RESTRICTED  
  
G/STR/M/40  
 
14 September 2022  
(22-6811) Page: 1/7 
Working Party on State Trading Enterprises  Original: English  
 
MINUTES OF THE MEETING  
HELD ON 13 MAY 2022  
CHAIR: SULTAN ALSHARIF (KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA)  
1.  The Working Party on State Trading Enterprises (the "Working Party") held a regular meeting on 
13 May 2022, in person as well as virtually via Interprefy.  
2.  The Working Party adopted  the following agenda (the proposed agenda had been circulated in 
WTO/AIR/STR/16  on 22 April 2022, as complemented by WTO/AIR/STR/16/ADD.1  and 
WTO/AIR/STR/16/ADD.2 , which were circulated on 29 April 2022 and 3 May 2022, respectively).  
1  REVIEW OF NEW AND FULL NOTIFICATIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS  ..................  1 
2  REVIEW OF NOTIFICATIONS PREVIOUSLY REVIEWED  
BY THE WORKING PARTY  ................................ ................................ .............................  5 
3  CONTINUED NON -NOTIFICATION OF STATE TRADING ENTERPRISES  
BY THE RUSSIAN  FEDERATION  ................................ ................................ ....................  6 
4  OTHER BUSINESS  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..... 7 
5  DATE OF THE FOLLOWING MEETING  ................................ ................................ ........  7 
 
1  REVIEW OF NEW AND FULL NOTIFICATIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS  
3.  The Chair began to introduce the first item on the agenda, i.e. the review of Members' new 
notifications. A number of Members requested the floor.  
4.  The United Kingdom  condemned the continued large -scale aggression and  egregious violations 
of international law and of the Charter of the United Nations (UN Charter) committed by one 
WTO Member against another. The economic consequences and spillover of the Russian Federation's 
widespread and devastating actions were starti ng to show, particularly in relation to food security, 
and the Russian Federation's actions were impeding the ability of Ukraine to fully participate in the 
work of the WTO and in the global trading system. While the Russian Federation continued to violate  
international law, human rights and multiple commitments to peace and security, the 
United  Kingdom would work with allies and partners across the multilateral system to condemn the 
Russian Federation's actions and isolate it on the international stage.  
5.  Canada firmly condemned the Russian Federation's unjustified, unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, 
considering it a clear violation of international law and the international rules -based order. The 
Russian Federation was solely responsible for the crisis, its rhe toric could not change that, and the 
Russian Federation had cut itself off from the international trading system. Canada was acting to 
protect its essential security interests, which were inextricably linked to an international environment 
based on rules, and would work with allies and partners to promote peace and security for all states 
and their citizens.  
6.  The United States  referred to the joint statement on the aggression by the Russian Federation 
against Ukraine with the support of Belarus in document W T/GC/244, which condemned the 
Russian  Federation's actions as a violation of international law, the UN Charter and the fundamental 
principles of international peace and security. The United States condemned the Russian Federation's G/STR/M/40  
 
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  actions as undermining t he rules -based system which Members had built and worked to improve, 
and reiterated its support for Ukraine during this difficult time.  
7.  Japan  supported the statements made by others. Japan condemned the Russian  Federation's 
aggression against Ukraine in th e strongest terms, as clearly infringing on Ukrainian sovereignty and 
territorial integrity and constituting a serious violation of international law. It had come to Japan's 
attention that a series of inhumane acts had taken place in Ukraine, and the Russi an Federation's 
actions in Ukraine constituted serious violations of international humanitarian law and war crimes. 
The aggression by the Russian Federation was causing global economic turmoil, disrupting Ukraine's 
agricultural sector, and posing a serious  threat to global food security. Japan strongly urged the 
Russian Federation to withdraw its forces from Ukraine immediately.  
8.  The European Union  condemned in the strongest possible terms the Russian Federation's 
unprovoked and unjustified military aggressi on in Ukraine, which grossly violated international law 
and undermined international security and stability. The European Union called on the 
Russian  Federation to immediately end its act of aggression, withdraw its troops and fully respect 
Ukraine's terri torial integrity, sovereignty and independence within its internationally recognized 
borders. The European Union stood firmly by Ukraine and its people, had adopted significant 
economic and trade sanctions against the Russian Federation, and remained ready  to move quickly 
with further measures.  
9.  Australia  reiterated its ongoing support for the people of Ukraine during this difficult time. 
Australia continued to condemn the Russian Federation's unprovoked, unjust and illegal invasion of 
Ukraine. Australia sta ted that the invasion by the Russian Federation was a violation of international 
law, including the UN Charter, and was inconsistent with global rules and norms that underpin 
multilateral organizations such as the WTO. Australia could not continue to remai n silent when 
talking about a rules -based international order while the Russian Federation continued actions that 
were inconsistent with those norms. It called for the Russian Federation to immediately withdraw its 
troops from Ukraine.  
10.  Moldova  strongly con demned the Russian Federation's aggression against Ukraine, and stood 
in support of and solidarity with the people of Ukraine during this difficult time. Moldova expressed 
serious concern on the impact the conflict was having on the welfare of the local po pulation and the 
national economy, and stated that Moldova's economy was being seriously affected by the 
disturbances in agricultural supply chains and in its main trading export markets. Moldova was 
determined to ensure all the necessary support to the pe ople of Ukraine.  
11.  Korea  joined in condemning the Russian Federation's armed invasion of Ukraine as violating the 
principles of the UN Charter and international law. The use of force that caused innocent casualties 
could not be justified under any circumsta nces. Ukraine's sovereignty, territorial integrity and 
political independence should be respected. Korea shared the concerns regarding increased market 
uncertainty and supply chain disruptions resulting from the Russian Federation's intervention in 
Ukraine  as well as the disruptions to the work of the WTO. The only solution was for the 
Russian  Federation to stop the aggression and get back to a diplomatic course.  
12.  The Russian Federation  responded that these were unsubstantiated accusations, and reiterated 
its position shared before other WTO bodies that the WTO is not the right platform to raise issues 
that are outside its scope and fall under the competence of other international organizations and 
diplomatic agencies. The Russian Federation had always demons trated its openness to analysing 
and discussing the events and consequences of the Ukrainian crisis with the world community in the 
appropriate forum. The global economy was already suffering from elevated food and fuel prices, 
and those were the result of  the restrictive and discriminatory actions taken by some Members 
against the Russian Federation. The only way to address the current crisis was to talk economics, 
not politics, and prevent the violation of multilaterally agreed trade rules through unilate ral means. 
Otherwise, world markets and economies —and most importantly those of developing Members —
would continue to suffer.  
13.  For the review of the new and full notifications of state trading enterprises (STEs) submitted by 
Members, the Chair suggested tha t the Working Party conduct the review in the same way as at 
previous meetings, focusing on: (i) whether the notification responded adequately to the information 
requested in the Questionnaire ( G/STR/3/Rev.1 ); and (ii) whether more information was required in G/STR/M/40  
 
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  order to permit a clear  appreciation of the manner of operation of the enterprises notified and the 
effect of their operations on international trade.  
14.  The Chair recalled that new and full notifications were now presented every two years. The most 
recent call for new and full not ifications was contained in document G/STR/N/19 , and called for 
Members to submit notifications for the years 2020 and 2021 by 30  June 2022. The  Working  Party 
would take up notifications from 14 Members circulated since the previous meeting on 
5 October  2021.  
15.  The Chair recalled that, as provided in the Working Party's 1995 Report ( G/L/35 ), Members 
wishing to raise questions on a notification under review were to present them in writing to the 
notifying delegation and to the Secretariat at the latest three weeks befo re the meeting. The Chair 
also reminded Members asking questions not already sent in writing that, if they wished to receive 
a written response, they would have to follow up by submitting their questions in writing to the 
Member concerned, with a copy to t he Secretariat for circulation.  
16.  No questions were posed and no comments were made regarding the notifications of Argentina  
(G/STR/N/19/ARG ), El Salvador  (G/STR/N/19/SLV ), Kyrgyz Republic  (G/STR/N/19/KGZ ), 
Macao, China  (G/STR/N/19/MAC ), Republic of Mold ova (G/STR/N/19/MDA ), Nicaragua  
(G/STR/N/18/NIC - G/STR/N/19/N IC), North Macedonia  (G/STR/N/1 9/MKD ), Kingdom of 
Saudi  Arabia  (G/STR/N/19/SAU ), Republic of Seychelles  (G/STR/N/19/SYC ), Chinese Taipei  
(G/STR/N/18/TPKM/Add.1 - G/STR/N/19/TPKM ), and Tonga  (G/STR/N/19/TON ). 
17.  Regarding the notification of China  (G/STR/N/18/CHN ), the United States  thanked China but 
also noted that, throughout its notification, China had not provided the required information on 
import quantity, average import price, average representative domestic sales price, mark -up, 
average procurement price, average export price, as well as national production in certain instances, 
instead describing the information as "not available". The United States  questioned whether that 
information could really not be available to China, noting that several entities in the notification were 
listed companies that had periodic reporting requirements and that some of the missing information 
was publicly available through other sources. The Unit ed States further  emphasized that, given the 
role the state plays in many of the products reported in the notification, China would likely have 
knowledge of and track information regarding national production. The United States requested that 
China review its notification and provide the information to the Working Party for review. Finally, the 
United States emphasized the vital role of the transparency function of the Working Party and the 
WTO broadly, pointing out that notifications sometimes offer the on ly means to learn about other 
Members' activity in a given area, and that all Members have committed to fulfilling their 
transparency obligations.  
18.  China  responded it had just learned of the United States' concerns and would submit the 
United  States' reques t to its capital for review before providing a formal reply. China also indicated 
that since its accession it had done its best to comply with its WTO notification obligations.  
19.  Regarding the notifications of Malaysia  (G/STR/N/17/MYS - G/STR/N/18/MYS ), the 
European  Union  thanked Malaysia , and noted that during its 2018 trade policy review, Malaysia had 
indicated that Padiberas Nasional Berhad (BERNAS)  conducted non -commercial activities on behalf 
of the Government of Malaysia in connection with the importation of rice.1 However, Malaysia 's 
notifications G/STR/N/17/MYS  - G/STR/N/18/MYS  indicated that the importation and distribution of 
rice by BERNAS  was a commercial activity. Moreover, media reports indicated that BERNAS' largest 
private shareholder, Tradewinds, earned substantial commercial profits from rice importati on under 
existing import licensing arrangements. In light of this, the European Union asked Malaysia to clarify 
how the commercial and non -commercial activities of BERNAS were separated, and whether the rice 
importation activities were commercial, as indic ated in the STE notifications (at section 3(A)), or 
non-commercial, as stated during the trade policy review and at section 3(B) of the STE notifications. 
And if BERNAS undertook both commercial and non -commercial activities for rice imports, the 
European Union asked Malaysia to provide further statistics separating the two. The European Union  
indicated that it would send its questions in writing following the meeting.  
 
1 WT/TPR/M/366/Add.1, p. 87, question 9.  G/STR/M/40  
 
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  20.  Regarding the notification of Australia  (G/STR/N/19/AUS ), the European Union  thanked 
Australia for the notification and had questions on the Rice Marketing Board for New South Wales. 
The European Union asked (1) how Australia considered the monopoly on exports of rice from 
New South Wales to be in accordance with commercial considerations within the meaning of 
Article  XVII( 1)(b) of the GATT 1994; (2) how enterprises of other Members could compete in the 
purchase of Australian rice for export in accordance with Article XVII(1)(b) of the GATT 1994; (3) 
regarding the extension of vesting powers in the Rice Marketing Board until  June 2027, whether 
there would be any changes in the operation of the export monopoly compared with previous years; 
(4) what the rationale for not discontinuing the Rice Marketing Board was; (5) why the objectives of 
the Rice Marketing Board could not be achieved other than through a monopolistic market structure; 
and (6) how Australia would ensure consistency with the requirement in the Nairobi Decision on 
Export Competition that export monopoly powers by agricultural exporting STEs be used in a way 
that minimizes trade distorting effects and does not result in displacing or impeding the exports of 
another Member . The European Union indicated that it would send questions in writing following the 
meeting.  
21.  Australia  thanked the European Union for its questio ns and indicated that it would respond in 
due course in writing.  
22.  The Chair drew the attention of delegations to the document containing the Status of 
Notifications ( G/STR/27 ). The Chair noted that the Status of Notifications showed that many 
Members were not fulfilling their notification obligations and that this prevented Members from 
enjoying the full benefit of transparency. The Chair, therefor e, urged Members that had not yet 
notified to do so, and to consult the Secretariat if they had any questions. The Chair also thanked 
Members that had notified.  
23.  The European Union  and the United  States  jointly expressed appreciation for the Chair's 
statement encouraging Members to make the required notifications. The European Union and the 
United  States noted that numerous Members had either failed to make any notification or had not 
notified for some t ime. Referring to data circulated by the Secretariat, the European Union and the 
United  States noted that 48 Members had not made a notification in the last 10 years, and 
only 43 out of 136  Members had made the requisite notification for the most recent no tification 
cycle. That was the lowest level of compliance the Working  Party had ever seen, the previous being 
45 notifications in 1996. The European Union and the United  States stressed that transparency was 
an important requirement for all WTO Members and  notifications and counter -notifications were 
sometimes the only way in which other Members could be properly informed of a certain Member's 
activities in a given area. Low levels of compliance undermined the transparency function of the 
Working Party. The  European Union and the United  States also noted that much of the information 
to be provided in STE notifications had been provided and discussed in the Trade Policy Review 
process, in the WTO  Committee on Agriculture, in particular the yearly Export Compe tition 
Questionnaire, or had otherwise been provided to the WTO . Thus, Members could benefit from 
synergies in respect of information submitted through STE  notifications and the Committee on 
Agriculture reporting, which could contribute to greater transpar ency and reduce burdens for 
Members. The European Union and the United  States called on other Members to submit their regular 
STE notifications within the deadlines and to respond to other Members' questions in a substantive 
and timely manner. The European  Union and the United  States also indicated that they would fully 
support any initiative that the Chair or the Secretariat might take regarding compliance with 
notification requirements.  
24.  The United Kingdom  thanked Members who had submitted their 2020 STE n otifications and 
Members who had made efforts to become up to date with their notifications. The United Kingdom 
also thanked the Secretariat for its continued efforts in highlighting the status of notifications. The 
United Kingdom believed that transparenc y was integral to the proper functioning of the WTO and 
therefore called on Members that had not submitted their outstanding notifications to take all the 
necessary steps to do so in a complete and timely manner and to seek Secretariat support if needed.  
25.  Japan echoed its support for the joint statement made by the European Union and the 
United  States on the importance of transparency improvements, and recalled that Japan was a 
co-sponsor of a proposal for a Ministerial Decision on Transparency Improvements in Agriculture, 
contained in document JOB/AG/213 . Compliance with notification requirements was essential both 
to monitor implementation of the current rules and as a basis for further discussions. Japan 
encouraged all Membe rs to submit their notifications in a timely manner, and seconded the views G/STR/M/40  
 
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  expressed by the European Union and the United States on synergies with the work of the Committee 
on Agriculture.  
26.  The Working Party took note  of the notifications, questions and an swers and statements made.  
2  REVIEW OF NOTIFICATIONS PREVIOUSLY REVIEWED BY THE WORKING PARTY  
27.  The Chair  recalled that delegations had requested that the Working Party revert to notifications 
from two Members. First, regarding the notifications of India  conta ined in documents 
G/STR/N /15/IND  and G/STR/N/16/IN D – G/STR/N/17/IND , the Chair recalled that on 
28 October  2019 the United  States had posed written questions to India on these notifications, which 
had been circulated as document G/STR/Q1/IND/21 . On 9 June 2021, India had submitted written 
responses to the United States' questi ons, which were circulated as document G/STR/Q1/IND/22 . 
On 14  September  2021, Australia had also posed questions regarding document G/STR/N/16/IND  – 
G/STR/N/17/IND , which were circulated as G/STR/Q1/IND/23 . On 5 April 2022, the Euro pean Union 
also posed written questions regarding India's notifications G/STR/N/16/IND  – G/STR/N/17/IND , 
which were circulated as document G/STR/Q1/IND/24 . 
28.  The United States  thanked India for its responses but also noted that responses to several 
questions remained substantively outstanding. The United States r equested an update as to when 
finalized responses and an updated notification were expected, highlighting that India had indicated 
in its June 2021 replies that responses were still being finalized and that a revised notification would 
also be provided in due course.  
29.  Australia  had welcomed India's notifications in document G/STR/N/16/IND  – G/STR/N/17/IND  
containing trade data for 2014 -2018. Australia noted that India's notifications did not list any STEs 
with import or export privileges for pulses, but Australia understood that sev eral STEs listed in the 
notification had been granted trading privileges for pulses and that other enterprises not listed in 
the notification also appeared to have similar trading privileges for pulses. Australia recalled that it 
had formally posed questio ns to India on 14 September 2021, as reflected in document 
G/STR/Q1/IND/23 , seeking to clarify whether India had granted any enterprises special rights or 
privileges for the import or export of pulses, and reque sted an update on when India would respond.  
30.  The European Union  recalled that, at the last meeting of the Working Party on 15 October 20212, 
the European Union had asked India questions regarding the state -owned Vijaya Dairy, located in 
the Indian state of  Telangana, which were subsequently submitted in writing in document 
G/STR/Q1/IND/24  on 5 April 2022. The European Union requested an update on when India would 
respond.  
31.  India thanked the United States, Australia and the European Union for their questions and 
interest in India's notific ations.  
32.  India indicated that it would consult with capital before replying to the United States' questions.  
33.  Regarding Australia's questions, India indicated that it had previously responded to similar 
questions from Australia, contained in G/STR/Q1/IND/20  of 12 April 2019, during the meeting of the 
Working Party held on 16 July 2019. India's responses were recorded in the minutes of that meeting3 
and they had not changed. In accordance with the Foreign Trade Policy, and on the recommendation 
of line ministries and departments of the Government of India, India's STE -notifying agency had 
listed 15 STEs with import or export privileges for certain id entified items, but none of those had 
been granted any special rights or privileges for the import or export of pulses during the relevant 
period, nor had those STEs exported domestically procured pulses. Those STEs disposed of pulses 
in the open market vi a e-auction and institutional sales in accordance with governmental guidelines. 
In addition, some of the stocks were offered to the states for utilization under various central and 
state government welfare programmes, to provide a protein -rich diet to the targeted beneficiaries 
at affordable rates.  
 
2 G/STR/M/39, para.22.  
3 G/STR/M35, paras. 10 and 14.  G/STR/M/40  
 
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  34.  Regarding the European Union's questions, India indicated that India's STE -notifying agency 
had not until then received a request from the state of Telangana to notify Vijaya Dairy as an STE. 
India indicated tha t it would submit a written reply after the meeting, and that it would provide more 
information, when it became available, either to the European Union bilaterally or at the next 
meeting of the Working Party.  
35.  Regarding the notifications of Viet Nam  (G/STR/N/15/VNM – G/STR/N/16/VNM ), the Chair 
recalled that the United  States had made a counter -notification, G/STR/Q1/VNM/4 , and that 
Viet Nam had responded in documents G/STR/Q1/VNM/5  and G/STR/Q1/VNM/5/Corr.1 . 
The United  States had asked follow -up questions to Viet Nam in document G/STR/Q1/VNM/6 , and 
Viet Nam had responded to those questions in document G/STR/Q1/VNM/7 . In November 2020 the 
United States had posed further follow -up questions to Viet Nam in documents G/STR/Q1/VNM/8  
and G/STR/Q1/VNM/8/Corr.1 . Viet Nam responded to these questions in document 
G/STR/Q1/VNM/9 . 
36.  The United  States  thanked Viet Nam for its responses, noting tha t in its response to question 4 
from documents G/STR/Q1/VNM/8  and G/STR/Q1/VNM/8/Corr.1 , Viet Nam had indicated that 
further verification was necessary before it could provide a response. The United States asked 
Viet Nam to indicate when it expected to respond. In addition, the United States noted that 
Viet Nam's response to question 7 did not appear to answer the question being asked. Therefore, 
the United States indicated that it would resubmit this question so tha t Viet Nam could resubmit a 
response.  
37.  Viet Nam  responded that  it would consult bilaterally with the United States to understand the 
United States' concerns  and why the provided response was not satisfactory.  
38.  The Working Party took note  of the questions and answers and statements made.  
3  CONTINUED NON -NOTIFICATION OF STATE TRADING ENTERPRISES BY THE 
RUSSIAN  FEDERATION  
39.  The United  States  expressed regret that thi s was the fourteenth consecutive meeting at which 
the continued non -notification of STEs by the  Russian  Federation was on the agenda. However, the 
United States stated that as a result of the Russian Federation's premeditated and unprovoked war 
of aggressi on in Ukraine and the unspeakable horrors being inflicted on the people of Ukraine by the 
Russian Federation's military, the United States would not engage in "business -as-usual" activity for 
matters concerning the Russian Federation. The United States sta ted that the actions of the 
Russian  Federation were incompatible with the rules -based system that Members had built in the 
WTO and had worked to improve. Therefore, the United States indicated that it would not make a 
fuller intervention and instead referr ed Members to its prior statements at the 20154, 20165, 20176, 
20187, 20198, 20209, and 202110 meetings of the Working Party.  
40.  The United Kingdom  stated that it considered transparency to be an important requirement for 
all WTO Members, and essential to the proper functioning of the WTO. The submission and 
subsequent review of notifications was sometimes the only way Members could be properly infor med 
of particular activities of other Members in certain sectors and assess potential trade effects. 
Therefore, the United Kingdom urged all Members to take all steps necessary to fulfil their obligations 
across all agreements in a complete and timely mann er. 
41.  The European Union  indicated that it was not in a position to deliver a statement in full because 
it did not interact with the Russian Federation, but it referred to its statement made at the previous 
meeting of the Working Party on 5 October 2021.11 
 
4 G/STR/M/27, para. 27 and G/STR/M/28, para. 37.  
5 G/STR/M/29, paras. 73 and 74 and G/STR/M/30, paras. 64 and 65.  
6 G/STR/M/31, para. 36 and G/STR/M/32, para. 28.  
7 G/STR/M/33, para. 36 and G/STR/M/34, para. 29.  
8 G/STR/M/35, para. 35 and G/STR/M/36, para. 27. 
9 G/STR/M/37, para. 44.  
10 G/STR/M/38, para. 31 and G/STR/M/39, para. 28.  
11 G/STR/M/39, paras. 28 and 30.  G/STR/M/40  
 
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  42.  The Russian Federation  thanked the European  Union, the United Kingdom and the United  States 
for their continued interest in the matter. The Russian Federation stated that as it had previously 
informed the Working Party, it continued to hold internal consultations with the relev ant ministries 
and companies to move forward with its notifications. However, the Russian Federation indicated 
that despite its ongoing efforts, it was facing difficulties resulting from unilateral, discriminatory 
sanctions imposed by some WTO Members agai nst STEs of the Russian Federation. The 
Russian  Federation stated that those measures represented unprecedented violations of 
fundamental WTO rules and of the principles of the Working Party, and had also caused further 
turbulence in the global economy, wh ich had not yet completely recovered from the COVID -19 
pandemic. The Russian Federation indicated that because of those external circumstances, as well 
as cyberattacks on government domains, it would require more time to complete its internal 
procedures.  
43.  The Working Party took note  of the statements made.  
4  OTHER BUSINESS  
44.  No issue was raised under other business.  
5  DATE OF THE FOLLOWING MEETING  
45.  The Chair recalled the Working Party's practice of holding its regular meetings either 
immediately before or immediate ly after the week during which the Committees on 
Anti-Dumping  Practices, on Safeguards and on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures hold their 
regular meetings. Given that, the Chair proposed to schedule the following meeting of the 
Working  Party for 21 Oc tober 2022.  
46.  No objections were raised.  
47.  The meeting was adjourned . 
 
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