G/SG/W/253  
11 May 2021 
(21-4023) Page: 1/2 
Committee on Safeguards  Original:  English  
 
  
STATEMENT BY ECUADOR AT THE MEETING OF THE  
SAFEGUARD COMMITTEE  HELD ON 26 APRIL 2021  
The following intervention,  made by the delegation of Ecuador at the meeting held on 26 April 2021  
and the relevant agenda item is "3.21. Ukraine - fresh cut roses ", is being circulated at this 
delegation's request.  
 
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Mr Chairman, it grieves me deeply to bring this matter to discussion, we should have done so in the 
light of the circumstances in which we find ourselves.  
These circumstances are, Mr Chairman, that last Thursday ( April 22) we were notified of a decision 
of the Ukrainian investigating authority, which ha d been adopted almost a week before ( April 16). 
This unfortunate decision was to adopt a safeguard for three years to roses, blatantly contravening 
the obligations derived from the Multilateral Trading System.  
The decision of the Ukrainian Government entails numerous errors of form and substance .  
Regarding the fulfilment of the procedural aspects, I would like to highlight:  
• The transparency problems in the handling of this process, in which the interested parties 
were only notified two weeks after the beginning of the investigation, granting unfeasible 
deadlines to respond, contrary to the provisions of Art. 12 of the Agreement on 
Safeguards.  
• The lack of transparency that results in a flagrant violation of due process since most of 
the information was declared confidential without the corresponding justification, even 
less so, the presentation of the non -confidential summary as required by Art. 3.2 of the 
Agreement.  
• The absence of non -confidential summaries -which grants the parties a mini mal 
understanding of the concerned variables -removes all possibility for those affected to 
exercise their right to defense . This is because the evidence on the basis of which the 
decision was made has not been delivered and the information in almost all ca ses is not 
available, making it impossible to analyze, contrast and respond to it.  
More problematic are, Mr Chairman, the errors in the substantive aspects set by the Agreement:  
• The accommodative way in which deadlines are chosen, modified, and ultimately 
interpreted, to demonstrate what Ukraine decided from the beginning that the 
investigation would reflect, giving little regard for what the numbers actually say and 
without considering the defense arguments made by Ecuador and the other parties 
interested in the investigation.  
• The state of disinformation to which the interested parties have been subjected regarding 
the procedural deadlines and steps.  
• It is worrying how the Investigating Authority initiated an investigation with the period 
2016-2019 without having the basic information of the domestic industry that only 
presented information until 2018 ; and even more worrying, the change from the 
investigation period from 2017 to June 2020 without timely informing the interested 
parties, thus preventing acces s to information related to the "new period ". G/SG/W/253  
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  • The Investigating Authority has not adjusted the baseline information submitted by the 
domestic industry until 2018 . And if it has done it so, it has not reported it and has not 
allowed access to this informati on. 
Additionally, and not by any means agreeing with the decision taken by the Government of Ukraine, 
the measure does not comply with the obligation of progressive liberalization at regular intervals,  
since it starts with 56 % in the first year, 11 percent age points are reduced in the first year and 9 % 
the second, leaving a third instalment of almost 36 % that is not reduced until the last day of the 
programmed safeguard, violating the legal obligation to progressively liberalize the measure at 
regular inter vals during the period of its application . This calculation clearly violates Art. 7.4 of the 
Agreement.  
There is no explanation regarding the way in which, in accordance with the principle of proportionality 
established in Art. 5.1 of the Agreement, the 56 % tariff has been set . Ukraine does not consider 
that a duty should be applied "only to the extent necessary to facilitate adjustment" . Nor is it 
explained how this high tariff is "necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury"  
This explanation could come from the comparison between the price of the imported good and the 
local good . We wouldn 't know Mr Chairman ; it is an impossible task considering the supposed 
confidentiality of the data argued by Ukraine . In addition to the above, there is no adjustment p lan 
submitted by the domestic industry, a fundamental requirement for the adoption of a safeguard 
measure.  
The analysis carried in accordance with the obligation set in Article XIX of the GATT 1994, regarding 
the unforeseen evolution of circumstances, does not conform to the standards established in the 
Agreement or in the WTO jurisprudence . It cannot be argued that the establishment of a 
phytosanitary measure, which is no longer in force, or that a country has better conditions for the 
production of roses, is considered as an "unforeseen development ". 
There is no analysis of the causal link between imports and injury . Ukraine declares the existence 
of this substantial element contained in Art. 4.2 b) instead of demonstrating it . Furthermo re, the 
increase in absolute terms required by Art. 8.3 of the Agreement does not exist, since the volume 
of flower imports from Ecuador falls 8 % in 2020.  
As soon as Ukraine honors us with the notification provided for in paragraph c) of Article 12, the 
Secretariat will be able to verify that there is no demonstration of the existence of serious injury and 
the causal link required by Art. 12.2 of the Agreement.  
Mr President, I lament the need to present these data to the Committee, but we consider that a 
review of the procedure that led to the decision taken by the Government of Ukraine is unavoidable . 
The safeguards system cannot be abused by Members, even by the Member that makes the most 
use of them throughout the WTO, considering the size of its market ; around twenty procedures to 
date. 
The investigating authority is a depository of obligations on two levels . On the first level, to respect 
the obligations enshrined in international agreements, and on the second level, the obligation to 
conduct the investi gations requested by the domestic industry that demand commercial relief . Both 
levels must be adequately balanced and one cannot be addressed to the detriment of the other.  
Finally, Mr Chairman, Ecuador awaits with interest the responses that Ukraine shall  present to this 
Committee to the questions formulated at the October  2020 meeting regarding the investigation of 
fresh cut Roses . This information will already put into context the violations to due process and to 
the Agreement on Safeguards.  
That is why,  Mr President, in accordance with Article 13.1 (b)  of the aforementioned Agreement, 
Ecuador requests the Committee to verify whether the procedural requirements have been met in 
relation to the safeguard measure adopted by Ukraine, and to communicate its f indings to the 
Council for Trade in Goods.  
Ecuador will be attentive to the communication made by the Committee.  
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