RESTRICTED  
  
WT/CTE/M/76  
 
6 March 2023 
  
(23-1613) Page: 1/83 
Committee on Trade and Environment    
 
  
REPORT OF THE MEETING HELD ON 17 AND 21 OCTOBER  2022  
NOTE BY THE SECRETARIAT1 
The Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE Regular) met on 17 and 21 October  2022, chaired 
by H.E. Mr. Simon MANLEY ( United  Kingdom) . The Committee adopted the Airgram  
WTO/AIR/CTE/19/Rev.1 , dated 3 October 2022 . The Report of the last CTE meeting, held on  
2 June 2022 , is contained in WT/CTE/M/75 . 
_______________  
 
Contents  
1   ADOPTION OF THE AGENDA  ................................ ................................ ........................  5 
2   ENVIRONMENTAL MEASURES AND MARKET ACCESS, PARAGRAPH 32(I) OF THE  
DOHA MINISTERIAL DECLARATION – ITEM 6 OF THE CTE WORK PROG RAMME  ................  9 
2.1   EU Green Deal  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..........  9 
2.2   Recent developments on fossil fuel subsidy reform  ................................ ........................  24 
2.2.1   Update by New Zealand on recent developments on fossil fuel subsidy reform  ................  24 
2.2.2   Report by the Friends of Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform (FFSR) on their event held on 18 
October 2022 on "FFSR: challenges and opportunities in the context of an energy crisis"  ............  25 
2.3   Circular e conomy and plastics pollution  ................................ ................................ ........  27 
2.3.1   Plastics Pollution  ................................ ................................ ................................ .... 27 
2.3.2   Report by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on its event held on 19 October 2022 on  
"Circularity for a Sustainable Future"  ................................ ................................ ..................  34 
2.3.3   Report by the European Union on its event held on 19  October 2022 on "Circular  
Design and Trade"  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...........  35 
2.3.4   Report by the Organisation for Economic Co -operation and Development (OECD) on  
its event held on 20 October 2022 on "The role of trade in a circular economy transition"  ...........  36 
2.4   Other  ................................ ................................ ................................ ......................  36 
2.4.1   Presentation by India on its renewable energy and energy efficiency measures  ...............  36 
2.4.2   Presentation by India on its event held on 20 October 2022 on "An introduction to 
International Solar Alliance and Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure"  ..........................  40 
2.4.3   Presentation by China on its policy framework and progress regarding achieving peak 
carbon dioxide emissions and carbon neutrality and concepts for international cooperation  .........  41 
2.4.4   Presentation by India on its concern over the increasing use of environment as a  
non-tariff measure  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...........  45 
 
1 This document has been prepared under the Secretariat's own responsibility and is without prejudice to 
the positions of Members or to their rights and obligations under the WTO.  WT/CTE/M/76  
 
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  3   TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND CAPACITY BUILDING – PARAGRAPH 33 OF THE  
DOHA MINISTERIAL DECLARATION  ................................ ................................ ...............  48 
3.1   Third Trade and Environment Week reports  ................................ ................................ .. 48 
3.1.1   Report by the WTO Secretariat  ................................ ................................ ................  48 
3.1.2   Report by the United  States on its event held on 18 October 2022 on "Supporting  
More Circular Economies through Trade Policy for Climate Change Solut ions" ...........................  50 
3.1.3   Report by India on its event held on 20 October 2022 on "Lifestyle for Environment  
(LiFE) – Building a Communit y of Pro -Planet People"  ................................ .............................  50 
3.1.4   Report by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) on its event  
held on 17 O ctober 2022 on "Environmental, social and governance (ESG) traceability of  
supply chains"  ................................ ................................ ................................ .................  51 
3.2   Aid for Trade Global Review  ................................ ................................ .......................  52 
4   MULTILATERAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS AND WTO – CTE WORK  
PROGRAM ITEMS 1 AND 5  ................................ ................................ ..............................  55 
4.1   United  Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)  ...............................  55 
4.1.1   Update by the United  Kingdom on the COP26 presidency year  ................................ ...... 55 
4.1.2   Brief by the UNFCCC on the preparation for COP27  ................................ .....................  56 
4.1.3   Update by the International Trade Centre (ITC) on its participation in the UNFCCC's  
COP27  ................................ ................................ ................................ ............................  58 
4.1.4   Presentation by Switzerland on bilateral cooperation under Article 6 of the Paris   
Agreement  ................................ ................................ ................................ ......................  59 
4.1.5   Update on behalf of participants on negotiations towards the Agreement on Climate 
Change, Trade and Sustainability (ACCTS) ................................ ................................ ...........  61 
4.1.6   Report by the United  States on its event held on 3 October 2022 on "Roundtable  
Discussion on trade and Climate: Trade Approaches to Climate Mitigation and Adaptation"  .........  62 
4.1.7   Report by the United  Kingdom on its event held on 17 October 2022 on "View from  
the ground: Exploring the business experience of trade in environmental goods and services"  .... 63 
4.1.8   Report by the United  Kingdom on its event held on 19 October 2022 on "Spotlight  
on International Collaboration to Accelerate Decarbonization" ................................ .................  64 
4.1.9   Report by Samoa on its event held on 19 October 2022 jointly by the Pacific Islands  
Forum Secretariat and the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) on  
"Trade and climate change adaptation"  ................................ ................................ ...............  65 
5   TRANSPARENCY OF ENVIRONMENT -RELATED TRADE MEASURES – CTE WORK 
PROGRAMME ITEM 4  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 66 
5.1   Presentation by the WTO Secretariat on the WTO Environmental Database (EDB)  ..............  66 
6   MEMBERS' SUGGESTIONS AND PROPOSALS  ................................ ..............................  69 
6.1   Trade and Environmental Sustainability Structured Discussions (TESSD)  ..........................  69 
6.2   12th Ministerial Conference (MC12)  ................................ ................................ ..............  74 
7   RELATIONS WITH IOS AND NGOS – CTE WORK PROGRAMME ITEM 10  ......................  80 
8   OTHER BUSINESS  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 80 
8.1   Update by Singapore and Australia on the Singapore -Australia Green Economy  
Agreement  ................................ ................................ ................................ ......................  80 
9   DATE OF THE NEXT MEETING  ................................ ................................ ....................  81 
ANNEX 1: ITEMS OF THE CTE WORK PROGRAMME (1994)  ................................ ..............  82 
ANNEX 2: DOHA MINISTERIAL DECLARATION PARAGRAPHS  ................................ .........  83 
 
_______________  WT/CTE/M/76  
 
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  ACRONYMS  
  
 ACCTS  Agreement on Climate Change, Trade and Sustainability  
AFT Aid for Trade  
APEC Asia-Paciﬁc Economic Cooperation  
BRS (Conventions)  Basel, Rotterdam and Stockholm (Conventions ) 
¢ US dollar cents  
CBAM  Carbon border adjustment mechanism  
CDRI Coalition for Disaster  Resilient Infrastructure  
CE Circular economy  
CNY Chinese yuan  
COP Conference of the Parties  
CTE Committee on Trade and Environment  
CTG Council for Trade in Goods  
EPR Extended producer responsibility  
ETS Emissions trading scheme  
EUR Euros  
FFS Fossil fuel subsid ies 
FFSR Fossil fuel subsidy reform  
FLEGT  Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade 
GEA Green Economy Agreement  
GHG Greenhouse gas  
GW Gigawatt  
HS Harmonized System  
IDP Informal Dialogue on Plastics Pollution and Environmentally 
Sustainable Plastics Trade  
IEA International Energy Agency  
IISD International Institute for Sustainable Development  
IMF International Monetary Fund  
INC Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee  
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change  
ISA International Solar Alliance  
ITC International Trade Centre  
ITMOs  Internationally transferred mitigation outcome s 
KLiK Swiss  Foundation for Climate Protection and CO₂ Compensation  
LDCs Least developed countries  
M&E Monitoring and evaluation  
MC Ministerial Conference  
MEAs  Multilateral environmental agreements  
MMT Million metric tons  
MSME  Micro, small and medium -sized enterprises  
MVA Mega volt-amperes  
NDC Nationally determined contribution  
OECD  Organisation for Economic Co -operation  and Development  
OEWG  Open-ended working group  
PV Photovoltaic  
R&D Research and development  
RE Renewable energy  
SCM Subsidies and countervailing measures  
SCM Agreement  Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures  
SDG Sustainable Development Goal 
SIDS Small, Vulnerable Economies, Small Island Developing States  
SMEs  Small and medium -sized enterprises  
SPS Agreement  Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures  
TBT Technical barriers to trade 
TBT Agreement  Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade  
TESSD  Trade and Environmental Sustainability Structured Discussions  
TPRs Trade policy reviews  
UNCTAD  United  Nations Conference on Trade and Development  
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme  
UNEA  United  Nations Environment Assembly  WT/CTE/M/76  
 
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  UNECE  United Nations Economic Commission for Europe  
UNEP  United  Nations Environment Programme  
UNFCCC  United  Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change  
UNIDO  United Nations Industrial Development Organization  
USD US dollars  
WCO World Customs Organization  
WtE Waste to energy  
 
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  1  ADOPTION OF THE AGENDA  
1.1.  The Committee  adopted the agenda contained in WTO/AIR/CTE/19/Rev.1 . 
1.2.  The representative of Canada  delivered the following statement : 
1.3.  Canada strongly condemns Russia's unjustifiable and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine. This 
invasion is causing devastating humanitarian consequences and the senseless death  of innocent 
people. The consequences of Russia's actions has already extended well beyond Ukraine's borders, 
making it a direct concern to every Member represented here. What Russia has done cannot be 
normalized. Holding Russian leadership to account, cal ling on it to abandon this path of war, and 
return to good faith diplomacy represents the best means of addressing what is not only an urgent 
humanitarian emergency in Ukraine, but also a growing global food security challenge and a threat 
to the very core  of rule -based institutions.  
1.4.  The representative of the European Union  delivered the following statement : 
1.5.  Let me first thank you , Chair, and the Secretariat, for organi zing this year 's Environment week.  
Let me also use the opportunity to stress that the EU resolutely condemns Russia 's continued 
aggression in Ukraine and , in particular , the illegal annexations of Ukrainian territory and the 
indiscriminate attacks on civilians. The EU is deeply concerned about the global consequences of this 
war, relating to t rade, food security, and the environment. Russia 's war is causing widespread 
damage, in Ukraine and beyond, intensifying the triple planetary crisis . We urge Russia to stop its 
indiscriminate attacks and to immediately and unconditionally withdraw its troo ps and military 
equipment from the entire territory of Ukraine within its internationally recogni zed borders.  
1.6.  The representative of Norway  delivered the following statement : 
1.7.  Norway joins other s in condemning in the strongest possible terms the unprecedente d military 
aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine. Let me express Norway's concern for the 
severe destruction and human suffering this illegal act of aggression is causing by its unprovoked 
unjustified and premeditated military actions. Attem pting to annex the territory of another WTO 
Member, the Russian Federation is grossly violating international law, the core principle on which 
the international rule -based order is built, including the WTO, and the fundamental principles of the 
UN Charter that has prevailed since the Second World War. Let me conclude by reiterating that we 
stand in solidarity as long as it takes with Ukraine and the Ukrainian people.  
1.8.  The representative of New Zealand  delivered the following statement : 
1.9.  At the outset of this morning's meeting, I would like to make clear that New Zealand joins 
other Members in condemning in the strongest possible terms Russia's unprovoked and unjustified 
attack on Ukraine. Russia's illegal invasion is an act of aggression under international la w and has 
already caused thousands of deaths, a humanitarian crisis and widespread suffering. New Zealand 
continues to convey our support for Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity.  
1.10.  Furthermore, we stand firmly against any steps by Russia that ris k a further escalation in this 
conflict. We steadfastly support the collective action taken in response by the international 
community and we continue to call on Russia to act consistently with international obligations, cease 
its invasion of Ukraine, with draw its troops , and return to diplomatic negotiations as a pathway to 
resolution of the conflict.  
1.11.  Our efforts, Chair, to advance trade and environmental objectives are critical to all people, 
but multilateral cooperation in this and other fora continues t o be profoundly undermined by Russian 
action.  
1.12.  The representative of Australia  delivered the following statement : 
1.13.  Thank you very much, Chair, and apologies absolutely not needed. First, let me say it is a 
pleasure to be here for Trade and Environment Week. This week highlights the importance of 
international cooperation and compliance with international law and those issues I have spotlighted 
are paramount if we are to tackle the collective challenges of environmental sustainability.  WT/CTE/M/76  
 
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  1.14.  On that very note of in ternational cooperation, let me say that Australia condemns Russia's 
unilateral, illegal and immoral aggression against the people of Ukraine. The invasion is a gross 
violation of international law, including the Charter of the United Nations. Australia al so condemns 
Russia's illegal annexation of the regions of Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia in Ukraine.  
1.15.  Russia's sham referenda in occupied areas of Ukraine are illegitimate and have no legal effect. 
The regions are sovereign Ukrainian territory and Presid ent Putin's annexation is illegal and 
dangerous escalation. Any claims that these territories are now part of Russia are baseless and false.  
1.16.  The representative of the United States  delivered the following statement : 
1.17.  The United States continues to condemn Russia 's unwarranted and illegal war of aggression 
against Ukraine. We reject the sham referenda conducted in the four Ukrainian provinces and 
Russia 's fraudulent attempt to annex sovereign Ukraine territory and change Ukraine 's 
internationally rec ognized borders . This act is a flagrant violation of international law, and it has no 
legitimacy.  Russia tries to deflect Members ' responses to its actions by saying that they have no 
place in this meeting. But Russia 's actions contravene the principles an d values of the WTO - respect 
for WTO Members ' sovereignty is crucial to maintaining open and predictable markets and facilitating 
international trade. The United States will never recognize these purported annexations, nor the 
sham "referenda " conducted a t gunpoint.  We call upon all Members of this organization to condemn 
unequivocally Russia 's war of aggression and its attempt to acquire territory by force.  
1.18.  The representative of the United Kingdom  delivered the following statement : 
1.19.  As we meet here to disc uss the environment and how the rules -based multilateral trading 
system can play its part in tackling climate change and other environmental issues, we cannot sit 
by and ignore the egregious violations of international law and the UN Charter committed by o ne 
WTO Member against another. Let us remember that the WTO is founded on respect for the rule of 
law. As such, the basis upon which this organization operates has been fundamentally undermined 
by Russia's illegal invasion of Ukraine. Putin's illegal annex ation of regions of Ukraine constitutes a 
new low point in Russia's blatant flouting of international law. The United Kingdom unreservedly 
condemns this outrageous and illegal act.  
1.20.  What happens in Ukraine matters to the work of this Organization and it ma tters to us all. 
Russia's actions will prolong the impact on the global economy, have global consequences and 
jeopardize prospects for peace. The UK and the international community have made it clear to 
President Putin that his attack on the Ukrainian peop le must stop and that he must withdraw from 
Ukraine and restore regional and global stability.  
1.21.  The representative of the Philippines  delivered the following statement : 
1.22.  Thank you, Mr. Chairman . May I just commend the Chair , yourself , and the Secretariat for  
organizing the high -level panel earlier this morning to kick off this year's Trade and Environment 
Week.  
1.23.  During the recent WTO MC12 last 17 June, our Ministers took the long overdue step of 
recognizing the importance of the trade and environment remit tha t we have in the outcome 
document. There is indeed an ever  increasing acceptance that the various issues of environmental 
protection, sustainability, climate mitigation and adaptation must be fully integrated into the WTO 
economic and trade development age nda. The Philippines, in this context, continues to be firm in its 
belief that a triple win for trade, development and the environment is achievable and our 
conversations this week will help feed ideas into the WTO reform process with the vision of a truly  
responsive and action -oriented WTO as the end goal of the reform process and the goal of this Trade 
and Environment Week.  
1.24.  The Philippines stands ready to contribute to our discussions this week and commends the 
Chair and the Secretariat  on the streamlinin g of our agenda and a nnotated advanc e agenda . This 
streamlining greatly assists many developing country delegations in preparing for our meetings . 
Finally, may we just extend our very best wishes to all the delegates in this important addition of 
Trade and Environment  Week.  WT/CTE/M/76  
 
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  1.25.  The representative of Ukraine  delivered the following statement : 
1.26.  Good morning, dear colleagues . First of all , I would like to thank those delega tions who made 
their statement in support of Ukraine . In this difficult time , such support is  much needed. We would 
also l ike to commend the partners for their assistance in mitigating negative repercussions of 
Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine an d the restoration of Ukraine's environments.  
Environmental damage caused by Russia's invasion has been already estimated at around 
EUR 36 billion, with EUR 25 billion needed to address air pollution and 11.4 billion needed to address 
damage to soil.  
1.27.  The se ven months of war alone have caused 31 million ton nes of CO 2 emissions – roughly the 
amount produced by some countries annually and, according to current estimates, another 79 million 
tonnes of greenhouse emissions could be produced during the reconstructi on of the infrastructure 
and buildings destroyed during the Russian -led war.  
1.28.  Saying all of this, we once again emphasize that worse negative repercussions for the 
environment specifically are not – and cannot – be contained just within Ukrainian borders. A ny kind 
of heavy pollution will affect directly and indirectly stronger or lesser all WTO Members. Nuclear 
threats and consequences of such attacks concern not just Ukrainian people but the whole world. 
Russia's war against Ukraine has already significantl y damaged international trade with the 
disruption of trade routes and supply chains, the creation of critical goods' and commodities' 
shortages, and forced changes in consumption habits. The bottom line is that to deal with acute 
challenges and prevent fur ther aggravation of already devastating crises, we need to put an end to 
Russia's ability and desire to wage this war of aggression and to recognize human suffering.  
1.29.  We all know that trade can make a difference, can contribute to environmental sustainabil ity, 
and help us to stop the aggressor and to prevent greater environmental degradation. Your assistance 
in this task is crucial. So we ask your support to deprive Russia of its ability to finance the war, to 
bring death and suffering, and undermine the mu ltilateral trading system.  
1.30.  The representative of Switzerland  delivered the following statement : 
1.31.  Switzerland joins others in condemning the Russian military aggression on Ukraine in the 
strongest possible terms. This is a serious violation of international law. Russia's actions violate the 
prohibition of the use of force and the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine as enshrined 
in international law. Switzerland calls on Russia to respect its international obligations and to reverse 
its actions as well as to withdraw its troops and contribute to de -escalation. Switzerland calls on all 
actors to respect international law, including international humanitarian law.  
1.32.  The representative of the Russian Federation  delivered the following stat ement : 
1.33.  Since some Members insist on raising this issue and repeating unfounded allegations with 
regard to Russia, I am forced to reply. The political situation in Ukraine is not relevant to today's 
discussion. Moreover, positions of all parties have been s tated numerous times and have not 
changed. Repeating them over and over during this meeting detracts from our joint work on 
mandated issues.  
1.34.  Moreover, attempts to pin on Russia the blame for bleak prospects for reaching SDGs and 
energy crisis are simply mi sleading. Energy crisis started emerging long before. One of its core 
causes lies in the forced "green transformation " pushed by certain Members accompanied by their 
propensity to subsidize this transition heavily. Excessive reliance on alternative energy sources and 
allocation of massive subsidies to renewables have led to underfunding and drop in output of 
conventional energy sources; while new legislative initiatives, being quite protectionist in their 
nature, rather than pursuing environmental cause, re duced the predictability both for energy 
producers and consumers. This has directly affected the price of fuel and gas energy with negative 
economic consequences.  
1.35.  This situation has been further exacerbated by illegal unilateral economic restrictions impo sed 
by certain WTO on trade with Russia, including in energy products. As a result, everyone now has 
to pay much higher price for energy, food and other products. Everyone, including their authors. For WT/CTE/M/76  
 
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  instance, some Members relaunch coal stations and ask third countries to increase oil exports to 
their territories despite their initial position in respect of these energy sources.  
1.36.  The sanctions affect industry, logistics, finance, and have respective consequences by 
disabling the smooth flow of goods, capit al and technologies. Including low -emissions ones. Such 
policies, in our view, contradict with the slogans of respective Members for more active actions 
towards decarboni zation and more environmentally sustainable trade  
1.37.  The representative of Congo , on beha lf of the African Group , delivered the following 
statement : 
1.38.  Thank you , Mr Chairman . I am making this statement on behalf of the African Group. The 
African Group would like to welcome the discussions  this week  on trade and environment. The Group 
would also like to thank you and the Director -General for the efforts  that you have been undertaking 
to advance the discussions in this Organi zation, in accordance with paragraph 14 of the  MC12  
outcome document, particularly with regard to the role of the CTE as the standing body for dialogue 
between  Members  on this issue .  
1.39.  The African Group believes that the world is currently facing increasing environmental 
challenges, for which we need to find appropriate solutions. The multilateral trading system can 
contribute to overcoming  these challenges  in the context of the mandates of our Organi zation. The 
Group appreciates the constru ctive engagement and the efforts to reach mutual agreements within 
the CTE as well as the informal discussion . 
1.40.  The Group takes this opportunity to draw Members' attention to the fact that discussions 
within this Organiz ation should not cross over into the work undertaken  in other speciali zed 
international organi zations and should respect and , where necessary , complement commitments 
made by some developed countries in the context of environmental protection and climate change 
in other fora, and  should  not alter their substance or indeed nullify them. Therefore, it is important 
to distinguish between the specifi c objectives pursued by our discussions and those already taken 
into account by the various international instruments  on the environment . 
1.41.  Furthermore, our discussions should  fully integrate the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilit ies and th e primary responsibility of developed nations  in the current environmental 
crisis. Finally, the Group remain s particularly attentive  that any conclusion of our work does not 
constitute an additional technical barrier to trade for market access of African g oods and products. 
To conclude , the African Group looks forward to working in this Committee in order t o advance our 
discussions and to fulfil the mandates given by Ministers, as stipulated in the Marrakech Agreement 
establishing the WTO.  
1.42.  The representativ e of the Republic of Korea  delivered the following statement : 
1.43.  Russia's war in Ukraine is a blatant violation of the principles of the UN Charter and 
international law. Ukraine's  sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence should be respected. 
The Korean Government does not recognize the referenda conducted in the four Ukrainian provinces 
and Russia's attempt to annex southern Ukrainian territory last week. As the United States indicated, 
respect for WTO Members' sovereignty is crucial to maintainin g open and predictable markets. Korea 
will continue to stand with Ukraine and the Ukrainian people.  
1.44.  The representative of Japan  delivered the following statement : 
1.45.  Japan would like to echo other Members in respect to the recent announcement of referenda 
in four states by the Russian Federation. The purported incorporation of these areas that have been 
forcibly put under Russia's temporary control by Russia's aggression are nothing but attempts to 
require territory by force, and go against international law, including the United Nations Charter. 
Such attempts are invalid and go diametrically against the principles of the rule of law in the 
international community.  
1.46.  Japan also condemns the most recent missile attacks by Russia against civilian infrastructure 
and cities across Ukraine. Japan strongly urges Russia once again to stop the aggression and to 
withdraw its forces from the territory of Ukraine within internationally recognized borders WT/CTE/M/76  
 
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  immediately. Japan will also continue to work firmly on the two pillars  of imposing strong actions 
against Russia and supporting Ukraine in cooperation with the international community . 
1.47.  The representative of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia  delivered the following statement : 
1.48.  First, I would like to thank you and the Secretariat of the WTO for the tireless efforts to 
organize this third edition of Trade and Environment Week. We are all aware that sustainable 
development and protection of the environment are fundamentally linked to trade. The Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia believes and suppo rts the strong nexus between environment, trade and development, 
as it contributes to reducing trade barriers and eliminating discriminatory treatment in international 
trade relations. We also believe that organizing a week for trade and environment is ess ential to 
discuss ways to make global trade more sustainable, resilient, and inclusive and to discuss options 
of adaptation and mitigation of climate change risks and challenges. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
is delighted to participate in the side events by  organizing a workshop on circularity for a sustainable 
future o n 19 October 2022. We will be happy to welcome you at our workshop.  
1.49.  The representative of the Russian Federation  delivered the following statement:  
1.50.  I just wanted to say that my statement was dedicated to Korea and Japan too.  
2  ENVIRONMENTAL MEASURES AND MARKET ACCESS , PARAGRAPH 32(I) OF THE DOHA 
MINISTERIAL DECLARATION – ITEM 6 OF THE CTE WORK PROGRAMME  
"The effect of environmental measures on market a ccess, especially in relation to 
developing countries, in particular the least -developed among them, and those 
situations in which the elimination or reduction of trade restrictions and distortions 
would benefit trade, the environment and development".  
2.1  EU Green Deal  
2.1.  The representative s of the European Union  delivered the following statement2: 
2.2.  The EU Green Deal is now a consistent item on the agenda here to ensure that we show 
transparency on our measures. The European Union  is continuing to implement the European Green 
Deal, which is the comprehensive plan to make our economy and society ready for a climate -neutral 
future. We have made a number of presentation s over the last two years, including a deep dive into 
several Commission proposals . During the last CTE , we presented  new rules to facilitate intra -EU 
waste shipments  to promote circular economy  and tackle the export of illegal waste and waste 
challenges to third countries ; and, secondly , we pr esented the Eco-design  for Sustainable Products , 
an initiative that aims to make sustainable products the norm in the EU . It does so  by defining 
sustainability principles and requirements on the placing of products on the market and improv ing 
the applicati on of the current eco-design  framework . Earlier this year , we had a proposal for new 
rules to curb EU -driven deforestation ; and around a year ago a proposal on a Carbon Border 
Adjustment Mechanism . 
2.3.  Today we will provide update s on the state of play on the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism 
and deforestation , but let me first give you an overview of what is coming up at the end of this year 
and next year.  
2.4.   There are  a number of proposals that the EU is working on under the European Green Deal. 
Some of t hem are internal EU policy driven but others are of importance  or interest to exporters to 
the EU. Selecting a few examples, in Quarter 4 of 2022, in  the Zero Pollution  Package , we have new 
emissions ' standards for cars, vans, lorries and buses . In the Circular Economy Package  II, there 
are rules on the substantiation of green claims ; a policy framework for bio -based, biodegradable and 
compostable plastics ; and a re vision of rules on packaging and packaging waste . In 2023, there will 
be measures tackling micro plastic pollution ; a re vision of  the EU chemicals legislation ; and a review 
of CO 2 emission standards for heavy -duty vehicles . We are planning to provide a deep dive 
presentation on the circular economy initiatives in the next CTE meeting.   
 
2 See document RD/CTE/217.  WT/CTE/M/76  
 
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  2.5.  On the carbon border adjustment  mechanism,  the Commission made a proposal on 14 July last 
year. Since then, both EU co -legislators have been working on it – the Council of the European Union 
adopted a general approach on 15 March; and the European Parliame nt adopted an opinion on 
22 June. Both Parliament and Council confirmed the approach put forward by the Commission: that 
the carbon border adjustment mechanism ( CBAM ) is an environmental instrument , that it is building 
on the  EU emissions trading scheme  (ETS), that it aims at addressing the risk of carbon linkage and 
will replace the current instruments to address carbon leakage , and that it is focusing on carbon 
intensive industries.  
2.6.  The inter -institutional discussions are progressing well. There are a few elements that are being 
discussed on governance, on the scope of product, on the timeline and on the coordination with the 
ETS, but they are progressing well. The objective is to reach an agreement soon , possibly before 
the end of the year.  At the same time, the EU is taking part in international discussions where the 
CBAM may be raised, for example, in the  Organisation for Economic Co -operation and Development  
(OECD ) inclusive framework on carbon mitigation approaches and in the G7 discussi ons on the 
possible climate club.  
2.7.  The last thing that I should report on is that we are also working on the implementation of 
CBAM and developing a methodology for reporting emissions. For this purpose, an expert group has 
just been set up. So we are prog ressing well on putting CBAM  in place . 
2.8.  On the EU initiative on deforestation, I will just provide a short update given that we went into 
much more detail a couple of months back. As regards to timing, the Commission presented its 
legislative proposal last year in November and then the co -legislators, namely Council, got their 
"general approach" in June this year – "general approach" meaning their basis for inter-institutional  
negotiations. For its part in the system, the European Parliament got to agree on its report in 
September this year. Currently, we are in inter -institutional negotiations between the Commission, 
the Council, and the Parliament. Progress is rather good, but we are in relatively early stages so it 
is difficult to say how they will evolve. There is hope that there might be an agreement still this yea r. 
However, of course, since the timelines are quite strict, it could be that the negotiations go into 
2023.  
2.9.  In terms of substance, and without going into any specific points because we did that at the 
last meeting , all the basic elements of the Commissio n's legislative proposal are kept in both the 
Council's general approach and the European Parliament report and this, in particular, includes the 
due diligence as one of the most important elements but also the cooperation with partner countries 
(both prod ucer and consumer countries).  
2.10.  Building on what was mentioned by my colleague on CBAM, besides in this context in the 
WTO, we have been working very closely with other relevant multilateral fora such as the 
United  Nations Forum on Forests (UNFF), but also the FAO and others, plus a number of plurilateral 
initiatives coming from our member states but also others, with a broad range of partner countries 
(both producer and consumer countries). On top of that, we have been engaged for a long time and 
currently we are stepping up bilateral talks with all interested partner countries across the globe in 
terms of moving together towards the best ways of addressing deforestation globally in order to 
meet the goals and the commitments that we have all subscribed to, namely,  halting deforestation 
by 2030.  
2.11.  After this presentation, some delegations had the following reactions.  
2.12.  The representative of  Bangladesh,  on behalf of Djibouti , coordinator of the LDC Group , 
delivered the following statement : 
2.13.  Bangladesh will deliver this statement on behalf of Djibouti, coordinator of the LDC Group. 
The LDC Group thanks the EU for its presentation of the trade -related aspects of the European Green 
Deal and takes note of the discussions under this agenda item. The group is of the view that this 
issue requires time to be studied. Our group reserves the right to come back with comments and to 
participate in future discussions on this issue within the framework of the Committee on Trade and 
Environment. There is one preliminary remark: the group hopes that any discussion on trade and 
environment remains within a multilateral framework.  
2.14.  The representative of Thailand  delivered the following statement : 
2.15.  Thank you very much for the reports  on the EU Green Deal, CBAM, and deforestation . These  WT/CTE/M/76  
 
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  EU regulations  are of the utmost  importan ce to exporting countries such as Thailand and many  other  
countries as well.   
2.16.  I have recei ved the report on the progress of the EU Green Deal from my office in Brussels 
for the past 2 -3 years. As a matter of principle, Thailand supports and understands the European 
Union 's intention and objective to go forward in implementing their very lofty a nd ambitious goals 
to meet climate change goals and also to be environmentally friendly in any aspect that they can.  
2.17.  The thing I want to highlight here  from my delegation is that, f irst, if you read the EU Green 
Deal in detail , plus CBAM and also the new deforestation regulation, you w ill see that all these things 
will have a lot of impacts on exporting countries. Of course, I have heard many times the EU sa ying 
that most of the se regulations  will have to be implemented by the importers , but of course  importers 
will have to coordinate and pass on some of the burden of proof to the exporting countr ies. W e are 
very worried that this will be pervasive and have a broad impact  on every body. We consider that 
the amount of time that the EU has allowed for consultation with other countries, WTO or non -WTO, 
has been very short.  
2.18.  I had consultations with my colleagues and the private sector on CBAM measures about  three 
months ago and we talked with our Brussels office. The only  thing that we heard was th at nothing 
is finalized yet, so nobody can confirm any details to our exporters . With such an important measure , 
a lot of preparation is needed if we are going to be able to comply with exporting to the EU market.  
At this stage, nobody from the EU side can  confirm any details and  yet you are expecting us to be 
able to meet the regulation or the requirement s within a couple of years. I know that an adjustment 
period will be allowed , which I think is contained in the EU regulation , but again that has not been  
confirmed.  So, I just want to raise our concerns on all of these  aspects. Many things in the EU Green 
Deal are coming out in the 'Fit for 55'  that will require the existing  mechanism to already exist to a 
certain extent in the exporting countries.  
2.19.  For Thailand, we have just started the 'Carbon Market ' last month , but a  lot of things need to 
be prepared and we do  not have the time or the details. So while I would not like to contradict the 
EU's objective, you have to be mindful that what you are doing will affect a lot of people in the world 
and especially countries with a lot of  export s to the EU in these sectors , such as Thailand.  
2.20.  My last point will be a question about defor estation. Before I went to work in my office in 
Brussels almost ten years ago, I was working on the EU  Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and 
Trade (FLEGT ) Regulation , which is also a sustainable forestry plan . So I would like to know the 
status of the FLE GT Regulation – is the new Deforestation Regulation something new in addition to 
FLEGT or how is the EU policy on deforestation evolving?  
2.21.  The representative of Guatemala  delivered the following statement : 
2.22.  Guatemala  would like to thank the European Union fo r updating the Committee on the 
relevant trade aspects of the E U Green Deal.   
2.23.  As a first point, we would like to refer to the proposal on certain commodities and products 
associated with deforestation and forest degradation. This issue was discussed at the February 
Committee meeting and , at that time , we asked preliminary questions. Since then, we have been 
able to look at these proposals and we wou ld like to submit some  questions  now.  
2.24.  First, looking at the selection of product s that are covered by the draft regulation, at the 
February meeting , my delegation asked questions about which criteria had been  applied to select 
the commodities that would b e included in the regulation. At that meeting , the EU representative 
referred us to the impact assessment  that had been done . We looked at this  and saw that the surveys 
that had been mentioned regarding the products covere d only refer red basic commodities that are 
imported into the EU, but no stud y used had looked at those commodities produced outside the EU. 
Could  the European Union therefore confirm that this regulation is specifically aimed at products 
that do not originate from the EU ? Could the Europea n Union tell us if that is what you are trying to 
cover here? And will the EU apply these "deforestation -free" and due diligence obligations equally to 
commodities and related products originating in the European Union?  
2.25.  We would also like to ask questions about the country risk categori zation and risk sectors for 
third countries. With regard to this system, we w ould like to know wh ich criteria are being  used for 
such categori zation. Could the European Union tell us what scientific evidence has been  used as a 
basis to establish these different categories? H ow will the European Union  ensure that the measure 
will no t provide less favourable treatment than that accorded to similar products of European origin?  WT/CTE/M/76  
 
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  2.26.  Thirdly, with regard to the due diligence model used in this  initiative, we would like to know 
why this is not based on the production model and management proc esses. 
2.27.  Finally, we would also like to know whether the European Union  has any impact studies on 
the implications of th is initiative for the countries to which it is addressed in terms of economic, 
production, export, employment and environmental impacts . Here, we would like to refer to the 
intervention by Thailand who noted the impact that this will have internationally.  
2.28.  Referring to the proposed regulation on eco-design  for sustainable products , which was 
presented at the June  Committee meeting this year, my delegation would like to raise the following 
questions . I note that the EU delegation said that we would be talking about the circular economy 
at the next meeting and these questions could certainly come under that heading.  
2.29.  Looking at the scope o f the eco-design  proposal, we would like to hear  which specific 
categories are going to be covered by this and whether the re are other specific categories of products 
which might also be taken into account. Could the European Union tell us whether "foods" will be 
exempted from the categories of minimum eco-design  requirements? If yes, could the y also tell us 
which regulation will cover "food" and whether they have any changes in the pipeline for existing 
regulation s?  
2.30.  In addition, could the European Union i ndicate whether there are other products that will be 
exempted?  We understand that the regulation would apply equally to producers within the EU. In 
this regard, we would like to know whether materials or inputs imported into the EU for the 
production of g oods must also comply with the performance and information requirements set out 
in the eco-design  proposal?  
2.31.  With regard to the "digital passport ", we would like to know  which products  will actually be 
required to have such a p assport , how it will work and how it will be granted. Looking at when goods 
enter the EU customs system, will the y be asked to give that passport before they enter and what 
would be the process for bringing this i nto implementation? Will th ere be a phased entry into force 
of this strategy?  
2.32.  Alongside the eco-design  regulation, there seems to be a strategy for circularity and 
sustainability of  textile products being proposed alongside  and my delegation also has specific 
questions on that . I believe a number of these questions could be taken up in the next presentation .  
2.33.  Looking at textiles, we would like to know how the digital passport will work for textiles – will 
it be a label on garments, a certificate or licence to be attached with export documents, or will it be 
a QR code or barcode on garment labels? Would the digital passport replace labelling on garmen ts 
or will each garment or textile product have a code with information on its production process ? How 
exactly would this code work – by model or  according to  design?  How would textiles actually be 
covered with regards to the responsibility of the producer  – would this responsibility refer to the 
producer or to the brand ? We would also like to know what c ontacts the EU has had with stakeholders 
in the textile and clothing sector, for example, the  Sustainable Apparel Coalition, Inditex Group, 
C&A, among others .  
2.34.  These are important points for us and I think it is important that they be discussed in detail 
in the Committee. As the Ambassador of Thailand said so cogently just  now, without these fine 
details it is very difficult to respond. We would certainly look fo rward to receiving this information 
from the European Union.  
2.35.  The representative of Japan  delivered the following statement : 
2.36.  Thank you to the European Union for its presentation on the EU Green Deal, which has been 
very useful. As for the CBAM, w hile it is a prerequisite that the measures be designed consistently 
with the WTO rules, we acknowledge that there are other challenges that need to be addressed.  In 
specific terms, restrictions on trade should be kept to a minimum in order to achieve the objectives  
and we also would like to highlight the following four elements, among others, to be addressed:  
i. how to determine whether or not carbon leakage is actually taking place ; 
ii. how the amount of carbon emissions per unit of product will be measured and assessed 
using the same international standards;  WT/CTE/M/76  
 
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  iii. how to verify each country's efforts to reduce emissions while taking into account the 
burden of carbon costs that are effectively proportional to the amount of emissions;  
and 
iv. how to compare the strength of measures internationally, while keeping in mind the 
different circumstances of each country.  
2.37.  As we have just illustrated, there are many challenges to be considered. It would also be 
useful to discuss, as appropriate, the possible unintended effects on wor ld trade if CBAM s were 
introduced.  With these  issues in mind, I would like to point out some observations about the current 
proposed carbon border adjustment measures. We are greatly concerned about the possibility that 
measures introduced for the purpose of environmental protection will be applied even in cases where 
there is no risk of carbon leakage. We are also concerned that measures can be designed to create 
trade barriers in a way that does not contribute to environmental protection . 
2.38.  As for deforesta tion, the European Union  is planning to introduce forestry due diligence to 
ensure that certain commodities are produced on farmland that is not affected by deforestation in 
order to prevent the deforestation and degradation of the world's forests when these commodities 
are distr ibuted to the EU market. In addition, we understand that the EU is planning to lower the 
maximum residual levels  for the purpose of protecting pollinators, not for the original purpose of 
protecting human life or health.  
2.39.  When introducing any of these regu lations, Japan requests that the EU  should ensure 
consistency with WTO rules , obtain international consensus , provide sufficient information to third 
countries and engage in sufficient dialogue with them , and provide a s ufficient transition period to 
minim ize the impact on enterprise s. 
2.40.  Regarding the draft eco-design  regulation for sustainable products, we understand that the 
target products will be identified through public consultation. Since the products regulated by this 
regulation require a "digital pro duct passport " in order for them to be placed on the market in the 
EU, prior and sufficient information sharing to manufacturers outside of the EU will be  necessary in 
order to avoid the occurrence of trade barriers.  
2.41.  The representative of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia  delivered the following statement : 
2.42.  The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia would like to thank the European Union for the update on 
trade-relevant aspects of the E U Green Deal with a focus on CBAM and deforestation. We would like 
to reiterate our position : this issue has been addressed under the Agenda of the Committee on 
Market Access, where Members discussed , and will continue to discuss , in depth their views and 
concerns in this regard.  
2.43.  Furthermore, it should be noted that any trade aspect of climate c hange that will impact trade 
negatively would convert the spirit of cooperation among nations under the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change  (UNFCCC ) to confrontation. This is why the UNFCCC – as 
outlined in Article 3, paragraph 5 – warns against such approaches. It states: "Measures taken to 
combat climate change, including unilateral ones, should not constitute a means of arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade."  
2.44.  Moreover, measures taken  to combat climate change, including unilateral ones, must not be 
accommodated , let alone be inconsistent with WTO rules and principles. To conclude, while the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia recognizes the urgent need to make trade more environmentally 
sustainabl e and to refrain from adopting unilateral, discriminatory and trade -restrictive measures to 
combat climate change, it supports multilateral, fair, inclusive and consensus -based solutions in line 
with the principle of common but differentiated responsibilit ies. 
2.45.  The representative of  Cameroon  delivered the following statement : 
2.46.  The delegation of Cameroon would like to thank the European Union for the presentation they 
made, and would also like to welcome the European Union's engagement on environmental issues.  
It is always commendable when a country decides to be a leader in an area, especially in terms of 
international commitments that they have taken on, and even more so given that the environmental 
issue is one that is very important. We would therefore like  to welcome the presentation and the 
ongoing efforts taken by the EU to share with Members the new measures that they have been WT/CTE/M/76  
 
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  taking.  
2.47.  We should just simply like to make a few observations and to note some which have been 
made by previous delegations. We would like to call on the European Union to look at the impacts 
of these measures on trade globally with their traditional and classic p artners, such as Cameroon in 
particular. The European Union is a dear partner with whom we have historic links. But, following 
these measures, there has been an increase in the rejection of products from a number of our 
countries by European customs, which  means that there is an interest for both parties to continue 
their exchanges in order to facilitate market access to these products.  
2.48.  The standards which have been issued by the international institutions are perhaps not 
binding but are more or less accep ted by all. When you have more ambitious standards and 
regulations, it is important that they be justified by scientific means and do not constitute additional 
obstacles to trade. For us, that is a very important point, even more so as the majority of our states 
are already significantly affected by the burden of trade, which has been brought about by the 
ecological transition. These are ever more difficult to take into account because of a lack or indeed 
an insufficiency of support from developed countries  that have nevertheless committed to provide 
assistance to developing countries going through ecological transition under the principle of common 
but differentiated responsibilities, but also the 'polluter pays' principle.  
2.49.  We would also like to draw the E uropean Union's attention to a number of different points. 
We think it is important to develop a response to this. The environmental issue should leave no one 
behind and so collective and united efforts are very important to us.  
2.50.  In terms of deforestation,  we would perhaps like to raise a question to the European Union : 
we think that the increase in green zones is essential in terms of combatting climate change, but 
also in terms of improving the quality of air globally. We cannot talk about deforestation w ithout 
talking about reforestation. Reforestation  should be taken into account and the contribution of 
countries in reforestation efforts  should be  globally appreciated, as well as international efforts in 
that sense, and so we would like to look at the li nk between the two.  
2.51.  Also, on the international level, there is a collective understanding, which states that the 
obligation to protect green areas should be a right upheld by national states and that should be 
subject to specific attention. We do have res erves and they should be duly protected, but it is also 
the right of the country to declassify a zone if it wishes to and to be able to make use of it that is 
appropriate in the context of its international commitments. So there should not be any conflict 
between the regulations issued by the EU and international commitments which are common to all 
countries and which rule on the usage and the management of forests. If that were done, then that 
should of course not mean a blockage for us . We do however a ppreciate there is a collective 
interpretation of this that is yet to be matured so that it can then be translated into international 
commitments.  
2.52.  Once again, we should like to thank the E uropean Union for their contribution to this area and 
we remain ready to work on this constructively.  
2.53.  The representative of the Russian Federation  delivered the following statement : 
2.54.  We thank the European Union for its update on trade -related aspects of the E U Green Deal 
and its intentions to make the process of developing these measures more transparent.  However, 
Russia shares the concerns raised by other Members in respect of the CBAM and the proposal on 
deforestation -free products.  
2.55.  These measures, as well as certain other elements of the EU Green Deal  – such a s the new 
battery regulation, or the sectoral strategies like "from farm to fork" and the chemical strategy for 
sustainability – are questionable from the point of view of WTO law and practice. Concerns are 
regularly raised during the meetings of the C ommi ttee on Market Access, the  Committee  on 
Technical Barriers to Trade  (TBT Committee) , and the Council on Trade in Goods  etc., which are 
designated to discuss trade barriers and how to better address them. We hope that these concerns 
will be duly addressed a nd the Green Deal will not be a package of measures aimed to carry out the 
comprehensive import -substitution and localization policies under the pretext of environmental 
protection.  
2.56.  With regard to the CBAM, in particular , Russia is concerned with the plan s to expand the 
measure. It seems that no opportunity will be provided for recognition of alternative s to carbon 
pricing internal measures aimed at decarbonization applied by third countries exporting to the EU. WT/CTE/M/76  
 
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  It is not sufficiently clear how mutual reco gnition of the verification results can be applied in the 
proposed scheme.  
2.57.  Further clarifications  are required in respect to mirroring the EU ETS for importers of the 
covered products. As far as we understand, the EU ETS implies effective financial contri bution 
measures, while the EU State Aid Guidelines provide compensation for the reduction of indirect 
greenhouse gas  emissions. In other words, the national authorities provide financial support to 
companies if they consume alternative energy sources, which are de facto manufactured in the 
territory of the EU, instead of traditional fuels usually imported. This scheme l ooks like specific 
import -substitution subsidy that is prohibited by the WTO agreement s. Besides, the participants of 
the EU ETS have free allocation within this system and do not purchase any allowances. We would 
appreciate further clarifications on how t he WTO -consistency is ensured in this regard.  
2.58.  As for deforestation -free product s, first of all, as this is a trivial quantitative restriction 
measure , it must be compatible with Art icle XI of the GATT  1994. This measure should be  subject 
to discussions in the respective WTO working bodies dealing with market access.  Second ly, more 
clarity is needed on the implementation of the measure. For instance , import permits are to be 
issued if a number of criteria are met. Among them are  if the production of the supplied products 
has not caused deforestation and forest degradation , the question is how will that be estimated and 
by whom?  The second criteria is if due diligence expertise has been conducted by the importer . Are 
there any specific requirements in respect of due diligence ? Who can conduct it  so that the results 
of the expertise are accepted  and w ithin which timelines?  
2.59.  We are also concerned about the plans to add new criteria, which are also not sufficiently 
clear, such as the lack of the use of compulsory labo ur force. More clarity is needed on how the 
compliance with these new criteria will be estimated.  
2.60.  Besides, the draft regulation imposes benchmarks depending on three levels of risk. If the 
country of origin falls under the high -level risk group, its imports will be prohibited. How exactly is 
it planned to estimate which  country fall s under which risk group?  We woul d appreciate more 
clarification on these issues.  
2.61.  The representative of  India delivered the following statement : 
2.62.  We welcome the information sharing and the engagement that the European Union has carried 
out with respect to the provisions of the EU  Green Deal . We remain  concerned with the unilateral 
and trans boundary  application of domestic laws, which seem to be disguised restrictions to 
international  trade and may be enacted to increase the competitiveness of the domestic industry.  
2.63.  In principle, w e believe that i nternational trade law and international environment law should 
exist in harmony and that the principles of international environmental law, like the principle of 
common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities , shoul d be respected in any 
design of i nternational trade law.  
2.64.  We look forward to getting more information from European Union on how it believes that 
these laws under the EU Green Deal are compatible and consistent with the WTO provisions.  
2.65.  The representative of  China  delivered the following statement : 
2.66.  China would like to thank the Chair and the Secretariat for organizing this year's WTO Trade 
and Environment Week. China thanks the E uropean Union for its continued efforts to update 
Members on the  Green Deal related to environmental measures.  
2.67.  China would like to reiterate its concern over the EU's proposed carbon border adjustment 
mechanism. At this stage, the concept of carbon leakage is still questionable from both theoretical 
and practical poin ts of view. We share the concerns of some Members that such measures and CBAM 
will create unnecessary barriers in the name of environmental protection, thus exacerbating 
international trade tensions and impeding the post -pandemic economic and trade recover y. China 
fully supports international efforts to fight against climate change. However, we believe that to 
effectively combat climate change we need to take collective actions, as has been mentioned by 
many Members, rather th an introduce unilateral measure s by individual Members. We also call for 
the full respect of basic principles, including common but differentiated resp onsibilities and 
respective capabilities and national ly determined contributions under the UNFCCC and Paris 
Agreements, as well as full respect of the WTO rules.  WT/CTE/M/76  
 
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  2.68.  We encourage the E uropean Union to further consult with Members in the spirit of 
transparency and ensure the proposed measures are fully compatible with WTO rules. We will closely 
follow the evolution of the initiative and look fo rward to further communication with the 
EU delegation.  
2.69.  The representative of  Türkiye  delivered the following statement : 
2.70.  As always, Türkiye thanks the European Union  for their transparent approach and the constant 
information  sharing efforts on the Green De al. We welcome increased efforts at the global level to 
mitigate the impacts of climate change and we deem it important to discuss how cooperation at the 
WTO could help facilitate the transformation needed in attaining environmentally sustainable 
economic growth globally in an inclusive and just manner.  
2.71.  In this respect, Türkiye understands the climate -related motives behind the EU Green Deal 
and share s the EU's objectives of protecting the environmental and tackling climate change. That 
being said, it is of utmost importance that climate mitigation efforts are built on constructive 
cooperation and a strong global response to the challenges we are all fa cing. In this process, access 
by developing countries and the Least developed countries  (LDCs) to critical technologies and 
affordable financing mechanisms will be key for inclusivity and a globally coordinated climate 
response.  
2.72.  We are closely following th e ongoing legislative processes under the E U Green Deal and the 
CBAM. There are certain questions at the technical level that will affect the implementation of  the 
CBAM that remain to be fully answered , as voiced by certain Members before us. Also, while n ot 
today, we have been informed before that certain new aspects are being mentioned as a result of 
the discussions with the European Parliament, such as inclusion of indirect emissions to the 
mechanism and the possibility of free allowances for EU exports to countries without similar carbon 
pricing. These further increase our concerns with regard to its WTO-consistency, as well as the 
additional burden it may create on manufacturers in other countries.  
2.73.  We would like to underline that unilateral mechanisms such as CBAM should not create 
unnecessary barriers to trade, and undue burden to developing countries and LDCs. Proportionality 
of the measure as opposed to the perceived risk of carbon leakage and strict observance of the rules 
based in the WTO agreement s, as well as adhering to the principles of the UNFCCC , will be needed 
to ensure the credibility of this mechanism.  
2.74.  Allocation of CBAM revenues to the financing of green transformation projects of developing 
countries and LDCs would also be more in line wi th the climate change mitigation objectives 
underlying this draft regulation. Otherwise, we are concerned that unilateral actions might risk 
creating trade barriers and could be used as an excuse for trade policy tools in international trade , 
which could l ead to increasing barriers to trade, trade retaliations, as well as becoming a stumbling  
block in the international climate change negotiations and, consequently, give harm to both 
rules-based international trade and international climate change negotiatio ns. 
2.75.  The representative of the  United  States  delivered the following statement : 
2.76.  The United  States thanks the E uropean Union  for its presentation on the trade -relevant 
aspects of its Green Deal.  As noted by Members earlier this month  and here , it is essential that we 
have transparency and engagement to advance our respective trade and environmental goals. We 
strongly encourage the EU, in the spirit of transparency, to engage with interested Members to 
ensure the measures under the Green Deal are no more trade restrictive than necessary.  
2.77.  Regarding the CBAM, we are supportive of using trade polic y to drive climate ambition and 
recognize that a CBAM, when designed and implemented correctly, is a legitimate tool to address 
carbon leakage. We encourage the EU to take into account domestic regulatory policies that impose 
costs on producers, even if the re is no explicit carbon price.  
2.78.  We also encourage provisions in the CBAM that would allow for exclusions based on other 
international arrangements that relate to carbon intensity.  Members can and should pursue a 
mixture of policies to address climate chan ge and , while carbon pricing is one tool , it is not the only 
tool available. Recognizing  different choices governments make in response to their domestic 
realities is key to ensuring that climate measures do not lead to trade disputes in the future.  WT/CTE/M/76  
 
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  2.79.  The representative of Australia  delivered the following statement : 
2.80.  Australia thanks the European Union for the update on the EU Green Deal. The Australian 
Government is now more committed than ever to lowering carbon emissions. On 8 September 2022, 
Australia's P arliament passed government legislation enshrining a pledge to cut carbon emissions by 
43% by 2030 and to net zero by 2050.  
2.81.  Australia intends to be part of the solution to tackle greenhouse gas emissions globally. We 
are conscious of the importance of tac kling carbon leakage as a part of those efforts. Our preference 
remains to tackle carbon leakage through multilateral or plurilateral approaches, which would 
potentially have the greatest impact on emissions globally. Australia notes that the EU's draft CB AM 
policy , as part of the EU's Green Deal , aims to address the problem of carbon leakage. We welcome 
the consultative approach that the EU has taken in relation to CBAM to date. Australia encourages 
the EU to continue to share , to the maximum extent possib le, details of its policy deliberations and 
any updates on the likely form th e CBAM might take, consistent with the central WTO principle of 
transparency. We appreciate the EU's advice that it is committed to ensuring the consistency of its 
eventual measur e with WTO obligations. Further clarity on how the EU will address the issue of 
WTO-consistency would be helpful for Members.  
2.82.  Australia would also welcome further information on how the CBAM policy could recognize 
different types of emissions reductions policy, including ones that do not include an explicit carbon 
price.  
2.83.  We look forward to collaborating with the EU as the CBAM policy is f inalized. We are committed 
to working with the EU and all Members on these important issues where trade can assist in 
furthering our climate, environment and sustainability objectives.  
2.84.  The representative of  Argentina  delivered the following statement : 
2.85.  At the outset, Argentina would like to thank the Chair  and the Secretariat for organizing this 
week's meetings on trade and environment and we would like to thank the EU delegation for the 
updated information on the Green Deal.  
2.86.   Argentina considers that it is necessary for the new regulations issuing  from the European 
Green Deal to respect the EU's commitments  to the  WTO and to be based on scientific evidence in 
order to ensure that these measures  do not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimi nation or a disguised restriction on international trade.  
2.87.  Argentina shares the Europe an concerns about climate change and, in particular, shares the 
objective of sustainable food production, taking into account the current challenges of safeguarding 
food s ecurity under changing climatic conditions. At the same time, it should be taken into account 
that there are regional and national differences in terms of natural resources, environmental 
challenges, and the impacts of climate change, so the best practices  of one region of the world may 
be different to those of another. Therefore, solutions must be adapted to local realities . Policies and 
initiatives proposed for the legitimate purpose of environmental protection must be flexible, 
pragmatic, fully implement able, realistic, as effective  as possible in order to achiev e the desired 
objective , and as least trade restrictive as possible .  
2.88.  Regarding the carbon  border  adjustment mechanism, Argentina has already expressed in this 
Committee , as well as in the Council for Trade in Goods , that this measure gives rise to increasing 
concern among the Membership, with s ome s erious doubts about the consistency of such a 
mechan ism with the WTO agreements, in particular with the provisions of the GATT 1994.  
2.89.  Combatting climate change is a commitment undertaken by all and the actions we enter into, 
as well  as the instruments that we use, should  respect international commitments and  should not 
restrict international trade more than necessary  in order  to achieve legitimate objectives, and should 
not constitute a disguised restriction on international trade.  
2.90.  Regarding the draft regulation on deforestation, we are concerned that it doe s not consider 
measures that could be less restrictive in terms of trade in order to achieve the environmental 
objective sought, such as the recognition of forest ry conservation programmes or certification 
undertaken by  third countries. Similarly, by impos ing mandatory and more onerous due diligence WT/CTE/M/76  
 
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  requirements on countries classified as "high risk " than on others, the EU will apply more demanding 
and more trade -restrictive criteria to certain countries classified by the EU itself as "high risk", which 
could be inconsistent with WTO rules.  
2.91.  Furthermore, the proposed approach is  not consistent with the historical responsibilities for 
environmental degradation of developed countries, including the EU, by setting a baseline of the 
year 2020 without taking into account land-use changes and deforestation  which has occurred  since 
the industrial revolution in these  developed  countries,  thus effectively penali zing developing 
countries, inconsistent with the principle of common but differentiated responsib ility.  
2.92.  In sum, Argentina would like to highlight the importance of avoiding  any unilateral actions 
without due legal and multilateral basis and without the necessary scientific support . We will be 
closely follow ing the evolution of these initiatives, in o rder to avoid disguised restrictions on 
international trade in the name of the environment . 
2.93.  The representative of  Norway  delivered the following statement : 
2.94.  Norway thanks the EU for its update on the Green Deal. The European Union and Norway 
share the view that a price on carbon emissions is in general the most cost -efficient way to reduce 
such emissions. Our common carbon  pricing tool is the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS), which 
operates in all EU member states plus Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. If international partners 
do not share the same climate ambition, there is a risk of carbon leakage and our efforts to reduce 
emissions in Europe will not result in a similar reduction in global emissions.   
2.95.  However, it is crucial , as others have pointed out, that the CBAM be in compliance with 
WTO rules and that the implementation does not cause unnecessary friction in international trade 
relations.  With regard to deforestation and the EU's proposed regulation 706 for import and e xport 
of commodities and products associated with deforestation and forest degradation , Norway  is 
presently doing an assessment of this proposal to see its relevance to the European Economic Area 
(EEA) Agreement, which Norway has with the EU.  
2.96.  The represent ative of  Egypt  delivered the following statement : 
2.97.  Egypt thank s the European Union  for its comprehensive update on the trade -related aspects 
of the EU Green Deal including the CBAM and deforestation.  Egypt attaches great importance to the 
process of transition to a green economy, as we do to climate change adaptation. Nonetheless, we 
should be mindful of the possible negative effects embedded in this transition and its implications 
on international tra de on the short and medium term.  It is our conviction that, in pursuing those 
policy objectives, Members shall avoid the adoption and application of unilateral measures that would 
create unnecessary or disguised barriers to trade and avoid those measures t hat might have a 
detrimental effect on trade flows from all countries but especially developing countries and LDCs .  
2.98.  Trade -related measures pertaining to environmental and climate change and gas emission 
goals should be consistent with the rules of the WTO . They should be transparent and should take 
the special needs of developing country Members and LDCs in to consideration before such measures 
are adopted or applied.  
2.99.  Egypt believes that, in order to preserve transparency and integrity within the multilater al 
trading system, all trade -related climate change measures, including the various forms of carbon 
pricing and associated taxes, should be subjected to deep and comprehensive discussions and 
analysis within the WTO in order to collectively  figure  out the best possible approach to achieve 
sustainable development in all countries.  This should be done through measures that consider the 
special needs of developing countries and help them  to increase their share in international trade , 
as recognized in paragrap hs 1 and 2 of the Marrakesh Agreement, while catering for climate 
adaptation .  
2.100.   Egypt associate s itself with the statements made by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on behalf 
of the Arab Group and C ongo on behalf of the African Group.  
2.101.   The representative of  Colombia  delivered the following statement : 
2.102.   Colombia thanks the European Union for the presentations that have been made today. The 
world clearly is increasing a wave of national green regulations with  significant trade impacts. Th ese WT/CTE/M/76  
 
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  unilateral measures affect mainly developing countries Members , particularly tropical countries, 
which applies to Colombia. We believe that it is not possible to have a "one size fits all".  
2.103.   It is essential to recall that the preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement recogni zes the 
importance of the objective of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and preserve the 
environment and to enhance the means for doing so in a manner consistent with their respective 
needs and concerns at different levels of economic development.  Colombia  believes that we need a 
green transition that is just and inclusive  and that takes a holistic approach , for example, we should  
look at measures such as subsidies  and energy inputs, which can be damaging to a good trade 
system.  
2.104.   Sometimes we find that environmental measures are hybrids with a foot in two worlds  – one 
in the international trade camp and one in the international environment  camp . These worlds should 
be relevant  and complementary to each other,  and neither can be forgotten. The principles  that we 
have agreed upon in the environmental world are high ly relevant and trade and environmental 
measures should be consistent with those. For example, this Committee should have a conversation 
about the sovereignty o f natural re sources ; the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilit ies; the principle of international cooperation, among many others ; and how 
trade-related measures could be consistent with those for a fair and inclusive transition. We will 
have to look at the legal stance taken with regard to these at the WTO, such as Article XX of the 
GATT 1994 and similar provisions in the other similar  agreement s. 
2.105.   The representative of  Indonesia  delivered the following statement : 
2.106.   Indonesia wishes to thank the European Union for the update and the presentation on the 
EU Green Deal, specifically on CBAM a nd deforestation. Indonesia takes notes of the update and the 
report by the EU on these measures. Indonesia continues to pay close to attention to the Green 
Deal, since the EU is one of Indonesia's substantial markets for agricultural product s – namely , palm 
oil, coffee, as well as woods and its derivative products  – which could be affected by those policies.  
2.107.   In line with the UN 2030 Agenda and SDGs, the multilateral trading system under the WTO 
needs to ensure that it is relevant and able to achieve the SDGs, mainly on areas of poverty 
reductio n, hunger  prevention, job creation, as well as reducing inequalities with development at its 
core. This is also in line with what is enshrined in the preamble of the Marrakech Agreement. In this 
regard, Indonesia wo uld like to again express our serious concern on the EU Green Deal of which 
those measures would potentially harm and affect our farmers and threaten the livelihood of many 
small scale farmers in Indonesia. Moreover, Indonesia is of the view that the EU's policy is potentially 
inconsistent with the WTO principle of non -discrimination and results in unnecessary barriers to 
trade.  
2.108.   Trade measures related to environmental and climate change must not be counterproductive 
with the g oals of achieving the SDGs. In  this regard, the domestic policy to address climate change 
or the environment should not be punitive in nature to other Members, especially developing 
countries, or punishing other countries with certain market access measures based on a mere 
unilateral p resumption that other countries have not fulfilled their respective environmental 
obligation. Every measure should be based on scientific evidence and objective findings, otherwise 
such measures may be arbitrary and become disguised protectionism.  
2.109.   Therefo re, Indonesia requests the EU to carefully reconsider these measures and their 
potential effects on the global market and development.  Indonesia also encourages the EU to 
undertake further consultations, particularly with developing countries, before enter ing the final 
stage of the legislation. We believe that a better approach can be reached through cooperative 
means that are in line with the WTO rules.  
2.110.   The representative of  Costa Rica  delivered the following statement : 
2.111.   Costa Rica would like to thank the E U for the update regarding the Green Deal and the 
actions which will be taken with regard to CBAM and the proposal on deforestation -free products. 
We believe that we can support the spirit behind this, but we believe that , as of yet , we do not have 
enough of a scientific basis on the environmental impact of carbon leakage and also how exporting 
countries to the EU will have to fall in line with these measures. Costa Rica believes very much in 
the multilateral trading system and we believe that the tenets on  which it is based should 
predominate in any drawing up of global policies, particularly the application of environmental 
protection measures, which could become discriminatory trade barriers. We believe that good faith WT/CTE/M/76  
 
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  will hold sway here and that this wi ll be borne in mind when looking at these various issues in the 
discussions within this Organization.  
2.112.   The representative of  the Republic of Korea  delivered the following statement : 
2.113.   Korea thanks the EU for the update on the EU Green Deal and today's updated information 
on CBAM and deforestation. My delegation would like to reiterate our position that trade -related 
measures on protecting the environment should be carefully designed to advance environmental 
objectives in accordance with WTO rules and pr inciples. At this stage, as other Members have pointed 
out, the principle of carbon leakage and the ways of designing carbon pricing are still questionable. 
In this regard, Korea encourages the EU to continue to share details of the CBAM in a transparent 
manner and to have consultations before implementing concrete actions.  
2.114.   The representatives of the  European Union  delivered the following statement : 
2.115.   In response to the questions on  deforestation , I would like to thank all colleagues for their 
very relevant a nd interesting questions and I will try to address as many of those as I can at this 
moment going one by one.  
2.116.   Starting with the questions from Thailand, I would like to emphasize that the burden of proof 
in the case of this legislative proposal is actuall y on the EU operators, it is not on the third country, 
so we need to bear in mind that the burden of proof is really on the EU operators or on the 
EU industry. We also want to stress, not only as a reply to the questions from Thailand but also the 
question s from a number of other partner countries, that actually there have been long consultations 
with not only governmental bodies and authorities from partner countries, but also with the 
stakeholders from, for example, civil society and industry across many countries. This has taken the 
form of, for example, their participation in some of our stakeholder platform meetings but also in 
many others. We have been organizing meetings in third countries on this particular subject with 
the authorities and together w ith the representatives of civil society and industry as well – for 
example, in Malaysia, Cameroon, and also in other places. This is continuing to be the case and will 
continue also in the future because, for the EU, working with partner countries not onl y in terms of 
legislation but also in the broader fight in halting deforestation is a crucial element of the puzzle. We 
cannot work on this alone, we have to work together and we are working together with partner 
countries  – both producers and consumers.  
2.117.   In terms of details not known at this stage, in the meetings that I have mentioned but also 
in our official replies to some of the questions from both authorities and other stakeholders, we have 
provided detailed answers to many of these questions. So, we cannot really say that details are not 
known. Of course, on some specific issues, the talks are still ongoing, and this will be clear only 
when we have the final results. However, many, many details are there and will not be changed.  
2.118.   I do wish to stress th at once there is an agreement on the new regulation, which could be 
later this year but could also be next year as this will take some time, there will be a transition 
period as always, so it is not that the same day the rules will apply. This transition p eriod goes for 
both industries in our partner countries but also EU industries. We have to have a transition period, 
which will be the time for industries both within the EU and in our partner countries to adapt and for 
the Commission and colleagues from t he member states to work on supporting them in that process, 
especially in those countries that are producer countries and are in need of our support. We are 
already engaged in a number of programmes and projects in terms of cooperation and development, 
for example, in cocoa talks in Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire and Cameroon, but also many others like projects 
in Indonesia and Malaysia.  
2.119.   In terms of the question on FLEGT, the main difference here is actually that the studies that 
we had in terms of a fitness check o f the previous regulations  have shown that, in order to fight 
deforestation , we have to do it altogether if we are to reach the goals that we have set at a planetary 
level in terms of climate change and biodiversity loss, and we do need to cover many more relevant 
commodities besides goods. So, in this case, we will be looking at a number of commodities that are 
relevant in terms of deforestation. For further details on this, and also to answer some of the 
questions from Guatemala, we do need to refer back to the impact assessment, as was mentioned. 
So there is a jump from focusing only on illegal logging to focusing on broader deforestation, because 
that is what we need if we want to achieve any of the commitments that we have made on behalf 
of the EU , but also globally speaking, in terms of climate change and biodiversity.  
2.120.   The s election of commodities is explained in detail in the impact assessment and, on top of WT/CTE/M/76  
 
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  that, we do need to mention that this would be a state -wide approach, so it is possible – and that is 
actually foreseen already – that there will be regular reviews to base ourselves on further analysis 
of the latest scientific data to possibly adapt the scope in terms of commodities but also products. A 
very important clarification – there was a q uestion from Guatemala, "does this apply only to products 
not from the EU?" No, the answer is no, this applies to all products : those produced within the EU 
and outside of the EU. This is not about imported products, it is about placing on the EU market al l 
products, both those produced within the EU and in other partner countries.  
2.121.   In terms of benchmarking, there have been a number of questions. I do wish to reassure 
everyone that all the criteria will be based on scientific data and, of course, one of the most important 
criteria that we will be looking at – or basically the most important one – is the deforestation rate . 
This will be based on the data that are internationally agreed upon and recognized, such as, for 
example, those from the FAO.  
2.122.   In terms of the questions from Guatemala on why due diligence was the way forward of the 
two that was selected and whether the impacts on partner countries but also the EU Member States 
were calculated, all this data can be found in the impact assessment. On the impac ts, there are a 
number of tables there, which are extremely interesting in terms of looking at the trade flows and 
percentages in terms of relevance for specific commodities in specific countries, especially in terms 
of trade with the EU.  
2.123.   To answer some other questions : Cameroon, I do wish to emphasize that, for the EU, 
cooperation and development is crucial , so working with partner countries has always been a central 
element of our work and that will continue. As I mentioned, for example, there is the exam ple of 
cocoa talks. In terms of reforestation, th is particular initiative focuses on deforestation but of course 
working together on reforestation is also extremely relevant for us as well.  
2.124.   On deforestation, I will keep it at that, because there were a nu mber of questions from other 
countries, but actually many of those that were already covered address the rest. We are more than 
open for answering any further questions you might have.  
2.125.   Regarding  CBAM , I note d a number of comments and questions that we think are important 
to reply to on a number of issues such as WTO compatibility, multilateral engagement, the common 
but differentiated responsibility principle,  taking into consideration the cost of mitigation i n other 
countries , and the timeline for the introduction of the carbon border adjustment  mechanism . I will 
reply in that order.  
2.126.   On the fact that we have designed CBAM as an instrument that has to be, and that needs to 
be, WTO -compatible, this is something that is essential for the EU and this is part of how we intend 
to deal with the issue jointly with our trade partners. The CBAM is an instrument that builds on the 
carbon pricing that we have in the EU , which is our main carbon mitigation instrument on ind ustrial 
emissions and it aims at reinforcing this instrument and the effect of the CBAM will be on EU 
businesses and on EU businesses only. It applies the same rules on imported goods that it applies 
in the EU and it is designed to address the risk of carb on leakage in the areas where carbon emissions 
are significant and where the trade in goods is significant , leading to a risk of carbon leakage. So 
there is different treatment for imported goods than for EU production.  
2.127.   In terms of multilateral engagement , I have heard a number of calls to have international 
discussions and to address climate change together, and we totally agree with this approach. We 
are engaged in many fora here in the WTO, but also in the OECD, the G7, the G20, in the coalition 
of fina nce Ministers for climate action, and in a number of other fora in many areas in the EU and 
the UNFCCC. We know that the se discussions will take time and, since these discussions take time, 
we think it is worth reinforcing the ETS, which is something that we do in the EU to make our share 
of reduction of emissions on production within the EU or related to the EU. In this respect, we have 
designed CBAM so that it can take into account the policies of our partners and it is designed for 
international cooperat ion.  
2.128.   In this respect, it is very important to outline that CBAM looks at the embedded emissions 
in the goods that are imported into the EU and that is the first principle of CBAM. CBAM looks at the 
emissions of the goods, so it is not at the policies of c ountries, it is not at the measures that are in 
place in countries, it is at the effects of these policies and measures, because these policies and 
measures have an effect on the carbon content and therefore have an effect on CBAM. That is the 
first way it  takes into account the policies in different countries. If, in addition to having policies and 
regulations to reduce emissions, countries have a carbon pricing, this will also be taken into account WT/CTE/M/76  
 
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  in CBAM, and this will reduce the amount of CBAM. But the  first thing that reduces CBAM is reduction 
of emissions, either as a result of national policies or as a result of national efforts by a company.  
2.129.   The fourth element that was mentioned that deserves an answer is the question of whether 
CBAM is compatible with the principle of common but differentiated responsibility. The bulk of the 
impact of CBAM will be on the EU, it is there to reinforce the ETS a nd, as I outlined earlier, it fully 
takes into account the situation in other countries and the policies in other countries.  
2.130.   There were also questions on the possible extension of the scope of CBAM. What I can tell 
you about that is that it is being discu ssed in the inter -institutional dialogue between the Council 
and Parliament, but it is not possible at this stage to see what the result of these discussions will be. 
I cannot pre -empt the inter -institutional discussions in this respect.  
2.131.   The last point is  the time to prepare for CBAM. In the Commission proposal, it was foreseen 
that CBAM would start on 1 January next year. Considering the stage that we are at in the 
inter-institutional dialogue, it will not be the case, it will start later. But, in any cas e, there will be 
time for traders outside of the EU to prepare because CBAM starts with a transitional period where 
it is only reporting basic information on the embedded carbon in the goods and the financial 
adjustment will only start later, in the Commis sion's proposal in 2026. So there will be time and 
there will be guidelines for trade. With that, I think that I have covered all the questions that were 
raised on Monday and thank you again for your interest.  
2.132.   Finally, I wanted to pick up on the other ques tions but first I would like to thank all 
delegation s who intervened for their precious efforts to analyse and assess in detail the different EU 
regulations. To us, this shows the value of the work in this Committee, in particular , the transparency 
functio n and subsequent deliberations resulting from that. We are very keen to continue this exercise 
and dialogue.  
2.133.   In response to these questions, I would like to make some general remarks. First, our sole 
objective is to be able to deliver on the climate and e nvironmental agenda and objectives to which 
we are all committed, not only the EU. It is a given that some of these will affect trade. Climate and 
environment does not stop at a border and plays a role throughout the supply chain. So the question 
is not wh ether one can take such measures but how. With so many measures in the pipeline, the EU 
has very carefully looked, in a systemic way, at the impact of measures. You can see all policy 
options that have been the subject of our analysis in the impact assessm ents of each measure and 
the justification of the selected option in there, as well as in the legislation. We have across the 
board applied our own guidelines to the selection and design of measures. This includes, for example, 
non-discrimination; it inclu des that measures have to have an environmental objective and 
justification; it includes the consideration that it should not be more burdensome than necessary to 
achieve the policy objective; and, of course, it should be based on international standards a nd 
accompanied by an international strategy of engagements with partner countries plus capacity 
building and technical assistance with those partners in need.  
2.134.   In effect and by means of illustration, Global Europe is the EU's main financial tool for 
promoti ng sustainable development, peace and stability across the globe. With an envelope of nearly 
EUR 80 billion for the period 2021 -2027, the EU's external action supports partner countries in 
achieving SDGs, which includes the EU Green Deal. The EU is also th e biggest donor in Aid for Trade. 
2.135.   As indicated, we have based ourselves on international standards. Our guidelines also 
include where we have not yet been able to reach international consensus on a specific standard. 
This should not withhold us from addres sing the issue. Indeed, climate requires us to take urgent 
action. Still, where there is no full international standard yet, we have based ourselves on 
international work and are pursuing in parallel a strategy of cooperation with third countries to 
develo p such standards. In a nutshell, these international guidelines have much in common with 
what I remember from a couple of years to go – an exercise of the WTO Secretariat who produced 
a checklist of what Members would need to take into account when develop ing measures – and we 
have topped this up.  
2.136.   All the way through, we have made a strong plea for transparency. We walk the talk. I would 
hope that, in future discussions, we move into a discussion on the various practices that other 
Members may also have dev eloped to deal with the climate and environmental urgency. We could WT/CTE/M/76  
 
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  do this, for example, by selecting some specific areas – deforestation or other areas – where several 
Members may have developed a project. We would bring in aforementioned internal guidan ce that 
we developed and discuss the policy options and maybe even best practices.  
2.137.   Let me now turn to the question about the proposal on Eco-design  for Sustainable Products . 
The core of the proposal is to widen successful eco-design  directives beyond ener gy-related products 
to make it applicable to the broadest possible range of products and deliver further on circularity.  
However, I can confirm that food and other types of product such as animal feed and medical 
products are excluded from the scope of the  Commission's proposal.  
2.138.   The design of the Eco-design  for Sustainable Products Regulation resembles that of the 
existing Eco-design  Directive. In essence, this means that detailed product rules are laid down in a 
second stage via measures dedicated to a particular product or to groups of products. Priority product 
in the value chains will be identified through a workplan on which publ ic consultation s will be 
launched at the end of 2022. Intermediate products, like iron, steel and alumin ium, have high 
environmental impact and potential for improvement, and may thus be suitable candidates for 
inclusion in the first workplan for the categ ories of products to be selected under this initiative.  
2.139.   As regards information included in the digital product passport  (DPP), the information to be 
included will be carefully examined on a case -by-case basis when preparing product -specific rules. 
It may i nclude information such as the environmental footprint of a product, information useful for 
recycling purposes, the recycled content of a certain material, information about the supply chain, 
etc. Dedicated security and privacy protocols will be developed through the standardi zation process. 
Moreover, access to information will be granted on a 'need-to-know ' basis. Different stakeholders 
will have access to different sets of information, based on access rights defined in the delegated acts 
for each product group regulated.  
2.140.   We also had a question on the EU strategy for sustainable and circular textiles, its Extended 
Producer Responsibility (EPR), and whether measures under the strategy are being consulted with 
sectoral stakeholders.  
2.141.   The Commission is conside ring EPR for textiles as part of the impact assessment on the 
revision of the EU framework legislation on waste. As part of this impact assessment, extensive 
stakeholder consultations took place, among which an open public consultation and two workshops 
on textiles for sectoral stakeholders. Third countr y stakeholders were invited to provide an input and 
16 non -EU countries did. Responses to this consultation will be considered by the Commission in 
shaping up the revision of our waste framework legislation.  
2.142.   As a final note , I would like to stress that the EU has provid ed an  unprecedented level of 
transparency in its regulatory processes but also in this group.  Of course, it is clear and we have 
heard several Members saying that they do not know yet how to an ticipate the measures, but that 
is the result of being transparent up front.  It is clear that not all the details of the proposed measures 
are ironed out  yet, because we are in an inter -institutional legislative process. But we are sharing 
this information  even before the regulations are in place  and we a re providing you  the opportunity 
to comment early on in the process, before legislation is adopted. Moreover , our proposals generally 
have incubation time before they enter into force allowing businesses to  prepare for the regulation.  
2.143.   With this, thank you for all the comments and I would like to say that we have duly taken 
note of the latest intervention this morning by Bangladesh and we will be happy to continue to 
engage.  
2.144.   The representative of  Guatemala  delivered the following statement : 
2.145.   I would like to thank the EU delegation for the answers to our questions. I just had one 
follow -up comment based on the comments we received on the questions we provided in the last 
session on the deforestation measure. As I mentioned during my statement, the first time that this 
measure was presented, we asked the EU delegation how it chose the commodities that will be 
affected by the deforestation measure. At the time, we got the response that all of the details were 
included in the impact assessment, but  in fact we looked at the impact assessments, in particular 
the area that explains how they chose the commodities affected, and there are references to three 
different studies. I wanted to make reference to the names of these studies, because it is relevan t 
and important for us to understand the criteria that was used because, of course, there are other 
commodities that might be causing deforestation that are not necessarily the ones chosen by this 
delegation or by this regulation. We therefore want to unde rstand the process of choosing one WT/CTE/M/76  
 
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  commodity over another.  
2.146.   In fact, we looked at the names of the studies mentioned in the impact assessment and they 
say "Study on the demand -side measures to address deforestation, impact of EU consumption on 
deforestatio n", which only makes references to the consumption of imported food and non -food 
commodities and manufactured goods on deforestation, estimating the role of seven commodities 
in agriculture linked to deforestation – palm oil, soy, cattle, wood fibre, cocoa , coffee and rubber. 
This study, in particular, is focused on Latin America n and Asian regions. So looking at the contents 
of these studies, we reali se that the studies were actually already focusing on the commodities that 
were chosen but none of them g ive us any explanations as to what criteria were used and how the 
impact of these particular commodities are different from the impact of other commodities when we 
are looking at deforestation. So that is why we re -ask the question and we hope to have some 
answers on this.  
2.147.   The representative of the European Union  responded : 
2.148.   Thank you Guatemala for the question. In fact, there were also previous elements that were 
considered and basically the basic criteria retained is what is most important from the viewpoint  of 
the EU contribution to deforestation through these commodities. So, we want to take responsibility 
for what is linked to EU consumption, so the emphasis is on commodities for which the EU has a 
particularly important footprint in terms of contributi ng, or potentially contributing , to deforestation. 
So that is the basic tenet. We are not looking at all sorts of commodities, but rather the ones for 
which  the EU  can somehow be responsible . 
2.2  Recent developments on fossil fuel subsidy reform   
2.2.1   Update by New Ze aland on recent developments on fossil fuel subsidy reform   
2.149.   The representative of  New Zealand  delivered the following statement:  
2.150.   Pursuant to the Joint Ministerial Statement and High -Level Workplan on Fossil Fuel Subsidies 
that was issued with co -sponsorshi p from 47 Members at MC12  in June, New  Zealand convened a 
first WTO meeting on fossil fuel subsidy reform (FFSR) on 3 October 2022 . This first meeting was 
well attended, with a good turnout of both Joint Statement co sponsors  and other delegations .  
2.151.   In the first part of the session, we heard presentations from the International Institute for 
Sustainable Development (IISD), the WTO's Economic Research Division, the Asia-Paciﬁc Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) Trade and Investment Co mmittee and the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) . These presentations covered current activities on FFSR, including in the G7, G20, 
APEC and in follow up to the Paris Agreement and COP26 in Glasgow .  
2.152.   From these presentations , it was clear that FFS levels are again on the rise – they are 
estimated to have rebounded to almost USD 700 billion in 2021 after a pandemic -induced lull in 
2020. Taking into account the human health effects and other costs, some commentators at the 
session put the overall cost of FFS much higher and estimated that the removal of FFS could add 
4% to global government revenue . 
2.153.   In the second part  of our October session , the UN Environment Programme briefed on its 
work to develop a methodology for reporting F FS at the global level, in support of efforts to monitor 
the UN SDG 12(c) targets. The first phase of this work, covering 20 countries, will be online from 
March 2023, with the aim of having a reliable and comparable inventory of FFS measures completed 
by 2025. Speakers at the meeting acknowledged the challenging context of the current energy crisis, 
and pointed out that this underlined the importance of continued work to achieve FFSR. Several 
delegations also emphasi zed that short -term FFS relief measures should be extraordinary, 
temporary and time  bound . 
2.154.   Participants at that meeting supported intensification of work on FFSR starting with increased 
transparency; sharing experience (both domestic experience and that derived from international 
processes such as APEC or G7 peer reviews) ; sharing of  best practice on areas such as 
cross-government identification, examination and reform . There were also calls for further analysis 
of the social, economic and environmental impacts of FFS. In this context, the need t o take into 
account equity issues and efforts towards 'just transition' were emphasi zed. WT/CTE/M/76  
 
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  2.155.   There was interest in understanding more about the incidence and effects of FFS across the 
value chain, including subsidies to fossil fuel production; the proportion o f subsidies categori zed 
usually as for 'consumption' but that actually  usually  went into industrial processes or further 
production; subsidies provided to or through state -owned enterprises; and subsidies at the 
sub-central level .  
2.156.   Existing WTO rules and e xperience on subsidies were seen as a good basis to build on. There 
was strong support for using Trade Policy Reviews  (TPRs) , the S CM Committee, and the TESSD 
discussions to advance Member understanding on this work. The connection with the work of the 
Informal Dialogue on Plastics (IDP) was also noted .  
2.157.   Finally, c ollaboration with other international organi zations was  also seen as key, particularly 
with UNFCCC to encourage inclusion of FFSR commitments in NDCs , as well as collaboration with 
the Internat ional Energy Agency  (IEA), UNEP, the OECD and APEC on data collection. Participants 
were keen to keep up to date with developments in APEC on use of its voluntary reporting template. 
There was also interest in the work some delegations are undertaking to n egotiate an Agreement on 
Climate Change, Trade and Sustainability, with a fossil fuel subsidies pillar.  We will provide an update 
on that work later on.  
2.2.2   Report by the Friends of F ossil Fuel Subsidy Reform (FFSR) on their event held on 
18 October 2022 on  "FFSR: challenges and opportunities in the context of an energy crisis"  
2.158.   The representative of New Zealand  delivered the following statement:  
2.159.   Earlier this week, the 'Friends of FFSR' held a side event to examine the challenges and 
opportunities of FFSR in the  context of the current energy crisis. It featured presentations from 
experts at the International Energy Agency, the International Institute for Sustainable Development 
and the OECD .  
2.160.   Key points coming out of this session were:  
• the scale of this energy crisis and its effects on prices;  
• the massive fiscal strain now entailed for governments in this context, particularly for developing 
country budgets;  
• against this background, the importance of ensuring temporary relief measures were targeted, 
transparent and time  bound  (a common theme in the discussions that we have been having in 
the past month) ; 
• the experience of past energy crises in acting as a driver for reform  (the IEA spoke about the 
1970 oil shocks as promoting major strides in reduction of fossil fuel dependency) ; 
• the particular challenges faced by developing countries; and the importance of good 
communications and steady re form to achieve public support for achieving reform and to make 
sure that th e incentive  structure support a transition away from fossil fuel dependency and 
towards green energy alternatives.  
2.161.   Looking ahead to next steps, p lanning is now under  way for the second meeting under the 
auspices of the Joint Ministerial Statement. As agreed in the High -Level Workplan, this will foc us on 
the development and social issues associated with FFSR.  
2.162.   In closing, I would like to note that the co sponsors  of the Joint Ministerial Statement continue 
to welcome  new cosponsors. We would like to encourage those who have not yet done so to join us 
in cosponsoring this important work.  WT/CTE/M/76  
 
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  2.163.   Following th ese presentation s, some delegations had the following reactions.  
2.164.   The representative of  Switzerland  delivered the following statement:  
2.165.   We thank New Zealand for their leadership in this initiative and we were pleased to 
participate in the first very productive meeting of this initiative. We were also pleased to notice the 
presence of many Members in this meeting.  
2.166.   The three planetary crises require us more than ever to keep insisting on fossil fuel subsidy 
reform and having them on the global agenda. We need to collectively work to avoid the pressure 
to subsidize fossil fuels in the immediate term. The current energy crisis makes the case for a clean 
energy transition all the more urgent and important. I  would like to reiterate that Switzerland is a 
very active Member on this issue and is part of the group of Friends of Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform 
(FFFSR) and is working on this issue in the Agreement on climate change, trade and sustainability 
(ACCTS) initiative. Discussing the reform of FFS at the WTO is an important step towards progress.  
2.167.   The representative of  the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia  delivered the following statement:  
2.168.   The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia would like to thank New Zealand for continuing to share 
updates on their programme of phasing out fossil fuel subsidies. While we encourage the sharing of 
information, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia would like to reiterate its position stated during previous 
meetings, namely, this issue is dealt with under a different for um whereby there is a voluntary peer 
review of inefficient fossil fuel subsidies that encourage wasteful consumption among some G20 
Members in accordance with their national circumstances, priorities and needs. We believe that 
issues such as this one should not be addressed under the WTO.  
2.169.   The representative of  Indonesia  delivered the following statement:  
2.170.   Indonesia appreciates the update and the report from New Zealand on its recent 
development on the Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform, including its first meet ing. Indonesia shares the 
view on the importance of fossil fuel subsidy reform and recognizes the interests of some 
WTO Members to bring the discussion under the WTO. However, it is also important that the issue 
should be discussed in the right framework s ince WTO itself still has unfinished homework that needs 
to be resolved by Members.  
2.171.   Moreover, Indonesia also underlines that the implementation of this subsidy reform must 
take into account the capacity and capability of each Member at the national level a nd current global 
trade volatility.  
2.172.   The representative of  the European Union  delivered the following statement:  
2.173.   The E uropean Union is one of the co sponsors  of the Fossil Fuel Subsidy reform initiative. We 
are pleased with the first meeting on 3 October and thank New Zealand for having organized it .  
2.174.   The first exchanges were already fruitful and pointed to the need to increase awareness and 
enhance transparen cy on fossil fuel subsidies. We agree with the need to have more granular 
information to be able to differentiate amongst fossil fuel subsidies to start reforming the most 
harmful ones.  
2.175.   We consider that the C TE has an important role to play on transparenc y and we believe that 
conversation on the fossil fuel subsidies could also take place  in the CTE. We agree on the importance 
of development and social dimensions of fossil fuel use and support for many countries. We would 
therefore encourage WTO Members to  join the initiative and the discussion in the next meeting of 
the FFSR initiative that will focus on development and social dimensions.  
2.176.   The representative of  the Russian Federation  delivered the following statement:  
2.177.   We would like to thank New Zealand for the update s. However, Russia would like to join the 
statement made by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on FFSR. WT/CTE/M/76  
 
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  2.178.   It is true that fossil fuels are not as cheap and affordable as they were , with  more than 
136 countries rely ing on fossil fuel imports and with the p oorest nations being hit particularly hard. 
However, this is a logical extension of the resurgence of energy demand after COVID -19 lockdowns 
and supply crunch, compiled with the excessive reliance on alternative energy sources, allocation of 
massive subsid ies to renewables and significant neglect of conventional energy sources. This all has 
led to underfunding and a drop in supply on the market. While new legislative initiatives, being quite 
protectionist in their nature, reduced the predictability both for  energy producers and consumers, 
rather than pursuing environmental goals.  
2.179.   Meanwhile, not all countries can afford to abandon the use of fossil fuels. Renewables, unlike 
fossil fuels , cannot provide sustainable power generation, low electricity cost and high power output , 
plus they are still less affordable than fossil fuels.  
2.180.   We do welcome collective and individual efforts to promote renewable and clean energy. Our 
first national poli cy in the field of increasing energy efficiency by means of renewable energy 
generation dates back to 2009  and we have been constantly upgrading it ever since. However, the 
promotion of renewables should not be done at the cost of trade distortions and dis crimination of 
traditional energy sources.  
2.181.   In our point of view, we should focus on eliminating restrictions that prevent Members from 
a gradual and just transition, taking into account all national peculiarities, rather than on developing 
new potential re strictions aimed to push forced energy transition forward.  
2.182.   Concluding my intervention, I would like to note hereby that this energy transition should 
rest on a reasonable balance between environmental aspects and socio -economic development as 
promoting en ergy security.  
2.183.   The representative of  the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela  delivered the following statement:  
2.184.   We would like to thank New Zealand for its presentation. Our delegation would like to point 
out that our countries are still dealing with the pand emic due to COVID -19, which has shown that 
the most vulnerable are the most affected, so the global concern is on how to access vaccines, 
medicines , and medical equipment to deal with the pandemic and save lives.   
2.185.   Venezuela notes what was said by Saudi Ara bia and Russian Federation and we are also 
concerned that what is being addressed in other fora, such as climate change and other bodies, may 
be reversed  by the duplication of approaches in other spaces that do not have the mandate to do 
so, and are not th e most suitable for these purposes, such as the WTO.  
2.186.   The representative of  Norway  delivered the following statement:  
2.187.   Norway is a long  standing supporter of the work to phase out inefficient and wasteful fossil 
fuel subsidies. We would like to congratulate the cosponsors with the upstart of this process and , in 
particular , New Zealand who has shown leadership on the issue for many years.  
2.3  Circular economy and p lastics  pollution  
2.3.1   Plastics Pollution  
2.3.1.1   Update b y the Coordinators  on the work of the Informal Dialogue on Plastics 
Pollution and Environmentally Sustainable Plastics Trade (IDP)  
2.188.   The representative of Ecuador , on behalf of the IDP Coordinators , delivered the following 
statement:  
2.189.   May I first congratulate you, Mr. Chairman, on your excellent conduct o f today's meeting.  It 
is very satisfying to the Committee with so much energy and livel iness and we are very grateful to 
you for that. O n behalf of the IDP coordinators , we would like to extend a welcome to Mexico , Samoa 
and Mauritius as new cosponsor s of the initiative.  We are now 75  Members working on the IDP here 
at the WTO. I would like to excuse myself in advance because I have a long and detailed report to 
give today on the various meetings that have been held in Septemb er 2022, in par ticular , the plenary WT/CTE/M/76  
 
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  which was held  this month  and, f urthermore, an event by the cosponsors held this week as part of 
Environment Week at  the WTO.  
2.190.   The third out of four 2022 pre -plenary meetings of the Dialogue took place 
on 19-20 September and was chaired by Colombia , Fiji and the Philippines . It was open to all 
Members and we covered discussions  on each of the Dialogue 's workstreams through technical work 
and presentations by stakeholders and the WTO Secretariat. Members recalled the D ialogue's 
successful Ministerial Statement by coordinators at MC12 and the ongoing work  on the two D ialogue 
surveys – the first one on trade -related policy measures and the second one on Aid for Trade.  
2.191.   On our work on tackling plastic pollution, our workstr eam facilitated by Ecuador and 
Colombia, the WTO Secretariat presented the survey on trade -related policy measures . Inputs have 
been received from a good number of Members so far. The on going survey was circulated in  June 
2022 and is available in th e three languages in digital format. The Secretariat had already identified 
(and this is updated information ) more than 250 trade-related policy measures and presented to the 
group the first sample  analysis on measures related to single -use plastic bags . According to the 
analysis , 60 trade-related p olicy measures targeted single -use plastic, 35 of which  specifically 
applied to single -use plastic bags. With the analysis presented during this  pre-plenary and also the 
information that has been taken into consideration and the updated data up to today, it is clear t hat 
the transparency information generated by the survey and launched by the Dialogue is of great value 
and will be even more so once it has been completed by all Members.  
2.192.   Stakeholders and experts ga ve a series of t echnical and scientific presentations  on their 
latest activities in reducing plastic pollution. I will not go into detail on all the presentations as they 
are available online. Briefly, the OECD presented their findings from the second part  of the G lobal 
Plastics Outlook  on policy scenarios to 20 60 providing a roadmap for increasing policy ambition to 
tackle plastic pollution that addresses all elements of the full lifecycle of plastics . The Secretariat  of 
the Basel, Rotterdam and Stockholm Conventions  (BRS Conventions) provided an update on the 
plastics -related out comes of the Conference of the Parties, a brief introduction on the plastic waste 
amendments of the  Basel C onvention and its implementation, and some Members  have highlight ed 
that some of our discussions have, for example,  identified a need for technologies required to ensure 
the implementation of  this plastics amendments. The Pew Charitable Trust presented its 
comprehensive assessmen t of pathw ays towards stopping ocean plastic pollution . The C onsumer 
Goods Forum made a presentation on the Coalition of Action on Plastics Waste and its goal to 
eliminate unnecessary packaging. The MarViva  Foundation, a stakeholder from the Latin America n 
and Carib bean region, made recommendations to the Dialogue, among others: disincentivizing the 
export and imports of plastics waste in Latin America and the Caribbean; promoting transparency 
and control over trade in waste; tackling illicit t rade in plastic wa ste; and encouraging the Dialogue  
to continue international cooperation effort s with processes such as those at  the United Nations 
Environment Assembly  (UNEA ) and BRS  Conventions .  
2.193.   Contributions were welcomed by all delegations and stakeholders . The importance of data 
was recalled  and a reduction in the plastic production as the most  attractive solution for the 
environmental, economic and social perspectives by some Members. Also Members welcomed the 
OECD r eport noting that it provides information  that could directly support  and inform the 
development of domestic and international app roaches to plastics. The work that was carried out at 
the WTO and in other international organizations and for a in this regard  was also acknowledged. 
Finally, some underscored that the reduction of harmful and unnecessary plastics and  that limiting 
the sin gle-use application of plastics were core polic ies for achieving  the first pillar of  a circular 
economy , as well as the importance of  identifying common de finitions and reviewing policies that 
were inconsistent in terms of plastic waste management .  
2.194.   On our  second workstream  – promoting trade to tackle plastic pollution  – facilitated by 
Australia  and the Philippines , we had pr esentations by the private sector.  They share d experiences 
on using environmentally sound and effective alternative s and substitutes t o plastics and plastics 
packaging. We had a presentation by the Yves Rocher Foundation  on their  cosmetics initiatives to 
replace plastic packaging by cellular fibres. The AptarGroup  presented on perspectives on 
alternatives to conventional resin on the sup ply and customer side and challenges faced therein. 
Nestlé presented on trade -related challenges in using alternative packaging materials and how global 
compliance can be managed. The World Business Council for Sustainable Development presented 
on packagin g sustainab ility framework to support companies in switching to sustainable p ackaging. 
All of these presentations are  online. Finally, the World Bank underscored that the WTO can and WT/CTE/M/76  
 
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  should contribute in bringing more  transparency on both products trade and waste trade. UNCTAD 
and the WTO Secretariat briefed participants on preparation s for the Dialogue's exploratory 
workshops on sustainable and effective alternative s and substitutes to plastic, which is scheduled to 
take place on 6 December. We invite all Members to participate in this workshop.  
2.195.   Delegation s and stakeholders indicated the importance of  regulatory measures to support 
and stimulate the usage of plastic substitutes or alternatives under trade and also that this must 
take into account the readiness of industry to switch to alternatives and the timing for such a 
transition, as well as the es sential role of innovation and technologies and the need to take into 
consideration that alternatives and substitutes are environmentally friendly and fully circular and 
non-toxic.  
2.196.   On cross -cutting issues , which is  facilitated by the Fiji, United  Kingdom and China  (I would 
like to highlight that Fiji is one of the Coordinators that was there from the inception of the Dialogue 
and whose Ambassador is here), Fiji indicated that since its inception the Dialogue had coherence 
and cooperation at its core of its  work and therefore the session of cross -cutting issues is dedicated 
to bringing these conversations together and placing emphasis on i nternational collaboration and 
avoiding duplication of efforts . In this session , Ms. Jyoti Mathur -Filipp, the Executive S ecretary of 
the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) Secretariat at  UNEP , provid ed an update on t he 
UNEA negotiation process and the outcome of the first meeting of the Open -Ended Working Group 
(OEWG), which was held in May and June 2022 to prepar e for the work of the first INC that will take 
place in November this year in Punta del Este, Uruguay. The INC will work from the second half of 
2022 to the end of 2024 on forging an internationally legally binding instrument on plastic pollution 
addressin g the full lifecycle of plastics.  
2.197.   This was followed by a b riefing from the WTO Secretariat on its participation in the OEWG  
and the contribution  of the Dialogue to the UNEA discussion. The WTO participation, I am very proud 
to say, has been – and is – well received . There is genuine interest from the delegates and 
stakeholders in the plastic discussions at the  WTO. The collaboration between  UNEP and between 
the two communities, the trade and en vironmental community , has been key in having a successful 
process and of course in strengthening the collaboration, including technical collaboration , with 
UNEP. 
2.198.   Finally, the World Customs Organization  (WCO) presented its main takeaway s from the first  
WCO Global Green Customs Conference held in June and the Harmonized System ( HS) reform efforts 
to better identify materials  and material flows in plastics thr ough trade and value chains . We 
provided an update on the WCO -WTO cooperation as requested by the Dial ogue's communication 
that we adopted on 8 June and we share d potential areas of w ork for the two organizations. All of 
these presentations will be online as well.   
2.199.   The Ambassador of Portugal updated the Dialogue on the plastics -related outcomes of the 
UN Oceans Conference, which was  held in Lisbon, Portugal, from 27 June to 1 July 2022. The 
Conference receives submissions of over 700 voluntary commitments towards the implementation 
of SDG 14, including se veral in r elation to marine pollution , marine science and financial 
commitments. Ecuador provided a briefing on the D ialogue's side  event that was held during the 
side event during the Eighth Aid for Trade (A FT) Global Review 2022 , highlighting the perspec tives 
of Small Island Developing States  and LDCs. This was followed by a presentation by the S ecretariat 
on the  AFT Needs Assessment Survey .  
2.200.   There were comments from Members on what we can do from the analysis once we have 
the results of the Aid for Trade  survey, as it will help to better identify plastic -related programmes, 
for example, a matchmaking on technical assistance and capacity building exercise s between donors 
and needs  identified . With donors, we had the presentations of the World Bank and the Global 
Environmental Facility and identified e -learning opportunities in trade -related technical assistance 
for interested Members. Finally, in this session, the World Bank presented on trade -related aspects 
of their programmes to address plastic pollution  in the Asia -Pacific region, in particular in 
collaboration with ASEAN. Overall, this valuable experience  sharing was welcome amongst 
participants and we were encouraged to go deep into specific topic s to share experiences. Some 
delegations took the  floor in support of the WTO's contribution to the UNEA  process and welcome d 
updates provided by the UNEP Secretariat . Discussions highlighted that these joint efforts in the  
area of plastics will be very useful, particularly as there were Members participating in both  
processes.  WT/CTE/M/76  
 
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  2.201.   Discussions also noted that t he cooperation between  UNCTAD and the WTO could bring 
different stakeholders and could contribute  on behalf of the Dialogue to the INC negotiation pro cess. 
Delegations and  stakeholders welcomed the updates by the WCO and supported the work initiated 
under the partnership of the WTO and WCO. Discussions also put emphasis on the need to encourage 
national submissions for  the revision of the WCO HS system that will take place in 2027 for which 
draft amendments will be  finalized by March 20 24. Discussions also impressed upon the importance 
of combining synergies between  different in ternational organizations a s well as stakeholders and 
bringing the environmental community into th ese conversations. More generally, participants 
underlined that tackling plastic pollution could not be achieved in silence and welcome d the 
Dialogue's continuous leadership and commitment in t erms of bringing inclusivity and encouraging 
stakeholders' cont ributions as well as  civil societ y engagement . 
2.202.   The Coordinators – China, Morocco and Australia  – on behalf of all of the Coordinators of the 
IDP, including Fiji, Barbados  and Morocco , informed u s on progress made with regard to the effective 
practical and meaningful outcomes at MC13 in keeping with the mandate  provided by Minister s. We 
heard from China that the key elements of the next steps and initiative s setting out results expected 
at MC 13 cooperating on other international processes  and notably  at the United  Nations, with a 
legally binding treaty to slow plastic pollution and the increasing number of participants in the 
Dialogue. Morocco highlighted the importance of the Dialogue as we try to tackle plastics  pollution , 
underlining the importance of having information from the OECD – they were warning th at the 
quantity of plastics may almost triple by 2060, with half of which ending up in landfills , in other parts 
of the ecosystem , and with less than a fifth being recycle d currently .  
2.203.   The Vice Minister of Ecuador a ddressed the participants underlying the importance of 
recycling plastics throughout its lifecycle and to look at it in th is Dialogue  because much could be 
contributed to this.  The Philippines and Colombia presen ted their reports , which can be found on the 
webpage . We heard from the Secretariat with regard s to the survey , which I have already referred 
to in my report . We would like to encourage the Dialogue  coordinators and all Members to  respond 
to this survey . We have had some responses from non -participants and we also look to bring more 
into this and we acknowledge that there are challenges still  when it comes to  consultations among 
ministries when it comes to finding the right information. At the plenary, there were more than a 
dozen Members taking the floor commenting on facilitators ' report s, surveys and  giving their points 
of view on the issues at hand . Australia, who was coordinating the Dialogue, h ighlighted the 
importance of significant participation with  regard to plastic pollution and to be ar this out the 
importance of ongoing commitment and the close cooperation of participants to meet the mandate 
that was handed down at the Ministerial.  
2.3.1.2   Report by the Coordinators of the Informal Dialogue on Plastics Pollution and 
Environmentally Sustainable Plastics Trade (IDP)  on their  event held on 18 October 2022  
on "A stocktaking side event organized by the coordinators of the Dialogue on plastics 
pollution and environmentally sustainable plastics trade"  
2.204.   The representative of Ecuador , on behalf of the IDP Coordinators , delivered the following 
statement:  
2.205.   I will now report on the side event organized by the Coordinators of the Dialogue  on Plastic 
Pollution and Environmental ly Sustainable Plastics Trade, that took place this week . The e vent served 
as a stocktaking exercise organized by the Coordinators of the Dialogue  in cooperation with the 
WTO, UNEP, UNCTAD, WCO , and the BRS Secretariat. It  brought over 120 participants  online and 
around 75 i n person. The session showcase d the relevance and co ntribution of international 
cooperation to tackle plastic pollution while avoiding duplication of work. It also provided an 
opportunity  to look at the next steps required to further strengthen international trade cooperation 
in support of efforts to end plastic pollution. The event was moderated by Ms  Ludivine Tamiotti, the 
Secretary of the CTE, and the high-level speakers included  the DDG Jean -Marie Pau gam, the 
Executive Secretary of the INC, Jyoti Mathur -Filipp, WCO Deputy Secretary -General Ricardo Treviño, 
Executive Secretary Rolph Payet from the BRS Conventions, the Director of the Office of the 
Secretary -General of UNCTAD, Pedro Moreno, and the Ambas sador of Ecuador, H.E. José Valencia.  
2.206.   I will briefly go into  the h ighlights of the event, because it was very important  and really 
showcased the collaboration amongst organizations . I am very sorry again for being  so detailed but 
Members have requested us to be very detailed in this session.  WT/CTE/M/76  
 
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  2.207.   DDG Paugam suggested three points for the next step s towards MC 13: increasing 
transparency to capture h idden  plastic flows  and increas ed and improved mapping of trade policies 
and related policies related to plastics  and i dentifying trade-related technical  assistance needs; 
capacity building to continue to identify to regional and bilateral fi nancing mechanisms; and concrete 
action points such as identifying environmentally sound and effective alternatives and  substitutes to 
plastics (and this will be an issue that will be tackled during our workshop in December). Executive 
Secretary Jyoti Mathur -Filipp underlined the importance of the mutual supportiveness between the 
INC process at UNEA and the WTO. She under scored the importance of the WTO  process to improve 
data gathering on trade across plastic lifecycles  from destruction up to waste management ; trade 
flow database s that provide an important basis for the i ntergovernmental process ; review of global 
plastic  trade policies to ensure policy coherence ; and enhancing en gagement and collaboration with 
all stakeholders , including the private sector, NGOs and academics. Trade -related technical 
assistance, capacity building, information and experience sharing a re relevant  for the INC process. 
She also mentioned how the  international ly legally binding instruments can play an active key role 
in achieving a framework, targets, guidelines, and focus for cooperation.  
2.208.   Jyoti Mathur -Filipp highlighted  that the INC plastic pollution document refers very much to 
trade, even if it is not  explicit. She called on WTO Members to discuss the documents  produced by 
UNEP and see how they can interact and engage in the discussions on the plastics treaty. From the 
WTO, she requested specific guidance on how to gather relevant trade data and to reflect on how 
this can  feed into the INC process . She underscored that the INC would like to collaborate and 
engage with the WTO and the IDP and its  stakeholders.  
2.209.   Executive Secretary Payet of the BRS Conventions drew attention to trade in plastic waste . 
He highlighted that only 9% of the plastic  waste produced to date has been recycled. That problem 
lies in recycling contaminated plastics or plastics containing hazardous chem icals and additives. He 
also shared insights about significant impacts of plastic waste amendments and the movement of 
plastic waste across international boundaries and he gave us on the information on the partnership 
on plastic waste. He touche d upon the impact of plastic waste on SIDS and the lack of capacity  in 
recycling plastic waste in an environmentally sound manner. He underscored the need to strengthen 
cooperation with shipping companies as work that can be done  by the WTO in order to facilitate saf e 
trade in plastic waste for those SIDS.  
2.210.   Mr. Treviño from the WCO shared three initial potential areas. I will not go into detail but I 
will mention better identification of problematic plastics, better identification of hidden flows of 
plastics embedded in goods or as packaging, and better identification and differentiation of 
preferable goods. So those are the three areas where the WCO and the WTO can contribute and 
work towards better identification of trade flows in plastics. He noted the key role that  international 
cooperation plays in ensuring that capacity gaps are filled and shared about WCO global cooperation 
focusing on plastic waste and illegal trade. Addressing illegal trade in plastic waste is an area that 
has been mentioned by many Members and  also stakeholders.  
2.211.   Finally, Chief of Staff Moreno highlighted the need for a new green deal. Such a deal could 
include multilateral trade rules, international regulations, ban and taxes that are done in a fair and 
non-discriminatory manner. UNCTAD also hi ghlighted the need to consider the issues of fossil fuel 
subsidies, lowering tariffs and non -tariff barriers and eliminating non-tariff measures  for plastics, 
alternatives and substitutes, and promoting market access initiatives, bilaterally, plurilaterall y and 
multilaterally on substitutes. He underscored also the need for these substitutes to be 
environmentally sound and effective.  
2.212.   Ambassador Valencia concluded by underscoring the importance of this collaboration and 
highlighting how the Dialogue  can fee d into other processes and can contribute to the global 
response on plastic pollution but also the importance of maintaining constant dialog ue with public 
opinion.  
2.213.   I will finalize my intervention by indicating that the next meeting of the IDP will take pl ace 
for the pre -plenaries on 17 -18 November and the plenary will take place on 7 December. As I 
mentioned, on 6 December, we will have a special workshop that is being organized by the WTO in 
collaboration with UNCTAD on alternatives and substitutes to pla stic. We will showcase also in situ 
some of these goods and services around this area.  WT/CTE/M/76  
 
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  2.214.   Following these presentations, some delegations had the following reactions.  
2.215.   The representative of Japan  delivered the following statement:  
2.216.   Thank you to the Secretariat  and all Members for organizing this important Trade and 
Environment Week with the participation of a wide range of stakeholders. Japan would also like to 
thank Ecuador for the comprehensive update on the IDP.  
2.217.   Japan attaches great importance to measures a gainst plastic pollution. In order to reduce 
plastic waste, it is important to recycle plastic resources throughout their entire lifecycle from 
product design and manufacturing, including the reuse of plastic, to waste disposal. From this 
perspective, Japa n has been promoting "3R + Renewable " initiatives based on the Act on Promotion 
of Resource Circulation for Plastics, which came into force in April this year.  
2.218.   Japan also actively contributes to supporting other countries. As one of the measures against 
plastic pollution in trade -related fields, we are implementing a plastic waste border control project 
in the Asia -Pacific through contributions to the World Customs Organization (WCO). Japan has 
contributed to the capacity building of customs officials in So utheast Asia and its neighbo uring 
countries, by providing training that aims to improve the knowledge and response capabilities of the 
customs authorities of the target countries with regard to the illegal movement or transportation of 
plastic waste across  borders.  
2.219.   In order  to further promote the principles of these initiatives, at the G20 Osaka Summit in 
2020, Japan announced the "Osaka Blue Ocean Vision ", which aims to reduce additional pollution 
from marine plastic litter to zero by 2050, and this vision is now shared by 87 countries. It is 
important to aim for an effective measure against plastic pollution and to involve more countries in 
the negotiatio ns on legally binding international instruments ( or treaties ) on measures against 
plastic pollution, including marine plastic pollution, which will begin in November this year. Japan is 
committed to actively participating in the negotiations at the Intergo vernmental Negotiating 
Committee on this treaty.  
2.220.   The representative of Fiji, on behalf of the Pacific Group , delivered the following statement:  
2.221.   I am pleased to make this statement on behalf of the Pacific Group.  The Pacific Group is 
pleased to note that Samoa recently joined the I DP joining Fiji, Vanuatu and Tonga. This underscores 
the importance of this issue for the Pacific Island states , who contribute less than 1.3 % of the 
mismanaged plastics in the world's oceans, yet are one of the main recipie nts of plastics pollution 
and its impacts.  
2.222.   The Pacific Group welcomes the important progress made in the United  Nations Environment 
Assembly mandating negotiations on a new global instrument to address plastics pollution and notes 
that the first negotiati ng session is due to be held in Uruguay next month (week of 28 November  
2022). The Pacific Group encourages the IDP to actively engage with this process, noting that the 
trade community will be a central player in developing a robust and workable instrument.  
2.223.   The Pacific Group welcomes the concrete progress the IDP has made in key strategic areas 
of importance to the Pacific region, including:  
a. the Aid for Trade Needs Assessment  Survey , which will help to identify financing needs to 
support countries to develop and implement appropriate policies in regard to plastics 
pollution and sustainable trade ; 
b. the work being done in partnership with the World Customs Organi zation to ensure 
improved customs classification , which will be important to increase transparency and as 
a foundation for future measures ; and  
c. the collaboration with UNCTAD looking at the vital areas of standards, non-tariff barriers, 
financing and technology transfer for  developing countries.  WT/CTE/M/76  
 
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  2.224.   The Pacific Group is of the view that strong progress through the IDP will be an important 
contribution to bringing the MC12 mandate on trade and environment to fruition through the 
multilateral track.  
2.225.   The representative of the European Union  delivered the following statement:  
2.226.   The European Union thanks Ecuador for the updates. As stressed in previous meetings, the 
EU wants to move from linear plastic production and consumption to a circular plastic cycle. Changing 
the way plastics is  designed, produced, used can greatly contribute to reducing plastic pollution and 
marine litter, by preventing waste or turning used plastics into secondary resources.  
2.227.   The EU maintains that engagement on a global plastics agreement is critical. The EU 
appreciated the recent update on the negotiation process towards a multilateral, legally binding 
instrument on plastic pollution provided by UNEP  to the I DP last September. The EU has always 
maintained that it is important for the discussions within the IDP to be supportive of this negotiation 
process.  
2.228.   The exchanges in the IDP can provide important contributions to the negotiations on the 
plastics -related environmental impact of trade and on trade -related measures concerning plastics. 
The sharing of expertis e and insights from national and regional case studies, including knowledge 
exchanges on trade flows and risks linked to trade, such as leakage points or shipments of concern, 
can help inform the delegations' chief negotiators engaging in the Intergovernme ntal Negotiating 
Committee.  
2.229.   While the discussions within the IDP should be supportive of the negotiation process, it is 
equally important to avoid duplicating the work of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee, 
particularly with respect to definition s. 
2.230.   The representative of China delivered the following statement:  
2.231.   China thanks Ecuador for its updat es on the progress of IDP. First of all, we would like to 
also take this opportunity to welcome Mauritius, Samoa and Mexico who joined the IDP recently.  
2.232.   As Ecuador mentioned, in March of this year, 175 Members of UNEP endorsed a historic 
resolution at the UN Environment Assembly to end plastic pollution. We are pleased to learn that the 
first negotiation  of the UNEA  on an international legal binding instrumen t will be launched in coming 
November.  
2.233.   Plastic pollution is a global challenge. No single organization, single country or region can 
solve it on its own. In the IDP side event during  this Trade and E nvironment week, Ms. Jyoti 
Mathur -Filipp, Executive Secr etary of the INC, underlined the importance of the mutual 
supportiveness between the INC process and the WTO. As our environment colleagues from 
175 Members have demonstrated their strong political will and ambition to tackle plastic pollution at 
UNEA, why not we, our trade colleagues, do the same at the WTO? As one of the six IDP coordinators, 
China would like to join other cosponsors to encourage all WTO Members to join the IDP discussion, 
to share your comments and suggestions on the IDP and  to plan for next step s.  
2.234.   The Dialogue is a good platform to raise awareness. For past years, in this meeting room, 
we only have plastic cup. But recently, like today, I found that we only have this new cup. It looks 
like a paper cup. It is a good signal. It could be a sample that the Dialogue is changing our own 
awareness and behavio ur. When I look closely to this new cup, there is a label "plastic in product ". 
it reminds  us that we still have a long way to go.  
2.235.   All meetings and workshops of the IDP and its three workstreams  will continue to be held in 
an inclusive and transparent way, open to all WTO Members. We look forward to close cooperation 
with all member to achieve concrete results in the future, to show the relevance of the WTO to the 
global challenges.  
2.236.   The representative of Australi a delivered the following statement:  WT/CTE/M/76  
 
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  2.237.   I would like to thank Ecuador for the update on the Dialogue on Plastics Pollution and the 
event t hat was held this week, which may I say was an excellent event, made up of a panel of very 
esteemed figures from international organizations, including the WTO, UNEP, the World Customs 
Organization, and of course one of the key leaders of our work at the W TO, Ambassador Valencia of 
Ecuador. We would like to thank those presenters for their engagement at the event. The 
participation of this high -level panel highlights the complexity and the global nature of this problem 
and confirms that global cooperation i s critical if we are to address it.  
2.238.   Australia is a proud coordinator of the initiative and we are pleased that discussions in the 
Dialogue have been progressing very positively. Plastics pollution requires global solutions and trade 
must be a part of our e fforts to tackle plastics pollution: it is a powerful lever, a powerful tool. Plastic 
flows and plastic pollution flows are indeed a transboundary issue and require transboundary 
solutions, i.e. trade. We welcome the Dialogue's ongoing collaboration with o ther bodies investing 
in this issue, particularly the process underway in the UNEA resolution, which established the 
Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) to develop a legally binding instrument on plastics 
pollution.  
2.239.   We thank the broad group of 7 5 WTO Members for their participation and engagement in 
this initiative and we welcome the Dialogue's ongoing commitment to openness, transparency and 
inclusivity.  
2.3.2   Report by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on its event held on 19 October 2022 on 
"Circularity f or a Sustainable Future"  
2.240.   The representative of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia  delivered the following statement:  
2.241.   The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is pleased to update the Committee about the workshop 
entitled "Circularity for a Sustainable Future" hosted on the s ide-lines of the Trade and Environment 
week.  The session explored the aspects of Circularity and its role in creating a Sustainable future for 
us all, as well as the interdependency between global trade, environment, technology and 
innovation.  
2.242.   A diverse p anel of experts from the Public and Private sectors, and Research centres 
discussed the relevant innovative technologies to address circularity of materials and emissions. 
Highlighting key facets of Circularity and its role in addressing key challenges in relation to trade 
and environment.  
2.243.   Providing on ground examples from Saudi Arabia's Circular Carbon Economy national 
program, launched in 2022 with the aim at delivering its climate change ambitions as well as VISION 
2030. Utilizing all possible options a nd solutions, providing enabling mechanisms for investment & 
technology deployment. Once again, we thank you and the Secretariat for their support, and we 
look forward to further collaboration with all Members in the Committee.  
2.244.   Following this presentation,  some delegations had the following reactions.  
2.245.   The representative of the Russian Federation  delivered the following statement:  
2.246.   First of all, let me thank all engaged in the preparations of the related events during the 
Trade and Environment Week. There was a rich agenda on circular economy and plastic pollution, 
which once again demonstrates the relevance and importance of this is sue. 
2.247.   I would like to express my gratitude to the coordinators of the Dialogue on plastics pollution 
for the stocktaking event they have organized at the beginning of the week. We are pleased to see 
the involvement of international organization into that issue. We share the views regarding necessity 
of effective waste management and circular plastic economy that were mentioned by some of the 
stakeholders during event.  
2.248.   I would also like to thank Saudi Arabia for their impressive presentations of circul ar carbon 
economy and the Saudi Green Initiative. It is nice to see that the whole energy ecosystem of 
Saudi  Arabia is actively engaged in more than 260 circular initiatives and sustainability programs. 
For its part, Russia attaches high importance to topi c.  WT/CTE/M/76  
 
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  2.249.   As we stated during the sessions of the IDP, we attach high importance to building circular 
economy and combat ting plastic pollution. W e have shared our experience during the IDP session 
and submitted our inputs to the mentioned Trade -related Plastic M easures Survey.  
2.250.   What Russia aims in its policy is to ensure a comprehensive and balanced approach to plastic 
pollution and "trade -related reduction policies", in particular. We believe that an emphasis should 
be put on stimulating measures, rather than ban s and restrictions. This, for example, include 
environmental label ling systems, economic incentives for the transition from refractory plastics to 
more environmentally friendly ones.  
2.251.   In case restrictive measures take place , they should be cost -effective an d be based on 
scientific evidence. Moreover, we have to respond the following questions:  Are there other 
alternatives available? Is industry ready to switch to alternatives and would the reasonable transition 
period be provided? What is the cost of the alt ernative and what are the consequences for 
consumers?  
2.252.   Before introducing any restrictive measures, all these questions must get clear answers.  
Besides, the scale of the problem largely depends on the efficiency of the waste management 
systems and recyclin g. This is especially relevant to the waste generation countries. Circular 
economy is not about excluding the use and trade of polymers; it is about creating an effective waste 
management system.  
2.253.   In this context, we strongly encourage efforts to reduce pl astic pollution through 
improvement of effective waste management systems, and recycling.  Russia is looking forward to 
constructively engage in the WTO work in this important area.  
2.254.   The representative of the Dominican Republic  delivered the following state ment:  
2.255.   The Dominican Republic would like to join the positive comments on the coordination of this 
meeting and, personally, I would like to congratulate you and the WTO on behalf of His Excellency 
Dr. José Sánchez -Fung for this creation of this great Trade and Environment Week, that is ending 
today. This is a very relevant topic for the Dominican Republic as a developing country. The 
Dominican Republic would also like to thank India for its excellent presentation, as well as Ecuador, 
represented by my collea gue Daniela, for a very explicit and detailed intervention and, of course, 
many thanks to all the interventions that we have had the opportunity to listen to today.  
2.3.3   Report by the European Union on its event held on 19  October 2022 on "Circular 
Design and T rade"  
2.256.   The representative of the European Union  delivered the following statement:  
2.257.   The E uropean Union  would like to report on the event on circular design and trade. The panel 
provided perspectives from the EU, Chile and South Africa as well as presentation s by the 
United  Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE ) and Institute for European Environmental 
Policy . The discussions have shown that a transition towards a more resource efficient and circular 
economy has broad interlinkages with international t rade, through cross -border supply chains, end -
of-life value chains, and services trade. We heard several interventions about the importance of 
access to the relevant products and information, the role of standards, and transparency and 
traceability along t he value chain. Along with these, the potential role of best practice was also 
highlighted as a possible area where WTO CTE/TESSD could further work on, in addition to offering 
a platform for deliberations and exchanges.  
2.258.   We also heard the importance of not  leaving the developing countries behind and ensuring 
they are able to be part of circular markets – this is particularly relevant for the downstream part of 
the value chain. Moreover, the importance of Micro, Small and Medium -sized Enterprises  (MSMEs ) 
was underlined , as they  may have a harder time participat ing in the circular economy.  
2.259.   In addition, the panel noted the importance that the product design can play in favouring 
value -retention processes, i .e. remanufacturing, refurbishment, repair and re use. It is also quite 
relevant for increasing product durability and  making recycling easier. The p anel also noted the role 
for digital solutions (like electronic product passport, block chain technologies) in enabling the WT/CTE/M/76  
 
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  circulation of goods worldwide. These digital solutions can facilitate transparency and traceability 
along the value chain.  
2.260.   Followin g our event, but also other presentations made this week , we would see a benefit in 
the WTO identifying where it can best contribute to facilitating the transition to circularity. We would 
encourage WTO Members to work  jointly  in this regard.  
2.3.4   Report by th e Organisation for Economic Co -operation and Development (OECD ) on 
its event held on 20 October 2022 on " The role of trade in a circular economy transition " 
2.261.   The representative of the OECD delivered the following statement:  
2.262.   The session organi zed by the OECD  on "The Role of T rade in the Circular Economy Transition " 
aimed to shed light on how a global transition to a circular economy can be supported by trade an d 
how policy coherence between circular economy ( CE) and trade policies can be fostered.  
2.263.   The first p art of the session consisted of three presentations by OECD staff, highlighting the 
breadth and depth of relevant OECD work in recent years. Rob Dellink from the Environment 
Directorate kicked o ff the session with an introduction and a presentation on the narrow path for a 
CE transition to have environmental, economic and social gains. He highlighted how global materials 
use is projected to double by 2060, and how this links to economic activities such as construction 
for infrastructure development. He stre ssed how a switch to secondary materials and a transition to 
a CE more general ly can alleviate severe environmental consequences and lead to job gains.  
2.264.   The second presentation, by Shunta Yamaguchi, showed how international trade and circular 
economy are in terlinked through global supply chains, end -of-life value chains and services trade, 
and highlighted opportunities for co operation  towards a mutually supportive trade and circular 
economy agenda, such as on environmental goods and services, definitions and  classifications, and 
regulations and standards.  
2.265.   The third presentation, by Evdokia Moise , gave an overview of the markets for re -using and 
recycling lithium -ion ("Li-ion") batterie s for electric vehicles , the expected evolution of recycling 
capacity, rela ted innovation and investments, and the role of international trade for current and 
future circular chains for lithium -ion batteries.  
2.266.   After these presentations , Olivia Cook, one of the co -facilitators of the informal working 
group on trade and circular eco nomy at TESSD, moderated a panel discussion with Hugo Schally of 
the European Commission, Christophe Bellmann of the Forum on Trade, Environment and the SDGs 
(TESS) and the OECD speakers. The main conclusions from the discussions were four -fold: first, t he 
CE transition needs an all -of-lifecycle approach. Downstream waste management is important but , 
as one of the speakers phrased it , "the problems and solutions star t upstream ". 
2.267.   Secondly, t rade policy needs to accommodate two seemingly opposing objectives: trade that 
leads to environmental degradation, such as waste dumping, needs to be strictly regulated. But , at 
the same time, trade is essential to scale up circular  business models and markets for recycling, 
secondary materials and second -hand goods. In loose terms, we need to facilitate the good flows, 
and regulate the bad ones.  
2.268.   Thirdly, t he global international development and cooperation angle is crucial as only a  global 
transition to a CE brings significant environmental and economic gains.  Fourth ly, the ongoing 
discussions at WTO, not least those taking place in TESSD and IDP, are vital to mak ing progress and 
it is heartening to see so many countries actively eng aged in finding ways to further reconcile trade 
and CE objectives.  
2.4  Other  
2.4.1   Presentation by India on its  renewable energy and energy efficiency measures  
2.269.   The representative of India delivered the following statement:  WT/CTE/M/76  
 
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  2.270.   Today I will be making a presentation on India's renewable energy and energy efficiency 
measures. India is committed to an energy transition to cleaner and more sustainable energy 
resources . India's  energy transition goals include a reduction in emissions intensity of India's GDP 
by 45% by 2030 (from 2005 level) and the achievement of 50% of cumulative electric power 
installed capacity from non -fossil fuel -based energy resources by 2030. These two are some of the 
various steps forward towards India's long -term goal of becoming net zero by the year 2070. Of 
course, renewable energy deployment is central to achieving th is goal. 
2.271.   In the last decade, India has made remarkable progress in renewable energy sector and 
some of the key achievements include: presently, India has about 163 gigawatt ( GW) of installed  
power generation capacity from  renewable energy ( RE) sources , which is more than two times the 
growth in installed capacity of power generation from RE sources, which was nearly  76 GW in 2014.  
We have been able to achieve about 10% y ear-on-year growth in the last eight years. Out of 
this 163 GW RE -powered capacity, we have been able to avoid ~1 billion tonnes of CO 2 emissions 
cumulatively. Presently, the share of electricity generation from RE sources in India is around 25% 
of the total electricity generation in the country. Through competitive bidding, we have been able to 
achieve power prices of around ¢3/kWh per u nit for wind electricity and even lower at 
around  ¢2.5/kWh per unit for solar electricity. There has been an investment of around 
USD 65 billion in the renewable energy sector in the country and we expect a future investment to 
also come in allied technolo gies including electrolysers, green hydrogen, energy storage, electric 
vehicles , biofuels processing units etc.  
2.272.   With regards to the break -up of the installed electric power generation capacity in the 
country, presently India 's installed grid -connected pow er generation capacity is around 406 GW and, 
out of that, nearly 170 GW (approximately 42% of our total installed power generation capacity) is 
from non -fossil fuel -based sources, which primarily includes major contributions from solar, 
hydropower, and win d power. Apart from this 170 GW of total installed power generation capacity 
from non -fossil fuel -based sources, we have another 87 GW of non -fossil fuel -based power 
generation capacity under implementation and another 30 GW of non -fossil fuel -based electr ic power 
generation capacity under tendering. That makes the total  of installed, plus pipeline, capacity of 
non-fossil fuel -based electric power generation as 287 GW.  
2.273.   India has a long -term vision for the year 2047 for the RE sector, which includes installa tion 
of 1,125 GW of power generation capacity from RE sources; an installed capacity of around 140 GW 
of RE equipment manufacturing in the country; avoidance 2.5 billion tonnes of CO 2 emissions; and 
increasing the share of electricity generation from RE sources from the present levels of around 25% 
to around 67% of total electricity generation. We expect the total investment in the RE sector in the 
country to reach around USD 600-750 billion by 2047. We also envisage making  our 
top 1,000  corporations meet a ll their energy requirements from RE sources by the year 2047.  
2.274.   To achieve these by the year 2047, India is leveraging all its key strengths, which include: 
abundant RE potential. We have estimated our solar potential to be around 750 GW and wind 
potential  to be 695 GW. Similarly , for bioenergy, we estimate a potential of 42 GW and for Waste to 
Energy (WtE)  around 6 GW. We have a robust grid infrastructure to enable renewable energy power 
generation. We have 'One Nation -One Grid ' and we are also implementin g a programme for Green 
Energy Corridors to further strengthen the power transmission network to enable it to carry more 
renewable energy. India is a growing economy and there is a robust demand for energy and 
electricity with economic growth and that ulti mately translates into robust demand for renewable 
energy as well.  
2.275.   We have a strong institutional framework for ensuring the deployment of new energy and 
we have a dedicated Ministry for new and renewable energy backed by strong regulatory bodies and 
implementing agencies who implement these renewable energy programmes on behalf of the central 
government.  
2.276.   Regarding renewable energy deployment, the Indian Government is implementing several 
programmes. First of all, the PM KUSUM project, which is primarily aimed at reducing diesel 
dependency in the agricultural sector by solarizing the agriculture sector and also increasing farmers' 
incomes. Under this plan, we have three components: component A targets the installation 
of 10,000  MW of small (up to 2 MW) sol ar power plants by farmers on their waste land; component  B 
targets installation of around 2 million off -grid agricultural solar power pumps; and component  C 
targets installation of around 1.5 million grid -connected solar power agricultural pumps.  WT/CTE/M/76  
 
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  2.277.   We have  another scheme called Solar Parks, whose primary objective is to support free 
access to public infrastructure like land and transmission of  solar power on payment of applicable 
charges. Under this scheme, we have sanctioned 61 solar parks of a cumulative 40 GW of electricity, 
which includes parks for floating solar power projects as well. Many GW -scale solar  power  parks 
have been set up under this scheme, which includes a 2,000 MW solar power park, which is one of 
the largest solar parks in the world. We a re also implementing solar photovoltaic (PV) rooftop 
programmes. Their primary objective is to promote decentralized generation of solar power by 
solarizing homes and buildings. It has a target installation of 40 GW and to date we have been able 
to achieve about 6.9  GW of solar power rooftop install ation. We are also implementing programmes 
for tapping the potential in the wind and the WtE sectors. Under the wind energy programme, we 
have already  installed around 42 GW of wind power plants and another 12 GW of wind power farms 
are under installation.  Under the WtE programme, we have been able to set up around 5  million 
small domestic household -level biogas units and around 258 WtE plants, with a cumulative capacity 
of around 477 MW equivalent.  
2.278.   We are also working on strengthening our ecosystem. We ar e developing a complete 
ecosystem for the renewable energy sector to ensure that robust supply chains for renewable energy 
sector equipment are in place in our country.  
2.279.   Regarding our wind energy programme, we have potential of around 695 GW for wind 
energy . India also ha s a strong base of manufacturing wind turbines and associated components. 
We export nearly 500 MW per year of wind turbines and components. India is also working on 
tapping the offshore wind potential in the country. We have identified aroun d 70 GW of offshore 
wind potential zones on the coasts of two of our states, Gujarat and Tamil Nadu, and a strategy and 
roadmap for offshore installation of wind projects in this area is being developed.  
2.280.   As I explained earlier, under the WtE programme, we  have installed nearly 5 million domestic 
biogas plants owned by households. To date, we have been implementing off -grid and decentralized 
RE programmes to various small teams and now we are preparing a comprehensive "Decentralized 
RE Livelihood Applicatio ns Programme", which has four major components. It includes solar street 
lighting, off -grid solar PV power plants, solar study lamps, solar water heaters, Community 
Concentrated Solar Thermal (CST) Based Cooking, and distributed renewable energy Livelihood  
Applications. The programme is primarily aimed at providing the aforementioned components to 
marginalized sectors and areas of society, which include rural individuals and households, school 
going students, village councils, public service institutions, c ommunity cooking institutions and rural 
entrepreneurs. The programme envisage s giving priority and enhanced support to women 
beneficiaries.  
2.281.   RE waste management is one of the identified focus areas for the circular economy. 
Preliminary estimates suggest 0.3 75 million metric tons ( MMT) of solar waste in 2030 to 11.9 MMT 
in 2050. An action plan has been formulated for circular economy in RE waste management and a 
study has been commissioned on disaggregated forecasting and estimations. We give support to the 
circular economy sectors through research and development  (R&D) programmes, pilot projects, 
reporting frameworks and business models.  
2.282.   We are also implementing a Green Energy Programme, which is primarily aimed at 
strengthening our existing grid infrastructu re network to enable it to carry more renewable energy. 
Under the programme, presently cumulatively about 8,651 circuit kilometres (ckm) transmission 
lines and around 20,198 Mega Volt -Amperes (MVA) capacities have been set up. Recently, 
10,750  ckm of trans mission lines and 27,500 MVA substation capacities have been approved to be 
set up in the near future. India is also implementing a programme called "Greening of Islands", 
which is aimed at the deployment of renewable energy in the island regions of the co untry (namely, 
the Lakshadweep and Andaman and Nicobar islands).  
2.283.   India is also implementing a skill development and human resource development 
certification programme. Certification programmes of around 1.5 -3 months are conducted for 
training young people in the areas of installation, operation and maintenance of solar PV projects, 
solar pumps, small hydro projects and wind power projects. Under our Solar PV development 
programme, we have been able to trained over 50,000 youth to date.  WT/CTE/M/76  
 
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  2.284.   The Indian Governmen t encourages the association of women in the RE sector and to 
recognize the contribution of women in the green energy sector it has launched a special portal in 
October 2022. The Indian Government is implementing distributed renewable energy solutions , 
which are being scaled up because these solutions provide multifarious growth opportunities for 
thousands of women by assisting women self-help groups ( SHGs ) and women entrepreneurship 
development programmes; increasing skill sets and employability of women f rom remote 
marginalized sections/areas; and also providing bank linkages; etc. The Government of India 
encourages the mentoring and training of women in technical, marketing and business skills with 
the aim of increasing their role and participation in the RE sector.  
2.285.   India has also initiated at the global level an International Solar Alliance, which was launched 
at COP21 by Prime Minister Shri Naredra Modi. It has 109 signatory member countries. The 
International Solar Alliance has the aim of unlocking USD 1 trillion of investment by 2030 and focus 
on LDCs and Small Island Developing States (SIDS) by programmatic interventions in 
grid-connected solar  power , solar  power  for agriculture and Decentralized Renewable Energy. India 
has made to date a total commitm ent of USD 53 million until 2022 -23 and the International Solar 
Alliance has a large pool of resources available made up of  officers from the Indian public sector 
undertakings (PSUs) who have rich experience in RE sectors that can also be used as a resourc e for 
member countries.  
2.286.   India is also implementing a R&D programme whose focus areas include: high -efficiency PV; 
advanced chemistry batteries; smart grids; hydrogen storage and pipelines; offshore wind; wind 
modelling and simulation; advanced materials; e lectrolysers; and fuel cell vehicles. The programme 
is aimed at increasing the share of renewables in the energy mix. Recently, we have solicited new 
R&D proposals in this area and we have received around 1,468 research proposals, which are being 
shortlist ed for help and support by the government. Our R&D partners include Indian Institutes of 
Technology and other prominent research labs and institutes of the Government of India.  
2.287.   After this presentation, some delegations had the following reactions.  
2.288.   The repr esentative of Thailand  delivered the following statement:  
2.289.   I would like to express my sincere thanks for the very interesting and informative 
presentation from the Indian  delegation. It is very illuminating and encouraging to see a country 
such as India with such a very full ecosystem thinking about how to develop renewable energy. I 
have a lot of admiration for the thing s that the Indian delegation has just presented . I have a few 
questions to ask . If the Indian delegation cannot answer today , that  is fine, maybe we will look 
forward to an explanation or information in the future from fellow developing countries who are 
embarking on such an ambitious target.   
2.290.   Firstly, I am very interested to hear about the source of technology for India's renewable 
energy sector . We saw many things – solar panels and stuff , electric vehicles , etc. You have thought 
of about everything – R&D, HR  development  etc. M y primary interest would be the technology . I 
suppose with India being a very advance d scientific and engin eering country, they have no problem 
with technology in this area, so is that the case – is most of the technology homegrown?  
2.291.   My second question is that I w ould like to ask whether India relies on any foreign investment 
in the sector . Towards the end of th e presentation , the Indian representative talked about India 
being an investor in this  area themselves, so my understanding is that India probably has sufficient 
money to invest in the area in the corridor. Still, if  India can let me know is there are any limitation s 
on foreign investment in environmental goods and services and manufacturing and related area s. 
What is the foreign investment regime in this area for India?  
2.292.   The third question is : does the representative of India believe or see that trade rules  can 
contribute to India 's lofty objective on the environment? Do you foresee any barriers to trade or 
barriers to investment that may hamper the implementation of India 's policy that you have just 
presented? Since we are concerned about trade rules , I wou ld like to see whether you think trade 
rules can contribute or can hinder  India's efforts to the environmental objective.  
2.293.   Last but not least, i n Thailand, when we started having policies on renewable energy , we 
used certain subsid ies, I think, the jargon in the circle is called "adder " to be one of the tools to WT/CTE/M/76  
 
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  encourage people to invest and manufacture more goods . Thailand has more goods than services . 
So what kind of subsid ies or measure s are there? Is there any help from the govern ment to do this 
or any other s upport measures that the government gives to Indian manufacturer s or service 
provider s in this area? I am not asking  to put India on the spot , because I suppose almost every 
country ha s certain types of subsidies to help their  domestic player s to move upward in the 
environment and climate measures , I am just curious to learn about India 's experience. What has 
been the most important kind of support that the Indian Government ha s given to domestic players?  
2.294.   Finally, I have nothing but admiration that you even thought about women in renewable 
energy. One final question: there are some short -term problems that many countries are facing , 
which is a shortage of semi -conductors , rare earths and materials  like that. In Thailand, w here we 
are trying to develop our electric vehicles, we are debating whether, in the future, there will be a 
shortage of the necessary essential parts of the new technology to attain these kinds of materials . 
Is India facing similar challenges in the futur e, i.e. access to rare earths or to certain essential 
components? Or maybe India is so advanced in technology that it has no problem as it can produce 
everything it needs? For Thailand , it is a problem in the short term , but it can have long -term 
implicati ons as to which road the developing country uses. As I said, I do  not expect to have all the 
answers today, but please could India explain a little bit further on these trade and investment 
measures.  
2.295.   The representative of the Philippines  delivered the following statement:  
2.296.   Just two very brief questions. One, could we perhaps get a bit more detail in terms of the 
regulatory regime. How are projects structured? Is there a feed -in tariff system in place or are they 
done through individual pur chase power agreements? That is one question. The second is what is 
the general tariff regime on environmental goods? We understand that India did impose some 
safeguards on solar cells and modules. I am not entirely certain of the status of that, but for e xample 
with that example, how is it currently structured in terms of your tariff regime?  
2.297.   The representative of India responded : 
2.298.   We would like to thank the Ambassador of Thailand and the Philippine delegation for their 
questions. Chair, in the interests of  time and so that we do not have to sit for this meeting tomorrow 
on a weekend and to ensure that we have the right answers with the right details, I propose that 
we come back to these questions from Thailand and the Philippines either bilaterally or perha ps at 
the next meeting. There are, of course, fairly structured regimes for investment, for local technology 
research capability and, of course, for the transmission and distribution, but it would be only fair 
that we respond in more detail and with more a ccurate information.  
2.4.2   Presentation by India on its event held on 20 October 2022 on "An introduction to 
International Solar Alliance and Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure"  
2.299.   The representative of India delivered the following statement:  
2.300.   Chair, firstly we would like to congratulate you and the Secretariat for the organization of 
Trade and Environment Week 2022. India has organized two sessions this week. In this agenda of 
the CTE, I will speak about our first presentation, which took place yester day on 20 October.  
2.301.   Two international organizations – the International Solar Alliance (ISA) and the Coalition for 
Disaster  Resilient Infrastructure (CDRI) – presented on their work programmes and organizations. 
Both of these organizations are headquartere d in the Indian national capital region. The ISA was 
formed with the joint sponsorship of India and France after COP21. Its mandate is to catalyse global 
solar growth by helping reduce the cost of financing and technology for solar. It aims to create 
unive rsal and affordable last -mile electricity connectivity towards facilitating economic development.  
2.302.   The ISA assembly has India as the President and France as the Co -President. The eight Vice 
Presidents currently come from four different regions – Fiji and Na uru from Asia -Pacific, Mauritius 
and Niger from Africa, Cuba and Guyana from Latin America and the Caribbean, and the 
United  Kingdom and the Netherlands from Europe. The organization has 110 members, including 
most of the countries represented here today i n the CTE.  WT/CTE/M/76  
 
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  2.303.   The CDRI was launched at the UN Climate Action Summit in September 2019 and is a 
relatively new organization. Despite being hit by the COVID -19 pandemic soon after its formation, 
the CDRI has made giant strides in the short period it has existed . It is structured as a 
multi-stakeholder partnership of national governments, UN agencies and programmes, multilateral 
development banks and financing mechanisms, the private sector and knowledge institutions.  
2.304.   The CDRI has 31 members with a strong presen ce in North America, South America and 
Western Europe and evolving interest in other regions. India, Australia, the United  Kingdom and the 
European Union are the main donors, while the United  States, Japan and France are providing 
technical know -how and capacity building support. The first flagship initiative of the CDRI is called 
the Infrastructure for Resilient Island States (IRIS).  
2.305.   India provides human capital support for both the organizations in addition to hosting them. 
Through these tw o initiatives, India seeks to influence positive and impactful outcomes on mitigation, 
adaptation and resiliency measures required to combat the climate crisis.  
2.306.   We thank the countries working together on these initiatives. The membership of the two 
organi zations remains open. Finally, the ISA has applied for Observer Status at the WTO  Committee 
on Trade and Environment and they will reach out to missions in Geneva to seek support for their 
application.  
2.4.3   Presentation by China on its policy framework and pro gress regarding achieving 
peak carbon dioxide emissions and carbon neutrality and concepts for intern ational 
cooperation  
2.307.   The representative of China  delivered the following statement:  
2.308.   It is my pleasure to take this opportunity to share information on progr ess made on China's 
policy framework regarding carbon peak and carbon neutrality and China's concepts for international 
cooperation.  
2.309.   On 22 Septembe r 2020, at the Gene ral Debate of the 75 th Session of the United  Nations 
General Assembly, President  Xi Jinping formally announced the aim of having  carbon dioxide 
emissions peak before 2030 and to achieve carbon neutrality before 2060.3 On 12 December 2020, 
at the Climate Ambition Summit, President Xi announced some further Nationally Determined 
Contri butions targets : China will lower its carbon dioxide emissions per unit of GDP by over 65% 
from the 2005 level, increase the share of non -fossil fuels in primary energy consumption to around 
25%, increase the forest stock volume by 6 billion cubic met res from the 2005 level, and bring its 
total installed capacity of wind and solar power to over 1.2 billion kilowatts.4 
2.310.   Peaking carbon emissions and achieving carbon neutrality is a major strategic decision of 
the Chinese Government . It means that, as the worl d's largest developing country, China will make 
the biggest reduction in carbon emission intensity in the world and move from carbon peak to carbon 
neutrality in the shortest time span in world history. It demonstrates China 's resolve to promote the 
green and low -carbon transition, and represents an important contribution made by China to the 
global efforts to respond to climate change.  
2.311.   In recent  years, China has been fully implementing the new development philosophy and 
has written the goals for carbon pea k and carbon neutrality into the master plan for building 
ecological civilization. The Report on China's Policies and Actions to Address Climate Change is 
published every year, and the White Paper on Responding to Climate Change: China's Policies and 
Actions was released in 2021.  
2.312.   First, establishing high -level coordination and implementation mechanisms . The central 
government  set up the Leading Group on Carbon Peaking and Carbon Neutrality, headed by Vice 
Premier Han Zheng and comprised of 28 ministerial de partments, with a view to strengthening 
overall planning, coordination and effective implementation. Provinces (autonomous regions and 
 
3 http://english.scio.gov.cn/topnews/2020 -09/23/co ntent_76731466.htm.  
4 https://en.qstheory.cn/2020 -12/14/c_573223.htm.  WT/CTE/M/76  
 
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  municipalities directly under the central government) have each established their own leading group, 
so as to strengthen vertical and horizontal coordination and synergy.  
2.313.   Second, constructing the "1+N" policy system . Her e, the "1" refers to the over -arching 
design for peaking carbon emissions  and achieving carbon neutrality,  as reflected in two policy 
documents: the Working Guidance for Carbon Dioxide Peaking and Carbon Neutrality in Full and 
Faithful Implementation of the New Development Philosophy5, and the Action Plan for Carbon Dioxide 
Peaking Before 20306; the "N" refers to relevant implementation and support plans, including 
implementation plans for such key sectors as energy, industry, urban and rural development, 
transportation, agriculture and rural affairs, reduction of pollution and carbon emissions, as well as 
implementation plans for such key industries as iron and steel, non -ferrous metals, petrochemical 
and chemical industries, and building materials, as well as supporting plans covering technological 
support, financial support, statistics and accounting, human  resource development, etc. All provinces 
(autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the central government) have also formulated 
their own implementation plans for carbon peaking. The "1+N" policy system is well put in place.  
2.314.   Third, keep improving relevant policy measures and mechanisms.  Efforts include:  optimizing 
and refining the policy for controlling both the total amount and intensity of energy consumption, 
and establishing a unified  and standardized statistics and accounting system f or carbon emissions; 
launching  instruments supporting carbon emission reduction, special re -finance programs for clean 
and efficient use of coal, and the China Carbon Emission Trade Exchange ( CCETE) ; improving the 
innovation system for green technology, wi th an emphasis on the training of professional talents; 
strengthening the regime for energy conservation, whereby a system of laws and regulations 
promoting energy conservation has been formed, with the Energy Conservation Law on the top, and 
with underlyi ng regulations for energy conservation in buildings and public institutions, regulations 
for energy conservation inspection  and supervision, and the rules for the administration of key 
energy users; and, last but not least, promoting the Green life, includ ing encouraging green 
consumption, and advocating the simple, moderate, green and low -carbon ways of life.  
2.315.   First, the transition to green and low -carbon energy advanced steadily and orderly.  Based 
on its national  condition of coal as the dominant source of  energy, China vigorously promoted the 
clean and efficient utilization of coal, upgrading coal -fired power units in a three -pronged way: 
energy efficiency, heating optimization and more flexibility in peak load regulation capacity; and 
planned to build 450  million kilowatt large -scale wind farms and solar farms in deserts and Gobi 
areas.  Since 2020, the annual newly installed wind and solar power capacity in China has exceeded 
100 million kilowatts for two consecutive years, and in 2021, the electricity gen erated by new energy 
exceeded 1 trillion kilowatt -hours for the first time.   
2.316.   Second, the energy efficiency has been greatly improved, effectively promoting high -quality 
development. Since 2012, China has advanced energy conservation through technological and 
managerial means as well as structural transformation.  The GDP grew by 6.6 % year -on-year while 
energy consumption grew by just 3% on average per year. The energy consumption intensity has 
decreased by 26.4% accumulatively, and energy consumed by industrial units above the designated 
size has decreased by 36.2% accumulatively, eq uivalent to saving about 1.4 billion ton nes of 
standard coal. This has effectively alleviated gaps in the energy supply and demand, and laid a solid 
foundation for getting off to a good start for carbon peaking and carbon neutrality.  
2.317.   Third, the industrial structure is being vigorously optimized and upgraded.  China actively 
promoted the development  of strategic and emerging industries, promoted energy conservation and 
carbon reduction in key industries, and resolutely curbed the dis -organized development of 
energy -intensive, high -emission and low -end projects. In 2021, China's national carbon emissions 
intensity decreased by 34.4% compared to 2012, water consumption intensity down by 45%, while 
the output rate of major resources up by 58%.  
2.318.   Fourth, the constru ction and transportation sectors are undergoing the low -carbon 
transition. China  actively developed green buildings and renovated existing buildings to make them 
greener by reducing their carbon emissions. By 2021, the newly  built green building area in ur ban 
areas had reached more than 2 billion square met res. China also stepped up efforts to promote the 
 
5 https://en.ndrc.gov.cn/policies/202110/t20211024_1300725.html.  
6 
https://english.www.gov.cn/policies/latestreleases/202110/27/content_WS6178a47ec6d0df57f98e3dfb.html  WT/CTE/M/76  
 
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  use of energy -efficient and low -carbon means of transportation, produced and sold more new energy 
vehicles than any other countries in the world for seven  consecutive years, and run more than half 
of the world 's new energy vehicles.  
2.319.   Fifth, the ecosystem's carbon sink capacity has increased.  China took an integrated approach 
to the protection and restoration of mountains, forests, farmlands, lakes, grassland s and deserts, 
and scientifically promoted large -scale land afforestation.  Our forest coverage and forest stock 
volume have continued to grow for many years in a row, with the highest growth in forest coverage 
in the world.  In 2021, China reported a forest  coverage rate of 24.02% and forest stock 
of 194.93  cubic met res. 
2.320.   Sixth, the China Carbon Emission Trade Exchange (CCETE) had a solid start.  The exchange 
was officially launched on 16 July 2021.  After the first compliance period, it had established an 
integrated management framework consisting of "quota allocation, data management, transaction 
supervision, law enforcement and inspection, and supporting platform". Measures for the 
Administration of Carbon Emissions Trading (for Trial Implementation) was issu ed.7 Quota allocation 
plan based on carbon intensity were adopted. China also established the carbon emissions statistics, 
accounting, reporting and verification management system, issued a series of technical regulations, 
and clarified the technical requ irements for accounting and verification.  The basic framework of the 
national carbon market has started to take shape . The price discovery mechanism has begun to 
manifest itself. Enterprises are more aware and capable of cutting their emissions. The market -
oriented mechanism has started to play an increasing role in urging enterprises to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions and accelerate green and low -carbon transition.   
2.321.   Seventh, significant achievements have been made in curbing carbon dioxide emissions. In 
2020, China's carbon dioxide emissions per unit of GDP was 48.4% lower than that in 2005, over 
and above the 40% -45% target previously committed.  In 2021, carbon intensity fell 3.8% 
year-on-year and 50.8% compared to 2005, arresting the trend  of rapid growth of carbon dioxide 
emissions.  
2.322.   South -South cooperation on climate action is one of the important measures to actively 
respond to climate change. So far, China has earmarked over CNY 1.2 billion for such efforts and 
signed 43 cooperation docu ments with 38 developing countries on climate action. For example, 
China is jointly building low -carbon demonstration zones with Laos, Cambodia and Seychelles, and 
carrying out 40 mitigation and adaptation projects with more than 30 developing countries, i ncluding 
Ethiopia, Pakistan, Samoa, Chile, Cuba and Egypt. Meanwhile China actively carried out capacity  
building training projects, having hosted 45 training sessions on South -South cooperation in 
response to climate change, and trained about 2,000 govern ment officials and technicians from more 
than 120 developing countries in the aera of climate change mitigation.   
2.323.   More milestones have been hit since 2021, marked by the release of The Declaration on 
China -Africa Cooperation on Combat ting Climate Change, t he launch of China -Africa three -year 
action plan on climate change,  the establishment of China -Pacific Island Countries Climate Action 
Cooperation Cent re, and China -Pacific Island Countries High -end Dialogue on Climate Action, in 
order to help other develo ping countries actively respond to climate change.   
2.324.   On multilateral economic and trade cooperation platforms such as BRICS and G20, China 
has long been actively promoting green and sustainable development, sharing best practices of 
promoting green developm ent and reducing energy consumption intensity, and urging other member 
states to effectively implement the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.  As the BRICS Chair 
of 2022, China  held the 14th BRICS Summit which endorsed the Initiative on Trade and Inve stment 
for Sustainable Development in the economic and trade fields. This is the first economic  and trade 
outcome document reached by BRICS countries in this field, and marks a breakthrough in promoting 
sustainability among BRICS countries. Focusing on cre ating a favo urable  trade and investment 
environment for sustainability, the Initiative aims to strengthen policy communication, information 
exchange and capacity building, proposes 16 cooperation measures, and maps out a roadmap 
toward green and sustainabl e development.   
2.325.   In his keynote speech , at the Opening Ceremony of the 4th China International Import Expo, 
President Xi Jinping said that "China will take an active and open attitude in negotiations on issues 
 
7 http://www.gov.c n/zhengce/zhengceku/2021 -01/06/content_5577360.htm.  WT/CTE/M/76  
 
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  such as  … trade and the environment  …, uphold t he position of the multilateral trading regime as 
the main channel for international rules -setting ".8 China  opposes unilateralism, protectionism and 
barriers to green trade, and supports discussions on climate change -related trade policies within the 
WTO framework.  Specifically:  
• First, China supports the efforts of Members to address climate change through trade and 
investment liberalization and facilitation measures, and support in -depth discussions on the 
liberalization of environmental products and services at the trade and environmental 
sustainability structured discussions (TESSD).  
• Second, China  supports the coordination of Members ' trade policies and measures in response 
to climate  change based on WTO rules, so as to avoid unilateral measures and disguised trade 
barriers.  China supports thematic discussions on trade measures adopted by Members to 
address climate change under CTE and TESSD, with a view to strengthening cooperation and 
ensuring that such trade policies are aligned with the obligation s specified in the 
WTO Agreement and the basic principle of respecting "common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities" and the institutional arrangement for " nationally 
determined contributions" stipulated in the United  Nations Fra mework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) and the Paris Agreement.   
• Third, we support  the provision of technical assistance and capacity  building support in 
relevant areas to developing Members in the WTO, with a view to understanding Members' 
needs in specific trade policies and providing targeted assistance.  
2.326.   In the Report on the Opening Conference of the Twentieth National Congress of the 
Communist Party of China, President XI Jinping emphasized that China will accelerate the green 
transformation of th e development mode, implement the comprehensive conservation strategy, 
develop green and low -carbon industries, advocate green consumption, and promote the formation 
of green and low -carbon production and lifestyle. China will further promote the preventio n and 
control of environmental pollution; improve the diversity, stability and sustainability of the 
ecosystem; actively and steadily promote carbon peaking and carbon neutralization, and implement 
carbon peaking action in a planned way.  China is also  willing to strengthen coordination and expand 
cooperation with other WTO Members, and actively participate in global governance , to jointly 
respond to climate change . 
2.327.   After this presentation, a delegation had the following reaction.  
2.328.   The representative of Thailand  delivered the following statement:  
2.329.   My question would be similar to that raised to the Indian delegation so I will send my 
questions to both delegations with a copy to the Secretariat and hopefully the Secretariat can pass 
it on to the two delegations. I am sure that other delegations would be interested to hear their 
responses.  
2.330.   With respect to the Chinese delegation, thank you very much for the detailed explanation.  
China's report is of a broader scope than India 's. I would li ke to make an observation to the Chinese 
delegation in capital, which is regarding the rare earth s issue. I mention this again because it is vital 
for the further development of the green economy in many countries.  
2.331.   China is not the largest country that has  rare earth s, but is the largest producer  – China 
produc es 60% of important essential rare earth s, which are vital for many green industries . I hope 
that the idea of export restriction s or anything like that would not be in China's future policy 
regarding the green economy. Just my observation and a note for the Chinese delegation , but other 
questions I will send to the Secretariat .  
 
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  2.4.4   Presentation by India on its c oncern o ver the increasi ng use of environment as a 
non-tariff measure  
2.332.   The representative of India delivered the following statement:  
2.333.   Sustainable development and environment al protection and to enhance the means for doing 
so in a manner consistent with the respective needs and concerns of countries at different levels of 
economic development are critical concerns for each country. There are, however, serious concerns 
as regards the trends and manner on the increasing use of unilateral measures impacting trade, 
which are sought t o be justified as environmental measures. The implications of such measures for 
the rules of the WTO need to be reflected upon. The underlying concern is that of systemic 
implications for international law as a whole and the impact any unilateralism would have for the 
multilaterally negotiated rights and obligations of countries.  
2.334.   We would like to highlight three types of measures which we foresee are being used as 
non-tariff measures but classified as environmental measures. Firstly, border adjustment measu res 
are effectively nullifying the tightly negotiated balance of rights and obligations under the multilateral 
environmental agreements. The Paris Agreement under the UNFCCC, guided by the principles of 
common but differentiated responsibilities and respec tive capabilities, in the light of different 
national circumstances adopted the principle of nationally determined contributions (or NDCs). Using 
NDCs,  each country  – both developed and developing – notified its emission reductions with the 
overall goal be ing to achieve net zero emissions over a period of time. There are no sector -specific 
targets and the overall threshold is determined on the basis of economy -wide emissions.  
2.335.   Secondly, proposed regulations relating to  the ban on imported products relating t o the 
determination of land -use patterns or deforestation and country of origin have a potential to severely 
impact global agricultural trade. Such outcomes would be a travesty at a time that the world faces 
severe food and security challenges. Conservatio n of biological diversity and ensuring adherence to 
principles of forestry are at the heart of international environmental law. However, proposals in this 
area include unrealistic compliance burdens on importers as well as exporters. Thirdly, arrangements 
on tariff quotas or equivalent measures based on carbon content of the products being traded have 
the potential to severely fragment global trade flows.  
2.336.   Such arrangements seem to effectively use environmental measures to bypass foundation 
principles and d esign of the global trading system. Chair, it is important to recollect the outcome 
document of the recent MC12, which is document WT/MIN(22)/24 , which recognized global 
environmental challenges, including climate change, and the importance of the contribution of the 
multilateral tradi ng system to promote the UN 2030 Agenda and its SDGs in each of its dimensions, 
which are economic, social and environmental, insofar as they relate to the WTO mandate s and in a 
manner consistent with the respective needs and concerns of Members at different levels of economic 
development.  
2.337.   We would urge the WTO membership to ensure that environmental measures should be 
carefully designed so as to only advance environment al objectives, and in full accordance with WTO 
rules and principles as well as fully incorporating the principles of international environmental law. 
We will continue to work with like -minded WTO Members to highlight these concerns on rising trade 
protecti onism, which is thought to be justified in the name of environment.  
2.338.   After this presentation, some delegations had the following reactions.  
2.339.   The representative of Paraguay  delivered the following statement:  
2.340.   Paraguay thanks the delegation of India for having raised this item on today's agenda. This 
is a very relevant debate given the m andate of this Committee. We think it is very important and 
absolutely necessary to avoid the responses of Members to the challenges faced by pollution, climate 
change, and biodi versity loss generating new barriers to trade and boosting protectionism, and that 
we do so in such a way that it is in line with the aim of this Organization. We must study how the 
measures which have environmental goals can be seen from the point of view  of strengthening the 
Organization's rules with a view to meeting its legitimate objective and not through a lens which 
sets out to establish a narrative that rules are a bad thing and that we must therefore, in response, 
act unilaterally.  WT/CTE/M/76  
 
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  2.341.   International c ooperation and collaboration are fundamental if we are to move forward 
together to meet the global challenges. Once again, may I thank the delegation of India for this very 
relevant contribution to today's discussion.  
2.342.   The representative of the Russian Fede ration  delivered the following statement:  
2.343.   We would like to thank India and China for the valuable overviews of their climate policies. 
In our view, this kind of information sharing is very helpful and should be continued. We would also 
like to thank Indian  colleagues for raising an important issue of non-tariff measures . Russia shares 
concerns regarding the increased use of environmental objectives to disguise protectionist 
measures.  
2.344.   Possible improvement of the WTO rules to make them better address environ mental 
challenges is a considerable option. We clearly lack a common understanding on trade -related 
aspects of green policy measures, but it is always better to first agree upon common rules and then 
implement them, rather than to invent our own individual  measures focused on specific economic 
elements and then impose them on others. Unfortunately, this is what we have been witnessing 
from some Members recently.  
2.345.   For instance, the introduction by countries of individual standards and requirements is a 
measu re of technical regulation and  must also comply with the requirements that are laid down in 
the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade  (TBT A greement ). If the provisions of these norms are 
not enough to combat climate change, we should discuss how such n orms could be adjusted.  
2.346.   The representative of South Africa  delivered the following statement:  
2.347.   We thank India for putting this item on the agenda and for its remarks. We share India's 
view and believe that , if we are to address the effects of climate chang e, global cooperation and 
solidarity is critical. This is an issue of global commons and cannot be addressed through unilateral 
measures. We need to ensure that trade measures do not undermine coherence in multilateral trade 
and climate policy making.  
2.348.   Carbon border taxes that close off export markets will shift the burden and penalize already 
resource and financially constrained economies, making the move toward lower carbon emitting 
economies even more challenging. There is therefore a need for a multilateral dialogue on the impact 
of these measures, including how they comply with WTO rules. Trade measures should be carefully 
calibrated and sequenced with green technology transfer and financing for developing countries to 
effect the green transitio n. In other words, measures should not be punitive but should rather 
encourage countries to meet their national greenhouse gas reduction targets.  We therefore need a 
transition that is just and equitable and promotes climate resilient development and it mu st be based 
on common but differentiated responsibility.  
2.349.   Africa is an important source of critical minerals and metals that are vital for the new 
technologies needed for renewable energy sources. Global solidarity and international collaboration, 
as well a s access to affordable finance and technology , can provide a platform for African 
industriali zation in a manner that supports global efforts to reduce carbon emissions. This is the 
reason we are calling for a cooperative  rather than a punitive approach to climate change.  
2.350.   The representative of Argentina  delivered the following statement:  
2.351.   Argentina share s the concern expressed by India about the growing trend in the use of 
environmental measures as non -tariff barriers. In this regard, environmental measures w ith trade 
effects should be consistent  with WTO rules, and should not constitute a means of arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade. Any measures should be 
based on scientific evidence and take into accou nt the needs and c apacities of developing countries. 
Initiatives should be designed in an inclusive manner, through a process of consultation involving all 
stakeholders and those potentially affected, and avoiding unilateral implementation without 
multilat eral efforts. Furthermore, the application of uniform, undifferentiated measures that do not 
take into account the differences between production systems and are not adapted to the production 
and development realities of the different countries should be a voided. Instead,  they should foster WT/CTE/M/76  
 
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  the recognition of equivalence s in environmental programmes and consider the scope and legitimate 
purposes of protecting the environment.  
2.352.   The representative of Brazil  delivered the following statement:  
2.353.   Brazil thanks Ind ia for raising this timely topic and wishes the Indian delegation very warm 
Diwali celebrations.  At MC12, WTO Members all committed to seek ways of how trade can support 
the UN 2030 Agenda and Brazil supports the adoption of policies with legitimate enviro nmental 
objectives. We are, however, concerned about the adoption of unilateral measures that result in 
unnecessary negative impacts on international trade, and that may violate core principles of both 
the trade and environmental regimes, thus impairing th e capacity of these regimes to provide global 
solutions to global problems.  
2.354.   Let us be clear about what we are talking about. In recent days, a high EU authority gave a 
speech entitled "Should the international order be based on rules or on the law of the j ungle?" While 
we will refrain from commenting on the great choice of metaphor that was employed, the title of his 
speech is very suitable to our present discussions. Time and again, in recent years, w e have 
discussed in this house how EU policies with alle ged environmental purposes clearly violate articles 
of the GATT  1994, the A greement on Agriculture , the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures (SCM Agreement), the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures  (SPS Agreement), the  TBT Agreement, as well as Codex norms and UNFCCC and Paris 
Agreement rules. Additionally, we have heard this week the EU saying  that it will basically respect 
principles and standards only insofar as they are suitable for their own particu lar vision of 
sustainability.  
2.355.   When a Member judges itself in a position to select which commitments and rules it wants 
to abide by , this is a textbook definition of the sort of "law of the jungle " behaviour we all want to 
avoid. Additionally, if , after 20 years of negotiations , the EU signs a trade agreement with Mercosur 
and the next day it starts to adopt measures with alleged environmental purposes that impair the 
balance achieved  in terms of negotiations,  this is  hardly behavio ur we would expect from a Member 
that seeks to promote a rules -based international order and regain influence it has been losing in 
some parts of the world.  
2.356.   Finally, let us note that , while possible environmental benefits of measures such as CBAM 
and other border carbon adjustments  (BCAs) being mooted have been estimated as being nearly 
negligible, this constant and across the board violation of norms will ultimately lead to a 
fragmentation of trade rules, which, as our D irector -General recently argued, will leave everyone 
worse off . To quote her remarks, "a fragmented world will be a very costly world". We therefore 
commend all WTO Members seeking to deploy measures based on environmental purposes to fully 
abide by WTO rules and by commitments assumed in the relevant multilateral environmental 
agreements  (MEAs ) and to duly consider  the consequences of their measures.  
2.357.   The representative of  the European Union  delivered the following statement:  
2.358.   Thank you for the presentation of India. I think we have addressed some of the comments 
in our previous presentation, notable on why EU carbon border adjustment is an environmental 
measure and how it interlinks with the common but differentiated responsibi lities. For the EU, it is 
important to address  climate change and deliver on the Paris Agreement goals. I think we all agree 
here, including as we have recognized in the Ministerial Statement in June, each country will need 
to design and implement policies  that will deliver on our NDCs. Therefore, it is only normal that the 
number of environmental policies are growing and we have seen quite a few presentations here 
today by other Members.  
2.359.   We believe that we should not oppose them but see how they can be de signed in the least 
trade-restrictive way and encourage dialogue and cooperation. The EU believes that the WTO and 
the CTE can play a particular role by providing space for transparency and deliberations among its 
Members on trade -related climate and envir onmental measures so they do not lead to conflicts or 
lack of coherence. This should provide a basis for a dialogue on how such measures can be designed 
to achieve climate goals while limiting unnecessary impact on trade. We should focus these 
deliberation s on improving understanding of the design of the measures, policy choices and the 
concerns of third countries. These discussions could also lead to the identification of means to WT/CTE/M/76  
 
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  support developing country compliance with requirements linked to trade -related climate and 
environmental policies.  
2.360.   The Chair noted the  relevant statements made under this item.  
3  TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND CAPACITY BUILDING  – PARAGRAPH 33 OF THE DOHA 
MINISTERIAL DECLARATION  
3.1  Third Trade and Environment Week reports  
3.1.1   Report by the  WTO Secretariat  
3.1.  The WTO Secretariat  delivered the following statement:  
3.2.  I am delighted to report to you on the third WTO Trade and Environment Week.  This has been 
the biggest edition of Trade and Environment Week.  We had 16 side events and 83 speakers, and 
very active engagement from across the WTO membership. Events were hosted by a number of 
Members and regional groupings including the United  States, the Pacific Islands Forum, the 
European Union, India, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and the United  Kingdom. Think tanks, like 
Silverado and  the IISD, and international agencies, like UNECE and the OECD, also participated. We 
also learnt about developments in two of the new environment initiatives at the WTO: the Dialogue 
on Plastics and the Fossil Fuel Subsidy R eform.  
3.3.  On the attendance side, 738 people registered to attend online and 280 in person. These 
participants government officials, business representatives, international organizations, academics, 
and civil society interacted on subjects of relevance to th e CTE such as traceability of supply chains; 
plastic pollution; climate and development; circular economy transition; climate adaptation and 
resilience; and environmental goods and services. All from the vantage point of finding solutions 
through trade.  
3.4.  For the first time, we also brought artworks and visual displays on the theme of environmental 
sustainability and climate change to the WTO. The artworks in the atrium sent provoking messages 
about each aspect of the triple planetary crisis:  from the devast ating wildfires caused by climate 
change inducing huge damage on biodiversity and human life ; through the perils of melting glaciers 
and rising waters impacting lives of innumerable people around the world, like the inhabitants of the 
island of Kuna Yala i n Panama ; to the plastics waste that we are leaving behind to the next 
generation to clean up.  
3.5.  We in the Secretariat are grateful to the artists and organizations for sharing their work. The 
art in the atrium and discussions in the meetings rooms share a common thread.  They have all come 
together to discuss ways to make global trade more sustainable, resilient, and inclusive. They have 
all outspokenly demonstrated to us how trade and trade policies can and should be part of the 
solution in the figh t against climate change.  
3.6.  Let me underscore a few highlights of the week.  We started with a high -Level panel on 
multilateral trade and environmental cooperation with WTO DDG Jean -Marie Paugam and UNEP 
Deputy Executive Director Sonja Leighton -Kone speaking of the strong institutional collaboration 
between the two organizations and MEAs, as well the international cooperation that is needed to 
confront the climate crisis and how trade can be part of the sustainability solution.  
3.7.  Following the opening remarks, distinguished speakers from the Multilateral Environment 
Agreements: Ivonne Higuero, Secretary -General of the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES); Rolph Payet, Executive Secretary of the Basel, 
Rotterdam,  and Stockholm Conventions; and David Cooper, Deputy Executive Secretary of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, collectively welcomed the event in showcasing how the trade and 
environment communities can work together for the coherent nexus of trade, e nvironment, and 
sustainable development . 
3.8.  In his concluding remarks, the chairperson of the CTE, Ambassador Simon Manley of the 
United  Kingdom, highlighted the need for shared solutions by all WTO Members and support for the 
vulnerable.   WT/CTE/M/76  
 
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  3.9.  Moving on now to th e events organized by NGOs , the session by  the IISD on Fisheries Subsidies 
Agreement implementation had presentations from the Rules Division, The Pew Charitable Trusts, 
the Permanent Mission of the Gambia, and the IISD. The event provided: an overview of the Fisheries 
Subsidies Agreement; it's possible impact, which is contingent on the approach that WTO Members 
will take towards implementation. National experiences were also shared with the Gambia 
highlighting some of the concrete domestic policy steps th at are needed to implement the 
Agreement, including which ones could prove more challenging and require technical assistance or 
capacity  building support.  
3.10.  The IISD presented their forthcoming Self -Assessment Tool to support WTO Members' efforts 
to impleme nt the Agreement. The Tool allows Members to collect key information and data for 
implementation; assess if current domestic policies are in line with the Agreement's provisions and, 
if not, what steps are needed; and determine whether Members have domesti c mechanisms in place 
to enable ongoing policy alignment with the Agreement and, where these mechanisms are absent, 
identify where they may need technical assistance or capacity  building support.  
3.11.  An e vent was held by the Grantham Research Institute on Clim ate Change and the 
Environment at the London School of Economics with the Ecologic Institute of Berlin on 18 October 
on "A Win-win Agenda for Climate, Development and Trade – How an Inclusive Climate Club and 
Trade Policy Can Be P art of the Solution". The objective of the event was to discuss how international 
cooperation and an inclusive Climate Club can accelerate climate action and how trade can be part 
of the solution. It was emphasi zed that a stronger policy agenda at the intersection of climate, 
devel opment and trade is crucial to ensure a credible transition towards net  zero. The discussion 
built on the report prepared by the Grantham Research Institute under the German G7 Presidency.  
3.12.  The session had a presentation from the Grantham Research Institut e on their report on 
Climate Clubs commissioned by the German G7 Presidency, which was followed by a panel discussion 
involving the European Commission DG -TRADE, the WTO Trade and Environment Division, Bruegel, 
University of Edinburgh and the Indonesia Res earch Institute for Decarbonization. The panel 
discussed how to achieve coherence between climate change policy and trade policy; what climate 
change objectives can be achieved within existing WTO rules and which ones require adjustments; 
how to rethink th e trade legal framework in a way that supports investments and transfer of 
low-carbon products to developing countries; the importance of agreement on common standards, 
definitions for green materials and methodologies for measuring the carbon content of g oods; and 
how a Climate Club and the WTO could support these efforts.  
3.13.  Silverado Policy Accelerator – a Washington -based think tank focused on trade and 
environmental policy – organized the session, "Practical Trade Solutions to Facilitate Circular 
Economy ". US Ambassador María Pagán opened with a statement on using trade to facilitate the 
circular economy to reduce life  cycle impacts, to keep goods and materials in productive use for as 
long as possible, and to minimize waste generation.  The panel, moderate d by Silverado Co -Founder 
Maureen Hinman, included Crispin Conroy of the International Chamber of Commerce, Jack Barrie 
of Chatham House and Amy Burk of HP, Inc. The panel examined reverse supply chains, especially 
how to help keep precious materials in co ntinuous productive use and help achieve positive 
environmental outcomes. The importance of transparency – both in the reverse supply chain as well 
as regulatory notifications to the WTO; international standards for products and materials; trade 
facilitati ve measures for customs clearances; and considerations for regulatory coherence and 
convergence, were highlighted by the panel and many participants.  
3.14.  The event was concluded by Ambassador Sofía Boza of Chile. She noted that her government 
has included circular economy into Chile's national strategy for sustainable development, including 
on extended producer responsibility, targets for recycling and resource efficiency and the role of 
trade to meet these goals. The work of TESSD and IDP were also noted.  
3.15.  In closing, let me just recall that in paragraph 14 of the MC12 outcome document, you 
Members reaffirmed the special role of this Committee as a standing forum dedicated to dialogue 
among Members on the relationship between trade and environmental measures. You have shown 
this week that you want to keep this momentum and sustai n this unique platform to maximize 
synergies, by hearing from leading experts, by gathering successfully implemented good practices, 
and by connecting with international partners to enhance collaboration.  WT/CTE/M/76  
 
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  3.16.  We thank you for your support for Trade and Enviro nment Week, which is your week, and we 
hope that it will help you in your deliberations and work in this body.  
3.1.2   Report by the United  States  on its event held on 18 October 2022 on "Supporting 
More Circular Economies through Trade Policy for Climate Change Solutions"  
3.17.  The representative of the United  States  delivered the following statement:  
3.18.  On 18 October 2022, the United  States hosted a side event at the WTO's 2022 Trade and 
Environment Week. Assistant US  Trade Representative  for Environment and Natural Reso urces , 
Kelly Milton , and Ecuador 's Deputy Permanent Representative , Daniela Garcia, co -moderated the 
session, which was focused on how we can support a more affirmative trade policy to enhance 
circularity for climate change solutions.  
3.19.  Three expert speaker s from the OECD, the Rochester Institute of Technology, and the Smart 
Prosperity Institute described areas and opportunities where trade policy can be proactively utilized 
to support more circularity for goods and technologies relevant to climate change mi tigation and 
adaptation efforts.  
3.20.  They highlighted priority trade -related actions and considerations, including suggestions for 
how to support an inclusive, environmentally sustainable, and just transition to greater circularity 
for primary resource produc ers (often developing countries), and to increase transparency and 
traceability throughout each stage of the value chain of relevant technologies to help improve their 
environmental footprints.  
3.21.  The panelists also raised a number of important questions tha t WTO Members could consider 
taking up for discussion, including analy sing what materials will be required to meet low energy 
carbon demand, where these materials are sourced from and where there are risks in supply chain 
reliability, and identify financia l, regulatory and technical barriers that may exist.  
3.22.  They also identified the need for more engagement from practitioners and stakeholders, and 
for more data to develop evidence -based trade policy, such as conducting deeper analysis within 
relevant sector s and markets to develop a stronger understanding of the emerging demand for more 
circularity across value chains, as well as the associated risks.  
3.23.  It is clear that we will need a lot of increasingly scarce resources to produce the technologies 
that are cr itical to help us reach our climate goals. However, circular economy approaches can 
increase efficiencies, keep them in productive use for longer, and reduce their life cycle greenhouse 
gas emissions as well as the need for mining of primary materials.  
3.24.  As mentioned during the session, we hope that this can be just the start of a longer -term 
discussion among WTO Members to support more circular economies for climate change solutions.  
3.1.3   Report by  India  on its event held on 20 October 2022 on " Lifestyle for E nvironment 
(LiFE) – Building a Community of Pro -Planet People "9 
3.25.  The representative of India delivered the following statement:  
3.26.  India ha s organized two sessions in this Trade and Environment Week. In this agenda of the 
CTE, I will speak about our second pr esentation which took place yesterday, October 20 in the latter 
part of the morning.  
3.27.  As we fight the climate and environment battles, Indian Prime Minister H.E. Shri Narendra 
Modi launched the Lifestyle for Environment or LiFE initiative earlier in the yea r. While there is a lot 
of discussion on production related carbon footprint, we don't hear much about consumption side 
changes or improvements possible.  
3.28.  LiFE is an attempt to address this latter topic. The U N Secretary -General H.E.  Mr. António 
Guterres attended an event on this initiative just yesterday along with Prime Minister Modi. Leaders 
 
9 See document RD/CTE/216.  WT/CTE/M/76  
 
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  of Argentina, Estonia, France, Georgia, Guyana, Madagascar, Maldives, Mauritius, Nepal and the 
United  Kingdom addressed the gathering through video mes sages.  
3.29.  The objective of the LiFE mission is to create a global mass movement to trigger simple actions 
that everyone around the world can take to protect the environment. It nudges responsible 
production and consumption. The most important part of this co nceptualization is that the LiFE 
actions are not targeted towards negatively impacting any economic activity.  
3.30.  India will be working on creating awareness on 75 LiFE actions in seven sectors : transport, 
electricity, food and solid waste, agriculture, water, healthy lifestyle and reuse and recycle. We will 
share more information on the initiative as it evolves. We welcome discussions on this subject and 
stand ready to engage bilaterally with interested WTO Members.  
3.1.4   Report by the United Nations Economic Commis sion for Europe (UN ECE) on its event 
held on 17 October 2022 on " Environmental, social and governance (ESG) traceability of 
supply chains "10 
3.31.  The representative of  the UNECE  delivered  the following statement:  
3.32.  On behalf of the UNECE, I would like to start by  thanking the Secretariat for this  session as 
part of WTO Trade and Environment Week and I congratulate you for the many super interesting 
discussions that were held during this week.  
3.33.  The UNECE's session was entitled "Environmental, Social and Governance Traceability of 
Supply Chains" and took place on Monday afternoon. What we focused the session around is we had 
a great line up of speakers, we had to open His Excellency, Mr. Ulugbek Lapasov, Ambassador of 
Uzbekistan, providing the perspective of a countr y acceding to the WTO. We then had speakers, 
Mr. Christian Hudson, lead EU G7/20 on environmental diplomacy of the German Agency for 
International Cooperation ( GIZ), as well as colleagues from UNCTAD, UNEP, and the Clean Clothes 
Campaign. When we designed our session, we really built it around the UNECE framework initiative 
for transparency and traceability for sustainable value chains in the textile sector, so that is an 
outcome product of UNECE's intergovernmental machinery and it is something that really focuses 
on the textile sector that has been mentioned in your discussions here many times during the various 
interventions.  
3.34.  What does the UNECE framework do? We h ave a policy recommendation, we have a call to 
action, we have a traceability and transparency information exchange standard, implementation 
guidelines, and we are currently doing block chain pilots, where we are trying to trace the 
environmental and socia l implications of textiles value chains throughout from the field to the shelf 
if you are buying a cotton shirt with cotton made in Uzbekistan so that you can trace what the 
environmental and social implications are all along the value chain until the shop  in Geneva. So that 
was a little bit the background of the session we had here in Geneva.  
3.35.  Now, what were the key takeaways from the discussion in the room? On the one hand, it was 
clear that traceability about the environmental and social implications alo ng the value chains are 
key to providing information on what actually happens in these value chains and what are the many 
different steps of what are frequently opaque and very complex value chains. Traceability can really 
help to respond to consumers' nee ds for consumers wishing to buy environmentally sound products 
but also respond to the needs and requests of investors. Traceability can also mitigate risks. 
Ultimately, it was also felt that traceability can help to move to a future of trade that is green , digital 
and inclusive.  
3.36.  In the session, we looked a little bit at the block chain pilots and the experience there in terms 
of tracing the cotton from Uzbekistan. However, we did not only look at cotton but also at other 
sectors that have quite a "hotspot nature", such as, for example, chemicals. Our speaker from UNEP 
in particular discussed the respective regulatory and governance frameworks in the context of the 
different BRS Conventions, which were also mentioned by many speakers here today.  
 
10 See document RD/CTE/218.  WT/CTE/M/76  
 
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  3.37.  Now what di d we discuss in terms of the interaction between trade policy and traceability and 
transparency in supply chains? Here one of the key findings that came up was that research at the 
moment is very limited and maybe more research is needed by both academic a nd think tanks to 
shed more light on what is the relationship between traceability of supply chains and trade policy. 
Each speaker emphasized that there is clearly a link between supply chain traceability and trade but 
it is not yet fully explored. We disc ussed sustainability certificates and standards and the risk of 
fragmentation there. We looked into different approaches to open data solutions and the many 
challenging questions that are raised in terms of data governance and inclusiveness. We looked a 
little bit at the incentives – both financial and non -financial incentives – that can be used to phase 
out unsustainable behaviour, but we also emphasized the importance of maintaining a level playing 
field. Last but not least, very importantly, we looked at  the needs of SMEs and at the specific needs 
of developing countries and, from the UNECE's perspective, countries with economies in transition.  
3.38.  On the minds of all speakers was the need to ensure that traceability of supply chains acts as 
an enabler of tr ade and does not turn into a trade barrier, so we really tried to look at what the risks 
and opportunities are in this regard.  
3.39.  To close, we felt that we looked at a lot of challenges in the discussion and we summarized 
that the challenges could only be add ressed by breaking down the silos and bringing together the 
communities. The community looking at supply chain traceability is a very different community to 
the one looking at trade policy, so there is maybe a need for more interaction there, but there was  
clearly also a need to bring in business, governments, investors, academia and all the different 
actors in the countries around the globe both from a developed country perspective and from a 
developing country perspective and, importantly for UNECE, from countries with economies in 
transition. Thank you again for the opportunity to hold our session and also to report about it here 
today.  
3.2  Aid for Trade Global Review  
3.40.  The WTO Secretariat  delivered the following statement:  
3.41.  I would like to report on the Aid for  Trade Global Review held on 27-29 July 2022 on the 
theme of "Empowering connected, sustainable trade" . I shall cover three points in my briefing for 
the Committee:  some "headlines" from the Global Review; a brief overview of the discussions that 
touched o n environment issues at the Global Review; and a  look ahead to the next Aid for Trade 
work programme.  Some points to highlight:  
• Environmental sustainability is being included as a priority in the national development 
strategy (96% of 53 developing country partners) . 
• Trade objectives are increasingly common in these national sustainable development 
strategies  (e.g. sustainable/green export strategies, standards) . 
• More attention to environment issues in A FT programming by donors and south -south partners 
(Paris alignment) and also women's economic empowerment . 
3.42.  These results are from the monitoring and evaluation  (M&E) by WTO.  Additionally, the OECD 
monitors flows reported to their database on aid flows.  Some highlights here to bring to your 
attention:  
• USD 48.7 billion was disbursed in 2020.   
• 51% of Aid for Trade commitments included climate -related objectives (with more going to 
mitigation activities, notably renewable energy).  
• Intersection with climate finance (e.g. renewable energy).  It's something that w as discussed 
at the Global Review itself and which we'll need to look at in more depth with OECD.  
Global Review: "Empowering connected, sustainable trade": 27 -29 July  
 WT/CTE/M/76  
 
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  3.43.  There were a total of 53 sessions organized.  So forgive me if I cherry pick some to bring to 
your attention : 
• On day two the focus was on sustainable trade.  
• Session looking at green hydrogen organized by Germany and the United Nations Industrial 
Development Organizat ion (UNIDO ) looked at the investment needs to develop this industrial 
activity in Namibia. With turbulence in gas markets, this is very much a topic in public eye. 
Useful perspectives on development dimension.  
3.44.  I would also like to highlight the session org anized by Ecuador on "Plastics, the circular 
economy and options to mainstream trade -related cooperation to tackle plastic pollution in Aid for 
Trade".  The title gives a very good idea of what was discussed.  
3.45.  It is u seful also to note that 23 developing cou ntry respondents to the 2022 M&E questionnaire 
highlighted that they have circular economy strategies – and a similar number of donors also circular 
economy objectives in their strategies.  
Next Aid for Trade work programme  
 
3.46.  The Global Review is the not qu ite the end point, but certainly the high point of the biennial 
work programmes. The current work prog ramme runs to the end of this year.  New work programme 
for the period 2023 -24. Expect environmental dimension to sustainable development actions to be 
a major focus of the new work programme.  In parallel, there will be consideration of the DG's 
suggested pivot to "Invest for Trade" approach or even an "Invest for sustainable trade" . 
3.47.  This discussion began with a briefing at the CTD A4T meeting on 11 October.  It will continue 
at informal CTD A4T meetings on 1 and 29 November chaired by Amb assador  Dwarka -Canabady of 
Mauritius.  
3.48.  In the context of the Aid for Trade Global Review, the Clean Cooking Alliance and the Trade 
and Environment Division co -hosted an outrea ch session, "Unlocking Sustainable Development with 
Clean Cooking" on 28 July, under the co -sponsorship of the Kingdom of The Netherlands and the 
United  Kingdom. The objective of the session was to raise awareness that trade can be part of the 
solution and facilitate the affordability of modern stoves and fuels that would enable clean cooking 
for vulnerable and poor communities around the world.  
3.49.  The session  was opened by Ambassador Manley of the United  Kingdom, followed by a 
presentation on "Cle an Cooking – Benefits, Opportunities and Barriers" by Jillene Connors 
Belopolsky, Chief of Staff and External Affairs, Clean Cooking Alliance. A panel discussion followed 
highlighting the realities in Ghana and Kenya, led by community leaders of clean cook ing, and a 
policy maker.11  
3.50.  The Clean Cooking  Alliance is currently looking for possible WTO Members partners to facilitate 
the use of appropriate  trade policies and international standards to reduc e costs to consumers and 
accelerating access to cleaner so lutions and technologies.   
3.51.  Following this presentation, some delegations had the following reactions.  
3.52.  The representative of Fiji, on behalf of the Pacific Group , delivered the following statement:  
3.53.  On behalf of the six WTO Members that make up the Pacific G roup, we wish to reiterate that 
our Group includes SIDS, Small and Vulnerable Economies (SVEs) and one LDC. The region is 
particularly vulnerable to climate change disruption as many of our island nations are low  lying and 
susceptible to sea  level rise as well as extreme weather. Indeed the 2021 World Risk Index 
assessment for disaster risk found that three Pacific Island states (Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands 
 
11 Michael Akurang Opoku, Team Leader, Policy, Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation, Ministry of Trade  
and Industry, Ghana; Mariam Karanja, Programme Manager, Clean Cooking Association of Kenya; and Sophie 
Odupoy, Group Head of Public Affairs, KOKO Networks . WT/CTE/M/76  
 
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  and Tonga) are the three most at risk countries in the world, with Papua New Guinea ranking 9th 
and Fiji 14th.  
3.54.  Add to this acute economic and environmental vulnerability, the ongoing impacts of the 
COVID -19 pandemic and the growing global food security and energy challenges and it is clear that 
our small economies lack the necessary finance and scientif ic know -how to tackle these multiple and 
overlapping crises.  In this context , assistance in the form of Aid for Trade and increased climate 
finance are absolutely critical and it is vital that there is greater alignment between the two.  
3.55.  The representative of South Africa  delivered the following statement:  
3.56.  We would like to emphasi ze that making adjustments to address climate change is a serious 
undertaking and requires deep structural changes in developing country economies who are not the 
major contributors  to climate change. Adjustments require time and resources for adaptation and 
mitigation measures to reali se the goals of sustainable development.  
3.57.  In this regard, there are several areas where technical and capacity building assistance can 
help developing countries. For instance, in building and maintaining systems of environmental 
monitoring. However, technical and capacity building assistance must also be accompanied by the 
requisite technology transfer and environmental finance to developing c ountries, to build capacity 
for resilient economies and to help them meet their economic development and environmental 
protection needs. We therefore believe that positive measures and incentives such as financial and 
technology transfers and technical ass istance are more efficient and effective ways of ensuring a 
global response to environmental challenges. The CTE will need to explore within its mandate 
effective solutions that can be implemented in this regard.  
3.58.  The representative of Panam a delivered the following statement:  
3.59.  Panama  would like to thank the Committee and the Chairperson and the Secretariat for their 
outstanding organization and the coordination of WTO Trade and Environment Week. Panama also 
thanks the speakers and participants in the various sessions and activities th at have been held this 
week. I would like to take this opportunity now, if I may, to share with you some of our national 
experience in this area.  
3.60.  For Panama, the role it may play in international trade and the combat against environmental 
pollution is very  important and that is why we have joined the various initiatives and cosponsored 
them within the WTO.  
3.61.  We are the first country in Latin America to see the humanitarian displacement of the 
indigenous people on the Guna Yala archipelago because of the conse quences of global warming, 
which has raised the sea level. These islands are now threatened with disappearance within the next 
few decades. Their population has been forced to leave their lives behind in order to find firm ground. 
This has affected tourism , which is the main source of revenue for these populations, in addition to 
changing their traditions and way of life. In order to mitigate situations like this, Panama is focusing 
on initiatives and national programmes to strengthen the legal framework wh en it comes to 
environmental trade issues by promoting sustainable trade with a better impact on the environment.  
3.62.  Panama was the first country in Central America to ban the use of plastic bags in its law of 
19 January 2018. In addition, to Law 187 of 2 De cember 2020, which regulates production and the 
progressive substitution of single -use plastics, coming into force on 1 July 2021.  
3.63.  In terms of the Panama canal, these activities have reduced approximately 16 million tonnes 
of CO 2 because it offers a short er route for vessels compared to alternative routes.  Also, in relation 
to this, we have a decarbonization programme for these operations, the objective being to become 
carbon neutral by 2030. We have an emissions calculator enabling operators to measure th eir 
greenhouse gas emissions, which also strengthens the analysis we carry out of the daily emissions 
of produced through the Panama canal. The data from these emissions calculated enable us to 
develop and improve the incentives as part of the environmenta l classification incentive programme 
– this rewards clients that have high standards of environmental efficiency. Incentives are given in 
terms of points that people can accumulate in terms of how clients are classified and, if you have a 
high level of cla ssification with many points, you can move up in the queue for transit. Criteria are WT/CTE/M/76  
 
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  not just in environmental efficiency, but also in terms of engineering, the structure of the vessel, 
the route chosen, and also whether the vessel has technology to make i ts operations more efficient 
and it reduce its carbon footprint.  
3.64.  In April of this year, we set up the national plan of gender and climate change, which seeks 
to promote the role of women in various sectors of the country like political participation, by 
diversity, energy, agriculture, sustainable livestock and the circular economy. At the end of 
September of this year, Panama presented a good practice guide for corporate sustainability as part 
of our national objective to foster sustainable development thro ughout the country.  
3.65.  In terms of the circular economy, the guide is a benchmark for the efficient use of water, 
electricity, emissions, and the comprehensive management of solid waste and green business.  
3.66.  The guide was developed because the corporate secto r was concerned about how to transit 
to the circular economy if Panama does not yet have a special national plan for this. On this note, 
the country is still making progress in terms of transitioning towards a circular economy and this 
guide is a first ste p, if you like, towards our transition phase. Also we are holding preparatory 
meetings for a "cooling plan" with technical assistance from the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP ). This programme seeks to consolidate strategic programmes for the 
refrigeration, air conditioning, and cooling systems to make them sustainable and competitive, 
facilitating the linking of public policy in line with global commitments in combatting climate change, 
seeking sustainable energy, protecting the environment inter  alia. This plan is complimented by our 
existing chlorofluorohydrocarbon programme and a future plan to eliminate hydrofluorocarbons 
altogether and broader plans for climate mitigation and to seek energy efficiency in the short, 
medium and long term.  
3.67.  To conclude, we would like to take this opportunity to reaffirm our commitment to continue 
working with WTO Members to respond appropriately to the challenges that we all face and, in 
particular, developing countries, and ensuring that in negotiating for a like the WTO that special 
efforts are made for sustainable trade and progress in our countries.  
4  MULTILATERAL ENVIRONMENTAL  AGREEMENTS AND WTO  – CTE WORK PROGRAM 
ITEMS 1 AND 5   
4.1  United  Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)  
4.1.1   Update by t he United  Kingdom  on the COP26 presidency year 
4.1.  The representative of the United  Kingdom  delivered the following statement:  
4.2.  The United  Kingdom is pleased to provide this final update on the progress made during our 
Presidency of COP26, before shortly passing the bato n to our Egyptian colleagues, hosts of COP27 
in Sharm El  Sheikh.  
4.3.  We are now into the final weeks of our Presidency of COP26. This represents nearly three years 
of hard fought and won achievements on the part of all those parties involved in this process. The 
COP process is only as strong as the sum of collective efforts and without every country and partner 
working together, delivering together, we could not have reached this point.  
4.4.  While there is still more we must do, we can take this moment to reflect on what we have 
achieved collectively over the past year. At COP26, all 197 Parties agreed to the historic Glasgow 
Climate Pact to take concerted and urgent action in this critical decade to keep the 1.5°C goal in 
reach. The gap in ambition has nar rowed  and 1.5°C thankfully r emains alive.  
4.5.  However, as the UK's Presidency comes to an end, we must increase our efforts and 
demonstrate that the promises made as part of the Glasgow Climate Pact have been kept. We 
therefore implore international partners to formalise pledges and strengthen efforts to implement 
initiatives, ensuring that they are embedded and delivering across commitments made on mitigation, 
adaptation, finance, and loss and damage.  WT/CTE/M/76  
 
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  4.6.  Should we fail to take  action now, we will run out of tim e to avert catastrophe. The reality is 
that if we do not bend the curve of global warming downwards in this critical decade, we will go 
beyond the limits of our ability to adapt. The scientific evidence on this is clear and unequivocal. 
Around the world, w e are already seeing what the future could look like.  
4.7.  We recogni ze that the challenges facing us are great and these have only been exacerbated by 
recent international events. Countries around the globe are now facing perilous economic and 
geopolitical co nditions due to rising energy prices, and threats to energy security. Whil e 
governments are taking action to deal with immediate supply issues, they are also accelerating the 
global transition to clean, reliable sources of power. Renewables and energy effi ciency provide the 
quickest, cheapest, most reliable route to long -term climate and energy security, and long -term 
prosperity.  
4.8.  Ahead of COP27 and beyond, we will continue to champion further progress . On mitigation , 
since COP26, we  have seen 24 countries , including the UK , submit new or updated NDCs. We 
continue to encourage countries to submit updated NDCs and new Long -Term Strategies, particularly 
those who have not significantly increased their ambition since Paris. Countries should also make 
efforts to deliver on the sectoral commitments they signed up to at COP26. The Breakthrough 
Agenda Report has now been published by the IEA and  the International Renewable Energy Agency , 
which provides independent recommendations to make progress on global transition s for power, 
hydrogen, road transport, steel and agriculture.  
4.9.  On adaptation , at COP26, countries committed to producing an Adaptation Communication by 
COP27, if they had not already done so. We encourage all countries to deliver on this commitment, 
and to also consider developing a National Adaptation Plan to prepare for current and future impacts 
and risks from climate change. To ensure effective adaptation action on the ground, we also urge 
countries and organi zations to endorse the Principles for Locally  Led Adaptation.  
4.10.  On finance , the UK has driven progress to rebuild trust as a result of the missing of the 
USD 100 billion  climate finance goal. This includes working with Canada and Germany to coordinate 
the USD 100 billion  Delivery Plan and, since COP26,  to produce a progress report on this to maintain 
transparency and trust in our commitments, especially in the new goal to double adaptation finance. 
We know that public finance alone will never be enough to achieve the scale of mobilisation required 
for the transition to clean energy. We will therefore continue to focus on the broader financial system 
and encourage private firms to step -up their efforts to mobilise more finance and transition the 
whole global economy.  
4.11.  On loss and damage , at COP26, parties  made a collective strong statement on loss and 
damage in the Glasgow Climate Pact and committed to enhance action and support. Parties set up 
the Glasgow Dialogue to discuss how funding arrangements for loss and damage can be enhanced, 
and all agreed on t he functions of the Santiago Network. We encourage governments and technical 
agencies to make progress at COP27 on loss and damage through operationalising the Santiago 
Network.  
4.12.  The UK stands ready to support the incoming Egyptian Presidency to realise the  promises 
made in Glasgow and build upon them in Sharm El  Sheikh and beyond.  
4.1.2   Brief by the UNFCCC  on the preparation for COP27  
4.13.  The representative of the UNFCCC  delivered the following statement:  
4.14.  From recent meetings, including those at ministerial level such as the pre -COP meeting in 
Kinshasa (DRC), it is clear that climate change remains high on the political agenda in 2022, despite 
the well  known challenges of the current international situation , which require high political attention 
and engagement at the moment. It is well understood that the importance of addressing climate 
change urgently does not diminish with time but rather increases, in particular because of the latest 
findings from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change  (IPCC) and the World Meteorological 
Organization .  
4.15.  Despite the current tension in international relations, or maybe exactly because of that 
tension, it is critical to uphold the value of multilateralism in addressing global issues, such as climate WT/CTE/M/76  
 
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  change, based on values and principles of the United  Nation s. This relates not only to climate change 
but to many other issues, often linked to climate change, such as biodiversity or food security.   
4.16.  For the climate change agenda, COP26 in Glasgow last year resulted in parties' agreement on 
the Glasgow Climate Pac t, along with a number of other key decisions and also outcomes beyond 
formal negotiations, such as many important initiatives and pledges  – bilateral or multilateral. This 
year, we see clearly from the discussions that the decisions taken last year in Gla sgow were the 
correct ones and were timely. But the challenge now is in the delivery on these decisions: ambition 
needs to be shown, credibly, in the implementation of the Glasgow Climate Pact, especially with 
regard to the objective of limiting global war ming to 1.5 °C. That is what the world will be watching 
for at COP27 in Sharm El Sheikh.  
4.17.  The climate change conference in Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt (COP27, CMP 17, CMA 4) will be 
the first annual UNFCCC conference fully focused on the implementation of climat e action under the 
Convention, the Kyoto Protocol and, following the completion of the remaining implementation rules 
at COP26 in Glasgow in 2021, now the Paris Agreement as well. The decisions taken in Glasgow, 
especially those with regard to "keeping 1.5 °C alive ", reflected and emphasized the sense of urgency 
in climate action, and the critical role of this decade in that respect. That sense of urgency in action 
will need to be maintained in Sharm El Sheikh, given that the current level of ambition in red ucing 
emissions is far from a path consistent with the 1.5°C goal of the Paris Agreement.  
4.18.  To be successful, COP27 should result in a balanced package of decisions across all key topical 
areas: adaptation, loss and damage, mitigation, and means of implemen tation, including, notably, 
finance. It is known that for some issues, like the mitigation work programme, full outcome is 
expected in Sharm El Sheikh whereas for others, like the global goal on adaptation, the outcome of 
work needs to be reported only in 2023 or, for some other issues, even later. But even for those 
issues which cannot be completed at COP27 achieving tangible, credible and visible progress will be 
important to ensure a balanced outcome and demonstrate that implementation of climate action is 
unfolding swiftly and with the ambition required. This will not be easy, and the recent controversy 
in the relations between China and the United  States, two key players in the international 
negotiations on climate change, makes the task even more chall enging. But climate change is a 
global emergency , which requires urgent and ambitious action  at COP27 in Sharm El Sheikh and we 
must deliver on that action under the leadership of Egypt as the COP27 Presidency.  
4.19.  We are about to publish our NDC synthesis re port, which shows the impact of the existing 
NDCs on the global emissions trajectories, and compares the projected emissions with the emission 
pathways identified by the IPCC as compatible with keeping the temperature increase to below 1.5 
or 2°C. Without citing the numbers of the yet unpublished report, I can say that the report shows, 
once again, that the current trends, based on the existing NDCs, are far from what is needed to 
stabilize global temperature at those levels. We need stronger action, urgent ly. The same message 
can be found in the new UNEP repor t, which will be also published in the coming days.  
4.20.  Last but not least , at COP26 in Glasgow , we saw a high number of forward -looking initiatives 
pledged, undertaken or strengthened by non -State actors  outside the formal negotiations 
framework. Examples are the Glasgow breakthrough agenda, the Global Methane Pledge or the 
Glasgow Leaders Declaration on forests and land use. Knowing what happened to these initiatives is 
important for understanding the po tential of action by non -party stakeholder s and for the credibility 
of that action. The incoming COP27 Presidency pays much attention to action by non -party 
stakeholders, and we expect that an assessment of past initiatives will be part of the discussions in 
Sharm El Sheikh, along with possible new initiatives.  
4.21.  Following this presentation, a delegation had the following reaction.  
4.22.  The representative of the European Union  delivered the following statement:  
4.23.  The E uropean Union  would just like to react on the briefing on COP27. We believe that COP27, 
like every COP, is a moment for accountability. As mentioned by the speaker of the UNFCCC, we 
must maintain political momentum to keep 1.5°C alive. We call for further ambition and 
implementation in this critical decade.  WT/CTE/M/76  
 
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  4.24.  The European Union is ready to demonstrate how we are staying the course in Sharm  El Sheik. 
The EU's energy security will not be achieved to the detriment of climate action. By the end of this 
year, the EU aims to ag ree on new and binding targets under our emissions trading system, on 
renewable energy, energy efficiency that will demonstrate how we will reach our NDC s and be on 
the pathway to net zero by 2050. This is not only a commitment towards the decisions taken in 
Glasgow but also a continuous sign of the EU 's leadership in addressing the climate crisis.  
4.1.3   Update by the International Trade Centre ( ITC) on its participation in  the UNFCCC 's 
COP27  
4.25.  The representative of the ITC delivered the following statement:  
4.26.  The Ex ecutive Director had planned to be here but unfortunately due to timing she sends her 
regrets and asked me to deliver her statement on her behalf. She extends her congratulations to 
Ambassador Manley for successful ly chairing the CTE  so far . You are leadin g an important Committee 
at an important time.  
4.27.  Thank  you so much for giving me the opportunity to brief you on ITC's participation at COP27 
taking place in Sharm El Sheikh in a few weeks. I do  not have to tell you what you know already: 
COP27 is going to b e a very big deal – or at least I hope there will be a big deal happening – especially 
after the summer of crazy weather we had, which I think brought home the reality of climate change 
for a lot of people. Countries like my own (Jamaica) knew it was happening for a long time, but now 
that recognition is global.  
4.28.  Let me first tell you what motivated me when I told my staff that I wanted our COP 
participation to be as important as our involvement in any other global platform.  
4.29.  I genuinely feel that there are missing voices at COP  and that lack of inclusivity means that 
the ambition of the Paris Agreement – the need to meet commitments under NDCs – all these things 
will be that much harder, particularly in the four -C crisis we are living through of COVID, c limate, 
conflict and cost -of-living.  
4.30.  One of those missing voices are the small developing countries that suffer the greatest from 
climate change. I was once one of those SIDS delegates, sitting for hours in Room W when 
environmental issues were first broug ht into the multilateral trade agenda. I remember how 
contentious these issues were way back in the early 90s. I remember feeling that big -power politics 
were determining outcomes on a n issue where my country could suffer disproportionately.  
4.31.  Another missin g voice is that of ITC's core constituency – small businesses, especially those 
that engage in trade. They make up 90 % of all businesses, are very much aware of what is about 
to hit them, but our research shows that they are – to be frank – very unprepared . Our business 
surveys make it clear that they need training, finance, and the right policy environment not just to 
make the green transition, but to see it as a business opportunity. A chance to become even more 
competitive, more resilient, and more inclu sive. All this at a time when so many small businesses  
and many small and least  developed countries are simply struggling to survive. A time when the 
geopolitical landscape is really very difficult . I am just back from G20 and saw how multilateralism 
is facing – to put it very mildly – some strong headwinds.  
4.32.  So the more people, the more countries, and the more businesses we can bring to COP 
convinced that the green transition is an opportunity and not just a cost, the better chance  we have 
for landing a deal. 
4.33.  That why I  am happy that the Egyptian Presidency wants to make COP27 the first 
"implementation COP ". They  have made it clear that they want to move from negotiations and 
planning to action on the ground.  This fits perfectly with ITC. For 60 years, we  have maintained that 
you can craft the best agreements and the best policies, but if you do  not support your businesses 
to make trade happen, then you won't implement a single sentence.  
4.34.  At COP in November, we  will be bringing a delegation of small businesse s to Sharm El Sheikh 
to voice the perspectives of the small business community. At our pavilion in the blue zone, w e will 
host discussions with small businesses. We  will showcase the role of trade in supporting climate WT/CTE/M/76  
 
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  action through case stories, tools an d projects. We  will give a sneak pe ek of our forthcoming Climate 
Competitiveness Assessment Tool or C -CAT, which provides data, analysis and recommendations to 
"climate proof " value chains.  
4.35.  For ITC, COP27 will also be about highlighting partnerships. We  will launch a joint project with 
the US State Department, through their Special Presidential Envoy for Climate , John Kerry, which 
will connect climate smart small businesses in developing countries with international buyers. We  
will help small businesses at the forefront of climate change to connect, compete and change.  
4.36.  We will also be co -organi zing an official UNFCCC side event  entitled "Accelerating the 
Low-Carbon Transition Through Sustainable and Inclusive Trade ". I am thrilled that the WTO is 
among the o rganizers for this session, alongside UNEP, UN -OHRLLS, and the World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO ). Let me conclude by inviting all of you to join us. If you  are not going 
to be in Sharm El Sheikh, then please do watch online at our ITC at COP27  page on our website 
(www.intracen.org) and our social media channels , which we will be regularly updating in the lead 
up to and at the event.  
4.37.  Following this presentation, s ome delegations had the following reactions.  
4.38.  The representative of Vanuatu  delivered the following statement:  
4.39.  As we know, climate change is the defining challenge of our time, posing a great threat to 
humanity as a whole and an existential threat to the most vulnerable. Sea level rise, in particular, 
threatens to render low  lying island nations uninhabitable, while climate -induced weather events 
and other impacts have already resulted in immense suffering throughout the world.  
4.40.  While the international comm unity has recognized the urgency of the climate crisis, in our 
view, progress to date has fallen short of achieving the level of climate action necessary to prevent 
environmental catastrophe. In the context of the slow -moving UN negotiations, including wha t we 
expect in COP27, the Prime Minister of Vanuatu launched a campaign to seek , through a vote at the 
UN General Assembly , an advisory opinion on climate change from the International Court of Justice. 
Since then, the initiative has been endorsed by a num ber of countries.  
4.41.  We hope that those who are attending COP27 will engage with the events that will be taking 
place in Egypt to support this initiative by the Government of Vanuatu and the core group of countries 
who are taking some lead role in this. This  initiative , which  will help in our discussions and  those  in 
other multilateral regimes , is to provide an opportunity to clarify the legal obligations of all states to 
prevent and redress the adverse effects of climate change and to raise awareness about t he impact 
of the climate crisis, while recognizing that climate change is disproportionally felt by persons in 
vulnerable situations. We ask for your support.  
4.42.  The representative of Egypt  delivered the following statement:  
4.43.  Egypt thank s the UNFCCC, the ITC and the United  Kingdom  for their statements.  We would 
like to recall our statement made at the previous CTE meeting where we provided an overview of 
the preparations of COP27  to be held in Sharm El Sheikh from 6-18 November 2022.  We look forward 
to making a clear and detailed statement on COP27 in the next CTE meeting after the event has 
been concluded  and we look forward to welcoming you in Sharm El Sheikh . We are counting on your 
support and cooperation to ensure a successful COP27 that achieves its desir ed goals . 
4.1.4   Presentation by Switzerland  on bilateral cooperation under Article 6 of the 
Paris  Agreement12  
4.44.  The representative of Switzerland  delivered the following statement:  
4.45.  I will be referring to Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, which is an interesting Article because 
it enables governments to exchange emission certificates made abroad and to involve the private 
sector. Article 6.2 refers to bilateral arrangements and Articl e 6.4 to multilateral arrangements.  
 
12 See document RD/CTE/220.  WT/CTE/M/76  
 
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  4.46.  The rules that govern implementation of Article 6.2 were agreed upon in Glasgow last year at 
COP26 and, according to those rules, countries are now expected to implement the arrangements.  
4.47.  Before the rules were set in G lasgow, Switzerland reached bilateral agreements with a number 
of countries. Switzerland has been at the very forefront of implementation of Article 6.2. In a way, 
it had to invent how to implement the Article. A number of conditions are set in the Article but it 
remains fairly vague, so there is quite a lot of leeway for what is understood as environmental 
integrity and the negotiations bilateral agreements fleshed out the provisions. There are also aspects 
relating to the permanence of the emission reduct ion commitments and Switzerland had to develop 
provisions on that because there was no agreement at multilateral level. That was reached in 
Glasgow, but Switzerland had already begun the process before that.  
4.48.  Within these bilateral agreements, there are a number of conditions governing the transfer of 
Internationally Transferred Mitigation Outcome s (ITMOs) from partner countries to  Switzerland. 
There are also provisions regarding the implementation of those transfers, which national authorities 
are responsi ble, what the regulations and processes are for the transfer of ITMOs and how this works 
with the transfer of emissions. So all of this is contained in the bilateral cooperation agreements.  
4.49.  In these agreements, there are two parties. One allowing for fina ncing private investment, in 
other words for the implementation of these emission transfers, which is the Swiss Foundation for 
Climate Protection and CO₂ Compensation (KLiK). This foundation is the main buyer of ITMO s from 
party countries. There is also a section in the agreement allowing for public stakeholders , like the 
Swiss Federal Administration , to buy ITMOs . We are in favour of this as a national body because we 
compensate all of our emissions in building , travel, and everything that entails a cost f or our 
administration, through these agreements by offsetting them and buying a certain number of ITMOs 
from partner countries allows us to do this. We also cooperate with the UNDP.  
4.50.  How does it actually work in practice? The programmes that are implemente d under these 
aforementioned agreements can be proposed by private entities and organizations or by public 
operators. This is done through an e -submissions through KL iK. Then those programmes of a certain 
quality and that inspire trust and confidence are a uthorized by the partner country and that is 
essential because all programmes and projects are not supposed to substitute the NDC in the country 
itself. The country has to agree, in other words, that this programme will allow the transfer of ITMOs 
to Switz erland and will not damage or injure in any way the interests and efforts of emission 
reductions of the country itself. This also gives us the certainty that these transfers will actually take 
place subsequently.  
4.51.  Then, the programme also has to be authoriz ed by Switzerland. In Switzerland, it is the 
Federal Office of the Environment that does this and it is up to them to give the green light. As I 
said, the programme has to be complementary to the NDC -related policies in the partner countries 
and should not  be an obstacle to the NDC obligations under the Paris Agreement.  
4.52.   We have signed a number of bilateral cooperation agreements with partner countries in this 
area. Even before, we signed with Peru, Ghana, Senegal and other countries and we are just about 
to sign some extra agreements with the Kingdom of Morocco, the Republic of Malawi and Uruguay. 
In principle, this should be done in Sharm El Sheikh at COP27.  
4.53.  We will not go any further than that because that is already a number of agreements that we 
have to manage and under each of these agreements there are a great number of programmes that 
need to be implemented, which entails a great amount of portfolio management. However, it is still 
possible that we extend these arrangements to Chile.  
4.54.  Some examples of programmes that are not yet authorized are e.g. Bangkok E -Buses , Solar 
Eco-Minibuses in Senegal , and a National Clean Energy Programme in Ghana . These are submissions 
that we have received that need to be evaluated by us, partner countries and KL iK, but  nevertheless 
we do have a number of pending projects e.g. electric buses in Bangkok, Thailand and renewable 
energy in Peru, for efficient stoves in Ghana etc. A lot of projects have to do with clean energy, 
renewable energy sources and energy efficiency, which are common themes. So there is a large 
amount of work to be done.  WT/CTE/M/76  
 
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  4.55.  In terms of our procedures, we have authorization prior to this process. We do not know how 
many ITMOs will be transferred at the end, we will only know this in 2030; we cannot plan o r forecast 
this, but the authorization is given straight away by the partner countries and by Switzerland. We 
think that this gives a certain legal certainty to the project, despite the fact that most of the funds 
are private – millions of dollars are inve sted to pay for the compensation of emissions abroad.  
4.56.  As a reminder, the objective is to cut emissions by half by 2030, have c arbon neutrality by 
2050, and for 25% of emissions more or less to be, so to speak, "earned " abroad. Th is gives you an 
idea of the reduction that we need to finance and fund . These agreements will enable us to do this. 
We also hope that partner countries will also contribute to sustainable development projects and 
ultimately increase this venture with additio nal investment.  
4.57.  For more details about the various programmes set up and those in the pipeline, you can go 
to the text of the bilateral agreements on the webpage of the Federal Office of the Environment or 
the KL iK website.  
4.58.  Following this presentation, a delegation had the following reaction.  
4.59.  The representative of Argentina  delivered the following statement:  
4.60.  First and foremost, we should like to thank the UNFCCC, the ITC, the United  Kingdom and 
Switzerland for the various presentations and comments. Argent ina would like to make a general 
comment, if we may, under this item on the agenda in line with that established in the work plan. 
Argentina encourages the Committee to reinforc e the link between trade agreements and  
international environmental agreements.   
4.61.  On this note, Argentina would like to register its interest in including, at the next Committee 
meeting, the other conventions that came out of the 'Cumble de la Tierra' UN Conference in 1992 in 
Rio de Janeiro; the UN Co nvention to Combat D esertification ; and the Convention on Biodiversity. 
We have a broadly recognized need to implement joint actions in the framework synergy in line with 
these three conventions to achieve their respective objectives.  
4.1.5   Update on behalf of participants on negotiations towar ds the Agreement on Climate 
Change, Trade and Sustainability (ACCTS)  
4.62.  The representative of New Zealand , on behalf of ACCTS,  delivered the following statement:  
4.63.  I am delivering this statement on behalf of Costa Rica, Fiji, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway 
and Switzerland, who together continue to lead trade and climate action through the negotiation of 
the Agreement on Climate Change, Trade and Sustainability (ACCTS). This innovat ive agreement 
will encompass four key pillars that demonstrate how trade policy ca n contribute to addressing 
climate and other environmental and sustainable development policy challenges.   
4.64.  As many of you will recall, the ACCTS negotiations are initially concentrating on: the 
liberali zation of environmental goods; new and binding commitm ents for environmental services; 
binding disciplines to eliminate harmful fossil fuel subsidies; and best practice guidelines to inform 
the development and implementation of voluntary eco -labelling programmes and mechanisms.  
4.65.  Since our update to this Commit tee in June, the ACCTS Trade Ministers met to consider 
progress in the negotiations and issued a Joint Statement in the margins of MC12 in Geneva on 
15 June. Ministers emphasi zed the importance of the ACCTS in leading a path forward on important 
trade and environmental sustainability issues for multilateral action, and highlighted their 
commitment to conclude the ACCTS negotiations as swiftly as possible.  
4.66.  Subsequently, ACCTS partners have held their tenth negotiation round in September, with 
multiple sessio ns across each of the Working Groups. We achieved our goal of advancing the 
construction of the environmental goods and environmental services list in an ambitious manner, 
while also ensuring text continues to be progressed. We are pleased that the environ mental goods 
short list is now over 200 products.  WT/CTE/M/76  
 
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  4.67.  Concurrent with our negotiations, we continue to welcome interest from WTO Members on 
the Agreement and will continue to keep Members informed on developments. The objective is for 
the ACCTS to evolve into  an 'open plurilateral' agreement, available for all other WTO Members 
willing to join if they are able to meet its obligations.  
4.68.  We believe the diversity of the ACCTS membership demonstrates that a diverse range of 
economies, geographies and systems are m otivated to proactively work on how trade and climate 
change issues can be taken forward. It is hoped that , once concluded, this diverse membership will 
also be a powerful tool for encouraging the agreement's expansion. I would now like to pass to my 
fellow ACCTS member , Fiji, to provide some comments.   
4.69.  The representative of Fiji delivered the following stateme nt: 
4.70.  From our perspective, as a small island developing country in the South Pacific, the ACCTS is 
an important initiative because it is a practical manifestation of our commitment to addressing 
climate change. As Prime Minister Bainimarama said at COP26 , together we can "keep 1.5 alive, 
keep low  lying island nations above water, keep erratic and severe weather from devastating us all 
and keep the trust between nations so we can keep faith that our children and grandchildren will 
have a future. " 
4.1.6   Report by th e United  States on its event held on 3 October 2022 on " Roundtable 
Discussion on trade and Climate: Trade Approaches to Climate Mitigation and Adaptation " 
4.71.  The representative of the United  States  delivered the following statement:  
4.72.  On 3 October 2022, the United States convened a trade and climate small group roundtable 
to discuss non -price measures to address climate change. In the interest of transparency and 
inclusiveness, the following is a report of the discussion during the roundtable.  
4.73.  To set the stage for the discussions, the WTO Secretariat presented an overview of non -price 
approaches that are available within trade policy to address climate change. The Secretariat noted 
the need for similar metrics of measuring carbon emissions across products, and t he role that aligned 
measurement and metrics play in international trade facilitation.  
4.74.  Second, the Secretariat also noted that noted the TBT Agreement decision on use of 
international standards and the role of the TBT Agreement code of good practice in ho w standards 
are developed.  
4.75.  Finally, it noted the development context and challenges that smaller economies can face 
when verifying information and considering limitations of developing countries.  
4.76.  Participants were then invited to share experiences and vi ews on opportunities for the WTO 
to address climate change through trade, based on the following guiding questions:  
• First, what are the non -price approaches, including voluntary and regulatory actions, that 
Members are taking or identify as opportunities f or addressing emissions and/or pollution?  
• Second, what are the potential trade implications of trade -related climate measures? Are there 
actions that Members can take to facilitate trade through addressing barriers to trade that 
would yield a positive envi ronmental and economic outcome?  
• Third, taking into account the following topics, what are the opportunities for the WTO 
Membership to address climate change through trade?  
4.77.  A number of themes emerged over the course of the discussion. For example, some Mem bers 
noted the need to recognize diversity of country priorities related to climate change adaptation and 
mitigation approaches, the need for strategies to engage across income levels, and to ensure that 
standards are relevant for countries at different st ages of development.  
4.78.  Several Members also noted the importance of incorporating the needs of MSMEs and ensuring 
those businesses are not overlooked or excluded from international trade. Participants also noted WT/CTE/M/76  
 
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  the importance of non -pricing measures to com plement other technical and financial support, 
including the role of carbon pricing to reach net zero.  
4.79.  Likewise, challenges were noted in measuring carbon emissions, and there was recognition 
that a sectoral approach could help focus attention on the ques tion of carbon measurement and 
considering divergences across standards. Relatedly, a sense that WTO Members should continue to 
track climate policy discussions in other venues such as UNFCCC, the OECD, the I nternational 
Monetary Fund (I MF)/World Bank shou ld be used to inform our discussions.  
4.80.  Finally, Members expressed interest in considering how the CTE and TBT Committees could 
contribute to more transparency, for example through notifying climate -related technical regulations 
and allowing sufficient time  for member comments; and to build a common understanding on 
climate -related regulations recognizing that measures should be least trade restrictive and countries 
should seek to limit distortions in competition or increased regulatory costs.  
4.81.  At the close of the roundtable, the United  States, as roundtable convener, noted the role of 
the TESSD forum to provide a venue to elevate these issues and bring energy to the conversation.  
We suggested future informal conversations, in various configurations, may be u seful to explore key 
questions and move work forward. We acknowledge the extensive efforts by governments to take 
measures to address climate change and that Members should seek opportunities to share 
information and discuss measures at the WTO.  
4.82.  The WTO S ecretariat concluded by noting that focusing on sectors that are highest emitting 
and most fragmented by regulatory requirements and/or standards the WTO could contribute by 
bringing conversations on those sectors under the CTE or TBT Committees or through  a joint 
Committee meeting.  
4.83.  Following this presentation, a delegation had the following reaction.  
4.84.  The representative of Australi a delivered the following statement:  
4.85.  Australia would like to thank the United  States for hosting the roundtable discussion, whic h 
we were pleased to engage in. Trade has a critical role to play in addressing climate change and we 
encourage Members to continue discussions. We welcome initiatives and workshops like this to foster 
discussion and deepen engagement on these important is sues.  
4.1.7   Report by the United  Kingdom  on its event held on 17 October 2022 on "View from 
the ground: Exploring the business experience of trade in environmental goods and 
services"  
4.86.  The representative of the United  Kingdom  delivered the following statement:  
4.87.  We would like to thank Members, stakeholders, international organi zations and the WTO 
Secretariat for a diverse and fruitful series of discussions at WTO Trade and Environment Week. The 
UK hosted two events this week, an d we would like to provide a short summary of the key messages 
from them.  
4.88.  On Monday, under the theme "The view from the ground: Exploring the business experience 
of trade in environmental goods and services ", we heard directly from the private sector what the 
benefits and challenges are of green trade, and how the WTO can support the transition to green 
economy. Our speakers from Africa, Asia and Europe all highlighted the opportunities from the 
transition to net zero in enabling sustainable development, ec onomic growth and energy security. 
Developing countries in particular, are in a unique position to leapfrog the transition and become 
net zero producers and consumers from the onset.  
4.89.  Mansoor Hamayun, Chief Executive Officer of BBOXX, spoke about the poten tial of Africa as 
the hub of innovation and about the path to reducing poverty being access to goods and services to 
allow opportunities for growth – particularly by enabling access to ever -cheaper renewable energy.  
4.90.  Esther An, Chief Sustainability Officer  at City Development Limited, spoke about the rapid 
population growth and urbanisation in Asia providing an opportunity to reconsider our buildings and WT/CTE/M/76  
 
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  construction to move towards low -carbon materials. In countries like Singapore, which are reliant 
on imp orts, trade incentives for green materials and technology could hugely increase their uptake.  
4.91.  Tania Kumar, Deputy Director for Decarboni zation at the Confederation of British Industry 
spoke about the difficulty of measuring emissions across the supply cha in and the need for global 
standards to ensure consistency of approaches and sharing of best practice. There was a lot that the 
global community could learn from Africa on solar power or from the UK in terms of offshore wind 
policy.  
4.92.  The panel agreed that there was an important role for the WTO and the trade community to 
support the green transition, particularly in providing trade incentives, preferential access, 
promoting the development of global standards and supporting developing countries to adapt.  
4.1.8   Report by the United  Kingdom on  its event held on 19 October 2022 on "Spotlight 
on International Collaboration to Accelerate Decarboni zation"  
4.93.  The representative of the United  Kingdom  delivered the following statement:  
4.94.  On Wednesday, we hosted an event titled  "Spotlight on International Collaboration to 
Accelerate Decarboni zation." The session focused on industrial decarboni zation, and the value of 
international initiatives such as the COP26 Breakthrough Agenda, and the Industrial Deep 
Decarboni zation Initiati ve.  
4.95.  Stephanie Edwards from the Breakthrough Agenda outlined the progress made from COP26, 
including how the Breakthrough Agenda will help achieve new, ambitious commitments in the most 
emissions -intensive sectors.  
4.96.  Will Hall from the International Energy A gency explained how a huge increase in Near -Zero 
Steel production will be needed to meet our shared climate goals. He highlighted the need for a 
strategic dialogue on trade in near -zero emission steel, for common standards, and for scaling up 
funding commi tments in research and innovation.  
4.97.  Rana Ghoneim from UNIDO spoke about the Industrial Deep Decarboni zation Initiative which 
is working to stimulate demand for low -carbon industrial materials. She also laid out the importance 
of harmoni zed standards and rep orting mechanisms for enabling trade in zero emission steel. We 
also heard about how the Industrial Deep Decarbonization Initiative (IDDI) is creating a 'pull' in the 
market through government procurement, including the Green Public Procurement Pledge.  
4.98.  We then heard from our panel : Mattias Frumerie from Sweden, and Michael Buechl from 
Germany. Mattias outlined the case for collective action, and described how the 'green industrial 
revolution' in Sweden is reducing emissions and creating new jobs and growth Michael stressed the 
urgency of international collaboration in decarboni zation and how international standards and 
definitions are key to future progress.  
4.99.  Overall, this event aimed to reinforce the need for increased climate ambition and to 
encourage coun tries to join these world -leading initiatives. It also reinforced how the multilateral 
trading system can support coordinated decarboni zation, which can therefore reduce the 
trade-related risks of carbon leakage. We would like to thank all the speakers and  panel ists for their 
time and their valuable contribution to this event.  
4.100.   Finally, the UK would also like to highlight some conclusions from the event that we hosted 
at the Public Forum, given its relevance to the work of the CTE.  
4.101.   Together with the Mission s of Ecuador, Paraguay, Switzerland and Uruguay, the 
United  Kingdom hosted insightful discussions amongst panel ists on 27 September which explored 
how trade measures and supply chains can contribute to the sustainable production of agricultural 
commodities .  
4.102.   In the discussions , we heard a diverse range of views about how trade policy can incentivi ze 
trade in sustainably produced goods and help support the transition to more sustainable production 
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  from panel Members on how trade can support sustainable prod uction, including bespoke approaches 
for different commodities; the links between agriculture and climate change, and how the 
liberali zation of agricultural trade may be one way that can incentivi ze and support sustainability 
efforts within developing coun tries. 
4.103.   We would like to thank esteemed colleagues Ambassador Cancela from Uruguay; Mr . Franco 
from Paraguay; Ms . Däppen from Switzerland; Ms . Bonzom from UNDP;  Mr. Hurd from the Tropical 
Forest Alliance; and Mr . Wickerham from  the ISEAL  Alliance  who contri buted to our fruitful 
discussion.  
4.104.   We look forward to continuing discussion on sustainable supply chains for agricultural 
commodities, and developing a shared understanding of the complexities involved. We hope this can 
become a become a regular feature of  the CTE agenda moving forward.  
4.1.9   Report by Samoa on its  event held on 19 October 2022 jointly by the Pacific Islands 
Forum Secretariat  and the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD)  on 
"Trade and climate change adaptation"  
4.105.   The representa tive of Samoa  delivered the following statement:  
4.106.   On behalf of Ambassador Toleafoa Nella Levy, I am delighted to provide a report on the 
Trade and Environment Week session organized by the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat together 
with the IISD on 19 Octob er 2022, in which Ambassador Levy was invited to deliver the keynote 
speech. The session addressed the linkage of trade and climate change adaptation, which reflected 
on the fact that 'while climate change will clearly drive changes in international trade,  international 
trade also has a role to play in efforts to adapt to climate change.'  
4.107.   Ambassador Levy, Mr. Joel Richards from the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States 
(OECS ) Mission in Geneva, as well as Dr.  Fahmida Khatun representing the Centre for Po licy Dialogue 
(CPD) based in Bangladesh, shared the perspectives of the Pacific region, Caribbean region and 
LDCs, respectively. Ms. Anne Hammill, the Senior Director of the IISD Resilience Program, also 
joined others in sharing how trade could support the  adaptation efforts of countries.  
4.108.   The session highlighted the climate change adaptation planning process, as well as the key 
adaptation challenges and needs emerging in developing countries, particularly the distinctive 
vulnerabilities of SIDS and LDCs to  climate change, some of those vulnerabilities were mentioned 
by Ambassador Antas of Vanuatu a moment ago. It was pointed out that the matter of climate 
change adaptation for SIDS is not the question of new scientific evidence or new pledges but rather 
the one of survival. While the emergency facing regions such as the Pacific and the Caribbean has 
been recognized by the international community and at the leaders level, the links between the 
climate adaptation track and the trade track have so far been miss ing.  
4.109.   The intervention by Ms. Hammill focused on three key pathways through which trade can 
leverage the efforts of climate change adaptation: domestic trade policy measures enhancing access 
to adaptation goods and services ; access to trade -related financi ng mechanisms ; and the 
international collaborative frameworks on trade in support of climate adaptation. It was also noted 
from her presentation that 129 countries are currently undertaking their national adaptation planning 
process and such efforts can pr ovide an important insight into goods, services or technologies that 
can help countries address the widening gap in adaptation needs.  
4.110.   Mr. Chairman, there were many valid and good points made at the session on how the WTO 
could contribute solutions to the climate change adaptation issue. One noteworthy, but not new to 
our discussions, is the need to recogni ze the difficulties faced by SIDS who are on frontlines of 
climate change impacts. Thirteen of the 38 UN Small Island Developing States (SIDS) are in the 
Pacific. We recall , in 1993, the UN recognized SIDS as special case with regard to both environment 
and development, that SIDS are ecologically fragile and vulnerable; and SIDS small size, limited 
resources, geographic dispersion and isolation from markets place SIDS at a disadvantage 
economically and limit the economies of scale; and that for SIDS, the ocean and coastal environment 
is of strategic importance and constitutes a valuable development resource. This recognition should 
be institutionali zed at the WTO, integrated in the negotiations and reflected in the outcomes and 
texts of WTO agreements as well as all other international disciplines that impact human lives.  WT/CTE/M/76  
 
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  4.111.   We hope to continue to engage on the discussions on trade and climate change in t he hope 
that tangible actions are taken to support the adaptation plans and enhance economic resilience of 
Members, especially those who are most vulnerable such as the LDCs and SIDS.  
5   TRANSPARENCY OF ENVIRONMENT -RELATED TRADE MEASURES  – CTE WORK 
PROGRAMME  ITEM 4  
5.1  Presentation by the WTO Secre tariat on the WTO Environmental Database  (EDB)  
5.1.  The WTO Secretariat  delivered the following statement:  
5.2.  Just to note that the full presentation has been circulated to Members in room document .13 In 
the interests of time, I will just present the main salient highlights, but you can see the full 
presentation in the room document itself.  
5.3.  The Environmental Database is well known to all of you in the CTE as we have presented this 
before, including the online version, but just i n case you have missed it in the past, the URL address 
for the online version is www.wto.org/edb. We of course continue to rely heavily on our Members to 
both continually improve and upgrade the database itself, for example, we have just recently 
improved the free text search in the database, but also we rely on Members for the data itself in the 
database – this is a database of your official information drawn from WTO Members' notifications 
across all WTO agreements and, of course, the TPRs of Members (bot h the Government and 
Secretariat TPR reports). The purpose of this update this afternoon is to share with you the highlights 
of the 2021 update. Year -on-year, we update the database and we have now finished the 2021 
update of both notifications and TPRs.  
5.4.  So what are the headline numbers? Well, the first thing to say is that we have had a bumper 
harvest as far as environment -related information is concerned in 2021. A record number of 
environment -related notifications in fact: 931 (almost a thousand) notific ations and some 
2,250  measures, so one notification can have multiple measures. Both of these numbers are records 
for us, especially when you start seeing the journey from where we have come: in 1987, we 
had 165 notifications, which was roughly about 8% of  all WTO notifications, so 1 in 12 or 
1 in 10 notifications were environment -related. Last year, in 2021, the number was 931, but also 
importantly about 19% of all WTO notifications are now environment -related, so 1 in 5 notifications 
now is environment -related. Therefore, both in terms of absolute numbers but also importantly in 
the case of the share of notifications, we are seeing a trend towards more environmental -related 
notifications across all WTO agreements. In terms of types of measures and, of cour se, it is important 
to say that we do have year -on-year fluctuations, partly driven by the SCM Agreement, I might add, 
because the SCM Agreement notifications are done on a biennial basis (once every two years), so 
last year was of more Article 25, subsidy  notifications, so we did see a large number of 
SCM Agreement measures as the top type of measures and that was followed by the TBT Agreement, 
which is also consistently an important chunk of the dataset. Of course, we do have more granularity 
thereafter, so we do break down support measures into different types (grants, direct payments, 
loans and financing, non -monetary support, and so on). Grants, in fact, were almost a third of all 
notified measures in the database last year followed by technical regulat ions and specifications 
stemming mainly from, of course, the TBT and SPS Agreements.  
5.5.  In terms of type of sectors, we again harmonize categories for both type of measures and type 
of sectors so there are 25 types of measures and 11 harmonized sectors, so ag riculture was last 
year the top one, followed by manufacturing, chemicals and energy. I should add that the residual 
category, which is called "other", is also an important one as far as the dataset is concerned, mainly 
because we also club together stuff like waste or wildlife in this "other" category. Some further 
topic-specific analysis is perhaps warranted under this "other" category, especially when it comes to 
biodiversity or wildlife, and that is something that we can perhaps look into for the purpos es of the 
EDB 2021 report, which will of course follow at the next meeting.  
5.6.  In terms of types of objectives, last year, chemicals and toxic substances management still is 
the most important one as far as the types of objectives and the notified measures, f ollowed by 
energy conservation and efficiency, and sustainable agricultural management. We are, of course, 
 
13 See document RD/CTE/214.  WT/CTE/M/76  
 
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  talking about a large number of environmental notifications, but an even larger number of 
environment -related measures. In fact, last year there were  2,250 – it has almost gone off the scale 
as far as this chart is concerned because it was a 62% increase from 2020. Last year, we saw a 
large jump and the main factor behind this was the SCM Agreement as it had over 1,000 
environment -related measures in a bout 50 notifications.  
5.7.  Overall, 116 WTO Members had one or more environment -related notifications in the database 
in 2021. The EU was the most with 115  notifications, and EU member states have some of their own 
notifications as well under the SCM  Agreement, Trade Facilitation and so forth. It is important to 
mention that the notifications are coming from all regions of the world and from all levels of 
development as well, so developing countries and LDCs are also notifying environment -related 
measu res in the dataset, so you can see that in addition to the EU and the US, which are the top 
two, you also have Brazil, India, China and others who spoke this morning as well. Another important 
factor is that there are also LDCs (Rwanda and Uganda, for exam ple, have been in the top ten over 
the last few years, particularly Rwanda).  
5.8.  I will not go into a breakdown of the type of measure, type of sector or harmonized type of 
objective as that is there in the room document, but we can of course discuss it later.  Just to say 
that last week we published all the TPR entries so now we have the full dataset, which is why we are 
presenting the 2021 results to you today. In terms of TPR entries, last year was also a big chunk as 
well because there were actually 18 TPR r eports done last year. There may be a backlog from 
COVID -19 because in 2020 there were fewer TPRs done, but last year it was more than business as 
usual and we had about 1,500 entries from these TPRs.  
5.9.  Following this presentation, some delegations had the following reactions.  
5.10.  The representative of Paraguay  delivered the following statement:  
5.11.  Paraguay  wanted to make a few quick comments regarding the database and the notifications 
and collection of agricultural measures in the database.  
5.12.  We have been trying t o use the database for what it was intended for, that is, to be able to 
look at environmental measures  and we have found that the database not including the amount of 
subsidies that are reported is not necessarily helpful for Members when they are trying t o visualize 
the level of support . We would encourage the Secretariat to include the actual level of subsidies 
when we are looking at environmental measures that are related to the Agreement on Agriculture.  
5.13.  Further, we have found to our surprise that some of the information that has been correctly 
notified by Members as non -product -specific Amber Box support when extracted from the database 
that was compiled by the Secretariat is reclassified as Annex II Green Box support . We are looking 
forward to hearing the Secretariat's explanation as to why they are reclassifying the measures in 
the database. They may be environmental matters or with environmental objectives, but if they are 
trade-distorting that does not make them Green Box. I think there is confusion as to what "Green 
Box" means in agriculture and what it means in environment, so I would also encourage the 
Secretariat to take a very close look as to why this is happening in the database and to consult with 
their colleagues in the Agriculture Division t o make sure that this can be fixed. We will approach the 
Secretariat on a bilateral basis to share the specific examples that we have found where measures 
have been reclassified from the original notification to Annex II Green Box measures.  
5.14.  The representa tive of Brazil  delivered the following statement:  
5.15.  Regarding the issue raised by Paraguay, we hope the Secretariat is not seeking to reclassify 
as "Green Box " measures that Members classified as non -product -specific Amber Box, only because 
it was directed t o environment purposes.  
5.16.  As there is a lot of "greenwashing" being seen in notifications by other Members, we request 
clarification regarding the reason why the Secretariat is seeking to label such measures as "green ". 
5.17.  Let's also undo confusion for those he re that are not part of the agriculture community: when 
we are talking about Green Box, we are referring to agriculture measures that have no or minimal WT/CTE/M/76  
 
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  trade and production -distorting effects.  We are in the World Trade Organization. Let's not leave 
trade aside from our discussions.  
5.18.  This referred reclassification risks creating a system in which only developed countries with 
large fiscal space will have their agriculture considered sustainable. Additionally, the listing can be 
seen as arbitrary. For instanc e, almost every domestic support measure in Brazil is contingent on 
the producer respecting our forest code which has the most restrictive rules regarding land 
retirement in private property without any compensation being paid for the producer. If the same  
criteria were applied, all this support has environmental conditionalities and should be in this list.  
5.19.  Let us stress that repurposing must not be "green washing ". Rather, it must be tackling 
trade-distorting domestic support and redirecting efforts to tran sforming food systems into more 
sustainable ones, without introducing new kinds of distortions and without losing sight of the three 
dimensions of sustainable development and Common But Differentiated Responsibilities . 
5.20.  This is particularly serious when we consider that domestic support subsidies have amounted 
to more than USD 800 billion per year, being thus more than one hundred times what is being 
granted to the Global Environment Fund.  
5.21.  Let us all imagine what the world would look like if a highly subsidi zing member had, over the 
past two decades, dedicated just 10% of its agricultural subsidies for real environmental initiatives, 
and not for things such as mechanical tillage, which is a subsidy for a practice that entails fossil fuel 
usage and is hardly s ustainable.  
5.22.  If a real re -purpose had taken place, we would certainly be in a much better position in 
achieving our SDGs globally, we would have seen significant development in LDCs and developing 
countries, each with enhanced capacities to push for sustain ability goals, less migration push into 
northern countries, and we would have a more diversified source of food systems, with larger offers 
and thus reduced inflation.  
5.23.  Members, particularly the developed ones, have, thus, within their power, the ability to make 
significant contributions to our common efforts for social, economic and environmental sustainability.  
5.24.  However, putting Amber and Green Box measures in the same basket may indirectly support 
behavio ur such as what we see related to green washing , and this will diverge us from the path we 
should be commonly pursuing.  
5.25.  The representative of India delivered the following statement:  
5.26.  We wanted  to thank the delegation of Paraguay for raising this issue and we will reach out 
bilaterally to underst and the discrepancies that they have found.  
5.27.  The representative of the United  States  delivered the following statement:  
5.28.  Thank you to the Secretariat for its presentation on the environmental database.  The database 
demonstrates the clear nexus of the enviro nment and environmental measures to trade, and it is a 
useful resource for Members seeking to understand the breadth of trade policy issues that intersect 
with environmental concerns.  We note not all Members have notified relevant measures to the WTO, 
and we encourage Members to meet their transparency and reporting obligations under the WTO so 
that databases like this on can be fully utilized.  
5.29.  The WTO Secretariat  delivered the following statement:  
5.30.  Thank you Members for raising the good, the bad and the ugl y in the database. First of all, 
just to say thank you to Paraguay, Brazil, India, and the United  States for their pointed comments 
and also their suggestions. We had two specific points to make, and Brazil mentioned them as well . 
On agriculture , we have a round 599, almost 600, agricultural notifications between 2009 and 2021. 
These 600 agricultural notifications amount to about 3,150  environment -related agricultural 
measures, so 600 notifications and about 3,000 plus environment -related measures within the m. 
These include support measures notified under Annex  II, the Green Box , but also many of the other WT/CTE/M/76  
 
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  provisions. Yes, this database was earlier done in Excel and now is done online and this has reduced 
the human error to an extent, but it has not eliminate d all human errors of course.  
5.31.  We will reach out to Paraguay and other Members bilaterally to understand what is the 
quantum or scale of this oversight, if I may call it that, because there is no intention to change the 
nature or the substance of the notif ication. We are trying to basically transpose that information 
from the notification to the dataset. We are using, of course, humans to do this, so there are 
sometimes human errors in that, but having said that I would be interested in knowing if out of 
these 3,150 odd measures this is a small or big problem and to correct it as soon as possible.  
5.32.  There were some other points from Paraguay particularly on the amount of the grant being 
mentioned in the dataset. I think we had a similar discussion a week or tw o ago in a useful meeting 
on subsidies itself. We had a dedicated discussion on subsidies when we talked about it and we were 
saying that we can of course keep improving the dataset by adding new filters or new elements of 
information. The database itself has links to the notification, but of course when we developed the 
electronic version of this database in 2009, the criteria we used covered everything from TBT/SPS 
notifications (which at that time was the most dominant part of the database) to subsidies.  Now, 
TBT and SPS, for example, has HS codes, whereas subsidy notifications do not have HS codes. So if 
you download the data into Excel you will see that from A to M (we can go on from A to Z also) but 
we don't cover the whole notification, we cover parts  of the notification, and the parts which we 
thought were the most relevant and usable in WTO, of course, was the HS, for example. Information 
on grants does not make sense in other agreements, whether it is quantitative restrictions, import 
licencing, TBT  or SPS, and that is why the amount of grants was not itself put into the database, but 
that information is available because we identify the specific programmes and, of course, if a Member 
then goes back to the notification itself, they will be able to ex tract the amount of the grant. But, of 
course we are in Members' hands and will continue to improve the database in whatever direction 
you lead us.  
6  MEMBERS'  SUGGESTIONS AND PROPOSALS  
6.1  Trade and Environmental Sustainability Structured Discussions (TESSD)  
6.1.  The representative of Canada , on behalf of the TESSD C o-convenors , provided an update on 
the TESSD  discussions.  
6.2.  Congratulations on a highly successful Trade and Environment W eek to the entire team. It is a 
pleasure to be here today to provide an update on the discussions that have been taking place in 
the TESSD since the last meeting of the CTE. Since the last meeting, cosponsors have continued 
their engagement to expand their  knowledge about the linkages between trade and environment, to 
share experiences and to discuss how cosponsors can further strengthen and deepen our discussions 
on trade and environment.  
6.3.  At the last TESSD plenary in July, cosponsors heard a range of pres entations on various areas 
of interest. Firstly, cosponsors heard about how technical barriers to trade can have significant 
impacts on the trade in environmental goods. Part of the meeting was also dedicated to a 
transparency section on some intersessiona l dialogues on the four areas being discussed by 
cosponsors. These are: trade -related climate measures; environmental goods and services; circular 
economy – circularity; and subsidies. A large portion of the meeting was also dedicated to three 
exchanges on  regional experiences. The aim of these sessions was to allow Members and cosponsors 
to hear from different cosponsors and also non -cosponsors about their experiences in addressing 
trade and environmental challenges in their specific regions.  
6.4.  The first se ssion covered Asia -Pacific and heard amongst other things about specific 
experiences and implementing solutions to advance sustainability and green competitiveness, as 
well as broader experiences of regional economies and engaging in trade in environmental  goods 
and services. The second session focused on Africa, where participants heard presentations on 
African perspectives on the circular economy, environmental sustainability perspectives from the 
shea industry, and an example of specific technological so lutions in the building industry. The third 
session focused on South and Central America and the Caribbean touching on the importance of 
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  climate goals, discussion s on ocean bio trade and an example of a business success story from an 
organic chocolate company, which also brought samples, which was nicely to end that day!  
6.5.  We very much encourage Members to take a look at the Member's section of the TESSD 
website. All  of the presentations are available and some of the videos as well, so you can take a look 
at some of the specific areas that were discussed.  
6.6.  TESSD cosponsors have also continued discussions through intersessional meetings on specific 
areas of interest, i ncluding meetings that took place earlier this month. As mentioned before, under 
our work plan, Members engaged on trade -related climate measures; environmental goods and 
services; circular economy – circularity; and subsidies. In the area of trade -related  climate 
measures, the most recent discussions had Members hear presentations touching on a range of 
issues related to carbon accounting, as well as pricing and non -pricing measures related to climate 
change. The cosponsors heard from ISO, the IMF, a prese ntation from the Secretariat, and the OECD 
on different work that is ongoing in the area. Members also had the opportunity to discuss some of 
the challenges associated with carbon pricing and one Member noted the important role that the 
WTO can play in pro viding for transparency and dialogue in this area.  
6.7.  On environmental goods and services, Members had the opportunity to discuss non -tariff 
measures and the significant impact that they can have in hindering trade in goods that are critical 
to the achieveme nt of environmental goals. Cosponsors noted the importance of transparency and 
dialogue in minimizing barriers. Members also discussed services, touching on discussions taking 
place in the CTE -SS and highlighting some national experiences in addressing ser vices in the 
environmental sphere. A number of cosponsors have indicated an interest in continuing discussions 
regarding environmental goals, the goods and services that can aid Members in achieving those 
goals, and the role of the WTO in facilitating trad e in these goods and services. In the near term, 
discussions will continue on climate change and mitigation and adaptation.  
6.8.  In the area of circular economy – circularity, cosponsors heard updates on various elements 
impacting the creation of sustainable ci rcular economy circularity systems. A presentation by the 
WCO touched on challenges and distinguishing between used goods and recyclable materials from 
waste and customs procedures. The BRS Secretariat touched on the identification of used goods, 
prior inf ormed consent procedures and updates regarding e -waste. The OECD presented on 
cross-border reverse supply chains and the Secretariat presented some information about 
trade-related policy issues and elements that may serve as a basis for a mapping exercise,  as 
Members have expressed an interest in looking more closely at the trade -related aspects that can 
support the development of effective circular economy circularity systems.  
6.9.  Finally, in the session on subsidies, cosponsors heard a range of presentations,  including one 
by the Secretariat on the Environmental Database, a presentation by the OECD on environmental 
impacts of industrial subsidies and by the IISD on some of the discussions surrounding the fisheries 
subsidies. The aim is to continue to find oppo rtunities to expand Members' knowledge and continue 
discussions in this area and, again, I will make a pitch for taking a look at the website, which has a 
lot of presentations and excellent information to do a deep dive.  
6.10.  The next plenary meeting of the TE SSD will take place on 11 November. Originally, we were 
meant to have a two -day meeting, but a completing event has requisitioned all of the larger rooms 
on 10 November, so we will be holding only a one -day meeting. During that time, we hope to provide 
an update to Members on plans for a high -level stocktaking event in December. Unfortunately, the 
one-day meeting means that we will not be able to continue with our planned second session on 
regionally focused discussions, but we will aim to continue with tha t format in the next calendar 
year. 
6.11.  As always, our plenaries are open to all WTO Members, as it allows us to ensure transparency 
and an opportunity for Members who may not have time to attend all of the meetings to hear a bit 
about the discussions that hav e taken place intersessionally. With that, I will leave it there.  
6.12.  Following this presentation, some delegations had the following reactions.  WT/CTE/M/76  
 
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  6.13.  The representative of Japan  delivered the following statement:  
6.14.  In order to achieve carbon neutrality by 2050, it i s necessary not only to eliminate tariffs on 
products that are already widely used, but also to remove barriers and to promote its diffusion at 
various stages, not only from the development of new products and technologies but also to the 
stages of product ion, distribution, and trade.  
6.15.  Based on this awareness of the problem and reflecting on the Environmental Goods 
Agreement, one idea would be to first narrow down the definition of "environmental goods " to 
products that use technology that directly contribut es to the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions.  
6.16.  In this regard, APEC is taking new initiatives to liberalize trade in environmental goods and 
services, using the existing APEC Environmental Goods List as a foothold. Last year, based on Japan's 
proposal, a workshop was held on non -tariff measures related to the environment, and this year 
research and analysis of related measures are being conducted as well. We would like to utilize the 
results of these efforts in discussions at the WTO  
6.17.  Regarding environmental services, the APEC Ministerial Meeting, held in November 2021, 
adopted the Reference List of Environmental and Environmentally Related Services as an annex to 
the Ministerial Statement. In addition, following this adoption, APEC is moving for ward with a project 
to create a template for a positive list of environment and environmentally  related services. We 
believe that these can contribute to future discussions in TESSD.  
6.18.  The representative of the Maldives  delivered the following statement:  
6.19.  Let me first of all congratulate the Chair and the Committee on holding a successful WTO 
Trade and Environment Week . I am confident that the discussions that were held during this week 
will improve the output of the CTE 's work.  
6.20.  Paragraph 14 of the MC12 outco me document recogni zes Committee on Trade and 
Environment as a standing forum dedicated to dialogue among Members on the relationship between 
trade measures and environmental measures. We believe more can be done in this Committee to 
incentivize the market  access of sustainable and environmental goods to achieve sustainable supply 
chains.  
6.21.  Excellencies and Colleagues,  the development of Small Island Developing States are clearly 
outlined in the SIDS Accelerated Modalities of Action Pathway. The SAMOA Pathway  states that Small 
Island Developing States have extraordinary marine and terrestrial biodiversity that in many cases 
is fundamental to their livelihoods and identity and it supports the efforts by SIDS to export 
sustainably produced products. In this rega rd, Maldives has taken measures to ensure our important 
fishing industry has a sustainable supply chain by promoting the practice of intrinsically 
environmentally sustainable fishing methods like pole and line and hand line fishing. These methods 
have zero  by-catch and thus have a significantly lower impact on the environment, and serves to 
protect marine biodiversity unlike indiscriminate methods of fishing such as drift netting. In order to 
enhance the potential of the blue economy and harness its positiv e trade impact, it is imperative to 
incentivi ze these activities including through preferential market access.  
6.22.  Excellencies and Colleagues,  the effect of environmental measures on market access is an 
important area of CTE for SIDS. In the pursuit of susta inable supply chains, CTE should look at 
incentivizing the market access of sustainable and environmental goods and assist developing 
countries especially SIDS to identify products, and develop export markets for environmentally 
friendly products including  sustainably sourced products, in areas where SIDS can enjoy a 
comparative advantage. I believe such actions would lead to concrete outcomes that would enhance 
the potential of the blue economy and the development of SIDS as outlined in the SAMOA Pathway.  
6.23.  Before I conclude may I once again thank the Chair and the presenters for the updates and 
information provided today. We stand ready to work with WTO to further the trade and environment 
agenda, in particular, to find solutions to promote sustainably sourced products.  WT/CTE/M/76  
 
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  6.24.  The representative of the Russian Federation  delivered the following statement:  
6.25.  Russia attaches great importance to environmental issues. We are constantly improving our 
respective national legislation and are actively engaged  in international efforts to tackle climate 
change and its consequences.  We recognize that trade policy and the WTO can play a role in this 
task, too.  
6.26.  Following this logic, Russia has joined the format of Structured discussions last year. To us, 
its main v alue was in enhanced information sharing and exchange of views with an aim to further 
explore how we can better use the WTO tool  kit to support environmental objectives and what do 
we need for that. This task cannot be achieved if the basic principles of i nclusivity and transparency 
are neglected, and the discussions are primarily held in small groups. Unfortunately, this is what we 
are witnessing today.  
6.27.  We agree that the WTO rules need improvement in certain areas. However, that must be done 
collectively, taking into account interests and concerns of all Members. The need to follow an 
inclusive multilateral approach is dictated by the very essence of trade and environment issues. Be 
it climate change or loss of the biodiversity – these are the global proble ms, which cannot be solved 
by efforts of one or a group of Members.  
6.28.  Without doubt, every WTO Member shares the view on the necessity of environmental 
protection and fighting against climate change. With that, the methods differ in various countries 
depend ing on geography and nature conditions, as well as economic models and available 
technologies. It is necessary to assess the impact of different national methods, not follow the path 
of their exclusion. Only in this way, our joint efforts will be truly syn ergized, helping us to achieve 
common environmental goals.   
6.29.  We hope that the abovementioned concerns will be duly addressed in the future organization 
of the work within the TESSD, especially, by the coordinators.  
6.30.  The representative of the United  Kingdom  delivered the following statement:  
6.31.  The United  Kingdom supports the ongoing efforts of the TESSD to share ideas and evidence 
on trade and environment, and to try and carve a path towards concrete outcomes.  
6.32.  The UK has been active across the four workstreams , particularly in the Environmental Goods 
and Services workstream – where we see natural overlap between our shared environmental 
objectives and the trade tools available to us.  We would like to highlight one point that we were not 
able to raise at the mos t recent TESSD working group meeting.  
6.33.  The UK has been participating in recent discussions at the World Customs Organ ization, 
looking at how customs and the Harmoni zed System can help Members meet their environmental 
objectives. The Greening of Customs Conf erence hosted in June, together with the current Green 
Symposia series, underlines the importance of working across the trade policy and customs 
communities to ensure trade and environment policies can be implemented effectively at the border.  
6.34.  In our view,  the WCO has an especially important role to play in distinguishing environmental 
goods: helping us to obtain data about the movement of these goods through supply chains, target 
trade policy measures that facilitate their movement, and by harmoni zing the relevant codes. Recent 
revisions of the Harmoni zed System demonstrate this, with new 2022 codes being created for 
products such as electric cars and motorcycles separate from diesel and petrol vehicles.  
6.35.  However, time is short to influence the next cycle co ncluding in 2027, and it takes time for 
Members to build robust proposals for consideration. The UK has submitted two proposals to the 
WCO Review Sub -Committee for consideration in November, covering heat pumps and solar powered 
water pumps. This has been achieved through a close and focus ed collaboration between trade and 
environment policy makers and customs officials in capital.  
6.36.  With the pace of development of environmental technologies, and the growing importance of 
discussions about how trade supports  environmental outcomes in practice, we would like to 
encourage other Members to look carefully at the current work of the WCO and the HS2027 and WT/CTE/M/76  
 
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  consider whether they have capacity to make proposals. We would be willing to discuss our process 
and views wi th any interested member.  
6.37.  The representative of Australia  delivered the following statement:  
6.38.  Australia welcomes the updates provided by the coordinators and we value the efforts being 
taken on sustainability, trade and the environment across the four Worki ng Groups, including trade -
related climate measures, circular economy – circularity, subsidies and environmental goods and 
services. We underline the importance of trade as a tool as a policy lever to address environmental 
issues. We would encourage other Members to engage in these structured discussions and thank the 
TESSD conveners for the transparent way that they have been convening these important 
discussions including open meetings, the publishing of agendas and reports on the WTO website, 
and of cour se the report to this esteemed body as well.  
6.39.  We are looking forward to the high -level TESSD event in December, which will be an important 
opportunity to stocktake the work that has been done and to set out our priorities for the 
membership's ongoing work on the important issues relating to the nexus of trade and the 
environment. At the start of this week, we heard a call at the high -level event for the WTO to take 
action. We echo that call and look forward to continuing to engage positively and inclusively  with 
Members on these very important issues.  
6.40.  The representative of the United  States  delivered the following statement:  
6.41.  The United  States thanks the coordinators for their hard work to coordinate the TESSD and 
its Working Groups.  We also thank the co -facilitators for their efforts to build robust programs of 
work to advance implementation of the Ministerial Statement, and to deepen Members' 
understanding and consideration of issues on trade -related climate measures, environmental goods 
and services, circul ar economy, and environmental related impacts from subsidies.  
6.42.  We look forward to continuing to our work under the TESSD and considering how we can work 
within the framework of the WTO expand opportunities for environmentally sustainable trade in an 
inclusi ve and transparent way.  
6.43.  We view the TESSD as a valuable forum to explore emerging trade -relevant environmental 
policy issues at the WTO.  We hope the work by Members through the TESSD forum will lead to 
revitalizing the work under this Committee, as the st anding Committee responsible for trade and 
environment issues in the WTO.  
6.44.  The representative of the European Union  delivered the following statement:  
6.45.  We believe that TESSD had some useful discussions this year. High -level meeting in December 
will be an important stocktaking moment in order to give a vision for the next year.  
6.46.  We welcome sectoral approach and focused discussion on facilitating environmental goods 
and services. We believe that more deep dive sessions sh ould be organi zed next year particularly 
trying to unravel the development dimension of this works stream.  
6.47.  The need for more transparency on the trade -related climate measures has been a recurring 
comment from many Members. We would welcome deeper underst anding on how this could be 
achieved. Similarly, we can support the idea by the group to develop a checklist of for designing 
trade-related climate measures.  
6.48.  We would welcome mapping work on how trade policy can contribute to the transition to 
circular an d resource efficient economy. We would encourage to deepen the understanding how 
trade policy can contribute to value -retention processes or supporting trade is second -hand goods.  
6.49.  The subsidies work stream includes several items that would merit considera tions also in the 
Committee on Trade and Environment or in other Committees. For example, we see strong interest 
of WTO Members to engage on sustainability aspects of agricultural support – this discussion would 
benefit of the expertise from this Committee  as well as the Committee of Agriculture to be able to 
address its multifaceted nature.  WT/CTE/M/76  
 
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  6.50.  Another important topic that emerged from the exchanges and important to flag here is the 
environmental effects of subsidies. This covers both the potential environmen tal harm of subsidies 
as well as the best practices of designing positive, green subsidies that aim to advance climate and 
environmental policy objectives.  
6.2  12th Ministerial Conference  (MC12)  
6.51.  Members  were invited to express views and comments on the CTE and  trade and paragraph  14 
of the MC12 outcome document. In particular, the Chairperson of the CTE would like to ask 
delegations to assess the sufficiency of the current output of the CTE in light of global challenges. 
Suggestions to improve the relevance and  reactivity of the CTE would be welcome.  
6.52.  The representative of Switzerland  delivered the following statement:  
6.53.  Switzerland is very happy to see your commitment and that of the Secretariat in having a 
successful Trade and Environment Week, which shows that t here is great interest and there was a 
good turn out from Members. You, Chair, have asked Members to look at the sufficiency of the 
current work done by this Committee given the challenges we face, and I think that simply we can 
say it is not enough. We ha ve seen that there has been a paradigm shift and we had seen that the 
WTO is not able to make a headway without looking at environmental sustainability. In fact, thanks 
to the MC12 remit, climate change is now recognized as a part of the WTO's agenda and a  number 
of discussions have already taken place as part of various initiatives within the WTO.  
6.54.  We agree that climate change, the loss of biodiversity, and pollution should not simply be 
recognized as challenges to the world but that we should also have a c ommitment that will tackle 
them. These are the three reasons to justify that: first, we believe that international trade policy has 
to make a real contribution to resolving the environmental and climatic challenges and sustainable 
development in all countr ies; secondly, climate change is a threat for development, peace and 
prosperity, and this is something that we have to tackle urgently and it has to be taken on by all 
Members, that is to say this means we need a global and urgent response; thirdly, if tra de of itself 
cannot deal with the threat of climate change, then viable economic solutions need multilateral 
governance of trade. Therefore, we believe that this is a real opportunity to strengthen dialogue with 
this Committee, and that we find matters of interest to all Members. Members could do this by 
submitting non -papers for discussion, as Switzerland has done in the past, on subjects that are 
linked to the remit of the Committee so that we can trigger discussion. This means that we have to 
work on thi s so that we can build trust between Members and we can favour constructive discussions 
so that we can boost transparency, which goes beyond our regular remit.  
6.55.  It goes without saying that we have to look at synergies with other organizations, particularly 
when looking at the environment. We are always in favour of close collaboration between the WTO 
and other multilateral agreements. Finally, and I will finish by saying this, as was said on Monday, 
this is an inspiring age and we have to make sure that we w ork to maintain the importance of this 
Committee.  
6.56.  The representative of South Africa  delivered the following statement:  
6.57.  Paragraph 14 of the MC12 Outcomes Document recognizes  global environmental challenges 
including climate change and related natural disas ters, loss of biodiversity and pollution. However, 
the paragraph does not speak to the CTE mandate.  
6.58.  The CTE mandate is reflected in the Doha Ministerial Declaration. Given the importance of 
global environmental  challenges, this is an opportune time for the  CTE to refer to its mandate and 
work programme and to review any progress it has made to date on the Doha environment mandate. 
Where there has been no progress, it must be understood why.  
6.59.  Now is also the time for the CTE to invigorate the necessary politi cal will amongst Members 
to move forward on the more difficult environmental issues based on the CTE mandate and work 
programme, and in a manner that fits countries'  needs and priorities, and this includes discussions 
taking place within a sustainable deve lopment framework that better suits the long -term interests 
and needs of developing countries.  WT/CTE/M/76  
 
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  6.60.  The CTE should not be used as a platform for the discussion of non -mandated issues. Nor 
should it be used to expand the potential for the use of environmental me asures to restrict market 
access of goods from certain countries. Inclusion of non -mandated issues in the CTE means an 
expansion of the mandate and effectively a change in the work programme. Only mandated issues 
should be discussed in the CTE . These are i mportant issues that must be addressed and remain of 
critical importance to a developmental agenda of the CTE.  
6.61.  Importantly, WTO seminars and discussions on the environment under the CTE must be 
balanced if we are to make inroads, including balance views based on institutions and panelists 
invited to address the issues. Otherwise, this risks polarization of the discussions  which is not helpful. 
We need a Member -driven process that takes into account the interests of all Members.  
6.62.  The representative of the United  Kingdom  delivered the following statement:  
6.63.  At MC12, all WTO Members recogni zed the role of the multilateral  trading system to address 
global environmental challenges including climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution. The 
challenge now is working out what is possible – the levers available to use as trade officials and 
trade policymakers – and where ther e is fertile ground for cooperation, because global problems 
require collective global solutions.  
6.64.  No single member can solve these problems alone – and in attempting to do so, we might 
create unintended adverse impacts on both trade and development. There fore, as countries work 
tirelessly to meet their climate and sustainability goals, it is vital that we work together to find policy 
solutions that reduce the risk of a patchwork of unilateral actions. To reach these mutually beneficial 
solutions, Members m ust be willing to work together at the WTO.  
6.65.  Trade and climate change do not exist in vacuums. Climate change will catastrophically disrupt 
supply chains on a scale even greater than that seen during the COVID pandemic. And without 
concerted and coordinated  action, international trade risks propagating the problem by relocating 
polluting activities rather than helping eliminate them.  
6.66.  The good news is that, with the emergence of new and dynamic industries and sectors, there 
are opportunities for trade facili tate the green transition, and help achieve the sustainable 
development goals in all three of their dimensions – economic, social and environmental. 
Constructive dialogue is key to achieving this.  
6.67.  On what that might look like in practice, and how the CTE c an play a role, the UK offers the 
following ideas and suggestions for Members to consider:  
a. While there are constructive dialogues taking place in other joint initiatives at the WTO, 
the CTE offers a valuable forum to enhance transparency and even publicise  best practice 
on the measures Members are taking to address environmental challenges. We thank the 
Members who continue to share their experiences, and we encourage continued 
engagement on reducing trade frictions and maximi zing positive environmental imp act.  
b. The CTE can also support principled discussions on the trade and environment nexus. For 
example, finding common ground on what constitutes sustainable trade is imperative to 
supporting Members consider how best to advance policies that support both t rade and 
the environment. This requires the trade community and the environment community 
coming together, not only between international institutions, but domestically too, we 
should all be speaking inter -governmentally to try and understand the principle s of 
sustainable trade  
c. Furthermore, as being discussed in other for a such as the TESSD, we know there are trade 
tools at our disposal which can help advance environmental objectives, including by 
facilitating the uptake and lowering costs of key environmental goods and services. We 
also know that developing countries will need additional support to realise some of these 
opportunities and participate in global value chains – particularly in accessing cheap, 
reliable, resilient, and clean energy. The CTE could be a forum to understand and 
coordinate technical assistance and c apacity  building needs, alongside other international 
organi zations like the ITC and  the UN Climate Technology Centre and Network  and offer a WT/CTE/M/76  
 
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  space to consider how tools ranging from trade facilitation to technology transfer can 
support this uptake - perhap s through dedicated workshops for developing Members.  
d. From a more practical perspective, the CTE could also help coordinate greater join -up with 
the work of other committees. This will help ensure that sustainability is embedded across 
the work of the WTO , help upskill delegates on trade & environment issues, and ensure 
that information, evidence and progress achieved in the CTE is shared across platforms.  
e. Finally, we might also consider where the CTE could provide updates and 
recommendations to other bodi es or committees outside of the WTO – for example, where 
there is a lack of harmoni zed environmental standards, could these be identified and 
presented by the CTE for consideration by policymakers outside the trade space?  
6.68.  All of the suggestions we have ou tlined, may require us to rethink the current standing agenda 
and work programme of the CTE, which is still reliant on the 1994 CTE work programme, and 2001 
Doha Round Ministerial Declaration. We have a new commitment in the 2022 Ministerial outcome 
docume nt from MC12, so perhaps we should be rethinking the Committee's mandate. We suggest 
that at the next CTE meeting, Members could bring forward proposals on what a new work 
programme and mandate might look like, reflective of the 2022 Ministerial Declaratio n. 
6.69.  The representative of the United  States  delivered the following statement:  
6.70.  The United  States remain s committed to the CTE as the standing Committee at the WTO for 
discussing trade and environment measures. We continue to see benefit to Members to utiliz e the 
TESSD to discuss the evolving nature of trade and environment and timely and current issues 
through that dynamic forum.  
6.71.  We view the TESSD as an opportunity to workshop ideas and discuss topics, but we should 
remain committed to bringing work back to  the CTE for engagement and transparency purposes. We 
could consider providing opportunities for more dynamic discussions and presentations during the 
CTE meetings, on emerging policy choices relevant to climate change and other environmental 
challenges. W e are open to considering how we can bring energy back into the CTE so we can fully 
utilize its role as the Committee dedicated to environment at the WTO.  
6.72.  The representative of New Zealand  delivered the following statement:  
6.73.  I would like to also swell the chorus of thanking the Chair and the Secretariat for all the hard 
work and the excellent organization during this week. I think we, like others, have found it a very 
full, engaging and stimulating environment week, and that i s not just our view, we have heard that 
also from stakeholders and NGO colleagues too, so thank you again, it was very worthwhile.  
6.74.  For us, also the MC12 outcome document and the important references in paragraph 14 and 
the important acknowledgment in parag raph 14 of the global challenges of climate change, 
biodiversity loss, and pollution was a singularly important outcome. We do, as others have remarked, 
we are very aware that this Committee is the multilateral forum dedicated to the dialogue on those 
important issues. From that perspective, we are very open to ways to maintain and strengthen the 
functioning of this Committee in that role and we have three practical ideas also to contribute to the 
food for thought.  
6.75.  First, we, too, have been very struck by the extent of the cross -cutting dialogue that reaches 
across other areas of work in this Organization. Like the UK, we see a very useful role for this 
Committee in joining us up in terms of what is happening on environment -related work elsewhere 
and we cou ld potentially invite the Chairs of other Committees to brief the CTE on some of this work, 
for example, the work of the Government Procurement Committee on green procurement issues. 
This would be really helpful in continuing to break down the silos across  the WTO's 
environment -related discussions and work and also to promote the role of the CTE in supporting 
coherence across the Organization.  
6.76.  A second practical thought is that we think that it is very useful that we continue to hear back 
on other environme nt initiatives that are taking place. We see this as an important contribution to 
transparency. From a practical perspective, it is also very helpful for smaller delegations to WT/CTE/M/76  
 
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  understand what is going on in initiatives that they cannot necessarily get to.  As a matter of good 
practice, we would like to encourage those reports to also be circulated as room documents and we 
will be taking note that work for our own two contributions in that regard this week so that they can 
be circulated as CTE documents and are able to be accessed through the central repository of the 
CTE.  
6.77.  Lastly, we thought that potentially arranging some thematic discussions may also be a way 
to encourage a deeper and more meaningful exchange on policy objectives and design options of 
various measures. Our sense is that, through the course of the week, we have seen a bit of an 
appetite for that, and some of our meatier discussions this week have seen us get into deeper 
exchanges on particular policies and objectives and design, so potential ly some thematic discussions 
might be a way to strengthen that role.  
6.78.  The representative of the European Union  delivered the following statement:  
6.79.  The EU appreciates all the hard work done by the CTE Chair, as well as by the Secretariat, in 
order to improve the working of our Committee and to streamline conversations. In the last few 
years, the Committee has clearly developed and the engagement and involvement of the 
membership has significantly increased. This past environment week clearly demonstrates the 
membership's interest in the topic and its relevance.  
6.80.  The EU is also very pleased that the membership was able to overcome differences and 
recogni ze the challenges we are facing with a paragraph on environment in the outcome document. 
That said we believe t hat climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution should not only 'recogni zed' 
as global challenges, but that MC13 should commit to addressing them.  
6.81.  We should ensure that trade contributes to climate -neutral, nature -positive and clean 
economies and help  achieving sustainable consumption and production, including through resource 
efficiency and circular economy.  To achieve that and in line with the outcome document, the EU is 
of the view that we need to further review and continue improving the work of th is Committee.  
6.82.  Since we have noticed the interest in the updates of the EU Green Deal, we started considering 
if and how we can improve the transparency and deliberation functions of the CTE. Can we broaden 
the dialogue by focusing on individual topics, whe re Members could volunteer to share their 
approaches. The thematic discussion could be based on factual background paper with guiding 
questions, which the WTO Secretariat could provide in advance. We are aware that this would require 
more work from both th e Secretariat and membership. Nevertheless, we hope such a focused 
approach could enable Members to have a deeper, more focused conversation on policy decisions of 
relevance to the nexus of trade and climate. We would welcome a discussion with the membersh ip 
on how we can improve the functioning of the Committee on Trade and Environment in the next CTE 
meeting.  
6.83.  The representative of Australia  delivered the following statement:  
6.84.  I would like to welcome the inclusion of this agenda item in today's Committee m eeting and 
we welcome the MC12 outcome document paragraph on the environment, which was agreed by our 
Ministers and highlights common interests and topics of focus for Members, including climate 
pollution, natural disasters and biodiversity. We urge all Me mbers to up efforts to do more than just 
discuss these issues but to also address these issues. We welcome the ongoing efforts to improve 
the functioning of the CTE and congratulate you, Ambassador Manley, the Secretariat, and indeed 
all the participants i n this week's Committee and Trade and Environment Week for the fantastic 
conversations and discussions that we have been having.  
6.85.  The CTE, as the standing Committee on these issues, is the place for multilateral discussions 
on trade and environment, and we  should continue our efforts to develop the role of the CTE, 
including the transparency functions and the deliberative functions of this body, but also recalling 
the need to be laser -like focused on the nexus of trade and the environment. We welcome the ma ny 
suggestions that have been put forward by others today and would be happy to participate in a 
discussion to develop those.  WT/CTE/M/76  
 
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  6.86.  We welcome the collective efforts of this body to further articulate how we can undertake 
efforts at the WTO to address environme nt issues. We have further thinking to do on what can be 
done both individually, but also collectively, and so we look forward to further discussions on how 
we can improve the functioning of the CTE. Frankly, Chair, this is not something that we can simply  
ponder, it is something that we must do if this house is to have an effect on the environmental 
challenges that face our global community.  
6.87.  The representative of Norway  delivered the following statement:  
6.88.  Norway would also like to congratulate the Chair , the Secretariat, and all participants for a 
successful WTO Trade and Environment Week and a very substantial meeting of the CTE.  
6.89.  Norway is pleased that the link between the Multilateral Trading System and the SDGs was 
recogni zed in para graph  14 of the MC12 outcome document. Now, Members must find ways to 
strengthen the contribution of the WTO to solve the environmental challenges. In our view, this is 
best done in a combination where we both strengthen our common, mandated work here in the CTE, 
while also pursuing th e new initiatives that were launched by groups of Members last December.  
6.90.  Norway participates in all the three initiatives – TESSD, FFSR and IDP. We thank the 
respective coordinators of the initiatives for their updates earlier today. We see good progress.   
6.91.  At the same time, it must be underlined that the CTE remains a valuable forum where the 
whole membership participates. This week has truly demonstrated the high interest of Members. 
The information exchange on relevant national policies, ongoing negotiat ions, as well as technical 
assistance and capacity building, has been very useful. And as you noted on Monday, Chair, the CTE 
also remains an incubator for ideas. Norway would support a further strengthening of the 
transparency and deliberation functions o f the CTE. We think the EU's and other speakers' ideas in 
this regard merit further consideration.  
6.92.  The representative of Bangladesh  delivered the following statement:  
6.93.  Bangladesh welcomes the inclusion of this item in the agenda. With regard to paragraph  14 
of the MC12 outcome document, Bangladesh emphasizes that the Ministers reaffirmed the 
importance of providing relevant support to developing countries, especially the LDCs, to achieve 
sustainable development, including through technological in novation. Bangladesh suggests the CTE 
to discuss this issue in fuller length in its next sessions. The delegation of Bangladesh stands ready 
to work constructively with Members.  
6.94.  The representative of Indonesia  delivered the following statement:  
6.95.  In line wi th working on the MC12 outcome document, we need to carefully identify what issues 
are acceptable to all to be followed up given the principles of common but differentiated responsibility 
and respective capability with a view to promoting the UN 2030 Agend a and the SDGs. At the same 
time, differences in the level of economic development should also be taken into account. We should 
be mindful that the discussions under the WTO should not disturb the carefully balanced 
commitments achieved under the UNFCCC. T herefore, Indonesia is of the view that, substance -wise, 
some issues would be better discussed under the framework of the UNFCCC.  
6.96.  The representative of Colombia  delivered the following statement:  
6.97.  Colombia has been actively participating in the TESSD discus sions and in the structured 
discussions on specific topics. We consider the CTE as a very important Committee; it is a place 
where we can jointly decide on very important environmental matters. We believe it is very 
important to work together with other Co mmittees of the Organization. We need complementary 
agendas and we need to find areas in which we can act jointly. My delegation, for instance, finds 
that we could work with the TBT and the CTG because there are many important synergies that we 
could exami ne. We are committed to taking practical measures to carry out the remit that is in the 
ministerial document of the CTE and we believe that this is the right place to do so. Therefore, we 
are very grateful for including this item on the agenda . 
6.98.  The represe ntative of Ecuador  delivered the following statement:  WT/CTE/M/76  
 
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  6.99.  Ecuador is actively participating in the discussions on trade and the environment within this 
Committee and also in the context of other initiatives, for instance, the initiative on plastic pollution 
and the environmental sustainability discussions. Our country has not perhaps made practical 
proposals but we, as other groups of vulnerable economies, have emphasized the importance of this 
topic. Ecuador is very much interested in these topics and we consi der that there is an important 
moment at which we will be able to reactivate or promote the exchange of experiences on trade and 
the environment in a much more active way.  
6.100.   Looking at the link between sustainable trade and development, we recognize the 
importance of this and the importance of the SDGs and the Ministerial Declarations and the outcome 
document. As mentioned by Bangladesh, we believe that technical assistance is also extremely 
important and that we should also address this. We consider that the  work that has been carried out 
to have a paragraph on trade and sustainable development in the document is one that we can work 
on together. We are currently thinking, together with Australia, about this. We are thinking about it 
both individually and in groups and we believe that this is something that matters to all of us. I just 
wanted to add, Chair, that I believe we must continue this conversation and, as we mentioned during 
the discussions on the outcome document, despite not having made concrete pro posals today and 
even though we are a small and vulnerable economy, Ecuador is greatly committed to all of these 
topics.  
6.101.   The representative of  the Philippines  delivered the following statement:  
6.102.   At MC12, Ministers took the long overdue step of recognizing t he importance of climate 
action in the outcome document. There is an ever increasing acceptance that sustainability, 
particularly climate mitigation and adaptation, must be fully integrated into the WTO agenda moving 
forward. The Philippines continues to b e firm in its belief that a triple win for trade, development 
and the environment is achievable and discussions during the Trade and Environment week have 
provided important ideas that could be integrated into how the CTE's work may evolve under the 
WTO re form process.  
6.103.   The CTE will continue to play a central role as the WTO's standing forum on trade and 
environment and we remain supportive of efforts to strengthen transparency through the 
Environment Database and expanded analytical research on trade and en vironment issues. In 
particular, while we have heard from certain Members about their evolving environmental 
regulations, we recommend that under the auspices of the CTE, we undertake a comprehensive 
mapping of carbon pricing regulations and its impact on trade.  
6.104.   As consumers ' preferences are increasingly prioritizing sustainability, the CTE may wish to 
re-examine its role in examining labe lling requirements for environmental purposes, with a particular 
focus on various regional initiatives on eco -labelling.  
6.105.   While the Philippines is not a co -sponsor of the Trade and Environmental Sustainability 
Structured Discussions (TESSD), the Philippines supports revitalizing work on environmental goods 
and services. The Philippines support a high level of ambition on t his front, which should also take 
into account intermediate products that are used to produce green goods, applications for disaster 
risk reduction and climate adaptation, as well as new technologies like green hydrogen and energy 
storage. As we move towar ds MC13, we may wish to consider how to further mainstream these 
discussions within the CTE and CTE -SS. 
6.106.   The current overlapping crises are providing us with strong tailwinds to collectively move to 
a clean energy transition and the WTO must play a compleme ntary role by facilitating energy and 
environmental services, reducing non -tariff barriers, and individually providing supportive regulatory 
regimes. And given that developing Members will increasingly have to develop trade policy within 
the context of env ironmental regulations and other measures, we foresee greater demand for 
technical assistance. The Philippines would therefore recommend that WTO Secretariat's 
Environment Unit work with the Institute for Training and Technical Cooperation (ITTC) in develo ping 
a model training program me on the design and implications of trade -related environmental 
measures.  
6.107.   The Philippines stands ready to further contribute to sustainability discussions in the WTO 
and looks forward to harnessing the complementary mechanisms  to transition to a circular economy.  WT/CTE/M/76  
 
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  7  RELATIONS WITH IOS AND NGOS – CTE WORK PROGRAMME ITEM 10  
7.1.  Due to a lack of time, the OECD14 and UNECE15 agreed to circulate their presentations as room 
documents . 
8  OTHER BUSINESS   
8.1  Update by Singapore and Australia on the Singapore -Australia Green Economy 
Agreement  
8.1.  The representative of Australia  delivered the following statement : 
8.2.  It is a privilege to advise the Committee on Trade and Environment, particularly during this 
seminal trade and environment week,  that Australia and Singapore have now finali zed the 
Singapore -Australia Green Economy Agreement (GEA).  This landmark agreement was signed by 
Australia's Minister for Trade and Tourism, Don Farrell, and Singapore's Minister for Trade and 
Industry, Gan Kim Yong, in Canberra on 18 October 2022.  
8.3.  The GEA is a first -of-its kind agreement that builds on existing cooperation between Australia 
and Singapore to take action on climate change, to strengthen trade and investment in clean energy 
across our region and as sist in advancing our net zero ambitions. The agreement demonstrates our 
joint commitment to an ambitious climate change agenda that promotes and supports trade.  
8.4.  The agreement will catalyse economic growth and create jobs in green sectors by building skil ls 
and technology capabilities in new green growth sectors, and strengthen trade and investment in 
clean energy, including renewable electricity and hydrogen, across our regions while promoting 
decarboni zation.  
8.5.  It will also build on the Singapore -Australia  Free Trade Agreement by promoting greater trade 
and investment in environmental goods and services and exploring ways to tackle non -tariff barriers 
to advance our mutual decarboni zation agendas. The Agreement includes a non -binding and 
ambitious list of 3 72 environmental goods and 155 environmental services which can be adapted 
and enhanced over time.   
8.6.  We believe this list could contribute to multilateral discussions on liberali zing trade in 
environmental goods and services, including in the WTO.  The GEA identified seven key areas of 
cooperation for future work:  
• Trade and investment;  
• Standards and conformity;  
• Green and transition finance;  
• Carbon markets;  
• Clean energy, decarboni zation and technology;  
• Skills and capabilities; and  
• Engagements and partners hips. 
 
8.7.  The GEA also includes a set of 17 joint initiatives as part of our initial efforts to pursue 
cooperative projects in emerging areas. Implementation has already begun including on:  
• work to develop the necessary architecture to facilitate cross -borde r electricity trade;  
• cooperation to promote and facilitate business opportunities and collaborations between 
Australian and Singaporean businesses, especially SMEs on activities in green growth sectors; 
and 
• cooperation on R&D to strengthen collaboration o n science, technology and innovation.  
 
8.8.  The GEA is a model for international cooperation in the green economy space that we envisage 
could contribute to progressing discussions on trade and environmental sustainability at the WTO.  
 
14 See document RD/CTE/215  
15 See document RD/CTE/219  WT/CTE/M/76  
 
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  Should Members wish, we w ould be happy to share more details on the GEA or provide a further 
update to the Committee at a later date.  
8.9.  The representative of Singapore  delivered the following statement : 
8.10.  The GEA will also build on the Singapore -Australia Free Trade Agreement by promo ting 
greater trade and investment in environmental goods and services and exploring ways to tackle 
non-tariff barriers to advance our mutual decarbonization agendas. The agreement includes a 
non-binding and ambitious list of 372 environmental goods and 155  environmental services, which 
can be adapted and enhanced over time. We believe that this list could contribute to multilateral 
discussions on liberalizing trade and environmental goods and services, including at the WTO.  
8.11.  The GEA has identified seven key areas of cooperation for future work, including on trade and 
investment, standards and conformity, green and transition finance, carbon markets, clean energy, 
decarbonization and technology, skills and capabilities and engagements and partnerships. The GEA  
also includes a set of 17 joint initiatives as part of our initial efforts to pursue cooperative projects 
in emerging areas. Implementation has already begun, including on how to develop the necessary 
architecture to facilitate cross -border electricity tr ade, cooperation to promote and facilitate business 
opportunities, and collaboration between Australian and Singaporean businesses particularly SMEs 
on activities in green growth sectors and cooperation on R&D to strengthen collaboration on science, 
techno logy and innovation.  
8.12.  The GEA is a model for international cooperation in the green economy space and we envisage 
that this will contribute to progressing discussions on trade and environmental sustainability at the 
WTO. Should Members wish, we will be happ y to share more details on the GEA and provide further 
updates to the Committee at a later date.  
9  DATE OF THE NEXT MEETING  
9.1.  The next meeting of the CTE is scheduled to take place on 14 -15 March 2023.  
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  WT/CTE/M/76  
 
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  ANNEX 1: ITEMS OF THE CTE WORK PROGRAMME (1994)  
Item 1:  The relationship between the provisions of the multilateral trading system and trade 
measures for environmental purposes, including those pursuant to multilateral 
environmental agreements.  
Item 2:  The relationship between environme ntal policies relevant to trade and environmental 
measures with significant trade effects and the provisions of the multilateral trading 
system.  
Item 3(a):  The relationship between the provisions of the multilateral trading system and 
charges and taxes for  environmental purposes.  
Item 3(b):  The relationship between the provisions of the multilateral trading system and 
requirements for environmental purposes relating to products, including standards 
and technical regulations, packaging, labelling and recycli ng. 
Item 4:  The provisions of the multilateral trading system with respect to the transparency of 
trade measures used for environmental purposes and environmental measures and 
requirements which have significant trade effects.  
Item 5:  The relationship betw een the dispute settlement mechanisms in the multilateral 
trading system and those found in multilateral environmental agreements.  
Item 6:  The effect of environmental measures on market access, especially in relation to 
developing countries, in particular to the least developed among them, and 
environmental benefits of removing trade restrictions and distortions.  
Item 7:  The issue of exports of domestically prohibited goods.  
Item 8:  The relevant provisions of the Agreement on Trade -related  Aspects of Intell ectual 
Property Rights.  
Item 9:  The work programme envisaged in the Decision on Trade in Services and the 
Environment.  
Item 10:  Input to the relevant bodies in respect of appropriate arrangements for relations 
with intergovernmental and non -governmental or ganizations referred to in Article  V 
of the WTO.  
 
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  WT/CTE/M/76  
 
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  ANNEX 2: DOHA MINISTERIAL DECLARATION PARAGRAPHS  
32. We instruct the Committee on Trade and Environment, in pursuing work on all items on its 
agenda within its current terms of reference, to give particular attention to:  
 
(i) the effect of environmental measures on market access, especially in relation to 
developing countries, in particular the least  developed among them, and those situations in 
which the elimination or reduction of trade restrictions and distortions would benefit trade, 
the environment and development;  
 
(ii) the relevant provisions of the Agreement on Trade -Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights; and  
 
(iii) labelling requirements for environmental purposes.  
 
Work on these issues should include the identification of any need to clarify relevant WTO rules. The 
Committee shall report to the Fifth Session of the Ministerial Conference, and make 
recommendations, where appropriate, with respect to future action, in cluding the desirability of 
negotiations. The outcome of this work as well as the negotiations carried out under paragraph  31 
(i) and  (ii) shall be compatible with the open and non -discriminatory nature of the multilateral 
trading system, shall not add to or diminish the rights and obligations of members under existing 
WTO agreements, in particular the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures, nor alter the balance of these rights and obligations, and will take into account the ne eds 
of developing and least  developed countries.  
 
33. We recogni ze the importance of technical assistance and capacity building in the field of trade 
and environment to developing countries, in particular the least  developed among them. We also 
encourage t hat expertise and experience be shared with members wishing to perform environmental 
reviews at the national level. A report shall be prepared on these activities for the Fifth Session.  
 
51. The Committee on Trade and Development and the Committee on Trade  and Environment shall, 
within their respective mandates, each act as a forum to identify and debate developmental and 
environmental aspects of the negotiations, in order to help achieve the objective of having 
sustainable development appropriately reflect ed. 
 
 
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