that engagement is not a substitute for addressing the issue in this 
Council or its subsidiary bodies. The United States continues to hear reports of confusion over how 
 
22 Document  G/C/M/138, paragraphs  19.5-19.7. 
23 Document  G/C/M/138, paragraphs  8.2-8.3, and document  G/MA/M/73, paragraph  10.2. G/C/M/139  
 
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  the decree is being enforced, and of delays facing goods at the border. US  agricultural exporters 
remain concerned over delays that perishable goods face amidst all this uncertainty. The United 
States urges Angola to r evise this decree to address the US  concerns and to ensure that its measures 
in respect of imports are in compliance with WTO  rules.  
33.6.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
33.7.   The EU maintains its concerns over Decree No.  23/19, which seem s to protect domestic 
industries in a manner that is not compatible with WTO  rules and that could be detrimental to foreign 
investments in Angola. The EU's concerns have already been raised in previous WTO  meetings, 
notably the Council on Trade in Goods, s ince 2019. To date, the EU has still not received substantive 
explanations from Angola on how it intends to bring this Decree into compliance with WTO  rules. 
Irrespective of the issue of the Decree's compatibility with WTO  rules, the EU would welcome more 
clarity as to the process considered by Angola regarding this decree; might Angola be considering 
introducing any changes, for example, and if so, in which areas. The EU remains supportive of 
Angola's intention to diversify its economy and to develop its d omestic industry. Nonetheless, the 
EU urges Angola to review the relevant measures in order to ensure their compliance with WTO  rules.  
33.8.   The delegate of Angola  indicated the following:  
33.9.   Angola thanks the Russian Federation for raising the question. Angola wou ld like to inform 
Members that, at Capital -level, Angola continues its work with the relevant authorities in order to 
finalize this question. In addition, as reported previously, bilateral consultations with the Russian 
Embassy in Luanda began last year wi th a meeting between our Deputy Minister for Trade and the 
Ambassador of the Russian Federation accredited in Angola. The discussion focused on mutual 
concerns and other relevant issues. Both parties agreed to seek positive solutions. The government 
is mak ing every effort to reduce the time and costs for importers and exporters to make it easier for 
the relevant economic operators to do business in Angola. Angola reaffirms its commitment to the 
Multilateral Trading System and will provide its answers in due  course. Angola believes that bilateral 
dialogue is a good solution to resolve differences. Angola also understands that these concerns are 
linked to Decree No.  23/19 and its efforts to diversify its economy, which will be taken into account 
in its answers  that will be presented in due course.  
33.10.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
34  MONGOLIA – MEASURES APPLIED WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN AGRICULTURAL 
PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  
34.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included in the agenda at the request of the 
Russian Federation . 
34.2.   The delegate of the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
34.3.   The Russian Federation reiterates its previous statements on Mongolia's measures applied 
with respect to the importation of ce rtain agricultural products.24 In March  2021, Mongolia stated 
that it did not open quotas for the importation of liquid milk and wheat flour for 2021, but it did not 
provide the respective legal acts confirming the absence of quotas. Flour and milk are sti ll not 
excluded from the list of agricultural products subject to annual QRs, which means that quotas may 
be imposed in the future. In practice, each year the time -frames between the Decision of the Food 
Security Council on the establishment of quotas, and  the official publication of the document, differ 
deeply, creating great uncertainty with regard to import conditions. In light of this, the Russian 
Federation urges Mongolia to clarify when it is going to provide written and official information about 
the absence of the quota regime for 2021 and the decision on its further cancelling, as the quota 
regime continues to be inconsistent with WTO  rules.  
34.4.   The Russian Federation would also like to reiterate its concern regarding the Enrichment Law, 
which sets out the mandatory requirements for wheat flour to be fortified with vitamins and mineral 
compounds in order to be marketed. According to Russia's information, the methodology for the 
determination of vitamins in fortified wheat flour is still being worked out,  and that the standard will 
 
24 Document  G/C/M/138, paragraphs  28.2-28.6. G/C/M/139  
 
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  be approved by 2021. The Russian Federation expects Mongolia to explain why the fortification of 
the wheat flour is already mandatory, while according to Russia's information the methodology of 
vitamins identification has not ye t been adopted. Bearing in mind that imported products are 
subjected to the fortification, while national flour is supplied unfortified, the measure seems to be 
inconsistent with Article  2.1 of the TBT  Agreement. The Russian Federation expects Mongolia to 
provide its feedback on the concerns raised and to bring its legislation into compliance with the 
relevant WTO  provisions. The Russian Federation also urges Mongolia to cease implementing its Law 
on Fortified Food Products. The Russian Federation will cont inue monitoring Mongolia's quota policy 
and food nutrition measures carefully.  
34.5.   The delegate of Mongolia  indicated the following:  
34.6.   Mongolia thanks the Russian Federation for its statement and the questions raised. Mongolia 
would like to reiterate its stateme nt made at the last meeting of the Committee on Agriculture, as 
well as the recent TBT  Committee meeting in February. Mongolia continues to work on this matter 
internally, and measures are being taken step by step. In this regard, Mongolia would like to th ank 
the Russian Federation for the bilateral meeting that was held in February in Moscow on this 
particular issue. Mongolia would like to inform Members that, following the recommendation made 
by the National Food Security Council at its meeting of 4  March , the import quotas are not to be 
imposed on wheat flour and liquid milk. Mongolia communicated the situation to its Russian 
colleagues accordingly and will keep them informed of any further developments.  
34.7.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
35  KINGD OM OF SAUDI ARABIA – TRADE RESTRICTIVE POLICIES AND PRACTICES 
CONCERNING TURKEY - REQUEST FROM TURKEY  
35.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included in the agenda at the request of 
Turkey . 
35.2.   The delegate of Turkey  indicated the following:  
35.3.   Turkey r egrets to reiterate that the ongoing systematic import restrictive practices of Saudi  
Arabia, which became a part of its trade policies, continue in an increasing manner. As Members 
may recall, Turkey brought this issue to the Council's attention at its me eting last November. Trade 
volumes between Turkey and Saudi Arabia were exceeding USD  6 billion in 2019. However, Turkey's 
exports to Saudi Arabia decreased by almost 24% from 2019 to 2020, and by a disappointing 92% 
in the first two  months of 2021 compare d to the same period of the previous year. The official figures 
of Saudi Arabia also point to a drop of 97.7% in January  2021, which clearly reveals the recent 
erosion of market opportunities for Turkish products in the Saudi market. These decreases are 
directly linked to the mandatory commitments having to be signed by Saudi companies not to import 
from Turkey, as well as the ongoing boycott calls against Turkish products by the Saudi press and 
Chambers, which are also guided by the same systemic policies.  The practices against Turkish export 
products at the Saudi customs provide the other reason for the decrease in exports. Consequently, 
Turkish companies do not have any opportunity to access the Saudi Arabian market due to Saudi 
Arabia's systemic and diss uasive practices, as the export statistics vividly demonstrate.  
35.4.   Imports from Turkey have been subject to discriminatory and arbitrary practices with 
unreasonably long delays at Saudi customs and unnecessarily burdensome product safety 
inspections. To be sp ecific, it is stated in the 2020 Doing Business Report  that "time to import: 
border compliance" in Saudi Arabia takes 72  hours, which is equal to three  days. However, border 
compliance for Turkish -origin goods at Saudi customs is completed in 100  days on a verage. There 
are even some cases when this period takes as long as 204  days. Turkey has already shared 
information and data with Saudi Arabia to document this frustrating situation. Turkey would like to 
emphasize that the import prohibitive policies of Sa udi Arabia are not only harmful to bilateral trade, 
but also disruptive to global value chains and hence to global trade overall. In addition, these policies 
of Saudi Arabia would also undermine the confidence and trust of international businesspeople in 
the Saudi Arabian trading system since  there is no longer any security and predictability in the 
system for traders.  G/C/M/139  
 
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  35.5.   In response to Turkey's complaints, Saudi Arabian representatives have expressed on many 
occasions that Saudi Arabia agrees with Turkey on t he importance of the removal of barriers to free 
trade within the framework of the rights and obligations arising from being a Member of the WTO. 
Unfortunately, these commitments have not yet been fulfilled. As the numbers clearly show, there 
is, in fact, a de facto  import ban against Turkey. Turkey is seriously concerned about these import 
prohibitive policies and practices of Saudi Arabia against Turkish goods, which are in clear violation, 
inter alia , of Article  I of the GATT on MFN  treatment, and of Article  XI of the GATT on QRs. Moreover, 
Turkey also believes that the discrimination, orchestrated by the government against Turkish 
products in the Saudi Arabian market, is also in breach of Article  III:4 of the GATT on the principle 
of National Treatment. Turkey wou ld like to underline that it remains committed to defending its 
rights stemming from the WTO  Agreements in all necessary platforms. In this vein, Turkey urges 
Saudi Arabia to abide by its WTO  commitments and to bring its policies and practices concerning 
Turkey in line with its WTO  obligations to ensure the smooth flow of bilateral trade. Turkey would 
like to hear an official announcement from Saudi Arabia about this topic while at the same time it 
stands ready to engage bilaterally with Saudi Arabia with a  view to addressing all trade -related 
matters, and to promoting fair and balanced bilateral trade relations.  
35.6.   The delegate of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia  indicated the following:  
35.7.   The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia would like to stress that it always affirms its co mmitments to 
all trade rules stipulated in the WTO  Agreements. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a keen supporter 
of the Multilateral Trading System to achieve its objectives aiming to liberalize international trade  
among Members. Saudi Arabia has responded o n several occasions, bilaterally and here in the WTO, 
to Turkey's questions and comments. Through these responses, Saudi Arabia has confirmed that 
there is no restriction or discrimination imposed on Turkish imports to Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia 
would like  to emphasize once again that its borders and markets are open to all goods and products, 
including those coming from Turkey. In addition, Saudi Arabia would like to reiterate that Saudi 
authorities do not interfere in consumer preferences, nor encourage b uyers to trade with products 
based on their country of origin.  
35.8.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
36  EUROPEAN UNION – DRAFT IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS REGARDING PROTECTED 
DESIGNATIONS OF ORIGIN AND GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS, TRADITIONAL TERMS, 
LABELLING AND PRESENTATION OF CERTAIN WINE SECTOR PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM 
THE UNITED STATES  
36.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included in the agenda at the request of the 
United States . 
36.2.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the followi ng: 
36.3.   It is very disappointing that the United States must again raise its concerns with the EU's 
revisions to its draft regulation on geographical indications and traditional terms for wine; and 
specifically, US  industry's pending applications for tradition al terms. The EU's persistent failure to 
provide any information leaves the United States with no choice but to keep this item on the 
WTO TBT Committee's agenda, as well as on the agenda of the C TG. After nearly three  years, the 
EU is still unable to provi de any estimate or to tell the US about the status of these pending 
applications. In the interests of time, the United States requests that the minutes for this meeting 
reflect its intervention from the November  2019 CTG  meeting.25 This statement reads as follows:  
36.4.   The delegate of the United States regretted that her delegation had again to raise this issue 
in this Council. The United States and other WTO  Members had voiced their objections to the EU's 
proposed protection of the term Havarti as a geographica l indication (GI) during the 2014  opposition 
period, in this Council and in other WTO  Committees; insofar as Havarti had been established as an 
international standard under the Codex Alimentarius, the EU had nevertheless moved forward with 
the process. Hav arti had undergone a rigorous review to prove its use in the public domain and in 
international trade, which had been reconfirmed by Codex members, including the EU, in 2007, 
2008, and 2010. The EU's decision to move forward raised serious questions about the views of 
 
25 Document  G/C/M/138, paragraphs  23.6-23.8. G/C/M/139  
 
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  Denmark and the EU  Commission regarding the legal relevance of Codex and the integrity of the 
international standards system, as well as the international trading system. The US reminded the 
EU that no WTO  Agreement was superior to another. Th erefore, the fact that the EU asserted that it 
was following procedures under the Trade -Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
(TRIPS)  Agreement did not mean it could disregard TBT  commitments to uphold international 
standards. The EU had to comply with both WTO  Agreements. The US strongly encouraged the EU 
to uphold its WTO  TBT obligations to follow international standards and to consider a less trade 
restrictive approach to protecting Danish cheese producers by linking Havarti with the place of origin 
and protecting only the entire compound term.  
36.5.   The delegate of Argentina  indicated the following:  
36.6.   Argentina has repeatedly presented as a specific trade concern, within the scope of the 
TBT Committee, the EU  regulations on this matter, considering that their  application has been 
discriminatory for third  countries. Argentina therefore wishes to support the presentation made by 
the US and to express its gratitude for having kept this item on the Council's agenda. Argentina has 
suffered the same discriminatory t reatment as the United States due to the impossibility of using 
the terms Reserva  and Gran Reserva  on wine labels, despite having met all the EU  requirements 
10 years ago. Argentina is therefore compelled to draw attention to this issue once again.  
36.7.   The del egate of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
36.8.   New Zealand refers the European Union to its statement on this trade concern made at 
preceding TBT  Committees, most recently in October  2020.26 New Zealand recognizes that Members 
have the right to protect their consumers from deceptive practices in line with their WTO obligations. 
New Zealand asks that the European Union take into consideration the concerns raised by Members 
relating to the scop e and application of the system of traditional terms, as well as transparency, 
process, and timelines relating to applications by third  countries that wish to use traditional terms 
in the European Union.  
36.9.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the fol lowing:  
36.10.   The EU notes the continued interest of the United States, Argentina, and New Zealand in 
this issue. The EU has completed the revision of its internal legislation on traditional terms , which 
was discussed in previous TBT  Committees (Commission Deleg ated Regulation (EU)  2019/33 and 
Commission Implementing Regulation (EU)  2019/34). The EU believes that its internal legislation 
offers a meaningful and transparent system of protection to traditional terms used on wine products 
from the EU, as well as on products from third  countries. In the past, the EU has demonstrated its 
ability to address specific Members' concerns in this area either via its internal legislation or via 
bilateral agreements.  
36.11.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
37  UNITED STATES – MEASURES REGARDING MARKET ACCESS PROHIBITION FOR 
ICT PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM CHINA  
37.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included in the agenda at the request of 
China . 
37.2.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
37.3.   China regrets to raise this  issue again, as the US recently initiated investigations on certain 
Chinese enterprises providing information and communications technology and services (ICTS) in 
the US with the aim of identifying whether related transactions fall under the scope of the executive 
order, namely Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain. 
China is seriously concerned over this issue and believes that the continued restrictions and 
interference in the ICT  industry by the US will further undermine the stability of the global supply 
chain and cause huge losses to the related ICT  companies of many Members. National Security 
 
26 Document  G/TBT/M/82, paragraph  2.327.  G/C/M/139  
 
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  should no longer serve as a defence for disguised trade protectionism. China urges the US to abide 
by the WTO  rules and  to refrain from its unilateral practice to abuse the national security exception.  
37.4.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
37.5.   As the United States has  stated previously, it does not believe that the WTO  Council for Trade 
in Goods is the app ropriate forum to discuss issues related to national security.  
37.6.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
38  UNITED STATES – EXPORT CONTROL MEASURES FOR ICT  PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM 
CHINA  
38.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included in the agen da at the request of 
China . 
38.2.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
38.3.   China regrets to raise this issue again, as the US has recently imposed stronger export control 
measures against China and labelled some of China's high -tech companies as companies that pose 
a threat to US  national security. Taking Huawei as an example, without showing any evidence, the 
US has made export control rules tailored to Huawei twice and has also tried to restrict related 
companies from other Mem bers from supplying goods to Huawei. China firmly opposes this practice, 
which disregards basic WTO  rules, undermines the market principle and the principle of fair 
competition, and endangers the security of global supply chains. China takes note that the US has 
been carrying out relevant assessments of the measures and would like to urge the US to take 
concrete steps to stop its unjust and unfair practice and to relax its export control measures against 
China's companies ; in this way, the US would  create f avourable conditions for bilateral normal trade 
and investment cooperation and avoid any negative effect on the global supply chain.  
38.4.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
38.5.   As the United States has stated previously, it does not believe that the WTO  Council for Trade 
in Goods is the appropriate forum to discuss issues related to national security.  
38.6.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
39  UNITED STATES – EXECUTIVE ORDER ON SECURING THE BULK -POWER SYSTEM - 
REQUEST FRO M CHINA  
39.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included in the agenda at the request of 
China . 
39.2.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
39.3.   China regrets to raise this issue again, as China believes that the Executive Order issued by 
the US, na mely Securing the United States Bulk -Power System, violates basic WTO  rules by imposing 
market access barriers on China's equipment. China takes note that the US has temporarily 
suspended the order and is making an assessment of it. China sincerely hopes t hat the US could 
make an objective assessment, avoid any abuse of "national security", and abide by the WTO  rules.  
39.4.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
39.5.   As the United States has  stated previously, the referenced Executive Order, issued  on 
1 May 2020, is a matter of US  national security. The United States does not believe that the 
WTO Council for Trade in Goods is the appropriate forum to discuss issues related to national 
security.  
39.6.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  G/C/M/139  
 
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  40  AUSTRALIA  – DISCRIMINATORY MARKET ACCESS PROHIBITION ON 5G  EQUIPMENT – 
REQUEST FROM CHINA  
40.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included in the agenda at the request of 
China . 
40.2.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
40.3.   This item has been on the Council's agenda since 2018. China has sent Australia written 
questions twice and would like to thank Australia for providing answers. However, China regrets to 
see that many key questions are still not yet directly answered. China thinks that this respons e is 
inconsistent with the transparency obligation in the WTO  rules. More than two  years have passed, 
and Chinese companies still cannot participate in Australia's 5G  network construction. What worries 
China more is that Chinese companies' equipment in the  existing 4G  network has also been removed. 
These measures have had a devastating impact on those Chinese companies operating in Australia. 
China is of the view that the issue of telecommunication network security should be addressed based 
on scientific ve rifiable facts and data, rather than the origin of suppliers. China urges Australia to 
review its regulatory policies in the telecommunication s sector, to provide fair market access to 
Chinese companies to participate in its 5G  network construction, and to  bring its measures in line 
with the WTO  rules.  
40.4.   The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
40.5.   Australia notes China's statement. Since China first  raised this issue elsewhere in the WTO, 
in late 2018, Australia has engaged constructively and in good f aith with China to explain in detail 
the rationale for its position, including by providing written responses to China's written questions. 
For the purposes of this meeting, Australia reiterates that its position on 5G  networks is 
country -agnostic, transpa rent, risk -based, non -discriminatory, and fully WTO -consistent.  
40.6.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
41  FUNCTIONING OF THE COUNCIL FOR TRADE IN GOODS AND SUBSIDIARY 
COMMITTEES: INFORMATION FROM THE CHAIR  
41.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that he had convened an informal meeting on 11  February  2021 
with the objective of continuing to exchange views and ideas about the "Functioning of the Council 
for Trade in Goods and its subsidiary bodies". He had invited delegations to provide their comments 
and views, inter alia, on the following issues: (i)  a year plan/calendar of meetings of the CTG and 
its subsidiary bodies; (ii)  the possible introduction of an eAgenda for CTG  meetings; and  (iii) the 
conduct of meetings, including advance statements for interpreters, prese ntation of the agenda, 
delivery of statements, and an introductory briefing session addressed to new delegates.  
41.2.   On the first  topic, delegations had appreciated the year plan of meetings circulated by the 
CTG Secretariat , finding it helpful to better organi ze their annual activities and to be aware of the 
closing dates of agendas. They had also considered that a year plan should be structured so as to 
avoid overlaps of meetings in the goods area by also allowing the subsidiary bodies to meet 
sufficiently in advance of the Council. In light of these comments, the Chair person  confirmed that 
he would suggest to his successor to conduct a coordination meeting with Chairs and Secretaries of 
CTG subsidiary bodies. Furthermore, the year plan would be updated and circulated to all delegations 
at least twice a year: at the beginning of each calendar year and before the summer break. The 
Chair person  had also encouraged the Secretariat to continue assessing the possibility of an 
automated year plan of meetings.  
41.3.   The Ch airperson  considered that the eAgenda was an important IT  tool which provided 
delegations with a mechanism for advising  the rest of the Membership of issues that they wished to 
raise at the following CTG  meeting sufficiently in advance and before the agend a closed. Such 
mechanism would enhance the coordination between delegations and their Capitals, and among 
delegations themselves, thus allowing them to better prepare their interventions and improve the 
quality of the debates at CTG  meetings. At the same t ime, the Chair person  understood the Members' 
concerns expressed at the informal meeting that such a tool must be tailored to the particularities 
of each body, and their position that the  eAgenda should be implemented in the subsidiary bodies G/C/M/139  
 
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  first before b eing considered at CTG  level. However, he invited delegations to further reflect on the 
advantages of exploring a pilot project  given the increasing number of agenda items and the fact 
that Director -General Ngozi Okonjo -Iweala herself had referred to the i mportance of  eAgendas in 
her inaugural statement.  
41.4.   Turning to the conduct of meetings, delegations had considered that the provision of advance 
statements for interpreters was a good practice , and a practice  to be encouraged , as it facilitated 
the interpret ation and understanding of the issues being discussed. However, some Members had 
indicated that the advance distribution of statements to other Members should remain at the 
discretion of delegation s. Regarding the organization and presentation of the CTG  agenda, some 
Members had not supported the organization of trade concerns in alphabetical and chronological 
order. As to the interventions at CTG  meetings, various delegations had reiterated their positions 
from the previous CTG  meeting , regarding  (i) on time-limits when delivering  statements ; and (ii) on 
making reference to previous statements in the absence  of new developments in old er trade 
concerns. Finally, one  delegation had objected to the scheduling of a briefing introductory session 
addressed to new  delegates on how the CTG  meetings function, when  the issues regarding the 
functioning of the CTG  itself had not yet been resolved . 
41.5.   On the organization of a briefing session for new delegates, the Chair person  clarified that 
such sessions would be of a pure ly technical nature and aimed at providing an overview of the 
Council's activities and the particularities of its three  annual meetings. Therefore, the session would 
familiarize new delegates with routine and practical issues related to the functioning of the CTG, 
such as the mandate of the CTG and its place within the WTO  structure, the main issues considered 
at CTG  level, the organization of CTG  meetings and the structure of the agenda, key documents 
relating to the CTG, and the election of  officers to its subsidiary bodies. Since there were a number 
of new delegates responsible for CTG  matters, and given that at the informal meeting in 2020 there 
had been no opposition to organizing such an introductory session, the Chair person  invited 
delegations to consider this possibility in the coming months. Finally, the Chair person  encourage d 
delegations to keep reflecting on these issues and to continue having these discussions with his 
successor.  
41.6.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the follo wing:  
41.7.   Regarding the yearly plan of meetings, the United  States would like to reiterate its proposal, 
made at the informal meeting in February  2020, in line with the Chair's suggestion, that the Council 
Chair meet both with the Secretariat and with the chai rs of the subsidiary bodies, and that he also 
consult with Members when planning for the appropriate sequencing of meetings for the following 
year. Regarding the eAgenda , the US recognizes its utility in several WTO  committees currently , but 
its position remains the same in terms of the implementation of the eAgenda at the CTG in the short 
term. The US continues to prefer that the eAgenda be taken up by individual subsidiary bodies before 
Members turn to considering its use at the CTG. The United  States als o continues to express 
reservations with regard to scheduling a briefing session for new delegates. The US does not wish 
to prevent incoming delegates' access to information which is still readily available by conversing 
with the Secretariat. The US simply  feels that it is important to reach a conclusion on the discussion 
on the functioning of the Council before proceeding to brief new delegates on its functioning.  
41.8.   The delegate of Switzerland  indicated the following:  
41.9.   Switzerland firmly believes that improvi ng the work of WTO  regular bodies and committees is 
in the interest s of all Members. Members should notably take advantage of new technologies and 
instruments, for instance the eAgenda . Recently the CMA has started  to use this instrument and 
there is progr ess there in terms of managing the meetings and allowing Members to see the issues 
and prepare for the meetings. Switzerland also supports the idea of a briefing session for new 
delegates, especially now that Members are working virtually. Switzerland than ks the Chair of the 
CTG for his efforts in this regard and notes that he can count on Switzerland's support.  
41.10.   The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
41.11.   On the yearly plan of meetings, Canada strongly encourages the incoming CTG  Chair to 
continue plann ing and interact ing with the Chairpersons of the subsidiary bodies. There is value in 
gathering the Secretaries and the Chairpersons of subsidiary bodies, in order to talk about the plan G/C/M/139  
 
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  for the coming year and the planning of meetings, to take stock of th e constraints when holding 
specific meetings , and to recognize that most of the subsidiary bodies' meetings must be held before 
certain times of the year so that they can feed into the Council's discussion. It is well  worth work ing 
together as a group in the CTG  family and to plan out meetings together, so that we can organize 
work and ensure that there are no overlaps as those that have occurred in previous years.  
41.12.   In terms of the  eAgenda , Canada agrees not to implement it yet at the CTG, although there 
is always a rush before the closing date of the agenda to submit agenda items to the Secretariat 
and to confirm co -sponsorship. The pilot project is an interesting idea and can be discussed  in the 
future, but we should be working to perfect the functioning of the eAgenda in some of the subsidiary 
bodies that are experimenting with it and learn lessons that can be applied to the CTG  context.  
41.13.   Finally, in terms of the scheduling of a briefing s ession for new delegates, Canada does not 
understand why it cannot be offered to Members. It was tested one  year ago in the CMA and, using 
that presentation as a model, this would be a reasonable and factual way to set out the purpose and 
role of the Counc il itself. Canada recognizes the ongoing discussion around the functioning of the 
Committees and would not want to prejudge it. However, there are some relatively standard and 
consistent practices at the CTG, such as why it exists, how often it meets, and standard agenda 
items  such as , for example , the annual status of notifications or notification of Free Trade 
Agreements ( FTAs). It would be useful for new delegates to understand these general long -standing 
practices at the CTG. It is also helpful to put a  name to a face and identify contacts at the Secretariat. 
Furthermore, it is important to ensure that new delegates are registered in the e -registration system 
and that they tick off the committees for which they are responsible because this also allows 
Members to get to know the new colleagues and establish contacts for future discussions. Canada 
would encourage continuing the discussions on the briefing session for new delegates , keeping the 
briefing session factual, specific to the long -standing role of the Council, and without delving into 
issues related to the functioning of the Council currently under discussion.  
41.14.   The Chairperson recalled that he had not been able to organize additional consultations on 
these issues because he had been fully occupied with the consultations concerning the election of 
Chairpersons of the subsidiary bodies. He noted that the new Chairperson was in attendance and 
had heard all the comments , and he would no doubt be reach ing out to Members to continue the se 
consultations. On the information to newly arrived delegates, he believed that there would be a 
benefit in explaining to new delegates what was happening in the Council, and he expressed surprise 
that the Council could not agree on this point. Although individual delegation s could always meet 
the Secretariat to  request an explanation of an issue , he also saw benefit in sharing some of these 
explanations collectively.  
41.15.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
42  WORK PROGRAMME ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE  
42.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that the Ministerial Decision adopted at MC11 in Buenos Aires had 
decided to reinvigorate the Work Programme on E -Commerce. It had also instructed the General  
Council to hold periodic reviews, based on the reports submitted by the rele vant bodies, among 
them the Goods Council, in preparation for MC12, and to maintain the current practice of not 
imposing customs duties on electronic transmissions. MC12 had been postponed on two  occasions. 
At its meeting in March  2021, the Chair person  of the General Council had indicated that the General 
Council would continue holding periodic reviews of the Work Programme in its future sessions, based 
on the reports submitted by the WTO  bodies entrusted with the implementation of the Work 
Programme in pre paration for MC12. Accordingly, the E -Commerce issue was again an agenda item 
at the Goods Council's meeting. The Chair person  invited delegations to continue to express their 
opinions and to make suggestions for the preparation of the periodic review to be  held in the General 
Council in anticipation of MC12. He also informed delegations that, in order to fulfil this mandate, 
the Goods Council would again submit, at the General Council's meeting in July, a factual report 
under his own responsibility.  
42.2.   The del egate of Chad indicated the following:  
42.3.   With the appearance of the current crisis, which has led to restrictions on the movement of 
people and which has seen a slowdown in global activity and global demand, those countries that G/C/M/139  
 
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  have the technology are those  best prepared to confront such a situation. The COVID -19 pandemic 
has had a significant impact on trade and exports. LDCs have been particularly affected by the 
pandemic, not only in terms of health but , significantly , in economic and social terms as well . For 
them, technology transfer and the use of technology is very important for enabling them to catch 
up economically. That is why the LDC  Group is looking for an effective update to Article  66.2 of the 
TRIPS  Agreement on Transfer of Technology Promotion.  Developed countries are not yet providing 
these encouragements, so we need to look at encouraging that transfer towards LDCs to allow them 
to have an appropriate technological basis, which is solid and viable. In the current context, Members 
have seen to what extent a technology can be useful in terms of maintaining links between 
individuals, but also for promoting continuing activity. E -Commerce can help Members work towards 
the goal of coming out of the crisis and strengthening Members' economies. Theref ore, Chad has a 
deep interest in the benefits which come along with E -Commerce for companies, for consumers, but 
also for the economy  more generally . 
42.4.   The LDC  Group  has nevertheless identified some difficulties which appear in terms of the use 
of E-Commerce  that need to be taken into account in the WTO's Work Programme on E -Commerce. 
The question that arises is how E -Commerce can help SMEs in countries that are fragile, such as the 
LDCs. How can it help them to increase their activity and stimulate their dev elopment and create 
jobs? That is the spirit in which the LDC  Group is going to move forward and hopes that Members 
will lend an attentive ear to this topic and seek to understand the difficulties that LDCs are currently 
facing in terms of addressing E -Commerce. The LDC  Group is ready to continue discussions with 
Members on this topic.  
42.5.   The delegate of India indicated the following:  
42.6.   As the digital revolution is still unfolding, India has stated on a number of occasions that it is 
important to first understan d the complex and multi -faceted dimensions of issues related to 
E-Commerce. India still does not comprehend the full implications of E -Commerce on competition 
and market structures, issues related to transfer of technology, data storage and automation, as 
well as its impact on traditional jobs and gaps in policy and regulating frameworks in developing 
countries. Therefore, India has been a proponent of strengthening the multilateral work under the 
non-negotiating and exploratory 1998  Work Programme on E -Commerce.  
42.7.   Under this multilateral Work Programme, with the intention of understanding the implications 
of the Moratorium on customs duties on electronic transmissions, India, along with South Africa, has 
introduced three  submissions, which explain their under standing of the scope and impact of the 
Moratorium. In December  2019, India joined the consensus for a six -month extension of the 
Moratorium, with an understanding that the Work Programme on Electronic Commerce will be 
reinvigorated with the specific objec tive of achieving clarity on issues related to the scope of the 
Moratorium, the definition of electronic transmissions, identification of products which are covered 
under the Moratorium, as well as its impact. In this context, India would again draw the at tention of 
the Membership to paragraph  3.1 of the Work Programme, which requires this Council to examine 
and report on aspects of electronic commerce relevant to the provisions of GATT  1994, the trade 
agreements covered under Annex  1A of the WTO  Agreement, and the approved Work Programme. 
The said paragraph also provides an inclusive list of issues to be deliberated upon here in this Council. 
In this regard, India is working on a submission with like -minded Members and would urge the 
Membership to  sincerely deliberate and report on these mandated issues, instead of prematurely 
jumping to rule -making on such issues.  
42.8.   The delegate of Pakistan  indicated the following:  
42.9.   The importance of this agenda item in the work of the Council cannot be overemphasize d. 
Pakistan considers that this is the most appropriate forum to discuss the various development 
aspects and implications of E -Commerce. It can help developing countries to better understand and 
explore avenues for economic growth through digital capabilit ies, in their peculiar socio -economic 
context. The prevalent digital divide, which goes beyond the issues of infrastructure and 
connectivity, has been further exacerbated by the incidence of the COVID -19 pandemic. But the 
pandemic has also highlighted the growing need for E-Commerce and the increasing dependence on 
digitalization. However, there is a need to enhance capacity  in developing countries in order to 
benefit from the opportunities provided by E -Commerce and to bridge the digital divide. 
Furthermor e, as trade through E -Commerce continues to increase, it is also necessary to analyse 
the financial and policy implications of the Moratorium for developing countries.  G/C/M/139  
 
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  42.10.   It is important to understand and address these issues and any attempt at rule-making, 
without first addressing them, particularly in a non -consensual environment, might widen the 
existing digital divide and create further imbalances. This could have detrimental effects on the 
prospects of developing countries address ing existing and new chal lenges. Therefore, Pakistan  
encourages Members to engage on these issues in the correct, mandated forum of the Work 
Programme, which was reinvigorated again through consensus when extending the Moratorium 
temporarily. Pakistan looks forward to collective a nd constructive engagement on issues clearly 
outlined for this Council under the Work Programme on E -Commerce.  
42.11.   The delegate of Ukraine  indicated the following:  
42.12.   Ukraine reiterates its position on the issue of the Moratorium already voiced at the meeting 
of the General Council in March  2021. Ukraine remains a strong supporter of the Moratorium on 
customs duties on electronic transmissions, since it encourages the engagement of business, 
especially MSMEs, in cross -border E -Commerce , and has already contributed  significantly to its 
global growth. Ukraine has already committed not to impose customs duties on electronic 
transmissions under a number of active Free Trade Agreements. For this reason, Ukraine supported 
the extension of the Moratorium until MC12 and re iterates its readiness to continue the work on this 
issue with interested Members under the Work Programme on Electronic Commerce. However, 
taking into account the general nature of electronic transmissions and the fact that all WTO  Members 
have already ap plied the practice of not imposing customs duties on electronic transmissions over 
two decades, Ukraine hopes that at MC12 Members will decide  to make the Moratorium permanent.  
42.13.   The Chairperson  recalled the Buenos Aires mandate and proposed that the incomin g 
Chairperson submit, under his own responsibility, a purely factual report to be considered at the 
July meeting of the General Council, which would be based on the discussions held in the CTG in 
2021.  
42.14.   The Council took note  of the statements made  and agreed  to the Chairperson's proposal . 
43  OTHER BUSINESS  
43.1  Date of Next Meeting  
43.1.   The Chairperson  noted that the next meeting of the Council was scheduled to take place on 
8 and 9 July 2021. These dates would be confirmed in due course.  
43.2  Secretariat Staff Changes in Connection with the Council for Trade in Goods  
43.2.   The Chairperson  informed Members  that Mr  Alejandro Gamboa -Alder would shortly retire from 
the WTO  Secretariat, and that Mr Roy Santana would replace him as Secretary to the Counci l. The 
delegations of Colombia, Panama, Paraguay, Ecuador, Mexico, Chad (on behalf of th e LDC Group) , 
Uruguay, Canada, the European Union, the Russian Federation, and the United  States intervened to 
congratulate Mr  Gamboa -Alder and to thank him for his ser vice to the CTG.  
44  ELECTION OF CHAIRPERSON OF THE COUNCIL FOR TRADE IN GOODS  
44.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that the Chair of the General Council had carried out consultations 
on a slate of names for Chairpersons to the different WTO  standing bodies in accordance with the 
established Guidelines for the Appointment of Officers. These proposed nominations had been 
approved by the General Council at its last meeting. In line with the nominations, he proposed that 
the CTG elect Ambassador Lundeg Purevsuren of Mongolia as Chairperson of the Council by 
acclamation.  
44.2.   The Council so agreed . 
44.3.   The meeting was closed . 
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