G/SG/W/248  
 
3 August 2020 
(20-5382) Page: 1/5 
Committee on Safeguards  Original: English  
 
VIRTUAL INFORMAL MEETING OF THE WTO COMMITTEE ON  
SAFEGUARDS OF 27 JULY 2020 ON AN EU REQUEST FOR A REVIEW  
UNDER ARTICLE 13.1 (E) OF THE AGREEMENT ON SAFEGUARDS  
EU INTERVENTION STATEMENTS  
The following statement , dated 27 July 2020, is being circulated at the request of the delegation of 
the European Union.  
 
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1  BACKGROUND  
• On behalf of the European Union (hereinafter " EU"), I would like to thank the Chair of the 
Committee, Ms Dellar, and the WTO Secretariat f or organising this informal meeting of the 
Safeguards Committee. I would also like to thank the other WTO Members which are present 
in this meeting for attending.  
• This informal meeting takes place following the request by the EU to this Committee under 
Article 13.1(e) of the Agreement on Safeguards to review the proposal of suspension of 
concessions notified by Turkey to the WTO on 25 May 20201 and updated last week on 
23 July 2020.  
• Last May, Turkey notified its intention to suspend concessions and other obligations vis -a-
vis the EU in reaction to the alleged adverse effects on Turkish steel trade caused by the 
definitive safeguard measure on imports of certain steel products which th e EU adopted on 
31 January  20192. In the meantime, the EU safeguard measure in question has been 
reviewed twice by the EU, namely in September 20193 and in June 20204. 
• In its suspension of concessions notification, Turkey advances that the alleged adver se 
effects of the EU safeguard measure on its trade with the EU would amount to $  1.810 million 
on an annual basis. Turkey has not notified to the WTO the details of this calculation. Turkey 
has apparently based this calculation on its level of exports to the EU in 2018.  
2  PRELIMINARY REMARKS  
• Before presenting the EU's initial position with respect to its review request and without 
prejudice to the work of this Committee in this respect, the EU would like to make a series 
of preliminary remarks. First, on the illegality of the suspension of concessions proposed by 
Turkey and, second, on the deficiencies of its suspension notification.  
 
1 G/L/1359 - G/SG/N/12/TUR/9 of 22 May 2020.  
2 OJ L31 of 1 February 2019 . 
3 OJ L248 of 27 September 2019 . 
4 OJ L206 of 30 June 2020 . G/SG/W/248  
 
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  Illegality of the possible rebalancing measures: Breach of th e WTO Agreement on Safeguards  
• In the first place, the EU wishes to note that an implementation of rebalancing 
measures by Turkey would clearly breach  Articles 8.2 and 8.3 of the Safeguards 
Agreement.  
• Article 8.2 of the WTO Safeguard s Agreement prohibits me mbers from exercising any 
suspension of concessions during the first three years that a safeguard measure is in effect, 
when such a measure has been taken as a result of an absolute increase in imports and that 
it conforms to the provisions of the agreemen t. 
• The EU maintains that these conditions were scrupulously respected  when it adopted 
and reviewed the safeguard measure that Turkey intends now to rebalance before the 
expiration of the three -year grace period.  
• The EU Regulations that imposed and reviewed  the safeguard measure at stake 
substantiated at length and in detail why it conformed to the provisions of the 
WTO Safeguard Agreement.  
• As regards the absolute increase in imports, let me briefly mention the most 
relevant  import figures, so that there be no doubt in the mind of the members of this 
Committee  that this absolute increase in imports occurred . During the period of 
investigation 2013 –2017, the worldwide imports of the steel products from the 
countries  finally covered by the safeguard measure inc reased by 64% and over 19% during 
the three -year period 2015 –2017 prior to the imposition of the safeguard measure.  
• More specifically, the imports grew in every individual year in comparison to the 
preceding year , and this over the entirety of the five -year investigation period.  There is 
therefore no way whatsoever to deny the existence of an absolute increase. This picture by 
the way did not depend on the exclusion of certain countries from the safeguard measure 
and investigation.  
Import volume (after excl usion of certain countries and products) and market share  
 2013  2014  2015  2016  2017  MRP 
Imports (000 tonnes)  18 329  21 868  26 552  29 141  30 094  31 314  
Index 2013 = 100  100 119 145 159 164 171 
Market share  12,7%  14,4%  16,9%  17,9%  18,1%  18,8%  
• As to the conformity of the EU safeguard measure with the provisions of the WTO Agreement 
on Safeguards, the EU maintains that Turkey is not entitled to unilaterally decide that 
the EU safeguard measure is not in line with these provisions . Only the WTO by  
means of a binding dispute settlement report adopted by or notified to the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Body can make such findings, which Turkey could rely on only thereafter. Until 
then, and in line with the WTO 's paramount ban on unilateral determinations, T urkey has to 
wait until the dispute settlement procedure it has initiated recently is finalised.  
• To sum up, the EU safeguard measure was adopted as a result of an absolute increase in 
imports, and it must be regarded as conforming to the provisions of the Safeguards 
Agreement. Therefore, Turkey would be in clear breach of its WTO obligations under 
Article 8 paragraph of the Safeguards Agreement, if it were to impose the proposed 
rebalancing measures during the first three years that the safeguard measure is  in 
effect . 
• The EU has explained this to Turkey on several occasions within the framework of the 
numerous consultations held so far.  
• I take this opportunity to invite Turkey  once more to explain here on which legal grounds 
Turkey considers that its proposed suspension of concessions would at all be 
allowed . G/SG/W/248  
 
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  • In the EU 's view this question is pertinently raised in the present context of surveillance 
under Article 13.1(e) because the "substantial equivalence" of a proposed suspension can 
only be assesse d when also considering the extent to which a suspension is allowed 
immediately or only after three years.  
3  MAIN MESSAGES  
• After these preliminary remarks, let me now turn to the quantitative core of the present 
review by this Committee whether Turkey 's susp ension proposal is "substantially 
equivalent".  
• In this respect, the EU would like to note that, even if the Turkish proposed suspension were 
at all possible during the first three years, quod non  as just explained, this proposal is 
tainted by two serious d eficiencies: the first is of procedural nature, the second 
being substantive . 
Procedural deficiency: Lack of necessary information to assess the conformity of Turkey 's 
calculation with the legal requirements  
• The EU considers that in cases where a Member no tifies its intention to adopt rebalancing 
measures against another Member, it should also share the underlying calculations especially 
when the Member concerned requests them, as the EU has already done, in order to check 
whether the proposed suspension is  indeed substantially equivalent.  
• Turkey 's approach is particularly worrying, as it deprives not only the potentially affected 
Member (in this case the EU), but every other Member and the Safeguards Committee in its 
exercise of its review under Article 13. 1(e), of the ability to assess other Members ' actions.  
This clearly runs counter to the commitment towards transparency embedded in the 
WTO rules.  
• Therefore, in the absence of the submission by  Turkey of the details of its calculation 
of alleged adverse effects, the EU, as well as this Committee, will be  unable to properly 
assess whether Turkey 's proposed suspension is "substantially equivalent".  
• The EU has already requested from Turkey these det ails but has received no answer so far.  
• The EU therefore invites Turkey to submit this information for the EU and this Committee to 
then be able to take it into consideration in this review.  
Substantive deficiency: Absence of adverse effects  
• Apart from the  procedural deficiency just explained, which seriously undermines the EU right 
to defend itself in full knowledge of all the facts underlying an action against it, the proposal 
of Turkey also fails to prove a fundamental requirement for the suspension of c oncessions 
and other obligations, which is the existence of adverse effects on its trade with the EU.  
• Since the first consultations with Turkey after the adoption of the definitive 
safeguard  measure, the EU has explained to Turkey that the EU safeguard mea sure, because 
of the way it has been shaped, not only preserves traditional trade, but also allows trading 
partners to continue increasing their export flows to the EU in a manner equivalent to the 
years preceding the EU safeguard measure/investigation. in  which case there might exist no 
adverse effects.  
• Moreover, in the case of Turkey, the lack of adverse effects is clearly evidenced by the 
extraordinary progression of its exports to the EU in the products concerned:  
o Turkey 's level of exports in the year p rior to the imposition of the safeguard 
measure, that is 2017, was 4.7 million tonnes.  
o In 2018, the year in which the Commission adopted the provisional safeguard 
measure in July, Turkey 's level of exports increased to 7.4 million tonnes . G/SG/W/248  
 
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  o In 2019, the firs t year under the definitive safeguard measure Turkey 's level of 
exports was a bit lower, almost 7 million tonnes,  but the safeguard measure 
played no role in this slight reduction, since Turkey had ample room to 
increase its exports much further, duty -free, because of the large availability 
of unused quotas.  
• Given these figures, the EU considers that Turkish exports to the EU in the products 
concerned have not been negatively affected by the EU safeguard measure . Quite 
to the contrary, one could even say th at Turkey has benefited from the safeguard measure 
with a continuous improvement of its export position in the EU in terms of both volumes and 
market share.  
• Therefore, Turkey has no right to propose, in the absence of adverse effects, a 
suspension of substantially equivalent concessions or other obligations, as 
notified . 
Ancillary contention: Wrong basis for the calculation of alleged adverse effects  
• Finally, without prejudice to the additional claims the EU might make once Turkey disclos es 
its calculation of alleged adverse effects, the EU would like to contest today one element 
which is already known in this calculation.  
• Even if the EU steel safeguard measure were to have caused adverse effects on the relevant 
Turkish trade, quod non  as the previously mentioned statistics prove, the EU would like 
to contest already today the year that Turkey has used as basis for the alleged 
adverse effects calculation, which is apparently 2018 . 
• The EU considers that any potential calculation of equivalen t concessions to suspend, even 
if it were legal quod non , cannot be based on the level of exports from Turkey to the EU in 
the year 2018, because 2018 is precisely the year in which the provisional safeguard 
measure was already in place since July.  
• Precede nts show that, for the calculation of rebalancing, WTO Members have used the 
period immediately preceding the year in which the safeguard measure was 
imposed . 
• The EU would like to note that what Turkey is proposing is also against its own 
practice in sever al cases : 
o In the proposed suspension against the US concerning safeguard measures on steel 
and aluminium imposed on 23 March 20185, Turkey 's rebalancing was based on 
the 2017 export value;  
o In the proposed suspension against Thailand concerning a safeguard measure on 
non-alloy hot rolled steel extended on 7 June 20176, Turkey 's rebalancing was based 
on the 2013 export value; and  
o In the proposed suspension against Ukraine concerning a safeguard measure on 
motor cars imposed on 14 March 20137, Turk ey's rebalancing was based on the 2012 
export value.  
• Turkey itself had justified its position when discussing Thailand 's request for a Review before 
this Committee in 2018 that, in almost all the notifications submitted to the Committee, 
Members calculated  their level of suspension based on their exports in the year preceding 
the year in which the original measure was imposed8. It is worth pointing out that in the 
suspension against Thailand, Turkey 's rebalancing was based on the 2013 export value, 
 
5 G/L/1242 . 
6 G/L/1183 . 
7 G/L/1028 . 
8 G/L/1276 . G/SG/W/248  
 
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  which w as the year prior to the imposition of initial provisional measures, that is to say, four 
years prior to the rebalancing.  
4  CONCLUSIONS AND REQUESTS  
• To conclude, the EU requests that this Committee review  whether the suspension of 
concessions or other obliga tions proposed by Turkey is "substantially equivalent" as provided 
for in Article 8.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards.  
• In this assessment, the Commission considers that  it must be borne in mind that  Turkey 
would be in breach of its WTO obligations, if it we re to impose the proposed 
rebalancing measures during the first three years that the safeguard measure is in 
effect.  
• The EU maintains in any case that Turkish trade to the EU in the products concerned has not 
been negatively affected by the EU safeguard me asure  and requests that Turkey submits 
to this Committee the details of its calculation of alleged adverse effects, otherwise 
this Committee will be  unable to properly asses s whether Turkey 's proposed 
suspension is "substantially equivalent".  
• In this respe ct, the EU would like to reserve its right to discuss the details of the 
Tukey 's calculation of alleged adverse effects,  possibly in a subsequent meeting of this 
Committee, once Turkey discloses these details.  
•  The EU finally requests that the Committee on  Safeguards reports  its findings to the 
Council for Trade in Goods.  
*** 
• Thank you for your attention.  
 
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