RESTRICTED  
  
JOB/TN/CTD/2  
JOB/TNC/106  
 
28 February 2023  
(23-1360) Page: 1/12 
Committee on Trade and Development Special Session  
Trade Negotiations Committee  Original: English  
 
 
G-90 DOCUMENT FOR THE SPECIAL SESSION OF THE COMMITTEE ON TRADE  
AND DEVELOPMENT (CTD -SS) ON 10 AGREEMENT -SPECIFIC SPECIAL  
AND DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT PROPOSALS  
Submission by  South Africa  on behalf of the Organisation of African, Caribbean  
and Pacific States (OACPS), the African Group and the LDC Group  
The following communication, dated 27 February 2023, is being circulated at the request of the 
Delegation of South Africa on behalf of the  Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States 
(OACPS), the African Group and the LDC Group.  
 
_______________  
 
 
A Introduction  
1.  The Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO) recognized the 
"need for positive efforts designed to ensure that developing countries, and especially the least 
developed amongst them, secure a share of growth in international trade  commensurate with the 
needs of their economic development."  Special and differential treatment (SDT) was embedded in 
WTO agreements precisely as an acknowledgement of the different levels of economic development 
and capacities among its membership and the  role that trade should play in bridging the 
development divide which finds expression in a number of forms, including infrastructure, prosperity, 
technology, industrialisation, digital connectivity, etc .  
2. The constructive exchanges and interaction at t he Informal General Council Meeting on WTO 
Reform focused on Development on 2 -3 February 2023 revealed consensus among WTO Members 
on the centrality of development as a fundamental objective of the multilateral trading system. The 
G-90 is encouraged that a ll members reasserted their commitment to the founding principles and 
objectives of the WTO, in particular, that trade is not an end in itself, but a means towards "…raising 
the standards of living, ensuring full employment and to enhance the means of doin g so in a manner 
consistent with their respective needs and concerns at different levels of economic development." 
Consistent with the reaffirmation by the 12th Ministerial Conference (MC12) that SDT provisions of 
the WTO and its agreements are an integral  part of the WTO and its agreements, the unanimity 
among members that SDT remains a crucial pillar both in existing and future agreements as a means 
towards achieving these objectives was significant.  
3. Paragraph 2 of the MC12 Outcome Document (WT/MIN(22 )/24 – WT/L/1135) contains an 
unambiguous mandate and instruction for "…officials to continue to work on improving the 
application of special and differential treatment in the CTD SS and other relevant venues in the WTO, 
as agreed and report on progress to  the General Council before MC13."  The G -90 is confident that 
this political  commitment and guidance provides a clear pathway and necessary impetus towards 
the review of all special and differential treatment provisions with a view to strengthening them an d 
making them more precise, effective, and operational in line with paragraph 44 of the Doha 
Ministerial Declaration.  
4. The global economy faces more challenges today than it did since the last formal submission by 
the G -90 on agreement specific proposals  on special and differential treatment (JOB/DEV/65 – 
JOB/TNC/97). As developing countries, including LDCs are still grappling with the lingering 
devastating impact of the COVID -19 pandemic on their economies and remain constrained in JOB/TN/CTD/2 • JOB/TNC/106  
 
- 2 - 
 
  realising equitable an d meaningful integration into the global economy and reaping gains from the 
‘post-pandemic’ recovery, these countries are now contending with new sets of external shocks such 
as rocketing inflation, the food and energy crises, and balance of payment challe nges, among a host 
of threats. These shocks to the global economy and disruptions to global supply chains have also 
exposed the risk of overconcentration of production among a few economies, with those overly 
reliant on imports bearing the highest and disp roportionate impact. Of significance is the 
disproportionate impact of these global economic shocks for developing countries, including LDCs 
relative to more resilient developed economies with the resources and capacities to cushion and 
withstand negative economic shocks.   
5. The G -90 remains committed to the pursuit of meaningful mainstreaming of development in the 
WTO and its agreements. A significant part of this exercise and effort will be ensuring that the 
various vague SDT provisions in existing WTO agreements are rendered implementable and infusing 
more clarity on SDT provisions that have the potential to address the real and practical difficulties 
that developing countries, including least developed countries (LDCs) find themselves in and that 
continue to inhibit their access to and ability to deploy developmental policies to advance their 
economies. It is worth recalling that the 10 Agreement -Specific Proposals (ASPs) outlined herein for 
consideration by members have been a result of serious conside ration over several years and have 
undergone arduous rationalization from what were over 150 ASPs. These have been selected by the 
G-90 as signifying the most effective provisions, but by no means the only tools, that can propel 
their trade potential and m eaningful integration into global trade.  
6.  While some 75% of WTO Members are currently developing countries, the promises of welfare 
gains from trade liberalization have not materialized for a majority of them or at the least been much 
more modest than anticipated when the WTO was established. Just as recognised in paragraph 44 
of the Doha Ministerial mandate and reaffirmed by Ministers at MC12, t he G-90 believes that whilst 
the multilateral trading system ha s been equipped with SD T to level the playing field and to provide 
developing  countries, inc luding LDCs  with the necessary assistance to catch up with the ir developed 
countr y partners, these provisions  have in reality and practice not been effective in addressing 
development gaps among members at different levels of development nor  operational  largely owing 
to their opaqueness .  
7. The G -90 believes that providing the necessary clarity and certainty to the policy space and 
flexibilities accorded in theory in the 10 ASPs will positively contribute to the industrialization, 
economic diversification and structural transformation of i ts members and ensure their integration 
into the multilateral trading system. These flexibilities are after all not foreign concepts nor 
inventions, including to developed economies whose advances were on the back of similar policies 
geared towards buildin g resilient value chains and in support of their own industrialization objectives.  
8. As was numerously pointed out at the Informal General Council Meeting on WTO Reform Focused 
on Development, improving the development prospects of developing countries, including LDCs and 
narrowing the development divide is in the interests of all members, including developed countries.  
Indeed, evidence also points today to a growing use of policy tools that are deployed especially by 
developed countries, including the ad option of measures to promote industrial development, build 
supply -chain resilience, among other objectives, and to address specific vulnerabilities.  
9. In the context of the current global economic climate characterised by multiple crises and new 
emergin g challenges such as climate -related disasters that threaten to reverse even the meagre 
gains that some developing economies had started to register pre Covid -19, ensuring that SDT 
provisions are reviewed with a view to strengthening them and making them m ore precise, effective, 
and operational remains not only relevant, but all the more urgent. Therefore, strengthening the ten 
carefully picked S&D provisions and their effective operationalisation should be at the heart of the 
response of the multilateral t rading system to achieve the developmental aspirations of developing 
and least developed countries. Delivering on the G -90 proposals will ensure a meaningful and 
structured response by the WTO to operationalise existing policy space developing countries, 
including LDCs need to respond to the multiple global economic crises and promote their economic 
resilience.  
10. Delivering on the mandate  of the CTD -SS, in particular  issues that are central  to development 
is critical to  the restor ation of  confidence and trust in the MTS , especially among the majority of 
developing countries, including LDCs.  Not doing so would be denying developing countries, including 
LDCs the tools through which they can arrest a reversal of gains towards achieving the United JOB/TN/CTD/2 • JOB/TNC/106  
 
- 3 - 
 
  Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and ensuring that no one is left behind. These 
include the Goals and Targets directly falling within the ambit of the WTO aimed at addressing the 
challenges faced by developing countries, including LDCs on matte rs of international trade1. 
11. The G-90 has sought to elaborate and provide clarity on numerous occasions and in different 
formats where the 10 ASPs have not been appreciated by some members, and avails itself to 
constructively engage with a view to reac hing mutually agreeable outcomes that meet the standards 
of effectiveness, precision, and operability of existing SDT provisions as contained in the 10 ASPs 
and mandated by Ministers in paragraph 44 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration and at MC122. This 
submission aims to contribute towards that effort.  
B CTD-SS Process & Roadmap Pre -MC13  
12. In September 2022, the G -90 and Sri Lanka circulated an Unofficial Room Document 
RD/TN/CTD/1  and RD/TN/CTD /1/Add.1 as an input towards discussions at the first CTD -SS meeting 
following MC12. Therein we reaffirmed our commitment to having structured engagements within 
the CTD -SS in pursuance of the mandate and ‘instruction’ from Ministers to ensure we have concre te 
outcomes on SDT prior MC13.  
13. To this end, the G -90 proposes a series of CTD -SS formal meetings dedicated to focussed, 
technical discussions all the 10 ASPs over 4 -5 meetings. These could be complimented by informal 
open-ended meetings, as necessary to facilitate substantive negotiations based on proposals by 
members on the ASPs within each of the 10 ASPs.  
14. The Chair may, where it is deemed requisite and feasible, organise a workshop and invite 
relevant experts, including from institutions such as UNCTAD and members of the WTO Secretariat 
responsible for the agreements under which the ASPs fall to apprise the Committee on the 
implementation of relevant SDT provisions in those agreements, including factual data and 
information that could assist the C TD-SS to appreciate the technical matters at hand.  
15. Without inferring any hierarchy of importance or priority, the G -90 proposes the next CTD -SS 
meeting should be dedicated to substantive discussions on ASP 4 on the Agreement on the 
Application of Sanit ary and Phytosanitary Measures and ASP 5 on the Agreement on Technical 
Barriers to Trade.  
16. All members are encouraged to provide substantive proposals that will facilitate technical 
engagements in solutions -based mode.  
C The rationale behind the G -90 Agreement Specific Proposals (ASPs)  
17. The 10 ASPs identified and presented herein by the  G-90 focus on  key policy tools that can 
advance the development aspirations of developing countries as well as enhance their participation 
in global trade. Whilst the core elements and motivations are enunciated in earlier submissions by 
the G -90 as referenced above (s ee footnote 2) and which remain the core bases of the G -90 ASPs, 
it is instructive to highlight that at the heart of the ASPs are time -bound or time -based elements of 
SDT and proposals that primarily seek to provide  clarification and precision to existing SDT provisions 
in order to make them more accessible, effective and operational.  
18. The G -90 reiterates the following key points and principles that inform its approach to fulfilling 
the mandate to make SDT provisions more precise, effective and operatio nal:  
• SDT for developing and least developed countries is an integral part of the multilateral 
trading system architecture and a treaty embedded right.  
 
1 For instance SDG Target 10.a "Implement the principle of special and differential treatment for 
developing countries, in particular least developed countries, in accordance with World Trade Organization 
agreements " 
2 In documents JOB/DEV/60 – JOB/TNC/79 , JOB/DEV/61, and in JOB/DEV/65 – JOB/TNC/97   JOB/TN/CTD/2 • JOB/TNC/106  
 
- 4 - 
 
  • The mandate under paragraph 44 of the Doha Declaration  and reaffirmed at MC12  is to 
review SD T provision s under the covered Agreements with a view to strengthening them 
and making them more precise, effective and operational.  
• The G -90 is not seeking blanket exemptions from commitments, but rather, to 
operationalize the collective commitments of the WTO Memb ership in several WTO 
agreements to facilitate the effective integration of developing  countries  and LDCs into 
the multilateral trading system.  
• SDT is not confined to transitional periods and capacity building and technical assistance, 
but should be intrinsically embedded in the trade rules to allow policy flexibility to 
developing countries and LDCs to achieve their development objectives , and under 
conditions of certainty . 
19. G-90 proposals do not aim to seek blanket, permanent, unconditional carve outs. On the 
contrary, they aim to seek the effective implementation of existing S&D provisions, including through 
the provision of assured technical assistance and capacity building , policy space, commercially 
meaningful export opportunities, and implementation timelines. They seek to provide stability, 
predictability and transparency in the implementation of existing S&D provisions, and thus 
strengthen the key hallmarks of the multi lateral trading system. These proposals are the result of 
careful and detailed deliberations among G -90 members, taking into account the needs of members 
at different levels of development.  
20. In relation to the SPS and TBT, of all the NTMs that are noti fied to the WTO, Technical barriers 
to trade account for 57.6% and SPS account for 37.6%. The G -90 is not putting into question the 
right of Members to implement legitimate measures but is calling for an opportunity to be provided 
where possible and where the regulations of the Member implementing the measures allow to make 
provision for phased implementation, longer timeframes and capacity building for developing 
countries that are facing capacity constraints.  
21. The G -90 reiterates its commitment to eng age in good faith in the negotiations and is open  and 
willing to benefit from the insights and reasoned inputs from other members, as we move towards 
a results -oriented and solutions -based discussion.  
22. The polycrisis is revelationary in highlighting th e structural weaknesses of developing countries 
and underscores the need to move with speed to strengthen SDT provisions in the WTO covered 
agreements. The discussions on the 10 ASPs should be framed on the basis of strengthening SDT 
provisions with a view  to address these structural weaknesses and to ensure effective and 
meaningful integration of developing countries in global trade.  
1  AGREEMENT ON TRADE -RELATED INVESTMENT MEASURES  
1.1.  The G-90 proposes a temporar y, time-bound deviation from the provisions of Article  2 of the 
TRIMs Agreement for developing countries, to enable the introduction of new investment measures 
related to trade in goods, to achieve structural and socio -economic transformation , as well as 
accelerate industrialization, move up the value chain; stimulate development and transfer of 
technology; address the digital divide;  and modernize the domestic manufacturing capabilities of 
small and medium enterprises and their contribution to employment gen eration.  
1.2.  A special provision for LDCs in this regard  would exempt them from  neither  implement ing, 
apply ing, nor enforc ing the provisions of the TRIMS Agreement as long as they remain LDCs . The 
flexibility is targeted to only those measures needed for a clearly specified set of objectives, e.g. 
those related to environmental -friendly methods or products, developing industries in green 
technologies, bridging the digital divide, fostering com petition, development of geographically 
disadvantaged regions, high value -added/technology -intensive sectors, etc. Importantly, the 
measures will be temporary, with transparency provisions through notifications to the Council for 
Trade in Goods.  
1.3.  The aim o f this proposal is to:  
i. Accelerate industrialization and achieve socio -economic transformation;   JOB/TN/CTD/2 • JOB/TNC/106  
 
- 5 - 
 
  ii. Upgrade and modernize the domestic manufacturing capabilities of small and medium 
enterprises and their contribution to employment generation;  
iii. Promote domesti c manufacturing capabilities in high value -added sectors or technology 
intensive sectors;  
iv. Stimulate and facilitate the transfer or indigenous development of technology;  
v. Promote domestic competition and/or correct restrictive business practices;  
vi. Promote purchases from disadvantaged regions in order to reduce regional disparities 
within their territories and support the development of geographically disadvantaged 
regions;  
vii. Stimulate environment -friendly methods or products and contribute to sustainable 
development;  
viii. Increase export capacity in cases where structural current account deficits would cause or 
threaten to cause a major reduction in imports;  
ix. Close the digital divide in industrial production.   
2  GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE 1994 (GATT 19 94) ARTICLE XVIII: 
SECTION A AND C  
2.1.  Implementation challenges related to Article  XVIII Sections  A and C are particularly related to 
burdensome consultation procedures. The existing provisions make it almost impossible to avoid 
retaliation by other Members, and also broaden the scope of such retaliation.  
2.2.  The G -90 proposes a more concise, simplified and accessible procedure that recognizes the 
human and financial resource constraints of Members that seek to invoke Article XVIII:  A or C.  
2.3.  For purposes of clari ty, the G-90 further proposes an addition of the phrase "developing country 
member facing constraints" to  provide certainty  that th is proposal is targeted at developing 
countries, who are in actual need. This is borne out of our understanding that such fle xibilities are 
for Members designated by paragraph (4) of Article XVIII. Thus, it enables an LDC or a developing 
country facing constraints to deviate from the provisions of Section A and paragraphs 14, 15, 17 
and 18 of Section C, to achieve its developmen t objectives.  
2.4.  Accordingly, these countries may temporarily modify or withdraw concessions included in the 
appropriate schedules annexed to the GATT, or where the Member concerned finds that no measure 
consistent with the other provisions of the GATT is pr acticable to achieve these development 
objectives, they may have recourse to Section C of Article XVIII and deviate from other provisions 
of the GATT/WTO to the extent deemed necessary by the concerned Member.  
2.5.  The second  challenge that the G -90 proposal se eks to remedy is the uncertainty regarding  
where a Member seeking to invoke these sections would need to notify. Accordingly, the G -90 
proposes that such notifications be submitted to the Committee on Trade and Development. It also 
seeks to bring clarity i n the consultations process and implementation of the outcome through 
consultations which are in line with the Agreement on Safeguards.  
3  GATT: ARTICLE XVIII – SECTION B  
3.1.  Article  XVIII-B deals with Balance of Payments (BoP) difficulties faced by developing c ountries. 
BoP illustrates the intersection of trade and finance and reveals the relationship of a given economy 
to the international marketplace. Balance -of-payments crises among developing countries stem from 
the basic obstacles that they face in trying t o diversify their economies and industrialise towards 
higher value manufacturing or services activities. Addressing BoP challenges is critical for the 
implementation of development strategies  and even more so for economies in distress that more 
often than not requires urgent interventions . JOB/TN/CTD/2 • JOB/TNC/106  
 
- 6 - 
 
  3.2.  Owing to the difficulties in timeously processing and reaching consensus on requests made 
under the BoP  provisions of Article XVII due to overly stringent and overelaborate procedures, the  
G-90 proposal is, therefore designed to ensure that the unique challenges facing developing 
countries, including commodity price volatility and volatile financial capita l flows are taken into 
account. In particular, it seeks to clarify that short -term financial flows should not be included in 
determining the adequacy of a developing country’s external financial position and proposes better 
guidelines for determining the a dequacy of Member’s reserves within the context of their economic 
development progress and programmes. The proposal also calls for the suspension of the right to 
retaliate against countries who use this provision.  
3.3.  The WTO must serve its meaningful purpose  and provide developing countries and LDCs with 
better tools to overcome their trade and economic difficulties. SD T should not be regarded as a 
compromise but as a necessity to help address the challenges posed by global crises, such as the 
COVID -19 pandem ic and current multi -crises afflicting the global economy such as spiraling inflation, 
high food price bills, interest rate hikes that trigger unpredictable short -term financial flows with 
developing countries, including LDCs who generally rely on narrow b asket of goods for foreign 
earnings disproportionately affected . The proposal respects WTO provisions and does not aim to 
change them. It does not change the fundamentals of Article  XVIII B or the bi -annual review and 
consultations by the Committee on BoP Restrictions. The proposal simply seeks to facilitate that 
vulnerable developing and least developing members utilise the right that all members have agreed 
upon without fear of undue retaliation.  
4  AGREEMENT ON THE APPLICATION OF SANITARY AND PHYTOSANITARY  MEASURES  
4.1.  The G -90 proposal on the application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) measures, recognises 
the legitimate goal of safeguarding populations' health and well -being. The G -90 acknowledges 
measures prohibiting imports for SPS reasons or imposing c ertification requirements can contribute 
directly and positively to public health and well -being.  
4.2.  The G -90, nevertheless reiterates that without the necessary support, SPS measures can 
become significant barriers to developing countries and LDCs' access to key international markets.  
The increasing use of SPS measures on environmental grounds of late threatens the majority of 
exports from developing countries, including LDCs. Such environmental and related health 
requirements are becoming increasing ly numerous, complex and wide -ranging  with the standards 
becoming so  stringent or technically advanced that developing countries may not have access to the 
equipment  nor technologies  and expertise needed to implement them and demonstrate compliance.  
4.3.  The G-90 proposal aims to equip capacity -constrained developing countries and LDCs to 
participate effectively and provide meaningful comments in the development stages of measures or 
standards that would enable them to meet such standards and safeguard their ma rket access. It 
consists of three key elements to realise this objective:  
a. Longer time periods for developing countries and LDCs facing capacity constraints to 
provide comments on proposed SPS measures or standards by a developed country;  
b. Longer time frame s for compliance, accompanied by capacity building and technical 
assistance by developed country to developing countries and LDCs  to ensure no or minimal 
disruptions to their exports ; 
c. Compensatory adjustment support by developed countries to adversely affe cted 
developing and least -developed countries in case of urgent implementation of SPS 
measures to maintain their market share in developed countries export markets and 
support of their quality infrastructural capabilities to meet such measures.  
4.4.  The G -90, t herefore proposes mandatory provisions for the above elements to avoid 
uncertainty and ensure transparency and stability - key objectives of the multilateral trading system. 
Mandatory provisions will also ensure that all Members are aware of their respecti ve rights and 
obligations without any doubt. These will not confer either blanket exemptions or universal rights 
for all, but will be applicable to only those developing countries and LDCs that face capacity 
constraints and/or are to be adversely affected by the technical regulation or standard at hand.  JOB/TN/CTD/2 • JOB/TNC/106  
 
- 7 - 
 
  4.5.  The proposal therefore aims to operationalise and make effective existing S&D provisions in 
the Agreement. The proposal is not intended to limit the ability of Members to implement legitimate 
SPS measures f or health and safety, but aims to ensure that their implementation will not further 
marginalise developing countries and LDCs in international trade owing to their very limited 
capacities. The objective is to embed the necessary flexibility (e.g. timelines ) and assured capacity -
building and technical support to enable them to meet such standards developed in accordance with 
the SPS Agreement.  
5  AGREEMENT ON THE TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO TRADE  
5.1.  The G -90 fully appreciates the right of Members to regulate their mark ets in accordance with 
the WTO TBT Agreement in pursuance of the legitimate objectives enshrined therein. It is however 
important to also recognize that many developing countries face capacity and supply -side 
constraints. The inadequate availability of (cr edible) conformity assessment infrastructure, such as 
testing and certification services, poses significant challenges for many developing country traders, 
including their ability to comply. Access to technical assistance, skills, equipment, credit and oth er 
supply -side inputs are critical in ensuring that countries/ firms benefit from standards.  
5.2.  Without the necessary support, standards and technical regulation can act as significant 
barriers to the ability of developing countries , including LDCs  to access  key international markets. 
On the supply -side, standards may affect foreign producers fixed and variable costs through a myriad 
of channels, e.g. by necessitating investment in new technologies or inputs or generating economies 
of scale.  
5.3.  According to UNC TAD, environmental and related health requirements are becoming 
increasingly numerous, complex and wide -ranging. They include energy efficiency standards and 
restrictions on the use of hazardous substances in electrical products, low residue levels for 
pesticides and other chemicals in food imports, animal welfare concerns and occupational safety 
issues. Some standards are so stringent or technically advanced that developing countries may not 
have access to the equipment , technology  and expertise required  to implement them and 
demonstrate compliance. For example, the removal of heavy metals such as lead, from electronic 
equipment requires costly research and development work to create substitute materials and new 
product designs. Meeting such standards is of ten made more difficult by the lack of internationally 
recognised testing procedures.  
5.4.  Developing countries are constrained to defend their interests by influencing environmental 
requirements at the design stage both at national level and in international f ora. There is a need for 
consultation processes to be transparent and inclusive, and those creating new requirements should 
facilitate the participation of developing country producers. We need to acknowledge the shared 
responsibility of both developed and  developing countries to ensure that environmental 
considerations are not overshadowed by trade protectionist impulses when technical requirements 
are developed or implemented.  
5.5.  The G -90 proposal in this regard contains three key elements:  
a. Longer time periods for developing countries and LDCs facing capacity constraints to 
provide comments on proposed technical regulations or standards by a developed country;  
b. Longer time frames for compliance and support by developed countries to developing 
countries , including LDCs to be adversely affected by the technical regulation or standard 
and facing capacity constraints  to ensure no or minimal disruptions to their exports ; 
c. Compensatory adj ustment support by developed country to adversely affected developing 
and least -developed countries in case of urgent implementation of technical regulation or 
standard to maintain their market share in their export markets and support for their 
technologi cal and infrastructural capabilities.  
5.6.  The G -90, therefore proposes mandatory provisions for the above to avoid uncertainty and 
ensure transparency and stability. Mandatory provisions will also ensure that all Members are aware 
of their respective rights an d obligations without any doubt. The mandatory provisions will not confer 
either blanket exemptions or universal rights for all. These will be applicable to only those developing JOB/TN/CTD/2 • JOB/TNC/106  
 
- 8 - 
 
  countries and LDCs that face capacity constraints and / or are to be adversel y affected by a particular 
technical regulation or standard.  
5.7.  The G -90 proposal does not question the need for such technical regulations or standards. In 
fact, it also recognizes that at times the technical regulation or standard might need to be 
implemen ted on an urgent basis. Its aim is rather to equip capacity -constrained developing countries 
and LDCs to provide useful comments on the technical regulation or standard in order to meet its 
requirements. It also aims to safeguard adversely affected develop ing countries and LDCs against 
losing their hard -earned share in export markets.  
5.8.  The G -90 proposal aims to strike the right balance between the pursuit of public policy 
objectives and the pursuit of gains from trade  and to ensure that measures implemented do not 
further marginalize developing countries in international trade. However, it emphasizes the need for 
flexibility (e.g. timelines) and assured capacity building and technical support to enable its Members 
to meet such standards in view of their "spec ial circumstances", i.e. very limited capacities.  
6  AGREEMENT ON SUBSIDIES AND COUNTERVAILING MEASURES  
6.1.  The essence of the G -90 proposal on the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
is an attempt to seek the necessary, well -defined and time-bound flexibilities for qualifying 
developing countries, and LDCs to provide targeted subsidies. This flexibility will be premised on the 
following:  
a. The support to be provided will be for achieving development goals, including regional 
growth, technol ogy research and development funding, production diversification and 
development, and implementation of environmentally sound methods of production , and 
development of green technology industries ; 
b. A developing country will have to demonstrate that it meets  the criteria mentioned in the 
proposal to benefit from the provision; and  
c. The flexibility is being sought for a certain and defined period, i.e. 10 years for LDCs 
and 8 years for qualifying developing countries.  
6.2.  The proposal  seeks to develop  a well -design ed tool to assist developing and least -developed 
countries achieve their development aspirations in line with the Doha mandate.  
6.3.  Subsidisation has been a part of the industrialisation strategies of developed countries. 
Developed economies continue to provid e substantial amounts of subsidies for their selected sectors 
to this day. Developing and least -developed countries should have access to similar instruments that 
developed economies utilised for their development. Improving production and productivity for  fast-
growing populations, creating decent jobs for bulging youth populations, technological development 
and industrial transformation including to bridge the digital divide, and promoting environmentally 
sustainable pathways to economic growth are the obj ectives that the G -90 seeks to promote .  
6.4.  The proposal on ASCM  aims to operationalize the S&D provision under covered Agreements 
taking into account that enterprises in developing countries and LDCs are mostly micro, small and 
medium enterprises (MSMEs)  which generally face the problems of limited liquidity, limited access 
to credit/finance, uncertain market conditions (the same problems that COVID -19 has created for 
the enterprises in the developed countries); and provide jobs to large and growing populations.  
7  AGREEMENT ON CUSTOMS VALUATION AND DECISION ON MINIMUM V ALUES  
7.1.  This LDC -specific proposal aims to redress significant problems being faced by LDCs while 
implementing the Agreement on Customs Valuation. The WTO Customs Valuation Agreement (CVA) 
stipulates the rules for valuations of goods for customs purposes. Wh ile there are a number of 
methods to determine the customs value of imported goods, the Agreement largely suggests that 
such valuation should mainly be based on the transaction value of the goods.  JOB/TN/CTD/2 • JOB/TNC/106  
 
- 9 - 
 
  7.2.  There are currently no LDC -specific provisions in the CVA.  A G-90 proposal would establish, for 
LDCs, that minimum values for customs valuation purposes be used for 10% of tariff lines in cases 
where the accuracy of declared values cannot be established (WTO/EIF, 2020) .  
7.3.  This proposal takes into account that many  customs administrations in LDCs are small and 
suffer from a lack of resources, which means that no part of their organization is specifically set up 
to deal with valuation issues. There is often a lack of knowledge within customs administrations of 
the co ntents of the CVA, as well as difficulties to fully implement it. The result is a disparity in the 
levels of knowledge and technical capacities among and between customs authorities.  
7.4.  Also important are the challenges particularly related to the scourge of under -invoicing, the 
need for easier access to international pricing data to identify and effectively correct improperly 
billed transactions, and the need of customs cooperation. Due to these problems, LDCs are losing 
substantial amounts of revenues each y ear. A study conducted in January  2019 by Global Financial 
Integrity and titled "Illicit Financial Flows to and from Developing Countries: 2006 -2015" noted that 
"between 2006 and 2015, the countries of sub -Saharan Africa lost each day, the equivalent of 
USD 23 million in tax revenue, due to false invoices made by economic actors in international trade 
transactions."  
7.5.  The G -90 proposal seeks to address this problem and will contribute to the curbing of illegal 
practices, increasing the revenues of LDCs, and p romote cooperation among customs authorities 
with those of LDCs. By granting flexibility to LDCs in the implementation of the Customs Valuation 
Agreement, this G90 proposal will also contribute to better application of the Trade Facilitation 
Agreement.  
8  1979 DECISION ON DIFFERENTIAL AND MORE FAVOURABLE TREATMENT, 
RECIPROCITY AND FULLER PARTICIPATION OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES ("ENABLING 
CLAUSE")  
8.1.  The original GATT 1947 already contained some exceptions to the MFN clause to allow trade 
preferences between certain  countries (GATT Art I:2 –4).  
8.2.  In 1969 the second UNCTAD Conference formulated the concept of GSP which allowed 
developed countries to grant non -reciprocal market access (low tariff or duty -free) to products from 
developing countries, whilst developing coun tries could grant each other more preferential tariffs. 
Non-discrimination between developing countries was at the core of the scheme, so that preferences 
had to be offered on an equal basis to all developing countries. The objectives of the generalized, 
non-reciprocal, non -discriminatory system of preferences in favour of the developing countries, 
including special measures in favour of the least advanced among the developing countries, were 
meant to: (a) increase their export earnings; (b) promote their i ndustrialization; and (c) to 
accelerate their rates of economic growth.  
8.3.  The Tokyo Round and later embodied in the Enabling Clause of 1979 sought to address 
capability differentials between developed and developing states through a general undertaking of 
trade liberalization obligations. In many respects the Enabling Clause consolidated the concept of 
"differential and more favourable treatment" for developing countries, the principle of non -
reciprocity in trade negotiations in derogation to the MFN clause, and trade preferences. The Enabling 
Clause also supported South –South preferential trading schemes. Fundamentally too, it specifically 
recognized the status of LDCs and their special needs.  
8.4.  The 1979 Decision on Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller 
Participation of Developing Countries (known as the  “Enabling Clause ”) that was part of the Tokyo 
Round Agreements  established a permanent legal framework for special and more favourable 
treatment for developing countrie s and territo ries. The Enabling Clause paragraph 2(a) (developed 
country preferential agreements) pertains to the promotion of North –South trade and the Enabling 
Clause paragraph 2(c) (developing country preferences) can be used in support of South –South 
trade.  
8.5.  The G-90 proposal, rather creating  an obligation of result , instead merely intends  that 
developed countries give due consideration to meaningful  market access. We refer, as further 
articulation of paragraph  2a in the Enabling Clause, to the Decision of the CONTR ACTING PARTIES JOB/TN/CTD/2 • JOB/TNC/106  
 
- 10 - 
 
  of 25  June 1971, which envisages the establishment of "generalized, non -reciprocal and non -
discriminatory preferences beneficial to the developing countries" (BISD 18S/24) .  
8.6.  It is not impractical for developed members in designing their GSP  schemes to proactively 
consider how meaningful market access can be best secured for developing and least developed 
country members. We seek that developed countries, in formulating their GSP schemes, should 
consider how the export interests of relevant d eveloping and least developed country members can 
be ensured  or enhanced , and make the market access accorded to them under the various GSP 
schemes meaningful.  
8.7.  This means ensuring that such market access is not undermined by non -tariff barriers or 
onerous  market entry requirements. Such considerations would extend to the product coverage of 
such schemes to ensure they include products that developing countries, including LDCs actually 
trade in, the qualification criteria that render market access under the se schemes inaccessible or 
uncertain, support of supply side capacity constraints of beneficiary countries, policy design that 
promotes diversification of exports, and preference margins sufficient enough to grant real 
competitive advantage to their export s.  
9  ARTICLE 66.2 OF TRIPS AGREEMENT (TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY)  
9.1.  Technology and innovation play an increasingly important role in the global economy, and can 
potentially contribute to meeting urgent human needs for improved health, food security, water and 
energy, climate change sustainability, among others. The role of technology in development has 
attracted increased attention, particularly with regards its role in  bridging the technological gap 
between countries with different levels of industrial capacity.  
9.2.  Article  7 on the Objectives of the TRIPS Agreement states that the protection and enforcement 
of intellectual property rights should contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to 
the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual  advantage of producers and users of 
technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance 
of rights and obligations. Therefore, technology transfer is an integral part of the TRIPS Agreement.  
9.3.  The question of how the TRIPS provisions can be implemented in a manner conducive to 
technology transfer is quite evident  and came sharply to the fore most recently  in the context of 
COVID -19 with regards access to  digital health technology solutions . This  matter is also quite 
relevant in the context of ensuring an inclusive digital economy , and the role that green technologies 
should play in supporting global and individual countries’ climate change mitigation and adaptation 
goals.  
9.4.  In the spirit of ensuri ng that no one is left behind, technology transfer is fundamental to an 
inclusive MTS. LDCs have attracted special consideration in the debates on technology transfer, in 
recognition that TRIPS implementation would put an additional burden on them. Special  
consideration was given to LDCs in the TRIPS Preamble and Article  66.2. The obligation under 
Article  66.2 is for developed countries to provide incentives to induce technology transfer to LDC 
Members, in order to enable them "to create a sound and viable technological base".  
9.5.  The core concern of LDCs has been that some of the policies and programmes reported by 
developed countries either barely target or do not at all target LDCs. LDCs request that these 
programmes be made more effective in meeting their intended purpose. Even where  there is regular 
reporting by developed country Members on their contributions under Article  66.2 of the TRIPS 
Agreement,  there remains  a lack of clarity in notifications on the nature of incentives and whether 
such incentives sufficiently result in  technology transfer to LDCs, including whether such incentives 
truly contribute to the creation of a sound and viable technological base in LDCs. Many notifications 
continue to show that recipients of incentives are not LDCs, and where LDCs are identified  in the 
notifications as recipients, the incentives do not result in any transfer of technology. Thus, 
notwithstanding the decisions taken in 2001 and 2003, and the subsequent mechanisms and 
processes introduced in the TRIPS Council, the implementation of Article  66.2 of the 
TRIPS  Agreement continues to fall short of the  letter and spirit of TRIPS Agreement mandate.  
9.6.  The LDC group previously tabled three specific submissions to the Council for TRIPS (through 
document IP/C/W/561 dated 6  October  2011, document IP/C/W/640 dated 16  February  2018, and JOB/TN/CTD/2 • JOB/TNC/106  
 
- 11 - 
 
  document RD/IP/24 dated 14  June 2018) to further assist Members provide clarity in reporting under 
this Article and to acknowledge the expected contributions by developed country Members to 
promote and encourage transfer of technology to the least -developed country Members. The LDC 
Group have developed an illustrative list containing the types of programmes, that in their view, 
could qualify as incentives or actual transfer of technology. They have encouraged Members to use 
this guide as a basis.  
9.7.  A further challenge is the lack of a  standard definition of what comprises technology transfer, 
nor does the TRIPS Agreement prov ide one. This lack of common understanding and definition 
implies that technical capacity programmes are at times included as part of technology transfer. 
While the G -90 appreciates the dialogue taking place through various platforms between developed 
countries and LDCs, it is important to ensure an effective mechanism for real and meaningful 
technology transfer in the WTO.  
9.8.  The proposal by G -90 affords a real opportunity to developed countries to discharge their 
commitment under Article  66.2; to meaningful ly contribute to the achievement of SDGs and bridging 
the digital divide; and to send a positive signal about the role of the multilateral trading system for 
the growth and development of developing  countries  and least -developed countries.  
9.9.  Sustainable Deve lopment Goal 17.6 -8 encourages international cooperation on and access to 
technology and innovation, including the promotion, development, transfer, dissemination and 
diffusion of technologies to developing and least -developed countries. A key element of t he WTO 
role in this respect is full and effective operationalisation of Article 66.2 of the TRIPS Agreement. It 
is worth emphasising that Article 66.2 is a firm commitment made a quarter of a century ago by 
developed countries and not a promise of best -endeavour efforts. Technology is at the heart of 
structural transformation for sustainable development. It is the backbone of the knowledge and 
digital economy of the 21st century.  
10  ACCESSION  
10.1.  The accession process, including the availability of S&D, other ben efits and the level of 
concessions extracted from acceding members, has increasingly  become a critical issue  of concern . 
The demands made to LDCs for specific commitments during accession negotiations with 
far-reaching implications for such Members  erode t he necessary policy space required for countries 
at their level of development and prejudice their ability once acceded to meaningfully gain and 
integrate into the multilateral trading system in line with their development objectives . Typical 
commitments i nclude binding tariffs at significantly lower levels than the overall WTO membership 
or even comparable economies, and often times at applied tariff levels, removing agricultural 
subsidies  or entitlements , making significant services commitments, joining p lurilateral agreements, 
and complying with most or all WTO agreements upon entry without recourse to transitional periods.  
10.2.  In the services area, acceding developing countries are often asked to make commitments 
that are more generous than even the most developed WTO members. Demands in the area of 
agriculture are particularly stringent and, with some standard S&D provisions ne gotiated away 
during accession. Acceding LDCs are generally not afforded transitional periods to implement WTO 
commitments even in areas where such periods were provided to existing members. Implementation 
periods included in the WTO agreements are calcula ted from the entry into force of the 
WTO Agreement, not from the date of accession of a particular country.  
10.3.  Despite the specific flexibilities in the WTO texts vis -à-vis the LDCs accession process, the 
reality is that LDCs still face significant challenge s, as the requirements are not always in line with 
the level of development and regulatory capacity of LDCs. This also contributes to protracted WTO 
accession timeframes, which averages more than 12 years for LDCs.  
10.4.  The G -90 has pointed out that even in li ght of the 2002 LDCs Accession Guideline and 
the 2012 General Council Decision that call for Members to offer reasonable concessions that are 
commensurate with their level of development, on the contrary, undue concessions are extracted 
during the accessio n process. The G90 proposal seeks to ensure that Members restrain from seeking 
concessions and commitments beyond the individual level of development and regulatory capacity 
of acceding LDCs.  JOB/TN/CTD/2 • JOB/TNC/106  
 
- 12 - 
 
  10.5.  Since the average period for completion of accessions exceed 12  years, we call for the 
Guideline to be 'instrumentalized' as a minimum requirement to "fast -track" the accession procedure 
of LDCs. This proposal will specifically contribute towards achieving SDG 17.10 and 17.11 which 
envisages an open, non -discriminator y and equitable rules -based trading system as well as doubling 
LDCs share of global exports by 2020 – an objective that is yet to be achieved.  
__________