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G/AG/R/103  
 
31 October  2022 
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Committee on Agriculture    
 
SUMMARY REPORT OF THE MEETING HELD ON 14-15 SEPTEMBER  2022  
NOTE BY THE SECRETARIAT1 
1  ADOPTION OF THE AGENDA  
1.1.  The Committee on Agriculture (CoA) held its one hundred th and second  (102nd) regular meeting 
on 14-15 September  2022 under the Chairpersonship of M r. Marcel Vernooij  of the Netherlands . 
1.2.  The agenda contained in the convening airgram WTO/AIR/AG/ 61 circulated on 
5 September  2022 was adopted  with the following additions  under Agenda item IA- Review Process : 
matters relevant to the implementation of commitments under the reform programme raised under 
Article 18.6 of the Agreement  (Specific Implementation Matters ): 
− The United States requested to include a question concerning Ecuador's new milk law 
(AG-IMS ID 102 131).  
− The European  Union requested to include a question concerning India's export restriction on 
rice AG-IMS ID 10213 2). 
− The following questions were co -sponsored:  
 
▪ India's Public stockpiling (AG -IMS ID 102018) - co-sponsored by Uruguay ; 
▪ India's Public stockpiling (AG -IMS ID 102019) - co-sponsored by Uruguay and Ukraine ; 
▪ India's other support for rice (AG -IMS ID 102020) - co-sponsored by Uruguay . 
1.3.  Additionally, the Chairperson acknowledged the written submission by  the World Food 
Programme in G/AG/GE N/205 , which w as circulated after the issuance of the convening airgram , for 
consideration under Part II of the agenda ( item 2.A (iii)  – Ministerial Declaration on the 
WTO response to the COVID -19 pandemic and preparedness for future pandemics 
(WT/MIN(22)/31 -WT/L/1142) .  
2  THE REVIEW PROCESS  
2.1.  The Chairperson urged Members to provide timely and complete responses to questions raised 
under the Committee's review process and to submit them through the Agriculture Information 
Management System (AG -IMS)2 for interested Members to consult.  The Chairperson  also referred to 
the in -built co -sponsoring function of the Agriculture Information Management System (AG -IMS) 
Q&A facility and noted that more than 20% o f the questions raised for th is meeting had been 
co-sponsored by at least one Member.  
2.2.  The Chairperson noted that for th e meeting, as of 9 am, 14 September  2022, 26 out of the 
116 questions raised had responses available on  the AG -IMS. The Chairperson welcomed Members ' 
practice  of submit ting responses  in advance of CoA meetings  allowing for  deepen ed exchanges 
during meetings.   
2.3.  The Secretariat continued its practice of ascertaining the attendance of Members subject to 
advance questions  prior to Committee meetings . Morocco  had forewarned the Secretariat of its 
absence at the September  meeting.  
 
1 This document has been prepared under the Secretariat's own responsibility and is without prejudice 
to the positions of Members or to their rights and obligations under the WTO.  
2 http://agims.wto.org/ . G/AG/R/103  
 
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  2.1  Matters relevant to the implementation of commitments under the reform programme 
- Article 18.6  of the Agreement on Agriculture  
2.4.  A total of 37 specific implementation matters (SIMs) were raised at the 102nd CoA meeting 
under Article 18.6.3 Out of the 37 SIMs, 21 were raised for the first time. Members' responses and 
follow -up comments can be accesse d by clicking on the relevant hyperlinks in column  3 of Table  1 
in Annex 1 to this report . This information can also be  consulted directly in the AG -IMS using the 
relevant question ID numbers as provided in that table.  
2.2  Review of Notifications  
2.5.  The Chairperson reported that since the previous Committee meeting held on  27-28 June 2022, 
88 notifications had been received. Out of those  notifications , 10 related to market access, 
17 concerned domestic support, 56 related to export competition,  4 concerne d export prohibitions 
or restrictions , and 1 was a net food -importing developing country  (NF) notification . Those 
notifications had been distributed electronically to all delegations and were available for consultation 
through the  AG-IMS.  
2.2.1   Notifications in respect of which questions have been raised in advance of the 
issuance of the convening airgram  
2.6.  Table 2 of Annex 1  to this report includes the list of questions relating to individual notifications 
raised in advance of the issuance of the convening airgram .4 Members' responses and follow -up 
comments can be accessed  directly by clicking on the hyperlinks contained in the table or through 
the AG -IMS using the relevant question ID numbers.   
2.2.2   Overdue notifications  
2.7.  The Committee took note of the  Secretariat document summarizing the status of Members' 
compliance with notification obligations .5 
2.8.  The Chairperson acknowledged Members' efforts to bring their notifications up to date , noting 
that several Members had submitted agriculture notifications covering multiple years since the 
June 2022 meeting, including:  
• Argentina  – Table DS:1 covering the years 201 8-2020;  
• Kenya – Table ES:1 covering the years 199 8 to 2020;  
• Lesotho  – Table ES: 1 covering the years  2019-2021;  
• Mali – Table ES:1 covering the years 2018 -2021;  and 
• Tonga  – Table ES: 1 covering the years 2009-2017.  
2.9.  The Chairperson also drew Members' attention to the overall situation with respect to 
outstanding domestic sup port and export subsidy notifications for the period 1995 to 20 20: 
• 948 Table DS:1 domestic support notifications  remained outstanding; and  
• 958 export subsidy notifications in the Table ES:1 series remained outstanding.  
2.10.   Eight question s were raised under this agenda item.6 Members' responses and follow -up 
comments can be accessed through the hyperlinks contained in Table 3 of Annex 1  to this report  or 
through the AG -IMS using the  relevant question ID numbers.  
2.11.   The Chairperson emphasized the i mportance of transparency and timely notifications and 
encouraged Members to fulfil their notification obligations.  
 
3 WTO/AIR/AG/ 61, Section A of Attachment  1. The full version of the questions raised can be found 
under Section 1 of the compilation document in G/AG /W/222. 
4 WTO/AIR/AG/ 61, Section B of Attachment  1. The full version of the questions raised can be found 
under Section 2 of the compilation document in G/AG/W/2 22. 
5 G/AG/GEN/86/Rev.4 6 circulated on 5 September  2022. 
6 The details of the question  raised can be found under Section 3 of the compilation document  in 
G/AG/W/2 22. G/AG/R/103  
 
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  2.2.3   Notifications subject to review in respect of which no questions have been raised 
in advance of the issuance of the convening airgram  
2.12.   The Co mmittee took note of the 71 notifications circulated before the issuance of the 
convening airgram on 5 September 2022, including notifications carried over from the September  
2022 meeting, but in respect of which no questions had been raised by that date , under paragraph  9 
of the Committee's working procedures.7 
2.2.4   Notifications circulated after the issuance of the convening airgram  
2.13.   The Committee took note of the one notification circulated after the issuance of the convening 
airgram on 5 September  2022:  
• China, Table MA:2 for 2021 (G/AG/N/ CHN/57). 
 
2.14.   This notification would be reverted to for substantive review during the next regular meeting, 
in accordance with paragra ph 9 of the working procedures.  
2.2.5   Points concerning notifications raised at previous meetings which have been 
pursued bilaterally: information regarding outcome where the issue involved is one of 
general interest  
2.15.   There were no requests for the floor under this agenda item.  
2.2.6   Counter -notifications under Article 18.7 of the Agreement on Agriculture  
2.16.   No counter -notifications under Article 18.7 were made for this Committee meeting.  
2.3  Deferred replies to questions raised under the review process  
2.17.   The Secretariat document G/AG/W/204/Rev. 7 lists questions raised under the CoA  review 
process from 2013 to 202 1 where responses remain outstanding.  As of 4 September 2022, a total 
of 136 questions still had outstanding responses  from 43 Members  for the period 2013-2020. 
Similarly, 49 responses from 15 Members had outstanding responses to questions posed in 202 1.  
2.18.   The Chairperson urged Members to make dedicated efforts to shorten, and eventually close, 
the list of pending responses. To assist Members in this endeavour, the Secretariat ha s introduced 
a feature in the AG -IMS to generate automatic reminders to Members with outstanding responses.  
2.19.   Brazil reminded Nigeria of  outstanding responses to its questions  raised at the 98th, 99th and 
100th CoA meetings .  
3  OTHER MATTERS WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF THE COMMITTEE  
3.1  Implementation of Ministerial outcomes   
3.1.  The delegation of India, supported by Indonesia, Sri Lanka and Egypt, questioned the rationale 
of selective listing of ministerial outcomes on the agenda and wondered w hy some other decisions 
like the Ministerial Decision on Public Stockholding for Food Security Purposes, the Ministerial 
Decision on the Special Safeguard Mechanism, and the Ministerial Decision on the World Food 
Programme had not been i ncluded . Those Memb ers proposed the inclusion of missing ministerial 
outcomes on the agenda of the next meeting of the Committee. The Chairperson indicated that he 
would consult with Members on the organization of agenda of the next Committee meeting.  India 
also requested th e WFP to provide further information on how the MC12 Decision on the WFP had 
assisted its food procurement operations and to share details of export restrictions affecting those 
operations before and after th e Decision.  
 
7 WTO/AIR/AG/ 61, Section C of Attachment  1. G/AG/R/103  
 
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  3.1.1    Bali Ministerial Decision on TRQ ( WT/MIN(13)/39 – WT/L/914)   
3.2.  The Chair reported on the informal meeting of the Committee that took place on 14 September 
where Members discussed the follow -up to the recommendations of the review under G/AG/29, and 
the finalization of the Secretariat's TRQ underfill mechanism Tracking Register. The report can be 
found in Annex 2 of this document.  
3.1.1.1   Follow -up to the Recommendations of the review (G/AG/29) : First triennial 
review pursuant to paragraph 3 of G/AG/29 and Revised Secretariat note on TRQ 
administ ration and fill rates (G/AG/W/183/Rev.2)  
3.3.  Regarding the First Triennial Review Pursuant to Paragraph 3 of G/AG/29,  the Chair noted that 
Paragraph 3 of the recommendations of the Review of the operation of the Bali Decision on 
TRQ Administration approved by the General Council in its December 2019  meeting,  instruct ed the 
Committee to undertake regular reviews of the operation of the Bali TRQ Decision every three years. 
The Chair noted the useful discussion the Committee had at the June 2022 informal meeting w here 
Members alluded to specific issues that they would wish to consider during th e first triennial review. 
The Chair noted that Members had further elaborated on these issues during the 14  September 
informal CoA meeting as described in the report of the i nformal meeting. The Chair noted that the  
Secretariat w ould prepare a list of issues raised by Members for the triennial review and would 
circulate it to Members . The Chair stated that it would  organize additional consultations on this 
matter before the No vember CoA meeting based on those identified issues. The Chair  also noted 
that the triennial review would be expected to be conclude d at the last meeting of the Committee in 
November  2022 scheduled for 21-22 November.   
3.4.  The Committee took note of the revised Secretariat note on TRQ administration and fill rates.8  
3.1.1.2   Secretariat Tracking Register (RD/AG/83/Rev.2)  
3.5.  The Committee a pproved the Secretariat Tracking Register which was distributed to Members 
on 15 August 2022 unde r document symbol RD/AG/83/Rev.2 with the understanding that the 
Committee may periodically review and adjust the register, as necessary, based on the experience 
of the implementation of the underfill Mechanism. The Secretariat Tracking Register , as approv ed, 
was later distributed in document G/AG/34.  
3.1.2   Ministerial Declaration on The Emergency Response to Food Insecurity 
(WT/MIN(22)/28 – WT/L/1139) – Work Programme pursuant to paragraph 8 of the 
Declaration  
3.6.  The Chair person  reported on the informal meeting of the Committee that took place on 
14 September where Members exchanged views on the elaboration of the work programme on how 
to make the NFIDC Decision more effective and operational , as mandated by paragraph 8 of the 
Ministerial Declaration on the Emergenc y Response to Food Insecurity. The Chair's report can be 
found in Annex 3 to this report.   
3.7.  The IMF expressed its commitment to supporting Members affected by food insecurity with the 
full range of its instruments and complementing the work of other institutions. This included working 
to help address pressures on external balances and fiscal situations  result ing from food shortages 
and elevated global food prices. Working in collaboration with other international institutions, t he 
IMF referred to its four main workstreams of activities , namely (i) monitoring the macroeconomic 
impacts an d vulnerabilities of countries in the current global food security crisis with a particular 
attention to fragile and conflict -affected states, many of which were severely affected by food 
insecurity (ii) policy advice and capacity development  on macroecono mic frameworks, and on 
improving social safety nets to protect vulnerable households from the imminent threat of food 
insecurity , (iii) financial support either through program mes or emergency financing in the form of 
balance of payments support  to catalyz e and complement financing from other institutions. The IMF 
also informed that it was considering strengthening its emergency toolkit to provide emergency 
support to countries facing urgent balance -of-payments needs associated with the current global 
food shock ; and (iv)  cooperation and partners hip with other international organizations  to help 
 
8 G/AG/W/183/Rev.2.  G/AG/R/103  
 
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  countries with food security concerns to identify and implement policies to increase production and 
to strengthen allocation of food supplies. The IMF expressed its readiness to further engage with the 
Committee , as it develops the work programme pursuant to the MC12 Declaration on food insecurity.  
3.8.  The World Bank stated that their response to food insecurity was global, and that it provided 
countr y support along the following four lines: (i) support to producers  and production for the next 
season by  addressing barriers to inputs trade, financing and more efficient use of fertilizers , and 
repurposing public polic y expenditures to better support farmers'  output ; (ii) facilitate trade  by 
building international consensus  in order to  avoid trade restrictions that increase global food prices 
and discourage production in developing countries ; (iii) support ing vulnerable households  by scaling 
up targeted nutrition and social pro tection  programmes, and  replenish ing early response financing 
mechanisms ; and (iv) invest ing in sustainable food and nutrition security  by strengthen ing food 
systems to make them more resilient to r ising risks, such as conflict, climate  change , pest and 
diseases, trade disruptions, and economic shocks.  The World Bank noted that it had already started 
working on projects in different countries to assist them to respond to the food security crisis. The 
overall support would amount to USD 30 billion, entailing projects for agriculture and input support, 
social protection , and water and irrigation support to increase productiv ity. The World Bank noted 
that the majority of the  resources  were going to Africa and the Middle East .  
3.9.  Türkiye  welcomed the IMF and World Bank reports and noted that Türkiye  had been one of the 
largest contributors to world food security, and that it would maintain efforts towards  ensur ing that 
countries in need met their food r equirements . 
3.10.   The Chair person  thanked both the IMF and the World Bank to brief the Membership of their 
activities to assist governments in dealing with the current food security challenges and looked 
forward to continued collaboration on the matter.  The Cha ir also noted that an informal CoA meeting 
would be organized on 11 October 2022 to consider the elaboration of work programme pursuant to 
paragraph 8 of the MC12 Declaration on food insecurity and invited Members to submit inputs and 
suggestions on possib le themes that they would like to be taken up under the work programme by 
30th September. Members could also submit p roposals for technical workshops  on specific themes.  
The Chair urged Members to reflect on how the discussion on the work programme should be 
organized at the November CoA meeting which would also undertake the annual monitoring of the 
Marrakesh Decision pursuant to paragraph 18 of the Committee's working procedures.  Egypt 
highlighted a sense of urgency on the matter.   
3.1.3   Ministerial Declaration on the WTO  response to the COVID -19 pandemic and 
preparedness for future pandemics (WT/MIN(22)/31 - WT/L/1142) : Continuing 
engagement on "COVID -19 and Agriculture" to feed into the annual stocktaking exercise 
by the General Council pursuant to P aragraph 24 of the Declaration   
3.11.   The Chair noted that paragraph 24 of the Ministerial Declaration on the WTO response to the 
COVID -19 pandemic and preparedness for future pandemics provided that relevant WTO bodies, 
including the Committee on Agriculture, w ould analyse lessons that have been learnt and challenges 
experienced during the COVID -19 pandemic based on proposals by Members. The Chair added that 
a stock taking exercise would be undertaken at the General Council at the end of 2024 based on the 
report s from the relevant bodies, including the Committee on Agriculture.  
3.12.   The Chair recalled the special meeting of the Committee held in June 2020 devoted to 
COVID -19 and agriculture, noting that since then the Committee had held discussions on the 
pandemic an d its effect on the agricultural sector under a standing agenda item. The Chair noted 
that the standing agenda item had provided an important opportunity for a holistic engagement 
among Members on COVID -19 related matters, to appreciate the challenges pose d by the pandemic 
on global agriculture and food systems, and to collectively reflect on ways to deal with the crisis and 
its aftershocks. Members also exchanged views under that agenda on each other's trade measures 
taken in response to the pandemic withi n the context of the relevant provisions of the Agreement 
on Agriculture, including based on ad hoc  reports that they had submitted on such measures. The 
agenda item had also provided an opportunity to benefit from the work and experience of the 
observer i nternational organizations.  
3.13.   The Chair added that the MC12 Declaration on the WTO response to the COVID -19 pandemic 
had provided further guidance to all relevant WTO bodies, including the CoA, for the conduct of G/AG/R/103  
 
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  discussions on COVID -19. In light of the MC1 2 Declaration, the committee had informally considered 
the matter of organization of the agenda item on 'COVID -19 and Agriculture' during the June  2022 
CoA meeting. Based on the discussions at the June meeting and the Chair's subsequent consultations 
with Members, the agenda item on COVID -19 and agriculture was accordingly organized for the 
September CoA meeting as seen in the Convening Airgram under WTO/AIR/AG/61. The Chair further 
added that discussions in the Committee on C OVID -19 and Agriculture may acc ordingly be organized 
in future CoA meetings, guided further by the MC12 Declaration on the COVID -19 pandemic. The 
discussions could also suitably feed into the annual stocktaking exercise by the General Council 
pursuant to paragraph 24 of that Declaration .  
3.14.   The Committee acknowledged the written submissions by FAO9 and the WFP10. 
3.15.   The FAO alluded to the unequal pattern of economic recovery in 2021 among countries and 
stated that the unrecovered income losses among those most affected by the pandemic had 
exacerbated existing inequalities and had worsened the food security situation for vulnerable 
populations impeding progress towards the achievement of SDG 2 (Zero Hunger) by  2030. The FAO 
highlighted that the prevalence of undernourishment had increased from  8% to 9.3% from 2019 
to 2020, and grew further to 9.8% in 2021. The updated projections posited that 8% of the world 
population would still be undernourished in 2030, which is the same share as in 2015 at the time of 
the launch of the SDG 2030 Agenda.  The FAO noted that between 700 to 800 million people were 
affected by hunger in 2021, and this figure had grown by at least 150 million since the outbreak of 
COVID -19. The FAO further noted that food prices had increased in 2021 due to bottlenecks in supply 
chains, soaring energy and transport costs and other disruptions caused by the COVID -19 pandemic;  
the war in Ukraine further exacerbated the situation and pushed prices in 2022 further up to record 
highs. Referring to the OECD -FAO Agricultural Outlook 2022 -2031, the FAO stated that achieving 
SDG-2 of Zero Hunger by 2030 (while simultaneously keeping agricultural emissions on track to 
reach the Paris Agreement targets), would require average global agricultural productivity to 
increase by 28% over the next de cade which was more than triple the increase recorded in the last 
decade. The FAO also referred to its efforts to enhance market transparency, inter alia , through the 
joint G20 initiative of Agricultural Market Information System  (AMIS)  and the Global Info rmation 
and Early Warning System on Food and Agriculture (GIEWS) towards stable and predictable trading 
environment and expressed its commitment to support countries in mitigating the impacts of 
COVID -19, strengthening the longer -term livelihood resilience  and transforming agrifood systems 
through its multiple initiatives and programmes.  
3.16.   The WFP noted that the world was facing a food crisis of unprecedented proportions in 2022. 
Based on information from WFP's operations in 82 countries, nearly 345 million people might be 
acutely food insecure in 2022, including up to 50 million people on the edge of famine. The increase 
in international food prices over the past year had been further exacerbated by the conflict in 
Ukraine. The WFP also referred to high fert ilizer costs, close to their 2008 levels, and climate change 
shocks in major exporting countries, which could contribute to significant decrease in cereal 
production. The WFP stated that it was mobilizing all available resources to address these challenges . 
It had planned to provide urgent and lifesaving nutritional assistance to 153 million vulnerable people 
in 2022.  At the same time, the WFP was committed to supporting national food systems, supply 
chains and markets, to boost long term resilience against  these shocks. The WFP underlined that 
the current crisis required joint efforts to help the most vulnerable countries towards stabilizing their 
national food systems. It also alluded to its efforts, in collaboration with other international agencies, 
to support the Food and Agriculture Resilience Mission initiative launched by the Government of 
France.  The WFP expressed its gratitude to the WTO for the MC12 decision on the exemption of the 
WFP's humanitarian food purchases from the application of export re strictions as a step in the right 
direction to help tackle the global food crisis and facilitate the achievement of the SDG 2 objective 
of zero hunger.  
3.17.   Members welcomed the written reports by FAO and the WFP and appreciated the information 
contained therei n. 
3.18.   Referring to the FAO report, Brazil lamented that every one in three persons in the world was 
moderately to severely food insecure in 2021. It drew attention to figure 1 of the Report which 
showed that the period of most pronounced reduction in world hu nger coincided with the period of 
 
9 G/AG/GEN/204 . 
10 G/AG/GEN/205 . G/AG/R/103  
 
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  greater global agricultural trade flows. While not attributing the reduction in hunger solely to 
increased agricultural trade, Brazil also did not suggest that there was tension between domestic 
production and trade. It no ted that the two could be mutually supportive and were in fact necessary 
to meet countries' food security goals. It regretted the current state of food insecurity despite a high 
level of support channelled to agricultural production according to the WTO an d OECD data. Despite 
a poor cost -benefit ratio of the prevailing support type, Brazil wondered why both developed and 
developing countries seemed more inclined towards the coupled form of domestic support since the 
adoption of the AoA. Brazil considered th at the WTO framework offered an opportunity to Members 
to pursue productive and profitable agricultural production systems. However, the current support 
policies inadvertently deprived agricultural producers of efficient production means and increased 
the wasting of limited natural resources. Brazil believed that a 28% increase in agricultural 
productivity required to achieve the objectives set out in SDG 2  might not be achievable under 
current policies . On figure 4 of the FAO's report concerning the trade costs arising from tariffs, non -
tariff barriers and procedural inefficiencies, Brazil underlined the need for enhanced technical 
assistance and policy collaboration among Members as well as their renewed acknowledgement and 
understanding of the role of tra de. On the WFP submissions, Brazil stated that it would seek to have 
a clearer understanding of the FARM initiative and how it fitted within the WFP framework. Referring 
to some documents on the FARM initiative which talked about the provision of food comm odities, 
supply chain solutions, and agricultural inputs at favourable costs and surplus countries making their 
excess supply of cereals available to deficit countries at fair prices, Brazil wondered what these 
'favourable costs' and 'fair prices' would be  and whether the modalities of implementing such 
provisions would be consistent with the WTO provisions on export competition, including the Nairobi 
Decision on export competition.  Brazil, supported by India, also raised questions about the WTO's 
involveme nt in the FARM initiative.  
3.19.   Egypt stated that the FAO and WFPs reports highlighted the gravity of the problem with 
193 million people across 53 countries in need of urgent assistance. It proposed that the Committee 
should act using the tools available to i t. Egypt considered and hoped that the required target of a 
28% increase over the next decade would be achievable, but stressed the need for the increase to 
come from all regions and the benefits shared equitably rather than it being concentrated in only 
one region.  Egypt hoped that the declining trend in global food prices would continue.  It also noted 
that despite the declining prices, the percentage of hunger and food insecurity was higher than in 
previous years. Egypt wondered whether trade alone could be the solution, especially considering 
that 83% of food consumption is met by domestic production and only the rest from trade.  
3.20.   India referred to global food prices, which it said had been elevated even prior to the Ukraine 
conflict, and wondered whether  trade could be portrayed as the only answer to food security.  India 
rather emphasized the role of enhanced production capacity to bring down international food prices. 
In this regard, India cited the example of its own food security programmes carried out  during the 
COVID -19 pandemic. India also posed a number of specific questions to the WFP on its submission 
concerning the food procurement prices which it considered high, share of local procurement in 
WFP's overall food purchases, definition of a small -holder farmers, WFP's support to local farmers 
and markets to boost long -term resilience, and an update on restrictions imposed on the WFP's food 
purchases since the adoption MC12 Decision on WFP, and the impact of the Decision on its 
procurement operations .11 
3.21.   Ukraine noted that the ongoing conflict in the county had deeply affected agricultural and food 
supply chains exacerbating the negative effects of the COVID -19 pandemic. Given the high 
significance of Ukraine as supplier of key agri -food commodities an d inputs to global markets, the 
war had led to shortages and fuelled inflation. Ukraine also stated that Russia 's war had damaged 
Ukraine's critical agricultural infrastructure and alluded to the pilfering of more than 1 million tonnes 
of grains valued at more than 100 million USD from Ukraine by Russia.  Ukraine stated that despite 
the brutal war against the norms of the United Nations (UN) Charter, and rules -based international 
order, it had demonstrated its commitment to maintain stable supply to international agricultural 
markets. Export of grains, legu mes, oilseeds, and processed products from Ukraine reached 4.5 
million tonnes in August which was 1.5 times higher than the amount in July. Ukraine also highlighted 
the importance of the Black Sea Grain Initiative negotiated under the auspices of the UN. U kraine 
stated that in August, world wheat prices had fallen by 5% driven, among other factors, by the 
resumption of exports from the Black Sea ports in Ukraine for the first time in over five months of 
 
11 The WFP later provided a response to these questions in writing to India which  was also shared with 
all Members for transparency purposes.  G/AG/R/103  
 
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  interruption assisting all importing countries, especi ally the ones from the low -income group. Ukraine 
informed the Committee that since the departure of the first vessel from the Odesa port in 
August  2022, a total of 136 ships carrying more than 3.1 million tonnes of Ukrainian agricultural 
products had alrea dy left the Ukrainian Black Sea ports destined to more than 20 countries, including 
China, Egypt, Iran, Israel, India, the Republic of Korea, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Turk iye, Syria, 
Ethiopia and the European Union member States. Ukraine considered that the Russian Federation 
bears the full responsibility for the functioning of the grains corridor and urged the beneficiary 
recipient countries to demand no interference from the Russia n Federation for the continued 
functioning of the initiative. Ukraine called on Members to demand from the Russian Federation to 
unblock all its ports and to withdraw its troops from its territory.  
3.22.   Chile expressed concerns about the rise in food and fertilizer prices and thanked the FAO and 
the WFP for highlighting the magnitude of  the problem. Chile reminded Members about the 2008 
historic price peaks and requested further inputs from the two organizations on practices that could 
improve the situation.  
3.23.   Nigeria described the food security situation prevailing in developing countries  as alarming. 
Nigeria considered that food insecurity in Africa was primarily due to the export concentration in the 
global markets, mainly involving developed countries. Nigeria further noted that most developing 
countries were unable to meet their food s ecurity needs due to policy constraints originating in the 
imbalances of the AoA. Nigeria suggested that the WTO should make efforts to address existing 
asymmetries, preserve the existing flexibilities and to provide for more policy space to developing 
countries, especially LDCs and NFIDCs, to enable them to upscale their agricultural production 
capacities. Nigeria didn't fully share the FAO's report on the causes of food insecurity and requested 
the FAO to balance the analysis of the root causes of food in security.  
3.24.   Canada thanked the FAO and the WFP for their written reports and to Ukraine for their 
intervention. Canada condemned the war in Ukraine and expressed its commitment to assist Ukraine 
and other affected countries. It stated that the war had exacer bated food insecurity around the 
world, especially in LDCs, undermined world trade and the multilateral trading system, and impacted 
the attainment of SDG goals. Canada's response to the current crisis was in the form of pledged 
food supply, innovation, fi nance, trade, and enhanced coordination. Canada stated that it had sought 
to increase productivity; total acreage of Canadian wheat was expected to increase by 7% in 2022, 
and that Canada was investing $4 million to increase its their ability to bring more  cereal, grains, 
and oats to international markets. Canada was further leveraging innovative ideas to support farmers 
and exploring ways to share Canada's expertise in the areas of conservation tillage, fertilizer 
application, water management, and other t echnical fields. Financially, Canada had provided over 
$238 million to the WFP in order to meet global needs, and augmented support to the IFAD and 
regional development banks and doubled its investment in the AMIS. This support built on last year's 
support  of more than $800 million to agriculture and food systems. Canada looked forward to 
working together with Members in the CoA, as well as with the FAO, the WFP, and other International 
Organizations, to address food security concerns globally.  
3.25.   South Africa  welcomed the Ministerial Declaration on the emergency response to food 
insecurity and the Ministerial Declaration on the WTO response to the COVID -19 pandemic and 
preparedness for future pandemics. South Africa noted that food security was a multi -faceted  issue 
and accordingly required a comprehensive policy response. South Africa was pleased that the two 
ministerial declarations acknowledged that trade, along with domestic production plays an important 
role in improving global food security. South Africa further welcomed the commitment under the 
MC12 Declaration on food insecurity to cooperate with a view to ensuring enhanced productivity and 
production, trade availability, accessibility, and affordability of food. South Africa noted that while 
trade was a n important element to resolve food insecurity, it was important to focus on investment 
and building productive capacities in developing countries, particularly in Africa, to ensure long term 
resilience of their economies. Disproportionate reliance on impo rts of basic food stuff, especially 
when sources of supply were concentrated in a limited number of exporting countries, would pose 
systemic risks to food security in the concerned importing countries.  
3.26.   The United States noted that among the latest factors  engendering global food insecurity, the 
war in Ukraine and the threat to end the Black Sea arrangement for the flow of Ukrainian agriculture 
exports could further destabilize the food security landscape. The United States noted that the 
majority of the ex ports shipped via the Black Sea were destined for Türkiye , Africa, Asia, and the 
Middle East. The United States further reminded Members that the Russian Federation continued to G/AG/R/103  
 
- 9 - 
 
  impose export restrictions on various agricultural inputs and commodities. The se restrictions were 
non-transparent and added considerable market uncertainty and volatility. The United States further 
underlined that its sanctions against the Russia n Federation  were carefully targeted not to impede 
global trade of fertilizers, agricul tural and food products, or humanitarian aid. Further, to assist net 
food-importing developing countries, the US Government had announced in June 2022, 2.76 billion 
USD of additional funding to help protect the world's most vulnerable populations from the impacts 
of food insecurity. The US Government had announced in August that they would contribute more 
than 68 million USD to the WFP to support the procurement, transport, and storage of up to 150,000 
tonnes of Ukrainian wheat to address the acute food ins ecurity. The United Stated welcomed the 
work undertaken by the FAO on trade and markets, which provided objective data, information and 
outlook, that could inform decision -making and policy designs. The United States expressed its 
determination to act with  urgency, at scale, and in concert with its allies and partners, to address 
the urgent food security and nutritional needs of hundreds of millions of people around the world, 
with additional investment and contribution in the near future.  
3.27.   The United Kingdo m stated that the war in Ukraine impacted international prices of food and 
key agricultural inputs, which had already been high due to a variety of factors. The United Kingdom 
echoed the statement of Ukraine and some others concerning the detrimental impac t of Russia's 
actions on global markets. The United Kingdom commended the efforts by Ukraine to produce and 
export key agricultural and food products onto international markets, to ensure supply to the most 
vulnerable populations, including through the WFP . The United Kingdom recognized that this also 
depended on ensuring the effective continuation of the grain corridor agreement. The United 
Kingdom had announced in June that it would invest 370 million pounds in food security in 2022, 
including 130 million  pounds for the WFP. The United Kingdom recognized and supported the vital 
work by the WFP in the current crisis, as well as the critical importance of upholding the commitment 
made by Ministers in June that WTO Members shall not impose export prohibitions  or restrictions on 
WFP's food purchases for non -commercial humanitarian purposes. The United Kingdome supported 
the ongoing discussions at the CoA on this very important matter.  
3.28.   The European Union noted that Russia's unprovoked and unjustified military ag gression 
against Ukraine combined with the commodities price surge and climatic cataclysm like droughts 
and floods affecting large parts of the world over the summer, brought at the forefront the link 
between geopolitics, globalization, climate change, and  food security. In this context, the European 
Union welcomed the Black Sea shipping agreement reached between Ukraine and the Russian 
Federation facilitated by Türkiye and the United Nations, which allowed the resumption of foodstuff 
exports from Ukraine t hrough sea routes. The European Union noted that the UN deal together with 
the EU solidarity lane had led to price drops on the global markets towards the alleviation of food 
insecurity in some of the most vulnerable parts of the world as seen in the FAO's  report. The 
European Union added that keeping Ukrainian exports flowing safely was a crucial prerequisite for 
improving food security, particularly by pushing agricultural commodities prices down. However, 
reaching and respecting the Black Sea Agreement, was only a partial solution to the existing 
challenges in the field of food security. The European Union highlighted that the latest report of the 
UN global crisis response group pointed that rising energy prices were accelerating the cost -of-living 
prices  and sustaining a vicious cycle of constrained household budgets, increasing food and energy 
poverty, and increasing social unrest. The European Union added that high energy and input prices 
exacerbated by the Russian invasion on Ukraine had dramatically i ncreased the cost of production, 
especially via the prices of nitrogenous fertilizers which, in turn, were heavily dependent on natural 
gas prices. This had impacted farmers, fuelled food price inflation, and risked impacting the 2023 
harvest season. The E uropean Union stated that the continuation of the war would hamper sowing, 
crop management, and harvesting in Ukraine; further, the recovery of the diminished export capacity 
due to damages to the export infrastructure would also require time. Therefore, g lobal food 
insecurity remained an issue of great concern. The European Union stressed that Members needed 
to facilitate trade in agriculture and food, avoid export restrictions, and help the flow of Ukrainian 
grains into world markets. The European Union s tated that it had taken multiple initiatives aimed at 
mitigating the severe effects of the global food crisis. It assured that it would continue to engage 
with all partners and fully support the work of the UN global crisis response group on food, energy, 
and finance. It further stated that the EU Global Food Security Response comprised four strands of 
actions: solidarity, by assisting vulnerable population with emergency relief and support; production 
support to boosting output and resilience of food syste ms based on humanitarian -development -
peace nexus approach; trade, by calling on all partners not to restrict global trade and to keep trade 
from Ukraine flowing, notably through getting Ukrainian grain to global markets through the 
EU solidarity lane actio n plan and supporting the UN efforts on implementing the Black Sea initiative; G/AG/R/103  
 
- 10 - 
 
  multilateralism, by anchoring the EU's response in the multilateral system and working closely with 
the UN and other key partners. In total, the European Union envisaged support  of over 7.7 billion 
EUR for food security and food systems until 2024. This contribution would be further increased by 
the EU member States and the European financial institutions, in a Team Europe approach. The 
European Union noted that the fast -growing global food insecurity and malnutrition was a stark 
reminder of the need to foster sustainable food systems and climate resilience, particularly in 
vulnerable regions.  
3.29.   New Zealand recognized and commended the efforts of the FAO and the WFP in helping tack le 
the current food security crisis. New Zealand particularly highlighted the FAO's role in helping 
countries to develop their agricultural sectors to produce sufficiently and to diversify their production. 
New Zealand noted that the focus in the WTO discu ssions should be on the role that trade and 
WTO rules might play to assist countries move forward in the same direction. Referring to the FAO's 
report estimating the need to increase productivity by 28%, New Zealand noted that production 
should be undertak en more efficiently rather than targeting just enhanced production. Relying on 
the recent statistics that 3.7 billion tonnes of food was needed annually to feed the world, and the 
current annual global production of 4 billion tonnes of food, New Zealand no ted that about 1.3  billion 
tonnes of food was simultaneously being wasted annually on an average. The question that should 
be asked therefore was whether the current trade rules enhance food supply chains and promote 
efficient distribution of food through trade. New Zealand noted that this consideration, combined 
with the efforts of the FAO to harness production, should be the way to address  food security 
challenges. New Zealand maintained that Russia's invasion of Ukraine had major implications for 
food se curity across the world, both in the short and the medium term, and through global grain 
and energy market impacts, this was compounding existing food system challenges resulting from 
the pandemic and its economic repercussions. New Zealand repeated its ca ll to the Russian 
Federation to cease military operations in Ukraine and withdraw from there permanently in order to 
avoid further catastrophic and pointless loss of life.  
3.30.   The Russian Federation questioned Members' attempts to accuse it of triggering the global 
food crisis which, it stated, were not economically founded; long -standing difficulties in ensuring 
food security were rather part of the macroeconomic crisis that ha d evolved over years. A range of 
factors had contributed to the process, including the COVID -19 pandemic, post -pandemic recovery 
challenges, soaring inflation and boom in commodity prices, fertilizer shortages, weather conditions, 
forced introduction of bi ofuel technologies, and uniliteral economic restrictive measures. By referring 
to the FAO report which showed that food prices had reached their peak in March, after a long period 
of growth, and started to decrease consistently since then, the Russian Fede ration noted that price 
movements were independent of the current situation in Ukraine and were driven by other factors; 
the Russia n Federation  asked Members to take an objective look at the situation in 2022 rather than 
blaming it for everything.  The Russ ian Federation noted that before MC12, instead of finding 
sustainable solutions to the problem of food security, some Members had accused the Russia n 
Federation  of triggering a humanitarian crisis in Africa and Asia, due to lack of grain exports from 
Ukraine. Nevertheless, the Russia n Federation  acknowledged that increase in food insecurity and 
hunger among the world's poorest and most vulnerable was a threat to global food security. As a 
response to the global shortage of foodstuff, the grain deal between the Russian Federation and 
Ukraine was concluded in Istanbul on 22 July, with the mediation of the UN and Türkiye ; the export 
of food accordingly began on 1 August. The Russian Federation noted that according to the joint 
coordinating centre, 100 ships had  left the ports since the signing of the deal carrying over 2 million 
tonnes of grain across three continents. The Russian Federation stated that most of the ships with 
Ukrainian products had arrived in Türkiye, 27 delivered in Italy and 9 deliveries in Eg ypt, and that 
the main recipients of food from Ukraine were not poor and vulnerable developing countries but 
mostly countries in Europe. The Russian Federation stated that the UN Under -Secretary -General for 
Political Affairs, Rosemary DiCarlo, had noted th at only 30% of cargo shipped from Ukraine went to 
low and lower middle -income countries.  The Russian Federation noted that it had contributed to 
global food security by providing humanitarian assistance to countries in need; the WFP delivered 
Russian food to Armenia, Afghanistan, Cuba, Lebanon, Mozambique, Madagascar, Mali, Nicaragua, 
Palestine, Tajikistan, Kyrgyz Republic, Yemen, and Sudan. By contrast, those Members who called 
for assistance to vulnerable economies had not undertaken actions to provide fr ee access of Russian 
grain and fertilizers to world markets. Notwithstanding the claim that there were no restrictions on 
supplies of Russian grain and other agricultural products, in practice, there was a blockage of the 
payment system and logistics of su pplies, closure of foreign ports for Russian cargo, ban on ships 
for entering Russian harbours, and threat of mass arrest of dry cargo ships and the refusal of their 
insurance. The Russian Federation noted that these restrictions disrupted the export of Ru ssian foods G/AG/R/103  
 
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  and fertilizers to the world markets and led to price increases. The Russia n Federation  stated that it 
was convinced that the only way of dealing with the current crisis was to talk economics not politics, 
and to prevent the violation of multil ateral trade rules; the Russian Federation remained committed 
to the WTO principles and respected the rights of other Members and it expected the same from 
other Members.  
3.31.   Switzerland shared the concerns expressed by other Members about the current food 
insecurity situation, which had been further exacerbated by the Russian military aggression, as 
shown by the FAO and WFP presentations. Switzerland condemned the Russian aggression on 
Ukraine in the strongest possible terms noting that this was a serious viol ation of international law. 
Switzerland added that transparency and predictability were crucial in order to mitigate global 
uncertainty about international markets. Switzerland called on Members to keep markets open and 
refrain from applying export restric tions and prohibitions, whenever possible.  
3.32.   Japan joined other Members in condemning Russia's aggression on Ukraine, as it infringed on 
Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity, constituting a serious violation of international law 
which prohibited t he use of force, and was a grave breach of the United Nations Charter. Japan 
noted that any unilateral change of the status quo by force was unacceptable. Japan condemned 
these actions in the strongest terms and expressed its solidarity with Ukraine, and n oted that it 
would continue to cooperate with Members of the international community in support of Ukraine.  
3.1.4   Nairobi Decision on Export Competition (WT/MIN/(15)/45 – WT/L/980)  
3.33.   As part of the monitoring of the Nairobi Decision on Export Competition (WT/MIN(1 5)/45 -
WT/L/980), Members have the possibility to raise questions under this agenda item  where  ten 
questions were raised.12 Due to the paucity of time, and w ith the agreement of the United  States 
which raised all ten questions, the Chair invited the Members who had received questions to submit 
their responses in writing through  the AG -IMS. Members' responses can be accessed through the 
hyperlinks contained in Table 4 of Annex 1  to this repor t or through the AG -IMS using the relevant 
question ID numbers.  
3.1.5   Bali Decision on Public Stockholding for food security purposes (WT/MIN(13)/ 38 – 
WT/L/913) - Consultations under paragraph 6 of the Decision13 
3.34.   The Chair noted that at the June 2022 meeting of the Committee, a group of Members 
informed the Committee that they had sent a request to India in writing to seek consultations under 
paragraph 6 of the Bali Decision on Public Stockholding for Food Security Purposes. The Chair noted 
the importance of transparency in the Committee on this matter while also acknowledging that India 
had questioned the placement of the matter on the agenda of th e CoA  meeting.  
3.35.   Thailand, on behalf of the signatory Members, noted that the request for consultations was 
made to India in writing on 13 May. Thailand noted that the original seven  signatory Members,  joined 
by Brazil and New Zealand , wrote another letter to India on 7 September requesting a plurilateral 
consultation to take place on 19 Septem ber. To facilitate the proposed 19 September consultations, 
the letter by the nine co -signatories also include d a list of questions  based on t he questions posed  
previously to India in the CoA . Thailand also noted that  the co -signatory Members  had correspon ded 
several times  with India since the last CoA meeting , in an effort to agree on a suitable date for 
consultations.  The co -signatories appreciate d India's prompt responses, however , due to lingering 
differences on the structure and format of  consultation , they ha d yet to arrive at a mutually 
acceptable date for the proposed consultations. T he co-signatories expressed their readiness to work 
with India on a mutually acceptable approach to bring th e consultation s forward in a transparent 
and ef fective manner . 
3.36.   India registered  its objection to the inclusion of this item on the agenda of the Committee  
while taking note of the Chair's explanation as to why this topic was added as an agenda item . India 
stated that several consultations had happened outside of the Committee, and not all of them had 
become CoA agenda items. Regarding the chronology of consultations, India noted that the 
co-signatories were not explicit in acknowledging that India had responded to the ir first letter of 13 
 
12 The details of the question  raised can be found under Section 4 of the compilation document  in 
G/AG/W/2 22. 
13 Paragraphs 4.34 - 4.35 of G/AG/R/102 refer. G/AG/R/103  
 
- 12 - 
 
  May on 22 May proposing 27  May as the date of consultations. India noted that it had proposed 
bilateral consultation s with each requesting Member  separately; however , the requesting Members 
did not agree to consult bilaterally and rather insisted on plurilateral consultations.  On the statement 
by some Members requesting consultations that they desired enhanced transparency , India noted 
that it  had provide d its PSH notification s to the entire Membership  and that any additional 
information or clarification could be dealt with in a bilateral setting. S eeking  information by a select 
group of Members in a plurilateral format might not add to transparency  and India would not agree 
to hold plurilateral consultations. India noted that  paragraph 6 of the Bali PSH Decision did not oblige 
beneficiary  Members to hold consultations in a plurilateral format. India also considered that given 
the diverse nature of the requesting group compris ing developed  Members,  developing  Members, 
net food -importing a s well as  net food -exporting  Members , bilateral discussions, rather than a 
CoA-like or plurilateral setup, would be more efficacious to understand and respond to individual 
consulting M embers ' concerns in detail . If the consulting Members were not satisfied with India's 
responses to their questions in the CoA, India wondered how a  plurilateral consultation raising the 
same questions would result in a different outcome. India noted that it had accordingly agreed to 
hold bilateral consultations with all requesting Members and had reques ted those Members to 
indicate convenient dates to hold bilateral meetings in the months of May, August, September or 
October. India  reiterated  its willingness in the CoA to hold bilateral consultations and requested to 
put on record that the co -signatories  had declined India's  offer to hold such consultations  bilaterally . 
India also requested that this item  be removed from t he agenda of the  next Committee meeting.  
3.37.   The Chair noted that th e consultation mechanism had been initiated by a group of Members  
under the Bali PSH Decision , and at a certain moment the rest of the Membership would  like to be 
informed of the discussions  considering its systemic importance. The Chair also noted India's 
readiness to hold consultations with relevant Members. In view of time limitation, and based on 
requests from the floor, the Chair invited only short interventions by interested Members under this 
agenda  item.   
3.38.   Paraguay noted that there had been a joint response to India by the consulting Members who 
had expres sed their continued interest in holding c onsultations. Paraguay agreed with India that it 
was not obliged  to hold consultations in a plurilateral setting . Simultaneously, paragraph 6 did not 
provide enough guidance on the format of the consultation s, and t herefore it wa s natural that 
Members ha d divergent views  on that matter . Paraguay noted it was in the interest of all to find a 
mutually agreed way forward on the format of the consultation s and the group had reiterated its 
interest to India in holding th ese consultations. Paraguay clarified that the date proposed by India  
for consultations in May was a non -working day , and it was not clear from India's letter that it would 
agree to hold consultations only in a bilateral format ; that confirmation had arrived at a later stage.  
3.39.   Brazil stated that since 2020 , they ha d posed 14 questions to India on its domestic support 
and PSH programmes mainly due to the systemic concerns on minimum support price programmes . 
Brazil stated that it had threefold objectives in joining the consultation : engag ing with India to  get 
satisfactory answer s to its unanswered questions in the Committee ; to understand whether the Bali 
PSH D ecision was fulfilling its objective ; and to find elements for the improve ment of the WTO PSH 
disciplines from the perspective of both food security and a less -distorted multilateral trading system 
if those objectives were not met. All cosignatories were inspired by these t hree objectives. Brazil 
urged India to engage in the  requested  consultations in a mutually agreed format .  
3.40.   New Zealand appreciated India's willing ness to engage in consultations  with interested 
Members.  New Zealand noted that it had a significant interest in  the area of  domestic support , 
including PSH, and sought  to join the consultations  with India  to deepen its understanding on the 
operation of India 's PSH program me. New Zealand  recognize d the importance of well -targeted  and 
appropriately safeguarded  PSH programmes for food security, but also s ought  the compliance of 
these program mes with WTO rules  and did not become a source of distortion t o supply and demand 
in the international market. New Zealand hoped  to find a mutually suitable date to undertake 
consultation s that work ed for all sides.  
3.41.   Japan  noted that as a large net food -importing count ry, it recognize d the significant role of 
PSH programmes  as one of the means to ensure food security.  Japan was interested in , and 
concerned about the way India's PSH programm e operated, including whether there was an 
adequate element of transparency . Japan look ed forward to working with India and other Members  
to bring the consultations forward.  G/AG/R/103  
 
- 13 - 
 
  3.42.   The European Union welcomed the consultation initiative by a group of Members with a view 
to improv ing transparency on the use of the Bali PSH Decision  by India which had been the only 
Member thus far to invoke the Decision in relation to its PSH program mes. The E uropean Union had 
previously spoken on the need for more transparency on the PSH prog rammes, and expressed 
interest to join consultations with India , indicating that they  would follow -up formally in writing.  
3.43.   The United States noted that the co -signatories shared the same concerns regard ing India's 
PSH programme , which was the reason why they ha d jointly requested for consultations. They 
believe d that th e plurilateral format would be efficient, effective, and transparent.  The U nited States 
expressed its  disappoint ment that India ha d declined the request for a plurilatera l consultation, and 
noted that paragraph 6 of the Bali PSH Decision did not provide guidance on the format. The  United 
States  added that they had joined the consultation request with other Members due to India's  lack 
of transparency in the Committee. The U nited States noted that s ince 2020, India ha d been asked 
127 questions regarding its PSH policies, and of these, 52 questions had remain ed unanswered, 
30 questions ha d stated that information would be provided in the future, and 30 questions ha d only 
partial responses. The U nited States noted that together with the other co -signatories, they  would 
continue to work with India to find an approach to making the consultation as effective and 
productive as possible and  that they would  update the Membe rship in November on the progress 
made.  
3.44.   Uruguay hoped to be able to reach an agreement as soon as possible with India  on the  
consultation format and date s that would be convenient to all interested  Members.  Uruguay 
reminded that these consultations were r equested as per paragraph 6 of the Decision which oblige d 
a beneficiary developing country Member to hold consultations with other Members on the operation 
of its public stockholding programmes notified under paragraph 3.a  of the Decision.  
3.45.    Australia con curred with the comments made by Paraguay and acknowledged India's position 
on the format of  consultations under  paragraph 6  of the Bali PSH Decision . Australia noted  that the 
rising number of co -signatories  to the consultation request  demonstrat ed their strong interest in the 
functioning of India's PSH policies, which ha d lacked transparency for an extended period of time . 
Australia stated that they  continued to see value in  a plurilateral format for the consultations, since 
it would provide the most open, transparent, and inclusive format for communicating consistent 
information to an audience with a unified interest. Plurilateral  consultations were not to look for 
cover, and that from a practical perspective, a  meeting  in a plurilateral setting would be a better 
and more efficient use of time, particularly for capital participants. Australia remained open to 
meeting India in all formats and hoped to receive more consistent and complete information from 
India than the one it  had provided to the Committee.  
3.46.   Canada echoed the comments by other co -signatories and expressed its interest in improving 
transparency on the operation of PSH for food security program mes, especially when the amounts 
of domestic support provided exceed ed annual limits. Canada thanked India for its response to the 
joint letter by the co -signatories and noted that it would co ntinue to engage with India in the spirit 
of cooperation, to find the best time and format possible to proceed with the consultations.  
3.47.   India clarified they were not engaged in any discussions with requesting Members on the 
format of consultations; India's position was rather clear that it w ould not agree to plurilateral 
consultations.  It preferred to hold bilateral consultations  with the  interested Members . India also 
noted that nine Members raising questions in a plurilateral format might not add to the existing CoA 
transparency on this matter; transparency mattered for the entire Membership. India restated its 
readiness to hold bilateral consultations as per paragraph 6 pf the Bali PSH Decision and noted that 
their capital -based government officials were present in Geneva  to engage in those consultations ; it 
expressed its disappointment that t hese consultations were yet to take place.  
3.1.6   Implementation of other Ministerial outcomes  
3.48.   There were no requests for the floor under this agenda item . 
3.2  Chair report on the informal meeting of 14 September – Other issues  
3.49.   During the informal meeting of 14 September 2022, the Committee continued its deliberations 
on enhancing transparency and the Committee's review process. At the formal meeting, G/AG/R/103  
 
- 14 - 
 
  the Chairperson provided an oral report on the discussions. The oral report is contained  in Annex  4 
to this report .  
3.3  Implementation -related issues (G/AG/16, G/AG/16/ADD.1, G/AG/22)14 
3.50.   Due to lack of time, this agenda item could not be considered.  
3.4  Other Business15 
3.4.1   Date of next regular meetings  
3.51.   The next (103rd) regular meeting of the Committee on Agriculture will be held on 
21-22 November  2022. On that basis, the convening airgram w ill be distributed to Members on 
Friday 11 November 2022.  
  
 
14 See the Ministerial Decision of 14 November 2001 as contained in WT/MIN(01)/17.  
15 In view of not enough time, the agenda item on 'Advanced Agriculture Notification Workshop' was not 
specifically taken up.  G/AG/R/103  
 
- 15 - 
 
  ANNEX 1  
Annex 1 includes the full list of questions raised under the various agenda items of the Committee. 
Members' responses and follow -up exchanges (if applicable) can be accessed through the AG -IMS 
(http://agims.wto.org/ ) by selecting the function "Search Q&A Submitted Since 1995" a nd inputting 
the ID number of the question concerned. This information can also be accessed directly by clicking 
on the relevant hyperlinks in the last column  ("ID number") of  tables 1-4 below . Question IDs where 
replies were yet to be submitted into the A G-IMS as of  31 October 2022  have been identified with 
the symbol "*".  Members are invited to submit outstanding replies through the AG -IMS at the earliest 
opportunity.  
Table 1 - Specific Implementation Matters (Article 18.6)  
Specific Implementation Matter  Question by  ID 
Number  
Argentina's export restrictions  United States of America, United Kingdom, 
Japan, Switzerland  102076  
Canada's Financial support for wine production  European Union  102009  
Canada's Review of the TRQ System  United Kingdom  102090  
Canada's Special Milk Class Scheme  New Zealand  102073  
China's Blue Box support to cotton  United States of America  102032  
China's cotton policies  United States of America  102034  
China's cotton policies  United States of America  102035  
China's cotton reserves purchasing system  United States of America  102033  
China's grain reserve  Australia  102075  
Ecuador's new milk law  United States of America  102131  
Egypt's Export Prohibitions on Agricultural 
Products  New Zealand, Paraguay, United Kingdom, 
Australia  102074  
Egypt's import requirement  European Union  102010  
Egypt's increase in planted area  European Union  102011  
EU's new CAP  Korea, Republic of  102091  
India's price support  United States of America, Australia, Paraguay  102017  
Indian Export Restriction measures on rice  European Union  102132 * 
India's export restrictions on wheat  Australia  102092 * 
India's export restrictions on wheat  United States of America, Japan, Brazil, 
Paragua y, United Kingdom, Canada, Ukraine, 
New Zealand, European Union  102021  
India's export restr ictions on wheat  Paraguay  102078  
India's export restrictions on wheat  European Union, United States of America, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom  102012  
India's oilseeds policies  Paraguay 102080  
India's other support for rice  United States of America, Thailand, Japan, 
Brazil, Australia, Paraguay, Canada, European 
Union, Uruguay  102020  
India's public stockpiling  Paraguay  102079  
India's public stockpiling  Paraguay  102081  
India's public stockpiling  New Zealand  102083  
India's public stockpiling  United States of America, Thailand, Japan, 
Brazil, Australia, Paraguay, Canada, European 
Union, Ukraine, Uruguay  102019  
India's public stockpiling  United States of America, Thailand, Japan, 
Brazil, Australi a, Paraguay, Canada, European 
Union, Uruguay  102018  
Japan's stockpiles of skim milk powder  Australia  102093  
Kazakhstan's export quotas on meslin, wheat, 
and wheat flour  United States of America, Switzerland, Japan  102028  
Mexico's tariff reductions on foodstuffs to 
improve food security  New Zealand  102101  
Panama's compliance with its domestic support 
commitments  United States of America, Canada, European 
Union  102022  
Panama's support to ric e, milk, and maize  United States of America  102023  
Philippines - Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Import Clearance (SPSIC) permits  United State s of America  102036 * G/AG/R/103  
 
- 16 - 
 
  Specific Implementation Matter  Question by  ID 
Number  
Philippines - Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Import Clearance (SPSIC) perm its United States of America  102037 * 
Philippines' import regime for rice  United States of America  102038 * 
Saudi Arabia's tariff increases on agricultural 
goods  Australia  102109  
Chinese Taipei's import tariff on Champagne  Australia  102085  
Türkiye's  export restrictions on agricultural 
products  United States of America, Switzerland, Japan, 
United Kingdom  102029  
Tajikistan's new Tax Code  United States of America  102031 * 
Tajikistan's poultry tariffs  United States of America  102030 * 
U.S. domestic support programmes  India 102129  
U.S. funding for environmental action  New Zealand, Paraguay  102102  
U.S. support to biofuel producers  India 102096  
UK's Bound Total AMS  India 102094  
UK's SSG entitlements  India 102095  
United States - Climate Smart Agriculture and 
Forestry Strategy  New Zealand, Paraguay  102103  
 
 
 
  
  G/AG/R/103  
 
- 17 - Table 2 - Questions raised in connection with individual notifications  
Document 
Symbol  Question by  Answer by  Notification Format  Keywords  ID 
Number  
G/AG/N/BRA/70  European Union  Brazil  MA:2 - Imports under TQs  Tariff quota fill  102002  
G/AG/N/DOM/48  European Union  Dominican  Republic  MA:2 - Imports under TQs  Tariff quota fill  102003  
G/AG/N/SLV/82  Paraguay, Brazil  El Salvador  MA:2 - Imports under TQs  Transparency issues  102064 * 
G/AG/N/EU/76  India European Union  MA:2 - Imports under TQs  Tariff quota fill  102098  
G/AG/N/IND/28  Brazil  India MA:2 - Imports under TQs  Tariff quota fill  102110  
G/AG/N/JPN/278  Australia  Japan  MA:2 - Imports under TQs  Tariff quota fill  102111  
G/AG/N/KAZ/13  European Union  Kazakhstan  MA:2 - Imports under TQs  Transparency issues  102004  
G/AG/N/KOR/89  New Zealand  Korea, Republic of  MA:2 - Imports under TQs  Tariff quota fill  102084  
G/AG/N/NOR/121  Paraguay, Brazil  Norway  MA:2 - Imports under TQs  Transparency issues  102065  
G/AG/N/NOR/121  United Kingdom  Norway  MA:2 - Imports under TQs  Tariff quota fill  102112  
G/AG/N/PAN/60  Australia  Panama  MA:2 - Imports under TQs  Tariff quota fill  102113  
G/AG/N/PAN/60  European Union  Panama  MA:2 - Imports under TQs  Tariff quota fill  102005  
G/AG/N/PHL/82  United States of 
America  Philippines  MA:2 - Imports under TQs  Transparency issues  102039 * 
G/AG/N/PHL/82  Brazil  Philippines  MA:2 - Imports under TQs  Tariff quota fill  102114 * 
G/AG/N/PHL/82  New Zealand  Philippines  MA:2 - Imports under TQs  Tariff quota fill  102099 * 
G/AG/N/GBR/13  Australia  United Kingdom  MA:2 - Imports under TQs  Tariff quota fill  102115  
G/AG/N/GBR/13  Brazil  United Kingdom  MA:2 - Imports under T Qs Tariff quota fill  102116  
G/AG/N/GBR/13  Paraguay  United Kingdom  MA:2 - Imports under TQs  Tariff quota fill  102066  
G/AG/N/GBR/13  Thailand  United Kingdom  MA:2 - Imports under TQs Tariff quota fill  102117  
G/AG/N/USA/162  India United  States  of America  MA:2 - Imports under TQs  Tariff quota fill  102104  
G/AG/N/USA/162  Switzerland  United States of America  MA:2 - Imports under TQs  Tariff quota fill  102001  
G/AG/N/PHL/53  United States of 
America  Philippines  MA:4 - Price-based SSG  Trigger calculations  102040 * 
G/AG/N/PHL/81  Indonesia  Philippines  MA:5 – Annual  summary of SSG 
action  Transparency issues  102118 * 
G/AG/N/ARG/50  European Union  Argentina  DS:1 - Exempt and non -exempt 
support - Current total AMS  Transparency issues (including Tab le 
DS:2)  102006  
G/AG/N/ARG/51  United Kingdom  Argentina  DS:1 - Exempt and non -exempt 
support - Current total AMS  Direct payments: structural 
adjustment assistance provided 
through investment aids  102120  
G/AG/N/ARG/51  Australia  Argentina  DS:1 - Exempt and non -exempt 
support - Current total AMS  Other product -specific AMS/EMS  102119  
G/AG/N/ARG/51  United States of 
America  Argentina  DS:1 - Exempt and non -exempt 
support - Current total AMS  Other product -specific AMS/EMS  102041  
G/AG/N/BOL/30  United  States of 
America  Bolivia, Plurinational State 
of DS:1 - Exempt and non -exempt 
support - Current total AMS  Transparency issues (including Table 
DS:2)  102042 *  
  G/AG/R/103  
 
- 18 - Document 
Symbol  Question by  Answer by  Notification Format  Keywords  ID 
Number  
G/AG/N/BW A/35  Thailand  Botswana  DS:1 - Exempt and non -exempt 
support - Current total AMS  Input subsidies available to low -
income or resource -poor producers  102121  
G/AG/N/CUB/66  Japan  Cuba DS:1 - Exempt and non -exempt 
support - Current total AMS  General services: training services  102014  
G/AG/N/EU/79  Australia  European Union  DS:1 - Exempt and non -exempt 
support - Current total AMS  Transparency issues (including Table 
DS:2)  102122  
G/AG/N/EU/79  Paraguay, Brazil  European Union  DS:1 - Exempt and non -exempt 
support - Current total AMS  Transparency issues (including Table 
DS:2)  102068  
G/AG/N/EU/79  Paraguay, Brazil  European Union  DS:1 - Exempt and non -exempt 
support  - Current total AMS  Transparency issues (including Table 
DS:2)  102069  
G/AG/N/EU/79  Paraguay, Brazil  European Union  DS:1 - Exempt and non -exempt 
support - Current total AMS  Transparency issues (including Table 
DS:2)  102070  
G/AG/N/EU/79  India European Union  DS:1 - Exempt and non -exempt 
support - Current total AMS  Scheduled commitment level  102097  
G/AG/N/EU/79  Paraguay, Brazil  European Union  DS:1 - Exempt and non -exempt 
support - Current total AMS  Scheduled commitment level  102067  
G/AG/N/EU/79  Australia  European Union  DS:1 - Exempt and non -exempt 
support - Current total AMS  Other product -specific AMS/EMS  102123 * 
G/AG/N/EU/79  Thailand  European Union  DS:1 - Exempt and non -exempt 
support - Current total AMS  Other product -specific AMS/EMS  102124  
G/AG/N/EU/79  Japan  European Union  DS:1 - Exempt and non -exempt 
support - Current total AMS  Non-product -specific AMS  102016  
G/AG/N/GEO/25  United States of 
America  Georgia  DS:1 - Exempt and non -exempt 
support - Current total AMS  Transparency issues (including Table 
DS:2)  102043 * 
G/AG/N/HKG/52  United States of 
America  Hong Kong, China  DS:1 - Exempt and non -exempt 
support - Current total AMS  Transparency issues (including Table 
DS:2)  102044  
G/AG/N/IND/27  European Union  India DS:1 - Exempt and non -exempt 
support - Current total AMS  Transparency issues (including Table 
DS:2)  102007  
G/AG/N/IND/27  Paraguay  India DS:1 - Exempt and non -exempt 
support - Current total AMS  Transparency issues (including Table 
DS:2)  102082  
G/AG/N/IND/ 27  United States of 
America, Paraguay, New 
Zealand  India DS:1 - Exempt and non -exempt 
support - Current total AMS  Transparency issues (including Table 
DS:2)  102025  
G/AG/N/JPN/277  New Zealand  Japan  DS:1 - Exempt and non -exempt 
support - Current total AMS  Public stockholding for food security 
purposes  102100  
G/AG/N/JPN/277  India Japan  DS:1 - Exempt and non -exempt 
support - Current total AMS  Direct payments: structural 
adjustment assistance provided 
through investment aids  102105  
G/AG/N/JPN/277  India Japan  DS:1 - Exempt and non -exempt 
support - Current total AMS  Non-product -specific AMS  102106  
G/AG/N/MYS/53  Thailand  Malaysia  DS:1 - Exempt and non -exempt 
support - Current total AMS  Input subsidies available to low -
income or resource -poor producers  102125  
G/AG/N/PHL/85  Brazil  Philippines  DS:1 - Exempt and non -exempt 
support - Current total AMS  Input subsidies available to low -
income or resource -poor producers  102126 *  
  G/AG/R/103  
 
- 19 - Document 
Symbol  Question by  Answer by  Notification Format  Keywords  ID 
Number  
G/AG/N/PHL/85  Japan  Philippines  DS:1 - Exempt and non -exempt 
support - Current total AMS  Input subsidies available to low -
income or resource -poor producers  102015 * 
G/AG/N/CHE/114  Paraguay, Brazil  Switzerland  DS:1 - Exempt and non -exempt 
support - Current total AMS  Direct payments: payments under 
regional assistance programmes  102077  
G/AG/N/GBR/11  India United Kingdom  DS:1 - Exempt and non -exempt 
support - Current total AMS  Transparency issues (including Table 
DS:2)  102108  
G/AG/N/GBR/11  Paraguay  United Kingdom  DS:1 - Exempt and non -exempt 
support - Current total AMS  Transparency issues (including Table 
DS:2)  102072  
G/AG/N/GBR/11  India United Kingdom  DS:1 - Exempt and non -exempt 
support - Current total AMS  Market price support  102107  
G/AG/N/GBR/11  Paraguay, Brazil  United Kingdom  DS:1 - Exempt and non -exempt 
support - Current total AMS  Classification of measures  102071  
G/AG/N/USA/157  Australia  United States of America  DS:1 - Exempt and non -exempt 
support - Current total AMS  General services: extension and 
advisory services  102130  
G/AG/N/ARG/52  United States of 
America  Argentina  DS:2 - New or modified DS  Transparency issues (including Table 
DS:2)  102045  
G/AG/N/ARG/53  United States of 
America  Argentina  DS:2 - New or modified DS  Transparency issues (including Table 
DS:2)  102046  
G/AG/N/ARG/53  United Kingdom  Argentina  DS:2 - New or modified DS  Direct payments: payments for relief 
from natural disasters  102127  
G/AG/N/KAZ/19  United Kingdom  Kazakhstan  ER:1 - Export restrictions  Transparency issues  102128  
G/AG/N/MYS/52  United States of 
America, Japan, United 
Kingdom  Malaysia  ER:1 - Export restrictions  Transparency issues  102047  
G/AG/N/MYS/52  European Union, United 
Kingdom  Malaysia  ER:1 - Export restrictions  Other  102008  
 
 
 
 
 G/AG/R/103  
 
- 20 - 
 
  Table 3  - Questions raised under agenda item "Overdue notifications"  
Question by  Answer by  ID Number  
United States of America  Botswana  102048  
New Zealand  Canada  102086  
United States of America  China  102049  
European Union  Egypt  102013  
New Zealand, Paraguay  Egypt  102087  
United States of America  Egypt  102050  
United States of America  Kazakhstan  102024 * 
New Zealand  Malaysia  102088  
United States of America  Morocco  102051 * 
New Zealand, Paraguay  South Africa  102089  
 
Table 4 - Questions raised under agenda item " Developments in the field of Export 
Competition " 
Question by  Answer by  ID Number  
United States of America  Australia  102052  
United States of America  Canada  102053  
United States of America  China  102054  
United States of America  China  102055  
United States of America  China  102056  
United States of America  European Union  102057  
United States of America  European Union  102058  
United States of America  Ghana  102059 * 
United States of America  India 102026  
United States of America  India 102027  
United States of America  Indonesia  102060 * 
United States of America  Korea, Republic of  102061  
United States of America  Thailand  102062 * 
United States of America  Türkiye 102063  
 
 
 
 
 
  G/AG/R/103  
 
- 21 - 
 
  ANNEX 2  
CHAIR REPORT ON THE INFORMAL COA MEETING OF 14 SEPTEMBER 2022 ON BALI 
DECISION ON TRQ  ADMINISTRATION: TRIENNIAL REVIEW, UNDERFILL TRACKING 
REGISTER, AND SECRETARIAT NOTE (G/AG/W/183/REV.2)  
(AGENDA ITEM – 2 A(I)) 
1. At the informal CoA meeting on 14 September, the Committee examined:  i) possible elements to 
be considered during the first tr iennial review of the operation of the Bali TRQ Decision, ii) Underfill 
Tracking Register based on the draft contained in RD/AG/83/Rev.2; and iii) Secretariat background 
note on tariff quota administration in G/AG/W/183/Rev.2.  
 
2. On the possible issues t hat Members would like to take up in the first triennial review of the 
operation of the Bali TRQ Decision, the suggestions made during the June 2022 informal meeting, 
as recorded in Annex 2 of G/AG/R/102, were referred to and clarified. On the suggestion d ealing 
with TRQ notification requirements under the Agreement on Agriculture and the Agreement on 
Import Licensing Procedures, one Member stressed that the effort should be to enhance 
transparency rather than undermining it.   
 
3. As regards the suggestions  to improve the transparency and consistency of MA:2 notifications, 
support was expressed for notifying imports by exporting countries in cases of TRQs that comprise 
both an erga omnes  component and country -specific allocations. Some Members additionally 
suggested that imports data should be disaggregated by tariff line, especially in case of underfilled 
TRQs.  On the latter suggestion, a few other Members considered the need for further discussions; 
they raised the issue of balance between transparency and burdensomeness, as well as the nature 
of current TRQ commitments being scheduled on an aggregate basis. On the suggestion for 
disaggregated import statistics by tariff line, I  advised the two sides to explore the idea jointly using 
real examples to contrib ute to a better understanding between Members and allay concerns.  
 
4. Members thanked the Secretariat for the revised background note in G/AG/W/183/Rev.2. In their 
preliminary comments, some Members considered it appropriate to clarify in the note that the  
apportioned TRQ quantities implemented by the EU and the UK after 1 January 2021 were without 
prejudice to divergent positions of Members on the apportionment. Another Member considered that 
the information contained in the background note on Table MA:1 n otifications did not seem to 
explicitly answer the question of Members' implementation of paragraphs 2 -5 of the Bali 
TRQ Decision, and urged the need for updated MA:1 notifications to demonstrate the fulfilment of 
those obligations.  
 
5. On the issue of the Underfill Tracking Register, Members welcomed the inclusion of footnote 1 in 
the revised draft of the Register in RD/AG/83/Rev.2 stating that ' (t)he Committee may periodically 
review and adjust the Register, as necessary, based on the experience of the  implementation of the 
Underfill Mechanism. ' and expressed their willingness to approve the draft inclusive of that footnote.  
 
  G/AG/R/103  
 
- 22 - 
 
  ANNEX 3  
CHAIR REPORT ON THE INFORMAL COA MEETING  OF 14 SEPTEMBER 2022 ON THE 
MINISTERIAL DECLARATION ON THE EMERGENCY RESPONSE  TO FOOD INSECURITY: 
WORK PROGRAMME PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 8 OF THE DECLARATION  
(AGENDA ITEM – 2 A(II))  
1. At the informal CoA meeting on 14 September, Members focussed on the specific issues or themes 
that they would like to consider under the work program me mandated by the MC12 Declaration on 
the Emergency Response to Food Insecurity as well as the mechanics or the process to conduct the 
discussions. Members welcomed the way the issue of the Work programme was reflected in the 
Convening airgram of the Sept ember meeting.  
2. The discussion on the possible themes was assisted by two written contributions in G/AG/W/223 
and 224. There was a broader sense that both these written communications are mutually 
supportive. There were somewhat differing views on the sc ope of the work programme as described 
in paragraph 8 of the Declaration especially whether the thematic discussion would be limited to 
examining the implementation of the Marrakesh Decision only.  I suggested that in the beginning we 
should be open to rece iving all ideas which Members consider would contribute to the objective of 
the work programme and that we should avoid entering into interpretive discussions on the text of 
the declaration itself. Simultaneously, I reminded that I would everything possibl e to assist the 
Membership on the conduct of the work programme as a chairperson of this committee, i.e the 
Committee on Agriculture in Regular session.  
3. I also noted that depending on the specific ideas that Members would present for consideration 
under  the work programme to examine, we would collectively reflect on the format of the 
conversation on those topics, like organizing a seminar or workshop on a select theme. It was in 
this context that I also raised the issue of the participation of internatio nal organizations in 
discussions outside the formal meetings; in the formal CoA meetings these organization would in 
any case be welcome to participate. Members supported the idea to involve the relevant international 
organizations, in the conduct of discu ssions in the informal setting, as necessary.  
4. In terms of the future steps:  
i. I indicated that I would convene an open -ended informal CoA meeting devoted solely to the 
issue of work programme prior to the next Committee meeting in November. [I will indic ate 
the date after reading my report on the informal meeting.]  
ii. Based on the date of that proposed Informal CoA meeting, Members will be invited to send 
their inputs in advance of that meeting on the possible specific themes that they would like 
to examine  under the Work Programme. The two written proposals received prior to the 
meeting already contain some specific themes; however, several Members indicated the need 
for some additional time to digest the proposals and come up with their ideas;   
iii. Third, I ur ged all donor Members to submit their Table NF:1 notifications well in time for the 
November CoA meeting, as these notifications had always been a key input to monitor the 
implementation of the Marrakesh Decision; and  
iv. The Secretariat would work on the requ ested compilation on flexibilities for LDCs and NFIDCs 
under the existing rules.  
v. Based upon a suggestion from a Member, I proposed to open the possibility for a few 
technical  workshops, preceding sessions of the informal or formal CoA. I invited Members t o 
take the initiative  to organize such gatherings, for which they can rely on some support of 
the Secretariat and myself. We will send out a communication to you. One Member already 
indicated to be interested to organize a workshop on developments in globa l availability and 
trade of fertilizers, and responses by Members to this.  
5. This summarizes broadly the discussions on the Work Programme in the informal meeting. I also 
acknowledge before I close my report that the Secretariat has taken good note of the  request by 
one delegation to reflect its statement in the formal record.  
This concludes my report on the informal.  G/AG/R/103  
 
- 23 - 
 
  ANNEX 4  
 
CHAIR REPORT ON THE INFORMAL MEETING OF 14 SEPTEMBER  2022 ON ENHANCING 
TRANSPARENCY  AND THE COA REVIEW PROCESS'  
(AGENDA ITEM 2.B) 
During the informal meeting on enhancing transparency and the Committee's review process, 
Members again took up the joint proposal in RD/AG/92 entitled "Improving access to information 
contained in Members' notifications: A domestic suppo rt database". The proponents supported the 
idea behind the proposal and noted that the suggested database would offer significant benefits to 
the Membership, and to developing country Members in particular, in terms of facilitating their access 
to domestic  support data. They underlined the importance of the database to improve Members' 
participation in the domestic support negotiations. The proponents also noted that the database 
would be populated with information primarily sourced from Members' notificati ons and would 
address the existing data gaps especially in respect of value of production and exchange rates relying 
on recognized international sources and in consultations with concerned Members. It was also noted 
that a similar practice existed for the maintenance of the Secretariat's Integrated Database (IDB) in 
the domain of market access.  
 
2. Some other Members expressed their concern on the last bullet point of the proposal saying it 
contained elements of potential additional transparency burden for Members or that it might trigger 
counter -notifications. These Members expressed their inability to consider including any information 
in the proposed database outside Members' domestic support notifications.   
 
3. Considering that none of the Members questi oned the utility of the database and most of their 
concerns seemingly concentrated in the last sub -clement of the proposal, I suggested the need for 
practical discussions on the matter to make progress. I accordingly suggested that the Secretariat 
may be a sked to prepare a methodological note on the proposed database with the details of 
technical elements required for its construction. The Secretariat in that methodological note should 
also explain the existing structure of the AG -IMS reports under the dome stic support pillar and the 
current status in terms of the accuracy/functioning.  Without prejudice to a final decision on the 
design or the establishment of the proposed database, such a methodological note would bring in 
the required clarity in respect of  technical parameters of the database to support an informed 
discussion among Members. I also heard one proponent Member expressing its willingness to reflect 
on the last bullet of the current proposal for possible adjustments in order to seek convergence.   
 
4. The Secretariat made a detailed presentation on the Agriculture Information Management System 
covering both the on -line notification system and the Q&A facility. The Secretariat also introduced 
its background document in RD/AG/93 which provided detai led information on the work of the 
Committee and its current documentation practices. Given the useful information contained in this 
background note, I suggested that the Secretariat should circulate the note as an official document 
in the G/AG/ series for  the benefit of the whole Membership.  
 
5. The Secretariat also briefed the Membership on its various technical assistance activities to help 
developing and least developed country Members build and strengthen their trade capacity so that 
they can participa te more effectively in the multilateral trading system. A few participants of the 
ongoing advanced Agriculture notification workshop shared their country's experience regarding 
transparency and the work of the committee and elaborated on how the Workshop m ight help them 
in the future in this regard.  
 
6. On the issue of enhancing transparency, one Member referred to joint proposals made prior to 
MC12 in the context of the agriculture negotiations containing concrete ideas to modernize, improve 
and streamlin e the existing agriculture notification and transparency obligations.   Another Member 
outlined the need for structured discussions to streamline notifications under the export competition 
pillar and also suggested possible approaches to address the existin g large list of outstanding 
Table  ES:1 and Table ES:2 notifications.  
 
 
__________