G/SCM /Q2/CHN/86  
 
29 January 2020  
(20-0670) Page: 1/8 
Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures  Original: English  
 
SUBSIDIES  
QUESTIONS POSED BY THE UNITED STATES  REGARDING  
THE NEW AND FULL NOT IFICATION OF CHINA1 
The following communication, dated 27 January 2020 , is being circulated at the request of the 
delegation of the United States . 
 
_______________  
 
 
The United States appreciates China 's 2019 subsidy notification, which was submitted in a timely 
manner and is clearly the most extensive and substantive notification China has submitted since 
becoming a WTO Member in 2001.  While clearly the most comprehensive  subsidy notification China 
has submitted to date, the United States remains concerned that China 's notification over -reports 
inconsequential subsidy programs that do not satisfy the criteria for notification under Article 25 of 
the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (Subsidies Agreement), while 
under -reporting significant programs that do satisfy the criteria for notification.  Nonetheless, the 
United States views China 's latest notification as a major step forward towards meeting its 
transp arency obligations under the Subsidies Agreement.  
Question 1  
As noted above, China 's subsidy notification appears to over -report inconsequential subsidy 
programs that should not be notified.  These include programs for poverty alleviation, disabled 
people, HIV drugs, general employment promotion, and sewage treatment.  The programs for 
poverty alleviation are the most extensive and include the following: central government 
Programs  47 Fund for Poverty Alleviation and 73 Preferential Tax Policy for Pov erty Alleviation 
Migration and sub -central programs in:  Shanxi Province ( Fund for poverty alleviation ); 
Inner  Mongolia Autonomous Region ( Fund for poverty alleviation ); Jilin Province ( Fiscal Fund for 
poverty alleviation ); Heilongjiang Province ( Fiscal fun d for poverty alleviation ); Anhui Province 
(Fiscal fund for poverty relief ); Henan Province ( Fund for employment and social society projects ); 
Hubei Province ( Fiscal Fund for poverty alleviation ); Hunan Province ( Fund for poverty alleviation ); 
Hainan Provi nce (Fund for ethnic minorities development ); Chongqing Municipality ( Fund for poverty 
alleviation ; Subsidy for employment of workers living under the poverty line ; Fund for poverty 
alleviation ); Tibet Autonomous Region ( Fund for poverty alleviation ); Shaa nxi Province ( Fund for 
poverty alleviation ); Gansu Province ( Grant for poverty alleviation workshop ; Grant to support 
targeted poverty alleviation ); Qinghai Province ( Fund for poverty alleviation ). 
Do these programs provide a benefit to an entity that prod uces a good?  How is the subsidy benefit 
provided under each program specific under Article 2 of the Subsidies Agreement?  
Question 2 
a. Did any of the following programs, directly or indirectly, support the installation of new 
capacity: central government Programs 60 ( Reward and Support Fund for Restructuring of 
Industrial Enterprises ) and 70 ( House Property Tax and Urban Land Use Tax Concession for 
Enterprises Involving the Reduction of Excessive Capacities and Structural Adjustment ) and 
sub-central programs in:  Hebei Province ( Fund for workers ' resettlement of enterprises with 
 
1 G/SCM/N/3 43/CHN . G/SCM/Q2/CHN/86  
 
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  overcapacity reduction and Reward for efforts to remove steel overcapacity ); Inner Mongolia 
Autonomous Region ( Reward for removing overcapacity in the steel and coal secto rs); 
Anhui  Province ( Fund for removing overcapacity in the iron and steel and coal industries ); 
Shandong Province ( Reward for overcapacity reduction in steel industry  and Reward for the 
structural adjustment of industrial enterprises ); Henan Province ( Fund to resolve the 
overcapacity ); Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region  (Reward for the restructuring of 
industrial enterprises ); Chongqing Municipality ( Subsidy for workers' diversion and 
resettlement in the effort to cut Overcapacity ); and Shaanxi Province ( Fund for overcapacity 
reduction )? 
b. Why are the funds provided through Program 60 distributed to enterprises instead of directly 
to dislocated workers?  
c. For each of the programs identified above, once funds for having reduced capacity are 
received, can the enterp rise spend that money as it wishes?  
d. For all of the funds identified above, are enterprises allowed to use funds or money saved 
through tax breaks to invest in new higher technology steel capacity, even if such investment 
results in a net increase in steel production capacity?  
Question 3 
a. Beside the coal production capacity reducing subsidy provided by Hebei province, there also 
appears to be a steel capacity reduction subsidy, which was not notified.  The Notice on 
Issuing the Hebei Province Dissolving Steel Overcapacity Award Measure  (Ji Fa Gai Chan Ye 
[2014] No. 709) appears to provide subsidies at a rate of RMB 20 -30 per ton of production 
capacity that is retired (Section 1).  Funding distribution notices indicate that RMB 1.18 billion 
was s pent on the program in 20172 and RMB 700 million in 2018 .3 Why was this program 
not notified?  Have the relevant legal measures been published in the MOFCOM Gazette?  
b. Does this program apply only to production capacity retired in absolute terms, or can it 
support, directly or indirectly, the installation of new capacity?  
Question 4 
a. For each of the following programs, please identify the specific products or sectors being 
supported ( e.g., the eight product categories identified under the current strategic emer ging 
industry (SEI) policy; the ten product categories identified under the Made In China 2025 
(MIC 2025) policy; a combination of SEI and MIC 2025 products; or some other group of 
products or industries): central government Program s 56 (Fund for Developme nt of Strategic 
Emerging Industries ), 59 ( Fund for Industrial Transformation and Upgrading ); 60 ( Reward 
and Support Fund for Restructuring of Industrial Enterprises ); and 70 ( House Property Tax 
and Urban Land Use Tax Concession for Enterprises Involving th e Reduction of Excessive 
Capacities and Structural Adjustment ); and sub -central programs in:  Hebei Province ( Special 
reward for restructuring of industrial enterprises  and Fund for development of emerging 
industries ); Shanghai Municipality ( Fund for indust ry transformation and development ; Fund 
for the development through structural adjustment ; and Fund to accelerate the fostering of 
emerging industries ); Zhejiang Province ( Fund for promoting industrial restructuring ); 
Fujian province ( Grant for supporting the development of strategic emerging industries ); 
Hunan Province ( Fund for industrial transformation and upgrading ); Guangdong Province 
(Fund developing innovation platforms for strategic emerging industries and Fund for 
technical renovation ); Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region ( Fund for industry and 
information technology development and Fund for technological renovation of enterprises ); 
Guizhou Province ( Fund for transformation and upgrading the industry ); Shaanxi Province 
(Reward for Technical transformation  and Fund for the development of new materials ); 
Gansu Province ( Fund for developing strategic emerging industries ); Ningxia Hui 
 
2 See attachment to Hebei Province Government Office Notice on Adjusting and Specifying the 
2016-2017 Dissolving Steel Overcapacity Special Purpose Funding (Ji Cai Jian [2017] No. 15) . 
3 See attachment to the Hebei Province Government Notice on Early Distribution of the 2018 Dissolving 
Steel Overcapacity Special Purpose Funding (Ji Cai Jian [2017] No. 376) . G/SCM/Q2/CHN/86  
 
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  Autonomous Region ( Fund for new industrialized development projects ); Xinjiang Uygur 
Autonomous Region ( Fund for strategic emerging industries ); Ningbo City of 
Zhejiang  Province ( Fund for technical transformation) ; and, Shenzhen City of Fujian Province 
(Fund for strategic emerging industries ). 
b. Do any of the sub -central "transformation and upgrading " funds identified above also 
support Made in China 2025 (as Shanghai 's transformation and upgrading program and the 
central government 's transformation and upgrading programs do)?  
c. Do any of the programs identified above, or the programs funded by the notif ied special 
funding outlays, provide a benefit based on a catalogue of specific products?  If yes, which 
programs?  If yes, does that catalogue include imported products?  
d. Do any of the programs identified above in any way encourage the development of domesti c 
supply chains or provide subsidies contingent upon the purchase of domestically -made 
equipment or components?  
Question 5 
Based on the United States ' review of the MOFCOM Gazette, it appears that none of the legal 
measures referenced in the sub -central po rtion of China 's notification have been published in the 
MOFCOM Gazette.  When will these measures be published as required by China 's Protocol of 
Accession?  
Question 6 
The U.S. appreciates China's more fulsome fishery subsidy notification, covering the 2017-2018 
period.  Regarding Program 75, have the local governments that implement subsidy programs 
pursuant to the legal measure identified for this program notified all of the relevant subsidy programs 
in the relevant local government sections?  If so, whi ch local government programs are related to 
this central government program ( i.e., Program 75)?  
Question 7 
How does the fishery sector benefit from these funds?  What other sectors benefit from these funds? 
The relevant legal measure China notified seems to  indicate that a total of RMB 17.556 billion in 
funds supported programs described in this measure.  How was the amount attributed to the fishery 
sector (RMB 44 million in 2017 and RMB 60 million in 2018) calculated?  How much funding was 
made available by l ocal governments, pursuant to this measure?  
Question 8 
a. The measure notified under Program 76 indicates that the funding is in the form of 
"investment ". Does that indicate that the administration of the subsidy program is governed 
by the Administrative Meas ures for Investment Subsidies and Subsidized Interest within the 
Central Budget (PRC NDRC Order No. 45, issued Dec. 5, 2016)?  
b. Are "investment subsidies " and "subsidized interest " subsidies, as described in the 
Administrative Measures for Investment Subsidi es and Subsidized Interest within the Central 
Budget (PRC NDRC Order No. 45, issued Dec. 5, 2016) related to "special funds " notified 
elsewhere in this notification (G/SCM/N/343/CHN)?  For instance, if a notified special fund 
administrative measure indicates that the funding can be used for "investment " or 
"subsidized interest, " does that mean that such programs should operate pursuant to the 
Administrative Measures for Investment Subsid ies and Subsidized Interest within the Central 
Budget (PRC NDRC Order No. 45, issued Dec. 5, 2016)?  
c. Are "investment subsidies " and "interest subsidies " related to "basic construction " (基建) 
expenditures in the national and local budgets?  G/SCM/Q2/CHN/86  
 
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  Question 9 
Regardin g Program 77, under "2. Policy objective and/or purpose of the subsidy ", China indicates 
that one goal is "to promote the sustainable and healthy development of distant water fishing and 
improve the stability, safety, pollution prevention and habitability of distant water fishing vessels ". 
How much of the funds described in program 77 are used to: (1) refurbish domestic marine vessels, 
(2) retire domestic marine vessels, (3) refurbish distant water vessels, and (4) reduce the operating 
costs or support inte rnational fishery resource exploitation and usage of distant water vessels?  
Question 1 0 
Further research suggests that there is more detail on the operation of the subsidies administered 
under Program 77 in the Ministry of Finance Notice on Supplementing t he Vessel Scraping and 
Decommissioning and Vessel -type Standardization Subsidy Funding Administration Measure  
(Cai Jian [2016] No. 418).  In particular, this  measure appears to establish the International Fishery 
Resource Exploitation and Usage subsidy for distant water fisheries.  When will China intend to notify  
this measure and publish it in the MOFCOM Gazette?  
Question 11 
Further research suggests that ther e is more detail on the operation of the subsidies administered 
under Program77 in the General Office of the Ministry of Agriculture Notice on Issuing the Distant 
Water Fishery Fuel Price Policy Implementing Adjustment Plan (Nong Ban Yu [2016] No. 43).  In 
particular, this measure appears to provide detailed information on the operation of the International 
Fishery Resource Exploitation and Usage subsidy for distant water fisheries.  Does China intend to 
notify this measure and publish it in the MOFCOM Gazett e? Where can this measure be obtained?  
Question 1 2 
Regarding Program 79, "Subsidy for reform in tax and fee on refined oil (for fisheries) ", China does 
not provide a precise value for the fiscal expenditures that fall under Program 79.  However, the 
United States has identified a budget expenditure titled "Subsidy for reform in tax and fee on refined 
oil for fisheries " in the National General Public Budget Expenditure budget ( RMB 18.5 billion in 20174 
and RMB 18.1 billion in 20185). 
a. Is the U.S. understanding correct that the budget expenditures identified as "Subsidy for 
reform in tax and fee on refined oil for fisheries " account for the subsidies issued pursuant 
to Program 79?  
b. Are there any other budget line items where other fishery related subsidies might be 
accounted for?  
c. Further research suggests that there is more detail on the operation of the subsidies 
administered under Program 79 in the General Office of the Ministry of Agriculture Notice on 
Issuing the Implementation Plan related to the Domestic Fishery Fishing and Aquaculture 
Industry Fuel Price Subsidy Policy Adjustment  (Nong Ban Yu [2015] No. 65).  Does China 
intend to notify this measure and publish it in the MOFCOM Gazette?  Where can this measure 
be obtained?  
Quest ion 1 3 
According to the Domestic Refined Fuel Price Reform Upward Adjustment According to the System 
notice issued on December 2, 2019 (and earlier iterations of this program), purchasers of diesel fuel 
in the fishery sector enjoy a preferential price comp ared to other retail purchasers, based on a state 
 
4 2017 National General Public Budget Expenditure.  
5 2018 National General Public Budget Expenditure.  G/SCM/Q2/CHN/86  
 
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  determined sales price.6 Does China intend to notify this program and publish it in the MOFCOM 
Gazette?  
Question 1 4 
How many other local governments have specific budgetary outlays to support distant water fishing 
vessels, like Shandong 's program 15.7 and the Qingdao City, Shandong Province program 33.1?  Do 
programs 15.7 and 33.1 provide subsidies independently in addition to the central International 
Fishery Resource Exploitation and Usage subsidy for dista nt water fishing vessels?  
Question 1 5 
For each of the sub -central fishing programs identified below, how much of the funding is used to: 
(1) decrease the operation costs of domestic marine vessels, (2) decrease the operation costs of 
distant water vessels,  (3) reward distant water fishing vessels for bringing catch back to China for 
processing, (4) provide insurance and other income supplement to fishermen during a moratorium 
on fishing, or (5) support vessel refurbishing?  
Sub-central fishery programs: Zhejiang Province (Grant for policy -based fishery mutual insurance; 
and Fund for marine and fishery comprehensive management and industry development); 
Fujian  Province (Fund for marine and fishery structural adjustment); Fuzhou City, Fujian Provi nce 
(Fund for fishing ports); Shandong Province (Fund for distant water fishery development); 
Guangdong Province (Fund for developing the deep -water cage aquaculture; Production and living 
allowance for fishermen during fishing close seasons;  Fund for aqua culture; and Living allowances 
for fisherman during fishing close seasons); Dalian City of Liaoning Province (Fund for marine and 
fishery development); Qingdao City of Shangdong Province (Fund for distant water fishery); 
Ningbo  City of Zhejiang Province  (Fund for policy -based fishery insurance); and, Xiamen City of 
Fujian Province (Fund for marine and fishery development)  
Question 1 6 
The United States had previously asked about the relationship between administrative measures and 
subsidy program operation i nformation.  For instance, regarding Program 1.80 , Industrial 
Transformation and Upgrading Fund  of China 's 2017 notification7, the United States asked about 
subsidy programs implemented through other measures, besides the administrative measure which 
descri be the operation of separate subsidy programs.8 In particular, the United States asked why 
"subsidy programs that draw funding from the notified Program 1.80 were not notified. " China 's 
response was that the documents the United States raised guide "the application for support from 
the Industrial Transformation and Upgrading Fund. "9 Here we list again the measures in reference:  
• MIIT Notice on Issuing the 2015 Industrial Transformation a nd Upgrading Key Project Guide  
(Gong Xin Bu Gui [2015] No. 252) . 
• MIIT Notice on Issuing the 2016 Industrial Transformation and Upgrading (Made in China 
2025) Key Project Guide  (Gong Xin Bu Gui Han [2016] No. 433) . 
• Notice on Organizing the Development of Gr een Manufacturing System Integration Work  
(Cai Jian [2016] No. 797) . 
If these measures guide "the application for support from the Industrial Transformation and 
Upgrading Fund, " please explain why these measures were not notified.  Is it China 's position th at 
all of the program operation information (including how the subsidy is provided, the form of the 
subsidy, and how the amount of the subsidy is determined for each subsidy recipient) for each 
subsidy program supported by the Industrial Transformation and  Upgrading Fund can be found in 
the administrative measure, without reference to any subsidiary measures?   
 
6 Domestic Refined Fuel Price Reform Upward Adjustment According to th e System (December 2, 2019), 
Footnote 4.  
7 G/SCM/N/315/CHN . 
8 G/SCM/Q2/CHN/75 , Question 53.  
9 China’s Responses to G/SCM/Q2/CHN/75 , Question 53.  G/SCM/Q2/CHN/86  
 
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  Question 1 7 
Like the central government, it appears that certain large and complicated subsidy funding 
allocations do not contain all program operati on information in the administrative measures.  For 
instance, Shanghai notified the "Fund for Industry Transformation and Development "10, and 
indicated that RMB 1.05 billion was spent in 2017, and RMB  1.55 billion was spent in 2018.  We also 
note that China 's 2018 subsidy notification references the Shanghai Fund for Industry 
Transformation and Development.11 
The United States could not find any specific subsidy program operation information (including h ow 
the subsidy is provided, the form of the subsidy, and how the amount of the subsidy is determined 
for each subsidy recipient) in the notified administrative measure.12 Instead, the United States 
found, similar to the central "Industrial Transformation an d Upgrading Fund ", that there were other 
subordinate measures that actually provide information on how the various subsidy programs 
operate under and draw funding from the Shanghai Fund for Industry Transformation and 
Development.  
The United States has ide ntified at least 13 separate subsidy programs that appear to be funded by 
the Shanghai Fund for Industry Transformation and Development, and these 13 programs are 
described through five separate "detailed rules ", which appear to be measures issued pursuant  to 
the notified Administrative Measures of Shanghai Municipality on the Management of Funds for 
Industrial Transformation and Development (Hu Jing Xin Gui [2015] No. 101).  
• The Detailed Rules for the Shanghai Municipality Industrial Strong Base Special Pur pose 
Support Implementation  (Hu Jing Xin Fa [ 2017] No. 232) appears to contain subsidy 
program operation information for at least one subsidy program.  
• The Detailed Rules for the Shanghai Municipality Industrial Technology Innovation Special 
Purpose Suppor t Implementation  (Hu Jing Xin Ji [ 2015] No. 769) appears to contain subsidy 
program operation information for at least three subsidy programs.  
• The Detailed Rules for the Shanghai Municipality Technology Transformation Special Purpose 
Support Implementatio n (Hu Jing Xin Gui Fan [2018] No. 1) appears to contain subsidy 
program operation information for at least one subsidy program.  
• The Detailed Rules for the Shanghai Municipality Promotion of Product Brand Economic 
Development Special Purpose Support Impleme ntation  (Hu Jing Xin Du [2015] No. 543) 
appears to contain subsidy program operation information for at least four subsidy 
programs.  
• The Detailed Rules for the Shanghai Municipality First Piece of High End Smart Equipment 
Breakthrough and Demonstration Use  Special Purpose Support Implementation  (Hu Jing Xin 
Zhuang [2015] No. 737) appears to contain subsidy program operation information for at 
least 4 subsidy programs.  
If our understanding that the program operation information (including how the subsidy is provided, 
the form of the subsidy, and how the amount of the subsidy is determined for each subsidy recipient) 
is detailed in the above list of detailed rules, please  explain why these measures, and the subsidy 
program operation information described therein, were not notified along with the Administrative 
Measures of Shanghai Municipality on the Management of Funds for Industrial Transformation and 
Development (Hu Jin g Xin Gui [2015] No. 101).  If China considers that these other subordinate 
measures are not necessary to understand the operation of all 13 subsidy programs identified, can 
China please indicate in which provisions of the Administrative Measures of Shangha i Municipality 
on the Management of Funds for Industrial Transformation and Development (Hu Jing Xin Gui [2015] 
No. 101) specific subsidy operation information for each of the 13 programs (including how the 
 
10 G/SCM/N/343/CHN, Subsidies at the Sub -Central Government Level, 9.2.  
11 G/SCM/N/315/CHN, which covers China’s subsidies for FY 2015 -2016, Program 2.83.  
12 Administrative Measures of Shanghai Municipality on the Management of Funds for Industrial 
Transformation and Development (Hu Jing Xin Gui [2015] No. 101) . G/SCM/Q2/CHN/86  
 
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  subsidy is provided, the form of the subsidy, and  how the amount of the subsidy is determined for 
each subsidy recipient) can be found?  
Question 1 8 
Do any other special funds notified by China have detailed rules or guides, pursuant to the notified 
administrative measures, that provide the actual subsidy operation information (including how the 
subsidy is provided, the form of the subsidy, and how the  amount of the subsidy is determined for 
each subsidy recipient) ? If so, which administrative measures notified at the central and local level 
would need "detailed rules " or "guides " to be identified in order to understand the program 
operation?  
Question 1 9 
The Shanghai Fund for Industrial Transformation and Development has been notified in both of 
China 's most recent notifications.13 Regarding China 's notification of 2015 -2016 programs and 
specifically referring to the Shanghai Fund for Industrial Transform ation and Upgrading, the 
United  States asked, "Is this program related to, or implemented pursuant to Made in China 2025? "14 
to which China responded, "Reply: This program is not  related to Made in China 2025. "15 However, 
at least two of the detailed rules t he United States identified above16 explicitly state that the 
subsidies are meant to implement the central or local level Made in China 2025 policies.  Why does 
China consider these programs to be not related to Made in China 2025?  Are there other instances 
where an administrative measure mi ght not cite to the underlying industrial policy, but where 
detailed rules or guides do cite to the underlying industrial policy, at either the central or local level?  
Question 20 
There  also appear to be a number of other special funds that Shanghai did no t notify.  Can you 
explain why China did not notify the following Shanghai funds?  
• The Science and Technology Innovation Program Special Fund17, which provided 
RMB 3,043,150,000 in subsidies in 201818, appears to maintain some programs that are 
specific to the  "high technology industry, biopharmaceutical industry and other sectors ".19 
Since these funds do appear to support enterprises in specific sectors, can China explain 
why this fund was not notified?  
• The Patent Funding20, which provided RMB 169,429,000 in sub sidy funding in 201821, 
"focuses support on invention patent and strategic emerging industry patent work. "22 Since 
these funds appear to focus on SEI sectors, can China explain why this fund was not notified?  
How much of the funding actually went to enterpri ses applying for patents in the SEIs 
compared to other subsidy recipients?  
 
13 G/SCM/N/315/CHN, Program 2.83; and G/SCM/N/343/CHN, Su bsidies at the Sub -Central Government 
Level, 9.2.  
14 G/SCM/Q2/CHN/75, Question 65.  
15 China’s Responses to G/SCM/Q2/CHN/75, Question 65 (emphasis added).  
16 Detailed Rules for the Shanghai Municipality Industrial Strong Base Special Purpose Support 
Implementation  (Hu Jing Xin Fa [ 2017] No. 232) and Detailed Rules for the Shanghai Municipality  Technology 
Transformation Special Purpose Support Implementation  (Hu Jing Xin Gui Fan [2018] No. 1) . 
17 Administrative Measures for Shanghai’s Science and Technology Innovation Program Special Fund  
(Hu Ke He [2017] No. 11) . 
18 2018 Distribution Notice for Shanghai’s Science and Technology Innovation Program Special Fund . 
19 Administrative Measures for Shanghai’s Science and Technology Innovation Program Specia l Fund  
(Hu Ke He [2017] No. 11) , Art. 3.  
20 Administrative Measures for Shanghai Patent Funding (Hu Zhi Ju [2017] No. 16) . 
21 2018 Distribution Notice for Shanghai Patent Funding . 
22 Administrative Measures for Shanghai Patent Funding (Hu Zhi Ju [2017] No. 16 ), Article 4.  G/SCM/Q2/CHN/86  
 
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  Question 21 
Shanghai also has a Zhangjiang  National Indigenous Innovation Demonstration Zone Development 
Special Fund23 which provided RMB 431,540,000 in subsidies in 2018.24 The administrative measure 
states that support should target "key sectors ".25 Are the "key sectors " referenced here indicating  
the eight key product categories now targeted by strategic and emerging industry (SEI) policy or 
the ten key sectors targeted by the Made in China 2025 policy?  If "key sectors " does not include the 
eight key product categories targeted by strategic and em erging industry (SEI) policy or the ten key 
sectors targeted by the Made in China 2025 policy, which sectors does "key sectors " refer to in this 
measure? Since at least some of the subsidy programs provided through this National Indigenous 
Innovation Demon stration Zone support manufacturers in research and development to 
commercialize new products26, can China provide the program operation information (including how 
the subsidy is provided, the form of the subsidy, and how the amount of the subsidy is determ ined 
for each subsidy recipient) for the programs that enterprises in the "key sectors " can apply for?  How 
many other National Indigenous Innovation Demonstration Zones are there?  Has China notified all 
of the funding outlays that support enterprises throu gh other National Indigenous Innovation 
Demonstration Zones, particularly the funding that supports enterprises in the "key sectors " 
targeted?  
 
__________  
 
23 Shanghai Zhangjiang Independent Innovation Demonstration Zone Development Special Fund 
Administrative Measures  (Hu Zhangjiang Gao Xin Guan Wei [2016] No. 85) . 
24 2018 Distribution Notice for Shanghai Zhangjiang Independent Innovation Demonst ration Zone 
Development Special Fund . 
25 Shanghai Zhangjiang Independent Innovation Demonstration Zone Development Special Fund 
Administrative Measures  (Hu Zhangjiang Gao Xin Guan Wei [2016] No. 85) , Article 2(1).  
26 Shanghai Zhangjiang Independent Innovatio n Demonstration Zone Development Special Fund 
Administrative Measures  (Hu Zhangjiang Gao Xin Guan Wei [2016] No. 85) , Article 5(3).